Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.
The Machinery of Government Manske

Needs a Tune-Up 

Lessons for the US National Security Council 

from the British Committee of Imperial Defence

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cut along dotted line

After you have read this research report, please give us your 

frank opinion on the contents. All comments—large or small,

complimentary or caustic—will be gratefully appreciated.

Mail them to the Air Force Fellows—Spaatz Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6006.

Thank you for your assistance.

AIR UNIVERSITY

CARL A. SPAATZ CENTER 

FOR OFFICER EDUCATION

AIR FORCE Fellows

The Machinery of Government 

Needs a Tune-Up

Lessons for the US National Security 

Council from the British Committee

of Imperial Defence

Chad T. Manske

Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 15

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

March 2009
Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Manske, Chad T.

The machinery of government needs a tune-up : lessons for the US National 

Security Council from the British Committee of Imperial Defence / Chad T. Manske

p. ; cm. – (Walker paper, [1555-7871] ; no. 15)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-190-9

1. National Security Council (U.S.)—History. 2. Great Britain. Committee of Imperial Defence—History. 3. National Security Council (U.S.)—Evaluation. 4. Great 

Britain. Committee of Imperial Defence—Evaluation. 5. National security—United 

States. 6. Military policy—Decision making. I. Title. II. Series: Walker paper (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.) ; no. 15.

355.0335/73––dc22

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.au.af.mil and the AU Press Web site 

http://aupress.au.af.mil.

ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.
iii

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours 

at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of 

professional military education at senior service schools. In 

2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well 

as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, 

and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, 

foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force 

Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of 

ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected 

to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and 

foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for 

research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force 

Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the 

chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on 

career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force Legislative 

Air Force Fellows
iv

Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the Foreign 

Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows program 

in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

AIR FORCE FELLOWS
v

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

AcknowledgmentS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

2 The British Committee of

Imperial Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3 The US National Security Council . . . . . 35

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4 The Committee of Imperial DefenCe

and the National Security Council: 

Comparison and Contrast . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

5 Analysis, Conclusions, 

Recommendations, and Implications . . . 79

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Appendix	

A National Security Council Structure . . . . . . . . . . 93

B Policy Coordination Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

C President’s Special Review Board National

Security Advisor Performance Functions . . . . . . 97
vi

	 	 Page

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Illustrations

Figure

1 World War II Organization of the Committee

of Imperial Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2 National Security Council System . . . . . . . . . . . 44

CONTENTS
vii

Foreword

History can tell us a great deal about the roots of our own 

national security institutions. This is certainly true in the case 

of our modern National Security Council (NSC). In this well 

documented study, Air Force colonel Chad Manske traces the 

roots of the NSC to its organizational prototype—the British Committee of Imperial Defence (BCID). Both the NSC and the BCID 

were devised to address the need for greater coherence in developing and advising on the implementation of the most pressing 

national security and defense matters of their day. With its 

roots in the nineteenth century, Colonel Manske’s research reveals the BCID as an early effort precisely to bring greater coherence to the making of British security policy during its brief 

existence from 1904 through the end of World War II. With the 

dawn of a new post-war era, the United States was similarly in 

need of a new structure to plan for the new security environment. Within two years of the war’s conclusion, the US Congress had passed the National Security Act of 1947 and established the National Security Council to assist in these affairs. 

The historical comparison of these two institutions comprises 

a fascinating study of two major-power efforts to bring rational 

decision making to the increasingly complex domain of national 

security policy. By looking at the conditions that gave rise to 

each, Colonel Manske illuminates the conditions under which 

institutional innovation in security policy making takes place. 

By closely examining the structural similarities and differences 

of these institutions, and by explicating the way each conducted 

its business, we get a nuanced picture of how modern major 

powers have tackled the problem of thinking holistically about 

threats to national security. By comparing these institutions––

their functions, purposes, leadership––and assessing how each 

changed over time, we gain an appreciation of the strengths 

and weaknesses of these different approaches to policy development. Colonel Manske successfully draws on comparative historical experience to make sound recommendations for strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of the National Security 

Council as a deliberative policy coordinating body within the 

Executive Office of the President. By doing so, Colonel Manske 
viii

advances our understanding of how two great countries and 

their most important national security institutions are related, 

and how the United States in particular has learned a great 

deal from institutional innovations in the United Kingdom.

Originally submitted as a research study for Air University’s 

Air Force Fellows Program and to Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, The Machinery of Government Needs a Tune-Up: Lessons for the US National Security

Council from the British Committee of Imperial Defence was selected as the best of dozens of papers submitted by an Air Force 

Fellow for the 2008 Brig Gen Kenneth N. Walker series award.

This study is a thought-provoking, meticulously researched 

study that will inform and educate future US presidential administrations of the evolution of their most important national 

security advising entity—the National Security Council. I commend this exceptional work to anyone who wants to better 

comprehend the history of the NSC with an eye toward improving its effectiveness.

Beth Simmons

Clarence Dillon Professor of 

International Affairs

Director, 

Weatherhead Center for 

International Affairs

FOREWORD
ix

Col Chad T. Manske was commissioned through the Air Force 

Reserve Officer Training Corps at Michigan State University in 

June 1989, came on active duty in April 1990, and has extensive operational experience flying the KC-135, KC-10, C-17, 

and C-5, accumulating over 3,600 flying hours. Colonel Manske 

has a bachelor of social science degree in political science from 

Michigan State University, a master of science degree in aerospace science and management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical

University, a master of operational art and science degree from 

the Air Command and Staff College, and a master of airpower 

art and science degree from the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). He is also a graduate of 

the Air War College. 

Colonel Manske completed a tour as a special assistant to 

the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, in Norfolk, Virginia 

and was the commander of the 7th Airlift Squadron and deputy 

commander of the 62d Operations Group, McChord AFB, Washington, and the 436th Airlift Wing vice commander at Dover 

AFB, Delaware. He has also deployed to Southwest Asia as an 

air expeditionary group commander and deputy director of the 

US Central Command’s Deployment and Distribution Operations Center. He most recently spent a year as a National DeAbout

the Author

Col Chad T. Manske
fense Fellow at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for 

International Affairs, where he wrote this paper. 

Colonel Manske has published his written work, including 

“Looking Ahead: Future Airlift,” in the Air Force Journal of Logistics––a required reading for Air War College students, as well 

as his SAASS thesis published as CADRE Paper No. 18, Unmanned Airlift—A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift

Shortfall. He is married to the former Stacey LoPrete, and they 

have three girls—Taylor, Madison, and Reilly.

x

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
xi

Abstract

This study examines the history, likes, and differences of the 

US National Security Council system and its organizational 

prototype, the pre-World War II British Committee of Imperial 

Defence. To comprehend the relationship between these organizations, the following questions will be posed: 

• Since the Committee of Imperial Defence was an advisory 

and policy coordinating mechanism that was also the 

organizational prototype for the NSC, what are the similarities and differences between the two and what are the 

substantive conclusions that can be drawn from such an 

examination? 

• What recommendations and implications, if any, can be 

drawn from these conclusions with respect to the ongoing 

performance and function of the NSC system? 

To answer the questions, corresponding assessments of each 

organization summarize their origins, the historical contexts 

leading to their creation, their organizational structures, purposes, functions, leadership, and the significant changes each 

experienced over time. Then, each organization is compared, 

contrasted, and subjectively examined, while bringing historical 

evidence to bear. The study concludes with insights that form 

the underlying bases for recommending modest changes to the 

NSC system. These recommendations include appropriately 

sizing the NSC staff and emphasizing the importance of strategic planning and others.

xiii

Acknowledgments

The idea for this research project came from an email conversation I had with Dr. Hal Winton of SAASS while I was deployed 

to Southwest Asia in 2007. I will never forget his insightful advice that led me to understand the truth: “It seems to me the 

British really figured out how to coordinate the various agencies dealing with national security much more effectively than 

we have. The departments appear to me to be overly bureaucratized and the NSC seems to be virtually neutered in terms of 

making them work together in a common cause.” Hal was an 

academic mentor of mine when I attended SAASS and I admired and valued his shrewd and straightforward intellect, especially his approach regarding evidence-based argumentation 

in academic writing. He also stressed economy in usage of the 

English language. His simple inspirational idea flourished into 

this study of generous length. I am also deeply indebted to him 

for offering to review drafts of this study. 

Another SAASS faculty member I appreciated was Air Force 

colonel Peter “Huggy” Huggins. His national security expertise 

and inputs helped me think about my topic in ways I never 

imagined, opening up the possibility of future related research 

if I can ever find the time again.

I am also grateful for the thoughts, criticisms, and assistance 

in shaping this work from several other significant people. Dr. 

Meghan O’Sullivan––former special assistant to the president, 

deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan and 

senior director for Iraq on the National Security Council––

brought an insider perspective missing from my outsider’s vision. I am also grateful for the assistance of Air Force lieutenant colonel Jim Regenor––sitting National Security Council 

deputy executive secretary––who also provided an insider’s 

viewpoint and with whom I shared the privilege of serving with 

as a fellow C-17 Globemaster III squadron commander from 

2002 to 2004. 

Thanks also for significant feedback from Dr. John White of 

the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. As a former US deputy secretary of defense in the mid1990s––among other previous significant DOD appointments—

Dr. White’s substantial experience in defense matters as the 
chairman of the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of 

the Armed Forces, and expertise on many other significant defense and national security reform issues was a real benefit to 

me. Additionally, I profited greatly from his experiences while I 

was a student in his National Security and Organization Management course at the Kennedy School.

I also appreciated the efforts and assistance of Dr. Amy Zegart, 

associate professor of public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. Having had the opportunity to use one of her 

books, Flawed by Design, as a source for this study, I greatly 

valued the thorough review she gave my manuscript and the 

time she spent with me during an event-packed schedule to the 

Cambridge, Massachusetts, area. Her insights into the structure 

and analysis of my work, as well as the depth and breadth of her 

national security studies credentials, lent credible authenticity. 

Another valuable mentor for this project was Dr. Dan 

Mortensen from the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama. Having worked with Dan in the past, I appreciated his deep understanding and experience with the rigors of 

writing and development of ideas. This made it easier for me to 

ask for his assistance again. He was a tough critic and took me 

to task on several aspects of this work, ultimately strengthening the final product. 

Thanks also go to my Weatherhead Center for International 

Affairs colleagues, US Army colonel Ed Passmore, J. Nicholas 

Beadle of the British Ministry of Defence, and Meidyatama “Dymas” Suryodiningrat of the Indonesian Jakarta Post publication. Their easygoing––yet critical––examinations, wealth of 

knowledge, and ready availability offered me the opportunity 

for instant feedback.

Dr. Kathleen Molony, Fellows director for the Weatherhead 

Center for International Affairs, was also an invaluable supporter, reviewer, and cheerleader of my work who served to 

make my year at the center one of the most enriching, academically satisfying, and culturally rich experiences of my life. 

In addition, I am grateful for the assistance of Sue Wagner, 

copyeditor for the Weatherhead Center, who made my prose 

come alive with active voice, clean transitions, and a smoothness I could never have achieved alone. 

AcknowledgmentS

xiv
xv

This project was made possible through the sponsorship of 

the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies located at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and its director, Dr. James Smith. The institute truly 

enabled the academic license to fully explore this topic in a 

manner I saw fit.

Above all, I am thankful to God and my family. God’s continual blessings on my life truly made this work possible and 

allowed me to “hang tough” through very long days and nights 

of researching, writing, and editing. To my family, I owe much. 

Working from sunrise until sundown, and beyond, during the 

short days of winter elevated the cabin fever effect, particularly 

when Stacey and the girls wanted my time and attention. Their 

understanding of why I spent so much time in my basement 

office writing away is immeasurably appreciated. 

AcknowledgmentS



Chapter 1

Introduction

It will be readily seen that the British and American 

systems have influenced each other, America receiving 

far more than Great Britain, however. 

—Franklyn Arthur Johnson,

Professor and Committee 

of Imperial Defence researcher

Near the end of the nineteenth century, the necessity for 

Great Britain to defend her borders, protect her colonies, and 

create a coherent security mechanism to manage these functions became paramount. The necessary security mechanism, 

the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), would not materialize 

until 1904 after Britain had experienced the crucible of war not 

once, but twice, through the First (1880–1881) and Second 

(1899–1902) Boer Wars. The CID became an essential ad hoc 

part of the British government and empire from just after the 

Second Boer War until the start of World War II, and was responsible for research, planning, and policy coordination on 

issues of military, defense, and national strategy. After the 

dawn of the twentieth century, the empire, and thus the CID, 

would soon find itself again preparing for war. Proving itself a 

valuable instrument in advising and coordinating defense policies and plans leading up to and during World War I, the CID 

would once again repeat the cycle, making preparations for a 

war it would fight 20 years later. At the end of World War II, 

however, and having served its noble purpose for 40 years, the 

CID was disbanded in favor of a similarly purposed, but differently functioning Ministry of Defence. In looking back on its 

contributions to the entirety of the British government, the CID 

was crowned by one influential scholar in 1960 as “history’s 

most successful experiment under democratic auspices.”1

Moreover, although this was the end of an era for one organization, another with its same paternity was soon to be created. 

While the British were remaking their government structures 

in the aftermath of World War II, the United States was also 
INTRODUCTION

considering how to do the same. Similar to the British posture 

and sentiments at the end of the Boer Wars, the United States 

also perceived the need to establish a security mechanism to 

manage the functions necessary in dealing with the changing 

world order and the nation’s place in it. In searching for an organizational model to emulate, the United States naturally 

turned to the British and the successful CID. Deliberations on 

the scope, authorities, and functions of such an organization 

eventually were midwifed from the landmark National Security 

Act of 1947. Among other things, the National Security Act is 

best known for realigning and reorganizing the United States’ 

armed forces, foreign policy, and intelligence apparatus. It also 

merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy 

into the National Military Establishment headed by the secretary of defense, as well as establishing the Department of the 

Air Force as a separate service. 

Of lesser significance at the time, the act also established 

the National Security Council (NSC)––a central body for providing advice and coordination for national security policy in 

the executive branch. Although different from the CID in many 

ways, the NSC adopted many of its functional attributes as a 

starting frame of reference—much of which has endured through 

the present day. As the NSC has evolved as a function of the 

preferences and statutory prerogatives of the US presidents, 

however, critics argue it has drifted away from its foundational 

principles—the same principles that had more or less characterized the CID’s enduring existence.

These critics have a basis for their arguments. Over the last 

60 years, there has been wide variance in the NSC’s size, function, influence, and employment. Some of this has arguably led 

to unfortunate domestic and international consequences that 

often point back to a breakdown in the interagency coordination process––a primary responsibility of the NSC. These concerns converge in this study, leading to a focal point and the 

following research questions: Given that the British CID was 

an advisory and policy coordinating mechanism that was also 

the organizational prototype for the NSC, what are the similarities and differences between the two, and are there any substantive conclusions that can be drawn from such an examination? Assuming this latter question can be answered in the 
INTRODUCTION



affirmative, what recommendations and implications, if any, 

pertain to these conclusions with respect to the ongoing performance and function of the NSC system? 

Method

In order to answer these questions and understand the relationship between the two organizations, this study will establish 

corresponding assessments of each by summarizing pertinent 

aspects of their origins, the historical contextual environment 

leading to their creation, organizational structures, purposes, 

functions, leadership, and significant changes each experienced over time. Next, each organization’s similarities and differences are illuminated and subjectively examined, bringing 

historical evidence to bear. Lastly, an analysis of all the above 

is provided.

The study will examine the extant body of literature on the 

history, development, employment, and conduct of the CID 

and the NSC by comparing and contrasting the circumstances 

and attributes of their existence. These comparisons will then 

form the bases of analysis in determining the answers to the 

research questions. 

Definitions

This study uses terms with respect to the NSC requiring definition. Today’s NSC is statutorily comprised only of the president, who is its chairman, the vice president, the secretary of 

state, the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of defense, 

and the assistant to the president for national security affairs, 

otherwise known as the national security advisor (NSA). There 

is also a statutory military advisor––the chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and a statutory intelligence advisor––the 

director of national intelligence (DNI). Other cabinet members, 

such as the attorney general and the director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, are invited to participate in NSC 

meetings, but are not statutory members. In addition, the 

heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as 

other senior officials, are also invited to attend meetings of the 

NSC when appropriate.2
INTRODUCTION

The “NSC system” refers to the entire grouping of government and cabinet agencies, including the NSC and NSC staff, 

who produce the work and recommendations that ultimately 

go before the president for decision. This is often referred to as 

the “interagency system.”

Many use the term “NSC” in referring to the NSC staff, who 

are actually the group(s) of people who prepare and coordinate 

policy from myriad cabinet departments and agencies for deliberation by the NSC and eventual approval by the president.3

The members of the NSC staff serve at the pleasure of the president, operate with independence, and are generally protected 

by executive privilege with regard to their communications.4

Background and Significance of the Problem

Since a conscious effort was made by US planners to imitate 

a British model, and while accounting for the distinctive characteristics of the American political system, a natural curiosity 

emerges as to why they did so.5 For Britain, the CID “provided 

the foundation for the system of government” which differentiated the supervision of public affairs in Britain by allocating 

the responsibility for the defense of the empire through creation of an administrative standard for the management not only 

of military issues, but also of domestic and economic ones.6

The CID as a British national security apparatus begs the question of how the US considered adopting a version of it to suit its 

needs. Implausibly, a report entitled “Unification of the War 

and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National 

Security” submitted to the secretary of the Navy in 1945 “recommended that there be established by a statute a National 

Security Council to provide a permanent organization for the 

coordination of foreign policy and military policy in the United 

States.”7 In making this recommendation, the Eberstadt Report—named after Ferdinand Eberstadt who produced it––became a matter of US Senate record. The report devoted a considerable amount of space to explain the evolution, structure, 

and operation of the CID, and “how” and “why” a similar model 

would be beneficial to the United States.8

Yet through the evolution, management, and administration 

of the NSC system over the last 60 years, the executive branch 
INTRODUCTION

of government has been the cause of considerable foreign policy 

failures with significant domestic and international implications 

for America’s standing in the world. Examples include the embarrassing 1961 failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion; the Vietnam 

War; the devastating 1987 Iran-Contra affair; the questionable, 

yet almost universally accepted pretext for the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 (presence of weapons of mass destruction); 

subsequently, the lack of planning for stability operations in 

Iraq; and then, responses to domestic calamities such as Hurricane Katrina. National security scholar Amy Zegart suggests 

that events like these have “exerted . . . direct influence on the 

NSC system’s development,”9 but this author contends that not 

all of this development has been positive nor led to favorable 

policy outcomes, resulting in significant unaddressed challenges. According to scholar Paul Bracken, “most of these challenges require skills and energy from several departments working together to make any headway, yet the NSC/interagency 

system was never designed for that kind of integration.”10

Cabinet secretaries have also commented on the lack of an 

effective functioning NSC system. During his farewell meeting 

with Pres. George W. Bush, Colin Powell, secretary of state, 

“told the president that the national security decision-making 

process—meaning, principally, the NSC process—was broken.”11 Former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld also commented while reflecting on more recent failures, by stating that 

the United States was “still functioning with an interagency 

process and a governmental structure that is in the industrial 

age in the last century.”12 Despite strong national security institutions and the great people working for them, foreign and 

domestic policy mistakes continue to occur, “reminding presidents of the imperatives of office and the price of failure.”13

The international strategic context has changed considerably 

since the establishment of the NSC system while the system 

itself has not been changed.14 Critics will argue that every president has changed the NSC system. These critics argue that 

through various presidential decision documents and executive orders, presidents have been able to construct the kinds of 

NSC systems that suited their needs. While this author does 

not take issue with the fact that these documents and orders 

allow the president to shape the NSC system, these arguments 
INTRODUCTION

do not hold up when the aforementioned failures and still others 

are considered. 

Forged in the nexus between the end of World War II and the 

dawn of the Cold War, the NSC system has had to transition 

from analyzing and comprehending an environment with a single, 

closely watched, and relatively predictable nuclear-armed adversary, the Soviet Union, to trying to understand a more diverse and obscure environment consisting of dozens of possible 

enemies. These threats are much more elusive and include 

transnational threats, non-state actors, terrorism, rogue nations, failing states, rising near-peer competitors, complex contingency operations, and the continual worry of proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction—among others. 

If these environmental factors are not diverse enough, consider the fact that even more diffuse, nontraditional issues like 

energy security, human trafficking, and ideological differences 

constitute the agendas of many NSC system deliberations.15 In 

addition, shifts in national interests and priorities between domestic and foreign policies brought on by the changes in successive presidential administrations have left the NSC system 

to try to cope with the load. A former NSA remarked that “every 

president needs some arrangement that helps him develop 

policy and strategy, coordinate decision making, supervise 

policy implementation, provide him with personal advice that 

keeps his own presidential perspectives and interests in mind, 

and articulate the policies that he is pursuing. These needs cannot be satisfied through reliance on a traditional department.”16

Unlike the world of business where changes can be made to 

meet customer needs and stave off the competition, large government organizations do not face life-or-death competition 

and lack motivation for change. Therefore, change comes hard. 

No one is going to buy out the government or merge it into another organization, and it cannot go bankrupt and then start 

over. Even worse, there is intense competition for resources 

between government agencies, but no agency fears institutional annihilation and the one guaranteed constant appears 

to be the permanent turf wars. Nevertheless, the national security environment demands the best effort from its government institutions, and this is the underlying motivation for 

this comparative study. 
INTRODUCTION

Preview of the Argument

Chapter 2 examines the origins of the CID and the historical 

context leading to its creation. In addition, the CID’s organizational structures, purpose, functions, and the significance of 

its changes over the course of its existence are explored. British 

surprise at the alarming lack of planning and preparation before the Second Boer War, growing concern of German militarism and the threat of its domination of the European continent, as well as the necessity of securing and defending Britain’s 

vast colonies were the major driving forces for the CID’s creation. This chapter also examines CID leadership through the 

office of the secretariat—a key to much of CID’s success over 

the duration of its epoch. 

Chapter 3 sets out to accomplish the same purpose as in 

chapter 2, but for the NSC. Foundations for the NSC were laid 

in the aforementioned 1945 Eberstadt unification report to US 

Navy secretary James Forrestal, which suggested studying and 

imitating the British CID model. This eventually led to enacting 

legislation creating the presidential advisory and policy coordinating NSC.

Chapter 4 compares and contrasts both the significant 

and less noteworthy attributes of the CID and the NSC in 

order to bring to light the similarities and differences between each organization. 

Chapter 5 summarizes and synthesizes the findings from the 

previous chapters. The analyses of the findings reveal conclusions that have implications for imparting recommendations 

for change.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see appropriate entry in 

the Bibliography.)

1. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 366.

2. The Whitehouse, National Security Council. See the section entitled 

“Membership of the National Security Council.”

3. See Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 

21–23.

4. Dr. Amy B. Zegart (associate professor of public policy at the University 

of California, Los Angeles) interviewed by author, 17 April 2008.

5. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 366.
INTRODUCTION

6. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 25.

7. Eberstadt, Unification, 55.

8. Ibid., 47–50.

9. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 104.

10. Bracken, “Managing to Fail,” 73.

11. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 502, as quoted in Ross, Statecraft, 121. 

12. See Woodward, State of Denial, 379.

13. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 105.

14. See Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 

61, appendix A, for a listing of the historical nomenclature of these presidential documents.

15. Although outside the scope of this study, an excellent discussion of 

some of these threats and challenges, how they pertain to the NSC system, 

and prescriptions for change can be found in Carter and White, Keeping the 

Edge, 268–71. See also Bracken, “Managing to Fail,” presenting a compelling 

case linking US failures in national security strategy to an interagency system that has not been structurally changed or updated to do so. He makes 

the analogy that in order to stay competitive in the market place, businesses 

must change their structure. Consequently, if our NSC system does not similarly change, it is doomed to failure. Finally, see Gerstein, Securing America’s 

Future, 147–50, who asserts the only way to guarantee changes to the NSC 

system is through the passage of a new national security act designed to 

overhaul the entire government. 

16. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 94.


Chapter 2

The British Committee 

of Imperial Defence

A useful, indeed, an invaluable addition to our constitutional machinery.

—Lord Herbert H. Asquith

British Prime Minister, 

1908–1916

As expressed by the epigraph above, the CID indeed was a 

very valuable organization in assisting Great Britain with her 

defense and security arrangements. This chapter will explore 

this assertion, acquainting the reader with an essential context 

for understanding how the CID operated, the environment it 

operated in, and why these mattered. From this account the 

reader should take away an appreciation for how the size of 

organizations like the twentieth century CID mattered as it related to their effectiveness, how the British system of government interrelated with the CID, and why the leadership and 

personalities of the CID made a difference in carrying out operations and functions. These takeaways will then serve as a 

prologue for understanding the American NSC system in chapter 3, thereby allowing readers to form their own conclusions 

about the CID and NSC. 

Origins

The creation of the British CID was intended to assist the 

British cabinet and prime minister in a time of increasing threat 

to the British Empire. Its establishment was the result of a 

combination of startling realizations.1 In 1885, after the Crimean 

(1853–1856) and First Boer Wars (1880–1881), the British 

formed several committees, commissions, and other bodies to 

examine the empire’s imperial defense problems, which 

stemmed from a national postwar desire to reform the economy 

and sever the ties with their maturing colonies.2 These bodies 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

10

tended to focus their efforts around two facets of the problem: 

reducing the cost of defending the colonies, and disposing of 

the constitutional relationships between Britain and her colonies.3 Of great concern, specifically, was the threat of Russian 

invasion along the northwest border of India. A secondary concern was Napoleon’s hegemonic ambitions on the European 

continent and elsewhere along Britain’s colonial possessions. 

One such body called into creation in 1878, because of these 

problems, was the Colonial Defence Committee (CDC). The 

CDC was perhaps the most influential institution during its 

short existence (one year) for its nascent long-range militaryplanning capabilities, and was also considered the most prominent institution, despite its brief longevity, leading up to the 

creation of the CID.4 Differences, however, between the CDC 

and the eventual CID were considerable. The CID had: 

1. a record-keeping secretariat, 

2. flexible membership, 

3. relationship between the service departments and other 

vital cabinet departments (e.g., exchequer, foreign office, 

colonial office, and the India office), and 

4. made use of both politicians and professional service 

leaders as full members.5

The CDC had no methodical processes or ongoing means to 

provide the necessary information and legitimate coordination 

of the various cabinet departments.6 Neither did it have a director or head, such as its successor CID possessed via the secretariat function, to champion, filter, and focus issues for the 

prime minister’s attention.7 What the CID’s creation was intended to remedy, thus, was this empty space in the government and provide the cabinet a full-time body to study these 

and other challenges.8 Further complicating the situation was 

British concern over the threat of German militarism, Germany’s bent on European continental domination, and the bitterness of British colonies (such as South Africa, Australia, and 

New Zealand among others) in their struggles for independence. 

This situation required Britain to have an organization more 

powerful and influential than the CDC.9 Because of these cir-
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

11

cumstances, the cabinet established a commission in 1890 to 

investigate the problem.

The Hartington Commission’s report of 1890 issued recommendations to the cabinet for considering the principles of imperial defense including the need for an organization equipped 

to study the problem and provide advice on protecting the empire.10 The commission condemned “the inadequacy of existing 

interservice coordination, both in peace and in war and for both 

national and imperial defence.”11 Colonial struggles led to concern by prominent figures in the British government that, not 

only was the protection of the colonies becoming a struggle, 

but there was also speculation some, like South Africa, would 

invade the British mainland. In addition, the discussions continued urging “Britain to build up the machinery for planning 

and administering such individual operations as the defence of 

the British Isles, of the North-West Frontier of India, and of the 

several colonial ports,” yet no substantive organization of significance or permanence was created.12

As the last decade of the century ended, Britain again found 

herself at war. As defeat upon defeat mounted during the Second Boer War,the national distaste over the losses and lack of 

preparation intensified the need for a solution.13 As historian 

Franklyn Johnson noted: “The lack of a general staff left the 

government with neither complete intelligent analyses, nor instructions to field commanders, nor a comprehensive plan of 

campaign. Most of the higher army officers grossly underestimated 

the Boer potentialities; an archaic and inefficient administrative system existed . . . the lack of joint planning left combat 

units at home to meet an imagined invasion danger while there 

were insufficient troops at the front.”14

Therefore, at the end of the Second Boer War in 1902, the 

empire, still lacking planning abilities as it had from before the 

war, had not yet come up with a viable solution for an organization to handle such matters as recommended by the Hartington Commission. It was this failure and the recommendations 

of another working group known as the Esher Committee of 

1904 that catalyzed the establishment and creation of the CID 

that same year.15

In promulgating its recommendations, the Esher Committee 

looked at the British army’s inefficiencies and weaknesses during 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

12

the Second Boer War, further revealing how isolated Britain 

was—both geographically and politically—from the rest of the 

world. Through the Esher Committee’s findings, their report 

recommended sweeping changes in the administration of the 

British army and Britain’s military apparatus writ large.16 One 

of the recommendations proposed having the recently formed 

CID act “as the coordinating head of all the departments concerned in the conduct of, and in the preparations for war” (emphasis in original).17 In addition, the Esher Committee realized 

that existing cabinet processes in an increasingly complex industrial age, coupled with other domestic issues, left the prime 

minister with very little intellectual capital to think about complex defense issues, a serious weakness for the nation.18 This 

fully opened the door for a viable security solution—the CID. 

The primary force in the CID’s creation was arguably the result of the sheer will and initiative of sitting British prime minister Arthur Balfour. Coming to power in 1902 at the end of the 

Second Boer War, Balfour took note of the various reports and 

recommendations proposing a new coordinating body. Balfour 

brought the CID into existence by a treasury minute dated 4 

May 1904.19 Although Balfour’s tenure as prime minister and 

president of the CID ended with his resignation in December 

1905, he carefully watched over the committee’s progress from 

the sidelines through periods of peace and war over the next 30 

years.20 In establishing the CID, Balfour envisioned a creative 

apparatus at the center of the government whereby specified 

ministers of the cabinet and other influential politicians could 

reform the defense establishment as well as advise, debate, 

and propose policy options free of the partisan organizational 

ties to the prime minister.21 

To put this another way, when questions of British territorial 

defense arose involving the coordination of more than one government department, the CID’s job was to advise. In considering the larger political issues, the British cabinet then decided,

and, once decisions were made, it was the responsibility of the 

various government departments to execute. In cases involving 

the dominions, including India, decision and execution responsibilities resided with their respective governments.22
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

13

Historical Context

In order to make a fair and useful comparison between the 

CID and the NSC, it is vital to understand the historical contexts and respective eras in history leading up to when each 

was established and matured. This understanding will help 

parse the challenges each faced in both the formative and mature periods of their existence. The Boer Wars, as has been 

mentioned, provided the catalyst for the CID’s eventual establishment. Nevertheless, one can only appreciate this fact 

through knowledge of the details. The Esher Committee’s investigation into the conduct of the Second Boer War revealed 

divisions and failures between the political and military departments of the government and attention was eventually focused 

on the War Office.23

Besides the need for defense reform that was gathering steam 

in the late 1800s, an external requirement for better mainland 

security had emerged from the outcome of the Russo-Turkish 

War of 1877–1878. Though considered a Russian win by many 

historians, the 1856 Treaty of Paris had previously guaranteed 

Ottoman territorial integrity by Great Britain, France, and Austria.24 This guarantee, in turn, required military power to assure it. The requirement for military power led directly to the 

formation of the CDC which had military resources and was 

the predecessor to the CID.25 In short, the Russo–Turkish War 

led to the creation of the CDC, which took the British into the 

Boer Wars. The outcome of the Boer Wars exposed external security threats to the nation. Those threats coupled with the 

internal need to reform the War Office culminated in the formation of the CID from remnants of the CDC. 

Once the CID was created, new defense challenges emerged 

as the international environment changed. As the twentieth 

century dawned, the world witnessed the rise in power of the 

United States and the Soviet Union, as well as Japan. Other 

changes to the balance of power on the European continent 

also grew evident as the decline of both France and Britain was 

manifested, caused to a large degree by the losses of their colonies, erratic fluctuations of their strength, and the perceived 

belligerence of Germany.
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

14

The conduct of warfare also changed during the early twentieth century, giving rise to unanticipated military and diplomatic consequences. No longer were small arms engagements 

the primary means of fighting between armies. Advanced weaponry and technology combined to create greater distances between combatants, depersonalizing conflict so much that military force became more than just means for states to violently 

engage one another—opposing forces in being became instruments of statecraft and diplomacy. Worldwide developments in 

science and technology gradually affected the CID and its thinking, as did concurrent shifts in political thought—both within 

the British government and without. Furthermore, enormous 

increases in the costs of national security and defense over this 

period served to make the CID’s role evolve in complexity.26

This complexity, in turn, cultivated the fertile ground in which 

the various committees of the CID flourished. 

Organizational Structure and Attributes

The CID’s early organizational structure was extremely flexible 

and varied greatly depending on the needs of the prime minister. This flexibility was perhaps the key attribute to the CID’s 

success, second only to the diverse selection of advisers from 

whom the prime minister could solicit counsel. Advising the 

prime minister was a nucleus of administrators and bureaucrats including cabinet ministers, military leaders, and other 

key officials familiar with British national security and politicomilitary matters. CID-provided advice exerted tremendous influence on the prime minister and the cabinet, yet was proffered without specified executive authority, leaving plenty of 

deliberative and interpretive room to consider its worth.27 Nevertheless, this arrangement seemed amenable to the prime 

minister, since as it was merely an advisory instrument, he and 

other cabinet members could reject the advice and keep their 

own counsel as desired.28 On top of that, the prime minister 

was both the president and chairman of the CID and had complete discretion and authority to select its members without 

cabinet interference.29 This design was deemed an effective 

planning vehicle across the government, and its expressed purpose was touted as “an example to be imitated.”30 Next to the 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

15

members selected to represent the brain trust of the CID, the 

committees were another important advisory vehicle for the 

prime minister and cabinet. 

Committees

One of the most noticeable features of the CID’s organization 

was the makeup and positioning of the various permanent and 

ad hoc subcommittees that provided tremendous continuity 

and direction to the head of government. Four permanent subcommittees were established at various times after the CID was 

initially created. The first subcommittee was the CDC, renamed 

the Overseas Defence Committee in 1908.31 As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the CDC was the predecessor body to 

the CID. The CDC did not go away but became part of the CID. 

Under the CID, the CDC subcommittee was employed “to edit 

the detailed reports approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence in matters of defensive preparation over a vast range of 

subjects for transmission to the Dominions and Colonies.”32

Other permanently established subcommittees included the 

Home Ports Defence Committee (1909), the Coordination Committee (1912), and the Air Committee (1912).33 These subcommittees managed government details and edited reports from 

other subcommittees (particularly ad hoc subcommittees), and 

were comprised mainly of staff officers and other permanent 

officials.34

These structural aspects coupled with the CID’s disciplined 

ability to work in a bipartisan manner improved the quality of 

work produced and allowed the CID to garner “fairly general 

official acceptance” as the foremost military planning body in 

the British government.35 The major drawback of the committee system Britain employed was its quickly growing size. At 

the height of its existence, the CID was comprised of 733 subcommittees under which there were 179 sub-subcommittees.36

As one can imagine, these numerous committees produced a 

continuous flow of unending paperwork.37 However, the subcommittees were organized in ways that contributed to the 

speed and efficiency with which the CID handled problems and 

ultimately to its competence and success. 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

16

Probably the most valuable of all CID permanent subcommittees was the Coordination Committee, responsible for the 

codification of various plans from all government departments 

in the event war broke out. Its plans were catalogued and contained within the famous War Book. The War Book was a significant development in its day for it contained “a thorough list 

of all individual responsibilities and tasks of all government 

departments.”38 The War Book came into being in 1911 during 

the yearly imperial session. Under the supervision of CID secretary Maurice P. A. Hankey, 1st Baron Hankey, the War Book 

inevitably became a tool of inestimable worth on the eve of 

World War I, as it contained very detailed actions and plans 

required of every government department.39 Never before had 

the government harnessed the collective power of the entirety 

of government and defense entities in such a comprehensive 

manner. The War Book even integrated the efforts of the colonies into those of the cabinet and government departments. As 

one scholar put it, “the C.I.D. contributed vitally to departmental administrative preparedness and inter-departmental 

co-ordination.”40 

Analogous to the deliberative planning process that occurs in 

the US defense establishment, each plan was phased with trigger points calling for action by specific players in the government. The first phase, for example, was normally called the 

“precautionary” or “strained relations” phase, with the War 

Book delegating the secretary of state for foreign affairs the responsibility for ordering the involved parties to implement this 

phase at a specified time when the conditions of the plan allowed.41 Next was the “war stage,” which was designated by the 

prime minister after which the War Office delegated implementation and execution to all government departments.42 “As a 

result of this work, the British machinery for the conduct of war 

had by 1914 reached an ordered completeness of detail . . . 

which had no parallel in the previous history of the country.”43

While permanent subcommittees handled seemingly administrative and editorial details, they tended to be the continuity 

foundation for the entire CID. “Larger questions of policy were 

dealt with by committees appointed ad hoc and composed of 

Cabinet Ministers and officers holding the highest Service appointments.”44 Additionally, these smaller ad hoc committees 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

17

regularly tackled “intricate problems concerned with special aspects of defence” with meticulous plans “prepared to co-ordinate 

the actions of the naval, military and civil departments in the 

event of war.”45 When the problem or challenge was solved and 

the corresponding actions completed—including detailed advance planning—the ad hoc committee was simply dissolved. 

As confidence grew in the CID’s abilities, many within the 

government came to rely on it as not only valuable, but also essential to the government’s security apparatus.46 This confidence led to earning increasing volumes of work of greater complexity, which in turn demanded greater analysis and specificity 

from the CID, which in turn gave the CID increased experience 

with corresponding accolades for well done execution. 

As mentioned previously, CID membership varied in size and 

composition depending on the problem or challenge requiring 

study, with a core group of the same government and defense 

experts attending nearly every meeting. Additional cabinet 

members and ranking professional officers were added to the 

group on an informal basis.47 By 1910 the core members of the 

CID included the following: the prime minister (chairman), the 

secretary of state for foreign affairs, the secretary of state for 

war, the chancellor of the exchequer, the first lord of the admiralty, the first sea lord, the director of naval intelligence, the 

secretary of state for air, the chief of the general staff, and the 

director of military operations. Additionally, the following officials were often added depending upon the issues discussed: 

the secretary of state for India, the lord president of the council, the lord privy seal, the chiefs of staff of the three fighting 

services, the general officer commanding in the Mediterranean, 

the secretary of state for the colonies and dominion affairs, the 

inspector general of the forces, and the permanent secretary to 

the treasury (as head of the civil service).48 Although these 20 

regular members could rightfully assemble to discuss issues 

and advise the cabinet and prime minister, in reality only a half 

dozen or so regularly attended meetings, which convened 

weekly when the CID was first created. However, the number of 

people associated with the CID in any given year, depending on 

the issues discussed, could number in the hundreds.49 A 

smaller number seemed to be more suitable for Prime Minister 

Balfour who considered himself a strategist in his own right, 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

18

capable of analyzing complex defense problems without the 

counsel of a large group of people.50

It should be noted that only during wartime did the CID function more efficiently when a greater number of members were 

advising the government.51 By contrast, adding members during peacetime slowed the processing of advice to the executive 

and conveyed the stereotype of a large and slow-moving bureaucratic organization. Smaller numbers during peacetime allowed the CID to handle bureaucratic challenges well, owing 

much of its apparent success to the flexibility and constitution 

of its subcommittee structure. Lord Hankey, CID secretary for 

26 years, described these workings as follows: 

The detailed work is entrusted to a large number of Sub-Committees of 

appropriate constitution, while the Main Committee itself lays down the 

broad lines of policy, and acts as a sort of clamping machine and clearing house, and, if necessary, a court of appeal. The analogy that I would 

give you is that the Committee of Imperial Defence itself is the architect 

and at the same time the master-builder, engaged in directing and supervising the erection of the gigantic edifice of Imperial Defence; the 

actual construction and equipment of the building being entrusted to a 

host of sub-contractors, each of them an expert in his own particular 

line of business and each of them able to draw upon the most skilled 

labour available in the country.52

Using the same analogy, Hankey emphasized that defects 

emerge in even the best-constructed buildings. The CID had, 

through its permanent coordination committee, the means and 

ability to discern and correct these deficiencies as they became 

evident.53

The glue that held the CID committee machinery together 

was the permanent secretariat. Formed in 1904 simultaneously with the creation of the CID, the structure of the secretariat looked more like a military organization than a civilian 

one. Headed by a secretary appointed by the prime minister for 

a renewable five-year term, its core included seven assistants—

two from the army, two from the navy, two from the Indian 

service, and one from the colonies. The secretariat’s job was to 

guide the processes, studies, and work of the CID. Unlike other 

changes that were made to the composition and structure of 

the CID during preparation for World War I, the same exact 

secretariat structure and composition was retained. This pro-
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

19

vided necessary continuity of purpose and direction to the wartime version of the CID.54

Besides having a secretariat function as a conduit of information to the prime minister and cabinet, which its predecessor organization did not have, the CID’s best attributes continued to be its flexible membership and advisory status.55 Flexible 

membership allowed the injection of a diversity of opinions 

from across, within, and even external to (in the case of private 

citizens) the political establishment to be circulated, commented on, and deliberated on for executive decision.56 Further, since the chief executive was not bound to follow the advice, the prime minister and cabinet could still use the CID’s 

insights to complement, confirm, or contrast their own thinking, hopefully leading to well-determined actions. 

Another constructive attribute of the CID not resident in the 

CDC or previous CID-like bodies, was its ability to consider 

initiatives formulated within the CID and not just those received from the cabinet. This flexibility of thought and action 

was valuable in revealing potential imperial defense and national security blind spots, helping to keep the prime minister 

in a proactive, rather than reactive, mindset. 

Purpose and Function

It has already been established that the CID’s primary role 

was advising the British prime minister and cabinet on defense 

and security issues, but how did the CID do it? How did its 

structure, comprised primarily of subcommittees and a secretariat, allow it to perform its work? 

Purpose

Before the CID was established, its predecessor, the CDC, was 

assigned the primary purpose of providing “local schemes of 

defence” to the Colonial Conference of 1887.57 As a start, this 

entailed taking an inventory of all self-defense-related resources 

of both the empire and the colonies including labor and equipment and all homeland defense plans.58 The conference then 

took the inventory, studied it carefully, and made necessary 

adjustments and alterations.59 If any adjustments were made, 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

20

they were given to the War Office for safekeeping and modifications, as necessary. The conference and its subsequent outcomes were both significant because it was the first time the 

empire acted upon such a comprehensive and all-encompassing 

approach to defense. Previously, only offensive preparations 

had been organized with such detail. 

The work of the CDC was not lost on the newly formed CID 

in 1904, as their “first great task” was “the analysis of Britain’s 

home defence problem.”60 Specifically, they were tasked to 

study issues such as the effectiveness of sea power, protection 

against invasion, the defense of India and South Africa, closer 

military ties with the colonies, positive control of railways and 

ports, censorship in war, war-risk insurance, and explanations 

for Britain’s isolation in international affairs, among a myriad 

of other matters.61

How the Committee of Imperial Defence Functioned

As the CID took up its taskings, a paradox arose regarding 

its warrant. Since the CID was an advisory body comprised 

mostly of military staff, suggestions that the cabinet establish 

“executive bodies” like the CID to tackle specialized defense 

problems seemed to threaten the cabinet’s civil authority “over 

the units which possessed the weapons of force.”62 In this it is 

important to note the distinction between “strategic discussions” and “strategic planning.” Scholarship is in disagreement 

as to the actual function of the CID. One view is that the CID 

only facilitated strategic discussions, while another is that it 

also accomplished strategic planning.63 This seems to indicate 

that the CID managed to tread a fine line between inconsequence and threatening civilian control of the military. In any 

event, the sheer volume of plans drawn up by the CID demonstrates that it was, at once, at the foundation of strategy and

an indispensable tool for the prime minister.64 Strategic discussions were always held behind closed doors where experts could 

debate the issues. Discussions took place below the cabinet 

level, encouraging as honest and open a dialogue as possible 

without being marginalized by the complexities of cabinet-level 

government bureaucracy.65 Franklyn Johnson described this 

method as follows:
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

21

The CID was an organ of inquiry and persuasion, a free association of 

the amateur and the expert. In it there now appeared to exist all the 

basic machinery necessary to the comprehensive planning of imperial 

security, making unnecessary any compartmented and secret planning 

by each service, while the cabinet politicians, ignorant of military matters, stood by to patch them together. It also rendered outmoded the 

dangerous vacuum caused by the lack of planning so general during 

the nineteenth century.66

Furthermore, because of the credibility of the experts involved 

in the deliberations and the depth of their recommendations, 

nearly all (95 percent) of the affected government departments 

automatically implemented the recommendations.67 In addition, at no time did it appear that the CID exceeded its authority 

or advisory function. The government always seemed to have 

full control, and thus the authority of the cabinet never seemed 

to diminish. 

CID members and the secretariat alike were equally entitled 

to bring topics and issues of policy to the CID for study. “Because the C.I.D. was the Prime Minister’s creature, it was to 

him that the Secretariat submitted its own proposals and those 

which came from the various departments of state. Once a subject had been placed on the agenda, it was the duty of the Secretariat or the department or departments concerned to submit 

papers for circulation.”68 The CID was thus effective while operating within a system where formal authority rested with 

cabinet ministers, and where CID members could study—apparently without pressure or prejudice—all the issues that they 

perceived as priorities in defense of the empire. This is remarkable considering the pressures and struggles that today’s governments often channel toward short-term, reactive planning 

rather than long-term, deliberative planning. This ultimately 

guaranteed CID’s worth to the ministers while demonstrating 

its enduring flexibility.69

Leadership: Prime Ministers and Secretaries

Leadership within the CID, particularly exhibited by the secretary of the committee, was the primary reason for its success. 

The secretary provided the prime minister and defense department necessary stability, direction, and interdepartmental coordination.70 The 1945 Eberstadt Report to Secretary of the 
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22

Navy Forrestal made note of this as well, stating that: “In its 

existence of over 40 years it has created a habit of working together on questions of national policy. In the achievement of 

this result the importance of the role of the permanent secretariat must be emphasized.”71 According to Lord Hankey, the 

secretariat’s primary role was to “ensure as far as humanly 

possible that the machinery for planning at all stages was functioning successfully and properly coordinated.”72 In other 

words, the committee secretary was the director for the development of all plans. Previous CID-like bodies, like the CDC, 

lacked this secretariat function, and thus lacked a crucial element in the planning process. 

Although merely having a secretariat function was clearly 

important to the CID’s operation, selection of the committee 

secretary was equally important, if not more so. Since the 

prime minister selected this individual (and had the power to 

remove him without cause) without a confirmation process 

from the cabinet or anyone else, he had to be someone the 

prime minister trusted. 

Due to the nature of the CID’s work, its growth rate and variety, the secretary had to be a self-starter. One scholar reflected that the secretary “must be an individual of initiative 

and yet, if continuity were to be preserved, he must be adaptable to the personality and methods of his chiefs.”73 Of the 

handful of secretaries who led the CID, Lord Hankey served the 

CID longer than any other did. He deserves specific mention and 

consideration as the “one man who greatly contributed to . . . 

progress in imperial defence and who was to have lasting influence upon the C.I.D. and official policies in war and peace.”74

From 1908 to 1912, Lord Hankey served as the assistant secretary of the CID. In 1912 he became the secretary and served 

in the post for 26 years. His influence on the British defense 

establishment from the time he became secretary was such 

that his life and the life of the CID were practically the same.75

Johnson best captures the character and qualities Hankey exhibited in this respect:

Lord Hankey has been described by many of the most eminent 

statesmen of the period, almost always in glowing terms, and I can 

only affirm from numerous talks with him and with those who were 

closely associated with him that he has emerged with the large stat-
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

23

ure with which these printed memoirs endow him. . . . Two virtues 

above all others seem to have motivated Hankey, a desire patriotically, constructively, anonymously and loyally to serve the state, 

and a conscientious thoroughness which compensated for the inattention or lack of time of others . . . he kept his viewpoint remarkably 

free of . . . bias. This was an indispensable attribute of a high-level 

secretary, and thus by his selfless service he quickly captured the 

confidence of seven successive Prime Ministers.76

Johnson also noted that one of the qualities that elevated Hankey above all others was his attention to detail. Prior to his appointment to the CID, an adequate system for taking notes and 

minutes of meetings, record keeping, and general file storage 

was lacking.77 Hankey excelled in these areas while developing 

and implementing organizational systems to ensure accuracy 

and easy record retrieval and maintaining the secrecy of sensitive discussions necessary to a functioning government. His 

administrative abilities greatly sped up the decision-making 

process for the government and alleviated the prime minister of 

inestimable worries. Hankey’s influence would not have been 

possible had it not been for the full trust and confidence of the 

prime ministers he served.78

In addition to having no authority, but paradoxically still 

possessing a reputation for getting things done, the secretary had no parliamentary following to speak of. If he were 

to lose the confidence or openly criticize a member of the 

cabinet, or take a partisan position biased in one direction 

or another, his influence would vanish.79 Thus, his largest 

challenge, as well as his biggest constraint, lay in his ability 

to function within the confines of his positional authority 

without exceeding it. By operating within and up to the limits of his authority, Hankey was able to garner enormous 

credibility for, and acceptance of, the CID’s work as well as 

strengthen his own reputation. Johnson succinctly summarizes Hankey’s lasting contributions: “Hankey’s tenure 

strengthened the C.I.D., pulled together the threads of prewar preparations, and laid the foundations for the C.I.D.’s 

central place during the interwar period. He seems to be the 

cement of the C.I.D., equally trusted and relied upon by all, 

never tactless, always unruffled.”80
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

24

Noteworthy Committee of 

Imperial Defence Changes over Time

The first several years of the CID’s existence were unremarkable, 

reflecting the calm of relative world peace and security. By the 

seventh year, however, the organization was still managing to 

preserve its strict advisory role to the cabinet and prime minister, while steadily accumulating the functions of an imperial 

consultative council.81 During these early years, the CID gradually accepted colonial representatives from outside the British 

government, which altered the status and make up of the body. 

This changed the face of the CID from one of a handful of close 

advisors—primarily insiders—to a larger council that had political responsibilities to entities, governments, and parliaments 

well outside the core British system. This, in turn, led to the 

introduction of a wide variety of views on matters of state for 

the cabinet and prime minister to consider. Many of the divergent views often ran counter to British mainland national interests. Uniformity and cooperation were sometimes at odds as 

the CID forged its identity and established its worth.82

Also during these early years, roughly 1906 to 1911, the CID 

was primarily focused on domestic security disturbances as a 

direct result of the peacetime environment it found itself in, 

giving scant attention to issues beyond—such as the scares in 

the Balkans and rising German power. The CID developed procedures for handling both domestic security disturbances, as 

well as challenges abroad, through plan and policy development and the hammering out of fundamental guiding principles 

for imperial defense. Between 1911 and the beginning of World 

War I, the CID “made itself the centre of strategic planning and 

foreign policymaking [for] the whole Empire in relation to a possible war with Germany.”83 New defense issues and challenges 

materialized requiring innovative security solutions, which 

subsequently led to the expansion of standing and ad hoc subcommittees. The plans this burgeoning group of military and 

civilian experts produced grew extensively, covering dozens of 

defense emergencies.84 Johnson described this development as 

follows: “Altogether, the years from 1912 to 1914 confirmed the 

C.I.D., supplemented by the Imperial General Staff and the Naval Staff on the technical level, as the Empire’s central advisory 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

25

and co-ordination organ in defence and foreign policy matters. 

This fact was strongly emphasized with the start of the war, 

when the plans carefully prepared by the C.I.D. went into effect 

with relative smoothness and rapidity.”85

Thus, during the early years of World War I, innovative organizations were created and adapted to deal with the new challenges and needs intrinsic to modern warfare.86 Then prime 

minister, H. H. Asquith (Lord Oxford), who borrowed core members of the CID to form the new bodies and manage the requirements of the government, primarily established these new 

organizations. The first new organization Asquith created transformed the peacetime CID into a wartime war council. Materially, 

the members and functions of the war council did not differ 

from the CID. The chairman and the secretary were the same 

for both, as were the regular attendees.87 The biggest difference 

between the two was that the war council was granted more 

executive authority—even though it was still subordinate to the 

cabinet—and because of the dynamic nature of the war, the 

council was empowered to act upon the decisions it made.88 In 

essence, wartime events necessitated a faster decision-toaction cycle from its organizations than peacetime. 

When David Lloyd George became prime minister at the end 

of 1916, he consolidated the defense functions of both the cabinet and the various committees into a smaller organization 

known as the War Cabinet. It was comprised of the prime minister and five other key ministers.89 Occasionally, when the business merited it, the War Cabinet was enlarged to include representatives from the colonies and India. When this happened, it 

was dubbed the “Imperial” War Cabinet.90 The War Cabinet had 

full decision authority, unlike any of its predecessor bodies, 

and was given sole responsibility for the conduct of war.91 Apart 

from this, though, the War Cabinet and CID functioned as one 

in the same, with the War Cabinet even retaining the same secretary as the CID. They had the same flexible procedures, the 

same close association with the chiefs of staffs of the fighting 

services, the same ability to call upon staff officers and outside 

experts, and could make full use of the extensive subcommittee 

system, among other things.92 One significant difference, however, was that the War Cabinet’s duties were increased to encompass the entirety of the actions of the government—including 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

26

statecraft and some diplomatic function—which persisted until 

the end of the war.93

After World War I, the association between the War Cabinet 

and the CID was dissolved.94 The War Cabinet organization was 

retained, however, but it was much smaller, had virtually no 

responsibilities, and retained no authority. The leftover majority 

of the organization reverted to the CID and its prewar functions.95 New problems faced the government at the end of the 

war including the demobilization of fighting forces and the integration into the defense department of the now mature Royal 

Air Force. Complex relations with other nations after World War 

I now became an affair between “whole” nations, not just militaries. Since the entire nation’s might—human, economic, industrial, and material resources—was mobilized for the war 

effort, there was no good way to carry out the government’s 

business without cementing the close linkages and contributions of the various departments of state and the CID. Important to the complexity of the defense challenges Britain faced 

was the fact that airpower had forever taken away their relative 

advantage of insularity, and with it, time to deliberate upon 

and subsequently implement defensive preparations.96

There were significant changes that occurred in the structure and functions of CID’s subcommittees, too. Before World 

War I, the subcommittees were generally delegated specific 

tasks normally dedicated to planning some aspect of defense 

and security. As mentioned earlier, four primary subcommittees existed then: Colonial Defence (later renamed Overseas), 

Home Ports Defence, Air, and Coordination. During the interwar period, the committee structure had grown tremendously 

and was meeting with such increasing frequency that by 1939

they were all organized underneath a handful of large up-echelon 

groups: Strategy and Planning, Organization for War, ManPower, Supply, and Miscellaneous (figure 1).97 The Strategy and 

Planning Group’s primary subcommittee was called the Chiefs 

of Staff Subcommittee. More than any of the other subcommittees of this or other groups, it had become the most prominent 

as World War II approached, eventually becoming the prototype 

for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.98

In addition to these developments, other interwar period 

changes and transitions within the function of the CID are worth 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

27

noting. First, there was a continuing debate within parliament 

and among the public for a centralized security organization. 

The majority supported an organization headed by a minister of 

defence.99 Before World War I this effort was of little importance. 

After World War I, however, it could not be ignored. As noted 

earlier, the complexity of problems facing Britain after World 

War I led many in the cabinet to debate the merits of a defence 

minister separate from the prime minister, as well as a military 

counterpart who could lead the chiefs of the fighting services, 

but still function as an impartial government official.100

During World War II, the CID reemerged and functioned 

much as it did in World War I. When World War II ended, the 

challenges facing the nation seemed exponentially magnified 

compared to the aftermath of World War I. The Defence Committee (DCOM), which was significantly different in function 

from the CID, replaced the CID. Whereas the CID was purely 

an advisory body, the DCOM had certain executive authorities. 

The DCOM also had a smaller, fixed membership versus the 

flexible membership that characterized the CID. Other changes 

to the defense apparatus saw the replacement of the three service ministers by a single defense minister, thus creating a unified defense “voice.” With respect to these changes, scholar 

Henry Donaldson Jordan observed: “The real significance of 

the step . . . lies in its recognition of the principle of the grouping 

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Adapted from F. A. Johnson, Defence by Committee: British Committee of 

Imperial Defence, 1885–1959, (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 

1960), 275.
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

28

of the top staff work of government by function rather than by 

departments [emphasis added].”101 The DCOM taking over 

the CID’s work and the changes in the world order combined to 

motivate the government to act. The end result, a product of 

the British government’s 1947 white paper, called for the establishment of a ministry of defence to replace the CID after its 

nearly 40 years of service.102

During its existence, the CID filled an empty void in the British war machinery of defense thinking and planning.103 Pacifistic attitudes and a down-turning economy just before and after 

World War II accelerated its demise. Johnson observed that: 

“The state of international relationships deteriorated so inexorably and the destructiveness of scientific warfare mounted so

drastically that by 1940 defense by committee was in decline.”104

As an imperial defense council and interdepartmental committee for the government’s use, the CID made tremendous contributions to the nation’s defense. Johnson’s evaluation of the 

conclusive merits of the CID speaks volumes: “The challenges 

with which the C.I.D. grappled were breathtaking in their rapid 

sequence and their significance to British national and imperial 

security. With all the weaknesses and failings which these 

events revealed in a nation that had long been peaceful, concerned largely with social reform and economic matters, sedentary and bourgeois in its temperament, the British in their finest hour turned in a truly striking performance.”105

This shining evaluation certainly makes one wonder exactly 

why the CID was abandoned in favor of a ministry of defence. 

Perhaps as World War II ran its course, the British, instead of 

relying on their own established systems of policy coordinating 

mechanisms, adapted to the US system. The great work of the 

CID was that, despite its title, it looked at the concept of security in its broadest sense—hence treasury, foreign office, and 

colonial office representation in the committee. Yet when the 

Admiralty, the War Office, and the Air Office were consolidated 

into a single ministry, the need for broader coordination did not 

disappear, leaving a national security hole in the British government that until only recently was filled.106 The most likely 

reasons the CID was subsumed and abandoned, was that the 

United States, through its nascent national security system, so 

widely represented the shared interests of both nations (Britain 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

29

and the United States) and the fact that the United States had 

assumed greater responsibility for UK security worldwide.

The CID’s significance and role in governmental organization 

and efficiency, however, should not be underestimated. Indeed, 

even measured by today’s modern standards of a contextually 

complex and issue-rich world, the forgotten CID stands out as 

an extraordinary—even revolutionary—organization. Forged by 

the necessities of war, it became one of the first comprehensive 

government organizational models ever established: “The Committee of Imperial Defence was history’s most successful experiment, under democratic auspices, in harnessing land, sea 

and airpower to the political objectives of strategic planning, 

preparedness, policy formulation and war making. It was not 

only outstandingly successful in the United Kingdom, but the 

C.I.D. has been adapted to other great democracies.”107

Notes 

1. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 353.

2. Ibid., 16; and Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 234.

3. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 16–17.

4. Ibid., 16. As will be seen over the next few pages, the CDC was renamed 

the Overseas Defence Committee in 1908 and functioned as the first permanent subcommittee under the CID. Hankey, Supreme Command, 52.

5. See Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 235, for a full 

description of the distinction. 

6. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 25. 

7. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 36.

8. See Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 48. 

9. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 24 and 37.

10. Ibid., 32.

11. Ibid., 28.

12. Ibid., 39.

13. Also known as the South African War, this conflict was “fought from 

11 October 1899 until 31 May 1902, between the British Empire and its independent six (6) colonies of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand and the 

two independent Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal Republic).” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. 

“Second Boer War,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War; and 

Hankey, Supreme Command, 45.

14. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 40.

15. Ibid., 41; and Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 233.

16. Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 242; and 

Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Esher Report,” http://en.wikipedia
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

30

.org/wiki/Esher_Report, accessed 31 January 2008. This report was the impetus for establishment of a general staff, akin to and the arguable prototype 

to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to sweeping organizational changes 

to the War Office for which the US Office of the Secretary of Defense is modeled. Here is language from the Esher Committee Report: “The British Empire 

is pre-eminently a great naval, Indian and Colonial Power. There are, nevertheless, no means for co-ordinating defence problems, or for dealing with 

them as a whole. . . . We are driven to the conclusion that no measure of War 

Office reform will avail, unless it is associated with provision for obtaining 

and co-ordinating for the use of the Cabinet all the information and the expert advice required for the shaping of national policy in war, and for determining the necessary preparations in peace. . . . The scientific study of imperial resources, the co-ordination of the ever-varying facts upon which imperial 

rule rests, the calculation of forces required, and the broad plans necessary 

to sustain the burden of Empire have, until recently, found no place in our 

system of government.” See also Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 242; and Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 48.

17. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 139 and 307. Although executive authority is implied by this statement, it appears that in the context of the entire report it was not intended. See also Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 239; and Hankey, “Editorial,” 256.

18. Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 233.

19. Hankey, Supreme Command, 45; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 84–85. Treasury Minutes in the British parliamentary system are 

roughly equivalent to the US Congress’ system of bills or legislation in this 

instance. 

20. Hankey, Supreme Command, 45.

21. See “Sir Maurice Hankey and the Origins of the Cabinet Office,” Source 

UK.net; and d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 27.

22. Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 85; and Roskill, Hankey, 90.

23. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 47.

24. This treaty made the Black Sea neutral territory, thus prohibiting fortifications and the presence of armaments on its shores, as well as barring it 

to all warships.

25. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 17. In 1879, then British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli established the Colonial Defence Committee comprised 

of officials in the offices of the Admiralty, War Office, Treasury, and Colonial 

Office “to consider what steps could be taken at short notice to provide some 

measure of security for Colonial Ports,” (emphasis in original). Ibid.

26. Ibid., 3.

27. Ibid., 1; Roskill, Hankey, 90; and Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee 

of Imperial Defence,” 243. In addition to this reference, Lord Hankey gives 

this explanation for the role the CID plays within the government: “The Committee is not a super-department; it has no executive responsibilities; it gives 

no orders; it only gives advice; and in framing that advice the representatives 

of all the departments concerned are sure to take their share. It thus supplies 
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

31

the machinery which is not only cheap, efficient, and infinitely flexible; but 

one which can give help to all Governments whatever their political complexion, though it cannot shelter any Minister or Government from the Parliamentary consequences of their own bad luck or bad management.” Hankey, 

“Editorial,” 273.

28. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 161.

29. Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 242; and 

Roskill, Hankey, 90.

30. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 1.

31. Hankey, Supreme Command, 52.

32. Ibid., 53.

33. Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, appendix.

34. Hankey, “Editorial,” 258; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 88; 

and Roskill, Hankey, 91.

35. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 98.

36. Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 259–60.

37. Roskill, Hankey, 145.

38. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 131. 

39. Ibid., 161.

40. Roskill, Hankey, 140.

41. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 132.

42. Ibid.

43. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 49.

44. Hankey, “Editorial,” 258; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 88.

45. Roskill, Hankey, 91; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 99.

46. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 103.

47. Hankey, Supreme Command, 46–47.

48. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 104; Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 98–99; and Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 245.

49. Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 85.

50. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 1; and Johnson, Defence 

by Committee, 58.

51. Hankey, Supreme Command, 48.

52. Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 250.

53. Ibid.

54. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 48 and 49. 

55. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 57; and Hankey, Supreme Command, 49.

56. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 57–58. The Prime Minister could “call 

upon any department, politician, permanent official, military expert, Dominion representative or even private citizen to give him advice within the constitutional framework.”

57. Ibid., 19. 

58. Ibid., 21 and 23.

59. Ibid., 21.

60. Ibid., 58.
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

32

61. Ibid., 77; Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 86–87; Johnson, “British 

Committee of Imperial Defence,” 236; and d’Ombrain, War Machinery and 

High Policy, 5. Johnson provides examples of the international affairs isolation including the Entente Cordiale (which was a series of agreements signed 

in 1904 between the United Kingdom and France regarding a more peaceful 

coexistence) and the alliance with Japan. Further examples of the wide range 

of subjects the CID closely studied demonstrate the usefulness, flexibility, 

and broad influence the CID had on the Cabinet and prime minister, including control of the press, insurance for shipping goods, espionage, and the 

long-range development of air power. See also Roskill, Hankey, 140; and 

d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 21. 

62. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 75; and Hankey, Supreme Command, 

49. As historian Franklyn Johnson relates, “The politicians . . . had only recently won their long campaign to remove even the tenuous threads of royal 

influence over the army. This was in addition to their long success in financially starving the services, especially the army. Their concern had been primarily the control over, not the efficiency of, the armed forces, and now this 

control rested in name, as well as in fact, [with] the cabinet. Political leaders 

. . . were in no mood to allow any aspects of this power to pass to another 

body, and [Prime Minister] Balfour was one of the strongest defenders of the 

tradition of cabinet responsibility.”

63. Roskill, Hankey, 138. Roskill contends that Franklyn Johnson’s characterization of the CID as the “Centre of Strategic Planning: 1906–1911,” a 

separate chapter in his 1960 work Defence by Committee, did not have the 

benefit of private and official records publicly released after 1960 that indicate differently. He further states rather unequivocally on page 140 that, “the 

simple truth is that up to 1914, and indeed for some years after the outbreak 

of war . . . the C.I.D. neither directed strategy nor possessed any measure of 

control over the Admiralty and War Office.” Yet a third scholar, d’Ombrain in 

his 1973 work entitled War Machinery and High Policy, noted that the CID 

“achieved a remarkable measure of progress towards its development as an 

organ for centralizing defence policy-making and planning” (emphasis added). 

d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 73. 

64. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 72.

65. Ibid., 81.

66. Ibid.

67. Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 243. Lord 

Hankey uses an excellent example of how this process worked: “Let us suppose that the situation demands the dispatch of military forces . . . to some 

threatened point abroad. In that event the Committee of Imperial Defence 

considered all the factors which have a bearing on the problem—political, 

military, economic and so forth. Having reached agreement, it puts forward 

recommendations to the Cabinet as to the precise naval, military, and air 

forces which should be sent, the dates on which they should start, the route 

by which they should go, the action that they should take on arrival, the diplomatic action that should be taken in parallel, and so forth.” 

68. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 138.
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

33

69. Catterall, “How Imperial was the Committee of Imperial Defence?”

70. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 164.

71. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 50.

72. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 73.

73. Ibid., 74.

74. Ibid., 126–27.

75. Ibid., 127 and 261. Lord Hankey’s service to the British government, 

the CID, and its various committees is extensive. Here is an overview of the 

many positions he held: naval assistant secretary of the CID, 1908–1912; 

secretary, 1912–1938; secretary of the War Cabinet, 1916–1919; secretary of 

the Cabinet, 1919–1938; clerk of the Privy Council, 1923–1938; secretary of 

the Chiefs of Staff Committee and innumerable other subgroups of the cabinet and CID; War Cabinet minister without portfolio, 1939–1940; chancellor 

of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1940–1941; paymaster general, 1941–1942; chairman of the Scientific Advisory and Engineering Advisory Committees, 1942–

1943. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 127, note 12.

76. Ibid., 127.

77. Roskill, Hankey, 91. Roskill further describes Hankey’s administrative 

acumen: “Minutes of each meeting, stating clearly and concisely the conclusions reached, were produced and circulated within 24 hours, and were numbered consecutively from the first meeting held on 18th December 1902 to the 

day when the Defence Committee of World War II took over its functions.”

78. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 128. Johnson further notes that 

“Hankey’s precision, his efficiency, his thoroughness, his administrative ability, 

his obsession to get the job done speedily and yet accurately, which was 

strangely refreshing amid the usual slipshod ways of doing business in government.” Ibid. 

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., 129–30.

81. Ibid., 109.

82. Ibid., 111.

83. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 120.

84. Ibid., 121.

85. Ibid., 161.

86. Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 92. More exactly, from November 

1914 through December 1916. Hankey, “Editorial,” 262.

87. Hankey, “Editorial,” 262; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 93.

88. Hankey, “Editorial,” 262; and Roskill, Hankey, 92. Within a few 

months after the name change to the War Council, lasting from November 

1914 to June 1915. The name was changed to the Dardanelles Committee, 

June to October 1915, then again changed to the War Committee, formed in 

November 1915, where it remained through November 1916. These three iterations “were an adaptation to the circumstances of the war of the elastic 

machinery devised by Lord Balfour in 1904.” Hankey, “Editorial,” 263.

89. Hankey, “Editorial,” 263; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 94.

90. Hankey, “Editorial,” 264.
The British Committee of Imperial Defence

34

91. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 49–50; and 

Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 94.

92. Hankey, “Editorial,” 263; Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 95; and 

Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 244. By the end of 

the war, over 200 subcommittees existed. 

93. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 49.

94. This occurred in November 1919 after the Peace Conference. Hankey, 

“Editorial,” 264; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 96.

95. Hankey, “Editorial,” 264.

96. Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 245.

97. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 253. In 1933 the total number of personnel working for the CID was 405. Between 1935 and 1936, that number 

jumped to 532 and by 1938, the number increased more to more than 876.

98. Ibid., 242–43.

99. Ibid., 167.

100. Jordan, “Foreign Government and Politics,” 78.

101. Ibid., 81. According to this scholar, the name change to Defense 

Committee is because it was given executive powers. This arrangement, covered in chapter 2, would be similar to the efforts in the United States whereby 

the National Security Act of 1947 would legislate defense unification.

102. Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 251.

103. Ibid., 354.

104. Ibid., 256–57.

105. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 362.

106. Interview with J. Nicholas Beadle, former private secretary to British 

Ministry of Defence secretary Des Browne, interview by the author, 28 March 

2008. Beadle noted that Britain has come full circle in some respects by establishing a new Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development on 23 July 2007. Designed to “consider issues relating to national security, and the government’s international, European 

and international development policies,” the committee brings together ministers from across the British government. This committee, however, does not 

function the same as the CID or the NSC, but nonetheless reflects the established protocol of “collective Cabinet responsibility.” 

107. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 366.
35

Chapter 3

The US National Security Council 

In form and in public imagery, the National Security 

Council is the most exalted committee in the federal 

government. 

—I. M. “Mac” Destler

NSC and foreign policy 

scholar and researcher

Key takeaways and questions in this chapter are primarily 

fourfold. First, what similarities existed between the CID and 

NSC? How did one organization operate versus the other and 

why does that matter? Second, what has happened over the 

course of the NSC’s existence when the size of the NSC staff varies and what is significant about that? Third, what do the US 

foreign policy and international engagement successes and failures of the past resulting from NSC involvement suggest as a 

contribution to presidential decision making? What kind of accountability should the NSC have to the Congress or to the 

American people, if any? And lastly, what are the similarities 

and differences between the British CID and US NSC that could 

show the reader how the NSC system might be made stronger?

Origins

When outlining the origins of the NSC, one would think the 

framers had resolved to create a body to oversee the whole of 

US national security. In fact, that is not entirely true.1 Evidence 

suggests that the NSC’s roots stem back to World War I or before; most accounts, however, place the origin closer to the end 

of World War II. What is certain is the fact that several attempts 

were made throughout the last century to synchronize the 

management of the myriad of government and defense departments to provide for a more unified and coordinated national 

security and defense structure. These attempts often failed, as 

many proposals were perceived as conveying power and preeminence to one department over another. 2 Between 1921 and 
The US National Security Council 

36

1945 alone, 50 bills were introduced to Congress to make these 

kinds of changes in the executive branch, yet none were successfully enacted into law.3 In the fall of 1945, it was found that 

“a survey of the relationship between foreign policy and military policy in the United States reveal[ed] that there [was] a 

serious lack of coordination between these two categories of 

governmental and national activity.”4 Despite these shortcomings 

in the 1940s, concerted efforts for enhancing defense and 

national security coordination gathered energy. 

In December 1944 the issue of postwar German occupation 

surfaced. The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 

was eventually established in 1946 to deal with this exigency.5

In 1947 the SWNCC was renamed the State–Army–Navy–Air 

Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) and was comprised of 

officials at the assistant secretary level on down. Later that year 

and as a direct result of the Eberstadt report, the SANACC was 

essentially remade into its organizational successor, the NSC, 

after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

6 How did 

this come about?

In 1945 Eberstadt forwarded a report to his friend and boss, 

then secretary of the Navy Forrestal, at his request regarding 

the unification of the armed forces.7 This report contained recommendations for creating a handful of statutory agencies and 

national security bodies to enhance and facilitate governmental policy coordination. Eventually, these recommendations 

were refined, forming the bases for the National Security Act of 

1947 two years later. Scholar Richard Best described the NSC 

as an inconspicuous by-product of the larger National Security 

Act. “It is difficult,” he wrote, “to isolate the creation of the NSC 

. . . especially as the NSC was much less controversial than the 

unification of the military and so attracted less attention.”8 The 

real question should be, in view of the fact that he was the Navy 

secretary, did Forrestal request the report in the first place? 

First, Forrestal wanted to find a legal way to circumvent and 

avoid what he perceived in Pres. Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime 

conduct as his “highly personalized, ad hoc decision making 

during World War II, above and around his principal formal 

advisers” (emphasis in original),9 as well as to promulgate a 

strategy “by the Navy to retain its preeminent position among 

the military services.”10 In addition, Forrestal was looking for 
The US National Security Council 

37

an American version of the British CID and saw in the idea of 

an NSC a means to curb the authority of his boss, Pres. Harry 

S. Truman, in whom he had limited confidence.11 Ironically, 

President Truman supported some kind of national security 

apparatus, if nothing else than to put in place structures to 

ensure that surprise attacks such as those on Pearl Harbor 

never occurred again.12

At the time of its creation, the NSC was nearly overlooked as 

just a small organization in the larger government bureaucratic hierarchy. The organization and its staff were considered merely pawns in the mind of the president. To Eberstadt, 

however, the NSC was designed for much more. To him it was 

“to be a strong, independent, collaborative institution,” and he 

had ultimately hoped that this kind of a coordination system 

“would better conform to American democratic ideals, would 

protect civilian control of the military, and would prevent domination by one military service—all . . . while improving cooperation between the services and integrating US military and 

foreign policies.”13 But President Truman envisioned the circumstances differently. 

In a special address to Congress on 19 December 1945, 

President Truman snubbed the idea of an NSC by not even 

making mention of it but explicitly calling for enacting legislation to “protect American interests and reinforce American influence in the postwar world” (emphasis added).14 Within two 

years, this legislation would be enacted in the form of the National Security Act of 1947. According to former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the timing of the president’s 

address was no accident since the US role in the postwar world 

was already assured: “American decision makers were conscious that the direction of the war effort in World War II had 

been improvised and involved a number of ad hoc arrangements for decision making. Key military and political decisions 

often had been made on the basis of personal arrangements 

informally structured and responsive to specific circumstances. 

The National Security Act of July 26, 1947, provided more formal machinery to deal with America’s involvement in global 

realities over a longer term.”15 Ultimately, when the National 

Security Act was passed, Forrestal got his NSC, but with the 

president approving its creation and deciding its role: “Instead 
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of a central policy-making body to institutionalize the Navy’s 

power, the National Security Council became a purely advisory 

council . . . without policy making authority [and] without express statutory powers.”16

Historical Context

In 1916, during World War I, a proposal for a defense council 

was put forth as a way to manage efforts for improving the coordination of national defense and security. According to the 

Eberstadt report, the defense council was proposed by statute 

(Army Appropriation Act of 1916) as an organization:

to guide the mobilization of the national resources. This was to be an 

advisory council consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Labor, Agriculture, and Commerce, with responsibility for coordinating industry and the national resources for national security. The functions of 

the Council were in fact to be discharged by an Advisory Commission of 

experts . . . The responsibilities of the Council [would be] limited to the 

mobilization of the national economy. The Council [would do] nothing to 

centralize the responsibility for military policy and foreign policy.17

Pres. Woodrow Wilson’s administration, however, was disinclined to establish measures perceived to favor increasing military influence in formulating national policy.18 The statute also 

permitted the president to appoint an advisory commission of 

selected specialists to aid the council.19 Ultimately, no significant structural changes to the departments were made, and 

the council was disbanded in 1921.20

Before and during World War II, officials within the US government were discussing ways and means to correlate domestic and foreign policy with military and economic means. In 

1940 then secretary of war Henry Stimson and secretary of the 

Navy Frank Knox met regularly with secretary of state Cordell 

Hull in a meeting forum referred to as a “war council.” President Roosevelt convened a similarly named and functioning 

body during the same period consisting of the secretaries of 

state, war, the Navy, the chief of staff of the Army, the chief of 

naval operations, and the chief of the Army Air Corps to discuss national strategy.21 During the war, as fighting intensified 

around the world, these correlations grew stronger, and it became evident that fighting alone was not going to defeat enemy 

forces. In fact several studies and plans were completed within 
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39

US defense circles in which defeating an enemy’s economic 

strength—Germany’s ball bearing industry, for example—was 

the key to collapse. As the war came to a close and questions 

about the occupation arose, economic rebuilding plans and 

new political structures for the defeated nations became major 

challenges to surmount and solve. Many looked to the United 

States for solutions as these events “sharpened the need for the 

creation of a mechanism to enable the Executive Branch to act 

quickly and judiciously in the face of problems involving our 

security and cutting across practically all fields of governmental responsibility.”22 The establishment of the State–War–Navy 

Coordinating Committee in 1944, and its successor State–

Army–Navy–Air Force Coordinating Committee, as discussed 

earlier in the chapter, was a springboard to National Security 

Act legislation and was the first solution to the apparent weaknesses in US national decision-making capacity.23

Nevertheless, even before the National Security Act of 1947

was passed, Cold War tensions were beginning to build between 

the Soviet Union and the United States, hastening the need for 

a national security apparatus to harness, organize, and employ 

all the instruments of power. In addition, political scientist and 

scholar Carnes Lord noted that “[as] defense unification gained 

momentum from the example of superior British coordination 

of its military establishment during the war itself, . . . the establishment of the NSC reflect[ed] widespread dissatisfaction 

with the wartime leadership style of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 

a commitment to more orderly and disciplined decision making 

at the national level.” With regard to the Soviet threat, Lord 

further emphasized that, “the NSC apparatus . . . clearly bore 

much of the burden of developing and executing American policy 

as the confrontation with the Soviets hardened.”24

After 1947, when the Cold War was in full bloom, national 

security policy began to grow in complexity. The constant enforcement of containment doctrine and nuclear deterrence depended in part on the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) alliance. Yet the United States’ serious 

adversaries, for the most part, were limited to communist nations, making policy formulation simple by today’s measures. 

Further simplifying the equation, but not making the problem 

easier to comprehend, was the fact that strategic thinking and 
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theory entailed an acute understanding of the relationships between conventional and nuclear forces. 

By comparison, today’s national security structures must 

deal with a strategic environment with far more convoluted issues across a wider scale, including terrorism, homeland defense, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as 

well as nontraditional threats like energy security, climate 

change, and transnational crime.

Organization and Structure 

When the National Security Act of 1947 was passed, little attention was paid to the structure of the NSC. The act established the council’s composition: the president, vice president, 

secretary of state, secretary of defense, chairman of the National Security Resources Board, the secretaries and undersecretaries of other executive departments and of the military 

departments, the chairman of the Munitions Board, and the 

chairman of the Research and Development Board “when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of 

the Senate, to serve at his pleasure.”25 Within 10 short years of 

the act’s passing, during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration, this list of statutory members would shrink to only the 

first four on this list plus the director of the Office of Defense 

Mobilization.26 By way of comparison, the NSC in 2007 included 

only the top four as statutory advisors plus three others as 

nonstatutory members including the CJCS (military advisor), 

the DNI (intelligence advisor), and the NSA.27

Several provisions set forth seem to echo the British experience. One of those provisions called for an organization “to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures 

for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government 

relating to the national security.”28 Another provision called for 

the formation of a staff to support the organization to be headed 

by an executive secretary appointed by the president.

The National Security Council Staff

The language describing the executive secretary’s role in the 

NSC is interesting. As mentioned above, this position was to be 
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41

filled by the president with an intention to use this person as an 

“anonymous servant of the Council” to coordinate the exchange 

of ideas and recommendations from across the government departments.29 Scholar Amy Zegart contends that the wording in 

the statute calling for an executive “secretary” is significant, in 

that other positions specified in the act were “chairmen and 

directors of new organizations,” connoting a “lower” position for 

the secretary. She further explains that the term secretary in 

1947 was used to describe “a professional bureaucrat in the 

neutral competence tradition” (emphasis added).30 The first executive secretary, Sidney W. Souers, characterized his roles and 

responsibilities: “His proper functions demand that he be a 

non-political confidant of the President, and willing to subordinate his personal views on policy to his task of coordinating the 

views of responsible officials. As a staff assistant to the President, he maintains the President’s files on Council business 

and briefs him daily of the progress of work in hand.”31

Of course, we know this description today applies to the person officially known as the assistant to the president for national security affairs, or more commonly, the NSA. The executive secretary position was retained, though, with a change in 

his role to heading the career staff of the NSC.32 Rather than 

being anonymous, the NSA enjoys cabinet-level standing despite not having to face Senate confirmation.33 Unlike the executive secretary, the NSA’s role was not established in the 

National Security Act of 1947, nor has it since been defined by 

legislation.34 Despite this, the NSA is considered to be a peer of 

the other statutory members when the NSC meets, essentially 

chairing the meetings and serving as the president’s go-to expert for routine national security issues.35

While the National Security Act of 1947 established the foundation for a small, purely administrative staff to assist the executive secretary in coordinating advice for the president’s consideration, it did not specifically constrain its size. In particular, 

the legislation called for the staff “to perform such duties as 

may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.”36 The act, however, does not “direct 

or require the [president] to take counsel with particular advisers in reaching decisions,” and allows the president to come to 

his own conclusions on issues (appendix A contains the NSC 
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42

organizational structure as of September 2006).37 Though it 

appears large and complex today, it was not always so.38 The 

modern NSC staff has had as many as 200 members or more, 

with responsibilities varying in importance from the most senior policy analysts to the most junior support staffers.39 Over 

the course of its existence, the NSC’s size, composition, and 

most importantly, its influence has been dependent upon the 

president.40 Today’s NSC staff works for the NSA, however.41

Committees

A hierarchy of committees comprises the structure under 

which the NSC staff is organized. The modern system of committees was created in the administration of George H. W. Bush 

and has remained mostly intact since. The most senior group 

contained therein is the Principals Committee (PC) that “acts 

as the President’s senior level policy review and coordination 

group.”42 It looks very similar to the statutory NSC composition 

itself only without the president and vice president. It is comprised of the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, as well 

as the CJCS, DNI, and NSA. Different presidents have used 

this committee in distinctive ways depending on personal style 

and preferences. Among other functions, it has primarily been 

used to “discuss current and developing national security issues, review and coordinate policy recommendations developed 

by subordinate interagency groups and affected departments 

and agencies, and give direction for implementation or followup analyses.” Its primary task, however, is to bring consensus 

positions from within the executive branch departments and 

agencies regarding policy decisions to the president. Other key 

subject-matter advisers may be called upon to attend a PC 

meeting to bring expertise and clarity to the issues being discussed. Examples include the secretary of the Department for 

Homeland Security, White House chief of staff, and the vice 

president’s own NSA.43

The next structure below the PC is the Deputies Committee 

(DEPC). Its regular composition includes up to 13 deputies 

spanning the breadth of the executive branch and is responsible 

“for directing the work of interagency working groups and ensuring that issues brought before the PC or the NSC have been 
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properly analyzed and prepared for high-level deliberation.” 

Traditionally, the DEPC is where the majority of the policy formulations and discussions are thoroughly debated before the 

PC reviews them, and before their appearance in front of the 

president for decision. 44

Underneath the DEPC are various interagency working 

groups collectively known as policy coordination committees 

(PCC). The PCCs are comprised of subject-matter experts and 

senior officials of the departments represented in the DEPC. As 

time has passed since the modern committee system was established, control of policy issues has centered within the PC 

and DEPC. The PCCs, however, were historically the “primary 

forum for interagency coordination.”45 As one might imagine 

within a bureaucracy, the PCCs undertake the lion’s share of 

the planning and coordination that flows up to the DEPC and 

beyond, while guidance flows down to them in a like manner.

The PCCs normally meet weekly, but sometimes daily in a 

crisis, and are organized both functionally and regionally (see 

appendix B for a complete listing of the PCCs extant as of 

2007).46 The Bush administration has at times added other interagency groups to the PCCs on short-term bases for activities 

requiring dedicated policy planning and staff work that do not 

fall into the functional categories of the existing PCCs.47 See 

figure 2 below depicting the relationship between the various 

committees of the NSC system.

Purpose and Function

The purpose of the NSC is spelled out explicitly in the National Security Act of 1947, Section 101 of Title 1:

a. The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, 

and military policies relating to the national security so 

as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more 

effectively in matters involving the national security.

b. In addition to performing such other functions as the 

President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively 

coordinating the policies and functions of the departments 
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44

and agencies of the Government relating to the national 

security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, 

be the duty of the Council:

1. To assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, 

and risks of the United States in relation to our actual 

and potential military power, in the interest of national 

security, for the purpose of making recommendations 

to the President in connection therewith; and

2. To consider policies on matters of common interest to the 

departments and agencies of the Government concerned 

with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. . . . 

d. The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other reports to the President as 

it deems appropriate or as the President may require.48

Given this stated purpose, wide latitude is conferred on the 

president in seeking advice and coordinated policy options from 

anyone in his cabinet or the NSC staff, and this actually is a 

frequent occurrence. Although the entire cabinet is concerned 

with national security, the restricted composition and attendance by the NSC allows the president to synthesize the diverse 

views from the wider body of available experts and focus at a 

Figure 2. National Security Council System

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The US National Security Council 

45

high level on the most important aspects of his responsibilities.49 It also facilitates the opportunity for transparent and 

candid discussion. 

The wording of the National Security Act implies that the constitutional right of the president be preserved and that the cabinet and NSC staff members’ authority to coordinate policy is 

delegated to them by the president. Also important to note is 

that the NSC staff has no explicit responsibility to implement 

policies that result from presidential decisions—those are the 

responsibilities of the affected departments.50 In order to ensure 

that presidential policies are being followed, however, it behooves the NSC staff to at least monitor policy implementation 

for the president.

In the first few years of the NSC’s existence when the staff 

was small and had minimal influence, policy papers requiring 

presidential decision were originated within the policy planning 

staff of the State Department. Often, the secretary of state 

would approve these papers before they went to the NSC. They 

were then analyzed and prepared for deliberation at the next 

NSC meeting.51 Because President Truman was skeptical of the 

NSC, since it was more or less foisted upon him, he intentionally 

stayed away from the early sessions, only attending a dozen of 

the first 57. 

By the time President Eisenhower became comfortable with 

the NSC—around 1956—his NSA, Robert Cutler had transitioned the policy origination process from the Department of 

State to what became known as the NSC Planning Board (a 

committee of departmental assistant secretaries) within the 

NSC staff. The importance of the Planning Board cannot be 

understated. At one NSC meeting early in his administration, 

President Eisenhower remarked on its importance as a tool of 

the NSC to do all the thinking and planning, with undivided 

attention, for which the NSC members themselves had little 

time.52 Scholars Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman explain some of the board’s workings:

The Planning Board was charged . . . with flushing out the policy views 

of each of the NSC’s member bodies on major national security issues. 

The Board subjected those positions to what Cutler called an “acid 

bath,” sharply delineating them and identifying and specifying points of 

disagreement. The board was strictly instructed not to water down disagreements or cover them up. Instead, “policy splits” were to be spelled 
The US National Security Council 

46

out . . . so that they might be debated in the NSC and resolved by the 

President. Before the documents hammered out by the Planning Board 

were discussed by the NSC, the board members briefed their chiefs on 

them, explaining their own positions and reviewing the splits. . . . The 

superiors of the Planning Board members were not obliged to support 

the policy recommendations of their department’s representatives on 

the board. Instead, Eisenhower instructed everyone involved in the national security process to view [themselves] as a general presidential 

adviser rather than a departmental delegate. The Planning Board was 

the engine of the Eisenhower national security process.53

The changes Eisenhower instituted represented a major shift 

in the organizational dynamic and influence of the NSC, as it 

was now presiding “over the development of papers that analyzed virtually every significant US foreign policy problem and 

proposed, on each, a general ‘policy’ for Council review and 

Presidential approval.”54

By contrast, in today’s NSC, the president and cabinet members, led by the NSA, discuss policy options for presidential 

decision while the executive secretary and the NSC staff ensure 

the right policy papers get to the right people at the right time.55

Once the president decides on a course of action, the other 

members of the NSC take those decisions back to their departments or agencies for implementation and execution. 

Leadership: Presidents and 

National Security Advisors

The flexibility incorporated into the NSC system has allowed 

every president who has used it the unfettered ability to shape, 

staff, and employ it to suit his personal style of leadership and 

management. In practice, presidents have varied its use widely. 

Some presidents preferred vigorous debate in the NSC, while 

others favored consensus and affirmation of their predetermined decisions. Serving the president well meant not only 

presenting one’s own views and advice, but also fairly representing the views of others down stream of the process and 

telling the president candidly of disagreement with his pending 

decisions.56 According to scholar Charles A. Stevenson “time 

constraints limit the number of matters brought to the attention of senior policymakers. . . . In such real-life circumstances, 

it can be difficult for presidents to maintain close control over 
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47

important policy matters.”57 Constraints on the president’s time 

have also affected the way in which he employs the “formal” 

NSC. “Formal meetings of the National Security Council have 

tended to be rare . . . because Presidents did not see a need to 

hold ‘official’ NSC meetings versus other, more informal consultations.”58 Conducting national security affairs in this manner could lead to distrust among the other members of the NSC 

who are not present, and they may feel slighted by being unable to participate in the statutory policy-making process. 

Furthermore, since records of these sessions might not be kept, 

they easily could be subject to misinterpretation and conjecture, let alone forgotten or not followed through with.59

Presidential Use of the National Security Council

As already discussed, the National Security Act was designed 

so that the NSC and staff could provide advice to the president 

to inform his decision making. President Truman was particularly sensitive to this aspect of the NSC function and was opposed to any organization within the executive branch that 

might hold any national-security-policy decision-making 

power.60 Unlike President Truman, President Eisenhower 

expected the NSC members to “seek, with their background 

and experience, the most statesmanlike answer to the problems of national security, rather than to attempt solutions 

which represent a mere compromise of agency positions.”61 He 

significantly and positively changed the NSC into a breeding 

ground for spirited discussions and diverse views, against a 

backdrop of thoughtfully prepared and detailed issue papers. 

According to Cutler, the president sought differences and liked 

“nothing better than the flashing interchange of views among 

his principal advisers.”62

In March 1953, shortly after taking office, Eisenhower quickly 

moved to institutionalize the NSC, creating the position of special assistant to the president for national security affairs and 

establishing an elaborate structure of committees. Eisenhower 

was also probably the most procedurally formal president in 

the early years of the NSC. Being accustomed to hierarchical 

staff structures his entire military career, it is understandable 

why Eisenhower managed his staff in this manner. This for-
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48

mality led to deference, particularly from his executive secretary Robert Cutler, possibly inhibiting Cutler from fully expressing his views. 

Interactive relationship styles differed widely between presidents and their NSAs. In contrast to Cutler’s deference to President Eisenhower’s managerial style and council leadership, 

Pres. Richard Nixon more or less deferred completely to the 

personality of his NSA—Henry Kissinger—to take the lead on 

policy formulation. Whereas, Presidents John F. Kennedy and 

Lyndon B. Johnson preferred a very collegial and informal approach to policy formulation.63 Through Kissinger’s aggressive 

leadership style and managerial dominance, his name and actions became synonymous with the NSC staff itself.64 Also interesting is the fact that Nixon coined the term “national security adviser” in his 1969 presidential inauguration speech.65

Many presidents, in addition to President Nixon, also eschewed Eisenhower’s formal approach. Unlike Eisenhower, 

Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson often received 

counsel from outside the formal structure of the NSC system, 

but from close advisers, nonetheless. This in part explains why 

the formal NSC rarely met under each of these presidents. In 

fact, the formal NSC has not met on a regular, prolonged basis 

since President Eisenhower’s era, with the exception of Pres. 

George W. Bush.66 Most presidents have preferred informal 

meetings with pertinent cabinet members present to receive advice, information, and analysis. President Kennedy is probably 

best known for his informal meeting style, often using informal 

groups and other arrangements to get assistance and opinions. 

He found that the formal process lacked creativity and was ineffective.67 Other examples of how presidents met informally 

outside the structured NSC include President Johnson’s Tuesday lunches and Pres. Jimmy Carter’s Friday breakfasts.

Presidential National Security Council Models 

President Carter’s NSA, Zbigniew Brzezinski, identified two 

distinct NSC models of presidential leadership—a presidential 

system and a secretarial system.68 Brzezinski noted that the 

chief executive involved himself intimately with the details of 

national security policy in the presidential system. In the sec-
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49

retarial system, presidents have maintained control of the highest responsibilities in decision making, but have consciously 

withdrawn from close policy supervision. He further noted that, 

although no president through 1980 fell neatly into one category or the other. Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter tended 

toward the presidential approach while Presidents Truman, 

Eisenhower, Johnson, and Gerald Ford assumed more of a secretarial approach. Furthermore, through the presidential approach, he observed that no president allowed any high-ranking 

cabinet member, such as the secretaries of state or defense, to 

play a principal role in formulating policy (though the NSA’s 

role was somewhat elevated). But through the secretarial system, presidents tended to permit the secretary of state (not the 

NSA) to take the leading role in shaping foreign policy. Regarding this last point, Carter publicly stated several times that his 

secretary of state was his primary national security representative. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Brzezinski concluded that no significant lessons could be drawn in favor of 

one model or the other.69

Role of the National Security Advisor 

NSA’s have enjoyed a variance of conveyed presidential status depending on the preferences of the presidency in which 

they worked. Scholars Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson outlined their view of what the roles of the NSA should be: “It is 

[their] responsibility to ensure that matters submitted for consideration by the Council over the full range of issues on which 

review is required; that those issues are fully analyzed; that a 

full range of options is considered; that the prospects and 

risks of each are examined; that all relevant intelligence and 

other information is available to the principals; that legal considerations are addressed; that difficulties in implementation 

are confronted.”70

The first NSA, Robert Cutler, was a banker before meeting 

Eisenhower, and had also worked on his campaign staff, so he 

was relatively familiar with workings at the White House. President Eisenhower quickly put him in charge of the NSC Planning Board, ensuring that presidential views would be heard in 

the earliest stages of the NSC policy process.71
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Perhaps the best-known NSAs, because of their forceful roles 

in going beyond mere policy coordination and into the policy 

formulation realm, are Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, under Presidents Nixon and Carter, respectively. Each 

served as powerful policy representatives such that many would 

argue—on good grounds—that they stepped over the line of the 

intent of the National Security Act as policy coordinators, and 

into the policymaking realm. Zegart concluded that, although 

their systems were not identical, they had much in common as 

they and their staffs “dominated the foreign policy process to a 

degree unmatched by any NSC staff before or since. In both 

administrations, major issues were decided far away from the 

State Department, the Defense Department, and even the National Security Council” (emphasis added).72 Again, this was 

certainly not the intent of the National Security Act. 

In addition, President Nixon’s dominant managerial style led 

to ensuring that control of foreign policy resided in the White 

House.73 Kissinger expanded the NSC staff so that it could 

handle numerous foreign policy issues. While the staff did analytical foreign policy work, as well as continuing its role as a 

policy coordination body, Kissinger also formulated his own 

extensive written recommendations for President Nixon, who 

preferred them to NSC group meetings.74 Complicating matters, secretary of state William Rogers was often not consulted 

on issues regarding major policy positions and decisions.75 Illustrating this point was the fact that Nixon sent Kissinger 

instead of Rogers to negotiate for the United States at the Vietnam War Paris peace talks. 

Kissinger’s dominance of foreign policy through the NSC machinery had detrimental side effects on the national security 

process. The increased size of the NSC staff tended to further 

“complicate and prolong an already tedious and constipated 

decision-making process,” by taking “matters which [had] already been subjected to the most exhaustive review in the State 

Department, and by State with other agencies,” then dissecting, 

dismantling, and putting them back together again. This not 

only had a devastating effect on the morale of the State Department, it led to a continuing cycle of distrust of the NSC which 

caused it to take months, instead of weeks and days, to make 

decisions, which by then were out of date or immaterial. On a 
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51

positive note, Kissinger elevated the stature of the NSC staff to 

the prominent position it enjoys to this day and was previously 

unaccustomed to, and by doing so, enduringly boosted its influence and capacity. Ultimately, because the NSC staff does not 

typically testify before Congress, the NSC staff can create significant divisions of opinion with the rest of the executive branch, 

particularly the White House, possibly resulting in the breakdown of the entire national security apparatus.76

After President Nixon resigned, President Ford inherited the 

remnant NSC structure. At the time, Kissinger had been serving as both the NSA and as the secretary of state.77 Over a year 

after becoming president, Ford took Kissinger out of the NSA 

post, but left him as the secretary of state, appointing Brent 

Scowcroft to the former position. Scowcroft assumed the intended traditional role of the NSA, coordinating policy between 

the cabinet departments and principals and providing advice to 

President Ford.78

Pres. Ronald Reagan’s two terms in office saw an unprecedented number of NSAs. Of the 20 NSAs that have held the 

post, six served in President Reagan’s administration. Richard 

Allen was the first, and unlike many of his predecessors, was 

relegated to the basement of the White House and his advice 

marginalized.79 William Clark was Reagan’s second advisor and 

was a close friend who wielded influence beyond his professional capacity in the position. His third and fourth advisors, 

Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, were career military 

officers accustomed to paying deference to the commander in 

chief, and thus lacked the fortitude to assert themselves in disputes where their opinions were counter to either the secretaries of state or defense.80

Frank Carlucci was President Reagan’s fifth NSA and, as a 

result of his lifelong experience in government, played a more 

significant role, perhaps more so than any of the previous four. 

His many years as a Foreign Service officer working for the 

State Department and time he spent at the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) likely gave him an advanced grasp of foreign policy, 

national security issues, and interagency experience. After 

about a year in the post he then went on to become President 

Reagan’s last secretary of defense. 
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52

Last, but certainly not least, Colin Powell served President 

Reagan. He brought a more forthright and collegial personality 

to the post than the previous military officers who held the position and was primarily responsible for implementing many of 

the NSC structural change recommendations issued in the 

Tower Commission report stemming from the Iran-Contra affair.81 The commission identified several specific roles for the 

NSA to assist the president in effectively managing national 

security affairs (see appendix C for a complete list of the recommendations made by the President’s Special Review Board). 

Furthermore, as Best observed: “Although NSC staff efforts to 

manage certain crises, such as the capture of the Achille Lauro

hijackers, were successful, the participation of the NSC personnel, especially Lt Col Oliver North, in operations run apart 

from the traditional intelligence apparatus, including efforts to 

gain the release of American hostages and to supply Nicaraguan insurgents, has been widely censured.”82

In contrast to President Reagan, Pres. George H. W. Bush appointed a single veteran advisor, Brent Scowcroft, to the post; 

Scowcroft would serve his entire presidency. Scowcroft was no 

stranger to the position of NSA. He and President Bush worked 

well together in dealing with arguably some of the biggest national security issues since the Vietnam War. Beginning with 

the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and subsequent German 

unification in the fall of 1989, through the end of the Cold War 

and the dissolution of the Soviet Union into the 1990s, and 

the 1991 Persian Gulf War and into the uncertain international order that followed, Scowcroft and Bush attempted to 

establish an NSC system patterned after the original mold.83

In addition, as mentioned earlier, President Bush is credited 

with reorganizing and establishing the modern NSC system’s 

committee structure. 

When Pres. Bill Clinton came into office, he seemingly placed 

greater emphasis on economic matters than foreign policy issues. He kept President Bush’s successful model in place, however, falsely believing “that choosing the ‘correct’ NSC organization and process was the key to producing a successful foreign 

policy.”84 According to Inderfurth and Johnson, this was only 

partially correct. Good processes and organization are only part 

of the equation, but they do not ensure the sound policymaking 
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53

that leads to sound decisions. Individuals and their skill sets 

and experience go further than these basic building blocks 

when it comes to making sensible choices. Add to that a president who understands how the system works, gets personally 

involved, then allows the system to function properly, and there 

will be a strong foundation for sound policymaking.85

Pres. George W. Bush has built on the previous two presidential administrations’ NSC systems, but with varied success. 

He expanded the participation in formal NSC meetings by inviting his chief of staff, counsel, secretary of the treasury, assistant for economic policy, and the assistant for homeland 

security.86 The attacks of 11 September 2001 and their consequences have defined George W. Bush’s presidency. These 

events precipitated changes in the NSC system including unprecedented increases to the NSC staff and the number of 

PCCs, as well as the addition of two special interagency working groups designed to better coordinate “the activities of the 

large commitments of US military, reconstruction, and diplomatic contingents in Afghanistan and Iraq.”87

President Bush’s two NSAs, Condoleezza Rice and Stephen 

Hadley, have performed as well as can be expected given the 

circumstances of world events.88 Their previous experience on 

the NSC staff has been of tremendous benefit in leading the 

staff. Coming from academia, Condoleezza Rice brought a critical thinking and experienced analytical perspective to the position.89 Analysis of the process that led to the decision to invade Iraq and the Bush administration’s expressed reasons for 

the necessity of that invasion suggest breakdowns in the policy 

coordination and advisory role played by Rice.90 Rice’s function as an honest broker in the interagency process deteriorated as the president began to expect her to serve instead as 

“a private counselor to the president and as [a] public spokesperson.”91 Stephen Hadley, who served as Rice’s deputy NSA 

and succeeded her as NSA, attempted to return to the policycoordinating and honest-brokering role originally envisioned 

for the NSA.92 Some evidence suggests, however, that coordination with the rest of the cabinet and other interagency organizations may still be lacking.93
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Noteworthy National Security 

Council Changes over Time

President Truman kept the NSC at arm’s length during its 

first three years. Instead of receiving counsel from the NSC, he 

relied on a succession of personal White House advisers (George 

Elsey, Rear Adm Robert Dennison, and William Averell Harriman) to coordinate major foreign policy matters for him, in opposition to the notion of calling upon congressional legislators 

who could more expertly advise him on national security matters.94 In 1949 the National Security Act was amended, and the 

NSC system was reorganized to include the vice president but 

the three service secretaries were removed with the newly created 

secretary of defense in their places.95

Despite the lack of presidential use in the late 1940s, the 

NSC functioned as a major presidential forum into the 1950s. 

“The challenges faced by the formation of NATO, the humanitarian and reconstruction requirements for Europe, the Soviet 

Union entering the nuclear age, and the communists gaining 

control of China all mandated [further] changes to the NSC.”96

When the Korean War began, the NSC met more frequently 

with President Truman, not only attending and working through 

Korean challenges, but also the larger political issues in response to the Communist threat.97 President Truman appreciated 

the work and policy studies produced by the NSC staff and issued a presidential directive in 1950 stressing that all policy 

advice and coordination should come to the president through 

the NSC system process.98

Within two years after its creation, the NSC was already 

functioning with a strong sense of teamwork, coherence, and 

direction.99 That is no surprise considering that, in the first 

115 weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the formal NSC 

met 115 times, which in fact turned out to be the frequency 

zenith of all presidents’ use of the NSC.100 President Eisenhower’s NSC staff also had 28 permanent members with 11 of 

those termed “thinkers.”101 The steep adjustment to more frequent meetings in the new council’s life peaked shortly after 

Eisenhower’s second year in office since he had accumulated a 

full and varied “reservoir of basic policies and forward strategy.”102

These policies generated new ideas on how to organize and 
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coordinate the vast amount of information generated to preserve national security. 

An outcome of one of these ideas was a mechanism created 

by the 1953 executive order called the Operations Coordination 

Board (OCB), designed to do just that—coordinate operations.103

Cutler metaphorically described how the OCB fit in with the 

maturing policy-making function:

Assume that the National Security Council sits at the top of Policy Hill. 

On one side of the hill, policy recommendations travel upward through 

the Planning Board to the Council, where they are thrashed out and 

submitted to the President. When the President has approved a policy 

recommendation, it travels down the other side of Policy Hill to the departments and agencies responsible for its execution. Each department 

or agency with a function to perform under such approved policy must 

prepare its program to carry out its responsibility. Part way down this 

side of the hill is the Operations Coordinating Board, to which the President refers an approved national security policy as its authority to advise with the relevant departments and agencies as to their detailed 

operational planning and as to coordinating the interdepartmental aspects of their respective programs. In no sense is the O.C.B. concerned 

with the making of policy. While it cannot make or negate programs to 

carry out a policy, it may assist in developing them. The Board is a coordinator and an expediter and a follower-up and a progress reporter.104

(emphasis added) 

The OCB persisted as a part of the NSC staff structure for eight 

years before it was abolished by executive order in 1961. The 

OCB met weekly at the State Department and was comprised of 

the under secretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the directors of the CIA, the US Information 

Agency, the International Communication Agency, and the special assistants to the president for national security affairs and 

security operations coordination. If this composition looks familiar, it is because it was the predecessor to the modern-day 

DEPC discussed earlier in the chapter. 

The OCB was the coordinating and implementing arm of the 

NSC for all aspects of the implementation of national security 

policy. NSC action papers were assigned to a team from the 

OCB for follow-up. During its existence, the OCB established 

more than 40 interagency working groups with experts covering various countries and subjects. The 24-person staff of the 

OCB supported the working groups in which officials from various agencies met each other to staff and coordinate policy.105

With the OCB’s termination, the NSC staff “focused on policy-
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making and became less involved in program management 

and implementation.”106

Successive presidents varied their meeting frequency vis-àvis the formal NSC process. Under President Kennedy the NSC 

continued to hold formal meetings but not with the frequency 

that had prevailed under Eisenhower. Not only did Kennedy 

prefer fewer meetings—16 within the first six months in office 

and less frequently thereafter—he preferred less formal ones.107

“Moreover, the meetings themselves were seldom significant forums of policy debate or decision.”108 In all, Kennedy averaged 

about one meeting a week, attending 49.109 After a very short 

period following his inauguration, Kennedy reduced the NSC 

staff from 74 to 49, with a dozen of them being thinkers.110

Kennedy’s NSA, McGeorge Bundy, and his NSC staff tried to 

focus on their core task of policy development and providing 

coordinated advice, but instead they served primarily as Kennedy’s personal—and oftentimes political—advisers.111

Many scholars have speculated that this lack of utilizing the 

NSC system processes led to a “groupthink” phenomenon among 

very few men, which may have contributed to the failed Bay of 

Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, as well as the confusion surrounding US policy in the coup against Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem of 

South Vietnam in 1963.112 Had alternative policy options been 

coordinated, reviewed, and then presented to President Kennedy through the formal NSC process, the Cuba incident might 

never have happened. The failed invasion led to deep distrust by 

Cuba of American intentions which was compounded the following year when the world was on the brink of nuclear war 

during the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis. After the Bay of Pigs 

failure, President Kennedy fortunately made dramatic changes 

to the NSC which were arguably critical to the Cuban Missile 

Crisis’ successful outcome—the avoidance of nuclear war. 

By the time Kennedy was assassinated, the core of foreign 

policy and national security policy making had fully transitioned from the cabinet to the White House, or what former 

Pentagon official and journalist Leslie Gelb termed, “from the 

king’s ministers to his palace guard.”113 A complete reversal of 

Truman’s and Eisenhower’s formal NSC process had occurred 

through Kennedy’s unprecedented use of informal structures, 

and the NSA had developed from a “purely administrative 
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executive secretary servicing the council’s needs to a powerful 

political presidential adviser.”114

The pattern of informality trademarked by President Kennedy continued when President Johnson took office. Johnson 

preferred a more relaxed atmosphere for his meetings, although 

he still embraced the attendance of statutory members. The 

Tuesday Lunch Group, as it came to be known as, met 27 times 

from February to September 1964, with President Johnson 

convening approximately 160 Tuesday luncheons during his 

presidency. By comparison, midway through President Nixon’s 

term, his NSC had held 73 meetings with half of those being 

held in his first year. “This twice-a-month average was nearly 

double that of the Johnson Administration.”115 The number of 

President Ford’s NSC engagements fell somewhere between the 

two, averaging one and a half times per month in his first 20 

months in office. Approaching the 30th anniversary of the creation 

of the NSC in 1977, scholar I. M. Destler concluded that, up to 

the writing of his article, regular use of the formal council was 

more the exception than the rule. He also astutely observed 

that the “formality and regularity of [the NSC’s] membership 

and meetings; [and] pre-established, well-disseminated agendas—prove[d] to be drawbacks in practice,” suggesting that 

smaller, more informal meetings lacking precoordinated agendas accomplished more.116

During President Nixon’s term, Henry Kissinger reversed the 

lower staffing trend, quickly bringing the number of thinkers 

from 12 to 34,117 and eventually to 50 by the end of Nixon’s 

presidency.118 President Ford did not alter this mix much other 

than reorganizing the intelligence community,119 but when 

President Carter came to office, he reduced the size of the “thinking” staff to around 35 and decreased the size of standing NSC 

committees from seven to two.120

President Carter made other significant changes to the NSC 

system when he took office. One of his first acts was to issue 

Presidential Directive 2 reorganizing the NSC staff with the 

purpose of placing “more responsibility in the departments and 

agencies while insuring that the NSC, with [his] Assistant for 

National Security Affairs, continu[ing] to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.”121 He also decreased 

the number of formal meetings, convening only 10, compared 
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with 125 meetings during the eight years of the combined Nixon 

and Ford administrations.122

The focus of President Reagan’s terms of office was characterized less by the frequency of NSC meetings and more by 

changes to the structure, processes, control, and flow of information to the president. Shortly after taking office, President 

Reagan downgraded the NSA’s status via National Security Decision Directive 2 to defuse the rivalry that had existed between 

the NSC and the State Department in previous administrations.123 Significantly, this directive gave responsibility for the 

NSC subcommittees to various officials from the Departments 

of State and Defense and the CIA rather than consolidating 

their functions under NSC officials. This structure led to a lack 

of unity of effort and uncertainty regarding lines of responsibility. It also stifled effective decision making, diminished the likelihood that fair and balanced policy recommendations would filter 

up to the president and may have contributed to the Iran-Contra 

affair.124 The President’s Special Review Board, also known as 

the Tower Commission, was established by President Reagan 

and published recommendations to this effect, remarking:

Most presidents have set up interagency committees at both a staff and 

policy level to surface issues, develop options, and clarify choices. There 

has typically been a struggle for the chairmanship of these groups between the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff on the one hand, 

and the cabinet secretaries and department officials on the other. Our 

review of the operation of the present system and that of other administrations where committee chairmen came from the departments has led 

us to the conclusion that the system generally operates better when the 

committees are chaired by the individual with the greatest stake in 

making the NSC system work. We recommend that the National Security Advisor chair the senior-level committees of the NSC system.125

Another change President Reagan made was in the creation of 

more hierarchical policy structures. He established three senior interdepartmental groups (SIG) for foreign, defense, and 

intelligence problems, chaired respectively by the secretaries of 

state and defense and the director of central intelligence. Under the SIGs, a series of assistant-secretary-level interdepartmental groups, each chaired by the agency with particular responsibility, dealt with specific issues. The NSC staff was 

responsible for the assignment of issues to the groups.126
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President Reagan also made other significant structural 

changes by creating additional groups that further subdivided 

an already hierarchical and compartmentalized policy coordinating security apparatus. Among these groups was the National Security Planning Group, which was created in 1981, 

met weekly, and was composed of the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the director of central intelligence, 

the CJCS, and the NSA.127 Another was the Crisis Management 

Center, headquartered within the White House and comprised 

of a large staff of its own to manage developing crises and facilitate decision making.128

During the George H. W. Bush administration, the Bill Clinton administration, and the George W. Bush administration, 

the NSC system, for the most part, became stronger and more 

mature. According to Inderfurth and Johnson, “while there 

have been variations in the decision-making style of each President, there has also been unprecedented continuity in the formal structure of the NSC system, reflected best in the continuation of the principals and deputies committees” (emphasis in 

original).129 Although these structures have in fact reinforced 

the strength of the US national security apparatus, shortcomings in the way the major players in the policy coordination and 

advisory process functioned outside the prescribed manner 

have led to high-level policy failures.130

President Clinton expanded the NSC membership by presidential order to include the secretary of the treasury, the US 

representative to the United Nations, the assistant to the president for economic policy, and the White House chief of staff.131

In this vein, perhaps the most significant change President 

Clinton made was in creating a National Economic Council by 

Executive Order 12835 on 25 January 1993, to coordinate and 

consider international economic policy within the NSC and balance what he perceived as a system too narrowly focused on 

diplomatic and national security issues.132 The head of this 

body, the assistant to the president for economic policy, was 

given a statutory seat at the NSC table. These changes were 

made to ensure that economic considerations were factored 

into traditional national security policy thinking. President 

Clinton’s first NSA, Anthony Lake, started out his tenure claiming to be a “behind-the-scenes consensus builder,” but later he 
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decided to change his approach: “I would stay behind the 

scenes. . . . And I would do my best always to try to achieve 

consensus and to make sure that my colleagues’ views always 

had a fair hearing with the President. But I would be less hesitant in voicing my own views when they differed from those of 

my colleagues, even if it prevented consensus or put me more 

at odds with them—whether on NATO enlargement, Bosnia, 

Haiti, or other issues.”133 Samuel Berger, who succeeded Lake 

in March 1997, really exhibited the role Lake professed to engender back when Lake began his appointment. Berger’s role in 

keeping the integrity of the NSC system dependable regarding 

the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, while also mollifying traditional 

disagreements between the secretaries of state and defense, 

lent tremendous credibility to the Clinton administration.134

The September 2001 terrorist attacks resulted in major 

changes to the national security apparatus, including the creation 

of a Homeland Security Council (HSC) in October 2001 and a 

Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.135 The creation 

of the HSC is largely viewed today as the logical reaction to 

what was viewed as shortcomings in the ability to detect homeland security threats. Its existence outside and parallel to the 

NSC indicates both the significance and the scope of effort required to analyze homeland defense requirements in the post 

11 September 2001 security environment. Perhaps it will come 

under the NSC when, and if, terrorist threats are ever considered manageable.

Changes in the size and function of the NSC staff also reflected the nature and scope of world events as well as presidential preferences. It has been a relatively easy task to make 

these changes since the National Security Act made it possible 

for presidents to do so without legislation or any other approval. 

According to Zegart, by “using executive orders, presidential 

directives, and other self-executing commands to create the 

national security adviser’s position; to alter fundamentally the 

NSC staff’s role, power, and jurisdiction; and to downgrade the 

operation of the formal National Security Council,” the president’s power has gone unchecked. Through this process, presidents have sometimes committed the nation to pursue reckless 

courses of action.136 Finally, the US Commission on National 

Security/21st Century noted that: 
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Over the last decade, Presidents have increasingly centralized power 

with the NSC staff for the making and execution of national security 

policy. In many ways, the NSC staff has become more like a government 

agency than a Presidential staff. It has its own views and perspectives 

on the myriad of national security issues confronting the government. 

It has its own press, legislative, communication, and speechmaking 

“shops” to enable it to conduct ongoing relations with the media, Congress, the American public, and foreign governments.137

This last quotation combined with supporting evidence provided 

in this chapter seem to indicate that presidents, their NSCs, 

and their NSAs have at times strayed far from the original intentions of the statutes of the National Security Act of 1947.

Notes

1. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 56. Zegart notes that Truman initially did 

not welcome the NSC, but eventually “championed” it in order to get Navy 

support for his unification plan. John Deutch, Arnold Kantner, and Brent 

Scowcroft attribute the “primary motivation” for the creation of the NSC to 

the “recognition that the nation’s foreign policy interests could not be pursued exclusively through the efforts of executive departments acting separately.” Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, 265. However, most evidence 

suggests individual (Forrestal, Eberstadt) and institutional (US Navy) interests in the defense arena played a larger role in the creation. The Oxford 

Companion to American Military History, s.v. “National Security Council.” 

2. See Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 51–52, for 

a brief but thorough accounting of attempts dating to as early as 1910 calling 

for defense councils of various types to help coordinate the increasingly complex nature of national defense. The “Eberstadt Report” of 1945 states that 

commitments made under the umbrella of the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century overcommitted the United States such that “the history of our 

foreign relations in the twentieth century is a story of failure. It is the story of 

our national failure to balance the commitments that were made in the nineteenth century. Because of that failure we have been compelled to fight two 

great unexpected wars for which we were unprepared.” Ibid., 51.

3. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 69, 

note 3.

4. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 54.

5. Ibid., 53. The SWNCC was mostly seen as a failure primarily because 

the problems it was intended to address were too large. It (1) was not organized at a high level, (2) was not vested with appropriate authority and power, 

and (3) did not have a permanent secretariat (unlike its archetype). Ibid., 54. 

6. Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 252–53.

7. Stevenson, “Underlying Assumptions,” 2–3. This report was 250 pages 

long and advocated arguments against defense consolidation using the idea 

of a National Security Council as somewhat of a ‘consolation’ substitute.
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8. Best, National Security Council, 6.

9. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 147. According to Destler the NSC 

was considered “Forrestal’s revenge.” 

10. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 57.

11. The Oxford Companion to American Military History, s.v. “National Security Council.”

12. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 6.

13. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 57, 64, and 65.

14. Ibid., 66.

15. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 80. The National Security Act signed 

by President Truman culminated four years of intense debate and resulted in 

more than just the creation of the NSC. It also made the Department of the 

Air Force separate from the other service departments, it granted statutory 

authority to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it created the Central Intelligence 

Agency, and made provisions for the creation of other bodies and committees. 

Among these were the National Security Resources Board, a War Council, a 

Munitions Board, and a Research and Development Board.

16. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 74–75.

17. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 52. Interestingly, the secretary of state is missing from this list. 

18. Ibid.

19. Hammond, “National Security Council,” 899; and US Bureau of the 

Budget, United States at War, 2.

20. Best, National Security Council, 3.

21. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 52.

22. Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 534.

23. Lord, “NSC Reform,” 434; and Best, National Security Council, 5.

24. Lord, “NSC Reform,” 434 and 435. See also Carter and White, Keeping 

the Edge, 266.

25. National Security Act of 1947.

26. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 442–43 and 

451–52.

27. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 10.

28. National Security Act of 1947, Sections 101 and 102; Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 18; US Senate, “National Security 

Act of 1947,” 2.

29. Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 537.

30. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 78.

31. Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 537.

32. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 156.

33. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 343.

34. See section entitled “Truman Administration, 1947–1953” in The 

Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

35. Rothkopf, Running the World, 7. Also see Bumiller, Condoleezza Rice, 

and Public Broadcasting Service, “Frontline Interviews Elizabeth Bumiller.” 

According to then national security adviser, Condoleeza Rice, in the first days 

of President Bush’s administration, Vice President Cheney went to the presi-
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dent asking him if he could run the NSC meetings in the president’s absence. 

Upon hearing of this, Rice went to the president in protest, stating: “Mr. 

President, this is what national security advisers do. They’ve already run 

National Security Council meetings in the president’s absence.” The president subsequently sided with Rice.

36. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 94, quoting from US Statutes at Large 1948, 

497.

37. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 443.

38. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 65. Zegart notes that the NSC staff was to 

be a nonpartisan and permanent body, unspecified in size, tasked with preparing agendas, providing data, and distributing the NSC’s conclusions to 

affected departments and agencies.

39. Rothkopf, Running the World, 7. The size of the NSC in 2007 numbered 

around 225 with approximately 110 of those serving in policy positions. See 

Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 11.

40. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 91–92. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski provides an interesting observation of this phenomenon, concluding that “as the prestige of the NSC declined, its size increased and its titles were inflated.”

41. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 10. A 

mix of political appointees (from academia and think tank organizations), 

senior government officials from other executive branch departments and 

military officers round out most of the staff’s backgrounds.

42. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 23, 

and Gerstein, Securing America’s Future, 78.

43. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 11–

12, and 23–24.

44. Ibid., 12–13. The “deputies” include the deputy secretary of state (or 

under secretary of state for political affairs), under secretary of the treasury 

(or under secretary of the treasury for international affairs), deputy secretary 

of defense (or under secretary of defense for policy), deputy attorney general, 

deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, deputy DNI (or the 

director of the National Counterterrorism Center), vice CJCS, deputy chief of 

staff to the president for policy, chief of staff, NSA to the vice president, 

deputy assistant to the president for homeland security affairs, deputy assistant to the president for international economics, and the deputy national 

security advisor. 

45. Ibid., 13; and Gerstein, Securing America’s Future, 146.

46. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 13.

47. Ibid., 14–15.

48. National Security Act of 1947, 402.

49. Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 535. Robert Cutler also described the 

Council’s purpose in practical terms as follows: “to integrate the manifold 

aspects of national security policy (such as foreign, military, economic, fiscal, 

internal security, psychological) to the end that security policies finally recommended to the President shall be both representative and fused, rather than 
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compartmentalized and several” (emphasis added). See Cutler, “Development 

of the National Security Council,” 441.

50. Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 536.

51. Ibid., 540. For a more thorough discussion of how the NSC and staff 

operated in 1949, see ibid., 538–42.

52. Greenstein and Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising,” 340.

53. Ibid.

54. See Lord, “NSC Reform,” 436; and Destler, “National Security Advice,” 

152. According to Destler the most thorough of these was the yearly overview 

document entitled “Basic National Security Policy.”

55. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 79; and Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 536.

56. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 343.

57. Stevenson, “Underlying Assumptions,” 133.

58. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 11.

59. According to the current deputy executive secretary, NSC, Lt Col 

James Regenor, “records are kept for almost all meetings in some form or 

another” (emphasis added). Regenor to the author, email.

60. Clifford, “Workings of the National Security System,” 19–20; Stevens, 

“National Security Council,” 56–57; and Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 83.

61. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 442; and 

Johnson, Defence by Committee, 329.

62. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 443; and 

Zegart, Flawed by Design, 80–81.

63. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 161.

64. Ibid., 158.

65. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 87. Regarding the Vietnam War, 

Nixon stated, “This is all going to take time, but I can assure you that it will 

have my personal attention. It will have my personal direction. The Secretary 

of State, my Adviser for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, all 

of us will give it every possible attention and we hope to come up with some 

new approaches.” Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 86–87.

66. President Eisenhower today stands as the greatest exception among 

presidents who have operated under the NSC system in terms of the number 

of frequent formal NSC meetings he conducted, however, according to former 

NSC staffer under Pres. George W. Bush—Dr. Meghan O’Sullivan––noted, “for 

years, the President has had regular (generally in the form of weekly) NSC 

meetings on Iraq, and perhaps NSC meetings on Afghanistan every fortnight. 

O’Sullivan to the author, e-mail.

67. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 87.

68. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 82.

69. Ibid., 88, 81–82.

70. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 342.

71. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 81.

72. Ibid., 90.

73. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 8.

74. Ibid.
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75. See The Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council; Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 86–88; and Lord, Presidency and the Management 

of National Security, 73–74. 

76. Yost, “Instruments of American Foreign Policy,” 64–65.

77. Kissinger served in both positions simultaneously from 21 September 

1973 through 3 November 1975.

78. See The Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council; Lord, 

Presidency and the Management of National Security, 73–74; and Stevens, 

“National Security Council,” 58–59. 

79. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 89.

80. Ibid., 90; and Best, National Security Council, 27–28.

81. See Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 106. Though significant to the history of the NSC, the Iran-Contra Scandal and subsequent 

congressional and Tower Commission investigation and report findings concluded that the NSC functions and structure were not to blame for the mistakes, but that improper decisions and judgment by NSC staff members was 

to blame. See Tower, Muskie, and Scowcroft, Report of the President’s Special 

Review Board for in-depth details or Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National 

Security Policy Process, 71, footnote 23 for a concise summary of the IranContra affair. 

82. Best, National Security Council, 28.

83. For firsthand accounts of the Bush-Scowcroft partnership see Bush 

and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, especially 18–19 and 30–56.

84. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 108. See also Whittaker, 

Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 9. The latter reference 

is more complementary to President Clinton, stating that, “The biggest change 

in the Clinton Administration was the emphasis on economics as an element 

of U.S. national security.”

85. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 108.

86. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 10. 

Additionally, the attorney general and director of the Office of Management 

and Budget are invited to attend pertinent formal NSC meetings. 

87. Ibid., 14.

88. See Bumiller, Condoleezza Rice, and Weisberg, Bush Tragedy, for appraisals that are more detailed.

89. See Bumiller, Condoleezza Rice.

90. See Woodward, Bush at War, 254; Woodward, Plan of Attack, 266–69; 

Burke, “Contemporary Presidency,” 554–75, but particularly 563; and Pfiffner, “Did President Bush Mislead the Country?” 33. 

91. Burke, “Contemporary Presidency,” 555. According to Burke, these 

additional roles weakened Rice’s brokerage role.

92. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 19.

93. Woodward, State of Denial, 379.

94. He attended the first meeting on 26 September 1947, and then stayed 

away from all but 10 of the next 55 meetings. The Whitehouse, History of the 

National Security Council.
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95. See National Security Act of 1947. Less significant to this paper, the 

1949 amendment also designated the director of central intelligence and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff as statutory advisers. The chairman of the National Security Resources Board remained until removed in 1973.

96. Gerstein, Securing America’s Future, 78.

97. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 148; and Zegart, Flawed by Design, 

79–80. When the Korean War started, Truman made all but seven of 71 NSC 

meetings thereafter. See section entitled “Truman Administration, 1947–

1953” in The Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council; and Sander, 

“Truman and the National Security Council,” 369–88.

98. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 152; and Zegart, Flawed by Design, 80.

99. Souers, “Policy Formulation,” 542–43.

100. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 445. Eisenhower attended a total 329 of 366 NSC meetings. See also the section entitled 

“Eisenhower Administration, 1953–1961” in The Whitehouse, History of the 

National Security Council.

101. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 455. 

102. Ibid., 445.

103. Officially, the OCB was established as an independent agency by 

Executive Order (EO) 10483, 2 September 1953, to report to the NSC on the 

development, by appropriate executive branch agencies, of operational plans 

for national security policies of international import. It was then incorporated 

into the NSC, effective 1 July 1957, by EO 10700, 25 February 1957. It was 

abolished by EO 10920, 18 February 1961. “Records of the National Security 

Council,” Guide to Federal Records.

104. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 448–49.

105. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “History of the United States 

National Security Council, 1953–1961,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

History_of_the_United_States_National_Security_Council_1953-1961. 

106. Carter and White, Keeping the Edge, 266.

107. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 149; Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife 

Crisis,” 86; Zegart, Flawed by Design, 84; and Gerstein, Securing America’s 

Future, 78.

108. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 84.

109. See section entitled “Kennedy Administration, 1961–1963” in The 

Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

110. See Bolt, Coletta, and Shackleford, American Defense Policy, 161.

111. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 84; Best, National Security Council, 15; 

and Thayer, “Presidential Policy Processes,” 555.

112. See Best, National Security Council, 17. Also see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; and Wyden, Bay of Pigs.

113. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 76; and Gelb, “Why Not the State Department?” 26.

114. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 85.

115. See section entitled “Johnson Administration, 1963–1969” in The 

Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.
The US National Security Council 

67

116. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 150.

117. Section entitled “Nixon Administration, 1969–1974” in The Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

118. Destler, “National Security Advice,” 158.

119. Best, National Security Council, 21.

120. Ibid., 23; and Tower, Muskie, and Scowcroft, “Organizing for National 

Security,” 188.

121. Presidential Directive/NSC-2. See also Carter, Public Papers of the 

Presidents, 8.

122. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 90; and section entitled “Carter Administration, 1977–1981” in The Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

123. See Reagan, Public Papers of the Presidents, 18–22.

124. Best, National Security Council, 26–27.

125. See Tower, Muskie, and Scowcroft. Report of the President’s Special 

Review Board, “Report of the President,” V-5.

126. See section entitled “Reagan Administration, 1981–1989” in The 

Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

127. Ibid.

128. Lord, “NSC Reform,” 443; and Hinckley, “National Security in the 

Information Age,” 25–39.

129. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 106.

130. The Iran-Contra affair has already been mentioned, but there are 

also examples in Gertz, Betrayal; Girard, Clinton in Haiti; Lute, Improving 

National Capacity to Respond; and Woodward, State of Denial. 

131. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 108. This was called 

Presidential Decision Directive 2, Organization of the National Security Council, issued on 20 January 1993. Best, National Security Council, 31.

132. Best, National Security Council, 30.

133. Lake, 6 Nightmares, 131–32.

134. Harris, “Berger’s Caution,” A24.

135. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 48. 

For a more in-depth discussion of how these bodies function, see 48–55.

136. Zegart, Flawed by Design, 98.

137. See US Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map 

for National Security, 49.

69

Chapter 4

The Committee of Imperial Defence 

and the National Security Council: 

Comparison and Contrast

There is no doubt that the Committee of Imperial Defense 

. . . had a great deal of influence on the establishment 

in this country of the National Security Council.

—H. Struve Hensel

Former assistant 

secretary of defense, 1954–1955

Although the CID and NSC existed in different historical contexts, their similarities have served to strengthen the legacy of 

the CID and make clear that, as the prototype for the NSC system, the United States has been served well by the CID’s creation 

and development. Recognizing the similarities and differences 

between the CID and NSC is easy to do, but explaining their 

significance is harder, because in doing so, there is a tendency 

toward bias for one organization vis-á-vis the other. The challenge is to assemble objective data for comparison. 

The logical place to begin is by looking at the historical context of each organization before and during the creation of each. 

Before delving deeper into the examination of both of these systems, it is vital to discuss inherent distinctions between the 

British and American systems of government. In 1961 Frank 

Arthur Johnson described these differences between the parliamentary and presidential systems: “The American utilization of 

the British experience, procedures and organization has therefore taken place within the limitations enforced by a setting, for 

example, of greater individual leadership by the president in 

contrast with the corporate responsibility of the Prime Minister 

and cabinet, of a competitive rather than an intimate executivelegislative relationship, and of relatively formal, impersonal and 

transitory bureaucratic arrangements” (emphasis added).1

The significance of these differences and their implication 

should neither be lost nor understated. As good as the British 
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

70

system was within the historical context of its existence, the new 

ascendant world power—the United States—was ready, willing, 

and able to step in and take their place as the next leader in the 

international order. President Truman more succinctly captured 

the essence of this difference in his memoirs: “In some ways a 

Cabinet government is more efficient—but under the British 

system there is a group responsibility of the Cabinet. Under our 

system the responsibility rests on one man—the President.”2

The US system was intentionally structured this way.

America’s founding fathers explicitly separated powers to 

limit the possibility of tyranny. James Madison notes in “Federalist No. 51” that power is separated three distinct ways: horizontally (executive, legislative, and judicial), vertically (federal, 

state, and local), and within each branch (House/Senate, multiple departments in the executive branch, and the levels and 

divisions of the federal judiciary) with that end in mind.3 These 

separations lead to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness at times, 

but the framers of the Constitution would likely argue that 

these are necessary to ensure our freedoms. These separations do lead, though, as Princeton scholar Edward Corwin 

noted, to “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing 

American foreign policy.”4 Because of this, one area that is 

fundamentally different between the two systems is that the 

Congress has explicit powers in the foreign policy realm—powers that they are not afraid to wield. This is quite a different 

domestic political environment than the British system where 

the prime minister should be able to exercise control over his 

party and any supporting coalition members in the legislature 

but cannot do so unilaterally.5

Like the American experience where Ferdinand Eberstadt 

and James Forrestal saw defense unification as a catalyst for a 

national security enterprise that could harness the government 

departments to formulate and coordinate policy, the British defense establishment of the late nineteenth century was interested in the same. After the British Boer War experiences, the 

Colonial Defence Committee, the Joint Naval Committee, and 

the Military Defence Committee were like minded in their view 

that cabinet harmonization was necessary to improve imperial 

defense. The prevailing sentiment within the government, however, was that nothing could “alter the unwillingness of states-
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 

71

men to look abroad and see that the world of British hegemony 

was changing, and act accordingly.” This intentional unwillingness to consider the changing international order and Britain’s 

place within it persisted despite operational difficulties in South 

Africa and the growing German military threat. Though not 

fully mature, Britain did have the “machinery of government” 

(the means) in place to cope with these dangers, but apparently 

chose not to use them.6

Since the CID sprang from a corporately (to borrow Frank 

Johnson’s term) administered government, it was created to 

be nonpartisan, and it remained nonpartisan throughout its 

existence. The NSC is the product of a competitive system but 

was created with the same intent. Nevertheless, from President Eisenhower forward, the NSC became a partisan and oftentimes highly politicized organization within the Executive 

Office of the President. Inderfurth and Johnson found evidence 

underscoring these differences. They observed that bureaucratic cultures and administrative styles differ significantly in 

the ways in which British civil servants and their American 

counterparts view their governmental roles. Regarding the 

day-to-day political environment of each system, they observed 

that “American elite civil servants responsibilities beg[i]n at a 

level of authority significantly below that of their British counterparts,” such that “the American system has displayed a penchant for mismatching titles of formal authority and possibilities for influencing policy.”7 Nevertheless, the parliamentary 

and presidential systems, despite their notable differences, 

seem to reflect a common fundamental premise that recognizes a need for delegated and shared authority within deliberative decision-making processes.

One interesting but otherwise lesser comparison to note is 

the time taken by each organization to rise to prominence in 

their respective governments. By 1911 a mere seven years after 

its establishment, the CID had become “the key forum of imperial consultation upon those policies which determined the external security of the Empire.”8 Likewise, within seven years 

after the NSC’s establishment in 1947, the NSC system under 

President Eisenhower had “evolved into the principal arm of 

the President in formulating and executing policy on military, 

international, and internal security affairs.”9
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

72

Another more interesting comparison between the two organizations concerns the influence of the CID secretary and the 

NSA. Positive influence on the prime minister and president 

depended on the demonstrated competency, organizational 

professionalism, and trust engendered by each. For the CID, 

Lord Hankey had succeeded in his role of looking at the whole 

of imperial security and providing his committee’s coordinated 

perspective to the prime minister and cabinet. As his success 

endured, the trust and confidence Lord Hankey earned with 

prime ministers served to elevate his standing: “once the Prime 

Minister had full confidence in him (as they all did), his position was at least as influential as that of a cabinet minister 

backed by a great department of state.”10 The American system 

has corresponding examples. President Reagan seemed to have 

had similar trust in Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, Pres. 

George H. W. Bush in Brent Scowcroft, President Clinton in 

Samuel Berger, and Pres. George W. Bush in Stephen Hadley. 

With respect to committee structures, both organizations 

evolved through the addition of numerous committees and informal arrangements. At the height of World War II, the CID 

had 733 subcommittees. The number of NSC committees has 

also increased to an unprecedented and correspondingly high 

number (at least 34), by comparison, of PCCs and interagency 

working groups.11 Arguably, the span of control for such large 

and diffuse organizations tends to stifle high-quality policy 

ideas and advice from fully making it to the top of the organization. In fact, the Esher Committee report and Prime Minister 

Balfour expressed caution over the fast growing CID. With its 

expanding secretariat and increasing numbers of subcommittees, the potential for smooth coordination to wane accordingly 

became a real concern. Lord Hankey commiserated over the issue of a greater number of CID participants and observed, “this 

increase in numbers made the Committee rather unwieldy, 

overcrowded the room, and led to the delegation of business 

more and more to the subcommittees” resulting in “one of the 

principal causes of the ineffectiveness of the Committee of Imperial Defence.”12 This in turn “mitigated against [the] free and 

open discussion of controversial issues of national policy.”13

Coupled with the bureaucratic inefficiency that often accompanies government largesse, Esher and Balfour were also con-
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 

73

cerned the CID’s work would compete directly with the War 

Office and Admiralty. To counter this possibility, they worked 

hard to ensure the CID stay “as objective and free of bias towards either service as possible. Only as the Prime Minister’s 

servant and as a body linked with all the national interests 

concerned, and not as a third department having independent 

interests and prestige, could the [CID] achieve Esher’s and Balfour’s aim.”14 It does appear that this aim was achieved by the 

prodigious efforts of the secretaries and prime ministers who 

served with the CID. 

Yet another comparison between the CID and NSC rests in 

America’s decision to make the president the NSC chairman, 

as the British had made the prime minister the CID chairman. 

Since the prime minister was politically responsible for leading 

the country in war as well as peace, the Esher Committee and 

Prime Minister Balfour agreed that Britain had, through the 

head of the government, a permanent and powerful means for 

planning and coordinating by the CID the carrying out of the 

“heavy obligations” of empire.15 There really was no debate in 

the United States as to who would chair the NSC as it was always intended to be led by the president. Thus, from the end of 

World War I on, as America’s place as the world leader became 

clearer, and as the Eberstadt Report of 1945 clearly stated, establishing a national security apparatus blueprinted on the 

soundness of the CID model meant the US chief executive alone 

would chair it.16

Another likeness, albeit of lesser significance, between the 

CID and the NSC was in the wording of the descriptions of the 

secretary and executive secretary, respectively. According to the 

Treasury Minute establishing the CID in 1904, the secretary’s 

administrative duties and executive functions were threefold:

1. preservation of records of deliberations,

2. procurement of information and documents on imperial 

defense, and

3. provision of continuity of method in the treatment of 

questions coming before the CID.17

By comparison the executive secretary’s duties were necessarily 

vague: “The executive secretary, subject to the direction of the 
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

74

Council, is authorized . . . to appoint and fix the compensation 

of such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties 

as may be prescribed by the Council in connection with the 

performance of its functions.”18 Understandably, the relative 

formless lack of specificity in both duty descriptions was intended to permit maximum flexibility to each. By operating in 

this manner, however, the American system has functioned 

well outside its statute, thereby contributing to the several policy 

missteps already described in this study.

Nowhere in the National Security Act of 1947 is there provision for the NSA position. The executive secretary’s duties were 

assumed by the assistant to the president for national security 

affairs at the beginning of President Eisenhower’s administration. This position was then downgraded to an “administrative 

and logistical one” becoming the NSA.19 The NSA’s position and 

duties, therefore, have never been statutorily established, and 

the NSA has remained an independent advisor to the president 

not subject to congressional oversight. This helps explain the 

wide range within which NSAs have conducted their duties over 

the last 60 years. According to former career US diplomat 

Charles Yost, transforming the executive secretary position into 

that of the NSA has created “one of the most conspicuous and 

prestigious policy makers in Washington, [who is] not normally 

or necessarily nonpartisan.”20 This again begs the question of 

whether or not independence, nonpartisanship, and not being 

subject to congressional oversight are always necessarily beneficial attributes of the American NSA. 

The partisan aspects of the NSA’s position have a mixed past 

in interagency politics. Oftentimes, bringing all interagency 

perspectives to the NSC requires that the NSA remains a biasfree policy coordinator and adviser to the president. President 

Clinton’s NSC, in its efforts regarding Kosovo, is a widely acknowledged example of this kind of success thanks to NSA 

Samuel Berger who, “focused on the political dimension of policymaking and sought to avoid options that might lead to paralyzing debate in this country or other NATO states.” A middle 

ground was successfully negotiated between a possible ground 

war and capitulation to Serb aggression.21 Another good example would be Brent Scowcroft’s consistency in serving the 

first President Bush. According to the official White House his-
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 

75

tory, the NSC under Scowcroft’s leadership “maintained good 

relationships with the other agencies, and Secretary of State 

Baker and Scowcroft appear to have maintained the most comradely working terms. Through the collapse of the USSR and 

the unification of Germany, Operation Just Cause which sent 

American troops into Panama in December 1989, and Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the NSC worked effectively 

in facilitating a series of American foreign policy successes.”22

When the national security advisor functions outside the appropriate boundaries for the position, foreign policy errors and 

government embarrassment can easily result. Examples of this 

include President Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Carter’s

failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran, and President Reagan’s IranContra affair. Likewise, President Nixon’s consolidation of national security and foreign policy power in the hands of one 

man—Henry Kissinger—deeply attenuated interagency coordination. Kissinger, also with President Nixon’s approval, changed 

the NSC committee structure to make himself the chairman of 

six key NSC-related committees, highly politicizing his role and 

thereby limiting the free flow of cabinet department deliberations to the president.23

While the likenesses and differences between the CID and 

NSC say much to describe how each organization influenced 

the policymaking of two world powers, other, lesser, similarities 

and differences also can contribute to understanding of these 

unique institutions. 

One such difference is reflected in the way the CID changed 

in structure, authority, and name in the transition from peacetime to wartime. The CID’s effective transition to a war footing 

is not nearly as significant as the transformation that was 

thereby wrought in the workings of the entire British government. Recall chapter 1. Left unstated there was, during World 

War I, the fact that the CID took on the responsibility of fulfilling the functions of a general staff. Not only did the CID—called 

the War Cabinet in wartime—function in its traditional national 

security coordination and advisory role; it also assumed the 

equivalent roles of today’s US Department of Defense, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (including the Joint Staff), the NSC, and certain 

tasks of the US Department of State.24 All of this would fall under the leadership of the secretariat, thus putting considerable 
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

76

discretionary power into one man’s hands. Add to this speculation that the war cabinet held executive authority similar to 

that of the prime minister and cabinet and the result is the 

makings of a nation’s nearly stand-alone, full-government apparatus within the war cabinet.25 No comparable similarities of 

this scope and scale can be made with the NSC system, since 

the United States preserves the principle, at least, of divided 

government in peace and in war.26

A more obvious similarity is that the CID and the NSC were 

both essentially products of wars—the CID came out of the 

Boer Wars and the NSC from World War II. Another similarity 

was the flexibility in membership of both the CID and NSC as 

determined by the head of government. In the British system, 

the prime minister selected “with absolute discretion” the participating members of the CID.27 The president’s ability to 

choose the NSA, executive secretary, and a handful of others is 

similar, except that the majority of the president’s choices for 

key positions in his NSC (i.e., cabinet level secretaries, etc.) 

were and are subject to congressional confirmation, while a few 

others (the NSA and some other key positions) are not. In the 

British CID system, however, the prime minister simply picked 

whom he wanted for key positions. 

Other slight differences existed in the general compositions 

of each organization’s staff. Whereas the CID’s staff was always 

“equally divided between military and civilian representatives,”28 the NSC staff began with a predominance of military 

officers that has evolved today into an organization comprised 

mostly of highly educated academics with only a handful of 

military officers.29 This is understandable considering the CID 

was initially conceived as a defense committee encompassing 

the entirety of British military defense, which also doubled in 

assuming the larger national security responsibilities. While 

the NSC system from its conception was designed solely to address broader national security issues, the National Security 

Act that created it established the separate Department of Defense in order to manage defense and military responsibilities. 

Lastly, the NSC presidential national security policy decision 

documents issued by the president are direct descendents of 

the British war books and the chiefs of staff subcommittee reports process.30 These systems established the procedural tone 
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE 

77

for their respective chief executive’s administrations by providing necessary direction to every national security professional 

in each system. Likewise, each of these document systems 

served a parallel purpose of authorizing executive actions for 

which the government departments and agencies were obliged 

to implement or execute. 

Notes

1. Johnson, “British Committee of Imperial Defence,” 232. See also Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 50 for further distinctions 

between the features of the British and American systems of government.

2. Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 230.

3. See Madison, “Federalist No. 51.”

4. See Corwin, Bland, Hindson, and Peltason, The President, 171.

5. Huggins to author, e-mail.

6. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 35, 43.

7. Inderfurth and Johnson, Fateful Decisions, 298–99.

8. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 113.

9. See section entitled, “Eisenhower Administration, 1953–1961” in The 

Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

10. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 128.

11. Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, National Security Policy Process, 13–15.

12. Hankey, Supreme Command, 48. Hankey further observed that if the 

top-heavy “elder statesmen were to be retained, the Committee would have 

been as large as the Cabinet and in addition overweighted with persons without 

responsibility. Yet to throw them overboard would have been discourteous.” 

13. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and High Policy, 116.

14. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 72.

15. Ibid., 67.

16. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 48.

17. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 70.

18. National Security Act of 1947, Section 402 (c).

19. See Best, National Security Council, 12, particularly note 16.

20. Yost, “Instruments of American Foreign Policy,” 64.

21. Best, National Security Council, 32; and Harris, “Berger’s Caution,” A24.

22. See section entitled “Bush Administration, 1989–1992,” in The Whitehouse, History of the National Security Council.

23. See Best, National Security Council, 67. Committees Kissinger chaired 

included the Senior Review Group (noncrisis, nonarms-control matters), the 

Washington Special Actions Group (serious crises), the Verification Panel (arms 

control negotiations), the 40 Committee (clandestine operations), the Intelligence Committee (intelligence community policy), and the Defense Program 

Review Committee (how the defense budget relates to foreign policy aims).

24. This statement loses a bit of significance when you consider the United 

Kingdom did not have a Chiefs of Staff Committee until 1923, nor a Secretary 
THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

78

of State for Defence until April 1964. Without a leader for the Ministry of Defence (the Ministry of Defence was not created until 1940 by Winston 

Churchill), it is easy to understand how their organizational functions were 

absorbed over the course of the war. As an aside, the US Department of Defense’s Joint Chiefs of Staff system is a direct descendent from the British 

system. In July 1942 the office of “Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief” 

(the president) position was created. The incumbant also was the chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Fleet Adm William Leahy was the first officer 

appointed to this position analogous to that held by Britain’s Lord Ismay who 

was the chief of staff to the British minister of defence. One important difference between the two positions is worth noting. Leahy sat the chair of the 

JCS while Ismay did not sit the British equivalent. See Hankey, Diplomacy by 

Conference, 319; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Staff, section 

entitled “Origin of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” for more info. 

25. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 139; Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 243; and Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference, 85.

26. Of course, arguable exceptions to this statement exist. A case could be 

made that in fact every president has made intra-NSC changes or additions 

and subtractions to committee sizes and the like and has expanded the NSC 

system in response to world events. Examples include creating the Homeland 

Security Council, which was a response to the events on 11 September 2001 

by President Bush, as well as the creation of the National Economic Council 

by President Clinton. There are certainly other examples not listed here.

27. Ismay, “Machinery of the Committee of Imperial Defence,” 242.

28. Eberstadt, Unification of the War and Navy Departments, 50.

29. Regenor to author, e-mail.

30. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 333; and Whittaker, Smith, and 

McKune, National Security Policy Process, appendix A, 61. The nomenclature 

for the NSC system has changed nearly as often as every president who has 

used the NSC. The president has historically used these documents to communicate his policies for national security and to authorize specific actions.
79

Chapter 5

Analysis, Conclusions, 

Recommendations, and Implications

The committee is of the essence of the British way of 

life, which is pleasantly easygoing and inefficient. . . . 

If only the rest of the world could be persuaded to adopt 

the British committee system, what a pleasant place it 

would be in which to live.

—Lt Gen Sir Frederick E. Morgan

Original planner, Operation Overlord

To maintain its position in the world and advance its 

interests, the United States needs to maximize the 

impact of its diplomatic, military, and financial resources. 

That can only be done if the NSC system is permitted to 

perform as its creators originally intended.

—Zbigniew Brzezinski

President Carter’s national

security advisor

Though evolving from different nations across an ocean, the 

CID and the NSC are paternal relations. Blueprinting alone, however, did not guarantee that these organizations would turn out 

the same, let alone progress along the same evolutionary lines.

The CID became a first-of-its-kind experiment in the history 

of the world bringing the increasingly complex aspects of national security and mainland defense under the stewardship 

of Britain’s highest political leaders. In spite of its novelty, the 

CID flourished at a time in history when the two greatest wars 

of our time were waged. By nearly all accounts including this 

one, the CID’s organizational paradigm served to support its 

functions and operational ethos well, assessing its existence 

as successful. 

Attempting to duplicate the British experiment, the United 

States created its own national security apparatus in the CID’s 

image, assisting every president since 1947. The NSC system has 
CONCLUSIONS

80

served as America’s capstone government organization for policy 

coordination and advice. With respect to the NSC’s ability to coordinate effective policy, over the past 60-plus years, the NSC 

has contributed to some of the greatest national security and 

foreign policy triumphs, as well as to some of its worst failures.

Similarities and differences between each organization reveal 

either positive correlations or negative ones, depending on the 

aspect compared:

• The CID and the NSC were both created because of postwar needs—Britain after the Boer Wars and America essentially after World War II.

• Each system was considered the primary national security 

policy coordinator and advisor to the head of government. The 

CID had the additional responsibility of defense planning. 

• Each system was fully integrated into its respective government within seven years.

• Britain and the United States employ different executive 

governing systems that have colored how the CID and NSC 

systems would function. The British system of responsible 

government exercises a corporate system where both the 

cabinet and prime minister are jointly responsible for making decisions, while the United States employs a system of 

divided government where the president alone is responsible for executive decisions. Individual cabinet members 

in the United Kingdom have more gravitas than their counterparts in the United States (with the exceptions of perhaps defense and state, but that depends on the president). 

This difference arises from the British concept of responsible government which emphasizes the importance of faction and perhaps coalition. Parties in the United Kingdom 

create governments. Divided government in the United 

States means that parties:

° elect presidents, 

° provide vehicles for various levels of federal politics, and 

° translate the various federal polities into the Congress 

and provide the bases for organizing the Congress. 
CONCLUSIONS

81

Thus, the government differences between the United Kingdom 

and the United States are wide and deep. These differences are 

clearly evident in the respective conception and execution of 

their security policies. Because of these differences, professional CID and NSC bureaucrats view their role in the policy 

formulation process differently. 

• Both systems depended upon trust: between the cabinet/

prime minister and the CID secretary in the British system, and the president and the NSA in the US system.

• Executive authority was not granted to the CID or NSC 

staffs. The difference was that, when the CID assumed the 

war cabinet functions during World Wars I and II, it was 

granted executive authority, thereby increasing its influence and power.

• In order to function effectively, both organizations evolved 

and expanded well beyond their original intent. Specifically, the authority of the CID and the NSC evolved and 

expanded (and contracted) in degree and scope alternately 

emphasizing (and deemphasizing) policy coordinating 

authority, directive authority, and policy authority. For the 

CID, this arguably was a contributing factor in its demise.

• The chief executive of the respective governments chaired 

both organizations.

• Both organizations’ original staff leaders—the secretary for 

the CID and the executive secretary for the NSC—were 

statutorily assigned necessarily vague duties and functions, permitting both maximum administrative flexibility. 

Since the executive secretary’s imprecise duties migrated 

into the NSA position, the NSA’s duties have never been 

statutorily established, making the position’s official 

responsibilities and functions vague and unclear.

• The chief executive had complete freedom and flexibility to 

choose their security staff’s leader.

• The CID and the NSC were both created to be nonpartisan 

advisory bodies, but over the course of time, the NSC has 

become politicized and partisan.
CONCLUSIONS

82

• When the size of the NSC staff or the pattern of its utilization has deviated greatly from the intent of the explicit provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, unfortunate 

foreign policy consequences have resulted. This did not 

happen with the CID.

• Both organizations’ staffs had roughly the same combination of civilian and military personnel, but the NSC has 

evolved to be staffed predominantly by civilians.

• The CID wrote drafts of the war books and the NSC drafts 

of the presidential decision memoranda, but only the chief 

executives authorized execution usually with a signature 

to a final document. CID and NSC, both, were/are merely 

implements of the chief executive.

The findings of this study form the basis for the following 

recommendations with respect to improving the ongoing performance and function of the NSC system. 

Recommendations

The British and American experiences have arguably both 

demonstrated that too large a staff or too many committees can 

detract from an organization’s ability to serve the head of government effectively and efficiently. 

Appropriately Size the National Security Council Staff

With regard to the CID, one might argue that the existence of 

733 committees at the height of World War II was unnecessary 

and wasteful, but a reality nonetheless. Not only was the likelihood of multiple committees working on the same or similar 

policy issues a probability, the differing policy perspectives 

making their way to the top of the hierarchy were at times likely 

to work against one another. This could conceivably cause the 

time required to deliberate such diverse and wide-ranging positions to exceed the time limits with which a decision was 

needed. Similar to the large committee presence in the CID was 

the expansion of the NSC system under presidents Eisenhower 

and Nixon. As discussed in the study, this had a negative impact on the NSC’s performance of its responsibilities. 
CONCLUSIONS

83

In addition, one cannot confuse the idea of a smaller body 

necessarily being better at its duties. President Kennedy’s reduction of the NSC staff did not necessarily result in the Bay of 

Pigs invasion failure or the heightened intensity of the Cuban 

Missile Crisis. Instead, President Kennedy disregarded much of 

the body’s advice in favor of counsel from associations personally 

close to himself and outside the NSC structure. 

Next, there is a tendency for individuals in large groups to 

feel creatively stifled, which could limit the best thinking, perspectives, and critical analysis from vertically working up 

through the organization’s highest reaches. In this regard, the 

Report of the President’s Special Review Board advocated for a 

small NSC staff, noting, “A large number of staff action officers 

. . . enhances the possibilities for poorly supervised and monitored activities by individual staff members.”1 The evidence in 

this study of the modern NSC system supports the board’s 21-

year old finding. The board, however, did caution that putting a 

“legislative restriction” on the size of the staff would restrict the 

flexibility of future presidents’ unforeseen requirements. This, 

of course, is conjecture and not fully supportable by the evidence brought to light in this study. This study suggests that 

certain checks, balances, and other legislative restrictions could 

be put into place regulating the staff size without impeding the 

president’s ability or prerogative to make policy decisions. 

The establishment of both the CID and NSC represented bold 

and important additions to existing government structure, reflecting the respective governments’ willingness to implement 

change through lessons learned. Today, however, there is a 

smaller appetite to make such sweeping change in either the 

British or American governments even though the shift in the 

security environment from state to nonstate actors is at least 

as significant as the challenges faced by governments in the 

twentieth century.

Finally, the testimony of the very first NSA, Robert Cutler, 

cautioned against the idea of too large a staff, noting that it 

“would drift into becoming itself a policy maker.” Furthermore, 

he went on to state, “the larger the staff, in connection with 

policy making, the more work it makes for itself and the less 

work it does for the chief.”2 In this light, Zbigniew Brzezinski 

and other national security experts agree, going even further 
CONCLUSIONS

84

by stating that from 30 to 50 professionals is a good number of 

staffers for the NSC.3 This statement is correspondingly supported by the CID experience. The CID was comprised of core 

members numbering only 15 to 20 at any given time—striking 

a good balance between too many and too few.4

Whatever the proper size the staff should be to function effectively, consideration should be given to harnessing information technologies that support and do not detract from the 

NSC’s work. Similar to the effort in the intelligence community 

to create fusion centers, the idea of bringing standardized, 

cross domain, and collaborative information environment tools 

and concepts into the policy-coordinating realm may enhance 

and increase governmental efficiency. Commercial companies 

specializing in information technologies have matured some of 

the collaborative tools that could easily be transitioned for 

large-scale government use. 

The bottom line is that the number of the people on the 

staff should be appropriately sized as it relates to the tasks 

at hand, which can change over time given the state of the 

world, but should remain as diminutive as practical to accomplish its objectives. 

Continue to Stress the Importance of Strategic Planning

One of the hallmarks of the CID’s success was its ability to 

make advanced, long-range preparations—both defensively 

and offensively (eventually). Noteworthy, too, is the fact that a 

great deal of forethought and strategic planning is occurring at 

the highest levels of the US government. This occurs both 

overtly, through publicly accessible unclassified planning documents and other strategic documents such as the National 

Security Strategy, and covertly, via similarly classified strategic 

planning documents. 

Brzezinski stressed the importance and responsibility of national security strategic planning. He observed that neither the 

departments of state nor defense are individually staffed to 

plan on a comprehensive stand-alone basis because they are 

staffed with necessarily specialized and trained diplomats and 

military thinkers, respectively. Brzezinski also suggested remaking and using the Eisenhower-era NSC Planning Board as 
CONCLUSIONS

85

a possible solution to the lack of a useful planning arm—a suggestion supported by the evidence in this study.5 According to 

scholar and former NSC senior staffer Meghan O’Sullivan, “inherent disconnects [exist] in planning time horizons between 

[government departments and] agencies and speculating 

whether the NSC is well positioned to harmonize them” is a 

challenging endeavor.6 In this respect, one might argue that the 

NSC is the institution least able to think and long-range plan 

beyond the presidential administration but should not be restrained by such arbitrary restrictions, nonetheless. 

Another example can be found in the lack of a coherent US 

policy toward Turkey in the mid-1990s. According to Dr. John 

White, deputy secretary of defense from 1995 to 1997, the NSC 

DEPC would often discuss the need for developing and coordinating a long-term strategy for US engagement with Turkey, yet 

none was ever actually created.7 At the time, Turkey’s relationship with the US had grown into one of great significance on the 

heels of the Persian Gulf War involving the use of Incirlik Air Base 

to prosecute operations Provide Comfort and Northern Watch. 

One would think that because of the importance of this continued strategic relationship that a thoroughly coordinated policy 

was crafted and put into use but that was simply not the case. 

Lastly, the US Commission on National Security/21st Century and groups like it have referred to the dearth of a strategic 

planning function with regard to the NSC system. They have 

concluded that “no overarching strategic framework guides US 

national security policymaking,” and implored the president to 

“personally guide a top-down strategic planning process and 

delegate authority to the National Security Advisor to coordinate that process.”8 Unfortunately, shorter-term planning and 

“inbox management,” coupled with policy “implementation coordination and oversight” override the precedence long-range 

planning should take.9

Rethink the Longstanding Tradition of Extending Executive 

Privilege to the Workings of the National Security Council

Although NSA staff members customarily have not formally 

appeared before Congress, perhaps they should. In the British 

experience, the CID was responsible to the cabinet and the 
CONCLUSIONS

86

prime minister, yet still consistently demonstrated remarkable 

effectiveness. Though the author is not advocating that the 

United States consider adopting the British system of government, the idea of some official kind of dialogue or feedback loop 

with Congress is conditionally merited, if for no other reason 

than to at least inform Congress of NSC staff policy positions 

under consideration.10 The US government system is one of 

checks and balances and no part of it should be fully veiled 

from Congress. Considering the fact that the last comprehensive review of the NSC system and NSA took place during the 

investigation producing the Report of the President’s Special Review Board in 1987, over 21 years have passed and the strategic contextual environment has changed drastically.11 Moreover, the stakes for failure are very high as has been illustrated 

in this study.

Critics of this recommendation will find it problematic, 

though, particularly those who work in the NSC and the president’s administration. Foremost is the possible loss of trust 

between the president and his personal NSA. Inviting congressional inquiry and scrutiny into the presidential policy-making 

realm could have the opposite effect it was trying to achieve by 

infringing on that trust relationship. Additionally, congressional insight into the specific activities of the NSC has the potential for creating an adversarial relationship between Congress 

and the chief executive to the extent that Congress may become 

overly critical of the presidential prerogative to make policy, and 

thus, defeat the purpose of information sharing by the president. According to Dr. Megan O’Sullivan, “the W[hite] H[ouse] 

and NSC staff do have lots of relationships with Congress. [NSA] 

Hadley, [former US Ambassador to the United Nations John] 

Bolton, and even members of the NSC regularly have conversations with [Capitol] Hill on important issues. There are regular 

consultations and . . . these are important.”12 This is encouraging but what is not clear, however, is if these conversations are 

useful in informing the Congress of what they need to know, 

and more importantly, if they are more than a one-way dialogue from the NSC to Congress. If these informal relationships, 

engagements, and their dialogue do not have an effect or ability 

to reach the highest levels of the NSC, is the US government 

fully serving the American people? 
CONCLUSIONS

87

Consider Making the National Security Advisor a 

Nonpartisan Advisor and Policy Coordinator

The nonpartisan aspects of the CID’s staff and secretary 

throughout its entire existence were of great benefit to its administration and function. To the extent possible, the evidence 

of this study is sufficiently suggestive that the NSC staff, and 

particularly the NSA, should remain as objective and bias free 

as possible when coordinating policy on behalf of the cabinet 

departments and agencies, and when subsequently advising 

the president. Conduct of a partisan nature by the NSC leadership in the past has led to damaging consequences. A downside 

to this recommendation is that a nonpartisan NSA may not 

gain the presidential trust necessary to advise the chief executive fully and effectively.

This recommendation, understandably, will not be received 

well by any presidential administration because it necessarily 

detracts from the chief executive’s ability to forge his own national security policy free from outside interference. Of course, 

the author well understands this very important aspect of 

American national security policy making and constitutional 

design and does not fully subscribe to making the NSA nonpartisan, however, consider the following. 

If not a nonpartisan NSA, consideration for nonpartisan key 

NSC staff personnel should be entertained. What does this 

mean? Perhaps a career track for professional NSC staff members should be created and developed similar to the career 

track for Department of State Foreign Service officers.13 A cadre 

of professional national security staffers would bring necessary 

continuity to the policy making and coordinating function of 

the executive branch that is lacking in the today’s NSC system. 

With the potential changeover of administrations every four 

years, national security institutional knowledge is lost when 

key personnel leave the NSC. Important considerations germane to the recommendation include defining exactly what 

nonpartisan means. Does it mean the person(s) cannot be a 

registered party member? On the other hand, are military personnel perhaps better at the job because of their apolitical nature when wearing the uniform? The overriding issue with a 
CONCLUSIONS

88

nonpartisan NSA is trust and having a close confidant is probably 

the most important consideration.

Conduct an Independent Investigation

This is a catchall recommendation not specifically connected 

to the findings of this comparative study, but a vital one nonetheless. The general idea is to commission a nonpartisan and 

independent government accountability office-like entity to 

study and report to Congress on the aforementioned proposals. 

As a starting point for their investigation, they may find that 

useful work already exists to this extent. Additionally, the observations and studies by the nonpartisan, nonprofit Project for 

National Security Reform, the US Commission on National 

Security/21st Century, and a host of other similarly focused efforts could benefit the national security system greatly.14 These 

two efforts have already produced comprehensive studies, articles, 

and literature reviews in an attempt to inform persons of influence within the government that share a penchant for improving 

the US national security apparatus of the improvements that are 

possible and necessary.15 There would also be support for such 

efforts from the executive branch as the current Bush administration has already publicized the importance of initiatives in the 

president’s 2006 National Security Strategy.

16

The bottom line of this recommendation is that some moderate form of accountability should be employed with respect to 

this most important of all government policy coordinating institutions—the NSC—in the implementation and execution of its 

policies and decisions. The policy positions and engagement of 

the United States with the rest of the world, as well as its standing as the world’s current superpower, demands the best from 

its institutions, including an accountable, policy-making government body in which a diversity of perspectives are considered 

and debated. This is not to communicate that the author believes that either an investigation or its recommendations should 

be listened to or followed by the president, but merely that a 

wider net should be cast for which a greater number of views are 

heard, and perhaps advanced. One possible way to frame larger 

involvement and bring a certain level of accountability to NSC 

processes is to consider repealing the provision in the Inspector 
CONCLUSIONS

89

General Act of 1978 that excludes the Executive Office of the 

President from the provisions of this act, thereby infusing necessary accountability into the policy-making process.17

Implications

In order for any of these recommendations to be seriously 

considered, the executive branch and Executive Office of the 

President must be willing to have their processes more closely 

studied and scrutinized than ever before. It also requires them 

to have a receptive and open mindset to change for the sake of 

improving an already well-functioning national-security apparatus. This way of thinking is also one that believes in making 

improvements or changes only for the good of the nation. The 

US Congress can play a key role in these matters. 

Ultimately, the national security system and all of the processes therein belong to the president. The exceptional threats 

and challenges of this century clearly require the best the 

United States has to offer. Past breakdowns by the NSC system 

have led to domestic and international failures with significant 

consequences, demonstrating where it has fallen short of the 

congressional intent of the National Security Act of 1947. 

On behalf of America, the president alone approves policy 

actions and decides the courses of action the nation will take. 

Any attempts to change the law and statutes of the 60-year-old 

NSC system must consider its staying power, endurance, and 

continued existence in contrast with the CID’s shorter 35-year 

existence. Yet just because the system has endured for so long 

does not mean it should not entertain the potential and possibility to improve. Change comes hard, but is an inevitable part 

of the human experience. 

In the end, only by the close comparison between the CID 

and its prototyped NSC can one appreciate the similarities and 

differences that existed between them. By bringing to light and 

subsequently analyzing their similarities and differences, the 

CID and NSC systems served to illustrate how the effective 

operation of organizations, standing in resemblance and contrast to one other, can later serve as useful discussion points 

of departure. Given that this study was completed in a presidential election year, the recommendations are suitably appro-
CONCLUSIONS

90

priate to inform and educate a new presidential administration . . . and beyond. 

Notes

1. Tower, Muskie, and Scowcroft, Report of the President’s Special Review 

Board, V-3 to V-4.

2. Cutler, “Development of the National Security Council,” 457–58.

3. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 97; and Inderfurth and Johnson, 

Fateful Decisions, 361. In these, Brzezinski cogently explains the reasons for 

his recommendations. 

4. Johnson, Defence by Committee, 362–63.

5. Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” 96.

6. O’Sullivan to the author, e-mail.

7. Dr. John White, former deputy secretary of defense, interview by the 

author, 5 April 2008. Dr. White noted to me that this was just one example of 

many he was witness to at his level.

8. US Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security, 64. See also Uchida, Reforming the Interagency Process, 57. 

9. Andivahis et al., Project on National Security Reform, F-6.

10. The interaction with Congress could be provisioned such that no decisions would be made in contravention to the NSC staff’s developing positions 

so that the president’s ability to fully deliberate and approve coordinated NSC 

staff policy is unfettered, unconstrained, and does not dilute the effectiveness and compromise privilege the president currently enjoys with his national security advisor as well as the White House chief of staff. Understandably, 

this may be harder to legislate in practice as the two principles are at odds 

with one another. Some very informal interactions with Congress do take 

place, but apparently on a limited scale, and perhaps inconsistently as noted 

by NSC deputy executive secretary Lt Col James Regenor: “outreach [is accomplished] as needed whether it is before we move forward on an issue or 

after. The NSA [national necurity advisor] meets with members [of Congress]. 

Members [of Congress] will also provide us updates on pending [presidential 

trip] leg[s] or upon return from a trip or a meeting with a head of state. This 

is very informal and crosses both parties.” Regner to author, e-mail. 

11. One last note on congressional interactions—as long as the separation 

of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government are 

not breached, some form of interaction could help build congressional support for presidential positions and foster a trust that appears to be missing in 

the US government. As well, meeting with the Congress in some capacity 

might invest them more into the national security process and build trust 

and confidence between the executive and legislative branches.

12. O’Sullivan to author, e-mail.

13. There are lower-level staffers serving in the NSC that continue in their 

capacities from administration to administration, but the author is talking 

about more influential, higher-level officials serving continuously.
CONCLUSIONS

91

14. See Andivalis, et al., Project on National Security Reform. The Project for 

National Security Reform’s mission is to “assist national leadership in improving the US government’s ability to effectively provide for the nation’s security 

in the 21st century.” Likewise, the US Commission on National Security/21st 

Century was “initiated over two years ago out of a conviction that the entire 

range of US national security policies and processes required examination in 

light of new circumstances that lie ahead.” 

15. For example, see US Commission on National Security/21st Century, 

Road Map for National Security. 

16. The Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, 1. The applicable overarching statement reads: “Transform America’s national security institutions 

to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.” 

17. Inspector General Act of 1978, Sec. 8G (a) (1) (C). Making the NSC System (not the entire Executive Office of the President) subject to certain provisions of the Inspector General Act might have the effect of providing independent accountability to NSC processes without impinging on its ability to 

function properly.

Appendix A

National Security Council Structure

93
Adapted from PowerPoint slide provided by Col James A. Regenor, deputy executive secretary, National Security Council, to author, e-mail, 17 October 2008.
95

Appendix B

Policy Coordination Committees

Provided by Col James A. Regenor, deputy executive secretary, 

National Security Council, to author, e-mail, 18 March 2008.

Current regional PCCs include (the department responsible for chairing the committee is in parentheses): 

• Europe and Eurasia (State)

• Western Hemisphere (State and NSC co-chair)

• Mexico/Central America Regional Strategy (State and NSC 

co-chair)

• East Asia (State)

• South and Central Asia (State)

• Iran (State and NSC co-chair)

• Syria-Lebanon (State and NSC co-chair)

• Africa (State and NSC co-chair) 

• Russia (State and NSC co-chair)

• Iraq (NSC)

• Afghanistan (State and NSC co-chair)

Functional PCCs include:

• Arms Control (NSC)

• Biodefense (NSC and HSC)

• Combating Terrorism Information Strategy (NSC)

• Contingency Planning/Crisis Response Group (NSC)

• Counter-terrorism Security Group (NSC and HSC)

• Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning Department of Defense) 
APPENDIX B

96

• Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations 

(NSC)

• Detainees (NSC)

• Global Environment (NSC and National Economic Council 

co-chair)

• HIV-AIDS and Infectious Diseases (State and NSC)

• Information Sharing (NSC and HSC)

• Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)

• Interdiction (NSC)

• International Development and Humanitarian Assistance 

(State and NSC co-chair)

• International Drug Control Policy (NSC and Office of 

National Drug Control Policy)

• International Finance (Treasury)

• International Organized Crime (NSC)

• Maritime Security (NSC and HSC)

• Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland 

Defense (NSC)

• Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (State and NSC)

• Records Access and Information Security (NSC)

• Space (NSC)

• Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications (State)

• Transnational Economic Issues (NSC)

• Weapons of Mass Destruction-Terrorism (NSC)

• Avian and Pandemic Influenza (NSC and HSC)

• Communication Systems and Cybersecurity (NSC and HSC)
97

Appendix C

President’s Special Review Board 

National Security Advisor Functions

The Report of the President’s Special Review Board mentioned 

the functions that NSAs had come to perform. These functions 

were described as appearing “essential to the effective discharge 

of the President’s responsibilities in national security affairs” 

and serve as an excellent guide for all NSAs to follow in the 

present day.* The NSA:

• is an “honest broker” for the NSC process, assuring that 

issues are clearly presented to the president; that all reasonable options, together with an analysis of their disadvantages and risks, are brought to the president’s attention; and that the views of the president’s other principal 

advisors are accurately conveyed.

• advises from the president’s vantage point, without 

institutional responsibilities and biases. Unlike the secretaries of state or defense, who have substantial organizations for which they are responsible, the president 

is the NSA’s only constituency.

• monitors the actions taken by the executive departments 

in implementing the president’s national security policies, 

asking whether actions are consistent with presidential 

decisions and whether, over time, the underlying policies 

continue to serve US interests.

• has a special role in crises management. This has resulted 

from the need for prompt and coordinated action under 

presidential control, often with secrecy being essential.

• reaches out for new ideas and initiatives that will give substance to broad presidential objectives for national security.

• keeps the president informed about international developments and developments in the Congress and the executive 

branch that affect the president’s policies and priorities.

*Tower and Scowcroft, Report of the President’s Special Review Board, II-3.

99

Abbreviations

CDC	 Colonial Defence Committee

CIA	 Central Intelligence Agency

CID	 Committee of Imperial Defence

CJCS	 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DCOM	 Defense Committee

DEPC	 Deputies Committee

DNI	 Director of National Intelligence

HSC	 Homeland Security Council

NATO	 North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSA	 National Security Advisor

NSC	 National Security Council

OCB	 Operations Coordination Board

PC	 Principals Committee

PCC	 Policy Coordination Committee

SANACC	 State-Army-Navy-Air Force

Coordinating Committee

SIG	 Senior Interdepartmental Group

SWNCC	 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

101

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The Machinery of Government Needs a Tune-up

Lessons for the US National Security Council 

from the British Committee of Imperial Defence

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