IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOHN T. DRIGGUS, :

 : C.A. No.: K23C-01-015 JJC

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. :

 : 

STATE FARM MUTUAL :

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE : 

COMPANY, : 

 :

 :

Defendant. :

Submitted: December 16, 2023

Decided: January 8, 2024

ORDER

On this 8

th day of January 2024, after considering Plaintiff John Driggus’ 

motion for reargument, and Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company’s opposition to that motion, it appears that:

1. Mr. Driggus sued State Farm for personal injury and property damage

that he alleges resulted from a January 2021 automobile accident.

1

 State Farm 

insured both Mr. Driggus and the other driver for the accident under separate policies 

of insurance.2 In Mr. Driggus’ complaint, he did not name the other driver as a 

defendant even though he contended that the other driver’s negligence was the sole 

proximate cause of his injuries and losses.3 Under the circumstances, the most 

1 D.I. 1.

2 D.I. 31.

3 D.I. 1.
2

reasonable reading of his complaint supported a claim for only uninsured or 

underinsured (hereafter “UM/UIM”) benefits from his own policy.4 

2. State Farm then moved to dismiss Mr. Driggus’ complaint for failure to 

state a UM/UIM claim.

5

 Because the parties relied upon matters outside the 

pleadings to support their positions, the Court elected to convert State Farm’s motion 

to one for summary judgment.

6

 Accordingly, the Court provided the parties 

additional time to supplement the summary judgment record. 

3. After considering the parties’ positions and their evidentiary 

supplements, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm for three 

reasons.

7

 First, the other driver, and not State Farm, would have been the proper 

party in interest for Mr. Driggus’ claim for benefits from the other driver’s State 

Farm policy.

8

 When Mr. Driggus declined to sue the other driver, it became 

impossible for him to exhaust available coverage from the other driver’s policy.

9

 

Second, Mr. Driggus failed to demonstrate that the other driver had either (1) no 

insurance, or (2) that Mr. Driggus had exhausted the other driver’s insurance.

Accordingly, Mr. Driggus could not recover uninsured or underinsured benefits from 

his own policy because he met neither prerequisite.

10

 Third and finally, the Court 

observed that even if Mr. Driggus were to move to add the other driver as a 

4

Id. 

5 D.I. 19.

6 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).

7 Driggus v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 7599490 (Del. Super. Nov. 15, 2023). 

8

Id. at *4; see also Parker v. Breckin, 620 A.2d 229,232 (Del. 1993) (recognizing that in an 

automobile accident claim, the individual tortfeasor, and not the insurance carrier, is the proper 

party in interest).

9

18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3) (providing that an insurer is not required to pay UM/UIM benefits “until 

after the limits of liability under all bodily injury bonds and insurance policies available to the 

insured at the time of the accident have been exhausted by payment of settlement or judgments”).

10 Driggus, 2023 WL 7599490, at *4; see also Dunlap v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 878 

A.2d 434, 439-40 (Del. 3005) (recognizing that an insurance carrier is not obligated to pay its 

insured until after the insured exhausts all available liability policies). 
3

defendant, the attempt would be futile because the two statutes of limitations that 

apply to property damage and personal injury claims had expired.

11

 

4. Presently, Mr. Driggus asks the Court to reconsider its decision granting

summary judgment.12 In his motion, he emphasizes that State Farm separately 

insured both parties involved in the accident.13 Mr. Driggus does not request 

reconsideration of the Court’s decision that UM/UIM benefits are unavailable to him 

as a matter of law. Rather, he reiterates his belief that suing State Farm within two

years of the date of the accident complied with the statutes of limitations as to the 

other driver.14 On that basis, he maintains that he can recover compensation directly 

from the other driver’s State Farm policy without suing him.15

5. State Farm counters that Mr. Driggus neither alleged, nor provided 

evidence, that he exhausted the alleged tortfeasor’s liability policy.16 Furthermore, 

State Farm emphasizes that the two-year statutes of limitations for (1) bodily injury 

and (2) property damage claims against the tortfeasor have expired.17 For that 

reason, State Farm reiterates that Mr. Driggus’ failure to sue the proper party in 

interest within two years of the accident makes it impossible to sue the other driver.18

6. In a motion for reargument under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e), the 

Court must examine whether it overlooked controlling precedent or legal principles, 

11 Driggus, 2023 WL 7599490, at *4. Mr. Driggus did not attempt to amend his complaint to add 

the alleged tortfeasor as a party. In addition, Mr. Driggus did not contend, and the record did not 

independently demonstrate, that the individual tortfeasor had any knowledge that Mr. Driggus had 

filed suit, which could have triggered a relation back analysis under Superior Court Civil Rule 

15(c)(3). Because of Mr. Driggus’ pro se status, however, the Court independently examined the 

question of whether he could remedy the infirmity through an amendment. The expiration of the 

statutes of limitation would have made it futile to do so. 

12 D.I. 31.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 D.I. 32.

17 Id.

18 Id.
4

or whether it misapprehended the law or facts in a way that would have changed the 

outcome of the challenged decision.19 A motion for reargument is not a mechanism 

to rehash arguments already decided by the Court.20

7. Here, Mr. Driggus merely reargues what he raised during the summary

judgment proceeding. His motion focuses primarily on the fact that State Farm 

separately insured both he and the alleged tortfeasor. To that end, Mr. Driggus 

maintains that he satisfied the statutes of limitations that applied to his claims against 

the individual tortfeasor when he sued State Farm.

21

 

8. Mr. Driggus unfortunately misunderstands who is the proper party in 

interest in an automobile negligence case. Namely, the injured party must sue the

other driver – not the other driver’s insurance company – to successfully recover 

third-party liability benefits from the other driver’s policy.

22

 Mr. Driggus did not 

which makes recovery from the other driver’s liability policy impossible. 

9. Given Mr. Driggus’inability to recover benefits from the other driver’s 

policy, his only other potential recovery would be from his own UM/UIM policy. 

To sustain such a claim, Mr. Driggus would have had to demonstrate that the other 

driver had no available insurance coverage for the accident, or that he first exhausted 

the other driver’s coverage through suit or settlement.23 As the Court explained in 

its summary judgment decision, he met neither prerequisite. As a result, summary 

judgment denying his claim to recover UM/UIM benefits remains appropriate. 

10. In summary, Mr. Driggus raises no new arguments to justify 

reconsideration of the Court’s decision. The Court cannot excuse mandatory 

statutory and contractual requirements that included (1) the need for him to sue the 

19 Petit v. Country Life Homes, Inc., 2005 WL 3194392, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 29, 2005).

20 Id. 

21 D.I. 31.

22 Breckin, 620 A.2d at 232.

23 18 Del. C. § 3902(b)(3).
5

proper party within the statutes of limitations, (2) the need to comply with 18 Del. 

C. § 3902(b)(3)’s requirements, and (3) the need to satisfy the conditions of his 

policy. 

WHEREFORE, for the reasons above, Mr. Driggus’ motion for reargument 

must be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jeffrey J Clark

 Resident Judge