Department of Homeland Security
 

The Effects of USCIS Adjudication 

Procedures and Policies on 

Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers 

OIG-12-24 January 2012
 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

January 5, 2012

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services effort to detect fraud in immigration benefit adjudications. It is 

based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, 

direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Charles K. Edwards 

Acting Inspector General 
Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1 


Background ..........................................................................................................................2 


Results of Review ................................................................................................................5 


Greater Support for the Fraud Detection Mission Is Necessary ....................................5 


The New Performance Measurement System Is Developing Slowly ..........................10 


Inappropriate Pressure on the Adjudications Process Must Be Avoided ....................14 


The Standard of Proof in Immigration Benefit Cases Affects the USCIS Mission.....28 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................33 


Appendices 

Appendix A: 

Appendix B: 

Appendix C: 

Appendix D: 

Appendix E: 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................40 


Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................41 


The Survey of District and Field Office ISOs .....................................49 


Major Contributors to this Report........................................................53 


Report Distribution ..............................................................................54 


Abbreviations 

AAO Administrative Appeals Office
 

CSC California Service Center
 

DHS Department of Homeland Security
 

DOJ Department of Justice 


FDNS Fraud Detection and National Security
 

FOD Field Operations Directorate
 

FY fiscal year
 

GAO Government Accountability Office 


HCT Office of Human Capital and Training
 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 


IO Immigration Officer 


ISO Immigration Services Officer
 

OCC Office of Chief Counsel
 

OIG Office of Inspector General
 

OSI Office of Security and Integrity 


RFE request for evidence
 

SCOPS Service Center Operations Directorate
 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

 

OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Senator Charles Grassley expressed concern to the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Inspector General about United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) efforts to process 

requests for immigration benefits while protecting the system from 

fraud. We reviewed policies related to fraud detection in the 

immigration benefit caseload. 

Requests for immigration benefits are submitted to USCIS. USCIS 

employees known as Immigration Services Officers process most 

of these requests. Immigration benefits include citizenship, lawful 

permanent residence, and a variety of other benefits. We examined 

whether USCIS policies could have a negative effect on the 

detection of immigration benefit fraud. 

We interviewed 147 managers and staff, and received 256 

responses to an online survey. We reviewed USCIS policies 

related to the effort to detect benefit fraud. We identified a range 

of possible improvements to practices in areas such as performance 

measurement, training, and collaboration between adjudications 

and fraud detection staff. 

Through process improvements and additional systems checks, 

USCIS has taken important steps to improve national security and 

fraud detection. USCIS has also increased fraud detection 

resources and training. Additional changes would help 

Immigration Service Officers improve fraud detection. USCIS can 

take further steps to insulate the benefit adjudication process from 

internal and external pressures that continue to hinder the 

adjudications function. We are making 11 recommendations to 

advance the fraud detection mission in the immigration benefit 

adjudication process. 

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Background 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

determines the eligibility of individuals who seek immigration and 

citizenship benefits. Each year, USCIS processes more than 

6 million applications or petitions, including requests for U.S. 

citizenship, lawful permanent residence, employment authorization, 

humanitarian relief, and other benefits. Most benefit requests are 

processed domestically at four service centers, the National 

Benefits Center, 26 district offices, and 81 field offices. More than 

18,000 USCIS employees and contractors process benefit requests. 

USCIS is the front-line defense against individuals who seek to 

abuse or defraud the immigration benefit system in the United 

States. Before the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 

created, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(INS) processed immigration benefits. 

Benefit fraud detection is challenging and has always created 

difficulties for federal agencies. In 2002, the then General 

Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the government’s 

approach to immigration benefit fraud was fragmented and 

unfocused. GAO also concluded that the INS employees who 

adjudicated requests for benefits, now known as Immigration 

Services Officers (ISOs), lacked important tools to protect the 

immigration system.1

 That same year, the Department of Justice 

Office of Inspector General (DOJ OIG) concluded that INS did not 

closely scrutinize student aliens who requested entry into the 

United States. There was also inconsistency regarding the 

documentation required prior to benefit issuance.2 

Threats to the immigration benefit system have not abated. In the 

2012 DHS Appropriations Bill, the House of Representatives 

described recent attempted terrorist attacks on the United States as 

“ongoing efforts by extremists to infiltrate our country through the 

exploitation of legitimate travel and immigration processes.”

3 

USCIS recently revised its policies and reorganized its 

organizational structure to address immigration security concerns 

and facilitate fraud detection. One key change is a shift from 

1

 GAO is now known as the Government Accountability Office. See Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused 

Approach Is Needed To Address Problems (GAO-02-66), January 2002. 2

 Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Contacts 

With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS’s Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan 

Alshehhi, Its Processing of Their Change of Status Applications, and Its Efforts to Track Foreign Students 

in the United States, Special Report, May 2002. http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0205/fullreport.pdf 3

 House Report 112-091. 

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employee performance measures that focus on the number of 

applications or petitions that an ISO processes. 

The former Domestic Operations Directorate is now divided into 

two directorates, Service Center Operations Directorate (SCOPS) 

and Field Operations Directorate (FOD). SCOPS and FOD 

develop and revise policy to meet legislative mandates and provide 

policy guidance to ISOs and managers throughout the country. 

SCOPS managers direct the service centers in California, 

Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont. ISOs at these four centers 

adjudicate more than 70% of all immigration benefit applications 

and petitions. FOD manages the district and field offices across 

four national regions. ISOs at the district and field offices conduct 

interviews on nonasylum applications and work closely with 

Application Support Centers, which provide fingerprinting and 

related services. 

USCIS also elevated the Office of Fraud Detection and National 

Security (FDNS) to directorate status. The USCIS Director told us 

that this change reflects a focus on antifraud and national security 

responsibilities. Although FDNS issues fraud policy, fraud 

detection Immigration Officers (IOs) are based in the field and 

supervised by the service center or office where they are located. 

Additionally, FDNS field staff organization and funding is 

managed locally. The IOs work with ISOs at USCIS offices 

throughout the country. IOs are responsible for reviewing 

information when ISOs have a concern about possible fraud. 

Therefore, the policies and practices that govern the relationship 

between ISOs and IOs on particular cases are central to the success 

of the adjudication process. 

Immigration law is complex, and USCIS administers benefits of 

great value. For cases where fraud is suspected, strong partnerships 

and collaboration between ISOs and IOs are necessary to 

strengthen national security and protect public safety. ISOs and 

IOs must work together to ensure that the best benefit eligibility 

determination is made in each case. During the adjudication of a 

case, the ISO considers all of the information available in the case 

file to decide whether the benefit can be granted. Some benefit 

requests can be easily approved based on the information they 

submit, whereas others may stretch the truth or commit fraud in an 

effort to gain a benefit inappropriately. 

In October 2010, Senator Charles Grassley wrote a letter to the 

USCIS Director, the Inspector General, and the Secretary of 

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Homeland Security. The Senator expressed several concerns about 

the immigration benefit adjudication system. He was uncertain 

about the effectiveness of USCIS efforts to protect national 

security and prevent fraud. Senator Grassley requested that we 

review— 

The performance evaluation process for ISOs to determine 

what incentives to detect fraud exist; 

Whether pressure to process cases hinders national security 

and fraud detection; 

How employees view management efforts to promote 

process integrity; and 

Whether ISOs are encouraged to adjudicate benefit 

applications favorably without thorough review. 

Although this report recommends several process improvements, 

three important points are relevant to our findings. First, the 

testimonial evidence that our interviewees provided may not be 

views shared by other employees. Quotations from our interviews 

and survey responses reflect the views and personal experiences of 

individuals, not necessarily the experience of most ISOs across the 

United States. Second, USCIS has taken action to diminish threats 

to the immigration benefits system. General employee concerns 

about the impact of production pressure on the quality of an ISO’s 

decisions do not mean that systemic problems compromise the 

ability of USCIS to detect fraud and security threats. No ISOs 

presented us with cases where benefits were granted to those who 

pose terrorist or national security threats to the United States. 

Even those employees who criticized management expressed 

confidence that USCIS would never compromise national security 

on a given case. Third, as our September 2010 report noted, 

employees are required to report certain incidents to the USCIS 

Office of Security and Integrity (OSI).4

 One reportable incident is 

any case of misconduct by an employee at the GS-15 level or 

higher. Senior USCIS leadership suggested that we use our current 

report to reiterate employee reporting requirements. The Director 

of USCIS informed us that managers and supervisors must ensure 

the integrity of each benefit determination, based on the evidence 

presented in the case file. ISOs who are pressured to approve 

cases that do not warrant approval should report such incidents to 

OSI. 

4

 DHS OIG, Efforts to Detect and Deter Fraud Committed by Immigration Services Officers, (OIG-10­

118), September 2010. 

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Results of Review 

Greater Support for the Fraud Detection Mission Is Necessary 

More Training and Collaboration Is Needed To Improve the 

Fraud Referral Process 

ISOs use both national and local fraud indicators to determine 

whether a file contains possible fraud information. Files are 

referred to an IO when fraud indicators are evident. The file is 

accompanied by a written referral memorandum in which the ISO 

articulates questions and suspicions. The IO conducts research, 

including Internet searches and queries of databases not available 

to ISOs, to review the referral. Based on what the IO discovers, a 

statement of findings is returned to the ISO. 

In our survey of ISOs in district and field offices, we asked for an 

assessment of the frequency of direct personal interaction with IOs 

on the resolution of fraud concerns. In response, 179 out of 254 

ISOs (70.5%) said there was not enough interaction with IOs. 

None of the respondents said there was too much interaction. Our 

interviewees and survey respondents support greater personal 

collaboration between the two groups to improve fraud detection. 

Additional communication between ISOs and IOs would allow 

ISOs to engage in meaningful dialogue on the reasons for a fraud 

referral, and how particular information would assist adjudication 

of the case. Before deciding to send a file to an IO, the ISO would 

have an opportunity to ask an IO questions about the case, discuss 

fraud indicators, and determine whether the case warrants a 

referral. In addition, the ISO could obtain an IO’s comments on 

the adequacy of the referral memo that the ISO sent. ISOs desire 

confirmation that the information sent to an IO was useful. 

Communication improvements would make both the ISO and the 

IO more effective and create process efficiencies. In some cases, 

ISOs are concerned that an IO’s response to a case referral might 

yield little of value. In other cases, the ISO may not know what 

happens after the referral is sent to the IO. ISOs need to know 

what information helps an IO research possible fraud cases. Some 

survey respondents and interviewees informed us that when an IO 

returns the case file, the statement of fraud findings is often just a 

paraphrase, if not a copy, of the ISO’s fraud referral language. The 

absence of new information in such cases leads to confusion 

among ISOs. One respondent argued that ISOs could perform 

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many IO functions with additional systems access or research 

tools. It is common for ISOs to view IOs as overwhelmed with 

referrals, which may explain the ISO perception that certain cases 

languish after a fraud referral is submitted. Another source of 

frustration for ISOs occurs when the statement of findings notes 

that fraud is “possible” in the case. One supervisory ISO said that 

inconclusive Statements of Finding are not useful. “Either fraud is 

found or not,” the supervisor noted. Many ISOs and supervisors 

are not sure how to resolve such cases. With limited dialogue 

between ISOs and IOs, the adjudicators are disappointed and 

confused when, without explanation, the fraud they suspected is 

not found. Regular interaction between ISOs and IOs would offer 

a means to resolve these cases. 

The level of communication between ISOs and IOs varies among 

offices. During our fieldwork, we visited offices where we 

observed little or no direct contact between IOs and ISOs. In other 

offices, there were frequent information exchanges. At the service 

centers, the fraud units are larger and farther away, which gives 

some ISOs the impression that the two groups are not intended to 

interact. 

Although some ISOs and IOs reported satisfaction with the referral 

process, others told us that inconsistent ISO-IO collaboration 

diminished the effectiveness of fraud detection. Interviewees and 

survey respondents said that some managers discourage in-person 

or telephone contact with IOs. One respondent wrote, “ISOs in my 

office have been instructed not to communicate directly with our 

FDNS officers, when obviously, the opposite would be beneficial 

in assessing and finding fraud.” Another ISO said that some 

supervisors verbally reprimand ISOs who discuss cases with those 

outside the chain of command. The ISO wrote, “This results in 

important and critical information regarding fraud trends not being 

properly relayed to all officers.” 

ISOs desire more information on fraud detection practices and 

trends so they can make better fraud referrals. Improved training 

on fraud issues is a reasonable way to meet this need. IOs could 

provide general training on immigration benefit fraud, as well as 

examples of what types of cases should be referred. 

Our interviewees and survey respondents offered several ideas 

about how and when training can be provided. The most common 

suggestion was for IOs to brief ISOs during meetings. At these 

sessions, IOs could provide handouts that contain information on 

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fraud trends or particular individuals of concern. One survey 

respondent said FDNS briefings of this type “are very helpful in 

combating fraud at our office.” Another respondent suggested that 

the ISOs should take the IO training course to expand their 

knowledge of fraud issues. Staff at one service center mentioned a 

Fraud Intelligence Database, which was a local collection of 

information on fraud trends, indicators, and persons of interest, as 

a reference tool for ISOs. Unfortunately, the database was not 

maintained and is no longer used. 

In our review of the special immigrant nonminister religious 

worker visa program, we reported that ISOs and IOs “lamented the 

infrequent nature” of collaborative meetings and fraud roundtables.5 

Additional efforts in this area would improve the fraud detection 

mission across USCIS. Regular informative meetings between 

ISOs and IOs would be a strategic tool in the fraud detection 

process over the long term. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #1: Promote better collaboration and cross 

training between Immigration Services Officers and Immigration 

Officers in support of fraud detection efforts. 

Recommendation #2: Assess, document, and correct as needed 

the level of fraud training and collaboration between Immigration 

Services Officers and Immigration Officers across all USCIS 

offices. 

ISO Detailees Benefit From Time Spent in Fraud Offices 

We interviewed two center ISOs who were detailed to the local 

fraud unit. Both ISOs said the detail was a great learning 

opportunity. The ISOs worked with experienced IOs to learn 

about fraud indicators and trends. Additional input from staff and 

managers substantiates that ISOs gain valuable knowledge when 

they are temporarily assigned to a fraud unit. A detail in the local 

fraud office enables ISOs to apply an expanded knowledge of 

fraud detection after returning to adjudicating cases. Details also 

promote understanding between ISOs and IOs, because detailed 

ISOs gain a better understanding of the fraud unit’s 

responsibilities. One IO at a service center said that interaction 

5

 DHS OIG, The Special Immigrant Nonminister Religious Worker Program (OIG-09-79), June 2009, p. 6. 

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with ISOs ensures that the two groups of employees understand 

each role. Our interviews indicate that the perspective that ISOs 

gain enhances subsequent fraud referrals. 

Because of the knowledge ISOs gain after completing details at the 

local fraud unit, USCIS should create a national policy in this area 

that would increase the number of ISOs who could complete a 

fraud unit detail assignment. ISOs can benefit from the enhanced 

fraud detection skills a detail would offer. Detailed ISOs gain 

insights from IOs that will assist in the further development of an 

ISO’s fraud identification skills. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #3: Develop a process to promote more detail 

assignments for Immigration Service Officers to local fraud units. 

USCIS Immigration Security Check Process Has Difficulty 

Identifying Aliases in Certain Cases 

Section 10.1(c) of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual lists 

requirements that the applicant or petitioner must meet before an 

ISO can adjudicate the case. These requirements include submitting 

the applicable signed benefit form and paying applicable fees. 

During the adjudication process, ISOs complete security checks on 

law enforcement and immigration systems to determine whether an 

applicant is a possible security or criminal risk. 

Individual aliases or multiple spellings of names complicate the 

security check process. A staff report of the National Commission 

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States reported that the 9/11 

hijackers used 364 different names and aliases.6

 Because files can 

be large—hundreds of pages in some cases—ISOs can miss aliases 

during the review of a case file. 

Supervisors and managers noted that ISOs miss aliases on 

occasion. Production pressure to adjudicate quickly may hinder an 

ISO’s ability to identify and query names and aliases during the 

security check process. An OSI manager informed us that USCIS 

internal review staff analyze cases where the ISO overlooks aliases 

in the file. This process helps mitigate risk in this area. 

6

 http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf 

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Quality assurance data we reviewed demonstrate that further work 

is needed to identify more aliases in some benefit applications and 

petitions. Challenges in alias identification are compounded 

because USCIS uses cumbersome and outdated immigration data 

systems. Both USCIS employees and some law enforcement 

agency users express frustration with USCIS systems. Our recent 

report on overseas screening noted that information on foreign 

nationals is fragmented among 17 data systems. Officers must 

conduct labor-intensive, system-by-system checks to verify or 

eliminate each possible match to terrorist watch lists and other 

derogatory information.7 

To decrease this burden, and improve the security and integrity of 

the immigration system, USCIS is implementing the 

Transformation program. The Office of Transformation has 

established teams across USCIS directorates and solicited 

information from third parties to enhance operational capabilities. 

The Vermont Service Center is scheduled to test and evaluate the 

Transformation System in early fiscal year (FY) 2012. By 2013, 

all service centers will have implemented Transformation. 

Additional short-term solutions should be studied to ensure that 

aliases are not missed so frequently. Because of the importance of 

name checks to the security of the immigration system, USCIS 

needs to focus on this problem prior to the USCIS-wide 

implementation of Transformation. 

Transformation will consolidate data systems and include state-ofthe-art enhancements. One goal of Transformation is automated 

fraud detection, which will streamline the referral process for 

possible fraud cases. Transformation’s fraud efforts will use a risk 

analyzer for adjudication, which will make it difficult for 

individuals who use different names and aliases to circumvent 

fraud and national security system checks. 

We were informed that the risk analyzer will identify all aliases, 

which will provide greater protection for the immigration system. 

Transformation will provide access to data from the applicant, 

USCIS data systems, and any aliases discovered from other 

immigration and law enforcement data systems. The system will 

identify aliases much more efficiently than ISO review of paper 

files, according to a Transformation official. 

7

 DHS OIG, Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Overseas Screening (OIG-11-68), April 2011. 

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Even with these improvements, we suggest that USCIS use the 

existing supervisory review and quality assurance processes to 

focus on alias identification before Transformation is fully 

implemented. The national security implications of alias 

identification are obvious. Additional steps in this area are needed 

now, even with the changes that Transformation is expected to 

bring. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #4: Develop additional quality assurance or 

supervisory review procedures to strengthen identification of all 

names and aliases of individuals seeking an immigration benefit. 

The New Performance Measurement System Is Developing Slowly 

In FY 2011, USCIS began to implement a new ISO performance 

evaluation process. This revised process originated from the 2008 DHS 

Employee Performance Management Program, which mandated that an 

agency’s employee performance goals be aligned with DHS strategic 

priorities. In FY 2010, the USCIS Office of Human Capital and Training 

(HCT) updated performance management procedures to transfer 

bargaining unit employees to the DHS system. USCIS development of the 

FY 2011 ISO performance measures followed. 

The revised ISO performance measures prioritize quality and national 

security as critical elements. The forms used to evaluate employee 

performance contain several elements, some of which are critical to 

successful performance, while others are noncritical. In the past, 

performance evaluations established production as a critical element. This 

meant that an ISO had to process a certain number of benefit requests over 

a given period to earn an excellent rating. 

With the new FY 2011 performance measures, production is noncritical to 

performance. This change aligns performance measurement for ISOs with 

USCIS and DHS strategic goals. The new ISO performance measures are 

designed to protect the integrity of the immigration system through a focus 

on national security and fraud identification. 

The FY 2011 performance measures are a pilot initiative. A USCIS 

workgroup met in the spring of 2011 to discuss changes to the measures 

for FY 2012. These discussions focused on standardization of performance 

measures across different work locations. HCT noted that each directorate 

in USCIS participated in the workgroup, which will ensure meaningful 

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comments and better implementation of the new measures. In FY 2012, 

USCIS will focus on continued improvements to the FY 2011 measures, 

based on what is learned from the FY 2011 performance management 

cycle. FY 2013 is the target to finalize the new measures. 

We assessed whether ISO performance evaluation criteria encourage and 

reward the appropriate denial of ineligible or fraudulent immigration 

benefit applications and petitions. The decision to make production 

noncritical is a significant change that should improve fraud detection and 

national security. 

Additional Field Outreach Is Needed To Explain the New 

Performance Measures 

In FY 2011, 50% of an ISO’s overall performance rating was 

based on fraud detection and national security identification. The 

quality and accuracy of an ISO’s decisions accounted for the other 

50% of the rating. Some variance existed between service center 

and field office ISOs, because of the different work that ISOs 

performed in different locations. Performance measures for fraud 

detection IOs differed from those of ISOs. 

USCIS faces a complex task as the new measures are finalized. 

We learned that ISOs and supervisors are concerned that— 

Insufficient training on the performance measures hinders 

their success; 

Production remains the focus, even under the new measures; 

Rating an ISO’s fraud detection skills is difficult; and 

Certain ISOs will be disadvantaged because of the form 

types they adjudicate. 

ISOs and supervisors received limited training on the new 

performance measures. Because of resource and time limitations, 

HCT’s effort to inform staff about the new measures could not 

eliminate all ISO confusion about the new process. 

Survey respondents and interviewees informed us that insufficient 

guidance led to confusion in the field. One individual said that 

supervisors have not instructed ISOs to do anything differently, 

since they have always performed fraud detection efforts. 

Additional onsite training for ISOs and IOs offers the chance to 

inform ISOs about how the evaluation process will change. 

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ISOs are eager to receive information from HCT on new 

performance measures. One ISO said that employees wanted to 

know what the expectations were so they can exceed them. HCT 

provided training and reference guides for management, but it 

could not visit all USCIS centers and field offices. HCT provided 

us information about plans in FY 2012 to conduct onsite national 

training throughout USCIS offices. Also, training courses for 

rating and reviewing officials have been developed, and 

workgroups have helped disseminate information. These steps are 

necessary and appropriate. Additional work in this area will 

prepare supervisors and ISOs for the new performance 

measurement system. The assistance of operational directorates 

and the USCIS Director is necessary to ensure that the planned 

training will have maximum effect. Many interviewees and 

several survey respondents expressed some confusion about the 

new measures. More extensive training on the purpose, scope, and 

content of the performance management system changes is a key to 

successful implementation. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #5: Perform onsite outreach efforts nationwide 

to discuss the performance management system with Immigration 

Services Officers and Immigration Officers. 

Comments From Field Personnel Would Improve ISO 

Performance Measures 

In previous years, INS and USCIS performance measures 

emphasized production. In January 2002, GAO reported on 

production pressure that adjudication officers faced and the effect 

of this pressure on fraud referrals. That same year, the DOJ OIG 

reported that production pressures were a factor in how quickly 

adjudications officers worked and the decisions they made. The 

report noted that officers would disregard certain steps in the 

adjudications process when they risked not being able to complete 

the required number of cases. 

Many ISOs expressed concern that production will remain a 

central managerial focus, although production is now a noncritical 

performance element. Many ISOs believe that, despite the new 

measures, supervisors will continue to judge ISOs by the quantity, 

not the quality, of their work. An ISO explained that job 

performance success is based on the number and timeliness of 

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completions. “It is a known fact that it is easier and faster to 

approve an application than to deny an application.” Concerns that 

production will still guide USCIS decisions affect how ISOs 

perceive the new performance measures. 

At the time our fieldwork ended, HCT had yet to receive comments 

from officials and employees about the FY 2011 midyear review. 

HCT views input from employees as a way to gain insight into 

how the performance measures are viewed in the field. USCIS 

leadership should ensure that HCT has the resources to gain input 

from ISOs across the country. 

Our survey of district and field office ISOs informed us of 

concerns that could help USCIS revise performance measures. 

ISOs were asked, “What do you expect from the new 2011 ISO 

performance evaluation criteria?” Of the 249 ISOs who 

responded, 165 (66.3%) expect little or no change. Employees’ 

apprehension about the new measures may stem from their 

perspective on how supervisors previously evaluated ISOs. 

Another survey question asked ISOs whether past performance 

evaluation criteria were “applied to ensure that employees made 

appropriate denials of ineligible or potentially fraudulent 

applications.” Although 107 of 252 ISO respondents (42.5%) said 

that the criteria were applied appropriately, a majority believed 

otherwise. Eighty-two respondents (32.5%) had some concern 

about how performance evaluation criteria were used. These 

respondents knew of instances when a supervisor’s emphasis on 

productivity led to ISOs feeling rushed, making proper case 

determination less likely. Another 35 ISOs (13.9%) had serious 

concerns that employees who focus on fraud or ineligibility were 

evaluated unfairly. 

It is unclear to many ISOs how their fraud referral skills will be 

measured. Interviewees and survey respondents conclude that 

managers do not know how to compare an ISO’s fraud detection 

work with USCIS expectations. Field office managers asked how 

a supervisor would know whether ISOs are missing fraud. Survey 

respondents wrote that fraud detection for ISOs is “a very vague 

concept” because “there is no way to measure referrals.” Some 

respondents said that better, not more, referrals should be the true 

measure of an ISO’s fraud detection skills. 

Under the new performance management system, an ISO who 

meets 70% of the performance goal for fraud detection will 

achieve a satisfactory rating. We were informed that some ISOs 

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adjudicate form types that have little or no fraud, and experience in 

fraud cases varies across USCIS offices. An ISO wondered, “What 

if I have very complex denials that do not involve issues of fraud?” 

Some ISOs opined that the new measures set expectations too 

high, which will make satisfactory performance difficult to 

achieve. The new quality component in the FY 2011 measures 

was mentioned as an example. One error, ISOs said, could mean 

that an employee would be unable to achieve excellence in the 

quality area. 

These concerns demonstrate the need for ISOs and supervisors to 

participate more in identifying potential problems of which 

headquarters personnel may not be aware. Because of the 

preliminary nature of the FY 2011 measures, USCIS should 

endeavor to learn as much as possible from the field about how 

employees view the performance measures. This would facilitate 

the continued development of performance measures and improve 

the measures over time. The resources required for an online 

survey are negligible, and the feedback gained should improve the 

performance measures in future years. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #6: Solicit comments from Immigration 

Services Officers and supervisors regarding the new performance 

measures. 

Inappropriate Pressure on the Adjudications Process Must 

Be Avoided 

The Perception of Pressure To Process Cases Remains a 

Concern 

Even with implementation of performance measures with 

production a noncritical element, ISOs informed us that production 

pressure remains a part of the adjudication process. ISOs in 

multiple locations are concerned that production expectations are 

too high. The consensus among ISOs throughout the country is 

that quantity is still at least as important to their supervisors and 

managers as quality. An important part of our interviewees’ 

concern about production pressure is the perception that USCIS 

strives to satisfy benefit requesters in a way that could affect 

national security and fraud detection priorities. 

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The DOJ OIG identified similar problems prior to the creation of 

USCIS. Its reports noted that adjudicators may skip systems 

checks that could be done quickly because some parts of the 

process would interfere with timely completion of the required 

number of cases.8 In 2000, the DOJ OIG reported that time 

pressures “discouraged the pursuit of potentially disqualifying 

issues” in immigration benefit adjudications. At that time, many 

adjudications officers said that “the pressure they were under was, 

in fact, pressure to approve applications and not just to complete as 

many naturalization cases as possible.” The increased likelihood 

of benefit approvals under such circumstances was obvious.9 

Recent inspections provided us views of production pressure from 

district and field offices. In 2010, a field office manager informed 

us that USCIS is “very production driven,” which “sets the wrong 

tone” for ISOs. Also in 2010, a field office ISO said that simple 

mistakes will be made in the adjudication of cases as long as time 

pressures existed. A manager in the same office concluded that 

USCIS was “drastically failing” to comprehend how time pressure 

affects an ISO’s ability to make the best decision on individual 

cases. 

A service center ISO can take only certain actions after review of a 

case: 

Issue a letter to request specific additional evidence, 

Write a fraud referral to transfer the case to the fraud unit, 

Issue a Notice of Intent to Deny, with an explanation, 

Deny the application and write a detailed justification, or 

Approve the case. 

Approval of a case takes significantly less time and effort than any 

of the other actions. ISOs who feel pressed for time or behind in 

their work, and wish to meet production goals, might opt to 

approve a marginal case and move on to the next file. 

Survey responses revealed concern about production pressure. 

When asked how well USCIS balances national security and 

promoting immigration, 130 of 252 respondents (51.6%) said that 

USCIS policy is too heavily weighted toward promoting 

8

 DOJ OIG, The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A 

Review of the INS’s Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, Its Processing of Their Change of 

Status Applications, and Its Efforts To Track Foreign Students in the United States, May 2002, pp. 91–104. 9 DOJ OIG, “Interviews and Adjudications,” in An Investigation of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service’s Citizenship USA Initiative, July 2000, pp. 13, 47, and 116–118. 

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immigration. Only 25 of 251 respondents (10%) concluded that 

they have sufficient time to complete interviews of those who seek 

immigration benefits. On another question, 63 of 254 ISOs 

(24.8%) responded that they have been pressured to approve 

questionable applications. Although fewer than one in four 

respondents had this concern, we view the number of pressured 

ISOs as a threat to the integrity of the benefit issuance system. 

ISOs in district and field offices stressed the need for more time to 

interview those who seek benefits. Our interviews and survey 

responses indicate that district and field office ISOs generally must 

complete between 12 and 15 interviews per day. ISOs said that the 

amount of time to conduct interviews is insufficient. According to 

Section 15.1 of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual, the length of 

interviews depends on several factors, including the complexity of 

the case, possible fraud issues, officer experience, and cooperation 

of the interviewee. Most of the ISOs we interviewed said that they 

must complete interviews in less than 30 minutes. Fifteen 

interviews per day, with 30 minutes for each interview, is 7.5 hours 

per day. These ISOs have other responsibilities, and some 

interviews last longer than 30 minutes. Such time pressure does 

not allow the ISO to review cases prior to interviews, or ask 

questions of coworkers or supervisors. 

One survey respondent wrote that “adjudicators should not be 

‘rushed’ to complete an interview, especially interviews with past 

and/or potential fraud indicators present.” Most of the ISOs we 

interviewed were concerned with the insufficient time to review 

cases thoroughly. Some ISOs arrive for duty before their 

scheduled start time so they can get a few extra minutes to review 

cases before the day’s first interview. ISOs explained that once the 

interviews start, there is not time to conduct database checks or 

simply review the next file. 

The speed at which ISOs must process cases leaves ample 

opportunities for critical information to be overlooked. One ISO 

said that an ISO is likely to “grant and just move on,” rather than 

use information to make a better determination in certain cases. 

Additional ISO positions, rather than production pressure, are the 

better way to reduce production backlogs. For USCIS to prioritize 

fraud detection and national security, a reduction in case numbers 

per day is necessary. This would allow ISOs time to review case 

files and interact with employees and supervisors on fraud issues 

or other relevant case matters. 

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A SCOPS manager said that USCIS is not yet sure how the move 

to noncritical production for ISOs will affect a service center’s 

production. The comments we received suggest that ISO 

production expectations have not changed, although an ISO’s 

performance rating no longer treats production as a critical job 

element. The new performance measurement system based on 

fraud and national security identification skills faces significant 

challenges if production goals remain as prominent across USCIS 

as our interviewees and survey respondents reported. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #7: Develop standards to permit more time for 

an Immigration Services Officer’s review of case files. 

Directed Decisions Need Clarification 

Section 10.14 of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual describes what 

should occur when an ISO and a supervisor cannot agree on the 

outcome of a case. When there is disagreement, additional 

research and discussion should occur. If disagreement remains, the 

supervisor’s perspective prevails in what is known as a directed 

decision.10 This terminology is misleading, because the supervisor 

is not permitted to direct the subordinate to approve the case. 

Instead, the supervisor is expected to exercise his or her superior 

experience and judgment regarding the case. 

Several USCIS employees informed us that ISOs have been 

required to approve specific cases against their will. Some ISOs 

told us that they complied with the demands of their supervisors 

and approved visa applications containing suspect information. 

Although the higher ranking officer’s view dictates the outcome, 

the manual establishes that: 

[An] ISO should never sign something when he or she disagrees with the 

decision merely because a supervisory officer directs such action. If the 

adjudicator has reason to believe that the directed decision is wrong 

either because he or she does not believe a favorable exercise of 

discretion is warranted or because there is a disagreement over what is 

permitted by statute or regulation, the decision should be signed by the 

supervisory officer and the file noted by the adjudicator. 

10 The disputed case could also be sent to the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) for review. 

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USCIS practice deviates from this policy. Several interviewees 

and survey respondents informed us that a supervisor will reassign 

a case to another ISO rather than sign a directed decision. One 

district ISO wrote, “Cases are sometimes taken away from us and 

given to officers who the supervisor knows will approve the case.” 

A SCOPS senior manager said that supervisors can reassign work 

in general, so an ISO should not be surprised when a debatable 

case goes to a colleague. One service center provided us a local 

policy similar to the senior manager’s views. 

Reassignment in such a situation does not conform to USCIS 

policy. Section 10.4 of the manual, which discusses the transfer of 

cases, does not instruct the supervisor to reassign a case to another 

ISO when the first ISO made an incorrect decision. The supervisor 

can give a case to another ISO if the original ISO has been 

transferred to other duties, but not because the supervisor and the 

ISO disagree on the disposition of a case. 

ISOs may not be aware of the policy on directed decisions. A 

survey respondent, who was concerned about production pressure 

and the drive for approvals, did not know that an ISO could refuse 

to sign a directed decision. Another survey respondent was 

threatened with a formal reprimand if a case was not approved as 

the supervisor required. When discussing another directed 

decision, one ISO wrote, “management found someone else” after 

the ISO did not concur with the approval. 

Reassigning a file to a second ISO could foster rivalry between 

ISOs, lead ISOs to please supervisors through approval of 

problematic cases, and decrease office morale. A supervisor may 

be correct to override an ISO’s judgment in certain cases, but the 

supervisor should then be required to sign the case as the deciding 

officer, in accordance with USCIS policy. Reiteration of existing 

policy would improve process integrity, make more efficient use of 

resources, and conform to the manual’s policy on directed 

decisions and the transfer of cases. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #8: Enforce the policy in the Adjudicator’s 

Field Manual regarding directed decisions, and ensure that staff 

and supervisors are aware of their responsibilities when such 

decisions are made. 

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Policy on Requests for Evidence Needs Clarification 

If additional information is needed before an ISO can make a 

decision on a case, a request for evidence (RFE) is sent to the 

applicant or petitioner. An RFE allows the individual who seeks 

the benefit to provide further proof of entitlement. Stakeholders 

and the USCIS Ombudsman have expressed concern that some 

RFEs needlessly delay adjudications and create public confusion. 

Complaints suggest that some RFEs are unclear, incomplete, or 

otherwise of low quality. USCIS has responded with an effort to 

revise internal templates so that an RFE recipient will better 

understand what additional information is needed before an ISO 

can render a decision. 

When an ISO first examines a file, it contains mostly information 

that the applicant submitted. This information will probably 

support the applicant’s claim. Some cases are clearly approvable 

or clearly deniable, but for many cases the ISO will need more 

information to make a determination. One source for this 

additional information is the applicant. In those cases, an ISO will 

send the applicant an RFE. 

The USCIS Ombudsman has a statutory responsibility to examine 

adjudication processes and suggest changes to USCIS policy.11 

Three recent annual reports from the Ombudsman expressed 

concern about inefficiencies in the RFE process. In 2008 and 

2009, the Ombudsman determined that RFEs place burdens on 

benefit requesters and increase costs for USCIS. In 2010, the 

Ombudsman determined that RFEs are not uniform, are 

duplicative, and ask for information that petitioners are not 

required to provide. 

After examining specific RFEs, the Ombudsman corroborated 

some public complaints, but also determined that other RFEs were 

justified. The Ombudsman’s June 2010 report also reminded 

petitioners and applicants that an RFE can be a second chance to 

establish eligibility for the requested benefit. 

USCIS issued three RFE policy memos between 2004 and 2007. 

The first memo, released in May 2004, concluded that denials can 

be made without RFEs in certain cases, such as when there is clear 

evidence of ineligibility. In February 2005, the May 2004 memo 

11 P.L. 107-296 § 452(b). 

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was rescinded because it gave the mistaken impression that denials 

should be issued even if the RFE might give the beneficiary a 

chance to provide evidence that established eligibility. The 

February 2005 memo informed ISOs that a case did not require an 

RFE if initial evidence was sufficient to establish eligibility for the 

requested benefit. The 2005 memo stressed two other points: An 

RFE is appropriate when needed evidence is missing, and RFEs 

should be limited to documentation needed to adjudicate the case. 

This reasonable balance was lost when a third RFE memo was 

released in June 2007. That memo might confuse ISOs and the 

public. Although the need for RFEs in some situations is obvious, 

ISOs were informed that “RFEs should, if possible, be avoided,” 

while also guiding ISOs “to request the evidence needed for 

thorough, correct decision-making.” This contradictory guidance 

remains in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual. 

Many ISOs said that USCIS leans too heavily toward limiting 

RFEs and increasing approvals. Some ISOs told us that they have 

insufficient time to create RFEs, or RFEs are not issued in 

marginal cases because of concern that management will question 

their necessity. Supervisors have legitimate reasons to reduce the 

issuance of unnecessary RFEs, but existing manual policy 

establishes a bias against RFEs. 

Quality assurance data demonstrate the effect of ISO confusion 

about RFE policy. Quality reviewers noted incomplete evidence in 

some approved petitions. RFEs, rather than approval letters, 

should be issued in cases where evidence is unclear. Also, there 

were inconsistencies in RFE issuances in some cases where denial 

letters were sent, although additional evidence could have 

demonstrated entitlement to the benefit. USCIS should rewrite 

current policy, which establishes the avoidance of RFEs as a policy 

preference. New policy would diminish ISO confusion about the 

role of RFEs in the adjudication process. 

For applicants who have not submitted persuasive evidence or 

whose eligibility is unclear, the RFE process creates an opportunity 

to provide more information for USCIS’ consideration. 

Conversely, the response to an RFE provides the ISO with more 

information upon which to base the decision that best advances the 

interests of the government. 

We examined certain files and had supervisors or ISOs discuss 

some previously decided cases with us. In some instances, 

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supervisors told us that there was insufficient evidence in the file 

to justify its approval. These included instances where Department 

of State consular officers returned files to USCIS after beneficiaries 

were interviewed overseas prior to visa issuance. In other 

instances, the expert ISOs said that a particular case was likely 

approvable, but an RFE should have been issued to ensure that all 

regulatory requirements were met in the application or petition. 

One senior ISO opined about the file of an L-1A visa petitioner 

that needed additional evidence, although an approval was issued. 

An L-1A visa petition is submitted when an overseas company 

wishes to transfer a manager to a U.S. subsidiary. The beneficiary 

must manage professionals and be detached from day-to-day work. 

Thus, an L-1A manager cannot be extensively involved in providing 

products or services. For this particular file, there was limited 

evidence that the individual would manage staff. Additionally, the 

beneficiary’s job description included a requirement to interact 

with clients and do other nonmanagerial work. An RFE might 

have clarified these issues and demonstrated eligibility, but a quick 

approval was made without an effort to gain additional evidence. 

The ISO who discussed this file said that many ISOs would not 

request evidence for such cases, since supervisors usually question 

RFEs and petition denials, not approvals. 

Because of contradictions in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual, 

USCIS’ RFE policy is not clear. This lack of clarity, coupled with 

continued pressure to process applications and petitions, decreases 

the chance that RFEs will be issued. Suppressing RFE issuance is 

not the best response to the problem of inconsistent or improper 

RFEs. Clarification of USCIS policy in this area, in tandem with 

the RFE template improvements that are being implemented, 

should lead to better RFEs, less public confusion, and improved 

adjudication decisions. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #9: Revise policy on requests for evidence to 

clarify the role that the requests play in the adjudication process. 

Efforts To Change O Visa Policy and Approve Certain Cases 

Were Misguided 

Congress created the O visa classification for aliens who have 

extraordinary ability in science, arts, education, business, or 

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athletics. The extraordinary ability that aliens must demonstrate 

varies depending on the field of expertise. For the arts, the 

beneficiary must exhibit “distinction,” while those in motion 

picture and television productions must have attained 

“extraordinary achievement.” For other fields, the level of skill 

requires “sustained national or international acclaim.”12 

Individuals must submit Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant 

Worker, to initiate the O visa benefit adjudication process. ISOs at 

the California and Vermont service centers, where O visa petitions 

are processed, adjudicated 44,386 O visa petitions from January 

2008 through March 2011. 

Many employees expressed concerns about how a small number of 

individuals in the USCIS Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) 

attempted to increase the approval of O visa benefit petitions. 

OCC informed service centers that certain questionable petitions 

should be approved and initiated changes to USCIS policy on O 

visas. 

While we question the efforts of certain managers in the OCC, 

including individuals who are no longer employed at USCIS, we 

do not mean to criticize all OCC staff. Our comments in this 

report should not cast doubt on the legal advice that USCIS 

professional attorneys provide ISOs on a daily basis across the 

country. 

An O visa petition that a university filed led to much internal 

USCIS debate in late 2009. Based on our interviews, unease about 

this case and others like it still lingers throughout the agency. The 

California Service Center (CSC) denied the petition, based on 

insufficient evidence that the beneficiary had achieved the 

extraordinary ability that the statute requires. Senior OCC officials 

disagreed with the CSC’s decision. This prompted a great deal of 

discussion and email about the appropriateness of the denial. OCC 

attorneys at the CSC generally supported the center’s decision, but 

the former USCIS Chief Counsel remained adamant that an 

approval was necessary. Subsequently, the center’s denial was 

upheld by a 26-page opinion from the USCIS Administrative 

Appeals Office (AAO). Although the AAO upheld the original 

CSC decision, a belief that USCIS headquarters wanted to push a 

high level of approvals has affected USCIS managers and ISOs. 

12 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(46) and (a)(15)(O). 

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OCC management attempted to change USCIS policy on O visas 

shortly after the university’s petition was denied. In early 2010, 

OCC expressed heightened interest in O visa adjudications as a 

result of public complaints. One private attorney was concerned 

specifically about O visa petition denials from the CSC. This 

attorney admitted that he had not reviewed each of the cases, but 

he wrote directly to an OCC manager with his concerns that ISOs 

at the CSC issued inappropriate denials. 

Like the complainant, the OCC manager had not examined the 

case files. Nonetheless, in an email to the CSC, which included a 

draft memo on O visa adjudications policy, the OCC manager 

noted the attorney’s complaint and perceived problems with the 

CSC’s denial decisions. The OCC manager declared an interest in 

“a more flexible and liberal policy for weighing the evidence and 

granting petitions.” 

The CSC had another viewpoint on the overall problem. A CSC 

manager suggested, “We have a bit of a different perspective given 

the review of the actual files and the caliber of the beneficiaries.” 

The manager suggested that OCC made incorrect assumptions 

based on the private attorney’s complaints. 

Quality assurance information we examined demonstrates that 

excessive O visa approvals are more likely than denials. SCOPS 

staff conducts random reviews of completed I-129 adjudications. 

We analyzed 10 reports from these reviews that took place 

between November 2008 and February 2011. The quality reviews 

included statements such as, “No evidence to establish that the 

beneficiary qualifies as an alien of extraordinary ability,” or 

“insufficient evidentiary criteria” to support the approval. No 

inappropriate O visa petition denials were included in the quality 

assurance data we reviewed. These data confirm that USCIS was 

more likely to grant O visa status incorrectly than to deny a 

legitimate petition. 

Examples of erroneous approvals like those that USCIS quality 

staff found may explain why O visa petitions are granted at such a 

high rate. From January 2008 through March 2011, the California 

and Vermont service centers approved 40,719 of 44,386 O visa 

petitions (91.7%). This approval rate exceeds the approval rate for 

many other nonimmigrant worker petitions. During the same time 

period, the two centers approved 78.5% of H-1B (specialty 

occupations) and 76.1% of L-1B (specialized knowledge worker) 

petitions. OCC’s efforts to increase the approval rate of the 

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relatively small O visa case load that has a much higher approval 

rate are mysterious. 

As occurred in the university’s case, the USCIS AAO frequently 

supports the ISO’s decision on appeal. From January 2010 

through February 2011, O visa petition appeals succeeded only 4 

times out of 44 cases, a 9.1% success rate. The quality assurance 

and AAO data suggest that ISOs generally make good O visa 

petition denial decisions. 

There may be a basis for clarifying adjudication policy for O visa 

petitions. A low approval rate is not one of them. The attorney 

who prompted the attempt to change O visa policy said that 

petitioners should receive the benefit of the doubt, because “none 

of these organizations hires untalented performers.” This clearly 

contradicts the statutory standard of “distinction,” which does not 

say that any employable artist can gain O visa status. The 

regulation requires that beneficiaries possess a “degree of skill and 

recognition substantially above that ordinarily encountered” and be 

“renowned, leading, or well known.”13 For the university case, the 

former USCIS Chief Counsel suggested that a prestigious 

university should get an approval, since ISOs are not qualified to 

question the petitioner’s evidence. Universities obviously wish to 

hire excellent candidates, but Congress did not establish that 

extraordinary ability exists among all those who gain university 

employment. 

The intent of OCC’s efforts in this area is unclear. Without 

reviewing individual cases, we are unable to determine how OCC 

could conclude that ISOs made improper decisions based on the 

statute or regulations. Because data and our analysis refute OCC’s 

contentions, we believe that in certain instances OCC may have 

improperly responded to outside complaints through undue 

pressure on adjudication decisions. 

USCIS attorneys must have contact with ISOs to provide legal 

advice on the correctness of decisions, what evidence is necessary, 

and other areas pertinent to adjudication decisions. Our concern is 

with those cases where OCC leaders may create pressure on the 

adjudications process so that improper approvals are or could be 

made. Some limitation on OCC’s ability to affect the 

adjudications process is necessary. 

13 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(3)(ii). 

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We interviewed a senior OCC manager after we had become 

familiar with the details of the university case and other 

controversial decisions. We asked about the appropriateness of the 

OCC efforts to push for approval in marginal cases. The manager 

said that new restrictions on OCC interaction with those inside or 

outside of USCIS are not necessary, because state bar requirements 

and executive branch ethical guidelines for conflict of interest limit 

the conduct of USCIS attorneys. We did not evaluate OCC’s 

actions based on these professional norms, but we know these rules 

did not prevent OCC’s questionable intervention in some O visa 

cases. USCIS needs written rules to keep OCC attorneys from 

placing inappropriate pressure on the adjudications process. The 

integrity of the benefit issuance process is vital, especially since 

special treatment of complainants fosters a sense among ISOs that 

USCIS inappropriately grants benefits in certain cases. Because 

we were informed that no internal policy governs the conduct of 

OCC regarding petitioner complaints, incidents like the university 

case could recur. Additional guidance in this area is necessary. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services, in consultation with the DHS Office of General Counsel: 

Recommendation #10: Develop a policy to establish limitations 

for managers and attorneys when they intervene in the adjudication 

of specific cases. 

Concern Exists About the Level of Outside Influence on the 

Adjudications Process 

The effort to increase O visa petition approvals is one type of 

inappropriate pressure in the adjudications process. We identified 

other cases where private attorneys or other parties contacted 

USCIS managers or attorneys to request a review of cases that an 

ISO had denied. Some USCIS employees expressed concern that 

these situations subvert the formal appeals process. 

Many USCIS petitioners submit only one or two applications. 

Other petitioners submit petitions for a large number of employees. 

Experienced filers have great interest in the USCIS benefit 

adjudications process. However, instances have arisen where 

USCIS has experienced difficulty aligning improved “customer 

service” with the approval of only those applications or petitions 

that are entitled to the benefit. We understand that USCIS must 

engage with outside experts and be responsive to public questions. 

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Caution should be exercised, however, when appearance of favors 

or special consideration exists. 

On the issue of outside complaints creating a climate that stresses 

benefit approvals, USCIS faces the burden of history. In 2000, the 

DOJ OIG, in a review of INS actions during the Citizenship USA 

initiative, identified cases where outside entities “attempted to 

influence or manipulate” adjudications in a variety of ways, 

including pressure to approve cases or requests to transfer cases to 

adjudicators perceived as more lenient. The DOJ OIG wrote that 

adjudicators “perceived a perpetuation of the historical favoritism 

shown to certain organizations.”14 According to interviewees and 

survey respondents, a culture of “get to yes” continues to exist at 

USCIS. 

Recent examples exist of senior leaders disagreeing with the 

statements made in requests for special treatment. One senior 

manager provided email messages that showed headquarters 

defending ISO decisions or challenging a private attorney’s views. 

Nonetheless, numerous staff said that private attorneys will often 

complain to management, which leads to special review of cases. 

We examined email messages where these requests were granted. 

Survey respondents and interviewees noted that this type of 

pressure compromises the adjudications process, and therefore the 

overall USCIS mission. A survey respondent wrote of a sense that 

private immigration attorneys are “running our offices.” 

OCC’s response to outside pressure has contributed to this 

impression. Although it is not currently filled, OCC does have a 

position for a special liaison counsel. The responsibilities of this 

position include receiving outside complaints, then inquiring with 

the USCIS office that rendered the adjudications decision. OCC 

interviewees told us that plans exist to designate another liaison 

counsel in the future. ISOs and other USCIS employees suggested 

that this position generated concern about OCC’s impartiality. We 

were informed of cases where OCC inquiries created frustration 

and concern, resulting in ISOs simply approving cases. One 

manager noted the chilling effect of such inquiries, especially 

because OCC appeared to be promoting the cases of private 

attorneys. 

14 DOJ OIG, “Interviews and Adjudications,” in An Investigation of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service’s Citizenship USA Initiative, July 2000, pp. 103–104. 

http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0007/intervus.pdf 

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Some private attorneys recognize that their requests for special 

review are improper. In a note to an OCC manager, a private 

immigration attorney was “very aware that it is not permissible” to 

ask for special review of a case, but the attorney asked for OCC 

intervention. OCC forwarded the email to certain individuals in 

USCIS, which led the CSC to review the case again. After that 

review, the denial determination was reaffirmed. 

ISOs and managers in some USCIS offices said that efforts to 

undercut some denial decisions waste USCIS resources and send 

an implicit message to approve petitions and eliminate outside 

complaints. We were informed that special treatment remains 

prevalent. An ISO said that the American Immigration Lawyers 

Association “owns” USCIS. USCIS is aware of this perception 

and has taken some steps to treat this organization less uniquely. 

For example, a regularly scheduled conference call with the 

association is now open to other interested parties. 

ISOs and supervisors claimed that any informal process where an 

ISO is asked to review a case again implies that an approval is 

expected. One supervisor said that when a special review is 

requested, the center will “try to find a way to approve something.” 

An appeals case illustrates how special treatment adds inefficiency 

and cost to the adjudication process. After a service center denied 

a group of petitions, SCOPS leadership had the center reexamine 

the cases, and the denials were affirmed. SCOPS then ordered the 

cases to be transferred to a second center, which also denied the 

petitions. The appeal decision, which agreed with the centers, 

notes that a private attorney influenced the requests for special 

review of the cases. 

These types of actions have the potential to create a two-tier 

immigration benefit system: Those with private attorneys or 

contacts at USCIS get special treatment, while others do not. 

Although we received evidence that the Director of USCIS does 

not support special treatment for complainants, more attention 

must be paid to this matter. 

An individual who is denied a benefit may submit an appeal to the 

USCIS AAO. AAO is also useful for adjudicators who need 

guidance on particular cases. During the 14 months from January 

2010 through February 2011, AAO received an average of 1,013 

cases each month. ISOs and OCC attorneys informed us that 

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AAO’s written decisions to sustain or dismiss an appeal assist 

ISOs in future adjudications of similar cases. 

AAO occupies a unique position in USCIS. The AAO Chief 

reports to the USCIS Director, and AAO, like all other parts of 

USCIS, cannot ignore USCIS policy. Nonetheless, AAO decisions 

must be an impartial legal and policy review of a case’s merits. In 

our interviews with AAO managers, we determined that AAO is 

insulated from undue pressure. One common public complaint, 

that AAO takes too long to issue opinions, is being addressed 

through the allotment of new staff to AAO. 

USCIS has yet to find an effective balance between its interaction 

with the public, especially immigration attorneys, and the need to 

protect the integrity of the adjudications process. This is a dilemma, 

because many people have an interest in USCIS decisions, and 

public comment is vital to the regulatory process. USCIS should 

strive to recognize the differences between legitimate public 

opinions about its processes and requests to change individual case 

decisions. Those who gain a special review of their case essentially 

receive a second adjudication without having to file an appeal. 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #11: Issue policy that ends any informal 

appeals process and the special review of denied cases. 

The Standard of Proof in Immigration Benefit Cases Affects the 

USCIS Mission 

A Low Standard of Proof Is Used for Most USCIS 

Adjudications 

The issuance of immigration benefits entails many important 

considerations, ranging from national security, fraud prevention, 

family reunification, and efforts to improve the economy through 

use of alien labor and expertise. As a result, ISOs have a very 

complex and important task. Implementation of the USCIS 

mission requires a merge, not just a balance, of all relevant 

governmental and societal concerns. ISOs must evaluate evidence, 

check a range of information, consult all applicable rules, and then 

approve or deny the benefit. 

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ISOs are the fact finders in benefit adjudications. They must 

decide whether the evidence justifies an approval or denial. As 

part of the adjudication process, an ISO applies a standard of proof 

to the materials submitted in a benefit application or petition. A 

standard of proof refers to the level of information or the degree of 

persuasion needed to prove a fact.15 The Supreme Court has 

written that evidentiary standards are “an attempt to instruct the 

fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks 

he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions.”16 When 

the standard of proof is met in immigration benefit cases, the ISO 

has the level of confidence needed to approve the benefit. 

The difference between the burden of proof and the standard of 

proof is important. The burden of proof in immigration proceedings 

is the responsibility of the individual requesting the benefit.17 

Thus, the information that an applicant or petitioner submits to 

USCIS must demonstrate entitlement to the benefit. The standard 

of proof helps an ISO determine whether the submitted evidence 

permits an approval. 

In most USCIS adjudications, the evidentiary standard is “a 

preponderance of the evidence,” a common standard in civil 

proceedings.18 Two other common standards, “clear and 

convincing evidence” and evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 

require a higher level of certainty. 

Like many others, ISO managers view a preponderance of the 

evidence as greater than a 50% certainty that a fact is true. Clear 

and convincing evidence is seen as approximately 75% certainty. 

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 95% or more certainty. These 

percentages illustrate the differences between standards, although 

an exact percentage may not be easy to quantify in a given case. 

To satisfy the preponderance of the evidence in immigration 

proceedings, applicants or petitioners must demonstrate only that 

the facts in their case are slightly more likely true than not true. In 

most instances, a benefit must be granted after the ISO concludes 

that the preponderance of the evidence is met. A recent AAO 

decision illustrates this point. The decision establishes that doubt 

about truth cannot justify a denial if relevant and credible evidence 

15 Analysis of Evidence, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press (2005), p. 385.
 16 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970).
 17 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 


18 Matter of Soo Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1965).
 

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establishes that the claim for a benefit meets the preponderance of 

the evidence threshold.19 

A Higher Standard of Proof Would Improve Program 

Integrity Without Undue Burden on the Public 

National security and public safety can be compromised when 

individuals take advantage of the immigration system. The 9/11 

attacks were the ultimate example of how terrorists abused the 

adjudications process. All of the hijackers lied on their immigration 

applications, and some were granted benefits to which they were 

not entitled.20 

To further protect the immigration system, Congress may wish to 

raise the standard of proof for some or all USCIS benefit issuance 

decisions. An immigration benefit determination is not a typical 

civil proceeding. Each day, ISOs make decisions that directly 

relate to the integrity of the immigration system. The Supreme 

Court has written that evidentiary standards “are important for 

their symbolic meaning, as well as for their practical effect.” A 

higher standard “is one way to impress the fact finder with the 

importance of the decision ...”21 A relatively low standard of 

proof does not account for all societal interests involved in the 

issuance of immigration benefits. 

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, used in criminal cases, 

has very limited applicability to USCIS adjudications. However, 

the Supreme Court has concluded that the clear and convincing 

standard “is no stranger to the civil law.”22 Congress has legislated 

use of the clear and convincing standard for certain benefit 

decisions, such as establishing a good-faith marital relationship 

within 5 years of gaining lawful permanent residence through a 

previous marriage.23 If clear and convincing evidence is required 

for more benefit adjudication decisions, the ISO would need 

greater certainty before a case was approved. Even then, this 

standard “does not require that the evidence be unequivocal or of 

19 Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010).
 20 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 


United States, August 2004, pp. 138–139; DOJ OIG, The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 


Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS’s Admissions of Mohamed Atta and 


Marwan Alshehhi, Its Processing of Their Change of Status Applications, and Its Efforts To Track Foreign 


Students in the United States, May 2002, pp. 91–104.
 21 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–427 (1979).
 22 Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
 23 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(2)(A). 


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such a quality as to dispel all doubt.”24 Clear and convincing 

evidence, as an intermediate standard of proof, offers a better 

balance among all of the factors applicable to USCIS benefit 

adjudications. 

A 1998 appeals case demonstrates that the clear and convincing 

standard need not create undue burdens on benefit requesters. 

Even with this higher standard, the petitioner was entitled to the 

“same fair and reasonable evaluation of his evidence and factual 

situation as that given to any petitioner in visa petition 

proceedings.” Thus, the “firm belief and conviction” required 

under the clear and convincing standard should not lead the ISO to 

believe that the evidence is false or fraudulent.25 Additional 

documentation, or further insight gained through more interview 

questions, would ensure that ISOs have greater confidence before 

making a decision. 

Process improvements and the national security checks currently in 

place have improved the ability to detect criminal or terrorist threats. 

Also, consular officers overseas, site visits after a benefit is issued, 

or additional evidence revealed later can catch benefit fraud. 

Nonetheless, the ongoing strategic deficiencies we identified in the 

USCIS fraud detection effort hinder an ISO’s ability to make the 

best determination on some cases. Greater certainty that an 

application or petition is legitimate would decrease the chance of 

issuing benefits to the wrong individual. 

The benefit issuance system cannot be fully successful when ISOs 

across the country express concern about the time pressure to 

process cases, even though production is ostensibly noncritical. 

Deficiencies in the interaction between ISOs and fraud staff can 

cause ISOs to feel less confident about some decisions. Since 

notable levels of doubt can exist in cases that are approved, the 

preponderance of the evidence standard does not instill confidence 

that risk in the immigration benefit system has been minimized 

sufficiently. 

Even with the additional security checks and process improvements 

USCIS has made in the past several years, national security and 

fraud concerns may require more thorough review of immigration 

applications and petitions. These concerns may increase the time 

needed to process benefit requests. Concern about delays in 

24 Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 783 (BIA 1988). 25 Matter of Patel, 19 I&N Dec. 774, 784–785 (BIA 1988). 

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issuing benefit determinations should not override all other 

interests. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Court recognized 

additional interests at stake. In 1982, the Court wrote, 

Both the number of the applications received . . . and the 

need to investigate their validity may make it difficult for 

the agency to process an application as promptly as may be 

desirable. . . . An increasingly important interest, 

implicating matters of broad public concern, is involved in 

cases of this kind. Enforcing the immigration laws, and the 

conditions for residency in this country, is becoming more 

difficult. 26 

The complexity of immigration law and the threats to the United 

States have increased since the Court reached this conclusion. In 

another case that same year, when discussing standards of proof, 

the Court wrote that the preponderance of the evidence “allocates 

the risk of error nearly equally.”27 Significant aspects of the 

benefit issuance process, as this report has demonstrated, are not 

reliable enough to identify all fraud, even when national security 

checks work to protect the system from criminals and known or 

suspected terrorists. Although most fraud cases may not involve 

national security, USCIS should rely on a higher standard than a 

belief that an applicant probably is entitled to a requested benefit. 

Our perspective is made more pressing because many of the 

problems ISOs and managers expressed are not new. In a 1997 

congressional hearing, the DOJ Inspector General suggested that 

fraud detection difficulties in the immigration system were “a 

reflection of the primacy of other priorities and a lack of 

resources.”28 As previously cited reports noted, a year before the 

9/11 attacks, the DOJ OIG suggested that the adjudications process 

was subject to immense production pressure that should be 

lessened. In a report released 8 months after the attacks, the DOJ 

OIG cited problems with immigration benefit issuance for two 

9/11 hijackers. A recommendation in that 2002 report suggested 

that those who adjudicate immigration benefit requests needed 

“more time to review files and seek additional information.” Even 

so, it was 2011 before USCIS made production noncritical to an 

ISO’s performance. Concern from some ISOs and managers about 

ongoing production pressure, the desire for longer interviews of 

applicants, and the incomplete nature of the new performance 

26 INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1982).
 27 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982). 
 28 http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju44195.000/hju44195_0f.htm
 

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measures means that much work remains before USCIS instills a 

culture that emphasizes quality over quantity. A higher standard of 

proof, and implementation of this report’s recommendations, offer 

a variety of means to improve the benefit issuance process. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

USCIS submitted formal comments to our report. We made 

changes to the report where we deemed appropriate. A copy of the 

USCIS response is included as appendix B. We also received 

technical comments from USCIS, and we have made corrections to 

the report based on these comments. 

USCIS concurred with eight of our 11 recommendations. 

Although USCIS did not concur with recommendations 7, 10, and 

11, it offered alternative corrective action. 

Our analysis of the USCIS response to the recommendations 

follows a brief discussion of the concerns about our use of surveys. 

USCIS suggested that our use of an online survey could lead us to 

flawed conclusions. Our use of surveys is not new. We use 

surveys to collect data that we cannot directly observe without 

significant expenses of time and money for extensive travel. For 

this report, our survey was sent to ISOs in each of the 26 domestic 

district offices. The survey universe included all ISOs who work 

in those offices, and USCIS provided this list of employees. We 

did not select survey recipients based on prior complaints we 

received or particular concerns about any USCIS office. We agree 

that individual survey responses may not reflect the opinions of 

most ISOs across the United States. However, the survey was 

supplemented by interviews with other managers, supervisors, and 

ISOs across the country. 

Recommendation #1: Promote better collaboration and cross 

training between Immigration Services Officers and Immigration 

Officers in support of fraud detection efforts. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #1. Additional steps will supplement actions 

already taken to encourage greater cooperation between ISOs and 

IOs. USCIS said that FDNS will work with SCOPS and FOD to 

create a fraud detection training program for ISOs. With its 

learning management and training expertise, HCT intends to assist 

the operational directorates to implement this recommendation. 

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OIG Analysis: The general USCIS comments are responsive to 

the intent of this recommendation. In its corrective action plan, 

USCIS should provide further details about the planned ISO fraud 

detection training program. 

Recommendation #2: Assess, document, and correct as needed 

the level of fraud training and collaboration between Immigration 

Services Officers and Immigration Officers across all USCIS 

offices. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #2. The management response reiterated a 

commitment to a new fraud detection training program. The 

training program will include recommendations for ISOs to 

improve the information provided in fraud referrals. 

OIG Analysis: The intent of this recommendation was to ensure 

that USCIS assesses, documents, and corrects as needed, the level 

of ISO-IO collaboration across the country. USCIS demonstrates a 

commitment to the new training program, but it must ensure 

continued efforts in the field to maintain the necessary level of 

ISO-IO interaction. To be responsive to this recommendation, the 

USCIS corrective action plan should describe the steps planned to 

assess, document, and, if necessary, correct the level of interaction 

taking place in USCIS offices across the country. 

Recommendation #3: Develop a process to promote more detail 

assignments for Immigration Service Officers to local fraud units. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #3. HCT will work with the operational 

directorates to implement a pilot initiative to expand ISO detail 

opportunities. USCIS will identify how workload issues and 

staffing could affect an ISO detail program. The pilot will focus 

on the creation of optimal detail experiences for individuals. 

USCIS concluded that the possibility of IO details into 

adjudication units will be explored. 

OIG Analysis: USCIS comments are responsive to this 

recommendation. In the corrective action plan, USCIS should 

provide further information about the pilot initiative, and any 

policy under development on the use of detail assignments. 

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Recommendation #4: Develop additional quality assurance or 

supervisory review procedures to strengthen identification of all 

names and aliases of individuals seeking an immigration benefit. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #4. A workgroup will be established to develop 

policy in response to this recommendation. USCIS said that this 

group will consider revisions to improve alias identification, as 

well as comprehensive changes to the background check and 

security review process. Development and testing of new alias 

identification efforts would occur before changes are implemented 

throughout USCIS offices. 

OIG Analysis: We agree that USCIS could use this workgroup to 

suggest changes to the existing background check process. Details 

about the workgroup and an update on the workgroup’s process 

should be included in the USCIS corrective action plan. 

Recommendation #5: Perform onsite outreach efforts nationwide 

to discuss the performance management system with Immigration 

Services Officers and Immigration Officers. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #5. Current outreach efforts will be expanded. 

HCT plans additional travel to gain onsite comments from USCIS 

staff across the country. 

OIG Analysis: USCIS efforts in this area are responsive to this 

recommendation. In its corrective action plan, USCIS should 

provide a travel schedule for those visits that address the 

recommendation. We also request additional information about 

how the points of contact will work with USCIS offices on 

performance management outreach efforts. 

Recommendation #6: Solicit comments from Immigration 

Services Officers and supervisors regarding the new performance 

measures. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #6. HCT will use online surveys, USCIS said, 

which will allow for staff input on the performance measures. 

OIG Analysis: The use of surveys, which could supplement 

HCT’s onsite visits, is responsive to this recommendation. 

Additional details about the number of surveys used and the 

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information learned should be provided in the USCIS corrective 

action plan. 

Recommendation #7: Develop standards to permit more time for 

an Immigration Services Officer’s review of case files. 

Management Response: USCIS did not concur with 

Recommendation #7. Additional time without analysis, according 

to USCIS, is not the solution to address national security and fraud 

concerns. USCIS suggests an analysis of the appropriate amount 

of time needed to process immigration cases. Risk assessment, 

legal requirements, and the likelihood of material evidence would 

be part of this analysis. 

OIG Analysis: As USCIS conducts analysis of this issue, the 

participation of ISOs across the country is necessary. Historically, 

and during our fieldwork for this report, ISOs have perceived time 

pressure as an unspoken managerial preference for approval of 

marginal cases. This remains a concern under the new qualitybased performance measures. Further details on how USCIS can 

address that problem are necessary to corrective action. 

Recommendation #8: Enforce the policy in the Adjudicator’s 

Field Manual regarding directed decisions, and ensure that staff 

and supervisors are aware of their responsibilities when such 

decisions are made. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #8. USCIS said that Section 10.4 of the 

Adjudicator’s Field Manual is not intended to prohibit a supervisor 

from reassigning work in all cases, because a particular ISO may 

have enhanced skills in adjudicating specific cases. Section 10.14 

was not intended to prohibit reassignment of a case for what 

USCIS calls an “independent adjudication.” USCIS intends to 

clarify case reassignment responsibilities in a pending revision to 

the manual. 

OIG Analysis: Revisions to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual 

could be responsive to the recommendation. USCIS should not 

prohibit all reassignment of work, since there can be legitimate 

reasons to assign a case to another ISO. However, we are not sure 

what an “independent adjudication” is in the context of our 

recommendation. An ISO who disagrees with a supervisor may 

still have an independent view of a case. Policy change would be 

undesirable if ISOs must sign a decision with which they disagree. 

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There is nothing wrong with correction of an ISO who made 

incorrect legal determinations. However, USCIS should ensure 

that changes do not foster a culture where ISOs curry favor 

through the approval of marginal cases. Supervisors themselves 

should continue to be responsible in policy and practice when they 

direct that a certain decision be made, and USCIS should require 

further education to clarify policy that currently exists. 

Recommendation #9: Revise policy on requests for evidence to 

clarify the role that the requests play in the adjudication process. 

Management Response: USCIS concurred with 

Recommendation #9. USCIS intends to issue revised RFE policy 

in FY 2012. 

OIG Analysis: Details of the policy revision should be provided 

in the corrective action plan. 

Recommendation #10: Develop a policy to establish limitations 

for managers and attorneys when they intervene in the adjudication 

of specific cases. 

Management Response: USCIS did not concur with the wording 

of Recommendation #10. USCIS said that it considers it the 

responsibility of managers and attorneys to help ensure the quality 

of adjudications; specifically, to help ensure that an adjudication 

adheres to the law and is supported by the facts. Broad references 

to OCC could be seen as a negative view of individuals throughout 

the office, rather than a small number of managers. 

USCIS opposes any individual effort to reach a case result that is 

not legally correct. Further guidance could clarify the 

requirements placed on USCIS employees and managers so that 

the best decision is made in each case. 

OIG Analysis: Although USCIS did not concur with the wording 

of Recommendation #10, plans to provide additional guidance are 

responsive to our intent. We recognize that USCIS attorneys and 

managers have a role in the oversight and management of the 

adjudications process. Nonetheless, we discovered several 

examples that rose to the level of interference to affect the outcome 

of an ISO’s decision. It is, after all, the ISO who bears primary 

responsibility to “ensure that adjudication adheres to the law and is 

supported by the facts.” New guidance would be helpful to ensure 

that such problems do not recur. We agree with USCIS that 

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employees have an obligation to report improper interference with 

the adjudications process. 

Recommendation #11: Issue policy that ends any informal 

appeals process and the special review of denied cases. 

Management Response: USCIS did not concur with the wording 

of Recommendation #11. A variety of options are available for 

customers to interact with USCIS, including toll-free numbers, 

public and congressional engagement, the USCIS Ombudsman, 

and the special liaison counsel. USCIS addresses public inquiries 

based on the complexity of the specific issue. In certain cases, an 

extensive review of the case file may occur. USCIS responds to 

outside inquiries to ensure that the best decision is made on each 

case. These are not considered special reviews, but rather efforts 

to improve decisional uniformity. This could lead to a change in 

the ISO’s original determination and remedial action. Rendered 

decisions occasionally reveal a need for policy changes. The 

precedent created when a decision is made must be consistent with 

policy. 

This does not mean that USCIS condones improper case 

intervention. USCIS agrees that incidents of undue pressure are 

troubling. This has prompted additional educational efforts so 

ISOs understand the manner in which public inquiries are 

addressed, including the possibility of further review of 

adjudicated cases. The OIG report demonstrates the need for 

vigilance, rather than proof of systemic problems with USCIS 

policies. Planned written guidance includes reinforcement of 

USCIS policy that does not condone undue pressure on ISOs, and 

instructions on how employees can respond to such pressure. 

OIG Analysis: New USCIS written guidance could be responsive 

to the recommendation. Customer service is a necessary goal at 

USCIS, and legitimate policy change may result from public 

comments. Caution must be exercised, however, when USCIS 

addresses outside inquiries. Automatic deference to public views 

can, and has, negatively affected the integrity of certain 

adjudications. The regulatory, national security, and fraud 

prevention duties of USCIS should lead to the rejection of some 

public complaints. Without clearly articulated expectations, the 

potential exists that USCIS will face challenges as it tries 

simultaneously to regulate immigration and to promote issuance of 

immigration benefits. The complexity of this dual role is why we 

remain concerned about the use of a special liaison counsel. Our 

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fieldwork demonstrated that in the past the position led to efforts to 

alter adjudication decisions. The specific steps USCIS intends to 

take to eliminate such problems should be described in the 

corrective action plan. There may be occasions when public 

attorneys and other complainants are incorrect. We remain 

concerned that some USCIS managers and staff may not 

understand the difficulty in distinguishing between appropriate 

customer service and pressure to approve marginal cases. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We initiated this review at the request of U.S. Senator Charles 

Grassley, based on his concerns about USCIS policies that could 

hinder national security and the detection of immigration benefit 

fraud. 

In addition to review of USCIS policies and data, we conducted 

147 interviews, including the Director of USCIS. Other 

interviewees included staff and managers at each of the four 

service centers, the National Benefits Center, and six field offices. 

We also interviewed headquarters leadership in the Service Center 

Operations, Field Operations, and Fraud Detection and National 

Security directorates. Our file review included conversations with 

expert ISOs about particular cases. 

Our analysis included results from an online survey that we sent to 

a random selection of the ISOs in all 26 USCIS district offices. 

We received 256 responses, 193 (75.4%) of which came from 

respondents who had been ISOs for more than 3 years. Survey 

questions dealt with the FY 2011 performance measures, pressure 

to adjudicate cases, and overall impressions about the USCIS 

mission. The results of the survey are discussed throughout the 

report; the survey appears in appendix C. 

We conducted our review between January and May 2011 under 

the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, 

and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by 

the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Office of the Director (MS 2000) 

Washington, DC 20529-2000 

 

 

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Memorandum 


TO: Charles K. Edwards

 Acting Inspector General 

FROM: Alejandro N. Mayorkas /s/ 12-5-2011 

 Director 

SUBJECT: USCIS Response to OIG Project No. 11-079-ISP-USCIS, The Effects of 

USCIS Adjudication Procedures and Policies on Fraud Detection by 

Immigration Services Officers 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has reviewed the DHS Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) report entitled, “The Effects of USCIS Adjudication Procedures 

and Policies on Fraud Detection by Immigration Services Officers.” USCIS recognizes 

and appreciates the time and energy the OIG dedicated to the report and values OIG’s 

independent assessment of USCIS’s work. This report both validates and reinforces 

USCIS’s focus on one of its critical missions: to help safeguard our national security and 

protect the integrity of our immigration system. 

As set forth below, USCIS concurs with the majority of OIG’s formal recommendations 

and already is in the process of acting upon them. As a preliminary matter, there are two 

aspects of the report that USCIS comments upon separately here. First, there are many 

statements and assumptions throughout the report with which USCIS disagrees. 

However, USCIS focuses its attention in this response on the formal, final 

recommendations themselves. Second, and more broadly, OIG’s conclusions are based 

on anecdotal statements regarding USCIS’s purported policies and practices and not on 

fact-based data; the report’s Executive Summary on page one identifies that OIG received 

256 responses to an on-line survey. Within the quality arena these types of surveys are 

referred to as “self-selected opinion polls” that scholarly research concludes can produce 

flawed results. Nevertheless, USCIS is focused on the formal recommendations and 

responds to them below. 

USCIS has proven its commitment to strengthening the security and integrity of the U.S. 

immigration system. This commitment includes combating immigration benefit fraud 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

and ensuring that individuals or organizations filing for immigration benefits do not pose 

a threat to national security or public safety. USCIS has made significant advances in 

achieving these goals, as the OIG recognizes in its report. Again, we thank the OIG for 

assisting in this critical effort. 

DHS-OIG recommends that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

Recommendation 1: Promote better collaboration between ISOs and IOs in support 

of fraud detection efforts. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

While USCIS has already implemented measures to encourage greater cooperation and 

exchange between Immigration Officers (IO) and ISOs, we will examine ways to further 

this effort. The Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) will work 

with Service Center Operations (SCOPS) and Field Operations Directorate (FOD) 

leadership to better promote these types of meetings and consider formal guidance or 

requirements relating to such collaboration. Where practical and appropriate, USCIS will 

consider temporary assignments or details of ISOs to FDNS and vice versa. USCIS will 

also support fraud detection efforts by providing more operational and analytical 

information to ISOs and IOs across the agency. 

Understanding that relevant and focused anti-fraud training is most impactful, USCIS 

will develop a fraud detection training program for ISOs. FDNS will work with SCOPS 

and FOD to determine the types of training needed and how best to deploy it to maximize 

effect. The Office of Human Capital and Training (HCT) will support SCOPS, FOD, and 

FDNS in implementing this recommendation. This support may include, among other 

things, advice to the Directorates on how to most effectively analyze the training needs, 

collaboration on the development and delivery of appropriate training programs, and 

access to learning management tools that can facilitate sharing of training materials 

across the organization. 

Recommendation 2: Assess, documents, and correct as needed the level of fraud 

training and collaboration between ISOs and IOs across all USCIS offices. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

USCIS is committed to improving the quality of fraud detection training for ISOs. FDNS 

will work with SCOPS and FOD, in consultation with HCT, to develop training programs 

that target specific programs, ensuring that training is relevant to officers adjudicating 

particular categories of applications or petitions. When deployed, the course will provide 

field officers with information on how to identify fraud, how to refer fraud cases to 

FDNS, and how to use the information FDNS returns in Statements of Findings. In turn, 

training will be developed for IOs regarding the various visa categories represented by 

the applications and petitions referred to FDNS so that they can return more informed 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

reports to the referring ISOs. HCT plans to coordinate closely with SCOPS, FOD, and 

FDNS to design and help implement appropriate evaluation and assessment tools to 

identify training needs, areas for future collaboration, and the success of ongoing 

collaboration. For example, HCT is finalizing a survey instrument to gather from ISOs 

and supervisors information regarding training needs for experienced adjudicators. Fraud 

detection and related issues are some of the areas of possible training need that will be 

addressed by this planned survey. 

While training will encourage greater collaboration between ISOs and IOs, USCIS will 

also encourage such collaboration through other methods (see response to 

Recommendation 1 above). 

Recommendation 3: Develop a process to promote more detail assignments for 

Immigration Service Officers to local fraud units. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

HCT will work with SCOPS, FOD, and FDNS to establish a process to implement detail 

assignments of ISOs into fraud units. A pilot initiative would be undertaken to determine 

the parameters of the detail assignments and allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness 

of the assignments. Issues to be explored during the pilot would include identification of 

a flexible schedule for detail assignments based on workload-driven requirements, as well 

as staffing considerations to ensure optimal information sharing and learning experiences. 

We will explore with SCOPS, FOD, and FDNS the value of also detailing FDNS IOs into 

adjudications units. 

Recommendation 4: Develop additional quality assurance or supervisory review 

procedures to strengthen identification of all names and aliases of individuals 

seeking an immigration benefit. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

A cross-cutting work group consisting of members from FOD, SCOPS, FDNS, and the 

Office of Performance and Quality, will be established to review, identify, and develop 

the necessary enhancements to existing quality assurance and/or supervisory reviews 

performed to ensure USCIS officers properly identify all names and aliases of individuals 

seeking an immigration benefit. The work group will be established and will review all 

existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and quality assurance (QA) review 

procedures to identify and assess the areas within the current background/security check 

process that are in need of improvement. Following a review of the SOP and QA 

procedures, the workgroup will determine whether additional quality assurance 

procedures and/or supervisory reviews are warranted or, alternatively, whether a new, 

more comprehensive background/security check quality assurance process should be 

developed. One element of that process would be the identification of names and aliases. 

If the review were to identify that only adjustment to existing QA and/or supervisory 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

reviews was needed, the workgroup would be expected to complete the updates and 

implement the changes by mid-FY12. However, if the review identified that a new 

expansive background/security check quality review process was needed, this work 

would not be completed until the latter part of FY12. Quality review procedures would 

need to be developed and tested, and results obtained would need to be fully analyzed and 

validated before a final review process was officially introduced within USCIS field 

offices and service centers. 

Recommendation 5: Perform onsite nationwide outreach efforts to discuss the 

performance management system with Immigration Services Officers and 

Immigration Officers. Solicit comments from ISOs and supervisors regarding the 

new performance measures. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

Communication and information sharing regarding the USCIS performance management 

program already occurs on a consistent basis through targeted messages and regular 

telephonic interaction with Performance Management Points of Contact (PM POCs). 

Moreover, heightened attention to and awareness of enhancing the USCIS performance 

management program has occurred over the past several months as the agency continues 

its efforts to bring performance goals standardization to a wider group of occupational 

series. These efforts to provide comprehensive guidance and communication will 

continue and be expanded as performance management program changes are 

implemented and evaluated. 

The Performance Management Team in the USCIS HCT is prepared to travel to different 

sites within the agency (field offices and service centers) to educate and advise officers, 

their supervisors and PM POCs on the proposed goals, standards, and metrics in 

preparation for either mid-cycle FY12 or FY13 changes. It will be especially important 

for the PM POCs to understand the expectations of officers (formerly called ISO or IO) 

as a consequence of the changes to their Performance Plans & Appraisals (PPA), as 

ongoing training and assistance will need to be conducted through the PM POCs. The 

timeline will be dependent on two important factors: (1) when the USCIS Standardization 

Advisory Board completes its recommendations for impact and implementation of 

Officer Goals; and (2) when bargaining on said goals is completed with AFGE, National 

Council 119. 

Recommendation 6: Solicit comments from ISOs and supervisors regarding the new 

performance measures. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

Upon implementation of the aforementioned Officer Goals, surveys will be conducted 

throughout the rating cycle to ensure compliance and understanding of expectations and 

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Management Comments to the Draft Report 

to gain feedback on how the goals, standards, and metrics are working for field 

employees and supervisors. 

Recommendation 7: Develop standards to permit more time for an Immigration 

Services Officer’s review of case files. 

USCIS Response: USCIS non-concurs with this recommendation insofar as it broadly 

identifies additional time as the solution to improving the analysis of a case for issues 

related to national security and fraud detection. 

USCIS concurs that an analysis of the tasks that contribute to a quality adjudication is 

needed, concurrent with or followed by an analysis of the appropriate amount of time 

needed to accomplish these tasks. Such an analysis will involve, among other things, an 

assessment of risks, legal requirements, and the likelihood of gathering material evidence 

beyond what is contained in the record at the time of file review. 

Recommendation 8: Enforce the policy in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual regarding 

directed decisions, and ensure that staff and supervisors are aware of their 

responsibilities when such decisions are made. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

Section 10.4 of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) only provides examples of 

situations involving the transfer of jurisdiction; it is not intended to be an exhaustive list, 

nor is it intended to preclude supervisors from assigning and reassigning work as they 

deem appropriate. It may be proper to reassign a case from one employee to another 

based on the supervisor’s assessment of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of each 

employee and the issues presented in a specific case. 

Section 10.14 of the AFM describes the process to properly document accountability 

when a supervisor directs a decision over the objection of the assigned adjudicator. It 

does not guide or restrict the reassignment of cases to another for an independent 

adjudication. USCIS intends to further clarify responsibilities by revising this section of 

the AFM and communicating expectations to staff and supervisors. This should be 

completed by January 31, 2012. 

Recommendation 9: Revise policy on requests for evidence to clarify the role that 

the requests play in the adjudication process. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurs with this recommendation. 

The policy governing requests for evidence is being reviewed and the goal is to issue a 

new policy in FY12. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Recommendation 10: Develop a policy to establish limitations for managers and 

attorneys when they intervene in the adjudication of specific cases. 

USCIS Response: USCIS non-concurs with this recommendation as framed. 

USCIS considers it the responsibility of managers and attorneys to help ensure the quality 

of adjudications; specifically, to help ensure that an adjudication adheres to the law and is 

supported by the facts. 

Accordingly, USCIS construes the OIG’s use of the term “intervene” to refer to the 

improper involvement of managers or attorneys to steer an adjudication to a particular 

result not supported by the law and the facts. To this, USCIS responds as follows: 

In its report the OIG makes references to the USCIS Office of Chief Counsel (or to 

broad groups within the Office of Chief Counsel) when, in fact, focus on a 

particular former employee and perhaps another individual would be most accurate. 

USCIS has addressed this issue and the broad-brush reference in the OIG report is 

unfair. 

USCIS does not condone any individual’s effort to reach a case result that does not 

adhere to the law and is not supported by the facts. 

While USCIS has ethical and other guidelines that are dispositive, USCIS will issue 

or reinforce guidance to ensure that adherence to the law and the facts is not 

impeached through the involvement of attorneys, managers, or anyone else. This 

ethical requirement cannot be overemphasized. 

Recommendation 11: Issue policy that ends any informal appeals process and the 

special review of denied cases. 

USCIS Response: USCIS non-concurs with this recommendation and respectfully offers 

a modification below. 

As part of the USCIS Mission Statement and Strategic Goals, USCIS is committed to 

strengthening the security and integrity of the immigration system by providing effective 

customer-oriented immigration benefit and information services. A core value of USCIS 

is to strive for the highest level of integrity in its dealings with USCIS customers, fellow 

employees, and the public by administering the nation’s immigration system fairly, 

honestly, and correctly. 

In meeting this responsibility, USCIS offers a variety of resources and mechanisms for its 

customers, the organizations and legal practitioners that serve them, Congress, educators, 

researchers, and the general public. Among the various resources USCIS offers are: the 

National Customer Service Center toll free number for nationwide assistance for 

immigration services and benefits offered by USCIS; InfoPass for customers to schedule 

appointments at Field Offices to speak with Immigration Information Officers to have 

their questions answered; USCIS Service Center email addresses for customers to send 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

their inquiries regarding cases; the HQ Public Engagement program or a Community 

Relations Officer email address; and, the contact information for the USCIS Ombudsman 

Liaison Unit, which works with the USCIS Ombudsman's Office in addressing customer 

inquiries and complaints. In addition, the OCC Special Liaison Counsel is available to 

receive incoming inquiries and address complaints s any USCIS stakeholder submits. 

The manner in which USCIS handles or addresses a stakeholder inquiry or complaint 

depends on the nature and complexity of the incoming information. Some inquiries are 

very straightforward and can be addressed quickly with readily available information. 

However, other inquiries or complaints are more complex and may involve allegations of 

case mishandling, inconsistency in USCIS decisions, or violations of privacy and civil 

rights or civil liberties. In such instances, USCIS’s review of the incoming information 

could lead to a substantive review of any decision associated with the allegation. While 

the adjudicator involved may subjectively perceive a request to review a decision as 

putting undue pressure to ensure a certain outcome, such is not the intention of the 

request. Rather, USCIS’s responsibility is to ensure that the decision was correct and that 

the allegations are addressed. 

This process is not an “informal appeals process” whereby applicants are receiving 

special review of denied cases. Rather, this is the process by which USCIS ensures that 

its decisions are in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations. There is a 

legitimate USCIS interest in reviewing decisions and the adjudication process when 

inquiries or complaints are received. If review of the matter results in a change in a 

decision or a modification in an existing process, these remedial measures are evidence of 

USCIS’s continued efforts to make certain that the nation’s immigration system is 

administered fairly, honestly, and correctly. 

USCIS does not, and must not, tolerate pressure on its adjudicators to reach particular 

outcomes. If any such pressure occurs, it should be reported and USCIS will investigate 

promptly and thoroughly. But sometimes adjudicative decisions, once rendered, expose 

problems that a change in USCIS policy could effectively remedy. On those occasions, 

USCIS has a responsibility to constantly improve its policies. It also has a responsibility 

to ensure that the combination of adjudicative precedent and other formal expressions of 

agency policy mesh coherently. To inhibit the effective discharge of those functions 

would be counter-productive. 

USCIS does acknowledge that the subjective feeling of undue pressure among some of its 

personnel is troubling. In an effort to ensure that such a perception is addressed and 

changed, USCIS is committed to further educating its staff on the manner in which 

inquiries and complaints are received, the types of inquiries and complaints that are 

commonly received, the USCIS components that are responsible for handling and 

addressing these inquiries and complaints, and the steps that may be necessary in 

resolving the information received, such as review of a decision or adjudicative process. 

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Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Although USCIS does not perceive any pervasive or systemic problem along the lines 

implied in the lead up to recommendations 10 and 11, the OIG report usefully highlights 

the need to be vigilant. Accordingly, we think there would be value in providing written 

guidance to all USCIS employees (including the OCC attorneys) that: (a) reinforces the 

prevailing culture of avoiding actions that might cause adjudicators to perceive pressure 

to reach particular results; and (b) instructs employees how best to respond to external 

requests or complaints concerning both pending and decided cases. We would concur 

with a recommendation to that effect. 

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Appendix C 

The Survey of District and Field Office ISOs 

1. How long have you been an ISO/adjudicator for USCIS/INS? 

Number Percentage 

4 1.6% 

59 23.0% 

193 75.4% 

Less than 1 year 

More than 1 but less than 3 years 

More than 3 years 

2. What district or field office serves as your work location? 

248 of the survey’s 256 respondents answered this question. The respondents 

represented each of the 26 USCIS districts in the United States. 

3. Have you personally ever been asked by management or a supervisor 

to ignore established policy or pressured to approve applications for 

benefits that should have been denied based on the Adjudicator Field 

Manual, other USCIS policy documents, or fraud/ineligibility 

concerns? 

Number Percentage 

63 24.8% 

191 75.2% 

Yes 

No 

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Appendix C 

The Survey of District and Field Office ISOs 

4. What do you expect from the new 2011 ISO performance evaluation 

criteria, which focus on measuring referrals for potentially fraudulent 

applications/petitions rather than production? 

Number Percentage 

84 33.7% 

165 66.3% 

I expect a lot of positive change 

I expect little or no change 

5. Regarding past performance evaluation criteria for 

adjudicators/ISOs, to what extent were the criteria applied to ensure 

that employees made appropriate denials of ineligible or potentially 

fraudulent applications? 

Number Percentage 

107 42.5% 

28 11.1% 

82 32.5% 

35 13.9% 

In my experience and in 

discussions with colleagues, the 

performance evaluation criteria 

were applied appropriately in 

order to ensure that petitions were 

processed correctly 

Any deviation from the proper 

evaluation of an ISO’s work did 

not impact the USCIS mission to 

protect the immigration system 

I have some concern about how 

performance evaluation criteria 

were used; there were instances 

which compromised an ISO’s 

ability to make proper decisions 

In my office there has been serious 

concern that employees who focus 

on fraud/ineligibility in their 

adjudications were being 

evaluated or disciplined unfairly 

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Appendix C 

The Survey of District and Field Office ISOs 

6. What is your opinion of how well USCIS balances or merges the 

promotion of immigration with the protection of national security? 

Number Percentage 

130 51.6% 

116 46.0% 

6 2.4% 

USCIS policy is too heavily 

weighted toward promotion of 

immigration, rather than the 

protection of national security 

In general, USCIS has a 

reasonable balance between 

promotion of immigration and 

national security 

USCIS policy makes national 

security concerns too prominent in 

the immigration benefit petition 

process 

7. Do you have access to USCIS estimates or data on the percentage of 

fraudulent or ineligible applications, and does this data improve your 

ability to identify potentially inappropriate applications? 

Number Percentage 

58 22.8% 

170 66.9% 

6 2.4% 

20 7.9% 

No, I do not have access to fraud 

estimates, and I do not see how 

such data would help process a 

specific application 

No, I do not have access to fraud 

estimates, but such data might be 

helpful in the processing of 

specific applications 

Yes, I have access to fraud 

estimates, but the data do not 

help me identify potentially 

inappropriate applications 

Yes, I have access to fraud 

estimates, and the information 

does help me process specific 

applications 

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Appendix C 

The Survey of District and Field Office ISOs 

8. What is your opinion of the amount of time allowed for your 

interviews of petitioners/applicants in regard to the goal of identifying 

fraudulent or ineligible requests for benefits? 

Number Percentage 

25 10.0% 

117 46.6% 

109 43.4% 

I have enough time to interview 

applicants in order to ensure that 

suspicions of fraud or ineligibility 

can be found and reviewed 

Current policy on the length of 

time for an interview should 

change, but only to a limited 

extent, as a way to increase the 

integrity of the immigration 

system 

I have serious concerns that the 

time allowed for interviews is too 

short for me to make a good 

determination on whether a 

benefit should be granted 

9. What is your assessment of the frequency of direct personal 

interaction between ISOs and fraud detection immigration officers in 

your office on issues of common concern, such as ways to identify 

potential fraud in benefit applications? 

Number Percentage 

0 0.0% 

75 29.5% 

179 70.5% 

We meet too much with local 

fraud detection staff 

The frequency of our interaction 

does not need to change 

We do not meet enough with 

fraud detection officers 

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Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector 

Darin Wipperman, Team Lead Inspector 

Pharyn Smith, Senior Inspector 

LaDana Crowell, Inspector 

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Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

USCIS Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

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