del" army on Saudi soil, home to Mecca

and Medina, the two holiest cities in

Islam (forbidden to nonbelievers), was a

potential public relations disaster. On the

other hand, Saddam had invaded Kuwait,

a fellow Arab country that had materially

aided Iraq in its war against Iran. Moreover, Saddam's own Ba'athist party was an

avowedly secular organization devoted in

part to ethnic Arab nationalism. Both of

these facts helped Saudi Arabia maintain

its image in the Islamic world while accepting American aid. But the situation

required constant, careful manipulation.

There were many tensions between the

Saudis, who naturally wished Coalition

forces would disrupt Saudi life as little as

possible, and the Coalition forces who

often felt unappreciated by the Saudis

they were ostensibly in the desert to protect.

Saudi military forces were divided into

two distinct services. The Ministry of

Defense and Aviation (MODA) consisted

of the regular Saudi ground and aviation

forces, whose mission was to protect the

kingdom from external threats. The

Gen Khaled bin Sultan bin Saud, a prince

of the Saudi royal family, was the Joint

Forces Commander and General

Schwartzkopf's opposite number. Joint

Forces Command was composed of the

Coalition's Islamic members forces: Saudi

Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and others. The Battle of al-Khafji was the first conflict on

Saudi soil in decades; as a result Gen

Khaled was pressured to end the battle decisively and quickly.

DVIC DA-ST-92-08034

Saudi aviation forces were folded, along

with other Coalition air forces, into the

air campaign, but the Royal Saudi Land

Forces or Saudi Army operated separately

as nine brigades.21

The Ministry of Defense and Aviation

units were supplemented by the Saudi

Arabian National Guard (SANG) comprised of two mechanized brigades. Ostensibly the Saudi Arabian National

Guard was intended to reinforce the Ministry of Defense and Aviation forces in the

event of a war, but in reality the Saudi National Guard's primary role was to protect

the royal family from internal rebellion.

Staffed with personnel loyal to the House

of Saud specifically through family and

tribal ties, the Saudi Arabian National

Guard was descended from the Ikhwan

(White Army), a Wahhabi tribal militia,

which formed the main body of Ibn

Saud's forces during World War I. The

Saudi government employed the National

Guard to protect the holy cities of Mecca

and Medina, and to counter the regular

armed forces in the event of an attempted

coup. It received the lion's share of training and equipment that was available to

Saudi forces, although it did not possess

tanks.22

The Saudi National Guard was favored

over the Ministry of Aviation and Defense. The Royal family kept the two

forces separated, and neither force

trained with the other. Nevertheless, oilrich Saudi Arabia did not lack resources

and both services were lavishly equipped

with modern military hardware. Despite

massive amounts spent on modernization, many Saudi soldiers lacked professional standards or competence and the

officer corps granted the noncommissioned officers neither authority nor responsibility.

In 1990-1991, direct American military assistance to Saudi Arabia centered

around two organizations. Officially,

there was the Department of Defense's

Office of Program Manager for the Modernization of the Saudi National Guard,

which assigned American officers as advisors to the Saudi National Guard. In

addition, the Vinnell Corporation provided military contract advisors to the

Saudi National Guard, most of whom

were American veterans of the Vietnam

War. In both cases, the personnel assigned to train the Saudi National Guard

prior to the invasion of Kuwait fought

with the National Guard forces, greatly

increasing their effectiveness. The military advisors and Vinnell Corporation

employees worked closely together supporting the Saudi National Guard.23

Since neither Saudi Arabia nor the

United States was willing to have its forces

under the other's command, a Joint structure was set up. Joint Forces Command,

a parallel organization of Central Command, was composed of most of the Arab

contingents and was led by Saudi General

Khaled bin Sultan. A nephew of King

Fahd, he was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and the Air

War College at Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama. In 1986, after 25 years in the

armed forces of his country, General

Khaled was appointed commander of the

Royal Saudi Air Defence Forces.

The command was further subdivided

into Joint Forces Command-North and

Joint Forces Command-East. Joint Forces

Command-North, although dominated

by two Egyptian divisions, also contained

Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and

Aviation, Kuwaiti, and Syrian brigades. It

controlled the territory from the "elbow"

at al-Manaqish to the Kuwait-Iraq border.

Saudi National Guard units, Ministry of

Defense and Aviation forces, as well as

Kuwaiti forces and a Qatari mechanized

brigade made up Joint Forces CommandEast. It controlled the territory from the

eastern border of the al-Wafrah oil fields

to the Persian Gulf coast, including alKhalji and the surrounding territory.24

The assignment of National Guard units

under the command of General Khaled

was out of the ordinary, and indicated

how seriously the House of Saud took the

crisis.25 The placement of the subcommands was due to Arab pride which dictated that they hold positions in the front

line to ensure theirs would be the first

blood shed.

Although well equipped, and provided

with professional military advisors, the

Saudi forces were still not up to Western

military standards. Islamic holidays,

daily prayers, and familial obligations

dramatically decreased the amount of

training. The troops generally averaged

an eighth grade education. The officers

were often well educated and most spoke

at least some English, but they were discouraged from independent thought or

The Battle of al-Khafji 7
action until given battalion-level command. They faced tremendous pressure

to keep their superiors happy. As Captain

Joseph Molofsky, 3d Marines liaison officer to the 2d Brigade of the Saudi Arabian

National Guard, noted: "It's all make or

break. You displease your senior and

you're done forever. You make him happy

and he sends you on vacation to Europe.

Literally:'26 Saudi forces were untested in

1991, having last seen action in the 1920s.

There was serious concern about how

well they would perform in battle.27

i

As Desert Shield progressed, additional liaison elements were attached to

the Saudi forces. United States Army Special Forces teams were attached to Ministry of Defense and Aviation forces at the

brigade level, and the Marine Corps assigned 1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison

Company (1st ANGLICO) teams

throughout Joint Forces CommandEast.28 When it became clear that the 1st

Marine Division would be fighting beside

Saudi forces, the division's commander,

Major General James M. Myatt, ordered

his assistant division commander,

Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, to

take primary responsibility for liaison duties.29 Brigadier General Draude used 3d

Marines, the Marine unit nearest to Joint

Forces Command-East units, as the primary focus of his liaison effort. As

Colonel John A. Admire, commander of

the 3d Marines, noted:

We were the only U.S. combat force

located on the eastern coast. Now

the significance of that of course is

that we continued to train with

Coalition forces. We were the division's primary instrument from October-November-December and

through January of training with

the Saudis and training with the

Qatari forces.

Colonel Admire assigned Captain

Molofsky, an officer with previous experience in the Middle East serving with the

United Nations on the Sinai Peninsula, as

the 3d Marines liaison officer to the 2d

Brigade, Saudi Arabian National Guard.3°

From the beginning, there was tension

between the Marines and the Saudis.

"The Marines felt that they needed to get

their own eyes on," Captain Molofsky explained. "They couldn't trust the Saudis.

The Saudis were insulted that the Marines

didn't trust them."3' This situation was exacerbated in January 1991 when 3d

Marines was given the duty of protecting

the town and airfield of al-Mishab. Previously al-Mishab had been part of Joint

Force Command-East's area of operations; placing it within the Marine area of

operations, especially as the United States

began to use the airfield, implied a lack of

faith in Saudi military capabilities on the

part of Marine commanders.32

In addition to the U.S. Army advisors

and Special Forces teams assigned to the

Saudi forces, commanders attached airnaval gunfire liaison teams to coordinate

Marine air and artillery support for the

Saudis. Specifically, 1st ANGLICO was

attached to Joint Forces Command-East,

and in turn the company assigned supporting arms liaison teams to Saudi

brigades and fire control teams to Saudi

battalions. These teams worked closely

with their Saudi counterparts, developing

excellent working relationships.33

On the eve of the battle of al-Khaf5i,

8 The Battle of al-Khaf)i

Coalition Armored Vehicles

P. i A

Vehicle Type Armament Top

Speed

1I____ AMX-30

105mm main gun

Coax 12.7mm MG

7.62mm MG

65kph

M-60

105mm main gun

Coax 7.62mm MG

12.7mm MG

48kph

LAV-25

25mm main gun

2 x 7.62mm MG

4 troops

or

TOW-2 ATGM

lOOkph

—----L V-150

.50 caliber MG

6-8 troops or 4 troops

TOW-2

88kph

..t—-.. M-113

12.7mm MG

11 troops

or

4 troops

TOW ATGM

6lkph
American and Saudi forces had worked

and trained together for five months.

There was some unease between the two

forces, but both sides had made a concerted effort to overcome it. The Iraqi invasion would put those efforts to the test.

The Saudi coastal town of Ra's alKhal5i, more commonly know as alKhafi, lies approximately seven miles

south of the Saudi-Kuwait border. Before

the war, the primary industries in the

town were oil and tourism, but it was essentially deserted just prior to the attack.

General Khaled bin Sultan had ordered

the town evacuated in August because it

was too close to the Kuwaiti border to

properly defend.34 North of the town

there was a water desalination plant, and

to the south there was an oil refinery, a

pier, and a small airstrip. Southeast, beyond the town's outskirts, was a Saudi

Arabian National Guard compound.

Ra's al-KhaI5i was particularly difficult

to defend because the town lies to the

north of extensive sabkhas or salt

marshes. As Captain Molofsky explained:

"A sabkha is a patch of desert that has

some kind of underlying moisture that

causes a thin, mud like crust to develop

on the top, which cracks in the heat, but

it's easily penetrated by a vehicle and very

soft underneath—you get stuck in it in a

huge way."35 The sabkhas served to channel traffic onto the coastal highway, especially the heavy vehicles needed to support the logistics of large military forces.

Covering deployed Coalition forces

were a series of observation posts strung

out along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. Each

post was situated near a Saudi border fort,

described by virtually every eyewitness as

a "Beau Geste fort' U.S. Navy Sea, Air,

and Land (SEAL), Army Special Forces,

and Marine reconnaissance teams

manned these posts in order to gather intelligence on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Placed at 10 to 20 kilometer intervals, Observation Post 8 was set on the coast, Observation Post 7, further to the west, with

Observation Posts 2, 1, 4, 5, and 6 following the border until the "elbow" was

reached at alJathathil.*

Nearest to the coast, the Marine Corps'

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group controlled Observation

Posts 8, 7, and 2.** The coastal highway

ran between Observation Post 7 and Observation Post 8, which gave those two

posts overlapping oversight of the most

likely route into al-Khafi. In addition to

the special operations teams, air-naval

gunfire supporting arms liaison teams

also occupied these observation posts.

The 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

*MOSt works on the Battle of aI-Khaf)i list the observation posts slightly differently from east to west:

OP-8, OP-7, OP-i, OP-2, OP-4, OP-5, and OP-6.

Two important primary sources, the command

chronology of the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion and the after action report of 1st ANGLICOI 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

Intelligence Group both make clear that the order

should be the one given in the text.

**The 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (1st SRIG) was a unit responsible for

coordinating intelligence gathering operations, and

was subordinate to the I Marine Expeditionary

Force (I MEF) rather than the 1st Marine Division.

Its primary headquarters was with the I MEF headquarters, but it maintained a forward headquarters

in al-Khaf)i.

The Battle of al-Khafji 9

Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

Saudi soldiers move through the evacuated border city of aI-Khafji. Although the city's

architecture was relatively monotonous it offered civilized amenities and was a popular

stop for Coalition commanders and journalists.

The crew of a Marine LAV-25 scans the desert. The LAV-25 was the backbone of the light

armored infantry battalions, an untried concept prior to the Battle of al-Khafji. The battalions were used in a traditional cavalry role, providing a screen in front of the main body

of I Marine Expeditionary Force.

History Division Photo
Intelligence Group had a headquarters at

the desalination plant located to the north

of al-Khafji.36 The 1st Air-Naval Gunfire

Liaison Company, attached to Joint

Forces Command-East, was a subordinate unit of the 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group, which

coordinated closely in and around alKhalji with the various units in the

Kuwaiti border area.

Task Force Shepherd (1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion) of the 1st Marine Division had companies on a

screening mission near Observation Post

4 (Company D), Observation Post 5

(Company B) and Observation Post 6

(Company C). Only Observation Post 4

had a Marine reconnaissance platoon in

place when the Iraqi attack occurred on

29 January.37 * The 2d Marine Division's

2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion established a similar screen to the east directly in front of the al-Wafrah oil fields

and Observation Post 1, between Task

Force Shepherd and the Joint Forces

Command-East area of operations along

the coast.

Under the command of Maj or General

Sultan 'Adi al-Mutairi, Joint Forces Command-East was further divided into task

forces. Abu Bakr Task Force, comprised

of the 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard

Brigade and an attached Qatari armored

battalion, was responsible for al-KhaiJi

and the surrounding desert. The 2d Saudi

Arabian National Guard Brigade's 5th

Battalion established a screen north of alKhafji and west of the coastal highway,

behind Observation Post 7. Tariq Task

Force, comprised of the nascent Saudi

Arabian Marines as well as a battalion of

Moroccan infantry, was along the coast

south of al-Khafji. Further west was 0thman Task Force, built around the 8th

Mechanized Ministry of Defense and Aviation Brigade. A battalion of the 8th

Brigade served as a screening force behind Observation Posts 2 and 7. In addition, further west in Joint Forces

Command-East's area of operation was

Omar Task Force, built around the 10th

Mechanized Ministry of Defense and Avi-

* The 1st Marine Division's 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion was actually a composite organization with companies from three separate light

armored infantry battalions. To encourage a sense

of identity in the ad hoc battalion, it was designated

Task Force Shepherd.

ation Brigade, with a battalion serving as

a screen behind the border. The Saudi

mechanized screens were approximately

three kilometers behind the border, while

the main Saudi defensive positions were

approximately 20 kilometers behind the

screen. The I Marine Expeditionary Force's

area of operations at this time was shaped

somewhat like a fat "L." The leg of the "L"

extended along the bend of the SaudiKuwaiti border from al-Jathathil to just

east of the oil fields at al-Wafrah and the

foot of the "L" extended south of Joint

Forces Command-East's area of operations to al-Mishab and the airfield. AlMishab and the surrounding area were

held by Task Force Taro, built around the

3d Marines. The pillar of the "L" was held

by Task Force Shepherd and 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, which

stretched along the border in a light armored screen. Behind this screen was the

massive Marine logistical base at Kibrit,

which Lieutenant General Boomer, commander ofT Marine Expeditionary Force,

decided to place forward of the main Marine combat forces, in order to speed the

eventual attack into Kuwait. Kibrit was

relatively vulnerable, and during the Iraqi

attack on a1-Khaii, Brigadier General

Charles C. Krulak, commander of the Direct Support Command and the Kibrit logistics base, would quickly call for

armored forces to establish positions

north of the base. There is little indication, however, that the Iraqis were ever

aware of the base, or its importance to future Marine operations in the region.39

Colonel Admire, responsible for the

defense of al-Mishab, was unconvinced

that Saudi forces between the Marines

and the Iraqis would fight if attacked. In

January, he began to run reconnaissance

training missions into the town of alKhafji. Teams from the 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion,

then attached to Task Force Taro, would

infiltrate the city by vehicle, usually

humvees, establish an observation post,

and then leave a day or so later. Unfortunately, these missions were not coordinated with the Coalition forces in

al-Khafji. This would have a dramatic impact during the Iraqi invasion, as Captain

Molofsky later noted: "I was unaware, [1st

ANGLICO's Captain James R.} Braden

was unaware, and the Saudis were unaware, that the Marines had reconnaissance teams up in al-KhaIji."4°

Other Marine operations would lead

to the Coalition's success at al-KhafJi,

however. In response to the difficulties

involved in defending Saudi Arabia from

an Iraqi attack in the early days of Operation Desert Shield, Marine planners had

developed Task Force Cunningham.

They designed it as a task organized, aviation only task force that would stop Iraqi

ground maneuver forces with concentrated fire from the air, covering the withdrawal of Saudi and Marine forces along

the coastal highway. Bell UH-1N Huey

and AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters

would operate alongside North American

OV-1OD Broncos and McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II fixed wing aircraft

in the task force. Joint Forces CommandEast liked the plan, and it would serve as

the model for air support during the battle.41

After the air campaign against Iraq

began, I Marine Expeditionary Force

began a series of artillery raids against

Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The first artillery

raid occurred on the night of 21 January,

and was fired from a location just north of

al-KhafJi against enemy artillery positions

north of the border. Two subsequent raids

occurred on the nights of 26 January and

28 January. The 26 January raid was near

the "elbow" at al-Jathathil, while the third

was again from just north of al-KhafJi. Although Iraqi counter-battery fire was ineffective, there was a vehicular accident

during the 26 January raid that resulted in

the death of three Marines.

The raids served multiple purposes.

First, they were aimed at specific Iraqi artillery forces; second they were designed

to confuse and bewilder the Iraqis by

making the ultimate Marine breaching

points unclear; and third they permitted

Marine air to strike against the Iraqi artillery, considered Iraq's most dangerous

conventional asset, which inevitably

replied with counter-battery fire.

Each raid followed the same basic pattern. A Marine artillery battery would advance to the border and fire a carefully

planned barrage. As soon as the shells

cleared the barrels, they would "limber"

the artillery pieces and drive away. Within

minutes, the firing location would be

10 The Battle of al-Khafji
empty desert. When Iraqi artillery attempted counter-battery fire, it would fall

on the abandoned position, and waiting

Marine air would pounce on the revealed

Iraqi artifiery and destroy it.

The composition of the raid forces followed a pattern as well. The ground element consisted of a battery of artillery

with a small security force and a company

of light armored vehicles from one of the

light armored infantry battalions. The 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing provided an aviation element: usually an OV-10 aircraft

acting as an airborne forward air controller, a McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D

Hornet and two Grumman A-6E Intruders to strike the enemy artillery sites, an

F/A-18D and two McDonnell Douglas

F/A- 18 Hornets to suppress enemy air defenses, an F/A-18D as a forward air controller, and a Grumman EA-6B Prowler

to provide electronic counter-measures

support.42 *

Despite the danger of Coalition air attacks, Saddam Hussein journeyed from

Baghdad to the southern Iraqi city of alBasrah on the morning of 27 January,

*The F/A-18D was a two seat version of the F/A-iS.

It was often used to perform coordination duties or

to act as an airborne forward air controller.

where he met with two of his senior Iraqi

officers in Kuwait, General Aeeid Khlel

Zaky, commander of IV Corps, and General Salah Aboud Mahmoud commander

of III Corps. Among others at the meeting

was the Minister of Defense, the chief of

staff, their deputies, other members of the

general staff, and Colonel Aboud Haneed

Mahoud, commander of Saddam's bodyguard.43

Al-Basrah's infrastructure was in ruins:

"It was apparent on the road, which had

big holes from the bombs and some destroyed military vehicles on the both side

of the road:' General Salah Aboud remembered. "In al-Basrah region all the

damage was clear and we noticed it on the

bridge, railroads, on the roads, on the facilities.... And the streets were very dark,

compared to before the war, when they

were glowing." At the military headquarters there was no power and small candles

dimly lit the rooms. General Salah did not

realize that he was to meet Saddam until

he "saw the faces of the special guards'

At the meeting, the Iraqi president presented the plan for the attack on al-KhaIJi

and then gave his officers some words of

inspiration. As General Hashem Sultan

later recalled, Saddam began by discussing

Iraqi military successes in the Iran-Iraq

War. He said that success had come from

Iraqi willpower, despite Iran's advantages

in personnel and material. Then he discussed the Coalition air campaign against

"our factories, cities, and roads:' The air

attacks had already lasted two weeks, he

explained, because the Coalition did not

have as much willpower as the Iranians

and was afraid to fight a ground war

against Iraq.45

He then told his officers that by inflicting casualties on the Coalition they would

win the war, and save the lives of thousands of Iraqi citizens. Waiting was not to

Iraq's advantage, they must do something

now, implying that Iraq could not survive

the continuous air bombardment. He

concluded with an old Iraqi proverb: "In

order to be ready to fight the fox, you

must prepare to fight the lion'46

General Salah Aboud Mahmoud,

given command of the al-Khaf)i mission,

informed Saddam that he would present

him with the city as a present on the

morning of 30 January.47 The meeting

then broke up and the Iraqi president returned to Baghdad, surviving an attack by

two U.S. Air Force General Dynamics F16 Falcons. The Air Force did not realize

they had hit Saddam's convoy until after

the war.48

General Salah Aboud returned to

Kuwait and met with his division and

The Battle of al-Khafi 11

History Division Photo

Marines of Task Force Shepherd plan their next operation. In addition to screening duties, the light armored infantry battalions also

provided security for the Marine batteries conducting artillery raids on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 1991, Modified by W. Stephen Hill

brigade commanders at the 5th Mechanized Division's headquarters, then at the

oil facility of al-Maqoa. He instructed his

commanders in tactics for countering

Coalition airpower and ordered them to

dig in quickly after reaching their objectives. He then passed on Saddam's inspirational words and told them of his

promise to make Saddam a present of alKhafji on the morning of 30 January. Finally, he approved IV Corps' request for

artillery fire against the sector opposite

the 7th Infantry and 14th Infantry Divisions. The Iraqi forces then began to

move into position for the upcoming battle.49

The Coalition did have some indications that the Iraqis were planning something. One of the E-8C Joint Surveillance

and Target Acquisition Radar System aircraft reported large Iraqi vehicle movements on the night of 22 January, and

again on 25 January. These were only preliminary Iraqi movements, but it also

noted the Iraqi movement on the night of

28 January, which was the direct preparation for the upcoming offensive.50

All three of the observation posts

manned by air-naval gunfire liaison

Marines (Observation Posts 2, 7, and 8)

reported unusually heavy Iraqi activity on

the nights of 27 and 28 January. In addition, the Marines reported "sporadic Iraqi

rocket and artillery fires were directed at

the city of al-KhaIji, the forward Saudi defensive belt, and the border observation

posts, often with illumination rounds

mixed in?'5t On the night of 27 January,

Marines at Observation Post 7 called in a

strike on Iraqi "mechanized reconnais12 The Battle of al-Khaf3i
sance forces" moving in front of their position, reporting two Iraqi armored personnel carriers destroyed.52 Some Marine

officers considered the Iraqi movements

to be a response to the Marine artillery

raids which had taken place on 21 and 26

January.53

On the night of 28 January the reported Iraqi mechanized movements coincided with another Marine artillery

raid. The teams at the desalination plant

north of al-Khafi, and at Observation

Post 8, each called for airstrikes on Iraqi

forces they observed, but the artillery raid

just to the west had the priority for air

support.54 By 0315 on the 29th, the artillery raid had concluded and air support

was again available to the observation

post teams. At Observation Post 7, the

air-naval gunfire supporting arms liaison

team under Captain John C. Bley II called

a flight of Fairchild-Republic A-b Thunderbolt attack aircraft in on a column of

Iraqi armored vehicles moving west

across its front toward the al-Wafrah oil

field. The Iraqi column suffered heavy

damage; Bley's team reported nearly a

dozen vehicles destroyed. The team observed Iraqi soldiers trying to recover vehicles at sunrise.55 The team at

Observation Post 2 also observed a large

Iraqi force moving from east to west,

which Coalition air power engaged. All

three observation posts heard the movement of the Iraqi vehicles for the rest of

the night.56

One Coalition officer who realized, at

the time, that the Iraqis were preparing

for an offensive was Lieutenant Colonel

Richard M. Barry, commander of the forward headquarters of the 1st Surveillance,

Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.

He closely monitored Iraqi radio traffic

during the airstrikes on 28 January and

decided that "the Iraqis put probably 150

sappers out there to try and clear that

road. [I] sensed they really wanted it

opened. They were obviously using that

road as some sort of interior line like at

Gettysburg:'57 The information was

passed on to higher headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Barry was right; the air attacks against the 3d Armored Division as it

tried to pass through the Iraqi minefields

of al-Wafrah paralyzed much of the division and General Saiah Aboud spent

much of 29 January trying to fix the

scheduling problems these attacks

caused.58 When the division's attacks finally did fall on Observation Post 4 and

Observation Post 1, they would be far

weaker as a result.

Despite Lieutenant Colonel Barry's

warning that "this is it . . . the Iraqis want

Khal5i," Central Command thought the

possibility of an Iraqi ground attack remote as attention was focused on the air

campaign and the expected ground offensive to liberate Kuwait.59

eral Salah Aboud inspected the assembly

areas of the SthMechanizedDivision, and

found fewer vehicles moving than he expected, many being broken down alongside the road. He also found that the

division's deception operations were

working well and he saw no sign that

Coalition forces knew of its movements.

He believed this was because "the order

was given to take cover under the smoke

clouds of the burning oil, and also the

tanks, the armored personnel carriers,

and the support weapons' vehicles were

all deployed under the trees of al-Thai

and were hard to see."6°

Things were going worse with the 3d

Armored Division, especially with the division's 6th Armored Brigade commanded

by Colonel Ibdii Raziq Mahmoud. The

brigade had been pounded by Coalition

aircraft the night before and it had lost at

least two tanks.

"On the morning of 29 January, the

enemy started screaming and shouting

after we completed deploying our forces

in the desert area; although the enemy

had their reconnaissance technologies

they were not able to notice our forces:'

recalled Brigadier General Hussan Zedin

commander of the 3d Armored Division.

He added: "[Coalition aircraftl started to

attack our troops during the daylight, in

their concealed locations. They tried to

affect our morale and cause damage in

order to make us too weak to execute the

On the morning of 29 January, Gen- mission:' 61

The Marines of 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, would spend much of their time in the desert at Observation

Post 4. Here they pose around an Iraqi T-55 tank captured on the morning of 30 January 1991.

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

The Battle of al-Khafji 13
The air attacks led General Salah

Aboud to conclude that the Coalition had

discovered his brigade, and he expected

it would face stiff resistance at its objectives. He told the 3d Armored Division

commander, Brigadier Commander Hussan Zedin, that the 6th Armored Brigade

could expect to face "tanks, anti-tank

weapons, and armored cars." He ordered

the brigade to employ "a reconnaissance

assault a suitable distance ahead of the

main convoy to get information about the

strength of the resistance of the enemy."62

General Salah Aboud was wrong,

however. Aside from Lieutenant Colonel

Barry at 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance,

and Intelligence Group, the Coalition was

not expecting an Iraqi attack, missing

much of the Iraqi movement and interpreting the movement that it did observe

as either training exercises or reactions to

the Marine artillery raids. On the morning of 29 January, the Iraqi III Corps and

IV Corps had moved to their assembly

areas successfully. Coalition air power

had already inflicted significant losses,

but those losses had resulted from routine

strikes in Kuwait and chance attacks

against Iraqi forces caught moving in the

open. The bulk of the Coalition's air effort

remained focused elsewhere.

At al-Khafji, the various special operations and reconnaissance forces occupying the city were proceeding with what

had become their normal day. For the

air-naval gunfire liaison Marines, this

meant routine relief of the forward positions. Captain Douglas R. Kleinsmith's

supporting arms liaison team relieved

Captain Bley and his team at Observation

Post 7 in the early morning, and Bley's

team returned to the group headquarters

at the water desalination plant north of

al-Khafji.

Less routine, but not surprising, was

the capture of three Iraqi soldiers by

Marines at Observation Post 8. All three

were in clean uniforms, and appeared to

be in good health, despite two weeks of

Coalition airstrikes. First Lieutenant Kurtis E. Lang, commander of the air-naval

gunfire team at the post, thought they

were forward observers; the Iraqis carried

maps that detailed Iraqi and some Coalition positions, including Observation

Post 8. A U.S. Navy SEAL unit took

charge of the prisoners and sent them to

the rear. Approximately 30 minutes after

the team captured the Iraqis, the enemy

fired a single tank shell at the position,

causing no damage.63

Along the coastal highway there were

also indications of increased Iraqi activity. At Observation Post 7, Captain Kleinsmith reported Iraqi artillery six to eight

kilometers in front of his position, while

at Observation Post 8, Lieutenant Lang

reported heavy vehicle noises.64 At 2000,

Captain Kleinsmith directed a successful

A-6 attack on the two Iraqi artillery positions, eliminating at least one of the

sites.65

Observation Post 4 was a two-story

Saudi police post known as Markaz alZabr. To the north, along the border ran

a large berm approximately 15 feet high.

The fort protected one of the few openings in the embankment.66 On 29 January, Observation Post 4 was the only post

this far west that was manned; it was held

by 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and a company of

light armored vehicles.

The reconnaissance platoon had originally been Deep Reconnaissance Platoon,

Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, based on Okinawa. Comprised of

volunteers, it had shipped out to the Middle East in the initial rush to get Marines

to Saudi Arabia in September 1990. With

its parent battalion remaining on Okinawa, the platoon was absorbed into 1st

Reconnaissance Battalion.67

Nearly two weeks before, the platoon,

commanded by First Lieutenant Steven A.

Ross, was assigned to Observation Post 4.

Working as a platoon was a welcome

change, since it had been previously assigned to various observation posts in

smaller groups alongside other Marine reconnaissance and Army special forces

teams. Supplies were running low, however, and the platoon was to be relieved

on 30 January. Lieutenant Ross had dispersed his men along the berm, divided

into three teams along a 500-meter front.

Armed with M16 rifles, M249 squad automatic weapons, M60 machine guns,

and M136 AT4 antitank weapons, the

Marines were not equipped to stop a

major Iraqi assault. Lieutenant Ross stationed the platoon's vehicles, four

humvees and a 6x6 5-ton truck, behind a

U-shaped berm approximately 500 meters to the rear of the observation post. In

the event of a serious Iraqi attack, the plan

was for the platoon to withdraw to the Ushaped berm, mount up, and move to the

rear while calling in airstrikes on the

Iraqis.68

Captain Roger L. Pollard's Company

D, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion,

14 The Battle of al-Khafji

Marine Corps Art Collection

The Saudi border fort at Observation Post 4 was known as "OP Hamma" to some

Marines. The painting by Capt Charles G. Grow depicts the oilfields at al-Wafrah on fire

following a Coalition bombing raid on 24 January 1991.