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“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”

-- George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense (1905)

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of 

1986, 22 U.S.C. § 4831 et seq., (the “Act”), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 

Clinton convened an Accountability Review Board (ARB) for Benghazi to 

examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012, 

killings of four U.S. government personnel, including the U.S. Ambassador to 

Libya, John Christopher Stevens, in Benghazi, Libya. A series of attacks on 

September 11-12, 2012 involving arson, small-arms and machine-gun fire, and use 

of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), grenades and mortars, focused on two U.S. 

facilities in Benghazi, as well as U.S. personnel en route between the two facilities. 

In addition, the attacks severely wounded two U.S. personnel, injured three Libyan 

contract guards and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of both facilities –

the U.S. Special Mission compound (SMC) and Annex.

Four Board members were selected by the Secretary of State and one 

member from the intelligence community (IC) was selected by the Director for 

National Intelligence. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering served as Chairman, with 

Admiral Michael Mullen as Vice Chairman. Additional members were Catherine 

Bertini, Richard Shinnick, and Hugh Turner, who represented the IC. 

The criminal investigation of the September 11-12, 2012, Benghazi attacks, 

for which the statutory responsibility rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), was still underway at the time of this report. The Board enjoyed excellent 

cooperation with the Department of Justice and FBI throughout preparation of this 

report. The key questions surrounding the identity, actions and motivations of the 

perpetrators remain to be determined by the ongoing criminal investigation. 

As called for by the Act, this report examines: whether the attacks were 

security related; whether security systems and procedures were adequate and 

implemented properly; the impact of intelligence and information availability; 

whether any other facts or circumstances in these cases may be relevant to 

appropriate security management of U.S. missions worldwide; and, finally, 

whether any U.S. government employee or contractor, as defined by the Act, 

breached her or his duty. 
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The Benghazi attacks represented the first murder of a U.S. ambassador 

since 1988, and took place 11 years to the day after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001. Ambassador Stevens personified the U.S. commitment to a 

free and democratic Libya. His knowledge of Arabic, his ability to move in all 

sectors of the population, and his wide circle of friends, particularly in Benghazi, 

marked him as an exceptional practitioner of modern diplomacy. The U.S. Special 

Mission in Benghazi, established in November 2011, was the successor to his 

highly successful endeavor as Special Envoy to the rebel-led government that 

eventually toppled Muammar Qaddafi in fall 2011. The Special Mission bolstered 

U.S. support for Libya’s democratic transition through engagement with eastern 

Libya, the birthplace of the revolt against Qaddafi and a regional power center. 

The Benghazi attacks took place against a backdrop of significantly 

increased demands on U.S. diplomats to be present in the world’s most dangerous 

places to advance American interests and connect with populations beyond 

capitals, and beyond host governments’ reach. With State Department civilians at 

the forefront of U.S. efforts to stabilize and build capacity in Iraq, as the U.S. 

military draws down in Afghanistan, and with security threats growing in volatile 

environments where the U.S. military is not present – from Peshawar to Bamako –

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is being stretched to the limit as never 

before. DS overall has done a fine job protecting thousands of employees in some 

273 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. No diplomatic presence is without 

risk, given past attempts by terrorists to pursue U.S. targets worldwide. And the 

total elimination of risk is a non-starter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for the 

U.S. government to be present in places where stability and security are often most 

profoundly lacking and host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent. 

The Benghazi attacks also took place in a context in which the global 

terrorism threat as most often represented by al Qaeda (AQ) is fragmenting and 

increasingly devolving to local affiliates and other actors who share many of AQ’s 

aims, including violent anti-Americanism, without necessarily being organized or 

operated under direct AQ command and control. This growing, diffuse range of 

terrorist and hostile actors poses an additional challenge to American security 

officers, diplomats, development professionals and decision-makers seeking to 

mitigate risk and remain active in high threat environments without resorting to an 

unacceptable total fortress and stay-at-home approach to U.S. diplomacy. 
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For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to 

obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of 

success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding 

resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government 

department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department 

managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. There is 

no easy way to cut through this Gordian knot, all the more so as budgetary 

austerity looms large ahead. At the same time, it is imperative for the State 

Department to be mission-driven, rather than resource-constrained – particularly 

when being present in increasingly risky areas of the world is integral to U.S. 

national security. The recommendations in this report attempt to grapple with 

these issues and err on the side of increased attention to prioritization and to fuller 

support for people and facilities engaged in working in high risk, high threat areas. 

The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment from Congress to 

support State Department needs, which, in total, constitute a small percentage both 

of the full national budget and that spent for national security. One overall 

conclusion in this report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge 

and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks 

and meet mission imperatives.

Mindful of these considerations, the ARB has examined the terrorist attacks 

in Benghazi with an eye towards how we can better advance American interests 

and protect our personnel in an increasingly complex and dangerous world. This 

Board presents its findings and recommendations with the unanimous conclusion 

that while the United States cannot retreat in the face of such challenges, we must 

work more rigorously and adeptly to address them, and that American diplomats 

and security professionals, like their military colleagues, serve the nation in an 

inherently risky profession. Risk mitigation involves two imperatives –

engagement and security – which require wise leadership, good intelligence and 

evaluation, proper defense and strong preparedness and, at times, downsizing, 

indirect access and even withdrawal. There is no one paradigm. Experienced 

leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and 

adequate funding and personnel resources are essential. The selfless courage of the 

four Americans who died in the line of duty in Benghazi on September 11-12, 

2012, as well as those who were injured and all those who valiantly fought to save 

their colleagues, inspires all of us as we seek to draw the right lessons from that 

tragic night.
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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12, 2012,

resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel, Ambassador Chris 

Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; seriously wounded two 

other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan contract guards; and resulted in the 

destruction and abandonment of the U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex. 

FINDINGS

In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board 

for Benghazi determined that:

1. The attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and machine gun 

fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against U.S. personnel at two 

separate facilities – the SMC and the Annex – and en route between them. 

Responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities 

and property rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the 

attacks. The Board concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, 

which were unanticipated in their scale and intensity. 

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels 

within two bureaus of the State Department (the “Department”) resulted in a

Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly 

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a “shared 

responsibility” by the bureaus in Washington charged with supporting the post, 

resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions on policy and security. That 

said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with 

Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.

The short-term, transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi’s staffing, with 

talented and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often 

on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished 

institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.
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Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) security staff in 

Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months and weeks leading up to it 

was inadequate, despite repeated requests from Special Mission Benghazi and 

Embassy Tripoli for additional staffing. Board members found a pervasive

realization among personnel who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission 

was not a high priority for Washington when it came to security-related 

requests, especially those relating to staffing.

The insufficient Special Mission security platform was at variance with the 

appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to 

perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely under-resourced 

with regard to certain needed security equipment, although DS funded and 

installed in 2012 a number of physical security upgrades. These included 

heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area egress windows, 

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the 

Villa C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, 

security cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an 

Internal Defense Notification System.

Special Mission Benghazi’s uncertain future after 2012 and its “non-status” as a 

temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for security and 

personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet security standards to the 

working-level in the field, with very limited resources.

In the weeks and months leading up to the attacks, the response from post, 

Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a deteriorating security situation was 

inadequate. At the same time, the SMC’s dependence on the armed but poorly 

skilled Libyan February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) militia members 

and unarmed, locally contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for 

security support was misplaced. 

Although the February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to

improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in April and 

June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its reliability in the months 

and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador 

Stevens’ visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special 

Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours.
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Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the September 

11, 2001 terrorist attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible 

threats against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11 anniversary. 

Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken the anniversary 

into account and decided to hold all meetings on-compound on September 11. 

The Board found that Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to 

Benghazi independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his 

trip was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap 

between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador’s trip 

provided for minimal close protection security support and were not shared 

thoroughly with the Embassy’s country team, who were not fully aware of 

planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat 

of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative 

trendline of security incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the 

leading U.S. government advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on 

Benghazi in particular, caused Washington to give unusual deference to his 

judgments.

Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington, Tripoli, 

and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but were constrained 

by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at the senior levels. 

Among various Department bureaus and personnel in the field, there appeared 

to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered 

to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations. 

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and procedures 

and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the 

Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that began with the 

sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by dozens of armed 

attackers. 

The Board found the responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be 

inadequate. The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 

17 guards offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in 

summoning a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously. 

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly lacking 

on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and near absence of 
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central government influence and control in Benghazi. The Libyan government 

did facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the 

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan 

government also provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate 

remaining U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to 

Tripoli on September 12.

The Board determined that U.S. personnel on the ground in Benghazi 

performed with courage and readiness to risk their lives to protect their 

colleagues, in a near impossible situation. The Board members believe every 

possible effort was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean 

Smith.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was not 

enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a difference. 

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical 

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence 

community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the potential 

threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats were known to exist.

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two 

bureaus demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in 

their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given 

the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable host government 

protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable cause to determine that 

any individual U.S. government employee breached his or her duty. 

 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

With the lessons of the past and the challenges of the future in mind, the Board 

puts forward recommendations in six core areas: Overarching Security 

Considerations; Staffing High Risk, High Threat Posts; Training and Awareness; 

Security and Fire Safety Equipment; Intelligence and Threat Analysis; and 

Personnel Accountability. 

OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
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1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond 

traditional reliance on host government security support in high risk, high 

threat1 posts. The Department should urgently review the proper balance 

between acceptable risk and expected outcomes in high risk, high threat areas. 

While the answer cannot be to refrain from operating in such environments, the 

Department must do so on the basis of having: 1) a defined, attainable, and 

prioritized mission; 2) a clear-eyed assessment of the risk and costs involved; 3) 

a commitment of sufficient resources to mitigate these costs and risks; 4) an 

explicit acceptance of those costs and risks that cannot be mitigated; and 5) 

constant attention to changes in the situation, including when to leave and 

perform the mission from a distance. The United States must be self-reliant and 

enterprising in developing alternate security platforms, profiles, and staffing 

footprints to address such realities. Assessments must be made on a case-bycase basis and repeated as circumstances change. 

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and 

management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy 

planning for all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities. In this context, the recent 

creation of a new Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary for High 

Threat Posts could be a positive first step if integrated into a sound strategy for 

DS reorganization.

3. As the President’s personal representative, the Chief of Mission bears “direct 

and full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the 

personnel for whom [he or she is] responsible,” and thus for risk management 

in the country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional 

Assistant Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of 

Mission in executing this duty. Regional bureaus should have augmented 

support within the bureau on security matters, to include a senior DS officer to 

report to the regional Assistant Secretary. 

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts 

(military, security, humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas 

to support DS, identify best practices (from other agencies and other countries), 

and regularly evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high threat posts. 

 1 The Board defines “high risk, high threat” posts as those in countries with high to critical levels of political 

violence and terrorism, governments of weak capacity, and security platforms that fall well below established 

standards.
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5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of 

temporary facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater 

flexibility for the use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) 

sources of funding so that they can be rapidly made available for security 

upgrades at such facilities. 

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the 

Department should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the 

regional bureau. The support cell should work to expedite the approval and 

funding for establishing and operating the post, implementing physical security 

measures, staffing of security and management personnel, and providing

equipment, continuing as conditions at the post require. 

7. The Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs’ report of January 1999 called for

collocation of newly constructed State Department and other government 

agencies’ facilities. All State Department and other government agencies’ 

facilities should be collocated when they are in the same metropolitan area, 

unless a waiver has been approved. 

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from DS, OBO and other relevant 

offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic facilities, including 

immediate steps to deal with urgent issues. The report should also include 

reviews of fire safety and crisis management training for all employees and 

dependents, safehaven standards and fire safety equipment, and 

recommendations to facilitate survival in smoke and fire situations. 

9. Tripwires are too often treated only as indicators of threat rather than an 

essential trigger mechanism for serious risk management decisions and actions. 

The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to 

perform in-depth status checks of post tripwires. 

10.Recalling the recommendations of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs, the 

State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost 

Sharing Program at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2 

billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up to ten-year program addressing that 

need, prioritized for construction of new facilities in high risk, high threat areas. 

It should also work with Congress to expand utilization of Overseas 
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Contingency Operations funding to respond to emerging security threats and 

vulnerabilities and operational requirements in high risk, high threat posts. 

11.The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional 

Marines and expand the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as 

corresponding requirements for staffing and funding. The Board also 

recommends that the State Department and DoD identify additional flexible 

MSG structures and request further resources for the Department and DoD to 

provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts.

STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS

12.The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS 

personnel for high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security 

Deployment teams, as well as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of 

such action. 

13.The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at 

high risk, high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical 

personnel, the temporary duty length (TDY) length should be no less than 120 

days. The ARB suggests a comprehensive review of human resources

authorities with an eye to using those authorities to promote sending more 

experienced officers, including “When Actually Employed” (WAE) personnel,

to these high risk, high threat locations, particularly in security and management 

positions for longer periods of time.

14.The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat 

posts, with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff 

(LES) and management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded 

and the human resources process prioritized to hire LES interpreters and 

translators.

15.With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the 

Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its 

language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including 

DS, and receive greater resources to do so.

TRAINING AND AWARENESS
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16.A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit 

DS high-threat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival 

as well as Chief of Mission protective detail training.

17.The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should 

collaborate in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk 

management decision processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign 

Service Officers and better prepare them for leadership positions in high risk, 

high threat posts. They should consult throughout the U.S. government for best 

practices and lessons learned. Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training should 

be mandatory for high risk, high threat posts, whether an individual is assigned 

permanently or in longer-term temporary duty status.

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT

18.The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security 

equipment for safehavens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA2 facilities, as 

well as high threat Inman facilities.

19.There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the 

State Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures 

additional options for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and 

trains personnel on their use.

20.DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for 

greater resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post. 

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS

21.Post-2001, intelligence collection has expanded exponentially, but the Benghazi 

attacks are a stark reminder that we cannot over-rely on the certainty or even 

likelihood of warning intelligence. Careful attention should be given to factors 

showing a deteriorating threat situation in general as a basis for improving 

 2 “Inman buildings” are diplomatic facilities that meet the mandatory minimum physical security 

standards established after the 1985 Inman Report about the 1983 Embassy and Marine barracks 

bombings in Lebanon. “SECCA” refers to the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act of 1999, passed by Congress after the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 

Embassy bombings. SECCA mandated setback and other standards for newly acquired 

diplomatic facilities.
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security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and used to sharpen risk 

calculations. 

22.The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the 

DS Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS 

components, regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission in order to 

get key security-related threat information into the right hands more rapidly.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

23.The Board recognizes that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a 

breach of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but is instead 

addressed through the performance management system. However, the Board 

is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior 

officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential 

basis for discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a 

revision of Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this 

end.

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the 

ground in Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team 

who defended their colleagues; the Tripoli response team which mobilized 

without hesitation; those in Benghazi and Tripoli who cared for the wounded;

and the many U.S. government employees who served in Benghazi under 

difficult conditions in the months leading up to the September 11-12 attacks. 

We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to 

recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the 

highest ideals of government service.
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POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS

On April 5, 2011, then-Special Envoy to the Libyan Transitional National 

Council (TNC) Chris Stevens arrived via a Greek cargo ship at the rebel-held city 

of Benghazi to re-establish a U.S. presence in Libya. The State Department had 

been absent from Libya since the Embassy in Tripoli suspended operations and 

evacuated its American personnel on February 25, 2011, amidst an escalating 

campaign by Muammar Qaddafi to suppress violently a popular uprising against 

his rule.

Benghazi, the largest city and historical power center in eastern Libya, was 

the launching point for the uprising against Qaddafi and a long time nexus of antiregime activism. It also served as the rebel-led Transitional National Council’s 

base of operations. Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) had long felt neglected and 

oppressed by Qaddafi, and there had been historic tensions between it and the rest 

of the country. Throughout Qaddafi’s decades-long rule, eastern Libya 

consistently lagged behind Tripoli in terms of infrastructure and standard of living 

even as it was responsible for the vast majority of Libya’s oil production. Stevens’ 

presence in the city was seen as a significant sign of U.S. support for the TNC and 

a recognition of the resurgence of eastern Libya’s political influence.

Benghazi was the seat of the Senussi monarchy until 1954, the site of a U.S. 

consulate, which was overrun by a mob and burned in 1967, and the place where 

Qaddafi began his 1969 revolution against the monarchy. Qaddafi’s subsequent 

combination of oppression and neglect enhanced the city’s sense of 

marginalization, and its after-effects were felt more widely in the eastern region 

where a Salafist jihadist movement took root. Jihadis from Benghazi engaged in 

Afghanistan against the Soviets and took up arms against U.S. forces in the post2003 Iraq insurgency. Many of them reemerged in 2011 as leaders of anti-Qaddafi 

militias in eastern Libya.

Stevens initially operated from the Tibesti Hotel in downtown Benghazi. He 

was accompanied by a security contingent of 10 Diplomatic Security agents whose 

primary responsibilities were to provide personal protective services. Stevens’ 

mission was to serve as the liaison with the TNC in preparation for a post-Qaddafi 

democratic government in Libya. By all accounts, he was extremely effective, 
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earned the admiration of countless numbers of Libyans, and personified the U.S. 

government commitment to a free and democratic Libya.

Benghazi, however, was still very much a conflict zone. On June 1, 2011, a 

car bomb exploded outside the Tibesti Hotel, and shortly thereafter a credible 

threat against the Special Envoy mission prompted Stevens to move to the Annex.

On June 21, 2011, he and his security contingent moved to what would become the 

Special Mission Benghazi compound (SMC). By the end of August 2011, the 

walled compound consisted of three sections (Villas A, B, and C) on 13 acres. 

(Use of Villa A was discontinued in January 2012, when the SMC footprint was 

consolidated into the Villas B and C compounds, some eight-acres total.) 

On July 15, 2011, the United States officially recognized the TNC as 

Libya’s legitimate governing authority although Qaddafi and his forces still 

retained control over significant portions of the country, including Tripoli. The 

TNC continued attacking the remaining Qaddafi strongholds, and Tripoli fell 

earlier than expected at the end of August. The TNC immediately began moving 

the government from Benghazi to Tripoli. By early September, 21 members of 

State Department Mobile Security Deployment teams were in Tripoli with the 

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in preparation for the resumption of operations of 

the U.S. Embassy, which Ambassador Gene Cretz officially re-opened on 

September 22, 2011. From September 2011 onwards, Embassy Tripoli was open 

with a skeleton staff built on temporary duty (TDY) assignments, to include the 

DCM and Regional Security Officer (RSO). (The fall of Tripoli took place shortly 

after Embassy Tripoli lost its assigned staff and bureaucratically ceased to exist, 

pursuant to Department regulations regarding the length of time a post can remain 

open in evacuation status.) 

Although the TNC declared that Tripoli would continue to be the capital of a 

post-Qaddafi Libya, many of the influential players in the TNC remained based in 

Benghazi. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he 

departed Libya on November 17, 2011, after which the Special Envoy position was 

not filled. Stevens was replaced by an experienced Civil Service employee who 

served for 73 days in what came to be called the “principal officer” position in 

Benghazi. After November 2011, the principal officer slot became a TDY 

assignment for officers with varying levels of experience who served in Benghazi 

anywhere from 10 days to over two months, usually without transiting Tripoli. In 

December 2011, the Under Secretary for Management approved a one-year 

continuation of the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, which was never a consulate 
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and never formally notified to the Libyan government. Stevens arrived in Tripoli 

on May 26, 2012, to replace Cretz as Ambassador.

Throughout Libya, the security vacuum left by Qaddafi’s departure, the

continued presence of pro-Qaddafi supporters, the prevalence of and easy access to 

weapons, the inability of the interim government to reestablish a strong security 

apparatus, and the resulting weakness of those security forces that remained led to 

a volatile situation in which militias previously united in opposition to Qaddafi 

were now jockeying for position in the new Libya. Frequent clashes, including 

assassinations, took place between contesting militias. Fundamentalist influence 

with Salafi and al Qaeda connections was also growing, including notably in the 

eastern region. Public attitudes in Benghazi continued to be positive toward 

Americans, and it was generally seen as safer for Americans given U.S support of 

the TNC during the war. However, 2012 saw an overall deterioration of the 

security environment in Benghazi, as highlighted by a series of security incidents 

involving the Special Mission, international organizations, non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs), and third-country nationals and diplomats:

• March 18, 2012 – Armed robbery occurs at the British School in Benghazi.

• March 22, 2012 – Members of a militia searching for a suspect fire their 

weapons near the SMC and attempt to enter.

• April 2, 2012 – A UK armored diplomatic vehicle is attacked after driving 

into a local protest. The vehicle was damaged but occupants uninjured. 

• April 6, 2012 – A gelatina bomb (traditional homemade explosive device 

used for fishing) is thrown over the SMC north wall. 

• April 10, 2012 – An IED (gelatina or dynamite stick) is thrown at the 

motorcade of the UN Special Envoy to Libya in Benghazi. 

• April 26, 2012 – Special Mission Benghazi principal officer is evacuated 

from International Medical University (IMU) after a fistfight escalated to 

gunfire between Tripoli-based trade delegation security personnel and IMU 

security. 

• April 27, 2012 – Two South African nationals in Libya as part of U.S.-

funded weapons abatement, unexploded ordnance removal and demining 

project are detained at gunpoint by militia, questioned and released.

• May 22, 2012 – Benghazi International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 

building struck by rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). 

• May 28, 2012 – A previously unknown organization, Omar Abdurrahman 

group, claims responsibility for the ICRC attack and issues a threat against 

the United States on social media sites.
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• June 6, 2012 – IED attack on the SMC. The IED detonates with no injuries 

but blows a large hole in the compound’s exterior wall. Omar Abdurrahman 

group makes an unsubstantiated claim of responsibility.

• June 8, 2012 – Two hand grenades target a parked UK diplomatic vehicle in 

Sabha (800 km south of Benghazi). 

• June 11, 2012 – While in Benghazi, the British Ambassador’s convoy is 

attacked with an RPG and possible AK-47s. Two UK security officers are 

injured; the UK closes its mission in Benghazi the following day.

• June 12, 2012 – An RPG attack is made on the ICRC compound in Misrata 

(400 km west of Benghazi). 

• June 18, 2012 – Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi. 

• July 29, 2012 – An IED is found on grounds of the Tibesti Hotel. 

• July 30, 2012 – Sudanese Consul in Benghazi is carjacked and driver beaten.

• July 31, 2012 – Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers abducted in Benghazi.

• August 5, 2012 – ICRC Misrata office is attacked with RPGs. ICRC 

withdraws its representatives from Misrata and Benghazi.

• August 9, 2012 – A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker is 

abducted from the Islamic Cultural Center in Benghazi and released the 

same day.

• August 20, 2012 – A small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat’s 

vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.

It is worth noting that the events above took place against a general 

backdrop of political violence, assassinations targeting former regime officials, 

lawlessness, and an overarching absence of central government authority in eastern 

Libya. While the June 6 IED at the SMC and the May ICRC attack were claimed 

by the same group, none of the remaining attacks were viewed in Tripoli and 

Benghazi as linked or having common perpetrators, which were not viewed as 

linked or having common perpetrators. This also tempered reactions in 

Washington. Furthermore, the Board believes that the longer a post is exposed to 

continuing high levels of violence the more it comes to consider security incidents 

which might otherwise provoke a reaction as normal, thus raising the threshold for 

an incident to cause a reassessment of risk and mission continuation. This was true 

for both people on the ground serving in Libya and in Washington.

While the June IED attack and the RPG attack targeting the UK convoy in 

Benghazi prompted the Special Mission to reduce movements off compound and 

have a one-week pause between principal officers, the successful nature of Libya’s 
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July 7, 2012, national elections – which exceeded expectations – renewed 

Washington’s optimism in Libya’s future. Nevertheless, the immediate period 

after the elections did not see the central government increase its capacity to 

consolidate control or provide security in eastern Libya, as efforts to form a 

government floundered and extremist militias in and outside Benghazi continued to 

work to strengthen their grip. At the time of the September attacks, Benghazi 

remained a lawless town nominally controlled by the Supreme Security Council 

(SSC) – a coalition of militia elements loosely cobbled into a single force to 

provide interim security – but in reality run by a diverse group of local Islamist 

militias, each of whose strength ebbed and flowed depending on the ever-shifting 

alliances and loyalties of various members. There was a notional national police 

presence, but it was ineffectual. By August 2012, Special Mission Benghazi would 

evaluate the worsening security situation and its implications. 
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“I was at the foot of the wide marble staircase when the breakthrough occurred. 

Fanatical knife-carrying intruders, bleeding from cuts received as they were 

pushed through broken windows, ran down the hall. Putting on gas masks and 

dropping tear gas grenades, we engaged them on the stairs with rifle butts. In 

seconds tear gas saturated the area. We then moved into the vault, securing the 

steel combination door, locking in ten persons.... My greatest fear, which I kept 

to myself, was that gasoline for the generator would be found, sloshed under the 

vault door and ignited. When after minutes this did not happen, our hearts sank, 

nonetheless, as outside smoke wafted in and we knew the building had been set 

afire.”

-- First-person account of the June 5, 1967 mob siege of the then-U.S. 

Consulate in Benghazi

TIMELINE OF THE ATTACKS

September 11-12, 2012

(All times are best estimates based on existing data

and should be considered approximate.)

The Prelude – the Ambassador’s Arrival

Ambassador Chris Stevens arrived in Benghazi, Libya on September 10, 

2012, accompanied by two temporary duty (TDY) Assistant Regional Security 

Officers (ARSOs) from Tripoli. It was the Ambassador’s first visit to Benghazi 

since he departed as then-Special Envoy in November 2011. With the 

Ambassador’s arrival, there were eight Americans at the Special Mission 

compound (SMC) on September 10-11, 2012, including the Ambassador; 

Information Management Officer (IMO) Sean Smith, who arrived in Benghazi one 

week earlier to provide TDY communications and management support; and five 

Diplomatic Security (DS) agents (three assigned on short-term TDY to Benghazi –

“TDY RSO”, “ARSO 1” and “ARSO 2” – and the two who traveled from Tripoli 

to provide protection for the Ambassador during his visit – “ARSO 3” and “ARSO 

4”). The eighth American, the TDY Benghazi principal officer, completed his 13-

day assignment and returned to his full-time job in Tripoli the morning of 

September 11, leaving seven Americans at the compound. Ambassador Stevens 

was scheduled to remain in Benghazi until September 14, and his visit was timed 

in part to fill the staffing gaps between TDY principal officers as well as to open 

an American Corner at a local school and to reconnect with local contacts.
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In the absence of an effective central government security presence, the 

Special Mission’s Libyan security contingent was composed of four armed 

members of the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade (February 17) – a local umbrella 

organization of militias dominant in Benghazi (some of which were Islamist) and 

loosely affiliated with the Libyan government, but not under its control. They 

resided in a guest house building on compound. Normally four members resided

on the Special Mission compound near the front gate, but on September 11 one had 

been absent for several days, reportedly due to a family illness. The Special 

Mission also had an unarmed, contract local guard force (LGF), Blue Mountain 

Libya (BML), which provided five guards per eight-hour shift, 24/7, to open and 

close the gates, patrol the compound, and give warning in case of an attack.

After the Ambassador’s arrival at the Special Mission on September 10, 

ARSO 1 gave the Ambassador a tour of the SMC and pointed out the safe area and 

escape hatch windows in the Ambassador’s room in Villa C. Later that afternoon, 

the Ambassador visited the Annex for a briefing. He then met with the City 

Council at a local hotel for dinner, an event at which local media invited by the 

Council showed up unexpectedly, despite U.S. efforts to keep the Ambassador’s 

program and movements from being publicized. 

Security Environment on September 11, Preceding Attacks

In consultation with the TDY RSO and mindful of the threat environment 

and the September 11 anniversary, Ambassador Stevens did not leave the SMC on

September 11, but rather held meetings there. At approximately 0645 local that 

morning, a BML contract guard saw an unknown individual in a Libyan Supreme 

Security Council (SSC) police uniform apparently taking photos of the compound 

villas with a cell phone from the second floor of a building under construction 

across the street to the north of the SMC. The individual was reportedly stopped 

by BML guards, denied any wrongdoing, and departed in a police car with two 

others. This was reported to ARSOs 1 and 2. Later that morning they inspected 

the area where the individual was seen standing and informed the Annex of the 

incident. There had not been any related threat reporting. The local February 17 

militia headquarters was informed of the incident and reportedly complained to the 

local SSC on the Special Mission’s behalf. The Ambassador reviewed a Special 

Mission-drafted complaint to local authorities on the surveillance incident; 

however, it was not submitted due to the typically early closure of Libyan 

government offices. Later on September 11, the Ambassador was informed by his 

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tripoli of the breach of the Embassy Cairo 
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compound that had occurred that day and briefly discussed the news with ARSO 3. 

The TDY RSO was also informed of the Cairo compound breach by his Regional 

Security Officer counterpart in Tripoli and shared the information with colleagues 

at the Annex. 

At approximately 1940 local, Ambassador Stevens and an accompanying 

ARSO escorted a Turkish diplomat to the SMC’s main exit at the north C1 gate, 

where nothing out of the ordinary was noted. Some 30 minutes later, between 

2010 and 2030 local, a UK security team supporting a day visit by British

diplomats dropped off vehicles and equipment at the SMC (per arrangements made 

after the UK diplomatic office in Benghazi suspended operations in June 2012). 

When the UK security team departed via the C1 gate at about 2030 local, there 

were no signs of anything unusual, including no roadblocks outside of the 

compound, and traffic flowed normally. 

Ambassador Stevens and IMO Sean Smith retired for the night to Villa C at 

about 2100 local, while ARSO 4 watched a video in the Villa C common space. 

ARSOs 1, 2, and 3 were sitting together outside and behind Villa C; the TDY RSO 

was working in the workspace building referred to as the “Office” or “TOC”

(Tactical Operations Center), near the Villa B compound, which was connected to 

the Villa C compound by an alleyway. From the TOC, the TDY RSO could 

monitor a series of security cameras placed in and around the perimeter of the 

SMC. The ARSOs were each armed with their standard issue sidearm pistol; their 

“kits,” generally consisting of body armor, radio and an M4 rifle, were in their 

bedroom/sleeping areas, in accord with Special Mission practice. 

The Attack on the Special Mission Compound

An SSC police vehicle, which had arrived at the main compound gate (C1) 

at 2102 local, departed at 2142. The Special Mission had requested that a marked 

SSC police car be posted outside of the compound 24/7, but in practice a car was 

there only intermittently. The Special Mission had requested this presence again, 

specifically for the duration of the Ambassador’s visit. A subsequent local press 

report quotes an SSC official as saying that he ordered the removal of the car “to 

prevent civilian casualties.” 

Around the same time, the TDY RSO working in the TOC heard shots and 

an explosion. He then saw via security camera dozens of individuals, many armed, 

begin to enter the compound through the main entrance at the C1 gate. He hit the 
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duck and cover alarm and yelled a warning over the radio, and recalled no such 

warning from the February 17 or BML guards, who had already begun to flee to 

points south and east in the compound, towards the Villa B area. ARSOs 1 and 2 

heard an attack warning from the BML guards passed on over the radio. The TDY 

RSO also alerted the Annex and Embassy Tripoli by cell phone. 

The other three ARSOs behind Villa C also heard gunfire and explosions, as 

well as chanting, and responded immediately along with ARSO 4, who was inside 

Villa C. Following the SMC’s emergency plan, ARSO 1 entered Villa C to secure 

the Ambassador and IMO in the safe area and to retrieve his kit; ARSOs 2, 3, and 4 

moved to retrieve their kits, which were located in Villa B and the TOC. ARSO 1 

in Villa C swiftly located the Ambassador and IMO Smith, asked them to don body 

armor, and led them into the safe area in Villa C, which ARSO 1 secured. He then 

reported their whereabouts by radio to the TDY RSO in the TOC. ARSO 1, armed 

with an M4 rifle, shotgun and pistol, took up a defensive position inside the Villa C 

safe area, with line of sight to the safe area gate and out of view of potential 

intruders. ARSO 1 gave his cell phone to the Ambassador, who began making 

calls to local contacts and Embassy Tripoli requesting assistance. 

From Villa C, ARSO 4 ran to his sleeping quarters in Villa B to retrieve his 

kit, while ARSOs 2 and 3 ran to the TOC, where ARSO 3 had last seen the 

Ambassador, and where ARSO 2’s kit was located. (ARSO 2’s sleeping quarters 

were in the TOC, making him the designated “TOC Officer” in their emergency 

react plan.) ARSO 3, upon not finding the Ambassador in the TOC, ran to Villa B 

to get his kit; ARSO 2 remained in the TOC with the TDY RSO and shared 

notification and communication duties with him. At Villa B, ARSO 3 encountered 

ARSO 4, who was also arming and equipping himself, and the two then attempted 

to return to Villa C. They turned back, however, after seeing many armed 

intruders blocking the alley between Villas B and C. ARSOs 3 and 4, 

outnumbered and outgunned by the armed intruders in the alley, returned to Villa 

B and barricaded themselves in a back room, along with one LGF member whom 

they had encountered outside Villa B. 

Attack Continues, Use of Fire as a Weapon

Sometime between 2145 and 2200 local, armed intruders appear to have 

used filled fuel cans that were stored next to new, uninstalled generators at the 

February 17 living quarters near the C1 entrance to burn that building. The crowd 
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also lit on fire vehicles that were parked nearby. Members of the crowd then 

moved to Villa C.

In Villa C, ARSO 1, who was protecting Ambassador Stevens and IMO 

Smith in the safe area, heard intruders breaking through the Villa C front door. 

Men armed with AK rifles started to destroy the living room contents and then 

approached the safe area gate and started banging on it. ARSO 1 did not want to 

compromise their location in the safe area by engaging the intruders, and he 

warned the Ambassador and IMO Smith to prepare for the intruders to try to blast 

the safe area gate locks open. Instead the intruders departed, and the lights in Villa 

C appeared to dim. ARSO 1 realized that smoke from fires set inside the villa, 

away from his vantage point, was reducing the light and visibility. (There was no 

line of sight to Villa C from the Villa B/TOC compound where the TDY RSO and 

three ARSOs were barricaded. The TDY RSO in the TOC did not see smoke 

emerge on the view from the camera near Villa C until shortly after 2200 local.)

As smoke engulfed the Villa C safe area, ARSO 1 led Ambassador Stevens 

and IMO Smith into a bathroom with an exterior window. All three crawled into 

the bathroom, while the thick, black smoke made breathing difficult and reduced 

visibility to zero. ARSO 1 tried to seal the door with towels and provide some 

ventilation by opening the window. Instead, opening the window worsened 

conditions and drew more smoke into the bathroom, making it even more difficult 

to breathe. ARSO 1 determined that they could no longer stay in the safe area and 

yelled to the others, whom he could no longer see, to follow him to an adjacent 

bedroom, where there was an egress window. ARSO 1 crawled on his hands and 

knees through a hallway to the bedroom, unable to see, while yelling and banging 

on the floor to guide the Ambassador and IMO Smith to safety. ARSO 1 opened 

the window grill and exited the building, collapsing onto a small, partly enclosed 

patio, at which point he believed he was being fired upon. Immediately following 

his exit, ARSO 1 realized the Ambassador and IMO had not followed him out the 

window. He then re-entered Villa C through the egress window several times to 

search for his colleagues while under fire by the intruders outside. He was unable 

to locate the Ambassador or IMO Smith, and severe heat and smoke forced him to 

exit the building to recover between each attempt. After several attempts, he 

climbed a ladder to the roof where he radioed the TOC for assistance and 

attempted unsuccessfully to ventilate the building by breaking a skylight. Due to 

severe smoke inhalation, however, ARSO 1 was almost unintelligible, but the TDY 

RSO and ARSO 2 in the TOC finally understood him to be saying that he did not 

have the Ambassador or IMO Smith with him.
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UNCLASSIFIED

While Villa C was under attack, armed individuals looted Villa B’s interior 

and attempted to enter the area where ARSOs 3 and 4 were barricaded. The 

intruders carried jerry cans and were seen on security cameras trying to dump them 

on vehicles outside the TOC, but they were apparently empty. A group of 

intruders also attempted unsuccessfully to break down the TOC entrance. 

Annex Responds, DS Agents Rally for Further Rescue Efforts

Just prior to receiving the TDY RSO’s distress call shortly after 2142 local, 

the head of Annex security heard multiple explosions coming from the north in the 

direction of the SMC. The Annex security head immediately began to organize his 

team’s departure and notified his superiors, who began to contact local security 

elements to request support. The Annex response team departed its compound in 

two vehicles at approximately 2205 local. The departure of the Annex team was 

not delayed by orders from superiors; the team leader decided on his own to depart 

the Annex compound once it was apparent, despite a brief delay to permit their 

continuing efforts, that rapid support from local security elements was not 

forthcoming.

While the TDY RSO continued to man the TOC and communicate with 

Tripoli, the Annex, and Washington, ARSO 2 used a smoke grenade to obscure his 

movements from the TOC to Villa B, where he joined ARSOs 3 and 4 who were 

barricaded inside. By this point, the first group of attackers appeared to have 

receded. The three ARSOs then drove an armored vehicle parked outside of the 

TOC to Villa C, where they assisted ARSO 1, who was in distress on the roof, 

vomiting from severe smoke inhalation and losing consciousness. ARSOs 2, 3, 

and 4 repeatedly entered Villa C through the egress window, at times crawling on 

their hands and knees through the safe area due to heavy smoke and the lack of air 

and visibility.

Near the SMC, the Annex team hoped to bring along friendly forces from 

militia compounds located along their route. The Annex team stopped at the 

intersection to the west of the C1 entrance and attempted to convince militia 

members there to assist. There was periodic, ineffective small arms fire in the 

team’s location from the direction of the Special Mission. 

Unable to secure additional assistance, the team moved on to the SMC. The 

February 17 living quarters and adjacent vehicles were burned, and heavy smoke 
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was pouring out of the still smoldering Villa C. The Annex team made contact 

with the four ARSOs at Villa C. Some Annex team members went to retrieve the 

TDY RSO from the TOC, while other Annex team members joined the ARSOs in 

their search for the Ambassador. 

During their searches of the Villa C safe area, the ARSOs found and 

removed the body of IMO Smith with Annex security team assistance. The team 

checked for vital signs and verified that IMO Smith was already deceased, 

apparently due to smoke inhalation. Other Annex security team members and the 

TDY RSO joined up with the ARSOs again to enter Villa C via the egress window 

but were unable to locate Ambassador Stevens despite multiple attempts. Heat and 

smoke continued to be limiting factors in their ability to move farther into the safe 

area. When the TDY RSO attempted to enter Villa C through the front door, the 

ceiling collapsed. During these rescue attempts, an ARSO received a severe 

laceration to his arm. 

Second Phase Attack on the Compound, Evacuation to the Annex

At the urging of the Annex security team and friendly militia members, who 

warned that the compound was at risk of being overrun, the TDY RSO and four 

ARSOs departed for the Annex without having found Ambassador Stevens. As the 

Annex team provided cover fire, the five DS agents’ fully armored vehicle 

departed and took hostile fire as they left the SMC and turned right out of the C1 

entrance. The driver, ARSO 1, reversed direction to avoid a crowd farther down 

the street, then reverted back to the original easterly route towards the crowd after 

a man whom the DS agents believed to be with February 17 signaled them to do 

so. Farther ahead, another man in a small group of individuals then motioned to 

them to enter a neighboring compound, some 300 meters to the east of the C1 

entrance of the Special Mission compound. The DS agents suspected a trap, 

ignored this signal, and continued past. The group along the route then opened fire 

at the vehicle’s side, shattering and almost penetrating the armored glass and 

blowing out two tires. While the identities of the individuals who fired upon the 

DS agents is unknown, they may have been part of the initial wave of attackers 

who swarmed the SMC earlier that night. A roadblock was present outside this 

compound and groups of attackers were seen entering it at about the time this 

vehicle movement was taking place.

ARSO 1 accelerated past the armed crowd and navigated around another 

crowd and roadblock near the end of the road, driving down the center median and 
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UNCLASSIFIED

into the oncoming lane at one point to bypass stopped traffic. Two cars followed, 

with one turning off and the other following them with its lights off until it turned 

into a warehouse area not far from the Annex. The DS vehicle then proceeded to 

the Annex, arriving around 2330 local. There the ARSOs joined Annex personnel 

and took up defensive positions, to await the Annex security and Tripoli response 

team. The situation was relatively quiet. Wounded personnel received medical 

support. 

Back at the SMC, the Annex security team at Villa C used small arms fire 

and took defensive positions to respond to an apparent second phase attack, which 

lasted about 15 minutes and included small arms fire and at least three rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs) launched from outside the C3 gate. With their many 

and repeated attempts to retrieve the Ambassador having proven fruitless and 

militia members warning them the SMC could not be held much longer, the Annex 

team departed the SMC, carrying with them the body of IMO Smith. They arrived 

back at the Annex and moved to take up additional defensive positions. 

Embassy Tripoli Response

Upon notification of the attack from the TDY RSO around 2145 local, 

Embassy Tripoli set up a command center and notified Washington. About 2150 

local, the DCM was able to reach Ambassador Stevens, who briefly reported that 

the SMC was under attack before the call cut off. The Embassy notified Benina 

Airbase in Benghazi of a potential need for logistic support and aircraft for 

extraction and received full cooperation. The DCM contacted the Libyan President 

and Prime Minister’s offices to urge them to mobilize a rescue effort, and kept 

Washington apprised of post’s efforts. The Embassy also reached out to Libyan 

Air Force and Armed Forces contacts, February 17 leadership, and UN and third 

country embassies, among others. Within hours, Embassy Tripoli chartered a 

private airplane and deployed a seven-person security team, which included two 

U.S. military personnel, to Benghazi.

At the direction of the U.S. military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM), DoD 

moved a remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance aircraft which arrived over the 

SMC shortly before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed 

surveillance aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of 

personnel from the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 

12.
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Uncertainty on Ambassador Stevens’ Whereabouts

U.S. efforts to determine Ambassador Stevens’ whereabouts were 

unsuccessful for several hours. At approximately 0200 local, Embassy Tripoli 

received a phone call from ARSO 1’s cell phone, which he had given to the 

Ambassador while they were sheltered in the safe area. A male, Arabic-speaking 

caller said an unresponsive male who matched the physical description of the 

Ambassador was at a hospital. There was confusion over which hospital this might 

be, and the caller was unable to provide a picture of the Ambassador or give any 

other proof that he was with him. There was some concern that the call might be a 

ruse to lure American personnel into a trap. With the Benghazi Medical Center 

(BMC) believed to be dangerous for American personnel due to the possibility 

attackers were being treated there, a Libyan contact of the Special Mission was 

dispatched to the BMC and later confirmed the Ambassador’s identity and that he 

was deceased. 

BMC personnel would later report that at approximately 0115 local on 

September 12, an unidentified, unresponsive male foreigner – subsequently 

identified as Ambassador Stevens – was brought to the emergency room by six 

civilians. The identities of these civilians are unknown at the time of this report,

but to the best knowledge of the Board these were “good Samaritans” among the 

hordes of looters and bystanders who descended upon the Special Mission after the 

DS and Annex teams departed. With the clearing of smoke, Ambassador Stevens’ 

rescuers found him within a room in the safe area of Villa C, did not know his 

identity, pulled him out through an egress window, and sought medical attention 

for him. Although the Ambassador did not show signs of life upon arrival at the 

BMC, doctors attempted to resuscitate him for some 45 minutes before declaring 

him deceased, by apparent smoke inhalation.

Attacks on the Annex

Just before midnight, shortly after the DS and Annex security teams arrived 

from the SMC, the Annex began to be targeted by gunfire and RPGs, which 

continued intermittently for an hour. Annex security personnel engaged from their 

defensive positions, which were reinforced by DS agents. Other personnel 

remained in contact with Embassy Tripoli from the Annex. 
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The seven-person response team from Embassy Tripoli arrived in Benghazi 

to lend support. It arrived at the Annex about 0500 local. Less than fifteen 

minutes later, the Annex came under mortar and RPG attack, with five mortar 

rounds impacting close together in under 90 seconds. Three rounds hit the roof of 

an Annex building, killing security officers Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty. The 

attack also severely injured one ARSO and one Annex security team member. 

Annex, Tripoli, and ARSO security team members at other locations moved 

rapidly to provide combat first aid to the injured. 

At approximately 0630 local, all U.S. government personnel evacuated with 

support from a quasi-governmental Libyan militia. They arrived at the airport 

without incident. The DoD unarmed surveillance aircraft provided visual oversight 

during the evacuation. Embassy Tripoli lost communication with the convoy at 

one point during transit, but quickly regained it. 

Evacuees, including all wounded personnel, departed Benghazi on the 

chartered jet at approximately 0730 local. Embassy Tripoli staff, including the 

Embassy nurse, met the first evacuation flight at Tripoli International Airport. 

Wounded personnel were transferred to a local hospital, in exemplary coordination 

that helped save the lives of two severely injured Americans. 

Embassy Tripoli worked with the Libyan government to have a Libyan Air 

Force C-130 take the remaining U.S. government personnel from Benghazi to 

Tripoli. Two American citizen State Department contractors traveled to the airport 

and linked up with the remaining U.S. government personnel. While awaiting 

transport, the TDY RSO and Annex personnel continued to reach out to Libyan 

contacts to coordinate the transport of the presumed remains of Ambassador 

Stevens to the airport. The body was brought to the airport in what appeared to be 

a local ambulance at 0825 local, and the TDY RSO verified Ambassador Stevens’ 

identity.

At 1130 local, September 12, 2012, the Libyan government-provided C-130 

evacuation flight landed in Tripoli with the last U.S. government personnel from 

Benghazi and the remains of the four Americans killed, who were transported to a 

local hospital. 

In coordination with the State Department and Embassy Tripoli, the 

Department of Defense sent two U.S. Air Force planes (a C-17 and a C-130) from 

Germany to Tripoli to provide medical evacuation support for the wounded. At 

1915 local on September 12, Embassy Tripoli evacuees, Benghazi personnel, and 
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those wounded in the attacks departed Tripoli on the C-17 aircraft, with military 

doctors and nurses aboard providing en route medical care to the injured. The 

aircraft arrived at Ramstein Air Force Base at approximately 2230 (Tripoli time) 

on September 12, just over 24 hours after the attacks in Benghazi had commenced. 
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

1. The attacks in Benghazi were security-related, resulting in the deaths of 

four U.S. personnel after terrorists attacked two separate U.S. government

facilities – the Special Mission compound (SMC) and the Annex. 

Identification of the perpetrators and their motivations are the subject of an 

ongoing FBI criminal investigation. The Board concluded that no protest took 

place before the Special Mission and Annex attacks, which were unanticipated in 

their scale and intensity. 

ADEQUACY OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

2. Systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior 

levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special 

Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly 

inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.

Through the course of its inquiry, the Board interviewed over 100 

individuals, reviewed thousands of pages of documents, and viewed hours of video 

footage. On the basis of its comprehensive review of this information, the Board 

remains fully convinced that responsibility for the tragic loss of life, injuries, and 

damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and completely with the 

terrorists who perpetrated the attack.

Overriding Factors

This is not to say, however, that there are no lessons to be learned. A 

recurring theme throughout the Board’s work was one also touched upon by the 

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs in 1999. Simply put, in the months leading up to 

September 11, 2012, security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as 

a “shared responsibility” in Washington, resulting in stove-piped discussions and 

decisions on policy and security. Key decisions, such as the extension of the State 

Department presence in Benghazi until December 2012, or non-decisions in 

Washington, such as the failure to establish standards for Benghazi and to meet 

them, or the lack of a cohesive staffing plan, essentially set up Benghazi as a 
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floating TDY platform with successive principal officers often confined to the 

SMC due to threats and inadequate resources, and RSOs resorting to fieldexpedient solutions to correct security shortfalls. 

Communication, cooperation, and coordination between Washington, 

Tripoli, and Benghazi occurred collegially at the working-level but were 

constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and leadership at senior 

bureau levels. The DS Bureau’s action officers who worked on Libya are to be 

commended for their efforts within DS and across the Department to provide 

additional security resources to Benghazi. Action officers in the Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs’ (NEA) Office of Maghreb Affairs and Executive Office showed 

similar dedication in collaborating on solutions with their DS counterparts and 

responding to TDY staffing demands. However, in DS, NEA, and at post, there 

appeared to be very real confusion over who, ultimately, was responsible and 

empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security considerations. 

The DS Bureau showed a lack of proactive senior leadership with respect to 

Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of a high risk, high 

threat post were met. At the same time, with attention in late 2011 shifting to 

growing crises in Egypt and Syria, the NEA Bureau’s front office showed a lack of 

ownership of Benghazi’s security issues, and a tendency to rely totally on DS for 

the latter. The Board also found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with 

their own staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special need for 

increased security for Benghazi. 

Further shortfalls in Washington coordination were manifested by the flawed 

process by which Special Mission Benghazi’s extension until the end of December 

2012 was approved, a decision that did not take security considerations adequately 

into account. The result was the continuation of Special Mission Benghazi with an 

uncertain future and a one-year expiration date that made allocations of resources 

for security upgrades and personnel assignments difficult. 

Another key driver behind the weak security platform in Benghazi was the 

decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary, residential facility, not officially notified 

to the host government, even though it was also a full time office facility. This 

resulted in the Special Mission compound being excepted from office facility 

standards and accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA) and the Overseas Security Policy Board 

(OSPB). Benghazi’s initial platform in November 2011 was far short of OSPB 
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standards and remained so even in September 2012, despite multiple fieldexpedient upgrades funded by DS. (As a temporary, residential facility, SMC was 

not eligible for OBO-funded security upgrades.) A comprehensive upgrade and 

risk-mitigation plan did not exist, nor was a comprehensive security review 

conducted by Washington for Benghazi in 2012. The unique circumstances 

surrounding the creation of the mission in Benghazi as a temporary mission outside 

the realm of permanent diplomatic posts resulted in significant disconnects and 

support gaps. 

Personnel

The Board found the short-term, transitory nature of Benghazi’s staffing to 

be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in Benghazi. 

Staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering post’s security posture and 

high risk, high threat environment. The end result was a lack of institutional 

knowledge and mission capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard 

work alone, although the Board found ample evidence of both in those who served 

there. The situation was exacerbated by the lack of Locally Employed Staff (LES) 

who would normally provide a backstop of continuity, local knowledge, and 

language ability. This staffing “churn” had significant detrimental effects on the 

post’s ability to assess adequately both the political and security environment, as 

well as to provide the necessary advocacy and follow-through on major, essential 

security upgrades.

The Board determined that DS staffing levels in Benghazi after Embassy 

Tripoli re-opened were inadequate, decreasing significantly after then-Special 

Envoy Stevens’ departure in November 2011. Although a full complement of five 

DS agents for Benghazi was initially projected, and later requested multiple times, 

Special Mission Benghazi achieved a level of five DS agents (not counting DoDprovided TDY Site Security Team personnel sent by Embassy Tripoli) for only 23 

days between January 1-September 9, 2012. 

As it became clear that DS would not provide a steady complement of five 

TDY DS agents to Benghazi, expectations on the ground were lowered by the 

daunting task of gaining approvals and the reality of an ever-shifting DS personnel 

platform. From discussions with former Benghazi-based staff, Board members

concluded that the persistence of DS leadership in Washington in refusing to 

provide a steady platform of four to five DS agents created a resignation on the 
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part of post about asking for more. The TDY DS agents resorted to doing the best 

they could with the limited resources provided. 

Furthermore, DS’s reliance on volunteers for TDY positions meant that the 

ARSOs in Benghazi often had relatively little or no prior DS program management 

or overseas experience. For a time, more experienced RSOs were sent out on 

longer term TDYs, but even that appeared to diminish after June 2012, exactly at 

the time the security environment in Benghazi was deteriorating further. It bears 

emphasizing, however, that the Board found the work done by these often junior 

DS agents to be exemplary. But given the threat environment and with very little 

operational oversight from more experienced, senior colleagues, combined with an 

under-resourced security platform, these agents were not well served by their 

leadership in Washington. The lack of Arabic-language skills among most 

American personnel assigned to Benghazi and the lack of a dedicated LES 

interpreter and sufficient local staff also served as a barrier to effective 

communication and situational awareness at the Special Mission. 

Required security training for DS agents prior to service in Benghazi 

consisted of the High Threat Training Course (HTTC). However, domesticallybased DS agents who had not served abroad did not have the opportunity to receive 

RSO training before serving in Benghazi. In addition, after April 2012 all 

personnel scheduled to serve in Libya for over 30 days were required to take the 

Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) training. IMOs, who also served as the 

“management officer” at post, did not, as a prerequisite, receive any basic 

management or General Services Officer (GSO) training to prepare them for their 

duties. 

The Board determined that reliance on February 17 for security in the event 

of an attack was misplaced, even though February 17 had been considered to have 

responded satisfactorily to previous, albeit less threatening, incidents. The four 

assigned February 17 guards were insufficient and did not have the requisite skills 

and reliability to provide a reasonable level of security on a 24/7 basis for an eightacre compound with an extended perimeter wall. In the days prior to the attack 

and on September 11, 2012, one was absent. Over the course of its inquiry, the 

Board also learned of troubling indicators of February 17’s loyalties and its 

readiness to assist U.S. personnel. In the weeks preceding the Ambassador’s 

arrival, February 17 had complained about salaries and the lack of a contract for its 

personnel. At the time of the attacks, February 17 had ceased accompanying 

Special Mission vehicle movements in protest. The Blue Mountain Libya (BML) 
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unarmed guards, whose primary responsibilities were to provide early warning and 

control access to the SMC, were also poorly skilled.

Physical Security

Given the threat environment, the physical security platform in Benghazi 

was inadequate. It is incumbent upon the Board, however, to acknowledge that 

several upgrades and repairs took place over 2012. DS provided additional 

funding for the Local Guard Force (LGF), February 17, and residential security 

upgrades, including heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety grills on safe area 

egress windows that helped save the life of ARSO 1 on the night of September 11, 

concrete jersey barriers, manual drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa 

C safe area, some locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security 

cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an Internal Defense 

Notification System. Because OBO does not fund security upgrades for 

“temporary” facilities, DS also identified non-traditional funding streams to fund 

physical security upgrades and worked with the IMOs, NEA and Embassy Tripoli 

to move funds and supplies to Benghazi. The Engineering Security Office (ESO) 

in Cairo provided strong technical support and regularly visited. Following the 

June 2012 IED incident, which blew a large hole in the compound wall, DS, OBO, 

Tripoli, NEA and ESO Cairo immediately responded to Benghazi’s request for 

assistance. Tripoli identified OBO funds that could be used to fix the wall, and 

ESO Cairo traveled to Benghazi on June 8 to provide technical support. The TDY 

IMOs worked tirelessly with the RSOs, Tripoli procurement and financial 

management staff, and Libyan professionals on statements of work, contracts and 

funding for the emergency repair of the SMC wall and for the other physical 

security upgrades, as well as ongoing electrical repairs. New upgrades remained a 

challenge, however, due to a lack of cash reserves and contract and procurement 

expertise, which meant Benghazi had to rely on Tripoli for further processing. 

The Board found, however, that Washington showed a tendency to 

overemphasize the positive impact of physical security upgrades, which were often 

field-expedient improvements to a profoundly weak platform, while generally 

failing to meet Benghazi’s repeated requests to augment the numbers of TDY DS 

personnel. The insufficient Special Mission compound security platform was at 

variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards

with respect to perimeter, interior security, and safe areas. Benghazi was also 

under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment. 
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Security Planning

Post and the Department were well aware of the anniversary of the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, although DS did not issue a worldwide 

caution cable to posts related to the anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and his DS 

agents had taken the anniversary into account by deciding to hold all meetings at 

the SMC that day rather than making any moves outside. 

The Ambassador chose to travel to Benghazi that week, independent of 

Washington, as per standard practice. Timing for his trip was driven in part by 

commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing gap between principal officers in 

Benghazi. His trip had been put off earlier in the summer, and the September 10-

14 dates were not decided upon well in advance. The Board found that plans for 

the Ambassador’s trip provided for minimal close protection security support, and 

that Embassy country team members were not fully aware of planned movements 

off compound. The Ambassador did not see a direct threat of an attack of this 

nature and scale on the U.S. Mission in the overall negative trendline of security 

incidents from spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government 

advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular, caused 

Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES ON SEPTEMBER 11-12, 2012

3. Notwithstanding the proper implementation of security systems and 

procedures and remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those 

systems themselves and the Libyan response fell short in the face of a series 

of attacks that began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission 

compound by dozens of armed attackers. In short, Americans in Benghazi 

and their Tripoli colleagues did their best with what they had, which, in the end, 

was not enough to prevent the loss of lives of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, 

Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. At the same time, U.S. security 

professionals prevented a further loss of life and helped ensure the safe 

evacuation of remaining American personnel in Benghazi 12 hours after the 

attacks began.

As noted in the preceding section, physical security at the Special Mission 

was insufficient. The SMC perimeter was breached immediately, providing no 

reaction time to the five DS agents on compound. There was no advance warning 

regarding the group of attackers approaching outside the SMC prior to the attack, 
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and no sign of them on surveillance cameras outside the C1 gate until the attack 

was underway. The Board learned that, as of the time of the attacks, the Special 

Mission compound had received additional surveillance cameras, which remained 

in boxes uninstalled, as technical support to install them had not yet visited post. 

In addition, the camera monitor in the local guard force booth next to the C1 gate 

was inoperable on the day of the attacks, a repair which also awaited the arrival of 

a technical team. 

Some aspects of physical security upgrades did perform as intended – in 

particular, the safe area in Villa C, which prevented intruders from entering and the 

TOC door, which protected the DS agents from attackers trying to enter. Also, the 

installation of exits in the window grates of the Villa C safe area allowed ARSO 1

to escape the fire, and those exits were the entry point for him and other DS agents 

and Annex personnel to make multiple attempts to rescue and recover Sean Smith 

and Ambassador Stevens. 

The Board found the responses by both BML and February 17 to be 

inadequate. No BML guards were present outside the compound immediately 

before the attack ensued, although perimeter security was one of their 

responsibilities, and there is conflicting information as to whether they sounded 

any alarms prior to fleeing the C1 gate area to other areas of the SMC. Although 

the unarmed BML guards could not be expected to repel an attack, they had core 

responsibility for providing early warning and controlling access to the compound, 

which they had not always performed well in the past. In the final analysis, the 

Board could not determine exactly how the C1 gate at the Special Mission 

compound was breached, but the speed with which attackers entered raised the 

possibility that BML guards left the C1 pedestrian gate open after initially seeing 

the attackers and fleeing the vicinity. They had left the gate unlatched before.

The Board’s inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards 

alerted Americans at the SMC to the attack or summoned a February 17 militia 

presence to assist expeditiously once the attack was in progress – despite the fact 

that February 17 members were paid to provide interior security and a quick 

reaction force for the SMC and the fact that February 17 barracks were in the close 

vicinity, less than 2 km away from the SMC. A small number of February 17 

militia members arrived at Villa C nearly an hour after the attack began. Although 

some February 17 members assisted in efforts to search for Ambassador Stevens in 

the smoke-filled Villa C building, the Board found little evidence that February 17 
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contributed meaningfully to the defense of the Special Mission compound, or to 

the evacuation to the airport that took place on the morning of September 12. 

In contrast, DS and Annex personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed 

with courage and an overriding desire to protect and rescue their colleagues, in a 

near impossible situation. The multiple trips that the DS agents and Annex 

security team members made into a burning, smoke-filled building in attempts to 

rescue Sean Smith and Ambassador Stevens showed readiness to risk life and limb 

to save others. They ultimately were unable to save Sean Smith and Ambassador 

Stevens, due to the intensity of the heat and smoke and a lack of resources, 

including breathing apparatus. The DS agents’ decision to depart the SMC without 

the Ambassador came after they had all suffered smoke inhalation due to multiple 

rescue attempts, and amidst a renewed attack that continued as they departed the 

compound. The Board members believe every possible effort was made to protect, 

rescue, and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, and that the bravery of 

the DS agents present in Benghazi helped prevent a further loss of life, particularly 

given their assistance in defending the Annex. 

The Board found that the lack of non-lethal crowd control options also 

precluded a more vigorous defense of the SMC. The Board also determined that 

the lack of fire safety equipment severely impacted the Ambassador’s and Sean 

Smith’s ability to escape the deadly smoke conditions. On the other hand, the DS 

agents’ tactical driving training, as well as their fully-armored vehicle, saved their

lives when they were attacked by weapons fire en route from the SMC to the 

Annex. In addition, the DS emergency medical training and the DS-issued 

personal medical kit saved an ARSO’s life after he was severely injured by a 

mortar attack at the Annex. 

The Board found the Libyan government’s response to be profoundly 

lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and a near total 

absence of central government influence in Benghazi. The Libyan government did 

facilitate assistance from a quasi-governmental militia that supported the 

evacuation of U.S. government personnel to Benghazi airport. It also facilitated 

the departure of the charter plane carrying the Tripoli rescue team to Benghazi, and

provided a Libyan Air Force C-130 that was used to evacuate remaining personnel 

and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi on the morning of September 12.

Washington-Tripoli-Benghazi communication, cooperation, and 

coordination on the night of the attacks were effective, despite multiple channels of 
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communication among Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, and AFRICOM 

headquarters in Stuttgart, as well as multiple channels of communication within 

Washington itself. Embassy Tripoli served as a lifeline to Benghazi throughout the 

attacks, marshalling support from Washington, Stuttgart and elsewhere, including 

quickly organizing the charter plane that sent the seven-person reinforcement team 

to Benghazi. At the direction of AFRICOM, DoD moved a remotely piloted, 

unarmed surveillance aircraft to Benghazi, which arrived over the SMC shortly 

before the DS team departed. A second remotely piloted, unarmed surveillance 

aircraft relieved the first, and monitored the eventual evacuation of personnel from 

the Annex to Benghazi airport later on the morning of September 12. 

Embassy Tripoli staff showed absolute dedication and teamwork in 

mobilizing to respond to the crisis, with the DCM, DATT, Political, and other 

country team sections reaching out to a wide range of contacts in Tripoli and 

Benghazi to secure support; the Public Affairs team monitoring social media sites 

and recording a log of Mission calls; the Embassy nurse providing invaluable 

guidance on caring for the wounded evacuated from Benghazi; and a Consular 

officer donating blood that helped save the life of a wounded colleague. 

Throughout the crisis, the Acting NEA Assistant Secretary provided crucial

leadership guidance to Embassy Tripoli’s DCM, and Embassy Tripoli’s RSO 

offered valuable counsel to the DS agents in Benghazi.

The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there simply was 

not enough time given the speed of the attacks for armed U.S. military assets to 

have made a difference. Senior-level interagency discussions were underway soon

after Washington received initial word of the attacks and continued through the 

night. The Board found no evidence of any undue delays in decision making or 

denial of support from Washington or from the military combatant commanders. 

Quite the contrary: the safe evacuation of all U.S. government personnel from 

Benghazi twelve hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein Air 

Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. government coordination and 

military response and helped save the lives of two severely wounded Americans. In 

addition, at the State Department’s request, the Department of Defense also 

provided a Marine FAST (Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team) as additional 

security support for Embassy Tripoli on September 12.

Overall, communication systems on the night of the attacks worked, with a 

near-constant information flow among Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington. Cell 

phones were the main method of contact, but lacked redundancy. Radio 
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communications between the Annex and the SMC also worked well, thanks to 

prior coordination between the two. 

Shortly after receiving the initial notification from Embassy Tripoli at 

approximately 1545 EST, the State Department Operations Center notified the 

interagency, including the White House, of the Special Mission attack by secure 

conference call and email alerts. The Operations Center and the Diplomatic 

Security Command Center (DSCC) were exemplary in eliciting information from 

Tripoli- and Benghazi-based colleagues without overloading them.

IMPACT OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY

4. The Board found that intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical 

warning of the September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the 

intelligence community’s understanding of extremist militias in Libya and 

the potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats 

were known to exist. 

Terrorist networks are difficult to monitor, and the Board emphasizes the 

conclusion of previous accountability review boards that vulnerable missions 

cannot rely on receiving specific warning intelligence. Similarly, the lack of 

specific threat intelligence does not imply a lessening of probability of a terrorist 

attack. The Board found that there was a tendency on the part of policy, security 

and other U.S. government officials to rely heavily on the probability of warning 

intelligence and on the absence of specific threat information. The result was 

possibly to overlook the usefulness of taking a hard look at accumulated, 

sometimes circumstantial information, and instead to fail to appreciate threats and 

understand trends, particularly based on increased violence and the targeting of 

foreign diplomats and international organizations in Benghazi. The latter 

information failed to come into clear relief against a backdrop of the lack of 

effective governance, widespread and growing political violence and instability 

and the ready availability of weapons in eastern Libya. There were U.S. 

assessments that provided situational awareness on the persistent, general threat to 

U.S. and Western interests in eastern Libya, including Benghazi. Board members, 

however, were struck by the lack of discussion focused specifically on Benghazi.

Benghazi’s threat environment had been generally deteriorating since the 

“gelatina” bomb was thrown over the SMC fence on April 6, but was not judged to 

have reached a critical point before September 11. The July 7 elections, about 
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which there had been some trepidation regarding the security situation, passed with 

less violence than expected and were followed by Ramadan, when incidents are 

usually lower. Before September 11, a patchwork of militias in Benghazi had 

assumed many, if not all, of the security functions normally associated with central 

government organs, as the government had little authority or reach in Benghazi. 

There seemed to be no attempt, however, to link formally the many anti-Western 

incidents in Benghazi, the general declarations of threat in U.S. assessments and a 

proliferation of violence-prone and little understood militias, the lack of any 

central authority and a general perception of a deteriorating security environment 

to any more specific and timely analysis of the threat to U.S. government facilities.

Board members found that there was little understanding of militias in 

Benghazi and the threat they posed to U.S. interests. One prime factor behind this 

knowledge gap was that eastern Libya is home to many militias, which are 

constantly dissolving, splitting apart and reforming. Furthermore, many 

individuals are associated with more than one militia. Understanding of February 

17, in particular, was further limited by the fact that it is an umbrella organization, 

made up of many different militias with differing ideologies, some of which are 

extremist in nature. 

The Board determined there were no warnings from Libyan interlocutors.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PERSONNEL

5. The Board found that certain senior State Department officials within two 

bureaus in critical positions of authority and responsibility in Washington 

demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability 

appropriate for the State Department’s senior ranks in their responses to 

security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi, given the deteriorating 

threat environment and the lack of reliable host government protection. 

However, the Board did not find that any individual U.S. Government 

employee engaged in misconduct or willfully ignored his or her responsibilities, 

and, therefore did not find reasonable cause to believe that an individual 

breached his or her duty so as to be the subject of a recommendation for 

disciplinary action.