[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 9 (Tuesday, January 16, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 1808-1887]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-39]



[[Page 1807]]

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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, and 135



Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-Engine Airplanes; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 9 / Tuesday, January 16, 2007 / Rules 
and Regulations

[[Page 1808]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, and 135

[Docket No. FAA-2002-6717; Amendment Nos. 1-55, 21-89, 25-120, 33-21, 
121-329, 135-108]
RIN 2120-AI03


Extended Operations (ETOPS) of Multi-Engine Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule applies to air carrier (part 121), commuter, 
and on-demand (part 135) turbine powered multi-engine airplanes used in 
extended-range operations. However, all-cargo operations in airplanes 
with more than two engines of both part 121 and part 135 are exempted 
from the majority of this rule. Today's rule establishes regulations 
governing the design, operation and maintenance of certain airplanes 
operated on flights that fly long distances from an adequate airport. 
This final rule codifies current FAA policy, industry best practices 
and recommendations, as well as international standards designed to 
ensure long-range flights will continue to operate safely. To ease the 
transition for current operators, this rule includes delayed compliance 
dates for certain ETOPS requirements.

DATES: Effective date: These amendments become effective February 15, 
2007. Compliance date: Some sections of the final rule have a delayed 
compliance date as discussed in section VI of this document and 
provided in Table 2 of the appendix.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical information on 
operational issues, contact Robert Reich, Flight Standards Service, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Ave., SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166; facsimile (202) 267-
5229; e-mail Robert <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#085a6d616b60486e6969266f677e"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4311262a202b032522226d242c35">[email protected]</span></a>. For technical information on 
certification issues, contact Steve Clark, Transport Airplane 
Directorate, ANM-140S, 1601 Lind Ave., Renton, WA 98055; telephone 
(425) 917-6496; facsimile (425) 917-6590; e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#7427001102111a5a245a371815061f343235355a131b02"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="5d0e29382b3833730d731e313c2f361d1b1c1c733a322b">[email protected]</span></a>. For legal information, contact Bruce 
Glendening, Office of the Chief Counsel, Division of Regulations, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, 
DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3073; facsimile (202) 267-7971; e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1153636472743f567d747f75747f787f76517770703f767e67"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="aae8d8dfc9cf84edc6cfc4cecfc4c3c4cdeacccbcb84cdc5dc">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page at http://dms.dot.gov/search
    (2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking's web page at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/recently_published.
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
    You can search comments in the docket by the name of the individual 
submitting or signing the comment. You may review DOT's complete 
Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 
2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question about 
this document, you may contact your local FAA official, or the person 
listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out more 
about SBREFA on the Internet at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act.

Glossary of Terms Used in This Final Rule

    Technical terms used in this final rule are located in 14 CFR 1.2. 
Definitions used in the rule are found in sections 1.1 and 121.7, and 
appendix G to part 135 of the final rule language.

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Summary of the FAA's Existing ETOPS Program
    A. Airplane-Engine Type Design Approval
    B. Operational Requirements
    C. Polar Policy
III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking To Codify and Expand Existing 
ETOPS Program
    A. Development of the NPRM
    B. Summary of the NPRM
    C. Summary of Comments
IV. Safety Need for the Final Rule
    A. Safety Risk Associated With ETOPS
    B. Impact of ETOPS Requirements on Engine Reliability
    C. Fuel Exhaustion
    D. Cargo or Baggage Compartment Fire Suppression Requirements
    E. Decompression Scenarios
    F. Satellite-Based Voice Communications
V. Applicability of the Final Rule
VI. Delayed Compliance Dates and Grandfather Provisions
VII. In-Flight Shutdown Rates
VIII. Definition of ETOPS Significant System
IX. Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements
    A. Transport Category Airplane Airworthiness Standards (Part 25)
    1. General
    2. Additional Airworthiness Requirements for Approval of an 
Airplane-Engine Combination for ETOPS (Part 25, Appendix K)
    B. Engine Certification (Part 33)
    1. Engine Design and Test Requirements for ETOPS Eligibility
    2.Engine Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
    C. ETOPS Reporting Requirements for Manufacturers (Part 21)
    1. Early ETOPS: Reporting, Tracking, and Resolving Problems
    2. Reliability of Two-Engine Airplanes
X. Operator Maintenance Requirements
    A. Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program
    B. Limitations on Dual Maintenance
    C. Maintenance Actions
    1. ETOPS pre-departure service check
    2. Engine condition monitoring program
    3. Oil consumption monitoring program
    4. Verification procedures
    5. Task identification
    6. Configuration Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) Document
    7. Training and documentation
    D. Operator Reporting Requirements
XI. Operational Requirements (Part 121)
    A. Route Limitations
    B. ETOPS Alternate Airports
    1. Determination of ETOPS alternate airports
    2. Passenger recovery plans
    3. Rescue and firefighting services (RFFS)
    C. Crewmember and Dispatcher Training
    D. Communication Requirements
    E. Time-Limited System Planning and the Critical Fuel Scenario
    F. Dispatch or Flight Release
    1. Original dispatch or flight release, re-dispatch or amendment 
of dispatch or flight release
    2. Dispatch release: U.S. flag and domestic operations
    G. Engine Inoperative Landing
XII. ETOPS Authorization Criteria
    A. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 Operations--Airplanes With Two 
Engines
    B. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 Operations--Airplanes With More 
Than Two Engines
    C. ETOPS Approvals for Part 135 Operations
    D. Airplane Approvals in the North Polar and South Polar Areas
    1. Part 121 operations
    2. Part 135 operations
XIII. Comments on the Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Rule
XIV. Rulemaking Notices and Analyses

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XV. Appendix of Tables
    Table 1--Applicability of Final Rule
    Table 2--Part 121 and Part 135 Operational Requirements 
Timetable
    Table 3--Certification Requirements
    Table 4--Comparison of Current ETOPS Guidance; Regulations 
Proposed by the NPRM; and Final Rule
    Table 5--Design Requirement Objectives
    Table 6--Part 25, Appendix K Revised Numbering
XVI. The Final Rule

I. Executive Summary

    This rule is a result of the FAA's desire to review the current 
body of rules and guidance for extended-range flight operations and to 
codify a uniform set of regulations for airplane and engine design in 
parts 21, 25, and 33, and airplane operations in parts 121 and 135.
    Extended operations, or ETOPS, for long-range international travel 
provide many benefits related to savings in time, fuel, and operational 
efficiencies. However, there are unique safety concerns associated with 
these operations. When one travels great distances from airports, the 
safety of these operations depends on the risk of critical loss of 
engine thrust, additional system failures during a diversion for any 
cause, the distance from an adequate airport used in a diversion, and 
the conditions encountered upon arrival at the diversion airport.
    Part 121 domestic, U.S. flag, and supplemental rules have limited 
the amount of time two-engine airplanes could fly from an airport (14 
CFR 121.161). In the past, the risks associated with longer flights 
were accepted as a function of the number of engines on an airplane and 
were based on the reliability of engines existing at the time the part 
121 rules were initially issued. Airplanes with more than two engines 
had minimal part 121 regulatory guidance since engine and system 
redundancies reduce the safety risk associated with engine failures 
during diversions.\1\ Current part 121 regulations for airplanes with 
more than two engines require adequate oxygen supplies to address 
emergencies (14 CFR 121.329), but do not explicitly require the 
operator to consider other risk mitigation measures, such as providing 
the extra fuel necessary to reach a diversion airport. Likewise, the 
FAA has regulated turbine-powered on-demand operations under separate 
part 135 guidance, which specifies performance criteria when an engine 
is inoperative but not any restrictions based on the potential distance 
from an airport. (See 14 CFR 135.381 and 135.383.) A lack of regulatory 
oversight in areas of equipment requirements and fuel planning for a 
maximum diversion creates a very real safety risk apart from engine 
reliability.
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    \1\ Airplanes with more than two engines are excluded from the 
section 121.161 requirement to remain within 60 minutes from an 
adequate airport. Section 121.193 is a requirement limiting all 
airplanes to 90 minutes from an airport unless they have the 
performance, after the failure of two engines, to land at an 
adequate airport. Section 121.329 requires all turbine powered 
airplanes to have enough supplemental oxygen after a decompression 
to ``allow successful termination of the flight.'' Section 121.565 
requires only two engine airplanes to ``land at the nearest 
suitable'' airport after engine failure. For airplanes that have 
three or more engines the rule allows the pilot to proceed to an 
airport that he selects if, after consideration, he decides that 
proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest 
suitable airport. Section 121.645 requires similar ``normal'' fuel 
carriage for all turbine-powered airplanes.
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    As engine reliabilities increased during the previous three 
decades, there had been increasing pressure from the airline industry 
for the FAA to recognize technological advances and allow part 121 two-
engine airplanes to fly farther from airports than Sec.  121.161 
allowed. The FAA developed advisory circulars (AC 120-42, June 6, 1985; 
AC 120-42A, December 30, 1988) that provided guidance for the operation 
of part 121 two-engine airplanes beyond the regulatory limits.\2\ These 
advisory circulars introduced the term ``ETOPS'' for these extended 
operations and addressed airplane and engine design aspects, 
maintenance programs, and operations. Under this guidance, ETOPS 
operations for part 121 two-engine airplanes are permitted to fly up to 
180 minutes from an airport sufficient to accommodate a landing, 
provided certain criteria are met. The FAA Administrator thus 
authorizes qualified operators to engage in long-range operations in 
remote areas. As a result of the FAA's ETOPS programs, two-engine 
airplane operators can fly over most of the world other than the South 
Polar Region, a small section in the South Pacific, and the North Polar 
area under certain winter weather conditions.
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    \2\ Section 121.645 allows an operator to fly farther from an 
airport in a two-engine airplane if authorized by the FAA. The FAA 
granted such authorizations for Caribbean operations in the 1970's. 
Since the mid-1980's, the FAA has provided formal ETOPS guidance for 
part 121 operators on how to receive two-engine ETOPS authorization.
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    Operations under these programs have been highly successful. 
Although part 121 two-engine ETOPS have increased worldwide from less 
than 1,000 per month in 1985 to over 1,000 per day in 2004, engine 
reliability, as measured by the in-flight shutdown rate (IFSD rate), 
has improved to a point that is better than one-half the rates 
experienced in the 1980s.
    With the growing success of the current ETOPS guidelines 
established for part 121 two-engine operators, the FAA recognized in 
the 1990s that we could no longer continue to administer this program 
as a special authorization under an operating rule. The FAA also 
recognized that there were certain aspects of the ETOPS guidelines not 
solely relevant to two-engine airplanes. Also during this period, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) established 
international standards requiring member states to define diversion 
time thresholds for all two-engine airplane operations. For the United 
States, this requirement includes airplanes operated under part 135. In 
addition, the airline industry requested the FAA develop standards 
extending the existing limit beyond which two-engine airplanes may 
operate.
    The FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) in 
June 2000 to codify the existing policies and practices to be 
applicable to all airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, by 
developing comprehensive ETOPS standards for 14 CFR parts 25, 33, 121, 
and 135, as appropriate. The FAA also tasked ARAC to develop ETOPS 
operational requirements for diversion times greater than 180 minutes 
up to whatever extent may be justified.
    During this same period, the FAA developed guidance for polar 
operations. These operations became more commonplace with the opening 
up of Siberian airspace following the fall of the former Soviet Union. 
Although not defined as ETOPS, this guidance has been expanded in 
today's rule to include both the North and South Polar Areas and has 
been incorporated into the overall ETOPS rule package. Significantly, 
this aspect of the rule applies to all turbine-powered multi-engine 
operations including all-cargo operations.
    Today's rule codifies and expands existing FAA policy and route 
authorizations for all part 121 two-engine airplanes conducting ETOPS 
beyond certain distances from an adequate airport. This final rule also 
extends most requirements previously applicable only to part 121 two-
engine airplanes to a limited number of part 121 passenger-carrying 
three- and four-engine airplane operations and applies the same 
limitations to comparable part 135 operations. Significantly, this rule 
excludes the ETOPS maintenance requirements from the operation of 
airplanes with more than two engines in both part 121 and 135. The FAA 
has accepted the safety case that current

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engine reliabilities and the level of engine redundancy on such 
airplanes is sufficient to protect such operations. The appendix has 
several charts and tables that demonstrate the interrelationship 
between the affected parts of Title 14, as well as their applicability 
and compliance schedules.
    Under past ETOPS guidance, a part 121 operator of a two-engine 
airplane was required to use an airplane-engine combination approved 
for ETOPS. The manufacturer of the airplane obtained the ETOPS type 
design approval on behalf of the operator. Under today's rule (Sec.  
121.162, G135.2.3), two-engine airplane-engine combinations already 
approved for ETOPS under previous FAA guidance can continue to be used 
in ETOPS operations under parts 121 and 135. No re-certification under 
the new Sec.  25.1535 is required. Likewise, this rule allows airplanes 
with more than two engines manufactured within 8 years of when this 
rule becomes effective to be used in ETOPS operations without type 
design approval under the new Sec.  25.1535. Airplanes with more than 
two engines manufactured more than 8 years after the effective date of 
this final rule must meet the certification requirements for airplane-
engine combinations adopted today. Today's rule allows two-engine 
airplanes with existing type certificates to be approved for up to 180-
minutes ETOPS without meeting requirements for fuel system pressure and 
flow, low fuel alerting, and engine oil tank design. These three 
provisions are new to this rule, and are not in the guidance previously 
used to approve two-engine airplanes for ETOPS.
    The FAA is adopting a compliance schedule to allow an orderly 
transition to future safety requirements as the industry adjusts to the 
new, broader ETOPS operating criteria. We recognize that, in some 
cases, it is appropriate to permit existing airplanes to continue to 
operate under existing authorization. It is also appropriate in some 
cases to delay implementation of certain portions of the rule to 
minimize its economic impact. We are setting a 1-year compliance date 
for most requirements involving a set-up or installation program. In 
all cases when a delayed compliance date is established, we have 
determined that there is a minimal increase in safety benefit for 
implementing the rule immediately. In addition, the FAA has provided 
grandfather provisions for part 121 ETOPS operations using airplanes 
with more than two engines and for all ETOPS operations conducted under 
part 135.
    The total anticipated costs of today's rule are estimated at $20.9 
million over a 16-year period or $12.4 million, present value. The 
costs of the rule to part 121 operators and U.S. manufacturers of 
airplanes with more than two engines are estimated to be $7.7 million 
($3.8 million, present value). Benefits to the rule are attributed to 
increased safety resulting from design, dispatch, and operational 
requirements. In addition, operators of two-engine airplanes may 
realize cost savings from decreased fuel requirements.

II. Summary of the FAA's Existing ETOPS Program

    The requirements adopted today are based almost exclusively on the 
FAA's existing ETOPS program, with some additions. Accordingly, the FAA 
believes it helpful to discuss in some detail the existing guidance. As 
noted earlier, all airplanes operated under 14 CFR part 121 are 
required to comply with Sec.  121.161. Unless otherwise authorized by 
the Administrator, this regulation limits the operation of two-engine 
airplanes to routes that contain a point no farther than 60 minutes 
flying time at an approved one-engine inoperative cruise speed in still 
air from an adequate airport. This restriction applies to all airplanes 
operating under this rule regardless of the terrain or area to be over 
flown.
    The first deviations to Sec.  121.161 were issued for 75-minutes 
ETOPS in the Caribbean Sea in 1977. In June of 1985, responding to an 
increasing desire by industry to obtain further deviations that would 
allow flights from the United States to Europe, the FAA issued Advisory 
Circular (AC) 120-42, which defined a process for obtaining 
authorization for ETOPS diversions up to 120 minutes. This AC was 
amended in 1988 with the publication of AC 120-42A, which expanded the 
maximum diversion period to no more than 180 minutes. This AC defined a 
process for obtaining three categories of ETOPS operational approval, 
i.e., guidance for 75-minute ETOPS (based on the earlier Caribbean 
approvals), 120-minute ETOPS, and 180-minute ETOPS. The AC 120-42A 
guidance contains a two-fold approval process: a type design approval 
of the airplane-engine combination and an operational approval 
consisting of ETOPS maintenance, flight dispatch, and crew training 
elements. The ETOPS maintenance program also incorporates supplemental 
processes to the non-ETOPS continuous airworthiness maintenance program 
(CAMP).
    The original guidance for extended range operations with two-engine 
airplanes in AC 120-42 allowed for an increase of up to 15 percent 
above the 120-minute limit (138-minute ETOPS). This provision was 
eliminated with the release of the guidance in AC 120-42A providing for 
operations up to 180 minutes.
    However, recognizing a need for ETOPS diversion authority between 
120 and 180 minutes, the FAA reinstated the 138-minute provision by 
issuing policy letter EPL 95-1 in 1994. In March of 2000, at the 
request of the industry, the FAA issued ETOPS Policy Letter EPL-20-1, 
``207-minute ETOPS Operation Approval Criteria''. This document 
provided a similar 15 percent increase in the 180-minute maximum 
diversion time, i.e., 207 minutes. However, this approval was limited 
to ETOPS operators flying in the North Pacific and only when weather or 
airport conditions did not permit normal 180-minute ETOPS flights.
    The basic principles expressed throughout this body of guidance are 
that (1) the design of the airplane and its systems must be acceptable 
for the safe conduct of the intended operation, and (2) the operator 
must have the requisite experience and ability to maintain and operate 
the airplane at the required level of reliability and competence. The 
design standards and operational processes for ETOPS were designed to 
prevent circumstances that could cause an engine in-flight shutdown or 
otherwise cause a diversion and to protect the safety of a diversion if 
one does occur.

A. Airplane-Engine Type Design Approval

    Since the introduction of AC 120-42, airplane-engine combinations 
have had to be approved by the FAA before ETOPS flights could be 
conducted. The type design approval of airplanes for ETOPS under AC 
120-42 and -;42A involves a two-part process. First, the FAA determines 
that airplane systems meet certain design standards for safe operations 
during an airplane diversion. One criterion for approval is that a 
candidate airplane have at least three independent electrical 
generators. Another criterion is that a required auxiliary power unit 
(APU) can start after the airplane has been at high altitude for 
several hours (cold-soaked) and can run reliably for the remainder of 
the flight. There are other criteria governing airplane systems such as 
cargo compartment fire suppression, communication, navigation, flight 
control, wing and engine ice protection, cabin pressurization, and 
cockpit and

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cabin environment. System safety analyses have to show that expected 
system failures will not prevent safe landing at a diversion airport. 
Systems with time limited capabilities, such as the cargo compartment 
fire suppression system, need to have the capacity to support a maximum 
length diversion, including a 15-minute allowance for a hold or go-
around at the diversion airport.\3\
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    \3\ For a 180-minute ETPOS approval, these time-limited systems 
would have a 195-minute capacity to meet this requirement.
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    The second part of the approval process is an evaluation of engine 
in-flight shutdowns and other significant airplane system failures that 
have occurred while the airplane-engine combination has been in 
service. The candidate airplane-engine combination should accumulate at 
least 250,000 engine-hours of service experience for a meaningful 
evaluation, although the AC allows a lower number of hours with 
adequate compensating factors. An assessment of the causes of these in-
flight shutdowns and other significant failures leads to a list of 
corrective actions that will prevent future occurrences of these events 
for similar causes. This list of corrective actions is contained in a 
configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document. The CMP 
document also contains minimum equipment requirements that come out of 
the airplane systems assessment from the first part of the process.\4\
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    \4\ The CMP document is an extension of the airplane type for an 
ETOPS approval. An operator wishing to fly an airplane in ETOPS has 
to comply with the CMP document as a condition for obtaining its 
operational approval.
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    AC 120-42A utilizes a relative risk model to support the expansion 
of maximum ETOPS diversion time for up to 180 minutes. This relative 
risk model is based on an airplane-engine combination maintaining a 
target IFSD rate at or below 0.02 per 1,000 engine-hours, which the 
model shows would allow a safe ETOPS flight for a 180-minute diversion. 
An applicant for ETOPS approval under this method has to show that the 
candidate airplane-engine combination has achieved this in-flight 
shutdown (IFSD) rate before the FAA will grant a 180-minute ETOPS 
approval. However, an applicant may also get an ETOPS approval for 120-
minute ETOPS if the candidate airplane-engine combination IFSD rate is 
approximately 0.05 per 1,000 engine hours. For an IFSD rate that meets 
this standard, but is above the 0.02 for 180-minute ETOPS approval, the 
FAA conducts an assessment of the causes of in-flight shutdowns in the 
same manner as under AC 120-42, including the incorporation of 
corrective actions into a CMP document. The applicant must show that 
the incorporation of these corrective actions will bring the IFSD rate 
down to the target 0.02 level. After a year in service operating in 
120-minute ETOPS, an airplane-engine combination is eligible for an 
expansion of its approval up to 180 minutes.
    Once an ETOPS approval is granted, the FAA monitors the propulsion 
system IFSD rate of the world fleet to make sure that it remains at or 
below the target rate. If the IFSD rate for a particular airplane-
engine combination in the world fleet goes above the target rate, the 
FAA asks the airplane and engine manufacturers what corrective actions 
they are taking to bring the rate below the target level. If, in our 
review of the manufacturer's corrective actions we determine that an 
unsafe condition exists, we may issue an airworthiness directive (AD) 
to correct the unsafe condition. We may also issue an AD to withdraw an 
ETOPS approval, or to require several corrective actions for causes 
that individually do not constitute an unsafe condition, but in the 
aggregate create an IFSD rate that is unacceptably high. In such cases, 
an operator's ETOPS approval may be predicated on compliance with the 
AD.
    With the introduction of the Boeing Model 777, the FAA introduced a 
new method for an applicant to obtain an ETOPS type design approval 
without the service experience required for an approval under AC 120-
42A. This method is known as the ``early ETOPS'' approval process.
    The early ETOPS process takes a systems approach to the development 
of an airplane and engine. Without service experience to identify 
design flaws that could lead to in-flight shutdowns or diversions, an 
applicant must demonstrate that the design flaws on previously designed 
airplanes are not present in the new airplane. The applicant must also 
consider how the maximum length flight and diversion affect the design 
and function of airplane systems to ensure that they have the 
capability and reliability for safe ETOPS flight.
    Rigorous ground and flight tests are required to demonstrate that 
the airplane-engine combination can successfully support an ETOPS 
program, including validation of maintenance procedures for systems 
whose failures could lead to an engine in-flight shutdown or a 
diversion. An enhanced problem reporting and resolution system 
identifies and corrects significant problems before the airplane is 
certified. After approval, this same system remains in place during the 
early service period to identify and correct such problems before they 
can lead to additional in-flight shutdowns and diversions.

B. Operational Requirements

    AC 120-42A requires that each operator demonstrate its ability to 
maintain and operate the airplane so as to achieve the necessary 
reliability and to train its personnel to achieve competence in ETOPS. 
The operational approval to conduct ETOPS is made via amendment to the 
operator's operations specifications. Operator approval is based on the 
following levels of operator in-service experience:
    1. 75-minute ETOPS--no minimum level required.
    2. 120-minute ETOPS--12 consecutive months of operational 
experience with the airplane-engine combination listed in its 
application.
    3. 180-minute ETOPS--12 consecutive months of operational 
experience at 120-minute ETOPS with the airplane-engine combination 
listed in its application.
    4. 207-minute ETOPS--hold current approval for 180-minute ETOPS.
    These in-service requirements can be reduced, or equivalent in-
service experience can be substituted, based on a review by the FAA. 
The reduction of operator in-service requirements is called 
``accelerated ETOPS'' and the substitution of equivalent experience is 
called ``simulated ETOPS.'' As a minimum, an ETOPS validation flight or 
flights must be completed prior to FAA approval. Guidance for both of 
these approval mechanisms are contained in draft appendices to the AC 
120-42A.\5\
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    \5\ Although the AC was never officially revised to include 
these appendices, the FAA has approved operators for ETOPS using the 
draft policy.
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    Certain operational requirements are also placed on the operator. 
The most prominent requirement is for the operator to plan airplane 
routings and to dispatch airplanes so as to remain within the approved 
diversion distance from adequate airports.\6\ Further, these adequate 
airports must have certain required weather minimums both at dispatch 
and during the flight and must have minimum levels of rescue and fire 
fighting services (RFFS). The operator must have programs in place to 
monitor the conditions at these airports during ETOPS and have a 
methodology to provide the flight crew with this data.

[[Page 1812]]

The operator must also have a methodology to calculate the fuel and oil 
supply for the ``critical fuel scenario.'' \7\ Further, the operator 
must provide in its operations manual airplane performance data to 
support both this critical fuel requirement and any other area of 
operations calculations in their operations manual.
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    \6\ ``Adequate airport'' is a new definition that codifies 
various references in current regulatory language and practice. It 
defines the minimum requirements for sufficiency based on the 
landing limitations contained in 121.197 and the airport 
requirements of part 139.
    \7\ AC 120-42A describes this scenario as any combination of 
engine failure and decompression at the most critical (furthest) 
distance from the airports used to plan the flight.
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    AC 120-42A also provides guidance on airplane system redundancy 
levels appropriate for ETOPS. An operator's Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL) based on this guidance may be more restrictive than the Master 
Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) when considering the kind of operation 
proposed and equipment and service problems unique to the operator. The 
FAA has established criteria for MMEL based on this guidance and the 
ETOPS approval level. Operational dispatch of an ETOPS flight is based 
on these criteria.\8\
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    \8\ Some examples of the increasing requirements of the MMEL for 
ETOPS approvals are (1) ETOPS beyond 120 minutes requires three 
generators; (2) ETOPS beyond 180 minutes requires SATCOM equipment, 
an engine-out auto land system, an auto throttle system, a fuel 
quantity indicating system, and minimum requirements for fuel cross 
feed and fuel boost pump electrical power.
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    Since the quality of maintenance and reliability programs can have 
an appreciable effect on the reliability of the propulsion system and 
the airframe systems required for ETOPS, AC 120-42A requires a two-
engine airplane operator to have a maintenance and reliability program 
sufficient to maintain a satisfactory level of airplane systems 
reliability for the particular airplane-engine combination. The 
elements of such a program are contained in an ETOPS-approved CAMP. 
This CAMP begins with a basic CAMP that is approved for use in non-
ETOPS operation, which is then supplemented for ETOPS with:
    1. An ETOPS maintenance document,
    2. An ETOPS pre-departure service check,
    3. Dual maintenance procedures,
    4. Verification procedures for corrective action to ETOPS 
significant systems,
    5. ETOPS task identification,
    6. Centralized maintenance control procedures,
    7. ETOPS parts control program,
    8. An airplane reliability program,
    9. Propulsion system monitoring,
    10. Engine condition monitoring program,
    11. Oil consumption monitoring program,
    12. An APU in-flight start program, if APU in-flight start 
capability is required for ETOPS,
    13. Maintenance training for ETOPS, and
    14.A system to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements set 
forth in the CMP document or the type design document for each airframe 
and engine combination.

C. Polar Policy

    In February 2001, in response to several U.S. carriers' plans to 
conduct polar operations with two-engine airplanes, the FAA developed a 
``Polar Policy Letter.'' This policy letter documented the requirement 
for airlines to develop necessary plans in preparation for polar 
flights and identified the necessary equipment and airplane 
configuration requirements for all airplanes regardless of the number 
of engines. The FAA's intent in issuing the policy letter was to 
establish a process that can be applied uniformly to all applicants for 
polar route authority.
    This policy letter placed the following requirements on the 
operator:
    1. Defined area of application,
    2. Enhanced facilities requirements for ETOPS alternate airports,
    3. Passenger recovery plan for diversion airports used to support 
operations,
    4. A fuel freeze strategy,
    5. Enhanced MEL requirements to include emergency medical kits and 
crew foul weather gear,
    6. Consideration of solar flare,
    7. Polar specific crew and dispatcher training,
    8. MEL requirements similar to those for operations beyond 180-
minute ETOPS, and
    9. A validation flight prior to approval.

III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking To Codify and Expand Existing ETOPS 
Program

A. Development of the NPRM

    In response to FAA's tasking, the ARAC formed an ETOPS working 
group consisting of more than 50 representatives of U.S. and foreign 
airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, pilot unions, industry 
groups and airline accident family support groups, as well as 
representatives from the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), ICAO, and the 
FAA.
    After 2 years, the ETOPS working group produced a draft notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM), advisory material, and a proposed preamble 
discussion to explain how the working group arrived at its 
recommendations. The ARAC presented the ETOPS working group final 
product to the FAA as a consensus document, which the FAA published, 
largely unchanged, as an NPRM on November 14, 2003 (68 FR 64730).
    Among the recommendations were:
    <bullet> Given the current reliability of part 121 two-engine 
airplanes, successful ETOPS processes should be expanded to allow two-
engine ETOPS throughout the world.
    <bullet> A comprehensive ETOPS rule should include all part 121 and 
part 135 airplanes used in specific long-range operations regardless of 
the number of engines.
    <bullet> The term ETOPS should be retained, but its definition 
should be changed to ``extended operations'' to highlight its 
application to all extended airplane operations.
    The ARAC ETOPS working group recognized that although engine 
reliability has improved significantly, diversions are sometimes 
necessary for reasons unrelated to engine performance, such as onboard 
fire, medical emergency or cabin decompression. Ensuring availability 
of en-route alternate airports, adequate fire fighting capabilities at 
these airports, and fuel planning to account for decompression are 
sound operational practices for all airplanes. Likewise, limits on an 
airplane's maximum allowable diversion time for certain time-limited 
systems (e.g., cargo fire suppression) that were applied to two-engine 
airplanes under the existing AC guidance should also apply to airplanes 
with more than two engines. Accordingly, ARAC recommended adding 
certain safety requirements to long-range operations for parts 121 and 
135 independent of the number of engines on an airplane.

B. Summary of the NPRM

    The NPRM proposed an expansion of ETOPS for part 121 two-engine 
airplanes and implementation of consistent ETOPS requirements for 
airplanes flying beyond 180 minutes from an adequate airport. The NPRM 
addressed three specific areas: airplane and engine design and 
reporting requirements (parts 21, 25, and 33), air carrier operations 
and maintenance (part 121), and commuter and on-demand operations and 
maintenance (part 135). The NPRM also proposed definitions in part 1 
for terms used in these three areas.
    The two main objectives of the proposed airplane and engine design 
requirements were to prevent failures that result in airplane 
diversions and to protect the safety of diversions when

[[Page 1813]]

they do occur. The proposed airplane and engine design requirements 
fell into five categories:
    1. Designing to reliably provide functions necessary for safe ETOPS 
flights.
    2. Eliminating sources of airplane diversions that occurred in 
current or past designs.
    3. Ground and flight testing.
    4. Reporting and correcting design problems.
    5. Demonstrating reliability.
    The airplane design requirements in part 25 were further divided 
into three parts: those applicable to all airplanes; those applicable 
to two-engine airplanes only; and those applicable to airplanes with 
more than two engines. Within each of the two latter parts, an 
applicant could choose to certify its airplane using existing service 
experience with the candidate airplane-engine combination, by 
conducting more thorough analysis and testing to certify a new 
airplane-engine combination without service experience (early ETOPS 
method) or through a combination of the two. Table 5 in the appendix 
summarizes how today's rule meets these design objectives from the 
NPRM.
    Requirements specifically applicable to engines to make them 
eligible for installation on an ETOPS airplane were proposed for part 
33. Only engines intended for installation on two-engine airplanes 
being certified for ETOPS, using the early ETOPS method in part 25 were 
contemplated under the proposed engine test requirements.
    The NPRM proposed part 121 amendments to codify current two-engine 
ETOPS guidance, including the designation of areas where the ETOPS rule 
would apply. It also proposed additional communications requirements; 
fire-fighting capabilities necessary at an ETOPS alternate airport; a 
recovery plan for caring for stranded passengers; utilization of an 
expanded ETOPS CAMP; airplane system performance requirements; and 
additional training and reporting requirements for crewmembers and 
dispatchers.
    Additionally, the FAA proposed other requirements for part 135 
operations conducted beyond 180 minutes from an airport. The proposed 
part 135 amendments were similar to part 121 but recognized the 
differing regulatory history and nature of part 135 operations. For 
example, the fire and rescue equipment required at diversion airports 
for part 121 operations would not be required for part 135 operations 
since these operations are irregular and few in number.
    Although most current air carrier operations can be conducted 
within 180 minutes flying time from an adequate airport, there are 
certain remote and demanding routes where diversion times greater than 
180 minutes are required to reach an adequate en-route alternate 
airport. Knowing that all operators flying routes with greater than 
180-minute diversion times would experience the same operating demands, 
the FAA proposed an ETOPS program to regulate flights in remote areas, 
which would benefit part 121 three- and four-engine airplanes and all 
part 135 airplane operations, regardless of the number of engines. The 
NPRM provided a public comment period to end on January 13, 2004. In 
response to requests, the FAA extended the comment period to March 15, 
2004 (69 FR 551; January 6, 2004).

C. Summary of Comments

    More than 50 commenters representing foreign regulatory bodies, 
associations, manufacturers, and foreign and U.S. operators responded 
to the NPRM. In general, the comments supported the work of the ARAC 
and agreed with the framework of the NPRM.
    However, commenters took issue with the economic summary of the 
NPRM and its stated cost benefits. They believed, and we now agree, 
that these benefits were based on the incorrect premise that the 
operations proposed to be regulated as ETOPS for part 121 three- and 
four-engine and all part 135 airplanes were previously restricted and 
consequently would provide new opportunities to the industry. In 
addition, many of the commenters disputed specific provisions of the 
proposal. In most cases, those who disagreed are operators or 
manufacturers of three- and four-engine airplanes, or part 135 
operators. Currently, these operators and manufacturers are not subject 
to any ETOPS safety provisions such as en-route alternate planning, 
time-critical systems analysis (e.g., cargo fire suppression), and the 
more rigorous ETOPS maintenance program. They expressed a strong 
opinion that 35 years of experience shows such rules are unnecessary, 
cost-prohibitive, and add nothing to aviation safety. The FAA also 
received detailed comments on satellite communications, certification 
standards, engine monitoring, fuel requirements, maintenance 
requirements and passenger recovery plans--all related ultimately to 
additional costs for operators. The FAA has mitigated many of these 
costs with extended compliance dates as shown in Table 2 of the 
appendix to this document. In addition, we have decided against 
adopting the ETOPS maintenance program for airplanes with more than two 
engines and have excluded all-cargo operations aboard airplanes with 
more than two engines from all aspects of the rule other than the 
minimal requirements for safe operation in the North and South polar 
areas for part 121 operations and the North polar area for part 135 
operations. We justify the safety need for applying this rule to 
airplanes with more than two engines in section IV of this preamble. A 
more detailed discussion of the commenters' recommended changes, a 
number of which the FAA adopt today, is provided in the substantive 
discussion of this final rule.
    In addition, some commenters provided extensive comments and 
suggestions on the risk of smoke and fire in ETOPS operations and asked 
the FAA to establish smoke detection standards. However, smoke in the 
cockpit issues are beyond the scope of this proposal. Since the issues 
raised by these commenters introduce new safety requirements, the FAA 
may consider them for future rulemaking, but will not discuss them 
further here.
    Several commenters, including the JAA, National Air Carrier 
Association (NACA) and the Civil Aviation Authority of the United 
Kingdom (UK CAA), recommended use of the acronym ``LROPS''--meaning 
``Long Range Operations''--for three- and four-engine ETOPS, to avoid 
confusion, particularly for those operations beyond 180-minutes 
diversion time. The FAA has decided to use the single term, ``extended 
operations,'' or ETOPS, for all affected operations regardless of the 
number of engines on the airplane. As discussed in the NPRM, the ARAC 
had determined that the use of a single term would be less confusing 
than two separate terms that govern the same types of operations. We 
agree with this assessment and believe any confusion created by 
expanding the term to three- and four-engine airplanes will be short-
lived.

IV. Safety Need for the Final Rule

A. Safety Risks Associated With ETOPS

    The FAA believes that operations of all long-range passenger-
carrying airplanes, regardless of the number of engines, need a viable 
diversion airport in the case of an onboard fire, medical emergency, or 
loss of cabin pressure. Ensuring availability of diversion airports, 
adequate fire fighting coverage at these airports, passenger recovery 
plans, and fuel plans for the diversion

[[Page 1814]]

are sound operational practices for all airplanes. Likewise, all 
airplane time-critical systems should account for the maximum allowable 
diversion and worst-case scenarios. Many commenters to the NPRM 
disagreed with this fundamental premise and questioned why new 
regulations should be imposed on operations that have been safely flown 
without any regulatory restrictions.
    In response to these comments, the FAA has reviewed the historic 
data for past long range operations and has come to several 
conclusions.
    First, the operating environment for certain long-range operations 
has changed significantly in the past 35 years. In the past, most 
operations conducted under part 121 and part 135 have flown over routes 
that remain within a reasonable distance from adequate airports. As 
technology has increased the range and endurance of all airplanes, 
operators are increasingly flying over regions of the world that both 
are less likely to be served by sizable airports and present extreme 
weather conditions. Some of the airports that would support a diversion 
are over 180 minutes away from the airplane during some portion of the 
flight, the previous limit for two-engine ETOPS. While the frequency of 
long-range operations is increasing, the aviation infrastructure to 
support these operations in remote areas of the world is decreasing. 
The U.S. military has abandoned long-standing diversion airports in the 
Aleutians and Pacific such as Adak and Wake Islands. In addition, 
Canada no longer provides financial support for its airports. At the 
same time, opening up of North Polar routes has resulted in an increase 
in operations over a particularly harsh and remote environment. The 
aviation industry expects that with increased route authority for two-
engine airplanes and increasing use of polar routes, by 2010 there will 
be 39,000 flights a year over the four current Polar routes alone. In 
2004, U.S. operators conducted 1,600 flights over these routes. 
Conservative industry estimates are that the number of these flights by 
U.S. operators will double by 2010. In the Southern Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans and the Antarctic area, only a few routes are being 
flown today, mostly by non-U.S. carriers. The industry estimates that 
by 2010 there will be 3,200 flights per year in these areas. Transport 
Canada stated that operations over the Canadian Arctic rose from 85,000 
in 1999 to 142,000 in 2004 and predicts a 7% yearly increase in these 
operations.
    Second, in-service data shows that all airplanes, regardless of the 
number of engines, occasionally divert for reasons unrelated to engine 
failure. Since most operations are conducted over areas of robust 
infrastructure where the crew usually has numerous choices in airports, 
most diversions are not problematic. The same cannot be said for 
diversions over remote areas of the world, particularly in light of 
operational infrastructure changes that have eroded the basic safety 
net upon which long-range operations of all types of airplanes have 
come to rely.
    In its development of proposed new regulations for expanded part 
121 two-engine operations, ARAC recommended extending the authority of 
these two-engine airplanes to operate on routes that are greater than 
180 minutes from an airport. The additional operational challenges of 
these more remote routes are equally demanding of all airplanes, 
regardless of the number of engines, and include such issues as 
extremes in terrain and climate, as well as limited navigation and 
communications infrastructure. Support of a necessary diversion and 
subsequent recovery in such areas demand added training, expertise, and 
dedication from all operators. Therefore ARAC concluded that there is a 
need to address these issues for all airplanes flying in these areas. 
ARAC recommended that some of the same ETOPS guidance developed for 
part 121 two-engine airplanes be applied to common elements of all 
airplane operations, both part 121 and part 135. The FAA agrees that 
such issues are relevant to all operations but is unable to justify the 
cost of this rule for all-cargo operations in airplanes with more than 
two engines and has accepted this recommendation only for passenger 
carrying operations.
    As a result, the same limited geographic areas that would cover 
greater than 180-minute two-engine ETOPS would also be applicable to 
part 121 and part 135 passenger-carrying operations in three- and four-
engine airplanes and all part 135 two-engine airplanes under this rule. 
Operations in these very limited areas are the only ones the FAA 
intends to regulate for these airplanes. All long-range operations 
could benefit from an ETOPS program. However, we believe, as do some 
commenters, the increased systems redundancy of the three- and four-
engine airplane operating less than 180 minutes is sufficient to 
maintain acceptable levels of risk associated with engine failure at a 
distance far from an adequate airport. We also believe imposing new 
regulatory guidance on part 135 two-engine airplanes below this 
threshold would impose costs on these operations that cannot be 
justified. However, for the limited case of operations beyond 180 
minutes from an adequate airport, we are convinced these operations 
must meet the minimum requirements of this rule.
    The whole premise of ETOPS has been to prevent a diversion and, if 
one were to occur, to have programs in place that protect the 
diversion. ETOPS demands that propulsion systems are designed and 
tested to ensure an acceptable level of in-flight shutdown risk, and it 
demands that other airplane systems are designed and tested to ensure 
their reliability. Maintenance practices must be adopted to monitor the 
condition of the engines and take aggressive steps to resolve problems 
with airplane systems and engines, thus minimizing the potential for 
procedural and human errors that could lead to a diversion.
    However, despite the best design, testing, and maintenance 
practices, situations may occur which require an airplane to divert. 
Regardless of whether the diversion is for technical (airplane systems 
or engines related) or non-technical reasons, there must be a flight 
operations plan in place to protect both crew and passengers during 
that diversion. Such a plan may include ensuring pilots are 
knowledgeable about diversion airport alternatives and weather 
conditions at those airports; pilots have the ability to communicate 
with the airline's dispatch office and air traffic control; and 
airplanes have sufficient fuel to divert to the alternate airport. 
Under the ETOPS ``preclude and protect'' concept, various failure 
scenarios also need to be considered by the operator. The best 
available options are then provided to the pilot before and during the 
flight.
    Unlike the ETOPS guidance provided for two-engine airplanes, there 
has been no regulatory framework governing the long-range operations 
airplanes with more than two engines. For example, in emergencies such 
as loss of cabin pressure, current regulations require adequate oxygen 
supplies but do not require the operator to consider the amount of 
extra fuel necessary to reach a diversion airport. An analysis by 
Boeing shows that between 1980 and 2000, 33 of the 73 cruise 
depressurization events occurred on airplanes with more than two 
engines. A study conducted by this manufacturer using a modern four-
engine aircraft carrying normal route planning fuel reserves raises 
issues about the adequacy of the current fuel planning requirements in 
the event of a diversion. Accordingly, the FAA finds there is a need 
for all passenger-carrying operations beyond 180 minutes from an

[[Page 1815]]

adequate airport to adopt the same ``preclude and protect'' concept 
contained in the two-engine ETOPS rules for all types of operations.
    Part 135 operations are subject to the same types of causal factors 
resulting in accidents as large transport operations are under part 
121. Therefore, the FAA is applying the same safety provisions required 
for part 121 operators to part 135 operators in these limited 
operations.
    The FAA also recognizes the need to respond to the ICAO Annex 6 
requirement for states to establish ETOPS thresholds for all two-engine 
turbine powered airplanes, including on-demand operations. Unlike other 
ICAO member states, the U.S. recognizes several categories of air 
carrier operations and has never imposed ETOPS rules on operators that 
conduct non-scheduled flights with ``business jets.'' The FAA is 
adopting these amendments for part 135 two-engine operations and 
passenger operations using airplanes with more than two engines in 
recognition that these operations are very similar to part 121 
operations in terms of both the types of airplane used and the 
particular long-range routings. The FAA believes the rule is a 
legitimate and necessary step to harmonize with international aviation 
standards.

B. Impact of ETOPS Requirements on Engine Reliability

    ETOPS design and maintenance requirements have contributed greatly 
to the reliability of the engines used in two-engine airplanes and 
appear to have had some impact on engines used in three- and four-
engine airplanes. Applying these requirements to all airplanes that fly 
long distances from airports would improve the reliability of all 
engines. However we agree with many commenters that the current level 
of engine reliability coupled with the engine and system redundancy on 
airplanes with more than two engines is sufficient to protect the 
operation from critical loss of thrust. Consequently there is no 
requirement for an ETOPS maintenance program for ETOPS on airplanes 
with more than two engines.
    Operators and manufacturers of airplanes with more than two engines 
have benefited from improvements in engine safety resulting from ETOPS 
requirements for airplanes with two engines.\9\ Prior to ETOPS, we 
considered a 0.02 IFSD rate the best rate the industry could achieve. 
Since ETOPS began in 1985, the IFSD rates have improved to 0.01 or 
lower, half of what we previously thought possible. This overall 
improvement in the IFSD rate for all airplanes was a result of design 
improvements and aggressive maintenance programs introduced by the 
engine and airplane manufacturers to correct in-service events to 
maintain the world fleet IFSD rate below the ETOPS maximum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Operators of three- and four-engine airplanes have benefited 
from the engine reliability improvements introduced into the same 
engine models that are also used on two-engine airplanes in ETOPS. 
Because of industry lease pool arrangements, there is a very strong 
industry incentive to maintain all engines to the ETOPS standard so 
that they can be swapped easily from non-ETOPS to ETOPS fleets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Fuel Exhaustion

    In 1983, a U.S.-manufactured two-engine airplane (foreign operator) 
made a no power landing at an airport in North America that was caused 
by an inadequate amount of fuel being loaded on the airplane for the 
flight.
    In August 2001, a foreign manufactured two-engine airplane (foreign 
operator) made a no-power landing at an airport in the Eastern 
Atlantic, due to the fact that the flight crew was unaware of a fuel 
leak that resulted in a critical amount of fuel being leaked overboard.
    Both of these airplane types are used in long-range passenger 
service in U.S. operations. Due to the similarity of the operating 
environment, it is the FAA's view that these particular incidents could 
have occurred in U.S. operations and, therefore, we view them as viable 
data points. We were extremely lucky that both airplanes in these 
instances made safe landings. The low fuel alerting requirement in the 
ETOPS rule will prevent low fuel quantity problems from becoming 
accidents on ETOPS flights. The low fuel alert will tell the flight 
crew when the quantity of fuel available to the engines falls below the 
level required to fly to the destination airport. The alert must be 
given while there is still enough fuel remaining to safely complete a 
diversion.

D. Cargo or Baggage Compartment Fire Suppression Requirements

    The historical rate of occurrence of in-flight cargo and baggage 
compartment fires is approximately 1 x 10<SUP>-7</SUP> per flight 
hour.\10\ This rate translates to about one cargo fire per 10 million 
flight hours. The FAA Seattle Aircraft Certification Office received 
five reports of cargo or baggage compartment fires for the period 1999 
to 2004. In-flight fires can be particularly hazardous. The cargo and 
baggage compartment fire suppression system requirement will ensure all 
ETOPS airplanes whose cargo or baggage compartments require fire 
suppression systems will have systems capable of putting out fires and 
suppressing re-ignition for the longest duration diversion for which 
the airplane is approved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Boeing analysis drawing from Boeing and other industry 
sources. Boeing presented this analysis to the ARAC ETOPS Working 
Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Decompression Scenarios

    Most estimates for the probability of decompression on a commercial 
airplane are on the order of 1 x 10<SUP>-6</SUP> or 1 x 10<SUP>-7</SUP> 
per flight hour. Airbus, in a recent exemption request for the A380 
stated in comments to the docket that there have been nearly 3,000 
depressurization events since 1959.\11\ It notes the probability of 
decompression due to the pressurization system alone to be in the order 
of 3.5 x 10<SUP>-6</SUP> per flight hour (3.5 decompression events per 
million flights). Boeing has provided a sample of depressurization 
events on Boeing airplanes from 1980 to 2000. Their sample shows 33 of 
73 events occurred on three- and four-engine aircraft. Two-engine ETOPS 
requirements have always required those operations to flight plan their 
fuel requirements for a ``critical fuel scenario.'' This requirement 
has been codified into the new approval process in this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Docket No. 20139, January 21, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unlike ETOPS guidance for two-engine airplanes, there is no 
existing regulatory framework governing the long-range operations of 
airplanes with more than two engines other than the requirements of 14 
CFR 121.193, which only governs the operation up to 90 minutes from an 
airport. The only rule governing decompression on a these airplanes 
addresses oxygen supplies and not fuel necessary for a successful 
diversion (14 CFR 121.329). The regulation does not require the 
operator of an airplane with more than two engines to check the 
conditions at possible diversion airports where the flight might 
terminate or check for fuel sufficiency.
    Boeing conducted a study using a modern four-engine airplane 
carrying normal route planning fuel reserves. On any route that is 16 
hours long, if a four-engine airplane has a major decompression 
anywhere in the cruise phase between approximately 7.25 hours to 12.5 
hours, the airplane will not have sufficient fuel to descend and cruise 
at 10,000 ft and reach its point of origin or destination. A similar 
calculation for a 10-hour flight shows that between the 4.5 to 7.5 
hours into the flight that same airplane would not have enough fuel to 
be able to continue

[[Page 1816]]

to its destination or turn back to its origination airport. Without a 
suitable airport at which to land, the results would be catastrophic. 
Under today's final rule, 14 CFR 121.646 now covers this omission and 
requires three- and four-engine operators flying more than 90 minutes 
to have enough fuel to fly to an adequate airport. The rule also 
extends ETOPS requirements on their operations that are greater than 
180 minutes from an airport.

F. Satellite-Based Voice Communications

    The use of SATCOM is a new requirement that applies only to ETOPS 
conducted beyond 180-minutes. Other available communication systems in 
use (VHF, HF voice, and datalink) all have significant limitations. The 
range of very high frequency (VHF) radio is limited to line-of-sight 
distances, typically less than 200 miles at high altitude. High 
frequency (HF) radio works at the longer distances from transmitting 
and receiving stations associated with ETOPS flights, but is subject to 
unreliable voice quality and loss of signal. This is particularly true 
during periods of intense solar flare activity.
    Datalink capability (both HF and SATCOM) is limited by message 
length and ability to clearly state the issue or message. A bigger 
limitation on datalink is the full attention required by the flight 
crew to interact with a small and compactly designed keypad. The device 
is difficult to use without error during turbulence and airplane 
maneuvering. Its use also requires crew coordination and verification 
of message content. This is extremely distracting during a time that 
requires the pilot's focused attention on a problem at hand. In 
comparison, the use of SATCOM voice allows clear and immediate 
conversation that can quickly convey the situation and needs for the 
flight.
    In March 2004 during a period of intense solar flare activity, a 
certification test flight was aborted because the crew could not 
communicate with air traffic using the HF radio. The purpose of this 
flight test was to simulate an airplane failure condition that made 
SATCOM unavailable and was conducted in a part of the world beyond the 
range of normal VHF radio signals. The test pilot decided the safety 
risk was too high to continue the flight test without his ability to 
communicate the airplane's position with air traffic control. This 
situation is similar to one an airline crew would face under similar 
solar conditions during a flight in areas outside the range of normal 
line-of-sight VHF radio in an airplane not equipped with SATCOM. The 
requirement for satellite-based voice communications adopted today will 
ensure that ETOPS flight crews will be able to communicate emergency 
situations with air traffic control or their airline during an ETOPS 
flight.

V. Applicability of the Final Rule

    This final rule is applicable to all ``extended operations 
(ETOPS)'' as now defined. These are long-range operations beyond 
certain distances from adequate airports. Specifically they are: (1) 
Two-engine airplanes operated under part 121 when more than 60 minutes 
from an adequate airport; (2) passenger-carrying airplanes with more 
than two engines operated under part 121 when more than 180 minutes 
from an adequate airport; and (3) flight operations of all two-engine 
transport category turbine powered airplanes and all passenger-carrying 
transport category turbine powered airplanes with more than two engines 
under part 135 when more than 180 minutes from an adequate airport. 
Because of the harsh and remote environments of the Polar areas, 
portions of this rule are also applicable to all airplane operations in 
those areas, although these operations are not classified as ETOPS.
    Today's rule imposes a requirement for a passenger recovery plan 
for certain operations of all U.S. flag and supplemental passenger 
operators. The rule also affects manufacturers of both airplanes and 
engines used in ETOPS by mandating certain certification standards for 
their manufacture. Should the manufacturers choose not to meet the new 
requirements of parts 25 and 33, their products could not be used for 
ETOPS operations.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Because of the potential benefits associated with the 
superior design of airplane-engine combinations demonstrated under 
the existing ETOPS certification programs, the FAA has decided to 
extend those requirements to the airplanes with more than two 
engines should the manufacturer wish to market these airplanes as 
suitable for ETOPS operation. The FAA anticipates the cost 
associated with this requirement ultimately will result in greater 
engine reliability at a very low cost. This is because these 
requirements are optional and will not take effect for such 
airplanes within the next 8 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current ETOPS guidance only covers part 121 two-engine operations 
between 60 and 180 minutes from adequate airports. This rule codifies 
current guidance up to 180 minutes and is expanded to include unlimited 
two-engine operations in certain parts of the world. We have responded 
to certain comments to the NPRM by enlarging the geographic area 
defined for the current 207-minute approval and the geographic area 
defined for the new 240-minute ETOPS approval.
    In keeping with the ARAC recommendation, the rule applies certain 
elements of current part 121 two-engine ETOPS guidance to operations in 
remote and demanding areas of the world, defined by flights more than 
180 minutes from an adequate airport, of part 121 passenger-carrying 
airplanes with more than two engines and to comparable part 135 
operations using turbine-powered airplanes. Many commenters to the 
original NPRM expressed concern over the cost of the rule and the 
difficulty in its application. Where the FAA determined that no 
reduction in safety would occur, we made changes from the NPRM. For 
example, the passenger recovery plan requirements are applicable only 
to part 121 ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes from an airport or in 
the Polar areas and are no longer applicable to cargo operations. 
Similarly, such plans are only applicable to part 135 passenger 
operations in the North Polar Region. Likewise, we have eliminated 
ETOPS requirements for part 121 operations using airplanes with more 
than two engines operating at less than 180 minutes from an adequate 
airport in the Polar Regions. We have also excluded all-cargo 
operations of airplanes with more than two engines in both part 121 and 
part 135 from the ETOPS requirements of the rule.
    Many commenters were concerned that airplanes they were currently 
using in operations that would be covered under the ETOPS rule would 
have to be re-certified when the new rule becomes effective. That is 
not our intent. A new Sec.  25.3 has been created specifying the 
applicability of the new airworthiness standards to airplanes with 
existing type certificates on the effective date of the rule, or to 
airplanes for which an application for an original type certificate was 
submitted before the effective date. A new Sec.  121.162 has been 
created delineating the airworthiness standards required for airplanes 
to be used in part 121 ETOPS. Appendix G, paragraph G135.2.3, has been 
revised to make the requirements applicable to all airplanes operated 
under that part similar to the requirements in Sec.  121.162 for 
airplanes with more than two engines. Table 4 in the appendix compares 
the applicability of both the NPRM and the final rule to current 
guidelines.

VI. Delayed Compliance Dates and Grandfather Provisions

    In this final rule the FAA has adopted a compliance schedule that 
will ease the

[[Page 1817]]

burden of compliance and make the rule less costly. Airplane-engine 
combinations that have been previously approved for ETOPS can continue 
to be used in those operations without re-certification. Manufacturers 
of two-engine airplanes who seek type design approval for ETOPS after 
the effective date of the rule must meet certain requirements based on 
whether they request approval for ETOPS up to and including 180 
minutes, or beyond 180 minutes. For type design approvals of 180 
minutes or less, two-engine airplanes with existing type certificates 
are exempted from the fuel system pressure and flow requirements, low 
fuel alerting, and oil engine tank design requirements. These three 
requirements are beyond what has been required under AC 120-42A.
    For airplanes with more than two engines, the new airplane 
certification requirements found in part 25 applies only to airplane-
engine combinations that are manufactured more than 8 years after the 
effective date of this rule.
    Likewise, the operational requirements under part 121 have delayed 
compliance dates. Some requirements, such as dispatch, weather minimums 
and fuel supply, are already required by either regulation or ETOPS 
approvals and may require minimum adjustment to an operator's ETOPS 
program within 30 days of publication of today's rule. For requirements 
that take additional planning and implementation time--such as SATCOM, 
training and passenger recovery plans--the FAA established a 1-year 
extended compliance period. Cargo fire suppression may present a 
retrofit requirement for airplanes with more than two engines, and so 
the FAA is allowing 6 years to meet this requirement. Some requirements 
proposed in the NPRM have been eliminated. Passenger recovery plans are 
not required for part 121 ETOPS of 180 minutes or less or for all-cargo 
operations. For part 135 operations, passenger recovery plans are only 
required in the North Polar Region. An ETOPS maintenance program is not 
required for passenger airplanes with more than two engines operated in 
ETOPS, and the ETOPS requirements are not applicable to all-cargo 
operations in airplanes with more than two engines in either part 121 
or part 135.
    Because part 135 operators will have limited ETOPS operations, the 
FAA has decided to grandfather from today's rule all part 135 airplanes 
manufactured up to 8 years from the effective date of the rule. For 
purposes of airworthiness requirements, part 135 operators may use 
these airplanes in ETOPS without certification under Sec.  25.1535. 
This is a change from the NPRM, which proposed grandfathering only 
those airplanes that were on an operator's operations specifications up 
to 8 years after the rule. Under the NPRM, they would then have had to 
remain on the operator's operations specifications to continue to 
operate ETOPS.
    To meet the operational requirements, the FAA has allowed a delayed 
compliance date of 1 year for part 135 operators to meet the North 
Polar, passenger recovery, and training requirements of the final rule. 
For cargo fire suppression, the final rule allows 8 years for currently 
approved part 135 ETOPS operators to comply.
    Tables 2 and 3 of the appendix present these delayed compliance 
dates.

VII. In-Flight Shutdown Rates

    A 12-month rolling average IFSD rate is the primary measuring tool 
the FAA uses to determine if an airplane-engine combination has 
acceptable propulsion system reliability before approving it for ETOPS. 
It is also used to monitor the health of a fleet of existing ETOPS 
approved airplanes in service. A 12-month rolling average IFSD rate is 
calculated by dividing the number of in-flight shutdowns that occur in 
an airplane fleet by the total number of engine-hours \13\ that 
accumulate in that fleet during the same 12-month period. Each month, 
the number of in-flight shutdowns and engine-hours from the same month 
12 months earlier are dropped from the calculation and replaced by the 
number of IFSD's and engine-hours in the current month. In this way, 
the resulting IFSD rate ``rolls'' from one month to the next.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ An engine-hour is an operating hour accumulated on each 
engine installed on an airplane. Similarly, an airplane-hour is an 
operating-hour accumulated on an airplane independent of the number 
of engines installed. For example, one airplane-hour on a four-
engine airplane would correspond to four engine-hours (one engine-
hour for each engine.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The manufacturer of an airplane approved for ETOPS and the 
manufacturer of the engines installed on that airplane monitor the IFSD 
rate of all airplanes and engines of that type, whether or not those 
airplanes and engines are operated on ETOPS routes. Today's rule refers 
to these airplanes as the ``world fleet.'' Operators of that airplane-
engine combination monitor the IFSD rate of only the airplanes and 
engines in their fleet. In-flight shutdown rates are discussed in 
several parts of the rule. Section 1.1 defines ``in-flight shutdown,'' 
which an operator or manufacturer uses, for ETOPS purposes only, to 
determine which in-service occurrences count in the calculation of an 
IFSD rate.
    Part 25, appendix K identifies the IFSD rate limits that a two-
engine airplane must remain at or below in order to receive an ETOPS 
type design approval.
    Paragraph 21.4(b)(2) identifies IFSD rate limits for airplanes 
approved for ETOPS in service. The manufacturer of an airplane approved 
for ETOPS and the manufacturer of the engines installed on that 
airplane must issue service information to the operators of that 
airplane-engine combination, as appropriate, to maintain the world-
fleet IFSD rate at or below the regulatory limit. Operators may 
incorporate this service information as part of their reliability 
program to maintain the IFSD rate of their fleet at or below the world-
fleet limits.
    Paragraph 121.374(i)(1) identifies the IFSD rate limits that prompt 
an investigation into whether there are any common cause or systemic 
problems in an operator's ETOPS program that are contributing to the 
high IFSD rate. The operator must report the results of its 
investigation and any necessary corrective action it is taking to the 
FAA. The IFSD rates specified in this paragraph are higher than the 
world-fleet rates in recognition that this action is taken only after 
the operator's normal reliability program fails to maintain the 
operator's rate at or below the world-fleet IFSD rate objective.
    Several factors may cause in-flight shutdowns that contribute to an 
operator's IFSD rate exceeding the world-fleet rate. First, there may 
be causes of in-flight shutdowns for which the manufacturer has not 
issued service information. There may be existing service information 
available to prevent causes of in-flight shutdowns that the operator 
has not yet incorporated into its fleet. An operator may have unique 
maintenance or operational procedures that unknowingly cause in-flight 
shutdowns. Finally, an operator may experience a higher IFSD rate for 
no known reason other than statistical chance.
    Another factor affecting an operator's IFSD rate is the numerical 
effect that a single in-flight shutdown has on the rate of a small 
fleet of airplanes. An IFSD rate of 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours results 
in an in-flight shutdown approximately once every 100,000 engine-hours. 
A fleet of 100 two-engine airplanes operating an average of 10 hours a 
day would accumulate 2,000 engine-hours per day or 730,000 engine-hours 
in 12 months. This fleet of airplanes could experience seven in-

[[Page 1818]]

flight shutdowns during that 12-month period and still have an IFSD 
rate below the 0.01 limit. A 10-airplane fleet of the same type 
operated in the same manner would accumulate only 73,000 engine-hours 
in a 12-month period. One in-flight shutdown on the 10-airplane fleet 
would result in an IFSD rate of 0.014, which is above the 0.01 limit. 
Thus, one in-flight shutdown on an operator of a small fleet of 
airplanes can place their fleet above the limit. To further compound 
the impact of fleet size, an in-flight shutdown that occurs in June of 
one year continues to count in the IFSD rate until the next June. A 
single in-flight shutdown would place the operator of the 10-airplane 
fleet above the 0.01 limit for an entire year.
    This one factor showing the magnified effect an in-flight shutdown 
has on the IFSD rate of a small fleet has generated the most concern 
from both the manufacturers and operators since AC 120-42A introduced 
IFSD rates into the ETOPS standard. They are concerned the FAA, or 
other airworthiness authorities, will adopt an FAA ETOPS standard that 
improperly uses IFSD rates in the rule to revoke the ETOPS authority of 
an operator who experiences in-flight shutdowns due to causes beyond 
its control, simply because its rate exceeds the allowable limit. Many 
comments to the NPRM were in some way connected to reducing the number 
of occurrences that count toward the IFSD rate, or in lessening the 
regulatory effect of a rate that exceeds the limit.
    The FAA will not revoke an existing ETOPS operational approval 
solely because of a high IFSD rate. The operating rules require the 
operator to investigate the cause of each in-flight shutdown and report 
to the FAA any corrective actions it is taking to prevent future 
occurrences. Only after additional in-flight shutdowns in the 
operator's fleet cause the FAA to believe the operator's corrective 
actions are insufficient to reduce the IFSD rate below the limit, will 
the FAA investigate taking further action. During this subsequent 
investigation, we will consider how a small fleet, even with successful 
corrective actions, may need up to a year to reduce the IFSD rate to 
below the required limit. However, if we determine that a series of in-
flight shutdowns is caused by a common cause or systemic problem in the 
operator's ETOPS program, we may reduce the maximum allowable diversion 
time or revoke the ETOPS approval until we are satisfied that the 
operator has corrected the problem.
    The FAA received several comments on the proposed IFSD rate 
requirements. Continental Airlines (Continental) and United Airlines 
(United) were concerned that the definition of in-flight shutdown, as 
proposed, would cause certain events to count against their IFSD rate 
even if the engine was not actually shut down by the flightcrew. 
Continental also stated that the proposed definition does not address 
modern engine auto-relight capability in which an engine flameout is 
detected by the engine control and an engine re-start is initiated 
automatically without any flightcrew action.
    The FAA finds these concerns have merit. We have revised the NPRM 
definition of in-flight shutdown to clarify our intent and address 
these commenters' concerns. First, we have replaced ``in-flight'' with 
``when an airplane is airborne'' which more clearly indicates that a 
condition for an in-flight shutdown is that the airplane is in the air 
(wheels not touching the ground). There has been some disagreement in 
the past about whether an engine failure that occurs during the takeoff 
roll should be considered an in-flight shutdown. This change clarifies 
our intent that the airplane must be in the air.
    We have clarified that an in-flight shutdown includes a situation 
when a flight crew member cycles the engine start control, however 
briefly, even if the engine operates normally for the remainder of the 
flight. This clarification addresses confusion over events that have 
occurred in service where a pilot has cycled the engine start control 
switch to re-establish normal engine operation following a compressor 
stall that causes the engine to not respond to throttle changes. Some 
have argued that such events, even though the engine was temporarily 
shut down, should not be counted in the IFSD rate because normal engine 
operation was reestablished and the engine operated normally for the 
remainder of the flight.
    We agree that an engine control system that performs this cycling 
as part of its normal design without any flight crew action should not 
be counted as an in-flight shutdown. The engine control system is 
performing a function that the engine was certified to perform. 
Accordingly, we have specifically excluded this type of ``auto-
relight'' function from the revised definition.
    We have also excluded from the revised definition the situation 
where an engine does not achieve desired thrust, but is not shutdown. 
There have been such events in service where some have argued that they 
should be counted as an in-flight shutdown because the engine does not 
produce usable thrust for the remainder of the flight. Historically, we 
have not counted these ``loss of thrust control'' events as in-flight 
shutdowns because the engines were not physically shutdown by the 
flight crew. All of these changes to the definition of in-flight 
shutdown are consistent with our past interpretations under AC 120-42A.
    United, American Airlines (American), and Continental all said that 
the IFSD rates contained in various parts of the rule were 
inconsistent. United suspects that some of the rates are based on the 
individual operator's rates and others are based on the world fleet 
rates. American and Continental requested further clarification as to 
why the rates in Sec.  121.374 were different from those in part 25, 
appendix K. American also said there is no guidance or timeline to 
establish when or if the 120-minute initial rate of 0.05 will be 
reduced down to 0.02.
    The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) commented that since the 
IFSD rates are a benchmark by which a regulator must manage an 
operator's performance and measure its success, the critical issue is 
what number above this rate will the FAA use to manage in-flight 
shutdowns. ALPA asked what the consequence of such a process would be?
    The FAA agrees that the NPRM created confusion with how IFSD rates 
are used for propulsion system reliability monitoring. We have revised 
the rule to clarify the differences in the various sections of the type 
design and operating rules that address IFSD rates.
    Part 25, appendix K, K25.2, defines the world-fleet IFSD rates that 
a two-engine airplane would have to achieve before it could receive an 
ETOPS type design approval based on service experience. As noted by 
Boeing, calculation of this rate is not based solely on ETOPS 
operations. There are no comparable IFSD rate requirements for 
airplanes with more than two engines in K25.3 of appendix K. Because of 
the greater number of engines per airplane, the corresponding rates for 
these airplanes would be so high that we were concerned we may 
inadvertently encourage a lower standard than is already normally 
achieved without a specific IFSD rate requirement.
    The NPRM proposed that IFSD rates for the purpose of obtaining type 
design approval for ETOPS would be approximate rates. This terminology 
came from AC 120-42A, which had been successfully applied to those 
airplanes currently used in ETOPS. However, for the purposes of a final 
rule, such terminology does not convey

[[Page 1819]]

that a candidate airplane-engine combination must be at or below these 
IFSD rates before the FAA would grant an ETOPS type design approval. We 
recognize that there are circumstances where a candidate airplane-
engine combination may be slightly above the regulatory limit, but 
because of factors such as the small fleet size effect discussed 
earlier, we may determine that the rate meets the intent of the rule. 
Therefore, we have revised K25.2.1(b) of this final rule to say that 
the world-fleet must be at or below the limit unless otherwise approved 
by the FAA.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Boeing had suggested the FAA merely specify the IFSD rate 
as approximate. Such a qualifier results in an ambiguous regulation. 
The FAA believes that it can retain the desired flexibility by 
approving, on a case-by-case basis, those IFSD rates that exceed the 
regulatory cap because of unique circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    K25.2.2(b)(2) of appendix K, requires an applicant for Early ETOPS 
approval to design an airplane's propulsion system to minimize failures 
and malfunctions so as to achieve the same IFSD rate objectives as 
apply to airplanes with service experience.
    Paragraph 21.4(b)(2) defines IFSD rates for airplanes that have 
received ETOPS type design approval. These rates are requirements that 
apply to airplane and engine manufacturers, and they are used to 
monitor the reliability of the world fleet in service.
    Additionally, the world-fleet IFSD rate applies to operators who 
must show the FAA that they have the ability to achieve and maintain 
these rates before the FAA will grant approval to conduct ETOPS. This 
requirement comes from AC 120-42A, paragraph 10(b) and is now codified 
in the final rule in part 121, Appendix P, section I, paragraph (a). 
(Note that the FAA proposed this appendix as Appendix O in the NPRM. 
Because an Appendix O was adopted in a separate final rule after the 
ETOPS NPRM was issued, the FAA is adopting proposed Appendix O as 
Appendix P in this final rule.)
    The IFSD rates in Sec.  121.374 are for an individual operator's 
propulsion system monitoring program. They were derived from AC 120-
42A, Appendix 4, and were recommended by the ARAC. These rates are 
slightly higher than those for the world fleet required elsewhere in 
the rule. Although operators are required to investigate the cause of 
each in-flight shutdown in order to maintain their fleet IFSD rate at 
or below the level required for the world fleet, these higher rates 
provide a trigger for when the operator must do a comprehensive review 
of its operations to determine if there are any common cause or 
systemic errors contributing to the high rate.
    The IFSD rate required to obtain type design approval for 120-
minute ETOPS in part 25 is 0.05 per 1,000 engine-hours or less. 
However, unless the IFSD rate is 0.02 or less, the manufacturer must 
provide a list of corrective actions in the CMP document specified in 
K25.1.6 of Appendix K that, when taken, would result in a rate of 0.02 
per 1,000 engine-hours or less.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The NPRM did not clearly state in proposed paragraph 
21.4(b)(2) that a reduction in the IFSD rate from 0.05 to 0.02 for 
120-minute ETOPS was linked to compliance with a CMP document that 
was required as a condition for an airplane's ETOPS approval. We 
have revised the language of this paragraph to clarify this intent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Air Transport Association (ATA) concurs with the IFSD rate 
requirements for two-engine airplanes under the propulsion system 
monitoring requirements in Sec.  121.374(i) as they simply codify the 
existing ETOPS policy and guidance. However, it objects to including 
IFSD rate standards for three- and four-engine airplanes. The ATA 
stated that the proposed rate threshold for these airplanes is 
significantly higher than the current IFSD rates of the industry. It 
also says that the existing reliability programs and reporting 
requirements of Sec.  121.703 has provided a safe and reliable system 
for these airplanes.
    The FAA agrees that the IFSD rates identified in Sec.  121.374(i) 
are significantly higher for three- and four-engine airplanes than for 
airplanes with two-engines. These rates were the result of applying 
established risk models and an analysis of the probability of losing a 
critical number of engines on airplanes with three and four engines.
    We also agree that the industry is achieving IFSD rates that are 
significantly lower than the threshold rates in Sec.  121.374(i). 
However, if an operator of a three- or four-engine airplane were to 
actually have a rate higher than the threshold, this provision will aid 
the FAA and the operator in determining if there are any common cause 
or systemic errors contributing to the high IFSD rate.
    JAA and the UK CAA believe that the 0.01 IFSD rate standard for 
greater than 180-minute ETOPS should apply to 207-minute approval in 
the North Pacific as well. Airbus makes a similar comment, but they 
also suggest that for the 207-minute exception-based operation, the 
0.01 rate should be applied in a similar manner to 120-minute ETOPS: 
That is, start out with an initial rate of 0.02 with a CMP standard 
that results in a rate of 0.01.
    The FAA disagrees that the 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours IFSD rate 
requirement should be applied to the specific exception based 207-
minute ETOPS approval. This operation is fundamentally a 180-minute 
operation. The 207-minute allowance is only permitted when the 
alternate airports normally available within 180 minutes diversion time 
are not available for a particular flight in the North Pacific area of 
operations. The baseline airplane requirement for 207-minute ETOPS is a 
180-minute type design approval.
    The JAA and UK CAA comment that the IFSD rate targets should not be 
specified in part 21 as it creates an immediate non-compliance in case 
of an excessive rate, particularly early in the life of an airplane. As 
discussed earlier, this rule only requires a type certificate holder to 
issue service information, as appropriate, to maintain the world-fleet 
IFSD rate at or below the limit. Paragraph 21.4(b)(2) does not apply to 
an Early ETOPS airplane until the world fleet has accumulated a minimum 
of 250,000 engine-hours. Accordingly, these commenters' concern about 
an immediate non-compliance in the early life of an airplane is 
unwarranted.
    The JAA and UK CAA also comment the FAA proposal for diversion 
times greater than 180 minutes has a fixed IFSD rate requirement 
unrelated to the maximum approved diversion time, whereas the JAA 
criteria provide a curve of IFSD rate target from 0.014 to 0.01 per 
1000 flight hours for diversion times ranging from 3 to 10 hours.
    The FAA requirements are intended to eliminate propulsion system 
reliability as a consideration from the maximum diversion time 
capability of the airplane. Only the most time-limiting airplane system 
capability will determine the maximum diversion time capability for a 
two-engine airplane under the new requirements for airplanes certified 
for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes in part 25. The FAA's risk model, 
discussed in detail in the NPRM, established that the probability of 
complete loss of thrust due to independent failures with an IFSD rate 
for two-engine airplanes of 0.01 per 1000 engine-hours would be 
sufficiently low that the main focus of long-range operational safety 
should be on reducing the possibility of other risk factors. This 
approach eliminates the need to re-evaluate an airplane-engine 
combination's propulsion system reliability each time the applicant 
seeks to increase the airplane's approved maximum diversion time.
    Dassault comments that there are no IFSD rate requirements for 
airplanes that will be operated under part 135. Thus, they posited that 
appendix K should be revised to say that the minimum IFSD rates only 
apply to

[[Page 1820]]

airplanes that will be used in part 121 operations. Dassault's comment 
was made with respect to the Early ETOPS method of approval of Appendix 
K. However, this comment has equal applicability for airplanes 
certified for ETOPS using the service experience or combined service 
experience and Early ETOPS methods.
    We disagree with Dassault's position. At the time an airplane 
receives a type certificate, the FAA cannot determine what rules an 
airplane will be operated under throughout its service life. Part 25 
airworthiness standards apply equally to all airplanes receiving part 
25 type certificates regardless of the operating part they will be 
flown under.
    Boeing commented that the term ``IFSD'' in the rate implies that 
only ``flight'' hours should be used as the denominator for the 
statistic. Boeing recommends changing how the rate is based from 
``engine-hours'' to ``engine flight hours.'' To do as Boeing suggests 
would constitute a change in the way IFSD rates have been calculated 
since ETOPS began in 1985. The FAA discussed whether to calculate the 
IFSD rate calculations using engine flight-hours when the IFSD rate 
definition was established in 1985. At that time, the industry had 
already established methods for tracking engine-hours, and the FAA did 
not want to create an additional burden on the industry by requiring it 
to track engine-flight hours for the purpose of calculating an IFSD 
rate for ETOPS. Given the historical method of calculation is well 
understood, we have decided against adopting Boeing's suggestion.
    Boeing also recommended replacing the word ``operations'' with 
``type design approval'' for each IFSD rate listed in K25.2.1(b) of 
Appendix K. Boeing stated that part 25 pertains to type design approval 
and using the word ``operations'' could create unnecessary confusion 
with the operational approvals granted under parts 121 and 135. We 
agree and have made this change as Boeing recommended.
    The NPRM proposed a new paragraph 21.4(c), which defined what 
actions the FAA would take if the world-fleet IFSD rate were exceeded. 
General Electric (GE) stated that section 21.4(c) is inconsistent with 
AC 39-8, which stated that any IFSD rate less than 2 x 10<SUP>-4</SUP> 
per cycle is not an unsafe condition. We disagree with GE. AC 39-8 
provides general policy the FAA Engine and Propeller Directorate uses 
as a guideline for determining whether an unsafe condition exists for 
engines used in all types of airplane operations. Since it is advisory 
in nature, this policy is subject to change.
    Proposed paragraph 21.4(c) stated the FAA will review the IFSD rate 
to determine if an unsafe condition exists. The FAA will review all in-
service problems to determine if an unsafe condition exists and may 
issue ADs as necessary to correct each unsafe condition found. If each 
individual cause for an in-flight shutdown does not constitute an 
unsafe condition, the FAA has the discretion to determine that a high 
IFSD rate by itself constitutes an unsafe condition and may issue an AD 
mandating a revised CMP document containing several corrective actions 
that collectively will bring the IFSD rate back down to a safe level. 
Because the FAA already has this discretionary authority, proposed 
paragraph 21.4(c) is unnecessary and has been withdrawn from this final 
rule.

VIII. Definition of ETOPS Significant System

    Boeing, Airbus, and ALPA had comments on the proposed definitions 
of ETOPS significant systems, ETOPS Group 1 systems, and ETOPS Group 2 
systems.
    Boeing stated that the definition of ETOPS significant systems 
should be revised to add ``extended'' before ``diversion'' at the end 
of the first sentence to clarify that ETOPS significant systems relate 
to extended diversions of ETOPS flights, not any length diversion. ALPA 
recommended deleting the last part of the definition of ETOPS 
significant systems ``based on the relationship to the number of 
engines, or to continued safe engine operation'' since the definition 
of ETOPS significant systems make this redundant. Boeing recommended 
deleting the parenthetical examples from the definition of ETOPS Group 
1 systems. They felt that the examples could be confusing or 
misinterpreted for designs where these systems may not be associated 
with the number of engines. Airbus commented that the NPRM introduced 
definitions for ETOPS Group 1 and ETOPS Group 2 systems, but did not 
use them anywhere in the proposed rule. It recommended the FAA withdraw 
these two definitions.
    The FAA agrees that the definition of ETOPS significant systems 
needs clarification. We agree with the recommended changes from Boeing 
and ALPA for the reasons they cited. We have made these changes in the 
final rule.
    Airbus is correct that nowhere in the NPRM was ETOPS Group 2 
significant systems used. However, the term ``ETOPS group 1 significant 
systems'' was used in several places in the NPRM, including the problem 
reporting requirements for Early ETOPS airplanes in paragraph 21.4(a) 
and the relevant experience assessment required for Early ETOPS two-
engine airplanes in K25.2.2(a) of Appendix K. The generic term ``ETOPS 
significant systems'' is also used in several places, including 
paragraph 21.4(a) and the time limited systems requirement of 
K25.1.3(c).
    We looked at whether we could eliminate the group 2 definition and 
combine the group 1 definition with the basic ETOPS significant system 
definition. However, there is a sufficient difference between the group 
1 systems, whose design depends on the number of engines on the 
airplane, and the other ETOPS significant systems, such as a cargo fire 
suppression system, whose design does not depend on the number of 
engines, but whose failure or malfunctioning could adversely affect the 
safety of extended operations. We could not eliminate this broader 
class of ETOPS significant systems from the rule, nor could we include 
these systems in those requirements that only apply to the group 1 
systems without increasing the burden of those requirements. Even 
though ``ETOPS group 2 significant systems'' is not used in the rule, 
we have decided to keep this term for completeness. We have revised the 
definition to clarify that an ETOPS group 2 system is any ETOPS 
significant system that is not a group 1 system.

IX. Airplane and Engine Certification Requirements

A. Transport Category Airplanes Airworthiness Standards (Part 25)

    As proposed in the NPRM, we are adding a new Sec.  25.1535 to part 
25 as a general requirement for manufacturers seeking ETOPS type design 
approval. The FAA decided against adopting a new subpart into part 25 
because ETOPS approval is an optional certification for manufacturers. 
The NPRM contained three provisions under this section. These included 
showing compliance with part 25 requirements considering the maximum 
mission time and longest diversion time, considering crew workload and 
operational implications and the flight crew's and passengers' 
physiological needs following system failures, and complying with the 
requirements of a new part 25 appendix. The specific airworthiness 
requirements applicable to ETOPS type design approval are contained in 
that appendix.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The first two provisions, contained in subparagraphs (a) 
and (b) of Sec.  25.1535 in the NPRM, are also specific 
airworthiness requirements that are more appropriately located in 
new appendix K. In this final rule, we have re-identified these 
subparagraphs as paragraphs K25.1 and K25.1.2.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 1821]]

1. General
    Today's rule adopts a regulatory scheme that airplane manufacturers 
must follow to receive ETOPS type design approval. Airplanes with 
existing type certificates at the time this rule becomes effective are 
exempted from some or all of the new part 25 requirements (see Sec.  
25.3).\17\ The inclusion of type design requirements and reliability 
validation methods in the rule has been objected to by the JAA and the 
UK CAA. They state a regulatory approach is too prescriptive and does 
not allow any flexibility for alternative reliability methods. These 
commenters add that the design materials are already included as 
objective requirements in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
Further, they state that the reliability validation process should be 
included as interpretive material to be agreed upon at the time of 
application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The FAA believes the accommodation to existing type 
certificate designs should relieve the concerns raised by NACA 
regarding the economic impracticability of the new requirements for 
existing airplane designs, a concern shared by the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA understands that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
may be taking a different approach in overseeing ETOPS design criteria. 
We believe JAA's and UK CAA's comments reflect this philosophy. The 
type design requirements and reliability validation methods adopted 
today are the result of nearly 20 years of successful experience in 
certifying airplanes for ETOPS. However, most of this experience comes 
from the two major transport airplane manufacturers in the world today. 
As ETOPS has grown, and now with the new operating requirements 
expanding ETOPS to part 135 airplanes, we expect many more 
manufacturers to apply for ETOPS type design approval.
    The type design requirements contained in this rule provide a 
consistent standard of proven ETOPS type design approval methods for 
the new applicants. This will ensure that all manufacturers use the 
same methods as used successfully in previous ETOPS approvals the FAA 
granted under AC 120-42A and the Boeing Model 777 ETOPS special 
conditions.
    We also disagree that the airworthiness standard contained in 
appendix K does not allow any flexibility for alternative reliability 
methods. If an applicant chooses to pursue validation methods different 
from those in appendix K, the applicant may do so under Sec.  
21.21(b)(1).
    Dassault stated that parts of the proposal, such as the requirement 
for an independent electrical power source for fuel boost pumps and 
cross-feed valve actuation, would impose a system architecture. 
Dassault notes that the goal of a requirement should be to set safety 
objectives rather than drive airplane systems design.
    We agree with Dassault's basic premise that the goal of a 
requirement should be objective rather than prescriptive. We have made 
every effort to define objective requirements whenever possible except 
where existing experience dictates that a specific design requirement 
is necessary to provide an acceptable level of safety.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The particular section mentioned in Dassault's comment 
codifies a provision of the 207-minute ETOPS policy letter EPL 20-1. 
As stated in the preamble to the NPRM, loss of normal electrical 
power to the boost pumps is the primary cause of the loss of fuel 
system boost pressure. The FAA finds it necessary to include this 
requirement in order to address this specific cause of loss of fuel 
boost pressure on airplanes being certified for greater than 180 
minute ETOPS. Paragraph K25.1.4(a) defines the basic objective for 
the fuel system design. Changes to this rule in response to Boeing 
comments on that provision provide a less restrictive requirement 
while maintaining the basic objective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dassault also stated that the NPRM lacked information that normally 
would be part of an advisory circular. It recommended the FAA publish 
the advisory circular and then reopen the comment period. We have 
decided against delaying this rule until after publication of an 
advisory circular on the proposed rule. Since the advisory circular 
defines an acceptable method of compliance, but not the only method, it 
is not a necessary element of the rule. Dassault will have an 
opportunity to comment on the associated advisory circular under a 
separate notice of availability.
2. Additional Airworthiness Requirements for Approval of an Airplane-
Engine Combination for ETOPS (Part 25, Appendix K)
    The NPRM proposed adding a new appendix K, which defines specific 
airworthiness requirements for type certification of an airplane for 
ETOPS. The appendix is divided into three parts. Section K25.1 is 
applicable to all airplanes, K25.2 is applicable to airplanes with two 
engines, and K25.3 is applicable to airplanes with more than two 
engines.
    The NPRM divided the appendix into three sections I, II, and III. 
Paragraphs of each section were labeled sequentially as (a), (b), (c), 
and so on. This numbering system led to confusion on how to refer to 
paragraphs from different sections with the same number. In this final 
rule, we have reorganized the paragraph numbering to include the 
applicable section in the paragraph number. This renumbering more 
clearly identifies which section of the appendix a particular paragraph 
is in.
Appendix K--Design Requirements (K25.1)
    We moved paragraphs (a) and (b) from proposed Sec.  25.1535 in the 
NPRM to K25.1 as these are design requirements that an applicant must 
comply with for all airplane-engine combinations proposed for ETOPS 
type design approval. The following discussion of comments refers to 
the designation of these paragraphs in the final rule.
    Boeing stated that the ARAC proposal did not discuss how system 
safety assessments are conducted for ETOPS. Boeing points out that the 
JAA's draft Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) addresses how to conduct 
system safety assessments for group 1 versus group 2 systems and 
recommends the FAA include similar information in its guidance 
material. Boeing recommends the FAA acknowledge in the preamble that 
the system safety assessments are different for group 1 and group 2 
systems and reference the JAA's draft NPA.
    Boeing is correct that ARAC did not discuss how airplane system 
safety assessments are to be conducted for ETOPS. However, we disagree 
with Boeing that there should be a difference between Group 1 and Group 
2 systems. Section K25.1 simply requires an applicant to comply with 
the requirements of part 25 considering the maximum flight time and the 
longest diversion time for which the applicant seeks approval. Airplane 
safety assessments would be covered under the specific objectives of 
Sec. Sec.  25.901(c) and 25.1309 considering these additional factors.
    The FAA has already established a body of policy for showing 
compliance with these sections. These policies do not differentiate 
between systems whose design depends on the number of engines from 
those that do not. Boeing did not provide any justification for 
treating relevant system failure conditions for ETOPS assessment 
differently just because they are associated with Group 2 systems. The 
main impact that ETOPS will have on airplane safety assessments is a 
potential increased hazard when considering the long range and 
diversion distances associated with an ETOPS flight. The purpose of 
conducting the airplane safety

[[Page 1822]]

assessments required by Sec. Sec.  25.901(c) and 25.1309 are to 
evaluate the airplane for potentially hazardous safety conditions that 
are not specifically addressed elsewhere in the rule.
    Boeing also provides suggested language for system safety 
assessments to be included in the ETOPS advisory circular. That 
language is not relevant to the specific safety objective of paragraph 
K25.1.1. However, Boeing will have an opportunity to comment on the 
part 25 ETOPS AC under a separate notice of availability.
    Although paragraph K25.1.1 would require an applicant to consider 
the flight crew's and passengers' physiological needs following 
failures during a maximum length diversion, Transport Canada is 
concerned about the introduction of new technologies such as onboard 
oxygen generating systems. These systems would allow flight with a 
depressurized cabin at altitudes in excess of 15,000 feet, which would 
require less fuel for diversions on ETOPS flights because airplanes do 
not use as much fuel at higher altitudes.
    Transport Canada stated that the NPRM does not adequately address 
the potential physiological problems for crewmembers or passengers 
associated with continued exposure to higher altitudes even if 
breathing 100 percent oxygen. Therefore, Transport Canada recommends 
the FAA revise the appendix to include a maximum decompression profile 
altitude, such as 18,000 feet.
    We agree that Transport Canada's comment has merit, but is beyond 
the scope of this rulemaking project, which was to codify existing 
ETOPS standards and certain ARAC recommendations. The FAA is 
investigating specific policy or future regulations for the 
certification of onboard oxygen generating systems. When we receive an 
application for approval of such a system, we will apply this policy as 
interpretation of existing regulations or introduce special conditions 
if appropriate.
Appendix K--Operation in icing conditions (K25.1.3(a))
    The NPRM proposed that an ETOPS airplane must be certified for 
flight in icing conditions in accordance with Sec.  25.1419, which is 
otherwise optional. In addition, the NPRM proposed that the ice 
protection systems must be capable of continued safe flight and landing 
at engine inoperative and decompression altitudes in icing conditions, 
and the applicant show the unprotected areas of the airplane would not 
collect a load of ice that would make the airplane uncontrollable or 
create too much drag to safely complete a diversion in icing 
conditions.
    Only ALPA supported the proposed requirements for operation in 
icing conditions without change. New World Jet stated the manufacturer 
already demonstrates that its airplanes can operate in icing conditions 
and questions why the proposal would be different from normal 
requirements.
    Although airplanes are regularly certified for flight into known 
icing conditions under Sec.  25.1419, part 25 does not require that 
certification in order to be granted a type certificate. Paragraph 
K25.1.3(a)(1) of today's rule makes certified flight into known icing 
conditions a prerequisite for ETOPS approval. The other part of 
paragraph K25.1.3(a)(2) addresses the unique aspects of operation in 
icing conditions during an ETOPS flight not now covered in a basic part 
25 evaluation of flight into icing conditions.
    Boeing agrees the FAA needs to codify the icing criteria in AC 120-
42A, paragraph 8(b)(11). However, Boeing is concerned the proposed 
requirement could create confusion with respect to compliance with 
Sec.  25.1419 and the operational fuel planning requirements in parts 
121 and 135. Boeing recommends the rule be rewritten to a single 
requirement stating, ``The airplane must be able to safely conduct an 
ETOPS diversion in icing conditions.''
    The FAA does not believe paragraph K25.1.3(a) will create confusion 
with respect to compliance with the basic Sec.  25.1419 icing 
regulation and the operational fuel planning requirements in parts 121 
and 135. In addition to applying to airplane manufacturers under part 
25, rather than operators under parts 121 or 135, the objectives of 
paragraph K25.1.3.(a), including Sec.  25.1419, are different from the 
fuel planning requirements of parts 121 and 135. The part 25 
requirements establish that an airplane can operate safely in icing 
conditions that could be encountered during an ETOPS flight. The 
operational requirements ensure enough fuel is onboard to safely 
complete a flight along a route with known icing conditions. In order 
to establish safe operation, the manufacturer must define the most 
critical ice accumulation that may occur on the airplane. This 
accumulation usually also results in the highest fuel usage. Thus, it 
is likely the airplane manufacturer will use the testing and analysis 
performed for compliance with paragraph K25.1.3(a) to develop the 
performance data an operator will need for compliance with the fuel 
planning requirements of parts 121 and 135.
    The JAA and UK CAA state the terms ``load of ice'' and ``too much 
drag'' in the proposed appendix are not appropriate language for 
regulatory material because they lack precision. Airbus recommends the 
FAA withdraw the proposed requirement because this issue is not unique 
to ETOPS and would be more appropriately addressed under a general 
rulemaking action.
    We agree the proposed paragraphs lacked normal regulatory 
precision. We also agree with Boeing that the intent of AC 120-42A was 
to ensure the airplane would continue to be airworthy, considering the 
exposure to potential icing conditions during an ETOPS diversion at 
engine-inoperative or decompression altitudes.
    The NPRM proposed requirements to meet this objective, but did not 
clearly state that continued safe flight and landing at engine 
inoperative and decompression altitudes in icing conditions applies to 
all of the flight phases during an ETOPS diversion, including a 15-
minute hold. The NPRM also did not define the icing conditions to 
consider during each of these flight phases.
    In Sec.  25.1419, safe operations with ice accretions on the 
protected and unprotected areas are considered, but not specifically 
mentioned. The FAA has revised this final rule to more clearly state 
which flight phases and associated icing conditions must be considered 
during an ETOPS diversion. Paragraph K25.1.3(a)(2), requires that the 
airplane must be able to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion with the 
most critical ice accretion resulting from:
    (A) Icing conditions encountered at an altitude that the airplane 
would have to fly following an engine failure or cabin decompression; 
and
    (B) A 15-minute hold in the continuous maximum icing conditions of 
Appendix C with a liquid water content factor of 1.0.
    (C) Ice accumulated during approach and landing in Appendix C icing 
conditions.
    This new paragraph makes the rule language similar to Sec.  25.1419 
while adding the icing conditions encountered during an altitude-
limited diversion to those factors currently evaluated under Sec.  
25.1419.
    Boeing, Dassault, and Airbus all state additional guidance for this 
rule is needed in an associated advisory circular. Dassault and Airbus 
stated the NPRM would require analytical and flight testing to assess 
the impact of ice accumulation. The commenters add that without 
guidance material describing the assessment, they cannot comment

[[Page 1823]]

properly on this section. Airbus also adds that it is inappropriate for 
the FAA to define a critical test parameter in an advisory circular.
    As discussed above, the FAA has revised this final rule to clarify 
the flight phases and associated icing conditions to consider during an 
ETOPS diversion. The FAA disagrees that the associated guidance 
material is necessary to properly comment on the proposal. Airbus 
rightfully notes that it is inappropriate for the FAA to define a 
critical test parameter in an advisory circular, and the FAA is not 
doing that. Rather, the advisory circular merely will describe an 
acceptable method for showing compliance with the new rule.
    The rule as revised stands on its own merit. The second and third 
provisions of the revised paragraph K25.1.3(a)(2) are based on Appendix 
C icing conditions that are currently evaluated for compliance with 
Sec.  25.1419. There is currently no accepted industry standard for 
icing conditions that may be encountered during an altitude-limited 
diversion due to an engine failure or cabin decompression. Until such 
an industry standard is developed and accepted by the FAA, each 
applicant will have to propose an acceptable method for showing 
compliance with this requirement.
    Airbus stated that the preamble does not indicate why the FAA 
increased the severity of the certification standards and does not 
relate the increase to a clearly documented service event or safety 
problem that has occurred. Nor does the economic impact assessment 
compare the cost of the proposed type design assessment to the expanded 
safety benefit. Airbus stated the FAA proposed to reduce the 
contribution of icing in the ETOPS fuel reserve calculations compared 
with the reserves required by current ETOPS criteria as a result of the 
CASP II \19\ icing research program that ARAC extensively used to show 
that prolonged substantial icing was virtually impossible during a 
diversion. On the other hand, Airbus pointed out that the type design 
rule seems to assume that extremely severe icing beyond the level 
covered by normal certification criteria may be encountered during 
engine inoperative diversions at decompression altitudes. Thus, Airbus 
posited that the proposed type design rule appears to contradict the 
operating rule, which excludes significant prolonged icing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ The Atmospheric Environment Service (AES) of Canada with 
support from the National Research Council (NRC) of Canada conducted 
the Second Canadian Atlantic Storms Program (CASP II) out of St. 
John's, Newfoundland during the period of January 16 through March 
16, 1992. The objective of this program was to study the icing 
climatology off the east coast of Canada to provide better short 
term, severe weather forecasting for the area around the Hibernia 
Oil Fields and the cod fishing ground in the Grand Banks. ARAC used 
the data from this research to evaluate the severity and extent of 
icing conditions that may be encountered during an ETOPS diversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We have not increased the severity of part 25 certification 
standards as indicated by Airbus' comments. ETOPS approvals 
accomplished in accordance with AC 120-42A have included conditions 
that were not previously considered during a part 25 certification 
program. This rule codifies the existing ETOPS policies and practices. 
Consequently, the part 25 regulations address the ETOPS-related issues 
that were addressed in previous ETOPS approvals. The FAA has determined 
that the current policies applied to approve airplanes for ETOPS have 
provided an acceptable level of safety. This rule simply codifies these 
policies.
    The FAA does not agree that the type certification and operating 
rules are contradictory. Previous ETOPS type design approvals have 
included an evaluation of the drag effects of conservative ice 
accumulations on airplane surfaces. The FAA determined that this 
conservatism, combined with the operational fuel reserves resulting 
from the original ETOPS icing fuel planning requirements, has been 
excessive. The NPRM proposed to reduce the fuel reserves required for 
ETOPS operational dispatch on the assumption that the fuel consumption 
used for fuel planning would be based upon the conservative ice shapes 
used during the type certification of the airplane.
    The Final Regulatory Evaluation includes the overall cost to comply 
with the proposed rulemaking and the overall benefit of the rule. The 
ETOPS icing requirements define additional conditions that an applicant 
must consider when showing compliance with Sec.  25.1419 to certify an 
airplane for flight in icing. The maximum ice accretion on an airplane 
during an ETOPS diversion will be compared to the maximum accretion 
from other icing conditions used for icing certification to determine 
the most critical ice shapes to demonstrate during certification flight 
testing. The applicant will also likely use these ice shapes to define 
fuel consumption in icing conditions that the operators will use for 
ETOPS fuel planning.
    Airbus indicates that the rule seems to assume the airplane will 
encounter ``extreme severe icing'' during a diversion. This 
interpretation of the proposed amendment is incorrect. The rule 
requires an applicant consider icing conditions expected to occur at 
the altitudes an airplane would fly during a maximum length diversion 
with an inoperative engine or depressurized cabin. The rule merely 
requires the consideration that the airplane may be at altitudes 
conducive to icing for extended distances. The FAA does not consider 
this to be extremely severe icing, although the resulting ice 
accumulations may be greater than that resulting from traditional 
compliance with Sec.  25.1419.
    We acknowledge the CASP II icing research that Airbus cites showing 
that prolonged substantial icing is virtually impossible during a 
diversion. However, the CASP II data only covers a limited part of the 
globe in the North Atlantic region. Since a significant future growth 
is forecast for ETOPS in the Arctic, Antarctic and Southern oceanic 
areas, we are concerned about the ice accumulation that may occur 
during altitude-limited diversions in those areas.
    As we indicated above, each applicant will have to propose an 
acceptable method for showing compliance with the icing requirements. 
The applicant may use whatever data at its disposal to justify the 
icing conditions used to determine the most critical ice accretion 
during an altitude limited diversion.
    Dassault recommends the FAA not go beyond already established 
certification standards, in particular the maximum three inches of ice 
in the JAA's proposed Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) 25.1419. Dassault's 
proposal would impose a specific design requirement in this rule. In 
keeping with our overall objective of basing regulations on the safety 
objectives, instead of driving airplane design, we are not adopting 
Dassault's recommendation. Each applicant will have to propose an 
acceptable method for determining the ice thickness to be evaluated in 
order to meet the overall objectives of the requirement.
    The British Air Line Pilots Association (BALPA) notes that an 
auxiliary power unit could be susceptible to icing during prolonged 
exposure to icing conditions while on the ground. BALPA is concerned 
that running the APU in flight during prolonged icing conditions may 
result in surging or failure and loss while the APU is being used as a 
critical power source. As a result, BALPA recommends the FAA amend the 
rule to require an APU to continue to function in icing conditions.
    The FAA agrees with BALPA that an APU could be susceptible to icing 
during prolonged exposure to icing conditions. The FAA evaluates APU

[[Page 1824]]

exposure to icing conditions during basic certification of the airplane 
for compliance with Sec.  25.1093(b). This evaluation includes the 
ground operating condition, which historically has been the most severe 
operating environment for an APU in icing conditions. This finding 
correlates with the commenter's own experience. However, the FAA does 
not believe that a change to the rule is necessary. New section K25.1 
will require an applicant to consider the ETOPS mission in showing 
compliance with the requirements of part 25. For an APU, this would 
include operation in icing conditions for compliance with the 
applicable part 25 APU icing requirements.
    Airbus stated that three- and four-engine airplane service 
experience indicates that depressurization events almost never occur in 
cruise or during the ETOPS portion of the flight. It goes on to state 
that engine failures do not put three- and four-engine airplanes at 
icing altitudes. Airbus contends that there is no support for applying 
the type design rule to three- and four-engine airplanes.
    Though uncommon, decompression events have occurred at cruise 
altitudes. Furthermore, most decompression events are independent of 
the number of engines on the airplane. Following decompression, it is 
common practice to descend to and maintain an altitude where 
supplemental oxygen is not required. This would result in operation of 
the airplane at altitudes where icing can occur.
    The FAA agrees that the engine inoperative altitudes for three- and 
four-engine airplanes may place them above altitudes conducive to 
icing. This would mean that the engine inoperative diversion would not 
contribute to the most critical ice accretion that the applicant must 
consider for compliance with the rule. However, the applicant would 
still have to consider the ice accretion during a 15-minute hold, 
approach and landing as those phases of flight are relevant to all 
airplanes regardless of the number of engines.
Appendix K--Electrical power supply (paragraph K25.1.3(b))
    The NPRM proposed requirements for airplane electrical system 
reliability, including a requirement that airplanes certified for ETOPS 
greater than 180 minutes must be equipped with at least three 
independent electrical generation sources.
    The JAA and the UK CAA state that the second and third electrical 
system requirements proposed in the NPRM are objective requirements 
already covered in part 25 and JAR 25. The FAA agrees. These proposed 
paragraphs are essentially restatements of Sec.  25.1309(b)(1) and (2), 
which are already required for ETOPS airplanes by new paragraph 
K25.1.1. These paragraphs are deleted from the final rule.
    ALPA expressed concern that the proposal did not conform to the 
current standard of requiring three independent electrical power 
sources for all two-engine airplanes approved for ETOPS, including for 
diversion times less than 180 minutes. ALPA stated that ARAC was tasked 
with codifying current design and MMEL relief provisions for two-engine 
airplanes. ALPA expressed discomfort with the lack of justification in 
the NPRM for ignoring current requirements. ALPA also suggested that 
future three- and four-engine airplanes could be developed with fewer 
than three electrical power sources. ALPA proposed changes to the rule 
to ensure that all ETOPS airplanes covered by part 121 and two-engine 
airplanes covered by part 135 would comply with the three-generator 
requirement.
    The FAA acknowledged in the NPRM that the three-generator 
requirement would apply only to airplanes being certified for greater 
than 180-minute ETOPS. AC 120-42A specifies three generators for any 
airplane approved for ETOPS under this guidance. However, the FAA also 
stated in the NPRM that the proposed requirement represented a 
compromise position that allowed ARAC consensus on the proposal. ALPA 
is the only organization to comment that the rule should apply to ETOPS 
approval of any two-engine airplane intended for part 121 operations, 
indicating general support for this compromise.
    However, after further consideration, and in order to establish a 
consistent industry minimum standard for ETOPS, the FAA has revised 
paragraph K25.1.3(b) to require a minimum of three independent sources 
of electrical power for all airplanes being approved for ETOPS without 
regard to maximum diversion time. Manufacturers already have to comply 
with Sec.  25.1309. The FAA has determined from service experience that 
a minimum of three electrical power sources is necessary to comply with 
the objectives of Sec.  25.1309 when considering long ETOPS diversions. 
Paragraph K25.1.3(b) codifies the ``three-generator'' criteria of 
paragraph 8.(b)(8) of AC 120-42A.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Four commenters remarked that the three-generator 
requirement was too prescriptive. These commenters believe that the 
rule should allow the safety analyses to dictate the number of 
electrical power sources rather than specifying a number in the 
rule. We disagree that the rule is too prescriptive. This paragraph 
establishes a consistent industry minimum standard for ETOPS in 
keeping with the original objective of paragraph 8(b)(8) of AC 120-
42A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    New World Jet commented that levels of risk are defined based upon 
systems design and failure rate and then compared to a determined level 
of acceptable risk for the operation to be conducted. If the risk is 
within an acceptable level, the aircraft should be allowed to operate 
at the specified number of minutes from an airport. The probability of 
an event associated with aircraft system failures, rather than the 
number of generators, should determine if an aircraft is qualified for 
a route.
    The FAA agrees that the level of risk of a system failure should be 
commensurate with its effect on the safety of the airplane. The 
airplane system assessments required by Sec.  25.1309 do exactly as New 
World Jet suggested. New section K25.1 would require an applicant to 
show compliance with this section considering the effects of a system 
failure during an ETOPS flight. The three generator requirement of 
paragraph K25.1.3(b) is an acknowledgement that electrical generator 
technology has not yet achieved a level of reliability that would allow 
an electrical system design with fewer than three generator sources and 
still meet the system safety objectives of Sec.  25.1309 for ETOPS 
approval.
    The JAA and the UK CAA stated that the JAA specifies what loads 
each electrical power source should be capable of powering in an 
Advisory Circular Joint. Since each new airplane may have unique 
electrically powered functions that are critical to continued safe 
flight and landing, the FAA is reluctant to specify a list of 
functions. The safety assessments required under Sec.  25.1309 will 
determine what system functions must be powered by the three required 
electrical power sources. These assessments should consider the 
cumulative effect on airplane safety from the loss of seemingly 
unrelated airplane system functions resulting from the same loss of 
power.
    The JAA and UK CAA add that for beyond 180-minute ETOPS, a fourth 
stand-by power source is needed, because it is unlikely that three 
power sources would meet the safety objectives associated with the 
total loss of electrical power. The FAA does not have any data to 
confirm a fourth stand-by electrical power source would be required to 
meet the safety objectives associated with the total loss of electrical 
power for diversion times

[[Page 1825]]

greater than 180 minutes. Accordingly, the FAA is comfortable in 
letting the safety analyses of Sec.  25.1309 determine if additional 
power sources are required.
    American Airlines asks whether a ram air turbine generator would be 
considered an alternative source of electrical generation for 
compliance with the rule or whether the APU is the only acceptable 
third independent source of power for a ``legacy'' aircraft like the 
Boeing Model 777. It further queries whether the determination of the 
three independent electrical generation sources is left to the 
discretion of the individual operators or the aircraft manufacturer.
    The airplane manufacturer will decide what power sources constitute 
the three independent electrical power sources for compliance with 
paragraph K25.1.3(b). Any electrical power source that provides those 
airplane functions for continued safe flight and landing during an 
ETOPS diversion would qualify as one of the three independent sources 
of electrical power. Electrical power sources the FAA has accepted for 
meeting this requirement include generators powered by a ram air 
turbine (RAT), APU generators, or dedicated back-up generators driven 
by the main engines. Future airplanes may have other arrangements to 
meet this requirement.
Appendix K--Time-limited systems (K25.1.3(c)) and Airplane flight 
manual (K25.1.7(d))
    The NPRM proposed to add a new requirement to existing Sec.  
25.857(c)(2) that would require an applicant to provide the certified 
time capability of a Class C cargo compartment fire suppression system 
in the airplane flight manual for ETOPS approval. One paragraph in the 
proposed appendix would have required an applicant to define each ETOPS 
significant system that is time-limited while a separate paragraph in 
that appendix would have required the airplane flight manual to contain 
the maximum diversion time capability of the airplane.
    The JAA and the UK CAA commented that it is not clear whether the 
certified time capability of the cargo fire extinguishing system under 
the proposed Sec.  25.857(c)(2) would be considered as a particular 
case or if it would be treated separately as additional time limited 
information under the proposed appendix. They also commented that the 
rule should indicate how to translate the maximum system capability 
into maximum diversion time.
    The FAA agrees that the NPRM was unclear how proposed Sec.  
25.857(c)(2) and the two paragraphs of the proposed appendix are 
related to each other. We also agree that it was not clear how cargo 
and baggage compartment fire suppression system information and other 
limiting airplane systems' time-capability should be defined in the 
airplane flight manual. We have revised this final rule to state that 
the applicant must define the system time-capability of each ETOPS 
Significant System that is time-limited under appendix K (K25.1.3(c)). 
A time-limited cargo fire suppression system for any cargo or baggage 
compartments would be included under this requirement.
    We have also revised the airplane flight manual requirement in 
paragraph K25.1.7(d) to require the operator to identify in the 
airplane flight manual the system time-capability for both the most 
limiting fire suppression system for any cargo or baggage compartment 
and the most limiting ETOPS Significant System other than fire 
suppression for cargo and baggage compartments. It is necessary to 
specify both times in the airplane flight manual because of how they 
are used in the operating rules to determine the maximum diversion time 
that an airplane may fly. We are withdrawing the proposed change to 
Sec.  25.857(c)(2), because we have determined it is no longer needed 
and is potentially confusing.
    The FAA likewise recognizes that the proposed paragraph on maximum 
diversion time capability for the flight manual was confusing. We did 
not intend to require the maximum diversion time capability be stated 
in the airplane flight manual. The maximum diversion time that an 
airplane may operate is controlled by the operating rules in parts 121 
and 135. Our changes to this requirement in paragraph K25.1.7(d) 
described above clarify our original intent.
    Boeing stated the FAA needs to issue advisory material to clarify 
the compliance methods for obtaining ETOPS approval of cargo 
compartments. Boeing recommended the FAA allow certification of any 
required changes using the policies and certification methodology in 
place at the time of original type certification of the airplane. 
Boeing also stated that compliance with the flight test requirements in 
Sec.  25.855(h)(3) should be allowed based on data from the original 
certification flight tests of the airplane model being modified. Boeing 
added that additional flight testing should be required only if novel 
systems designs are used.
    In its comment, Boeing seemed to be concerned about the 
certification of increased capacity cargo or baggage compartment fire 
suppression systems on currently certified airplanes. The requirements 
of the Changed Product Rule, Sec.  21.101, will apply to the 
modification of currently certificated airplanes. The certification of 
time-limited cargo or baggage compartment fire suppression systems will 
be done in accordance with the applicable certification requirements, 
methods, and policy as determined through compliance with Sec.  21.101.
Appendix K--Fuel system design (K25.1.4(a))
    The NPRM proposed three requirements for an airplane fuel system 
design. The first would require that the system supply fuel to the 
engines at a pressure required by the engine type certificate for any 
failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. The second 
would require one fuel boost pump in each tank and at least one 
crossfeed valve to be powered by a back-up electrical generation source 
other than the primary engine or APU driven generators. The third fuel 
system provision would require alerts to be displayed to the flight 
crew when the quantity of fuel falls below the level required to 
complete a flight.
    Boeing stated the FAA has unintentionally proposed an increase to 
the safety requirements for existing ETOPS approvals. This section 
presented objective requirements but does not take into consideration 
the practical impact on fuel system design. Boeing noted the FAA's 
explanation in the NPRM suggests that there must always be a method for 
boosting the fuel pressure delivered to the engine beyond what is 
available from head pressure or fuel tank ram air rise. Boeing pointed 
out that with today's fuel boost pumps and their associated 
reliability, the standard design configuration of two fuel boost pumps 
per tank would not meet the intent of this section.
    Boeing agreed it is important that fuel be available to the 
operating engine or engines at the pressure and flow required for safe 
operation. Boeing pointed out that the ARAC and the JAA working groups 
extensively discussed this issue and the intent of this requirement was 
to ensure the fuel boost pumps would function following all power 
supply failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Boeing stated 
ARAC found the two fuel boost pumps per tank configuration was 
satisfactory for any length ETOPS operation and determined adding boost 
pumps to a fuel tank would be detrimental and introduce additional 
complexity to the fuel system without any benefit. Boeing

[[Page 1826]]

stated the JAA's draft Notice of Proposed Amendment allows engine 
operation at negative fuel pressures (suction feed) provided 
appropriate criteria are met. Boeing disagreed with the NPRM and stated 
that not allowing suction feed is overly restrictive. Boeing also 
suggested rule language changes consistent with their comments 
including provisions for demonstrating suction feed operation.
    We disagree with Boeing's proposal to limit consideration of loss 
of fuel boost pressure to only fuel pump power supply failures. The 
proposed rule stated a clear objective that the airplane fuel system 
must deliver fuel to the engines at the pressure and flow they require 
for any intended operation following airplane failure conditions that 
are not extremely improbable. These may include failures to more than 
just the fuel pump power supply.
    This rule intentionally increases the safety standard from that 
applied to airplanes approved under the previous guidance. The FAA went 
to great lengths in the NPRM to explain the safety justification for 
this requirement. Section 25.1351(d) requires an applicant to show that 
an airplane can operate safely in visual flight rule weather conditions 
for at least 5 minutes with normal electrical power inoperative using 
the type fuel most likely to cause an engine flameout with the airplane 
initially at its maximum altitude. Airplane manufacturers show 
compliance with this requirement by demonstrating that an engine will 
start on suction feed following an expected engine flameout at this 
altitude. The reason this demonstration is required for a minimum of 
five-minutes is to give time for the flight crew to restore normal 
electrical power to the fuel boost pumps after engine restart.
    Current regulations do not require applicants to demonstrate the 
engines will operate at negative pump inlet pressures (suction feed) 
for extended periods of time. The types of engine failure conditions 
that could result from suction feed operation fall into two categories, 
engine operating problems and mechanical failures. Engine operating 
problems could mean engine instability, permanent loss of thrust, or 
flameout. Mechanical failures to the engine pump would result in 
flameout and permanent loss of the engine for the remainder of the 
flight.
    The FAA is aware of at least one engine pump failure that occurred 
on a test stand during a non-required demonstration of suction feed 
operation. A loss of fuel boost pressure to more than one engine during 
an ETOPS diversion on an airplane with engines with this kind of 
vulnerability could potentially result in the failure of multiple 
engines from the same cause. However, contrary to Boeing's comments, 
certifying an engine for extended suction feed operation is an 
acceptable option for complying with paragraph K25.1.4(a). In this 
case, the airplane manufacturer must design a fuel feed system to 
deliver fuel to the engine above a certified suction feed pump inlet 
pressure limit established for the engine under Sec.  33.7. The engine 
manufacturer must demonstrate acceptable engine operation and integrity 
under part 33 in order to establish this suction feed limit.
    The effect of today's rule is to ensure that the engines will 
always have fuel delivered at normal pump inlet pressure, or that the 
engines are certified to operate for the longest diversion time for 
which the airplane manufacturer is requesting approval at the lowest 
engine pump inlet pressure expected to occur during operation with the 
normal airplane fuel boost pumps inoperative. If an applicant chooses 
to use suction feed as a means to comply with this rule, it must 
demonstrate safe operation of the airplane in that configuration.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Boeing recommended rule changes that add certain conditions 
that an applicant must consider if suction feed is to be a means to 
comply with the rule. We agree that these conditions further clarify 
the meaning of the rule and have added them to the final rule as 
paragraph (1), (1)(i) and (1)(ii) with editorial changes to state 
the requirement in proper regulatory language. The following 
paragraphs proposed in the NPRM have been re-numbered sequentially.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When using suction feed to comply with this requirement, the 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness developed in accordance with 
Sec.  25.1529 must include procedures for maintaining the integrity of 
the fuel system plumbing. The purpose of these procedures is to prevent 
the introduction of air into the fuel feed lines during suction feed 
operation. Any air in the fuel feed lines can lead to flameout of a 
turbine engine.
    Boeing recommends revising the proposed requirement for an 
alternative fuel boost pump power source to not limit it to a back-up 
electrical generator. Boeing stated that an acceptable design could be 
a four-generator system, all with equal capability. We agree with the 
intent of Boeing's comment that the back-up generator source required 
in proposed requirement could include a fourth main electrical 
generator instead of a back-up generator system. We have broadened the 
requirement of K25.1.4(a)(2) to state that for two-engine airplanes to 
be certified for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, one fuel boost pump in each 
main tank and the actuation capability of at least one crossfeed valve 
must be capable of being powered by an independent electrical 
generation source other than the three required to comply with 
K25.1.3(b). This requirement does not apply if the required fuel boost 
pressure or crossfeed valve actuation is not provided by electrical 
power.
    Dassault commented that it understands the FAA's intent for an 
automatic warning to clearly indicate to the flight crew what's wrong 
with the fuel system, but believes this is not the only way to achieve 
this goal. Dassault stated that pilot training and fully developed 
flightcrew procedures are another efficient way to achieve the same 
goal. Dassault pointed out that automatic fuel alerts would require 
flightcrew initialization before the flight. Dassault noted that the 
human error during this procedure is of the same order of magnitude as 
the application of procedures. Therefore, Dassault stated that adequate 
pilot training and procedures provide an equivalent means of 
compliance.
    UPS stated that an automatic warning is not necessary for three- 
and four-engine ETOPS airplanes because of their demonstrated safety 
and reliability. UPS pointed out that the rule seems to assume a two-
crew airplane and does not take airplanes with three crewmembers into 
account. UPS added that compliance with this section would require 
extensive modifications to three- and four-engine airplanes to add 
flight management computers to provide the required alerts. It argued 
this burden is unjustified because there is no need for the automatic 
warning.
    The FAA does not believe crew training and fuel management 
procedures are a long-term solution for the types of fuel exhaustion 
events the FAA is addressing with this requirement. Dassault's proposal 
in effect would not require anything not already done operationally. 
The low fuel alerting system will provide a safety net for major fuel 
loss events or fuel loading errors perhaps too difficult to detect by 
operational procedures alone, such as occurred in 2001 when an Air 
Transat A330 was forced to land in the Azores following an all engine 
flameout from fuel exhaustion.
    However, we recognize some existing airplanes may have difficulty 
in complying with this requirement without substantial airplane system 
modifications. Also, older three-crew airplanes have a flight engineer 
who monitors fuel quantity throughout a long flight. The FAA considers 
this additional crewmember to be an

[[Page 1827]]

acceptable alternative to the automatic low fuel alerting for those 
airplanes.
    In recognition of these concerns and the compensation that a flight 
engineer provides, the FAA has modified the rule to exempt existing 
airplanes from this requirement. However, all new two-crew airplanes, 
and two-crew airplanes with existing type certificates manufactured 8 
years after the effective date of the rule must comply with this 
requirement.
Appendix K--APU design (K25.1.4(b))
    When APUs are necessary for an airplane to comply with the ETOPS 
requirements, the NPRM proposed that these APUs have adequate 
reliability and be capable of starting and providing their required 
functions up to the maximum operating altitude of the airplane, but no 
higher than 45,000 feet.
    Dassault, Air New Zealand, New World Jet, the JAA, and UK CAA 
questioned the proposed requirement to substantiate that the APU in-
flight start envelope extends up to the maximum altitude of the 
airplane, but need not exceed 45,000 feet. Dassault, Air New Zealand, 
and New World Jet indicated that 45,000 feet was too high. The JAA and 
UK CAA commented the demonstration of APU starting should cover all 
altitudes for which the airplane is approved.
    The ARAC ETOPS Working Group discussed whether required APUs on 
ETOPS airplanes should be capable of starting throughout the entire 
flight envelope. The FAA was concerned that an electrical generator 
failure should not force an ETOPS flight to a lower altitude in order 
to successfully start an APU. Doing so could create problems with other 
traffic on the same track in areas with limited communications 
capability. Also, the additional fuel consumed during a descent to 
start an APU and climb back to the assigned altitude could itself lead 
to a diversion later on in the flight if the remaining fuel reserves 
become too low. However, certain members of the working group stated 
that some part 25 airplanes were certified for altitudes above 50,000 
feet and that it may not be possible to design an APU to start at those 
altitudes. The 45,000 foot minimum altitude start capability 
requirement is an acknowledgement of this possibility while still 
mandating a minimum start envelope that would keep any necessary 
altitude changes above the more densely traveled altitudes along these 
routes.
    New World Jet commented that a need to start an APU at the maximum 
operating altitude is unlikely. Dassault stated that the need to start 
an APU in flight is likely to occur following an engine failure, which 
would result in an altitude substantially less than maximum 
certificated altitude. Dassault recommended changing the requirement to 
the one-engine inoperative maximum altitude. New World Jet commented 
that the 45,000-foot start requirement assumes that an airplane 
experiences a dual generator failure, is then unable to receive a 
clearance to descend and has to declare an emergency. They say that 
this scenario seems unlikely.
    We disagree with these commenters. Dassault implies an APU would 
only be started in flight following an engine failure. More commonly, 
the APU is started following a main engine-driven generator failure. 
Generator failures may occur at any altitude that the airplane is 
certified to fly. Typical mean time between failures of main engine-
driven generators is approximately 10,000 hours while the mean time 
between failures for engines on ETOPS airplanes operating under the 
existing 180-minute standard is 50,000 hours. For ETOPS approval on a 
two-engine airplane for greater than 180 minutes, the required engine 
reliability will be 100,000 hours between engine shutdowns. Therefore, 
an electrical generator will fail 5 to 10 times more frequently than an 
engine on the same ETOPS airplane. Additionally, the loss of two 
electrical generators in flight is not uncommon. Dassault's proposal 
would lower the existing level of safety compared to airplanes approved 
under the criteria of AC 120-42A, which have had APU start and run 
capability up to the maximum certificated altitude of the airplane.
    Air New Zealand stated the APU on the Boeing 767, which is 
currently approved for ETOPS, is certified to start up to 35,000 feet, 
while the airplane maximum altitude is 43,100 feet. Air New Zealand's 
statement is in error. We required design changes to the 767 APU so 
that it would start up to 43,100 feet when we approved that airplane 
for 180-minute ETOPS. These design changes are required by the Boeing 
767 ETOPS CMP document before that airplane may be flown on 180-minute 
ETOPS routes.
    United expressed concern that an APU should only be required on 
airplanes with more than two engines to meet the design requirements if 
the APU is one of the three sources for back-up in-flight electrical 
power. The final rule does address United's concern. We have revised 
paragraph K25.1.4(b) to clarify that the APU reliability and starting 
requirements apply only if an APU is needed to comply with that 
appendix K.
Appendix K--Engine condition monitoring (K25.1.5)
    The NPRM proposed that an applicant must develop procedures for 
engine condition monitoring in accordance with part 33, appendix A.
    Transport Canada recommended the FAA eliminate the term ``condition 
monitoring'' because its use was discontinued in reliability centered 
maintenance and Maintenance Steering Group MSG-3, and contends there is 
an inherent safety risk associated with mixing terminologies and 
maintenance program development processes. Transport Canada recommended 
a harmonized and standardized approach for setting terminology and 
maintenance program requirements.
    Transport Canada recommended substantial changes to the proposal to 
permit manufacturers, operators, and regulatory authorities to 
participate in a structured maintenance review board process for the 
development of an airplane ETOPS maintenance program and engine health 
assessment program.
    Transport Canada made some interesting points, but they involve 
concepts that are beyond the scope of the proposed ETOPS rule, which 
was to codify the existing ETOPS standard contained in AC 120-42A. This 
advisory circular used the term ``engine condition monitoring'' which 
has been successfully applied since its inception. Transport Canada's 
other suggested changes would involve a level of integration that has 
never been used before. Although such an integrated approach is in the 
FAA's long term goals of improving safety, we do not want to compromise 
those future long-term goals by introducing such concepts into this 
rule without a much larger review in the context of that effort.
Appendix K--Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) (K25.1.6)
    The NPRM proposed that any configuration, maintenance, and 
operational standards necessary to maintain appropriate reliability for 
ETOPS must be contained in a CMP document.
    Transport Canada proposed eliminating the CMP document requirement 
and placing the information that would be contained in the CMP document 
into the illustrated parts catalog, the Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness required by Sec.  25.1529, or the airplane flight manual. 
It states a separate CMP document is duplicative for a new airplane 
being evaluated for ETOPS as part of a basic type certificate program.

[[Page 1828]]

    The CMP document is an extension of the airplane type design 
definition described in Sec.  21.31 as a prerequisite for the airplane 
being eligible for extended operations. FAA airworthiness inspectors 
use compliance with the CMP requirements to determine if an airplane 
may be added to a carrier's operations specifications.
    Since the CMP requirements are a condition for the ETOPS approval, 
they have to be in an FAA approved document. The Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness required by Sec.  25.1529 must be accepted by 
the FAA, but are not approved. The illustrated parts catalog is a 
manufacturer document and is not even reviewed by the FAA. The airplane 
flight manual may contain ETOPS procedures since it is approved for 
issuance of the type certificate. However, the airplane flight manual 
would not contain the other information that would be included in a CMP 
document. Therefore, we are adopting paragraph K25.1.6 as proposed with 
editorial changes to make the rule easier to understand.
Appendix K--Two-engine airplanes (K25.2)
    Section K25.2 defines the ETOPS design requirements applicable to 
two-engine airplanes. Three methods are provided for ETOPS 
certification. An applicant may assess a candidate airplane-engine 
combination already in service by a review of service experience gained 
on that airplane. If an airplane-engine combination has not yet been 
certified, an applicant may use the Early ETOPS method, which takes a 
systems approach to the design, testing, and monitoring of a new 
airplane-engine combination as a substitute for service experience. 
This method establishes more rigorous analysis and test requirements 
than for an airplane with existing service experience. If the candidate 
airplane-engine combination has some service experience, but not enough 
to use the service experience method, the applicant may substitute 
15,000 engine-hours of world-fleet service experience in place of the 
rigorous airplane demonstration test required by the Early ETOPS 
method. All of the other Early ETOPS requirements would apply in this 
case.
Appendix K--Service experience method (K25.2.1)
    After obtaining a minimum of 250,000 engine-hours of service 
experience, an applicant using the service experience method would 
conduct airplane and propulsion system assessments to evaluate the 
safety and reliability of those systems for ETOPS. A two-engine 
airplane must also meet minimum IFSD rate requirements and demonstrate 
by a flight test that it has the capability to safely conduct ETOPS 
flights for the maximum diversion time being assessed.
    Boeing and GE commented that the proposed requirement to have 
corrective actions for all causes or potential causes of engine in-
flight shutdowns or loss of thrust control occurring in service does 
not recognize that even engines with IFSD rates well below the rate 
required for ETOPS approval occasionally fail in service. While they 
agreed with the philosophy of the rule to correct causes of engine in-
flight shutdowns or loss of thrust control, there are situations in 
service where no cause is identified or no technology is currently 
available to prevent future failures. They posited the FAA has accepted 
situations where industry did not have corrective actions for some 
causes if the IFSD rate was at an acceptable level without these 
corrective actions. They go on to state the intent of the ARAC proposal 
was to ensure an acceptable IFSD rate for the ETOPS approval being 
sought.
    These commenters propose similar changes to address these concerns. 
Boeing proposes the causes of in-flight shutdowns and loss of thrust 
control be assessed and appropriate corrective actions be taken to 
ensure an appropriate IFSD rate will be maintained. GE proposes all 
causes or potential causes of engine IFSD or loss of thrust control 
must have corrective actions, unless it can be shown the rate of the 
causes or potential causes will not result in IFSD rates exceeding the 
requirement.
    The FAA agrees the proposed rule needs clarification. Sometimes a 
corrective action is either not technologically feasible or cannot be 
determined because the root cause of the failure is unknown. We also 
agree we have accepted situations where industry did not have 
corrective actions for some causes or potential causes of in-flight 
shutdowns if the rate was at an acceptable level without these 
corrective actions. However, we disagree with commenters' proposed 
changes.
    The commenters' proposed changes suggest that for an airplane with 
an existing IFSD rate above the maximum allowable for approval, the 
identification or development of corrective actions could stop at a 
point when the applicant predicts the IFSD rate would just meet the 
maximum allowable with incorporation of those corrective actions 
already identified or developed. The FAA found from airplanes approved 
using the guidance of AC 120-42A, Appendix 1, the basis for the 
proposed rule, that it is necessary to correct as many causes of in-
flight shutdowns or loss of thrust control as possible at the time the 
applicant conducts the propulsion system assessment in order to offset 
unforeseen problems that would cause a higher IFSD rate in the future.
    However, we want to be consistent with how we have required 
corrective actions for causes of engine in-flight shutdowns and loss of 
thrust control in past airplane ETOPS approvals. Therefore, we have 
revised paragraph K25.2.1(c)(2) to say that corrective actions are not 
required for events where the manufacturer is unable to determine a 
cause or potential cause, for events where it is technologically 
unfeasible to develop corrective actions, or where the world fleet IFSD 
rate already complies with the final IFSD rate required by paragraph 
K25.2.1(b) for the level of ETOPS approval being sought. However, the 
FAA emphasizes that we will respond to any cause of an engine in-flight 
shutdown or loss of thrust control that we determine to be an unsafe 
condition even if the IFSD rate meets the required rate. In such a 
case, we will issue an airworthiness directive (AD) requiring 
corrective action on all airplanes that may fail from the same cause. 
If the FAA determines an unsafe condition would exist only during the 
ETOPS portion of a flight, we would require the corrective action be 
specified in the CMP document as a condition for ETOPS approval of the 
airplane under the provisions of Sec.  21.21(b)(2). That paragraph 
requires an airplane to have no feature or characteristic that makes it 
unsafe for the issuance of a type certificate. In addition, the FAA 
reiterates that an operator must comply with the provisions of the CMP 
document as a condition for ETOPS operational approval under part 121.
    Boeing stated that the NPRM unintentionally requires a more 
comprehensive airplane systems assessment under the proposed service 
experience approval method than it does for the proposed Early ETOPS 
method. Boeing stated that assessing, providing corrective action for, 
and showing effectiveness of the corrective action as proposed in the 
NPRM creates an extraordinary amount of work if it includes all ETOPS 
significant systems, including Group 1 and Group 2 systems. Boeing 
recommends changing the requirement to apply the airplane systems 
assessment only to ETOPS group 1 significant systems.
    The FAA acknowledges that the NPRM would have required a more

[[Page 1829]]

comprehensive airplane systems assessment under the service experience 
method than the comparable relevant experience assessment under the 
Early ETOPS method. The proposed service experience method would have 
required corrective actions for ``all'' causes or potential causes of 
ETOPS significant system failures while the Early ETOPS method would 
have required the applicant to identify specific corrective actions for 
``relevant'' design, manufacturing, operational and maintenance 
problems. Also, the proposed Early ETOPS method relevant experience 
assessment would not require corrective actions if the nature of the 
problem is such that it would not significantly impact the safety or 
reliability of the system. This proposed requirement also defines what 
types of problems are ``relevant'' for this assessment.
    Boeing is correct the FAA did not intend to create this 
inconsistency. The requirements for conducting assessments of the 
airplane systems for ETOPS should be similar when using either the 
service experience or the Early ETOPS method. The only difference 
between the two methods is that the data used under the service 
experience method would come from the candidate airplane-engine 
combination; whereas for the Early ETOPS method, the data would come 
from previously certified part 25 airplanes manufactured by the 
applicant. The FAA has changed the requirements for these two 
assessments to be similar in paragraphs K25.2.1(d) and K25.2.2(a) in 
this final rule.
    Boeing comments that it may not be clear from the proposal that the 
flight test requirements are related specifically to ETOPS operations. 
Boeing stated that it is not necessary for every conceivable failure 
condition to be demonstrated. It says that the intent of the rule is to 
codify AC 120-42A, paragraph 8.d.(3), which was meant to focus on 
failures of ETOPS significant systems, primarily group 1 systems, or 
group 2 systems whose failure would be more hazardous during an ETOPS 
diversion. To clarify this intent, Boeing proposes changing the rule to 
state a flight test must be conducted to validate the adequacy of the 
airplane's flying qualities, performance, and the flight crew's ability 
to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion with engine inoperative and non-
normal worst case ETOPS significant system failure conditions that are 
expected to occur in service.
    The FAA agrees that the required flight test evaluation is related 
to safely conducting an ETOPS diversion. We also agree the intent of 
the flight test is to evaluate ETOPS significant systems. Any airplane 
system whose failure would be worse the farther an airplane is from a 
place to land would make the associated system an ETOPS significant 
system by definition. We have changed K25.2.1(e) as Boeing recommends. 
We have also revised the similar requirement for airplanes with more 
than two engines in paragraph K25.3.1(c) for consistency.
Appendix K--Early ETOPS method (K25.2.2)
    The NPRM proposed an Early ETOPS approval method that takes a 
systems approach to the design, testing, and monitoring of a new 
airplane-engine combination. This method contains several elements 
designed to minimize the number of design, maintenance or operational 
problems that could result in engine in-flight shutdowns or diversions. 
This method also includes elements to demonstrate that the airplane 
systems have the capability to meet the operational requirements for 
ETOPS. An applicant using this method must evaluate problems that 
occurred on previous airplanes it has manufactured and describe how it 
will prevent these same problems from occurring on the new airplane. 
The applicant must design the propulsion system to preclude failures or 
malfunctions that could result in an in-flight shutdown. The applicant 
must validate all maintenance and operational procedures for ETOPS 
significant systems. There are ground and flight test requirements and 
a problem-tracking and resolution system requirement the FAA will use 
to evaluate the airplane prior to ETOPS approval. This problem-tracking 
and resolution system continues in accordance with new Sec.  21.4(a) 
after an airplane receiving ETOPS approval under this method enters 
service. Finally, the rule defines reliability demonstration acceptance 
criteria used to compare the type and frequency of failures that occur 
on a candidate airplane-engine combination with those that we expect 
could occur on airplanes with existing ETOPS approvals.
    ALPA commented that the objective for the propulsion system design 
in the proposed appendix did not match the explanation in the preamble 
of the NPRM. The rates should have been specified as 0.02 or less for 
180-minute ETOPS and 0.01 or less for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes. We 
agree with ALPA's comment. We had intended the rule specify that the 
IFSD rate objective for the propulsion system design would be the 
target rate or less. This was an inadvertent omission from the rule 
text in the NPRM that we have corrected in the final rule.
    Dassault stated that the proposed rule requires that new technology 
be demonstrated through testing. Dassault points out that it is not 
able to identify the exact criteria the FAA will use to determine if 
such technology is defined as a new technology. Dassault recommends the 
FAA better define the scope of this requirement to require testing only 
for systems defined as ``time limited systems,'' and those for which 
the occurrence of any failure condition is probable, that is, greater 
than 1 x 10<SUP>-5</SUP> per flight hour.
    The FAA believes the proposed rule was clear in stating that the 
requirement is applicable to technology new to the ``applicant,'' and 
has adopted the requirement as proposed. The applicant will determine 
which technology is new to it when the airplane is designed. The 
purpose for requiring testing of new technology is to provide a process 
to evaluate airplane components designed or manufactured using 
technology with which the applicant has had no previous experience. In 
an Early ETOPS program, this testing substitutes for the service 
experience that we would otherwise require before approving an airplane 
for ETOPS.
    Boeing recommends limiting the demonstration of non-normal failures 
during the airplane demonstration flight testing under the Early ETOPS 
method to ETOPS significant systems, the same as they recommend for the 
flight test required under paragraph K25.2.1(e) of this service 
experience method. We agree with Boeing's recommendation for the same 
reasons as we gave for the flight testing required under the service 
experience method. However, for an Early ETOPS airplane, we want to 
make sure that an applicant considers all relevant failures early in an 
airplane development program to determine what systems are ``ETOPS 
significant.'' It may not be obvious during the airplane design phase 
what failure conditions may potentially affect the safety of an ETOPS 
diversion. We also want to leave open the possibility that unforeseen 
failure effects may be identified during other flight testing that 
changes the list of ETOPS significant systems and the failure 
conditions that must be demonstrated during the ETOPS airplane 
demonstration. We have revised the similar requirement for airplanes 
with more than two engines in K25.3.2(d)(1)(iv) for consistency.
    Dassault comments that the non-normal failure conditions 
demonstrated during the airplane demonstration test should come from 
the system failure analyses, taking into account the

[[Page 1830]]

specific airplane design. We agree the system failure analyses would be 
a good method for identifying failure conditions that could occur in 
service. However, in using this method, Dassault is proposing a 
particular method of compliance that may not fit all situations. Each 
applicant will have to propose a list of failure conditions the FAA 
accepts for the airplane demonstration. In coming up with this list, an 
applicant must consider the effects that failures in one system may 
have on other airplane systems. An example is the loss of multiple 
systems following the loss of all normal electrical power. Individual 
system failure analyses alone may not be sufficient to determine the 
worst case failure conditions. In this instance, an airplane-level 
failure analysis that considers the combined effect of multiple system 
failures would be the best guide for determining what failure 
conditions to demonstrate.
    Dassault comments that the requirement to demonstrate airplane 
diversions into representative operational diversionary airports is 
typically an operational requirement. Dassault recommends moving this 
requirement from the proposed appendix to parts 121 and 135. We 
disagree with Dassault's recommendation. The overall objective of the 
airplane demonstration flight testing during type certification is to 
simulate the operational environment that an operator of the airplane 
may expect in service. We require such a demonstration to verify the 
candidate airplane has the capability to operate in extended 
operations. With this objective in mind, it is appropriate that the 
applicant conduct diversions into airports that represent airports 
normally used for ETOPS diversions.
    Boeing acknowledges that the wording of the proposed airplane 
demonstration test requirement for repeated exposure to humid and 
inclement weather on the ground followed by long-range operations at 
normal cruise altitude, is identical to what ARAC proposed and what 
appears in the 777-300ER ETOPS Special Conditions. However, Boeing 
contends that the intent of this rule is to expose the airplane and 
engines to moisture that could potentially become trapped and freeze at 
altitude. This freezing could cause a system to malfunction causing an 
in-flight shutdown or loss of thrust control.
    Boeing stated the use of the word ``inclement'' may be 
misinterpreted to imply that an airplane must be exposed to all types 
of inclement weather, including snow, hail, sleet, hurricanes, and 
typhoons. Boeing stated that as demonstrated during the 777-300ER ETOPS 
flight test program, cycling the airplane in and out of high humidity 
airports sufficiently demonstrates the intent of the rule. Boeing 
recommends the FAA replace ``humid and inclement weather'' with ``high 
humidity.''
    The FAA never intended the test requirement in the 777 ETOPS 
special conditions to be limited to high humidity, and we do not intend 
such a limitation in today's rule. Rather, the inclement weather 
requirement should be interpreted exactly as Boeing has indicated in 
their comment. Inclement weather is not solely limited to high humidity 
conditions, but may include such meteorological conditions as heavy 
rain, high winds, snow, and extreme cold. We want to expose an airplane 
to the types of conditions on the ground that may be encountered in 
service to demonstrate that there are no unexpected design problems 
associated with such exposures.
    We agree that a major source of engine problems on long duration 
flights typical of ETOPS has been moisture becoming trapped in engine 
control pressure sense lines and freezing at altitude, causing engine 
operating problems. Heavy precipitation on the ground and high humidity 
intensify the amount of moisture available to create this type of 
failure mode.
    This rule does not require specific types of inclement weather for 
the airplane demonstration, except for high humidity, in recognition of 
the chance nature of encountering such conditions. We expect, however, 
an applicant would take advantage of any available inclement weather 
conditions during the required airplane demonstration test.
    Dassault comments that the inclement weather requirements are not 
specifically relevant to ETOPS operations. Dassault recommends the FAA 
remove these two paragraphs from the final rule. While none of the 
environmental conditions we are requiring for the airplane 
demonstration would be unique to ETOPS, the potential consequences of 
system failures resulting from these conditions could be worse the 
farther an airplane is from a suitable place to land. Accordingly, we 
have decided against dropping the requirement.
    Boeing, ALPA, and BALPA commented on the post-airplane 
demonstration inspection requirement. The NPRM proposed that an 
applicant conduct on-wing inspections or tests of ETOPS significant 
systems installed on the test airplane or airplanes used for the 
airplane demonstration in accordance with the tasks defined in the 
proposed Instruction for Continued Airworthiness to establish their 
condition for continued safe operation. These inspections or tests must 
be conducted in a manner to identify abnormal conditions that could 
result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion.
    Boeing stated it considers an external inspection of the engine and 
an internal inspection of the airflow path of the fan, compressor, 
combustor and turbine sections of the engine to provide the most 
valuable information for ETOPS. Boeing noted the ETOPS flight test 
demonstrates an airplane's capability. It is not an endurance test. 
Boeing recommended changing the rule to require only a complete 
external on-wing inspection of the engines and engine-mounted 
equipment.
    The FAA agrees with Boeing that the ETOPS airplane demonstration is 
not an endurance test, such as the 3000-cycle propulsion system 
validation test. This flight test is a demonstration of an airplane's 
ability to safely operate in ETOPS. We did not intend that it be a test 
of durability. However, the FAA does not agree with Boeing that a 
complete on-wing external inspection of the engines and engine-mounted 
equipment alone would be adequate for a completely new airplane being 
evaluated under the Early ETOPS approval method. Many of the airplane 
ETOPS significant systems that need to be evaluated are located inside 
the engine compartment or airplane fuselage, and such wording could be 
confusing.
    ALPA does not believe that a cursory ``visual inspection'' such as 
those performed on routine overnight or even weekly or monthly checks 
would meet the intent of this requirement. ALPA commented that the 
requirement should include the types of airplane inspections performed 
in conjunction with major, heavy, or ``D'' checks. ALPA proposed that a 
robust inspection process similar to that required at the conclusion of 
the 3000 cycle propulsion system validation test could uncover 
potential future failure modes.
    The FAA does not believe that a robust post-test inspection 
requirement applied to the airplane demonstration test would uncover 
any significant information. Unlike the 3000-cycle test (which is 
designed to identify potential failures resulting from high stresses 
caused by repeatedly starting the engine, running it to high power then 
shutting it down), the airplane demonstration test would not accumulate 
a large enough number of these ``cycles'' to inflict noticeable damage. 
Similarly, the few hundred

[[Page 1831]]

hours accumulated during the airplane demonstration would not be enough 
to create a significant amount of wear on moving parts.
    BALPA said that a visual inspection is inadequate for some ETOPS 
significant systems. BALPA recommended a change in this section to 
state there must be an assessment of the ability of essential 
components or systems to function within their specified performance 
and tolerance limits by appropriate test methods.
    We agree with BALPA that a visual inspection is not adequate for 
some ETOPS significant systems. The instructions for continued 
airworthiness required by Sec.  25.1529 define appropriate inspections 
or tests to establish that a system or component is in a condition for 
safe operation. However, these are not necessarily ``visual'' 
inspections. As such, we have changed paragraph K25.2.2(g)(4), and the 
same requirement for airplanes with more than two engines under 
paragraph K25.3.2(d)(4), to require that each ETOPS significant system 
must undergo an on-wing inspection or test in accordance with the tasks 
defined in the proposed Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to 
establish their condition for continued safe operation. We have 
included the qualifier ``on-wing'' to clarify that we are not requiring 
any equipment be removed from the airplane for these inspections. These 
inspections are of the type that an airline would do to establish the 
airworthiness of the airplane in service, with the exception that the 
inspections must be conducted in a manner to identify abnormal 
conditions that could result in in-flight shutdowns or diversions.
    ALPA and BALPA commented the FAA has proposed deleting wording 
recommended by ARAC for the use of non-ETOPS fleets in the reliability 
demonstration acceptance criteria for two-engine airplanes, but 
retained this provision in the corresponding requirement for airplanes 
with more than two engines. ALPA and BALPA want the ARAC wording in 
both locations. BALPA avers that the non-ETOPS fleet may provide a 
significant ``heads up'' on cyclic related failures. ALPA contends that 
the wording is meant to ensure consideration of similar airplanes and 
engine types, which may be certified and flown in both ETOPS and non-
ETOPS environments.
    We are not including non-ETOPS airplanes in the reliability 
acceptance criteria of paragraph K25.2.2(i). It appears these two 
commenters are confusing the reliability benchmark that we judge a new 
airplane against under this requirement with the relevant experience 
assessment of K25.2.2(a). For the relevant experience assessment, we 
expect that a manufacturer of a new airplane to consider any relevant 
failures from ETOPS and non-ETOPS airplanes that may be applicable to 
the new design. The objective of the reliability acceptance criteria 
requirement is to demonstrate a level of reliability similar to that of 
airplanes currently approved for ETOPS. Including non-ETOPS airplanes 
in the reliability comparison would result in a lower safety standard 
because the types and frequency of failures that would be expected to 
occur on non-ETOPS derivative models may be more severe than would be 
expected on a currently approved ETOPS fleet that has established a 
high level of reliability.
    We explained in the NPRM our rationale for allowing non-ETOPS 
airplanes to be used in the reliability comparison of airplanes with 
more than two engines. We said previous ETOPS experience might not 
exist on airplanes with more than two engines at the time this proposed 
rule becomes effective. However, the rule as proposed would limit the 
use of non-ETOPS airplanes to derivative models of the same airplane 
and engine. Under this provision, an applicant for a new type 
certificate would have no derivative models of the airplane to use in 
place of existing ETOPS approved airplanes. For the same reason, we 
outlined above for two-engine airplanes, derivative models of a 
candidate airplane and engine may not have a service history that is 
consistent with our expectations for an airplane approved for ETOPS. 
After further consideration, we find a comparison with any non-ETOPS 
fleet of airplanes would not be consistent with the objectives of this 
rule. An applicant can predict the type and frequency of the failures 
and malfunctions expected to occur in service on airplanes with more 
than two engines based on whatever data the FAA accepts to meet this 
requirement.
    Only airplanes with more than two engines manufactured 8 years 
after the effective date of this rule will have to be approved for 
ETOPS under the grandfathering provisions of new Sec.  25.3. Airplanes 
manufactured before that date may be operated under the new operating 
requirements from the effective date of the rule. For the initial type 
design approvals of airplanes with more than two engines under Sec.  
25.1535, world-fleets of newer, more reliable airplanes with previous 
experience in extended operations would provide the best source for the 
comparison specified in paragraph K25.3.2(f). As a larger number of 
airplanes with more than two engines receive ETOPS type design approval 
and are operated under the new part 121 ETOPS operational requirements, 
the comparison database for compliance with this provision will grow.
    We inadvertently included the use of non-ETOPS fleets from the 
original ARAC proposal in the corresponding engine certification 
requirement under proposed Sec.  33.200(e)(iii). For the reasons noted 
here, the FAA is changing Sec.  33.201(e)(4) to be consistent with 
appendix K.
Appendix K--Combined service experience and Early ETOPS method 
(K25.2.3)
    The NPRM proposed an alternative to either the service experience 
or Early ETOPS methods for airplane approval. This combined method 
would use all of the design, analyses, and tests required by the Early 
ETOPS method except for the airplane demonstration test. In place of 
the airplane demonstration test, this method would allow the much less 
rigorous flight test of the service experience approval method, 
providing the candidate airplane-engine combination had obtained at 
least 15,000 engine-hours of service experience. The NPRM also 
contained a provision for a reduction of service experience below 
15,000 engine-hours as long as the applicant had compensating factors 
that provide an equivalent level of safety.
    ALPA commented it understands how the combined service experience 
and Early ETOPS method can be used to reduce the service experience 
required for type design approval of an airplane for ETOPS. However, it 
expressed concern that the equivalent level of safety provision as 
proposed might unintentionally allow an applicant to use a method 
resulting in a lower level of safety than provided of the other defined 
approval methods. Without listing specific additional requirements in a 
manner similar to that contained in the first paragraph of the combined 
method, ALPA stated that an applicant could attempt to completely 
bypass the requirements of any of these methods.
    ALPA recommended the FAA amend this paragraph to say that the in-
service experience requirements may be reduced to some other level, 
provided the applicant defines compensating factors that provide an 
equivalent level of safety as the provisions of paragraph K25.2.3 (a).
    The FAA agrees with ALPA's concern that without further definition 
the proposed wording of the equivalent safety provision in the combined

[[Page 1832]]

approval method might unintentionally lead to a level of validation 
substantially less than provided by the other provisions of section 
K25.2. After further review, we have determined that this proposal and 
the related paragraph for airplanes with more than two engines are just 
a restatement of existing authority under Sec.  21.21(b)(1) and are not 
necessary. Therefore, we have deleted these sections in the final rule.
Appendix K--Airplanes with more than two engines (Section K25.3)
    The requirements for airplanes with more than two engines are 
organized similarly to section K25.2 for two-engine airplanes. We 
created this separate section, K25.3, so that an applicant for 
airplanes of this configuration would not be confused about which 
requirements applied to it.
    Many commenters made the same comments on paragraphs in section 
K25.3 for airplanes with more than two engines than they did for the 
corresponding paragraphs in section K25.2. Our responses for those 
comments in section K25.2 also apply to this section. We are only 
discussing those comments on section K25.3 here that are unique to 
airplanes with more than two engines.
    ALPA expressed concern that under the NPRM an applicant could apply 
for ETOPS approval of an airplane with more than two engines that has a 
high IFSD rate (such as those experienced during introduction of the B-
747, DC-10, and L-1011 airplanes almost 30 years ago). ALPA stated the 
original ARAC draft proposal required a ``review * * * utilizing 
reliability data for all airplane, propulsion and ETOPS significant 
systems.'' ALPA noted the ARAC proposal would apply equally to all 
airplane types regardless of the number of engines. ALPA commented this 
level of ``benign'' review would provide the FAA with satisfactory 
regulatory guidance to prevent the certification of a design otherwise 
unsatisfactory for the challenging ETOPS environment.
    The FAA does not believe a propulsion system assessment is 
necessary for airplanes with more than two engines to get a type design 
approval for ETOPS. We do not envision any modern propulsion system 
experiencing the kinds of high IFSD rates experienced by the airplanes 
in their examples. The IFSD rates required for three- and four-engine 
airplanes to reach an unsafe level are so high that the normal FAA 
engine safety management program and the propulsion system monitoring 
requirements of Sec.  121.374 would correct any major causes of engine 
in-flight shutdowns before that level could be reached.
    The JAA and the UK CAA stated that the required 250,000 engine-
hours of service experience seems excessive for three- and four-engine 
airplanes considering the lower in-flight shutdown objectives for these 
types of airplanes and the built-in systems redundancy.
    The FAA disagrees with this comment. Since there are no IFSD rate 
requirements for three- and four-engine airplanes in the proposed rule, 
the service experience requirement is primarily focused on obtaining a 
significant experience base to properly evaluate the airplane systems.
    The 250,000 engine-hours service experience requirement came from 
AC 120-42A. Taken in the context of the actual exposure of the airplane 
systems under this requirement, those airplane systems on a two-engine 
airplane would accumulate a total of 125,000 airplane hours during this 
period while the same systems on a four-engine airplane would only 
accumulate a total of 62,500 airplane hours. This is a significant 
reduction in the total amount of required service experience compared 
to the same systems on a two-engine airplane. This constitutes a 
natural compensation for the added redundancy of systems on airplanes 
with more than two engines.
    Dassault commented that the flight test requirements of paragraph 
K25.3.1(c) should not require an applicant for an airplane with more 
than two engines to demonstrate the loss of all normal electrical 
power. This proposed requirement would require an applicant to conduct 
a flight test to evaluate non-normal worst case system failure 
conditions expected to occur in service. Dassault posited this 
requirement would be unfair to airplanes with more than two engines, 
which it claims should not be treated at the same level as two-engine 
airplanes. Dassault recommended the FAA withdraw the loss of all normal 
electrical power from the required flight testing for airplanes with 
more than two engines.
    The FAA disagrees with Dassault. Although the electrical systems on 
airplanes with more than two engines may have additional redundancy 
that would make loss of normal electrical power less likely than on a 
two-engine airplane, we cannot assume that this would not occur. Most 
occurrences of the loss of normal electrical power in service are the 
result of multiple generator or electrical bus failures from a common 
source. Airplanes with more than two engines are not immune to these 
types of failures. An example from service experience of a common cause 
failure mode would be spilled fluids from galleys that leak through 
floor panels onto electrical equipment.
    Also, we cannot assume that an airplane manufacturer would always 
design an electrical system to take full advantage of the inherent 
isolation and redundancy that the additional engines provide. For 
example, an electrical system architecture consisting of four engine-
driven generators supplying two main electrical busses would not 
provide any more isolation from bus failures than for a two-engine 
airplane.
    ALPA commented that the reliability acceptance criteria for 
airplanes with more than two engines should include airplane and 
propulsion systems, not just ETOPS significant systems. They said that 
the ARAC proposal did not limit the reliability acceptance criteria to 
ETOPS significant systems only.
    We are not making the suggested change. The only systems that would 
be relevant in assessing an airplane's readiness for ETOPS would be 
those whose failure could impact the safety of ETOPS. By definition, an 
ETOPS significant system means an airplane system, including the 
propulsion system, the failure or malfunctioning of which could 
adversely affect the safety of an ETOPS flight, or the continued safe 
flight and landing of an airplane during an ETOPS diversion. The 
propulsion system is covered already by the proposed reliability 
acceptance criteria because it is an ETOPS significant system. Airplane 
systems of interest are also ETOPS significant systems. Thus, ALPA's 
concern is already addressed by the existing language of paragraph 
K25.3.2(f). For consistency, we have revised the corresponding 
paragraph K25.2.2(i) for two-engine airplanes to be the same as this 
requirement for airplanes with more than two engines.

B. Engine Certification (Part 33)

    For certain ``early ETOPS'' applications, the part 33 amendments 
require engine manufacturers to address all ETOPS relevant malfunctions 
(e.g., lost of thrust control or in-flight shutdown) and design-related 
maintenance errors that have occurred in the manufacturer's current 
FAA-certified engine models. The part 33 amendments also include a test 
requirement for these ``early ETOPS'' applications, and certain, 
specific type design requirements for all ETOPS applications.

[[Page 1833]]

1. Engine Design and Test Requirements for ETOPS Eligibility
    The JAA and UK CAA stated the introduction of precise and detailed 
testing requirements in the rule (proposed Sec.  33.200; hereafter 
Sec.  33.201) is too prescriptive and prevents tailoring of the testing 
program to the different intermediate cases that may be encountered 
between the completely new design and the derivatives. The commenters 
recommend the FAA make reference to an approved testing program and 
transfer the detailed content into an advisory circular, such as the 
JAA has done.
    The FAA does not concur with deleting the specific test 
requirements from Sec.  33.201 and placing them in an advisory 
circular. This requirement is for Early ETOPS eligibility for two-
engine applications without any service experience. These requirements 
have been carefully developed to address this specific case, and 
successful completion of this test should provide a suitably reliable 
engine for the purpose of Early ETOPS approval at the airplane level. 
To place these test requirements in an advisory circular as an option, 
would likely result in instances of non-standard testing that is not 
the equivalent to the contemplated safety standard, and potentially not 
suitable to support the Early ETOPS concept. Also, Sec.  33.201 would 
not generally be required for an existing engine design that has the 
requisite service experience, and therefore this section's 
applicability to ``intermediate cases'' should be relatively uncommon. 
However in the event such a situation occurs, the test requirements of 
Sec.  33.201 can be modified using a part 21 Equivalent Level of Safety 
approach to optimize a test for a specific ``intermediate case'' 
situation.
    Pratt and Whitney stated that it is not clear when the rule must be 
completed with regard to the overall part 33 type certification and 
asks if part 33 certification will be held until all the requirements 
of Sec.  33.201 are complete. The FAA clarifies that compliance with 
Sec.  33.201 is only required when an applicant desires Early ETOPS 
eligibility for a two-engine-engine application under Sec.  25.1535 
authority. Compliance with Sec.  33.201 is not required for basic 
engine type certification. The lead-in sentence of Sec.  33.201 is 
clear on this.
    ALPA fully supported the guidance presented for part 33. Because 
various part 33 regulatory design and testing requirements would 
establish a ``limit'' of ETOPS engine suitability, ALPA suggested that 
an engine type certificate data sheet note be required stating the 
specific diversion time limit. NACA recommended the FAA clarify that 
the text simply codifies current engine certification procedures for 
two-engine airplanes and apply any new requirements to new engine 
designs in the future (that is, ``grandfather'' current designs).
    The FAA does not agree the engine Type Certificate Data Sheet 
should specifically note ETOPS diversion time limitations nor does it 
believe a ``grandfather'' provision is appropriate. Approved ETOPS 
diversion times are controlled through the operating standards (i.e., 
parts 121 and 135) and airplane type design (Sec.  25.1535) 
certification. The part 33 requirements do not establish an independent 
maximum diversion time limitation for ETOPS. ETOPS diversion times are 
dependent upon many factors, most of which are beyond basic engine 
certification. However, for Early ETOPS eligibility for two-engine 
applications where compliance with Sec.  33.201 is required, FAA will 
include a discussion in advisory material for the use of a Type 
Certificate Data Sheet Note to state that Sec.  33.201 has been 
complied with (i.e., ETOPS eligibility granted), along with the 
applicants demonstrated diversion time from that test.
    The JAA and UK CAA agreed with the proposal that each oil cap 
provide an oil-tight seal. Along with Federal Express (FedEx), 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), and Royal Dutch 
Airlines (KLM), they commented that the design requirements for oil 
tank cap installation errors causing hazardous oil loss should apply to 
all types of operations, and the FAA should not limit them to ETOPS. 
The commenters added that an in-flight engine shutdown due to massive 
oil loss after an incorrect oil tank cap installation will most likely 
occur early in the flight and probably well outside any ETOPS segment. 
These commenters recommended the FAA word the rule as a generic 
requirement applicable to all new engine models. ALPA fully supported 
the requirement for engine oil tank filler cap design, as proposed.
    The FAA has decided against expanding applicability of this new 
regulation to all new engine models at this time. While it is true that 
oil tank cap installation errors can, and have, occurred in all types 
of operations, this proposal was only evaluated for ETOPS operations 
where suitable alternate landing sites are limited, especially when 
considering the multi-engine nature of many of these types of events. 
Also, the FAA does not agree that hazardous oil loss due to such errors 
would only occur early in a flight, as it is impossible to predict the 
exact error (e.g., cap loose vs. cap off) or how a given design may be 
affected by that particular error. A range of outcomes is possible, 
including hazardous oil loss near the maximum diversion time point in 
an ETOPS operation. The FAA will continue to monitor related service 
experience, and will consider expanding the applicability of this 
requirement by future rulemaking if service data so dictates.
2. Engine Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
    Appendix A to part 33 proposed an engine condition monitoring 
program to ensure continuing engine reliability.
    Transport Canada recommended the FAA delete the rule, or replace 
the term ``condition monitoring'' with ``engine health assessment 
programs'' which is a more descriptive term. It added that a power 
assurance check methodology should not be required in the Instructions 
for Continued Airworthiness and validated at the part 33 design 
certification stage when the engine would not as yet be installed on an 
ETOPS type certificated airplane; these requirements should more 
appropriately be required as part of the part 25 design certification 
process. Transport Canada stated the operational requirements determine 
a viable health assessment program for a particular airframe-engine 
installation. Thus, the most effective time for developing an engine 
health assessment program would be when the engine is installed in an 
identified airplane and when the operational role of that airplane has 
been defined. Transport Canada concluded the development of ETOPS 
maintenance and health assessment programs would be most effectively 
managed when the airplane's total maintenance program is being 
developed.
    The FAA does not agree with eliminating the term ``condition 
monitoring'' from the rule to be replaced with the term ``engine health 
assessment''. The agency believes either term is adequate, but will 
retain the currently used and proposed term ``condition monitoring''. 
Compliance with this section is only required when an applicant desires 
ETOPS eligibility under Sec.  25.1535. Compliance with this section is 
not required for basic engine type certification. The lead-in sentence 
of Appendix A to part 33, paragraph A33.3(c) makes this clear. However, 
conversely, an engine applicant could choose to obtain ETOPS 
eligibility without identifying a specific airplane

[[Page 1834]]

installation identified. The engine manufacturer would define generic 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to comply with part 33 
Appendix A, which in turn may be modified once the engine is installed 
on a particular airplane model. The FAA does not want to preclude an 
engine manufacturer from the option of obtaining engine ETOPS 
eligibility without a defined airplane application.
    GE expressed a concern with repairs to and parts installed on 
engines from sources other than the engine Type Certificate (TC) 
holder. These would include engine parts approved by the FAA under a 
Parts Manufacturing Approval (PMA) or engine repairs approved by a 
Designated Engineering Representative, which are not reported to the 
holder of the TC. GE expressed concern that common cause multiple 
failures may be masked by calculating the reliability of an entire 
fleet, while a certain segment may be afflicted by unreliable parts 
from a supplier other than the engine TC holder. This should not be 
acceptable for the types of operations conducted under ETOPS where high 
reliability is necessary. The commenter also stated the results of the 
3,000-cycle test could also be affected if other than GE parts are 
installed in the field. GE asks the FAA for either supplemental 
rulemaking or a safety determination on other engine parts.
    The FAA does not agree that additional rulemaking is necessary to 
specifically address PMA or repaired parts usage in ETOPS operations. 
PMA parts comply with the applicable airworthiness standards and are 
approved as replacements for corresponding TC holder parts. Repairs 
approved by the FAA or a Designated Engineering Representative must 
also meet the applicable airworthiness standards. Likewise, follow-on 
TC holder parts and repairs meet those same standards whether processed 
as major or minor type design changes. Note that major design changes 
by a non-TC holder can only be processed as a Supplemental Type 
Certificate (STC), which must also meet the applicable airworthiness 
standards. With respect to service difficulty reporting, the FAA 
monitors service data to identify unsafe conditions and other 
situations affecting ETOPS operations. This data is collected from TC 
holders, operators, repair stations, PMA holders, and other sources as 
applicable. The FAA will take appropriate corrective action to 
eliminate identified unsafe conditions or other situations negatively 
affecting ETOPS operations.

C. ETOPS Reporting Requirements for Manufacturers (Part 21)

    To support the FAA's safety monitoring program for airplanes in 
service, the NPRM proposed a new Sec.  21.4 for reporting, tracking and 
resolving problems on ETOPS approved airplanes. These requirements 
apply to the type certificate holder of an airplane approved for ETOPS, 
and the type certificate holder of an engine installed on an airplane 
approved for ETOPS. These requirements are separate from the ETOPS 
reporting that an airline must do under parts 121 and 135.
    Section 21.4 is organized into two parts. The first part defines 
requirements for reporting, tracking, and resolving problems on an 
airplane-engine combination approved using the Early ETOPS approval 
method in part 25. The second part defines general reporting 
requirements for all airplanes approved for ETOPS, including the 
reporting of engine IFSD rates the FAA uses to monitor propulsion 
system reliability.
1. Early ETOPS: Reporting, Tracking, and Resolving Problems
    ALPA recommended revising proposed paragraph 21.4(a)(1) to reflect 
the original ARAC philosophy that the tracking requirements were not 
limited to ETOPS significant systems. ALPA recommended that the rule be 
revised to require the prompt identification of ETOPS significant 
problems.
    The list of occurrences that must be reported and resolved under 
Sec.  21.4(a) are defined in paragraph (a)(6). The type certificate 
holder must report these occurrences and propose solutions to the FAA 
to resolve the cause of each occurrence regardless of which airplane or 
propulsion system caused the event. The significance of these 
occurrences to ETOPS is implicit by their inclusion in the list. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to change the rule as ALPA recommended. 
However, we have revised this paragraph to delete reference to ``ETOPS 
significant systems'' to clarify that the type certificate holder of an 
Early ETOPS airplane-engine combination must use a system for 
reporting, tracking, and resolving each problem resulting in one of the 
occurrences specified in paragraph (a)(6) of this section. For 
consistency, we have made a similar change to the related sections in 
part 25 appendix K (K25.2.2(h)(1)(i) and K25.3.2(e)(1)(i)) for the 
problem tracking and resolution system required for the Early ETOPS 
type design approval method.
    The JAA and the UK CAA recommended removing the words ``Early 
ETOPS'' from the heading of Sec.  21.4(a) and ``without service 
experience'' from the first sentence because they imply that the 
requirements would only apply to new type-certificated airplanes. The 
commenters asserted that the ETOPS reporting should apply to all 
manufacturers holding an ETOPS approval. Paragraph (a) only applies to 
airplanes approved for ETOPS without service experience. This paragraph 
codifies the special conditions applied to the Boeing Model 777 
airplane for Early ETOPS certification. Paragraph (b) of Sec.  21.4 
defines the reporting requirements for all two-engine airplanes 
approved for ETOPS.
    Boeing recommended the FAA insert ``significantly'' after ``systems 
that have changed'' in Sec.  21.4(a)(3) to give the FAA authority to 
allow an applicant to exclude reporting on systems with only minor 
changes that do not affect system reliability on derivative airplanes 
or engines. We disagree with Boeing's comment. This rule already allows 
an applicant to not report on unchanged areas of a derivative airplane 
as agreed to by the FAA. Adding the word ``significantly'' as Boeing 
suggests adds nothing to the proposed language that would help an 
applicant or the FAA differentiate what specific changes would not 
require reporting under the rule from those that would. However, we 
have clarified what is meant by a derivative airplane or engine in the 
rule. A derivative airplane or engine is one where the changes are not 
so significant as to require an application for a new type certificate 
in accordance with Sec.  21.19. We have added a table in Sec.  
21.4(a)(3), and in part 25, appendix K, to clarify the applicability of 
the problem reporting, tracking, and resolution system for derivative 
airplanes and engines.
    Boeing recommended Sec.  21.4(a)(4) should make it clear that the 
type certificate holder, not the operator, is responsible for tracking 
the data. We agree and have revised this section to refer to the type 
certificate holder throughout. Since Sec.  21.4 applies to airplanes 
that have already received a type certificate, the airplane or engine 
manufacturer is no longer an ``applicant'' but a type certificate 
holder.
    The JAA and UK CAA stated that the list of reportable occurrences 
in Sec.  21.4(a)(6) implies in-flight shutdown events do not include 
the inability to control the engine or obtain desired thrust or 
precautionary thrust reductions. They contended this contradicts the 
definition of in-flight shutdown in part 1 and recommended the FAA 
revise the rule to make it clear

[[Page 1835]]

that these events are also in-flight shutdowns. These commenters are 
correctly interpreting our intent that the inability to control the 
engine or obtain desired thrust or precautionary thrust reductions are 
separate from in-flight shutdowns. The revised part 1 definition of 
``in-flight shutdown'' clarifies our intent that this reporting 
requirement does not contradict the definition.
    The NPRM included a parenthetical exception to the proposed 
requirement to report precautionary thrust reductions, which would 
exclude precautionary thrust reductions for normal troubleshooting as 
allowed in the aircraft manual. The ARAC provided no justification for 
this exception in its recommended rule, upon which the NPRM was based. 
We believe ARAC intended that this exception cover special flights 
conducted for maintenance purposes to evaluate airplane problems that 
occurred on a previous flight. Such a flight may include a thrust 
reduction. However, we do not see how an intentional thrust reduction 
for maintenance troubleshooting purposes could be confused with the 
intent of this requirement in Sec.  21.4(a)(6), which would be a thrust 
reduction in direct response to a problem in flight in order to 
mitigate that problem. Also, the exception is so broadly written that 
some parties may infer that any precautionary thrust reduction is for 
normal troubleshooting purposes so as to avoid reporting an occurrence. 
After further consideration, we have decided to delete this exception 
from the final rule.
    GE stated that the majority of in-flight shutdowns are not 
restartable and the requirement to report degraded ability to start an 
engine in flight appears to address a situation where there is an in-
flight shutdown of an engine that is restartable, but with degraded 
start capability and a need to restart that engine. GE contended that 
ETOPS does not rest on the engine being restartable, it rests on the 
engine being reliable so there is no need to restart that engine. GE 
stated that this requirement diverts resources from higher priority 
safety issues. The FAA disagrees with GE. Many engines are shutdown for 
indications that later turn out to be false. If there is a subsequent 
problem with another engine, the ability to restart an engine improves 
safety by giving the flight crew more landing options. If an engine 
flames out during cruise, but is otherwise operational, restarting the 
engine may allow the flight to continue without a diversion. Thus, it 
is critical to know about and correct problems that degrade an engine's 
capability to restart in flight.
    Boeing recommended combining the requirement to report failures of 
a backup system with reporting of a complete loss of any electrical 
power generating system or hydraulic power system. Boeing said there is 
no clear definition of ``primary'' and ``backup'' systems and that the 
backup function could be provided by another equivalent primary system. 
We agree with Boeing that these sections may not clearly state the 
intended requirement. We also agree that they may be combined into one. 
In order to clarify the rule, we have replaced the two NPRM sections 
with the following wording:
    ``Loss of any power source for an ETOPS group 1 significant system, 
including any power source designed to provide backup-power for that 
system.''
2. Reliability of Two-Engine Airplanes
    We rearranged Sec.  21.4(b)(1) and (b)(2) to clarify the intent of 
the rule. We have moved the requirement for FAA approved corrective 
actions for causes of in-flight shutdowns from paragraph (b)(1) to 
(b)(2). We also clarified that the requirement on the type certificate 
holder under this paragraph is to issue appropriate service information 
to the operators. The implementation of such service information would 
be conducted under the operating certificate for the operator.

X. Operator Maintenance Requirements

A. Continuous Airworthiness Maintenance Program (CAMP)

    The premise of an ETOPS maintenance program is to continually 
provide airworthy airplanes that will prevent mechanically related 
diversions. Under this concept, engines are designed and tested to 
assure an acceptable level of in-flight shutdowns in the worldwide 
fleet. Similarly, other key airplane systems are designed and tested 
for enhanced airplane reliability. ETOPS maintenance practices reduce 
diversions through disciplined procedures like engine condition 
monitoring, oil consumption monitoring, aggressive resolution of any 
identified reliability issues, and procedures that avoid human error 
during the maintenance of airplane systems and engines.
    Maintenance issues are addressed in Sec.  121.374 of the final 
rule. Before flying ETOPS, a certificate holder operating two engine 
airplanes must develop an ETOPS ``continuous airworthiness maintenance 
program'' (CAMP) and provide the necessary training to ensure those 
airplanes are maintained at the highest level of safety. The elements 
of an ETOPS-approved CAMP begin with a basic CAMP that is approved for 
use in non ETOPS operation, which is then supplemented for ETOPS with: 
(1) A system to ensure compliance with the minimum requirements set 
forth in the CMP document or the type design document for each airplane 
and engine combination; (2) an ETOPS pre-departure service check; (3) 
procedures limiting dual maintenance; (4) procedures verifying 
corrective action to ETOPS significant systems; (5) ETOPS task 
identification; (6) centralized maintenance control procedures; (7) an 
ETOPS parts control program; (8) a reliability or enhanced continuing 
analysis and surveillance system (CASS); (9) propulsion system 
monitoring; (10) an engine condition monitoring program; (11) an oil 
consumption monitoring program; (12) an APU in-flight start program; 
(13) maintenance training for ETOPS; (14) an ETOPS maintenance 
document; and (15) procedures to have the initial program and 
subsequent revisions approved by the FAA's certificate holding district 
office (CHDO).
    The requirement is to ``develop and follow a continuous 
airworthiness maintenance program based on the manufacturer's 
maintenance program or one currently approved for the operator and be 
supplemented for ETOPS for each airframe and engine combination.'' Each 
operator's current maintenance program must be approved by its 
principal maintenance inspector via operations specifications. 
Continental and United commented that it was the understanding of the 
ARAC that each operator's approved ETOPS maintenance program would, by 
in-service demonstration, be accepted. If the currently approved 
program contains all maintenance elements necessary for ETOPS, then it 
will be adequate without change. However, after evaluating its current 
program, an operator may have to supplement its program to incorporate 
any missing ETOPS elements prior to operating ETOPS.
    There were comments by the aviation industry supporting 
incorporation of the ETOPS supplemental requirements for two-engine 
airplanes. However, Airbus, UK CAA, JAA, Singapore Airlines and others 
commented negatively regarding the same requirements for three- and 
four-engine airplanes. Some comments suggested that because long range 
operations with three- and four-engine airplanes for the past 30 to 50 
years has been so successful, there is no justification for 
incorporation of the ETOPS supplements. Qantas agreed

[[Page 1836]]

with the approval requirements for ETOPS and notes that the robust 
maintenance programs have contributed to the success of ETOPS. It 
found, however, that this success has brought on increased operational 
restrictions for political reasons that are not based on safety.
    The FAA strongly believes that all operators would benefit from an 
ETOPS maintenance program. However, the FAA agrees with many of the 
commenters that the cost of implementing this new requirement for 
airplanes with more than two engines would be significant. The FAA has 
determined that this cost cannot be justified based on the current 
level of safety achieved by the combination of engine reliability and 
the engine redundancy of this fleet of airplanes.
    Airbus and UK CAA cited confusion regarding when ETOPS maintenance 
requirements apply. The elimination of ETOPS maintenance program 
requirements for all part 121 operations for airplanes with more than 
two-engines eliminates most of the confusion. Part 121, Appendix P has 
also been amended to provide any remaining clarification necessary. An 
operator's maintenance program for all two-engine ETOPS airplanes, 
regardless of diversion time, must comply with Sec.  121.374.

B. Limitations on Dual Maintenance

    The FAA has included provisions in today's rule to prevent dual 
maintenance on two-engine ETOPS significant systems during the same 
routine or non-routine visit. This requirement is a codification of 
existing policy and is necessary to recognize and preclude common cause 
human failure modes without proper verification processes or 
operational test prior to conducting ETOPS.
    Many ETOPS maintenance requirements focus on preventing human error 
from threatening flight safety. Of these, common cause failures, where 
the same mistakes are made more than once during maintenance, are the 
greatest threat to long-range operational safety in these airplanes. 
Since 1982, the FAA has recorded ten multiple engine failure events 
resulting from maintenance errors.
    FedEx, KLM, and IATA commented that additional ETOPS dual 
maintenance limitations are unnecessary since requirements are found in 
existing maintenance programs such as those identified in the 
manufacturers Maintenance Planning Document (MPD).
    The FAA disagrees that dual maintenance limitations for all ETOPS 
operations are unnecessary. We also disagree that dual maintenance 
limitations for ETOPS already exist and are identified in an airplane's 
MPD. The FAA agrees an MPD appendix provides a critical systems list. 
However, the tasks identified in that list do not necessarily include 
all ETOPS significant systems.
    It is not the intent of the rule to specifically require a certain 
number of mechanics per airplane. It is incumbent on the operator to 
have processes in place to avoid common cause failure modes. Section 
121.374(c)(ii) addresses those situations where dual maintenance cannot 
be avoided, providing specific requirements under those circumstances. 
Operators need to identify their ETOPS significant systems with the 
assistance of the manufacturers in order to adequately address dual 
maintenance requirements that may arise during scheduled and 
unscheduled maintenance.
    FedEx noted part 121 operators already have a Required Inspection 
Item (RII) program to eliminate maintenance errors and believes this 
program will discover any problems arising from dual maintenance. 
Although the FAA agrees an operator's current RII procedures may be 
used as one method to ensure proper maintenance of ETOPS significant 
systems, it is not necessarily sufficient by itself to avoid dual 
maintenance risks. Furthermore, the FAA does not believe ETOPS 
certificate holders would want to include all their ETOPS significant 
system items into their RII program, nor is the FAA advocating it. 
Verification of ETOPS dual maintenance, when unavoidable, can include 
an RII visual inspection as one method of verification, but additional 
methods may need to be employed to meet ETOPS dual maintenance ground 
verification requirements.
    ATA, United, Continental and others suggested we change the NPRM's 
proposed dual maintenance provisions. The FAA agrees and has revised 
the final rule language. The FAA's intent is for operators to package 
routine maintenance tasks so dual maintenance is never scheduled on the 
same maintenance visit.
    Obviously, it is best never to perform dual maintenance since a 
major cause of airplane diversions and turnbacks due to mechanical 
failures is common-cause human factors. However, the FAA understands 
unforeseen situations may arise necessitating unscheduled dual 
maintenance on an airplane. The FAA expects operators to have in place 
procedures that prevent identical mistakes being made on two systems 
when dual maintenance is accomplished. These procedures must be 
included in the operator's ETOPS Maintenance Document.

C. Maintenance Actions

1. ETOPS Pre-Departure Service Check
    ATA stated the pre-departure check is specifically designed for a 
two-engine airplane and to extend this check to the three- and four-
engine airplane is confusing and may contribute to human error. FedEx, 
KLM and IATA commented that this check would add man-hours and costs 
due to the new oil consumption, verification, and dual maintenance 
requirements associated with the pre-departure service check.
    The FAA, as stated previously, has removed this requirement along 
with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for airplanes with more 
than two engines. For two-engine ETOPS the FAA believes the pre-
departure service check is a significant factor in ETOPS' past success. 
The specific content of the check is developed by each ETOPS operator 
and based on ETOPS significant systems verification and historical 
operational data. Accordingly, the check's content varies significantly 
among operators.
    The operator's ETOPS maintenance program should include necessary 
training requirements and work form task identification to eliminate 
confusion. This is one reason for having each operator develop a pre-
departure check tailored to its own operation based upon the equipment 
and performance history of the operator's fleet.
2. Engine Condition Monitoring Program
    ATA commented it is unnecessary for three- and four-engine 
airplanes to have an engine condition monitoring program since current 
practices have served the part 121 operators adequately for the last 30 
years. Many certificate holders currently use engine condition 
monitoring programs for their three- and four-engine airplanes as an 
economic tool to detect engine deterioration and to reduce full thrust 
take off requirements. The ETOPS engine condition monitoring program is 
required to ensure engine inoperative flight can be safely conducted in 
the event of long diversions.
    The FAA acknowledges these comments and has removed this 
requirement along with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for 
airplanes with more than two engines.

[[Page 1837]]

3. Oil Consumption Monitoring Program
    ATA, FedEx, KLM and IATA commented that it is unnecessary for 
airplanes with more than two engines to have an oil consumption 
monitoring program since current practices have served the part 121 
operators adequately for the last 30 years. Additionally, commenters 
said that with the current IFSD rate there is no justification for 
requiring such a program.
    The FAA agrees with these comments and has removed this requirement 
along with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for airplanes with 
more than two engines.
4. Verification Procedures
    ATA stated the FAA provided no justification for its proposed 
verification program and additionally stated that any safety issue that 
arises in the future can be specifically dealt with through the AD 
process. It appears the commenter may be confusing the AD process with 
routine maintenance procedures. This type of verification is in no way 
related to an AD.
    ATA and others commented that there is no justification for having 
a verification program for airplanes with more than two engines that 
goes beyond what is already required by a CASS.
    The FAA agrees with these comments and has removed this requirement 
along with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for airplanes with 
more than two engines
5. Task Identification
    Commenters said recommended ETOPS-specific tasks should be clearly 
defined for two-engine airplanes, but not for three- and four-engine 
airplanes. The FAA agrees with these comments and has removed this 
requirement along with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for 
airplanes with more than two engines
6. Configuration Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) Document
    IATA, FedEx, KLM and others directed comments toward the 
certificate holder's requirement to have a ``system to ensure 
compliance with CMP.'' We believe that many of the comments stemmed 
from a misunderstanding of the requirement. The CMP document is a type 
certification document that some manufactures have produced to 
establish a specific standard for a particular make and model airplane-
engine combination intended for ETOPS operations. A certificate holder 
must evaluate the CMP documents, if applicable, and incorporate the CMP 
requirements. This requirement has been applicable to two-engine 
operations throughout the history of ETOPS.
    However, an existing three-or four-engine airplane may not have a 
CMP document. Accordingly, there is no requirement to comply with a 
CMP. For airplanes with more than two engines, this CMP requirement is 
included in the event that manufacturers develop a CMP document for 
existing three- and four-engine airplanes and for new airplanes being 
type certificated for ETOPS operations that may have a CMP document. 
The FAA does not intend for operators to develop their own CMP, which 
would be tantamount to re-certification Compliance with a CMP is 
comparable to compliance with a manufacturer's Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness (ICA), which the FAA already requires all 
operators to comply with. Accordingly, the FAA has decided to require 
compliance with the CMP for any airplane used in ETOPS when a CMP is 
available.
    FedEx, KLM and IATA recommended that an ETOPS minimum system/
subsystem list be provided by the manufacturer, approved by the FAA, 
and made part of the CMP. The FAA believes that an ETOPS minimum 
system/subsystem list, otherwise referred to as an ETOPS significant 
systems list, may be developed by the manufacturers, and approved by 
the FAA as part of future aircraft certifications. It is impractical to 
develop such a list at this time. The final rule requires that each 
certificate holder, in coordination with the manufacturers and their 
CHDO, develop a list tailored to the certificate holder's operation. 
The FAA believes the list should not be part of a CMP because not all 
ETOPS airplanes will have a CMP. Rather, the list should be contained 
in the certificate holder's ETOPS Maintenance Document.
    IATA, Boeing, FedEx and KLM commented that since there are no CMP 
documents for three- and four-engine aircraft, there is no parts 
control program. The FAA agrees that with no CMP, there is no issue of 
ETOPS parts control for airplanes that do not have a CMP. However, 
Continental went further and suggested that once all aircraft are 
modified with the new time duration parts, there is no need for a parts 
control program. The FAA disagrees. All ETOPS operators must have an 
ongoing parts control program to ensure an ETOPS airplane is maintained 
and to account for all sources of supply, including parts borrowing and 
parts pooling.
7. Training and Documentation
    ATA did not support additional training requirements for three- and 
four-engine airplanes, stating that the existing training has served 
the industry well. ATA had the same comment for procedural changes. The 
FAA agrees with these comments and has removed this requirement along 
with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for airplanes with more 
than two engines

D. Operator Reporting Requirements

    The final rule includes certain proactive safety requirements to 
prevent the occurrence of unsafe conditions that may occur in ETOPS 
service instead of reacting to unsafe conditions after they occur.
    For example, the FAA uses a world fleet IFSD rate, as defined in 
part 25, to monitor airplane propulsion system reliability. This final 
rule contains IFSD rates in Sec.  121.374, above which an operator must 
submit a report to the CHDO, reporting the operator's investigation and 
any necessary correction action taken.
    Various comments were made relative to the need for an ETOPS 
reliability program for three- and four-engine airplanes, the structure 
of the program, and the reporting requirements of the program. Because 
the FAA has decided that the additional engines establish a sufficient 
level of redundancy to merit not imposing additional engine-related 
requirements on operators of airplanes with more than two engines, we 
have removed the reliability program requirement, including IFSD rate 
reporting, along with all ETOPS maintenance program elements for 
airplanes with more than two engines.
    United and Continental discussed the maintenance reporting 
requirements in Sec.  121.374 with American requesting withdrawal of 
the requirements, believing it is redundant to Sec.  121.703. During 
ARAC meetings, there was considerable discussion about these reporting 
requirements. Since Sec.  121.703 does not already contain all the 
requirements found in current ETOPS policy, the final rule codifies 
current policy, creating a new section for a reporting program that has 
successfully served the industry for many years without ambiguity. In 
particular, the reporting requirements for ``problems with systems 
critical to ETOPS'' and ``any other event detrimental to ETOPS'' were 
taken directly from AC 120-42A and the ARAC proposal. The FAA needs to 
be aware of significant mechanical failures that could affect the 
safety of an ETOPS flight, regardless of whether it occurs in the air 
or on the ground. Since

[[Page 1838]]

we have decided against imposing maintenance requirements on operators 
using airplanes with more than two engines, this reporting requirement 
does not apply to those operations.
    Responding to requests by ATA, Continental and United, the agency 
has revised several reporting requirements in the final rule involving 
airplane diversions or turnbacks due to mechanical reasons and their 
effect on future ETOPS operations.
    In addition, the final rule adopts the term ``ETOPS significant 
systems'' to address the ambiguities found by many commenters including 
Fed Ex, Boeing, Singapore Airlines, ALPA and IATA. The key intent of 
the program is to discover mechanical failures on ETOPS airplanes so 
they can be appropriately addressed in the operator's maintenance 
program.
    United and Continental disputed the 72-hour reporting requirement, 
asserting that it does not allow enough time for an operator to 
determine the cause of the occurrence, take corrective action, and 
report that action to the FAA. This requirement is solely to report the 
event, not determine its root cause and take action within a certain 
time limit. This initial reporting requirement is not intended to 
include the final solution but to notify the CHDO of all problems 
associated with ETOPS. The FAA understands many ETOPS diversions are 
for reasons other than mechanical failures. The certificate holder 
needs to identify in its ETOPS maintenance document, how these flights 
will continue after a diversion for non-mechanical reasons, such as a 
medical emergency.

XI. Operational Requirements (Part 121)

A. Route Limitations

    The FAA proposed to define ``ETOPS area of operation'' to mean, for 
turbine-engine-powered-airplanes with two engines, an area beyond 60 
minutes from an adequate airport, or for turbine-engine-powered-
airplanes with more than two engines, an area beyond 180 minutes from 
an adequate airport. These areas are further defined as within the 
authorized ETOPS maximum diversion time approved for the operation 
being conducted and are the basis for FAA approval of ETOPS authorities 
for operators. Finally, ETOPS area of operation was to include the 
North Polar and South Polar areas. An ETOPS area of operation is 
calculated at an approved one-engine inoperative cruise speed under 
standard conditions in still air. The FAA further proposed that 
operations in these areas must be approved by the Administrator and 
would be authorized in the certificate holder's operations 
specifications based on the criteria defined in part 121, appendix P.
    KLM commented the ARAC did not complete its task assignment, which 
was to revise the 60-minute requirement because modern aircraft are 
much more reliable. They further stated that modern aircraft should be 
allowed to operate at least 90 minutes without the ETOPS burden. These 
subjects were not part of the ARAC tasking statement and were not 
included in their proposal to the FAA. Since we did not consider any 
changes to the current ETOPS authorizations in the NPRM beyond those 
recommended by the ARAC, KLM's suggestions are beyond the scope of the 
final rule.
    JAA and UK CAA did not support the application of ETOPS by area. 
These commenters posited it is preferable to set a safety standard for 
ETOPS operations in general, without specifying specific geographic 
areas of applicability. ALPA suggested that the wording in the 
definition be changed to ``areas of ETOPS applicability''.
    The ETOPS authority granted an air carrier since 1985 has always 
been based on an airplane/engine combination, a specific diversion 
time, and the area of operation for which the approval is valid. The 
``area of ETOPS applicability'' concept was developed and recommended 
by the ETOPS ARAC. Although we have maintained the relationship between 
ETOPS approvals and specific geographic areas in most ETOPS 
authorities, we have modified the definition of ``ETOPS area of 
operation'' to exclude the North and South Polar areas and have removed 
the specific definition of ``ETOPS Area of Applicability.'' Operations 
in the polar areas now have certain requirements in this rule based on 
the codification of current polar policy guidance but are not subject 
to other ETOPS requirements unless they meet the ``distance from 
adequate airports'' criteria of 121.161.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ NACA also commented that the definition of ``ETOPS area of 
operation'' includes the entire NOPAC and the North Pacific. This 
commenter objected to any new requirements for three- and four-
engine airplanes that previously had approved operations 
specifications. NACA did not see the correction made to this section 
that was published in the Federal Register 11/18/2003. NOPAC and 
North Pacific are not designated as applicable for ETOPS. ETOPS in 
these areas is defined as a function of distance from adequate 
alternates and not the simple transiting of these areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Airbus and IATA supported clear and concise requirements for ETOPS 
approvals. However, these commenters and others, stated there is no 
safety justification for applying the requirements for two-engine 
airplanes to three- and four-engine airplanes that have built-in 
redundancies. We do not agree with the commenters that ETOPS should not 
be applied under any conditions to airplanes with more than two 
engines. The basic concept of ETOPS is to prevent a diversion but, if a 
diversion is required, to protect that diversion. As discussed earlier, 
the diversion rate for all airplane-related and non-airplane-related 
causes are comparable between two-engine airplanes and airplanes with 
more than two engines. Therefore, the concept of precluding and 
protecting the diversion has equal validity, regardless of the number 
of engines. In addition, the ETOPS requirements for three- and four-
engine aircraft apply only to passenger operations and then only when 
these operations are greater than 180 minutes from an alternate 
airport. Applied to current technology aircraft and engines, such 
operations encompass only a very few, distinct areas of the world. More 
importantly, these areas, which comprise the South Pacific between the 
west coast of the United States and Australia, the South Atlantic and 
South Polar region, are indicative of demanding operations over remote 
areas with minimal operational infrastructure. In the case of the 
Poles, the areas also include harsh operating conditions.

B. ETOPS Alternate Airports

1. Determination of ETOPS Alternate Airports
    The FAA proposed to codify the definition of ``adequate airport'' 
found in AC 120.42A. Although the term is used elsewhere in part 121, 
its use is not unique to ETOPS. It has not been defined previously in 
part 121.
    Airbus is concerned with the inclusion of military airports in the 
definition. It questions the ability of a military airport to support a 
recovery plan and recommends that the rule be amended to indicate that 
the operator must obtain written permission from the responsible 
military authority to use a military airport for an en-route ETOPS 
alternate airport, for safety audit and training, and for implementing 
a recovery plan. JAA and JAL made similar comments. UK CAA makes a 
similar comment but adds that a military airport should meet the public 
protection requirements of Sec.  121.97. Other commenters such as 
FedEx, Singapore Airlines and IATA professed confusion over the 
definition and request clarification.
    The FAA believes much of the confusion relates to the criteria 
required

[[Page 1839]]

for an ETOPS alternate airport and those required for the more general 
``adequate airport.'' An adequate airport may not be appropriate for an 
ETOPS diversion because it cannot support a recovery plan, cannot 
provide sufficient rescue and firefighting support, or is experiencing 
inclement weather conditions. ``Adequate airport'' should not be 
defined in terms specific to ETOPS because this new definition is 
intended to cover the term wherever it is used in part 121, not just in 
meeting ETOPS requirements. The criteria for the designation and use of 
ETOPS alternate airports are contained in Sec.  121.624. The 
requirements of Sec.  121.624 apply to all ``adequate airports'' 
(including those that are military airports) and must be met before a 
military airport may be designated as an ETOPS alternate for that 
flight. The FAA agrees that the proposed definition was unclear and has 
amended it to state that an alternate airport must meet the 
requirements of Sec.  121.97. A certificate holder must comply with 
Sec.  121.97 for each airport it uses, including military airports, and 
so it is unnecessary to repeat this limitation on the use of military 
airports in the definition of an adequate airport.
    The FAA proposed that an airplane could not be dispatched for an 
ETOPS flight unless the ETOPS alternate airports could be reached 
within the maximum diversion time under which the flight is to be 
dispatched. Each required ETOPS alternate airport must be listed in the 
dispatch or flight release and meet the specified criteria, including 
passenger protection, and weather minima.
    The FAA proposed that an airport listed as an ETOPS alternate 
airport must have weather forecasts that are at or above the minimums 
specified in the operator's operations specifications. Both JAA and UK 
CAA supported this aspect of the proposal. Airbus and JAA commented 
that this section would require an operator to consider all adequate 
airports within the diversion limits of that operator and some airports 
may not support a recovery plan without the investment of considerable 
resources with no safety benefits. ATA also suggests clarification of 
what a carrier must do in considering whether an adequate airport can 
be an ETOPS alternate airport for the purpose of a particular flight. 
Airbus suggests that either the definition of ``adequate airport'' be 
amended to include a passenger recovery plan, or Sec.  121.624 be 
amended to require operators to consider all adequate airports capable 
of supporting a passenger recovery plan. JAA also recommends the FAA 
revise the definition of an adequate airport to require that such an 
airport should have the necessary infrastructure to support a passenger 
recovery plan.
    The requirement for the operator to consider all adequate airports 
within the diversion limits of the operation will likely be 
accomplished when route planning is conducted for a proposed departure 
and destination airport. It is not the intent of this rule that an 
operator make a determination that all adequate airports within a 
diversion limit fulfill the requirements of an ETOPS alternate airport. 
It is only necessary that every adequate airport in an operator's 
operations specification be used in determining those that, in fact, 
qualify for designation as ETOPS alternate airports during dispatch. 
This information will then be used at the dispatch or flight planning 
stage for the given flight to determine which airport meeting the 
alternate weather criteria will be designated as the ETOPS alternate 
airport. Accordingly, the FAA does not agree that the definition of 
``adequate'' airport needs to be changed.
    ATA, IATA and several carriers requested the FAA include 
suggestions from the ARAC that alternate weather criteria provide 
guidance for relief from most conditional elements of an airport's 
weather forecast. ATA, IATA, and United commented that the ARAC also 
included a revised method of determining alternate minima, based on 
applying Category II and III approaches.
    The ETOPS ARAC developed a weather criteria table for use by 
operators to determine appropriate weather criteria needed in order to 
designate airports as ETOPS alternate airports. The FAA has adopted 
this table, and it will be contained in the advisory material. The FAA 
intends to formulate operator operations specifications for ETOPS 
alternate weather criteria based on this standard. The table includes a 
provision on how to handle conditional (PROB40 and TEMPO)\23\ 
forecasts, and permits the use of weather visibility minimums of 700m 
rather than 800m to allow for variations in the international metric 
weather forecasting standard. This flexibility has been maintained. The 
ETOPS alternate weather criteria table contains the provision for 
Category II and III approaches, as well as single or separate runway 
criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ PROB40 is the probability of 40%. TEMPO is a temporary 
condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ATA and Fed Ex also commented that the ARAC recommended the 
consideration of the use of GPS/RNAV. Singapore, IATA, and United 
recommended that GPS/RNAV be considered at airports where other 
navigational aids are not available. ARAC did not include such 
approaches in its final proposal, and we believe that the request to 
allow GPS/RNAV approaches is beyond the scope of this regulatory 
change. Operators may request to receive this authorization through the 
FAA, which would be reflected in the operator's operations 
specifications.
    JAA recommended the extension of diversion time when necessary to 
allow operators to reach an adequate airport or when necessary to allow 
applicants to disregard airports that present unacceptable standards 
that may impose passenger safety risks.
    The FAA cannot agree with the recommendation. The ETOPS rules are 
predicated on the ability of the airplane and its systems to support a 
possible diversion during the particular operation. Arbitrary extension 
of diversion times is contrary to the entire premise behind ETOPS, 
i.e., management of risk by an operator that is controlled through an 
approved ETOPS program. In addition, the pilot-in-command can exercise 
his command authority to proceed to another airport if he decides that 
proceeding on is as safe or safer than landing sooner. However, 
airports should not be designated as ETOPS alternate airports by the 
operator if they do not meet the required minimum standards for use.
    Japan Airlines commented that some airports may not report as open 
when dispatching is taking place but may be quite normal and usable en 
route. This commenter suggested the language should reflect an operator 
looking at ``expected field conditions'' instead of ``filed condition 
reports.'' The FAA does not agree, and the final rule keeps the NPRM 
language. The agency's intent is to direct the operator to use specific 
field condition reports to determine actual conditions at an airport. 
It is not the FAA's intent to preclude an operator from using an 
airport assumed to be open at time of use, ``from the earliest to the 
latest possible landing time'' as stated in the rule language.
    Qantas disagrees with the proposed weather requirements, stating 
that the older a weather forecast, the more inaccurate it is likely to 
be. Qantas also notes omissions from the NPRM. For example, the NPRM 
does not mention Safety Height Planning to account for some areas of 
the world where special tracking procedures are required due to 
terrain. Also, the NPRM requires a descent to 10,000 feet when many 
aircraft have passenger oxygen systems that allow extended operations 
at 14,000 feet.

[[Page 1840]]

    The FAA does not understand the comment on special tracking 
procedures. The en-route fuel supply requirement of Sec.  121.646 (b) 
requires a descent following a rapid decompression to a safe altitude 
in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of Sec.  121.333. 
This would accommodate an altitude higher than 10,000 feet if the 
operator were equipped with an augmented passenger oxygen system.

2. Passenger Recovery Plans

    The FAA proposed in the NPRM that all U.S. flag and supplemental 
operations include a passenger recovery plan applicable to each 
approved en-route alternate airport listed in the air carrier's 
operations specifications. This proposal was not limited to ETOPS 
operations. Airbus commented the FAA has defined neither the purpose 
nor scope of such plans nor the approval process. Along with several 
other commenters, it also stated that it finds it difficult to comment 
on details yet to be defined for a recovery plan. Airbus, JAA, KLM and 
other commenters also posited that such plans should only pertain to 
airports in harsh environments or to airports located in areas where a 
diversion conducted without specific advance planning might result in a 
hazard to passengers. They believe that there is no safety 
justification for any other plans and to include all airports creates 
an administrative burden with no safety justification. UK CAA makes 
similar comments. Airbus further stated there is no justification for 
requiring a plan for airports other than ETOPS alternate airports, and 
does not support any other application. Airbus further stated that the 
costs of this rule would be prohibitive and the FAA should include all 
costs of developing passenger recovery plans in the rule. Air New 
Zealand supported the concept of the need for a plan that addresses the 
shelter, well-being, and recovery of passengers.
    The FAA agrees in principle with the concept that such plans need 
to particularly address only those airports that would present a 
challenge to protecting passengers in the event of a diversion. The FAA 
accepts the premise that the general application of this philosophy is 
satisfied for the majority of airports by generic contingency planning 
by operators. Consequently we have limited the requirement for recovery 
plans in this rulemaking A specific recovery plan is only required for 
ETOPS alternate airports used in ETOPS greater than 180 minutes and for 
diversion airports that support operations in the North Polar and South 
Polar areas. The FAA does not agree that this requirement should apply 
only to ETOPS alternates. Current FAA policy for Polar flying requires 
that ``a sufficient set of alternate airports'' must be able to 
``provide for the physiological needs of the passengers and crew for 
the duration until safe evacuation''. No safety justification has been 
given for the elimination of this requirement during the ARAC process 
or by the commenters, and it is retained in this rulemaking for all 
airplanes not engaged in all-cargo operations. The regulatory 
evaluation supporting this final rule includes the estimated costs of 
providing these specific passenger recovery plans. Airbus, IATA, and 
several operators believe that cargo operators should be exempted from 
the requirement for passenger recovery plans. We agree that passenger 
recovery plans are not necessary for all-cargo operators. The language 
in Sec.  121.135 has been changed to specify only ``passenger'' flag 
and supplemental operations.
    ALPA noted that some operations may have only one choice for 
diversion and therefore it is critical that alternate airports have the 
capabilities, services, and facilities to safely support the diversion. 
The FAA agrees. The rule stated this requirement for all alternate 
airports in the North Polar and South Polar areas and for ETOPS greater 
than 180 minutes.
    ATA commented that with its limited operations, any rigid 
requirements would add significant costs. Therefore, this operator 
requested a compliance period of 18 months. The FAA agrees that a 
delayed compliance period is appropriate but considers 18 months 
excessive. The FAA has changed the rule to allow U.S. flag and 
supplemental air carriers a 12-month implementation period to develop 
airport specific passenger recovery plans.
    FedEx and IATA commented the FAA should accept regional plans 
rather than require airport specific plans and that facilities on site 
that protect passengers from the elements for 48 hours should be 
acceptable.
    The FAA does not believe the designation and use of certain 
airports in extreme climatic areas can be covered adequately by a 
``regional'' type plan. The FAA agrees that current contingency 
planning is sufficient to eliminate the need for regional plans for 
most operations but agrees with most commenters that specific plans are 
appropriate for airports in harsh environments or to airports located 
in areas where advanced planning could be hazardous to passengers. For 
this reason the requirement for a regional plan has been eliminated 
from this rulemaking. The ARAC considered the possible costs and 
logistics for recovery plans and recommended that 48 hours is 
sufficient time to effect passenger recovery. The FAA agrees with this 
premise.
    IATA commented that limiting the airports to those that offer 
sufficient shelter and can satisfy the physiological needs of 
passengers may reduce the number of airports that can be considered. 
This commenter believes the capabilities of the aircraft (blankets, 
dinghies, etc.) should be considered.
    There is no question that onboard equipment such as blankets can be 
used for the safety and comfort of passengers for a short period of 
time. However, in a diversion, advanced planning should dictate there 
would be sufficient availability of facilities for the protection of 
passengers and crew. A plan depending on long-term use of the airplane 
hull to protect passengers and crew from the elements is not considered 
acceptable.
    The FAA proposed to clarify the ``public protection'' requirement 
of Sec.  121.97 to include data showing the availability of facilities 
at each airport or in the immediate area sufficient to protect the 
passengers and crew from the elements and to see to their welfare.
    FedEx commented the FAA is demanding data that is not available in 
such detail at all airports around the world. JAA seeks clarification 
as to the detail of such required information.
    That is, what is ``adequate'' in areas of severe climate? Several 
commenters suggested an enhanced definition of ``adequate'', to include 
severe climate area, and typical weather and seasonal variations. The 
JAA maintained that a more enhanced definition could then be used to 
define an operation as ETOPS or non-ETOPS.
    Providing ``public protection'' data is a current regulatory 
requirement. However, in response to this concern, the FAA is limiting 
this expanded requirement only to airports used by passenger-carrying 
airplanes for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes and for operations in the North 
Polar and South Polar areas. By definition, airports used in these 
operations are either in remote or demanding areas of the world. By 
their nature such airports will require extra attention to the safety 
of passengers in a diversion scenario. It is incumbent on all 
passenger-carrying operators to have contingencies for such an event. 
It is expected that more than one carrier will serve such routes and 
the data will be shared and readily available. We agree in principle 
with the JAA's comment,

[[Page 1841]]

but do not agree that it is necessary to change the definition of 
``adequate airport''. The ``public protection'' requirements of this 
rule have always applied to all airports used by an operator. The 
expanded definition of this rulemaking likewise does not differentiate 
with regard to weather extremes.
3. Rescue and Firefighting Services (RFFS)
    The FAA proposed in the NPRM to codify current two-engine ETOPS 
RFFS criteria for all ETOPS alternate airports. ICAO Category 4 RFFS at 
alternate airports would be required for ETOPS operations up to 180-
minute diversion length. For all ETOPS beyond 180 minutes ICAO Category 
7 services would be required.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Although not completely equivalent to part 139, ICAO RFFS 
categories are applied in a similar manner. ICAO category 4 is 
generally equivalent to part 139 Index A and is defined as suitable 
for the needs of an ATR-42 or equivalent airplane. It can consist of 
1 truck and 500 lbs. of halon and 100 gallons of AFFF (fire fighting 
foam). ICAO category 7 is generally equivalent to Index C, suitable 
for a B-757 and can consist of two trucks and 3000 gallons of AFFF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current RFFS standards for airports are contained in part 139. 
These requirements are indexed to a formula based on aircraft width and 
length and the number of operations of a particular type of airplane at 
the airport. Section 121.590 specifies the conditions U.S. domestic, 
flag and supplemental carriers must use in their operations at part 139 
certified airports and imposes these requirements on destination 
airports but not on alternate airports. AC 120-42A placed RFFS 
requirements on alternate airports used in ETOPS.
    KLM noted that in the case of a fire in the cargo hold, the plane 
will divert to the nearest airport, which may not be the designated 
category 7. Qantas claims that since the introduction of ETOPS there 
has never been an ETOPS related incident where RFFS were required. ATA 
and many operators did not support the NPRM requirement for Category 7 
for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes and recommend that the less 
stringent criteria for current two-engine 207-minute ETOPS apply. IATA 
and FedEx commented that there is no scientific reason to connect RFFS 
to the length of the diversion. KLM made a similar comment. IATA noted 
that if an operator needed to rely on airports with a greater than 
category 4 RFFS, the proposed rule might result in forcing the 
selection of an alternate airport further from the planned route than 
necessary. ALPA, however, supported an ICAO category 7 capability for 
all ETOPS alternate airports.
    The requirement for RFFS levels for ETOPS below 180 minutes and for 
207 minutes are well known and set the precedent for these rules. It is 
the FAA's position that such requirements are applicable for all long 
range operations defined by this rule. The captain (pilot in command) 
of any flight, ETOPS included, is allowed by regulation to land the 
plane safely wherever necessary in an emergency. The purpose of this 
rule is to ensure that all alternate airports supporting these 
demanding operations have a reasonable minimum capability. The FAA does 
not believe it can justify the requirement to have an increased RFFS 
level of ICAO category 7 at each designated ETOPS alternate airport for 
ETOPS beyond 180 minutes. Although the recommendation for a category 7 
RFFS capability in the ARAC report was accepted by the FAA, several 
commenters have pointed out the restrictions and limitations that such 
a requirement presents to the planning and conduct of ETOPS beyond 180 
minutes. There is, however, overall support for the requirement to have 
RFFS capability at ETOPS alternate airports, and there is general 
acceptance that the ICAO category 4 represents the minimum acceptable 
level.
    The proposed RFFS requirement was developed as a logical extension 
of the standard establishment for the 207-minute ETOPS policy. The FAA 
continues to believe that it is important that there be at least one 
airport available with sufficient RFFS capability to deal with a 
significant safety hazard. Accordingly, the FAA has amended Sec.  
121.106 to be consistent with the RFFS requirements established for the 
207-minute ETOPS policy. For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, ICAO category 4 
would be required with at least one adequate airport within the 
authorized diversion time having a RFFS category 7 capability. This 
change will allow for optimum route planning as well as providing the 
flight crew with available alternate airport options in the event a 
situation requires a higher RFFS capability.
    Omni commented that the majority of ETOPS diversions are for 
medical emergencies, yet there are no requirements for adequate medical 
care on the ground. This commenter also found an airport may downgrade 
its declared fire fighting capabilities at some point without the 
knowledge of the operator, or that an airport may be unable to inform 
operators of downgrades because of lack of authority from the State 
Civil Aviation Authority. Qantas noted GPS or Required Navigation 
Performance (RNP) approaches would make landing much safer, yet no 
requirements for these approaches appear in the NPRM.
    There is no regulated plan for a medical emergency because the FAA 
cannot assess the relative risk associated with medical emergencies. 
These are events that defy risk analysis. Certain guidelines have been 
codified for passenger recovery and public protection in today's rule 
the FAA considers adequate. Regulating the standards for airport 
approaches as urged by Qantas is beyond the scope of this regulation.

C. Crewmember and Dispatcher Training

    Today's rule requires training for crewmembers and dispatchers in 
their roles and responsibilities in the certificate holder's passenger 
recovery plan.
    JAA, UK CAA, and United supported such a requirement. FedEx and 
IATA concur with additional training for pilots and dispatchers, but 
note that training for pilots of three- and four-engine airplanes may 
result in a tradeoff with other training. Therefore, they requested 
training only in fields where there is an obvious justification or 
safety benefit. American Trans Air concurred with the training 
requirement but requests a compliance period of 18 months.
    The FAA agrees that air carriers need a reasonable compliance 
period to make necessary adjustments as a result of a new rule. However 
we do not agree with the proposed 18-month period, and instead will 
allow a 12-month compliance period from the effective date of the rule. 
We also understand that an air carrier may need to adjust the pilot 
training syllabus in order to accommodate the new training unit for 
three- and four-engine flight crews. This should not be a significant 
change. Therefore, it should not be a significant cost to operators.
    Northwest assumed that its experience on trans-oceanic flights is 
sufficient, but if additional training is required by the certificate 
management office, then it would like to do so through bulletins and 
written procedures to minimize costs. It is the FAA's position that the 
training syllabus as well as the means to provide that training is 
within the air carrier's discretion. It can and should be tailored to 
fit within the existing training and operational experience of the 
carrier.
    Qantas commented that the NPRM did not consider the simplified 
ETOPS training rules that have been in place in Australia for 18 years 
that require little or no training. These rules have resulted in no 
ETOPS-related incidents. Qantas

[[Page 1842]]

further noted that the pilot and dispatcher are only a small component 
of the diversion process.
    The FAA agrees with the commenter that straightforward and 
understandable rules establishing minimum acceptable standards are 
needed. We believe today's rule establishes those standards. We do not 
agree, however, that established standards, no matter how 
``simplified'' they may be, need not be part of pilot and dispatcher 
training. The FAA is well aware that for ETOPS, and in particular with 
an ETOPS flight that encounters the need to divert, it is the entire 
company that mobilizes to support that diversion. Both the pilot and 
the dispatcher are a critical part of the diversion and need to be 
trained accordingly.

D. Communications Requirements

    The FAA proposed that a certificate holder conducting U.S. flag 
operations provide voice communications for ETOPS flights. For ETOPS 
beyond 180 minutes the certificate holder must have a second 
communication system that provides immediate SATCOM with ``landline 
telephone-fidelity''. Section 121.122 extends this ETOPS beyond 180 
minutes requirement to supplemental passenger-carrying operations and 
to two-engine all-cargo operations.
    Continental and other commenters objected to the prescriptive 
requirement for SATCOM. They suggested a more flexible requirement for 
voice-based systems. ATA, Airbus, and other commenters urged the FAA to 
coordinate any new ETOPS communication requirements with the Terminal 
Area Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee (TAOARC) recommended 
language.
    The FAA has coordinated the amendment to Sec. Sec.  121.99 and 
121.122 with the parallel activity by the TAOARC and Area Navigation 
(RNAV) rulemaking initiative (Docket No. FAA-2002-1-4002). As of this 
writing, the RNAV final communications rule (Sec.  121.99) has not been 
finalized. The FAA has determined that there is a significant safety 
benefit associated with an ETOPS flight having the ability to 
communicate via a satellite based voice system, especially for those 
situations that occur while on long, remote ETOPS routes. The need for 
safety is best served through information and technical assistance that 
is clearly and rapidly transmitted to the flight crew in a way that 
requires the least amount of distraction to piloting duties best serves 
the need for safety. The FAA has determined that the best way to assure 
clear and timely communication in general is via voice communication. 
Other than the area north of 82 degrees latitude, satellite 
communications provides the best means to provide that capability 
because it is not limited by distance.
    FedEx, IATA, United, and Continental and others noted that SATCOM 
may not be useable beyond 82 degrees North latitude, and is thus 
ineffective for operations in Polar areas. The FAA recognizes the 
limitations of SATCOM in the North Polar Area above this latitude, and 
in such an area an alternate communication system such as HF voice or 
data link is to be used. The relatively short period of time that the 
flight is above latitude 82 degrees North in relation to the total 
planned flight time is a small fraction of the total flight. The 
ability to use SATCOM for all other portions of the flight, which for 
some routes could be longer than 15 hours duration, is advantageous to 
the flight. For flights above 82 degrees latitude the operator must 
also ensure that communications requirements can be met by the most 
reliable means available, taking into account the potential 
communication disruption due to solar flare activity.
    Several commenters noted that the proposed communication 
requirements are more restrictive than the current 207-minute policy 
letter. Continental asserted that ARAC recognized that SATCOM was 
costly and arbitrary and chose to recommend it because it was first 
specified in the 207-minute operations letter. In its development of 
the 207-minute policy, the FAA and industry agreed that the areas of 
the world defined by ETOPS greater than 180 minutes were remote areas 
where the safety benefits of SATCOM would be significant. There is 
considerable difference in the level of operational authority allowed 
with the 207-minute North Pacific area of operation (NOPAC) authority, 
which is a limited extension of the 180-minute ETOPS authority and an 
infrequent operation and that of the proposed approval for beyond 180-
minute operations. ETOPS authorizations in Appendix P to part 121 for 
greater than 180 minutes allows operations on a continuous basis up to 
the certified time-limited system capability of the airplane.
    IATA and FedEx proposed that operators of three- and four-engine 
airplanes be allowed to continue ETOPS without SATCOM for a period not 
to exceed 6 years. JAL proposed a similar exemption consistent with the 
6 months allowed in Sec.  121.633 for system planning. We agree with 
the commenters that a period of time should be allowed for the air 
carrier to install the required satellite communication system on 
airplanes not currently subject to ETOPS authorization restrictions but 
believe 6 years is too long a period of time. We have amended 
Sec. Sec.  121.99 and 121.122 to allow for a 12-month installation 
period for airplanes with more than two engines used for ETOPS.
    ATA commented that HF voice and HF data link communication are 
sufficient for the safety of ETOPS. We agree that the use of data link 
for communications is a very effective tool especially when used to 
transfer blocks of data such as revised flight plans or updated winds 
aloft data or to downlink airplane performance data. It is also very 
effective when used for controller pilot data link communication to 
transmit air traffic service clearances and flight crew responses using 
pre-stored messages. However, data link becomes more cumbersome when 
used in free text message form. The use of data link (both HF and 
SATCOM) is limited by message length and ability to clearly state the 
issue or message, and tasks the flight crew more than voice 
communication by requiring full attention to the task of interacting 
with a small and compact keypad. Turbulence and airplane maneuvering 
compounds the difficulty in using the device without error. Its use 
also necessitates crew coordination/verification of message content 
prior to sending the message. This is extremely distracting during a 
time of flight that requires the pilot's focused attention to the 
problem at hand. In comparison, the use of voice SATCOM allows clear 
and immediate conversation that can quickly convey the situation and 
needs for the flight.
    Omni commented that the proposal does not meet its intended safety 
purpose: it requires an operator to structure its operations around the 
availability of SATCOM rather than more sophisticated communications 
systems. Moreover, this commenter and Airbus found the FAA did not 
clearly define ``landline fidelity'' in quantifiable terms. Several 
commenters stated that flight watch \25\ can be adequately conducted 
with HF voice communication, and that in most regions of the globe 
there are adequate ground and communication facilities available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Flight watch is a shortened term for use in air-ground 
contacts to identify a flight service station providing ``En-route 
Flight Advisory Service (Weather)''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of SATCOM is a new requirement that applies only to ETOPS 
conducted beyond 180 minutes. The other available communication systems

[[Page 1843]]

in use (VHF and HF voice and data link) all have significant 
limitations. VHF has poor range capability. HF two-way voice 
communications are routinely degraded by voice distortion, background 
noise, static, and can be unclear and unintelligible due to atmospheric 
conditions and frequency clutter. Voice SATCOM allows for immediate 
clarification by use of questions and dialogue that will result in 
important and relevant information being clearly transmitted. This 
occurs with minimum workload and distraction to the flight crew from 
their piloting duties. It is by many factors over, a quantum leap 
improvement in communications that can greatly benefit the safety of a 
flight; particularly an ETOPS flight that could be 4 or more hours from 
a landing site. The capabilities of SATCOM to connect with the 
communications satellite are not hindered by the altitude of the 
airplane, and are useable on the ground following a diversion. The 
communication benefits are clear.
    The words selected in the rule ``of landline telephone-fidelity'' 
are to convey to the average person in the United States the 
communication qualities expected. A person knowledgeable of the 
communication qualities of SATCOM understands the equivalent 
relationship in comparison to landline telephone fidelity. The 
quantifiable term ``landline telephone-fidelity'' is in reference to 
the experience one would have using the telephone system in the United 
States. The FAA disagrees with the comment that the rule would require 
operators to structure its operations around the availability of SATCOM 
before considering alternatives. The rule language does not restrict 
operations based on the availability of satellite based voice 
communication.
    Airbus, IATA and FedEx commented that although operators may 
initially ensure communication infrastructures, demonstrating the 
reliability and response time to local air traffic personnel on a 
continuing basis may be an impossible task. The FAA does not understand 
the commenters' objection to Sec.  121.122(a). The requirement for the 
air carrier to identify the ground- or satellite-based communication 
installations to ensure reliable and rapid communications with air 
traffic services has been a long-standing requirement for U.S. flag air 
carriers (Sec.  121.99(a)).
    Boeing recommended deleting the word ``additional'' to dispel any 
interpretation of needing a second satellite-based communication 
system.
    It is not possible for an air carrier to have a SATCOM system 
installed in place of the communication system required by Sec.  
121.99(a) because SATCOM does not have broadcast capability. If, 
however, an air carrier has already installed SATCOM as an additional 
communications system, as Boeing suggests, to meet the requirement of 
Sec.  121.99(c), then there would not be a requirement for a second 
``additional'' system to satisfy Sec.  121.99(d). The air carrier is 
not required to install two ``additional'' satellite-based 
communication systems to meet the regulatory requirement. The FAA 
requires the additional voice communication system to be a satellite-
based system.
    Airbus also noted that operators may have to bear expenses charged 
by owners of satellite systems, particularly in Polar areas, a cost not 
included in the FAA's economic evaluation. JAA also urged the FAA to 
consider these prescriptive requirements in its cost/benefit analysis. 
The FAA agrees, and the Final Regulatory Evaluation includes the costs 
for installation and use of SATCOM.
    ATA objected to a requirement for SATCOM for supplemental 
operators, while ALPA supports such a requirement. As stated earlier, 
the FAA has agreed that for the particular case of all-cargo, 
supplemental operations on airplanes with more than two engines the 
cost of the ETOPS requirements such as SATCOM cannot be justified. This 
communication requirement has been withdrawn from this rule

E. Time-Limited System Planning and the Critical Fuel Scenario

    The FAA proposed that planned ETOPS diversion times not exceed the 
time limit specified in the airplane's most time limited system minus 
15 minutes. In the case of cargo fire-suppression systems for airplanes 
with more than two engines, the proposal allowed 6 years for 
compliance. The FAA anticipates that the most time-limited system would 
typically be either the cargo fire suppression system if required, or 
the en-route fuel supply. Current two-engine ETOPS guidance codified in 
this rule for operations up to 180 minutes bases diversion times on a 
one-engine inoperative cruise speed (under standard conditions in still 
air). Required system capabilities are then based on this calculation. 
The rule requires wind to be considered for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes to 
ensure that system time limits are not exceeded. Since data has shown 
the likelihood of a simultaneous engine failure and cargo fire to be 
extremely remote, for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, the cargo fire 
suppression system requirement is based on an all engine operating 
speed calculating the effect of wind.
    The FAA proposed to define ``one engine inoperative cruise speed'' 
for ETOPS as a speed within the certified operating limits of the 
airplane, selected by the certificate holder and approved by the FAA, 
that is used for calculating fuel reserve requirements and the still 
air distance associated with the maximum approved one-engine-
inoperative diversion distance for the flight.
    FedEx, Singapore Airlines, JAL, and IATA recommended the FAA 
develop more detailed information for determining one-engine 
inoperative cruise speeds to increase operational flexibility. These 
commenters also recommended the FAA establish conditions or scenarios 
for calculating the maximum approved distances (using still air) 
associated with one-engine inoperative operations.
    The definition is already flexible in that the certificate holder 
selects the speed as long as that speed is within the certified 
operating limits for the airplane. This gives operational flexibility 
for different areas of operation where the engine inoperative net 
level-off altitude may require consideration of terrain and other 
factors. The certificate holder must also get FAA approval to use that 
speed. This selected and approved speed is also the speed used to 
determine the critical fuel reserves required for ETOPS by Sec.  
121.646(b). While this approval gives the certificate holder 
flexibility, it would not be acceptable to the FAA for a certificate 
holder to designate the fastest possible speed in order to achieve the 
largest ETOPS area of operation, and then use a slower speed in 
determining critical fuel reserves to reduce the amount of fuel 
reserves. The speed used by the certificate holder to determine the 
critical fuel reserves must be the same speed used to determine the 
ETOPS area of operation in that geographical area.
    Air New Zealand commented that the proposed requirement for ETOPS 
flights beyond 180 minutes for cargo suppression time to be adjusted 
for wind and temperature is unreasonable. FedEx and United echo this 
objection.
    The ETOPS ARAC Working Group deliberated extensively over the 
concept of applying wind and temperature values in calculating ETOPS 
distances. The conclusion reached was that for ETOPS up to and 
including 180 minutes, the present standard of calculating the distance 
in still air was adequate and should continue. However with the 
diversion times increasing to 240 minutes and beyond, it was deemed

[[Page 1844]]

appropriate to require diversion time computations for longer ETOPS 
distances to account for winds and temperature, because the total 
effect on long flights could be considerable. The FAA has accepted the 
ARAC recommendation. The FAA does not agree with the commenter that 
calculations with actual and forecast wind and temperature are 
unreasonable. All fuel planning and critical fuel reserves needs are 
already computed based on forecast wind data.
    The FAA also agrees that the planning for an ETOPS flight beyond 
180 minutes is more complex in that wind and temperature are factored 
into determining an all engine speed distance as well as an engine-
inoperative speed distance. The FAA expects that an airline would first 
conduct a route planning exercise for each planned city pairing to 
determine the diversion authority needed in still air conditions. If 
the route or segments of the route exceed 180 minutes based on one 
engine inoperative speed and still air, then a secondary planning 
exercise (that may be required seasonally) should be conducted that 
factors in expected winds and temperatures on that route. The distance 
between adequate alternate airports on the route is converted into time 
(minutes) computed for an all engine cruise speed, as well as an engine 
inoperative speed. The number of minutes cannot exceed the time-limited 
system (cargo fire suppression and the other most limiting system) that 
is identified in the airplane flight manual less the 15-minute pad. The 
operator needs to determine how much system capability is required for 
the planned route and equip its airplane to have sufficient margins. 
The FAA expects that manufacturers will provide system capability with 
a margin greater than the 15 minutes required by the rule so that the 
operator has more flexibility when unforecast adverse winds are 
encountered. Thus, the operator, in coordination with the manufacturer, 
needs to determine how much extra margin should be allocated to provide 
greater flexibility when encountering the unexpected on the planned 
routes. Finally for the actual flight, the operator's flight planning 
must be within the airplane systems capability for the selected ETOPS 
alternate airports on the planned route based on diversion times that 
are calculated using known or forecast winds and temperature 
conditions. Airplane flight manual system limits must be adhered to. 
Any segment planning that provides only a minimum of excess time-
limited system capability compared to the maximum distance from an 
airport on the route should be backed up with an alternate course of 
action.
    ALPA, FedEx, Singapore, and IATA commented that there is no fire 
suppression limit for ETOPS up to and including 180 minutes. Because of 
this, FedEx and United suggested a fire suppression time guideline 
beyond 180 minutes rather than final limit. ALPA, on the other hand, 
stated this limit should be applied to operations up to 180 minutes as 
well as those over 180 minutes. United requested clarification that 
this requirement is an amendment to part 25.
    The FAA acknowledges the apparent disparity created by applying 
time-limited systems capability, such as cargo fire suppression 
capability, only to those three- and four-engine airplanes conducting 
ETOPS and not to those airplanes operating 180 minutes or less. Since 
the overwhelming number of airplanes with three or four engines will 
not be used in ETOPS, the FAA recognizes that the costs to retrofit the 
cargo fire suppression system for all of the other airplanes would be 
significant, and simply overwhelm the benefit that would be derived.
    In response to FedEx and United's comment, the principle of 
requiring system capabilities that are sufficient to support the 
operation and to protect the operation from occurrences that are not 
extremely improbable is a basic tenet of all previous ETOPS guidelines. 
These have been instrumental in the success of current ETOPS in the 
absence of rulemaking. Now tasked with developing regulatory language 
for such operations, the FAA finds it prudent to define them as rules 
and not guidelines. This is a part 121 limitation on the operation. The 
only part 25 requirement is to place this time capability into the 
airplane flight manual.
    ATA recommends that the cargo suppression requirements be revised 
to apply only to airplanes that do not incorporate procedures for fire 
suppression through oxygen starvation. This section should clearly 
state that its provisions apply only to Class C cargo compartments. 
Boeing, IATA, and many operators make similar comments. Northwest 
comments that since the majority of all-cargo operations have only 
Class E compartments, they should be excluded from this requirement. 
The FAA agrees that the intent of ARAC and the final rule would only 
apply to those cargo and baggage compartments that have an ``active'' 
fire suppression system installed, i.e., systems that incorporate fire-
suppressing agents in containers that limit the length of time that 
these agents can suppress a fire. Most airplanes used in part 121 
passenger-carrying service have only Class C cargo or baggage 
compartments, or Class D compartments retrofitted with time-limited 
fire suppression systems. Some all-cargo two-engine airplanes may have 
Class C compartments or retrofitted Class D compartments, although most 
have only Class E compartments. Class E compartments may only be 
installed in all-cargo airplanes. The rule announced today requires 
that carriers determine--in terms of time--the most limiting fire 
suppression system capability. This rule does not apply to Class E 
compartments, whose method of extinguishing a fire is not time-limited.
    Boeing suggested adding ``or CMP'' to paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) 
to permit ETOPS operators to continue their operations without 
potential disruption. Boeing also suggested the proposed rule should 
allow the all engine speed for determining allowable ETOPS time to an 
alternate airport for time-limited systems other than the cargo fire 
suppression system. Their premise is that there may be other non-engine 
related time-limited systems that would be appropriate to consider as 
all-engine operations for calculating the ETOPS time to an alternate 
airport.
    The FAA agrees that the time-limited system capability may be 
included in the CMP document, and has amended the rule accordingly. The 
FAA does not agree that Sec.  121.633(c) should be changed as 
suggested. Diversion lengths have always been limited by the most time-
limited system, which has historically been the cargo fire suppression 
system. During ETOPS ARAC discussions material was presented to show 
that the probability of an engine failure and a simultaneous cargo fire 
both occurring at the most critical point in flight was extremely 
improbable. This analysis supported the decision to separate diversion 
lengths for cargo fire suppression system capability from other time-
limited systems capability. This was accomplished by allowing the use 
of all-engine speed calculation for the cargo fire suppression limit, 
and the one-engine inoperative speed calculation for the other most 
limiting systems. There has not been any other time-limited system 
identified by anyone that would justify a similar procedure as is 
allowed for the cargo fire suppression system.
    FedEx, KLM, and IATA commented that the proposed cargo fire 
suppression system might be technically and/or economically difficult 
to accomplish. These commenters suggested an 8-year compliance period. 
Boeing

[[Page 1845]]

recommended ``grandfathering'' three- and four-engine airplanes for 
paragraph (c) of Sec.  121.633 because the installation of such systems 
would essentially require recertification of airplanes manufactured 
over 30 years ago.
    The FAA agrees that older and current three- and four-engine 
airplanes should be given consideration in application of this rule. 
However, the commenters have not submitted any data to support their 
position and the FAA cannot independently justify extending this 
exemption to 8 years based on the data it has. The 6-year period was a 
recommendation from industry following extensive discussion and debate.
    FedEx, United, and IATA also suggested that the manufacturer should 
provide a list of time-limited systems to enable a consistent industry 
application of this rule.
    The rule requires that the manufacturer provide the systems limit 
in the airplane flight manual for the cargo fire suppression system, 
and the next most time-limited system that is installed on the 
airplane. The FAA does not anticipate a need to account for more than 
the top two time-limited systems, although a manufacturer is welcome to 
provide more information if it so chooses.
    FedEx, KLM, and IATA asked about the diversion considerations 
caused by headwinds and whether the flight should be cancelled if this 
factor cannot be accommodated. The FAA clarified that the time limited 
system capability that is stated in the airplane flight manual cannot 
be exceeded. If the airplane systems capability is not adequate for the 
intended route, then the flight cannot proceed. The operator must 
ensure that the airplanes systems capability is sufficient for the 
intended route.
    KLM commented that the only time-limiting system that can be 
justified is the cargo hold fire suppression. They stated that oxygen 
cannot be limiting since this has to be covered by procedures. The FAA 
cannot agree. Although the best-known and understood limiting 
capability system is the cargo fire suppression system, the 
manufacturer must still identify the next most limiting system, because 
the incident requiring diversion may be unrelated to a fire in the 
cargo hold. For some airplanes this second limiting factor may be the 
fuel load capability of the airplane, which needs as a minimum the 
capability to support the required ETOPS critical fuel reserves.
    UK CAA and the JAA agreed with the proposal but noted that UK CAA 
airplanes incorporate the required 15 minutes within the calculation of 
all time-limited functions. Commenters stated that the 15 minutes 
should not be incorporated twice. The FAA agrees that the European 
regulation should not require the 15-minute pad twice. These and other 
issues require harmonization to be resolved in follow-on discussions 
that would determine applicability.
    The FAA proposed to define ``maximum diversion time'' to mean, for 
the purposes of ETOPS in part 121, the diversion time, under standard 
conditions in still air at the one-engine inoperative cruise speed. JAA 
and UK CAA found this definition misleading as it refers only to still 
air time. These commenters suggested that an approved still airtime be 
given to operators and that the maximum diversion time be defined as 
the system limit (to be determined on the day of the flight in the 
forecast conditions).
    We generally agree with this comment. For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes 
use of this term is only applicable to prior ETOPS route planning, not 
day-to-day operations. Accordingly, the definition is clarified to 
read, ``for ETOPS route planning,'' thus applying to all ETOPS planning 
(including operations beyond 180 minutes). This does not contradict the 
new Sec.  121.633, which applies to day-to-day operations since the 
term ``maximum diversion time'' is not used in that section.
    Today's rule requires in Sec.  121.646 that an airplane have enough 
fuel on board, assuming combinations of an engine failure and a rapid 
decompression at the most critical point of the route, to land at an 
adequate airport with enough additional fuel to hold for 15 minutes at 
1500 feet above field elevation. It adds additional fuel requirements 
to compensate for wind, icing, and an APU unit, if one is required as a 
power source. This subject has been termed the ``critical fuel 
scenario'' and has been a significant part of two-engine ETOPS guidance 
from AC120.42A. Based on the weather forecasting techniques of the 
early 1980s, the advisory circular required very conservative 
calculations for wind and icing effects. The advisory circular required 
a 5% fuel addition to total fuel to account for wind forecast errors 
and required the operator to assume icing and ice drag for the entire 
scenario. However, winds-aloft forecasting has improved dramatically in 
the last twenty years. The use of these products and techniques has 
reduced the need for such conservative calculations and the FAA is 
requiring only a 5% adjustment to the forecast wind if approved 
techniques are employed. Based on studies done by the Atmospheric 
Environment Service of Canada such as CASP II, the probability of a 
continuous or repetitive significant icing encounter is very small on a 
long flight segment. For these reasons the proposed icing calculations 
have been reduced to the effects of ice drag during only 10% of the 
time ice is forecast or the use of icing systems during the entire time 
of forecast icing.
    ATA, Northwest, United, and IATA commented that the requirement for 
an additional 15 minutes of fuel for the three- and four-engine 
airplane for more than 90 minutes, but less than 180 minutes, will add 
costs to operators. ATA suggested that the current fuel requirements be 
retained for these aircraft.
    The FAA accepts the comment that the additional 15 minutes of 
holding fuel is a new requirement that has been added to Sec.  
121.646(a) to require sufficient fuel for a decompression scenario. 
However, the added 15-minute holding-fuel requirement does not 
represent an additional cost to operators. Part 121 currently has two 
separate fuel requirements that apply to three- and four-engine 
operators conducting U.S. flag and supplemental operations. Section 
121.645(b)(4) requires fuel for 30 minutes at holding speed at 1,500 
feet with all engines operating. Section 121.193(c)(2)(iv) requires 
fuel to fly with two engines inoperative to an airport to arrive 1500 
feet directly overhead and then fly for an additional 15 minutes at 
cruise power. The requirement of Sec.  121.646(a) for holding fuel is a 
value less than fuel reserves already required for the operation and 
therefore is not an additional cost to the operator.
    BALPA commented that the reduction of the 5% additional fuel for 
wind is overly optimistic given the ICAO standard of a 20% forecasting 
error and the fact that typically fuel-indicating systems are accurate 
only to a 1-1.5% scale. BALPA suggested that the critical fuel 
calculation have an additional sum of fuel to allow for an overall 
error of not less than 3% of the calculated fuel from the critical 
point to the alternate airport. Qantas however, supported the reduction 
in critical fuel values. Qantas also concurred with an additional fuel 
requirement if an APU unit is required. UK CAA commented the FAA should 
either retain the 5% fuel factor or use a reduction analysis based on 
historical data and proof that the operator is using the World Area 
Forecasting System unequivocally.
    The FAA concurs with the ETOPS ARAC conclusion that the industry 
has a better and more accurate wind forecast ability than previously 
available. This

[[Page 1846]]

enhanced capability justifies the change in determining fuel required 
for a flight. The FAA does not accept BALPA's recommendation to 
increase the contingency fuel to a 3% value as proposed. Likewise, the 
FAA does not agree with the UK CAA. The basis for the contingency fuel 
values in Sec.  121.646(b) is the service experience gained in ETOPS 
for almost two decades and the vast improvement in accuracy of the 
World Area Forecasting System wind forecasting.
    FedEx, Singapore, and IATA commented that in the current regulatory 
language additional fuel for icing is implied for operations beyond 90 
minutes and is now required in ETOPS. They have requested 
clarification. To clarify, the intent to include icing in Sec.  
121.646(a) is to clearly state that the fuel required to operate engine 
and wing anti-ice systems as well (as to account for the induced drag 
from ice accumulation on unheated surfaces) must be included. The FAA 
has, however, modified the language of this section to be consistent 
with the language used in other sections of part 121. Section 
121.646(a) is modified to read: ``* * * considering wind and other 
weather conditions expected, it has enough fuel * * *''. The intent 
with this change remains the same in that if icing conditions are 
expected, then the fuel requirements for this condition need to be 
accounted for in the fuel calculation.
    FedEx, Singapore, IATA, and Japan Airlines commented that the 
rationale for adopting a 90-minute threshold for three- and four-engine 
airplanes is not clearly addressed. The 180-minute threshold seems to 
be based on the ETOPS threshold for rapid decompression, which several 
commenters found unreasonable. The rationale for selecting the 90-
minute threshold in Sec.  121.646(a) is based on Sec.  121.193(c), that 
established the 90-minute threshold for three- and four-engine 
airplanes.
    Qantas questioned the need to allow extra fuel for decompression 
and a simultaneous engine failure, noting that most engine failures 
occur at times of major thrust. Qantas suggested that in the extremely 
unlikely event that these two events should occur simultaneously, the 
flight variable reserve would suffice. The FAA does not agree with this 
rationale. The connection with the loss of an engine combined with the 
loss of pressurization has previously occurred due to an uncontained 
engine failure. Such a failure can occur on all airplanes, especially 
four-engine airplanes where the inboard engines are located in closer 
proximity to the fuselage. In determining the critical fuel reserve 
required for ETOPS, Sec.  121.646(b) requires the operator to use the 
greater fuel burn rate between flying all engines unpressurized versus 
flying one-engine inoperative unpressurized. Planning for this type of 
failure ensures that sufficient fuel is onboard to fly to and land at 
an alternate airport. This fuel planning allows the other contingency 
fuel requirements to be available to the pilot for the non-planned 
variables.
    Qantas commented the FAA has overlooked two factors: additional 
oxygen for passengers and high or mountainous terrain areas where 
longer decompression tracks will be required. The FAA crew and 
passenger supplemental oxygen requirements are contained in Sec. Sec.  
121.329 and 121.333 of current regulations. These requirements are 
applicable to all flights. Special escape tracks over high or 
mountainous terrain are necessary in the event the flight cannot 
maintain the necessary obstruction clearances due to an engine loss or 
loss of pressurization. Such routes require approval by the FAA, and 
are listed in the operator's operations specifications.
    Transport Canada commented that future technology aircraft may 
allow airplanes to fly decompression profiles at altitudes higher than 
15,000 feet. Therefore, Transport Canada proposed that analysis be done 
to verify altitudes greater than 15,000 feet and whether the 5% 
alternative still remains valid. The FAA agrees that continued 
assessments as to the accuracy of wind forecasts would be needed. If 
data indicates that a desired level of accuracy has not been achieved, 
then appropriate fuel margins up to the standard 5% value are 
appropriate.

F. Dispatch or Flight Release

1. Original Dispatch or Flight Release, Re-Dispatch or Amendment of 
Dispatch or Flight Release
    The FAA proposed that before passing the ETOPS entry point, weather 
conditions at alternate airports must be evaluated to ensure that they 
are at or above the operating minimums specified in the operator's 
operations specifications. This rule codifies current ETOPS 
requirements expressed in AC 120-42A.
    ATA requested the FAA clarify its intent concerning the ETOPS entry 
point to include the intended authority of the captain and dispatcher 
to determine the suitability of an en-route alternate airport. FedEx, 
United, Singapore and IATA made a similar comment, saying that it is 
not clear whether weather changes at alternate airports, once the ETOPS 
entry point is passed, may require a turn back.
    The FAA agreed that clarification is needed for the situation where 
the flight has passed the ETOPS entry point.\26\ An operator is not 
required to turn back once the flight has gone beyond the ETOPS Entry 
Point if an unexpected worsening of the weather at the designated ETOPS 
alternate airport drops the airport below operating landing minima (or 
any other event occurs that makes the runway at that airport unusable). 
The FAA expects that the pilot-in-command, in coordination with the 
dispatcher if appropriate, will exercise judgment in evaluating the 
situation and make a decision as to the safest course of action. This 
may be a turn back, re-routing to another ETOPS alternate airport, or 
continuing on the planned route. Should the operator become aware of a 
potential weather problem prior to the airplane entering the ETOPS 
stage of the flight, the rule allows the operator to designate a 
different alternate airport at the ETOPS entry point in order to 
continue the flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Section 121.7 defines ETOPS Entry Point as the first point 
on the route of an ETOPS flight, determined using a one-engine 
inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in still air, 
that is--
    (1) More than 60 minutes from an adequate airport for airplanes 
with two engines; or
    (2) More than 180 minutes from an adequate airport for airplanes 
with more than two engines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    UK CAA recommended that the requirement be amended to say that the 
flight crew are to remain informed of changes in conditions at 
designated en-route alternate airports. If conditions are identified 
that preclude safe approach and landing, the crew should take an 
appropriate action. The FAA believes that the language of the NPRM and 
final rule adequately convey a practice that has been required for all 
two-engine ETOPS conducted up to 180 minutes as well as the 207-minute 
ETOPS policy letter.
    Airbus and JAA found this requirement impractical for polar routes, 
where the ETOPS alternate airport may be located outside the ETOPS 
area. Airbus therefore recommended the FAA exclude polar flights with a 
diversion time not exceeding 60 minutes for a two-engine airplane or 
180 minutes for a three-or four-engine airplane from the scope of this 
requirement. The FAA agrees that the original intent of the NPRM--to 
establish the Polar Areas as areas where the ETOPS rules apply--created 
confusion. We have therefore abandoned this concept. The

[[Page 1847]]

application of the ETOPS rules for these areas are no different than 
for any other area of the world and are only required for two-engine 
airplanes whose routes take them farther than 60 minutes from an 
adequate airport and for passenger airplanes with more than two engines 
whose routes take them farther than 180 minutes from an adequate 
airport. The FAA believes that the particular requirements of current 
polar policy codified in this rule are sufficient to ensure the safety 
of all other non-ETOPS flights in these areas.
2. Dispatch Release: U.S. Flag and Domestic Operations
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed adding ETOPS approvals to the items 
that must be included in a flight dispatch release. A flight dispatch 
release for each flight is a regulatory requirement for each 
certificate holder conducting domestic or flag operations. It must 
contain information on the flight, list the airports to be used by the 
flight including alternates, and contain pertinent weather and 
maintenance information. It must be signed by both the pilot and 
dispatcher.
    Qantas commented that this requirement is unnecessary, arguing the 
pilot already knows of the ETOPS approvals for a particular fleet. The 
pilot-in-command should be notified only when there are changes. Qantas 
objected to application of this requirement to supplemental operations. 
United agreed with the proposal and suggested that it simply be added 
to the Flight Plan Forecast.
    The purpose of the requirement to show the ETOPS time basis on the 
dispatch or flight release is to ensure that the status of the 
equipment, flight planning, and crew qualification all match for the 
planned flight. The time an ETOPS flight is released for flight 
requires that all personnel involved be focused on that flight's 
requirements. The dispatch and flight planning process considers not 
only the airline's approved ETOPS authority, but also the status of the 
airplane and its equipment to meet those standards. The dispatch and 
flight planning personnel, the maintenance personnel, and the flight 
crew must all be aware of what is required for the flight so that last 
minute adjustments or decisions are correctly applied. We agree that 
the use of the Flight Plan Forecast is the most logical method of 
compliance.

G. Engine Inoperative Landing

    Today's rule requires that under certain circumstances a pilot must 
land the airplane at the nearest suitable airport as soon as a safe 
landing can be made. The FAA proposed a change in the wording of this 
rule from ``* * * whenever the rotation of an engine is stopped to 
prevent possible damage,'' to ``whenever an engine is shut down to 
prevent possible damage.'' This minor revision was made to delete the 
reference to stopping the rotation of an engine, which applies only to 
propeller driven airplanes, and adding a reference to engine shutdown, 
which applies to all airplane engines. In the final rule this 
application is extended to all relevant paragraphs in Sec.  121.565.
    Although JAA and UK CAA supported the proposal, many operators took 
the opportunity to discuss the term ``suitable'' in the rule language. 
They commented that while this section is consistent with today's ETOPS 
operations, the ARAC and ICAO Operations Panel recommended a more 
flexible plan by allowing the pilot to determine the optimum airport 
based on factors such as weather or facilities. These commenters 
believe that the pilot should be able to choose the most appropriate 
airport if the diversion time is only slightly different. Omni makes a 
similar comment. Boeing commented that it assumes the FAA will define 
``nearest suitable airport'' in its advisory circular.
    The FAA understands the commenters' concern about determining what 
would be the best airport for diversion. The ETOPS ARAC Working Group 
recommended to the FAA material that provides guidance and 
clarification to pilots to determine the ``suitability'' of an airport 
for landing. The FAA believes such material is better suited to an 
advisory circular. The FAA does not require any pilot to land at an 
airport that the pilot-in-command does not deem to be suitable. The 
requirement of Sec.  121.565(a) does require landing at the ``nearest 
suitable airport''. However, a pilot-in-command may exercise his 
command authority to land at an airport other than the nearest suitable 
airport, and then file a report as required by Sec.  121.565(d).

XII. ETOPS Authorization Criteria

    The final rule creates a new Appendix P to part 121, which 
specifies the criteria the FAA Administrator will evaluate in approving 
ETOPs operations. These ETOPs authorities must be listed in the 
certificate holder's operations specifications. Appendix P is divided 
into three sections, approvals for two-engine airplanes, approvals for 
passenger-carrying airplanes with more than two engines, and approvals 
for all airplanes in Polar operations.

A. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 Operations--Airplanes With Two Engines

    The FAA proposed certain criteria for extended operations, from 60 
minutes to more than 240 minutes, for two-engine airplanes. We have 
codified the step ETOPS approvals in AC 120-42A (75, 120, 138, 180, and 
207 minutes), added a 90 minute approval for Micronesia, and have 
expanded the operation of two-engine airplanes to include new 
authorities of 240 minutes and ``greater than 240 minutes''. Like all 
previous approvals discussed in section I of the preamble, these new 
authorities are area specific and have operator experience and minimum 
equipment (MEL) requirements.
    Additionally, we have added to the NPRM language a reference to the 
propulsion system reliability for ETOPS that is required by Sec.  
21.4(b)(2) and which comes from the original guidance of AC120-42A, 
paragraph 10(b). This guidance required that before the FAA grants 
ETOPS operational approval, an assessment should be made of the 
applicant's ability to achieve and maintain the demonstrated level of 
propulsion system reliability of the world fleet. This determination 
can be based on service experience, ETOPS process validation or a 
combination of both and will be addressed in advisory material. This 
language is now codified in the final rule in part 121, Appendix P, 
section I, paragraph (a).
    IATA and United correctly noted that allowing 138-minute ETOPS to 
be applied in any geographical location adds flexibility. The 138-
minute diversion authority is no longer restricted to the North 
Atlantic area of operation. The operator may request the use of 138-
minute ETOPS in geographical areas that have sufficient adequate 
airports that could, for the given flight, be used as ETOPs alternate 
airports within 138-minutes diversion distance.
    United commented that the proposal to add all of the 207-minute 
ETOPS requirements on all operations beyond 180 minutes may be too 
restrictive to some operators. United also contended that the 207-
minute ETOPS should be allowed in all areas where the operator is 
authorized to conduct 240-minute ETOPS. This should apply to the polar 
region and South Pacific.
    The development of the 207-minute ETOPS authority was in response 
to a request from United and others and was a joint effort between the 
FAA, ATA and several U.S. carriers. Its goal was to develop 
methodologies to extend ETOPS beyond 180 minutes while

[[Page 1848]]

maintaining the level of safety in the operation. The FAA does not 
agree with the expansion of 207-minute ETOPS as suggested. The 207-
minute diversion authority was developed to deal with a particular 
problem in the NOPAC. The FAA approved the use of a 207-minute ETOPS in 
NOPAC based on safety benefits for the flight. Airlines could dispatch 
the flight on a preferred air traffic route that actually placed the 
flight in closer proximity to a greater number of adequate airports 
located in northern Russia and the Aleutians even though the flight was 
up to 207 minutes from its declared ETOPS alternate airport at its 
farthest point. This type of dispatch is limited to only those flights 
where the normal 180-minute dispatch will not work. Since this safety 
argument was only applied to NOPAC, it would not be appropriate to have 
the 207-minute NOPAC authority apply to other areas that have different 
conditions. More importantly, for the case of 207-minute ETOPS, the 
airplane-engine combination need only be ETOPS type design approved for 
180-minutes. For other two-engine ETOPS approvals for beyond 180-
minutes, the airplane-engine combination needs to have a world fleet 
IFSD rate of 0.01 per 1,000 engine hours, and also be ETOPS type design 
approved for a minimum of 240 minutes.
    Both United and Continental commented that in the absence of a rule 
expanding the 207-minute authority, the FAA should expand the 240-
minute ETOPS areas of approval. Further, United requested that this 
extension apply to areas of the South and Central Pacific as well as 
the North Pacific. United also commented that the area of the North 
Pacific should be expanded from the current proposal of 40[deg] N 
latitude to those routes north of the equator between North America and 
Asia and between Hawaii and Asia.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters that it is necessary to clarify 
the areas where both the 207-minute and 240-minute ETOPS authority may 
be exercised. Likewise we have agreed to expand both areas of 
operation. The FAA has modified the 207-minute ETOPS authority to cover 
the ``North Pacific area of operations'', defined as Pacific Ocean 
areas north of 40[deg] N latitudes including NOPAC air traffic routes, 
and published PACOTS (Pacific Organized Track System) tracks between 
Japan and North America. The FAA has modified Appendix P to allow 240-
minute ETOPS for the Pacific Ocean area north of the equator.
    United commented that the IFSD rate for the 240-minute ETOPS in a 
small fleet could cause an operator to lose ETOPS authority for 12 
months with just one IFSD. However, if the 207-minute ETOPS were 
available in areas other than the north Pacific, it would allow 
operators to employ the lesser 207-minute ETOPS IFSD target rate. The 
FAA agrees that this is a legitimate concern for a small fleet IFSD, 
but the FAA will not manage ETOPS approvals only by operator IFSD 
rates. Many factors are considered, especially the commitment and 
proactive response by the operator to determine the root cause of each 
failure. Once the cause has been determined, planned corrective actions 
are taken as well as a means to ensure that the problem is fixed. There 
may be no safety need to change the operator's ETOPS authority provided 
the operator shows that it is effectively managing the problem. The FAA 
does not see this as a valid reason to expand the 207-minute ETOPS area 
of authority.
    United commented further that the existence of special MEL 
requirements for 120, 180, and presumably 240-minute ETOPS means that 
additional ``must be available'' MEL requirements would be added for 
240-minute ETOPS. Any amendment to the MMEL for 240-minute ETOPS will 
be processed through the FAA FOEB process.
    Airbus stated that the proposal was not specific in the amount of 
prerequisite ETOPS experience required of two-engine operators applying 
for routes between 180 and 240 minutes. Airbus also questioned the 
criteria an operator must use to determine what ``extreme weather'' 
conditions would allow an operator to utilize 240-minute ETOPS 
authority in the Pacific Ocean areas north of the equator. They 
suggested that the choice to select more distant diversion airports be 
predicated on medical data-link and cargo hold monitoring capabilities 
on the airplane.
    The rule requires that all operators requesting ETOPS approval 
beyond 180 minutes must have existing 180-minute ETOPS approval for the 
airplane-engine combination in their application. The FAA believes this 
is satisfactory. Rather than requiring a minimum experience level and 
allowing for reductions based on compensating factors similar to past 
guidance, the FAA believes that the language is satisfactory to limit 
any accelerated approval process to an initial authority beyond 180 
minutes while still leaving the approval decision to the particular 
merits of the operator's application. The FAA believes that the 
discussion of what constitutes acceptable criteria to extend diversion 
times to 240 minutes can be discussed within the context of advisory 
language. As stated in the rule language, the definition of extreme 
weather ``must be established by the certificate holder and accepted by 
the FAA.''
    Qantas found the limits in Appendix P arbitrary and not based on 
any scientific method. They posited that the historical and safety 
analysis would show that 120-minute ETOPS should be the starting point 
for two-engine airplanes and that the smaller step approvals for modern 
airplanes (60-, 75-, and 90-minute) are inappropriate and should be 
withdrawn. There should also be grandfathering rights for operators who 
have flown ETOPS routes for decades, requiring no additional approval 
processes.
    Qantas has not provided sufficient data to support its premise. 
Past progress and successes achieved in ETOPS have been due to the 
deliberate and limited step process of extending diversion lengths in 
response to improvements in type design and the needs of the 
operational environment. The FAA believes maintaining current ETOPS 
authorities adds flexibility for an operator to choose ETOPS approvals 
that match their specific needs. Changing the threshold for two-engine 
ETOPS was not part of the ARAC tasking and is beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking. The success of past ETOPS shows the importance of the 
operator's continued airworthiness maintenance program that is a 
requirement for all ETOPS authority levels. We therefore do not accept 
the recommendation that the ETOPS threshold for two-engine airplanes 
should start at 120 minutes. It is not necessary to address 
grandfathering since there is no language in the NPRM or this rule that 
requires new ETOPS approvals for airplanes or operators to continue 
flying routes for which they already have ETOPS approval. As stated 
earlier in this preamble we have added a new Sec.  121.162 which 
clarifies the ability of current ETOPS qualified operators to continue 
operating their ETOPS routes without a new approval process.

B. ETOPS Approvals for Part 121 Operations--Passenger-Carrying 
Airplanes With More Than Two Engines

    The FAA proposed certain criteria for extended operations for 
airplanes with more than two engines. These criteria include 
certification requirements for the airplane-engine combination, 
requirements for en-route flight planning to ETOPS alternate airports 
based on system limitations, an ETOPS maintenance program and certain 
system and MEL requirements.
    FedEx, IATA, and KLM noted that adding three- and four-engine 
airplanes to ETOPS will add maintenance and other training requirements 
for these

[[Page 1849]]

airplanes. The FAA agrees in part to the comment regarding possible 
additional training for employees. The FAA strongly believes that all 
operators would benefit from an ETOPS maintenance program. However, the 
FAA agrees with many of the commenters that the cost of implementing 
this new requirement for airplanes with more than two engines would be 
significant. The FAA has determined that this cost cannot be justified 
based on the current level of safety achieved by the combination of 
engine reliability and the engine redundancy of this fleet of 
airplanes. Therefore, the requirement for an ETOPS maintenance program 
for airplanes with more than two engines in ETOPS has been withdrawn. 
The remaining costs have been calculated and are presented in the final 
regulatory evaluation for today's rule. If the operator is an existing 
two-engine ETOPS operator, the training burden should be minimal. If 
the operator is a new ETOPS operator, the burden will be more 
substantial but is necessary to ensure safe operation. The individual 
operators, with concurrence from the FAA principal inspectors, will 
determine what, if any, additional training employees will require. It 
will be up to each individual operator to develop a training program 
that suits its operation.
    JAA commented the FAA should introduce a compliance time for 
operators of three- and four-engine airplanes to meet the requirements 
of this section that will not disrupt operations. This commenter also 
requested the FAA add a paragraph to this section that addresses 
greater than 240-minute operations as it did for the two-engine 
airplane. The FAA agrees that a compliance period is justified for 
those operators with airplanes with more than two engines conducting 
ETOPS. We are adopting a compliance period of 1 year following 
publication of today's rule. There is no need to address those 
operations beyond 240 minutes in section II in the same manner as for 
two-engine ETOPS in section I because the rule does not require the 
operator to do anything more than designate the nearest available ETOPS 
alternate airport on the planned route of flight. However the rule 
language has been modified to drop the reference to a specific 240-
minute approval since this might cause confusion.
    Qantas opined this is a commercially-based rule and has no safety 
relevance for more than two-engine airplanes that have been operating 
safely for years. They stated that the rule would all but stop flights 
between Australia and the U.S., Australia and South America, and 
Australia and Africa. Qantas stated that restrictions based on a time 
limit from an alternate airport is arbitrary and that the rule should 
be based on reliability requirements. They noted that the NPRM does not 
address the major cause of diversions--passenger requirements. Qantas 
posited that paramedics may be required on flights in the future, and 
this would have a greater impact than any flight time limit to a 
diversion airport. Qantas also noted there has never been an on-board 
fire, yet the NPRM would require cargo compartment fire protection 
while ignoring passenger compartment fires.
    The FAA does not accept the assertion that this rule is 
commercially based or has no safety basis for ETOPS operational 
application for airplanes with more than two engines. These same 
requirements have been in place for two-engine engine ETOPS for many 
years and the commenter has not shown justification for limiting its 
use to two-engines. The FAA reiterates its position that the risk 
analysis shows that three- and four-engine operations are similar 
enough to demand certain, common application of the rules. Throughout 
this rule the FAA has based its reasoning on the safety risk associated 
with long range flying over remote and hazardous areas that are far 
from adequate airports. We agree that some of those areas mentioned by 
the commenter would be subject to these new ETOPS rules under certain 
conditions. It will be the operator's choice to accept the rule 
requirements or reroute to avoid their application. The FAA believes 
that no rule could ever address all issues that would cause a 
diversion. However, the examples given by the commenter are further 
justification for this rule and the need to protect those listed 
diversions when they occur.

C. ETOPS Approvals for Part 135 Operations

    The rule incorporates a new Sec.  135.364 which stated that no 
certificate holder may operate an airplane other than an all-cargo 
airplane with more than two engines on a planned route that exceeds 180 
minutes flying time (at the one-engine inoperative cruise speed under 
standard conditions in still air) from an adequate airport outside the 
continental United States unless the operation is approved by the FAA 
in accordance with Appendix G of this part, Extended Operations 
(ETOPS). The FAA has revised the part 135 rule to be consistent with 
part 121 operations to exclude all-cargo operations on airplanes with 
more than two engines from the ETOPS requirements and has limited the 
ETOPS maintenance program requirements to two-engine ETOPS airplanes. 
Appendix G defines ETOPS requirements for such things as operator 
experience, airplane certification, operational procedures and training 
of personnel. New language has been added to Sec.  135.411 that 
requires two-engine airplanes used in ETOPS to conform to the 
additional maintenance requirements of the same Appendix G.
    Airbus commented that currently part 135 operators do not need 
approval for ETOPS flights since the current ETOPS operations are 
deviations from Sec.  121.166. There is no FAA guidance for, and FAA 
inspectors have not approved, any part 135 ETOPS flights. Dassault 
echoed this observation, stating that the cost assumptions in the draft 
regulatory evaluation were accordingly incorrect. Airbus noted, 
however, that there may currently be long-range business jets that fly 
from the West Coast of the U.S. to Australia. NBAA commented that the 
primary cost for operations with airplanes that meet the ETOPS 
requirements will be maintenance-related.
    The FAA acknowledges that this rule imposes new requirements on 
part 135 operations. However, along with ARAC, the FAA has determined 
that part 135 operations in remote areas pose the same risk to crew and 
passengers as part 121 operations. Recognizing that many part 135 
operations are not frequently recurring, as is the case with part 121 
scheduled service operations, the rule imposes fewer restrictions on 
part 135 ETOPS than on part 121 ETOPS. The FAA agrees that a major cost 
of implementing an ETOPS program is the cost to develop and apply an 
ETOPS maintenance program. The FAA has determined that based on the 
probability of critical loss of thrust for two-engine airplanes the 
cost of an ETOPS maintenance program is justified. However, because of 
the combination of current engine reliability and engine redundancy, 
the FAA has decided against adopting an ETOPS maintenance requirement 
for airplanes with more than two engines.
    The Final Regulatory Evaluation assesses the cost of the rule for 
part 135 operators as new costs since no ETOPS restrictions have been 
imposed on these operators until now.
    135.364 Maximum distance from an airport.
    The FAA proposed that no part 135 operation could be conducted 
outside the continental U.S. unless the planned route remains within 
180 minutes flying time from an airport meeting the ETOPS requirements 
of Sec. Sec.  135.385, 135.387, 135.393 or 135.395 (as applicable), and

[[Page 1850]]

Sec. Sec.  135.219 or 135.221 (as applicable). In response to many 
commenters concerns with the cost justification of the proposal, the 
FAA has withdrawn this requirement for all-cargo operations in 
airplanes with more than two engines.
    Netjets requests that the rule be revised to require that at no 
time will the airplane be operated in such as manner that it cannot 
reach a suitable airport from the Equal Time Point \27\ of the planned 
route. The FAA notes that equal time points are based on an engine 
failure only. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to consider that engine 
failure or a loss of pressurization can only occur separately in 
determining necessary fuel reserves. The regulatory standard required 
by the ICAO Annex 6 is for a threshold to be established by the State 
that clearly defines when ETOPS requirements and standards take effect 
for all two-engine airplanes. Section 135.364 establishes that 
threshold and is consistent with many years of FAA/JAA deliberation 
that involved the U.S. industry on this matter. The wording is such 
that consideration by users is not necessary until flights are planned 
that are outside of the continental United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Equi-Time Point is a point on the route of flight where the 
flight time, considering wind, to each of two selected airports is 
equal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Part 135, Appendix G, Certificate holder experience prior to 
conducting ETOPS.
    The FAA proposed 12 months of international operating experience in 
transport category turbine engine powered airplanes (excluding Canada 
and Mexico, but including Hawaii), 6 months of which could be domestic 
(if conducted before the effective date of the rule); or ETOPS 
experience in other aircraft as approved by the Administrator.
    NetJets commented that these requirements do not recognize the 
exemplary safety record of part 135 operators currently conducting 
ETOPS operations and that full credit should be given to current 
operations. NATA disagreed with the exclusion of Canada and Mexico, 
noting that flights over these countries could include remote areas.
    Netjets stated it can reach the same objective of having the full 
12-month credit apply to all its ``ETOPS'' type flights because of the 
delayed effective date of this rule. The FAA will not require 
compliance with part 135 ETOPS until 1 year following the publication 
of the rule, allowing for more operating experience that will be 
creditable. In response to NATA, the intent of the rule is to ensure a 
carrier's ability to deal not only with routes over remote areas, but 
also routes in dissimilar, international airspace. If ETOPS 
requirements were to apply to such routes in these countries, then 
current flights to those countries would also satisfy the experience 
requirement.
    Part 135 Appendix G.--Airplane requirements.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that any airplane added to an 
operator's operations specifications 8 years after the effective date 
of the final rule must meet the certification standards of Sec.  
25.1535. The NPRM proposed that those aircraft added on or before 8 
years must only meet certain electrical and fuel redundancies.
    Gulfstream commented the FAA should change the 8-year compliance 
date to 10 years or make the certification applicable to airplanes 
certificated 5 years after the effective date of the rule. In a related 
comment, NBAA commented that there is no safety justification for this 
requirement. This commenter found that the rule does not recognize the 
actual useful life of turbine-powered business airplanes. The 
association posited that continuing ETOPS operations beyond 8 years 
should be based on operator experience and its safety record.
    The FAA partially agrees with the commenter about the useful life 
of these airplane types. Thus, we have changed the basis for 
grandfathering current part 135 airplanes. The criterion is now based 
on a ``manufactured date'' rather than the time an airplane is placed 
on a certificate holder's operations specifications.
    Airbus commented that the NPRM discussion falsely stated that 
current 135 operations are restricted from those operations proposed to 
be regulated by this rule. NetJets and Actus Aviation stated that the 
rule will restrict the current mainland to Hawaii operations of certain 
types of their aircraft.
    The FAA agrees that the NPRM was incorrect in assuming that part 
135 operations defined as ETOPS in this rule were previously 
restricted. The FAA has corrected that assumption in the analysis of 
this final rule and agrees with the commenter and others that this rule 
will impose costs on those operators who chose to operate in ETOPS.
    The question of whether or not operations between the mainland U.S. 
and Hawaii are defined as ETOPS for part 135 operators is dependent on 
the computed single engine cruise speeds for their airplanes. The FAA 
does not agree that the majority of those airplanes whose range and 
endurance legitimately qualifies them for such operations would be 
considered ETOPS in this case. But the FAA does agree that there is 
difficulty in obtaining sufficient single engine data across all fleets 
of airplanes to accurately account for the cost of the rule's 
application in this case. Without this data there is no way to 
calculate the costs and which operators would be affected. In 
consideration of this fact and because of a lack of incident data in 
this operation, the rule provides a grandfathering provision for all 
those airplanes manufactured up to eight years beyond the effective 
date of this rule. Further, the fuel and electric requirements for 
airplanes added to an operator's operation specifications between the 
effective date of the rule and 8 years later, contained in the NPRM, 
have been deleted.
    Gulfstream commented that the proposed rule implies that compliance 
with Appendix G will be retroactive to existing operators approved for 
more than 180-minute ETOPS. This commenter asks the FAA provide relief 
in the form of an alternate means of compliance for the operator that 
cannot meet portions of the rule that provide no safety benefit. The 
rule does not impose a retroactive requirement within Appendix G for 
operators to conduct ETOPS. Paragraph (c)(2) of Appendix G gives 
consideration for the use of existing airplanes in ETOPS. The FAA fully 
understands that it would not be economically feasible to require any 
retrofit on existing airplanes to the new part 25 ETOPS requirements. 
This is why it is grandfathering airplanes manufactured up to 8 years 
after the effective date of the rule and used in part 135.
    NATA questioned the intent of the rule that the operator has 
available, in flight, current weather and operational information for 
all airports. This commenter found the requirement vague and asked what 
equipment would be acceptable. They questioned whether the 
communications equipment required by new Appendix G is sufficient. The 
FAA has not considered requiring any additional communications 
equipment for the flight crews to use in-flight to update weather 
reports and other operational information. The communications required 
by paragraph (F) in Appendix G should meet all communication needs.
    Both NBAA and NATA questioned the intent of the rule as it pertains 
to the requirements for weather analysis at the ETOPS entry point and 
beyond. NATA questioned what is the basis of determining whether or not 
an en-route alternate airport is ``above minimums.''

[[Page 1851]]

NATA recommended a requirement that the airport be at or above approach 
minima, not alternate airport minima.
    NATA appeared to confuse the ETOPS dispatch requirements of an 
ETOPS alternate in part 121 with this rule language. Part 135 requires 
only that the alternate be ``at or above operating minimums''. The FAA 
agrees that clarification is needed for the situation where the flight 
has passed the ETOPS Entry Point. As with part 121 operations, once the 
flight has gone beyond the ETOPS Entry Point, an unexpected worsening 
of the weather at the designated ETOPS alternate to below operating 
landing minima, or any event that makes the runway at that airport 
unusable does not require a turn back by this regulation. It is 
expected that the pilot-in-command, in coordination with the dispatcher 
if appropriate, will exercise judgment in evaluating the situation and 
make a decision as to the safest course of action. This may be a turn 
back, or re-routing to another ETOPS alternate, or continuing on its 
planned routing.
    Dassault disagreed with the requirement for sufficient fuel to fly 
to an alternate airport at cruise speed assuming a rapid decompression 
and a simultaneous engine failure at the most critical point. We 
discussed the potential for simultaneous failure of these systems 
earlier in this document. The purpose of the ETOPS critical fuel 
reserves is to protect that flight by ensuring that it will have 
sufficient fuel to fly to an alternate airport. Having an ETOPS 
alternate airport designated for use, and then not carrying sufficient 
fuel to make that alternate viable for a possible failure scenario is 
not managing known risks to the operation.
    UK CAA commented on the 5% fuel factor for wind by saying that it 
should remain in place for events that cannot be predicted, unless the 
operator produces historical data to show that the extra fuel is 
superfluous (fuel remaining at the critical point), or the operator 
proves that the World Area Forecasting System is unequivocally being 
used in the flight plan. The FAA does not agree. The basis for the 
contingency fuel values in paragraph (G) of Appendix G is the service 
experience gained in ETOPS for almost two decades, and the vast 
improvement in accuracy of the World Area Forecasting System wind 
forecasting. For those operators that cannot show the use of a wind 
model acceptable to the FAA, then 5% of the total ETOPS fuel is to be 
added to compensate for errors in wind forecast data.
    NBAA agreed with the FAA's proposal for extra fuel for anti-icing 
systems; however, it notes that not all of its members' airplane flight 
manuals have information on increased fuel burn due to anti-icing 
systems. This commenter opined the FAA should not require a performance 
factor that operators cannot figure out from the airplane flight 
manual. The FAA agrees that performance data for the particular 
airplane is necessary for operators to apply correct values when 
determining fuel requirements. Airplanes that have the range and 
technology to undertake operations of this complexity and stage length 
are limited and unique to the industry. The FAA is aware of significant 
performance history and supporting manufacturer data for most of these 
types. The FAA has also been assured by manufacturers and GAMA that 
this data will be available for those airplanes that qualify for ETOPS. 
The FAA will not require the application of part 135 ETOPS until 1 year 
following the publication of the final rule.
    Part 135, Appendix G, Definitions.
    The FAA proposed definitions for ETOPS and ETOPS dual maintenance. 
For this final rule, the definition of ETOPS Alternate Airport and 
ETOPS Entry Point have been added for clarification, while limitations 
on dual maintenance are now specified rather than defined. For part 
135, any passenger-carrying operation outside the continental United 
States more than 180 minutes flying time (in still air at normal cruise 
speed with one engine inoperative) from an airport is considered ETOPS. 
This operation is further limited to a maximum of 240 minutes.
    JAA, UK CAA, and Airbus commented that the definition of ETOPS 
would limit the maximum diversion time for part 135 airplanes to 240 
minutes and argued that this limitation for three- and four-engine 
airplanes should be removed. NBAA likewise disagreed with the maximum 
240-minute diversion, noting that operations that have been flown 
beyond the 240-minute limit would now be prohibited. They also opined 
that a restriction on airplanes with more than two engines is 
unnecessary. NBAA stated it would support some limited additional 
requirement, such as limitations on dual maintenance for ETOPS critical 
components, to allow approval beyond 240-minute operations.
    The FAA continues to believe that three- and four-engine airplanes 
conducting ETOPS should be limited to 240-minute diversion authority. 
This subject was discussed extensively during the ARAC process, and the 
same conclusion was reached each time. The industry agreed that for 
operations conducted under part 135, a 240-minute diversion limit was 
sufficient. It was the consensus of the industry that the 240-minute 
diversion limit met the industry needs. Part 135 on-demand flight 
operations have few restrictions on the type of airport required for 
use. Thus, the number of airports that could be used as an ETOPS 
alternate airport is far greater than what is available for a part 121 
ETOPS operator. For the part 135 ETOPS operator, the airport is not 
required to have part 139 equivalent safety standards. Likewise, part 
135 on-demand operators are not required to have a minimum RFFS 
capability at the selected ETOPS alternate airports. Because of the 
different performance capabilities with small turbojet airplanes used 
in part 135 on-demand ETOPS, the minimum airport runway length is far 
less, typically around 5,000 feet. Thus there are many more airports 
available in all areas of the world that may be used as an ETOPS 
alternate airport by the part 135 ETOPS operator. As a result, the 240-
minute limit will not restrict flight operations, and a diversion time 
exceeding 240-minutes is not supported. Although NBAA now disagrees 
with the 240-minute limit, this organization supported the ARAC 
proposal.
    NATA and NBAA commented that the manufacturer, not the operator, 
must determine the air speeds necessary for ETOPS approval. They stated 
they are not aware of any publicly approved data to meet this need and 
that the lack of information on air speeds prevents any meaningful 
comment on the effect of the proposed rule on part 135 on-demand 
operators. Without the ability to determine a 180-minute range, no 
operator can comply with the proposed regulations.
    The FAA agrees with the commenter that the manufacturer must 
develop the required data on engine-inoperative cruise speeds. The 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) organization has 
assured the FAA that the manufacturers will have this data available to 
operators before this rule is effective. The FAA is committed to 
provide the necessary time for part 135 operators to evaluate the 
applicability of the rule to their operation, and to make any necessary 
ETOPS program and associated training program changes. This time will 
also be available to manufacturers to develop and publish the necessary 
performance data. The FAA has adjusted the effective date of the part 
135 rule for the operational requirements to be 1 year from the 
effective date. Likewise, the FAA has expanded the grandfathering 
criteria of the NPRM to provide a uniform

[[Page 1852]]

application between parts 121 and 135. Those airplanes manufactured up 
to 8 years after the effective date of this rule do not have to comply 
with the airworthiness requirements of this rule.
    NATA requested the regulation specifically state how the 180-minute 
distance is calculated once ETOPS speeds are available. For example, 
the preamble stated the ETOPS threshold is based on ``a single-engine 
inoperative speed in still air and standard conditions''; Appendix G 
fails to state the standard conditions and only ``still air'' is 
indicated.
    Calculations made to determine the distance represented by 180 
minutes should use standard conditions and still air. Section 135.364 
has been changed to reflect this requirement. In calculating the 
distance flown at the selected one-engine inoperative cruise speed, the 
operator may select a speed provided by the manufacturer that best 
suits the area of operation being flown. A slower speed will result in 
a higher engine-inoperative service ceiling, but in less distance 
flown. A slower speed may be required when terrain clearance is an 
issue. Conversely, the selection of the fastest speed will result in a 
further distance flown, but at a much lower engine-inoperative ceiling. 
The selection of a higher speed will also result in a higher fuel burn, 
and that fuel burn rate for the planned one-engine inoperative speed 
must be used in the ETOPS critical fuel calculation. This calculation 
can result in a larger critical fuel reserve requirement for the 
flight, and that may impact the useable payload for that flight. Since 
the operator is in the best position to know what factors to consider 
on a particular flight, the FAA has provided operators with the 
flexibility to make those determinations.

D. Airplane Approvals in the North Polar and South Polar Areas

1. Part 121 Operations
    The current FAA Polar Policy letter guidance, discussed earlier in 
this document, is codified in this section and is expanded to include 
the South Pole.
    Qantas and IATA commented that Polar operations are unique and 
therefore, requirements for operations in this area should be addressed 
in a separate rule. While the polar requirements could be addressed in 
another rule, they were proposed in the NPRM and the FAA does not 
believe there is any reason to further delay their adoption. Operations 
in these areas are necessarily conducted over parts of the globe 
subject to hazardous conditions and have many of the same 
characteristics as areas of the world containing routes that are 
greater than 180 minutes from adequate airports. The current polar 
guidance codified in this rule contains requirements specific to these 
areas, including some ETOPS-like requirements such as passenger 
recovery plans and diversion planning.
    The South Polar area by this rule is defined in this rule as the 
area South of 60[deg] S latitude. The FAA is aware that there is not a 
great amount of industry experience conducting flight operations in 
this area of the world. However the forecast for traffic growth 
prepared by both major airplane manufacturers indicate that the South 
Polar area, like the North Pole, will become a major region for 
commercial air transportation as direct routes over the polar cap to, 
from, and between South America, Australia, New Zealand, and South 
Africa are established. The rules that will apply to the South Polar 
area provide a proven safety process for these future operations.
    Several commenters, including JAA, NACA, and Airbus, noted that 
meeting the ETOPS planning, equipage, and operational requirements for 
polar areas may not be practical, and may give some operators an 
economic advantage. FedEx found while the dispatch requirements may be 
reasonable, other ETOPS requirements, such as maintenance and 
reporting, should not be an issue for three- and four-engine airplanes 
operating in the Polar region today.
    The Polar policy letter already requires planning, equipage and 
operational requirements similar to ETOPS in these areas and the rule 
codifies such practices in this section III. To the extent some 
operators may face greater costs than others, the FAA has made certain 
changes to the NPRM necessary to address the economic burden on those 
operators. Specifically, for the polar areas where flight operations 
can be conducted at less than 180 minutes, Appendix P, section II has 
been changed to eliminate ETOPS requirements from polar route approval. 
If the operator flight plans the route in a manner that would classify 
the operations as ETOPS under other circumstances, the operator must 
meet both the ETOPS requirements and the polar requirements established 
by this rule.
    FedEx commented that the NPRM would require any aircraft operating 
north of 78[deg] N latitude to comply with these requirements, yet it 
has operations specifications that already address operations in Polar 
areas. FedEx believes that the NPRM addresses passenger-carrying 
aircraft and that these issues have already been addressed for all-
cargo operations.
    The commenter's reference to current operations specifications 
represents the current FAA Polar Policy codified in this rule. Because 
the FAA intends all operations in the polar areas to be governed by the 
agency's polar policy, we believe it is more appropriate to regulate 
these operations through a rule of general applicability rather than by 
operations specifications. The Polar policy outlined in Appendix P, 
Section III of this rule apply to all air carrier operations in these 
areas including all-cargo operations.
    JAA fully supported the concern of the FAA concerning the use of 
airports in severe weather conditions, but found that the proposed rule 
does not achieve its intended purpose in that it does not account for 
the variability of airports in Polar regions. Some airports may present 
an unacceptable level of risk, regardless of the season, and others are 
safe during the summer, but not otherwise. While the JAA takes into 
account safety precautions (based on seasonal, wind and temperature 
factors) for specific airports, the NPRM does not take such factors 
into account.
    The FAA does not agree with the conclusion reached by the JAA that 
today's rule fails to meet the intended purpose of applying safety 
precautions to those airports designated for use as alternates that are 
in severe climate areas. The FAA fully understands the JAA/European 
approach to designated airports located in severe climate areas, i.e., 
operators need only consider specified alternate airports already 
deemed adequate by the JAA. We believe the FAA rule is sufficiently 
robust, and ultimately places the responsibility with the operator as 
to the required amount of detail and preparation necessary for 
passenger protection and recovery. The operator also has the 
flexibility to modify the procedures if seasonal variations for that 
airport exist. The JAA draft proposal as currently written does not 
require any preparation for those airports used as ETOPS alternate 
airports that are not determined to be severe climate airports. We 
believe that this system might encourage some operators to avoid those 
``designated severe climate airports'' to avoid the need for a 
passenger recovery plan, even when the use of that airport may be the 
most appropriate action for the given problem encountered.
2. Part 135 Operations
    This rule likewise codifies the current FAA Polar Policy letter 
guidance for

[[Page 1853]]

part 135 operations in Sec.  135.98. This section covers only the North 
Polar area and although the operation is not considered ETOPS, 
certificate holders must follow these standards whenever a route is 
flown and a portion of the route traverses this area. The FAA proposed 
that, except for intrastate operations within the State of Alaska, any 
operations in the region north of 78[deg] N latitude, designated as 
Polar, must be authorized by the Administrator and have certain items 
addressed in the operator's operation specifications. Included in these 
items were identification of alternate airports, recovery plans, 
specific communication systems, changes to the operator's MEL including 
the requirement for special equipment and consideration of solar flare 
activity.
    Dassault commented that the proposal implies that an operator may 
not enter the Polar area unless the weather and operating conditions of 
the required alternate airports are reviewed and are expected to be 
above minimums specified in the operations specifications. It 
recommended the FAA specify the type of weather in the weather 
information requirement. Dassault also commented the FAA should 
consider a reduced recovery plan for airplanes with a maximum seating 
capacity of 19 or fewer passengers. Dassault goes on to say the FAA 
should allow a 1-year compliance period for setting up an MEL that 
takes Polar operations into account which becomes effective one year 
after, and apply only to those airplanes that were added to the 
operator's operations specifications, 8 years after the effective date 
of the rule. Dassault noted the proposal would require considerations 
during solar flare activity and recommends the FAA allow a predictive 
method for evaluation of radiation, since measuring equipment is not 
yet available on the market. Finally, Dassault recommended the 
requirement for Polar equipment only apply to the crewmembers, and the 
FAA should specify the contents of the Polar kit.
    The FAA does not agree that the rule need be so detailed that it 
specifies the weather information required. In general it is understood 
that the weather reports should provide the present weather conditions 
including surface winds, any adverse trends, and the updated weather 
forecast for the expected time of use, if available. In addition, field 
condition reports should be obtained. The pilot will need to evaluate 
this information to determine that the weather minimums required for 
the instrument approach can be met.
    The FAA agrees that the recovery plan for a part 135 passenger-
carrying operator will require far less complexity than a plan for a 
similar part 121 operator because of the limited number of passengers. 
However, it does not agree that a further reduced plan is appropriate 
if the maximum seating capacity is less than 20. Currently, part 135 
applies to certain passenger-carrying airplanes with a maximum seating 
capacity of 30 or less. Should the FAA change the current restriction 
on seating capacity in part 135 operations, it may consider permitting 
a tailored passenger recovery plan based on the seating capacity of a 
particular airplane.
    In response to Dessault's comment, the FAA has determined that a 1-
year compliance period is acceptable for development of an MMEL and 
MEL. As discussed earlier, the certification requirements of this rule 
apply specifically to those aircraft manufactured 8 years after 
publication of today's rule. The FAA is not requiring operators to 
equip their airplanes with radiation measuring equipment. There is 
advisory material already available to set up a predictive system for 
measuring solar flare activity. AC 120-52, Radiation Exposure of Air 
Carrier Crewmembers, and AC 120-61, Crewmember Training on In-Flight 
Radiation Exposure, are excellent resources for the operator to consult 
in developing a system and any necessary training. Likewise, today's 
rule does not require a part 135 operator to keep any ``polar kits'' on 
board the airplane. Rather, cold weather anti-exposure suits are for 
use by the crewmembers. No provision is made for passengers, although 
operators may choose to provide such suits should they transport 
passengers through the polar regions.

XIII. Comments on the Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Rule

    Many commenters noted that current part 121 and part 135 
regulations do not prohibit operations beyond 180 minutes and that the 
initial regulatory assessment was wrong. The FAA acknowledges the error 
and the final regulatory evaluation does not attribute any cost savings 
to more efficient routings. The following is a summary of the proposed 
provisions that would entail costs and an analysis of the comments 
concerning economic impacts from the NPRM.
    In response to the certifications requirements of the proposed 
rule, Airbus and other commenters stated the proposed rule might be 
understood to require manufacturers of current generation ETOPS 
aircraft to apply retroactively for type design approval under this 
section and appendix K, which would impose very high costs. Airbus 
estimated costs for manufacturers at $500,000 per aircraft family to 
perform an assessment of all time-limited systems in normal and 
degraded system configurations, with a full numerical system safety 
assessment of all aircraft systems in the order of $1 million per 
aircraft family. Any design change found necessary as a result of these 
assessments would increase this cost.
    The FAA has recognized that existing aircraft designs may have 
difficulty complying with the new part 25 requirements and has added 
Sec.  25.3. Airplanes with existing type certificates at the time this 
rule becomes effective are exempted from some or all of the new part 25 
requirements. Therefore the FAA does not find that these system-wide 
costs will be incurred.
    Airbus and Dassault commented that the icing requirements in the 
proposal go beyond the current requirement and would require analytical 
and flight test assessment. Airbus stated that manufacturers would 
incur costs in the order of $1.5 million per aircraft family to 
complete an analysis and a flight demonstration of icing on unprotected 
areas of the airplane in order to comply with this provision.
    The FAA agrees that this requirement may add additional analysis to 
the certification of a new airplane to meet the requirements of the 
rule. However, evaluating ice accumulation on an airplane in icing 
conditions is required for a new part 25 airplane regardless of whether 
it's ETOPS certified. The effect of the ETOPS rule will be to add 
another criterion for determining the size of the ice shapes simulated 
during certification testing. The ETOPS environment will not 
necessarily be the most critical condition for the maximum ice 
accumulation. An applicant will determine the maximum ice accretion on 
an airplane during an ETOPS diversion and compare that to the maximum 
accretion from other icing conditions used for basic part 25 
compliance. The additional costs associated with flight testing an 
airplane for ETOPS icing will be minor since an applicant will likely 
only test the most critical ice accretion from all these conditions as 
is done for basic part 25 certification.
    UPS stated that the installation of a low fuel alerting system 
``would require extensive modifications to three- and four-engine 
aircraft to add flight management computers that will allow the system 
to provide the required flight deck alerts * * *'' but did not provide

[[Page 1854]]

any cost information. Airbus stated that the design and certification 
costs would be in the order of $2.5 million per aircraft family not yet 
fitted with any of the prescribed alerts and up to $1 million per 
aircraft family partly compliant. The FAA estimates the cost of a full 
retrofit will be $200,000 per aircraft; the cost of a partial retrofit 
will be up to $110,000 per aircraft.
    Dassault recommended allowing alternate solutions to the fuel alert 
display.
    The FAA recognizes that some existing airplanes may have difficulty 
in complying with this requirement without substantial airplane system 
modifications. Older three-crew airplanes, in particular, have a flight 
engineer who monitors fuel quantity throughout a long flight and the 
FAA considers this additional crewmember to be an acceptable 
alternative to the automatic low fuel alerting for those airplanes. As 
such, the requirement for a low fuel alerting system does not apply to 
three- and four-engine airplanes with a required flight engineer, or to 
three- and four-engine airplanes with existing type certificates 
manufactured up to eight years after the effective date of this rule. 
This rule will also not apply to two-engine airplanes with existing 
type certificates being approved for ETOPS up to 180-minutes. However, 
all newly type-certificated airplanes, and two-engine airplanes being 
approved for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes must comply. The FAA will 
continue to use its estimate of $2.25 million that substantially agrees 
with Airbus' estimate.
    Air New Zealand, Dassault, JAA, New World Jet, Northwest, and 
United made comments on various technical aspects of the APU 
requirements. KLM commented that the NPRM is unclear if existing three- 
and four-engine aircraft on long range routes must have an APU In-
flight Start Capability, noting that MD11s have an APU in-flight start 
capability below and up to flight level (FL) 250 and all 747-400s APUs 
do not have an in-flight start capability at all. This requirement will 
have a large cost impact that is not addressed in the NPRM. FedEx made 
a similar statement. UPS noted that APUs are not currently installed on 
its DC8 fleet, and it is unclear whether this proposal would require 
installation for ETOPS. ATA noted those efforts would include design or 
adaptation of an APU, development of new interface equipment, and 
extensive ground and flight testing. The effort also would include 
potentially extensive aircraft structural modifications to accommodate 
the APU installation.
    The FAA has amended the final rule language to make it clear that 
an APU in-flight start and run program is only required if APU in-
flight start and run capability is required by the type certificate for 
ETOPS. ETOPS requires that the airplane must be equipped with at least 
three independent sources of electrical power. For airplanes that must 
use the availability of the APU to satisfy this requirement, an APU in-
flight start and run program is required. Since current models of the 
747-400 satisfy this certification requirement without the APU, no such 
program is required. The rule is written to take into account possible 
future airplane designs or existing airplane modifications which would 
make this requirement applicable. The cost of designing an APU program 
for a new model is minimal. The final economic evaluation does not 
include any costs related to the APU requirement.
    Boeing proposed changing the requirements to obtain certification 
for a two-engine airplane for ETOPS to state that a flight test must be 
conducted to validate the adequacy of the airplane's flying qualities, 
performance and the flight crew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS 
diversion with an engine inoperative and under non-normal worst case 
ETOPS significant system failure conditions. The FAA agrees that the 
intent of the flight testing is to evaluate ETOPS significant systems. 
We have included the cost of this testing.
    In response to Boeing, the Air Line Pilots Association, 
International (IALPA), and the BALPA comment on the post-airplane 
demonstration inspection requirement, the FAA has changed the first 
sentence of paragraph K25.2.2(g)(4) to require that the ETOPS 
significant systems must undergo on-wing inspections in accordance with 
the tasks defined in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
required by Sec.  25.1529 to establish the ETOPS significant system 
condition for continued safe operation. The engines must also undergo a 
gas path inspection. These inspections must identify abnormal 
conditions that could result in an in-flight shutdown or diversion. Any 
abnormal conditions must be identified, tracked and resolved in 
accordance with paragraph (l) of section K25.2. The costs of these 
assessments are contained in the final rule.
    The FAA's preliminary economic assessment for additional voice 
communication equipment for all ETOPS operations beyond 180 minutes 
estimated the installed cost per unit at $223,000 or $209,000, 
discounted. The operating costs per unit include weight-related fuel 
consumption, a fixed monthly fee, and a variable usage charge. The FAA 
estimated that revenues derived from passenger use of the SATCOM 
capabilities or improved maintenance procedures made possible by the 
new system would offset the variable usage fee. The annual operating 
costs per unit were estimated at approximately $2,500 ($2,000 fixed fee 
+ $500 fuel cost). Atlas Air estimated that the first-year cost of 
installing and maintaining SATCOM would be roughly $225,000 per 
aircraft. FedEx estimated the unit cost of installing SATCOM and 
alternate communication capabilities at $263,035 and annual costs of 
$3,035. ATA surveyed members and reported an average one-time charge of 
$329,892. (A key assumption in ATA's estimate is an anticipated need to 
install a dual HF/DL communication system in addition to the SATCOM at 
an additional cost of $105,000 per unit.) ATA members did not take 
issue with the FAA's estimate of annual recurring charges. Airbus 
stated, depending on the SATCOM system, charges-per-minute may be 
incurred which may also include air traffic system use. FedEx, and IATA 
requested that three- or four-engine operators not meeting the 
requirement be permitted to continue ETOPS for a period not to exceed 6 
years from the rule's effective date. Commenters also said that SATCOM 
was ineffective in Polar areas.
    The FAA does not agree that a dual HF/DL system will need to be 
installed under the requirements of this rule. Adjusting FedEx's 
estimate by the $105,000 it included in its estimate reduces its 
estimate to $158,035, significantly below the FAA's estimate. The same 
adjustment to the ATA cost estimate results in a cost of $224,892, also 
below the FAA estimate. These lower estimates reflect lower initial 
equipment costs. The higher fuel costs cited by FedEx result in an 
additional cost of fuel of approximately $160 per year. The FAA also 
does not agree with Airbus' assertion that the variable use costs were 
not addressed; the FAA believes these costs will be offset as noted 
above. The FAA, in order to be conservative, will retain its higher 
initial cost estimate and we have substituted fuel price projections 
provided by the Office of Management and Budget, which are higher than 
FedEx's estimate.
    As discussed earlier, the FAA does not agree to the 6-year phase-in 
period requested for the communications equipment; we allow a 12-month 
installation period for three- and four-engine airplanes used for 
ETOPS.
    The FAA agrees that for the polar areas, three- and four-engine 
passenger

[[Page 1855]]

carrying operators do not have to meet the ETOPS requirements provided 
the flight operations are planned not to exceed 180-minutes to an ETOPS 
alternate airport. The FAA has amended Appendix P to clarify this fact. 
As stated earlier, all-cargo operations using airplanes with more than 
two engines never have to comply with ETOPS requirements.
    The FAA did not assign any cost to the fire fighting requirements 
proposed in the NPRM. Omni International stated the additional costs to 
upgrade the capabilities of an aerodrome, including the cost of 
training additional personnel, are not one that a municipality or State 
will entertain willingly on the off chance that an aircraft might 
divert there. It is entirely conceivable that carriers like Omni will 
be compelled to bear these costs either through consortia established 
to protect the integrity of an ETOPS route, or through radical 
increases in user's fees like navigation charges.
    The FAA has amended Sec.  121.106 to be in-line with the RFFS 
requirements established for the 207-minute ETOPS policy. For ETOPS 
beyond 180-minutes, the minimum acceptable RFFS for ETOPS alternates 
remains at ICAO category 4 as long as the aircraft remains within the 
authorized diversion time (for that flight) to an adequate airport that 
has a ICAO category 7 RFFS capability or higher. Since operators 
currently do not fund RFFS operations and the agency cannot speculate 
on future conditions, the FAA does not find a cost to be associated 
with this change.
    A commenter stated that the public protection requirements of the 
NPRM demand data regarding the provision of public protection including 
facilities to a detail that is not available in all parts of the world 
but are obviously required to complete the proposed aerodrome specific 
passenger recovery plans.
    The FAA clarifies that additional data may be required to complete 
the passenger recovery plan. However, the airline is responsible to 
obtain the data under the existing regulation, even if that requires 
visiting some airports. Furthermore, it is expected that more than one 
carrier will serve such routes and the data will be shared and readily 
available.
    The rule will require certificate holders with passenger operations 
beyond 180 minutes from an ETOPS alternate airport or operating in a 
polar area to prepare passenger recovery plans that are robust enough 
to handle a diversion. The FAA estimated that the initial development 
of a plan would cost $7,500 and $3,000 annually to maintain the 
robustness of each plan. In a discussion of the benefits, the FAA 
sought information on the costs of diversions and provided a 
hypothetical ``worse case'' scenario of recovery costs as high as $1 
million. FedEx, IATA, and KLM stated that in some cases this would 
require a spare aircraft and/or crew with all related costs. American 
Trans Air stated that this requirement would require the addition of 
full time employees at significant costs. It also requested an 18-month 
phase-in period. The ATA stated that, based on the ``worse case'' 
scenario, costs and the number of projected diversions of three- and 
four-engine airplanes would result in costs of $2.05 million. The 
Association also stated that 73 percent of ETOPS-candidate three- and 
four-engine airplanes of ATA members are all-cargo operators.
    The FAA requested information on the number and cost of diversions. 
While the possibility exists that a spare aircraft may be needed, the 
history of mechanically related diversions indicates that this will be 
a rare event and the need for a spare aircraft even rarer. The 
commenters provided no cost information so the FAA cannot consider this 
issue. The FAA does not agree with American Trans Air's assertion for 
the need to add full-time employees because of this provision. The 
estimated hours necessary to set-up and maintain recovery plans do not 
warrant full-time employees and it should be noted that expert contract 
employees can be retained to develop and respond to this requirement. 
The FAA acknowledges ATA's estimate of all-cargo operations and has 
removed the passenger recovery plan requirement for such operations.
    The FAA however does not oppose that the air carrier passenger 
recovery plan being a part of the air carrier's emergency response 
plan. The FAA cannot use the ``worst case'' cost offered by the ATA 
since it is unsubstantiated.
    The FAA requested comments and supporting data on the impact of the 
requirement that all MEL items, the Fuel Quantity Indicating System, 
and the communication system must be operational. American Trans Air 
stated that the proposed regulation would restrict and/or remove its 
L1011 aircraft from North Polar Operations. Airbus commented that the 
cost for operators to modify two-engine aircraft and long-range three- 
and four-engine aircraft procedures, documentation, training and the 
software applications that they use in fuel planning, flight planning, 
and other related activities has not been taken into account in the 
Economic Impact Assessment. The lead-time for the companies that supply 
computerized flight-plan and map plotting systems to release new 
versions of their applications compliant with the new rules is 12 
months after the publications date of the rule. The cost of the 
updating the necessary software applications ranges from $7,000 to 
$15,000 depending on the application and supplier. The overall cost of 
documentary modifications and re-issuing of documents and manuals is 
estimated to $200,000 for an operator with one ETOPS aircraft. The 
lead-time is in the order of 6 months. Fuel reserve training is 
estimated at $200,000 and passenger recovery training is estimated at 
$100,000 for a fleet of six aircraft. In addition, three- and four-
engine aircraft operators would have to undergo a full process of 
operational assessment and approval including an assessment of their 
service experience and reliability record. This assessment is 
comparable to an ETOPS assessment for a first approval under current 
ETOPS criteria and requires 6 months notice with FAA. The overall cost 
of the approval process is estimated to cost $500,000 per applicant 
based on data from former ETOPS assessments. Three- and four-engine 
aircraft operators would have to train their flight crew, dispatchers, 
maintenance personnel and cabin crew to the entire extent of the 
operation and maintenance rules instead of just to the modified 
elements. The overall cost for a fleet of six four-engine aircraft of 
one type is estimated at $2.5 million.
    The FAA is allowing delayed compliance to minimize the costs to 
operators. The commenter does not explain the basis for its estimated 
costs. Existing regulations in section 121 already require operators of 
airplanes with more than two engines to take into consideration 
adequate airports along the route in the event of one or two engines 
becoming inoperative. The new requirement for ETOPS en-route alternate 
airports does not constitute a big impact; the final regulatory 
evaluation includes a per flight charge to account for this task. 
Existing regulations require fuel reserves. The commenter has not shown 
how the incremental cost of the new passenger recovery training 
requirements will be $100,000. However, the FAA has included the cost 
of four hours of initial ETOPS training for pilots and dispatchers in 
the final rule in addition to passenger recovery training for pilots, 
dispatchers, and flight attendants where applicable. If the operator 
intends to only fly the North or South Pole at or below 180 minutes, 
there are no additional ETOPS requirements. Operators currently serving 
the North

[[Page 1856]]

Pole must meet current polar policy guidance and its operational 
requirements such as having a recovery plan, listing en-route alternate 
airports, and having effective communication capability for all 
portions of the flight route. For operators desiring to operate ETOPS 
in any other geographical area subject to ETOPS, an ETOPS application 
process will need to be completed. The commenter did not explain what 
they mean by data from former ETOPS assessments and has not provided 
detail to support this cost estimate.
    The FAA believes it is reasonable to assume that an operator will 
make a decision that minimizes costs and creates the most efficient 
operations. Experience with other rules in part 121 provide evidence 
that operators do not train every flight crewmember and every 
maintenance person on every new rule. However, we cannot determine that 
only four airplanes and five mechanics per airplane used in the initial 
economic assessment accurately reflect the most efficient operation. 
Therefore, in order not to underestimate the costs of the final rule, 
we assume that the operator will have to train a full crew and ground 
personnel and equip all or most airplanes for ETOPS.
    FedEx and IATA recommended that ETOPS regulations not be applied to 
airplanes with more than two engines. The FAA does not agree completely 
with the commenter that ETOPS should not be applied to airplanes with 
more than two engines. The basic concept of ETOPS is to preclude the 
diversion and, if a diversion is required, to protect that diversion. 
We do however agree that for airplanes with more than two engines, 
passenger carrying operations may be excluded from the ETOPS 
maintenance program requirements and that all-cargo operations may be 
excluded from all ETOPS requirements.
    The concept of precluding and protecting the diversion has equal 
validity among all passenger-carrying airplanes, regardless of the 
number of engines. In addition, the increased frequency of operations 
on routes that are distant from en-route airports and the recent 
opening of routes over the Canadian and Russian far North bring 
additional challenges that affect the operations of all airplanes, 
regardless of the number of engines. Even though these passenger-
carrying airplanes with more than two engines have operated safely and 
successfully on long range routes in all areas of the world for many 
decades, it is reasonable to expect airplanes with more than two 
engines to designate the nearest alternate airport, and be flight 
planned at 240-minute diversion authority, if possible. The application 
of such ETOPS concepts as recovery plans; designating the nearest 
alternate airport, and pre-flight planning to operators of airplanes 
with two-or-more engines will enhance the safety of their operations 
and benefit the industry.
    Section 121.374 sets forth the ETOPS maintenance elements: CMP; 
CAMP; monitoring of propulsion system, engine condition, and oil 
consumption; APU in-flight start program; maintenance training; and 
procedural changes approval. While many of these elements are a normal 
part of an operator's maintenance program, some may need to be 
supplemented in consideration of the special requirements of ETOPS. 
Airbus commented that these additions would require that operators 
engaged in any of the ETOPS operations covered in Appendix P of part 
121 apply all ETOPS maintenance elements. The FAA acknowledges possible 
confusion regarding the maintenance elements required in appendix P. 
Section 121.374 has been amended. An operator's maintenance program for 
all two-engine ETOPS airplanes, regardless of diversion time, must 
comply with Sec.  121.374. An operator of three- and four-engine 
airplanes operating beyond 180 minutes will not be required to have an 
ETOPS maintenance program.
    FedEx noted three- and four-engine aircraft, pursuant to the 
provisions of a CMP, do not have parts and systems that must be 
equipped on aircraft in ETOPS operations. Presumably, the manufacturers 
will develop and offer these parts for sale once a CMP has been 
created. FedEx anticipates buying and storing these parts will be very 
expensive. FedEx also estimated certification costs (including the 
costs of developing CMP documents, and certification of aircraft parts 
and systems) as a one-time cost of $4,962,000. The development of ETOPS 
parts Control Programs, maintenance training, creation of centralized 
maintenance control system, additional parts inventory, performance of 
pre-departure service checks and other Sec.  121.374 programs would be 
$17,033,000 as a one-time cost, and $847,000 per year.
    The FAA does not agree. As stated in the preamble, if there is no 
CMP document for an existing airplane, then there is no requirement to 
comply with a CMP. The certification costs are a cost to manufacturers 
and not operators. These costs are discussed in parts 21, 25, and 33. 
Most likely the existing IPC program will satisfy the ETOPS parts 
control needs. Most airlines already have a centralized maintenance 
control program and if they do not it will require minimal cost to 
establish and the operator has a year to accomplish it. The FAA does 
not have a specific ETOPS parts inventory requirement.
    Continental noted the time estimated by the FAA of 6 weeks to 
create the pre-departure check does not include the timeframe for FAA 
approval. When the FAA approval time is factored in development time 
would be 14 weeks. The FAA has provided a 1-year period to implement 
the maintenance requirements. The FAA also estimated the continuing 
costs of several elements of the CAMP program. A pre-departure check 
was estimated to take two staff-hours at a cost of $90.
    ATA did not concur with proposed pre-departure check for three- and 
four-engine airplanes. It posited utilizing the proposed ETOPS pre-
departure service check would prevent none of the incidents cited in 
the proposal risk analysis. The FAA has agreed to withdraw this 
requirement and all other elements of the ETOPS maintenance program for 
airplanes with more than two engines in ETOPS.
    FedEx commented that it agrees with the additional training for 
passenger recovery training for crewmembers and dispatchers of three- 
and four-engine aircraft pilots as required, as well as generally on 
ETOPS procedures. Northwest stated that it would like to minimize cost 
and operational impact by training through bulletins and written 
procedures.
    We understand that an air carrier may need to adjust the pilot 
training syllabus in order to accommodate the new training unit for 
three- and four-engine flight crews. We have included the costs of 4 
hours of initial pilot and dispatcher training and recurring costs for 
ETOPS related training, and 1 hour for passenger recovery training for 
pilots and dispatchers and one-half hour for flight attendants for 
those operators conducting ETOPS greater than 180 minutes from an ETOPS 
alternate airport and for operations in the polar areas.
    The training syllabus, as well as the means to provide that 
training, is at the discretion of the air carrier, as it should be 
tailored to fit within existing training and operational experience.
    Airbus stated the cost of training cabin and flight crews for their 
roles in the passenger recovery plan is estimated to be $100,000 for a 
fleet of six ETOPS aircraft not involved in Polar and NOPAC operations 
using airports subject to extreme Polar weather.
    Airbus did not provide supporting data, and the FAA cannot accept 
its estimate. This requirement will only entail minimum training of 
cabin and

[[Page 1857]]

flight crews. An air carrier's existing emergency response plan 
includes many of the elements of a passenger recovery plan. In 
addition, there are expert contract services available to implement the 
passenger recovery plan. The FAA has included initial training and 
recurring training costs for pilots, flight attendants and dispatchers 
for those operators conducting ETOPS greater than 180 minutes from an 
ETOPS alternate airport and for operations in the polar areas in the 
final regulatory evaluation.
    Several carriers including Atlas Air, Omni International, FedEx, 
and UPS included aggregate costs of training maintenance, crewmembers, 
flight attendants, dispatchers, and other operational personnel 
covering all or significant portions of their fleets.
    The FAA in this final regulatory evaluation has estimated the cost 
of training all maintenance personnel, all dispatchers, all 
international pilots and flight attendants, and included all or 
significant portions of operators fleets that have operation 
specifications for affected areas and have or may have conducted 
flights in the affected areas during a one-year period.
    Airbus stated that the requirement to consider all alternate 
airports in its dispatch or flight release would result in a severe 
increase in the cost of implementing the rule. Airbus recommends that 
the definition of an adequate airport be amended such that these 
airports would be required to have the infrastructure and services 
necessary to support a passenger recovery plan. Alternatively, the rule 
might be amended to require that the operator consider all adequate 
airports ``capable of supporting a passenger recovery plan for the 
concerned aircraft.''
    The FAA does not agree. The requirement to consider all adequate 
airports in an operator's selection of ETOPS alternates for a specific 
flight will likely occur during the route planning stage and will be a 
minimal addition to the route planning process. It is a requirement of 
the rule that only adequate airports that meet such passenger recovery 
criteria be used as ETOPS alternate airports during the dispatch 
planning. The final regulatory evaluation includes a computer 
programming cost.
    The final rule requires that flight plans for ETOPS beyond 180 
minutes be calculated based on certain criteria so that the resulting 
time not exceed the time specified in the airplane flight manual for 
the airplane's cargo fire suppression time minus 15 minutes. Three- and 
four-engine airplanes not meeting this requirement will have a period 
not to exceed 6 years from the date of this regulation to meet the 
requirement. The FAA estimated the cost of the upgrade kit and an 
additional Halon bottle at $75,000 plus a $1,400 installation cost per 
aircraft. Additional fuel costs will also be incurred. ATA's survey of 
its members indicated an average of $62,500 for parts. Atlas Air 
estimated first year cargo fire suppression cost at $81,200. FedEx 
estimated installation of fire suppression upgrades at $54,800 per 
aircraft and annual costs of $1,450. They indicate that the time to 
modify the cargo fire extinguishing system should be at least 8 years. 
IATA and KLM agree with the 8-year time frame.
    The ATA survey results were 17 percent lower than the FAA estimate 
with an average ten-year total cost per aircraft eight percent less 
than the FAA estimate. The Atlas Air and FedEx estimates were also 
lower. In order to not underestimate the costs of installing the fire 
suppression system, the FAA will retain its estimate of installation 
costs and revise its annual cost to reflect higher fuel costs. The FAA 
does not agree with the request to extend the installation deadline by 
an additional 2 years.
    The final rule prohibits the dispatch or release of a flight by an 
airplane with more than two engines for more than 90 minutes at full 
cruise speed unless it has adequate fuel, considering wind and weather 
conditions, assuming a rapid decompression, followed by descent to a 
safe altitude to fly to an adequate airport, including enough fuel to 
hold for 15 minutes at 1,500 feet. ETOPS flights greater than 180 
minutes have to comply with similar conditions in flight planning. The 
FAA estimated flight-planning costs to be minimal since they are 
generally computerized. Airbus commented the cost of retraining 
dispatchers and flight crews on the new fuel reserves and dispatch 
criteria is estimated to be $150,000 for a fleet of six ETOPS aircraft 
of one type. The lead-time is 3 months after the new software 
applications have been deployed and validated. FedEx noted this 
additional rule will increase rapid decompression fuel requirements for 
three- and four-engine aircraft, with the addition of 15 minutes 
holding fuel at 1500 feet whenever the aircraft is operated more than 
90 minutes but less than 180 minutes from an adequate airport. This 
rule represents a cost not required in current operations. Northwest 
requested further review of the increase to the decompression fuel 
requirements for three- and four-engine aircraft. This all engine 
reserve is not currently required and represents an additional cost 
(either fuel cost to carry or payload limiting) to operators.
    The FAA disagrees. The added 15 minutes of holding fuel does not 
represent an additional cost to operators. There is currently within 
part 121 two separate fuel requirements that apply to 3- and 4-engine 
operators conducting flag and supplemental operations. The requirement 
of Sec.  121.646(a) for holding fuel is a lesser amount of fuel 
reserves already required for the operation and is therefore not an 
additional cost to the operator.
    Appendix P to part 121 sets forth the ETOPS approval requirements 
and limitations for various areas of operation and diversion time 
limits. Airbus stated that the retroactivity of type design 
requirements would impose very high costs for existing ETOPS aircraft 
and for three- or four-engine aircraft. It recommends a compliance time 
of at least 6 years for all two-engine ETOPS aircraft already assessed 
or in the process under current criteria and at least 8 years for 
three-or four-engine aircraft.
    The FAA is not making the type design requirements retroactive as 
explained earlier in the preamble.
    The rule will require a part 135 operator to be ETOPS certified for 
operations outside the continental United Stated unless the route is 
planned to remain with 180 minutes flying time of an adequate airport 
or the operation involves an all-cargo operation aboard an airplane 
with more than two engines. NATA believes that this will require proof 
that a flight was below the 180 minute threshold. The FAA, however, 
holds that it is the responsibility of the operator to determine what 
is and is not ETOPS. If it is, then they must flight plan accordingly. 
There is no requirement to prove a flight is not ETOPS. The rule does 
not impose any burden of proof in this case and therefore there is no 
additional paperwork or associated cost.
    Part 135 operators will have to comply with the continuous 
maintenance program and the requirements of Appendix G if the 
operations use two-engine airplanes. NetJets stated the cost/benefit 
analysis does not adequately address the added costs of maintaining ``9 
passenger seat or less'' aircraft under a continuous maintenance 
program currently required for aircraft with ``10 or more'' passenger 
seats. These costs not only include the actual development and approval 
of the program, but the added costs associated with maintaining 
personnel for the program. Also, the ``dual maintenance'' requirement 
will mandate that more maintenance technicians be made

[[Page 1858]]

available for maintenance conducted on ETOPS aircraft. This cost is not 
addressed in the cost/benefit analysis.
    The FAA's database indicates that only 37 operators have aircraft 
that currently meet the aircraft requirements but do not meet the 
maintenance provisions for aircraft type certificated for 10 or more 
seats that is a requirement for operations beyond 180 minutes. None are 
authorized for operations in the Polar regions. The only other route 
beyond the ETOPS 180-minutes threshold is a portion of the South 
Pacific, which can be avoided by some additional flying time. The FAA 
concludes that these operators can continue to fly non-ETOPS 
international routes and therefore will not incur ETOPS-related costs. 
Also the FAA has eliminated the ETOPS maintenance requirements for 
ETOPS on passenger-carrying airplanes with more than two engines.
    ETOPS flights beyond 180 minutes but planned to remain within 240 
minutes have, in addition to the maintenance requirements, certain 
planning, operational, experience, and equipment requirements. Dassault 
commented that the check required immediately before a flight and 
certified by an ETOPS qualified maintenance person is unrealistic for 
part 135 operators who do not fly ETOPS routes on a regular basis.
    The FAA disagrees that a pre-departure service check is unrealistic 
for 135 operators. Part 135 operators are already required to have 
procedures in place to ensure that maintenance is performed by properly 
qualified maintenance personnel. Allowing a pilot to perform a pre-
departure service check degrades the importance of the check and places 
a safety critical task below the level of performance required to 
change a tire or replace a light bulb for reading.
    NetJets, Inc., commented that it manages and/or operates 
approximately 500 turbojet aircraft in fractional ownership programs 
and part 135 operations. The flight operations of approximately 220 of 
those aircraft will be directly impacted by this proposed rule. The 
most significant impact is for operations conducted between the west 
coast of the United States and Hawaii. In 2003, they conducted more 
than 760 flights to and from Hawaii and the contiguous U.S. At the 
present pace, more than 1100 flights will occur in 2004. Based on the 
data available at this time, approximately 75-80% of these flights will 
not be possible if the proposed rule is adopted as written. It is 
estimated that over the 10-year period following adoption of the 
proposed rule, 21,420 flights would be eliminated. Actus Aviation 
stated that residents of the state of Hawaii rely on long-range air 
ambulance flights to transport them to the mainland where more advanced 
critical medical treatment is available. Currently part 135 operators 
are utilizing Lear 36 aircraft and 1125 Astra Jets to fly these 
missions. Actus believes that if this rule becomes final, the next 
aircraft to conduct the flights would be a Falcon 50 or larger 
aircraft. The cost differential between the Astra and a Falcon 50 would 
be a minimum of $1,000 per hour.
    The FAA has corrected its assumption that operations between the 
west coast and Hawaii would be classified as ETOPS. The question of 
whether or not operations between the mainland U.S. and Hawaii are 
defined as ETOPS for part 135 operators is dependent on the computed 
single-engine cruise speeds for their airplanes. The FAA does not agree 
that the majority of those airplanes whose range and endurance 
legitimately qualifies them for such operations would be considered 
ETOPS in this case. But the FAA does agree that there is difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient single-engine data across all fleets of airplanes 
to accurately account for the cost of the rules application in this 
case. Without this data there is no way to calculate the costs and 
which operators would be affected. In consideration of this fact and 
because of a lack of incident data in this operation, the rule provides 
an exemption for all those airplanes listed on an operator's operations 
specification for up to eight years beyond the effective date of this 
rule. Further, the fuel and electric requirements for airplanes added 
to an operator's operation specifications between the effective date of 
the rule and 8 years later, contained in the NPRM, have been deleted.
    NetJets was also concerned that all maintenance personnel 
performing maintenance on ETOPS aircraft must be trained in accordance 
with the certificate holder's ETOPS maintenance training program. The 
vast majority of maintenance work for part 135 operators is conducted 
by repair stations and/or manufacturer service centers, which places a 
substantial training burden on the certificate holder. Coupled with the 
fact that all manual changes would require approval before adoption, 
NetJets asserted that a very ponderous maintenance requirement is being 
proposed.
    The FAA finds that the operator is already required to train 
persons performing preventative maintenance functions in accordance 
with Sec.  135.433. The amount of additional burden for ETOPS-specific 
training depends on the type of training program the operator chooses 
to incorporate. The FAA has limited the ETOPS maintenance requirements 
to only two-engine operations in part 135.
    TriCoastal Air, a part 135 on-demand air cargo carrier, stated that 
the two Lear 35As operated by that firm are capable of exceeding the 
180-minute range. This carrier estimated that compliance with this rule 
was estimated at $150,000 per aircraft not including the cost of pilot 
training. The commenter realized the possible payback in terms of 
monies saved from fuel stops, but noted that it simply does not have 
the financial resources for the upfront investment.
    The rule provides an exemption for all airplanes that are 
manufactured up to 8 years beyond the effective date of this rule. In 
addition, part 135 operators are likewise given 8 years to comply. In 
view of the fact that the only route beyond the ETOPS 180-minutes 
threshold is located in a portion of the South Pacific, the operator 
can maintain the safety of its operations by avoiding this area.
    NetJets questioned the basis for the estimated cost savings; it 
finds the 2 hours of flying time per round trip for operations beyond 
180 minutes to be inaccurate. The FAA has corrected that assumption in 
the analysis of this final rule and agrees that this rule will impose 
costs on those operators who chose to operate in ETOPS.

XIV. Rulemaking Notices and Analyses

Economic Summary

    Proposed changes to Federal regulations must undergo several 
economic analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal 
agency to propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies 
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. 
Third, the Trade Agreements Act prohibits agencies from setting 
standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade Act also 
requires agencies to consider international standards and, where 
appropriate, use them as the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a 
written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects of 
proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to result 
in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal

[[Page 1859]]

governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation.)
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this rule (1) 
has benefits that justify its costs, is a ``significant regulatory 
action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and is 
``significant'' as defined in DOT's Regulatory Policies and Procedures; 
(2) will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities; (3) will not place U.S. operators at a significant 
competitive disadvantage to foreign operators of three- and four-engine 
airplanes; and (4) does not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, 
or tribal governments, or on the private sector. These analyses, 
available in the final regulatory evaluation supporting today's rule, 
are summarized below.

Total Costs and Benefits of This Rulemaking

    The total costs to the industry are estimated at $20.2 million over 
a 16-year period or $11.9 million, in present value. These costs 
assume:
    <bullet> An Operator of four-engine airplanes that has conducted 
operations in the South Pacific area beyond 180-minutes will elect to 
incur extra flying time costs rather than comply with the ETOPS 
requirements.
    <bullet> No Part 135 operator will seek North polar area 
authorization or serve the South Pacific area beyond 180-minutes.
    <bullet> There are two ``makes'' of U.S. manufactured three-or 
four-engine airplanes (B-747, MD-11) that will obtain supplemental 
certification.
    <bullet> Only one ``major'' business airplane manufacturer will 
comply with the aircraft manufacturing provisions of the rule.

Who is Potentially Affected by This Rulemaking

    <bullet> Part 121 operators with operations beyond 180 minutes from 
an alternate airport or operating in the polar regions
    <bullet> Part 135 operators with operations beyond 180 minutes from 
an alternate airport or operating in the North Polar Region
    <bullet> Engine and airplane manufacturers

Our Costs Assumptions and Information

    A number of fundamental changes since the NPRM regulatory 
evaluation have been made to the cost assumptions in the preparation of 
this final regulatory evaluation as outlined below:
    <bullet> Current Parts 121 regulations for airplanes with more than 
two engines and 135 regulations do not impose requirements for 
operations beyond 180-minutes from a suitable airport. The NPRM assumed 
that policy letters and operation specifications prevented operations 
beyond 180 minutes, and thus cost savings would result from more 
efficient routings.
    <bullet> Type design requirements are not retroactive. Airplanes 
manufactured up to eight years after the effective date of the rule are 
grandfathered.
    <bullet> Recovery plans are required for all part 121 operators 
with operations beyond 180 minutes or in a polar area. The initial 
regulatory assessment incorrectly estimated the cost of recovery plans 
as only for ETOPS operations on a single route.
    <bullet> Recovery plan training hours were incorrectly estimated in 
the initial regulatory assessment and no training hours were estimated 
for ETOPS training. The final regulatory assessment corrects these 
mistakes.
    <bullet> The NPRM assumed only one route for all operations 
specification holders. In the regulatory evaluation for this final 
rule, activity is based on FAA internal records of flight operations. 
If an operator did not conduct ETOPS area flights, no costs are 
estimated for that operator.
    <bullet> Hourly wage estimates for most positions are based at the 
75th percentile level rather than the mean level used in the NPRM. 
Adjustments to these base rates for benefits and overhead costs are the 
same as the initial evaluation. Pilot and flight attendant wage 
estimates based on industry input; other wages based on Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data.
    <bullet> Airplanes cost estimates are based on the number of planes 
operated by a Part 121 carrier. Communication equipment costs exclude 
airplanes that, according to industry information, already have the 
equipment installed. Part 135 cost estimates are calculated on an 
assumed fleet size.
    <bullet> The cost analysis has been extended to 16 years to include 
the effects of the cargo fire suppression provisions that have a six-
year phase-in.
    In addition to changes to the cost assumptions, a number of 
regulatory changes to the final rule affect the costs of the rule. 
These are discussed in the ``Changes from the NPRM to the Final Rule'' 
section.

Alternatives Considered

    The basic framework of the ETOPS rule represents the consensus of a 
working group consisting of over 50 members, including U.S. and foreign 
airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, pilot unions, industry 
associations, international regulatory bodies, and the FAA. During the 
course of their discussions many alternatives were considered and the 
NPRM reflected their views. In general, the more than 50 commenters to 
the NPRM agreed with the framework of the NPRM but disputed specific 
provisions.
    The FAA rejected some of the proposals but adopted a number that 
significantly change provisions of the final rule and are discussed in 
the ``Changes from the NPRM to the Final Rule'' section.

Benefits of This Rulemaking

    The upgraded fire suppression and communications systems, coupled 
with ETOPS procedures and planning will help reduce the risks of flying 
over remote areas, distant from alternate airports. The cargo and 
baggage compartment fire suppression system requirement will ensure 
that all ETOPS airplanes will have fire suppression systems capable of 
putting out fires and suppressing any chance of re-ignition for the 
longest duration diversion that the airplane is approved for. The 
SATCOM requirement will result in a significant improvement in 
communications that can greatly benefit the safety of an ETOPS flight 
that could be three or more hours from a landing site. The ETOPS safety 
enhancements contained in this rule focus on defining methods of 
preventing potential threats caused by known sources of potential 
failures.
    The passenger recovery plan will ensure the safety of the 
passengers and crew. The FAA is projecting that there could be between 
220 and 300 diversions during the next sixteen years for ETOPS flights. 
Some of these diversions may involve airports that are in rather remote 
locations, where it would not be safe to off-load passengers and crew 
until help arrived and where it may not be safe to keep them on-board 
the aircraft either.

Cost Summary

    The Part 121 operators with passenger operations beyond 180 minutes 
from an ETOPS alternate airport will incur costs for passenger recovery 
plans and related training totaling $158,000 or $94,000, present value. 
The total cost to operators in the South polar area is estimated at 
$305,000 or $185,000, present value excluding passenger recovery 
related costs. The costs to the operators that have conducted 
operations in the area of the South Pacific where some flights may 
exceed 180-minutes from an alternate airport will be $1.386 million or 
$735,000, present value. The total cost to Part 121 operators is 
estimated at $1.9 million or $1.0 million, present value over a 16-year 
period.

[[Page 1860]]

    Part 135 operators seeking to avoid operating over 180-minutes from 
an alternate airport will incur extra flying time costs of $396,000 or 
$224,000, present value.
    A business aircraft manufacturer will incur reporting and 
investigation costs that will be required by the provisions of Part 21 
estimated at $5.3 million or $3.1 million, present value. The 
manufacturer will also incur airplane ETOPS certification costs of $5.4 
million. This would consist of design costs of $4.5 million, and 
assessment and validation costs of $900,000. Engine certification costs 
(for a model that does not require Early ETOPS) to make an engine ETOPS 
eligible will cost $1.4 million or $800,000, present value. This will 
consist of design and certification costs of $1.0 million and 
establishing engine condition monitoring procedures at a cost of 
$375,000. The total cost to a business aircraft manufacturer for 
reporting and investigation, and airframe and engine certification will 
be $12.1 million or $7.1 million, present value. The absence of any 
significant activity in the North polar area or in other areas beyond 
180 minutes from an alternate will result in only one manufacturer 
complying with the provisions of the rule.
    The manufacturer of an existing four-engine airplane will incur 
additional reporting costs under part 21 of $3.7 million to include 
operators that choose to fly beyond 180-minutes, supplemental 
certification costs of $1.9 million to allow operators of existing 
three- or four-engine airplanes to increase the capacity of the cargo 
fire suppression system required for beyond 180-minutes ETOPS and other 
required costs of $200,000 for a total cost of $5.8 million, or $3.6 
million, present value.
Benefits
    The FAA is projecting that there could be between 220 and 300 
diversions during the next 10 years involving multi-engine aircraft 
performing an ETOPS operation. Some of the ETOPS operations have 
alternate airports, which are beyond 180 minutes and these airports are 
in rather remote locations, where it would not be safe to off-load 
passengers and crew until help arrived and it may not be safe to keep 
them on-board the aircraft either. Some of the above diversions are 
bound to happen at a remote airport where this might be the case. 
Therefore, the FAA is requiring operators to develop airport specific 
passenger recovery plans for ETOPS alternate airports beyond 180-
minutes.
    The historical rate of occurrence of in-flight cargo and baggage 
compartment fires is approximately 1 x 10<SUP>-7</SUP> per flight hour. 
Since these events cannot be considered extremely improbable the 
possibility must be addressed. For this reason, aircraft cargo and 
baggage compartment fire suppression systems must be capable of putting 
out fires and suppressing any chance of re-ignition for the longest 
duration diversion for which the aircraft is approved. Currently this 
is not the case for some three- and four-engine aircraft used in ETOPS 
operations. This rule will require that all aircraft have a fire 
suppression capability to put out the fire and suppress any re-ignition 
during the longest duration diversion.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the agency determines that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the RFA.
    However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the 
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis 
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing 
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    The final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of airframe and engine manufacturers or part 121 and 
part 135 operators. All United States manufacturers of transport 
category airplanes exceed the Small Business Administration small 
entity criteria of 1,500 employees for aircraft manufacturers. Those 
U.S. manufacturers include: Boeing, Cessna, Gulfstream, Lockheed 
Martin, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and Sabreliner. All United States 
manufacturers of ETOPS-capable engines exceed the Small Business 
Administration small entity criteria of 1,000 employees for aircraft 
engine manufacturers. Those U.S. manufacturers include: General 
Electric, Pratt & Whitney, and Rolls Royce. All United States operators 
of transport category airplanes that are currently authorized to 
conduct 180-minute ETOPS operations exceed the Small Business 
0Administration small entity criteria of 1,500 employees for scheduled 
and non-scheduled air transportation firms. Those U.S. operators 
include: American, American Trans Air, Continental, Delta, United, and 
U.S. Airways.
    All United States operators of transport category airplanes that 
are currently authorized to conduct 180-minute ETOPS operations exceed 
the Small Business Administration small entity criteria of 1,500 
employees for scheduled and non-scheduled air transportation firms. 
Those U.S. operators include: American, American Trans Air, 
Continental, Delta, United, and U.S. Airways.
    Two part 121 operators that have operation specifications to serve 
the South polar area are small entities. To assess the cost impact to 
these airlines, the FAA uses the highest estimated annual cost to 
operators in the period of analysis. This analysis indicates that 
neither of these carriers will experience a significant economic 
impact. One non-scheduled part 121 operators that operate in the South 
Pacific area is not a small entity. It also will not incur significant 
avoidance costs to continue operating in the area. The FAA, therefore, 
certifies that the final rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small part 121 operators.
    One of the 14 part 135 operators with flight activity in the South 
Pacific is a large entity and the 13 others are small entities under 
the SBA criteria. We determined annual revenues for six of the 13 small 
entities and the amounts ranged from $1.4 million to $50 million. We 
believe the revenues of none of the operators with unknown revenues are 
less than the lowest amount of $1.4 million. Two of the operators with 
unknown revenues flew three flights in the area where some flights may 
exceed 180-minutesd from an alternate airport and the rest flew two or 
less. Even if all three flights were to incur avoidance costs (which is 
unlikely since only 20 percent of flights may encounter conditions 
requiring extra flying time) the total cost will be only seven-tenths

[[Page 1861]]

of one percent of the estimated revenues of $1.4 million. None of the 
operators with known revenues will incur significant costs. The FAA 
therefore certifies that the final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small part 135 operators.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not 
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this final rule and concludes that these 
requirements may have some potential affect on a small number of U.S. 
operators under certain conditions unless other countries adopt similar 
aviation regulations. The requirements imposed on both domestic and 
foreign airframe and engine manufacturers create no obstacles to the 
foreign commerce of the United States.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended, 
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal 
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act 
requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing 
the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule 
that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more (adjusted 
annually for inflation) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $128.1 million in lieu of $100 
million. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies 
from establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, are not 
considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also requires 
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that 
they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed the 
potential effect of this final rule and concludes that these 
requirements may have some potential affect on a small number of U.S. 
operators under certain conditions unless other countries adopt similar 
aviation regulations. The requirements imposed on both domestic and 
foreign airframe and engine manufacturers create no obstacles to the 
foreign commerce of the United States.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. The requirements 
of Title II do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government, and therefore does not have federalism implications.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices that correspond to these regulations.

Plain English

    Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) requires each 
agency to write regulations that are simple and easy to understand. To 
the extent possible, the regulations adopted today meet these criteria. 
However, in some instances terms that are not readily understandable to 
the general public have been used. Today's rule imposes no obligation 
on the general public. The entities regulated under this final rule, 
airplane and engine manufacturers and air carriers and on-demand 
operators, are familiar with the terminology included in the 
regulation. Accordingly, the FAA believes the regulation meets the 
requirements of Executive Order 12866.

Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from the preparation of an environmental impact statement 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined that this 
rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical exclusion and involves 
no extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined it is not a 
``significant energy action'' under the executive order because it is 
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866, 
and it is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the 
supply, distribution, or use of energy.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)), the FAA has submitted a copy of the new information 
collection requirements(s) in this final rule to the Office of 
Management and Budget for its review.
    The FAA included a detailed discussion of the new information 
collection requirements of the proposed rule at 68 FR 64782, November 
14, 2003. No comments were received on these estimated requirements.
    However, with certain revisions to the proposal, the FAA finds that 
the information collection burden on the public will be less than 
originally estimated in the NPRM. Some of the reasons for this are that 
type design requirements are not retroactive; therefore, there is no 
paperwork burden for recertification of airplanes used in existing 
ETOPS. In addition, based on operator comment and internal FAA 
research, this paperwork estimate is based on actual activity levels of 
individual operators rather than averages for potential fleet 
operation. Regional recovery plans also have been omitted from the 
final rule, reducing that burden. The following chart shows the record 
keeping requirements of today's final rule.

[[Page 1862]]



                             Summary of Initial and Total Paperwork Hours and Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Initial                    Sixteen year    Sixteen year
                       Category                          hours     Initial cost        hours           costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Part 121
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Recovery Plans.............................        200         $20,600           1,320        $135,960
Recovery Training....................................         55           8,960             132          21,504
South Polar--flare planning..........................        200          20,000             480         132,000
South Polar--fuel strategies.........................        200          20,000             480         132,000
Sec.   121.415 training:
    Pilots...........................................        200          34,600             480          83,040
    Dispatchers......................................         20           1,240              48           2,976
Sec.   121.415 computer planning.....................  .........          29,200  ..............         438,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Part 21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ETOPS Reporting......................................      4,160         187,200          66,560       2,995,200
Investigations.......................................      2,000         146,000          32,000       2,336,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Part 25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electrical system design.............................     30,000       2,250,000          30,000       2,250,000
Fuel system design...................................     30,000       2,250,000          30,000       2,250,000
System assessments...................................     12,000         898,000          12,000         898,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Part 33
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Engine Monitoring....................................      5,000         375,000           5,000         375,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Part 135
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Pacific Operations.............................         64           4,608             288          20,736
                                                      ----------------------------------------------------------
    Total............................................  .........  ..............  ..............      12,049,416
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

XV. Appendix of Tables

                                                          Table 1.--Applicability of Final Rule
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Current requirements                                              Final Rule
                               -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Beyond 60 minutes      Beyond 180         Up to 60      Beyond 60 minutes up
                                 Up to 60 minutes  up to 180 minutes       minutes           minutes          to 180 minutes        Beyond 180 minutes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 121 two-engine...........  Section 121.161    Advisory material  Currently          ...............  Would codify previous   New ETOPS rules would
                                 applies.           and policy         restricted.                         ETOPS guidance with     apply. Airport
                                                    letters.                                               some reductions in      specific PRP.
                                                                                                           requirements*.
Part 121 more than two-engine.  No current         No current         No current         ...............  (From 90-180 minutes)   New ETOPS rules would
                                 regulation.        regulation.        regulation.                         New requirement: Fuel   apply to passenger-
                                                                                                           for depressurization.   carrying operations
                                                                                                                                   only. Airport
                                                                                                                                   specific PRP. No
                                                                                                                                   ETOPS maintenance
                                                                                                                                   program.
Part 135......................  No current         No current         No current         No change......  No change.............  New ETOPS rules would
                                 regulation.        regulation.        regulation.                                                 apply. All-cargo
                                                                                                                                   airplanes with more
                                                                                                                                   than two engines
                                                                                                                                   excluded. PRP in
                                                                                                                                   North Polar region
                                                                                                                                   only. No ETOPS
                                                                                                                                   maintenance program
                                                                                                                                   for airplanes with
                                                                                                                                   more than two
                                                                                                                                   engines.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRP = passenger recovery plan.
* a. Fuel requirements for icing and wind calculations in the critical fuel scenario have been reduced.
b. The area of applicability for 207-minute ETOPS has been increased.


[[Page 1863]]


                       Table 2.--Part 121 and Part 135 Operational Requirements Timetable
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Requirement                                            Compliance date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Part 121                 Airplanes with two engines      Airplanes with more than two engines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 1 & 121.7 Definitions.............  30 days...................  30 days.
121.97 Airport required data...........  1 year....................  1 year.
121.99 & 121.122 SATCOM................  1 year (except for 207-     1 year.
                                          minute ETOPS approval in
                                          the North Pacific area of
                                          operation).
121.106 Rescue and firefighting          30 days...................  30 days.
 equipment at alternate airports.
121.135 Passenger recovery plan........  1 year....................  1 year.
121.161 Airplane limitations...........  30 days...................  1 year.
121.162 ETOPS Type Design Approval.....  30 days...................  8 years.
121.374 Maintenance....................  30 days...................  Not required.
121.415 Crew training..................  1 year....................  1 year.
121.565 Reporting--engine inoperative    30 days...................  30 days.
 landing.
121.624 ETOPS alternates...............  30 days...................  30 days.
121.625 Alternate weather minimums.....  30 days...................  30 days.
121.631 Dispatch.......................  30 days...................  30 days.
121.633 Cargo fire suppression.........  30 days...................  6 years.
121.646 En-route fuel supply...........  30 days...................  30 days.
121.687 & 689 Contents of dispatch.....  30 days...................  30 days.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Part 135                                              All airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
135.98 North Polar Operations..........                                  1 year.
135.345 Passenger Recovery Training....                                  1 year.
135.364 Maximum Flying Time............                                  1 year.
135.411 Applicability..................                                  1 year.
Part 135 Appendix G (General)..........                                  1 year.
 a. Time-Limited Systems...............                                  8 years.
 b. Airplane Requirements..............                                  8 years.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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             Table 6.--Part 25, Appendix K Revised Numbering
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         NPRM  (old Appendix L)              Final Rule  (Appendix K)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section I..............................  K25.1.
    Sec.   25.1535(a)..................  K25.1.1.
    Sec.   25.1535(b)..................  K25.1.2.
    (a)................................  K25.1.3.
    (a)(1).............................  K25.1.3(a).
    (a)(2).............................  K25.1.3(b).
    (a)(3).............................  K25.1.3(c).
    (b)................................  K25.1.4.
    (b)(1).............................  K25.1.4(a).
    (b)(2).............................  K25.1.4(b).
    (b)(2)(i)..........................  K25.1.4(b)(1).
    (b)(2)(ii).........................  K25.1.4(b)(2).
    (b)(3).............................  K25.1.4(c).
    (c)................................  K25.1.5.
    (d)................................  K25.1.6.
    (e)................................  K25.1.7.
Section II.............................  K25.2.
    (a)................................  K25.2.1.
    (a)(1).............................  K25.2.1(a).
    (a)(2).............................  K25.2.1(c).
    (a)(3).............................  K25.2.1(d).
    (a)(4).............................  K25.2.1(b).
    (a)(5).............................  K25.2.1(e).
    (b)................................  K25.2.2.
    (b)(1).............................  K25.2.2(a).
    (b)(2).............................  K25.2.2(b).
    (b)(3).............................  K25.2.2(c).
    (b)(4).............................  K25.2.2(d).
    (b)(5).............................  K25.2.2(e).
    (b)(6).............................  K25.2.2(f).
    (b)(7).............................  K25.2.2(g).
    (b)(9).............................  K25.2.2(i).
    (c)................................  K25.2.3.
Section III............................  K25.3.
    (a)................................  K25.3.1.
    (a)(1).............................  K25.3.1(a).
    (a)(2).............................  K25.3.1(b).
    (a)(3).............................  K25.3.1(c).
    (b)................................  K25.3.2.
    (b)(1).............................  K25.3.2(a).
    (b)(2).............................  K25.3.2(b).
    (b)(3).............................  K25.3.2(c).
    (b)(4).............................  K25.3.2(d).
    (b)(5).............................  K25.3.2(e).
    (b)(6).............................  K25.3.2(f).
    (c)................................  K25.3.3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

XVI. The Final Rule

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 1

    Air transportation.

14 CFR Part 21

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Exports, Imports, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

14 CFR Part 33

    Aircraft, Aviation safety.

14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, 
Drug abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Safety, Transportation.

14 CFR Part 135

    Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, Drug 
abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Amendment

0
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends 14 CFR parts 1, 21, 25, 33, 121, and 135 as 
follows:

PART 1--DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


0
2. Amend Sec.  1.1 by adding the following definitions in alphabetical 
order to read as follows:


Sec.  1.1  General definitions.

* * * * *
    Configuration, Maintenance, and Procedures (CMP) document means a 
document approved by the FAA that contains minimum configuration, 
operating, and maintenance requirements, hardware life-limits, and 
Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) constraints necessary for an 
airplane-engine combination to meet ETOPS type design approval 
requirements.
* * * * *
    Early ETOPS means ETOPS type design approval obtained without 
gaining non-ETOPS service experience on the candidate airplane-engine 
combination certified for ETOPS.
* * * * *
    ETOPS Significant System means an airplane system, including the 
propulsion system, the failure or malfunctioning of which could 
adversely affect the safety of an ETOPS flight, or the continued safe 
flight and landing of an airplane during an ETOPS diversion. Each ETOPS 
significant system is either an ETOPS group 1 significant system or an 
ETOPS group 2 significant system.
    (1) An ETOPS group 1 Significant System--
    (i) Has fail-safe characteristics directly linked to the degree of 
redundancy provided by the number of engines on the airplane.
    (ii) Is a system, the failure or malfunction of which could result 
in an IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other power loss.
    (iii) Contributes significantly to the safety of an ETOPS diversion 
by providing additional redundancy for any system power source lost as 
a result of an inoperative engine.
    (iv) Is essential for prolonged operation of an airplane at engine 
inoperative altitudes.
    (2) An ETOPS group 2 significant system is an ETOPS significant 
system that is not an ETOPS group 1 significant system.
    Extended Operations (ETOPS) means an airplane flight operation 
other than an all-cargo operation in an airplane with more than two 
engines during which a portion of the flight is conducted beyond a time 
threshold identified in part 121 or part 135 of this chapter that is 
determined using an approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed under 
standard atmospheric conditions in still air.
* * * * *
    In-flight shutdown (IFSD) means, for ETOPS only, when an engine 
ceases to function (when the airplane is airborne) and is shutdown, 
whether self induced, flightcrew initiated or caused by an external 
influence. The FAA considers IFSD for all causes: for example, 
flameout, internal failure, flightcrew initiated shutdown, foreign 
object ingestion, icing, inability to obtain or control desired thrust 
or power, and cycling of the start control, however briefly, even if 
the engine operates normally for the remainder of the flight. This 
definition excludes the airborne cessation of the functioning of an 
engine when immediately followed by an automatic engine relight and 
when an engine does not achieve desired thrust or power but is not 
shutdown.
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  1.2 by adding the following abbreviations in 
alphabetical order to read as follows:


Sec.  1.2  Abbreviations and symbols

* * * * *
    AFM means airplane flight manual.
* * * * *
    APU means auxiliary power unit.
* * * * *
    ATS means Air Traffic Service.
    CAMP means continuous airworthiness maintenance program.
* * * * *
    CHDO means an FAA Flight Standards certificate holding district 
office.
    CMP means configuration, maintenance, and procedures.
* * * * *

[[Page 1872]]

    Equi-Time Point means a point on the route of flight where the 
flight time, considering wind, to each of two selected airports is 
equal.
    ETOPS means extended operations.
* * * * *
    IFSD means in-flight shutdown.
* * * * *
    MEL means minimum equipment list.
* * * * *
    NOPAC means North Pacific area of operation.
* * * * *
    OPSPECS means operations specifications.
    PACOTS means Pacific Organized Track System.
* * * * *
    PTRS means Performance Tracking and Reporting System.
* * * * *
    RFFS means rescue and firefighting services.
* * * * *
    SATCOM means satellite communications.
* * * * *

PART 21--CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS

0
4. The authority citation for part 21 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 
44701-44702, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.


0
5. Add Sec.  21.4 to read as follows:


Sec.  21.4  ETOPS reporting requirements.

    (a) Early ETOPS: reporting, tracking, and resolving problems. The 
holder of a type certificate for an airplane-engine combination 
approved using the Early ETOPS method specified in part 25, Appendix K, 
of this chapter must use a system for reporting, tracking, and 
resolving each problem resulting in one of the occurrences specified in 
paragraph (a)(6) of this section.
    (1) The system must identify how the type certificate holder will 
promptly identify problems, report them to the responsible FAA aircraft 
certification office, and propose a solution to the FAA to resolve each 
problem. A proposed solution must consist of--
    (i) A change in the airplane or engine type design;
    (ii) A change in a manufacturing process;
    (iii) A change in an operating or maintenance procedure; or
    (iv) Any other solution acceptable to the FAA.
    (2) For an airplane with more than two engines, the system must be 
in place for the first 250,000 world fleet engine-hours for the 
approved airplane-engine combination.
    (3) For two-engine airplanes, the system must be in place for the 
first 250,000 world fleet engine-hours for the approved airplane-engine 
combination and after that until--
    (i) The world fleet 12-month rolling average IFSD rate is at or 
below the rate required by paragraph (b)(2) of this section; and
    (ii) The FAA determines that the rate is stable.
    (4) For an airplane-engine combination that is a derivative of an 
airplane-engine combination previously approved for ETOPS, the system 
need only address those problems specified in the following table, 
provided the type certificate holder obtains prior authorization from 
the FAA:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Then the Problem Tracking and
  If the change does not require a new    Resolution System must address
  airplane type certificate and . . .                 . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Requires a new engine type           All problems applicable to the
 certificate.                             new engine installation, and
                                          for the remainder of the
                                          airplane, problems in changed
                                          systems only.
(ii) Does not require a new engine type  Problems in changed systems
 certificate.                             only.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (5) The type certificate holder must identify the sources and 
content of data that it will use for its system. The data must be 
adequate to evaluate the specific cause of any in-service problem 
reportable under this section or Sec.  21.3(c) that could affect the 
safety of ETOPS.
    (6) In implementing this system, the type certificate holder must 
report the following occurrences:
    (i) IFSDs, except planned IFSDs performed for flight training.
    (ii) For two-engine airplanes, IFSD rates.
    (iii) Inability to control an engine or obtain desired thrust or 
power.
    (iv) Precautionary thrust or power reductions.
    (v) Degraded ability to start an engine in flight.
    (vi) Inadvertent fuel loss or unavailability, or uncorrectable fuel 
imbalance in flight.
    (vii) Turn backs or diversions for failures, malfunctions, or 
defects associated with an ETOPS group 1 significant system.
    (viii) Loss of any power source for an ETOPS group 1 significant 
system, including any power source designed to provide backup power for 
that system.
    (ix) Any event that would jeopardize the safe flight and landing of 
the airplane on an ETOPS flight.
    (x) Any unscheduled engine removal for a condition that could 
result in one of the reportable occurrences listed in this paragraph.
    (b) Reliability of two-engine airplanes--(1) Reporting of two-
engine airplane in-service reliability. The holder of a type 
certificate for an airplane approved for ETOPS and the holder of a type 
certificate for an engine installed on an airplane approved for ETOPS 
must report monthly to their respective FAA type certificate holding 
office on the reliability of the world fleet of those airplanes and 
engines. The report provided by both the airplane and engine type 
certificate holders must address each airplane-engine combination 
approved for ETOPS. The FAA may approve quarterly reporting if the 
airplane-engine combination demonstrates an IFSD rate at or below those 
specified in paragraph (b)(2) of this section for a period acceptable 
to the FAA. This reporting may be combined with the reporting required 
by Sec.  21.3. The responsible type certificate holder must investigate 
any cause of an IFSD resulting from an occurrence attributable to the 
design of its product and report the results of that investigation to 
its FAA office responsible for administering its type certificate. 
Reporting must include:
    (i) Engine IFSDs, except planned IFSDs performed for flight 
training.
    (ii) The world fleet 12-month rolling average IFSD rates for all 
causes, except planned IFSDs performed for flight training.
    (iii) ETOPS fleet utilization, including a list of operators, their 
ETOPS diversion time authority, flight hours, and cycles.
    (2) World fleet IFSD rate for two-engine airplanes. The holder of a 
type certificate for an airplane approved for ETOPS and the holder of a 
type certificate for an engine installed on an airplane approved for 
ETOPS must issue service information to the operators of those 
airplanes and engines, as appropriate, to maintain the world fleet 12-
month rolling average IFSD rate at or below the following levels:

[[Page 1873]]

    (i) A rate of 0.05 per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours for an 
airplane-engine combination approved for up to and including 120-minute 
ETOPS. When all ETOPS operators have complied with the corrective 
actions required in the configuration, maintenance and procedures (CMP) 
document as a condition for ETOPS approval, the rate to be maintained 
is at or below 0.02 per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours.
    (ii) A rate of 0.02 per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours for an 
airplane-engine combination approved for up to and including 180-minute 
ETOPS, including airplane-engine combinations approved for 207-minute 
ETOPS in the North Pacific operating area under appendix P, section I, 
paragraph (h), of part 121 of this chapter.
    (iii) A rate of 0.01 per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours for an 
airplane-engine combination approved for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, 
excluding airplane-engine combinations approved for 207-minute ETOPS in 
the North Pacific operating area under appendix P, section I, paragraph 
(h), of part 121 of this chapter.

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
6. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 44704.


0
7. Add Sec.  25.3 to subpart A to read as follows:


Sec.  25.3  Special provisions for ETOPS type design approvals.

    (a) Applicability. This section applies to an applicant for ETOPS 
type design approval of an airplane:
    (1) That has an existing type certificate on February 15, 2007; or
    (2) For which an application for an original type certificate was 
submitted before February 15, 2007.
    (b) Airplanes with two engines. (1) For ETOPS type design approval 
of an airplane up to and including 180 minutes, an applicant must 
comply with Sec.  25.1535, except that it need not comply with the 
following provisions of Appendix K, K25.1.4, of this part:
    (i) K25.1.4(a), fuel system pressure and flow requirements;
    (ii) K25.1.4(a)(3), low fuel alerting; and
    (iii) K25.1.4(c), engine oil tank design.
    (2) For ETOPS type design approval of an airplane beyond 180 
minutes an applicant must comply with Sec.  25.1535.
    (c) Airplanes with more than two engines. An applicant for ETOPS 
type design approval must comply with Sec.  25.1535 for an airplane 
manufactured on or after February 17, 2015, except that, for an 
airplane configured for a three person flight crew, the applicant need 
not comply with Appendix K, K25.1.4(a)(3), of this part, low fuel 
alerting.

0
8. Add Sec.  25.1535 to read as follows:


Sec.  25.1535  ETOPS approval.

    Except as provided in Sec.  25.3, each applicant seeking ETOPS type 
design approval must comply with the provisions of Appendix K of this 
part.

0
9. Add Appendix K to read as follows:

Appendix K to PART 25--EXTENDED OPERATIONS (ETOPS)

    This appendix specifies airworthiness requirements for the 
approval of an airplane-engine combination for extended operations 
(ETOPS). For two-engine airplanes, the applicant must comply with 
sections K25.1 and K25.2 of this appendix. For airplanes with more 
than two engines, the applicant must comply with sections K25.1 and 
K25.3 of this appendix.
    K25.1 Design requirements.
    K25.1.1 Part 25 compliance.
    The airplane-engine combination must comply with the 
requirements of part 25 considering the maximum flight time and the 
longest diversion time for which the applicant seeks approval.
    K25.1.2 Human factors.
    An applicant must consider crew workload, operational 
implications, and the crew's and passengers' physiological needs 
during continued operation with failure effects for the longest 
diversion time for which it seeks approval.
    K25.1.3 Airplane systems.
    (a) Operation in icing conditions.
    (1) The airplane must be certificated for operation in icing 
conditions in accordance with Sec.  25.1419.
    (2) The airplane must be able to safely conduct an ETOPS 
diversion with the most critical ice accretion resulting from:
    (i) Icing conditions encountered at an altitude that the 
airplane would have to fly following an engine failure or cabin 
decompression.
    (ii) A 15-minute hold in the continuous maximum icing conditions 
specified in Appendix C of this part with a liquid water content 
factor of 1.0.
    (iii) Ice accumulated during approach and landing in the icing 
conditions specified in Appendix C of this part.
    (b) Electrical power supply. The airplane must be equipped with 
at least three independent sources of electrical power.
    (c) Time limited systems. The applicant must define the system 
time capability of each ETOPS significant system that is time-
limited.
    K25.1.4 Propulsion systems.
    (a) Fuel system design. Fuel necessary to complete an ETOPS 
flight (including a diversion for the longest time for which the 
applicant seeks approval) must be available to the operating engines 
at the pressure and fuel-flow required by Sec.  25.955 under any 
airplane failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. 
Types of failures that must be considered include, but are not 
limited to: crossfeed valve failures, automatic fuel management 
system failures, and normal electrical power generation failures.
    (1) If the engine has been certified for limited operation with 
negative engine-fuel-pump-inlet pressures, the following 
requirements apply:
    (i) Airplane demonstration-testing must cover worst case cruise 
and diversion conditions involving:
    (A) Fuel grade and temperature.
    (B) Thrust or power variations.
    (C) Turbulence and negative G.
    (D) Fuel system components degraded within their approved 
maintenance limits.
    (ii) Unusable-fuel quantity in the suction feed configuration 
must be determined in accordance with Sec.  25.959.
    (2) For two-engine airplanes to be certificated for ETOPS beyond 
180 minutes, one fuel boost pump in each main tank and at least one 
crossfeed valve, or other means for transferring fuel, must be 
powered by an independent electrical power source other than the 
three power sources required to comply with section K25.1.3(b) of 
this appendix. This requirement does not apply if the normal fuel 
boost pressure, crossfeed valve actuation, or fuel transfer 
capability is not provided by electrical power.
    (3) An alert must be displayed to the flightcrew when the 
quantity of fuel available to the engines falls below the level 
required to fly to the destination. The alert must be given when 
there is enough fuel remaining to safely complete a diversion. This 
alert must account for abnormal fuel management or transfer between 
tanks, and possible loss of fuel. This paragraph does not apply to 
airplanes with a required flight engineer.
    (b) APU design. If an APU is needed to comply with this 
appendix, the applicant must demonstrate that:
    (1) The reliability of the APU is adequate to meet those 
requirements; and
    (2) If it is necessary that the APU be able to start in flight, 
it is able to start at any altitude up to the maximum operating 
altitude of the airplane, or 45,000 feet, whichever is lower, and 
run for the remainder of any flight .
    (c) Engine oil tank design. The engine oil tank filler cap must 
comply with Sec.  33.71(c)(4) of this chapter.
    K25.1.5 Engine-condition monitoring.
    Procedures for engine-condition monitoring must be specified and 
validated in accordance with Part 33, Appendix A, paragraph A33.3(c) 
of this chapter.
    K25.1.6 Configuration, maintenance, and procedures.
    The applicant must list any configuration, operating and 
maintenance requirements, hardware life limits, MMEL constraints, 
and ETOPS approval in a CMP document.
    K25.1.7 Airplane flight manual.
    The airplane flight manual must contain the following 
information applicable to the ETOPS type design approval:
    (a) Special limitations, including any limitation associated 
with operation of the airplane up to the maximum diversion time 
being approved.

[[Page 1874]]

    (b) Required markings or placards.
    (c) The airborne equipment required for extended operations and 
flightcrew operating procedures for this equipment.
    (d) The system time capability for the following:
    (1) The most limiting fire suppression system for Class C cargo 
or baggage compartments.
    (2) The most limiting ETOPS significant system other than fire 
suppression systems for Class C cargo or baggage compartments.
    (e) This statement: ``The type-design reliability and 
performance of this airplane-engine combination has been evaluated 
under 14 CFR 25.1535 and found suitable for (identify maximum 
approved diversion time) extended operations (ETOPS) when the 
configuration, maintenance, and procedures standard contained in 
(identify the CMP document) are met. The actual maximum approved 
diversion time for this airplane may be less based on its most 
limiting system time capability. This finding does not constitute 
operational approval to conduct ETOPS.''
    K25.2. Two-engine airplanes.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval of a two-engine 
airplane must use one of the methods described in section K25.2.1, 
K25.2.2, or K25.2.3 of this appendix.
    K25.2.1 Service experience method.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval using the service 
experience method must comply with sections K25.2.1(a) and 
K25.2.1(b) of this appendix before conducting the assessments 
specified in sections K25.2.1(c) and K25.2.1(d) of this appendix, 
and the flight test specified in section K25.2.1(e) of this 
appendix.
    (a) Service experience. The world fleet for the airplane-engine 
combination must accumulate a minimum of 250,000 engine-hours. The 
FAA may reduce this number of hours if the applicant identifies 
compensating factors that are acceptable to the FAA. The 
compensating factors may include experience on another airplane, but 
experience on the candidate airplane must make up a significant 
portion of the total service experience.
    (b) In-flight shutdown (IFSD) rates. The demonstrated 12-month 
rolling average IFSD rate for the world fleet of the airplane-engine 
combination must be commensurate with the level of ETOPS approval 
being sought.
    (1) For type design approval up to and including 120 minutes: An 
IFSD rate of 0.05 or less per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours, unless 
otherwise approved by the FAA. Unless the IFSD rate is 0.02 or less 
per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours, the applicant must provide a 
list of corrective actions in the CMP document specified in section 
K25.1.6 of this appendix, that, when taken, would result in an IFSD 
rate of 0.02 or less per 1,000 fleet engine-hours.
    (2) For type design approval up to and including 180 minutes: An 
IFSD rate of 0.02 or less per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours, unless 
otherwise approved by the FAA. If the airplane-engine combination 
does not meet this rate by compliance with an existing 120-minute 
CMP document, then new or additional CMP requirements that the 
applicant has demonstrated would achieve this IFSD rate must be 
added to the CMP document.
    (3) For type design approval beyond 180 minutes: An IFSD rate of 
0.01 or less per 1,000 fleet engine-hours unless otherwise approved 
by the FAA. If the airplane-engine combination does not meet this 
rate by compliance with an existing 120-minute or 180-minute CMP 
document, then new or additional CMP requirements that the applicant 
has demonstrated would achieve this IFSD rate must be added to the 
CMP document.
    (c) Propulsion system assessment. (1) The applicant must conduct 
a propulsion system assessment based on the following data collected 
from the world-fleet of the airplane-engine combination:
    (i) A list of all IFSD's, unplanned ground engine shutdowns, and 
occurrences (both ground and in-flight) when an engine was not shut 
down, but engine control or the desired thrust or power level was 
not achieved, including engine flameouts. Planned IFSD's performed 
during flight training need not be included. For each item, the 
applicant must provide--
    (A) Each airplane and engine make, model, and serial number;
    (B) Engine configuration, and major alteration history;
    (C) Engine position;
    (D) Circumstances leading up to the engine shutdown or 
occurrence;
    (E) Phase of flight or ground operation;
    (F) Weather and other environmental conditions; and
    (G) Cause of engine shutdown or occurrence.
    (ii) A history of unscheduled engine removal rates since 
introduction into service (using 6- and 12-month rolling averages), 
with a summary of the major causes for the removals.
    (iii) A list of all propulsion system events (whether or not 
caused by maintenance or flightcrew error), including dispatch 
delays, cancellations, aborted takeoffs, turnbacks, diversions, and 
flights that continue to destination after the event.
    (iv) The total number of engine hours and cycles, the number of 
hours for the engine with the highest number of hours, the number of 
cycles for the engine with the highest number of cycles, and the 
distribution of hours and cycles.
    (v) The mean time between failures (MTBF) of propulsion system 
components that affect reliability.
    (vi) A history of the IFSD rates since introduction into service 
using a 12-month rolling average.
    (2) The cause or potential cause of each item listed in 
K25.2.1(c)(1)(i) must have a corrective action or actions that are 
shown to be effective in preventing future occurrences. Each 
corrective action must be identified in the CMP document specified 
in section K25.1.6. A corrective action is not required:
    (i) For an item where the manufacturer is unable to determine a 
cause or potential cause.
    (ii) For an event where it is technically unfeasible to develop 
a corrective action.
    (iii) If the world-fleet IFSD rate--
    (A) Is at or below 0.02 per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours for 
approval up to and including 180-minute ETOPS; or
    (B) Is at or below 0.01 per 1,000 world-fleet engine-hours for 
approval greater than 180-minute ETOPS.
    (d) Airplane systems assessment. The applicant must conduct an 
airplane systems assessment. The applicant must show that the 
airplane systems comply with Sec.  25.1309(b) using available in-
service reliability data for ETOPS significant systems on the 
candidate airplane-engine combination. Each cause or potential cause 
of a relevant design, manufacturing, operational, and maintenance 
problem occurring in service must have a corrective action or 
actions that are shown to be effective in preventing future 
occurrences. Each corrective action must be identified in the CMP 
document specified in section K25.1.6 of this appendix. A corrective 
action is not required if the problem would not significantly impact 
the safety or reliability of the airplane system involved. A 
relevant problem is a problem with an ETOPS group 1 significant 
system that has or could result in, an IFSD or diversion. The 
applicant must include in this assessment relevant problems with 
similar or identical equipment installed on other types of airplanes 
to the extent such information is reasonably available.
    (e) Airplane flight test. The applicant must conduct a flight 
test to validate the flightcrew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS 
diversion with an inoperative engine and worst-case ETOPS 
Significant System failures and malfunctions that could occur in 
service. The flight test must validate the airplane's flying 
qualities and performance with the demonstrated failures and 
malfunctions.
    K25.2.2 Early ETOPS method.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval using the Early 
ETOPS method must comply with the following requirements:
    (a) Assessment of relevant experience with airplanes previously 
certificated under part 25. The applicant must identify specific 
corrective actions taken on the candidate airplane to prevent 
relevant design, manufacturing, operational, and maintenance 
problems experienced on airplanes previously certificated under part 
25 manufactured by the applicant. Specific corrective actions are 
not required if the nature of a problem is such that the problem 
would not significantly impact the safety or reliability of the 
airplane system involved. A relevant problem is a problem with an 
ETOPS group 1 significant system that has or could result in an IFSD 
or diversion. The applicant must include in this assessment relevant 
problems of supplier-provided ETOPS group 1 significant systems and 
similar or identical equipment used on airplanes built by other 
manufacturers to the extent such information is reasonably 
available.
    (b) Propulsion system design. (1) The engine used in the 
applicant's airplane design must be approved as eligible for Early 
ETOPS in accordance with Sec.  33.201 of this chapter.
    (2) The applicant must design the propulsion system to preclude 
failures or

[[Page 1875]]

malfunctions that could result in an IFSD. The applicant must show 
compliance with this requirement by analysis, test, in-service 
experience on other airplanes, or other means acceptable to the FAA. 
If analysis is used, the applicant must show that the propulsion 
system design will minimize failures and malfunctions with the 
objective of achieving the following IFSD rates:
    (i) An IFSD rate of 0.02 or less per 1,000 world-fleet engine-
hours for type design approval up to and including 180 minutes.
    (ii) An IFSD rate of 0.01 or less per 1,000 world-fleet engine-
hours for type design approval beyond 180 minutes.
    (c) Maintenance and operational procedures. The applicant must 
validate all maintenance and operational procedures for ETOPS 
significant systems. The applicant must identify, track, and resolve 
any problems found during the validation in accordance with the 
problem tracking and resolution system specified in section 
K25.2.2(h) of this appendix.
    (d) Propulsion system validation test. (1) The installed engine 
configuration for which approval is being sought must comply with 
Sec.  33.201(c) of this chapter. The test engine must be configured 
with a complete airplane nacelle package, including engine-mounted 
equipment, except for any configuration differences necessary to 
accommodate test stand interfaces with the engine nacelle package. 
At the conclusion of the test, the propulsion system must be--
    (i) Visually inspected according to the applicant's on-wing 
inspection recommendations and limits; and
    (ii) Completely disassembled and the propulsion system hardware 
inspected to determine whether it meets the service limits specified 
in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness submitted in 
compliance with Sec.  25.1529.
    (2) The applicant must identify, track, and resolve each cause 
or potential cause of IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other power 
loss encountered during this inspection in accordance with the 
problem tracking and resolution system specified in section K25.2.2 
(h) of this appendix.
    (e) New technology testing. Technology new to the applicant, 
including substantially new manufacturing techniques, must be tested 
to substantiate its suitability for the airplane design.
    (f) APU validation test. If an APU is needed to comply with this 
appendix, one APU of the type to be certified with the airplane must 
be tested for 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles. 
Following completion of the test, the APU must be disassembled and 
inspected. The applicant must identify, track, and resolve each 
cause or potential cause of an inability to start or operate the APU 
in flight as intended in accordance with the problem tracking and 
resolution system specified in section K25.2.2(h) of this appendix.
    (g) Airplane demonstration. For each airplane-engine combination 
to be approved for ETOPS, the applicant must flight test at least 
one airplane to demonstrate that the airplane, and its components 
and equipment are capable of functioning properly during ETOPS 
flights and diversions of the longest duration for which the 
applicant seeks approval. This flight testing may be performed in 
conjunction with, but may not substitute for the flight testing 
required by Sec.  21.35(b)(2) of this chapter.
    (1) The airplane demonstration flight test program must include:
    (i) Flights simulating actual ETOPS, including flight at normal 
cruise altitude, step climbs, and, if applicable, APU operation.
    (ii) Maximum duration flights with maximum duration diversions.
    (iii) Maximum duration engine-inoperative diversions distributed 
among the engines installed on the airplanes used for the airplane 
demonstration flight test program. At least two one-engine-
inoperative diversions must be conducted at maximum continuous 
thrust or power using the same engine.
    (iv) Flights under non-normal conditions to demonstrate the 
flightcrew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion with 
worst-case ETOPS significant system failures or malfunctions that 
could occur in service.
    (v) Diversions to airports that represent airports of the types 
used for ETOPS diversions.
    (vi) Repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the 
ground followed by a long-duration flight at normal cruise altitude.
    (2) The airplane demonstration flight test program must validate 
the adequacy of the airplane's flying qualities and performance, and 
the flightcrew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under 
the conditions specified in section K25.2.2(g)(1) of this appendix.
    (3) During the airplane demonstration flight test program, each 
test airplane must be operated and maintained using the applicant's 
recommended operating and maintenance procedures.
    (4) At the completion of the airplane demonstration flight test 
program, each ETOPS significant system must undergo an on-wing 
inspection or test in accordance with the tasks defined in the 
proposed Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to establish its 
condition for continued safe operation. Each engine must also 
undergo a gas path inspection. These inspections must be conducted 
in a manner to identify abnormal conditions that could result in an 
IFSD or diversion. The applicant must identify, track and resolve 
any abnormal conditions in accordance with the problem tracking and 
resolution system specified in section K25.2.2(h) of this appendix.
    (h) Problem tracking and resolution system. (1) The applicant 
must establish and maintain a problem tracking and resolution 
system. The system must:
    (i) Contain a process for prompt reporting to the responsible 
FAA aircraft certification office of each occurrence reportable 
under Sec.  21.4(a)(6) encountered during the phases of airplane and 
engine development used to assess Early ETOPS eligibility.
    (ii) Contain a process for notifying the responsible FAA 
aircraft certification office of each proposed corrective action 
that the applicant determines necessary for each problem identified 
from the occurrences reported under section K25.2.2. (h)(1)(i) of 
this appendix. The timing of the notification must permit 
appropriate FAA review before taking the proposed corrective action.
    (2) If the applicant is seeking ETOPS type design approval of a 
change to an airplane-engine combination previously approved for 
ETOPS, the problem tracking and resolution system need only address 
those problems specified in the following table, provided the 
applicant obtains prior authorization from the FAA:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Then the Problem Tracking and
  If the change does not require a new    Resolution System must address
  airplane type certificiate and . . .                . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Requires a new engine type           All problems applicable to the
 certificate.                             new engine installation, and
                                          for the remainder of the
                                          airplane, problems in changed
                                          systems only.
(ii) Does not require a new engine type  Problems in changed systems
 certificate.                             only.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (i) Acceptance criteria. The type and frequency of failures and 
malfunctions on ETOPS significant systems that occur during the 
airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration flight 
test program specified in section K25.2.2(g) of this appendix must 
be consistent with the type and frequency of failures and 
malfunctions that would be expected to occur on currently 
certificated airplanes approved for ETOPS.
    K25.2.3. Combined service experience and Early ETOPS method.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval using the combined 
service experience and Early ETOPS method must comply with the 
following requirements.
    (a) A service experience requirement of not less than 15,000 
engine-hours for the world fleet of the candidate airplane-engine 
combination.
    (b) The Early ETOPS requirements of K25.2.2, except for the 
airplane demonstration specified in section K25.2.2(g) of this 
appendix; and
    (c) The flight test requirement of section K25.2.1(e) of this 
appendix.
    K25.3. Airplanes with more than two engines.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval of an airplane with 
more than two engines must use one of the methods described in 
section K25.3.1, K25.3.2, or K25.3.3 of this appendix.
    K25.3.1 Service experience method.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval using the service 
experience

[[Page 1876]]

method must comply with section K25.3.1(a) of this appendix before 
conducting the airplane systems assessment specified in K25.3.1(b), 
and the flight test specified in section K25.3.1(c) of this 
appendix.
    (a) Service experience. The world fleet for the airplane-engine 
combination must accumulate a minimum of 250,000 engine-hours. The 
FAA may reduce this number of hours if the applicant identifies 
compensating factors that are acceptable to the FAA. The 
compensating factors may include experience on another airplane, but 
experience on the candidate airplane must make up a significant 
portion of the total required service experience.
    (b) Airplane systems assessment. The applicant must conduct an 
airplane systems assessment. The applicant must show that the 
airplane systems comply with the Sec.  25.1309(b) using available 
in-service reliability data for ETOPS significant systems on the 
candidate airplane-engine combination. Each cause or potential cause 
of a relevant design, manufacturing, operational or maintenance 
problem occurring in service must have a corrective action or 
actions that are shown to be effective in preventing future 
occurrences. Each corrective action must be identified in the CMP 
document specified in section K25.1.6 of this appendix. A corrective 
action is not required if the problem would not significantly impact 
the safety or reliability of the airplane system involved. A 
relevant problem is a problem with an ETOPS group 1 significant 
system that has or could result in an IFSD or diversion. The 
applicant must include in this assessment relevant problems with 
similar or identical equipment installed on other types of airplanes 
to the extent such information is reasonably available.
    (c) Airplane flight test. The applicant must conduct a flight 
test to validate the flightcrew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS 
diversion with an inoperative engine and worst-case ETOPS 
significant system failures and malfunctions that could occur in 
service. The flight test must validate the airplane's flying 
qualities and performance with the demonstrated failures and 
malfunctions.
    K25.3.2 Early ETOPS method.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval using the Early 
ETOPS method must comply with the following requirements:
    (a) Maintenance and operational procedures. The applicant must 
validate all maintenance and operational procedures for ETOPS 
significant systems. The applicant must identify, track and resolve 
any problems found during the validation in accordance with the 
problem tracking and resolution system specified in section 
K25.3.2(e) of this appendix.
    (b) New technology testing. Technology new to the applicant, 
including substantially new manufacturing techniques, must be tested 
to substantiate its suitability for the airplane design.
    (c) APU validation test. If an APU is needed to comply with this 
appendix, one APU of the type to be certified with the airplane must 
be tested for 3,000 equivalent airplane operational cycles. 
Following completion of the test, the APU must be disassembled and 
inspected. The applicant must identify, track, and resolve each 
cause or potential cause of an inability to start or operate the APU 
in flight as intended in accordance with the problem tracking and 
resolution system specified in section K25.3.2(e) of this appendix.
    (d) Airplane demonstration. For each airplane-engine combination 
to be approved for ETOPS, the applicant must flight test at least 
one airplane to demonstrate that the airplane, and its components 
and equipment are capable of functioning properly during ETOPS 
flights and diversions of the longest duration for which the 
applicant seeks approval. This flight testing may be performed in 
conjunction with, but may not substitute for the flight testing 
required by Sec.  21.35(b)(2).
    (1) The airplane demonstration flight test program must include:
    (i) Flights simulating actual ETOPS including flight at normal 
cruise altitude, step climbs, and, if applicable, APU operation.
    (ii) Maximum duration flights with maximum duration diversions.
    (iii) Maximum duration engine-inoperative diversions distributed 
among the engines installed on the airplanes used for the airplane 
demonstration flight test program. At least two one engine-
inoperative diversions must be conducted at maximum continuous 
thrust or power using the same engine.
    (iv) Flights under non-normal conditions to validate the 
flightcrew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion with 
worst-case ETOPS significant system failures or malfunctions that 
could occur in service.
    (v) Diversions to airports that represent airports of the types 
used for ETOPS diversions.
    (vi) Repeated exposure to humid and inclement weather on the 
ground followed by a long duration flight at normal cruise altitude.
    (2) The airplane demonstration flight test program must validate 
the adequacy of the airplane's flying qualities and performance, and 
the flightcrew's ability to safely conduct an ETOPS diversion under 
the conditions specified in section K25.3.2(d)(1) of this appendix.
    (3) During the airplane demonstration flight test program, each 
test airplane must be operated and maintained using the applicant's 
recommended operating and maintenance procedures.
    (4) At the completion of the airplane demonstration, each ETOPS 
significant system must undergo an on-wing inspection or test in 
accordance with the tasks defined in the proposed Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness to establish its condition for continued 
safe operation. Each engine must also undergo a gas path inspection. 
These inspections must be conducted in a manner to identify abnormal 
conditions that could result in an IFSD or diversion. The applicant 
must identify, track and resolve any abnormal conditions in 
accordance with the problem tracking and resolution system specified 
in section K25.3.2(e) of this appendix.
    (e) Problem tracking and resolution system. (1) The applicant 
must establish and maintain a problem tracking and resolution 
system. The system must:
    (i) Contain a process for prompt reporting to the responsible 
FAA aircraft certification office of each occurrence reportable 
under Sec.  21.4(a)(6) encountered during the phases of airplane and 
engine development used to assess Early ETOPS eligibility.
    (ii) Contain a process for notifying the responsible FAA 
aircraft certification office of each proposed corrective action 
that the applicant determines necessary for each problem identified 
from the occurrences reported under section K25.3.2(h)(1)(i) of this 
appendix. The timing of the notification must permit appropriate FAA 
review before taking the proposed corrective action.
    (2) If the applicant is seeking ETOPS type design approval of a 
change to an airplane-engine combination previously approved for 
ETOPS, the problem tracking and resolution system need only address 
those problems specified in the following table, provided the 
applicant obtains prior authorization from the FAA:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Then the Problem Tracking and
  If the change does not require a new    Resolution System must address
  airplane type certificate and . . .                 . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Requires a new engine type           All problems applicable to the
 certificate.                             new engine installation, and
                                          for the remainder of the
                                          airplane, problems in changed
                                          systems only.
(ii) Does not require a new engine type  Problems in changed systems
 certificate.                             only.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (f) Acceptance criteria. The type and frequency of failures and 
malfunctions on ETOPS significant systems that occur during the 
airplane flight test program and the airplane demonstration flight 
test program specified in section K25.3.2(d) of this appendix must 
be consistent with the type and frequency of failures and 
malfunctions that would be expected to occur on currently 
certificated airplanes approved for ETOPS.
    K25.3.3 Combined service experience and Early ETOPS method.
    An applicant for ETOPS type design approval using the Early 
ETOPS method must comply with the following requirements:
    (a) A service experience requirement of less than 15,000 engine-
hours for the world fleet of the candidate airplane-engine 
combination;

[[Page 1877]]

    (b) The Early ETOPS requirements of section K25.3.2 of this 
appendix, except for the airplane demonstration specified in section 
K25.3.2(d) of this appendix; and
    (c) The flight test requirement of section K25.3.1(c) of this 
appendix.

PART 33--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES

0
10. The authority citation for part 33 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.

0
11. Amend Sec.  33.71 by revising paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  33.71  Lubrication system.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (4) Each oil tank cap must provide an oil-tight seal. For an 
applicant seeking eligibility for an engine to be installed on an 
airplane approved for ETOPS, the oil tank must be designed to prevent a 
hazardous loss of oil due to an incorrectly installed oil tank cap.
* * * * *

0
12. Revise Sec.  33.90 to read as follows:


Sec.  33.90  Initial maintenance inspection test.

    Each applicant, except an applicant for an engine being type 
certificated through amendment of an existing type certificate or 
through supplemental type certification procedures, must complete one 
of the following tests on an engine that substantially conforms to the 
type design to establish when the initial maintenance inspection is 
required:
    (a) An approved engine test that simulates the conditions in which 
the engine is expected to operate in service, including typical start-
stop cycles.
    (b) An approved engine test conducted in accordance with Sec.  
33.201 (c) through (f).

0
13. Add subpart G to read as follows:

Subpart G--Special Requirements: Turbine Aircraft Engines


Sec.  33.201  Design and test requirements for Early ETOPS eligibility.

    An applicant seeking type design approval for an engine to be 
installed on a two-engine airplane approved for ETOPS without the 
service experience specified in part 25, Appendix K, K25.2.1 of this 
chapter, must comply with the following:
    (a) The engine must be designed using a design quality process 
acceptable to the FAA, that ensures the design features of the engine 
minimize the occurrence of failures, malfunctions, defects, and 
maintenance errors that could result in an IFSD, loss of thrust 
control, or other power loss.
    (b) The design features of the engine must address problems shown 
to result in an IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other power loss in 
the applicant's other relevant type designs approved within the past 10 
years, to the extent that adequate service data is available within 
that 10-year period. An applicant without adequate service data must 
show experience with and knowledge of problem mitigating design 
practices equivalent to that gained from actual service experience in a 
manner acceptable to the FAA.
    (c) Except as specified in paragraph (f) of this section, the 
applicant must conduct a simulated ETOPS mission cyclic endurance test 
in accordance with an approved test plan on an engine that 
substantially conforms to the type design. The test must:
    (1) Include a minimum of 3,000 representative service start-stop 
mission cycles and three simulated diversion cycles at maximum 
continuous thrust or power for the maximum diversion time for which 
ETOPS eligibility is sought. Each start-stop mission cycle must include 
the use of take-off, climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing 
thrust or power and the use of thrust reverse (if applicable). The 
diversions must be evenly distributed over the duration of the test. 
The last diversion must be conducted within 100 cycles of the 
completion of the test.
    (2) Be performed with the high speed and low speed main engine 
rotors independently unbalanced to obtain a minimum of 90 percent of 
the recommended field service maintenance vibration levels. For engines 
with three main engine rotors, the intermediate speed rotor must be 
independently unbalanced to obtain a minimum of 90 percent of the 
recommended production acceptance vibration level. The required peak 
vibration levels must be verified during a slow acceleration and 
deceleration run of the test engine covering the main engine rotor 
operating speed ranges.
    (3) Include a minimum of three million vibration cycles for each 60 
rpm incremental step of the typical high-speed rotor start-stop mission 
cycle. The test may be conducted using any rotor speed step increment 
from 60 to 200 rpm provided the test encompasses the typical service 
start-stop cycle speed range. For incremental steps greater than 60 
rpm, the minimum number of vibration cycles must be linearly increased 
up to ten million cycles for a 200 rpm incremental step.
    (4) Include a minimum of 300,000 vibration cycles for each 60 rpm 
incremental step of the high-speed rotor approved operational speed 
range between minimum flight idle and cruise power not covered by 
paragraph (c)(3) of this section. The test may be conducted using any 
rotor speed step increment from 60 to 200 rpm provided the test 
encompasses the applicable speed range. For incremental steps greater 
than 60 rpm the minimum number of vibration cycles must be linearly 
increased up to 1 million for a 200 rpm incremental step.
    (5) Include vibration surveys at periodic intervals throughout the 
test. The equivalent value of the peak vibration level observed during 
the surveys must meet the minimum vibration requirement of Sec.  
33.201(c)(2).
    (d) Prior to the test required by paragraph (c) of this section, 
the engine must be subjected to a calibration test to document power 
and thrust characteristics.
    (e) At the conclusion of the testing required by paragraph (c) of 
this section, the engine must:
    (1) Be subjected to a calibration test at sea-level conditions. Any 
change in power or thrust characteristics must be within approved 
limits.
    (2) Be visually inspected in accordance with the on-wing inspection 
recommendations and limits contained in the Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness submitted in compliance with Sec.  33.4.
    (3) Be completely disassembled and inspected--
    (i) In accordance with the applicable inspection recommendations 
and limits contained in the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
submitted in compliance with Sec.  33.4;
    (ii) With consideration of the causes of IFSD, loss of thrust 
control, or other power loss identified by paragraph (b) of this 
section; and
    (iii) In a manner to identify wear or distress conditions that 
could result in an IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other power loss 
not specifically identified by paragraph (b) of this section or 
addressed within the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
    (4) Not show wear or distress to the extent that could result in an 
IFSD, loss of thrust control, or other power loss within a period of 
operation before the component, assembly, or system would likely have 
been inspected or functionally tested for integrity while in service. 
Such wear or distress must have corrective action implemented through a 
design change, a change to maintenance instructions, or operational 
procedures before ETOPS eligibility is granted. The type and frequency 
of wear and distress that occurs during the engine test must be 
consistent with the type and frequency of wear and distress

[[Page 1878]]

that would be expected to occur on ETOPS eligible engines.
    (f) An alternative mission cycle endurance test that provides an 
equivalent demonstration of the unbalance and vibration specified in 
paragraph (c) of this section may be used when approved by the FAA.
    (g) For an applicant using the simulated ETOPS mission cyclic 
endurance test to comply with Sec.  33.90, the test may be interrupted 
so that the engine may be inspected by an on-wing or other method, 
using criteria acceptable to the FAA, after completion of the test 
cycles required to comply with Sec.  33.90(a). Following the 
inspection, the ETOPS test must be resumed to complete the requirements 
of this section.

0
14. Add paragraph A33.3(c) to Appendix A to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 33--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

* * * * *

A33.3 Content

* * * * *
    (c) ETOPS Requirements. For an applicant seeking eligibility for 
an engine to be installed on an airplane approved for ETOPS, the 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must include procedures for 
engine condition monitoring. The engine condition monitoring 
procedures must be able to determine prior to flight, whether an 
engine is capable of providing, within approved engine operating 
limits, maximum continuous power or thrust, bleed air, and power 
extraction required for a relevant engine inoperative diversion. For 
an engine to be installed on a two-engine airplane approved for 
ETOPS, the engine condition monitoring procedures must be validated 
before ETOPS eligibility is granted.
* * * * *

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

0
15. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 41706, 44101, 44701-
44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903-
44904, 44912, 45101-45105, 46105, 46301.


0
16. Add Sec.  121.7 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.7  Definitions.

    The following definitions apply to those sections of part 121 that 
apply to ETOPS:
    Adequate Airport means an airport that an airplane operator may 
list with approval from the FAA because that airport meets the landing 
limitations of Sec.  121.197 and is either--
    (1) An airport that meets the requirements of part 139, subpart D 
of this chapter, excluding those that apply to aircraft rescue and 
firefighting service, or
    (2) A military airport that is active and operational.
    ETOPS Alternate Airport means an adequate airport listed in the 
certificate holder's operations specifications that is designated in a 
dispatch or flight release for use in the event of a diversion during 
ETOPS. This definition applies to flight planning and does not in any 
way limit the authority of the pilot-in-command during flight.
    ETOPS Area of Operation means one of the following areas:
    (1) For turbine-engine-powered airplanes with two engines, an area 
beyond 60 minutes from an adequate airport, computed using a one-
engine-inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in still air.
    (2) For turbine-engine-powered passenger-carrying airplanes with 
more than two engines, an area beyond 180 minutes from an adequate 
airport, computed using a one-engine-inoperative cruise speed under 
standard conditions in still air.
    ETOPS Entry Point means the first point on the route of an ETOPS 
flight, determined using a one-engine-inoperative cruise speed under 
standard conditions in still air, that is--
    (1) More than 60 minutes from an adequate airport for airplanes 
with two engines;
    (2) More than 180 minutes from an adequate airport for passenger-
carrying airplanes with more than two engines.
    ETOPS Qualified Person means a person, performing maintenance for 
the certificate holder, who has satisfactorily completed the 
certificate holder's ETOPS training program.
    Maximum Diversion Time means, for the purposes of ETOPS route 
planning, the longest diversion time authorized for a flight under the 
operator's ETOPS authority. It is calculated under standard conditions 
in still air at a one-engine-inoperative cruise speed.
    North Pacific Area of Operation means Pacific Ocean areas north of 
40[deg] N latitudes including NOPAC ATS routes, and published PACOTS 
tracks between Japan and North America.
    North Polar Area means the entire area north of 78[deg] N latitude.
    One-engine-inoperative-Cruise Speed means a speed within the 
certified operating limits of the airplane that is specified by the 
certificate holder and approved by the FAA for --
    (1) Calculating required fuel reserves needed to account for an 
inoperative engine; or
    (2) Determining whether an ETOPS alternate is within the maximum 
diversion time authorized for an ETOPS flight.
    South Polar Area means the entire area South of 60[deg] S latitude.

0
17. Amend Sec.  121.97 by revising paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  121. 97  Airports: Required data.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) Public protection. After February 15, 2008, for ETOPS beyond 
180 minutes or operations in the North Polar area and South Polar area, 
this includes facilities at each airport or in the immediate area 
sufficient to protect the passengers from the elements and to see to 
their welfare.
* * * * *

0
18. Amend Sec.  121.99 by revising the section heading and adding 
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.99  Communications facilities--domestic and flag operations.

* * * * *
    (c) Each certificate holder conducting flag operations must provide 
voice communications for ETOPS where voice communication facilities are 
available. In determining whether facilities are available, the 
certificate holder must consider potential routes and altitudes needed 
for diversion to ETOPS Alternate Airports. Where facilities are not 
available or are of such poor quality that voice communication is not 
possible, another communication system must be substituted.
    (d) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, after 
February 15, 2008 for ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, each certificate holder 
conducting flag operations must have a second communication system in 
addition to that required by paragraph (c) of this section. That system 
must be able to provide immediate satellite-based voice communications 
of landline-telephone fidelity. The system must be able to communicate 
between the flight crew and air traffic services, and the flight crew 
and the certificate holder. In determining whether such communications 
are available, the certificate holder must consider potential routes 
and altitudes needed for diversion to ETOPS Alternate Airports. Where 
immediate, satellite-based voice communications are not available, or 
are of such poor quality that voice communication is not possible, 
another communication system must be substituted.
    (e) Operators of two-engine turbine-powered airplanes with 207 
minute

[[Page 1879]]

ETOPS approval in the North Pacific Area of Operation must comply with 
the requirements of paragraph (d) of this section as of February 15, 
2007.

0
19. Add Sec.  121.106 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.106  ETOPS Alternate Airport: Rescue and fire fighting 
service.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the 
following rescue and fire fighting service (RFFS) must be available at 
each airport listed as an ETOPS Alternate Airport in a dispatch or 
flight release.
    (1) For ETOPS up to 180 minutes, each designated ETOPS Alternate 
Airport must have RFFS equivalent to that specified by ICAO as Category 
4, or higher.
    (2) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, each designated ETOPS Alternate 
Airport must have RFFS equivalent to that specified by ICAO Category 4, 
or higher. In addition, the aircraft must remain within the ETOPS 
authorized diversion time from an Adequate Airport that has RFFS 
equivalent to that specified by ICAO Category 7, or higher.
    (b) If the equipment and personnel required in paragraph (a) of 
this section are not immediately available at an airport, the 
certificate holder may still list the airport on the dispatch or flight 
release if the airport's RFFS can be augmented to meet paragraph (a) of 
this section from local fire fighting assets. A 30-minute response time 
for augmentation is adequate if the local assets can be notified while 
the diverting airplane is en route. The augmenting equipment and 
personnel must be available on arrival of the diverting airplane and 
must remain as long as the diverting airplane needs RFFS.

0
20. Add Sec.  121.122 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.122  Communications facilities--supplemental operations.

    (a) Each certificate holder conducting supplemental operations 
other than all-cargo operations in an airplane with more than two 
engines must show that a two-way radio communication system or other 
means of communication approved by the FAA is available. It must ensure 
reliable and rapid communications under normal operating conditions 
over the entire route (either direct or via approved point-to-point 
circuits) between each airplane and the certificate holder, and between 
each airplane and the appropriate air traffic services, except as 
specified in Sec.  121.351(c).
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, each 
certificate holder conducting supplemental operations other than all-
cargo operations in an airplane with more than two engines must provide 
voice communications for ETOPS where voice communication facilities are 
available. In determining whether facilities are available, the 
certificate holder must consider potential routes and altitudes needed 
for diversion to ETOPS Alternate Airports. Where facilities are not 
available or are of such poor quality that voice communication is not 
possible, another communication system must be substituted.
    (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, for ETOPS 
beyond 180 minutes each certificate holder conducting supplemental 
operations other than all-cargo operations in an airplane with more 
than two engines must have a second communication system in addition to 
that required by paragraph (b) of this section. That system must be 
able to provide immediate satellite-based voice communications of 
landline telephone-fidelity. The system must provide communication 
capabilities between the flight crew and air traffic services and the 
flight crew and the certificate holder. In determining whether such 
communications are available, the certificate holder must consider 
potential routes and altitudes needed for diversion to ETOPS Alternate 
Airports. Where immediate, satellite-based voice communications are not 
available, or are of such poor quality that voice communication is not 
possible, another communication system must be substituted.
    (d) Operators of turbine engine powered airplanes do not need to 
meet the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section until 
February 15, 2008.

0
21. Amend Sec.  121.135 by--
0
a. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(23) and (b)(24) as paragraphs (b)(25) 
and (b)(26);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(10) through (b)(22) as paragraphs 
(b)(11) through (b)(23); and
0
c. Adding paragraphs (b)(10) and (b)(24) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.135  Contents.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (10) For ETOPS, airplane performance data to support all phases of 
these operations.
* * * * *
    (24) After February 15, 2008, for passenger flag operations and for 
those supplemental operations that are not all-cargo operations outside 
the 48 contiguous States and Alaska,
    (i) For ETOPS greater than 180 minutes a specific passenger 
recovery plan for each ETOPS Alternate Airport used in those 
operations, and
    (ii) For operations in the North Polar Area and South Polar Area a 
specific passenger recovery plan for each diversion airport used in 
those operations.
* * * * *

0
22. Amend Sec.  121.161 by revising paragraph (a) and adding paragraph 
(d) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.161  Airplane limitations: Type of route.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, unless 
approved by the Administrator in accordance with Appendix P of this 
part and authorized in the certificate holder's operations 
specifications, no certificate holder may operate a turbine-engine-
powered airplane over a route that contains a point--
    (1) Farther than a flying time from an Adequate Airport (at a one-
engine-inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in still air) 
of 60 minutes for a two-engine airplane or 180 minutes for a passenger-
carrying airplane with more than two engines;
    (2) Within the North Polar Area; or
    (3) Within the South Polar Area.
* * * * *
    (d) Unless authorized by the Administrator based on the character 
of the terrain, the kind of operation, or the performance of the 
airplane to be used, no certificate holder may operate a reciprocating-
engine-powered airplane over a route that contains a point farther than 
60 minutes flying time (at a one-engine-inoperative cruise speed under 
standard conditions in still air) from an Adequate Airport.
    (e) Operators of turbine-engine powered airplanes with more than 
two engines do not need to meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of 
this section until February 15, 2008.
0
23. Add new Sec.  121.162 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.162  ETOPS Type Design Approval Basis.

    Except for a passenger-carrying airplane with more than two engines 
manufactured prior to February 17, 2015 and except for a two-engine 
airplane that, when used in ETOPS, is only used for ETOPS of 75 minutes 
or less, no certificate holder may conduct ETOPS unless the airplane 
has been type design approved for ETOPS and each airplane used in ETOPS 
complies with its CMP document as follows:
    (a) For a two-engine airplane, that is of the same model airplane-
engine combination that received FAA approval for ETOPS up to 180 
minutes

[[Page 1880]]

prior to February 15, 2007, the CMP document for that model airplane-
engine combination in effect on February 14, 2007.
    (b) For a two-engine airplane, that is not of the same model 
airplane-engine combination that received FAA approval for ETOPS up to 
180 minutes before February 15, 2007, the CMP document for that new 
model airplane-engine combination issued in accordance with Sec.  
25.3(b)(1) of this chapter.
    (c) For a two-engine airplane approved for ETOPS beyond 180 
minutes, the CMP document for that model airplane-engine combination 
issued in accordance with Sec.  25.3(b)(2) of this chapter.
    (d) For an airplane with more than 2 engines manufactured on or 
after February 17, 2015, the CMP document for that model airplane-
engine combination issued in accordance with Sec.  25.3(c) of this 
chapter.

0
24. Add Sec.  121.374 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.374  Continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP) for 
two-engine ETOPS.

    In order to conduct an ETOPS flight using a two-engine airplane, 
each certificate holder must develop and comply with the ETOPS 
continuous airworthiness maintenance program, as authorized in the 
certificate holder's operations specifications, for each airplane-
engine combination used in ETOPS. The certificate holder must develop 
this ETOPS CAMP by supplementing the manufacturer's maintenance program 
or the CAMP currently approved for the certificate holder. This ETOPS 
CAMP must include the following elements:
    (a) ETOPS maintenance document. The certificate holder must have an 
ETOPS maintenance document for use by each person involved in ETOPS.
    (1) The document must--
    (i) List each ETOPS significant system,
    (ii) Refer to or include all of the ETOPS maintenance elements in 
this section,
    (iii) Refer to or include all supportive programs and procedures,
    (iv) Refer to or include all duties and responsibilities, and
    (v) Clearly state where referenced material is located in the 
certificate holder's document system.
    (b) ETOPS pre-departure service check. Except as provided in 
Appendix P of this part, the certificate holder must develop a pre-
departure check tailored to their specific operation.
    (1) The certificate holder must complete a pre-departure service 
check immediately before each ETOPS flight.
    (2) At a minimum, this check must--
    (i) Verify the condition of all ETOPS Significant Systems;
    (ii) Verify the overall status of the airplane by reviewing 
applicable maintenance records; and
    (iii) Include an interior and exterior inspection to include a 
determination of engine and APU oil levels and consumption rates.
    (3) An appropriately certificated mechanic that is ETOPS Qualified 
must accomplish and certify by signature, ETOPS specific tasks. A 
certificated mechanic, with an airframe and powerplant rating, who is 
ETOPS Qualified must certify by signature, that the ETOPS pre-departure 
service check has been completed.
    (c) Limitations on dual maintenance.
    (1) Except as specified in paragraph (c)(2), the certificate holder 
may not perform scheduled or unscheduled maintenance during the same 
maintenance visit on more than one ETOPS Significant System listed in 
the ETOPS maintenance document, if the improper maintenance could 
result in the failure of an ETOPS Significant System.
    (2) In the event an unforeseen circumstance prevents the 
certificate holder from complying with paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section, the certificate holder may perform maintenance on more than 
one ETOPS Significant System provided:
    (i) The maintenance action on each ETOPS Significant System is 
performed by a different technician, or
    (ii) The maintenance action on each ETOPS Significant System is 
performed by the same technician under the direct supervision of a 
second qualified individual; and
    (iii) For either paragraph (c)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section, a 
qualified individual conducts a ground verification test and any in-
flight verification test required under the program developed pursuant 
to paragraph (d) of this section.
    (d) Verification program. The certificate holder must develop and 
maintain a program for the resolution of discrepancies that will ensure 
the effectiveness of maintenance actions taken on ETOPS Significant 
Systems. The verification program must identify potential problems and 
verify satisfactory corrective action. The verification program must 
include ground verification and in-flight verification policy and 
procedures. The certificate holder must establish procedures to 
indicate clearly who is going to initiate the verification action and 
what action is necessary. The verification action may be performed on 
an ETOPS revenue flight provided the verification action is documented 
as satisfactorily completed upon reaching the ETOPS Entry Point.
    (e) Task identification. The certificate holder must identify all 
ETOPS-specific tasks. An appropriately certificated mechanic that is 
ETOPS Qualified must accomplish and certify by signature that the 
ETOPS-specific task has been completed.
    (f) Centralized maintenance control procedures. The certificate 
holder must develop and maintain procedures for centralized maintenance 
control for ETOPS.
    (g) Parts control program. The certificate holder must develop an 
ETOPS parts control program to ensure the proper identification of 
parts used to maintain the configuration of airplanes used in ETOPS.
    (h) Reliability program. The certificate holder must have an ETOPS 
reliability program. This program must be the certificate holder's 
existing reliability program or its Continuing Analysis and 
Surveillance System (CASS) supplemented for ETOPS. This program must be 
event-oriented and include procedures to report the events listed 
below, as follows:
    (1) The certificate holder must report the following events within 
72 hours of the occurrence to its certificate holding district office 
(CHDO):
    (i) IFSDs, except planned IFSDs performed for flight training.
    (ii) Diversions and turnbacks for failures, malfunctions, or 
defects associated with any airplane or engine system.
    (iii) Uncommanded power or thrust changes or surges.
    (iv) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power or 
thrust.
    (v) Inadvertent fuel loss or unavailability, or uncorrectable fuel 
imbalance in flight.
    (vi) Failures, malfunctions or defects associated with ETOPS 
Significant Systems.
    (vii) Any event that would jeopardize the safe flight and landing 
of the airplane on an ETOPS flight.
    (2) The certificate holder must investigate the cause of each event 
listed in paragraph (h)(1) of this section and submit findings and a 
description of corrective action to its CHDO. The report must include 
the information specified in Sec.  121.703(e). The corrective action 
must be acceptable to its CHDO.
    (i) Propulsion system monitoring. (1) If the IFSD rate (computed on 
a 12-month rolling average) for an engine installed as part of an 
airplane-engine combination exceeds the following values, the 
certificate holder must do a comprehensive review of its operations

[[Page 1881]]

to identify any common cause effects and systemic errors. The IFSD rate 
must be computed using all engines of that type in the certificate 
holder's entire fleet of airplanes approved for ETOPS.
    (i) A rate of 0.05 per 1,000 engine hours for ETOPS up to and 
including 120 minutes.
    (ii) A rate of 0.03 per 1,000 engine hours for ETOPS beyond 120-
minutes up to and including 207 minutes in the North Pacific Area of 
Operation and up to and including 180 minutes elsewhere.
    (iii) A rate of 0.02 per 1,000 engine hours for ETOPS beyond 207 
minutes in the North Pacific Area of Operation and beyond 180 minutes 
elsewhere.
    (2) Within 30 days of exceeding the rates above, the certificate 
holder must submit a report of investigation and any necessary 
corrective action taken to its CHDO.
    (j) Engine condition monitoring. (1) The certificate holder must 
have an engine condition monitoring program to detect deterioration at 
an early stage and to allow for corrective action before safe operation 
is affected.
    (2) This program must describe the parameters to be monitored, the 
method of data collection, the method of analyzing data, and the 
process for taking corrective action.
    (3) The program must ensure that engine-limit margins are 
maintained so that a prolonged engine-inoperative diversion may be 
conducted at approved power levels and in all expected environmental 
conditions without exceeding approved engine limits. This includes 
approved limits for items such as rotor speeds and exhaust gas 
temperatures.
    (k) Oil-consumption monitoring. The certificate holder must have an 
engine oil consumption monitoring program to ensure that there is 
enough oil to complete each ETOPS flight. APU oil consumption must be 
included if an APU is required for ETOPS. The operator's oil 
consumption limit may not exceed the manufacturer's recommendation. 
Monitoring must be continuous and include oil added at each ETOPS 
departure point. The program must compare the amount of oil added at 
each ETOPS departure point with the running average consumption to 
identify sudden increases.
    (l) APU in-flight start program. If the airplane type certificate 
requires an APU but does not require the APU to run during the ETOPS 
portion of the flight, the certificate holder must develop and maintain 
a program acceptable to the FAA for cold soak in-flight start-and-run 
reliability.
    (m) Maintenance training. For each airplane-engine combination, the 
certificate holder must develop a maintenance training program that 
provides training adequate to support ETOPS. It must include ETOPS 
specific training for all persons involved in ETOPS maintenance that 
focuses on the special nature of ETOPS. This training must be in 
addition to the operator's maintenance training program used to qualify 
individuals to perform work on specific airplanes and engines.
    (n) Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document. If 
an airplane-engine combination has a CMP document, the certificate 
holder must use a system that ensures compliance with the applicable 
FAA-approved document.
    (o) Procedural changes. Each substantial change to the maintenance 
or training procedures that were used to qualify the certificate holder 
for ETOPS, must be submitted to the CHDO for review. The certificate 
holder cannot implement a change until its CHDO notifies the 
certificate holder that the review is complete.

0
25. Amend Sec.  121.415 by adding paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.415  Crewmember and dispatcher training requirements.

    (a) * * *
    (4) After February 15, 2008, training for crewmembers and 
dispatchers in their roles and responsibilities in the certificate 
holder's passenger recovery plan, if applicable.
* * * * *

0
26. Amend Sec.  121.565 by revising paragraphs (a), (b) introductory 
text, (b)(2) and (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.565  Engine inoperative: Landing; reporting.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever 
an airplane engine fails or whenever an engine is shutdown to prevent 
possible damage, the pilot in command must land the airplane at the 
nearest suitable airport, in point of time, at which a safe landing can 
be made.
    (b) If not more than one engine of an airplane that has three or 
more engines fails or is shut down to prevent possible damage, the 
pilot-in-command may proceed to an airport that the pilot selects if, 
after considering the following, the pilot makes a reasonable decision 
that proceeding to that airport is as safe as landing at the nearest 
suitable airport:
* * * * *
    (2) The altitude, weight, and useable fuel at the time that the 
engine is shutdown.
* * * * *
    (c) The pilot-in-command must report each engine shutdown in flight 
to the appropriate ground radio station as soon as practicable and must 
keep that station fully informed of the progress of the flight.
* * * * *

0
27. Add Sec.  121.624 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.624  ETOPS Alternate Airports.

    (a) No person may dispatch or release an airplane for an ETOPS 
flight unless enough ETOPS Alternate Airports are listed in the 
dispatch or flight release such that the airplane remains within the 
authorized ETOPS maximum diversion time. In selecting these ETOPS 
Alternate Airports, the certificate holder must consider all adequate 
airports within the authorized ETOPS diversion time for the flight that 
meet the standards of this part.
    (b) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate Airport in 
a dispatch or flight release unless, when it might be used (from the 
earliest to the latest possible landing time)--
    (1) The appropriate weather reports or forecasts, or any 
combination thereof, indicate that the weather conditions will be at or 
above the ETOPS Alternate Airport minima specified in the certificate 
holder's operations specifications; and
    (2) The field condition reports indicate that a safe landing can be 
made.
    (c) Once a flight is en route, the weather conditions at each ETOPS 
Alternate Airport must meet the requirements of Sec.  121.631 (c).
    (d) No person may list an airport as an ETOPS Alternate Airport in 
the dispatch or flight release unless that airport meets the public 
protection requirements of Sec.  121.97(b)(1)(ii).

0
28. Revise Sec.  121.625 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.625  Alternate Airport weather minima.

    Except as provided in Sec.  121.624 for ETOPS Alternate Airports, 
no person may list an airport as an alternate in the dispatch or flight 
release unless the appropriate weather reports or forecasts, or any 
combination thereof, indicate that the weather conditions will be at or 
above the alternate weather minima specified in the certificate 
holder's operations specifications for that airport when the flight 
arrives.

0
29. Amend Sec.  121.631 by redesignating paragraphs (c) and (d) as 
paragraphs (f) and (g), respectively, and adding

[[Page 1882]]

paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.631  Original dispatch or flight release, redispatch or 
amendment of dispatch or flight release.

* * * * *
    (c) No person may allow a flight to continue beyond the ETOPS Entry 
Point unless--
    (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the 
weather conditions at each ETOPS Alternate Airport required by Sec.  
121.624 are forecast to be at or above the operating minima for that 
airport in the certificate holder's operations specifications when it 
might be used (from the earliest to the latest possible landing time); 
and
    (2) All ETOPS Alternate Airports within the authorized ETOPS 
maximum diversion time are reviewed and the flight crew advised of any 
changes in conditions that have occurred since dispatch.
    (d) If paragraph (c)(1) of this section cannot be met for a 
specific airport, the dispatch or flight release may be amended to add 
an ETOPS Alternate Airport within the maximum ETOPS diversion time that 
could be authorized for that flight with weather conditions at or above 
operating minima.
    (e) Before the ETOPS Entry Point, the pilot in command for a 
supplemental operator or a dispatcher for a flag operator must use 
company communications to update the flight plan if needed because of a 
re-evaluation of aircraft system capabilities.

0
30. Add Sec.  121.633 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.633  Considering time-limited systems in planning ETOPS 
alternates.

    (a) For ETOPS up to and including 180 minutes, no person may list 
an airport as an ETOPS Alternate Airport in a dispatch or flight 
release if the time needed to fly to that airport (at the approved one-
engine inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in still air) 
would exceed the approved time for the airplane's most limiting ETOPS 
Significant System (including the airplane's most limiting fire 
suppression system time for those cargo and baggage compartments 
required by regulation to have fire-suppression systems) minus 15 
minutes.
    (b) For ETOPS beyond 180 minutes, no person may list an airport as 
an ETOPS Alternate Airport in a dispatch or flight release if the time 
needed to fly to that airport:
    (1) at the all engine operating cruise speed, corrected for wind 
and temperature, exceeds the airplane's most limiting fire suppression 
system time minus 15 minutes for those cargo and baggage compartments 
required by regulation to have fire suppression systems (except as 
provided in paragraph (c) of this section), or
    (2) at the one-engine-inoperative cruise speed, corrected for wind 
and temperature, exceeds the airplane's most limiting ETOPS Significant 
System time (other than the airplane's most limiting fire suppression 
system time minus 15 minutes for those cargo and baggage compartments 
required by regulation to have fire-suppression systems).
    (c) For turbine-engine powered airplanes with more than two 
engines, the certificate holder need not meet paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section until February 15, 2013.

0
31. Add Sec.  121.646 to read as follows:


Sec.  121.646  En-route fuel supply: flag and supplemental operations.

    (a) No person may dispatch or release for flight a turbine-engine 
powered airplane with more than two engines for a flight more than 90 
minutes (with all engines operating at cruise power) from an Adequate 
Airport unless the following fuel supply requirements are met:
    (1) The airplane has enough fuel to meet the requirements of Sec.  
121.645(b);
    (2) The airplane has enough fuel to fly to the Adequate Airport--
    (i) Assuming a rapid decompression at the most critical point;
    (ii) Assuming a descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the 
oxygen supply requirements of Sec.  121.333; and
    (iii) Considering expected wind and other weather conditions.
    (3) The airplane has enough fuel to hold for 15 minutes at 1500 
feet above field elevation and conduct a normal approach and landing.
    (b) No person may dispatch or release for flight an ETOPS flight 
unless, considering wind and other weather conditions expected, it has 
the fuel otherwise required by this part and enough fuel to satisfy 
each of the following requirements:
    (1) Fuel to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport.
    (i) Fuel to account for rapid decompression and engine failure. The 
airplane must carry the greater of the following amounts of fuel:
    (A) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport assuming a 
rapid decompression at the most critical point followed by descent to a 
safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply requirements of 
Sec.  121.333 of this chapter;
    (B) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport (at the 
one-engine-inoperative cruise speed) assuming a rapid decompression and 
a simultaneous engine failure at the most critical point followed by 
descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen requirements 
of Sec.  121.133 of this chapter; or
    (C) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport (at the 
one engine inoperative cruise speed) assuming an engine failure at the 
most critical point followed by descent to the one engine inoperative 
cruise altitude.
    (ii) Fuel to account for errors in wind forecasting. In calculating 
the amount of fuel required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, the 
certificate holder must increase the actual forecast wind speed by 5% 
(resulting in an increase in headwind or a decrease in tailwind) to 
account for any potential errors in wind forecasting. If a certificate 
holder is not using the actual forecast wind based on a wind model 
accepted by the FAA, the airplane must carry additional fuel equal to 
5% of the fuel required for paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section, as 
reserve fuel to allow for errors in wind data.
    (iii) Fuel to account for icing. In calculating the amount of fuel 
required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section (after completing the 
wind calculation in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section), the 
certificate holder must ensure that the airplane carries the greater of 
the following amounts of fuel in anticipation of possible icing during 
the diversion:
    (A) Fuel that would be burned as a result of airframe icing during 
10 percent of the time icing is forecast (including the fuel used by 
engine and wing anti-ice during this period).
    (B) Fuel that would be used for engine anti-ice, and if appropriate 
wing anti-ice, for the entire time during which icing is forecast.
    (iv) Fuel to account for engine deterioration. In calculating the 
amount of fuel required by paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section (after 
completing the wind calculation in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this 
section), the airplane also carries fuel equal to 5% of the fuel 
specified above, to account for deterioration in cruise fuel burn 
performance unless the certificate holder has a program to monitor 
airplane in-service deterioration to cruise fuel burn performance.
    (2) Fuel to account for holding, approach, and landing. In addition 
to the fuel required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the airplane 
must carry fuel sufficient to hold at 1500 feet above field elevation 
for 15 minutes upon reaching an ETOPS Alternate Airport

[[Page 1883]]

and then conduct an instrument approach and land.
    (3) Fuel to account for APU use. If an APU is a required power 
source, the certificate holder must account for its fuel consumption 
during the appropriate phases of flight.

0
32. Amend Sec.  121.687 by adding paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.687  Dispatch release: Flag and domestic operations.

    (a) * * *
    (6) For each flight dispatched as an ETOPS flight, the ETOPS 
diversion time for which the flight is dispatched.
* * * * *

0
33. Amend Sec.  121.689 by adding paragraph (a)(8) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.689  Flight release form: Supplemental operations.

    (a) * * *
    (8) For each flight released as an ETOPS flight, the ETOPS 
diversion time for which the flight is released.
* * * * *

0
34. Add Appendix P to read as follows:

Appendix P to Part 121--Requirements for ETOPS and Polar Operations

    The FAA approves ETOPS in accordance with the requirements and 
limitations in this appendix.
    Section I. ETOPS Approvals: Airplanes with Two engines.
    (a) Propulsion system reliability for ETOPS. (1) Before the FAA 
grants ETOPS operational approval, the operator must be able to 
demonstrate the ability to achieve and maintain the level of 
propulsion system reliability, if any, that is required by Sec.  
21.4(b)(2) of this chapter for the ETOPS-approved airplane-engine 
combination to be used.
    (2) Following ETOPS operational approval, the operator must 
monitor the propulsion system reliability for the airplane-engine 
combination used in ETOPS, and take action as required by Sec.  
121.374(i) for the specified IFSD rates.
    (b) 75 Minutes ETOPS--(1) Caribbean/Western Atlantic Area. The 
FAA grants approvals to conduct
    ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 75 minutes on Western 
Atlantic/Caribbean area routes as follows:
    (i) The FAA reviews the airplane-engine combination to ensure 
the absence of factors that could prevent safe operations. The 
airplane-engine combination need not be type-design-approved for 
ETOPS; however, it must have sufficient favorable experience to 
demonstrate to the Administrator a level of reliability appropriate 
for 75-minute ETOPS.
    (ii) The certificate holder must comply with the requirements of 
Sec.  121.633 for time-limited system planning.
    (iii) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (iv) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374, except that a pre-departure 
service check before departure of the return flight is not required.
    (2) Other Areas. The FAA grants approvals to conduct ETOPS with 
maximum diversion times up to 75 minutes on other than Western 
Atlantic/Caribbean area routes as follows:
    (i) The FAA reviews the airplane-engine combination to ensure 
the absence of factors that could prevent safe operations. The 
airplane-engine combination need not be type-design-approved for 
ETOPS; however, it must have sufficient favorable experience to 
demonstrate to the Administrator a level of reliability appropriate 
for 75-minute ETOPS.
    (ii) The certificate holder must comply with the requirements of 
Sec.  121.633 for time-limited system planning.
    (iii) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (iv) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374.
    (v) The certificate holder must comply with the MEL in its 
operations specifications for 120-minute ETOPS.
    (c) 90-minutes ETOPS (Micronesia). The FAA grants approvals to 
conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times up to 90 minutes on 
Micronesian area routes as follows:
    (1) The airplane-engine combination must be type-design approved 
for ETOPS of at least 120-minutes.
    (2) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (3) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374, except that a pre-departure 
service check before departure of the return flight is not required.
    (4) The certificate holder must comply with the MEL requirements 
in its operations specifications for 120-minute ETOPS.
    (d) 120-minute ETOPS. The FAA grants approvals to conduct ETOPS 
with maximum diversion times up to 120 minutes as follows:
    (1) The airplane-engine combination must be type-design-approved 
for ETOPS of at least 120 minutes.
    (2) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (3) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374.
    (4) The certificate holder must comply with the MEL requirements 
for 120-minute ETOPS.
    (e) 138-Minute ETOPS. The FAA grants approval to conduct ETOPS 
with maximum diversion times up to 138 minutes as follows:
    (1) Operators with 120-minute ETOPS approval. The FAA grants 
138-minute ETOPS approval as an extension of an existing 120-minute 
ETOPS approval as follows:
    (i) The authority may be exercised only for specific flights for 
which the 120-minute diversion time must be exceeded.
    (ii) For these flight-by-flight exceptions, the airplane-engine 
combination must be type-design-approved for ETOPS up to at least 
120 minutes. The capability of the airplane's time-limited systems 
may not be less than 138 minutes calculated in accordance with Sec.  
121.633.
    (iii) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (iv) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374.
    (v) The certificate holder must comply with minimum equipment 
list (MEL) requirements in its operations specifications for 
``beyond 120 minutes ETOPS''. Operators without a ``beyond 120-
minute ETOPS'' MEL may apply to AFS-200 through their certificate 
holding district office for a modified MEL which satisfies the 
master MEL policy for system/component relief in ETOPS beyond 120 
minutes.
    (vi) The certificate holder must conduct training for 
maintenance, dispatch, and flight crew personnel regarding 
differences between 138-minute ETOPS authority and its previously-
approved 120-minute ETOPS authority.
    (2) Operators with existing 180-minute ETOPS approval. The FAA 
grants approvals to conduct 138-minute ETOPS (without the limitation 
in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of section I of this appendix) to certificate 
holders with existing 180-minute ETOPS approval as follows:
    (i) The airplane-engine combination must be type-design-approved 
for ETOPS of at least 180 minutes.
    (ii) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (iii) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374.
    (iv) The certificate holder must comply with the MEL 
requirements for ``beyond 120 minutes ETOPS.''
    (v) The certificate holder must conduct training for 
maintenance, dispatch and flight crew personnel for differences 
between 138-minute ETOPS diversion approval and its previously 
approved 180-minute ETOPS diversion authority.
    (f) 180-minute ETOPS. The FAA grants approval to conduct ETOPS 
with diversion times up to 180 minutes as follows:
    (1) For these operations the airplane-engine combination must be 
type-design-approved for ETOPS of at least 180 minutes.
    (2) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (3) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374.
    (4) The certificate holder must comply with the MEL requirements 
for ``beyond 120 minutes ETOPS.''
    (g) Greater than 180-minute ETOPS. The FAA grants approval to 
conduct ETOPS greater than 180 minutes. The following are 
requirements for all operations greater than 180 minutes.
    (1) The FAA grants approval only to certificate holders with 
existing 180-minute ETOPS operating authority for the airplane-
engine combination to be operated.

[[Page 1884]]

    (2) The certificate holder must have previous ETOPS experience 
satisfactory to the Administrator.
    (3) In selecting ETOPS Alternate Airports, the operator must 
make every effort to plan ETOPS with maximum diversion distances of 
180 minutes or less, if possible. If conditions necessitate using an 
ETOPS Alternate Airport beyond 180 minutes, the route may be flown 
only if the requirements for the specific operating area in 
paragraph (h) or (i) of section I of this appendix are met.
    (4) The certificate holder must inform the flight crew each time 
an airplane is proposed for dispatch for greater than 180 minutes 
and tell them why the route was selected.
    (5) In addition to the equipment specified in the certificate 
holder's MEL for 180-minute ETOPS, the following systems must be 
operational for dispatch:
    (i) The fuel quantity indicating system.
    (ii) The APU (including electrical and pneumatic supply and 
operating to the APU's designed capability).
    (iii) The auto throttle system.
    (iv) The communication system required by Sec.  121.99(d) or 
Sec.  121.122(c), as applicable.
    (v) One-engine-inoperative auto-land capability, if flight 
planning is predicated on its use.
    (6) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    (7) The certificate holder must comply with the maintenance 
program requirements of Sec.  121.374.
    (h) 207-minute ETOPS in the North Pacific Area of Operations. 
(1) The FAA grants approval to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion 
times up to 207 minutes in the North Pacific Area of Operations as 
an extension to 180-minute ETOPS authority to be used on an 
exception basis. This exception may be used only on a flight-by-
flight basis when an ETOPS Alternate Airport is not available within 
180 minutes for reasons such as political or military concerns; 
volcanic activity; temporary airport conditions; and airport weather 
below dispatch requirements or other weather related events.
    (2) The nearest available ETOPS Alternate Airport within 207 
minutes diversion time must be specified in the dispatch or flight 
release.
    (3) In conducting such a flight the certificate holder must 
consider Air Traffic Service's preferred track.
    (4) The airplane-engine combination must be type-design-approved 
for ETOPS of at least 180 minutes. The approved time for the 
airplane's most limiting ETOPS significant system and most limiting 
cargo-fire suppression time for those cargo and baggage compartments 
required by regulation to have fire-suppression systems must be at 
least 222 minutes.
    (5) The certificate holder must track how many times 207-minute 
authority is used.
    (i) 240-minute ETOPS in the North Polar Area, in the area north 
of the NOPAC, and in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. (1) The 
FAA grants approval to conduct 240-minute ETOPS authority with 
maximum diversion times in the North Polar Area, in the area north 
of the NOPAC area, and the Pacific Ocean area north of the equator 
as an extension to 180-minute ETOPS authority to be used on an 
exception basis. This exception may be used only on a flight-by-
flight basis when an ETOPS Alternate Airport is not available within 
180 minutes. In that case, the nearest available ETOPS Alternate 
Airport within 240 minutes diversion time must be specified in the 
dispatch or flight release.
    (2) This exception may be used in the North Polar Area and in 
the area north of NOPAC only in extreme conditions particular to 
these areas such as volcanic activity, extreme cold weather at en-
route airports, airport weather below dispatch requirements, 
temporary airport conditions, and other weather related events. The 
criteria used by the certificate holder to decide that extreme 
weather precludes using an airport must be established by the 
certificate holder, accepted by the FAA, and published in the 
certificate holder's manual for the use of dispatchers and pilots.
    (3) This exception may be used in the Pacific Ocean area north 
of the equator only for reasons such as political or military 
concern, volcanic activity, airport weather below dispatch 
requirements, temporary airport conditions and other weather related 
events.
    (4) The airplane-engine combination must be type design approved 
for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes.
    (j) 240-minute ETOPS in areas South of the equator. (1) The FAA 
grants approval to conduct ETOPS with maximum diversion times of up 
to 240 minutes in the following areas:
    (i) Pacific oceanic areas between the U.S. West coast and 
Australia, New Zealand and Polynesia.
    (ii) South Atlantic oceanic areas.
    (iii) Indian Ocean areas.
    (iv) Oceanic areas between Australia and South America.
    (2) The operator must designate the nearest available ETOPS 
Alternate Airports along the planned route of flight.
    (3) The airplane-engine combination must be type-design-approved 
for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes.
    (k) ETOPS beyond 240 minutes. (1) The FAA grants approval to 
conduct ETOPS with diversion times beyond 240 minutes for operations 
between specified city pairs on routes in the following areas:
    (i) The Pacific oceanic areas between the U.S. west coast and 
Australia, New Zealand, and Polynesia;
    (ii) The South Atlantic oceanic areas;
    (iii) The Indian Oceanic areas; and
    (iv) The oceanic areas between Australia and South America, and 
the South Polar Area.
    (2) This approval is granted to certificate holders who have 
been operating under 180-minute or greater ETOPS authority for at 
least 24 consecutive months, of which at least 12 consecutive months 
must be under 240-minute ETOPS authority with the airplane-engine 
combination to be used.
    (3) The operator must designate the nearest available ETOPS 
alternate or alternates along the planned route of flight.
    (4) For these operations, the airplane-engine combination must 
be type-design-approved for ETOPS greater than 180 minutes.
    Section II. ETOPS Approval: Passenger-carrying Airplanes With 
More Than Two Engines.
    (a) The FAA grants approval to conduct ETOPS, as follows:
    (1) Except as provided in Sec.  121.162, the airplane-engine 
combination must be type-design-approved for ETOPS.
    (2) The operator must designate the nearest available ETOPS 
Alternate Airports within 240 minutes diversion time (at one-engine-
inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in still air). If 
an ETOPS alternate is not available within 240 minutes, the operator 
must designate the nearest available ETOPS Alternate Airports along 
the planned route of flight.
    (3) The MEL limitations for the authorized ETOPS diversion time 
apply.
    (i) The Fuel Quantity Indicating System must be operational.
    (ii) The communications systems required by Sec.  121.99(d) or 
Sec.  121.122(c) must be operational.
    (4) The certificate holder must operate in accordance with the 
ETOPS authority as contained in its operations specifications.
    Section III. Approvals for operations whose airplane routes are 
planned to traverse either the North Polar or South Polar Areas.
    (a) Except for intrastate operations within the State of Alaska, 
no certificate holder may operate an aircraft in the North Polar 
Area or South Polar Area, unless authorized by the FAA.
    (b) In addition to any of the applicable requirements of 
sections I and II of this appendix, the certificate holder's 
operations specifications must contain the following:
    (1) The designation of airports that may be used for en-route 
diversions and the requirements the airports must meet at the time 
of diversion.
    (2) Except for supplemental all-cargo operations, a recovery 
plan for passengers at designated diversion airports.
    (3) A fuel-freeze strategy and procedures for monitoring fuel 
freezing.
    (4) A plan to ensure communication capability for these 
operations.
    (5) An MEL for these operations.
    (6) A training plan for operations in these areas.
    (7) A plan for mitigating crew exposure to radiation during 
solar flare activity.
    (8) A plan for providing at least two cold weather anti-exposure 
suits in the aircraft, to protect crewmembers during outside 
activity at a diversion airport with extreme climatic conditions. 
The FAA may relieve the certificate holder from this requirement if 
the season of the year makes the equipment unnecessary.

PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS; COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATION 
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT

0
35. The authority citation for part 135 continues to read as follows:


[[Page 1885]]


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 41706, 44113, 44701-44702, 44705, 
44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722.


0
36. Add Sec.  135.98 to read as follows:


Sec.  135.98  Operations in the North Polar Area.

    After February 15, 2008, no certificate holder may operate an 
aircraft in the region north of 78[deg] N latitude (``North Polar 
Area''), other than intrastate operations wholly within the state of 
Alaska, unless authorized by the FAA. The certificate holder's 
operation specifications must include the following:
    (a) The designation of airports that may be used for en-route 
diversions and the requirements the airports must meet at the time of 
diversion.
    (b) Except for all-cargo operations, a recovery plan for passengers 
at designated diversion airports.
    (c) A fuel-freeze strategy and procedures for monitoring fuel 
freezing for operations in the North Polar Area.
    (d) A plan to ensure communication capability for operations in the 
North Polar Area.
    (e) An MEL for operations in the North Polar Area.
    (f) A training plan for operations in the North Polar Area.
    (g) A plan for mitigating crew exposure to radiation during solar 
flare activity.
    (h) A plan for providing at least two cold weather anti-exposure 
suits in the aircraft, to protect crewmembers during outside activity 
at a diversion airport with extreme climatic conditions. The FAA may 
relieve the certificate holder from this requirement if the season of 
the year makes the equipment unnecessary.

0
37. Amend Sec.  135.345 by removing the word ``and'' from the end of 
paragraph (a)(7), redesignating paragraph (a)(8) as (a)(10), and by 
adding new paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) to read as follows:


Sec.  135.345  Pilots: Initial, transition, and upgrade ground 
training.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (8) ETOPS, if applicable;
    (9) After February 15, 2008, passenger recovery plan for any 
passenger-carrying operation (other than intrastate operations wholly 
within the state of Alaska) in the North Polar area; and
* * * * *

0
38. Add Sec.  135.364 to read as follows:


Sec.  135.364  Maximum flying time outside the United States.

    (a) After February 15, 2008, no certificate holder may operate an 
airplane, other than an all-cargo airplane with more than two engines, 
on a planned route that exceeds 180 minutes flying time (at the one-
engine-inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in still air) 
from an Adequate Airport outside the continental United States unless 
the operation is approved by the FAA in accordance with Appendix G of 
this part, Extended Operations (ETOPS).
    (b) For the purposes of this section Adequate Airport means an 
airport that an airplane operator may list with approval from the FAA 
because that airport meets the requirements of Sec. Sec.  135.385, 
135.387, 135.393, 135.395, 135.219 and 135.221, as applicable.

0
39. Amend Sec.  135.411 by adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  135.411  Applicability.

* * * * *
    (d) A certificate holder who elects to operate in accordance with 
Sec.  135.364 must maintain its aircraft under paragraph (a)(2) of this 
section and the additional requirements of Appendix G of this part.

0
40. Add appendix G to read as follows:

Appendix G to Part 135--Extended Operations (ETOPS)

    G135.1 Definitions.
    G135.1.1 Adequate Airport means an airport that an airplane 
operator may list with approval from the FAA because that airport 
meets the landing limitations of Sec.  135.385 or is a military 
airport that is active and operational.
    G135.1.2 ETOPS Alternate Airport means an adequate airport that 
is designated in a dispatch or flight release for use in the event 
of a diversion during ETOPS. This definition applies to flight 
planning and does not in any way limit the authority of the pilot in 
command during flight.
    G135.1.3 ETOPS Entry Point means the first point on the route of 
an ETOPS flight, determined using a one-engine inoperative cruise 
speed under standard conditions in still air, that is more than 180 
minutes from an adequate airport.
    G135.1.4 ETOPS Qualified Person means a person, performing 
maintenance for the certificate holder, who has satisfactorily 
completed the certificate holder's ETOPS training program.
    G135.2 Requirements.
    G135.2.1 General. After February 15, 2008, no certificate holder 
may operate an airplane, other than an all-cargo airplane with more 
than two engines, outside the continental United States more than 
180 minutes flying time (at the one engine inoperative cruise speed 
under standard conditions in still air) from an airport described in 
Sec.  135.364 unless--
    (a) The certificate holder receives ETOPS approval from the FAA;
    (b) The operation is conducted in a multi-engine transport 
category turbine-powered airplane;
    (c) The operation is planned to be no more than 240 minutes 
flying time (at the one engine inoperative cruise speed under 
standard conditions in still air) from an airport described in Sec.  
135.364; and
    (d) The certificate holder meets the requirements of this 
appendix.
    G135.2.2 Required certificate holder experience prior to 
conducting ETOPS.
    Before applying for ETOPS approval, the certificate holder must 
have at least 12 months experience conducting international 
operations (excluding Canada and Mexico) with multi-engine transport 
category turbine-engine powered airplanes. The certificate holder 
may consider the following experience as international operations:
    (a) Operations to or from the State of Hawaii.
    (b) For certificate holders granted approval to operate under 
part 135 or part 121 before February 15, 2007, up to 6 months of 
domestic operating experience and operations in Canada and Mexico in 
multi-engine transport category turbojet-powered airplanes may be 
credited as part of the required 12 months of international 
experience required by paragraph G135.2.2(a) of this appendix.
    (c) ETOPS experience with other aircraft types to the extent 
authorized by the FAA.
    G135.2.3 Airplane requirements. No certificate holder may 
conduct ETOPS in an airplane that was manufactured after February 
17, 2015 unless the airplane meets the standards of Sec.  25.1535.
    G135.2.4 Crew information requirements. The certificate holder 
must ensure that flight crews have in-flight access to current 
weather and operational information needed to comply with Sec.  
135.83, Sec.  135.225, and Sec.  135.229. This includes information 
on all ETOPS Alternate Airports, all destination alternates, and the 
destination airport proposed for each ETOPS flight.
    G135.2.5 Operational Requirements.
    (a) No person may allow a flight to continue beyond its ETOPS 
Entry Point unless--
    (1) The weather conditions at each ETOPS Alternate Airport are 
forecast to be at or above the operating minima in the certificate 
holder's operations specifications for that airport when it might be 
used (from the earliest to the latest possible landing time), and
    (3) All ETOPS Alternate Airports within the authorized ETOPS 
maximum diversion time are reviewed for any changes in conditions 
that have occurred since dispatch.
    (b) In the event that an operator cannot comply with paragraph 
G135.2.5(a)(1) of this appendix for a specific airport, another 
ETOPS Alternate Airport must be substituted within the maximum ETOPS 
diversion time that could be authorized for that flight with weather 
conditions at or above operating minima.
    (c) Pilots must plan and conduct ETOPS under instrument flight 
rules.
    (d) Time-Limited Systems.
    (1) Except as provided in paragraph G135.2.5(d)(3) of this 
appendix, the time required to fly the distance to each ETOPS 
Alternate Airport (at the all-engines-operating cruise speed, 
corrected for wind

[[Page 1886]]

and temperature) may not exceed the time specified in the Airplane 
Flight Manual for the airplane's most limiting fire suppression 
system time required by regulation for any cargo or baggage 
compartments (if installed), minus 15 minutes.
    (2) Except as provided in G135.2.5(d)(3) of this appendix, the 
time required to fly the distance to each ETOPS Alternate Airport 
(at the approved one-engine-inoperative cruise speed, corrected for 
wind and temperature) may not exceed the time specified in the 
Airplane Flight Manual for the airplane's most time limited system 
time (other than the airplane's most limiting fire suppression 
system time required by regulation for any cargo or baggage 
compartments), minus 15 minutes.
    (3) A certificate holder operating an airplane without the 
Airplane Flight Manual information needed to comply with paragraphs 
G135.2.5(d)(1) and (d)(2) of this appendix, may continue ETOPS with 
that airplane until February 17, 2015.
    G135.2.6 Communications Requirements.
    (a) No person may conduct an ETOPS flight unless the following 
communications equipment, appropriate to the route to be flown, is 
installed and operational:
    (1) Two independent communication transmitters, at least one of 
which allows voice communication.
    (2) Two independent communication receivers, at least one of 
which allows voice communication.
    (3) Two headsets, or one headset and one speaker.
    (b) In areas where voice communication facilities are not 
available, or are of such poor quality that voice communication is 
not possible, communication using an alternative system must be 
substituted.
    G135.2.7 Fuel Requirements. No person may dispatch or release 
for flight an ETOPS flight unless, considering wind and other 
weather conditions expected, it has the fuel otherwise required by 
this part and enough fuel to satisfy each of the following 
requirements:
    (a) Fuel to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport--(1) Fuel to 
account for rapid decompression and engine failure. The airplane 
must carry the greater of the following amounts of fuel:
    (i) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport 
assuming a rapid decompression at the most critical point followed 
by descent to a safe altitude in compliance with the oxygen supply 
requirements of Sec.  135.157,
    (ii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport (at 
the one-engine-inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in 
still air) assuming a rapid decompression and a simultaneous engine 
failure at the most critical point followed by descent to a safe 
altitude in compliance with the oxygen requirements of Sec.  
135.157; or
    (iii) Fuel sufficient to fly to an ETOPS Alternate Airport (at 
the one-engine-inoperative cruise speed under standard conditions in 
still air) assuming an engine failure at the most critical point 
followed by descent to the one engine inoperative cruise altitude.
    (b) Fuel to account for errors in wind forecasting. In 
calculating the amount of fuel required by paragraph G135.2.7(a)(1) 
of this appendix, the certificate holder must increase the actual 
forecast wind speed by 5% (resulting in an increase in headwind or a 
decrease in tailwind) to account for any potential errors in wind 
forecasting. If a certificate holder is not using the actual 
forecast wind based on a wind model accepted by the FAA, the 
airplane must carry additional fuel equal to 5% of the fuel required 
by paragraph G135.2.7(a) of this appendix, as reserve fuel to allow 
for errors in wind data.
    (c) Fuel to account for icing. In calculating the amount of fuel 
required by paragraph G135.2.7(a)(1) of this appendix, (after 
completing the wind calculation in G135.2.7(a)(2) of this appendix), 
the certificate holder must ensure that the airplane carries the 
greater of the following amounts of fuel in anticipation of possible 
icing during the diversion:
    (1) Fuel that would be burned as a result of airframe icing 
during 10 percent of the time icing is forecast (including the fuel 
used by engine and wing anti-ice during this period).
    (2) Fuel that would be used for engine anti-ice, and if 
appropriate wing anti-ice, for the entire time during which icing is 
forecast.
    (d) Fuel to account for engine deterioration. In calculating the 
amount of fuel required by paragraph G135.2.7(a)(1) of this appendix 
(after completing the wind calculation in paragraph G135.2.7(a)(2) 
of this appendix), the certificate holder must ensure the airplane 
also carries fuel equal to 5% of the fuel specified above, to 
account for deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance unless the 
certificate holder has a program to monitor airplane in-service 
deterioration to cruise fuel burn performance.
    (e) Fuel to account for holding, approach, and landing. In 
addition to the fuel required by paragraph G135.2.7 (a) of this 
appendix, the airplane must carry fuel sufficient to hold at 1500 
feet above field elevation for 15 minutes upon reaching the ETOPS 
Alternate Airport and then conduct an instrument approach and land.
    (f) Fuel to account for APU use. If an APU is a required power 
source, the certificate holder must account for its fuel consumption 
during the appropriate phases of flight.
    G135.2.8 Maintenance Program Requirements. In order to conduct 
an ETOPS flight under Sec.  135.364, each certificate holder must 
develop and comply with the ETOPS maintenance program as authorized 
in the certificate holder's operations specifications for each two-
engine airplane-engine combination used in ETOPS. This provision 
does not apply to operations using an airplane with more than two 
engines. The certificate holder must develop this ETOPS maintenance 
program to supplement the maintenance program currently approved for 
the operator. This ETOPS maintenance program must include the 
following elements:
    (a) ETOPS maintenance document. The certificate holder must have 
an ETOPS maintenance document for use by each person involved in 
ETOPS. The document must--
    (1) List each ETOPS Significant System,
    (2) Refer to or include all of the ETOPS maintenance elements in 
this section,
    (3) Refer to or include all supportive programs and procedures,
    (4) Refer to or include all duties and responsibilities, and
    (5) Clearly state where referenced material is located in the 
certificate holder's document system.
    (b) ETOPS pre-departure service check. The certificate holder 
must develop a pre-departure check tailored to their specific 
operation.
    (1) The certificate holder must complete a pre-departure service 
check immediately before each ETOPS flight.
    (2) At a minimum, this check must:
    (i) Verify the condition of all ETOPS Significant Systems;
    (ii) Verify the overall status of the airplane by reviewing 
applicable maintenance records; and
    (iii) Include an interior and exterior inspection to include a 
determination of engine and APU oil levels and consumption rates.
    (3) An ETOPS qualified person must accomplish all ETOPS required 
items specified in the ETOPS pre-departure service check and certify 
by signature that the check has been completed.
    (c) Limitations on dual maintenance. (1) Except as specified in 
paragraph (c)(2) of this appendix, the certificate holder may not 
perform scheduled or unscheduled maintenance during the same 
maintenance visit on one or more ETOPS significant system listed in 
the ETOPS maintenance document, if the improper maintenance of the 
systems could result in the failure of an ETOPS significant system.
    (2) In the event an unforeseen circumstance prevents the 
certificate holder from complying with paragraph G135.2.8 (c)(1) of 
this appendix, the certificate holder may perform maintenance on 
more than one ETOPS significant system provided it:
    (i) Has maintenance action on each ETOPS significant system 
performed by a different technician, or
    (ii) Has maintenance action on each ETOPS Significant System 
performed by the same technician under the direct supervision of a 
second qualified individual; and
    (iii) Conducts a ground verification test and any in-flight 
verification test required under the program developed pursuant to 
paragraph G135.2.8 (d) of this appendix.
    (d) Verification program. The certificate holder must develop a 
program for the resolution of discrepancies that will ensure the 
effectiveness of maintenance actions taken on ETOPS Significant 
Systems. The verification program must identify potential problems 
and verify satisfactory corrective action. The verification program 
must include ground verification and in-flight verification policy 
and procedures. The certificate holder must establish procedures to 
clearly indicate who is going to initiate the verification action 
and what action is necessary. The verification action may be 
performed on an ETOPS revenue flight provided the verification 
action is documented as satisfactorily completed upon reaching the 
ETOPS entry point.

[[Page 1887]]

    (e) Task identification. The certificate holder must identify 
all ETOPS-specific tasks. An ETOPS qualified person must accomplish 
and certify by signature that the ETOPS-specific task has been 
completed.
    (f) Centralized maintenance control procedures. The certificate 
holder must develop procedures for centralized maintenance control 
for ETOPS.
    (g) ETOPS parts control program. The certificate holder must 
develop an ETOPS parts control program to ensure the proper 
identification of parts used to maintain the configuration of 
airplanes used in ETOPS.
    (h) Enhanced Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (E-
CASS) program. A certificate holder's existing CASS must be enhanced 
to include all elements of the ETOPS maintenance program. In 
addition to the reporting requirements of Sec.  135.415 and Sec.  
135.417, the program includes reporting procedures, in the form 
specified in Sec.  135.415(e), for the following significant events 
detrimental to ETOPS within 72 hours of the occurrence to the 
certificate holding district office (CHDO):
    (1) IFSDs, except planned IFSDs performed for flight training.
    (2) Diversions and turnbacks for failures, malfunctions, or 
defects associated with any airplane or engine system.
    (3) Uncommanded power or thrust changes or surges.
    (4) Inability to control the engine or obtain desired power or 
thrust.
    (5) Inadvertent fuel loss or unavailability, or uncorrectable 
fuel imbalance in flight.
    (6) Failures, malfunctions or defects associated with ETOPS 
Significant Systems.
    (7) Any event that would jeopardize the safe flight and landing 
of the airplane on an ETOPS flight.
    (i) Propulsion system monitoring.
    The certificate holder, in coordination with the CHDO, must--
    (1) Establish criteria as to what action is to be taken when 
adverse trends in propulsion system conditions are detected, and
    (2) Investigate common cause effects or systemic errors and 
submit the findings to the CHDO within 30 days.
    (j) Engine condition monitoring.
    (1) The certificate holder must establish an engine-condition 
monitoring program to detect deterioration at an early stage and to 
allow for corrective action before safe operation is affected.
    (2) This program must describe the parameters to be monitored, 
the method of data collection, the method of analyzing data, and the 
process for taking corrective action.
    (3) The program must ensure that engine limit margins are 
maintained so that a prolonged engine-inoperative diversion may be 
conducted at approved power levels and in all expected environmental 
conditions without exceeding approved engine limits. This includes 
approved limits for items such as rotor speeds and exhaust gas 
temperatures.
    (k) Oil consumption monitoring. The certificate holder must 
develop an engine oil consumption monitoring program to ensure that 
there is enough oil to complete each ETOPS flight. APU oil 
consumption must be included if an APU is required for ETOPS. The 
operator's consumption limit may not exceed the manufacturer's 
recommendation. Monitoring must be continuous and include oil added 
at each ETOPS departure point. The program must compare the amount 
of oil added at each ETOPS departure point with the running average 
consumption to identify sudden increases.
    (l) APU in-flight start program. If an APU is required for 
ETOPS, but is not required to run during the ETOPS portion of the 
flight, the certificate holder must have a program acceptable to the 
FAA for cold soak in-flight start and run reliability.
    (m) Maintenance training. For each airplane-engine combination, 
the certificate holder must develop a maintenance training program 
to ensure that it provides training adequate to support ETOPS. It 
must include ETOPS specific training for all persons involved in 
ETOPS maintenance that focuses on the special nature of ETOPS. This 
training must be in addition to the operator's maintenance training 
program used to qualify individuals for specific airplanes and 
engines.
    (n) Configuration, maintenance, and procedures (CMP) document. 
The certificate holder must use a system to ensure compliance with 
the minimum requirements set forth in the current version of the CMP 
document for each airplane-engine combination that has a CMP.
    (o) Reporting. The certificate holder must report quarterly to 
the CHDO and the airplane and engine manufacturer for each airplane 
authorized for ETOPS. The report must provide the operating hours 
and cycles for each airplane.
    G135.2.9 Delayed compliance date for all airplanes. A 
certificate holder need not comply with this appendix for any 
airplane until February 15, 2008.

    Issued in Washington, DC on January 4, 2007.
Marion C. Blakey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 07-39 Filed 1-8-07; 2:00 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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