# I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S

NO. P D-0592-10

R O B E R T J A C K S O N C R I D E R , Appellan t

v. T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S On Discretionary Re view of Case No. 05- 09-00926-CR of the Fifth Court of App eals, Collin Cou nty
W O M A C K 

## , J ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which K E L L E R 

## , P. J ., joined.
The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that “no w arr ants shall issue, but upon probable c ause, suppor ted by oath or a ffirma

tion, and particula

rly descr ibing the place to be sea

rche d, and the pe rsons or thing s to be seized.” Unde r Article 18.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , a sea rch w arr ant may

be obtained f

rom a mag istrate only

afte r submission of an af fidavit setting f

orth substantial fac ts establishing proba ble ca use. Probable c ause e x ists if, 1

T E X . C O D E C R IM . P R O C . a r t
. 1 8
. 0 1 ( b )

. 1

## Crider Dissent – 2

under the totality

of the c ircumstance s set forth in the af fidavit prese nted to the mag istrate, ther e is a “fa ir probability ” that contra band or e vidence of a c rime will be found in a pa rticular pla ce 2 

## at the time the wa

rra nt is iss ued. The mag istrate may interpre t the aff

idavit in a non-tec hnical, 3



## common-sense manner

and may drawrea sonable infe renc es fr om the fac ts and circ umstances contained w ithin it s four c orner s. 4 

## Reviewing courts g ive g rea t defe renc e to a mag istrate’s de termination of proba ble ca use. 5 

## “[T] he duty

of a r eviewing court is simply to ensure tha t the mag istrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exis ted.” 6 

## I ag ree with the ultimate conclusion of the Court of A ppeals that the ma g istrate had a substantial basis for conc luding that pr obable c ause e x isted. Howeve r, I do not find an “uninterr upted seque nce of

events” or “f

actua l time-line” desc ribed in the a ffidavit. I n fac t, there is no lang uag e in the af

fidavit indicating any

amount of time that may have e lapsed be tween the events. The State would ha ve the mag istrate infe r an “ uninterrupted c ourse of events” when ther e is “nothing indica ting a

ny kind of brea

k or dela y befor e the of

fice r soug ht a sea

rch w arr ant.” B ut

I l l i n o i s v . G a t e s , 4 6 2 U
. S
. 2 1 3 , 2 3 8 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; F l o r e s v . S t a t e , 3 1 9 S
. W
. 3 d 6 9 7 , 7 0 2 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 1 0 ) ; 2 R o d r i g u e z v . S t a t e , 2 3 2 S
. W
. 3 d 5 5 , 6 0 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 0 7 )

.

S c h m i d t v . S t a t e , 6 5 9 S
. W
. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 1 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ( “ T h e f a c t s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e . . . 3 m u s t b e s u f

f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f

y t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y t h a t i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e s e a r c h i s p r o b a b l y o n t h e p r e m i s e s t o b e s e a r c h e d a t t h e t i m e t h e w a r r a n t i s s u e s . ” ) ( e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ) ; C a s s i a s v . S t a t e , 7 1 9 S
. W
. 2 d 5 8 5 , 5 8 8 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 6 )

.

F l o r e s , 3 1 9 S
. W
. 3 d , a t 7 0 2 ; C a s s i a s , 7 1 9 S
. W
. 2 d , a t 5 8 8

- 8 9
. 4
G a t e s , 4 6 2 U
. S
. , a t 2 3 6 ; R o d r i g u e z , 2 3 2 S
. W
. 3 d , a t 5 9

- 6 0
. 5
G a t e s , 4 6 2 U
. S
. , a t 2 3 8

- 3 9 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. 6

## Crider Dissent – 3

this inferenc e would run c ounter to our opinion in Schmidt v. State , in which a mag istrate could 7 

## not draw suc h an infe renc e fr om an af fidavit that failed to indica te the timing of a seque nce of events. I n other wor ds, the aff iant must submi t fac ts establishing that the e vidence is on the premises a t the time the war rant is issued; timeliness is not presumed in the a bsence of fa cts sug g esting staleness. I also do not ag ree with the State that a mag istrate may infer tha t a police of

fice r would not wait to submit an af

fidavit while evide nce w as likely disappea ring from the plac e to be
sear ched. T he State see ms to advocate a pre sumption t hat police of fice rs ac t rea sonably

in reque sting sea

rch w arr ants. Whil e many office rs may

act r easona

bly , the basic pur

pose of the Four th Amendment is to “safe g uard the privac y and sec urity

of individuals ag ainst arbitra ry invasions by

g overnme ntal officia ls.” I ndeed, se arc hes by office rs ar e dee med unre asonable 8 

## unless authorized by

a sea rch w arr ant or c erta in exceptions to t he wa rra nt require ment. To 9 

## presume tha t the aff

iant was a cting rea sonably rathe r than a

rbitrar ily in reque sting a

war rant would run counte r to the re quirements of the Amendment. On the other

hand, the a

ppellant’s ar g ument, that in order to issue the w arr ant in this case, the mag istrate must have be en able to conclude tha t the blood drawn w ould contain 0.08 g rams of alc ohol per 100 millili ters, is not corr ect. To the contra ry , the mag istrate nee ded only to conclude that there was a fair pr obability

that evidenc e of intoxi cation would be f ound. A per son commits the offense of Driving Whil e I ntox icated “ if the per son is intox icated w hile opera ting a

6 5 9 S
. W
. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 1 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 1 9 8 3 )

. T h e f a c t s a n d h o l d i n g o f S c h m i d t a r e d i s c u s s e d i n s o m e d e t a i l 7 i n S t a t e v . J

o r d a n , 3 4 2 S
. W
. 3 d 5 6 5 , 5 7 0

- 7 1 ( T e x . C r . A p p . 2 0 1 1 )

. C a m a r a v . M u n i c i

p a l C o u r t o

f C i t y a n d C o u n t

y o f S a n F r a n c i s c o , 3 8 7 U
. S
. 5 2 3 , 5 2 8 ( 1 9 6 7 )

. 8
I d

. , a t 5 2 8

- 2 9
. 9

## Crider Dissent – 4

motor vehicle in a

public place .” “I ntox icated” is defined in Penal Code Sec tion 49.01(2) to 1 0 

## mean “ (A) not ha

ving the normal use of

mental or phy sical fa cilities by rea son of the introduction of alc ohol, a controlled substanc e, a dr ug , a dang erous dr

ug , a combination of two or more substances, or

any other substanc e into the body ; or (B ) having an alc ohol conce ntration of 0.08 or more.” The wa

rra nt would be justified if a mag istrate could r easona bly conclude that there was a fa ir probability

of finding evidenc e of intoxi cation as de fined in Section 49.01(2) (A), w hich includes alc ohol conce ntrations below 0.08 as w ell as other dr ug s and combinations. I n fac t, the aff idavit itself stated that the blood would be a naly zed for “a lcohol or drug

conce ntration,” a

nd the war rant similarly

order ed ana ly sis of “alc ohol and/or drug conce ntration.” I would hold that the aff

idavit provided the mag istrate with a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair pr obability

that evidenc e of intoxi cation would be f ound in the appellant’ s blood. The a ffiant’ s observa tions indi cate d that the appe llant was hig hly intox icated 1 1 

## at the time of the stop and ha d consumed a t least alcohol. Evidenc e that other drug s had bee n inge sted, particula

rly in combination with the alcohol, would constitute furthe r evide nce of intox ication. I t is common knowledg e that tra ces of many drug s can be detec ted in the blood for substantially

longe r than 24 hours f

ollowing ing estion, so even if the stop had bee n made in the 1 2



## ear ly morning hours of June 6, near ly 25 hours bef

ore the mag istrate sig ned the wa rra nt at 1:07

T E X . P E N . C O D E § 4 9
. 0 4 ( a )

. 1 0
A t t h e r i s k o f b e i n g r e p e t i t i v e , I w i s h t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h i s c a s e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r 1 1 t h e r e w a s p r o b a b l e c a u s e u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b u t r a t h e r t h e g r e a t l y d e f e r e n t i a l q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e m a g i s t r a t e h a d a s u b s t a n t i a l b a s i s f o r s o d e t e r m i n i n g . S e e , e . g . , A m e r i c a n I

n t e r s t a t e I

n s . C o . v . H i n s o n , 1 7 2 S
. W
. 3 d 1 0 8 , 1 1 3 ( T e x . A p p . – B e a u m o n t 2 0 0 5 ) ; 1 2 S o t e l o v . G o n z a l e s , 1 7 0 S
. W
. 3 d 7 8 3 , 7 8 9 ( T e x . A p p

– E l P a s o 2 0 0 5 ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s N a t i o n a l L i b r a r y o f M e d i c i n e , N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e s o f H e a l t h , M e d L i n e P l u s : T

o x i c o l o g y S c r e e n ( a v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w . n l m . n i h

. g o v / m e d l i n e p l u s / e n c y / a r t i c l e / 0 0 3 5 7 8
. h t m 

## ).

## Crider Dissent – 5

a.m. on J une 7, the obse rved sy mptoms of intox ication provided the mag istrate with a substantial basis for c oncluding that probable cause exis ted at the time the wa rra nt issued. 1 3 

## I would aff

irm the judg ment of the Court of Appe als.
Filed: Nove mber 16, 2011. Publis h.

T h e b e t t e r p r a c t i c e i s f o r a f f i a n t s t o s p e c i f

y t h e t i m e s o f c r i t i c a l e v e n t s s o t h a t m a g i s t r a t e s h a v e p r e c i s e 1 3 i n f o r m a t i o n f

r o m w h i c h t o d e t e r m i n e p r o b a b l e c a u s e . O n d i f f e r e n t f a c t s , a l a c k o f s p e c i f

i c i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t i m e s m i g h t c a u s e a n a f

f i d a v i t t o b e i n s u f

f i c i e n t
.