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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 1 of 85

MARSHA JONES MOUTRIE (SBN 69711)

City Attorney

JOSEPH LAWRENCE (SBN 99039)

Assistant City Attorney

LANCE S. GAMS (SBN 125487)

MARTIN T. TACHIKI (SBN 83044)

Deputy City Attorneys

1685 Main Street, Third Floor

Santa Monica, California 90401-3295

Telephone: (310) 458-8336

Facsimile: (310) 395-6727

marty. tachiki@smgov .net

Attorneys for Defendant,

CITY OF SANTA MONICA

EXHIBIT

j--8-=L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and

MAR Y E. PETERS, United States Secretary

of Transportation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SANTA MONICA,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: CV08-02695 CW(Ex)

DATE:

TIME:

COURTROOM:

May 15,2008

8:30AM

10

DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'

APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MEMORANDUM OF

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; SUPPLEMENTAL

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN; AND EXHIBITS

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
2

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 2 of 85

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

3 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARy........................................................................ 1

4 ARGlJMENT....... 3

5 1.

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1 1

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IS

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19 II

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THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ISSUE A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BECAUSE THE INTERIM CEASE AND DESIST

ORDER IS UNLAWFUL ON ITS FACE AND THIS COURT

LACKS JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE IT 3

A. The Cease and Desist Order is Unlawful Under Federal

Statutes .

B. The Law Does Not Preclude This Court From Assessing

the Validity of the Interim Cease and Desist Order It is

Asked To Enforce .

c. Interpreting The Law To Preclude This Court From

Ascertaining The Legality Of the Interim Order Would

Frustrate The Congressional Requirement That Due

Process May Only Be Circumscribed To Protect Safety .

D. The Notion That This Court May Not Assess The Interim

Order's Validity Should Also Be Carefully Reassessed

Because the Order's Deficiencies May Implicate This

Court's Jurisdiction .

AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE THE

FAA IS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF

IlIIS CASE .

A The Ordinance Validly Expresses The City'S Proprietary

Rights .

B. The FAA's Claims That The Ordinance Violates Federal

Law Are Arbitrary and Capricious .

I. Contrary to the FAA's Unsubstantiated Assertions,

the Ordinance Does Not Unreasonably Discriminate

Between Categories Of Aircraft .

2. Nor Does The Ordinance Grant Any Exclusive Right.. .

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 3 of 85

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3. The Ordinance Is Fully Consistent With Both the

Documents Which Transferred the Airport Back to Its

Long-time Owner, the City At the End of World War II

And With the 1984 Settlement Agreement Which Resolved

the Rights And Responsibilities Of the City and FAA

With Respect to The Airport Through the Year 2015 .

Page

16 CONCLlJSION 22

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c. The Court Should Also Conclude That The City Is Likely

To Succeed On The Merits Because The Tenth Amendment

Protects the City Against the FAA's Demand That The City

Accept C&D Aircraft At Its Airport, Even Though Doing So

Violates The FAA's Own Safety Standards .

III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED BECAUSE

THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS TIPS MARKEDLY IN THE

CITY'S FAVOR AND DENIAL WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC

INTEREST BY FAVORING PUBLIC SAFETY OVER

INDIVIDUAL CONVENIENCE .

]]

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OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 4 of 85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Ai6f4r2~t~~6: fi3'(~}fci:~t9~ 1{~~~~~:'.~~~~~:~~: 4

Air One HelicoptfftS, Inc. v. FAA,

86 F.3d 880 (9tCir. 1996) 8

A lr Transport Ass 'n'of America v. Crotti,

389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 13

Clark v. Busey,

9 959 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1992) .4

10 Federal Land Bank of Jackson in Receivership v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank,

727 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-1059 (S.D.Miss. 1989) 8

11

Federal Maritime Comm 'n v. South Carolina Ports Auth ;

12 535 lJ.S. 743, 762 (2002) 7

13 Gordon v Havasf! Palms,

93 Cal.AppAt244,249 (200 1) 19

14

15

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17

GTE Sf?uth, Inc. v. MOfhris~n,

99 f·.3d 733, 744 (4 CIL 1999) 8

Millard Refrigerated Services, Inc., v. FAA,

98 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 13

Nader v. FAA,

18 440 F.ld 292 «(~ADC 1971) 6

19 National Business Aviation Ass 'n. v. City of Naples Airport Authority,

162 F. Supp.2d 1343 (M.D.Fla. 2001) 13

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Nai1f~·~3~e~if(C~e:..fN:y.o~·1998)~~.~:. ~~~.~!~~~.~~~~: 13

New York v. United States,

505lJ.S. 144, 157 (1992) 17

Printz v. United States,

521 lJ.S. 898, 935(1997) 17

Slati~~I~;:31~t4 {7~;6).~::.~.~~~~~~· 13

United States v. First Nat'l Bank,

27 379 lJ.S. 383 (1965) 22

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 5 of 85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York,

658 F.Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 13

Yakus v. United States,

321 tJ.S. 414 (1944) 7

Statutes

28 tJSC ~ 1331 8

28 tJSC ~ 1345 ." 8

49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) 15

49 tJ.S.C. § 40113(a) 4

49 U.S.C. § 40133 ; 4

49 tJ.S.C. § 4'1713 12

49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(4) 4, II

49 U.S.C. § 46105(c) 4,5

49 tJ.S.C. § 46106 11

49 U.S.C. § 46107 11

49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) :7

49 tJ.S.C. § 46110(b) : 7

49 U.S.C. § 46110(c) 6

49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(I) 14

49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(4) 15

49 U.S.C. § 47111(f) 11

49lJ.S.C. § 47121 4

California Government Code § 830(a) 19

California Government Code § 830.6 19

California Government Code § 835 19

IV

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 6 of 85

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Page

3 Regulations

4 14C.F.R.§16.1 5

5 14 C.F.R. § 16.I09(a) 5

6 14C.F.R. § 16.11 4

7 14 C.F.R. § 16.229(a) 9

8 14 C.F.R. § 16.3 6

9 14 C.F.l{ § 16.31(d) 5

10 Constitutional Provisions

II California Constitution, Article XI, § 5(a) 14

12 California Constitution, Article XI, § 7 14

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v

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
25

References to Exhibits I through 21 are to those exhibits attached to Defendant City

of Santa Monica's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order filed on

April 25, 2008. References to Exhibits 22 through 34 are attached hereto and submitted with this

Opposition to Plaintiffs Application for a Preliminary Injunction.

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 7 of 85

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

2 The City opposes the issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of

3 its ordinance (vthe Ordinance")(Exhibit 15)I, duly enacted to protect the public and the City

4 by implementing federal safety standards which define the Santa Monica Airport facilities as

5 inadequate for the C&D category aircraft that are using the Airport in growing numbers. The

6 Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") unlawfully issued a so-called "interim cease and

7 desist order" ("Interim Order") to block enforcement of the Ordinance and filed this action to

8 effectuate its Interim Order. But, the Interim Order is facially invalid. It was issued in a six

9 year old administrative proceeding under 14 C.F.R., Part 16 ("Part 16") that, by the FAA's

10 own admission, remains at its earliest, pre-hearing phase. The federal government's action

I I is an unprecedented and unlawful procedural maneuver. The statutory scheme adopted by

12 Congress simply does not allow such an order absent a hearing or a clear safety emergency.

13 There has been no administrative hearing; and, it is the City, not the FAA, which has acted to

14 protect safety. Thus, under these circumstances, the FAA has no authority to issue, and this

15 Court has no jurisdiction to confirm, a premature order prohibiting enforcement of the

16 Ordinance.

17 The legality of the Interim Order is squarely before this Court, and that order is

18 entitled to no deference. Rather, if the federal government believes that its unauthorized

19 Interim Order (rather than the City's duly adopted safety ordinance), should be enforced,

20 then the federal government must meet the normal standards for extraordinary relief.

21 However, it cannot; neither the law nor the facts support the preliminary injunction request

22 The FAA claims that the Ordinance must give way merely because it would

23 inconvenience a comparatively small number of persons who fly on C&D aircraft. However,

24

26

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28
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 8 of 85

those flyers have, within their own power, the choice and ability to simply fly in and out of

2 Santa Monica Airport on compliant aircraft or use another local airport. Unlike the flyers,

3 the City and its residents have no ready alternatives. Residents live in family homes within

4 300 feet of: and below, the runway ends. (Trimborn I, '12; Trimborn II, ~3 and Exhibit 1) 2

5 No runway safety areas protect them against an overrun. They cannot simply trade for a

6 safer home as flyers may trade aircraft. And, the City is responsible for the safety of its

7 Airport. The City cannot simply hand its legal responsibility off to the federal government

8 even though that government will not let the City conform the Airport to federal safety

9 standards.

10 Nonetheless, the FAA proclaims that the City must cease and desist from enforcing its

II safety Ordinance, that this Court must enforce the FAA's Interim Order, and that the City

12 may not challenge the legality of that Interim Order in this Court. Such is not the law.

13 Having voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, the federal government cannot then

14 proclaim that the Court must do its bidding despite the circumstances and the law. Congress

15 certainly did not cede authority to the FAA to turn a federal court into' its rubber stamp, and

16 most certainly not do so in the this factual and legal context

17 To the contrary, Congress requires the FAA to protect safety first. This

18 Congressional directive reflects one inescapable reality: accidents happen. Equipment fails'

19 and people make mistakes. Accidents happen to novices and to professionals alike. (See

20 Trimborn II, ~~7 and 8). One need not look beyond the daily newspaper or weekly magazine

21 to be reminded that experienced professionals operating all types of craft, including

22 automobiles, ships and airplanes have accidents. Even professional licensure and years of

23

24

25

26

27

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2

The Declaration of Robert Trimbom In Support of the City of Santa Monica's

Opposition to the Application for a Temporary Restraining Order was filed on April 25, 2008 and is

hereinafter referred to as "Trimborn I". The Declaration of Robert Trimbom in Support of the City'S

Santa Monica's Opposition to the Application for a Preliminary Injunction is attached hereto and is

hereinafter referred to as "Trimborn II". The Declaration of James Hall was filed on April 25, 2008

in Opposition to the Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and is hereinafter referred to as

"Hall".

2

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 . Page 9 of 85

unblemished experience do not avert the danger. Thus, the FAA has adopted safety

2 standards to safeguard the public against the inevitability of error and failure ..

3 As a prudent and responsible government and airport owner, the City of Santa Monica

4 has acted to implement those standards. The City studied the safety options, conducted

5 numerous public hearings, engaged in years of negotiations with the FAA, evaluated

6 alternative proposals, and ultimately reached the legislative conclusion that Airport safety

7 was best enhanced by conforming runway usage to the category A and B aircraft that the

8 FAA has approved the Airport to service because they are able to safely operate at the

9 Airport. The Ordinance is measured and targeted. It offers the least intrusive infringement,

10 on Airport usage while protecting residents of the City, neighboring communities, businesses

II and visitors. Yet, the FAA claims that none of this matters. Again, such is not the law. The

12 potential benefit of enforcing the Ordinance greatly outweighs any alleged harm of its taking

13 affect, Like the law, the balance of hardships tips precipitously in the City'S favor. And,

14 considerations of public safety and welfare dictate that, while this legal dispute remains

15 pending, public safety should be protected through enforcement of the ordinance.

16

17

18

19 I.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ISSUE A PRELIMINARY

20 INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE INTERIM CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IS

21 UNLA WFUL ON ITS FACE AND THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO

22 ENFORCE IT.

23

24 In response to the federal government's application for a Temporary Restraining

25 Order. the City has already argued that the FAA had no authority to issue the cease and

26 desist order, and that this Court has jurisdiction to assess the Interim Order's validity. And,

27 the Court has preliminarily concluded that it may not assess the Interim Order's validity and

28
12

13

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 10 of 85

must effectuate it. The Court's preliminary conclusion that the FAA's order must be

2 enforced through injunctive relief warrants careful reconsideration because the illegality of

3 the Interim Order does not simply impact its enforceability, it also raises jurisdictional

4 questions.

5 To the extent that there isjurisdiction to review a final order of the FAA, that

6 jurisdiction lies exclusively within the United States Courts of Appeals. See Clark v. Busey,

7 959 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1992). However, as the courts of appeals have not acted, nor

8 even been asked to act, this Court too lacks jurisdiction to enforce the FAA purported

9 "order". There is no proper or valid order to enforce. See e:g., Air California v. us.

10 Department of Transportation, 654 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1981). There exists no subject

I I matter jurisdiction for this court to proceed.

A. The Cease and Desist Order is Unlawful Under Federal Statutes.

14 The Court has preliminarily concluded that 49 U.S.C. §§ 40113(a), 46105(c) and 14

15 C.F.R. § 16.1 I authorizes the FAA's issuance of the Interim Order. This issue warrants

16 more attention. While those statutes and regulation mention orders, their language and the

17 statutory scheme reveal that they do not authorize the action taken by the FAA in this case.

18 The FAA's own regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 16.11 authorizes the FAA to issue orders on

19 Part 16 proceedings, but only pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 40133 and 47121. Neither of those

20 statutes expressly authorizes the extraordinary relief of a cease and desist order in a Part 16

2 I proceeding.

22 Nor should they be construed to authorize such extraordinary agency action. Section

23 4712 I deals with record keeping and audits, not airport operations. Section 40 I13(a) refers

24 to the issuance of orders in general. But, a more specific federal statute governs the cease

25 and desist order in this case: 49 U.S.c. § 461 0 l(a)(4). It provides: "After notice and an

26 opportunity for hearing, the Secretary shall issue a notice to compel compliance with this

27 part [49 U.S.c. Part A]] ifthe Secretary ... finds in an investigation under this subsection

28

4
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 11 of 85

that a person is violating this part." (Emphasis added.). Thus, the most specific and

2 therefore applicable federal statute requires a hearing before the issuance of a compliance

3 order. And, the parties do not dispute that no such administrative hearing has occurred in

4 this case.

5 The federal statutory requirement of a hearing before issuance of a compliance order

6 is reflected in the FAA's own regulations. 14 C.F.R. § 16.109(a) provides that "the agency

7 will provide the opportunity for a hearing if, in the Director's Determination, the agency

8 proposes to issue ... a cease and desist order ... or any other compliance order issued by the

9 Administrator to carry out the provisions of the acts, and required to be issued after notice

10 and opportunity for a hearing." Thus, in advance of a hearing, the Director may only

I 1 "propose" issuance of a compliance order. The order itself may only be issued after a

12 hearing.

13 Indeed, the statutory scheme enacted by Congress authorizes the FAA Director to act

14 before a hearing in only one situation, a safety emergency. 49 U.S.C. § 46 105(c) states that:

15 "When the Administrator is of the opinion that an emergency exists related to safety in air

16 commerce and requires immediate action, the Administrator ... may ... issue orders without

17 regard to this subpart .... " Thus, Congress simply has not allowed the FAA to issue a cease

18 and desist order without first conducting a hearing, except in the case of safety emergencies.

19 That section does not authorize interim orders in Part 16 proceedings, which relate to

20 such issues as whether federal grantees are operating their airports in compliance with

21 statutory mandates prohibiting unreasonable discrimination and exclusive rights. See 14

22 C.F .R. ~ 16.1 [listing Congressional statutes authorizing Part 16 actions, but not listed

23 among the provisions in 14 C.F.R. § 16.1 is 49 U.S.C. § 46105(c).]

24 Here, placing the cart far ahead of the horse, the Director has purported to issue an

25 "interim cease and desist order" prior to the issuing a determination. (Interim Order at 1, 2).

26 Part 16. however, does not authorize the Director to issue a binding cease and desist order.

27 Under Part 16, § 16.31 (d) only authorizes the Director, at the time he renders his

28

5

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 12 of 85

determination, to propose the issuance ofa Cease and Desist order. Thus, under the FAA's

2 own regulations, even if the Director had issued his initial determination -- which he has not

3 -- he could not have issued a binding cease and desist order. The regulations provide that the

4 Director's Determination is the "initial determination made by the Director following an

5 investigation, [and] is a non-final agency decision"). 14 C.F.R. § 16.3. Moreover, under Part

6 16, the Director's Determination, if and when issued, will function as a proposed set of

7 findings and remedial actions. If the Director's Determination is adverse to the City, the

8 next step will be a hearing before a hearing officer and then an appeal to the Associate

9 Administrator for Airports, who may make a Final Decision. (14 C.F.R., Part 16, Subparts D

10 and G).

11 Thus, under the federal regulations it is undisputable that, after six years, the

12 underlying agency process is still in its earliest phases of the Part 16 proceedings; and

13 because the Director has not yet issued an initial Determination, has not issued a proposed

14 Cease and Desist Order, and has not afforded the City a hearing, the FAA has no authority

15 under its own regulations to issue a binding Cease and Desist Order and has not presented

16 this Court with a valid order that can be enforced.

17 Thus, the federal laws that define and limit the FAA's authority do not allow it to ;

18 issue an interim cease and desist order in a Part 16 proceeding. The agency's emergency

19 powers are limited to averting immediate safety risks. See, Nader v. FAA, 440 F.2d 292, 293

20 (CADC 197/) [ill effects of smoking did not justify FAA's exercise of emergency power to

21 ban smoking on commercial aircraft since the FAA only has that power in a clear safety

22 emergency].

23

24

25 the Interim Cease and Desist Order It Is Asked To Enforce.

B. The Law Does Not Preclude This Court From Assessing the Validity of

26 The Court's initial decision that it lacks the jurisdiction to consider the legality of the

27 cease and desist order rests on 49 U.S.c. § 46110(c). However, that statute only vests

28
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 13 of 85

exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeal after (1) an aggrieved party exercises its option

2 to seek review of an FAA order [§ 4611 O(a)], and (2) the clerk of the court transmits the

3 petition for review to the Secretary [§ 46110(b)]. Neither of these events has occurred in this

4 case. Accordingly, at this time, no court of appeals has taken any jurisdiction over any part

5 of the FAA's order; and this Court's jurisdiction and ability to act are called into doubt.

6 Indeed, plaintiff herself puts the validity of the Interim Order at issue by assertions that "the

7 City is placing itself squarely in violation of a valid and effective order ofthe FAA"

8 (Plaintiff's Memorandum at 8; see also, id. at 10).

9 Nor is plaintiffs' position supported by the cases she has cited. In Yakus v. United

10 States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the Supreme Court found that provisions of a statute conferring

lion an Emergency Court of Appeals '''exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any

12 regulation or order', coupled with the provision that 'no court, Federal, State, or Territorial,

13 shall have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation are broad

14 enough in terms to deprive the district court of power to consider the validity of the

15 Administrator's regulation or order as a defense to a criminal prosecution for its violation."

16 Id. at 429. As discussed above, the statutory scheme governing appellate court jurisdiction

17 to review FAA orders does not make exclusive jurisdiction automatic; rather, exclusive

18 jurisdiction is triggered only when a petition for review has been filed and the Court sends

19 the petition to the Secretary [49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)-(c)], none of which has occurred here.

20 Moreover, none of the statutes the FAA relies on contain a provision removing this Court's

21 power to consider the validity of the regulation or order before issuing injunctive relief.

22 Likewise in Federal Maritime Comm 'n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,

23 762 (2002), the enforcement statute expressly limited the district court's authority to review

24 "whether the relevant order 'was properly made and duly issued.''' Id. [quoting 46

25 U.S.C.App. § 1713(c)]. Again, there is no corresponding statutory limitation on the Court's

26 authority in statutes cited by the Secretary in this case. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not

27 hold that the sanctioned party could never contest the merits of the agency's action, but only

28

7

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 14 of 85

that its failure to do so before the agency would compromise its ability to do so later. Id.

2 Here, the FAA has voluntarily invoked this Court's limited jurisdiction by claiming

3 that certain laws compel this Court to enforce the FAA's "valid and effective" action. But

4 those laws do no such thing particularly in a situation where the FAA's "valid and effective"

5 action so plainly has jumped the gun. The Court's already limited jurisdiction is squarely

6 therefore in doubt. And since the FAA asserts that it has not yet made any decision, it is

7 difficult to see what other jurisdiction exists.'

8 By issuing the Interim Order, and then immediately seeking a TRO, the FAA has

9 facially violated the very laws it says applies. The FAA, in contravention of applicable law,

10 has deprived Santa Monica of the ability to contest the Interim Order before the agency prior

I I to any proceeding in this or any other Court. 4 The governing statutes and regulations

12 preclude such high-handed action. The law the FAA invokes bars it from dragging the City

13 before this Court. No legal principle prevents Santa Monica from defending itself by

14 challenging the legality of FAA's order and this Court's jurisdiction. Nor should this Court

15 allow such unfairness by the FAA. Cj Air One Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 86 FJd 880, 881

16 (9th Cir. 1996)1Ninth Circuit grants review despite FAA's claim that the court lacked

17 jurisdiction to review an FAA opinion to end "bureaucratic gridlock" and thereby ensure

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

J In addition to these specific statutes, the federal government has also cited two general

jurisdictional statutes in its complaint: 28 USC § 1331, which confers broad jurisdiction over cases

presenting federal questions under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States; and 28

USC § 1345, which authorizes the federal government to sue in federal court. Despite these statutes'

breadth, issues of their application can be subtle. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of Jackson in

Receivership v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank 727 F. Supp. 1055, 1058-1059 (S.D.Miss. 1989)

lnoting the difficulty of determining the existence of federal question jurisdiction in a case involving

federal agencies and explaining that the requirement of "arising under" is technical one that must be

assessed by the courts].

28

4 The other cases cited b~ the Government are similarly inapposite. GTE South, Inc. v.

Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 744 (41 Cir. 1999) (different statutory scheme in which appeals challenging

validity of rules were already pending); United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287,290-92 (1946)

(statute expressly barred sanctioned party from contesting validity of order in enforcement

proceeding, while also providing a separate administrative process for such claims).

______________ 8

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICA TlON FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
8

9 c. Interpreting The Law To Preclude This Court From Ascertaining The

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 15 of 85

fairnessl.5

2 In short, it is one thing for Congress to provide that a party aggrieved by an

3 administrative decision may only seek judicial review of that decision in a federal appellate

4 court. It is quite another thing for this Court to conclude that a city aggrieved by an

5 unlawfully issued Interim Order is not entitled to contest the invocation of this Court's

6 limited jurisdiction or otherwise defend itself and its ability to protect safety if dragged into

7 the United States District Court by the FAA.

10 Legality Of the Interim Order Would Frustrate The Congressional

I I Requirement That Due Process May Only Be Circumscribed To Protect

12 Safety.

13 As explained in subsection A above, the federal statutory scheme requires a hearing in

14 advance of an FAA cease and desist order; the only exception being when a safety

15 emergency exists. Here, the FAA is attempting to jump this requirement, but the Court

16 should not allow a regulatory agency to disregard requirements ensuring fairness. Congress

17 has struck a balance between fairness to the regulated entity and public safety. When safety

18 is at imminent risk, Congress has established that the process guarantee must yield to that

19 necessity. Otherwise, those guarantees must be honored. The balance Congress struck must

20 be respected.

21 Moreover, if countenanced by this Court, the procedural maneuver which the FAA

22 has undertaken to defer its duties will also violate federal requirements of fairness in another

23 important way. In the hearing which the FAA has so far avoided, the burden of proof will

24 be on the FAA. 14 C.F.R. § 16.229(a) is unambiguous on this point. It provides "The

25

26

27 :;Of course, given the repeated pronouncements by fAA officials that the City's actions are

illegal, any proceeding before the FAA likely is futile as the FAA has already predetermined the

28 outcome, further eroding notions of due process.

9

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
7

8 D. The Notion That This Court May Not Assess The Interim Order's Validity

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 16 of 85

burden of proof of noncompliance with an Act or any regulation, order, agreement or

2 document of conveyance issued under the authority of an Act is on the agency." By the _

3 unlawful expedient of leapfrogging over the hearing requirement, the FAA has avoided its

4 burden of proof - a burden imposed by its own regulation and which it likely cannot meet on

5 the facts of this case. Federal law should not be interpreted to allow the FAA to avoid its

6 burden of proof.

9 Should Also Be Carefully Reassessed Because the Order's Deficiencies

10 May Implicate This Court's Jurisdiction.

I I The unprecedented process followed by the federal government in this case raises

12 serious issues of jurisdiction in other ways as well. The three federal statutes, which are

13 cited in the complaint for purposes of demonstrating jurisdiction, require an administrative

14 hearing before the Secretary is authorized to file suit. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 46106, 46107 and

IS 471 II (f). Section 46106 empowers the Secretary to file suit to "enforce this part or a

16 requirement or regulation prescribed, or an order or any term of a certificate or permit issued,

17 under this part." Thus, to invoke jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46106, the Secretary must,

18 in this case, establish that issuance of the Interim Cease and Desist Order was consistent with

19 the federal statutes. That requirement cannot be met in this case. As explained in subsection

20 A. above, the federal statutory scheme limits the FAA's authority to issue orders to those

21 situations in which it has first given notice and conducted a hearing. See 49 U.S.C. §

22 46101 (a)( 4)["After notice and an opportunity for a hearing ... the Secretary of

23 Transportation, Under Secretary, or Administrator shall issue an order to compel compliance

24 with this part if [he or she] finds in an investigation under this sub that a person is violating

25 this part:'] Likewise, 49 U.S.C. § 46107 makes the existence of an order a prerequisite to

26 suit,6 Similarly, 49 U.S.C. § 47111(f) allows this Court to effectuate enforcement of grant

27

28 (, Moreover, both specific provisions of the United States Code expressly state that court

10

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OFSANT A MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 17 of 85

conditions, but it too requires an administrative hearing before the Secretary may initiate

2 judicial proceedings. See 49 U.S.c. § 47111(e).

3 Moreover, these statutes do not excuse the federal government from meeting other

4 prerequisites to filing suit such as an actual case or controversy, standing and ripeness. Here,

5 it is not clear, for instance, that the matter is ripe because the FAA has not conducted the

6 hearing required by federal law as a prerequisite to proposing and issuing a cease and desist

7 order and as a prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction and the enforcement powers of this

8 Court.

9 Thus, for all the reasons explained in this section, the Court should reconsider its

10 initial decision that it cannot assess the legality of the Interim Order. The Court's limited

II jurisdiction has not been properly invoked.

12

13 II. AN INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE THE FAA IS UNLIKELY

14 TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF THIS CASE.

15 .,

16 Commencing with its administrative complaint against the City under Part 16 in

17 October 2002 and followed by its administrative order to show cause and its cease and desist

18 order in the Part 16 proceeding and most recently in plaintiffs' complaint filed herein, the

19 FAA has asserted a number of claims, which the City has steadfastly refuted with both

20 argument and evidence for almost six years. Even a cursory review of those claims and the

21 City's evidence shows that the FAA's actions in this dispute have been arbitrary and

22 capricious and that the Interim Order should therefore not be effectuated by this Court.

23 Instead, the Court should recognize and protect the rights of the City as an airport proprietor

24 to keep its Airport safe and thereby protect the public against aircraft accidents and the City

25

26

27 proceedings may be initiated "with respect to safety duties and powers designated to be carried out

by the Administrator". In this case there is no lawful order, and the Administrator or his designee is

28 not acting to discharge safety duties. Only the City is acting to promote safety.

I I

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 18 of 85

against liability for those accidents. Neither the law nor the balance of hardships favor the

2 FAA.

3

4 A. The Ordinance Validly Expresses The City's Proprietary Rights.

5 Congress has affirmed the judicial recognition of the "proprietor's exception" to

6 federal preemption of aviation regulation. 49 U.S.C. § 41713. See also. National Helicopter

7 Corp. of America v. City of New York, 13'7F.3d 81, 89 (2nd Cir. 1998) It allows the City to

8 make its Airport safe and protects the City from the unfairness which will result if the FAA

9 is allowed to prevent the City from making the Airport safe by federal standards. The

10 exception thereby ensures that airport proprietors will not be placed in the extremely unfair

11 position of bearing liability for circumstances beyond their control.

12 The exception gives airport proprietors the right to take reasonable actions to protect

13 themselves against liability which would otherwise arise for unsafe conditions existing at

14 airports. See Air Transport Ass 'n of America v, Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58,63-64 (N.D. Cal.

15 1975)[ explaining that an airport proprietor is responsible for the consequences attendant

16 upon its operation of a public airport]; Slapin v. Los Angeles Internat 'I Airport, 65

17 Cal.App.3d 484,488 (1976)[ explaining that, notwithstanding statutory immunities,

18 California cities may be liable for dangerous conditions at their airport].

19 Thus, pursuant to the proprietor's exception, an airport proprietor may limit airport

20 operations to avoid liability for unsafe conditions. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port

21 Authority of New York, 658 F.Supp. 952, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)[discussing the exception].

22 The proprietor's exception is reflected in federal grant assurance conditions and regulations

23 which allow airport owner/grantees to ensure safety. (Exhibit 10). It allows an airport

24 proprietor and operator to, for example, impose a curfew to protect against nuisance claims

25 for unreasonable noise. National Helicopter Corp, of America v. City of New York, 137 F.3d

26 81, 89-90 (2nd Cir. 1998). Likewise a city owning an airport may ban particular classes of jet

27 aircraft to avoid liability for jet noise. National Business Aviation Ass 'n. v. City of Naples

28

12

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

. PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
17

18

19

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 19 of 85

Airport Authority, 162 F. Supp.2d 1343, 1352-54 (M.D.Fla. 2001). The FAA has contended

2 in this dispute that the proprietor's exception is limited to taking steps to avert unreasonable

3 noise. That is simply incorrect. Congress has not limited the proprietor's exception to noise

4 restrictions, and the FAA itself recognizes that the exception gives airport proprietor's the

5 right to establish weight limits which exclude larger aircraft. See, Millard Refrigerated

6 Services, Inc. v. Omaha Airport Authority, FAA 13-93-19 (August 4, 1995), remanded on

7 other grounds by Millard Refrigerated Services, Inc., v. FAA, 98 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

8 (upholding weight based ban). Moreover, it simply makes no sense to interpret the

9 Congressional mandate of the proprietor's exception as being limited to noise restrictions. If

10 Congress meant only this, it certainly could have stated so easily enough.

11 Like federal law, state law empowers Santa Monica to protect airport safety. The

12 California Constitution gives all California cities broad police powers to protect the public,

13 safety, health and welfare through local legislation. California Constitution, Article XI, § 7.

14 Those powers are even broader for charter cities like Santa Monica, which are granted

15 additional "home rule" powers by Article XI, § 5(a).

16

B. The FAA's Claims That The Ordinance Violates Federal Law Are

Arbitrary and Capricious.

I. Contrary to the FAA's Unsubstantiated Assertions, the

20 Ordinance Does Not Unreasonably Discriminate Between

21 Categories Of Aircraft.

22 Federal law requires airport operators, which have received federal grants, to make

23 their airports "available for public use on reasonable conditions and without unjust

24 discrimination." 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(I). This requirement is echoed in Grant Assurance

25 22(a). (Exhibit 10) The FAA's Notice ofInvestigation against the City and its cease and

26 desist order, both pursuant to Part 16, are based, in part, on the contention that the City has

27 unjustly discriminated by banning Category C&D aircraft. As the record shows, this

28

13
12

13

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 20 of 85

contention is spurious and should be rejected out of hand. The Aircraft Conformance

2 Program merely implements federal safety standards. The ban of Category C&D aircraft

3 reflects the fact that the Airport's runway lacks runway safety areas for those faster aircraft.

4 There are no margins for error because the runway ends are just feet from major streets and

5 homes.

6 Even the FAA itself recognizes that safety may require imposing conditions on

7 Airport usage. Grant Assurance 22(h) states that the City "may establish such fair, equal and

8 not unjustly discriminatory conditions to be met by all users of the airport as may be

9 necessary for the safe and efficient operation ofthe airport." (Exhibit 10) The City has

10 prohibited faster jets because, under the FAA's own standards, their use of the Airport is not

II safe given the lack of runway safety areas, topography, and proximity of homes.

2. Nor Does The Ordinance Grant Any Exclusive Right.

14 Federal law also prohibits the City from giving any person an exclusive right for the

15 use of airport facilities. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(e) and 47 107(a)(4). However, as is obvious on

16 the face of the Ordinance, it does not exclude any person from the use of airport facilities.

17 Any person who had access prior to implementation of the Ordinance can have access after

18 the Ordinance is enforced, as long as they operate a compliant aircraft. Category C&D

19 operators are not an immutable class. Many C&D aircraft operations at SMO were

20 conducted by operators that utilize multiple aircraft, both compliant and non-compliant.

21 (Trimborn II,~12.) Moreover, the distinction between Category C&D aircraft and Category

22 A&B aircraft is reasonable and rationale because the Airport is approved by the FAA for

23 category A and B aircraft, but lacks the Runway Safety Areas specified by FAA's own

24 published guidance for' Category C&D aircraft.

25

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15

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

I)LAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 21 of 85

3. The Ordinance Is Fully Consistent With Both the Documents

Which Transferred the Airport Back to Its Long-time Owner, the

City At the End of World War II And With the 1984 Settlement

Agreement Which Resolved the Rights And Responsibilities Of

the City and FAA With Respect to The Airport Through the Year

2015.

7 The FAA contends that the Instrument of Transfer which transferred the Airport back

8 to the City at the end of World War II somehow circumscribes the City's right, as proprietor,

9 to operate the Airport safely. This is, likewise, simply and obviously wrong. Although the

10 City leased the Airport to the federal government during the War, it retained its fee interest

II in the airport land. The conveyances made by the City to the federal government were

12 merely leases. They expired, by their own terms 12 months after President Truman

13 terminated the national state of emergency by Proclamation 2487 in 1952. (Exhibits 2

14 through 7). Thus, the federal government merely acquired possessory rights, temporarily

15 and by leasehold, during the World War II, and the City'S recovered its possessory rights

16 after the War ended. As a mere tenant, the federal government can not dictate terms upon

17 the landlord (the City) once its rights as a tenant were extinguished. And, even if the federal

18 government could have imposed restrictions by this transfer, those restrictions would only

19 have mandated compliance with the federal prohibitions against unjust discrimination and

20 exclusive rights; they would not have added other substantive obligations.

21 Likewise, the Ordinance comports with the 1984 Settlement Agreement. (Exhibit 8)

22 It requires the City to keep the Airport open until 2015 to a variety of aircraft. However, that

23 requirement is circumscribed by the explicit language of the Agreement which states: "The

24 airport will be capable of accommodating most kinds of general aviation aircraft, generally

25 consistent with Group II Design Standards set forth in FAA advisory Circular 150/300-4B

26 dated February 24, 1983." (Emphasis added.)(Exhibits 8) That circular, which provided

27 technical guidance for the design of safe and efficient airports, provided: "[t]he standards,

28
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 22 of 85

recommendations, and guidance material in this Advisory Circular CAC) define an airport

2 suitable for the less demanding Aircraft Approach Category A and B airplanes, i.e., airplanes

3 with approach speeds ofless than 121 knots." (Emphasis added.)(Exhibit 9) Thus, by its

4 plain language and the reference to an advisory circular from the FAA, the 1984 Agreement

5 only obligates Santa Monica to keep its Airport accessible to slower aircraft. That is what

6 the City bargained for in the 1984 Agreement, and that is what the FAA agreed to when it

7 executed the agreement. Additionally, the Runway Data Table on the Airport Layout Plan

8 for the Airport approved by the FAA in August 1991 specifies an Airport Reference Code of

9 B-I1 indicating the FAA's recognition that the Airport was designed for category A and B

10 aircraft. (Exhibit II.) This is further evidence that the 1984 Agreement only obligates the

11 City to keep the Airport accessible to a mix of smaller aircraft. And, the City has fulfilled its

12 obligations under the 1984 Agreement. In 2007, the Airport accommodated about 127,000

13 operations, but only about 9,000 operations involved aircraft larger than the B-II category

14 specified in the Agreement. (See Trimborn II ~ 11.)

15 The FAA has also asserted in its administrative complaint and its Order to Show

16 Cause that the Ordinance violates both the Instrument of Transfer assigning the lease of the

17 Airport back to the City at the end of World War II and the 1984 Settlement Agreement

18 between the FAA and the City. Again, the evidence belies these claims.

19

20 c. The Court Should Also Conclude That The City Is Likely To Succeed On

21 The Merits Because The Tenth Amendment Protects the City Against The

22 FAA's Demand That The City Accept C&D Aircraft At Its Airport, Even

23 Though Doing So Violates The FAA's Own Safety Standards.

24 The Tenth Amendment ensures the viability of our system of dual sovereignty by

25 confirming "that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a

26 given instances, reserve power to the States." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157

27 (1992). While Congress has the authority to encourage states to regulate according to

28

16

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 23 of 85

federal preferences, "the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to

2 compel the States to do so." New York v. United States, Id. at 149. See Printz v. United

3 States, 52 IU.S. 898, 935(1 997)["The Federal Government may neither issue directives

4 requiring the State to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers ... to

5 administer or enforce a federal regulatory program."] "While Congress has substantial

6 powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas ofintimate concern to the States, the

7 Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the

8 States to govern according to Congress' instructions." New York v. United States, 505 U.S.

9 at 162. The law is abundantly clear: federal coercion is proscribed.

10 Thus, the central question of this case - whether the federal government may require

11 Santa Monica to allow C&D aircraft at its Airport, notwithstanding the obvious dangers they

12 pose under federal safety standards - is a question of constitutional dimension. Particular

13 care must be taken to fully assess the City's rights and duties to ensure protection of its

14 Tenth Amendment rights.

15 Here, by a six-year long course of conduct, beginning prior to its administrative

16 complaint against the City and extending through the issuance of the Interim Cease and

17 Desist Order, the FAA has attempted to compel the City to accommodate aircraft for which

18 the Airport was not designed. However, the evidence shows that is unsafe. Mr. James Hall,

19 a past Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, stated in his declaration that

20 "in the absence of meeting the federal standards for RSAs [Runway Safety Areas] at Santa

21 Monica Airport, Category C&D aircraft should not be permitted to operate due to the serious

22 risk of injuries and deaths to occupants of the aircraft and members of the community

23 resulting from aircraft operating on the margins of safety with no provision for the possibility

24 of mechanical failure or pilot error." (Hall, ~ 16)

25 Significantly, the City's grant assurances with the federal government preserve its

26 proprietary rights, as airport operator. Grant Assurance 22(i) provides that "[t]he sponsor

27 ISanta Monica] may prohibit or limit any given type, kind of class of aeronautical use of the

28

17

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 24 of 85

airport if such action is necessary for the safe operation of the airport or necessary to serve

2 the civil aviation needs ofthe public." Grant Assurance 22(i). (Exhibit 10) Moreover, the

3 1984 Settlement Agreement provides that the City is only required to accommodate Category

4 A&B aircraft, through its reference to an Advisory Circular setting forth design standards for

5 airports that only accommodate A&B aircraft. (Exhibits 8 and 9) Now, the FAA, at a

6 preliminary stage of an administrative proceeding, before an initial determination, before a

7 hearing and before a final agency determination, attempts to ignore the City's rights and strip

8 the City of its authority and property by forcing the City to use its resources to accommodate

9 faster Category C&D, even though the runway has no Runway Safety Areas to create

10 margins lor error or mechanical failure and the runway ends are less than 300 feet from

I I family homes.

12 This coercion is both unlawful under the Tenth Amendment and patently

13 unreasonable. The FAA, itself, has determined that runway safety areas are necessary and

14 appropriate for C&D aircraft. The City, as proprietor and responsible party, has determined

IS that it would be infeasible to provide such RSAs while maintaining the current usable

16 runway length, because the topography (steep drops offs at each end of the runway) and the

17 immediate proximity of long-standing residential neighborhoods make installation of 1,000

18 foot flat RSAs impracticable. The FAA has rejected City proposals to protect safety through

19 adequate RSAs and EMAS. Thus, the only way for the City to provide the margin of safety

20 intended by the FAA design standards is to ban operations by C&D aircraft.

21 If successful, the FAA's attempt, by its Interim Cease and Desist Order, to prevent

22 enforcement of the City's Ordinance and force the City to accommodate Category C&D

23 aircraft would commandeer the resources of the City to implement the FAA's regulatory

24 approach of requiring an airport proprietor to accept operations of aircraft far faster than

25 those for which the proprietor designed, built and agreed to operate its airport. In the event

26 of an overrun, the FAA's demand, if successful, would not only force the City to expend

27 emergency resources but also, more importantly, shoulder the liability risks associated with

28

]8

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 25 of 85

allowing operations of aircraft without safety measures specified by the FAA's own

2 standards. See, e.g. Gordon v Havasu Palms, 93 Cal.App.4th 244, 249 (2001).

3 Moreover, other than implementing a safety plan that reflects the FAA's standards,

4 there is no mechanism under state law by which the City can shield itself from liability. The

5 California Government Code confers immunities from liability for dangerous conditions on

6 public property but they are limited in scope and would only apply to the Airport ifits

7 runway safety measures were designed in conformity with federal runway standards. See

8 California Government Code §§ 830(a), 830.6, and 835[ establishing that cities are

9 responsible and liable for dangerous conditions on public property but may obtain statutory

10 immunity by designing and implementing safety protections]. Additionally, the FAA will

11 not assume the risks associated with accommodating faster aircraft at the Airport.

12 Thus, the Secretary's position is that pursuant to the FAA's Interim Cease and Desist

13 Order the City has no choice but to accept and shoulder the risks attendant upon

14 accommodating faster aircraft without the safety measures the FAA has designated as

15 appropriate for those aircraft. The Tenth Amendment precludes the FAA from forcing this

16 obligation upon the City.

17

18 III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD ALSO BE DENIED BECAUSE THE

19 BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS TIPS MARKEDLY IN THE CITY'S FAVOR

20 AND DENIAL WILL SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY FAVORING

21 PUBLIC SAFETY OVER INDIVIDUAL CONVENIENCE.

22

23 The Declarations of Robert Trimborn and James Hall attest to and explain the safety

24 risks at the Santa Monica Airport. In short, there are no runway safety areas. The residents

25 living within 300 feet of the runway ends are thus at risk in the event of an overrun resulting

26 from pilot error or equipment failure. And, the risk is heightened by increased usage of the

27 Airport by C&D aircraft, which travel faster and therefore require longer runway safety

28

19

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
28

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 26 of 85

areas. The risk is also increased by the Airport's location on a plateau above the surrounding

2 residential neighborhoods. Thus, landing at the Airport has been likened to landing on the

3 deck of an aircraft carrier in that there is no margin for error. But, the risks are different.

4 The Airport has no tail hook to stop planes. And, in the event an overrun, a faster aircraft

5 will not plummet into the open sea. It will crash into a dense residential neighborhood,

6 populated by families who depend upon the City for protection against overruns.

7 And it is undeniable that overruns occur. There have been two at Santa Monica

8 during the pendency of this dispute, one fatal. There was also an overrun at Santa Barbara

9 Airport last year, involving a plane which had landed at Santa Monica 13 times in the 7

10 months before the Santa Barbara accident. (Trimborn II, ~8F.)

11 At the hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order, the Court considered and

12 appeared to accept plaintiffs assertion that faster C&D category aircraft do not pose a

13 significant risk at Santa Monica Airport because C&D operations are safer than the

14 operations of slower aircraft. This assumption should receive additional consideration. All

15 humans make mistakes, arid all equipment fails. While it is true that the overruns to date at

16 Santa Monica have involved Category B aircraft and while it is true that pilots of C&D

17 aircraft may have more training or experience, those two facts do not warrant dismissal of

18 the City's safety concerns. The vast majority of operations at the Airport involve Category

19 A&B aircraft. Because those aircraft account for over 90% of the operations, it is not

20 surprising that they would be most likely to experience overruns. That likelihood does not

21 make the Airport safe for C&D operations. Though the likelihood of an overrun by a C or D

22 category aircraft may be smaller, the lower probability of a CorD aircraft overrun is

23 irrelevant to an airport like Santa Monica Airport which cannot afford even a single overrun

24 at either end of its runway. (Trim born II, ~ 6). The Category B aircraft, which overran the

25 runway at the start of this dispute, stopped at the edge of the airport property and burned up,

26 killing the passenger and pilot. A Category C or D aircraft traveling much faster and

27 weighing len times more would likely have crashed and burned in the residential
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 27 of 85

neighborhood across the street. And, as the evidence shows, C&D aircraft do overrun

2 runways. The fatal overrun at Teterboro in 2005 involved Category C aircraft which had

3 previously landed at Santa Monica Airport. (Trimborn II,~8C). This undeniable risk is

4 why the FAA's runway safety requirements apply to all airports, not just those that have

5 experienced overruns and certainly not just those which only accommodate Category A&B

6 aircraft. The risk is common to all aircraft but the federal safety requirements are more

7 demanding for category C&D aircraft because faster aircraft require greater safety margins.

8 Against this risk - a risk of both injury and death to Airport users and neighbors and a

9 risk to the City of liability that the FAA will not let it avert - the Court must weigh the

10 convenience of Airport users who wish to travel in C&D aircraft against the risk of injury

II and death to nearby residents who homes are just off the ends ofthe runway. There are

12 about 25 operations per day involving C&D aircraft. The passengers on those planes have

13 other choices. They may use other aircraft. (Trimborn I, ~~ 13 and Trimborn II, ~~ 11 to 14.)

14 The evidence shows that fractional operators make it easy for their clients to change aircraft.

15 They may use other airports in the area.

16 In ruling on this application, the public interest should be dispositive. See United

17 States v. First Nat 'l Bank, 379 U.S. 383 (1965). This means that public safety must

I 8 outweigh the federal governments concerns about the convenience of a relatively small

19 number of Airport users. To the residents living below the runway ends, this is a matter of

20 safety. not mere inconvenience. Runway overruns happen, and an overrun by a C or D

2 I aircraft at Santa Monica would threaten their lives. (See Exhibit 12) And, the City would

22 bear legal responsibility for that catastrophe. This court should protect the public interest by

23 allowing the City to enforce its Ordinance.

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OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
6

7 DATED: May 6, 2008

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CONCLUSION

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 28 of 85

3 For the forgoing reasons, the City of Santa Monica respectfully requests that this court

4 decline to issue a preliminary injunction and allow the Ordinance to go into effect to protect

5 safety during the pendency of this dispute.

OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY

SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

MARTIN T. TACHIKI

Deputy City Attorney

Attorneys for Defendant

CITY OF SANTA MONICA

22

OPPOSITION BY DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA TO

PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 29 of 85

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN IN SUPPORT OF

2 THE CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S OPPOSITION TO THE

3 APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

4

5 I, Robert Trimborn, declare that the following is true and correct based upon my

6 personal knowledge and that, if called upon to testify as a witness in any legal proceeding, I

7 could and would competently testify as set forth in this declaration.

8

9 I. I am the Acting Airport Director of the Santa Monica Municipal Airport

10 ("Airport"), and I have served as Airport Manager or Acting Airport Director continuously

11 since August of 1996. As I stated in my prior declaration in opposition to the issuance of the

12 Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), I have been involved in all aspects of the Airport's

13 management during the past twelve years, and I am familiar with all aspects of its history

14 and operation.

15 2. As part of my management duties in operating the Airport, I participate in

16 several national and regional aviation organizations such as the Southwest Chapter of the

17 American Association of Airport Executives, the American Association of Airport

18 Executives, and the Aviation Technical Advisory Committee of the Southern California

19 Association of Governments. These organizations provide updated information regarding

20 operational issues for airports like Santa Monica Municipal Airport. I also monitor the

21 aircraft that use the Airport to ensure that aircraft can safely operate within the physical

22 constraints of the Airport. Monitoring events at other airports is an important aspect of my

23 management duties since aircraft operating at other airports often become users of Santa

24 Monica's Airport.

25 3. In my prior declaration, I noted that the Airport sits on a plateau 40 feet above

26 the surrounding residential neighborhoods. As the photographs attached as Exhibit I to the

27 City's Opposition to the Application for a TRO show, homes in those neighborhoods are less

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DECLARA TION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN
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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 30 of 85

than 300 feet from both ends of the runway. Since the Airport has no runway safety areas

("RSAs") to safeguard residential neighbors or aircraft operators using Santa Monica

Airport, I have become particularly concerned about the probability of an aircraft overrun

into the nearby residential neighborhoods and Ihave monitored the incidents of aircraft

overruns at other airports to determine if there were precautionary measures that the City

could institute to prevent a catastrophic loss of life and property from an accident in Santa

Monica. My concern was reinforced when James Hall, a former Chairperson of the National

Transportation Safety Board concurred with my belief that the continued operation of

category C and 0 aircraft without adequate runway safety areas should not be permitted. See

Declaration of James Hall submitted with the City's Opposition to the Application for a

TRO.

4. Aircraft overruns at Santa Monica Airport and other airports across the country

are stark reminders that aircraft accidents can occur due to pilot error or mechanical

problems with the aircraft. The dramatic growth in category C and 0 aircraft operations at

Santa Monica Airport is a further reminder that the probability of pilot error or mechanical

problems with these aircraft are increasing. Incidents involving pilot error and aircraft

mechanical problems are not theoretical problems, but actual events that have occurred at

Santa Monica and at other airports nationwide.

5. At Santa Monica Airport, the most deadly accident occurred on November 13,

2001 when a twin engine Cessna 340A continued off the end of Runway 21, vaulted an

embankment and came to rest on an airport service road during an aborted takeoff due to

pilot error. The details are set forth in paragraph 8B below. More recently on January 13,

2008. a single engine four seat Jabiru aircraft went off the end of Runway 21, rolled down

the west slope of the Airport and came to rest on the service road. It was reported that the

pilot experienced mechanical failure on landing. The details are set forth in paragraph 8G

below.

6. While the FAA has focused on the lower probability of an aircraft in the

24

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 31 of 85

categories with faster approach speeds overrunning the Airport's runway, my review of the

2 incidents that have occurred at the Santa Monica Airport have led me to be concerned about

3 the tremendous difference in the impact if a category C and 0 aircraft, as opposed to a

4 category A or B aircraft, were to overrun the ends of the runway into the residential

5 neighborhoods. Although the two aircraft accidents at the Airport were category A aircraft,

6 the slower speeds at which they operated resulted in the aircraft remaining within the Airport

7 boundaries. With the total absence of RSAs at the Santa Monica Airport, the category C and

8 D aircraft incidents described below at other airports demonstrate that similar category C and

9 D aircraft overruns in Santa Monica would go beyond the Airport's boundaries into the

10 residential areas just off the ends of the runway. Without RSAs that meet FAA standards for

I I the aircraft fleet mix that uses the Airport or other runway safety measures to mitigate the

12 impact of pilot error or aircraft mechanical failure, the lower probabilities of a category C

13 and D aircraft overrun is not particularly relevant for an airport that cannot afford even a

14 single category CorD aircraft overrun. See Exhibit 12 the City'S Opposition to the

15 Application for a TRO.

16 7. There have also been dramatic jet aircraft runway overruns at the airports in

17 Santa Barbara, Teterboro, New Jersey and Palomar airport in Carlsbad, California - some of

18 which resulted in loss of life and substantial property damage and all of which were by the

19 same type of aircraft that use Santa Monica Airport. As the previously submitted Exhibit 12

20 illustrates, had the overruns at Teterboro and Santa Barbara occurred at the Santa Monica

21 Airport, the aircraft would have traveled a good distance into the residential neighborhoods

22 adjacent to the Airport. As the specifics of these accidents indicate, pilot error or mechanical

23 problems do occur regardless of the aircraft type or the caliber of the pilot operating the

24 aircraft.

25 8. Although a category C or 0 aircraft has not yet overrun the ends of the runway

26 at Santa Monica, my review of the National Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") reports

27 have revealed that several of the overrun accidents at other airports involved the same

28

25

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 32 of 85

aircraft models that use the Santa Monica Airport. Based on NTSB reports, overruns caused

2 by pilot error and mechanical problems occur at both air carrier and general aviation airports

3 and with both commercial and private pilots. Some of the accidents that have occurred

4 recently are:

5 A. Little Rock, Arkansas - A McDonnell Douglas MD-82 aircraft operated

6 by American Airlines overran the end of the runway on June 1, 1999 while landing during

7 severe thunderstorms. The NTSB concluded that errors made by the flight crew contributed

8 to the overrun. See Exhibit 22. a summary copy ofNTSB report DCA99AM060.

9 B. Santa Monica, California - On November 13,2001, a Cessna 340A

10 overran the end of the runway during an aborted take-off resulting in the death of two

II people. The NTSB concluded that the pilot failed to remove the control gust lock prior to

12 take-off and further failed to abort the take-off with sufficient runway remaining to stop the

13 aircraft on the runway. See Exhibit 23, a summary copy ofNTSB report LAX02FA028.

14 C. Teterboro, New Jersey - On February 2, 2005, a Challenger CL-600-

15 IA II overran the end of the runway on departure. The aircraft went through an airport

16 perimeter fence, across a six-lane highway where it struck a motor vehicle and passed

17 through a parking lot before impacting a building. The NTSB concluded that the pilot failed

18 to ensure that the aircraft was loaded within proper weight and balance limits, but still

19 attempted to take-off from the airport. See Exhibit 24, a summary copy ofNTSB report

20 DCA05MA031. The actual aircraft involved in this accident had operated previously at the

21 Santa Monica Airport on June 23, 2004.

22 D. Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois - On December 8, 2005, a Boeing

23 737-300 overran the end ofthe runway upon landing at Midway Airport. The aircraft went

24 through both a blast fence and airport perimeter fence before entering an adjacent roadway

25 where it hit a motor vehicle and killed a child in the motor vehicle. The NTSB cited several

26 factors related to the pilot's judgment and the absence of a runway safety area or other

27 aircraft arresting system to capture an aircraft overrunning the end of the runway. See

28

26

DECLARA nON OF ROBERT TRIMBORN
2

Although the Santa Monica Airport has not had an overrun from a category C

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 33 of 85

Exhibit 25, a summary copy ofNTSB report DCA06MA009.

E. McClellan-Palomar Airport, Carlsbad, California - On January 24,

3 2006, a Cessna 560 Citation overran the end of the runway on landing at the airport. The

4 NTSB found that the pilot's failure to attain a proper touchdown point during the landing and

5 approach speed contributed to the accident. Four people died in the accident. See Exhibit

6 26, a summary copy ofNTSB report SEA06MA047.

7 F. Santa Barbara, California - On June l O, 2007, a Falcon 900 overran the

8 end of the runway on departure from the airport. The airline transport rated captain of the

9 aircraft reported that the aircraft accelerated normally, but the aircraft did not respond as he

10 had expected. Although the captain decided to abort the take-off, he did not have sufficient

II remaining runway and the aircraft overran the end of the runway. Fifteen people were

12 injured in the accident. See Exhibit 27, a summary copy ofNTSB report SEA07LAI52.

13 The actual aircraft involved in this accident has operated at the Santa Monica Airport thirteen

14 times between November 15,2006 and May 5, 2007.

15 G. Santa Monica, California - Several months ago on January 13,2008, a

16 DeSousa J abiru J400 aircraft overran the end of the runway while landing at the Santa

17 Monica Airport. The pilot reported landing approximately halfway down the runway,

18 applying full brakes, but experienced brake failure three quarters of the way down the

19 runway. Three people were injured when the aircraft skidded down a 35 foot embankment.

20 See Exhibit 28, a summary copy ofNTSB report SEA08LA060.

21 9.

22 or D aircraft, many of the aircraft noted above also operate at the Santa Monica Airport. As I

23 stated above, the Challenger CL-600-lA aircraft that overran the end of the runway at airport

24 in Teterboro, New Jersey on February 2,2005 had previously been to the Santa Monica

25 Airport on June 23, 2004 and the Falcon 900 aircraft involved in the Santa Barbara incident

26 on June I O, 2007 operated at the Santa Monica Airport thirteen times between November 15,

27 2006 and May 5, 2007. Pilots of varying degrees of experience and aircraft of all types have

28

27

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 35 of 85

operations for the one year period ending in June 2000. By calendar year 2007, the number

2 of category C and D aircraft have grown to over 9000 operations, an increase of 32%.

3 12. On average 174 aircraft use the Airport on a daily basis and of that number,

4 only about 12 to 13 aircraft are either category C or D. Of the people who use the category

5 C and D aircraft. many of them are users of charter or fractional share operations that permit

6 the user to shift to other aircraft. Those charter and fractional share users are able to shift to

7 aircraft with slower approach speeds that are compatible with the Airport's Airport

8 Reference Code ("ARC") designation of B-1I. See Exhibits 16, 17 and 18, which were

9 attached to the City's Opposition to the Application for a TRO and are copies of relevant

10 information from the internet pages of three fractional share companies regarding the right to

II trade to a compliant aircraft. In the month of April 2008, there were 641 total category C

12 and D aircraft operations and 303 of those operations, or about 47.3%, were by fractional

13 share companies. As I stated in my earlier declaration, the City's Ordinance will not stop

14 any person from using the Airport.

15 13. Although the FAA has argued that the City's Ordinance would interfere with

16 the safe and efficient use of air space in the Los Angeles area by creating congestion and

17 delay for air traffic, it provided no facts to substantiate that claim. First, as stated above, the

18 individuals who use the 12 to 13 aircraft that could be affected by the Ordinance could

19 switch to aircraft that are compliant to the Airport's current ARC ofB-II. Second, airports in

20 the region have operated at much higher levels in the past and the number of aircraft that

21 could potentially be diverted from Santa Monica Airport by enforcement of the Ordinance

22 could be readily accommodated by airports in the Los Angeles area. For example, in 2007,

23 Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX") averaged about 933 aircraft per day and Van

24 Nuys Airport averaged about 513 aircraft per day. True and correct copies of the statistics

25 for LAX and Van Nuys airports from the Los Angeles World Airport's internet site are

26 attached hereto as Exhibits 30 and 31. Third, the Hawthorne Airport requested the assistance

27 of the City of Santa Monica in diverting category C and 0 aircraft to its airport since it is

28

29

DECLARATION OF ROBERT TRIMBORN
18

DECLARA nON OF ROBERT TRIMBORN

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 36 of 85

operating below its operational capacity. In January 2008, I had a conversation with the

2 operator of the Hawthorne Airport and he indicated their desire to increase the number of

3 category C and 0 operations at the Hawthorne Airport.

4 14. Some current users of Category C and 0 aircraft will undoubtedly convert to

5 compliant aircraft, but even ifnone did, the 12 to 13 aircraft that could be affected by the

6 City's Ordinance would not have a significant effect on the traffic at these two airports or air

7 traffic in the Los Angeles area. As the attached table from the internet site for Van Nuys

8 Airport shows, as recently as 1999, total operations were 598,564 which is over 200,000

9 more operations then the 2007 total operations level of394,915. A true and correct copy of

10 the operations figures shown the Van Nuys Airport internet site is attached hereto as Exhibit

I I 32. Similarly, in 1999, Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX") had total operations of

12 779. I50. which is almost over 100,000 more then the 2007 total operations level of 680,954.

13 True and correct copies of the internet pages for the operations levels at Los Angeles

14 International Airport are attached hereto as Exhibits 33 and 34. In addition, other airports in

15 the area include the facilities at Hawthorne, Torrance, Long Beach, Burbank and EI Monte.

16 It is entirely baseless for the FAA to contend that 9000 operations per year or 25 operations

17 per day would cause congestion and delay for air traffic in the Los Angeles area.

19 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and is

20 executed this 5th day of May 2008 under the laws of the United States of America and the

21 State of California in the City of Santa Monica, California.

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 37 of 85

EXHIBIT 22
DCA99MA060

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

Page 1 of 1

Page 38 of 85

NTSB Identification: DCA99MA060.

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (OMS). Please contact RecQrds

Mana~menLDivision

Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier AMERICAN AIRLINES INC

Accident occurred Tuesday, June 01, 1999 in LITTLE ROCK, AR

Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/28/2002

Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration: N215AA

Injuries: II Fatal, 45 Serious, 65 Minor, 24 Uninjured.

The full report (NTSB/AAR-01-02) is available on the NTSB Web site. See

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictnlpublictn.htm for details.

On June 1, 1999, at 2350:44 central daylight time, 1 American Airlines flight 1420, a McDonnell

Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), N215AA, crashed after it overran the end of runway 4R during

landing at Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas. Flight 1420 departed from

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, about 2240 with 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight

attendants, and 139 passengers aboard and touched down in Little Rock at 2350:20. After'

departing the end of the runway, the airplane struck several tubes extending outward from the

left edge ofthe instrument landing system (ILS) localizer array, located 411 feet beyond the end

of the runway; passed through a chain link security fence and over a rock embankment to a flood

plain, located approximately 15 feet below the runway elevation; and collided" with the structure

supporting the runway 22L approach lighting system. The captain and 10 passengers were killed;

the first officer, the flight attendants, and 105 passengers received serious or minor injuries; and

24 passengers were not injured.2 The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash

fire. Flight 1420 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)

Part 121 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as

follows:

The flight crew's failure to discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms and their

associated hazards to flight operations had moved into the airport area and the crew's failure to

ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown.

Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's (1) impaired performance resulting from

fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, (2)

continuation of the approach to a landing when the company's maximum crosswind component

was exceeded, and (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing.

Index for JuI11999 I II1d~)LQCmQnt~

031

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev _id=20001212XI8961 &key=1 5/2/2008
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 39 of 85

EXHIBIT 23
LA~~~:-g7a8-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Pllge 1 of 1

Filed 05/06/2008 Page 4(Jof 85

NTSB Identification: LAX02FA028.

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records

Management Division

14 CFR Part 91 : General Aviation

Accident occurred Tuesday, November 13, 2001 in Santa Monica, CA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/23/2003

Aircraft: Cessna 340A, registration: N2RR

Injuries: 2 Fatal.

During an aborted nighttime takeoff, the airplane continued off the end of the 4,987-foot-10ng

runway, vaulted an embankment, and impacted a guardrail on an airport service road 30 feet

below. According to the manufacturer's pilot operating handbook, the takeoff distance required

for the ambient conditions was 1,620 feet and the accelerate-stop distance was 2,945 feet.

Several witnesses reported observing the airplane traveling along the runway at an unusually

high speed, with normal engine sound, and without becoming airborne; followed by an abrupt

reduction in engine power and the sound of screeching tires. Skid marks were present on the last

1,000 feet of the runway. In the wreckage, the gust lock/control lock was found engaged in the

pilot's control column.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as

follows:

The pilot's failure to remove the control gust lock prior to takeoff and his failure to abort the

takeoff with sufficient runway remaining to stop the airplane on the runway.

Full narrative aveilsble

Index for Nov200l I Index of months

032

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsblbrief.asp?ev_id=200 ll120X02271 &key=l 5/2/2008
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 41 of 85

EXHIBIT 24
DCA05MAOJJ

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

NTSB Identification: DCA05MA031.

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records

~anagemenlI)ivision

Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter

Accident occurred Wednesday, February 02, 2005 in Teterboro, NJ

Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/1/2007

Aircraft: Bombardier CL-600-1 A 11, registration: N370V

Injuries: 4 Serious, 2 Minor, 7 Uninjured.

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm. The

Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-06/04.

On February 2,2005, about 0718 eastern standard time, a Bombardier Challenger CL-600-1All,

N370V, ran off the departure end of runway 6 at Teterboro.Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New

Jersey, at a ground speed of about 110 knots; through an airport perimeter fence; across a sixlane highway (where it struck a vehicle); and into a parking lot before impacting a building. The

two pilots were seriously injured, as were two occupants in the vehicle. The cabin aide, eight

passengers, and one person in the building received minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed

by impact forces and postimpact fire. The accident flight was an on-demand passenger charter

flight from TEB to Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois. The flight was subject to the

provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 and operated by Platinum Jet

Management, LLC (PJM), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, under the auspices of a charter management

agreement with Darby Aviation (Darby), Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Visual meteorological

conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as

follows:

the pilots' failure to ensure the airplane was loaded within weight and balance limits and their

attempt to takeoff with the center of gravity well forward of the forward takeoff limit, which

prevented the airplane from rotating at the intended rotation speed.

Contributing to the accident were: 1) PJM's conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and

airplanes) without proper Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification and its failure to .

ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements;

2) Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being

conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the

development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in

this accident; 3) the failure of the Birmingham, Alabama, FAA Flight Standards District Office

to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby's Part 135

certificate; and 4) the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and

PJM.

Index for Feb2005 I Index of months

.••. 033

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 43 of 85

EXHIBIT 25
DCA06MA009

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

Page I of I

Page 44 of 85

NTSB Identification: DCA06MA009.

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records

M~magement Division .

Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO

Accident occurred Thursday, December 08, 2005 in Chicago, IL

Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/29/2007

Aircraft: Boeing 737-700, registration: N4 71WN

Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 21 Minor, 85 Uninjured.

The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm. The

Aircraft Accident Brief number is NTSB/AAR-07/06.

On December 8, 2005, abouU914 central standard time, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 1248,

a Boeing 737-7H4, N471 WN, ran off the departure end of runway 31 center (31C) after landing

at Chicago Midway Airport (MOW), Chicago, Illinois. The airplane rolled through a blast fence,

and airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway, where it struck an automobile before

coming to a stop. A child in the automobile was killed, one automobile occupant received serious

injuries, and three other automobile occupants received minor injuries. Eighteen of the 103

airplane occupants (88 passengers, 3 flight attendants, and 2 pilots) received minor injuries, and

the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplarie was being operated under the provisions of

14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 and had departed from Baltimore/Washington

International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), Baltimore, Maryland; about 1758 eastern

standard time. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident flight,

which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as

follows:

The pilots' failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the

airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the

pilots' first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane's autobrake system distracted

them from thrust reverser usage during the challenging landing.

Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airline's 1) failure to provide its pilots with clear

and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and procedures related to

arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design of its onboard performance

computer, which did not present inherent assumptions in the program critical to pilot decision

making; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures without a familiarization period; and 4)

failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational

uncertainties. Also contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to divert to another airport

given reports that included poor braking action and a tailwind component greater than 5 knots.

Contributing to the severity of the accident was the absence of an engineering materials arresting

system. which was needed because of the limited runway safety area beyond the departure end of

runway 3 J C.

Full nl!!Ta,tiyeaYf1.ila,ble

Index for Dec2Q05 l Index.of months

.~... 03!r

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 45 of 85

EXHIBIT 26
SEA@~2l:t8-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page ~~f1gg2

NTSB Identification: SEA06MA047.

The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (OMS). Please contact Records

Management Division

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Accident occurred Tuesday, January 24, 2006 in Carlsbad, CA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/20/2007

Aircraft: Cessna 560, registration: N86CE

Injuries: 4 Fatal.

Air traffic control cleared the flightcrew for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to

runway 24, which was 4,897 feet long. The flightcrew then reported that they had the runway in

sight, cancelled their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, and executed a visual flight rules

(VFR) approach in VFR conditions to the airport. The reported winds favored a landing toward

the east, onto the opposite runway (runway 6). During the approach, after a query from the first

officer, the captain indicated to the first officer that he was going to "...land to the east,"

consistent with the reported winds. However, the final approach and subsequent landing were

made to runway 24; which produced a six-knot tailwind. During the approach sequence the

captain maintained an airspeed that was approximately 30 knots higher than the correct airspeed

for the aircraft's weight, resulting in the aircraft touching down about 1,500 feet further down the

runway than normal, and much faster than normal. The captain then delayed the initiation of a

go-around until the first officer asked if they were going around. Although the aircraft lifted off

the runway surface prior to departing the paved overrun during the delayed go-around it

impacted a localizer antenna platform, whose highest non-frangible structure was located

approximately 304 feet past the end of the runway, and approximately two feet lower than the

terrain at the departure end of the runway. The aircraft continued airborne as it flew over

downsloping terrain for about 400 more feet before colliding with the terrain and a commercial

storage building that was located at an elevation approximately 80 feet lower than the terrain at

the end of the runway. The localizer antenna platform was located outside of the designated

runway safety area, and met all applicable FAA siting requirements. The captain had type 2

diabetes, for which he took oral medication and monitored blood sugar levels. He did not reveal

his history of diabetes to the FAA. The captain's post-accident toxicology testing was consistent

with an elevated average blood sugar level over the previous several months; however, no

medical records of the captain's treatment were available, and the investigation could not

determine if the captain's diabetes or treatment were potentially factors in the accident. The

captain of the accident flight was the sole owner of a corporation that was asked by the two

owners of the accident airplane to manage the airplane for them under a Part 91 business flight

operation. The two owners were not pilots and had no professional aviation experience, but they

desired to be flown to major domestic airports so that they could transfer and travel

internationally via commercial airlines. One ofthe two owners stated that the purpose of the

accident flight was to fly a businessman to a meeting, and to also transport one of the owner's

wives to visit family at the same destination. According to one of the owners, the businessman

was interested in being a third owner in the accident airplane, so the owner permitted the

businessman to fly. The owner also stated that the accident pilot told him that the passenger

would pay for expenses directly related to the operation of the airplane for the flight (permitted

under FAA Part 91 rules), and an "hourly fee" (prohibited under FAA Part 91 rules); however,

no documentation was found to corroborate this statement for the accident flight or previous

flights.

.." 0 35

http://www .ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev _id=20060202X00149&key= 1 5/2/2008
SEAD6MA047

-Case- 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as

follows:

The captain's delayed decision to execute a balked landing (go-around) during the landing roll.

Factors contributing to the accident include the captain's improper decision to land with a

tailwind, his excessive airspeed on final approach, and his failure to attain a proper touchdown

point during landing.

Full narrative available

..• 036

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 48 of 85

EXHIBIT 27
SEA07LA152

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

Page 1 of2

Page 49 of 85

NTSB Identification: SEA07LA152

14 CFR Part 91 : General Aviation

Accident occurred Sunday, June 10, 2007 in Santa Barbara, CA

Aircraft: Dassault-Breguet Mystere Falcon 900, registration: N914DD

Injuries: 15 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this

report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On June 10,2007, approximately 1412 Pacific daylight time, N914DD, registered as a DassaultBreguet Mystere Falcon 900, was substantially damaged when it overran the departure end of

Runway 25 on take-off roll at the Santa Barbara Municipal Airport, Santa Barbara, California.

The airplane was registered to Kerry Acquisitions LLC, of Concord, Massachusetts, and

operated by Trishan Air, of Santa Barbara. The airline transport rated captain, airline transport

rated pilot acting as first officer/co-pilot (Fa), and 13 passengers were not injured. Visual

meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 CFR Part 91 business flight, and an instrument

flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. '

In a telephone interview with the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC), the captain, who was acting

as the pilot-in-command, reported that during the take-offroll the airplane accelerated normally.

The captain stated that as the airplane accelerated the co-pilot, verbalized "VI" and shortly

thereafter "rotate." The captain further stated that immediately after "rotate" was verbalized he

applied back pressure on the control column, "...but the nose wouldn't come up. I continued to

pull back on the yoke until it was all the way back in my chest, but there was still no response.

The nose wouldn't come off the ground." The captain reported that he then rejected the takeoff

but was unable to stop the airplane on the remaining available runway, which resulted in the

aircraft overrunning the end of Runway 25, coming to rest slightly off the extended centerline

about 300 feet from the departure end. Company maintenance personnel, who examined the

airplane shortly after the occurrerice, reported that the airplane had sustained substantial damage

to the forward section of the pressure vessel, just aft of where the nose landing gear is attached;

the nose landing gear had separated during the overrun.

At the request of the lIC, Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) inspectors from the Van Nuys

Flight Standards District Office, Van Nuys, California, will provide oversight supervision during

an examination of the airplane by representatives from Dassault-Breguet, in an effort to identify

the origin of the anomaly.

.••., 037

http://www .ntsb.gov/ntsblbriefasp?ev jd=20070616X00749&key=I 5/2/2008
SEAD7LA15')

- Case 2:rr8-cv-02695-GW-E

Index for J\ln2007 I Indexofmonths

Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008

http://www .ntsb. gOY/ntsb/brief.asp?ev jd=20070616X007 49&key= 1 5/2/2008
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 51 of 85

EXHIBIT 28
SEA08LA060

Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

Page 1 of 1

Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 52 of 85

NTSB Identification: SEA08LA060

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Accident occurred Sunday, January 13,2008 in Santa Monica, CA

Aircraft: DeSousa Jabiru J400, registration: N522RJ

Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this

report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On January 13, 2008, at 1720 Pacific standard time, an experimental DeSousa Jabiru J400

airplane, N522RJ, overran runway 21 during landing at the Santa Monica Airport, Santa Monica,

California. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the pilot, the owner and operator of the

airplane, and the two passengers, were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed

for the cross-country flight conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane

departed Catalina Island, California, approximately 35 minutes prior to the accident. Santa

Monica was the pilot's intended destination and no flight plan was filed.

During a telephone .conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-incharge, the pilot reported the airplane touched down approximately halfway down the runway.

He reported that he applied full brakes, however, approximately three quarters the way down the

runway, the brakes failed and the airplane overran the runway. After exiting the runway, the

airplane collided with a concrete ditch and skidded down a 35-foot embankment.

http://www .ntsb.gov/ntsblbrief.asp?ev _id=20080213X00179&key=1 5/2/2008

03q
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05106/2008 Page 53 of 85

EXHIBIT 29
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

U.S. Department

of Transportation

Federal Aviation

Administration

Filed 05/06/2008 Page 54 of 85

Advisory

Circular

Subject: Engineered Materials Arresting Systems

(EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns

AC No: 150/5220-22A

Change:

I. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (Ae) contains

standards for the planning, design, installation, and

maintenance of Engineered Materials Arresting

Systems (EMAS) in runway safety areas (RSA).

Engineered Materials means high energy absorbing

materials of selected strength,. which will reliably and

predictably crush under the weight of an aircraft.

2. CANCELLA TlON. This AC cancels AC

150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems

(EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns, dated August 28, 1998.

3. BACKGROUND. Aircraft can and do overrun

the ends of runways, sometimes with devastating

results. An overrun occurs when an aircraft passes

beyond the end of a runway during an aborted takeoff

or while landing. Data on aircraft overruns over a 12-

. year period (1975 to 1987) indicate that approximately

90% of all overruns occur at exit speeds of 70 knots or

less (Reference 7, Appendix 4) and most come to rest

between the extended runway edges within 1000 feet of

the runway end (Reference 6, Appendix 4).

To minimize the hazards of overruns, the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) incorporated the

concept of a safety area beyond the runway end into

airport design standards. To meet the standards, the

safety area must be capable, under normal (dry)

conditions, of supporting the occasional passage of

aircraft that overrun the runway without causing

structural damage to the aircraft or injury to its

occupants. The safety area also provides greater

accessibility for emergency equipment after an overrun

incident. There are many runways, particularly those

constructed prior to the adoption of the safety area

standards, where natural obstacles, local development,

andlor environmental constraints, make the

construction of a standard safety area impracticable.

There have been accidents at some of these airports

where the ability to stop an overrunning aircraft within

Date: 9/30/2005

Initiated by: AAS-I 00

the runway safety area would have prevented major

damage to aircraft and/or injuries to passengers.

Recognizing the difficulties associated with achieving a

standard safety area at all airports, the FAA undertook

research programs on the use. of various materials for

arresting systems. These research programs, as well as,

evaluation of actual aircraft overruns into an EMAS

have demonstrated its effectiveness in arresting aircraft

overruns.

4. APPLICATION. Runway safety area standards

cannot be modified or waived. The standards remain in

effect regardless of the presence of natural or manmade objects or surface conditions that might create a

hazard to aircraft that overrun the end of a runway. A

continuous evaluation of all practicable alternatives for

improving each sub-standard RSA is required. FAA

Order 5200.8, Runway Safety Area Program, explains

the evaluation process.

FAA Order 5200.9, Financial Feasibility and

Equivalency of Runway Safety Area Improvements and

Engineered Material Arresting Systems, is used in

connection with FAA Order 5200.8 to determinet he

best practicable and financially feasible alternative for

an RSA improvement.

The FAA does not require an airport sponsor to reduce.

the length of a runway or declare its length to be less

than the actual pavement length to meet runway safety

area standards if there is an operational impact to the

airport. An example of an operational impact would be

an airport's inability to accommodate its current or

planned aircraft fleet. Under these circumstances,

installing an EMAS is another way of enhancing safety.

A standard EMAS provides a level of safety that is

generally equivalent to a full RSA built to the

dimensional standards in AC 150/5300-13, Airport

Design. It also provides an acceptable level of safety

for undershoots.

••••• i O~G
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

AC 150/5220-22A

The FAA recommends the guidelines and standards in

this AC for the design of EM AS. In general, this AC is

not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. It

is issued for guidance purposes and to outline a method

of compliance. However, use of these guidelines is

mandatory for an airport sponsor installing an EMAS

funded under Federal grant assistance programs or on

an airport certificated under Title 14 Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) Part 139, Certification of Airports.

Mandatory terms such as "shall" or "must" used herein

apply only to those who seek to demonstrate

compliance by use of the specific method described by

this AC.

If an airport sponsor elects to follow an alternate

method, the alternate method must have been

determined by the FAA to be an acceptable means of

complying with this AC, the runway safety area

standards in AC 150/5300-/3, and 14 CFR Part 139.

5. RELATED READrNG MATERIAL.

Appendix 4, Related Reading Material, contains a list

of documents with supplemental material relating to

EMAS. These documents contain information on

materials evaluated, as well as design, construction, and

testing procedures utilized. Testing and data generated

under these FAA studies may be used as input to an

EMAS design without additional justification.

6. PLANNING CHARTS. The figures included in

Appendix 2, Planning Charts, are for planning purposes

only. They are intended as a preliminary screening tool

and are not sufficient for final design. Final design

must be customized for each installation. The figures

illustrate estimated EMAS stopping distance

capabilities for various aircraft types. The design used

in each chart is optimized specifically for the aircraft

noted on the chart. Charts are based on standard design

conditions, i.e. 75-foot set-back, no reverse thrust, and

poor braking (0.25 braking friction coefficient).

a. Example 1. Assume a runway with a DC-9

(or similar) as the design aircraft. Figure A2-1 shows

that an EMAS 400 feet in length (including a 75-foot

set-back) is capable of stopping a DC-9 within the

confines of the system at runway exit speeds of up to

75 knots.

b. Example 2. Assume the same runway, but

assume the design aircraft is a DC-1O (or similar).

Figure A2-2 shows an EMAS of the same length, but

designed for larger aircraft, can stop the DC-I 0 within

the confines of the system at runway exit speeds of up

to 62 knots.

7. PRELIMINARY PLANNING. Follow the

guidance in FAA Orders 5200.8 and 5200.9 to

Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 55 of 85

9/30/2005

determine practicable, financially feasible alternatives

for RSA improvements. Additional cost and

performance information for EMAS options to consider

in the analysis can be obtained from the EMAS

manufacturer.

8. SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. For

purposes of design, the EMAS can be considered fixed

by its function and frangible since it is designed to fail

at a specified impact load. An aircraft arresting system

such as EMAS is exempt from the requirements of 14

CFR Part 77, Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace.

When EMAS is the selected option to upgrade a

runway safety area, it is considered to meet the safety

area requirements of 14 CFR Part /39. The following

system design requirements must prevail for all EMAS

installations:

a. Concept. An EMAS is designed to stop an

overrunning aircraft by exerting predictable

deceleration forces on its landing gear as the EMAS

material crushes. It must be designed to minimize the

potential for structural damage to aircraft, since such

damage could result in injuries to passengersandlor

affect the predictability of deceleration forces. An

EMAS should be design for a 20-year service life.

b. Location. An EMAS is located beyond the

end of the runway and centered on the extended

runway centerline. It will usually begin at some

setback distance from the end of the runway to avoid

damage due to jet blast and undershoots (Figure A 1-2,

Appendix 1). This distance will vary depending on the

available area and the EMASmaterials. Where the area

available is longer than required for installation of a

standard EMAS designed to stop the design aircraft at

an exit speed of 70 knots, the EMAS should be placed

as far from the runway end as practicable. Such

placement decreases the possibility of damage to the

system from short overruns or undershoots and results

in a more economical system by considering the

deceleration capabilities of the existing runway safety

area.

The resulting runway safety area must provide adequate

protection for aircraft that touch down prior to the

runway threshold (undershoot). Adequate protection is

provided by either: (I) providing at least 600 feet (or

the length of the standard runway safety area,

whichever is less) between the runway threshold and

the far end of the EMAS bed if the approach end of the

runway has vertical guidance or (2) providing the full

length standard runway safety area when no vertical

guidance is provided.

An EMAS is not intended to meet the definition of a

stopway as provided in AC 150/5300-13. The runway
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

9/30/2005

safety area and runway object free area lengths begin at

a runway end when a stopway is not provided. When a

stopway is provided, these lengths begin at the stopway

end (AC 150/5300-13).

The airport sponsor, EMAS manufacturer, and the

appropriate FAA Regional Airports Division! Airport

District Office (ADO) should consult regarding the

EMAS location to determine the appropriate location

beyond the end of the runway for the EMAS

installation for a specific runway.

c. Design Method. An EMAS design must be

supported by a validated design method that can predict

the performance of the system. The design (or critical)

aircraft is defined as that aircraft using the associated

runway that imposes the greatest demand upon the

EMAS. This is usually, but not always, the

heaviest/largest aircraft that regularly uses the runway.

EMAS performance is dependent not only on aircraft

weight, but landing gear configuration and tire

pressure. In general, use the maximum take-off weight

(MTOW) for the design aircraft. However, there may

be instances where less than the MTOW will require a

longer EMAS. All configurations should be considered

in optimizing the EMAS design. To the extent

practicable, however, the EMAS design should

consider both the aircraft. that imposes the greatest

demand upon the EMAS and the range of aircraft

expected to operate on the runway. In some instances,

this composite design aircraft may be preferable to

optimizing the EMAS for. a single design aircraft.

Other factors unique to a particular airport, such as

available RSA and air cargo operations, should also be

considered in the final design. The airport sponsor,

EMAS manufacturer, and the appropriate FAA

Regional Airports Division!ADO should consult

regarding the selection of the design aircraft that will

optimize the EMAS for a specific airport.

The design method must be derived from field or

laboratory tests. Testing may be based either on

passage of an actual aircraft or an equivalent single

wheel load through a test bed. The design must

consider multiple aircraft parameters, including but not

limited to allowable aircraft gear loads, gear

configuration, tire contact pressure, aircraft center of

gravity, and aircraft speed. The model must calculate

imposed aircraft gear loads, g-forces on aircraft

occupants, deceleration rates, and stopping distances

within the arresting system. Any rebound of the

crushed material that may lessen its effectiveness must

also be considered.

d. Operation. The EMAS must be a passive

system.

Filed 05/06/2008 Page 56 of 85

AC 150/5220-22A

e. Width. The minimum width of the EMAS must

be the width of the runway (plus any sloped area as

necessary--see 8 (h) below).

f. Base. The EMAS must be constructed on a

paved surface capable of supporting the occasional

passage of the critical design aircraft using the runway

and fully loaded Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting

(ARFF) vehicles without deformation of the base

surface or structural damage to the aircraft or vehicles.

It must be designed to perform satisfactorily under all

local weather, temperature, and soil conditions. It must

provide sufficient support to facilitate removal of the

aircraft from the EMAS. Full strength runway

pavement is not required. Pavement suitable for

shoulders and blast pads is suitable as an EMAS base.

AC 150/5300-13 provides recommendations on

pavement for shoulders and blast pads. State highway

specifications may also be used.

g. Entrance Speed. To the maximum extent

possible, the EMAS must be designed to decelerate the

design aircraft expected to use the runway at exit

speeds of 70 knots (approach category C and D

aircraft) without imposing loads that exceed the

aircraft's design limits, causing major structural

damage to the aircraft or imposing excessive forces on

its occupants. Contact the FAA's Airport Engineering

Division (AAS-IOO) at 202-267-7669 for guidance

when other than approach category C and D aircraft is

proposed for the EMAS design. Standard design

. conditions are no reverse thrust and poor braking (0.25

braking friction coefficient).

Generally, when there is insufficient RSA available for

a standard EMAS, the EMAS must be designed to

achieve the maximum deceleration of the design

aircraft within the available runway safety area.

However, a 40-knot minimum exit speed should be

used for the design of a non-standard EMAS. For

design purposes, assume the aircraft has all of its

landing gear inf ull contact with the runway and is

traveling within the confines of the runway and parallel

to the runway centerline upon overrunning the runway

end.

The airport sponsor, EMAS manufacturer, and the

appropriate FAA Regional Airports Division! ADO

should consult regarding the selection of the

appropriate design entrance speed for the EMAS

installation.

Note that current EMAS models are not as accurate for

aircraft with a maximum take-off weight less than

25,000 pounds.

3

...• 042
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

AC 150/5220-22A

h. Aircraft Evacuation. The EMAS must be

designed to enable safe ingress and egress as well as

movement of ARFF equipment (not necessarily without

damage to the EMAS) operating during an emergency.

If the EMAS is to be built above existing grade, sloped

areas sufficient to allow the entrance of ARFF vehicles

from the front and sides must be provided. Provision

for access from the back ofthe EMAS maybe provided

if desirable. Maximum slopes must be based on the

EMAS material and performance characteristics of the

airport's ARFF equipment.

i, Maintenance Access. The EMAS must be

capable of supporting regular pedestrian traffic for the

purposes of maintenance of the arresting material and

co-located navigation aids without damage to the

surface of the EMAS bed. An EMAS is not intended to

support vehicular traffic for maintenance purposes.

j. Undershoots. The EMAS must not cause

control problems for aircraft undershoots which touch

down in the EMAS bed. Fulfillment of this

requirement may be based exclusively on flight

simulator tests. The tests will establish the minimum

material strength and density that does not cause

aircraft control problems during an undershoot.

Materials whose density and strength exceeds these

minimums will be deemed acceptable.

k, Navigation Aids. The EMAS must be

constructed to accommodate approach lighting

structures and other approved facilities within its

boundaries. It must not cause visual or electronic

interference with any air navigation aids. All

navigation aids within the EMAS must be frangible as

required by 14 CFR Part 139. To meet the intent of this

regulation, approach light standards must be designed

to fail at two points. The first point of frangibility must

be three inches or less above the top ofthe EMAS bed.

The second point of frangibility must be three inches or

less above the expected residual depth of the EMAS

bed after passage of the design aircraft. As a part of the

EMAS design, the EMAS manufacturer must provide

the expected residual depth to allow the determination

of this second frangibility point.

I. Drainage. The EMAS must be designed to

prevent water from accumulating on the surface of the

EMAS bed, the runway or the runway safety area. The

removal and disposal of water, which may hinder any

activity necessary for the safe and efficient operation of

the airport, must be in accordance with AC )50/5320-5,

Airport Drainage.

The EMAS design must consider ice accumulation

and/or snow removal lirnitations/requirementsd ictated

by the project locale. Requirements/limitations must be

4

Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 57 of 85

9/30/2005

addressed in the approved inspection and maintenance

program discussed in paragraph 14 and Appendix 3.

m. Jet Blast. The EMAS must be designed and

constructed so that it will not be damaged by expected

jet blast.

n. Repair. The EMAS must be designed for

repair to a usable condition within 45 days of an

overrun by the design aircraft at the design entrance

speed. Note that this is a design requirement only.

An EIytAS bed damaged due to an incident

(overrun/undershoot, etc.) must be repaired in a timely

manner. The undamaged areas of the EMAS bed must

be protected from further damage until the bed is

repaired.

9. MATERIAL QUALlF:ICA TION. The material

comprising the EMAS must have the following

requirements and characteristics:

a. Material Strength and Deformation

Requirements. Materials must meet a force vs.

deformation profile within limits having been shown to

assure uniform crushing characteristics, and therefore,

predictable response to an aircraft entering the arresting

system.

b. Material Characteristics. The materials

comprising the EMAS must:

(1) Be water-resistant to the extent that the

presence of water does not affect system performance.

(2) Not attract vermin, birds, wildlife or other

creatures.

(3) Be non-sparking.

(4) Be non-flammable.

(5) Not promote combustion.

(6) Not emit toxic or malodorous fumes in a

tire environment after installation.

(7) Not support unintended plant growth with

proper application of herbicides.

(8) Exhibit constant strength and density

characteristics during all climatic conditions within a

temperature range appropriate for the locale.

(9) Be resistant to deterioration due to:

(a) Salt.

..•.. 043
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

9/30/2005

(b) Approved aircraft and runway

deicing fluids.

(c) Aircraft fuels, hydraulic fluids, and

lubricating oils.

(d) UV resistant.

(e) Water.

(I) Freeze/thaw.

(g) Blowing sand and snow.

(h) Paint.

10. Material Conformance Requirements. An

EMAS manufacturer must establish a material sampling

and testing program to verify that all materials are in

conformance' with the initial approved material force

versus deformation profile established under paragraph

9.a. Materials failing to meet these requirements

must not be used.

The initial sampling and testing program must be

submitted to and approved by the FAA, Office of

Airport Safety and Standards for each design method

found by the FAA to be an acceptable means of

complying with this AC. Once approved, the program

may be used for subsequent projects.

II. DESIGN PROPOSAL SUBMITTAL. The

EMAS design must be prepared by the design engineer

and the EMAS manufacturer for the airport sponsor.

The airport sponsor must submit the EMAS design

through the responsible FAA Airports Region/District

Office, to the FAA, Office of Airport Safety and

Standards, for review and approval. The EMAS design'

must be certified as meeting all the requirements of this

AC and the submittal must include all design

assumptions and data utilized in its development as

well as proposed construction procedures and

techniques. The EMAS design must be submitted at

least 45 days prior to the bid opening date for the

project.

12. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAM. A

construction quality assurance program must be

implemented to ensure that installation/construction is

in accordance with the approved EMAS design. The

construction contractor and EMAS manufacturer

prepare the construction QA program for the airport

sponsor. The airport sponsor must submit the

construction QA program to the responsible FAA

Airports RegionlDistrict Office for approval 14 days

prior to the project notice to proceed.

Filed 05/0612008 Page 58 of 85

AC 150/5220·22A

13. MARKING. An EMAS must be marked with

yellow chevrons as an area unusable for landing,

takeoff, and taxiing in accordance with AC 150/5340-1,

Standards for Airport Markings. Paint application

should be in accordance with the EMAS

manufacturers' recommendations for the EMAS

system.

14. INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE. The

EMAS manufacturer must prepare an inspection and

maintenance program for the airport sponsor for each

EMAS installation. The airport sponsor must submit

the program to the responsible. FAA Airports

RegionlDistrict Office for approval prior to final

project acceptance. The airport sponsor must

implement the approved inspection and maintenance

program. The program must include any necessary

procedures for inspection, preventive maintenance and

unscheduled repairs, particularly to weatherproofing

layers. Procedures must be sufficiently detailed to

allow maintenance/repair of the EMAS bed with the

airport sponsor's staff. The program must include

appropriate records to verify that all required

inspections and maintenance have been performed by

the airport sponsor and/or EMAS manufacturer .. These

records must be made available to the FAA upon

request. Appendix 3, Inspection and Maintenance

Program, outlines the basic requirements ofan EMAS

inspection and maintenance program.

Airport personnel must be notified that the EMAS is

designed to fail under load and that precautions should

be taken when activities require personnel to be on, or

vehicles and personnel to be near, the EMAS.

15. AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING

(ARFF).

a. Access. As required by paragraph 8 (h), an

EMAS is designed to allow movement of typical ARFF

equipment operating during an emergency. However,

as the sides of the system are typically steeply sloped,

and the system will be severely rutted after an aircraft

arrestment, ARFF vehicles so equipped should be

shifted into all-wheel-drive prior to entering and

maneuvering upon an EMAS. .

b. Tactics. Any fire present after the arrestment

of an aircraft will be three-dimensional due to the

rutting and breakup of the EMAS material. A dualagent attack and/or other tactics appropriate to this type

of fire should be employed.

16. NOTIFICATION. Upon installation of an

EMAS, its length, width, and location must be included

as a remark in the AirportlFacility Directory (AFD).

To assure timely publication, the airport sponsor must

5
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Page 59 of 85

AC 150/5220-22A

forward the required information to the FAA

Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) as soon as

possible, but not later than the "cut-off' dates listed in

the AFD, for publication on the desired effective date.

(The AIS address and cut-off dates are listed on the

inside front cover of the AFD.) The airport sponsor

must also notify the appropriate FAA Regional Airports

Division! ADO.

The following is an example of a typical entry:

DA VlD L. BENNETT

Director of Airport Safety and Standards

Filed 05/06/2008

913012005

• "Engineered Materials Arresting System,

400'L x l50'W, located at departure end of

runway 16."

When an EMAS is damaged due to an overrun or

determined to be less than fully serviceable, a Notice to

Airmen (NOTAM) must be issued to alert airport

users of the reduced performance of the EMAS.
o

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THE RUNWAY PLUS ANY SLOPED AREA ALONG

THE SIDES REQUIRED FOR SAFE IHGRESSIEGRESS

AND MOVEMalT OF ARFF EQUlf'MENT OPERATING

DURING AN EMERGENCY.

&THE EMAS BED IS DESIGNED TO STOP THE OESlGH AIRCRAFT

THAT EXITS THE ENOOF THE RUNWAY TRAVEUNG

AT ro KNOTS.

FIGURE AI-I. STANDARD EMAS INSTALLATION PROVIDES A LEVEL OF SAFETY THAT IS GENERALLY

EQUIVALENT TO A STANDARD RUNWAY SAFETY AREA (RSA).

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 61 of 85

AC 150/5220-22A

Appendix I

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NO REVERSE THRUST & POOR BRAKING

90

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

AC 150/5220-22A

Appendix 2

Page intentionally left blank.

A2-8

Filed 05/06/2008 Page 69 of 85

9/30/2005

" 055
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 70 of 85

9/3012005 AC 150/5220-22A

Appendix 3

APPENDIX 3. INSPECTION AND MAINTENACE PROGRAM.

An inspection and maintenance program,p repared by the EMAS manufacturer, will be submitted to and approved by the

fAA Regional/Airports District Office. The Airport sponsor must implement the approved inspection and maintenance

program. As a minimum, a basic EMAS inspection and maintenance program must address the following areas:

1. General information on the EMAS bed including

• A description of the EMAS bed

• Material description

• Contact information for the EMAS manufacturer

2. Inspection requirements including:

• Type and frequency of required inspections

• Training of personnel

• Instructions on how to conduct each inspection

• List of typical problems and possible solutions

• Required documentation for inspections

• I nspection forms

3. Maintenance and repair procedures including:

• List of approved materials and tools

Description of repair procedures for typical damage to an EMAs bed such as repairing depressions/holes,

abrasion damage, replacing a damaged block, repairing coatings, caulking/joint repair, etc.

4. Any unique requirements due to location such as snow removal requirements and methods. Identify compatible

deicing agents. Specify snow removal equipment that is compatible with the EMAS bed and recommended clearing

procedures and/or limitations.

5. Warranty information

A3-1

056
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

AC 150/5220-22A

Appendix 3

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A3-2

Filed 05/06/2008 Page 71 of 85

9130/2005

" 057
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 72 of 85

9/30/2005 AC 15015220-22A

Appendix 4

APPENDIX 4. RELATED READING MATERIAL.

This appendix contains a listing of documents with supplemental material relating to the subject of EMAS. These

documents contain certain information on materials evaluated as well as design, construction, and testing procedures

utilized to date. These publications may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS),

Springfield, VA 22151.

1. DOT/FAA/PM-87/27, Soft Ground Arresting Systems, Final Report, Sept. I986-Aug. 1987, published Aug. 1987

by R.F. Cook, Universal Energy Systems, Inc., Dayton, OH.

2. 2. DOT/FAA/CT-93/4, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Commercial Aircraft. Interim Report. Feb. 1993 by

Robert Cook.

3. DOT IF AA/CT -93/80, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Airports, Final Report, Dec. 1993 by Jim White, Satish K.

Agrawal. and Robert Cook.

4. DOT,'F AAI AOV 90-1, Location of Commercial Aircraft Accidents/Incidents Relative to Runways, July 1990.

5. UDR-TR-88-07, Evaluation of a Foam Arrestor Bed for Aircraft Safety Overrun Areas, 1988 by Cook, R.F.,

University of Dayton Research Institute, Dayton, OH.

M-I

05&
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15

AC 150/5220-22A

Appendix 4

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A4-2

Filed 05/06/2008 Page 73 of 85

9/30/2005

Ojq
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 74 of 85

EXHIBIT 30
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 75 of 85

Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA)

Traffic Comparison (TeOM)

Los Angeles International Airport

December 2007 Calendar YTD December

..--.__ ......._----_.~-_..

2007 2006 %Change 2007 2006 % Change

Passenger Traffic Totals

Dorrestic 3.633,704 3.687,799 -1.47% 44,732,810 44.129.926 1.37%

International 1,456.168 1,384,533 5.17% 17,163,265 16,910,748 1.49%

._--------_ ..-. _._-------

Total 5,089,872 5,072,332 0.35% 61,896,075 61,040,674 1.40%

Domestic Passengers

Scheduled Carriers 3,290,869 3,360,849 -2.08% 40,875,515 40,256,824 1.5%

Corrrruter Carriers 339,270 323,534 4.86% 3,830,943 3,840,656 -0.3%

O1arter Carriers 3,565 3,416 4.36% 26,352 32,446 -18.8%

Totals 3.633,704 3,687,799 . -1.47% 44,732.810 44,129.926 1.37%

International Passengers

Tom Bradley inti 756,929 708,831 6.79% 9,193,010 9,028,075 1.83%

Terrrinal2 320.378 326.835 -1.98% 3,851.891 3,860,728 -0.23%

Terrrinal4 119,498 107,203 11.47% 1,324,111 1,308,144 1.22%

Terrrinal7 89.729 72.661 23.49% 838,790 896,238 -6.41%

Terrrinal5 75,971 74.107 2.52% 829,393 708,286 17.10%

All Other Terrrinals 93,663 94,896 -1.30% 1,126,070 1,109,277 1.51%

._. -- _.~.•._._-_._--------- ------_. __ .-

Totals 1,456,168 1,384,533 5.17% 17,163,265 16,910,748 1.49%

US Customs Arrivals

Tom Bradley ~tl 401,864 385,683 4.20% 5,246,231 5,081,738 3.24%

Terrrinal2 115,145 124,300 -7.37% 1,416,674 1,498,516 -5.46%

Terrrinal4 86,998 69,051 25.99% 844,712 817,436 3.34%

Termnal7 47.383 41,093 15.31% 462,558 493,901 -6.35%

Terrrinal5 41,684 28,956 43.96% 459,411 355,915 29.08%

-.-.------_ .._---.-- ------_._--_._----_ .._-------"-----.--

Totals 693.07_4 649.083 6.78% 8,429,586 8,247,506 2.21%

Air Cargo (Tons)

Mail 7,181 6,983 2.82% 76,093 78,871 -3.52%

Freight 160.826 171,853 -6.42% 2,001,434 2,024,089 -1.12%

--_._._-_ ..•. ------.------------------- _ ..--------- - -_._------~._--- ---

Total 168,007 178,837 -6.06% 2,077.527 2,102,960 -1.21%

FAA Aircraft Movement

Air Carrier 38,773 39,565 -2.00% 467,193 463,341 0.83%

Air Taxi 17,959 15.045 19.37% 193,930 174,745 10.98%

General Aviation 1,645 1,339 22.85% 17,217 16,142 6.66%

Mlttary 160 149 7.38% 2,614 2,614 0.00% '0' • ________ ..__ - .._----_. __ .---_.._--_._--

Total 58,537 56,098 4.35% 680,954 656,842 3.67%

060
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008· Page 76 of 85

EXHIBIT 31
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E

Passenger Traffic Totals

Dorrestic

International

Total

Domestic Passengers

Scheduled Carriers

ColTTT1JterCarriers

Charter Carriers

Totals

International Passengers

All Other Terrrinals

Totals

US Customs Arrivals

Totals

Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 77 of 85

Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA)

Traffic Comparison (TeOM)

Van Nuys Airport

December 2007

------_.

2007 2006 "Change'

0 100.00%

0 0 0.00%

.._'-_._~._------

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

..._--_._-~-----_._-+.-----_._._._.~--.---_.-

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

Air Cargo (Tons)

Mail 0 0 0.00%

Freight 0 0 200.00%

.._-~----_._---

Total 0 0 200.00%

FAA Aircraft Movement

Air Carrier 0 0 0.00%

Air Taxi 1.157 1.273 -9.11%

General Aviation 27.052 27,415 -1.32%

Mlilary 12 24 -50.00% ..... __ ._.- .._ ..-.__ ..•.._.--

Total 28,221 28,712 -1.71%

Calendar YTD December

2007 2006 "Change

99 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 99 -100.00%

0 0 0.0%

0 0 0.0%

0 99 -100.0%

0 99 -100.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

0 0 0.00%

o

8

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8 8 3.60%

o 0 0.00%

15,931 16,157 -1.40%

358,255 378,026 -5.23%

278 732 -62.02%

... -------_ .._-- _ ..._-------- ----

374,464 394,915 -5.18%

.1-:1 061
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 78 of 85

EXHIBIT 32
WWW.LA WA.ORGIV!\Y - Van Nuys Base Aircraft

VNY

news & airport facts

:- Statistics> BasedAircraft> Total Operation History

maps

information VAN NUYS AIRPORT

quick department links TOTAL OPERATIONS HISTORY

projects

Listed below is an account of the total flight operations conducted at the Van Nuys Airport.

YEARS TOTAL OPERATIONS YEARS TOTAL OPERATIONS

1949 70,275* 1979 600,953

1950 110,214 1980 540,560

1951 125,839 1981 558,918

1952 123,867 1982 507,758

1953 "133,222 1983 494,273

1954 131,303 1984 575,271

1955 144,661 1985 492,382

1956 194,821 1986 477,689

1957 218,401 1987 476,627

1958 191,671 1988 468,779

, 1959 215,720 1989 507,003

~•

1960 228,132 1990 528,110

1961 281,336 1991 509,620

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1962 320,993 1992 520,468 oQ)

1963 341,684 1993 514,320 (JlCD

386,063 1994 486,584

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1969 526,230 1999 598,564 ~I

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1970 575,784 2000 483,365

1971 562,030 2001 456,778 0

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1976 618,694 2006 400,398 11

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1978 601,230 2008

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 1Q Filed 05/06/2008 Page 81 of 85

EXHIBIT 33
WWW.LAWA.ORG/LAX- 10 Year Summary

f4Qs

:- Statistic> Ten Year Summary> FAAAircraft Movements

Air Carrier Air Taxi Military General Total Aviation

1993 408,043 212,592 14,784 47,027 682,446

1994 418,166 214,473 14,213 43,036 689,888

1995 472,134 230,997 3,178 26,330 732,639

1996 502,056 233,832 3,262 24,716 763,866

1997 524,035 227,479 3,572 26,406 781,492

1998 525,089 219,123 3,326 26,031 773,569

1999 542,082 215,886 2,646 18,536 779,150

2000 565,805 198,306 2,304 17,018 783,433

2001 524,014 193,892 2,052 16,156 738,433

2002 449,712 177,123 2,115 16,474 645,424

2003 433,370 171,199 2,561 15,248 622,378

-: back

inside the airport

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projects

rules & regs

TEN YEAR SUMMARY OF FAA AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS

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http://www.lawa.orgilaxitenYrSummary.cfm?process=2d

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Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 84 of 85

EXHIBIT 34
Case 2:08-cv-02695-GW-E Document 15 Filed 05/06/2008 Page 85 of 85

Los A ngeles World Airports (LA WA)

Traffic Comparison (TeOM)

Los Angeles International Airport

December 2007 Calendar YTD December

2007 2006 %Change 2007 2006 % Change

Passenger Traffic Totals

Domestic 3,633,704 3,687,799 -1.47% 44.732.810 44.129,926 1.37%

International 1,456,168 1,384,533 5.17% 17,163,265 16,910,748 1.49%

Total 5,089,872 5,072,332 0.35% 61,896,075 61.040,674 1.40%

Domestic Passengers

Scheduled Carriers 3.290,869 3,360,849 -2.08% 40,875,515 40,256.824 1.5%

Cormuter Carriers 339,270 323,534 4.86% 3,830.943 3.840,656 -0.3%

Charter Carriers 3.565 3,416 4.36% 26,352 32,446 -18.8%

- ._--------

Totals 3.633,704 3,687.799 -1.47% 44.732,810 44,129,926 1.37%

International Passengers

Tom Bradley Inti 756,929 708,831 6.79% 9,193,010 9,028,075 1.83%

Temlnal2 320,378 326,835 -1.98% 3,851,891 3,860.728 -0.23%

Terminal 4 119,498 107,203 11.47% 1,324,111 1.308.144 1.22%

Terminal 7 89,729 72,661 23.49% 838,790 896,238 -6.41%

Terminal 5 75.971 74,107 2.52% 829,393 708,286 17.10%

All Other Terminals 93,663 94,896 -1.30% 1,126,070 1,109,277 1.51%

Totals 1,456,168 1,384,533 5.17% 17.163,265 16,910,748 1.49%

US Customs Arrivals

Tom Bradley Inti 401,864 385,683 4.20% 5,246,231 5,081,738 3.24%

Terminal 2 115,145 124.300 -7,37% 1,416,674 1,498.516 -5.46%

Terminat 4 86,998 69,051 25.99% 844,712 817,436 3.34%

Terminal 7 47,383 41.093 15,31% 462,558 493,901 -6.35%

Terminal 5 41,684 28,956 43.96% 459,411 355.915 29.08%

Totals 693.074 649,083 6,78% 8,429,586 8,247,506 2.21%

Air Cargo (Tons)

Mail 7,181 6,983 2.82% 76,093 78,871 -3.52%

Freight 160,826 171,853 -6.42% 2.001,434 2,024,089 -1.12%

Total 168,007 178,837 -6.06% 2,077,527 2,102,960 -1.21%

FAA Aircraft Movement

Air Carrier 38,773 39,565 -2.00% 467.193 463,341 0.83%

Air Taxi 17,959 15,045 19.37% 193,930 174,745 10.98%

General Aviation 1,645 1,339 22.85% 17,217 16,142 6.66%

tv'ilitary 160 149 7.38% 2.614 2,614 0.00%

---_. ---'--'-~--~

Totat 58.537 56,098 4.35% 680,954 656,842 3.67%

066