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NEWS FROM THE FRONT

 February 2018

Setting Mission Command in a Geographic Theater 

U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)

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Introduction

Establishing mission command systems is an essential component to setting a geographical

theater for military operations and is a core function of the Unites States Army Pacific

(USARPAC). Doing so in advance of any contingency operation ensures continuous mission 

command, and allows headquarters and facilities to be identified, emplaced, and systems to be 

rehearsed routinely in order to seamlessly command and control Army forces throughout a

theater. An Army service component command (ASCC) must set the following mission 

command conditions: clear lines of command, support relationships, and authorities and the 

physical structure which allows commanders to have the uninterrupted ability to communicate 

throughout the depth and breadth of the geographic theater. End state is the uninterrupted 

reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of Army forces for employment. 

This News From the Front (NFTF) discusses how USARPAC prepares for mission command in 

its theater, controlling Army forces throughout the Pacific. Further, it illustrates how Pacific 

Pathways, USARPAC’s exercise strategy, enables the commander to set and rehearse mission 

command while Army forces flow in and out of theater, allowing mission command to become

second nature to its operations. Finally, it provides insights, lessons, and best practices on 

cyberspace, networks, and information operations that USARPAC has experienced in its mission 

command systems throughout the Pacific.

USARPAC Command Authorities and Relationships

The USARPAC Commander has often stated, “Phase 0 is where we want to stay. The minute it 

starts to go in another direction, we have to work hard to get back to Phase 0.”

USARPAC has established mission command authorities and facilities throughout the Pacific 

Theater. These permanent mission command nodes are anchor points where U.S. forces 

conducting operations within the region integrate into as they move from one host nation to 

another. In times of crisis, they will serve as the backbone for Army mission command networks 

that are established to support the contingency. Figure 1 provides a detailed picture of the 

command authorities and relationships of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the 

Pacific Theater. 

Pacific Pathways is a prime example of how USARPAC’s established mission command enables 

U.S. forces to remain for extended periods of time in theater. During a Pacific Pathways

exercise, brigade-sized units and divisional headquarters easily move through the theater 

conducting a wide variety of engagements in multiple countries for up to 90 days. The 

combination of established mission command nodes and the Pacific Pathways unit illustrates 

how mission command can be exercised across USPACOM. For example, in the Pacific Theater

has a regional hub node (RHN) in Okinawa. This nodes provide the ability for Army forces, 

during a Pacific Pathways, to communicate across the region. Army forces deployed in theater 

used this RHN routinely to gain reach back to Hawaii and to talk to 2ID HQ in South Korea to 

coordinate for it next leg of the deployment. In addition, the routine deployment of U.S. forces 

in theater allows an increased understanding of the theater by regionally aligned, CONUS-based 

follow-on forces. Simultaneously, U.S. partners and allies are able to test the interoperability of 

their own mission command equipment with USARPAC networks. Finally, the seamless 

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integration of USARPAC and host-nation forces demonstrates to would be adversaries that 

smaller nations have tangible assurances of U.S. commitment. 

In 2013, USARPAC went from a three-star headquarters to a four-star headquarters in order to 

better support the national command authority’s strategic rebalancing towards the Pacific. This 

command restructuring provided a greater ability for USARPAC to influence the national 

strategic objectives in support of USPACOM. In addition to the commander becoming a four 

star, the chief of staff went from a colonel to a major general, and the G-3 went from a colonel to 

a brigadier general. USARPAC also gained a U.S. two-star deputy commander and an Australian 

deputy two star. These additional flag officers and their staffs have made USARPAC a much 

more capable headquarters, able to affected better mission command across the region.

One of the significant outcomes for the Army in the Pacific was aligning I Corps to USPACOM, 

with operational control (OPCON) to USARPAC and administrative control (ADCON) 

remaining with FORSCOM. While I Corps receives funding from FORSCOM, they are assigned 

to the Pacific Theater. Further, the 25th Infantry Division (ID) is assigned to USPACOM and 

attached to USARPAC. USARPAC has OPCONed 25th ID to I Corps during a Pacific Pathways 

exercise. This 25ID and I Corps mission command relationship has freed USARPAC command 

and staff to focus more strategically in the Pacific and on its core mission of setting the theater.

Despite this prudent mission command choice, the Army has continued to give the 25th ID 

commander dual roles. The first of these is as the senior Army commander (ARFOR) in Hawaii, 

thus giving him and his staff responsibilities in addition to preparing the division for forward 

deployment. The USARPAC Commanding General has made his intent very clear that he wants

I Corps to provide operational-level mission command, to include many of the responsibilities 

25th ID incurs through the ARFOR mission. In addition, the Stryker brigade combat team (BCT) 

and Airborne BCT in Alaska will remain under U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) for training 

oversight. However, when they are operationally employed, they will be under I Corps OPCON

unless assigned to a division headquarters. 

The 7th ID has become a more operational headquarters, with a regional alignment in the Pacific. 

This has had a significant positive impact on mission command in the Pacific Theater, future 

Pacific Pathways exercise opportunities, and the overall ability for USARPAC to meet the 

National Command Authority’s rebalancing objectives. While the regional alignment of I Corps 

has generated some growing pains throughout USPACOM, overall it has been a positive 

evolution enhancing USARPAC’s ability to set the theater in Phase 0. For example, I Corps has 

been instrumental in the effort to operationalize Pacific Pathways. While a division headquarters 

has planning capabilities, it is still a tactical unit. The corps, on the other hand, is designed for 

the kind of operational-level planning and execution that is required to synchronize the units that 

conduct the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process. It is also the 

lowest level headquarters that can provide a mission command node to synchronize a theaterlevel operation and, if necessary, conduct crisis action planning at the joint level. Significant to I 

Corps’ ability to do this is the addition of the 593rd Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), 

which has been aligned to I Corps headquarters. This ESC will greatly enhance I Corps’ ability 

to conduct mission command throughout all phases of an operation.

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Figure 1: Command authorities and relationships of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater.
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Fixed Command Facilities and Nodes

The U.S. Army has had fixed mission command nodes mostly on the periphery of the Pacific 

area of operations for decades. Figure 2 provides the current disposition of fixed command 

facilities and nodes of Army forces assigned and regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater. 

USARPAC and 25 ID are in Hawaii. U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) with I Corps forward are in 

Japan. I Corps is located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and USARAK is in Alaska.

Figure 2: Current disposition of fixed command facilities and nodes of Army forces assigned and 

regionally aligned in the Pacific Theater.

Pacific Pathways extends mission command into the sub-regions of the Pacific where there are 

no fixed bases and assists USARPAC to remain engaged within the area of responsibility (AOR)

basis. USARPAC does this by positioning a divisional (-) command post forward during any 

given Pacific Pathways. In addition, this helps to operationalize the nine traditionally separate 

theater security cooperation exercises into a single yearlong operation. 

For example, Pacific Pathways 15 consisted of the following exercises: Cobra Gold (CG) in 

Thailand, Foal Eagle (FE) in the Republic of Korea, Balikatan (BK) in the Philippines, Hamel 

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(H) in Australia, Garuda Shield (GS) in Indonesia, Keris Strike (KrS) in Malaysia, Khaan Quest 

(KQ) in Mongolia, and Orient Shield (OS) with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces. Via 

this exercise plan, USARPAC was able to have a continual presence in regions where normally 

only a week or two per exercise was spent. As a result, each deployed task force provided 

continuity and unity, delivering a strategic message over three months rather than a week. This 

also provided an additional capability and flexibility to the USPACOM Commander when 

responding to contingencies. 

Figure 3: A typical Pacific Pathways mission command task organization for these exercises.

As Pacific Pathways matures, one of the goals is to establish expeditionary mission command in 

these austere sub-regions of the PACOM AOR on an extended and routine basis. For example, 

starting with Pacific Pathways 16-02, USARPAC deployed an ARFOR Early Entry Command 

Post (EECP) in the Philippines (see figure 4) for three months. The mission of this ECCP is to 

effect coordination, mainly logistics, transportation and host nation interaction, for the Pacific 

Pathways unit so it can focus on the engagements with the host nation Army. This mission 

command node was manned by the 25th ID. This was a proof of principle providing forward in6
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theater mission command for Army activities during future Pacific Pathways regardless of 

divisional alignment. If necessary, this command post (CP) could provide mission command for 

a contingency operation. Building these relationships is important as they shape the kind of trust

and confidence required for access in regions where no fixed U.S. headquarters exists.

Early Entry Command Post

The 25th ID EECP deployed in June and redeployed in August at the completion of Pacific 

Pathways 16-02 (Figure 4). It maintained a small footprint providing a forward-positioned 

mission command capability throughout the region. It provided limited planning but had 

reachback to the full division staff supporting from afar or, if needed, could surge forward to an 

established CP. It served as the element that could begin the planning while receiving and 

integrating the remainder of the division staff. 

Figure 4: EECP deployed in June and redeployed in August at the completion of Pacific 

Pathways 16-02

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Figure 5 depicts the 25th ID’s EECP manning for Pacific Pathways 16-02. Based on its mission 

command requirements at the time, it was task-organized heavy in logistics and current 

operations.

Figure 5: Division level EECP manning for Pacific Pathways 16-0

In addition, a sustainment task force (STF) was formed as a force package enhancement to 

coordinate RSOI activities at the multiple sea and air points of debarkation, as well as customs operations 

and various host-nation contracting functions. However, EECP, like any unit, can be task-organized 

to meet mission requirements.

CUOPS (7) G4 (2)

HHBN 36

25SB 14

413CSB 2

411CSB 1

DIVARTY 1

2-2ID 1

25CAB 1

593ESC 1

AMC 1

JCR 1

DLA 1

TOTAL 60

G-6 (11)

Protocol (1)

MFIT (3)

G-1 (2) G-2 (2) STF (14)

Medical (1)

Aid Station (2)

Contracting (3)

LNO (6)

JAG (1)

PAO (1)

Linguist (2)

An Example of an Early Entry Command Post Manning 

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25th ID EECP Considerations in the Pacific Theater:

Positioning the EECP: The 25th ID forward CP was positioned in the Philippines. The units in 

theater executing Pacific Pathways operated in three countries. It was a challenge to provide 

mission command to a BCT from a different country and in a theater with significant maritime 

terrain. It would be better to have the EECP deployed to the same country. For example, 

positioning the EECP at each port of entry would provide the EECP staff the ability to interact 

and deal with the issues of customs to deal with country team and contracting issues so the 

deployed BCT would be free to focus on its mission. Doing this would require 

additional/dedicated airlift or possibly sealift and a more mobile CP than what was currently 

deployed. 

Communications Platforms: The 25 ID EECP deployed both its WIN-T platform and its 

GATR-TAMPA expeditionary communications platform. This provided redundant capability 

which was demonstrated when it initially deployed the WIN-T system, while moving by air was 

damaged. The GATR-TAMPA was set up and provided the required communications package

on a smaller scale, but the CP was up and running while it repaired the WIN-T. Also, this 

combination of WIN-T and GATR-TAMPA provides the ability to echelon the CP during 

movement to a different location without a break in mission command. This communications

platform combination should be the standard for all divisional headquarters. 

The 25 ID EECP was essentially an ad-hoc staff. The G-3 previously identified positions to man 

its EECP. The other G-staffs and identified essential enablers had not. Also, there was no 

identified standard package of equipment associated with this EECP which caused some issues 

when it was preparing to deploy because no one knew what equipment was needed or where it 

would come from. A best practice is to identify and battle roster an (A) and (B) staff team and 

establish a minimal standard set of equipment for an early entry, no-notice deployable CP. This

type of readiness posture is not new but similar to the ready brigade construct the Army has had 

before. These staffs should also come together to train as well as inspect their equipment during 

regular exercises. This will allow the EECP to maintain a high state of readiness.

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Mission Command: Cyberspace/Networks/Information Operations

This section provides insights, lessons and best practices to how USARPAC sets and enabled its 

communication networks.

Regional Hub Nodes (RHNs) are primary communication structures enabling mission command 

systems, in a theater, to talk to each other. RHN’s are the largest transport nodes for the 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) network. Strategically located at five 

Department of Defense Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) locations globally, they enable the 

Army to deploy forces anywhere in the world in support of contingency operations, disaster 

relief, or national emergency response. USARPAC’s RHN is located in Okinawa, Japan. In 

addition to this structure, divisional and brigade size units deployed during Pacific Pathways 

have employed an expeditionary communications package (TAMPA microwave satellite 

terminals and GATR-inflatable and back packable antenna system) which provided 

capabilities/features supporting their mission during Pacific Pathways. These systems also

provide a redundant communication capability if the WIN-T were to become non-operational

and will be discussed later in this section.

Building Network Support Relationships. Planning/coordinating and building relationships is 

critical when establishing and maintaining networks in support of theater operations. The 311th 

Signal Command understood the importance of building relationships with its subordinate 

commands in order to understand the support requirements. The 311th Signal Command as well 

as 25 ID G-6 put a lot of effort in the development of relationships with units and agencies that 

provide communications support within and external to the command. This was key in 

understanding the communications support requirements for the 25 ID. The division G-6 officer 

established a liaison officer (LNO) system with those agencies by putting a warrant officer at the 

regional hub node to help engineer and establish communications links as well as 

troubleshooting. This relationship ensured there was an understanding on the communications

requirements, network support, and troubleshooting to units engaged in contingencies. This 

worked well in establishing and troubleshooting links for the 25th ID during Pacific Pathways. 

The division identified multiple challenges in standing up the network to support mission 

command for the Pacific Pathways exercise. 25 ID planners have to deal with a vast area of 

operations, over one million square miles as well as interoperability with joint/coalition forces. 

During the planning process, the division identified the capabilities, and requirements and 

coordinated with different agencies for support. The division did not have authority or 

permissions to adjust network configuration with most of the network supporting the AOR, so

the coordination and relationship building was key. The division sent a LNO to the regional hub 

node (RHN) in Okinawa to build relationships and to assist RHN in establishing the connection. 

The LNO was placed at the RHN to ensure understanding on the unit’s communications 

requirements and for connectivity. In addition, the relationship with the RHN organization 

assisted with professional development of Soldiers and officers. 

Throughout the command, the division established relationships with its signal support, 

USARPAC, 311th Signal Command, and 516th Theater Signal Brigade to better understand their 

requirements and assist in troubleshooting. Providing LNOs helped with the introduction of new 

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capabilities, an expeditionary communications package, and configuring the network to support 

division operations. Units deploying into the Pacific AOR should seek to replicate this 

relationship-building prior to entry.

Cyberspace Activities

Over the last decade of war, we have experienced the impacts of cyberspace activities on 

operations. Cyberspace activities affected military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pacific, and 

Europe. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA) is a complex joint enabler that is often 

misunderstood by commanders and staffs. This creates a challenge for commanders and staffs to 

effectively employ and manage cyberspace capabilities in support operations. Electronic warfare 

(EW) is a force multiplier that is not limited to just defense of networks, but also includes all 

aspects of offensive and defensive cyberspace capabilities. CEMA must be controlled to 

deny/exploit systems/networks used by our adversaries while protecting friendly 

systems/networks. USARPAC, through multiple exercises, has mitigated the impacts of 

cyberspace threats on its operations through training and establishing cyberspace standard 

operating procedures.

Cyberspace SOP. Units with established cyberspace SOPs have mitigated the effects of 

phishing attempts. Battle drills ensure units can respond to phishing attempts as well as report 

and employ the regional cyber center’s capabilities in support of division operations. Units 

(corps/div/BCT) have limited capabilities to combat the threat within the network and must rely 

on procedures and processes (SOPs) to provide the first line of defense in cyberspace. An 

effective SOP integrates the capabilities of the regional cyber center to assist and provide the 

required tools and skill sets to identify, isolate, extract, and monitor the threat within the network 

and cyberspace. Observations from Yama Sakura and Pacific Pathway exercises showed the 

benefits of developing cyber/EW SOPs to address threats. The unit was able to mitigate the 

threat while continuing operations through its SOPs and battle drills. 

CEMA Working Group. Conducting CEMA working groups in a multinational environment is 

a best practice for units. CEMA working groups are key in developing situational awareness of 

the cyberspace as well as synchronizing CEMA efforts in support of the mission. Working 

groups enhance the unit’s ability to integrate and synchronize cyber capabilities into the 

operations. The units were able to track cyber activities and determine the threat to operations as 

well as request additional support from the regional cyber center (RCC). Developing an 

allied/partner unit CEMA working group enhanced the unit’s ability to integrate cyberspace 

capabilities into operations and was part of the battle rhythm. The CEMA working group, led by 

the CEMA cell, should include elements from the staff, network operations (NETOPS), 

information operations (IO), spectrum management, staff judge advocate (SJA), other staff 

elements as well as partner units. CEMA workgroups provide a good forum to conduct bilateral 

information sharing. The working group should cover overall operations for situational 

awareness and orchestrate cyber capabilities to support the following:

 Nomination of targets in support the operations 

 Covered target guidance

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 List priority of targets in support of operations

 Synchronized targets

 Cyber update on threat, social engineering (phishing). During the working group, the 

NETOPS member recommended upgrade to cyber threat due to social engineering 

attempts 

Regional Cyberspace Center (RCC). Units must coordinate for RCC support to the exercise or 

operation. The RCC is an enabler that can provide tools and skills to enhance the unit’s defensive 

cyberspace operations (DCO) and offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The RCC provides 

support to the exercise play as well as monitoring the real-world threat.

 Regional Cyberspace Center Pacific (RCCP) established a good working relationship 

with the USARJ and I Corps through Yama Sakura and Pacific Pathways exercises. 

RCCP brings cyber tools and skills sets to monitor, isolate, and extract threats in the 

network. In addition, the RCC can provide/coordinate for offensive cyber capabilities. 

The RCC is part of the networks operations section in the G-6’s network operations 

control (NOC), providing cyberspace capabilities (tools) and expertise in the defense of 

the networks as well as reachback capability with agencies. Coordination and 

collaboration is key in identifying the resources needed to address the requirements to 

support the exercise. During all exercises like Yama Sakura, the network that supports 

the operations provides an opportunity for the adversary to learn our processes and 

procedures. We must ensure cyberspace support for all exercises takes this possibility 

into account and protects the network. 

 The RCCP involvement is key and factors influencing its support are:

o Building relationships between the RCCP and units requiring cyberspace support.

o Consistent involvement in theater exercise and integration into operations, not just 

major exercises. 

o Standard tool kit does not meet all requirements, tailorable cyber tool package 

required to meet requirements for the mission. 

Network Architecture Support. 

Units must establish a network that can support the CP when operating over vast distances and 

provide reachback capability to home-station installation through the RHN. Managing the 

network over vast distances creates challenges with connectivity, interoperability, and defense of 

the network. Identifying communications and information requirements will assist the unit’s G-6 

in building the network to support operations and obtain additional resources. To assist in 

network management, units must understand the importance of building relationships with their 

subordinate commands in order to understand the support requirements and how to manage the 

network. This is key in understanding the communications support requirements and standing up 

an effective NETOPS.

Network Operations (NETOPS) Updates. NETOPS updates with partner units provides a good 

vehicle to manage and synchronize communications assets in support of the unit’s mission. The 

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NETOPS updates provides a good forum for sharing information and teaching our partners. The 

updates should assist units in gaining situational understanding of the network and cyber 

activities throughout the AOR. Challenges the unit faces include system interoperability, 

network management, information sharing, and security policies. Tools used to manage the 

network must address the different networks used to support the operation. In most cases, the 

partner units will go to a common ground network or system to provide situational awareness 

information and enhance understanding. 

Partners’ NETOPS updates provide situational awareness of the network and updates on support 

to operations. An update with a visual display provides clarity to issues, statuses, and 

troubleshooting. The update should cover the overall operations situation and network/cyber 

statuses in support of the operation. The cyberspace section should brief cyber activities during 

the last 24 hours as well as action taken against the threat. The cyber section provides analysis of 

social engineering activities/phishing attempts and makes recommendations that address 

information operations condition (INFOCON) status. 

Collocated NETOPS. Collocated NETOPS provide better control and situational awareness of 

the network. Collocated partners’ NETOPS will enhance information sharing on network 

operations, network troubleshooting, and defensive cyber operations (DCO). The collocation of 

RCC elements in the NETOPS provided a good capability for network/ cyber monitoring 

capabilities. The RCC element provides tools for network monitoring as well as tools to enhance 

situational awareness of the network. The bilateral NETOPS enhanced collaboration and 

coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. In addition, bilateral NETOPS provided a good 

vehicle to educate the NETOPS section on U.S. and Japanese processes and procedures.

Spectrum Management. Spectrum management coordination and working with the host nation 

is critical in identifying frequency requirements and parameters in which units will have to 

operate. Planning, collaboration, and coordinating as early as possible with the host nation will 

ensure the unit’s success operating in a constricted frequency environment. 

I Corps spectrum manager plans and coordinates with the host-nation counterpart to provide 

spectrum management expertise to work any frequency conflicts. Spectrum managers participate 

in unit working group meetings that require frequencies for operations as well as electronic 

warfare. The spectrum management team provides reports on spectrum activities and frequency

management operations to NETOPS and CEMA workgroups. 

The spectrum management team provides spectrum updates to include a current spectrum 

interference report with the range of frequencies that impact forces. In addition, they provide 

frequency ranges to operate to avoid interference and support operations. 

I Corps spectrum manager explained the frequency management process and showed the impacts 

of the frequency spectrum on the operation and systems. This enhanced understanding and

provided a good environment for mentorship/education of staff and partners. 

Data Exchange. To avoid conflicts with information flow and understanding, units must address 

data exchange/information sharing requirements with our partners. Identifying the 

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communication network used with our partners in advance of any deployment will assist the unit 

in establishing requirements for sharing information. There are common networks used to share 

information between the allied partners. CENTRIX-J provided the common operational picture 

for the allied/joint partners and a tool for staff work. Web and SharePoint applications provide

useful platforms to conduct staff work and share information between allied partners.

Expeditionary Communications Package. Integrating the expeditionary communications

systems/package into the unit’s operations for early entry was a best practice. To address the 

challenges of supporting movement into country and over vast distances, the G-6 at the division 

used an expeditionary communications construct to establish a communications network to build 

on as communications assets arrived into the units AOR. The expeditionary communication 

package provided quality NIPR/SIPR and voice communications for the DTAC moving into 

location.

The division leveraged Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and RHN assets to provide 

the backbone and reachback capabilities for the exercises. The expeditionary communications 

construct provided reachback for services, reducing the number of personnel needed forward. 

The expeditionary package was small enough to be commercial air deployable, providing 

flexibility and reducing resources to set up and maintain. Due to the size of the package, it can 

easily fit on a C-17 (U.S. Air Force cargo airplane) to support the DTAC and BCTs. The 

expeditionary communications package provided connectivity from the units located in remote 

areas (Indonesian and Malaysia) to the RHN and reachback to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, for 

services.

The expeditionary communications package (TAMPA microwave satellite terminals and GATRinflatable and back packable antenna system) provided capabilities/features that supported the 

division’s mission during Pacific Pathways exercises. Expeditionary communications package

(TAMPA and GATR) provided communications support and benefits to the unit:

 User owned/ operated, easy to operate by Soldiers of all MOSs

 Training on placing systems into operations simple - no field service representative 

 Used existing capabilities from DISA which supported reachback to home station 

(Hawaii)

 Leveraged DISA and RHN assets 

 Provided the division with reachback capabilities to services

 Mobile: deployable via commercial/military air 

 Package can be tailored to meet the unit’s missions

 Easy to use, less people required forward

 More flexible for CP operations and movement

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Figure 6: Tampa and GATR microwave satellite terminals

Communication Security (COMSEC). COMSEC in a multinational environment is 

challenging for units due to incompatibility with COMSEC versions and radio systems. Tactical 

communication in support of operations must be encrypted to provide OPSEC and share 

information in a secure manner. Unit G-3 and G-6 staffs should ensure COMSEC requirements 

are understood by all participating units/countries and tested prior to exercise/operations.

Best Practices to Support Network Troubleshooting and Enhance Helpdesk Operations

Network Coordination. Units must know who can assist in fixing network issues in their AOR. 

Units must be aware that elements/units/agencies that can make the network functional and 

adaptive are not in the unit’s chain of command. Therefore, unit commanders and chiefs of staffs 

should ensure they conduct coordination with these entities as early as possible in the planning 

process as soon as possible. When interfacing with partner’s or host nation’s communications

networks, units should coordinate to ensure access (configuration, permissions and policies) is 

possible. 

LNOs. Place LNOs at supporting units/agencies that provide network support. LNOs help units 

develop and maintain relationships with supporting agencies. This facilitates the establishment of 

reachback capabilities with subject matter experts (SMEs) to support help desk operations and 

network troubleshooting. 

Relationships. The G-6 conducts key leader engagements with senior signal leaders of 

supporting agencies to make them aware of the division’s priorities. The unit should use LNOs 

and personal relationships with the RCCP, RHN, and DISA to enhance support and bring all 

elements to an understanding of the division’s communications requirements. Corps / 

USARPAC staff should encourage and facilitate this process for any operations within the 

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Pacific AOR. In all cases, participants should seek to develop these relationships in a manner 

that will also expedite wartime networks’ establishment.

Chat Rooms. A 24/7 chat room for troubleshooting links and systems assisted the unit in 

establishing and maintaining links. The chat room provided access to SMEs within the NETOPS 

or SMEs located in Hawaii for assistance with various problems (e.g., link issues, switch/router 

configurations, mission command systems, etc.). With reachback to home station, the unit can 

access capabilities to assist in troubleshooting and other communications challenges. LNOs 

placed at the help desk back at Hawaii assisted in troubleshooting as well as providing 

understanding to home-station personnel on the unit’s operations and communication needs. 

IO in support of the theater operations:

Country Teams/Embassy. While operating in a foreign country, units must coordinate with the 

country team and embassy prior to deployment for assistance in identifying the host nation’s 

information operations parameters. Therefore, it is essential to coordinate with the country team 

to ensure the commander’s themes and messages are not in conflict with existing information 

operations campaign plans. 

Restrictions. Restriction of IO in country is challenging for units. During Pacific Pathways, 

each country had a unique information environment. The rules and authorities governing each 

nation reside with the U.S. Ambassador to that country. In order to achieve nonlethal effects 

(MISO, CA, PAO, and COMCAM operations), the unit must gain approval from the chief-of 

mission prior to its deployment. Coordination with the embassy and country team is critical in 

these areas prior to a unit’s deployment/rotation to gain the right approval and resources. The 

country teams can provide tangible, real-world effects with regards to easing restrictions while 

maintaining exercise fidelity.

IO Working Group. Partner units conducted a joint information operations working group 

which enhanced information operations for the exercise. Developing a partner unit IO working 

group will enhance the unit’s ability to integrate information-related capabilities (IRC) into 

operations. Allied/partner IO working group meetings synchronize/coordinate IRC activities and 

are an integral part of the unit’s daily battle rhythm. The IO working group, led by the IO officer, 

should include elements from the staff, CEMA, NETOPS, spectrum management, staff judge

advocate (SJA), other staff elements as well as partner units. IO workgroup provides a good 

forum to conduct information sharing.

The workgroup covered an overall operations situation and IRC statuses in support of the 

operation. In addition, the workgroup discussed messaging and the timing of the messaging to 

support the commander’s intent. The workgroup’s update covered overall operations situation 

and IRC statuses in support of the operation as well as the following:

 Running estimate of information related capabilities

 The working group synchronized IO efforts with the ongoing operations. 

 Past 24hrs/next 24hrs activities

 Targeting

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Conclusion

Setting the theater for military operations is an ASCC's core function. Mission command is an 

essential element of that responsibility and has second and third order effects across all 

warfighting functions. The USARPAC Commander sets the conditions for mission command by 

establishing clear lines of command, support relationships, authorities, and the physical network 

infrastructure which allows commanders to have the uninterrupted ability to communicate 

throughout the depth and breadth of the geographic theater. Since 2014, the USARPAC 

Commander has also developed and leveraged Pacific Pathways into a more comprehensive 

theater engagement exercise program which clearly sets and rehearses the Pacific theater mission 

command systems to achieve the end state of uninterrupted reception, staging, onward movement 

and integration (RSOI) of Army forces for employment anywhere in theater.

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