United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Comptroller General

of the United States

Decision

Matter of: Pinnacle Solutions, Inc.

File: B-406998; B-406998.2

Date: October 16, 2012

Robert J. Symon, Esq., and Aron C. Beezley, Esq., Bradley Arant Boult Cummings 

LLP, for the protester.

Anand V. Ramana, Esq., Amanda W. Abshire, Esq., McGuireWoods LLP, for 

Logistic Services International, Inc., an intervenor.

Tina Marie Pixler, Esq., and Jonathan A. Hardage, Esq., Department of the Army, 

Army Materiel Command, for the agency.

Paul N. Wengert, Esq., Glenn G. Wolcott, Esq., and Sharon L. Larkin, Esq., Office of

the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protest that agency held defective discussions is denied where agency did not 

hold discussions with either offeror, did not invite either offeror to revise its proposal, 

and limited the scope of its communications to clarifying and confirming what the 

offerors had already committed to do.

2. Protest that agency misevaluated protester’s and awardee’s proposals is denied 

where the contemporaneous record shows that agency’s technical and past 

performance evaluations were reasonable and consistent with the terms of the 

solicitation. 

DECISION

Pinnacle Solutions, Inc. (PSI), of Huntsville, Alabama, a small business, protests the 

Department of the Army’s award of a contract to Logistic Services International, Inc. 

(LSI), of Jacksonville, Florida, pursuant to request for proposals (RFP) 

No. W5RGZ-12-R-015, for the production of Black Hawk Maintenance Trainers, 

UH-60M (BHMT-M) to be used by United States Army Aviation Logistics School 

(USAALS) at Fort Eustis, Virginia. PSI argues that the Army misevaluated both 

PSI’s and LSI’s proposals, failed to hold meaningful discussions, and made an 

unreasonable source selection decision. 

We deny the protest. 

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to 

a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has 

been approved for public release.
Page 2 B-406998; B-406998.2

BACKGROUND

The Army issued the RFP on March 16, 2012, seeking proposals to provide two 

BHMT-M units, as well as options for the Army to purchase four additional units. 

RFP at 1, 3. The BHMT-M is used for training of helicopter repair personnel to 

maintain a particular model of the Black Hawk helicopter, the UH-60M. The RFP 

provided that the Army would award a fixed-price contract1 to the offeror whose 

proposal provided the best value, based on the following evaluation factors, listed in 

descending order of importance: technical, program management, price, small 

business participation, and past performance.2

The RFP included a statement of work (SOW), which described the major elements 

of the BHMT-M as a student station (essentially a replica of the helicopter and its 

maintenance platform) and an instructor operator station (IOS) where the behavior of 

the student station could be controlled. SOW at 4. To facilitate fabrication of the 

BHMT-M, the RFP provided that the Army would provide, as government-furnished 

equipment, one crash-damaged UH-60A/L helicopter (one front half and one back 

half) for the first unit, followed later by one UH-60A/L/M “Category B” helicopter, for 

the second BHMT-M unit. SOW at 6. The RFP provided that the Army could 

exercise the four individual options, each for one additional BHMT-M unit, at any 

time within 5 years of award. RFP amend. 1 at 6. For each of the optional units, the 

Army explained that it would provide to the contractor either another crash-damaged 

aircraft, or another Category B aircraft, whichever the Army deemed to be available. 

AR, Tab 7, Answers to Offeror Questions, at 4 (Question/Answer No. 20). 

 RFP at 3, 62. 

The RFP also provided performance specifications, which identified faults and repair 

procedures, along with the corresponding steps that the BHMT-M was required to 

permit repair crews to perform. In this regard, for each step of each repair 

procedure, the RFP specified whether the BHMT-M had to replicate the UH-60M 

with parts and systems that were functionally identical, physically identical, or both, 

or could instead use non-functional or similar systems or parts. For example, with 

regard to the BHMT-M refuel/defuel system, the RFP provided: 

 1 The RFP provided that the contractor’s approved travel cost would be paid on a 

cost-reimbursement basis. RFP at 6. 

2 The RFP also identified subfactors under each of the four non-price factors. RFP 

at 61-62. As relevant to the protest, the three equally-weighted technical subfactors 

were technical design, system approach, and technology insertion, while the two 

equally-weighted program management subfactors were schedule, and integrated 

product teams. RFP at 61. Under the past performance factor, the RFP identified 

three subfactors: relevance, confidence, and hardware/software reuse. RFP at 62. 
Page 3 B-406998; B-406998.2

3.2.5.36 Pressure Refuel/Defuel System

The pressure refuel/defuel system components shall be installed on 

the [student station] replicating the actual aircraft systems. 

RFP attach. 5, BHMT-M Performance Specifications, at 24. 

The RFP provided that the first BHMT-M system would be delivered within 

24 months of award; production of the second unit would begin 1 year after award, 

for delivery within 18 months thereafter; and delivery of each optional unit would be 

due within 12 months of the Army exercising the option. RFP at 5; RFP amend. 1 

at 2. Under the performance management factor, offerors were required to provide 

a detailed development schedule. RFP at 57. 

On April 16, the Army received two proposals; one from PSI and one from LSI. In its 

proposal, PSI explained its approach to producing the BHMT-M units, stating that, 

for many of the required functions, PSI would rely on the reuse of “existing” or 

“legacy” software from another trainer--the Black Hawk Electrical Trainer UH-60M 

(BHET-M). For example, in describing the simulator systems and network 

architecture of its proposed design, PSI asserted that its design for the BHMT-M 

computer architecture “is almost identical to the system utilized by the BHET-M.” 

AR, Tab 12, PSI Technical Proposal, at 22. PSI’s proposal also indicated that the 

firm would reuse BHET-M elements to meet various other RFP requirements. For 

example, the proposal stated: 

[DELETED]

[DELETED]

[DELETED]

[DELETED]

Id. at 23, 24, 25, 27. 

With respect to the refuel/defuel system, PSI’s proposal stated that “[a]ccording to 

the Performance Specification, the Pressure Refuel/De-fuel System does not require 

modeling.” AR, Tab 12, PSI Proposal, at 38 (¶ 4.4.28.4). 

As an appendix to PSI’s program management proposal, the firm provided a master 

schedule. Among other things, PSI scheduled the simultaneous manufacture of the 

third and fourth (optional) units and similarly scheduled the simultaneous 

manufacture of the fifth and sixth (optional) units. AR, Tab 22, PSI Program 

Management Proposal, appx. A (BHMT-M Integrated Master Schedule Final), at 3. 

For its part, LSI’s proposal addressed each of the evaluation factors, including a 

description of the firm’s technical approach, and included past performance 
Page 4 B-406998; B-406998.2

information. LSI’s technical approach also contemplated the reuse of existing 

software for various BHMT-M elements. Specifically, LSI proposed to reuse 

software from several already-fielded trainers, principally three Chinook helicopter 

trainer systems and two Longbow helicopter trainer systems. Supplemental AR, 

attach. 1, LSI Technical Proposal, at 44-45; Supplemental AR at 10-11. LSI’s 

proposal further explained that its approach [DELETED]. Id., attach. 2, LSI 

Technical Proposal, at 10-11. 

The Army evaluated both proposals and thereafter prepared evaluation notices (EN) 

for each offeror. On April 25 and 26, the Army sent 27 ENs to PSI, and three ENs to 

LSI; each of the ENs was labeled as either an “error, omission and clarification 

report form,” or an “evaluation notice form-clarification.” See generally, AR, Tabs 13, 

ENs to PSI; AR, Tab 14, ENs to LSI. A significant portion of the ENs sent to PSI 

reflected the agency’s concern regarding the stage of development of the “existing” 

software on which PSI’s proposal relied, questioning PSI as to the platform on which 

the software was being used, and referring to particular relevant paragraphs of PSI’s 

proposal. AR, Tab 13, ENs to PSI, at 1-2. For example, the Army asked that PSI 

identify the critical development dates of the computer system architecture on which 

it relied, further asking “What platform is the ‘existing’ UH-60M software model 

currently used on?” and “What platform is the ‘UH-60M host simulation model’

currently used on?” Id. at Technical EN-01; Technical EN-07 & -08. 

Both offerors submitted responses to the evaluation notices. PSI’s responses 

addressed the source of various elements of its system, and the state of completion 

of the systems from which it proposed to reuse elements, frequently referring to the 

BHET-M (UH-60M Black Hawk Electrical Trainer), and occasionally referring to the 

UH-60L CEPT (UH-60L Cockpit Emergency Procedures Trainer). For example, in 

response to Technical EN-01, PSI stated: 

The BHET-M computer system architecture was designed to replicate 

UH-60M aircraft systems . . . . The BHET-M computer system 

architecture design was approved . . . at the BHET-M Critical Design 

Review (CDR) on March 15, 2012, is scheduled to complete 

production in September 2012, and be accredited and fielded in 

May 2013.

AR, Tab 15, PSI Response Spreadsheet, at 1.

In response to Technical EN-07, PSI further explained that some source code was in 

use on UH-60L CEPT training devices, and that other BHET-M source code was “in 

the Implementation Phase,” or running “in the Pinnacle test bed.” Id. For Technical 

EN-08,3

 3 EN-08 asked: “What platform is the ‘UH-60M host simulation model’ currently used 

on?”

PSI’s response mentioned only its use of BHET-M software, but did not 
Page 5 B-406998; B-406998.2

mention use of UH-60L CEPT software. Id. Responses to the other software 

development inquiries identified use of software being developed for the BHET-M, 

and occasionally referred to the UH-60L CEPT. Id. at 1-2. 

The Army evaluated both offerors’ responses to the ENs, assessing significant 

weaknesses under the technical and program management factors for PSI’s 

proposal. Under the technical evaluation, the significant weaknesses for PSI 

included the following: 

Throughout the entire proposal, [PSI] relied heavily on the reuse of 

software from the BHET-M, a device that it has not yet contracted, 

produced, accredited, or fielded. The technical review team assigned 

a risk of moderate to each element of the proposal that pointed to the 

BHET-M software reuse. 

AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 7; AR, Tab 23, PSI Technical Evaluation, 

at 4-5. 

Additionally, the Army evaluators assigned weaknesses because PSI’s proposal did 

not demonstrate an adequate understanding of the “pressures refuel and systems 

training task (Performance Specification 3.2.5.36),” and because PSI assumed that 

two items (external supports and a power cart) would be provided as governmentfurnished equipment (GFE), even though neither item was on the RFP’s list of GFE. 

AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 7; AR, Tab 23, PSI Technical Evaluation, 

at 27. 

Under the program management factor, the evaluators identified two significant 

weaknesses in PSI’s proposal. First, the evaluators noted that PSI’s approach relied 

on successful, on-time production of the BHET-M; yet as a subcontractor for that 

trainer, PSI bore risks of delays that it could not control. Second, PSI’s schedule 

relied on assumptions that were inconsistent with the RFP--specifically that the Army 

would deliver two Category B aircraft simultaneously to accommodate PSI’s 

proposed simultaneous production of the third and fourth BHMT-M units, as well as 

the similar simultaneous production of the fifth and sixth units. AR, Tab 17, Source 

Selection Decision, at 11. 

For LSI, the evaluators identified various strengths associated with the firm’s 

approach to software reuse, noting that LSI’s proposal relied on software from 

multiple systems that had already been successfully fielded. AR, Tab 17, Source 

Selection Decision, at 5-6. Under the past performance evaluation, the evaluators 

noted that LSI had demonstrated success through reusing software code to 

decrease development time, and that the firm had shown technical expertise and 

successful past performance that was relevant to all areas of the SOW, including 

support of an Army maintenance trainer system and other complex training systems. 

AR, Tab 20, LSI Past Performance Evaluation, at 1; AR, Tab 17, Source Selection 

Decision, at 17-18. 
Page 6 B-406998; B-406998.2

The evaluation of the proposals and responses to the ENs resulted in the following 

ratings: 

PSI LSI

Technical Acceptable Good

Program Management Acceptable Good

Small Business Good Good

Past Performance Very Relevant/ 

Substantial Confidence

Very Relevant/ 

Substantial Confidence

Price $32.1 million $30.8 million

AR, Tab 10, Contracting Officer’s Memorandum for Record, May 7, 2012, at 2. 

The contracting officer prepared a source selection decision, which concluded that 

LSI’s proposal was significantly superior to PSI’s, particularly under the two most 

important factors, and that it also offered a lower price. AR, Tab 17, Source 

Selection Decision, at 2. The source selection decision reflected the contracting 

officer’s review of each offeror’s evaluation and ratings, the evaluated strengths and 

weaknesses of each proposal, and then concluded that LSI’s proposal offered the 

best value for the government. Id. at 19. 

On June 27, the Army awarded the contract to LSI. After a debriefing, PSI filed this 

protest. 

DISCUSSION

PSI argues that the Army held inadequate discussions, rather than clarifications; that 

the agency evaluated PSI’s and LSI’s proposals unreasonably and unequally; and 

that the Army evaluated LSI’s past performance unreasonably. As discussed below, 

we find no merit in PSI’s arguments. 

Clarifications Were Properly Conducted 

PSI first asserts that the Army conducted discussions with PSI, and that those 

discussions were inadequate.4

 4 PSI has not argued that the agency’s communications with LSI constituted 

discussions.

 Its argument is based on PSI’s claim that, despite 

being labeled as clarifications, the questions posed by the Army through ENs were 

essential to determining the acceptability of PSI’s proposal, that PSI’s responses 

materially affected the evaluation of its proposal, and, therefore, that its responses 

should be considered proposal revisions. Protester’s Comments at 2. Accordingly, 

PSI maintains that the Army was required to hold comprehensive discussions with 

PSI to advise it of all the significant weaknesses in its proposal, which the firm 

argues it could have corrected. 
Page 7 B-406998; B-406998.2

The Army responds that it did not hold discussions but, rather, limited its 

communications with both offerors to clarifications. Thus, the agency argues that it 

properly did not communicate with PSI regarding aspects of its proposal that would 

have required proposal revisions to correct. In short, the agency maintains that it 

conducted only clarifications because it was proceeding to make award without 

discussions. 

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 15.306 describes a range of exchanges that 

may take place during negotiated procurements. In short, an agency is not required 

to hold discussions, and thus to allow offerors to submit proposal revisions; rather, it 

may properly limit its communications with offerors to clarifications. Id. Clarifications 

are defined as "limited exchanges" between an agency and an offeror for the 

purpose of eliminating minor uncertainties or irregularities in a proposal, and do not 

give an offeror the opportunity to revise or modify its proposal. FAR § 15.306(a)(2). 

Clarifications are not to be used to cure proposal deficiencies or material omissions, 

or materially alter the technical or cost elements of the proposal, or otherwise revise 

the proposal. Discussions, on the other hand, occur when an agency communicates 

with an offeror for the purpose of obtaining information essential to determine the 

acceptability of a proposal, or provides the offeror with an opportunity to revise or 

modify its proposal in some material respect. FAR § 15.306(d). Accordingly, our 

Office has confirmed that where communications do not permit an offeror to revise 

or modify its proposal, but rather request that the offeror clarify and confirm what the 

offeror has already committed to do, those communications are clarifications and not 

discussions. ERIE Strayer Co., B-406131, Feb. 21, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 101 at 4-5. 

The record here supports the Army’s position that it sought only clarifications from 

the offerors, and then made award based on the initial proposals as clarified. 

Notwithstanding PSI’s arguments, our review of the record shows that the questions 

posed to PSI and LSI were indeed clarifications--requests for each offeror to supply 

information clarifying the basis for statements in its proposal, or confirming what the 

offeror intended by a statement within its proposal. Thus, for example, where PSI’s 

proposal indicated reuse of software code without making clear from which system 

the code was being reused or the status of the development of that code, the Army 

properly sought a clarification from PSI.5

 5 Although, as noted above, most of the clarifications to PSI sought specific 

information about the reuse of software, others asked PSI to specifically identify a 

reference to a quality management system; to confirm its understanding that the first 

two aircraft would be delivered to Huntsville, Alabama on particular dates; and to 

advise that PSI understood that the Army would supply limited quantities of 

transmissions and rotor blades. See AR, Tab 13, ENs to PSI, at Program 

Management EN-01, Technical EN-02, -04 & -06. Although PSI maintains, 

nonspecifically, that its clarification responses were essential to determining the 

acceptability of its proposal, it also maintains, somewhat contrarily, that “none of the 

 None of the Army’s ENs invited either firm 

(continued...)
Page 8 B-406998; B-406998.2

to revise its proposal. Accordingly, we agree with the Army that it did not conduct 

discussions, and we deny PSI’s assertion that the Army held defective discussions 

by failing to identify other weaknesses in PSI’s proposal that could have been 

addressed only through proposal revisions. 

Evaluation of PSI was Reasonable 

Next, PSI argues that the Army misevaluated the firm’s proposal with respect to 

each of six significant weaknesses, and that the offerors were evaluated unequally 

with respect to software reuse. We discuss the most significant of these, relating to 

PSI’s reuse of software and its proposed schedule.6

PSI argues that it proposed to use not only software code from its BHET-M design, 

but also software code from the UH-60L CEPT, which it asserts is a fully developed, 

completed trainer. PSI also argues that its BHET-M software is actually derived 

from the UH-60L CEPT software, and thus its proposal should have been evaluated 

more favorable because the “baseline source code” has been fully developed, and 

put “in use on three training units.” Protester’s Comments at 14-15. In a 

supplemental protest, PSI further argues that the evaluation reflects unequal 

treatment because LSI also proposed software reuse from the firm’s Chinook and 

Longbow helicopter trainers, and was evaluated favorably, in contrast to the 

evaluation of what PSI asserts was its own equivalent approach. Protester’s 

Comments at 24-25. 

 

PSI also argues that the Army unreasonably assigned additional significant 

weaknesses under the performance management factor because, as a 

subcontractor for the BHET-M, PSI’s proposed reliance on continued progress on 

the BHET-M, PSI could not control the pace of progress on the BHET-M. PSI 

argues that timely completion of BHET-M software was not an element of its 

proposed critical path; rather PSI argues that its schedule allowed significant “float” 

 

(...continued)

ENs led [PSI] to believe that a problem existed with the substance of its proposal.” 

Protester’s Supplemental Comments at 2-3. Our review of the entire record leads us 

to agree with the Army that the agency did not invite proposal revisions, and that 

PSI’s responses did not alter its proposed approach. AR, Tab 15, PSI Response to 

ENs at 1-3. 

6 Nevertheless, we have considered and rejected all of PSI’s arguments. Briefly, 

PSI argues that its proposal was misevaluated with respect to the approach to 

replicating the BHMT-M refuel/defuel system and with respect to the presence of 

external supports on the GFE helicopters. PSI also argues that these issues should 

have been raised in discussions. We find the evaluation was reasonable and, as 

noted above, that the Army did not hold discussions and therefore properly did not 

invite PSI to revise its proposal. 
Page 9 B-406998; B-406998.2

between the expected completion of aspects of the BHET-M and PSI’s use of them 

in the BHMT-M. Therefore, PSI argues, any delays in progress on the BHET-M 

would not be likely to affect the firm’s development of the BHMT-M. 

With respect to PSI’s argument that the firm was treated unequally in comparison to 

LSI’s proposed software reuse, the Army explains that the firms’ proposals were 

evaluated differently regarding software reuse because of valid material differences. 

Specifically, LSI proposed to reuse fully developed software from a number of 

completed trainers, while PSI proposed to reuse software primarily from the 

BHET-M--a trainer that has not been finalized nor delivered. Supplemental AR 

at 4-6. The Army further explains that PSI’s proposal and clarifications emphasized 

the firm’s plan to reuse BHET-M software, not the UH-60L CEPT.7

The evaluation of an offeror’s proposal is a matter within the agency’s discretion, 

and this Office will not reevaluate proposals; rather, we will review an agency’s 

evaluation to determine whether the agency’s judgments were reasonable and 

consistent with the stated evaluation criteria. Thus, a protester’s disagreement with 

an agency’s judgments does not render the evaluation unreasonable. A2 Group, 

Inc., B-402829.2, B-402829.3, Dec. 8, 2010, 2011 CPD ¶ 33 at 7. Here, we find no 

merit in PSI’s complaints. 

 Finally, the Army 

explains that its evaluators reasonably discounted as self-serving, PSI’s prediction of 

how readily the firm could reuse BHET-M software, and instead concluded, again 

reasonably, that the incomplete development of the BHET-M would make PSI’s 

reliance on reuse of its software a moderate risk. AR at 23-27. 

First, our review of PSI’s proposal and its responses to the ENs supports the Army’s 

conclusion that the approach described by PSI appeared to primarily depend on the 

successful completion of software and other aspects of the BHET-M--a trainer that 

has not yet been completed or delivered. While PSI’s clarified proposal does 

contain limited references to the UH-60L CEPT as a software source, in comparison 

to PSI’s references to the BHET-M, its does so only rarely. Additionally, the Army’s 

explanation of differences between the UH-60L CEPT as a training simulator for 

particular helicopter cockpit functions, and the BHMT-M as a full-aircraft repair 

trainer, are consistent with and support the Army’s evaluation judgment that PSI’s 

proposal relied significantly on completion of BHET-M software. Since the record 

 7 The Army acknowledges that PSI’s proposal and (to a greater extent) its responses 

to the ENs made some reference to reuse of UH-60L CEPT software. However, in 

addition to the limited references to this trainer, the Army maintains that PSI’s role in 

the UH-60L CEPT was a comparatively small upgrade to an existing system, and 

that the unit is a pilot training simulator that has significant differences from the 

BHMT-M system, thus effectively preventing the UH-60L CEPT from being a source 

of significant software reuse for the BHMT-M. Supplemental AR at 8. 
Page 10 B-406998; B-406998.2

demonstrates the reasonableness of the Army’s evaluation judgments, we deny 

these grounds of protest. 

Likewise, we view the Army’s assessment of a significant weakness to PSI’s 

proposal due to the firm’s reliance on completion (or at least continued progress) of 

the BHET-M system, to provide fully developed software for reuse in the BHMT-M 

posed a risk in connection with PSI’s ability to manage the contract. Indeed, the 

Army points out that the BHET-M schedule has already slipped, and PSI’s proposal 

left concern that the firm was overly optimistic about the ease of reuse, even 

considering the “float” that PSI argues was built into its schedule. AR at 30-31. The 

record provides reasonable support for the evaluation of PSI’s proposal as 

presenting weaknesses in these areas. Accordingly we deny all of PSI’s challenges 

to the technical and performance management evaluations.8

Further, PSI argues that the Army unreasonably assigned a significant weakness in 

connection with its proposed schedule, due to PSI’s assumption that the Army would 

supply two Category B aircraft at the same time in order to accommodate PSI’s 

intent to produce optional units 3 and 4 simultaneously and, similarly, with regard to 

production of optional units 5 and 6. PSI argues that the Army never informed the 

offerors that two Category B aircraft would not be provided at the same time. 

Protester’s Comments at 22. 

 

The Army responds that, while it did not state that two “Category B” aircraft would 

not be provided at the same time for the optional BHMT-M units, the RFP did not 

commit the agency to do so. More specifically, the RFP made clear that the optional 

units could be ordered, on an individual basis, at any time within 5 years of award, 

and further, that the Army would determine whether to provide the contractor with a 

crash-damaged aircraft, or a Category B aircraft. AR at 32-33; see AR, Tab 7, Army 

Response to Offeror Questions, at 3 (Question/Answer 20). The Army argues that 

PSI’s schedule was based on assumptions of Army actions to which the Army was 

not committed. Accordingly, the Army maintains that the evaluators properly 

assigned a significant weakness based on PSI’s unwarranted assumptions. AR 

at 32-33.

In our view, the Army’s evaluation in this respect was reasonable. We agree with 

the Army that PSI’s master schedule depicted an unwarranted assumption that the 

Army would provide for PSI’s simultaneous production of the two pairs of option 

 8 As noted above, our discussion addresses the most significant themes of PSI’s 

protest of the evaluation of its proposal. Additionally, to the extent that PSI learned 

of other weaknesses in its debriefing, but only provided a substantive challenge to 

them in its comments, see Protester’s Comments at 20, we dismiss those 

challenges as untimely because those challenges were raised more than 10 days 

after the debriefing. 
Page 11 B-406998; B-406998.2

units. In contrast to PSI’s assumptions, the RFP made exercise of the option for 

each unit independent of any others. Accordingly, the Army’s assessment of a 

significant weakness was reasonable. 

Evaluations of LSI Past Performance was Reasonable 

Finally, PSI argues that Army unreasonably rated both PSI and LSI as very 

relevant/substantial confidence under the past performance factor because LSI has 

had no prior experience with Black Hawk trainers. Protest at 10-11; Protester’s 

Comments at 23. The Army responds that the RFP did not limit relevance of prior 

performance to performance on the BHMT-M (which neither firm had), nor to Black 

Hawk trainers (which differ as to their complexity and functionality). The Army 

maintains that the record supports the evaluators’ judgment that LSI’s successful 

experience, particularly with fully-fielded trainers for the CH-47F Chinook and 

Longbow helicopters, was properly evaluated at the same rating as PSI received--

that is, very relevant/substantial confidence. AR at 19-20; 33-34. 

The evaluation of an offeror’s past performance, including the agency’s 

determination of the relevance and scope of an offeror’s performance history, is a 

matter of agency discretion, which we will not find improper unless it is inconsistent 

with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria. National Beef Packing Co., B-296534, 

Sept. 1, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 168 at 4. The evaluation of experience and past 

performance, by its very nature, is subjective; we will not substitute our judgment for 

reasonably based evaluation ratings, and an offeror’s mere disagreement with an 

agency’s evaluation judgments does not demonstrate that those judgments are 

unreasonable. Glenn Def. Marine-Asia PTE, Ltd., B-402687.6, B-402687.7, 

Oct. 13, 2011, 2012 CPD ¶ 3 at 7. 

Here, the record reasonably supports the Army’s evaluation of LSI’s past 

performance as very relevant/substantial confidence. The record shows that the 

Army evaluators considered LSI’s successful past performance with maintenance 

trainer systems and other complex systems, and that the firm had demonstrated its 

expertise to all areas of the SOW. By contrast, the basis of PSI’s challenge--that an 

offeror lacking past performance on a Black Hawk trainer could not reasonably have 

received a very relevant/substantial confidence past performance rating--has no 

basis in the terms of the solicitation. As the agency notes, the solicitation did not 

limit relevance of past performance to Black Hawk trainers. 

The protest is denied. 

Lynn H. Gibson 

General Counsel