U . S . C o m m i ss i o n o n C i v i l R i g h t s

Washington, DC 20425

Visit us on the web: www.usccr.gov
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is an independent, 

bipartisan agency established by Congress in 1957. It is 

directed to:

•	Investigate complaints alleging that citizens are

being deprived of their right to vote by reason of their 

race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national 

origin, or by reason of fraudulent practices.

•	Study and collect information relating to

discrimination or a denial of equal protection of 

the laws under the Constitution because of race, 

color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national 

origin, or in the administration of justice.

•	Appraise federal laws and policies with respect to

discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws 

because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or 

national origin, or in the administration of justice.

•	Serve as a national clearinghouse for information

in respect to discrimination or denial of equal 

protection of the laws because of race, color, 

religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin.

•	Submit reports, findings, and recommendations

to the President and Congress.

•	Issue public service announcements to discourage

discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws.

Members of the Commission

Gerald A. Reynolds, Chairman

Abigail Thernstrom, Vice Chair

Todd Gaziano

Gail Heriot

Peter N. Kirsanow

Arlan D. Melendez

Ashley L. Taylor, Jr.

Michael Yaki

Martin Dannenfelser, Staff Director

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

624 Ninth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20425

(202) 376-8128 voice

(202) 376-8116 TTY

www.usccr.gov

This report is available on disk in ASCII Text and Microsoft Word 2003 for persons with visual impairments. Please call (202) 376-8110.

Cover photo: “Suburban American Flag.” David Gilder, 2006. Photo: istockphoto.com.
CIVIL RIGHTS

a n d t h e

Mortgage Crisis

U n i t e d S t a t e s C o m m i ss i o n o n C i v i l R i g h t s

September 2009

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

The President 

The President of the Senate 

The Speaker of the House 

Sirs and Madam: 

The United States Commission on Civil Rights transmits this report, An Examination of Civil Rights 

Issues With Respect to the Mortgage Crisis, pursuant to Public Law 103-419. The purpose of the report 

is to examine whether federal efforts to increase homeownership rates among minority and low-income 

individuals may have unintentionally weakened underwriting standards and lending policies to the point 

that too many borrowers were vulnerable to financial distress and heightened risk of default, thereby 

setting conditions for the current mortgage crisis. It also examines the policies of federal agencies in 

enforcing prohibitions against mortgage fraud and lending discrimination. 

To that end, the Commission studied federal policies aimed at increasing low-income and minority 

homeownership, including the Community Reinvestment Act and the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development’s lending goals for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac, and the critiques regarding the relationship of such policies to the mortgage crisis. As 

part of its analysis, the Commission also considered the impact of the growth of securitization on 

lending practices, including the availability of subprime mortgages and other kinds of credit, as well as 

the manner in which such credit was made available on the secondary market. This analysis involved 

gathering information from the GSEs and some eleven federal agencies with various levels of regulatory 

responsibility over the housing market and lending standards. 

The Commission also looked at issues of predatory lending, mortgage fraud, and lending discrimination 

and assessed the efforts of eight federal agencies with responsibility for enforcing the Fair Housing and 

Equal Credit Opportunity Acts to combat such practices. The result, we hope, will contribute to the 

growing body of literature for consideration by policy makers as they examine whether existing lending 

policies require revision, modification, or elimination to avoid a future similar crisis while enhancing the 

possibility that the American dream of homeownership remains an attainable goal for low and middleincome Americans. 

On August 7, 2009, the Commission approved this report. The vote was as follows: Chapters 1-5 and 

the appendix were approved by Commissioners Reynolds, Thernstrom, Kirsanow and Taylor, with 

Commissioners Yaki, Melendez, Heriot and Gaziano abstaining. The Commission declined to adopt 

findings and recommendations to this report with six Commissioners voting against adoption, and with 

Vice Chair Thernstrom and Commissioner Melendez abstaining. The report includes a joint statement 

and separate rebuttal statements submitted by Commissioners Melendez and Yaki, a separate statement 

by Vice Chair Thernstrom, and a joint rebuttal statement by Commissioners Gaziano, Reynolds, 

Kirsanow, and Taylor.

For the Commissioners, 

Gerald A. Reynolds 

Chairman

Table of Contents v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.................................................................................................................. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................ v

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................... 1

Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 1

Scope and Methodology ................................................................................................................... 2

PART I: MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP .............................................................................................. 5

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL POLICIES TO INCREASE MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP AND CRITIQUES REGARDING THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE MORTGAGE CRISIS ..... 7

I. Bipartisan Effort ........................................................................................................................ 7

II. The Community Reinvestment Act ........................................................................................ 11

A. Evolution of the CRA .................................................................................................................................... 11

B. Agencies and Their Evaluation Authority ..................................................................................................... 13

III. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ................................................................................................. 16

A. HUD Goals .................................................................................................................................................... 16

B. Legal and Regulatory History of HUD Goals ............................................................................................... 16

C. Setting and Meeting the Goals ...................................................................................................................... 18

D. Broad, Continued Legislative Response to the Mortgage Crisis ................................................................... 22

CHAPTER 2: HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICIES: CRITIQUES AND RESPONSE ................................ 25

I. Response to the Alleged Role of the CRA and HUD Lending Goals in the Mortgage Crisis 29

II. Other Causes ........................................................................................................................... 35

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES TO INCREASE MINORITY 

HOMEOWNERSHIP ............................................................................................................................... 47

I. Policies to Increase Minority and Low- and Moderate-Income Homeownership .................. 47

A. Homeownership Patterns............................................................................................................................... 47

B. Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership Over Time ....................................................................... 47

II. Review and Analysis of Mortgage Lending Statistics and Changes in Lending Standards ... 51

A. Disparities in Conventional Mortgage Loans by Race Over Time ................................................................ 51

B. Disparities in Refinance Loans by Race Over Time ..................................................................................... 55

III. Prime and Subprime Lending ................................................................................................. 59

A. Prime vs. Subprime Lending by Race Over Time ......................................................................................... 61

IV. Foreclosure Rates by Type of Loan Over Time ...................................................................... 64

V. Community Reinvestment Act ................................................................................................ 66

A. Number and Monetary Value of Prime v. Subprime Loans .......................................................................... 67
vi Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

B. Mortgage Lending Within CRA Assessment Areas 1993-2006 .................................................................... 69

C. Distribution of Subprime Loans 2004-2007 .................................................................................................. 70

D. Distribution of Prime Loans 2004-2007 ........................................................................................................ 74

E. Mortgage Lending by Neighborhood Income, 2006 ..................................................................................... 79

F. Mortgage Lending By Race .......................................................................................................................... 81

VI. HUD’s Lending Goals ............................................................................................................ 83

A. GSEs’ Performance Against the HUD Goals ................................................................................................ 86

B. GSEs’ Efforts to Increase Minority Homeownership .................................................................................... 88

C. GSEs’ Share of the Lending Market Over Time ........................................................................................... 97

D. GSEs’ Volume of Purchasing Subprime Lending Over Time..................................................................... 101

E. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Purchasing of Private-Label Securities Over Time................................... 104

PART II: PREDATORY LENDING, MORTGAGE FRAUD, AND MORTGAGE LENDING 

DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................................... 111

CHAPTER 4: PREDATORY LENDING, Mortgage FRAUD, AND MORTGAGE Lending 

DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................................... 113

I. Predatory Lending ................................................................................................................. 117

II. Mortgage Fraud ..................................................................................................................... 120

A. Mortgage Fraud Generally .......................................................................................................................... 120

B. Federal Enforcement Against Mortgage Fraud ........................................................................................... 123

III. Mortgage Lending Discrimination ........................................................................................ 129

A. Statutory Efforts to Protect Mortgage Applicants and Borrowers ............................................................... 131

B. Federal Enforcement of FHA and ECOA ................................................................................................... 141

PART III: CREDIT SCORING .............................................................................................................. 169

CHAPTER 5: CREDIT SCORING AND OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE GRANTING AND 

PRICING OF LOANS ............................................................................................................................ 171

I. Background: The Boston Fed Study ..................................................................................... 171

II. Methods Lenders Use to Quantify Credit Risk of Prospective Borrowers ........................... 174

A. Effects of Credit Scoring Methods on Minority and Other Populations. .................................................... 177

III. Factors Other than Credit Score that Relate to Differences in Lending for Minorities and 

Whites ................................................................................................................................... 187

METHODOLOGY USED IN REPORT ................................................................................................ 190

STATEMENT OF VICE-CHAIR THERNSTROM .............................................................................. 195

JOINT STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS MELENDEZ AND YAKI ........................................ 201

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MELENDEZ ....................................................... 207

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER YAKI .................................................................. 211

JOINT REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS GAZIANO, REYNOLDS, KIRSANOW, 

AND TAYLOR ....................................................................................................................................... 215
Table of Contents vii 

FIGURES 

Figure 2.1 New Privately-Owned Housing Units Started, 2000–2006 ..................................................... 41

Figure 2.2 The Federal Funds Rate: The Interest Rate at Which Depository Institutions Lend 

Balances at the Federal Reserve to Other Depository Institutions Overnight, 2000–2006 ...................... 42

Figure 3.1 Homeownership Rate by Race and Ethnicity, 1994–2008 ...................................................... 49

Figure 3.2 Net Gain in Homeownership Rate by Race and Ethnicity, 1994–2008 .................................. 51

Figure 3.3 Conventional Loans Made to Applicants by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 ........................ 52

Figure 3.4 Conventional Mortgage Applications Denied by Race and Ethnicity, 1999-2007 ................. 53

Figure 3.5 Denial of Conventional Mortgage Applications Based on Credit History by Race and 

Ethnicity, 1999-2007................................................................................................................................. 54

Figure 3.6 Refinance Loans Granted to Applicants by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 ......................... 56

Figure 3.7 Refinance Loan Applications Denied by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 ............................. 57

Figure 3.8 Denial of Refinance Loan Applications Based on Credit History by Race and Ethnicity, 

1999–2007................................................................................................................................................. 58

Figure 3.9 Subprime (Higher-Priced) Conventional Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans by 

Race and Ethnicity, 2004–2007 ................................................................................................................ 61

Figure 3.10 Subprime (Higher-Priced) Conventional Refinance Loans as a Percentage of Total 

Conventional Refinance Loans by Race and Ethnicity, 2004–2007 ......................................................... 63

Figure 3.11 Mortgage Foreclosure Rates by Type of Loan, 1998–2008 .................................................. 64

Figure 3.12 Conventional Foreclosure Rates by Type of Loan, 1998–2008 ............................................ 65

Figure 3.13 Subprime (Higher-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) Originated, 

2004–2007................................................................................................................................................. 67

Figure 3.14 Subprime (Higher-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Billions of Dollars), 

2004–2007................................................................................................................................................. 68

Figure 3.15 Mortgage Lending Within CRA Assessment Areas, 1993–2006 ......................................... 69

Figure 3.16 Distribution of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) by Income 

of Borrowers and/or Neighborhood, 2004–2007 ...................................................................................... 71

Figure 3.17 Distribution of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Mortgage Loan Volume (Billions of Dollars) 

by Income of Borrowers and/or Neighborhood Income, 2004–2007 ....................................................... 72

Figure 3.18 Percent Distribution of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) to 

Lower-Income of Borrowers and/or Neighborhoods by Lender Type, 2004–2007 ................................. 73

Figure 3.19 Distribution of Prime (Lower-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) 

Originated, 2004–2007 ............................................................................................................................. 74

Figure 3.20 Distribution of Prime (Lower-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Billions of 

Dollars), 2004–2007 ................................................................................................................................. 75
viii Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.21 Distribution of Prime Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) by Income of Borrowers and/ 

or Neighborhood, 2004–2007 .................................................................................................................. 76

Figure 3.22 Prime Mortgage Loan Volume (Billions of Dollars) by Income of Borrowers and/or 

Neighborhood Income, 2004–2007 .......................................................................................................... 77

Figure 3.23 Percent Distribution of Prime (Lower-Priced) Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) to Lowand Moderate-Income Borrowers and/or Neighborhoods by Lender Type, 2004–2007 .......................... 78

Figure 3.24 Home Purchase Mortgage Loans by Type of Neighborhood Income, 2006 ......................... 79

Figure 3.25 Refinance Mortgage Loans by Type of Neighborhood Income, 2006 .................................. 80

Figure 3.26 Home Purchase Loans by Race, 2006 ................................................................................... 82

Figure 3.27 Home Refinance Loans by Race/Ethnicity, 2006 .................................................................. 83

Figure 3.28 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Performance Against the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development’s Lending Goals and Subgoals, 1993–2007 ............................................................ 87

Figure 3.28 (continued) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Performance Against the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development’s Lending Goals and Subgoals, 1993–2007 ....................................... 88

Figure 3.29 GSEs’ Purchased Loans (of Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Ones) 

Apportioned by Race/Ethnicity of Minority Borrowers, 1999–2007 ....................................................... 91

Figure 3.30 Counts of GSEs’ Loans (of Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Ones) Involving 

Minority Borrowers, 1999–2007 .............................................................................................................. 93

Figure 3.31 Counts of GSEs’ Purchased Loans (of Institutions’ Originations or Purchased Ones) 

Involving Minority or White Borrowers, 1999–2007 ............................................................................... 96

Figure 3.32 Counts of GSEs’ Loans Purchased (of Financial Institutions’ Originations and 

Purchased Loans), 1999–2007 ................................................................................................................. 98

Figure 3.33 The Number of Loans Purchased (of Financial Institutions’ Originations and 

Purchased Loans), 1999–2007 ................................................................................................................. 99

Figure 3.34 GSEs’ Purchased Loans’ (of Financial Institutions’ Originations and Purchased 

Loans) Percent of the Market, 1999–2007 .............................................................................................. 100

Figure 3.35 Percent of the Number of Loans by Type of Purchaser (Originations and Purchased 

Loans), 1999–2007 ................................................................................................................................. 101

Figure 3.36 Number of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Loans (Both First and Junior Liens) 

(Originations Only) By Type of Purchaser, 2004–2007 ......................................................................... 102

Figure 3.37 Value of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Loans (Both First and Junior Liens) 

(Originations Only) By Type of Purchaser, 2004–2007 ......................................................................... 103

Figure 3.38 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Purchases of Private-Label Mortgage-Related 

Securities, 1990–2007 ............................................................................................................................. 105

Figure 3.39 Proportion of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Purchases of Private-Label 

Mortgage-Related Securities that Were Single-Family Subprime or Alt-A, 2002–2007 ....................... 107

Figure 4.1 Financial Institutions’ Mortgage Fraud-Related Suspicious Activity Reports, Fiscal 

Years 2003–2008 .................................................................................................................................... 121
Table of Contents ix 

Figure 4.2 FBI’s Pending Investigations of Mortgage Fraud, Fiscal Years 2003–2008 ........................ 125

Figure 4.3 Total Number of Closed HUD and FHAP Lending Complaints, 1990–2008 ....................... 143

Figure 4.4 ECOA Referrals DOJ Received from Each of Seven Federal Regulatory Agencies, 

1999–2007............................................................................................................................................... 146

Figure 4.5 Dispositions of the Year’s ECOA Referrals from Regulatory Agencies at Year’s End, 

1999–2007............................................................................................................................................... 147

Figure 4.6 Consumer Complaints to FDIC, 2003–2008 ......................................................................... 159

Figure 4.7 Mortgage Discrimination (Race/National Origin) and Predatory Lending Complaints 

Received by OCC, 1998–2008 ............................................................................................................... 163

Figure 4.8 Mortgage Lending Complaints Referred to HUD, 1999–2008 ............................................. 164

Figure 4.9 Home Mortgage Lending Complaints Received by OTS, 1999–2008 .................................. 166

Figure 5.1 Average Credit Score (on a Scale of 0 to 100) by Racial Group, June 30, 2003 .................. 179

Figure 5.2 Distribution of Credit Scores by Racial Group, June 30, 2003 ............................................. 181

Figure 5.3 Bad Performance on Any Account by Credit Score and Racial Group ................................ 183

Figure 5.4 Probability of Getting a New Loan by Credit Score and Racial Group ................................ 184

TABLES 

Table 1.1 Levels of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Lending Goals and 

Subgoals for Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 1996–2007 ................................................................ 18

Table 1.2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Revised Goals and Subgoals, 2009 ........................................... 22

Table 3.1 Levels of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Lending Goals and 

Subgoals for Government-Sponsored Enterprises Since 1996 by Year ................................................... 85

Table 5.1 Default Rate on New Loans for the Two Years (October 2000 to October 2002) after 

Origination, by FICO Credit Score ......................................................................................................... 175

Table 5.2 Average Interest Rate on Fixed-Rate, Thirty-Year Home Loan by FICO Credit Score, 

July 14, 2009 ........................................................................................................................................... 176

Table 5.3 Incidence of Credit Record Item by Demographic Group ...................................................... 178

Table 5.4 Percent of Racial and Ethnic Groups With No Credit History on Which to Base Credit 

Scores ...................................................................................................................................................... 185

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 

Introduction and Overview 1 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 

Overview 

Over the last several decades, the federal government has adopted a series of policies to address the 

persistent gap in homeownership rates between whites and racial and ethnic minorities. These efforts, 

undertaken by administrations of both major political parties, sought to increase minority homeownership through a variety of means. The initial steps focused on the adoption of laws prohibiting 

discrimination based on characteristics such as race, sex, religion, etc. More recently, federal laws and 

policies have sought to affirmatively further homeownership for those of low- and moderate-income. 

The most important of these policies involve the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act 

and the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) lending goals for governmentsponsored enterprises such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal 

Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). There is little doubt that, over the last 15 years, 

homeownership generally, and minority homeownership in particular, has increased. For example, from 

1994 to 2004, overall U.S. homeownership increased from 64 percent to 69 percent—an increase of 5 

percentage points in just over a decade. The increase in minority homeownership has been even more 

substantial. During the same time period, Hispanic homeownership rates increased 6.9 percentage points 

while Black homeownership rates increased 6.8 percentage points. 

Moreover, although the mortgage crisis may not have run its course, figures from 1994 through 2008 

indicate that overall homeownership rates demonstrate a net gain despite the advent of the crisis and 

increased rates of foreclosures. Specifically, overall homeownership from 1994 to 2008 increased by 3.8 

percentage points, White homeownership by 4.0 percentage points, Black homeownership by 5.1 

percentage points, Hispanic homeownership by 7.9 percentage points, Asian/Native Hawaiian 

homeownership by 8.2 percentage points, and American Indian homeownership by 4.8 percentage 

points. 

The current mortgage crisis, however, raises questions as to whether the policies that helped increase 

homeownership may have come with a hidden cost. Specifically, questions have been raised as to 

whether the actions taken to affirmatively further homeownership might have, unintentionally, 

weakened underwriting standards and lending policies to the point that too many borrowers were 

vulnerable to financial distress and a heightened risk of default. 

This report examines civil rights issues with respect to the mortgage crisis so that policy makers can 

determine whether existing policies should be revised, modified, or ended. We believe that this focused 

contribution will help determine the effectiveness of the various federal laws and policies adopted to 

increase homeownership for minorities and low- and moderate-income individuals.1

 

1

 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has historically reviewed housing policy and antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., U.S. 

Commission on Civil Rights, USCCR Statutory Reports 1961, 1961; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Federal Installations 

and Equal Housing Opportunity, March 1970; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Home Ownership For Lower Income 

Families: A Report on the Racial and Ethnic Impact of the Section 235 Program, June 1971; U.S. Commission on Civil 
2 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Scope and Methodology2

This study is presented in three parts. Part I is an overview of federal policies adopted to increase 

minority homeownership, critiques regarding the relationship of such policies to the mortgage crisis, and 

an analysis of the effects of the federal policies to increase minority homeownership. 

In preparing this section, the Commission sought and analyzed information of regulatory enforcement 

activities from 11 federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises. In addition, it assembled 

historic trend data on homeownership disparities and mortgage lending statistics from the Census 

Bureau and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve), which 

regulates collection of a statutorily-mandated database on loans under the Home Mortgage Disclosure 

Act. The Commission also obtained data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with regard to such matters 

as mortgages issued, overall financial performance, and lending standards. The effort included an 

internet document search and literature review as well as contacts with researchers and financial analysts 

who study relevant issues. 

Part II of the report addresses the issue of predatory lending, mortgage fraud, and mortgage lending 

discrimination. The section examines the roles and policies of various federal agencies in enforcing 

prohibitions against mortgage fraud and lending discrimination. For this purpose, the Commission 

studied the eight agencies assigned the responsibility of enforcing the Fair Housing Act and the Equal 

Credit Opportunity Act. These agencies are HUD, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade 

Commission, and the five agencies which comprise the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 

Council – the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 

 

Rights, Mortgage Money: Who Gets It?: A Case Study in Mortgage Lending Discrimination in Hartford, Connecticut, June 

1974; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement Effort, March 1979; U.S. Commission on 

Civil Rights, Housing: Chicago Style, A Consultation, October 1982; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, A Sheltered Crisis: 

The State of Fair Housing in the Eighties, September 1983; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Issues in Housing 

Discrimination, Vol. I (Papers Presented) & II (Proceedings), November 1985; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Prospects 

and Impacts of Losing State and Local Agencies from the Federal Fair Housing System, September 1992; U.S. Commission 

on Civil Rights, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Enforcement Report, September 1994; U.S. Commission on 

Civil Rights, Ten-Year Check-Up: Have Federal Agencies Responded to Civil Rights Recommendations? Vol. IV, September 

2004. 

2

 For a more detailed explanation of the methodology used by the Commission in preparing this report, please see the last 

section of the report entitled “Methodology Used in Report.” 
Introduction and Overview 3 

Finally, Part III of the study examines the role of credit scoring and other factors used by lenders in the 

granting and pricing of loans. This section analyzes whether such tools are objective predictors of 

creditworthiness. 

In preparing this report, the Commission was aided by the written statements and oral testimony of those 

appearing at the briefing held on this topic on March 20, 2009.3

 

3

 The written statements and oral testimony relating to the March 20, 2009 briefing are available at www.usccr.gov. The 

panelists were: David Berenbaum, National Community Reinvestment Coalition; Brian Brooks, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP; 

Luke Brown, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; Glenn Canner, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Jim 

Carr, National Community Reinvestment Coalition; Leonard Chanin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; 

Marsha Courchane, Charles River Associates; Eileen Harrington, Federal Trade Commission; Howard Husock, Manhattan 

Institute; Stan Liebowitz, University of Texas-Dallas; Ken Markison, Mortgage Bankers Association; Alfred Pollard, Federal 

Housing Finance Agency; Lisa Rice, National Fair Housing Alliance; John Weicher, Center for Housing and Financial 

Markets; and Barry Wides, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 

PART I: MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP 

Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 7 

CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL POLICIES TO INCREASE MINORITY 

HOMEOWNERSHIP AND CRITIQUES REGARDING THEIR RELATIONSHIP 

TO THE MORTGAGE CRISIS 

There are two primary federal programs meant to increase homeownership in minority and other 

underserved communities:1 the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the affordable housing goals 

established by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). 

In both cases, the federal policies in question do not provide for direct federal subsidies or transfer 

payments. Instead, the policies seek to increase homeownership through an indirect process, requiring 

private entities to comply with goals and performance criteria. 

The adoption and subsequent modifications of the HUD lending goals and the CRA have been the 

subject of extensive debate and challenges. This section will describe the stated goals behind these 

policies and discuss some of the issues that have been raised about the role these policies may have had 

with regard to the mortgage crisis. 

I. Bipartisan Effort 

The effort to increase homeownership generally, and minority homeownership in particular,2 has been 

bipartisan in nature. In recent decades, both political parties have sought to increase the rate of 

homeownership and to narrow the gap between Whites and minorities in this area.3

 

1

 While both policies do not explicitly indicate they are addressing minority homeownership, public statements by both the 

Clinton and Bush administrations made clear that increasing minority homeownership was a major goal of both policies. See 

also U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline Report, 

April 2000, p. ES-8 (“Although the CRA does not focus on race, the statute had its origins in concerns about redlining, and 

evidence of discrimination adversely affects the regulators’ evaluation of a depository institution’s CRA performance.”); 

John Weicher, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, March 20, 2009, p. 3 (hereafter referred to as 

Weicher, Statement) (“The affordable housing goals are not set in terms of the race or ethnicity of the borrower ... There is, 

however, policy interest in the extent to which borrowers ...are members of minority groups.”). 

2 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline Report

at p. ES-8. (“Although the CRA does not focus on race, the statute had its origins in concerns about redlining, and evidence 

of discrimination adversely affects the regulators’ evaluation of a depository institution’s CRA performance.”) See also

Weicher, Statement at p. 3. (“The affordable housing goals are not set in terms of the race or ethnicity of the borrower ... 

There is, however, policy interest in the extent to which borrowers ...are members of minority groups.”). 

3

 The push to increase homeownership of low-income individuals was also backed by community groups such as the National 

People’s Action on Housing, which brought pressure on the government, as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to loosen 

credit standards. In describing the efforts of one such group, one author noted: 

[The National People’s Action on Housing organization] would figure out how the entire American mortgage system 

functioned, take it apart, and put it back together again as a machine for fixing broken neighborhoods. Bolstered by 

the Community Reinvestment Act, they would use community organizing to take on every force that stood between 
8 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Many of the significant changes to both the CRA and the HUD lending goals began under President 

Clinton. 

Under President Clinton’s direction, HUD 

work[ed] with dozens of national leaders in government and the housing industry to 

implement the National Homeownership Strategy, an unprecedented public-private 

partnership to increase homeownership to a record-high level over the next 6 years.4 

As President Clinton explained: 

Since 1993, nearly 2.8 million new households have joined the ranks of America’s 

homeowners, nearly twice as many as in the previous two years. But we have to do a lot 

better. The goal of this strategy, to boost homeownership to 67.5 percent by the year 

2000, would take us to an all-time high, helping as many as 8 million American families 

across that threshold.5 

The Clinton administration’s goals were summarized in the policy document, The National 

Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream, issued by HUD in May 1995. This report 

made clear that it was federal policy to attempt to close the homeownership gap between Whites and 

minorities.6

 

Chicago residents and access to home loans. It would be a kind of democratic coup, where the nation’s financial 

powers would have to respond to the popular will. 

* * * 

To do that, ... Fannie Mae would have to do business very differently, and a little more recklessly. It would have to 

tolerate late mortgage payments, at least sometimes. It had to accept that old buildings in cities had some value, no 

matter what the appraisal manual said. The company would have to lower its minimum required down payment, 

from 10 to 5 or even 3 percent. And it would have to allow borrowers to take on more debt, compared to their 

income, than anyone had previously considered reasonable. 

ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US pp. 14, 24 (2009). 

4

 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Urban Policy Brief, Number 2, August 1995, 

<http://www.huduser.org/publications/txt/hdbrf2.txt> (last accessed July 13, 2009). See also U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development, The National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream, May 1995 (hereafter cited as 

HUD, National Homeownership Strategy). 

5

 President William J. Clinton, Remarks on the National Homeownership Strategy (June 5, 1995), 

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=51448> (last accessed July 13, 2009). 

6 See KATZ at p. 34: 

“We really did believe that assets and wealth-building changed the way that people thought about the future, their 

planning horizons, their way of building wealth,” says Michael Stegman, who headed policy development for 

Clinton’s HUD and recommended the National Homeownership Strategy’s goals .... Year by year, payment by 

payment, the new homeowners would move into what President Clinton liked to call the “economic mainstream.” 

Rather than government spending its money on aid to families month after month, it would reward them for the 

desired behavior of saving for the future. 
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 9 

Across all income levels, African-American and Hispanic-American households have 

lower homeownership rates compared to other groups with comparable incomes. At the 

same time, low- and moderate-income households are much less likely than higherincome households to own homes. Breaking down racial and ethnic barriers and 

increasing access for other underserved households will extend homeownership 

opportunities to millions of families and enable minority households to own homes in a 

much wider range of communities.7

The report further noted that the federal government had: 

a special responsibility and an important opportunity to target underserved populations 

and communities, including low- and moderate-income households, minorities, young 

adults, families with children, legal immigrants, people with disabilities, Native 

Americans, and residents of inner-city neighborhoods and rural areas.8

To meet these goals, the report sought federal policies that would increase down payment assistance, 

encourage lenders to expand creative financing9 and adopt more flexible mortgage underwriting 

criteria.10

The drive to increase homeownership was pressed with equal force by the Bush administration. In 

hosting a conference on minority homeownership in October 2002, President Bush stated that: “we want 

everybody in America to own their home” and that we should be “a nation of homeowners.”11 The 

President also expressed concern for disparities in homeownership, saying, 

Two-thirds of all Americans own their homes, yet we have a problem here in America 

because few[er] than half of the Hispanics and half the African Americans own the[ir] 

home[s]. That’s a homeownership gap ... it’s a gap that we’ve got to work together to 

 

7

 HUD, National Homeownership Strategy at p. 1-4. See also KATZ at pp. 27–37. 

8

 HUD, National Homeownership Strategy at p. 1-7. See also id. at pp. 1-4, 6-7. 

9 See id. at p. 1–3. See also Binyamin Appelbaum, Carol D. Leonnig and David S. Hilzenrath, How Washington Failed to 

Rein in Fannie, Freddie, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008 (“The Clinton administration wanted to expand the share of Americans 

who owned homes, which had stagnated below 65 percent throughout the 1980s.”). 

10 See HUD, National Homeownership Strategy at p. 4-1 (“It is vital that this change in the mortgage finance system be 

guided by a commitment to increase opportunities for homeownership for more families, particularly for low- and moderateincome and minority families, and to increase the national homeownership rate to an all-time high ...Financing strategies, 

fueled by the creativity and resources of the private and public sectors, should address ... these financial barriers to 

homeownership.”). See also id. at pp. 3-1, 4-13, 6-7; HUD, Urban Policy Brief, No. 2 (August 1995) (This publication urged 

lenders to make financing more available, affordable and flexible by taking such steps as reducing down payment 

requirements and by increasing the availability of alternative financing products.); KATZ at p. 35 (“Clinton’s Department of 

Housing and Urban Development pushed lenders to sign agreements committing them to adopt more flexible loan policies 

and market their products to new groups of consumers.”). 

11 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the White House Conference on Minority Homeownership (October 15, 2002), 

<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2002-10-21/pdf/WCPD-2002-10-21-Pg1772.pdf> (last accessed July 13, 2009). 
10 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

close for the good of our country, for the sake of a more hopeful future. We’ve got to 

knock down the barriers that have created a homeownership gap.12

The policies President Bush adopted to help close this gap included (i) the establishment of an 

“American Dream Down Payment Fund” to provide grants to local governments to help first-time home 

owners; (ii) providing a single-family housing credit to encourage the construction of single-family 

homes in neighborhoods where affordable housing is scarce; and (iii) providing funding to conduct 

homebuyer education.13

The President’s remarks at the housing conference echoed goals he had set forth several months earlier: 

I’ve set this goal for the country. We want 5.5 million more homeowners by 2010 – [a] 

million more minority homeowners by 2010. Five-and-a-half million families by 2010 

will own a home. That is our goal. It is a realistic goal. But it’s going to mean we’re 

going to have to work hard to achieve the goal, all of us. And by all of us, I mean not 

only the federal government, but the private sector, as well.14

In 2006, President Bush praised the House of Representatives’ passage of the “Expanding American 

Homeownership Act,” noting that “[b]y providing the FHA with increased flexibility for mortgage down 

payment requirements and the authority to tailor financing to suit a family’s unique situation, this bill 

will improve FHA’s ability to help lower and moderate-income families in achieving the American 

Dream.”15 

Reflecting the drive to increase homeownership rates, both administrations increased the HUD lending 

goals, with the low- and moderate-income goal rising from 40 percent in 1996 to 55 percent in 2007.16

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were expected to perform at levels more reflective of their unique position 

in the mortgage lending market. In April 2005 testimony before the House Committee on Financial 

Services, President Bush’s HUD Secretary, Alphonso Jackson, stated: 

To better ensure these two GSEs’ leadership in the mortgage market, HUD will require 

that the GSEs at least ‘meet the market’ – in other words, their purchases of mortgages in 

each goal category must be proportional to the share of all mortgages in the conventional 

conforming market that fall within that category. In the past, HUD’s goals have been set 

‘below the market.’ Other conventional lenders – without the GSEs’ Charter Act 

 

12 Id.

13 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Hosts Conference on Minority Home Ownership 

(October 15, 2002). 

14 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Home Ownership (June 18, 2002), <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020618-1.html> (last accessed July 13, 2009). The President 

proclaimed June 2002 “National Homeownership Month.” President George W. Bush, Proclamation, National Home 

Ownership Month, 2002 (June 4, 2002). 

15 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Pleased by House Passage of the “Expanding 

American Homeownership Act of 2006” (July 26, 2006), <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060726.html> (last accessed July 13, 2009). 

16 See Table 1.1, infra. 
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 11 

privileges – have served lower-income families and underserved areas better than the two 

GSEs have done. HUD believes the GSEs can do at least as well as other conventional 

lenders.17

In order to analyze the effects of these two policies, it is first necessary to examine their evolution over 

the last several decades. The following section examines both the CRA and the HUD lending goals as 

they have evolved. 

II. The Community Reinvestment Act 

The CRA18 was enacted in 1977 to encourage depository institutions to more effectively meet the credit 

needs of their communities.19 To that end, the statute requires periodic evaluation of each insured 

depository institution’s record in helping meet the credit needs of its entire community, consistent with 

safe and sound lending practices. CRA applies to federally-insured banks, state banks, and federally and 

state-chartered thrifts. 

A. Evolution of the CRA 

1989 Amendments 

The nature and execution of CRA examinations began to change significantly in 1989. “Banking 

regulators formulated a new CRA policy statement stating that lenders would be evaluated on the basis 

of their actual performance record at the time of examination, and not merely on promises for 

improvements or their existing record in reaching out to the community.”20

 

17 Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, 109th Cong. (Apr. 13, 2005) 

(Statement of Alphonso Jackson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development), 

<http://www.hud.gov/offices/cir/test041305.cfm> (last accessed July 13, 2009). See Weicher, Statement at p. 3. (The terms 

“lead the market” and “lag the market” have been described as follows: “This is shorthand for whether the loans in a given 

goal category are included in GSE purchases to the same extent that they are in the conventional conforming market. To give 

a numerical example, if loans to borrowers with incomes below the local median represent 50% of all loans in the 

conventional conforming market in a particular year, then the GSEs are ‘leading the market’ if such loans represent 51% or 

more of their purchases, and they are ‘lagging the market’ if such loans represent 49% or less of their purchases. Under the 

targets established as of 1996 and 2000, the GSEs were not asked to ‘lead the market’ in any goal category; the targets were 

set so that they could be fulfilled even though the GSEs ‘lagged the market.’ Under the targets set as of 2005, the GSEs were 

asked to ‘meet the market.’ To avoid creating problems for the GSEs, the targets were phased in year-by-year over the next 

four years.”). 

18 Community Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, Title VIII, § 802.91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified as amended at 12 

U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006)). 

19 123 Cong. Rec. 1958 (1977). 

20 U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline Report at 

pp. 7–8. Also in 1989 the Federal Reserve denied a merger application on CRA grounds for the first time, “ruling that 

commitments and plans to improve CRA performance by Continental Bank could not serve as a substitute for the established 

record of CRA performance required by the statute.” Id.
12 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Also in 1989, Congress, through the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 

(FIRREA),21 required regulators to publicly disclose an institution’s CRA rating as well as a written 

performance evaluation.22 The 1989 amendments also created a four-tiered descriptive rating system 

describing the lenders’ record of meeting community credit needs: (i) outstanding, (ii) satisfactory, 

(iii) needs to improve, and (iv) substantial noncompliance. Replacing the prior numeric scale, the 

amendments also required banking regulators to prepare a public, written evaluation of the institution’s 

CRA examination record.23

1995 Regulatory Amendments 

In 1995, federal regulators further refined CRA evaluation standards by revising their CRA 

regulations.24 “Responding to widespread complaints from both industry and advocacy groups that, 

despite the 1989 revisions, CRA evaluations still relied too heavily on the processes by which depository 

institutions attempted to meet their CRA obligations, the 1995 revisions focused explicitly on an 

institution’s actual performance.”25

The 1995 regulations established separate compliance tests for four categories of depository institutions: 

large, small, wholesale, and limited-purpose institutions.26 For institutions classified as “large retail,” 

examination ratings are based on the sum of scores relating to the institution’s lending, investment, and 

financial services provided to their entire communities with lending weighted more heavily. Small banks 

and thrifts are evaluated “under a streamlined approach that focuses on lending-related criteria.” 

 

21 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 

22 12 U.S.C. § 2906. (Prior to 1989, ratings of a financial institution’s CRA record were confidential.) 

23 Id. 

24 Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156-2226 (1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 25, 228, 345, 563e, 

203 (2006)). 

25 U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Baseline Report at p. 

9. 

26 60 Fed. Reg. 22156 (May 4, 1995). See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Explanation of the Community 

Reinvestment Act Asset Threshold Change and Federal Reserve (2008), <http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/pdf> (last accessed July 

15, 2009) (The 1995 CRA regulations defined small depository institutions as those with less than $250 million in assets that 

were either independent of a holding company or an affiliate of a holding company that had total bank and thrift assets of less

than $1 billion. However, under the 2009 annual asset-size threshold adjustments, a small institution is one that, as of 

December 31 of either of the prior two calendar years, had assets of less than $1.109 billion, without regard to holding 

company affiliation.) See also Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, (Dec. 17, 2008), 

<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20081217a.html> (last accessed July 15, 2009). Agencies Release 

Annual CRA Asset-Size Threshold Adjustments for Small and Intermediate Small Institutions (The regulations also provided 

an alternative option for an institution to be examined under a “strategic plan” of measurable goals and objectives, with input

from its community and approval from its federal banking regulator. Wholesale banks are not in the business of making home 

mortgages and are therefore not addressed in this report.). Limited purpose banks offer only a narrow product line of other 

than traditional retail lending products required to be evaluated under the lending test, including home mortgage loans, so 

they also should not be addressed. 
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 13 

Investments and service activities may be considered at the small institution’s option in order to improve 

a rating from satisfactory to outstanding.27 

The 1995 revisions include consideration of institutions’ community development activities as part of 

large retail institution performance tests. Finally, the 1995 regulations require regulating agencies to 

publish a list of banks scheduled for CRA examinations in the upcoming quarter, a requirement 

conducive to public comment. 

2005 Regulatory Amendments 

In August 2005, OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC amended their CRA regulations. One key 

change was to redefine “small bank” to be those with assets of less than $1 billion, adjusted annually for 

inflation. Another key change was creating a new category of “intermediate small banks” for those with 

assets between $250 million and $1 billion. These changes were a response to claims by banks that the 

asset threshold to qualify as a small bank was too low.28 OTS followed suit with respect to savings 

associations in March 2007. 

As part of these amendments, the agencies were to make annual adjustments to the asset-size thresholds 

to define “small” and “intermediate small” banks and thrifts. For 2009, a “small institution” under the 

small bank lending test is defined as having assets under $277 million as of December 31 of either of the 

prior two calendar years. An “intermediate small institution” is defined as having assets from $277 

million to just under $1.109 billion as of December 31 of the prior two years. “Large institutions” have 

total assets of at least $1.109 billion for December 31 of both of the prior two years.29

B. Agencies and Their Evaluation Authority 

Four agencies have responsibility for evaluating the CRA performance of the institutions they supervise: 

OCC, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and OTS. This responsibility is assigned in accordance with each 

agency’s oversight responsibility.30

 

27 U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization at p. 10. 

28 Josh Silver and Richard Marisco, An Analysis of the Implementation and Impact of the 2004-2005 Amendments to the 

Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: The Continuing Importance of the CRA Examination Process, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L.

REV. 271, 277 (2008/2009). 

29 12 C.F.R. 345.12(u). 

30 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System oversees bank holding companies, nonbank subsidiaries of bank 

holding companies, State-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, and the U.S. operations of 

foreign banking organizations. It also regulates the foreign activities and investments of the Federal Reserve member banks, 

and Edge Act corporations. 

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency supervises national banks and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. 

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation oversees State-chartered banks and savings banks that are not members of the 

Federal Reserve System and foreign banks having insured branches. 

The Office of Thrift Supervision oversees federal savings associations and also supervises State-chartered thrifts and thrift 

holding companies. 
14 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Each designated agency evaluates the extent to which lending entities help meet the credit needs of their 

entire communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and 

sound lending standards. The agencies consider this record in evaluating the applications of covered 

lending institutions for new branches and relocation of existing branches, as well as such activities as 

mergers, consolidations, and charter changes.31

Examinations 

Each of the four banking regulators assesses CRA compliance via periodic examinations. CRA exams 

evaluate the extent to which banks respond to the needs of their local communities, and, based on the 

relevant agency’s assessment of the bank’s responsiveness to those needs, assigns a rating. Exams vary 

according to the asset size and type of bank undergoing examination. 

The four agencies have developed identical examination procedures for the various types of 

institutions.32 These extensive detailed procedures vary depending on the size and business strategy of 

 

31 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2008). 

32 By way of example, highlights of the 2007 examination procedures for small institutions are as follow: 

Scope: For institutions with more than one assessment area, to determine which assessment areas to evaluate under a full 

scope review, consider, among other factors: 

• the level of the institution’s lending activity in the different assessment areas, including low- and moderate-income areas; 

• the number of other institutions in the different assessment areas and the importance of the institution under examination 

in serving the different areas, particularly any areas with relatively few other providers of financial services; 

• the existence of apparent anomalies in the reported HMDA data for any particular assessment area; 

• the institution’s prior CRA performance in different assessment areas; and 

• comments from the public regarding the institution’s CRA performance. 

An assessment area is a geographic area delineated in accordance with each responsible agency’s regulations. 

Performance Context: A review of, among other things, 

• relevant worksheets and other agency information to obtain relevant demographic, economic and loan data for each 

assessment area under review; 

• relevant reports including Call Reports, Thrift Financial Reports, Uniform Bank Performance Reports, annual reports, 

supervisory reports; and prior CRA evaluations, as well as a review of prior CRA evaluations of institutions of similar 

size that serve the same or similar assessment areas;

• information the institution may provide on its local community and economy, its lending capacity, etc.; and

• the institution’s public file for any comments received by the institution since the last CRA performance evaluation. 

The examination procedures for small banks, cited below as an example since most institutions fall into this category, include 

an evaluation of the following: 

Assessment Area: A review of the institution’s assessment area for conformance with regulatory requirements.

Performance Criteria: Include, 

A review of the assessment area, performance criteria including loan-to-deposit analysis: 

• comparison of credit extended inside and outside of the assessment area(s); 

• distribution of credit within the assessment area(s);

• review of complaints; 

• investments and services (at the institution’s option to enhance a “satisfactory” rating)
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 15 

the institution being examined: (i) small, (ii) intermediate small, (iii) large, and (iv) with a community 

development test for institutions with a wholesale or limited purpose designation. All institutions have 

the option of being evaluated under a strategic plan.33 Every institution is evaluated in light of its 

performance context, outlined below: 

Examination Frequency 

CRA provides that, with limited exceptions, “small banks” (or other regulated financial institutions) 

shall be subject to routine examination 1) not more than once every 60 months for an institution that has 

achieved a rating of “outstanding record of meeting community credit needs” at its most recent 

examination, 2) not more than once every 48 months for an institution that has received a rating of 

“satisfactory record of meeting community credit needs” at its most recent examination, and 3) as 

deemed necessary by the appropriate federal agency for an institution that has received a rating of less 

than “satisfactory record of meeting community credit needs” at its most recent examination.34 Larger 

regulated financial institutions are subject to examination more frequently; for example, OTS examines 

large savings associations every 24 months.35 

Ratings Generally 

CRA ratings are available to the public, and each agency posts the evaluation results on its website. 

From the sample reviewed by the Commission, “satisfactory” is by far the most common rating. For 

example, the Federal Reserve posted 99 evaluations of small banks in 2008. Ninety-four of those small 

banks received “satisfactory” ratings, with the remaining five receiving “outstanding” ratings. In that 

same year, the Federal Reserve posted 59 intermediate small bank evaluations and 42 large bank 

evaluations, with 50 and 33 “satisfactory” ratings respectively. No small, intermediate small, or large 

banks received ratings below “satisfactory” for this period.36 

 

Ratings: The examination procedures set forth an extensive and detailed set of instructions for determining an institution’s 

rating. [Ratings are maintained by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council and are available at 

http://www.ffiec.gov/craratings/default.aspx (last accessed July 15, 2009).] 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of 

Thrift Supervision, Small Institution CRA Examination Procedures (July 2007). Available at 

<http://www.ffiec.gov/cra/pdf/cra_exsmall.pdf> (last accessed July 15, 2009). 

As noted above, small banks are subject to streamlined examinations focusing on lending. Large banks are subject to more 

extensive examinations, with ratings based on the sum of scores relating to the institution’s lending, investment, and financial 

services provided to their entire communities with lending weighted more heavily.

33 An institution may elect to be evaluated under the strategic plan option. A strategic plan sets forth goals for satisfactory 

(and, where appropriate, outstanding) performance, and must be approved by the relevant agency. 

34 12 U.S.C. § 2908 (a) (2008). 

35 Office of Thrift Supervision, CRA History and OTS’s CRA Responsibilities, 

<http://www.ots/treas.gov/?p=CRAHistoryOTSCRAResponsibilities> (last accessed July 15, 2009). 

36 The Federal Reserve Board, CRA Performance Ratings, <www.federalreserve.gov/DCCA/CRA/crarate.cfm> (last 

accessed July 15, 2009). 
16 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Non-Compliance with CRA 

Low CRA ratings do not result in sanctions or fines.37 Instead, CRA performance ratings are a factor 

agencies take into account when an institution makes various applications.38 For example, the FDIC 

considers a bank’s CRA performance when assessing that institution’s application for the establishment 

of a domestic branch, the relocation of the bank’s main office or a branch, the merger, consolidation, or 

acquisition of assets, and deposit insurance for a newly-chartered institution.39 40

 III. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

A. HUD Goals 

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has for many years set affordable housing 

goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) chartered by 

Congress in 196841 and 1970 respectively. This section provides a brief overview of the evolution of the 

HUD goals and the performance of the GSEs. 

B. Legal and Regulatory History of HUD Goals 

Prior to 1992, federal law only required that a “reasonable portion” of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 

mortgage purchases advanced the goal of providing affordable housing to low- and moderate-income 

families.42 This amorphous goal was changed upon the adoption of the Federal Housing Enterprise 

Financial Safety and Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) of 1992. Prior to said statute, HUD promulgated rules 

 

37 But see 12 C.F.R. § 25.65 (2009) (OCC may impose sanctions against banks that are in violation of the prohibition against 

the use of interstate branches primarily for deposit production. Under this provision, if OCC determines that a bank is not 

reasonably helping to meet the credit needs of the communities served by the bank in the host state, and the bank’s statewide 

loan-to-deposit ratio is less than 50 percent of the host state loan-to-deposit ratio, the agency may order the bank’s covered 

branches to be closed and may not permit the bank to open a new branch unless the bank provides reasonable assurances that 

it has an acceptable plan under which it will reasonably help to meet the credit needs of the relevant communities.) 

38 The National Community Reinvestment Coalition observed some years ago that, “[a]lthough the federal regulators deny 

few applications, community activists have used the challenge process to organize and educate members of the community 

around credit and reinvestment issues. Faced with strong opposition, many banks and thrifts relent to community demands.” 

See Chris Bohner, CRA and HMDA: Tools for Reinvestment, SWELTERFORCE, NAT’L HOUSING INST., May–June 1995. See 

also, Howard Husock, The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities, CITY J. Winter 2000. 

39 Effect of CRA Performance on Applications, 12 C.F.R. § 345.29 (2009). 

40 For recent developments related to the CRA and the mortgage crisis generally, see p. 24. 

41 Fannie Mae was originally established as a federal agency in 1938. 

42 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Response to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Interrogatories and 

Document Requests, Response to Interrogatory Request 8, p. 19 (hereafter referred to as HUD Response to Interrogatories 

and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 8), citing Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 

§ 802(ee), 82 Stat. 476, 541 (1968) (regulation of Fannie Mae) and Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 

Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 731, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (regulation of Freddie Mac). 
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 17 

requiring “30 percent of GSE conventional mortgage purchase be devoted to mortgages for (1) low- and 

moderate-income housing; or (2) housing located in central cities.”43

FHEFSSA 

In 1992, Congress established oversight responsibilities for HUD under Title XIII of FHEFSSA.44

FHEFSSA reaffirmed HUD’s regulatory authority to ensure Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s compliance 

with their charters. FHEFSSA also mandated specific responsibilities, including: 

• Setting the housing goals that require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase mortgages 

made to (i) low- and moderate-income families, (ii) mortgages on properties located in 

underserved areas, and (iii) mortgages made to very low-income families and low-income 

families in low-income areas, including mortgages on multifamily properties; 

• Monitoring and enforcing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance in meeting the 

housing goals; 

• Reviewing requests for new program approval submitted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; 

• Prohibiting discrimination in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchase activities 

and reviewing and commenting on their underwriting guidelines; and 

• Establishing a public use database on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchases.45 

Following the enactment of FHEFSSA, HUD developed an oversight program to carry out these 

mandates. Specifically, HUD regularly: 

analyze[d] and report[ed] on the GSEs’ housing goal performance, housing needs, the 

marketplace, and the appropriateness of housing goal levels; review[ed] new GSE 

activities and made determinations about their new program implications; review[ed] the 

GSEs’ underwriting guidelines, including automated underwriting practices, for their fair 

lending implications; manage[d] performance and risk assessment reviews to verify the 

accuracy and integrity of data provided by the GSEs to [HUD]; perform[ed] special 

studies and analyses regarding the GSEs’ businesses and their performance in leading the 

market for affordable lending; create[d] new, and revise[d] existing, GSE reporting 

requirements as necessary to facilitate informed oversight; and issue[d] new regulations 

as needed. [HUD] also issue[d] letters and orders regarding its determinations for nonproprietary treatment of GSE mortgage loan data and maintain[ed] the GSE public use 

database.46 

 

43 Id. at pp. 19–20, citing 43 Fed. Reg. 36,203 (Aug. 15, 1978) (Fannie Mae housing goals rules) and 56 Fed. Reg. 1,022 

(Aug. 16, 1991) (Freddie Mac housing goals rules). 

44 Housing and Community Development Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4055, 1992 (codified generally at 42 U.S.C. 

4501–4641). 

45 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mission Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, (2003), 

<http://www.hud.gov/offices/cfo/reports/04estimates/fannieregs.pdf> (last accessed July 15, 2009). 

46 Id. HUD’s GSE regulatory responsibilities were reduced in July 2008 with the enactment of HERA. 
18 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Under the provisions of FHEFSSA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were assessed for the costs of their 

financial safety and soundness regulation by the Director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 

Oversight (OFHEO). OFHEO was responsible for ensuring that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 

adequately capitalized and operating safely.47 

Pursuant to FHEFSSA, HUD issued lending goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 1993, 1995, 

2000, and 2004, with the last set including home purchase subgoals.48 The lending goals and subgoals 

are described below by year they were issued. Importantly, HUD did not include B, C, and D subprime 

credit levels in its market share analyses when setting these GSEs’ goals because it was expected that 

“the GSEs were not purchasing mortgages in these markets.”49

C. Setting and Meeting the Goals 

Table 1.1 

Levels of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Lending Goals and Subgoals for 

Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 1996–2007 

HOUSING GOALS YEAR 

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

Low- and ModerateIncome Goal 40% 42% 42% 42% 42% 50% 50% 50% 50% 52% 53% 55%

Geographically Targeted 

(Underserved Area) Goal 21% 24% 24% 24% 24% 31% 31% 31% 31% 37% 38% 38%

Special Affordable Goal 12% 14% 14% 14% 14% 20% 20% 20% 20% 22% 23% 25%

HOME PURCHASE 

SUBGOALS 

Low- and ModerateIncome Subgoal 45% 46% 47%

Geographically Targeted 

(Underserved Area) 

Subgoal 

32% 33% 33% 

Special Affordable 

Subgoal 17% 17% 18% 

Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE 

Mortgage Purchases in 1999 and 2000, April 2002, p. 8 table 1; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office 

of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 2001-2004, April 2008, p. 9 table 1; U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage 

Purchases in 2005-2007, September 2008, pp. 9–10 tables 1a & 1b. 

 

47 Id.

48 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 8 at p. 20 (The goals issued in 1993 were 

actually categorized as “interim goals.”). 

49 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 10 at p. 25 ( “For purposes of setting 

individual goal levels, HUD included in its market share analyses [subprime] mortgages generally described as A-minus. 

These are not considered especially risky mortgages, and the GSEs had asserted that A-minus credit is actually prime credit 

eligible for more favorable financing. However, HUD excluded the B, C, and D subprime credit levels from its market share 

analyses, finding that these credit levels were not appropriate markets for the GSEs.”). Id.
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 19 

Caption: Between 1996 and 2007, HUD’s goals for government-sponsored enterprises increased from 40 

to 55 percent of mortgage lending to low- and moderate-income individuals, from 21 to 38 percent of 

home loans to borrowers in geographically targeted (i.e., underserved) areas, and from 12 to 25 percent 

to purchasers of special affordable housing. HUD introduced subgoals in 2005 and has increased them 

slightly since then, with the low-and moderate-income subgoal rising from 45 to 47 percent, the 

geographically targeted (underserved area) subgoal going from 32 to 33 percent, and the special 

affordable subgoal from 17 to 18 percent. 

Track Record Pre–1995 

In 1993, HUD published rules establishing interim goals and subgoals for Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac’s mortgage purchases for 1993 and 1994 and the requirements for implementing the goals. In 1993 

and 1994, 30 percent of dwelling units financed by Fannie Mae’s mortgage purchases were required to 

be affordable to low- and moderate-income families.50 

1996–2000 Goals 

In 1996, HUD started allowing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to get affordable housing credit for buying 

securities from third parties that included loans to low-income borrowers.51 This change did not allow 

B-, C-, or D-rated loan purchases to count toward the affordable housing goals. In 1996, HUD also 

added for the first time a Special Affordable Multifamily Subgo 52 al. 

2001–2003: Goals Significantly Increased 

In October 2000, HUD issued its final rule establishing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s housing goals 

levels for 2001 through 2003.53 For this time period, the Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Goal 

increased to 50 percent, the Underserved Areas Housing Goal was increased to 31 percent, the Special 

Affordable Housing Goal was increased to 20 percent, and the Special Affordable Multifamily Subgoal 

increased to 1 percent of each of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s average total mortgages purchased in 

the 1997-1999 period.54 Pending the establishment of annual housing goal levels for 2004 and 

subsequent years, the housing goal levels for each of those years were to be set at 50 percent, 31 percent, 

and 20 percent respectively. The 2000 rule also: (1) provided for temporary bonus points to Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac for the purchase of mortgages for small multifamily properties and certain singlefamily owner-occupied rental properties; (2) established a temporary adjustment factor for Freddie 

 

50 Id. at p. 20, citing 58 Fed. Reg. 53,048, 53,072 (Oct. 13, 1993). 

51 This policy was subsequently challenged as counter-productive by then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. See

Bethany McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 2009), 

<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/02/fannie–and–freddie200902?> (last accessed July 15, 2009); Peter J. 

Wallison and Charles W. Calomiris, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., THE LAST TRILLION-DOLLAR COMMITMENT: THE DESTRUCTION 

OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC (Sept. 2008), <http://www.aei.org/outlook/28704> (last accessed July 15, 2009). “The 

idea was that subprime lending benefited many borrowers who did not qualify for conventional loans. HUD expected that 

Freddie and Fannie would impose their high lending standards on subprime lenders.” Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage 

Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008 at A01. 

52 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 8 at p. 21. 

53 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044 (Oct. 31, 2000); HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 8 at 

p. 23. 

54 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044 at 65,086–89 (Oct. 31, 2000); HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, 

Interrogatory Request 8 at p. 23. 
20 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Mac’s purchases of mortgages for certain large multifamily properties; (3) prohibited high-cost 

mortgages with predatory features from counting towards the Housing Goals; (4) established and 

clarified counting rules for the goals for certain mortgage loans; (5) established a review process for 

HUD to determine appropriate Housing Goal treatment for new types of transactions; and (6) made 

definitional and technical corrections.55

2004–2008: Addition of Home Purchase Subgoals 

In November 2004, HUD set new Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac housing goals for 2005 through 2008 

and, for the first time, established Home Purchase Subgoals for each of the housing goals.56 The 

subgoals set a minimum share of home purchases on single-family, owner-occupied properties located in 

metropolitan areas for each of the goal categories. The purpose of the subgoals was “to encourage the 

GSEs to facilitate greater financing and homeownership opportunities for families and neighborhoods 

targeted by the housing goals.”57 The 2004 rule also increased the levels of the housing goals “in nearly 

equal steps from year-to-year. For example, the Low- and Moderate Income Goal rose from 52 percent 

in 2005, to 53 percent in 2006, 55 percent in 2007, and 56 percent in 2008.”58 The rule did provide that 

“if macroeconomic conditions were to change more [than] in previous years, the levels of the goals 

could be revised to reflect the changed conditions.”59

Post-Crisis Proposals 

A series of accounting and financial problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, along with financial 

difficulties at some Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), led many in Congress to conclude that Fannie 

Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs needed a stronger regulator. To that end, Congress enacted the 

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA),60 strengthening government oversight of Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac.61 The Act established the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which 

replaced OFHEO and HUD as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s safety and soundness and mission 

regulator. Among other things, FHFA has broad authority to require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 

hold capital above statutory minimum levels, regulate the size and content of their portfolio, and 

approve new mortgage products. 

 

55 65 Fed. Reg. 65,044 at 65,086–89 (Oct. 31, 2000); HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, 

Interrogatory Request 8 at p. 23. 

56 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 8 at p. 23. 

57 Id. at p. 24. 

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 Pub.L. No. 110–289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008). 

61 Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, N. Eric Weiss et 

al (August 19, 2008), p. 1. 
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 21 

On July 30, 2008, FHFA assumed all oversight responsibility of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 

compliance with the HUD housing goals set in 2004.62 Thereafter, on September 6, 2008, FHFA 

Director James Lockhart appointed FHFA as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

On December 8, 2008, FHFA sent letters to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae noting the likelihood of both 

GSEs meeting the three regulatory housing goals and subgoals established for 2008 based on 

performance through September 30, 2008.63 FHFA noted that both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were 

on course to meet only the Underserved Area Goal.64

On March 16, 2009, FHFA sent letters to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, notifying each of FHFA’s final 

determination that, in the case of Fannie Mae, “there is a substantial probability of failure by Fannie 

Mae to meet its low- and moderate-income housing goal, special affordable housing goal, and three 

home purchase subgoals for 2008.”65 The FHFA further noted its determination “that achievement of 

these goals and subgoals was not feasible.”66

HERA also revised FHEFFSA to maintain the 2008 goals’ levels during 2009, but required the FHFA to 

review those goals during a 270-day period beginning on the date of enactment.67 Pursuant to FHFA’s 

review, on May 1, 2009, a proposed rule containing revised 2009 housing goals was posted in the 

Federal Register.68 As highlighted in Table 1.2, the proposal would adjust the affordable housing goal 

and the home purchase subgoal levels for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

 

62 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 8 at p. 24. 

63 Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Chief Operating Officer and Senior Deputy Officer, Federal Housing Finance Agency, to 

David Moffett, Chief Executive Officer, Freddie Mac (December 8, 2008); Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Chief Operating 

Officer and Senior Deputy Officer, Federal Housing Finance Agency, to Herbert M. Allison, Jr., President and Chief 

Executive Officer, Fannie Mae (December 8, 2008). 

64 Id.

65 Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Chief Operating Officer and Senior Deputy Director for Housing Mission and Goals, 

FHFA, to Herbert Allison, Chief executive Officer, Fannie Mae (March 16, 2009). In its parallel letter to Freddie Mac, FHFA 

also included the underserved areas goal in this assessment. Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Chief Operating Officer and 

Senior Deputy Director for Housing Mission and Goals, FHFA, to John Koskinen, Interior Chief Executive Officer, Freddie 

Mac (March 16, 2009). 

66 Id.

67 Department of Housing and Urban Development, Overview of the GSEs’ Housing Goal Performance, 2000-2007, 

<http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/GSE/gse2007.pdf> (last accessed July 15, 2009). 

68 Federal Housing Finance Agency, 74 Fed. Reg. 20,236 (May 1, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1282) 

<http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=166986142392+0+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve> (last 

accessed July 30, 2009). 
22 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Table 1.2 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Revised Goals and Subgoals, 2009 

Category Goal/Subgoal 2009 Proposed 

Low-mod Income Goal 51% 

Underserved Areas Goal 37% 

Special Affordable Goal 23% 

Low-mod Income Home Purchase Subgoal 40% 

Underserved Areas Home Purchase Subgoal 30% 

Special Affordable Home Purchase Subgoal 14% 

Special Affordable 

Multifamily 

Subgoal: Fannie Mae Freddie Mac $5.49 billion 

$3.92 billion 

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency, 74 Fed. Reg. 20,236 (May 1, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1282) 

<http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=166986142392+0+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve> (last 

accessed July 30, 2009). FHFA, News Release: FHFA Sends GSE Housing Goals to Federal Register, April 28, 2009. 

These levels approximately mirror the prevailing goals from 2004 to 2006.69 

Starting with 2010, FHFA will establish three single-family home purchase goals, one single-family 

refinance goal, and one multifamily goal for low-income families.70

D. Broad, Continued Legislative Response to the Mortgage Crisis 

In March 2009, Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) introduced H.R. 1479, proposing 

extensive changes to the CRA.71 The bill proposes the expansion of the CRA to cover a variety of nonbank institutions, including securities and investment services, mortgages and mortgage-related services, 

insurance services, and credit unions. The bill also requires a reduction of CRA ratings for certain 

predatory lending or other negative credit practices, and expands coverage areas and opportunities for 

public comment.72

 

69 FHFA, News Release: FHFA Sends GSE Housing Goals to Federal Register, April 28, 2009. 

70 Fannie Mae 2008 Q2 10-Q Investor Summary at p. 6 (Aug. 8, 2008) Fannie Mae, 

<http:/www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/newsreleases/2008_Q2_10Q_Investor_Summary.pdf> (last accessed July 15, 2009). 

71 Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of 2009, H.R. 1479, 111th Cong. (2009). 

72 Many of the changes proposed in the bill reflect recommendations made by leadership of the National Community 

Reinvestment Coalition in an article appearing in the New York Law School Law Review. See John Taylor and Josh Silver, 

The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the Future, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 203 (2008/2009). 

A variety of proposed revisions to the CRA have been made in light of the mortgage crisis. See Revisiting the CRA: 

Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston 

and San Francisco (February 2009). 
Chapter 1: Overview of Federal Policies to Increase Minority Homeownership 23 

In June 2009, OCC, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and OTS proposed changes in the CRA regulations 

for two purposes: 1) to provide express CRA consideration for low-cost education loans to low-income 

borrowers (as required in the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008); and 2) to provide CRA 

consideration for non-minority and non-women owned financial institutions who undertake activities in 

cooperation with minority and women owned financial institutions and low-income credit unions (as 

currently required in the CRA. 

In addition to the changes to CRA and the housing goals, volumes of legislative proposals have emerged 

since the emergence of the mortgage crisis. Bills include the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory 

Lending Act,73 the Commission on the Foreclosure and Mortgage Crisis Lending Act,74 the National 

Financial Literacy Act,75 and scores of others addressing the mortgage crisis generally, foreclosure 

prevention, monitoring of the GSEs, mortgage fraud, and predatory lending. 

 

73 H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. (2009). 

74 H.R. 1285, 111th Cong. (2009). 

75 H.R. 767, 111th Cong. (2009). 

Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 25 

CHAPTER 2: HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICIES: CRITIQUES AND RESPONSE 

The bipartisan effort to increase homeownership, together with the evolution of the lending market, 

resulted in substantial gains. Nonetheless, the policies to affirmatively further homeownership have been 

criticized by some for weakening underwriting standards and for creating the conditions that led to the 

present crisis.1 This viewpoint has been summarized as follows: 

The crisis has its root in the U.S. government’s efforts to increase homeownership, 

especially among minority and other underserved or low-income groups, and to do so 

through hidden financial subsidies2 rather than direct government expenditures. 

* * * 

Instead of a direct government subsidy, say, for down-payment assistance for low-income 

families, the government has used regulatory and political pressure to force banks and 

other government-controlled or regulated private entities to make loans they would not 

otherwise make and to reduce lending standards so more applicants would have access to 

mortgage financing.3

Under this view, government policies seeking to overcome purported discrimination in mortgage 

lending led to a deterioration in lending standards. 

For almost a decade, beginning in the 1990s, the United States government pursued a 

policy to increase homeownership. The main tool for achieving the goal was the 

replacement of historical mortgage underwriting standards with what were called 

“innovations in mortgage lending” or “flexible underwriting standards.” By changing 

 

1

 Aside from specific critiques relating to the effects of the CRA on the present mortgage crisis, extensive additional criticism 

exists with regard to the CRA in general. Such criticism includes contentions that the CRA is not necessary, that it represents

unnecessary government interference in lending practices, and/or that it provides an entrée for special interest groups to bring 

political pressure on lending practices. See, e.g., Theodore Day and Stan J. Liebowitz, Mortgage Lending to Minorities: 

Where’s the Bias?, ECON. INQUIRY, vol. XXXVI (January 1998), at pp. 1–27; Howard Husock, The Trillion-Dollar Bank 

Shakedown that Bodes Ill for Cities, CITY J. Winter 2000; Michelle Minton, The Community Reinvestment Act’s Harmful 

Legacy: How it Hampers Access to Credit, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST., Mar. 20, 2008. 

2

 This method of government mandating changes in lending standards has been criticized for shifting risks and burdens from 

public to private sources, thus minimizing scrutiny and preventing a calculation of the true costs of the policies. See, THOMAS 

SOWELL, THE HOUSING BOOM AND BUST 36 (2009) (“Advocates of ‘affordable housing’ ... seek various ways of either 

forcing the private sector to charge lower home prices and lower apartment rents, or else they seek to use the taxpayers’ 

money to subsidize housing in one way or another. ... They do not seek to lower housing costs but to conceal housing costs 

with taxpayer-provided subsidies or with laws that prevent those costs from being expressed in the prices charged.”). 

3

 PETER J. WALLISON, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., CAUSE AND EFFECT: GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 

(Nov. 25, 2008), <http:www.aei.org/doclib/20081203_112372NovFSOg.pdf> (last accessed July 16, 2009). See also Stan J. 

Liebowitz, Anatomy of a Train Wreck; Causes of the Mortgage Meltdown, NAT’L REV., Oct. 3, 2008 at pp. 34–42 (“The 

government had been attempting to increase homeownership in the U.S., which had been stagnant for several decades. In 

particular, the government has tried to increase homeownership among poor and minority Americans. Although a seemingly 

noble goal, the tool chosen to achieve this goal was one that endangered the entire mortgage enterprise: intentional 

weakening of the traditional mortgage-lending standards.”). 
26 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

underwriting standards, the government was able to pursue this policy without using its 

own money. To get these underwriting standards in place, the government used the bully 

pulpit, legal and regulatory threats, and political and academic persuasion perhaps more 

accurately termed as propaganda, to at first coerce the market into bending to its will, and 

then, in effect, making it an enthusiastic partner in the project.4

Such criticism generally acknowledges that, while the CRA might have played a role in the crisis, the 

CRA was not sufficient to cause a worldwide financial meltdown.5 As noted by one analyst: 

It would be a foolish overstatement, in my view, to assert that the CRA is somehow the 

cause or main cause of the current crisis. Exceptionally low interest rates, high levels of 

available capital, and the advent of mortgage securitization combined – it’s clear in 

retrospect – to spur an overinvestment in housing, and underinvestment in the sort of due 

diligence which once typified lending. These are huge changes in the financial industry, 

and I think that they must be considered the key participants of the current situation. But 

as for the question of whether the CRA is at all linked to our current problems, I would 

answer in the affirmative.6

Instead, it contends that the effort to reduce underwriting standards for minority and low-income 

individuals inevitably “spread to the wider market – including to prime mortgage markets and to 

speculative borrowers.”7

Although the Community Reinvestment Act had no major immediate impact, over the 

years its underlying assumptions and provisions provided the basis for ever more insistent 

pressure on lenders from a variety of government officials and agencies to lend to those 

 

4

 Stan J. Liebowitz, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, March 20, 2009, p. 1 (hereinafter cited as 

Liebowitz, Statement). 

5 See also WALLISON, CAUSE AND EFFECT at p. 3. Peter J. Wallison, American Enterprise Institute, Debate with the 

Honorable Richard Posner (Apr. 27, 2009), <http://aei.org/include/pub_print.asp?pubID=297807> (last accessed July 16, 

2009) (“CRA did not produce a large number of subprime loans—certainly not enough to cause the current crisis. What it did 

was start the process of degrading the quality of mortgage loans. The flexible underwriting standards that the government 

wanted the banks to use really meant lowering down payments, not insisting on income, a steady job, or unblemished credit. 

The low quality mortgages that were required by CRA—and approved by bank regulators—gradually spread to the rest of 

[the] mortgage market.”); Howard Husock, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, March 20, 2009, p. 1 

(hereinafter cited as Husock, Statement); 

6

 The Community Reinvestment Act and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Is There a Connection, edited transcript, Hudson 

Institute’s Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal and Center for Housing and Financial Markets, Testimony of 

Howard Husock at p. 10 (October 23, 2008). 

7

 WALLISON, CAUSE AND EFFECT at p. 3 (Wallison elaborated: “Once these standards were relaxed – particularly allowing 

loan-to-value ratios higher than the 20 percent that had previously been the norm – they spread rapidly to the prime market 

and to subprime markets where loans were made by lenders other than insured banks.”). See also Liebowitz, Anatomy of a 

Train Wreck at p. 40 (“[A]lthough the original mortgage innovations were rationalized for low- and middle-income buyers, 

once this sloppy thinking had taken hold it is naïve to believe that this decade-long attack on traditional underwriting 

standards would not also lead to more relaxed standards for higher-income borrowers as well.”). 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 27 

whom politicians and bureaucrats wanted them to lend to, rather than to those that lenders 

would have chosen to lend to on the basis of the lenders’ own experience and expertise.8

* * * 

[E]ven though racial bias charges provided much of the initial impetus for greater federal 

government involvement in private mortgage lending decisions, once federal regulatory 

agencies became involved that involvement spread far beyond issues of race, and the 

policies imposed required a lowering of mortgage loan approval standards across the 

board, to people of all races.9

Similar criticism exists with regard to the HUD lending goals and the alleged effect they had on Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac’s lending practices.10 While the criticism of weakened underwriting standards is 

made with equal force as to the HUD lending goals,11 additional factors are said to exist with regard to 

the practices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This analysis posits that, as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

lost market share to private label securitization (i.e., Wall Street), Congress put increased pressure on 

them to increase low- and moderate-income loans.12 It is contended that this combination led Fannie 

 

8

 Sowell, The Housing Boom and Bust at pp. 36–37. 

9 Id. at p. 38. But see The Community Reinvestment Act and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Is There a Connection, edited 

transcript, Hudson Institute’s Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal and Center for Housing and Financial 

Markets, Testimony of Barry Zigas at p. 13 (Oct. 23, 2008). In his testimony, Mr. Zigas argued that the issue of causation 

between the CRA and the weakened lending standards could not be proven. He stated: 

I do get off the bus, though, when the analogy is extended to saying, well, CRA was in place; bad things 

ended up happening; ergo CRA is a contributor to the problem. I suppose that’s true, but then I will posit 

that gravity is also a contributing factor to the subprime mortgage crisis. After all, everything that goes up 

must come down; we’re all subject to gravity; and it has been there ever since we’ve been doing lending, so 

it must have something to do with this. The real issue here is to try to disaggregate the effects. We should 

ask, if it were a contributing factor to the current crisis, where is the evidence for it? 

10 See Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A01: 

In 2001, HUD researchers warned of high foreclosure rates among subprime loans. “Given the very high 

concentration of these loans in low-income and African-American neighborhoods, the growth in subprime 

lending and resulting very high levels of foreclosure is a real cause for concern,” an agency report said. But 

by 2004, when HUD next revised the goals, Freddie and Fannie’s purchases of subprime-backed securities 

had risen tenfold. Foreclosure rates also were rising. 

11 See Husock, Statement at pp. 4–5 (“Beginning in 1992, the Department of Housing and Urban Development pushed Fannie 

and Freddie to buy loans on criteria other than credit-worthiness.”). See also Michael Shermer, Irrational Economic Man, 

CITY J. Jan. 11, 2009; Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008. 

12 See WALLISON, CAUSE AND EFFECT at pp. 4–5: 

When the history of this era is written, students will want to understand the political economy that allowed 

Fannie and Freddie to grow without restrictions while producing larger profits for shareholders and 

management but no apparent value for the American people. The answer is the affordable housing mission 

that was added to their charters in 1992, which-like the CRA-permitted Congress to subsidize LMI [low 

and moderate income] housing without appropriating any funds. As long as Fannie and Freddie could 

credibly contend that they were advancing the interests of LMI homebuyers, they could avoid new 

regulation by Congress-especially restrictions on the accumulation of mortgage portfolios, totaling 

approximately $1.5 trillion by 2008, that accounted for most of their profits. They could argue to Congress 

that if the mortgage portfolios were constrained by regulation, they could not afford to subsidize affordable 
28 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Mae and Freddie Mac to increase their portfolios of subprime private label mortgages.13 One academic 

characterized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s subprime purchases in the first half of the decade as 

follows: 

Between 2000 and 2005, Fannie and Freddie met those goals every year, funding hundreds of 

billions of dollars worth of loans, many of them subprime and adjustable-rate loans, and made to 

borrowers who bought houses with less than 10% down. 

Fannie and Freddie also purchased hundreds of billions in subprime securities for their 

own portfolios to make money and to help satisfy HUD affordable housing goals. Fannie 

and Freddie were important contributors to the demand for subprime securities. 14

This criticism contends that, as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increased their purchase of subprime 

loans, a false impression was created that such loans carried little risk, which greatly influenced the 

lending and investment practices involving non-GSE entities.15 This argument has been summarized as 

follows: 

 

housing. In addition, the political sophistication of Fannie Mae’s management enabled the company to 

serve the interests of key lawmakers who could and did stand in the way of the tougher regulation that 

might have made the current crisis far less likely. 

13 Kathleen Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going., WASH. POST, June 1, 2008, at B01: 

For the most part, they [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] didn’t buy the most abusive subprime mortgages from lenders 

because the loans didn’t meet their standards. But they did buy private-label subprime bonds for their own 

investment portfolios to boost profits. From 2004 through 2006, these Congressionally-chartered companies bought 

a third of the $1.6 trillion in private-label bonds that Wall Street firms issued. This helped legitimize the market, 

giving pension funds and foreign governments additional (albeit false) comfort that these securities were safe. Bush 

regulators have also allowed Fannie and Freddie to count these securities toward federally set goals for encouraging 

mortgage lending to low-income borrowers. 

See also PETER J. WALLISON AND CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, AM. ENTER (Sept. 30, 2008), 

<http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080930_Binder1.pdf> (last accessed July 16, 2009) (hereinafter cited as WALLISON AND 

CALOMIRIS, AEI, THE LAST TRILLION DOLLAR COMMITMENT). 

14 Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21. See also SOWELL, THE HOUSING 

BOOM AND BUST at pp. 57–58 (“The development of lax lending standards, both by banks and by Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac standing behind the banks, came not from a lack of government regulation and oversight, but precisely as a result of 

government regulation and oversight, directed toward the politically popular goal of more “home ownership” through 

“affordable housing,” especially for low-income home buyers. These lax lending standards were the foundation for a house of 

cards that was ready to collapse with a relatively small nudge.”). 

15 See Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess; Zachary A. Goldfarb, Internal Warnings Sounded on Loans at Fannie, Freddie, 

WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at D01; ([D]ocuments suggested that Fannie and Freddie knew they were playing a role in 

shaping the market for some types of risky mortgages. An e-mail to Mudd [of Fannie Mae] in September 2007 from a top 

deputy reported that banks were modeling their subprime mortgages to what Fannie was buying.”); Stuart Taylor, Jr., $1 

Trillion of Blame, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008 (“[W]hy would investment banks take foolish risks with their own money, as 

well as that of investors, just because Fannie and Freddie were doing so? In an interview, [Peter] Wallison theorizes that the 

companies wrongfully assumed that these must be sound investments because the leading experts on the mortgage market, 

Fannie and Freddie, with their vast databases and sophisticated computer programs, thought so. But unbeknownst to the 

investment banks, the experts at Fannie and Freddie knew very well that their bosses were taking reckless risks.”). 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 29 

In a very real sense, then, competition from Fannie and Freddie beginning in late 2004 

caused both groups to scrape the bottom of the barrel – Fannie and Freddie in order to 

demonstrate to Congress their ability to increase support for affordable housing, and the 

private-label issuers trying to maintain their market share against the GSEs’ increased 

demand for subprime and Alt-A product. Thus, the gradual decline in lending standards 

that began with the revised CRA regulations in 1993 and continued with the GSEs’ 

attempts to show Congress that they were meeting their affordable housing missions, 

came to dominate mortgage lending in the United States.16

I. Response to the Alleged Role of the CRA and HUD Lending Goals in the Mortgage 

Crisis 

Each of the four agencies responsible for CRA examination (OCC, OTS, FDIC and the Federal Reserve) 

has stated publicly its belief that the CRA was not responsible for the current mortgage crisis. Deputy 

Comptroller for Community Affairs Barry R. Wides has stated, “[l]et me start off by assuring you, 

unequivocally, that CRA is not the culprit behind the abuses in subprime mortgage lending nor the 

broader credit quality issues in the marketplace.”17 In support of this belief, the various agencies cited 

three main factors.18 First that the CRA was enacted over 30 years ago and its last major change was 

over a decade ago. It is argued that, if the CRA was the impetus for relaxed underwriting standards, the 

crisis should have happened a long time ago. Second, the agencies point to the small number of CRA 

originations, which have been decreasing over time, as well as the comparable performance of CRA 

subprime loans to non-CRA subprime loans. Third, the agencies point out that the lending institutions 

that made the majority of subprime loans are not CRA-covered institutions.19

On the issue of timing – the passage of CRA in 1977 versus the more recent emergence of the subprime 

mortgage coverage – a Federal Reserve memorandum notes that, since 1995, 

there has been essentially no change in basic CRA rules or the enforcement process that 

can be reasonably linked to subprime lending activity. This fact weakens the link between 

the CRA and the current crisis since the crisis is rooted in the poor performance of 

mortgage loans made between 2004 and 2007. 20

 

16 WALLISON, CAUSE AND EFFECT at p. 6. 

17 Barry D. Wides, Deputy Comptroller for Community Affairs, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 

March 20, 2009. 

18 Each of these arguments was challenged by Stan Liebowitz in his written testimony submitted to the Commission. See

Liebowitz, Statement. 

19 Further elaborating, OTS stated that “foreclosure filings have increased at a faster pace in middle- or higher-income areas 

than in lower-income areas, which are the focus of CRA requirements,” and that, in fact, “CRA may have deterred 

irresponsible lending.” OTS, “Statement on the Role of the Community Reinvestment Act in the Current Mortgage Credit 

Crisis” (2009). 

20 Memorandum from Glenn Canner and Neil Bhutta to Sandra Braunstein, Director, Consumer & Community Affairs 

Division, Federal Reserve, Staff Analysis of the Relationship between the CRA and the Subprime Crisis, p. 2 (Nov. 21, 

2008).
30 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Furthermore, the Federal Reserve noted that the majority of the loans alleged to have contributed to the 

mortgage crisis were not made by CRA-covered lenders. 

[O]nly 6 percent of all the higher-priced [subprime] loans were extended by CRAcovered lenders to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods in their CRA assessment 

areas, the local geographies that are the primary focus for CRA evaluation purposes. This 

result undermines the assertion by critics of the potential for a substantial role for the 

CRA in the subprime crisis. In other words, the very small share of all higher-priced loan 

originations that can reasonably be attributed to the CRA makes it hard to imagine how 

this law could have contributed in any meaningful way to the current subprime crisis. 21

The Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan voiced a similar opinion in late 2008, saying that he 

“categorically disagrees with suggestions that the Community Reinvestment Act is partly responsible for 

the ongoing credit crisis.”22 

Indeed, the lenders most prominently associated with subprime mortgage lending abuses 

and high rates of foreclosure are lenders not subject to [the] CRA ... A recent study of 

 

21 Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Address at the Confronting Concentrated 

Poverty Policy Forum: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008). This theme was 

expanded upon in the November 21, 2008 memorandum: 

[T]he CRA does not cover independent nonbank lending institutions, such as mortgage and finance 

companies and credit unions. In other words, these institutions are not directly affected by CRA incentives 

... 

Analysis of 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data indicates that two-thirds of mortgage loans 

(first-lien home purchase and refinance loans for site-built properties) are entirely unrelated to CRA; these 

loans were extended to middle- or higher-income borrowers or to borrowers located outside of lowerincome neighborhoods. These data also indicate that only ten percent of all loans are “CRA-related” — that 

is, lower-income loans made by banks and their affiliates in their CRA assessment areas. 

More important for this discussion is CRA’s relationship to subprime mortgage lending. ... [I]n 2005 and 

2006, the peak years of subprime volume, independent mortgage companies (institutions not covered by the 

CRA) accounted for about half of all higher-priced loans (our proxy for subprime lending derived from 

HMDA data). 

Also, 57 percent of all higher-priced loans in 2006 were effectively unrelated to CRA because they were 

made to non-lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods Most importantly, only 6 percent of all higherpriced loans in 2006 were made by CRA-covered institutions or their affiliates to lower-income borrowers 

or neighborhoods in their assessment areas. As noted, CRA performance evaluations focus on lowerincome lending in CRA assessment areas. 

To the extent that banking institutions chose not to include their affiliates’ lending in their CRA 

examinations, the 6 percent figure overstates the volume of higher-priced lower-income lending that CRA 

examiners would have counted. 

Memorandum from Glenn Canner and Neil Bhutta to Sandra Braunstein, Director, Consumer & Community Affairs 

Division, Federal Reserve, Staff Analysis of the Relationship between the CRA and the Subprime Crisis, pp. 2–3 (Nov. 21, 

2008) (emphasis in original). 

22 John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Says CRA Not Responsible for Subprime Lending Abuses, 

REUTERS, Nov. 19, 2008. 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 31 

2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data showed that banks subject to CRA and their 

affiliates originated or purchased only six percent of the reported high cost loans made to 

lower-income borrowers within their CRA assessment areas.23

Finally, as stated by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner: 

[T]wo key points emerge from all of our analysis of the available data. First, only a small 

portion of subprime mortgage originations are related to the CRA. Second, CRA- related 

loans appear to perform comparably to other types of subprime loans. Taken together, as 

I stated earlier, we believe that the available evidence runs counter to the contention that 

the CRA contributed in any substantive way to the current mortgage crisis. 24

Another authority noted that the “dramatic increase in the share of originations by non-CRA regulated 

institutions ... was coincident with the rise in the importance of securitization and the increasing role of 

subprime lending as independent mortgage companies were not subject to CRA regulations.”25

 

23 Id. This argument was challenged during the Commission’s briefing on this topic. During his testimony, Stan Liebowitz 

raised an analogy to explain how even a small number of CRA loans could infect the system at large: 

To put things in perspective, it is helpful to use a simple analogy. Let’s assume that some owners of highperformance cars form a coalition with the goal of eliminating traffic lights and speed limits. Let’s also 

assume that they represent only a small portion of drivers but, nevertheless, are successful at changing the 

laws. We could say, in other words, that driving standards had been weakened. 

Then, with no traffic lights and no traffic speed limits, all hell breaks loose on the roads. Traffic jams are 

everywhere. Accidents occur, and injuries skyrocket. 

Let’s assume the economy is going to a standstill by the dysfunctional transportation system. Naturally the 

government would attempt to figure out who caused t his problem. 

The owners of the high-performance vehicles can point out, those who belong to that group, that their vehicles make 

up only a small proportion of all the vehicles stuck in traffic jams. And, therefore, it can’t be that the traffic jams are 

due to them or their vehicles. 

Further, they can point out that their members incur fatalities at no higher rates than other drivers of highperformance cars that do not belong to their coalition. They can claim, therefore, that their group has nothing to do 

with the traffic problems that have befallen the country. 

This is essentially the argument that has been made by those who are trying to deflect attention away from the true 

problem, which is the reduction in lending standards, and, instead, saying it has to do with just the CRA. 

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Briefing Transcript of March 20, 2009, pp. 56–57. Available at <http://www.usccr.gov>. 

24 Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Address at the Confronting Concentrated 

Poverty Policy Forum: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008).

25 Marsha Courchane, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, March 20, 2009, p. 6. (Ms. Courchane is 

Vice President of Charles River Associates and has extensive experience in the areas of mortgage and consumer lending.).

See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING: REPORT OF 

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY § 5 (December 2008); CENTER FOR AM.

PROGRESS, IDEA OF THE DAY: THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT DIDN'T CAUSE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, Oct. 3, 2008, 

<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ideas/2008/10/100308.html> (last accessed July 17, 2009); James H. Carr and 

David Berenbaum, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, March 20, 2009, p. 7. 
32 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Others have indicated a similar viewpoint with regard to HUD’s affordable housing lending goals, 

contending that the effort to increase homeownership did not cause the crisis in mortgage lending. For 

example, John Weicher, Director of the Center for Housing and Financial Markets at the Hudson 

Institute and former HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing, contends that the increases in affordable 

housing goals had little impact on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s subprime mortgage purchases. 

There is ... evidence on the extent to which the GSEs were buying subprime mortgages, 

both before and after the 2005 rule went into effect. This evidence indicates that the 

affordable housing goals had little if any impact on GSE activity in these markets. 

Instead, it appears that the GSEs were responding to the same factors in the mortgage 

market as other lenders.26

Weicher asserted: 

The GSEs were not alone ... Beginning in 2002, other lenders were taking more risk by 

relaxing underwriting standards. These lenders – both portfolio lenders such as 

commercial and community banks, and issuers of private mortgage pools – began taking 

more risk in 2002 and continued to do so until 2005. These lenders were not subject to 

the affordable housing goals, but they behaved the same way as the GSEs.27 

This position is bolstered by the argument that factors other than the HUD lending goals more directly 

affected the decision by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase their share of the subprime market. 

These independent factors included the effort to increase profits, the need to meet increased 

Congressional pressure to expand affordable lending as the housing market began to slow down, and the 

desire to escape the shadow of accounting scandals that hit both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2003 

and 2004.28 

 

26 John Weicher, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, March 20, 2009. p. 4 (hereafter referred to as 

Weicher, Statement). See also Bethany McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand, VANITY FAIR, February 2009, 

<http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/02/fannie-and-freddie200902?> (last accessed July 15, 2009) (“Although 

both companies justified their purchases of risky loans based on their need to meet HUD’s affordable housing goals, former 

Fannie employers say that, while the P.L.S. [private label securities] purchases did aid in meeting the goals... the Alt-A loans 

did not. In other words, Fannie dove into Alt-A not because of its mission but because of its bottom line – and because its 

executives feared that Fannie would become irrelevant if it continued to say no to this brave new world.”). 

27 Weicher, Statement at p. 6. Weicher further asked: 

If the affordable housing goals don’t account for the GSEs’ behavior, what does? The best explanation is 

the simplest. The GSEs badly misjudged the risk of subprime and Alt-A mortgages. So did other lenders. 

Indeed, the GSEs were by no means the first lenders to run into problems with their non-prime portfolios; 

HBSC and New Century were front-page news in February 2007. But the GSEs, because they were bigger 

and required to hold less capital, took the biggest risks and had the most spectacular problems. 

Id. See also Jeffrey Toobin, Barney’s Great Adventure, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 2009, at p. 40 (“Fannie and Freddie were 

contributors to the bubble, but they came late in the really bad loans, after the private issuers like Merrill and Citigroup,” 

Dean Baker, the co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, said.”). 

28 See WALLISON AND CALOMIRIS, AEI, THE LAST TRILLION-DOLLAR COMMITMENT. See also Goldfarb, Internal Warnings 

Sounded on Loans at Fannie, Freddie (“At Fannie Mae, top executives were told it was necessary to develop ‘underground’ 

efforts to buy subprime mortgages because of competitive pressure, although there were growing risks and borrowers often 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 33 

Following the accounting scandals, Daniel Mudd was named Chief Executive of Fannie Mae. 

The pressures he faced at the time have been summarized as follows: 

[B]y the time Mr. Mudd became Fannie’s Chief Executive in 2004, his company was 

under siege. Competitors were snatching lucrative parts of its business. Congress was 

demanding that Mr. Mudd help steer more loans to low-income borrowers. Lenders were 

threatening to sell directly to Wall Street unless Fannie bought a bigger chunk of their 

riskiest loans. 

So Mr. Mudd made a fatal choice. Disregarding warnings from his managers that lenders 

were making too many loans that would never be repaid, he steered Fannie into more 

treacherous corners of the mortgage market, according to executives. 

For a time, that decision proved profitable. In the end, it nearly destroyed the company 

and threatened to drag down the housing market and the economy.

29

In an interview, Mr. Mudd stated: 

“Fannie Mae faced the danger that the market would pass us by,” he said. “We were 

afraid that lenders would be selling products we weren’t buying and Congress would feel 

like we weren’t fulfilling our mission. The market was changing, and it’s our job to buy 

loans, so we had to change as well.”30

While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s expansion of subprime loan purchases was aided by the 1995 

HUD policy allowing them to count such purchases toward their affordable housing credit,31 it has been 

 

didn’t understand the terms of the loans, documents show.”). Charles Duhigg, At Freddie Mac, Chief Disregarded Warning 

Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008 (“The companies were constantly under [Congressional] pressure to buy riskier mortgages. 

Once, a high-ranking Democrat telephoned executives and screamed at them to purchase more loans from low-income 

borrowers, according to a Congressional source.”). 

29 Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1. Freddie 

Mac was feeling similar pressure. See Duhigg, At Freddie Mac, Chief Disregarded Warning Signs; Goldfarb, Internal 

Warnings Sounded on Loans at Fannie, Freddie (“As Mudd’s [at Fannie Mae] and Syron’s [at Freddie Mac] decisions have 

been called into question, they have described their push into these new areas of the mortgage business as an inevitable 

consequence of dueling mandates to support affordable housing and maximize profit for shareholders.”). 

30 Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point (This article also included the following purported 

comments from Angelo R. Mozilo, the head of Countrywide Financial, at the time the nation’s largest mortgage lender: 

“You’re becoming irrelevant,” Mr. Mozilo told Mr. Mudd, according to two people with knowledge of the meeting who 

requested anonymity because the talks were confidential. In the previous year, Fannie had already lost 56 percent of its loanreselling business to Wall Street and other competitors. “You need us more than we need you,” Mr. Mozilo said, “and if you 

don’t take these loans, you’ll find you can lose much more.”). See also WALLISON AND CALOMIRIS, AEI, THE LAST 

TRILLION-DOLLAR COMMITMENT (“[T]he GSEs sold out the taxpayers by taking huge risks on substandard mortgages, 

primarily to retain Congressional support for the weak regulation and special benefits that fueled their high profits and 

profligate executive compensation. As if that were not enough, in the process, the GSEs’ operations promoted a risky 

subprime mortgage binge in the United States that has caused a worldwide financial crisis.”). 

31 The policy is discussed in Chapter 1.
34 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

argued that their pursuit of subprime loans had more to do with profitability than increasing affordable 

housing.32

This argument is supported by the fact that, to a large degree, the expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac into subprime markets was in the form of increasing their own investment portfolios with the 

purchase of private-label bonds from Wall Street firms.33 This policy was questioned at the time as both 

creating excessive risk as well as failing to actually increase affordable home lending.34

As one author described the process: 

[Fannie and Freddie] began to repurchase their own mortgage-backed securities, and to 

buy similar securities that were created by Wall Street without the G.S.E. guarantee, and 

hold them in a portfolio. Then Fannie and Freddie pocketed the difference – what 

Greenspan called “the big fat gap” – between what the mortgages yielded and the 

companies’ own cost of borrowing funds. This was an immensely profitable business: 

Wall Street analysts estimated that it provided up to three-fourths of Fannie’s and 

Freddie’s earnings ... Critics, most notably Alan Greenspan, argued that the portfolio 

wasn’t worth any risk at all because it did nothing to put people in homes and existed 

only to make money for the companies’ executives and shareholders.35

Put another way, it is argued that the decision by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase their portfolio 

of subprime holdings was a back door way of meeting housing affordability goals while maximizing 

profits. The only problem was that neither of these goals actually increased affordable home lending. As 

stated by one expert: 

[Alan] Greenspan has suggested that their most profitable activity – holding portfolios of 

mortgages and MBS [mortgage-backed securities] – was the activity that created the 

greatest risk, and three Federal Reserve economists had concluded that the GSEs’ 

activities did not actually reduce mortgage interest rates. It was easy to see at this point 

 

32 McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand (“Although both companies resisted due to their worries about the riskiness of the new 

products, eventually senior executives disregarded internal warnings, because the lure of big profits was too great. ‘We’re 

rushing to get back into the game,’ Mudd told analysts in the fall of 2006. ‘We will be there.’”); Goldfarb, Internal Warnings 

Sounded on Loans at Fannie, Freddie (“Despite... concerns [over subprime and Alt-A loans], Fannie continued to push into 

this new market. A business presentation in 2005 expressed concerns that unless it didn’t, Fannie could be relegated to a 

‘niche’ player in the industry. Mudd later reported in a presentation that Fannie moved into this market ‘to maintain 

relevance’ with big customers who wanted to do more business with Fannie, including Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, 

IndyMac and Washington Mutual.”). 

33 See Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going (“For the most part, [Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac] didn’t buy the most abusive subprime mortgages from lenders because the loans didn’t meet their standards. But they 

did buy private-label subprime bonds for their own investment portfolios to boost profits. From 2004 through 2006, these 

Congressionally chartered companies bought a third of the $1.6 trillion in private-label bonds that Wall Street firms issued. 

This helped legitimize the market, giving pension funds and foreign governments additional (albeit false) comfort that these 

securities were safe.”). 

34 McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand (“In the end, it was Fannie executives who made a business decision to stake their 

future on risky mortgages that had nothing to do with helping people own homes.”). 

35 Id.
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 35 

that their political risk was rising quickly. The case for continuing their privileged status 

had been severely weakened. The only element of their activities that had not come under 

criticism was their affordable housing mission, and it appears the GSEs determined at this 

point to play that card as a way of shoring up their political support in Congress.36

II. Other Causes 

Regardless of the perceived influence of the CRA and the HUD lending goals, there can be no question 

that a variety of additional factors played a role in the increase in homeownership, the relaxation of 

underwriting standards, and the recent crisis in the mortgage markets.37 These factors were not static. 

That is to say, circumstances changed over time, as did market conditions. Such factors included the 

availability of various kinds of credit as well as the manner in which such credit was made available on 

the secondary market. 

In reviewing homeownership levels over several decades, one report noted the following: 

What sparked the decade-long homeownership boom was ... the improved affordability brought 

by lower interest rates and the flat home prices in the wake of the 1990-1991 recession. That 

downturn was quickly followed by the longest economic expansion since World War II and 

unusually strong, broad-based income growth. During this period, Congress and regulators also 

leaned on financial institutions to step up lending in low-income and minority neighborhoods. 

Deeply important, widespread adoption of automatic underwriting tools in the latter part of the 

1990s allowed many more borrowers to qualify for prime loans while adding little credit risk.

38 

An examination of lending practices from 2001 to 2006, during which the housing market rapidly 

expanded, crested and then began its decline, reveals two distinct stages.39 The first period was from 

2001 to 2003, a period during which most of the mortgage origination involved fixed rate loans: 

Over these three years, the vast majority of mortgages originated were loans with fixed rate 

mortgages provided to borrowers with relatively strong credit histories. The FRM [fixed rate 

mortgage] share of mortgage applications averaged 84 percent from 2001 to 2003, while 

 

36 See WALLISON AND CALOMIRIS, AEI, THE LAST TRILLION-DOLLAR COMMITMENT. 

37 It has been argued that these additional factors independently could affect underwriting standards. See, e.g., Paul S. Calem, 

Marsha J. Courchane and Susan M. Wachter, Sustainable Homeownership, paper presented at Housing After the Fall: 

Reassessing the Future of the American Dream, p. 19 (March 19, 2009): 

[T]he rapid expansion of subprime and Alt-A lending and originations during 2004-2006 was coincident 

with rapidly accelerating house price appreciations and some declines in homeownership rates. In this 

context, nonprime lending and non-traditional products were not serving to broaden homeownership. 

Rather rapid house price appreciation may have encouraged a loosening of credit standards. 

38 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. U. THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 17 (2008). 

39 As noted by one authority, financial booms often occur in stages: “Speculation often develops in two stages. In the first, 

sober stage of investment, households, firms, investors, or other actors respond to a displacement in a limited and rational 

way; in the second, capital gains play a dominating role.” CHARLES KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A

HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 131-32 (1978). 
36 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

subprime mortgage originations (i.e., loans made to borrowers with relatively weak credit history 

or loans made by lenders that specialize in such lending) accounted for only about 7 percent of 

total single family mortgage market activity over the three-year period ... because most of the 

loans originated from 2001 to 2003 were prime, traditional, fixed-rate mortgages, Fannie Mae, 

Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae dominated the secondary mortgage market activity (i.e., issuance 

of mortgage backed securities (MBS)) during this period.

40

By 2004, however, residential real estate had appreciated greatly. The increased cost of housing required 

loans in larger amounts which, in turn, resulted in greater risk in lending. As a result, lending practices 

changed: 

[T]he FRM share of mortgage applications averaged 69 percent from 2004 to 2006 (down from 

an average of 84 percent over the prior three year period). In addition, the subprime share of 

single family originations rose steadily from eight percent in 2003 to 20 percent in 2006, while 

the Alt-A share increased from just two percent to 13 percent over the same period. ... [A]fter 

2003, due to somewhat higher mortgage rates and very rapid home appreciation, housing 

affordability declined steadily until falling to a 21-year low in 2006. This decline in affordability 

led the mainstreaming of many of the nontraditional mortgage products that became quite 

popular among lenders and borrowers beginning in 2004. Relative to traditional FRMs, these 

non-traditional products offered significantly lower initial monthly payments that made it 

possible for borrowers to purchase homes that they might not have otherwise been able to afford 

(particularly in areas experiencing extremely rapid increases in home prices).

41 

Throughout this time period, the growth of securitization greatly influenced lending practices.42 The 

process of securitization has been described as follows: 

Securitization is the financial technology that integrates the market for residential 

mortgages with the capital markets. In securitization, investment banks take pools of 

home loans, carve up the cash flows from those receivables, and convert the cash flows 

 

40 Marsha J. Courchane and Peter M. Zorn Dawning of a New Age: Examination for Discrimination in Lending, BANKING &

FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., October 2008, p. 3. 

41 Id. at p. 4. See also Dina ElBoghdady and Sarah Cohen, The Growing Foreclosure Crisis, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2009 at 

A1 (“For a brief time in 2005, the housing market showed signs of cooling nationwide and interest rates edged up. Lenders 

reacted by reaching out to ever riskier borrowers with more subprime and other exotic loans to keep the home-buying frenzy 

going, said Howard Shapiro, an analyst at investment bank Fox-Pitt Kelton.”); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 126 (2009) 

(“The business had fallen victim to a vicious cycle: banks and other lenders were issuing more and more mortgages, which 

were riskier and riskier, so that those loans could be repackaged into more and more CDOs [collateralized debt obligations] 

in order to make up for the declining profit margins.”); Gretchen Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, 

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at BU1. 

42 See Peter M. Zorn and Marsha J. Courchane, Mortgage Market Players and Products, paper presented at Housing After the 

Fall: Re-assessing the Future of the American Dream, p. 3 (Mar. 17, 2009). 

[T]he secondary market allows lenders to pool loans from anywhere in the country and sell the securities through the 

secondary market. This increases the liquidity of lenders’ assets, dramatically reduces localized variations in lending 

rates and the availability of credit, and reduces credit risks through geographic diversification. The growth of the 

secondary market, therefore, encouraged economies of scale, as well as the growth of nondepository institutions. 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 37 

into bonds that are secured by the mortgages. The bonds are variously known as 

residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) or asset-backed securities (ABS). 

*** 

[T]he investment bank for the issues carves the principal and interest payments into 

tranches of bonds. Then, rating agencies gauge the credit risk of each tranch by 

comparing the loan pool’s characteristics with historical data and forecasting the tranch’s 

performance.43 

The process of securitization, and its applicability to mortgage-backed securities, greatly increased as 

mortgage interest rates dropped. While the return on other investments, such as stocks and government 

bonds, decreased, mortgage-backed securities, especially those based on riskier subprime mortgages, 

offered higher rates of return.44 As noted by one author: 

The American housing market had benefited hugely from the low interest rates Alan 

Greenspan was holding to, and the rapidly mounting piles of mortgage loans were fertile 

fodder for the CDO [collateralized debt obligation] machine. This was especially true 

because so many of the new mortgages were relatively high risk, which allowed the 

banks to offer extremely attractive returns....For returns-hungry investors, subprimemortgage-based CDOs were gold dust.45

Two factors came together to make subprime loans more attractive to investors. First, it was believed 

that financial markets had created sufficient safeguards to protect investors.46 While subprime loans 

traditionally have provided for greater interest rates, due to higher rates of default, it was perceived that 

 

43 Audrey Strauss, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2045-46 

(2007). 

44 Id. at n.78. See also Jill Drew, Frenzy: When the Housing Market Began to Tank in 2005, Wall Street Ran Through the 

Yellow Light of Caution and Created Even Riskier Investments – and Washington had no Mechanism for Finding out what 

was Going on, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at A1; TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at p. 30 (“[F]alling [interest] rates made it harder for 

investment managers to earn decent returns by purchasing relatively risk-free government or corporate bonds. Those pay less 

when rates fall.”). 

45 TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at pp. 94–95. See also Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell (“This shift began in 

2002, when low interest rates pushed investors to seek higher returns. ‘Investors said, ‘I don’t want to be in equities anymore

and I’m not getting any return in my bond positions,’’ said William T. Winters, co-chief executive of JPMorgan’s investment 

bank ... ‘Two things happened. They took more and more leverage, and they reached for riskier asset classes. Give me yield, 

give me leverage, give me return.’ A few years ago, of course, some of the biggest returns were being harvested in the riskier 

reaches of the mortgage market. As C.D.O.’s and other forms of bundled mortgages were pooled nationwide, banks, 

investors and rating agencies all claimed that the risk of owning such packages was softened because of the broad diversity of 

loans in each pool.”) 

46 See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2008, at A1 (“It is 

hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing one 

dollar in any of those transactions.”) (quoting Joseph J. Cassano, a former A.I.G. executive, August 2007)); Eric Dash and 

Julie Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as it Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (“The slice of 

mortgage-related securities held by Citigroup was ‘viewed by the rating agencies to have an extremely low probability of 

default (less than .01 percent),’ according to Citigroup slides used at the meeting [in the summer of 2007] and reviewed by 

the New York Times.”); TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at pp. 44–45, 52–53. 
38 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

n.”50 

these risks were offset by the advent of such protections as the geographic diversity of the loans 

securitized, the development of tranches with different levels of risk, and the ability of credit rating 

agencies to accurately identify potential risks of default.47 At the same time, the increasing use of credit 

default swaps was perceived as a means of providing insurance against such potential defaults.48

Of course, the strongest incentive for investment in subprime mortgage-backed securities was the fact 

that, until approximately 2006, rising markets led to the perception that defaults were not a serious 

risk.49 As noted by one investor: “In a rising market, even a bad loan is a good loa

At the same time, securitization created a perverse effect whereby those responsible for making the 

initial loans no longer had any financial risk in the event that the loans defaulted. That is to say, the 

process of securitization resulted in a system whereby the risk of not getting paid was transferred from 

the initial lenders to those who bought the mortgage-backed securities. The process has been described 

as follows: 

Before the advent of securitization, lenders typically handled loans from cradle to grave. 

They solicited loan applicants, underwrote and financed the mortgages, serviced the 

loans, and held the loans in portfolio to maturity. In turn, lenders largely made profits 

from the interest payments on the loans. Because lenders bore the full risk of default, they 

had strong incentives to turn down observationally risky borrowers. Securitization alters 

this incentive structure by unbundling the tasks in lending and parceling them out among 

a string of market actors. A mortgage broker may recruit loan applicants, a lender may 

 

47 See TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at pp. 44–56, 124, 276; Morgenson, How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell (“As C.D.O.’s 

and other forms of bundled mortgages were pooled nationwide, banks, investors and rating agencies all claimed that the risk 

of owning such packages was softened because of the broad diversity of loans in each pool.”); How Mortgages Became Part 

of the Mess, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/interactives/frenzy/> (last 

accessed July 31, 2009). 

48 Steven Lohr, In Modeling Risk, the Human Factor Was Left Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1: 

Credit-default swaps ... were originally created to insure blue-chip bond investors against the risk of 

default. In recent years, these swap contracts have been used to insure all manner of instruments, including 

pools of subprime mortgage securities. These swaps are contracts between two investors – typically banks, 

hedge funds and other institutions – and they are not traded on exchanges. The face value of the creditdefault market has soared to an estimated $55 trillion. Credit-default swaps, though intended to spread risk, 

have magnified the financial crisis because the market is unregulated, obscure and brimming with 

counterparty risk (that is, the risk that one embattled bank or firm will not be able to meet its payment 

obligations, and that trading with it will seize up). 

See also Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk; Robert O’Harrow, Jr. and Brady Dennis, The 

Beautiful Machine, WASH. POST, Dec. 29-31, 2008, at A01. 

49 TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at p. 123 (“Neither lenders nor borrowers worried much about the risk, because it was widely assumed 

that borrowers would simply refinance their loans at the end of their “teaser”-rate ... Lenders also assumed that if borrowers 

did face problems meeting their mortgage payments, they could simply sell their properties, at a profit, and easily repay their

loans.”). See also Peter M. Zorn and Marsha J. Courchane, Mortgage Market Players and Products at p. 5 (“Delinquencies 

did not appear to be a serious problem in the early part of this decade, and as a consequence lenders appeared more concerned 

with market share and increasing originations than with the potential risk of default.”). 

50 Ruth Simon and Michael Hudson, Bad Loans Draw Bad Blood, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at C1, quoting Nate Redleaf, 

research analyst, Imperial LLC. 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 39 

originate the loans, a specialist firm may provide the servicing, a trust may hold the loans, 

and outside investors may provide the financing.51

In separating the lending process from the risk of default, securitization created a system whereby the 

collection of fees, both by initial lenders as well as securitizers, became the main incentive to make a 

loan, as opposed to the creditworthiness of the borrowers.52 In a June 2009 joint op-ed, Secretary of the 

Treasury Timothy Geithner and Director of the National Economic Council, Lawrence Summers, noted: 

In theory, securitization should serve to reduce credit risk by spreading it more widely. 

But by breaking the direct link between borrowers and lenders, securitization led to an 

erosion of lending standards, resulting in a market failure that fed the housing boom and 

deepened the housing bust.53

The types of practices resulting from this change in perspective were described in a newspaper article: 

WaMu [Washington Mutual] gave mortgage brokers handsome commissions for selling 

the riskiest loans, which carried higher fees, bolstering profits and ultimately the 

compensation of the bank’s executives. WaMu pressured appraisers to provide inflated 

property values that made loans appear less risky, enabling Wall Street to bundle them 

more easily for sale to investors. 

*** 

For WaMu, variable-rate loans – option ARMs, in particular – were especially attractive 

because they carried higher fees than other loans, and allowed WaMu to book profits on 

interest payments that borrowers deferred. Because WaMu was selling many of its loans 

to investors, it did not worry about defaults: by the time loans went bad, they were often 

in other hands.54

In a rising market, there was no incentive to question the process. A lack of defaults made it appear that 

the process was properly balancing risks. Moreover, the process as a whole appeared to be benefiting all 

participants in the loan process. 

 

51 Strauss, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending. See also Drew, Frenzy; Devin Leonard, How 

Lehman Brothers Got Its Real Estate Fix, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at BU1; Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess?

52 See TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at p. 123 (“Back in the 1990s, when brokers made loans to subprime borrowers, they conducted 

checks to ensure that borrowers would be able to pay off their loans. However, during the boom, lenders had become a good 

deal less fussy about demanding that borrowers prove they had the income to repay loans.”). 

53 Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, WASH. POST, June 15, 2009. See also Dash and 

Creswell, Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as it Made Bolder Bets (“[Citigroup] pushed to get earnings, but in doing so, 

they took on more risk than they probably should have if they are going to be, in the end, a bank subject to regulatory 

controls... safe and soundness has to be no less important than growth and profits but that was subordinated by these guys.” 

(quoting Roy Smith, a professor at the Stern School of Business at New York University)). 

54 Peter S. Goodman and Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, 

at A1; See also Mara der Hovanesian, Sex, Lies, and Mortgage Deals, BUS. WK., Nov. 24, 2008, at pp. 71–75. 
40 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

“All sides wanted to benefit. Lenders wanted large numbers of originations to grow their 

market share, borrowers wanted to stretch as far as they could to get into a house and 

build wealth. Investors wanted to make their best rate of return.”55

In addition to the effects of securitization, arguments have also been made that the interest rate policies 

of the Federal Reserve created an environment that independently served both to weaken underwriting 

standards and to cause the steep increase in housing appreciation.56

The argument has been summarized as follows: 

[J]ust prior to the 2001 recession, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates to avert 

deflation and a deeper contraction of the economy. Soon after, home sales began to take 

off ahead of production. By 2003 these conditions helped create the tightest housing 

markets and the lowest interest rates in at least a generation. 

A dramatic run-up in home prices ensued as buyers with access to low-cost mortgage 

credit competed in bidding wars. For the first time since records were kept, median prices 

across the nation increased multiple times faster than incomes for several years in a row. 

The relaxation of underwriting requirements and the advent of mortgage products that 

initially reduced borrowers’ payments – together with the unprecedented availability of 

mortgage speculators, investors, and home buyers with past credit problems – helped to 

fuel the boom.57

 

55 Sarah Kellogg, The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: An Uncertain Future, WASH. LAW., February 2008 (quoting Marsha 

Courchane, Vice President of CRA International. See also KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF 

FINANCIAL CRISES, at p. 17 (1978) (“As firms or households see others making profits from speculative purchases and 

resales, they tend to follow. When the number of firms and households indulging in these practices grows large, bringing in 

segments of the population that are normally aloof from such ventures, speculation for profits leads away from normal, 

rational behavior to what had been described as “manias” or “bubbles.” The word “mania” emphasizes the irrationality; 

“bubble” foreshadows the bursting.”). 

56 See John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19 (“Monetary 

excesses were the main cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest rate, especially in 2003–2005, well below known 

monetary guidelines that say what good policy should be based on historical experience.”). 

Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, has contested this interpretation. See Alan Greenspan, The Fed 

Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A15 (“[The] decline in long-term interest rates across a 

wide spectrum of countries statistically explains, and is the most likely major cause of, real-estate capitalization rates that

declined and converged across the globe, resulting in the global housing price bubble.”). See also Did the Fed Cause the 

Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009 (This opinion piece presents a variety of views on the topic); Roberts, How 

Government Stoked the Mania. 

57 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. U., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 6 (2008). See also JOHN B. TAYLOR,

GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE 

FINANCIAL CRISIS 1–12 (2009) (Taylor argues that monetary excesses were the main cause of both the housing boom as well 

as the resulting bust. “In the United States such risk taking was encouraged by government programs designed to promote 

home ownership, a worthwhile goal but overdone in retrospect. During 2003-5, when short-term interest rates were still 

unusually low, the number of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) rose to about one-third of total mortgages and remained at 

that high level for an unusually long time. This made borrowing attractive and brought more people into the housing markets, 

further bidding up housing prices. It is important to note, however, that the excessive risk taking and the low-interest 

monetary policy decisions are connected.”). 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 41 

The substance of this argument is reflected in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, below. As said Figures reflect, 

substantial correlation exists between the decrease in interest rates beginning in 2001 and the increase in 

the number of housing starts over the same period.58

Figure 2.1 

New Privately-Owned Housing Units Started, 2000–2006 

Seasonally adjusted annual rate

1400

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

2100

2200

2300

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

Thousands of Units

Note: Figures are based upon monthly housing starts, which the authors of the publication then seasonally adjust to an annual 

rate. Where the monthly reports show differences in the number of units because of revisions or other adjustments, the graphs 

above depict the more recently reported values. 

Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using the linked monthly reports (e.g., joint news release, U.S. 

Department of Commerce/U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, New Residential 

Construction in June 2008, CB08-109, July 17, 2008, p. 4, table 3) for January 2001 through January 2009 from: U.S. Census 

Bureau, New Residential Construction, Historic Press Releases, June 16, 2009, 

<http://www.census.gov/const/www/newresconsthist.html> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

Caption: The number of new privately-owned housing units started fluctuated each month. However it 

generally rose between mid-2000 and the beginning of 2006, and then fell during 2006. In particular, the 

number of such units started was 1,822,000 in February 2000 and 1,477,000 in July 2000. It rose to 

2,228,000 in February 2005, fell to 1,833,000 in March 2005, and increased to 2,265,000 in January 2006. It 

dropped to 1,470,000, by November 2006, then recovered to 1,629,000 in December 2006. 

 

58 See SOWELL, THE HOUSING BOOM AND BUST at p. 7 (“In short, declining interest rates not only enable more people to be 

able to afford to buy a house, they enable the same person to buy a more expensive house without a higher monthly mortgage 

payment. In both cases, lower interest rates increase the demand for housing and thereby drive up home prices.”). See also

ElBoghdady and Cohen, The Growing Foreclosure Crisis (“The federal government played a central role in the boom. The 

Fed cut a key short-term rate to rev up the economy following the tech bust, enabling lenders to borrow money at low rates, 

lend that cash to home buyers at higher rates and then sell the mortgages to other institutions, said Esmael Adibi, an 

economist at Chapman University, south of Los Angeles.”). 
42 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 2.2 

The Federal Funds Rate: The Interest Rate at Which Depository Institutions Lend Balances at the Federal 

Reserve to Other Depository Institutions Overnight, 2000–2006 

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Federal Funds Rate (Percent)

Year

Federal Funds Rate (Percent) Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using The Federal Reserve Board, Monetary Policy, Open Market 

Operations, Dec. 15, 2008, pp. 1–4, <http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

Caption: The federal funds rate, which is the overnight interest rate at which depository institutions lend 

money through the Federal Reserve to other depository institutions, was 5.75 percent in February 2000 

and rose to 6.50 percent in May 2000. It remained as high as 6.00 percent in January 2001, but decreased 

steeply thereafter to 1.75 percent in December 2001, then to 1.25 percent in November 2002, and 1.00 

percent in June 2003. It rose to 1.25 in June 2004, and more rapidly thereafter, reaching 5.25 percent in 

June 2006. 

As the above figures reflect, as the interest rates established by the Federal Reserve declined, the 

demand for housing increased. That is to say, lower interest rates made monthly mortgage payments 

more affordable, thus increasing the demand for housing.59 When these historically low interest rates 

were combined with federal policies seeking to increase homeownership, it is argued that all the 

prerequisites for a housing financial bubble were in place.60

 

59 See KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES at p. 17. (“After a time, increased 

demand presses against the capacity to produce goods or the supply of existing financial assets. Prices increase, giving rise to 

new profit opportunities and attracting still further firms and investors. Positive feedback develops, as new investment leads 

to increases in income that stimulate further investment and further income increases. At this stage we may well get ... 

“euphoria.”); ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 110 (2009) (“Low interest rates were like a gift 

from the Federal Reserve to the homebuilding industry. Every percentage point that interest rates dropped was equivalent to 

another $8,000 or so off the price of the house.”). 

60 It has been argued that these interest rate policies, combined with the search for greater returns, affected underwriting 

standards. See KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US at p. 214: 

First the Fed lowered interest rates, in an effort to stimulate the economy after the dot-com bust and 9/11. The vastly 

increased potential for gain greased the securities-making machinery into gear, churning out thousands of new 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 43 

[T]he Federal Reserve decided to pursue an unusually expansionary monetary policy in 

order to counteract the downturn [in 2001]. When the Fed increased liquidity, money 

naturally flowed to the fastest expanding sector. Both the Clinton and Bush 

administrations aggressively pursued the goal of expanding homeownership, so credit 

standards eroded. Lenders and the investment banks that securitized mortgages used 

rising home prices to justify loans to buyers with limited assets and income. Rating 

agencies accepted the hypothesis of ever rising home values, gave large portions of each 

security issue an investment-grade rating, and investors gobbled them up. 

* * * 

By December 2001, the rate had been reduced to its lowest level since 1962. In 2002 the 

average Fed-funds rate was lower than in any year since the 1958 recession. In 2003 and 

2004, the average Fed-fund rates were lower than in any year since 1955 when the rate 

series began. 

Monetary policy, mortgage finance, relaxed lending standards, and tax-free capital gains 

provided astonishing economic stimulus: mortgage loan originations increased an average of 56 

percent per year for three years – from 1.05 trillion in 2000 to 3.95 trillion in 2003!61

In an interview in May 2009, current Treasury Secretary Geithner acknowledged that interest rates had 

played a substantial role in the mortgage crisis. He noted, however, that many factors affect interest 

 

offerings. Investment bankers then faced a curious problem: more money seeking their high-yielding products, 

coming from all over the world, than they had raw material—mortgages—to sell. Their quest for new customers led 

to the astonishing deterioration of standards and suspension of rational judgment, in deciding who and what would 

qualify for the mortgages they were financing. 

61 Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith, From Bubble to Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15. See also

LAWRENCE H. WHITE, CATO INST., HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS FINANCIAL MESS, briefing paper no. 110, Nov. 18, 2009, 

p. 1: 

The expansion in risky mortgages to underqualified borrowers was encouraged by the federal government. 

The growth of “creative” nonprime lending followed Congress’s strengthening of the Community 

Reinvestment Act, the Federal Housing Administration’s loosening of down-payment standards, and the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development’s pressuring lenders to extend mortgages to borrowers 

who previously would not have qualified. 

Meanwhile, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae grew to own or guarantee about half of the United States’ $12 

trillion mortgage market. Congressional leaders pointedly refused to moderate the moral hazard problem of 

implicit guarantees or otherwise rein in their hyperexpansion, instead pushing them to promote “affordable 

housing” through expanded purchases of nonprime loans to low-income applicants. 

The credit that fueled these risky mortgages was provided by the cheap money policy of the Federal 

Reserve. Following the 2001 recession, Fed chairman Alan Greenspan slashed the federal funds rate from 

6.25 to 1.75 percent. It was reduced further in 2002 and 2003, reaching a record low of 1 percent in mid2003 – where it stayed for a year. This set off what economist Steve Hanke called “the mother of all 

liquidity cycles and yet another massive demand bubble.” 

The actual causes of our financial troubles were unusual monetary policy moves and novel federal regulatory 

interventions. These poorly chosen policies distorted interest rates and asset prices, diverted loanable funds into the 

wrong investments, and twisted normally robust financial institutions into unsustainable positions.
44 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

rates, and that the monetary environment is influenced not only by the Federal Reserve, but by global 

factors as well. 

Mr. Geithner: “But I would say there were three types of broad errors of policy and 

policy both here and around the world. One was that monetary policy around the world 

was too loose too long. And that created this just huge boom in asset prices, money 

chasing risk. People trying to get a higher return. That was just overwhelmingly 

powerful.” 

Mr. Rose: “It was too easy.” 

Mr. Geithner: “It was too easy, yes. In some ways less so here in the United States, but it 

was true globally. Real interest rates were very low for a long period of time.” 

Mr. Rose: “Now, that’s an observation. The mistake was that monetary policy by the Fed, 

was not ...” 

Mr. Geithner: “Globally is what matters.” 

Mr. Rose: “By central bankers around the world.” 

Mr. Geithner: “Remember as the Fed started – the Fed started tightening earlier, but our 

long rates in the United States started to come down – even were coming down even as 

the Fed was tightening over that period of time, and partly because monetary policy 

around the world was too loose, and that kind of overwhelmed the efforts of the Fed to 

initially tighten. Now, but you know, we all bear a responsibility for that. I’m not trying 

to put it on the world.”62

Strengthening this view is the fact that other areas of finance sensitive to the effects of low interest rates, 

but unaffected by U.S. government efforts to affirmatively further homeownership, also experienced 

increases in risky lending practices.63 Two examples: 

First, similar lending patterns existed with regard to domestic corporate debt. 

In the first six years of the decade, the business of repackaging corporate loans and 

derivatives had also boomed. In 2006 alone bankers sold $105.8 billion in CDOs 

[collateralized debt obligations] made out of risky corporate loans, double the previous 

 

62 Geithner’s Revelation, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A16 (quoting Charlie Rose: An Hour with Timothy Geithner, U.S. 

Treasury Secretary (PBS television broadcast May 6, 2009) <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10278> (last 

accessed July 17, 2009)). 

63 The historical relationship between cheap credit and speculation has been previously recognized. See KINDLEBERGER,

MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES at p. 52 (“Speculative manias gather speed through 

expansion of money and credit or perhaps, in some cases, get started because of an initial expansion of money and credit.”). 
Chapter 2: Homeownership Policies: Critiques and Response 45 

year and seven times the volume at the start of the decade. They also sold $35.6 billion in 

CDOs built from corporate credit derivatives, ten times the amount sold in 2001.64

While corporate debt was equally subject to the pressures of securitization process and the decrease in 

interest rates, its fate cannot be related to policies governing affordable housing goals. 

Second, other nations also experienced dramatic increases in home prices over the last decade, as well as the 

subsequent bust. In a recent report by the International Monetary Fund, countries such as the United 

Kingdom, Canada, and Australia were identified as experiencing similar housing appreciation and 

lending policies as the United States.65 Other reports indicate that Ireland and Spain also have suffered 

through the same patterns.66 In each case, while these nations were subject to global monetary 

conditions, and decreasing interest rates, they were not subject to U.S. housing incentives or affordable 

housing goals. 

Nouriel Roubini, an economist from The Stern School of Business of New York University has noted: 

People talk about the American subprime problem, but there were housing bubbles in the 

U.K., in Spain, in Ireland, in Iceland, in a large part of emerging Europe, like the Baltics 

all the way to Hungary and the Balkans, “and most parts of the world.” That’s why the 

transmission and the effects have been so severe. It was not just the U.S. and not just 

‘subprime.’ It was excesses that led to the risk of a tipping point in many different 

economies.67

These competing theories continue to foster vigorous debate about policies that may have caused the 

mortgage crisis. While the competing factors cannot be definitively resolved, they nonetheless provide a 

framework for analyzing the data contained in Chapter 3. 

 

64 TETT, FOOL’S GOLD at p. 147. 

65 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HOUSING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (Apr. 2008). 

66 See, e.g., The Global Housing Boom: In Come the Waves, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2005; Christopher Caldwell, Ireland 

Shatters, WKLY. STANDARD, May 11, 2009, at pp. 18–23; Timothy Egan–A New York Times Blog, The Orphans of Ireland, 

<http://egan.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/the-orphans-of-ireland/> (Apr. 1, 2009, 22:00 EST); Joe Thornhill, The Property 

Pain in Spain, DAILY MAIL, May 8, 2007, available at http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/mortgages-and-homes/homesabroad/article.html?in_article_id=420094&in_page_id=505 (last accessed July 31, 2009); TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK at 

pp. 7–11. 

67 James Fallows, Dr. Doom Has Some Good News, ATLANTIC, July–August 2009, at pp. 89–90. 

Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 47 

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES TO 

INCREASE MINORITY HOMEOWNERSHIP 

I. Policies to Increase Minority and Low- and Moderate-Income Homeownership 

In order to analyze the effects of government policies meant to increase minority homeownership, this 

section analyzes general data relating to homeownership and mortgage lending over the last 10 to 15 

years. Where appropriate, the data attempts to determine the extent to which policies that sought to 

affirmatively further minority homeownership were effective. In addition, where practicable, the data 

sought to focus on the theories and critiques identified in the prior chapter. 

A. Homeownership Patterns1 

First examined is the homeownership rate generally, by race and ethnicity. This is followed by an 

examination of data relating to conventional loans made and denied, as well as an examination of 

denials measured against the applicants’ credit history. Next, a similar examination is made with regard 

to refinanced loans. Finally, this section seeks to measure the recent growth in subprime loans as well as 

recent foreclosure statistics. As to the latter, data are examined with regard to the performance of fixedrate and adjustable-rate mortgages, both in the prime and subprime markets. 

B. Racial2 and Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership Over Time 

This section offers a review and analysis of racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership over time 

using data from a variety of sources including, but not limited to, the American Housing Survey,3 the 

Decennial Census of Housing,4 the Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey,5 and the 

American Community Survey.6

While disagreement may exist as to its cause, there is no question that the rate of U.S. homeownership 

increased substantially over the last 15 years. In 1994, for example, the overall rate of U.S. 

homeownership was at 64 percent. At the peak of the real estate market, in 2004, this rate had increased 

to 69 percent, an increase of approximately 5 percentage points in only 10 years. 

 

1 See Figure 3.1, infra. 

2

 Although the term “race” is used throughout, this report also examines data relating to ethnicity to the extent such 

information exists. 

3

 Bureau of the Census, American Housing Survey, <http://www.2010census.biz/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs.html> (last 

accessed July 15, 2009). 

4

 Bureau of the Census, Census of Housing, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/histcensushsg.html> (last 

accessed July 15, 2009). 

5

 Bureau of the Census, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/histcensushsg.html> (last accessed July 15, 2009). 

6

 Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, <http://www.census.gov/acs/www/index.html> (last accessed July 15, 

2009). 
48 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

As reflected in Figure 3.1, as of 1994, significant differences in homeownership rates7 existed between 

Whites, American Indians/Alaskan Natives, Asians/Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders, Blacks, and 

Hispanics/Latinos.8,9 White homeownership was at 67.7 percent in 1994. The next closest categories, 

American Indians and Asian/Pacific Islanders, had ownership rates approximately 16 percentage points 

lower than Whites, 51.7 percent and 51.3 percent respectively. Homeownership rates for Blacks and 

Hispanics/Latinos were even lower, reflecting ownership rates approximately 22 percentage points 

lower than Whites, with Black homeownership rates at 42.3 percent and Hispanic homeownership rates 

at 41.2 percent. 

 

7

 The Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies/Homeownership Survey is the source data on homeownership by race 

and ethnicity from 1994–2008. Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2008, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, table 

22, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08src.html> (last access Feb. 24, 2009). 

Note that the U.S. Census Bureau states, “population controls that reflect the results of the 2000 decennial census are used in

the CPS/HVS [Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies and Homeownership Survey] estimation process for the first 

time in the first quarter 2003.” Population controls that reflect the 1990 decennial census are used in the CPS/HVS from 1994 

to 2002. Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2008, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, appendix B, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08src.html> (last accessed Feb. 24, 2009). 

The U.S. Census Bureau defines homeownership rate as the “proportion of households that are owners ... It is computed by 

dividing the number of households that are owners by the total number of households.” Bureau of the Census, Annual 

Statistics: 2008, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, appendix A, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08def.html> (last accessed Feb. 24, 2009). 

The Annual Statistics of the Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy and Homeownership Survey provides two sets of 

data for 2002, one of which was revised. Commission staff sought clarification and was advised to use the revised data. Bob 

Callis, survey statistician, U.S. Census, telephone interview with Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. 

Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 5, 2009. 

8

 For ease of reference, the above categories shall be shortened as follows: Whites, American Indians, Asians/Pacific 

Islanders, Blacks and Hispanics. 

9

 The U.S. Census Bureau states, “The questions on race in the CPS are modified beginning in the first quarter 2003 to 

comply with the revised standards for federal statistical agencies. Respondents may now select more than one race. The 

Hispanic/Nonhispanic origin question continues to be asked separately.” Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2007, 

Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, appendix B, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual07/ann07src.html> (last accessed Feb. 17, 2009). 

The U.S. Census also states, “Race and Hispanics are two separate concepts in the federal statistical system. People who are 

Hispanics may be of any race. The overlap of race and Hispanic origin is the main comparability issue.” Bureau of the 

Census, Guidance on the Presentation and Comparison of Race and Hispanic Origin Data

<http://www.census.gov/population/www.socdemo/compraceho.html> (last accessed Mar. 2, 2009). 

The Commission made the best possible equation of the racial categories of the 1990 and 2000 censuses in the following 

manner: 

1990 census 2000 census Best equivalence

White, total White alone, total White 

American Indian or Alaskan Native American Indian or Alaskan Native alone American Indian or Alaskan Native 

Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander alone Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

Black, total Black alone Black 

Note that homeownership rates from the Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies/Homeownership Survey were 

tabulated by race and ethnicity for the first time in 1994. Bob Callis, survey statistician, the U.S. Census Bureau, telephone 

interview with Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 5, 2009. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 49 

Over the following decade, ownership rates increased for each of these subgroups. Indeed, each minority 

racial and ethnic group showed stronger rates of growth than Whites. From 1994 through 2005, White 

homeownership increased from 67.7 percent to 72.7 percent, a gain of 5 percentage points. During the 

same period, however, homeownership rates increased 6.5 percentage points for American Indians, 8.8 

percentage points for Asian/Pacific Islanders, 5.9 percentage points for Blacks, and 8.3 percentage 

points for Hispanics. 

The homeownership differences among racial and ethnic groups, over time, are reflected in Figure 3.1. 

Figure 3.1 

Homeownership Rate by Race and Ethnicity, 1994–2008 

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

55.0

60.0

65.0

70.0

75.0

Year

Homeownership rate

U.S. 64.0 64.7 65.4 65.7 66.3 66.8 67.4 67.8 67.9 68.3 69.0 68.9 68.8 68.1 67.8

White 67.7 68.7 69.1 69.3 70.0 70.5 71.1 71.6 71.7 72.1 72.8 72.7 72.6 72.0 71.7

American Indian or Alaskan Native 51.7 55.8 51.6 51.7 54.3 56.1 56.2 55.4 54.0 54.3 55.6 58.2 58.2 56.9 56.5

Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific

Islander

51.3 50.8 50.8 52.8 52.6 53.1 52.8 53.9 54.6 56.3 59.8 60.1 60.8 60.0 59.5

Black 42.3 42.7 44.1 44.8 45.6 46.3 47.2 47.7 47.4 48.1 49.1 48.2 47.9 47.2 47.4

Hispanic or Latino 41.2 42.1 42.8 43.3 44.7 45.5 46.3 47.3 47.0 46.7 48.1 49.5 49.7 49.7 49.1

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Note: 1. According to the U.S. Census, “population controls that reflect the results of the 2000 decennial census are used in 

the CPS/HVS [Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies and Homeownership Survey] estimation process for the first 

time in the first quarter 2003.” Population controls that reflect the 1990 decennial census are used in the CPS/HVS from 1994 

to 2002. See Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2007, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, appendix B, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08src.html> (last accessed Feb. 24, 2009). 

2. The U.S. Census states that “The questions on race in the CPS are modified beginning in the first quarter 2003 to comply 

with the revised standards for federal statistical agencies. Respondents may now select more than one race. The 

Hispanic/Nonhispanic origin question continues to be asked separately. ”See Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2007, 

Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, appendix B, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual07/ann07src.html> (last accessed Feb. 17, 2009). 
50 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

3. The U.S. Census also states that “Race and Hispanic are two separate concepts in the federal statistical system. People 

who are Hispanics may be of any race. The overlap of race and Hispanic origin is the main comparability issue.” See Bureau 

of the Census, Guidance on the Presentation and Comparison of Race and Hispanic Origin Data

<http://www.census.gov/population/www.socdemo/compraceho.html> (last accessed March 2, 2009), 

The Commission made the best possible equation of the racial categories of the 1990 and 2000 censuses employed in 

Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies/Homeownership Survey in the following manner: 

1990 census racial categories 

employed for data from 1994-2002: 

2000 census racial categories 

employed for data from 2003-2008: Described in this report as: 

White, total White alone, total White 

American Indian or Alaskan Native American Indian or Alaskan Native 

alone 

American Indian or Alaskan Native 

Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific 

Islander 

Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific 

Islander alone 

Asian or Native Hawaiian/Pacific 

Islander 

Black, total Black alone Black 

All of the above should be borne in mind. 

4. The U.S. Census Bureau defines homeownership rate as the “proportion of households that are owners ... It is computed by 

dividing the number of households that are owners by the total number of households.” Bureau of the Census, Annual 

Statistics: 2008, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, appendix A, 

< http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08def.html> (last accessed Feb. 24, 2009). 

The Website for the Annual Statistics of the Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy and Homeownership Survey posted 

two sets of data for 2002, one of which was marked revised. Bob Callis, survey statistician, U.S. Census, in a telephone 

interview with Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 5, 2009, stated that the 

revised data for 2002 should be used. 

Source: Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2008, The Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancies/Homeownership 

Survey, table 22, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08ind.html> (last accessed July 21, 2009). 

Caption: From 1995 to 2004, all groups experienced rising homeownership rates. The significant racial 

and ethnic disparities in homeownership rates evident in 1994 persisted though 2008 despite stronger 

rates of growth among minority groups. 

Even following the collapse of the housing bubble, racial and ethnic minority groups still showed 

stronger rates of growth than Whites. Through 2008, the net gain10 in rates of homeownership indicates 

that Asians/Pacific Islanders’ homeownership increased by 8.2 percentage points, Hispanics 7.9 

percentage points, Blacks 5.1 percentage points and American Indians 4.8 percentage points. In each 

case, these groups exceeded the increase of White homeownership, which increased by 4 percentage 

points. 

Figure 3.2 presents the differences in the rate of growth in homeownership among racial and ethnic 

groups. 

 

10 The net gain (more precisely, net change) is derived by adding the yearly homeownership rate gains and losses during this 

period. The result is positive for every racial/ethnic group, hence “net gain.” 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 51 

Figure 3.2 

Net Gain in Homeownership Rate by Race and Ethnicity, 1994–2008 

5.1

8.2 7.9

4.8

4.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

White

American Indian

or Alaskan

Native

Asian or Native

Hawaiian/Pacific

Islander 

Black

Hispanic or

Latino

Racial and ethnic groups

Net gain in percent

Note: The net gain for this period is derived by summing the yearly gains and losses in homeownership rate for each racial 

and ethnic group. The result in every case is a net gain. See also Table A.1 in Appendix A, “Change in Homeownership Rate 

by Race and Ethnicity,” 1994–2008. 

Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey/Housing 

Vacancy Survey. See Bureau of the Census, Annual Statistics: 2008, Housing Vacancy and Homeownership, table 22, 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ann08ind.html> (last accessed July 21, 2009). 

Caption: During this period, the rate of growth in homeownership among racial and ethnic minorities was 

stronger than that of Whites, with Asians/Pacific Islanders and Hispanics showing highest gains 

Despite the growth of minority homeownership, and the narrowing of the gap between the various 

groups, substantial racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership rates still remain. In 2008, the White 

homeownership rate stood at 71.7 percent, that of Asian/Pacific Islanders at 59.5 percent, American 

Indians at 56.5 percent, Hispanics at 49.1 percent, and Blacks at 47.4 percent. See Figure 3.1. 

II. Review and Analysis of Mortgage Lending Statistics and Changes in Lending 

Standards 

A. Disparities in Conventional Mortgage Loans by Race Over Time 

Homeownership and mortgage lending are closely associated because the vast majority of home 

purchases are made with the help of a mortgage loan. An individual’s inability to obtain a mortgage, for 

whatever reason, represents obstacles to owning one’s own home. 

The data provided in Figures 3.3 through 3.5 relate to conventional loans only. A conventional loan is an 

agreement that is not guaranteed or insured by the federal government under the Veterans 

Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, or the Rural Housing Service of the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture. 
52 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

As reflected in Figure 3.3, conventional mortgage loans granted, as a percentage of conventional loan 

applications received, increased continuously for all racial and ethnic groups between 1999 and 2002. 

However, the degree of increase in the percentage of mortgage loans granted was not equally distributed 

among racial and ethnic groups. For example, the percentage of conventional loans made to Whites 

increased from 57.7 percent in 1999 to 69.6 percent in 2004, an increase of almost 12 percentage points. 

Even more dramatically, the percent of conventional loans made to Blacks increased from 31.4 percent 

in 1999 to 52.8 percent in 2004, an increase of 21.4 percentage points. Over the same period, Hispanics 

experienced approximately a 15 percentage point increase, while American Indians experienced a 13.4 

percentage point increase. During the same period, Asians suffered a minor decrease of 3.9 percentage 

points. Figure 3.3 further shows that, although the percentage of conventional mortgage loans made to 

Blacks greatly increased between 1999 and 2004, Blacks were still far less likely than any other racial or 

ethnic group to receive such loans. 

Figure 3.3 

Conventional Loans Made to Applicants by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

Year

Percent of Applications Granted

Total 55.3 58.3 66.4 71.1 70.4 67.5 64.6 62.6 61.6

White 57.7 60.8 68.6 73.1 72.6 69.6 66.8 65.2 64.1

Black 31.4 34.8 43.2 51.1 52.3 52.8 50.5 48.6 44.3

American Indian 40.7 41.5 43.5 55.6 53.6 54.1 54.4 52.0 48.8

Asian/Pacific Islander 68.6 68.2 70.0 71.0 68.4 64.7 62.0 60.1 59.2

Hispanic 45.2 49.0 56.8 61.4 60.6 60.2 57.0 54.2 47.9

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 4-2. 

Caption: Between 1999 and 2002, conventional mortgage loans granted, as a percentage of conventional 

loan applications received, increased continuously for all racial and ethnic groups. Although the 

percentage of conventional loans made to Blacks continued to increase throughout 2004, they were still 

far less likely than any other racial or ethnic groups to receive such loans. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 53 

While minorities experienced the greatest percentage of growth as the market expanded, they also 

suffered the greatest decrease as the market began to tighten. From 2004 through 2007, conventional 

loans made to Whites decreased by 5.5 percentage points. Over the same period, however, the decrease 

for Blacks was 8.5 percentage points, and 12.3 percentage points for Hispanics. American Indians and 

Asian/Pacific Islanders suffered decreases of 5.3 percentage points and 5.5 percentage points, 

respectively. 

Not surprisingly, as the percentage of conventional loans granted increased, the percentage of loan 

applications that were denied decreased. Figure 3.4 shows that, between 1999 and 2002, the percentage 

of conventional mortgage applications denied declined for all racial and ethnic groups. 

Figure 3.4 

Conventional Mortgage Applications Denied by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

Year

Applications Denied

Total 27.5 24.3 17.5 12.7 12.8 14.2 15.6 17.5 18.6

White 25.5 22.3 15.9 11.6 11.6 13.1 14.3 15.8 16.8

Black 49.0 44.6 35.7 26.3 24.3 23.5 24.5 27.9 32.6

American Indian 42.1 41.8 35.3 23.3 24.0 22.3 21.3 24.6 28.3

Asian/Nat.Hawaiian 11.8 12.4 10.8 9.8 11.4 13.6 15.6 16.6 17.8

Hispanic 35.0 31.4 23.4 18.2 18.4 18.7 20.1 23.3 28.1

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 4-2. 

Caption: Between 1999 and 2007, Black borrowers consistently had the highest percentage of 

conventional mortgage loan applications denied. Between 2005 and 2007, Blacks, American Indians and 

Hispanics experienced the most dramatic increases in the percent of conventional mortgage applications 

denied. 

Interestingly, although the rate of conventional mortgage denials began increasing for most groups in 

2004, denial rates for Blacks continued decreasing through 2004, going from 49 percent in 1999 to 23.5 

percent in 2004, a decrease of 25.5 percentage points in only six years. 
54 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Between 2005 and 2007, however, the percent of conventional mortgage applications that were denied 

increased for all groups. The most dramatic increases were experienced by Blacks, American Indians11

and Hispanics. According to Figure 3.4, the conventional mortgage denial rate increased over this period 

by 8 percentage points for both Blacks and Hispanics, but only by 2.5 percentage points for Whites. 

As both Figures 3.3 and 3.4 indicate, there are discrepancies between racial and ethnic groups, both with 

regard to the rate by which conventional loans were approved, as well as the rate by which such loans 

were denied. 

To examine possible explanations for this gap, Figure 3.5 details the denial of conventional mortgage 

loans based on credit history. An individual’s credit history includes detailed information about that 

person’s finances, including such things as late payments, bankruptcies, credit limits, balances, and 

actions taken to recover overdue debts.12 

Figure 3.5 

Denial of Conventional Mortgage Applications Based on Credit History by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

 Year

Credit History Denial

White 48.0 46.0 40.0 33.0 30.0 26.0 22.0 22.0 25.0

Black 55.0 50.0 44.0 37.0 33.0 29.0 24.0 24.0 27.0

American Indian 53.0 52.0 48.0 41.0 36.0 29.0 27.0 25.0 30.0

Asian/Nat. Hawaiian 25.0 26.0 27.0 23.0 19.0 17.0 15.0 15.0 14.0

Hispanic 45.0 41.0 37.0 31.0 28.0 23.0 20.0 19.0 19.0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

 

11 The Department of Treasury has pointed out that Native Americans face unique facts in the home mortgage market: 

“[f]inancing home mortgages ... presents a major challenge, since most Indian Lands and Hawaiian Home Lands are held in 

trust by federal or state governments and cannot be sold or encumbered by a mortgage lien, except as authorized by the 

Secretary of the Interior or other appropriate state official.” Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, Dept. of 

Treasury, The Report of the Native American Lending Study, 2001, p. 5. Practically, this “can effectively deprive Native 

Americans and Native Hawaiians of opportunities to use what is potentially the most valuable asset in their communities and 

thus creates and obvious barrier to the availability of debt financing.” Id. at p. 31. For further information on unique lending 

concerns in Native communities, see FIRST NATIONS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, BORROWING TROUBLE: PREDATORY 

LENDING IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (2008). 

12 Applications for mortgage loans are, of course, denied for many reasons. These include the inability to verify the 

applicant’s information, the applicant’s debt-to-income ratio, as well as the applicant’s credit history. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 55 

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 8-2. 

Caption: Between 1999 and 2005, the denial rates for mortgage loans based on credit history declined for 

Whites and Blacks and the gap between all racial and ethnic groups began to close. Between 2006 and 

2007, the denial rates for mortgage loans based on credit history increased for Whites, Blacks and 

American Indians; remained unchanged for Hispanics; and decreased slightly for Asian/Native Hawaiians. 

Figure 3.5 shows that the denial rates for mortgage loans based on credit history continuously declined 

between 1999 and 2005 for Whites and Blacks. At the same time, the gap between the various groups 

began to close. At the beginning of the time period in question, 1999, there was a gap of 7 percentage 

points between the denial rates of Whites (48 percent) and Blacks (55 percent) with similar credit 

histories. Over the next several years, the gap between these two races narrowed, decreasing to 4 

percentage points by 2001, 3 percentage points by 2004, and 2 percentage points each year from 2005 to 

2007. 

Between 1999 and 2007, Asian/Pacific Islanders were the least likely to be denied a mortgage loan 

based on credit history. In 1999, only 25 percent of all mortgage application denials for Asian/Pacific 

Islanders were based on credit history. In comparison, 55 percent of all mortgage application denials for 

Blacks were because of credit history. 

Between 2006 and 2007, as the market tightened, the numbers of those who were denied mortgage loans 

based on credit history increased by 3 percentage points for Whites and Blacks, and by 5 percentage 

points for American Indians. The percent of Hispanics and Asian/Pacific Islanders who were denied 

mortgages based on credit history either decreased slightly or remained unchanged. 

B. Disparities in Refinance Loans by Race Over Time 

Home mortgage refinancing is a process by which a borrower pays off an existing loan with the 

proceeds from a new loan, using the same property as collateral. Borrowers seek refinancing in order to 

secure lower interest rates or to lower monthly mortgage payments. In addition, borrowers can use 

refinancing to tap into the equity in their homes, using the money for anything from home remodeling, 

to paying off high-interest rate bills, to incurring additional consumer debt. 

Figures 3.6 through 3.8 portray the disparities that exist between racial and ethnic groups. Figure 3.6 

examines the percentage of refinancing mortgage loans granted by race and ethnicity, while Figure 3.7 

examines the percentage of loan applications denied by race and ethnicity. Figure 3.8 then shows the 

denial of refinance loan applications based on credit history. 

Figure 3.6 shows that refinance loans granted, as a percentage of total refinance loan applications 

received, increased dramatically for all racial and ethnic groups during the peak years of the boom, 

between 2000 and 2002. For example, refinance loans made to the total population increased from 50.8 

percent in 2000 to 71.2 percent in 2002, an increase of 20.4 percentage points over three years. Similar 

increases were experienced by all racial and ethnic groups. Whites experienced an increase of 19.3 

percentage points, Blacks an increase of 15.7 percentage points, Hispanics an increase of 13.9 
56 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

percentage points, Asian/Pacific Islanders an increase of 21.5 percentage points, and American Indians 

an increase of 18.5 percentage points—in each case, a striking increase in a period of only three years. 

Figure 3.6 

Refinance Loans Granted to Applicants by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

Year

Percent of Applications Granted

Total 57.0 50.8 69.9 71.2 67.5 52.2 49.7 47.6 44.3

White 59.8 53.8 72.1 73.1 69.5 54.0 51.5 49.5 46.5

Black 38.2 35.1 48.1 50.8 47.7 39.1 38.4 37.1 32.0

American Indian 42.1 39.1 54.9 57.6 50.9 41.1 37.9 35.5 27.7

Asian/Pacific Islander 54.3 48.3 67.3 69.8 66.4 55.9 51.5 47.9 43.3

Hispanic 46.3 42.6 55.8 56.5 54.9 47.8 46.0 43.2 35.5

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 4-3. 

Caption: The percentage of refinance loans granted to all racial and ethnic groups, except Hispanics, 

increased by roughly 20 percent between 2000 and 2002. Between 2003 and 2007, the percentage of 

refinance loans granted continuously decreased for all racial and ethnic groups. By 2007, the 

percentages of loans granted were significantly lower than the percentage of loans granted in 1999. 

Beginning in 2003, however, the percentage of refinance loans granted to all racial and ethnic groups 

began decreasing and continued in a downward spiral into 2007. For example, the percentage of 

refinance loans granted to Blacks decreased from 47.7 percent in 2003 to 32.0 percent in 2007. During 

this period, American Indians and Blacks continued to be less likely than other racial and ethnic 

minority groups to receive refinance loans. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 57 

As with the prior analysis of conventional loans,13 the percentage of refinance loan applications granted 

was roughly the inverse of the percentage of refinance loans denied. Figure 3.7 shows that denial rates 

significantly decreased between 2000 and 2002 for all racial and ethnic groups. Blacks experienced the 

highest rate of denial of any racial or ethnic group, with the percentage of denials decreasing by 10.4 

percentage points. During the same period, the rate of denials decreased by 11.4 percentage points for 

Whites, 8.8 percentage points for Hispanics, 12.5 percentage points for Asian/Pacific Islanders, and 13.3 

percentage points for American Indians. 

Figure 3.7 

Refinance Loan Applications Denied by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

Year

Applications Denied

Total 17.8 23.0 13.4 10.7 14.2 21.8 23.7 26.1 31.4

White 16.2 21.1 12.1 9.7 13.0 20.4 22.2 24.7 29.4

Black 28.8 33.6 28.2 23.2 27.8 32.0 33.3 34.4 42.6

American Indian 23.0 30.0 20.5 16.7 22.0 30.0 29.4 35.7 47.5

Asian/Native Hawaiian 17.0 22.2 12.6 9.7 12.2 18.0 21.4 24.9 30.8

Hispanic 22.6 27.1 20.7 18.3 21.4 24.6 25.7 28.6 37.7

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 4-3. 

Caption: Between 2000 and 2002, the percentage of refinance loan applications denied significantly 

decreased for all racial and ethnic groups. In 2003, the percentage of refinance loan applications denied 

continuously increased and by 2007, roughly 43 of refinance loans submitted by Blacks were denied and 

 

13 See Figures 3.3 through 3.5. 
58 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

48 percent of refinance loans submitted by American Indians were denied. By 2007, the denial rates for 

refinance loans for all racial and ethnic groups were at the highest level since 1999. 

Refinance denial rates increased steadily after 2002. By 2007, one-fourth or more of the total number of 

applications received for refinancing were denied regardless of race or ethnicity. Indeed, as of 2007, 

refinance loan denial rates were at their highest level than at any time during the previous eight years, 

with almost 43 percent of Black applicants being denied. 

Applications for refinance loans are denied for the same reasons as mortgage loans, such as the inability 

to verify the applicant’s information, the applicant’s debt-to-income ratio, and the applicant’s credit 

history. Figure 3.8 shows the denial of refinance loans based on credit history. As stated earlier, an 

individual’s credit history includes a record of a person’s past borrowing and repayment of debts, as 

well as detailed information about late payments, bankruptcies, credit limits, balances, and actions taken 

to recover overdue debts. 

Figure 3.8 shows that, generally, denial rates for refinance loans as a result of credit history are higher 

than the denial rates for conventional mortgage loans.14

Figure 3.8 

Denial of Refinance Loan Applications Based on Credit History by Race and Ethnicity, 1999–2007 

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

Year

Credit History Denial

White 34.0 35.0 32.0 32.0 26.0 27.0 24.0 24.0 23.0

Black 40.0 41.0 39.0 40.0 35.0 33.0 29.0 29.0 29.0

American Indian 37.0 37.0 35.0 33.0 28.0 32.0 29.0 26.0 24.0

Asian/Native Hawaiian 27.0 30.0 27.0 27.0 22.0 22.0 20.0 19.0 16.0

Hispanic 35.0 37.0 35.0 36.0 31.0 28.0 25.0 24.0 22.0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

 

14 See, e.g., Figure 3.5. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 59 

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 8-3. 

Caption: Between 2003 and 2007, refinance loan application denial rates based on credit history 

increased for all racial and ethnic groups, except American Indians. During this period, denial rates for 

Blacks were higher than for any other racial or ethnic group. Between 2003 and 2007, Asian/Native 

Hawaiians had the lowest denial rates. 

The denial rates for refinance loans based on credit history continued to decline between 2002 and 2005; 

however, Blacks continued to have higher rates of denial than other racial and ethnic groups. While the 

denial rate for Blacks improved during this period, decreasing from 40.0 percent in 2002 to 29.0 percent 

in 2005, the comparable rates for Whites showed a decrease from 32.0 percent to 24.0 percent over the 

same period, while the respective decrease for Hispanics was from 36 percent to 25 percent. 

Unlike the situation with conventional mortgages, the gap between the denial rates of Whites and Blacks 

regarding refinance loans did not close significantly over time. As discussed previously, the gap between 

Whites and Blacks relating to conventional loans closed from 7 percent in 1999 to 2 percent by 2005. 

The denial rate with regard to refinance loans, however, showed no such narrowing. There was a 6 

percent gap between Whites and Blacks in 1999, and a 6 percent gap in 2007. 

By 2007, the denial rates for refinance loans based on credit history were somewhat lower than those 

rates for conventional mortgage loans. 

III. Prime and Subprime Lending 

As discussed in Chapter 2, in the last decade and a half, lending practices relating to the home mortgage 

market have changed dramatically. A combination of improvements in technology, as well as the rise in 

securitization, drastically altered the nature and type of loans available to the public. The process has 

been described by experts at the Federal Reserve as follows: 

Traditionally, lenders offered consumers a relatively limited array of products at prices 

that varied according to the characteristics of the loan and property ... not ... the 

creditworthiness of the borrower. Effectively, borrowers either did or did not meet the 

underwriting criteria for a particular product, and those who met the criteria paid about 

the same price. ...15

However, over time, 

improvements in information processing and the maturation of a robust secondary market 

for loans ... spurred ... among [other] changes ... an evolution toward an explicitly risk-

 

15 Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook, Federal Reserve Board, “New Information Reported under HMDA 

and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement,” FED. RESERVE BULL., Summer 2005, at p. 349.
60 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

based pricing of credit. Now the creditworthiness of individual borrowers can lead to 

different prices for the same product. Less-creditworthy applicants, or those either 

unwilling or unable to document their creditworthiness or income, are increasingly less 

likely to be turned down for a loan; rather, they are offered credit at higher prices.16

Loans in the higher-priced market, i.e., that cost more to the borrower, fall into either the “near prime” 

or “subprime” segment. Borrowers in the latter category pay the highest prices because they pose the 

greatest risk of default. Lower-price mortgages, i.e., those that cost less to the borrower, are referred to 

as the prime market.17 These loans generally go to those who present less of a credit risk. 

As significant pricing variability has emerged in the market, along with concerns about potential abuses 

in the subprime market, the Federal Reserve Board issued regulations requiring the disclosure of pricing 

in the higher-priced segment of the residential mortgage market. Its 2002 regulations require financial 

institutions to report the spread between the annual percentage rate (APR) on a loan and the rate on 

Treasury securities of comparable maturity for loans with spreads above designated thresholds. It then 

sought to select thresholds that would exclude the vast majority of prime rate loans while including the 

vast majority of subprime loans. For this purpose, it established a threshold of 3 percentage points of the 

spread for first liens and of 5 percentage points for second liens.18 

Thus, HMDA data do “not identify subprime loans directly .... Rather, the HMDA data indicate which 

loans are categorized as ‘higher priced,’ including subprime loans and some alt-A loans.”19 Loans with 

no reported pricing data are “lower-priced” because the APR is below the threshold. 

Given these standards, in the tables of this report, loans in HMDA data with no reported pricing data are 

designated as “prime” and those with reported pricing data in which the APR is above the threshold are 

designated as “subprime.” 

The subprime and prime distinctions in other data sources may reflect characteristics of the loan, such as 

characteristics of the loan or the borrower that reflect credit risk, rather than pricing. This is the case for 

the Mortgage Bankers Association’s data on foreclosure and default rates used in this report. In 

collecting such data from banking firms, the Mortgage Bankers Association specifically instructs that 

they are to classify loans into prime and subprime “based on ... internal or investor guidelines.”20 As 

explained elsewhere, “[t]he guidelines for what type of mortgage can be sold into a subprime pool vary 

across securitizers. In general, borrowers in subprime pools tend to have low credit scores and high loan-

 

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id. at pp. 349-350.

19 Randall Kroszner, “The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage Crisis,” The CRA: Perspectives on the 

Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, 

February 2009, p. 9 n. 2. 

20 Mortgage Bankers Association, 3rd Quarter 2008 National Delinquency Survey of 1- to 4-unit, first-lien mortgage loans. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 61 

to-value ratios.”21 Thus, the distinction between higher- and lower-priced loans in HMDA data provides 

a good proxy, but not a direct measure, for prime versus subprime loans. 

A. Prime vs. Subprime Lending by Race Over Time 

Subprime mortgages were originally designed as loans to borrowers who did not qualify for 

conventional or conforming mortgage loans because they had less than perfect credit. These loans 

typically carry interest rates 3 to 5 percentage points higher than prime mortgages, as well as higher 

points and fees.22 

As reflected in Figure 3.9, the percentage of subprime conventional mortgages given to all racial and 

ethnic groups increased dramatically between 2004 and 2005; remained high in 2006; and dramatically 

decreased between 2006 and 2007. 

Figure 3.9 

Subprime (Higher-Priced) Conventional Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans by Race and Ethnicity, 

2004–2007 

15.7

11.4

22.2

10.0

21.1

12.7

32.0

54.2 53.4

34.0

20.0

32.4

34.1

17.6

5.9

16.6 16.7

7.7

17.7

34.8

33.8

46.0

19.6

44.9

28.6

23.7

14.1

25.0

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Subprime Loans 

White Black American Indian

Asian Native Hawaiian Hispanic

total

 

21 See Andrew Haughwout, Christopher Mayer, and Joseph Tracy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Subprime Mortgage 

Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on the Coast of Borrowing, staff report no. 368, April 2009, p. 6. 

22 EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S LATEST BOOM AND BUST 17 (The Urban Institute Press 

2007). 
62 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Table 11-3, 2004-2007. Data is for conventional home purchase loans, first lien, and does not include 

manufactured homes. 

Caption: The percentage of higher-priced or subprime conventional loans granted as a percentage of total 

loans increased dramatically between 2004 and 2005 for all racial and ethnic groups. Between 2005 and 

2006, the percentage of such loans given to all racial and ethnic groups showed no significant change. 

Between 2006 and 2007, although the percentage of higher-priced or subprime loans given to all racial 

and ethnic groups decreased significantly, Blacks were still far more likely than any other group to 

receive such loans. 

For most minority groups, however, the percentage receiving such loans was higher than for Whites. For 

example, in 2004, nearly a third of all conventional mortgages given to Blacks were subprime loans. A 

year later, in 2005, that rate had increased dramatically to 54.2 percent. The rate for Hispanics in 2004 

was 19.6 percent and 44.9 percent in 2005. During the same period, the figure for Whites was 10 percent 

in 2004 and 21.1 percent in 2005. 

By 2007, the percent of subprime loans given to Blacks dropped to 34 percent. In 2007, for Black 

homeowners who had a subprime mortgage, the typical annual percentage rate was roughly 3 percentage 

points greater than the rate on a typical 30-year, fixed-rate conventional mortgage.23 

As with subprime conventional loans, the percentage of Blacks who received subprime refinance loans 

was higher than for any other racial or ethnic group. As reflected in Figure 3.10, in 2005, 49.0 percent of 

all refinance loans granted to Blacks were subprime while more than half of all refinance loans to Blacks 

in 2006 were subprime. Over the same period, the figures for Hispanics were 33 percent in 2005 and 

37.6 percent in 2006. The figures for Whites were 22.4 percent and 27.3 percent, respectively. 

Asian/Pacific Islanders were far less likely than any other racial group to receive subprime refinance 

loans. In 2005 only 15.2 percent of all refinance loans made to Asians were subprime.24

 

23 RAKESH KOCHHAR, ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA, AND DANIEL DOCKTERMAN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THROUGH BOOM AND 

BUST: MINORITIES, IMMIGRANTS AND HOMEOWNERSHIP i (May 12, 2009). 

24 The discrepancies in the rate at which different racial and ethnic groups have received subprime loans have been viewed by 

some as an indicium of predatory lending and/or discrimination. See The Future of Fair Housing: Report of the National 

Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, Section V (December 2008); James H. Carr and David Berenbaum, 

Written Statement on behalf of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 

March 20, 2009; DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST AND WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR 

LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES (May 31, 2006). 

Others, however, have contended that, when full creditworthiness is taken into account, the disparities between the various 

races and ethnicities shrink dramatically. As stated by one authority: 

[T]he central reality of the subprime mortgage market is that borrowers with higher incomes, greater wealth, and 

higher credit scores default less often than borrowers with lower incomes, less wealth, and lower credit scores. The 

unfortunate and troubling legacy of America’s history of race relations is that, even in the 21st century, non-white 

borrowers as a group have lower incomes, less wealth, and lower credit scores on average than do white borrowers. 

Brian P. Brooks, Written Statement to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Mar. 20, 2009. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 63 

Figure 3.10 

Subprime (Higher-Priced) Conventional Refinance Loans as a Percentage of Total Conventional 

Refinance Loans by Race and Ethnicity, 2004–2007 

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

Year

Subprime Refinance Loans

Total 14.9 24.7 29.9 21.1

White 13.4 22.4 27.3 19.2

Black 34.3 49.0 52.7 41.3

American Indian 19.9 27.2 32.9 26.4

Asian 5.9 15.2 19.6 12.5

Native Hawaiian 16.4 28.4 33.5 22.9

Hispanic 18.6 33.0 37.6 27.3

2004 2005 2006 2007

Note: Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not available” categories are 

excluded from this data. Note further that because of the manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated 

as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence 

their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: HMDA Data, Table 11-7. 

Caption: Between 2004 and 2006, the percentage of higher-priced or subprime conventional refinance 

loans granted as a percentage of total conventional refinance loans increased dramatically for all racial 

and ethnic groups. In 2006, more than 50 percent of all refinance loans granted to Blacks were higherpriced or subprime loans. All racial and ethnic groups were far less likely to receive such loans in 2007 

than in earlier years. 

By 2007, all racial and ethnic groups were far less likely to receive subprime refinance loans than in 

earlier years. For example, 26.4 percent of all refinance loans made to American Indians in 2007 were 

subprime, down from 32.9 percent in 2006. Although the percentage of Blacks receiving subprime loans 

decreased in 2007, they still received subprime loans at a significantly greater rate than other racial and 

ethnic groups. 
64 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

IV. Foreclosure Rates by Type of Loan Over Time 

An examination of foreclosure rates also reflects the significant difference between prime and subprime 

loans. Conventional subprime loans are significantly more likely than conventional prime, FHA or VA 

loans to enter foreclosure. Figure 3.11 shows that, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, foreclosure 

rates for subprime loans escalated, and peaked at 9.4 percent in 2001. 

Figure 3.11 

Mortgage Foreclosure Rates by Type of Loan, 1998–2008 

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

Year

Foreclosure Rate

All Loans subprime Prime FHA VA

All Loans 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.2 2.0 3.3

subprime 4.4 6.3 7.6 9.4 8.0 5.6 3.8 3.3 4.5 8.7 13.7

Prime 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.8

FHA 2.4 2.0 1.7 2.2 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4

VA 1.9 1.7 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.7

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey. 

Caption: Between 1998 and 2008, subprime loans had the highest foreclosure rates than prime, FHA or 

VA loans. Foreclosure rates began decreasing on subprime loans in 2002 and decreased continuously 

each year through 2005. By 2008, the foreclosure rate on subprime loans spiked to 13.7 percent. During 

this period, foreclosure rates for all other loans remained at 3 percent or less. 

Not surprisingly, as overall homeownership rates crested in 2005,25 overall foreclosure rates were at 

their lowest. As reflected in Figure 3.11, foreclosure rates for all types of loans began to increase in 

2006. The increase in subprime loans was the most drastic. Specifically, foreclosure rates on 

conventional subprime loans went from 3.3 percent in 2005 to 8.7 percent in 2007 and were at 13.7 

percent in 2008. Moreover, whereas the gap in foreclosure rates between subprime and prime loans had 

only been 2.9 percentage points in 2005, by 2008 the gap had increased to nearly 12 percentage points. 

 

25 See Figure 3.1. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 65 

Figure 3.12 depicts foreclosure rates for prime and subprime loans both for adjustable-rate mortgages 

(ARMs) and fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). In an adjustable rate mortgage, the interest rate is generally 

fixed for a period of time, after which it will periodically adjust up or down based on some form of 

market index. In a fixed rate mortgage, the interest rate remains fixed for the term of the loan. 

Figure 3.12 

Conventional Foreclosure Rates by Type of Loan, 1998–2008 

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

Year

Foreclosure Rate

Subprime ARM Subprime FRM Prime ARM Prime FRM

Subprime ARM 4.6 6.6 7.3 9.1 8.0 5.7 3.8 3.4 5.6 13.4 22.2

Subprime FRM 4.1 6.2 7.7 9.5 7.9 5.6 4.2 3.1 3.2 3.8 6.2

Prime ARM 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.9 2.6 5.7

Prime FRM 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.1

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey. 

Caption: Between 1998 and 2005, foreclosure rates were highest for subprime loans, regardless of 

whether or not the loan was fixed or adjustable rate. After 2005, foreclosure rates on subprime adjustable 

rate loans began escalating and by 2008 those rates had increased from 5.6 to 22.2 percent. During this 

same period, foreclosure rates for subprime fixed rate mortgages also increased from 3.2 percent in 2006 

to 6.2 percent in 2008. Prime adjustable rates mortgages also increased from 0.5 percent in 2005 to 5.7 

percent in 2008. 

While prime FRM foreclosure rates remained low throughout this period, subprime FRM loans were 

more volatile. Although the foreclosure rate for subprime FRMs had decreased to 3.1 percent by 2005, 

the percentage of foreclosures for these loans steadily increased, reaching a high of 6.2 percent in 2008. 

Foreclosure rates for prime ARMs underwent greater change. Throughout much of the period examined, 

foreclosure rates for prime ARMs remained flat. Between 2006 and 2007, however, the rates nearly 

tripled from 0.9 percent to 2.6 percent. By 2008, the foreclosure rate for prime ARMs had increased to 

5.7 percent. 
66 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

By far the highest rate of foreclosure is attributable to subprime ARMs. While the rate of foreclosure for 

such loans declined from 2001 to 2005, it began to rise dramatically thereafter. By 2006, the rate of 

foreclosure for such loans had risen to 5.6 percent, and had increased to 13.4 percent by 2007. The rate 

of foreclosure in 2008 was 22.2 percent. By that point, the gap in foreclosure rates between prime ARMs 

and subprime ARMs, which had been at 2.9 percentage points in 2005, had increased to 16.5 percentage 

points. 

V. Community Reinvestment Act 

This section seeks to determine to what extent the requirements of the CRA may have affected 

residential mortgage lending practices and the existing mortgage crisis. 

The mortgage lending data presented in this section are restricted to conventional first liens on home 

purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties.26 Conventional mortgage loans exclude 

those made by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA loans) and those guaranteed by the Veterans 

Administration (VA loans) and the Rural Housing Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (RHS 

Loan Programs).27 

In order to analyze the effect of the CRA, this section examines practices of banking institutions and 

their affiliates and independent mortgage companies. This analysis compares and contrasts Performance 

with regard to a variety of factors in order to determine to what extent the CRA has played a role over 

approximately the last decade. 

In this regard, section A compares the number and monetary value of (i) prime loans; (ii) subprime 

loans; and (iii) subprime loans by banking institutions and affiliates within their CRA assessment areas. 

Section B then examines the decreasing amount of mortgage lending within CRA assessment areas. 

Section C then examines the distribution of subprime loans from 2004 to 2007 by examining differences 

between loans made to low- and moderate-income individuals as compared to middle- and upperincome individuals. This section looks not only at loan counts and the monetary value of such loans, but 

the percent distributed by year and by lender type. Section D undertakes a similar analysis with regard to 

prime loans. 

Sections E and F then analyze the race and types of neighborhoods that receive different types of loans. 

Section E examines mortgage lending by neighborhood income for the year 2006, while Section F 

examines mortgage lending by race for the same year. 

 

26 Neighborhood income level in the context of the CRA is defined in relation to a designated geographic area’s median 

family income; “lower income” is defined as less than 50 percent of the area’s median family income; “moderate income,” 

from 50 percent to less than 80 percent; “middle income,” 80 percent to less than 120 percent; and “upper income,” greater 

than or equal to 120 percent. Lower income neighborhoods include low- and moderate-incomes ones, the focus of the CRA. 

Non-lower income neighborhoods include middle and higher income ones. See The Federal Reserve, Briefing on CRA and 

Credit Scoring Issues to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, January 7, 2009 (“definition” and “the CRA”). Glenn B. 

Canner, senior advisor, The Federal Reserve, e-mail to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil 

Rights, Apr. 29, 2009. 

27 Mortgage-X Mortgage Information Service, Types of Mortgage Loans, <http://mortgage-x.com/library.loans.htm> (last 

accessed Feb. 24, 2009). 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 67 

A. Number and Monetary Value of Prime v. Subprime Loans 

Figure 3.13 contrasts (i) the number of all loans (subprime and prime) originated, with (ii) all subprime 

loans originated, and (iii) all subprime loans originated by banking institutions and their affiliates within 

their CRA assessment areas to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods. 

Figure 3.13 

Subprime (Higher-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) Originated, 2004–2007 

6,481,494

9,657,932 9,917,222

8,556,213

1,237,352

2,393,492 2,602,519

1,410,608

103,913 162,275 150,464 138,087 0

2,000,000

4,000,000

6,000,000

8,000,000

10,000,000

12,000,000

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Number of loans

Total subprime and prime loans (counts)

Total subprime loans (counts) 

Total subprime loans to LMI by banking institut. & affiliates within their CRA assess. area (counts)

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: During this period, the number of subprime loans compared to all loans originated was no more 

than 30.4 percent at its peak in 2005. At the same time, during its peak in 2007 the number of subprime 

loans made to low and moderate income borrowers/neighborhoods was no more than 11 percent of all 

such loans originated. 

Figure 3.13 shows that, from 2004–2007, the total number of subprime loans made up just 14.6 percent 

of the total market in 2004, but that the number of such loans rose to 30.4 percent of the total market in 

2005 as the market peaked. The share then fell to 24.1 percent in 2006, and by 2007 had decreased to 

19.1 percent.28

 

28 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total number of subprime loans constituted of the 

total number of subprime and prime loans originated. 
68 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The total number of subprime loans that banking institutions and their affiliates made in their CRA 

assessment areas to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods represented an even smaller 

fraction of the total number of subprime loans originated. Specifically, such loans constituted a mere 7 

percent of all subprime loans in 2004, 6 percent in 2005 and 2006, and 11.0 percent in 2007.29

Figure 3.14 presents the same three categories, measured by the monetary value of the loans. 

Figure 3.14 

Subprime (Higher-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Billions of Dollars), 2004–2007 

$1,520.3

$2,225.1

$1,876.9 $1,921.7

$240.1 $194.6

$470.9 $485.1

$8.4 $17.5 $19.0 $17.3 $0.0

$500.0

$1,000.0

$1,500.0

$2,000.0

$2,500.0

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Billions of dollars

Total subprime and prime loan volume ($)

Total subprime loan volume ($) 

Total subprime loan volume to LMI by banking institut. & affiliates within their CRA assess. area ($)

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: During this period, the monetary value of subprime loans compared to all loans originated was 

no more than 24.5 percent at its peak in 2005. Meanwhile, at its peak in 2007, the monetary value of 

subprime loans made to low and moderate income borrowers/neighborhoods was no more than 7 percent 

of all such loans originated. 

 

29 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total number of subprime loans banking 

institutions and their affiliates originated to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA 

assessment areas constituted of the total number of subprime loans originated. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 69 

HMDA data show that the monetary value of subprime loans constituted 10.4 percent of overall volume 

in 2004, a percentage that climbed to 24.5 percent in 2005, decreased to 21.8 percent in 2006 and fell to 

15.8 percent in 2007.30 

Most notably, the monetary volume of subprime loans made by banking institutions and their affiliates 

to lower-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA assessment areas comprised a very small 

segment of all subprime loans originated. Specifically, such loans accounted for only 4 percent of 

overall volume from 2004 to 2006. By 2007, the figure had risen to only 7 percent.31 

Based on Figures 3.13 and 3.14, the data indicate that, whether measured by number of loans, or 

monetary value of loans, subprime loans reached their peak in 2005 and never exceeded more than 30.4 

percent of the number of loans or 24.5 percent of the value of loans. In addition, said data reflect that 

subprime loans made by banking institutions or their affiliates in their CRA assessment areas remained a 

marginal segment of the overall market. 

B. Mortgage Lending Within CRA Assessment Areas 1993-2006 

Figure 3.15 documents home purchase and refinance mortgage lending within CRA assessment areas, 

irrespective of neighborhood income. 

Figure 3.15 

Mortgage Lending Within CRA Assessment Areas, 1993–2006 

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

Year

Percent

Home Purchase 36.0 38.6 35.5 32.2 32.0 30.6 31.1 29.6 28.1 27.5 25.8 24.1 21.4 24.9

Refinance 43.6 45.8 42.7 41.3 35.9 37.0 36.8 31.6 33.1 32.7 32.8 28.1 24.5 26.6

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

 

30 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total volume subprime loans constituted of the 

total volume of subprime and prime loans originated. 

31 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total volume of subprime loans banking 

institutions and their affiliates originated to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA 

assessment areas constituted of the total volume of subprime loans originated. 
70 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Note: The Figure shows the percentage of mortgage loans originated by deposit-taking organizations within their assessment 

areas. This graph was presented by Ren S. Essene and William C. Apgar, “The 30th Anniversary of the CRA: Restructuring the 

CRA to Address the Mortgage Finance Revolution in Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community 

Reinvestment Act, A Joint Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, p. 22, 

exhibit 1: Assessment Area Lending Has Fallen Steadily. The source of the raw data for the graph is the JCHS enhanced 

HMDA database. 

Source: Ren Essene, policy analyst, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, PowerPoint file “Exhibit 1: Assessment Area Lending 

has Fallen” to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Mar. 25, 2009, 11.01 p.m. 

Caption: Within CRA assessment areas, home mortgage lending and home refinancing particularly had 

been decreasing steadily from 1993 to 2006.

As reflected in Figure 3.15, mortgage lending within CRA assessment areas has decreased steadily over 

time. From 1993 to 2006, home purchase mortgage lending in CRA assessment areas, as a percent of all 

home purchase loans, decreased from 36.0 percent to 24.9 percent, a drop of 11.1 percentage points.32 

In the same period, mortgage lending in CRA assessment areas for home refinancing decreased at a 

higher rate, falling from 43.6 percent to 26.6 percent, a drop of 17.0 percentage points. This decrease, at 

a time when overall mortgage lending was increasing, indicates that persons in lower-income 

neighborhoods were increasingly using banking institutions and their affiliates outside the CRA areas, as 

well as to independent mortgage companies.33

C. Distribution of Subprime Loans 2004-2007 

Subprime loans traditionally have been made to those of low or moderate incomes. People of lower 

income often have lower levels of creditworthiness and, thus, are charged higher rates of interest on 

loans. The next set of Figures examines how such loans were distributed between low- and moderateincome borrowers/neighborhoods and middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods, for the 

period 2004-2007. Noticeably, as housing prices increased, even those with higher levels of income 

began obtaining subprime loans. 

 

32 See Ren S. Essene and William C. Apgar, “The 30th Anniversary of the CRA: Restructuring the CRA to Address the 

Mortgage Finance Revolution,” Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint 

Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, p. 22. See also KEVIN PARK,

“SUBPRIME LENDING AND THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT,” JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARV. U. 

33 One possible explanation for this phenomenon was as follows: 

I don’t want to say it’s in the cultural DNA, but a lot of us who are older than 30 have some memory of 

disappointment or humiliation related to banks,” Mr. Grannum said. “The white guy in the suit with the same 

income gets a loan and you don’t?” “So you turn to local brokers, even if they don’t offer the best rates.” This may 

help explain an unusual phenomenon: Upper-income black borrowers in the region are more likely to hold subprime 

mortgages than even blacks with lower incomes, who often benefit from homeownership classes and lending 

assistance offered by government and nonprofits. 

Michael Powell and Janet Roberts, Minorities Affected Most as New York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at 

A1. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 71 

Figure 3.16 

Distribution of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) by Income of Borrowers and/or 

Neighborhood, 2004–2007 

1,385,164 1,345,502

684,064 700,282

1,047,990

537,070

1,217,355

726,544

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

1,600,000

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Number of subprime loan counts

Middle and Upper Income Lower and Moderate Income

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: For three of the four years of this period, a smaller number of subprime loans were originated to 

low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods than to middle- and upper-income ones, with most 

being made in 2005. 

Figure 3.16 shows that, except in 2004, the number of subprime loans made to low- and moderateincome borrowers/neighborhoods by financial institutions was smaller than that to middle- and upperincome ones. The number of such loans to low and moderate borrowers was among the highest in 2005 

and 2006 and evidenced considerable variation over time. Rising from about 726,000 in 2004, such 

loans peaked at 1.2 million in 2005, an increase of 67.6 percent. In 2006, the number of such loans 

decreased somewhat, by 13.9 percentage points, but remained above a million. By 2007, they had fallen 

precipitously, bottoming out at about 537,000, a decrease of 48.8 percentage points over the previous 

year. 

For every year, other than 2004, the number of middle- and upper-income subprime loans exceeded 

those for low- and moderate-income groups. 

Figure 3.17 shows the distribution of subprime loans broken down by volume. 
72 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.17 

Distribution of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Mortgage Loan Volume (Billions of Dollars) by Income of 

Borrowers and/or Neighborhood Income, 2004–2007 

$330.7

$76.8

$117.9

$305.9

$168.3

$165.0 $154.4

$71.8

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Billions of dollars

Middle and Upper Income Lower and Moderate Income

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: The Reserve Board, “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, 

senior advisor, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: The monetary value of subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods 

is consistently lower than that to middle- and upper-ones and evidenced decline. Meanwhile, the overall 

monetary value of subprime loans had grown substantially since 2004, noticeably in 2005 and 2006. 

Figure 3.17 reflects that, during this period, the monetary volume of subprime loans to middle- and 

upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods consistently exceeded those made to lower- and moderateincome groups. Indeed, during the critical years of 2005, 2006, and 2007, subprime loans to lower- and 

moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods were often less than half the dollar value of subprime loans 

made to middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods. 

In addition, Figure 3.17 reflects the growth of subprime loans generally over this period. For example, 

the total value of subprime loans reflected in Figure 3.17 for 2004 was 194.7 billion. By 2005 that figure 

had risen to 470.9 billion, and by 2006 the figure had reached 485.1 billion. 

The next set of Figures seeks to examine to what extent subprime loans were made within CRA 

assessment areas. For that purpose, Figure 3.18 presents the number of subprime loans originated by 

different lender types, including independent mortgage companies. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 73 

Figure 3.18 

Percent Distribution of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) to Lower-Income of 

Borrowers and/or Neighborhoods by Lender Type, 2004–2007 

14.3 13.3 14.4

25.7

34.5 35.6

40.6

51.2 51.1 51.3

45.0

23.0

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent subprime loan count 

to lower income

Bankng institutions and affiliates- loans made within their CRA assessment area 

Banking institutions and affiliates- loans made outside their CRA assessment area 

Independent Mortgage Company

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: Independent mortgage companies dominated the market for subprime loans to low and 

moderate borrowers/neighborhoods from 2004 through 2006. Banking institutions and their affiliates 

made the smallest percentage of subprime loans within their assessment areas but growth of such loans 

outside these areas was discernable, particularly in 2006 and 2007. 

As reflected above, independent mortgage companies made the highest percentage of such loans for 

three of the four years, with their market share falling precipitously in 2007.34 In the first two years, they 

consistently claimed a majority of subprime loans. By 2006, however, that share had decreased to 45 

percent and, by 2007, their market share fell further to 23.0 percent. 

Of the subprime loans made by banking institutions and their affiliates, the smallest percentages were 

originated within an institution’s CRA assessment area. From 2004 to 2006, for example, the figures 

were consistently low, 14.3, 13.3, and 14.4 percent, respectively. Only in 2007 did this share in the 

market increase rising to 25.7 percent. 

 

34 The rather dramatic increase and decrease in market shares in 2007 on the part of the banking institutions and their 

affiliates and the independent mortgages, respectively, might be explained by a reduction in the number of lenders. In 2007, 

169 lenders that reported data for 2006 ceased operations and did not report in 2007. With the exception of two lenders, all 

were independent mortgage companies. The Federal Reserve, Briefing on the 2007 HMDA Data to the U.S. Commission on 

Civil Rights, Jan. 28, 2009. 
74 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

At the same time, progressively higher percentages were originated outside CRA assessment areas. Such 

loans initially increased modestly, rising from 34.5 percent in 2004 to 35.6 percent in 2005. They then 

increased to 40.6 in 2006, and finally to 51.3 percent in 2007. Between 2004 and 2007, there was an 

increase of 16.8 percentage points. 

Based on Figures 3.16-3.18, two major points can be discerned. First, during the time period in question, 

middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods were the largest consumers of subprime loans. This 

is so whether measured by number of loans or monetary volume. Second, as reflected in Figure 3.18, the 

largest percent of subprime loans, by a substantial margin, was made by either independent mortgage 

companies or banking institutions outside their CRA assessment areas. 

Both of these findings call into question not only the argument that the CRA played a major role in the 

current mortgage crisis, but also the CRA’s continued relevance as a means to ensure sound lending to 

low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods. 

D. Distribution of Prime Loans 2004-2007 

The focus of the next examination is on the extent of prime loans originated within CRA assessment 

areas. To that end, Figure 3.19 examines the number of such loans, while Figure 3.20 examines their 

monetary value. 

Figure 3.19 

Distribution of Prime (Lower-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) Originated, 2004–2007 

6,481,494

5,244,142

644,978

9,917,222

8,556,213

9,657,932

7,523,730

8,247,324

5,953,694

898,801 663,276 787,492

0

2,000,000

4,000,000

6,000,000

8,000,000

10,000,000

12,000,000

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Number of Loans

Total subprime and prime loans (counts)

Total prime loans (counts)

Total prime loan volume to LMI by banking institut. & affiliates within their CRA assess. area (counts)

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, The Federal Reserve, 

senior advisor, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 75 

Caption: During this period, prime loans constituted a substantial percentage of all loans originated, no 

less than 69.6 percent in 2005. In contrast, at its peak in 2007 prime loans to low- and moderate-income 

borrowers/neighborhoods comprised no more than 12 percent of all prime loans originated. 

As reflected in Figure 3.19, the total number of prime loans constituted a substantial proportion of all 

loans originated (prime and subprime), particularly in 2004 and 2007. In percentage terms, prime loans 

constituted 85.4 percent of the total in 2004, 69.6 percent in 2005, 75.9 percent in 2006, and 80.9 

percent in 2007.35

At the same time, the number of prime loans that banking institutions and their affiliates originated to 

low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA assessment areas was 

consistently a very small portion of all prime loans originated. In percentage terms, such loans 

represented only 11 percent of the total in 2004 and 2005, 10 percent in 2006, and 12 percent in 2007.36 

Figure 3.20 

Distribution of Prime (Lower-Priced) and All Home Mortgage Loans (Billions of Dollars), 2004–2007 

$1,280.2

$101.5

$1,520.3

$2,225.1

$1,921.7 $1,876.9

$1,682.2

$1,450.8

$1,740.0

$113.8 $98.8 $111.0

$0.0

$500.0

$1,000.0

$1,500.0

$2,000.0

$2,500.0

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Billions of dollars

Total subprime and prime loan volume ($)

Total prime loan volume ($)

Total prime loan volume to LMI by banking institut. & affiliates within their CRA assess. area ($)

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

 

35 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total number of prime loans constituted of the 

total number of subprime and prime loans originated. 

36 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total number of prime loans banking institutions 

and their affiliates originated to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA assessment areas 

constituted of the total number of prime loans originated. 
76 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Caption: During this period, the monetary value of prime loans constituted a substantial percentage of all 

loans originated, no less than 75.5 percent in 2005. In contrast, the monetary value of prime loans to lowand moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods constituted a significantly lower percentage of all prime 

loans originated, no more than 8 percent in 2007. 

Figure 3.20 presents similar results by examining the monetary value of such loans. HMDA data show 

that, during the period in question, the volume of prime loans made up a substantial portion of the total 

of all loans (subprime and prime) originated, particularly in 2004 and 2007. From a high of 89.6 percent 

in 2004, the monetary share of prime loans bottomed out in 2005 to 75.5 percent, but rose to 78.2 

percent in 2006 and climbed to 84.2 percent in 2007.37

Most notably, the volume of prime loans that banking institutions and their affiliates originated to lowand moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA assessment areas is consistently a 

very small portion of all prime loan volume originated, a finding similar to that relating to prime loan 

counts. Such loans represented only 7 percent of the total in 2004 and 2005, 6 percent in 2006, and 8 

percent in 2007.38 

The next set of Figures examines the distribution of prime mortgages between middle- and upperincome and low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods. The evidence indicates that middleand upper-income individuals were the primary recipients of prime mortgage loans. 

Figure 3.21 

Distribution of Prime Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) by Income of Borrowers and/or 

Neighborhood, 2004–2007 

4,142,025

3,640,077

5,611,507 5,272,868

2,635,817

1,811,669 1,604,065

2,250,862

0

1,000,000

2,000,000

3,000,000

4,000,000

5,000,000

6,000,000

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Number of prime loan counts

Middle and Upper Income Lower and Moderate Income

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

 

37 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total volume prime loans constituted of the total 

volume of subprime and prime loans originated. 

38 The figure for each year is obtained by calculating the percentage that the total volume of prime loans banking institutions 

and their affiliates originated to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA assessment areas 

constituted of the total volume of prime loans originated. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 77 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, The Federal Reserve, 

senior advisor, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009, 1:33 pm. 

Caption: During this period, more than twice the number of prime loans was made to middle- and upperincome borrowers/neighborhoods than to low and moderate ones. 

As reflected in Figure 3.21, financial institutions consistently originated a higher number of prime loans 

to middle- and upper-income borrowers. During each of the four years examined, the number of prime 

mortgage loans made to middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods was more than twice that 

to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods. 

Figure 3.22 examines similar information with regard to the volume of such loans. While Figure 3.21 

indicated that middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods received the largest number of prime 

loans, Figure 3.22 reflects that the monetary value of such loans is even greater, with the monetary value 

of loans to middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods often exceeding three times the value of 

such loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods. 

Figure 3.22 

Prime Mortgage Loan Volume (Billions of Dollars) by Income of Borrowers and/or 

Neighborhood Income, 2004–2007 

1,320.4

1,163.4

1,398.1

1,023.1

257.1

361.9

287.4 341.9

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Billions of Dollars

Middle and Upper Income Lower and Moderate Income

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: For this period, the monetary value of prime loans to middle and upper income 

borrowers/neighborhood exceeds that to low and moderate ones by more than three times.

In sum, as was the case with subprime lending, CRA-related prime loans made up only a minor part of 

the market, and the largest number and value of prime loans went to middle- and upper-income 

borrowers/neighborhoods. 
78 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The next series of Figures examines the extent to which prime loans made to low- and moderate-income 

borrowers/neighborhoods occur within CRA assessment areas. As reflected in Figure 3.23, and in this 

case unlike the situation with subprime loans,39 the percentage of prime loans made within a CRA 

assessment area is very similar to those made outside the CRA assessment area. 

Figure 3.23 

Percent Distribution of Prime (Lower-Priced) Mortgage Loans (Loan Counts) to Low- and ModerateIncome Borrowers and/or Neighborhoods by Lender Type, 2004–2007 

34.1 35.0

39.7 40.1

26.2 24.9

19.6

40.2

36.6 37.1

40.2

26.3

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent prime loan count to 

lower income

Bankng institutions and affiliates- loans made within their CRA assessment area 

Banking institutions and affiliates- loans made outside their CRA assessment area 

Independent Mortgage Company

Note: Restricted to conventional first liens on home purchase and refinance loans for owner-occupied properties. 

Source: “Statistics on Mortgage Lending from HMDA Data,” EXCEL spreadsheet, Glenn B. Canner, senior advisor, The 

Federal Reserve, to Sock-Foon C. MacDougall, social scientist, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 19, 2009. 

Caption: Banking institutions and their affiliates made similar percentages of prime loans within and 

outside their CRA assessment areas while independent mortgage companies made the least, no more 

than 26.3 percent. 

In the case of prime loans, the percentages originated to low- and moderate-income 

borrowers/neighborhoods within and outside the CRA assessment areas were generally similar. Loans 

made within CRA assessment areas ranged from 34.1 to 40.2 percent of the total, while loans made 

outside the areas ranges from 37.1 to 40.2 percent. In contrast, the independent mortgage companies, 

which focused primarily on subprime lending, originated the lowest percentages of prime loans, which 

decreased steadily over time from 26.2 percent in 2004 to 19.6 percent in 2007. 

 

39 See Figure 3.18. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 79 

E. Mortgage Lending by Neighborhood Income, 2006 

Figures 3.24 to 3.25 take a snapshot of mortgage lending in neighborhoods with different mixes of 

racial/ethnic populations and income levels for the year 2006. Figure 3.24 reviews home purchase 

lending. 

Figure 3.24 

Home Purchase Mortgage Loans by Type of Neighborhood Income, 2006 

23.2 24.5 27.0 21.9 24.1 29.3 24.1 28.4 30.7

33.0 38.3 40.4

33.2 37.3

40.8

33.8

35.0 39.6

43.8 37.1 32.6

45.0 38.6 29.9

42.2 36.5 29.7

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

 Low-income

minority

neigborhood

 Low-income

white

neighborhood

 ModerateNeighborhood income mixed

 High-income

minority

neigborhood

 High-income

white

neighborhood

Neighborhood Type

Home purchase mortgage loans in 

percent

Inside CRA assessment areas Outside CRA assessment areas

Independent mortgage companies

Note: First-lien loans for owner occupied properties only. The small share of loans originated by credit unions is included in 

"outside assessment area" totals. 

Source: Ren S. Essene and William C. Apgar, “The 30th Anniversary of the CRA: Restructuring the CRA to Address the 

Mortgage Finance Revolution,” Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint 

Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, p. 23 exhibit 2: Assessment Area 

Lending Lags in Low-income and Minority Areas. The source of the raw data for Exhibit 2 is the JCHS enhanced HMDA 

database, 2006. 

Caption: In 2006, banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to make home purchase 

mortgage loans within CRA assessment areas irrespective of the racial/ethnic composition and income 

level of the neighborhoods. Independent mortgage companies were more likely to make the highest 

percentage of home purchase mortgage loans in minority neighborhoods regardless of income level.

As reflected in Figure 3.24, in 2006, irrespective of the racial composition and income level of 

neighborhoods, banking institutions and their affiliates were still less likely to make home purchase 

loans within their CRA assessment areas than outside them. For example, of the total number of loans 

made in low-income minority neighborhoods, banking institutions and their affiliates originated 23.2 

percent within their assessment areas compared to 33.0 percent outside of them. Among the loans made 

in moderate-income White neighborhoods, banking institutions and their affiliates originated 29.3 

percent within their CRA assessment areas compared to 40.8 percent outside of them. Across the nine 

types of racial/ethnic income neighborhoods, the proportions of home purchase loans within CRA 
80 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

assessment areas were narrowly bounded, between 21.9 and 30.7 percent, a range of just 8.8 percentage 

points. 

Of greatest significance, the percentages of home purchase loans originated by banking institutions and 

their affiliates within their CRA assessment areas to minority neighborhoods were the lowest compared 

to other types of racial/ethnic neighborhoods irrespective of income level. For example, in low-income 

neighborhoods, the percentage of loans to minorities was 23.2 percent compared to 24.5 percent and 

27.0 percent to mixed neighborhoods and White neighborhoods, respectively. In moderate-income 

neighborhoods, the comparable figures were 21.9 percent in minority neighborhoods matched against 

24.1 percent and 29.3 percent in mixed and White neighborhoods respectively. Similarly, in high income 

neighborhoods, the percentage of loans to minority neighborhoods was 24.1 percent compared to 28.4 

percent and 30.7 in mixed and White neighborhoods, respectively. 

Tellingly, independent mortgage companies are most likely to make the highest percentage of house 

purchase loans in minority neighborhoods, regardless of income level. 

Figure 3.25 reviews similar information with regard to refinance mortgage lending. Again, the figures 

only relate to a single year, 2006. 

Figure 3.25 

Refinance Mortgage Loans by Type of Neighborhood Income, 2006 

22.7 21.5 25.3 23.8 23.2 26.5 27.8 28.5 28.6

35.2 41.0 43.1

34.5 39.9 43.1 33.8 36.9 41.5

42.0 37.5 31.5 41.8 36.8 30.4 38.4 34.6 29.9

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

 Low-income minority

neigborhood

 Low-income mixed

neighborhood

 Low-income white

neighborhood

 Moderate-income minority

neigborhood

 Moderate-income mixed

Neighborhood

 Moderare-income white

neighborhood

 High-income minority

neigborhood

 High-income mixed

neighborhood

 High-income white

neighborhood

Neighborhood type

Refinance mortgage loans in percent

Banking organization Independent mortgage companies

Banking organization Outside CRA assessment areas

Banking organization Inside CRA assessment areas

Note: First-lien loans for owner occupied properties only. The small share of loans originated by credit unions is included in 

"outside assessment area" totals. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 81 

Source: Ren S. Essene and William C. Apgar, “The 30th Anniversary of the CRA: Restructuring the CRA to Address the 

Mortgage Finance Revolution, Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint 

Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, p. 23 exhibit 2: Assessment Area 

Lending Lags in Low-income and Minority Areas. The source of the raw data for Exhibit 2 is the JCHS enhanced HMDA 

database, 2006. 

Caption: In 2006, banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to make refinance mortgage 

loans within CRA assessment areas regardless of the racial/ethnic composition and income level of the 

neighborhoods. Independent mortgage companies were most likely to make the highest percentages of 

refinance mortgage loans to minority neighborhoods irrespective of income level. 

As was the case of home purchase loans, irrespective of the racial composition and income levels of 

neighborhoods, banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to originate refinance loans 

within their CRA assessment areas than outside them. However, unlike with home purchase loans, the 

percentages of refinance loans banking institutions and their affiliates made within their assessment 

areas was lowest for minority neighborhoods only in high income areas, 27.8 percent. In low- and 

moderate-income areas, it was racially mixed neighborhoods that received the lowest share, 21.5 percent 

and 23.2 percent, respectively. 

Across the nine types of racial/ethnic income neighborhoods, the proportions of refinance purchase 

loans within CRA assessment areas are clustered closely together, between 21.5 and 28.6 percent, a 

range of only 7.1 percentage points. 

Again independent mortgage companies continued to be most likely to make the highest percentage of 

refinance loans in minority neighborhoods, regardless of income. 

F. Mortgage Lending By Race 

Figures 3.26 to 3.27 shift the focus to borrower race and ethnicity in examining home purchase and 

refinance lending. This analysis is particularly informative in determining the degree to which CRA 

loans are ultimately obtained by various racial and/or ethnic groups. 

Figure 3.26 documents home purchase lending practices for the year 2006. 
82 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.26 

Home Purchase Loans by Race, 2006 

24.8 29.9

19.6 22.3

29.1

20.4

38.5

36.1

35.7 33.5

38.4

34.1

36.7 34.0

44.7 44.3

32.5

45.5

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

 American

Indian

 Asian Black Native

Hawaiian

 Non-Hispanic

White

 Hispanic

Borrower race/ethnicity

Home purchase mortgage loans in percent

Independent mortgage companies

Outside CRA assessment areas

Inside CRA assessment areas

Note: First-lien loans for owner occupied properties only. The small share of loans originated by credit unions is included in 

"outside assessment area" totals. 

Source: Ren S. Essene and William C. Apgar, “The 30th Anniversary of the CRA: Restructuring the CRA to Address the 

Mortgage Finance Revolution, Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint 

Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, p. 23 exhibit 2: Assessment Area 

Lending Lags in Low-income and Minority Areas. The source of the raw data for Exhibit 2 is the JCHS enhanced HMDA 

database, 2006. 

Caption: Banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to make home purchase loans within 

their assessment areas regardless of the race or ethnicity of the borrowers.

The data in Figure 3.26 indicate that, in 2006, banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to 

make home purchase loans within their assessment areas, irrespective of the race or ethnicity of the 

borrowers. For example, home purchase loans made to Blacks within CRA assessment areas equaled 

19.6 percent. Such loans made outside the CRA areas, however, equaled 35.7 percent. Similar 

percentages apply with equal force to other groups. For Hispanics, the respective figures were 20.4 

percent versus 34.1 percent; for Whites, 29.1 percent versus 38.4 percent; and for Asians/Pacific 

Islanders, 29.9 percent versus 36.1 percent. 

While a single year is hardly determinative, for 2006, the minorities who were to most benefit from the 

CRA, were more likely to obtain loans from other sources. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 83 

Figure 3.27 examines the same information with regard to home refinance lending practices. Again, the 

figures only apply to 2006. 

Figure 3.27 

Home Refinance Loans by Race/Ethnicity, 2006 

26.4 32.1

18.0 23.2 27.4 24.9

42.3 35.6

42.4 33.9

40.2

33.6

31.4 32.3 39.6 43.0

32.5 41.5

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

 American

Indian

 Asian Black Native

Hawaiian

 NonHispanic

White

 Hispanic

Borrower race/ethnicity

Refinance mortgage loans in 

percent

Inside CRA assessment areas Outside CRA assessment areas

Independent mortgage companies

Note: First-lien loans for owner-occupied properties only. The small share of loans originated by credit unions are included in

"outside assessment area" totals. 

Source: Ren S. Essene and William C. Apgar, “The 30th Anniversary of the CRA: Restructuring the CRA to Address the 

Mortgage Finance Revolution,” Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act, A Joint 

Publication of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and San Francisco, February 2009, p. 23 exhibit 2: Assessment Area 

Lending Lags in Low-income and Minority Areas, p. 23. The source of the raw data for Exhibit 2 is the JCHS enhanced HMDA 

database, 2006. 

Caption: Banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to make home refinance loans within 

their assessment areas regardless of the race or ethnicity of the borrowers.

Figures for refinance loans mirror those in Figure 3.26, regarding home purchase loans. In both cases, 

banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to make loans within their CRA assessment 

areas, regardless of the race or ethnicity of borrowers. For example, the percentage of refinance loans to 

Black borrowers within CRA assessment areas was 18 percent, while the percentage of such loans 

outside the area was 42.4 percent. The respective figures for Hispanics were 24.9 percent and 33.6 

percent, while the percentages for Whites were 27.4 percent and 40.2 percent. 

VI. HUD’s Lending Goals 

This next section examines the performance of GSEs generally, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 

particular, with regard to HUD’s lending goals. First, this section examines performance of Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac against the HUD lending goals. These reflect that, until the market began to collapse, 

the goals were being met. 
84 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The section then examines the number of loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac involving 

minority borrowers. These figures reflect that most minority groups, including Hispanics and Blacks, 

received increasingly larger proportions of loans from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the period 

examined. When such figures were compared with loans involving White borrowers, the analysis 

demonstrates that the purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac roughly followed the same pattern for 

all groups. This is so both with regard to when the market was rising, as well as when the market began 

to tighten. 

Finally, this section examines the GSEs’ performance overall during the housing boom and bust. This 

section reflects that, while the GSEs’ share of the subprime market increased over time, other players in 

the secondary market vastly outpaced the GSEs’ purchase of subprime loans. 

Overall, the analysis contained in this section reflects that the GSEs’ growth mirrored the growth in 

homeownership from 2000 to 2004. Thereafter, the GSEs’ share of the market experienced a substantial 

drop. 

As far as minority lending, both the number and monetary volume of loans purchased by the GSEs from 

minorities mirrored the overall growth of homeownership. At all stages, however, the overwhelming 

majority of loans purchased by GSEs were to Whites. 

As discussed more fully in Chapter 2, in 1992 Congress established oversight responsibilities for HUD 

to ensure the GSEs’ compliance with their charters. Among these responsibilities was the obligation to 

encourage lending to low- and moderate-income families. Prior to 1995, these goals had to be met by the 

GSEs directly. In 1995, however, HUD allowed GSEs to receive affordable housing credits by buying 

securities from third parties that included loans to low-income borrowers. Such purchased loans could 

be held by the GSEs in their own portfolios. This section includes analysis of such purchases. 

Table 3.1 reflects HUD’s housing goals and home purchase subgoals for the period from 1996 through 

2007.40 As indicated, the goals in question increased significantly over this period. For example, the 

low- and moderate-income goal was at 40 percent in 1996. It was then increased to 42 percent from 

1997 through 2000, and was increased again, to 50 percent, for 2001 to 2004. The goal then increased 

yet again: to 52 percent in 2005; 53 percent in 2006; and 55 percent in 2007. This constituted an increase 

in the goal of 15 percentage points in a little over a decade. The increase in the geographically-targeted 

goal was even more dramatic, increasing from 21 percent in 1996 to 38 percent in 2006, an increase of 

17 percentage points. 

Table 3.1 shows HUD’s housing goals and home purchase subgoals except for the multifamily goal, 

which is not relevant to this study. 

 

40 HUD housing goals are for home purchase and refinancing mortgages. The subgoals, which were imposed for the first time 

in 2005, are for home purchases only. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 85 

Table 3.1 

Levels of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Lending Goals and Subgoals for 

Government-Sponsored Enterprises Since 1996 by Year 

HOUSING 

GOALS YEAR 

 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

Low- and 

ModerateIncome Goal 40% 42% 42% 42% 42% 50% 50% 50% 50% 52% 53% 55%

Geographically 

Targeted 

(Underserved 

Area) Goal 

21% 24% 24% 24% 24% 31% 31% 31% 31% 37% 38% 38%

Special Affordable 

Goal 12% 14% 14% 14% 14% 20% 20% 20% 20% 22% 23% 25%

HOME 

PURCHASE 

SUBGOALS 

Low- and 

ModerateIncome Subgoal 45% 46% 47%

Geographically 

Targeted 

(Underserved 

Area) Subgoal 

32% 33% 33%

Special Affordable 

Subgoal 17% 17% 18%

Source: Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles 

of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 1999 and 2000, April 2002, p. 8 table 1; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 

Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 2001-2004, April 2008, p. 9 table 1; U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage 

Purchases in 2005-2007, September 2008, pp. 9–10 tables 1a & 1b. 

Caption: Between 1996 and 2007, HUD’s goals for government-sponsored enterprises increased from 40 

to 55 percent of mortgage lending to low- and moderate- income individuals, from 21 to 38 percent of 

home loans to borrowers in geographically targeted (i.e., underserved) areas, and from 12 to 25 percent 

to purchasers of special affordable housing. HUD introduced subgoals in 2005 and have increased them 

slightly since then, with the low-and moderate- income subgoal rising from 45 to 47 percent, the 

geographically targeted (underserved area) subgoal going from 32 to 33 percent, and the special 

affordable subgoal from 17 to 18 percent. 

The GSEs’ performance against the HUD lending goals can be measured through annual loan-level data 

(provided by the GSEs to HUD) that includes detailed mortgage characteristics for all of their purchase 

transactions. This GSE database allows analysis of financial, borrower, and locational characteristics of 

GSE loan purchases and changes in GSE performance over time. HUD also uses this database to verify 

HMDA-reported data on GSE purchases.41

 

41 See, ,e.g., Harold L. Bunce and Randall M. Scheessele, The GSEs’ Funding of Affordable Loans: A 1996 Update (Office of 

Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Finance Working Paper 
86 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Insight into GSE performance as compared to the primary market, including portfolio lenders such as 

banks and thrifts, is possible via examination of HMDA data. The data provide information on both 

primary market originations and secondary market purchases.42 The data indicate GSEs’ goal-qualifying 

home purchase and refinance mortgages involving borrowers with (1) very low income, (2) “special 

affordable” qualifications (i.e., very low income or low-income living in low-income census tracts), (3) 

less than area median income, and (4) residences in underserved areas.43 

HMDA data include more types of loans than may be appropriate in evaluating GSE performance. 

HMDA data include investor loans and manufactured housing loans. Indeed, manufactured home loans 

generally do not meet the GSEs’ underwriting standards. Thus, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac argue that 

they should not be included when comparing GSEs to the rest of the market. Similar arguments arise 

over whether below-investment-grade loans, also represented in HMDA data, should be counted in 

comparisons.44

A. GSEs’ Performance Against the HUD Goals 

Figure 3.28 shows the HUD goals, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance against them, for 

1996 through 2007. These include: (i) the goals for low- and moderate-income lending; (ii) the 

geographically-targeted or underserved area goals; and (iii) the special affordability goal. 

In addition, it shows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s level of performance for three prior years (1993 to 

1995) of a transition period. During this period HUD was monitoring performance against three goals, 

only two of which are the same as those established in 1996 and thereafter.45 

 

Series, Working Paper No. HF-005, July 1998, p. 7 (hereinafter cited as Bunce and Scheessele, GSEs’ Funding of Affordable 

Loans). 

42 Id. 

43 See, e.g.,id. at pp. 11–12 tables 2a & 2b. 

44 Bunce and Scheessele, GSEs’ Funding of Affordable Loans at p. 8. 

45 See, e.g., Paul B. Manchester, Sue George Neal, and Harold L. Bunce, Characteristics of Mortgages Purchased by Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac, 1993-95 (Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, Housing Finance Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. HF-003, p. 6). A central city goal was an early 

predecessor of the geographically targeted goal. See, e.g., Paul B. Manchester, Sue George Neal, and Harold L. Bunce. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 87 

Figure 3.28 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Performance Against the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development’s Lending Goals and Subgoals, 1993–2007 

Low- and Moderate-Income

0%

10%

50%

60%

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

20%

30%

40%

Percent of Purchased Mortgages as Qualified 

Dwelling Units

Year

Goal 

Fannie Mae Goal Performance

Freddie Mac Goal Performance

Subgoal

Fannie Mae Subgoal Performance

Freddie Mac Subgoal Performance

Geographically Targeted or Underserved Area Goal

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent of Purchased Mortgages as 

Qualified Dwelling Units

Goal

Fannie Mae Goal Performance

Freddie Mac Goal Performance

Subgoal

Fannie Mae Subgoal Performance

Freddie Mac Subgoal Performance

(continued) 

Percent of Purchased Mortgages as 

Qualified Dwelling Units

Year

Low- and Moderate-Income

Percent of Purchased Mortgages as 

Qu

s

Geographically Targeted or Underserved Area Goal

alified Dwelling Unit

Year
88 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.28 (continued) 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Performance Against the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development’s Lending Goals and Subgoals, 1993–2007 

Special Affordable Goal and Subgoal

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent of Purchased Mortgages as Qualified 

Dwelling Units

Goal

Fannie Mae Goal Performance

Freddie Mac Goal Performance

Subgoal

Fannie Mae Subgoal Performance

Freddie Mac Subgoal Performance

Special Affordable Goal and Subgoal

Percent of Purchased Mortgages as 

Qualified Dwelling Units

Year

Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE 

Mortgage Purchases in 1999 and 2000, April 2002, p. 8 table 1; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office 

of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 2001-2004, April 2008, p. 9 table 1; U.S. 

Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage 

Purchases in 2005-2007, September 2008, pp. 9–10 tables 1a & 1b. 

Caption: With HUD’s increases in the GSEs’ goals from 1996 to 2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 

consistently performed above the goals for mortgage lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers, 

those in geographically targeted or underserved areas, and those buying special affordable housing. In 

2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance dropped below the HUD subgoals for low- and 

moderate-income borrowers, and those purchasing special affordable housing. 

As reflected in Figure 3.28, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to meet goals for low- and 

moderate-income lending, geographically-targeted or underserved area goals, as well as the special 

affordable goal during the time period in question. More difficulty, however, was experienced with 

regard to the subgoals, especially as the mortgage market began its collapse. 

B. GSEs’ Efforts to Increase Minority Homeownership 

As indicated previously, the HUD goals were designed to increase the number of mortgages issued to 

low- and moderate-income families, those living in underserved areas, or special affordable housing 

families. This section views the effects of the GSEs’ performance against these goals in terms of 

increases in mortgages to members of minority groups. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 89 

For this report, the government-sponsored enterprises collectively include those reported in HMDA 

data: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the 

Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac). Of these, this report presents detailed 

information on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are the largest two. 

The GSEs purchase mortgages from primary lenders and either hold the mortgages in portfolio or sell 

them to other investors as mortgage-backed securities, with a guarantee that the investors will receive 

full and timely payment of principal and interest.46 Their underwriting standards play a dominant role in 

determining the types of loans that primary lenders will originate in the conventional conforming 

market.47

The required data reporting under HMDA is designed to show whether financial institutions are serving 

the housing credit needs of their neighborhoods and communities and to help identify possible 

discriminatory lending patterns. This effort yields information about banks’ and other financial 

institutions’ annual loan activities—the applications for financing they receive and the loans they 

originate or purchase from other lenders—for mortgages to buy, improve, or refinance homes.48 

The GSEs do not originate mortgages. They purchase the loans that other financial institutions 

originated or purchased. The Figures that follow will show, by year, the loans that Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac, or collectively all GSEs, purchased, regardless of whether the financial institution selling 

them to the GSE originated or purchased them. 

 

46 See, e.g., Harold L. Bunce, The GSEs’ Funding of Affordable Loans: A 2000 Update (Office of Policy Development and 

Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing and Urban Development, Housing Finance 

Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. HF-013, April 2002, p. 3 (citing for explanations of the overall role of Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac in the secondary mortgage market, the following studies: Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the 

Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, May 1996; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 

Development, Privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Desirability and Feasibility, A HUD Report, July 1996; U.S. 

Department of Treasury, Government Sponsorship of the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home 

Loan Mortgage Corporation, July 1996). 

47 See, e.g, id. (citing for discussions of the GSEs’ underwriting standards the following studies: RUTGERS UNIVERSITY,

CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH, SUCCESSFUL MORTGAGE LENDING STRATEGIES FOR THE UNDERSERVED (November 

1998), a report to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; THE URBAN INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE GSES’

SINGLE FAMILY UNDERWRITING GUIDELINES (February 1999), a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research; and Robert Van Order and Ann B. Schnare, Finding 

Common Ground, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET, vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 1994), at pp. 1, 15–19). 

48 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, A Guide to HMDA Reporting: Getting It Right, Jan. 1, 2008, p. 1, 

available at <http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/guide.htm> (last accessed Aug. 3, 2009). A financial institution, whether depository 

or nondepository, must report HMDA data if it engages in residential mortgage lending and exceeds certain minimums for 

amount of business in metropolitan areas and size. Also, depository institutions, for example, must report a loan in HMDA 

data when they are federally insured or regulated; use a federal agency to insure, guarantee, or supplement the loan; or intend

to sell the loan to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Id. at p. 3. 
90 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.29 indicates, by year, the percentage of loans the GSEs purchased apportioned among minority 

borrowers. The Figure shows only loans of borrowers for whom racial or ethnic information was 

available in HMDA data. In addition, only the main racial or ethnic categories are reflected. Those 

designated as “other,” or who provide multiple designations, are not included. Whites, who are not 

shown in the figure, received approximately 80 to 90 percent of the loans that GSEs purchased. 

Regardless of year, no minority group received more than 10.4 percent of the loans whether purchased 

by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or all four GSEs. 

From 1999 to 2007, and particularly from 2004 through 2007, Hispanics and Blacks received 

increasingly larger proportions of the loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased. For example, 

the percentage of loans Fannie Mae purchased of Hispanic borrowers was 5.1 percent in 1999 and, after 

a rise and fall in 2000 and 2001, continued to increase from 5.7 percent to 10.4 percent in 2007. In a 

similar fashion, the percentage of loans that Fannie Mae purchased involving Black borrowers was 3.6 

percent in 1999 and, after rising and falling to the same level in 2001, continuously increased to 7.7 

percent in 2007. 

The percentage of loans that Freddie Mac purchased of Hispanic borrowers rose steadily since 2003 to a 

level of 8.8 percent in 2007. The percentage of loans that Freddie Mac purchased involving Black 

borrowers was 3.0 percent in 1999. It rose and fell, decreasing to 2.6 percent in 2003, and then increased 

thereafter, reaching 5.9 percent in 2007. 

The percentage of loans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased involving Asian Americans or Pacific 

Islanders did not increase in recent years. From 2002 through 2007, the proportion of loans purchased of 

Asian-American borrowers fluctuated between 4.1 and 5.1 for Freddie Mac and between 5.0 and 6.0 for 

Fannie Mae. For 2004 through 2007, the figure depicts Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders 

separately from Asian Americans. In each of the years shown, about half of a percent of the loans Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac purchased involved Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders. 

Of the loans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased, American Indians and Alaskan Natives were 

involved in between 0.2 and 0.4 percent in 1999 to 2003 and 0.5 and 0.8 percent in 2004 through 2007. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 91 

Figure 3.29 

GSEs’ Purchased Loans (of Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Ones) Apportioned by 

Race/Ethnicity of Minority Borrowers, 1999–2007 

All GSEs

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

11.0%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Purchased

Year

Percent of Loans 

All GSEs

Percent of Loans Purchased

Year

American Indian/Alaskan Native Asian American

Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Asian American/Pacific Islander

Black Hispanic

Fannie Mae

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

11.0%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Freddie Mac

0.0%

1.0%

2.0%

3.0%

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

7.0%

8.0%

9.0%

10.0%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent of Loans Purchased

American Indian/Alaskan Native Asian American

Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Asian American/Pacific Islander

Black Hispanic

Year

Percent of Loans Purchased

Year

Percent of Loans Purchased 

Fannie Mae

Year

Percent of Loans Purchased 

Freddie Mac
92 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Note: The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. Figures exclude borrowers 

for whom race was "2 or more minority races," "joint (white/minority)," "other," or unavailable. Note further that because of the 

manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, 

“Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, but they are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” 

“Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: From 1999 to 2007, Hispanics made up the highest percentage of minority borrowers among the 

loans purchased, whether by all four GSEs (ranging from about 7 to 10 percent), Fannie Mae, or Freddie 

Mac. Loans to Black borrowers comprised approximately 5 to 8 percent of those the GSEs purchased; 

home loans to Asian American/Pacific Islanders were roughly 3 to 5 percent; and those to American 

Indian/Alaskan Natives were always less than one percent. Indeed, the percentage of Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac’s purchased loans to Hispanics and Blacks increased, particularly from 2003 through 2007, 

while the percentage of purchased loans to Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, and American Indians 

and Alaskan Natives remained relatively level during these years. 

While Figure 3.29 looked at percentages, Figure 3.30 examines the number of loans the GSEs purchased 

of those which other financial institutions originated with minority borrowers. As reflected in Figure 

3.30, the actual number of such minority loans fluctuated greatly over the time period in question. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 93 

Figure 3.30 

Counts of GSEs’ Loans (of Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Ones) Involving Minority Borrowers, 

1999–2007 

Fannie Mae

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

50

00

50

00

50

300

350

400

1

1

2

2

Thousands of Loans 

Purchased

Year

American Indian/Alaskan Native Asian American

Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Asian American/Pacific Islander

Black Hispanic

Freddie Mac

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased

American Indian/Alaskan Native Asian American

Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Asian American/Pacific Islander

Black Hispanic

All GSEs

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased

Year

Thousands of Loans 

Purchased

Fannie Mae

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased 

Freddie Mac

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased 

All GSEs
94 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Note: “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. Figures exclude borrowers for whom race 

was "2 or more minority races," "joint (white/minority)," "other," or unavailable. Note further that because of the manner in 

which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, “Hispanics” are 

an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence their loans are also counted in the racial categories as “White,” “Black,” 

etc., where appropriate. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: All GSEs and Fannie Mae dramatically increased the hundreds of thousands of purchased loans 

to Black, Hispanic, and Asian American/ Pacific Islander borrowers in 2003. Freddie Mac increased 

purchases of minority loans too, but more gradually, spanning a period from 2001 to 2003. After 2003, the 

GSEs (either in total or for the two largest ones) decreased (by hundreds of thousands) the purchased 

loans to minorities through 2006, then increased from 2006 to 2007, with an exception of their purchased 

mortgages to American Indian/Alaskan Natives, which were small but steady throughout. 

The Figure shows that the number of loans the GSEs purchased that involved Hispanic, Asian American 

and Pacific Islander, and Black borrowers, decreased slightly from 1999 to 2000, increased sharply from 

2000 to 2003, then declined through 2006 before increasing again in 2007. This same trend occurs for 

Fannie Mae’s purchases, Freddie Mac’s, and all GSEs collectively. 

Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and the GSEs as a whole) purchased more loans of Hispanic 

borrowers than any other minority racial/ethnic group throughout the period. All four GSEs purchased 

214,312 loans of Hispanic borrowers in 1999 and 202,111 in 2000. The number grew to 658,713 in 

2003, then waned to 270,651 in 2006. It ended at 324,653 in 2007. In the peak year of 2003, Fannie Mae 

purchased 379,248 loans of Hispanics and Freddie Mac, 127,311. 

For both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the second largest amount of purchased loans came from Asian 

Americans/Pacific Islanders. Fannie Mae purchased 53,853 such loans in 1999, 303,180 in 2003, and 

89,823 in 2007. Freddie Mac purchased 36,591 loans of Asian American/Pacific Islander borrowers in 

1999, 119,150 in 2003, and 57,158 in 2007. 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s purchased loans from Blacks trailed those relating to both Hispanics and 

Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders. Fannie Mae purchased 47,838 loans of Blacks in 1999, 225,632 in 

2003, and 136,626 in 2007. Of loans to Black borrowers, Freddie Mac purchased 30,670 in 1999, 74,992 

in 2003, 49,112 in 2006. Freddie Mac did much better at purchasing loans of Blacks in 2007—reaching 

70,789. 

Notably, GSEs as a whole purchased more loans of Black borrowers than of Asian Americans/Pacific 

Islanders. This anomaly only occurred, however, because Ginnie Mae, which is not broken out in the 

chart, guaranteed much larger numbers of loans of Blacks relative to the few it purchased involving 

borrowers who were Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 95 

Native Americans and Alaskan Natives followed essentially the same pattern as other minorities. While 

their trends appear very flat, this is only because the GSEs guaranteed small numbers of their loans 

relative to the other groups—ranging (for all GSEs) from 7,427 in 2000, the lowest year, to 33,198 and 

33,258 in 2003 and 2004, and ending with 17,977 in 2007. 

Beginning in 2004, the HMDA data separate Asian Americans from Native Hawaiians and other Pacific 

Islanders. The Figure shows the two groups combined (which forms a continuous trend line from 1999 

to 2007) and separately (for 2004 to 2007). The GSEs purchased relatively small numbers of loans made 

to Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders—22,934 in 2004, decreasing to 13,795 in 2006, then 

rebounding slightly to 14,743 in 2007. 

The next Figure reflects the extent of GSEs’ purchase loans of minorities, but also includes White 

borrowers. Figure 3.31 reflects that the GSEs’ purchase of loans from White borrowers was far greater 

than those from minority borrowers during the whole period examined.

Most significantly, the rise and decrease in purchases by GSEs roughly followed the same pattern for all 

groups, Whites and minorities. That is to say, purchases increased from 2000 to 2003, at which time the 

GSEs’ purchases reached an apex. Thereafter, purchases related to all racial groups and ethnicities 

decreased. 
96 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.31 

Counts of GSEs’ Purchased Loans (of Institutions’ Originations or Purchased Ones) Involving Minority or 

White Borrowers, 1999–2007 

Fannie Mae

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased

American Indian/Alaskan Native Asian American

Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Asian American/Pacific Islander

Black White

Hispanic

Freddie Mac

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased

American Indian/Alaskan Native Asian American

Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Asian American/Pacific Islander

Black White

Hispanic

All GSEs

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased Thousands of Loans Purchased

All GSEs

Year

Fannie Mae

Thousands of Loans Purchased

Year

Thousands of Loans Purchased

Year

Freddie Mac
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 97 

Note: The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. Figures exclude borrowers 

for whom race was "2 or more minority races," "joint (white/minority)," "other," or unavailable. Note further that because of the 

manner in which HMDA data was collected, “Hispanics” are treated as a racial category in 1999 to 2003. In 2004 to 2007, 

“Hispanics” are an ethnicity, distinguished from non-Hispanics, hence their loans are also counted in the racial categories as 

“White,” “Black,” etc., where appropriate. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: The numbers of GSEs’ purchased loans to White borrowers from1999 to 2007 far exceed those 

to minority borrowers. These numbers show a dramatic increase, in millions of mortgages (e.g., from 2 to 

8 million for all GSEs), from 2000 to 2003, and then decline (to less than 3 million) in 2006, with a slight 

increase in 2007. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac show similar patterns. Compared to the scale of 

GSEs’ purchased loans to White borrowers, those involving minorities’ mortgages appear flat from 1999 

to 2007. 

C. GSEs’ Share of the Lending Market Over Time 

Figure 3.32 shows the total number of loans GSEs purchased from 1999 to 2007. In 1999, all four GSEs 

purchased a total of 4,294,620 loans. The number then dropped to just over 3 million in 2000 before 

growing more than fourfold during the next three years, reaching a total of 12,241,973 in 2003. It then 

dropped drastically to below 6 million in 2004 and just over 4 million in 2006. The number of loans all 

GSEs purchased grew slightly in 2007, reaching a total 4,410,553. 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed this same pattern of growth and decline in loan purchases. 

Fannie Mae purchased 1,815,193 loans in 1999, then only 1,361,352 loans in 2000. Growing thereafter, 

it purchased more than five times as many loans —7,219,289—in 2003. After the reductions in ensuing 

years, it purchased only 2,212,837 loans in 2006 and slightly more—2,406,229—in 2007. Freddie Mac 

purchased 1,331,081 loans in 1999, but only 838,712 loans in 2000. It increased the number of loans 

purchased to 3,601,946 in 2003, then declined to 1,359,056 loans in 2006. In 2007, it purchased 

1,532,893 loans. 
98 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.32 

Counts of GSEs’ Loans Purchased (of Financial Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Loans), 

1999–2007 

-

2,000,000

4,000,000

6,000,000

8,000,000

10,000,000

12,000,000

14,000,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Numbers of Loans Purchased

All GSEs

Fannie Mae

Freddie Mac

Numbers of Loans Purchased 

Year

Note: The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: Counts of loans GSEs purchased decreased slightly from 1999 to 2000, then increased steadily 

from 2000 to 2003, from around 3 million to over 12 million. From 2003 to 2004 the number of loans GSEs 

purchased dropped drastically, from over 12 million to under 6 million, and the downward trend continued 

through 2006, with only a slight increase in 2007. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed similar trends, 

with Fannie Mae’s purchased loans peaking at over 7 million in 2003, Freddie Mac’s reaching less than 4 

million then, and both having purchased roughly 2 million in 2007. 

As reflected in Figure 3.33 up through 2007, the total market of loans reported in HMDA data mirrored 

that of the GSEs, but not thereafter. Whereas the GSEs experienced a sharp drop in the number of loans 

purchased in 2004, and continued to decline, the market measured as a whole remained relatively stable 

in 2005 and 2006, before declining severely in 2007. This would seem to indicate that the GSEs’ share 

of the overall market was declining during this period. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 99 

Figure 3.33 

The Number of Loans Purchased (of Financial Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Loans), 

1999–2007 

-

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Numbers of Loans Purchased

All GSEs

Fannie Mae

Freddie Mac

Total Market

Numbers of Loans Purchased

Year

Note: The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. The “Total Market” is all 

loans reported in HMDA data. The legend of figure 3.35 lists the other types of purchasers in this “market.” 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: Comparing the numbers of GSEs’ purchased loans to those of the other financial institutions 

that bought loans reported in HMDA data, the GSEs and the whole market followed similar trends through 

2004. Notably the HMDA data show purchases of more than 20 million loans in 2003, but less than 15 

million in 2004. But HMDA data also show sustained numbers of purchased loans during 2004 to 2006, 

whereas those that the GSEs bought dwindled. 

While Figure 3.33 looked at the number of loans generated, Figure 3.34 shows the percentage share of 

the market that GSEs’ loan purchases represented. Notably, GSEs purchased 54.9 percent of loans in 

HMDA-covered loans in 1999 and 51.2 percent in 2000. Their share then rose to 61.2 percent in 2001 

and remained near 60 percent through 2003. It then plunged to less than half that amount—29.2 

percent—by 2006. In 2007 the GSEs’ share (of a declining market) increased to 43.4 percent. 

Figure 3.34 indicates that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac followed a pattern generally similar to GSEs as 

a whole, differing only in the years of their peak and the start of the decline. Fannie Mae’s purchased 

loans comprised approximately 23 percent of the market in 1999 and 2000, rose to 34.5 percent in 2003, 

then declined to 16.1 percent in 2006 and increased to 23.7 percent in 2007. Freddie Mac purchased 17 

percent of the loans reported in HMDA data in 1999, 14.1 percent in 2000, then 21 percent in 2001 and 

2002. It declined thereafter to 9.9 percent in 2006, but grew to 15.1 percent in 2007. 
100 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 3.34 

GSEs’ Purchased Loans’ (of Financial Institutions’ Originations and Purchased Loans) Percent of the 

Market, 1999–2007 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent of the Market of the Number of Loans

All GSEs

Fannie Mae

Freddie Mac

Percen

s t of the Market of the Numbers of Loan

Year

Note: The “market” represents the totality of loans reported in HMDA data. The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, 

Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: In 1999, GSE-purchased loans made up about 55 percent of the market of HMDA-reported loans, 

then fell to just over 50 percent in 2000. From 2001 to 2003 the loans GSEs purchased comprised about 

60 percent of the market, but decreased beginning in 2003, reaching a mere 30 percent in 2005 to 2006, 

and then rose to around 45 percent in 2007. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s percentage of the market 

followed similar trends, with Fannie Mae’s market share ranging from near 15 to 35 percent and Freddie 

Mac’s from about 10 to 21 percent during 1999 through 2007. 

The GSEs’ and other financial institutions’ loan purchases, as a share of the total market of loans 

reported in HMDA data, are shown in greater detail in Figure 3.35. The 1999 to 2007 trend lines for 

Fannie Mae and the combined GSEs match those appearing in Figure 3.34. Notably, only three of the 

GSEs—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae—are visible in the chart because the market share of 

Farmer Mac was essentially zero percent in all years. 

Figure 3.35 reflects that the GSEs’ share of the market of HMDA-reported loans decreased significantly 

between 2003 and 2004, as more of this market was taken over by non-governmental competitors of the 

GSEs. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 101 

Figure 3.35 

Percent of the Number of Loans by Type of Purchaser (Originations and Purchased Loans), 1999–2007 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent of Number of Loans Purchased

Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginny Mae

Farmer's Mac Commercial Bank Savings Bank or S&L

Life Insuance Company Affiliate Institution Other Purchaser

Percent of Numbers of Loans Purchased

Year

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, tables 3 or 3.1 for 1999 to 2007. 

Caption: As the GSEs’ (i.e., Fannie Mae’s, Freddie Mac’s, Ginnie Mae’s, and Farmer Mac’s) share of 

purchased HMDA-reported loans dropped from 50 to 60 percent in 1999 to 2003 to 30 to 45 percent in 

2004 to 2007, the proportion of HMDA loans other types of financial institutions purchased increased. 

Notably, Life Insurance Companies, Savings Bank or S&Ls, Commercial Banks, and Affiliate Institutions 

purchased much larger proportions of HMDA-reported loans in 2004 to 2007 than they had in 1999 in 

2003. 

In sum, the GSEs’ growth mirrored the growth in homeownership from 2000 to 2004. Thereafter, 

however, the GSEs’ share of the market experienced a substantial drop. As far as minority lending, both 

the number and monetary volume of loans purchased by the GSEs from minorities mirrored the overall 

growth of homeownership. At all stages, however, the overwhelming majority of loans purchased by the 

GSEs were to Whites. 

D. GSEs’ Volume of Purchasing Subprime Lending Over Time 

As discussed in Chapter 2, it has been contended that the HUD lending goals contributed to the increase 

in subprime lending. This next section examines data relating to this claim. As discussed in more detail 

herein, the data reflect that, while the purchase of subprime mortgages by the GSEs increased from 2004 

through 2007, other players in the market captured substantially larger portions of this market. 
102 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

At the same time, the data reflect that the GSEs continued their purchase of subprime loans after other 

purchasers began leaving the market. These purchases by the GSEs were often in the form of private 

label securities. 

Unlike Figures 3.32 through 3.35, which included originations and purchases, the loans in Figures 3.36 

through 3.39 (that relate to loan pricing on prime vs. subprime loans) contain originations only. Because 

of the costs lenders incur in complying with reporting and disclosure requirements, in 2002, when the 

Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation C, it limited the scope of its application to the disclosure of 

pricing on loan originations. Thus, any indication of pricing is lacking in HMDA data for mortgages 

purchased from other entities or applications that did not result in a loan origination.49

Figure 3.36 

Number of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Loans (Both First and Junior Liens) (Originations Only) By Type of 

Purchaser, 2004–2007 

"Subprime" Loans (First and Junior Liens)

-

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

Fannie Mae

Freddie Mac

All GSEs

Private Securitization

Commercial Bank, Savings Bank, or Saving Assoc

Insurance Co, Credit Union, Mortgage Bk, or Finance Co

Affiliate Of Institution

Other Purchaser

Purchaser of Loans

Number of Loans Purchased

2004

2005

2006

2007

“Subprime” Loans (First and Junior Liens)

Number of Loans Purchased

Purchaser of Loans

Note: The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. 

 

49 Robert B. Avery and Glenn B. Canner, both of the Division of Research and Statistics, and Robert E. Cook, of the Division 

of Consumer and Community Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application 

in Fair Lending Enforcement, FED. RES. BULL., December 2008, p. 349. The guide for reporting HMDA data instructs 

financial institutions to report pricing information “[f]or a home purchase loan, a refinancing, or a dwelling-secured home 

improvement loan that you originated,” and to enter “nonapplicable” “[i]f the loan is not subject to Regulation Z, or is a 

home improvement loan that is not dwelling-secured, or is a loan that you purchased,” or “in the case of an application that 

does not result in a loan origination. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, A Guide to HMDA Reporting: 

Getting It Right, at pp. A–8 to –9. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 103 

Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, table 3.2 for 2004 to 2007. 

Caption: From 2004 to 2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increased the number of subprime (i.e., higherpriced) loans they purchased each year. However, at less than 200,000, the number of loans that all four 

GSEs purchased in 2007 made up a very small amount of the market of HMDA-reported, higher-priced 

loans. Other types of financial institutions, for example, insurance companies, credit unions, mortgage 

banks, or finance companies, purchased higher-priced loans in far greater numbers than the GSEs, 

particularly in 2005 and 2006. However, the volume of these non-government enterprises’ purchases were 

more in line with the GSEs’ in 2007. 

Figures 3.36 and 3.37 show that the GSEs purchased only a very small proportion of the subprime 

originations from those financial institutions under federal regulation or otherwise required to report 

HMDA data. Figure 3.36 examines the number of subprime loans purchased. It indicates that the GSEs’ 

share of said market was minimal compared to others. 

Figure 3.37 examines the value of purchased subprime loans. Again, the GSEs’ share of said market was 

overwhelmed by other purchasers. 

Both with regard to number and value of loans, it is notable that, while the GSEs were never major 

purchasers of subprime loans, their share of the market did increase in 2007, at a time when other 

purchasers began to exit the market. 

Figure 3.37 

Value of Subprime (Higher-Priced) Loans (Both First and Junior Liens) (Originations Only) By Type of 

Purchaser, 2004–2007 

"Subprime Loans" (First and Junior Liens)

$-

$25.0

$50.0

$75.0

$100.0

$125.0

$150.0

$175.0

$200.0

Fannie Mae

Freddie Mac

All GSEs

Private Securitization

Commercial Bank, Savings Bank, Or Saving Assoc

Insurance Co, Credit Union, Mortgage Bk, Or Finance Co

Affiliate Of Institution

Other Purchaser

Purchaser of Loans

Value of Loans Purchased 

(billions of dollars)

2004

2005

2006

2007

Value of Loans Purchased 

(billions of dollars)

“Subprime” Loans (First and Junior Liens)

Purchaser of Loans

Note: The category “All GSEs” includes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and Farmer Mac. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using HMDA data, table 3.2 for 2004 to 2007. 
104 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Caption: By dollar value, the GSEs’ share of purchases of higher-priced loans is dwarfed by the 

purchases of other types of financial institutions in 2005 and 2006. The maximum value of GSEs’ 

purchases of higher-priced loans reached $25 billion in 2007, and other types of purchasers bought 

similar amounts that year. However, earlier, in 2005 and 2006, three other types of purchasers (as 

identified in HMDA data) bought $100 to $175 billion each. 

E. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Purchasing of Private-Label Securities Over Time 

Figure 3.38 shows the purchases Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made of private-label mortgage-related 

securities. The total includes single-family loans as well as multifamily and manufactured housing 

mortgages. 

Prior to 1995, Fannie Mae had not purchased any private-label mortgage-related securities. Beginning in 

1995 and 1996, it purchased only small amounts—$752 million and $777 million, respectively. It 

increased its purchases to $4.2 billion in 1997, then $15.7 in 1998, and $16.5 billion in 1999. It reduced 

its purchases to amounts ranging between $3.5 and $8.5 billion in 2000 through 2002. Then, in 2003, it 

doubled the amount of any previous year’s purchases to $34.0 billion, and more than doubled that 

amount again—to $90.7 billion—in 2004. Since then, Fannie Mae’s purchased amounts were less than 

that of 2004, but still more than that of 2003—$41.4, $57.8, and $37.4 billion in 2005 to 2007, 

respectively. 

Information on Freddie Mac’s purchases of private-label mortgage-related securities prior to 1997 is 

unavailable. In 1997, Freddie purchased $1.5 billion such securities. In 1998 and 1999, it purchased 

$15.7 and $15.2 billion. In 2000 it bought $10.3 billion worth of securities. In 2001 through 2003, it 

purchased $24.5, $59.4, and $69.2 billion respectively. In 2004, its purchases almost doubled to $121 

billion and increased yet again in 2005 to $180 billion. By 2006 the amount declined to $122 billion, 

before undergoing a drastic reduction to $76.1 billion in 2007. 

Detailed information on the types of private-label mortgage-related securities Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac purchased is only available for the former for 2002 to 2007 and the latter in 2006 and 2007. Figure 

3.39 shows the amounts of single-family fixed- and adjustable-rate subprime and Alt-A mortgages that 

the two GSEs purchased for these years. 

As shown in Figure 3.38, fixed-rate securities backed by single-family subprime mortgages were never a 

large part of the private-label securities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased.50 They amounted to 

$176 and $343 million of Fannie Mae’s purchases in 2004 and 2007 respectively, and $116 and $843 

million of Freddie Mac’s in 2006 and 2007. These small amounts are not visibly different from zero on 

the scale of overall private-label mortgage-related securities the GSEs purchased as shown in Figure 

3.38. The 2007 amounts comprised about 1 percent of each GSE’s total purchases of private-label 

mortgage-related securities. 

 

50 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2007, July 2008, p. 56 table 1b 

part 2, p. 73 table 10b part 2. Note that in many instances adjustable rate securities that Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae 

purchased might include fixed rate, adjustable rate or both types of mortgage loans as the underlying collateral backing such 

securities. One should not assume that all loans backing adjustable rate securities are adjustable rate mortgages. Letter from 

Alfred M. Pollard, general counsel, Federal Housing Finance Agency, to David Blackwood, general counsel, U.S. 

Commission on Civil Rights, July 15, 2009, attachment, p. 4. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 105 

Figure 3.38 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Purchases of Private-Label Mortgage-Related Securities, 1990–2007 

(a) Fannie Mae

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007

Period

BIllions of Dollars

Total Private-Label 

Single-Family Fixed-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Single-Family Fixed-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

(b) Freddie Mac

$0.0

$20.0

$40.0

$60.0

$80.0

$100.0

$120.0

$140.0

$160.0

$180.0

$200.0

19971998199920002001200220032004200520062007

Period

Billions of Dollars

Total Private-Label 

Single-Family Fixed-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Single-Family Fixed-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

(a) Fannie Mae

Billions of Dollars

Period

(b) Freddie Mac

Billions of Dollars

Period
106 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Notes: In addition to single-family subprime and Alt-A mortgages, the total private-label securities include other single-family 

loans, as well as multifamily and manufactured housing mortgages. The amounts of the purchases are based on unpaid 

principal balances and exclude mortgage-related securities that were traded, but not yet settled. Also, for Freddie Mac, data on 

the total private-label securities were unavailable prior to 1997. In addition, for the period 2001 through 2003, the data are 

based on restated financial results. Prior to 2006, the total represents, in part, "other" single-family loans that include nonFreddie Mac mortgage-related securities purchased for structured securities as well as non-agency securities purchased into 

the retained mortgage portfolio (principally backed by subprime or Alt-A loans). 

Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2007, July 2008, p. 56 table 

1b part 2 (citing Fannie Mae), p. 73 table 10b part 2 (citing Freddie Mac), available at

<http://www.ofheo.gov/media/research/MME2007.pdf> (last accessed Apr. 27, 2009). 

Caption: Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac greatly increased their purchases of private-label mortgagerelated securities from 2001 to 2005, going from around $5 to $90 billion in the case of Fannie Mae, and 

from over $20 to $180 billion for Freddie Mac. Their purchases decreased from 2005 to 2007 but still 

remained well above their pre-2001 level, with Fannie Mae falling to about $40 billion in 2007, Freddie Mac 

to $80 billion. Among the private label securities, Fannie Mae’s purchases of single-family adjustable-rate 

subprime mortgages fluctuated between $15 and$35 billion in 2003 to 2007. The value of Freddie Mac’s 

single-family adjustable-rate mortgages is only available for two years and fell from below $80 billion in 

2006 to just over $40 billion in 2007. 

As to single-family adjustable-rate subprime mortgages, Fannie Mae only purchased $2.7 billion such 

private-label securities in 2002. Thereafter, however, the amount was much larger, fluctuating between 

$15.6 and $34.9 billion. See Figure 3.38. Freddie Mac purchased $74.6 billion in single-family 

adjustable-rate subprime mortgages among private-label securities in 2006 and $42.8 billion in 2007. 

Furthermore, single-family adjustable-rate subprime mortgages comprised a major part of the GSEs’ 

private-label mortgage-related securities. 

Figure 3.39 shows that for Fannie Mae these were 36 percent of the GSE’s private-label purchases in 

2002, 47 percent in 2003, 38 percent in 2004, and 40 percent in 2005. In 2006 they were 60 percent of 

the private-label purchases, but the proportion fell to 42 percent in 2007. Freddie Mac purchases of 

single-family adjustable-rate subprime mortgages were a similarly large proportion of its private-label 

securities in 2006—61 percent—and only a slightly smaller proportion—56 percent—in 2007. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 107 

Figure 3.39 

Proportion of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Purchases of Private-Label Mortgage-Related Securities 

that Were Single-Family Subprime or Alt-A, 2002–2007 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Year

Percent of total private-label mortgage-related securities

Fannie Mae Single-Family Fixed-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Fannie Mae Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Fannie Mae Single-Family Fixed-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

Fannie Mae Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

Freddie Mac Single-Family Fixed-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Freddie Mac Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgages

Freddie Mac Single-Family Fixed-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

Freddie Mac Single-Family Adjustable-Rate Alt-A Mortgages

Percent of total private-label mortgage-related securities

Year

Notes: In addition to single-family subprime and Alt-A mortgages, the total private-label securities include other single-family 

loans, as well as multifamily and manufactured housing mortgages. Information on subprime and Alt-A mortgages was 

unavailable before 2002 for Fannie Mae and before 2006 for Freddie Mac. 

Source: Compiled by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Mortgage 

Markets and the Enterprises in 2007, July 2008, p. 56 table 1b part 2 (citing Fannie Mae) p. 73 table 10b part 2 (citing Freddie 

Mac). 

Caption: Fannie Mae’s purchases of single-family adjustable-rate subprime mortgages were 35 to 45 

percent of total private-label mortgage-related securities in 2002 to 2004, then rose to 60 percent in 2006 

and fell back to just over 40 percent in 2007. Fannie Mae’s single-family fixed-rate Alt-A mortgages 

declined over the time period, from over 20 percent in 2003, to nearly 0 percent in 2006 and 2007. In 

contrast, Fannie Mae single-family adjustable-rate Alt-A mortgages increased from 0 to 30 percent from 

2003 to 2005, then decreased from 30 to 15 percent over the course of 2005-2007. The similar proportion 

of Freddie Mac’s purchases is only available for 2006 and 2007. 

During 2002 to 2007, Fannie Mae began purchasing more Alt-A adjustable-rate, and less Alt-A fixedrate, mortgages. Figure 3.39 indicates that, in 2002, the private-label securities that Fannie Mae 

purchased included $1.2 billion in single-family fixed-rate Alt-A loans. This amount rose to $7.7 billion 

in 2003 and then diminished to $7.0 billion in 2004, $3.1 billion in 2005, $1.5 billion in 2006, and, 

finally, a mere $38 million in 2007. 
108 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The extent of Freddie Mac’s purchases of single-family Alt-A loans is known only for 2006 and 2007. It 

purchased relatively small amounts of single-family Alt-A fixed rate mortgages—$718 million in 2006 

and $702 million in 2007—but large numbers of single-family Alt-A adjustable-rate loans—$29.8 

billion in 2006 and $9.3 billion in 2007. 

The proportion of Fannie Mae’s purchases of private-label mortgage-related securities that were singlefamily fixed- and adjustable-rate Alt-A loans reflects that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac made a shift 

from buying fixed-rate loans, to purchasing variable-rate loans. See Figure 3.39. Thus, purchases of such 

fixed-rate mortgages represented 15.7 percent of private-label securities for Fannie Mae in 2002 and 

22.7 percent in 2003. In 2004 and 2005, the percentage dropped to 7.7 and 7.5 percent. In 2006, only 2.6 

percent were single-family fixed-rate Alt-A loans, and, in 2007, only a small fraction of a percent (0.1%) 

were. 

Looking at adjustable-rate mortgages for Alt-A loans, beginning from nothing in 2002, Fannie Mae 

increased the percentage that single-family, adjustable rate Alt-A loans represents of its private-label 

loans to 1.1 percent in 2003, then 16.3 percent in 2004, and 30.3 percent in 2005. In 2006 and 2007, the 

percentage decreased to 18.1 percent in the former year and 14.0 percent in the latter. Freddie Mac’s 

purchases as reported and shown in Figure 3.39 indicate that single-family Alt-A fixed-rate loans 

represented less than one percent of this GSE’s private-label purchases (i.e., 0.6 and 0.9 percent) in 2006 

and 2007, while single-family adjustable-rate mortgages are 24.4 percent and 12.2 of its 2006 and 2007 

private-label purchases. 

The above data are useful in addressing the arguments raised in Chapter 2 of this section. For purposes 

of analysis, the salient points have been broken down to four categories, set forth below. 

General Housing Information 

• During the period from 1994 through 2005, overall ownership rates increased for each of the 

ethnic and/or racial subgroups examined. During this period, each minority racial or ethnic group 

showed stronger rates of growth than Whites. 

• Even following the collapse of the housing bubble, racial and ethnic minority groups still showed 

stronger rates of growth than Whites. 

• Despite the growth of minority homeownership, and the narrowing of the gap between various 

groups, substantial racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership rates remain. In 2008, the 

White homeownership rate stood at 71.7 percent, that of Asian/Pacific Islanders at 59.5 percent, 

American Indians at 56.5 percent, Hispanics at 49.1 percent, and Blacks at 47.4 percent. 

• As to conventional loans, minorities experienced both the greatest percentage of growth as the 

market expanded as well as the greatest percentage of decrease as the market began to tighten. 

• When credit history was taken into consideration, the denial rate of Whites and Blacks regarding 

conventional mortgage applications narrowed. The gap between the denial rates of Whites and 

Blacks regarding refinance loans, however, did not close significantly over time. 
Chapter 3: Analysis of the Effects of Federal Policies 109 

Subprime Mortgages 

• The percentage of subprime conventional and refinance mortgages given to all racial and ethnic 

groups followed roughly the same pattern, increasing dramatically between 2004 and 2005, 

remaining high in 2006, and dramatically decreasing between 2006 and 2007. For most minority 

groups, however, the percentage receiving such loans was higher than for Whites. 

• While foreclosure rates have increased for all classes of loans, the highest rate of foreclosure is 

attributable to subprime adjustable rate mortgages. The next highest rate of foreclosure was 

amongst subprime fixed-rate mortgages, followed by prime adjustable rate mortgages. Prime 

fixed-rate mortgages have the lowest rate of foreclosure. 

• From 2004 to 2007, the monetary volume of subprime loans to middle- and upper-income 

borrowers/neighborhoods consistently exceeded those made to lower- and moderate-income 

groups. 

• Between 2004 and 2007, middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods were the largest 

consumers of subprime loans. This is so whether measured by number of loans or monetary 

value. 

• Independent mortgage companies were most likely to make the highest percentage of both home 

purchase loans and refinance loans in minority neighborhoods, regardless of income level. 

Community Reinvestment Act 

• Between 1994 and 2005, mortgage lending within CRA assessment areas has suffered a steady 

rate of decline, with only a modest rise since that time. Whether measured by number or value of 

loans, the CRA share of the subprime market has been modest. 

• Of subprime loans made by banking institutions and their affiliates, the smallest percentages 

were originated within an institution’s CRA assessment area. 

• The largest percent of subprime loans, by a substantial margin, were made by either independent 

mortgage companies or banking institutions outside their CRA assessment areas. 

• The number of prime loans that banking institutions and their affiliates originated in low- and 

moderate-income borrowers/neighborhoods within their CRA assessment areas was consistently 

a very small portion of all prime loans originated. 

• Irrespective of the racial composition and income level of neighborhoods, banking institutions 

and their affiliates were still less likely to make home purchase loans within their CRA 

assessment areas than outside them. 

• In 2006, banking institutions and their affiliates were less likely to make loans within their CRA 

assessment areas, regardless of the race or ethnicity of borrowers, for either purchase or 

refinance loans. 
110 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac/GSEs Generally 

• From 1999 to 2007, and particularly from 2004 through 2007, Hispanics and Blacks received 

increasingly larger proportions of loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased. 

Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of such loans involved White borrowers. 

• The rise and decrease in purchases by GSEs roughly followed the same pattern for all racial and 

ethnic groups. The number of loans purchased by GSEs generally, and Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac in particular, increased greatly from 2000 through 2003. Such purchases decreased 

drastically after 2004, and slightly increased between 2006 and 2007. 

• During the period from 2004 to 2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased only a very small 

portion of the subprime originations from financial institutions under federal regulation or 

otherwise required to report HMDA data. Both with regard to the number and value of such 

loans, the GSEs’ share of the market increased in 2007, at a time when other purchasers began to 

exit the market. 

The above data are inconclusive as to the extent to which either the CRA or the HUD lending goals 

contributed to the existing mortgage crisis. While both policies sought relaxed lending standards in an 

effort to increase homeownership, especially with regard to minorities, there is insufficient evidence to 

indicate to what degree the pressure for relaxed lending standards influenced the overall market. At all 

stages, third-party purchasers and those not governed by the CRA had substantially larger shares of the 

applicable subprime market. Moreover, the data demonstrate that the majority of subprime loans were 

received by middle- and upper-income borrowers/neighborhoods. 

At the same time, the evidence collected in this report does not support the contention that minority 

racial or ethnic groups were systematically targeted by predatory lending schemes involving subprime 

loans. As noted above, the majority of subprime loans were received by upper- and middle-income 

individuals or families. Throughout the period of the mortgage boom and bust, the lending patterns of 

Whites and racial and ethnic minorities mirrored each other. 

As to the performance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the data reflect that third-party purchasers had 

substantially larger shares of the subprime secondary market. What can be discerned is that, at a time 

when others in the secondary market were decreasing their share of subprime mortgages, Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac were actually increasing their purchases, presumably to reflect the political and market 

pressures these organizations were feeling as discussed in Chapter 2. 
PART II: PREDATORY LENDING, MORTGAGE FRAUD, AND 

MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION 

Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 113 

CHAPTER 4: PREDATORY LENDING, MORTGAGE FRAUD, AND 

MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION 

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this report, the federal government adopted policies to affirmatively 

increase minority homeownership. Since adoption of these policies, it is clear minority homeownership 

has increased. At the same time, it is also clear both that, as the housing boom came to an end, 

minorities have experienced higher rates of foreclosure and that they received subprime loans at a higher 

rate than have Whites. 

These consequences raise a question as to whether policies adopted to affirmatively increase minority 

housing (in conjunction with the market forces discussed in Chapter 1) were, in the end, 

counterproductive, either because they inadvertently lured the unprepared into homeownership and/or 

created an environment conducive to fraud. There is support for both propositions. 

In a January 2009 article, Representative Barney Frank, the Chairman of the House Financial Services 

Committee, was quoted as follows: 

According to Frank, at the root of the real-estate crisis was a misguided notion that 

homeownership should be available to all people — what President Bush has called “the 

ownership society.” “The ‘I told you so’ here is that homeownership is a nice thing but it 

is not suitable for everybody,” Frank said at Boston College. “There are people in this 

society who don’t have enough money to be homeowners, and there are people whose 

lives are not sufficiently integrated for them to take on the responsibility to be a 

homeowner. And we did too much pushing of people into inappropriate mortgages and 

into homeownership.”1

Under this view, government policies led too many unprepared individuals to become homeowners: 

There were real gains during the Clinton years, as homeownership rose to 67.4 percent in 

2000 from 64 percent in 1994. Hispanics and African-Americans were the biggest 

beneficiaries. But as the boom later gathered steam, and as the Bush administration 

continued the Clinton administration’s push to amplify homeownership, some of those 

gains turned out to be built on sand.2

In commenting on this scenario, Henry G. Cisneros, the former Secretary of the Department of Housing 

and Urban Development during the Clinton administration, stated: 

 

1

 Jeffrey Toobin, Barney’s Great Adventure, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 2009, at p. 38. 

2

 David Streitfeld and Gretchen Morgenson, Building Flawed American Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A1.
114 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

You think you have a finely tuned instrument that you can use to say: ‘Stop! We’re at 69 

percent homeownership. We should not go further. There are people who should remain 

renters,’ ... But you really are just given a sledgehammer and an ax. They are blunt 

tools.3

Others, however, have argued that it was the nature of the housing bubble itself which gave rise to an 

environment where fraud was possible and manipulation of the unsophisticated became inevitable. 

The short version of how we got here: Lenders, fat with money made cheap by the 

federal government, aggressively coaxed millions of borrowers to take out unaffordable 

mortgages. They lent this money without assessing whether borrowers could repay it. 

They assumed, in fact, that most wouldn’t be able to and would have to refinance into 

new, equally unaffordable loans. This process would produce an endless cycle of fees for 

the lenders – but only if home prices rose, fairy-tale-like, forever.4

The above interpretation, however, fails to give consideration to the fact that the rapid appreciation in 

housing created a bubble that encouraged all parties to manipulate the system.5 This process has been 

noted as follows: 

Throughout history, bubbles have induced fraud: “The propensity to swindle grows parallel with 

the propensity to speculate during a boom,” wrote the eminent economic historian Charles 

Kindleberger. The implosion of an asset price bubble always leads to the discovery of frauds and 

swindles,” he added. Said Bagehot, “The good times of too high price almost always engender 

much fraud.” 

Our most recent bubble was no different. Some borrowers lied about their income to get loans; 

some mortgage brokers misled borrowers or falsified documents; and there were various schemes 

to defraud lenders. The euphoria about rising prices characteristic of bubbles also induces 

carelessness, which makes fraud easier.6

 

3 Id.

4 See Kathleen Day, Villains in the Mortgage Mess? Start at Wall Street. Keep Going., WASH. POST, June 1, 2008, at B01. 

5

 This problem was recognized by Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, in a recent 

interview: 

Question: Is the current mess a result of naïve consumers being duped into horrible mortgages, or is it a case of 

greedy consumers chasing cheap loans? 

Answer: Some where misled, others took part in the deception. There were people, for instance, who lied about their 

incomes. But we have made a mistake in this society. The assumption that everybody can be a homeowner is wrong. 

We pushed and encouraged people into homeownership — people who, in some cases, weren’t ready for it. You 

can’t act on wishes that are unrealistic without having negative consequences. 

Janice Revell, CNN Money, Housing: Frank talk from Barney Frank, Aug. 25, 2008,

<http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/22/real_estate/barney_frank.moneymag/index.htm?postversion=20080825107> (last 

accessed July 21, 2009). 

6 See Alex J. Pollock, Your Guide to the Housing Crisis, THE AMERICAN: THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE, May/June 2008, available at <http://www.american.com/archive/May-june-magazine-contents/your-guide-th-the-
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 115 

As described more fully in Part I, the nature of the recent housing bubble sometimes created perverse 

incentives for both the lender and the borrower to commit fraud. The following incident is telling: 

As a supervisor at a Washington Mutual mortgage processing center, John D. Parsons 

was accustomed to seeing baby sitters claiming salaries worthy of college presidents, and 

schoolteachers with incomes rivaling stockbrokers’. He rarely questioned them. A real 

estate frenzy was under way and WaMu, as his bank was known, was all about saying 

yes. 

Yet even by WaMu’s relaxed standards, one mortgage four years ago raised eyebrows. 

The borrower was claiming a six-figure income and an unusual profession: mariachi 

singer. 

Mr. Parsons could not verify the singer’s income, so he had him photographed in front of 

his home dressed in his mariachi outfit. The photo went into a WaMu file. Approved.7

The data presented in Part I reflects that caution should be taken before jumping to simple conclusions. 

For example, while minorities may have taken out subprime loans at a higher rate than Whites, it is clear 

that Whites overall took out a majority of such loans. In addition, the evidence reflects that many 

subprime loans were taken out by high-income borrowers. The situation has been summarized as 

follows: 

While African Americans were more likely to be steered into subprime mortgages than white 

Americans, whites took out 56 percent of all subprime loans, far more than the 19 percent taken 

out by African Americans. The proportion was 21 percent for Hispanics. Money also increased 

the likelihood of a borrower taking out a subprime loan, but not in the way that conservatives 

claim. Most subprime loans went to high-income borrowers, according to data compiled as part 

of the 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. In fact, across all racial groups, as income 

decreased, the number of subprime loans decreased.8

The different motivations that guided borrowers and lenders, unfortunately, did not exclude racial 

discrimination. A June 2009 newspaper article discussing pending litigation involving the City of 

Baltimore reflected the following: 

As she describes it, Beth Jacobson and her fellow loan officers at Wells Fargo Bank 

“rode the stagecoach from Hell” for a decade, systematically singling out Blacks in 

Baltimore and suburban Maryland for high-interest subprime mortgages. 

 

housing-crisis> (last accessed July 17, 2009); Peter S. Goodman and Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire 

on Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at A1. 

7 See also CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 82 (1978) (“Greed 

not only creates suckers to be swindled by professionals but also pushes some of the amateurs over the line into fraud, 

embezzlement, defalcation, and similar misfeasance.”). 

8

 Tamara E. Holmes, Did They Cause the Credit Crisis, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1, 2009, available at 

<http://www.blackenterprise.com/wealth-for-life/homeownership/2009/01/01/did-they-cause-the-credit-crisis-2> (last 

accessed July 21, 2009). 
116 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

* * * 

Wells Fargo, Ms. Jacobson said in an interview, saw the black community as fertile 

ground for subprime mortgages, as working-class blacks were hungry to be part of the 

nation’s home-owning mania. Loan officers, she said, pushed customers who could have 

qualified for prime loans into subprime mortgages. Another loan officer stated in an 

affidavit filed last week that employees had referred to blacks as “mud people” and to 

subprime lending as “ghetto loans.”9

It would be misleading, however, to assume that disparities in lending levels between various racial and 

ethnic groups necessarily reflect discrimination. For example, while an analysis of Home Mortgage 

Disclosure Act data might show that subprime lending is disproportionately concentrated in low-income 

and minority neighborhoods,10 reports indicate that similar conclusions could be reached based on such 

factors as age, sex, and marital status.11 In addition, as more fully discussed in Part III hereof, disparities 

between different racial and ethnic groups might be explained by an examination of the specific 

creditworthiness of the individuals examined. For example, a study released in late 2008 revealed the 

following: 

2004-2006 HMDA data showed that loans to minority borrowers had a substantially 

higher probability of exceeding the rate-spread reporting used by the regulators to define 

“high priced loans.” These loans included both subprime and Alt-A loans ... The data for 

all three years suggested that, on average, minority borrowers paid higher APRs for their 

mortgages than did non-minority borrowers. 

* * * 

[But] [w]e were able to clearly demonstrate that the vast majority of APR differentials 

between minority and non-minority mortgage borrowers can be explained by observable 

characteristics appropriately associated with underwriting and pricing outcomes.12

As one of the panelists participating in the Commission’s briefing on this topic noted, discrepancies 

between lending rates to various racial and ethnic groups might be the product of historical forces 

relating to wealth accumulation, as opposed to current discrimination. 

 

9

 Michael Powell, Bank Accused of Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009, at A16. Allegations of 

discrimination in lending practices have led the NAACP to file a series of class action lawsuits against subprime lenders. See

Jesse Washington, NAACP to File Bias Suits Against Subprime Lenders, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2009, at D03. 

10 See, e.g., DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST AND WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING:

THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 3 (May 2006) (“Our findings show that, for 

most types of subprime home loans, African-American and Latino borrowers are at greater risk of receiving higher-rate loans 

than white borrowers, even after controlling for legitimate risk factors.”). 

11 See Joint U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of Treasury Task Force on Predatory 

Lending, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, June 2000, pp. 35-37 (hereinafter cited as Joint Task Force, Curbing 

Predatory Home Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report). 

12 Marsha J. Courchane, Dawning of a New Age: Examination for Discrimination in Lending, 27 No. 10 BANKING & FIN.

SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 1, 7 (2008). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 117 

[E]ven when we fully eradicate fraud and deception from the market, the fact will remain that, 

because of historical social injustice and inequality, African Americans and Hispanics have, on 

average, less access to credit than whites and other groups, on average, because these historically 

disadvantaged groups tend to have less household wealth, lower incomes, and lower credit scores 

on average than other groups.13

It is not possible for this report to reconcile the competing interpretations set forth above. It is possible, 

however, to examine the overall legal framework governing mortgage fraud and lending discrimination 

and the efforts undertaken by federal agencies to enforce these laws. Section I of this Part will examine 

the concept of predatory lending while Section II will examine mortgage fraud, and Section III will 

examine mortgage lending discrimination. 

I. Predatory Lending 

The term “predatory lending” is commonly used, but is not a legal term of art. That is to say, the term 

does not describe a uniform legal definition of specific acts. Depending how the term is used, it 

encompasses issues of mortgage fraud or lending discrimination, or aspects of both. 

At the same time, a general consensus appears to exist that what is commonly called predatory lending 

involves lender practices that abuse the borrower through fraudulent, deceptive, or unfair loan terms or 

marketing practices. Such practices may or may not involve aspects of discrimination. 

While there is no uniform agreement as to what constitutes predatory lending, the Federal Reserve uses 

the following simple but broad definition: “Targeting loans to elderly, low-income and other people to 

take advantage of their financial status or lack of financial knowledge.”14 The Office of the Comptroller 

of the Currency’s (OCC) Guidelines Establishing Standards for Residential Mortgage Lending Practices 

list a number of practices that national banks should avoid.15

As stated, discrimination is not always at issue in predatory lending. For example, claims of predatory 

lending may be limited to seeking economic advantage through such practices as fraud, negligent 

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations of consumer protection statutes,16 including 

the Federal Trade Commission Act’s (FTC Act) prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices, 

found in Section 5 of the FTC Act.17 Only when predatory terms and conditions have the purpose or 

 

13 Written statement of Brian P. Brooks to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Mar. 20, 2009. 

14 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Building Wealth: A Beginner’s Guide to Securing Your Financial Future, 2002, p. 32, 

available at <http://www.dallasfed.org/ca/wealth/pdfs/wealth.pdf> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). See also ROBERT G.

SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 18-8 n.33 (Thomson Reuters/West 2008) (citing Kathleen C. 

Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 356 n.6 (2006). 

(Professor Engel has found ‘compelling evidence that the great bulk of subprime loans contain predatory terms.’). 

15 12 C.F.R. Part 30, App. C (2008). 

16 SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at pp. 18–8 to –9 n.34 (citing specific cases). 

17 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). 
118 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

effect of discriminating against minorities or other protected groups would they also present a violation 

of the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, or other civil rights la 18 ws.

In a similar fashion, predatory lending is distinguishable from subprime lending.19 Federal agencies, 

including OCC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration, have 

issued joint guidance on subprime mortgage lending in July 2007.20 The Guidance notes that, “subprime 

lending is not synonymous with predatory lending.”21 Subprime lending, in and of itself, simply reflects 

that some lenders are less creditworthy than others and, accordingly, pay higher interest rates or fees to 

obtain credit. 

As noted by one of the panelists at the Commission’s briefing on this topic: 

[T]here are significant benefits that must be weighed against the cost of defining “predatory 

lending” so broadly that it essentially eliminates the flow of credit to low- and moderate-income 

borrowers and borrowers with imperfect credit histories—borrowers who disproportionately tend 

to be members of minority groups.22

At the same time, there has been recognition that certain practices, often associated with certain types of 

subprime lending, are often linked with predatory lending practices. For example, the Guidance 

referenced above notes that certain adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) products present substantial risks to 

both consumers and lenders and are typically offered to subprime borrowers. These loans have one or 

more of the following characteristics: 

Low initial payments based on a fixed introductory rate that expires after a short period 

and then adjusts to a variable index rate plus a margin for the remaining term of the loan; 

* * * 

Very high or no limits on how much the payment amount or the interest rate may increase 

(“payment or rate caps”) on reset dates; 

Limited or no documentation of borrowers’ income; 

Product features likely to result in frequent refinancing to maintain an affordable monthly 

payment; and/or 

 

18 SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at pp. 18–8 to –10 n. 34–35 (citing specific cases). 

19 See Joint Task Force, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending at p. 47 (“Not all subprime lending is predatory, but 

predatory practices are most frequently found in connection with subprime lending.”). 

20 Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37569, 37573 (Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller 

of the Currency; Fed. Reserve Sys.; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.; Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision; and Nat’l 

Credit Union Admin. July 10, 2007). 

21 Id.

22 Written statement of Brian P. Brooks to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Mar. 20, 2009. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 119 

Substantial prepayment penalties and/or repayment penalties that extend beyond the 

initial fixed interest rate period.23

Still, loans with such features, according to this Guidance, do not necessarily constitute predatory 

lending. Other factors are generally needed. For example, the Guidance notes that predatory lending 

typically involves at least one of the following elements: 

Making loans based predominantly on the foreclosure or liquidation value of a 

borrower’s collateral rather than on the borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage 

according to its terms; 

Inducing a borrower to repeatedly refinance a loan in order to charge high points and fees 

each time the loan is refinanced (”loan flipping”); or 

Engaging in fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of the mortgage loan obligation, 

or ancillary products, from an unsuspecting or unsophisticated borrower.24

A noted scholar on fair housing issues has defined predatory lending as “a syndrome of abusive loan 

terms or practices that involve one or more of the following five problems: (1) loans structured to result 

in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, e.g., loans that contain unaffordable balloon 

payments, (2) harmful profit seeking, e.g., prepaid credit life insurance, (3) loans involving fraud or 

deceptive practices, (4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud, and 

(5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.”25 For example, the National 

Community Reinvestment Coalition uses a broader definition: 

[A predatory loan is] an unsuitable loan designed to exploit vulnerable and 

unsophisticated borrowers. Predatory loans are a subset of subprime loans. A predatory 

loan has one or more of the following features: 1) charges more in interest and fees than 

is required to cover the added risk of lending to borrowers with credit imperfections, 2) 

contains abusive terms and conditions that trap borrowers and lead to increased 

indebtedness, 3) does not take into account the borrower’s ability to repay the loan, and 

4) violates fair lending laws by targeting women, minorities and communities of color.26

 

23 Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. at p. 37572. 

24 Id. at p. 37573. 

25 SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at p. 18-8 n.33 (citing Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 

McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260–61 (2002)). 

26 NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, THE BROKEN CREDIT SYSTEM: DISCRIMINATION AND UNEQUAL 

ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE LOANS BY RACE AND AGE (SUBPRIME LENDING IN TEN LARGE METROPOLITAN AREAS) 4 (2003), 

available at <http://www.omm.com/omm_distribution/newsletters/client_alert_financial_services/pdf/ncrcdiscrimstudy.pdf> 

(last accessed July 21, 2009). See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF 

FAIR HOUSING 31–36 (December 2008), available at 

<http://nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/reports/Future_of_Fair_Housing.PDF> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 
120 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

It is not the purpose of this report to reconcile these definitions. At this point it is sufficient to note that 

there is no accepted definition of what constitutes predatory lending. It should be noted, however, that 

the lack of a uniform definition precludes the collection of data relating to claims that might fall under 

the term of “predatory lending.” As noted in a January 2004 report by the General Accounting Office: 

Currently no comprehensive and reliable data are available on the extent of predatory lending 

nationwide, for several reasons. First, the lack of a standard definition of what constitutes 

predatory lending makes it inherently difficult to measure. Second, any comprehensive data 

collection on predatory lending would require access to a representative sample of loans and 

information that can only be extracted manually from the physical loan files.27

Given these limitations, for purposes of reviewing enforcement efforts, this report examines the issue of 

mortgage fraud and lending discrimination in separate chapters. 

II. Mortgage Fraud 

A. Mortgage Fraud Generally 

Mortgage fraud is “the intentional misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission by an applicant or other 

interested parties, relied on by a lender or underwriter to provide funding to purchase, or to insure a 

mortgage loan.”28 

Mortgage loan fraud encompasses many practices and can involve any or all parties to a transaction. 

Typical practices can include such schemes as misrepresentation of income or assets, the use of forged 

or fraudulent documents, misrepresentations as to intention to occupy property, fraudulent appraisals, 

identity fraud, and the use of straw buyers.29

 

27 U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, 

U.S. Senate, Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending, January 

2004, p. 23, available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

28 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report, April 2008 available at 

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud07.htm> (last accessed Mar. 9, 2009) (hereinafter cited as 2007 

Mortgage Fraud Report). 

29 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Update of 

Trends Based Upon an Analysis of Suspicious Activity Reports, April 2008, available at 

<http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rplfiles/MortgageLoanFraudSARAssessment.pdf> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). See also 

Press Release, DOJ, More Than 400 Defendants Charged for Roles in Mortgage Fraud Schemes as Part of Operation 

“Malicious Mortgage” (June 19, 2008) (Mortgage fraud schemes include “lending fraud, foreclosure rescue scams and 

mortgage-related bankruptcy schemes. Lending fraud frequently involves multiple loan transactions in which industry 

professionals construct mortgage transactions based on gross fraudulent misrepresentations about the borrower’s financial 

status, such as overstating the borrower’s income or assets, using false or fictitious employment records or inflating property

values. Foreclosure rescue scams involve criminals who target legitimate homeowners in dire financial circumstances and 

fraudulently collect fees for foreclosure prevention services or obtain ownership interests in residential properties. Both of 

these fraudulent mortgage schemes may be furthered by filing bankruptcy petitions that automatically stay foreclosure.”) 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 121 

For example, a recent report by the Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

indicated that borrowers were accused of wrongful acts in Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) at almost 

the same rate as mortgage brokers, when the claim related to fraud for profit. Other participants included 

appraisers, investors, sellers, settlement agencies, and loan officers.30

By any standard, the rate of mortgage fraud reports has increased rapidly. According to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

Mortgage fraud continues to be an escalating problem in the United States. Although no 

central repository collects all mortgage fraud complaints, Suspicious Activity Reports 

(SARs) from financial institutions indicated an increase in mortgage fraud reporting. 

SARs increased 31-percent to 46,717 during Fiscal Year (FY) 2007. The total dollar loss 

attributed to mortgage fraud is unknown. However, 7 percent of SARs filed during FY 

2007 indicated a specific dollar loss, which totaled more than $813 million.

31

Since this statement was issued, figures for FY 2008 have been released, showing an even 

greater increase in mortgage fraud reporting to 63,713. 

Figure 4.1 

Financial Institutions’ Mortgage Fraud-Related Suspicious Activity Reports, Fiscal Years 2003–2008 

6,936

21,994

63,713

35,617

17,127

46,717

-

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Fiscal year

Number of reports Number of reports

Fiscal year

Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report, April 2008, available at

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud07.htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009), p. 3 figure 1; Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, 2008 Mortgage Fraud Report, no date, available at

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud08.htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009), p. 3 figure 1. 

Caption: The number of mortgage fraud-related suspicious activity reports has steadily increased from 

2003 to 2007, going from 6,936 reports in 2003 to 63,713 in 2008. 

 

30 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Mortgage Loan Fraud. See also ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO 

OWN US 129-155 (2009) (detailing examples of fraud by borrowers).

31 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report.
122 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The rise and decline of subprime mortgage market has influenced mortgage fraud both directly and 

indirectly. As the bubble grew, and risk seemed to disappear, more and more individuals began to 

speculate or otherwise seek to benefit from rising values and inexpensive credit. The tone of the times is 

caught in the following description: 

Nearly everyone you met around Tampa had a Realtor’s license or a broker’s license or 

was a title agent. Alex Sink, the state’s chief financial officer and a Democrat, said, 

‘When the yardman comes and says he’s not going to mow your yard anymore because 

he’s going to become a mortgage broker, that is a sure sign that something is wrong.’ 

Flipping houses and condominiums turned into an amateur middle-class pursuit. People 

who drew modest salaries at their jobs not only owned a house but bought other houses as 

speculators, the way average Americans elsewhere dabble in day trading ... There were 

secretaries with five to ten investment homes—a thirty-five thousand dollar salary and a 

million dollars in investments. There’s no industry here, only houses.

32

The extent of the frenzy at the height of the boom is reflected in the fact that, in 2005, almost 28 

percent of all residential home purchases were made for investment purposes.

33

As the market began to fall, incentives for fraud changed, but remained equally strong. 

During 2007 there were more than 2.2 million foreclosure filings reported on 

approximately 1.29 million properties nationally, up 75 percent from 2006. The declining 

housing market affects many in the mortgage industry who are paid by commission. 

During declining markets, mortgage fraud perpetrators may take advantage of industry 

personnel attempting to generate loans to maintain current standards of living.

34

The FBI’s 2008 report on mortgage fraud indicates that the top mortgage fraud states for 2008 were 

California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Arizona, Texas, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New 

York, Ohio, Colorado, Nevada, Minnesota, Rhode Island, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, 

Pennsylvania, and Virginia.35

 

32 George Packer, The Ponzi State: Florida’s Foreclosure Disaster, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9 & 16, 2009, at p. 84. See also

KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US at pp. 156-84. 

33 See 2009 National Association of Realtor®s Investment and Vacation Home Buyers Survey, March 2005, p. 5; KATZ, OUR 

LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US at pp. 116–17 (“In Sacramento, one out of every six loan applicants in 2005 

admitted that they did not intend to live in the house they were financing — presumably, they were either intending to rent 

the property to tenants or to flip it quickly to a new owner.”). 

34 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report. Alt-A loans may also be ripe for mortgage fraud because in many instances [they] do not 

require documentation of the borrower’s income or assets, but rely instead on an applicant’s statement, “making them ideal 

for fraud exploitation.” Id. Losses involving Alt-A loans “were caused by income misrepresentations, employment frauds, 

straw buyers, investor-related frauds and occupancy frauds.” Id.

35 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008 Mortgage Fraud Report, no date, available at

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_ fraud08.htm> (last accessed July 13, 2009) (hereinafter cited as 2008 

Mortgage Fraud Report) 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 123 

B. Federal Enforcement Against Mortgage Fraud 

No regulatory agency is solely responsible for pursuing perpetrators of mortgage fraud. Agencies 

involved in mortgage fraud investigations include the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Office of Inspector General, the Internal Revenue Service, 

the Postal Inspection Service, and state and local governments. Those agencies most relevant to other 

areas of this report, DOJ (including the FBI), HUD, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are 

briefly addressed here: 

1. The Department of Justice 

DOJ investigates and prosecutes mortgage fraud, often in coordination with other federal and state 

agencies. Recent efforts, particularly by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, unearthed large numbers of defendants 

involved in wide-ranging mortgage schemes. In 2008, DOJ announced that its “Operation Malicious 

Mortgage” initiative resulted in 144 mortgage fraud cases involving 406 defendants from March 1 to 

June 18 of that year.36 

Through this operation, DOJ brought charges in every region of the United States, exposing mortgage 

fraud schemes that had inflicted approximately $1 billion in losses, according to FBI estimates.37 The 

FBI, the Postal Inspection Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Trustee Program, HUD, the Department of Veterans 

Affairs, and the FDIC collaborated with DOJ in the Operation Malicious Mortgage effort. 

In April 2009 a federal grand jury indicted four defendants (as well as an information against a fifth 

defendant) for their alleged participation in a “massive mortgage fraud scheme.”38 

A U.S. Attorney involved in the case reported that the indictment alleged that defendants convinced 

many victims to invest at least $50,000 by refinancing their existing homes or buying new homes at 

inflated prices, while claiming that Metro Dream Homes would repay the mortgages with revenue from 

profitable businesses ... Instead, according to the indictment, the conspirators allegedly used some of the 

investors’ money to repay earlier investors in the Ponzi scheme and spent the remainder on 

themselves.39

 

36 Press Release, DOJ, More Than 400 Defendants Charged for Roles in Mortgage Fraud Schemes as Part of Operation 

“Malicious Mortgage” (June 19, 2008), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-odag-551.html> (last 

accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

37 Id.

38 Press Release, DOJ, Five Charged in $70 Million “Dream Home” Mortgage Fraud Scheme (April 27, 2009), available at 

<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-395.html> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

39 Id.
124 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

The FBI40 “compiles data on mortgage fraud through Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) filed by 

federally-insured financial institutions and HUD-OIG reports. The FBI also receives complaints from 

the mortgage industry at large.”41

The FBI investigates mortgage fraud in two distinct areas: fraud for profit and fraud for housing: 

Fraud for profit is sometimes referred to as “Industry Insider Fraud,” and the motive is to 

revolve equity, falsely inflate the value of the property, or issue loans based on fictitious 

properties. Based on existing investigations and mortgage fraud reporting, 80 percent of 

all reported fraud losses involve collaboration or collusion by industry insiders. Fraud for 

housing represents illegal actions perpetrated solely by the borrower. The simple motive 

behind this fraud is to acquire and maintain ownership of a house under false pretenses. 

This type of fraud is typified by a borrower who makes misrepresentations regarding his 

income or employment history to qualify for a loan.42

The Bureau reports it is focusing its efforts on mortgage fraud perpetrated by industry insiders. “The 

FBI is engaged with the mortgage industry primarily in identifying fraud trends and educating the 

public. Some of the current rising mortgage fraud trends include: equity skimming, property flipping, 

and mortgage related identity theft.” 43

As reflected in Figure 4.2, the number of pending FBI investigations has risen steadily in recent years, 

from 436 investigations in 2003 to 1,204 in 2007 and 1,644 in 2008.44 

 

40 An organization with its own headquarters, field offices in major cities throughout the United States, and over 30,000 

employees, the FBI is part of the Department of Justice and reports to both the Attorney General and the Director of National 

Intelligence. FBI, About Us — Quick Facts, <http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm> (last accessed June 17, 2009). 

41 FBI, Financial Crimes Report to the Public, Fiscal Year 2007, available at 

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2007/financial_crime_2007.htm#Mortgage> (last accessed April 30, 

2009).

42 Id.

43 Id. (“Today's common equity skimming schemes involve the use of corporate shell companies, corporate identity theft, and 

the use or threat of bankruptcy/foreclosure to dupe homeowners and investors.”) Property flipping is not a new phenomenon; 

but with it, “once again law enforcement is faced with an educated criminal element that is using identity theft, straw 

borrowers, shell companies, along with industry insiders, to conceal their methods and override lender controls.” Id.

44 Id.
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 125 

Figure 4.2 

FBI’s Pending Investigations of Mortgage Fraud, Fiscal Years 2003–2008 

1,644

721

436

1,204

534

818

-

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Fiscal year

Number of investigations Number of investigations

Fiscal year

Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report, April 2008, available at

<http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud07.htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009), p. 7 figure 9; Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, 2008 Mortgage Fraud Report, no date, available at <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/fraud/mortgage_fraud08. 

htm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009), p. 7 figure 10. 

Caption: The number of FBI’s pending investigations on mortgage fraud increased steadily in the period 

from 2003 to 2007, from 436 in 2003 to 1,644 in 2008. 

3. The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Inspector General 

HUD-OIG investigates mortgage fraud related to FHA loans. According to former HUD Inspector 

General Kenneth Donohue, “FHA mortgages may be more prone to mortgage fraud because FHA 

insures mostly first-time homebuyers with limited credit histories and little money down.”45 HUD has 

investigated “thousands of cases of mortgage fraud” in the recent past and “repeatedly have found 

unlawful and deceptive practices and outright fraud in mortgage lending that often exploit first-time and 

uninformed FHA borrowers.”46

According to HUD, mortgage fraud can go undetected, and some fraud results in no loss to the 

government. These facts “make it difficult to quantify the exact amount, or even an estimated amount, of 

mortgage fraud.”47

Donohue provided examples of the types of scenarios that make mortgage fraud difficult to detect: 

 

45 HUD Inspector General Kenneth Donohue, Statement to the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on 

Housing and Community Opportunity (October 7, 2004), p. 2 (hereinafter cited as Donahue, Statement to the House 

Committee on Financial Services). 

46 Id. at p. 4. The FBI 2007 mortgage fraud study reported that HUD opened 239 single family mortgage fraud investigations 

in fiscal year 2006 and 151 in fiscal year 2007. The report indicates that HUD had a total of 466 loan investigations pending 

as of Sept. 30, 2007. The report attributes the 2006 to 2007 decrease in the number of opened investigations to a substantial 

decline in the FHA market share. 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report. 

47 Donohue, Statement to the House Committee on Financial Services at p. 5. 
126 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

(1) the appraiser that was pressured by the lender for a higher appraisal value to match 

the sales price; (2) the homebuyer that submits false down payment gift letters; (3) the 

seller that works a side loan with the buyer in order to make the deal work; (4) the loan 

processor that overlooks a known debt that is not on the credit report. These things 

happen every day and all would be categorized as mortgage fraud, and these can go 

undetected unless the borrower defaults on the loan, or there is a pattern of defaults 

associated with a particular lender, realtor, or appraiser. Complicating every case of fraud 

is proving the perpetrator did it intentionally and showing significant loss to the 

Government.”48

4. The Federal Trade Commission 

The FTC is also involved in mortgage fraud, examining deceptive and unfair practices in its role as the 

primary agency enforcing consumer credit laws for nonbank financial companies, including nonbank 

mortgage companies, mortgage brokers, and finance companies.49 The agency routinely coordinates 

enforcement activities with DOJ and HUD due to an overlap in fair lending jurisdiction.50 

Among the actions targeted by the FTC are deceptive or unfair practices by mortgage lenders, brokers, 

and loan servicers in all stages of mortgage lending, from advertising and marketing to loan servicing, 

with particular emphasis on the subprime market. The majority of the agency’s mortgage lending cases 

have challenged deception in advertising or marketing of subprime loans.51 In fall 2008, the FTC 

reported that in the past decade it had initiated 23 actions against large and small companies and against 

principals in the mortgage lending industry throughout the country.52 Over 320 million dollars have 

been returned to consumers as a result of large monetary judgments from several of these case 53 s. 

Deceptive practices 

The FTC reports that substantial enforcement efforts have also targeted mortgage brokers allegedly 

deceiving consumers about key loan terms, such as the existence of a prepayment penalty54 or a large 

balloon payment due at the end of a loan.55 The agency noted that in some of these cases it also has 

48 Id.

49 For a summary, see Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data and 

FTC Lending Enforcement before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

(July 25, 2007), pp. 7–9 (hereinafter cited as FTC Statement, Lending Enforcement); Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade 

Commission on Improving Consumer Protections in Subprime Lending before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, Trade, and Tourism (Apr. 29, 2008), pp. 2, 4 (hereinafter cited as 

FTC Statement, Consumer Protections). 

50 FTC Statement, Lending Enforcement at p. 4. 

51 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 5. 

52 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Bear Stearns and EMC Mortgage to Pay $28 Million to Settle FTC Charges of 

Unlawful Mortgage Servicing and Debt Collection Practices (Sept. 9, 2008), available at 

<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/emc.shtm> (last accessed April 24, 2009). 

53 Id.

54 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 6 (citing FTC v. Chase Fin. Funding, No. 04-549 (C.D. Cal. 2004); FTC v. 

Diamond, No. 02-5078 (N.D. Ill. 2002)). 

55 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 6. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 127 

charged brokers with falsely promising consumers low fixed payments and rates on mortgage loans.56

Representative deceptive practice actions include: 

• In 2004 the FTC filed a lawsuit against a California mortgage broker, Chase Financial Funding 

(CFF), and its principals for sending unsolicited e-mail and direct mail promising “3.5% fixed 

payment loan.”57 The FTC alleged that what the CFF offered was in fact a “payment option” 

adjustable rate mortgage that accrued interest at a rate higher than advertised. Furthermore, 

according to the agency, the payments were not “fixed.”58 

• In 2006 the FTC filed a lawsuit against a mortgage broker for allegedly misrepresenting many 

key loan terms to Hispanic consumers.59 The mortgage broker, the FTC alleged, conducted the 

business entirely in Spanish but provided at closing documents in English containing less 

favorable terms.60 As a result, the mortgage broker has been permanently enjoined from 

misrepresenting loan terms.61 

The FTC further reported that, as of April 2008, it was investigating more than a dozen mortgage 

companies as part of a mortgage advertising law enforcement sweep.62 In September 2007, the agency 

sent warning letters to more than 200 mortgage brokers and lenders (as well as to the media outlets that 

carried their advertisements), advising them that some of their mortgage advertisements may be 

deceptive and in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act63 and/or TILA.64 The FTC stated that it had 

reviewed advertisements of these mortgage brokers and will appropriately follow up with law 

enforcement.65

The FTC also challenges deceptive and unfair practices in the servicing of mortgage loans. Examples 

include: 

• In 2008, Bear Stearns and its subsidiary, EMC Mortgage Corporation, agreed to pay $28 million 

to settle charges that they engaged in unlawful practices in servicing consumers’ home mortgage 

 

56 Id. 

57 Id., citing FTC v. Chase Fin. Funding, No. 04-549 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 

58 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at pp. 6–7. 

59 Id. at p. 7 (citing FTC v. Mortgages Para Hispanos.Com Corp., No. 06-00019 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006)). 

60 Id.

61 Id. (citing FTC v. Mortgages Para Hispanos.Com Corp., No 06-00019 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2006)). 

62 Id.

63 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair 

methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices; (b) bring civil actions and seek civil penalties for unfair or 

deceptive acts and practices; and (c) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management 

of entities engaged in commerce. 

64 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 7 (citing Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Warns Mortgage 

Advertisers and Media That Ads May Be Deceptive (Sept. 11, 2007), available at 

<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/09/mortsurf.shtm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

65 Id. at p. 8. 
128 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

loans.66 The companies allegedly misrepresented the amounts borrowers owed, charged 

unauthorized fees, such as late fees, property inspection fees, and loan modification fees, and 

engaged in unlawful and abusive collection practices.67 Under the terms of the settlement, they 

were required to establish a data integrity program to ensure the accuracy and completeness of 

consumers’ loan information.68 

• In another case, the FTC and HUD settled with Fairbanks Capital Corporation (now known as 

Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.) and its parent company in November 2003. The FTC alleged 

that Fairbanks failed to post consumers’ payments upon receipt, charged unauthorized fees, used 

dishonest or abusive tactics to collect debts, and knowingly reported inaccurate consumer 

payment information to credit bureaus.69 

The FTC has intensified law enforcement to protect consumers from mortgage foreclosure rescue scams 

because of the rapid increase in delinquency and foreclosure rates.70 The agency reports that in 2007 

there were 2.2 million foreclosures, a 75 percent increase from 2006.71 While details may vary, it says 

that at the core of the foreclosure scam is a false promise that the firm will save a consumer’s home.72

Eight cases were brought within the space of approximately a year.73 The defendants in these cases 

guaranteed they would obtain loan modification or stop foreclosure if the consumers paid up-front 

amounts of $500 to $2,000. The companies took the fees, but failed to obtain the promised relief. In two 

of the eight cases,74 the FTC further alleged that the defendants falsely claimed affiliation with the nonprofit, government-endorsed HOPE NOW Alliance, which offers free assistance in foreclosure 

prevention.75 

 

66 Id. at pp. 9–10. 

67 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Leveraging FTC Resources to Protect Consumers of Financial 

Services and Promote Competition before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and 

General Government (March 31, 2009), p. 4 (citing FTC v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 4:08-cv-338 (E.D. Texas Sept. 9, 

2008)) (hereinafter cited as FTC Statement, Leveraging FTC Resources). 

68 Id.

69 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 9 (citing United States v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 03-12219 (D. Mass. 

2003). 

70 Id. at p. 11. 

71 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Foreclosure Rescue Fraud before the Senate Special Committee 

on Aging, Washington, D.C. (February 13, 2008), p. 1. 

72 Id.. 

73 FTC Statement, Leveraging FTC Resources at p. 3 (citing FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, No. 1:09-cv-01204-JBS-JS 

(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2009); FTC v. New Hope Property LLC, No. 1:09-cv-01203-JBS-JS (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2009); FTC v. 

National Foreclosure Relief, Inc., No. SACV09-117 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009); FTC v. United Home Savers, LLP, No. 8:08-

cv-01735-VMC-TBM (M.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2008); FTC v. Foreclosure Solutions, LLC, No. 1:08-cv-01075 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 28, 

2008); FTC v. Mortgage Foreclosure Solutions, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-388-T-23EAJ (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2008); FTC v. National 

Hometeam Solutions, Inc., No. 4:08-cv-067 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2008); FTC v. Safe Harbour Foundation, No. 08 C 1185 

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2008)). 

74 Id. at p. 3 (citing FTC v. Hope Now Modifications, No. 1:09-cv-01204-JBS-JS (D.N.J. March 17, 2009); FTC v. New Hope 

Property LLC, No. 1:09-cv-01203-JBS-JS (D.N.J. March 17, 2009)). 

75Id. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 129 

III. Mortgage Lending Discrimination 

Mortgage lending discrimination encompasses loans with a variety of purposes including purchasing or 

refinancing homes and financing home improvements.76 Refinancing includes efforts to reduce interest 

rates or alter the term of the loan or extracting cash from home equity. Borrowers may have, in addition 

to a first lien, a smaller junior lien, that would allow a borrower to access home equity or to avoid 

having to secure mortgage insurance on the first lien.77

The mortgages that financial institutions make to individual borrowers are often bought by financial 

institutions in the secondary mortgage market. The home mortgages may be securitized78 by the federal 

Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or private 

securitizers. 

Mortgage lending discrimination may occur in a variety of different ways, but often arises when 

mortgage lenders treat similarly situated borrowers differently because of membership in a protected 

class.79 For example, lenders may refuse to offer credit at all to certain types of groups or individuals.80

Early financial discrimination cases generally involved complaints of minorities or residents of minority 

neighborhoods that lenders rejected their applications for mortgage credit.81

 “Redlining” is a specific type of mortgage lending discrimination in which lenders deny home loans 

based on the characteristics of the would-be borrower’s neighborhood. When based on the race, color, 

national origin, sex, religion, disability, or familial status of persons, such denials may constitute 

discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. In addition, when based on race, color, national 

origin, sex, religion, marital status, or age, such denials may constitute discrimination in violation of the 

 

76 SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at p. 18-11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982 & Supp. 1987). 

77 The present examination analyzes both loans for home purchases and refinancing, sometimes together and sometimes 

separately. Some analyses examine first liens only, and others both first and junior liens. In the secondary mortgage market, 

the Commission directed its attention primarily to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or the government-sponsored enterprises 

collectively, although some analyses present data for the market as a whole or contrast the GSEs with other types of financial 

institutions. 

78 The process by which mortgage loans are sold to investors is securitization. Mortgage loans are purchased from loan 

originators (such as banks or mortgage companies) by government or private entities that group or “pool” individual 

mortgage loans with certain characteristics. The mortgage-backed securities (usually with a Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or 

Ginnie Mae guarantee) were sold to investors as bonds. 

79 ANDREW HAUGHWOUT, CHRISTOPHER MAYER, AND JOSEPH TRACY, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, SUBPRIME 

MORTGAGE PRICING: THE IMPACT OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER ON THE COST OF BORROWING, staff report no. 368 

April 2009, p. 3, <http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr368.pdf> (last accessed July 17, 2009). 

80 Id. 

81 SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at pp. 18–7 to –8 (attributing such cases to “the early years 

of the 1968 Fair Housing Act.”). See also Christine Robitscher Ladd, “Federal Fair Housing Enforcement: The Clinton 

Record at the End of the First Term, in CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE: CIVIL RIGHTS 

AND THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 229 (1997), <http://www.ccr.org/doc/struggle.pdf> (last accessed July 17, 2009) (where 

the author distinguishes a 1995 Department of Justice case (U.S. v. Northern Trust Company), which, along with earlier ones 

that also involved allegations of discrimination in underwriting, led to loan rejections, from 1996 cases that concerned 

discrimination in the pricing of loans.).
130 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Equal Credit Opportunity Act.82 Nevertheless, financial institutions may consider factors such as 

individual creditworthiness of borrowers, when evaluated in a non-discriminatory fashion, and which are 

justified by business necessity.83 Redlining may also include “reverse redlining,” which is the practice 

of targeting certain borrowers or areas with less advantageous products or services based on prohibited 

characteristics. 

Since the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, Congress has enacted additional statutes to combat 

housing and mortgage lending discrimination, the most relevant to this report being the Equal Credit 

Opportunity Act.84 Additional consumer protection statutes related to lending include the Truth in 

Lending Act, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 

Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 

Soundness Act of 1992. Enforcement of these laws involves no less than nine federal agencies – and in 

some instances many more. The diffuse nature of jurisdiction arises from the fact that oversight has been 

assigned based on the type of entity covered. Thus, generally: 

• The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve) oversees bank 

holding companies, nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, State-chartered banks that 

are members of the Federal Reserve System, and the U.S. operations of foreign banking 

organizations. It also regulates the foreign activities and investments of the Federal Reserve 

member banks, and Edge Act corporations. 

• The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises national banks and federal 

branches and agencies of foreign banks. 

• The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC) oversees State-chartered banks and 

savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and foreign banks having 

insured branches. 

• The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) oversees federal savings associations and also supervises 

State-chartered thrifts and thrift holding companies. 

• The National Credit Union Association (NCUA) oversees federal credit unions, including statechartered credit unions. 

• The Federal Trade Commission (the FTC) oversees mortgage brokers and non-bank mortgage 

lenders. 

• The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administers and enforces the Fair 

Housing Act, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act provisions applicable to all 

 

82 SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at pp. 18-22 to -23. 

83 Id. at p. 18-24.

84 Precursors to the Fair Housing Act that prohibited certain forms of discrimination in housing and/or mortgage lending 

included Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., which bars discrimination on the basis of race, 

color, or national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. Executive Order 11063 (1962), 

which bars discrimination in the sale, leasing, rental, or other disposition of properties and facilities owned or operated by the 

federal government or provided with federal funds, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides all citizens of the United States with 

the same rights “enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,” 

and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which guarantees “the equal protection of the laws.” 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 131 

federally related mortgage loans and administers the fair lending provisions of the Federal 

Housing Enterprises Financial Safety Act. 

• The Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces applicable fair housing and fair lending laws against 

all entities which may have engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, regardless of the 

type of entity.85

A. Statutory Efforts to Protect Mortgage Applicants and Borrowers 

1. Fair Housing Act 

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act (FHA), remains at the 

center of the federal government’s efforts to eliminate housing discrimination.86 FHA is based on “the 

policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the 

United States.”87 It was subsequently amended in 1974 and again in 1988 to expand coverage of the Act 

and to expand enforcement options by both private plaintiffs and the federal government. 

FHA prohibits, among other things, discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, including the 

provision of brokerage services, on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial status, 

or disability.88 FHA also prohibits discrimination in the residential lending process. Finally, it also 

makes it unlawful for a person to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with another person’s rights 

under FHA.89 

FHA is administered by HUD. In addition to its own enforcement efforts, HUD also works with 

government (federal and state) and non-governmental entities to formulate and carry out programs to 

prevent or eliminate discriminatory housing practices. Furthermore, HUD cooperates with and renders 

technical and other assistance to the Community Relations Service (a component of DOJ) to prevent or 

eliminate discriminatory housing practices.90 HUD is also charged with initiating educational and 

conciliatory activities to further the purpose of FHA.91

In addition to adding familial status and disability as protected classes under FHA, the 1988 Fair 

Housing Amendments Act created an administrative enforcement system that is subject to judicial 

review. Prior to 1988, HUD could only investigate and conciliate complaints of housing 

 

85 The diffuse nature of enforcement was recently examined in a study prepared by the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-704, Fair Lending: Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. 

Financial Regulatory Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts (July 2009). 

86 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2004)). 

87 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 

88 Id. § 3604. Race, color, religion, and national origin were the original protected bases covered by Title VIII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1968. Pub. L. 90-284, Title VIII, § 804, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 83. Sex was added by the 1974 amendments. 

Pub. L. 93-383, Title VIII § 808(b)(1), Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 729. Familial status and disability, or handicap, were added by

the 1988 amendments. Pub. L. 100-430, §§ 6(a)–(b)(2), (e), 15, Sept. 13, 1988, 102 Stat. 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636. 

89 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006). 

90 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-1 (2006). 

91 42 U.S.C. § 3609 (2006). 
132 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

discrimination.92 With the adoption of the 1988 amendments, if HUD’s investigation of a HUD-filed 

complaint determines that there was reasonable cause to believe that the respondents violated FHA, and 

the complaint cannot be conciliated, HUD will issue a Charge of Discrimination which is adjudicated 

before an Administrative Law Judge unless one of the parties elects to litigate the Charge in federal 

District Court.93 

In addition to the efforts of HUD, DOJ, through its Civil Rights Division’s Housing and Civil 

Enforcement Section, also enforces FHA. DOJ has the primary responsibility for initiating litigation 

relating to pattern or practice violations of FHA, but the Attorney General is also authorized to pursue 

pattern or practice or land use and zoning discrimination cases referred by HUD.94 Moreover, 

individuals who claim violations of FHA or the respondents in those matters can elect to have the matter 

heard in federal court, in which case DOJ brings the action on the complainant’s behalf, otherwise, the 

matter will go before an Administrative Law Judge at HUD. The individual claiming to be aggrieved 

also can file a private cause of action in federal court.95

The federal banking agencies (the FDIC, OCC, OTS, and Federal Reserve Board) regularly examine the 

insured depository institutions (banks and thrifts) that they supervise for fair lending compliance 

including compliance with FHA. The federal banking agencies may take administrative enforcement 

actions (cease and desist orders, civil money penalties, etc.) to address any violations of law or 

regulation, including FHA. If a federal banking agency has a reason to believe that a “pattern or 

practice” of discrimination of FHA has occurred, the agency must make a referral to DOJ for 

enforcement. 

The goals of FHA are furthered through the Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) and the Fair 

Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) supervised by HUD.96 Through FHIP, HUD provides funding to 

fair housing organizations, and non-profits and other private entities which assist individuals who 

believe they have been discriminated against in housing. In addition to helping organizations carry out 

enforcement and education initiatives, such funding also enables recipients to send “testers” to property 

holders or managers suspected of housing discrimination.97 Through FHAP, HUD provides funding to 

state and local agencies that enforce fair housing laws substantially equivalent to FHA. This funding is 

typically provided for the purposes of capacity building, using “testers,” complaint processing, 

 

92 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Enforcement Report, September 1994, 

p. 5. 

93 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (2006). 

94 Id. § 3614.4. 

95 Id. §§ 3610–3613. 

96 Id. § 3616a(a). 

97 Testers have been defined, for example, as “minorities and whites with the same financial qualifications who evaluate 

whether housing providers treat equally-qualified people differently.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 

Fair House Assistance Program, <http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/partners/FHIP/fhip.cfm> (last accessed Apr. 1, 2009). 

See also SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION at pp. 16-4 to -5.
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 133 

administrative costs, special enforcement efforts, training, and other projects related to enforcing fair 

housing law.98

2. Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) was enacted in 1974 and later amended in 1976 as Title VII 

of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.99 Additional detail is provided by Regulation B, promulgated by 

the Federal Reserve, which identifies ECOA’s purpose as: 

[T]o promote the availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants without regard to 

race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age; or to the fact that all or 

part of the applicant’s income derives from a public assistance program; or to the fact that 

the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Credit Protection 

Act.100

ECOA and Regulation B prohibit discrimination against an applicant for credit on the basis of race, 

color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, age (provided the applicant has the capacity to 

contract), the applicant’s acceptance of public assistance, or the applicant’s good faith exercise of rights 

under ECOA.101

In total, 11 agencies plus DOJ have specific administrative enforcement powers under ECOA with 

differing jurisdiction based on the type of entity regulated, as described later in this chapter102: (1) the 

Federal Reserve; (2) OCC; (3) the FDIC; (4) OTS; (5) NCUA; (6) the U.S. Department of 

Transportation; (7) the U.S. Department of Agriculture; (8) the Farm Credit Administration; (9) the U.S. 

Securities and Exchange Commission; (10) the Small Business Administration; and (11) the FTC.103

These agencies may initiate administrative proceedings against a covered entity who fails to comply 

with ECOA.104

In addition to the above, OCC, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, OTS, and NCUA must refer any matter 

to the Attorney General if there is a pattern or practice of discouraging or denying applications for credit 

that violates the Act.105 These agencies also have the discretion to refer the matter to the Attorney 

 

98 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fair House Assistance Program, 

<http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/partners/FHAP/index.cfm> (last accessed Apr. 1, 2009). 

99 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974), Pub. L. No. 94-234, 90 Stat. 253 (1976) (codified 

at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006)). 

100 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (2008). 

101 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2006). 

102 The nature of such enforcement powers was recently examined in a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-704, Fair Lending: Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial 

Regulatory Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts (July 2009). 

103 Id. § 1691c. 

104 OTS may also bring an enforcement action for noncompliance with its Nondiscrimination Rule (12 C.F.R., part 528), 

which supplements ECOA and the FHA. 

105 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (2006). 
134 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

General if one or more creditors are suspected of violating ECOA.106 Under this second scenario, if the 

agency chooses not to refer the matter to the Attorney General, but the agency believes the matter is also 

a violation of FHA, it is required to notify the Secretary of HUD, and to inform the applicant of the 

possible availability of remedies under FHA.107 Further, Executive Order 12892 provides that, upon 

receipt of a complaint alleging facts that may constitute a violation of the FHA or upon receipt of 

information from a consumer compliance examination or other information suggesting a violation of the 

FHA, each executive agency shall forward such facts or information to the Secretary of HUD.108 Where 

such facts or information indicate a possible pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of the Act, 

they also shall be forwarded to the Attorney General.109

The Attorney General may also independently institute appropriate civil actions when he or she believes 

that there is a pattern or practice that violates ECOA.110 

Finally, ECOA provides a private right of action for applicants for credit who believe they have been 

discriminated against.111

3. Truth in Lending Act 

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was enacted in 1968 to protect consumers in the use of credit.112 For 

the mortgage industry, the Act’s stated goal is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that 

the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him [or her] and 

avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit 

billing and credit card practices.”113 

TILA applies to various types of credit, but for the purposes of this study, its most relevant application is 

to “open end” and “closed end” credit secured by a consumer’s dwelling or residential property.114 In 

addition to providing meaningful disclosure of terms such as the finance charge, the annual percentage 

 

106 Id.

107 Id. § 1691e(k). 

108 Executive Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 20, 1994). 

109 Id.

110 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (2006). 

111 Id. § 1691e. 

112 Truth in Lending Act, Pub.L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2006)). 

113 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006). TILA was also enacted to protect consumers when leasing personal property also through 

meaningful disclosure of terms “so as to enable the lessee to compare more readily the various lease terms available to him 

[or her], limit balloon payments in consumer leasing, enable comparison of lease terms with credit terms where appropriate, 

and to assure meaningful and accurate disclosures of lease terms in advertisements.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(b). 

114 Open end credit is “consumer credit extended by a creditor under a plan in which: [1] the creditor reasonably contemplates 

repeated transactions; [2] the creditor may impose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and 

[3] the amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the term of the plan (up to any limit set by the creditor)

is generally made available to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (2008). Regulation 

Z defines closed end credit as any type of credit other than open end credit. Id. § 226.2(a)(10). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 135 

rate (APR), the amount financed, and the total of all payments,115 TILA provides, in certain 

circumstances, consumers the right to rescind a home equity or refinance mortgage within three days of 

the closing, the delivery of the rescission forms, or the statement containing the material disclosures 

required by TILA.116

Under the Act, the Federal Reserve is responsible for creating regulations to implement the law. These 

regulations have come to be known as Regulation Z codified in Part 226 of Title 12 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations. In addition to promoting the informed use of consumer credit through disclosures 

about terms and cost, Regulation Z also “gives consumers the right to cancel certain credit transactions 

that involve a lien on a consumer’s principal dwelling, regulates certain credit card practices, and 

provides a means for fair and timely resolution of credit billing disputes.”117 Regulation Z was 

substantially revised in 2008, as a response to the current mortgage crisis, but most of those changes will 

not go into effect until October 1, 2009.118 

TILA is enforced by a variety of federal agencies, depending on the entities each agency regulates. 

These agencies are: (1) OCC; (2) the Federal Reserve; (3) the FDIC; (4) OTS; (5) NCUA; (6) the U.S. 

Department of Transportation (DOT); (7) the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); (8) the Farm 

Credit Administration; and (9) the FTC, which has overall enforcement power.119

As to enforcement, these agencies can pursue administrative proceedings against suspected violators of 

TILA.120 State attorneys general may also pursue violators of TILA, but must inform the relevant 

agency and the agency can choose to intervene in the action or file a petition for appeal.121 A private 

right of action exists for individuals who believe their TILA rights have been violated.122 In addition, 

criminal liability exists for willfully and knowingly violating the sta 123 tute.

4. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 

In 1994, TILA was amended by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in order to 

address deceptive and unfair practices in certain types of mortgage loans with high rates and/or high 

fees.124 HOEPA establishes requirements for closed-end refinance mortgage loans and closed-end home 

equity loans (1) with interest rates greater than 8 percentage points for first-lien loans or 10 percentage 

 

115 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631–1638. Note that the terms required to be disclosed depends on whether the loan is classified as open 

end or closed end credit. 

116 Id. § 1635(a). 

117 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (2008). 

118 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522–44,614 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). 

119 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (a),(c) (2006). 

120 Id. § 1607. 

121 Id. § 1640(e). 

122 Id. § 1640(a). 

123 Id. §§ 1611–1612. 

124 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994). 
136 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

points for subordinate-lien loans above comparable Treasury securities; or (2) where the total points and 

fees paid by the consumer at or before closing is greater than 8 percent of the loan amount or a set dollar 

amount (for example, in 2009 the amount is $583).125 HOEPA excludes from coverage purchase money 

mortgages, reverse mortgages, and open-end credit plans.126 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1639(l), the Federal 

Reserve promulgated section 32 of Regulation Z to implement HOEPA.127

HOEPA’s goals are essentially two-fold: to provide additional disclosures to consumers for loans with 

high rates and/or high fees, and to prohibit certain terms in such loans. HOEPA also provides private 

and administrative remedies for violations of the Act. 

HOEPA also requires lenders to provide additional disclosures to borrowers regarding their right to not 

complete the loan transaction even after beginning the process, the consequence of foreclosure and 

penalties if payment is not made, and terms of the loan including the APR and loan amount.128 HOEPA 

which is an amendment to TILA, provides that any mortgage that contains a provision prohibited under 

HOEPA is deemed to be a failure to deliver the material disclosures required under TILA for purposes 

of TILA’s right of rescission provisions (found in 15 U.S.C § 1635).129 Summarized, HOEPA prohibits 

the following: 

In general, HOEPA prohibits the following: 

• Most prepayment penalties.130

• Loans with default interest rates that are higher than the interest rate that applies before the 

default.131

• Balloon payments for loans with less than five-year terms.132

• Loans with negative amortization.133

 

125 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) and 12 C.F.R. §226.32(a) (2008). The set fee cap is adjusted annually by the Federal Reserve using 

the Consumer Price Index. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(3) (2006). 

126 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2006). 

127 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (2008). 

128 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) (2006). Specifically, the following disclosures must be made: (1) “You are not required to complete 

this agreement merely because you have received these disclosures or have signed a loan application;” and (2) “If you obtain 

this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home. You could lose your home, and any money you have put into it, if 

you do not meet your obligations under the loan.” Id. § 1639(a)(1). In addition, HOEPA requires disclosures related to APRs, 

amount of regular monthly payment, statement regarding interest rate and that the monthly payment may increase for variable 

interest credit transactions, and the amount of maximum monthly payment for variable interest credit transactions. Id. § 

1639(a)(2). 

129 Id. § 1639(j). 

130 Id. § 1639(c)(1)(A). 

131 Id. § 1639(d). 

132 Id. § 1639(e). 

133 Id. § 1639(f). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 137 

• Loans that require prepayment at closing of more than two periodic payments.134

• Loans based on the value of the consumer’s property without regard to the consumer’s ability to 

repay the loan.135

• Creditor direct payments to home improvement contractors.136

As aforementioned, a violation of HOEPA constitutes a violation of TILA.137 Thus, all recourse 

available under TILA applies to HOEPA loans as well. In addition, civil penalties may be assessed.138

5. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) was passed in 1974 after Congress found that 

significant reform in the real estate settlement process was needed to ensure that consumers were 

provided greater and more timely information concerning the nature and the costs of the settlement 

process.139 In particular, Congress was concerned with unnecessarily high settlement charges and 

abusive practices that had developed throughout the country.140

RESPA requires that consumers receive disclosures at three distinct periods in the residential property 

transaction: at the time of application, at closing, and after the closing.141 It also prohibits practices that 

tend to increase the cost of settlement services, including kickbacks and unearned fees.142 and limits the 

amount home buyers are required to place in escrow accounts established to ensure the payment of real 

estate taxes and insurance.143 Finally, it places the choice of title insurance provider with the buyer.144

RESPA applies to transactions involving a “federally related mortgage loan” and to “persons,” which 

include entities and individuals.145 The Act’s provisions apply especially to those persons who and 

entities that provide “settlement services,”146 including: (1) mortgage bankers and mortgage brokers; (2) 

real estate brokers and agents; (3) title companies and title agents; (4) settlement agents; (5) home 

 

134 Id. § 1639(g). 

135 Id. § 1639(h). 

136 Id. § 1639(i). Proceeds for home improvement loans must be disbursed either directly to the consumer, jointly to the 

consumer and the home improvement contractor, or, in some instances, to the escrow agent. 

137 Id. § 1639(j). 

138 Section 8 of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h). 

139 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 – 2617) 

(1974). 

140 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2006). 

141 Id. §§ 2602 – 2609. 

142 Id. § 2607. 

143 Id. § 2609. 

144 Id. § 2608(a). 

145 Id. § 2602. 

146 Id. § 2602. 
138 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

warranty companies; (6) hazard insurance agents; (7) appraisers; (8) flood and tax service providers; and 

(9) others.147

RESPA also requires mortgage servicers to respond within 20 days to a “qualified written request” 

submitted by a borrower related to the servicing of a mortgage loan. The mortgage servicer has 60 days 

after the receipt of the borrower inquiry to conduct an investigation and make appropriate corrections to 

the account or to provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification of the reason the 

servicer believes the account is correct. During that investigation period, the servicer may not report an 

overdue payment to a consumer reporting agency.148

HUD is responsible for promulgating rules on enforcing RESPA. In addition, the federal banking 

agencies examine for and enforce compliance with RESPA’s requirements with respect to the 

institutions they supervise.149 Section 2617(a) authorizes the Secretary of HUD to prescribe rules and 

regulations, make interpretations, and grant exemptions for classes of transactions as necessary to 

achieve the purposes of the Act.150 The Act also mandates certain disclosures, including the good faith 

estimate,151 a standard form for the statement of settlement costs (known as the HUD-1 or HUD-1A)152

and escrow disclosures.153

RESPA also provides remedies for some violations of its provisions. Depending on the type of violation, 

borrowers, HUD, and certain state officials may bring actions under RESPA: 

(1) A borrower may bring a private lawsuit, or a group of borrowers may bring a class 

action suit, against a servicer who violates the servicing provisions of RESPA; 

(2) HUD may investigate and penalize loan servicers that violate the escrow account 

provisions of RESPA;154 

(3) Violators of RESPA’s provisions against kickbacks and fee-splitting can be pursued 

by the Secretary of HUD, the Attorney General of any state, the insurance commissioner 

of any state, or an individual borrower;155 and 

 

147 24 C.F.R. § 3500.2 (2008). 

148 Id. § 3500.21. 

149 See 24 C.F.R. § 35300.19(a) (“It is the policy of the [HUD] Secretary regarding RESPA enforcement matters to cooperate 

with Federal, State, or local agencies having supervisory powers over lenders or other persons with responsibilities under 

RESPA. Federal agencies with supervisory powers over lenders may use their powers to require compliance with RESPA.”). 

150 12 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2006). 

151 Id. § 2604. 

152 Id. § 2603. 

153 Id. § 2609. 

154 Id.

155 Id. § 2607. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 139 

(4) Violations of the title insurance provisions may be pursued by the Secretary of HUD, 

the Attorney General of any state, or the insurance commissioner of any state, or an 

individual borrower.156 

6. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was passed in 1975 to “provide the citizens and public 

officials of the United States with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether depository 

institutions are filling their obligations to serve the housing needs of the communities and 

neighborhoods in which they are located and to assist public officials in their determination of the 

distribution of public sector investments in a manner designed to improve the private investment 

environment.”157 In addition, HMDA provides loan data to assist in identifying possible discriminatory 

lending patterns.158 The Act provides the Federal Reserve the general power to prescribe regulations as 

necessary to carry out the purpose of HMDA.159 Pursuant to this authority, the Federal Reserve has 

promulgated Regulation C in order to effectuate the purpose of HMDA.160

Generally, HMDA applies to “depository institutions”161 and “other lending institutions.”162 Section 

2802(A) of HMDA defines the term “depository institution” as any bank, savings association, and any 

credit union, which makes federally related mortgage loans. “Other lending institutions” are defined as 

non-depository institutions such as savings and loans, mortgage banking subsidiaries of bank holding 

companies, savings and loan holding companies, and independent mortgage lenders. 

HMDA requires covered entities to compile lending data about home purchase loans annually and make 

this information public. The data collected include: race, ethnicity, minority status, income, gender, type 

of loan, purchaser of loan, disposition of loan applications, reasons for denial of applications, pricing 

information of loans.163 Over the years, HMDA’s reach and coverage have expanded.164 For the 

purposes of this report, the most noteworthy amendments occurred in 1989 and 2002. In 1989, the 

Federal Reserve revised Regulation C to incorporate amendments in the Financial Institutions Reform, 

Recovery and Enforcement Act to include, inter alia, identification of race, sex, and income of loan 

applicants and borrowers and lenders were permitted to explain the basis for their lending decisions. In 

2002, institutions were required to report rate-spread information on higher-priced loans, which is the 

 

156 Id. §§ 2608(b), 2617. 

157 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2801(b) (1975)). 

158 National Credit Union Administration, Response to U. S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Interrogatories and Document 

Requests, Response to Interrogatory Request. 

159 12 U.S.C. § 2804 (2006). 

160 12 C.F.R § 203 (2008). 

161 12 U.S.C. § 2802 (2006). 

162 Id.

163 See FFIEC, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: History of HMDA, <http://www.ffiec.gov/HMDA/history2.htm> (last 

accessed April 24, 2009). 

164 See id. 
140 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

first time that pricing data has been collected in HMDA data. In addition, HOEPA loans were identified 

and information on the type of property and lien-status of the loan were added165 

Institutions must also maintain a loan application register with information from loans on which it 

reports. The reported information, in turn, must be disclosed in a statement by the Federal Financial 

Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), which is disclosed to the public by the financial 

institution.166

HMDA provides the Federal Reserve with the general power to prescribe regulations necessary to carry 

out its purpose.167 The Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, NCUA, the FDIC, and HUD work together to 

develop the process for disclosing loan information to the public.168 Enforcement of HMDA is shared by 

these same agencies.169

HMDA also requires the Federal Reserve, in consultation with the Secretary of HUD, to report annually 

to Congress the loan data collected.170

The Act provides that the above six agencies may enforce compliance under the Federal Credit Union Act 

and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.171 A depository institution that fails to comply with HMDA may 

face termination of its status as an insured depository institution,172 and Regulation C also provides for 

civil and monetary penalties.173 Moreover, violations of HMDA are also deemed violations of the Federal 

Credit Union Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.174

In addition to the specific statutory and regulatory provisions cited above relative to home mortgage 

lending, the general prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts or practices found in Section 5 of the 

FTC Act also applies. All of the banking agencies have authority to enforce this law with respect to the 

institutions they supervise, although rulemaking authority is vested solely in the FRB, OTS, and NCUA. 

7. Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety Act 

The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety Act of 1992 (FHEFSSA) reformed federal regulation 

of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In addition to modifying their housing goals and providing for their 

 

165 See id. Even with these revisions, the scope of HMDA data has been criticized as being too narrow for purposes of fair 

lending enforcement. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-704, Fair Lending: Data Limitations and the 

Fragmented U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts (July 2009). 

166 12 C.F.R. § 203.5 (2008). 

167 12 U.S.C. § 2804(a) (2006). 

168 Id. § 2803(h). 

169 Id. § 2804(b). 

170 Id. § 2807. 

171 Id. § 1818; id. § 1751 et seq. 

172 Id. § 1818. 

173 12 C.F.R. § 203.6(b) (2008). 

174 12 U.S.C. § 2804(c) (2006). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 141 

monitoring as discussed above, FHEFSSA also contains several provisions relating to fair lending 

enforcement. Although the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 amended FHEFSSA to 

transfer various GSE oversight functions from HUD to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, HUD 

retained responsibility for administering FHEFSSA’s fair lending provisions. 

With regard to fair lending, FHEFSSA requires that HUD-issued regulations prohibit Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac from discriminating in their mortgage purchases and mandates that HUD “periodically 

review and comment on the underwriting and appraisal guidelines of each GSE to ensure that such 

guidelines are consistent with the Fair Housing Act and [FHEFSSA].”175 FHEFSSA and HUD’s 

regulations contain the same anti-discrimination provisions found in FHA, with age as an added 

protected class, and expressly prohibit “any consideration of the age or location of the dwelling or the 

age of the neighborhood or census tract where the dwelling is located in a manner that has a 

discriminatory effect.”176 FHEFSSA also provides HUD with the authority to request data from Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac to assist HUD in investigating whether a lender with which one of the GSEs does 

business has violated federal fair lending laws.177 In addition, FHEFSSA directs Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac to undertake remedial actions against lenders that have been found to have violated fede

fair lending laws.

ral 

 178

Additionally, the OCC, OTS, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve enforce the requirements of RESPA 

with respect to institutions within their supervisory authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1818. 

B. Federal Enforcement of FHA and ECOA 

Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act falls within the ambit of HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal 

Opportunity and DOJ’s Civil Rights Division’s Housing and Civil Enforcement Section. In addition, 

OCC, OTS, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve enforce the FHA with respect to institutions within their 

supervisory authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1818. 

ECOA encompasses all types of loans, not just residential mortgage loans. Thus, enforcement of ECOA 

is shared by a variety of entities based on type of transaction and entity. For the purposes of this report 

in evaluating ECOA’s protections to residential mortgage loan applicants and borrowers, DOJ, the 

Federal Reserve, NCUA, the FDIC, OCC, and OTS will be reviewed... 

1. The Department of Housing and Urban Development 

HUD is tasked with enforcing fair housing laws to prohibit discrimination in mortgage lending. Its 

primary tool in combating such discrimination is FHA.179 

 

175 Id. § 4545(1), (6). 

176 Id. § 4545(1); 24 C.F.R. § 81.42 (2008). 

177 12 U.S.C. § 4545(2), (3) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 81.44 (2008). 

178 12 U.S.C. § 4545(5) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 81.46 (2008). 

179 In addition to FHA, HUD administers and enforces the RESPA provisions applicable to all federally-related mortgage 

loans and administers the fair lending provisions of FHEFSSA. 
142 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Enforcement Efforts 

Under FHA, HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) investigates and prosecutes 

discrimination in home mortgage lending because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, familial 

status, and disability.180 In some instances, such discrimination may constitute what has been termed 

“predatory lending.”181 To enforce FHA, HUD has issued a number of memoranda of understanding 

with private entities. These include the Memorandum Regarding FFIEC Member Agency Notification in 

Fair Housing Act Complaints against Insured Financial Institutions; the Memorandum of Understanding 

Between and Among HUD and the National Association of Asian American Real Estate Professionals, 

the National Association of Hispanic Real Estate Professionals, the National Association of Real Estate 

Brokers, and the National Association of Realtors, and the Memorandum of Understanding Between 

Department of Housing and Urban Development and the FFIEC Member Agencies.182

Pursuant to FHA, HUD transmits to DOJ information regarding any case in which HUD has “reason to 

believe that a basis may exist for DOJ to file a pattern or practice claim.”183 Such cases may concern 

discriminatory financing, discrimination in making loans, discrimination in purchasing loans, 

discrimination in terms and conditions for making loans, and redlining. Between FY 1990 and January 

2009, HUD referred 23 mortgage lending discrimination matters to DOJ.184

Complaint Processing 

As previously discussed, prior to 1988, HUD could only investigate and conciliate complaints of 

housing discrimination.185 With the adoption of the 1988 amendments to FHA, HUD was authorized to 

issue Charges of Discrimination and to adjudicate them before an Administrative Law Judge if none of 

the parties elected to proceed instead in federal District Court.186 Such complaints concern 

discriminatory financing, discrimination in making loans, discrimination in purchasing loans, 

discrimination in terms and conditions for making loans, and redlining. 

Between FYs 1990 and 2008, HUD closed 3,689 lending complaints for a variety of reasons ranging 

from procedural dismissals to a final determination on the merits.187 In addition to the complaints 

processed internally by HUD, a large number of complaints are processed through HUD’s Fair Housing 

 

180 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 4. 

181 Id. 

182 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 4. 

183 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 15 at p. 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. §3610(e)(2) 

(2006)). Such a case exists when a person or group of persons are “engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full 

enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter [FHA], or that any group of persons has been denied any of the 

rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public importance.” 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2006). 

184 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 14. 

185 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Enforcement Report, September 1994, 

p. 5. 

186 Id. (citing Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 House Committee Report, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2178, p. 17). See 

also 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610 – 3613 (2006). 

187 HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 13. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 143 

Assistance Program (FHAP). Under FHAP, HUD provides funding to state and local agencies that 

enforce fair housing laws substantially equivalent to FHA.188 Between FYs 1990 and 2008, 3,276 

lending complaints have been processed through FHAP agencies. 

As reflected in Figure 4.3, the number of FHAP lending complaints closed increased substantially 

between 2004 and 2007. HUD closed 2 lending cases more in 2008 than in 2007 and FHAP closed 68 

less lending complaints in 2008 than in the previous year. 

Figure 4.3 

Total Number of Closed HUD and FHAP Lending Complaints, 1990–2008 

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Fiscal Year

Closed Lending Cases

FHAP 63 126 143 113 159 101 112 87 114 101 123 131 211 243 305 286 224 351 283

HUD 79 173 217 370 351 313 349 141 118 131 106 227 197 229 167 167 142 105 107

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: HUD Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 13. 

Caption: During the 1990s, HUD closed significantly more lending complaints than FHAP. Since 2003, 

HUD has closed fewer and fewer lending complaints and by 2008, it closed 107 complaints. During this 

same period, FHAP has continuously closed a larger number of complaints than HUD. In 2008, FHAP 

closed 283 lending complaints. 

Fair Lending Unit, Office of Systemic Investigations 

In June 2007, HUD created the Fair Lending Unit, Office of Systemic Investigations in response to the 

high number of lending discrimination cases across the country. This office “investigates allegations of 

 

188 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fair Housing Assistance Program, 

<http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/partners/FHAP/index.cfm> (last accessed Apr. 1, 2009). 
144 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

discrimination in mortgage lending transactions.”189 In addition to investigating complaints of lending 

discrimination filed with HUD, this office also initiates its own investigations of potential violations of 

FHA.190 This latter type of investigation, also known as Secretary-initiated investigations, has resulted 

in investigations against seven mortgage brokers or lenders, in which HUD used “information from a 

variety of sources, including Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, to identify an investigation target.”191

2. The Department of Justice 

As part of DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section enforces FHA, 

ECOA, and other statutes involving discrimination in public accommodations, land use, public facilities, 

and service members’ rights.192 Of particular interest to this report is the Section’s enforcement of FHA 

and ECOA, which covers forms of mortgage discrimination. DOJ reports that the bulk of its fair lending 

work has centered on three types of alleged discrimination: redlining, underwriting, and pricing, 

although DOJ also investigates predatory lending targeted at a protected class and discriminatory loan 

servicing.193

Compliance/Investigations/Litigation 

FHA 

In some instances, DOJ directly initiates litigation under FHA.194 Through such lawsuits, DOJ can 

obtain monetary damages (actual and punitive) for individuals harmed by a defendant’s discriminatory 

actions. Defendants may also be required to pay civil penalties to the government.195 DOJ also may 

intervene in civil actions brought by individual plaintiffs when the Attorney General certifies that the 

case is of “general public importance.”196 Finally, DOJ initiates litigation on behalf of an individual 

complainant when the case is referred to the Housing and Civil Enforcement Section by HUD under 42 

U.S.C. § 3612. This last enforcement mechanism is described in the “Complaints Processing” section, 

below. 

 

189 Fair Housing/Office of Systemic Investigations Report for US Civil Rights Commission Request – February 2009, HUD 

Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 13. 

190 Id.

191 Id.

192 DOJ, Civil Rights Division Programs and Activities, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, 

<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.php#hce> (last accessed May 5, 2009). 

193 Id.

194 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2006). The Attorney General may commence a civil action in U.S. district court whenever she has 

reason to believe “that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of 

any of the rights granted by [FHA] and such denial raises an issue of general public importance.” 

195 Id. § 3614(d)(1)(C); DOJ, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section. 

196 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e) (2006). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 145 

ECOA 

DOJ may commence a civil action under ECOA whenever the Attorney General “has reason to believe 

that one or more creditors are engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of [ECOA].”197 DOJ may also 

commence an ECOA action upon a referral from a bank regulatory agency.198

Processing of Complaints and Referrals 

In the area of mortgage/lending practices, DOJ may receive referrals from HUD under FHA and from 

the FTC and the federal bank regulating agencies (OTS, OCC, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and 

NCUA) under ECOA. 

FHA 

As described previously, HUD investigates individual cases of housing discrimination under FHA. If 

HUD finds reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred in a specific 

case, it refers the case to DOJ, at which point DOJ may initiate a civil action in any appropriate U.S. 

district court.199 In the past 10 years, DOJ has received from HUD and filed in federal court between 12 

and 31 “election” cases per year, but since 1999, none has involved fair lending issues. These cases are 

either handled directly by the Housing & Civil Enforcement Section of the Civil Rights Division or are 

handled by the appropriate United States Attorney’s office working in coordination with the Civil Rights 

division. In addition, HUD refers subpoena enforcement matters and matters involving breach of 

conciliation agreements for enforcement by DOJ. Between 1999 and 2007, DOJ has handled six fair 

lending issues referred by HUD. 

ECOA 

Pursuant to ECOA, the federal bank regulators process individual complaints of discrimination. As with 

FHA, the agencies refer cases to DOJ when they find reasonable cause to believe that a pattern or 

practice of discrimination exists.200

At the behest of the Government Accountability Office, in 1996 DOJ provided guidance to the federal 

bank regulatory agencies on the characteristics of what constitutes a referable pattern or practice of 

discrimination. One purpose was to describe the distinction between those cases DOJ would pursue and 

those it would likely return to the referring agency.201 As stated in DOJ’s annual ECOA reports to 

Congress, as part of this guidance DOJ indicated that it would likely return cases in which 

 

197 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (2006). 

198 Id. § 1691e(g). 

199 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(e), 3614(a) (2006). 

200 Note that DOJ receives fair lending referrals on issues other than home mortgages, including credit card programs, loans 

to purchase automobiles, and loans for home improvement. Also note that violations of fair lending may also occur based on 

receipt of public assistance income or the applicant’s good faith exercise of his or her rights under the Consumer Protection 

Act. 41 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006). 

201 DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2002 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 1996 (September 

2003), <http:www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa2002.php> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009) (hereinafter cited as DOJ, 

2002 Annual Report). 
146 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

(1) the practice has ceased and there is little chance that it will be repeated; and (2) the 

violation may have been accidental or arose from ignorance of the law’s more technical 

requirements, such as spousal signature violations and minor price breaks for certain age 

groups not entitled to preferential treatment.202 

These are the most common, but not the only circumstances under which DOJ would likely return a case 

to a bank regulatory agency. 

When DOJ deems a referral appropriate for federal court litigation, it may bring a civil action for relief 

including actual and punitive damages and injunctive relief.203 DOJ’s annual ECOA reports to Congress 

describe for each year the referrals received and whether they were returned or retained for possible 

litigation. 

As reflected in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, ECOA referrals have increased during the period of the housing 

boom. Figure 4.4 reflects the number of referrals made by each of the seven federal regulatory agencies. 

As said figure indicates, the great majority of such referrals have been made by the FDIC. Figure 4.5 

reflects disposition of referrals to DOJ. 

Figure 4.4 

ECOA Referrals DOJ Received from Each of Seven Federal Regulatory Agencies, 1999–2007 

1 0

5

33

29

42

35

29

15

1

6

0

5

9

2 2 2 3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Calendar year

Number of referrals

FDIC referrals FRB referrals OCC referrals

OTS referrals FTC referrals HUD referrals

NCUA referrals

Number of referrals

Calendar year

Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division’s annual ECOA 

reports to Congress (1999 to 2007). 

Caption: Of the ECOA referrals that DOJ received from other federal regulatory agencies, the greatest 

number came from FDIC, starting with 1 in 1999, then 5 in 2001, jumping to 33 in 2002, then hovering 

 

202 Id.

203 41 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (2006). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 147 

around 30 to 40 for the period from 2002 to 2006 and dropping to 15 in 2007. All other agencies had fewer 

than five referrals except for FRB in 2002 with 6, 2006 with 5, and 2007 with 9. 

Figure 4.5 

Dispositions of the Year’s ECOA Referrals from Regulatory Agencies at Year’s End, 1999–2007 

4

8

36

27

45

33

20

16

1 2 1

6

2 2

2 5

14

11

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Calendar year

Number of referrals

Returned to agency for administrative resolution

Under continuing investigation

Involved in pre-suit negotiations 

Filed case with consent decree

Number of referrals

Calendar year

Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights using U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division’s annual ECOA 

reports to Congress (1999 to 2007). 

Caption: DOJ returned the vast majority of ECOA referrals from regulatory agencies to the referring 

agency for administrative resolution. In most years before 2006, DOJ retained only 1 or 2 referrals for 

continuing resolution, although it kept 5 or 6 in 2002 and 2005. In 2006 and 2007, DOJ retained 14 and 11 

ECOA referrals for continuing investigations. 

Of the 246 referrals reflected in the Housing Section’s annual ECOA reports to Congress, between 1999 

and 2007, only 17 were home mortgage matters involving claims of racial or national origin 

discrimination, less than 7 percent of the total.204 These relevant referrals included: 

• A 2002 HUD referral of an allegation that a Washington, D.C. area lender steered AfricanAmerican and Hispanic borrowers to FHA-insured loan products and discriminated in the terms 

and conditions of the loans. The complaint’s evidence was based primarily on testing conducted 

nearly five years before the time of referral. DOJ concluded that the evidence was insufficient to 

warrant an enforcement action and returned the matter to HUD.205 

 

204 Of these 17 referred cases, the ECOA reports indicate that three were returned to the agencies for administrative 

enforcement during the reporting year. 

205 DOJ, 2002 Annual Report. 
148 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

• Seven allegations that lenders discriminated in the pricing of mortgages: two FDIC referrals in 

2006 and one in 2007; two OTS referrals in 2007; and two FRB referrals in 2007. The first five 

of these were on the basis of race; the last two were on race and/or national origin.206

• A 2006 FRB referral concerned redlining. The complaint alleged that a mortgage company 

excluded certain neighborhoods from the bank’s mortgage lending activities on the basis of 

race.207

In addition to processing referrals, conducting investigations, and initiating litigation, DOJ’s Housing 

Section coordinates activities with other federal agencies to bring about better fair lending 

enforcement.208 For example, it works with the Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending, a group 

currently chaired by the OCC.209 

The task force agencies have jointly published and distributed consumer brochures on shopping for the 

best mortgage price210 and the pitfalls of borrowing against your home, the potential of high-cost home 

 

206 DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2006 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 1976 (March 2007), 

<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/fairhousing/reports_congress.htm> (last accessed Apr. 3, 2009) (hereinafter cited as DOJ, 

2006 Annual Report); DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2007 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 

1976 (April 2008), <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/fairhousing/reports_congress.htm> (last accessed Apr. 3, 2009) 

(hereinafter cited as DOJ, 2007 Annual Report). 

207 Also included amongst the 17 referred complaints: 1) a 2000 FTC referral concerning allegations of a lender charging 

African Americans higher points and fees in connection with home mortgages; 2) a 2000 HUD referral alleging that a 

subprime lender engaged in a pattern or practice or disparate treatment of African American borrowers in the pricing of 

loans; 3) a 2002 HUD referral alleging that Hispanics are charged higher interest rates for loans to purchase mobile homes; 4) 

two HUD referrals from 2004 and 2005 alleging that a lender discriminated against African Americans by targeting them for 

"predatory loans" with high fees and interest rates; 5) a 2007 FRB referral of an allegation that a bank had implemented two 

criteria as part of its underwriting policies that appeared to be discriminatory on the basis of race or national origin. (After 

reviewing the evidence, DOJ returned the matter for administrative resolution because “the bank revised its lending policy 

and expressed willingness to take appropriate corrective action for any persons who were aggrieved by the discriminatory 

policy.”). DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2000 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 1976 (April 

2001), <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa2000.php> (last accessed Feb. 18, 2009) (hereinafter cited as DOJ, 

2000 Annual Report); DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2001 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 

1976 (March 2002), <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa2001.php> (last accessed Feb. 18, 2009) (hereinafter 

cited as DOJ, 2001 Annual Report); DOJ, 2002 Annual Report; DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2003 Annual Report to 

Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 1976 (June 2004), 

<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa2003.php> (last accessed Feb. 18, 2009) (hereinafter cited as DOJ, 2003 

Annual Report); DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2004 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 1976 

(March 2005), <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa2004.php> (last accessed Feb. 18, 2009) (hereinafter cited 

as DOJ, 2004 Annual Report); DOJ, The Attorney General’s 2005 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA 

Amendments of 1976 (March 2006), <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa2005.php> (last accessed Feb. 18, 

2009) (hereinafter cited as DOJ, 2005 Annual Report); DOJ, 2006 Annual Report; DOJ, 2007 Annual Report. 

208 DOJ, The Attorney General’s 1999 Annual Report to Congress Pursuant to the ECOA Amendments of 1976 (March 2000), 

<http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa1999.php> (last accessed Feb. 18, 2009) (hereinafter cited as DOJ, 1999 

Annual Report); DOJ, 2006 Annual Report; DOJ, 2007 Annual Report. 

209 DOJ, 1999 Annual Report; DOJ, 2000 Annual Report; DOJ, 2001 Annual Report; DOJ, 2002 Annual Report; DOJ, 2003 

Annual Report; DOJ, 2004 Annual Report; DOJ, 2005 Annual Report; DOJ, 2006 Annual Report; DOJ, 2007 Annual Report. 

210 DOJ, 1999 Annual Report (citing Federal Reserve Board, Looking for the Best Mortgage: Shop, Compare, Negotiate, 

<http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/mortgage/mortb_1.htm> (last accessed August 3, 2009).
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 149 

loans, and tips for getting the best financing.211 These brochures are available in English and Spanish. 

From 1999 to 2001, the task force discussed predatory lending issues with the goal of developing a 

policy statement on the currently available enforcement options that agencies can take under existing 

law.212 

3. The Federal Trade Commission 

The FTC divides its work among three bureaus: (1) the Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) protects 

consumers from unfair or deceptive practices in the marketplace by enforcing consumer protection laws 

and trade regulation rules; (2) the Bureau of Competition prevents anticompetitive business practices by 

overseeing mergers and enforcing antitrust laws; and (3) the Bureau of Economics evaluates and 

analyzes the activities of the FTC and their effect in the marketplace. The mortgage lending and related 

issues at issue in this report fall to the BCP.213

Among the laws the agency enforces are TILA, the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act, the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act, HOEPA, and the Fair and Accurate Credit 

Transactions Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.214 

Unlike other financial regulatory agencies, the FTC does not conduct compliance examinations, 

focusing instead on law enforcement activities.215 It also does not resolve individual consumer 

complaints, although it does collect such information to determine patterns of wrongdoing, which can 

lead to investigations and prosecutions.216

The FTC performs statistical analysis of the data financial companies reported pursuant to HMDA to 

investigate claims of discrimination.217 It uses the HMDA data as a screening or targeting tool.218

HMDA data include pricing and loan application data, but lack key information lenders used to evaluate 

the risk of a loan, such as borrower credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, loan type, 

and length of loan. For this reason, HMDA data alone are insufficient to establish a law violation.

.219

 

211 DOJ, 2003 Annual Report. The brochure is Putting Your Home on the Loan Line is Risky Business. 

212 DOJ, 1999 Annual Report; DOJ, 2000 Annual Report; DOJ, 2001 Annual Report. 

213 Federal Trade Commission, A Guide to the Federal Trade Commission, available at, 

<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen03.shtm> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

214 Federal Trade Commission, Legal Resources—Statutes Relating to Consumer Protection Mission,

<http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm> (last accessed March 31, 2009). 

215 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data and FTC Lending 

Enforcement before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (July 25, 

2007), p. 2 (hereinafter cited as FTC Statement, Lending Enforcement). 

216 Federal Trade Commission, Before You Submit a Complaint, <http://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov> (last accessed Dec. 

9, 2008). 

217 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 8. 

218 FTC Statement, Lending Enforcement at p. 7. 

219 Id. at pp. 7–8. 
150 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

According to the FTC, several non-public investigations of mortgage originators for possible violations 

of fair lending laws were in progress as of April 2008.220

Enforcement Efforts 

Since the enactment of ECOA, the FTC has initiated more than three dozen cases against subprime 

lenders, major non-mortgage creditors, and smaller finance companies under the statute.221 In about two 

dozen of these cases it alleged substantive discrimination on the basis of race, marital status,sex, age,

and the receipt of public assistance.222 Examples include: 

• In May 2009, the FTC sued Golden Empire Mortgage, Inc. and its owner, Howard D. Kootstra. 

The FTC alleges that the defendants violated ECOA by charging Hispanic borrowers higher loan 

prices than non-Hispanic whites. The FTC has alleged that the price disparities were substantial, 

statistically significant, and could not be explained by factors related to underwriting risk or 

credit characteristics of the mortgage applicants.223

• In December 2008, the FTC settled with Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Services, L.P., 

and its general partner, Gateway Funding Inc. (“Gateway”). The Commission alleged that 

Gateway violated ECOA because African-American and Hispanic consumers were charged 

higher prices for mortgage loans than non-Hispanic white consumers.224 

• In 2000 the FTC joined with DOJ and HUD to secure a settlement with Delta Funding Corp., a 

national subprime mortgage lender, to resolve alleged violations of ECOA, HOEPA, and 

RESPA.225 

• The FTC filed a complaint against a large subprime mortgage lender, Associates First Capital 

Corporation and Associates Corporation of North America (the Associates),226 alleging that it 

used false and misleading statements to market subprime loans. In particular, the FTC alleged 

that the Associates informed consumers that they could save money when consolidating their 

 

220 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at pp. 8–9. 

221 Id. at p. 8. 

222 Id. 

223 E-mail from Katherine Worthman, Division of Financial Practices, Federal Trade Commission, to U.S. Commission on 

Civil Rights (July 8, 2009, 6:17 p.m. EDT) (on file with the Commission). 

224 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Credit and Debt: The Role of the Federal Trade 

Commission in Protecting the Public before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, 

Trade, and Consumer Protection (March 24, 2009), p. 12. 

225 FTC Statement, Lending Enforcement at pp. 10–11 (citing United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 00-1871 (E.D.N.Y. 

2000)). According to the FTC, the complaint alleged that Delta had engaged in a pattern or practice of asset-based lending 

and other practices in violation of HOEPA; that higher broker fees were charged to African-American females than to White 

males in violation of the ECOA and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, and that few or no services were 

performed in exchange for certain broker charges in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 

2607. 

226 FTC Statement, Consumer Protections at p. 5 (citing FTC v. Associates First Capital Corp., No. 01-00606 (N.D. Ga. 

2001)). 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 151 

existing debts. However, the FTC said these “saving claims” did not take into account loan fees 

and closing costs that the Associates typically added to consumers’ loan amounts.227 The FTC 

further alleged that the Associates failed to reveal that, for certain of its loans, consumers would 

pay only interest but still would owe the entire principal amount in a “balloon” payment at the 

end of the loan term. The FTC also alleged the Associates’ practice of not disclosing to 

consumers inclusion of single-premium credit insurance in loans was deceptive. The Associates 

paid a record $215 million in consumer redress to settle the allegations according to the 

agency.228 

4. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 

The Federal Reserve System is the central banking system of the United States, created in 1913 through 

the Federal Reserve Act.229 The system comprises of twelve regional federal reserve districts and the 

Board.230 Among the variety of duties the Federal Reserve performs, its role in HMDA data collection 

and fair lending examinations is particularly noteworthy here. 

Assisting and Advising Other Federal Agencies in Their Enforcement Activities 

The Federal Reserve regards HMDA data as a useful tool that can be used by federal and state agencies 

to facilitate fair lending enforcement. The Federal Reserve has a special role in maintaining and 

expanding these data, making them available for other federal agencies’ analyses, and offering advice on 

their proper use.231 In explaining the system’s usefulness before the 2004 expansion in information, the 

Federal Reserve staff state: 

For some time, the Federal Reserve has been using a statistical analysis system that relies 

on the HMDA data to help assess fair lending compliance by high-volume mortgage 

lenders. The system identifies which supervised institutions and which loan products and 

geographic markets show meaningful differences in the denial rates of loan applications 

by the race, ethnicity, or sex of the borrower and thus warrant greater supervisory 

attention. 232

The 2004 revisions in the collection of HMDA data allowed more precise differentiation among loan 

products and provided new loan pricing information that agencies could review for differences across 

groups in the incidence of higher-priced lending and for broader patterns indicating fair lending 

issues.233 

 

227 Id. at pp. 5–6. 

228 Id. at p. 5 (citing FTC v. Associates First Capital Corp., No. 01-00606 (N.D. Ga. 2001)). 

229 Federal Reserve Board, FAQs: Federal Reserve System, <http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqfrs.htm> (last 

accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

230 Id.

231 Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook, Federal Reserve Board, New Information Reported under HMDA 

and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, FED. RES. BULL., Summer 2005, at p. 387.

232 Id.

233 Id.
152 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The Federal Reserve staff has also warned of the limitations of HMDA data: 

We emphasize that the Federal Reserve’s statistical analysis system is only a screening 

tool. The HMDA data alone, no matter how much they are manipulated, cannot be used 

to conclude whether a particular applicant was treated adversely on the basis of a 

prohibited factor regarding either the disposition of the application or the pricing of the 

loan. The data reveal little about an individual’s financial circumstances and nothing 

about the condition or value of the property offered as collateral. Furthermore, the data 

reveal nothing about the underwriting standards used by a lender to assess the 

creditworthiness of an individual or to set loan prices. Moreover, the data do not reveal 

how a lender’s credit decisions relate to its overall business strategy. For example, the 

data do not account for the possibility that an institution’s outreach efforts may attract a 

larger proportion of applicants with weaker credit profiles than do other institutions. 

Consequently, the data do not provide a final basis on which to draw conclusions 

regarding either the existence or the absence of fair lending violations.

234

In the Federal Reserve’s own bank supervisory process, the agency uses statistical analysis 

to identify financial institutions and their specific products that warrant closer review for 

fair lending concerns. Examiners familiar with the procedures and products of a given 

institution conduct the analysis and tailor it to the specific circumstances relevant to the 

institution....

235

If the Federal Reserve targets an institution for more intensive review, the examiner may solicit 

more information from the institution regarding its lending and underwriting procedures; gather 

additional loan-level data, such as credit scores and loan-to-value ratios; perform detailed 

reviews of loan-file data; and/or conduct interviews with current or past bank personnel or 

borrowers. These follow-up procedures may be integrated into the normal consumer examination 

cycle or become a special review of fair lending compliance.236

In 2005, the Federal Reserve reported sharing its screening procedures with other agencies so 

that, if they chose, they could integrate them into their supervisory programs. For example, the 

Federal Reserve reviewed 2004 HMDA data by other agencies for this purpose. It also responded 

to agency requests for additional, more detailed analysis of individual institutions that were of 

concern to the other federal entities.237

Finally, for agencies that evaluate compliance with HOEPA, the HMDA data that were expanded 

in 2004 offered the first opportunity to identify readily which lenders extend home loans that are 

subject to that law and to measure the extent of these institutions’ involvement in such lending. 

HOEPA examiners can use the expanded data to efficiently select samples of loan files for 

 

234 Id. at pp. 389–90.

235 Id. at p. 390.

236 Id.

237 Id. at pp. 390–91.
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 153 

review and examine patterns of HOEPA-related lending across borrowers and neighborhoods, 

arrayed by their racial and ethnic profiles. The Federal Reserve may screen for potentially 

unaffordable HOEPA loans given an applicant’s income and estimated monthly loan payments, 

or calculate differences across racial and ethnic groups in the incidence of HOEPA lending. 

Thus, HMDA analysis may reveal fair lending issues.238 

Fair Lending Examinations 

The Federal Reserve conducts examinations using the Interagency Fair Lending Examination 

Procedures. Examiners review information related to the institution, its credit products, and the markets 

it serves; assess fair lending risk across business lines; evaluate the bank’s fair lending compliance 

program, and determine whether violations have occurred.239

The agency performs fair lending reviews both within the context of its normal supervisory cycle for 

consumer compliance examination and when concerns about fair lending arise outside the usual cycle 

(such as from consumer complaints or based on the HMDA screening process described below).240

When the Federal Reserve examiners find fair lending violations, the agency refers matters that suggest 

a pattern or practice of discrimination under ECOA to DOJ, and, for more isolated instances, direct the 

institution to correct the violations and improve its fair lending compliance, as appropriate.241

The Federal Reserve referred eight matters to DOJ in 2007 and three in 2008.242 Many of these involved 

gender or marital status discrimination. Three of the 2007 matters concerned racial discrimination in 

obtaining home mortgages. Two of them involved mortgage pricing discrimination by race and 

ethnicity, where Hispanics and African-Americans paid higher mortgage prices across several 

metropolitan areas. A third case arose from restrictions on row house lending that discriminated by race 

and constraints on lending on Native American lands.243

Over time, the Federal Reserve has relied upon the statistical analysis of electronic data (i.e., HMDA 

data enhanced with other relevant fields) to increase the efficacy and efficiency of its fair lending 

reviews, including examinations of small lenders. It has conducted more reviews of lending policies for 

disparate impact, maintained a focus on loan pricing, and broadened its definition of steering. As some 

lenders have implemented declining market restrictions, the agency has emphasized the importance of 

analyzing these restrictions for fair lending risk. Also, it is concerned about the relationship between 

 

238 Id. at p. 392.

239 Federal Reserve Board, Fair Lending Enforcement Process, Briefing by Federal Reserve Board Staff for the U. S. 

Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 28, 2009, p. 3. 

240 Id. at p. 4. 

241 Id. at p. 5. 

242 Federal Reserve Board, Fair Lending Enforcement Process, Briefing by Federal Reserve Board Staff for the United States 

Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 28, 2009, pp. 7, 8. 

243 One 2007 matter concerned racial discrimination in auto loan pricing. See Federal Reserve Board, Fair Lending 

Enforcement Process, Briefing by Federal Reserve Board Staff for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 28, 2009, pp. 4, 

6–7, 14. 
154 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

tightening underwriting standards and access to credit, as well as the interplay between fair lending and 

responsible lending.244

5. The National Credit Union Administration 

The Federal Credit Union Act, enacted in 1934, authorized the formation of federally-chartered credit 

unions in all states and established the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions. The Bureau became an 

independent financial federal regulatory agency in 1970 with the creation of the NCUA to charter and 

supervise federal credit unions.245 The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) was 

established at the same time to insure federal and state-chartered credit union deposits. In 1977, 

legislative action expanded services available to credit union members, including issuance of share 

certificates and origination of mortgage loans.246 Currently, approximately 7,735 federally-insured credit 

unions serve 89.2 million members with $724 billion on deposit.247

NCUA enforces many consumer protection and financial protection laws and regulations,248 including 

the key laws designed to prevent discrimination, namely FHA and ECOA. 249 All credit unions report 

their members’ loan data in accordance with HMDA to the Federal Reserve.250 

Compliance Examinations 

As discussed previously, Regulation B defines and details the enforcement powers under ECOA as well 

as its examination and supervision process. 251 While the process is independent of the Federal Financial 

Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), the agency relies on guidance collaboratively developed with 

other Council members.252 According to NCUA, two objectives drive the examination and supervision 

process: (1) determining whether federal credit unions discriminate on any of the bases prohibited by 

 

244 Id. at pp. 15–18. 

245 Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1751 et seq. (2006). 

246 National Credit Union Administration, About NCUA and NCUA History, <http://www.ncua.govAboutNCUA/Index.htm> 

(last accessed Nov. 17, 2008). 

247 E-mail from Ross P. Kendall, Trial Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, National Credit Union Administration, to 

David P. Blackwood, General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (July 7, 2009, 3:45p.m. EDT) (on file with the 

Commission). 

248 National Credit Union Administration, Regulations, Legal Opinions and Law

<http://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/index.htm> (last accessed Nov. 18, 2008); National Credit Union 

Administration, Laws and Enforcement Authorities for Credit Unions, 

<http://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinions/Laws/LawEnforcementAuthorities.pdf> (last accessed Nov. 18, 2008). 

249 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 6 at p. 6. 

250 E-mail from Ross P. Kendall, Trial Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, National Credit Union Administration, to 

David P. Blackwood, General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (July 7, 2009, 3:45p.m. EDT) (on file with the 

Commission). 

251 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 6 at p. 5. 

252 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 17 at p. 15. The most recent guidance, 

Interagency Fair Lending Guidelines, and related Appendix are available at the FFIEC Web site, 

<http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/fairlend.pdf> and <http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/fairappx.pdf>, respectively. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 155 

ECOA in the granting of credit; and (2) determining whether federal credit unions have adequate 

procedures in place for complying with the requirements of ECOA.253

NCUA identifies seven risk areas: credit, interest rate, liquidity, transaction, compliance, strategic, and 

reputation.254 Under a risk-focused examination program, examiners assign to each risk a rating of high, 

medium, or low. Examiners then develop the scope for each examination or supervision contact based 

upon a credit union’s individual risk factors. 

NCUA also conducts fair lending examinations to assess Regulation B compliance in greater detail. The 

agency determines the number of credit unions it will examine each year depending on the availability 

of resources. Regional directors then select a pool of credit unions based on a variety of considerations, 

including adverse HMDA data over a multi-year period and previous fair-lending examination 

findings.255

With respect to federally insured state-chartered credit unions, NCUA’s focus is addressing safety and 

soundness concerns that might present a risk to the NCUSIF. NCUA generally defers to state regulators 

with regard to consumer violations, but will become actively involved with fair lending issues at a 

federally insured state-chartered credit union if such issues expose the NCUSIF to risk. NCUA also 

refers matters to DOJ and HUD as appropriate.256

Complaints Processing 

In 2005, NCUA contemplated referral action in a case of apparent disparate treatment of Hispanic and 

non-Hispanic applicants by a state-chartered credit union. NCUA ultimately decided against referring 

the case to DOJ after the management of the state-chartered credit union corrected concerns about 

disparate treatment and responded to the agency’s supervisory process by strengthening lending 

controls.257 With the exception of the above-mentioned episode, from FY 1990 to the present, it has 

resolved fair-lending violation issues through routine examination and supervisory process.258 

 

253 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 16 at p. 14. 

254 NCUA stated that it identified these seven risks in NCUA Letter to Federal Credit Unions 02-FCU-09. Id. at p. 14 n.4. 

255 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 16 at p. 14. 

256 Id. at p. 15. 

257 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 7 at p. 6. 

258 Id.
156 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

NCUA provides consumers with the information necessary to submit complaints via e-mail, telephone, 

and letter.259 Consumers whose complaint involves a state-chartered credit union are referred by NCUA 

personnel to the appropriate state regulatory authority for appropriate action.260 Federal credit unions 

have supervisory committees responsible for investigating member complaints.261 

According to the agency, on notification of a complaint, supervisory committees will conduct an 

investigation, determine the appropriate course of action, and report back to NCUA. The agency will 

review all complaints and follow up when necessary. All violations are recorded internally and reported 

to the Federal Reserve Board annually.262 

NCUA’s review of responses to complainants indicated that the supervisory committees are meeting 

their mandates. Should the agency determine otherwise, it will intervene by assigning an examiner to 

investigate and remedy the situation. If this proves to be unsuccessful, NCUA may issue letters of 

understanding and agreement, cease and desist orders, and/or assess civil money penalties.263 

If not satisfied with NCUA’s solution, a complainant may contact the NCUA Ombudsman, who is 

independent of the operational programs of the agency. The Ombudsman assists by identifying options 

and recommending actions, but may not decide issues or advocate positions of any party.264 

According to NCUA, the overwhelming majority of member complaints result from a misunderstanding 

of federal credit union policies or poor communication between the complainant and the federal credit 

union. As a result, almost all complaints are resolved informally. NCUA member complaints have not 

led to enforcement actions related to minority homeownership, predatory lending, and/or home 

mortgage lending. NCUA relies on data on complaints and actions taken to identify federal credit unions 

at potential risk of lawsuits.265 It does not collect data about lawsuits filed against federal credit unions 

nor does it maintain a centralized complaint database.266 

 

259 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 4 at p. 2. 

260 E-mail from Ross P. Kendall, Trial Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, National Credit Union Administration, to 

David P. Blackwood, General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (July 7, 2009, 3:45p.m. EDT) (on file with the 

Commission). 

261 National Credit Union Administration, Supervisory Committee Guide for Federal Credit Unions, NCUA Publication No. 

8023, Section 4.12, <www.NCUA.gov> (last accessed July 21, 2009). 

262 NCUA Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 4 at p. 2. 

263 Id. at p. 4. 

264 Id.

265 Id.

266 Id.
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 157 

6. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

The FDIC was established in 1933 as an independent agency in response to bank failures during the 

Great Depression.267 While a significant component of its mission is to provide insurance to depositors 

in banks and thrift institutions, the FDIC supervises state chartered banks that are not members of the 

Federal Reserve System. The FDIC directly examines and supervises approximately 5,160 banks and 

savings banks, more than half of the total number of institutions in the banking system.268 ECOA 

compliance is among the various laws it enforces269 

Compliance Examinations 

As the primary regulator of state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC 

conducts compliance examinations, visitations and investigations to ensure that state-chartered 

nonmember institutions adhere to federal consumer protection laws, fair lending statutes and regulations, 

HMDA and CRA. The FDIC performs compliance examinations to assess the quality of an FDICsupervised institution’s compliance management system, reviews compliance with relevant laws and 

regulations, and initiates administrative enforcement action when elements of an institution’s 

compliance management system are deficient or when major violations of law are discovered.270

Visitations are used to review the compliance soundness of newly-chartered institutions and institutions 

converting to state non-member status.271 The FDIC also uses visitations to assess progress on corrective 

actions or to ensure compliance with an enforcement action during the interval between compliance 

examinations.272 The FDIC conducts investigations to follow up on consumer inquiries or complaints, 

including those regarding fair lending. 

While most violations are corrected by the institution as part of the examination process, the more 

serious issues, including discrimination, normally result in formal or informal enforcement actions.273

The FDIC defines its informal actions as voluntary commitments made by the Board of Directors or 

trustees of a financial institution, that are designed to resolve identified deficiencies and ensure 

compliance with federal and state banking laws and regulations.274 Informal actions are not publicly 

disclosed.275 Formal enforcement actions are made pursuant to Section 8 of the Federal Deposit 

 

267 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Who is the FDIC?, <http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html> (last 

accessed Apr. 22, 2009). 

268 Id.

269 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Response to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Interrogatories and Document 

Requests, Response to Interrogatory Request 4 at pp. 3–4. 

270 FDIC Response to Interrogatories, Response to Interrogatory Request 10 at p. 10. A detailed description of the 

examination process can be found at <http://www.fdic.gov/regulatins/compliance/handbook/compmanual.pdf>. 

271 FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 9 at p. 9. 

272 Id. at pp. 9–10. 

273 FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 5 at p. 6. 

274 Id.

275 Id.
158 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Insurance Act.276 In addition, if the FDIC has reason to believe that a pattern or practice of fair lending 

violations has occurred, the FDIC must make a referral to DOJ for enforcement. 

Complaint Processing 

The consumer complaint process at the FDIC is handled by the Consumer Response Center (CRC) 

headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, and the Consumer Affairs Section located in Washington, D.C. 

CRC staff are responsible for investigating all consumer complaints and responding to consumer 

inquiries. Staff are located in almost all regional and area offices. When a consumer complaint is 

received, it is logged into the FDIC’s consumer complaint and inquiry database, which captures data 

about each complaint and inquiry the FDIC receives, as well as supporting documents for a given 

case.277 According to the FDIC, it codes complaints based on the consumer’s allegation, and not on 

whether the complaint is ultimately found to have merit.278 The FDIC indicates that it does not capture 

information about the specific race or ethnicity of the consumer.279 

The FDIC indicates that its record retention policy for consumer complaints is five years. As reflected in 

Figure 4.6 between 2003 and March 2008, the FDIC received 254 complaints alleging discrimination 

based on race, color and national origin. Of the 254 complaints received, only 45 complaints, or 17.7 

percent, alleged discrimination in the area of home mortgage lending. As reflected in Figure 4.6, in 

2003, there were 11 consumer complaints alleging discrimination in mortgage lending based on race, 

color and national origin. For 2003, none of these allegations was based on national origin. The number 

of complaints filed alleging mortgage lending discrimination decreased to 6 in 2004, and in 2007 that 

number had increased to 8 complaints. As of 2008, 8 complaints alleging mortgage lending 

discrimination had already been filed, with 1 complaint based on national origin and the remaining 7 

based on race and/or color. 

According to data the FDIC provided, less than one percent of the total number of complaints it received 

between 2003 and 2008 alleged mortgage discrimination.280 

 

276 Id.

277 FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Requests 11–12 at pp. 10–12. 

278 FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 11 at p. 10. 

279 Id.

280 Id. at p. 11. Between 2003 and March 1, 2008, FDIC received 23,519 complaints alleging discrimination in all products/all 

issues. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 159 

Figure 4.6 

Consumer Complaints to FDIC, 2003–2008 

8

45

11

6 6 6 8

52

27 21

48

61

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

Consumer Complaints

Mortgage Loans All Lending Products

Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Response to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Interrogatories and Document 

Requests, Response to Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 11. 

Caption: Between 2003 and 2008, FDIC received 254 complaints alleging discrimination in the area of 

home mortgage loans. More than half of these complaints were filed in 2007 and 2008. During the same 

period, FDIC received 45 complaints alleging discrimination in all lending products. After declining from 

11 to 6 between 2003 and 2004, the number of complaints alleging discrimination in the area of all lending 

products remained somewhat flat. 

In describing its complaint process, the FDIC indicated that, after a complaint is received, it is sent to 

the bank involved for a response.281 In its response, the financial institution must address at a minimum: 

(1) the transaction in question; (2) a description of the financial institution’s interaction with the 

complainant; (3) actions taken by the bank to address their lending policies; and (4) a response to all 

allegations.282 The FDIC will decide the course of action it must take based on information the financial 

institution provides. 

If an onsite investigation is needed, the examiner conducting the investigation must prepare a preinvestigation planning memo.283 During an onsite investigation, interviews are scheduled with the 

complainant and the financial institution; bank records are reviewed; comparative file analyses are 

 

281 FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 12. 

282 Id. 

283 Id.. 
160 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

conducted; copies of pertinent documents are obtained; and a complaint investigation report is 

prepared.284 

After completion of the onsite investigation, if it is determined that discrimination occurred, the FDIC 

sends a “15-day letter” informing the banking institution of preliminary findings and giving the 

institution an opportunity to respond within 15 days.285 

If the FDIC has reason to believe that a bank has engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory 

conduct, it is statutorily mandated under ECOA to refer the violation to DOJ.286 

The FDIC indicates that it has referred one complaint relevant to home mortgage lending to DOJ. The 

complaint alleged discrimination based on race and disability (handicap) because the institution denied a 

commercial loan application collateralized by the borrower’s residence.287 The FDIC conducted an 

onsite investigation, but did not find discrimination based on handicap. However, the FDIC cited the 

institution for an ECOA violation of discrimination based on race, and found the institution in violation 

of FHA based on race and familial status.288 In 2005, the complaint was closed and subsequently 

referred to DOJ for review, and the banking institution and complainant settled.289

7. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 

OCC, an independent bureau within the United States Department of the Treasury, was created in 1863 

under the National Currency Act. OCC now charters, regulates and supervises more than 1,600 national 

banks as well as 50 federal branches of foreign banks.290 

OCC examines the activities of banks by conducting on-site reviews and analyzing whether they are 

operating safely and soundly and in compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations. In 

addition, OCC approves or denies requests by banks to change their structure and takes supervisory 

action against banks that do not comply with applicable laws and regulations.291 In 2008, OCC opened 

36,346 consumer complaints involving national banks and logged 58,686 inquiries.292 Nearly 25 percent 

of complaints opened in 2008 resulted in monetary compensation.293 Historically, credit card issues top 

 

284 Id. at pp. 12–13. 

285 Id. at p. 13. 

286 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (2006). See also FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 5 

at p. 6. 

287 FDIC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 13 at p. 13. 

288 Id. 

289 Id. 

290 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of the National Banks, About the OCC, 

<http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm> (last accessed Apr. 1, 2009). 

291 Id.

292 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Response to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Interrogatories and Document 

Requests, Response to Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 12. 

293 Id.
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 161 

the list of complaints received by the Customer Assistance Group (CAG), with disputes about checking 

accounts ranking second, and complaints relating to mortgages ranking third.294

Compliance Examinations 

OCC’s comprehensive fair lending oversight program is designed to: (1) assess and monitor the level of 

fair lending risk in every national bank; (2) assess compliance with fair lending laws and regulations; (3) 

obtain corrective action when substantial weaknesses or deficiencies are found in a bank’s policies, 

procedures, and controls relating to fair lending; and (4) ensure that enforcement action is taken when 

warranted.295 

To test for and identify potential discriminatory practices, OCC uses a combination of analytical tools, 

lending information, and risk-based targeted fair lending examinations. OCC’s supervisory process 

entails several steps including: (1) risk assessment and screening; (2) on-site examinations and/or 

statistical analysis; and (3) enforcement and referrals.296 Once OCC identifies banks that show signs of 

heightened fair lending risk, those banks are examined to evaluate whether different outcomes in lending 

decisions are the result of unlawful discrimination.297 OCC examiners rely on the Fair Lending 

Examination Procedures handbook, which contains guidance for assessing risks of unlawful behavior 

involving overt discrimination, underwriting and pricing discrimination, steering, and discriminatory 

redlining and marketing.298 

According to OCC, when potentially unlawful discrimination is found, examiners present their findings 

to bank management for an explanation.299 If the bank’s explanation is inadequate to rebut the 

preliminary examination findings, the findings are documented and OCC makes a decision as to what 

supervisory or enforcement action should be taken and on whether a referral to DOJ is required and 

whether a notification must be provided to HUD of a potential FHA violation.300 Under its independent 

enforcement authority, OCC can take a variety of actions against banks and individuals, including cease 

and desist orders, formal agreements, civil monetary penalties, and the removal and prohibition of 

“institution-affiliated parties” from participation in the banking industry.301 OCC was the first federal 

banking agency to use its cease and desist authority to take a public enforcement action against a bank 

under ECOA.302

 

294 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Report of the Ombudsman, 2005–2006, November 2007, p. 22. 

295 Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on 

Domestic Policy, 110th Cong. (Oct. 24, 2007) (Statement of Ann F. Jaedicke, Deputy Comptroller for Compliance Policy, 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), p. 4 (hereinafter cited as Jaedicke Testimony). 

296 Id. at p. 5. 

297 Id. at p. 7. 

298 Id. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fair Lending Examination Procedures, April 2006, pp. 22–29, available at 

<http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/fairlep.pdf> (last accessed Aug. 4, 2009). 

299 Jaedicke Testimony at p. 9. 

300 Id. 

301 Id. at p. 10. 

302 Id. at p. 11. 
162 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

When no violation is found, but there are practices or weaknesses that could expose the bank to 

unacceptable risk that a fair lending violation could occur, the OCC will instruct bank management to 

modify its practices or policies to address that risk.303 According to OCC, its goal is to address fair 

lending risk before it develops into illegal practices requiring referrals and enforcement actions.304 

Complaint Processing 

As required by the Federal Trade Commission Act, CAG provides guidance and assists consumers in 

resolving complaints about national banks and their subsidiaries. Attorneys in the Law Department 

consult closely with CAG in reviewing cases involving allegations of discrimination, predatory lending, 

or unfair or deceptive practices. 

The complaint data CAG collects, summarizes, and makes available to the examiners help them identify 

practices and activities that merit further review or investigation.305 When assessing a bank’s overall 

compliance risk and ratings, examiners are required to consider consumer complaint information. 

Examiners also use complaint data to plan and adjust examinations to better target areas of probable 

concern.306 

As reflected in Figure 4.7, complaints alleging predatory lending increased dramatically between 2001 

and 2004, from 1 complaint to 32 complaints, respectively. Between 2006 and 2007, the number of 

complaints alleging predatory lending more than doubled from 32 complaints in 2006 to 79 complaints 

in 2007. By 2008 the number of complaints alleging predatory lending had spiked to 187, resulting in a 

137 percent increase between 2007 and 2008. 

The number of complaints alleging mortgage lending discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity 

peaked in 1999 at 36. Since 2002, there has been a steady decline in the number of complaints OCC has 

received alleging mortgage lending discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity. Between 2002 and 

2007, these complaints decreased from 20 to 11 or by 82 percent. In 2008 OCC received 14 such 

complaints while for the first month of 2009, OCC received 3 complaints. If OCC receives the same 

number of complaints each month throughout 2009, it is conceivable that the number of complaints will 

again reach 36. 

 

303 Id. at p. 13. 

304 Id. 

305 John C. Dugan, Remarks before the Exchequer Club and Women in Housing and Finance (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 17, 

2007, p. 13. 

306 Id. at p. 16. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 163 

Figure 4.7 

Mortgage Discrimination (Race/National Origin) and Predatory Lending Complaints 

Received by OCC, 1998–2008 

16

36

19

32

14 9

187

21 22 29

20

11 11

79

32

1

29 32 28

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

Number of Complaints

Mortgage Lending Predatory Lending

Source: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Response to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights Interrogatories, Response 

to Interrogatory Request 5 at pp. 7–8. Of the complaints of mortgage lending discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity 

received since 1998, 33 were withdrawn. OCC codes a complaint as “withdrawn” when the complainant affirmatively 

withdraws the complaint, or when the complainant has failed to provide a signed complaint or other requested information 

needed to process the complaint. If the complainant later provides the information, CAG will reopen the case for processing. 

Of the remaining cases, 13 were still pending as of February 2009, and the rest have been closed. Cases are closed once the 

complainant receives the requested resolution, where there is a lack of evidence that the bank’s actions conflict with applicable 

laws, regulations or policies, where the matter is already the subject of private litigation between the complainant and the 

bank, or where the matter involves a factual dispute. 

Caption: In 2003, OCC received 29 complaints alleging mortgage lending discrimination and 29 

complaints alleging predatory lending. Between 2004 and 2007, the number of complaints alleging 

mortgage lending discrimination decreased while the number of complaints alleging predatory lending 

more than doubled. In 2008, OCC received 187 complaints alleging predatory lending and 14 complaints 

alleging mortgage lending discrimination. 
164 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Referrals to DOJ and/or HUD 

In addition to helping consumers resolve complaints about national banks and their subsidiaries, OCC 

also refers matters to DOJ or makes notifications to HUD under the referral and notification provisions 

of ECOA.307 Between 1999 and 2008, OCC referred 9 matters relating to all types of lending to DOJ. 

Between 2003 and 2007 OCC did not make a referral to DOJ, while in 2008 one matter was referred. 

Between 1994 and 2008 a total of four referrals involving allegations of mortgage discrimination 

resulted in public consent decrees or settlement agreements. 308 

Referrals to HUD 

Under the terms of an MOU with HUD, the OCC forwards complaints of discrimination regarding 

mortgage lending that it receives involving lenders under its supervisory jurisdiction to HUD. Between 

1999 and 2008 OCC forwarded 104 such complaints to HUD. 

Figure 4.8 

Mortgage Lending Complaints Referred to HUD, 1999–2008 

3

7

2

5

22

19

15

11

8

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Year

Mortgage Lending Complaints

Source: Comptroller of the Currency Response to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights Interrogatories, Response to 

Interrogatory Request 13 at p. 13. 

Caption: Between 1999 and 2002, OCC referred only a small number of mortgage lending complaints to 

HUD. The number of referrals to HUD peaked at 22 in 2003 and declined steadily to 8 in 2007. OCC 

referred 12 complaints to HUD in 2008. 

 

307 OCC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 12; Office of the Comptroller of 

the Currency, Report of the Ombudsman, 2005-2006, November 2007, pp. 11–12. 

308 OCC Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 5 at pp. 5–6. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 165 

As shown in Figure 4.8, the number of complaints alleging mortgage lending discrimination which OCC 

forwarded to HUD peaked at 22 in 2003. Between 2003 and 2007, OCC continuously forwarded to 

HUD decreasing numbers of complaints alleging mortgage discrimination. During this period, the 

number of complaints OCC forwarded to HUD declined from 19 to 8, respectively. In 2008, OCC 

forwarded 12 complaints alleging mortgage lending discrimination to HUD. 

8. The Office of Thrift Supervision 

OTS, an agency of the United States Department of the Treasury with a traditional and statutory focus 

on mortgage lending and other forms of consumer lending, serves as the primary regulator of thrifts or 

savings associations (financial institutions that accept savings deposits and manage mortgage loans). 

OTS was created in 1989 to secure and regulate savings associations after a period of instability in the 

1980s and early 1990s.309 

Compliance Examinations 

OTS compliance oversight examination program is designed to (1) determine the extent and 

effectiveness of management’s efforts toward ensuring adherence to compliance and consumer 

protection laws and regulations, and (2) determine the extent and effectiveness of management’s efforts 

to maintain a comprehensive and reliable internal compliance program. 

OTS examines each savings association every 12 to 18 months to assess the institution’s safety and 

soundness and compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations.310 Examiners use the 

Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures to determine if there is any unusual fair lending 

risk and to implement an examination strategy centered on the investigation of those risks.311 

When OTS has an indication that a lender may have engaged in discriminatory practices, the agency 

implements supplementary targeted fair lending exams.312 Such risks can become evident through the 

screening of HMDA data, the complaint process, and the development of business lines and products 

that display unusual fair lending risks.313 In addition, examiners monitor the condition of thrifts 

through off-site analysis of regularly submitted financial data and regular contact with thrift personnel. 

OTS examinations and its ongoing supervisory oversight are tailored to the risk profile of each 

institution. 

On a scale of 1 through 5, with 1 being the best rating, as of September 30, 2008, 94 percent of thrifts 

were rated 2 or better in compliance; two thrifts were rated 4 and two thrifts were rated 5.314 

 

309 Office of Thrift Supervision, Supervising Through the Economic Crisis, Annual Report – Fiscal Year 2008, pp. 8–9. 

310 Office of Thrift Supervision, Response to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights’ Interrogatories and Document Requests, 

Response to Interrogatory Request 9 at p. 11. 

311 Id. at p. 11. The Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures are available on the internet at 

http://files.ots.reas.gov/422220.pdf>. 

312 OTS Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Requests 9 & 14 at p. 16. 

313 OTS Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 9 at p. 11. 

314 Office of Thrift Supervision, Supervising Through the Economic Crisis at p. 25. 
166 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Complaint Processing 

OTS’s Consumer Affairs division handles and processes all consumer complaints and inquiries 

regarding OTS-supervised institutions.315 When OTS receives a complaint, the Consumer Affairs 

division logs it in, reviews it for compliance with federal consumer protection laws and regulations, 

and provides the consumer the results of the review.316 If OTS finds a violation of federal consumer 

protection laws or regulations, the complaint is referred to the appropriate OTS regional supervisory 

staff for additional action.317 

As shown in Figure 4.9, from FY 1999 through FY 2008, OTS received 312 complaints alleging home 

mortgage lending discrimination. Home mortgage lending complaints account for less than 2 percent 

of the total number of complaints OTS receives during a given fiscal year.318

Figure 4.9 

Home Mortgage Lending Complaints Received by OTS, 1999–2008 

63

29

19

13

35

47

16

17

37 36

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Fiscal Year

home mortgage lending 

Source: Office of Thrift Supervision Response to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights Interrogatories, Response to 

Interrogatory Request 11 at pp. 13–14. 

Caption: In 1999, OTS received 63 complaints alleging home mortgage lending discrimination, its largest 

number since 2008. Between 2000 and 2002, the number of complaints OCC received alleging mortgage 

lending discrimination decreased from 47 to 29. The number of complaints increased in 2003 and 2004, 

 

315 OTS Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 15. 

316 Id.

317 Id.

318 OTS Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 11 at pp. 13–14. 
Chapter 4: Predatory Lending, Mortgage Fraud, and Mortgage Lending Discrimination 167 

but began decreasing again in 2005. In 2008 OTS received 13 complaints alleging mortgage lending 

discrimination. 

Mortgage lending discrimination complaints were at their highest level in FY 1999. Between FYs 

2000 and 2002, complaints alleging mortgage lending discrimination decreased each year, with annual 

claims going from 47 to 35 to 29. According to OTS data, mortgage lending discrimination complaints 

increased in FY 2003 and remained level in FY 2004. Figure 4.9 shows that between FYs 2006 and 

2008, home mortgage complaints went from 19 to 13, a decrease in claims of 46 percent. For the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2009, OTS received a total of 1,671 complaints; none alleged home mortgage 

lending discrimination.319

Referrals to DOJ 

Pursuant to ECOA, OTS refers matters to DOJ where there is reason to believe that a lender has 

engaged in a pattern or practice of prohibited discrimination.320 Such belief can arise through 

complaints about a lender, screening of HMDA data, or through a compliance examination.321 With 

respect to home mortgage lending, OTS referred 7 matters to DOJ between 2004 and 2008,322 after 

concluding that there was reason to believe that a pattern or practice of fair lending violations had 

occurred. OTS has referred two more mortgage related referrals to DOJ in 2009.323 The violations in 

these matters were discovered through the examination process as opposed to the complaint resolution 

process. 

 

319 Id. at p. 15. 

320 OTS Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 12 at p. 15. 

321 Id. At its discretion, OTS may also refer matters to DOJ even if that violation does not involve a pattern or practice. 

322 OTS Response to Interrogatories and Document Requests, Interrogatory Request 13 at pp. 15–16. 

323 Office of Thrift Supervision, Response to draft report on Civil Rights with Respect to the Mortgage Crisis. 

PART III: CREDIT SCORING 

Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 171 

CHAPTER 5: CREDIT SCORING AND OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE 

GRANTING AND PRICING OF LOANS 

While earlier parts of this report examined laws and policies which seek to prevent discrimination and 

increase homeownership, this Chapter examines the criteria lenders evaluate both in deciding whether a 

borrower is sufficiently credit worthy to repay a loan and in establishing appropriate pricing for risk of 

nonpayment. As discussed below, disparities in the manner and type of credit awarded to various racial 

and ethnic groups have often been a matter of controversy. Often, disputes have arisen as to whether 

credit standards accurately reflect creditworthiness. 

Most important among the factors lenders review is a widely-used statistical methodology that rates 

borrowers’ credit records, commonly referred to as a credit score. Additional items lenders consider are 

ratios of the amount of the loan compared to the value of the home the borrower is purchasing and the 

size of debt relative to the borrower’s income. This Chapter examines the accuracy of such criteria in 

predicting whether borrowers will repay their mortgages, that is, their credit worthiness. It also looks at 

the underlying racial and ethnic disparities in credit records and other factors that might result in 

minority groups receiving higher-priced mortgages at a higher rate. 

I. Background: The Boston Fed Study 

One of the most controversial analyses of disparities in mortgage lending was a 1992 study undertaken 

by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (the Boston Fed).1 

The purpose in analyzing such disparities was summarized in a contemporary newspaper article 

discussing the results of the study. 

These statistics don’t lie: Black and Hispanic home buyers have a harder time getting mortgages. 

But why? If lenders discriminate by race, it is up to bank regulators and the Justice Department 

to enforce anti-bias laws. If, however, minorities are less likely to obtain mortgages mostly 

because they are more likely to suffer from poverty, the cure — allocating credit by skin color — 

is arguably worse than the disease... Unequal treatment of minorities isn’t necessarily motivated 

by racism; it can also reflect lesser creditworthiness or other economic disparities.2

 

1 See Alicia H. Munnell, Lynn E. Browne, James McEneaney, and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Mortgage Lending in Boston: 

Interpreting the HMDA Data (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7, October 1992); Alicia H. Munnell, 

Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne, and James McEneaney, Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, 

AM. ECON. REV., vol. 86, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 25-53 (hereinafter cited as MTBM, 1996). Because there are two 

somewhat different write-ups with the same title, but only one research study, when it is not necessary to distinguish between 

the two write-ups, the research will be referred to as the Boston Fed (BF) study. 

2

 Peter Passell, Race, Mortgages and Statistics; The Unending Debate Over a Study of Lending Bias, NY TIMES, May 10, 

1996, at D1, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/10/business/race-mortgages-and-statistics-the-unending-debateover-a-study-of-lending-bias.html> (last accessed July 29, 2009). 
172 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

In order to address this issue, the Boston Fed report took advantage of the first-time availability of 

individual loan applicant Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data which included information as 

to the race of applicants and their success at obtaining a loan. The Boston Fed study also included 

extensive information from a supplemental questionnaire mailed to 131 financial institutions asking for 

38 additional pieces of information on the approximately 3,000 loan applications studied.3 

The study found that, after controlling for other factors such as financial, employment, and 

neighborhood characteristics, there still was a “statistically significant” disparity associated with racial 

discrimination in mortgage lending in the Boston area. Specifically, the study found that the rejection 

rate for minorities was seven or eight percent higher than for Whites with similar characteristics.4 As 

such, the study concluded that discrimination against minorities in mortgage lending continued to be a 

problem and that federal enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation was inadequate. 

Although the report was controversial, receiving both criticism and support,5 it was cited by the Clinton 

administration as a justification for aspects of its National Home Ownership Strategy.6 In addition, its 

findings prompted the Boston Fed to develop a manual to serve both as a guide to equal opportunity 

lending as well as a call for stricter enforcement of fair lending laws.7 

The manual was meant to serve as a “best practice” template for lending institutions and consumer 

groups. As such, it urged the Board of Directors of lending institutions to “eliminate biases in 

underwriting standards and practices” to “ensure that they are valid predictors of risk. Special care 

should be taken to ensure that standards are appropriate to the economic culture of urban, lower-income, 

and nontraditional consumers.”8 Specifically, the manual urged lenders to reconsider underwriting 

standards with regard to such considerations as down payments, lack of credit history, increased 

obligation ratios, employment history, and property appraisals.9

 

3

 MTBM, 1996 at p. 28. 

4 Id. at p. 33. 

5

 See, e.g., James H. Carr and Isaac F. Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage Lending 

Revisited, J. HOUSING RESEARCH, vol. 4, issue 2 (1993), pp. 277-313; Lynne Elaine Browne and Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 

Mortgage Lending In Boston-A Response to the Critics, NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., September/October 1995, pp. 53–78; 

STEPHEN ROSS AND JOHN YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE DISCRIMINATION, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND 

FAIR LENDING ENFORCEMENT (The MIT Press 2002); Theodore E. Day and Stan J. Liebowitz, Mortgage Lending to 

Minorities: Where’s the Bias, ECON. INQUIRY, vol. XXXVI (January 1998), pp. 3-28; David K Horne, Mortgage Lending, 

Race, and Model Specification, J. FIN. SERVICES RES., vol. 11, no. 1 (1997), pp. 43-68; David K. Horne, Evaluating the Role 

of Race in Mortgage Lending, FDIC BANKING REV., Spring/Summer 1994, pp. 1-15; Mitchell Stengel and Dennis Glennon, 

Evaluating Statistical Models of Mortgage Lending Discrimination: A Bank Specific Analysis, REAL ESTATE ECON., vol. 27, 

no. 2 (1999), pp. 299-334. 

6 See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American 

Dream, May 1995, pp. 6-1, 6-5. 

7

 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Closing the Gap: A Guide to Equal Opportunity Lending, 1996, available at

<http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/commaff/closingt.pdf> (last accessed July 28, 2009). 

8 Id. at p. 13. 

9 Id.
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 173 

The goal of establishing objective measures of creditworthiness is in the interest of both government and 

lenders. The former needs a benchmark by which to determine whether lending discrimination is 

occurring. The latter needs to demonstrate its compliance with the same laws. A shared goal, however, 

does not mean agreement as to what constitutes an objective measure of creditworthiness. This lack of 

agreement was further exacerbated by the fact that the validity of the Boston Fed data was quickly called 

into question. 

In response to the Boston Fed study, the FDIC dispatched examiners to the 70 FDIC-supervised 

institutions that participated in the study to investigate their lending patterns. The FDIC examiners 

undertook “an intensive review” of the loan files that corresponded to rejected applicants. This review 

turned up a large number of data errors and several systematic reporting errors.10 The FDIC report 

concluded that “a detailed examination of individual loan files is likely to be necessary to confirm 

evidence of lending discrimination” especially because “many loan decisions are influenced by factors 

that are difficult to capture in a statistical model.” 11

At the same time, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) collected additional data from 

the OCC’s official fair lending examination to compare how models similar to those used by the Boston 

Fed performed in comparison with the OCC’s traditional approach to investigating lending 

discrimination and to bank-specific models of lending and lending discrimination.12 This analysis found 

that a model like the one used in the Boston Fed study carried a likelihood of bias favoring a hypothesis 

alleging discrimination.13 In addition, OCC found that the Boston Fed study contained no direct measure 

of the applicant’s capacity to pay the home purchase’s closing costs (down payment, taxes, escrows and 

various fees), despite the fact that the HMDA database itself specifically lists this as a possible reason 

that mortgage loans could be denied.14

Finally, a review undertaken by Theodore E. Day and Stan J. Liebowitz found many data errors in the 

Boston Fed study, among them: 

 

10 For example, it was learned that the inability of applicants to obtain private mortgage insurance was incorrectly reported as 

a loan application that was not being accepted for special low-income mortgage programs. It was also found that, while some 

applicants were rejected for the particular loan terms that they wanted, they were offered alternatives, which the applicants 

subsequently rejected. However, if they accepted the alternative terms, this was considered an accepted loan application. 

Horne, Mortgage Lending, Race, and Model Specification at p. 48; Horne, Evaluating the Role of Race at pp. 5-6. 

Additionally, the review found that the variable “denial of mortgage insurance” might reflect discrimination on the part of the

mortgage insurance company and not the financial institution making the loan. Horne, Mortgage Lending, Race, and Model 

Specification at p. 49; Horne, Evaluating the Role of Race at pp. 6-7. 

11 Horne, Evaluating the Role of Race at p. 12. As an example of the limitations of this statistical model in measuring 

discrimination, Horne found that a single lender accounted for 47 percent of all denials to non-Whites in the BF subsample of 

FDIC supervised institutions. This institution rejected one out of every two minority applicants. However, Horne ascertained 

that this institution was the sole minority-owned institution in the Boston area. Furthermore, it conducted extensive minority 

outreach programs, participated actively in a number of affordable housing programs, and 82 percent of all mortgage loans 

approved by this institution were to non-White applicants. 

12 Stengel and Glennon, Evaluating Statistical Models, pp. 299-334. 

13 Id. at p. 330. 

14 Id. at pp. 307–09, 315–17. 
174 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

• Many observations for which the imputed interest rates were either too low or too high to be 

believed.15 

• Forty-four mortgages classified as rejections were also listed as having been sold on the 

secondary market.16 

• At least five mortgage applications where the applicant had a net worth of less than negative one 

million dollars.17 

• Out of 1,129 loans with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of greater than 80 percent, 517 loans, almost 

half of the total, failed to apply for mortgage insurance yet most of them were approved. Normal 

practice in the mortgage lending industry is for mortgage insurance to be required with loans 

with LTV ratios of greater than 80 percent. 

• One hundred and fifty-seven applications where the two measures of income, monthly 

employment income and other monthly income (for both the loan applicant and co-applicant), 

taken from the Boston Fed researchers extended data and the original HMDA data, are 

inconsistent by more than 20 percent. Of these, there were 66 instances where the difference was 

more than 50 percent. 

Other reviewers, while acknowledging that the Boston Fed data contained data errors, nonetheless 

argued that the findings of the study revealed statistical evidence of mortgage discrimination in the 

Boston metropolitan area.18 

Partly as a result of the dispute arising from the Boston Fed study, subsequent efforts have been made to 

attempt to develop improved objective measures of creditworthiness. These methods are the subject of 

the next section. 

II. Methods Lenders Use to Quantify Credit Risk of Prospective Borrowers 

One of the primary tools developed to measure creditworthiness is credit scoring, a statistical technology 

that quantifies credit risk. It ranks individuals, distinguishing those with lower risk of repaying loans 

from those with higher risks. It uses credit record data, not demographics. Credit scoring formulae 

generally include five broad types of characteristics—(1) payment history; (2) indebtedness, (3) length 

of credit history, (4) types of credit used (e.g., credit cards or loans), and (5) the pursuit of new credit—

some of which are more important than others.19 

 

15 Day and Liebowitz, Mortgage Lending to Minorities at p. 22. 

16 Id. at p. 23. 

17 Id. at p. 24. 

18 See Carr and Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage Lending Revisited. Day and Liebowitz

claim that even if the errors were corrected, the original findings were rendered statistically insignificant. Day and Liebowitz, 

Mortgage Lending to Minorities at p. 19. 

19 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the 

Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007, p. 24. 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 175 

Fair Isaac Corporation developed the widely-used “FICO Scores” that, according to company estimates, 

are used in more than 75 percent of all mortgage originations. These credit history scores rank 

consumers by their likelihood of becoming seriously delinquent on any of their credit accounts in the 

near future (typically over the next 18 to 24 months). FICO scores typically range in value from 300 to 

850, with higher scores indicating lower credit risk.20 

Credit scores, which are calculated from credit history, show a strong relationship to loan default rates 

for a period following origination. Table 5.1 shows this relationship for loans (not mortgages) where 

borrowers with FICO scores with high credit worthiness—720 or more—had a default rate of only 1 

percent in the first two years after origination. Those with low FICO scores—less than 520—had a 

default rate of 41 percent during the same timeframe. Indeed, with each reduction in credit worthiness as 

measured by FICO scores, the default rate increases. 

Table 5.1 

Default Rate on New Loans for the Two Years (October 2000 to October 2002) after Origination, by FICO 

Credit Score 

FICO score Default rate 

720 or more 1.0% 

680-719 4.4% 

640-679 8.9% 

600-639 15.8% 

560-599 22.5% 

520-559 28.4% 

Less than 520 41.0% 

Notes: New accounts were those opened in the six months from October 2000 to April 2001. An account was in default if it had 

been delinquent for at least ninety days or had any other derogatory credit information within the two years starting in October 

2000. 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the 

Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007, table 2, p. 133, citing the Fair Isaac Corporation. 

Caption: Borrowers with the lowest credit scores, less than 520, have the highest default rate: 41.0 

percent. Those with FICO scores of 520 to 559 have a 28.4 percent default rate; those with 560 to 599 have 

a 22.5 percent rate; those with 600 to 639 have a 15.8 percent rate; those with 640 to 679 have an 8.9 

percent rate; those with 680 to 719 have a 4.4 percent rate; and those with credit scores of 720 or more 

have a 1.0 percent default rate. 

 

20 Note that Fair Isaac provides statistical models specific to a credit reporting agency based upon that agency’s data. Thus, 

the results of different credit reporting agencies calculating the same individual’s FICO score may vary. Id. at pp. 22–24. 

Note further FICO scores are not the only available credit rating scheme. For example, Vantage Score Solutions LLC 

developed another formula for credit history scores, known as the VantageScores, which range from 501 to 990. See Id. at pp. 

24-25. 
176 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Lending institutions developed credit scoring to address the need for quick, accurate, inexpensive, and 

consistent evaluations of credit risk and have come to use the method for broader purposes such as loan 

pricing (i.e., setting interest rates for each loan according to estimated risk) or estimating loss in the 

event of default.21 

On average, interest rates are lower for loans of individuals with higher (i.e., better) credit scores. By 

way of example, Table 5.2 shows on July 14, 2009, the national average of interest rates for $300,000, 

thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages for borrowers with FICO scores of 760 to 850 was 4.773 percent. It was 

6.362 percent for similar home loans for borrowers with FICO scores ranging 620 to 639. The national 

average for borrowers with lower credit scores—500 to 619—is unavailable because financial 

institutions often reject such applications for a thirty-year fixed rate mortgage.22

Table 5.2 

Average Interest Rate on Fixed-Rate, Thirty-Year Home Loan by FICO Credit Score, July 14, 2009 

FICO score APR 

760-850 4.773% 

700-759 4.995% 

680-699 5.172% 

660-679 5.386% 

640-659 5.816% 

620-639 6.362% 

Notes: Rates are national averages on fixed-rate mortgages of $300,000. Elsewhere on a website this source notes that 

people with credit scores between 500 and 619 are not usually accepted for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage. See myFICO: Loan 

Savings Calculator: A Higher FICO Score Saves You Money, <www.myfico.com/my fico/CreditCentral/LoanRates.asp> (last 

accessed Mar. 24, 2009). 

Source: Informa Research Services, myFICO: Home Refinance Center: Mortgage rates as of July 14, 2009, 

<www.myfico.com/LoanCenter/Refinance/> (last accessed July 14, 2009). 

Caption: Borrowers with the highest credit scores receive the lowest interest rates and those with the 

lowest credit scores receive the highest interest rates. Rates range from 4.773 percent for borrowers with 

a FICO score of 760 to 850 to 6.362 percent for FICO scores between 620 and 639. 

Because of concerns about the use of credit scoring, Section 215 of the Fair and Accurate Credit 

Transaction Act (Fact Act) directed the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission 

(FTC) to conduct a study of the effects of credit scoring on the availability and affordability of credit 

and whether the use of credit scoring affect the availability and affordability of credit to different 

populations. 23 The resultant study24 provides much of the data for this section. 

 

21 Id. at pp. 29-32. 

22 See Table 5.2 and its sources. Figure 5.5, below, representing loans that are reported in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 

database, shows a similar trend in interest rates by credit scores for various racial and ethnic groups. 

23 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 215. See also Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of 

Credit, August 2007, pp. O-2–O-3, available at 

<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf > (last accessed July 28, 2009). 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 177 

The Federal Reserve Board’s study, which applied to credit generally, and not mortgage lending 

specifically, concluded that the use of credit scoring had beneficial effects for all borrowers because it 

improved the availability of credit, its affordability, and the rapidity of loan approval. Furthermore, 

“[c]redit scoring likely increases the consistency and objectivity of credit evaluation and thus may help 

diminish the possibility that” “personal characteristics or other factors prohibited by law, including race 

or ethnicity,” influence credit decisions.25

A. Effects of Credit Scoring Methods on Minority and Other Populations. 

This section examines the possible adverse effects of the use of credit scoring on minorities, as well as 

its benefits in increasing the amount of lending and decreasing loan processing time. Specifically, it 

looks at differences in credit records (i.e., credit scoring) as an explanation of racial and ethnic 

disparities in loans received; and the potential for discrimination in lending when credit scores are the 

same or equivalent. 

1. Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Credit Records 

Analysts have developed credit scoring formulae to best measure credit worthiness. Such efforts may 

not, however, produce equivalent average credit scores for all racial or ethnic subgroups.26 As one 

authority explained: 

Credit scoring has not been intentionally discriminatory in its typical uses. Nonetheless, 

regulators, researchers, and the developers of credit-scoring systems have all recognized 

that, on average, minorities have lower credit scores than majority populations. 

Therefore, the use of credit-scoring systems will frequently have an overall 

discriminatory effect. Such an effect, however, is not illegal if it is based on an overriding 

business necessity and if there is no less discriminatory way to achieve the underwriting 

goal. 27

Indeed, analysts derive credit scores from credit records, and these differ across racial and ethnic groups. 

Table 5.3 shows racial differences in information contained in credit records. The table indicates that 

credit records of Whites contain a greater number of loans, leases or bills than those of Blacks. 

However, twice or even three times as many Blacks have credit records showing signs of payment 

deficiencies. Specifically, among Blacks, 27.1 percent have a public record of bankruptcy, foreclosure, 

tax lien, garnishment, or other civil judgment, while only 12.1 percent of Whites have such records. 

Furthermore, 35.7 percent of Blacks had records of a collection agency involved in obtaining payment 

for a medical bill and 47.7 had a collection account for other types of bills. In comparison, only 13.7 

 

24 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring. 

25 Id. at pp. S-3–S-4. 

26 Black and Hispanics, younger individuals, single persons, and residents of lower-income areas or those with higher 

percentages of minority individuals have lower average credit scores. Id. at p. S-4. 

27 The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Community Investments Online—Perspectives on Credit Scoring and Fair 

Mortgage Lending, Aug. 9, 2007, <http://wwwfrbsf.org/publications/community/investments/0303/article1.html> (last 

accessed Mar. 25, 2009) (quoting Calvin Bradford, President, Calvin Bradford and Associates, Ltd.) (hereinafter cited as 

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Perspectives on Credit Scoring). 
178 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

percent of Whites had collection agencies seeking payment for medical expenses and 13.5 percent for 

other payments. Finally, 36.0 of Blacks had at least one account with a payment that was 90 or more 

days delinquent. Only 13.9 percent of Whites had such accounts. 

Slightly larger percentages of Hispanics (14.4 percent) have public records of payment deficiencies 

(such as bankruptcies and foreclosures) than Whites (12.1 percent). However, the percentage of 

Hispanics with a collection for a medical bill (20.9 %) or an account 90 or more days delinquent 

(22.7%) are about one and a half times the rates for Whites, and the proportion of Hispanics with a 

collection for bills other than medical expenses (27.7%) is about double the percent for Whites. 

Whites as a group, however, do not have the best credit records. Instead, both Asian Americans/Pacific 

Islanders and American Indians/Alaskan Natives are less likely to have public records of foreclosures, 

bankruptcy, liens, collection agency accounts, and delinquent payments than Whites. 

Table 5.3 

Incidence of Credit Record Item by Demographic Group 

Race or Ethnicity 

 

Average 

number of 

credit 

accounts1

Percent with 

a public 

record of a 

credit 

deficiency2

Percent with 

a collection 

agency 

account for a 

medical bill3

Percent with 

any other 

collection 

agency 

account3

Percent with 

any account 

payment 90 or 

more days 

delinquent 

Non-Hispanic White 16.7 12.1 13.7 13.5 13.9 

Black 13.3 27.1 35.7 47.7 36.0 

Hispanic 14.1 14.4 20.9 27.7 22.7 

Asian American or 

Pacific Islander 15.9 8.4 7.1 10.4 12.0 

American Indian or 

Alaskan Native 16.1 12.0 11.0 10.3 12.6 

Total Population 15.4 13.1 15.7 17.5 16.3 

1

A “credit account” refers to each current or past loan, lease, and bill on which creditors and some other entities, such as utility 

companies and medical facilities, reported detailed information on payment status. 

2

A “public record” is a monetary-related legal record of bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax lien (local, state, or federal), garnishment, 

or other civil judgment. 

3

A “collection agency account” is a delinquent credit account or unpaid non-credit-related bill that a collection agency is or has 

handled to obtain payment.

Note: The figures are for the Federal Reserve Board’s estimation sample. It included credit records for 200,437 loan 

applicants. Of these, 133,165 were non-Hispanic Whites; 18,274 were Blacks; 14,702 were Hispanics; 7,906 were Asian 

American or Pacific Islanders; 366 were American Indians and Alaskan Natives, and 26,024 had unknown race. The Social 

Security Administration provided information on race or ethnicity, which researchers matched to credit information using social

security numbers and date of birth. 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the 

Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007, p. 15, 143–44 table 9. 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 179 

Caption: Looking at racial differences in credit histories, Whites have a higher average number of credit 

accounts (16.7) than the total population (15.4), while Blacks have fewer (13.3). Blacks have the highest 

percentage with a public record of credit deficiency (27.1), more than twice as high as Whites (12.1). 

Blacks also have the highest percentage with a collection agency account for a medical bill (35.7), which 

is more than the total population (15.7) and Whites (13.7). Blacks and Hispanics have the highest percent 

with any other collections agency account, 47.7 and 27.7 percent, respectively. The two minorities also 

have the highest percent with any account payment 30 or more days delinquent: 36 percent for Blacks 

and 22.7 percent for Hispanics, as compared to 13.9 percent for Whites. 

Not surprisingly, given the large differences in the proportions of racial and ethnic groups with records 

of credit deficiencies, the credit scores calculated on credit records show racial and ethnic disparities. 

Figure 5.1 shows the average credit scores for racial and ethnic groups. 

Figure 5.1 

Average Credit Score (on a Scale of 0 to 100) by Racial Group, June 30, 2003 

38.3

57.3

54.8

25.8

54.0

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

Whites Blacks Hispanics Asian

Americans/

Pacific

Islanders

American

Indians/

Alaskan Natives

Average Credit Score Average Credit Score

Note: The Federal Reserve Board presents data on different proprietors’ credit scores—TransRisk scores and Vantage 

scores—as well those the researchers derived from their own estimation procedures. The figure presents their own “base” 

scores. 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the 

Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007, p. 154 table 14. 

Caption: American Indians/Alaskan Natives and Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders have the highest 

average credit scores, falling at 57.6 and 54.8, respectively, for scores that range from 0 to 100. Blacks are 

lowest with an average of 25.8. Hispanics’ scores, averaging 38.3, fall in the middle between Whites, with 

54.0, and Blacks. 
180 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Regarding the credit scores shown in Figure 5.1: Because credit scoring models, such as FICO scores 

(and VantageScores) have different ranges, the Federal Reserve Board’s study transformed its estimated 

credit scores into a scale that ranges from 0 to 100,28 with a higher score corresponding to greater 

creditworthiness. 

Figure 5.1 shows that on a credit scoring system developed to range between 0 and 100, the average 

scores for Whites, Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, and American Indians and Alaskan Natives 

are 54.0, 54.8, and 57.3, or slightly above the middle of the range. The average scores for Blacks and 

Hispanics are 25.8 and 38.3, respectively. 

Figure 5.2 reveals the distributions of each racial and ethnic group’s credit scores that make up the 

disparities within each group. The credit scores of Whites are fairly evenly divided throughout the full 

range of possible scores with slightly larger percentages of them in the 6th through 10th deciles (i.e., 

having scores of 50 and above) and slightly fewer in the 1st to 5th deciles (with scores below 50). 

However, Blacks’ scores cluster in the lowest range with more than 30 percent in the first decile (a score 

of 0 to 10 out of 100). Hispanics’ scores most often fall in the lower ranges of the credit score 

distribution but are not as concentrated there as those of Blacks. Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders 

more often score in the middle of the distribution. American Indians and Native Alaskans may have high 

or low scores (i.e., 20 to 30) more often than scores in the middle or very low (0 to 20) parts of the 

range.29

 

28 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring at p. 80. 

29 See id. at pp. 80–82. 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 181 

Figure 5.2 

Distribution of Credit Scores by Racial Group, June 30, 2003 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Non-Hispanic

White

Black Hispanic Asian Am. /Pacific

Islander

Am. Indian/

Alaskan Native Race and/or Ethnicity

Percent of Population in Decile

1st decile 2nd decile 3rd decile 4th decile 5th decile

6th decile 7th decile 8th decile 9th decile 10th decile

Percent of Population in Decile

Note: The credit scores are the Federal Reserve Board’s base score, which is normalized to range between 0 and 100. 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the 

Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007, p. 6 table 14. 

Caption: The distribution of credit scores for Blacks is highly skewed to the lower end, with 30 percent 

falling in the first decile (the lowest credit scores) and around 23 percent falling in the second decile. 

Hispanics are also skewed to the left, with around 15 percent in each of the first three deciles. The nonHispanic White population is fairly evenly distributed among deciles, with only slightly more than 10 

percent falling in the eighth and ninth percentiles. Both the Asian American/Pacific Islander and American 

Indian/Alaskan Native populations have credit scores that are more heavily distributed in the higher 

deciles (i.e., more credit worthy). 

Differences in credit scores across groups were partly reduced when the researchers considered other 

location and demographic characteristics, such as income. However, significant differences remained.30

For example, the differences in Black and White average credit scores shown in Figure 5.1 (i.e., the 

White average of 54.0 minus the Black average of 25.8) is 28.2 points on a scale of 0 to 100. When 

researchers took account of the fact that Blacks and Whites differ in income, age, gender, marital status, 

and certain neighborhood characteristics, the disparity between Blacks and Whites was reduced by 13.4 

points on this scale. Yet the reduction is less than half of the overall difference.31 For Hispanics, ethnic 

 

30 Id.

31 Id.
182 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

differences on these demographic factors reduce the disparity from Whites of 15.7 to 3.9.32 Thus, only 

about a quarter of the overall disparity remained for Hispanics. 

2. How Well Do Credit Records Predict Loan Performance For Racial and Ethnic Groups? 

Scores based on credit history predict credit risk for the population as a whole. The Federal Reserve 

study shows that over any credit-score range, the higher (better) the credit score, the lower the observed 

incidence of default. See Table 5.1. 

The Federal Reserve study indicated that scores based on credit history predict credit risk for all major 

demographic groups. In other words, for every race or ethnic group, the higher (better) the credit score, 

the lower the observed incidence of default. The report states “credit scores consistently predict relative

loan performance within all population groups; that is, for all populations, the percentage of individuals 

experiencing a serious delinquency on one or more of their credit accounts consistently declines as 

credit scores increase.33 See Figure 5.3. 

In some cases, the Federal Reserve study found differences across groups in average performance for 

individuals with the same score. In particular, Blacks and persons living in lower-income or minority 

neighborhoods underperform, that is, given their credit score their default rate exceeds the rate of other 

races or neighborhoods. In contrast, Asian Americans, foreign born individuals (particularly recent 

immigrants), and those living in higher-income areas over perform (i.e., default less often). 34 See Figure 

5.3, noting that the line for Blacks is higher, meaning greater frequency of “bad” performance, 

throughout the range of credit scores. The Federal Reserve Board found that analyses with other factors 

did not substantially explain these racial and neighborhood differences.35

As a banking counsel explained, banks’ use of validated credit-scoring systems “reduces the subjectivity 

of the final credit decision,” ensures “standard treatment of applicants” and “allows compliance officers 

to better monitor fair-lending compliance.” Describing a recent legal matter, he indicated that fairlending violations arose, not as a result of the credit-scoring model, but from ignoring it as a factor in the 

lending decision.36

 

32 Id.

33 Id. at p. S-4. 

34 Id. at pp. S-4–S-5. 

35 Id.

36 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Perspectives on Credit Scoring (quoting Paul Smith, senior counsel of the 

American Bankers Association). 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 183 

Figure 5.3 

Bad Performance on Any Account by Credit Score and Racial Group 

Source: The Federal Reserve Board, "Credit Scoring and Access to Credit," Briefing by staff of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System for staff of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 7, 2009, p. 9. See also Board of Governors of 

the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of 

Credit, August 2007, p. 244 figure 6.A. 

Caption: For all racial/ethnic groups, the percent bad performance on any account decreases as credit 

scores increase. 

Figure 5.4 reflects differences between the various groups, even when they have the same or similar 

credit scores. Overall, Figure 5.4 indicates that the likelihood of getting a new loan, although never 

above about 60 percent, varies according to credit score. It is lowest—about 10 percent—for those with 

low credit scores, but also low—about 20 percent—for those with the highest credit scores. It is highest 

for those with credit scores of about 40 on a normalized scale ranging between 0 and 100. The 

probability of receiving a new loan is slightly lower for Blacks than other groups for credit scores 

throughout most of the range. For individuals with credit scores of about 40 on this scale, Asian 

Americans and Hispanics are more likely to get new loans than Whites. 
184 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Figure 5.4 

Probability of Getting a New Loan by Credit Score and Racial Group 

Source: The Federal Reserve Board, "Credit Scoring and Access to Credit," Briefing by staff of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System for staff of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Jan. 7, 2009, p. 11. See also Board of Governors of 

the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of 

Credit, August 2007, p. 254 figure 8. 

Caption: For all racial/ethnic groups, the probability of getting a new account increases from near 0 or 10 

percent for the lowest credit scores to 40 to 50 for scores of about 40 (on a scale of 0 to 100), and 

declines to slightly for scores ranging as high as 80 or 90. 

3. What Adverse Effects Does the Use of Credit Scores Have on Racial and Ethnic Groups? 

a. Discrimination in Credit Histories May Contaminate Credit Scores 

Subjectivity and potential discrimination enter into the data of credit reporting agencies because, for 

example, creditors serving higher-risk customers are more aggressive in reporting late payments.37

Indeed, business advisors recommend developing a collection strategy that focuses recovery efforts on 

the highest-risk accounts. This strategy may identify the highest-risk accounts using customers’ 

demographics and past payment behavior. It may then establish procedures to initiate recovery efforts 

for risky accounts among those that are only recently delinquent, but delay such actions for more credit 

 

37 Scott Susin, Economist, Office of Systemic Investigations, FHEO, Failures of Credit Scoring, slide presentation, HUD 

FHEO Policy Conference, Apr. 9, 2008, pp. 12–13 (hereinafter cited as Susin, Failures of Credit Scoring). 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 185 

worthy accounts. Thus, businesses may reduce recovery costs by identifying accounts which will 

warrant little or no resources to resolve.38 

b. The Lack of Credit Scores 

Researchers estimate that 35 to 54 million adults lack credit scores because they have no credit files at 

all or have “thin files,” meaning those with insufficient information to calculate a standard credit score. 

Because creditors have difficulty predicting performance for consumers with little or no credit history, 

they are reluctant to extend credit.39

As reflected in Table 5.4, members of minority groups are more likely than Whites or Asian Americans 

to have no credit record on which to base credit scores. 

Table 5.4 

Percent of Racial and Ethnic Groups With No Credit History on Which to Base Credit Scores 

Race or Ethnicity Percent 

Non-Hispanic White 8.8% 

Black 17.6% 

Hispanic 12.8% 

Asian American 8.8% 

American Indian 7.3% 

Total 10.2% 

Note: Percentages are calculated excluding a category of "Unknown Race." Note that another author has reported the same 

information with different results based on the author’s estimates correcting for the presence of those with unknown race. See

Scott Susin, Economist, Office of Systemic Investigations, FHEO, Failures of Credit Scoring, slide presentation, HUD FHEO 

Policy Conference, Apr. 9, 2008, p. 10. 

Source: Compiled by U.S. Commission on Civil Rights from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the 

Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007, p. 142 table 9. 

Caption: Sources indicate that 17.6 percent of Blacks had no credit history on which to base credit 

scores. Only 12.8 percent of Hispanics were in this situation, compared to 8.8 percent of non-Hispanic 

Whites, and Asian Americans, and 7.3 percent of American Indians. Just over 10 percent of the total 

population lacks a credit history. 

Because of concerns that Americans new to the credit market may be missing out on the benefits of the 

credit reporting system, in 2004, the Federal Trade Commission studied whether any common financial 

 

38 Id. at pp. 14-18. 

39 Michael A. Turner and Amita Agarwal, Using Non-Traditional Data for Underwriting Loans to Thin-File Borrowers: 

Evidence, Tips and Precautions, J. RISK MGMT. FIN. INSTITUTIONS, vol. 1, no. 2 (2008), p. 166 & p. 179 n.2 (hereinafter cited 

as Turner and Agarwal, Underwriting Loans). Other industry experts rely on this article’s estimates. See ,e.g., Susin, Failures 

of Credit Scoring at p. 1. 

Note that a 2003 survey found that “no credit score” was the most important reason why mortgage lenders did not submit 

loan applications to an automated underwriting system through which borrowers benefited by providing less documentation 

than traditional underwriting procedures, paying lower origination fees, and obtaining quicker lending decisions. Federal 

Trade Commission, Report to Congress Under Sections 318 and 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 

2003, p. 78 (December 2004) (hereinafter cited as FTC 2004 Report to Congress). 
186 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

transactions that are not generally reported to the bureaus could be useful in evaluating creditworthiness. 

The FTC’s report concluded that regular bill payments, particularly for rent and utilities, were useful for 

establishing credit. However, barriers arise in the means of reporting these payments to credit bureaus. 

The diffuse housing market and the lack of centralized data collection impair the reporting of rental 

payments. Similarly, barriers such as cost, the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,40 some state 

privacy laws, and possible disincentives arising from state regulatory systems, make it often 

impracticable to report utility payments.41 

One study suggests that mainstream lenders generally assume that applicants with little or no 

information are high-risk or reject them because of the lack of information. Yet, research based on the 

inclusion of utility payments indicates that consumers who were unscoreable using traditional methods, 

were not clustered in the bottom rung of credit scores, but rather fairly evenly distributed throughout the 

range of scores. Including utility payment information also improves the risk sorting (i.e., the accuracy 

of credit scores) among individuals who were scoreable without utility data.42 

Credit score vendors are experimenting with developing nontraditional credit scores. Such scores rely on 

payment records for rent, utility, telecommunications, and other bills that are not reported to credit 

bureaus except when payments are late or in default.43

For example, one national consumer reporting agency and credit bureau, known as “Payment Reporting 

Builds Credit” or PRBC, collects, stores, scores, and reports bill payment data to enable consumers and 

small businesses to build a credit file to demonstrate creditworthiness. Consumers can either order a 

verification of past payments or register to build (i.e., voluntarily report through a third party) their 

record of future payments. In 2009, PRBC would verify rental history for $20 or rental history and 3 

additional payment accounts, such as electricity, phone, and cable, for $65. For building a credit history, 

consumers enroll themselves and pay a monthly fee (about five dollars) to an on-line bill payment 

service that automatically reports information to PRBC. With the consumer’s consent, PRBC then sells 

credit reports to lenders showing on-time bill payment for up to the past three years.44

 

40 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2006). 

41 FTC 2004 Report to Congress at pp. vii, 78-85. For example, enhanced privacy protections in California, New Jersey, 

Ohio, and Texas prohibit the onward transfer of data on customers’ utility and telecommunications payments. Furthermore, 

in 2008, other states had newly introduced legislation on consumer credit reporting to impede the ability of utility companies 

to report to credit reporting agencies. Turner and Agarwal, Underwriting Loans at p. 178. 

42 Turner and Agarwal, Underwriting Loans at pp. 166, 171-72. Other industry experts rely on this article’s estimates. See, 

e.g., Susin, Failures of Credit Scoring at p. 1. 

Note that a 2003 survey found that “no credit score” was the most important reason why mortgage lenders did not submit 

loan applications to an automated underwriting system through which borrowers benefited by providing less documentation 

than traditional underwriting procedures, paying lower origination fees, and obtaining quicker lending decisions. FTC 2004 

Report to Congress at p. 78. 

43 Susin, Failures of Credit Scoring at p. 7. 

44 See Credit Plus, Inc., PRBC—Non-Traditional Credit Information and Score, 2007, 

<http://www.creditplus.com/prbc.html> (last accessed Mar. 25, 2009); Payment Reporting Builds Credit (PRBC), PRBC 

Frequently Asked Questions—FAC, 2009, <http://ez.prbc.com/main/faq.php?passpath=main/faq.php&> (last accessed Mar. 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 187 

Acceptance of nontraditional credit scores has been slow. For example, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 

big lenders have not yet incorporated them into automated underwriting systems.45 Even proponents of 

using nontraditional data advise lenders to proceed with caution, despite the promising results of early 

tests of utility and telecommunications payment data. They urge that lenders test the value of such data 

in specific contexts, using such data to supplement, not replace, traditional methods.46

III. Factors Other than Credit Score that Relate to Differences in Lending for Minorities 

and Whites 

Apart from the borrower’s credit scores, financial institutions often consider other factors in making 

loans that could account for differences in the frequency with which minority group members receive 

subprime loans, or higher interest rates. Because additional factors may capture credit worthiness that is 

not represented in credit scoring models, disparities may arise even when Whites and members of other 

racial/ethnic groups have the same credit score.47 

As other factors are considered, however, it becomes more difficult to draw consistent conclusions as to 

whether lending decisions are based on factors other than creditworthiness. For example, various studies 

undertaken to review whether disparities are based on possible discrimination have varied as to the 

factors reviewed, the time period examined, the sample size considered, and the type of data reviewed.48

By way of example, in analyzing racial and ethnic differences in interest rates of mortgages, one very 

recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that differences in risk accounted for the 

significantly higher interest rates Black borrowers received. The study measured the risk of mortgages 

not only with credit scores, but also with loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, the level of 

documentation used in the underwriting, the loan amount, and the type of property used as collateral.49 It 

also found that the neighborhood of the mortgaged home mattered. Considering all of the listed factors, 

the study found the following: 

 

25, 2009); Payment Reporting Builds Credit (PRBC), Build Credit With Every Bill You Pay, 2009, 

<http://ez.prbc.com/consumers/how/futurepay.php> (last accessed Mar. 25, 2009). 

45 Susin, Failures of Credit Scoring at p. 8. 

46 Turner and Agarwal, Underwriting Loans at pp. 177-78. 

47 Overall wealth and creditworthiness are not necessarily completely captured by credit scores. In his regard, a recent study 

indicated that: “Regardless of age and income, African-American and Hispanic workers are less likely to participate in their 

company 401(k) plans, and when they do contribute, they save at much lower rates than whites.” See Ariel/Hewitt Study, 

401(k) Plans in Living Color: A Study of 401(k) Savings Disparities Across Racial and Ethnic Groups (2009). 

48 See, e.g., Andrew Haughwout, Christopher Mayer, and Joseph Tracy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Subprime 

Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing, staff report no. 368, April 2009, p. 

2. 

49 See id. at pp. 13, 15, 19–20, 27–28 table 3. 
188 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Our results provide no evidence of adverse pricing by race, ethnicity or sex of the 

borrower in either the initial rate or the reset margin. If any pricing differential exists, 

minority borrowers appear to pay slightly lower rates. We also find that borrowers in Zip 

Codes with a higher percentage of black or Hispanic residents or a higher unemployment 

rate actually pay slightly lower mortgage rates. 50

In making their finding, the authors of said study were careful to describe the parameters of their 

research. In this case the study involved a sample of more than 75,000 adjustable-rate mortgages for the 

month of August 2005 using a new dataset created by “merging information on the race, ethnicity, and 

gender of mortgage borrowers as reported under HMDA with mortgage pricing and risk variables 

reported by LoanPerformance (LP).”51 As noted by the authors, the merged dataset allowed them “to 

examine racial, ethnic, and gender differences in mortgage lending, controlling for both the risk profile 

of the mortgage and the characteristics of the neighborhood where the property is located.”52

In a similar fashion, a 2007 study used many of the same factors to examine racial and ethnic differences 

with regard to both the probability of obtaining a subprime loan and the pricing of mortgages. This study 

involved a review of data including “APR, typical underwriting variables such as loan-to-value ratios 

(LTV), debt-to-income ratios (DTI), and FICO scores, as well as other variables that likely affect 

mortgage pricing, such as documentation status, the existence of prepayment penalties, and sourcing 

channel.”53 The dataset for this study included over one million loan-level records of originations for the 

years 2004 and 2005 from over 20 lenders and/or their subsidiaries. 

Taking all such factors into consideration, the study noted that, although minority borrowers pay higher 

APRs than non-minority borrowers, “the vast majority of APR differentials between minority and nonminority mortgage borrowers can be explained by observable characteristics appropriately associated 

with underwriting and pricing outcomes.”54

By way of contrast, a 2006 study undertaken by the Center for Responsible Lending came to a different 

conclusion. This study used 2004 HMDA data merged with a propriety dataset which resulted in a 

sample of about 177,000 subprime loans. The analysis included all of the HMDA variables, as well as 

such credit-related variables as FICO scores, LTVs, documentation status, and term to maturity. Using 

this dataset, the report found: “Our findings show that, for most types of subprime home loans, AfricanAmerican and Latino borrowers are at greater risk of receiving higher-rate loans than white borrowers, 

even after controlling for legitimate risk factors. 55

 

50 Id. at p. 21. 

51 Id.

52 Id. at p. 2. 

53 Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers: How Much of the APR Differential 

Can We Explain?, J. REAL ESTATE RES., vol. 29, no. 4 (2007), p. 429. 

54 Id. at p. 431. 

55 DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST AND WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE 

EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 3 (May 2006). 
Chapter 5: Credit Scoring and Other Factors Related to the Granting and Pricing of Loans 189 

As the dispute surrounding the Boston Fed study indicated, studies relating to disparities in mortgage 

lending are likely to remain controversial. Absent consensus on the factors to be examined and the 

variables to be considered, there will always be a basis for objection or dissent. 

Clearly, however, there has been an attempt on the part of the lending industry to develop objective 

measures of creditworthiness. As additional studies are undertaken, continued attempts should be made 

to determine if existing disparities between races and ethnicities are the result of current discrimination 

or of other factors relating to creditworthiness. The adoption of policies based on false premises will not 

benefit either borrowers or lenders. 

As noted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its April 2009 study: 

[T]hese results suggest the possibility that subprime lending did serve as a positive 

supply shock for credit in locations with higher unemployment rates and minority 

residents. These results are consistent with economies of scale and subprime lending. We 

believe that further research is needed to understand better how this additional credit 

impacted these locations. Policy responses today often consider how to limit subprime 

lending in the future, but it is important to understand any positives that may also have 

occurred along with the down sides of subprime lending.

METHODOLOGY USED IN REPORT 

Methodology Used in Report 191 

METHODOLOGY USED IN REPORT 

In compiling the tables and figures of this report, the Commission drew data from various sources. 

Where possible the Commission relied on publicly available, national data and federal agency reports. 

The Commission sought additional information through interrogatories issued to federal agencies, 

particularly regulatory enforcement agencies and government-sponsored enterprises. It further 

supplemented this information with the statements of experts who participated in a Commission 

sponsored briefing held March 20, 2009. Finally, staff examined research efforts of financial industry 

experts, academicians, and policy analysts. Key sources are listed below along with brief discussions of 

their limitations and variations in their definitions of key factors such as race. 

Bureau of Census Data 

The Commission used the Bureau of the Census’ American Housing Survey,1

 Decennial Census of 

Housing,2

 Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey3 and the American Community Survey4

to obtain data on homeownership rates. In its surveys, the concept of race as used by the Bureau of the 

Census reflects self-identification according to the race or races with which survey participants most 

closely identify. The race categories include both racial and national-origin groups. The racial categories 

used in the 1990 census data products adhere to the guidelines in the Federal Statistical Directive No. 

15, issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). These racial categories were: (1) White, 

(2) Black, (3) American Indian, (4) Eskimo, or Aleut, (5) American Indian, (6) American Indian Tribe, 

(7) Eskimo, (8) Aleut, (9) Asian or Pacific Islander, (10) Asian, and (11) Pacific Islander, and (12) Other 

Race. Revisions to OMB Statistical Directive 15 designated five races: (1) White, (2) Black or African 

American, (3) American Indian and Alaska Native, (4) Asian, and (5) Native Hawaiian or other Pacific 

Islander and two ethnic origin categories (Hispanic or Latino and non-Hispanic or Latino). The 

American Housing Survey adopted the new terminology in 2003. Race and Hispanic origin are two 

separate and distinct concepts and people who are Hispanic may be of any race. This overlap is the main 

comparability issue when users want to compare a specific race with the number of Hispanics, or even 

when comparing the population size of one race group with another. The Commission used the racial 

categories as revised by OMB. 

 

1

 The U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey <http://www.2010census.biz/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs.html>. 

2

 The U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Housing <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/histcensushsg.html>. 

3

 The U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership 

<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/histcensushsg.html>. 

4

 The U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey <http://www.census.gov/acs/www/index.html>. 
192 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data 

The Commission obtained Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data for 1999 to 2007 from 

database tables posted on the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s (FFIEC) website.5

HMDA requires certain lending institutions to collect, disclose, and report data on the personal 

characteristics of mortgage borrowers and loan applicants, the type of loan, and certain financial data. 

HMDA’s many purposes include helping the public determine if lending institutions are meeting the 

housing credit needs of their communities, providing the public with loan data that can assist in 

identifying potential risks for patterns of discrimination, and aiding federal agencies in enforcing 

antidiscrimination laws.6

 In 2002, the Federal Reserve increased the reporting requirements for covered 

institutions, requiring them to incorporate into HMDA reporting the revised standards for collecting race 

and ethnicity information as required by OMB and to collect mortgage loan pricing data with an annual 

percentage rate of 3 or more percentage points higher than the yield for a comparable term Department 

of the Treasury security. These types of loans are referred to as “higher price.” Only “higher price loans” 

are reported and as a result the price of loans below that threshold is unknown. Institutions did not begin 

reporting pricing data until 2005. Transactions occurring in the current year are not reported until the 

following year. The Commission presented pricing data for 2004 to 2007. 

When analyzing and presenting tabular and graphic data extracted from the HMDA database tables, the 

Commission classified individuals into the following racial and/or ethnicity groups throughout this 

report: (1) White, (2) Black, (3) American Indian, (4) Asian, (5) Native Hawaiian, and (6) Hispanic. 

Borrowers who fall into the “2 or more minority races,” “joint (white/minority race),” or “race not 

available” categories are excluded. 

The National Mortgage Bankers Association Data 

The National Mortgage Bankers Association provided the National Delinquency Survey Data used in 

this report. For 1998 to 2008, the Commission used the National Delinquency Survey data for both 

tabular and graphic information on 30-, 60-, and 90-day delinquency rates and foreclosure rates for 

adjustable and fixed rate conventional and FHA prime and subprime loans. The Commission also 

presented this survey’s information on veterans’ (VA) loans. 

 

5

 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, <http://www.ffiec.gov/hmdaadwebreport/NatAggWelcome.aspx>. 

6

 U.S. General Accountability Office, Fair Lending: Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial Regulatory 

Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts, Washington, DC, July 2009, p. 11. 
Methodology Used in Report 193 

Information From Federal Agencies 

For this report the Commission cited numerous federal agency documents, including annual or periodic 

performance reports, oversight reports, and information routinely provided to the public. Such 

documents include, for example, the Department of Housing and Human Services’ Federal Register 

Notices on goals; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance against HUD housing goals; the Office of 

Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s annual reports on mortgage markets and the enterprises, the 

Department of Justice’s annual reports on the enforcement of ECOA, and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s reports on fraud. In addition to using such reports, many of which are available on 

agencies’ websites, the Commission visited staff at 11 agencies and sought information through 

responses to interrogatories. The agencies were the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 

Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Freddie 

Mac, Fannie Mae, and the five regulatory agencies which comprise the Federal Financial Institutions 

Examination Council: the Federal Reserve, the National Credit Union Administration, the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Office of the Comptroller of 

the Currency. 

Experts’ Briefing of the Commissioners 

On March 20, 2009, the Commission held a briefing at which experts were invited to make presentations 

and engage in discussion on whether policies intended to prevent discrimination in housing and 

mortgage lending contributed to the mortgage crisis and whether lenders’ policies unfairly targeted or 

otherwise discriminated against minority homeowners. The panelists were: David Berenbaum, National 

Community Reinvestment Coalition; Brian Brooks, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP; Luke Brown, Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation; Glenn Canner, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Jim 

Carr, National Community Reinvestment Coalition; Leonard Chanin, Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System; Marsha Courchane, Charles River Associates; Eileen Harrington, Federal Trade 

Commission; Howard Husock, Manhattan Institute; Stan Liebowitz, University of Texas-Dallas; Ken 

Markison, Mortgage Bankers Association; Alfred Pollard, Federal Housing Finance Agency; Lisa Rice, 

National Fair Housing Alliance; John Weicher, Center for Housing and Financial Markets; and Barry 

Wides, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The briefing transcript, written statements, and oral 

testimony are cited herein and are available at www.usccr.gov. 
194 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Miscellaneous Other Research Efforts 

In addition to information provided by the experts who briefed the Commissioners, the report relies on a 

select set of research not produced by federal agencies, most notably two studies of discrimination in 

mortgage lending. One is an academic piece by Marsha J. Courchane, and the other is from an advocacy 

group, the Center for Responsible Lending.7 The Commission used these studies along with research by 

the Federal Reserve and its Boston and New York branches8 in the credit scoring section. Notably, all 

five of these research efforts have very large samples of loans. They used proprietary industry data and 

census information, and, except for the historic Boston Fed study, combined such information with 

HMDA data. All employ complex statistical models using underwriting factors to adjust for differences 

in lending and pricing before attributing disparities to discrimination. Different results arise potentially 

because the New York Federal Reserve study is limited in the type of loans it examines9 and the Center 

for Responsible Lending’s analysis lacks loan pricing data for many of the mortgages as well as a 

measure of the borrower’s debt.10

 

7

 Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers: How Much of the APR Differential 

Can We Explain?, J. REAL ESTATE RES., vol. 29, no. 4 (2007), DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST AND WEI LI, 

CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME 

MORTGAGES 3 (May 2006). 

8 See Alicia H. Munnell, Lynn E. Browne, James McEneaney, and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Mortgage Lending in Boston: 

Interpreting the HMDA Data (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7, October 1992) or Alicia H. 

Munnell, Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Lynn E. Browne, and James McEneaney, Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA 

Data, AM. ECON. REV., vol. 86, no. 1 (March 1996); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the 

Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit, August 2007; and Andrew 

Haughwout, Christopher Mayer, and Joseph Tracy, Subprime Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 

on the Cost of Borrowing, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, p. 1, April 2009. 

9

 Andrew Haughwout, Christopher Mayer, and Joseph Tracy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Subprime Mortgage 

Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing, staff report no. 368, April 2009, This study 

focused on one mortgage product—“2-28s,” which have a fixed interest rate for the first two years and adjustable biannual 

resets in interest thereafter—and privately securitized loans. Ibid., pp. 3 and 8. 

10 Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst and Wei Li, Center For Responsible Lending, Unfair Lending: The Effect of 

Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages, May 31, 2006, pp. 3 and 12–13. 
STATEMENT OF VICE-CHAIR THERNSTROM 

Statement of Vice Chair Thernstrom 197 

STATEMENT OF VICE-CHAIR THERNSTROM 

August 20, 2009 

Our nation finds itself in the midst of a massive financial and economic crisis that continues to have 

devastating consequences for mortgage holders of all races and ethnicities. This report seeks to at least 

partially answer a series of deceptively simple questions: 

• What are the civil rights issues with respect to the mortgage crisis? 

• Did long-standing policies to increase minority homeownership contribute to the crisis? 

• On balance, did these policies hurt minority homeowners more than help them? 

• If the effect of these policies has been to hurt minority homeowners, can the regulators point to 

civil rights violations that occurred either in the implementation or execution of these policies? 

• During this period of economic turmoil, have the appropriate enforcement agencies been as 

vigilant as they could be in enforcing prohibitions against discrimination in mortgage lending? 

What We Did Not Find: Perhaps it is easier to begin by stating what our report did not find. 

Enforcement of Existing Anti-Discrimination Laws: Our report found no evidence that the myriad 

federal entities charged with prosecuting lending discrimination have failed to enforce lending 

discrimination laws. There are, however, a large number of such offices and no clear method of 

coordinating their efforts in a transparent, standardized manner. Monitoring and reporting on their 

enforcement efforts is thus difficult. Perhaps enforcement efforts would be more effective if 

communication and coordination among the various agencies were improved. 

Credit Scoring and Minority Borrowers: Our report cites a landmark study by the Federal Reserve 

which found no evidence that, for any given credit score, minorities were rejected for loans or charged 

higher interest at rates that were different than those offered whites with the same credit score.1

 The Fed 

study concluded that credit scoring is not a proxy for the race or ethnicity of loan applicants. The study 

did note that some ethnic groups tend to have lower credit scores based on objective criteria such as 

ability to repay a loan. Neither the Federal Reserve study nor our report attempted to examine the 

historical, social and economic reasons that this is so. 

Reduced Lending Standards to Promote Minority Homeownership: We did not find conclusive 

statistically significant evidence that regulatory mandates and policies to increase minority 

homeownership contributed to the current mortgage crisis. The best known of these mandates are the 

Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 

Lending Goals for Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 

 

1

 “Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit”, Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 2007. Submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 215 of the Fair and 

Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003. [Internet: 

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf. Last visited 8/15/09.] 
198 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Both programs sought to lower lending standards for the purpose of expanding minority 

homeownership. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether pressure for relaxed lending 

standards influenced the overall market. 

Predatory Lending: The evidence that we collected for this report does not support the thesis that 

certain racial or ethnic groups were targeted by predatory lending schemes involving subprime loans. 

The bulk of subprime loans went to upper- and middle-income borrowers.2 Our report notes that there is 

a lack of agreement among enforcement agencies and regulators about the definition of predatory 

lending. It is therefore not surprising that we found little enforcement activity in this area. By contrast, 

the collapse of the housing bubble has been accompanied by a sharp increase in prosecutions for 

mortgage fraud. 

What We Did Find: 

Rates of minority homeownership increased before and during the housing bubble, and even after the 

collapse of the housing bubble minority homeownership remains higher than it was previously. 

From 1994 through 2005, overall ownership rates increased for the ethnic and/or racial subgroups 

examined. During that period, every minority racial or ethnic group showed stronger rates of growth 

than whites. Even following the collapse of the housing bubble, that remained the case. 

Despite the growth of minority homeownership, and the narrowing of the gap between the various 

groups, substantial racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership rates remain. In 2008, the white 

homeownership rate stood at 71.7 percent, that of blacks at 47.4 percent, Hispanics at 49.1 percent, 

Asian/Pacific Islanders at 59.5 percent, and American Indians at 56.5 percent. 

When credit history was taken into consideration, the denial of conventional mortgage applications 

narrowed. The gap between the denial rates of whites and blacks regarding refinance loans, however, did 

not close significantly. 

Recommendations: 

Federal efforts to increase homeownership within low- and moderate-income communities should take 

the form of direct subsidies, rather than regulatory mandates that contribute to weakened underwriting 

standards. The goal of federal assistance should be sustainable homeownership. That goal will require 

the use of more conservative underwriting standards. Such standards, at a minimum, should include: (1) 

a requirement that borrowers contribute some percentage of their own funds to down payments; (2) 

verification of income and employment that reflect an ability to pay the debts incurred; and (3) 

mandatory pre-purchase counseling for borrowers with credit scores below a minimum threshold. 

 

2

 As our report notes on page 120 “Subprime lending is not synonymous with predatory lending. Subprime lending, in and of 

itself, simply reflects that some lenders are less creditworthy than others and, accordingly, pay higher interest rates or fees to 

obtain credit.” 
Statement of Vice Chair Thernstrom 199 

The landmark study by the Federal Reserve3 provided an example of the depth and quality of data that 

should be routinely collected to assist in meaningful, standardized analysis of lending patterns and 

enforcement. At the time of the Fed study no comprehensive data set existed that allowed sorting 

lending data by credit score, loan cost and amount, rates of rejection, or by race, ethnicity and gender 

and other criteria that would be enormously useful. The study used Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 

(HMDA) data, supplemented with data collected from credit bureaus and other sources. Construction of 

this data set was time consuming and expensive and, to the best of our knowledge, data of this quality 

are still not collected in a routine, standardized way. Therefore, HMDA data should be revised to 

include credit score information, including the source of the system used. Additional suggested 

information would include: (1) fee and pricing standards for all loans, not just high-cost ones; (2) 

whether the loan was fixed and/or adjustable rate; (3) the length of time in which the initial rate is in 

effect; and (4) loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios. 

As noted, a large number of entities have responsibility for fair housing enforcement, but there is little 

coordination among them. Therefore, a federal inter-agency group should be utilized to coordinate fair 

housing enforcement policy for all federal programs, with transparent reporting on policy results. This 

action could occur through the President’s Fair Housing Council or through a different entity. Any such 

committee should have as one of its primary goals the establishment of a uniform definition of those 

lending practices that constitute predatory lending and those acts that should be prohibited. 

In the course of preparing this report we collected and analyzed an enormous amount of data from many 

regulatory and enforcement agencies. Meaningful analysis of potential civil rights issues arising from 

the mortgage crisis was hampered by differences in both the quality and type of data collected as well as 

by inconsistent enforcement policies taken by these agencies. I strongly recommend that additional 

studies be undertaken regarding racial and ethnic disparities in credit and the source of such disparities. 

Do they arise from legitimate issues of creditworthiness or from other factors? Exploring this issue 

would be greatly aided by the revised HMDA standards recommended above. 

In the final analysis we have not been able to determine whether the mortgage crisis had a 

disproportionate impact upon minorities. Thus we cannot answer the important corollary question: If 

there was a disproportionate impact, is racial discrimination the explanation? 

 

3

 See previous citation of the Federal Reserve study. 

JOINT STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS 

MELENDEZ AND YAKI

Joint Statement of Commissioners Melendez and Yaki 203 

JOINT STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS MELENDEZ AND YAKI

Because this report does not assess (or provide the underlying data necessary to assess) whether federal 

agencies have adequately enforced laws against mortgage lending discrimination, we could not approve 

this report. Much of the information in this report is useful, accurate, and provides a general background 

of federal jurisdiction and efforts to enforce mortgage lending laws. However, more is (and should be) 

expected of the only major annual report1

 of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (“Commission”) on 

such a critical topic. 

While the crisis in mortgage lending has affected all Americans, it has disproportionately hurt many 

minority homeowners and neighborhoods. Media reports and several court filings have identified 

discriminatory mortgage lending practices as a leading cause of minority homeowners’ taking out high 

risk loans. In particular, there have been allegations of “steering,” a practice by brokers and lending 

institutions of directing potential borrowers to apply for certain types of loans (e.g., subprime instead of 

prime) or to certain lenders (e.g., independent companies instead of regulated banks). 

Such steering often occurs in the very first steps of a borrower taking out a mortgage, through targeted 

advertising, marketing, and bad advisory services. But the actions of lenders and brokers in these preapplication steps to a loan are not subject to the same regulatory review or reporting requirements that 

are triggered when a loan application is submitted. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Fair 

Housing Act (FHA) prohibit a lender from providing different information or services at any point in the 

lending process on the basis of a borrower’s protected status (e.g., race, sex, or national origin). 

However, without implementing regulations that focus enforcement agencies’ scrutiny of lenders’ preapplication activities or expand lenders’ disclosures of their activities, it is questionable whether the 

federal agencies responsible for enforcement of ECOA and FHA2

 have been monitoring steering 

enough. 

A July 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled Fair Lending: Data 

Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and 

Enforcement Efforts provides a useful assessment of the challenges faced by federal agencies trying to 

enforce ECOA and FHA prohibitions against steering and other discriminatory actions. GAO auditors 

not only conducted interviews of federal oversight agencies, but independently reviewed and analyzed 

the agencies’ internal policies, past investigations, and even staffing. The report is available to the public 

on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09704.pdf and readers of this Commission 

report are strongly urged to turn to the GAO report for a more thorough, often clearer, examination of 

federal enforcement efforts regarding mortgage lending discrimination. 

 

1

 By statute, the agency is directed to “submit to the President and Congress at least one report annually that monitors Federal

civil rights enforcement efforts in the United States.” 42 USC 1975a(c)(1). This annual report is the only deliverable 

specifically required of the agency by statute. Yet the agency has ceased initiating government-wide reviews of federal civil 

rights enforcement efforts in recent years. The agency’s annual reports now attempt to focus on a narrower civil rights 

enforcement issue, yet even that goal has overwhelmed the agency’s current capacity. 

2

 While multiple agencies have FHA and ECOA enforcement authority over banks and savings and loans, the primary 

agencies with enforcement authority for these and independent nonbank lenders are the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
204 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

In addition to noting the lack of lender reporting data that would enable more vigorous enforcement, the 

main findings of the July 2009 GAO report point to structural flaws in federal oversight: 

Federal oversight of lenders that may represent heightened risks of fair lending law 

violations is limited. For example, the enforcement agencies are responsible for 

monitoring independent mortgage lenders’ compliance with the fair lending laws. Such 

lenders have been large originators of subprime mortgage loans in recent years and have 

more frequently been identified through analysis of HMDA data as outliers than 

depository institutions, such as banks. Depository institution regulators are more likely to 

assess the activities of outliers and, unlike enforcement agencies, they routinely assess the 

compliance of lenders that are not outliers. As a result, many fair lending violations at 

independent lenders may go undetected, and efforts to deter potential violations may be 

ineffective. 

Although depository institution regulators’ fair lending oversight efforts may be more 

comprehensive, the division of responsibility among multiple agencies raises questions 

about the consistency and effectiveness of their efforts. For example, each regulator uses 

a different approach to analyze HMDA data to identify outliers and examination 

documentation varies. Moreover, since 2005, OTS [Office of Thrift Supervision], the 

Federal Reserve, and FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] have referred more 

than 100 lenders to DOJ for further investigations of potential fair lending violations, as 

required by ECOA, while OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] made one 

referral and NCUA [National Credit Union Administration] none.3

GAO auditors explicitly connect these informational and structural flaws of federal enforcement to the 

spike in risky loans made to minority homeowners in recent years. “Independent lenders, which were the 

predominant originators of subprime and other questionable mortgages that often were made to minority 

borrowers in recent years, generally are subject to less comprehensive oversight than federally insured 

depository institutions and represent significant fair lending risks.”4 “Second, limited data are available 

on the premortgage loan application process to help determine if loan officers engage in discriminatory 

practices, such as steering minority applicants to high-cost loans, before a loan application is filed.”5 

The GAO Report stops short of concluding that gaps in federal enforcement efforts allowed widespread 

discriminatory lending practices. However, the report makes clear that minority borrowers relied on 

loans that posed “significant fair-lending risks” and the extent of steering and other discrimination is 

unknown because of informational and structural defects in federal enforcement. 

We support the GAO’s conclusions and recommendations for remedial action, including increased 

reporting requirements for lenders, extension of the statute of limitations for ECOA, and interagency 

cooperation to identify approaches to better assess the potential risk for discrimination during the pre-

 

3

 Government Accountability Office, Fair Lending: Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial Regulatory 

Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts (GAO 09-704), July 2009, Coversheet. 

4 Id. at 63. 

5 Id. at 14. 
Joint Statement of Commissioners Melendez and Yaki 205 

application phase of mortgage lending. We hope that the GAO report, as well as some of the information 

in this Commission report, will spur Congressional and Executive branch action. 

Unfortunately, this Commission report sheds little light on the extent and nature of federal enforcement, 

particularly when compared to the GAO report. There are many causes of this report’s shortcomings. 

Elsewhere, we have noted the erosion of management and research standards for the agency’s reports 

and this one is no exception. Agency written procedures were sidelined as deadlines were repeatedly 

overrun, state advisory committee input was not sought or included, inchoate drafts were presented for 

Commissioners’ comments, and substantial changes were made to the plan originally approved by 

Commissioners without a Commission vote. Mid-stream, primary staff responsibility for this report was 

changed to the agency’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) from the research division, the Office of 

Civil Rights Evaluation (OCRE). Staff cuts and poor management in the Commission’s OCRE division 

have left it with just two social scientists, five staff overall, and an apparent inability to perform a major 

annual research project on its own. Finally, from its inception this report was saddled with a distracting 

directive from Commissioners to consider a misguided policy question—whether the Community 

Reinvestment Act (CRA) and other federal policies meant to aid minority homeownership contributed to 

the recent financial crisis and/or harmed minority homeownership.6 For all these reasons, and despite 

the hard work of several agency staff, the present report has failed to meet the high standards for 

research that were once the hallmark of the Commission. 

The national impact of the mortgage lending crisis, and the impact on minority homeowners in 

particular, has been staggering. As our country reviews and updates its regulatory structures and policies 

to prevent a similar occurrence happening again, leaders at all levels must take further steps to ensure 

that discriminatory mortgage lending practices end. A few years from now, after the wave of reforms 

has set in, we hope the Commission will be able to conduct a more careful review of whether federal 

enforcement of mortgage anti-discrimination laws has been effective. 

 

6

 As the current mortgage crisis first arose a number of conservative academics suggested the CRA and other federal policies 

intended to promote minority homeownership had backfired and that these very policies were responsible in significant part 

for the present crisis. These critics claimed to find a causal link between legislation with minority homeownership goals, such

as the CRA, and the relaxed credit lending standards that swept through the broader marketplace. Mainstream economists and 

federal regulators have since examined the matter and found that the CRA and the federal government’s policies to promote 

minority homeownership are not significant causes of the current mortgage crisis. See Part I, Chapter 2 of the present report, 

above. 

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MELENDEZ 

Rebuttal Statement of Commissioner Melendez 209 

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MELENDEZ 

I join in the rebuttal statement of Commissioner Yaki, but also write to respectfully disagree with many 

of Vice-Chairperson Thernstrom’s claims about what the report did and did not find. I also want to 

make clear to readers that the recommendations in the Vice-Chairperson’s statement are not those of the 

Commission. 

Unlike almost every other report issued by the Commission since 2005, this report has no findings and 

recommendations. No majority could be found to support the staff’s draft findings and 

recommendations, or to put forward alternatives. Why? The report repackaged and highlighted some 

useful information gathered from other sources, but little more. The report’s clear, one-sided evidence 

in Chapter 2 that the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) did not play a significant role in the current 

mortgage crisis, for example, is hardly new.1

 This report and its underlying data are simply 

inconclusive about the many open questions that should have been tackled. 

The Commission did not try to evaluate whether federal regulators were adequately enforcing lending 

discrimination laws (it just describes their jurisdiction and some of the few cases initiated in recent 

years). The Commission did not try to independently verify the conclusions of the 2007 Federal 

Reserve study about credit scoring (it just repeats its findings). Finally, the Commission did not try to 

collect evidence or evaluate whether minority groups were targeted by predatory lending schemes 

(although it describes some instances of fraud and lending discrimination that federal enforcement 

authorities investigated). Consequently, I disagree with the Vice-Chair’s characterization that the 

Commission “did not find” problems with enforcement, credit scoring, or discriminatory predatory 

lending. In truth, the Commission never seriously looked into these questions at all. 

One must look elsewhere to grapple with the extent of mortgage lending discrimination and federal 

enforcement. Again, for a review of the structural gaps in federal enforcement I strongly recommend 

interested readers review the July 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled 

Fair Lending: Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure Challenge 

Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts. Several watchdog and advocacy organizations have also 

done helpful investigations and policy research on these issues, particularly the National Fair Housing 

Alliance. As Vice-Chair Thernstrom points out, there remains a need for more extensive research of 

these issues. However, academics, federal regulators, and enforcement agencies have struggled with the 

current limitations of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and Congressional action must be 

taken to expand HMDA reporting requirements if we are to get a system-wide picture of the extent of 

mortgage lending discrimination. 

Lastly, while I generally support the Vice-Chair’s interest in expanding HMDA data and increasing 

coordination of federal enforcement policy, I find the GAO’s recommendations on these points more 

developed and useful. The Vice-Chair’s call for direct subsidies to increase homeownership in low- and 

moderate income communities is interesting but was not a subject of study by the Commission. Also, 

 

1

 This is the consensus position of academics as well as government experts. See, e.g., the Federal Reserve Bank of 

Cleveland’s February 6, 2009 Conference on the Community Reinvestment Act, proceedings online at 

http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Conferences/2009/2-6-2009/Proceedings.cfm. 
210 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

contrary to the Vice-Chair’s recommendation there is no basis in the agency’s work to conclude that 

there should be a rollback of regulatory mandates as a means to encourage homeownership. 

Our nation should consider all means at its disposal to address persistent economic and racial housing 

segregation, increase homeownership (particularly among minority populations), and enhance the 

effectiveness of lending anti-discrimination laws. Pragmatic solutions for our housing policy are needed 

to create the diverse, inclusive communities of economic opportunity that our country seeks. 
REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER YAKI 

Rebuttal Statement of Commissioner Yaki 213 

REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER YAKI 

I join in the rebuttal statement of Commissioner Melendez and wish to add the following. 

The issue that was literally staring the Commission in the face, but which it chose not to touch, dealt 

with the issue of homeownership in minority communities. A recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center 

showed that gains in ownership in African-American and native-born Latino communities fell sharper 

than those in other communities during the current economic downturn.1

 The study also showed, as 

have other studies, that the gains in homeownership among minority communities between 1995-2004 

was disproportionately tied to relaxed lending standards and subprime loans. 

Interestingly, the Pew Report also showed interesting gaps, trends, and disturbing conclusions that the 

Commission Report barely acknowledged: 

Overall, the ups and downs in the housing market since 1995 have reduced the 

homeownership gap between whites and all racial and ethnic minority groups. However, 

a substantial gap persists. As of 2008, 74.9% of whites owned homes, compared with 

59.1% of Asians, 48.9% of Hispanics and 47.5% of blacks. 

At the same time, blacks and Latinos remain far more likely than whites to borrow in the 

subprime market where loans are usually higher priced.2 In 2007, 27.6% of home 

purchase loans to Hispanics and 33.5% to blacks were higher-priced loans, compared 

with just 10.5% of home purchase loans to whites that year. For black homeowners who 

had a higher-priced mortgage, the typical annual percentage rate (APR) was about 3 

percentage points greater than the rate on a typical 30-year, fixed-rate conventional 

mortgage; for Latinos who had a higher-priced mortgage, the typical rate was about 2.5 

percentage points higher than that of the conventional mortgage. 

Moreover, in 2007, blacks and Hispanics borrowed higher amounts than did whites with 

similar incomes, exposing themselves to greater debt relative to their incomes. On both 

counts—the likelihood of higher-priced borrowing and higher debt relative to income—

the gap between minorities and whites is greater among high-income households than 

among low-income households.2

The questions raised in the Pew Report merit further serious study. To summarize: 

(1) The persistent and substantial homeownership gap between whites and all 

racial/ethnic minority groups; 

(2) The interest rate and loan “type” gap between whites and racial/ethnic groups; and 

 

1

 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13homeowner.html 

2

 Through Boom and Bust: Minorities, Immigrants and Homeownership, Rakesh Kochkar, Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Daniel 

Dockterman, Pew Hispanic Center, May 12, 2009. 
214 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

(3) The fact that the gaps persist even where incomes are comparable. 

It is precisely these putative fact patterns and outcomes that are the raison d’être of the Commission. It 

is our mission to explore, understand, find facts and make recommendations where disparities in our 

society on the basis of race and ethnicity may persist. It does not mean, as some of the Commission 

majority doubtless fear, that it will necessarily result in more programs, regulations, or laws that would 

benefit a specific racial or ethnic group. But it may, but if so, that is for Congress and the Executive to 

debate and decide whether to enact a new law. Nevertheless, it does not serve our charter, does not 

benefit any group, nor does it contribute to our nation to ignore a potential issue and pretend it does not 

exist. Yet, sadly, the current Commission would rather direct its resources to destroy extant programs 

such as affirmative action, rather than to research current and persistent problems that affect our nation’s 

commitment to equality and prosperity for all. 
JOINT REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS GAZIANO, 

REYNOLDS, KIRSANOW, AND TAYLOR 

Joint Rebuttal Statement of Commissioners Gaziano, Reynolds, Kirsanow, and Taylor 217 

JOINT REBUTTAL STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONERS GAZIANO, 

REYNOLDS, KIRSANOW, AND TAYLOR 

The Commission’s 200-plus page report likely will speak for itself, regardless of what individual 

commissioners write about it. The initial statements of some other commissioners, however, deserve 

more attention, and in responding to them, we will refer to the report as well. 

I. Scope and Coverage Issues 

We tend to agree with Commissioners Melendez and Yaki that the scope of the last two statutory report 

projects seems, at least at times, to have “overwhelmed the agency’s current capacity,”1 but we draw 

different conclusions from that assessment than they do. 

• The vacant staff positions noted in comments to last year’s report are, due to budget constraints, 

still vacant. The Office of General Counsel and the Office of Civil Rights Evaluation are still 

operating at a fraction of their statutorily authorized strength. That suggests to us that we need to 

work harder to focus our resources on research questions: (i) that really matter, (ii) that are 

within our current capacity to properly analyze, and (iii) that are within our special mandate. 

• The record of our proceedings reflects that some commissioners urged both staff and 

commissioners to narrow our study of the mortgage crisis and to do so early enough in the 

process so that we could produce social science of special significance. Indeed, commissioners 

reached an agreement early last fall that the topic would be narrowed as the staff work 

progressed and options were presented to us. Yet, at several important junctures, both staff and 

commissioners failed to follow through on this goal. Indeed, Commissioners Melendez and Yaki 

seemed interested in expanding the scope of the inquiry. 

• Notwithstanding the failure to obtain data sources that may have produced more valuable 

original research, commissioners had ample opportunity to direct the staff’s attention to 

particular issues of concern. Based on our discussion at Commission meetings, our staff was 

able to obtain witnesses who provided expert testimony and presented research on questions that 

several of us were interested in exploring. The expert testimony and related research shed light 

on whether certain minority-conscious federal policies may have contributed to a lowering of 

lending standards, and whether that, in turn, contributed to the home mortgage crisis. (See Part 

IV of this statement.) 

• In contrast, Commissioners Melendez and Yaki never expressed an interest or concern with 

allegations of “steering” during our proceedings. Yet, they seem to fault the final report, in part, 

because it did not address whether some brokers and loan officers direct potential borrowers to 

apply for higher-cost loans. If Commissioners Melendez and Yaki were particularly interested in 

that topic, they should have said so before the final report was adopted.2

 

1

 Melendez and Yaki Joint Statement at note 1. 

2

 There are many difficulties in evaluating steering allegations, especially as they relate to allegations of racially-biased 

steering (see below), but no commissioners asked for such an evaluation. Steering may be a subset of predatory lending, but 
218 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

In short, commissioners should not complain that the final report did not contain a discussion of 

something if they did not express an interest in that topic, particularly with a subject as broad as the 

cause of the mortgage crisis, which will be debated in academic circles for years to come. 

II. Quality Issues and the GAO Report 

We agree with Commissioners Melendez and Yaki that “the information in [the instant] report is useful, 

accurate, and provides a general background of federal jurisdiction and efforts to enforce mortgage 

lending laws.” As explained above, we also agree with them that this year’s report could have been more 

valuable. But several of their criticisms—as well as the general tenor of their statement—are off base. 

For example, Commissioners Melendez and Yaki compare a GAO report (issued in late July after the 

final draft of our report was circulated for approval)3

 favorably to our report, but it is not true that the 

GAO Fair Lending report is noticeably superior.4 Though Commissioners Melendez and Yaki rely 

heavily on the GAO report in their statement on “steering” and other matters, the two reports do not 

have the same focus. Readers can judge for themselves the relative merits of the two reports, but we 

think both serve the public interest and neither tells the whole story. 

III. The Lack of Evidence of Race-Based “Steering” 

Neither the Commission’s report nor the GAO report found statistical evidence of racial or ethnic 

discrimination in lending, or a failure by federal agencies to prosecute lending discrimination, which is 

the reasonable starting point to consider the “steering” allegation. Commissioners Melendez and Yaki 

admit there is no data to support claims that steering and other “pre-application activities” are a 

substantial problem. It’s an even greater leap to assume racially-motivated steering is a problem. 

Nevertheless, Commissioners Melendez and Yaki call for increased reporting during the pre-application 

stage. 

In many areas, minority borrowers are more likely to contact loan officers of the same race or ethnicity 

as themselves. Thus, in order to know whether race-based steering is taking place, it would be necessary 

to require the collection of data on the race/ethnicity of the broker, loan officer and every potential 

applicant. It is one thing to require such information on a loan application, but should the government 

really require brokers and loan officers to secure such personal information from every phone caller or 

internet rate inquiry? Even face-to-face contacts will not reveal the racial or ethnic background of many 

potential borrowers. Moreover, it would not be enough to know the race or ethnicity of all parties to a 

potential transaction. It would be necessary to know all the information that was exchanged in order to 

make some assessment regarding whether a particular pre-applicant was steered in the “right” or 

 

as our report relates, the term “predatory lending” has no fixed meaning (other than as a pejorative) and encompasses many 

disparate notions. Indicating an interest in “predatory lending” is not specific enough. 

3

 The final draft of the Commission’s report was circulated to commissioners in mid-July and was approved on August 7, 

2009. The GAO declined to make a copy of its report available to the Commission prior to our mid-July circulation date. 

4

 If the acknowledgement page of the GAO report is an accurate guide, it also appears that the GAO may have devoted about 

three times the number of staffers to its report than the Commission could have. 
Joint Rebuttal Statement of Commissioners Gaziano, Reynolds, Kirsanow, and Taylor 219 

“wrong” direction. There should be some reason to suspect racially-motivated steering is really a 

problem before recommending such an off-putting and potentially burdensome record-keeping regime. 

A lack of data is not an indication of discrimination, but the bigger problem is that there is no logical or 

other reason to suspect discrimination at play in the pre-application process, especially when there is 

little or no evidence of discrimination in the rest of the loan process. Assuming arguendo that there was 

a significant amount of steering by mortgage brokers and lenders, there is no reason to suspect that 

mortgage brokers or lenders have a discriminatory motive to steer only minority borrowers (as opposed 

to all borrowers) to higher-cost products. Whether this is a manipulative practice that should be more 

heavily regulated or not, it makes no sense to think that race or ethnicity is a factor for those who engage 

in it. 

By analogy, stock brokers have an incentive to steer all their clients to make trades that generate more 

and higher commissions, but there is no reason why they would do so only for clients of certain races or 

ethnicities. We suspect that the racial groups that comprise the upper-middle class pay more of these 

commissions, but that is only because they employ stock brokers more often. It has nothing to do with 

racial discrimination. Accordingly, there is no reason to require elaborate collection of data of the race 

of different stock market players. Likewise, neither the Commission’s report nor the GAO’s report 

contains sufficient evidence to support new record-keeping requirements for pre-application contacts in 

the mortgage lending industry. 

IV. How Minority-Conscious Policies May Have Helped Cause and Exacerbate the 

Credit Crisis 

As Vice Chair Thernstrom correctly points out, the report states that the data are inconclusive as to 

whether the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) or the Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD) affordable housing goals contributed to the mortgage crisis.5 In their joint 

statement, Commissioners Melendez and Yaki point to some economists and federal regulators under 

fire who claim that “the CRA and the federal government’s policies to promote minority 

homeownership are not significant causes of the current mortgage crisis.”6 Such self-serving claims, 

however, should not end the inquiry into whether and to what extent the CRA and other federal policies 

may have played a role in causing the mortgage crisis. Our report cites several other experts who make 

convincing cases that federal policies were major contributors to the crisis.7

Those who downplay the impact of the CRA cite the fact that only a small portion of failed loans were 

made by lenders subject to the CRA.8 Professor Stan Liebowitz offered an interesting analogy to rebut 

 

5

AN EXAMINATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE MORTGAGE CRISIS (“REPORT”), ch. 3, §§ V-VI. 

6

 Commissioners Melendez and Yaki also claim that it was a waste of time even to investigate whether the CRA and other 

federal policies contributed to the mortgage crisis. Apparently, they would have avoided reviewing the major federal policies 

that explicitly sought to increase minority homeownership. 

7 Id. ch. 2. 

8 Id. ch. 2, § I (citing Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Dugan Says CRA Not Responsible for 

Subprime Lending Abuses (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-136.htm). 
220 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

this point. Assume that a small group of sports car owners successfully lobbies to repeal all traffic lights 

and speed limits. Traffic laws are thus weakened. Chaos on the roads ensues, with traffic jams, 

increased accidents and injuries. When people blame the sports car owners, they point out that their 

sports cars comprise only a small portion of the cars involved in traffic jams and accidents. On that 

basis, they claim that they had nothing to do with the chaos on the roads.9 Professor Liebowitz argued 

that the CRA and the HUD affordable housing goals contributed to the weakening of lending standards 

and thereby contributed to the mortgage crisis. This theory is worth exploring, and our report does so. 

The Genesis of Weakened Credit Standards. The administrations of both Bill Clinton and George W. 

Bush set aggressive goals to increase homeownership in the United States, particularly for minorities 

and low-income individuals.10 Part of the effort included encouraging lenders to weaken credit 

standards, such as by reducing down payment requirements and adopting more flexible loan policies.11 

Community groups such as the National People’s Action on Housing pressured the federal government 

to weaken credit standards.12 Federal policy resulted in substantial gains in home ownership, at least 

until the crash. Overall home ownership increased from 64 to 69 percent from 1994 to 2004. Black and 

Hispanic rates of home ownership increased more than that for whites during this period.13

However, the data suggest that weakening credit standards may not have been an effective means to 

increase home ownership for minorities in the long run. Conventional mortgage loans approved, as a 

percentage of conventional loan applications received, increased for all groups from 1999 to 2004, with 

blacks and Hispanics experiencing a greater increase than whites. But as the market tightened from 

2004 to 2007, blacks and Hispanics suffered a greater decline in the rate of loan approvals than whites.14

Subprime mortgage data from 2004 to 2007 similarly show that weakening credit standards may have 

been counterproductive. Subprime mortgages increased dramatically for all groups from 2004 to 2005 

and decreased dramatically from 2006 to 2007. Most minority groups, including blacks and Hispanics, 

received subprime mortgages at a higher rate than whites.15 The foreclosure rate for subprime 

mortgages, always higher than for prime, rose dramatically from 2006 to 2008.16

The CRA and the HUD affordable housing goals certainly encouraged banks to weaken standards. In 

addition to the direct requirements imposed on CRA-covered banks, the CRA may have made it easier 

for banks with more aggressive, riskier lending policies to grow bigger through mergers and acquisitions 

relative to other banks with more prudent lending policies. This may be because the CRA requires 

federal bank regulators, such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 

(FDIC), to take into account a bank’s CRA record when evaluating the bank’s application to merge with 

 

9

 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Briefing Transcript at 53-54 (Mar. 20, 2009). 

10 REPORT, ch. 1, § I. 

11 Id.

12 Id. 

13 Id. ch. 3, § I.B, fig. 3.1. 

14 Id. ch. 3, § II.A & fig. 3.3. 

15 Id. ch. 3, § III.A, figs. 3.9, 3.10. 

16 Id. ch. 3, § IV, figs. 3.11, 3.12. 
Joint Rebuttal Statement of Commissioners Gaziano, Reynolds, Kirsanow, and Taylor 221 

or acquire another bank, or to open a branch in a new state.17 In addition, federal bank regulators must 

consider comments and objections made by the public.18 Public comments by community organizations 

and members of the public can have a substantial effect on regulators.19 The danger to a bank that a 

federal regulator would turn down a proposed merger or acquisition based on CRA-type objections was 

real.20

To meet CRA requirements and avoid protests by community organizations, banks may have sought 

innovative ways to make loans to low-income borrowers in low-income communities. In a speech in 

1998, Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H. Meyer noted concerns by “community development 

groups” that automated underwriting and credit scoring could result in “disparate impact 

discrimination.”21 To respond to these concerns, he urged banks to take advantage of new mortgage 

products in order to issue no-money down loans.22

Perhaps the most striking example of the conjunction between the CRA and aggressive lending practices 

was the case of Washington Mutual (WaMu). On December 21, 2001, WaMu announced approval from 

the Office of Thrift Supervision for its merger with Dime Bancorp.23 In order to receive approval, 

WaMu made an unprecedented, $375 billion commitment to lend to low- and moderate-income 

borrowers.24

In late September 2008, the FDIC seized WaMu and sold its assets to JP Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion, 

despite WaMu purportedly having assets of $307 billion.25 This was the largest bank failure in 

American history. 

 

17 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2); 2902(3)(E). Examining CRA requirements before blessing a merger or acquisition is the “stick” 

that helps regulators enforce CRA and keep the attention of regulated banks. Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the Disease or 

Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 633-34 (Spring 2009). 

18 12 C.F.R. § 262.25. 

19 John Taylor and Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the Future, 53 N.Y.L.

SCH. L. REV. 203, 206 (2008/2009). 

20 In 1993, the Federal Reserve initially denied Hartford, Connecticut-based Shawmut National Corporation’s acquisition of 

New Dartmouth Bank of Manchester, New Hampshire, on the grounds of “possible lending bias.” Steven Greenhouse, Fed 

Stops Bank Merger: Cites Lending Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993. The New York Times quoted one banking analyst, 

“‘The Fed is sending a strong signal to the banking industry that they're going to be looking at banks’ lending practices,’ said 

Joseph Duwan, a banking analyst with Keefe, Bruyette & Woods. ‘Clearly Shawmut is being made a little bit of scapegoat.’” 

Id. Shawmut certainly got the signal. It undertook an aggressive program to “increase lending activity to low-income 

Americans and minority groups that ... [included] the use of more flexible income criteria.” Id.

21 Governor Laurence H. Meyer, Remarks Before the 1998 Community Reinvestment Act Conference of the Consumer 

Bankers Association (May 12, 1998). 

22 Id.

23 Press Release, Washington Mutual, Washington Mutual Receives Regulatory Approval of Dime Acquisition (Dec. 21, 

2001). 

24 Id.

25 Madlen Read, AP Business Writer, WaMu’s Forced Sale Makes It Biggest U.S. Bank Ever to Fail, Sept. 26, 2008, 

available at http://blog.cleveland.com/business/2008/09/wamus_forced_sale_makes_it_big.html. 
222 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Credit Scoring and Discrimination: The Harmful Impact of the Boston Fed Study. One alleged 

justification for loosening credit standards in the 1990s was the belief that credit scoring based on a 

traditional credit history discriminates against minorities. As Vice Chair Thernstrom noted in her 

statement, the report found no evidence that standard credit scoring is discriminatory. In fact, a Federal 

Reserve Board study from 2007 found that credit scores accurately predict risk for all major 

demographic groups. The study found that blacks and those living in lower-income and minority 

neighborhoods tend to underperform what their credit score would predict, while Asian-Americans and 

those living in higher-income neighborhoods tend to overperform what their credit scores predict. That 

is, the default rate for blacks was slightly higher than other races with the same credit scores, while the 

default rate for Asian-Americans was slightly lower.26 

Yet, the Commission’s report explains the serious, fatal flaws of an earlier (1992) study conducted by 

the Boston Federal Reserve Bank (BF).27 That study had a profound influence on the public discussion 

and on policymakers, despite its invalidity.28 Financial institutions “responded to the [BF study’s] 

findings by making their underwriting criteria more flexible.”29 Until the early 1990s, the focus of bank 

regulators was on intentional discrimination. But the BF study “changed that, and attention has focused 

ever since on the issue of unintentional disparate treatment.”30 

Boston Fed Lending Guidelines. Perhaps the first policy change came at the BF itself when it 

published new lending guidelines, “Closing the Gap: A Guide to Equal Opportunity Lending,” following 

the release of the study.31 The purpose of the guidelines was to help “lenders as they work to close the 

mortgage gap” and as they “expand their markets to reach a more diverse customer base.”32 To reach 

more minority customers, the BF warned against “underwriting standards contain[ing] arbitrary or 

unreasonable measures of creditworthiness.”33 The guidelines suggested that lenders review their 

lending criteria, including standards relating to (1) the traditional obligation ratio, (2) down payments 

and closing costs, and (3) credit history.34 On this last point, the task force stated: 

 

26 REPORT, ch. 5, § II.A.2. 

27 Id. ch. 5, § I. 

28 The American Economic Review, where the revised 1996 version was published, is widely regarded as the leading journal 

in economics. The study “had an enormous impact on the banking industry.” Peter Passell, Beyond Statistics: Study Doesn’t 

Settle Issue of Why Minorities Lag in Mortgages, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 18, 1996. 

29 Joseph M. Kolar and Jonathan D. Jerison, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Its History, Evolution, and Limitations, 59 

CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 189, 190 (Fall 2005). Richard Syron, who headed the BF when it performed and issued the study, 

was named chairman and chief executive of Freddie Mac in 1993. Syron was selected to head Freddie Mac, in part, because 

of his leadership in completing and issuing the BF study. 

30 Shooting the Rapids of Credit Scoring and Fair Lending, ABA BANKING J., Vol. 89, Issue no. 9, Sept. 1, 1997. 

31 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, CLOSING THE GAP: A GUIDE TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LENDING. The guidelines 

make reference to the BF study in the editors’ note on page 2. 

32 Id. at 5.

33 Id. at 13. 

34 Id. at 13-14. 
Joint Rebuttal Statement of Commissioners Gaziano, Reynolds, Kirsanow, and Taylor 223 

Policies regarding applicants with no credit history or problem credit history should be 

reviewed. Lack of credit history should not be seen as a negative factor. . . . In 

reviewing past credit problems, lenders should be willing to consider extenuating 

circumstances.35

Although these recommendations were only “guidelines,” the publication ominously highlights the 

liability for lenders who fail to comply with federal housing laws. The message from the guidelines is 

clear: financial institutions must weaken their lending standards or they may face significant legal and 

financial exposure.

HUD Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending. The BF study’s influence was next felt in the major 

federal agencies with jurisdiction over fair housing laws. HUD led an Interagency Task Force on Fair 

Lending, which issued a “Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending” on April 15, 1994.36 The 

task force specifically cited the BF study as one of the reasons for its concern about discrimination

lending.

 in 

37 The purpose of the task force was “to establish uniform policy against discriminatory 

lending” because the federal agencies “share[d] a concern that some prospective homebuyers and other 

borrowers may be experiencing discriminatory treatment in their efforts to obtain loans.”38 

The HUD policy statement asserted that neutral lending policies which have a “disparate impact” on 

protected groups may be illegal.39 HUD further argued that intent is not necessary to show illegal 

discrimination.40 Once a disparate impact is identified, HUD maintained that the financial institution is 

illegally discriminating unless it can show that the “policy or practice is justified by ‘business 

necessity.’”41 The business necessity must be “manifest and may not be hypothetical or speculative.”42

 

35 Id. at 14. 

36 59 Fed. Reg. 18266 (April 15, 2009). The task force members were representatives of HUD, the Department of Justice, the 

Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal 

Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance Board, the Federal Trade 

Commission, and the National Credit Union Administration. 

37 Id. at 18267. 

38 Id.

39 Id. at 18269. The policy statement is “based upon” two fair lending statutes, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 

and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Id. at 18267. Neither statute explicitly creates a cause of action based on disparate impact, 

but the courts have read such a cause of action into them. See, e.g., McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 505 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2008) (FHA); Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (ECOA). The Supreme Court has 

never ruled on whether disparate impact claims are permissible under ECOA or FHA. 

40 59 Fed. Reg. 18266, 18269. 

41 Id.

42 Id.
224 Civil Rights and the Mortgage Crisis 

Similar to the BF lending guidelines, the task force stated, “[L]enders should think critically about 

whether widespread, familiar requirements and practices have an unjustifiable disparate impact.”43 The 

message for financial institutions was that if a traditional lending policy has a disparate impact on 

minorities, the easiest path may be to weaken the policy. Otherwise, the financial institution may be 

challenged by federal regulators.44

HUD Affordable Housing Goals. The thinking that animated the BF study also influenced the 

affordable housing goals set for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by HUD, as described in Chapter 1, 

Section III, of our report. As noted above, HUD led the interagency task force warning financial 

institutions that their traditional lending standards may be illegal if they have a disparate impact on 

minority borrowers. HUD’s affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were one way to 

ameliorate this alleged discrimination. Increasing the number of loans in low-income areas and to lowincome borrowers are indirect ways to increase loans to minorities and thereby reduce the alleged 

discrimination faced by minority borrowers, or so the thinking went. As discussed in the section on 

HUD’s affordable housing goals, the requirement for loans bought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

going to low- and moderate-income borrowers rose from 30 percent in 1993 to 56 percent in 2008.45

Conclusion. The impact of minority-conscious federal programs on lowering lending standards and the 

subsequent default rate for minority and other borrowers may never be known with much precision. The 

Commission’s study certainly did not attempt to quantify the possible impact. But the report sheds 

considerable light on possible causes that future scholars and public policy experts should pursue. It 

would be a mistake to ignore these leads just because the regulators themselves say that their policies 

had nothing to do with the mortgage crisis. 

 

43 Id. at 18269-18270. 

44 See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, How Did We Get into This Financial Mess?, USA TODAY (MAG.), May 1, 2009 

(“[B]eginning in 1993, officials in [HUD] began bringing legal actions against mortgage bankers that declined a higher 

percentage of minority applicants than white applicants. To avoid legal trouble, lenders began relaxing their down-payment 

and income qualifications.”). 

45 REPORT, ch. 1, § III.C. 


U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is an independent, 

bipartisan agency established by Congress in 1957. It is 

directed to:

•	Investigate complaints alleging that citizens are

being deprived of their right to vote by reason of their 

race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national 

origin, or by reason of fraudulent practices.

•	Study and collect information relating to

discrimination or a denial of equal protection of 

the laws under the Constitution because of race, 

color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national 

origin, or in the administration of justice.

•	Appraise federal laws and policies with respect to

discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws 

because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or 

national origin, or in the administration of justice.

•	Serve as a national clearinghouse for information

in respect to discrimination or denial of equal 

protection of the laws because of race, color, 

religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin.

•	Submit reports, findings, and recommendations

to the President and Congress.

•	Issue public service announcements to discourage

discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws.

Members of the Commission

Gerald A. Reynolds, Chairman

Abigail Thernstrom, Vice Chair

Todd Gaziano

Gail Heriot

Peter N. Kirsanow

Arlan D. Melendez

Ashley L. Taylor, Jr.

Michael Yaki

Martin Dannenfelser, Staff Director

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

624 Ninth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20425

(202) 376-8128 voice

(202) 376-8116 TTY

www.usccr.gov

This report is available on disk in ASCII Text and Microsoft Word 2003 for persons with visual impairments. Please call (202) 376-8110.

Cover photo: “Suburban American Flag.” David Gilder, 2006. Photo: istockphoto.com.
U . S . C o m m i ss i o n o n C i v i l R i g h t s

Washington, DC 20425

Visit us on the web: www.usccr.gov