SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4242-15T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RASHAWN M. ALEXANDER, a/k/a

RASHAN ALEXANDER and RASHAWNN

M. ALEXANDER,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted September 18, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment 

No. 15-06-0840.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Molly O'Donnell Meng, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Jenny M. Hsu, Deputy 

Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 18, 2017
2 A-4242-15T2

Defendant appeals from a March 11, 2016 judgment of conviction 

following a guilty plea for second-degree certain persons not to 

have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). He argues the trial judge 

should have granted his motion to suppress. We disagree and 

affirm.

On November 16, 2014, police responded to a call that an 

individual had forced his way into a home in Florence Township and 

dragged the homeowner out of the house into the street. When 

police arrived, the homeowner identified defendant by name, 

informed police defendant assaulted him, and warned defendant had 

a weapon. Sergeant Jonathan Greenberg observed defendant running 

away, drove his vehicle into an alley near defendant, exited, made 

eye contact with defendant, observed him holding a gun in his 

right hand, and ordered him to stop. 

Defendant did not stop, and the officers pursued him to a

house, where defendant went inside. The officers followed and 

announced themselves at the door when defendant's grandmother 

answered. She allowed the officers to enter, and family members 

told the officers that defendant was in the basement. Defendant 

came upstairs and was arrested. Sergeant Greenberg and another 

officer, who had arrived for backup, conducted a search of his 

person, but did not find any evidence.
3 A-4242-15T2

Sergeant Greenberg then entered the basement to search for

evidence while the other officer remained with defendant. 

Defendant loudly voiced his objection to the search. As he entered 

the basement, Sergeant Greenberg noticed one round of ammunition 

on the floor but was unable to examine anything further because 

he had to quickly return upstairs when defendant caused a commotion 

in the kitchen. Sergeant Greenberg and the other officer 

restrained defendant, escorted him from the residence, and placed 

him in a responding police car. Sergeant Greenberg then returned 

to the residence and requested consent to search it. He initially 

requested consent from defendant's grandmother, but she explained 

that defendant's father was the actual homeowner. After Sergeant 

Greenberg read defendant's father a standardized consent form, he 

acknowledged his consent and signed the form. Sergeant Greenberg 

then re-entered the basement, where he found and recovered a rifle, 

a handgun, ammunition, and some PCP.

Defendant was indicted for second-degree possession of a 

firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree 

possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(d); unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); 

aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); burglary, N.J.S.A.

2C:18-2(a)(1); criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(b)(2); 

resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(b); possession of a 
4 A-4242-15T2

controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); and 

certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). 

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, and on June 9, 2015, 

the trial judge granted the motion without prejudice. On June 30, 

2015, defendant was re-charged with the same offenses as the first 

indictment, with the exception of third-degree possession of a 

firearm for an unlawful purpose.

Defendant moved to suppress evidence found in the warrantless 

search of the basement. The court conducted a suppression hearing 

on August 24, 2015 and heard the testimony of Sergeant Greenberg 

regarding the events leading to the arrest and search. The judge 

denied the motion in an oral opinion, finding the owner gave valid 

consent to search the home, defendant was lawfully removed from 

the home after being arrested, and the situation was "infused with 

exigency." The judge also found defendant's objection to the 

search could not override the owner's consent.

After denial of the suppression motion, defendant pled guilty 

to second-degree certain persons not to have weapons and was 

sentenced to nine years with a five-year term of parole 

ineligibility. The remaining charges were dismissed. This appeal 

followed. On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I. THE SEARCHES OF THE BASEMENT WERE 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ALL OF THE EVIDENCE 

RECOVERED MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS THE FRUIT OF 
5 A-4242-15T2

THOSE UNLAWFUL SEARCHES. U.S. Const., amends. 

IV, XIV; N.J. Const. art 1., par. 7.

A. [Sgt.] Greenberg Did Not Have A Valid 

Basis To Enter Or Search The Basement 

Before Obtaining Consent.

B. [The Homeowner's] Consent, Given After 

The Search Began, Did Not Justify The 

Initial Unlawful Intrusion.

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "uphold the factual 

findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those 

findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence on the 

record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting 

State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those findings warrant 

particular deference when they are 'substantially influenced by 

[the trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and 

to have a "feel" of the case, which the reviewing court cannot 

enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 15) 

(alteration in original). "To the extent that the trial court's 

determination rests upon a legal conclusion, we conduct a de novo, 

plenary review." Ibid. (citing State v. J.D., 211 N.J. 344, 354 

(2012); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). 

Both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions protect 

individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. 

Const. amend IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Because the search at 

issue was executed without a warrant, it is presumptively invalid; 
6 A-4242-15T2

to overcome this presumption, the State must show the search falls 

within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant 

requirement. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 

93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973). The State 

bears the burden of demonstrating the seizure was legal. State 

v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 133 (1983). Here, the trial judge found 

the search was legal for two reasons: the homeowners' valid consent 

to search and the exigent circumstances of securing the premises 

as safe for a minor child in the house. 

Defendant argues Sergeant Greenberg did not have "a valid 

basis to enter or search the basement before obtaining consent." 

The trial judge found the homeowner gave valid consent, and 

defendant does not contest the validity of the consent later 

obtained. Defendant argues there was no consent when the sergeant 

went into the basement the first time prior to having defendant 

removed, and the subsequent consent given by the homeowner was not 

sufficient to allow the search and seizure of evidence. 

A search conducted without a warrant can be valid if it is 

an exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches. 

State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 552 (2008). The existence of 

exigent circumstances is one such exception. See ibid. To find 

exigent circumstances, the court should consider
7 A-4242-15T2

the degree of urgency and the amount of time 

needed to obtain the warrant; the reasonable 

belief that the evidence was about to be lost, 

destroyed, or removed from the scene; the 

severity or seriousness of the offense 

involved; the possibility that a suspect was 

armed or dangerous; and the strength or 

weakness of the underlying probable cause 

determination. 

[State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 292 (2013)

(citation omitted).]

The trial judge found the exigency of the circumstances 

supported the sergeant entering the basement based upon the 

presence of multiple individuals and a child in the house, when 

the officers knew a gun was likely in the basement somewhere. We 

have placed special emphasis on the possession and potential use 

of firearms to present exigent circumstances. State v. Wilson, 

362 N.J. Super. 319, 332-33 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J.

250 (2003); see State v. De La Paz, 337 N.J. Super. 181, 195-96 

(App. Div.), certif. denied, 168 N.J. 295 (2001). "Our state law 

has long recognized the special significance of firearms and the 

threat they represent to public safety." Wilson, supra, 362 N.J. 

Super. at 333 (citing State in re H.B., 75 N.J. 243, 245-47 

(1977)). "A deadly weapon poses a special threat to both the 

public and police, and its presence is a significant factor in 

evaluating whether there are exigent circumstances which justify 

a warrantless search." Ibid.
8 A-4242-15T2

Moreover, "exigent circumstances [created by the presence of 

a deadly weapon] do not dissipate simply because the particular 

occupants of the vehicle may have been removed from the car, 

arrested, or otherwise restricted in their freedom of movement." 

Id. at 334 (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 234 (1981)).

We found that "[t]he police were confronted with a dangerous 

situation which was not dissipated by the arrest and search of the 

suspects. There remained an urgent need to locate a missing and, 

in all probability, loaded handgun to eliminate the potential for 

deadly harm in a vulnerable public area." Id. at 336. Here,

exigency was created by the need to locate a handgun missing in 

the presence of a child and other members of defendant's family, 

which police reasonably believed to be in the home of defendant's 

family.

Defendant argues the officers failed to satisfy the 

requirements for a protective sweep; however, the trial judge did

not rely on the doctrine of protective sweep. "A 'protective 

sweep' is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an 

arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or 

others. It is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection 

of those places in which a person might be hiding." State v. 

Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 546 (2016) (quoting State v. Davila, 203 N.J.

97, 113 (2010)). Here, at the time of the search, the officers
9 A-4242-15T2

had arrested defendant, and there was no reason for them to believe

there was another suspect present who posed a danger. As we have 

already noted, the trial judge correctly found sufficient exigent 

circumstances to justify the search. 

Lastly, defendant asserts the evidence obtained from the 

basement must be suppressed because the officers lacked valid 

consent for the search. "New Jersey courts recognize the consent 

to search exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Lamb, 

218 N.J. 300, 315 (2014) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 

U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043-44, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 

(1973); State v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 305 (2006)). As discussed 

above, the warrantless search was valid because there were exigent 

circumstances to justify it. Thus, consent was not required. 

Nonetheless, valid consent was given for the second search, which 

produced the evidence defendant seeks to suppress. Even if the 

officers lacked consent for the initial search due to defendant's 

objections, they had valid consent for the second search after 

defendant was removed. See Lamb, supra, 218 N.J. at 320 (finding 

lawful consent to search a residence after an objector was lawfully 

removed). Here, the second search occurred only after the officers 

received valid consent from the homeowner and defendant was 

lawfully removed from the home. Therefore, in addition to exigent 
10 A-4242-15T2

circumstances, the officers had valid consent to search the 

basement. 

Any additional arguments introduced by defendant are without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.