NUREG/CR-6886, Rev. 2 

PNNL-15313 

Spent Fuel Transportation 

Package Response to the 

Baltimore Tunnel Fire 

Scenario 

Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards 
 
NUREG/CR-6886, Rev. 2 

PNNL-15313 

Spent Fuel Transportation Package 

Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire 

Scenario 

Prepared by 

H. E. Adkins, Jr. (PNNL) 

J. M. Cuta (PNNL) 

B. J. Koeppel (PNNL) 

A. D. Guzman (PNNL) 

C. S. Bajwa (USNRC) 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

Operated by 

Battelle Memorial Institute 

Prepared for 

Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation 

Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards 

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

NRC Job Code J5167 

iii 

ABSTRACT 

On July 18, 2001, a freight train carrying hazardous (non-nuclear) materials derailed and caught fire while 

passing through the Howard Street railroad tunnel in downtown Baltimore, Maryland. The United States 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), one of the agencies responsible for ensuring the safe 

transportation of radioactive materials in the United States, undertook an investigation of the train 

derailment and fire to determine the possible regulatory implications of this particular event for the 

transportation of spent nuclear fuel by railroad. 

The USNRC met with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to discuss the details of the 

accident and the ensuing fire. Following these discussions, the USNRC assembled a team of experts from 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory 

Analyses (CNWRA), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to determine the thermal 

conditions that existed in the Howard Street tunnel fire and analyze the potential effects of those 

conditions on various spent nuclear fuel transportation package designs. 

The Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) code developed by NIST was used to determine the thermal 

environment in the Howard Street tunnel during the fire. The FDS results were used as boundary 

conditions for the COBRA-SFS and ANSYS® computer models developed to evaluate the thermal 

performance of different package designs. The staff concluded that larger transportation packages 

resembling the TransNuclear Model No. TN-68 and HOLTEC Model No. HI-STAR 100 would withstand 

a fire with thermal conditions similar to those that existed in the Baltimore tunnel fire event with only 

minor damage to peripheral components. This is due to their sizable thermal inertia and design 

specifications in compliance with currently imposed regulatory requirements. 

For the TN-68 and the NAC International Model No. LWT (legal weight truck) transportation package, 

the maximum temperatures predicted in the regions of the lid and the vent and drain ports exceed the 

seals’ rated service temperatures, making it possible for a small release to occur, due to CRUD that might 

spall off the surfaces of the fuel rods. While a release is not expected to occur for these conditions, any 

release that could occur would be very small due to a number of factors. These include (1) the tight 

clearances maintained between the lid and cask body by the closure bolts, (2) the low pressure differential 

between the package interior and exterior, (3) the tendency of such small clearances to plug, and (4) the 

tendency of CRUD particles to settle or plate out. 

USNRC staff evaluated the radiological con-sequences of the package responses to the Baltimore tunnel 

fire. The analysis indicates that the regulatory dose rate limits specified in 10 CFR 71.51 for accident 

conditions would not be exceeded by releases or direct radiation from any of these packages in this fire 

scenario. All three packages are designed to maintain regulatory dose rate limits even with a complete 

loss of neutron shielding (as documented in their respective SAR analyses). While highly unlikely, the 

NAC LWT could experience some decrease in gamma shielding due to slump in the lead as a 

consequence of this fire scenario, but a conservative analysis shows that the regulatory dose rate limits 

would not be exceeded. 
iv 

The results of this evaluation also strongly indicate that neither spent nuclear fuel (SNF) particles nor 

fission products would be released from a spent fuel transportation package carrying intact spent fuel 

involved in a severe tunnel fire such as the Baltimore tunnel fire. None of the three package designs 

analyzed for the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario (TN-68, HI-STAR 100, and NAC LWT) experienced 

internal temperatures that would result in rupture of the fuel cladding. Therefore, radioactive material 

(i.e., SNF particles or fission products) would be retained within the fuel rods. 

There would be no release from the HI-STAR 100, because the inner welded canister remains leak tight. 

While a release is unlikely, the potential releases calculated for the TN-68 rail package and the NAC 

LWT truck package indicate that any release of CRUD from either package would be very small - less 

than an A2 quantity (see Section 8.2).
 v 

CONTENTS 

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................iii 

ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................................... xv 

1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................1.1

1.1 Evaluation of Tunnel Fire Characteristics.............................................................................. 1.1

1.2 Review of Rail Transportation Accidents .............................................................................. 1.3

1.3 The Baltimore Tunnel Fire Event........................................................................................... 1.6

1.4 Implications of the Baltimore Tunnel Fire for Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel........... 1.8

2 NIST TUNNEL FIRE MODEL .......................................................................................................2.1

3 CNWRA MATERIALS FIRE EXPOSURE ANALYSIS ...............................................................3.1

4 TRANSPORTATION PACKAGES ANALYZED .........................................................................4.1

4.1 TransNuclear TN-68 SNF Transportation Package ............................................................... 4.1

4.2 HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 SNF Transportation Package ......................................................... 4.3

4.3 NAC LWT SNF Transportation Package............................................................................... 4.4

5 ANALYSIS APPROACH................................................................................................................5.1

5.1 Modeling SNF Packages within Tunnel................................................................................. 5.1

5.2 Model of TN-68 Transportation Package............................................................................... 5.5

5.3 Model of HI-STAR 100 Transportation Package................................................................... 5.8

5.4 Model of NAC LWT Transportation Package ..................................................................... 5.17

6 ANALYSIS METHOD....................................................................................................................6.1

6.1 Modeling Assumptions and Boundary Conditions................................................................. 6.1

6.1.1 Boundary Temperatures from FDS ...........................................................................6.3

6.1.2 Convection and Radiative Heat Transfer Boundary Conditions ...............................6.5

6.1.3 Extrapolated Boundary Conditions for Long-Term Cool Down...............................6.7

6.1.4 Heat Transfer through NAC LWT Liquid Neutron Shield .....................................6.10
 vi 

6.1.5 Heat Transfer through NAC LWT Lead Gamma Shield.........................................6.13

6.2 Initial System Component Temperatures ............................................................................. 6.13

6.3 Tunnel Fire Evaluations of Rail Packages............................................................................ 6.22

7 ANALYSIS RESULTS....................................................................................................................7.1

7.1 TN-68 Fire Transient Results ................................................................................................. 7.1

7.1.1 TN-68 During the Fire...............................................................................................7.1

7.1.2 TN-68 Short-Term Post-Fire Response.....................................................................7.4

7.1.3 TN-68 Long-Term Post-Fire Response.....................................................................7.9

7.2 Holtec HI-STAR 100 Fire Transient Results ....................................................................... 7.11

7.2.1 HI-STAR 100 During the Fire.................................................................................7.11

7.2.2 HI-STAR 100 Short-Term Post-Fire Response.......................................................7.13

7.2.3 HI-STAR 100 Long-Term Post-Fire Response.......................................................7.17

7.3 NAC LWT Fire Transient Results........................................................................................ 7.20

7.3.1 NAC LWT During the Fire .....................................................................................7.20

7.3.2 NAC LWT Short-Term Post-Fire Response ...........................................................7.25

7.3.3 NAC LWT Long-Term Post-Fire Response............................................................7.28

8 POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES ...................................................................................................8.1

8.1 Potential Consequences of Loss of Shielding ........................................................................ 8.1

8.1.1 Neutron Shielding .....................................................................................................8.1

8.1.2 Gamma Shielding......................................................................................................8.1

8.2 Potential Release Issues.......................................................................................................... 8.5

8.2.1 Seal Performance and Potential Leak Paths ..............................................................8.6

8.2.2 Potential Release from the HI-STAR 100 Package...................................................8.6

8.2.3 Potential Release from the TN-68 Package...............................................................8.7

8.2.4 Potential Release from the NAC LWT Package .......................................................8.9

8.2.5 Potential Releases from Packages Carrying Failed Fuel.........................................8.11

8.3 Summary of Potential Releases............................................................................................ 8.12

9 REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................9.1
 vii 

FIGURES 

Figure 1.1. Radioactive Material Rail Shipment................................................................................... 1.2

Figure 1.2. Liquid Tripropylene Tank Car............................................................................................ 1.6

Figure 1.3. Puncture in Tank Car.......................................................................................................... 1.7

Figure 4.1. Cross-section of TN-68 Package (drawing 972-71-3 Rev. 4, “TN-68 Packaging General 

Arrangement: Parts List and Details”)................................................................................ 4.2

Figure 4.2. TransNuclear TN-68 Spent Fuel Transportation Package.................................................. 4.2

Figure 4.3. HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Spent Fuel Package .................................................................... 4.3

Figure 4.4. Spent Fuel Transportation Package on Rail car.................................................................. 4.4

Figure 4.5. NAC LWT Transport Package (without ISO container) .................................................... 4.5

Figure 4.6. NAC LWT Transport Package (within ISO container) ...................................................... 4.5

Figure 5.1. Configuration of Derailed Train in Vicinity of Fire ........................................................... 5.2

Figure 5.2. Possible Orientation of Derailed Train in Tunnel .............................................................. 5.2

Figure 5.3. Dimensions of Howard Street Tunnel with Tank Car on Track......................................... 5.3

Figure 5.4. Cross-section of Tunnel (diagram not to scale) Showing “Top”, “Side”, and “Bottom” 

Regions for Fire Boundary Temperatures .......................................................................... 5.5

Figure 5.5. COBRA-SFS Model of TN-68 Basket and Support Rails.................................................. 5.6

Figure 5.6. ANSYS HI-STAR 100 Package Analysis Model Element Plot......................................... 5.8

Figure 5.7. Cross-section of Package, Cradle, and Rail Car Section.................................................... 5.9

Figure 5.8. Cross-section of HI-STAR Package and MPC-24 Canister ............................................. 5.10

Figure 5.9. Close-up of Package Cross-section .................................................................................. 5.11

Figure 5.10. Close-up of Canister Basket and Fuel Compartment (without helium elements) ............ 5.12

Figure 5.11. Close-up of Canister Basket and Fuel Compartment (with helium elements) ................. 5.12

Figure 5.12. Complete Impact Limiter (Except Skin) .......................................................................... 5.13

Figure 5.13. Impact Limiter Skin and Primary Support Structure........................................................ 5.14

Figure 5.14. Surfaces Defined for Interaction with “Top” Gas Region............................................... 5.15

Figure 5.15. Surfaces Defined for Interaction with “Side” Gas Region .............................................. 5.16

Figure 5.16. Surfaces Defined for Interaction with “Bottom” Gas Region ......................................... 5.16

Figure 5.17. ANSYS NAC LWT Package Analysis Model Element Plot........................................... 5.18

Figure 5.18. Cross-section of NAC LWT Package............................................................................... 5.19

Figure 5.19. NAC LWT Package Geometry........................................................................................ 5.19

Figure 5.20. Zones for Convection Heat Transfer Within the ISO Container ..................................... 5.21

Figure 5.21. Zones for External Radiation Between ISO Container and Tunnel Surfaces.................. 5.22

Figure 6.1. BTF Peak Transient Ambient Air Temperatures (smoothed values, NIST 20-m data) ..... 6.4

Figure 6.2. BTF Peak Transient Tunnel Surface Temperatures for Floor, Walls, and Ceiling (smoothed 

values, NIST 20-m data)..................................................................................................... 6.4

Figure 6.3. BTF Peak Transient Horizontal Velocities near Package Surface ..................................... 6.5

Figure 6.4. Convection Heat Transfer Coefficients at Package Surface from NIST 20 m Air 

Temperature and Velocity Predictions ............................................................................... 6.6
 viii 

Figure 6.5. BTF Peak Transient Air Temperatures for Top, Side, and Bottom Regions (NIST Data Set 

and Extrapolated Values) ................................................................................................... 6.8

Figure 6.6. BTF Peak Transient Surface Temperatures for Floor, Walls, and Ceiling (NIST Data Set 

and Extrapolated Values) ................................................................................................... 6.8

Figure 6.7. Nusselt Number for Heat Transfer in Liquid Neutron Shield .......................................... 6.11

Figure 6.8. Effective Conductivity of Neutron Shield Tank Contents................................................ 6.12

Figure 6.9. Effective Conductivity of Expansion Tank Contents ....................................................... 6.12

Figure 6.10. Solid and Molten Lead: Enthalpy as a Function of Temperature................................... 6.14

Figure 6.11. Solid and Molten Lead: Thermal Conductivity as a Function of Temperature............... 6.14

Figure 6.12. HI-STAR 100 Package Hot-Normal Condition Temperature Distribution ........................ 6.15

Figure 6.13. LWT Package Hot-Normal Condition Temperature Distribution (2.5 kW Decay Heat) ... 6.19

Figure 6.14. LWT Package Normal Condition Temperature Distribution (2.5 kW Decay Heat) ........ 6.20

Figure 7.1. Maximum Temperature Histories for TN-68 Components During Fire Transient ............ 7.2

Figure 7.2. Temperature Profiles Top-To-Bottom Through TN-68 Package During Fire Transient ... 7.3

Figure 7.3. Maximum Temperature Histories for TN-68 Package Components During First 30 hr of 

Transient............................................................................................................................. 7.4

Figure 7.4. Maximum TN-68 Package Surface Temperatures Compared to NIST Boundary Condition 

Temperatures ...................................................................................................................... 7.5

Figure 7.5. Peak Fuel Cladding Temperature History in TN-68 During First 50 hr of Transient ........ 7.6

Figure 7.6. Maximum Global TN-68 Closure/Port Seal Temperature History for 30-hr Transient ..... 7.8

Figure 7.7. Temperature Profiles Top-To-Bottom Through TN-68 Package Axis to 30 hrs................ 7.8

Figure 7.8. Maximum Temperature Histories for TN-68 Package Components During 300 hr of 

Transient........................................................................................................................... 7.10

Figure 7.9. Maximum Temperature Histories for HI-STAR 100 Package Components During Fire 

Transient........................................................................................................................... 7.12

Figure 7.10. Maximum Temperature Histories for HI-STAR 100 Package Components During First 30 

hr of Transient .................................................................................................................. 7.13

Figure 7.11. Maximum HI-STAR 100 Package Surface Temperature Compared to NIST Boundary 

Condition Temperatures ................................................................................................... 7.14

Figure 7.12. Peak Fuel Clad Temperature History in HI-STAR 100 During First 50 hr of Transient . 7.15

Figure 7.13. Maximum Global HI-STAR 100 Closure/Port Seal Temperature History During First 30 hr 

of Transient....................................................................................................................... 7.16

Figure 7.14. Maximum Temperature Histories for HI-STAR 100 Package Components During 300 hrs 

of the Transient................................................................................................................. 7.18

Figure 7.15. NAC LWT Component Maximum Temperature Histories During Fire Transient .......... 7.21

Figure 7.16. Lumped Fuel Assembly Temperature Distribution 7 hr into Transient ........................... 7.22

Figure 7.17. Temperature History of Selected Elements in Cask Body Lead in NAC LWT Package. 7.23

Figure 7.18. NAC LWT Package Component Maximum Temperature Histories for First 30 hours of 

Fire Transient ................................................................................................................... 7.25

Figure 7.19. Maximum ISO Container Surface Temperature History Compared with NIST Boundary 

Condition Temperatures ................................................................................................... 7.26

Figure 7.20. Peak and Average Fuel Cladding Temperature Histories for NAC LWT Package During 

First 30 hr of Fire Transient.............................................................................................. 7.27
 ix 

Figure 7.21. Maximum Seal Temperature Histories for Drain/Vent Ports and Package Lid During First 

30 hr of Fire Transient...................................................................................................... 7.27

Figure 7.22. NAC LWT Package Component Maximum Temperature Histories During 300 hr 

Transient........................................................................................................................... 7.29

Figure 8.1. Lead Shielding Configuration in the NAC LWT Before and After Lead Melting............ 8.3

 xi 

TABLES 

Table 1.1. Comparison of Various Hydrocarbon Liquids........................................................................ 1.8

Table 6.1. TN-68 Hot-Normal Component Temperatures ................................................................ 6.16

Table 6.2. HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Hot-Normal Component Temperatures.................................... 6.16

Table 6.3. NAC LWT Component Temperatures at Various Decay Heat Loads.............................. 6.18

Table 6.4. NAC LWT Component Temperatures at 2.5 kW Decay Heat and 130°F Ambient......... 6.19

Table 6.5. NAC LWT Pre-Fire Component Temperatures at 2.5 kW Decay Heat Load and 100°F 

Ambient ............................................................................................................................ 6.22

Table 7.1. TN-68 Peak Component Temperatures During Fire Transient ........................................ 7.11

Table 7.2. HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Peak Component Temperatures During Fire Transient............ 7.19

Table 7.3. NAC LWT Lead Shielding Response to Fire Transient................................................... 7.23

Table 7.4. NAC LWT Peak Component Temperatures During Fire Transient................................. 7.28

Table 8.1. Potential Dose Estimate from NAC LWT with Reduced Shielding ................................... 8.4

Table 8.2. Assumptions Used for Release Estimate for TN-68 Package............................................. 8.8

Table 8.3. Potential Release Estimate for TN-68 Package .................................................................. 8.9

Table 8.4. Assumptions Used for Release Estimate for NAC LWT Package ................................... 8.10

Table 8.5. Potential Release Estimate for NAC LWT Package......................................................... 8.11

 xiii 

APPENDICES 

APPENDIX A – Material Properties for COBRA-SFS Model of TN-68 Package .................................. A.1 

APPENDIX B – Material Properties for ANSYS Model of HI-STAR 100 Package ................................B.1 

APPENDIX C – Material Properties for ANSYS Model of Legal Weight Truck Package ......................C.1 

APPENDIX D – Boundary Conditions from FDS Simulation of Fully Ventilated Fire Scenario ........... D.1 

APPENDIX E – Blackbody Viewfactors for COBRA-SFS Model of TN-68 Package.............................E.1 

APPENDIX F – HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Component Temperature Distributions ..................................F.1 

APPENDIX G – Summary of Staff Responses to Public Comments Received from Federal Register 

Posting ...................................................................................................................................................... G.1 

 xv 

ABBREVIATIONS 

APDL ANSYS® Parametric Design Language 

BTF Baltimore Tunnel Fire 

BWR Boiling Water Reactor 

CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics 

CoC Certificate of Compliance 

CNWRA Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses 

CRUD Chalk River Unknown Deposit (generic term for various residues deposited on fuel rod 

surfaces, originally coined by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) to describe deposits 

observed on fuel removed from the test reactor at Chalk River.) 

DOT Department of Transportation 

FDS Fire Dynamics Simulator (computational fluid dynamics computer code) 

FEA Finite Element Analysis 

HLW High Level Waste 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

ISO International Organization for Standardization (The International Organization for 

Standardization has decreed the use of the initials ISO for reference to the organization, 

regardless of the word order of the organization’s name in any given language. This 

defines a uniform acronym in all languages.) 

MPC Multi-Purpose Canister 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 

OFA Optimized Fuel Assembly 

PB Personnel Barrier 

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
 xvi 

PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 

SFST USNRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation 

SNF Spent nuclear fuel 

USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 1.1 

1 INTRODUCTION 

Current USNRC regulations specify that spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation packages must be 

designed to survive exposure to a fully engulfing fire accident lasting no less than 30 minutes with an 

average flame temperature of no less than 1475°F (802°C) [1]. The package must maintain containment, 

shielding, and criticality functions throughout the fire event and post-fire cool down in order to meet 

USNRC requirements. (The term “package” refers to both the contents, in this case spent nuclear fuel, 

and the protective enclosing structure in which the contents are placed.) 

The intent of the regulations is to ensure that spent fuel packages survive real world accidents, including 

those involving severe fires. The performance of spent fuel packages in severe accidents has been 

examined in previous studies by the NRC, as documented in NUREG-0170 (Final Environmental 

Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes1

), NUREG/CR-4829 

(Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditions2

, also known as the 

“Modal Study”), and NUREG/CR-6672 (Re-examination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates3

). 

However, these studies did not explicitly examine historical accidents involving severe rail tunnel fires. 

On July 18, 2001, a CSX freight train carrying hazardous (non-nuclear) materials derailed and caught fire 

while passing through the Howard Street railroad tunnel in downtown Baltimore, Maryland. (The event 

is described in Section 1.3.) The staff of the USNRC Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation 

(SFST), formerly the Spent Fuel Project Office, undertook an investigation of the derailment and fire in 

order to determine what impact this event might have on the risk associated with spent nuclear fuel 

transportation by rail. This evaluation included an assessment of the potential severity of a tunnel fire 

compared to a fully engulfing fire, a review of the frequency of rail transportation accidents involving 

severe fires, and an analytical evaluation of the response of representative licensed SNF transportation 

packages to the conditions of the Baltimore tunnel fire. 

1.1 Evaluation of Tunnel Fire Characteristics 

The 30-minute fully engulfing fire prescribed in the current USNRC regulations defines a bounding fire 

for essentially all credible fire accidents involving SNF shipping packages. A fully engulfing open pool 

fire would generally be expected to subject a package to the hottest possible conditions for a given fuel 

supply. However, when considering potential accidents involving rail transport of SNF or high level 

waste (HLW), it is arguable that a rail tunnel fire could also present one of the more severe thermal 

challenges to a spent fuel transportation package. This is one of the reasons the staff chose to study the 

Baltimore tunnel fire event. 

In examining real-world accidents that could involve a spent fuel transportation package, a number of 

significant differences are apparent between tunnel fires and severe fires occurring in an open (nontunnel) environment. These factors include: 1) the possible position of a spent fuel package in relation to 

 

1 NUREG -0170, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C., December 1977.

2 NUREG/CR-4829, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., February 1987.
 1.2 

the fire location; 2) the nature of the flammable material involved; 3) the rail bed materials; 4) the types 

of fires that can occur and; 5) emergency response to fire accidents. 

In a fully engulfing fire, in which the fuel is generally assumed to form a pool, the most severe conditions, 

by definition, occur in the hottest flaming region of the fire. In a typical regulatory fire analysis (defined 

by the fire conditions in 10 CFR 71.73[1]), a SNF package is assumed to be located within the flaming 

region of the fire 3.3 ft (1 meter) above the surface of the pool. However, because many railroad tracks 

are elevated above grade and are constructed on porous substrate, pooling of spilled flammable liquid is 

less likely in an open environment when compared with a tunnel environment, where the rail bed surface 

is often rock, concrete, or pavement. Historically many of the fires resulting from rail accidents have 

involved the leakage of flammable gas (such as propane), rather than a liquid. A flammable gas cannot 

form a pool. If ignited, flammable gas leaking from a tank car will generally result in a localized pressure 

fire that is incapable of engulfing a spent fuel transportation package. 

In a rail accident involving a fire, it is extremely unlikely that a spent fuel transportation package would 

end up directly adjacent to a tank car carrying flammable liquid. Federal regulations issued by the 

Department of Transportation (DOT), in 49 CFR 174.85, require very specifically defined spacing 

between rail cars carrying radioactive materials and hazardous materials of any kind, including flammable 

liquids. Typical requirements specify that a rail car carrying radioactive material must be separated from 

cars carrying other hazardous material by at least one buffer car. A rail car carrying a spent fuel package 

would not be coupled directly to a tank car carrying flammable or combustible liquid. Figure 1.1 shows 

an example of this arrangement in an actual radioactive material shipment by rail. 

Figure 1.1. Radioactive Material Rail Shipment 

 3 NUREG/CR-6672, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C., March 2000.
 1.3 

The location of the spent fuel package relative to the fire, for a fire in an open environment (i.e., a 

non-tunnel fire), will determine the amount of heat absorbed by the package (assuming a direct exposure 

to the fire). This is because thermal radiation is the main mechanism4

 for heat transfer from the fire to the 

package. In an open environment, the energy imparted to the package from the fire falls off rapidly with 

distance from the fire. In a tunnel environment, by contrast, the fire may result in elevated temperatures 

on adjacent tunnel surfaces, which could result in a package being subjected to an “oven” effect due to 

heat radiating from hot tunnel surfaces for an extended period of time, possibly for several hours after the 

fire has been extinguished. 

In rail accidents involving fires and hazardous materials in tank cars (including flammable gas or liquid), 

emergency responders follow the DOT Emergency Response Guidebook5

. Emergency personnel are 

directed to provide water spray cooling to tank cars, to prevent boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions 

(BLEVEs) from occurring. In tunnel fires, space restrictions may make it difficult or impossible to mount 

an effective emergency response, either to cool tank cars or extinguish the fire. This could result in a fire 

burning unchecked, having a longer duration, and possibly reaching higher temperatures, compared to a 

fire with essentially the same fuel supply occurring in an unobstructed (non-enclosed) environment. 

Based on these factors, fires occurring in tunnels have the potential of being more severe than fires 

occurring in non-tunnel environments. The only significant limiting factor in a tunnel fire, which would 

not affect a fire in an open environment, is the potential for limited ventilation in a tunnel (due to tunnel 

length or small degree of slope), which could greatly reduce the amount of oxygen available for 

combustion. This would tend to reduce the burn rate, which would reduce the intensity of the fire, and 

thus tend to produce lower temperatures, even for a longer fire duration. 

1.2 Review of Rail Transportation Accidents 

As part of its investigation of the impact of the Baltimore tunnel fire on the transportation of spent nuclear 

fuel, NRC staff conducted a detailed survey of rail transportation accidents in the United States. The staff 

reviewed accident reports (particularly those of the NTSB), historical media accounts, and data from the 

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) safety database, and from the Association of American Railroads 

(AAR). This review showed that severe rail fires, either in tunnels or open environments, are extremely 

infrequent events. 

The staff’s review revealed several facts about rail accidents in the United States in general, and those 

involving hazardous materials specifically. These facts, which are summarized below, aid in putting the 

Howard Street tunnel fire into perspective. 

• In nearly 34 billion kilometers (21 billion miles) of travel on American railroads between 1975 and 

2005, there have been 1700 reported incidents involving release of hazardous materials. 

 

4 For a discussion of this phenomenon see NUREG/CR-4892, Shipping Container Response to Severe Highway and 

Railway Accident Conditions, Vol. II, pages 175 to 178. 

5 2004 Emergency Response Guidebook, U.S. Department of Transportation, Pages 115 and 128.
 1.4 

• Many of the 1700 incidents involved minor releases of non-flammable hazardous materials. None of 

the incidents reviewed involved the release of any radioactive material. 

• Of the 1700 incidents, there were 8 that involved a significant quantity of flammable material and that 

resulted in a long duration fire. These incidents6

 were as follows: 

1) Derailment of CSXT freight train, Baltimore, Maryland, July 18, 2001 (the subject of this report) 

2) Derailment of Union Pacific Freight train, Eunice, Louisiana, May 27, 2000 [NTSB report RAR02-03; NTIS report PB2002-916303] 

3) Derailment of Wisconsin Central freight train, Weyauwega, Wisconsin March 4, 19967

 

4) Derailment of BNSF freight train, Cajon Pass, California, February 1, 1996 [NTSB report RAR96-05; NTIS report PB96-916305] 

5) Derailment of CSXT freight train, Akron, Ohio, February 26, 1989 [NTSB report HZM-90-02; 

NTIS report PB90-917006] 

6) Derailment of MT Rail freight train, Helena, Montana, February 2, 1989 [NTSB report RAR-89-

05; NTIS report PB89-916305] 

7) Derailment of CSXT freight train, Miamisburg, OH, July 8, 1986 [NTSB report HZM-87-01; 

NTIS report PB-87-917004] 

8) Derailment of Illinois Gulf Central freight train, Livingston, Louisiana, September 28, 1982 

[NTSB report RAR-83-05; NTIS report PB83-916305] 

Of these eight accidents, only one (the Baltimore tunnel fire) occurred in a tunnel. Based on an 

examination of the NTSB accident reports on the seven accidents listed above that did not occur in a 

tunnel, the staff concluded that none of them could have provided a fully engulfing fire environment for a 

spent fuel package, had one been involved in the event. 

This conclusion is based on three mitigating factors present in the accidents examined above: the potential 

proximity of a hypothetical SNF transportation package to the fire that occurred, the available fuel for the 

fire, and the emergency response time for each accident. These factors are expanded upon below: 

(1) Proximity: Using diagrams of the rail car configurations in the seven accidents, as given in the NTSB 

reports, a rail car carrying a spent fuel package and its required buffer cars could not have 

been located close enough to any tank cars that ruptured in these accidents. An SNF 

package, had one been involved, would not have been positioned near enough to the 

burning flammable material in these accidents to be fully engulfed. 

(2) Fuel for the fire: The flammable material involved in a majority of the accidents were gasses that 

resulted in localized pressure fires, so these accidents did not involve the pooling of 

 

6 The reports on these incidents are available on the NTSB web site, www.ntsb.gov, under the link “Accident 

Reports”, or from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) web site, www.ntis.gov. 

7 The NTSB did not issue a report on this accident. Information describing the accident is available in the public 

docket, National Transportation Safety Board Public Docket for Railroad Accident at Weyauwega, WI, March 4, 

1996. Docket ID: 8867, Released August 18, 1997, Washington, D.C. This document is available on the website: 

http://www.postcrescent.com/specials/assets/APCweyauweatrain/default.htm. 
 1.5 

flammable liquids. In those that did involve flammable liquids, pooling did not 

occur because of the nature of the track bed, which is elevated over porous media. 

(3) Response time: The emergency response times were extremely rapid in these seven accidents (most 

were responded to within 1-2 hours), and response efforts included cooling the tank 

cars, effectively minimizing fire intensity and duration. 

The Howard Street rail tunnel derailment and fire is unique in that none of the mitigating factors noted 

above (for non-tunnel fires) were acting to significantly limit the severity or duration of the fire. 

However, the staff’s examination of the FRA database shows that the Howard Street tunnel derailment 

and fire is the only severe rail tunnel fire involving hazardous materials shipments that has occurred in the 

nearly 21 billion rail miles of transportation that took place in the United States between 1975 and 2005. 

When this accident frequency is coupled with the expected number of shipments of radioactive material 

in the future, the risk of an accident of this type still remains low. In addition, several factors work to 

reduce the risk of this type of accident even further. These include: 

(1) The intent of the Department of Energy (DOE) to ship the bulk of SNF and HLW to the Proposed 

Geological Repository for the Disposal of SNF and HLW at Yucca Mountain (Yucca Mountain) via 

dedicated rail8

; 

(2) FRA consideration of enactment of regulations that would require the use of dedicated trains9

 for the 

shipment of SNF and HLW; 

(3) AAR enacting, at the recommendation of the NRC, a “no-pass” rule10 for single bore dual-track rail 

tunnels. The rule specifies that trains carrying tank cars containing hazardous materials, such as 

flammable or combustible liquids, and trains carrying SNF or HLW may not pass one another within 

the same tunnel. 

This investigation has shown that accidents involving hazardous materials and long duration fires on 

railroads in general and in rail tunnels in particular occur with extremely low frequency. As discussed 

above, DOE, FRA, and AAR have taken steps to further preclude the possibility of such an accident 

involving SNF or HLW and other hazardous (flammable or combustible) materials in a rail tunnel. 

Consequently, the frequency of any rail accident involving an SNF or HLW shipment in conjunction with 

a long duration fire in a rail tunnel essentially approaches zero. Detailed conservative analyses of the 

Baltimore tunnel fire show that the potential consequences of such an accident, were it to actually occur, 

are minimal (as discussed in Chapter 8 of this report). The NRC staff therefore concludes that the risk to 

public health and safety posed by this type of transportation accident is close to nonexistent. 

 

8 Letter to Stakeholders from Paul M. Golan, Principal Deputy Director Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management, July 18, 2005.

9 This consideration is mandated pursuant to Section 5105(b) of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform 

Safety Act of 1990, As Amended. 

10 Circular No. OT-55-I (CPC-1174), American Association of Railroads, July 17, 2006.
 1.6 

1.3 The Baltimore Tunnel Fire Event 

The Howard Street tunnel in Baltimore is a single track railroad tunnel of concrete and refractory brick. 

Originally constructed in 1895, later additions extended it to its current length of 1.65 mi (2.7 km). The 

tunnel has an average upward grade of only 0.8% from the west portal to the east portal, and at the time of 

the accident, the active ventilation system was not in operation. The tunnel is approximately 22 ft (6.7 m) 

high by 27 ft (8.2 m) wide in the vicinity of the accident; however, the dimensions vary along the length. 

The freight train involved in the accident had a total of 60 cars pulled by 3 locomotives, and was carrying 

paper products and pulp board in boxcars as well as hydrochloric acid, liquid tripropylene11, and other 

hazardous liquids in tank cars [4, 5]. As the train was passing through the tunnel, 11 of the 60 rail cars 

derailed. A tank car (Figure 1.2) containing approximately 28,600 gallons (108,263 liters) of liquid 

tripropylene had a 1.5-inch (3.81-cm) diameter hole punctured in it (Figure 1.3) by the car’s brake 

mechanism during the derailment. 

Figure 1.2. Liquid Tripropylene Tank Car 

 

11 Tripropylene carries an NFPA hazards rating of 3 for flammability, which is the same as that of gasoline. 
 1.7 

Figure 1.3. Puncture in Tank Car 

Ignition of the liquid tripropylene led to the ensuing fire. The exact duration of the fire is not known with 

certainty. Based on NTSB interviews of emergency responders, it was determined that the most severe 

portion of the fire in the Howard Street tunnel lasted approximately 3 hours. Less severe fires burned in 

the tunnel for periods of time greater than 3 hours. Approximately 12 hours after the fire started, 

firefighters were able to visually confirm that the tripropylene tank car was no longer burning. 

Tripropylene, which is also called Nonene, is a liquid hydrocarbon compound that is traditionally used for 

industrial processes. Table 1.1 lists the heat of combustion for tripropylene and a number of other 

hydrocarbon fuels that are commonly shipped by rail. Gasoline and jet fuel are also included in the table, 

but for comparison purposes only, as these fuels are rarely, if ever, transported by rail. Tripropylene has a 

heat of combustion comparable to that of gasoline, and has a higher heat of combustion than that of jet 

fuel. When compared to other common hydrocarbon liquids, tripropylene falls near the high end of the 

range of values for heat of combustion for hydrocarbon liquids. The range of values shown in Table 1.1 

for hydrocarbon fuels is relatively narrow, however, which indicates that when burned under the same 

conditions, these hydrocarbon liquids will generally have similar combustion characteristics. Therefore, 

while tripropylene was the specific fuel for the Baltimore tunnel fire, its combustion characteristics are 

generally representative of the behavior of other hydrocarbon fuels. 
 1.8 

Table 1.1. Comparison of Various Hydrocarbon Liquids 

Liquid Hydrocarbons Molecular Formula Heat of Combustiona 

Btu/ lb. (kJ/kg) 

Propane C3H8 19,800 (46,000) 

Butane C4H10 19,500 (45,400) 

Isobutane C4H10 19,600 (45,600) 

Pentane C5H12 19,300 (45,000) 

Hexane C6H14 19,200 (44,700) 

Heptane C7H16 19,200 (44,700) 

Toluene C7H8 17,400 (40,500) 

Octane C8H18 19,100 (44,400) 

Nonane C9H20 19,000 (44,300) 

Nonene (tripropylene) C9H18 19, 000 (44,300) 

Decane C10H22 19,000 (44,300) 

Undecane C11H24 19,000 (44,300) 

Gasoline 

(mixture of heptanes, 

octanes, nonanes and 

decanes) 

C8H15

b 19,100 (44,500)b 

Jet Fuel, grade JP-1 18,500 (43,000) 

Jet Fuel, grade JP-2 18,700 (43,500) 

Jet Fuel, grade JP-3 18,700 (43,500) 

Jet Fuel, grade JP-4 18,500 (43,000) 

a

Values derived from Perry, Chilton, and Kirkpatrick, Perry’s Chemical 

Engineer’s Handbook, 4th Edition, Table 3-202, Page 3-104. 

b

Typical values. Values will vary slightly depending on formulation. Derived 

from Ferguson and Kirkpatrick, Internal Combustion Engines, Applied 

Thermosciences, 2nd Edition, Page 316 and Table 10.8. 

1.4 Implications of the Baltimore Tunnel Fire for Transportation of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel 

As one element of the evaluations related to the Baltimore tunnel fire accident, calculations were 

performed by NRC for three currently licensed spent nuclear fuel transportation packages. This analysis 

is a case study of a historic event, with the addition of the involvement of a spent nuclear fuel 

transportation package and a conservative representation of the possible fire duration. The staff’s efforts 

were focused on providing a realistic transportation accident scenario based on the physical conditions of 
 1.9 

the Howard Street tunnel and the actual events surrounding the derailment and ensuing fire. The analysis 

is not intended to determine a “worst case” tunnel fire accident involving spent nuclear fuel. However, 

given the extremely low frequency of this type of accident (as discussed in Section 1.2), and the intensity 

and duration of the fire, this accident imposes extremely severe conditions on an SNF package, and 

constitutes a ‘beyond design-basis’ scenario. 

This analysis evaluated the performance of the TransNuclear Model No. TN-68 (“TN-68”), the HOLTEC 

International Model No. HI-STAR 100 (“HI-STAR 100”), and the NAC International Model No. LWT 

(“NAC LWT”) transport packages when subjected to boundary conditions representing the Baltimore 

tunnel fire. Tunnel air, wall, floor, and ceiling temperatures obtained from fire analyses performed by the 

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), were used to define the boundary conditions for 

the transient calculations. The purpose of the evaluation was to obtain an estimate of the temperature 

response of the various components of each of these packages during and after the fire. 

This report presents general descriptions of the transportation package designs analyzed, as well as a 

detailed description of the analyses conducted including modeling approach, boundary conditions, and 

computational results. Section 2 describes the NIST tunnel fire model used to develop boundary 

conditions for the thermal analyses of the spent fuel transportation packages. Section 3 briefly describes 

the material exposure analysis used to verify the predicted temperatures obtained in the fire simulations 

performed by NIST. Section 4 presents a detailed description of the spent fuel transportation packages 

evaluated. The computational models developed for the analyses are described in Section 5. Section 6 

presents a detailed description of the analysis method. Section 7 presents the results of the simulation, 

giving a detailed evaluation of the predicted response for each transportation package during and after the 

fire. Section 8 provides an analysis to determine the magnitude of any potential radiation hazard or 

release of radioactive material as a consequence of the effects of the fire on each of the packages. 
 2.1 

2 NIST TUNNEL FIRE MODEL 

Experts at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed a model [4] of the 

Baltimore tunnel fire using the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) code [6, 7]12 to assess the thermal 

environment within the tunnel during the fire. The NIST study was based on information developed by 

the NTSB investigation of the tunnel fire, including descriptions of the tunnel structural features, the 

damage to the rail cars, and the sequence of events in the accident. Using this information as the starting 

point for the calculations, the analysis was extended to include variation of the unknown parameters to 

predict the range and distribution of temperatures that could have been sustained in the tunnel during and 

after the fire, and the duration of the fire. 

FDS is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code that models combustion and flow of hot gas in fire 

environments. FDS solves the mass, momentum, and energy equations for a given computational grid, 

and uses a large eddy simulation technique to represent turbulence effects. The source term representing 

the fire is modeled by solving an additional transport equation for a conserved scalar quantity 

representing the mixture fraction of fuel and oxygen. Thermal radiation is modeled with the radiative 

transport equation for a non-scattering grey gas. The code is also able to construct a visual representation 

of smoke flow in a fire, taking into account the effects of the geometry of the fire environment and the 

material comprising surrounding structures. 

The extensive validation of FDS includes comparisons to results of tunnel fire tests with conditions 

similar to the Baltimore tunnel fire. NIST developed fire models using FDS based on the geometry and 

test conditions from a series of tunnel fire experiments conducted by the Federal Highway Administration 

and Parsons Brinkerhoff, Inc. as part of the Memorial Tunnel Fire Ventilation Test Program [8]. NIST 

modeled both a 6.83×107

 Btu/hr (20 MW) and a 1.71×108 Btu/hr (50 MW) unventilated fire test from the 

Memorial Tunnel Test Program, and achieved results using FDS that were within 100°F (56°C) of the 

recorded data[6,7]. 

The full-length, 3-dimensional representation of the Howard Street tunnel developed by NIST included 

the rail cars represented as solid blocks elevated 3.3 ft (1 m) above the rail bed. The rail car blocks can 

absorb thermal radiation, and provide obstructions to air flow in the tunnel. In the model, the blocks 

representing the rail cars were positioned in the center of the tunnel for the majority of the calculations. 

However, sensitivity studies included calculations performed with the rail cars modeled in their derailed 

positions in the tunnel, as documented by the NTSB. The source of the fire was specified in the 

simulation as a pool of burning liquid tripropylene13 positioned below the location of the hole that was 

punctured in the tripropylene tank car during the derailment. The computational grid for the tunnel fire 

model was relatively fine in the immediate vicinity of the fire, with nodes on the order of 6 to 12 inches 

 

12 Formal publication of the FDS code documentation began in 2001 with Version 2. Continuing validation and 

development of the code led to Version 3 in 2002. Version 3 was used in the FDS analyses discussed in this report.

13 Combustible materials in nearby box cars ignited during the fire, and continued to smolder for several days, long 

after the tripropylene fire self-extinguished. However, these materials contributed relatively little energy to the fire, 

and burned at temperatures far lower than those experienced during the flaming combustion of the liquid 

hydrocarbon fuel. 
 2.2 

(0.15 to 0.30 m) in length, in order to properly capture fire and gas behavior. The mesh size was 

expanded at distances farther from the fire source, where less resolution was needed. The entire tunnel 

volume was included in the FDS calculation, in order to appropriately simulate the mixing of air and hot 

gasses along the full length of the tunnel. 

Parametric studies of the burning rate of the fire based on the amount of available fuel, the air flow in the 

tunnel, the thermal conductivity of the bricks lining the tunnel, and sensitivity studies on the fuel pool 

area show that the Howard Street tunnel fire was oxygen-limited. In the confined space of the tunnel, the 

heat release rate of the fire was constrained by the supply of oxygen, rather than the supply of fuel. For a 

wide range of modeling assumptions, the overall heat release rate (or heat rate) for the fire was predicted 

to be no more than about 1.71×108

 Btu/hr (50 MW). The highest peak temperatures predicted in these 

simulations were 1832-2012°F (1000-1100°C) in the flaming region of the fire. The calculational results 

showed that the hot gas layer above the rail cars within three to four rail car lengths of the fire was an 

average of 932°F (500°C). Peak temperatures on the tunnel surfaces were calculated to reach 1472°F 

(800°C) where flames directly impinged on the ceiling of the tunnel. The average tunnel ceiling 

temperature within a distance of three to four rail car lengths from the fire was calculated to be 752°F 

(400°C). 

In these FDS simulations, the hottest temperatures occur within the first hour of the fire. After that point, 

the fire is oxygen-limited and temperatures are generally lower. A considerable fraction of the evaporated 

fuel does not burn due to lack of oxygen, and instead is predicted to have been carried out of the tunnel 

with the smoke and other combustion gases. However, these simulations extended only over the first 3 

hours of the fire. At that point, the bursting of a water main within the tunnel introduced significant 

uncertainty in the boundary conditions for the fire within the tunnel. The presence of water in the tunnel 

would be expected to affect the fire intensity and possibly duration, but there is no means of determining 

how much water might have actually reached the fire location. The tripropylene fire probably burned 

more than 3 hours, but it could have done so only at a reduced rate due to lack of sufficient oxygen and it 

may also have been affected by cooling or quenching due to the presence of water in the tunnel. Within 

12 hours, the fire had self-extinguished due to oxygen starvation and possibly water quenching. 

Additional FDS simulations were performed using the same model of the Howard Street tunnel, to 

investigate possible scenarios that could produce long-duration, high-temperature fires within the tunnel 

environment. In these simulations, the bursting of the water main was ignored, the tunnel was assumed to 

be ventilated in a manner that allowed the fire to be fully oxygenated, and the fire was assumed to burn 

until the entire inventory of fuel in the tank car was consumed by combustion. (This assumes that no fuel 

was lost due to evaporation or by draining away from the fire location or by soaking into the rail bed.) 

The cross-sectional area of the pool of fuel was assumed to be no more than 600 ft2

 (56 m2), 

corresponding to the footprint of the tank car, which is about the smallest pool that could have been 

sustained within the tunnel. This essentially supposes that the fuel was confined within the low “walls” 

formed by the rails of the track, that the tank car was fortuitously situated at a slight dip in the rail bed, 

and the fuel spilled from the puncture in the tank car at a rate that did not overflow this shallow pan 

before it could be consumed by the fire. Although somewhat unrealistic, these assumptions led to a more 

conservative fire duration. 
 2.3 

This minimum size for the fuel pool was assumed in order to determine the hottest and longest-lasting 

potential fire conditions for this event. A larger pool size would generally mean a shorter duration for the 

fire (because a fire burning over a larger area consumes fuel more rapidly) and the possibility of a lower 

peak temperature (due to the formation of an oxygen starved “core” at the interior of the pool area). The 

assumed pool size is very conservative for this scenario, since it is reasonable to assume that the fuel 

spilled freely through the rail bed and along the floor of the Howard Street tunnel and, therefore, would 

have burned over a larger area and at lower temperatures than were calculated for the assumed minimal 

fuel pool size in the FDS calculation. 

If the tunnel ventilation system had been operating at the time of the fire, air flow to the fire would have 

been higher, and the fire would not have been oxygen-starved to the same extent as it was with the 

ventilation system off. To allow sufficient ventilation within the tunnel for all of the fuel to be consumed 

by combustion, the FDS model was modified to include holes in the tunnel walls that connected to the 

ambient environment. Assuming 53.84-ft2

 (5-m2) holes (3.3 ft (1 m) high by 16.4 ft (5 m) wide, 9.8 ft (3 

m) above the tunnel floor), every 328 ft (100 m) along one side of the tunnel produced a fire lasting 6.7 

hrs. The peak gas temperatures in this scenario were 2084°F (1140°C) in the flaming region of the fire 

and 1958°F (1070°C) at 66 ft (20 m) downstream of the fire. At the location 66 ft (20 m) downstream of 

the fire, peak ceiling temperatures above 1832°F (1000°C) were predicted from about 3 hours until the 

end of the fire at 6.7 hrs. 

The heat rate for the fire in this scenario is approximately 1.71×109

 Btu/hr (500 MW), which is an order 

of magnitude higher than the heat rate predicted for the actual fire. The scenario conservatively assumes 

a sufficient supply of oxygen for the fire (as if the tunnel had been well ventilated) and a minimum 

credible fuel pool area within the confines of the tunnel. These assumptions produced a fire scenario 

within the tunnel that is comparable in severity to an open pool fire, and is arguably the most severe fire 

that could possibly have occurred with the available fuel. The temperatures predicted with FDS for this 

scenario provided the fire boundary conditions for the ANSYS and COBRA-SFS simulations in the 

current study. (See Section 6.1 for a complete description of the actual boundary conditions used.) 
 3.1 

3 CNWRA MATERIALS FIRE EXPOSURE ANALYSIS 

Staff from the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis (CNWRA), along with staff from NRC and 

NIST, examined rail cars and the tank car removed from the Howard Street tunnel, to evaluate evidence 

of high temperatures experienced by these components. The examination of physical evidence provided 

the staff with further insight into the fire environment that existed in the tunnel during the accident. Staff 

from CNWRA also collected material samples from these boxcars and the tank car for further analysis. 

By performing metallurgical analyses on the material samples collected, including sections of the boxcars 

exposed to the most severe portion of the fire and an air brake valve from the tripropylene tank car, 

CNWRA was able to estimate the fire exposure time and temperature for the samples tested. These 

analyses indicated that material temperatures on the roof of the boxcar located approximately 66 ft (20 m) 

from the tank car were in the range of 1382-1562°F (750-850°C) for approximately 4 hours. Material 

temperatures on other components of this boxcar were estimated to have reached values on the order of 

1112°F (600°C). (Additional details associated with the analyses performed by CNWRA can be found in 

the report on the analysis of the rail car components [5].) 

The material time and temperature exposures determined by the CNWRA analyses provide objective 

verification of the detailed predictions of the NIST FDS model of the Howard Street tunnel fire [4]. The 

FDS calculations predict peak gas temperatures of 1832-2012°F (1000-1100°C) in the flaming region of 

the fire, with peak surface temperatures of 1472°F (800°C) on the tunnel ceiling. Because of the 

insulation provided by the brick walls of the tunnel, the calculated temperatures within 3 to 4 rail car 

lengths (within approximately 200 ft (60 m)) of the fire were relatively uniform, as in an oven or furnace. 

As a result, the hot gas layer above the rail cars in this region is calculated to sustain an average

temperature of approximately 932°F (500°C) for at least 3 hours. The local material temperatures 

estimated in the CNWRA analysis at 66 ft (20 m) from the fire could easily have been sustained in this 

predicted fire environment. 

The fire scenario used to define the boundary conditions for the ANSYS and COBRA-SFS calculations in 

the current study, however, represents conditions that are more severe than the conditions predicted with 

FDS using realistic boundary conditions based on available information about the Howard Street tunnel 

fire. In this scenario, as described in Section 2, the fire is assumed to be fully ventilated and burns for 

nearly 7 hours, until all of the tripropylene fuel is consumed. The FDS simulation using these 

assumptions predicts peak gas temperatures above 1400°F (760°C) for more than 5 hours in the region 66 

ft (20 m) from the fire center. The peak ceiling temperature at this location is above 1400°F (760°C) for 

more than 6 hours. This fire environment would result in far more severe conditions at the hypothetical 

location of an SNF package than are indicated for the actual Baltimore tunnel fire by the results of the 

CNWRA materials analyses. 
 4.1 

4 TRANSPORTATION PACKAGES ANALYZED 

As discussed in Section 1, NRC regulations require that spent fuel transportation packages be evaluated 

for a series of hypothetical accident conditions that include a 30-ft (9 m) drop test, a 40-inch (1 m) pin 

puncture drop test, and a fully engulfing fire with an average flame temperature of 1472°F (800°C) for a 

period of 30 minutes. These tests are followed by the immersion of an undamaged package under 50 ft 

(15 m) of water [1]. The certification process must include either an open pool fire test or an analysis of 

the package for a fire exposure meeting the aforementioned criteria. Packages must maintain shielding 

and criticality control functions throughout the hypothetical accident conditions. 

This investigation evaluated how a fire similar to the Howard Street tunnel fire might affect three NRCcertified spent fuel transportation package designs. These included the TransNuclear TN-68 and 

HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 rail transportation packages, and the NAC LWT transportation package. The 

LWT was selected because it represents a typical truck (over-the-road) package that can also be 

transported by rail. The design of each of these packages is briefly described in the following sections. 

4.1 TransNuclear TN-68 SNF Transportation Package 

The TN-68 spent fuel shipping package transports BWR spent fuel assemblies. The basic design is 

similar to that of the HOLTEC HI-STAR 100, except that the TN-68 package does not include an inner 

seal-welded canister. The containment boundary is provided by the package shell and lid seals. The TN68 package holds up to 68 BWR assemblies, with a maximum total decay heat load of 72,334 Btu/hr 

(21.2 kW). The fuel assemblies are contained within a basket structure consisting of 68 stainless steel 

tubes that have aluminum and borated aluminum (or boron carbide/aluminum composite) neutron poison 

plates sandwiched between the steel tubes. The general layout of the TN-68 package is illustrated in 

Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Detailed information on the design can be found in the appropriate sections of the 

TN-68 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) [9]. 

The basket structure is supported by aluminum alloy support rails bolted to the inner carbon steel package 

shell, which also serves as the inner gamma shield. This inner steel shell is shrink-fitted within an outer 

carbon steel shell that serves as the outer gamma shield. The gamma shielding is surrounded by the 

neutron shielding, which consists of a ring of aluminum boxes filled with borated polyester resin. The 

outer shell of the package is carbon steel. 

The package bottom is carbon steel with an inner steel shield plate. The package lid is also carbon steel 

with a steel inner top shield plate. During transport, the ends of the package are capped with impact 

limiters made of redwood and balsa and covered in stainless steel plate (depicted in Figure 4.2). The TN68 weighs approximately 260,400 lb (118,115 kg) when loaded for transport. 
 4.2 

Figure 4.1. Cross-section of TN-68 Package (drawing 972-71-3 Rev. 4, “TN-68 Packaging General 

Arrangement: Parts List and Details”) 

Figure 4.2. TransNuclear TN-68 Spent Fuel Transportation Package 
 4.3 

4.2 HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 SNF Transportation Package 

This design provides an additional containment boundary in the form of a welded multi-purpose canister 

(MPC) enclosing the spent fuel. (The outermost containment boundary is provided by the package shell 

and lid seals.) HOLTEC has MPC designs to accommodate three different spent fuel loading 

configurations: up to 24 PWR assemblies, up to 32 PWR assemblies, or up to 68 BWR assemblies. The 

MPC-24 was selected for this evaluation. This design has an integral fuel basket that accommodates 24 

PWR spent fuel assemblies with a maximum total decay heat load of 68,240 Btu/hr (20 kW). The MPC is 

placed in the transportation packaging for shipment after it has been loaded with spent nuclear fuel and 

welded shut. A diagram of the HI-STAR 100 package system is provided in Figure 4.3. The package 

inner shell is stainless steel, and six layers of carbon steel plates comprise the gamma shield. The next 

layer is a polymeric neutron shield, strengthened by a network of carbon steel stiffening fins. The outer 

shell of the package is carbon steel, with a painted surface. 

Figure 4.3. HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Spent Fuel Package 
 4.4 

Aluminum honeycomb impact limiters with stainless steel skin are installed on the ends of the package 

prior to shipping. Impact limiters protect the closure lid, MPC, fuel basket, and contents from damage in 

the event of a package drop accident. The impact limiters also provide thermal insulation to the lid and 

port cover components in the event of a fire exposure. Figure 4.4 shows an illustration of this package 

secured to a rail car, with impact limiters installed. This package weighs approximately 277,300 lb 

(125,781 kg) when loaded for transport. Additional configuration details are provided in the HI-STAR 

100 Package System SAR [10]. 

Figure 4.4. Spent Fuel Transportation Package on Rail car14

4.3 NAC LWT SNF Transportation Package 

The NAC LWT is a small transportation package certified for transport on a standard tractor trailer truck, 

which can also be transported by rail. The NAC LWT is typically enclosed within an International 

Organization for Standardization (ISO) shipping container when shipped by rail. The Certificate of 

Compliance (CoC) for this SNF package requires that it be enclosed in either a personnel barrier (PB) or 

ISO container. Figure 4.5 shows a picture of a NAC LWT package on a flat-bed trailer with a PB 

installed, but without an ISO container. 

 

14 Image courtesy of HOLTEC International.
 4.5 

PBs commonly used for truck shipments are not suitable for rail shipments, so an ISO container would 

generally be required. Current DOE policy requires an ISO for truck packages shipped by rail, and every 

rail shipment of the LWT to date has been in an ISO container. Figure 4.6 shows an exterior view of the 

package within an ISO container on a flat-bed trailer. 

Figure 4.5. NAC LWT Transport Package (without ISO container) 

Figure 4.6. NAC LWT Transport Package (within ISO container) 
 4.6 

This package is designed to transport a variety of commercial and test reactor fuel types with widely 

varying maximum decay heat load specifications for the different fuels. For the purpose of this analysis, 

the package was assumed to contain a single PWR spent nuclear fuel assembly, with a maximum decay 

heat load of 8,530 Btu/hr (2.5 kW). This fuel configuration and maximum decay heat load is used for the 

thermal evaluation of the package presented in the SAR [11], and provides a conservative thermal load 

for the fire accident scenario. 

The loaded package weighs approximately 52,000 lb (23,586 kg). The containment boundary provided 

by the stainless steel package consists of a bottom plate, outer shell, upper ring forging, and closure lid. 

The package has an additional outer stainless steel shell to protect the containment shell, and also to 

enclose the lead gamma shield. Neutron shielding is provided by a stainless steel neutron shield tank 

containing a water/ethylene glycol mixture. An additional annular expansion tank for the mixture is 

provided, external to the shield tank. This component is strengthened internally by a network of stainless 

steel stiffeners. Aluminum honeycomb impact limiters covered with an aluminum skin are attached to 

each end of the package. Additional configuration details are provided in the SAR for this transport 

package [11].
 5.1 

5 ANALYSIS APPROACH 

The analytical approach chosen to evaluate the response of the selected transportation packages was to 

construct highly detailed analysis models capable of accounting for all the significant heat transfer paths 

to and from the package by means of conduction, convection, and thermal radiation. All three 

transportation package models were constructed in parallel to expedite the evaluation. Two different 

computer analysis codes were used for the large multi-assembly packages, to provide independent 

verification of the analytical approach. The TN-68 package was modeled using the COBRA-SFS finitedifference thermal-hydraulic analysis code [2]. The HI-STAR 100 and NAC LWT packages were 

modeled using the ANSYS [3] general purpose FEA code. Three-dimensional (3D) models of each of the 

packages were developed for these analyses. These models were subjected to boundary conditions (see 

Section 6) derived from a detailed simulation of the Howard Street tunnel thermal environment during 

and after the fire, performed with the FDS code. (See Section 2 for a discussion of the NIST analysis of 

the Howard Street tunnel fire and the selected fire scenario for these analyses.) 

Section 5.1 presents a general description of the representation of the SNF packages within the tunnel 

environment. Section 5.2 contains a detailed description of the COBRA-SFS model of the TN-68 

package. The ANSYS model of the HI-Star 100 is described in Section 5.3, and Section 5.4 contains a 

description of the ANSYS model of the NAC LWT. 

5.1 Modeling SNF Packages within Tunnel 

Boundary conditions for the models of the SNF packages were taken from the results of the FDS analysis 

at 66 ft (20 m) down stream of the fire source. This location was determined from the configuration of 

the rail cars within the tunnel relative to the fire, as shown in Figure 5.1. The selected location 

corresponds to the shortest possible distance between the tank car carrying liquid tripropylene and the 

nearest rail car that could have been carrying an SNF package on this particular train. 

Other possible derailment configurations were examined by the staff, based on behavior commonly 

exhibited by rail cars that have derailed. Figure 5.2 depicts a common derailment scenario involving a 

single bore tunnel where the distance between the side walls is twice the width of a rail car. As can be 

seen from the diagram, a derailment that results in a decoupling of the rail cars and an “accordion” 

placement of the rail cars would actually move the cars further apart than an in-line derailment of the type 

that occurred in the Howard Street tunnel. 

The assumed location of the SNF package in this analysis is based on Department of Transportation 

regulations that require rail cars carrying radioactive materials to be separated from other cars carrying 

hazardous materials or flammable liquids by at least one innocuous rail car (referred to as a buffer car) 

[12]. The dimensions of the Howard Street tunnel (depicted in Figure 5.3) would not have allowed a rail 

car carrying an SNF package to come any closer to the tripropylene tank car. Even if the buffer car is 

assumed to be a flat rail car, it would be essentially impossible, given the velocity of the train at the time 

of the derailment, for the buffer car to slide past either the tripropylene tank car or a rail car carrying a 

SNF package, and thereby decrease the distance between the SNF transportation package and the fire. 
 5.2 

Figure 5.1. Configuration of Derailed Train in Vicinity of Fire 

Figure 5.2. Possible Orientation of Derailed Train in Tunnel 
 5.3 

The package was assumed to remain on the rail car in a horizontal position with one end of the package 

facing the fire source. This orientation results in maximum possible exposure to the fire-driven flow of 

hot gas along the length of the package, and is the most adverse position for free convection cooling of 

the package during the post-fire cool down. It also results in the maximum exposure of package surfaces 

to tunnel surfaces for thermal radiation exchange. This is a particularly important consideration, since 

radiation heat transfer to the package is the most significant mode of heat transfer during and immediately 

following the fire, by at least an order of magnitude. 

Alternative orientations for the SNF package in this accident scenario, however plausible, would result in 

less severe boundary conditions during the fire transient. A vertical orientation for the package on the rail 

car would result in decreased exposure to the fire-driven flow of hot gas around the package and 

enhanced free convection cooling during the post-fire cool down phase of the transient. This orientation 

would also result in a decrease in thermal radiation interaction with the tunnel surfaces, due to attenuated 

view factors. In particular, the axial length of the package would not have the direct (essentially parallel) 

view of the tunnel ceiling that it has on its upper side in the horizontal orientation. 

Figure 5.3. Dimensions of Howard Street Tunnel with Tank Car on Track 
 5.4 

Postulating that the SNF package would separate from the rail car would also result in less severe 

boundary conditions on the package, even assuming that the package ended up closer to the fire. In such 

a scenario, the package would be on the floor of the tunnel, exposed to markedly lower temperatures from 

the surrounding air and tunnel surfaces, compared to the boundary conditions encountered at the elevation 

of the package on the rail car at 66 ft (20 m) down-stream of the fire. This position would also tend to 

attenuate thermal radiation interaction with the hottest surfaces in the tunnel (i.e., the ceiling and upper 

side walls). 

As discussed in Section 2, the FDS simulation used to define the boundary conditions for this analysis 

modeled a hypothetical fire scenario with greatly enhanced ventilation, in order to fully consume the 

available fuel supply at a fully oxygenated burn rate, and a minimal fuel pool size, in order to achieve the 

highest possible fire temperatures. This extremely conservative scenario resulted in a fire lasting 

approximately 7 hours, with increasing temperatures at the assumed location of the SNF package in the 

tunnel for the entire fire duration. In the FDS analysis, the calculation was extended out to a 23-hour 

post-fire cool down, for a total simulation time of 30 hours. To determine the packages’ complete 

transient temperature responses, and to explore the effects of prolonged exposure to post-fire conditions 

in the tunnel, the COBRA-SFS and ANSYS analyses further extended the post-fire duration to 300 hours. 

Tunnel wall and air temperatures predicted in the FDS analysis at 30 hours were extrapolated from 30 

hours to 300 hours using a power function, to realistically model cool-down of the tunnel environment. 

The FDS analysis utilized a fine-mesh noding that yielded detailed predictions of axial and radial 

distributions of tunnel air temperatures, gas velocities, and tunnel surface temperatures throughout the fire 

and post-fire cool down period. As a conservative approach to defining the thermal environment seen by 

the SNF packages during the fire, the peak air temperatures predicted in the FDS simulation in the top, 

middle, and bottom regions of the tunnel were used to define the boundary conditions around the 

corresponding regions on the circumference of the package during the transient. These temperatures were 

used to define the local ambient temperatures for convection heat transfer from the surfaces of the 

packages. Similarly, the peak tunnel surface temperatures on the ceiling, side walls, and floor were used 

to define the surface temperature boundary conditions for radiation exchange. 

This conservative simplification of the detailed FDS results describing the tunnel thermal environment 

was implemented by dividing the tunnel cross-section into three regions, as illustrated in Figure 5.4. 

(This figure is a conceptual diagram, not a scale drawing; proportions have been distorted to permit 

labeling of boundary regions.) For the air temperature boundary conditions for convection at the package 

surface, the “bottom” region was defined as extending from the tunnel floor to 1 ft (0.3 m) above the 

floor. The “side” region was defined as extending from 1 ft (0.3 m) to 15.8 ft (4.8 m) above the tunnel 

floor. The “top” region was defined as extending from 15.8 ft (4.8 m) above the tunnel floor to the tunnel 

ceiling at 22 ft (6.7 m). Similarly, for the wall temperature boundary conditions for radiation exchange, 

the “bottom” region was defined as the tunnel floor; the “side” region was defined as the tunnel wall 

extending to 15.8 ft (4.8 m) above the tunnel floor. The “top” region included the arch of the tunnel 

ceiling down to 15.8 ft (4.8 m) above the tunnel floor. 

The diagram in Figure 5.4 illustrates the coupling of the external thermal environment to the top, side, and 

bottom regions of the SNF package model, as implemented for the HI-STAR 100. For the NAC LWT, 
 5.5 

the external boundary conditions were imposed on the ISO container, rather than the package surfaces. A 

similar approach was also used for the TN-68 package, except that in the COBRA-SFS analysis, the rail 

car and package support cradle were neglected. 

Figure 5.4. Cross-section of Tunnel (diagram not to scale) Showing “Top”, “Side”, and “Bottom” 

Regions for Fire Boundary Temperatures 

5.2 Model of TN-68 Transportation Package 

The TN-68 package was analyzed with COBRA-SFS, a code developed by PNNL for thermal-hydraulic 

analyses of multi-assembly spent fuel storage and transportation systems. The code uses a lumpedparameter finite-difference approach for predicting flow and temperature distributions in spent fuel 

storage systems and fuel assemblies under forced and natural circulation flow conditions. It is applicable 

to both steady-state and transient conditions in single-phase gas-cooled spent fuel packages with 

radiation, convection, and conduction heat transfer. The code has been validated in blind calculations 

using test data from spent fuel packages loaded with actual spent fuel assemblies as well as electrically 

heated single-assembly tests [13,14,15]. 

The TN-68 package was modeled in COBRA-SFS as a one-half section of symmetry. Figure 5.5 shows a 

diagram of the center cross-section of the basket and support rails as represented in the COBRA-SFS 
 5.6 

model. The fuel assemblies within the basket are each modeled as detailed rod and subchannel arrays, 

and the tubes containing the fuel assemblies are represented using solid conduction nodes. 

Figure 5.5. COBRA-SFS Model of TN-68 Basket and Support Rails 

The aluminum and borated aluminum neutron poison plates sandwiched between the tubes are 

represented as an interconnected network of solid conduction nodes. The gamma shielding, neutron 

shielding, and outer steel shell are represented with concentric rings of interconnected solid conduction 

nodes with appropriate material properties. (For clarity, these nodes are not included in the diagram 

shown in Figure 5.5.) The half-section of the TN-68 package is represented with approximately 69,000 

fluid nodes, 53,000 fuel nodes, and more than 16,000 solid conduction nodes. 
 5.7 

The solid conduction nodes extend over 32 axial divisions comprising the axial length of the package. In 

cross-section, the stainless steel tubes containing the fuel assemblies are represented using two solid 

conduction nodes on each face of the enclosure, for a total of eight nodes per tube. The aluminum and 

borated aluminum neutron poison plates sandwiched between the tubes are represented as an 

interconnected network of solid conduction nodes that are in intimate physical contact with the stainless 

steel tubes and with each other. A total of 272 nodes are used to represent the 34 steel tubes in the halfsection of symmetry. The borated aluminum neutron poison plates making up the rest of the basket are 

modeled with a total of 83 solid conduction nodes. The aluminum alloy basket rails are represented with 

a total of 36 solid conduction nodes, and provide appropriate thermal connections between the basket and 

the steel inner gamma shield. 

The gamma shielding, neutron shielding, and outer steel shell are represented in the COBRA-SFS model 

as concentric rings of interconnected solid conduction nodes. The spent fuel arrays within the basket are 

assumed to be 7 x 7 BWR assemblies (the design basis fuel loading for the TN-68, as specified in the 

SAR [9]). Each assembly is modeled in detail, with 49 rods and 64 subchannels. 

In cross-section, the gamma shielding is represented with two rings of 16 nodes each, representing the 

inner and outer steel shells of this component. The neutron shield in cross-section is represented with 

three rings of nodes (for a total of 48 nodes), with properties and connections defined to represent the 

material properties and thermal interactions of the ring of aluminum boxes filled with borated polyester. 

In cross-section, the outer steel shell of the package is represented with a ring of 16 nodes, with 

appropriate thermal connections to the neutron shielding on one side and ambient air on the other. 

The COBRA-SFS model was verified by running the steady-state case for design basis normal hot 

transport conditions. The predicted peak clad temperature for these conditions was compared with the 

peak temperature reported in the SAR. The code predicts a peak clad temperature of 485°F (252°C); the 

SAR gives a value of 490°F (254°C) for these conditions (see Chapter 3, Table 3-1 in the SAR [9]). 

The steady-state solution obtained for normal hot transport conditions was used to define the pre-fire 

condition for the package in the transient calculations simulating the Baltimore tunnel fire. This provides 

a reasonably conservative estimate of the initial temperatures throughout the package, since the boundary 

conditions for normal hot transport are specified as 100°F (38°C) ambient temperature in still air with 

insolation. 

The external air temperatures predicted for the fire in the NIST simulation are sufficiently high to boil off 

the borated polyester neutron shield and completely char the wooden impact limiters. In both cases, the 

normal material would be replaced with material that would tend to insulate the package from the fire 

(i.e., air in place of the borated polyester, charred wood in place of the wooden impact limiter material). 

To maximize the heat load to the package from the fire, it was assumed for the purposes of the calculation 

that these materials would persist intact throughout the fire (rather than gradually degrading or burning 

off). Then at the end of the fire (6.75 hours into the transient), these materials would be instantly 

transformed to a degraded condition. For the nodes modeling the neutron shield, this was simulated in the 

calculation by changing the material properties to those of hot air at the end of the fire. The material 
 5.8 

properties specified for the nodes modeling the wooden impact limiters were changed from redwood to 

charcoal at the end of the fire. 

The material properties from the package vendor's SAR were verified and then used in the analyses [9]. 

The material properties used in this evaluation are given in Appendix A. 

5.3 Model of HI-STAR 100 Transportation Package 

The ANSYS model of the HI-STAR 100 package consists of a detailed three-dimensional representation 

of a half-section of symmetry for the package, its cradle support15, and the rail car decking directly below 

the cradle. (The remainder of the rail car was omitted from the model, as a conservatism, because it 

would partially shield the package from thermal radiation from the hot tunnel surfaces and block 

convection heat transfer to the package due to the flow of hot gas generated by the fire.) This half-section 

model of the package was placed within a complete cross-section of the surrounding tunnel. 

The model developed for the HI-STAR 100 package utilized 120,412 SOLID70 and 1,542 SHELL57 

thermal elements for conduction. It used two groups of 13,573 SURF152 surface effect elements for 

handling convection states in the pre-fire steady state and the fire accident transient. For radiation 

interaction, 288 highly structured AUX-12 generated MATRIX50 superelements were constructed using 

SHELL57 elements. Solar insolation (from 10CFR71 [1]) for the pre-fire condition was assigned via heat 

generation to the first group of 13,573 SURF152 surface effect elements. A portion of the model is 

shown in Figure 5.6. (In this figure most of the tunnel has been omitted for clarity.) 

Figure 5.6. ANSYS HI-STAR 100 Package Analysis Model Element Plot 

 

15Dimensions and materials for the rail car decking and the cradle were based on specifications (as of June 2005) 

from the package vendor. Cradle design determines the height of the package within the tunnel, the geometry of 

direct conduction paths to and from the package, and can affect thermal shielding of the package during the fire. 
 5.9 

The material properties from the package vendor's SAR were verified and used in the analysis [10]. The 

model explicitly represents the geometry of the package, including the internal geometry of the fuel 

basket, all gaps associated with the basket construction, as well as the integral neutron absorber plates. 

Figures 5.7 through 5.11 show cross-sections of the HI-STAR model highlighting key features that were 

included. 

Figure 5.7 shows the cross-section of the package, canister, cradle, and transport car section. In this 

figure, all helium conduction volumes have been removed for visualization purposes. The cradle and rail 

car sections were modeled as hollow enclosures. All internal thermal radiation exchange for these two 

enclosures were accounted for using AUX-12 generated MATRIX50 superelements (constructed with 

SHELL57 elements). Convection influences were accounted for using SURF152 elements with the extra 

node option. 

Figure 5.7. Cross-section of Package, Cradle, and Rail Car Section 

Conduction within the cradle and trailer material sections was also accounted for using additional 

SHELL57 elements with thickness option applied. Natural convection correlations and specially 

constructed automated subroutines written in ANSYS Parametric Design Language (APDL) were used to 

continuously evaluate and update the convective coefficients of heat conductance. Fourteen separate 

passive computation nodes were assigned as “extra nodes” for the SURF152 surface effect elements used 

in specifying the convection interaction within the cradle and rail car section (seven for each – not shown 

in Figure 5.7). Section 6 presents a discussion of the natural convection correlations used in this analysis. 
 5.10 

Figure 5.8 shows the cross-section of the package and canister, with the overall basket structure. As in 

Figure 5.7, all helium conduction volumes have been removed for visualization purposes. This figure 

shows the fuel compartment layout within the MPC-24 basket structure, and includes the inner shell (light 

green), gamma shield (dark blue), and the neutron shield (purple) components of the HI-STAR 100. 

Figure 5.8. Cross-section of HI-STAR Package and MPC-24 Canister 

The model cross-section in Figure 5.9 shows that the fillet welds joining the sections of the package outer 

skin and the expansion foam in the neutron shield area have been modeled explicitly. Special element 

material definitions were created for the elements providing the connection between the fins enclosing the 

neutron shield and the gamma shield. The material definition was specified such that the thermal 

conductivity could be readily degraded to represent the effect of single-sided fillet welds (i.e., not full 

penetration) that are used in this connection. Since the thermal conductivity through single-sided fillet 

welds is difficult to determine objectively, the conductivity of this material in the pre-fire steady state and 

post-fire transient was conservatively reduced to half of that of the solid base material. The effect of this 

assumption is to conservatively minimize the rejection of internal heat. During the fire, however, the 

thermal conductivity of these elements was assumed to be the same as the solid base material, mimicking 

that of a full penetration weld. This approach was used to conservatively maximize the heat input into the 

package during the fire. 

Special material definitions were also created for the elements making up the multi-layer steel gamma 

shield (dark blue in Figures 5.8 and 5.9). To account for the probability of gaps between the five steel 

shells due to standard manufacturing practices, a gap of 0.01 inch was assumed to exist between each 

layer. Effective material thermal conductivities were then calculated for the gaps, accounting for 
 5.11 

conduction through gas in the gap and radiation across the gap. These material property definitions were 

used in the pre-fire steady state and the post-fire transient to conservatively minimize the rejection of 

internal heat; However, during the fire, the conduction properties of these elements were reassigned to 

that of solid material (i.e., equivalent to assuming no gaps between these layers during the fire), to 

conservatively maximize the heat input into the package. A complete list of the material properties used 

in this evaluation is presented in Appendix B. 

Figure 5.9. Close-up of Package Cross-section 

Figure 5.10 presents a detailed view of the basket cross-section showing a typical basket fuel 

compartment (purple) containing a homogenized fuel assembly (light blue) surrounded by Boral sheets 

and their associated sheathing. Also shown in this figure are the MPC canister shell (blue-green) and the 

package containment/inner shell (lime). The same features are shown in Figure 5.11 with the elements 

for the helium regions included.

Westinghouse 17x17 OFA fuel was modeled in this evaluation. The effective fuel conductivity in the 

radial direction was determined using the approach documented in the HOLTEC SAR [10]. This 

approach uses a homogenization scheme similar to that presented by Bahney and Lotz [16], modified to 

include a helium gap between the homogenized fuel region and the fuel compartment, and the effect of 

cover gas pressurization. 
 5.12 

Figure 5.10. Close-up of Canister Basket and Fuel Compartment (without helium elements) 

Figure 5.11. Close-up of Canister Basket and Fuel Compartment (with helium elements) 
 5.13 

Axial conductivity for the homogenized fuel region was modeled with the cladding as the only 

conduction medium, using a cross-sectional area weighting scheme. The remaining portion of the 

homogenized region was considered to be helium. Density and heat capacity were based on volumetric 

averages of the cover gas, cladding, upper and lower end fittings, and uranium dioxide fuel. A 

normalized peaking factor of 1.1 (from the design basis axial power distribution in the SAR [10]) was 

used to establish the volumetric heat generation of 2,843 Btu/hr (0.833 kW) over each assembly along the 

active fuel length. Orthotropic effective conductivity properties were developed for the Boral to include 

the radiation and conduction heat transfer components through an assumed helium gap of 0.0035 inch 

between the Boral sheet and its stainless sheathing, and between the Boral and stainless basket structure. 

Radiation interaction within the basket, canister, and package was modeled by unselecting all helium 

regions and coating each interacting set of surfaces forming an enclosure with SHELL57 elements with 

specified emissivities. The SHELL57 elements were then used to produce highly structured AUX-12 

generated MATRIX50 superelements, each defined by an enclosure. A total of 269 MATRIX50 

superelements were defined to capture the radiation interaction within the package and canister. 

Figure 5.12 shows an element plot of the top impact limiter honeycomb core and steel substructure of the 

HI-STAR 100 package, including the Holtite-A neutron shield material sections. (The impact limiter skin 

is omitted for visual clarity.) The bottom impact limiter is similar to the top impact limiter, except for the 

bolting configuration and the extended steel ring covering the top forging, lid, and buttress plate. 

Figure 5.13 shows the top impact limiter skin and support structure, without the honeycomb core and the 

neutron shield materials included. 

Figure 5.12. Complete Impact Limiter (Except Skin) 
 5.14 

Figure 5.13. Impact Limiter Skin and Primary Support Structure 

The impact limiters are assembled with five different types of honeycomb sections. Gaps between the 

honeycomb sections, the steel substructure, and skin were conservatively ignored to maximize heat input 

during the fire. Thermal properties for the honeycomb sections were based on volumetric averages of 

each section using properties published by the honeycomb manufacturer [17]. Radiation interaction 

between the package ends and impact limiters was modeled by coating each respective interacting set of 

surfaces with SHELL57 elements with specified emissive material properties. The SHELL57 elements 

were then used to produce highly structured AUX-12 generated MATRIX50 superelements. A total of 16 

MATRIX50 superelements were defined to capture the radiation interaction between the package and 

impact limiter surfaces. 

Conduction and natural convection heat transfer between the package and impact limiter surfaces was 

handled using SURF152 surface effect elements. Correlations and specially constructed automated 

subroutines written in APDL were used to continuously evaluate and update the assigned convection 

coefficients of heat conductance. 

Sixteen separate passive computation nodes were assigned as “extra nodes” for the SURF152 surface 

effect elements used in specifying the convection interaction within the cradle and rail car section. (The 

natural convection correlations used are presented in Section 6.) Convection coefficients of heat 

conductance were conservatively boosted by a multiplicative factor of 100 between limiter and package 

during the fire to mimic enhanced heat conduction at this interface due to rapid thermal expansion. These 

values were returned to normal after the end of the fire. 
 5.15 

The tunnel structure was represented by an enclosure approximately 22 ft (6.7 m) high by 27 ft (8.2 m) 

wide and 42 ft (12.8 m) long. The tunnel enclosure was divided into three regions; top, side, and bottom 

(as illustrated in Figure 5.4). The bottom region consisted of the floor of the enclosure. The top region 

was conservatively considered to be all surfaces in the range from 15.8 to 22 ft (4.8 to 6.7 m). All 

surfaces from the floor to 15.8 ft (4.8 m) were considered to be the side region. The specified boundary 

temperatures for each region section are the maximum calculated in that region (top, side, and bottom, 

corresponding to ceiling, wall, and floor in the FDS simulation from NIST; see Section 6). The enclosure 

was capped at both ends and assigned the same boundary condition on the end caps as on the walls and 

ceiling. As specified by dimensions of the rail car decking and cradle, the transport system was located 

such that the center axis was 8.2 ft (2.5 m) above the tunnel floor, leaving 12.2 inches (31 cm) underneath 

the lowest part of the rail car decking. 

To determine the convection heat transfer to the package during the fire scenario, the exposed surfaces of 

the package were also divided into three regions. The top region was defined as all surfaces above an 

elevation of 9.4 ft (2.9 m). The bottom section was defined as the bottom of the rail car segment of the 

model. The side surfaces of the package were conservatively defined to be all remaining outer surfaces of 

the package. The surface elements of each of these sections are pictured in Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16. 

Forced and natural convection correlations and specially constructed automated subroutines written in 

APDL were used to continuously evaluate and update the assigned convective coefficients of heat 

conductance for the surface of the package during pre-fire, fire, and post-fire phases based on gas 

velocity. The bottom surface of the rail car section was the only surface influenced by convection heat 

transfer in the bottom gas region. In actuality, none of the “top” surfaces would be directly exposed to the 

highest temperature gas region at the top of the tunnel, because the package is not positioned that high in 

the tunnel. This assumption therefore represents an additional conservatism in the analysis. 

Figure 5.14. Surfaces Defined for Interaction with “Top” Gas Region 
 5.16 

Figure 5.15. Surfaces Defined for Interaction with “Side” Gas Region 

Figure 5.16. Surfaces Defined for Interaction with “Bottom” Gas Region 
 5.17 

Radiation interaction between the transport system (with its partial conveyance) and the tunnel surfaces 

was established by coating all respective interacting surfaces with SHELL57 elements with specified 

emissive material properties. The SHELL57 elements were then used to produce a highly structured 

AUX-12 generated MATRIX50 superelement. 

The Baltimore tunnel fire evaluation of the HI-STAR 100 was conducted in three phases. These were the 

pre-fire, fire, and post-fire phases. For the pre-fire phase, the hot-normal conditions of transport were 

evaluated assuming solar insolation and a 100°F (38°C) ambient temperature, in accordance with 

10CFR71.71 [1]. This conservatively established initial component temperatures. During this phase, the 

fillet welds joining the fins to the gamma shield were specified with their realistically reduced conduction 

and conservative gas gaps were assumed between the layers of the gamma shield. 

For the fire phase of the evaluation (0 < t ≤ 7 hr), solar insolation was shut off, the tunnel surfaces were 

introduced, and the transport package and tunnel surfaces were assigned an emissivity of 0.9 to represent 

surfaces affected by sooting. Air gaps originally assumed to be present between the gamma shield plates 

in the initial pre-fire steady state were closed, and perfect contact for conduction was assumed to exist 

where the heat fins attach to the gamma shield. Convection coefficients of heat conductance were 

conservatively multiplied by a factor of 100 between the impact limiters and package body to mimic 

enhanced heat conduction due to rapid thermal expansion. In addition to these conservative measures, all 

aluminum honeycomb and neutron shield resin materials were assumed to remain intact during the full 

duration of the fire, to maximize heat input during the fire. 

For the post-fire phase (t > 7 hr), aluminum honeycomb sections that exceeded an average temperature of 

1220°F (660°C) and all neutron shield material sections were degraded to thermal properties of air. The 

energy that would be absorbed due to phase change in this material was not subtracted from the heat input 

into the package. In addition, all gamma shield gaps and reduced fin fillet weld conduction properties 

were reintroduced. Finally, convection coefficients of heat conductance between the impact limiters and 

package body were returned to normal for the remainder of the simulation. 

5.4 Model of NAC LWT Transportation Package 

The model for the NAC LWT package constructed in ANSYS is similar in structure to the HI-STAR 100 

model described in Section 5.3, with the additional feature that the NAC LWT package is enclosed in an 

ISO container16. A detailed 3-D model of a half-section of symmetry was developed for the package and 

ISO container, within the same tunnel geometry as that used for the HI-STAR 100 model. A diagram of 

the package and shipping container model and partial tunnel is shown in Figure 5.17. The model used 

40,333 SOLID70 8-node brick elements and 3,409 SHELL57 4-node quadrilateral thermal elements to 

represent the structural components. A total of 6,931 SURF152 elements were used to incorporate 

radiation and convection heat transfer to the ISO container and tunnel environment for the various 

surfaces, and 12 MATRIX50 elements were used to model radiation heat exchange between package 

 

16 The CoC for this SNF package requires that it be enclosed in either a personnel barrier (PB) or an ISO container. 

Current DOE policy requires an ISO for truck casks shipped by rail, and every rail shipment of the LWT to date has 

been in an ISO container. 
 5.18 

surfaces. The surface effect elements were also used to generate solar insolation loads for calculation of 

the initial temperature distribution for the package. 

Figure 5.17. ANSYS NAC LWT Package Analysis Model Element Plot 

The model geometry was developed from the vendor’s engineering drawings from the package SAR [11]. 

The model cross-section is shown in Figure 5.18. The package contains a cylindrical solid aluminum 

basket that holds a single fuel assembly. The helium gaps between the fuel and the basket, and between 

the basket and package shell, were explicitly modeled with solid elements. 

The package body is constructed of several stainless steel shells to provide structural support and gamma 

shielding. The innermost shell is surrounded by a layer of lead that acts as a gamma shield. The outermost 

stainless steel shell is surrounded by an annular tank containing a solution of ethylene glycol and water 

which acts as a neutron shield. The tank is contained by an outer stainless steel skin and an annular 

overflow tank that extends approximately one-third of the axial length of the package body. All of these 

components were modeled using brick elements. 

The tank is constructed with eight stainless steel support ribs (in the half section) connecting the skin to 

the outer shell. These structures were modeled with shell elements. The package bottom is constructed 

with a stainless steel base, a layer of lead shielding, and a steel cover. The upper end of the package is 

sealed with a stainless steel lid (see Figure 5.19). Impact limiters attached to the ends of the package 

consist of an internal aluminum honeycomb structure covered by an aluminum skin. The expansion tank 

to handle overflow of the liquid neutron shield consists of an outer stainless steel skin. 
 5.19 

Figure 5.18. Cross-section of NAC LWT Package 

 

Figure 5.19. NAC LWT Package Geometry 
 5.20 

The entire package is contained in an ISO container constructed of stainless steel plate. This is based on 

the assumption that an ISO container would be required if the NAC LWT were shipped by rail. (The 

consequences of this hypothetical accident scenario on a package shipped without an ISO container are 

discussed with the results of this analysis in Section 7.3.) The model of the package and container is 

oriented horizontally in the tunnel with the center of the ISO container 97.7 inches (248 cm) above the 

tunnel floor. 

Heat exchange via conduction, convection, and radiation was modeled in appropriate detail between all of 

the components to provide a sound estimate of package temperatures during the transient fire event. 

Conduction is handled inherently by the elements modeling each component, but convective and radiation 

mechanisms must be separately implemented. 

Westinghouse 17x17 OFA fuel was modeled in this evaluation. The fuel region was represented with an 

effective conductivity determined using a homogenization scheme similar to that presented by Bahney 

and Lotz [16], modified to include a helium gap between the homogenized fuel region and the fuel basket. 

This yields a more realistic representation of the temperature profile through the assembly, and takes into 

account the effect of the non-uniform wall temperature distribution around the assembly. 

Axial conduction in the homogeneous fuel region was conservatively neglected in the fuel itself, and was 

modeled only in the cladding, using the conductivity of Zircaloy modified by a weighting scheme based 

on the cross-sectional area. The effective density and heat capacity for the fuel region was based on 

volumetric averages of the properties of the helium cover gas, fuel rod cladding, and uranium oxide fuel 

pellets. The design basis axial power profile from the SAR [11], which has a normalized peaking factor of 

1.2, was used to establish the volumetric heat generation of 8,532 Btu/hr (2.5 kW) over the assembly 

along the active fuel length. 

The 0.225-inch (0.57-cm) gap filled with helium cover gas between the fuel and the basket was modeled 

with solid elements and used standard helium thermal properties for conduction and specific heat. 

Convection was ignored in this small gap. Radiation exchange between the adjacent surfaces was 

modeled using MATRIX50 superelements. These were created by using SHELL57 elements to designate 

the discrete enclosure, and the AUX-12 hidden ray-tracing method was used to compute view factors for 

each element in the superelement. The 0.25-inch (0.64-cm) gap between the basket and the inner shell 

was modeled in the same manner, also assuming negligible convection. 

The entire package model was enclosed within elements modeling the ISO container. For the large air 

volumes in the ISO container, conduction across the gaseous medium is negligible but significant 

convection currents will be created by the buoyant forces due to the heated surfaces. Surfaces with 

unobstructed views of other surfaces will also experience significant radiation exchange that is highly 

dependent on the surface geometry and physical condition. Therefore, heat exchange between the package 

exterior and the container interior was modeled with internal free convection and radiation between 

adjacent surfaces. 

The radiation was implemented using the MATRIX50 superelement procedure described in Section 5.3 

for the Holtec HI-STAR 100 model. The convection calculations were based on empirical relations for 
 5.21 

free convection over flat plates and cylinders (see Section 6). Convection was implemented using 

SURF152 elements. These elements are defined on the exterior surface of a body and connect to the 

designated sink temperature assigned to a single node (called a “space node”) to compute the heat flux. 

Because convection heat transfer rates are expected to vary in different regions throughout the ISO 

container, the single volume was divided into 17 zones. These consisted of a zone on each end of the 

package, three zones representing the top, side, and bottom radial surfaces for each impact limiter, and 

similar zones for the package for three locations along its axial length (see Figure 5.20). 

Figure 5.20. Zones for Convection Heat Transfer Within the ISO Container 

A sink temperature was defined for each zone, computed as the average surface temperature of the 

participating package and container elements for that zone. The convective heat transfer coefficient was 

assigned to the package and container elements based on the temperature difference between the surface 

and sink temperature, and the surface geometry, as described in Section 6. The heat exchange between 

these surfaces and the space node was then computed by ANSYS during the solution. 

Convection and radiation are also the two mechanisms required to model thermal exchange from the 

exterior of the ISO container. In the fire analysis, the initial temperature distribution is obtained from a 

steady-state solution with conditions specified by 10CFR71.71 [1], followed by a transient solution 

representative of the fire. For the steady-state solution, convection is handled by SURF152 elements with 

a constant convection coefficient of 0.891 Btu/hr-ft2

-°F (5.06 W/m2-°K) and an ambient temperature of 

100°F (38°C). Solar insolation is incorporated by using SURF152 elements with heat generation on the 

outer surface at the rate specified in 10CFR71 [1]. 
 5.22 

During the fire, the sink node temperature for each of the SURF152 elements is set and the external 

convection coefficient is computed using a forced convection relation derived using the gas temperatures 

and velocities from the results of the NIST fire simulation using FDS. These results were obtained for the 

top, side, and bottom of the tunnel, and applied to three zones defined on the top, sides, and bottom of the 

ISO container, as illustrated in Figure 5.21. By the end of the transient simulation using FDS (i.e., 30 

hours), the predicted gas velocities have dropped to the point that free convection is the only significant 

mode of convection heat transfer. From this point in the transient, the convection coefficient is computed 

in the same manner as described for the steady-state initial conditions. 

Figure 5.21. Zones for External Radiation Between ISO Container and Tunnel Surfaces 

Thermal radiation between the container and the tunnel during and after the fire is incorporated by the 

MATRIX50 elements, as described previously, where the top, side, and bottom temperatures of the tunnel 

from the NIST fire simulation are imposed as boundary conditions. A conservative emissivity value of 

0.9 was used for the tunnel surfaces and ISO container exterior, to account for the effect of sooting. 

The material properties used in the thermal model are listed in Appendix C, and were obtained primarily 

from the vendor’s SAR [11]. Some modifications were made to the material properties to account for 

structural configuration and expected effects of the fire. More comprehensive material properties were 

needed for the lead comprising the gamma shielding, to accommodate the effects of melting and 

resolidification during the transient. For the impact limiters, the significant void volume of the aluminum 

honeycomb material reduces the heat transfer capability compared to the same thickness of solid material. 

The thermal conductivity assigned to elements modeling the impact limiters was scaled by the ratio of the 

honeycomb density to the solid aluminum density. 
 5.23 

Modeling of the liquid neutron shield was complicated by the expectation that the 56% ethylene glycol 

liquid will exceed its boiling point during a fire transient, leading to tank rupture and vaporization of the 

contents, which significantly affects the heat transfer of the package. Prior to rupture, the liquid in the 

tank is expected to sustain convective currents due to temperature gradients through the liquid between 

the tank surfaces. After rupture, empirical relations were used to obtain separate effective conductivities 

for the shield tank and expansion tank. 

The empirical relations were based on correlations by Raithby and Hollands [18], as described in Section 

6. The effective conductivity was then determined as a function of the average tank temperature and the 

radial temperature difference between the tank inner and outer surfaces. The material properties were 

updated between each time step during the transient solution using APDL. They were computed for the 

56% ethylene glycol solution up to the point where the average temperature reached its boiling point of 

350°F (177°C). 

When the average temperature in the tank exceeded the boiling point, it was assumed that rupture 

occurred and the liquid was immediately vaporized. After that point, the effective conductivity was 

computed using dry air as the medium. This calculation was continued during the cool down period also. 

This formulation conservatively neglects energy absorbed by the phase change (i.e., the heat of 

vaporization for the liquid), although this is mainly as a matter of convenience, since this would constitute 

a relatively small deduction from the total energy imparted to the package. 

The general solution procedure for this model was similar to that for the HI-STAR 100 described 

previously. The steady-state temperature solution for normal hot conditions was computed using solar 

insolation and 100°F (38°C) ambient temperature per 10CFR71.71 [1], and used as the initial temperature 

state. The insolation was removed and the tunnel was introduced for the transient fire analysis. The 

transient solution was then obtained for the 30 hours of the NIST simulation, representing the 7-hour fire 

and 23-hour cool down. The solution was also extended for a total simulation time of 300 hours, in the 

same fashion as described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 for the other two package models. 
 6.1 

6 ANALYSIS METHOD 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) performed analyses using the FDS code, to 

determine the type of fire that could have been sustained during the accident in the Howard Street tunnel 

and the possible fire duration. A conservative simulation was used to define the boundary conditions for 

COBRA-SFS and ANSYS evaluations of the thermal response of the selected spent fuel transportation 

packages. Section 6.1 lists the assumptions underlying the analytical approach used and describes in detail 

the boundary conditions obtained from the selected FDS simulation. This includes temperature boundary 

conditions and the approach used to define convection and radiation heat transfer rates. Section 6.2 

describes the initial steady-state conditions defined for each package. Section 6.3 describes the procedure 

used for the transient calculations. 

6.1 Modeling Assumptions and Boundary Conditions 

A number of conservative assumptions were made in the evaluations of the thermal response of the three 

spent fuel transport packages (TN-68, HI-STAR 100, and NAC LWT) to the Baltimore tunnel fire 

transient. The assumptions of greatest impact are listed below. 

(1) Boundary conditions were taken from a conservative simulation in which the fire is predicted to 

burn at a rate that is approximately an order of magnitude hotter than the rate predicted for the 

actual environment within the tunnel. In this conservative simulation, the fire was assumed to be 

fully ventilated, with a relatively small pool area, and burned until the entire supply of tripropylene 

fuel was consumed by combustion (as described in Section 2). 

(2) Boundary temperatures for the analyses in the current study were taken from predictions of peak 

gas temperatures in the lower, middle, and upper zones of the tunnel and peak surface temperatures 

on the tunnel floor, walls, and ceiling. The peak values in each region were used to define 

boundary temperatures over the entire region, rather than using the local or average temperatures 

predicted in the FDS calculation. This approach ensures a conservative estimate of the boundary 

temperatures, since the package does not see the peak temperatures on all surfaces, and in some 

regions may not see the peak temperature on any surface. (For example, the uppermost surface of 

the package (in the horizontal orientation) is not high enough to be exposed to the peak gas 

temperature at the top of the tunnel, but this value was used as the ambient temperature for 

convective heat transfer to the upper surface of the package.) 

(3) The package cradle and the rail car section beneath the cradle were included in the ANSYS model 

of the HI-STAR 100, but the rail car ends and honeycomb end blocks adjacent to the impact 

limiters were omitted. These structures were neglected because they would partially shield the 

package from thermal radiation from the hot tunnel surfaces and block convection heat transfer to 

the package due to the flow of hot gas generated by the fire. The rail car was omitted from the 

COBRA-SFS model of the TN-68 package and the ANSYS model of the NAC LWT package 

within the ISO container. This approach eliminated any shielding of these packages from thermal 

radiation and convective heat transfer from the tunnel environment. 
 6.2 

(4) During the fire (0 < t < 7 hr) and in the short-term post-fire cool down (7 hr < t < 30 hr), it was 

assumed that convection heat transfer at the package surface was forced convection only (due to air 

flow induced in the tunnel by the temperature gradients of the fire), using gas velocities predicted in 

the NIST analysis. This approach neglects the possible contribution of free convection around the 

package (due to non-uniform circumferential temperatures around the package outer shell), which 

would tend to remove heat from the package. The boundary condition was switched to solely free 

convection after 30 hours, in the extrapolated portion of the transient. This conservatively neglects 

any forced convection cooling of the package during the extended cool down period, when the gas 

velocities in the tunnel are predicted to have dropped to relatively small values. 

(5) The effect of optical densification due to combustion products and material degradation, which 

would tend to attenuate the radiation influence between the tunnel and package surfaces, was not 

taken into account in the boundary conditions defining the fire. Radiation views were treated as 

clear and unobscured at all times. Radiation attenuation was also neglected between the ISO 

container inner surfaces and the NAC LWT package surfaces. 

(6) The wooden impact limiters on the TN-68 were assumed to remain intact during the fire, to 

maximize the heat input into the package. At the end of the fire, the thermal conductivity value for 

the nodes representing this material was reduced to that of charcoal. As a result, these components 

then present an added thermal barrier to heat removal from the package after the fire. 

(7) Similarly, the aluminum honeycomb impact limiters on the NAC LWT and the HI-STAR 100 were 

assumed to remain intact during the fire. At the end of the fire, the thermal conductivity values for 

the portions of the impact limiters that had exceeded the melting temperature of aluminum were 

reduced to that of air. The thermal energy absorbed in the melting process, however, was 

conservatively neglected, and was not subtracted from the heat input to the package during the fire. 

(8) For the TN-68 and the HI-STAR 100, the resin materials comprising their neutron shielding were 

assumed to remain intact during the fire, to maximize the heat input into the package. At the end of 

the fire, the thermal conductivity values for these materials were reduced to that of air. As a result, 

the neutron shield region then presents an added thermal barrier to heat removal from the package 

following the fire; however, the thermal energy absorbed in the process of melting and volatizing 

the resin material of the neutron shielding was conservatively neglected, and was not subtracted 

from the heat input to the package during the fire. 

(9) For the NAC LWT, the ethylene glycol and water mixture comprising the package’s neutron 

shielding was assumed to remain in liquid form during the fire until the average temperature in the 

shield tank reached the boiling point of the fluid. The fluid in the expansion tank was treated in a 

similar manner. This conservative approach acts to maximize the heat input into the package 

during the fire. After the average temperature in the tank exceeded the boiling point of the fluid, 

heat transfer through the tank was reduced to conduction and thermal radiation through air. As a 

result, the neutron shield region then presents an added thermal barrier to heat removal from the 

package; however, the thermal energy absorbed in the process of boiling off the large mass of liquid 

was conservatively neglected, and was not subtracted from the heat input to the package. 
 6.3 

(10) In all three analyses, the package was assumed to be only 66 ft (20 m) from the center of the fire, in 

order to obtain the highest possible boundary temperatures due to the fire. Based on Department of 

Transportation regulations [12] that require rail cars carrying radioactive materials to be separated 

by at least one rail car (a buffer car) from other cars carrying hazardous materials or flammable 

liquids, 66 ft (20 m) is the shortest possible distance in this fire scenario between a hypothetical rail 

car carrying an SNF package and the tank car carrying liquid tripropylene. 

Given these assumptions, the ANSYS and COBRA-SFS analyses constitute conservative evaluations of 

the response of the spent fuel transportation packages. The FDS simulations for the NIST model of the 

Howard Street tunnel fire produced detailed predictions of gas flow rates, gas temperatures, and tunnel 

wall, ceiling, and floor temperatures during the 7-hour fire and 23-hour post-fire cool down. 

6.1.1 Boundary Temperatures from FDS 

The FDS simulations included the entire tunnel length, from the west portal (tunnel entrance) to the east 

portal (tunnel exit). The results obtained for the radial plane at the location 66 ft (20 m) from the center 

of the fire were used to define the boundary conditions for the analyses with COBRA-SFS and ANSYS. 

As a conservative simplification of the finely detailed noding in the FDS simulation, the tunnel radial 

geometry was divided into three regions; top, side, and bottom (see Figure 5.4). Within each of these 

regions, the predicted peak wall temperatures and peak gas temperatures as a function of time (with the 

associated gas velocities) were taken as representative of the transient behavior of the entire region, rather 

than following the local gradients obtained in the detailed NIST simulation with FDS. 

The peak temperature-vs.-time and velocity-vs.-time values from the FDS simulation were smoothed to 

conservatively remove the rapid stochastic variations typical of dynamic fire behavior, preserving only 

the major peaks and troughs related to the general physical behavior of the simulated fire. (The selected 

FDS results for this simulation are shown graphically in Appendix D, along with the smoothed values 

used in the ANSYS and COBRA-SFS calculations.) Figure 6.1 shows these smoothed peak air 

temperatures for the top, sides, and bottom regions in the tunnel at 66 ft (20 m) from the fire center. The 

smoothed peak surface temperatures for the walls, floor, and ceiling of the tunnel at this location are 

shown in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.3 shows the smoothed velocities predicted in the NIST analyses at the 

locations of the peak gas temperatures shown in Figure 6.1. 

The gas temperatures (Figure 6.1) and velocities (Figure 6.3) were used to define convection heat transfer 

on the top, side, and bottom regions of the package surfaces. The peak tunnel surface temperatures 

(Figure 6.2) were used to define the boundary conditions for radiation heat transfer between tunnel 

surfaces and the exposed surfaces of the package. For the ANSYS models of the HI-STAR 100 and LWT 

packages, these temperatures were applied to corresponding tunnel surface elements comprising the 

ceiling, walls, and floor. For the COBRA-SFS model of the TN-68 package, radiation exchange with the 

tunnel walls, ceiling, and floor was incorporated by calculating a radiation heat flux at the package 

surface using the local package surface temperature and the regional tunnel surface temperatures defined 

in Figure 6.2. Blackbody view factors between the package surface and the tunnel surfaces were 

determined using a conventional ray-tracing scheme. (These view factors are listed in Appendix E.) 
 6.4 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Top Air Temperature

Side Air Temperature

Bottom Air Temperature

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 6.1. BTF Peak Transient Ambient Air Temperatures (smoothed values, NIST 20-m data) 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Ceiling Temperature

Wall Temperature

Floor Temperature

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 6.2. BTF Peak Transient Tunnel Surface Temperatures for Floor, Walls, and Ceiling 

(smoothed values, NIST 20-m data)
 6.5 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Velocity (ft/sec)

Top Velocity (ft/sec)

Side Velocity (ft/sec)

Bottom Velocity (ft/sec)

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 6.3. BTF Peak Transient Horizontal Velocities near Package Surface 

(smoothed values, NIST 20-m data) 

6.1.2 Convection and Radiative Heat Transfer Boundary Conditions 

The NIST analyses showed that the thermal gradients created in the tunnel due to the fire would result in 

significant air flow past a body located near the fire. This fire-forced convection would significantly 

affect heat transfer around the package and could have a strong influence on the package outer shell 

surface temperatures. The smoothed air temperatures in Figure 6.1 and velocities in Figure 6.3 were used 

to define local time-dependent Nusselt number values at the top, sides and bottom of the package. These 

values were used to define the local surface heat transfer coefficient for the three computational models. 

To maintain consistency between the three models, the same Nusselt number correlation was used to 

define convection heat transfer at the package surface. The selected correlation gives the Nusselt number 

for gas flow over a flat or slightly curved surface at zero angle of attack [19], and has the form 

for laminar flow (ReL < 500,000), 1/ 2 1/ 3 Nu L = 0.665Re L Pr

for turbulent flow (ReL > 500,000), 0.8 1/ 3 Nu L = 0.032ReL Pr

The characteristic length, L, used to define the Nusselt number and Reynolds number for this application 

is the package body horizontal length. For the TN-68, a value of 160 inches was used, and for the HISTAR 100, a value of 173 inches was used. Both were based on the length of exposed package body. 

For the NAC LWT, a value of 240 inches was used, based on the ISO container wetted surface length. 
 6.6 

The peak air temperatures (see Figure 6.1) from the NIST analysis define the ambient sink temperature 

around the package during the fire and post-fire intervals. The Nusselt number defines the rate of heat 

transfer from the package surface, which allows both codes (COBRA-SFS and ANSYS) to calculate the 

convection heat flux at the package surface. Using the above relationship, local surface temperatures, Ts, 

are calculated, and the convection component of the heat flux at the surface is solved for using the 

formula 

( ) conv L Ts Tair L

k

q" = Nu −

 where k = thermal conductivity of ambient air 

 L = characteristic length 

 Ts = package surface temperature 

 Tair = ambient external air temperature. 

Separate boundary types were defined for the top, sides, and bottom surfaces of the package using the 

external air temperatures shown in Figure 6.1. The velocities in Figure 6.3 were used to define the 

Reynolds number so the boundary conditions on the package could change with time as the transient 

proceeded. Figure 6.4 shows the resulting local convection heat transfer coefficients calculated at the top, 

sides and bottom of the TN-68 package with the COBRA-SFS model during the 30 hours of the NIST 

transient simulation. 

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

0.55

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Convective Heat Transfer Coefficient

(Btu/hr-ft2-°F)

(top)

(side)

(bottom)

 Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 6.4. Convection Heat Transfer Coefficients at Package Surface from NIST 20 m Air 

Temperature and Velocity Predictions 
 6.7 

In addition to convection heat transfer between the transport package and the surrounding air during the 

transient, radiation heat transfer between the package surface and the tunnel ceiling, walls, and floor was 

also captured. Boundary conditions to define radiation heat transfer between the package surface and the 

tunnel ceiling, walls, and floor were included in the COBRA-SFS model in the following fashion. The 

total heat flux at the surface of the package is the sum of the two components: 

conv rad q"= q" + q"

The tunnel surface temperature profiles shown in Figure 6.2 were used to define the radiation heat flux as 

an additional boundary condition at the package surface using the relationship 

( ) 4

surf

4 q"rad = εiBij σSB Tpackage − T

 where εi = emissivity of surface i 

 Bij = blackbody viewfactor from surface i to j 

 σSB = Stefan-Boltzmann constant 

 Tsurf = tunnel ceiling, wall or floor surface temperature 

 Tpackage = package surface temperature. 

The blackbody view factors between the package surface and the tunnel ceiling, walls, and floor were 

determined using a Monte Carlo ray tracing scheme based on the package diameter and a uniform axial 

node length along the length of the package. (See Appendix E.) 

Radiation interaction between the tunnel surfaces and the package surfaces in the HI-STAR 100 model 

was established through the use of ANSYS superelement definitions, as described in Section 5 above. 

(The same approach was used to define thermal radiation between the tunnel and the ISO container 

surfaces in the NAC LWT system) The NIST tunnel surface temperature predictions (see Figure 6.2) 

were then used to establish the tunnel surface boundary condition temperatures. The emissivity of all 

tunnel surfaces and the package surface was assumed to be 0.9 for all evaluations during the fire and postfire transient. 

6.1.3 Extrapolated Boundary Conditions for Long-Term Cool Down 

NIST’s FDS analysis was carried out for a 7-hour fire and 23-hour post-fire cool-down. To determine the 

long-term temperature responses and explore the effects of prolonged exposure to post-fire conditions in 

the tunnel, the transient was extended to 300 hours (293 hours after the end of the fire). Temperatures 

predicted in the NIST analysis for 30 hours were extrapolated from 30 hours to 300 hours using a power 

function to realistically model cool-down of the tunnel environment. The extrapolated values are 

presented in Figures 6.5 for the air temperatures and in Figure 6.6 for the wall temperatures. 
 6.8 

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Top Air Temp

Side Air Temp

Bottom Air Temp

Extrapolated Data Set

NIST Data Set

Figure 6.5. BTF Peak Transient Air Temperatures for Top, Side, and Bottom Regions (NIST Data 

Set and Extrapolated Values) 

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Ceiling Temp

Wall Temp

Floor Temp

Extrapolated Data Set

NIST Data Set

Figure 6.6. BTF Peak Transient Surface Temperatures for Floor, Walls, and Ceiling (NIST Data 

Set and Extrapolated Values) 
 6.9 

About 20 hours into the transient, the velocities predicted in the NIST calculations have dropped to values 

of 1 to 2 ft/s (0.3 to 0.6 m/s) or less (refer to Figure 6.3). Heat transfer at the package surface for these 

flow conditions is a complex mixture of forced convection (due to air flow induced in the tunnel by the 

wall temperature gradients of the fire) and free convection (driven by the non-uniform circumferential 

temperatures of the package outer shell). At velocities below about 3 to 5 ft/s (1 to 1.5 m/s), heat transfer 

rates predicted assuming forced convection are generally lower than the heat transfer rates due to natural 

convection around the package body for these temperature conditions. 

To avoid the modeling uncertainties associated with mixed-mode heat transfer, forced convection only 

was assumed until the end of the NIST simulation, at 30 hours into the transient. From 30 hours to 300 

hours, the heat transfer was assumed to be natural convection only. This ensured a conservative treatment 

of convection heat transfer from the package surface during the entire calculation, since free convection to 

surface heat transfer from the package is ignored in the cool down from 7 to 30 hours, and forced 

convection is neglected in the period from 30 to 300 hours. 

For consistency, the natural or buoyant convection coefficients were those utilized for determining the 

pre-fire component temperature distributions (i.e., Hot-Normal Conditions of Transport, as defined in 10 

CFR 71.71(c)(1)([1]). The heat transfer coefficients were defined for the appropriate surface geometries 

using the following relationships [20]: 

For flow along a vertical plane or cylinder : 

 --laminar flow (104

 < Grf··Prf < 109) 

1/ 4

L

T h 1.42 ⎟

⎠

⎞ ⎜

⎝

⎛ Δ =

 --turbulent flow (Grf··Prf > 109

) ( )

1/ 3 h =1.31 ΔT

 where h = heat transfer coefficient, W /(m − °C)

 ∆T = Tw - T∞, °C

 Tw = surface or wall temperature, °C

 T∞ = ambient temperature, °C

 L = vertical or horizontal dimension, m

 Grf = Grashoff number of the gas at film temperature, 

 Prf = Prandtl number of the gas at film temperature 

 where film temperature is Tf = (Tw + T∞)/2 

For flow over a horizontal cylinder: 

 --laminar flow (104

 < Grf··Prf < 109) 

1/ 4

d

T h 1.32 ⎟

⎠

⎞ ⎜

⎝

⎛ Δ =

 where d = diameter, m 

 --turbulent flow (Grf··Prf > 109

) ( )

1/ 3 h =1.24 ΔT
 6.10 

For flow over a horizontal heated plate facing upward (cool side facing downward): 

 -- laminar flow (104

 < Grf··Prf < 109) 

1/ 4

L

T h 1.32 ⎟

⎠

⎞ ⎜

⎝

⎛ Δ =

 -- turbulent flow (Grf··Prf > 109

) ( )

1/ 3 h =1.52 ΔT

For laminar flow (104

 < Grf··Prf < 109) over a heated plate facing downward (cool side facing upward): 

1/ 4

L

T h 0.59 ⎟

⎠

⎞ ⎜

⎝

⎛ Δ =

Definitions of material properties for use with these correlations were taken from Table A-3 of Kreith 

[21]. 

6.1.4 Heat Transfer through NAC LWT Liquid Neutron Shield 

An empirical relationship for effective conductivity incorporating the effects of both conduction and 

convection was used to determine heat exchange through the liquid neutron shield. In the SAR analysis 

for the LWT package [11], the effective conductivity of the ethylene glycol mixture for conditions below 

350°F was determined using the correlation of Bucholz [22], which defines the ratio of the effective 

conductivity to the actual thermal conductivity as equal to the Nusselt number, such that 

2 0.278

c

eff Nu 0.135(Pr Gr /(1.36 Pr)) k

k = = +

 where keff = effective thermal conductivity of material 

 kc = thermal conductivity of motionless fluid 

 Nu = Nusselt number 

 Pr = Prandtl number 

 Gr = Grashoff number 

The Baltimore tunnel fire transient is outside the range of the Bucholz correlation, and it yields 

unrealistically large values for keff for these conditions. An alternative correlation from Raithby and 

Hollands [18], based on heat transfer between two concentric cylinders, was used in this analysis instead. 

This correlation produces reasonable values of keff, and the transient conditions are generally within its 

applicable range. The form of this correlation is similar to the Bucholz correlation in that it equates the 

Nusselt number to the ratio of the effective conductivity over the actual conductivity, but in the Raithby 

and Hollands formulation, the Nusselt number is expressed as 

 0.25 0.25

r

c

eff Nu 0.386D (Pr/(0.861 Pr)) Ra

k

k = = +

 where Ra = Rayleigh number (Ra = Pr*Gr) 

 Gr = Grashoff number (based on the temperature difference across the 

 annular gap) 
 6.11 

The variable Dr is a dimensionless parameter based on the geometry of the annulus, and is defined: 

 ⎥

⎦

⎤ ⎢

⎣

⎡

+ = 3/ 5 5 / 4

o

3/ 5

i

3/ 4

o i

r d (1/ D 1/ D )

ln(D / D ) D

 where Do = annulus outer diameter 

 Di = annulus inner diameter 

 d = width of annulus. 

Figure 6.7 shows a plot of the Nusselt number predicted with these two correlations for the liquid (56% 

ethylene glycol and water mixture) in the neutron shield annulus. Figure 6.8 shows the effective 

conductivity for the annulus as a function of the average temperature and temperature difference for the 

liquid neutron shield tank. Figure 6.9 shows the same relationship for the expansion tank. (The sharp 

discontinuity in the curves on both plots represents the phase change when the average temperature of the 

liquid reaches the boiling point of the ethylene glycol and water mixture.) For low values of the 

temperature difference, the results approach those for the conduction-only case. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1.E+02 1.E+03 1.E+04 1.E+05 1.E+06 1.E+07 1.E+08 1.E+09 1.E+10

Pr*Gr (unitless)

Nusselt Number (unitless)

Bucholz (from SAR)

Raithby & Hollands-1975 - (Guyer)

Vert. Rect. Cavity (Incropera & DeWitt)

Nu from SAR

Raithby & Hollands for fire transient dTs

dT = 1 F

dT = 10 F

dT = 25 F

dT = 50 F

dT = 70 F

Figure 6.7. Nusselt Number for Heat Transfer in Liquid Neutron Shield 
 6.12 

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

1.E+01

1.E+02

200 700 1200 1700 2200 2700

Average Annulus Temperature (°F)

keff (Btu/hr-ft-°F)

dT = 500

dT = 300

dT = 200

dT = 100

dT = 70

dT = 50

dT = 25

dT = 10

dT = 1

Figure 6.8. Effective Conductivity of Neutron Shield Tank Contents 

1.E-02

1.E-01

1.E+00

1.E+01

1.E+02

200 700 1200 1700 2200 2700

Average Annulus Temperature (°F)

keff (Btu/hr-ft-°F)

dT = 500

dT = 300

dT = 200

dT = 100

dT = 70

dT = 50

dT = 25

dT = 10

dT = 1

Figure 6.9. Effective Conductivity of Expansion Tank Contents 
 6.13 

6.1.5 Heat Transfer through NAC LWT Lead Gamma Shield 

Temperatures encountered in the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario are high enough to expect that the lead 

gamma shielding in the NAC LWT would melt in the fire transient. It would be conservative to neglect 

this process in the thermal analysis, since taking into account the thermal effects of lead melting would 

tend to slow the rate of heat input into the package. The melting of the lead absorbs energy from the fire 

due to the latent heat of fusion, which for lead is 10.4 Btu/lbm (24.2 kJ/kg). The lead shielding consists 

of about 27,134 lbm (12,308 kg) of lead, and would absorb approximately 83 kW-hr in the process of 

phase change. This heat would otherwise be conducted through the lead shielding to the package interior, 

contributing to higher basket and fuel temperatures within the package. In addition, the local temperature 

of the lead cannot rise above the melting temperature until the phase change is complete at that point. 

This will tend to slow the rate of temperature increase in the gamma shield region, and therefore slow the 

overall rate of temperature increase for the package internals. The thermal conductivity of molten lead is 

approximately 50% lower than that of solid lead. This lower conductivity would further slow the rate of 

heat input to the package during the hottest portion of the fire. 

However, the behavior of the lead as shielding material is also an important consideration in the analysis 

of the response of the NAC LWT to the fire scenario. Complete evaluation of the transient requires a 

realistic representation of the thermal response of the package, including the effects of melting and 

resolidification of the material in the course of the transient. Including the effect of phase change in the 

lead comprising the gamma shield of the NAC LWT package involves two major considerations in the 

specification of the lead material properties. First, the energy absorbed in the process of melting the 

material must be taken into account in the process of determining the local material temperature. Second, 

the thermal conductivity for elements representing this material must include values for both solid and 

molten conditions as a function of temperature. 

Figure 6.10 shows the enthalpy of lead as a function of temperature, including the ‘jump’ at the point of 

phase change. This step change corresponds to the latent heat of fusion for lead. Figure 6.11 shows the 

thermal conductivity for lead as a function of temperature used in the ANSYS analysis, compared to the 

values used for this material property from the package SAR [11]. (See Appendix C, Table C.6 for the 

thermal properties of lead used in this analysis.) The solid phase values from the SAR at temperatures 

approaching the melting point of lead conservatively ramp down to an average value of thermal 

conductivity for the liquid phase. The actual thermal conductivity of lead remains at a relatively high 

value for the solid phase all the way to the melting temperature. Upon melting, the thermal conductivity 

drops by more than 50%, then gradually increases with increasing temperature of the molten material. 

6.2 Initial System Component Temperatures 

The normal conditions of transport described in 10 CFR 71.71 [1] were used as initial conditions for each 

analysis. All three packages were subjected to an ambient temperature of 100°F (38°C), with solar 

insolation. For pre-fire conditions, the package surface was given an emissivity value representative of its 

surface finish (e.g., 0.3 for bare stainless steel, 0.85 for painted surfaces). In the ANSYS models for the 

HI-STAR 100 and NAC LWT systems, thermal radiation heat transfer to ambient was modeled using 

surface effect elements (SURF152). 
 6.14 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600

Temperature (°F)

Lead Enthalpy (Btu/lbm)

phase change--

latent heat of fusion 

 (10.4 Btu/lbm)

Figure 6.10. Solid and Molten Lead: Enthalpy as a Function of Temperature 

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500

Temperature (°F)

Lead Thermal Conductivity (Btu/hr-in-°F)

SAR values for solid lead

SAR value for lead above melting T

solid lead 

molten lead 

melting temperature of lead

Figure 6.11. Solid and Molten Lead: Thermal Conductivity as a Function of Temperature 
 6.15 

Convection from the surface of each package was modeled with a similar set of surface effect elements. 

The natural convection correlations for buoyancy driven flow discussed above were used to simulate 

convection heat transfer at the package surface. For the COBRA-SFS model of the TN-68 package, the 

surface boundary conditions also included natural convection and thermal radiation. 

For the TN-68, the heat generation rate was specified as 72,334 Btu/hr (21.2 kW). For the HOLTEC HISTAR 100, the heat generation rate was specified for a decay heat load of 68,240 Btu/hr (20 kW). For the 

NAC LWT, the heat generation rate was specified as 8,530 Btu/hr (2.5 kW). For all three packages, 

appropriate peaking factors (as reported in the respective SAR documents), were applied over the active 

fuel region. 

A steady state normal condition temperature distribution for each package was obtained to establish prefire conditions. The hot-normal condition temperatures for each package were verified against the results 

reported in the relevant SAR. Normal condition temperatures from the ANSYS solution for the HI-STAR 

100 are provided in Figure 6.12. (Appendix F contains additional plots showing the detailed steady-state 

temperature distributions for these conditions predicted for the HI-STAR 100.) The peak clad 

temperature predicted with ANSYS for the HI-STAR 100 is 738°F (392°C), compared to 701°F (372°C) 

reported in the SAR[10]. 

Figure 6.12. HI-STAR 100 Package Hot-Normal Condition Temperature Distribution 

Since COBRA-SFS does not have a graphical post-processing module, it is not possible to produce 

similar color-flooded thermographs for the TN-68 evaluation. However, the analysis results are similarly 
 6.16 

in very good agreement with the corresponding SAR values. The COBRA-SFS calculations predicted a 

peak clad temperature of 485°F (252°C) in the TN-68 package, compared to 490°F (254°C) reported in 

the TN-68 SAR [9]. 

Component temperature comparisons of results determined in this study and those published in the 

applicant’s SAR documentation are presented in Table 6.1 for the TN-68 analysis with COBRA-SFS and 

Table 6.2 for the HI-STAR 100 analysis with ANSYS. 

Table 6.1. TN-68 Hot-Normal Component Temperatures 

Component 

Current Study 

(COBRA-SFS) 

°F (°C) 

SAR Values 

°F (°C) 

(Table 3-1 [9]) 

Fuel Cladding 485 (252) 490 (254) 

Basket plate 467 (242) 469 (243) 

Basket Rail 332 (167) 319 (159) 

Inner Shell 292 (144) 262 (128) 

Gamma Shell 285 (141) 260 (127) 

Package Bottom 261 (127) 254 (123) 

Seals 260 (127) 234 (112) 

Radial Neutron Shield 256 (124) 244 (118) 

Outer Shell 243 (117) 204 (96) 

Table 6.2. HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Hot-Normal Component Temperatures 

Component 

Current Study 

(ANSYS) 

°F (°C) 

SAR Values 

°F (°C) 

(Table 3.4.10 [10])

Fuel Cladding 738 (392) 701 (372) 

MPC Basket Centerline 717 (381) 667 (353) 

MPC Basket Periphery 447 (231) 430 (221) 

MPC Outer Shell 347 (175) 315 (157) 

MPC/Overpack Helium Gap Outer Surface 299 (148) 291 (144) 

Radial Neutron Shield Inner Surface 258 (126) 271 (133) 

Overpack Enclosure Shell Surface 253 (123) 222 (106) 

Axial Neutron Shield 228 (109) 292 (144) 

Impact Limiter Exposed Surface 165 (74) 121 (49) 

Overpack Closure Plate 270 (132)** 163 (73) 

Overpack Bottom Plate 409 (209)** 295 (146) 

** Temperatures elevated due to superimposed gap conductance between impact limiters and 

cask body. This gap conductance is replaced with intimate contact during the fire duration. 
 6.17 

These tables show that the analytical results obtained for the TN-68 and HI-STAR 100 are in very good 

agreement with the results presented for the corresponding cases in the respective SARs. Minor 

differences between the SAR results and those obtained in the current study are due to differences in 

modeling detail and simplifying assumptions employed in the SAR models. For example, the SAR 

analysis of the HI-STAR 100 neglects the effect of the support cradle and possible limited gap 

conductance on component temperatures in the evaluation for the hot-normal conditions of transport. 

For the TN-68 model and the HI-STAR 100 model, the results presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are the 

initial conditions for the fire transient analysis. For the NAC LWT, the steady-state initial conditions for 

the fire transient analysis were based on similar assumptions, but direct comparison with the steady-state 

results presented in the SAR is not possible, due to the large number of significant differences between 

the approach used in the SAR analyses and the detailed modeling approach used in the current study 

In the 3-D ANSYS model of the NAC LWT (shown in Figures 5.18 and 5.19), convection from the 

surface of the ISO container was modeled with a set of surface effect elements similar to those used in the 

model of the HI-STAR 100. The natural convection correlations for buoyancy-driven flow described in 

Section 6.1.3 were used to simulate the convective heat transfer within the ISO container and on the 

external surface. A heat generation rate equivalent to a decay heat load of 8,530 Btu/hr (2.5 kW) was 

applied, with appropriate peaking factor, over the active fuel region. This value was selected because the 

bounding thermal evaluation in the SAR [11] for the NAC LWT is for an intact PWR fuel assembly with 

a maximum decay heat load of 2.5 kW. This approach ensures a conservative decay heat load for the 

package in the fire transient analysis. 

The steady-state initial condition temperature distribution predicted for the NAC LWT package was 

compared to the results reported in the SAR [11], but direct correspondence between the two sets of 

results is not to be expected, because the SAR [11] does not include any analytical cases similar to the 

detailed 3-D model used in the current study. Due to the relatively low associated decay heat load 

capacity of the package, the applicant chose to perform a series of highly conservative evaluations using 

much simpler models to qualify the system for its Certificate of Compliance (CoC). 

The most complex models presented in the SAR [11] involve simple 2-D ANSYS cross-sections in which 

the cutting plane includes the expansion tank as well as the neutron shield tank. This approach does not 

allow axial heat flow out of the plane of the 2-D cross-section, and also assumes that the decay heat load 

axial peak occurs on that cutting plane, placing the spent nuclear fuel peak decay heat location under two 

concentric neutron shields. This provides conservatism for a steady-state analysis, since the expansion 

tank makes a longer conduction path over which to dissipate the decay heat. For the fire transient, 

however, the assumptions in this 2-D model would have the effect of limiting the heat input to the 

package from the fire, and would not constitute a conservative approach. 

ANSYS 2-D cross-sectional models were also used in the SAR [11] to represent a 1.41 kW 25-rod BWR 

basket assembly and a 2.1 kW high burn-up PWR assembly, with detailed representation of the fuel pins, 

pin tubes, and can weldments with the pins resting on the pin tubes via point contact. These models 

included the ISO container, with boundary conditions that included solar insolation and 100°F (38°C) 

ambient temperature. The design basis model presented in Amendment 34 of the SAR [11] for a 2.5 kW 
 6.18 

PWR assembly also used a 2D representation of the package. This is a HEATING5 model, and consists 

of a 2-D axisymmetric representation using effective diameters for the basket and fuel assembly. This 

model does not include an ISO container or impact limiters, convection at the assembly end cavities is 

neglected, and the ambient temperature boundary is specified as 130°F (54°C). 

None of these cases from the SAR [11] use assumptions or boundary conditions identical to the initial 

conditions assumed for the fire transient in this analysis, but there are sufficient similarities to allow 

reasonable comparisons to be made for verification of the 3-D ANSYS model predictions. The results for 

these three cases are reported in Table 6.3. 

Table 6.3. NAC LWT Component Temperatures at Various Decay Heat Loads

Component 

2.5 kW 

°F (°C) 

(Table 3.4-2 [11])

1.41 kW 

°F (°C) 

(Table 3.4-7 [11]) 

2.1 kW 

°F (°C) 

(Table 3.4-10 [11]) 

Fuel Cladding 472 (244) 358 (181) 671 (355) 

Aluminum PWR 

Insert 276 (136) * 394 (201) 

Inner Shell 274 (134) 249 (121) 385 (196) 

Gamma Shield 273 (134) 248 (120) 375 (191) 

Outer Package 

Surface 229 (109) 185 (85) 308 (153) 

Neutron Shield 238 (114) 235 (113) 306 (152) 

Lid Seal 227 (108) * * 

Drain/Vent Ports 231 (111) * * 

Impact Limiters * * * 

ISO Container * * * 

* value not reported by applicant 

Figure 6.13 shows the predicted temperature distribution from the ANSYS solution for the 3-D model 

developed for the current study, obtained using 130°F (54°C) ambient temperature with a 2.5 kW decay 

heat load. This calculation was performed in addition to the initial conditions case at 100°F (38°C) 

ambient temperature, as a verification case for comparison to the results obtained for the 2.5 kW case 

reported in the SAR [11]. The 2-D axisymmetric model in the SAR [11], which used an ambient 

temperature of 130°F (54°C), is the most similar to the initial conditions in the fire transient for the 

purposes of this comparison, despite the exclusion of the ISO container. 
 6.19 

Figure 6.13. LWT Package Hot-Normal Condition Temperature Distribution (2.5 kW Decay Heat) 

Table 6.4 presents detailed component temperature results obtained with the 3-D ANSYS model, 

compared to the values published in the SAR [11] for this decay heat load. 

Table 6.4. NAC LWT Component Temperatures at 2.5 kW Decay Heat 

and 130°F Ambient 

Component 

Current Study 

(ANSYS) 

°F (°C) 

SAR Values 

(Table 3.4-2 [11]) 

°F (°C) 

∆T 

°F (°C) 

Fuel Cladding 434 (223) 472 (244) 38 (21) 

Aluminum PWR Insert 265 (129) 276 (136) 11 (6) 

Inner Shell 228 (109) 274 (134) 46 (26) 

Gamma Shield 227 (108) 273 (134) 46 (26) 

Outer Package Surface 200 (93) 229 (109) 29 (16) 

Neutron Shield 204 (96) 238 (114) 34 (19) 

Lid Seal 164 (73) 227 (108) 63 (35) 

Drain/Vent Ports 164 (73) 231 (111) 67 (37) 

Impact Limiters 167 (75) Not Modeled -- 

ISO Container 167 (75) Not Modeled -- 

At first glance, the differences between the results obtained with the two models appear to be rather 

sizable. The peak clad temperature predicted with the ANSYS 3-D model is 434°F (223°C), compared to 
 6.20 

472°F (244°C) reported in the SAR [11]. The other temperatures shown in the table are also considerably 

lower for the ANSYS model, compared to the corresponding SAR values. However, this is an expected 

result, given the modeling differences between the two cases. 

A more significant observation for the purposes of this comparison is to note that the differences in peak 

component temperatures between the two models are consistent. The radial temperature drop from the 

peak fuel cladding temperature to the outer package surface temperature is 234 °F (130 °C) for the 3-D 

ANSYS model used in the current study, compared to a temperature drop of 243 °F (135 °C) for the 

HEATING5 axisymmetric model used in the SAR [11]. This close agreement strongly suggests that the 

axisymmetric model featured in the SAR predicts essentially the same temperature distribution as the 

more detailed ANSYS model used in the current study. Most of the differences in the point-to-point 

temperatures predicted with each model are due to the differences in assumed external boundary 

conditions (100°F (38°C) for the current study, compared to 130°F (54°C) in the SAR analysis), and 

differences in modeling details. 

Figure 6.14 shows the temperature distribution predicted with the ANSYS 3-D model for the initial 

steady-state conditions before the fire transient. The boundary conditions for this calculation are from the 

Normal Transport Condition case, as described in 10 CFR 71.21 [1]. 

Figure 6.14. LWT Package Normal Condition Temperature Distribution (2.5 kW Decay Heat) 
 6.21 

The hottest fuel temperature is predicted to occur near the center of the assembly, at a location that 

corresponds closely to the cross-section with the highest decay heat (i.e., the location of the maximum 

axial peaking factor). This location is some distance away from the part of the package covered by the 

expansion tank. This shows that the assumption placing the peak location under the expansion tank, 

which was used in the 2-D cross-section model in the SAR [11], is markedly conservative, and therefore 

can be expected to yield a higher estimate of the peak temperature. 

As shown in Figure 6.14, the temperature gradients in the package are such that heat spreads and 

dissipates axially as well as radially. As a result, the 3D geometry yields a more realistic representation 

of the heat flow in the package. The conservative measures used in the simpler 2-D ANSYS crosssectional models and the HEATING5 axisymmetric cross-sectional model (as reported in the SAR [11]) 

will tend to result in higher predicted temperatures for steady-state conditions. Other associated modeling 

assumptions and simplifications, including boundary conditions developed by the applicant, also tend to 

drive up component temperatures, compared to what might be obtained with a detailed 3-D 

representation. 

The main concern in analyses for normal transport conditions is to determine a conservative rate of heat 

removal from the package. The approach employed in the SAR should yield conservative estimates of 

peak internal temperatures for the analysis. However, for the fire transient, the main concern is the 

amount of heat that the external fire can put into the package. In the fire transient calculations, a best 

estimate of component temperature distributions and heat transfer paths is more appropriate. 

The conservative approach for the fire analysis in the current study is to choose assumptions that tend to 

enhance the heat transfer paths, making it easier for heat to move into the package from outside. For 

example, the treatment of internal gaps between components is conservative in the SAR, in that gaps are 

assumed to be as large as possible. In the ANSYS model for the fire analysis, the shrinkage gap between 

the lead shielding and package shell is included during the initial steady-state calculation, but is ignored 

during the fire transient. This approach tends to minimize heat loss from the package at the initial 

conditions, but then maximizes the heat input into the package internal components during the fire. 

The pre-fire peak component temperature results determined in this study for the Normal Transport 

Condition case at 100°F (38°C), as described in 10 CFR 71.71 [1], are shown in Table 6.5. 
 6.22 

6.3 Tunnel Fire Evaluations of Rail Packages 

The Baltimore tunnel fire simulations for the three transport packages were conducted in three phases. 

These were the pre-fire steady-state (hot-normal) conditions of transport, the fire (consisting of the first 7 

hours of the transient), and the post-fire phase. For the pre-fire steady state, the hot-normal conditions of 

transport were evaluated with solar insolation and a 100°F (38°C) ambient temperature, according to 10 

CFR 71.71(c)(1) [1]. External heat transfer was assumed to be free convection in still air with thermal 

radiation exchange with the environment. This conservatively established component temperatures to 

serve as initial conditions for the transient. 

For the fire phase of the evaluation (0 ≤ t ≤ 7 hours), the energy input due to solar insolation was set to 

zero, the tunnel surfaces were introduced, and the transport package and tunnel surfaces were assign an 

emissivity of 0.9 to represent surfaces affected by sooting. A forced convection regime was assumed to 

exist on the exterior of the package, based on the gas velocity results from the analysis performed by 

NIST. These results were used to determine the surface heat transfer coefficient, and with the gas 

temperatures from the NIST analysis defining the ambient boundary temperature, the convective heat flux 

at the package surface could be determined in the solution for the local surface temperature. Tunnel wall 

temperatures were also taken as boundary conditions from the NIST calculations, and thermal radiation 

exchange between the tunnel walls and the package was also accounted for in the evaluations. In addition 

to these measures, all aluminum honeycomb, neutron shield resin materials, or wood were assumed to 

remain intact during the full duration of the fire to maximize heat input during the fire. 

For the post-fire phase of the evaluation (t > 7 hours), properties of the neutron shield resin materials, 

wood, and selected portions of aluminum honeycomb sections were replaced with thermal properties 

Table 6.5. NAC LWT Pre-Fire Component Temperatures at 2.5 kW 

Decay Heat Load and 100°F Ambient 

Component 

Component Temperature 

°F (°C) 

Fuel Cladding 418 (214) 

Aluminum PWR Insert 242 (117) 

Inner Shell 205 (96) 

Gamma Shield 204 (96) 

Outer Package Surface 176 (80) 

Neutron Shield 180 (82) 

Lid Seal 138 (59) 

Drain/Vent Ports 138 (59) 

Impact Limiters 141 (61) 

ISO Container 140 (60) 
 6.23 

identical to those of air. This change in material properties simulates the degradation of the materials due 

to the fire and has the effect of reducing the rate of heat release during the post-fire phase. 

Conservatively, the energy absorbed in the degradation of these materials was not subtracted from the 

heat input of the fire to the package. Other model-specific conservatisms were also incorporated, as 

described above in Section 5. 

Analysis of the post-fire phase was carried out for a duration of 293 hours. This included the 23 hours of 

the post-fire portion of the transient predicted by the FDS analysis, plus an additional 270 hours in which 

boundary conditions at 30 hours were extrapolated to 300 hours, using a power function (as discussed in 

Section 5 above). Purely forced convection heat transfer correlations (based on the NIST gas velocities 

and temperatures) were imposed for the post-fire phase of the simulation from 7 hours to 30 hours. The 

forced convection boundary condition at the package surface was then transitioned to free convection 

correlations, to establish the buoyant convective coefficients of heat conductance for the remainder of the 

evaluation period. 

Results obtained in the evaluations of the three packages are discussed in Section 7. 
 7.1 

7 ANALYSIS RESULTS 

Due to the temperature limits on the spent fuel cladding, closure seals, impact limiter core materials, and 

neutron shield core materials, these components are the most important elements to consider in evaluating 

the response of the transport systems to the fire scenario. The peak cladding temperature limit is 

important because the cladding is the primary fission product containment boundary for the spent fuel. 

The temperature limit for the closure seals is important because these seals constitute the outer-most 

containment boundary for the package. The temperature limits for the neutron shield material and impact 

limiters are important because these materials are the most vulnerable to damage or destruction during the 

fire. The results of the analyses for the three rail packages were evaluated primarily in relation to the 

peak predicted temperatures for these components in the fire transient. 

These analyses indicate that the spent fuel cladding reaches a peak temperature of 845°F (452°C) in the 

TN-68 package, 930°F (499°C) in the HI-STAR 100 package, and 884°F (473°C) in the NAC LWT 

system. Peak cladding temperatures for the TN-68, HI-STAR 100, and NAC LWT packages are below 

the currently accepted short term temperature limit17 of 1058°F (570°C) for Zircaloy clad spent nuclear 

fuel under accident conditions [23]. 

The transient results for each of the three systems are discussed in detail below. Section 7.1 discusses the 

response of the TN-68 package during the fire. Section 7.2 presents results for the HI-STAR 100 

package. Section 7.3 discusses the response of the NAC LWT package. 

7.1 TN-68 Fire Transient Results 

The COBRA-SFS model of the TN-68 package consists of a total of 530,228 computational nodes that 

are solved for each time step. This yields an overwhelming volume of output that must be sorted, sifted, 

and processed to produce a coherent picture of the response of the package to this fire scenario. The 

following three subsections present the peak temperatures versus time for selected components, as 

determined with COBRA-SFS for the TN-68 package subjected to the fire transient conditions described 

in detail in Section 6. The results are presented separately for the three main phases of the transient. 

Section 7.1.1 discusses the predicted response of the TN-68 package during the fire. Section 7.1.2 

presents results for the post-fire transient over the duration of the NIST simulation (to 30 hours). Section 

7.1.3 discusses the response to the postulated long-term post-fire conditions, out to 300 hours. 

7.1.1 TN-68 During the Fire 

Figure 7.1 shows the initial temperature response of the TN-68 package predicted with COBRA-SFS 

during the fire portion of the transient. The fire burns for the first 6.75 to 7 hours of the transient (see 

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for boundary temperatures representing the fire with the package 66 ft (20 m) from 

 

17 The short-term temperature limit of 1058°F (570°C) is based on creep experiments performed on two fuel 

cladding test samples which remained undamaged (i.e., no significant observable damage) when held at 1058°F 

(570°C) for up to 30 and 71 days [24]. This temperature limit is a relatively conservative limit, since the temperature 

at which Zircaloy fuel rods actually fail by burst rupture is approximately 1382°F (750°C)[25]. 
 7.2 

the fire center). During this time, the outer surface temperature of the package shell increases quite 

rapidly. The maximum temperature of the package surface increases at a rate of up to 10.5°F/min. 

(5.8°C/min.), reaching a peak temperature of 1789°F (976°C) at about 6.3 hours into the fire. The 

maximum temperature of the neutron shield material also shows a relatively rapid increase, reaching a 

peak of 1355°F (735°C) at approximately 6.9 hours into the fire. 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

0123456 7

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak)

Outer Shell

Neutron Shield

Gamma Shield (Outer)

Gamma Sheild (Inner)

Support Rails

Basket Plates

Impact Limiter (Peak)

Drain Plug/Closure Seal (Peak)

End of Fire

Figure 7.1. Maximum Temperature Histories for TN-68 Components During Fire Transient 

The internal components of the package show a very slow thermal response during the fire. The support 

rails and gamma shields take more than an hour to show any noticeable increase in temperature. 

Approximately 3.5 hours elapse before the peak fuel cladding temperature rises as much as 1°F above the 

initial steady-state peak temperature of 485°F (252°C). The peak temperatures of the basket tubes and 

poison plates rise only about 4°F (2.2°C) in the first four hours of the fire. During this time period, the 

peak temperature on the outer shell of the package is predicted to go up to 1647°F (897°C), the predicted 

peak temperature of the neutron shield rises to 1042°F (561°C), and the peak temperature on the gamma 

shields increases to 549°F (287°C). 

By the end of the fire, marking the point at which all volatile flammables are consumed, the peak clad 

temperature has risen to only 673°F (356°C), and the peak temperature of the basket tubes and poison 

plates is at about 714°F (379°C). The outer shell of the package is predicted to have a peak temperature 

of 1599°F (871°C) at the end of the fire, with the neutron shield at 1347°F (731°C) and the outer gamma 

shield at 886°F (474°C). 
 7.3 

Figure 7.2 shows midline temperature profiles from top to bottom vertically through the package crosssection, including the package shell, support rails, and basket structure during the fire at approximately 

hourly intervals. The large difference in the predicted rate of increase in temperature for the internal and 

external components of the package is illustrated by these profiles. The temperatures of the nodes 

modeling the basket tubes and poison plates change very little during the fire. The support rails and 

gamma shield nodes heat up relatively slowly, while the outer shell and neutron shield region increase 

rapidly in temperature in response to the fire. 

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Solid Node Location (top to bottom)

Temperature (°F)

7.0 hrs

6.2 hrs

6.0 hrs

5.0 hrs

4.0 hrs

3.0 hrs

2.0 hrs

1.0 hr

Steady-state Before Fire

Figure 7.2. Temperature Profiles Top-To-Bottom Through TN-68 Package During Fire Transient 

The neutron shield and gamma shields insulate the basket and fuel assemblies from the fire, but the slow 

response is also due in large part to the huge thermal inertia of the package components. The 68 

assemblies within the package weight on the order of 20 to 25 metric tons (mainly uranium dioxide and 

Zircaloy), with roughly 8 metric tons of material in the basket (mainly steel and borated aluminum). The 

inner and outer gamma shields consist of approximately 40 metric tons of carbon steel, while the outer 

shell of the package is approximately 5 metric tons of steel. Even under the severe heat load imposed by 

the sustained high temperatures of a fire lasting almost 7 hours, it takes time to raise the temperature of 

such a large mass of material, even with its internal heat generation due to the spent fuel assemblies. 

A significant detail discovered during the evaluation of the TN-68 is that during the first quarter of the 

fire transient, the total heat flux associated with radiation heat transfer from the tunnel to the package is 

nearly an order of magnitude greater than the total heat flux associated with convection heat transfer from 
 7.4 

the tunnel environment to the package. As a consequence, the most severe conditions for this transient 

are those that result in the package receiving the greatest exposure to radiation heat transfer. This means 

that a horizontal orientation will result in the greatest possible heat input for a given fire scenario. Any 

package orientation other than the horizontal orientation during the fire (e.g., the package up-ended into a 

vertical orientation as a result of an accident) would yield less severe heat input to the package. 

7.1.2 TN-68 Short-Term Post-Fire Response 

Figure 7.3 shows the temperature response of the package during the first 30 hours of the COBRA-SFS 

simulation. (This time period represents the total duration of the NIST analysis that is the source of the 

boundary conditions for this calculation.) During the fire, the material in the neutron shield reaches 

temperatures that would heavily degrade the borated polyester. This does not mean, however, that the 

package would fail to meet the requirement of maintaining appropriate shielding in this scenario. This 

spent fuel transportation package is expected to lose its neutron shield material in the fire accident 

specified in current regulations, and therefore the design does not rely on the neutron shield material 

remaining intact in order to maintain shielding. This package is designed to attenuate neutron radiation to 

acceptable levels (see 10 CFR 71.51 [1]) following an accident without the assistance of the neutron 

shield material. However, the loss of the shield material means that the neutron shield’s heat transfer 

capability would be expected to deteriorate rapidly during the fire. 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak)

Outer Shell

Neutron Shield

Gamma Shield (Outer)

Gamma Sheild (Inner)

Support Rails

Basket Plates

Impact Limiter (Peak)

Drain Plug/Closure Seal (Peak)

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.3. Maximum Temperature Histories for TN-68 Package Components During First 30 hr 

of Transient 
 7.5 

In the COBRA-SFS evaluation, it was assumed that the borated polyester remains in place and is 

unaffected during the fire, but instantly degrades at the end of the fire and is replaced by hot air. This 

maximizes the heat input into the package during the fire, then imposes an additional barrier to heat 

transfer from the package after the fire. From the standpoint of the thermal response of the system, this is 

a conservative representation of the effect of the fire on the neutron shield. The thermal conductivity of 

the borated polyester is about 140 times that of air, so extending the residence time of the polyester to the 

end of the fire results in a calculation that overestimates the rate of heat flow into the package during the 

fire. This will tend to result in higher calculated temperatures on the package internals than would be 

obtained if it were assumed that the polyester was replaced with air earlier in the transient. In reality, the 

change would be more gradual and would occur earlier in the transient as the neutron shield burned away. 

The heat absorbed in the process of consuming the polyester material is not subtracted from the heat of 

the fire, as an associated conservatism. 

The temperatures in Figure 7.3 show that once the fire is over, the peak temperatures on the package shell 

and neutron shield are predicted to begin to drop precipitately. This is primarily a response to the rapid 

decrease of the boundary temperatures, as can be seen in Figure 7.4. This plot shows the outer shell 

surface temperature predicted with COBRA-SFS compared to the tunnel ceiling temperature and the 

temperature of the air above the package, which are derived from the NIST calculations and used as 

boundary conditions. 

100

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300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Cask Surface

Top Air Temp

Ceiling Temp

End of Fire

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.4. Maximum TN-68 Package Surface Temperatures Compared to NIST Boundary 

Condition Temperatures 
 7.6 

Figure 7.3 also shows that the peak temperatures on the gamma shields and support rails of the package 

decrease after the fire ends. However, the temperature decrease for these components is much slower 

than for the neutron shield region and outer shell because the internal components must also absorb the 

thermal load from the fuel. For the same reason, the peak temperature of the basket shows a continuous 

increase even after the end of the fire, as does the peak clad temperature. 

The plot of the predicted peak clad temperature in Figure 7.3 shows that the thermal output of the fire 

itself does not have much of an effect on the fuel. The observed rise in peak clad temperature is mainly a 

response to the effect of the external boundary conditions on the rate of heat transfer from the package. 

The heat of the fire does not result in much of an increase in the package internal temperatures, but the 

increase in the external air temperature severely compromises the rate of heat rejection from the package 

and continues to do so long after the fire is out. This is illustrated very clearly by the plot of the global 

peak clad temperature alone, shown in Figure 7.5 for 50 hours of the transient (i.e., the 30 hours of the 

NIST transient, plus an additional 20 hours of the extended cool down beyond the NIST calculation). 

400

450

500

550

600

650

700

750

800

850

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Peak Clad Temp

End of Fire

NIST Data Set Extrapolated Data Set

Figure 7.5. Peak Fuel Cladding Temperature History in TN-68 During First 50 hr of Transient 

As shown by the plot in Figure 7.5, at about 4.5 hours into the fire the peak clad temperature begins an 

almost adiabatic heat up (approximately 77°F/hr (43°C/hr)) because the fire is preventing normal heat 

removal from the package (which occurs by thermal radiation to the external environment and natural 

convection at the surface). This adiabatic heat-up continues for about an hour after the end of the fire, 

until the package shell temperature drops low enough to permit some heat removal from the package by 

radiation to the tunnel surfaces. 
 7.7 

The fuel cladding temperature increase observed shortly before the end of the fire (at ~4.5 hours) occurs 

in fuel in the outer periphery of the basket, because the fire is heating the outer cylinder of the package. 

This causes the peak fuel cladding temperature to shift first to the bottom assembly in the horizontal 

basket cross-section, then to the top assembly. The rate of increase in the predicted peak cladding 

temperature slows briefly to 1-2°F/hr (0.5-1°C/hr) before increasing again as the peak temperature 

location shifts back to the center assembly in the core of the basket. (The peak fuel clad temperature 

location is automatically tracked in these results during the transient.) 

The peak clad temperature continues to increase after the fire, because thermal radiation from the tunnel 

ceiling, walls and floor is continuing to add heat to the package and the external ambient air temperature 

slows the rate of heat removal by convection. However, the rate of increase drops to only about 2°F/hr 

(~1°C/hr). At about 15 hours into the transient, the rate of increase of the peak clad temperature begins to 

climb again, to a rate of about 10°F/hr (6°C/hr), then again drops to only 3°F/hr (~2°C/hr) after about 20 

hours. This behavior is due to the decrease in the rate of heat removal via thermal radiation as the tunnel 

surfaces cool down, and the more gradual decrease in the rate at which heat is being removed from the 

package by forced convection, due to the decrease in velocity and temperature of the hot air flowing past 

the package. 

By the end of the NIST transient at 30 hours, the rate of increase of the peak clad temperature has 

dropped to less than 3°F/hr (<2°C/hr). The global peak cladding temperature of 845°F (452°C) is finally 

reached at ~40 hours into the transient. (The dashed portion of the curve in Figure 7.5 denotes results for 

boundary conditions extrapolated beyond the results obtained in the 30-hour NIST calculation.) 

The maximum temperature history of the seals in the package closure and vacuum port is shown in 

Figure 7.6. The curve in this figure represents the global peak of all seal material used in the TN-68. As 

shown in this figure, the Helicoflex® seal material is predicted to reach a maximum temperature of 811°F 

(433°C) right at the end of the fire, then gradually decreases as the transient proceeds into the post-fire 

cool down. This peak temperature exceeds the seal manufacturer’s recommended maximum long-term 

service temperature of 536°F (280°C) for this material, as specified in the SAR [11]. (For a discussion of 

the consequences of seal failure, see Section 8.2.1.) 

Bolts and other subcomponents were not explicitly represented at the package ends in the COBRA-SFS 

model of the TN-68. However, the depicted temperature history (see Figure 7.6) conservatively 

represents the peak temperature history of the closure bolts due to the manner in which heat must migrate 

around the top impact limiter into the package upper forging, through the closure seal location, and then 

into the closure. This is due to the limited conduction offered by the steel-encapsulated wooden impactdamping material comprising the impact limiter. 

The thermal response of the package after the end of the fire is further illustrated in Figure 7.7, with plots 

showing radial temperature profiles through the package at selected time intervals through the transient. 

These profiles show that the outer shell and former neutron shield cool rapidly once the fire is over, while 

the temperatures of the internal nodes representing the basket tubes and poison plates continue to rise in 

response to the heat load from the spent nuclear fuel. 
 7.8 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Drain Plug/Closure Seal (Peak)

End of Fire

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.6. Maximum Global TN-68 Closure/Port Seal Temperature History for 30-hr Transient 

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Solid Node (top to bottom)

Temperature (°F)

30 hrs (End of NIST Transient)

15 hrs

12 hrs

10 hrs

7 hrs (End of Fire)

6.245 hrs (Peak Fire Temp's)

Figure 7.7. Temperature Profiles Top-To-Bottom Through TN-68 Package Axis to 30 hrs 
 7.9 

7.1.3 TN-68 Long-Term Post-Fire Response 

The NIST calculation used to define the boundary conditions for the COBRA-SFS analysis simulated the 

fire transient and its aftermath out to 30 hours. However, the trends exhibited by the temperatures of the 

various components of the package at the end of the transient indicate that the system is not yet at a new 

steady state by then. Temperatures predicted by NIST for the first 30 hours were extrapolated from 30 

hours out to 300 hours using a power function to realistically model cool down of the tunnel environment. 

(The extrapolated values are presented in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 for the air and wall temperatures, 

respectively.) 

To explore the effects of prolonged exposure to post-fire conditions in the tunnel, the calculations were 

carried out for the full 300 hours (293 hours after fire cessation). This is equivalent to assuming that the 

package will be left in the tunnel for an extended period (days or weeks rather than merely hours) without 

any emergency responder intervention. This assumption is not realistic but is highly conservative, 

defining a severe long-term ambient environment around the package. 

During the first 30 hours of the transient, the heat transfer at the package surface was assumed to be 

forced convection at the velocities predicted in the tunnel by the NIST calculation. The basis for this 

approach is discussed in Section 6.0. This is a relatively conservative assumption, particularly for 

conditions after about 20 hours into the transient, when the velocities predicted in the NIST calculation 

have dropped to values of 1 to 2 ft/s (0.3 to 0.6 m/s) or less. For the latter portion of the transient (t ≥ 20 

hours), heat transfer at the package surface is a complex mixture of forced convection (due to air flow 

induced in the tunnel by the vertical temperature gradients from the fire) and free convection (driven by 

the non-uniform circumferential temperatures of the package outer shell). This was conservatively 

approximated by imposing a purely forced convection heat transfer coefficient (based on the NIST air 

velocities and temperatures) for the first 30 hours of the simulation, then imposing a free convection 

coefficient for the remainder of the calculation. 

Figure 7.8 shows the temperature response of the various components of the package for the long term 

transient calculation to 300 hours. (As previously indicated, the dashed portion of the curve is used to 

distinguish the results that stem from the boundary conditions that were extrapolated from the NIST 

simulation.) As shown in Figure 7.8, the highest peak clad temperature, 845°F (452°C), is reached at 

approximately 40 hours. The peak temperature for the basket structure is also reached at about the same 

time. The predicted maximum in the peak clad temperature is below the regulatory limit of 1058°F 

(570°C) by a difference of 213 °F (110 °C). All other temperatures in the package have been decreasing 

steadily since the end of the fire. 

By 100 hours, the peak clad temperature has dropped to 784°F (418°C), with temperatures decreasing at 

rates of about -1 °F/hr (-0.6 °C/hr). After 200 hours, the peak clad temperature has dropped to 719°F 

(382°C), and at 300 hours is predicted to be down to 690°F (366°C) for the specified boundary 

conditions. At this point in the transient calculation, the rate of change of local temperatures in the 

system is about -0.2°F/hr (-0.1°C/hr). The rate of cooling is very slow due to the huge thermal mass of 

the package and its fuel load. Projections of the cooling rate indicate that it would take an additional 175-

200 hours to reach a new post-fire steady state. 
 7.10 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak)

Outer Shell

Neutron Shield

Gamma Shield (Outer)

Gamma Sheild (Inner)

Support Rails

Basket Plates

Impact Limiter (Peak)

Drain Plug/Closure Seal (Peak)

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Extrapolated Data Set

NIST Data Set

Figure 7.8. Maximum Temperature Histories for TN-68 Package Components During 300 hr of 

Transient 

The trends in Figure 7.8 show that the overall thermal response of the package to the fire transient is 

essentially an accommodation to the new higher-temperature boundary conditions extrapolated from the 

conditions predicted at the end of 30 hours in the NIST fire analysis. The temperature of the fuel and 

basket is largely unaffected by the heat input to the package from the fire; the increase in peak clad 

temperature and peak basket temperature is due almost entirely to having no heat removal from the 

package during the fire and for about an hour immediately afterwards. After the ambient temperatures 

drop enough to allow heat removal from the package, the rate of increase of the peak clad temperature 

begins to level off and then finally turn around about 40 hours into the transient. 

Viewed on the scale of 300 hours, the fire portion of the transient appears as a large but relatively shortlived spike in the boundary conditions that significantly affects only the outer shell, neutron shield, and 

impact limiters, and to a lesser extent the outer and inner gamma shielding. These components show a 

rapid temperature increase during the fire, but after the end of the fire immediately begin a rapid cool 

down. Peak component temperatures for the TN-68 package in the fire simulation are summarized in 

Table 7.1. 
 7.11 

Table 7.1. TN-68 Peak Component Temperatures 

During Fire Transient 

Component 

Maximum Temperature

(COBRA-SFS) 

 °F (°C) 

Time 

(hours) 

Fuel Cladding 845 (452) 40 

Basket Plate 836 (447) 40 

Basket Rail 801 (427) 8.3 

Inner Shell 857 (458) 7.0 

Gamma Shell 886 (474) 7.0 

Package Bottom 762 (406) 7.0 

Seals 811 (433) 7.0 

Neutron Shield 1355 (735) 6.9 

Outer Shell 1789 (976) 6.3 

 

7.2 Holtec HI-STAR 100 Fire Transient Results 

The ANSYS model of the HI-STAR 100 package consists of a total of 149,100 standard computational 

elements and 288 superelements that are solved for each time step. Similar to the COBRA-SFS model of 

the TN-68, this model yields an overwhelming volume of output that must be processed to produce a 

coherent picture of the package response. The following three subsections present the peak temperatures 

versus time for selected components, as determined with ANSYS for the HI-STAR 100 subject to the 

hypothetical fire transient conditions described in Section 6. 

7.2.1 HI-STAR 100 During the Fire 

Figure 7.9 shows the initial temperature response of the HI-STAR 100 package predicted with ANSYS 

during the fire portion of the transient. The maximum temperature of the HI-STAR 100 package surface 

increases rapidly to a peak temperature of 1831°F (999°C) around 6 hours into the fire. The maximum 

temperature of the inner shell material, which defines the primary containment boundary, also shows a 

relatively rapid increase, reaching a peak of 1447°F (786°C) approximately 6.75 hours into the fire. This 

corresponds to the peak boundary condition temperatures defined by the fire. The fire temperatures 

predicted in the NIST analysis peak at 6.75 hours, and then drop off rapidly thereafter as the fire burns 

itself out. The peak temperature of the inner shell material is predicted to lead the gamma shield material 

peak temperature because the elements selected to define the primary containment boundary include the 

bottom and top forgings and lid. A large section of the top forging is directly exposed to the fire (unshrouded by the gamma shield, neutron shield/fin section and upper impact limiter). 

Similar to the TN-68 results with the COBRA-SFS model, the internal components of the HI-STAR 100 

package also show a very slow thermal response during the fire. The gamma shield takes more than half 
 7.12 

an hour to show any noticeable increase in temperature. Nearly three hours elapse before the internal 

canister shell temperature rises as much as 1 °F (0.6 °C) above the initial steady-state peak temperature of 

548°F (287°C). In the first five hours of the fire, the peak temperatures of the basket structure, poison 

plates, and fuel rise only by about 2 °F (1 °C). This is approximately an hour later than the TN-68 

response and can be attributed to the additional thermal barrier of the MPC canister. In these five hours, 

the peak temperature on the outer skin surrounding the neutron shield of the HI-STAR 100 is predicted to 

go up to 1809°F (987°C), and the peak temperature on the gamma shields increases to 1332°F (722°C). 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

01234567

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel (Peak)

Outer Shell

Gamma Shield (Outer)

Inner Shell (Primary Contaiment Boundary)

Canister Shell

Basket Structure/ BORAL Plates

Limiter Base Structure (Peak)

Lid/Vent Port/Drain Port

End of Fire

Figure 7.9. Maximum Temperature Histories for HI-STAR 100 Package Components During Fire 

Transient 

By the end of the fire, marking the point at which all volatile flammables are consumed, the peak clad 

temperature has risen to only 803°F (428°C). The outer shell of the package is predicted to have a peak 

temperature of 1801°F (983°C) at the end of the fire, with the outer gamma shield at 1404°F (762°C). 

This is a bit warmer than the TN-68 at this point in time. The difference is due mainly to the larger 

thermal resistance to radial heat flow in the thinner skin of the HI-STAR 100, compared to the TN-68. 

However, both packages tend to perform similarly overall. 

As with the TN-68 results, the large difference in the predicted rate of increase in temperature for the 

internal and external components of the HI-STAR 100 is because the neutron shield and gamma shield 

insulate the basket and fuel assemblies from the fire. The slow response is due mainly to the huge 

thermal inertia of the package components themselves. Even under the severe heat load imposed by the 

sustained high temperatures of a fire lasting nearly 7 hours, it takes time to raise the temperature of such a 

large mass of material, despite its internal heat generation component. 
 7.13 

7.2.2 HI-STAR 100 Short-Term Post-Fire Response 

Figure 7.10 shows the temperature response of selected components of the package during the first 30 

hours of the ANSYS transient simulation. During the fire, the material in the neutron shield is predicted 

to achieve temperatures that will heavily degrade it. As noted in Section 7.1.1 for the predicted loss of the 

TN-68 package’s neutron shield, the HI-STAR 100 is also designed to attenuate neutron radiation to 

acceptable levels (see 10 CFR 71.51 [1]) following an accident without the assistance of the neutron 

shield material. However, the neutron shield’s heat transfer capability is expected to deteriorate rapidly 

during the fire. In the ANSYS evaluation, it was assumed that the neutron shield material (HOLTITE-A) 

remains in place and unaffected during the fire, but instantly degrades at the end of the fire, to be replaced 

by hot air. This maximizes the heat input into the package. 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel (Peak)

Outer Shell

Gamma Shield (Outer)

Inner Shell (Primary Contaiment Boundary)

Canister Shell

Basket Structure/ BORAL Plates

Limiter Base Structure (Peak)

Lid/Vent Port/Drain Port

End of Fire

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.10. Maximum Temperature Histories for HI-STAR 100 Package Components During First 

30 hr of Transient 

This is a conservative representation of the effect of the fire on the neutron shield from the standpoint of 

the thermal response of the system. The thermal conductivity of HOLTITE-A is approximately 16 times 

that of air, so extending the residence time to the end of the fire results in the calculation somewhat 

overestimating the rate of heat flow into the package during the fire. This will result in higher calculated 

temperatures on the package internals than would occur if degradation were accounted for at a more 

realistic rate during the fire. As an additional conservatism, the latent heat absorbed in the degradation of 

the material, which would tend to decrease the external heat flux due to the fire, is also neglected. 
 7.14 

The results shown in Figure 7.10 demonstrate that once the fire is over, the predicted peak temperatures 

on outboard components begin to drop rapidly (i.e., outer shell, gamma shield, etc.). This is primarily a 

response to the rapid decrease of the boundary temperatures, as can be seen in Figure 7.11, which shows 

the outer shell surface temperature predicted with ANSYS compared to the tunnel ceiling temperature and 

the temperature of the air above the package derived from the NIST calculations and used as boundary 

conditions. 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Outer Shell

Top Air Temperature

Ceiling Temperature

End of Fire

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.11. Maximum HI-STAR 100 Package Surface Temperature Compared to NIST Boundary 

Condition Temperatures 

Figure 7.10 shows that the peak temperatures on the gamma shields and inner shell of the package 

decrease after the end of the fire. However, the temperature decrease for these components is much 

slower than for the outer shell because the internal components must absorb the thermal load from the 

fuel. Similarly, the peak temperature of the basket shows a continuous increase for nearly three hours 

after the end of the fire, as does the peak clad temperature. 

The plot of the predicted peak clad temperature in Figure 7.10 shows that the thermal output of the fire 

itself has little effect on the fuel or its accommodating basket. As discussed for the TN-68 in Section 

7.1.3, the observed rise in peak clad temperature is mainly a response to the effects of the external 

boundary conditions on the rate of heat transfer from the package. The heat of the fire does not result in 

much of an increase in the package internal temperatures, but the increase in the external air temperature 

severely compromises the rate of heat rejection from the package, and continues to do so long after the 

fire is out. This is illustrated very clearly by the plot of the peak clad temperature alone shown in Figure 
 7.15 

7.12 for the first 50 hours of the NIST transient. The fire is very nearly over before the peak clad 

temperatures show a discernable increase. 

550

600

650

700

750

800

850

900

950

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel (Peak)

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

NIST Data Set Extrapolated Data Set

Figure 7.12. Peak Fuel Clad Temperature History in HI-STAR 100 During First 50 hr of Transient 

Figure 7.12 shows that a little after 5 hours into the fire, the global peak clad temperature begins an 

almost adiabatic heat up (approximately 69°F/hr (38°C/hr)) because the fire prevents normal heat removal 

from the package by natural convection at the surface. This adiabatic heat-up continues for about an hour 

after the end of the fire, until the package shell temperature drops low enough to permit some heat 

removal from the package by radiation to the tunnel surfaces. 

The initial fuel cladding temperature rise shown to initiate shortly before the end of the fire (at 

approximately 6 hours) occurs on rods in the outer periphery of the basket in the portion of the package 

facing the top of the tunnel. The fuel in this region is initially rising in temperature faster than that 

residing in the center of the basket. This continues until about 8 hours into the transient. However, by 

this time the fire has been over for more than an hour, and internal component temperatures are 

redistributing radially throughout the package, causing the peak fuel cladding temperature to shift from 

one assembly to another. The peak cladding temperature drops for a brief period, due to this internal 

spreading of heat, but by about 15 hours begins to rise again as fuel in the center of the basket heats up 

enough to exceed the temperature of the fuel on the outer periphery. (Just as with the TN-68 results, the 

peak fuel clad temperature is captured in the global summary as it moves from assembly to assembly 

within the fuel basket during the transient.) 
 7.16 

The peak clad temperature continues to increase, because the hot air flow and hot tunnel surfaces 

resulting from the fire are continuing to compromise heat rejection from the package surface. The 

package is designed to reject heat to ambient at 100°F (38°C), but the air within the tunnel environment is 

still above 200°F (93°C) at 30 hours, decreasing from a peak of 1557°F (847°C) at the end of the fire. 

However, by the end of 30 hours, the rate of increase in the peak clad temperature has dropped to only 

about 2 °F/hour (1 °C/hour), in response to the decreasing boundary temperatures. The global peak 

cladding temperature reaches a maximum of 930°F (499°C) at approximately 35 hours into the transient. 

The maximum temperature history of the seals in the package lid closure, ports, and port covers is shown 

in Figure 7.13. The curve in this figure represents the global peak of all seal material utilized in the HISTAR 100. These temperatures are gathered by querying nodes at the seals’ locations, even though the 

seals were not explicitly represented in the model. As shown in this figure, the maximum temperature in 

these regions is 1181°F (638°C), reached at the end of the fire. The maximum temperature then gradually 

begins to decrease as the transient proceeds into the post-fire cool down. Despite an abrupt rise in 

temperature during the fire, the peak temperature in the seal region remains below the lowest reported 

maximum continuous-use temperature limit of 1200°F (649°C) for the metallic mechanical seal material. 

(See Table 4.1.1 of the SAR [10] for the HI-STAR 100.) 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Lid/Vent Port/Drain Port

End of Fire

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.13. Maximum Global HI-STAR 100 Closure/Port Seal Temperature History During First 

30 hr of Transient 

Bolts were not explicitly represented at the package lid and buttress interface in the ANSYS model of the 

HI-STAR 100. However, the depicted seal temperature history conservatively represents the peak 

temperature history of the closure bolts due to the manner in which heat has to migrate around the top 
 7.17 

impact limiter, into the package upper forging (between the top limiter and neutron shield/fin section), 

through the closure seal location, and then into the closure. This is due to the limited conduction offered 

by the stainless steel-encapsulated cellular honeycomb material. 

7.2.3 HI-STAR 100 Long-Term Post-Fire Response 

The trends exhibited by the temperatures of the various components of the HI-STAR 100 package at the 

end of the 30-hour transient indicate that the system is not yet at a new steady state. Boundary 

temperatures predicted by NIST were extrapolated from 30 hours out to 300 hours using a power function 

to realistically model cool down of the tunnel environment. (The extrapolated values are presented in 

Figures 6.5 and 6.6 for the air temperatures and wall temperatures, respectively.) 

To explore the effects of prolonged exposure to post-fire conditions in the tunnel, the calculations were 

carried out for the full 300 hours (273 hours after fire cessation). As discussed previously, this is 

equivalent to assuming that the package will be left in the tunnel for up to 12.5 days without any 

emergency response. This assumption is not realistic, but is highly conservative, defining a relatively 

severe long-term ambient environment around the package. 

The same conservative assumptions applied to the TN-68 evaluation for external convection during the 

fire and post-fire duration were applied to the HI-STAR 100 evaluation. A purely forced convection heat 

transfer regime and associated heat transfer coefficient was assumed for the first 30 hours of the 

simulation, then a purely free convection regime and associated coefficient was assumed for the 

remainder of the calculation (t ≥ 30 hours). (Refer to Section 6 for detailed discussion of the heat transfer 

boundary conditions on the package surfaces.) 

Figure 7.14 shows the temperature response of the various components of the package for the long term 

transient calculation to 300 hours. As previously discussed, the dashed portion of the curve is used to 

distinguish the results obtained with boundary conditions that were extrapolated from the NIST 

calculation. As noted in Section 7.2.2 (see Figure 7.12), the highest peak clad temperature is reached at 

approximately 35 hours, with a value of 930°F (499°C). This is 128 °F (71 °C) below the regulatory limit 

of 1058°F (570°C) for accident conditions. The peak temperature for the basket/poison plate structure is 

reached at about the same time. 

All other temperatures in the package decrease steadily after the end of the fire. By 100 hours, the peak 

clad temperature has dropped to 817°F (436°C). Similar to the results for the TN-68, this system is not 

yet at a new post-fire steady-state by this time (see Section 7.1.3, Figure 7.8). The HI-STAR 100 is 

nearing its new post-fire steady-state at about 200 hours, with rates of temperature change on the order of 

approximately -0.3 °F/hr (-0.2 °C/hr). After 250 hours, the peak clad temperature has dropped to 747°F 

(397°C), and at 300 hours, it is predicted to be 740°F (393°C) for the specified boundary conditions. At 

this point in the transient calculation, the rate of decrease in local temperatures in the system is less than 

0.1 °F/hr (0.06 °C/hr), and the conditions can be considered as essentially a new post-fire steady state. 

The trends in Figure 7.14 show that the overall thermal response of the package to the fire transient is 

essentially an accommodation to the new higher temperature boundary conditions represented by the 
 7.18 

conditions predicted at the end of 30 hours in the NIST fire analysis. Viewed on the scale of 300 hours 

(i.e., from pre-fire to post-fire steady state), the fire portion of the transient appears as a large but 

relatively short-lived spike in the boundary conditions that significantly affects only the outer shell, 

impact limiters, and the neutron shield, and to a lesser extent, the gamma shield, inner shell, and canister. 

The outer shell and neutron shield show a rapid temperature increase during the fire, but after the end of 

the fire immediately begin to rapidly cool down. Peak component temperatures for the HI-STAR 100 

over the entire 300-hr transient fire simulation are summarized in Table 7.2. 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel (Peak)

Outer Shell

Gamma Shield (Outer)

Inner Shell (Primary Contaiment Boundary)

Canister Shell

Basket Structure/ BORAL Plates

Limiter Base Structure (Peak)

Lid/Vent Port/Drain Port

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Extrapolated Data Set

NIST Data Set

Figure 7.14. Maximum Temperature Histories for HI-STAR 100 Package Components During 300 

hrs of the Transient 

The temperature of the fuel and basket is largely unaffected by the heat input to the package from the fire. 

The increase in peak clad temperature and peak basket temperature is due almost exclusively to having 

essentially no heat removal from the package during the fire and for about an hour immediately afterward. 

After ambient temperatures drop enough to allow heat removal from the package, the rate of increase of 

the peak clad temperature begins to level off, and finally turns around at about 35 hours into the transient. 

The TN-68 system displays a rapid peak cladding temperature increase during the interval from about 6 to 

8 hours of the transient, followed by a much slower rate of increase until about 16 hours, at which point it 

begins to rise again toward its final peak value, reached at approximately 40 hours. The peak cladding 

temperature predicted for the HI-STAR 100 follows a similar pattern, but with a somewhat more dynamic 
 7.19 

response. After reaching a peak at approximately 10 hours, the peak cladding temperature actually 

decreases for a time, until about 15 hours, at which point it begins to rise toward its final peak value, 

reached at about 35 hours. 

Table 7.2. HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Peak Component 

Temperatures During Fire Transient 

Component 

Maximum 

Temperature 

(ANSYS) 

 °F (°C) 

Time 

(hours) 

Fuel Cladding 930 (499) 35 

MPC Basket 911 (488) 35 

Boral 911 (488) 35 

Canister Shell 1041 (560) 7.3 

Inner Shell and Forgings 1447 (786) 6.8 

Gamma Shield 1404 (762) 6.8 

Package Skin 1831 (999) 6 

Lid/Vent/Drain Port Seals 1181 (638) 6.8 

Impact Limiter Skin 1826 (997) 6 

Impact Limiter Structure 1591 (866) 6.8 

The difference in response of the peak clad temperature in the two packages is due to three main factors. 

There are significant differences in construction and thickness of the finned neutron shield regions in the 

two package designs. There is about a 15% difference in the thermal inertia associated with the spent fuel 

assemblies in each package (the HI-STAR 100 contains 24 PWR fuel assemblies, compared to 68 BWR 

fuel assemblies within the TN-68 package), and the two packages have very different basket designs. In 

addition, the high thermal conductivity of the HI-STAR 100 aluminum honeycomb impact limiters aids in 

ramping up component temperatures faster in the ends of the package, compared to the effect of the 

redwood impact limiters on the TN-68 package. 

The TN-68 does not utilize an internal canister to hold spent fuel. It relies instead on the cask shell 

structural integrity and seals to prevent the release of radioactive materials from the fuel compartment. 

The maximum predicted seal temperature, which is seen by the package lid seal, is 811°F (433°C), and 

occurs at the end of the fire. This is below the peak seal temperature predicted for the HI-STAR 100 and 

is primarily due to the relatively low conductivity of the redwood material used in the TN-68 impact 

limiter design, compared to the aluminum honeycomb in the HI-STAR 100 impact limiter design. 

When comparing the heating trends associated with the HI-STAR 100 and the TN-68 (comparing results 

shown in Figure 7.14 and in Figure 7.8), it appears that the HI-STAR 100 generally heats up faster during 

the fire than the TN-68. However, this is mainly an artifact of the differences between the initial steadystate conditions in the two packages, different exterior packaging, and differences in their respective fuel 

loading. The HI-STAR 100 inner components enter the fire transient hotter by 100 °F to 200 °F (56 °C to 
 7.20 

111 °C) than the corresponding components of the TN-68. These temperature differences are due to the 

redundant encapsulation provided by the MPC canister in the HI-STAR system, the number of fuel 

assemblies that the decay heat is distributed over (24 for the HI-STAR 100 versus 68 for the TN-68), and 

the level of shrouding of the package surface by the support device. The HI-STAR 100 is heavily 

shrouded by its support cradle; the TN-68 outer surface is essentially bare to ambient conditions. 

In addition to these essentially incidental differences, there are some small differences in design that 

affect the rate of heat-up of the outer shells of the two packages. The TN-68 has a 50% thicker solid outer 

skin which distributes the heat from the fire transient circumferentially to cooler regions of the package 

more effectively than the thinner outer skin of the HI-STAR 100 package. The outer skin of the HISTAR 100 package consists of relatively narrow welded metal strips, rather than a single steel sheet. The 

0.19-inch (0.48 cm) fillet welds joining the metal strips (which were explicitly accounted for in the 

ANSYS model) present an additional barrier to circumferential heat flow in the HI-STAR 100 package 

outer shell. However, because both packages present a very large thermal mass to the fire and have very 

similar overall designs, they respond in essentially the same manner to the fire transient. The differences 

shown in these two sets of results consist mainly of minor time-shifts in the response to the imposed 

boundary conditions, and in general the behavior of the two sets of curves makes them almost 

indistinguishable. 

7.3 NAC LWT Fire Transient Results 

The ANSYS model of the NAC LWT package consists of a total of 50,673 standard computational 

elements and 12 superelements that are solved for each time step. Similar to the TN-68 and HI-STAR 

100 models, this model yields a large amount of output that has been processed to characterize the 

package response. The following three subsections discuss the hypothetical package response to the fire 

transient conditions described in Section 6 in terms of the peak temperatures versus time for selected 

components. 

7.3.1 NAC LWT During the Fire 

Figure 7.15 shows the initial temperature response for the NAC LWT package and ISO container, as 

predicted with ANSYS, during the fire portion of the transient. The maximum temperature on the 

exterior surface of the ISO container surrounding the NAC LWT package increases rapidly to a peak 

temperature of 1592°F (867°C) at around 6 hours into the fire. This is 307 °F (170 °C) below the 

HI-STAR 100 external surface peak temperature, and 265 °F (147 °C) below that of the TN-68. This 

difference is due to the substantial view that the hottest portion of the ISO container has of cooler nearby 

surfaces. The top of the ISO container can exchange energy by thermal radiation with the package body 

and the interior surfaces of the sides and bottom of the ISO container. In contrast, the bare external 

surfaces of the HI-STAR 100 and the TN-68 see only the fire and the hot walls and ceiling of the tunnel. 

The maximum temperature of the exterior surface of the NAC LWT package is 1525°F (829°C), only 

slightly lower than the peak temperature on the ISO container surface. The maximum temperature of the 

package inner shell material, which defines the primary containment boundary along with the bolted lid, 
 7.21 

shows a more gradual increase than the outer shell temperature, reaching a peak of 1261°F (683°C) at 

about 7 hours into the fire. 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

01234567

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak) Cask Inner Surface

Cask Outer Surface Impact Limiters

Lid Seal Drain/Vent Port Seals

Cask Body Lead End Lead

ISO Container End of Fire

Figure 7.15. NAC LWT Component Maximum Temperature Histories During Fire Transient 

Unlike the TN-68 and the HI-STAR 100, the internal components of the LWT package, particularly the 

fuel assembly, exhibit a noticeable thermal response during the fire. The peak fuel cladding temperature 

begins to rise at about two hours elapsed time, and the package structural components show a fairly rapid 

rise in temperature in the first hour of the fire. This occurs primarily because this package has 

considerably less thermal inertia than the two larger multi-assembly packages. The additional heat 

transfer paths available into the LWT package are also contributing factors, resulting from the fuel 

assembly being exposed within a cavity at each end of the package. As the inner shell surrounding the 

assembly ends heats up, radiation exchange within the cavities generates cladding temperatures at the 

ends of the fuel rods that are significantly higher than the temperatures at the center, as illustrated in 

Figure 7.16. 

By the end of the fire (at approximately 7 hours), the predicted peak fuel cladding temperature, which 

occurs in the end region of the fuel, has reached 884°F (473°C) and is still rising. This value continues to 

increase for another three hours, but does not exceed the currently accepted short term temperature limit 

of 1058°F (570°C) for Zircaloy-clad spent nuclear fuel under accident conditions [23]. 
 7.22 

Other components of the package, in contrast to the peak cladding temperature, reach their peak 

temperature values at or very close to the end of the fire. This behavior closely follows the sudden 

decrease in the external thermal load on the package as the fire burns itself out. This can readily be seen 

in the peak temperatures reached on the gamma shield and the neutron shielding structures. 

Figure 7.16. Lumped Fuel Assembly Temperature Distribution 7 hr into Transient 

The gamma shielding is provided by a lead layer between the inner and outer shells as well as a lead billet 

in the welded base (i.e., the end opposite the package lid). The temperature of the lead in the package 

body reaches a maximum of 1369°F (743°C) at 6.75 hours elapsed time, and the temperature of the end 

billet peaks at the same time, at 1413°F (767°C). These temperatures are considerably greater than the 

established safe operating limit of 600°F (316°C) [11] for this material, and are significantly above the 

melting temperature of 622°F (328°C) for lead. High temperatures are sustained in these components 

long enough for the lead layer to entirely melt during the transient. 

Figure 7.17 illustrates the thermal response of the lead shielding layer in the package body, showing the 

peak temperature in this component over time, and temperature histories of selected nodes within the lead 

region. Table 7.3 summarizes the process of melting and resolidification of the lead material in response 

to the fire transient. Melting of the lead begins at about 1.7 hrs, when the peak temperature in the end 

billet reaches the melting temperature of lead. The peak temperature in the package body shield is not far 

behind, reaching melting temperature about 9 minutes later. 
 7.23 

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Global Peak (cask body shielding)

near cask base (node 745)

near cask mid-section (node 505)

under expansion tank (node 322)

melting temperature of lead

Figure 7.17. Temperature History of Selected Elements in Cask Body Lead in NAC LWT Package 

Table 7.3. NAC LWT Lead Shielding Response to Fire Transient 

Lead Shielding Thermal Response 

Time 

(hours) 

End billet lead begins to melt 1.69 

package body shielding lead begins to melt 1.83 

Melting within package body shielding near base 3.16 

Melting within package body shielding near end of basket region 4.02 

Melting within package body shielding near midsection 4.07-4.13 

Melting within package body shielding under expansion tank 6.5 

All lead shielding in molten state 9 

End billet lead resolidified 16.05 

Package body shielding lead begins to solidify 27 

All lead shielding material resolidified 33.76 

These initial melting peak temperatures occur on the very outer edge of these components, and 

considerably more time is required for interior temperatures in the lead region to reach melting 

temperature. As shown by the individual node temperature histories in Figure 7.17, at least another hour 
 7.24 

elapses before an interior node near the base of the package body shield reaches melting temperature, at 

about 3.16 hours into the transient. Most of another hour elapses before the middle section of the package 

body shielding reaches melting temperature, at about 4 hours into the transient. 

The temperature history of an interior node near the package mid-section shows the effect of the phase 

change process in the change in slope as the temperature approaches the melting point. The energy 

absorbed in the phase change process (due to the latent heat of fusion, at 10.4 Btu/lbm (24.2 kJ/kg)) tends 

to slow the rate of temperature increase in the interior nodes of the region. A similar effect is seen in the 

temperature history of the selected node in the region under the expansion tank, although the temperature 

response of this node is also showing the thermal shielding effect of the expansion tank. The temperature 

rise is much slower at this location, and this element does not reach melting temperature until very close 

to the end of the fire, at about 6.5 hours elapsed time. An additional 2.5 hours is required for this portion 

of the cask body shielding to entirely melt. 

The peak temperatures for the lead components show that the lead in the end billet begins to solidify at 

about 16 hours into the transient. It takes an additional 11 hours (about 27 hours elapsed time) before 

elements in the package body shield cool back down to the melting temperature, beginning a rather slow 

process of solidification. It takes another 6.8 hours (to about 33.76 hours elapsed time) before the peak 

lead temperature in the package body shielding drops below 622°F (328°C). 

To maximize heat input to the package during the transient, the lead material was treated analytically in a 

manner that allowed the greatest possible heat transfer into the package from the fire. It was assumed that 

thermal expansion and expansion of the lead due to phase change would result in the lead entirely filling 

the cavity between the inner and outer steel shells of the package. As a result, there would be no gap 

resistance to heat flowing inward from the outer shell of the package. For the thermal analysis, possible 

slumping of the lead as a consequence of melting was conservatively ignored. (However, the potential for 

reduced gamma shielding as a result of the lead slumping is considered in Section 8.1.2.) 

The response of the neutron shielding material was also treated in a manner to maximize heat input to the 

package. As described in Section 5.3, the temperatures of the nodes representing the main tank and 

overflow tank, both of which contain a 56% ethylene glycol and water mixture, were monitored for 

temperatures indicating rupture and evaporation throughout the transient solution. Similar to assumptions 

in the standard fire analysis included in the SAR [11], the liquid in the tank is expected to lose its 

shielding capability when the temperature exceeds its 350°F (177°C) boiling point. The NAC LWT is 

designed to attenuate neutron radiation to acceptable levels (see 10 CFR 71.51 [1]) following an accident 

without the assistance of the neutron shield material (as are the TN-68 and HI-STAR 100; see Section 7.1 

and 7.2 above). However, the loss of the neutron shield affects the rate of heat transfer into and out of the 

package during and after the fire transient. 

As a measure of conservatism, tank rupture was considered to occur only after the average ethylene 

glycol temperature for each tank exceeded 350°F (177°C). This assumption effectively delays rupture to 

a slightly later point in the transient than might be expected, retaining the higher heat transfer rate through 

the liquid for a longer period before replacing it with lower conductivity air, and thereby maximizing heat 

input into the package. The model predicted that the inner neutron shield tank and the outer expansion 
 7.25 

tank would rupture at ~1.5 hours. Following rupture, the effective conductivity of the tank was 

significantly decreased, due to the ethylene glycol volume being expelled and replaced with air. As a 

further conservatism, the energy absorbed in the phase change, due to the latent heat of vaporization for 

the ethylene glycol and water mixture, was not subtracted from the heat input to the package. 

7.3.2 NAC LWT Short-Term Post-Fire Response 

Figure 7.18 shows the peak temperatures predicted for various components of the package during the first 

30 hours of the ANSYS transient simulation based on the NIST fire simulation results. The cladding 

peak and average temperatures continue to rise after the fire, just as in the analyses for the TN-68 and 

HI-STAR 100 packages, and for much the same reason. The ambient conditions in the tunnel, 

immediately following the fire, severely retard the rate at which the fuel decay heat can be removed from 

the package. 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak)

Cask Inner Surface

Cask Outer Surface

Impact Limiters

Lid Seal

Drain/Vent Port Seals

Cask Body Lead

End Lead

ISO Container

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.18. NAC LWT Package Component Maximum Temperature Histories for First 30 hours 

of Fire Transient 

Figure 7.18 shows that the peak temperatures for all package components begin to decrease shortly after 

the end of the fire. The peak cladding temperature reaches its maximum value of 1001°F (589°C) at 10 

hours. This is 57 °F (32 °C) below the short term limit of 1058°F (570°C), and 381 °F (212 °C) below 

the temperature at which Zircaloy fuel rods actually fail by burst rupture, which is approximately 1382°F 
 7.26 

(750°C) [25]. (The maximum temperature for the basket reaches its peak of 958°F (512°C) at about 8 

hours into the transient, but this temperature curve is omitted from Figure 7.18 for clarity.) 

Once the fire is over, however, the predicted peak temperatures on outboard components (i.e., the ISO 

container and package outer surface) begin to drop rapidly in response to the rapid decrease in the 

boundary temperatures, as illustrated in Figure 7.19. This figure shows the outer shell surface 

temperature predicted with ANSYS, compared to the tunnel ceiling temperature and the temperature of 

the air above the ISO container, derived from the NIST calculations used as boundary conditions. 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hour)

Temperature (°F)

Ceiling Temperature

Top Air Temperature

ISO Container

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.19. Maximum ISO Container Surface Temperature History Compared with NIST 

Boundary Condition Temperatures 

As a result of the low thermal inertia of this package, peak temperatures in the various internal 

components occur within 2-3 hours of the fire being extinguished, rather than 35 or 40 hours later, as in 

the TN-68 and HI-STAR 100, respectively. Because of the heating of the ends of the fuel rods due to 

thermal radiation as a result of the fire, the average fuel temperature gradually increases to a maximum of 

977°F (470°C). This peak is reached at 9 hours elapsed time, as shown in Figure 7.20. 

The maximum temperature histories of the seals in the drain/vent ports and the lid are shown for the first 

30 hours in Figure 7.21. (The calculated values were gathered by querying nodes at the seals’ locations, 

since the seals were not explicitly represented in the model.) The drain and vent ports are sealed with 

Teflon O-rings. The bolted lid is sealed by both metallic and Teflon O-ring seals. The drain and vent 

port seals reach a maximum temperature of 1407°F (764°C), and the lid seal reaches 1356°F (735°C) at 

the end of the fire. 
 7.27 

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1100

1200

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hour)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak)

Fuel (average)

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.20. Peak and Average Fuel Cladding Temperature Histories for NAC LWT Package 

During First 30 hr of Fire Transient 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Elapsed Time (hour)

Temperature (°F)

Lid Seal

Drain/Vent Port Seals

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Fire Duration Post-Fire Duration (NIST Data)

Figure 7.21. Maximum Seal Temperature Histories for Drain/Vent Ports and Package Lid During 

First 30 hr of Fire Transient 
 7.28 

These materials then gradually cool as the transient proceeds into the post-fire cool down. The extreme 

rise in temperature is due to the low thermal inertia associated with the LWT package and the close 

proximity of the seals to exterior surfaces subject to thermal radiation from the thin ISO container, which 

is in turn subject to thermal radiation and convection heat input from the tunnel environment. The 

predicted seal temperatures are far greater than the maximum continuous-use seal temperature limits of 

735°F (391°C) for the Teflon seals and 800°F (427°C) for the metallic seals. 

7.3.3 NAC LWT Long-Term Post-Fire Response 

As with the TN-68 and HI-STAR 100 analyses, the temperatures predicted in the NIST analysis were 

extrapolated from 30 hours to 300 hours using a power function in order to realistically model cool down 

of the tunnel environment. As discussed previously, this conservative approach is equivalent to assuming 

that the package will be left in the tunnel for nearly two weeks, without any emergency responder 

intervention. The same conservative assumptions used in the analysis of the TN-68 and HI-STAR 100 

were used to define the convection heat transfer boundary on the NAC LWT package. A purely forced 

convection heat transfer regime was assumed for the first 30 hours of the simulation, then a purely free 

convection regime was assumed for the remainder of the calculation (t ≥ 30 hours). (The extrapolated 

boundary conditions are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 for the tunnel air and surface temperatures, 

respectively.) Peak component temperatures for the NAC LWT over the entire transient fire simulation 

are reported in Table 7.4. 

Table 7.4. NAC LWT Peak Component Temperatures 

During Fire Transient 

Component 

Maximum 

Temperature 

(ANSYS) 

°F (°C) 

Time 

(hours) 

Fuel Cladding 1001 (539) 10 

Aluminum PWR Insert 958 (515) 8 

Inner Shell 1261 (683) 6.9 

Lead Gamma Shield: 

Package body 1369 (743) 6.75 

End billet 1413 (767) 6.75 

Outer Shell 1525 (829) 6 

Neutron Shield: 

Shield tank 1483 (806) 6 

Expansion tank 1524 (829) 6 

Lid Seal 1356 (732) 6.9 

Drain/Vent Ports 1410 (766) 6.75 

Impact Limiters 1521 (827) 6 

ISO Container 1592 (867) 6 
 7.29 

Figure 7.22 shows the temperature response of the various components of the package for the long term 

transient calculation to 300 hours. The maximum temperatures were reached within a short time after the 

end of the fire, and the LWT at 100 hours is very close to its new steady-state condition. This behavior is 

consistent with its lower thermal inertia, in comparison to the larger multi-assembly packages. 

Temperature distributions within the package for the final steady state will be slightly different than the 

original, due to the dissipation of the liquid neutron shield, changes in the surface emissivities because of 

the fire, and tunnel ambient conditions that differ from the hot-normal conditions assumed for the pre-fire 

steady state (i.e., lower ambient temperature and the absence of solar insolation). 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

Fuel Cladding (Peak)

Cask Inner Surface

Cask Outer Surface

Impact Limiters

Lid Seal

Drain/Vent Port Seals

Cask Body Lead

End Lead

ISO Container

End of Fire

End of NIST 20m Transient

Extrapolated Data Set

NIST Data Set

Figure 7.22. NAC LWT Package Component Maximum Temperature Histories During 300 hr 

Transient 
 8.1 

8 POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 

The potential consequences of a severe accident involving an SNF transportation package fall into two 

general categories: 1) the possibility of a direct radioactive dose to a member of the public due to a loss of 

either the neutron or gamma radiation shielding of the package, and 2) the potential release of radioactive 

material from the package due to a compromise of the containment boundary. Section 8.1 discusses 

potential loss of shielding events. Section 8.2 evaluates potential releases from each of the evaluated 

package designs. Section 8.3 provides a summary of the potential consequences of involving an SNF 

package in the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario. 

8.1 Potential Consequences of Loss of Shielding 

USNRC Staff evaluated the potential for increased neutron and gamma radiation dose rates from each of 

the three transportation packages (TN-68, HI-STAR 100, and NAC LWT) as a result of exposure to the 

Baltimore tunnel fire scenario. The analysis indicates that the regulatory dose rate limits for accident 

conditions, specified in 10 CFR 71.51, would not be exceeded by any of these packages in this fire 

scenario, even though all three packages would be expected to lose neutron shielding and the NAC LWT 

could possibly experience some loss of gamma shielding, as well. Section 8.1.1 describes the 

consequences of loss of the neutron shielding. Section 8.1.2 discusses the potential effects of loss of 

gamma shielding, with particular emphasis on the potential consequences of slump of lead shielding 

material in the NAC LWT. 

8.1.1 Neutron Shielding 

Neutron shielding in SNF transportation packages is typically provided by materials that have relatively 

low melting temperatures (such as hydrocarbon resins or polymers), or are liquid at ambient conditions 

(such as water or mixtures of water and glycol). These materials are not expected to survive the designbasis accidents specified in 10 CFR 71, and the analyses included in the SAR for an SNF transportation 

package typically assume loss of the neutron shield in all accident scenarios. 

The packages are designed to meet the regulatory radiation dose limits for all conditions of transport, 

including hypothetical accident conditions. (Refer to the respective SARs [9, 10, 11] of these three 

packages for details on the analyses supporting this design constraint). The severe conditions of the 

Baltimore tunnel fire scenario could do no more damage to the neutron shields of these SNF packages 

than is assumed in the required regulatory fire analyses. All three of the packages considered in this 

evaluation can meet the regulatory limits, even when their neutron shielding has been destroyed by fire. 

8.1.2 Gamma Shielding 

The effectiveness of gamma shielding materials can be reduced or lost in one of two ways:.1) the gamma 

shield material could be dislocated due to thermal effects, or 2) the gamma shield material could be lost 

from a package if the package’s outer wall was breached and the shield material subsequently melted. 

Reduction in the effectiveness of gamma shielding due to thermal effects such as thermal expansion or 
 8.2 

contraction, or slumping, could result in shielding material that may not be in the proper position to 

provide the degree of shielding required,. For loss of shielding material due to a breach, molten material 

might escape through the breach, reducing the amount of material available to provide the required 

gamma shielding. 

The TN-68 and the HI-STAR 100 packages would not experience a reduction in or loss of gamma 

shielding material effectiveness due to either of the two previously described mechanisms in this fire 

scenario. The gamma shielding in these packages is composed of multiple layers of carbon steel and 

stainless steel. Both types of steel have extremely high melting temperatures, in the range 2500-2800°F 

(1371-1538°C), which is far above the peak temperature attained on any package component in this fire 

scenario. 

The possibility of a decrease in the effectiveness of the gamma shielding for the NAC LWT package, 

however, cannot be ruled out. In the severe conditions of the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, the lead 

comprising the gamma shield of the NAC LWT is expected to begin to melt when the local temperature 

of the material reaches 622°F (328°C). This process of local phase change in the material absorbs 

additional energy from the fire due to the latent heat of fusion, which for lead is 10.4 Btu/lbm (24.2 

kJ/kg). The gamma shielding in the package body consists of approximately 24,441 lbm (11,089 kg) of 

lead, and will absorb about 254,000 Btu (2.7 x (108

) J or 74.5 kW-hr) in the process of melting. 

This process takes considerable time in this fire scenario, beginning at approximately 2 hours into the 

transient and extending beyond 9 hours elapsed time, and absorbs a significant amount of energy. In a 

short-duration fire, the thermal input from the fire may not be large enough to cause all of the lead to 

melt. In the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, however, this analysis predicts that the peak temperature of 

the gamma shielding material would be above the melting point of lead for approximately 25 hours, and 

the entire gamma shield becomes molten within the annular cavity in the steel shell and within the 

package base. 

Melting of the lead does not necessarily imply complete loss of gamma shielding, however. For a 

significant amount of shielding to be lost, a puncture must penetrate the 1.2-inch thick stainless steel 

package shell, to allow molten lead to flow out of the package. For the derailment in the Howard Street 

tunnel, the impact forces involved were not of a sufficient magnitude to result in a breach of the package 

wall. Therefore, there is no expectation of loss of gamma shielding due to loss of molten lead from the 

package in this scenario. 

In the absence of a breach of the package outer shell, the lead would be completely retained within the 

steel annulus of the package shell and within the package base. Even when molten from the effects of the 

fire, the lead would continue to act as a gamma shield. Some reduction of shielding effectiveness could 

occur, however, due to slumping of the lead within the confines of the annulus as it shrinks upon 

resolidification. This could result in the formation of voids between the package wall and the lead 

shielding material. 

The NAC LWT package is designed to accommodate some amount of void space between the steel and 

the lead, due to fabrication constraints. The lead shielding is poured in molten form into the steel 
 8.3 

annulus. The steel shell is heated to 550-650°F (288-343°C) during this process, and then allowed to cool 

to ambient temperature as the lead solidifies. Analyses presented in the SAR [11] conservatively assume 

a 0.35-inch (0.1374-cm) gap between the outer diameter of the lead and the inner surface of the package 

outer shell, due to lead shrinkage upon solidification and differential thermal expansion and contraction 

between the lead and the steel package body. Lead slump analyses in the SAR show that the package 

maintains gamma shielding when the lead slumps to fill this gap in the hypothetical drop accidents. The 

SAR analyses indicate dose rates below the regulatory limit of 1000 mrem/hr (10 mSv/hr) for the 

slumped condition. 

In the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, the slumping of the lead could be more severe than predicted for the 

analyses in the SAR, because of a larger increase in the volume of the annulus containing the lead. 

Thermal expansion of the package outer shell, due to the high temperatures reached by the steel, and 

increased hoop stress on the steel due to expansion of the molten lead, could result in a significant 

increase in the volume of the annulus between the inner and outer steel shells of the package. A 

conservative analysis suggests that the increase in the size of the cavity containing the lead shielding 

could be as great as 5%. When the molten lead resolidifies, it will not quite fill the enlarged cavity, 

resulting in extra void space between the lead and the steel shell of the package. 

Calculations were performed by NRC staff to determine the size of this void space, assuming that 

gravitational settling would result in the entire void space occupying a continuous volume within the 

annular cavity containing the lead shielding. For the horizontal orientation of the package assumed in this 

fire scenario, this results in a void volume extending the full length of the upper edge of the annulus, as 

illustrated in the cross-section diagrams in Figure 8.1. This figure shows a schematic representation of 

the configuration of the lead comprising the NAC LWT gamma shield before and after the fire, including 

conservative estimates of the change in dimensions of the cavity containing the lead shielding material. 

 

 before lead melting after lead melting 

Figure 8.1. Lead Shielding Configuration in the NAC LWT Before and After Lead Melting 
 8.4 

The analysis shows that for the horizontal orientation, the thickness of the lead in the upper region of the 

annulus could be reduced by up to about 2.3 inches. Because of the design of the gamma shielding, 

which extends at least 15.5 inches (39 cm) beyond the active fuel region and overhangs the cask inner 

cavity by 7.5 inches (19 cm) at either end, the horizontal orientation of the package is the most adverse 

orientation for lead thinning as a result of melting and relocation due to gravitational settling. If the cask 

were vertical, the total height of the void volume would be only 10.5 inches (27 cm), resulting in reduced 

shielding for only about 3 inches at the top of the cask inner cavity in a region of relatively low activity, 

while the shielding remained at full thickness in the active fuel region of the assembly. Geometric 

considerations show that if the cask were merely tilted at some angle to the vertical, rather than being 

fully horizontal, a large portion of the void volume would be taken up in the upper end of the annular 

cavity containing the lead shielding material. As a result, there would be less thinning of the shielding 

thickness, and the thinning would extend over a smaller area. There would therefore be a lesser potential 

radiation dose resulting from reduction of shielding. 

An estimate of the potential radiation dose resulting from the maximum possible localized thinning of the 

lead shielding with the cask in a horizontal orientation is provided in Table 8.1. The total potential dose 

rates in Table 8.1 are due to radiation only, and include the increased neutron dose rate due to the loss of 

the liquid neutron shield (as documented in the SAR [11] for the NAC LWT), plus the increased ionizing 

radiation dose rate due to the thinning of the gamma shield. Thinning of the gamma shielding would not 

result in any release of radioactive material from inside the package. (See Section 8.2 for discussion of 

potential dose rates due to release of radioactive material.) The safety issue due to lead slumping is 

strictly a matter of the possible dose to first responders from a package involved in a severe fire accident 

scenario. However, as shown in Table 8.1, this dose rate does not exceed the accident limit of 

1000 mrem/hr (10 mSv/hr) at one meter from the package surface, as specified in 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 

173. 

Table 8.1. Potential Dose Estimate from NAC LWT with Reduced Shielding 

Location 

Intact Package 

mrem/hr (mSv/hr) 

After lead melt 

mrem/hr (mSv/hr)

Regulatory Limit * 

mrem/hr (mSv/hr)

Neutron: 7.09 (0.0709) Neutron: 177.13 (1.773) 

Surface Gamma: 48.62 (0.4862) Gamma: 1216 (12.16) 

 Total: 55.71 (0.5571) Total: 1393 (13.93) 

Neutron: 50.93 (0.5093) 

1 m from surface Total: 14.99 (0.1499) Gamma: 331.3 (3.313) 1000 (10) 

 Total: 382.2 (3.822) 

*from 49CFR173 and 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2) 

This conclusion is consistent with the results of analyses presented in the package SAR [11] for reduction 

of gamma shielding due to lead slumping as a consequence of the hypothetical drop accidents specified in 

10 CFR 71. In the analyses presented in the SAR for these hypothetical accidents, the maximum dose 

rates do not exceed the design limits specified in 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 173, and are well below the 

limit of 1000 mrem/hr (10 mSv/hr) at one meter from the package surface. 
 8.5 

8.2 Potential Release Issues 

USNRC Staff evaluated the potential for a release of radioactive material from each of the three 

transportation packages (HI-STAR 100, TN-68 and NAC LWT) analyzed for the Baltimore tunnel fire 

scenario. The analysis indicates that there would be no release expected from the HI-STAR 100 package. 

However, the possibility of a small release cannot be entirely ruled out for either the TN-68 or NAC LWT 

packages, because temperatures during the fire or cool down period exceed the manufacturer’s 

recommended service temperature limits for the package lid seals and seals on the vent and drain ports. 

The thermal analyses show that the potential release would not involve a release of spent fuel or fission 

products, but could possibly result from CRUD detaching from the fuel rods. Any potential release from 

either the TN-68 or NAC LWT package would be small—less than an A2 quantity. An A2 quantity18 is 

defined in 49CFR173.403 as the maximum activity of Class 7 (radioactive) material permitted in a Type 

A package. Type A packages carry such small amounts of radioactive material that an accident resistant 

package is not required. This is because an A2 quantity of radioactive material would not be expected to 

result in a significant radiological hazard to first responders even if it were released from the package due 

to a transportation accident. Type B packages (which include SNF transportation packages) can carry 

more than an A2 quantity of radioactive material, but must retain the integrity of containment and 

shielding under normal conditions of transport, as required by DOT regulations in 49 CFR part 173. Type 

B packages must also be designed such that if one were subjected to the hypothetical accident conditions 

specified in 10 CFR part 71 [1], it would release less than an A2 quantity/week. 

Staff performed an analysis to determine the magnitude of any potential release, assuming the packages 

contained spent fuel that was 5 years old. Because it was determined by the thermal analyses conducted 

for each package that the fuel cladding for the fuel assemblies remains intact, it is not expected that any 

radioactive material would be released from inside the fuel rods. This limits any release from the package 

to CRUD particles that may detach from individual fuel rods. 

Rather than addressing all radionuclides that could be contained in such CRUD particles, (see Reference 

[26], Table I-7), the radionuclide of the greatest concern was used as the basis of the release calculation. 

For shipments consisting of fuel that is 5 years old or older, Co60 is the most important radionuclide to be 

considered. For fuel that is less than 5 years old, other short-lived isotopes, such as Mn54 and Co58 should 

be considered as well [26]. For PWR fuel cooled for 5 years, the total activity decreases to 3% of that at 

discharge, while after 13 years, the activity drops to 1% of that at discharge. Co60 accounts for 92% of the 

activity at 5 years and 99% at 8 years. For BWR fuel, the total activity decreases to 31% of that at fuel 

discharge after 5 years and 1% after 30 years. Co60 accounts for 98% of the activity at 5 years (see page 

I-50, Ref [26]). 

A discussion of seal performance and leakage pathways is provided in Section 8.2.1. The results of the 

release analysis for the HI-STAR 100 package are provided in Section 8.2.2, and the results for the TN-68 

 

18 The actual amount of a particular material that constitutes an A2 quantity depends on the radiological properties of 

the material. Appendix A of 10CFR71 defines the A2 quantities for a large number of different materials in Table 

A-1, and specifies methods for calculating the appropriate value for any material not listed in the table. 
 8.6 

are provided in Section 8.2.3. Results for the NAC LWT are provided in Section 8.2.4. Additional 

analyses are presented in Section 8.2.5, investigating the potential for releases from the HI-STAR 100 and 

NAC LWT when these packages are transporting failed fuel. 

8.2.1 Seal Performance and Potential Leak Paths 

A simple “pass/fail” criterion is used for evaluating seal performance in this study. If the manufacturer’s 

maximum recommended service temperature was exceeded at any time during the transient on any 

portion of the sealing surfaces, the seal was assumed to fail. Seal failure is defined as the inability of a 

seal material to maintain a seal against the internal pressure of the package cavity. This constitutes a 

conservative criterion, because exceeding the manufacturer’s service temperature limits for the seal 

material used in a spent fuel package lid or vent and drain port seal is not a direct indicator of seal failure, 

and does not necessarily mean that a release of radioactive material would occur from the package. The 

service temperature limits for seals are the temperature to which the manufacturer is willing to guarantee 

the seal’s extended performance. Exceeding these temperatures does not necessarily mean that the seal 

will fail immediately, although it does suggest that there is a potential for seal failure to occur, due to the 

eventual degradation of the seal material. This could lead to the failure of the seal to hold against the 

internal pressure of the package cavity, thereby creating conditions that could lead to a release. 

Similarly, failure of a seal does not remove all barriers to release of material from within the package. 

Even without the intact seals, potential releases from a package would be limited by the narrow, 

convoluted flow paths of the drain and vent ports, and by the tight clearances of the close metal-to-metal 

contact between the lid and package body. This close contact is maintained by the pre-load created by the 

initial torque on the lid bolts, and does not depend on the presence of the lid seals. 

The exact temperature at which a particular seal will fail and the particular mechanism of that failure is 

not known a priori, because most seal manufacturers have not tested their seals to failure at higher 

temperatures. However, the point at which seal failure would actually occur is irrelevant to this study. 

Complete and total failure of the seal materials was assumed if the manufacturer’s maximum 

recommended service temperature was exceeded at any time during the transient on any portion of the 

sealing surfaces. No credit is taken in the release calculation for the presence of any seals. This is 

considered to be a highly conservative approach. 

8.2.2 Potential Release from the HI-STAR 100 Package 

The thermal analysis shows that the HI-STAR 100 package design would maintain three important 

barriers throughout the fire and subsequent cool down period, which would prevent the release of 

radioactive materials. The welded inner canister remains intact and leak-tight, preventing any release 

from the fuel rods themselves or as a result of CRUD detaching from the fuel rods. The temperature of 

the fuel cladding is predicted to peak at about 930°F (499°C), well below the short-term temperature limit 

of 1058°F (570°C) for Zircaloy cladding, and significantly below its projected burst temperature of 

1382°F (750°C). This would prevent the release of fission products from the fuel rods. The maximum 

temperature of 1181°F (638°C) predicted for the package’s metallic O-rings is below their rated 
 8.7 

continuous-use service temperature of 1200°F (649°C). Thus, the O-rings would not be expected to 

significantly degrade. 

8.2.3 Potential Release from the TN-68 Package 

The thermal analysis for the TN-68 package shows that during the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, this 

package design would maintain the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is the single most important 

barrier to prevent the release of radioactive materials. At approximately 40 hours elapsed time, the 

temperature of the fuel cladding would peak at about 845°F (452°C), well below the short-term 

temperature limit of 1058°F (570°C) for Zircaloy cladding and significantly below its projected burst 

temperature of 1382°F (750°C). This would prevent the release of fission products from the fuel rods. 

However, the metallic helicoflex seals used on the TN-68 lid and the vent and drain ports reach a 

maximum temperature of 811°F (433°C) by the end of the fire (at 7 hours elapsed time). This exceeds the 

seals’ rated service temperature of 536°F (280°C) by 275 °F (153 °C). 

Because the predicted temperatures exceed the long-term service temperature of the seals, the seals are 

assumed to fail, and there is a potential for release of radioactive CRUD particles from the package. The 

amount of releasable CRUD in the TN-68 package was estimated using data developed by Sandia National 

Laboratory for analysis of CRUD contribution to shipping package containment requirements [26]. The 

calculation was based on package contents consisting of 68 BWR fuel assemblies, each assembly 

containing 49 fuel rods. An estimate of the maximum “spot” CRUD activity shows that for 90% of BWR 

spent fuel rods the maximum activity is 300μCi/cm2

 or less [26, Table I-17]. The ratio of the peak to 

average concentration on the rod surface (i.e., the maximum “spot” CRUD activity over the average 

value) varies by a factor of two for BWR fuel rods [26, Table I-17]. 

The CRUD activity estimates [26] are based on newly discharged spent nuclear fuel. The CRUD activity 

is expected to decay by a factor of one-half for five-year-cooled fuel, based on the decay rate for Co60. 

This proves to be a good approximation, because 98% of the activity for five-year-cooled BWR fuel 

comes from Co60. Based on this data, the average CRUD activity for a BWR rod with a surface area of 

1600 cm2

 is about 0.12 Ci for five-year cooled fuel. The average CRUD activity for a typical 7 x 7 BWR 

assembly is about 5.9 Ci. 

The amount of CRUD that might flake or spall from the surface of a BWR rod due to thermal stresses 

induced by temperature change in the fuel rods is estimated to be a maximum of 15% [26, Table I-10]. 

The major driving force for material release results from the increased gas pressure inside the package, 

due to increases in internal temperature. The temperature change in the package is bounded by the 

difference between the maximum gas temperature predicted during the fire transient and the fill gas 

temperature at the time the package is loaded. For this analysis, the loading temperature is defined as 

100°F (38°C), based on the temperature reported in the SAR [9]. The maximum fill gas temperature is 

assumed to be the maximum inner shell temperature, predicted during the transient, of 857 °F (458 °C). 

This yields a conservative estimate of the temperature change. 

A deposition factor of 0.90 was used to account for the settling and deposition of CRUD particles on 

package surfaces and fuel assemblies. The deposition factor was developed as part of NRC’s security 
 8.8 

assessments for spent nuclear fuel transport and storage packages, and is based on an analysis of the 

gravitational settling of small particles. The value of 0.90 is conservative because it does not consider the 

effects of particle conglomeration and plugging. It is also consistent with the values used in other studies 

[25]. The major assumptions used to estimate the potential CRUD release are given in Table 8.2. 

Table 8.2. Assumptions Used for Release Estimate for TN-68 Package 

Parameter Assumed value 

Number of Assemblies in TN-68 Package 68 BWR 

Rods per Assembly 49 

Maximum “spot” CRUD Activity on Fuel Rod 300μCi/cm2 

Peak to axial average variation 2 

CRUD decay factor (5 yr; based on Co60) 0.5 

Average surface area per rod 1600 cm2

Average CRUD Activity on BWR Fuel Rod (5 yr cooled) 0.12 Ci 

Average CRUD Activity on BWR Assembly (5 yr cooled) 5.9 Ci 

Fraction of CRUD released due to heating 0.15 

Deposition Factor 0.90 

To estimate the potential release from the TN-68 package, a methodology similar to that developed by 

Sandia National Laboratory was used (see NUREG/CR-6672 [25]). This methodology was developed for 

evaluation of the generic risks associated with the transport of spent fuel by truck and rail from 

commercial power plants to potential interim storage and disposal sites. 

The potential release from the TN-68 package can be estimated by adapting the equation developed in 

NUREG/CR-6672 ([25]) to estimate the releases from a severe fire accident. The estimated release is 

given by the relationship 

⎟

⎟

⎠

⎞

⎜

⎜

⎝

⎛ = − −

p

i

I T

T R C S(1 D) 1

 where R = release (curies) 

 CI = amount of CRUD on fuel assemblies (curies) 

 S = fraction of CRUD released due to heating 

 D = deposition factor 

 Tp = peak internal temperature (°R) 

 Ti = initial internal temperature (°R) 
 8.9 

Table 8.3 shows the results obtained when this equation is applied using the parameter values from Table 

8.2 and the temperatures predicted for the TN-68 package in this accident scenario. 

Table 8.3. Potential Release Estimate for TN-68 Package 

Initial 

temperature 

°F (°R) 

Peak 

temperature 

°F (°R) Potential release (curies) 

100 (560) 857 (1307) 3.4 

The potential CRUD release from the TN-68 package, based on five-year cooled fuel, is estimated to be 

approximately 3.4 curies of Co60. Since the A2 value for Co60 is 11 curies, the potential release is about 

0.3 of an A2 quantity (see Section 8.2). 

8.2.4 Potential Release from the NAC LWT Package 

The thermal analysis for the NAC LWT package shows that this package design would also maintain the 

integrity of the fuel cladding during the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, and thus would maintain the single 

most important barrier to prevent the release of radioactive materials. The peak temperature of the fuel 

cladding is conservatively predicted to reach 1001°F (539°C), a temperature that is below the short-term 

temperature limit of 1058°F (570°C) for Zircaloy cladding, and well below its projected burst temperature 

of 1382°F (750°C). This peak temperature occurs at approximately 10 hours after the start of the fire 

(i.e., after the 7-hour fire duration, about 3 hours into the cool down period). 

At about 6.9 hours elapsed time, the temperature predicted in the region of the Teflon and metallic 

helicoflex seals used on the NAC LWT lid reaches a maximum value of 1356°F (735°C). This value 

exceeds the continuous-use rated service temperature limit of 735°F (391°C) for the Teflon seal and 

800°F (427°C) for the metallic helicoflex seal. Similarly, the peak temperature of 1407°F (764°C) 

predicted for the vent and drain port seals at approximately 6.8 hours elapsed time, exceeds the rated 

long-term service temperature of the Teflon seal material. 

Because the predicted temperatures exceed the long-term service temperature of the seals, the seals are 

assumed to fail, and there is a potential for release of radioactive CRUD particles from the package. The 

amount of releasable CRUD in the NAC LWT package was determined based on contents consisting of 

one PWR fuel assembly containing 289 fuel rods. An estimate of the maximum “spot” CRUD activity 

shows that for 90% of PWR spent fuel rods the maximum activity is 20μCi/cm2

 or less [26, Table I-15]. 

The ratio of the peak (i.e., the maximum “spot” CRUD activity) to average concentration on the rod 

surface varies by a factor of two for PWR fuel rods [26, Table I-12]. 

The CRUD activity estimates [26] are based on newly discharged spent nuclear fuel. The CRUD activity 

is expected to decay by a factor of one-half for five-year cooled fuel, based on the decay rate for Co60. 

This proves to be a good approximation because 92% of the activity for five-year cooled PWR fuel comes 
 8.10 

from Co60. The majority of the remaining 8% of the activity comes from Mn54. By the time the fuel has 

aged 8 years, Co60 represents 99% of the activity. 

Based on these data, the average CRUD activity for a PWR rod with a surface area of 1200 cm2

 is about 

0.006 curies for five-year cooled fuel. The average CRUD activity for a 17 x 17 PWR assembly is about 

1.73 Ci. The amount of CRUD that would flake or spall from the surface of a PWR rod due to 

temperatures calculated for the fuel rods in the thermal analysis is estimated to be a maximum of 15% 

[26, Table I-10]. Finally, a deposition factor of 0.90 was used to account for the deposition of CRUD 

particles on package surfaces and fuel assemblies. 

The major assumptions used to estimate CRUD release are given in Table 8.4. The potential release from 

the NAC LWT package can be estimated from the same equation used for the TN-68 release estimate, as 

described in Section 8.2.1. The major driving force for material release results from the increased fill gas 

pressure inside the package due to increases in internal temperature. The temperature change is bounded 

by the difference between the maximum fill gas temperature predicted during the fire transient and the fill 

gas temperature inside the package at the time the package is loaded. 

For this analysis, the loading temperature is defined as 100°F (38°C), based on the temperature reported 

in the SAR [11]. The maximum fill gas temperature is conservatively assumed to be the maximum inner 

shell temperature, predicted during the transient, of 1261 °F (683 °C). Table 8.5 shows the results 

obtained when this equation is applied using the parameter values from Table 8.4 and the temperatures 

predicted for the NAC LWT package in this accident scenario. 

Table 8.4. Assumptions Used for Release Estimate for NAC LWT Package 

Parameter Assumed value 

Number of Assemblies in Package 1 PWR 

Rods per Assembly 289 

Maximum “spot” CRUD Activity on Fuel Rod 20μCi/cm2 

Peak to axial average variation 2 

CRUD decay factor (5 yr; based on Co60) 0.5 

Average surface area per rod 1200 cm2

Average CRUD Activity on PWR Fuel Rod (5 yr cooled) 0.006 Ci 

Average CRUD Activity on PWR Assembly (5 yr cooled) 1.73 Ci 

Fraction of CRUD released due to heating 0.15 

Deposition Factor 0.90 
 8.11 

Table 8.5. Potential Release Estimate for NAC LWT Package 

Initial temperature 

°F (°R) 

Peak temperature 

°F (°R) 

Potential release 

(curies) 

100 (560) 1261 (1721) 0.02 

The potential CRUD release from the NAC LWT package based on five-year cooled fuel is estimated to 

be approximately 0.02 curies of Co60. Since the A2 value for Co60 is 11 curies, the potential release is 

about 0.002 of an A2 quantity (see Section 8.2). 

8.2.5 Potential Releases from Packages Carrying Failed Fuel 

Of the three packages considered in this evaluation, only the HI-STAR 100 and the NAC LWT are 

approved to carry any kind of failed fuel. As discussed in Section 8.2.2, the HI-STAR 100 employs a 

welded inner multipurpose canister (MPC) that maintains its integrity throughout the entire fire transient. 

Even with failed fuel in this package, no fission products or fuel fines would be released into the cavity of 

the overpack for the conditions encountered in the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario. Therefore, no 

radioactive material from this package would be available for release into the environment. The NAC 

LWT, however, does present a possible path for the release of fission gasses and/or fuel fines, should a 

failed fuel payload be subject to conditions as severe as the tunnel fire analyzed in this study. 

The staff did not analyze how a shipment of failed fuel would affect the release of spent fuel constituents 

from the NAC LWT. However, analyses presented in NUREG/CR-6672 [25] investigated the effect of an 

extraordinarily severe fully engulfing fire lasting 11 hours at 1832°F (1000°C) on a generic truck package 

that was based on the design of the NAC LWT. In this fire analysis for the generic truck package, it was 

assumed that 100% of the rods of a single PWR assembly failed due to thermal rupture. The resulting 

fission product release from the rods very conservatively bounds the potential release from any shipment 

of failed fuel rods that the NAC LWT would be allowed to carry. 

The analysis in NUREG/CR-6672 [25] predicted the potential release fractions of various spent fuel 

constituents for a generic truck package carrying a single PWR spent fuel assembly consisting of high 

burn-up 3-year-cooled fuel. This assembly is far hotter than any fuel the NAC LWT is licensed to carry, 

and has a total activity of 7.9x104

 Curies of Cesium 137 (Cs137) (see Table 7.9 of NUREG/CR-6672 [25]). 

Using the release fraction 1.7 x10 -5 (see Table 7.31 of NUREG/CR-6672 [25]) for Cs137 calculated for the 

truck package, the estimated total release is approximately 1.3 Curies. This value is considerably larger 

than the estimated release for the fuel licensed for transport in the NAC LWT package (see Table 8.5), but 

is still far below the A2 quantity of 16 Curies for Cs137 (see Section 8.2). 

The analysis for Cs137 , as well as similar analyses conducted for particulates and the radionuclide 

Ruthenium (Ru) in NUREG/CR-6672[25], indicate that the potential release from the NAC LWT for any 

fuel that it is licensed to carry, whether intact or failed, would be small, even for conditions as severe as 

those encountered in the Baltimore tunnel fire. 
 8.12 

8.3 Summary of Potential Releases 

The results of the NTSB investigation of the Howard Street tunnel fire, the FDS tunnel fire model 

developed by NIST, and the rail car material fire exposure analyses completed by CNWRA, have 

provided a detailed picture of the potential duration and severity of the fire that occurred in the Howard 

Street tunnel in Baltimore on July 18, 2001. The fire transient analyses performed with ANSYS and 

COBRA-SFS using the FDS simulation results as boundary conditions have shown the robust nature of 

the larger spent fuel transportation package designs (HI-STAR 100 and TN-68). The predicted response 

of the smaller LWT package, if hauled by rail and exposed to the same tunnel fire environment, indicates 

more component degradation, but even this package survives the fire scenario without exceeding 

temperature limits for fuel cladding integrity or regulatory limits for radiological consequences. 

For the TN-68 and the NAC LWT, the maximum temperatures predicted in the regions of the lid and the 

vent and drain ports exceed the seals’ rated service temperatures, making it possible for a small release to 

occur, due to CRUD that might detach from the surfaces of the fuel rods. A release is not expected in this 

accident scenario, due to a number of factors, including (1) the tight clearances maintained between the 

lid and package body by the closure bolts, (2) the low pressure differential between the package interior 

and exterior, (3) the tendency of such small clearances to plug, and (4) the tendency of CRUD particles to 

settle or plate out. However, the above analysis shows that if a release were to occur, it would be within 

regulatory limits. 

USNRC staff evaluated the radiological consequences of the package responses to the Baltimore tunnel 

fire. The results of this evaluation strongly indicate that neither spent nuclear fuel (SNF) particles nor 

fission products would be released from a spent fuel transportation package carrying intact spent fuel 

involved in a severe tunnel fire such as the Howard Street tunnel fire in Baltimore. None of the three 

package designs analyzed for the Baltimore Tunnel fire scenario (TN-68, HI-STAR 100, and NAC LWT) 

experienced internal temperatures that would result in rupture of the fuel cladding. In all three packages, 

the peak fuel cladding temperature is conservatively predicted to remain below the short-term limit of 

1058°F (570°C). 

Therefore, radioactive material (i.e., SNF particles or fission products) would be retained within the fuel 

rods. There would be no release from the HI-STAR 100, because the inner welded canister remains leak 

tight and all seals remain intact. The potential releases calculated for the TN-68 package and the NAC 

LWT package (as a consequence of exceeding seal temperature limits) indicate that any release of CRUD 

from either package would be very small - less than an A2 quantity (see Section 8.2).
 9.1 

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 9.3 

26. Sandoval RP, RE Einziger, H Jordan, AP Malinauskas, and WJ Mings. January 1991. Estimate of 

CRUD Contribution to Shipping Cask Containment Requirements, SAND88-1358. Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
 

Appendix A 

Material Properties for COBRA-SFS Model of TN-68 Package 
 A.1 

Table A.1. Internal Fill Gas—Helium at Atmospheric Pressure 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Enthalpy 

(Btu/lbm) 

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Specific Volume 

(ft3/lbm) 

Viscosity 

(lbm/hr-ft) 

0 100 0.078 1.24 83.33 0.0410 

200 348 0.097 1.24 119.76 0.0533 

400 596 0.115 1.24 156.25 0.0641 

600 844 0.129 1.24 192.31 0.0727 

800 1092 0.138 1.24 229.36 0.0823 

1000 1340 0.138 1.24 265.25 0.0907 

2552 3264 0.138 1.24 549.00 0.1138 

Table A.2. External Ambient Air at Atmospheric Pressure 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Enthalpy 

(Btu/lbm) 

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Specific Volume 

(ft3/lbm) 

Viscosity 

(lbm/hr-ft) 

60 124.5 0.0146 0.24 13.5669 0.0434 

300 182.1 0.0193 0.243 19.8325 0.058 

400 206.5 0.0212 0.245 22.4432 0.063 

500 231.1 0.0231 0.247 25.0539 0.068 

600 256 0.025 0.25 27.6645 0.072 

700 281.1 0.0268 0.253 30.2752 0.077 

800 306.7 0.0286 0.256 32.8859 0.081 

900 332.5 0.0303 0.259 35.4966 0.085 

1000 358.6 0.0319 0.262 38.1072 0.0889 

2000 617.2 0.0471 0.2586 64.214 0.1242 

4000 1522 0.0671 0.4524 116.428 0.1242 

Table A.3. Summary of All Solid Material Properties Pre-Fire 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) Emissivity Description 

0.129 483.8 22.92 0.3 gamma shielding (SA-517 grade 70 carbon steel) 

0.13 499.4 10.44 0.3 fuel tubes (SA-240 stainless steel) 

0.214 165.9 41.72 0.3 borated aluminum poison plates 

0.311 98.5 4.34 N/A neutron shield (borated polyester) 

0.228 165.9 99.84 0.3 Aluminum alloy basket rails 

0.118 483.8 22.92 0.3 cask outer shella

0.228 165.9 84.00 N/A 

aluminum in neutron shield and thermal shield 

between cask and bottom impact limiter 

0.420 23.1 0.064 N/A wooden impact limiters (covered with sheet steel)

0.420 11.0 0.053 N/A 

thin top layer of wood on impact limiter ends 

(covered with sheet steel) a

Based on nominal emissivity for carbon steel. SAR analyses use emissivity of 0.9 for painted cask surface, but cask 

specifications allow option for unpainted outer surface. 
A.2 

Table A.4. Summary of All Solid Material Properties Post-Fire 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) Emissivity Description 

0.129 483.8 22.92 0.3 gamma shielding (SA-517 grade 70 carbon steel) 

0.13 499.4 10.44 0.3 fuel tubes (SA-240 stainless steel) 

0.214 165.9 41.72 0.3 borated aluminum poison plates 

0.26 0.027 0.03 N/A 

hot air (replaces polyresin neutron shield 

vaporized in fire) 

0.228 165.9 99.84 0.3 aluminum alloy basket rails 

0.118 483.8 22.92 0.8 

steel shell (SAR value post-fire is 0.95 for 

charred cask surface emissivity) 

0.228 165.9 84.00 0.9 

aluminum in neutron shield; inner and outer ring 

after polyresin evaporates 

1020.0 134.8 0.00735 0.8 charcoal (impact limiters after the fire) 

 0.9 tunnel wall 

COBRA-SFS Material Properties Compared with Published SAR Values 

Table A.5. BWR Spent Fuel Assemblies 

SAR values determined using k-effective model for homogeneous representation of fuel rods and 

helium gas within fuel tube. 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Transverse Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Axial Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

195.8 0.0157 0.055 257.5 

200.0 0.058 

268.4 0.0178 

365.9 0.0206 

400.0 0.0646 

463.7 0.0239 

561.8 0.0277 

600.0 0.0709 

660.3 0.0319 

758.9 0.0367 

800.0 0.0769 0.055 257.5 

COBRA-SFS input— BWR fuel rods; conservative values at nominal operating temperature and 

above. 

Component 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

fuel pellet: 3.0 0.059 655.0 

cladding: 10.0 0.1 409.0 
A.3 

Table A.6. Stainless Steel Type 304/304L (for fuel tubes) 

SAR values 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

70 7.56 0.111 499.4 

100 8.76 

200 9.36 0.124 

400 10.44 0.130 

600 11.28 0.134 

800 12.24 0.140 

1000 13.2 499.4 

COBRA-SFS input—selected conservative representative values at nominal operating 

temperature and above 

all 10.44 0.13 499.4 

Table A.7. Poison Plates (borated aluminum or boron carbide/aluminum matrix) 

SAR values 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

68 69.36 0.214 169.3 

212 83.76 

482 86.64 

571 86.64 0.214 169.3 

COBRA-SFS input—selected conservative values based on range of allowable fabrication 

variations, as described for cask specifications in SAR. 

all 41.72 0.214 165.9 

Table A.8. Aluminum Type 6060 (for basket support rails and shims) 

SAR values 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

70 96.12 0.218 165.9 

100 96.96 0.219 

150 98.04 0.223 

200 99 0.225 

250 99.84 0.228 

300 100.56 0.23 

350 101.28 0.233 

400 101.88 0.234 165.9 

COBRA-SFS input—selected conservative representative values at nominal operating 

temperature and above. 

all 99.84 0.228 165.9 
A.4 

Table A.9. Carbon Steel SA-516 Grade 70 (for inner and outer gamma shield and lid) 

SAR values 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

70 22.92 0.109 483.8 

200 23.76 0.118 

400 23.88 0.129 

600 22.92 0.139 

800 21.6 0.152 

1000 20.16 0.169 

1200 18.24 0.206 

1400 15.48 0.184 483.8 

COBRA-SFS input—selected conservative representative values at nominal operating temperature 

and above. 

all 22.92 0.129 483.8 

Table A.10. Neutron Shield (polyester resin with aluminum boxes) 

SAR values—properties are composite values for polyester resin and aluminum boxes 

modeled as single homogeneous material. 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

all 0.0996 0.311 98.5 

COBRA-SFS input—selected conservative representative values at nominal operating 

temperature and above. 

borated polyester 4.34 0.311 98.5 

aluminum 84.00 0.228 165.9 

Table A.11. Carbon Steel SA-350 grade LF3 (for cask outer shell) 

SAR values 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3) 

70 23.64 0.106 489.0 

100 23.88 0.11 

200 24.36 0.118 

400 24.24 0.128 

600 23.16 0.137 

800 21.72 0.149 

1000 20.04 0.165 

1200 18.24 0.189 

1400 15.36 0.406 489.0 

COBRA-SFS input—typical values for carbon steel at nominal operating temperature and 

above, based on range of allowable fabrication variations described for cask specifications 

in SAR. 

all 22.92 0.118 483.8 
A.5 

Table A.12. Impact Limiters (wood covered with sheet steel) 

SAR values—none provided; SAR analyses assume impact limiters act as perfect insulators on 

cask ends for normal, off-normal, and fire accident conditions. 

COBRA-SFS input—selected conservative representative values at nominal operating 

temperature and above. 

Material 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density

(lbm/ft3)

redwood 0.064 0.311 98.5 

balsa 0.053 0.228 165.9 

carbon steel 22.92 0.118 483.8 

charcoal 0.00735 1020.0 134.8 

Table A.13. Air (replacing neutron shield polyethylene after fire) 

SAR values 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-ft-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/ft3)

81 0.0156 0.231 0.0734 

261 0.0192 0.237 0.0551 

441 0.0228 0.239 0.0440 

621 0.0264 0.246 0.0367 

981 0.0336 0.264 0.0275 

COBRA-SFS input—selected representative values at immediate post-fire temperature and 

above. 

all 0.03 0.26 0.0270 
Appendix B 

Material Properties for ANSYS Model of HI-STAR 100 Package 
 B.1 

Table B.1. Homogeneous Fuel Region for Westinghouse 17x17 OFA 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3)

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

0 0.04412 0.04412 0.06256 0.14353 0.05869 

100 0.04412 0.04412 0.06256 0.14353 0.05869 

200 0.04412 0.04412 0.06256 0.14352 0.05869 

300 0.05078 0.05078 0.06509 0.14352 0.05869 

400 0.05895 0.05895 0.06797 0.14352 0.05869 

500 0.06837 0.06837 0.07082 0.14352 0.05869 

600 0.07834 0.07834 0.07391 0.14352 0.05869 

700 0.08920 0.08920 0.07756 0.14352 0.05869 

800 0.09508 0.09508 0.08121 0.15352 0.05869 

900 0.09508 0.09508 0.08484 0.15352 0.05869 

1000 0.09508 0.09508 0.08600 0.15352 0.05869 

Fuel Region 

(2.25 multiplier against 

helium contribution to 

account for limited 

convection and 

pressurization 

enhancement) 

Table B.2. Alloy-X 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 0.70000 * * 

450 0.81667 * * 

700 0.91667 * * 

1400 1.19670 * * 

0.28993 0.12000 

Basket Plates, Basket 

Supports, Boral Plate 

Sheathing, MPC shell, 

impact limiter skin shell 

Table B.3. Helium 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

0 0.00650 * * 6.90E-06 

200 0.00808 * * 4.81E-06 

400 0.00958 * * 3.69E-06 

600 0.01075 * * 2.99E-06 

800 0.01150 * * 2.52E-06 

1400 0.01370 * * 1.71E-06 

1.24000 gas conduction between 

MPC and cask 

Table B.4. Helium 

(with 2.25 multiplier to account for limited convection and pressurization enhancement) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

0 0.01400 * * 6.90E-06 

200 0.01740 * * 4.81E-06 

400 0.02063 * * 3.69E-06 

600 0.02315 * * 2.99E-06 

800 0.02476 * * 2.52E-06 

1400 0.02950 * * 1.71E-06 

1.24000 

Conduction in: central 

core region, between 

guide tubes and basket 

plates, between fuel 

and compartments, and 

between basket and 

MPC Shell 
B.2 

Table B.5. Boral Plates 

(includes 0.004” helium gap and gap radiation on both sides of Boral) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

0 0.30836 4.62020 4.62020 0.08390 

100 0.34331 4.62550 4.62550 0.08390 

200 0.37738 4.64850 4.64850 0.08390 

300 0.40969 4.69040 4.69040 0.08390 

400 0.44166 4.73250 4.73250 0.08390 

500 0.46611 4.74620 4.74620 0.08390 

600 0.49024 4.75200 4.75200 0.08390 

700 0.50544 4.73700 4.73700 0.08390 

800 0.52053 4.72210 4.72210 0.08390 

900 0.53517 4.70710 4.70710 0.08390 

1000 0.54970 4.69220 4.69220 0.08390 

1100 0.56438 4.68350 4.68350 0.08390 

0.24762 

parallel to thickness 

(switch x & y to 

define cross-width) 

Table B.6. Carbon Steel (SA-516, Gr. 70) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(radial) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(circumferential) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(axial) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 0.17409 2.03330 2.03330 

450 0.22634 1.99170 1.99170 

700 0.28273 1.86670 1.86670 

1400 0.44136 1.46670 1.46670 

0.28299 0.10000 

Gamma Shield with 

0.01” air gaps between 

plates 

Table B.7. Carbon Steel (SA-515, Gr. 70) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 2.43330 * * 

450 2.25830 * * 

700 2.05000 * * 

1400 1.46670 * * 

0.28299 0.10000 

For radial channels of 

overpack and enclosure of 

shells of overpack (Fins) 

Table B.8. Holtite-A 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) (z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

* 0.03108 * * 0.06076 0.39000 Neutron Shield/In 

impact limiter 

Table B.9. HT-870 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(y) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

* 0.00340 * * 0.00868 0.39000 Foam on back 

side of fins 
B.3 

Table B.10. Air Properties Representing Degraded Materials 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 0.00148 * * 3.48E-05 0.24110 

450 0.00188 * * 2.53E-05 0.24605 

700 0.00227 * * 1.99E-05 0.25355 

1400 0.00336 * * 1.31E-05 0.27445 

For degraded HoltiteA, HT-870, and 

Honeycomb after fire 

Table B.11. One-Quarter-Inch Fillet Weld - Carbon Steel (SA-515, Gr. 70) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 1.21670 2.43330 2.43330 

450 1.12920 2.25830 2.25830 

700 1.02500 2.05000 2.05000 

1400 0.73333 1.46670 1.46670 

0.28299 0.10000 

Reduced radial channel 

conductivity (Fin Fillet 

Weld Root) 

Table B.12. Carbon Steel (SA-516, Gr. 70) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 2.03330 * * 

450 1.99170 * * 

700 1.86670 * * 

1400 1.46670 * * 

0.28299 0.10000 

Gamma Shield (intimate 

contact) and impact limiter 

base structure 

Table B.13. Aluminum Honeycomb 

(700 psi unidirectional w/1700 psi cross-core backing) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

68 1.11710 0.47427 1.11710 0.01406 

212 1.15270 0.48944 1.15270 0.01406 

752 1.42620 0.59537 1.42620 0.01406 

1400 1.75440 0.72248 1.75440 0.01406 

0.20800 

(assumed) 

Type 1: Aluminum 

Honeycomb 

Table B.14. Aluminum Honeycomb 

(700 psi unidirectional and 2300 psi cross-core) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

68 0.82721 0.31682 0.82721 0.00579 

212 0.85369 0.32693 0.85369 0.00579 

752 1.03810 0.39771 1.03810 0.00579 

1400 1.25940 0.48265 1.25940 0.00579 

0.20800 

(assumed) 

Type 2&5: Aluminum 

Honeycomb 
B.4 

Table B.14. Aluminum Honeycomb 

(2300 psi cross-core) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

68 1.40690 0.63172 1.40690 0.01684 

212 1.45170 0.65194 1.45170 0.01684 

752 1.81430 0.79302 1.81430 0.01684 

1400 2.24930 0.96231 2.24930 0.01684 

0.20800 

(assumed) 

Type 3: Aluminum 

Honeycomb 

Table B.16. Aluminum Honeycomb 

(1100 psi unidirectional and 2300 psi cross-core) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

(x) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(y) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F)

(z) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

68 1.40690 0.63172 1.40690 1.40630 

212 1.45170 0.65194 1.45170 1.40630 

752 1.81430 0.79302 1.81430 1.40630 

1400 2.24930 0.96231 2.24930 1.40630 

0.20800 

(assumed) 

Type 4: Aluminum 

Honeycomb 

Table B.17. Emissivity Values for Radiation Heat Transfer 

Component Material Emissivity 

Fuel Zircaloy 0.80 

Basket Alloy-X 0.36 

Support Bracket Alloy-X 0.36 

MPC Wall Alloy-X 0.36 

Borated Aluminum Plate Boral 0.55 

Bare Carbon Steel Carbon Steel 0.65 

Painted Surfaces 0.90 

Cask and Impact Limiter Surfaces Alloy-X 0.36 

Tunnel Surface 0.90 

Soot Surfaces 0.90 
Appendix C 

Material Properties for ANSYS Model of 

Legal Weight Truck Package 
 C.1 

Table C.1. 304 Stainless Steel 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) Density (lbm/in3)

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

70 0.7143 - 0.1141 

212 0.7800 0.2888 0.1207 

392 0.8592 0.2872 0.1272 

572 0.9333 0.2855 0.1320 

752 1.0042 0.2839 0.1356 

932 1.0717 0.2822 0.1385 

1112 1.1375 0.2805 0.1412 

Used for cask 

body, cask lid, 

spokes 

Table C.2. 6061-T6 Aluminum 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) Density (lbm/in3)

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

32 9.7500 

212 9.9167 

572 11.0833 

932 12.9167 

0.0984 0.2140 Used for basket, 

IL 1, 2 skin 

Table C.3. 6061-T6 Aluminum Honeycomb 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-in-°F) Density (lbm/in3)

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

32 1.6965 

212 1.7255 

572 1.9285 

932 2.2475 

0.017118056 0.214 Used for IL 1 

(Honeycomb) 

Table C.4. 6061-T6 Aluminum Honeycomb 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-in-°F) Density (lbm/in3)

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

32 1.4235 

212 1.4478 

572 1.6182 

932 1.8858 

0.0144 0.214 Used for IL 2 

(Honeycomb) 

Table C.5. Helium 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal Conductivity

(Btu/hr-in-°F) Density (lbm/in3)

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) Description 

200 0.00808 4.83E-06 

400 0.00942 3.70E-06 

600 0.01075 3.01E-06 

800 0.0115 2.52E-06 

1.24 Used for cask gap 

and fuel gap 
 C.2 

Table C.6. Lead Gamma Shield 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Enthalpy(1)

(Btu/lbm) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity(2)

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Density(3)

(lbm/in3

) 

Description 

80.33 0.0860 80.3 1.698984 53.3 4.11060E-01 

260.33 5.7610 170.3 1.671552 233.3 4.07470E-01 

440.33 11.608 260.3 1.641888 413.3 4.03670E-01 

611.50 17.756 350.3 1.608588 607.7 3.99450E-01 

629.50 27.730 440.3 1.573092 622.1 3.84440E-01 

800.33 34.007 530.3 1.539792 802.1 3.80740E-01 

980.33 40.241 610.3 1.515924 982.1 3.76330E-01 

1160.33 46.432 630.3 0.746712 1162.1 3.71930E-01 

1340.33 52.580 710.3 0.796428 1342.1 3.67520E-01 

1520.33 58.641 800.3 0.84222 1522.1 3.63120E-01 

 890.3 0.884016 

 980.3 0.921852 

 1070.3 0.955764 

 1160.3 0.985716 

 1250.3 1.01171 

 1340.3 1.03378 

Used for lead 

gamma shield 

 (1) Based on specific heat from B.J. McBride, S. Gordon and M.A. Reno, NASA Technical Paper 3287, 

(1993). Enthalpy as a function of temperature calculated using definition of specific heat as partial derivative 

of enthalpy with respect to temperature at constant pressure; 

 

p

p T

h

c ⎟

⎠

⎞ ⎜

⎝

⎛

∂

∂ = 

(2) C.Y. Ho, R.W. Powell and P.E. Liley, J. Phys. Chem. Ref. Data, v1, p279 (1972).

(3) F.C. Nix and D. MacNair, Physical Review, v60, p597 (1941) and R. Feder, A.S. Norwick, Physical 

Review, v109, p1959 (1958); calculated from the linear expansion. 
 C.3 

Table C.7. 56% Ethylene Glycol Solution 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

50 0.0188 0.7405 0.0391 

70 0.0187 0.7522 0.0389 

100 0.0185 0.7696 0.0385 

150 0.0182 0.7979 0.0378 

200 0.0179 0.8255 0.0370 

250 0.0177 0.8522 0.0362 

260 0.0176 0.8575 0.0360 

270 0.0176 0.8627 0.0358 

280 0.0175 0.8679 0.0357 

290 0.0175 0.8731 0.0355 

300 0.0174 0.8782 0.0353 

310 0.0174 0.8833 0.0351 

320 0.0173 0.8884 0.0349 

330 0.0173 0.8934 0.0347 

340 0.0172 0.8984 0.0345 

350 0.0172 0.9034 0.0343 

Table C.8. Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F) 

Thermal 

Conductivity 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Specific Heat 

(Btu/lbm-°F) 

Density 

(lbm/in3) 

350 0.0017 0.2467 0.0000283 

450 0.0018 0.2494 0.0000252 

550 0.0020 0.2516 0.0000227 

650 0.0022 0.2533 0.0000206 

750 0.0023 0.2546 0.0000189 

850 0.0025 0.2556 0.0000175 

950 0.0026 0.2562 0.0000162 

1050 0.0027 0.2566 0.0000152 

1150 0.0029 0.2568 0.0000142 

1250 0.0030 0.2570 0.0000134 

1350 0.0031 0.2571 0.0000126 

1450 0.0033 0.2571 0.0000120 

1550 0.0034 0.2573 0.0000114 

1650 0.0035 0.2576 0.0000108 

1750 0.0036 0.2581 0.0000104 

1850 0.0038 0.2589 0.0000099 

1950 0.0039 0.2599 0.0000095 

2050 0.0040 0.2614 0.0000091 
 C.4 

Table C.9. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 1°F Temperature Gradient 

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 0.364 0.149 0.003 0.002 

260 0.374 0.153 0.003 0.002 

270 0.384 0.157 0.003 0.002 

280 0.393 0.161 0.003 0.002 

290 0.398 0.163 0.003 0.002 

300 0.396 0.162 0.003 0.002 

310 0.395 0.162 0.003 0.002 

320 0.394 0.161 0.003 0.002 

330 0.393 0.161 0.003 0.002 

340 0.391 0.160 0.003 0.002 

350 0.390 0.160 0.003 0.002 

351 * * 0.003 0.002 

400 * * 0.003 0.002 

500 * * 0.003 0.002 

600 * * 0.003 0.002 

700 * * 0.003 0.002 

800 * * 0.003 0.002 

1000 * * 0.003 0.003 

1200 * * 0.003 0.003 

1500 * * 0.003 0.003 

2000 * * 0.004 0.004 

2500 * * 0.004 0.004 
 C.5 

Table C.10. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 10°F Temperature Gradient 

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 0.654 0.268 0.006 0.002 

260 0.673 0.276 0.006 0.002 

270 0.691 0.283 0.006 0.002 

280 0.704 0.288 0.006 0.002 

290 0.705 0.289 0.006 0.002 

300 0.703 0.288 0.006 0.002 

310 0.701 0.287 0.006 0.002 

320 0.699 0.286 0.006 0.002 

330 0.697 0.286 0.006 0.002 

340 0.695 0.285 0.006 0.002 

350 * * 0.006 0.002 

351 * * 0.006 0.002 

400 * * 0.006 0.002 

500 * * 0.006 0.002 

600 * * 0.005 0.002 

700 * * 0.005 0.002 

800 * * 0.005 0.002 

1000 * * 0.005 0.003 

1200 * * 0.005 0.003 

1500 * * 0.004 0.003 

2000 * * 0.004 0.004 

2500 * * 0.004 0.004 
 C.6 

Table C.11. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 25°F Temperature Gradient

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 0.840 0.344 0.008 0.003 

260 0.863 0.353 0.008 0.003 

270 0.882 0.361 0.008 0.003 

280 0.888 0.364 0.008 0.003 

290 0.885 0.363 0.007 0.003 

300 0.883 0.361 0.007 0.003 

310 0.880 0.360 0.007 0.003 

320 0.877 0.359 0.007 0.003 

330 0.875 0.358 0.007 0.003 

340 0.872 0.357 0.007 0.003 

350 * * 0.007 0.003 

351 * * 0.007 0.003 

400 * * 0.007 0.003 

500 * * 0.007 0.003 

600 * * 0.007 0.003 

700 * * 0.007 0.003 

800 * * 0.006 0.003 

1000 * * 0.006 0.003 

1200 * * 0.006 0.003 

1500 * * 0.005 0.003 

2000 * * 0.005 0.004 

2500 * * 0.005 0.004 
 C.7 

Table C.12. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 50°F Temperature Gradient 

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity Neutron 

Shield (Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 1.061 0.434 0.009 0.004 

260 1.058 0.433 0.009 0.004 

270 1.055 0.432 0.009 0.004 

280 1.052 0.431 0.009 0.004 

290 1.049 0.430 0.009 0.004 

300 1.046 0.428 0.009 0.004 

310 1.043 0.427 0.009 0.004 

320 1.039 0.426 0.009 0.004 

330 * * 0.009 0.004 

340 * * 0.009 0.004 

350 * * 0.009 0.004 

351 * * 0.009 0.004 

400 * * 0.009 0.003 

500 * * 0.008 0.003 

600 * * 0.008 0.003 

700 * * 0.008 0.003 

800 * * 0.008 0.003 

1000 * * 0.007 0.003 

1200 * * 0.007 0.003 

1500 * * 0.006 0.003 

2000 * * 0.006 0.004 

2500 * * 0.006 0.004 
 C.8 

Table C.13. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 70°F Temperature Gradient

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 1.151 0.471 0.010 0.004 

260 1.148 0.470 0.010 0.004 

270 1.144 0.469 0.010 0.004 

280 1.141 0.467 0.010 0.004 

290 1.138 0.466 0.010 0.004 

300 1.134 0.464 0.010 0.004 

310 1.131 0.463 0.010 0.004 

320 * * 0.010 0.004 

330 * * 0.010 0.004 

340 * * 0.009 0.004 

350 * * 0.009 0.004 

351 * * 0.009 0.004 

400 * * 0.009 0.004 

500 * * 0.009 0.004 

600 * * 0.009 0.004 

700 * * 0.008 0.003 

800 * * 0.008 0.003 

1000 * * 0.008 0.003 

1200 * * 0.007 0.003 

1500 * * 0.007 0.003 

2000 * * 0.006 0.004 

2500 * * 0.006 0.004 
 C.9 

Table C.14. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 100°F Temperature Gradient

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective Conductivity

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 1.253 0.513 0.011 0.004 

260 1.249 0.512 0.011 0.004 

270 1.245 0.510 0.011 0.004 

280 1.242 0.509 0.011 0.004 

290 1.238 0.507 0.011 0.004 

300 1.234 0.505 0.011 0.004 

310 * * 0.010 0.004 

320 * * 0.010 0.004 

330 * * 0.010 0.004 

340 * * 0.010 0.004 

350 * * 0.010 0.004 

351 * * 0.010 0.004 

400 * * 0.010 0.004 

500 * * 0.010 0.004 

600 * * 0.009 0.004 

700 * * 0.009 0.004 

800 * * 0.009 0.004 

1000 * * 0.008 0.003 

1200 * * 0.008 0.003 

1500 * * 0.008 0.003 

2000 * * 0.007 0.004 

2500 * * 0.007 0.004 
 C.10 

Table C.15. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 200°F Temperature Gradient

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective 

Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 1.468 0.601 0.013 0.005 

260 * * 0.013 0.005 

270 * * 0.013 0.005 

280 * * 0.013 0.005 

290 * * 0.013 0.005 

300 * * 0.012 0.005 

310 * * 0.012 0.005 

320 * * 0.012 0.005 

330 * * 0.012 0.005 

340 * * 0.012 0.005 

350 * * 0.012 0.005 

351 * * 0.012 0.005 

400 * * 0.012 0.005 

500 * * 0.012 0.005 

600 * * 0.011 0.004 

700 * * 0.011 0.004 

800 * * 0.011 0.004 

1000 * * 0.010 0.004 

1200 * * 0.010 0.004 

1500 * * 0.009 0.004 

2000 * * 0.008 0.004 

2500 * * 0.008 0.005 
 C.11 

Table C.16. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 300°F Temperature 

Gradient 

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective 

Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 * * 0.014 0.005 

260 * * 0.014 0.005 

270 * * 0.014 0.005 

280 * * 0.014 0.005 

290 * * 0.014 0.005 

300 * * 0.014 0.005 

310 * * 0.014 0.005 

320 * * 0.014 0.005 

330 * * 0.014 0.005 

340 * * 0.014 0.005 

350 * * 0.013 0.005 

351 * * 0.013 0.005 

400 * * 0.013 0.005 

500 * * 0.013 0.005 

600 * * 0.012 0.005 

700 * * 0.012 0.005 

800 * * 0.012 0.005 

1000 * * 0.011 0.004 

1200 * * 0.011 0.004 

1500 * * 0.010 0.004 

2000 * * 0.009 0.004 

2500 * * 0.009 0.005 
 C.12 

Table C.17. Effective Conductivity for Liquid Neutron Shield with 500°F Temperature 

Gradient 

56% Ethylene Glycol Air 

Avg. 

Temperature 

(°F)

Effective 

Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Neutron Shield 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

Effective 

Conductivity 

Expansion Tank 

(Btu/hr-in-°F) 

250 * * 0.016 0.006 

260 * * 0.016 0.006 

270 * * 0.016 0.006 

280 * * 0.016 0.006 

290 * * 0.016 0.006 

300 * * 0.015 0.006 

310 * * 0.015 0.006 

320 * * 0.015 0.006 

330 * * 0.015 0.006 

340 * * 0.015 0.006 

350 * * 0.015 0.006 

351 * * 0.015 0.006 

400 * * 0.015 0.006 

500 * * 0.014 0.006 

600 * * 0.014 0.005 

700 * * 0.014 0.005 

800 * * 0.013 0.005 

1000 * * 0.013 0.005 

1200 * * 0.012 0.005 

1500 * * 0.011 0.005 

2000 * * 0.011 0.004 

2500 * * 0.010 0.005 

Table C.18. Emissivity Values for Radiation Heat Transfer 

Component Material 

Emissivity Before 

Fire 

Emissivity 

During/After Fire 

Canister stainless steel 0.36 0.36 

Cask stainless steel 0.36 0.36 

Outer Neutron Shield 0.34 0.34 

Inner Neutron Shield 0.34 0.34 

Basket stainless steel 0.36 0.36 

Fuel Clad zircaloy 0.8 0.8 

Boral Plate aluminum clad 0.55 0.55 

Shell Interior stainless steel 0.36 0.36 

Cask Exterior stainless steel 0.85 0.9 

Tunnel/ISO various 0.9 
 

Appendix D 

Boundary Conditions from FDS Simulation of 

Fully Ventilated Fire Scenario 
 D.1 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

01234567

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

FDS -- peak ceiling temperature

FDS -- peak wall temperature

FDS -- peak floor temperature

smoothed Ceiling Temperature

smoothed Wall Temperature

smoothed Floor Temperature

Figure D.1. Peak Surface Temperatures Calculated with FDS for Tunnel Ceiling, Wall, and Floor 

Regions at 20 meters from Fire Location during 7-hr Fire 

100

300

500

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

FDS -- peak ceiling temperature

FDS -- peak wall temperature

FDS -- peak floor temperature

smoothed Ceiling Temperature

smoothed Wall Temperature

smoothed Floor Temperature

Figure D.2. Peak Surface Temperatures Calculated with FDS for Tunnel Ceiling, Wall, and Floor 

Regions at 20 meters from Fire Location during 7-hr Fire and 23-hr Cool Down 
 D.2 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

01234567

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

FDS -- peak top region air temperature smoothed Top Air Temperature

FDS -- peak side region air temperature smoothed Side Air Temperature

FDS -- peak bottom region air temperature smoothed Bottom Air Temperature

Figure D.3. Peak Air Temperatures Calculated with FDS for Top, Side, and Bottom Regions at 20 

meters from Fire Location during 7-hr Fire 

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

FDS -- peak top region air temperature

FDS -- peak side region air temperature

FDS -- peak bottom region air temperature

smoothed Top Air Temperature

smoothed Side Air Temperature

smoothed Bottom Air Temperature

Figure D.4. Peak Air Temperatures Calculated with FDS for Top, Side, and Bottom Regions at 20 

meters from Fire Location during 7-hr Fire and 23-hr Cool Down 
 D.3 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

01234567

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

FDS -- Top Velocity smoothed Top Velocity

FDS -- Side Velocity smoothed Side Velocity

FDS -- Bottom Velocity smoothed Bottom Velocity

Figure D.5. Velocities at Peak Air Temperature Locations Calculated with FDS for Top, Side, and 

Bottom Regions at 20 meters from Fire Location during 7-hr Fire 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Elapsed Time (hours)

Temperature (°F)

FDS -- Top Velocity

FDS -- Side Velocity

FDS -- Bottom Velocity

smoothed Top Velocity

smoothed Side Velocity

smoothed Bottom Velocity

Figure D.6. Velocities at Peak Air Temperature Locations Calculated with FDS for Top, Side, and 

Bottom Regions at 20 meters from Fire during 7-hr Fire and 23-hr Cool Down 
Appendix E 

Blackbody Viewfactors for COBRA-SFS Model of TN-68 Package
 E.1 

C TUNNEL.1=TOP TUNNEL.2=SIDE TUNNEL.3=BOTTOM 

Cnode_1 node_2 Area*e*Bij $ Bij Bji 

 CASK.101, TUNNEL.1, 137.54 $ 0.79418,0.00045040 

 CASK.101, TUNNEL.2, 25.477 $ 0.14711,7.5761e-005 

 CASK.101, TUNNEL.3, 6.3683 $ 0.036772,2.1839e-005 

 CASK.102, TUNNEL.1, 67.819 $ 0.39161,0.00022209 

 CASK.102, TUNNEL.2, 87.635 $ 0.50603,0.00026060 

 CASK.102, TUNNEL.3, 13.723 $ 0.079241,4.7061e-005 

 CASK.103, TUNNEL.1, 12.951 $ 0.074781,4.2410e-005 

 CASK.103, TUNNEL.2, 90.996 $ 0.52544,0.00027059 

 CASK.103, TUNNEL.3, 65.443 $ 0.37789,0.00022443 

 CASK.104, TUNNEL.1, 6.2714 $ 0.036213,2.0538e-005 

 CASK.104, TUNNEL.2, 31.022 $ 0.17913,9.2251e-005 

 CASK.104, TUNNEL.3, 132.32 $ 0.76404,0.00045376 

 CASK.201, TUNNEL.1, 138.22 $ 0.79812,0.00045264 

 CASK.201, TUNNEL.2, 24.978 $ 0.14423,7.4277e-005 

 CASK.201, TUNNEL.3, 6.3135 $ 0.036456,2.1651e-005 

 CASK.202, TUNNEL.1, 68.135 $ 0.39343,0.00022313 

 CASK.202, TUNNEL.2, 87.392 $ 0.50463,0.00025988 

 CASK.202, TUNNEL.3, 13.599 $ 0.078527,4.6637e-005 

 CASK.203, TUNNEL.1, 12.937 $ 0.074702,4.2365e-005 

 CASK.203, TUNNEL.2, 90.689 $ 0.52367,0.00026968 

 CASK.203, TUNNEL.3, 65.701 $ 0.37938,0.00022531 

 CASK.204, TUNNEL.1, 6.1691 $ 0.035622,2.0203e-005 

 CASK.204, TUNNEL.2, 31.104 $ 0.17961,9.2494e-005 

 CASK.204, TUNNEL.3, 132.31 $ 0.76399,0.00045373 

 CASK.301, TUNNEL.1, 137.98 $ 0.79676,0.00045187 

 CASK.301, TUNNEL.2, 25.169 $ 0.14533,7.4844e-005 

 CASK.301, TUNNEL.3, 6.3354 $ 0.036583,2.1726e-005 

 CASK.302, TUNNEL.1, 68.192 $ 0.39376,0.00022331 

 CASK.302, TUNNEL.2, 87.312 $ 0.50417,0.00025964 

 CASK.302, TUNNEL.3, 13.687 $ 0.079031,4.6936e-005 

 CASK.303, TUNNEL.1, 12.880 $ 0.074375,4.2180e-005 

 CASK.303, TUNNEL.2, 91.267 $ 0.52700,0.00027140 

 CASK.303, TUNNEL.3, 65.225 $ 0.37663,0.00022368 

 CASK.304, TUNNEL.1, 6.1435 $ 0.035475,2.0119e-005 

 CASK.304, TUNNEL.2, 31.213 $ 0.18024,9.2819e-005 

 CASK.304, TUNNEL.3, 132.07 $ 0.76261,0.00045291 

 CASK.401, TUNNEL.1, 138.03 $ 0.79704,0.00045202 

 CASK.401, TUNNEL.2, 25.096 $ 0.14491,7.4627e-005 

 CASK.401, TUNNEL.3, 6.3204 $ 0.036496,2.1675e-005 

 CASK.402, TUNNEL.1, 68.295 $ 0.39436,0.00022365 

 CASK.402, TUNNEL.2, 87.210 $ 0.50358,0.00025934 

 CASK.402, TUNNEL.3, 13.632 $ 0.078717,4.6750e-005 

 CASK.403, TUNNEL.1, 13.054 $ 0.075376,4.2748e-005 

 CASK.403, TUNNEL.2, 90.720 $ 0.52385,0.00026977 

 CASK.403, TUNNEL.3, 65.460 $ 0.37799,0.00022448 

 CASK.404, TUNNEL.1, 6.0468 $ 0.034916,1.9802e-005 

 CASK.404, TUNNEL.2, 30.945 $ 0.17868,9.2020e-005 

 CASK.404, TUNNEL.3, 132.46 $ 0.76484,0.00045424 

 CASK.501, TUNNEL.1, 138.12 $ 0.79752,0.00045230 

 CASK.501, TUNNEL.2, 25.031 $ 0.14454,7.4434e-005 

 CASK.501, TUNNEL.3, 6.3279 $ 0.036539,2.1701e-005 

 CASK.502, TUNNEL.1, 68.608 $ 0.39616,0.00022468 

 CASK.502, TUNNEL.2, 86.890 $ 0.50173,0.00025838 

 CASK.502, TUNNEL.3, 13.693 $ 0.079069,4.6959e-005 

 CASK.503, TUNNEL.1, 12.946 $ 0.074757,4.2397e-005 

 CASK.503, TUNNEL.2, 91.115 $ 0.52613,0.00027095 

 CASK.503, TUNNEL.3, 65.179 $ 0.37636,0.00022352 

 CASK.504, TUNNEL.1, 5.9701 $ 0.034474,1.9551e-005 

 CASK.504, TUNNEL.2, 30.931 $ 0.17860,9.1979e-005 

 CASK.504, TUNNEL.3, 132.45 $ 0.76480,0.00045422 

 CASK.601, TUNNEL.1, 138.18 $ 0.79788,0.00045250 

 CASK.601, TUNNEL.2, 24.944 $ 0.14403,7.4176e-005 

 CASK.601, TUNNEL.3, 6.2188 $ 0.035909,2.1326e-005 

 CASK.602, TUNNEL.1, 68.688 $ 0.39663,0.00022494 

 CASK.602, TUNNEL.2, 86.987 $ 0.50229,0.00025867 

 CASK.602, TUNNEL.3, 13.491 $ 0.077899,4.6264e-005 

 CASK.603, TUNNEL.1, 13.037 $ 0.075278,4.2692e-005 

 CASK.603, TUNNEL.2, 91.088 $ 0.52597,0.00027087 

 CASK.603, TUNNEL.3, 65.088 $ 0.37584,0.00022321 

 CASK.604, TUNNEL.1, 5.9256 $ 0.034216,1.9405e-005 

 CASK.604, TUNNEL.2, 31.061 $ 0.17936,9.2367e-005 

 CASK.604, TUNNEL.3, 132.28 $ 0.76385,0.00045365 

 CASK.701, TUNNEL.1, 138.29 $ 0.79854,0.00045288 
 E.2 

 CASK.701, TUNNEL.2, 24.847 $ 0.14347,7.3886e-005 

 CASK.701, TUNNEL.3, 6.2483 $ 0.036080,2.1428e-005 

 CASK.702, TUNNEL.1, 68.225 $ 0.39395,0.00022342 

 CASK.702, TUNNEL.2, 87.042 $ 0.50261,0.00025884 

 CASK.702, TUNNEL.3, 13.824 $ 0.079826,4.7408e-005 

 CASK.703, TUNNEL.1, 13.006 $ 0.075103,4.2593e-005 

 CASK.703, TUNNEL.2, 90.921 $ 0.52501,0.00027037 

 CASK.703, TUNNEL.3, 65.304 $ 0.37709,0.00022395 

 CASK.704, TUNNEL.1, 5.8582 $ 0.033827,1.9184e-005 

 CASK.704, TUNNEL.2, 31.026 $ 0.17916,9.2263e-005 

 CASK.704, TUNNEL.3, 132.40 $ 0.76454,0.00045406 

 CASK.801, TUNNEL.1, 138.10 $ 0.79744,0.00045225 

 CASK.801, TUNNEL.2, 25.102 $ 0.14495,7.4647e-005 

 CASK.801, TUNNEL.3, 6.2315 $ 0.035983,2.1370e-005 

 CASK.802, TUNNEL.1, 67.889 $ 0.39201,0.00022232 

 CASK.802, TUNNEL.2, 87.307 $ 0.50414,0.00025963 

 CASK.802, TUNNEL.3, 13.869 $ 0.080083,4.7561e-005 

 CASK.803, TUNNEL.1, 12.847 $ 0.074182,4.2071e-005 

 CASK.803, TUNNEL.2, 90.805 $ 0.52434,0.00027003 

 CASK.803, TUNNEL.3, 65.535 $ 0.37842,0.00022474 

 CASK.804, TUNNEL.1, 5.7617 $ 0.033270,1.8868e-005 

 CASK.804, TUNNEL.2, 31.064 $ 0.17937,9.2374e-005 

 CASK.804, TUNNEL.3, 132.36 $ 0.76430,0.00045391 

 CASK.901, TUNNEL.1, 138.13 $ 0.79764,0.00045236 

 CASK.901, TUNNEL.2, 25.128 $ 0.14510,7.4724e-005 

 CASK.901, TUNNEL.3, 6.2207 $ 0.035921,2.1333e-005 

 CASK.902, TUNNEL.1, 68.091 $ 0.39318,0.00022298 

 CASK.902, TUNNEL.2, 87.277 $ 0.50396,0.00025953 

 CASK.902, TUNNEL.3, 13.700 $ 0.079107,4.6981e-005 

 CASK.903, TUNNEL.1, 12.952 $ 0.074789,4.2415e-005 

 CASK.903, TUNNEL.2, 90.982 $ 0.52536,0.00027055 

 CASK.903, TUNNEL.3, 65.132 $ 0.37609,0.00022336 

 CASK.904, TUNNEL.1, 5.7522 $ 0.033215,1.8837e-005 

 CASK.904, TUNNEL.2, 31.124 $ 0.17972,9.2553e-005 

 CASK.904, TUNNEL.3, 132.31 $ 0.76400,0.00045374 

CASK.1001, TUNNEL.1, 137.84 $ 0.79593,0.00045139 

CASK.1001, TUNNEL.2, 25.412 $ 0.14674,7.5569e-005 

CASK.1001, TUNNEL.3, 6.2311 $ 0.035981,2.1369e-005 

CASK.1002, TUNNEL.1, 68.564 $ 0.39591,0.00022453 

CASK.1002, TUNNEL.2, 86.856 $ 0.50153,0.00025828 

CASK.1002, TUNNEL.3, 13.655 $ 0.078849,4.6828e-005 

CASK.1003, TUNNEL.1, 12.716 $ 0.073426,4.1642e-005 

CASK.1003, TUNNEL.2, 90.924 $ 0.52502,0.00027038 

CASK.1003, TUNNEL.3, 65.500 $ 0.37822,0.00022462 

CASK.1004, TUNNEL.1, 5.6573 $ 0.032667,1.8526e-005 

CASK.1004, TUNNEL.2, 31.197 $ 0.18014,9.2770e-005 

CASK.1004, TUNNEL.3, 132.27 $ 0.76378,0.00045361 

CASK.1101, TUNNEL.1, 138.17 $ 0.79782,0.00045247 

CASK.1101, TUNNEL.2, 25.006 $ 0.14440,7.4362e-005 

CASK.1101, TUNNEL.3, 6.1872 $ 0.035727,2.1218e-005 

CASK.1102, TUNNEL.1, 68.446 $ 0.39523,0.00022415 

CASK.1102, TUNNEL.2, 87.049 $ 0.50265,0.00025886 

CASK.1102, TUNNEL.3, 13.505 $ 0.077980,4.6312e-005 

CASK.1103, TUNNEL.1, 12.985 $ 0.074982,4.2524e-005 

CASK.1103, TUNNEL.2, 91.145 $ 0.52630,0.00027104 

CASK.1103, TUNNEL.3, 65.061 $ 0.37568,0.00022312 

CASK.1104, TUNNEL.1, 5.6898 $ 0.032855,1.8633e-005 

CASK.1104, TUNNEL.2, 30.943 $ 0.17868,9.2016e-005 

CASK.1104, TUNNEL.3, 132.40 $ 0.76453,0.00045405 

CASK.1201, TUNNEL.1, 137.88 $ 0.79616,0.00045153 

CASK.1201, TUNNEL.2, 25.412 $ 0.14674,7.5567e-005 

CASK.1201, TUNNEL.3, 6.1750 $ 0.035657,2.1176e-005 

CASK.1202, TUNNEL.1, 67.908 $ 0.39212,0.00022238 

CASK.1202, TUNNEL.2, 87.439 $ 0.50490,0.00026002 

CASK.1202, TUNNEL.3, 13.717 $ 0.079208,4.7041e-005 

CASK.1203, TUNNEL.1, 12.998 $ 0.075055,4.2566e-005 

CASK.1203, TUNNEL.2, 90.706 $ 0.52377,0.00026973 

CASK.1203, TUNNEL.3, 65.409 $ 0.37769,0.00022431 

CASK.1204, TUNNEL.1, 5.5919 $ 0.032289,1.8312e-005 

CASK.1204, TUNNEL.2, 31.129 $ 0.17975,9.2567e-005 

CASK.1204, TUNNEL.3, 132.27 $ 0.76380,0.00045362 

CASK.1301, TUNNEL.1, 138.25 $ 0.79830,0.00045274 

CASK.1301, TUNNEL.2, 24.993 $ 0.14432,7.4320e-005 

CASK.1301, TUNNEL.3, 6.1782 $ 0.035675,2.1187e-005 

CASK.1302, TUNNEL.1, 68.155 $ 0.39355,0.00022319 
 E.3 

CASK.1302, TUNNEL.2, 87.155 $ 0.50326,0.00025917 

CASK.1302, TUNNEL.3, 13.671 $ 0.078943,4.6884e-005 

CASK.1303, TUNNEL.1, 12.737 $ 0.073546,4.1710e-005 

CASK.1303, TUNNEL.2, 91.130 $ 0.52622,0.00027099 

CASK.1303, TUNNEL.3, 65.245 $ 0.37674,0.00022375 

CASK.1304, TUNNEL.1, 5.6600 $ 0.032683,1.8535e-005 

CASK.1304, TUNNEL.2, 31.047 $ 0.17928,9.2325e-005 

CASK.1304, TUNNEL.3, 132.30 $ 0.76396,0.00045372 

CASK.1401, TUNNEL.1, 138.04 $ 0.79707,0.00045204 

CASK.1401, TUNNEL.2, 25.121 $ 0.14506,7.4703e-005 

CASK.1401, TUNNEL.3, 6.2019 $ 0.035812,2.1269e-005 

CASK.1402, TUNNEL.1, 68.195 $ 0.39378,0.00022332 

CASK.1402, TUNNEL.2, 87.073 $ 0.50279,0.00025893 

CASK.1402, TUNNEL.3, 13.807 $ 0.079729,4.7351e-005 

CASK.1403, TUNNEL.1, 12.669 $ 0.073153,4.1487e-005 

CASK.1403, TUNNEL.2, 91.365 $ 0.52757,0.00027169 

CASK.1403, TUNNEL.3, 65.069 $ 0.37573,0.00022314 

CASK.1404, TUNNEL.1, 5.5888 $ 0.032272,1.8302e-005 

CASK.1404, TUNNEL.2, 31.163 $ 0.17994,9.2668e-005 

CASK.1404, TUNNEL.3, 132.22 $ 0.76345,0.00045341 

CASK.1501, TUNNEL.1, 138.17 $ 0.79785,0.00045249 

CASK.1501, TUNNEL.2, 25.075 $ 0.14479,7.4565e-005 

CASK.1501, TUNNEL.3, 6.1911 $ 0.035749,2.1231e-005 

CASK.1502, TUNNEL.1, 68.139 $ 0.39346,0.00022314 

CASK.1502, TUNNEL.2, 87.197 $ 0.50350,0.00025930 

CASK.1502, TUNNEL.3, 13.646 $ 0.078797,4.6798e-005 

CASK.1503, TUNNEL.1, 12.784 $ 0.073818,4.1864e-005 

CASK.1503, TUNNEL.2, 91.009 $ 0.52552,0.00027063 

CASK.1503, TUNNEL.3, 65.230 $ 0.37666,0.00022370 

CASK.1504, TUNNEL.1, 5.6144 $ 0.032419,1.8386e-005 

CASK.1504, TUNNEL.2, 31.011 $ 0.17907,9.2217e-005 

CASK.1504, TUNNEL.3, 132.37 $ 0.76434,0.00045394 

CASK.1601, TUNNEL.1, 138.38 $ 0.79906,0.00045317 

CASK.1601, TUNNEL.2, 24.861 $ 0.14355,7.3928e-005 

CASK.1601, TUNNEL.3, 6.1468 $ 0.035493,2.1079e-005 

CASK.1602, TUNNEL.1, 68.267 $ 0.39420,0.00022356 

CASK.1602, TUNNEL.2, 87.153 $ 0.50325,0.00025917 

CASK.1602, TUNNEL.3, 13.587 $ 0.078457,4.6595e-005 

CASK.1603, TUNNEL.1, 12.646 $ 0.073025,4.1414e-005 

CASK.1603, TUNNEL.2, 90.521 $ 0.52270,0.00026918 

CASK.1603, TUNNEL.3, 65.886 $ 0.38045,0.00022595 

CASK.1604, TUNNEL.1, 5.5843 $ 0.032245,1.8287e-005 

CASK.1604, TUNNEL.2, 30.824 $ 0.17799,9.1661e-005 

CASK.1604, TUNNEL.3, 132.56 $ 0.76547,0.00045461 

CASK.1701, TUNNEL.1, 137.89 $ 0.79623,0.00045156 

CASK.1701, TUNNEL.2, 25.339 $ 0.14632,7.5351e-005 

CASK.1701, TUNNEL.3, 6.1499 $ 0.035511,2.1090e-005 

CASK.1702, TUNNEL.1, 68.793 $ 0.39723,0.00022528 

CASK.1702, TUNNEL.2, 86.707 $ 0.50067,0.00025784 

CASK.1702, TUNNEL.3, 13.529 $ 0.078123,4.6397e-005 

CASK.1703, TUNNEL.1, 12.704 $ 0.073359,4.1604e-005 

CASK.1703, TUNNEL.2, 91.173 $ 0.52646,0.00027112 

CASK.1703, TUNNEL.3, 65.193 $ 0.37645,0.00022357 

CASK.1704, TUNNEL.1, 5.5697 $ 0.032161,1.8240e-005 

CASK.1704, TUNNEL.2, 31.366 $ 0.18112,9.3274e-005 

CASK.1704, TUNNEL.3, 132.07 $ 0.76260,0.00045290 

CASK.1801, TUNNEL.1, 138.30 $ 0.79856,0.00045289 

CASK.1801, TUNNEL.2, 24.981 $ 0.14425,7.4286e-005 

CASK.1801, TUNNEL.3, 6.1334 $ 0.035416,2.1034e-005 

CASK.1802, TUNNEL.1, 68.068 $ 0.39304,0.00022291 

CASK.1802, TUNNEL.2, 87.271 $ 0.50393,0.00025952 

CASK.1802, TUNNEL.3, 13.649 $ 0.078815,4.6808e-005 

CASK.1803, TUNNEL.1, 12.694 $ 0.073297,4.1569e-005 

CASK.1803, TUNNEL.2, 91.352 $ 0.52750,0.00027165 

CASK.1803, TUNNEL.3, 65.097 $ 0.37589,0.00022324 

CASK.1804, TUNNEL.1, 5.5500 $ 0.032047,1.8175e-005 

CASK.1804, TUNNEL.2, 31.344 $ 0.18099,9.3208e-005 

CASK.1804, TUNNEL.3, 132.06 $ 0.76255,0.00045287 

CASK.1901, TUNNEL.1, 138.28 $ 0.79848,0.00045284 

CASK.1901, TUNNEL.2, 24.841 $ 0.14344,7.3870e-005 

CASK.1901, TUNNEL.3, 6.1732 $ 0.035646,2.1170e-005 

CASK.1902, TUNNEL.1, 68.778 $ 0.39714,0.00022523 

CASK.1902, TUNNEL.2, 86.557 $ 0.49981,0.00025739 

CASK.1902, TUNNEL.3, 13.637 $ 0.078746,4.6767e-005 

CASK.1903, TUNNEL.1, 12.841 $ 0.074146,4.2051e-005 
 E.4 

CASK.1903, TUNNEL.2, 91.151 $ 0.52633,0.00027105 

CASK.1903, TUNNEL.3, 65.209 $ 0.37654,0.00022362 

CASK.1904, TUNNEL.1, 5.6276 $ 0.032496,1.8429e-005 

CASK.1904, TUNNEL.2, 30.798 $ 0.17784,9.1584e-005 

CASK.1904, TUNNEL.3, 132.57 $ 0.76549,0.00045462 

CASK.2001, TUNNEL.1, 138.26 $ 0.79837,0.00045278 

CASK.2001, TUNNEL.2, 24.969 $ 0.14418,7.4252e-005 

CASK.2001, TUNNEL.3, 6.1633 $ 0.035589,2.1136e-005 

CASK.2002, TUNNEL.1, 67.893 $ 0.39204,0.00022234 

CASK.2002, TUNNEL.2, 87.430 $ 0.50485,0.00025999 

CASK.2002, TUNNEL.3, 13.778 $ 0.079561,4.7251e-005 

CASK.2003, TUNNEL.1, 12.702 $ 0.073347,4.1597e-005 

CASK.2003, TUNNEL.2, 90.326 $ 0.52157,0.00026860 

CASK.2003, TUNNEL.3, 66.063 $ 0.38147,0.00022655 

CASK.2004, TUNNEL.1, 5.6088 $ 0.032387,1.8368e-005 

CASK.2004, TUNNEL.2, 30.836 $ 0.17806,9.1696e-005 

CASK.2004, TUNNEL.3, 132.54 $ 0.76530,0.00045451 

CASK.2101, TUNNEL.1, 137.99 $ 0.79682,0.00045190 

CASK.2101, TUNNEL.2, 25.223 $ 0.14564,7.5005e-005 

CASK.2101, TUNNEL.3, 6.2208 $ 0.035921,2.1333e-005 

CASK.2102, TUNNEL.1, 68.122 $ 0.39336,0.00022308 

CASK.2102, TUNNEL.2, 87.248 $ 0.50380,0.00025945 

CASK.2102, TUNNEL.3, 13.695 $ 0.079082,4.6967e-005 

CASK.2103, TUNNEL.1, 12.623 $ 0.072889,4.1338e-005 

CASK.2103, TUNNEL.2, 91.084 $ 0.52595,0.00027086 

CASK.2103, TUNNEL.3, 65.444 $ 0.37790,0.00022443 

CASK.2104, TUNNEL.1, 5.6251 $ 0.032481,1.8421e-005 

CASK.2104, TUNNEL.2, 30.935 $ 0.17863,9.1992e-005 

CASK.2104, TUNNEL.3, 132.48 $ 0.76497,0.00045431 

CASK.2201, TUNNEL.1, 138.00 $ 0.79686,0.00045192 

CASK.2201, TUNNEL.2, 25.240 $ 0.14575,7.5057e-005 

CASK.2201, TUNNEL.3, 6.1738 $ 0.035650,2.1172e-005 

CASK.2202, TUNNEL.1, 68.741 $ 0.39693,0.00022511 

CASK.2202, TUNNEL.2, 86.917 $ 0.50189,0.00025847 

CASK.2202, TUNNEL.3, 13.480 $ 0.077838,4.6228e-005 

CASK.2203, TUNNEL.1, 12.900 $ 0.074490,4.2246e-005 

CASK.2203, TUNNEL.2, 91.269 $ 0.52702,0.00027141 

CASK.2203, TUNNEL.3, 64.953 $ 0.37506,0.00022275 

CASK.2204, TUNNEL.1, 5.6790 $ 0.032793,1.8598e-005 

CASK.2204, TUNNEL.2, 30.883 $ 0.17833,9.1837e-005 

CASK.2204, TUNNEL.3, 132.53 $ 0.76527,0.00045449 

CASK.2301, TUNNEL.1, 137.99 $ 0.79683,0.00045190 

CASK.2301, TUNNEL.2, 25.190 $ 0.14546,7.4909e-005 

CASK.2301, TUNNEL.3, 6.2267 $ 0.035955,2.1354e-005 

CASK.2302, TUNNEL.1, 68.414 $ 0.39504,0.00022404 

CASK.2302, TUNNEL.2, 86.942 $ 0.50203,0.00025854 

CASK.2302, TUNNEL.3, 13.674 $ 0.078957,4.6892e-005 

CASK.2303, TUNNEL.1, 12.930 $ 0.074664,4.2344e-005 

CASK.2303, TUNNEL.2, 90.672 $ 0.52357,0.00026963 

CASK.2303, TUNNEL.3, 65.491 $ 0.37816,0.00022459 

CASK.2304, TUNNEL.1, 5.6849 $ 0.032826,1.8617e-005 

CASK.2304, TUNNEL.2, 31.044 $ 0.17926,9.2315e-005 

CASK.2304, TUNNEL.3, 132.32 $ 0.76406,0.00045377 

CASK.2401, TUNNEL.1, 137.91 $ 0.79636,0.00045164 

CASK.2401, TUNNEL.2, 25.207 $ 0.14555,7.4957e-005 

CASK.2401, TUNNEL.3, 6.2003 $ 0.035803,2.1263e-005 

CASK.2402, TUNNEL.1, 68.065 $ 0.39303,0.00022290 

CASK.2402, TUNNEL.2, 87.281 $ 0.50399,0.00025955 

CASK.2402, TUNNEL.3, 13.655 $ 0.078847,4.6827e-005 

CASK.2403, TUNNEL.1, 12.813 $ 0.073989,4.1961e-005 

CASK.2403, TUNNEL.2, 90.843 $ 0.52456,0.00027014 

CASK.2403, TUNNEL.3, 65.521 $ 0.37834,0.00022470 

CASK.2404, TUNNEL.1, 5.7547 $ 0.033229,1.8845e-005 

CASK.2404, TUNNEL.2, 31.095 $ 0.17955,9.2466e-005 

CASK.2404, TUNNEL.3, 132.32 $ 0.76405,0.00045377 

CASK.2501, TUNNEL.1, 138.26 $ 0.79836,0.00045277 

CASK.2501, TUNNEL.2, 25.000 $ 0.14436,7.4342e-005 

CASK.2501, TUNNEL.3, 6.1776 $ 0.035672,2.1185e-005 

CASK.2502, TUNNEL.1, 68.473 $ 0.39539,0.00022424 

CASK.2502, TUNNEL.2, 87.067 $ 0.50275,0.00025891 

CASK.2502, TUNNEL.3, 13.573 $ 0.078375,4.6547e-005 

CASK.2503, TUNNEL.1, 12.768 $ 0.073729,4.1814e-005 

CASK.2503, TUNNEL.2, 91.066 $ 0.52584,0.00027080 

CASK.2503, TUNNEL.3, 65.294 $ 0.37703,0.00022391 

CASK.2504, TUNNEL.1, 5.8355 $ 0.033696,1.9110e-005 
 E.5 

CASK.2504, TUNNEL.2, 30.930 $ 0.17860,9.1976e-005 

CASK.2504, TUNNEL.3, 132.43 $ 0.76468,0.00045414 

CASK.2601, TUNNEL.1, 138.10 $ 0.79746,0.00045226 

CASK.2601, TUNNEL.2, 25.102 $ 0.14495,7.4647e-005 

CASK.2601, TUNNEL.3, 6.2378 $ 0.036019,2.1392e-005 

CASK.2602, TUNNEL.1, 68.554 $ 0.39585,0.00022450 

CASK.2602, TUNNEL.2, 86.943 $ 0.50203,0.00025854 

CASK.2602, TUNNEL.3, 13.613 $ 0.078605,4.6684e-005 

CASK.2603, TUNNEL.1, 12.843 $ 0.074160,4.2058e-005 

CASK.2603, TUNNEL.2, 91.332 $ 0.52738,0.00027160 

CASK.2603, TUNNEL.3, 64.991 $ 0.37528,0.00022288 

CASK.2604, TUNNEL.1, 5.8796 $ 0.033951,1.9254e-005 

CASK.2604, TUNNEL.2, 31.149 $ 0.17987,9.2628e-005 

CASK.2604, TUNNEL.3, 132.23 $ 0.76355,0.00045347 

CASK.2701, TUNNEL.1, 138.10 $ 0.79741,0.00045224 

CASK.2701, TUNNEL.2, 25.040 $ 0.14459,7.4462e-005 

CASK.2701, TUNNEL.3, 6.3016 $ 0.036387,2.1610e-005 

CASK.2702, TUNNEL.1, 68.016 $ 0.39275,0.00022274 

CASK.2702, TUNNEL.2, 87.294 $ 0.50407,0.00025959 

CASK.2702, TUNNEL.3, 13.821 $ 0.079805,4.7396e-005 

CASK.2703, TUNNEL.1, 12.778 $ 0.073785,4.1846e-005 

CASK.2703, TUNNEL.2, 90.618 $ 0.52326,0.00026947 

CASK.2703, TUNNEL.3, 65.768 $ 0.37977,0.00022554 

CASK.2704, TUNNEL.1, 5.8947 $ 0.034038,1.9304e-005 

CASK.2704, TUNNEL.2, 31.135 $ 0.17978,9.2585e-005 

CASK.2704, TUNNEL.3, 132.22 $ 0.76350,0.00045344 

CASK.2801, TUNNEL.1, 137.92 $ 0.79641,0.00045167 

CASK.2801, TUNNEL.2, 25.255 $ 0.14583,7.5100e-005 

CASK.2801, TUNNEL.3, 6.2785 $ 0.036254,2.1531e-005 

CASK.2802, TUNNEL.1, 68.305 $ 0.39442,0.00022369 

CASK.2802, TUNNEL.2, 87.253 $ 0.50383,0.00025946 

CASK.2802, TUNNEL.3, 13.602 $ 0.078545,4.6648e-005 

CASK.2803, TUNNEL.1, 12.785 $ 0.073827,4.1869e-005 

CASK.2803, TUNNEL.2, 91.110 $ 0.52610,0.00027094 

CASK.2803, TUNNEL.3, 65.358 $ 0.37740,0.00022414 

CASK.2804, TUNNEL.1, 6.0104 $ 0.034706,1.9683e-005 

CASK.2804, TUNNEL.2, 31.037 $ 0.17922,9.2294e-005 

CASK.2804, TUNNEL.3, 132.37 $ 0.76435,0.00045394 

CASK.2901, TUNNEL.1, 137.95 $ 0.79655,0.00045175 

CASK.2901, TUNNEL.2, 25.208 $ 0.14556,7.4961e-005 

CASK.2901, TUNNEL.3, 6.3047 $ 0.036405,2.1621e-005 

CASK.2902, TUNNEL.1, 68.094 $ 0.39320,0.00022299 

CASK.2902, TUNNEL.2, 87.286 $ 0.50402,0.00025956 

CASK.2902, TUNNEL.3, 13.756 $ 0.079430,4.7173e-005 

CASK.2903, TUNNEL.1, 12.735 $ 0.073535,4.1704e-005 

CASK.2903, TUNNEL.2, 91.049 $ 0.52575,0.00027075 

CASK.2903, TUNNEL.3, 65.491 $ 0.37817,0.00022459 

CASK.2904, TUNNEL.1, 6.0330 $ 0.034837,1.9757e-005 

CASK.2904, TUNNEL.2, 31.507 $ 0.18193,9.3691e-005 

CASK.2904, TUNNEL.3, 131.85 $ 0.76133,0.00045215 

CASK.3001, TUNNEL.1, 137.97 $ 0.79670,0.00045183 

CASK.3001, TUNNEL.2, 25.049 $ 0.14464,7.4489e-005 

CASK.3001, TUNNEL.3, 6.3339 $ 0.036574,2.1721e-005 

CASK.3002, TUNNEL.1, 68.734 $ 0.39689,0.00022509 

CASK.3002, TUNNEL.2, 86.655 $ 0.50038,0.00025769 

CASK.3002, TUNNEL.3, 13.815 $ 0.079771,4.7376e-005 

CASK.3003, TUNNEL.1, 12.791 $ 0.073857,4.1886e-005 

CASK.3003, TUNNEL.2, 91.080 $ 0.52592,0.00027084 

CASK.3003, TUNNEL.3, 65.432 $ 0.37783,0.00022439 

CASK.3004, TUNNEL.1, 6.1398 $ 0.035453,2.0106e-005 

CASK.3004, TUNNEL.2, 31.115 $ 0.17967,9.2525e-005 

CASK.3004, TUNNEL.3, 132.27 $ 0.76378,0.00045361 

CASK.3101, TUNNEL.1, 137.70 $ 0.79510,0.00045093 

CASK.3101, TUNNEL.2, 25.393 $ 0.14663,7.5511e-005 

CASK.3101, TUNNEL.3, 6.3698 $ 0.036781,2.1844e-005 

CASK.3102, TUNNEL.1, 68.267 $ 0.39420,0.00022356 

CASK.3102, TUNNEL.2, 87.177 $ 0.50339,0.00025924 

CASK.3102, TUNNEL.3, 13.703 $ 0.079126,4.6993e-005 

CASK.3103, TUNNEL.1, 12.902 $ 0.074502,4.2252e-005 

CASK.3103, TUNNEL.2, 91.407 $ 0.52781,0.00027182 

CASK.3103, TUNNEL.3, 65.078 $ 0.37578,0.00022317 

CASK.3104, TUNNEL.1, 6.2118 $ 0.035869,2.0342e-005 

CASK.3104, TUNNEL.2, 30.914 $ 0.17851,9.1928e-005 

CASK.3104, TUNNEL.3, 132.43 $ 0.76470,0.00045415 

CASK.3201, TUNNEL.1, 138.23 $ 0.79819,0.00045268 
 E.6 

CASK.3201, TUNNEL.2, 24.820 $ 0.14332,7.3808e-005 

CASK.3201, TUNNEL.3, 6.3863 $ 0.036877,2.1901e-005 

CASK.3202, TUNNEL.1, 67.949 $ 0.39236,0.00022252 

CASK.3202, TUNNEL.2, 87.413 $ 0.50475,0.00025994 

CASK.3202, TUNNEL.3, 13.866 $ 0.080068,4.7552e-005 

CASK.3203, TUNNEL.1, 13.070 $ 0.075471,4.2802e-005 

CASK.3203, TUNNEL.2, 90.901 $ 0.52489,0.00027031 

CASK.3203, TUNNEL.3, 65.388 $ 0.37757,0.00022424 

CASK.3204, TUNNEL.1, 6.2751 $ 0.036235,2.0550e-005 

CASK.3204, TUNNEL.2, 31.217 $ 0.18026,9.2829e-005 

CASK.3204, TUNNEL.3, 132.12 $ 0.76292,0.00045309 
 

Appendix F 

HOLTEC HI-STAR 100 Component Temperature Distributions 
 F.1 

Figure F.1. Impact Limiter Skin Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 

Figure F.2. Impact Limiter Structure Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 
 F.2 

Figure F.3. Canister Shell Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 

Figure F.4. Cask Inner Shell (Primary Containment Boundary) Temperature Distribution - 

Normal Transport Conditions. 
 F.3 

Figure F.5. Gamma Shield Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 

Figure F.6. Fin Structure Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 
 F.4 

Figure F.7. Basket Axial Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 

Figure F.8. Basket Radial Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 
 F.5 

Figure F.9. Spent Fuel Axial Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 

Figure F.10. Spent Fuel Axial Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 
 F.6 

Figure F.11. Spent Fuel Radial Temperature Distribution - Normal Transport Conditions. 
APPENDIX G 

Comments and Responses from Public Posting in the Federal Re
G.1 

Comments on NUREG/CR-6886 were solicited via a Federal Register Notice dated September 16, 2005. A second Federa

posted on November 30, 2005, extending the comment period on this document to December 30, 2005. The NRC received 

diverse group of external stakeholders, consisting of Northeast High Level Radioactive Waste Transportation Project Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen Agency for Nuclear Projects, State of Nevada William Rothman, M.D. (private citizen) Comments ranged from concerns about the potential consequences of the effects of the fire transient on spent fuel transportcomments that raised questions related to the basis for the staff's analysis. A revised version of this document (NUREG/CR

been developed, which includes additional discussion addressing the issues raised in these comments, an expanded level of 

explanation of the analysis methodology, and additional analysis of the potential consequences of the accident scenario. Th

submitted by external stakeholders and the staff's responses to those comments are summarized in the following table. 

19 Some comments have been condensed slightly to remove redundancies or edited to correct typographical errors, without omitting any 

comment. Full text of the original comments, as submitted to the NRC point of contact for this document, can be obtained from the AgAccess and Management System (ADAMS) under the accession number ML062340334. 
G.2 

Summary of Comments and Responses from Public Posting on the Federal Register (9/16/2005 through 12/30/2005

Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario

No. Comment Response 

1 On page 5.1 the statement is made that 66 ft. downstream from the fire source is the shortest possible 

distance between the fire center and an SNF package because of the existence of a buffer car. This assumption seems problematic: even in the Baltimore Tunnel and certainly in wider tunnels with 

more than one track – it seems possible that the cask car and a buffer car could become uncoupled and slide past each other, that the buffer car could override or be overridden by the package car or that the derailment could realign the cars in such a way that the minimum distance between the fire Center and the package could be only a few feet. 

The 66-ft (20-m) location was chosen as a reasonable estimpackage could have been located in this particular fire, baseregulations issued by the Department of Transportation (DOin 49CFR174.85, require very specifically defined spacing bcarrying hazardous materials of any kind, including flammaradioactive materials. Typical requirements specify that a rradioactive material must be separated from cars carrying oby at least one buffer car. Therefore, the package was placefor this particular accident, not a 'worst possible location' foscenario. Additions to Chapter 5 address this issue in an exthe fire scenario, the configuration of the derailed train carsapproach. Additions to Chapter 1 evaluate the Baltimore tunthe frequency and severity of rail transportation accidents inmaterial and severe fires. 
G.3 

No. Comment Response 

2 The study assumes that the package remains 

horizontal with one end facing the fire source. It states that this orientation results in the maximum possible exposure and in the least post-fire free convection cooling. While I do not doubt that that is 

true, it would seem that there should be some discussion or study of an inclined or vertical package particularly, as I believe is pointed out later, because of the vertical temperature distributions both in the air and on the tunnel walls. (Would the seals in a vertical [c]ask where the end is near the heated ceiling of the Tunnel – or sitting just above a pool of flammable liquid – exceed rated service temperatures sooner than in the assumed position?) 

The position and orientation of the package within the tunnmaximize heat input to the package from convection and raPeak gas and tunnel surface temperatures were used as bounpackage surface, as a conservative estimate of the distributegradients the package would actually see within the tunnel eorientation. This is of particular importance in terms of mathe seals, because the package ends (and therefore the seals

impact limiters, which shield the seal region from direct conradiation from the tunnel environment. The heat input to ththe rate of heat up of the seals, rather than heat input to the seals heat up primarily because of conduction from the packChapters 5 and 6, which expand the discussion of the modea review of the conservative assumptions underlying the selorientation, location relative to the fire, and boundary condi

3 on page 5.7, the analysis assumed that the center axis 

of the package would be 8.2 ft. above the Tunnel floor. ... it is not obvious that it is a worst-case position .... (While I understand from the comment in the first numbered paragraph of section 6.1 that the peak gas temperature at the top of the Tunnel was used as the ambient temperature for active heat transfer to the upper surfaces of the packages, it is not clear to me that this is equivalent to assuming that the package itself were higher in the Tunnel.) 

Using the peak gas temperatures for the boundary condition

assuming the package is located at that corresponding posit'worst case' for convection would be to assume that the packthe tunnel ceiling, and the peak air temperature is seen by ahowever, radiation view factors to the tunnel walls and flooSince radiation heat transfer is at least an order of magnitudconvection, this position would not produce the worst heat t

the package. The 'worst case' for radiation assumes the pac

horizontally, near the center of the tunnel, so that it has the view factors on all surfaces, particularly the sides of the pacis used in the analysis, and is arguably the 'most adverse ori

transfer during the fire and in the post-fire cool down. Addand 6 expand the discussion of the modeling approach, inclconservative assumptions underlying the selection of the palocation relative to the fire, and boundary conditions. 
G.4 

No. Comment Response 

4 regarding the use of a seven-hour fire [based on the 

predictions of the NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator code calculations for the tunnel fire], ...there should be some discussion of both the confidence of the 7-hr FDS prediction and of the [potential consequences] of a fire lasting 10 or more hours. 

Seven hours is an extremely conservative estimate of the poBaltimore tunnel fire. Based on known facts about the Balt

from NTSB accounts of the accident and testimony of emerthe scene), the most severe portion of the Howard Street tun

approximately 3 hours. Sensitivity studies conducted by NImodel of the Howard Street tunnel evaluated variables in thtunnel geometry, fuel pool size, wall material properties), aheat release rate of the fire was limited to about 50 MW, duVarying the fuel pool size can yield longer a duration fire, btemperatures are limited due to lack of sufficient oxygen in tunnel. The 7-hr fire duration used to define the boundary conditionwas obtained by assuming a fully ventilated fire that burned was consumed. The heat release rate for this fire scenario iMW, an order of magnitude higher than the heat rate predicrepresentation of the fire conditions. Simulation of a longer the burn rate or limiting the available oxygen for the fire, or result in lower fire temperatures. The scenario selected for 

conservative representation of a potentially ‘worst case’ fire accident. Additions to Chapter 2 expand the discussion of t

assumed in the FDS simulation used to determine the boundanalyses of the SNF transportation packages. 
G.5 

No. Comment Response 

5 In NRC's report on the Baltimore Tunnel fire, it 

appears that far too much emphasis is placed on investigating the possibility of loss of containment and not enough on the possibility of a loss of shielding scenario regarding the TN-68, Hi-Star 100, and NAC LWT SNF shipping casks. Loss of shielding is of particular concern to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen for the following reasons: 

Licensing regulations specified in 10 CFR 71 require that nshielding must be maintained within specified limits in all dincluding the regulatory fire transient. All three packages e

to lose their neutron shield in the regulatory fire, and still mneutron shielding. How this is accomplished is described in SARs. Additions to Chapter 8 discuss the possible consequneutron shielding and gamma shielding in terms of potentiaanalyses show that the potential dose would be below the liprescribed in 10CFR49 and 10CFR71 for all three packages 

6 Shielding is an internal component of the cask design 

and any damage to the shielding would not be visually apparent to railroad employees. 

All three packages evaluated can lose their neutron shield a

external dose rates within regulatory limits, as documented 

SARs. Gamma shielding is provided by steel in the TN-68 packages, and this shielding will not be reduced by any fire reduction of gamma shielding due to lead slumping as a conand resolidifying is possible with the NAC LWT package. 

increase in radiation dose from the NAC LWT would requithe package outer shell (such as a puncture), which could reshielding due to molten lead leaking from the package. Anof this fire scenario show that the physical forces are not su

damage to the package shell, and the lead shielding would rcavity between the inner and outer shell during melting and Potential dose increases due to possible slumping of the leabelow the regulatory limit for accident conditions. Additionthe potential consequences of reduction in gamma shielding 

to this fire scenario. 

7 Train crews are not expected to be provided with 

dosimetry to measure off-link or on-link exposure during normal transportation, let alone emergency situations. 

Additions to Chapter 8 discuss the potential consequences oshielding in all three packages, and potential reduction in gaNAC LWT due to this fire scenario. All three packages are within regulatory limits without neutron shielding in place, 
G.6 

No. Comment Response 

that the NAC LWT also maintains radiation shielding withieven when the potential reduction in gamma shielding is coTrain crews that observe current regulations and procedures 171: §§ 171.15 and 171.16, 49 CFR part 172: subparts C G174: subparts A through D and K) governing the transportamaterials (including radioactive material) would not be at rihazards beyond the current regulatory limits for accident copackage subjected to the conditions of the Baltimore tunnel It is the purpose of OCRWM and DOE to ensure that all aptaken to protect carriers, workers, and the general public froconsequences associated with shipments of spent nuclear furadioactive waste. Regulations and procedures are currently designed to further the safety and security of SNF shipmentinstituting a “no pass” rule in tunnels for trains carrying radtrains carrying hazardous or flammable materials, to further low probability of a tunnel fire accident involving an SNF t(See discussion of AAR Circular OT-55 in Chapter 1.) This analysis of the Baltimore tunnel fire and previous evalChapter 1) show that the risks associated with SNF shipmenAdditional measures under consideration to further mitigate include 

- providing dosimeters for specific workers involved i

of SNF shipments 

- instituting ‘dedicated’ rail lines on specific sections o

where the consequences of an accident are deemed swarrant such precaution, despite the low probability 
G.7 

No. Comment Response 

8 There are no plans to equip locomotives with 

radiation detectors to alert crews to dangerous spikes in dose rate. 

See response to Comment 7 above. 

9 In all three models, the loss of neutron shielding was 

a given, but loss of gamma shielding was scarcely touched upon. Lead has a melting point of 621 degrees[F (328°C)]. In all three models, the gamma shield exceeded that temperature. The TN-68 exceeded that temperature after 5 hours, both the HiStar 100 and the NAC LWT casks reached that point in just two hours. The NAC LWT uses lead rather than carbon steel as its gamma shield. The shielding would have likely failed at the two-hour mark, eventually reaching 1378 degrees[F (748°C)] after 6.75 hours in the fire. 

Gamma shielding is not lost in the TN-68 or HI-STAR 100 

tunnel fire, since these packages use steel for gamma shieldNAC LWT, the lead reaches its melting point, but in this ac

lead remains encapsulated within the steel shell of the packcontinues to function as a gamma shield. Additions to Chapexpanded discussion of the consequences of the lead meltin

the consequent effect on gamma shielding in the NAC LWTpresented show that this package maintains shielding such t

meter from the package surface is below 1000 mrem/hr, as conditions. (See response to Comments 5, 6, and 7.) 

10 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include an expanded introductory section summarizing previous NRC studies of spent fuel shipping cask response to severe fire environments, including an explanation of the relationship between this report and NUREG/CR-6672 (SAND2000-0234). 

There is no direct relationship between NUREG/CR-6672 aNUREG/CR-6672 undertakes a detailed study of the risks a

transport of spent nuclear fuel by all possible modes, considloads and thermal loads imposed by conservatively defined 

scenarios. Thermal loads were evaluated by postulating an duration (11 hours) fully engulfing pool fire at 1832°F (100envelopes the "worst case" possibilities presented by any hiincluding the Baltimore tunnel fire. The analyses in NUREextremely conservative assumptions and highly simplified mpackages for the thermal analyses, which tend to severely otemperatures within the package, and do not consider the th

of a tunnel fire or any specific historic accident scenarios. The main effect of the modeling simplifications and conserv
G.8 

No. Comment Response 

NUREG/CR-6672 is to grossly over-estimate the peak predan SNF package in the response to any fire scenario. Even conservative bounding assumptions, including assumptions frequency, severity and consequences, the analysis in NURthat the risks associated with the shipment of spent nuclear very small. The report further concludes that current regulatransportation of spent nuclear fuel “adequately protect pub

11 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a more detailed discussion of the Nation[al] Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of the Baltimore Tunnel Fire, including the NTSB safety recommendations (R-04-15 and -16, issued January 5, 2005) and the NTSB decision not to issue an official report on the cause and history of the fire. 

As discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of NUREG/CR-

from the NTSB was used in the process of determining a co

representation of the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, as well experts at NIST and CNWRA. The NTSB performed a thothis accident, but declined to issue a final report because the to a decision on the cause of the accident. The cause of the to the analyses presented in NUREG/CR-6886, which accepaccident did indeed occur. Similarly, the NTSB safety recoand -16 are not relevant to the fire analysis. These recommneed for improved communications between CSX and the cimprovements to the city’s emergency preparedness plans. 

12 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a detailed discussion of the 2001 analysis of the Baltimore Tunnel Fire prepared by Radioactive Waste Management Associates for the State of Nevada. 

NUREG/CR-6886 is a case study of a historical event, not a work related to general transportation accidents involving r

The RWMA study is particularly problematic, since it is badifferent assumptions regarding the fire and the properties osuch that it is impossible to make meaningful comparisons reports. The RWMA study was released less than 3 monthlong before the NTSB, CNWRA, NIST, and NRC had finisevent, and as a result the RWMA study is based on inaccuraassumptions about the nature, duration, and intensity of this RWMA report overstates the intensity and duration of the f
G.9 

No. Comment Response 

fire duration for the intense portion of the fire vs. the 3-houby NTSB investigations.) The RWMA study inappropriatepredictions from the long-duration pool fires analyzed in NUestimate the tunnel fire environment. The RWMA report inbehavior of the package and spent fuel, assuming an incorrefor fuel cladding (i.e., creep vs. pressure rupture), and neglein the release pathway (e.g., metal to metal contact and lid treport also overestimates the amount of Cesium that is avaithe fuel rods. As a result, the RWMA report vastly overesticonsequences of the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario when appackage, and does not present a reliable analysis that could the risks associated with transportation of spent nuclear fue

13 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a detailed discussion of the 2002 analysis of the Baltimore Tunnel Fire prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy as part of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain (DOE/EIS-0250). 

A direct comparison between the analyses in NUREG/CR-60250 is not meaningful. The analysis in EIS-0250 does not tunnel fire specifically; instead it considers the maximum reaccident, which is considered to envelope events such as th

scenario. 

14 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include side-by-side fire transient results and consequence analyses of the NAC LWT cask, with and without enclosure in an ISO container. (The discussion at page 7.17 implies that these analyses were performed, but they apparently were not reported.) 

The NAC LWT was not analyzed without an ISO container package was analyzed enclosed in an ISO container becausmode of transport when it is shipped by rail. The CoC for tthat it be enclosed in either a personnel barrier (PB) or an IScommonly used for trucks are not shippable by rail, so for rwould generally be required. Current DOE policy requires packages shipped by rail, and every rail shipment of the LWan ISO container. The discussion on p. 7.17 is intended to container does not substantially shield the NAC LWT packpeak component temperatures would be essentially the samISO container. 
G.10 

No. Comment Response 

15 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include an additional cask analysis, parallel to the approach described in Section 5, of a General Atomics GA-4 legal-weight truck cask, shipped on a rail car without enclosure in an ISO container. 

This study evaluated the performance of three representativservice, based on resources that are postulated to be used. Ithe GA-4 package in NUREG/CR-6886 would not be expecalter the results or conclusions obtained in this study. In adperformance of the GA-4 package in an extra-regulatory fir

examined in NUREG-1768, United States Nuclear Regulato

Package Performance Study Test Protocols. 

Additional analyses may be warranted for future studies, if scale use of a particular package is expected. 

16 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include an additional thermal analysis for each of the four casks, parallel to the approach described in Section 5, assuming that the cask is located 5 meters (16 feet) from the fire center. 

As noted in the response to Comments 1, 2, and 3, the selecpackages for this analysis is consistent with the physical attand the possible shipping configurations for an SNF packagtunnel fire scenario. 

17 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include an additional thermal analysis for each of the four casks, parallel to the approach described in Section 5, assuming that the cask is located within the hottest region of the fire. 

See response to Comments 1, 2, 3, and 16. 

18 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a re-examination of the potential for fuel cladding failure and release of radioactive materials, including fission products, at temperatures below the projected burst temperature of 1382 ̊F (750 ̊C) for 

Zircaloy cladding. (Additional attention should be given to the presence of older fuel with brittle and/or previously failed cladding.) 

The limit of 1382 ̊F (750 ̊C) is a conservative lower bound 

which Zircaloy cladding might be expected to fail by burst reason to suppose that this limit is not sufficient for fuel witwhen exposed to the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario, since thcarry only intact fuel assemblies. The HI-STAR 100 is licefuel, but this analysis shows that this cask would not be expcontainment in the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario. This pacan inner canister (MPC) that is conservatively predicted to mthroughout the entire fire transient. Radioactive materials, 
G.11 

No. Comment Response 

products, would not be released from this package, even unsevere as the Baltimore tunnel fire scenario. The NAC LWT is also licensed to carry failed fuel, but this and can carry only a limited amount of spent nuclear matericonsisting of a single PWR assembly. Analysis of the cons100% failure of all rods in a single PWR assembly consistinyr-cooled fuel (see NUREG/CR-6672) shows that the potenpackage remains below an A2 quantity for this fire scenario

Chapter 8.2.5. The available fission products from one PWfar exceeds that of any failed fuel the NAC LWT is licensed that includes failed fuel does not adversely affect the potentBaltimore tunnel fire scenario. Additional discussion of the potential consequences of the Bscenario for the HI-STAR 100 and the NAC LWT when carbeen added to Chapter 8. 

19 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a reexamination of the potential for fuel cladding failure and release of radioactive materials for higher burn-up fuels, specifically addressing the issues of radiation embrittlement, pellet degradation due to thermal cycling, and fission product buildup. 

This analysis was performed assuming that all of the packag

with design basis fuel, based on the cask's licensing qualificand HI-STAR 100 packages are not licensed to carry high bLWT is the only package considered in this study that is licburn-up fuel, in which case the total fuel load is limited to nAs noted in the response to Comment 18, an analysis assumrods in a single high burn-up, 3-yr-cooled PWR assembly srelease from this package remains below an A2 quantity for 

available fission products from one PWR assembly of this tthe maximum of 25 high burn-up fuel rods the NAC LWT i
G.12 

No. Comment Response 

20 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a reexamination of the potential for release of radioactive materials for fuel assemblies with higher levels of CRUD activity (e.g., BWR assemblies with surface concentration up to150 μCi/cm2). 

The current analysis (see Chapter 8) was performed assumiactivity of 300 μCi/cm2, and corresponding average activity 

TN-68. Given the conservative assumptions on the amount detach from the rod surfaces and plate out, and the fact that cleaner than this assumed level of activity, this assumption conservative for this analysis. 

21 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a reexamination of the mechanisms for seal failure and release of radioactive materials, including seal failure long before maximum seal temperatures are reached, bolt failure, and pressure-induced blowout of failed seals. 

Failure due to exceeding temperature limits is the only credfailure in this accident scenario. The specified limits are inhin that they are based on long-term service temperature limilimits. Temperatures are not high enough to consider bolt finternal pressure increase is not sufficient by itself to comprAs discussed in Chapter 8, the potential release of radioacti

limited by the condition of the seals or by the time required The conclusion that there would be no release from the HI-the welded inner canister remaining intact, not simply the inFor the TN-68 and the NAC LWT, the seals are assumed to the potential release is based primarily on the amount of CRfor release from the package. It is not dependent on the timfailure. The potential release is determined using a model dNational Laboratory for analysis of CRUD contribution to scontainment requirements (SAND88-1358; see Ref. 26). 

22 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a reexamination of the role of the HI-STAR 100 train carriage and cask restraints regarding heat shielding and heat conduction. 

Heat shielding effects of these structures during the fire wou

heat load on the package during the fire; heat conduction afto hasten cool-down. Assumptions made in the analysis are 

the fire and post-fire cool down.
G.13 

No. Comment Response 

23 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a discussion of the emergency response implications, and cask recovery implications, of the predicted damage to the neutron shielding for all three considered casks, and the loss of gamma shielding for the NAC LWT. 

The loss of neutron shielding is expected in all 3 designs as regulatory fire (i.e., 30 minutes at 800°C). Existing regulatregarding emergency response should be sufficient for this NAC LWT does not lose its gamma shielding in this scenarduring the fire, but is confined and held in place by the steeAdditional discussion has been added to Section 8.1 evaluaof lead melting and resolidification in this package. (See re5 through 9 above.)

24 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a reexamination of the uncertainties associated with the NIST FDS simulations of gas and wall temperatures 20-30 meters from the fire center. (These issues include the construction and benchmarking of the FDS code, selection of the conductivity value for the tunnel bricks, and potential inconsistencies with the materials analyses.) 

Because of uncertainties and unknowns related to the fire scsimulation and the package analyses were performed using assumptions. The results of the FDS simulations using realclose agreement with the peak temperatures estimated from recovered from the tunnel after the fire. (See the discussion addition, sensitivity studies were performed with FDS to devarying parameters that could potentially affect peak predicincluding the thermal conductivity of the tunnel wall surfacpredicting a fire duration of 7 hours is the result of specifyinassume an unrealistically high rate of oxygen flow to the fircomplete combustion of the entire inventory of available fuconditions are an order of magnitude hotter than conditions realistic assumptions for the fire scenario. Variation in parauncertainties would generally result in a less severe fire tranChapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 expand the discussion of the conservanalysis of the fire scenario and the modeling approach useSNF packages.
G.14 

No. Comment Response 

25 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a comprehensive analysis of uncertainties in the following factors, and how these uncertainties might affect the results of the consequence assessment: fire size, location, and duration; gas and wall temperatures from the NIST FDS simulations; CNWRA metallurgical analyses; uncertainties in the package models; seal and cladding temperature limits; and heat transfer models for the neutron shield (including gap radiation in charred solid, and boiling heat transfer in liquid) and impact limiters. 

Relevant discussions of all of these issues are included in thversion of the report, and have been expanded in Chapters 2current Revision 1. Uncertainties related to all of these enuconsidered and accounted for in a conservative manner in thEvaluation of less conservative variations within the range ofactors would result in shorter fire durations and lower fire would lower predicted package component temperatures. 

26 The final version of NUREG/CR-6886 should 

include a discussion of any peer reviews conducted for this report, and any peer reviews conducted for two of the major supporting studies, NUREG/CR6793 (NIST) and NUREG/CR-6799 (CNWRA). 

NUREG/CR-6886 has not been subjected to external peer rdocument has undergone intense internal technical peer revNRC before publication, and was made available for public of approximately 3 months. This permitted independent revinterested parties. All public comments on this document apublication. An external peer review was not deemed necessary because associated with this scenario. This is due to the low frequenaccident and the minimal consequences of postulated accideobserved frequency is once during 21 billion miles of train comprises the last 30 years of historical rail shipments. The consequences are estimated to be less than 0.3 of an A2 qua

analysis predicts large margins of temperature against claddstudy, a peer review would not be cost effective. 
G.15 

No. Comment Response 

27 The possibility of fuel oil fire temperatures of 1650-

2000°C for periods of time far in excess of the 30-minute test characteristic of Type B casks, make it impossible to consider that the circumstances know[n] about the Baltimore tunnel fire would be the worst circumstances that would be likely to apply in a fire situation affecting nuclear waste casks, during their transport. 

The analyses in NUREG/CR-6886 predict the effects that a fire accident could be expected to have on three specific SNpackages. This report does not attempt to define the worst pHowever, this is an extremely severe accident with a statistorder of one such accident in 21 billion miles of train travelbounded by the analyses in NUREG/CR-6672 and NUREGrisks associated with transportation of spent nuclear fuel. 

28 The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste 

(ACNW) inquired during a public meeting on September 21, 2006, as to whether or not the figure of 21 billion rail miles traveled between 1975 and 2005, cited in the report, included DOE Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program waste shipments. 

This mileage figure includes all commercial rail transportattime; however, it was not broken down into specific categortransportation. DOE Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program wacommonly done on commercial railways and, as a result, wnumber.