IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01471-COA RALPH ARNOLD SMITH, JR. APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI AND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/21/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN S. GRANT III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: W I LLIAM CHARLES BELL ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BENNY MCCALIP “MAC” MAY TIMOTHY HUTSON JONES HAROLD EDW ARD PIZZETTA III NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DISMISSED PETITION FOR OUTPATIENT TREATMENT DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/14/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE AND GREENLEE, JJ. ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The L ef

lore County Chancery Court granted a petition to have Ralph Arnold Sm ith
Jr. involuntarily com m itted f or inpatient treatm ent in t h e M ississippi State Hospital at W h itf ield (W hitf

ield). Sm ith’s counsel subsequently f iled a petition f

or outpatient t reatm ent in the Rankin County Chancery Court. Af ter f inding t hat the Hinds County Chancery Court had jurisdiction o v er t he petition, the Rankin County Chancery Court dism issed his petition. Sm ith appeals. Finding no error, we af f irm

.STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Af ter f acing crim inal charges in 2012, the Lef lore County Circuit Court determ ined that Sm ith was not com petent to stand trial. On J a n u a r y 6 , 2 015, the Lef lore County C h a ncery Court held t hat Sm ith should be involuntarily com m itted to W hitf ield

. 1 I n Febru a r y 2 015, Sm ith’s counsel requested “a hearing o n the question of [ Sm ith’s]

c o m m i t m e n t f or f urther treatm ent,” pursuant to Mississippi Co d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 4 1

- 2 1

- 8 1 (Rev. 2 013). U nder Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-21-83 ( Rev. 2013), the First Judicial District of t he Hinds County Chancery Court was required to conduct such a hearing regarding a person com m itted to W hitf ield. The Hinds County c ourt conducted the “20-day ” hearing, and o n March 10, 2015, determ ined that Sm ith needed to c o ntinue his inpatient
treatm ent at W h itf

ield. ¶3. Displease d w i t h t he Hinds County Chancery Court’s order of continued treatm ent, Sm ith’s counsel returned to t he Lef lore County Chancery Court and f iled additional m otions seeking outpatient treatm ent and other f orm s o f r elief to have Sm ith released f r om W hitf

ield. On July 30, 2015, h owever, the Lef lore County C hancery Court entered a f inal j udgm ent, of f icially c losing the civil-com m itm ent case. Displeased again, Sm ith’s counsel then f iled

a petition f

or outpatient treatm ent in the Rankin County Chancery Court under Mississippi Code Annotated section 44-21-74 (Rev. 2013). 2

1 S m ith rem ain ed co m m itted an d p h y sically h o u sed a t Wh i tf

ield u n til h is release in N o v e m b er 2 0 1 6

. 2 S m ith ’s co u n sel f

ailed to m en tio n th e H in d s C o u n ty C h an c ery C o u rt’s o rd er in h is p etitio n f iled w ith th e R an k in C o u n ty co u rt. 2¶4. The State m oved to dismi s s S mi t h ’ s p e t i t i on f or outpatient treatm ent. T he State argued that because S m ith was com m itted to W hitf ield, the Hinds County Chancery Court

was statutorily r equired t o hear a petition f or outpatient t reatm ent. In addition, the State noted that the Hinds C ounty Chancery Court had already f ound that Sm ith required f urther inpatient treatm e nt, and Sm ith did not appeal t hat order. The Rankin County Chancery Court agreed t h a t it lacked jurisdiction. Consequently , it granted the State’s m o tion to dism iss. Sm ith appeals. During the pendency of this appeal, Sm ith successf ully petitioned the Hinds County Chancery Court’s release f rom W hitf ield f or outpatient treatm ent. DISCUSSION
I. Sm ith’s c ase falls unde r the ex ception to the m ootness d octrine, “capable of repetition y et evading review .” ¶5. Because Sm ith has been released f rom W hitf i eld, this Court i s f

aced with an appeal that c ould be considered m oot. Generally , this Court w i ll dism iss an appeal “when no usef ul
purpose could be accom

plished by entertaining i t, when so f ar a s concerns any practical ends
to be served the decision u p on the legal questions involved would be m erely a c adem ic.” Strong v. B ostick , 4 2 0 So. 2d 1356, 1359 ( Miss. 1982). Exceptions t o t he m ootness doctrine, however, do exist. As such, we m ay address app e a l s c o n sidered m oot where the m atter is “capable of repetit i on y et evading review.” In re Bauman , 8 78 So. 2 d 1033, 1037 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 0 0 4 ) ( c i vil-com m itm ent action where appellant was discharged prior to adjudication o f his appeal, b ut held a ppeal f ell under “capable o f repet i t i o n y et evading review” exception); s ee also W einstein v. B r a d

f ord , 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). An appeal that is “capable of repetition y et evading r eview,” though m o ot, m ust possess two qualities:

3(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be f ully litigated prior to its cessation

or e xpiration; and (2) there was a reasonable e x p e ctation that the sam e com plaining party would be subject to the sam e action again. Bauman , 878 So. 2d at 1037 (¶15) (citing Strong , 420 So. 2d at 1359). ¶6. Apply ing the precedent set f orth in Bauman , we f

i nd that Sm ith’s appeal f

a lls within the purview of the “capable o f repetition y e t e v ading review ” e x c e p t i o n to the m ootness doctrine. Sm ith’s com m itm ent, though over a y ear in duration, does not def eat t he f irst prong

o f t h i s exception, as the subject of this a p peal is the Rankin C ounty Chancery Court’ s dism issal of Sm ith’s petition f or outpatient treatm ent, wh i c h Sm ith tim ely appealed while

c o mmi t t e d

. We f

ind that the challenged action was too short i n its duration to be f ull y litigated prior to its cessation or expiration. W e also f ind that there is a r e a s o n able expectation that Sm ith could be subject to the sam e action again. This is because Sm ith
asserts that H inds County did not, and does not, h ave proper jurisdiction over his petition f or outpatient treatm ent, b ut that court ultim ately granted t he relief that S m ith s ought. Thus, we f ind this case m eets both prongs of the exception. See Strong , 420 So. 2d at 1359. ¶7. Lastly , this Court f i n d s t h e present m atter involves a question af f ecting the public interest. “[ T]here is an excep t i o n to the general rule as respects m oot cases, when the question concerns a m a tter of s uch a nature t hat it w ould be distinctly det r i m e n t a l to the public interest that t here should be a f ailure by di s mi s s a l to declare and e nf orce a rule f

or f uture conduct.” Bauman , 878 So. 2d at 1 038 ( ¶18) ( citing Alfred v. W ebb , 641 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Miss. 1994)). Thus, w e f ind the possible c onf

lict regarding which court has

4jurisdiction under the circum stances necessitates that t his Court address the public interest

at issue.
II. The Rankin County Chancery Court did not err as a m atter of law in granting the State’s m otion to dism iss. ¶8. The p rim ary issue in this appeal is whi c h c o u r t h a s jurisdiction over a request f or outpatient treatm ent of som eone who has been i nvoluntarily com m itted f or in p a tient
treatm ent at W h itf

iel d

. A de novo standard of review is em ploy ed by this C ourt when reviewing a trial c ourt’s g rant or denial of a m otion t o dism iss. T allahatchie Gen. Hosp. v. Howe , 154 So. 3d 29, 31 (¶7) ( Miss. 2015). “Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation

. . . present m atters of law reviewed de novo.” Leg. of S tate v. Shipman , 170 So. 3d 1211, 1214 (¶10) (Miss. 2015). Reviewing the statutes at issue, we f ind the Rankin County Chancery Court did not err as a m a t ter of law in granting the m otion to dism iss. ¶9. The q u e s t i o n turns on the correlation between sections 4 1-21-74(4) and 41-21-83. Section 41-21-74(4) relates to “outpatient treatm e nt,” and provides that: The chancery c o u r t o f the county where t he p ublic facility is located or the committing court shall have jurisdiction over m a tters c oncerning outpatient com m itm ents when such an order is s o ught subsequent to an inpatient course of treatm ent pursuant t o Sections 41-21-6 1 t h r ough 41-21-107, 43-21-611, 99-13-7 and 99-13-9 . . . . (Em phasis added). Sm ith expressly sought relief pursuant to section 41-21-74. Under the language of section 41-21-74(4), then, Sm i th a sserts that jurisdiction is vested in one of two
courts: (1) the court in the c ounty “where the public f acility is located” (Rankin County ); or (2) “the com m itting court” (Lef lore County ). T hus, Sm i th c ontends jurisdiction clearly vests in the Chancery Court of Rankin C ounty f or h is p etition f

or outpatient treatm e nt, as he was

5housed i n Rankin County a t W hitf ield at t he tim e of his petition. Sm ith f urther asserts that because Lef

lore County closed his case, Rankin County is alternatively the only court with proper jurisdiction under the statute. ¶10. The S tate, however, asserts otherwise through its r eading of section 41-21-83, which states the f

ollowing: If a hearing i

s r equested as provided in [ s] ection 41-21-74, 41-21-81 [ ( Rev. 2013) ,] or 4 1

- 2 1 -99 [ (

Rev. 2013)

] , the court s hall not m ake a determ ination of the need f

or continued com m itm ent unless a hearing is held an d the court f i n d s b y clear and c onvincing evidence t hat (a) the person continues to hav e m ental illness or have an intellect ual disability ; and (b) i nvoluntary com m itm ent is necessary f or t h e p r o t ection of t he p atient or others; a nd ( c) there is no alternative to involuntary com m itm ent. H e arings held under this section shall be held in the chancery court of the county where the facility is located; however, if the patient is confined at the Mississippi State Hospital at W hitfield, M

ississippi, t

he hearing shall be conducted by the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. (Em phasis added). The State, theref ore, argues, as it did i n its m otion to dism i ss, that based
upon the l anguage of section 41-21-83 and S m ith’s conf inem ent at W hitf

ield, it is Hinds County , rather than Rankin County , that possesses jurisdiction over Sm ith’s requested relief

. W e agree. ¶11. This Court has clearly articulated its standards f or i nterpreting a statute. “The m ost f undam ental rule of

statutory construction is the plain[

- ]m eaning rule, which p rovides that if a statute is not am

biguous, then this Court m ust a pply t he statute according to its term s.” Buckel v. Chaney , 47 So. 3d 148, 158 (¶35) (Miss. 2010) (quotin g S t a t e e x rel. Hood v. Madison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors , 873 So. 2d 85, 90 (¶19) (Miss. 2004)). “Likewise, it is a well-settled rule of s tatutory construction that when two statutes p ertain to the sam e subject,

6they m

u st be read together in light of legislative intent.” Tunica C t y. v. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur. , 27 S o. 3d 1128, 1133 (¶15) (Miss. 2009) (citing Lenoir v. M a d i s o n Cty. , 641 So. 2d 1124, 1129 (Miss. 1994)). “The f unction of the Court is n ot to decide what a statute should provide, but to determ ine what it does provide.” Russell v
. State , 231 Miss. 176, 181, 94 So. 2d 916, 917 (1957). Statutes “on the sam e subject, although in apparent conf lict, should if possible b e construed in harm ony with each other to give ef f ect t o e ach.” Tunica Cty. , 27 So. 3d at 1134 (¶16) (citing Miss. Gaming Comm'n v. Imperial Palace of Miss. , 7 51 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (¶15) (Miss. 1999)). ¶12. Heeding these canons of statuto r y c o n struction, we a d dress the specif ic statutes at issue i n the present m a tter. S ection 41-21-74(4) s tates that “[ t]he chancery c ourt of the county where the public facility is locat e d o r t he committing court shall have jurisdiction

over m atters concerning outpatient com m itm ents when such an order i s sought subsequent
to an inpatient course of treatm ent

. . . .” (Em p hasis added). A s Sm ith has asserted, the plain and u nam biguous lang u a g e o f section 41-21-74(4) vests jurisdiction in either the Rankin County Chancery Court or the com m itting court of Lef lore County

. W hen reading section 41-21-83, however, conf

l ict arises as to jurisdiction f o r hearings held pursuant to section 41- 21-74

. A p l a i n -language reading of section 41-21-83 reveals that, as a general m atter, hearings requested pursuant to section 41-21-74 “shall be held in the chancery court of the county where the f

acility is located[ .]” See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-83. T h e s tatute did not
sto p t h e r e, however. Instead, the Legislature specif ically stated that where the patient is conf ined a t W hi t f

i e l d, “ the h earing shall be c onducted by the Chancery C ourt o f the First

7Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. ” See id. (e m phasis added)

. As these two
statutes “pertain to the s am e subject, they m ust be read together in light o f legislative intent.” Tunica Cty. , 27 So. 3d at 1133 (¶15). ¶13. To rebut the plain language of section 41-21-83, S m ith s e em ingly avers that section
41

- 2 1

- 8 3 ’ s r ef

e rence to hearings held under section 4 1-21-74 r elates only to section 41-21-74 (1)-(3). The State argues otherwise, and we agree. The p lain and unam biguous language of section 41-21-83 applies broadly , directing t hat any hearing held p ursuant to section 41-21-
7 4 i s to be heard b y the Hinds C ounty C hancery C ourt when the patient i s c o n f i n e d a t W h itf ield. The statu t e i n no way delineates that when a p atient is conf ined at W hitf

ield, outpatient hearings under 41-21-74(1)-(3) m ust be held in H inds County , while hearings under 41-21-74(4) m

ust be held in the county where the public f a cility is l ocated, despite the patient’s c onf

inem ent at W hitf

ield. T hus, we f

ind no m erit to Sm ith’s a ssertion that section 41-21-83 i m

pliedly carves out an exception f or hearings specif

ically held u nder section 41- 21-74(4). ¶14. To f

u rther support his argu me n t , S mi t h contends that he d id not r equest a hearing under any provision that i s f ound in section 41-21-83. W hat Sm i th f a ils to realize, however, is t hat a request f

or a hearing under section 74-21-74(4) incorporates within i t the m andates of section 41-21-83. This is because section 41-21-83 o utlines t h e r e s p ective court’s procedural burden when conducting any hearing f iled pursuant to sections 41-21-74, 41-21- 81, or 41-21-99. S

ee Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-83. Theref ore, we likewise f

ind no m erit to this contention.

8¶15. Thus, reading sections 41-21-74 and 4 1-21-83 together, we f ind section 41-21-83’s plain and unam

biguous language controlling of the jurisdictional issue at hand. See Buckel , 47 So. 3 d at 158 (¶35). Because Sm ith was undisputedly “conf ined at the Mississippi State Hospital at W hitf

ield” w hen he f

iled his petition f

or outpatient treatm ent, we f ind the plain language o f section 41-21-83 r equired that the m atter b e r esolved by the C hancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County

. Though section 41-21-74 does not explicitly state which v enue i s p r oper f

or outpatient hearings req u e s t e d b y patients conf ined a t W hitf

ield,

we f ind t hat, af

ter reading the statutes together in light of what t he L egislature intended, any hearing by a patient conf

ined at W hitf

i eld at t he tim e a petition is f iled under section 41-21- 74 m ust be heard in the Chancery Court of Hinds County

. See also Miss. C ode Ann. §§ 41- 21-81; 41-21-89 ( R ev. 2013); and 41-21-103 (Rev. 2 013) (all stating that Hinds County shall have jurisdiction over m atters f or patients conf

ined at W hitf

i eld). T h e r e f

o re, we f ind no

m erit to this issue. CONCLUSION ¶16. Em

ploy ing a de novo standard of review, we f

ind that the Rankin County C hancery Court did not err a s a m atter of law in dism issing Sm ith’s petition f or outpatient t reatm ent. Though W hitf

ield is located in R ankin County a nd, t hus, Rankin Co u n t y w o u ld ordinarily have proper jurisdiction to hear a petition f or outpatient treatm e nt u nder section 41-21-74(4),

we hold that such jurisdiction was divested b y virtue of section 41-21-83’s plain and

unam b i g u o u s language. As such, we hold that Sm ith should have f iled h is petition in the First Judicial District of

the Hinds County C hancery Court. Theref

ore, we af f irm

.

9¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF T HE RANKIN COU N T Y C H A N C E R Y C O U R T IS

AFFIR M E D. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RES U L T ONLY W I T H O U T S E P A R A T E W R I T T E N O P I N I O N . B A R N E S , J . , N O T PARTICIPATING.

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