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i 

58–295 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–147] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES 

KOREA 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 25, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 25, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Requests from the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces 

Korea ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 25, 2010 ...................................................................................... 33 

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. 

FORCES KOREA 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Sharp, Gen. Walter L. ‘‘Skip,’’ USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea ................ 5 

Willard, Adm. Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 40 

Sharp, Gen. Walter L. ‘‘Skip’’ .......................................................................... 83 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 37 

Willard, Adm. Robert F. ................................................................................... 44 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 111 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 115 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 25, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today, our committee will continue its posture hearings. 

Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the United States Pacific 

Command [PACOM]; General ‘‘Skip’’ Sharp, Commander of United 

States Forces in Korea [USFK]. 

At the outset, let me welcome both of you back to our committee 

and thank you for your excellent leadership. We are downright 

proud of you. We all thank the troops that you lead along with 

their families and the incredible service and personal sacrifice that 

they have. 

There is an ever-present danger that we in Washington are so 

focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iraq that security challenges elsewhere in the world don’t get the attention that they 

merit. More concretely, as a result of the last nine years of operations, the readiness posture of all the combatant commands outside of the Middle East has suffered, creating a high strategic risk. 

There are clear examples of these problems in the AsiaPacific, and I believe that we ignore them to our peril. 

Let me review just a few of the daunting challenges ahead in the 

Asia-Pacific area. The rebasing of United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam is one of the largest movements of military assets 

in decades, estimated to cost over $10 billion. The challenges are 

there. 

Changes planned as part of the move not only affect our bilateral 

relationship with Japan, they will shape our strategic posture 

through the critical Asia-Pacific region for at least 50 years, yet the 

path forward remains unclear. 

Japan is reassessing the agreement to move troops from Okinawa to Guam. It does not appear that the budget includes sufficient funds to accomplish the agreement. And the Environmental 

Protection Agency [EPA] has identified problems with the rebasing 

plans’ environmental projects. 
2 

We must get this right, and I assure you that this committee will 

work to make sure that we do. 

Last year, North Korea launched a Taepodong–2 missile over 

Japan, conducted a second nuclear test, kicked out inspectors, 

pulled out of the Six-Party Talks, and restarted its nuclear facilities. All this occurred in the context of an uncertain leadership and 

succession environment that may have fed some of these very concerning events. 

At the same time, our presence in South Korea is transforming. 

We are undertaking tour normalizations in Korea and substantially 

relocating our forces in an effort we will hear about today. 

There are also questions about how the new U.S. and South Korean command relationship started in 2012 will work. And I am interested in an update on those issues. 

Never to be forgotten in this entire region, of course, is China, 

which recently suspended high-level military and other contracts 

with our country in response to a U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. While 

China announced a defense budget increase for this year, it is less 

than it has been in the past. Their budget is still growing rapidly, 

and the linkage between their stated strategic intentions and their 

actions remain unclear in certain areas. 

China conducted an unexpected midcourse missile interception 

test earlier this year, and reports of cyber attacks from China 

against Google and other large U.S. companies continue to be troubling. We must be proactively engaged in the Asia-Pacific region on 

multiple fronts. We must realize that our own actions may well influence the choices and actions of others. 

We must be able to pursue opportunities for security cooperation 

with regional allies and partners. And that is very important. At 

the same time, we must ensure that our force posture allows us to 

deter or to confront any security challenge that might emerge in 

that part of the world. 

We have difficult work to do. I am pleased that the Department 

of Defense [DOD] and this Administration have already taken a 

number of positive steps in this direction. 

I now turn to my Ranking Member, my friend, Buck McKeon, the 

gentleman from California, for any statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today, we conclude our series of posture hearings with the Commanders from U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. I 

would like to welcome back Admiral Willard and General Sharp, 

both of whom have traveled great distances to be with us this 

morning. 

I am glad we were able to spend the whole week here so we 

wouldn’t have to ask you to come back again. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and service to our Nation, and please pass on my gratitude to our extraordinary military 
3 

men and women who are serving in the Asia-Pacific region to protect Americans’ national interests. 

Gentlemen, you are no strangers to this committee. Admiral Willard, when you were here a couple of months ago, we had an opportunity to examine the Administration’s policy toward China and 

how such a policy is aligned with our overall approach to the region. 

Let me begin with where our discussion left off in January—with 

my speculation, or rather my fear, that the China threat would be 

downgraded to justify last year’s and future cuts to key defense 

programs. According to open-source reports, the White House National Security Council [NSC] directed U.S. intelligence agencies to 

lower the priority placed on intelligence collection for China. 

If true, I am interested in hearing what impact, if any, this 

would have on PACOM’s ability to understand China’s military 

modernization. You can provide this information in a classified format if you prefer. 

Now, turning to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], 

when we last met, Congress was weeks away from receiving the 

final draft of the QDR. What we know now is that, unlike the 2006 

QDR, which explicitly called out China as having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States, the most recent QDR understates the requirements required to deter and defeat challenges from state actors, and it overestimates the capabilities of the force the Department would build. 

While the QDR did an excellent job of delineating the threat 

posed by those with anti-access capabilities, notably China, it does 

little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability, and force structure. This is where I would like to focus our 

discussion. 

Admiral Willard, how would the U.S. assess China’s intentions 

and capacity to develop and field disruptive technologies, including 

those for anti-access and area denial as well as for nuclear, space, 

and cyberspace? As you know, it is vital for our national security 

interests that it maintain an upper hand when it comes to America’s capabilities to project power in China’s neighborhood and reassure our allies in the region. 

From the PACOM perspective, do we have the right range of capabilities to counter China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities? 

How is PACOM adjusting in its scenario planning to ensure we 

maintain access to the global commons and proximity to Taiwan? 

Are we making the necessary investments in updating our scenario planning to take into account advances in these anti-access 

capabilities in the mid- to long-term? 

I think it is critical this committee ensures that we maintain our 

military superiority in undersea warfare and in environments 

where there is advanced anti-aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, 

and cyber and space threats. China is not the only nation of concern, but it is one that requires our immediate attention. 

I would like to emphasize that this is not an over-the-horizon 

problem, but it is a gap that we face today. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you in this regard. 

Now, turning to a nuclear-armed, missile-ready, and unstable 

North Korea. Since last year’s posture hearing, North Korea con-
4 

ducted a nuclear test, and we have seen considerable developments 

in its short-, mid-, and longer-range missile programs. 

We know that North Korea has a history of cooperating and proliferating with such nations as Syria and Iran. 

Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I hope that you will address 

the following questions. First, how do we define the outlook of 

North Korea as both a regional and global threat? How is the 

United States working with our key allies in the region to expand 

our defensive capabilities? 

Also, as we hear more about increasing demands for missile defense in Europe and the Middle East, I would like to learn what 

that means for the Asia-Pacific AOR [area of responsibility] and if 

assets will be taken away from PACOM. 

Again, I look forward to an informative and candid discussion, 

and I thank you for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my entire statement be included 

for the record where I address other issues facing PACOM and 

USFK. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the statement will be submitted for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I ask each of you to testify, we wish to 

welcome the Admiral’s wife, Mrs. Donna Willard, and thank you 

very much for being with us today. 

Admiral, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, so that we can get to the committee’s questions 

sooner, I will keep my remarks brief. But I ask that my full statement be included for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

the United States Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific region. 

Seated behind me, as you have already acknowledged, sir, is my 

wife, Donna, who has been at my side for 36 years. She is an outstanding ambassador of our Nation and a tireless advocate for the 

men and women of our military and especially their families. 

I also would like to thank you for your interest in our area of 

responsibility. I have either met many of you en route to the region, or I have followed your travels in the region with great interest. Your presence and interest sends a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way into the region 

so my staff and I can brief you on the security environment or on 

your return trip in order that I may hear your insights from the 

engagements that you encounter. 

Today is my first posture hearing as the Commander of United 

States Pacific Command. Since taking command last October, I 

have had the chance to meet with many of my counterparts, travel 

throughout the region, and exercise several of our contingency 

plans. 
5 

When combined with my previous years of experience in the 

Asia-Pacific, this has led me to the following conclusions, which I 

hope that we can expand on during today’s hearing. 

The Asia-Pacific region is quickly becoming the strategic nexus 

of the globe as a consequence of its economic expansion and potential. Key to our commitment in the region is our forward-deployed 

and postured forces. We face constraints in building partner capacity from shortfalls that exist in our security assistance programs. 

The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific though China’s rising influence is changing regional power dynamics in ways that create both challenges and, I think, opportunities. 

Advancing our relationships with our allies and strategic partners is vital to maintaining security in the region. China continues 

to progress in the rapid, comprehensive transformation of its armed 

forces, elements of which appear designed to challenge our freedom 

of action in the region. 

And, finally, India’s strategic location, shared democratic values, 

growing economy, and evolution as a regional power combine to 

make them a partner with whom we need to work much more 

closely. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Asia-Pacific 

region is a region of great potential and is vital to the interests of 

the United States. Every day, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians of Pacific Command are working with our allies, partners, and friends to help maintain this region’s security. 

Our success has been enabled by this committee’s long-standing 

support. You have provided us with the most technically advanced 

systems in the world and with military quality of life worthy of the 

contributions of all of this volunteer force. 

On behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the 

United States Pacific Command, thank you for your support and 

for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture of this critical 

region of the world. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the 

Appendix on page 44.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. 

This is not, by any means, the first appearance of our friend, 

General Sharp, and I want to welcome you back, and we would love 

to receive your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. WALTER L. ‘‘SKIP’’ SHARP, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA 

General SHARP. Chairman Skelton and Congressman McKeon 

and distinguished members of this committee, I do appreciate this 

opportunity, and I am honored to report to you today on the state 

of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. 

Forces Korea. 

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. Since 

1950, Congress and the American people have made an enormous 

investment in blood and treasure to first defeat and then deter 

North Korea aggression. The alliance continues to reap the returns 

of that investment. 
6 

The Republic of Korea bears the majority of the burden of defending itself, and in 2012, wartime operational control transitions 

from Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff 

[ROK JCS]. Beyond its borders, the Republic of Korea has become 

an important part of the international efforts to keep peace and respond to disasters. With significant forces deployed to Lebanon, 

Haiti, the Horn of Africa, and other missions, the Republic of Korea 

is fast becoming a global strategic ally envisioned by the 2009 Joint 

Vision Statement signed by Presidents Lee and Obama. 

With our long-term commitment of 28,500 troops, we continue to 

deter aggression and maintain peace not only in the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia. Last year, I spoke about three 

command priorities. And thanks to your support and funding, I am 

able to share with you the progress that we have made since then. 

First, the United States Forces Korea, in the Republic of Korea– 

U.S. alliance, is prepared to fight and win. I flew here directly from 

our annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle combined exercise. This exercise demonstrated that the United States and the Republic of 

Korea Forces and staffs are trained and ready to fight tonight on 

the Korean Peninsula. 

Second, the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance continues to grow 

and strengthen. Militarily, we will be prepared to transition wartime operational control to the ROK JCS on 17 April 2012. In last 

year’s Ulchi–Freedom Guardian exercise, we successfully stood up 

and tested many of the post-OPCON [operational control] transition command and control structures and organizations. 

Through our strategic transition plan, future Ulchi–Freedom 

Guardian exercises and the final certification exercise will ensure 

the readiness of the ROK JCS to accept wartime operational control in April of 2012 and the ability of the U.S. Korea Command 

to become the supporting command. 

The Republic of Korea is also deferring a significant portion of 

U.S. Forces Korea costs. Under the five-year Special Measures 

Agreement, Korea will provide U.S. Forces Korea with approximately $700 million per year of cost-sharing funds. 

My third priority is improving quality of life for the command 

personnel. We are making substantial progress here, and with Congress’ support, we will achieve all of our goals. We are improving 

the quality of life through two key initiatives. The first is the relocation of U.S. forces. 

By consolidating U.S. forces from 105 facilities maintained in 

2002 to 48 sites in two hubs, we will make better use of limited 

resources and be better postured to support our service members 

and families. 

The second initiative toward normalization goes hand in hand 

with the relocation. As we consolidate bases, we are building worldclass facilities in housing that are transforming U.S. Forces Korea 

from a command where one-year tours are the norm to one where 

single service members serve for two years, and those with families 

stay for three. 

In the last 2 years since June of 2008, the number of families on 

the peninsula have increased from about 1,600 to, today, over 3,900 

families. By keeping trained military personnel in Korea for normal 

tour lengths, we retain institutional knowledge and create a more 
7 

capable force and are better able to support the alliance and deter 

aggression and, also, demonstrate our commitment to Northeast 

Asia. 

At the same time, we are eliminating unneeded, unaccompanied 

tours and building the strong families that are key to retention and 

the effectiveness in this time of ongoing conflict. 

To close, the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance has never been 

stronger. The alliance has successfully deterred aggression on the 

Korean Peninsula for 57 years. In doing so, it has helped to make 

Northeast Asia a remarkably peaceful and prosperous place. 

With the Republic of Korea contributing a substantial portion of 

the alliance costs, we are maintaining combat readiness and improving the quality of life of our military personnel and their families. 

I thank you for supporting the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, 

and DOD civilians and their families serving our great Nation in 

the Republic of Korea. And I look forward to the questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in the 

Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Admiral, bring us to date on the proposed plan of moving 8,000 

Marines from Okinawa to Guam. How is it today? What are the 

major challenges that you see? 

Admiral WILLARD. Mr. Chairman, the Defense Posture Review 

Initiative, the DPRI, the realignment arrangement with the Government of Japan, has been ongoing for some time, and contains 

many moving parts, to include the movement of air forces and consolidation from urban areas on the main island of Honshu to other 

attendant smaller moves throughout Japan. 

And as you suggest, one of the main thrusts of this is the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 

Currently in discussions with the Government of Japan is one 

element of the Marine Corps move that has to do with an airfield 

relocation at Futenma, which is the rotary-wing Marine Corps lift 

that is attendant to our Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Okinawa. And this—the new Government of Japan has chosen to 

relook at the Futenma replacement facility issue, and we are looking forward to their response back, which Prime Minister 

Hatoyama has contended will be by next month or—excuse me— 

by the month of May. 

So we are looking forward to hearing back from the Japanese on 

this review. 

In our assessment, across Okinawa, having discussed this with 

the Japanese for about the last 17 years, we believe that the current plan for the Futenma replacement facility is the best plan on 

the island of Okinawa. 

Other issues with regard to the movement of 8,000 Marines to 

Guam pertains to Guam itself. And as has already been suggested 

in opening statements, there is an ongoing draft environmental impact study, and we are presently in negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] on criticisms of the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] thus far which I would be happy to explain in greater detail if you would like. But the EIS is scheduled 
8 

right now to be concluded with a Record of Decision by late summer. And we are aggressively pursuing the corrective actions that 

may come with the discussions with EPA. 

But to answer the issues pertaining to the EIS in time, to then 

execute the budget for Guam that has been established thus far, 

so we have, you know, the discussion is ongoing with Japan and 

issues with Guam’s infrastructure and others, our EIS process, and 

the combination of the two and the timing of that, I think, will establish our ability to move forward with DPRI. 

The last point that I would make, sir, is that this is a very complex series of moves associated with DPRI. Many moving parts. 

And in order to achieve it against the timeline and within the 

budget that has been prescribed, will require the commitments of 

both the United States Government and the Government of Japan 

across many departments, in our case, and across multiple ministries in the case of Japan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you. 

General Sharp, you explained the length of tours and the fact 

that families will be increasing accompanying the troops to South 

Korea. But would you please tell the committee and bring our committee up to date on the moves within South Korea, what is being 

built up and from where are they being moved? 

General SHARP. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, several years ago, the Republic of Korea came to 

the United States and said we would like you to move the forces 

that you have in Yongsan, where my headquarters is, from 

Yongsan down to another location further south near Osan Air 

Force Base. 

That was a program called the Yongsan Relocation Program, and 

we agreed to that. And the Republic of Korea is burdening all of 

the cost to construct all the facilities, to replace what we have on 

Yongsan today. 

At about the same time, we said we would also like to consolidate forces up north of Seoul, primarily 2nd Infantry Division, and 

consolidate them also down to what is now becoming called U.S. 

Army Garrison-Humphreys. 

That progress, in order to be able to build up Camp Humphreys—U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys—is progressing very well. 

The Republic of Korea has already purchased the land that is needed in order to be able to expand Camp Humphreys. It will expand 

three times from what it originally was. It will go from a population of about 6,000 military and dependents to over 49,000. 

We are on track over the next five or six years to complete all 

of the construction down there. We will actually start moving down 

there in 2012 and then phase that in over the next several years 

following that. 

As with the move to Guam, this is very complicated because I 

have to not only make sure all the facilities are in place but make 

sure I have unit integrity so that we could fight tonight if we had 

to. So we are working through, with the Republic of Korea, on a 

very detailed plan in order to be able to have all of that move complete. 

Once consolidated down there, thanks to your support and really 

the support of the Republic of Korea, U.S. Army Garrison-Hum-
9 

phreys will be an outstanding Army installation. And it should be 

if you can build it from the ground up, which we are going to be 

able to do. 

So we are on track, and I can report good progress, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. What date do you anticipate it will all be finished? 

General SHARP. Sir, again, the goal is within the next five or six 

years, and I know that is not a definitive date. We are trying to 

do it as quickly as possible to be able to return this land to the Republic of Korea and to consolidate our forces to improve the quality 

of life for our service members. 

What we are doing now is taking the very detailed engineer work 

to be able to get all of those moving pieces in place and seeing 

where we can shorten the time by—I mean, such simple things as 

creating another access road into Camp Humphreys greatly reduces the amount of time it takes to construct. 

I mean, one example is, in 2012 alone, there will be $2 billion 

worth of construction going into Camp Humphreys. And the number of trucks that are coming in and out of the gates and the number of folks that we have to card to make sure that they have access in is what we are trying to reduce and minimize as much as 

possible. 

But, again, to specifically answer your question, I am very comfortable to say within the next five or six years, it will be complete. 

But we will have moved a lot of people down there, soldiers down 

there, well before that as the land and the construction is complete. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. 

My friend, Buck McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for taking us there last year and giving us a 

chance to see some of that dirt being moved and this air site in 

Okinawa. That was a good, worthwhile trip to get a hands-on of 

what was happening in the area. 

As I stated earlier, the QDR did a good job of delineating the 

threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities, most notably 

China, but it did little to address the risk resulting in gaps in funding, capability, and force structure. 

Admiral Willard, from PACOM’s perspective, how would you assess China’s intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive 

technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial? Specifically, can you comment on China’s anti-ship ballistic missile capability and how it is evolving? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman McKeon. I can. And 

thanks for the question. 

The China military capacity has been growing, by and large, 

unabated for the past 10 to 20 years. The past 10 years have been 

pretty dramatic. And as you suggest, this has included investments 

in what has broadly been termed anti-access capabilities. Area-denial capabilities is another way to think about it. 

And these range from the investments in submarine capabilities 

to investments in integrated air and missile defense capabilities to, 

as you suggest, anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities at extended 

ranges from the mainland of China as well as cyber capabilities 
10 

and anti-space capabilities, all of which we have been monitoring 

very closely for some years. 

In terms of China’s intentions, one of your questions—it is truly 

the question that we would endeavor to see answered—the uncertainty that comes with investments of this type generates concern 

not just for the United States military that has patrolled this region and maintained security in this region, by and large, for the 

last 150 years, but for the regional allies and partners that we 

have in the region as well whose own navies, air forces might be 

challenged by these same capabilities. 

So this is a challenge that we are attempting to address with the 

Chinese that is broader than just the U.S. military and the Western Pacific, but I would offer, the entire Asia-Pacific is interested 

in understanding what the long-term plans are for capabilities such 

as you described. 

We have worked hard to identify the gaps that you suggest and 

the insufficiencies that are required to deal with area-denial capabilities such as this, and we continue to. And they range from the 

way in which we develop our concepts of operations to actual technologies that the program produces. 

And Pacific Command continues to provide its input both individually and through its service components to identify the concerns 

with regard to gaps and insufficiencies as we proceed. 

Mr. MCKEON. I think the concerns I have are if we feel like or 

if it is perceived that we are being pushed back, then neighbors, 

allies in the area start taking different positions to make sure they 

have more options. And I think this sets us on a path that we don’t 

want to be on. 

What is PACOM doing to ensure that the United States will 

maintain its current access within the global commons and its 

proximity to Taiwan? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir. And related to the final statement that you made to the China question, we are not being 

pushed back. I maintain the same forces forward that we have enjoyed, again, for decades in both the sea space and air space. 

These are commons that we have maintained a presence in to 

guard sea lanes of communication that carry over a trillion dollars 

in commerce per year that not only supports the economy of the 

United States but the economies of our close allies and partners in 

the region and China as well. 

So our presence is being sustained in the region. And as you suggest, it is very much an assurance to our allies that we are here 

to stay. And we will continue to work with China over time to attempt to ascertain what their long-term intentions are but, also, to 

see them emerge in the Asia-Pacific region as a constructive partner, which is truly, I think, all of our desire and all of our intent. 

But at the same time, it is very important that it, through our 

presence, through the application of extended deterrence, and 

through the partnering and capacity building that we do in the region, that we assure our allies and partners in the region and try 

to suppress the urge to proliferate weapons and build up armies as 

a consequence of the concerns that are being generated by this 

changing dynamic in the Asian area. 
11 

Mr. MCKEON. That is very important because we—the question 

what are their intents, we don’t know. And we can never know another person’s full intentions or another country’s, so it really behooves us to always be prepared. 

I am reminded of President Reagan’s comments about all the 

wars in his lifetime never came because we were too strong. So I 

think it is important that we always maintain that area of 

strength. 

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, I am deeply concerned about 

North Korea’s provocative behavior during the last year. In your 

judgment, will North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks? If not, 

beyond our tools of diplomacy and sanctions, what are we doing to 

expand our defensive capabilities? 

And, also, as we hear about increasing demands for missile defense in Europe and the Middle East, what does that mean for the 

Asia-Pacific AOR? Is it your understanding that assets will be 

taken away from PACOM? 

General SHARP. I will start first with the Six-Party Talks. We 

highly encouraged Kim Jong-il to come back to the Six-Party Talks. 

It is the way that I think that he has the opportunity to be able 

to stop the downward spiral that has happened in North Korea 

over the last several years. 

I do believe that the UN [United Nations] Security Council resolutions have made a difference in North Korea and, again, we hope 

that Kim Jong-il takes this opportunity. 

What we have done specifically on the Korean Peninsula in order 

to make sure that we are prepared for any contingency from North 

Korea is along several lines. First, we continue to develop our plans 

to make sure that we do have the full range of plans to deal with 

all possible scenarios. 

Secondly, we have worked very closely between the ROK JCS 

and Combined Forces Command in between the U.S. Embassy, led 

by Ambassador Stevens, and MOFAT [Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

and Trade] in order to be able to make sure that we, in South 

Korea, and we, as the U.S. alliance, along all elements of power, 

are saying one thing to North Korea. And we work very hard to 

make sure that that single voice comes out. 

I also do believe that, as we move towards OPCON transition, 

that is strengthening our force and it is clearly demonstrating to 

North Korea the strength of the Republic of Korea military that 

they will be ready to take the lead in 2012. 

And, again, I am confident along all those lines that we were prepared for North Korea. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. 

Admiral WILLARD. As the United States and the other party 

members of the Six-Party Talks all encourage and are attempting 

to bring North Korea back into the talks forum, I would offer that 

our actions, as General Sharp has already described, the deterrence 

that is represented by the ROK–U.S. alliance, is a cornerstone of 

our response to potential aggression from North Korea and has 

been for 60 years. 

I would also offer that our strong alliance with Japan is equally 

a deterrent and that Japan and Russia and China, the United 

States and the Republic of Korea, together, as Six-Party members, 
12 

offer both the impetus to North Korea to return to talks and, in our 

teaming, a deterrent value in itself. 

And then lastly, we have other issues with North Korea than just 

on the peninsula. The potential proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction [WMD] or the proliferation of the delivery systems represented by United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 

1784 are an example of concerns that we have that North Korea 

has in the past, and may continue to be, a proliferator. 

And then the provocations that we encountered through the sequence of missile tests that occurred last year are another example 

of the actions that we take in this ballistic missile defense [BMD] 

area to deal with North Korea and the instability that this regime 

represents. 

On the subject of European ballistic missile defense, I am an advocate of the way ahead in Europe. I think that what the maritime 

BMD dimension brings to our missile defense capability is very 

powerful and very flexible. At the same time, as we develop that 

maritime capability into the future—so this is the number of Aegis 

ships that we transition to be BMD-capable—and as we develop the 

missiles themselves that provide our BMD capability and, especially, the follow-on missiles that will greatly expand the envelope 

and reduce the requirement for as many ships on scene as currently exist—those are the capability developments that I think all 

of the COCOMs [Combatant Commands] are watching with great 

interest, very interested to see progress on a timeline. 

Thus far, as we have shared ballistic missile assets between Pacific Command, European Command [EUCOM], and Central Command [CENTCOM], this has been manageable. But I would offer 

that we still are producing the weapons, and we are still producing—you know, transitioning our ships at a pace that must be 

managed very carefully in order to provide that capability into the 

future as quickly as we need it. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, General, thank you so much for joining. It is good to see 

both of you again. And thank you for your service. 

Admiral Willard, I wanted to discuss with you the Marine Corps 

move from Okinawa to Guam. And as you may be aware, this realignment of forces has been a great concern for this committee. 

In the end, this committee is dedicated to ensuring that we realign the forces correctly and that it does not adversely impact the 

residents of Guam. I have been briefed that the Department believes an additional 80,000 military, civilians, construction workers, 

and their dependents beyond the 180,000 current residents are expected on the island of Guam by the year 2014. 

The EPA has reviewed the Department’s plans and has expressed great concern that the Department will adversely affect the 

residents of Guam because of insufficient utility infrastructure. 

There are additional concerns regarding workforce’s housing, medical care, and other community infrastructure. 

And of course, I am a great believer in us having a forward presence. Just a couple of questions. With the 80,000 additional resi-
13 

dents in 2014, including 20,000 construction workers and their dependents, do you believe that Guam will be adversely impacted by 

the Marine Corps relocation? And what steps would you recommend that the Government of Guam take to better prepare for 

this relocation? 

And, finally, what steps should the Federal government be taking to support the Marine Corps relocation? I think that this is a 

very important move. I think that—I am a great believer in having 

forward presence with what we see in that area. And maybe you 

can give us some insight or enlighten us on this move. 

Admiral. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman. 

The move is a very important one to me as well. The forward 

presence of our Marines in Okinawa currently provide great flexibility to General Sharp in terms of responses to the Korean Peninsula, in our obligations in accordance with our alliance and defense 

agreement with Japan. 

These same Marines are knowledgeable of the area of responsibility of the Asia-Pacific region, and they are constantly engaged in 

capacity building with our partners. They are my first-to-respond 

forces for non-combatant evacuation operations [NEOs] or for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. 

So the III Marine Expeditionary Force, very, very vital as a forward-postured force in the Western Pacific. 

The move to Guam of 8,000 of those Marines and their families, 

in order to maintain that forward posture, very, very important to 

Pacific Command and, I think, important to the Nation that, as the 

chairman commented in his opening remarks, that we get it right. 

There is no question that the construction pressures on Guam 

through a port that, thus far, is inadequately suited to handle the 

shipping and amount of work that is likely to come with the construction efforts in Guam, and that the pressures on infrastructure 

in Guam will be challenging. 

I don’t think anyone in the course of our environmental impact 

study and in the course of the deliberations over the challenges and 

issues expressed by the Environmental Protection Agency—I think 

it is acknowledged that Guam infrastructure is suffering from inadequacies now given the population on Guam and that any additions 

to the population are likely to pressurize its water systems, power 

systems, waste disposal systems, sewage systems, and the like. 

In order to get it right, we are working with the Environmental 

Protection Agency, but, just this past week, I sent my senior representatives to Guam with Ms. Sutley, the President’s environmental adviser, in order that they could see first-hand and listen 

first-hand to the concerns regarding the outside-the-fence requirements on Guam, the infrastructure concerns that Guam has. 

And it is our intention to work closely with the EPA, closely with 

Ms. Sutley, closely with the Government of Guam, in order to identify where the inadequacies are and then to work across the departments in this Government in order to determine the best solution for the corrective actions that need to be taken as a consequence of this relocation effort. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. The people of Guam are great people, and 

I don’t want them to feel that we are taking them for granted. I 
14 

am glad that you are coordinating all these other agencies to support and build a good infrastructure and, like the Chairman said, 

to do it right. 

Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Randy Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Willard, thank you for being here. 

General Sharp, we thank you for your service. 

And, Admiral Willard, let me just begin with you. We received 

a breakdown of a list of unfunded requirements that the Navy 

needed. Did you have any part at all in helping to create that list 

of unfunded requirements for the Navy? 

Admiral WILLARD. The impact that our combatant command 

would have in the Navy’s determining a list of unfunded requirements would be based on the IPL, the integrated priority list that 

I provide into the Joint Staff process, and it is exposed to the Navy, 

so they will know what Pacific Command’s particular requirements 

and concerns are and, as a consequence, where it has a maritime 

dimension to it—and the naval staff concurs with that—they will 

normally include that in their unfunded requirements list if it is 

not already being attended to in other ways. 

Mr. FORBES. By definition, I take it, if it is a requirement, it 

would be something you need to fulfill your mission, or is there another definition for that requirement? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think when we discuss requirements in the 

Pentagon or as combatant commanders in our regions, we are talking about the needs to fulfill our mission. That said, across the 

globe, not all of our requirements are necessarily ever being met 

to the maximum. And as a consequence, we mitigate to the requirements where shortfalls exist or gaps exist. 

Mr. FORBES. General Sharp, would you concur? Do you have any 

role at all in participating in the unfunded requirements that the 

Army would have? And would you agree with Admiral Willard that 

they were requirements needed to fulfill the mission? 

General SHARP. Yes, sir. I go through the same process. I submit 

my requirements in order to be able to execute my plans through 

Admiral Willard who then consolidates them, as he said, and submits them to the Joint Staff. 

Mr. FORBES. One of the things that I would ask you both—not 

today because I don’t expect you to have that information now—we 

are in the business of making sure you have what you need to do 

your jobs, and when we get that list of unfunded requirements, we 

assume that they are requirements and we want to try to see how 

we can get them. 

One of my worries is always our ability to assess the risk factors 

we have of not getting those requirements. I would just ask each 

of you if you would be kind enough to submit for the record, at 

some point in time, which of those requirements would impact you 

and some assessment as to the risk we run if we do not fulfill those 

requirements. 

Could you provide that for us at some later date? Again, don’t 

expect you to have that information—— 
15 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, Congressman. I will provide you that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 111.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you very much. 

Admiral, the last thing I would like to ask you, one of the things 

that we always worry and hear about is when we see that spiraling 

curve of ships that the Chinese are creating and we see a downward move in the ships that we have, how do we have a mechanism that adequately deals with the risk factor of those two curves 

changing? 

And you and I had the ability to talk about this before. And I 

would just wonder if you could tell us today, one, at what point 

does quantity start mattering? You know, sometimes we always 

love to say, well, the quantity is different, but we are looking at 

capabilities. But at some time, quantity has a role to play there. 

Secondly, how comfortable do you feel with our risk assessment 

mechanisms? I mean, are there weaknesses there? And thirdly, 

what is the role that modeling and simulation might be able to 

play in cutting that down? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir. Those are excellent questions, 

all three. 

And I think the answer to the first is that quantity has its own 

quality now. So those of us that have regional responsibilities, and 

especially the Asia-Pacific which relies so heavily on forward presence and posture and time-distance factors that are profound in 

this region of the world that encompasses half the globe, that the 

ability to be present in all of the places that we are required to be 

demands that certain quantities of force structure be made available to this particular region. 

I think the 60–40 split that has been decided upon in terms of 

submarine force structure and aircraft carrier force structure are 

examples of the bias toward meeting the quantity demands of Pacific Command. 

But, again, to your question, quantity is important to all of us 

now, I think. 

In terms of our ability to, you know, view or quantify our forces 

into the future, I think the—it will be very important for us to ensure that we identify where the forces must be present, how they 

must be present, and to describe that back to our, both down to 

our, service components and back to our leadership in the Pentagon. 

And so, once again, I think the ability to gauge risk associated 

with quantity shortfalls, the importance of being able to characterize the risk that might be attendant to our contingency plans or 

the risk that might be attendant to our ability to meet our peacetime requirements, are important elements to quantify. And when 

we account for risk at the unit level and walk it up to a strategic 

level, there is a compound risk factor that I think needs to be accounted for as well. 

And these things are not entirely objective. Sometimes some subjective and difficult, as you have suggested, to understand, to quantify, and to discuss in an apples-to-apples way. I think that modeling and simulation is a mechanism that would assist us in accomplishing that. 
16 

So this is the idea that, in a modeling and simulation approach, 

that risk factors could be incorporated into that quantitative or, in 

the case of modeling and simulation that occurs in a qualitative 

way, qualitative fashion. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 

Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both of you gentlemen not only for your service 

to your country but for making a very long trip back to Washington 

to testify before the committee. 

Admiral, you know, our Nation has got a lot of challenges. I am 

told that this year, the Social Security Trust Fund starts paying 

out more than it collects in taxes. Same for Medicare. A trillion dollar annual operating deficit and it just doesn’t get any easier when 

you look at replacement of the Ohio class, the Joint Strike Fighter 

coming on board, et cetera, et cetera. 

With regard to the Ohio class, the early estimates are is that ship is going to cost in that neighborhood of $7 billion. And unfortunately, my experience here is, if someone tells me it is going to 

cost $7 billion, it means it is $9 billion by the time it is actually 

delivered or more. 

The primary reason for the Ohio replacement is to carrier the D5 

missile which travels approximately 5,000 miles. So my question to 

you as the person with the toughest job in the Navy: Should we be 

building a sub that fits the D5 missile? Or should we consider— 

and I want to just use the word ‘‘consider’’—building a missile that 

will fit the Virginia-class submarine which has proven to be a very 

good acquisitions programs, and I am told by those who operate 

those vessels, a fine submarine? 

If you are uncomfortable talking about that in public, I would 

welcome your thoughts in private, but it is a decision that is going 

to affect shipbuilding budgets starting about the year 2019 in a 

very significant way. And in the purest terms, in 2019, we can buy 

a carrier and a sub a year, and there is no money for anything else. 

And I know that is unacceptable. 

Secondly, to Mr. Forbes’ comment about—Mr. Forbes, I can assure you today, you are going to have an opportunity to cast a vote 

to grow the Navy. I am going to put that on the table and give you 

that opportunity. Okay? We only want to go one way on this committee, and that is for a bigger fleet. 

And lastly, General Sharp, I wanted to say this. I like Koreans. 

I take tae kwon do from a Korean guy. They are smart, diligent, 

hard-working people. I took the opportunity to visit four of the 

most phenomenal shipyards in the world. They are all in Korea. It 

was a humbling experience as a guy who represents shipbuilders 

to see the money that they have invested in those yards. It is a 

beautiful modern country. 

I mean, most Americans, including myself, have this image from 

the show ‘‘M*A*S*H’’ of Korea in the 1950s. It looks nothing like 

the nation now. 

Having said all of that, at what point could we declare a victory 

and bring those 28,000 Americans home? Because, again, that is a 
17 

very modern, well-financed country with sharp, hardworking, diligent people and, again, a phenomenal manufacturing base. 

So at what point do we still need to be there, in your opinion? 

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman, I will begin with your question 

regarding Ohio class, the Virginia-class option with regard to replacement for our SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines]. 

Fundamentally, the missions differ greatly between our fast-attack submarine [SSN] force and our ballistic missile submarine 

force. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I understand that, sir. 

Admiral WILLARD. I think that alone calls for a recapitalization 

of our SSBN force when the time comes. And I take your point that 

submarines are very expensive—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess, to my point, do you need a 5,000-mile missile? What is the magic number, if there is such a thing, for the 

distance that that missile should need to travel in order to fulfill 

your needs? 

Admiral WILLARD. Senator, I think we ought to—I think we 

ought to—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. I think that is the question. 

Admiral WILLARD. Okay. That is probably a subject more appropriately taken in closed committee. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you, at some point, get me that answer. 

Admiral WILLARD. I will. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you. 

General Sharp, to my second question? 

General SHARP. Sir, first off, as you just pointed out, the Republic of Korea has greatly advanced since the end of the Korean War. 

Their military has, likewise, greatly advanced. 

And they are taking more and more responsibilities not only for 

the defense of their own country, as evidenced by the move towards 

OPCON transition, also evidenced by, since 1994 when the ROK 

JCS has been responsible for and in charge of OPCON of their 

forces during armistice, but also what they are doing globally in 

order to be able to, as I said in my opening statement, to help build 

peace and security around the world with all the different peacekeeping missions that they are in. They are about ready to go back 

into Afghanistan. 

Having said that, I really do think that presence makes a big difference in any part of the world. And I think that our presence and 

our teaming with the Republic of Korea for the foreseeable future, 

just as it has for the last 57 years, will ensure peace and stability 

in Northeast Asia for the foreseeable future. 

So I think our investment of 28,500 troops, which our President 

and Secretary Gates have said is the force level that we will maintain for the foreseeable future, is a great investment in order to be 

able to help build the ROK military, as I think we have helped 

greatly along those lines so that they can globally engage, and to 

be able to have peace and security remain in Northeast Asia. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank both of you gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
18 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

And to Mrs. Willard, you look much better off than your husband 

does after those 38 years. You have held up great. 

But my question is, going with—being a Marine spouse or a 

Navy spouse can, at times, be lonely, fulfilling, exhilarating, and 

just not fun sometimes. So thank you for your service as well. 

Tying into Ranking Member McKeon’s question, when it comes 

to access—and I am talking forcible access. Just really quickly, 

what would you rate our forcible access capability on an A through 

F grade when it comes to the Pacific? 

Admiral WILLARD. We believe that, in our contingency plans, 

that we can achieve the access required to win those plans. 

Mr. HUNTER. So it would be an A-plus then? You can be anywhere that you needed to? 

Admiral WILLARD. I would offer that, to be quantitative—I mean, 

to describe this in the way that you desire, my preference would 

be to do this in a closed hearing. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Okay. We can do that. That was my question. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen, please. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can I have the rest of Mr. Hunter’s time? [Laughter.] 

Just kidding. 

Gentlemen, thanks for coming and helping us out. I want to start 

with General Sharp. I have to tell you, there is no better advocate 

for tour normalization in Korea than a spouse from my district. 

And so when you matched her up with my wife and me—or your 

predecessor did when we were there last—I heard about it on the 

way back, so, no better advocate. And I want to ask a question 

about that with regards to tour normalization. 

So we are headed to this, and it is a great idea, but what are 

the resources that you need, and how are you planning for those 

resources to accommodate the, you know, two-year and three-year 

tours? 

General SHARP. We are approaching tour normalization in a 

process to make sure that, as I tell the folks in my command, I 

don’t get ahead of my own headlights because we have got to make 

sure we have got the right infrastructure from schools, from housing, from medical in order to be able to do the right thing for these 

families. 

So the phases that the Department is going through right now 

is we are in, if you will, right now the first phase of tour normalization, which is to get the number of families there that I can accommodate with the infrastructure that I have in place, basically, right 

now. 

And that number is about 4,900 families. And, again, we are at 

about 3,900 right now. The goal is to get to that 4,900 and the 

services, mainly the Air Force and the Army, are committed to that 

by the end of, really, next summer. And, again, I am confident that 

we can get there. We are increasing about 100 families a month in 

Korea right now. 

The next phase is really what we are working through right now 

with the POM ’12–’17 [Program Objective Memorandum 2012– 
19 

2017] work that is going on right now in the Department and how 

quickly we are going to be able to get there. It is also—we have 

also got to link it to the move down to Camp Humphreys and the 

completion of Camp Humphreys because, again, that will be the 

place where we have the majority of Army service members and 

families. There will be many still down at Daegu, but the big hub 

is going to be at Camp Humphreys. 

So there is going to be some time in there where we are concentrating on moves and concentrating on building that Camp Humphreys infrastructure. And then, again, it gets down to, you know, 

the resources in order to be able to move forward to get all the facilities needed. 

And, again, you will see that, well really, next January when the 

Department submits the ’12–’17 POM. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thanks. 

Admiral Willard, two questions for you. In your testimony, on 

page 12—as I am leafing through this—on page 12, I think you 

really wrap up the issue with China—China’s interest a peaceful, 

stable environment that will support the country’s developmental 

goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving military capabilities 

that appear designed to challenge the U.S. freedom of action in the 

region. That is sort of this conundrum that we are in with this relationship with China. 

On page three, you talk about the growing presence and influence in the region create both challenges and opportunities. And 

we have been through some of these—you have talked through 

some of these challenges. Anti-access, we have talked about the 

ASAT [anti-satellite] tests, the military modernization. 

But I was wondering if you can talk about, you know, what kind 

of opportunities line up against that. And the final question I 

would have for you, if you would include separately, is you say we 

face challenges in building partner capacity in the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our security 

assistance efforts. 

Can you briefly wrap up your answer by talking about what does 

that patchwork look like and what does it need to look like to be 

cohesive for it to work for you? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much, Congressman Larsen. 

In terms of opportunities with China, when you consider the capacity building that has been ongoing, particularly as it relates to 

the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Navy, the potential for China 

to contribute constructively to security of the region and to contribute to ongoing prosperity in the region, the protection of commerce and the like is excellent—terrific. 

To date, we haven’t seen them dedicate their assets to that goal. 

Although, were they to emerge as a constructive partner, I think 

the region would be better for it. And when we look across the capabilities that they have produced, their ability to demonstrate a 

contribution to counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden, their ability to 

contribute into Haiti, and what that could look like in an ability 

to contribute into the Asia-Pacific region in our every-eight-week 

disaster response on average or through the soft areas of humanitarian assistance, I think China has great potential in all of that. 
20 

Mr. LARSEN. And, Mr. Chairman, could we get for the record the 

answer to the third question about security assistance and the 

patchwork and some of the changes Admiral Willard would like to 

see happen to make that work better for him? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If the Admiral would furnish that, please? 

Admiral WILLARD. I would be happy to furnish that, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found on pages 30 through 

31.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thanks, Chairman. 

General Sharp, Admiral Willard, thank you so much for your 

service to our country. 

General Sharp, you mentioned the movement of our troops from 

the northern part I guess towards the demilitarized zone [DMZ] of 

South Korea down to Camp Humphreys. And I understand that the 

South Korean Government is paying for those costs. 

General SHARP. Sir, they are paying for the cost of rebuilding the 

facilities that I have at Yongsan where my headquarters is now in 

Seoul. The cost to consolidate and to move the 2nd Infantry Division, which are in the camps and stations north of Seoul to Camp 

Humphreys is a shared burden between the United States and the 

Republic of Korea. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. And the policy change from an unaccompanied tour to a longer accompanied tour where the families of 

U.S. military service personnel are now going to South Korea, I understand probably now for, instead of a year assignment, now the 

personnel will stay on station for three years. 

But is that the U.S. cost—is that a cost to the U.S. taxpayers to 

build those schools, to build that infrastructure? 

General SHARP. Primarily, yes. And we are looking, again, at 

how to best do that to partner through many different mechanisms 

in order to be able to have that to be the most reduced cost. There 

is savings in and of itself where you don’t have to, you know, send 

somebody every year. Just the cost of moving people around, I 

think, is a cost that you are going to save by longer tours over 

there. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

General SHARP. The other thing is the tour normalization, as we 

call it, really bring us is, of course, a much more capable force. If 

I don’t have to train a new service member every year but I have 

got them for two or three years, that really greatly increases just 

our overall capability. 

Secondly, is it really does reduce stress. Why have an unaccompanied tour anywhere in the world if you don’t have to? And, finally, it really does, I think, show our commitment to Northeast 

Asia, which is critical. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I think that is my question, about showing our 

commitment. And I would raise the point, can’t we demonstrate 

commitment by having, say, annual scheduled military exercises— 

as we do currently, is my understanding—where we bring forces 

from the United States, when available, but to have annual exercises with the South Korean military where we—instead of having 

our forces permanently there, that we bring them there? 
21 

And we will certainly know that, when the situation would dictate, that intelligence or say the political environment and the military environment, the security environment in South Korea is such 

that it is coming to a boiling point, then we deploy our forces there. 

So is it necessary in this day and time to permanently have—if 

I understand the numbers right—28,000 U.S. military personnel in 

South Korea? 

General SHARP. Sir, first off, as you said, we do do exercises 

throughout the year, several very big ones. But I guess I personally 

believe that presence consistently around there in order to be able 

to develop the relationships, in order to be able to help work together military-to-military, is a requirement and gives us huge 

benefits to be able to do that. 

So I think, again, that presence is a requirement in an important 

part of the world like Northeast Asia. 

Secondly, to your point on being prepared and being able to have 

forces come, you know. As you know, North Korea has the great 

majority of their forces currently stationed very close to the DMZ. 

And the ability for them to be able to attack with little notice is 

there. And that is why we have to be prepared, shared with, you 

know, with the Republic of Korea who really has the forces along 

the DMZ to be prepared for that short contingency and to be able 

to get—our family members out of there—the other American citizens out there and then to be able to receive other forces that come 

in. 

So, again, and the number, sir, is 28,500. I do believe it is a great 

investment and has proven itself for 57 years in order to be able 

to maintain stability in not only Korea but Northeast Asia. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Admiral Willard, it would seem like, with China, that they could 

be participating in the Six-Party Talks a lot more than they are; 

that they certainly have the capacity to put pressure on North 

Korea that they are not putting on North Korea. It would seem to 

me that they feel that they benefit by having an uncertain security 

situation in North Korea and by forcing us to provide our assets 

in that direction. 

Could you comment on that? 

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman, I think we are convinced that 

the Chinese are committed to the denuclearization of North Korea 

as we are. And they have made efforts, increasing efforts, I think, 

over the past year to exert their influence over North Korea. At the 

end of the day, the choice to reenter into Six-Party or not has been 

a North Korean refusal. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and testifying today. 

Admiral, in looking at—we talked about our forward presence in 

relation to China and looking at it on a routine basis where there 

is not heightened tensions between the two nations. As we move 

forward, and if we—and not looking at a specific that we have a 

mission there to carry out where we insert to do certain things. But 

as we move forward, if there was a time of say, heightened tensions, could we maintain that, with what we anticipate the Chinese 
22 

to do, could we maintain that forward presence and still have safety in our fleet? 

Admiral WILLARD. If I understand your question correctly, Congressman, I think the answer is yes. 

We maintain a forward presence in the region for many, many 

purposes, and, again, the safety of the maritime domain, the safety 

of the sea lines of communication, and the international air space 

is a main reason why we are there. 

We respond to heightened tension and have, in my experience, on 

a fairly regular basis, last year’s provocations out of North Korea 

being a perfect example. 

And I am very confident in my ability to consolidate forces where 

I need them when I need them should a contingency arise. 

Mr. KISSELL. And we have talked about China and its relation 

with the United States and Japan and Korea. What about in the 

other parts of Southeast Asia, the other countries? As we see the 

presence of China grow and that influence change, do you see any 

response in those countries in how they might be in relation to us, 

the Chinese, and how that might be changing? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, I think that China’s influence is very 

wide-ranging throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and I would offer 

farther than that. I mean, we have all read and understand China’s influence in Africa, China’s influence in South America and so 

forth. I mean, this is a greatly expanding economy, and they are 

very influential. 

Likewise, their military-to-military contacts are also expanding 

throughout the region such that, wherever I go, whether I am 

speaking to military leadership or civilian leadership, we often 

have a discussion with regard to China, their influence in the region, their expanding military capacity, and what our views on it 

are. 

I think there will be comparisons drawn regarding the presence 

and influence of the United States military and the growing influence of China, you know, for a long time. And now, those comparisons are drawn and often written about or commented on throughout the region. 

Mr. KISSELL. At this point in time, there is changing relationships in the recognition of China and its objectives. Is there anything exceptionally negative there towards our relations with other 

nations that are taking place? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think on the contrary. The other nations are 

very receptive to U.S. presence, so this has been mostly a discussion regarding our staying power in the region and their desire for 

our continued influence in the region. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you. And, General, the move in Korea to 

Camp Humphreys, is that more strategic? More political? A combination? What for? What are the things that went into that thinking? 

General SHARP. First off, I think we are going to get a lot more 

efficient because we are able to consolidate. We are going down 

from over 105—approximately 107 camps and stations that were 

basically there at the end of the Korean War down to about 45 

camps and stations and consolidating many of those forces going 

into Camp Humphreys. 
23 

So just the efficiency that comes with that consolidation, I think, 

is very important. 

Secondly, again, it is able to be able to give back to the Republic 

of Korea some of the land that is very valuable, and I think that 

strengthens as far as the strategic alliance in order to be able to 

do that. 

Mr. KISSELL. And one last question. The expansion of the time— 

the rotation. We have been through all the reasons why. I am assuming this is popular with the service and their families? 

General SHARP. Sir, thank you for that question. It really is. And 

it is popular for a couple of reasons. 

Number one is, of course, we have many unaccompanied tours for 

service members that are going to Iraq and Afghanistan and other 

places, and there is no need to have an additional one in Korea. 

And secondly, the Republic of Korea is a great place to live. It 

is a great place to serve. The training that we are able to give our 

service members because of the ranges, because of the joint environment that we do with other services and the combined that we 

do with the Republic of Korea military. It is a great place to train 

our military. 

It is extremely safe. The people in Korea understand the importance of U.S. forces there. A recent State Department poll gave us 

87 percent of the people in Korea say it is important for us to be 

there. So it is a great place to serve. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson, please. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral and General, thank you very much for your service. 

I had such a great opportunity last year to go with a delegation 

the chairman led to Hawaii and to the very beautiful island of 

Guam, to Iwo Jima, Okinawa, to Korea. And everywhere, the 

American troops would just make you so proud. 

And what you have achieved—one of the longest periods of lack 

of conflict in the Pacific in history, and it is because of your good 

work and the good work of our troops. I am particularly grateful 

because my dad served in India and China during World War II. 

And I learned firsthand growing up the business spirit of the people of those two countries. And it has been exciting as the past cochair of the India Caucus, the largest country caucus here in Congress, reflecting the new partnership between India and the United 

States. 

And so, Admiral Willard, how is the Pacific Command engaging 

with India to help address terrorism concerns and strengthen the 

U.S.-India security partnership? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much for that question. 

We regard India as a particular area of focus for growing the 

strategic partnership that India and the United States currently 

enjoy. And the military-to-military relationship is a very important 

part of that. In the five months that I have been at Pacific Command, I have traveled to India twice and had, you know, very encouraging and good discussions with my counterparts there. 
24 

I think that the India-U.S. relationship right now is stronger 

than I have ever enjoyed. As you know, because of our history, we 

have only been truly engaging with India mil-to-mil [military-tomilitary] for about the last half a dozen years. And yet it has been 

pretty profound how far that has come. 

We are engaged with India now with regard to their counterterrorism challenges, particularly as it relates to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the 

terrorist groups that emanates from Pakistan and attacked into 

Mumbai, and what we believe to be their presence in areas surrounding India. And PACOM has a responsibility to develop the 

contingency plans to deal with that in support of our Indian 

friends. 

So I think, from foreign military sales [FMS] to other means of 

security assistance, to high-level strategic talks and the counterterrorism concerns that we both have, the Indian-U.S. relationship is 

terrific. 

Mr. WILSON. And as you said, it is exciting. This has only been 

a recent phenomenon. And the world’s largest democracy, India, 

with the oldest democracy, the United States, and to see us working together. I want to thank you. 

Another success story, obviously, is Korea, General. And I had 

the opportunity to meet with Korean troops in Afghanistan at a 

provincial reconstruction team site. What an example Korea is of 

recovery, success after a war. And so with that, I know our relationship now is going to evolve into a Joint Vision Statement. 

Can you tell how that will work? 

General SHARP. As I said, both President Lee and President 

Obama signed a Joint Vision Statement in June that really takes 

a look at how can the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance engage globally through all elements of power in order to be able to help security and stability, to be able to help economically around the world. 

I think President Lee’s vision is to be able to—because of the 

great prosperity and the great progress that the Republic of Korea 

has made since the end of the Korean War, to be able to give back 

some of that to the rest of the world. I mean, he is doing it—I will 

speak on the military side—very well with the different places that 

they are in UN peacekeeping missions around the world. 

And I think any sort of mechanism that increases that alliance 

between the Republic of Korea and the U.S., whether it is militarily or economically, really strengthens us in Northeast Asia and, 

really, globally. 

Mr. WILSON. And I can remember, as we were studying to go, 

that Korea had a per capita income back in 1960 of like a hundred 

dollars, today—which is equivalent to Afghanistan, but, today, one 

of the wealthiest countries on Earth. And so we can’t anticipate 

that for Afghanistan, but we can sure try to create the environment. 

A final question, Admiral, we do have international terrorism in 

that region. What is our success, particularly the Philippines? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir. 

The Philippines is now a longstanding engagement in support of 

the armed forces of the Philippines counterterrorism efforts. It has 

been very successful and particularly so in about the last 24 
25 

months where significant accomplishments against the Abu Sayyaf 

group have occurred. 

As you suggest, in our region, we have concerns in Indonesia. 

The Indonesian Government has been successful there, and we are 

now engaging the issues in and around India that I just described. 

So we have our own counterterrorism responsibilities that we are 

accomplishing through the great efforts of our forces every day. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis, please. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you so much for your service, both of you, and for joining 

us today. 

General Sharp, I actually am very pleased that many of my colleagues have asked about the normalization in South Korea, and 

I appreciate that as a spouse who was there in Japan many years 

ago during the Vietnam War. 

I actually have been wanting to kind of go and see with my own 

eyes. One of the concerns that I understand that may be changing 

some points of view for families are the high cost of housing, and 

I want to ask you quickly about that. 

Is it that we are not raising the bar sufficiently? We don’t have, 

I would assume, enough housing on any of the bases to accommodate those families. 

General SHARP. We, of course, go through recurring looks at how 

much cost of housing for those that are not on-post, are not on one 

of our bases, and we adjust in order to be able to accommodate 

that, so I believe that we are paying the amount that we need in 

order for families to get to standard housing off-post. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And of those families that you—when you see them 

coming on, you mentioned about a hundred a month—what percentage are on-post? What percentage are on the economy? 

General SHARP. It depends upon where they are going. All of 

them up north of Seoul are on the economy because we are moving 

out of those locations, and we are not going to build housing up in 

that area. 

I had to make the decision can we bring families to what we call 

Area 1, 2nd Infantry Division, or not have any families there until 

the move to Camp Humphreys. I talked to a lot of people, and people understand that, when they come command-sponsored up there, 

the facilities that they are going to get, but it is a family choice to 

be able to do that. 

And, again, they get housing allowance to get into true standard 

quarters off-post in Yongpyong—and the other places up north. 

Down where we are in Seoul, the great majority are on-post as is 

down in Osan on the Air Force base down there. 

That is kind of why I am capping at 4,900 until we make the 

move so that we can balance what we have both on-post and offpost. And let me just be a little more specific in Seoul. It is either 

on-post or Government-leased quarters which we have some 

around Seoul as to where the families are living. They are allowed 

to live on the economy, but that is what we have available at Seoul. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And on the economy, it has to be three years even 

for the economy—or can it be two years accompanied as well? 
26 

General SHARP. Right now, it can be two years or three years. 

The service member gets to make that choice. And the Department 

decided to start at that so that, as someone mentioned earlier, 

there is still a vision within a lot of our families, of ‘‘M*A*S*H’’ in 

Korea. And until we get the word out that, no, Korea is a modern 

country and it is a great place to live, the service members are 

being given choice. You can either come for two years and bring 

your family, or you can come for three years. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask about public opinion in both of the AORs and 

the extent to which I guess, in Korea, that the fact that you do 

have more families on the economy, what impact that has at all. 

But, also, speaking to Japan, you mentioned, Admiral Willard, 

the need to keep that relationship strong. I am wondering, also, 

about the messages that Members of Congress can send on any visits they make to Japan or even in your AOR. I mean, how important is that? Is that something that you would encourage more of? 

We know that members do travel, a lot, you know, certainly, to 

the war theater. But as well, we probably need to be making some 

of those contacts as well. We certainly do some of that, but perhaps 

it could and should increase. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. I don’t think there is any place in 

the world where the U.S. message is regarded as so important and 

so valued as in the Asia-Pacific. You know, we are polling and trying to understand the extent to which we are understood and the 

extent to which we are supported in the region. 

I would offer that, in recent surveys in Japan, the alliance is 

very, very highly regarded by the Japanese people, and I think that 

the recent statements by the Japanese Government as well have 

reinforced that. 

But I think Congress’ messages, whether they are delivered here 

in Washington or whether it is during your travels into the AsiaPacific, that have to do with our commitment to the region, the importance that our presence in the region, in your views, shares. I 

think these messages are invaluable. So thank you for delivering 

them and look forward to hosting you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have no questions. 

Well, on second thought, I will ask about—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. I will ask about Guam. The water 

facilities, the facilities, the infrastructure to deliver water, electrical generation facilities, landfills or some way of doing away with 

trash and garbage, sewage capacity, those kinds of things on the 

island as it is now would be—are already—those systems are 

termed as being inadequate. Is that correct? 

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman, I think that there are different 

levels of adequacy and insufficiencies associated with Guam infrastructure. It is important to remember that, by and large, this is 

infrastructure that was created after World War II and probably 

into about the 1970s, and they do have, you know, many concerns, 

challenges that they face. 
27 

In the area of water, they have an aquifer in the north and a reservoir in the south actually on Navy property. And the sufficiency 

of the aquifer is, right now, a concern of scientists in evaluating 

Guam’s ability to absorb more. 

So as you suggest, there are waivers and other challenges associated with Guam infrastructure, by and large, across the board of 

the items that you discussed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I mean, what would we do with trash and other 

waste products for 80,000 people at peak construction? How would 

we handle that? Is there a plan in place right now? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, Guam is in the process of developing another solid-waste disposal area on the island. 

Mr. JOHNSON. A landfill? 

Admiral WILLARD. They are expanding their landfill capacity 

now. But I think the answer to your question is, one, that, you 

know, the private enterprise could assist with and that we have to 

think broadly about how Guam fulfills its needs for its people 

through this, you know, peak capacity of new construction and with 

the additional 8,000 Marines and their families that, ultimately, 

would settle there. 

So there is analysis to be done to the extent that it hasn’t to ensure that we know and that the Government of Guam settles on 

what capacities and corrective actions need to be taken. 

Mr. JOHNSON. This is an island that, at its widest level is, what, 

12 miles from shore to shore? And at its smallest level or smallest 

location, it is 7 miles between one shore and the other. Is that correct? 

Admiral WILLARD. I don’t have the exact dimensions, but to your 

point, sir, I think Guam is a small island. 

Mr. JOHNSON. A very small island and about 24 miles, if I recall, 

long. So 24 miles long, about 7 miles wide at the least widest place 

on the island and about 12 miles wide on the widest part of the 

island. 

And I don’t know how many square miles that is. Do you happen 

to know? 

Admiral WILLARD. I don’t have that figure with me, sir. I can certainly supply it to you if you would like. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. My fear is that the whole island will become 

so overly populated that it will tip over and capsize. 

Admiral WILLARD. We don’t anticipate that. The Guam population, I think, currently about 175,000 and, again, with 8,000 Marines and their families, it is an addition of about 25,000 more into 

the population. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And, also, things like the environment, the sensitive areas of the environment—coral reefs and those kinds of 

things. And I know that, you know, lots of people don’t like to think 

about that, but you know, we didn’t think about global warming either. 

Now, we do have to think about it. And so I am concerned from 

an environmental standpoint whether or not Guam is the best 

place to do this relocation, but it is actually the only place. Is that 

correct? 

Admiral WILLARD. This is the best place. This is the farthest 

west U.S. territory that we own. And, you know, this is part of our 
28 

Nation. And in readdressing the forward presence and posture importance to Pacific Command, Guam is vital to this decision. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Willard, the comment was made earlier today that in 

order to justify cutting our defense budget, the somehow perceived 

threat from China was decreased in order to justify defense cuts. 

Do you have any reason to think that that is accurate? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think that the Quadrennial Defense Review, 

in characterizing the capabilities that have been part of what we 

have discussed here in terms of China’s advances, I think the QDR 

report accurately—it captures the concerns that I have regarding 

China. 

I think, likewise, the Secretary’s recent report to Congress on 

China capabilities accurately captures the concerns that we have 

with regard to China as well as we have already discussed some 

of the opportunities. 

So I do believe we understand the issues that we face out there. 

I spend a great deal of time and focus ensuring that I know these 

things and in communicating those to my counterparts and to my 

boss back in the Pentagon. 

Dr. SNYDER. This is my 14th year here, and through the years 

I have occasionally asked this question, and I will ask you because 

I don’t think you and I have talked about it before. 

At the highest ranks of Navy leadership, when you look at what 

the Chinese military is doing as their economy has grown over the 

last 2 or 3 decades, as they modernize their military, as they look 

to widen their military capability to extend out into the Pacific, 

how do you evaluate, if you were a Chinese Navy admiral, how do 

you evaluate, from your perspective, what is appropriate modernization consistent with their stature as a country with a growing economy versus behavior that we would think is not appropriate for a nation? Or does it matter from your perspective as U.S. 

Navy—— 

Admiral WILLARD. I think it does matter, and I think, sir, you 

are capturing the dilemma that we have with them. So this is China’s global strategy and regional approach. The stated intentions 

versus the actions that we actually see and the type of capabilities 

and so on that they develop, so to the extent the stated strategy 

is a peaceful contribution to a harmonious existence throughout the 

region and across the globe and what is developed are area-denial 

weapons and capabilities and power projection capabilities. The incongruence in that is what we are endeavoring to both understand 

and to answer. 

And in our engagement with China, while we seek to cooperate 

in areas of common interest, we want to have frank dialogues on 

exactly what you have suggested is the question. 

Dr. SNYDER. All right. Thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
29 

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today and your service 

to our Nation. 

I would just like to turn to a couple of areas, both cyber issues 

and missile defense, if I could. 

If I could, could you tell me what PACOM is doing in terms of 

defending our cyber assets if you are thinking of how PACOM has 

responded to recent reports of cyber attacks originating from China 

against Google. Clearly, this is—modern warfare has probably 

changed, and our cyber systems are at risk, and we can’t move 

quick enough as far as I am concerned to protect those assets. 

I also wondered, if you could, respond to China’s missile defense—China’s midcourse interception test earlier this year and 

how has PACOM factored that into the work that it does. And 

could you also give me an update on where we are on the Navy’s 

role in missile defense, particularly in your AOR? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. I will. 

As you suggest, cyber is a concern that I think is manifested in 

our Nation, let alone, in our military. Certainly, a concern in Pacific Command. We have been contending with intrusions, some of 

which are likely emanating from the People’s Republic of China 

[PRC] for years at this point. And I think you have seen the culmination of some of that as some of those intrusions have reached 

into our corporate communities most recently. 

The actions that we have taken in Pacific Command to contend 

with this range from passive defense actions to more active defense 

actions where we are endeavoring to understand all of the cyber 

domain as it relates to our command and control capabilities and 

information sharing capabilities and exactly how to defend them. 

And this is a combination of organizational adjustments, process 

adjustments, and technological additions to our systems that will 

help protect it as well as the mitigating actions when we do come 

under attack and how we deal with it. 

So we take many actions day to day. We have plans for contingency, and we are working very closely with Strategic Command 

[STRATCOM], the newly formed Cyber Command, and the Pentagon to ensure that our requirements in Pacific Command are understood and met. We think we are pretty central to the problem 

out there, and we are exercising to it as well in our large-scale exercises. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are you factoring in resilience and redundancies 

so that, should the system go down as a result of the cyber attack, 

that you will be able to respond, bounce back quickly? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, in passive defenses, 

that is hardening. That is the resilience and redundancy as well as 

our ability in, under attack, to come back with a secondary plan, 

a branch plan in order to continue to command and control. 

So this is a very multidimensional approach and, again, we are 

advancing in this, and I think we, as a Nation, have a long way 

to go to be assured that we are protecting our cyber domain. I 

think, inevitably, this will be a global challenge that will be discussed internationally and, ultimately, solved internationally. 

On your question of China’s missile defenses, the question arises 

as to whether or not the most recent exercise by China that had 

to do with a missile intercept was an anti-satellite test or a missile 
30 

defense test. And we are monitoring China’s capabilities in this 

area very closely, particularly concerned with their approaches to 

counter space. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And status on your role in integrating responsibilities in missile defense? 

Admiral WILLARD. In my previous assignment as the Pacific 

Fleet Commander, I was immersed in missile defense capabilities 

on the maritime side, the use of our Aegis platforms, and the naval 

dimension of missile defense but also its integration into our theater missile defense plans, regional missile defense plans, and national missile defense plans which now incorporate ground-based 

interceptors, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile systems, Patriot, and the like. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. It appears no one else has 

a question. Let me end with one question. 

Admiral, China has recently suspended the military-to-military 

contacts since American arms sales to Taiwan. What is the status 

of that now? And is China continuing to cooperate with us on maritime security issues? 

Admiral WILLARD. As you suggest, after the last announcement 

of Taiwan arms sales, China, once again, suspended military-tomilitary relations with the United States. If I were to look across 

all the forms of engagement across the departments of the U.S. 

with China, our military-to-military engagement is probably lagging all other forms of engagement as a consequence of both lack 

of substance at times in the engagement as well as the suspensions 

that routinely characterize it. 

We are seeking to reengage with China at multiple levels, and 

we look forward to the opportunity to reengage mil-to-mil both in 

terms of visitation and in terms of a variety of forms of contact 

with them. 

I think the broader issue is China’s appreciation for the value of 

mil-to-mil on a continuum, which we believe very strongly contributes to not just the military-to-military understanding and dialogue 

between the two countries but our ability to prevent misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and sometimes miscalculation. 

So we are encouraging our Chinese counterparts to consider milto-mil differently than they have in the past. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen has an additional question. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And this will save staff time on the question for the record. It 

gets back to the security assistance and the patchwork of programs 

that you have, and just a quick comment for context. 

A lot of discussion, obviously, on China, on Korea, and Japan, 

but showing our commitment to a lot of the smaller countries in 

terms of population and maybe they don’t get in the news a lot. 

These programs that we have that can help with our outreach on 

the military side of some of these countries is very important. 

What changes to the patchwork of programs would be necessary 

to help with the security assistance that will, you know, underscore 

that message of engagement that we are trying to have with these 

other countries in the region? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman Larsen. 
31 

The importance of this, as you suggest, in capacity building and 

capability growth among our partners in the region, critically important. I think if you were to poll them and say, ‘‘What in security 

assistance is lacking in your relationship with the United States 

military?’’, it is often our ability to deliver to their needs with 

speed. 

And so this gets into the processes associated with our foreign 

military support—FMS—our ability to execute foreign military 

sales and even some of the vehicles that we go to for other means 

of security assistance to fund to their immediate needs. 

So in lieu of years of effort in order to achieve a sale to one of 

these countries or an offer of excess capability to one of these countries, they are seeking assistance, often, in weeks and months. And 

our aged systems, processes, don’t support that. 

So I very much endorse Secretary Gates’ initiatives to try and 

streamline, particularly FMF [Foreign Military Financing], FMS 

processes—foreign military sales processes—in order to meet some 

of the speed demands that I perceive in the region. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Taylor has an additional question. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, I am very much in support of the President’s decision to move our national missile defense on ships. I was 

an early convert to Admiral Roughead’s decision to truncate the 

1,000 [DDG–1000 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer] and go back to building 51s [DDG–51 Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyers]. 

But given the complexity and the added dimension of another nation’s anti-ship missile that is now a factor, do you feel like we are 

doing everything we need to have a fleet that can defend itself 

while it is providing our Nation’s missile defense while it is obviously engaged in other actions around the world? Or is there something that we need to be doing additionally that, because of the 

new requirement for missile defense, has that changed the things 

you need? And are we getting you the things that you need? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think there are a couple ways to answer 

that. One is, in missile defense itself, there is the point defense requirements that our units need in order to be protected, so there 

are layered defenses that come down to a very internalized defense 

that each ship needs to be capable of. 

And I think we understand what those are, but our ability to 

contend, as you suggest, in an area-denial environment where we 

are relying on our ships for missile defense but also for four or five 

other mission areas in their multimission assignment, very important that they have the capabilities both in layering to defend 

themselves and as individual units to defend themselves. 

As I have viewed into the programs that are in work, both in 

areas that are kinetic and in areas that are non-kinetic, we are addressing these issues. I have advocated for many years for a better 

anti-ship capability within our fleet, and I think that, in the areas 

of development, we are seeking to understand what those requirements are. 

So to your point, yes, our units need to defend themselves. And 

it becomes increasingly important as we rely on them in this new 

and very critical mission area. I think we are addressing these 
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areas. I think they are vitally important that we pay attention to 

what those programs are and ensure that they are followed 

through. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess the simple question is: With that additional 

mission, are 313 ships enough? Or does that number have to go up 

again, keeping in mind that they not only have to defend us from 

missiles, but they have to defend themselves or else they are no 

good to us in the first instance? 

And that has got to have changed—plus the threat of that missile that everyone knows is out there. 

Admiral WILLARD. Some of the ballistic missile defense developments on the weapons side—so this is SM–3 developments—and 

the theater-level missile terminal capabilities that are under discussion and in development—I think these are the areas that will 

allow us to continue to incorporate these as multimission platforms 

across broader areas. 

I think that CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], right now, characterizes 313 as a floor, and I agree with that. I think that our shipbuilding, ship numbers, quantity of fleet are very important to 

United States Pacific Command, and I would expect that all the 

combatant commanders feel the same. 

So there is an importance in our continuing our shipbuilding efforts. I think that the answer with regard to this particular mission 

area across the multimissions of these units is a more multifaceted 

answer than simply numbers. It is the follow-on weapon developments as well. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, you know my concerns. You are in town. 

I would welcome the opportunity to talk to you off the record. 

Admiral WILLARD. I would be happy to do that, sir. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. 

General Sharp, thank you so much for being with us again. It is 

good to see you. 

And, Admiral Willard, we hope to see you many times in this 

role, so with that, we thank you for your service and the service 

of those you represent. The hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 25, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 25, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2010 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral WILLARD. The United States Pacific Command develops the Integrated 

Priority List (IPL) as part of the Comprehensive Joint Assessment response to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The IPL is my top ten capability gaps derived 

from analysis and assessment of the Pacific theater operational and contingency 

plans. The IPL becomes the ‘‘war fighter’s voice’’ within the Pentagon and exists to 

provide a transition from planning to programming. I rely upon the Services and 

defense agencies to use the IPL too as a foundational element as they develop their 

individual Program Objective Memoranda (POM). When the Services are unable to 

fund all the needs within their POM, they use the unfunded requirements mechanism to identify additional resources for emergent and growing operational needs. 

Navy’s FY11 unfunded list for Aviation Spares, Ship Depot Maintenance, and 

Aviation Depot Maintenance are all key to sustaining crucial operational capabilities in the Pacific. 

I cannot stress enough the importance of sustaining and maintaining the fleet. I 

depend upon the Navy and the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to provide prompt, 

capable, forward naval presence to continue our engagement strategy across the region. Our allies and regional partners depend on our naval aviation and maritime 

capabilities to assure and deter. I strongly endorse the Navy’s effort to sustain war 

fighting capabilities they seek in their FY11 unfunded list to mitigate risk to the 

Pacific Command. [See page 15.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, the 4 phases of the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach (PAA) provide some direction on the development of missile defense in Europe, but it does not address the PACOM region specifically. How do you 

see the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) applying to PACOM? What are the milestone dates to gain a capability in PACOM? What specific systems and inventory 

levels will be required to support a PAA in PACOM? What sites are likely candidates for land-based SM–3s and what is the status of host nation agreements for 

those sites? 

Admiral WILLARD and General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified 

and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, please discuss the threat that 

North Korean ballistic missiles pose in the region. How do you assess the current 

threat and the near-term threat over the next five years? I am especially concerned 

about the progress the North Koreans made in longer-range ballistic missiles last 

year and I would like to hear your assessment of where we stand today and in the 

future. 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

General SHARP. North Korea continues to develop its ballistic missile forces in 

order to threaten not only the Republic of Korea, USFK, and all of Japan but increasingly U.S. bases and territory in the western Pacific and beyond. Already possessing hundreds of theater ballistic missiles capable of doing significant damage to 

the South Korean and Japanese economies, we believe North Korea is now focused 

on improving the range, accuracy, and overall quality of its missiles. Recently, 

Pyongyang fielded a long-range theater ballistic missile, probably capable of threatening U.S. bases on Guam and the Aleutian Islands. 

North Korea’s announced intention on 29 April 2009 to conduct an ‘‘intercontinental ballistic missile’’ (ICBM) test launch—coming shortly after the 5 April 2009 

Taepo Dong–2 (TD–2) apparent satellite launch attempt—suggests a separate line 

of long-range missile development that could bring Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. 

mainland under threat of attack. Moreover, Pyongyang is likely interested in eventually developing a more survivable mobile ICBM—a natural evolutionary step 

given its goal of maintaining a credible deterrent and considering all other mature 

North Korean ballistic missile systems are mobile. If North Korea pursues robust 

research & development and testing, it is certainly possible for it to have an operational ICBM-range missile in five years’ time. 

With the 2009 launches of the multistage TD–2 Space Launch Vehicle and multiple-theater ballistic missiles, North Korea probably gained valuable testing experience, furthering the development of long-range missiles. Future TD–2 Space launch 

attempts may also serve as a test bed for other long-range missiles in development 

and the TD–2 itself could probably be used as a backup or alternate ICBM. Considering North Korea’s steady pursuit of both longer-range missiles and nuclear weapons, we believe the Kim Jong-il regime seeks to hold U.S. territory throughout the 

Pacific and the continental U.S. at risk of nuclear missile attack. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, the Administration’s shift to 

the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) in missile defense last Fall drives many force 

structure changes. As AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships are allocated to the Middle East and European missile defense to meet PAA milestones, 

does PACOM retain enough AEGIS-based missile defense capability to meet its 

needs against the growing threats in the region? What is the specific PACOM requirement for BMD-capable ships today? What do you project as the requirement 

in 5, 10 or 15 years? 

Admiral WILLARD and General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified 

and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, Admiral, the cyber attack 

against Google in China highlights an existing vulnerability for the United States. 

Our technological edge is a double-edged sword. There have been many initial steps 

taken to respond to the very real, and growing cyber threat. What has PACOM done 
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specifically to respond to the threat and how do you assess the cyber threat to your 

operations? 

Admiral WILLARD. PACOM has increased its cyber security posture as well as its 

vigilance regarding cyber threats to thwart any adversary’s intrusions on PACOM 

networks. Specifically, we have created a Cyber Fusion Center to coordinate directorate responses to network intrusions and to prevent network intrusions when possible. Through the Cyber Fusion Center, we have recently published theater Tailored Response Options and an Information Assurance situational awareness report 

to increase the theater’s and headquarters’ situational awareness regarding 

PACOM’s cyber threat. We assess the current cyber threat to our operations as 

high. 

General SHARP. I will address this question from the perspective of United States 

Forces Korea (USFK). We agree that there is a persistent and evolving cyber threat 

against USFK. We assess the current risk to USFK operations as low due to our 

ability to implement countermeasures. 

Historically, we have implemented a layered computer network security defense 

structure termed Defense-in-Depth that has successfully mitigated the risk of cyber 

threat Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation 

(CNE). A Red Team assessment that simulated cyber threat activities during March 

2010 validated our secure and strong defensive posture. However, cyber threat actors have discovered new ways to circumvent our Defense-in-Depth structure with 

varying degrees of success. As such, in order for USFK to maintain confidence in 

the protection of our networks, we must continue to identify and resource new technologies that defend against the evolving threats. The discussion below outlines the 

mitigation steps USFK implements on a daily basis to respond to cyber threats. 

USFK employs various layers of Defense-In-Depth countermeasures to thwart off 

attacks similar to the Google Aurora cyber threat; to include four different commercial vendors of network layer Intrusion Detection System (IDS) used at the network 

layer which identify network traffic at the source and destination. We also use web 

cache engines that screen malicious content, and reverse proxy servers for publicfacing web servers. Secure external remote access to our networks is achieved 

through Virtual Private Network (VPN) concentrators and Public Key Infrastructure 

(PKI) for authentication. 

USFK has implemented additional host security tools. These products defend 

against known, unknown zero-day exploits, and malware. We utilize four different 

vendors for remediating and identifying vulnerabilities in our Defense-In-Depth architecture. Units in Korea are given the Army Gold Masters (AGM) software image 

for ensuring a secure baseline is being maintained; this software baseline is also 

validated daily with the Host Based Security System (HBSS) tool. There are three 

different antivirus vendors that are used to ensure the malware is detected, stopped, 

and eradicated from the Email servers. The Common Access Card (CAC) utilizes 

PKI for identity management. These combined technologies provide user confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation when using information systems. USFK users are required to sign an Acceptable Use Policy, and receive annual 

security awareness training to reinforce security focused usage on government networks. PKI has been detrimental in email phishing attempts like those used in the 

Google Aurora cyber threat. 

Note—USFK was used as the test bed for DOD’s deployment of HBSS, Hercules, 

and Retina Enterprise Manager (REM). Since we were one of the first enterprises 

to successfully deploy HBSS, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and 

McAfee have modeled their BBPs off of our deployment methods. 

In the past 6 months, DISA performed two Command Cyber Readiness Inspections (CCRI) on the Korean Peninsula. Both Kunsan Air Base and Joint Command 

Information Systems Activity (JCISA) inspections resulted in monitor compliance 

and excellent marks, respectively. The 1st Signal Brigade Korea–Theater Network 

Operations and Security Center (K–TNOSC) is scheduled for their CCRI in June. 

Microsoft released a patch for this zero-day vulnerability on the 21st of January 

2010; one week after the initial US–CERT notice. Before this patch was made available, USFK IA/CND informed their community of the vulnerability and available 

countermeasures recommended in JTF–GNO, US–CERT, and other civilian reports. 

USFK maintains a robust Information Assurance Vulnerability Management 

(IAVM) program. As of 31 March 2010, USFK is currently 99.40% compliant for this 

particular Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA). 

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