UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4192

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHN THOMAS NELON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (7:10-cr-00041-MFU-1)

Submitted: September 19, 2018 Decided: September 21, 2018

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Frederick T. Heblich, Jr., Interim Federal Public Defender, Charlottesville, Virginia, 

Christine Madeleine Lee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas T. Cullen, United States 

Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

John Thomas Nelon, Jr., appeals the eight-month sentence imposed upon the 

revocation of his supervised release. Nelon contends that the district court imposed a

plainly unreasonable sentence, primarily because the sentence was greater than necessary 

to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation 

of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We 

will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not “plainly 

unreasonable.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). “When 

reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine 

whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th 

Cir. 2010). In making this determination, “we strike a more deferential appellate posture 

than we do when reviewing original sentences.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] 

factors.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (footnotes omitted); 

see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) (listing statutory factors applicable to revocation context). 

“And a revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently states a 

proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” 

Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). We presume 
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that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines policy statement range is substantively 

reasonable. United States v. Gibbs, 738 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018).

Here, the district court correctly calculated Nelon’s policy statement range and 

sentenced him within that range and the applicable statutory maximum. The court 

considered the parties’ arguments and Nelon’s lengthy allocution and provided a 

reasoned explanation for the sentence it imposed, grounded in the applicable § 3553(a) 

factors.

Nelon argues that his eight-month term of imprisonment was plainly unreasonable, 

as his violations were not willful, and a term of intensive supervision in a halfway house 

would have been sufficient to satisfy the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Nelon asserts that 

his violations indisputably resulted from his drug addiction and were otherwise explained 

by his difficulty in obtaining transportation. We conclude, however, that Nelon fails to 

rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness accorded his sentence.

Nelon’s addiction and transportation difficulties no doubt contributed to his 

postrelease conduct, but the district court permissibly concluded that these circumstances

did not fully mitigate his responsibility for his violations. Notably, the probation officer 

testified that he could have assisted Nelon in obtaining transportation and job placement 

had Nelon kept the probation officer apprised of his whereabouts. 

Nelon’s argument also overlooks the more flagrant conduct underlying his 

violations. The court acknowledged Nelon’s struggle with drug abuse and transportation 

difficulties but emphasized Nelon’s need for deterrence in light of his failure to 

meaningfully comply with his supervision requirements and his unauthorized 
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disappearance. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), 3583(e). The court also 

appropriately focused on Nelon’s breach of its trust in failing to take advantage of

treatment opportunities offered as an alternative to revocation and, instead, absconding 

from supervision. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 641 (recognizing that revocation sentence

“should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district 

court acted within its discretion in determining that a sentence of imprisonment at the 

middle of the policy statement range was appropriate.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED