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IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

AND THE SURROUNDING REGION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 5, 2012

Serial No. 112–192

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D., senior lecturer, University of Haifa ................................ 9

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., senior research fellow, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom 

Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation .............. 26

Michael Rubin, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute ............ 37

Mr. Alex Vatanka, adjunct scholar, Middle East Institute .................................. 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Brenda Shaffer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 11

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 28

Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 39

Mr. Alex Vatanka: Prepared statement ................................................................. 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

(1)

IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH 

CAUCASUS AND THE SURROUNDING REGION 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BURTON. We will now call the hearing to order. 

This is a very important hearing, in my opinion. Some of them 

are not nearly as important as others, but this one is extremely important because Greg and I, the ranking member, and Jean, we are 

all concerned about the influence of Iran in the entire region, in the 

Caucasus and also in the Gulf Region. 

So today we are here to discuss the influence, expanding influence in the South Caucasus, but we are also talking about—I intend to talk about some of the problems in the Persian Gulf region 

because that is of vital interest to us. If the Straits of Hormuz or 

the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal are blocked in any way, it could 

have a devastating impact on the United States because we still 

get a large part of our energy from that region. 

I traveled to Azerbaijan and Armenia in early September, and 

you have been over there, too, Greg? 

Mr. MEEKS. Absolutely. 

Mr. BURTON. Yeah. And I also stopped in Georgia and met in 

Tbilisi with President Saakashvili. When I talked to these leaders, 

Iran was one of the things that came up at the very beginning because they all feel the influence and the aggressive attitude underneath the cover, so to speak, of Iran. 

In particular, I think Azerbaijan feels a great deal of concern, 

and when I talked to the President and the members of their Parliament and others there, it was readily apparent to me that they 

thought that there ought to be closer ties between Azerbaijan and 

the United States and Georgia, and hopefully Armenia, because 

Iran is really trying to destabilize or undermine those governments. We believe that is their long-term goal. 

Iran has been involved in terrorism, as we know, for some time. 

It is hardly unique in that area. We have seen the Iranian regime 

operating through organizations such as the Republican Guard and 

employ such tactics around the globe, including right here in Washington, DC. 

2

However, the proximity of the South Caucasus to Iran, as well 

as strong relationship Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have with 

both the United States and Israel, it increases the appeal of the 

Iranians for targeting those countries. I applaud those governments 

in the region for their vigilance against the Iranian threat. However, I am particularly concerned about the security at the U.S. 

Embassy in Baku, as the age and location of that facility leave our 

people there particularly vulnerable. 

I often find myself comparing the geopolitics of the South 

Caucasus to a Gordian knot. The tangle of the historical and current events leaves countries in the region isolated from their neighbors. Unfortunately, such isolation can play into the hands of powers lying on the periphery of the region. Press reports and conversations that I had while I was in the region indicate that Iran 

is taking, or at the least has potential to take advantage of Armenia’s regional isolation, and thus the country’s economic dependence on their common border, to use Armenian banks and enterprises to skirt international sanctions. 

The United States and our regional partners, including Armenia, 

must be vigilant by fully applying current laws and regulations and 

by amending sanctions as needed to close the loopholes. I hope the 

legislation that is currently pending in the Congress makes its way 

through rapidly, that will do just that. 

Regarding energy, sanctions are an essential tool in our continued attempts to isolate the Iranian regime. However, we have to 

recognize that for many countries in this subcommittee’s jurisdiction decreasing consumption of Iranian energy means increasing 

consumption of Russian energy. Such a chain reaction is not in the 

national interest of the United States. 

The solution to this problem requires renewed American leadership, or partnership, to increase the development of resources that 

lie across the South Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the infrastructure, the pipelines and other things needed to transport 

these resources. 

I would also like to elaborate a little bit more about Bahrain. We 

have some people on the panel today that we will ask questions 

about Bahrain, and they have some intimate knowledge of some of 

the problems that have taken place there. And as I said before, the 

concerns that we have in the Caucasus and the whole region is 

only part of the concern that we feel for the region. Bahrain has 

been an ally of the United States for a long, long time. We have 

our 5th Fleet there. And the attempts by Iranians to work with dissident forces there in Bahrain to undermine that government is 

something that we must be concerned about. 

I have talked to the leadership over there, and they are concerned about the problems that some of the people feel toward the 

government, and they have tried to work with them to solve that 

problem. But so far the problems have not all been solved, and for 

that reason they continue to try to work with them even though 

we know and they know from intelligence sources that Iran is stirring things up over there and trying to undermine that government. 

Since we have a great relationship with that government, I think 

it is extremely important that we try to work with them, as long 

3

as we have our 5th Fleet there, and it is vital to the United States 

interests that we do everything we can to solve that problem, the 

problems in that country, without giving Iran the ability to undermine and destroy that government. 

In conclusion, let me just say that the South Caucasus is of extreme importance, and we have today with us a number of people 

from Azerbaijan. They have sent a delegation over here to follow 

this hearing because they are very much aware of how important 

it is that we illuminate the issue of Iranian expansionism or their 

attempt to expand their influence throughout the region. 

The United States must not look weak in this entire region. We 

have to look strong. If we look like we are weak, it will give them 

the encouragement that they need to continue to move throughout 

that whole region. We are concerned, as my colleagues know, about 

Libya, we are concerned about Egypt, we are concerned about 

Syria, we are concerned about Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and 

the Gulf States, especially Bahrain right now. 

So I will end up by just saying that this is going to be probably 

my last hearing as chairman of this committee, but my good friend 

Greg, and I am sure my other colleagues will do everything they 

can to make sure we continue to pursue this issue to make sure 

that not only the region is secure, but our interests, the United 

States of America’s interests are safe as well. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

4


77164e-1.eps

Remarks of the Honorable Dan Bnrton 

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Hearing on: "Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and Surrounding Region" 

*"*As prepared for delivery*"* 

December 5, 2012 

The purpose of this hearing is to better understand Iran's influence in the South Caucasus 

and the surrounding region. I traveled to Azerbaijan and Armenia in early September In both 

countries I met with the President as well as the Speaker of Parliament, cabinet officials, and 

businesses leaders. I also had the opportunity to meet with Georgian President Misha Saakashvili 

while passing through Tbilisi. Iran was a common theme in all of these meetings as well as my 

meetings with our Ambassadors and their teams 

Iran was bound to come up. The Islamic Republic currently fonns the southern border of 

a region long squeezed between three historic powers. However, it was the way in which Iran 

entered my conversations in the region that caused me to call this hearing. Iranian policy in the 

South Caucasus seeks to attack what it views as "soft" Western targets within easy reach of 

Tehran, to take advantage of regional geopolitical realities to undermine Western efforts to 

sanction Iran's nuclear weapons program, and to counter Western attempts to develop the region 

as an energy production center and transportation corridor. 

Iranian sponsored terrorism is hardly unique to the South Caucasus We have seen the 

Iranian regime, operating though organizations such as the Republican Guard, employ such 

tactics around the globe-including right here in Washington, DC. However, the proximity of 

the South Caucasus to Iran as well the strong relationship that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 

have with both the United States and Israel increases the appeal of targets in the region. I applaud 

governments in the region for their vigilance against this Iranian threat. However, I am 

particularly concerned about security at the US Embassy in Baku as the age and location of the 

facility leave our people there particularly venerable 

I often find myself comparing the geopolitics of the South Caucasus to a Gordian Knot. 

The tangle of hi storical and current events leaves countries in the region isolated from their 

neighbors. Unfortunately such isolation can play into the hands of powers lying on the periphery 

of the region. Press reports and conversations that I had while in the region indicate that Iran is 

taking-or at the least has the potential to take-advantage of Armenia's regional isolation and 

thus the country's economic dependence on their common border to use Armenian banks and 

enterprises to skirt international sanctions. The United States and our regional partnersincluding Armenia-must be vigilant by fully applying current laws and regulations and by 
5


77164e-2.eps

amending sanctions as needed to close loopholes. 1 hope that legislation currently working its 

way through this Congress will do just that. 

Sanctions are an essential tool in our continued attempts to isolate the Iranian regime. 

However, we must recognize that for many countries in this Subcommittee's jurisdiction 

decreasing consumption of Iranian energy means increasing consumption of Russian enert\y 

Such a chain reaction is not in the national interest of the United States. The solution to this 

problem requires renewed American leadership to increase the development of resources that lie 

across the South Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the infrastructure--the pipelines-needed 

to transport these resources to European consumers. 

The Iranian threat in the South Caucasus reminds us of the strategic importance of this 

outpost of Europe, a region that the United States has attempted to integrate into the West since 

the fall of the Soviet Union two decades ago. After a couple weeks, 1 will not be here to see this 

project to its completion. It is my hope that my colleagues seated here, with the intellectual 

support of these witnesses, will finish thejob. 
6

Mr. BURTON. With that, I will yield to my colleague, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you 

for holding, as you said, this most important hearing, and I also 

want to say to a degree sad, sad because this probably will be your 

last hearing here in the United States House of Representatives 

after almost 3 decades of service to our country, and we want to 

salute you for that. 

Some, you know, may be with regret not having Dan Burton to 

kick around anymore, but we, indeed, are going to miss you. And 

I got to say that it has been an honor and a personal privilege for 

me to sit as the ranking member and to work with you over the 

last 2 years on this subcommittee. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. You have been a chairman that has been very fair 

and open, and we have worked together, and you are going to be 

missed here. And so I hope that as you retire you will enjoy a fruitful and prosperous life with your beautiful wife, who is here, and 

your family, and you have a great retirement, and maybe now you 

will have time to schedule that round of golf with Bill Clinton. 

Mr. BURTON. That is an inside joke, folks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me turn to the subject at hand. I believe we are 

dealing with an important question in the South Caucasus region, 

which represents a complex web of both regional alliances and conflicts, bitter rivalries, varying degrees of Western orientation, desperate economic trajectories, and a potential venue for instability 

and even violence. 

In terms of viewing the South Caucasus region from the perspective of this subcommittee, it is important to note that some of our 

strongest instruments, the Euro-Atlantic institutions of NATO and 

the European Union, have a weak presence in this region and, 

therefore, are not as relevant as they are in the Balkans, for instance. Ultimately, this means that Europe and the United States 

have less leverage in the region. This allows other countries in the 

region to compete for political, economic, and military influence in 

the region. 

And I am looking forward to hearing our witnesses discuss this 

issue today. I really want to hear what you have to say in this regards. I believe that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia represent 

trustworthy allies of the United States, but I realize full well that 

their bilateral relationships are complicated and that they have to 

take their immediate neighborhood into account also. 

With only two open borders, and one of them being with Iran, Armenia faces the constant threat of isolation, and this is a core driver in managing Armenia’s relationship with Iran. Azerbaijan has a 

sizable diaspora in northern Iran, but a vastly different strategic, 

social, and political orientation than Iran’s leaders. Despite a potential religious kinship between Iran and Azerbaijan, Iran has 

historically sided with Armenia over the contested region of 

Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, Azerbaijan enjoys a solid relationship with Israel, which further distances Baku and Tehran 

from one another. 

Georgia has the strongest Western orientation in the region, and 

my sense is that this will remain intact even after their change of 

government. But like any other country, Georgia is seeking ecoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:38 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\120512\77164 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

nomic opportunities everywhere, including potential trade or investment relations with Iran. 

I believe there is a potential for Iran to exploit the complicated 

relationship between each of these countries and that the others in 

the region have significant regional interests that compete or overlap with Iran. Simultaneously, each of the South Caucasus nations 

play an important role in Western relations with Iran, particularly 

their ability to comply with international sanctions, and I think it 

is important for the United States policy toward the region to find 

ways to strengthen this compliance. 

Russia appears to want to limit both the influence of the United 

States and Turkey in the South Caucasus, but it is unclear to me 

whether they also seek to minimize Iranian influence. I have followed with great interest Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations 

with Armenia, and my sense is that such a step holds the greatest 

potential to improve both stability and prosperity in the region. 

Lifting Armenia’s isolation would not only allow Yerevan greater 

independence from Iranian and Russian influence, it would also be 

mutually beneficial for Turkey and Armenia in a number of ways, 

and I am interested in hearing the panel’s perspectives on whether 

this is an issue the Turkish and Armenian Governments might be 

able to reengage on. 

What we can all agree on is this, as I conclude, is that it is in 

no one’s interest to see a nuclear-armed Iran. And I look forward 

to exploring how the South Caucasus region can help the United 

States and Europe to prevent this outcome. We cannot have that 

as an outcome. 

I anxiously await hearing the testimony of our witnesses. And 

again, Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure, and I think that this 

hearing is very timely at this date. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. And I am sure my wife put 

you up to that nice comment, so I want to thank you for that as 

well. 

Mr. Gallegly. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is a 

special day for me as well, a bittersweet day after having had the 

honor to serve in the People’s House for 26 years, and on this committee for 24 years, and had the honor of chairing this subcommittee. 

I can’t tell you what an honor it has been to serve with you, Dan, 

not only on this committee, but as next door neighbors in the Rayburn Building for many years, and for bringing this important 

issue before us today. I can’t think of anything that seems to be 

more timely than bringing this issue up today. 

I would like to also associate myself with a comment that our 

ranking member made, a good friend of mine. While I recognize 

that Mr. Burton does have a beautiful wife here in the audience 

today, I also have a beautiful wife in the audience here today as 

well. And we have had the great honor of having Dan at our home 

in California, and I am going to leave the porch light on for the 

two of you and hope that you will join us out West. 

It has been an honor to serve with you, Jean. The three of us 

will be leaving Congress here in a few days. It may be quite a few 

8

days with the way things are going on the Hill and over on the 

other side of town. Hopefully we will get through that. 

But words can’t express the honor that I feel for having had the 

opportunity to do so many of the things we have done, and this 

being our closing hearing. I want to make sure we have ample time 

for all of our witnesses today, so I will defer from an opening statement. I would like to place one into the record as a part of the 

hearing, and just thank you all for the friendship and the dedication you have shown this great country for all the years. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, without objection, we will put your written 

statement in the record. But I want to tell you, we are patting each 

other on the back here today because this is probably the last time 

we will get a chance to do that. But, Elton, you have been a great 

member, too, and I reciprocate. I really enjoyed it. And I am glad 

you are leaving the light on. 

He has a beautiful house in California and an extra bedroom, so 

I may be going out there to spend a little bit of time. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The porch light is on. 

Mr. BURTON. The porch light. 

And Jean is going back to Ohio. 

And, Jean, you have been a great person to work with, and we 

are going to miss you as well. Sure, we will yield to you. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Well, first off, parting is such sweet sorrow. But 

I am only sorry that more people aren’t here to listen to this panel 

on what I believe is one of the most critical national security issues 

that the world faces. And I am glad that Congressman Meeks will 

be carrying the banner for this very important region in the world. 

It is important for a lot of reasons, but one of those reasons is 

the potential for energy, energy from Azerbaijan, to really free 

Western Europe from other alternative sources that may not be 

right for them or right for the world. And yet it is not in certain 

countries’ best interest—Iran, Russia comes to light—for the pipeline to go through to bring natural energy, oil and gas resources 

to parts of the world that would like to have alternative sources 

And so I think that it is important for Congress to keep an eye 

on this region and to make sure that the stability that has been 

in place continues and that these emerging markets are allowed to 

continue to grow and prosper, because I truly believe that they are 

a bright spot in the world’s future. 

I yield back. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, and I will miss all you guys. 

Ariel Cohen is a leading expert in Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. He serves as a senior research fellow 

in Russian and Eurasian studies and international energy policy at 

the Heritage Foundation. 

And we are glad to have you here. Thank you very much. 

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise 

Institute and a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. He was 

a former senior adviser at the Pentagon. 

Thank you for being here. 

Dr. Brenda Shaffer is a specialist on the Caucasus, ethnic policies in Iran, Caspian energy, energy and foreign policy, and Eastern Mediterranean energy issues. She previously served as the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:38 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\120512\77164 HFA PsN: SHIRL
9

search director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University—should have been a Big Ten school, but we will settle—Harvard University. In January she will be a visiting scholar at 

Georgetown University Center for Eurasian, Russian, and Eastern 

European Studies. 

Alex Vatanka specializes in Middle Eastern affairs with a particular focus on Iran. He joined the Middle East Institute as an adjunct scholar in 2007. He also lectures as a senior fellow in Middle 

East studies at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and 

at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management. 

Want to welcome all of you, and we will start—I think we will 

start with you, Dr. Shaffer, since she is the prettiest gal at the 

table. 

STATEMENT OF BRENDA SHAFFER, PH.D., SENIOR LECTURER, 

UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA 

Ms. SHAFFER. Thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity to testify in front of this committee. 

We often think of Iran as a Middle Eastern country, but actually 

it sits in the crossroads of a number of regions, Southwest Asia, 

Central Asia, and the Caucasus. And actually the influence between Iran and the South Caucasus is two ways. Not only is Iran, 

as you pointed out correctly, extremely active in subversion in the 

region and destabilizing any of the countries that are pro-Western 

in the region, but also there is two-way influence because Iran 

itself is a multi-ethnic country. 

So to understand any of Iran’s policies in the region, we have to 

remember that half of the population of Iran isn’t Persian; of that 

half of the whole of the population of Iran, a third is ethnic Azerbaijani. And this is really what drives Iran’s policies in the region, 

is to destabilize Azerbaijan, to make sure that its own ethnic minorities cannot be attracted to Azerbaijan, cannot be thinking 

about breaking off from Iran or any type of other activity. 

And for this reason, for instance, we find that the Islamic Republic of Iran is actually an ally of Christian Armenia in its struggle 

against Azerbaijan, and in fact the war effort, the occupation of Armenia, of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory could not have taken 

place without Iranian supplies, Iranian support. 

And in fact the ethnic minorities of Iran are located mostly in the 

border areas of Iran, so it affects Iran’s relations with a number 

of neighboring states, with Pakistan, with Turkey, with 

Turkmenistan, with Iraq, because there is co-ethnics on each side 

of the border with the states that are Iran’s neighbors. 

Many of the top leaders of Iran are actually ethnic Azerbaijanis. 

Khamenei, the spiritual leader, is actually from Khomein on northwest Iran. When he goes to that area he speaks Azerbaijani. 

Mousavi, the head of the Green Movement, is also ethnic Azerbaijani. And despite the integration of Azerbaijanis into the leadership of Iran, all the non-Persian minorities are not allowed to use 

their language in schools, they are not allowed to use it in court, 

and the Azerbaijanis, among them a third of the population, 

women going into trials in courts in Persian and not understanding 

even what is happening in the court side. 

10

The ethnic minorities have a variety of views toward Tehran, toward the state. Most of the Iranian Azerbaijanis I would say to 

date see themselves as citizens of Iran but would like a place also 

for their culture, not to separate from Iran, not to break up Iran, 

but to change, to change Iran. But a number of the other groups, 

for instance the Baloch, the Arabs, the Kurds, are really having an 

active, full-scale insurgency going on. We don’t hear about it too 

much in the press, we don’t hear about it too much from American 

officials, but real insurgencies where Iranian soldiers, when they go 

into the Baloch-populated areas, the Arab-populated areas of Iran, 

are seriously under threat. 

I welcome and thank you, Mr. Burton, for being one of the only 

Members of Congress and U.S. officials who has actually tried to 

integrate Iran and South Caucasus policies, because again we tend 

to think about it, even think, for instance, in the National Security 

Council we have the Caucasus together covered with the Balkans, 

two regions that are completely different, the dynamics are completely different, there is no dominant power in the Balkans, where 

in the South Caucasus we have a region with huge influence of 

Turkey, Iran, Russia all competing in this region, and this region 

is vitally important for the outcomes in Russia-Iran, Iran and Turkey. So I thank you, first thing, for calling attention of integrating 

these two policies. 

As part of that integration, I think U.S.-Iran policy could benefit 

if the South Caucasus was integrated into these policies. One issue 

pointed out is the sanctions regime. These countries are crucial to 

the sanctions regime, both on the negative and positive, meaning 

the countries like Azerbaijan that fully implement the sanctions 

are watchdogs for the United States, are doing a very important 

job, but the countries that don’t implement the sanctions, it is a 

loophole, it is very dangerous. And I think especially we see this 

in the nongoverned territories, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, 

Abkhazia, their financial institutions, moving of gold. It is a real 

black hole for the sanctions, and it is something that I hope the 

U.S. will pay attention to monitor and to close these gaps. 

Another point is that the U.S. Congress, we should work harder 

to resolve these secessionist conflicts in the Caucasus. They also 

make the countries more vulnerable to Iranian influence, to Iranian destabilization issues. And I think one thing that the Congress, I could say, has not been so helpful is that for most of its 

history the Congress has earmarked money to the secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. That is in violation of U.S. law. It 

would be as if you were earmarking money for Jewish settlements 

in the occupied West Bank, something the Congress even wouldn’t 

do for an ally of the United States like Israel, let alone to earmark 

money for occupation of a territory that the U.S. law recognize as 

occupied territory. 

I think also we should follow up in terms of monitoring the institutions like Voice of America that receive U.S. financial support to 

see if they can give more of a voice to the ethnic minority issue in 

Iran. 

And I think we should be well aware, as you pointed out, that 

if there will be any sort of tightening of the sanctions, military action in the region, one of the first countries to be attacked by Iran, 

11

and Iran has made this clear, is Azerbaijan. It is a long border, it 

is very porous, people are going back and forth. They are trying 

constantly to do terrorist events, and we must increase our security 

cooperation with Azerbaijan to make sure that they don’t pay the 

price for being a neighbor of Iran. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Shaffer follows:]


77164d-1.eps
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77164d-2.eps

Thank you for the opportunity to testify in front of this committee. 

We often think of Iran as a Middle Eastern country. However, Iran borders a 

number of regions besides the Middle East: Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and the South 

Caucasus. Iran's location on the edge of a number of regions endows the state with 

significant influence in, but also vulnerability to influence from, these regions. As states 

in a region that borders Iran, the three states of the South Caucasus-Azerbaijan, 

Armenia, and Georgia-playa special role in Tehran's foreign and security policies. In 

addition, these three states playa crucial role in the efforts to prevent iran from 

acquiring nuclear weapons. The Republic of Azerbaijan also affects the domestic stability 

in Iran, since a third of Iran's population is comprised of ethnic Azerbaijanis. 

I am a researcher who specializes on the Caucasus, focusing on Iran's policies in 

the South Caucasus, ethnic politics in Iran, and Caspian energy issues. In my testimony, I 

will focus on Iran's poliCies toward the South Caucasus, the role of the states of the 

South Caucasus in the implementation of u.s. sanctions on Iran, the influence of the 

Azerbaijani minority in Iran on regime stability in Tehran, and recommendations on how 

to integrate U.S. policies on Iran and the South Caucasus in order to further promote the 

U.S. national interest. 

2 
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Iran: Realpolitik in the Caucasus 

Tehran has four primary goals in the Caucasus: (1) Preventing destabilization in the 

northwest provinces of Iran that border the Caucasus and any rise in ethnically based 

activity among the Azerbaijanis in Iran, (2) limiting U.s. influence and power in the 

Caucasus, (3) expanding its trade and influence in the region, and (4) linking the region 

through energy export and transportation infrastructure. Tehran maintains clandestine 

ties to a number of regional Islamic and ethnic groups in the Caucasus that could serve 

<lsievers of influence over the states in the region. Iran prefers, however, to promote its 

direct ties with the ruling governments in the region and primarily activates these other 

groups as a tool to coerce policy change in the states or to destabilize governments that 

do not conform to I ran's demands. 

Among the three states of the Caucasus, Tehran enjoys its closest ties and 

greatest cooperation with Armenia. Iran maintains extensive trade and its most 

intensive security cooperation in the region with Armenia, in spite of the fact that 

Armenia is embroiled in a conflict with Shiite"majority Azerbaijan. Iran and Armenia are 

closely linked through energy trade and infrastructure, as Tehran supplies natural gas to 

Armenia, and Yerevan supplies electricity to Iran, further cementing long"term 

cooperation between the states. Iran's relations with Georgia during Georgian president 

Mikhail Saakhashvili's tenure were tumultuous due to Tbilisi's close cooperation with 

the United States, including with regard to non-proliferation and other issues related to 

Iran. Iran's relations with Azerbaijan, meanwhile, are the most convoluted, due to 

3 
14


77164d-4.eps

Tehran's concerns that Azerbaijan could serve as a source of inspiration or support for 

Iran's sizeable ethnic Azerbaijani minority population and due to the state's close ties 

with the United States. 

Iran's policies toward the region are very instructive to understanding Tehran's 

foreign strategies. In all of the armed conflicts in tile Caucasus and greater Caspian 

region during the post-Soviet period, Tehran has declined to support Muslim 

populations, including in conflicts where Muslims were pitted against non-Muslim 

groups, such as the Chechens in the struggle with Moscow or the Azerbaijanis in their 

conflict with Armenia. Despite its rhetoric about solidarity with Muslims facing 

oppression, Iran's actual policies toward the region show that Tehran puts its regime 

stability above all else and subordinates the interests of its fellow Muslims throughout 

the ['egion in pursuit of Hlis goaL' 

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tehran has worked to undermine 

the stability of the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan. As part of its policy to undermine 

Azerbaijan's security, Tehran has supported Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan and 

engaged in broad security, military, and economic cooperation with Yerevan since 1.992, 

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war centered over the control of the region of 

1 For more on the lack of Islamic influence in Iran's policies in the CallcaslIs, see Brenda 

Shaffer, "The Islamic Republic of Iran; Is It Really?" in Brenda Shaffer (ed.), The Limits of 

Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press" 2006), pp. 2:19·239. 

4 
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Nagorno-Karabagh from 1992 to 1994. As a result of the war, Armenia now occupies 20 

percent of the territory of Azerbaijan (as legally recognized by the U.s. government) and 

over a million refugees were left homeless (including 870,000 Azerbaijani refugees). 

Armenia consistently praises Iran's stance on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and 

regularly calls for greater Iranian involvement in the peace negotiations process. 2 During 

the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Iran supplied Armenia with fuel and food and 

allowed the flow of arms through its territory to Armenia. Without these supplies and 

the transit corridor from Iran, Armenia could not have sustained its war effort and 

conquered extensive territory from Azerbaijan. These Iranian supplies were crucial, 

because the civil war at the time in neighboring Georgia hindered Russia (Armenia's 

main ally) from proViding supplies to Yerevan. 

Throughout the post-Soviet period, Iran has shared strong strategic cooperation 

and interests with Russia in shaping the strategic outcomes in the South Caucasus. Both 

'States strive to minimize U.s. influence and presence in the region. One issue where 

Moscow and Tehran's interests in the region fundamentally diverge, however, is energy 

exports. Russia and Iran are natural competitors in the field of natural gas supply. The 

Russian Federation is currently the top producer and exporter of natural gas in the 

2 See, for instance, Tehran Times, "Iran Opposes Any U.S. Peacekeeping Role for 

Karabakh," Radio Free Europe!Radioliberty, June 24, 2010 

(http://tehrantimes.com!index.php!politics/2666-iran-says-concerned-over-nato-radarsystem-in-turkey). 

5 
16


77164d-6.eps

world, producing 24 trillion cubic feet (TeF, 20 percent of world total) and exporting 7 

TeF of natural gas each year. Russia holds the largest proven reserves of natural gas in 

the world, amounting to an estimated 1,680 TCF. 

Iran holds the second-largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world after 

Russia, amounting to about 1,046 TeF. It is also the fifth top producer of natural gas in 

the world (5.2 TeF per year, 4.4 percent of world total). Yet despite its tremendous 

reserves, Iran is a net importer of natural gas. At this stage, Iran exports only small 

amounts of natural gas to Turkey and Armenia. However, Iran is the only country with 

the potential volumes and location to pose any major threat to Russia's dominance in 

European natural gas markets. In 2006, Moscow spent a great deal of money in order to 

buyout Iran's pot<"ntial access to European gas markets through Armenia. 3 

3 One of the most evident examples of this policy is the Russian national gas company 

Gazprom's April 2006 purchase of a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia that was 

inaugurated in March 2007, and which might have provided a route from Iran to 

European gas markets. in order [0 block the Armenian route for Iranian gas, Gazprom 

forced Armenia to reduce the pipeline's circumference (from the originally designed 

diameter of a major gas export pipeline) to almost half of its planned size, preventing 

the opportunity for significant expansion of the volumes it carries. Armenia also granted 

Gazprom and its partner Itera controlling stakes of the segment of the new pipeline that 

runs through Armenian territory. 

6 
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Multi-ethnic Iran's Azerbaijan problem 

Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and its domestic security could be affected by developments 

in the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan and other neighboring states. Half of Iran's 

population is comprised of non-Persian ethnic minorities, with Azerbaijanis being the 

largest group, representing close to a third of the total population: The majority of 

residents in the northwest provinces of Iran, contiguous to the border with the Republic 

of Azerbaijan, are Azerbaijanis. One reason that Iran supports Armenia in its conflict 

with Azerbaijan is that it prefers Azerbaijan to be embroiled in a conflict and unable to 

serve as a source of support for the ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran. In addition, despite the 

shared cultural affinities between Azerbaijan and Iran, Iran determined early after the 

Soviet breakup that Azerbaijan's independence had not created an opportunity for 

Iranian influence in the country because of Azerbaijan's Western orientdtion. 5 In 

addition, Tehran fears that Azerbaijan-a secular, modern,. Shia-majority state that 

adheres to strict separation of religion and state-could serve as an alternative model 

for its own citizens. 

Tehran has also sponsored a number of terrorist cells and attempted terrorist 

attacks inside Azerbaijan, with targets that inclUded the u.s. embassy, u.s. ambassador, 

4 For more on ethnkity in Iran, see Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the 

Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 

5, See, for example. Jomhuri-ye Is/ami. March 4, 1992, 4. 

7 
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77164d-8.eps

and local Jewish institutions in Baku. 6 Due to their long common border and the 

frequent flow of Iranian citizens for visits in Azerbaijan, Tehran frequently uses the 

territory of Azerbaijan in attempt to carry out attacks on Western, Israeli, and Jewish 

targets. In some instances, these terrorist plans have been conducted in conjunction 

with members of Lebanon's Hezbollah movement. 

Tehran also attempts to undermine the Western-oriented and open society in 

Azerbaijan. Since Iranian Citizens frequently visit their northern neighbor, Tehran sees 

Baku's more open lifestyle as a threat to its domestic control. Thus, it has sponsored 

terrorist attempts on Western-style cultural events held in Baku, such as the 2012 

Eurovision contest. Iran also supports radical Islamic movements in Azerbaijan and 

frequently attacks the Western mores of President Ilham Aliyev and his family members. 

Iran also sponsors regular television programming in the Azerbaijani language (Sahar lV) 

that broadcasts messages against the Aliyev government in Azerbaijan. Many of these 

broadcasts also employ anti-Semitic rhetoric. 

5 Office ofthe Coordinator on Counterterrorism, State Department, Country Reports on 

Terrorism 2011, Azerbaijan "actively opposed terrorist organizations seeking to move 

people, money, and material through the Caucasus. The government has had some 

success in reducing the presence of terrorist facilitators and hampering their activities." 

8 
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Mu.lti-ethnic Iran 

• Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and over fifty percent of its population is 

non-Persian. Azerbaijanis are the largest ethnic minority in Iran, 

comprising over a third of the country's population. 

.. Iran's ethnic minorities are concentrated in its border provinces, and 

these groups share cross-border ties with co-ethnics in the neighboring 

states of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan. 

.. Many prominent figures in Iran are ethnic Azerbaijanis, including Iran's 

spiritual leader, Savyid Ali Khamenei, and the head of Iran's opposition 

Green Movement, Mir Hossein Mousavi. 

.. Even though Azerbaijanis share the Shiite faith and a long history of 

common statehood with Iran's Persian majority, Tehran does not allow 

Azerbaijanis in Iran to operate schools or universities in their native 

language or to use the Azerbaijani language in government institutions. 

• In addition to shared ethnic and cultural ties, many Azerbaijanis from 

both sides of the border share family ties and engage in trade with each 

other. 

.. Among the approximately 25 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran, there is 

a wide diversity of attitudes toward the Iranian state. Some 

Azerbaijanis comprise a core part of Iran's ruling elite, while others 

strive for language and cultural rights. But a growing segment of 

Azerbaijanis in Iran, especially young people who openly identify as 

Azerbaijanis, oppose Persian-centered rule and struggle against the 

ruling regime. 

In some of Iran's provinces with significant ethnic minority populations, 

such as the Kurdish and Baluch provinces, full-scale insurgencies are 

taking place and attacks on Iranian soldiers occur on a regular basis. In 

the Azerbaijani-populated provinces of Iran, more sporadic outbreaks 

against the regime related to tamer issues, such as environmental 

questions, are used to mobilize the ethnic Azerbaijanis to a nationalist 

agenda. 

9 
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77164d-10.eps

Prevention of Iran's acquisition of nndear weapons 

As states bordering Iran, the states of the South Caucasus playa crucial role in the 

efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and upholding the sanctions 

regime. On a number of occasions,. Azerbaijan's security services have uncovered 

attempts to transport materials for Iran's nuclear program from Russia to Iran. 

Furthermore, Baku cooperates with the United States to insure that its banks are not 

used to circumvent U.S. sanctions and funnel funds to Iran. Azerbaijan's neighbors in the 

Caucasus-Armenia and Georgia-can also playa pivotal role in either hampering or 

aiding lrim's proliferation efforts. Despite being one of the top per capita recipients of 

U.S. foreign aid, Armenia does not support the sanctions on Iran, and Armenian citizens 

and companies have been sanctioned for trading with Iran on a number of occasions. In 

November 2012, the Iranian Minister of Justice Seved MOfteza Bakhtiari praised 

Armenia in the Iranian press for not supporting the sanctions on Iran.' 

If there is a military attack on Iran's nuclear installations, Azerbaijan could be one 

of the first targets of Iran's retaliation. This is due to Azerbaijan's dose ties with the 

United States, and also due to its vulnerability: with the extensive flow of goods and 

7 FARS News Agency, "Minister Appreciates Armenia for Defending Iran against Western 

Sanctions", November 11, 2012. 

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107118390 

10 
21


77164d-11.eps

people across the border between Iran and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan is very exposed to a 

potential Iranian attack. 

Ungoverned territories in the South Caucasus~·Nagorno-Karabagh, South 

Ossetia, and Abkhazia-are particular regions of concern for nuclear proliferation and 

the sanctions regime against Iran. Due to the fact that they are under occupation by 

states that do not formally take responsibility for the activity in these regions, their 

financial systems and border control mechanisms are poorly developed and not in line 

with any international treaties or U.s. sanctions on Iran. The region's banks and other 

financial institutions can be useful for Iran for circumventing the sanctions regime. 

Disinformation campaigns aimed at breaking Baku's friendly relations 

with Israel 

Azerbaijan and Israel share extensive cooperation and friendly ties. Baku is Israel's 

number one supplier of oil and according to press reports, the countries concluded a 

major arms supply deal in 2008. In recent years, some have attempted to explain Iran's 

antagonism toward Azerbaijan as a response to Azerbaijan's dose cooperation with 

Israel. This is not accurate: Azerbaijan and Israel's close security cooperation began 

around 2008, while Iran has attempted to destabilize Azerbaijan since its independence 

in 1991. As mentioned earlier, the clearest example of Iran"s anti-Azerbaijan policy is its 

support for Armenia in the country's war with Azerbaijan from 1992 to 1994 and in the 

ongoing stalemate that has followed. 

11 
22


77164d-12.eps

Integration of U.S. policy on Iran and on the South Caucasus 

U,S, policy on Iran could benefit from better coordination with its policies on the South 

Caucasus, The Obama Administration has imposed unprecedented sanctions on Iran, 

which required intensive work with other nations in the world oil market, so that the 

potential loss of some of the Iranian production would not have major impact on oil 

prices, The administration should be commended for the sanctions policy and the 

meticulous planning and strategic preparation that accompanied it, 

As bordering states to Iran, it is crucial that the three states of the South 

Caucasus uphold the sanctions regime and that their financial institutions are not used 

to circumvent the sanctions, Washington should intensify its monitoring of the sanctions 

regime in the three states and demand implementation, Furthermore, the ungoverned 

territories of the region-Nagorno-Karabagh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia-silould be 

monitored especially closely and held accountable for any use of their territory and 

financial institutions to circumvent the Iran sanctions, 

Successful resolution of the secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus will 

reduce the region's vulnerability to coercion from Iran, Washington should invest efforts 

in resolution of the conflicts, The United States should cooperate directly with Russia on 

resolving these conflicts since Moscow hold the key levers for resolution and prevention 

of resolution of the conflicts in the region, As part of the conflict-resolution efforts, the 

U,S, Congress should halt its annual custom of earmarking funds for the secessionist 

12 
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77164d-13.eps

region of Nagorno-Karabagh. These allocations are in violation of U.S. law, since they 

support settlement activity in occupied territories. Congressional allocations to 

Nagorno-Karabagh are equivalent to the idea of earmarking funds for Israeli settlements 

in the occupied West Bank, clearly an action that Congress would not take. However, 

annually Congress approves the earmark to the occupied Nagorno-Karabagh. 

In the unfolding developments over Iran's nudear program, policymakers should 

keep in mind this rivalry between Russia and Iran in the sphere of natural gas supplies. 

Moscow, while sharing strategic cooperation with Tehran, encourages the non· 

resolution of the conflict between Iran and the West in order to insure that Iran is "in a 

strategic box" and that its gas riches cannot be exported to markets in Europe and 

compete with the Russian supplies. 

The Obama Administration should evaluate the activities of Voice of America and 

other media outlets that it funds to see how they can be best used to voice the concerns 

of Iran's ethnic minorities. The United States should encourage international human 

rights institutions to monitor the state of Iran's ethnic minorities ;md to study their 

grievances against the regime in Iran. Research of trends and activities of Iran's ethnic 

minorities should be integrated into analytical work on Iran. 
24


77164d-14.eps

Dr. Brenda Shaffer is a specialist on the Caucasus/ ethnic politics in Iran! Caspian ellergy, energy a;nd 

foreign policy, and Eastern Meditarr"nean energy issues. Dr. Shaffer is a faculty member in the School of 

Political Science in the University of Haifa, From J~nuary 2013, she will be a visiting scholar at GeorgNown 

University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and Eastern European Studies. Dr. Shaffer previously served as 

the Research Director of the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard University, Among her recent articles are 

"Niltural gas supp'y slability and foreign policy" (Energy Policy 2012) and "Caspian energy phd,e II: Beyond 

2005" (Energy Pallcy 2010). She is the author of the book Energy Politics (University of Pennsylvania Press, 

2009). She is also the author of Border's and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (MIT 

Press, 2002). 

14 

77164g.eps

Iran and the Caucasus 

Black Sea UZBEKIST

IRAQ I RAN 

SAUDI ARABIA 
26

Mr. BURTON. We will now go to Mr. Cohen. 

STATEMENT OF ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, THE KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, it is indeed with sorrow that I hear 

about your stepping down. I testified before you several times, and 

it was always a great pleasure. I was always very, very impressed 

by your knowledge, the knowledge of other members. And I am 

sorry to hear Ms. Schmidt and Mr. Gallegly are retiring. 

The topic today is important indeed. The Islamic Republic of Iran 

has emerged as a major anti-status quo actor in the Middle East, 

threatening America’s Sunni Arab allies along the so-called Shi’a 

Crescent, from Lebanon, via Syria and Iraq, to the Persian Gulf. 

Iran’s implacable hatred of Israel and threats to wipe the Jewish 

State off the map are widely reported. What is less known are the 

threats Iran presents with its destabilizing influence in South 

Caucasus. 

Our country worked for the last 20 years in a bipartisan fashion, 

in the first Bush, Clinton, and the second Bush administrations, to 

stabilize South Caucasus to have for the peoples of the region security, economic development, the rule of law, and democracy. Today 

all these American interests are threatened by Iranian attempts to 

export terrorism, destabilize neighboring Azerbaijan, bypass U.N. 

and E.U. Sanctions. 

The energy development is also stalling because of Iranian policies objecting to the national sector regime for the Caspian, are 

preventing gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to traverse the 

Caspian Sea in pipelines and be shipped further west to Turkey 

and Europe. But the main current concern is Iranian export of terrorism into the South Caucasus. 

The U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan, which I visited in October and 

spoke to Ambassador Morningstar, and such ‘‘iconic’’ locations as 

McDonald’s were all targeted by Iranian terrorist cells and were 

rounded up by Azeri security. The Qods—or ‘‘Jerusalem’’—Force, 

the Iranian elite paramilitary organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC, is exporting the Islamic revolution by 

fostering militant Shiite movements, creating deterrence and retaliatory networks, destabilizing regimes unfriendly to Iran, and Azerbaijan is in their crosshairs. 

The relationship with the United States, Western Europe, and 

Israel are irritating the Iranian leadership to the point that some 

of their statements are questioning the sovereignty of the country 

of Azerbaijan, reminding the Azeri leaders that in the distant past 

Azerbaijan used to be a province of the Persian empire. 

Iran’s anti-Israel agenda is brought to bear by targeting the Embassy of Israel, the Ambassador of Israel, and even local Jewish 

community leaders and a rabbi. These cells, too, were rounded by 

Azeri security. 

In the broader geopolitical sense, the Iranian activity in South 

Caucasus is dangerous because they are aiming to bust the sanctions regime by developing their presence in Armenia and Georgia, 

possibly in Azerbaijan, by putting their front organizations, front 

27

companies to acquire dual-use technologies and technologies with 

military applications to plan banking operations, very important 

for our Treasury effort, such as the Mellat Bank, a bank that is 

under U.S. Treasury sanctions and the British Treasury sanctions. 

Mellat Bank branch is operating out of Yerevan. 

The Iranian drug trade is an especially pernicious activity that 

is targeting South Caucasus. While Iran is becoming increasingly 

a transit country for Afghan opium and heroin, Iran is running its 

own drug operation, such as methamphetamine production, supervised by pharmacists and professional chemists, and trying to run 

these with speedboats into Azerbaijan, et cetera. 

I would like the rest of my presentation to be included in the 

record and just focus on our policy recommendations. 

The U.S. Government needs to expand anti-terrorism and drug 

trafficking cooperation between the U.S. and the three South 

Caucasus States, neutralizing Iranian subversive activities; focus 

Intelligence Community efforts on collecting and neutralizing Iranian sanction-busting activities in financial and technology transfer 

sectors in the region; cooperating with our Western European and 

other allies; uphold the interests of small South Caucasus countries 

when attempting to construct an effective Iran policy, which leads 

to elimination of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program; sustain Caspian energy projects, and help European countries in diversifying 

their energy supplies by connecting them to energy resources of the 

Caspian Sea and Central Asia region. And specifically we should 

support and help Turkey and Azerbaijan and Europe to finalize the 

TANAP and Nabucco West projects. 

Finally, we should develop a comprehensive interagency soft 

power strategy, including broadcasting, including exchanges to 

powerfully support the Iranian opposition, including that of the Iranian Azerbaijanis, and leading to a victory of democratic forces in 

Iran. 

As Professor Blank of the U.S. Army War College wrote,

‘‘The administration has hitherto treated South Caucasus as 

an afterthought or as an overflight issue on the road to Afghanistan. Such neglect is dangerous and misconceived. The 

mounting threats in the Middle East, Iran, and the Caucasus 

show how vital it is that the U.S. strengthen pro-Western regimes, for if we continue to neglect the Caucasus, this neglect 

will quickly become malign, and malign neglect invariably generates not only instability, but also protracted violence.’’

By its aggressive action, Iran is endangering the fragile equilibrium in the strategically sensitive region which is important for 

U.S. interests. America should remain vigilant to deter violence, 

extremism and terrorism practiced by the Islamic Republic against 

America’s friends and allies in the Caucasus. Thank you so much. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Doctor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

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77164a-1.eps

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE' Washington DC 20002' (202) 546-4400' heritage.org 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Iran Threatens U.S. Interests in the 

South Caucasus 

Testimony before the 

Snbcommittee on Enrope and Enrasia, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

U.S. House of Representatives 

December 5, 2012 

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian Studies and 

International Energy Policy, 

The Heritage Foundation 
29


77164a-2.eps

Iran Threatens U.S. Interests in the South Caucasus 

Prepared Remarks before the 

Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Russian and t-'urasian Studies and 

International Energy Policy, 

ine Heritage Foundation 

Chairman Burton, Members of Congress, Ladies and Gentlemen: 

My name is Ariel Cohen. I am the Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and 

International Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony 

are my own, and should not be construed as representing any otlicial position of The Heritage 

Foundation. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the Iranian threats to U. S interests in 

the South Caucasus. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI or Iran), has emerged as a major anti-status quo actor in the 

Middle East, threatening American Sunni Arab allies along the so-called Shi' a Crescent from 

Lebanon, via Syria and Iraq, to the Persian Gulf Iran's implacable hatred of Israel and its threats 

to wipe the Jewish State off the map are widely reported. What is less well known is the 

destabilizing influence of the Islamic Republic in the South Caucasus. 

The South Caucasus is located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, neighboring Central 

Asia to the east, the Middle East (Iran and Turkey) to the south, and Eastern Europe to the west, 

hence connecting Europe and Asia. It also plays a key role in connecting Central Asia to the 

world via the Black Sea and Mediterranean ports. Home to ancient civilizations and populated by 

Christians, Muslims, and Jews, the South Caucasus is also the area where Russia, Iran, and 

Turkey meet. 

The United States has worked hard over the last twenty years to encourage development of this 

strategically important region. American interests in the South Caucasus include security, energy 

and economic development, and democratization. Thus far, our track record in achieving these 

goals is decidedly mixed. 

Security in the region is threatened by Iranian attempts to export terrorism, destabilize 

neighboring Azerbaijan, and bypass U.N. and RU. sanctions. Since the launch of the BakuTbilisi -Ceyhan Main Oil Export Pipeline in 2006, no gas export pipeline from the Caspian has 

been completed; no Turkmen or Kazakhstani gas is transiting the region for exports; and the 

level of democratization leaves much to be desired. 

2 
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77164a-3.eps

Since the collapse of the USSR, Washington has sought to prevent Russia and Iran from reestablishing dominance in this region, especially as the importance of Caspian energy resources 

- oil and gas - is increasing. "Given that the region involves the Russians, Iranians and Turks, it 

is inevitable that the global power [the U.S. - A.C.] would have an interest as well," U.S. 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked during her visit to the region in July 2010. The U.S. 

long-term strategy has been to ensure the independence of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, 

allowing for markets to develop and the rule of law to thrive, while sustaining democratization 

and promoting regional integration.! Since the era of bipartisanship on South Caucasus during 

the Clinton and Bush Administrations, there is a reversal in U.S. attention to and achievements of 

these policy goals. 

Importantly, Iran is endangering the U.S. strategy through the export of terrorism, sanction 

busting, subversion through soft power application, and cultivating close relations with Armenia 

while posing a threat to the stability and development of the pro-Western and pro-American 

country of Azerbaij an. 

Iran, the Prime Exporter of Terrorism. Iranians are responsible for at least two recent (2012) 

and documented terrorist attacks on U.S. and Israeli targets in Azerbaijan, and one in Georgia. 

Iranian networks and agents targeted the U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan and "iconic" locations such 

as McDonalds. 

They also targeted the Israeli Ambassador to Baku, the Israeli embassy building, a rabbi, and a 

number of prominent members of the Azerbaijani Jewish community leaders and their center in 

Baku. 

Georgian security services have disarmed a bomb, apparently planted by Iranian agents, targeting 

an Israeli diplomat. Georgia is allowing Iranians to travel to their country visa-free. These attacks 

are a part of a global wave of terror, which includes planned or executed attacks on the Saudi and 

Israeli Embassies in Washington, D.C., New Delhi, Bangkok in Thailand, and Burgas in 

Bulgaria, as well as Kenya and Cyprus. 

The Qods (or "Jerusalem") Force, an Iranian elite paramilitary organization of the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is exporting the Islamic revolution by fostering militant 

Shiite movements, creating deterrence and retaliatory networks, and destabilizing unfriendly 

regimes. Officially, the Qods Force is a part of the IRGC's five known branches, alongside the 

ground forces, the navy, the air force (in parallel with the regular tri-services), and the brutish 

Basij street militia2 In reality, the Force enjoys a great degree of autonomy and is directed by the 

Supreme Leader. Iranian student activists compared IRGC to the Soviet KGB and the Nazi SS, 

calling it "the agent of order for a harsh ideological regime and its agent of oppression".' 

1 Inessa Baban & 2aur Shiriyev. "The U.S. South Caucasus Strategy and Azerbaijan:' Turkish Policy Quarterlv. 

Vol. 9 No.2, pp. 94-95. tmp://www.mrki.hpolicy.com/dosyah:ritl1es/93-Hl3.pdf(accessed December 2. lOll). 

::: Kcvjn Lim, "Tran's Secret Weapon." The :!I.,Ta1ional [meres£, htlp://tk1IionalintcrcsLorg/commcntarvl1nms-5ccfCl-

!Keapol1-7, 1 I!'p"ge~ t (accessed December 2. 2012). 

~ Sarah Ala-ami and Saeed Ghasseminejad, --The terrorist organization behind the pmver ofille mullahs", Jerusalem 

Post, May 22. 20 12, http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArtic1e.aspx.!id~271 045The terrorist organization 

behind the power of the mullahs (accessed December 3, 2012) 
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77164a-4.eps

A 2010 U.S. Department of Defense report indicates that the Qods Force "clandestinely [exerts] 

military, political, and economic power to advance Iranian national interests abroad," making the 

Force the spearhead of Iran's foreign policy. 

The Qods Force has been accused ofmastenninding or supporting some of the most prominent 

attacks against Western and Israeli targets over the past three decades. Its role was decisive in 

launching Hezbollab, the Shiite militant group that is responsible for the death of over 240 

American Marines and numerous American diplomats and intelligence otlicers in Lebanon in the 

1980s, and attained notoriety for its massive rocket attacks on Israeli civilians in the Second 

Lebanon War of the summer of2006. 

Little wonder, then, that international attention has in recent years focused on Qods Force Major 

General Qassem Soleimani, the enigmatic operator who runs the "handpicked elite of an already 

elite ideological army" Ali Alfoneh, an Iran scholar specializing in the IRGC at the American 

Enterprise Institute, wrote that although lacking fonnal qualifications, Soleimani rose through 

the ranks due to his reputation for gutsiness during tough times. 

In his current role, Soleimani replaced Ahmad Vabidi in the late 1990s. Vabidi went on to 

become Iran's defense minister. Soleimani's personal connection to Supreme Leader Khamenei, 

which dates back to before the 1979 revolution, may have facilitated his ascendancy. 

It is no wonder that Iran's leaders, who believe that independent Azerbaijan belongs within the 

Persian orbit, turned to Soleimani and the Qods Force. The Iranian intelligence services have 

been operating on Azeri soil as far back as the mid-1990s. 

In 1997, members of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan were tried for spying on behalf oflran. 1n 

2007, Said Dadasbeyli, an Azeri cleric and alleged leader of a group known as the "Northern 

Mahdi Anny" was accused of receiving assistance from the Qods Force and plotting to 

overthrow the secular government. The Azerbaijani authorities believed he had provided Iran 

with sensitive intelligence on the American and Israeli embassies in Baku. 

In October 2009, two Lebanese Hezbollah operati ves and their four local Azerbaij ani assets were 

charged with plotting to attack the U.S. and Israeli embassies. In January 2012, three men were 

accused of planning to assassinate a rabbi and a teacher working at a Baku Jewish school. 

Iran's Anti-Israel Agenda. The fact that the Iranian intelligence services have prioritized Israeli 

and Jewish targets inside Azerbaijan may be interpreted as a signal to the Azerbaijani 

government that Tehran is upset by the close Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation. In the past, Iran 

undertook a number of diplomatic steps to signal its ire to Baku about the relationship with 

Israel. For the Iranian Islamist Shi 'a dictatorship, neighboring, predominantly Shi 'a Azerbaijan is 

far too secular, too pro-Western, and too pro-Israel. 

Secular Azerbaijan is not the model Iran wants to see at its northern border: a prosperous, 

energy-exporting, Western-oriented and Israel-friendly, majority-Muslim country. Iranian4 
32


77164a-5.eps

Azerbaijani relations are further complicated by rising Azerbaijani nationalism inside Iran, where 

over 25 percent of the population is ethnic Azeri. 

Unconstitutional discrimination against the Azerbaijani language as a language of public 

discourse and education in Iran continues to poison Azeri -Persian ties. 

It is no wonder that Iranian policies are making Azerbaijan's leadership feel threatened. I believe 

that they should also engender greater concern among U.S. foreign policy makers. 

Sanction Busting. Iranian attempts to circumvent the sanctions regimes imposed by the U.N., 

the U.S., and the E.U. in an attempt to pressure Tehran away from developing nuclear weapons 

target the South Caucasus. These include illegal banking operations and the proliferation of 

"front" companies engaged in the acquisition of sensitive, dual use, or outright military 

technology. All three South Caucasus countries are involved in trade with Iran, but Armenia, the 

closest to Tehran, is the principal concern for U.S. policymakers, law enforcement, and the 

intelligence community. 

According to Armenian press reports, Iranians use Yerevan real estate to launder money and 

achieve liquidity outside of the country4An additional aspect of the Iranian-Armenian 

cooperation, which may violate the sanctions, is the Meghri hydroelectric plant along the Arax 

River between the two countries. On November 8, 2012, Annenia broke ground for the longplanned l;S$330 million 130-megawatt plant, which will be built by an Iranian company, and 

Iran will use the electricity generated by the project for the next 15 years. Atlelwards, ownership 

of the plant will be transferred to Armenia. Tn 2011, Armenia and Iran also agreed to an oil 

product pipeline planned to run from the city of Tebriz to the Armenian border, to supply 

Armenia with Iranian fuels. 

Bypassing Banking Sanctions and Acquiring Technology. Last August, news agencies 

reported that the Iranian regime was attempting to expand its banking relationships in Armenia 

as a convenient location to avoid international sanctions. Mellat Bank. an Iranian financial 

organization sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for helping to finance imports for Iran', nuclear 

proliferation and suspected the British of violating intemational sanctions, 

operates in Yerevan. Other Iranian connected to military-industrial, economic, and 

financial activities by the regime also attempt to operate in Annenia in order to bypass 

international law enforcement. While the Govemment of Armenia has denied these reports, 

according to the Armenian press, their adherence to international banking sanclions against Iran 

has been questioned by Westem officials. 

Richard Giragosian, director of the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Centre (RSC) says that Iran 

looks at the South Caucasus as a region where it can procure "critical elements" for its nuclear 

effOlt that the sanctions have restricted: "\ian}' [Iranianj Revolutionary Guard units have 

4 Justin Vela, "Tran May Look North to Skirt US Sanctions," Hctq, November 25, 2012, 

http://hetq.am/eng/articles/20897 /iran-may -look-north-to-skirt-lls-sanctions. html (accessed December 2, 2(12). 

5 --Shareholders to intervene ill Ballk: lV1elbt y tiM rre~lSUrY han s~nctlOIls Supreme Court challenge," Global 

Banking and Finance Revie\y, httn.l/\.vTv,v.glQb.aJJ!;.-mking3nillln~1[1Ce.cQlTIflnye.gi!!g§hareh9JQ.ers-to-i.m..er\'cl!~inBmll(-h1el1at-Y-Hl\1-Treasurv-lran-sanctiolis-Supreme-Court-challem~e.htnll, (accessed December, 2. 2012). 

5 
33


77164a-6.eps

pursued over the past several years setting up joint ventures wit II foreign partners ---- from 

companies ---- designed to pursue technical spare pans for military use and nuclear centlifugo 

development" Front companies of this type were closed in recent years in Dubai and Kuala 

Lumpur. "There is new concern that Armenia, Georgia, and other countries may become 

attractive for such a pursuit."" 

The Iranian Drug Trade Threatens the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus is increasingly 

becoming a prime drug transit destination for the Iranian drug trade, directed and protected by 

the Quds Force and Hezbollah. 

Drug dealers using high-speed motorboats, night goggles, grenades, automatic assault rifles, and 

machine guns are breaching the borders of Azerbaij an, and may be laundering their ill-gotten 

gains in the casinos of the region. Iranian producers of methamphetamines use industrial 

chemical production lines supervised by professional phannacists and chemists to produce ultrapure meth for export. 

Hezbollah's ratlines through the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Europe, and South 

America make it a drug pushing terrorist organization with global reach, busy opening the doors 

to cooperation with drug cartels for distribution deals. The porous borders and corrupt customs 

officers of the Caucasus have created an additional trafficking route via the Black Sea and air 

routes to Western Europe7 

Caspian Sea Delimitation. Iran is subverting the delineation of the Caspian Sea, causing 

signiticant delays in otT-shore energy development there. The Soviet-Iranian Treaties of 1921 

and 1940 did not provide maline boundaries or delineation lines, and therefore, these treaties do 

not apply to today's situation, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union. 

By resisting the partition of the Caspian Sea and construction of a modem hydrocarbon pipeline 

infrastructure, as proposed in the past by Am eli can government and international energy 

companies as well as Azerbaijan, Iran is blocking the ability ofland-Iocked Newly Independent 

States such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to gain revenue and develop properly. 

To put it simply, Iran's leaders don't care about the well-being of the peoples of the neighboring 

states. It has bountiful oil and gas resources to the south and ample access to the Persian Gulf 

and the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean. Applying their zero-sum approach, the Iranians believe that it 

is in their interest to limit the Caspian oil and gas supply to European and Western markets. 

In July 1998, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the delimitation of the northern 

part of the Caspian Sea in order to exercise their sovereign rights to subsoil use. On November 

29,2001, and February 27,2003, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on the 

delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia signed an agreement on the 

: Vela, "Iran May Look North to Skirt US Sanctions". 

Job)' '\larrick, "Tn Tran, Dmg Trafficking Soars as Sanctions Take Bigger Bite:' The Washington Post, November 

L 2012 (accessed December 2,2012). 

6 
34


77164a-7.eps

delimitation of adjacent sections of the Caspian Sea on May 14, 2003. g Thus, Kazakhstan, 

Azerbaij an, and Russia recognize the national sector regime in the Caspian, while Iran resists the 

partition. 

Turkmenistan, intimidated by Iran, has also not signed the national sector regime The lack of 

this regime makes it difficult to build underwater pipelines for oil and gas. Turkmenistan could 

be sending its gas west via Azerbaijan's rapidly developing export pipeline system for sale in 

Turkey and Europe. However, as a result of Iran's intransigence, almost all of Turkmenistan's 

gas is sent to China, and Kazakhstan is equally unwilling to commit to an oil or gas crossCaspian pipeline as long as Iran resists the settlement of the Caspian Sea's legal regime. 

Iranian claims to the Azerbaijani national sector in the Caspian have already led to dangerous 

incidents that had the potential to escalate. In 2001, 1ran-a known sponsor of terrorism-began 

an aggressive campaign to claim a greater portion of the Caspian Sea and its resources. Its 

leaders asserted that [ran has 1.erritorial and treaty righIs 10 as much as 2.0 percent ofthe Caspian 

Sea sutface area alld seabed, signi1icantly more than long-recognized sector comprising about 

12 10 14 percent9 

Tehran's use of air and naval forces to threaten a seismic research ship working for a ""'estern 

company in Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea sector has jeopardized, in addition to energy production, 

\Vestern investmems and the economic deVelopment of the post-Soviet states in that region. 

Iran's use of military force to assert its claim to part of Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea 

undermines secmity and the future of Caspian oil and gas development. Iran Hot only bas 

violated its neigbbor' s air space and ten'itonal waters, but on one occasion even massed ground 

troops on rhe border. 

These aggressive actiollS ,verc a blatant violation of international law On July 23,2001, an 

Iranian warship and two jets forced a research vessel vvorking on behalf of BF in the A.raz-AlovSharg field out of that sectof. That field lies 100 kilometers (60 miles) n01111 of Iranian waters. 

Due to that pressure, BP immediately announced that \vould cease exploring that field, which it 

did bv \vithdrawing the research vessels. This aggressive policy has not changed since 

Soft Power Competition. Finally, Iran is concerned about Western pop culture intluence, which 

is palpable in neighboring Azerbaijan, as well as with the easy reach of casinos and beaches in 

the resort of Batumi, Georgia, all the Black Sea. Azerbaijan's victory in the 2011 Eurovision 

song contest; hosting Eurovision in 2012 as well as concerts by Jennifer Lopez; Rihanna; and 

Shakira; and hosting the under-17 Women's World Cup Soccer Tournament may all be 

interpreted as points scored in the soft power competition with the Islamic Republic. It is no 

accident that Iranians come in droves to relax in Baku, and not vice versa. 

x T. Jafarov_ --1mB to Consider Determination of Imnian Part of Caspian Sea,-- Trend. November 19_ 201L 

h1.1QJ/cl;.trend.8L/regjolLsJirallj)OX9495.litm!. (accessed December 2,2012) 

9 Ariel Cohen, "[mn's Claims Over Caspian Sea Resources Threaten Energy Security," Heritage Founcbtion 

Backgmunder No. 1582, September 5. 2002, httrr;l!Jlli.vv.hru:tage.Olg/~sea.Ich!replHts/20Q2LQ9Ilr4ll~rj£i.llt-overg;mJJ..n-sea-re®J!I£e"'-threl!1.tl.11-en~2?_Curjtv . 

7 
35


77164a-8.eps

The payback is harsh: Iranian-trained and -paid mullahs are indoctrinating Azerbaijanis living in 

the villages and towns along the Iranian border. One of the main complaints: they convince 

families to pull their daughters from the state-run, co-ed education system and encourage early 

marriages for girls-as early as 12 orl3As part of putting forward the argument for a more 

militant, severe interpretation of Islam and more rigorous adherence to Shari a, these mullahs 

preach polygamy, forbidden by Azerbaijani law. Azeri government officials justifiably complain 

that the barrage of propaganda is undermining the secular regime in the country. 

Conclusion. On the bilateral level, the U.S. has strong economic and strategic interests in the 

Caspian and the South Caucasus. Without Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Northern Distribution 

Network, which supplies the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, would lack its Caucasus leg. 

An American partnership with Azerbaijan answers Washington's need to consolidate its 

presence in the South Caucasus-Caspian Sea region and isolate Iran. 

As Professor Stephen Blank of the U.S Anny War College recently wrote, 

The administration has hitherto treated the South Caucasus as an afterthought or as an 

overflight issue on the road to Afghanistan. Such neglect is dangerous and misconceived. 

The mounting threats in the Middle East, Iran, and the Caucasus show how vital it is that 

the U.S. strengthen pro-Western regimes .... For if we continue to neglect the Caucasus, 

this neglect will quickly become malign. And malign neglect invariably generates not 

only instability but also protracted violence. 10 

Around the region, the U.S. needs to: 

• Expand anti-terrorism and drug trafficking cooperation between the U.S. and the three 

South Caucasus states, neutralizing Iranian subversive activities in the region; 

• Focus intelligence community efforts on collecting and neutralizing Iranian sanctionbusting acti vities in financial and technology transfer sectors; 

Uphold the interests of small Southern Caucasian countries when attempting to construct 

an effective Iran policy which leads to elimination of Tehran's nuclear weapons program; 

• Sustain energy projects and help European countries in diversifying their energy supplies 

by connecting them to the energy resources of the Caspian Sea-Central Asia region. 

Specifically, the U.S should help Turkey and Europe to finalize the TANAP and 

Nabucco pipeline projects;l1 

10 Stephen P. Blank, "US Should Work to Strengthen Relations with Azerbaijan;' The Hill, November 2. 2012, 

http://thelrill.com!blogs/congrcss-hlog/foreign-poliev 1265-+ 27 -us-should-\york -to-strellb>tl:en-relntiollS-1yitli1l?erb31jll!l (accessed December 5, 2(12). 

11 Bahan and Shiriyev, 'The U.S. South Caucasus Strateh'Y and Azerbaijall" pp. 103-1M. 

8 
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77164a-9.eps

Develop a comprehensive interagency soft power strategy to powerfully support the 

Iranian opposition, including that of Iranian Azerbaijanis, and leading to a victory of 

democratic forces in Iran. 

By its aggressive actions, Iran is endangering the fragile equilibrium in the strategically sensitive 

region, which is important for the U.S. interests. America should remain vigilant and deter the 

violence, extremism and terrorism practiced by the Islamic Republic against America's friends 

and allies. 

The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research. and educational organization recognized as exempt under 

section 501 (e)(3) of the Internal Reyenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government 

at any level, nor does it perfonn any govenunent or other contmet work. 

The Herit2ge Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2011, it had nearly 

700.000 individuaL foundation, and eorporale supporlers representing every slale in lhe U.S. Us 20ll income came 

from the follmving sources: 

11l(lividuals 

Foundations 

Corpomtions 

78% 

17% 

5% 

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 2% of its 2011 income. The Heritage 

Foundation's books arc audited mmually by the natiolk11 accounting finn of McGladrcy & PulleH. A list of major 

donors is available from The Heritage Foundntion upon request. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their O\VI1 independent research. The 

vie\vs e:\."]Jressed are their mvn and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of 

tmstccs. 

9 
37

Mr. BURTON. I think we will now go to you, Michael. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. RUBIN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Honorable 

Members——

Mr. BURTON. Incidentally, before we do, Dana Rohrabacher, Congressman Rohrabacher from California has joined us. He is a valuable member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. And the next ranking member from New York, thank you for coming. We appreciate. 

He is going to be the ranking member of the full committee. 

So we are pleased to have both of you here today. Thank you. 

And with that we will go ahead with your statement. And if we 

could keep your statements to 5 minutes, it would be great. 

Mr. RUBIN. Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify. 

Iranian officials sometimes quip that they play chess while 

Americans play checkers. Increasingly this appears to be the case 

in the Caucasus and the surrounding region. While many American 

policymakers focus on Iranian influence and activity in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East and perhaps describe the Islamic 

Republic as a regional power, the Iranians themselves now describe 

themselves as a ‘‘pan-regional power.’’ Iranians have a sense of 

near abroad over the former domains of the Persian Empire as 

strong as that of Russian nationalists who pine to exert their influence over the states of the former Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are front and center in this conception. 

Iranian strategy is multifaceted, combining both terror campaigns and soft power. Beyond headline-grabbing bombings and assassination plots, the Islamic Republic seeks to expand its reach 

through education and with charities. 

Within the Caucasus, the Islamic Republic concentrates its subversion efforts at Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of only three countries beyond Iran—Bahrain and Iraq being the others—which is 

majority Twelver Shiite. Because these countries’ success challenge 

the claim that the Islamic Republic’s rule is divinely inspired, 

Tehran subverts them. Baku’s rejection of religious populism and 

its mosque-state separation contrast sharply with Iran’s theocracy. 

The fact that Azerbaijanis enjoy a greater life expectancy, are more 

literate, and because of recent sanctions on Iran enjoy greater purchasing power than Iranians embarrasses the Iranian clergy. It is 

hard for the Supreme Leader to claim that he presides over a nearperfect Islamic system as the deputy of the messiah on Earth when 

secular governments outperform him. 

As I detail in my written testimony, Iran has sought to undermine Azerbaijani territorial unity and sponsored anti-Western political parties. After attempts to send radical missionaries into 

Azerbaijan failed, Tehran shifted to provide scholarships to train 

Azerbaijani clerics in Iran. This has been a tactic which has paid 

long-term dividends to the Islamic Republic in other countries, like 

Bahrain. 

Iranian authorities also utilize charities to expand their influence. Of myriad Iranian charities, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee is the regime’s chief aid organization abroad. With assets 

38

supplied by the Supreme Leader, the committee sponsors programs 

similar to those conducted by Western NGOs, but while the committee’s activities might look at first sight benign, its track record 

is sinister. In 1997 its office provided cover for surveillance against 

the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan. In 2010 the U.S. Treasury Department designated the committee’s branch in Lebanon to be a terrorist entity. With both Revolutionary Guard and Relief Committee 

funded from the same trough, it is likely that the committee offices 

in Azerbaijan now also provide cover for Revolutionary Guard activities. 

Is Armenia the weak link, however? For American policy, Armenia is the weak link. It increasingly provides the central pivot for 

a Russia-Iran access which undermines both U.S. interests and national security. In 2008 U.S. diplomats concluded that Armenia 

shipped Iran weaponry which the Islamic Republic used to kill 

Americans in Iraq. 

Whereas the Armenian Government has long sought to keep its 

banking cooperation with Iran outside the limelight, Armenia’s 

warm embrace of Iran is apparent. Sanctioned Iranian banks appear to operate in Yerevan. In October 2011 the Iranian press reported that a member of Armenia’s Nuclear Energy Organization 

suggested that Iran had enticed several Armenian nuclear scientists to work in Iran’s nuclear program. 

While the Armenian-American community is vibrant, it is unfortunate that organizations representing the diaspora in the United 

States do not do more to encourage change in the Armenian Government’s behavior. By ignoring Armenia’s pro-Iranian orientation, 

Armenian-American community—the community squanders an opportunity to build a true strategic partnership between Washington 

and Yerevan. 

What worries me looking into the future is this: The strategic situation has never been more perilous. The recent Georgian elections 

threaten to radically reorient Georgia, which under President 

Saakashvili has been reliably pro-Western. A reorientation of Georgia’s relationship with Iran might accompany its shift to Moscow. 

Georgia is not the only company in play. While there remain sectarian tensions between Turkey and Iran, it would be a mistake for 

American policymakers to assume Turkey will cooperate with the 

West regarding Iran. To dismiss Turkish outreach to Iran, such as 

the gold for gas scheme, as simply economic opportunism misses 

the point. 

Across administrations, U.S. strategy is too often reactive rather 

than proactive. Alas, the absence of a coherent U.S. strategy to 

counter and roll back Iranian influence in the Caucasus increasingly proves the Iranian chess and checkers quip correct. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Doctor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]

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77164b-1.eps

"Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region" 

Michael Rubin, Ph.D. 

Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia 

December 5,2012 

1 

An Iranian attempt to assassinate Israeli diplomats in Georgia last February and a 

subsequent plot to target Americans in Azerbaijan demonstrate the reality of the Islamic 

Republic's terror sponsorship and reach. This should not surprise. The Islamic Revolution was 

about ideology. Infusing the speeches of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and 

written into the founding statute of the ls1amic Revolutionary Guard Corps (1RGC) is the call to 

export revolution. ln recent years, senior lranian officials have reinforced the notion that the 

ls1amic Republic cannot limit itself to soft power strategies as it tries to influence neighbors. For 

a number of reasons, both strategic and historical, the Caucasus is front-and-center in the Islamic 

Republic's attempts to expand Revolutionary Guards operations. 

Iranians proudly trace their country's lineage back to the Persian Empire, yet most 

Iranians feel history has been unkind. In the last two centuries - a flash in the pan to the Islamic 

notion of history - Iran has lost half its territory. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay confinned the 

loss of what today are Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia to the Russian Empire. From an Iranian 

perspective, these collectively constituted not a peripheral province but rather the second most 

important region, one over which the crown prince would always rule as governor. This does not 

mean that the Iranians seek to reacquire lost territory; they do, however, see it as their near 

abroad and believe they a natural right to dominate the Caucasus economically, politically, and 

diplomatically. 

Iranian Strategy and Soft-Power 

Export of Revolution remains a core Iranian goal. In 2008, fonner President Mohammad 

Khatami suggested that Khomeini's push to expand the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran's 

borders was more symbolic than real, and geared more to building Iran up as an example to 

emulate rather than a call for subversion abroad. "What did the Imam want, and what was his 

purpose of exporting the revolution? Did he wish us to export revolution by means of gunpowder 

or groups sabotaging other countries?" Khatami asked rhetorically, before declaring that 

Khomeini "meant to establish a role model here, one in which people should see that in this 

society, the economy, science, and dignity of man are respected .. ,,1 

Iranian authorities were furious. Not only had Khatami tacitly acknowledged that the 

regime sanctioned Iranian terror support, but he also diluted a pillar of the revolution. Seventy1 "Khntami: Dar Zamineh-e tahrif andisheh-ha-ye hazirat-e Imam 'alnm khatar mikonnm" [Khat3mi: T Find Danger 

in the Distortion of His Excellence the Imam's Thoughts]. Enuooz (Tehran). May 3. 2008. 
40


77164b-2.eps

z 

seven members of parliament demanded the Intelligence Ministry punish Khatami for his 

comments 2 Lest anyone accept Khatami's revisionism, then-Judiciary Chief Ayatollab 

Mabmoud Hashemi Shahroudi reinforced Tehran's commitment to export revolution. Speaking 

to the anned forces, he declared the IRGC to be "the hope of Islamic national and Islamic 

liberation movements. ,,3 The Iranian government has even been so bold as to include a line-item 

for "resistance" in its budget4 

This does not mean that the Supreme Leader and the IRGC will not sometimes check the 

drive to export revolution. Iranian officials, for example, give Islamists in both Chechnya and 

Dagestan a wide berth so as to avoid antagonizing Moscow, whose support Tehran values for its 

nuclear program. Still, the State Department should not assume that pragmatism means Iran's 

leadership is open to compromise for peace. For the Islamic Republic's ideologues, pragmatism 

involves temporarily subordinating certain ideological goals to pursue others. Rather than 

identify formulas for peace, the regime uses pragmatism to find new and creative ways to 

undermine enemies. 

While journalists focus on headlines involving violence and terrorism, the Iranian 

strategy is more sophisticated, especially in its use of soft-power. Too often, American 

policymakers misconstrue soft-power. When Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, Jr., coined the term, 

he did not suggest soft power should be exclusi ve of hard power. The Islamic Republic provides 

a useful example of how adversaries can combine hard and soft power strategies. 

Beyond head-grabbing bombings and assassination plots, the Islamic Republic seeks to 

expand its reach through education and with charities. Iran provides educational scholarships in 

order to indoctrinate clergy in surrounding states and to radicalize the next generation. Charities 

not only serve as a mechanism to win hearts and minds, but the IRGC will also often leverage 

Iranian aid organizations to support terror operations. 

Afghanistan provides a useful example to demonstrate how Iranians leverage education. 

In Kabul, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, a figure beholden to Tehran because his religious credentials 

are not recognized in Najaf, founded Khatam al-Anbia University. Its professors are trained in 

Iran, Iranian officials set its curriculum, and regime-approved publishers supply its library. In 

2010, the budget for that single Iranian-backed university was greater than the Afghan 

government's entire higher education budget. While the Armenian government is more opaque, 

the Iranian government operates a branch of the Islam Azad University in Armenia and may 

subsidize other programs. 

Subverting Azerbaijan 

Within the Caucasus, the Islamic Republic concentrates its subversion efforts at 

Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of only three countries beyond Iran-Bahrain and Iraq being the 

~ "Jamayeh-i Avari Tm73 . Alebeh Khat3mi," ["Gathering Signatures Against Khatami,"] E"temad (Tehran), May 7, 

2008 

3 "[mn's Forces Are Models of Resistance," Press TV (Tehmn). May 22.2008. 

4 Flalow v. Islamic Republic of Iran. 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998). 
41


77164b-3.eps

3 

others-which is majority Twelver Shi'ite. Because these countries' success challenges the claim 

that the Islamic Republic's rule is divinely-inspired, Tehran subverts them. 

Azerbaijani success is especially threatening to the Islamic Republic of Iran because of 

the links between the two peoples. Millions of Azeris reside in Iran-more than twice as many as 

live in independent Azerbaijan. Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, is ethnically Azeri. 

Balm's rejection of religious populism and its mosque-state separation contrast sharply with 

Iran's theocracy. The fact that Azerbaijanis enjoy a greater life expectancy than Iranians, are 

more literate, and, because of recent sanctions on Iran, enjoy greater purchasing power 

embarrasses the Iranian clergy. It is hard for the Supreme Leader to claim that he presides over a 

near perfect Islamic system as the deputy of the messiah on earth when secular governments 

perfonn better. 

Beyond outright terrorism, such as the recent alleged Iranian plot to attack the Eurovision 

finals in Azerbaijan,S the Islamic Republic has employed a number of strategies to undercut 

Azerbaijan's pro-Western and secular orientation. Even prior to Azerbaijan's independence from 

the Soviet Union, Iranian missionaries operated in rural Azerbaijan. Iranian authorities helped 

support the fiercely anti-American Islamic Party of Azerbaijan in the early years of Azerbaijani 

independence but, after that group-true to the Hezbollah model so often employed by Iranian 

proxies-began sponsoring a militia, Azerbaijani authorities cracked down, arresting party 

leaders and banning Iranian broadcasting from Azerbaijani territory. 6 

The Iranians may have been down, but not out. To reverse the old saying, if they could 

not bring Muhammad to the mountain, they instead would bring the mountain to Muhammad. 

Instead of sending missionaries to Azerbaijan, they arranged scholarships to bring young 

Azerbaij ani students to Qom where they could indoctrinate them into the Iranian regime's 

interpretations of Shi'ite Ishun. This has been a tactic which has paid long-tenn dividends to the 

Islamic Republic. Because Saddam Hussein made it so difficult for foreign students to study in 

Najaf in the 1980s and I 990s, for example, a generation of Bahraini clerics traveled to Qom for 

study. Many of these same clerics today are at the forefront of the Bahraini Shi'ite uprising 

against the Bahraini royal family. 

At the height of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Iranian authorities 

sought to exploit and radicalize many Azerbaij ani refugees seeking refuge in Iran. Perhaps 

because training clerics and indoctrinating refugees pays only long-tenn dividends, Tehran has 

turned to other strategies to undercut Azerbaijani stability; Azeri authorities accuse Iran of 

promoting separatist ambition among Azerbaijan's Talysh minority Iranian academics have, for 

example, sponsored an International Talysh Association to support "oppressed" Azerbaijani 

Talysh7 

5 "ALetbaijan Jails..J. for EurovisionPlot." Jhjrr~vel Daily _News, December 3.2012. 

(J Igor Rotar, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Azerbaijan: Myth or Reality?"" Jamcstml'n Foulldation Pri:Hll, Aug. 31, 

2000. 

7 Jonathan Eric Lewis, "Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner'?" Middle Eas! Quanerl)" Spring 2006; 

Vladimir Socor. 'Talysh Issue, Dormant in Azerbaijan, Reopened in Armenia:' Eurasia Dm/y Momtor, 

May 27, 2005. 
42


77164b-4.eps

4 

Iranian authorities also utilize charities to expand their int1uence. Of myriad Iranian 

charities, the hnam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC) is the regime's chief aid organization 

abroad. With assets supplied by the Supreme Leader, the Committee sponsors programs similar 

to those conducted by Western NGOs for orphans, the disabled, and the elderly, and it also 

provides food aid, blankets, fuel, sponsors medical clinics, and offers interest-free loans 8 It also 

spreads int1uence in a way few Western organizations could, sponsoring mass weddings for 

those for whom the price of weddings would otherwise put marriage out ofreach9 

While IKRC's activities might look benign, its track record is more sinister. In 1997, its 

office provided cover for surveillance against the US. Embassy in Tajikistan. 10 In 2010, the US. 

Treasury Department designated the IKRC branch in Lebanon to be a terrorist entity for its aid 

and assistance to Hezbollah. ll With both the lRGC and lKRC funded from the same trough, it is 

likely that lKRC offices in Azerbaijan,12 not only in Baku but also in provincial towns like 

Lankaran, Ganja, and Giiychay, may also provide cover for IRGC operations. 

The United States can take solace in the fact that Azerbaijan remains a steady ally. While 

fears of Iranian encroachment should not derail U.S. pressure to support democratization and 

respect for human rights in Azerbaijan, US. officials should also recognize that the Islamic 

Republic will seek to hijack legitimate protest, as it does in Bahrain. Nevertheless, Iranian 

penetration of Azerbaijan remains unfulfilled, largely because of Baku's recognition of the 

Iranian threat and also because Iran's oil dispute with Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea remains a 

major irritant in bilateral relations. The Azerbaijani people remain largely pro-Western and 

unwilling to accept Iranian domination. 

Is Armenia is the weak link? 

The same cannot be said for Annenia. Ties between Iran and Annenia run deep, and 

predate Iran's Islamic Revolution. Annenians fonn the bulk of Iran's sizeable Christian 

community. While the Islamic Republic will broker no Sunni mosque in Tehran, an Annenian 

cathedral sits in the heart of the city. The southern Isfahan neighborhood of Julfa is a veritable 

"little Annenia" with Annenian churches and schools dotting roads and alleys. Even Iranian 

soldiers, when they fancy a drink stronger than the local Coca-Cola knock-off, will head into 

Annenian pizzerias for some homemade vodka. Anti-Turkish posters and banners are a fixture of 

8 Ali Alfonch and Ahmad Majidyar, "Iranian TnOucncc in Afghanistan: hnnm Khomcini Relief Committee," AET 

Middle East Outlook. Julv 2010. 

<J --Jashan-e Komiteh-e El~dad Baraye z(l\\jha-ye AfghaIL" ("Relief Committee Celebration for Afghan Husbands.") 

Faramcolll, Mav 2~, 2012. 

10 Author ,vas a~ intern based at the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan at the time. 

11 "Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasll1:~v Department Targets Inm's Support for Terrorism Treasury AnnOlllces Ne\", Sanctions 

againstlmn's Islamic Revolutionmy Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership." U.S. Treasury Department, August 3, 

201ll. 

12 "Hamayat az Moharoman-e Jomhori Azerbaijan," --Support for the Disadvantaged of Azerbaijan,'- Imam 

Khomeini Relief Committee, htn.;L'i-\,\Y1,v.emdild, lr/beinol!ll§.hlliaf<lt~r/;]nlrbavi3n,<1fill. (Accessed December J, 

2012). 
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5 

many Armenian neighborhoods, in Isfahan and elsewhere. In 2011, Armenian television 

purchased Iranian soap operas from Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. 13 

There is nothing necessarily wrong with cultural links between Iran and Armenia. The 

problem for the United States is that Annenia provides the central pivot for a Russia-Iran Axis 

which increasingly undennines both U.S. interests and national security. In 2007, Yerevan State 

University awarded Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad its gold medal. "Annenia and Iran 

will be relatives eternally," Ahmadinejad declared upon receiving his honorary doctorate. 14 

In 2008, US. diplomats concluded that Armenia shipped Iran weaponry, which the 

Islamic Republic used to kill Americans. John D. Negroponte, then deputy secretary of state at, 

expressed his "deep concerns about Armenia's transfer of arms to Iran which resulted in the 

death and injury of U.S. soldiers in Iraq" to Annenian President Serzh Sargsyan. 15 

Whereas the Annenian government has long sought to keep its banking cooperation with 

Iran outside the limelight, Annenia's wann embrace of Iran is readily apparent. Indeed, 

sanctioned Iranian banks operate in Yerevan. 16 Other Iranian businesses continue to dot the 

Armenian capital. While Iranians can get visas on demand upon arrival in Armenia, the Iranian 

Foreign Minister now pressures his Armenian counterpart to allow completely visa-free travel 

for Iranians into Armenia. This could greatly facilitate Iranian efforts target Western interests not 

only in Annenia, but also in neighboring Georgia. In October 2011, a member of Annenia's 

Nuclear Energy Organization suggested that Iran had enticed several Armenian nuclear scientists 

to work in Iran's nuclear program n 

While the Armenian-American community is vibrant, it is unfortunate that organizations 

representing the Annenian Diaspora in the United States and the congressmen who partner with 

them do not do more to encourage change in the Armenian government's behavior. They need 

not drop their advocacy for recognition of the Armenian genocide but by ignoring Annenia's 

pro-Iranian orientation, the Armenian-American community squanders an opportunity to build a 

true strategic partnership between Washington and Yerevan. 

Could Georgia and Turkey Shift into Tehran's Camp? 

The strategic situation has never been more perilous. The victory of Bidzina Ivanishvili's 

Georgian Dream party in October 2012 elections threatens to radically reorient the Republic of 

Georgia which, under President Mikheil Saakashvili has been reliably pro-Western. While 

Western press has focused on the antipathy between Saakashvili and the Kremlin, a reorientation 

of Georgia's relationship with Iran might accompany its shift to Moscow. It is conceivable that 

1" "KodamKeshvarha Moshtare Saryarha-ye Irani HastandT ("Which Countries Are Customers of Iranian Soap 

OpcmsT).,·l1e{1r (Tehran). August 9. 2011. 

14 "Ahn12dinejad YSU Guest," Yerevan State University, October 22,2007. 

1, Eli Lake, "WikiLeaks: Anuel1ia sent kIll afilS used to kill U.S. troops," The Washington Times, November 29, 

20lO. 

16 "Recent OF AC Actions - June 16, 2010," U.S. Treasury Department, ht1p:;/p,\y't,Y,JJ~2SUrY.gO" .... /resQllrcecenter/sanctions/OF AC··EuforcementlPagesI20 1 0061 G.asj.Jx 

l~ "Eda'ye Mohnjemt-e Daneshmnndan-e Hnsteh-aye Armenisten beh Tran:' ("Alleged Emigmtiol1 of Nuclear 

Scientists from Annel1ia to Imn"), ~.jsr-e Iran. October 30. 2011. 
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77164b-6.eps

6 

Tbilisi could become in the near future an uninviting and perhaps even dangerous city for 

Western interests. 

Georgia is not the only country in play. While there remains sectarian tension between 

Turkey and Iran, it would be a mistake for American policymakers to assume Turkey will 

cooperate with the West regarding Iran. To dismiss Turkish outreach to Iran-such as Turkey's 

recent gold for gas scheme-as simply economic opportunism misses the point. Likewise, the 

dispute between Turkey and Iran over the situation in Syria is temporary. Just three years ago, 

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was hosting joint cabinet meetings with Syria, 

and inviting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to vacation with him on the Turkish 

Mediterranean coast. 

Today, Turkey and Iran share many interests: They are both supporters not only of 

Hamas, but also of its most militant faction, and both embrace increasingly extreme rhetoric 

toward Israel. Turkish and Iranian leaders coordinate closely on international efforts to restrict 

free speech to prevent criticism of Islam. Turkey is almost alone in joining Latin America's 

increasingly anti-American alliance of Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia in providing 

Iranians visa-free entry. The United States should not count on Turkey's intelligence service to 

monitor and report upon Iranian operatives traversing Turkey. Hakan Fidan, Turkey's 

intelligence chief, mal,es little secret of his preference for Tehran over Washington, raising 

questions both about the wisdom of U.S. intelligence sharing with Turkey, and the possibility 

that technology shared with Turkey-such as F-35 Joint Strike Fighter coding and softwaremight leak to American enemies. In 2010, the Turkish daily Hiirriyet reported the Turkish and 

Chinese Air Forces had conducted joint war games without first alerting the Pentagon or NATO. 

Such exercises would not have been possible without Tehran's cooperation; the Chinese fighters 

had refueled in Iran. 18 

Conclusion 

Iranian officials often quip that they play chess while Americans play checkers. The 

IRGC and Qods Force have global reach, and will confront the United States wherever they can, 

so long as they can do so an maintain plausible deniability. As Iran's nuclear program increases 

tension and sanctions strain the Iranian economy, the Caucasus and surrounding regions will 

increasingly become targets for Iranian influence and, perhaps, Iranian terrorism. Not only will 

the Islamic Republic continue to target the Republic of Azerbaijan and exploit its wann ties with 

Annenia, but Iranian authorities will also increasingly try to leverage leadership changes and 

ideological solidarity in Georgia and Turkey. Across administrations, U.S. strategy is too often 

reactive rather than proactive. Alas, the absence of a coherent U.S. strategy to counter and roll 

back Iranian influence in the Caucasus increasingly proves the Iranian quip correct. 

l~ -'Chinese \Varplanes Refueled in Iran en route to Turkey." Hiirr~vet Daj~1/ NCl-t's. October 11, 2010. 
45

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Vatanka. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALEX VATANKA, ADJUNCT SCHOLAR, 

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE 

Mr. VATANKA. Thank you very much. Chairman Burton, members of the committee, thank you very much for having me here 

this afternoon. It is an honor to join you. 

I wanted to focus on Iran’s failures to project its influence in the 

South Caucasus region, if I may. As has been said, Iran has deep 

roots in this part of the world. It is the giant neighbor to the south 

after all. Much of the South Caucasus has at one time or another 

been under Iranian influence or been part of the Persian Empire. 

Therefore cross-border, that is to say people-to-people ties remain 

strong. 

By most estimates there are some 20 million people in Iran that 

are ethnic Azerbaijani. Just to remind everyone, that is over twice 

as many as you have in the Republic of Azerbaijan. One of the largest Armenian diaspora communities anywhere in the world is also 

to be found in Iran, estimated at some 80,000. 

But I would argue that while Iranian civilization is close to the 

peoples of the region, the world views and goals of the Islamist regime in Tehran have no appeal. 

I think we have to deal with three key facts when assessing 

Iran’s influence in the South Caucasus. First, because the Islamist 

regime in Tehran is beholden to Russia and Moscow’s support oftentimes that it provides to Iran in places like the U.N. Security 

Council, the Iranians are very worried about upsetting Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus. This is best reflected by Iran’s position in regards to Armenia and Georgia, where Russian interests 

are strongest. I have provided more detail in my testimony and 

provided some examples. 

Second, I think where we have a failure, it is Iran’s so-called big 

brother approach, which I think is heavily tainted with an ideological syndrome. So I would quickly say it is not just that Iran 

doesn’t want to be active in the South Caucasus because it fears 

that the Russians might be upset, but it is also because of a failure 

of its model as a political invitation that has extended over the last 

20 years to these three countries, particularly Azerbaijan. 

In Azerbaijan, where Russian interests are least sensitive, in my 

view, Iran has also failed to gain any traction. This is thanks to—

excuse me—where Iran has basically insisted on Baku sharing its 

anti-American and anti-Western positions, and this is a call which 

the authorities in Azerbaijan have repeatedly over the last 2 decades rejected. 

I think Baku would have been far more open to Iranian overtures if Iran did not insist on this anti-Westernism as a common 

platform, but I am afraid to say that seems to still be the case if 

you listen to the latest statements coming from Tehran. 

One of the best examples of how Iranian intervention in Azerbaijan have failed to result or produce results for Tehran is this 

Iranian insistence that Azerbaijan walk away from its relations 

with the State of Israel. In doing so not only does Iran want to impose this ideological will on a smaller and pro-Western neighbor in 

Azerbaijan, but it also fails to recognize the needs of Baku. 

46

In my conversations with diverse voices in Azerbaijan, I was constantly reminded of the fact that the State of Israel provides material support to Baku as the country develops and looks to enhance 

its international position. 

What can an internationally isolated Iran in turn offer Azerbaijan? The answer to that is very little, at least while Tehran pursues the policies that it is pursuing at the moment. 

Let me also say this. This is widely recognized to be a problem, 

but those nonideological actors in Tehran, they see the problem. 

The trouble is they are not in the driving seat, so they are just 

banging their heads against the wall, saying, we are losing on the 

regional level. And the narrow sets of interest, Iran Ayatollah Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are calling the shots to the detriment 

of the national interests of the country of Iran. 

Let me just very briefly say a few words about the Iranian influence that does exist. This refers to Armenia and Georgia. It is very 

important to recognize that overwhelmingly we are talking about 

economic cooperation and trade between Iran versus Armenia and 

Georgia. These countries are not looking to—it is very important to 

emphasize this—these countries are not looking to hear the Iranian 

political message of anti-Westernism. They look to Iran, particularly Armenia, out of simple necessity and the geographic reality 

that they have to deal with. But whenever they can they have preferred Western partners, particularly look at Armenia’s continued 

pursuit of better ties with Turkey. 

In conclusion, let me very briefly say that the South Caucasus, 

when you measure the Iranian influence there, simply does not 

match the proximity of Iran and historical ties that that country 

has with the region, and this can be, as I said, overwhelmingly 

blamed on Iran’s insistence on this anti-Western platform that it 

continuously seeks and will not get from the three States of the 

Caucasus. 

Final point I will make, and I am running out of time, I say the 

only real negative driver that I can see changing the status quo is 

if the Iranian standoff with the U.S. and the international community continues, there is a likelihood that radical elements in 

Tehran, and we have already heard this, will look at the region, 

particularly Azerbaijan, as a platform and a battleground to confront the United States and its allies. 

Chairman Burton, members of the committee, thank you very 

much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vatanka follows:]

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Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region 

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia 

Alex Vatanka 

Adjunct Scholar 

Middle East Institnte 

December 5, 2012 

Assertions and opinions in this testimony are solely those of the above-mentioned 

author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which 

expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy. 

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48


77164c-2.eps

Chairman Burton, members of the committee and ladies and gentlemen. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today 

My focus this afternoon is on Iran's policies toward the South Caucasus. I will provide a 

brief assessment ofIran's foreign policy behavior in this region of the world and how it 

impacts the interests of the US and her allies and partners. 

First, let me set the regional scene. Iran has deep roots in this region. Much of the South 

Caucasus region was historically part of or heavily influenced by the Persian Empire. In 

some aspects, cross-border ties remain significant. Today, there are over twice as many 

ethnic Azerbaijanis in Tran (estimated at around 20 million people) than in the Republic 

of Azerbaijan. One of the largest Armenian Diaspora communities is also found in Iran 

(estimated at around 80,000 people). 

Iran's reach and influence 

The close historical, ethnic and religious ties (particularly the shared Shia Islam with 

Azerbaijan) should on paper make this region fertile ground for Iranian influence 

Nonetheless, Tehran's record in this region is at best mixed. 

The record is mixed for one key reason: The three countries of the region - Armenia, 

Azerbaij an, and Georgia - view their large southern neighbor through very different 

lenses. Accordingly, relations range rrom intimate (Armenia) to cordial (Georgia) to 

complicated and often outright hostile (Azerbaijan). 

Before assessing Tehran's relations with these three states, let me say something about a 

fundamental factor that shapes Iran's posture toward the South Caucasus. That pertains to 

Iran's relations with Russia. In my view, the regime in Tehran appears to be extremely 

deferential toward Russian interests in the South Caucasus, a region that Moscow still 

considers to be part of it "Near Abroad." 

Why is this reality the case" Given Iran's international isolation, the ruling clericalmilitary elite in Tehran appear to prioritize Russia as the periodic - albeit unreliable -

supporter of Iran and have therefore opted not to challenge Moscow's policies in the 

South Caucasus and in Central Asia. 

This is of course to the detriment of long-term Iranian national interests. But the lslamist 

regime in Tehran is above all driven by its own narrow set of political goals which are 

overwhelmingly rooted in a desire to ensure the regime's survival at the cost of 

undermining Iran's national interest. I believe this is the most plausible explanation 

behind Tehran's inclination to accommodate Russia above and beyond, and a conclusion 

which is commonly accepted by independent observers in Tehran. 

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77164c-3.eps

In fact, across the wider Caucasus region, Iran's posture has either been mute toward 

Russian assertiveness or Tehran actively complements Moscow's pursuit of its strategic 

objectives. For example, the Iranian regime - a selt:declared guardian of Muslim peoples 

- remained conspicuously silent during Russian military campaigns in the Muslim 

republic of Chechnya. 

More recently, Tehran barely reacted after Russia invaded Georgia in August of 2008 

Elsewhere, Iranian policies have actively complemented Russian objectives. The best 

example of this is Tehran's close ties with Armenia, a close ally of Russia, at the expense 

of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations 

In other words, if Russian interests are at stake, Iran prefers to either align its policies 

with those of Moscow (as is the case with Armenia) or stay out Russia's path (as is the 

case with Georgia). 

Iran-Azerbaijan standoff 

Among the three South Caucasian states, Azerbaijan has been the one where immediate 

Russian interests are least sensitive. This reality, combined with the fact that Azerbaijan 

is closest to Iran on ethnic and religious terms, has turned Baku into Tehran's primary 

target. For that reason, Iran-Azerbaijan relations are presently the most turbulent in the 

region. 

When Azerbaijan tirst emerged as an independent state in 1991, Tehran was hopeful that 

this new Shia-majority country would be open to Iranian overtures and Tehran's Islamist 

and anti-Western political model. 

This was not the case then in 1991 and the appeal of the Iranian Islamist model has only 

weakened in the meantime, a feature which has been a constant irritant in lranianAzerbaijani relations over the course of the last 21 years. 

In fact, Baku early on chose a pro-Turkish and Western-oriented position This continues 

to frustrate Tehran as one of Baku's strategic goals is to become a close regional partner 

of the United States 

Meanwhile, as Azerbaijan has matured politically and become wealthier thanks to oil and 

gas export revenues, it has clearly also become bolder in pursuing its foreign and national 

security interests. This is best exemplified by Baku's decision to forge close ties with 

Israel and knowing full well that this would anger and further complicate relations with 

Tehran 

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Azerbaij an has been steadfast and argues that Iran has no basis to criticize its ties with the 

Jewish state given that Tehran has long ignored Baku's pleas to shun Armenia or 

otherwise accommodate Azerbaijani security interests. 

Azerbaijan-Israel relations, however, are more than merely a knee-jerk response to 

Iranian policies. The Azerbaijanis argue that they too need allies they can turn to meet 

their diplomatic, economic and military needs, and Israel is judged as both a resourceful 

and reliable partner. 

Despite repeated vocal Iranian objections, Azerbaijani-Israeli relations remain solid In 

February 2012, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion defense deal with Israel that included air 

defense systems, intelligence equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles 

In my discussions with an array of political figures in Azerbaijan - from government 

officials to key opposition figures - I found very little disagreement on the issue of 

Baku's close ties with Israel. At the heart of the matter is an Azerbaijani desire across the 

political spectrum for the development of the country's capabilities and specifically in 

regards to finding a settlement to the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

As Iran's "Big Brother" approach and pressure toward Baku has failed to deliver, Tehran 

is now instead seeking to incentivize Baku with a new wave of promises of cooperation 

This latest approach has been very noticeable in the last few months, most likely 

indicating that Tehran is hoping to prevent further fallout with its immediate neighbors 

The latest overtures toward Baku need to be seen in the context ofTran's already isolated 

position due to its nuclear program and UN resolutions and sanctions. Nonetheless, 

despite such Iranian offers, deep suspicion in relations is highly unlikely to go away in 

the foreseeable future 

Perhaps more important than any other factor, Baku shows no sign of wanting to abandon 

its pro-US position or its ties with Israel and certainly shows no sign of wanting to adopt 

policies that would appease the ruling elite in Tehran 

The impact ofIranian behavior on US interests and its partners 

Throughout the 1990s, one of Tehran's key objectives across the Caucasus and Central 

Asia was to prevent an increase of US influence. This is still an objective, but Tehran's 

resources are limited and it is now far more likely to out-source to Russia and China and 

regional collective organizations - such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - to 

realize this objective. This shift is also a retlection of the undoubted failure of the Iranian 

Islamist message, even in countries such as Azerbaijan, with a Muslim and Shia majority 

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77164c-5.eps

However, this equilibrium could shift if the Iranian nuclear standoff continues and if 

radical entities within the Iranian regime opt to increase anti-US activities in the South 

Caucasus as a way to challenge or confront the US and its allies. There have been some 

recent signs to justify such concerns 

Earlier in the year, Azerbaijani officials reported the arrest of individuals charged with 

planning to attack US and Israeli and Jewish targets. As recently as 9 October 2012, 

Azerbaijan sentenced 22 people charged with spying for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 

Guards Corps (TRGC) and plotting to carry out attacks against American and Israeli 

targets in Azerbaijan. These realities point to Azerbaijan as a potential battle-ground in 

Iran's stand-off with the US and her allies. 

On the question of Iranian intluence and activities in the South Caucasus, Armenia and 

Georgia pose different challenges for US policy makers. 

Given that its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan have been closed since 1993, Armenia 

has become reliant on Iran and Georgia as its sole avenues to world markets. Iran is also a 

principal trading partner for Armenia and Yerevan's economic interests are already 

harmed by the sanctions imposed on Iran. It would appear that both Armenia and Iran 

would have an incentive to circumvent international sanctions imposed on Iran, although 

this is strongly denied by the Armenian authorities. 

In the case of Georgia, it is again about whether Iran can use the country to circumvent 

international sanctions. Since 201 0, Tran-Georgia relations have warmed and a visa-tree 

regime has been established between the two countries, increasing the flow of Iranian 

tourists and investment to Georgia. The bulk of this traffic can be expected to be 

legitimate as Iranian investors and tourists look for new and affordable destinations and 

particularly since traditional destinations such as those in Europe and in the United Arab 

Emirates have become less accessible. At the same time, the greater Iranian access to 

Georgia is highly likely to be exploited by Iran's intelligence services for operational 

purposes although there is very little concrete material in this regard in open sources. 

In conclusion, let me say that Iran's influence in the South Caucasus does not match its 

proximity or historical ties to the region. Tehran insistence on building relations on an 

ideological and anti-Western plaltorm is a failed policy. This is best symbolized by the 

poor state of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. And it goes beyond bilateral ties. 

Thanks to its ideological intransigence, Tehran has removed itself as a contender in 

Caspian Basin energy bonanza. When Tehran has been able to make inroads in the region 

- specifically in Armenia and less so in Georgia - it has done so overwhelmingly because 

those states lack alternatives and not because of a convincing Iranian message. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the Committee, thank you again for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. 

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52

Mr. BURTON. First of all, before I take my time, I want to congratulate Mr. Engel on being the ranking Democrat. He is going to 

be a powerhouse here on the committee for the next couple of—

well, maybe 6 years. So congratulations. You have worked hard for 

it, and you deserve it. 

One of my concerns and the reason I wanted to hold this hearing 

is because we have been focusing on Iran’s nuclear program. We 

have been talking about the threat that that presents to the entire 

region and how Israel would have to respond to that in the event 

that they continue with that program. 

But one of the things that is not being discussed is what this 

hearing is about today, and that is the subversive movement by 

Iran to undermine governments in the entire region. Our hearing 

today is on the Caucasus and that whole region, but I want to go 

into a broader area. Bahrain is one of the areas that I am very familiar with because I was in the Persian Gulf region recently. It 

is not under this committee’s purview, but it fits into the overall 

problem that we see. 

So I would like to start with you, Dr. Rubin, and ask you what 

you think of Iran’s underground movement to try to undermine 

those governments to gain more and more influence and how extensive is it. And I would like for you to include Azerbaijan, that 

whole region, Georgia, Armenia, and I would like for you to also 

interject into your comments, and I will let your other colleagues 

speak as well, what is going on in Bahrain and in the Persian Gulf. 

Mr. RUBIN. Sir, I spent 14 years in a Quaker school, and when 

I was being schooled in the Quaker school we always learned that 

multiculturalism was always about appreciating our differences. 

But fundamentally multiculturalism isn’t about walking into a 

sushi restaurant and ordering a mojito. It is ultimately about different peoples thinking in very, very different ways. 

When it comes to Iran, we need to recognize that both in the constitution and in the statute of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps is the imperative to export revolution. In the year 2008 the 

former President, Mohammad Khatami, said, well, when we talked 

about export of revolution, what we meant is to build ourselves up 

into a soft-power power which everyone around could emulate, and 

it was actually the Revolutionary Guard and the hardline judiciary 

which shot him down and said, no, export of the revolution is fundamentally about insurgency. I have detailed this in my written 

testimony. 

Now, when it comes to the Iranian strategy, I already talked 

about the soft-power strategy of trying to infiltrate countries 

through charities. We also have the infiltration in through the 

media as well. 

Within Bahrain there is a special problem, and I highlighted 

this, the parallels in Azerbaijan. In Bahrain’s case, because of Saddam Hussein’s crackdown in Iraq over the decades, most Bahraini 

clergy, instead of going to Najaf and Karbala to study, ended up 

going to Qom in Iran where the Iranians tried to indoctrinate 

them. I would hazard to guess that there is not a single village 

mullah under the age of 55 in Bahrain who hasn’t studied in Iran, 

and that is going to be a problem which will take generations to 

work out of the system. 

53

Now, many of the grievances in Bahrain are real, but that 

doesn’t mean that the Iranians aren’t trying to take advantage of 

them. As you know, earlier this year I went to Bahrain, and when 

I was meeting with oppositionists, I found many of the younger opposition to be quite sincere. Some of the older opposition, from the 

days of the 1981 fighting, what they were saying to me in English 

versus what we Googled them saying to the Persian press in Persian was radically different as to the status of the U.S. 5th Fleet 

headquarters and so forth. So we do have a constant problem in 

which many of the people working on behalf of Iranian interests——

Mr. BURTON. But what did they say? You said you spoke to them 

in Persian. 

Mr. RUBIN. Okay. When they spoke in English, they would talk 

about how we genuinely want reforms and that so long as the reforms occur, the United States of course would be welcome to keep 

the 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Not when I spoke to them 

in Persian, but when we Googled their names in Persian to call up 

what they had said to the Iranian press, they talked about how the 

colonial vestige of the American satan must be expelled forthwith. 

So a slight difference in tone between what they were saying in 

English and what they were saying in Persian. That is constantly 

a problem, of course, in the Middle East, as you know, where interlocutors will be told one thing and they will be told another subsequently. 

When it comes to television, most Bahrainis will listen to Iranian 

television and radio almost exclusively. Most Bahraini Shiites I 

should say. Now, when it comes to the Bahraini—the media—oftentimes what the Iranians will do is distribute cell phones, distribute 

video cameras, and urge students to be stringers. If you can film 

anything of interest, send it back, and we will give you a salary. 

This encourages people to film greater unrest. Instead of having 

one Voice of America correspondent in the area, imagine having 

500 Voice of Iran correspondents in the area, and this is ultimately 

the problem we have. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Rubin, we will proceed with that. I want to give 

you all a chance to respond. But Mr. Rohrabacher has to catch a 

plane, he has got to go back to California, and he is going to be 

very active in this region in the next couple of years I understand. 

So, Mr. Rohrabacher, we will recognize you so you can catch your 

plane. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And I would like to 

especially thank Ms. Schmidt and Congressman Burton for the 

hard work they have put in over the last 2 years and actually 

many more years than that, and just thank you both for laying the 

stage. Whoever is going to be coming next will be able to pick up 

something and carry the flag, and I hope whoever that is, it could 

be me, who knows, will do half as good a job as you guys have 

done. So thank you very much. 

I would like to thank the panel and thank the chairman for this 

particular hearing. I think that Americans’ understanding of what 

is going on in Iran and around Iran is so limited and so cliched 

that it really is a threat to making the policies that we need to 

54

make that will benefit the United States as well as benefit the 

cause of world peace. 

Most people only know that the mullahs in Iran are oppressive 

to their own people and have said they are going to wipe out Israel, 

and that is it. And most people think all Iranians are Persians, and 

today’s testimony is going to be of great assistance in laying the 

foundation for perhaps new policies that will be approached in the 

coming year. 

Let me just note, and, Mr. Chairman, for the record I have a 

copy of H. Con. Resolution 137, which is a resolution that I submitted earlier this year which basically states that the people, that 

the Azeri people who we have heard in testimony number up to 20 

million in Iran, that those Azeri people have a right of self-determination to determine what their status will be in the future, 

whether it is a status as part of Azerbaijan or whether it is a part 

of Iran or whether it is a sovereign country of their own. And that 

resolution, while it didn’t go many places here on Capitol Hill, it 

certainly was an area of discussion in that part of the world. 

And let me just note, I believe in the right of self-determination 

not only for the Azeri people, but for all the peoples of that region 

and of the world. It is a part of the things that we as Americans 

are supposed to believe in because our Declaration of Independence 

was a declaration of the rights of people to determine self-determination that God has given every person, not just Americans. 

I also am very grateful to the panel today for pointing out the 

complications of Iranian policy to the various, not just Israel, but 

the other conflicts in the region as well, especially dealing with Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

I think that we owe a great deal of debt to the Government of 

Azerbaijan for being willing to step up to this threat from the 

mullah regime and not cower before it. And that type of courage, 

I hope, would be—would actually inspire those of us in the United 

States who are engaged in policymaking to understand that the 

mullah regime needs to be treated for what it is. 

The Mullah regime is a gangster regime that murders its own 

people and threatens the peace and civility of an entire region of 

the world. And we should be looking for allies in that part of the 

world, and not just Israel, but other countries of the—other countries in that region to try to isolate and, yes, empower the people 

of Iran to win their freedom against this gangster regime. Whether 

it is promoting self-determination or the right to self-determination 

or just pure democracy, we should—the Iranian mullahs should not 

be on the offensive, they should be on the defensive, because they 

do not represent anything but an evil force in their own country 

and in that region. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I had my say. Maybe there is someone who 

has 45 seconds to comment on that on the panel. Thank you. 

There you go. Mr. Cohen. You have got 15 seconds. 

Mr. BURTON. If you have a comment, go ahead. 

Ms. SHAFFER. I think it is very important that you mentioned 

Iran’s policies toward the conflicts in the region, because I think we 

can learn really how—how there is such a gap between Iran’s rhetoric of Islamic solidarity, helping oppressed peoples and its activities in actuality. And, I mean, Iran should be the poster child of 

55

helping Muslims around the world, but in its close region, it helps 

Armenia against Azerbaijan, it helps Russia against Chechens, it 

bowed out of Tajikistan for Moscow’s interest. 

And even when it tries to explain its hostility toward Azerbaijan, 

it says, well, it is about Israel. To tell the truth, Azerbaijan and 

Israeli relations actually came to ‘‘frutation’’ only about 4 to 5—5 

years ago did they establish close cooperation. Iran has been trying 

to undermine Azerbaijan stability and supporting its adversaries in 

the region since the beginning of independence. 

Again, it goes back to this ethnic issue. Just as you have brought 

attention of Congress on the multiethnicity of the Iran, Iranian 

leaders, the first day in the Tehran Times when the Soviet Union 

broke up, the first article was not about what a great opportunity 

to expand Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic influence, it was, 

we must be careful that the ethnic hand won’t come over the border the other way. And this is what drives Iranian policy in the region. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have people in Belujistan, we have people 

who are Azeris, we have many different groups of people who deserve their freedom who are now under the thumb of the mullah 

dictatorship. We should be on the side of democracy and freedom 

in Iran, and that would solve a lot of our other problems. 

Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I won’t take 

the whole time. 

I want to start by, first of all, telling you how much I have appreciated our friendship through the years, and from the time we both 

served on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, first you as 

chair and me as ranking member, then me as chair and you as 

ranking member, we have always been friends, and you have always been a gentleman and a very good student of foreign policy. 

And it has just been a pleasure working with you, and personally 

I am going to miss you. So I hope you will come back and visit. 

I hope your district and the country understands how—what a 

patriot you are and how much you care. Even when we’ve disagreed on things, I never have had doubt for one moment that you 

didn’t say anything that you didn’t believe. That you—you are a 

patriot, you are a tremendous American, and you really love this 

country. And, you know, we love you; even on this side of the aisle 

we are going to miss you. 

And I want to say something to you’re my good friend, dear 

friend, Jean Schmidt. Going to miss you, too, my cochair of the Albanian Issues Caucus and someone that I have gotten to know very 

well. We have traveled together, as Mr. Burton and I have, and we 

have gotten to know our families on a personal level. And I’m going 

to miss you very, very much. And you, too, are a great patriot and 

amazing woman, amazing woman. 

I don’t know, I tell a little tale out of school, we are—when we 

are traveling abroad, we always have these big, strong Marine guys 

or whatever following us and taking care of us and whatever. And 

Congresswoman Schmidt is an avid runner. She competes in all 

56

kinds of classical marathons, thank you. And I want to tell you, 

those Marine guys that are less than half her age, they couldn’t 

hold a candle to her when she gets up at 4:30 in the morning and 

is ready to do running. So we are going to miss you, Jean. Please 

keep in touch. And honored to call both of you my friend. So thank 

you. 

I wanted just to ask anyone who can answer just one question. 

It involves the relationship with Azerbaijan and Israel. There had 

been reports, I guess it must have been 6 or—6 months ago to a 

year, I guess, where there was talk that Azerbaijan had agreed to 

let Israel use its bases in case Israel felt it had to make a strike 

on Iran to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability. There seemed to be, 

whether it was our State Department or someone somewhere, went 

public on it. And it seemed to me that it undermined any kind of 

deal that Azerbaijan and Israel have had. 

I am wondering if any of you can shed some light on that for me 

and, you know, just tell me your thoughts. Because I have to tell 

you, my thoughts were I was disappointed when I thought on the 

U.S. side that we were—we were sort of bringing that to light. I 

was—I thought that was something that was better left unsaid. 

Yes, Ms. Shaffer. Dr. Shaffer. 

Ms. SHAFFER. I think this shows the power, also the negative 

power, of the Internet. Here a guy wrote an article, who, by his 

own biography, had served as an advisor to Yasser Arafat, for instance, when he was in Lebanon, an article based on six unnamed 

sources—I can understand an article that has a couple unnamed 

sources and some people on the record—six unnamed sources, two 

independent scholars—in my opinion, independent scholars are either unemployed or on the payroll of someone they don’t want to 

mention—and this creates noise all over the world as if it is the 

reality, and everyone else has to respond to it. 

I think there has been a big disinformation campaign going on 

in a number of media sources that are trying to break apart the 

friendship between Israel and Azerbaijan. It makes a lot of people—and trying to make Azerbaijan pay in the Muslim world for 

its close friendship to Israel. And I think these articles that are always, you know, talking about military cooperation here, military 

cooperation there. If you show a map, there is a lot of countries 

that Israel is going to have a military attack on Iran. There is a 

lot of countries it has to pass over before it gets to Azerbaijan. 

Azerbaijan is a landlocked country. So that would mean that its 

planes were flying over Turkey, Georgia, a number of other countries, before it reached Azerbaijan. 

This really isn’t about Azerbaijan and Israel. I think that we 

have to be very careful with many of these—the impact of these articles, which we really don’t know who is behind them and why—

I mean, if a student of mine wrote paper with six unnamed 

sources, I wouldn’t give them a very good grade. 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes. Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. I am not sure if it is the purview of this committee 

or the full committee, but as that publication hurt U.S. policy and 

U.S. relations with both Israel and Azerbaijan, I am wondering if 

an investigation can be made as to whether U.S. sources were involved in leaking this information; or, alternatively, maybe it was 

57

commissioned by the Iranian regime. And because what Dr. Shaffer 

mentioned the connections of the author to Yasser Arafat, and I am 

personally aware of those connections, he is not hiding them. It 

could be it was done on behalf of the Islamic Republic here in 

Washington, which also raises very serious questions as to the influence of that. 

Mr. Chairman, if I may go back to the Bahrain issue? If you look 

at the map, Bahrain is there across Iran on the shores of the Persian Gulf. As Dr. Rubin said, Bahrain has 70 percent Shia majority. Some Iranian officials claim that Bahrain is a 14th province of 

Iran. This is kind of rhetoric that we heard by Saddam Hussein 

which led to the war in Kuwait. So this is a highly explosive territorial claim, and if, through its military power or through subversion, and supporting the Shia radicals in Bahrain, Iran overthrows 

the current regime and establishes hold on Bahrain, then it can 

close the Persian Gulf from both sides, which has tremendous implications for energy traffic—40 percent of all oil in the world is 

shipped through the Persian Gulf—and it establishes an Iranian 

bridgehead on the southern or eastern shore of the Persian Gulf 

aimed right at Saudi Arabia. 

So geopolitically, purely looking at the map, and understanding 

that such a step would unfortunately prevent the Fifth Fleet to 

continue being there, this is a development that Iranians are pursuing, and that is extremely dangerous to our national security interest, to the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and to our 

allies in the Persian Gulf. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me also join the chorus to say to Jean that we 

will miss you. I was just thinking before Eliot, when he was talking 

about our travel together, and the fact that you outrun everybody, 

and also the fact that we have gotten to know one another on these 

trips and talked about family, and friends, and life and what it 

really means, and your dedication as a true patriot to our great 

country of ours. So we are going to miss you and the service that 

you have rendered here in the United States Congress, and I want 

to wish you well in your future endeavors. 

Let me now go to the witnesses. 

As I indicated in my opening statement, it seems to me influence 

is stronger when you divide and conquer. It seems to me if you can 

divide folks up in the region, et cetera, then you can have more influence. And that is what my concern is, to a large degree, in the 

South Caucasus. And that is why I will just open up with this 

question. 

I have been watching, because I think it is extremely important, 

if we could get Turkey and Armenia to have a better relationship, 

to move that tighter together, because if you have them divided, et 

cetera, that helps weaken the relationship. 

So my question, first question, is, do you think that there’s any 

prospect maybe in—because I always have the statement that 

there is—there is two of the oldest forms of relationships between 

countries. One is trade or economic engagement, and the other is 

war. I like trade and economic engagement much better than war 

to try to have relationships. So I was wondering whether or not did 

58

you see any prospect for increased economic engagement in between Armenia and Turkey and—or would the relaxation of the 

closed border between Turkey and Armenia or even the normalization of diplomatic relations in the region, would that make a difference? Would you see that being possible anytime soon in any—

I am one to believe the glass is half full all the time, but I would 

like to get your viewpoints. 

You can start. go ahead. 

Mr. VATANKA. I will be very brief, if I may. 

As far as I can see, the Turks have already said they are interested in that kind of a development vis—vis Armenia. And Armenians, as I stated earlier, definitely are trying to expand in terms 

of their partners that they have in the region. But I am not sure 

about the timing right now. Certainly I think the Turks have their 

hands full with everything going on in the region, specifically in 

Syria. So I am not sure if they are going to do something as radical 

as that, because that is going to be perceived, at the very least, as 

a radical step in Baku. And Turkey does not want to walk away 

from its very close ties with Azerbaijan. 

So that is how I see it. I think timing here is very important. 

Secondarily, you want to make sure those areas understand the 

motive, that this is not going to be done at their sort of cost. 

If I may just very quickly, two points I also wanted to make in 

terms of Israel and Bahrain. First, when I was in Azerbaijan, there 

were two messages that pretty much stood out for me very clearly. 

One was the Israel-Azerbaijan relationship which is not just about 

Iran. It is a key factor, but it is more about developing Azerbaijan’s 

diplomatic, economic, and political clout on the international stage, 

Israel being forthcoming. So that, I think, is an important factor 

to remember. 

But number two, equally important, Azerbaijan, as far as I could 

see, is not interested in becoming battleground and certainly 

doesn’t want to be involved in a war with Iran. It will play its role, 

as far as I could see, as an international partner in terms of maintaining the sanctions and so forth, but it is not going to sort of 

stick its head out because it certainly doesn’t feel comfortable in 

that regard. 

On Bahrain, the thing to remember—again, I was in Bahrain 

this year. And one of the issues, again, that stood out clearly, there 

is some genuine grievances on the ground, and I heard Bahraini officials admit to that. So there are things, reform, that needs to be 

done on the ground. 

Where the Iranian danger comes in if there is a vacuum, because 

whenever Iran has really succeeded under a regional level has been 

where there has been a vacuum. We have seen that in Lebanon in 

the 1980s. We saw that with the creation of strength in Hamas in 

the 1990s. That is what the Iranians are very good at, to come in 

and fill vacuums. 

The important thing for the United States is that opposition in 

Bahrain, at least the moderate voices in the Bahraini opposition, 

don’t feel the need that there is only Iran to turn to. United States, 

I think, can play an important role in that regard. 

Ms. SHAFFER. Mr. Meeks, I think you are correct that the conflicts create vulnerability to the countries, but more for Iranian inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:38 Jan 03, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EE\120512\77164 HFA PsN: SHIRL
59

fluence, for Russian influence. And for precisely this reason, the 

normalization between Turkey and Armenia and the opening of the 

Turkish-Armenian border has to take place in a greater regional 

context, meaning if you just look at Turkey-Armenia, you say, 

okay, fine, they trade, yes, there can be many benefits. But we 

have to use this border issue as a means to further resolve the 

Nagorno-Karabakh complex, because if one border happens, but 

still the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues, we 

don’t have peace in the region, we won’t have that kind of stability 

we want to achieve. 

In fact, today Armenia occupies 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. The only nonmilitary means, the only thing Armenia wants 

that it doesn’t have, is actually the trade with Turkey. Therefore, 

we have to use that lever for some movement in the peace process 

to really—you know, maybe not the whole resolution for Armenians 

to leave a few of the occupied districts to show some sort of sign 

of the process moving forward. And so to put peace, again, peace 

on two sides of Armenia’s borders, because if not, all we are doing 

is putting war closer and closer in the region. 

Mr. RUBIN. Representative Meeks, I certainly agree with the desire that there would be some sort of rapprochement, but, in the 

larger context, I really don’t think it would be enough, given the 

recent changes in Turkey. 

Turkish and Iranian leaders coordinate closely on international 

efforts to restrict free speech that criticizes Islam. Hakan Fidan, 

Turkey’s Intelligence Chief, makes little secret of his preference to 

Tehran over Washington, which raises questions about intelligence 

sharing, especially when it comes to some of the coding and technology for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

In 2010, what concerns me most is that Turkish and Chinese Air 

Forces conducted joint war games over the—over Turkey without 

first alerting either NATO or the Pentagon. And, of course, the 

Chinese fighter jets couldn’t have gotten to Turkey if they hadn’t 

stopped first and refueled in Iran. 

What I see now beyond just the issue of the Turkish-Armenian 

dispute is that Iran feels that it is about to deliver us a coup de 

grace, because they have Armenia in their camp, increasingly they 

seem to have flipped Turkey in many ways, they are very optimistic about what the future will bode with regard to Georgia, 

which only leaves only Azerbaijan behind, which leads me to think 

that even if you do have some rapprochement between Turkey and 

Armenia, that we are going to have a much hotter time in the region over the months and perhaps year to come. 

Mr. COHEN. Just to follow up on this, Armenia enjoys a historic 

and strategic relationship with Russia. It has very strong ties with 

Iran. So two out of three major powers in the Caucasus are in the 

Armenians’ corner. On the other hand, Turkey, historically, is supporting Azerbaijan and made it clear to Armenia, after the memoranda was signed back in 2010, I believe—2010 or 2009—in 2009, 

that Turkey will link the opening of the border to progress on the 

Karabakh issue. And we understand it because countries support 

their allies. In the case of Turkey, Azerbaijan is an ally. 

But I also want to support what my colleague Mr. Rubin said 

about Turkish-Iran relations. Those relations are developing. And 

60

doubling of trade by 2015 between Turkey and Iran while Iran is 

under international sanctions is proclaimed again and again as a 

strategic goal of the Turkish Republic, which raises a question how 

our ally, Turkey, is playing a policy or conducting a policy that appears to be contradicting our sanctions against Iran. 

Mr. MEEKS. And I know I am out of time, but just following up 

on that, though, it seems to me—and this is what I also stated in 

the opening statement—that when you look at some of our allies, 

whether it is Turkey in particular and others, they look at their national interests, and they are dependent upon either Russia or Iran 

for their oil or their—you know, their resources. So they go back 

and forth because they need it. And one or the other could be bad 

for us, et cetera, if they are completely dependent upon it. So people are looking at what they have in their particular regions. 

What I would think, then, in order to eliminate some of that—

and I throw that question out as my last question for now, then 

I yield to the chair and to Jean—is my thought is what could we 

do to help transit from the Caspian so that we can get oil into 

these regions so they are not dependent on Russia or Iran? And 

what do you see the United States doing, or how we can be more 

helpful to make sure that transit exists so that they can get the 

resources they need with regards to what they need for their vital 

necessities? 

Mr. COHEN. Sir, these are very important questions. And on oil, 

the United States took a principled and active position both under 

Clinton and George W. Bush to promote the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 

main oil export pipeline—Ceyhan is a port in Turkey. That pipeline 

is at capacity of about 1 million barrels a day, but because of the 

Iranian obstructionist position on delineating and demarcating the 

Caspian, additional oil pipelines cannot be built from Kazakhstan, 

for example, and they are going to have to ship that oil into the 

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by tanker. 

On gas, the same Iranian position prevents gas from going from 

Turkmenistan or, in the future, from Kazakhstan into Azerbaijan 

and then into Turkey. But today the TANAP Pipeline, the TransAnatolian pipeline, between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, is 

going to join a pipeline that will supply additional gas and also natural gas from Kurdistan, from Northern Iraq; can be pumped into 

Turkey and then further to the European markets. 

Additionally, Turkey has excellent relations with Sunni Arab 

countries, many of which are exporters both of oil and liquid natural gas, like Qatar. So Turkey has its sources of both oil and gas, 

and if Turkey wasn’t so disruptive in its relationship with Israel, 

there could be a place of discussing the Israeli and Greek Cypriot 

offshore gas fields supplying some gas to Turkey in the future. 

Unfortunately, the Turkish leadership today is at the head of the 

crowd that is bashing Israel and supporting the terrorist organization Hamas, including its latest attacks on Israel with rockets. And 

right now I think Turkey shot itself in the foot by excluding itself 

from the east Mediterranean gas development of Israel and Cyprus. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Before we go to my good friend Jean, let me just 

say that you have been an outstanding panel, and I hope that we 

61

can get the information you are giving us today out to everybody, 

because I don’t think the things you are telling us today are widely 

known. And so we really appreciate you being here. 

Jean. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. And I want to continue on Congressman Meeks’ discussion about oil. Forty years ago—and I can’t believe I can say 40 years ago—when I was studying Middle East politics, I had a professor that said the reason why the Middle East 

is important is a three-letter word, and that is called ‘‘oil.’’ And it 

still is. 

And as we look at the emerging markets of Azerbaijan and 

Kazakhstan, we see oil-rich, natural-gas-rich countries that really 

want to not just continue the development of these energy resources, but also distribute it into areas that, quite frankly, are 

good for international security, which I am talking about is Western Europe, which right now has to get their energy sources from 

places that aren’t so popular. 

But in reading your testimony, Mr.—Dr. Cohen, I—I am getting 

a deeper understanding as to why Iran doesn’t want this. Iran 

doesn’t want it for a multitude of reasons. One, it doesn’t want 

these countries to continue to develop and become more Western 

and more attractive for business, international business, to come to 

their borders; but also because it is not in Iran’s best interest to 

have anybody else pumping these supplies. 

So it is in Iran’s best interest, it seems, to be subversive in all 

of these countries in any single way that they can, including trying 

to make Turkey not be as friendly to the United States as I believe 

Turkey wants to continue to be, to be disruptive by not allowing 

the Caspian Sea to be open enough to allow these pipelines to go 

through. 

And so really what we—we have to do not just as the United 

States, but as an international body, in my view, is apply international pressure to allow these new countries to develop. 

And the other thing that I am thinking of when I am looking at 

this—maybe I am wrong in this, and please tell me—is it is not in 

Russia’s best interests either. You know, Russia lost its—some of 

its best parts of itself 20 years ago, when you look at Kazakhstan 

and Azerbaijan and the fact that they are free. And they can do 

what they want to do. It is not in Russia’s best interest for these 

countries to make money and become emerging markets that can 

be world players. And so of course Russia, in my view, is looking 

at Iran to smother them and hurt them. 

And am I right or am I wrong in this? And what as an international body should the international body be doing in the—concretely to allow that pipeline to go through? Because I truly believe 

it is in the best interests of the world for it to start pumping energy 

quickly. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, ma’am. Clearly the increase of supply of oil and 

gas, and now gas is becoming a globally transshipped commodity 

in the form of LNG, liquid natural gas, it is very much in the interests of every developed economy, every developing economy that is 

not hydrocarbon rich. 

And you are absolutely right. There is a confluence of interest between Russia and Iran. These two countries form a north-south 

62

axis, whereas Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and countries all the 

way east to China and West to Europe comprise an east-west axis, 

the corridor through which oil, gas, but also industrial goods, ideas, 

and information can flow. 

The Russian situation is not dissimilar. The Russian situation in 

Europe with gas is similar to Iranian or Saudi situation with oil. 

It is all about market share. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Right. 

Mr. COHEN. So if you have Azerbaijani gas, Turkmen gas competing with the Russian gas in European markets, or, for that matter, Qatari LNG, or LNG from Algeria or Nigeria, it will drive the 

Russian market share down, it may drive the prices down. And Europe is really at a—at a crossroads, because they need to decide 

whether to go with natural gas or they continue with coal and continue with nuclear. So gas plays a strategic energy role in Europe 

right now. 

And you asked about what can we do. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. That is the most important question of all. 

Mr. COHEN. A $64-trillion question. 

We did not coordinate enough with Western Europe. Western Europe by itself, especially now with the economic crisis, is not really 

focused enough on ensuring that east-west pipelines will go 

through. 

I think the EU lost to the Russians on Nabucco, the big pipeline 

that was supposed to carry gas from the Caspian through Turkey 

into Western Europe. But TANAP is a good, smaller alternative to 

Nabucco, with a spur, a side pipeline, most probably what is called 

West Nabucco, which is a pipeline to Austria. 

We could have done more, especially when the regime, the leader, changed in Turkmenistan. I had conversations with senior State 

Department officials saying, let us invite the new leader, 

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow—the new—Turkmenbashi—the new 

President, to Washington. And there was a huge pushback because 

they wanted for the Foreign Minister to visit, then they wanted the 

Prime Minister to visit. Then they were concerned, justifiably so, 

about human rights in Turkmenistan. In the meantime, Mr. Putin 

was there in 2 weeks signing deals. The Chinese now are the principal buyer for Turkmen gas. 

So I do not want to present it as only a zero-sum game, but this 

is a game of immense and intense competition between the buyers 

of these natural resources. 

Ms. SHAFFER. Yes. Russia and Iran have been allies in trying to 

make sure that less and less oil from the Caspian region reaches 

international markets; unsuccessful, thanks to really strong U.S. 

policy efforts in the early days after the Soviet break-up. 

But where actually Russia and Iran are rivals is the question of 

natural gas, and I talk about this in depth in my testimony. The 

only country that really has the volume that could—to be a true 

rival to Russian dominance in a number of markets in Europe is 

Iran. And now because of the conflict between Iran and the West, 

Iran is in a box. 

It really helps us understand Russia’s kind of policy on Iran. 

Sometimes it is with us, sometimes it is against us on the sanctions, because basically what Iran’s interest is that Iran—Russia’s 

63

interest on Iran is that there is no war, no peace; no resolution of 

the conflict, no ending of the nuclear Iranian nuclear; on the other 

hand, no full-scale war, because it is in Russia’s interest that the 

Iran volumes are locked up in Iran and don’t reach outside markets 

and compete with Russia. 

We saw this even—for instance, Iran opened the pipeline to Armenia to supply gas. Gazprom bought up this pipeline, even though 

what does it matter to the—a pipeline between Iran and Armenia, 

Armenia is not a large market, just to make sure the Iranian gas 

doesn’t transit through Armenia and end up in European markets. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me add about Iran. I have been watching Iranian oil and gas industry for a long time. With this regime, because 

this is a highly ideological regime that does not allow private property of natural resources, doesn’t allow Western investment, that 

creates such an oppressive atmosphere inside the country that a lot 

of Iranian engineers, scientists, doctors leave the country. This regime is not really capable to be a good steward of Iranian natural 

resources in a way like Saddam Hussein was not a good steward 

of the Iraqi natural resources. 

What we are facing in terms of the economic and developmental 

interests of the West, of the newly industrialized countries of Asia, 

and from the point of view of the Iranian people themselves is a 

recognition that is often lacking that this particular ideological 

Islamist dictatorship, Shia militant dictatorship, is working against 

best interests of their own people as well as against the economic 

interests of potential buyers of Iranian natural resources. They 

don’t negotiate well. They don’t have the legal base to allow Western investment. And, yes, they are under sanctions and will be, 

God willing, until such time as they reverse their nuclear military 

program. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Jean, Mrs. Schmidt. 

Let me just end up by saying I want to thank my colleague, my 

buddy here for about 20 years, for being such a good friend. 

And I want to thank you once again for being such a great panel. 

I really, really appreciate it. 

The one thing I hope—and I know we have C–SPAN here, and 

I hope this is transmitted to our State Department—it sounds to 

me like where Azerbaijan is concerned, where the Persian Gulf is 

concerned, and Bahrain, as well as the other Persian Gulf countries, as well as the entire region, Turkey and everything else, it 

is extremely important that our State Department doesn’t drop the 

ball. They need to be extremely involved right now, and I hope the 

administration realizes. 

One of the things that I am concerned about—and my colleague 

and I have some differing opinions on some of these things. One 

of the things I am concerned about right now is we are so concerned about the financial cliff that we are losing sight of something that may be of greater importance in the next 5 or 10 years, 

and that is if everything goes awry in the Middle East, we could 

be shutting off some of our lights here because of a war that would 

get out of hand. So our State Department and people like you need 

to be listened to. We need to be involved. And I want to thank you 

once again for being here. 

64

And I want to thank our friends from Azerbaijan and Bahrain 

and others who are here today for attending. 

And with that, we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(65)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

66

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77164n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TTVES 

WASHINGTON, D,C. 20515-0128 

Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia 

Dan Burton (R-I N), Chairman 

December 5, 2012 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs' 

Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, to be held in Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building (and 

available live on the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, December 5, 2012 

2:00 p,m 

Iranian Int1uence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region 

Ariel Cohen, PhD 

Senior Research Fellow 

The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies 

The Heritage Foundation 

Michael Rubin, Ph,D 

Resident Scholar 

American Enterprise Institute 

Brenda Shaffer, PhD 

Senior Lecturer 

University of Haifa 

Mr Alex Vatanka 

Adjunct Scholar 

Middle East Institute 

Direction of the Cbairman 
67

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77164m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _______ -=E-"u''''"p''-e:.c'''''n.:c<i=E''''''-=us'''i'' _______ HEARTNG 

Day Wednesday Date December 5. 2012 Room 2172 

Starting Time _-"?",.Ou8'1'n"w,-_Ending Time _~3",: 3"-'5'----_ 

Recesses I I L--to ~ L--to~ L--to~ L--to~ L-to ~ L--(o~ 

Presiding Member(s) 

Dan Burton, Gregory Meek.:v, Eliot Engel, Dana Ro/trahacller, Jean Schmid" EI/on Galfl!g/y 

Check all o/tfle /ollowing that apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

Executive (closed) Session 0 Televised [2] 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Rccord'!!!Jtaped) D 

Stenographic Record l.:L.J 

Tranian Influence in the South Caucasus and Ihe Surrounding Region 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Dan Burton, Gregory Meeks, Elton Gallegly, Eliot Engel,Jeun Schmidt 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an· if they are not member,. aJfuli committee) 

Dana Roltrabaclter 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Ves m No D 

(If "no ", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted/or the record.) 

Chairman Burton's Opening Remarks 

Witne!,s Statement of Brenda Shaffer, PIl.D., Senior Lecturer, University of IIaifa 

Witness Statement Of Ariel CO/feu, Ph.D' j Seuior Research Fe{fowJ Tlte Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, 

Tile Heritage Foundation 

Witness Statement oiMichael RubitlJ Ph.D'J Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

Witness Statemenl oj Alex Vatunlfa. A«junct Scholar, Middle East Institute 

Written Testomony fur the Record by Emanuele OttolenghiJ Senior Fellow! Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

.. r 

T~EADJOURNED __ ~3~:~35~p~m~_