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76–070 PDF 2012

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HOMELAND THREATS AND AGENCY RESPONSES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 19, 2012 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Associate Staff Director for Homeland Security 

Prevention and Protection 

NICOLE M. MARTINEZ, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

RYAN M. KALDAHL, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy 

MARSHALL C. ERWIN, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Moran .................................................................................................. 19 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 21 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 31 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 34 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 36 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 37 

Senator Moran .................................................................................................. 38 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2012 

Hon. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ...... 6 

Hon. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence .............................................................. 9 

Kevin L. Perkins, Associate Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

U.S. Department of Justice, on behalf of the Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, 

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ......... 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Napolitano, Hon. Janet: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Olsen, Hon. Matthew G.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61 

Perkins, Kevin L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record: 

Secretary Napolitano ........................................................................................ 82 

Mr. Olsen ........................................................................................................... 104 

(1) 

HOMELAND THREATS AND AGENCY 

RESPONSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Collins, and 

Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good 

morning to all. This is our Committee’s annual homeland threat assessment hearing. I want to welcome back Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and Matt 

Olsen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC); and welcome the Associate Deputy Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Kevin Perkins, who is standing in 

for Director Robert Mueller today. The Director had to undergo an 

unexpected surgical procedure resulting from complications associated with a recent dental treatment so he is unable to join us 

today. But we welcome Mr. Perkins in his stead with confidence, 

and we extend best regards to the Director for a speedy recovery. 

This will be the final time that I have the privilege of chairing 

this annual hearing, so I want to use this opportunity to thank 

each of you for your leadership in our Nation’s homeland security 

and counterterrorism efforts; to thank those who work with you in 

each of your departments or agencies; and more narrowly to thank 

you for the productive relationship that each of you and your predecessors have had with this Committee. 

The obvious fact, as I look at the three of you, and then look 

back, is that on September 11, 2001 (9/11), two of the three organizations testifying today did not exist, and the third, the FBI, was 

a very different organization than it is today, focused on domestic 

crime as it had been for quite a while. 

Obviously, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on America 

of September 11, 2001, Congress and the Executive Branch created 

the Department of Homeland Security and then, pursuant to the 

9/11 Commission recommendations, created the National Counterterrorism Center. The FBI essentially re-created itself into a firstrate domestic counterterrorism intelligence agency, in addition to 

2 

carrying out all of its other responsibilities. And in his absence, we 

should thank Director Mueller for what I think is the extraordinary 

job he has done in overseeing this historic transformation and 

thank the two of you, Secretary Napolitano and Director Olsen, for 

what you have done. 

Together these changes represent the most significant reforms of 

America’s national security organization since the 1940s at the beginning of the Cold War. And it is not coincidental since after 

9/11 we understood that we were facing a very different threat to 

our national security and with an intensity that we had not experienced through most of American history, a very real threat to our 

homeland security. 

So as I look back, I really want to again thank you and your 

predecessors in each of these roles—although in the FBI, Director 

Mueller has pretty much been there the whole time—and the thousands of Federal employees who work under you, because I think 

without question, because of all that the three organizations represented here before us have done, the American people have been 

much safer here at home than we otherwise would have been if 

your agency had not existed. So with a lot of gratitude, I thank you 

for that remarkable transformation. We have made a lot of 

progress; we have kept the enemy away for most of the last 11 

years. 

The most lethal threats or attacks on our homeland have actually been carried out, as we know, by homegrown terrorists: Nidal 

Malik Hasan at Fort Hood and Carlos Bledsoe at the Army recruiting station in Little Rock. But the battle goes on, and it is hard 

to reach a conclusion other than it will go on for a long time. 

Obviously, we hold this hearing today still mourning the deaths 

of the American Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, and three 

other State Department personnel, still, speaking personally, infuriated by those attacks that resulted from a movement against— 

which I believe to be a terrorist act—our consulate in Benghazi on 

the 11th anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001. 

These attacks do many things, but they remind us, I think, first 

of the bravery and commitment of government officials who serve 

in countries around the world, supporting the struggles of people 

in those countries to live free and, by doing so, work to improve our 

own national security. 

The attack in Libya also reminds us that even though the core 

of al-Qaeda has been seriously weakened, we still face threats from 

an evolving and fractious set of terrorist groups and individuals, 

united by a common ideology, which is that of violent Islamist extremism. And I will have some questions to ask the three of you 

about the nature of the terrorist threat today and specifically with 

regard to the reaction to this film, whether you think it has raised 

the threat level against any places, institutions, or individuals here 

in the United States. 

In reporting to us on the terrorist threat to the homeland today, 

I also hope you will address other concerns, such as the effort to 

counter homegrown violent Islamist groups; the threat to our 

homeland and people in a different way over the last couple of 

years posed by Islamic Republic of Iran, its Iranian Guard corps, 

and the Quds force, part of it, and its proxy groups such as HezbolVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Dec 17, 2012 Jkt 076070 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\76070.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
3 

lah, which certainly seem to be reaching outside of their normal 

areas of operation in the Middle East and conducting attacks elsewhere. These include an attempted assassination, which was 

thwarted, of the Saudi ambassador here in Washington, and apparently the attack on a tourist bus in Bulgaria just a short while ago. 

I would like to just say a few words about cybersecurity, which 

has been a significant focus of this Committee this year. We know 

how serious the problem is. Enormous amounts of cyber espionage 

and cyber theft are going on, and there is increasing danger of a 

cyber attack. As you know, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which 

was the compromise bipartisan legislation that made it to the Senate floor, has had problems getting enough votes to get taken up 

on the Senate floor. We worked for years with partners on both 

sides of the aisle. We had extensive consultations with private industry, and, of course, we went to substantial lengths to find common ground, including by making the standards voluntary and not 

mandatory for the private sector owners of cyber infrastructure. 

But despite the magnitude of the threat as recognized by national security leaders and experts from the last two Administrations, regardless of party, and the many compromises that were 

made, the bill was filibustered on the Senate floor last month so 

it could not come up. Thus was lost the best opportunity we have 

had to pass comprehensive cybersecurity legislation. And, of course, 

all of you have said, Director Mueller perhaps most memorably, 

that, in his opinion, the threat of cyber attack will soon replace the 

threat of terror attack as a danger for our homeland security. 

I believe that it is obvious that we are not going to pass the 

cybersecurity legislation before the election, and because we are 

probably leaving here in the next couple of days to return after the 

election, but I think it is still possible and, I would add, critical for 

Congress to pass a cybersecurity bill this session. And I certainly 

will continue to try to do everything in my power to do so. But I 

must say if the gridlock continues, as I fear it will, then the President and others in the Executive Branch should really do everything within their power, as I know they are considering actively 

now, to raise our defenses against cyber attack and cyber theft. 

The fact is that today, because of the inadequate defenses of 

America’s privately owned critical cyber infrastructure, we are very 

vulnerable to a major cyber attack, perhaps a catastrophic cyber attack, well beyond in its impact what we suffered on September 11, 

2001. 

I understand that Executive action cannot do everything legislation can to protect us from cyber attack, but it can do a lot. And 

as this session of Congress concludes at the end of this year, we 

have still failed to fix this problem and close some of our 

vulnerabilities to cyber attack. And I certainly hope the President 

will step in, along with you, Secretary Napolitano, and act as 

strongly as you can to protect our country. And I will be asking 

some questions of you when we get to that point in the testimony. 

So I thank you again for being here. I look forward to this hearing every year. It is sometimes unsettling, but it is really important 

as a report to both Congress and the American people about the 

status of the current threat to our homeland. 

Senator Collins. 

4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last week, we observed the 11th anniversary of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001. We again remembered the victims 

and the heroes of that day. And we acknowledged the dedicated 

military, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security professionals who have worked together to bring terrorists to justice 

and to prevent another large-scale attack within the United States. 

And I want to join the Chairman in thanking each of you for your 

hard work in that endeavor. 

Tragically, however, we have also witnessed violent attacks on 

the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in the killings 

of our Ambassador and three other brave Americans. While these 

attacks remain under investigation, it is difficult not to see shades 

of the 1998 attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 

which were among the many precursors to the attacks of September 11, 2001. This tragedy once again underscores the ongoing 

threat we face, both abroad and at home, from violent Islamist extremists. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, we took significant actions to address this threat. When Senator Lieberman and I authored the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004 (IRTPA), our aim was to improve coordination within the intelligence community and among the key stakeholders at all levels 

of government. Achieving the goals of this landmark law remains 

a work in progress. 

We know we face a determined enemy. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) has tried repeatedly to exploit holes in our security. The failed 2009 Christmas Day bomber used a device specifically designed to avoid detection. The 2010 cargo plot sought to circumvent improvements in passenger screening by targeting cargo. 

In May of this year, al-Qaeda tried again. The bomb maker apparently sought to avoid the failures of the earlier Christmas Day attack. Through the aggressive efforts of our intelligence community, 

fortunately this plot was disrupted before it could threaten American lives. Nevertheless, that operation was also plagued by leaks— 

apparently from within the Executive Branch—that may have undermined future efforts and compromised sources. 

Not every threat that we face has been met with sufficient resolve and action. Perhaps the best example, which the Chairman 

has mentioned, is the ever-increasing cyber threat. Experts have 

repeatedly warned that the computer systems that run our electric 

grids, our water plants, financial networks, and transportation systems are vulnerable to a cyber attack that could harm millions of 

Americans. In fact, rarely has there been such a bipartisan consensus among experts that this threat must be addressed. 

Just last week, former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre 

said that the threats in cyberspace ‘‘took a darker turn’’ this summer, as three very large corporations experienced cyber attacks 

‘‘designed to damage operations.’’ Citing government sources, he 

said that at least two of the attacks may have come from Iran. 

China and Russia we know have also launched cyber attacks. 

To respond to this escalating threat, the Chairman and I have 

worked during the past 2 years to craft a bipartisan bill that relies 

5 

on the expertise of government and the innovation of the private 

sector. Despite our hard work to find common ground, the Senate 

has failed to pass cybersecurity legislation. Given the significant 

damage already done to our economy and our security, as well as 

our clear vulnerability to even worse attacks, this failure to act is 

inexcusable. 

Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, and former National 

Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

chief Michael Hayden describe the urgency this way: ‘‘We carry the 

burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be in the 

same position again when ‘cyber 9/11’ hits. It is not a question of 

‘whether’ this will happen; it is a question of ‘when.’ ’’ 

This time all the dots have been connected. This time the warnings are loud and clear, and this time we must heed them. 

In contrast to the known threat of cyber attacks, another persistent challenge we face comes from those threats that we fail to 

even anticipate—what the 9/11 Commission memorably referred to 

as ‘‘a failure of imagination,’’ the so-called black swan events that 

test our assumptions. These are our most vexing problems because 

we cannot simply build walls around every potential target. Nevertheless, if we strengthen information sharing and analytic capabilities, our law enforcement and intelligence officers can disrupt even 

more plots, whether they are ones that we know well are coming 

or those that we have never before seen. 

In my judgment, which is informed by numerous briefings and 

discussions with experts, the attack in Benghazi was not a ‘‘black 

swan’’ but, rather, an attack that should have been anticipated 

based on the previous attacks against western targets, the proliferation of dangerous weapons in Libya, the presence of al-Qaeda 

in that country, and the overall threat environment. 

Whatever the plots hatched by our enemies, I am also concerned 

about vulnerabilities that stem from our own government’s actions 

or failure to act. 

I have already noted what I believe to be the inexplicable lack 

of security in Benghazi, the grave, self-inflicted wounds from intelligence leaks, and the failure to enact a cybersecurity bill. There 

is also a genuine danger posed by the automatic, mindless cuts 

known as sequestration. Absent a commitment by the President 

and Congress to avoid this disastrous policy, the budget of every 

Federal agency represented here today—the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the 

FBI—the very agencies charged with protecting our Nation from 

terrorism and other disasters—will be slashed in an indiscriminate 

way, by 8 percent or more, potentially harming such vital programs 

as border security, intelligence analysis, and the FBI’s work. 

At a time when budget constraints require everyone to sacrifice 

and priorities to be set and waste to be eliminated, we should ask 

where resources can be spent more effectively and what tradeoffs 

should be made to balance the risk we face with the security we 

can afford. What we cannot afford, however, is to weaken a homeland security structure that is helping to protect the citizens of this 

country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

6 

1The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the Appendix on page 40. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Secretary Napolitano, thank you for being here, and we would 

welcome your testimony at this time. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO,1 SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. And I would also like 

to thank Associate Deputy Director Perkins and Director Olsen for 

their partnership. 

Mr. Chairman, this is my 17th appearance before you. It is my 

44th hearing overall since becoming Secretary of the Department. 

I am grateful personally for this Committee’s tireless advocacy on 

behalf of DHS, not only during its initial creation but in the time 

since. Senator, you have been one of our strongest supporters, and 

our Nation’s security has benefited as a direct result. Thank you 

for all you have done to make the country more secure. 

Eleven years after the 9/11 attacks, America is stronger and 

more secure, thanks to the work of the men and women of DHS; 

our many Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and international 

partners; and Members of this Committee. And while the United 

States has made significant progress since the 9/11 attacks, we 

know that threats from terrorists persist and continually evolve. 

We face direct threats from al-Qaeda. We face growing threats from 

other foreign-based terrorist groups which are inspired by al-Qaeda 

ideology, such as AQAP and al-Shabaab. And we must address 

threats that are homegrown as well as those that originate abroad. 

These threats are not limited to any one individual, group, or 

ideology. And as we have seen, the tactics employed by terrorists 

can be as simple as a homemade bomb or as sophisticated as a biological threat or a coordinated cyber attack. 

While we deal with a number of threats and threat actors at any 

given time, three areas merit special sustained attention. The first 

is aviation. The Christmas Day 2009 plot, the October 2010 air 

cargo threat, and the AQAP plot earlier this year that would have 

targeted a U.S.-bound airliner with explosives make clear that 

commercial aviation remains a target. Terrorists, especially AQAP, 

continue to seek ways to circumvent existing security measures. 

Their methods and tactics are sometimes ingenious and increasingly sophisticated. 

A second threat area is cybersecurity, as both of you have mentioned. Cyber threats and incidents have increased significantly 

over the past decade. Our Nation confronts a dangerous combination of known and unknown vulnerabilities in cyberspace: Strong 

and rapidly expanding adversary capabilities, and limited threat 

and vulnerability analysis and awareness. 

We are committed to working with the Congress to make sure 

the Department and our Nation have the tools and authorities we 

need to effectively confront threats to cyberspace, and that includes 

minimum standards for our Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

7 

We remain hopeful that the Congress can pass strong cybersecurity legislation, and I thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, for your leadership in this area. 

The third area of growing concern is homegrown violent extremism. Within the context of U.S.-based violent extremism, we 

know that foreign terrorists groups affiliate with al-Qaeda and individual extremists are actively seeking to recruit or inspire westerners to carry out attacks against western and United States targets. Importantly, however, as recent events have demonstrated, 

we also know that violent extremism can be inspired by various religious, political, or other ideological beliefs. Moreover, the attack 

last week against the U.S. consulate in Libya that took the life of 

Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans, the terrorist attack in Bulgaria in July, as well as this summer’s shootings in Aurora, Colorado, and Oak Creek, Wisconsin, demonstrate that we 

must remain vigilant and prepared. And certainly our thoughts are 

with those impacted by these senseless attacks. 

How do we mitigate the threat? We mitigate these threats in several ways. First and foremost, we have worked to build a homeland 

security enterprise that allows DHS and our many partners to detect threats earlier, to share information, to minimize risks, and to 

maximize our ability to respond and recover from attacks and disasters of all kinds. 

With respect to the aviation sector, we have implemented a layered detection system focused on risk-based screening, enhanced 

targeting, and information sharing, while simultaneously facilitating travel for nearly 2 million domestic air travelers every day. 

Following the December 2009 threat, we launched a historic global initiative to strengthen international aviation, which has improved cooperation on passenger and air cargo screening, technology development and deployment, and information collection 

and sharing, as well as the development of internationally accepted 

security standards. 

As part of this effort, last week, in Montreal, 13 member states 

of the International Civil Aviation Organization met to reaffirm our 

commitment to these principles and to continue our progress, including through the development of global air cargo security standards. We have strengthened information sharing with our international partners. 

For example, our new and historic passenger name record agreement with the European Union allows us to continue sharing passenger information so that we can better identify travelers who 

merit our attention before they depart for the United States. 

And in addition to our Pre-Departure Targeting Program, Immigration Advisory Program, and enhanced in-bound targeting operations, all of these allow us to more effectively identify high-risk 

travelers who are likely to be inadmissible to the United States 

and to make recommendations to commercial air carriers to deny 

boarding before a plane departs. 

And at home, we have continued the deployment of advanced 

technology at airports, including advanced imaging technology machines, while implementing new programs to make the screening 

process more efficient for trusted travelers through programs such 

8 

as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Pre-Check 

and Global Entry. 

Around the cyber domain, we have partnered with sector-specific 

agencies and the private sector to help secure cyberspace, such as 

the financial sector, the power grid, water systems, and transportation networks. 

We have taken significant action to protect Federal civilian government systems through the deployment of intrusion detection 

systems like EINSTEIN, greater diagnostic and sharing of threat 

information, national exercises and incident response planning, 

public awareness and outreach programs, and a cyber workforce 

initiative to recruit the next generation of cyber professionals. 

And, internationally, we are working with our partners to share 

expertise, combat cyber crime, and strengthen shared systems and 

networks. 

Finally, we have improved our domestic capabilities to detect and 

prevent terrorist attacks against our citizens, our communities, and 

our critical infrastructure. We have increased our ability to analyze 

and distribute threat information at all levels. Specifically, we have 

worked to build greater analytic capabilities through 77 designated 

fusion centers, resulting in unprecedented levels of information 

sharing and analysis at the State and local level. We have invested 

in training for local law enforcement and first responders of all 

types to increase expertise and capacity at the local level. 

In partnership with the Department of Justice, we have transformed how we train front-line officers regarding suspicious activities through a nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. 

And as part of that initiative, we have helped to train over 234,000 

law enforcement officials. 

We are in the final stages of implementing a Countering Violent 

Extremism curriculum for Federal, State, local, and correctional 

law enforcement officers that is focused on community-oriented policing, which will help front-line personnel identify activities that 

are potential indicators of terrorist activity and violence. 

We have also expanded training with respect to active shooter 

threats, providing a range of information, tools, case studies, and 

resources to Federal, State, and local partners to help them prepare for and, if necessary, respond to attacks involving active 

shooters. 

And through the nationwide expansion of the ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ campaign, we continue to encourage all 

Americans to alert local law enforcement if they see something that 

is potentially dangerous. 

In conclusion, DHS has come a long way in the 11 years since 

September 11, 2001, to enhance protection of the United States and 

engage our partners in this shared responsibility. Together, we 

have made significant progress to strengthen the homeland security enterprise, but significant challenges remain. Threats against 

our Nation, whether by terrorism or otherwise, continue to exist 

and to evolve, and we must continue to evolve as well. We continue 

to be ever vigilant to protect against threats while promoting travel 

and trade and safeguarding our essential rights and liberties. 

I thank the Committee for your support in these endeavors and 

for your attention as we work together to keep the country safe. 

9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen appears in the Appendix on page 61. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Secretary Napolitano, 

for that opening statement, which was a good beginning for us. 

Probably most Americans, certainly a large number, know about 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security. Probably very few know about the National Counterterrorism Center, which was created by what I call the 9/11 Commission legislation. But it is really one of the most significant steps 

forward we have taken in our government. It is the place at which, 

to go back to language we all used after September 11, 2001, we 

make sure that the dots are on the same board and can be connected. As a matter of fact, as we have discussed, we have now figured out how to put so many dots on that same board, the challenge now is to see them all and see the patterns and the connections. But I think the folks at NCTC have really taken us a long 

way, working with the Department of Homeland Security and the 

FBI. And, Mr. Olsen, I thank you for your leadership and look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MATTHEW G. OLSEN,1 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. OLSEN. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, 

and Members of the Committee. I really do appreciate this opportunity to be here this morning. 

I also want to express my appreciation to your Committee for its 

leadership on national security matters and certainly your support 

of NCTC from its inception. And I thank you for your kind comments this morning about our work, and I accept those on behalf 

of the men and women at NCTC. And I am also very pleased to 

be here with Secretary Napolitano and Associate Deputy Director 

Perkins. We are close partners in the fight against terrorism. 

In my brief remarks this morning, I will focus on recent events 

and highlight a few areas of real key concerns for us, and then I 

will take a moment to highlight our efforts at NCTC to analyze and 

share critical threat information. 

Certainly the attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi last 

week that took the lives of four Americans, including Ambassador 

Stevens, is proof that acts of terror and violence continue to threaten our citizens and our interests around the world. As the President said of these Americans just this past Friday, they did not 

simply embrace the American ideal, they lived it. 

It is now our responsibility to honor them by fulfilling our mission to combat terrorism and to combat violent extremism. The intelligence community, I can tell you, is working as one to determine 

what exactly happened in Benghazi, to uncover new threats in the 

region, and then to identify and bring to justice those who are responsible for this attack. 

Last week’s attacks I think should be viewed in the context of 

the evolving threat landscape we face that you have spoken about 

as well as the ongoing unrest and political transition in the region. 

More than a decade after the September 11th attacks, we face a 

dynamic threat from al-Qaeda, from its affiliates, as well as those 

10 

who follow al-Qaeda’s ideology. There is no doubt that over the past 

few years our government, working with our allies, has placed relentless pressure on al-Qaeda’s core leadership. We have denied the 

group safe haven. We have denied the group resources and the 

ability to plan and train. In short, the intelligence picture shows 

that al-Qaeda’s core in Pakistan is a shadow of its former self. 

But even as al-Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan struggles to remain relevant, the terrorist threats we face have become more diverse. Al-Qaeda has turned to other groups to carry out attacks 

and to advance its ideology. These groups are based in an array of 

countries, including Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and Iraq. 

In particular, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the group 

that is most likely, we think, to attempt attacks against the United 

States. We saw this in May with the disruption of an AQAP plot 

to take down an airliner. Other affiliates and related groups, such 

as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Boko Haram 

in Nigeria, as well as militants based in Pakistan, all pose threats 

to our citizens and interests in those regions of the world. 

We are also focused on threats posed by Iran and by Hezbollah. 

Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world, 

and over the past year, the threat from Iranian-sponsored terrorism has increased. 

Inside the United States, we remain vigilant to prevent violent 

extremists from carrying out attacks in the name of al-Qaeda. This 

past week, the FBI arrested a Chicago man after he allegedly tried 

to blow up a crowded bar in the city. Also last week, a Federal 

judge sentenced a Virginia man to 30 years in prison for plotting 

to bomb the U.S. Capitol. These plots highlight the danger that 

al-Qaeda inspired extremists pose to our country. 

And beyond these threats, we face a period of unrest and a period of transition in the Middle East and in North Africa. The Arab 

spring or awakening, now in progress for well over a year, has led 

to fundamental reforms in the region. Al-Qaeda was not part of 

this change, but the group is seeking to take advantage of the unrest in some areas, seeking to establish safe havens and to recruit 

extremists where security is diminished. 

Now, if I may, turning to the role of the National Counterterrorism Center, Congress and this Committee created NCTC to help 

lead this effort to combat these threats. Our founding principle is 

the imperative to integrate all terrorism information and to share 

that knowledge with those on the front lines of this fight. I will 

take a few moments to describe the ways in which we are seeking 

to achieve this goal every day at NCTC. 

First, intelligence information and state-of-the-art analysis. 

NCTC serves as the primary organization in the government for integrating and assessing all intelligence relating to international 

terrorism. We have a unique responsibility to examine all terrorism 

issues, spanning geographical boundaries to identify and analyze 

threat information, regardless of whether that information is collected inside or outside the United States. 

At NCTC, our culture is defined by collaboration. Nearly every 

NCTC analytic product is coordinated throughout the intelligence 

community. It therefore reflects multiple perspectives for policymaker and operators alike. 

11 

Second, access to data and technological innovation. We are promoting information integration and sharing with the development 

of a Counterterrorism Data Layer. This approach to data allows 

our analysts to access terrorist information that we have collected 

from across the government in a single place, and it allows us to 

do that without having to manually search multiple networks. 

Here, if I may, I would like to make a point about the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act, a law that 

is set to expire at the end of this year. As this Committee knows, 

this law authorizes the government to collect valuable intelligence 

involving international terrorists and other enemies by targeting 

non-Americans who are overseas. These provisions were carefully 

crafted and carefully implemented to protect the privacy and civil 

liberties of Americans and should remain law. 

Third, NCTC has enhanced its focus on tactical intelligence and 

developing leads involving threats to the United States. We established a Pursuit Group—analysts from across the counterterrorism 

community who have unparalleled data access and expertise. Their 

mission is to focus on information that could lead to the discovery 

of threats, to connect those dots, and to identify actionable leads 

for agencies such as the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the CIA. 

Finally, NCTC provides situational awareness and intelligence 

support to the broad counterterrorism community. Our Operations 

Center, which is collocated with the FBI’s Watch, provides aroundthe-clock support to counterterrorism agencies. We also maintain 

the government’s central repository for terrorist identities. This enables us to provide near-real-time watchlisting data to support 

screening and law enforcement activities across the government. 

In addition, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), which is located at NCTC and is led by senior 

DHS and FBI officers, brings Federal and State and local officers 

together in one place at NCTC. This group is dedicated to providing 

relevant intelligence on terrorism issues to State, local, tribal, and 

private sector partners, helping to ensure that information is 

shared with public safety officials, including police officers and firefighters. Faced with the possible loss of funding, we are working 

closely with DHS and FBI to retain this capability. Mr. Chairman, 

you have been a strong supporter of ITACG and have noted its successes, and I am personally committed to working with DHS and 

FBI to sustain this initiative, to find ways to do so in a cost-effective way, and we are working closely together to chart a way 

ahead. 

I just want to close by identifying our most important assets, and 

that is our people. NCTC is working to meet the many challenges 

ahead, but that effort is really dependent on our diverse and dedicated workforce. Maintaining this workforce—through the continued commitment and support of agencies like DHS, the FBI, and 

other organizations—is a priority for me at the center. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, 

thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you this morning, and thank you for your continued support of NCTC. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director Olsen. 

12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Perkins appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

Associate Deputy Director Perkins, thanks again for being here, 

and we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN L. PERKINS,1 ASSOCIATE DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON BEHALF OF HON. ROBERT S. 

MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. PERKINS. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and for your continued support of the men and women of the FBI. I also want to 

thank Secretary Napolitano and Director Olsen and the men and 

women they lead in our joint fight against those seeking to do 

harm against U.S. citizens here and around the world. 

As you know, the Bureau has undergone unprecedented transformation in recent years. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, 

we have refocused our efforts to address and prevent emerging terrorist threats. The terrorist threat is more diverse than it was 11 

years ago, but today, we in the FBI are in a better place to meet 

that threat. 

We also face increasingly complex threats to our Nation’s cybersecurity. Nation-state actors, sophisticated organized crime groups, 

and hackers for hire are stealing trade secrets and valuable research from America’s companies, universities, and government 

agencies. Cyber threats also pose a significant risk to our Nation’s 

critical infrastructure. 

As these threats continue to evolve, the FBI must continue to 

adapt to counter those threats. We must continue to build partnerships with our law enforcement and private sector partners, as well 

as the communities we serve. Above all, we must remain firmly 

committed to carrying out our mission while protecting the civil 

rights and civil liberties of the people we serve. 

Counterterrorism remains our number one priority. We face a 

fluid, dynamic, and complex terrorist threat. We have seen an increase in the sources of terrorism, a wider array of terrorism targets, a greater cooperation among terrorist groups, and an evolution in terrorist tactics and communications methodologies. 

In the past decade, al-Qaeda has become decentralized, but the 

group remains committed to high-profile attacks against the West. 

Al-Qaeda affiliates and surrogates, especially al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, now represent the top counterterrorism threat to 

the Nation. These groups have attempted several attacks on the 

United States, including the failed Christmas Day airline bombing 

in 2009 and the attempted bombing of U.S.-bound cargo planes in 

October 2010. 

We also remain concerned about the threat from homegrown violent extremists. Over the past years, we have seen increased activity among extremist individuals. These individuals have no typical 

profile; their experiences and motives are often distinct. Lone offenders, some of whom may have some affiliation with known domestic terrorist organizations, present a special challenge. They 

13 

may be self-trained, self-financed, and self-executing. They are 

sometimes motivated to take action in furtherance of their ideological beliefs, but they stand on the periphery and are hard and difficult to identify. 

Unfortunately, we have recently seen a number of lone offender 

incidents, as we have recently witnessed the shooting at the Sikh 

Temple in Wisconsin. 

Now, as this Committee knows, the cyber threat has evolved and 

grown significantly over the past decade. Foreign cyber spies have 

become increasingly adept at exploiting weaknesses in our computer networks. Once inside, they can exfiltrate government and 

military secrets, as well as valuable intellectual property—information that can improve the competitive advantage of state-owned 

companies. 

Unlike state-sponsored intruders, hackers for profit do not seek 

information for political power; rather, they seek information for 

sale and trade to the highest bidder. In some cases, these once isolated hackers have joined forces to create criminal syndicates. Organized crime in cyberspace offers a higher profit with a lower 

probability of being identified and prosecuted. And hackers and 

hactivist groups such as Anonymous and Lulz-Sec are pioneering 

their own forms of digital anarchy. 

With these diverse threats, we anticipate that cybersecurity may 

well become our highest priority in the years to come. That is why 

we are strengthening our cyber capabilities in the same way we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the 

wake of the September 11 attacks. 

We are focusing our Cyber Division on computer intrusions and 

network attacks. We are also hiring additional computer scientists 

to provide expert technical support to critical investigations ongoing in the field. 

As part of these efforts, we are expanding our cyber squads in 

each field office to become Cyber Task Forces that will be focused 

on intrusions and network attacks. 

We are also working with our partners to improve on the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF)—the FBI-led 

multi-agency focal point for coordinating and sharing of cyber 

threat information. The NCIJTF brings together 18 law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies to stop current and predict future attacks. 

As we have in the past, we will be inviting the participation of 

our Federal, State, and local partners as we move forward with 

these initiatives. As we evolve and change to keep pace with today’s complex threat environment, we must always act within the 

confines of the rule of law and the safeguards guaranteed by the 

Constitution. Following the rule of law and upholding civil liberties—these are not burdens. These are what make all of us safer 

and stronger. 

Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins, I thank you for this 

opportunity to discuss the FBI’s priorities and the state of the Bureau as it stands today. Mr. Chairman, let me again acknowledge 

the leadership that you and this Committee have provided to the 

FBI. The transformation of the FBI over the past 11 years would 

not have been possible without the support of Congress and the 

14 

American people. I would be happy to answer any questions you 

may have at this time, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Associate Deputy Director Perkins. It has been a privilege to work with the FBI and 

the other agencies here. 

We will do a 7-minute first round of questions. Let me focus in 

on the recent wave of protests throughout large parts of the Muslim world, but also the attacks in Benghazi. Director Olsen, let me 

begin with you and see if you can help us separate this out. It certainly seems to me that there were a series of protests that were 

set off as a result of this film, and I will get back to that, but what 

happened in Benghazi looked like a terrorist attack. The NCTC 

uses the definition of terrorism, which I think is a good one, as ‘‘politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.’’ 

So let me begin by asking you whether you would say that Ambassador Stevens and the three other Americans died as a result 

of a terrorist attack. 

Mr. OLSEN. Certainly, on that particular question, I would say 

yes, they were killed in the course of a terrorist attack on our embassy. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. And do we have reason to believe 

at this point that the terrorist attack was sort of pre-planned for 

September 11, or did the terrorists who were obviously planning 

it—because it certainly seemed to be a coordinated terrorist attack—just seized the moment of the demonstrations or protests 

against the film to carry out a terrorist attack? 

Mr. OLSEN. A more complicated question and one, Mr. Chairman, 

that we are spending a great deal of time looking at even as we 

speak, and obviously the investigation here is ongoing and facts are 

being developed continually. 

The facts that we have now indicate that this was an opportunistic attack on our embassy. The attack began and evolved and escalated over several hours. I said ‘‘our embassy.’’ It was our diplomatic post in Benghazi. It appears that individuals who were certainly well armed seized on the opportunity presented as the 

events unfolded that evening and into the morning hours of September 12. 

We do know that a number of militants in the area, as I mentioned, are well armed and maintain those arms. What we do not 

have at this point is specific intelligence that there was a significant advanced planning or coordination for this attack. Again, we 

are still developing facts and still looking for any indications of 

substantial advanced planning. We just have not seen that at this 

point. 

So I think that is the most I would say at this point. I do want 

to emphasize that there is a classified briefing for all of Congress 

that will take place tomorrow. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. We will be there. Let me come 

back to what you said, that there was intelligence, as you indicated 

broadly a moment ago, that in eastern Libya, in the Benghazi area, 

there were a number of militant or violent Islamist extremist 

groups. Do we have any idea at this point who was responsible 

among those groups for the attack on the consulate? 

15 

Mr. OLSEN. This is the most important question that we are considering. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. OLSEN. We are focused on who was responsible for this attack. At this point, what I would say is that a number of different 

elements appear to have been involved in the attack, including individuals connected to militant groups that are prevalent in eastern Libya, particularly in the Benghazi area. As well, we are looking at indications that individuals involved in the attack may have 

had connections to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda’s affiliates, in particular 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So that question has not been determined yet whether it was a militant Libyan group or a group 

associated with al-Qaeda and influence from abroad. 

Mr. OLSEN. That is right, and I would add that the picture that 

is emerging is one where a number of different individuals were involved, so it is not necessarily an either/or proposition. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK, good. 

Mr. OLSEN. Again, as you know, the FBI is leading the investigation, and that is ongoing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I wanted to go to you now, Associate 

Deputy Director Perkins, and ask you about that. What is the status of the FBI investigation into the attack on our consulate in 

Benghazi, Libya? 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as Director Olsen noted, we 

have an open investigation at this time. We have a significant 

number of FBI agents, analysts, and various support employees assigned to this matter. We are conducting interviews, gathering evidence, and trying to sort out the facts. We are working with our 

partners, both from a criminal standpoint as well as in the intelligence community, to try to determine exactly what took place on 

the ground that evening. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Secretary Napolitano, let me go to you, I 

know that last Thursday the Department of Homeland Security 

and the FBI released a bulletin indicating that this film was the 

apparent catalyst for these protests and that the fact could increase 

the risk of violence here in the United States and could motivate 

homegrown violent extremists, certainly with their recruitment efforts and perhaps with actions. 

I wonder if in this setting you could comment on the state of 

your concern about that and what steps DHS and the FBI are taking, along with other government agencies, to proactively address 

the potentially higher risk of homegrown terrorist acts as a result 

of the film? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Right now, Mr. Chairman, we have no intelligence of impending violent attacks within the United States. 

There is open source information on some planned demonstrations 

in, I believe, Los Angeles and Houston, among other places. Those 

are posted on the Web. But we have no indication of anything that 

is violent in nature. 

Nonetheless, immediately after the attack in Benghazi, we began 

outreach to a number of groups within the country, faith-based 

groups and others, who could be the target of a violent attack and 

provided them with guidance on things they can do to make sure 

16 

they are as safe as possible. So we continue that outreach. We continue working with our local partners in terms of what they are 

seeing on the ground and then monitoring the open-source media. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Let me ask you finally what 

we as a government can do to counteract the impact of this film. 

You know, we are a country of almost 310 million people now. This 

film, hateful really, was done by a handful of people. And yet 

American embassies and consulates not only are the subject of protests, which is very much in the American spirit of civil protest and 

right of free speech, but going beyond that to destruction of property and, at its worse, a terrorist attack in Benghazi that kills four 

people. In one other case, I believe in Yemen, the demonstrators 

were armed. And, of course, in some cases, including Tunisia, the 

local police or security forces actually ended up having to fire at 

crowds to stop them from doing further damage. 

I know this is very sensitive, but we have to ask our friends in 

the Muslim world and ourselves to be willing to say this film does 

not represent us and, therefore, it is simply unacceptable, even if 

you are offended by the film, which we understand, to do more 

than protest, to begin to act violently. It is no more acceptable than 

it would be in this country if some group seized on the statements 

of a fringe religious leader or a political leader in some foreign 

country that attacked Americans, Christians and Jews, and as a result some group in America started to not just protest but to attack 

the embassy of the country in which that happened. In other 

words, we have to blow the whistle on this behavior. Fortunately, 

we have had some help from our allies in countries like in the governments of Libya and Tunisia, and I think we have to be forthright in doing that ourselves. So with apologies for the length of 

the question and the opportunity I took to get a little bit off my 

chest, I wonder if any of you could tell us what our government is 

trying to do now to challenge people in the Muslim world to confront the reality that this film is not representative of America or 

the American Government? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, the film is absolutely not 

representative of America or the American Government. It is deplorable. The issue you raise is a difficult one. We are a country 

where people have rights, and one of the rights they have is to 

have free speech, and that can include things we find deplorable 

as well as other things. 

So we also recognize that there is a right to assembly, a right 

to petition the government, so we recognize the right to have a 

peaceful demonstration against deplorable speech. 

What we need to keep communicating is, as deplorable as we 

find that film to be, it is not, and never will be an excuse for violence and for the senseless killing we saw in Benghazi and other 

places. And we need that voice to come loud and clear, not just 

from Washington but from the country as a whole and internationally, and it needs to come from people of all faiths. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. My time is up. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Olsen, I want 

to follow up on the series of questions that the Chairman raised 

17 

with you about the attack in Benghazi that cost the lives of four 

Americans. 

First, I will tell you that, based on the briefings I have had, I 

have come to the opposite conclusion and agree with the President 

of Libya that this was a premeditated, planned attack that was associated with the anniversary of September 11, 2001. I just do not 

think that people come to protests equipped with rocket-propelled 

grenades and other heavy weapons. And the reports of complicity— 

and they are many—with the Libyan guards who were assigned to 

guard the consulate also suggest to me that this was premeditated. 

Nevertheless, I realize that is something you are still looking at, 

the FBI is still looking at, but I for one believe that the very forthright conclusion by the President of Libya is more likely the correct 

one. 

But putting aside the issue of whether this was an opportunistic 

attack or a premeditated one, the issue of the security of the consulate in what by any measure has to be considered a dangerous 

threat environment continues to trouble me. It is clear that the security situation in Benghazi was deteriorating given that there 

were at least four attacks that I am told about, beginning in June, 

on diplomatic and western targets. We are also all aware that 

Libya is awash in heavy weapons. I think there are something like 

10,000 man-portable air-defense systems, maybe 20,000, that are 

still missing. 

We also know that it is a bastion for extremist groups, including 

offshoots of al-Qaeda. We know that the No. 2 person in al-Qaeda 

was a Libyan who was killed. The Libyan government is having a 

hard time controlling its borders, getting the militias under control. 

And even this week, the FBI team investigating the attack had difficulties getting to Libya safely because of the security situation. 

So given these facts, how would you personally have assessed the 

general threat environment prior to the attacks on our diplomats 

in Benghazi and the former Navy SEALs? 

Mr. OLSEN. Well, Senator Collins, I would agree with your characterization of the threat pretty much as you laid it out. So the 

threat in Libya from armed militant groups, from al-Qaeda-affiliated individuals was high, and that made Libya in some ways very 

similar to other countries in the region, and certainly similar to 

parts of Egypt and to northern Mali. We are concerned about Nigeria. 

So the region, particularly those countries following the Arab 

spring, are faced with real challenges from a security perspective. 

So we are, again, working with our partners, both in the Federal 

Government here but also with the governments in the region, 

seeking to increase the security capabilities of those as well as, of 

course, cooperating with them to look at specific threats or attacks, 

such as the investigation that is on going in Libya. 

Senator COLLINS. Was there any communication between NCTC 

and the State Department alerting them to the high-threat environment in which Benghazi was located and suggesting that be 

considered as the State Department evaluated its security? 

Mr. OLSEN. So over the course of the last several months, again, 

you highlighted particularly events in June of this year, we know 

that there was a small-scale attack on our mission, our post in 

18 

Benghazi in June. We also know that there was a more sophisticated attack involving the convoy with the British ambassador in 

Benghazi. So there were reports detailing those attacks and detailing generally the threat that was faced to U.S. and Western individuals and interests in eastern Libya from, again, armed militants 

as well as elements connected to al-Qaeda. 

There was no specific intelligence regarding an imminent attack 

prior to September 11 on our post in Benghazi. 

Senator COLLINS. Were there any indications that there were 

communications between extremist elements and the guards, the 

Libyan guards that were assigned to the consulate? 

Mr. OLSEN. In the immediate aftermath—or prior to the—— 

Senator COLLINS. Prior to the attack. 

Mr. OLSEN. That question I think would be better addressed in 

the session that we are going to have tomorrow. 

Senator COLLINS. It just concerns me so gravely that there were 

not marines present in Benghazi to defend the consulate, and as 

I have been looking further into this issue, I am learning that the 

situation is far more common than I would have thought. We are 

relying on foreign nationals, perhaps on a British security firm that 

has been told to be unarmed, and other more questionable and less 

secure means of protecting our American personnel in extremely 

dangerous parts of the world. And I am just stunned and appalled 

that there was not better security for all of the American personnel 

at that consulate given the high-threat environment. 

I know you are not in charge of assigning security. You do communicate information to the State Department about the threat. 

Can you enlighten me at all on why decisions were made to have 

virtually no security? 

Mr. OLSEN. I would say that we do as a community provide as 

much information as we possibly can in as timely a way as possible 

with the State Department as well as the rest of the Federal Government. I would say this: We do rely on host countries to help protect our diplomatic personnel in those countries. But I think that 

the ultimate question that you have asked of the decisions about 

the security at our post in Benghazi would be better addressed to 

the Diplomatic Security Service within the State Department. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Perkins, is your FBI team looking at security as well as trying to better understand how the attack came 

about and whether or not it was premeditated? 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Senator. Let me start by saying I share your 

specific concerns regarding the security. In Libya, as well as on a 

larger scale, we have FBI employees posted around the world and 

in many places that have higher-than-usual security concerns. We 

need to do that to carry out our mission every day in the counterterrorism environment. 

But with regard to the specifics within Benghazi, within Libya 

itself, we are counting on our investigators on the ground to be able 

to sort that out, obviously, to gather the facts, go where the facts 

take us, and then on the back end to be able to work with the State 

Department, with Diplomatic Security’s Regional Security Office, 

and others to share whatever it is we have found that may be of 

benefit to providing better security for the people on the ground. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

19 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

I do want to say for the record that last Friday, Senator Collins 

and I addressed a request to the Inspector General at the Department of State to do an investigation of what happened with regard 

to security at our consulate in Benghazi prior to these deadly attacks, and then to draw conclusions or lessons learned that might 

relate to provision of security generally, particularly at non-embassy locations throughout the world. 

The other thing I would say, although I understand you have a 

respectful disagreement on the question of whether the attack that 

resulted in the four American deaths in Benghazi was pre-planned 

for that day or a spontaneous taking advantage of the protests that 

were going on, I do appreciate the fact, Director Olsen, that you as 

the head of the National Counterterrorism Center have told the 

Committee this morning without hesitation that you believe what 

happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. There seemed to be 

a little confusion about that over the last few days. And, of course, 

I could not agree with you more and will await your conclusion of 

the investigation as to whether you think it was pre-planned for 

that day or just spontaneous. 

My own inclination is to agree with Senator Collins, as I usually 

do, but I will await the investigation. 

In order of importance, we have Senators Moran, Akaka—did I 

say ‘‘importance’’? [Laughter.] 

I take that back because Senator Akaka is the most important 

Senator. But in order of appearance, Senators Moran, Akaka, 

Pryor, and Carper. 

Senator MORAN. I very much appreciated your original comment, 

Mr. Chairman, but have great deference and respect for the Senator from Hawaii and recognize his importance. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MORAN 

Senator MORAN. What a difficult hearing with so many topics 

and how the world changes so often and so rapidly. So I thank the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member for hosting this hearing, and 

I appreciate our three witnesses and express my gratitude for the 

efforts that are being made to make certain that Americans remain 

safe and secure around the world. 

I need to focus my attention, Madam Secretary, as you would expect, on a conversation that we constantly have, and it deals with 

the threat of biological weapons, either intentional or inadvertent. 

For a long time, the Department of Homeland Security has been 

the lead department in developing a bioscience and agroscience facility, and I think all the hurdles that have been placed in making 

progress in the completion of this facility have now been completed 

with the National Academy of Sciences report that was released in 

July. 

You and I had a conversation in early August about the Office 

of Management and Budget. I would like to thank you personally 

for the graciousness and kindness that you have always demonstrated toward me in our conversations and your interest in this 

topic and in seeing a good conclusion to this facility being built. 

Every time you have testified, and every time I have asked you 

20 

questions, you have expressed your support not only for the facility 

but for the location and the process by which that site location was 

made. 

I think we are at the point now, Madam Secretary, at which 

there is no reason for you, your Department, not to allow the facility to proceed. There is a lot of uncertainty now with the contractors that are on site and when their contracts expire, and all 

money that has been spent on this facility to date has been from 

the State of Kansas, and the Congress has appropriated $40 million for use in the utility plant and another $50 million to begin 

construction. It seems clear to me that whether or not those dollars 

are available for those purposes rests in your hands. It would require also in addition to the money that the land be transferred. 

I think that also rests at your desk. And my question, I guess, is 

to be broadly asked: Now what, Madam Secretary? As we know, 

the construction timetable only becomes more expensive. We know 

the need for the facility, and I am not certain how long the contractors have a purpose for being on site if you do not release the 

funds. And I think Kansas has indicated its strong commitment to 

this process, is willing to continue to provide resources, work with 

you to accomplish that. But in the absence of a land transfer, I 

think our confidence that something is going to happen here, that 

our money is being well spent is greatly diminished. 

And so my question is, Madam Secretary, now what? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, you are right, Senator Moran. We 

have had a number of things to accomplish as predicates to being 

able to move forward with the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), the most recent being the National Academy of 

Sciences’ analysis. I think from all the studies, all the analyses, I 

think they confirm a couple of basic facts. 

One is we need a Bio Level 4 laboratory for this there. It is an 

essential part of our security apparatus, as it were. 

Two, the current facility at Plum Island is inadequate as a substitute, although it will have to serve as a bridge and some monies 

will have to be invested there to allow it to do so while we move 

forward with the NBAF. 

Three, as you say, I think it is time that we begin moving forward with the land exchange and the Central Utility Plant (CUP). 

Before we do so, I hope to host a meeting with the Kansas delegation and perhaps the governor to talk about out-year funding, cost 

shares, and some of the things that Kansas has mentioned they are 

willing to contemplate. But the $40 million for the CUP has been 

held in our fiscal year 2012 budget. We have a fiscal year 2012 

budget, so we can move ahead. So we will be in touch with your 

office about when we want to have such a meeting. 

But I think it is necessary for the country, and I think it is time 

to fish or cut bait. 

Senator MORAN. Madam Secretary, I always appreciate what you 

say, and you expressed sentiments that I was pleased to hear. 

What I would follow up with is you indicate now is the time. What 

is the definition of ‘‘now is the time’’? From many of our perspectives, now is the time has been true for a long time. And, again, 

let me see what your understanding is of what happens on some 

date, September 30 or October 30, when the contracts have expired 

21 

and the contractors leave. We would hate to have to rebid this, so 

I think when you say the time is now, it is not a matter of many 

months. It is a matter of a few weeks before this needs to happen. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is right. 

Senator MORAN. Is that true? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, that is my understanding as well. I 

know some of you will be back in your home States, but it could 

be done by conference call or people can come back here. But I 

would hope to pull together something in the next couple of weeks. 

Senator MORAN. Madam Secretary, I spoke with Governor 

Brownback last evening and I spoke again with him on the phone 

this morning during this hearing. His request of me is to tell you 

that he will be on a plane today or tomorrow, at your earliest convenience, to reach an agreement in which you will sign the transfer—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Exchange, yes. 

Senator MORAN [continuing]. And release the $40 million. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We will be in touch with your office over 

the next few days to schedule such a meeting. 

Senator MORAN. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Moran. 

And now, Senator Akaka. If I may on a point of personal privilege before I call on Senator Akaka, this happens to be the day on 

which Senator Akaka will chair the last hearing of his Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia this afternoon. Senator 

Akaka has really given extraordinary leadership to this Committee 

and worked particularly in a way that really is unsung but very 

important on human capital management in the Federal workforce. 

Senator Akaka will be concluding 36 years of service to the people of Hawaii, 22 in the Senate, 13 in the House, and retiring at 

the end of this year to spend more time with what I take to be the 

three great loves of his life: His beloved wife, Millie, his family, and 

the island paradise of Hawaii. Senator Akaka and his wife, Millie, 

have four sons, one daughter, 15 grandchildren, and 16 greatgrandchildren. Not bad. He is much loved here in the Senate and 

in Hawaii. He has accomplished an enormous amount in his time 

here. I want to just express to him not only my gratitude for his 

friendship and what an honor it has been to serve with him, but 

as the Chairman of the Committee to thank him for his steadfast 

and principled work on this Committee year in and year out. 

And since we are going out together, so to speak, at the end of 

this term, one of the benefits I hope, Senator Akaka, is that I will 

have time to visit you in Hawaii more often, and expecting that, 

I will, just as I turn it over to you, say, ‘‘Aloha pumehana.’’ Not 

bad for a Yankee from New England. [Laughter.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. That is terrific. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman, and thank you for your words. I am glad that we are 

stepping out of the Senate together, and I have enjoyed working 

with you very much throughout the years. I want to thank you and 

Senator Collins for your leadership on this Committee and in the 

Senate. You continue to do great work, so thank you very much, 

22 

Mr. Chairman, for your words. And thank you so much for holding 

this timely hearing. 

I want to join all Americans in mourning the loss of the four 

brave and dedicated American public servants who died as a result 

of what we consider senseless attacks in Libya last week. I honor 

them and the thousands of civilian Federal employees overseas who 

risk their lives every day in service to this country. We all owe a 

debt of gratitude to those that have made essential contributions 

to fighting terrorism. In the face of domestic and international 

threats, we really rely on these workers to keep us safe, and we 

will continue to try to help these workers. 

Also, I want to commend the Departments of our witnesses for 

your increased efforts for protecting our Nation against terrorist attacks and for your partnerships that you have been bringing about 

so that we can have the best kind of efforts made for our country, 

and also for the training of 230,000 law enforcement officials to 

help in this effort. And I want to commend you for all of that. 

At my request, I want to tell the panel, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report last week that highlighted 

troubling vulnerabilities in the security of radiological materials 

used at medical facilities across the country. Terrorists could steal 

these materials to build a dirty bomb that would have devastating 

social and economic consequences. 

What is your reaction to this report of GAO? And what are the 

current threats regarding terrorists’ acquisition of radiological materials? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I will start and, again, thank 

you for your years of service to the country. 

With respect to that report, it is primarily medical radiological 

material. The Department of Energy has the responsibility for the 

security of that material and how it is handled, so we are reaching 

out to them to see what steps they intend to take with respect to 

those medical materials. And we will be happy to report back to 

you. 

Senator AKAKA. Any further comments? Mr. Olsen. 

Mr. OLSEN. Senator, as well I would like to thank you for your 

years of service. 

In answer to your question, what I would say as a general matter is that we do have at NCTC a significant element within our 

organization of analysts who are focused solely on radiological, 

chemical, and biological weapons, and the possibility of terrorists 

obtaining and using those. And we work closely with the National 

Counterproliferation Center in that regard, as well as with our domestic partners represented here, and the CIA and other agencies 

that focus overseas. It is obviously a significant concern for us, and 

so I will look forward to working, again, with Secretary Napolitano 

and the FBI on this issue. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Director. Mr. Perkins. 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Senator, and I, too, congratulate you on your 

years of service to the country. 

I reflect what Madam Secretary and Director Olsen both stated. 

We have a Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate that works 

closely with the Department of Energy, with components of DHS, 

as well as NCTC, in tracking, following, and in trying to be in a 

23 

mode where we are able to detect any thefts along those lines. We 

will have to have some time to review the actual aspects of the 

GAO report and could get back to you on that. But we work closely 

with our counterparts in these agencies as well as the Department 

of Energy to mitigate those threats. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you again for your partnerships. It 

really shows. As you know, Secretary Napolitano, the Senate failed 

to pass comprehensive cybersecurity legislation prior to the August 

recess. Because the prospects of enacting legislation this year are 

dim, I support the President’s use of his authorities to improve 

cybersecurity of the Nation’s critical infrastructure such as the 

power grid. 

What are the contours of the Executive Order currently under 

consideration? And when do you expect it to be issued? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator Akaka, there is an Executive 

Order that is being considered. It is still being drafted in the interagency process, but I would say that it is close to completion pending a few issues that need to be resolved at the highest levels. And, 

of course, the President will need to be involved. It is perhaps easier to say what cannot be in an Executive Order as opposed to what 

can be in an Executive Order. 

We still need cyber legislation. We still need the congressional 

action and appreciate the efforts everyone has made in this regard. 

This is something that the Congress should enact in a comprehensive fashion. We have come close, but we have not been able to get 

across the goal line here. But it remains an urgent need. 

There are at least three things I can think of just off the top of 

my head that an Executive Order cannot solve. One is it cannot 

solve some of the limitations we have on personnel, personnel hiring and salaries, and how that works. It cannot solve issues about 

liability protections, which are often viewed as a mechanism to foster timely and effective information sharing. And we cannot without legislation increase criminal penalties for the bad actors that 

we find or the FBI finds. So those are at least three important 

areas that even a robust Executive Order would not be able to 

cover. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. 

Let me pick up on the last round of questioning by Senator 

Akaka. I appreciate that report, Secretary Napolitano, and I am 

glad that the Administration is going forward with a sense of urgency about this because it is possible that we will be able for a 

variety of reasons to adopt cybersecurity legislation in the lameduck session. But I agree with Senator Akaka. Based on what we 

have been through up until now, I would not count on it. I will be, 

obviously, quite pleasantly surprised if we are able to find common 

ground. And we are still working on it. We still have bipartisan 

discussions going on. 

But with that probability of the failure of Congress to adopt the 

Cybersecurity Act of 2012 or something like it, I think the sooner 

the Executive Branch is ready to try to fill whatever gaps it can, 

the safer the country will be. So I appreciate that, and I certainly 

take this to be what the pace of work in the Administration is, so 

24 

I am not saying anything that is at odds with it. But I certainly 

would not wait to see how the lame-duck session works out. In 

other words, if we get something passed, then it will presumably 

overcome the Executive Order. And as you said, there are at least 

those three matters that are in legislation that the President cannot adopt by Executive Order. 

I assume, but I look for reassurance now, that you and the Department of Homeland Security are quite actively involved since 

you are charged with the unique responsibility for cybersecurity in 

the construction of a possible Executive Order or orders regarding 

cybersecurity. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, yes, we have been very 

actively involved, as have some of the other agencies who have primary responsibility in this area. One of the benefits of the legislation, even though it did not pass, is it helped to begin educating 

people as to the really considerable civilian cyber responsibilities 

and capabilities that are already being exercised by the Department of Homeland Security. And I think that any Executive Order 

will reflect that as well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is good. Even though we ended up 

with a proposal that would have made compliance with the standards voluntary—and I understand the President by Executive 

Order cannot make them mandatory—but we looked at the possibility that under existing statutory authority, various regulatory 

agencies might have the existing authority to make whatever 

standards emerged mandatory on the sector of the economy that 

they oversee. Do you know whether the Executive Order is considering that possibility? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, without talking in detail 

because things are still in draft. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. But I can tell you that there has been a 

deep diver into sector-specific analysis as to where there may already exist some powers. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is good to hear. I am encouraged by 

that. 

Let me give you an opportunity one more time to rebut what 

seems to be driving a lot of the opposition to the bill, which is that 

this would be the heavy hand of government over the private sector 

that controls critical cyber infrastructure. Even though in the noncyber infrastructure or primarily non-cyber, the 18 areas that are 

designated now which DHS has authority over, you are working 

really quite constructively and collaboratively, I gather, with the 

private sector in each of those areas. So what more do you think 

you and we can do to reassure the private sector that this is intended to be collaborative, not coercive. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, we need to 

continue to remind them that past is prologue to the future; that 

we have worked collaboratively on a number of areas outside of 

cyber affecting critical infrastructure; and that they themselves 

benefit if there are shared standards. And, quite frankly, with respect to core critical infrastructure, many businesses, communities, 

and families rely on that core infrastructure to be safe and secure. 

So that in and of itself I think elevates this to a different plane. 

25 

We want to be collaborative. We think that is the way to go. It 

is truly public-private in contemplation and in current activity. 

But, again, a significant gap anywhere respecting core critical infrastructure can have ripple effects far beyond the individual entity 

that is the controller. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Agreed. Associate Deputy Director Perkins, do you want to add anything? The FBI has developed really 

impressive cybersecurity capacities, obviously particularly with regard to domestic law enforcement. I take it you two are involved 

in the construction of a possible Executive Order? 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is correct. We are working 

with our partners at DHS to effect that end, and I echo to some 

degree what Secretary Napolitano was talking about as far as the 

efficiency. We have to have the partnerships to make things work. 

In many of the things the FBI does, partnerships make our work 

efficient. In the world of cyber crime and cyber threat, partnerships 

are essential, more than efficient. They have to be there in order 

for us to carry out our mission. 

So looking at the past, looking at the success we have had with 

the partnerships with the private sector, we hope to play on that 

going forward to win the confidence and to get this type of partnerships, whether it be through legislation or Executive Order, in 

place that could benefit our ability to carry out our mission. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My staff just handed me a note that said 

that Reuters news service is just reporting that the Bank of America’s Web site has suffered intermittent problems amid threats on 

the Internet that a group was planning to launch cyber attacks on 

the bank and the New York Stock Exchange, again, in retaliation 

for this film. Do any of you know anything about that at this point? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, there has been some ongoing activity, and whether it is retaliatory I do not think has been 

determined. Without going into more, I will just simply say that 

this is an example of where working public to private and private 

to public benefits everybody. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Director Olsen or Associate Deputy 

Director Perkins, do you want to add anything? 

Mr. OLSEN. I would just add, we were familiar with these reports 

as of last night, and so there have been ongoing efforts in this regard. 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, sir, that is accurate. We are working with 

DHS on that matter, but beyond that point right now I really cannot share a great deal of detail on it as we look into it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good enough. It does make the point. 

Again, this is a news story that I am going from, but you have 

given some legitimacy to parts of it, although not clearly to whether it is related to the film. But it does make the point that we have 

been trying to make in the cybersecurity legislation that we are in 

an unusual circumstance now where the target of an attack by an 

enemy, whether a nation-state or a terrorist group, would just as 

likely, in some senses more likely, be privately owned cyber infrastructure that controls some significant part of life in America as 

opposed to attacking a military target or a government Web site or 

something of that kind. 

26 

I want to move to another area, and that is, the extent to which 

over the last year or so the Iranian Revoluionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC) and Quds Force from Iran and its clients, including particularly Hezbollah, have attempted to perpetrate a number of terrorist 

attacks in countries around the world, again, most recently the successful terrorist attack on a tourist bus in Bulgaria. But, obviously, 

again, we know that last year the government of Iran apparently 

attempted to carry out an attack here in Washington against the 

Saudi ambassador to the United States using someone they believed to be a member of a Mexican drug cartel. 

I wanted to ask the three of you—first, to put this into context— 

my impression is that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and 

the Quds Force have made a strategic decision to move out of their 

immediate neighborhood and to begin to operate internationally. 

Am I correct on that, Director Olsen? 

Mr. OLSEN. What I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that we have 

seen an uptick in operational activity by the Iranian Revolutionary 

Guards Force and the Quds Force over the last year or so. And certainly to your point, the plot against the Saudi ambassador here 

in Washington last fall highlighted a willingness of Iran and its 

terrorist elements to actually carry out or seek to carry out an attack inside the United States. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. And what I am wondering is am I 

right—my impression certainly is that whereas traditionally the 

IRGC and the Quds Force have operated within the Middle East 

through Hezbollah—perhaps sometimes Hamas, certainly Hezbollah—and Iraqi Shia militias in, obviously, Iraq, that now they seem 

to be spreading out more broadly. The two cases we know are the 

United States and Bulgaria. 

Mr. OLSEN. I would say that your impression is consistent with 

my own insofar as certainly we have seen Iranian influence in Iraq 

and in Afghanistan. But we have also seen links between Iran and 

terrorist operations in India, Thailand, and Georgia. So it is a 

threat that is posed beyond the immediate region of Iran. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So let me ask any of you to what extent 

now this expansion of terrorist activity sponsored by the Iranian 

government rises as a threat to our homeland among the other terrorist threats to our homeland? 

Mr. OLSEN. I will take that, at first at least. Again, you mentioned and I discussed briefly the planned attack last fall. I would 

consider it to be a significant source of concern for us, both Iran 

and, again, its terrorist element, the Quds Force, as well as the 

group that it coordinates with, Lebanese Hezbollah. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Associate Deputy Director Perkins. 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, I agree with Director Olsen in that Quds 

Force, Hezbollah, and others have shown they both have the capability and the willingness to extend beyond that region of the world 

and likely here into the homeland itself. We look at it as a very 

serious problem. We look at it as a serious threat and that we are 

focusing intelligence analysts and other resources on that on a 

daily basis to monitor that threat, to make determinations, is it increasing, is it dropping off, and the like. But I agree with Director 

Olsen that they have the capability and they have the willingness 

to do that, which are two very important steps. 

27 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. And obviously you are coordinating 

with other parts of our intelligence community that have unique 

responsibility for intelligence outside of the United States. 

Mr. PERKINS. That is correct, Senator, and that is a key point 

there, that this is a whole-of-government approach to dealing with 

this. This is very key across the entire intelligence community, 

both outside of the United States, as well as here in the homeland. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go to aviation security which, 

overall post-September 11, 2001, has been an area where we have 

put tremendous resources into the battle, and overall we have successfully defended our country and the enormous number of people, 

Americans and non-Americans, who travel by air. You offered testimony that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula nonetheless continues to show an intention to attack American and international 

aviation systems. 

I wonder, and I will begin, Secretary Napolitano, with you, apart 

from your statement in your prepared remarks, are there additional steps that you would like to highlight at this point which you 

think we can or should take to deter or detect future attacks via 

our aviation systems? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I think the whole aviation sector 

demonstrates the necessity to have a layered approach so that if 

someone or some group is able to evade one layer, another layer 

can pick them up. And it begins fundamentally with good intelligence, good intelligence sharing with our international partners, 

good intelligence sharing within the aviation sector, and good intelligence sharing among the Federal family. It goes to the standards 

that we require for planes bound for the United States, both for 

passengers and for cargo, and how we inspect those standards. 

It goes to what we ourselves require of airports and airport authorities that control, say, the perimeter of the airport. We have 

had one or two instances of breaches this last year. We have 

jumped on both of those to see why and what corrective measures 

needed to be taken. 

It goes to when you get into the airport, what you see in the area 

before you get to the gate, what you may not see in the area before 

you get to the gate, and the construction of the gate itself with the 

new technology. Then there are things that we are doing in the socalled sterile area where, even though we call it a sterile area, 

there is still a lot of work underway and different things that TSA 

does on different days at different times and different places to increase security. So it is an entire layered approach. 

One of the things I think has really helped and I think American 

passengers will begin seeing the benefits, if they have not already, 

is moving to a risk-based approach where, if we have pre-knowledge of a traveler and we have their biometrics, they are able to 

go through the airport and go through customs or whatever more 

quickly. So we are really encouraging that. That takes pressure off 

of the lines. 

The second thing that is going on is a lot of technology research 

to see if in this country, where we have the world’s best scientists 

and engineers, we can devise a system that is even more efficient 

for travelers and yet deals with the evolving threat. Research cyVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:01 Dec 17, 2012 Jkt 076070 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\76070.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
28 

cles take time, but there is some very interesting work underway 

in that regard. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Olsen, Associate Deputy Director 

Perkins, do you want to add to that? 

Mr. OLSEN. Just a couple of quick points. 

First, in terms of the threat, and I know we have touched on this 

briefly, but we do see from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that 

it has demonstrated its desire to carry out an attack involving the 

aviation sector, really three failed attempts since December 2009, 

including one just this past May. I concur completely with Secretary Napolitano in terms of developing a layered approach, in 

terms of NCTC’s contribution to that effort. We maintain the identities database of known and suspected terrorists, which becomes 

the basis for watchlisting and screening, at least in part the types 

of screening that can take place at airports. And then, finally, I 

would highlight again the point that Secretary Napolitano made 

about the value of intelligence and developing at the earliest possible stages the signs, indications, and information about individuals who may be seeking to carry out such an attack so that we 

can disrupt that type of plot before that person ever seeks to board 

an airplane or go to an airport. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Perkins. 

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I echo their comments. I agree 

that AQAP is one of the top if not the top threat we face right now 

simply because of their active willingness to continue coming at us 

in that way. 

I echo Director Olsen’s comments as far as intelligence goes. One 

of the things we have done recently to enhance and build our intelligence capabilities, especially within our Counterterrorism Division, is a better integration of our intelligence analysts into operations. Recently, we have named three deputy assistant directors 

who are all non-agent personnel, intelligence analysts, to lead those 

efforts within the Counterterrorism and Criminal Investigative Divisions. So the focus on intelligence ahead of time as well as the 

layered approach to thwart these attempts is vital. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you said something just now that anticipated the following question I was going to ask, which we are 

in a context, as we have said, where core al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, has been 

greatly weakened. Bin Laden is dead. A series of people who have 

worked their way up to replace others are gone. Abu Laith al-Libi, 

the Libyan who was close to the top, is now gone. Ayman alZawahiri unfortunately remains at liberty, but I am sure that he 

is in our sights nonetheless. 

So if I asked you to give me what you would rank as the top two 

or three Islamist terrorist threats to the homeland, what would you 

say? Associate Deputy Director Perkins, you said you might even 

put AQAP now at the top. What else? Other groups? Iran, Quds 

Force? Which? 

Mr. PERKINS. Obviously, Quds Force, Hezbollah. A lot depends on 

future world events as to where exactly that goes. But as we 

echoed, they have the capability and the willingness so that puts 

them near the top of that list as well. Other emerging threats in 

other parts of the world that we look at in addition to AQAP, are 

29 

some of the West Africa, East Africa threats in those regions, as 

far as their actual extent and threat to the homeland, there is debate in those areas. But, nonetheless, those are things that are 

near the top of our list to follow as they emerge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Olsen, how about you? What are 

your major concerns about sources of threats to our homeland? 

Mr. OLSEN. In terms of the threat to the U.S. homeland, I would 

put AQAP at the top of the list. But I would also put, again, 

al-Qaeda core. Notwithstanding its greatly diminished capability, it 

does retain the intent—and we have seen this—to carry out an attack, even if it is a smaller-scale, less sophisticated attack than we 

have seen in the past, against the U.S. homeland. And then, 

third—and, again, these are not in any particular order—but I 

would also include on that list Iran and Hezbollah, echoing the 

comment that the likelihood of an attack inside the United States 

depends largely on events in the Middle East and what we see. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would add to what was said the nature 

of homegrown Islamist terrorists or terrorism, what we saw, for example, the arrest in Chicago last Saturday of an individual. We 

have seen a pattern of this or several of these instances over the 

last year. I think the Internet serves as a facilitator for that, and 

I think the so-called lone wolf can also be a lone Islamist in that 

regard, driven by motivations that may be behind, for example, 

what occurred in Benghazi. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I thank you, the three of you, very 

much. Again, we have made great progress. I think the American 

people have reason not only to be grateful to you and all the work 

with you for our increased security in the face of a really unusual, 

unprecedented threat to our homeland security, unique really in 

American history—and we are not only improving our defenses, we 

are on the offense in a very real way. But the threat goes on, and 

so will the work that you and this Committee will continue to do, 

so I thank you very much. 

The record of the hearing will stay open for 15 days for any additional statements or questions that you or Members of the Committee have. Associate Deputy Director Perkins, you can tell Director Mueller that he does not have to appear anymore, that you 

have done very well. [Laughter.] 

With that, thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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