[Cite as Fling v. Daniel, 2019-Ohio-1723.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HIGHLAND COUNTY 

WILLIAM E. FLING, : Case No. 18CA18 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

v. : DECISION AND 

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

JANET DANIEL, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : RELEASED: 04/22/2019

______________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Andrew P. George, Esq., Lebanon, Ohio, for appellant. 

Fred J. Beery, Esq., Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee. 

______________________________________________________________________ 

Hess, J. 

{¶1} William Fling (“Fling”) and Janet Daniel (“Daniel”) are first cousins who 

own adjoining properties formerly owned by their now deceased parents. Fling appeals 

from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Daniel in an action seeking a declaratory 

judgment that he has an easement for use of a spring and related water supply system 

on her property and an injunction prohibiting her from restricting his access to the water. 

Fling maintains that the trial court erred when it found that he does not have a 

prescriptive easement, that Ohio does not recognize easements by estoppel, and if it 

does, he does not have an easement by estoppel. However, the trial court’s 

determination that Fling failed to establish the adversity element for a prescriptive 

easement is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence 

shows his parents’ use of the water supply system was permissive. And although we 

conclude that Ohio recognizes easements by estoppel, the trial court’s determination 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 2 

that Fling failed to establish such an easement is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence because the evidence does not show that Fling’s parents contributed to the 

installation and maintenance of the system in reliance on a purported easement. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

I. FACTS 

{¶2} Fling’s parents, William Fling (“William Sr.”) and Juel Fling (“Juel”), 

formerly owned what we will refer to as the “Fling Property.” Daniel’s father, Albert Fling 

(“Albert”), was the brother of William Sr. and formerly owned what we will refer to as the 

“Daniel Property.” Before 1962, water on the Fling Property came from a pond, a 

cistern, and purchase. In 1962, the brothers decided to develop a spring on the Daniel 

Property. They installed a collection tank, water line, and electric pump on the Daniel 

Property and split the water line so one line ran to the Fling Property and another to the 

Daniel Property. The spring supplied water for both properties, which contained 

residences, farm buildings, and livestock operations. During their lifetime, the brothers 

performed repairs on the water supply system but had no written agreement regarding 

the spring or system. 

{¶3} Albert died, and Daniel and her sisters obtained title to the Daniel 

Property. In August 2000, William Sr., Juel, and Daniel executed an 

“Agreement/Contract for Water Supply” prepared by Juel. They agreed that “a water 

supply” on the Daniel Property currently provided water to both properties, that it would 

be used “only for residential purposes,” that the “[w]ater lines, etc.” from “the source to 

the split” would be maintained and repaired “50/50 by the owners,” and that the lines to 

each residence would be “repaired and maintained 100% by each property owner.” The 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 3 

agreement stated it would be in effect “as long as either” William Sr. or Juel “resides at” 

the Fling Property. In 2005, William Sr. died. In 2016, Juel died. 

{¶4} Fling does not live on the Fling Property but has rented out the house on 

it. He has operated an event barn on the property and currently operates a veterinary 

clinic there. Fling wanted to perform maintenance on the water supply system and 

improve it; however, he wanted to formalize his rights to the water supply before making 

these investments. In 2017, he had an attorney prepare a proposed waterline 

easement, which angered Daniel’s husband and caused him to have the water line to 

the Fling Property cut and capped. Fling ran a water line to the Fling Property from 

other property he owns but wants to sell and estimated it would cost $35,000 to $40,000 

to install a direct line from the county water supply to the Fling Property. 

{¶5} Fling filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that he has an 

implied, prescriptive, equitable, or other easement regarding the spring, reformation of 

deeds to include the easement, and an injunction to prohibit Daniel from restricting his 

water access. After a trial, the court held that Fling “has not proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that there is an easement for use of the water supply from the 

spring * * * and he is therefore not entitled to injunctive [relief] or to declaratory judgment 

on any of his claims.” It found Fling did not have an implied easement because the 

parties’ properties were not united in ownership prior to the construction of the water 

lines. It also held that Fling did not have a prescriptive easement because his parents’ 

use of the spring was not exclusive and was permissive rather than adverse. The trial 

court noted the facts were “somewhat analogous” to those in Yeager v. Tuning, 79 Ohio 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 4 

St. 121, 86 N.E. 657 (1908), and held that William and Albert had a “parol agreement” 

which was a “revocable license.” 

{¶6} The trial court also found “the Ohio Supreme Court has not recognized 

easements by estoppel.” It observed that in Kallner v. Wells, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 

05CA3030, 2006-Ohio-4634, we noted that Yeager rejected easement by estoppel 

when a licensee made valuable improvements on land and has not been overruled. 

The trial court determined Yeager “remains the law of this state.” However, it noted 

“there are a number of appellate courts including the Fourth District that have allowed 

the argument of easement by estoppel despite the holding in Yeager.” But “[e]ven if 

there is a cause of action of easement by estoppel in this state,” Fling “did not prove the 

elements” because “there is no evidence that [his] parents expended money on the 

water system in reliance upon their belief that there was an easement.” Rather “this 

was joint use by family members by agreement and at mutual expense.” Thus, the trial 

court granted judgment in favor of Daniel. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶7} Fling assigns the following error for our review: 

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING 

TO FIND AN EASEMENT BY ESTOPPEL OR OTHER IMPLIED 

EASEMENT EXISTED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT. 

III. Prescriptive Easement 

{¶8} In the sole assignment of error, Fling asserts in part that the trial court 

erred when it found that he failed to prove a prescriptive easement. 

{¶9} “The basic definition of an easement is that it is the grant of a use on the 

land of another.” Alban v. R.K. Co., 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 231, 239 N.E.2d 22 (1968). 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 5 

“The required elements of a prescriptive easement are similar to those in the law of 

adverse possession.” Dunn v. Ransom, 4th Dist. Pike No. 10CA806, 2011-Ohio-4253, 

¶ 77. “ ‘Ordinarily a party seeking a prescriptive easement “must demonstrate clear and 

convincing evidence of open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of the easement 

for a 21-year period.” ’ ” Pinkerton v. Salyers, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3388, 2015-

Ohio-377, ¶ 23, quoting Queen v. Hanna, 2012-Ohio-6291, 985 N.E.2d 929, ¶ 37 (4th 

Dist.), quoting Dunn at ¶ 77. We have explained: 

In determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and 

convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to 

determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to 

satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 

74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990). * * * When an appellate court reviews whether 

a trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the 

court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed. * * * “Because 

the trial court is best able to view the witnesses, observe their demeanor, 

gestures, and voice inflections, and use those observations in weighing 

the credibility of the witnesses, a reviewing court will presume that the trial 

court’s findings of fact are accurate.” Cadwallader v. Scovanner, 178 Ohio 

App.3d 26, 2008-Ohio-4166, 896 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.) * * *. We will 

reverse a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence 

only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against 

the judgment. 

Id. at ¶ 18. 

{¶10} Exclusive use is not required to prevail on a prescriptive easement claim. 

“Unlike a claim for adverse possession, a claim for a prescriptive easement does not 

require proof of exclusive possession of the property.” Gulas v. Tirone, 184 Ohio 

App.3d 143, 2009-Ohio-5076, 919 N.E.2d 833, ¶ 24 (7th Dist.). However, Fling is 

required to show that the use was adverse, which is an essential element for a 

prescriptive easement. See Pinkerton at ¶ 23. 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 6 

{¶11} Fling does not dispute that the establishment and use of the water supply 

system was permissive and admits that generally permissive uses cannot ripen into 

prescriptive rights. See Burchfield v. Wolfe, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 00CA11, 2001 WL 

978865, *5 (Aug.1, 2001). However, he asserts the use occurred under a “claim of 

right” which gave rise to a prescriptive easement. He claims that Shanks v. Floom, 162 

Ohio St. 479, 124 N.E.2d 416 (1955) “determined that in the event neighboring property 

owners each expend resources to create a mutually beneficial structure, there is 

created a presumption in favor of an easement” and that Shanks “obviates the need for 

a review of whether or not the original use” was adverse or permissive. 

{¶12} In Shanks, adjacent landowners orally agreed to construct a common 

cement driveway on their properties. Id. at 479. They split the cost of the driveway and 

used it for over 21 years. Id. A dispute arose between their successors in title, resulting 

in a lawsuit for quiet title and injunctive relief. Id. at 480. The trial court denied the 

injunction and concluded the parties each had a right to use the driveway. Id. The 

appellate court held both properties were subject to a prescriptive easement for 

driveway purposes. Id. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that it “ ‘has 

been held in many cases’ ” that a use is adverse or hostile if it is “ ‘inconsistent with the 

rights of the title owner and not subordinate or subservient thereto. Hostile use is 

sometimes described as possession and use under a claim of right.’ ” Id. at 482, 

quoting Kimball v. Anderson, 125 Ohio St. 241, 244, 181 N.E. 17 (1932). The court 

stated: 

We believe it is unreasonable to assume that the owners of these 

properties, at the time this driveway was constructed and the use thereof 

began, each felt that he was using his half as a matter of right and the 

other’s half merely by permission. On the contrary, the nature and 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 7 

permanence of the improvement, that it was constructed of concrete, and 

that it was constructed on what the owners considered to be the boundary 

line between their properties are more consistent with a claim of right on 

the part of each than with a day-to-day permissive use. We hold 

therefore, that the use in this case was under a claim of right and as such 

was adverse and not permissive. 

Id. at 484. It further held: 

Where owners of adjacent lots, pursuant to an oral agreement, construct a 

common cement driveway, substantially one-half of which is on the land of 

each, and each pays one-half of the cost thereof, the use by each owner 

of the land of the other is under a claim of right and as such is adverse, 

each to the other, and after 21 years each owner thereby acquires by 

prescription an easement over the land of the other. 

Id. at syllabus. 

{¶13} Fling’s reliance on Shanks is misplaced. Shanks does not stand for the 

proposition that a prescriptive easement is presumed when neighboring property 

owners expend resources on a mutually beneficial structure and that adversity need not 

be proven. Rather, it explains that use under a claim of right satisfies the adversity 

element of a prescriptive easement, and it held that a claim of right existed under 

specific factual circumstances not present here. In Shanks, the landowners dedicated a 

substantially equal amount of land and money to a common use. But here, Fling’s 

parents did not dedicate any of their land to a common use. They used the water 

supply with Albert’s permission and not under a claim of right. 

{¶14} The trial court’s finding that Fling did not establish a prescriptive easement 

by clear and convincing evidence is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

We overrule the first assignment of error to the extent it asserts otherwise. 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 8 

IV. Easement by Estoppel 

A. Whether Ohio Recognizes Easements by Estoppel 

{¶15} In the first assignment of error, Fling also claims that the trial court 

erroneously held that easements by estoppel do not exist in Ohio. Fling maintains that 

the trial court’s reliance on Yeager and Kallner is misplaced. He argues that Renner v. 

Johnson, 2 Ohio St.2d 195, 207 N.E.24 751 (1965), “clearly affirms the existence of 

easements by estoppel and expanded Ohio’s approach to same far beyond” Yeager,

and he notes that Roubanes v. Brown, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 11CA019, 2012-Ohio-1933, 

“espouses this analysis.” 

{¶16} The trial court did not explicitly hold that Ohio does not recognize 

easements by estoppel, but it did express uncertainty on the matter. Whether the 

doctrine of easement by estoppel exists in Ohio is a question of law we review de novo. 

Roubanes at ¶ 14-15. In general, “ ‘[e]quitable estoppel prevents relief when one party 

induces another to believe certain facts exist and the other party changes his position in 

reasonable reliance on those facts to his detriment.’ ” Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 

116 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-67, 880 N.E.2d 892, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Chavis v. 

Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 34, 641 N.E.2d 188 (1994). 

“Equitable estoppel usually requires actual or constructive fraud.” State ex rel. Shisler 

v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 122 Ohio St.3d 148, 2009-Ohio-2522, 909 N.E.2d 

610, ¶ 28. “[E]quitable estoppel must be determined on the particular facts of each 

case.” In re Election of Nov. 6, 1990 for Office of Atty. Gen. of Ohio, 58 Ohio St.3d 103, 

113, 569 N.E.2d 447 (1991). 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 9 

{¶17} In Yeager, the plaintiffs averred in a petition that they had an oral 

agreement with the defendants to construct a telephone line “over and across their 

respective lands and to their residences.” Yeager, 79 Ohio St. at 121, 86 N.E. 657. 

They agreed to erect and maintain poles at their own expense and agreed to equally 

contribute to the purchase and installation of wires and to line maintenance and repairs. 

Id. After they used the line for about three years, the defendants cut the wires and 

removed some of the poles, rendering the line useless in places. Id. The plaintiffs filed 

a petition seeking an order requiring the defendants to replace the poles and restore the 

line and an injunction prohibiting future interference with the line. Id. The circuit court 

sustained a demurrer to the petition and dismissed it. Id.

{¶18} In affirming, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]n easement is a right 

without profit, created by grant or prescription, which the owner of one estate may 

exercise in or over the estate of another for the benefit of the former,” and “[a] license is 

a personal, revocable, and nonassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or parol, 

to do one or more acts upon land without possessing any interest therein.” Id. at 124. It 

also stated: 

“At common law a parol license to be exercised upon the land of another 

creates an interest in the land, is within the statute of frauds, and may be 

revoked by the licensor at any time, no matter whether or not the licensee 

has exercised acts under the license, or expended money in reliance 

thereon. In many of the states this rule prevails, while in others the 

licensor is deemed to be equitably estopped from revoking the license, 

after allowing the licensee to perform acts thereunder, or to make 

expenditures in reliance thereon. These two lines of cases cannot be 

reconciled; for one of them holds that an interest in land cannot be created 

by force of a mere parol license, whether executed or not, while the other 

declares that where the licensee has gone to expense, relying upon the 

license, the licensor may be estopped from revoking it, and thus an 

easement may be created. The former line of cases, it seems to us, is 

founded upon the better reason. They decide that a parol license to do an 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 10 

act on the land of the licensor, while it justifies anything done by the 

licensee before revocation, is revocable, at the option of the licensor, and 

this although the intention was to confer a continuing right, and money has 

been expended by the licensee upon the faith of the license. Such license 

cannot be changed into an equitable right on the ground of equitable 

estoppel.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 125-126, quoting 31 A.C. Freeman, American State Reports 

715 (1893) (annotation to Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N.J.Eq. 289, 24 A. 933 (1892)). 

And since Yeager, the court has broadly stated that an easement “may be acquired only 

by grant, expressed or implied, or by prescription.” Trattar v. Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286, 

95 N.E.2d 685 (1950), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶19} In Renner, the owner of two parcels established water and sewer lines on 

the properties before selling them. Renner, 2 Ohio St.2d at 196, 207 N.E.2d 751. 

Later, the plaintiffs and defendants each acquired one of the parcels. Id. The plaintiffs 

filed suit to enjoin the defendants from shutting off the lines running from the plaintiffs’ 

property across the defendants’ property to public water and sewer lines. Id. The trial 

court granted an easement, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 197. 

{¶20} The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. Id. at 199. It explained: 

Where an owner of two parcels of land subjects one of them to an 

easement in favor of the other and where such owner sells the dominant 

parcel without providing for that easement in his grant and where the 

enjoyment of such easement is reasonably necessary to the beneficial 

enjoyment of the parcel granted, the grant of such an easement may be 

implied. 

Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. However, the “equitable right of the grantee of the 

dominant parcel to reform the grant to provide for such easement * * * is not enforceable 

against a bona fide purchaser for value who has no actual or constructive notice of such 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 11 

easement.” Id. at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. Because the defendants 

were such purchasers, the court held the plaintiffs had no right against them. Id. at 197. 

{¶21} Renner addresses easements by implied grant when there has been a 

severance of unity of ownership in an estate; it does not overrule Yeager or explicitly or 

implicitly permit easements by estoppel. Contra Roubanes, 2012-Ohio-1933, at ¶ 17 

(finding Renner “permits an easement by estoppel”). Nonetheless, we do not construe 

Yeager as a general prohibition against easements by estoppel. It only prohibits 

conversion of a license into an easement by estoppel based on an intent to confer a 

continuing right and expenditures in reliance on the license. Yeager, 79 Ohio St. at 

125-126, 86 N.E. 657. And while our research has not revealed any cases in which the 

Supreme Court of Ohio has explicitly or implicitly recognized easements by estoppel, it 

has also not revealed any cases in which that court declined to recognize such an 

easement despite the presence of actual or constructive fraud. 

{¶22} Our decision in Kallner also does not prohibit easements by estoppel. 

There, the defendant had an express easement for ingress and egress over a tract of 

farmland to access his landlocked property. Kallner, 2006-Ohio-4634, at ¶ 5. With 

assistance from of one of the owners, he planted trees along the easement—a 

permanent improvement that went beyond the scope of the express easement. Id. at ¶ 

6, 15. After the plaintiffs obtained title to the farm, they filed suit seeking to quiet title to 

the tract. Id. at ¶ 3, 7. The trial court awarded the defendant title by adverse 

possession. Id. at ¶ 1. We reversed because the defendant failed to prove his use of 

the tract was adverse. Id. at ¶ 19. We also stated: 

We are tempted to construe the trial court’s decision to grant [the 

defendant] the disputed property by adverse possession as an easement 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 12 

created by estoppel. However, in light of the [plaintiffs’] citation to Yeager 

v. Tuning (1908), 79 Ohio St. 121, 86 N.E. 657, which has not been 

overruled expressly or by implication, we decline to do so in this instance. 

The court characterized the oral grant of permission to use another’s land 

as a license, which is revocable. The Supreme Court has gone further to 

expressly reject easement by estoppel, even in the context of the land 

owner’s acquiescence to the making of valuable improvement and the 

erection of structures upon the land by the “licensee.” See Fowler v. 

Delaplain (1909), 79 Ohio St. 279, 87 N.E. 260, syllabus 2. 

Id. at ¶ 20. We did not hold that easements by estoppel do not exist Ohio. Rather, we 

declined to find one under the circumstances because the plaintiff had a license to plant 

the trees, which pursuant to Yeager, could not be converted into an easement by 

estoppel. See id.

{¶23} This court and other Ohio appellate courts have recognized easements 

by estoppel. See Pinkerton, 2015-Ohio-377, at ¶ 32-33; Northwest Ohio Properties, 

Ltd. v. County of Lucas, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1190, 2018-Ohio-4239, ¶ 37-42; Von 

Stein v. Phenicie, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-13-18, 2014-Ohio-4872, ¶ 74-77 (recognizing 

easements by estoppel but declining to find one under the circumstances); Byham v. 

Pierce, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13206, 1992 WL 127714, *2-3 (June 9, 1992). We 

have stated: “A landowner cannot remain silent and permit another to spend money in 

reliance on a purported easement, when in justice and equity the landowner should 

have asserted his conflicting rights. If he fails to object, under these circumstances the 

landowner is estopped to deny the easement.” (Emphasis added.) Pinkerton at ¶ 32. 

This standard is consistent with Yeager, Kallner, and the purpose of equitable estoppel 

“ ‘to prevent actual or constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.’ ” Doe, 116 

Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-67, 880 N.E.2d 892, at ¶ 7, quoting Ohio State Bd. of 

Pharmacy v. Frantz, 51 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 555 N.E.2d 630 (1990). 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 13 

{¶24} Accordingly, we hold that Ohio recognizes easements by estoppel. 

B. Whether an Easement by Estoppel was Established 

{¶25} Next, Fling challenges the trial court’s finding that he failed to establish an 

easement by estoppel. He asserts that William Sr. and Albert “split the bill for the water 

system,” that “[c]arrying forth the original arrangements, both Fling and Daniel have paid 

for work on the water system over the years,” and that Daniel should not be “permitted 

to benefit from expenditures by William Sr. and Fling made under the belief they had a 

right to the water supply.” 

{¶26} We set forth the standard for an easement by estoppel in Section IV.A. 

An easement by estoppel must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and 

we review whether the finding that Fling did not establish such an easement is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. See Pinkerton, 2015-Ohio-377, at ¶ 17-18. 

{¶27} Here, as the trial court indicated, there is no evidence Fling’s parents 

expended resources on the water supply system under the belief that Albert had given 

them an easement as opposed to a license. The fact that after Albert’s death, Fling’s 

parents contracted for use of the water supply for the rest of the time they lived on the 

Fling Property suggests they believed Albert had given them a license which terminated 

on his death rather than an interest in the Daniel Property. See McCoy v. Hines, 4th 

Dist. Adams No. 518, 1992 WL 188480, *2 (July 28, 1992), quoting 36 Ohio 

Jurisprudence 3d, Easements and Licenses, Section 1, at 386 (1982) (“ ‘Unlike an 

easement, a license passes no property or interest in real property’ ” and “ ‘ceases with 

the death of either party’ ”). As in Yeager, the fact that the licensor intended to confer a 

continuing right and that the licensees expended money on the faith of the license does 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 14 

not convert the license into an easement by estoppel. See Yeager, 79 Ohio St. at 125-

126, 86 N.E. 657. 

{¶28} Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court’s finding that Fling 

failed to establish an easement by estoppel is not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. We overrule the first assignment of error to the extent it asserts otherwise. 

V. CONCLUSION 

{¶29} Having overruled the sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Highland App. No. 18CA18 15 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the 

costs. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland 

County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of 

this entry. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

McFarland, J. & Smith, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court 

 BY: ________________________________ 

 Michael D. Hess, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.