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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DARRYL FLETCHER

(AC 39358)

Lavine, Alvord, and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

revoking his probation and committing him to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for eighteen months. The defendant was charged

with violating his probation after he failed to verify his employment

with his probation officers, to complete a domestic violence treatment

program and to submit to a drug treatment program, and tested positive

for marijuana and cocaine use. On appeal, he claimed that, in the dispositional phase of the hearing, the trial court improperly inferred from the

evidence that, for nearly a year, he had eluded service of the warrant

charging him with violation of his probation, and that the court, in

imposing the sentence, substantially relied on its faulty determination

that he had avoided being arrested. Held:

1. The state could not prevail on its claim that the appeal had become moot

because there was no practical relief that could be afforded to the

defendant, who had completed his sentence for violating his probation

and had been released from the custody of the Department of Correction,

as the appeal qualified for an exception to the mootness doctrine; despite

the expiration of the defendant’s sentence, there was a reasonable possibility that, in the event that the defendant were to face a sentencing

court in the future, the court’s determination revoking his probation

and sentencing him to a period of incarceration could subject him to

prejudicial collateral consequences, and there was also a reasonable

possibility that the presence of the sentence on his criminal record

could subject him to prejudicial collateral consequences affecting his

employment opportunities and his standing in the community generally,

and this court had the ability to provide the defendant practical relief

by granting him a new dispositional hearing that could result in a more

favorable outcome.

2. The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly relied

on a fact that was not part of the record when it found that he had

tried to elude law enforcement in their efforts to serve the violation of

probation warrant was unavailing; the information on which the court

relied satisfied the requisite standard of reliability, as the court reasonably inferred from the facts that the warrant officer had made reasonable

efforts to locate the defendant but was unable to find him and that, as

a consequence, law enforcement took almost a year to serve the warrant,

and there was evidence in the record that the defendant’s whereabouts

were not readily ascertainable and that during the defendant’s probationary period, he moved frequently, did not keep probation informed of

his whereabouts and did not take any steps to make his whereabouts

known or to turn himself in with respect to the warrant, and the defendant did not demonstrate that the inference drawn by the court was

unreasonable or unjustifiable, as the court’s inference from the warrant

officer’s testimony that the warrant officer was unable to locate the

defendant for nearly a year was a logical conclusion based on the evidence and was not the product of speculation or conjecture.

Argued March 12—officially released June 26, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New Haven, and tried to the

court, B. Fischer, J.; judgment revoking the defendant’s

probation, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Laila M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).

Jennifer W. Cooper, special deputy assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s attorney, and Karen A. Roberg, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Darryl Fletcher, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32 and sentencing him to a term of incarceration of eighteen months.

The defendant claims that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the court improperly relied on

a fact that was not part of the record. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our analysis. In 1999, the defendant

was convicted of possession of narcotics with intent

to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b), possession of

narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public

school in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278a (b),

possession of marijuana in violation of General Statutes

§ 21a-279 (c), and three counts of criminal possession

of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-217c. The defendant received a total effective sentence of twenty years, execution suspended after thirteen years, followed by five years of probation. This

court affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v.

Fletcher, 63 Conn. App. 476, 777 A.2d 691, cert. denied,

257 Conn. 902, 776 A.2d 1152 (2001).

The defendant’s probationary period commenced

when he was released from incarceration on November

17, 2011.1 Among the court-ordered special conditions

of the defendant’s probation2 was that he submit to

drug screening, evaluation, and treatment and that he

obtain full-time verifiable employment.

In 2015, the defendant was arrested and charged with

violating his probation in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-32. The defendant denied the charge. The matter

was tried before the court on May 2, 2016. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory phase of the hearing, the court

found that the state had proven that the defendant had

violated several of the conditions of his probation. Specifically, the court found that the defendant did not

verify his employment with his probation officers, failed

to complete a domestic violence treatment program,

failed to submit to a drug treatment program, and tested

positive for marijuana and cocaine use. At the conclusion of the dispositional phase of the hearing, the court

terminated the defendant’s probationary status and sentenced him to serve a term of incarceration of eighteen months.3

On June 28, 2016, the defendant filed the present

appeal. The defendant does not claim that the court

erroneously determined, in the adjudicative phase of

the hearing, that he violated his probation. The defendant claims that, in the dispositional phase of the hearing, the court improperly inferred from the evidence

that, for nearly a year, he eluded service of the warrant
charging him with violating his probation.4 Moreover,

the defendant argues that, in imposing its sentence, the

court ‘‘substantially relied upon its faulty determination

that the defendant was avoiding being arrested . . . .’’

The remedy that he seeks from this court is a new

sentencing hearing.

On August 31, 2017, after the defendant filed his principal brief, the state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal

on the ground that it became moot when the defendant

was released from the custody of the Department of

Correction (department) on August 22, 2017. The state

argued that this court could no longer afford the defendant, who was challenging only the manner in which

the court imposed its sentence and not the finding that

he had violated his probation, any practical relief. In

his objection to the motion to dismiss, the defendant

acknowledged that he had been released from custody

on August 22, 2017, but argued that exceptions to the

mootness doctrine applied and that this court should

not dismiss the appeal. This court denied the state’s

motion without prejudice to the state, and permitted

the state to address the mootness issue in its brief and

the defendant to address the issue in his reply brief.

They have done so. Additional facts will be set forth

as necessary.

I

First, we address the state’s argument that the appeal

is moot because the defendant has completed his sentence. ‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must

be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [a] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . It is

well settled that [a]n issue is moot when the court can

no longer grant any practical relief.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council, 326 Conn. 40, 53–54, 161 A.3d

537 (2017). ‘‘Under such circumstances, the court would

merely be rendering an advisory opinion, instead of

adjudicating an actual, justiciable controversy.’’ State

v. Jerzy G., 326 Conn. 206, 213, 162 A.3d 692 (2017).

‘‘Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to

a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . .

Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . .

(2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . .

(3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being

adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the

determination of the controversy will result in practical

relief to the complainant.’’ Glastonbury v. Metropolitan

District Commission, 328 Conn. 326, 333, 179 A.3d 201

(2018). ‘‘[A]n actual controversy must exist not only at

the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the

pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude

an appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become

moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002). ‘‘If

there is no longer an actual controversy in which [this

court] can afford practical relief to the parties, we must

dismiss the appeal. . . . In determining mootness, the

dispositive question is whether a successful appeal

would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Medeiros v. Medeiros, 175 Conn. App. 174, 196, 167 A.3d

967 (2017).

The parties do not dispute that because the defendant

has completed his sentence, this court no longer has

the ability to reduce the number of days he must remain

incarcerated. On this ground, the state argues that this

court may not grant any practical relief and that the

appeal should be dismissed. In reply, the defendant

argues that this appeal falls within two well settled

exceptions to the mootness doctrine, namely, the collateral consequences exception as well as the exception

for appeals involving issues that are capable of repetition yet evade review.

‘‘[T]he court may retain jurisdiction when a litigant

shows that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. . . . [T]o

invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable

possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will

occur. Accordingly, the litigant must establish these

consequences by more than mere conjecture, but need

not demonstrate that these consequences are more

probable than not. This standard provides the necessary

limitations on justiciability underlying the mootness

doctrine itself. Where there is no direct practical relief

available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the

collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate,

calling for a determination whether a decision in the

case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the

future.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Reddy, 135 Conn. App. 65, 69–70, 42 A.3d 406 (2012);

see also Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219, 226, 802

A.2d 778 (2002) (litigant bears burden of demonstrating

reasonable possibility that prejudicial consequences

will occur); State v. McElveen, supra, 261 Conn. 205

(same).

The defendant argues: ‘‘The record of jail in his criminal history will stigmatize him in the community for

the rest of his life and hinder his efforts to obtain meaningful employment. And if he is ever charged with

another crime, judges and prosecutors will factor in

the defendant’s incarceration when determining a sentence.’’ Also, the defendant argues: ‘‘Although our citizens suffer greatly from the collateral consequences of

convictions, it is simply not the case that all collateral

consequences arise from the conviction alone. Any
potential employer or school admissions office would

know from the defendant’s record that he has served

time in prison. They would understand that during that

time the defendant was not learning new skills and

was not making connections within the community that

would benefit future employment. Just the fact that the

defendant’s transgressions had earned him the most

severe punishment possible in our criminal justice system, rather than a fine or more probation, will hurt him

because the stigma of incarceration is much heavier

than other, lesser sentences. . . . To suggest otherwise ignores the very real barriers that former inmates

contend with every day after they are released from jail

and return to their communities.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

Essentially, the defendant’s appeal is based on what

he claims to be error in the court’s determination to

revoke his probation. ‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized that revocation of probation hearings, pursuant

to [General Statutes] § 53a-32, are comprised of two

distinct phases, each with a distinct purpose. . . . In

the evidentiary phase, [a] factual determination by a

trial court as to whether a probationer has violated a

condition of probation must first be made. . . . In the

dispositional phase, [i]f a violation is found, a court

must next determine whether probation should be

revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation

are no longer being served.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Altajir, 123 Conn. App. 674, 680–81,

2 A.3d 1024 (2010), aff’d, 303 Conn. 304, 33 A.3d 193

(2012). The defendant argues that the court’s allegedly

erroneous finding in the dispositional phase led it to

revoke his probation and order him to serve a substantial portion of his unexecuted prison sentence. He

argues that, in the absence of the court’s error, it may

have imposed a lesser form of punishment, including

permitting him to remain on probation.

With respect to employment and his standing in the

community generally, the defendant has identified what

he believes to be a reasonable probability of prejudicial

collateral consequences that do not arise from the

court’s finding that he violated his probation, but the

fact that, in the dispositional phase of the proceeding,

the court revoked his probation and sentenced him to

a term of incarceration.5 Also, the defendant argues that

there is a reasonable probability that, if he were to be

convicted of a crime in the future, the court’s sentence

could result in his receiving greater punishment by a

future sentencing court. The defendant argues that a

future sentencing court could learn from his criminal

record that he had been sentenced to serve time in

prison for violating his probation and use this information to his detriment. The defendant argues: ‘‘A jail

sentence reveals to future sentencing courts that the

defendant failed to demonstrate [that a lesser form of

punishment was appropriate] . . . and that the beneficial aspects of [the defendant’s] probation could [not]
continue to be served by allowing the defendant to

remain on probation. . . . Such information signals to

the court that the defendant’s violations were serious

and that he was wilful, uncooperative, unable to submit

to authority, and averse to being rehabilitated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In evaluating the defendant’s arguments, we look for

guidance in relevant appellate case law. In State v. McElveen, supra, 261 Conn. 214–15, our Supreme Court concluded that, despite the fact that the sentence imposed

upon a defendant following his probation violation had

expired, it was reasonably possible that collateral consequences flowed from the fact that his probation had

been revoked. The court concluded that his appeal from

the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation

was not rendered moot due to the expiration of his

sentence, and stated: ‘‘We appreciate that there is something unsettling about looking to future involvement

with the criminal justice system as a predicate for our

determination that a case such as the present one is

not moot. Even under its more narrow application of the

collateral consequences doctrine, however, the United

States Supreme Court has relied upon collateral consequences that would arise in the event of future criminal

behavior to conclude that an otherwise moot judgment

of conviction merits review.’’ Id.

In State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 369, 944 A.2d

276 (2008), a defendant appealed from the judgment

rendered following a probation revocation proceeding

and claimed that the trial court (1) improperly found

that he had violated his probation and (2) abused its

discretion in revoking his probation. Relying on the fact

that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the underlying

offenses, thereby eliminating any live controversy about

his conduct, this court dismissed his first claim as moot.

Id. This court dismissed the second claim as moot for

lack of a live controversy because it determined that

the defendant failed to demonstrate that prejudicial

consequences flowed from the revocation of his probation. Id., 369–70. Following a grant of certification to

appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of

this court with respect to the defendant’s claim that

the trial court had abused its discretion when it revoked

his probation. Id., 370–71.

In Preston, our Supreme Court determined, initially,

that a circumstance that renders moot a claim arising

from the evidentiary phase of a revocation of probation

hearing does not necessarily render moot a claim arising

from the dispositional phase of the hearing. Id., 380.

Thereafter, the court determined that it was reasonably

possible that the defendant would suffer collateral consequences as a result of the revocation of his probation.

Id., 382–84. Relying on McElveen and other relevant

authority, the court reasoned that prejudice flowed

from the revocation of probation. Id., 383. The court,
quoting this court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 11

Conn. App. 251, 256, 527 A.2d 250 (1987), stated: ‘‘ ‘[P]robation revocation is a blemish on [the defendant’s]

prison record which will affect his job opportunities

and his standing in the community because it connotes

wrongdoing and intractability and is a burden analogous

and in addition to his criminal stigma.’ ’’ State v. Preston,

supra, 383.

Finally, in State v. Natal, 113 Conn. App. 278, 280,

966 A.2d 331 (2009), the defendant appealed from the

judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and

committing him to the custody of the Commissioner of

Correction for two years. He raised a claim related

to the adjudicative phase of the probation revocation

hearing and a claim related to the dispositional phase

of the hearing. Id. Despite the fact that the defendant’s

sentence expired during the pendency of the appeal,

this court explained that the appeal was not moot, stating: ‘‘Although the defendant’s two year sentence

appears to have expired . . . the present appeal is not

moot due to the collateral consequences doctrine. In

State v. McElveen, [supra, 261 Conn. 198], our Supreme

Court determined that subject matter jurisdiction

existed over an appeal from the revocation of probation

even though the probationer subsequently completed

his term of incarceration [during the pendency of the

appeal]. The court reasoned that there were collateral

consequences that reasonably could ensue as a result

of a probation revocation, such as a negative impact

on a defendant’s standing in the community and the

ability to secure employment. . . . Because there is a

reasonable possibility that those collateral consequences will attach in the present case, the appeal is

not moot.’’ Id., 282 n.1.

We observe that ‘‘[i]t is a fundamental sentencing

principle that a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, and largely unlimited

either as to the kind of information he may consider

or the source from which it may come. . . . The trial

court’s discretion, however, is not completely unfettered. As a matter of due process, information may be

considered as a basis for a sentence only if it has some

minimal indicium of reliability.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Huey, 199 Conn.

121, 127, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986). A defendant’s criminal

record may shed light on his willingness to conform to

socially acceptable behavior and, thus, is a relevant

factor to consider at the time of sentencing. See General

Statutes § 54-91a (c) (presentence investigation report

shall include information regarding defendant’s criminal history); State v. Garvin, 43 Conn. App. 142, 152, 682

A.2d 562 1996) (‘‘[f]or the determination of sentences,

justice generally requires consideration of more than

the particular acts for which the crime was committed

and that there be taken into account the circumstances

of the offense together with the character and propensi-
ties of the offender’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), aff’d, 242 Conn. 296, 699 A.2d 921 (1997).

A record that reflects that a defendant has violated

his probation and that probation has been revoked

sheds light on his criminal character because, as the

defendant argues, such information reflects that the

defendant’s violations were serious enough to warrant

a finding that the beneficial aspects of probation were

no longer being served. As our case law reflects, the

court’s disposition gave rise to a reasonable possibility

of prejudicial consequences for the defendant. See, e.g.,

State v. Smith, 207 Conn. 152, 161, 540 A.2d 679 (1988)

(‘‘[i]f the revocation of the defendant’s probation

stands, it may not only have an effect on his ability to

obtain probation in the future but also affect his standing in the community in its connotation of wrongdoing,

job opportunities and is a blemish on his record’’).

In the present case, the defendant challenges the

court’s exercise of discretion in the dispositional phase

of the revocation of probation hearing. See State v.

Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 185–86, 842 A.2d 567 (2004)

(abuse of discretion standard of review applies to

court’s determination in dispositional phase). On the

basis of the foregoing authority, we are persuaded that,

despite the expiration of the defendant’s sentence, there

is a reasonable possibility that, in the event that the

defendant were to face a sentencing court in the future,

the court’s determination in revoking probation and

sentencing the defendant to a period of incarceration

may subject him to prejudicial collateral consequences.

Additionally, we are persuaded that there is a reasonable possibility that, despite the expiration of the defendant’s sentence, its presence on the defendant’s

criminal record could subject him to prejudicial consequences affecting not merely his employment opportunities, but his standing in the community generally.

If the court made improper findings in the dispositional phase of the hearing and relied on such findings

in sentencing the defendant, this court has the ability

to provide the defendant practical relief by granting the

defendant a new dispositional hearing that could result

in a more favorable outcome. In light of the prejudicial

collateral consequences we have discussed, we retain

jurisdiction over the appeal despite the fact that the

defendant has completed serving his sentence. Accordingly, we reject the state’s argument that the present

appeal should be dismissed on mootness grounds.6

II

Next, we address the defendant’s claim that the court

improperly relied on a fact that was not part of the

record. We disagree.

The following additional information is relevant to

the present claim. During the dispositional phase of the

hearing, the court heard testimony from Yvonne Lee,
the defendant’s probation officer; Matthew Steinfeld, a

psychologist who provided substance abuse treatment

to the defendant following his arrest for violating his

probation; and Clint Cave, the defendant’s cousin who

had employed the defendant following his release

from prison.

In its oral ruling in the dispositional phase of the

hearing, which later became the court’s signed, written

memorandum of decision in accordance with Practice

Book § 64-1 (a), the court found in relevant part: ‘‘[Y]ou

had seven years hanging over your head. The thing that

is just surprising to me is how [flippant] you seem to

be with probation. . . . You . . . missed countless

meetings with them. You never kept them posted on

your address here in Connecticut. You kept moving

along. You were very evasive with them. You went out

of state without their permission. You had violations

where you didn’t follow through with [a program

offered by] Catholic Charities. . . .

‘‘[There were problems with the] nonviolence program where . . . you were given two opportunities.

You didn’t follow through. You had positive marijuana

use in September and October in 2014. . . . Again, this

is when you’re meeting with probation. . . .

‘‘[I]t shouldn’t have taken you all these opportunities

to finally, quote, unquote, get it. And there’s a price to

be paid for that. Again . . . anybody who is on probation is on thin ice. You know, in many ways, you were

fortunate they didn’t violate you, and I know they filed

a warrant or one was signed in November of 2014,

and they couldn’t find you, and it took them a year to

eventually serve the warrant on it. You had multiple

arrests while on probation, and you had domestic matters, violation of protective orders. You had driving

suspensions. So you [engaged in] numerous [types of]

criminal activity during your course of probation. Listen, to your credit, the testimony from Dr. Steinfeld

was positive for you. He did indicate that you were a

good part of the group, that you graduated from the

group, that your testing for the drugs [had] been going

down, and he felt that . . . his plan and their treatment

of you has [had] a positive effect on you. But as you

heard earlier, you’re in violation. There’s many violations here. . . .

‘‘And you heard the probation officers. They don’t

want to . . . put you back on probation because you

never showed up at half the meetings. You never followed through with what you were supposed to do. I

mean, you dropped the ball countless, countless times.

So there’s a penalty to be paid for that. So I feel out of

all the facts I heard at this hearing, the arguments of

the attorneys, and your comments, that a degree of

incarceration is appropriate.’’ The court then revoked

probation and imposed a sentence of eighteen months

of incarceration.
The defendant argues that the court improperly found

that a warrant officer, or members of law enforcement

generally, had looked for him for a year to serve the

violation of probation warrant on him. He argues that

the court substantially relied on this improper finding

in reaching its disposition. The defendant argues that

‘‘the record reflects that the warrant was not served

for nearly a year after it was signed, [but] there was

no evidence that the authorities ever searched for the

defendant. Moreover, there was no evidence that the

defendant tried to elude capture during this period.’’7

The defendant correctly acknowledges that he did not

object to the court’s reliance on its findings at the time

of trial. He seeks review of this unpreserved claim under

the bypass rule set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn.

233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).8 We will review the

claim under Golding because the record is adequate

for review and the claim implicates the defendant’s

due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of

improper factors or erroneous information. See State

v. Thompson, 197 Conn. 67, 77, 495 A.2d 1054 (1985).

‘‘The standard of review of the trial court’s decision at

the [dispositional] phase of the revocation of probation

hearing is whether the trial court exercised its discretion properly by reinstating the original sentence and

ordering incarceration. . . . In determining whether

there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable

presumption should be given in favor of the correctness

of the court’s ruling. . . . Reversal is required only

where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done. . . .

‘‘In this exercise of broad discretion, however, the

trial court must continue to comport with the requirements of due process. The United States Supreme Court

has recognized that [b]oth the probationer . . . and

the [s]tate have interests in the accurate finding of fact

and the informed use of discretion—the probationer

. . . to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken

away and the [s]tate to make certain that it is neither

unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the

community. . . . Our review of whether the trial court

engaged in such an informed use of discretion . . . is

in turn governed by the well established standards for

reviewing a trial court’s exercise of similarly broad discretion at sentencing in a criminal trial.

‘‘It is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry

broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind

of information he may consider or the source from

which it may come. . . . In keeping with this principle,

we have recognized that [a] sentencing judge has very

broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the

statutory limits and in exercising that discretion he may

and should consider matters that would not be admissi-
ble at trial. . . . Generally, due process does not

require that information considered by the trial judge

prior to sentencing meet the same high procedural standard as evidence introduced at trial. Rather, judges may

consider a wide variety of information. . . .

‘‘We have cautioned, however, that [t]he trial court’s

discretion . . . is not completely unfettered. As a matter of due process, information may be considered as

a basis for a sentence only if it has some minimal indicium of reliability. . . . As we have long recognized,

in keeping with due process, a defendant may not be

sentenced on the basis of improper factors or erroneous

information. . . . Further, courts must be concerned

not merely when a sentencing judge has relied on

demonstrably false information, but [also] when the

sentencing process created a significant possibility that

misinformation infected the decision. . . . Nonetheless, [a]s long as the sentencing judge has a reasonable,

persuasive basis for relying on the information which

he uses to fashion his ultimate sentence, an appellate

court should not interfere with his discretion. . . .

‘‘In considering a claim that the trial court relied

on unreliable information at sentencing, we therefore

conduct a two-pronged inquiry: first, did the information at issue contain some minimal indicium of reliability; second, if it did not, did the trial court substantially

rely on this improper information in fashioning its ultimate sentence? . . .

‘‘With respect to the threshold inquiry into reliability,

we note that [t]here is no simple formula for determining what information considered by a sentencing judge

is sufficiently reliable to meet the requirements of due

process. The question must be answered on a case

by case basis.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Altajir, 303

Conn. 304, 315–18, 33 A.3d 193 (2012).

Having set forth applicable principles, we turn to the

evidence before the court. At the violation of probation

trial, the defendant’s probation officer, Lee, testified

that prior to drafting an arrest warrant in November,

2014, she warned the defendant that he was in danger

of a violation. Lee testified that the warrant was not

served on the petitioner until October, 2015. She testified, as well, that, after he was found to be in violation,

she told the defendant that, because of his violation,

he did not have to ‘‘report to probation.’’ Additionally,

Lee testified that the defendant did not make any efforts

with her to turn himself in on the violation of probation

warrant. The court questioned Lee about the delay in

serving the warrant, as follows:

‘‘The Court: Ms. Lee . . . did you file a violation of

probation warrant against this defendant in October,

2014?

‘‘[The Witness]: I believe . . . [November 12, 2014]
was when we decided to go forward with the violation.

‘‘The Court: So when you say you made a decision

to go forward with the violation, do you actually get a

warrant and sort of hold it in abeyance to see how

the defendant responds? I’m just trying to understand

your testimony.

‘‘[The Witness]: Well, we go forward. We write the

warrant, and then it goes to the court to get signed

off on.

‘‘The Court: All right. So that was in October of 2014?

‘‘[The Witness]: November of 2014.

‘‘The Court: All right. . . . And what happened to

the warrant? . . .

‘‘[The Witness]: The warrant will go to our warrant

officer. They make attempts to have it served.

‘‘The Court: So you had a warrant signed back in

2014?

‘‘[The Witness]: [It] was signed . . . .

‘‘[The Prosectutor]: Your Honor, I believe the warrant

was signed by the court on November 28, 2014. . . .

Signed by Judge Clifford.

‘‘The Court: So then what happened to that warrant?

‘‘[The Witness]: The warrant sat, and they made it—

‘‘The Court: Sat where?

‘‘[The Witness]: It sits with our warrant officer. They

try to make attempts to get in contact with the defendant to turn himself in, and they also I believe get in

contact with the local [police departments] to make

attempts to go—

‘‘The Court: But you’re now his probation officer at

this time?

‘‘[The Witness]: I am. Yes.

‘‘The Court: And you told him, you know, the judge

approved the warrant for the violations we’ve gone

through. And . . . that warrant was not served on him

. . . for another [twelve] months?

‘‘[The Witness]: That’s correct.

‘‘The Court: And is that usual?

‘‘[The Witness]: No. Usually they’re served much

quicker.

‘‘The Court: Is there a reason why it wasn’t served

on him for [twelve] months? . . . Did you still hold

back on the warrant to see if he would sort of respond

to the requests and the conditions of his probation

or not?

‘‘[The Witness]: Oh, no, not at all.

‘‘The Court: So it had . . . no connection to that?
‘‘[The Witness]: No.

‘‘The Court: You had a warrant signed in 2014, and

it just so happens it just wasn’t served on him until 2015?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: A year later?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Even though you saw him several times

during that time frame?

‘‘[The Witness]: No, I didn’t see him several times. No.

‘‘The Court: Okay. Why didn’t you see him several

times during that time frame?

‘‘[The Witness]: Once the violation is issued . . . his

probation is put on pause. . . .

‘‘The Court: Doesn’t he have the same conditions

of probation even though . . . the warrant is served

upon him?

‘‘[The Witness]: Unless it’s ordered a supervised violation, which that didn’t occur until the warrant was

served in October of 2015.

‘‘The Court: So then when . . . it’s served upon him,

this defendant, like any other defendant, then [he] is

obliged to comply with the conditions of probation during the pendency of the violation; is that correct?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: So . . . it sort of [is] in limbo . . . from

October, 2014, until service about [eleven] months

later?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes.’’

The evidence supports several conclusions. First, the

defendant’s arrest warrant was issued on November 28,

2014, but it was not served on him until October, 2015.

Second, the defendant was aware that he was at risk

of violating his probation, learned that a warrant had

been issued, and did not take any steps to turn himself

in with respect to the warrant. Third, the usual practice

of Lee’s office is to forward arrest warrants to a warrant

officer who, perhaps in conjunction with local law

enforcement, will serve it quickly. Fourth, the lengthy

delay in serving the warrant on the defendant was

unusual and not attributable to Lee or her colleagues.

Additionally, among the findings made by the court in

the dispositional phase of the hearing that the defendant

does not challenge are the court’s findings that, prior

to the time that the violation of probation warrant was

issued, he failed to keep probation informed of his

whereabouts, he continued to ‘‘mov[e] along,’’ and he

was ‘‘very evasive’’ with probation.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, we conclude that

the information on which the court relied satisfied the
requisite standard of reliability. Specifically, the court

reasonably inferred from the facts that the warrant officer made reasonable efforts to locate the defendant but

was unable to find him and, consequently, it took law

enforcement nearly a year to serve the warrant that

had been issued in November of 2014. There was evidence that the defendant’s whereabouts were not

readily ascertainable. Lee testified that the defendant

was no longer required to comply with the conditions

of his probation between the time that the violation of

probation warrant was issued in November, 2014, until

the time that the warrant ultimately was served on him

in October, 2015. Nonetheless, the evidence supported a

finding that, during the defendant’s probationary period

that commenced in November, 2011, he moved frequently and, contrary to the conditions of his probation,

did not keep probation informed of his whereabouts.

Moreover, after the defendant learned of the warrant,

he did not take any steps to make his whereabouts

known or turn himself in with respect to the warrant.

‘‘The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to

be reasonable and logical.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Berger, 249 Conn. 218, 224, 733 A.2d

156 (1999). The defendant has not demonstrated that

the inference drawn by the court was unreasonable or

unjustifiable. The court’s inference, that the warrant

officer was unable to locate the defendant for nearly a

year, was not the product of speculation or conjecture;

it was a logical conclusion on the basis of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

defendant has failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation exists and that it deprived him of a

fair trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant acknowledges that he also was placed on probation as a

result of his conviction in a separate criminal matter. In a separate probation

revocation proceeding that occurred on May 13, 2016, which took place

following the hearing at issue in the present case, his probation in that

matter was terminated after he admitted that he had violated his conditions

of probation.

2 Prior to his probationary period, the defendant signed a written ‘‘conditions of probation’’ form that set forth standard conditions of probation as

well as the court-ordered special conditions of probation, thereby representing that his probation officer had reviewed the conditions with him, that

he understood the conditions, and that he would abide by the conditions.

3 The defendant, exercising his right of allocution, admitted that he had

used marijuana during his probationary period, stated that he was trying

to comply with his probation requirements, and asked the court for ‘‘a

little leniency.’’

4

In his principal brief, the defendant also argued that the court erroneously

found and relied on the fact that he had failed to keep probation informed

of his address. In his reply brief, the defendant expressly abandoned this

aspect of his claim.

5 We note that the defendant already has suffered from what he believes

to be the negative effects of incarceration as a result of his being sentenced

in 1999 to a term of incarceration for his commission of the underlying

crimes. We interpret his argument to mean that the additional sentence of

incarceration that resulted from the present probation revocation hearing
caused him further prejudice with respect to employment and his standing

in the community generally.

6

In light of our conclusion that the present appeal falls within the collateral

consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, we need not consider

the defendant’s reliance on the exception for appeals involving issues that

are capable of repetition yet evade review.

7 As reflected in our discussion of the defendant’s argument, part of his

argument is that the court found and relied on the fact that he had ‘‘tried

to elude capture.’’ The court did not expressly find that the defendant

attempted to elude capture. The court found that the warrant officer was

unable to find the defendant and that this had resulted in a lengthy delay

in serving the warrant on him.

8 As modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015),

the Golding doctrine provides that ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of

constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of

error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of

a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged

constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any

one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail. The appellate tribunal

is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40. ‘‘The

defendant bears the responsibility for providing a record that is adequate

for review of his claim of constitutional error. . . . The defendant also

bears the responsibility of demonstrating that his claim is indeed a violation

of a fundamental constitutional right. . . . Finally, if we are persuaded that

the merits of the defendant’s claim should be addressed, we will review it

and arrive at a conclusion as to whether the alleged constitutional violation

. . . exists and whether it . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 240–41.