[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 126 Ohio St.3d 389, 2010-Ohio-3824.] 

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FREEMAN. 

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 

126 Ohio St.3d 389, 2010-Ohio-3824.] 

Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Continuing to practice law after suspension — 

Failure to notify court of suspension — Indefinite suspension. 

(No. 2010-0346 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided August 24, 2010.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-008. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Henry Roosevelt Freeman of Tallmadge, Ohio, 

Attorney Registration No. 0022713, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 

1981. On August 13, 2008, this court imposed a one-year suspension with six 

months stayed on conditions based upon respondent’s failure to maintain proper 

accounting of client funds and his improper use of trust accounts as personal 

checking accounts. Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 119 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-

Ohio-3836, 894 N.E.2d 31. 

{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline now 

recommends that we indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law 

based upon his (1) continued representation of two clients during his suspension 

and (2) failure to notify opposing counsel or the court of his suspension. Neither 

party has objected to the board’s report. For the reasons that follow, we agree that 

respondent’s actions violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and that an 

indefinite suspension, with reinstatement conditioned upon his compliance with 

the conditions set forth in his prior disciplinary action, is appropriate. 

Misconduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

{¶ 3} As part of respondent’s suspension order in his prior disciplinary 

case, this court ordered respondent to immediately cease the practice of law in any 

form; forbade him to appear on behalf of another before any court, judge, 

commission, board, administrative agency, or any other public authority; ordered 

him to notify all opposing counsel and unrepresented parties of his suspension 

within 30 days; and ordered him to file a notice of disqualification with each court 

in which he had a matter pending. 

{¶ 4} While the board made no finding in this regard, respondent 

admitted that he had received actual notice of his suspension from the practice of 

law and that he had read this court’s opinion in that case. Although he denied 

having received or read a copy of the court’s order of suspension, and no evidence 

in this record establishes that respondent was served with that order, respondent 

conceded that he had received several certified mailings from this court but that 

he “probably did not open [them] up.” In any event, the duties of a suspended 

attorney are stated in Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E), of which respondent is charged with 

notice. 

{¶ 5} In a two-count complaint, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged 

respondent with continuing to represent clients after this court suspended his 

license to practice law and failing to notify either opposing counsel or the courts 

of his suspension. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline conducted a hearing and issued a report containing findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and a recommendation. 

{¶ 6} With respect to count one, the panel and board found that 

respondent represented a client at a September 11, 2008 contested-custody 

hearing without informing his client, opposing counsel, or the court that his 

license had been suspended approximately one month earlier. On September 19, 

2008, respondent went to inform the court that he would be late for the continued 

hearing due to his participation in another proceeding. The court, however, had 
January Term, 2010 

3

independently learned of his suspension and informed him that he could not 

appear on behalf of his client. Respondent admitted that the allegations in count 

one are true. 

{¶ 7} With regard to count two, the panel and board found that 

respondent had appeared at a September 19, 2008 final pretrial hearing on behalf 

of a client. Without informing opposing counsel or the court’s staff attorney of 

his suspension, respondent discussed possible settlement of the case. At the 

conclusion of that hearing, citing a disagreement with his client rather than his 

suspension from the practice of law, he orally moved the court for leave to 

withdraw as counsel. Both the panel and the board rejected respondent’s selfserving claims that he was not representing his client as “simply not credible.” 

{¶ 8} Based upon these findings, the board concluded, and we agree, that 

clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that respondent’s conduct in each of 

the two counts violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 

in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice” ), 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 

that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law), and 5.5(a) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in violation of the regulation of the 

legal profession in the jurisdiction) and Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E) (setting forth the 

duties of a disbarred or suspended attorney). 

Sanction 

{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 

determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 

St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 10} The panel and board found as aggravating factors that respondent 

had a prior disciplinary offense, had engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving 

multiple offenses, had failed to fully acknowledge the wrongfulness of his 

conduct by claiming that his actions with respect to count two did not constitute 

the practice of law, and had failed to comply with this court’s August 13, 2008 

suspension order requiring him to file an affidavit of compliance and pay the costs 

of that disciplinary action. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (d), and (g). 

{¶ 11} While the board acknowledged respondent’s testimony that he 

remained involved with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and 

was dealing with depression, the board noted that respondent offered no 

independent evidence of his current involvement with that program. The board 

therefore did not explicitly consider it as a factor in mitigation, and the board 

found no other mitigating factors. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) through (h). 

{¶ 12} Having weighed respondent’s conduct, the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances, and the sanctions imposed in similar cases, the board 

recommended that we indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law. 

Further, as a condition to his reinstatement, the board recommended that 

respondent be required to comply with all the conditions set forth in his prior 

disciplinary action. 

{¶ 13} We have stated, “The normal penalty for continuing to practice law 

while under suspension is disbarment.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 

Ohio St.3d 433, 436, 674 N.E.2d 1371. Relator, however, has not advocated 

disbarment and instead argues that we should indefinitely suspend respondent 

from the practice of law. In support of this lesser sanction, relator notes that in 

respondent’s earlier disciplinary case, there was evidence that he had been 
January Term, 2010 

5

diagnosed with anxiety and depression and that it was his doctor’s opinion that he 

was not yet capable of providing legal services because his recovery was 

incomplete. 

{¶ 14} As the board observed, we have routinely imposed indefinite 

suspensions for attorneys who continued to practice law after we have suspended 

their licenses for CLE and registration violations. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel 

v. Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008-Ohio-1509, 884 N.E.2d 1070; Toledo Bar 

Assn. v. Crandall, 98 Ohio St.3d 444, 2003-Ohio-1637, 786 N.E.2d 872; Akron 

Bar Assn. v. Barron (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 167, 707 N.E.2d 850. We have also 

imposed indefinite suspensions when attorneys have continued to practice law 

during license suspensions imposed for other forms of misconduct. See, e.g., 

Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield, 107 Ohio St.3d 360, 2006-Ohio-6, 839 N.E.2d 

924 (imposing an indefinite suspension on an attorney who practiced law during 

the suspension imposed in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Winkfield (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 

364, 745 N.E.2d 411, for multiple violations including neglect of client matters 

and failure to promptly pay funds to a client); and Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Jackson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 104, 712 N.E.2d 122 (imposing an indefinite 

suspension on an attorney who practiced law during a reciprocal suspension 

imposed following his suspension in Hawaii for misconduct requiring payment of 

restitution to clients). 

{¶ 15} Having weighed respondent’s conduct and the aggravating and 

mitigating factors and considered the sanctions imposed for comparable conduct, 

we agree that the proper sanction for respondent’s misconduct is an indefinite 

suspension from the practice of law. Accordingly, Henry Roosevelt Freeman is 

indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio. Before he 

may petition for reinstatement, respondent must comply with the following 

conditions: (1) extend his OLAP contract for at least two years from the date of 

our order in this case, (2) abide by the obligations imposed on him by his OLAP 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

contract, (3) continue his treatment for anxiety and depression and provide proof 

of his treatment and any other medical information that may be requested by his 

OLAP-contract monitor, and (4) refrain from any disciplinary violations. Costs 

are taxed to respondent. 

Judgment accordingly. 

 PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 

CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 BROWN, C.J., not participating. 

__________________ 

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Henry Roosevelt Freeman, pro se. 

______________________