[Cite as Michaels v. Michaels, 2012-Ohio-641.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

ARTHUR J. MICHAELS 

 Appellant/Cross-Appellee 

 v. 

KIMBERLY A. MICHAELS 

 Appellee/Cross-Appellant 

C.A. No. 11CA0012-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 05 DR 0182 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: February 21, 2012 

 

BELFANCE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant Arthur Michaels (“Husband”) and Cross-Appellant Kimberly Michaels 

(“Wife”) appeal from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand the matter for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. 

{¶2} This case has a lengthy procedural history, much of which has been recited in 

prior appeals to this Court. See Michaels v. Michaels, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0047-M, 2010-Ohio963 (“Michaels II”); Michaels v. Michaels, 9th Dist. No. 07CA0058-M, 2008-Ohio-2251 

(“Michaels I”). Thus, we will only briefly restate the relevant portions here. 

{¶3} The parties were married July 26, 1986. In 2005, the parties filed for divorce. 

The trial court initially entered a judgment entry/decree of divorce on May 9, 2007. Husband 

appealed the entry, and while the appeal was pending, Husband filed a motion to modify spousal 
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support on December 26, 2007. This Court reversed the trial court’s judgment on May 12, 2008. 

Michaels I at ¶ 21. The trial court entered a judgment entry/decree of divorce on July 24, 2009, 

reflecting the terms of a prior settlement agreement. Husband appealed that decision, and this 

Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Michaels II. 

{¶4} On March 2, 2010, Husband filed a motion to modify spousal support. On 

January 11, 2011, the trial court concluded that: 

Husband[’s] obligation to pay Spousal Support to Wife shall be modified and 

Husband shall pay to Wife as and for spousal support the sum of $2,000 a month 

for one hundred twenty (120) consecutive months. * * * 

The modification [of] Husband’s obligation to pay spousal support shall be 

retroactive to January 1, 2008. The Court finds that on January 1, 2008, Husband 

was current in his monthly spousal support obligation of $6,500 and, in fact, had a 

$2,000 overpayment. 

In 2008[,] Husband paid $8,000. Giving Husband a $2,000 credit for the 2007 

overpayment his 2008 arrearage is $14,000. Husband paid nothing for 2009 

leaving him with an additional $24,000 arrearage. From June[] 2010[,] through 

November[] 2010, Husband paid $2,000 a month for a total of $10,000 leaving an 

arrearage of $12,000 (December not included.) 

The Court therefore finds Husband has a spousal support arrearage, after 

modification, of $50,000. Husband shall continue paying $2,000 a month at the 

conclusion of his 120 month obligation until the arrearage is extinguished. 

Considering the fact that the modification is retroactive to 2008, Husband is given 

credit for 35 months (December 2010 not included) and his obligation shall 

continue for an additional eighty five (85) months. 

Husband has appealed, raising two assignment of error for our review, and Wife has crossappealed raising two assignments of error for our review. To facilitate our review, the 

assignments of error will be rearranged. 
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II. 

HUSBAND’S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXTENDING THE TERM FOR PAYMENT 

OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT WHEN IT HAD NOT RETAINED JURISDICTION 

OVER THE [] TERM OF THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND LACKED 

JURISDICTION TO MODIFY IT. 

{¶5} Husband asserts in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred in altering 

the term of spousal support when the decree did not grant the trial court continuing jurisdiction to 

do so. We agree. 

{¶6} We note that while the trial court could properly determine the amount and 

method of payment of arrearages, for the reasons outlined below, it did not have authority to 

extend the underlying term of spousal support given the lack of reservation of jurisdiction. See 

Boyer v. Boyer, 9th Dist. No. 03CA0137-M, 2004-Ohio-5450, ¶ 14-18 (concluding that the 

“court’s failure to reserve jurisdiction to modify the spousal support award itself is exclusive of 

and has no implications for the court’s ability to enforce the payment of arrearages[]”). 

{¶7} R.C. 3105.18(E)(1) provides that: 

If a continuing order for periodic payments of money as alimony is entered in a 

divorce or dissolution of marriage action that is determined on or after May 2, 

1986, and before January 1, 1991, or if a continuing order for periodic payments 

of money as spousal support is entered in a divorce or dissolution of marriage 

action that is determined on or after January 1, 1991, the court that enters the 

decree of divorce or dissolution of marriage does not have jurisdiction to modify 

the amount or terms of the alimony or spousal support unless the court 

determines that the circumstances of either party have changed and unless one of 

the following applies: 

In the case of a divorce, the decree or a separation agreement of the parties to the 

divorce that is incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically 

authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony or spousal 

support. 

(Emphasis added.) 
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{¶8} The 2009 divorce decree states: 

Effective the 1st day of May, 2007, the Husband shall pay, as and for spousal 

support, * * * the sum of $6,500 per month * * * until the first of the following 

events shall occur: 

Wife’s death; 

Husband’s death; 

Wife’s remarriage; 

Eighty-three (83) consecutive months. 

The Medina County Domestic Relations Court shall specifically retain jurisdiction 

to modify the amount of spousal support. However, the Medina County Domestic 

Relations Court shall not retain jurisdiction to modify the term of the spousal 

support. 

{¶9} In the instant matter, the trial court clearly altered the term of spousal support. As 

the language of the decree did not provide for the modification of the term of the spousal 

support, and instead only provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to modify the 

amount, the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the duration of the spousal support 

award. See Vengrow v. Vengrow, 9th Dist. No. 24907, 2010-Ohio-2568, ¶ 24 (concluding that 

because “[t]he trial court had not reserved jurisdiction to modify the spousal support payments in 

regard to duration in its February 25, 2003 judgment entry * * * the trial court was without 

authority to extend the duration of support payments in its July 10, 2009 order[]”). Accordingly, 

we sustain Husband’s first assignment of error. 

WIFE’S SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 

GRANTED HUSBAND’S MOTION TO MODIFY SPOUSAL SUPPORT 

WHEN THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL INDICATED THAT THE CHANGE IN 

CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED BY THE HUSBAND, AT TRIAL, WAS 

CONTEMPLATED AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE. 
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{¶10} Wife asserts in her second assignment of error that Husband failed to supply 

evidence that the substantial change of circumstances prompting the spousal support 

modification was not contemplated at the time of the original decree. However, as the trial court 

failed to make the requisite findings under Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 121 Ohio St.3d 433, 

2009-Ohio-1222, paragraph two of the syllabus, necessary to establish its jurisdiction, we do not 

reach the merits of Wife’s specific argument. 

It is well established that R.C. 3105.18 requires a two-step analysis before an 

award of spousal support may be modified. The first step is jurisdictional * * * . 

(Internal citations omitted.) Tufts v. Tufts, 9th Dist. No. 24871, 2010-Ohio-641, ¶ 8. The 

Supreme Court held in Mandelbaum that: 

[a] trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a prior order of spousal support unless 

the decree of the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make the modification 

and unless the court finds (1) that a substantial change in circumstances has 

occurred and (2) that the change was not contemplated at the time of the original 

decree. 

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. “Once jurisdiction is established, the second step of the 

analysis requires the trial court to determine whether the existing support order should be 

modified in light of the change in circumstances that has occurred. Such a determination is 

conducted in consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C).” (Internal citations 

omitted.) Tufts at ¶ 8. 

{¶11} Here, as noted above, the decree reserved jurisdiction to modify the amount, but 

not the term of spousal support. Thus, we examine whether the remaining prongs of 

Mandelbaum have been met. This Court has interpreted Mandelbaum to require the trial court to 

specifically find that there has been a substantial change of circumstances which was not 

contemplated at the time of the original decree in order to modify a spousal support award. See 

Johns v. Johns, 9th Dist. No. 24704, 2009-Ohio-5798, ¶ 8-10 (reversing the decision of the trial 
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court because “[n]either the trial court’s decision, nor the magistrate’s decision include[d] the 

findings that the change of circumstances was substantial and that the change was not 

contemplated at the time of the divorce[]”); see also Weir v. Weir, 9th Dist. No. 10CA0058-M, 

2011-Ohio-2992, ¶ 5 (concluding that “because the trial court failed to make the requisite finding 

necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the matter as contemplated by Mandelbaum, the trial 

court erred in proceeding to determine that the existing support order should be modified[]”); 

Tufts at ¶ 11 (determining the trial court erred in modifying the spousal support award when “it 

did not recount whether there was a substantial change in circumstances and that the change was 

not contemplated by the parties at the time of the divorce[]”). The trial court’s entry in this 

matter is devoid of either of these findings, and there is no language to suggest the trial court 

considered the standard pronounced in Mandelbaum. While the trial court’s entry states that it 

found that “there is a significant change in Husband’s financial well-being[,]” the trial court did 

not go on to find that there was a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the 

time of the original decree. Mandelbaum at paragraph two of the syllabus. Accordingly, as the 

trial court did not make the requisite findings, it committed reversible error in modifying the 

spousal support award. See Weir at ¶ 5; Tufts at ¶ 12; Johns at ¶ 10. Thus, we sustain Wife’s 

assignment of error to the extent she asserts the trial court erred in modifying the spousal support 

award. We reverse the trial court’s modification of the spousal support award, and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

HUSBAND’S SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A DEFICIENCY IN 

SPOUSAL SUPPORT EXISTED DURING A PERIOD IN WHICH THE 

HUSBAND HAD LOSSES AND NO INCOME, HAD NO LIQUID ASSETS 

AND HAD ALREADY MOVED THE COURT TO REDUCE THE SPOUSAL 

SUPPORT FOR THOSE REASONS. 
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WIFE’S FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

DESIGNATING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF HUSBAND’S SPOUSAL 

SUPPORT AS OF JANUARY 1, 2008. 

{¶12} In light of our resolution of Husband’s first, and Wife’s second, assignments of 

error we decline to address the remaining assignments of error. 

III. 

{¶13} In light of the foregoing, we sustain Husband’s first and Wife’s second 

assignments of error, as discussed above. The judgment of the Medina County Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is reversed, and this matter is remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 EVE V. BELFANCE 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, J. 

WHITMORE, J. 

CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

RONALD N. TOWNE and ANN L. WEHENER, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant/CrossAppellee. 

JEFFREY V. HAWKINS, Attornery at Law, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.