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70–801PDF 2011

REVIEW OF THE BLUE RIBBON 

COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE 

DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

JOINT WITH THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2011 

Serial No. 112–47 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

VACANCY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HON. ANDY HARRIS, Maryland, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Thursday, October 27, 2011 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 22 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24 

Statement by Representative Paul Tonko, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 25 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27 

Statement by Representative Andy Harris, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 28 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29 

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32 

Witnesses: 

Mr. Jack Spencer, Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36 

Dr. Peter Swift, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratory 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Dr. Roger Kasperson, Professor and Distinguished Scientist, Clark University 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 48 

Mr. Gary Hollis, Chairman, Nye County Board of County Commissioners 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 62 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 63 

Mr. Rick McLeod, Executive Director, Savannah River Site Community Reuse 

Organization 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 65 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 66 

Dr. Mark Peters, Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs, Argonne National 

Laboratory 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 69 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 71 

Discussion 80 
Page

IV 

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. Jack Spencer, Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation ........................................................................................................................ 94

Dr. Peter Swift, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratory .................................................................................................. 99 

r. Roger Kasperson, Professor and Distinguished Scientist, Clark University 109 

Mr. Gary Hollis, Chairman, Nye County Board of County Commissioners ....... 110 

Mr. Rick McLeod, Executive Director, Savannah River Site Community Reuse 

Organization ......................................................................................................... 113 

Dr. Mark Peters, Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs, Argonne National 

Laboratory ............................................................................................................ 118 

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record 

Report by the Majority Staff of the House Science, Space, and Technology 

Committee: Yucca Mountain: The Administration’s Impact on U.S. Nuclear 

Waste Management Policy, June 2011 ................................................................ 122 

Documentation from Nye County ........................................................................... 167 

What’s Next for Nuclear Waste? A New Strategy for the CSRA ........................... 179 

Letter from the Department of Energy Pertaining to Yucca Mountain Repository License Application ...................................................................................... 208 

Federal Report: ‘‘Nuclear Waste: Can Nevada Keep America’s Sizzling Nuclear Waste Out of Its Backyard?’’ Governing Magazine, April 1990 .............. 213 

Testimony of Martin G. Malsch, Special Deputy Attorney General for the 

State of Nevada .................................................................................................... 220 

‘‘Nuclear Waste Program Faces Political Burial,’’ Science, 22 August 1986 ....... 232 
(1) 

REVIEW OF THE BLUE RIBBON 

COMMISSION ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR 

FUTURE 

DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 

JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight] 

presiding. 
2 

RALPH M. HAL:", TEXAS 

C'-IAli1MAN 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

EDDIE BERNICE jDHNSD~. TEXAS 

RANKING MEM3ER 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

{202) 225-6371 

"'vvwscience.housegov 

Joint Hearing: 

Snbcommittee on Investigations & Oversight 

Subcommittee on Energy & Environment 

Review of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future 

Draft Recommendations 

Thursday, October 27, 2011 

10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Mr. Jack Spencer, Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation 

Dr. Peter Swift. Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff', Sandia National Laboratory 

Dr. Roger Kasperson, Professor and Distinguished Scientist, Clark University 

Mr. Gary Hollis, Chairman, Nye County Board of County Commissioners 

Mr. Rick McLeod, Executive Director, Savannah River Site Conununity Reuse Organization 

Dr. Mark Peters, Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs, Argonne National Laboratory 
3 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESE1'fTATIVES 

COMlVllTTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

Joint Hearing: 

Subcommittee on Investigations & Oversight 

Subcommittee on Energy & Environment 

HEARING CHARTER 

Review o/the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Draft 

Recommendations 

Thursday, October 27, 2011 

10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

On Thursday, October 27, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office 

Building, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology's Energy & Environment and 

lnvestigations & Oversight Subcommi~es will hold a hearing titled "Review of the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America's Nuclear Fut/ire Draft Recommendations." The purpose of this 

hearing is to examine the recommendations contained in the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America's Nuclear Future (BRC) Draft Report to the Secretary of Energy. Additionally, the 

Subcommittees will consider science and technology issues associated with spent nuclear fuel 

management. 

• Mr. Jack Spencer, Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation 

• Dr. Peter Swift, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff, Sandia National 

Laboratory 

• Dr. Roger Kasperson, Professor and Distinguished Scientist, Clark University 

• Mr. Gary Hollis, Chairman, Nye County Board of County Commissioners 

• Mr. Rick McLeod, Executive Director, Savannah River Site Community Reuse 

Organization 

• Dr. Mark Peters, Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs, Argonne National 

Laboratory 

Nuclear Waste Manauement Policy Background 

All nuclear related activity, be it related to research, commercial, military or otherwise, generates 

waste byproducts of varying radioactivity. These bypro ducts range from low-level waste such as 

tools, equipment, and clothing to high-level waste such as used fuel and reactor components. 

Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, first enacted in 1980 and amended in 1985, 
4 

each state is responsible for low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders.! In 

contrast, the federal government is responsible under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 

(NWPA) for the disposal of high-level waste (as defined in 42 U.S.C.10001).2 

Today, 104 commercial nuclear power reactors generate approximately 20 percent of the United 

States electricity needs. Each reactor uses about 20 metric tons of uranium fuel per year, and 

collectively the industry creates 2,000 to 2,400 metric tons of spent fuel on an annual basis (one 

metric ton is about 2,200 pounds).3 This spent nuclear fuel, considered high-level waste, is 

currently stored at the generation site in spent fuel pools (to cool the most recently used fuel 

rods) or in above ground dry casks. 

Figure 1 - Used Nuclear Fuel in Storage4 

Used Nuclear Fuel in Storage (Metric Tons, End of 2010) 

1 P.L 96-573 andP.L 99-240. 

242 u.s.c. §IOOOI Section 12 - The term "high-level radioactive waste" means - (A) the highly radioactive material 

resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and 

any solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations; and (B) 

other highly radi<?active material that the Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires 

permanent isolation. 

"Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Draft Report to the Secretary of Energy, " p. 14, July 29, 

2011. Accessible at: http://brc. G ov/sites/defaultffilesidocuments!brc draft report 29iuI201 I O.pdf 

4 Nuclear Energy Institute, "Used Nuclear Fuel in Storage," 2010. Accessible at: 

http://www.nei.or~/filefolderflJsed Nuclear FuelMa..JL1QlQj:ng, 
5 

In addition to storage at operating nuclear reactors, spent nuclear fuel is also cUlTently held at 

nine deconunissioned U.S. reactor sites throughout Ibe country.5 Storage of spent fuel at 

decommissioned sites is disproportionately expensive, estimated to be $4.5 to $8 million per 

year6

, as security is still necessary to guard the waste. The most notable of these sites is Maine 

Yankee, located in Wiscasset, ME, which stores 542 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM). Zion 

reactors 1 & 2 are in the process of decommissioning the site, which when completed will store 

approximately 1,019 MTHM.7 The Department of Energy (DOE) currently manages radioactive 

material at multiple locations in the United States, with the largest located in Hanford, 

Washington followed by the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, and Jdaho National 

Laboratory. 

History of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant8 

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located 26 miles southeast of Carlsbad, New Mexico, 

currently serves as the world's only deep geological repository for long-lived nuclear waste. 

WIPP is operated by DOE and only accepts radioactive waste from defense programs. WIPP 

does not receive high-level waste, but material that contains radioactive transuranic elements 

such as plutonium. 

In 1974, local officials sought consideration of the site, prompting the selection ofWIPP for 

exploratory work. In 1979, Congress passed a law stipulating WIPP would not serve as 

permanent disposal of spent fueL However, the Congressional action did not assuage the State 

of New Mexico's full concerns regarding the projects, which filed suit against the Federal 

Government to halt construction of the facility. Once the lawsuit was resolved, DOE continued 

moving forward with WIPP. In 1987, DOE announced the facility would open the following 

year; however, ongoing difficulties and litigation led to further delays. EPA certified WIPP met 

the regulatory thresholds for disposal of waste and the facility received its first shipment of waste 

in 1999. As of June 2010, WIPP "had received 8,641 shipments for a total waste volume of 

approximately 68,200 cubic meters.,,9 

History of a Deep Geological Repository 

Establishment of a deep geological repository has long been the most agreed upon method by 

numerous credible scientific bodies, such as the National Academies of Science, to permanently 

dispose of radioactive waste. Detailed study and consideration of this approach began in the 

1970s, when the U.S. government undertook a serious review of geological repositories, focusing 

on three specific sites: Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Hanford, Washington; and Deaf Smith County, 

Texas. 

5 A list of decommissioned sites and quantities of stranded fuel can be found in the BRC Draft Report, p. 40. 

~ BRC Draft Report, p. 41. 

BRC Draft Report, p. 40. 

8 Condensed from BRC Draft Report, p. 21 

'Ibid. 
6 

Enactment of the NWP A in 1982 furthered this effort by pro~iding a statutory framework to 

govern the disposal of U.S. high-level waste. IO The Act directed the Federal government to 

assume ownership of civilian high-level nuclear waste and a one- mil (or one-tenth of one cent) 

per kilowatt-hour fee of nuclear generated electricity was mandated to provide funding for 

development of the eventual site. 1 1 Since no long-te= storage facilities were available, it was 

expected that existing locations where nuclear waste was stored would continue to store that 

waste until a more permanent solution became available. I2 

To advance study and development of a permanent disposal solution, the Act established the 

Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) within DOE and tasked it with 

the study of potential storage locations, taking into account criteria including but not limited to 

geology, seismic risk, proximity to water supplies, and nearby popUlations. The Secretary of 

Energy was required to provide to the President a list with a minimum of five sites that met these 

criteria. 13 

In 1987, DOE ultimately judged Yucca Mountain, located approximately 100 miles from Las 

Vegas, to have the "best overall prospects for being considered a suitable repository site,,,14 and 

the NWP A was amended to focus long-term storage facility efforts at the site. 

Additional key dates in the development of a permanent geological repository in the United 

StatesI5 include: 

• 1957: the flIst recommendation for the disposal of radioactive waste in a permanent 

geologic repository. 

• 1982: Congress passes the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1983 (NWP A), which 

centralized the long-term management of nuclear waste and mandated the construction of 

a safe and pe=anent nuclear waste repository. 

• 1984: DOE publishes a draft environmental assessment of the Yucca Mountain Project. 

• 1985: DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCR WM), submits the 

"Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program" which sets 

overall goals, objectives, and strategy to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

waste. 

!O P.L. 97-425. 

II Although no long-term facility has been opened, this fee is still required by law to be paid by civilian reactor 

operators. Some utilities have successfully sued the federal government to reclrum the money paid so far since no 

waste storage facility has been opened. 

12 ClUTent spent fuel storage locations can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/wasle/spent-fuel-storagellocations.html. 

1::1 See Supra note 10. 

14 Hearing titled "Nuclear Waste Program" Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, June 29, 

1987. Available at: www.archive.ore:/streamlnuclearwasteproll04unitinuclearwastenroo-04unit divu.txt 

15 A more detailed timeline and description of events can be found in the Majority Staff Report Of the House 

Science, Space, and Technology Committee, "Yucca Mountain: The Administration's Impact on u.s. Nuclear Waste 

Management Policy," June 201L Accessible at: 

http-:!/science.house.2:ov/sitesirepubIicans.science.hollse.!lOv/fiJes/documentslLettersl'iucca%20lvfountain% 20-

%20The%20Administration%27s%20Impact%20on%20D.S.%20Nuclear:'/020\VasteO/a20Mana....oement<'/o20Policyo/·o'J 

OFULL.pdf 
7 

o 1986: DOE issues a report on multi-attribute utility analysis to rank possible sites on preclosure and post-closure technical guidelines. 

o 1987:, Congress amends the NWPA by designating Yucca Mountain as the only site to 

be considered as a repository. 

o December 1998: DOE publishes five volumes assessing the viability ofthe Yucca 

Mountain Project. 

• February 2002: OCWR,\1 releases "Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report: 

Technical Information Supporting Site Recommendation Consideration. " 

o February 2002: DOE publishes 15-chapter Environmental Impact States required by the 

NWPA in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. 

o April, July 2002: Congress reaffirms the selection of Yucca Mountain as a high-level 

radioactive waste repository. 

o May 2002: Secretary of Energy Abraham recommends Yucca Mountain as the site of the 

high-level waste repository. President Bush formally recommends Yucca Mountain to 

Congress. 

o June 3, 2008: DOE submits the License Application for a High-Level Waste Geologic 

Repository at Yucca Mountain (License Application) to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). 

Recent Events Relating to a High-Level Waste Repository 

In order to proceed with construction of Yucca Mountain, the NRC must flTst approve the DOE 

License Application for the site. This approval is contingent upon the site meeting detailed 

scientific and technical criteria defined in NRC regulations that govern permanent disposal of 

nuclear waste. 

In February 2010, DOE announced its intention to withdraw the License Application for Yucca 

Mountain. Additionally, the Administration declared it would dismantle OCR WM by the end of 

the fiscal year. While concurrently establishing the BRC, DOE formally filed the motion on 

March 3, 2010 with the NRC to withdraw the License Application. The NRC's Atomic Safety 

and Licensing Board (ASLB) rejected DOE's Motion to Withdraw on June 29, 2010, stating 

DOE did not have the authority under the NWPA to withdraw the License Application. The 

ASLB decision was appealed to the full Commission and on September 9, 2011, the Commission 

issued a decision stating that the Commission was evenly divided on the appeal and directed the 

ASLB to complete all necessary and appropriate case management activities. 16 

Until further regulatory or legal action is taken to permit the License Application to move 

forward or be withdrawn, it remains pending before the Commission. As a result, no long-term 

nuclear waste management program is currently in place. The Administration has stated its 

intention to wait for the BRC Final Report to inform future policy decisions regarding the 

direction of America's nuclear waste management policy. 

16- u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memorandum and Order eLI-I 1-07, Docket No. 63-00 I -HL w~ ASLBP 

09-892-HL W -CAB04, September 9, 201 L 
8 

Bachround on the Blue Ribbon Commission's Draft Report 

On January 29, 2010, President Obama issued an Executive Order (Appendix A) directing the 

Secretary of Energy to establish a Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future to 

"conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back of the nuclear fuel cycle, 

including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used 

nuclear fuel and nuclear waste.,,17 The BRC was directed not to consider a number of issues in 

its report. Specifically, the BRC did not "rende[r] an opinion on the suitability of the Yucca 

Mountain site or on the request to withdraw the license application for Yucca Mountain" or 

identif'yany sites to conduct activity related to a waste management system. IS 

The 15 member Commission operates under the authority outlined in the Advisory Committee 

Charter. 19 The BRC held numerous open meetings and site visits in an effort to operate the BRC 

in an "open and inclusive manner"zo The BRC and its subcommittees held 26 public meetings 

and 11 site visits21 prior to the release of the Draft Report, and received over 2000 public 

:=::s::~sa ~~;?1ety of stakeholders and interested parties on all aspects considered 

Blue Ribbon Commission Subcommittee Structure and Recommendations 

The BRC was divided into three subcommittees: Reactor arid Fuel Cycle Technology (RFCT), 

Transportation & Storage (TS), and Disposal. 

The Reactor and Fuel Cvcle Technology Subcommittee was formed to consider issues 

relating to the "evaluation of existing fuel cycle technologies and R&D programs.,,23 The 

Subcommittee specifically evaluated the options using criteria to include "cost, safety, 

resource utilization and sustainability, and the promotion of nuclear nonproliferation and 

counter-terrorism goals.,,24 The RFCT Subcommittee submitted its draft report on June 

20,2011, centering on four key recommendations: 

(1) "provide stable, long-term (Research, Development, and Demonstration) 

RD&D support for advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies," to achieve both 

near-term safety improvements and performance of existing light-water reactor 

technology and longer-term efforts to identif'y potential "game-changing" nuclear 

technologies and systems; 

17 The White House, "Memorcmdum/or the Secretary o/Energy: Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear 

Future," January 29. 2010. Accessible at: bttp:llbrc.e:ov/index.php?a=nage!executive-order 

18 BRC Draft Report, p. vi. 

19 The Advisory Committee Charter is Appendix B and the full list of membership and subcommittee assignments is 

Appendix C. 

2D Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, "About the Commission. "Accessible at: 

httn://brc.Q:ov/index.php?q=naQ.:e!about-commission 

21 The full list of meetings and even~s can be found at: htto:/lbrc.gov!index.php?g=calendarl 

22 Public Comments can be found at: http://brc.O"ov/index.php?q=comments 

23 Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future Advisory Committee Charter. Accessible at: 

http:Hbrc.2:ovlindex.php?q=oage!charter 

24 Ibid. 
9 

(2) coordination of energy policies and programs across the federal government 

and more federal support for energy-related research, development, 

demonstration, and deployment; 

(3) additional RD&D funding for the NRC to "accelerate a regulatory framework 

and supporting anticipatory research for novel components of advanced nuclear 

energy systems;" and 

(4) continued international leadership to address global non-proliferation concerns 

and improve safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials worldwide?5 

The Transportation and Storage Subcommittee addressed the question, "[s]hould the United 

States change the way in which it is storing used nuclear fuel and high level waste while one or 

more final disposal locations are established?,,26 The TS Subcommittee issued its report on May 

31,2011, focusing on seven key recommendations: 

(I) expeditiously establishing consolidated interim storage facilities; 

(2) continued research on current storage technologies; 

(3) removal of spent fuel stored at decommissioned reactor sites; 

(4) establishment of a new quasi-governmental waste management organization; 

(5) a "science-based, consent-based, transparent, phased, and adaptive" approach 

to "develop and implement all aspects of the spent fuel and waste management 

system;" 

(6) continued coordination for the transport of spent fuel and high-level waste; 

and 

(7) restructuring the manner in which the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) is 

accessible.27 

The Disposal Subcommittee addressed five issues contained in the BRC Charter: 

• Options for permanent disposal of used fuel and/or high-level nuclear waste, including 

deep geological disposal; 

• Options to make legal and commercial arrangements for the management of used nuclear 

fuel and nuclear waste in a manner that takes the current and potential full fuel cycles into 

account; 

• Options for decision-making processes for management and disposal that are flexible, 

adaptive, and responsive; options to ensure that decisions on management of used nuclear 

fuel and nuclear waste are open and transparent, with broad participation; and 

• The possible need for additional legislation or amendments to existing laws, including the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended.28 

2S Blue Ribbon Commission on America'S Nuclear Future, "Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee 

Report to the Full Commission," June 20, 2011. Accessible at: 

http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documentsirfct fullreport rev?OjuneJ l.OOf 

26 Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future "Transportation & Storage." Accessible at: 

bttp:/!brc.aov/index.php?g=subcommittee/transnortation-storage 

27 Blue Ribbon Commission on America~s Nuclear Future, "Transportation and Storage Subcommittee Report to the 

Full Commission, "May 31,201 L Accessible at: http://brcoO"ov/sites/defaultlfiles/documents/draft ts report 6-1-

ll..rulf 
10 

The Disposal Subcommittee also made seven recommendations to the BRC: 

(1) moving forward with the development of one or more permanent deep 

geological facilities for permanent disposal of high-level nuclear waste; 

(2) establishment of a new single-purpose organization to handle the 

transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste; 

(3) access of that organization to the balance of the NWF; 

(4) a new approach to site and develop nuclear waste management and disposal 

facilities in the United States that is consent-based, transparent, phased, adaptive, 

and standards- and science-based; 

(5) joint coordination of regulatory responsibilities and safety standards between 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency; 

(6) involvement of key stakeholders, including all affected levels of government, 

and providing the respective stakeholders direct authority over aspects of 

regulation, permitting, and operations in order to protect interests and generate 

confidence; and 

(7) retaining the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board for independent 

technical advice and review?9 

Blue Ribbon Commission Draft Report 

On July 29, 2011, the BRC released the Draft Report for public comment. The public comment 

period concludes on October 31, 2011. The Draft Report incorporates the recommendations of 

the three subcommittees and provides additional policy context and commentary. The Draft 

Report notes, "[tJhe Commission was asked to recommend a better strategy for managing the 

back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. We have concluded that the central flaw 

or gap in the U.S. program to date has been its failure, des~ite decades of effort, to develop a 

permanent disposal capability as required by the NWP A." 0 

Specifically. the BRC Draft Report identifies the following high-level recommendations:3! 

"The Blue Ribbon Commission concludes that the United States needs a new, 

integrated strategy for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including, in 

particular, a new approach to siting nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities. The 

strategy we recommend has seven key elements: 

1. An approach to siting and developing nuclear waste management and disposal 

facilities in the United States that is adaptive, staged, consent-based, 

transparent, and standards- and science-based. 

28 Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, "Disposal Subcommittee Report to the Full Commission 

Drcrft," June 1,2011. Accessible at hltp:lfbrc.2ov/sites/defaultlfilesldocumentsfdraft disposal report 06-0I-II.pdf 

2'Ibid. 

30 BRC Draft Report p. 30 

31 BRC Draft Report p. xv 
11 

2. A new, single-purpose organization to develop and implement a focused, 

integrated program for the transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear 

waste in the United States . 

.J. Assured access by the nuclear waste management program to the balance in 

the Nuclear Waste Fund and to the revenues generated by annual nuclear 

waste fee payments. 

4. Prompt efforts to develop, as expeditiously as possible, one or more 

permanent deep geological facilities for the safe disposal of spent fuel and 

high-level nuclear waste. 

S. Prompt efforts to develop, as expeditiously as possible, one or more 

consolidated interim storage facilities as part of an integrated, comprehensive 

plan for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. 

6. Stable, long-term support for research, development, and demonstration 

(RD&D) on advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies that have the 

potential to offer substantial benefits relative to currently available 

technologies and for related workforce needs and skills development. 

7. International leadership to address global non-proliferation concerns and 

improve the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials worldwide." 

Additional Findings and Recommendations are included in Appendix D. 

Legislative Requirements, Near-Term Actions, and Legal Considerations of the BRC Draft 

Report 

The BRC Draft Report notes that in order to fully implement many of the recommendations, 

Congress must take legislative action. Many of the required changes in law would necessitate 

changing the NWP A. The most significant recommendation would require the NWPA to 

authorize a "new consent-based process to be used for selecting and evaluating sites and 

licensing consolidated storage and disposal facilities in the future.',32 Other proposed legislative 

changes include "authorizing consolidated interim storage facilities, establishing a new waste 

management organization, ensuring access to dedicated funding, and promoting international 

engagement to support safe and secure waste management.,,33 The Draft Report did not provide 

any legislative text for the necessary statutory changes. 

While key recommendations will require specific legislative action, the BRC suggests some 

actions can be accomplished with near-term, non-legislative steps. Those areas include 

modifying the manner in which the Nuclear Waste Fee is collected, preparing to implement 

consolidated storage, continuing the development of regulations associated with transporting 

spent fuel, "keep[ing] a repository program moving forward through valuable, non-site specific 

activities,,,34 and "develop[ing] a RD&D plan and roadmap for taking the borehole disposal 

concept to the point of a licensed demonstration.,,35 

32 BRC Draft Report, p. 5. 

33 Ibid. 

34 BRC Draft Report, p. 134. 

35 Ibid. 
12 

To help identifY which near-term actions can be taken within the bounds of existing law, BRC 

staff requested a "Legal Analysis of Commission Recommendations for Near-Term Actions.,,36 

The Legal Analysis considered the recommendations relating to the initial development of 

consolidated interim storage facilities, the modification of the order in which DOE receives spent 

commercial fuel, and how to alter the timing and method in which the nuclear waste fee is paid. 

The analysis concluded that these recommendations can be implemented under existing law. 

The document suggests a legal issue may arise should DOE formally designate a Monitored 

Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility37 to serve as consolidated interim storage for nuclear waste.38 

Further, legal authority exists to alter the order in which DOE would accept spent nuclear fuel, • 

permitting DOE to first accept spent fuel currently located at decommissioned reactor sites. 

The NWF currently holds a balance of afProximately $25 billion; however it is currently 

difficult to access and utilize the N\\lF. 3 The Legal Analysis identifies certain near-term actions 

in which the NWF could be made available for funding activities associated with the creation of 

a consolidated storage facility."O 

Public Comment Period and Final Report 

Between the release of the Draft Report and the conclusion of the public comment period, the 

BRe will hold five regional public meetings 10 specifically solicit feedback and public comment 

on the Draft Report. The BRC will review public comments and deliver the final report to the 

Secretary of Energy on or before January 29,2012. 

36 Van Ness Feldman, "Legal Analysis o/Commission Recommendations/or Near-Term Actions," to Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America's Nuclear Future, July 29, 2011, revised October 11,20] 1. Accessible at 

hltD:llbrc.govlsitesJdefaultifile,idocurnents/20111011 legal authorities memo revised final clean I.pdf 

37 The NWP A provides DOE authority to site, construct and operate a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) 

facility. A MRS facility could store spent fuel and high-level waste, but would be designed to permit for continuous 

monitoring, management and retrieval of the materials, rather than permanent storage. In 1987, Congress amended 

the NWP A prohibiting construction of a MRS facility prior to the licensing of a permanent repository. 

38 Van Ness Feldman, p. 3. 

" A detailed explanation of how the Nuclear Waste Fund is administered and budgetary restrictions can be found in 

the BRC Draft Report, Chapter 8. 

40 Van Ness Feldman, p. 13. 

10 
13 

Appendix A 

Executive Order Creating the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Energy Future 

THE WlUTE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary 

For Immediate Release January 29, 2010 

January 29,2010 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRED\RY OF ENERGY 

SUBJECT: Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future 

Expanding our Nation's capacity to generate clean nuclearenergy is crucial to our ability to 

combat climate change, enhance energy security, and increase economic prosperity. My 

Administration is undertaking substantial steps to expand the safe, secure, and responsible use of 

nuclear energy. These efforts are critical to accomplishing many of my Administration's most 

significant goals. 

i\n important part of a sound, comprehensive, and long-term domestic nuclear energy strategy is 

a wel1-considered policy for managing used nuclear fuel and other aspects of the back end of the 

nuclear fuel cycle. Yet the Nation's approach, developcd more than 20 years ago, to managing 

materials derivcd from nuclear activities, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, has not 

proven effective. Fortunately, over thc past two decades scientists and engineers in our country 

and abroad have learned a great deal about effective strategies for managing nuclear material. 

My Administration is committed to using this advanced knowledge to meet the Government's 

obligation to dispose of our Nation's used nuclear material. 

Accordingly, I request that you establish a Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear 

Future (Commission) and appoint its members. Those members should include recognized 

representatives and experts from a range of disciplines and with a range of perspectives, and may 

include participation of appropriate Federal officials. The Commission's business should be 

conducted in an open and transparent manner. 

The Commission should conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end 

of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of 

civilian and defense used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. This review should include an 

evaluation of advanced fuel cycle technologies that would optimize energy recovery, resource 

utilization, and the minimization of materials derived from nuclear activities in a manner 

consistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals. 

In performing its functions, the Commission should consider abroad range of technological and 

policy alternatives, and should analyze the scientific, environmental, budgetary, cconomic, 

financial, and management issues, among others, surrounding each alternative it considers. 

Where appropriate, the Commission may also identifY potential statutory changes. 

The Commission should provide an interim report to you within18 months ofthe date of this 

memorandum, and that report should be made available for public comment. The Commission 

should provide a final report to you within 24 months of the date of this memorandum. The 

11 
14 

Department of Energy shall provide funding and administrative support for the Commission, as 

you detennine appropriate, so that it can complete its functions within these time periods. . 

Additionally, all executive departments and agencies shall provide such infonnation and 

assistance to the Commission as you or the Commission may request for purposes of carrying 

out the Commission's functions, to the extent pennitted by law. Nothing in this memorandum 

shall be construed to require the disclosure of classified, proprietary, law enforcement sensitive, 

or other infonnation protected under governing law. This memorandum shall be implemented 

consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. This 

memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or 

procedural, enforceable at law or inequity by any party against the United States, its departments, 

agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. 

You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register. 

BARACK OBAMA 

### 

12 
15 

AppendixB 

Blue Ribbon Commission Charter 

Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Advisory Committee Charter 

L Committee's Official Designation. Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (the 

Commission). 

2. Authority. The Commission is being established in accordance with the provisions of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as amended, 5 U.S.c. App. 2, and as directed by the 

President's Memorandum for the Secretary of Energy dated January 20, 2010: Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America's Nuclear Future. This charter establishes the Commission under the 

authority of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 

3. Objectives and Scope of Activities. The Secretary of Energy, acting at the direction of the 

President, is establishing the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for 

managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, 

processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and 

materials derived from nuclear activities. Specifically, the Commission will provide advice, 

evaluate alternatives, and make recommendations for a new plan to address these issues, 

including: 

The Commission will produce a draft report to the Secretary and a final report within the time 

frames contained in paragraph 4. 

a. Evaluation of existing fuel cyele technologies and R&D programs. Criteria for evaluation should 

include cost, safety, resource utilization and ~ustainability, and the promotion of nuclear 

nonproliferation and counter-terrorism goals. 

b. Options for safe storage of used nuclear fuel while final disposition pathways are selected and 

deployed; 

c. Options for permanent disposal of used fuel and/or high-level nuclear waste, including deep 

geological disposal; 

d. Options to make legal and commercial arrangements for the management of used nuclear fuel 

and nuclear waste in a manner that takes the current and potential full fuel cycles into account; 

e. Options for decision-making processes for management and disposal that are flexible, adptive, 

and responsive; 

f. Options to ensure that decisions on management of used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste are open 

and transparent, with broad participation; 

g. The possible need for additional legislation or amendments to existing laws, including the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended; and 

h. Any such additional matters as the Secretary determines to be appropriate for consideration. 

13 
16 

4. Description of Duties. The duties of the Commission are solely advisory and are a~ stated in 

Paragraph 3 above. 

A draft report shall be submitted within 18 months of the date of the Presidential memorandum 

directing establishment of this Commission; a fInal report shall be submitted within 24 months of 

the date of that memorandum. The reports shall include: 

a. Consideration of a wide range of technological and policy alternatives, and should analyze the 

scientifIc, environmental, budgetary, financial, and management issues, among others, 

surrounding each alternative it considers. The reports will also include a set ofrecommendations 

regarding policy and management, and any advisable changes in law. 

b. Recommendations on the fees currently being charged to nuclear energy ratepayers and the 

recommended disposition of the available balances consistent with the recommendations of the 

Commission regarding the management of used nuclear fuel; and 

c. Such other matters as the Secretary determines to be appropriate. 

5. Official to Whom the Committee Reports. TIle Commission reports to the Secretary of 

Energy. 

6. Agency Responsible for Providing the Necessary Support. DOE will be responsible for 

fInancial and administrative support. Within DOE, this support will be provided by the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Eucrgy or other Departmental element as required. The 

Commission will draw on the expertise of other federal agencies as appropriate. 

7. Estimated Annual Operating Cost and Staff Years. The estimated ammal operating cost of 

direct support to, including travel of, the Commission and its subcommittees is $5,000,000 and 

requires approxinlately 8.0 full-time employees. 

8. Designated Federal Officer. A full-time DOE employee, appointed in accordance with agency 

procedures, will serve as the Designated Federal Officer (DFO). The DFO will approve or call 

all of the Commission and subcommittee meetings, approve all meeting agendas, attend all 

Commission and subcommittee meetings, adjourn any meeting when the DFO determines 

adjournment to be in the public interest. Subcommittee directors who are full-time Department of 

Energy employees, as appointed by the DFO, may serve as DFOs for subcommittee meetings. 

9. Estimated Number and Frequency of Meetings. The Commission is expected to meet as 

frequently as needed and approved by the DFO, but not less than twice a year. 

The Commission will hold open meetings unless the Secretary of Energy, or his designee, 

determines that a meeting or a portion of a meeting may be closed to the public as permitted by 

law. Interested persons may attend meetings of, and file comments with, the Commission, and, 

within time constraints and Commission procedures, may appear before the Commission. 

Members of the Commission serve without compensation. However, each appointed non-Federal 

member may be reimbursed for per diem and travel expenses incurred while attending 

Commission meetings in accordance with the Federal Travel Regulations. 

10. Duration and Termination. The Commission is subject to bi=ial review and will terminate 24 

months from the date of the Presidential memorandum discussed above, unless, prior to that 

time, the charter is renewed in accordance with Section 14 of the FACA. 

14 
17 

11. Membership and Designation. Commission members shall be experts in their respective fields 

and appointed as special Government employees based on their knowledge and expertise of the 

topics expected to be addressed by the Commission, or representatives of entities including, 

among others, research facilities, academic and policy-centered institutions, industry, labor 

organizations, environmental organizations, and others, should the Commission's task require 

such representation. Members shall be appointed by the Secretary of Energy. The approximate 

number of Commission members will be 15 persons. The Chair or Co-Chairs shall be appointed 

by the Secretary of Energy. 

12. Subcommittees. 

a. To facilitate functioning of the Commission, both standing and ad hoc subcommittees may be 

formed. 

b. The objectives of the subcommittees are to undertake fact-finding and analysis on specific topics 

and to provide appropriate information and recommendations to the Commission. 

c. The Secretary or his designee, in consultation with the Chair or Co-Chairs, will appoint members 

of subcommittees. Members from outside the Commission may be appointed to any 

subcommittee to assure the expertise necessary to conduct subcommittee business. 

d. The Secretary or his designee, in consultation with the Chair or co-Chairs will appoint 

Subcommittees. 

e. The DOE Committee Management Officer (CMO) will be notified upon establishment of each 

subcommittee. 

13. Recordkeeping. The records of the Commission and any subcommittee shall be handled in 

accordance with General Records Schedule 26, Item 2 and approved agency records disposition 

schedule. These records shall be available for public inspection and copying, subject to the 

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. 

14. Filing Date. 

Date filed with Congress: March 1,2010 

Carol A. Matthews 

Committee Management Officer 

15 
18 

AppendixC List of Blue Ribbon Commission Members and Subcommittee Structure41 

• Lee Hamilton - Co-Chair 

• Brent Scow croft - Co-Chair 

• Mark Ayers - President, Building & Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO 

• Vicky A. Bailey - Principal, Anderson Stratton Enterprises, LLC 

• Albert Carnesale - Chancellor Emeritus and Professor, UCLA 

• Pete V. Domenici - Senior Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Center; former U.S. Senator (RNM) 

• Susan Eisenbower - President, Eisenhower Group, Inc. 

• Sen. Cbuck Hagel- Distinguished Professor, Georgetown University; Former U.S. 

Senator (R-NE) 

• Jonatban Lash - President, World Resources Institute 

• Allison Macfarlane - Associate Professor of Environmental Science and Policy, George 

Mason University 

• Richard A. Meserve - President, Carnegie Institution for Science and Senior Of 

Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP; former Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission 

• Ernie Moniz - Professor of Physics and Cecil & Ida Green Distinguished Professor, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

• Per Peterson - Professor and Chair, Department of NucIear Engineering, University of 

California - Berkeley 

• John Rowe - Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exelon Corporation 

• Phil Sharp - President, Resources for the Future 

Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology 

Co-Chair(s): Ex Officio(s): 

Per Peterson 

Pete V. Dornenici 

Albert Carnesale 

Susan Eisenhower 

Allison Macfarlane 

Richard A. Meserve 

Ernie Moniz 

Phil Sharp 

Transportation and Storage 

Brent Scowcroft 

Lee Hamilton 

41 For full biographies see; http://brc.swvlindex.pho?q=comrniss1on-memD_lli 

16 
19 

Co-Chair(s): 

Phil Sharp 

Richard A. Meserve 

Mark Ayers 

Vicky A. Bailey 

Albert Carnesale 

Pete V. Dornenici 

Ernie Moniz 

John Rowe 

Disposal 

Co-Chair(s:) 

Chuck Hagel 

Jonathan Lash 

Mark Ayers 

Vicky A. Bailey 

Susan Eisenhower 

Allison Macfarlane 

Per Peterson 

John Rowe 

Ex Officio(s): 

Brent Scowcroft 

Lee Hamilton 

Exofficio(s): 

Brent Scowcroft 

Lee Hamilton 

17 
20 

AppendixD ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS42 

• The current division of regulatory responsibilities for long-term repository performance 

between the U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency is appropriate and should continue. The two agencies should develop 

new, site-independent safety standards in a formally coordinated joint process that 

actively engages and solicits input from all relevant constituencies. 

• The jurisdictions of safety and health agencies should be clarified and aligned. New siteindependent safety standards should be developed by the safety and health agencies 

responsible for protecting nuclear workers through a coordinated joint process that 

actively engages and solicits input from all relevant constituencies. Efforts to support 

uniform levels of safety and health in the nuclear industry should be undertaken with 

federal, industry, and joint labor-management leadership. Safety and health practices in 

the nuclear construction industry should provide a model for other activities in the 

nuclear industry. 

• The roles, responsibilities, and authorities of local, state, and tribal governments (with 

respect to facility siting and other aspects of nuclear waste disposal) must be an elenlent 

of the negotiation between the federal govcrnmcnt and the other affected units of 

government in establishing a disposal facility. All affected levels of government (i.e., 

local, state, tribal, etc.) must have, at a minimunl, a meaningful consultative role in 

important decisions; additionally, states and tribes should retain--or where appropriate, 

be delegated--direct authority over aspects of regulation, permitting, and operations 

where oversight below the federal level can be exercised effectively and in a way that is 

helpful in protecting the interests and gaining the confidence of affected communities and 

citizens. At the same'time, local, state, and tribal governments have responsibilities to 

work productively with the federal govemment to help advance the national interest. 

• Recognizing the substantial I~ad-tinles that may be required in opening one or more 

consolidated storage facilities, dispersed interinl storage of substantial quantities of spent 

fuel at existing reactor sites can be expected to continue for some time. The Commission 

sees no unmanageable safety or security risks associated with current methods of storage 

(dry or wet) at existing sites in the United States. However, to ensure that all near-term 

forms of storage meet high standards of safety and security for the multi -decade-long 

time periods that they are likely to be in use, active research should continue on issues 

such as degradation phenomena, vulnerability to sabotage and terrorisni, full-scale cask 

testing, and other matters. 

• The Commission recommends that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) be tasked 

with carrying out an assessment of the lessons learned from Fukushima and their 

implications for conclusions reached in earlier NAS studies on the safety and security of 

spent fuel and high-level waste storage am,mgements. 

• Spent fuel currently being stored at shutdown reactor sites should be "first in line" for 

transfer to consolidated interim storage. 

• Although regulatory standards for different types of facilities will differ, the new 

organization should be responsible for developing consolidated interim storage and 

permanent disposal facilities and should apply the same principles of decision making to 

42 BRC Draft Report, p, ~ 

18 
21 

all aspects of the waste management program (i.e., science-based, consent-based, 

transparent, phased, and adaptive). 

• Siting processes for future waste management facilities should include a flexible and 

substantial incentive program. 

• The current system of standards and regulations governing the transport of spent fuel and 

other nuclear materials has functioned well, and the safety record for past shipments of 

these types of materials is excellent. However, planning and coordination for the 

transport of spent fuel and high-level waste is complex and should commence at the very 

start of a project to develop consolidated storage capacity. 

• The federal government should take steps to resolve ongoing litigation between the 

Department of Energy and the utilities regarding fuel acceptance as expeditiously as 

possible. 

• A well-designed federal RD&D program will enable the United States to retain a global 

leadership position in nuclear technology innovation. Public and private RD&D efforts 

should focus on two distinct areas of opportunity: 

o Near-tenn improvements in the safety and perfonnance of existing light-water 

reactor technology, as currently deployed in the United States and elsewhere as 

part of a once-through fuel cycle, and in the technologies available for storing and 

disposing of spcnt nuclear fuel and high-level waste. 

o Longer-tcnn ef10rts to advance potential "game-changing" nuclear technologies 

and systems that could achieve very large benefits across multiple evaluation 

criteria compared to current technologies and systems. 

• A portion of federal nuclear energy RD&D resources should be directed to the NRC to 

accelerate a regulatory framework and supporting anticipatory research for novel 

components of advanced nuclear energy systems. An increased degree of confidence that 

new systems can be successfully licensed is important for lowering barriers to 

commercial investment. 

19 
22 

Chairman BROUN. The Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight as well as the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment will come to order. 

Good morning. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘Review of 

the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future Draft 

Recommendations.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies and Truth in Testimony disclosures for 

today’s witness panel. Before we get started, since this is a joint 

hearing involving two Subcommittees, I want to explain how we 

will operate procedurally so that all Members understand how the 

question-and-answer period will be handled. As always, we will alternate between the majority and minority Members, and allow all 

Members an opportunity for questioning before recognizing a Member for a second round of questions if we have time for those second 

rounds. We will recognize those Members of either Subcommittee 

present at the gavel in order of seniority on full Committee and 

those that come in after the gavel will be recognized in order of 

their arrival. I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

On January 29, 2010, the President directed the Secretary of Energy to establish a Blue Ribbon Commission to ‘‘conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back of the nuclear 

fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing and 

disposal of civilian and defense use nuclear fuel and nuclear 

waste.’’ 

Over the last year and a half, the Commission held numerous 

meetings and site visits around the country in a transparent and 

open manner, to hear a wide array of stakeholder input. I was 

pleased that the Commission recognized the importance of this 

issue in my community and came down to Georgia and South Carolina last winter and listened to the concerns held by a variety of 

organizations. On July 29th, the Commission released its draft recommendations, announced it will seek comments on that draft 

until October 31, and indicated that it will meet its deadline to deliver a final report by January 29, 2012. That is a novel idea, meeting a deadline. This hearing allows the Committee to hear expert 

opinions on the Commission’s draft report and weigh in accordingly. 

At the same time the Administration formed the BRC, the Department of Energy announced its intention to withdraw the Yucca 

Mountain license application before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Chu promised that the BRC 

would have the authority to explore a ‘‘full range of scientific and 

technical options.’’ Unfortunately it appears that promise was broken. Co-Chair Lee Hamilton said Secretary Chu made it ‘‘quite 

clear that nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain is not an option, and that the Blue Ribbon Commission will be looking at better alternatives.’’ 

While the BRC charter does not expressly prohibit the consideration of Yucca Mountain, it is not surprising that the BRC draft 

recommendations ignore the 900-pound gorilla in the room. That 

900-pound gorilla, not 800-pound but 900-pound gorilla, or more 

appropriately the $15 billion gorilla, was actually recommended by 

Secretary Chu months before he joined this recommendation. He 
23 

made the recommendation of Yucca Mountain. Given the longstanding acknowledgement of the need for a permanent deep geological repository, it should come as no surprise that the BRC still 

called for a geological repository to be expeditiously developed. 

Many of the Commission’s other recommendations, such as the 

development of a quasi-governmental organization and the manner 

in which the Nuclear Waste Fund, which finances activities to store 

spent nuclear fuel, is administered are very interesting. I look forward to working with the Commission and the Administration on 

these recommendations, particularly the research, development and 

demonstration provisions that fall within this Committee’s jurisdiction. 

Ensuring a sustained, viable and safe nuclear sector is an important part of a balanced energy portfolio, and that is enabled by responsible public and private investments in research and development. In Georgia alone, almost a quarter, 24.7 percent, of its electricity generation comes from nuclear energy. Two power stations, 

Hatch and Vogtle, have the capacity to generate over 4,000 

megawatts of emissions-free energy. 

That nuclear power production also produces spent fuel. There is 

already a significant amount, 2,410 metric tons, of commercial 

spent fuel currently stored in Georgia awaiting disposition, fuel 

that the people of Georgia have already paid over $700 million to 

dispose of. On top of the fees paid by ratepayers, the American taxpayers are on the hook for $12 billion in liabilities, due to the Federal Government’s inability to meet their legal obligation to accept 

spent nuclear fuel. This liability is likely to skyrocket in future 

years in the absence of federal action. 

In addition to the fuel stored at Georgia’s nuclear reactors, the 

Savannah River Site also houses a great deal of radioactive material as a result of its contributions to our Nation’s nuclear weapons 

program. I am concerned that the BRC interim storage recommendations will be used to make the Savannah River Site a de 

facto repository without any of the scientific study that Yucca 

Mountain has undergone. This concern has long been recognized 

and was the reason why in 1987 Congress prohibited the construction of such a facility prior to a license being issued for a permanent geological repository. 

This distrust brings me to another point. This Administration 

has long claimed that it makes its decisions based on science. In 

2008, the President stated that he would ‘‘restore the basic principle that government decisions should be based on the best available, scientifically valid evidence, not on the ideological predispositions of agency officials or political appointees.’’ Also, just last year, 

the President’s Press Secretary stated this: ‘‘I think what has taken 

Yucca Mountain off the table in terms of a long-term solution for 

a repository for our nuclear waste is the science. The science ought 

to make these decisions.’’ 

After reviewing the NRC’s evaluation of whether Yucca Mountain meets regulatory standards, I have trouble reconciling those 

two statements. 

At this point, I would like to enter into the record a majority 

staff report titled Yucca Mountain: The Administration’s Impact on 
24 

U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Policy. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information may be found in Appendix 2.] 

Chairman BROUN. The report pointedly highlights the NRC’s 

independent evaluation of Yucca Mountain determined the proposed repository meets all applicable safety requirements, including those related to human health and groundwater protection, and 

the scientific performance goals set forth by the regulatory agencies. 

While I believe the Commission’s draft recommendations offer an 

opportunity to explore innovative policy options, the fact that the 

Commission was precluded from addressing Yucca Mountain limits 

the usefulness of the report. Any serious review of spent fuel management has to recognize the decades of research and billions of 

dollars, taxpayers’ dollars, in investment to ready Yucca Mountain 

to accept spent nuclear fuel. Let us also not forget that Yucca 

Mountain is designated by law as the Nation’s spent fuel repository. I hope that the Commission members take this into consideration as they prepare their final report. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN, CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

On January 29, 2010, The President directed the Secretary of Energy to establish 

a Blue Ribbon Commission to ‘‘conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back of the nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, 

processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel and nuclear 

waste.’’ 

Over the last year and a half, the Commission held numerous meetings and site 

visits around the country in a transparent and open manner, to hear a wide array 

of stakeholder input. I was pleased that the Commission recognized the importance 

of this issue in my community and came down to Georgia and South Carolina last 

winter and listened to the concerns held by a variety of organizations. On July 29, 

the Commission released its draft recommendations, announced it will seek comments on that draft until October 31, and indicated that it will meet its deadline 

to deliver a final report by January 29, 2012. This hearing allows the Committee 

to hear expert opinions on the Commission’s Draft Report and weigh in accordingly. 

At the same time the Administration formed the BRC, the Department of Energy 

announced that its intention to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application 

before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Chu promised that the BRC would have the authority to explore a ‘‘full range of scientific and 

technical options.’’ Unfortunately it appears that promise was broken. Co-Chair Lee 

Hamilton said Secretary Chu made it ‘‘quite clear that nuclear waste storage at 

Yucca Mountain is not an option, and that the Blue Ribbon Commission will be 

looking at better alternatives.’’ While the BRC charter does not expressly prohibited 

the consideration of Yucca Mountain, it is not surprising that the BRC draft recommendations ignore the 900-pound gorilla in the room. That 900-pound gorilla, or 

more appropriately the $15 billion gorilla, was actually recommended by Secretary 

Chu months before he joined the Administration. Given the long-standing acknowledgement of the need for a permanent deep geological repository, it should come as 

no surprise that the BRC still called for a geological repository to be expeditiously 

developed. 

Many of the Commission’s other recommendations, such as the development of a 

quasi-governmental organization and the manner in which the Nuclear Waste Fund, 

which finances activities to store spent nuclear fuel, is administered are very interesting. I look forward to working with the Commission and the Administration on 

these recommendations, particularly the Research, Development, and Demonstration provisions that fall within this Committee’s jurisdiction. Ensuring a sustained, 

viable, and safe nuclear sector is an important part of a balanced energy portfolio, 

and that is enabled by responsible public and private investments in research and 

development. In Georgia alone, almost a quarter (24.7%) of its electricity generation 
25 

comes from nuclear energy. Two power stations—Hatch and Vogtle—have the capacity to generate over 4,000 megawatts of emission-free energy. 

That nuclear power production also produces spent fuel. There is already a significant amount (2,410 metric tons) of commercial spent fuel currently stored in Georgia awaiting disposition—fuel that the people of Georgia have already paid over 

$700 million to dispose of. On top of the fees paid by ratepayers, the American taxpayers are on the hook for $12 billion in liabilities, due to the Federal Government’s 

inability to meet their legal obligation to accept spent nuclear fuel. This liability is 

likely to skyrocket in future years in the absence of federal action. 

In addition to the fuel stored at Georgia’s nuclear reactors, the Savannah River 

Site also houses a great deal of radioactive material as a result of its contributions 

to our Nation’s nuclear weapons program. I am concerned that the BRC interim 

storage recommendations will be used to make the Savannah River Site a de facto 

repository without any of the scientific study that Yucca Mountain has undergone. 

This concern has long been recognized and was the reason why in 1987 Congress 

prohibited the construction of such a facility prior to a license being issued for a 

permanent geological repository. 

This distrust brings me to another point. This Administration has long claimed 

that it makes its decisions based on science. In 2008, the President stated that he 

would ‘‘restore the basic principle that government decisions should be based on the 

best-available, scientifically valid evidence and not on the ideological predispositions 

of agency officials or political appointees.’’ Also, just last year, the President’s Press 

Secretary stated, ‘‘I think what has taken Yucca Mountain off the table in terms 

of a long-term solution for a repository for our nuclear waste is the science. The 

science ought to make these decisions.’’ After reviewing the NRC’s evaluation of 

whether Yucca Mountain meets regulatory standards, I have trouble reconciling 

those two statements. At this point, I would like to enter into the record a majority 

staff report titled Yucca Mountain: The Administration’s Impact on U.S. Nuclear 

Waste Management Policy. The report pointedly highlights the NRC’s independent 

evaluation of Yucca Mountain that determined the proposed repository meets all applicable safety requirements, including those related to human health and groundwater protection, and the specific performance goals set forth by the regulatory 

agencies. 

While I believe the Commission’s draft recommendations offer an opportunity to 

explore innovative policy options, the fact that the Commission was precluded from 

addressing Yucca Mountain limits the usefulness of the report. Any serious review 

of spent fuel management has to recognize the decades of research and billions of 

dollars in investment to ready Yucca Mountain to accept spent nuclear fuel. Let’s 

also not forget that Yucca Mountain is designated by law as the Nation’s spent fuel 

repository. 

I hope that the Commission Members take this into consideration as they prepare 

their final report. 

Chairman BROUN. With that, now I will recognize—and I welcome our new Ranking Member, Mr. Tonko, and I recognize you, 

my friend, for five minutes. I look forward to working with you on 

this Committee. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate the 

trust shown by the Democrats of the Committee to have me serve 

as their Ranking Minority Member for the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, and I do look forward to a productive 

working relationship. 

On November 4, 2008, the citizens of this country chose thenSenator Barack Obama to serve as President of these United 

States. He received 53 percent of the popular vote and the largest 

absolute number of votes of any candidate in our country’s history. 

As a candidate, he had promised very clearly that Yucca Mountain would not be used as a nuclear waste repository. After taking 

office he took steps to keep that promise. That is politics, but that 

is the kind of politics that lies at the heart of a functioning democracy. Apparently, President Obama’s position on Yucca will not be 

reversed even in the unlikely event that Congressman Paul or Governor Romney or Governor Perry wins the 2012 Presidential elec-
26 

tion. In the Republican candidates’ debate in Nevada last week, all 

three of them said that they would not open Yucca either. 

The decision to close Yucca Mountain was not driven by science, 

and it is a fiction to pretend that it was. The change that this— 

the charge, rather, that this is an example of a lack of scientific 

integrity only stands as an argument one way, if you can sell the 

idea that somehow the decision-making on Yucca always hinged on 

science, and that the new Administration abandoned that path or 

somehow skewed the science to support a favored outcome. 

The truth is that the actual decision process surrounding Yucca 

has always been political. The Administration’s decision to close 

Yucca was a position advocated by a Presidential candidate and 

then supported by a majority of American voters. In the United 

States democratic system, we also call that a mandate for change. 

How was Yucca selected to become the Nation’s permanent nuclear waste repository in the first place? You can look at the entire 

body of the majority’s report, almost 40 pages long, but one critical 

term is missing. It was popularly referred to in more colloquial 

terms but we might otherwise call it the ‘‘Forget Nevada’’ amendment. The majority’s report does not mention this Amendment that 

came back from a House-Senate Conference Committee in 1987. 

In 1987, two of the leading alternative sites had powerful political patrons. Texas had a site in Speaker Wright’s district. Washington State had a site in Majority Leader Foley’s district. It may 

not be too much of a shock to learn that those sites were pulled 

out of the competition by Congress, thereby leaving Yucca Mountain as the only alternative. At the time, Harry Reid, a former 

member of the I&O Subcommittee, was in his first year as a Senator from Nevada. Two decades later, the situation has changed in 

remarkable ways, but with predictable consequences. 

Let me be clear: it was not science that led Yucca to be selected, 

but rather political muscle exercised by highly influential Members 

of this House and the Senate. However, none of this is in the Majority Staff’s report. 

After the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the 

only site that DOE was authorized to characterize and develop was 

Yucca Mountain. Politicians told scientists where they could look. 

The State of Nevada, aside from a very small number of people, 

never accepted this imposition by Washington, DC. The State has 

always felt it was unfair to the people of Nevada. In the face of a 

claim of injustice, questions about science seem small. 

Candidate Obama recognized the procedural failings in trying to 

force a waste repository on the State. His statement on Yucca 

speaks of science, but the core of his position was about fairness, 

justice and equity. His statement reads, in relevant part, ‘‘States 

should not be unfairly burdened with waste from other States.’’ 

The Majority Staff report does not quote this portion of Mr. 

Obama’s position. By ignoring this foundational claim, the Majority 

Staff report distorts a key problem with Yucca: that 49 States 

ganged up on one State. In such a situation, the most important 

quality of the site is not its geology and it is not its hydrology, but 

the fairness of how the site was selected in the first place. In other 

words, this is a partially—this is partially a States’ rights issue. 
27 

Science can provide facts about a changing world, but making 

policy is about weighing the anticipated consequences of policy options against a complex set of values and interests. To try to claim 

that Yucca is solely about science defaces the history of that site, 

the motives of President Obama, and even the positions of leading 

Republican Presidential candidates such as Governor Romney, Governor Perry and Congressman Paul. 

Nevada has successfully pushed back and now has a political 

weight that they lacked back in 1987. I don’t want to say that 

Yucca will never be used as a repository for waste, but if it is 

opened, it should be because Nevadans are willing to take the 

waste, not because 49 States have forced it on them. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tonko follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL TONKO, 

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your welcome, and I look forward to a productive 

working relationship. 

On November 4, 2008, the citizens of the United States chose Barack Obama to 

serve as our President. He received 53% of the popular vote and the largest absolute 

number of votes of any candidate in the country’s history. 

As a candidate he had promised, very clearly, that Yucca Mountain would not be 

used as a nuclear waste repository. After taking office he took steps to keep that 

promise. That is politics, but that is the kind of politics that lies at the heart of 

a functioning democracy. 

Apparently, Mr. Obama’s position on Yucca will not be reversed even in the unlikely event that Mr. Paul or Mr. Romney or Mr. Perry wins the 2012 Presidential 

election. In the Republican candidates’ debate in Nevada last week, all three of 

them said that they would not open Yucca either. 

The decision to close Yucca Mountain was not driven by science, and it is a fiction 

to pretend that it was. The charge that this is an example of a lack of scientific 

integrity only stands as an argument one way—if you can sell the idea that somehow the decision making on Yucca always hinged on science, and that the new Administration abandoned that path or somehow skewed the science to support a favored outcome. 

The truth is that the actual decision process surrounding Yucca has always been 

political. The Administration’s decision to close Yucca was a position advocated by 

a Presidential candidate and then supported by a majority of American voters. We 

might otherwise call that a mandate for change. 

How was Yucca selected to become the Nation’s permanent nuclear waste repository in the first place? You can look at the entire body of the Majority’s report— 

almost 40 pages long—but one critical term is missing. Please excuse the colloquial 

nature of my comment, but the Majority’s report does not even mention the ‘‘Screw 

Nevada’’ amendment, as it was popularly known, that came back from a House-Senate Conference Committee in 1987. 

In 1987, two of the leading alternative sites had powerful political patrons. Texas 

had a site in Speaker Wright’s district. Washington had a site in Majority Leader 

Foley’s district. It may not be too much of a shock to learn that those sites were 

pulled out of the competition by Congress, thereby leaving Yucca Mountain as the 

only alternative. At the time, Harry Reid, a former Member of this I&O Subcommittee, was in his first year as a Senator from Nevada. Two decades later, the 

situation has changed in remarkable ways, but with predictable consequences. 

Let me be clear, it was not science that led Yucca to be selected, but political muscle exercised by highly influential Members of the House and the Senate. However, 

none of this is in the Majority Staff’s report. 

After the 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the only site that 

DOE was authorized to characterize and develop was Yucca Mountain. Politicians 

told scientists where they could look. 

The State of Nevada, aside from a very small number of people, never accepted 

this imposition by Washington, DC. The State has always felt it was unfair to the 

people of Nevada. In the face of a claim of injustice, questions about science seem 
28 

small. Candidate Obama recognized the procedural failings in trying to force a 

waste repository on the State. His statement on Yucca speaks of science, but the 

core of his position was about fairness, justice and equity. His statement reads, in 

relevant part, ‘‘States should not be unfairly burdened with waste from other 

states.’’ 

The Majority staff report does not quote this portion of Mr. Obama’s position. By 

ignoring this foundational claim, the Majority staff report distorts a key problem 

with Yucca: that 49 States ganged up on one State. In such a situation, the most 

important quality of the site is not its geology or hydrology, but the fairness of how 

the site was selected in the first place. 

In other words, this is a States’ rights issue. 

Science can provide facts about a changing world, but making policy is about 

weighing the anticipated consequences of policy options against a complex set of values and interests. To try to claim that Yucca is solely about science defaces the history of the site, the motives of President Obama and even the positions of leading 

Republican Presidential candidates such as Mr. Romney, Mr. Perry and Mr. Paul. 

Procedural justice represents one of those qualities that distinguishes democracy 

from despotism. When you ignore fairness, people push back, as the representatives 

of the people of Nevada have done. 

Nevada has successfully pushed back and now has a political weight that they 

lacked in 1987. I don’t want to say that Yucca will never be used as a repository 

for waste, but if it is opened, it should be because Nevadans are willing to take the 

waste, not because 49 States have forced it on them. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Tonko. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Garamendi, be allowed to sit on the dais with the 

Committee and participate in the hearings. Hearing no objection, 

so ordered. 

Now I recognize Dr. Harris for his opening statement. Doctor, 

you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I first want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning 

as the Subcommittees review the draft recommendations of the 

Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. 

Nuclear energy is an integral component of America’s energy 

portfolio. One hundred four currently operating commercial nuclear 

reactors deliver a clean, affordable and reliable energy source that 

supplies 20 percent of America’s electricity. That electricity generation, along with America’s nuclear weapons programs, produces radioactive waste that the Federal Government has a longstanding 

statutory responsibility to accept and permanently dispose of. 

It is important to recognize how we arrived at this point. For 

more than 30 years, Yucca Mountain, Nevada, has been extensively 

studied to determine if a permanent, geologic repository for highlevel radioactive waste can safely be constructed and operated. 

Taxpayers spent approximately $15 billion on this effort, and in 

2008, the Department of Energy submitted an 8,600-page application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposing that it could 

indeed be done safely. NRC scientific and technical staff reviewed 

this application in equally excruciating detail, and agreed with the 

Department of Energy. 

Yet, despite this investment and decades of scientific work, the 

DOE has sought to withdraw its application on political, not technical grounds, asserting only that Yucca Mountain ‘‘isn’t a workable option’’ and the NRC Chairman has halted all work on the application review and refused to allow for finalization of the technical review. 
29 

Now, the argument that campaign promises and politics should 

always trump sound policy is belied by Guantanamo Bay, for instance. This is the Science Committee, not the Politics Committee, 

and this hearing is not only justified but owed to the American 

public who longs for solutions not beholden to politics. 

President Obama’s unilateral decision to discard decades of the 

scientific community’s hard work and ignore the current law on the 

books has thrown United States nuclear waste management policy 

into disarray. 

This brings us to the Blue Ribbon Commission, established by 

President Obama in concurrence with his dismantling of existing 

nuclear waste management structure. The BRC is specifically 

tasked to review policies associated with managing the back end of 

the nuclear fuel cycle and related issues of storage, processing and 

disposal of both civilian and defense nuclear waste. 

In July, the BRC issued its draft report to the Secretary of Energy and will release its final report by the end of January 2012. 

I would first like to recognize the good work put in by the members 

of the Commission in drafting this report. It contains valuable 

ideas that Congress should consider and work to be a thoughtful 

partner in advancing. 

For example, I support the BRC’s interest in long-term support 

for research, development and demonstration of advanced reactor 

and fuel cycle technologies that could reduce the amount of highlevel radioactive waste produced and change how that waste is 

managed. 

The potential contributions of the BRC, however, appear to be 

limited by politics. Upon initiating the panel’s work, Commission 

Co-Chair Lee Hamilton said that Secretary of Energy Chu ‘‘made 

it quite clear that nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain is not 

an option, and that the Blue Ribbon Commission should be looking 

at better alternatives.’’ This action by the Administration is striking not only in its audacity; it is also simply irrational to suggest 

a ‘‘better alternative’’ can be identified without a direct comparison 

to the current plan for which an alternative is being sought. 

To its credit, the Commission calls for expeditious development 

of a permanent geologic repository, but turning a blind eye to the 

elephant in the room that is Yucca Mountain will render all its efforts fundamentally flawed. Unless and until the Federal Government honors its legal obligation to proceed in good faith with disposal of high-level radioactive waste, the long-term viability of nuclear energy to meet growing electricity demands remains in doubt. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission still has an opportunity to impact 

this future direction, and I hope today’s hearing provides it with 

informative and useful guidance toward that end. 

Today I welcome hearing evaluations of and recommendations on 

the Commission’s draft report, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ANDY HARRIS, CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

I want to thank our witnesses for being here this morning as the Subcommittees 

review the draft recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. 
30 

Nuclear energy is an integral component of America’s energy portfolio. One hundred four currently operating commercial nuclear reactors deliver a clean, affordable, and reliable energy source that supplies 20 percent of America’s electricity. 

That electricity generation, along with America’s nuclear weapons programs, produces radioactive waste that the Federal Government has a longstanding statutory 

responsibility to accept and permanently dispose of. 

It is important to recognize how we arrived at this point. For more than 30 years, 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada, has been extensively studied to determine if a permanent, 

geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste can safely be constructed and operated. Taxpayers spent approximately $15 billion on this effort, and in 2008 the 

Department of Energy submitted an 8,600 page application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposing that it could indeed be done safely. NRC scientific and 

technical staff reviewed this application in equally excruciating detail, and agreed 

with DOE. 

Yet, despite this investment and decades of scientific work, the DOE has sought 

to withdraw its application on political, not technical grounds—asserting only that 

Yucca Mountain ‘‘isn’t a workable option’’—and the NRC Chairman has halted all 

work on the application review and refused to allow for finalization of the technical 

review. These actions come from political appointees of a President who entered office touting his commitment to ‘‘restore the basic principle that government decisions should be based on the best-available, scientifically valid evidence and not on 

the ideological predispositions of agency officials or political appointees.’’ 

President Obama’s unilateral decision to discard decades of the scientific community’s hard work and ignore the current law on the books has thrown United States 

nuclear waste management policy into disarray. 

This brings us to the Blue Ribbon Commission, established by President Obama 

in concurrence with his dismantling of existing nuclear waste management structure. The BRC is specifically tasked to review policies associated with managing the 

back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and related issues of storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense nuclear waste. 

In July, the BRC issued its Draft Report to the Secretary of Energy and will release its final report by the end of January 2012. I would like to recognize the good 

work the Members of the Commission put into drafting this report. It contains valuable ideas that Congress should consider and work to be a thoughtful partner in 

advancing. 

For example, I support the BRC’s interest in long-term support for research, development, and demonstration on advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies that 

could reduce the amount of high-level radioactive waste produced and change how 

that waste is managed. 

The potential contributions of the BRC, however, appear to be limited by politics. 

Upon initiating the panel’s work, Commission Co-Chair Lee Hamilton said that Secretary of Energy Chu ‘‘made it quite clear that nuclear waste storage at Yucca 

Mountain is not an option, and that the Blue Ribbon Commission will be looking 

at better alternatives.’’ 

The action by the Administration is striking not only in its audacity; it is also 

simply irrational to suggest a ‘‘better alternative’’ can be identified without a direct 

comparison to the current plan for which an alternative is being sought. To its credit, the Commission calls for expeditious development of a permanent geologic repository, but turning a blind eye to the elephant in the room that is Yucca Mountain 

will render its efforts fundamentally flawed. 

Unless and until the Federal Government honors its legal obligation to proceed 

with disposal of high-level radioactive waste, the long-term viability of nuclear energy to meet growing electricity demands remains in doubt. The Blue Ribbon Commission still has an opportunity to impact this future direction, and I hope today’s 

hearing provides it with informative and useful guidance toward that end. 

I welcome the witnesses’ evaluation and recommendations on the Commission’s 

draft report and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Miller, the Ranking Member 

of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee from North Carolina 

for your statement. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a very odd hearing. We are considering the draft report 

of a Blue Ribbon Commission with no witnesses from the Commission to explain their tentative findings. They are, to their credit, 
31 

seeking comments, presumably some from scientists. To their credit, apparently they want to consider those findings before they 

issue a final report, and it certainly would be useful for this Committee to hear those comments too, again, many presumably from 

scientists. 

It is very likely, as the Chairs have said, that we will need to 

rely more on nuclear power in the future. It is kind of hard to 

imagine an energy future in the next couple generations that does 

not include more nuclear power. But it is still far more expensive. 

It is not affordable compared to natural gas, for instance. It is far 

more expensive than other forms of energy, even with the massive 

subsidies that it does get from the Federal Government, and with 

the construction of more nuclear power plants requiring the capital 

investment of many billions of dollars, which investors have been 

understandably reluctant to put down, it is not at all clear why we 

could not wait until the end of January to see the final report of 

the Commission, comments and all. 

And there are still many reasons to be concerned, despite the fact 

that we obviously are going to have to rely upon nuclear power 

more in the future, there are many reasons for caution. The experience in Fukushima should underscore that pretty dramatically. 

And undoubtedly, one of the unresolved issues is what to do with 

high-level nuclear waste. We already have 80,000 tons of it, and 

that figure is growing, that nuclear power plants will continue to 

produce, and it has to be stored safely somewhere for 10,000 years. 

That is a long time. But even more important, it doesn’t just appear magically at the storage site. We have to get it there. We have 

to transport it from all over the country, and while it is true, I 

know, that there is a witness from Nye County who would welcome 

the economic activity of storing the waste at Yucca Mountain, the 

people of the nearby town/city of Las Vegas, who know that the 

bulk of the nuclear waste, high-level nuclear waste, will come 

through or very near Las Vegas, whether it is transported by rail 

or by truck, are adamantly opposed to it. The opposition of the people of Nevada is pretty well shown by the adamant opposition of 

their Congressional delegation, by President Obama’s opposition, 

by the opposition of, as Mr. Tonko has said, three of the leading 

Republican candidates for President when they were asked in Nevada about it. It is good to be an early primary State and a State 

that in a general election is now a swing State. You do get a lot 

of attention as a result. People in national politics care what you 

think. 

And it is also understandable that the people of Nevada are more 

than a little skeptical about the supposed science that supports 

this. That has not been the history of the decision to site a highlevel nuclear repository in Yucca Mountain. As Mr. Tonko has already said, 25 years ago there were three sites proposed: one in the 

district of the Speaker of the House, one in the district of the Majority Leader of the House, and then Yucca Mountain. Senator Reid 

now has a great deal of political influence, but at the time he was 

in his first year in the Senate. And as Mr. Tonko has said, actually 

he said the phase, the colloquial phrase at the time was ‘‘forget Nevada.’’ We all know what that really was. It wasn’t ‘‘forget.’’ I had 

a somewhat more sanitized version in my materials, which was 
32 

‘‘screw Nevada,’’ but it was not a real scientifically pristine decision. It was always a decision that was filled with politics. 

So yes, we do need to have more science and less politics in this 

decision. I hope we will get some of that in our Committee’s deliberations on this issue, but there is little to suggest it in today’s 

hearing, which seems to be taking place at a very odd time for a 

decision that will really consider closely the science behind this decision. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BRAD MILLER, 

RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

This is a very odd hearing. We are considering the draft report of a Blue Ribbon 

Commission with no witnesses from the Commission to explain even their tentative 

findings. 

It is very likely that we will need to rely on nuclear power more in the future, 

but with nuclear power still far more expensive than other forms of energy, even 

with massive subsidies from the Federal Govermnent, and with the construction of 

nuclear power plants requiring the capital investment of many billions of dollars, 

which investors have been understandably reluctant to put down, it is not at all 

clear why we did not wait at least until the Commission issued a final report. 

And while it is hard to imagine an energy future for the next couple of generations that does not include more nuclear power, there are still many reasons for caution, as the experience in Fukishuma should underscore. 

One ofthe unresolved issues is what to do with the high-level radioactive waste, 

already 80,000 tons and growing, that nuclear power plants produce. The high-level 

waste will need to be stored safely for 10,000 years. That’s a long time. And we have 

to figure out how to transport the waste safely to wherever we store it. 

Unfortunately, the question of storage of nuclear has always been driven more by 

politics than by science. We will hear today from local leaders in Nye County, Nevada, who would welcome the economic boost of storing nuclear waste at the proposed Yucca Mountain facility. But the communities that the waste would go 

through, notably Las Vegas, are adamantly opposed to the proposed Yucca Mountain facility. 

The prevailing view of Nevadans is reflected in the Nevada Congressional delegation’s opposition, President Obama’s opposition, and the opposition of three Republican Presidential candidates when asked in Nevada. It’s good to be both an early 

primary and a swing State in the fall. 

And the resentment of Nevadans to the siting of the facility in their State is more 

than understandable. A quarter century ago, there were at least three proposed 

sites: one in the district ofthe Speaker of the House, another in the district of the 

House Majority Leader, and Yucca Mountain. Senator Reid is powerful now, but at 

the time he was in his first year of service in the Senate. The Amendment to site 

the facility in Nevada was colloquially called the ‘‘screw Nevada’’ amendment at the 

time. 

We do need more science and less politics in this decision, but there is little to 

suggest today’s hearing is a move towards science, away from politics. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Miller. I think we have a 

unanimous consent request from Mr. Tonko. 

Mr. TONKO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if you would please yield a moment of time. 

Chairman BROUN. Without objection. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

As I am sure you are aware, the Washington Post is reporting 

that former Member of Congress Howard Wolpe passed away on 

Tuesday. Mr. Wolpe was a Representative from the State of Michigan who served as Chair of the I&O Subcommittee back in 1991 

and 1992. He held many landmarks hearings, and his investigative 

staff was topnotch. Probably the one item that the Representative 

was very fondest of and best remembered for was his work to stop 
33 

the Superconducting Super Collider project. Representative Wolpe 

worked hard and hand in hand with his Ranking Minority Member 

to stop that project, and their efforts saved taxpayers, in their opinion, at least $10 billion in construction costs and billions more in 

operating expenses. 

His record as I&O Chair stands among the strongest of any 

Chair to serve in that role. In my new capacity on this Subcommittee, Mr. Chair, I look forward to emulating his bipartisan 

spirit and productive working relationship that both he and Mr. 

Boehlert, Representative Boehlert from my region, conducted, and 

I appreciate you yielding me that time, and we call to mind and 

to memory the service of Representative Howard Wolpe. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Tonko, and we pray for his 

family also. 

At this time I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. Our 

first witness is Mr. Jack Spencer, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation. Our second witness is Dr. 

Peter Swift, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff at Sandia 

National Laboratory. Dr. Swift has worked on geological disposal of 

radioactive waste since 1989. He worked on the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Project—that is hard for a Southerner to say all those Ps— 

from 1989 to 1998, and on the Yucca Mountain project since 1998, 

serving as the Yucca Mountain Lead Laboratory’s Chief Scientist 

since 2006. Our third witness is Dr. Roger Kasperson, Research 

Professor and Distinguished Scientist at Clark University. Our 

fourth witness is Mr. Gary Hollis, who is Chairman of the Nye 

County Board of County Commissioners. Yucca Mountain is located 

in his county in Nevada. Our fifth witness is Mr. Rick McLeod, Executive Director of the Savannah River Site Community Reuse Organization. SRS currently stores the second-highest amount of 

high-level radioactive material in the country. Our final witness is 

Dr. Mark Peters, Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs at the 

Argonne National Laboratory. Dr. Peters previously served as Senior Scientific Adviser in the former Applied Science and Technology 

Directorate, where he supported the Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Dr. Peters also served as the 

Director of Program Development for nuclear waste management 

technical work at the laboratory’s former Chemical Engineering Division. Prior to joining Argonne, he was the Yucca Mountain 

Project Science and Engineering Testing Project Manager. 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee will 

have five minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony 

will be included in the record of this hearing. 

It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight to receive testimony under oath. Do any of you have any 

objection to taking an oath? Anybody, please? Shake your head 

from side to side or up and down so I can see. Dr. Kasperson, do 

you have an objection? I don’t see your head moving. Okay. Let the 

record reveal that all witnesses are willing to take an oath. You 

may be represented by counsel. Do any of you have counsel here 

today? Anybody have counsel? Mr. Hollis? Dr. Kasperson? Mr. Hollis? No? Okay. Let the record reflect that none of the witnesses has 

counsel. 
34 

Now, if all of you would please now stand and raise your right 

hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect that 

all the witnesses participating have taken the oath. Please be seated. 

Those bells that you just heard is the sign to us that we just 

started a vote. For Members’ edification, we will go through as 

many opening statements as we can. We will recess to go for votes. 

We will recess at about five minutes so that everybody has time to 

get to the Floor to vote, and we will reconvene at 10 minutes after 

the last vote is called. So please hurry back so we can get this 

hearing finished and accomplished and hear from our witnesses 

and get to questions. 

I now recognize our first witness, Mr. Spencer. You are recognized for five minutes. Please keep it within five minutes, and then 

if you can make it shorter, please do. Your full testimony will be 

included in the record. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JACK SPENCER, 

RESEARCH FELLOW, NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY, 

HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. SPENCER. All right. We will do what we can. 

Chairmen Broun and Harris, Ranking Members Tonko and Miller, and Members of the Subcommittees, my name is Jack Spencer. 

I am the Research Fellow for Nuclear Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation. The views expressed in this testimony are my own 

and should not be construed as representing the official position of 

the Heritage Foundation. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 attempted to establish a 

comprehensive disposal strategy for high-level nuclear waste. This 

strategy has failed. The government has spent billions of dollars 

without opening a repository, has yet to receive any waste and is 

amassing billions of dollars in liability. The strategy codified in the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act seemed straightforward and economically 

sound when it was developed in the early 1980s. It charged the 

Federal Government with disposing used nuclear fuel in Yucca 

Mountain and created a structure through which users of nuclear 

energy would pay a fee for that service. These payments would go 

to the Nuclear Waste Fund, which the Federal Government could 

access through Congressional appropriations. What has become 

clear over time, however, is that this approach was wrought with 

problems. Nonetheless, it continued to inch forward, providing 

some confidence that the Nation was moving toward a nuclear 

waste management solution. 

The Obama Administration’s anti-Yucca policy, however, had destroyed any such notion. The combination of the Federal Government’s historical ineptness and this Administration’s actions has 

undermined all confidence in Washington’s ability to meet its legal 

nuclear waste obligations. To restore this confidence, the Obama 

Administration established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to develop a new strategy. Though the Administration’s actions had added substantial uncertainty to an already 

unpredictable federal policy on nuclear waste, it does provide an 
35 

opportunity to bring about the reform necessary to get America’s 

nuclear waste policy on track. 

Unfortunately, the BRC’s recommendations as currently drafted 

will not achieve this because it accepts the basic tenets of the current system; that is that the Federal Government should be responsible for nuclear waste management and that these activities 

should be financed through a flat fee, largely disconnected from 

any actual service. Accepting this leads to recommendations that 

focus more on symptoms than on the underlying flaws. These basic 

flaws are that, one, waste producers are relieved of their responsibility for waste management. This structure misaligns incentives, 

responsibilities and authorities. And secondly, that there is no specific price for specific services rendered. Accurate pricing is critical 

to any efficient marketplace. Nonetheless, the BRC does provide a 

framework that, with modification, could yield long-term solutions. 

For example, the BRC proposes that a federal corporation be responsible for nuclear waste management. Simply moving a function 

from one government agency to another only perpetuates existing 

deficiencies. This approach essentially blames current problems on 

the federal bureaucracy when the actual problem is relegating a 

commercial activity to a government entity. A better approach is to 

use the federal corporation to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for nuclear waste management to the private sector. To 

achieve this, the corporation’s responsibilities should be limited to 

disposing of existing nuclear waste and should get access to the approximately $25 billion paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund to fund 

its activities. Once this is complete, the corporation should be dissolved or privatized. 

Moving forward, the waste disposal fee should be repealed and 

waste producers should manage their own waste. Utilities would 

then bear the responsibility and have the freedom to choose how 

to best manage their waste. This could include direct disposal, reprocessing or some combination thereof. The federal role would be 

to set and enforce regulatory standards. 

Next, I would like to talk a little bit about nuclear waste finance. 

The BRC correctly spent significant effort on how to finance nuclear waste management. It recommended paying nuclear waste 

fees into escrow accounts. Only that amount appropriated by Congress would be paid to the Treasury. Though this would protect 

fees from being used to fund other government priorities, currently 

a major problem, it falls short of the reform necessary. 

A better approach would mandate that nuclear utilities place in 

escrow adequate funds to dispose of waste stored on site. This 

would eliminate the federal role in waste financing, ensure that 

utilities have access to the funds that they have set aside for waste 

disposal, and protect taxpayers by guaranteeing adequate disposal 

funds will be available if a plant ever goes out of business. 

The final area I would like to address is geologic storage. Unfortunately, the Secretary of Energy directed the BRC to rule out any 

consideration of Yucca Mountain. Luckily, the BRC charter makes 

no such prohibitions. Indeed, it does the opposite by directing the 

BRC to consider all options. 

The reality is, is that neither the BRC nor anyone else can make 

a truly informed decision on Yucca because the NRC has stopped 
36 

work on the DOE’s application to construct a repository and refuses 

to release the NRC technical staff’s findings regarding the application. Therefore, the most important recommendation the BRC 

should make is to demand that the NRC complete the Yucca application and publicly release all data generated by the application 

process. Whether or not the Yucca repository is ever built, the 

NRC’s completed review process will yield unique information that 

has important future relevance. 

That concludes my testimony. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JACK SPENCER, 

RESEARCH FELLOW, 

NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Chairmen Broun and Harris, Ranking Members Tonko and Miller and Members 

of the Subcommittees: My name is Jack Spencer. I am the Research Fellow for Nuclear Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position 

of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before the Energy & Environment and Investigations & Oversight subcommittees regarding the very important draft recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. 

As we sit here today, there are approximately 440 commercial nuclear reactors 

operating around the world. One hundred four of them are operating in this country 

alone. With the exception of a few highly publicized and, I might add, often misunderstood accidents, these reactors have operated safely, cleanly, and to the benefit 

of society. 

This is not to suggest that no problems have ever arisen as the accident in 

Fukushima, Japan, makes abundantly clear. It is merely to acknowledge the good 

track record of nuclear power. 

Strong, Predictable Policy Is Needed for Nuclear Expansion 

Nuclear energy is among America’s least expensive electricity sources, emits nothing into the atmosphere, and has a safety record that includes no injuries, much 

less fatalities. Despite these facts, no new plants have been ordered in the U.S. for 

three decades. 

Given what we know about nuclear energy, there must be some underlying problems that would make investment in this proven technology so scarce. Indeed, 

today, despite all of the benefits of nuclear power, the industry insists that it will 

not build new plants without backing from the U.S. taxpayer. 

Providing taxpayer support has been the approach of most politicians in recent 

years. They recognize that nuclear energy has many benefits, and to show their support they propose subsidies. In fact, looking at most of the proposals in recent years, 

one might conclude that Washington thinks that it can subsidize nuclear energy 

into commercial viability. Essentially, doing so was the basic premise behind the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) proposals. That legislation put forth a series of 

subsidies to build five or so nuclear plants. That was supposed to help the industry 

get off the ground so that they could begin privately building plants. While the legislation instigated a series of permit applications to build new plants and even site 

work at two locations, it has not brought about the advertised nuclear renaissance. 

Indeed, since the 2005 law passed, quite the opposite has occurred. 

Instead of helping the nuclear industry to reestablish itself in the marketplace, 

the law has merely led to a proliferation of requests for additional taxpayer support. 

Since EPACT 2005, Congress has introduced a virtual parade of legislation to broaden the Federal Government’s support for the nuclear industry. These proposals 

would increase capital subsidies, use taxpayer money for such activities as workforce development and manufacturing improvements, empower the Department of 

Energy to decide which technologies should move forward, and create mandates that 

essentially dictate that nuclear power is used. 

One of the basic problems with using subsidies to promote an industry is that it 

allows both industry and government to ignore the underlying problems, from a 

business or government standpoint, that give rise to the need for subsidies to begin 

with. This perpetuates those structural issues and creates a cycle where industry 
37 

1 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, ‘‘Draft Report to the Secretary of Energy,’’ July 29, 2011, at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 

brc¥draft¥report¥29jul2011¥0.pdf (August 10, 2011). 

becomes dependent on Federal Government—and that is where the nuclear industry 

is today. 

I believe that this dependence is not a financial one. Commercial nuclear reactors 

and the businesses that support them operate profitably in the United States, largely subsidy free, despite an enormous and growing regulatory burden and an organized anti-nuclear opposition. Instead, the U.S. nuclear industry depends on the 

U.S. government for strong, predictable, and rational policies that govern how the 

industry operates. It is the lack of these policies that increase the financial risk of 

new nuclear investment and drives the pursuit of subsidies to counter it. 

This dearth of policy falls into two major categories: nuclear waste management 

and disposal and an antiquated, unpredictable regulatory approach. The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future attempts to address one of these 

problems: nuclear waste. 

Reforming Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal 

Despite growing political and public support for nuclear power, progress toward 

actually building any new plants has been a struggle. While the blame for this stagnation often goes to inefficient government subsidy programs, the real problem lies 

in why those subsidies are necessary to begin with. Chief among these structural 

problems is the nation’s incoherent nuclear waste policy. Ultimately, the lack of a 

pathway to waste disposal creates substantial unpredictability for nuclear investors. 

That risk must be offset to allow investment to move forward. 

This was a problem prior to the Obama Administration. The Federal Government 

was legally obliged, according to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, as 

amended, to begin collecting nuclear waste in 1998. Despite collecting approximately 

$30 billion (fees plus interest) from electricity ratepayers and spending nearly $15 

billion (ratepayer and taxpayer funds), it has not collected one atom of nuclear 

waste. The one bright spot was the progress on Yucca Mountain made by President 

George W. Bush’s Department of Energy (DOE). 

The Obama Administration’s anti-Yucca policy destroyed this progress. It ignored 

existing statute, such as the NWPA and the Yucca Mountain Development Act of 

2002, which stated clearly that Yucca Mountain shall be the location of the nation’s 

nuclear materials repository. It unilaterally requested the withdrawal of the DOE’s 

permit application for Yucca to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Questions over the legality of this policy are currently under review by the courts. 

Meanwhile, in October 2010, former advisor to Senator Harry Reid and current 

NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko ordered a stop to all Yucca-related NRC activities. 

He argued that his authority to close out the Yucca program was derived from 

President Obama’s 2011 budget request. The problem is that neither the House nor 

the Senate had passed that proposed budget. Further, the order ignores the fact 

that the NRC’s own Atomic Licensing and Safety Board agreed unanimously that 

the DOE lacked authority to withdraw the application. The Chairman’s actions were 

so unusual and contentious that fellow NRC Commissioners were compelled to publicly denounce the decision. 

The combination of federal promises to store nuclear waste, the Obama Administration’s policy, and the NRC’s actions has resulted in a complete lack of direction 

on nuclear waste management and a dereliction of responsibility on the part of the 

Federal Government. This creates substantial government-imposed risk on the nuclear industry, which is the primary obstacle to an expansion of U.S. nuclear power. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 

Understanding that his policy to end the Yucca program without a backup plan 

would essentially end the American nuclear renaissance before it started, the 

Obama Administration established the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to develop with a plan to manage and dispose of America’s nuclear 

waste. 

Unfortunately, the draft recommendations in President Barack Obama’s Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future (BRC) 1 fall short of fixing America’s 

nuclear waste policy dilemma. Though some of the recommendations were positive, 

they would, if implemented, not result in the fundamental reforms necessary for an 
38 

2 Jack Spencer, ‘‘Introducing Market Forces into Nuclear Waste Management Policy,’’ Statement to the Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission 

on America’s Nuclear Future, Heritage Foundation Testimony, August 30, 2010, http:// 

www.heritage.org/research/testimony/introducing-market-forces-into-nuclear-waste-management-policy. 

economically sustainable and technologically diverse approach to nuclear power to 

emerge. 2

While acknowledging the many challenges and failures of America’s nuclear waste 

management and disposal program, the BRC unwisely accepts that the basic structure of the system is sound. This acceptance leads to recommendations that focus 

more on symptoms than on underlying flaws. Real progress requires first identifying 

the real problems. 

There are three fundamental problems with nuclear waste management in the 

United States: 

• No long-term geologic storage. Deep geologic storage like that proposed for 

Yucca Mountain, Nevada, provides a safe, long-term solution and thus is critical 

to any comprehensive nuclear waste management plan. To date, despite having 

spent approximately $15 billion in electricity rate payers’ and taxpayers’ money 

on Yucca Mountain and a statutory mandate to do so, the U.S. still has no functional geologic repository for nuclear waste. 

• Waste producers are relieved of their responsibility for waste management. Private nuclear plant operators produce waste, but under current law 

the Federal Government is responsible for managing it. This removes the incentive for those who financially depend on waste production, the nuclear utilities, 

to have any interest in how the waste is managed because the Federal Government is wholly responsible. Washington, however, has proven unable to implement anything close to a workable solution. This outcome is predictable given 

a structure that fundamentally misaligns incentives, responsibilities, and authorities. The nuclear industry, which is fully capable of running safe nuclear 

power plants, is likewise fully capable of managing its own waste and should 

have the responsibility to do so. 

• No specific price for specific services rendered. Under the current system, 

nuclear utilities produce waste, then pay the Federal Government a flat fee for 

an undefined, not-rendered service. Accurate pricing is critical to any efficient 

market place. Prices provide suppliers and purchasers a critical data point to 

determine the attractiveness of a product or service, and give potential competitors the information they need to introduce new alternatives. 

Although the BRC is missing an opportunity to address major underlying issues, 

it does provide a framework that, with some modification, could yield a long-term 

solution. To achieve it, the BRC’s final draft should consider the following recommendations. 

Nuclear Waste Management Responsibility 

The centerpiece of the BRC’s recommendations is its proposal to establish a federal corporation ‘‘dedicated solely to implementing the waste management program 

and empowered with the authority and resources to succeed.’’ While the general 

proposition could help transition the United States toward a more market-based system, the BRC’s version will not work because it maintains the current system’s 

basic underpinnings. A government-based entity, separate from waste production, 

will remain responsible for waste management and disposal, relieving producers of 

all responsibility, and there would remain no direct connection between services rendered and pricing. 

Though the BRC goes to great lengths to define the responsibilities of the new 

organization, these responsibilities are similar to those of the Department of Energy 

under the current system. In both cases, the Federal Government is fully responsible for all nuclear waste management and disposal responsibilities. Simply moving 

a function from one government agency to another (even if the new agency is called 

a federal corporation) without changing the system fundamentals only perpetuates 

existing deficiencies while creating the perception of action. 

This approach assumes that the basic premise of the current system is correct— 

that nuclear waste management and disposal falls ideally within the purview of the 

Federal Government. It essentially blames the current problems on a misplaced federal bureaucracy when the actual problem is relegating a commercial activity to a 

government bureaucracy. Instead of trying to modify a fundamentally flawed system, the BRC’s final report should recommend transferring the responsibility for nu-
39 

3 Nuclear Energy Institute, ‘‘Costs: Fuel, Operation, and Waste Disposal,’’ at http:// 

www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/nuclear¥statistics/costs/ (August 10, 2011). 

clear waste management and disposal away from Washington and toward the private sector. 

The BRC’s recommendation to create a federal corporation could facilitate that 

transition to private-sector responsibility. Though the objective should be to remove 

federal responsibility for nuclear waste management and disposal, near-term privatization is likely not practical. This is because the Federal Government is obligated 

by virtue of signed contracts to take responsibility for the disposal of nuclear waste 

produced at existing plants and the nuclear industry, through fees levied on nuclear 

power users, has already paid $38.5 billion (about $750 million annually) for that 

service. 3 The result is that the Federal Government is currently responsible for disposing of a total of about 70,000 tons of waste. A federal corporation, limited in 

scope, could be the correct entity to take responsibility for disposing of that waste. 

In preparing its final recommendations, the BRC should emphasize closely realigning incentives, responsibilities, and authorities in nuclear waste management. 

These recommendations should include: 

• Creating a federal corporation with a limited scope of responsibility, 

limited duration, and access to the Nuclear Waste Fund. The federal corporation should have two basic responsibilities. First, it should site a geologic 

repository. If the repository is located at Yucca Mountain, as current law stipulates, then the federal corporation should assume the Department of Energy’s 

responsibilities of completing the Yucca construction and operation permit application. Once issued, the permit to operate Yucca should be transferred to a 

non-federal entity to construct and operate the facility. If the Yucca location is 

deemed technically deficient, the corporation should be responsible for overseeing the selection of a new location. However, the permit application should 

be prepared by whichever entity will eventually construct and operate the facility. 

The corporation’s second responsibility should be to assure proper disposal of the 

existing nuclear waste for which the Federal Government is currently responsible 

and it should get access to the approximately $25 billion in the Nuclear Waste Fund 

to finance its activities. This would allow the Federal Government to meet its existing contractual and regulatory waste disposal responsibility while allowing an eventual transfer of waste management responsibility to the private sector. It would also 

allow the Nuclear Waste Fund to be used for its intended purpose. Most important, 

however, it would create a significant market demand for privately offered waste 

management services like storage, transportation, and processing. Businesses would 

naturally emerge to meet this demand that would then be available for future private waste management operations. 

Finally, the transitional federal corporation must be mission specific and its creation must be accompanied by a dissolution plan. Once its two responsibilities are 

met, it should either be privatized or abolished. 

• Removing the federal role in geologic repository operations. All geologic 

repositories should be operated by non-federal entities. The management organizations could be private, for-profit, non-profit, state-based, or a combination 

thereof. Among their most basic responsibilities would be to set market-driven 

prices for waste emplacement. Market-driven prices would take waste characteristics, such as heat load, toxicity, and volume as well as repository space into 

consideration. Waste producers would then have different variables to consider 

when deciding which fuels to purchase and what nuclear technologies to use as 

these decisions would affect how they would ultimately manage their waste. It 

could be most cost effective to place waste directly in the repository for some 

utilities, while others might find interim storage or another processes to be 

more economical. Market-based price signals would encourage new technologies, 

such as small nuclear reactors that have a different waste streams, and services, such as reprocessing, to be introduced as new market demands emerge. 

• Transferring responsibility for management of new waste to waste producers. As noted above, the Federal Government through the corporation 

should meet its responsibility to dispose of existing waste. But moving forward, 

nuclear utilities should be made responsible for waste they produce. This responsibility should be accompanied by a repeal of the fee—1/10 of 1 cent per 

kilowatt hour of electricity produced at nuclear power plants—paid to the Federal Government for waste disposal. Utilities would then bear the responsibility 

and also have the freedom to choose how best to manage their waste. The fed-
40 

4 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, ‘‘Charter,’’ March 1, 2010, at http:// 

brc.gov/index.php?q=page/charter (August 10, 2011). 

eral role would be to ensure that private waste management activities meet 

adequate regulatory standards. In essence, waste management would be treated 

the same way the rest of the nuclear industry is treated. The Federal Government is not responsible for getting the fuel to the reactor and it should not be 

responsible for removing it. 

• Allowing the federal corporation to broker waste management services. To further ensure that nuclear waste producers have access to waste management services, the federal corporation could be permitted, for a fee, to broker 

waste management services for private industry. Transportation, reprocessing 

or repository emplacement could be offered separately or as a bundled, comprehensive service. This would allow waste producers to hire the federal corporation to contract for waste management services on their behalf. It may be 

the case as the corporation gains experience and establishes relationships with 

waste management providers, it can negotiate better terms based on volume, 

or other variables, for specific services. Or waste producers may simply find the 

convenience of contracting with the federal corporation to manage its waste is 

worth a premium. Waste producers would not be obligated to seek waste management services through the federal corporation. This brokering service would 

only be available as long as the federal corporation is carrying out its chartered 

mission, and would not justify its existence beyond those specified responsibilities. However, one can imagine a business case where brokering such services 

could provide the basis for future privatization. Ultimately, while such an arrangement is not necessary, it does provide an additional transition step toward 

the new, market-based system. 

• Limiting the Federal Government’s long-term role to setting broad regulatory guidelines and taking final title of decommissioned repository 

sites. Once the federal corporation carries out its mission and is dissolved, the 

Federal Government should have two roles. First, it should set the broad regulatory guidelines for waste management just as it does for other parts of the 

nuclear industry. Second, the Federal Government should take final legal possession, what is commonly referred to as ‘‘title,’’ of geologic repositories and 

their contents as they are decommissioned. While private actors should manage 

nuclear waste and finance its final disposal, including long-term maintenance, 

only the Federal Government has the guaranteed longevity to credibly take 

long-term possession and liability for whatever elements of waste end up in geologic repositories after decommissioning, when the repository would be permanently sealed. 

Geologic Storage 

Of the seven key elements addressed by the BRC, two are dedicated to geologic 

storage. One calls for a new, consent-based approach to searching out future nuclear 

waste management facilities, while the other calls for a prompt effort to develop one 

or more geologic repositories. While clearly stating the need for geologic storage is 

important, the BRC’s charge from the Secretary of Energy to rule out any consideration of the Yucca Mountain facility weakens the utility of its otherwise reasonable 

recommendations. For this reason, the BRC should address Yucca in its final recommendations, which is allowable per the BRC’s charter that gives no direction to 

preclude Yucca. Indeed, it does the opposite, by directing the BRC to consider all 

options. It states that the Secretary of Energy established to commission at the direction of the President to: 

• conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the 

nuclear fuel cycle, including all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of civilian and defense used nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and materials 

derived from nuclear activities. 4

Furthermore, the BRC’s recommendations on geologic storage reflect its more general flaw—that nuclear waste management should remain within the purview of the 

Federal Government. These problems can be addressed in the final report by the 

following actions: 

• Address Yucca Mountain head on. The BRC should state what it believes 

should happen with Yucca Mountain based on the best science and evidence 

available. If its members believe Yucca should be shut down, it should state 

why and provide a recommendation for disengaging from Yucca. If, on the other 
41 

hand, it finds that Yucca should be pursued, perhaps as one of a number of options, then the Commission should provide recommendations on how to move 

forward. Such a conclusion could reject the current Yucca program while proposing an alternative. Such an alternative could embody the recommendations 

of the BRC’s consent-based approach where the people of Nevada are given control over the future of the Yucca facility. Even though the Secretary of Energy 

directed the BRC to pretend Yucca Mountain does not exist, nothing in the 

BRC’s charter prevents it from facing facts. For the sake of the Commission’s 

credibility, it must honestly and directly address Yucca in its final conclusions. 

• Demand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission complete its review 

of the Department of Energy’s Yucca Mountain application. The reality 

is that the Blue Ribbon Commission can likely not make a truly informed decision on Yucca Mountain because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 

stopped work on the Department of Energy’s application to construct the repository and refuses to release the NRC technical staff’s findings regarding the application. Therefore, the single most important recommendation that the BRC 

could make would be to demand that the NRC complete the Yucca application 

and publicly release all data generated by the application process. Whether anyone ever builds a repository at Yucca or not, the NRC’s completed review process will yield unique information that will have important future relevance. 

Furthermore, the public and electricity ratepayers deserve to have the application review completed given its $15 billion investment. 

• Limit the Federal Government’s responsibility to siting and permitting 

one geologic repository. Whether at Yucca or elsewhere, the Federal Government’s role should be limited to developing a single geologic repository. This repository should be located at Yucca Mountain unless the NRC deems that site 

to be technically deficient. Should that be the case, the new site must at least 

match the capacity of Yucca Mountain, which is sufficient to hold all of the 

waste produced by America’s existing commercial reactors over their expected 

lifetimes. Once sited and permitted, a non-federal entity should operate the repository. Developing future repositories should be the responsibility of non-federal actors. 

• Rescind recommendation to develop one or more interim storage facilities. The BRC is correct that interim storage of nuclear waste, like geologic 

storage, is a critical part of any comprehensive nuclear waste management system. Further, it correctly points out a myriad of reasons why interim storage 

makes sense, such as allowing for fuel removal from shutdown plants. However, 

the Federal Government should neither construct such a facility nor mandate 

that one be built. Instead, private-sector interim storage facilities would emerge 

to meet the demand for such services in a market-based system. The Federal 

Government’s role should be to ensure that those willing and able to develop 

appropriate interim storage facilities have an efficient and predictable regulatory environment. The BRC makes very sound recommendations toward this 

end. 

Financing Nuclear Waste Management and Disposal 

The BRC correctly spent significant effort on making recommendations on how 

nuclear waste management should be financed. Indeed, it correctly identifies many 

of the problems with the current system, namely that it does not work as intended 

and that continuing to collect fees for services not rendered is patently unfair. It 

also correctly recognizes that government accounting rules make gaining access to 

collected funds extraordinarily difficult. Finally, it recognizes that building a sustainable nuclear waste policy program is nearly impossible so long as it relies on 

the inherently inefficient and unpredictable congressional appropriations process. 

Separating finance issues from larger organizational issues is impossible. The two 

are inherently related. How nuclear waste activities are financed will ultimately depend on who is responsible for its disposal. Therefore, any rational financing scheme 

must be developed congruently with larger organizational reform. So if one accepts 

the BRC’s general proposition that the Federal Government should remain responsible for nuclear waste management, its recommendations on finance reform make 

sense. However, since its recommended actions would do little to change the underlying system fundamentals, the same inefficiencies that result from federal control 

would ultimately resurface. 

Similar to its larger organizational recommendations, the BRC does provide a 

framework from which a more market-based, economically rational system could be 

constructed. Indeed, the BRC introduces some elements that are critical to a sus-
42 

tainable waste management system. Instead of attempting to modify the current 

system, the BRC should develop recommendations to allow the United States to 

transition to a new model for financing nuclear waste management while ensuring 

that existing resources are used for their intended purposes. To achieve this transition, the BRC’s final recommendations should include the following: 

• Congress should immediately begin transferring the Nuclear Waste 

Fund to the new organization. The BRC acknowledges that whoever is ultimately responsible for waste management and disposal must gain access to the 

$25 billion in the Nuclear Waste Fund, and puts forth a basic plan to achieve 

this. The plan would allow limited access to those funds 10 years after the new 

organization is established. Near-term operations would be funded through ongoing fee payments. This approach, however, assumes that the new organization would maintain ongoing responsibility for waste management and disposal. 

Under the modifications proposed in this analysis, the new organization would 

only be responsible for waste produced to date, and should be funded through 

fees already paid. Thus, the new organization would need immediate access to 

the Nuclear Waste Fund, although dispersal could take place over time. 

• Congress should mandate the creation of utility- or plant-specific escrow accounts to fund waste management activities. An innovative concept in the BRC report is to create escrow accounts held by an independent 

third party into which nuclear waste fees are paid. Only that amount appropriated by Congress for waste disposal activities would be paid to the U.S. 

Treasury out of the escrow accounts. This would ensure that only those funds 

actually being spent on waste disposal would go to the government, thus preventing additional funds from being placed into the Nuclear Waste Fund. 

This specific idea is not consistent with the overall reform that is necessary, but 

the introduction of waste management financed through escrow accounts is consistent with fundamental reform. A better model would mandate that nuclear utilities place in escrow adequate funds to dispose of whatever waste is being stored on 

site. No funds would ever go to the U.S. Treasury, and congressional appropriators 

would have no role. Utilities would simply pay for waste management and disposal 

services on an as-needed basis. This approach would benefit nuclear utilities by ensuring they have access to the funds set aside for waste disposal and it would protect the American taxpayer by making sure adequate disposal funds will be available even if a plant owner goes out of business. 

• Congress should repeal the fee paid to the Federal Government for future waste 

disposal services. Since, under these reforms, existing nuclear waste disposal 

would be financed through existing nuclear waste fund fees, and future disposal 

through the privately held escrow accounts, there would be no need to continue 

paying the nuclear waste fee to the Federal Government. 

Building on the BRC’s Recommendations 

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future has an opportunity to 

resolve America’s nuclear waste policy dilemma. While it has provided a credible 

analysis and introduced some new ideas, it has focused more on the symptoms of 

America’s failed approach to nuclear waste management than addressing the system’s structural deficiencies. Nonetheless, its recommendations provide a starting 

framework that could be modified to address these difficult issues. Moving the responsibility for nuclear waste management away from the Federal Government will 

be difficult, but it is necessary to for an economically rational, technologically diverse, and sustainable resolution to America’s nuclear waste dilemma. 

That concludes my testimony. 

I look forward to your questions. 

The Heritage Foundation 

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is privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor 

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• Individuals: 78% 
43 

• Foundations: 17% 

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The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 2% of its 

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Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their 

own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an 

institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Spencer. 

Dr. Swift, I understand you have fairly short testimony. We need 

to get to the floor, so go ahead, if you would, with your oral testimony. You are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER SWIFT, 

DISTINGUISHED MEMBER OF THE TECHNICAL STAFF, 

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. SWIFT. Thank you. Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, 

Ranking Members Tonko and Miller, and the distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you. I am Dr. Peter Swift from 

Sandia National Laboratories. 

In your letter requesting my testimony, you asked me to address 

three topics. First, you asked me to provide my views on the draft 

recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission regarding the 

need for a permanent geological repository. Second, you asked me 

to describe my role as the Chief Scientist for the Yucca Mountain 

Lead Laboratory. And third, you asked me to describe the various 

scientific issues and technical conclusions in the Department of Energy’s license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. 

I will start with the second and third questions, and I will close 

with my views on the Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft recommendations. I am speaking only for myself. Anything I say here 

today represents my own personal beliefs and does not necessarily 

represent the position of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. 

Department of Energy. Specifically, I am not here to amend or add 

to Sandia’s technical position with respect to the Yucca Mountain 

license application. That position remains unchanged from its documentation in the application. 

I am a geologist by training, and I have worked for the last 22 

years studying how deep geologic repositories for radioactive waste 

will perform over hundreds of thousands of years. In my role as the 

Chief Scientist for the Yucca Mountain Lead Laboratory team, I focused on ensuring the integrity and credibility of the scientific 

basis for the postclosure portions of the license application that the 

DOE submitted in June 2008. I was extensively involved in interactions with external and internal technical review and oversight 

groups, and I had a significant role in preparing the application 

and presenting it to the NRC. 

The development of the technical basis for the repository was the 

work of hundreds of scientists and engineers, spread over decades. 

When I speak about the work contained in the license application, 

I am summarizing the contributions of multiple experts who prepared those sections. 
44 

What types of political—sorry—of postclosure scientific issues 

does the application consider? The detailed analyses presented in 

the application focus on those processes that have a significant potential to affect long-term performance of the repository, but all relevant events and processes, including those that are highly unlikely and those that are shown to have little or no impact on the 

system, are summarized in the application and evaluated in detail 

in supporting documents. 

Subsections of the application address each of the major processes affecting the repository, including, for example, climate 

change, groundwater flow, long-term degradation of the waste 

packages. As required by EPA and NRC regulations, analyses provide an estimate of the mean annual radiation dose that a person 

living in the vicinity might receive at any time in the next million 

years. One of the main conclusions of these analyses is that estimated releases and radiation doses to hypothetical future humans 

are well below the EPA and NRC standards. Overall, the application concludes that there is a significant—sorry—a sufficient technical basis for the NRC to issue a license authorizing construction 

of the facility. This conclusion was a fundamental basis for the 

2008 submittal of the application to the NRC for review. 

This brings me to my views on the Blue Ribbon Commission’s 

draft recommendation regarding the need for a permanent geological repository. The Commission observed in their draft report that 

‘‘every foreseeable approach to the nuclear fuel cycle still requires 

a means of disposal that assures the very long-term isolation of radioactive wastes.’’ I agree with this observation. Alternative approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that involve separating and recycling fissile material in irradiated fuel can change the type and 

character of waste requiring geologic disposal, but they will not 

eliminate the need. The Commission also concluded in its draft report that ‘‘deep geological disposal is the most promising and accepted method currently available.’’ The Commission further noted 

that disposal could occur either in mined repositories or potentially 

in deep boreholes. Again, I agree. Research to date in the United 

States and elsewhere provides confidence that safe and effective 

disposal facilities could be designed and operated in a range of geologic settings. 

Recognizing that there is much to be done to establish the scientific and technical basis for licensing any of the disposal concepts 

available to us, and also recognizing that the regulatory process essential to ensuring public health and safety may be time-consuming, I strongly support the Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft recommendation for ‘‘prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic 

disposal facilities.’’ 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Swift follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER SWIFT, 

DISTINGUISHED MEMBER OF THE TECHNICAL STAFF, 

SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY

Chairman Harris, Chairman Broun, Ranking Members Miller and Tonko, and the 

distinguished Members of the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to testify. 
45 

1 Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the United States Government and operated by Sandia Corporation for the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation under Department of 

Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-94AL85000. 

I am Dr. Peter Swift, a Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories. 1

In your letter requesting my testimony, you asked me to address three topics. 

First, you asked me to provide my views on the draft recommendations of the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future regarding the need for a permanent geological repository. Second, you asked me to describe my role as the Chief 

Scientist for the Yucca Mountain Lead Laboratory. Third, you asked me to describe 

the various scientific issues and technical conclusions in the Department of Energy’s 

License Application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. 

I’d like to start with the second and third questions, and I’ll close with my views 

on the Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft recommendation. 

I’m speaking only for myself; anything I say here today represents my own personal beliefs and does not necessarily represent the position of Sandia National Laboratories or the U.S. Department of Energy. Specifically, I am not here to amend 

or add to Sandia’s technical position with respect to the Yucca Mountain License 

Application. That position remains unchanged from its documentation in the License Application. 

I’m a geologist by training, and I’ve worked for the past 22 years studying how 

deep geologic repositories for radioactive waste will perform over hundreds of thousands of years. In my role as Chief Scientist for the Yucca Mountain Lead Laboratory team, I focused on ensuring the integrity and credibility of the scientific basis 

for the postclosure portions of the License Application that the DOE submitted to 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in June 2008. I was extensively involved in 

interactions with external and internal technical review and oversight groups, and 

I had a significant role in preparing the application and presenting it to the NRC. 

The development of the technical basis for the Yucca Mountain repository was the 

work of hundreds of scientists and engineers, spread over decades. When I speak 

about the scientific and technical work contained in the License Application, I’m 

summarizing the contributions of the multiple experts who prepared the individual 

sections. 

What types of postclosure scientific issues does the application consider? The detailed analyses presented in the application focus on those processes that have a significant potential to affect long-term performance of the repository, but all relevant 

events and processes, including those that are highly unlikely and those that are 

shown to have little or no impact on the system, are summarized in the application 

and evaluated in detail in supporting documents. 

Subsections of the application address each of the major processes affecting the 

repository, including, for example, climate change, groundwater flow, and long-term 

degradation of the waste packages. As required by EPA and NRC regulations, analyses provide an estimate of the mean annual radiation dose that a person living in 

the vicinity of the repository might receive at any time in the next million years. 

One of the main conclusions of these analyses is that estimated releases and radiation doses to hypothetical future humans are well below the EPA and NRC standards. Overall, the application concludes that there is a sufficient technical basis for 

the NRC to issue a license authorizing construction of the facility. This conclusion 

was a fundamental basis for the 2008 submittal of the application to the NRC for 

review. 

This brings me to my views on the Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft recommendation regarding the need for a permanent geological repository. The Commission observed in their draft report that ‘‘every foreseeable approach to the nuclear fuel 

cycle still requires a means of disposal that assures the very long-term isolation of 

radioactive wastes from the environment.’’ I agree with this observation. Alternative 

approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that involve separating and recycling fissile material in irradiated fuel can change the type and character of waste requiring geologic disposal, but they will not eliminate the need. The Commission also concluded 

in its draft report that ‘‘deep geological disposal is the most promising and accepted 

method currently available,’’ and the Commission further noted that disposal could 

occur either in mined repositories or potentially in deep boreholes. Again, I agree. 

Research to date in the United States and elsewhere provides confidence that safe 

and effective disposal facilities could be designed and operated in a range of geologic 

settings. 

Recognizing that there is much to be done to establish the scientific and technical 

basis for licensing any of the disposal concepts available to us, and also recognizing 
46 

1 Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the United States Government and operated by Sandia Corporation for the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation under Department of 

Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-94AL85000. 

that the regulatory process essential to ensuring public health and safety may be 

time-consuming, I strongly support the Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft recommendation for ‘‘prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities.‘‘ 

Thank you. 

Summary 

I am speaking for myself, and this statement does not necessarily represent the 

positions of Sandia National Laboratories 1 or the U.S. Department of Energy. My 

statement neither amends nor adds to Sandia’s position regarding the Yucca Mountain License Application, which remains unchanged from its documentation in the 

License Application. 

In my role as Chief Scientist for the Yucca Mountain Lead Laboratory team, I focused on ensuring the integrity and credibility of the scientific basis for the 

postclosure portions of the License Application that the DOE submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in June 2008. 

The detailed analyses presented in the application focus on the processes that 

have a significant potential to affect long-term performance of the repository, but 

all relevant events and processes, including those that are highly unlikely and those 

that are shown to have little or no impact on the system, are summarized in the 

application and evaluated in detail in supporting documents. As required by EPA 

and NRC regulations, analyses provide an estimate of the mean annual radiation 

dose that a person living in the vicinity of the repository might receive at any time 

in the next million years. 

These analyses conclude that estimated releases and radiation doses to hypothetical future humans are well below the EPA and NRC standards, and that there 

is a sufficient technical basis for the NRC to issue a license authorizing construction 

of the facility. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future draft report recommends ‘‘prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities.’’ The 

draft report concludes that ‘‘deep geological disposal is the most promising and accepted method currently available’’ for isolating high-level radioactive wastes, and 

that disposal could occur either in mined repositories or potentially in deep 

boreholes. I agree. Research to date in the United States and elsewhere provides 

confidence that safe and effective disposal facilities could be designed and operated 

in a range of geologic settings. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Swift. 

We have got to go to the floor to vote, so the Committee will now 

stand in recess until 10 minutes after the last vote. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman BROUN. We will reconvene the joint Committee meeting. 

I now recognize our next witness. Thank you, all of you, for your 

indulgence in this vote series and appreciate you all staying 

around. Our next witness is Dr. Kasperson. Doctor, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER KASPERSON, 

PROFESSOR AND DISTINGUISHED SCIENTIST, 

CLARK UNIVERSITY 

Dr. KASPERSON. In 2001, the National Academy of Sciences published a major report that represented both an unusually large 

committee for the academy and also a rather substantial period of 

time with international representation of leading world scientists 

as well as prominent engineers and scientists in the United States, 

and I want to indicate what all that work resulted in, an observa-
47 

tion by the panel in its report that despite the conversations we 

may have here today and what will go on about Yucca Mountain 

and so forth, the major issues are really not geology. There are a 

number of geological options that would probably work quite well, 

and the failures and challenges that we are seeing are really connected as the Academy noted in achieving the sort of people-related 

problems, the societal nature of the issues that are involved. And 

so while you all have the responsibility of designing the next steps 

in our national efforts to deal with radioactive waste, you are going 

to need to give a lot of attention to issues that have been quite neglected in the past. 

I might remind you, I have been around long enough to know 

that Alvin Weinberg, who was a very prominent scientist involved 

in the early history of radioactive waste management, noted that 

the problems that he had most underestimated were connected 

with waste storage and waste disposal and particularly the public 

interactions that occurred. 

Now, there is—if we are honest about it, there are some pretty 

serious problems to be dealt with in trying to come up with a new 

program for radioactive waste, and I have noted some of them here. 

They are what some of us might call deep uncertainty problems 

that when you are talking about situations where you have really 

long time frames like 10,000 and 100,000 years, and we don’t know 

what the future of technology and society is going to look at, that 

there are site-specific problems connected with any site that can be 

reviewed and considered as a repository site, and so there are 

things connected with future populations, lifestyles and values, 

health and medical issues and even the political context itself 

where we really can’t predict very well what is going to happen, 

and that has implications, I think, for whatever Administration 

takes this problem on. They are going to have to deal with some 

of these, some of these issues, and they are not easy issues. 

Also, we might note that we have never done, you know, a really 

high-level waste or spent fuel repository before, so it will be a firstof-a-kind facility. There are also not facilities that exist anywhere 

in the world at the moment, so our experience is limited, and so 

we need to understand that somehow the management process is 

going to need to be evolutionary because that will be the nature of 

knowledge, will be evolutionary and these uncertainties are going 

to change over time. 

Now, what I do want to focus on particularly is the problem of 

social trust. Some of you may have seen in yesterday’s New York 

Times on the front page that a new New York Times/CBS national 

poll has discovered that social trust has reached—it has been—we 

have been experiencing long-term erosion in social trust in our 

country, and in the last few weeks it has hit the low point that has 

existed at any time in the last 20 or 30 years. The loss of trust is 

particularly pronounced in the nuclear area, but we must understand that it really cuts across and it is generally responsible and 

found elsewhere in many other institutions. In other words, the social trust problem is not just a matter of getting the nuclear things 

right because it is a general problem in our society, and there has 

been a loss of social trust in institutions, in corporations, in Congress, regrettably, in the Presidency, and so forth, and those things 
48 

are—and it is not one particular poll because we now have evidence 

drawn from a number of different surveys that basically indicate 

that, and I am just about out of time. 

Just to indicate, I can probably give you only one piece of social 

science research. We actually have a large body of evidence which 

has been accumulated among scientists and researchers over the 

past 20 years. This is one example drawn from work by psychologists, and you will see in the upper part of this diagram, those are 

a whole—don’t worry about reading all those things. They are a 

whole list of actions that can be taken that ought to build trust, 

and the lower part of the diagram is actions that are taken and 

events that happen that lose trust. Look at the size of the bars involved. And what we have found, and I will just state it and maybe 

I will end there, that what we think is that social trust is easily 

lost and very difficult to recover. And so one of the things that is 

going to be facing Yucca Mountain or in the next phase of the radioactive waste problem is how do we deal with social trust, and 

if you are dealing with very feared hazard and one that concerns 

the public and the social trust in managers is very low, you have 

got a real problem to deal with, and we are going to need to give 

that a lot of thought in designing the process of moving forward for 

radioactive waste. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kasperson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ROGER KASPERSON, 

PROFESSOR AND DISTINGUISHED SCIENTIST, 

CLARK UNIVERSITY

The management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and defense high-level waste (HLW) 

is a complex socio-technical systems challenge. Coordinated, reliable, and safe performance will be required over very long periods of time within evolving and changing social and technical contexts. To accomplish these goals, a waste management 

system will involve a host of facilities for interim storage and long-term disposal, 

a transportation infrastructure, and research and development centers. The complexity of SNF and HLW management will also require an array of robust institutions and procedures. Waste management is multi-institutional, comprising multiple 

private companies and sectors (e.g., commercial nuclear utilities, trucking and railway companies), multiple government agencies at different levels (local, State, National), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other institutional stakeholders, as well as citizens. At the moment, experience of how this will work is limited. 

No matter how many checks and balances are put into place, no matter how much 

information is disclosed, no matter how many instruments for monitoring, evaluation, and oversight are implemented there will ultimately be individuals and groups 

entrusted to make sure ‘‘it all works.’’ Trust and confidence are necessary for stable 

arrangements in contexts of unequal power, whether in terms of access to information, economic resources, or ability to implement desired actions (Kuhn and Ballard 

1999). Stable arrangements, in turn, are essential for the institutional continuity 

necessary for long-term projects such as the disposal of SNF and HLW. 

Unfortunately, the principal agencies responsible for nuclear wastes, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are not trusted by 

majorities of the public in recent public opinion polls (e.g., Whitfield et al. 2009) and 

other earlier assessments (e.g., DOE 1993, DOE 2000). Social perceptions of 

missteps and failures in government and private parties’ management of nuclear 

wastes have contributed to long-term erosion of trust and confidence (DOE 1993, 

DOE 2000, Hewlett 1978, Kraft 1996, NRC 2001, OTA 1985, Pijawka and 

Mushkatel 1992, Rosa and Clark 1999, Rosa et al. 2010). Reasons include Congressional scrapping of a site selection in the Eastern half of the U.S., Congressional 

scrapping of technical integrity and equity provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Amendments, attempts to coerce Nevada rather than negotiate, failure to clearly de-
49 

fine regulatory criteria in advance and then adapt them to fit existing conditions, 

attempts to re-negotiate or circumvent compliance with cleanup agreements related 

to HLW at DOE sites, and treating the public as if its concerns are irrational. In 

short, social distrust is multi-lateral and ‘‘widespread in the nuclear waste domain, 

is deeply seated, reflects broader trends in society, and has a continuing history of 

events to maintain it.’’ (NRC 2001, pg. 74) 

Two reasons for the difficulty of regaining social trust in the context of SNF and 

HLW management stand out for special attention. First, nuclear waste is thought 

of in largely negative terms. Changing negative views can be hard. The ‘‘affect heuristic’’ explored in the work of Slovic and colleagues (Finucane et al. 2000, Slovic 

et al. 2007) suggests that when people like an activity or technology, they tend to 

view it as having high benefit and low risk. On the other hand, if they dislike it, 

they see benefits as low and risk as high. Furthermore, recent work on ‘‘cultural 

cognition’’ reinforces findings that people tend to select and interpret information to 

support preexisting views, protect values and worldviews (e.g., anti-nuclear or pronuclear), or preserve identity with an ideological group (Braman et al. 2005, Kahan 

et al. 2007). Thus, information intended to educate or persuade is all too often impotent. 

Second, evidence suggests that events and activities that erode social trust have 

a stronger impact on overall levels of trust than do those thought to strengthen social trust (Figure 1). This is often referred to as the ‘‘asymmetry of trust’’ (Slovic 

1993). Slovic (1993) found that of the many trust-building actions investigated, only 

one had a moderate effect: ‘‘An advisory board of local citizens and environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is given legal authority to shut it down 

if they believe it to be unsafe.’’ 

Figure 1. Differential impact of trust-increasing and trust-decreasing 

events on levels of trust among respondents. Respondents were asked about 

each event whether it would increase or decrease their trust in the management of 

a nuclear power plant. They then rated how strongly their trust would be affected 

(1 = very small impact on trust; 7 = very powerful impact on trust). Source: Slovic, 

1993. 
50 

Rebuilding Social Trust 

Based upon the sizable literature on social distrust, we offer six recommendations 

for how nuclear waste management should move forward. 

• The planning process should commission a set of focus papers by leading experts on the major social and ethical problems that must be addressed in the 

evolving approach. These should include options for solutions and their pluses 

and minuses. 

• Social science and policy expertise will be essential (Rosa et al. 2010). We suggest convening a standing advisory committee of leading social scientists and 

policy analysts with whom nuclear waste planner regularly consult. 

• A dual strategy should be adopted. First, planning, including the design of institutional architecture and procedures, should proceed in a way that recognizes 

the need to perform and be effective in a context of social distrust. It may be 

that proceeding on the recognition of a deficit in social trust will lay the foundation for transparent, participatory procedures that can rebuild functional, critical social trust over the long term. Second, while working in a context of distrust, there must also be consistent efforts at all levels and in all aspects of nuclear waste policy-making—planning, implementation, and operations—to support the (re)development of critical social trust. 
51 

• Given the long, apparently obdurate distrust of the DOE, it is time to think of 

putting waste management in the hands of alternative institutions. We argue 

that responsibility should be placed in a public corporation, as many countries 

have done. 

• A premium should be placed on openness, inclusive stakeholder involvement, 

and truly independent peer review (including impacted communities and knowledgeable, demanding critics) during the planning, decision, and monitoring 

process for all stages of program development and operation. The role of public 

involvement and peer review should be clear and meaningful. Independent review by critics. 

• Contingent on geological suitability, the approach to siting should emphasize 

voluntary consent rather than coercion as much as possible. 

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Rebuilding Social Trust in the 

Management of Radioactive Waste 

Testimony presented to the House Committee 

on Science, Space, and Technology 

October 27,2011 

Roger E. Kasperson 

Research Professor and Distinguished Scientist 

CLARK 

.-UNIVERSITY 

Clark University 

1 
WHAT ARE THE CHIEF CHALLENGES FOR 

A SUCCESSFUL SPENT FUEL AND HLW 

DISPOSAL PROGRAM? 

"TODAY THE BIGGEST CHALLENGES TO WASTE 

DISPOSITION PROGRAMS ARE SOCIETAL IN NATURE. 

DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING PUBLIC SUPPORT HAVE 

BEEN SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED IN THE PAST, AND 

OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 

AND GAIN PUBLIC TRUST HAVE BEEN MISSED." 

NRC, DISPOSITION OF HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. 

WASHINGTON NAS, 2001, pp. 29-30. 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL IS A 

DEEP UNCERTAINTY PROBLEM 

• THE EXTRAORDINARILY LONG TIME FRAMES 

MAKE A "PROOF OF SAFETY" IMPOSSIBLE; 

• THE PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PHENOMENA 

THAT CONTROL SITE AND REPOSITORY 

EVENTS AND THE NATURE OF OTHER 

FUTURE EVENTS (E.G.CLlMATE CHANGE); 

• FUTURE INTERACTIONS WITH HUMAN 

SYSTEMS ARE ESSENTIALLY UNKNOWABLE; 

• FUTURE POPULATIONS 

• LIFE STYLES AND VALUES • HEALTH AND MEDICAL ISSUES 

• POLITICAL STABILITY 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL IS A 

DEEP UNCERTAINTY PROBLEM 

(cant.) 

• THE DISPOSAL FACILITY WILL BE A FIRST-OFA-KIND FACILITY AND RISKS AND 

UNCERTAINTIES WILL BE HIGHLY SITESPECIFIC; 

• IMPLICATION: UNDERSTANDING OF RISKS 

AND UNCERTAINTY WILL BE EVOLUTIONARY 

WITH THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND 

EXPERIENCE 
SOCIAL TRUSTA PRECIOUS RESOURCE 

• OVER THE PAST 25 YEARS, DOE AND THE 

CONGRESS HAVE LOST THE TRUST OF THE 

PRINCIPAL STAKEHOLDERS AND PUBLICS IN 

THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES; 

• SOCIAL TRUST ONCE LOST IS NOT EASILY 

REGAINED AND SO A NEW DISPOSAL 

PROGRAM WILL PROCEED UNDER CONDITIONS 

OF HIGH SOCIAL DISTRUST 

• THE LOSS OF TRUST IS PRONOUNCED IN THE 

NUCLEAR AREA BUT IS SYSTEMIC ACROSS 

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE U.S. 
SOCIAL TRUSTA PRECIOUS RESOURCE (cont.) 

• WHERE THOSE BEARING RISKS LACK TRUST IN 

THOSE MAKING DECISIONS, THEY DEMAND A 

GREATER ROLE IN DECISION MAKING. 

• THE INTERACTION AMONG A HIGHLY DREADEDHAZARD, LARGE UNCERTAINTIES, AND LOW 

SOCIAL TRUST CREATES UNUSUALLY 

DIFFICULT MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY 

CHALLENGES. 
60 
Six Recommendations for 

Rebuilding Social Trust 

• COMMISSION FOCUS PAPERS ON SOCIAL AND 

ETHICAL PROBLEMS; 

• AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF LEADING SOCIAL 

SCIENTISTS AND POLICY ANALYSTS; 

• DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND 

PROCEDURES; 

• A PUBLIC CORPORATION FOR WASTE 

MANAGEMENT; 

• OPENNESS,STAKEHOLDERINVOLVEMENT,AND 

INDEPENDENT PEER REVIEWS; 

• VOLUNTARY CONSENT RATHER THAN COERCION 
62 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. Hollis, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GARY HOLLIS, CHAIRMAN, 

NYE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

Mr. HOLLIS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Gary Hollis, 

Nye County—I am Chairman of the Nye County Board of Commissioners. 

In July of 2002, Congress designated Nye County as the site for 

nuclear waste repository in accordance with the provision of the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the law Congress enacted to establish 

our Nation’s policy on high-level radioactive waste. The act gives 

Nye County the authority to oversee federal activities on the repository. It is a duty that I and my fellow commissioners take very seriously. 

We have worked with DOE on the science. We have participated 

in the licensing and carefully followed the deliberation of the Blue 

Ribbon Commission. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is clear. It sets out a process to 

determine if the repository can be built safely, and in 2008 the 

DOE submitted a licensing application to the NRC with the assurance that it could be built safely. Two years later, they asked to 

withdraw that application. 

There is no need for the BRC to make alternatives to Yucca 

Mountain. DOE, NRC and the Obama Administration should comply with the law or change it. 

Nye County has been fully engaged with the BRC. We are disappointed that the draft report implies there is no local support in 

Nevada when it insists that the siting of any repository have the 

consent of local government and communities. 

Mr. Chairman, Yucca Mountain has local support. If the NRC determines it is unsafe to build this repository, Nye County would oppose its construction. If it is found to be safe, we favor its construction. In a very real sense, Nye County is the only community close 

to Yucca Mountain. At least six rural Nevada counties support continuing the licensing application process to determine that Yucca 

Mountain can be built safely. The land mass of these counties 

taken together is larger than many States. By any reasonable geographic definition, Yucca Mountain has the support of the surrounding communities. 

The DOE, the ERDA and the AEC spent many years attempting 

to site a geological repository. The current language in the NWPA 

has a compromise by Congress to deal with the local support issue, 

but it also has set up procedures to follow if no local support is 

found. In other words, Congress carefully considered the possibility 

that the repository could have to be built despite State or local opposition. Congress determined that building the repository was the 

national priority and should take—should proceed despite local 

conditions. 

Mr. Chairman, the State of Nevada currently opposes Yucca 

Mountain. However, in 1975, the Nevada legislature passed a resolution that said in part, and I quote, ‘‘The legislature of the State 
63 

of Nevada strongly urges the Energy, Research and Development 

Administration to choose the Nevada Test Site for the storage and 

processing of nuclear material.’’ In 1987, the State legislature created Bullfrog County that completely enclosed Yucca Mountain 

with the intent to control the receipts of the benefits of payment. 

The point is, the State of Nevada at one time was not opposed to 

dealing with nuclear waste. Follow the money. 

It will take decades to study, license and build something other 

than Yucca Mountain. What if we do not find a willing State? What 

happens if a State changes its mind? Would the fate of the repository be in jeopardy at every election? Would that violate the consent-based goal? The draft report does not answer these questions. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, we take our site county 

responsibilities seriously. We conducted a robust science program 

to determine if a repository could be built safely. To this date, our 

studies have shown that the repository can be built safely, but we 

want an additional confidence that a complete license process will 

provide. To ignore the science, the law and facts, not to mention 

the Administration’s scientific integrity policy because the BRC 

says Yucca Mountain does not have local support is an insult to the 

process and contrary to the rule of law. Yucca Mountain does have 

local support. My presence here today confirms that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hollis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GARY HOLLIS, CHAIRMAN, 

NYE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about some of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission. I am 

Gary Hollis, Chairman of the Nye County Board of Commissioners and one of the 

County’s two liaison Commissioners on Yucca Mountain issues. I have worked at the 

Nevada Test Site and also worked on Yucca Mountain characterization activities. 

As you know, Yucca Mountain is located in Nye County. In July 2002 Congress 

specifically designated Nye County as the site county for a nuclear waste repository 

in accordance with provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act—the law Congress 

enacted to establish our Nation’s policies on high-level radioactive waste. The Act 

also gives Nye County authority to oversee federal activities on the repository. It 

is a duty that I and my fellow commissioners take very seriously. 

As part of Nye County’s oversight role, we worked with DOE on the science of 

the Yucca Mountain project, participated in the licensing proceedings, and carefully 

followed the deliberations of the Blue Ribbon Commission. Personally, Mr. Chairman, I have questions about the need for the Blue Ribbon Commission. 

The provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act are clear. The Act sets out specific 

procedures and rules to determine if a repository at Yucca Mountain can be built 

safely. In 2008, when the Department of Energy submitted the license application 

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, it was with their assurance it could be built 

safely. Two years later DOE tried to withdraw the license application, but not on 

safety grounds. To me, this is a clear violation of the law. To me, there is no need 

for a Blue Ribbon Commission to determine alternatives to Yucca Mountain. Instead, DOE, the NRC and the Obama Administration should either obey the clear 

mandates in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or should try to change it. 

However, in our oversight role, Nye County has been fully engaged with the Blue 

Ribbon Commission. We have attended a majority of the Commission’s public hearings. We shared our unique and extensive experience and offered thoughtful advice. 

IWe are disappointed that the BRC draft report implies there is no local support 

in Nevada when it insists that the siting of any repository be with the consent of 

the communities surrounding the project. Mr Chairman, Yucca Mountain has the 

support of the surrounding communities. Nye County supports completing the licensing process. If the NRC determines it is unsafe to build the repository, and that 

determination is based on sound science and not political pressure, Nye County 
64 

would oppose the construction of the repository. If it is found to be safe, we favor 

its construction. 

Mr. Chairman, Nye County is the third largest county in the United States. In 

a very real sense Nye County is the only community close to Yucca Mountain. At 

least six rural Nevada counties support continuing with the license application process to determine if Yucca Mountain can be build safely. Included in my written testimony are resolutions of support from Nye, Esmeralda, Mineral, Lander, Churchill 

and Lincoln counties. The land mass of these counties, taken together, is larger than 

many States in this country. By any reasonable geographic definition, Yucca Mountain has the support of the surrounding community. 

The DOE, ERDA, and AEC spent many years in unsuccessful attempts to site a 

geologic repository. The current language in the NWPA was a compromise by Congress to deal with a very difficult problem. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act tries to 

encourage local support, but it also sets up procedures to follow if no local support 

is found. In other words, Congress carefully considered the possibility that the repository would have to be built despite local opposition. Congress determined that 

building the repository was a national priority and should proceed despite local conditions. 

It is true that the State of Nevada currently opposes Yucca Mountain. However 

at one time it supported it. In 1975, the Nevada legislature passed a resolution that 

said in part: 

‘‘the legislature of the State of Nevada strongly urges the Energy Research and 

Development Administration to choose the Nevada Test Site for the storage and 

processing of nuclear material.’’ 

In 1987, the State Legislature created a new county that completely enclosed 

Yucca Mountain. It was called Bullfrog County. The new county had no population, 

which meant that any payment by the Federal Government for Yucca Mountain 

would go to the State government. The State fully intended to benefit from the repository. 

The point is that the State of Nevada, at one time, was not opposed to dealing 

with nuclear waste. 

It will take decades to study, license, and build something other than Yucca 

Mountain. What if we do not find a willing state? Or if we find a willing state, what 

happens if it later changes its mind? If 10 or 15 years into the process, what will 

happen if there is an election and the new Governor opposes the repository? Would 

we go back to the drawing board again? Would the fate of the repository be in jeopardy with every local government election? What if the State favors the repository 

but it is opposed by an outspoken community activist group? Would that violate the 

consent based goal? The BRC does not answer those questions. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to point out that Nye County, in addition to its 

oversight role, has conducted a robust science program to determine if the repository 

can be built safely. The full list of our investigations is in my submitted testimony, 

but they include extensive study of the underground water aquifer by: 

• more than forty boreholes into about 145 water zones and tracer tests to determine underground water flow; 

• structural geologic studies; 

• development of information on hydrology south of Yucca Mountain that DOE 

needed to complete its license application; 

• underground ventilation measurements and modeling for worker safety; and 

• participation, as a cooperating agency, in the preparation of Environmental Impact Statements 

In short, Nye County took its site county oversight responsibilities seriously. We 

have been active participants in the science of Yucca Mountain. To date, our studies 

have shown that the repository can be built safely. We do not have all the scientific 

facts, but that is why we want to see the licensing process completed. We want a 

decision to be made based on science. 

To ignore all this science, the law and the facts, not to mention this administration’s stated ‘‘scientific integrity policy,’’ because the BRC says Yucca Mountain does 

not have local support, is an insult to the process and contrary to the rule of law. 

Yucca Mountain does have local support. My presence here today confirms that. 

Thank you. I am available to answer any questions you may have. I am here with 

one of the County’s technical professionals. He is available to answer questions as 

well. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Hollis. 
65 

Mr. McLeod, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICK MCLEOD, 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SAVANNAH RIVER SITE 

COMMUNITY REUSE ORGANIZATION 

Mr. MCLEOD. Mr. Chairmen Broun and Harris and Members of 

the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the draft recommendations of the President’s Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. 

I am Rick McLeod, Executive Director of the Savannah River 

Site Community Reuse Organization, or SRSCRO. The SRSCRO is 

a nonprofit regional group supporting economic diversification and 

job creation in the five-county region of Georgia and South Carolina near the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site, or SRS. 

Our organization is unique across the DOE complex in that our 

area of interest covers multiple counties and two States. We have 

prepared extended remarks for inclusion in the record, but during 

my time today I would like to focus briefly on four of the Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft recommendations. 

Let me preface my remarks by saying that the individuals and 

groups I represent in South Carolina and Georgia continue to believe that the Administration’s decision to halt work on Yucca 

Mountain is wrongheaded and counter to the Nation’s long-term 

best interest. We applaud Congressional efforts, including those of 

this Committee, specifically the June 2011 report on Yucca Mountain, to scrutinize the Administration’s actions with respect to 

Yucca Mountain and the lack of scientific integrity, openness, and 

transparency in its determination to terminate the project. Now to 

the Commission’s recommendations. 

We fully agree with recommendation number one, which calls for 

consent-based, transparent and science-based approach to the nuclear waste management solutions. If a science-based approach 

were followed, we would be completing the Yucca Mountain project 

today. 

We are on record multiple times with our strongly held concerns 

about high-level defense waste continuing to be stored at the Savannah River Site with no disposition path available and by default 

becoming the de facto Yucca Mountain. 

On the following point, we want to be extremely clear: in its final 

report, the Blue Ribbon Commission needs to decouple high-level 

defense waste from commercial spent fuel. The defense waste is different. The quantity is different. The number of locations affected 

is different. The potential for future use is different. The legal and 

financial implications for the government are different. Specific 

separate recommendations are needed for disposition of high-level 

defense waste and for commercial spent fuel. 

Second, we share the view of those who fear that forming some 

type of federal corporation dedicated to managing nuclear waste 

could further delay efforts to dispose of the waste, especially defense waste, which had no other disposition path than a geologic 

repository. Rather than create a new organization, why not simply 

focus for a shorter period and for less money on just disposing of 

the waste? We need solutions, not more bureaucracy. 
66 

While we appreciate the need for interim storage, our concerns 

center on the term ‘‘interim.’’ When it comes to nuclear waste, this 

is a relative term that is almost never associated with a fixed time 

frame. Rather, it can mean anything from 10 years to 500 years 

or more. ‘‘Interim’’ needs to be clearly and legally defined before 

communities such as ours can begin to address the potential and 

advisability of such storage. 

In any event, our community would not support interim storage 

scenario of commercial spent fuel at the Savannah River Site unless a permanent solution is pursued at the same time. This means 

progress towards a permanent repository for both high-level defense waste and commercial spent fuel and/or a program to reprocess or recycle commercial used nuclear fuel. Community support 

also requires removal of a sufficient quantity of waste currently 

stored at SRS and the recommitment of processing used nuclear 

fuel currently stored at SRS storage pools. These two conditions 

along with ongoing health and safety monitoring, proper regulatory 

oversight, both at the local and State level, and a legally binding 

commitment to a final disposition plan are essential to community 

support for an interim storage option. 

Finally, we strongly urge the Blue Ribbon Commission to amend 

its recommendation number seven to specifically recognize the critical role of H Canyon at the Savannah River Site in international 

nonproliferation efforts. H Canyon, as you know, is a one-of-a-kind 

facility of immense importance to DOE and the Nation. In our 

view, it is imperative to reinstate H Canyon to operational status, 

fully funded and fully staffed. 

I thank the Committee for its oversight and contribution to the 

national dialog, and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McLeod follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RICK MCLEOD, 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

COMMUNITY REUSE ORGANIZATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today regarding the draft recommendations of the President’s Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. 

I am Rick McLeod, Executive Director of the Savannah River Site Community 

Reuse Organization—or ‘‘SRSCRO.’’ 

The SRSCRO is a non-profit regional group supporting economic diversification 

and job creation in a five-county region of Georgia and South Carolina near the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site. 

Our organization is unique across the DOE complex in that our area of interest 

covers multiple counties and two states. 

Blue Ribbon Commission Draft Recommendations 

The Blue Ribbon Commission’s draft report issued in July included seven recommendations: 

1. Develop an approach to siting and developing nuclear waste management and 

disposal facilities in the U.S. that is ‘‘adaptive, staged, consent-based, transparent, and standards- and science-based.’’ 

2. Create a new, single-purpose organization to develop and implement a focused, integrated program for the transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste in the U.S. 

3. Assure access by the nuclear waste management program to the balance in 

the Nuclear Waste Fund and to the revenues generated by annual nuclear 

waste fee payments. 
67 

4. Initiate prompt efforts to develop, as quickly as possible, one or more permanent deep geological facilities for the safe disposal of spent fuel and high-level 

nuclear waste. 

5. Initiate prompt efforts to develop, as quickly as possible, one or more consolidated interim storage facilities as part of an integrated, comprehensive plan for 

managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. 

6. Provide stable, long-term support for research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) on advanced reactor and fuel cycle technologies that have the potential to offer substantial benefits relative to currently available technologies 

and for related workforce needs and skills development. 

7. Provide international leadership to address global non-proliferation concerns 

and improve the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials worldwide. 

Halting Yucca Mountain Is Wrong Decision 

First, let me say that the individuals and groups I represent in South Carolina 

and Georgia continue to believe that the Administration’s decision to halt work on 

Yucca Mountain is wrongheaded and counter to the Nation’s long-term best interests. 

Our objection to the Administration’s Yucca Mountain policy is well-known and 

highlighted by actions taken by our organization. 

• We produced a widely distributed community white paper designed to facilitate 

discussion and a regional and national consensus on safe, permanent nuclear 

waste disposal. 

• We gathered resolutions from 22 governmental bodies and economic development groups in our region supporting continuation of the Yucca Mountain 

project. 

• We held a well-covered press conference at the National Press Club in Washington to amplify our objections to the Administration’s decision. 

• We co-sponsored print ads as part of a national campaign to ask our elected officials and candidates where they stand on Yucca Mountain. 

• We have communicated frequently with our state and federal elected officials 

concerning our views and concerns. 

• We appeared three times before the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Energy Future. 

• Most recently, we joined with 25 other organizations across the country in signing a letter to the U.S. Senate supporting funding resumption of the NRC’s review of the Yucca Mountain license application. 

In short, we have mounted an extremely proactive community response in an effort to force reconsideration of the government’s ill-advised decision to halt work on 

Yucca Mountain, especially since Congress specifically stated so in the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act and Yucca Mountain is still considered the ‘‘law’’ of the land. 

DOE Should Reconsider Its Position 

We continue to urge DOE to reconsider its position and allow science and engineering—not politics—to establish the most appropriate means for disposal of highlevel defense nuclear waste. 

And we applaud Congressional efforts—including those of this Committee, specifically the June 2011 report on Yucca Mountain—to scrutinize the Administration’s 

actions with respect to Yucca Mountain and the lack of scientific integrity, openness, 

and transparency in its determination to terminate the project. 

We continue to believe Yucca Mountain was—and is—the right answer for permanent nuclear waste disposal, and its completion should be pursued vigorously, especially for high-level defense waste. We note that the Blue Ribbon Commission did 

not address Yucca Mountain in its draft report at the direction of the Secretary of 

Energy. We consider this to be the ‘‘missing recommendation.’’ 

Transparent, Science-Based Approach Is Needed 

With respect to the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendations, we fully agree 

with Recommendation #1 which calls for a consent-based, transparent, and sciencebased approach to waste management solutions. 
68 

If a science-based approach were followed with transparency, we would be completing the Yucca Mountain project today. 

High-Level Defense Waste Needs Separate Consideration 

It should be pointed out that we are on record multiple times with our strongly 

held concerns that because of the Yucca Mountain decision high-level defense waste 

will continue to be stored at the Savannah River Site with no disposition path available, thus by default becoming the ‘‘de facto’’ Yucca Mountain. 

On this point, we want to be extremely clear. In its final report, the Blue Ribbon 

Commission needs to de-couple high-level defense waste—including the vitrified 

waste and used nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research reactors—from commercial spent fuel. 

The waste is different. The quantity is different. The number of locations affected 

is different. The potential for future use is different. The legal and financial implications for the government are different. 

Commercial spent fuel and high-level defense waste should be treated differently 

based on their unique characteristics and requirements for safe storage and retrieval. Specific, separate recommendations are needed for disposition of high-level 

defense waste. 

New Federal Corporation Will Delay Progress 

With respect to the Commission’s second recommendation, we share the view of 

those who fear that forming a federal corporation dedicated to managing nuclear 

wastes could further delay efforts to dispose of the waste, especially defense waste 

which has no other disposition path than a geologic repository. 

All evidence points to the fact that disposal of defense waste at Savannah River 

Site is low among the Department of Energy’s priorities. 

It is also a fact that considerable time, money and effort would have to be devoted 

to setting up a new federal or quasi-federal organization to oversee disposition. 

Rather than create new bureaucracy, why not simply focus for a shorter period 

and for less money on just disposing of defense waste. A new organization just 

doesn’t seem to be a helpful solution in the current environment. We need solutions, 

not more bureaucracy. 

Nuclear Waste Fund Should Be Used for Its Purpose 

Third, we fully agree that access by the nuclear waste management program to 

the balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund and to the revenues generated by annual 

nuclear waste fee payments should be assured. 

Permanent Geologic Facility Is Needed Soon 

Fourth, we also fully agree with the Commission’s recommendation that prompt 

efforts should be initiated to develop, as quickly as possible, one or more permanent 

deep geological facilities for the safe disposal of spent fuel and high-level nuclear 

waste. We believe Yucca Mountain is the first of those facilities. 

‘‘Interim’’ Should Be Legally Defined 

The Commission’s fifth recommendation is that we develop one or more interim 

storage facilities as quickly as possible. 

While we appreciate the need for such storage, our concern centers on the term 

‘‘interim.’’ When it comes to nuclear waste, this is a relative term that is almost 

never associated with a fixed time frame. 

Rather, it can mean anything—from 10 years to 500 years or more. ‘‘Interim’’ 

needs to be clearly and legally defined before communities such as ours can begin 

to address the potential and advisability of such storage. 

In any event, our community will not support any interim storage of commercial 

spent fuel scenario unless a permanent solution is pursued at the same time. 

This means progress toward a permanent repository for commercial spent fuel 

and high-level defense waste and/or a program to reprocess or recycle commercial 

used nuclear fuel. 

Community support also requires removal of a sufficient quantity of waste currently stored at SRS and the re-commitment of processing used nuclear fuel currently stored at SRS in used fuel pools. 

These two conditions—along with ongoing health and safety monitoring, proper 

regulatory oversight both at the local and State level, and a legally binding commit-
69 

ment to a final disposition plan—are essential to community support for an interim 

storage option for commercial spent fuel at SRS. 

Fuel Cycle R&D Is Needed; H Canyon Should Be Utilized 

We strongly agree with Recommendation Six which calls for stable, long-term support for research, development, and demonstration on advanced reactor and fuel 

cycle technologies. Furthermore, we believe the Commission needs to make a specific recommendation regarding the preservation and use of H Canyon as part of 

this R&D program. 

H Canyon, as you know, is a one-of-a-kind facility of immense importance to DOE 

and the Nation. 

• It is the only large-scale DOE facility that can stabilize and separate DOE’s 

inventory of complex plutonium materials into a form suitable for disposition. 

• It is the only facility that can prepare the large and growing inventory of research reactor fuel at the Savannah River Site for disposition, while recovering 

valuable highly enriched uranium. 

• It is the only facility that can support engineering development and ‘‘hot’’ 

testing of alternate nuclear fuel cycles and advanced Small Nuclear Reactors. 

We strongly urge the Blue Ribbon Commission to amend its Recommendation 

Number 7 to specifically recognize the critical role of H Canyon at the Savannah 

River Site in international non-proliferation efforts. 

The Commission should acknowledge that H Canyon is a national treasure that 

should be fully deployed to complete the original plan of disposing of nuclear materials brought to SRS. 

We believe DOE’s decision to place H Canyon at the Savannah River Site in modified operational status is short-sighted, especially at a time when critical existing 

mission needs are unmet. 

In our view, it is imperative to reinstate H Canyon to operational status—fully 

funded and fully staffed. 

Nuclear Waste Solution Is Critical National Challenge 

As we point out in our Yucca Mountain white paper, the challenge of properly disposing of nuclear waste touches every man, woman and child in America. 

It speaks to public safety, to energy independence, to technology and innovation, 

to global competitiveness and economic leadership and to the political will to do 

what is right—what must be done for the good of our communities today and of future generations tomorrow. 

I thank this Committee for its oversight and contribution to the national dialog. 

I urge you to carefully consider our comments and urge the Blue Ribbon Commission to incorporate our views into their final report. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. McLeod. And if any member 

of the Committee would like some interpretation, Mr. McLeod and 

I will be glad to interpret each other for you all. So thank you, Mr. 

McLeod. I appreciate your testimony. 

Dr. Peters, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MARK PETERS, 

DEPUTY LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAMS, 

ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I would 

like to thank Chairman Broun, Ranking Member Tonko and Members of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, also 

Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Miller and Representative 

Biggert and the other Members of the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Environment for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

My name is Mark Peters and I am the Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs at Argonne National Laboratory. Mr. Chairman, 

I ask that my full written testimony be entered into the record, and 

I will summarize it here. 
70 

I am honored to be here today to testify about science and technology challenges and opportunities associated with the nuclear 

fuel cycle, the need to develop new, sustainable technologies to enable America’s nuclear energy future, and finally, my perspectives 

on the BRC draft recommendations. 

For decades, the United States has grappled with the multiple 

challenges of crafting a long-term solution for the management of 

legacy and future used nuclear fuel. Over this past year, these persistent challenges have taken on new urgency as the accident at 

Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has focused international attention on the safety and security of used nuclear fuel 

storage. Today as we consider the BRC’s draft recommendations, it 

is critically important for us to take a close look at the many challenges that must be addressed if we are to succeed in managing 

our used nuclear fuel. 

I concur with the BRC’s draft recommendation to move forward 

expeditiously with siting, licensing and operating a storage and disposal system to manage legacy and future used nuclear fuel. I believe this is an important and necessary step toward enabling a 

sustainable nuclear energy future. A storage and disposal system 

is required in any nuclear fuel cycle. 

I also strongly support the BRC recommendation to conduct a robust advanced fuel cycle R&D program to inform future domestic 

fuel cycle options and maintain U.S. leadership in the global nuclear energy and fuel cycle enterprise. Yet while I understand the 

BRC’s conclusion that it is premature to seek consensus on the policy question of whether the United States should commit to closing 

the fuel cycle, I believe the BRC’s omission of this issue will result 

in a missed opportunity to inform our nuclear waste policy going 

forward. 

Given the necessary linkages between fuel cycle technologies and 

ultimate disposition of nuclear waste, I believe it is vital to make 

advanced nuclear fuel cycle R&D a critical component of our longterm strategy for nuclear waste management, and that our national strategy must simultaneously address issues of economics, 

uranium resource utilization, nuclear waste minimization and a 

strengthened nonproliferation regime. 

This is an increasingly urgent issue. At present, nuclear energy 

is the sole proven, reliable, abundant, affordable, and carbon-free 

source of electricity generation for the United States and the world. 

Our current nuclear-generating capacity is not sufficient to support 

the goals of our energy system going forward. Additionally, most 

existing nuclear power plants in the United States will reach the 

end of their operating licenses in the next few decades, so we must 

work swiftly and urgently to extend, replace, and add to the nuclear energy-generating capacity in the United States. 

To a great extent, our future capacity for nuclear energy generation will depend on our ability to safely dispose of nuclear waste, 

and perhaps even more importantly, to assure the public of the 

safety and security of our used nuclear fuel. Failure to find new 

workable solutions to the continuing problem of nuclear waste 

management will have serious long-term ramifications for our national economy and future global competitiveness. 
71 

Real technological progress in addressing these challenges is possible only within the context of a thoughtful, consistent policy for 

nuclear waste management, one that acknowledges the reality that 

a once-through fuel cycle may not be sustainable if global nuclear 

energy generation increases substantially. Our national policy must 

include substantial support for an advanced fuel cycle R&D program that is focused on outcomes, that is closely integrated with 

storage and disposal efforts, and that ultimately leads to down-selection, demonstration, and deployment of effective advanced fuel 

cycle technologies. 

To that end, the United States should conduct a science-based 

advanced nuclear fuel cycle research, development, and demonstration program to evaluate recycling, transmutation, and disposal 

technologies that minimize proliferation, environmental, health, 

and safety risks. This program should be carried out through robust public-private partnerships involving the Department of Energy, its national laboratories, universities and industry, and it 

should be conducted with a sense of urgency and purpose. My written testimony provides a more specific set of recommendations to 

advance nuclear fuel cycle R&D. 

I thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Peters follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARK PETERS, 

DEPUTY LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAMS, 

ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Summary 

The Blue Ribbon Commission’s (BRC) draft recommendation to move forward expeditiously with siting, licensing, and operating a storage and disposal system to 

manage legacy and future used nuclear fuel is an important and necessary step to 

enabling a sustainable nuclear energy future. A storage and disposal system is required in any nuclear fuel cycle. The BRC recommendation to conduct a robust advanced fuel cycle R&D program to inform future domestic fuel cycle options and 

maintain United States leadership in the global nuclear energy and fuel cycle enterprise is also important. Given the necessary linkages between fuel cycle technologies 

and ultimate disposition of nuclear waste, it seems most rational and efficient to address the challenges of advanced fuel cycle technologies concurrently with the broader policy questions of America’s nuclear waste management program. Real progress 

in addressing these challenges is possible only within the context of a thoughtful, 

consistent policy for nuclear waste management, one that acknowledges the reality 

that a once-through fuel cycle will not be sustainable if global nuclear energy generation increases substantially. 

Our national policy must include substantial support for a robust advanced fuel 

cycle research and development program that is focused on outcomes, that is closely 

integrated with storage and disposal efforts, and that ultimately leads to down-selection, demonstration, and deployment of effective advanced fuel cycle technologies. 

To that end, the United States should conduct a science-based, advanced nuclear 

fuel cycle research, development, and demonstration program to evaluate recycling 

and transmutation technologies that minimize proliferation risks and environmental, public health, and safety impacts. This program should be carried out 

through robust public-private partnerships involving the Department of Energy 

(DOE), its national laboratories, universities, and industry, and it should be conducted with a sense of urgency and purpose. 

Introduction 

For decades, the United States has grappled with the multiple challenges of 

crafting a long-term solution for the management of legacy and future used nuclear 

fuel. Over this past year, these persistent challenges have taken on new urgency, 
72 

as the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has focused 

international attention on the safety and security of used nuclear fuel storage. 

Today, as we consider the BRC draft recommendations on America’s nuclear energy 

future, it is critically important for us to take a close look at the scientific and technological challenges that must be addressed if we are to succeed in managing our 

used nuclear fuel. 

We must keep in mind, however, that real technical progress is possible only within the context of a thoughtful, consistent policy for nuclear waste management. Our 

national policy must include substantial support for a robust advanced fuel cycle research and development program that is focused on outcomes, that is closely integrated with storage and disposal efforts, and that ultimately leads to down-selection, demonstration, and deployment of effective advanced fuel cycle technologies. 

Only a reasoned plan for research, development, and deployment can lead to a decision on a preferred fuel cycle technology that will enable safe, sustainable expansion 

of the U.S. nuclear fleet. 

I concur with the BRC recommendation for prompt action regarding siting, licensing, and operation of storage and disposal systems to manage used nuclear fuel. Yet 

while I understand the Commission’s conclusion that it is premature to seek consensus on the policy question of whether the United States should commit to closing 

the fuel cycle, I believe the BRC draft report’s omission of this issue will result in 

a missed opportunity to inform U.S. nuclear waste policy going forward. As the draft 

report notes: ‘‘Future evaluations of potential alternative fuel cycles must account 

for linkages among all elements of the fuel cycle, (including waste transportation, 

interim storage and disposal).’’ Given those necessary linkages between fuel cycle 

technologies and ultimate disposition of nuclear waste, it seems most rational and 

efficient to address the challenges of advanced fuel cycle technologies concurrently 

with the broader policy questions of America’s nuclear waste management program. 

To that end, as I have testified previously to the House of Representatives, I believe that the United States should conduct a science-based, advanced nuclear fuel 

cycle research, development, and demonstration program to evaluate recycling and 

transmutation technologies that minimize proliferation risks and environmental, 

public health, and safety impacts. This program should be carried out through robust public-private partnerships involving the Department of Energy (DOE), its national laboratories, universities, and industry, and it should be conducted with a 

sense of urgency and purpose. To be most effective, this program must support evaluation of alternative national strategies for commercial used nuclear fuel disposition 

in close conjunction with ongoing efforts to site and develop a permanent geologic 

repository(s). 

Sustainable Nuclear Energy 

The ongoing challenge of America’s nuclear waste management program must not 

be considered in a vacuum. World energy demand is increasing at a rapid and largely unsustainable pace; each year, humans consume an average of 15 trillion watts 

of electricity and release over 30 gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere, and worldwide energy use is expected to soar over the coming decades. To satisfy national and 

worldwide energy demand, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and protect the environment, energy production must evolve from current reliance on fossil fuels to a 

more balanced, sustainable approach based on abundant, clean, and economical energy sources. At present, nuclear energy is the sole proven, reliable, abundant, affordable, and ‘‘carbon-free’’ source of electricity generation for the United States and 

the world. However, our current capacity for nuclear generation is not sufficient to 

support the goals of reliable, carbon-free, and affordable energy. Additionally, most 

existing nuclear power plants in the United States will reach the end of their operating licenses in the next few decades. At present, it is extremely unlikely that renewable energy sources, such as solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal energy, will be 

sufficient to replace that reliable, base-load capacity when those nuclear power plant 

licenses expire. So we must work swiftly and urgently to devise economically viable, 

environmentally responsible means to extend, replace, and add to the generating capacity of America’s 104 existing nuclear power plants, which now produce nearly 

20% of our electricity. 

As we seek to expand our portfolio of sustainable energy sources, we must take 

into account the national and international response to the accident at the 

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which occurred in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck northeastern Japan on March 11, 

2011. The Fukushima accident has led to worldwide uncertainty about the future 

of nuclear power; in response, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy have announced 

plans to phase out or cancel all existing and future reactors. To a great extent, our 
73 

future capacity for nuclear energy generation will depend on our ability both to safely dispose of nuclear waste and—perhaps even more importantly—to assure the 

public of the safety and security of our used nuclear fuel. Failure to find new, workable solutions to the continuing problem of nuclear waste management will have serious long-term ramifications for our national economy and future global competitiveness. 

In considering the draft recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission, I believe it is vital to make advanced nuclear fuel cycle research a critical component 

of our long-term strategy for nuclear waste management, and that our national 

strategy must simultaneously address issues of economics, uranium resource utilization, nuclear waste minimization, and a strengthened nonproliferation regime. All 

of these issues will require both systems analysis and substantial, consistent investments in research and development, demonstration, and test and evaluation, with 

those efforts directed toward the ultimate goal of a closed fuel cycle for waste and 

resource management. 

Used Nuclear Fuel Management 

It is the composition of used nuclear fuel that make its ultimate disposal challenging. Fresh nuclear fuel is composed of uranium dioxide (about 96% Uranium238, and 4% Uranium-235). During irradiation, most of the Uranium-235 is 

fissioned, and a small fraction of the Uranium-238 is transmuted into heavier elements known as transuranics. The used nuclear fuel contains about 93% uranium 

(mostly Uranium-238), about 1% plutonium, less than 1% minor actinides (neptunium, americium, and curium), and about 5% fission products. Uranium, if separated from the other elements, is relatively benign, and could be disposed of as lowlevel waste or stored for later re-use. However, some of the other byproducts raise 

significant concerns: 

• The fissile isotopes of plutonium, americium, and neptunium are potentially usable in weapons and therefore raise proliferation concerns. However, used nuclear fuel remains intensely radioactive for more than 100 years. Without the 

availability of remote handling facilities, these isotopes cannot be readily separated, essentially protecting them from diversion. 

• Three isotopes, which are linked through a decay process (Plutonium-241, Americium-241, and Neptunium-237), are the major contributors to long-term 

radiotoxicity (100,000 to 1 million years). Hence, they are potential significant 

dose contributors in a repository, and also major contributors to the long-term 

heat generation that is a key design limit to the amount of waste that can be 

placed in a given repository space. 

• Certain fission products (notably cesium and strontium) are major contributors 

to any storage or repository’s short-term heat load, but their effects can be mitigated through engineering controls. 

• Other fission products, such as Technetium-99 and Iodine-129, also contribute 

to long- term potential dose in a repository. 

The time scales required to mitigate these concerns are daunting: several of the 

isotopes of concern will not decay to safe levels for hundreds of thousands of years. 

Thus, the solutions to long-term disposal of used nuclear fuel are limited to three 

options (not necessarily mutually exclusive): the location of a geologic environment 

that will remain stable for that period; the identification of waste forms that can 

contain these isotopes for that period; or the destruction of these isotopes. These 

three options underlie the major fuel cycle strategies that are currently being developed and deployed in the United States and abroad. 

The nuclear fuel cycle is a cradle-to-grave framework that includes uranium mining, fuel fabrication, energy production, and nuclear waste management. There are 

two basic nuclear fuel-cycle approaches. An open (or once-through) fuel cycle, as currently envisioned by the United States, involves treating used nuclear fuel as waste, 

with ultimate disposition of the material in a geologic repository (see Figure 1). 
74 

In contrast, a closed (or recycle) fuel cycle, as currently planned by other countries 

(e.g., France, Russia, and Japan), treats used nuclear fuel as a resource, separating 

and recycling actinides in reactors and using geologic disposal for remaining wastes 

(see Figure 2). 

The open nuclear fuel cycle relies on disposition of used nuclear fuel in a geologic 

repository that must contain the constituents of that fuel for hundreds of thousands 

of years. Several countries have programs to develop these repositories. This approach is considered safe, provided suitable repository locations and space can be 

found. As noted in the BRC draft report, the challenges of long-term geologic disposal of used nuclear fuel are well recognized and are related to the uncertainty 

about both the long-term behavior of used nuclear fuel and the geologic media in 

which it is placed. 

For the closed nuclear fuel cycle, limited recycle options are commercially available in France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. These nations currently use the 

Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extraction (PUREX) process, which separates 

uranium and plutonium and directs the remaining transuranics to vitrified waste, 

along with all the fission products. In this process, uranium is stored for eventual 

reuse and plutonium is used to fabricate mixed-oxide fuel that can be used in conventional reactors. Used mixed-oxide fuel currently is not reprocessed, though the 

feasibility of mixed-oxide fuel reprocessing has been demonstrated. It is typically 

stored for eventual disposal in a geologic repository. Although a reactor partially 

loaded with mixed-oxide fuel can destroy as much plutonium as it creates, this approach results in increased production of americium, a key contributor to the heat 

generation in a repository. 

This limited recycle approach has two significant advantages: 

• It can help manage the accumulation of plutonium. 

• It can significantly reduce the volume of used nuclear fuel and high-level waste 

destined for geologic disposal. For example, the French experience indicates 

that this limited recycling can achieve volume reductions by a factor of 5 to 10. 

However, there are several disadvantages to the PUREX process: 
75 

• It imposes a small economic penalty by increasing the net cost of electricity a 

few percent. 

• The separation of pure plutonium in the PUREX process is considered by some 

to be a proliferation risk. 

• This process does not significantly improve the use of the repository space (the 

improvement is around 10%, as compared to many factors of 10 for closed fuel 

cycles). 

• This process does not significantly improve the use of natural uranium (the improvement is around 15%, as compared to several factors of 10 for closed fuel 

cycles). 

Full recycle approaches are currently being researched in France, Japan, China, 

Russia, South Korea, India, and the United States. These typically comprise three 

successive steps: an advanced separations technology that mitigates the perceived 

disadvantages of PUREX, partial recycle in conventional reactors, and closure of the 

fuel cycle in fast reactors. Note: the middle step can be eliminated and still attain 

the waste management benefits; inclusion of the middle step is a fuel cycle systemlevel consideration. 

The first step, using advanced separations technologies, allows for the separations 

and subsequent management of high-purity product streams. These streams are: 

• Uranium, which can be stored for future use or disposed of as low-level waste. 

• A mixture of plutonium and neptunium, which is intended for partial recycle 

in conventional reactors, followed by recycle in fast reactors. 

• Separated fission products intended for short-term storage, possibly for transmutation, and for long-term disposal in specialized waste forms. 

• The minor actinides (americium and curium) for transmutation in fast reactors. 

The advanced separations approach has several advantages: 

• It produces minimal liquid waste forms and eliminates the issue of the ‘‘waste 

tank farms.’’ 

• Through advanced monitoring, simulation, and modeling, it provides significant 

opportunities to detect misuse and diversion of weapons-usable materials. 

• It provides the opportunity for significant cost reduction. 

• Finally, and most importantly, it provides the critical first step in managing all 

hazardous elements present in the used nuclear fuel. 

The second step—partial recycle in conventional reactors—can expand the opportunities offered by the conventional mixed-oxide approach. In particular, it is expected that, with significant R&D effort, new fuel forms can be developed that could 

burn up to 50% of the plutonium and neptunium present in used nuclear fuel. Some 

studies also suggest that it might be possible to recycle fuel in these reactors many 

times—i.e., reprocess and recycle the irradiated advanced fuel—and further destroy 

plutonium and neptunium; other studies also suggest possibilities for transmuting 

americium in these reactors. Nevertheless, the practicality of these schemes is not 

yet established and requires additional scientific and engineering research. The advantage of the second step is that it reduces the overall cost of the closed fuel cycle 

by consuming plutonium in conventional reactors, thereby reducing the number of 

fast reactors needed to complete the transmutation mission of minimizing hazardous 

waste. As mentioned above, this step can be entirely bypassed, and all transmutation performed in advanced fast reactors, if recycle in conventional reactors is 

judged to be undesirable. 

The third step, closure of the fuel cycle using fast reactors to transmute the fuel 

constituents into much less hazardous elements, and advanced reprocessing technologies to recycle the fast reactor fuel, constitutes the ultimate step in realizing 

sustainable nuclear energy. This process will effectively destroy the transuranic elements, resulting in waste forms that contain only a very small fraction of the 

transuranics (less than 1%) and all fission products. These technologies are now 

being developed in the U.S. at Argonne National Laboratory and Idaho National 

Laboratory, with parallel development internationally (e.g., Japan, France, and Russia). 

Several disadvantages have been noted for a closed fuel cycle, including: 

• Increased cost. (Note that, in practice, closed fuel cycle processes actually would 

have limited economic impact; the increase in the cost of electricity would be 

less than 10%.) 
76 

• Expected increased generation of low-level waste, although this increase might 

be addressed successfully through improved technologies. 

• Management of potentially weapons-usable materials may be viewed as a proliferation risk. 

These disadvantages can be addressed through a robust research, development, 

and demonstration program focused on advanced reactors and recycling options. In 

the end, the full recycle approach has significant benefits: 

• It can more effectively utilize repository space. 

• It can effectively increase the use of natural uranium. 

• It eliminates the uncontrolled buildup of isotopes that are a proliferation risk. 

• An advanced reactor and associated processing plant can be deployed in small 

co-located facilities that minimize the risk of material diversion during transportation. 

• A fast reactor does not require the use of very pure, weapons-usable materials, 

thus decreasing proliferation risk. 

• Finally, full recycle can usher the way towards full sustainability to prepare for 

a future time when uranium supplies may become increasingly difficult to obtain. 

In summary, the overarching challenge associated with the choice of any fuel cycle 

option is used nuclear fuel management. While geologic repositories will be needed 

for any type of nuclear fuel cycle, a closed fuel cycle would result in very different 

use of a repository. For reprocessing to be beneficial (as opposed to counterproductive), it must be followed by recycling, transmutation, and destruction of the 

long-lived radiotoxic constituents (i.e., plutonium, neptunium, americium). Reprocessing (with PUREX) followed by thermal-recycling (mixed-oxide [MOX] fuel in light 

water reactors [LWRs]) is well established, but is only a partial solution. It is not 

at all clear that the United States should embark on this path, especially since we 

have not made a large investment in a PUREX/MOX infrastructure. (N.B. The U.S. 

is proceeding with a plan to reduce excess-weapons plutonium inventory using MOX 

in LWRs.) In contrast, advancement of fast reactor technology for transuranic recycling and consumption would maximize the benefits of waste management and also 

allow essential progress toward the longer-term goal of sustainable use of uranium 

(and subsequently thorium) with fast reactors. These differences illustrate the importance of integrating advanced fuel cycle technology research and development 

into any national plan to address nuclear waste management. 

As we approach this subject, we also must remember that, while there is no urgent need to deploy recycling today, a once-through fuel cycle will not be sustainable 

if global nuclear energy generation increases substantially. To maximize the benefits of nuclear energy in an expanding nuclear energy future, it will be necessary 

to close the fuel cycle. 

Detailed Discussion 

Argonne National Laboratory 

Located 25 miles southwest of Chicago, Argonne National Laboratory is a direct 

descendant of the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory, where Enrico 

Fermi and his colleagues created the world’s first controlled nuclear chain reaction. 

Appropriately, Argonne’s first mission 64 years ago was to develop nuclear reactors 

for peaceful purposes. Managed by the UChicago Argonne, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy, Argonne has grown into a multidisciplinary laboratory with a 

unique mix of world-class scientists and engineers and leading-edge user facilities, 

working to create new technologies that address the most important scientific and 

societal needs of our nation. 

Argonne’s experience over many years of research and development in the advancement of nuclear energy positions it as a leader in the development of future 

generation reactors and fuel cycle technologies. A primary goal of Argonne’s nuclear 

energy research program is to advance the sustainable use of nuclear energy 

through research and development of technologies that enable waste minimization, 

enhanced resource utilization, competitive economics, and increased assurance of reliability, safety, and security. Expertise in reactor physics, nuclear and chemical engineering, computational science and engineering, and fuel cycle analysis is applied 

in the assessment and conceptual development of advanced nuclear energy systems 

that meet these important goals. 
77 

In collaboration with other DOE laboratories and universities, Argonne is advancing a science- and simulation-based approach for optimizing the design of advanced 

nuclear energy systems and assuring their safety and security. This approach seeks 

increased understanding of physical phenomena governing system behavior and incorporates this understanding in improved models for predicting system performance in operating and off-normal situations. Once validated, these models allow the 

simulation and optimization of system design and operation, to enhance safety assurance and cost competitiveness with alternative energy supply options. They also 

promise to accelerate the demonstration of commercially attractive systems in partnership with industry. 

Primarily, the DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), through its Fuel Cycle 

Research and Development program, supports Argonne’s waste management and reprocessing research and development activities. The objective of Argonne’s research 

in this area is to develop and evaluate separations and treatment processes for used 

nuclear fuel that will enable the transition from the current open fuel cycle practiced in the U.S. to a sustainable, environmentally acceptable, and economic closed 

fuel cycle. 

Our research focuses on the science and technology of chemical separations for the 

treatment of used fuel from both commercial and advanced nuclear reactors, used 

fuel characterization techniques, and waste form engineering and qualification. Ongoing projects related to reprocessing and waste management include: 

• Using advanced modeling and simulation coupled with experiments to optimize 

the design and operation of separations equipment. 

• Exploring an innovative one-step extraction process for americium and curium, 

radionuclides that are major contributors to nuclear waste toxicity, to reduce 

the cost of used-fuel treatment. 

• Further developing pyrochemical processes for used fuel treatment. These processes enable the use of compact equipment and facilities, treatment of used fuel 

shortly after discharge from a reactor, and reduction of secondary waste generation. 

• Developing highly durable and leach-resistant waste forms of metal, glass, and 

ceramic composition for safe, long-term disposal. 

In addition, Argonne’s nuclear science and engineering expertise utilizes theory, 

experiment, and modeling and simulation in the assessment and conceptual development of innovative, advanced reactors operating with a variety of coolants, fuel 

types, and fuel cycle schemes. Argonne also leads U.S. development of innovative 

technologies that promise to reduce the cost of fast-neutron reactors and increase 

their reliability. These technologies include high-performance fuels and materials; 

compact, low-cost components for the heat transport systems; advanced power conversion and refueling systems; and improved capabilities for in-service inspection 

and repair. 

Argonne’s research into the behavior of irradiated fuels and materials supports 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the regulation of industry initiatives to extend the operational lifetime and optimize the operation of existing and 

evolutionary nuclear reactors. Leading-edge systems analysis and modeling capabilities are used to assess the relative merits of different advanced nuclear energy systems and fuel cycles for various domestic and global scenarios of energy demand and 

supply consistent with environmental constraints and sustainability considerations. 

Argonne also has expertise in the components of nuclear technology that are critical 

for national security and nonproliferation, including the conversion of research reactors to low-enrichment fuels, technology export control, risk and vulnerability assessments, and national-security information systems. 

Current Nuclear Waste Reprocessing Technologies 

PUREX 

As discussed above, current commercial used nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies are based on the PUREX process, a solvent extraction process that separates uranium and plutonium and directs the remaining minor actinides (neptunium, americium, and curium) along with all of the fission products to vitrified 

waste. The PUREX process has over 50 years of operational experience. For example, the La Hague reprocessing facility in France treats used fuel from domestic and 

foreign power reactors. The plutonium recovered is recycled as a mixed-oxide fuel 

to generate additional electricity. This technology is also used for commercial applications in the United Kingdom and Japan. 
78 

There are a number of drawbacks to the PUREX system. PUREX does not recover 

the minor actinides (neptunium, americium, curium, and heavier actinide elements), 

which compose a significant fraction of the long-term radiotoxicity of used fuel. Advanced reactors can transmute and consume minor actinides if they are separated 

from other fission product elements, but incorporation of minor actinide separations 

into existing PUREX facilities adds complexity and is outside commercial operating 

experience. Moreover, existing international facilities do not capture fission gases 

and tritium; these are discharged to the environment within regulatory limits. Although plutonium is recycled as mixed oxide fuel, this practice actually increases 

the net discharge of minor actinides. Finally, the production of pure plutonium 

through PUREX raises concerns about materials security and proliferation of nuclear weapons-usable materials. 

PYROPROCESSING 

Pyroprocessing is currently being used at the Idaho National Laboratory to treat 

and stabilize used fuel from the decommissioned EBR-II reactor. The key separation 

step, electrorefining, recovers uranium (the bulk of the used fuel) in a single compact process operation. Ceramic and metallic waste forms, for active metal and 

noble metal fission products respectively, are being produced and have been qualified for disposal in a geologic repository. However, the demonstration equipment 

used for this treatment campaign has limited scalability. Argonne has developed 

conceptual designs of scalable, high-throughput equipment as well as an integrated 

facility, but to date only a prototype advanced scalable electrorefiner has been fabricated and successfully tested. 

Advanced Reprocessing Technologies 

Research on advanced reprocessing technologies focuses on processes that meet 

U.S. non-proliferation objectives and enable the economic recycling of long-lived 

actinides in used fuel, while reducing the amount and radiotoxicity of high-level 

wastes that must be disposed. Main areas of research include: 

• Aqueous-based Process Design—Current studies target the simplification of 

aqueous processes that can recover the long-lived actinides as a group in one 

or two steps. 

• Pyrochemical-based Process Design—Present work is focused on development of 

scalable, high-throughput equipment and refining our understanding of the fundamental electrochemical process. We are targeting greater control of the composition of the recovered uranium/transuranic alloy, which will facilitate safeguards consistent with U.S. non-proliferation goals. 

• Off-gas Treatment—Environmental regulations limiting the release of gaseous 

fission products require the development of materials that will efficiently capture and retain volatile fission products. Because these volatile fission products 

are generally difficult to retain, development of novel materials with strong affinities for specific fission products is essential. 

• Product/Waste Fabrication—This development effort includes concentrating the 

product streams and recovery/recycle of process fluids, solidification of products 

for both waste form and fuel fabrication/recycle. The products must meet stringent requirements as nuclear fuel feedstocks or must be suitable for waste form 

fabrication. 

• Process Monitoring and Control—Advanced computational techniques are being 

developed to assess and reduce uncertainties in processing operations within a 

plant. Such uncertainties in design, in processing, and in measurements significantly increase costs through increased needs for large design margins, material 

control and accounting, and product rework. 

• Sampling Technologies—The tracking of materials is critical to the safeguarding 

and operational control of recycle processes. Improving the accuracy of real-time 

measurements is a major goal for material accountancy and control. Reducing 

the turnaround time for analysis by applying state-of-the-art sampling and analytical techniques will enable ‘‘on-line’’ material accountancy in real time. Advanced spectroscopic techniques are under study to reduce gaps in our ability 

to identify key species at key locations within a plant. 

Impact on Future Nuclear Waste Management Policy 

The BRC draft report details possible solutions for the ultimate disposal of used 

nuclear fuel in the United States. To be most effective, these efforts should proceed 
79 

in parallel with advances in used fuel processing and recycling, to ensure development of a fully integrated policy for nuclear waste management in the United 

States—one that is consistent with our energy security, nonproliferation, and environmental protection goals. 

As previously noted, high-level waste disposal facilities are required for all fuel 

cycles, but the volumes and characteristics of the wastes generated by these fuel cycles are different. A cohesive waste classification system will be needed to define the 

facilities required to support waste disposal. Currently, the United States relies on 

an ad hoc system based on point of origin to address management of specific wastes. 

The result is a complex dual waste categorization system, one for defense wastes 

and another for civilian wastes. This approach has resulted in high disposition costs, 

nuclear waste with no disposition pathways, limited disposition sites, and a system 

that will be difficult to align with any alternative fuel cycle that is adopted. Without 

a consistent waste classification system, it is impossible to compare waste management costs and risks for different fuel cycles without making arbitrary assumptions 

regarding theoretical disposition pathways. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends a risk-based classification system that accounts for the intensity of the radiation and the time needed 

for decay to an acceptable level. The intensity of radiation is given by a range of 

radioactivity per unit of weight. Decay time is split into short lived (<30 years) and 

long lived (>30 years). The IAEA system does not consider the source of nuclear 

waste in either categorization or disposition options. The result is a simple, consistent, standardized system. 

The question of waste categorization is yet another example of why reprocessing 

technologies should be fully considered in any discussions about disposal options 

and long-term waste management policies. Alternative technologies will have different economies of scale based on the type and number of wastes. In addition, 

waste packages may be retrievable or not, and waste forms should be tailored to 

the repository site geology. Given the need to craft the most cost-effective solution, 

it would be a missed opportunity to approach the question of long-term disposition 

without developing a congruent approach to the fuel cycle. 

An Effective Fuel Cycle Strategy Going Forward 

Argonne believes that advanced recycle processes and waste management technologies should be developed and demonstrated at engineering scale during the next 

few decades. To enable an effective research and development strategy, the development of advanced fuel treatment technologies and waste forms must be closely coordinated with R&D on: 

• Advanced fuels and interim storage strategies for current light water reactors 

(LWRs), as these affect the requirements on reprocessing and waste technologies. Research on advanced fuels for light water reactors is one of the proposed thrusts of the DOE-NE Light Water Reactor Sustainability program. 

• Advanced reactors such as liquid metal and gas-cooled ‘‘Generation IV’’ reactors, 

which employ different fuel types and thus discharge used fuel that is very different from that of LWRs. Advanced fast spectrum reactors can efficiently consume the residual actinides in used nuclear fuel, effectively converting these 

actinides to electricity instead of discharging them as waste. 

Recommendations 

As part of our long-term strategy for nuclear waste management, the United 

States should conduct an advanced nuclear fuel cycle research, development, and 

demonstration program to evaluate recycling and transmutation technologies that 

minimize proliferation risks and environmental, public health, and safety impacts. 

This would provide a necessary option to reprocessing technologies deployed today, 

and supports evaluation of alternative national strategies for commercial used nuclear fuel disposition, effective utilization and deployment of advanced reactor concepts, and eventual development of a permanent geologic repository(s). This should 

be done as part of robust public-private partnerships involving the Department of 

Energy, its national laboratories, universities, and industry, and conducted with a 

sense of urgency and purpose consistent with the U.S. retaining its intellectual capital and leadership in the international nuclear energy community. 

Over the next several years, the research, development, and demonstration program should: 

• Complete the development and testing of a completely integrated process flow 

sheet for all steps involved in an advanced nuclear fuel recycling process. 
80 

• Characterize the byproducts and waste streams resulting from all steps in the 

advanced nuclear fuel recycling process. 

• Conduct research and development on advanced reactor concepts and transmutation technologies that consume recycled byproducts resulting in improved 

resource utilization and reduced radiotoxicity of waste streams. 

• Develop waste treatment processes, advanced waste forms, and designs for disposal facilities for the resultant byproducts and waste streams characterized. 

• Develop and design integrated safeguards and security measures for advanced 

nuclear fuel recycling processes that enable the quantification and minimization 

of proliferation risks associated with deploying such processes and facilities. 

• Evaluate and define the required test and experimental facilities needed to execute the program. 

Upon completion of sufficient technical progress, the program should: 

• Develop a generic environmental impact statement for technologies to be further developed and demonstrated. 

• Conduct design and engineering work sufficient to develop firm cost estimates 

with respect to development and deployment of advanced nuclear fuel recycling 

processes. 

• Cooperate with the NRC in making DOE facilities available for carrying out 

independent, confirmatory research as part of the licensing process. 

Argonne supports a greater emphasis on coupling the science-based approach for 

system development with an active design and technology demonstration effort that 

would guide and appropriately focus R&D, and thus enable assessment of programmatic benefits in a holistic manner. This would be accomplished by close cooperation of DOE, national laboratories, universities, and industry. The overall approach would seek to: 

• Increase understanding of the diverse physical phenomena underlying reactor 

and fuel cycle system behavior. 

• Improve ability to predict system behavior through validated modeling and simulation for design, licensing; and operation. 

• Develop advanced materials, processes, and designs for reactor and fuel cycle 

systems through application of scientific discoveries and advanced modeling and 

simulation capabilities, as well as the insights and lessons learned from past 

nuclear energy development programs. 

These efforts would allow for fuel cycle demonstration in a time frame that could 

influence the course of fuel cycle technology commercialization on a global basis. 

Moreover, each of the individual elements of the planned R&D (e.g., separations, 

waste forms, transmutation fuels) is potentially vast in scope and could absorb substantial resources, without commensurate benefit, if the different areas are not sufficiently integrated for the results to fit together in a viable system. 

It is clear that the United States must address significant hurdles, both in policy 

and in technology, as we seek effective solutions to the pressing question of used 

nuclear fuel management. We can expect success only if we can craft a consistent 

national policy that includes substantial support for a robust advanced fuel cycle research and development program, to be carried out through strong public-private 

partnerships involving the Department of Energy (DOE), its national laboratories, 

universities, and industry. This program must be focused on outcomes and closely 

integrated with storage and disposal efforts. It also must support evaluation of alternative national strategies for commercial used nuclear fuel disposition in close 

conjunction with ongoing efforts to site and develop a permanent geologic repository(s). Ultimately, this program must lead to down-selection, demonstration, and 

deployment of effective advanced fuel cycle technologies. Only through a reasoned 

plan for research, development, and deployment can we expect to reach a wise, 

workable decision on a preferred fuel cycle technology that will enable safe and sustainable expansion of the U.S. nuclear fleet. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Peters. I thank the panel for 

you all’s testimony. Reminding members that Committee rules 

limit questioning to five minutes, the Chair at this point will open 

the first round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five 

minutes. 
81 

Mr. McLeod, in your opinion, does the demand of the Secretary 

of Energy that BRC exclude Yucca in its deliberations detract from 

its ability to develop the best possible recommendations for nuclear 

waste management? 

Mr. MCLEOD. Yes, sir, Congressman, we do. We believe that is 

fact. We also believe that they could—we know eventually there is 

going to have to be another repository as well. We can move first 

with Yucca Mountain and then start work on the second one, and 

as I stated in our testimony, the written testimony, we also believe 

that maybe one of the missing recommendations from this report 

is where is the recommendation to utilize Yucca Mountain. 

Chairman BROUN. Very good. Thank you. 

Dr. Swift, please summarize the scientific evaluation of Yucca 

Mountain that you led for Sandia and the Department of Energy. 

How many years was the site studied? Can you describe some of 

the issues considered—hydrology, seismic activity, the robustness 

of engineering barriers—and what was found? Ultimately, what 

was concluded regarding the site’s suitability and its ability to 

meet NRC safety recommendations and requirements? 

Dr. SWIFT. Thank you. Certainly. The site was studied from the 

early 1980s until the time the license application was submitted. 

Work continued after the submittal of the license application in response to questions received from the NRC. Just in terms of the— 

one way to look at it is the volume of the work, the page count. 

The application is about 8,000 pages, 8,600. You know, there are 

196 documents that went with it. These were not simple documents. These were thick technical reports, maybe 50,000, 60,000 

pages total. The types of topics that were addressed, from a technical point of view, we saw our responsibility to evaluate essentially everything that was potentially relevant, so we catalogued 

what might happen, potentially relevant things, and including 

things that were on the face of them probably not relevant but for 

completeness there they were—changes in sea level, the effects of 

future changes in sea level, for example, effects of erosion at the 

land surface well above where the waste would be buried, seismic 

effects, the effects of possible volcanism at the site. Each of these 

ends up with a detailed technical analysis, specialists focusing on 

it, sometimes for years. 

The other processes, groundwater flow, transport of radionuclides 

in the groundwater away from the site, the way radionuclides 

might be taken up in the biosphere through potential pathways for 

human exposure in the future, the treatment of uncertainty that 

Professor Kasperson mentioned, and all of this we did attempt to 

estimate the range of uncertainty in our knowledge understanding 

of those physical processes, and that would be incorporated into 

what I refer to as an estimate, not a prediction of the future. It is 

an estimate based on our understanding of the uncertainty. 

And I think you asked for the conclusions of it. Again, as I said 

in my testimony, we concluded with good confidence that the site 

would perform well, that it would meet the NRC and EPA requirements, that the two things, the primary measures that the regulations judge on would be the releases from the site into groundwater 

and potential doses to humans. Those are both well below regulatory limits. 
82 

Chairman BROUN. Very good, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. Hollis, the State of Nevada currently opposes the repository 

at Yucca Mountain. You were very clear that your local community 

does ardently support it being there. One of the primary recommendations from the draft, the Blue Ribbon Commission report, 

was that any repository should have local support. Why does Nevada oppose the Yucca Mountain project yet your county favors it, 

and how do you define consent-based siting and local support? 

Mr. HOLLIS. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the big things is people calling it a dump. If you go out and ask people, do you favor 

a radioactive site, that it is a dump, you are going to get no, I don’t 

want it. If you were to ask them, do you want a repository to keep 

the radioactive source safe, you will probably get a yes. Most people 

keep their money in banks. Banks are a repository. That is what 

this facility is, a repository to keep something safe. 

And as far as the consent basis program, the Blue Ribbon Commission didn’t answer any question. What if a State doesn’t or no 

State wants the repository? That is the reason Congress had a provision in there that the Congress would vote on it after a disapproval by the State. 

Chairman BROUN. Very good. My time is expired. 

Now I recognize the Ranking Member Tonko for five minutes. 

Mr. TONKO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Dr. Kasperson, could you briefly tell us about the role of politics 

in the 1987 decision to designate Yucca Mountain as a permanent 

repository for waste? 

Dr. KASPERSON. The history of radioactive waste management 

not only in the United States but elsewhere has indicated that it 

has never been a purely scientific process anywhere as far as I 

know, and there has always been a mixture of politics and science 

and interaction between the two, in particular, a 1987, a concern 

that I think went through the scientific community as well as people in Nevada. By the way, I also don’t like the terminology of calling a repository a dump, but I don’t think we fix the problem by 

changing the name. 

Anyhow, in the case of the 1987 amendments, what happened in 

effect was that although a commitment had been made in the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act to have a competitive process, if you 

will, about characterizing the technical qualities and quality assurance and risks associated with sites, a decision was made basically 

to make the choice prior to the scientific work being completed, and 

that was a major problem in a loss of social trust and in polarizing 

the local people of Nevada. There have been other issues like this, 

for example, in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of fairness. Actually, 

Congress, I think, tried very hard on—in that legislation to achieve 

fairness of process, and subsequently the President simply eliminated the eastern repository as basically a political move, I think, 

primarily because of the dangers that were represented and the 

election going on at that time. 

Mr. TONKO. Now, even if the geology and the climate, for instance, were perfect or are perfect, which some dispute, Yucca has 

been a political failure with, you know, then-Presidential candidate 

Senator Obama promising to close it. Now, leading Republican candidates for the Presidency are making that same sort of pledge, 
83 

and we hear about the vast number of Nevadans who oppose, you 

know, hosting that repository. Are there any lessons that you can 

cite for us, Dr. Kasperson, from the failure that can be used to 

guide future siting processes? 

Dr. KASPERSON. Well, let me indicate one example. I spent some 

time in Sweden earlier, in the early years of this century, and had 

some contact with their process there, and the Swedes really take 

a rather different approach than we have taken, and I think it is 

a lesson from both the process going on in Sweden and a lesson 

from Yucca Mountain that if you really rely upon coercion rather 

than on trying to achieve a high degree of voluntary consent, you 

are going to find yourself in a war with local States, and I think 

a number of us wrote in the 1980s that we already had learned 

enough about radioactive waste management to know that if you 

had to deal with trying to coerce an unwilling State with an active 

and talented Attorney General, you were going to have a major 

problem in winning over consent, and the polarization that has 

happened in Nevada is, I think, a good lesson that we ought to try 

to do more of what the Swedes have done of achieving a high degree of voluntary consent, taking things off the agenda that local 

people are concerned about and moving that whole process along, 

greasing the wheels rather than producing the backs up of local 

people. 

Mr. TONKO. I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Tonko. 

Now I recognize my fellow Subcommittee Chairman, Dr. Harris, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to get back to, you know, talking about the science of 

Yucca Mountain. We have spent, as I said in my opening statement, billions of dollars, many of years studying it, and all the 

science that we are aware of right now says that the nuclear waste 

can be stored there safely, but much of that scientific effort and 

data is being blocked from public view because the NRC simply refuses to release the safety reports that scientists prepared and refuses to complete its review of the Yucca Mountain license application. In fact, Chairman Hall, Dr. Broun and myself have sent multiple letters to the NRC demanding release of this information and 

action on the license. 

I want to ask the panel, and begin with Mr. Spencer, how important is it for the NRC to finalize and release its scientific reviews 

of the site, that is, the safety evaluation reports? Can any of you 

think of any reason why you would want to withhold any of that 

from the public, stonewall this, and what does the continued suppression of those reports mean with respect to the scientific integrity goals and guidelines that this Administration, you know, to 

their credit regularly talk about but, you know, I would like to actually see it in action? So, Mr. Spencer. 

Mr. SPENCER. As I testified today and I have written extensively 

on in the past, I think it is absolutely critical that all that information be made available if for no other reason, notwithstanding 

whether we ever build the repository or not, to allow us all to make 

the most informed decisions possible about Yucca Mountain. In addition to that, the fact is, we have spent as a country $15 billion 
84 

characterizing that project. There simply is no good reason not to 

allow all the information relevant to that project be shown the light 

of day so that we can make our determinations on that. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you. 

Dr. Swift, any reasons you can think of not to do it? 

Dr. SWIFT. I want to thank you for the question. I want to emphasize the importance of the role of the regulator in this process. 

I asserted earlier that I believe the site meets those regulations. 

The test of that is when a regulator makes that finding. I as a scientist don’t actually make a decision here. I inform a decision, and 

we do have a process here which decision is up to the regulator, 

a lengthy and detailed process to be followed. Yes, I see value in 

following that process. 

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. McLeod? 

Mr. MCLEOD. I will give a short answer. Yes, they should release 

the report. 

Mr. HARRIS. No reason you can think of where we should hide 

any of that from the public? 

Mr. MCLEOD. No reason. 

Mr. HARRIS. Okay. Dr. Peters? 

Dr. PETERS. Yes, I would agree. I would like to see it released. 

The reason I would also like to see it released is because regardless 

of whether we move forward with Yucca Mountain, we have to develop a repository, so there is a tremendous amount to learn from 

understanding what—— 

Mr. HARRIS. What we have done so far. 

Dr. PETERS. What we have done so far and what the regulator 

said about the license application. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you. 

Let me just ask two other very short questions. One is, is that, 

you know, Dr. Kasperson, I appreciate your point about, you know, 

coercion versus voluntary consent. That is important. But right 

next to you is Mr. Hollis. I mean, he lives in the area. His family 

drinks the water, breathes the air, and he is here, he doesn’t look 

coerced to me. So I am going to ask you, Mr. Hollis, you know, according to your testimony, you have—Nye County has done some 

scientific investigation, according to your written testimony, and 

based on that, I mean, do you need to be coerced or are you, you 

know, looking at the data, looking at what the county itself looked 

at, you want to be neighbors with this facility? 

Mr. HOLLIS. Absolutely. We have had a really good relationship 

with the Department of Energy until about two years ago, three 

years ago, then they started cutting down the program. The cooperation kind of went blank. And they don’t talk to us much anymore. 

Mr. HARRIS. But your testimony is that the county most affected 

and the people most affected, and it will never be everyone but 

they want this to go forward, at least to complete the investigation? 

Mr. HOLLIS. Absolutely. I have—I don’t get calls on Yucca Mountain. I get more phone calls on dogs and cats than I do—— 

Mr. HARRIS. I appreciate that, being a local elected official. I appreciate that. 

Dr. Swift, I just want to ask you one question, because I understand the DOE has asked Sandia to begin review of deep borehole 
85 

methods versus other methods of disposal. Could you just briefly 

discuss the advantage and disadvantage of the deep borehole methods, and then of course whether or not—because one of the conditions that is supposed to be retrievable is whether or not that is 

accomplishable with a deep borehole method. 

Dr. SWIFT. With respect to that last point first, if permanent disposal is not what you intend, a deep borehole probably is not the 

preferred option. There are ways to retrieve things out of a deep 

borehole. The oil industry, for example, can retrieve things from 

quite surprising depths out of a hole. But no, you are making it 

harder on yourself there. 

The premise of the concept is, you drill a relatively large diameter hole, say a half a meter in diameter, to maybe a five-kilometer 

depth into bedrock, crystalline bedrock, and you use the lower two 

kilometers of the hole for disposal and that gives you a very long 

column to seal it. It is a very long transport pathway for radioactive material to come back out. The premise is straightforward. 

The technology is within reach now. It is there now to implement 

it. There is work to be done to demonstrate that seal technology 

would work, that the permeability of bedrock at that depth is as 

low as we think it is. There is work to be done. 

Mr. HARRIS. And just out of curiosity, and I know I am a little 

over time, about how many of these boreholes would you need for 

the current nuclear waste we have? It seems like you would need 

a lot. Any idea? 

Dr. SWIFT. Yes, we looked at that. Without reconsolidating waste 

and just taking the fuel assemblies as they exist today, the entire 

projected inventory from the current fleet of 104 commercial reactors would fit in under—probably under 1,000 boreholes. 

Mr. HARRIS. Okay. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Miller for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Kasperson, I had the experience a couple years ago of living 

through a proposal to locate a facility in my district that initially 

everyone was for, and by the time it was done, hardly anyone was 

for it. It was a biological research center. It was to move the Plum 

Island facility from Plum Island. Supposedly, the decision to site it 

there in the first place was always completely political. There was 

a provision written into the law that required that it be on an island, supposedly to contain foot-and-mouth disease but supposedly 

that was always just to make sure it went to Plum Island and had 

no scientific basis. Initially everyone saw it as research, great jobs 

with all four of the county commissioners of that county was for it, 

everybody nearby was for it. NC State was for it, Duke was for it, 

Carolina was for it, everybody was for it. Over the course of several 

public hearings, all public support for it in Granville County deteriorated, and eventually the county commissioners reversed their 

positions, and at that point I reversed my position from having 

supported local government’s desire to bring it into their county to 

not supporting bringing the facility to a county in my district that 

did not want it. 
86 

How would the NBAF—it was called NBAF, that is an acronym 

for something—how did bringing—how did the siting decision for 

NBAF compare to the Yucca Mountain decision? Are you familiar 

with both processes? 

Dr. KASPERSON. No, I am really not, but I might make one observation, that we have been looking with interest on the siting of 

wind energy facilities in the United States, and everybody agrees 

in principle. At first, everybody favors it, and they agree in principle that wind energy is a fairly benign energy source as compared 

with nuclear and coal and so forth. But we also know that in many 

of these cases what starts—what you are seeing in that particular 

facility is something that occurs in many places, that people start 

off very positive about it. As they learn more and as issues are 

raised about it and risks get onto the agenda and become discussed, that people’s fears and concerns tend to take over in the 

process, and many of these situations end up with people quite 

negative, and I think it has become really difficult for hazardous 

facilities, hazardous industrial facilities and energy facilities very 

generally, even when they are as benign as wind energy and solar 

units, for example, to site any of those things, and the Cape Wind 

case, which you may be familiar with, is a good illustration of this 

where there has been a 10-year fight about establishing offshore 

wind turbines. 

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Hollis, you testified that there is support in 

your county that would actually be the—the Yucca Mountain facility would actually be in your county and that folks in your county 

do support it, see it as bringing jobs, economic activity, and as I 

said in my opening statement, though, this high-level nuclear 

waste, although there are concerns enough about keeping it someplace safely for 10,000 years, you have got to get it there first and 

it will not magically appear at Yucca Mountain, and all the rail 

lines, all of the roads that it would likely travel through, on to get 

to your county, to the Yucca Mountain facility, go through Las 

Vegas, and what is the population of your county and what is the 

population of Las Vegas, and would there be any jobs associated 

with having high-level nuclear waste coming through Las Vegas on 

roads or on rail? 

Mr. HOLLIS. Well, I have shipments of waste going to the test 

site pretty much every day, and none of that waste goes through 

Las Vegas. All of it goes around Las Vegas into Nye County and 

to the test site. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. My understanding is that 80,000 shipments 

a year would go through Clark County, through Las Vegas. 

Mr. HOLLIS. Far as I know, none of the shipments would go 

through downtown Las Vegas. 

Mr. MILLER. Downtown Las Vegas. How about Clark County? 

Mr. HOLLIS. There might be a few shipments that would come in 

from down and towards California but far as I know, all of it—well, 

there might be some coming across a little piece of Clark County 

going into Lincoln County, but most of it would go around Clark 

County. 

Mr. MILLER. Why is Clark County designated as an affected 

area? 
87 

Mr. HOLLIS. Well, I think it is an affected area. We used it as 

affected local units of government because it was designated at one 

time to have transportation. But there has never been any transportation that I know of nuclear waste going through Clark County. All the nuclear waste comes through Nye County, and I get it 

from every which way, no matter if it comes east, west, north or 

south. It has to go though Nye County. 

Chairman BROUN. The gentleman’s time is expired. I now—the 

Chairman now recognizes Ms. Biggert for five minutes. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. I wish that this wasn’t kind of a getaway date 

because I think this is a very important hearing, and we really 

could spend a lot more time, I think, than we have today. 

Dr. Peters, I have been at Argonne, and since I have been in 

Congress, we have gone through electrometallurgic process, we 

have gone through the pyro process, we have gone through the reprocessing, and now we are talking about recycling, and so I would 

like to know what you recommend for the next stage for the advanced nuclear fuel cycle R&D program. 

Dr. PETERS. I think DOE, Department of Energy’s, nuclear energy program has a lot of the right priorities set in place, so we 

have an R&D program that is developing advanced fuels for transmutation and fast reactors. There is fast reactor R&D going on. 

There is also work on materials for reactors and also bench-top experiments on electrometallurgical or pyro processing as well as 

aqueous reprocessing of spent fuel, so there has been tremendous 

research done. Resources are being provided. That needs to continue. As I said in my testimony, my plea would be to take that 

to try to start to develop some down-selection and actual demonstration of some of these technologies at the pilot scale. Take it 

out of the lab and start to demonstrate at the pilot scale working 

with industries. Even by the end of this decade would be optimal. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. You know, we really tried to jumpstart with 

GNEP and several programs and it just—it just seems to be 

stalled. Wouldn’t it make a difference if we had the closed nuclear 

fuel—the closed reactor to be able to then recycle and recycle and 

recycle so that we don’t have the waste that really—if we were to 

put the waste into some repository like Yucca Mountain, it would 

fill up with all the nuclear waste that we have right now, and it 

seems like before we really, you know, make such a site, that really 

to get the advanced fuel cycle recycling going would really be a 

benefit to how we are going to deal with this waste. 

Dr. PETERS. Yes, I agree. I agree, Mrs. Biggert. I think closing 

the fuel cycle will have a variety of benefits. It will reduce the volume and the toxicity of the waste. As I said before, there is still 

a repository required, but you could design a repository in a much 

different way if you close the fuel cycle. All that would go there is 

fission product waste. And you can also optimize the real estate 

that you take up in a repository, Yucca Mountain or any other repository. You are also reusing the actinides in the uranium to 

make additional electricity, so it is a more sustainable approach. 

The research that we are doing is to try to make it more economic 

and also reduce the amount of waste that is produced from those 

processes, but I firmly believe that if you grow nuclear, closing the 
88 

fuel cycle is the right path, but we have got to—if I may, I would 

actually like to go back briefly to the question about boreholes because it is a systems question. 

I would argue, it may not make sense to put spent fuel down a 

borehole, but it may make sense to put process waste down a borehole, so you have got to think about this whole thing as a system. 

The repository has to work with whatever fuel cycle you decide to 

do. 

And back to your point about the GNEP program, I think we— 

I would like to think we learned from that, and I think we did premature down-select in that case. I think we need to do a much 

more rigorous job of doing the R&D and having a transparent selection process that would allow us to down-select. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. And a demonstration? 

Dr. PETERS. Right, into a demonstration. I agree. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you. 

Mr. McLeod, you seem to be—— 

Mr. MCLEOD. I wanted to say that we would love to see the R&D 

done at the H Canyon at the Savannah River Site, which is one 

of the few facilities that could do that research and development. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. I might fight for Argonne, but we could do it more 

than one place. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. MCLEOD. We would be glad to share. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Biggert. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. McNerney for five minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is an important and serious topic, and I am getting the feeling, or I got the feeling, that the majority party here is using at 

least in part this topic as an opportunity to bash the Obama Administration. So we are going down a political path that we don’t 

need to go down, and I would rather talk about this in terms of 

issues that are going to help us solve the problem. 

As a graduate student at the University of New Mexico, I studied—I worked on a fault tree analysis for the Waste Isolation Pilot 

Project. So I have some scientific understanding of the issue, and 

my opinion is that deep geologic sequestration is a good approach 

and it can work, but I agree wholeheartedly with Dr. Kasperson 

that public trust and public acceptance is absolutely essential. We 

are not going to get this solved unless we have the public trust. 

Lawsuits are going to hold up everything. And, you know, I do appreciate the comments of Mr. Spencer that—or at least the approach that we think about using a method that will gain public 

acceptance. It is just that going to the private sector and letting 

them take care of it is not going to really engender public acceptance, and in fact, it would require an enormous amount of federal 

oversight and then there is also profits involved, so I think it would 

end up costing more and getting less done, so that is why I would 

not favor that particular approach. 

But I do think that you start out, Mr. Spencer, with very inflammatory language when you said the Obama anti-Yucca policy, and 

again, when you use that language, shutters close and people are 

going to react in a negative way, so my recommendation is to take 
89 

a less inflammatory approach to this if you want to get your idea 

across. That is just a recommendation that I give to you personally. 

Now, I wanted to ask Dr. Swift, I thank you for your testimony 

and I wanted to ask you personally, do you think that there is 

other alternatives to the Yucca Mountain that would be technically 

feasible? 

Dr. SWIFT. Yes, I do. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. I mean, one of the things that struck me here 

is, I think that nuclear waste has potential value in the future, and 

drilling a hole down there five kilometers and just dumping material waste and then closing it up, it is not going to be a repository, 

it is going to be a dump. Nuclear waste needs to be carefully stored 

and safely stored and monitored with the idea, in my opinion, that 

a withdrawal sometime in the future will be necessary. So I can’t 

say that I like that approach very well. That isn’t what is being 

done at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, is it? 

Dr. SWIFT. The—on your last point there, the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant does not have waste that has any particular recycling 

value to it. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Right. 

Dr. SWIFT. It would not be easy to recover waste out of it but it 

would be feasible, and that is actually a regulatory description of 

the situation. You would mine back through the salt and extract 

the salt and the waste at the same time. It can be done. 

In terms of other viable alternatives, for those that are fully retrievable at all times, actually Yucca Mountain was an excellent— 

that was one of the strongest features of Yucca Mountain because 

of its location above the water table in dry rock. Retrievability is 

fairly straightforward there. But other disposal options, the Swedish granite repository concept also being employed in Finland, 

being developed there. The French are looking and the Belgians 

and the Swiss are looking at disposal in clay formations. The Germans are looking at disposal in salt formations. These are concepts 

that are potentially viable in this country also as alternatives to 

Yucca Mountain. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. How is the—what is the current plan for encasing the actual high-level waste? Is it encased in—not in barrels obviously but in glass formations or something before it—— 

Dr. SWIFT. It—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY [continuing]. Can be sent downstairs? 

Dr. SWIFT. It depends on the environment you would want to put 

it into. You would want to choose a metal canister that was as corrosion-resistant, as long-lived as possible in the environment you 

were putting it in. So for example, in chemically reducing environments such as deep granites or clays, copper is a metal of choice. 

It is very stable in a reducing environment. In Yucca Mountain, 

where it is an oxidizing environment, the choice was a nickel-molybdenum-chromium-based alloy called alloy 22 that was as corrosion-resistant in that environment as we could come up with. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, I guess my final words are that we need 

to have public buy-in on this, and using inflammatory language 

isn’t going to help that happen. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. McNerney. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher for five minutes. 
90 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and I am very happy 

to hear Mr. McNerney admonish people for using—politicizing 

science and using harsh language. I guess when George Bush was 

in, that never happened. The other side never did that when Bush 

was in. I just want to make that clear for the record, that that only 

happens now. 

Let me just note that when you find yourself—this is a truism 

that I have learned. When you find yourself in a hole that you don’t 

want to be in, you should quit digging. That is a truism. And in 

this case, it sounds like to me what we have done is we have a 

Blue Ribbon Commission who is supposed to come up with our alternative or a vision of what we are going to be doing with nuclear 

waste, and they can’t get out of their mind the idea of digging a 

hole, and what I have seen here and what I am listening to is that 

it sounds like new technologies are not being addressed. What is 

being addressed is digging the hole. Can we dig the shafts this 

deep or whatever, whatever. You know, this—talk about old think. 

This is the ultimate old think, and here we were supposed to have 

a Blue Ribbon Commission that was going to give us a vision of 

what we would do in the future, and it has all been based on only 

what has been happening in the past. The Blue Ribbon Commission seems, from what I am understanding, what I can see here as 

well as from what I have heard, is that they have been negative 

or even hostile to looking into new concepts, for example, gas-cooled 

reactors, thorium reactors, or fast reactors, and their interest in 

small modular reactors seems to stop right at, let us say, the water’s edge, meaning that they are only interested in looking at 

water-cooled reactors. 

What I don’t understand is, we have several very prominent scientific and very, very responsible companies that are involved with 

development of technologies that have told us there are other alternatives than water-cooled reactors and they have done the science. 

One of them is General Atomics, who has a great track record. And 

we have many people talking about small modular reactors. We 

have many people talking about these pebble-based reactors, pebble 

base for fuel. All of these things offer a tremendous alternative to 

digging a hole and letting it sit there for thousands of years. I am 

shocked to hear that we have spent $15 billion on digging a hole 

in Yucca Mountain but we haven’t been able to come up with the 

money necessary to build a prototype of one of these reactors that 

would go a long way in reducing the challenge of nuclear waste. 

Am I wrong that these new reactors do offer a promise in the future of reducing the amount of nuclear waste that we would face? 

Dr. Peters? 

Dr. PETERS. No, you are not wrong, but I would emphasize the 

word ‘‘promising.’’ If I may, a lot of what you are referring to, the 

fast reactor technology has been demonstrated in the United States 

and worldwide so it could be—if there was a market for a fast reactor in the United States, we could develop that relatively quickly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The market? Where is the market for $15 billion to dig a hole in the desert? 

Dr. PETERS. But—— 
91 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I mean, there is a market for the fact that 

we would be creating electricity and there would be less nuclear 

waste left over here. 

Mr. Chairman, this is—what we have here is an example. If you 

put the people in the electronics industry who only could think 

about building the huge computers of the past, you know, they 

used to build them as big as this room, and then you got them to 

say well, can we—is there any solutions that we might have by 

building a small computer or maybe there could be a computer the 

size of your telephone. They wouldn’t know what you were talking 

about. 

There are some visionaries in this country that can help us solve 

the problem of nuclear waste, and we aren’t even building the prototypes and moving forward on the prototypes to see if they are actually correct, but the people who are advocating this are very 

high-quality scientists and engineers and people in the private sector. I would suggest that this hearing, while—and the Blue Ribbon 

Commission, while they have focused on what was—what they 

could have focused on in the 1970s should be focusing on a vision 

for the better future based on technologies that can change our reality, and until we do that, I am just afraid that we are—$15 billion. We are going to waste another $15 billion? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. PETERS. Mr. Chairman, may I real quick, very quickly respond? 

Chairman BROUN. Very quickly. 

Dr. PETERS. I guess I just wanted to—I mean, I don’t want to disagree. I want to agree with everything that you said, but a lot of 

the promising ones that you are referring to are on paper at this 

point so we need to go do the research and the prototyping to—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, but they were put on paper by prominent scientists and people who have built nuclear power plants and 

people who are—we are not saying Dana Rohrabacher put it on 

paper. 

Dr. PETERS. No, but we—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Some really prominent people put it on 

paper. 

Dr. PETERS. We need to make the investment to do it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Albert Einstein put something on paper and 

he ended up helping us usher us into this nuclear world. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Before we close, I would like to enter in the record by unanimous 

consent a number of documents previously exchanged with the Minority. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information may be found in Appendix 2.] 

Chairman BROUN. This hearing has allowed the Subcommittees 

to hear expert outside opinions about the BRC draft report. For the 

record and in response to comments by the minority at the outset, 

the Committee was in contact with the BRC prior to the hearing 

at which time that they indicated it would be premature to participate as their report is still in draft form and they are continuing 

to accept public comment. We will certainly continue to work with 

the BRC as they finalize their report and we will likely have an 

opportunity to hear from the BRC after they finalize their report. 
92 

I want to thank the witnesses for you all’s valuable testimony 

and the members for you all’s questions. The members of the Subcommittee may have additional questions for you all, and we ask 

for you to respond to those in writing, and please do it quickly. The 

record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments 

from members. 

The witnesses are now excused and the hearing is now adjourned, and I thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 
93 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
94 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Jack Spencer, Research Fellow, 

Nuclear Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation 

Questions Submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. Do you believe the demand of the Secretary of Energy that the Blue Ribbon Commission exclude consideration of Yucca Mountain as the site for a permanent geological repository in its deliberation detract from its ability to develop the best 

possible recommendation for nuclear waste management? 

A1. I absolutely believe that the demand by the Secretary of Energy to exclude any 

consideration of Yucca Mountain from the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 

Nuclear Future detracted from the Commission’s ability to develop the best possible 

answer. As the Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) stated in its draft report, the Nation 

will need a geologic repository regardless of what other technologies are brought to 

bear for the disposition of high-level commercial nuclear waste. Further, the BRC’s 

establishing document demands that it consider ‘‘all’’ options for nuclear waste disposal. 

Given both its findings and its charge, reason would dictate that the BRC be free 

to consider the Yucca location. After all, federal statue names the site as the Nation’s nuclear waste repository and the Nation’s taxpayers and electricity rate payers have invested over $15 billion in it so far. Thus, demanding that the BRC not 

even consider the Yucca project undermines the credibility of the entire BRC’s draft 

findings. If it ignores the facility that most clearly meets the conditions that the 

BRC has determined are necessary for any nuclear waste solution, one must question the legitimacy of the remainder of its findings. 

Giving the BRC the freedom to actually fulfill its charge by considering ‘‘all’’ options would not have necessarily been an overt endorsement of Yucca Mountain. The 

BRC could have acknowledged the political controversy surrounding the project and 

even recommended that a new site be found. At a minimum, it should have recommended that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission complete its review of the Department of Energy’s application to construct the repository and that all information 

relevant to that review be made public, including the entire Safety Evolution Report. 

However, denying the BRC the ability to even consider Yucca represents a major 

shortfall in the Commission’s analysis. 

Q2. How important it is for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to finalize and release its comprehensive technical reviews of the site (known and the ‘‘Safety 

Evaluation Reports’’)? Are there any drawbacks from completing the technical 

review of Yucca Mountain? 

A2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must release all information pertaining 

to the Yucca application. Regardless of whether or not the Yucca repository is ever 

built, the application contains critical analysis that is relevant to future repository 

activities. Though the information in the application is public, whether or not the 

NRC deemed the analysis provided by the Department of Energy sufficient to move 

forward with the project is not. Understanding how the NRC staff approached this 

analysis is critical to future repository applications. 

Further, regardless of President Obama’s current policy to abandon the Yucca 

project, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, clearly states that Yucca 

Mountain shall be the site of the Nation’s nuclear waste repository. The legality of 

the President’s policy is currently being determined by the court system. Should the 

courts find DOE’s attempt to withdraw the Yucca application to be illegal, then one 

would presume that the Yucca project would move forward. By releasing all data 

and analysis relevant to the Yucca application, the NRC would ensure that it could 

pick up its application review where it stopped. Just as important, the public would 

have access to this critical data, which would help them also to ensure that the NRC 

is picking up where it left off, as opposed to starting over or purposefully dragging 

its feet on the process. 

Even if the courts were to determine that the DOE could withdraw the application, there is a possibility that the Yucca project could move forward at some future 

point under other circumstances. In that situation, all data regarding the NRC’s review of the application would be critical. 

Finally, the public deserves to know what the NRC staff thought about the Yucca 

project. The public has invested too much money for the government to not provide 
95 

an answer to the whether Yucca could have been built safely. This is especially true 

given that many in the public base their opposition to the repository on the belief 

that it is not safe. Should the NRC determine it is not safe, then the NRC should 

show clear, science-based analysis as to why it is not safe, allowing the nation to 

then move beyond Yucca. However, if it is deemed safe by the NRC, then the public 

can have an open and transparent debate on the project’s merits. 

Q2a. What might the continued suppression of this technical information mean with 

respect to the scientific integrity goals and guidelines that the President regularly touts? 

A2a. Continuing to suppress this critical data seems to contradict President 

Obama’s scientific integrity objectives. Indeed, whether one is discussing climate 

change policy, policies regarding access to America’s vital natural resources, or nuclear waste policy, it seems that the President’s policies often do not respect sciencebased analysis. The fact is that whether the issue is building the XL Pipeline, drilling for oil and natural gas off America’s shores, or building the waste repository at 

Yucca Mountain, the science says one thing while the President’s policies and actions seems to convey another. 

Q3. You recommend that an entity other than the government have title over nuclear 

waste. Assuming that an entity could be created to accomplish this, what types 

of federal guarantees would be needed for the entity to operate in the long term? 

What sort of liability protections would be necessary? Do you believe the Federal 

Government has a role in providing liability protections to such an entity? 

A3. I recommend that nuclear waste producers be responsible for managing their 

own waste. They are best positioned to determine whether waste should be recycled, 

reprocessed, placed in a repository, or some combination thereof. Government management of commercial activities does not work. The outcomes are the same each 

time it is attempted. Despite the best intentions of politicians and bureaucrats, they 

are not capable of planning the best combination of activities and investments to 

yield an efficient and economically sustainable commercial activity. There are simply too many variables to consider. Ultimately, nuclear waste management is a commercial activity. It is part of the process, often referred to as the nuclear fuel cycle, 

necessary to produce useable energy from natural uranium. And just like other 

parts of the nuclear fuel cycle have been successfully run by the private sector over 

the past decades, so too must nuclear waste management. 

Instead of relying on politicians and bureaucrats to centrally manage the system, 

which has been a demonstrable failure, subjecting nuclear waste management to the 

powers of the market would yield real solutions. Ultimately, those that stand to 

profit from the production of waste have the greatest incentive to develop sound, 

safe, and economically sustainable solutions. Indeed, the private sector would even 

have the incentive, just as it has the ability, to develop commercial uses for spent 

nuclear fuel that have not been thought of before. 

This does not mean, however, that the private sector should take title of the final 

disposed waste. Given the long-lived nature of nuclear waste, the Federal Government should take ultimate title of whatever ends up in a repository once the repository is decommissioned. In essence, the waste producers would be responsible for 

getting the waste from the reactor to the repository. 

The repository should be privately operated as well. By allowing the repository 

to be privately operated and setting a specific price for emplacing waste, the nuclear 

industry could decide how best to manage its waste. 

Imagine that the repository operator sets a price to emplace waste based on a formula that considers waste volume, heat load, and toxicity. A reactor operator would 

know that it costs ‘‘X’’ amount of dollars to place a certain amount of waste in the 

repository based on that formula. It could then decide how to manage its waste 

based on that price. Perhaps placing it in interim storage to allow the heat load and 

radio toxicity to dissipate, thus resulting in reduced repository emplacement costs 

would make sense. If so, this would create a demand for interim storage, which a 

company could provide. It might make sense to reprocess the fuel as well. There is 

any number of combinations of services that could be brought to bear. The important thing is that the market would help guide investment towards that which 

makes the most sense. Because the waste producers would be responsible, they 

would pursue those options in the market place. 

Privatizing nuclear waste management, however, does not remove the role of government. The Federal Government’s role would be the same as it is for the rest of 

the nuclear industry. It would set strict safety guidelines and enforce them through 

the regulatory process. I would not recommend that any federal guarantees be 

made. My view is that nuclear energy only makes sense if it can be done economi-
96 

cally. I believe that it can be. But the only way to really find out is to subject the 

entire industry to the market. In fact, I believe that the best way to maximize its 

economic benefit is through market-based policies. Alternatively, the quickest way 

to ensure that the United States never realizes the full benefit of nuclear energy 

is for a major sector of the industry to be controlled by the Federal Government. 

That said, there is a limited role for liability protection until the United States 

creates a better system that allows businesses to operate without the fear of being 

subject to frivolous lawsuits. I believe that nuclear waste management activities 

should fall under Price-Anderson as do other commercial nuclear activities. However, I also believe that the Price-Anderson should not be extended beyond 2025, 

the current date it is set to expire. For this to happen, however, the U.S. must engage in regulatory, nuclear waste policy, and liability reforms that would allow the 

commercial nuclear industry to prepare for a post-Price-Anderson environment. 

Questions Submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer, Subcommittee 

on Energy and Environment 

Q1. In your testimony, you mentioned the importance of transferring nuclear waste 

disposal responsibility to the private sector. How can we ensure that the private 

sector will be willing to take the risks associated with nuclear waste disposal, 

as well as the regulatory concerns that will inevitably continue at the local, 

state, and national level? 

A1. We do not know with certainty that the private sector will take on these risks, 

but I believe that they will. We do know that the nuclear industry already engages 

in all other parts of the fuel cycle in order to produce and sell electricity. It mines 

the uranium, going thousands of feet underground to retrieve the valuable ore. It 

takes that ore and mills it into yellowcake, which is then enriched so that the uranium can be fabricated into fuel pellets. These pellets are then placed into bundles 

that ultimately fuel the reactors. The private sector then takes this used fuel, stores 

it in cooling pools, and then moves it into dry casks where it is being safely stored 

indefinitely. We have seen the private nuclear industry safely and profitably engage 

in every step of the fuel cycle, except for waste management. 

That has not always been the case. The Federal Government was at one time responsible for all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of these have been privatized 

over time. Most recently, in the late 1990s the nation privatized the uranium enrichment industry, and today the United States enjoys a robust, technologically 

modern, and private enrichment industry. That is the case across the board in nuclear energy. As government steps back, industry steps up. Consider the extremely 

high efficiency at which American power plants operate today. American nuclear 

power plants operate at over a 90 percent capacity factor. This feat was not a function of government intervention. It was the result of private nuclear plant operators 

responding to the market and figuring out how to maximize their profits, which ultimately benefits ratepayers. 

Even nuclear waste management has benefited from private ingenuity. The Federal Government decided in 1976 that it would not reprocess used commercial nuclear fuel, and the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, places the responsibility for nuclear waste management with the Federal Government. It was determined during that time that all nuclear waste would be placed in geologic storage. 

Nearly three decades later, having not implemented any solution for nuclear waste 

management, President Obama created the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s 

Nuclear Future to come up with an alternative strategy for disposing of America’s 

nuclear waste. Essentially, they determined again that nuclear waste be placed in 

geologic storage. In three decades, the Federal Government has made zero technological progress on nuclear waste management. 

Quite a different story exists in the private sector. Each nuclear power plant was 

built with a spent fuel pool in which to house the spent fuel when it is removed 

from the reactor. The initial thinking was that the fuel would spend roughly five 

or so years in the pools until it got moved to some other facility—either for burial 

or some other process. The pools were sized to meet this requirement. Over time, 

however, the pools began to fill up since the Federal Government never collected 

any of the fuel. This created a dilemma for the private utilities. They either had 

to figure out a way to store additional fuel or stop operating. So they did what the 

private sector always does if they want to stay in business: innovate. 

The nuclear industry developed two methods to allow it to store more fuel. First, 

it developed a technique call re-racking, which allowed them to safely place more 

fuel into the pools than they were originally designed to hold by placing newer fuel 

next to older fuel. But more impressively, they developed dry cask storage options. 
97 

Since the Federal Government was not coming to pick the fuel up, private industry 

figured out a way to safely store the fuel outside of the pools on dry casks. This 

innovation is allowing America’s nuclear power plants to operate despite the Federal 

Government’s failures. 

The nuclear industry has demonstrated time and again that it can solve most any 

problem. The flaw of the current system is that nuclear waste is a government problem. Solving nuclear waste could be accomplished by making it an industry problem. 

Q2. Most scientists agree that we need long-term storage of nuclear waste. Our experiences with Yucca Mountain highlight the political difficulties locally, statewide, and nationwide in accomplishing such an objective. How can we build 

local consensus anywhere in the country to accept long-term storage of nuclear 

wastes? 

A2. Building a local consensus to accept long-term storage can be accomplished. 

However, the Federal Government cannot do it. The fact is that no local community 

will want to negotiate with the Federal Government. It has proven to be an 

untrustworthy partner. The better approach is to allow industry to negotiate directly with local communities and for them to rely on the force of law through negotiated contracts to be the guarantor of terms. Further, it is critical that the local 

communities be in control of the negotiations. It is not fair if the Federal Government comes in and states that it is going to do something either way. That is not 

a negotiation. That is subjugation. The private sector does a very good job at working with local communities to site major projects, and it could do the same for a 

nuclear materials repository. 

Consider Yucca as an example. Under the current process, as dictated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, the Federal Government owns and operates the 

facility and predetermines that Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is the location. The negotiation was never really a negotiation at all. It was the Federal Government stating 

what was going to happen and trying to force the Nevadans to accept it. 

A better approach would be to transfer all of the permits and regulatory authorities to construct and operate the Yucca facility away from the Federal Government 

and to some entity that represented Nevadan interests. It could be the state of Nevada, a Nevada-based non-profit or even a Nevada-based business. Once those permits were in hand, then that entity could negotiate directly with the nuclear industry the terms that would be acceptable. This approach places all parties on equal 

ground and would allow for an actual negotiation that could yield a positive outcome. 

The government role in such a system would be to provide regulatory predictability and integrity. In essence, the private sector should be permitted to carry out 

whatever waste management activities that it deems appropriate if it meets local, 

state and federal regulatory and safety standards. 

Question Submitted by Representative Sandy Adams, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. Ratepayers in my state alone have contributed over $800 million to the Nuclear 

Waste Fund to date. While the used fuel is currently being held safely onsite by 

our utilities, doing so constitutes an additional economic burden. With the Administration pulling the plug on Yucca Mountain for political, not scientific, reasons, and no realistic alternative in place, why should my constituents continue 

to have to pay into the Waste Fund? 

A1. Your constituents should not have to pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund. The 

Federal Government has collected over $30 billion (principal and interest) since the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended became law. While competently collecting 

this money, the Federal Government has completely failed in its obligation to dispose of nuclear waste. Since the Federal Government has provided no nuclear waste 

disposal services, it is unclear why electricity rate payers should be compelled to 

continue paying the nuclear waste fee. At a minimum, rate payers should be relieved of this fee until the Federal Government instates a reliable nuclear waste disposal policy. Unfortunately, this seems to be beyond the Federal Government’s capability. That is why the focus of any solution should not be on reforming how the 

nuclear waste fee is collected but rather on repealing the fee altogether. This would 

eliminate the Federal Government from the nuclear waste business by allowing the 

utilities to directly finance nuclear waste management and disposal activities. 

While the blame for the Nation’s lack of a feasible nuclear waste policy lies 

squarely on the Federal Government’s shoulders, the solution should come from the 

private sector. 
98 

Unfortunately, that is not what the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future recommends. The draft recommendations that we discussed during this 

hearing would do little, if anything, to change the underlying flaws of the current 

system. Thus, the same problems plaguing nuclear waste management today will 

ultimately resurface. That is because the Federal Government remains responsible 

for nuclear waste management under the BRC’s recommendations. This is a flawed 

approach. Central government planning of commercial activities does not work. A 

better approach would be to put waste producers in charge of their own waste. 

Under such a system, your constituents would no longer pay any fee to the Federal Government. Instead, the cost of waste management would be folded into the 

price of nuclear-generated electricity. This would allow the nuclear utilities to build 

business models around the entire fuel cycle. Currently, they need only consider 

fueling the reactors and operating them, because the government takes responsibility for dealing with the waste. The problem with this system is that waste management is critical part of the nuclear fuel cycle. By giving that responsibility to the 

waste producers, the utilities would then seek the most cost-effective means to manage and dispose of the waste. This market-based approach would not only ensure 

that solutions were developed, since the utilities would need to dispose of their 

waste to keep operating their reactors, but it would ensure that the solutions made 

the most economic sense. 

This is in direct opposition to the current system, which misaligns incentives, authorities, and responsibilities. Currently, the Federal Government has no real incentive, despite the force of law, to develop any solution whatsoever, as evidenced by 

decades of incompetence on the issue. And further, even if it were to find a solution, 

there is no incentive for the Federal Government to operate economically. Placing 

waste producers in charge of their own waste management would fix both problems. 

That does not relieve the Federal Government of any responsibility. It would set 

strict regulatory guidelines and enforce them, for example. In essence, it would treat 

nuclear waste management activities the same as it does the rest of the nuclear industry. 
99 

Responses by Dr. Peter Swift, Distinguished Member, of the Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratory 

Questions Submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. Currently, two sets of federal regulatory standards for high-level radioactive 

waste repositories exist, one specifically developed for Yucca Mountain and another that would apply to all other sites. Which of these two standards is more 

stringent? 

A1. Background: Each of the two existing sets of federal regulations that govern 

permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste is consistent with the legal 

framework defined in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and each set includes overall 

safety standards set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and implementing criteria defined by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). One 

set, including EPA‘s 40 CFR part 197 and NRC‘s 10 CFR part 63, was written in 

the past 15 years specifically for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository, and 

would not apply to any other disposal concept without new rulemaking activities. 

The other set, EPA‘s 40 CFR part 191 and NRC‘s 10 CFR part 60, date from the 

middle 1980s, prior to the decision to focus solely on Yucca Mountain, and, in the 

absence of new rulemaking, would still apply in principle to any disposal concept 

other than Yucca Mountain. 

The older regulations, framed by the EPA in 40 CFR part 191, defined the regulatory period to be 10,000 years and set quantitative limits for scenarios that include all release pathways on the probability that the total amount of radiation released during the entire period would exceed specified values, rather than on the 

peak release in any single year. These regulations also tied the magnitude of the 

allowable release to the amount of waste emplaced in the repository: allowable releases were smaller for smaller repositories and larger for larger repositories. Consequences of inadvertent human intrusion by drilling were required to be included 

in the probabilistic compliance analysis. For the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 

which is the only repository operating under 40 CFR part 191, the approach to estimating the density of future drilling was specified by the EPA in the implementing 

criteria (40 CFR part 194.33). 

The newer regulations, framed by the EPA in 40 CFR part 197, are based on and 

consistent with guidance from the National Academy of Sciences (National Research 

Council, 1995) and were written specifically for Yucca Mountain. These regulations 

focus on the long-term annual dose from a repository and, following resolution of 

legal challenges, set limits on the peak dose allowable in any one year during the 

next one million years. (The period of one million years is consistent with the National Academy‘s guidance indicating that the period of geologic stability at Yucca 

Mountain is on the order of one million years.) There is no provision for scaling the 

allowable release to the size of the repository: the peak dose limits apply regardless 

of the amount of waste emplaced at the site. Human intrusion is required to be considered separately from overall performance in a stylized analysis, and releases directly to the land surface during drilling were excluded from consideration. 

Response: Both sets of regulations are highly protective of future human health 

and the environment, and it is not useful to attempt to determine which is more 

stringent during the 10,000-year period required by the older set of regulations. The 

Yucca Mountain standards apply for 1,000,000 years, and can therefore be viewed 

as being more stringent during the longer time period. However, I agree with the 

Blue Ribbon Commission‘s caution relevant to requirements for quantitative standards that apply for one million years: ‘‘the Commission believes that over-reliance 

on million-year calculations can reduce credibility rather than enhance it. As the 

IAEA has warned: ‘Care needs to be exercised in using the criteria beyond the time 

where the uncertainties become so large that the criteria may no longer serve as 

a reasonable basis for decision making‘ ’’ (BRC 2010, p. 103; IAEA 2006). 

Q1a. If Yucca Mountain has the more stringent regulatory standards, do you believe 

the government should abandon it to pursue an unknown repository with less 

robust thresholds? 

A1a. While I do not believe that the government should abandon Yucca Mountain 

to pursue an unknown repository, I also do not believe that the existing standards 

that would apply to other repositories would necessarily be less protective of human 

health and the environment. In addition, I concur with the conclusion in the draft 

report of the Blue Ribbon Commission that ‘‘the generic regulations that would currently apply to all other sites will need to be revisited and revised in any case’’ (BRC 
100 

2011, p. 98). The NRC staff has come to the same conclusion, indicating in public 

presentations that they intend to update or replace 10 CFR part 60 prior to licensing disposal at locations other than Yucca Mountain (e.g., Kokajko, 2011). I believe 

it is unlikely that any alternative repository would be subject to significantly less 

protective standards than those applied to Yucca Mountain. 

Q2. Knowing how long Yucca Mountain was studied, do you anticipate a similar 

timeline to establish confidence in the safety of a consolidated interim storage 

facility? What would you estimate such an evaluation to cost? 

A2. I believe technical issues associated with demonstrating the safety of a consolidated interim storage facility could be addressed with substantially less time than 

was required for Yucca Mountain. It is relevant in this regard to note that there 

are currently 63 independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) licensed by 

the NRC under 10 CFR part 72. Most of these facilities are located at existing nuclear power plants, and none store as much spent fuel as would be present at a consolidated interim storage facility, but the existing record indicates that both the nuclear industry and the NRC have substantial experience in constructing, licensing, 

and operating storage facilities. 

There is one recent example of a consolidated interim storage facility in the U.S. 

that may be directly relevant to this question. The NRC issued a license in 2006 

to Private Fuels Storage, LLC (PFS), to construct and operate a consolidated interim 

storage facility, in Skull Valley, Utah, 13 years after the Goshute Tribe first negotiated with the Department of Energy for an interim storage facility and nine years 

after PFS began the licensing process (NRC 2006). The license allows dry cask storage of up to 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power 

plants. The license conditioned authorization to construct the facility on obtaining 

funding and necessary approvals from other agencies, including the Department of 

Interior. The Department of the Interior subsequently denied the PFS application 

to use rights-of-way across federal land and to lease tribal land (BLM 2006; BIA 

2006). A federal court overturned the Department of Interior‘s decisions in July 

2010 (U.S. District Court 2010), but the future of the facility remains uncertain despite a valid license from the NRC. 

Commenting on the total cost of licensing an interim storage facility is outside my 

area of expertise. The Government Accountability Office estimated in 2009 that the 

total cost of 100 years of centralized interim storage of 70,000 metric tons of spent 

nuclear fuel would be in the range of $12 billion to $20 billion and that the cost 

of 100 years of centralized storage for 153,000 metric tons would be in the range 

of $15 billion to $29 billion (GAO 2009, table 4). 

Q3. The Department of Energy has asked Sandia National Laboratory to begin review of a deep borehole method of disposal for high-level radioactive waste. Can 

you describe how a mined repository differs from a deep borehole? Please describe the primary advantages and disadvantages associated with the two types 

of repositories. 

A3. As proposed in the U.S. and internationally, mined repositories are generally 

1,000 to 3,000 feet below the land surface, in a variety of geologic media including 

salt, clay or shale, granitic crystalline rocks (including high-grade metamorphic 

rocks), volcanic tuff, and limestone. Mined openings are large enough for access by 

both humans and heavy equipment, either by inclined ramps or hoists in vertical 

shafts. For waste that emits little gamma radiation, such as the transuranic waste 

disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, waste can be emplaced by humanoperated equipment. For high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel, waste is packaged 

in robust containers, and emplacement is done by remotely-operated equipment. 

After waste containers and, in many disposal concepts, backfill are emplaced, access 

shafts and ramps are filled and sealed and the combination of engineered and natural barriers provides long-term isolation. 

As proposed in recent work on deep borehole disposal concepts (e.g., Gibb, 1999; 

MIT 2003; Brady et al., 2009; Arnold et al., 2011), disposal would occur within crystalline bedrock at substantially greater depths, between approximately 10,000 and 

16,000 feet (3–5 kilometers). Boreholes would be drilled so that they had a bottomhole diameter of up to approximately 17 inches (0.43 m), depending on waste type 

and configuration. Although drilling for oil and gas routinely goes to much greater 

depths in sedimentary rocks that have the potential to produce hydrocarbons, this 

is a relatively large diameter for current drilling technology. However, as Arnold et 

al. (2009, p. 19) state, ‘‘there are no known technical issues that present unreasonable barriers to drilling to this diameter at depth.’’ The stated diameter was chosen 

to allow emplacement of intact fuel assemblies from typical commercial reactors 

without disassembling or processing the spent fuel. If fuel is to be processed or con-
101 

solidated before disposal, narrower diameter boreholes could be used. Holes would 

be lined with steel casing to facilitate emplacement operations. Spent nuclear fuel 

or high-level radioactive waste would be placed within containers of steel pipe and 

lowered down the hole by cable. The lower portion of the borehole (nominally the 

lower 2 km, or approximately the bottom 6500 feet) would be used for waste disposal, allowing emplacement of a very long (i.e., 3 km or approximately 10,000 feet) 

borehole seal, primarily of compacted clay and concrete. 

Advantages of mined repositories are that they rely on well-understood mining 

technology, they have been studied in great detail for decades in disposal programs 

in the United States and other nations, and safety assessments for multiple repository concepts indicate they have the potential to provide excellent long-term isolation. The size of mined repositories allows for disposal of large volumes of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste at a single location. 

Relatively less research has been done on deep borehole disposal concepts, and 

there are far fewer examples that can be called on to evaluate the long-term performance of the approach. Studies in the United States and other nations since the 

1970s have concluded that the approach is feasible and has a high potential to provide essentially complete long-term isolation, but no full-scale demonstration 

projects, with or without radioactive waste, have been completed at the relevant 

depths. Potential advantages for the approach include the relative simplicity of the 

isolation concept, widespread availability of suitable geology, and modularity of construction. 

The deep borehole isolation concept relies primarily on the extremely low permeability of crystalline rocks at the greater depths proposed for waste disposal, where 

pressure from the overlying rock will tend to keep fractures closed. Clearly, the low 

permeability of rocks at that depth must be demonstrated, but this is something 

that can be measured directly in a borehole before waste is emplaced. If borehole 

tests show unexpectedly high permeability, or flowing water, or other unfavorable 

conditions at the disposal depths, the site can be abandoned before waste is emplaced. In the absence of open fractures, the primary pathway for radioactive material to get back to the near-surface environment will be back up the borehole, where 

thousands of feet of compacted clay and concrete seals will provide an extremely effective and permanent barrier to flow. 

Fundamentally, deep boreholes have the potential to isolate radioactive waste 

much further away from the human environment than mined repositories, while 

minimizing the pathways for release. Potentially suitable rocks could be found in 

large portions of the continental United States, where old and stable crystalline bedrock is found within approximately one mile or less of the land surface. As a further 

benefit, rocks of this type and depth are unlikely to ever provide a source of natural 

resources that might encourage future drilling operations in the region. 

The modularity of borehole disposal provides another potential benefit. Boreholes 

can, in principle, be drilled on an as-needed basis, with less infrastructure than 

mined repositories. The benefit here may be greater for other nations with smaller 

quantities of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, but even in the 

United States, it is perhaps worth considering the flexibility introduced by a disposal option in which all of the spent fuel generated in the 60-year lifespan of a 

typical light-water reactor could be disposed of in 10 (or fewer) deep boreholes, 

drilled and sealed as needed. Alternatively, the concept could be applied on a limited basis for a subset of high-level waste forms, including, for example, fission product wastes already existing at the Hanford site in Washington State. A perhaps significant advantage associated with the modularity of the concept is the ability to 

make a decision to proceed or not with a specific site with the relatively modest investment required to make a pilot borehole. 

With respect to cost, Arnold et al. (2009, table 9) estimate costs for drilling a typical disposal borehole, emplacing waste, and sealing the hole to be on the order of 

40 million dollars. Actual costs are uncertain, but this figure is competitive with, 

and potentially significantly less than, the costs associated with disposal of the same 

quantity of waste in a mined geologic repository. 

Disadvantages to deep borehole disposal fall into three main categories: the relative scarcity of research on crystalline rock properties at these depths; operational 

limitations caused by the narrow diameter of the borehole; and issues associated 

with retrievability of the waste. The first two are addressed here, and retrievability 

issues are addressed in the response to the following question. 

Scarcity of data on crystalline rock properties at depth is not surprising, given 

that most deep drilling has been done in sedimentary rocks that have the potential 

to produce oil and gas. Much of the data that are available for crystalline rock come 

from drilling done for geothermal research, where scientists and engineers have 

sought out deep rocks with both anomalously high temperatures and high 
102 

permeabilities, neither of which would be desirable conditions for waste disposal. 

There is no reason to believe a priori that suitable low permeability rocks at depth 

will be exceptionally difficult to find, but further research, including field tests in 

instrumented boreholes, is needed to demonstrate the broad applicability of the concept. 

Operational limitations associated with the relatively narrow diameter of the 

borehole need to be acknowledged directly. Individual containers of existing 

borosilicate high-level radioactive waste (i.e., reprocessing waste currently stored at 

the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and at the West Valley site in western 

New York State) are too large to be emplaced in a deep borehole. The glass waste 

forms planned for the liquid wastes stored at the Hanford site will also be too large, 

as presently designed, for borehole disposal. Furthermore, essentially all spent nuclear fuel currently in dry storage would need to be repackaged in single-assembly 

canisters. (Repackaging of spent fuel currently in dry storage is likely to be needed 

for mined repository concepts also, because thermal constraints encourage disposal 

in smaller packages than are typical for storage; disposal packages could be larger 

in mined repositories than in boreholes, however.) 

Q3a. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires stored high-level waste to be retrievable. 

Do you believe storage of spent nuclear fuel in a deep borehole meets that definition? 

A3a. I believe deep borehole disposal concepts could be designed and operated to 

meet the retrievability requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. With that 

said, I also believe that deep geologic disposal, either in boreholes or in mined repositories, should not be undertaken if there is any foreseeable intent to retrieve 

the waste. Geologic disposal should be viewed as permanent, and not as a storage 

option that allows ready retrieval of the spent nuclear fuel. 

The requirement for retrievability in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is as follows: 

• Sec. 122. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, any repository 

constructed on a site approved under this subtitle shall be designed and constructed to permit the retrieval of any spent nuclear fuel placed in such repository, during an appropriate period of operation of the facility, for any reason 

pertaining to the public health and safety, or the environment, or for the purpose of permitting the recovery of the economically valuable contents of such 

spent fuel. The Secretary shall specify the appropriate period of retrievability 

with respect to any repository at the time of design of such repository, and such 

aspect of such repository shall be subject to approval or disapproval by the 

Commission as part of the construction authorization process under subsections 

(b) through (d) of section 114. 

As I understand the language of Section 122, the NWPA requires that it be possible to retrieve spent nuclear fuel during the operations of the repository. I believe 

a deep borehole repository could be designed such that it was possible to retrieve 

canisters of spent nuclear fuel as long as the borehole remained open and unsealed 

(i.e., during the period of operation) using essentially the same equipment that was 

used to emplace the canisters in the borehole. Looking beyond the operational-period requirements of the NWPA, however, I do not believe it is feasible to design 

a deep borehole repository such that canisters can reliably be retrieved intact after 

disposal operations have ended and the borehole is sealed. I believe techniques could 

be implemented using current drilling and solution mining technology that would 

recover some and perhaps most of the radioactive material in the spent nuclear fuel, 

but full retrievability of intact waste forms after a borehole has been sealed should 

not be viewed as a realistic option with today‘s technology. 

The potential for recovering some portion of the wastes after the borehole has 

been sealed is relevant because the EPA expanded on the NWPA approach in 40 

CFR part 191, by requiring that ‘‘disposal systems shall be selected so that removal 

of most of the wastes is not precluded for a reasonable period after disposal’’ (40 

CFR 191.14(f)), where disposal is defined to occur when the repository is sealed. The 

NRC, on the other hand, stayed close to the language of the NWPA by requiring, 

at 10 CFR 60.111(b)(1), that ‘‘the geologic repository operations area shall be designed so that any or all of the emplaced waste could be retrieved on a reasonable 

schedule starting at any time up to 50 years after waste emplacement operations 

are initiated, unless a different time period is specified by the Commission.’’ 

In 40 CFR part 197, specific to Yucca Mountain, the EPA defers to the NRC regulation: ‘‘Because NRC‘s proposed licensing criteria . . . contain requirements similar 

to the assurance requirements in 40 CFR part 191 . . . we believe it is unnecessary 

for us to include similar requirements in this rule’’ (EPA 2001, 66 FR 32103). The 
103 

NRC repeats its retrievability requirements from 10 CFR part 60 essentially unchanged at 10 CFR 63.111(e)(1). 

Because of the differences between the EPA‘s requirement in 40 CFR 191 that the 

majority of the waste must be removable for some period after a repository is sealed 

and the NRC‘s emphasis on maintaining retrievability during operations, existing 

U.S. regulations provide ambiguous guidance for evaluating disposal concepts. Deep 

borehole concepts that might otherwise provide excellent long-term isolation of the 

waste might be challenged to meet removal and retrievability expectations under 

the current EPA or NRC regulations, depending on the interpretation of phrases 

such as ‘‘most of the wastes’’ and ‘‘on a reasonable schedule.’’ 

Lastly, the potential difficulty of retrievability in deep borehole disposal can also 

be viewed as an advantage in preventing subsequent theft, diversion or sabotage of 

fissile material and helping to achieve nuclear nonproliferation and security objectives. 

Questions Submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer, Subcommittee 

on Energy and Environment 

Q1. What are the alternative, legitimately viable options for nuclear waste storage 

in the United States aside from Yucca Mountain? How do the benefits and 

drawbacks of those options compare to those of Yucca Mountain? 

A1. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended in 1987, there are no legally 

viable alternatives to Yucca Mountain for permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive wastes in the United States. Were the Act to be amended 

to allow alternative sites, there are potentially many viable options. I agree with 

the Blue Ribbon Commission‘s statement in its draft report (BRC 2011, p. 33) that 

‘‘[d]ecades of research and site investigations in the United States and elsewhere 

suggest that a wide variety of rock types and geologic environments could—in combination with appropriate repository design—be suitable for achieving [safe isolation 

of the waste]. The rock types that have been considered for a deep geologic repository have included bedded and domed rock salts, crystalline rocks (i.e., granite or 

gneiss), clay, shale, volcanic tuffs, basalt, and various other types of sedimentary 

rocks.’’ I also agree with the BRC‘s observation that ‘‘[d]eep boreholes represent another form of deep geologic disposal that may offer benefits, particularly for the disposal of certain forms of waste’’ (BRC 2011, p. 33). Potentially suitable rock types 

are widely distributed across the United States, and I share the BRC‘s ‘‘confidence 

that many geologic formations and sites that would be technically suitable for 

hosting a permanent repository can be found’’ (BRC 2011, p. 33). 

Any comparison of benefits and drawbacks of the various alternatives should 

begin with the observation that before any disposal concept can be implemented it 

will have been shown to meet EPA and NRC regulatory requirements. Long-term 

safety of a disposal facility, as defined by the EPA and the NRC, is not negotiable, 

and concepts that do not meet the safety standards should not be considered viable 

or technically suitable. Benefits and drawbacks of viable alternatives therefore are 

most usefully compared in terms of metrics other than safety, such as the extent 

to which inherent properties of the geologic media simplify (or complicate) the licensing case, and programmatic attributes such as operational efficiency, schedule, 

and cost. 

Benefits and drawbacks are discussed in general terms for the primary alternative concepts in the following section. Relative benefits and drawbacks of deep 

borehole disposal are also discussed in more detail above in response to a question 

from Representative Broun. All of these concepts, as well as Yucca Mountain, have 

the potential to provide excellent long-term isolation, and the benefits and drawbacks described here should be considered in that context. None of the alternatives 

mentioned here, however, has a sufficient technical basis for the United States to 

proceed directly to site selection and licensing. For any alternative, I believe the 

United States will need to move through a staged process of site and concept screening, site selection, site characterization, and facility design before beginning the licensing process. 

Attributes of mined repositories in granitic rocks. Granitic rocks are widely distributed in the United States, and are found in geologically stable areas where the likelihood of seismicity and volcanism is low. There is extensive experience in mining 

granitic rocks, and underground openings remain open and stable with relatively little support, facilitating emplacement operations and retrieval, should it be necessary. Granitic rocks tend to have very low permeability when unfractured. Granitic rocks are not associated with oil and gas resources, and locations can be found 
104 

where the likelihood of competition with other resources (e.g., metals or geothermal 

resources) is very low. 

As is true for most potential repository locations deep below the water table, 

water chemistry within granites tends to be reducing (i.e., with a low oxygen content). Reducing conditions lower the solubility of most of the important radioactive 

species in the waste, including uranium, plutonium, and other transuranic elements. (Iodine, and its long-lived radioisotope I–129, is an exception, in that it remains highly soluble in essentially all groundwater conditions). This is in contrast 

to the chemical environment at Yucca Mountain, where the decision to place the repository above the water table (and therefore in a largely dry environment) means 

that if and when water does reach the waste, oxidizing conditions will allow greater 

dissolution of radioactive species. Reducing groundwater conditions can therefore be 

viewed as a positive attribute for potential repositories in granitic rocks (and in essentially all other deep locations far below the water table). Oxidizing conditions, 

however, should not be viewed as a disqualifying attribute; if little water reaches 

the waste, for example because of the use of long-lived waste packages, solubility 

is of less importance, and locations above the water table can provide other benefits 

that should be taken into account. 

Potential drawbacks of granitic rocks begin with the observation that at the 

depths envisioned for mined repositories, granitic rocks may have relatively highpermeability fractures that can allow significant amounts of groundwater to enter 

the disposal region. These same fractures can provide a pathway for radionuclides 

to reach the near-surface environment if and when waste packages fail and waste 

is exposed to water. Granitic repository concepts, therefore, typically include clay 

backfill and long-lived corrosion-resistant waste packages as components of the engineered system, providing additional barriers to groundwater flow and radionuclide 

transport. 

In common with other disposal concepts that call for a clay backfill surrounding 

the waste packages (e.g., mined repositories in clay or shale), repositories in granitic 

rocks will require waste packages that are small relative to the packages that could 

be emplaced in Yucca Mountain or another similar repository designed without 

backfill. The size limitation comes from the desire to keep temperatures in the clay 

backfill below approximately 100 °C, to avoid changes in the material properties of 

the clay. There are four primary ways to manage the heat output of spent nuclear 

fuel and reprocessing wastes in disposal operations: waste can be allowed to decay 

in surface storage before disposal, waste packages can be kept small enough to limit 

the thermal load, waste packages can be spaced far enough apart to limit cumulative heating effects, and the disposal region can be ventilated after the waste 

packages are emplaced to remove heat. Because of its location above the water table 

and the lack of a clay backfill, the Yucca Mountain design allowed for relatively 

higher temperatures on the waste package surface, mitigated by effective ventilation 

of the disposal region during the operational period. This in turn allowed for emplacement of relatively large waste packages spaced relatively close together. Specifically, the waste packages designed for Yucca Mountain can each accommodate 

21 pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies. Waste packages in typical mined repositories in granitic rocks (or clay/shale settings) would be much smaller, accommodating perhaps 4 assemblies with fuel of similar characteristics. Thermal loading 

constraints do not affect the long-term safety of a repository. Rather, they have the 

potential to affect the efficiency of the disposal operation. 

Attributes of mined repositories in clay and shale rocks. Like granitic rocks, clay 

and shale are widely distributed in the United States, and are found in geologically 

stable regions where the likelihood of seismicity and volcanism is low. Many of the 

potential benefits and drawbacks are similar to those of granitic rocks: for example, 

groundwater chemistry will be reducing in these settings, and thermal constraints 

on repository design and waste package size are essentially the same. Additional potential benefits of clay or shale sites include the extremely low permeability of the 

host rock, relatively low frequency of open fractures, and chemical properties that 

tend to sorb most radionuclides of concern. A potential drawback for clay and shale 

sites is the frequent association of these rocks with oil and gas resources, both in 

underlying porous rocks and trapped within the low-permeability shale layers themselves. 

Attributes of mined repositories in salt. Like the other rock types discussed, salt 

deposits are widely distributed in the United States and are found in geologically 

stable regions where the likelihood of seismicity and volcanism is low. Unique properties of rock salt provide significant potential benefits for disposal of radioactive 

waste. Salt is relatively easy to mine. Pure salt is essentially impermeable, and it 

is realistically possible to find places in the center of thick salt deposits where water 

has not moved in hundreds of millions of years. Salt is a plastic material at the 
105 

pressures found at repository depths, and it will flow relatively rapidly (on a scale 

of decades) to heal fractures opened by the mining of the repository and to entomb 

the waste packages. Waste surrounded by salt will remain fully isolated from the 

surrounding environment indefinitely, for as long as the salt remains intact. Thermal constraints for salt repositories are intermediate between those of repositories 

above the water table (like Yucca Mountain) and repository concepts that call for 

clay backfill. Acceptable peak temperatures are higher in salt than clay, and the 

high thermal conductivity of salt means that waste packages could potentially be 

larger in salt repositories than in granitic rocks or clay/shale sites. 

Properties of salt pose potential drawbacks, also. Salt is easily dissolved in fresh 

water, and although the presence of salt deposits today is proof that dissolution has 

not occurred in the geologic past, repository sites in salt must be chosen so that they 

remain isolated from flowing water in the future. The capability of salt to flow 

under pressure will complicate (but not preclude) retrieval of waste after it is emplaced. The bedded salts (in which the original sedimentary layering is preserved) 

that are the most widely distributed salt deposits in the United States tend to have 

layers of other evaporite minerals (primarily anhydrite) and clay interspersed with 

layers of pure halite. These layers have somewhat higher permeability than the 

pure halite, and can complicate the analysis of the potential for water to move in 

the rock. Finally, like clay and shale, salt is commonly found in association with 

oil and gas resources. 

Attributes of mined repositories in other rock types. Mined repositories have also 

been proposed in other rock types, most noteworthy basalt at the Hanford site in 

eastern Washington site in the early 1980s, and recently limestone in a proposed 

repository for intermediate level waste in Canada. Potential benefits and drawbacks 

to these and other less commonly investigated rock types primarily relate to their 

availability, their ability to isolate the waste from moving water, and their association with natural resources. To the extent that any potential host rock displays appropriate characteristics such as low water content, low permeability, absence of 

open fractures, and/or favorable chemical characteristics, it could be considered as 

a viable medium for disposal. 

Attributes of deep borehole disposal in crystalline rock. Deep borehole disposal 

could potentially be implemented anywhere where low-permeability crystalline bedrock occurs within approximately a mile or less of the land surface. Although relatively few data are available from deep crystalline rock in much of the United 

States, potentially favorable rock types are widely distributed. As discussed in more 

detail in response to a question from Representative Broun, deep boreholes have the 

potential to provide essentially complete isolation for the wastes indefinitely. Potential conflicts with natural resource extraction are virtually nonexistent. Thermal 

constraints that provide a point of comparison between Yucca Mountain and other 

mined repository concepts are not as relevant for deep boreholes, because geometric 

constraints posed by the diameter of the hole are likely to keep thermal loads below 

levels of concern. Costs are believed to be competitive with, and perhaps significantly less than, those anticipated for mined repositories. The modularity of borehole construction and operation allows a level of flexibility in waste management 

that is not available in mined repository operations. 

Potential drawbacks of deep borehole disposal are straightforward. There are relatively few data from deep crystalline rocks in the United States, and further research, including demonstrations of rock properties in instrumented boreholes, is 

needed to confirm the concept. The narrow diameter of the borehole creates geometric constraints that preclude disposal of some waste forms, including existing 

borosilicate glass reprocessing waste at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina 

and the West Valley site in western New York State. Removing waste from a deep 

borehole after the hole has been sealed will not be simple (although recovery of 

much of the waste could perhaps be achieved using drilling and solution mining 

techniques), and deep borehole disposal should not be undertaken if full retrieval 

of intact waste forms is considered essential. From the alternative perspective of 

nonproliferation goals, however the relative difficulty of retrieving radioactive materials from a deep borehole could be viewed as a potential benefit-fissile material at 

the bottom of a deep borehole is unlikely to be recovered for use in a nuclear weapon. 

Attributes of other disposal concepts. Various alternatives to deep geologic disposal 

have been proposed over the past decades for the management of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive wastes. Rechard et al. (2011) provide a summary explanation of past proposals, four of which warrant a brief mention here. Constructing 

an engineered mountain or mausoleum over waste stored at the land surface has 

been proposed informally at various times, but the concept does not meet the intent 

of requirements for deep geologic disposal and, to the best of my knowledge, no sub-
106 

stantive design concepts have been developed. Launching radioactive waste into 

space has been proposed at least since the 1970s; cost and risk analyses indicate 

that it is not a viable option. Disposal in polar ice sheets was proposed in the 1970s; 

analyses raised concerns about operational feasibility and the potential for longterm isolation, and the concept was subsequently precluded in Antarctica by international treaty. Finally, disposal in clay sediments below the deep ocean floor was 

proposed in the 1970s. Detailed evaluations in the 1980s indicate excellent potential 

for long-term isolation in sub-seabed sediments, and I believe the concept remains 

technically feasible. International treaty agreements in the 1990s eliminate it from 

further consideration. 

Q2. How long can we expect current storage sites at existing nuclear facilities to remain safely operable? How long would new temporary repositories be able to 

handle nuclear waste? 

A2. The safe operation of currently operating independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 CFR 

part 72. The duration of a license granted under 10 CFR 72.42 is limited to 40 

years, with the opportunity to apply for a 40 year license renewal. With respect to 

fuel stored either in spent fuel pools at reactor sites or at ISFSIs, the NRC has concluded in its most recent update to 10 CFR part 51.53 (NRC 2010) that ‘‘if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years beyond the licensed life for operation . . . of that reactor in a combination of storage in its spent fuel storage basin 

and at either onsite or offsite spent fuel storage installations.’’ 

There are no fundamental technical reasons why temporary storage facilities 

could not be operated indefinitely as long as the spent nuclear fuel and its containers are monitored appropriately and structures, systems, and components are 

repaired or replaced as needed. The condition of the spent fuel will change through 

time, and degradation of the spent fuel and associated structures, systems, and components may complicate options for future handling of the waste, but I am not 

aware of any foreseeable processes inherent in the aging of the facility that would 

create unsafe conditions that could not be mitigated as needed. Non-technical factors that may limit the realistic duration of temporary storage include regulatory 

requirements, legal obligations concerning ownership of the spent fuel, and financial 

considerations regarding the cost of maintaining indefinite temporary storage. The 

Government Accountability Office evaluated two relevant scenarios for extended 

temporary storage at existing sites in a 2009 assssment of nuclear waste management options (GAO 2009): in one scenario storage was limited to 100 years, and in 

a second scenario storage was extended to 500 years with the assumption that spent 

fuel required repackaging every 100 years. Estimated costs for storing 153,000 metric tons of spent fuel at existing sites for 100 years ranged from $13 billion to $34 

billion; estimated costs for storing the same amount of fuel for 500 years ranged 

from $34 billion to $225 billion (GAO 2009, table 5). 

Acknowledgment 

Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the United States 

Government and operated by Sandia Corporation for the National Nuclear Security 

Administration. Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE–AC04–94AL85000. The 

statements expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 

views or policies of the United States Department of Energy or Sandia National 

Laboratories. 

References cited 

Arnold, B.W., P.V. Brady, S.J. Bauer, C. Herrick, S. Pye, and J. Finger, 2011, Reference Design and Operations for Deep Borehole Disposal of High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, SAND2011–6749, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. 

Brady, P.V., B.W. Arnold, G.A. Freeze, P.N. Swift, S.J. Bauer, J.L. Kanney, R.P. 

Rechard, J.S. Stein, 2009, Deep Borehole Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste, 

SAND2009–4401, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. 

BIA (U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs), 2006, ‘‘Notice of Availability of the Record 

of Decision (ROD) for a Proposed Lease of Tribal Trust Lands Between Private 

Fuels Storage, L.L.C. (PFS) and Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indian (Band) in 

Tooele County, UT,’’ Federal Register vol. 71, no. 192, p. 58629–58630, October 4, 

2006. 
107 

BLM (U.S. Bureau of Land Management), 2006, ‘‘Notice of Availability of the 

Record of Decision for the Right-of-Way Applications Filed by Private Fuel Storage, 

L.L.C., for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation on the Reservation of the 

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians and the Related Transportation Facility in 

Tooele County, UT,’’ Federal Register vol. 71, no. 188, p. 57005–57006, September 

28, 2006. 

BRC (Blue Ribbon Commission on America‘s Nuclear Future), 2011. Draft Report 

to the Secretary of Energy, July 29, 2011. 

GAO (Government Accountability Office), 2009, Nuclear Waste Management: Key 

Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives, GAO–10–48, United States Government Accountability Office 

Report to Congressional Requesters. 

Gibb, F.G.F., 1999, ‘‘High-temperature, very deep, geological disposal: a safer alternative for high-level radioactive waste?’’ Waste Management v. 19, p. 207–211. 

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2006, Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Safety Requirements, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS–R–4, 

IAEA, Vienna. 

Kokajko, L., 2011, ‘‘Assuring Safety and Security for an Evolving Nuclear Fuel 

Cycle,’’ presentation to the Nuclear Regulatory Information Conference, Session T14, 

Rockville, MD, March 8, 2011. http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conferencesymposia/ric/past/2011/docs/abstracts/sessionabstract¥42.html. 

MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 2003, The Future of Nuclear Power: 

An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 

MA, ISBN 0-615-12420-8. 

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NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 2006, ‘‘Notice of Issuance of Materials License SNM–2513 for the Private Fuel Storage Facility,’’ 7590–01–P, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 72–22, Private Fuel Storage, Limited Liability Company. 

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 2010, ‘‘10 CFR Part 51: Consideration of Environmental Impacts of Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel after Cessation 

of Reactor Operation; Waste Confidence Decision Update; Final Rules,’’ Federal Register Vol. 75, page 81032–81076, December 23, 2010. 

Rechard, R.P., B. Goldstein, L.H. Brush, J.A. Blink, M. Sutton, and F.V. Perry, 

2011, Basis for Identification of Disposal Options for Research and Development for 

Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste, FCRD–USED–2011–000071, Department 

of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Fuel Cycle Research and Development Program. 

http://www.ne.doe.gov/FuelCycle/ 

neFuelCycle¥UsedNuclearFuelDispositionReports.html. 

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Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, and Private Fuel Storage,, Plaintiffs, v. 

Laura Daniel Davis, Associate Deputy Secretary of the Interior, Chad Calvert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and Minerals Management, 

United States Department of the Interior, C. Stephen Allred, Assistant Secretary of 

the Interior for Land and Minerals Management, Defendants, Civil Action No. 07– 

cv–0526–DME–DON: United States District Court for the District of Utah, 728 F. 

Supp. 2d 1287; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75815. 

Laws and Regulations Cited 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 10101 and following. 

10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for 

Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions. 

10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 60, Disposal of High-Level Radioactive 

Wastes in Geologic Repositories. 

10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 63, Disposal of High-Level Radioactive 

Wastes in a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 

10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and ReactorRelated Greater Than Class C Waste. 

40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 191, Environmental Radiation Standards for 

Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes. 
108 

40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194, Criteria for the Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant’s Compliance with the 40 CFR Part 191 

Disposal Regulations. 

40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 197, Public Health and Environmental Radiation Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV. 
109 

Responses by Dr. Roger Kasperson, 

Professor and Distinguished Scientist, Clark University 

Question Submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. In his testimony, Mr. Spencer testified that the BRC should address Yucca 

Mountain head-on, stating: 

‘‘The BRC should state what it believes should happen with Yucca Mountain based 

on the best science and evidence available. If its members believe Yucca should be 

shut down, it should state why and provide a recommendation for disengaging from 

Yucca. If, on the other hand, it finds that Yucca should be pursued, perhaps as one 

of a number of options, then the Commission should provide recommendations on 

how to move forward. Such a conclusion could reject the current Yucca program 

while proposing an alternative. Such an alternative could embody the recommendations of the BRC’s consent-based approach where the people of Nevada are given control over the future of the Yucca facility.’’ 

Do you agree or disagree with this recommendation, and why? 

A1. Answer: 

• The science must be there and it must be strong; 

• Strong science suggests that alternatives must be considered, not one site selected before the evidence is in; 

• Beyond that, technical science is not the only thing that matters. Fairness in 

process and collaboration with those who will bear the burdens and risks are 

essential. They must have a role; 

• And so a consent-based role is the way to proceed. In the end it will be the most 

successful, as Sweden and Finland have fully shown. Can we ever stop screwing 

it up here in the U.S.? 
110 

Responses by Mr. Gary Hollis, Chairman, Nye County Board of County Commissioners 

Questions Submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. Do you believe the demand of the Secretary of Energy that the Blue Ribbon Commission exclude consideration of Yucca Mountain as the site for a permanent geological repository in its deliberations detracts from its ability to develop the best 

possible recommendation for nuclear waste management? 

A1. Yes. Doing so sets up the Blue Ribbon Commission to be complicit in the Department of Energy’s violation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It is an outrage that 

Federal law is so blatantly being ignored. Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act. Either it should be followed or Congress should change it. The BRC is not a 

siting commission, but remaining silent regarding the abandonment of the Yucca 

Mountain Project has nothing to do with repository siting. For the BRC to claim 

that the Secretary’s direction prohibits the BRC from considering Yucca Mountain 

is disingenuous. The BRC charter makes no such prohibition and the Federal Advisory Committee Act does not allow the sponsoring authority to unduly influence the 

BRC as an independent commission, a direct compromise of the BRC’s credibility. 

Q2. How important is it for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to finalize and release its comprehensive technical reviews of the site (known as the ‘‘Safety Evaluation Reports’’)? Are there any drawbacks from completing the technical review 

of Yucca Mountain? 

A2. It is extremely important that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission be allowed 

to complete their review of the Yucca Mountain license application, and if appropriate, make a technical finding as to the safety of the Yucca Mountain site. The 

Country needs a repository to dispose of its spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The BRC did not discover a previously unknown solution; they recommended that the country proceed expeditiously to develop one or more geologic 

disposal facilities. With more than $11 billion invested in studying the science of 

Yucca Mountain, the country has a right to know whether or not it is possible to 

complete a first of a kind Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing proceeding. 

That knowledge is invaluable whether or not the country develops the Yucca Mountain repository or seeks another location. It will take billions of dollars and decades 

to develop another repository site; to come as close as the country is today without 

finding the answer to the safety of the Yucca Mountain repository would be a crucial 

mistake. 

With the completion of the Safety Evaluation Reports and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission hearings, it will also be possible to once and for all separate the technical questions about the Yucca Mountain site from the political rhetoric and misinformation that has been used in the past. If a new political solution is to be crafted, 

it should not be based on a false premise that the Yucca Mountain science was bad. 

Over the years, the opponents of the project have tried to delay every phase of 

the project and the NRC review is no exception. It is widely viewed that completion 

of the NRC licensing process would show that the NRC technical staff concurs with 

DOE and their national laboratory partners that a repository at Yucca Mountain 

could be constructed and operated safely. Opponents who continue to vocally claim 

that a Yucca Mountain repository would be unsafe would lose credibility. 

Q3. In his testimony, Mr. Spencer testified that the BRC should address Yucca 

Mountain head-on, stating: 

‘‘The BRC should state what it believes should happen with Yucca Mountain based 

on the best science and evidence available. If its members believe Yucca should be 

shut down, it should state why and provide a recommendation for disengaging from 

Yucca. If, on the other hand, it finds that Yucca should be pursued, perhaps as one 

of a number of options, then the Commission should provide recommendations on 

how to move forward. Such a conclusion could reject the current Yucca program 

while proposing an alternative. Such an alternative could embody the recommendations of the BRC’s consent-based approach where the people of Nevada are given control over the future of the Yucca facility.’’ 

Do you agree or disagree with this recommendation, and why? 

A3. We agree. The BRC should address Yucca Mountain head on. The most difficult issue in high-level radioactive waste disposal in this country (and likely the 

world) is finding an acceptable geologic repository. The BRC touts a consent-based 
111 

approach to finding the appropriate repository site. If the opponents of Yucca Mountain are correct, then what harm is there to allow the NRC licensing process to proceed to its completion or allow the NRC Safety Evaluation Reports regarding Yucca 

Mountain to be published? Even with DOE’s decision to abandon Yucca Mountain, 

they and their national laboratory partners have continued to maintain that Yucca 

Mountain is safe. The licensing process should be completed, and if Yucca Mountain 

is determined to be a safe option for a repository, then it is at least a baseline for 

comparison of other sites. This would also be a good starting point for negotiations 

with the State of Nevada and Nye County on mitigation of impacts and possible 

benefits. The only way to ever get consent for a repository is to understand the impacts to the State and local governments and then negotiate for money, land, water, 

etc., that help to offset these impacts. 

Q4. During hearing Q&A, Ranking Member Miller asserted that ‘‘all the rail lines, 

all of the roads that [waste] would likely travel through, on to get to your county, 

to the Yucca Mountain facility, go through Las Vegas’’ and that ‘‘80,000 shipments a year would go through Clark County, through Las Vegas.’’ You disputed 

this assertion. Please elaborate on your response. Should Yucca Mountain be licensed and accept shipments of spent nuclear fuel, what is the planned route for 

transportation of the spent fuel containers? Are any container required or expected to pass through Las Vegas? What about Clark County? 

A4. The opening assertion that ‘‘all the rail lines, all of the roads that [waste] 

would likely travel through, on to get to your county, to the Yucca Mountain facility, 

go through Las Vegas’’ is inaccurate. There is no existing rail to Yucca Mountain, 

and there are other roads and new routes that do not go through Las Vegas. Nye 

County endorses rail and road options that would completely avoid the Las Vegas 

valley. 

The second assertion that ‘‘80,000 shipments a year would go through Clark 

County, through Las Vegas’’ is also inaccurate. The Department of Energy Environmental Impact Statement that selected mostly rail as the preferred option acknowledges 95 rail shipments and 90 truck shipments per year for 25 to 30 years, a combined total of 5,550 shipments during those 30 years. 

The aforementioned EIS Record of Decision rail route is a 350-mile spur through 

central Nevada from Caliente, NV (approximately 125 miles northeast of Las 

Vegas), that dead ends at Yucca Mountain. That route, although it would not be 

Nye County’s choice, would result in approximately nine (9) percent of the total rail 

shipments through Las Vegas. Nye County, along with Esmeralda, Mineral, Lander, 

and Churchill Counties prefers a north/south through-going rail alignment (a combination of the Mina and Jean routes) that would completely avoid the Las Vegas 

Valley, cost less to construct, provide greater economic development opportunities 

within Nevada, and more directly connect with the major east/west national railroad 

systems. 

Road routes were not finalized. Individual states are authorized to designate preferred alternative road routes within their borders There are road routes in Nevada 

that would avoid the Las Vegas valley. Nevada has yet to designate alternative 

routes. 

Transportation routes that avoid the requirement or expectation of any shipments 

through Las Vegas are easy and have already been studied. Completely avoiding all 

of Clark County is possible but more difficult. The through-going rail route that is 

easiest to construct requires construction of the Jean Corridor in the rural southwestern part of Clark county about 30 miles from Las Vegas. 

Question Submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer, Subcommittee 

on Energy and Environment 

Q1. Most scientists agree that we need long-term storage of nuclear waste. Our experiences with Yucca Mountain highlight the political difficulties locally, Statewide, and Nationwide in accomplishing such an objective. How can we build 

local consensus anywhere in the country to accept long-term storage of nuclear 

waste? 

A1. The issue is not with local community consensus; the local support for WIPP 

is well documented, the local support for the PFS Interim Storage Facility is clear, 

and the local support for the Yucca Mountain facility has been demonstrated to the 

Committee. The State of New Mexico ultimately supported WIPP after negotiations 

that included regulatory changes, transportation improvements and other benefits, 

while the State of Utah found ways to block the privately owned PFS facility after 

it had been licensed. 
112 

The State of Nevada exercised its legal authority to submit a notice of disapproval 

when the President recommended that Yucca Mountain be designated and a license 

application submitted. That provision was explicitly included in the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act; Congress recognized there could be resistance at the State level and required a supermajority vote to override the notice of disapproval. The strongest argument the State of Nevada has against the Yucca Mountain repository is a fairness 

complaint. When Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and eliminated 

the second repository program, Nevada was able to build support for their argument 

about unfair treatment; a fundamental compromise in crafting the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act was that no one State would have to take all of the waste. A meaningful 

step in building consensus could be reinstating a commitment to more than one repository. 

The Blue Ribbon Commission has based their recommendation for a new, consentbased approach to siting future nuclear waste management facilities on the success 

of the Swedish program in siting a repository. It must be recognized that the Swedish model is not applicable in the U.S.; in Sweden, the decision authority is the local 

community, and there is not a state-level government. A meaningful step in building 

consensus could be to focus on local communities that host an acceptable geologic 

disposal medium, with commitments for meaningful mitigation and compensation 

for both the local community and the State. Incidentally, the six rural Nevada counties that have provided resolutions attesting to local support encompass an area of 

more than 46,500 sq. mi. That is equivalent in area to a square of more than 215 

miles on a side, the distance from Washington, DC, to New York City. That area 

is also larger than the areas of 18 states, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Virginia. 

It is also larger than a number of countries, including, for example, Portugal, Austria, or Iceland. It is difficult to argue that local community support in Nevada is 

not meaningful. 

There are other dimensions of consensus that should be addressed. The State of 

Nevada’s arguments that the Yucca Mountain site is based on bad science has never 

had technical peer consensus; the best way to address their concerns would be to 

complete the license application. The State of Nevada’s arguments that compensation for accepting the repository is not forthcoming is without merit; despite specific 

provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the State has never entered into discussions for a consultation and cooperation agreement. If Congress were to initiate discussions with the state and local governments on compensation and impact mitigation, it could weaken support for the State’s opposition. Finally, it is appropriate to 

note that contrary to Nevada’s State’s rights arguments, two facts must be acknowledged. First, the majority of the land encompassed by the rural Nevada Counties 

that have stated their support for Yucca Mountain is federally controlled public 

lands; Nye County is 98% federally controlled land. And second, the State of Nevada 

raised the State’s rights issue in its lawsuits following the recommendation of Yucca 

Mountain and were not successful in that claim with the Court rejecting the State’s 

challenge to the constitutionality of the resolution approving the Yucca Mountain 

site (see United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 

01–1258, Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc., Petitioner v. Environmental Protection 

Agency, Respondent, Decided July 9, 2004.) 
113 

Responses by Mr. Rick McLeod, Executive Director, 

Savannah River Site Community Reuse Organization 

Questions Submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. Please describe concerns associated with constructing and operating a consolidated interim storage facility prior to the licensing of a permanent high-level 

waste repository. What assurances would be necessary from the Federal Government to satisfy those concerns and begin consideration of a consolidated storage 

facility? 

A1. First, our community leaders have studied the issues associated with nuclear 

waste storage for the past two years. The SRS Community Reuse Organization produced a White Paper in 2009 describing the impacts of waste storage and outlining 

the path for a community consensus position. A copy of the White Paper is attached. 

[The White Paper may be found in Appendix 2.] 

Secondly, in considering Consolidated Interim Storage, it is important to point out 

a couple of significant points: (1) Consolidated Interim Storage only applies to commercial spent fuel. We believe it is important that there is a clear distinction between commercial spent nuclear fuel and high-level defense waste. The two should 

be de-coupled and considered independently of each other. While many debate the 

disposal of commercial spent fuel as a ‘‘states right’’ issue, the disposal of high-level 

defense waste can only be regarded as a national issue. The high-level defense 

waste is our Nation’s waste and it needs a national solution. We believe Yucca 

Mountain is that solution. (2) The storage of commercial spent fuel either separately 

or consolidated can be conducted safely. Safety is not the concern. We remain concerned about the definition of ‘‘interim‘‘ which, in discussing nuclear waste, can 

mean anything from 10 years to 500 years or more. ‘‘Interim’’ must be clearly and 

legally defined before communities such as ours can agree to host Consolidated Interim Storage. In the absence of such clear definition, we are in danger of becoming 

a ‘‘de facto’’ permanent repository for nuclear waste. 

In addition, as stated in our testimony, our five-county region in South Carolina 

and Georgia will not support any interim storage scenario unless a permanent solution in pursued at the same time. This means measurable progress toward a permanent repository for commercial spent fuel and high-level defense waste and/or a program to reprocess or recycle commercial used nuclear fuel. 

Community support also requires removal of a sufficient quantity of waste currently stored at DOE’s Savannah River Site and the re-commitment of processing 

used nuclear fuel currently stored at SRS in used fuel pools. 

These two conditions must be accompanied by ongoing health and safety monitoring, proper regulatory oversight at both the local and state level, and a legally 

binding commitment to a final disposition plan. All such considerations must be vetted in the local community in conjunction with State officials before any type of Consolidated Interim Storage can be considered. 

Q2. Do you believe the demand of the Secretary of Energy that the Blue Ribbon Commission exclude consideration of Yucca Mountain as the site for a permanent geological repository in its deliberations detracts from its ability to develop the best 

possible recommendations for nuclear waste management? 

A2. Our position on this is clear. Excluding Yucca Mountain definitely detracts 

from the Blue Ribbon Commission’s ability to develop the best possible recommendations, In fact, we consider this to be the ‘‘missing recommendation.’’ 

The BRC draft report recommends that prompt efforts be undertaken to develop, 

as quickly as possible, one or more permanent, deep geologic facilities for waste disposal, yet fails to mention Yucca Mountain. 

We continue to believe Yucca Mountain was—and is—the right answer for permanent nuclear waste disposal, and its completion should be vigorously pursued, especially for high-level defense waste. To blatantly and purposefully omit consideration 

of Yucca Mountain as an option is misguided and ignores three decades of intense 

research and billions in funding, which brought the Nation to the edge of a highly 

workable, ultimately safe solution for storing nuclear waste. 

In addition, it should be noted that the vitrified glass logs of high-level defense 

waste from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River 

Site were produced based on Waste Acceptance Criteria developed for Yucca Mountain. We have to wonder if some ‘‘new’’ permanent geologic repository will be able 

to accept this waste mixture. If not, where will this national waste stream go? This 

underscores the point that science—not politics—should govern the process for selecting a permanent repository for nuclear waste. 
114 

Q3. How important is it for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to finalize and release its comprehensive technical reviews of the site (known as the ‘‘Safety Evaluation Reports’’)? Are there any drawbacks from completing the technical review 

of Yucca Mountain? 

A3. We see no drawbacks whatsoever in the NRC completing its technical review 

of Yucca Mountain, The public needs to know that Yucca Mountain is safe, and the 

Safety Evaluation Report will be reassuring. 

This multi-discipline review involves dozens of trained professionals with expertise in numerous technical and scientific disciplines, including geochemistry, hydrology, climatology, structural geology, volcanology, seismology and health physics, as 

well as chemical, civil, mechanical, nuclear, mining, materials, and geological engineering. 

It offers a comprehensive review of all aspects of the repository’s siting, construction, and operation. This report can become an important part of an overall education and awareness program necessary for public acceptance. 

Q4. In his testimony, Mr. Spencer testified that the BRC should address Yucca 

Mountain head-on, stating: 

‘‘The BRC should state what it believes should happen with Yucca Mountain based 

on the best science and evidence available. If its members believe Yucca should be 

shut down, it should state why and provide a recommendation for disengaging from 

Yucca. If, on the other hand, it finds that Yucca should be pursued, perhaps as one 

of a number of options, then the Commission should provide recommendations on 

how to move forward. Such a conclusion could reject the current Yucca program 

while proposing an alternative. Such an alternative could embody the recommendations of the BRC’s consent-based approach where the people of Nevada are given control over the future of the Yucca facility.’’ 

Do you agree or disagree with this recommendation, and why? 

A4. Mr. Spencer is right in his view that Yucca Mountain should be included in 

the BRC recommendations, but he overlooks an important consideration. His recommendation fails to recognize that Yucca Mountain is not just an option for waste 

storage. It is the law of the land. As a Nation, we should be moving forward in accordance with the law established by Congress through the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act unless and until that law is changed. 

It can only be changed by legislative initiative in Congress. It cannot be altered 

by the Blue Ribbon Commission, which can only advise and has no authorizing, regulatory, or legal mandate. We should not be waiting on the Blue Ribbon Commission 

in moving Yucca Mountain forward 

Q5. Can you describe in greater detail the opportunities associated with the development of a research and development center to be located at Savannah River 

Site’s H Canyon? 

A5. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), along with H 

Canyon personnel, are currently conducting a comprehensive feasibility study to determine the benefits and challenges associated with establishing an R&D test bed 

for advanced detector technologies. 

The need for such a test bed has been expressed the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and would 

serve as a way to transfer emerging safeguards technologies from the laboratory to 

an operational environment. 

This technology strengthens the U.S. safeguards program by opening the possibility for more efficient and cost-effective detection of nuclear materials, improving 

the timeliness of detection, minimizing uncertainty, and improving confidence in results. 

As identified in the NGSI program plan, there is a lack of fully operational facilities that allows for full-scale testing of new technologies. H Canyon has been identified as a potential location due to its unique standing as the Nation’s only operational nuclear chemical separations plant. 

H Canyon offers several areas where full-scale testing could be conducted. Combined with nearby SRNL, the needed expertise for developing, deploying, testing, 

and evaluating advanced detector technologies is readily available. 

The concept would eventually open SRNL to other DOE National Laboratories, resulting in a comprehensive initiative for testing national and international safeguards-related equipment. 

Q6. What would be the impact on the Savannah River Site and surrounding communities should consideration of Yucca Mountain site be halted and the Nation em-
115 

bark on a new search for a nuclear waste repository? How would this impact 

Savannah River Site concerns about the cost of managing, guarding, monitoring, and other issues relating to existing nuclear material? 

A6. There are numerous potential impacts. 

First and most significantly, there has been a substantial loss of trust and credibility. The Federal Government has broken faith with our community and with others across the country that trusted implicitly in the Department of Energy’s commitment to complete Yucca Mountain as the Nation’s preferred method of nuclear 

waste storage. 

The Federal Government has reneged on its promise to provide a permanent repository for defense nuclear waste and for commercial spent fuel from nuclear power 

plants. As a region, we have counted on this promise and on the government’s assurances that our site and others would be a temporary home for nuclear waste. 

We relied even more heavily on this promise once the choice of Yucca Mountain 

became the law of the land through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

Today, the Savannah River Site has approximately 3,000 canisters of stabilized 

legacy high-level waste from the Cold War stored onsite, and another 3,000 to 4,000 

canisters will be generated in the process of stabilizing the remaining liquid radioactive waste now stored in aging tank farms at SRS. This stabilized high-level 

waste must be disposed in a federal repository, but until a federal repository is 

available, it will have to be stored at SRS. 

In addition, Savannah River Site is the receipt and storage site for aluminum-clad 

research reactor spent fuel from decommissioned research reactors worldwide. 

Based on approved operational plans, SRS will reprocess this fuel in H Canyon to 

recover the enriched uranium for use as fuel in nuclear reactors pending operational 

approval by DOE and budget approvals by Congress. The high-level waste resulting 

from processing the fuel will be stabilized along with other high-level waste at SRS 

and stored until a repository is available. 

Savannah River Site was also selected by DOE to provide interim storage for surplus non-pit plutonium in the United States. The plutonium originally located at 

Rocky Flats, Hanford, Los Alamos, and several weapons research laboratories will 

be consolidated at SRS. Approximately 60 percent of the plutonium by weight is 

scheduled to be converted to commercial reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX). 

However, DOE planned to dispose of the remaining 40 percent in the federal repository by dissolving in H Canyon, incorporating plutonium into borosilicate glass 

in the Defense Waste Processing Facility with existing high-level liquid waste, and 

storing it in the Glass Waste Storage Buildings at SRS until a repository is available. 

If there is no repository, the costs for monitoring materials stored at SRS will continue for a longer period of time and will increase as years go by. In addition, SRS 

will be forced to build additional glass log storage buildings to accommodate material that should be going to the repository. There are currently two glass log storage 

buildings at SRS, and a third is being designed with more to follow. These facilities 

only have a design life of approximately 50 years. A study on the consequences of 

long-term storage (100-plus years) has yet to be conducted, and therefore their suitability for long-term storage is unknown. 

While we recognize that DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the nuclear utilities are diligent in ensuring that these materials are stored securely, and 

we have no concerns about the ability to store these materials safely in the near 

term, the impacts of long-term interim storage, including continued safety, have not 

been adequately evaluated. This represents an additional cost required for community support. 

Question Submitted by Representative Sandy Adams, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. ‘‘Ratepayers in my State alone have contributed over $800 million to the Nuclear 

Waste Trust Fund to date. While the used fuel is currently being held safely on 

site by our utilities, doing so constitutes an additional economic burden. With 

the administration pulling the plug on Yucca Mountain for political, not scientific reasons, and no realistic alternative in place, why should my constituents 

continue to have to pay into the Waste Fund?’’ 

A1. The Nuclear Waste Fund was created to provide a permanent solution for nuclear waste disposaL We do NOT believe your constituents should continue to pay 

into the Nuclear Waste Fund, UNLESS those funds are used for that purpose or 

for specific, current storage needs. For example, they could be earmarked for safe-
116 

guards, security and environmental protection at the existing storage sites which 

now dot the country. 

In addition to nuclear plant sites where commercial spent fuel is currently stored, 

these funds could also be utilized by communities who agree to host a Consolidated 

Interim Storage facility for commercial spent fuel. 

New legislation in the form of amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act would 

be needed to allow funds to be used in this way. 

Otherwise, if payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund are not being used to provide 

permanent storage. as intended, the payments should cease. 

Question Submitted by Representative Judy Biggert, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment 

Q1. A primary recommendation from the BRC is to establish a new ‘‘consent-based 

siting’’ process that would require relevant State and local governments to accept 

a facility before it proceeds. The report, however, is silent on the question of consent by local communities where nuclear waste currently resides. If the BRC’s 

recommendation is worthy of consideration, how can the Federal Government 

ensure ‘‘consent’’ requirements are a two-way street? In other words, should all 

the communities around the country currently storing spent fuel be required to 

do so indefinitely without their consent? 

A1. We do NOT believe communities currently storing spent fuel around the country should be required to do so indefinitely without their expressed consent. First, 

storage of commercial spent fuel was—and is—a legal obligation of the Department 

of Energy, one that has important implications in health and safety, the economics 

of nuclear power as an energy source, and national security. DOE has not lived up 

to its obligatIons in this regard and, by default, has left the job to utilities and local 

communities across the Nation. 

Secondly, consent by local communities is an essential element of long-term success in storage of commercial spent fuel and high-level defense waste. Because of 

the stalemate that currently exists in progress toward a permanent solution, the 

matter of consent by local communities where nuclear waste currently resides has 

taken on added importance. 

A key to the ‘‘two-way street’’ assurance concerning consent requirements is education and engagement with DOE, congressional delegations, and the industry AS 

EARLY AS POSSIBLE in the decision-making process. 

Local governments working alongside organizations like ours are the formal voice 

and institutional authority speaking on a community’s behalf and pursuing community interests with Federal and State Governments. They also are uniquely positioned to negotiate economic benefits on behalf of the impacted community. It is imperative that any economic benefits reside at the local community level first, not 

merely directed from the State level down. We must keep in mind that this is where 

the waste will ultimately reside. whether that is interim or long term. 

Question Submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer, Subcommittee 

on Energy and Environment 

Q1. Most scientists agree that we need long-term storage of nuclear waste. Our experiences with Yucca Mountain highlight the political difficulties locally, Statewide, and Nationwide in accomplishing such an objective. How can we build 

local consensus anywhere in the country to accept long-term storage of nuclear 

waste? 

A1. Clearly, this is a major challenge—one not subject to glib, easy answers. For 

starters, to develop local consensus, potential host communities must get educated 

on nuclear issues and then educate their citizens. Outreach and education can include hosting meetings for the community at large with site managers, contractors 

or utilities; creating public information centers; and building websites and producing 

written materials that outline the pros and cons of the proposed initiative. 

Local communities and governments must help ensure there is a defined public 

participation process and appropriate government services and funding for key activities, including oversight infrastructure development, workforce development and 

emergency training and preparedness. 

The public participation process needs to be locally focused. Outside stakeholders 

(those not living in the community), while having a right to an opinion, must not 

be allowed to dictate or confuse the consensus process or decision. Many times their 
117 

more vocal views are taken by DOE, congressional delegations, and the press above 

the voice of the local community. 

Local communities and governments also can play an important role in working 

with States and private companies to ensure that local values, concerns, and priorities are understood and taken into account in any proposed project and that appropriate incentives and benefits result. Some of these include: 

• Infrastructure improvements, including highways, railroads, waterways, airports or other public projects; 

• Environmental improvements, including the cleanup of existiny air, water or 

waste problems; 

• Public school assistance programs; 

• Higher education programs; 

• Health care programs; 

• Proposed co-location of other federal projects or existing federal expansions; 

• General economic development programs; 

• Transfer of ownership of federal properties; 

• Tax subsidy or property value protection programs; 

• Public recreation improvement projects; 

• Direct financial assistance; 

• Local employment or product purchasing agreements; 

• Any other type of assurance, equity, or assistance desired. 

A basic and fundamentally important principle of this program is that a host jurisdiction has the opportunity—and the responsibility—to define the benefits and 

conditions appropriate to its particular and unique needs. 

Finally. it is essential that communities have a defined oversight role, particularly 

with respect to safety. security, and emergency response training. 
118 

Responses by Dr. Mark Peters, Deputy Laboratory Director 

for Programs, Argonne National Laboratory 

Questions Submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Q1. What areas of nuclear energy-related research, development and demonstration 

offer the most promise to make a significant change in the quantity of spent nuclear fuel produced and the manner in which it is handled? 

A1. The most promising research areas relate to the development and demonstration of safe, secure, and economic technologies for ‘‘closing’’ the nuclear fuel cycle. 

The current nuclear fuel cycle in the United States is ‘‘open,’’ which means that fuel 

is used only once in a reactor, for about four years. The fuel then is removed from 

the reactor and stored at the plant site while it cools and its radioactivity decreases. 

The ‘‘open’’ fuel cycle yields wastes that still contain a substantial amount of untapped energy. At present, the fuel for our operating light water reactors (LWRs) 

is discharged after only about five percent of the uranium has been fissioned and 

another one or two percent has been converted to plutonium and ‘‘minor actinides,’’ 

such as neptunium, americium, and curium. If the residual uranium, plutonium, 

and minor actinides in used LWR fuel were recycled and reused, they could generate additional electricity. Recycling also would minimize the discharge of plutonium and minor actinides as waste. Because these constituents of used fuel remain 

radiologically toxic for thousands of years, recycling would increase the efficient use 

of our uranium resources while minimizing the creation of ultralong-lived radioactive waste requiring permanent deposition. 

Specific research priorities include: 

• Development and demonstration of efficient processing techniques to extract/recover all long-lived constituents (plutonium and minor actinides) from used nuclear fuel. These techniques must be economical to implement and safeguard, 

must minimize creation of secondary wastes, and must produce high-quality 

feedstock for fuel re-fabrication. Wastes generated during the processing and recycle should be compact, durable, and leach-resistant. 

• Design and demonstration of economical and passively safe fast-spectrum reactors (including their fuels) for consuming long-lived constituents in used nuclear 

fuel. 

• Development and validation of advanced modeling and simulation approaches 

for designing efficient recycling systems and facilities, enhancing assurance of 

their safety, and facilitating safeguards and protection of nuclear materials. 

Research also should be undertaken to improve the existing once-through fuel 

cycle. Specific recommendations include: 

• Development of LWR fuels that will achieve increased burnup, provide greater 

reliability and operational flexibility, offer enhanced ‘‘accident tolerance,’’ and 

assure long-term stability following discharge from the reactor. 

• Verification of the stability and integrity of existing LWR fuels and their packaging (containers) after fuel discharge, during extended storage, and during 

transport following extended storage. 

Q2. In his testimony, Mr. Spencer testified that the BRC should address Yucca 

Mountain head-on, stating: 

‘‘The BRC should state what it believes should happen with Yucca Mountain based 

on the best science and evidence available. If its members believe Yucca should be 

shut down, it should state why and provide a recommendation for disengaging from 

Yucca. If, on the other hand, it finds that Yucca should be pursued, perhaps as one 

of a number of options, then the Commission should provide recommendations on 

how to move forward. Such a conclusion could reject the current Yucca program 

while proposing an alternative. Such an alternative could embody the recommendations of the BRC’s consent-based approach where the people of Nevada are given control over the future of the Yucca facility.’’ 

Do you agree or disagree with this recommendation, and why? 

A2. The duties specified for the BRC in its Charter center on the consideration and 

assessment of a broad range of technological and policy alternatives for managing 

the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. The Commission’s intent, as well as its direction from the Administration, evidently focused on identification of workable alternatives to the Yucca Mountain Repository. In its draft report, the Commission offers only generic technical and policy options for nuclear 
119 

waste management, with no specific recommended locations for interim storage or 

permanent disposal. In particular, the report neither includes nor excludes Yucca 

Mountain in its identification of options, and instead calls for a consent-based approach to siting nuclear waste management and disposal facilities. 

The BRC draft report does include some discussion of the Yucca Mountain program. Section 3.4.3 of the draft report summarizes the ‘‘Experience with the Yucca 

Mountain Repository Program,’’ highlighting delays and difficulties that affected the 

program and discussing the erosion of public trust in the program, particularly in 

Nevada. Moreover, in p. 24 of the draft report, the Commission acknowledges that 

‘‘with key decisions by the courts and the NRC still pending, the future of the Yucca 

Mountain project remains uncertain.’’ It also should be noted that the Yucca Mountain repository is a specific example of a mined geologic repository (in volcanic tuff), 

which is one of the generic disposal options identified in the draft report. 

As I stated during my testimony, I believe that completion and release of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Evaluation Reports on Yucca Mountain would 

provide an important opportunity for lessons learned as we seek options for permanent disposition of new and legacy nuclear wastes. These reports, combined with the 

Yucca Mountain license application to the NRC, represent a substantial investment 

of both scientific endeavor and taxpayer funding, and I believe they will be valuable 

to the nuclear energy industry and to policymakers and regulators going forward. 

Q3. Having watched the situation unfold in Japan in the wake of their historic 

earthquake and tsunami, I think we can all agree that it is appropriate to study 

what happened at Fukushima Daiichi and apply any lessons learned to our fleet 

of American nuclear reactors. However, it is also clear that the Japanese regulatory model is a different one than ours. What can we learn from what happened in Japan, and what do we know about the safety and security of our own 

plants? 

A3. It is important to remember that the nuclear industry in the United States 

has an outstanding safety record, along with a history of improving its procedures 

and practices in response to safety incidents and accidents worldwide. However, the 

Fukushima accident highlights the need for continued vigilance and attentiveness 

to safety in the operation and regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants. As we 

learn more about the Fukushima Daiichi accident and its aftermath, the NRC and 

regulatory agencies in other nations should thoughtfully re-evaluate safety requirements and verification of industry compliance. 

In the weeks following the Fukushima accident, nuclear plant operators in the 

United States and other nations re-examined and verified their preparedness to 

cope with emergencies, especially the type of station-blackout scenario that occurred 

at Fukushima after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. Additionally, the NRC 

sent inspectors to every U.S. nuclear plant to review preparedness for natural and/ 

or man-made disasters, especially those which could cause prolonged loss of offsite 

power. The NRC also established a Near-Term Task Force, which has issued a report on its initial recommendations to assure the safe operation and emergency preparedness of U.S. plants. The NRC currently is reviewing those initial recommendations and is planning a more intensive six-month study. 

Given the U.S. nuclear industry’s decades-long track record of safe and reliable 

operation, it seems that the safety and security risks of continued operation of 

America’s existing nuclear power plants appear to be relatively low, especially when 

compared with the safety and health risks caused by other means of baseload electricity generation. However, it should be noted that important design improvements 

have been made since the construction of America’s current operating fleet. Wherever possible, next-generation nuclear plant designs replace ‘‘active’’ systems, which 

are dependent on pumps, valves, and human operators, with ‘‘passive’’ systems that 

use natural forces, such as gravity and convection, to respond to malfunction. For 

example, in next-generation designs, the reactor may be engineered so that, if core 

temperature rises above normal levels, the efficiency of the fission reaction decreases and it slows down automatically. Control rods that stop the nuclear reaction 

can be suspended above the reactor and held in place with electricity, so that any 

interruption to the station’s electrical power will automatically insert the rods into 

the reactor. These passive safety systems mean that if a plant loses power, as happened at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan, the reactor does not require electricity to cool the core after shutdown. Incorporating these technologies in future 

construction of American nuclear power plants would provide additional safeguards 

against any possibility of a Fukushima-type disaster in the United States. 

The Fukushima accident also highlights the need for safe storage and management of used nuclear fuel. As the United States seeks workable policies and practices for short- and long-term management of nuclear wastes, we must carefully con-
120 

sider the need to find prompt, safe, and cost-effective means to limit risks associated 

with used fuel storage at plant sites, especially risks arising from inadequate cooling 

or proximity to operating reactors. 
(121) 

Appendix 2 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
122 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

REPORT BY THE MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

COMMITTEE: Yucca Mountain: The Administration’s Impact on U.S. Nuclear Waste 

Management Policy, June 2011 
123 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Authority and Jurisdiction 

Pursuant to Rule X of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology Committee has jurisdiction over the following areas pertinent to civilian radioactive 

waste management, and Yucca Mountain in parlicular; All energy research, development, and 

demonstration therefor, and all federally owned or operated llonmHitary energy laboratories; 

environmental research and development; commercial application of energy technology; and 

scientific research, development. and demonstration, and project therefor. 1 . 

Rule X also tasks the Committee with a speciaJ oversight function to review and study on a 

continuing basis laws, programs, and Government.activities relating to nonmilitary research and 

deveJopment 2 Additionally. Rule XI allows the Committee to conduct at any time such 

investigations and studies as it considers necessary or appropriate in the exercise of its 

responsibilities under Rule X. J Since the passage of the Nuclear \Vaste Policy Act of 1982 in the 

97i:h Congress, the Committee has actively engaged in the scientific evaluation of nuclear waste 

repository site selection and evaluation through oversight hearings and legislative activity.4 

! Note: The Committee has general oversight responsibilltie:s. in order to assist the House in-

(1) its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of-

(A) the application, administra.tio~ execution, and effectiveness of Federal laws; and 

(B) conditions and circumstances that may indicated the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional 

lcgislation; and 

(C) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of changes in Federal laws, and of such additionaIlegislation as 

may be necessary or appropriate. 

In order to determine whether laws and programs within the jurisdiction of the Committee are being implemented and carried out 

in accordance with the intent of Congress and whether they should be continued, curtailed. or eliminated, the Committee is 

tasked wit.1. re"l.'iewing and studying on a continuing basis-

(A) the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness ofJaws and programs addressing subjects \vithin its 

jurisdiction; 

(B) the organization 90d operation of Federal agencies and entities having reSpOnsibilities for the administration and 

execution of laws and programs addressing subjects within its jurisdiction_ 

(C) Any conditions or circumstances that may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional 

legislation addressing subjects \v:ithin itsjur:isdiction (whether or not a biII or resolution has been introduced V.':itll 

respect thereto) 

;: Rule X, Rules ofthe House of Representatives, 1I2th Congress, January 5, 2011. Available at 

http://rolcsJlOllse.go\l!McdiaifileIPDF _ll2 _1/legislativetextl112thO/020RulesO/020Pamphlet.pdf 

J Rule XI, Rules oftbe House'ofRepresentatives, 112111 Congress, January 5, 201 1. AvaiJable at: 

http://rules,house.govlMedialfi.le/PDF _ I 12_1/Iegislativetextlll2tbO/020RulesO/020Pamphlet.pdf 

.; Sec Appendix B. 
124 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Over the course of the last two and a half years, Committee Republicans have reviewed in depth 

Administration actions associated with the Yucca Mountain Project and disposal of the Nation's 

spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. Focusing in particular on the scientific and 

technical information and processes associated with key policy decisions, the Committee's effort 

included numerous letters to Administration officials, extensive questioning at Committee 

hearings, and acquisition and review of thousands of pages of internal documents. This report 

details the results of our review of the Administration's actions related to Yucca Mountain in the 

context of promises and specific guidelines On scientific integrity, opelllless, and transparency set 

for'.h by President Obama and senior Administration officials. 

The results of this review are striking. Despite numerous suggestions by political officialsincluding President Obama-that Yucca Mountain is unsafe for storing nuclear waste, the 

Committee could not identifY a single document to support such a claim. To the contrary, the 

Committee found great agreement among the scientific and technical experts responsible for 

reviewing the suitability of Yucca Mountain--{;onsidered by many to be "the most studied piece 

of land on Earth"--that nuclear waste can be safely stored at the site for tens of thousands of 

years in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. 

Most noteworthy in this regard is Volume III of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report (SER}--a 

comprehensive technical evaluatiou of site safety critical to advancing licensing and construction 

of the Yucca facility. Obtained by the Committee only after repeated demands and over the 

objections of the NRC Chairman, SER Volume TIl demonstrates in excruciating detail the level 

of technical support among NRC and Department of Energy (DOE) experts in favor of the site's 

advancement: the Committee found that :NRC agreed with over 98.5 percent of DOE's findings 

regarding the site's suitability to meet regulatory requirements. The remaining 1.5 percent did 

not impact the NRC staff's overall conclusions, which found that DOE's Yucca Mountain 

License Application complies with applicable NRC safety requirements, including those related 

to human health and groundwater protection, and the specific performance objectives called for 

in NRC regulations for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes at Yucca Mountain (lO CFR 

63.113-115). 

Why, then, has the President shut down the Yucca Mountain Project? And why does NRC 

Chainnan Iaczko refuse to permit NRC safety review of the site to continue, and refuse to allow 

his fellow Commissioners to formally vote on DOE's Motion to Withdraw the Yucca Mountain 

License Application? The answer is clearly not explained by or based on any scientific or 

technical evaluation. 

While the specific instances of concem uncovered by the Committee and detailed in this report 

are convincing in and of themselves, they collectively reveal not just a pattem, but a systematic 

and active effort on the part of the Administration to obfuscate, delay, and muzzle scientific and 

technical information and related processes in order to shut down Yucca Mountain. 
125 

SST Committee Yu(:rn Mountain Majority Staff Report 

These actions have not only violated the President's own highly promoted principles and 

directives on scientific integrity, transparency, and openness, they have also increased taxpayer 

liabilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, left nuclear waste sitting at reactor sites across the 

country with no plan for disposal, and ultimately threatened ihe long-term potential of nuclear 

power to meet America's growing energy demands with safe, clean, and affordable baseload 

electricity. 

In closing, it should be noted that, despite the path that has been wom and the damage that has 

been done, the Administration still has ample opportunity to make things right. Disclosing to 

Congress the relevant and necessary information related to the Yucca Mountain decision process, 

allowing formal completion of the Safety Evaluation Reports, and bringing the DOE's Motion to 

Withdraw its license application to a vote before the full Commission would go a long way to 

restoring public confidence in the nuclear waste management policy process. 

"Other than the termination of the Department's Super Conducting, Super 

Collide,. Project in Texas in 1998, we.know of no comparable single project 

termination in the Department's recent history as consequential as Yucca· 

Mountain, given the importance of its intended mission, the massive investment in 

recIiand personal property·and the development and compilation of huge 

quantities of Project-related, intellectual property," 
126 

SST Committee Yucca Monntain Majority Staff Report 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Authority and Jurisdiction Inside Cover 

Executive Summary 

1. Foreword 

1. Background 4 

1.1 The History of Yucca Mountain 

1.2 The History of Yucca Mountain Legislation 

1.3 The History of Scientific, Technical, and Safety Reviews 

2. Chronology of Events Under the Obama Administration 10 

2.1 President Obama's Campaign Promise 

2.2 The Shutdown Announcement 

2.3 The Blue Ribbon Commission 

2.4 DOE's Motion to Withdraw and Related License Application Activities at the NRC 

2.5 Closure of NRC's High-Level Waste Prognnn 

2.6 The Administration's Justification for Closing Yucca Mountain 

2.7 The Shutdown ofOCRWM 

3. Taxes, Liabilities, and 1m plications 15 

4. The Department of Energy 18 

4.1 Previous Concerns with DOE Decision-making and Project Management 

4.2 Correspondence between the Committee and the Admiuistration 

4.3 Outside Reports and Activities 

4.4 Committee Review of Documents 

4.4.1 Scientific Integrity 

4.4.2 Shutdown Planning and the Retention of Documents and Science 

4.4.3 Lack of Scientific or Technical Justification to Determine 'YMP is Not Safe or Viable 

5. The l\ uelear Regulatory Commission 

5.1 Correspondence between Committee Members and the NRC 

5.2 Committee Review of Documents 

5.2.1 Volume III ofthe Safety Evaluation Report 

5.2.2 Safety Evaluation Report Volume III Content 

29 
127 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

5.2.3 "Update on the Yucca Mountain Program" Memorandum 

5.3 Slow Walking of the ASLB Decision 

5.4 Intemal Disputes over NRC's Closure of the High-Level Waste Program 

6. Summary and Conclusions 39 

Appendix A - Acronyms 

Appendix B - Committee Hearings 

Appendix C - March 3, 2010 Committee Hearing 

Appendix D - Correspondence 

Appendix E - Documents 
128 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority StlffReport 

FOREWORD 

"J will restore the basic principle that government decisions should he 

based on the best-available, scientifically valid evidence and not on the 

ideological predispositions of agency officials or political appointees. " 

- Barack Obarna to Nature Magazine, September 2008 

The Science, Space, and Technology Committee has conducted active oversight of the issue of 

scientific integrity throughout the government, a theme consistently touted by the Obama 

Administration. Even before taking office, the President's transition office established a clear 

commitment to "Restore Scientific Integrity to the White House," and stated that the incoming 

administration would "[rJestore the basic principle that government decisions should be based on 

the best available, scientifically valid evidence and not on ideological predispositions.'" 

President Obarna further emphasized this point in his inaugural address when he promised to 

'-restore science to its rightful place. ,,6 These assurances were once again affirmed by the 

President before the National Academy of Sciences on April 27, 2009 when he stated "[ u Jnder 

my administration, the days of science taking a back seat to ideology are over.,l7 

The President went on to pledge a "new effort to ensure that federal policies are based on the 

best and most unbiased scientific information," and stated, "I want to be sure that the facts are 

driving scientific decisions -and not thc other way around."s He continued to highlight these 

tenets in a Presidential Memorandum that tasked the Director of the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop recommended principles for ensuring scientific integrity 

within 120 days. In that memo, the President stated: 

<'Except for information that is properly restricted from disc10sure under procedures 

established in accordance with statute, regulation, Executive Order, or Presidential 

Memorandum, each agency should make availab1e to the public the scientific or 

technological findings or conclusions considered or relied on in policy decisiotlS.,,9 

5 "The Obama-BidenPlan, Techn<)logy Agenda," The Office of the President-Elect. Available at: 

http:// change.gov 1 agenda/techno logy_agenda 

6 President Barack Obama's Inaugural AddreS5, January 21, 7.009. Availa:,le at: http://www.wrutehouse.govlbloglinauguraladdress 

7 Remarks by lhc President at the National Academ) ofSeienccs, The White House, April 27, 2009. Available at: 

http://v,i"l,vw.whitehouse.gov/thc-press-officelremarks-presideDt-national-academy-sciences-annual-meeting 

8 Ihid 

9 White House Memorandum.. Subject: Scientific Integrity, March 9, 2009. Available 81' 

http://,,,'WW.whitchouse.gov/the'''pf'Cs5_officeiMemorandum-for-me-Heads-o[-Execuove-Departments-and-Agcncies-3-9-09 
129 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

The Presidential Memorandum continued, "[tJhe public must be able to trust the science and 

scientific process infonning public policy decisions."!O It also directed that "[tJo the extent 

permitted by law, there should be transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of 

scientific and technological information in policymaking," and that "[pJolitical officials should 

not suppress or alter scientific ortechnological findings and conclusions."]] 

"/ started corresponding with John Holdren 

(in his position leading the National 

Commission on Energy Policy) backin 

October, 2008, about the scientific integrity 

problem that would "merge if a new Obam~ 

administration were to withdraw the Yucca 

Mountain license application and thus stop 

the independent NRCtechnicol review of that 

application." 

- Ematl from Per Peterson to DOE Ass't 

Secretary Warren Miller 

Despite the President's call for 

recommendations on scientific integrity in 

120 days, the Director of OSTP took nearly 

two years to respond to the tasking, 

ultimately only providing "further guidance" 

to agencies, and directed them to submit 

draft guidelines to OSTP. 12 In that memo, 

the OS11' Director stated, "[sJeience, and 

public trust in science, thrives in an 

environment that shields scientific data and 

analysis from inappropriate political 

influence; political officials should not 

suppress or alter scientific or technical 

findings." i 3 

The Director of OS11' also directed all executive branch departments to provide a progress report 

on the adoption of scientific integrity policies. It WaS reported the progress reports Were 

submitted on April 21, 201 I, including the Department of Energy's progress report. 14 However, 

despite President Obarna' s commitment to openness, the reports are not publicly available. 

The Administration's promises on transparency and openness have been just as strong as its 

rhetoric on scientific integrity. In issuing a January 2009 memorandum titled "Transparency and 

Open Govemment," the President stated: 

"My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in 

Government. ¥/e wi11 work togetber to ensure the public"trust and establish a system of 

transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our 

democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government. '" Transparency 

promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about what their 

Government is doing. Information maintained by the Federal Government is a national 

asset: My Administration will take appropriate action, consistent with law and policy, 

to disclose infoITI1ation rapidly in forms that the public can readiJy find and use.,,15 

:Olbid. 

11 Ibid 

12 Ofii~e of Science and Technology PoUcy Memorandum, Subject: Scientific Integrity, December 17, 201]. Available at: http://wv.w.whitehouse.goY/sites/defauIUfiles/micIQsites/ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf 

13 Ibid. 

14 "Agencies Report Scientific Integrity Progress," OSTP Blog, April 21, 2009. Available at: 

www . ......ttitehouse.gov/blog/20I 1/04/21fagencies-report-scientific-integrity-progress 

15 VVhite Hoose Memomndum, Subject: Transparency and Open Government, January 21, 2009. Available at: htrp:l/\V\V\v.wbitehouse.gov/the:.yress _ officeiTtansprrencyandOpenGovernmeXlt 
130 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

In December 2009, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a 

directive to agencies to uphold and advance the President's transparency goals, stating as a highlevel prineiple that, "[t]o create an unprecedented and sustained level of openness and 

accountability in every agency, senior leaders should strive to incorporate the values of 

transparency, participation, and collaboration into the ongoing work oftheir agency.,,16 

In response to the Directive, the NRC issued an Open Government Plan to guide implementation 

of the OMB Directive. 17 The NRC Plan notes that "The NRC views nuclear regulation as the 

public's business and, as such, believcs it should be transacted as openly and candidly as 

possible to maintain and enhance the public's confidence. Ensuring appropriate openness 

explicitly recognizes that the public must be infomled about, and have a reasonable opportnnity 

to participate meaningfully in~ the NRC's regulatory processes. t,18 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Gregory .laczko added his personal emphasis to 

NRC's commitment, stating, "I believe that all of this scrutiny and attention makes it even more 

important that we conduct the public's work in an open and transparent manner.,,19 Chairman 

Iaczko went on to state: 

"Over the past few months, we have moved fonvard with implementing the President's 

Open Government Directive. As an independent agency, we were not required to comply 

with this Directive, but we have done so because irs in line with our historic 

organizational cOIIlmitment to openness and transparency. This is an area that will a1ways 

require our continuing focus. We can't simply check a few boxes on a form, and then 

declare o~selves open and tr:ms~arent. We have to co.ntin.ua~6' explain to the public what 

we are domg, how we are domg It. and why we are domg It.''-

The Department of Energy touted similar objectives in its own Open Governn1ent Plan, 

committing to "increase transparency, participation and collaboration aCrOss its unique programs 

and offices" and "advance open governn1ent in support of a more effective Departmcnt for its 

employees and for American people, businesses and communities.,,21 

The Committee regularly reviews wbether administration actions comply with stated policy. In 

this instance, the Administration's declarations on both scientific integrity and transparency must 

be taken into account when evaluating its handling of the Yucca Mountain Project. This report 

examines Administration actions related to Yucca Mountain in the context of promises and 

specific guidelines on scientific integrity, openness, and transparency set forth by President 

Obarna and senior Administration officials. 

It> Office of Management and Budget Memorandum, Subject Open Gove;nment Directive, December 8, 2009. AvailabI:: at: 

"WW\\I. whitehouse.gov/openldocuments!open-government-directive 

!7 "Open Government Plan," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. June 7,2010. Available at: v..-\o\lw.nrc.gov!publicirtvolve/openiphilosoph),/nrc-open-!i!:ov-plan.pdf 

J8 "'Strategic Plan, Fiscal YearS 200S-1013,"U.S. Nuc1earRegulato:ry Commission, February, 2008. Available at: 

W\v\v.nrc.goylreading~rmI doc-collections/nuregsi sraffi' sr 161 4/v4/srl614 v4. pdf#page= 20 

!9 "A Strong Foundation. A Strong Regulatory Future," Dr. Gregor)' B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

March 9. 2010. Available at: http://pbadnpws.nrc.gov!docSIMLl006fMLl00680213.pdf 

20 Ibid. 

2) "Open Government,Plan," U.S. Dep£Irtmcnt of Energy, June 2010. Available at: 

www.energy.gov/open/opengovplan_htrnLhtm 
131 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Maiority Staff Report 

Chapter 1. Background 

1.1 The History of Yucca Mountain 

For over fifty years, scientists have considered how best to manage radioactive waste materials."2 

A deep geological repository has been, and continues to be, the most agreed upon method by 

numerous credible scientific bodies to dispose of radioactive waste. 

In the late 1970's, the United States govenunent began serious consideration of geological 

repositories. Initially, DOE considered numerous sites scattered throughout the country, but 

quickly focused On three specific sites including Vucca Mountain, Nevada; Hanford, 

Washington; and Deaf Smith County, Texas. DOE began studying Yucca Mountain in 1978 and 

an Environmental Impact Statement issued in 1980 proposed to "adopt a national strategy to 

develop a mined geologic repository for disposal of commercially generated high-level and 

transuranic radioactive waste.,,23 DOE ultimately judged Vucca Mountain, a site about 100 miles 

from Las Vegas, on the edge of the Nevada Test Site, to have the "best overall prospects for 

being considered a suitable repository site.,,24 

Aerial View of Yucca Mountain 

,n <OTlle Disposal of Radioactive Waste," National Academy ofSeiences, Board of Radioactive Waste Management. September 

1957. Available at: 'W\o\'W,nap.eduiopenbook.php?record_id=I0294 

23 ·'Management ofCommereially Generated Radioactive Wask," Environmental Impact Statement, U.S. Department of Energy. 

October 1980, Available at: wwv,'.energy.gov/medlalEIS0046F _33515.pdf 

24 Hearing titled "Nuclear Waste Program," Committee On Energy and Natural Resources, U.s. Senate, June 29, 1987. Available 

at: www.archive.orgistrearnlnuclem-wasteprog04unitlnuc1earwasteprog04unit_djvu.tx1. 

4 
132 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

1.2 The History of Yucca Mountain Legislation 

Since the U.S. Government began nuclear waste specific studies into Yucca Mountain nearly 35 

years ago, Congress has consistently voted in support of a national geological repository at the 

site. This legislative record began in the 97th Congress with the passage of the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) that centralized the long-term management of nuclear waste, most 

notably by mandating construction of a safe and permanent nuclear waste repository. In 1987, 

Congress amended the NWPA by designating Yucca Mountain as the only site to be considered 

as a repository by a vote of 237-181 in the House of Representatives and 61-28 in the Senate. In 

2002, Congress reaffirmed this designation by a vote of306-117 in the House of Representatives 

and a vote of 60-39 in the Senate. Again in 2007, the IIouse of Representatives overwhelmingly 

rejected, by a vote of 80-351, an attempt to eliminate funding for the Yucca Mountain nuclear 

waste disposal program. 

The NWP A also assigned responsibility for various aspects of the repository to four primary 

entities: 

1. The Department of Energy to site, construct, operate, and close a repository; 

2. The Environmental Protection Agency to set public radiological health and safety 

standards for a repository; 

3. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission to promulgate reiulations governing construction, 

operation, and closure of a repository; and 

4. The civilian nuclear power industry to handle the costs of disposal of spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste.2S 

As part of the nuclear industry responsibility under NWPA, the collection from nuclear power 

users of one mil (or one-tenth of one cent) per kilowatt-hour of nuclear generated electricity was 

mandated to provide funding for development of the eventual site. 

13 The History of Scientific, Technical, and Safely Reviews 

Since the N\VPA passed in 1982, Yucca Mountain has been exhaustively examined, commonly 

earning it the moniker of the "most studied piece of land in the world.,,26 These site 

examinations have resulted in tens of thousands of pages of scientific, engineering, and technical 

studies contributing to a robust level of confidence in the safety and radiological protection 

characteristics of the site. 

In June 1985, DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) submitted 

the "Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program," that set forth the 

overall goals, objectives, and strategy to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. It 

further presented detailed information required by the NWPA, for "obtaining information; 

potential financial, institutional, and legal issues; plans for the test and evaluation facility; the 

25 "Yucca Mountain Sci.ence and Engineering Report: Technical Information Supporting Site Recommendation Consideration," 

Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, February 2002. Available at: 

http://\,\-'\.vw.energy.gov!mediaiSER.PDF 

2" "Yucca Mountain: The Most Studied R~a1 Estate on the Planet,"U.S_ Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 

March 2006. Available at: htlp:l/epw.serurtc.gov/repwhitepapersfYuccaMountainBPWReport.pdf 

5 
133 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

principal results obtained to date from site investigations; information on the sitecharacterization programs; information on the waste package; schedules; costs; and 

socioeconomic impacts:,27 The Mission Plan provided a foundation for future site 

characterization and the path to open a permanent geologic repository. 

As early as 1984, DOE published a draft environmental assessment of the Yueea Mountain 

Project that was incorporated into a May 1986 DOE report on multi -attribute utility analysis?8 

In the analysis, DOE used quantitative methods to rank possible sites on pre-closure and postclosure technical guidelines. Among the sites considered, Yucca Mountain was rated as the best 

option and most resilient to all impacts. DOE continued to study the public health and safety 

implications a,"ociated with opening Yucca Mountain. 

In December 1998, DOE published five volumes titled the "Viability Assessment of a Repository 

at Yucca Mountain." This Viability Assessment noted the design of a repository at Yucca 

Mountain had undergone multiple improvements to reduce uncertainties and improve its 

performance, highlighting that repository design is an iterative process, always incorporating a 

greater understanding of underlying scientific and technical issues. The report concluded that, 

"based on the viability assessment, DOE believes that Yucca Mountain remains a promising site 

for a geologic repository.,,29 

Cutaway Diagram of tile Yucca Mountain Repository Design 

27 "Mission Plan for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program. Volume I:' Department of Energy. Oflice of Civilian 

RadIoactive WfiSte Management, June 1985. Available at; bttp:Hwww.energy.gov/mediaJ1'yfissionPlan-HQP-19870601-

0271J1p I-2S0.pdf 

28 "A Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Sites Nominate-d For Characterization For the First Radioactive Waste. Repository - A 

Decision Aiding Methodology," May 1986. Available a1.: http://\\.'wy.i.energy.gov/mediaiMultiattribute-UtiI-ity-AnalysisJIQS198R0517-1161ypl-250.pdf 

29 <Viabiliry J\ssessment ofa Repository at Yucca Mountain," Department of Energy, Office of Civilian RHdioactive Waste 

Management, December 199K Available at: http://www.energy.gov/mediaiViahiliTy_Overview_b_1.pdf 

6 
134 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

In February 2002, OCWRM published the "Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report: 

Technical Information Supporting Site Recommendation Consideration." The report "describes 

the results of scientific and engineering studies of the Yucca mountain site, the waste forms to be 

disposed, the repository and waste package designs, and the results of the most recent 

assessments of the long-term performance of the potential repository.,,3o 

Upon review ofOCWRM's analysis of key technical aspects relating to Yucca Mountain, thenSecretary of Energy Spencer Abraham formally recommended to President George W. Bush that 

a geological repository for spent nuelear fuel and high-level radioactive waste should be located 

at Yucca Mountain. In his reeommendation of Yucca Mountain, Abraham noted: 

I have considered whether sound science supports the determination that the Yucca 

Mountain site is scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a 

repository. I am convinced that it does. The results of this extensive investigation and 

the external technical reviews of this body of scientific work give me confidence for 

the conclusion, based on sound scientific principles, that a repository at Yucca 

Mountain will be able to protect the health and safety of the public when evaluated 

against the radiological protection standards adopted by the Environmental Protection 

Agency and implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.s1 

Secretary Abraham also pointed out in 2002 testimony to the Senate Energy and Natural 

Resources Committee that the "scientific evaluation of the Yucca Mountain site had been 

conducted over a 24-year period.,,32 After consideration of Secretary Abraham's 

recommendation, President Bush made a formal recommendation to Congress in 2002 to move 

forward with a repository at Yucca Mountain. The NWPA afforded the state in which the 

repository was selected to formally disapprove of the selection. In response to Nevada's 

objection, Congress reconfirmed the selection of Yucca Mountain by voting to move forward 

with Yucca Mountain by a vote of 306-117 in the Housc and adopted the measure by voice vote 

in the Senate.33 

Following this recommendation, DOE entered the final stages of the site characterization and 

reeommendalion process by begirming to prepare the License Application and Safety Analysis 

Report (SAR) for Yucca Mountain. Meanwhile, technical reviews, quality assurance evaluations, 

and studies continued to promulgate the necessary regulatory thresholds to protect public health 

and safety, and prevent adverse environmental impact. 

In 2002, DOE published a IS-chapter Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) required by the 

NWPA in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act." In addition to the original 

30 "Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report Tecbnicallnfonnation Supporting Site Recommendation Consideration," 

Febf'1.lary 2002, Available at; http)lwww.energy.gov!mediaiSER..PDF 

31 "Energy Timeline for the Year 2002," U.S. Department of Energy. Availa.ble at 

http://www.energy.goviaboutltirneline2002.htm 

n Statement of the Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, Before the House Energy and Natural Resources Committee. May 16, 

2002. Available at: http:l(www.yuccamounmin.org/abraham051602.htrn 

33 "Yucca Mountain Repository Site Approval Act.'· Final Vote ResulL<; for Roll CaIl 133, HJ :Res. 87, May 8. 2002. Available 

at: http://clerk.house.gov/evs!2002lrollI33.xml 

34 "Environmental Impact S1alement for a Geologic Reposito!~y for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High~Level 

Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nyc:: County, Nevada." Februur;y 28. 2002. Ayailable at: 

http.llpbadupv.'S.nTC-gov/docsl.ML0326/ML032690321.html 
135 

S~T Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

EIS, in 2008 DOE submitted a supplemental EIS to resolve points raised following the initial 

BIS." The EIS did not identify any environmental issues that would prevent the Yucca 

Mountain license from moving fon-vard. 

After years of preparation, DOE submitted the License Application (LA) for a High-Level Waste 

Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain to the NRC on June 3, 2008. 36 The LA included a 

detailed SAR, focused On lbe development of lbe necessary safety and technical thresholds to be 

considered by the NRC in the SER. The SAR was divided into five chapters: "Repository Safety 

Before Pemlanenl Closure," "Repository Safety After Permanent Closure," "Research and 

Development Program to Resolve Safety Questions," "Perfonnance Confirmation Program," and 

"Management Systems.,,37 Again, no obstacles were identified in the SAR and DOE 

demonstrated it could safely construct and manage a repository. . 

Upon receipt oflbe LA and accompanying SAR, the NRC began work on the five-volume SER. 

The detailed and meticulously prepared SER reports are intended to provide a final 

comprehensive analysis of the technical feasibility of Yucca Mountain with respect to its ability 

to meet regulatory thresholds. 

u~s. Commercial NucleaT Power Reacto:rs---Years or Opera'Uon 

Map ofClIrrent Naclear Power Reactors in the United Silltes 

35 Final Supplemental Environment.a.1lmpact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and 

High~Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye COllnty, Nevada," July 3, 2008. Available at: 

http://pbadupws,nrc,gov/docslML0817IML981750191.h1ln1 

36 "DOE's License Application for a High-Lev~l Waste Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain," June 3. 200S. Available at: 

http;IIv.'l,yW.illC.gov/wastel1ilw-di::,.pu~Vyur.:lla-lir.:-app.h!ml 

J7 "Ym:caMount;,u1 Repository Licellse Application: Sa.fe1y Analysis Rcport," June 2008. Available at: 

http://w-ww.nrc.gov/was1elhlw-disposalfyucca~lic~app!yucca-1 ic-app-safery-report.htrnl 
136 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority SGlffReport 

The summary and status of the SER volumes is as follows: 

Volume I: Released August 23, 2010, Volume I found that DOE's license application 

satisfied the general description of the repository, proposed schedules for activities, and 

described security measures and site characterization.3 

Volume II: Originally scheduled for release in March 2011/9 before being advanced to 

December 2010, Volume II assesses pre-closure issues such as placing spent nuclear fuel 

in the repository and other actions necessary prior to closing the site. Volume II remains 

private due to NRC Chainnan Jazcko's decision to stop [mal work on this volume. 

Volume III: Completed and waiting approval in July 2010, Volume III evaluates the 

safety and technical issues associated with post-closure activities. Targeted for release in 

November 2010, Volume III remains private due to NRC Chairman Jaczko's decision to 

halt all review ofthe LA and end the High-Level Waste Program. 

Volume IV: Still pending, originally scheduled for release in January 2011, Volume IV is 

to address the maintenance, quality assurance, and radiological issues. 

Volume V: Still pending, originally scheduled for release in March 2011, Volume V 

would include modifications ·to previous SER volumes and sU(llmarize previous four 

volumes. 

While NRC staff were the primary entities responsible for the preparation of the SER, DOE was 

also closely involved with the document preparation. Contentions, or scientific questions 

needing to be resolved, were addressed in coordination between the two agencies. 

38 "Safety Evaluation Report Related to Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at' Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada; Volwne 1: General Information,'" United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 2010. Available at: 

http://,",ww.nrc.govJreading,rmJdoc~coliectionslnllrcgs/sta:f£lsr1949J#abs 

,» See "Tentative Completion Dates for Safcty Evaluation Report Volumes" figllTE!, page 33. 

9 
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Chapter 2. 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Chronology of Events Under the Obama 

Administration 

. 2.1 President Obama's Campaign Promise 

President Obama has been a consistent opponent of Yucca 

Mountain, despite the large number of nuclear power 

reactors with onsite waste storage in his home state of 

lllinois.40 This skepticism and opposition continued 

through his Presidential campaign. 

Early during his campaign for the presidency, Barack 

Obama vowed to shut down Yucca Mountain. Campaign 

materials noted that "Barack Obama and Joe Biden do not 

believe that Yucca Mountain is a suitable site. They will 

lead federal efforts to look for safe, long-term disposal 

solutions based on objective, scientific analysis.,,41 

Candidate "abama publicly stated: 

President abama with Scrence Advisor 

John Holdren 

After spending billions of dollars on the Yucca Mountain Project, there are still 

significant questions about whether nuclear waste can be safely stored there. I 

beJieve a better short-term solution is to store nuclear waste on-site at the reactors 

where it is produced ... until we find a. safe, long-term disposal solution that is 

based on sound science.41 

2.2 The Shutdown Announcement 

With the release of the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 201 I budget request in February 2010, DOE 

announced ils intention to withdraw the License Application for Yucca Mountain. The budget 

request also declared the Administration's intent to dismantle OCRWM by the end of the fiscal 

year. DOE immediately initiated the process to shutter the office. 

Despite the President's continued assertions that his nuclear waste management policy decisions 

would be driven by sound science, the Administration has repeatedly refused to provide a 

scientific or technical justification for its shutdown decision, instead simply stating that Yucca 

"is not a workable option." Secretary Chu has noted that "teclmology has advanced" since the 

NWP A passed in 1982; however he has not specified what those advancements mean and how 

new technologies change the law. 

40 Letter from Senator Darack Obama to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Senator Barbara Boxer, Dated October 30, 2007. 

Available a1' http://my.barackobama.comJpageJcorrunnnity/postJroup/NVHQ/CSYB 

41 "Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for America," August 3, 2008. Available at: 

http://pensecinc.com/docS/factsheet_ ~ergL speech_ 080308. pdf 

42 "Barack Obama Explains Yucca Mountain Stance." Las Vegas Review Journal. May 20, 2007. Available at: 

http://www.ivrj.com/opinionf7598337.html 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Stzlff Report 

2.3 The Blue Ribbon Commission 

In concurrence with DOE's announcement to close OCRWM 

and pennanently remove Yucca Mountain as an option for a 

pennanent repository, Presidem Obama established the Blue 

Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC). The 

BRC is tasked to evaluate and make recommendations relating 

to policies guiding fuel cycle technologies, interim waste 

storage, pennanenl Sl\TF disposal and related management 

issues4 ' While the BRC is prohibited from making alternative 

site recommendations due 10 Yucca Mountain's lawful 

designation as the repository site, BRC Co-Chairman Lee Energy Secretary Stephen Chu 

Hamilton said Secretary Chu made it "quite clear that nuclear 

waste storage at Yucca Mountain is not an option.,,44 Then-Climate Change Czar Carol Browner 

said, "It is time to move forward with a new strategy based on the best science,,,45 in spite of the 

lack of credible scientific evidence demonstrating Yucca Mountain is not viable. 

These actions highlight the highly illogical nature of terminating the only existing waste storage 

option before assessing potential alternative options. 

2.4 DOE's Motion to Withdraw and Related License Application Activities at tbe NRC 

On March 3, 2010, DOE filed a motion with the NRC to withdraw the License Application for a 

High-Level Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain "with prejudice:' By attempting to withdraw 

with prejudice, the Administration would permanently prevent consideration of Yucca Mountain, 

blocking future Congresses and Administrations from reversing this decision. 

The primary argument of the Motion to Withdraw rested on the vague statement that Yncca 

Mountain isn't a "workable option." The Motion lacked detailed justification in support of this 

decision, stating for example that "It is the Secretary of Energy's judgment that scientific and 

engineering knowledge on issues relevant to disposition of high-level waste and spent nuclear 

fuel has advanced dramatically over the twenty years since the Yucca Mountain project was 

initiated.,,46 These general advancements in the understanding of waste storage' are of course 

irrelevant to the fundamental question of whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable site without an 

open assessment of how this advanced knowledge impacts the safety of the Yncca Mountain 

Project. 

On June 29, 2010, the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB)47 rejected DOE's 

Motion to Withdraw. The detailed denial repeatedly stressed the lack of scientific justification 

4J Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, U.s. Department of Energy, "Advisory Committee Charter," March 1, 

2010. Available at: http://v .... ,:w.energy.gov!news.!docurnentslBRC_Charter.pdf 

44 Tetreault, Steve, "Federal panel to examine nuclear waste storage." Las Vegas RevieJ1.' Jowna/. January 30, 20ID. Available at: 

http://\..,..,,'WJvrj.comlnewS/federal~panel-to-examine-nuclear-waste-storage-83143397 .hnnl 

45 Jbid. 

46 "U.S. Department of Energy's Motion to Withdraw," Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, March 3, 2010. Available at: http://www.energy.gov/mcdiaIDOE_Motion_to_Withdraw.pdf 

4i Note: The ASLB is an independent technical body 'Within NRC that reviews license applications and olberteciJ.njcal materials 

in order to advance Commission ded:;ion-making. 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

provided by DOE. For example, the ASLB notes, "conceding that the Application is not flawed 

nor the site unsafe, the Secretary of Energy seeks to withdraw the Application with prejudice as a 

'matter of policy' because the Nevada Site 'is not a workable option. ",48 ASLB also notes, 

"When Congress selected the Yucca Mountain site over Nevada's objection in 2002, it 

reinforced the expectation in the 1982 Act that the project would be removed from the political 

process and that the NRC would complete an evaluation of the technical merits,,49 and "DOE has 

acknowledged that its decision to seek to withdraw the Application is not based on a judgment 

that Yucca Mountain is unsafe or on flaws in the Application. It should be able to proceed with 

an evaluation of the technical merits, as directed by the NWPA,. without undue discomfort."so 

ASLB summarily rejected all aspects of DOE's Motion to Withdraw, including a comprehensive 

rejection of the attempt to withdraw with prejudice. 

Following the ASLB's ruling, the full Commission invited participants to file briefs with the 

Commission 'to determine whether the Commission should review, and reverse or uphold 

ASLB's decision. While it has been publicly acknowledged that the four participating 

Commissioners have filed their individual positions with the NRC Secretary,51 NRC Chairman 

laczko has blocked further action on the matter by refusing to schedule a formal meeting to issue 

a final decision on DOE's Motion to Withdraw the License Application. 

2.5 Closure of NRC's High-Level Waste Program 

During the same time frame in which the Commissioners were considering the ASLB's order 

rejecting DOE's Motion to Withdraw, the NRC proceeded to halt all work on the High-Level 

Waste Program (HL W). In accordance with the President's decision to shutter the Yucca 

Mountain Project, the FY 2011 NRC budget request for the High-Level Waste Repository 

program included funds only to carry out work related to an "orderly closure of the agency's 

When Congress selected the Yucca Mountain site over Nevada's objection in 2002, 

it reinforced the expectation in the 1982 Act that the project would be removed 

from the political process and that the NRC would complete an evaluation of the 

technical merits" . 

... DOE has acknowledged that its decision to seek to withdraw the Application is 

not based on a judgment that Yucca Mountain is unsafe or on flaws in the 

Application. It should be able to proceed with an evaluation of the technical merits, 

as directed by the NWPA, without undue discomfort. 

- NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, February 2010 

43 ASLB Board Response, page 1. 

49 Ibid. 

50 Ibid. 

51 Ling, Kath~Tinc, ''NRC cbairtnan reven.ls Yucca vote; still no tirneline for decision," E&E Publishing, November 8, 2010. 

Available at: http;//ecnews.netleenc:wspm/printl2010/11108110 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Yucca Mountain licensing support activities" in correlation to DOE's announcement of its 

intention to withdraw the License Application.s2 The budget request "reflects that possibility" 

and "upon the withdrawal or suspension of the licensing review, the NRC would begin an 

orderly closure of the technical review and adjudicatory activities, and would document the work 

and insights gained from the review."s3 However, when the ASLB rejected DOE's Motion to 

Withdraw, the precondition for the NRC's budget request was not fulfilled. 

Unable to pass a complete appropriations bill before the end of the fiscal year, Congress passed, 

and President Obama signed into law, a Continuing Resolution (CR) to continue funding 

government operations at existing levels. Shortly thereafter, on October 4, 2010, an NRC 

memorandum directed all work On HL W to halt because the CR did not "include specific 

restrictions on spending funds.~' Thus, the memo directed staff to "continue its activities on tilt: 

Yucca Mountain license application in accordance with the Commission's decision on the FY 

201 I budget using available Nuclear Waste Fund resources during the CR."" 

However, NRC's FY 2011 budget request was never signed into law. The Commission therefore 

opted to shut down a program in the absence of explicit Congressional approval. This directive 

was unusual and highly controversial, especially given the drastic consequences of the action. 

An NRC spokesman said he was "not sure whether there was a precedent for the decision."'; 

The directive halted all NRC review of the LA and prevented the approval process for SER 

Volume III from moving forward. Commissioner Ostendorff requested a formal meeting to 

consider the memorandum. However the three Democratic Commissioners - Chairman Jaczko, 

Commissioner Magwood, and Commissioner Apostolakis - refused to agree to the request and 

thus a lack of quorum prevented the entire Commission from considering the request. Thus, NRC 

review of DOE's License Application including the Safety Evaluation Report came to a halt. 

"[1] he Administration's staled rationale for changing course does 

not seem to rest on factual findings and thus does not bolster the 

credibility of Our government to handle this matter competently. 

Those who would distort the science of Yucca .Mountain for political 

purposes should be reminded that is was a year ago today that the 

President issued his memorandum on scientific integrity, in which 

he stated that "The public must be able to trust the science and 

scientific process informing public policy deCisions. " 

- Dale Klein. Commissioner. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. \1arch, 20 I 0 

~2 "Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2011," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 2010. 

",,·vvV"-I1Tc.govlreading-rmfdoc-Gol1ccrionsinuregs/staff7srllOO/v26/srllOOv26.pdf 

53 Ibid. 

5 .. "Guidanc(; Under a Fis(;al Year 2011 Continuing, Resolution,"- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory COllunissioD, October 4,2010. 

55 Ling, Katherine, -'NRC starts controversial shuldown of Yucca review, E&E Publishing. October 7, 2010. k ... ailable at: 

,\vw" ... eenev.'S.netlgreerrwlrel2010/10/07/04 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

2.6 The Administration'5 Justification for Closing Yucca Mountain 

Despite repeated commitments to scientific integrity and adhering to science-informed decisions, 

the Administration has repeatedly disregarded the lack of scientific evidence regarding the safety 

ofa geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. For example, in a March 3, 2010 hearing with the 

Committee on Science and Technology, Secretary Chu could not reference a single scientific 

analysis to justity the Administration's decision not to move forward with Yucca Mountain. 56 

As previously noted, DOE does not cite any scientific issues in their Motion to Withdraw, but 

rather reference "scienlific advancements." Despite the widely documented lack of scientific or 

technical issues, it was reported the President told South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, Yucca 

Mountain isn't an option because of "safety concerns') in December 2010. 57 

It is extremely concerning to have the President of the United States raise safety issues despite 

the results of all government conducted scientific and technical evaluations. This is particularly 

alarming given pending court cases relating to Yucca Mountain brought against the U.S. 

government. Another political opponent of Yucca Mountain, Senate Majority Leader Reid, said 

the project is "technically and scientifically unsound,"" again, with no credible scientific 

evidence. 

2.7 The Shutdown ofOCRWM 

As a part of the Administration's coordinated effort to permanently close Yucca Mountain, DOE 

announced in the President's FY 2011 budget request its plans to abolish OCRWM by the end of 

FY 2010. OCRWM was specifically established by the NWPA with a mission to "manage and 

dispose of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.,,59 Enabled by the failure of the 

111 th Congress to complete work on the FY2011 budget, DOE proceeded to act on its plans, thus 

eliminating an office with important programmatic and statutory rcsponsibilities (DOE divided 

statutory responsibilities amongst various DOE offices, specifically the Offices of Nuclear 

Energy and Environmental Management). According to the DOE's Inspector General, DOE's 

move to shut down OCR \\1M was done in such haste that it did not prepare a formal shutdown 

plan.'o 

56 For full exchange and Secretary Chu's responses to the Committee's Questions fm-the Record, see Appendix C 

57 Chebium, Raju, "Nikki Haley and Barack Obama Talk Health Care, Yucca Mountain." December 2, 201 O. A vailab1e at 

http://v,'WW.wltx.cominewsilocal/story.aspx?storyid=ll 0547 &catid=2 

58 Rogers" Keith, "House members tour Nevada Yucca Mountain tunnel," Las Vegas Revinl!JolJ.rnal, December 2,2010. 

Available at http://W.WWJvrj.comlnews{house-mem]jeis.tour~nevada-yucca-mountain-site-120740349.html?ref=::349 

5~ U.S. Department of Energy, "About OCR WM, 't Available at http://v.''WW.energy.gov/environrnentiabou'L0crwm.htm. 

6(1 '"Special Report: Need for Enhanced Surveillance During the Yucca Mountain Project Shut Do'WJl," Offcie ofthe Inspector 

General, U.S. Department of Energy, Joly 2010. Available at ,vw""..ig.energy.gov/documentsiOAS-SR-IO-Ol.pdf 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Chapter 3. Taxes, Liabilities, and Implications 

Beyond the policy and legal repercussions of closing Yucca Mountain, the Obama 

Administration's actions are causing increasingly severe financial implications for U.S. 

taxpayers. To date, almost $15 billion has been spent studying, preparing and advancing to 

construction of Yucca Mountain. Should the Administration continue down this path, those tax 

dollars will simply be wasted. 

Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Dry, Casks 

Additionally, the NWPA instituted a one mil per kilowatt-hour fee upon nuclear generated 

electricity to be deposited in the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) to pay for costs associated with 

S"N'F disposal, specifically Yucca Mountain. This surcharge is passed on to ratepayers. Despite 

the lack of a permanent repository, ratepayers continue to contribute to the NWF. The 

Congressional Budget Office estimates the NWF contains over $25 billion and is accruing at a 

rate of $2 billion per year with fees and interest.6

! 

The lack of a permanent repository places additional burdens on states and localities that 

currently store high-level radioactive waste. In particular, two states host to DOE facilities that 

store radioactive waste are directly impacted - Washington, where the nation's largest deposit of 

51 "The Federal Governmen1's Responsibilities and Liabilities Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act," COJ:lgressjonal Budget 

Office, July 27, 2010. Availahle at: www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.s!117xxJdocJl77.8/07·27-NuclearWaste_Te:rtlmony.pdf 

15 
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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

waste is stored at DOE's Hanford Site, and South Carolina, horne of Savannah River Site, that 

also holds a significant amount of waste produced from nuclear weapons program. Both states 

are actively pursuing litigation seeking damages from the Federal Government as a consequence 

of DOE's inability to accept waste in a permanent repository. Washington and South Carolina 

are also parties along with Aiken County, SC, the National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners, and the Prairie Island Indian Community, in a suit challenging DOE's authority 

to withdraw its License Application.52 The D.C. Circuit Court heard oral arguments in the case 

on March 22, 201 I, but has yet to issue a ruling. 

U sed Nuclear Fuel in Storage 

(Mc>fric Tons, End nl20l 0) 

,:,o-'MTS.PE.'9.~Fuei ' 

: .. ' <HOOMrspentFUe! 

':1101-1000MTSpentftR1! 

:r;: ... 1~OO flit Spent ·Ftlef 

Commercial Spellt Nuclear Fuel Stored ill the United States 

Taxpayers are also liable for the government's breach of contract with nuclear generators. The 

NWPA stipulated the government would assume responsibility for commercially generated spent 

nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998. Because the government has not fulfilled this obligation, 

taxpayers are liable for approximately $12 billion in damages, even if the government began 

accepting SNF in 2020 at another location, which looks increasingly doubtful. This liability will 

increase by $500 million annually thereafter. 63 Further, the courts have ruled that the NWF 

62 See In re: Aiken County (& Consolidated Cases), Nos. 10-1050, 10-1069 & 10-1082 (D.C. Cir.) 63 Ibid. 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

cannot be used to pay for the damages; instead it must come from the Department of Justice's 

Judgment Fund, exacerbating the financial exposure to taxpayers. 64 

The lack of a permanent repository also raises other issues. For example, NRC is not permitted 

to license a new reactor without a plan for disposal of SNF, as stipulated in the Standard 

Contract, restraining the nuclear industry's ability to grow over the long-term. Also of great note 

are the implications to homeland security and military readiness. In the absence of a permanent 

repository, more SNF will be stored onsite in spent fuel pools, which a 2005 study by the 

National Academy of Sciences deemed a credible terrorist threat. 65 

The U.S. Government is also responsible for disposal of nuclear waste generated by the Navy. A 

March 2011 Goverrment Accountability Office (GAO) report notes penalties of $28 million 

annually will be incurred by the taxpayer should DOE not fulfill its obligation with the states of 

Colorado and Idaho to remove high-level radioactive waste.'6 Even more concerning is the 

possibility that Idaho could have the ability to suspend any further shipments from DOE or the 

Navy to DOE's Idaho site until DOE meets their obligation. This would have severe national 

security implications and impair the Navy's ability to provide for national defense. 

64 In 2002 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eieventh Circuit detennined that the Nuclear Waste: Fund was not available 

to pay these judgments or to pay settlements. See Alabama Power Company et al. v DOE No. 00-16138 (11 th CiL). 

M Wald, Matthew, "Study Finds Vulnerabilities in Pools of Spent Nuclear Fuel," The Nih.., York Times, April 7, 2005. Available 

at: http://\.\fW\\'.nytirnes.coml2005/04i07/politicsl07nukc.html 

6S "Better Information Need::!d on Waste Storege at DOE Sites as a Result ofYlJcca Mountain Shutdown," Government 

Accountability Office. March 2011. A"ailablc at: w",,,,w.gao.gov/new.iterns/dl1230.pdf 

17 
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SST Committee Yucca. Mountain Majority Sta:ffReport 

Chapter 4. The Department of Energy 

4.1 Previous Concerns witb DOE Decision-making and Project Management 

Evaluating DOE's decisions related to major energy projects is not new for the Committee. 

DOE's decision to restructure the FutureGen program drew the Committee's attention in the 

I lOth Congress. Many of the issues the Committee encountered in its review of that program, as 

well as its ultimate findings. are relevant to this review as well. In the 2009 report titled The 

Passing of FutureGen: How the World's Premier Clean Coal Technology Project Came to be 

Abandoned by the Department of Energy, the then majority staff stated: 

"DOE was extremely reluctant to produce documents to the Committee so that it could 

detennine exactly how decisions were made concerning FutureGen. Despite numerOUS 

requests from the Committee since April 2, 2008, and the threat of a subpoena, the 

Department has not yet provided a full response.',67 

The majority staff report also found that: 

"In abandoning the original concept, the Department of Energy left the country 

with no coherent strategy for carbon capture and sequestration - despite having 

many fingers in many pots.)!68 

As detailed throughout this report, these experiences and findings with respect to FutureGen are 

very similar to DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain Project and nuclear waste 

management. Despite numerous requests for documents over a two-year span, the Committee 

has yet to receive a final production of documents. In abandoning Yucca Mountain, the 

Departmcnt of Energy left the country with no coherent strategy for nuclear waste disposal. 

Although the Administration formed a Bluc Ribbon COllunission to evaluate alternatives, it was 

explicitly barred from evaluating the viability of continuing to advance the Yucca Mountain site. 

Making matters worse, the decision was made prior to any recommendations from the Blue 

Ribbon Commission . 

. FINDING #1: A pattern exists whereby DOE makes major policy decisions I prior to comprehensive analysis of costs, benefits, and risks. 

67 "The Passing ofFutureGen: How the World's. Premier Clean Coal Technology Project Came to be Abandoned by the 

Department of Energy," House Science and Technology Committee, March 10,2009. 

68 Ibid Note: The Majority Staffs conclusions vrore supported by the Government Accountability Office report GAO~09-248 

(February 2009) which stated: "Contrary to best practices, DOE did not base: its decision to n:structurc Flltl1rcGen on a 

comprehensive analysis offactors, such as associated costs, benefits. and risk.:;." 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

4.2 Correspondence between the Committee and the Administration 

May 7, 2009 - Science and Technology Committee Ranking Member Ralph llall, Science 

and Technology Snbcommittee on Investigations and Oversight Ranking Member Paul 

Broun, Energy and Commerce Committee Rauking Member Joe Barton, and Energy and 

Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Ranking Member Greg Walden 

to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. 

Members requested responses to numerous questions 

relating to the Administration's decision, including the 

establishment of a Blue Ribbon Commission.69 None 

of the questions posed in the letter were answered in 

Sccretary's Chu's June 1, 2009 reply?O Subsequent 

staff level correspondence on June 18, 2009 confmned 

that DOE considered its June 1, 2009 reply responsive 

10 the Members requests, and that DOE did not possess 

documents responsive to the Members requests. As of 

February 2, 2010, Secretary Chu still refused to 

comment on the Blue Ribbon Commission's charter,"] 

although information was eventually revealed in a 

Press Bulletin on March 2, 2010.72 

Members also requested "all documents relating to any legal, technical, or scientific analysis that 

formed the basis for your decision to re-evaluate nuclear waste disposal alternatives to the 

proposed Yucca Mountain repository, including, but not limited to, evaluations and 

recommendations that led you to determine that Yucca Mountain was 'not an option.",73 

Additionally, Members requested "any analysis of the potential impact that failing to pursue the 

Yucca Mountain repository may have on the construction of new nuclear power plants, which 

are essential to providing clean and reliable energy in the futurc.,,74 

February 3, 2010 - Ranking Members Hall and Broun to Secretary Steven Chu. 

Members once again requested explanation and documentation regarding the Administration's 

decision, as well as documents related to the establisJnnent of the Blue Ribbon Commission.75 

Secretary Chu eventually replied to the letter on July 7th, six months later. The only documents 

provided at that time were the DOE press release dated January 29, 20J 0, and the BRC charter 

which was issuedpublicalJy on March 2, 2010. No other documents were provided.76 

~9 Letter from Reps. HaIL Broun, Barton, Walden to Sec. Chu dated May 7, 2009. 

10 Letter from Sec. Chu to Reps. Hall, Broun., Barton.. Walden dated June I, 2009. 

71 Behr, Peter, "The Administration puts its O'."Il stamp on a possible nudear revival," New York Times, February 2. 2010. 

Available at: http://w<.).:vv.nytimes.com/cwireJ20 1 O/02J02/02c1imate ........ ~re-the-administration-puts-lts-ovm-stamp-on-a-p76078.htmi 

72 AdvisOT), Committee Charter, Blue Ribbon Commission OIl America's Nuclear Future., U.S. Department of Energy, March 2. 

2010. Available at: http://www.energy.gov!news/docurncntsIBRC_Charter.pdf 

73 See Supra 68. 

74 Ibid. 

15 Letter from Reps. Hall and Broun to Sec. Chu dated February 3. 2010 

76 Letter from Sec. Chu to Reps. Hall and Broun dated July 7, 2010. 

19 
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SST Committee Yucca MOWltain Majority Staff Report 

June 22, 2010 - Resolution of Inquiry. 

On June 22, 2010, Representative Sensenbrenner submitted a Resolution ofInquiry77 requesting 

documents related to DOE's application to foreclose use of Yucca Mountain as a high-Jevel 

nuclear waste repository.78 This resolution was considered by the Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, pursuant to House rules, on July 19,201079 The Energy and Commerce Committee 

voted to report H. Res. 1466 without recommendation with the understanding that Majority 

Members would join Rep. Sensenbrenner in requesting documents from the Department. A joint 

request was never sent. 

July 6, 2010 - Ranking Member Hall, Ranking Member Broun, and Select Committee on 

Energy Independence and Global Warming Ranking Member Sensenbrenner (along with 

numerous other Senators and Members) to Secretary Chu. 

Senators and Members called on the Secretary to halt all efforts to reprogram funds or terminate 

contracts related to Yucca Mountain. In response to this request to Secretary Chu, DOE General 

Counsel Scott Blake Harris responded to Members on August 3, 2010.80 DOE refused to heed 

the Congressional request and continued to move forward with the closure of its Yucca 

Mountain-related activities. 

July 20, 2010 - Ranking Member Hall, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, Ranking 

Member Broun. 

Members once again restated their previous requests. Members also sought additional 

documents related to I) the Department's Motion to Withdraw its pending licensing application 

with prejudice for a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; 2) any decision 

to temiinate, reduce, or limit funding for the Yucca Mountain project; 3) the discontinuation or 

altering of standard monitoring and data collection at the site; 4) the Department's policies and 

procedures relating to preservinp and archiving documenls related to the Yucca Mountain 

Repository License Application8 On July 23,2010, Assistant Secretary for Congressional and 

Intergovernmental Affairs Jeffrey Lane replied simply noted "We are in the process of collecting 

responsive documents and will soon begin to review them .,,82 

77 Note: A Resolution of Inquiry (RO!) is procedural options in the House for use by Members seeking information from Federal 

agencies or the Administration. Authorized under House Rule xm. Clause 7, this parliamentary tool is considered the proper 

form to "request" factual infonnation from the President or "direct" lnformation from Agency or DepartnJent Heads. Once 

introduced by a Member, the ROI is referred to the Committee of jurisdiction. Once received, the Committee has 14 legislative 

days to report the Raj (excluding day of introduction and day of discharge). The Committee may report the ROI favorably, 

adversely or without recommendation. If the Committee fails to report the ROI within toe appropriate time, any Member of the. 

Bouse may offer a Motion to Discharge. If the Motion prevails, the ROI is considered on the House floor under the Hour Rule. 

78 B.Res 1466, "Of inquiry requesting the President and djrecting the Secretary of Energy to provide c~rtain documents to the 

House ofReprcsc:nfatives relating to the Department of Energy's application to foreclose use of Yucca Mountain as a high-level 

nuclear .. vaste repository," June 22, 2010. Available at: http://wv,.w.gpo.gov/fdsyslpkgfBILLS-111hres1466rhipdVBILLS1] Ihres1466rh,pdf 

7'1 House Report J 11-550. July 19,2010. 

gO Letter from Scott Blake Harris, General Counsel, DOE, to Ranking Member Paul Broun, August 3, 20 I O. 

£j Letter from Reps. Hall, Sensenbrenner, and Broun to Sec. Chu dated July 20, 2010. 

S2 Letter from Jeff Lane to Sensenbrcnncr, July 23, 2010. 

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SST Committee: Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

February 14, 2011 - Space, Science, and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight Committee Chairman Broun to Secretary Chu. 

Representative BraWl once again reiterated his request for all documents that were previously 

requested, this time in his new capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on lnvestigations and 

Oversight of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology." "While documents were 

provided prior to this letter, the majority of those documents were press releases, public reports, 

and Congressional correspondence already in the public domain. Some documents were, in fact, 

responsive, but they were limited. DOE did, however, begin producing more substantive 

documents with a February 28, 2011 reply to Chairman BroWl's letter from DOE General 

Counsel Harris. This response Was received three days before Secretary Chu appeared before the 

Committee on March 3, 2011 to present DOE's FYl2 Budget Request. 

DOE's responsiveness to Committee requests improved drastically following Chairman Brouu's 

February 14th letter. Unfortunately, a complete production of documents relative to Committee 

requests has not been received. To its credit, the Department has worked in a collegial fashion to 

meet the Committee's requests. The Department has notified the Committee that the only 

documents that have not been provided to the Committee are those with interagency interests, 

and that they have no schedule for the delivery of those documents because of the uncertainty of 

the interagency process. The Committee will continue to pursue these documents, but will not 

delay its review of the Yucca Mouutain project. 

I FINDING #2: Replies to initial inquiries from Members were unresponsive. I 

FINDING #3: The Administration's establishment of the Bluc Ribbon 

Commission lacked transparency, contrary to established Administration 

policy. 

FINDING #4: No documents were provided to Members that demonstrated 

that potential impacts on the construction of nuclear power plants were 

evaluated prior to the decision to terminate the program. 

Fll"'DING #5: No documents provided to the Committee support the 

I determination that Yucca was "not an option." I 

FINDING #6: A final production of documents has not been delivered I 

despite numerous inquiries. No schedule for delivery has been provided. No 

index of documents withheld has been provided. No claim of privilege has I 

been stated. 

8, Letter from Rep. Droun to Sec. Chll datEd Pd;lnl<'1.T}' 14, 7.011. 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Sbff Report 

4.3 Outside Reports aud Activities 

DOE Inspector General Memo: Need for Enhanced Surveillance During the Yucca 

Mountain Project Shut Down (July 2010) 

In a July 21, 2010 Memorandum to the Undersecretary of Energy on the Shutdown of the Yucca 

Mountain Project, the DOl:! IG exprcssed the significance ofthc Department's decision, noting: 

"Other than the termination of the Department's Super Conducting, Super Collider 

Project in Texas in 1998, we know of no comparable single project tennination in the 

Department's recent history as consequential as Yucca Mountain, giverr the importt'lnce 

of its intended mission, the massive investment in real and personal property and the 

development and compilation of huge quantities of Project-related, intellectual 

property. "S4 

Because of this importance, the DOl TG announced an audit on February 23, 2010 to "determine 

whether OCRWM had adequately planned for the Project's orderly shutdown."" Surprisingly, 

the DOE IG quickly learned that no such plan existed, stating "On March 2, 2010, management 

informed us that it was in the process of preparing a master plan to manage the shut down 

process and that it would be completed by the end of March 2010.,,86 The DOE IG then deferred 

its audit until DOE completed its plan. DOE never completed this planning. The DOE IG report 

stated that, . 

"On June 12, 2010, we met with OCRWM officials to determine the status of the 

shutdown planning in anticipation of restarting our audit. We were told that the plan was 

not complete and the events were moving so quickly that no further action on the master 

plan was contemplated. ,~7 

r

---.. · .. FIl'.'DING #7: Despite an explicit commitment from the Department, DOE 

failed to develop a master plan prior to one of the most consequential 

decisions in the Department's history. 

GAO Report 11-230: DOE Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at 

DOE Sites as a Result ofYlIcca Mountain Shutdown (March 2011) 

According to a March 20 Il GA 0 report, 

<'[f]ive states have agreements with DOE, and in one case with the Navy, regarding the 

storage, treatment, or disposal of nuclear waste stored at DOE sites. Only agreements 

with Colorado and Idaho include deadlines, or milestones~ for removing waste from sites 

S4 '~eed for Enhanced Surveillance During the Yucca MQuntain Project Shut DO,"VIl," Department of Energy, Office of the 

Inspector General, July 21, 2010. Available at: http://'NW\.'.dg_eneTgy_gov/docllmentsiOAS-SR-10-OI.pdf 

85 Ibid. 

861bid. 

87 Ibid. 

22 
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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

that may be threatened by a tennination of the Yucca Mountain repository program. 

Under the agreements, DOE and the Navy are expected to remove their spent nuclear fuel 

from Idaho, and DOE is to remove its fuel from Colorado, by January '1, 2035. If a 

repository is not available to accept the waste, however, DOE and the Navy could miss 

these milestones. As a result, the government could face significant penalties-$60,OOO 

for each day the waste remains in Idaho and $15,000 for each day the waste remains in 

Colorado-afler January 1, 2035. These penalties could total about $27.4 million 

atUJually. Navy officials told GAO, however, their greater concern is that Idaho might 

suspend Navy shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the state until the Navy meets its 

agreement to remove spent nuclear fuel, a suspension that would interfere with the 

Navy's ability to refuel its nuclear warships."" 

The report went on to state, "DOE and the Navy have not yet developed plans to mitigate the 

potential effects of longer storage resulting from a termination of the Yucca Mountain 

repository .,,89 

I FINDING #8: DOE's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain Project I 

leaves the federal government vulnerable to significant financial penalties 

and could inte!:fere with the Navy's ability to refuel nuclear warships. 

I FINDING #9: The GAO determined that DOE and the Navy did not develop I 

plans to mitigate the potential effects of longer storage prior to tbe 

termination of the Yucca Mountain Project. 

GAO Report 11-229: Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of the Yucca 

Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned (April 2011). 

In April of 2011, the GAO issued a report on the effects of, and lessons learned from, the 

termination of the Yucca Mountain Project. One of its findings largely reiterated the DOl IG 

memorandum from July 2010. which fOlmd "DOE did not finalize a plan for shutdown, nor did it 

identifY or assess risks of the shutdown. Both steps are required under federal internal control 

standards and DOE orders.,,9o The report went also found that "DOE did not cite technical or 

safety issues" associated with the Yucca Mountain Project," and that "social and political 

opposition to the permanent repository, not technical issues, is the key obstacle." Similarly, the 

report also found that "there is no guarantee that a more acceptable or less costly alternative will 

be identified.,,9! 

~8 "DOE Nucle-aI Waste ~ Better Infonna1ion Needed on Waste Storage at DOE Sites as a :Result ofYuCCEl Mountain Shutdown," 

U.S. OQvememenf Accoutnability Office, March 2011. Available at: http://v,ww.gao.gov/new.itemsldl1230.pdf 

g9Ibid. 

90 "Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program aild Lessons Learned," U.S. Government Accountability 

Office, April 2011. Available at: http://WlNW.gaQ.gov/new.items/dll229.pdf 

91 Ibid. 

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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

. FINDING #10: GAO determined that DOE did not develop a plan for 

, shutdown that could have indentified and assessed risks. 

FINDING #11: As part of GAO's investigation, DOE did not cite any 

technical or safety issues associated with the Yucca Mouutain Project. 

FINDING #12: GAO found DOE concerns with respect to key issues 

associated with the Yucca Mouutain Project are social and political, not 

technical. 

4.4 Committee Review of Documents 

A review of documents provided by the Department of Energy revealed issues associated with 

scientific integrity, inadequate shutdown planning, rushed document retention, and a lack of a 

scientific justification for the Departmenfs decision. 

4.4.1 Scientific Integrity 

Correspondence provided to the Committee revealed several scientific integrity-related issues. 

Most notable among these were multiple correspondences between Dr. Per Peterson, Department 

of Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Berkley, and senior Administration officials 

including Dr. John Holdren, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Dr. Steven 

Chu, Secretary, Department of Energy. 

Currently a member of the Blue Ribbon Commission, Peterson has written extensively on Yucca 

Mountain safety issues and the need for the NRC to complete its review of the DOE License 

Application. In a 2009 report to DOE from Dr. Peterson titled "U.S. nuclear waste policy: 

soientific integrity, policy, and politics" that was obtained by the Committee, Peterson made the 

following key points: 

The license application that the DOE submitted to the USNRC in June 2008, shows a 

large margin for compliance with the million-year safety standard establishment by the 

Environmental Protection Agenc} (EPA), as shown in Fig.!. 

There is not a major philosophical difference between ignoring scientific evidence to 

serve ideological predispositions. versus actively suppressing scientific inquiry to serve 

ideological predisposinons. But the second approach causes yet greater damage - the 

most recent Yucca Mountain appropriations decisions that the U.S. Congress has made 

did not simply reduce U.S. capacity to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site, they have also 

almost completely dismantled the US. scientific capacity to study any kind of geologic 

repository. 

24 
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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

A robust U.S. policy would allow the USNRC review to continue to completion because 

it would be technically sound and will provide vital infonnation to inform policy. 92 

Tine {yean;} , 

Figure 1. The DOE license application for Yu.:::ca Mountain, now under ~dent 

U;clmi.cai review by ilie USNRC, shows alarge margin for compliance with the millionyea: EPA safety standani 

Peterson warned Administration officials, beginning as early as October 2008, of scientific 

integrity and data retention issues that would arise if the Obama Administration were to 

withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application. Additional emails sent during this process 

reinforce this conccrn.93 

Email from Per Peterson to Warren Miller, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, DOE 

Office of Nuclear Energy, July 14, 2009, Subject: RE: Call me please. 

"I started corresponding with John Holdren (in his position leading the National 

Corru;nission on Energy Policy) back in Oclober, 2008, about the scientific 

inte~ity problem that would emerge if a new Obarna administration were to 

withdraw the Yucca MDlmtain license application and thus stop the independent 

NRC technical review of that application. I recommend that instead, the 

administration focus on fixing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which is highly 

flawed." 

Email from Warren Miller to Kristina Johnson, Under Secretary for Energy, DOE, Chris 

Kouts Principal Deputy Director, DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management, and Peter Lyons Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, DOE Office of 

Nuclear Energy, October 12,2009, Subject: Fw: FY 11 OCRWM Budget. 

n See Appendix E. 

S'3 Ibid. 

25 
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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

"Per is a distinguished member of the academic community. Steven Chu, John 

Holdren (and I) very much trust his judgment. I think We should take his advice 

very, very seriously." 

Email from Per Peterson to John Holdren, Director, Office of Science and Technology 

Policy, and Steve Chu, Secretary, Department of Energy, October 12, 2009, Subject: FY 

II OCRWM Budget. 

"Senator Rcid announced at the end of the July that the administration will zero 

funding for the review of the Yucca Mountain license application. While 

stopping the license review would be one thing, the larger question relates to the 

fate of the scientific and technical information that supports the license 

application. If Quality Assurance (QA) controls are stopped on the electronic 

records, }o~g-tenn corrosion experiments stopped~ and samples in storage 

discarded, the scientific data base that supports the current license application 

and understanding of the site would be destroyed. The analogy that is emerging 

is that the administration might "burn the books" on the scientific work that has 

been done for Yucca Motmtain. The loss of YM scientific and technical data 

would be pretty clearly analogous to the loss of knowledge that occurred with the 

burning of the scrolls in the Library of Alexandria (it might also invite more 

unsavory, if less accurate, analogies to book burning in Germany in ] 933). 

Overall, it's a bad idea to allow this base of U.S. repository scientific and 

technical knowledge to be destroyed. My recommendation is that even though 

the FY II budget request may stop the current license application review, that the 

budget contain ,ubstantiaJ funding to OCRWM and some to NRC and [Nuclear 

Waste Technical Review Board] to sustain knowledge and capability in 

repository science. It would also be great if the Slated administration policy 

would be to sustain OCRWM knowledge and capability until congress amends 

the NWPS to provide the DOE with guidance on how to move forward with 

management of spent fuel and high level waste." 

fiNDING #13: On mnltiple occasions, scientific integrity issnes regarding 

, Yncca Mountain were brought to the attention of the White House Science 

Advisor and Secretary of Energy prior to the Administratiou's decision to 

shutter the program. 

4.4.2 Shutdown Planning and the Retention of Documents and Science 

Numerous documents obtained by the Committee pertain to the Department's attempts to plan 

for the shutdown ofthe Yucca Mountain Project beginning in the fall of2009. These documents 

show a Department genuinely concerned with data collection and document retention but also 

illustrate the negative impacts and pressure generated by the rushed nature and lack of planning 

associated with the shutdown decision. 

26 
154 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Stafflleport 

• Email from Peter Lyons to AsafNagler, November 15,2009, Subject: Re: Yucca Mtng 

[Responding to a request for items to be discussed at a Yucca Meeting] '"Need to 

protect nations [sic] technical investment in repository science-both knowledge 

and people.,,94 

Email from Dave Zabransky to All OCRWM, May 20,2010, Subject: Further Guidance 

on the Retention of Documents 

"All OCR \VM personnel are instructed to continue to refrain from the destruction 

of any documents or copies of documents that relate to Yucca Mountain and any 

of the science relating to storage or disposal of high~level waste or spent fuel, 

even if permitted under applicable retention schedules. This instruction is to be 

carried through to all contractors perfonning services for OCR WM, including 

other agencies performing serv~ces under interagency agreements. During the 

recent hiatus of shmdown activities, we were already refraining from destruction 

of documents or copies of documents. This confirms that this restriction remains 

in effect" 

Despite the best intentions of those involved, emails and memos obtained by the Committee also 

shed light on the complexity of tasks, particularly given the tight deadlines and limited planning 

involved in the endeavor. During the spring of 2010, senior-level meeting notes show that 

sample disposition and file maintenance issues were still not resolved, a records management 

plan was not finalized, and funding streams for the execution of the work were still uncertain:' 

Several emails obtained by the Committee highlight these uncertainties. 

94 Ibid. 

95 Ibid. 

Email from JW to AP, RS, KD, LD [All redacted], May J 1, 2011, Subject: RE: Yucca 

Mountain Withdrawal of Work 

rResponding to a request for a shutdown plan and a termination of task activities 

within six days] "As we discussed, I think the tum-around time is unreasonable 

(i.e., a deliverable of this magnitude and importance in less than a week). I 

understand that Sandia may have done some preliminary work but still don't 

think the timing is adequate." 

Email fromEBtoMW.SO.CP.RW [All redacted], June 15, 2010, Subject: GAO 

Interview 

~'As you know, one of the main concems we have is that we're not being allowe,d 

to have sufficient time to archive the technical information supporting the 

postc]osure technical baseline in a manner that would be conducive to retrieval 

and use of the information within a reasonable time." 

27 
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SST Co~mittee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Email fromAPtoKD.JW.MM. and MR [All redacted], June 29, 2010, Subject: FW: 

ASLB Denies DOE petition to Withdraw LA 

"Do not know what impact this will have but I am more concerned with us not 

allowing Sandia to properly archive information based on direction from 

OCRWM." 

Additional correspondence. also points to confusion over what tasks should continue for 

document preservation, and how it will be funded, up until July 201 0. 96 

I FINDING' #14: Despite the agencies' best attempts to continue data 

collection and preserve scientific and tecbnical records, tbe Department did 

not finalize and fund a records management plan in a timely fashion. 

Because of this rushed process, uncertainty and questions associated with i 

data retention remain an area of concern to tbe Committee. I 

4.43 Lack of Scientific or Technical Justification to Determine YMP is Not Safe or Viable 

For over two years, the Committee sought documents related to the decision to terminate the 

Yucca Mountain Project. Additionally. Committee Members requested, on multiple occasions, 

documents related to the scientific and technical determination that the Yucca Mountain Project 

was "not a viable option." Over this time, staff reviewed thousands of pages of documents 

provided by DOE. 

96 Ibid. 

FINDING #15: Not a single document provided to the Committee by the 

, Department of Energy found tbat the Yucca Mountain Project was not safe 

, or viable, contrary to the President, and tbe Department of Energy. 

28 
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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Chapter 5. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Given the Administration's repeated statements regarding the need to find a safe, long-term 

nuclear waste disposal facility, the 695-page Volume III of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) 

that focuses on post-closure safety provides the most relevant and detailed information to 

determine whether sound science guided the decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain Project. 

Dcspite years of work by his staff, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 

obstructed the approval of the SER or to release it to the public to allow all Americans to judge 

for themselves whether sound science was used as a basis to terminate the Yucca Mountain 

Project. This chapter summarizes Committee correspondence with the NRC and reviews of 

materials provided as a result oftbis correspondence. 

5.1 Correspondence between Committee Members and the NRC 

July 15,2010 - Fourteen Members of Congress (including Science and Technology 

Committee Members Sensenbrenner, Iuglis, Broun, and Olson) to Chairman Jaczko 

Fourteen Members of Congress wrote to the NRC expressing support for the ASLB's denial of 

DOE's Motion to Withdraw the License Application. Members reaffirmed Congressional intent 

to locate a national geologic repository at Yucca Mountain and called for the Conunission to 

"make all relevant documents related to DOE's Motion to Withdraw public.,,97 On July 30, 2010, 

Amette Vietti-Cook, the Secretary of the NRC, responded, "given the pendency of the 

adjudicatory proceeding, therefore, the Conunission cannot discuss or comment on issues 

involved in this matter.,,98 No documents were released. 

October 13, 2010 - Ranking Member Hall, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, Ranking 

Member Barton, and Natural Resources Committee Ranking Member Doc Hastings to 

Chairman Jaczko 

Four House Committee Ranking Members expressed concern regarding the budget directive to 

bring the High-Level Waste Program, including NRC's review of the license application and 

preparation of the SER, to a close. The Members also requested a response to six separate 

questions, including the actions taken to terminate review of the License Application and specific 

communication on the matter between the NRC, Secretary Chu, Majority Leader Reid, and the 

White House.99 Chairman Jaczko responded on October 27, 2010 but did not provide the 

communications, as requested,lOO 

97 LetteT from Reps. Scnsenbrenner, lnglis" Wil..lOTl, Barrett, McMorris Rodgers, Hastings, Shimkus, Bonner, ManzuHo, 

LaTourette, Terry, Broun, Olson and Rehberg to NRC Chairman Jaczko, July 15, 2010 

98 Letter from l-\nnette L Vietti-Cook to Rep. SensenbreIiller, July 30, 2010. 

99 Letter from Reps. Hall" Sensenbrenner, Barton, and Hastings to Chairman Ja.czko. October 13, 2010. 

100 Letter !Tom Chairman Iaczko to ~ps. Hall, Sensenbrenner, Barton. and Hastings, October 27,2010. 

29 
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SST Committee ¥ucc;:J, Mountain Majorlty Staff Report 

November 19, 2010 - Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Hastings, and 

Oversight and Government Reform Committee Ranking Member Darrell Issa to 

Chairman Jaczko 

Members requested the release of NRC's decision on the ASLB's dCllial of the Motion to 

Withdraw. The communication highlighted the votes filed by the four participating 

Commissioners and neglect by Chairman Jaczko to affirm the order. 101 The letter requested 

C;,airman Jaczko's plans, including a specific date for issuing the final order. On December 6, 

20 I 0, NRC Secretary Vietti-Cook again responded, stating "given that the aqjudicatory process 

is ongoing, the Commission itself cannot discuss or comment on the issues involved. No specific 

date has been established for completion of the matter."J02 No documents were released. 

February 10,2011 - Science, Space, and Technology Committee Chairman Ralph Hall, 

Science, Space, and TechnolOgy Committee Vice-Chairman James Sensenbrenner, 

Subcommittee Chairman Broun, and Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittee on 

Energy and Environment Chairman Andy Harris to Chairman Jaczko, NRC 

Commissioners Magwood, Svinicki, Apostolakis, and Ostendorff. 

In the spirit of openness and transparency, M embers requested release of SER Volume III in 

light of the directive to halt all activities in the High-Level Waste Program. Members also 

requested all documents relating to the release of the SER. 103 Commissioners Apostolakis, 

Ostendorff, Magwood, and Svinicki replied on February 18,23,24 and 25, respectively .. 

Chairman Jaczko responded on March 4, stating a redacted version of SER Volume III was 

released on February J 7 in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from an outside 

organization.,04 The letter argued against the release of the unredacted document. No 

documents relating to the release of the SER were provided to the Committee. 

March 10,2011 - Chairman Hall, Vice-Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman Broun, 

Chairman Harris to Chairman Jaczko 

Members reiterated the call to finalize SER Volume 1Il and release the document. The letter 

repeated the request for all documents and communication relating to the completion and release 

of SER Volume III, the February 4, 20 I J memorandum titled "Update on the Yucca Mountain 

Program," and included six ex~licit questions regarding the status of SER Volume III and 

closure of the HLW programl , On March II, a redacted version of the "Update on the Yucca 

Mountain Program" memorandwn was publicly released. The Committee Chairmen received a 

response from Chairman Jaczko on April 28, which stated, "[n]otwithstanding my reservations a 

majority of the Commission is willing to provideunredacted copies in response to Congressional 

Committee requests.,,106 On April 29, the Committee received an unredacted copy of SER 

Volume 1II. No other document production was included, as called for in both the February 10 

and March 10 letters. The response to Committee Members from Chairman Jaczko said the 

!OJ Letter from Reps. Hastings, Issa, and Sensenbrennerto Chairman Jaczko, November 19,2010. 

)02 Letter from Annette L. Vietti-Cook to Reps Sensenbrenner, Hastings, and Issa., December 6, 2010. 

103lE':tt£:r from Reps. Hall, Sensenbrenoer, Broun, and Harris to NRC Commissioners, February 10,2011. 

][).l Letter from Chaimlan Jaczko to Reps. HalL Sensenbrcnner, Broun, and Harris. March 4. 2011. 

lOS Le~er from Reps. Halt Sensenbrenner, Broun, and Harris to Chairman Jaczko, March 10, 2011. 

)06 Letter from Chairman J!lczko to Reps. Hall, Scnsenbrenner, Broun, and Harris, April 28, 201 L 

30 
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ssr Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Commission "is currently identifying documents related to these matters." As of June 7, 2011, 

the Committee has yet to receive any production of documents. The Committee will continue to 

pursue these documents, but will not delay its review of NRC' s activities relating to the SER and 

HL W Program. 

The Imredacted version ofSER Volume II was labeled "not for public disclosure." However, a 

prudential determination was made that certain aspects of SER Volume III are important to 

advancing the Committee's aforementioned oversight authorities, responsibilities, and interest in 

advancing sound scientifically·based policymaking. Accordingly, key portions ofSER Volume 

III are described below. 

FINDING # 16: The jliRC was non·responsive to Committee requests for the 

complete records upou which NRC Commissioners have and will be makiug 

critical decisions. With respect to outstanding requests, no schedule for 

delivery has been provided. No index of documents withheld has been 

provided. No claim of privilege has been stated. 

5.2 Committee Review of Documents 

The Committee thoroughly reviewed an umedacted version of the 695·page preliminary SER lIT 

as well as other related NRC documents. Committee staff note that the impressive thoroughness 

and technical detail evident throughout the SER reflect highly on the expertise and 

professionalism of NRC staff that worked so long to prepare it. 

5.2.1 Volume III of the Safety Evaluation Report 

A key concern with the disposal of high level nuclear 

waste is the long term safety of the material after the 

storage facility is closed, leaving the radioactive waste 

to decay over time into non·radioactive elements. As 

previously noted, the long.term safety issue has been 

highlighted by the Obama Administration as a key 

issue to determine where long term storage of nuclear 

waste should be located. Storage risks include 

improper loading of the nuclear waste into storage 

containers, improper manufacture of these storage 

containers, and water or other intrusions into the 

facility risk compromising the ability of the material to NRC Chairman Gregory laczko 

decay. As part of the effort to determine the suitability 

of Yucca MOlUltain to store high·level radioactive waste, DOE engaged in a multi·year effort to 

gather comprehensive data and scientific information on the site and its associated risk factors. 

This effort culminated in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), compiled by DOE and last updated 

by staff in February 2009. The SAR was then submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

31 
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SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

by DOE along with its Yucca Mountain License Application. The NRC spent over two years 

reviewing the Safety Analysis Report to assess the assumptions, plans, and overall technical 

rigor associated with the planned Yucca Mountain project. This NRC staff effort culminated in 

the Safety Evaluation Report comprising the following five volumes; 

1. General Information 

II. Repository Safety Before Penn anent Closure 

III. Repository Safety After Permanent Closure 

IV. Administrative and Programmatic Requirements 

V. License Specifications 

NRC developed a review schedule for each of the respective SER volumes. The schedule 

inserted below (now a public document released by the NRC) was included in a March 30, 2010 

NRC memorandum on the status of the High-Level Waste Program. According to this schedule, 

all five volumes would have been finalized and published by March 20] I if Chairman Jaczko 

had not halted work on the SER volumes. 

TEN'rA'n'iE COMPLETlON DATES FO~ SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT VOLUMES 

\Mires1ones'tO be ct:lmp!eteo 1'10 t3!~r than dates St'\O"'lr'l) 

____ 0_-. ____ , . __ . ______ :-~ ____ .___.._,___'-.'"'-.~~! '_~: 

j 5ER Volume ; Voillme 1 I Volume X' I Votume 3"' ~ VoJume 4'" ; Volume 5"' ! ! Number 'General I Preclosure Postdosure: Adminlstrattve'I' Licens!" ! ~ ; Information! l _~~rammatlc~~. Speclfic;rtu:U1S ; 

: HLWRS Staft ! 04/2312010 j 09/21120iC 1 061'14/2010 I OSf5/2010 ' 0913012010' j completes. text 1 ! 'I I . and E:.xe(;utive 1 I ; Summary J , i J 

I HL~5 \ 06f112010 11/312010 I~ 07/27/2010 09/1712010 11/1512010 Ii ! Management 

I andOGC! .1 

; Volume Revie..... II 

t COmplete , 

i ROS:Qh'~ 1 ComYTltinbi and 

I ~~~:!,~y 1 ~r:;:tt;;,.lcal 

Q7/CS/'2010 

, 

1210312010 I 0812412010 10{'!8120'tO 12fi4iZ010 

~GC cO:Plet~ j 071;0/2010 ! 1211;12010 [ 0910812010 11101/2010 01/13/2011 

i L"9al Rev~~~ ; I +-= .---tj------j-------

I. NMSS DII"(t-e1;or 11" 07/27/2010 Ii 0110.4/2011 i 09/2212010 11111612010 0112712011 i Re\lieW3nd 

; ConCUfT'9'nce 

.--+-----' i, Fin ..... ' OGe I 0810312010 1 01/1BJ2G11 ~ 10J06/201Q 1210112010, 02/1012011 

RevIew I I ! I ; : Complete with ; j I 1 

I ~~r~:,r~,~I" ~ 1 1 I ! . 

;~;;,';::~:,; of ! 0813;;;;'~1 03l0il2;;;-I~-11119;2010! ~'''14I20' ;.- ;1' a3~~~;D1l i Volume, ! 

·Wcrk on thesE.> va.lumas. will b<'!' dis.,;ontirlUil'd once. FY" 2011;1 funds aTa Iit~h .. usted 

ENCLOSlJRE :2 ~_&EeIILI :':l£:N.S!;;--l.~E-tN=r-E~~M ... 'F*"N__~~~ __ _ 32 
160 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

5.2.2 Safety Evaluation Report Volume ill Content 

In its executive summary, SER III described its objective as documenting "the staffs evaluation 

to' determine whether the proposed repository design for Yucca Mountain will comply with the 

technical criteria and post-closure public health and environmental standards that apply after the 

repository is permanently closed." The report went on to note that in arriving at that 

detennination, the NRC must consider "whether the site and design comply with the 

performance objectives and requirements contained in NRC's regulations at 10 CFR Part 63, 

Subparts E and L." 

The preliminary staff draft was submitted to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards on July 15,2010 for review and approval. However, it appears no action 

was takeu on Volume III from July through October, when it was directed to bring the HL W 

program to an orderly close. 

The specific safety issues studied in detail to support this review included: 

Short-term atmospherie changes to the desert 

environment 

Long-term atmospheric changes to the desert 

environment 

Volcanic activity 

Earthquakes 

Meteor impacts 

Improper manufacture of waste packages 

Improper loading of waste packages 

Drip-shield corrosion 

Drip-shield failure 

Human intrusion post-closure 

"Legitimate scientific questions 

have been raised about the 

safety of storing spent nuclear 

foel at this location. " 

Lelter from Senator Barack 

Obama to Senator Harry Reid 

and Barbara Boxer, October, 

2007 

Each of these factors were studied in depth by both DOE and NRC. The DOE SAR 

determined-and the NRC staff SER III confirmed-that they have no significant impact on the 

long-term safety of the facility. 

For example, DOE staff used risk analysis to determine what would happen as a result of water 

that might seep through the desert floor. DOE estimated that for the first 10,000 years, the 

limited amouut of rain that falls on the site will evaporate by the time it reaches the waste 

containers due to heat given off by the decaying waste. Beyond the first 10,000 years, the 

engineered barrier system composed of titanium drip shields will divert away any water that 

seeps in from above. The J'..'RC staff review concluded that DOE acceptably demonstrated these 

natural and engineered barriers work together to protect groundwater resources in the vicinity of 

Yucca Mountain. 

33 
161 

SST Committee Yucca Mauntain Majority Staff Repart 

The preliminary SER III undertook similar in-depth reviews to determine, for example, potential 

radiologic exposure if people in the far distant future "unwittingly drill into the repository 

without realizing the repository is there." According to the SER, DOE selected 200,000 years as 

a conservative assumption of the earliest time the waste package could degrade enough so that an 

intrusion would occur without drillers recognizing it. This test also passed, with NRC staff 

accepting DOE's estimate that the peak dose from such human intrusion to be 0.0001 mSv per 

year-nearly 10,000 times below the regulatory threshold. 

"After spending billions of 

dollars on the Yucca Mountain 

Project, there are still 

significant questions about 

whether nuclear waste can be 

safely stored there. " 

Overall, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff made 

over 1500 findings related to the scientific and technical 

research efforts of the Department of Energy. In their 

comments, NRC staff agreed 98.5% of the time resulting 

in the conclusion section listed. at the beginning of this 

Committee report. The remaining 1.5 percent did not 

impact the NRC staff's overall conclusions, which found 

that DOE's Yucca Mountain License Application 

complies with applicable NRC safety requirements, 

including those related to human health and groundwater 

protection, and the specific performance objectives called 

for in NRC regulations for disposal of high-level 

radioactive wastes at Yucca Mountain (10 CFR 63.113-

115). 

Senator Baraek Obama, May 

2007 

FINDING #17: Not a single document provided to the Committee by the II 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission found that the Yucca Mountain Project was 

not safe or viable. ~_ ... __ -.l 

FINDING #18: The NRC staff review of DOE's Yucca Mountain License 

Application detailed in SER III agreed overwheliningly with DOE on thc 

scientific and technical issues associated with the site, ultimately concluding 

that the application complies with applicable NRC safety regulations 

necessary for the site to proceed to licensing for construction. 

5.2.3 "Update on the Yucca Mountain Program" Memorandum 

On March 1 I, 2011, NRC placed two redacted memos-both of which were requested by the 

Committee-in its publicly-available "ADAMS" database. 107 The memos consisted of a March' 

30,2010 memo titled, "Plans for the High-Level Waste Repository Program" and a February 4, 

2011 memo titled "Update on the Yucca Mountain Program.,,108 The purpose of the February 4, 

2011 memo was to "describe the status of the Yucca Mountain Program," in light of the 

107 Available at: http://www.nrc.gov!rcading-rmJadarns.html#web.based-adams 

108 MernoR'..ndum to Chairman Jaczko, Commissioner Svinicki, Commissioner Apos101aki, Commissioner Magwood, and 

Commissioner Ostendorfffrom Catherine Haney, titled ·'Update on the Yucca Mountain Program.."February 4~ 2011. See 

Appendix E 

34 
162 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

transition to close the )\mC staff safety review of the License Application. The memo was 

addressed to the five Commissioners from Catherine Haney, Director of the Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS). 

Director Haney described the activities associated with closure of the review of the LA and 

accompanying actions. For example, the memo notes that, since the October 1, 2010. NRC staff 

focused solely on converting its preparation of the safety evaluation reports into teclmical 

documents and that the reports "will contain no staff findings of regulatory compliance.,,]09 

Absent regulatory findings, the teclmical review lacks context and does not provide value. 

Notably, three NRC staff med non-concurrences on the memorandum, highlighting areas of 

disagreement with the contents of the memo. Aby Mohseni, Deputy Director for the Licensing 

and Inspection Directorate in the Division of the High-level Waste Repository Safety, submitted 

a non-concurrence taking issue with the CR budget guidance, directed by Chairman Jaczko. 

Mohseni's objection states: 

Although the Commission memorandum describes the current status of the program, it 

also addresses a path forward that seems to mc to contain policy issues that require 

Commission direction or guidance. For example, whereas the application of Nuclear 

Waste Funds in FY 2011 was only authorized for orderly shutdown activities under a CR 

guidance and as specifically directed by the Chainnan, the ongoing ASLB hearings 

require that those funds also support legal activities in ongoing Yucca Mountain licensing 

proceedings. If there are no constraints in using FY2011 or carryover NWF monies to 

support licensing activities then it would be a policy issue to direct the staff to apply 

resources to orderly shutdown instead of completing and issuing the remaining SER 

volumes, especially since the Commission has not reversed the A.sLB's decIsion that 

denied DOE's motion to withdraw its application. 

Director Haney's response to Mr. Mohseni dismissed the issue, noting "the memo was 

not intended to raise policy issues" and refers to the lack of quorum to consider 

Commissioner Ostendorff s request for full Commission consideration of the CR budget 

directive. However, the inconsistent logic of the Chairman was noticed by NRC staff. 

, FINDING #19: Chairman Jaczko inconsistently and arbitrarily substituted 

his own judgment on key policy decisions more appropriately considered and 

decided before the full Commission. In doing so, he manipulated process to 

achieve his desired end: closure of the High-Level Waste Program. 

The remaining two non-concurrences directly addressed the handling of the SER and shutdown 

of the HLW program. Dr. Janet Kotra, Senior Project Manager at Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), and her supervisor, Dr. King Stablein, Branch Chief for the 

NMSS, authored extensive opinions highlighting their disagreement with the fmal content of the 

memorandum. Dr. Kotra detailed the timeline and motivations behind NRC directives which 

stated. "[w]hen, on June 14,2010, the Chairman ordered the Director to postpone issuance of 

109 Ibid. 

35 
163 

SST Committee Yucca_Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Safety Evaluation Report Volumes 1 and 3, [High-Level Radioactive Waste] and NMSS 

managers became concerned the entire Commission may not be fully aware of the policy, legal 

and budgetary conseguences of such redirection." She continued: 

"I was given to understand the memorandum was not to refer to any of the related policy 

issues, a decision with which I disagreed. Later, in September, it became clear that, rather 

than postpone issuances of individual SER volumes, the Chaimlan's intent was to 

terminate the staff's safety review altogether. Using the continuing resolution as 

justitication, the Chainnan, through [Office of Executive Director of Operations] and the 

[Chief Firiancial Officer], told staff that all work on the SER must stop, including 

Volume 3 on post-closure satety, which was already complete, and undergoing 

management review ... [The Chainnan] explained that the decision 10 shut down the 

statr s review of the application was his alone and that staff should move to orderly 

closure of NRC's Yucca Mountain program." . 

Dr. Stablein reiterated this point, saying, "the Chairman unilaterally brought development of the 

SER to a halt" and "it waS pointed out to [Chairman IaczkoJ that allowing the staffto finish the 

SER volumes would be by far the most efficient and effective use of [NWFJ resources and at the 

same time would give the Nation the benefit of an independent regulator's evaluation of the 

Yucca Mountain application." Internally, Chairman Iaczko took direct credit for ending the 

Yucca Mountain review, while he externally stated he was simply following broad, established 

NRC guidance. 

I FINDING #20: Chairman Jaczko unilaterally decided and directed NRC 

j staff to discontinue work on the SER. 

5.3 Slow-Walking of the ASLB Decision 

On Iune 29, 2010, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

rejected DOE's Motion to Withdraw the License Application.]]O On June 30, the Secretary of the 

N'RC issued an order to invite briefs as to whether the Commission should review the appeal, and 

reverse or uphold the ASLB order. 111 

On July IS, NRC Commissioner Apostolakis recused himself from consideration of the order 

due to his work with Sandia National Laboratories, that reviewed the adeguacy of the long-term 

perfonnance assessment of Yucca Mountain. ll2 Commissioner Apostolakis' recusal left the 

remaining four Commissioners to rule on the ASLB's order. 

Commissioners Svinicki, Ostendorff, and Magwood filed their votes On the matter on August 25, 

26, and September 15, respectively. Chairman Iaczko voted initially on August 25. then 

no NRC A..5LB, Memorandum and Order, Docket No. 63-001 ASLBP "No. 09-892-HL W-CAB04 (June 29, 201 0) 

111 NRC Secretary, Order of the Secretary, Docket No. 63-001 ASLBP No. 09-S92-IILW-CAB04 (Jilne 30, 2010) 

111 NRC. Notice ofRecusal, Docket No. 63-001 ASLBP No. 09-892-HI.W-CAB04 (July 15,2010) 

36 
164 

SST Committee Yucca M.ountain Majority StaifReport 

withdrew his vote and resubmitted his vote again on October 29.m The votes are filed with the 

Secretary of the NRC; however, Chairman Jaczko has neglected to schedule a formal meeting to 

register the Commissioners' votes. At a May 4, 20 II Congressional hearing, 114 Commissioners 

Svinicki, Ostendorff, and Magwood noted their positions have not changed, which raises the 

question as to the intention behind Chairman Jaczko's refusal to rule on the ASLB's decision. 

FlNDING #21: NRC Chairman Jaczko continnes to block consideration of I 

ASLB's decision to deny DOE's Motion to Withdraw the License j 

Application, now almost a full year removeil from the decision and over nine 

months since Commissioners fIled their votes. 

5.4 Internal Disputes over NRC's Closure oftbe High-Level Waste Program 

Chairman Jaczko's October directive to bring NRC's HLW program to closure raised concerns 

with his fellow Commissioners. Chairman Jaczko dismissed Commissioner Ostendorff's request 

for the full Commission to consider the budget memO ordering all staff work for the HL W 

program to be directed to an "orderly closure." This tension was reiterated by Commissioner 

Sviniciki. 

In response to Congressional correspondence between Select Committee on Energy 

Independence and Global Warming Ranking Member Sensenbrenner and Chairman Jaczko, 

Commissioner Svinicki sent a letter expressing her explicit disapproval with Chairman Jaczko's 

characterization of the budget directive. ll5 She took particular issue with the Chairman's claim 

NRC was simply "following established Commission policy to begin to close out the HL W 

program." 1 16 

Commissioner Svinicki's letter highlights the differing conditions upon which the FY 2011 

budget request was submitted in January 2010 and the circumstances the NRC was facing nine 

months later. She \\'Tote: 

113 Letter from Kristine Svinicki, William OstendortT, and William Magwood, to Senator James Inhofe, November 2010. 

Available at: http://epw.semrte.gov!publiciindex.cfin?FuseAction=Flles.View&FileStorc_id=E:70db547-7058-4f1f-aa27-

87d80de5f2e9 

114 Committee 011 Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Subcommittee on Environment and Economy, 

"The Role oftbc Nuclear Regulatory Commission in America"s Energy Future," May 4, 2011 

1,5 Letter fiam Commissioner Svinicki to Rep. Sensenbrenner, November 1,2010. 116rDid. 

37 
165 

117 Ibid. 

SST Committee Yucca Mountain MajOIity Staff Report 

"When the Commission voted to approve budget justification language 

related to NRC's proposed HLW activities for FY 2011, a majority of the 

Commission's members supported language stipulating that orderly closure 

of the program activities would occur "[u]pon the withdrawal or suspension 

of the licensing review." The budget justification submitted to the Congress, 

and pending there now, was modified to include this language. These 

precursors have not occurred and an adjudicatory appeal related to DOE's 

request to withdraw its application lies unresolved before the Commission, 

making the orderly closure of NRC's program, in my view, grossly 

premature.,,117 

FlNDING #22: Chairman Jaczko neglected to consider legitimate concerns 

raised by fellow Commissioners that should be resolved through an open and 

transparent decision-making process. 

38 
166 

ssr Committee Yucca Mountain Majority Staff Report 

Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusions 

The Committee undertook this study to determine the impact of the efforts by the Obama 

Administration to terminate the Yucca Mountain Project. Described as the most studied piece of 

ground on the world, Yucca Mountain was determined by a rigorous review process using sound 

science to be an appropriate pem1anenl geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. At 

the beginning of the Administration, President Obama committed to using sound science to 

develop federal policies. 

Yet even after a multi-year review of the Yucca Mountain Project by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission that agreed with over 98.5 percent of the findings of the Department of Energy, the 

Obama Administration continued efforts to terminate the Project without stating any scientific 

basis to do so. This decision not only violated the President's own highly promoted principles 

and directives on scientific integrity, transparency, and openness, it has increased taxpayer 

liabilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, left nuclear waste sitting at reactor sites across the 

country with no plan for disposal, and ultimately threatened the long-term potential of nuclear 

power to meet America's growing energy demands with safe, clean, and affordable baseload 

electricity. 

After summarizing the history of the Yucca Mountain Project and the history of the Committee's 

oversight., this report includes copies of key emails and documents related to the termination as 

well as a series of Committee findings. Currently, the TJ .S. has no long term plan to store nuclear 

waste leaving it to collect at numerous sites across America. 

39 
167 

DOCUMENTATION FROM NYE COUNTY

NYE COUNTY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 

Early Warning Drilling Program 

This program consisted primarily of exploratory drilling for characterization of the geology south 

of Yucca Mountain. Under this program, Nye County drilled and sampled over 45,000 feet 

using various methods, and completed 40 wells. Cuttings samples and cores from many of these 

boreholes were tested in Nyc County's soils laboratory to determine grain size distribution and 

other soil-related parameters. [n addition to providing valuable geologic data, these wells were 

used for a variety of tests intended to characterize the hydrogeology south of Yucca Mountain. 

Independent Scientific Investigations Program 

Nye County conducted numerous scientific investigations to characterize the geology and 

hydrogeology south of Yucca Mountain. These studies included: 

[. Pump tests to determine aquifer transmissivity and storativity; 

2. Tracer tests to determine how radionuclides and other contaminants might move through 

alluvium (soils); 

3. Geophysical studies to determine geological structure and unit relationships between 

existing wells; 

4. Water level measurements to determine groundwater flow paths; 

5. Water sampling and chemical analysis to determine groundwater age and now path 

relationships; 

6. Specialized borcholc geophysical logging to determine groundwater now velocities 

through both fractured rock and alluvial materials. 

7. Structural geologic studies to characterize the regional groundwater 110w system; and 

8. Ventilation modeling efforts to assess DOE's models and closure times related to heat 

loading and repository safety. 

Quality Assurance 

All of Nye County's scientific investigations were conducted under a Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission approved Quality Assurance (QA) program. The quality and traceability of data 

generated under this QA program were sufficient to allow DOE to include them in its Yucca 

Mountain License Application (LA). 
168 

NYE COUNTY RESOLUTION NO. 2011-21 

A RESOLUTION OF THE NYE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS RESOLUTION 

SUPPORTING COMPLETION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S REVIEW OI 

THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN LICENSE APPLICATION 

WHEREAS, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, ("Act") selected Yucca 

Mountain, located in Nye County as the only site to be characterized as the nation's first high-level 

radioactive waste repository; and 

WHEREAS. Congress in July 2002. in accordance with provisions of the 

Act, as amended, overrode Nevada's notice of disapproval; and 

WHEREAS, Yucca Mountain was designated to be the site for development of a permanent 

repository for United States spent nuclear fuel and defense high level radioactive waste; and 

WHEREAS, the U.S. Department of Energy ("US DOE"), in accordance with the Act, submitted 

1 License Application (LA) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and 

WHEREAS, that LA, in accordance with NRC regulations, was accepted for review by the NRC 

md 

WHEREAS, the USDOE has since requested withdrawal of its submission of the LA "with 

Jrejudice"; and 

WHEREAS, the request for withdrawal has been denied by the Atomic Safety and Licensing 

Board (ASLB) and challenged in Federal Court; and 

WHEREAS, the Conunissioners of the NRC have not issued a final ruling on their review of the 

I>,.SLB decision that USDOE does not have the legal authority to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license 

ipplication; and 

WHEREAS. the nation needs to move forward on the established NWPA strategy that provides 

'or the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste; and, 

WHEREAS, the Nye County Board of Commissioners (Board) recognizes that further delays in 

he development of a permanent geologic repository will result in significant public expenditures and 

)otentially jeopardizes the future expansion of nuclear power production and energy independence; and 
169 

WHEREAS, the Board is convinced that until such time as the NRC completes its review of the 

LA, Nye County, the State of Nevada and the nation will be denied a scientific and technical 

jetermination of the potential of the Yucca Mountain repository to be built and operated safely and 

mccessfully; and 

WHEREAS, Nye County adopted Resolutions 2002-7, 2002-22 and 2004-25 defining the 

County's involvement as the site county for the nation's geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and 

jefense high level waste, 

NOW THEREFORE, it hereby is resolved as follows: 

L The Yucca Mountain licensing proceedings should be restarted and the NRC should 

complete a thorough and detailed review of the License Application; and 

2, If upon completion of the license application review by the NRC staff and the licensing 

proceeding before the ASLB, the conclusion is that the Yucca Mountain repository can 

be constructed and operated safely, Nye County reaffirms our prior resolutions and 

supports such construction and operation consistent with these prior resolutions; and 

APPROVED this 15th day of March, 201 L 

NYE COUNTY BOARD OF 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 

ATTEST: 

Sandra "Sam" L Merlino, Nye County Clerk 

And Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board 
170 

ESMERALDA COUNTY RESOLUTION NO. If -?I - oS 

A RESOLUTION OF THE ESMERALDA COUNTY BOARD OF COMMSSIONERS SUPPORTING 

COMPLETION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE YUCCA 

MOUNTAIN LICENSE APPLICATION 

WHEREAS, the Nudear Waste Policy Act ("NWPA") of 1982, as amended, ("Act") 

selected Yucca Mountain, located In Nye County, Nevada as the only site to be characterized 

as the nation's first high-level radioactive waste repository; and 

WHEREAS, Congress in July 2002, in accordance with provisions of the Act, overrode, 

the State of Nevada's notice of disapproval; and 

WHEREAS, Yucca Mountain was designated to be the site for development of a 

permanent repository for United States spent nuclear fuel and defense high level radioactive 

waste; and 

WHEREAS, the U. S. Department of Energy ("USDOEH ), in accordance with the Act, 

submitted a License Application ("LA") to the Nudear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"); and 

WHEREAS, that LA, in accordance with NRC regulations was accepted for review by the 

NRC; and 

WHEREAS, the USDOE has since requested withdrawal of its submission of the LA 

"with prejudice"; and 

WHEREAS, the request for withdrawal has been denied by the Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board ("ASLB") and challenged in Federal Court; and 

WHEREAS, THE Commissioners of the NRC have not issued a ruling on their review of 

the ASLB decision that USDOE does not have the legal authority to withdraw the Yucca 

Mountain License Application; and 

WHEREAS, tho!' nation needs to move forward on the established strategy that 

provides for the permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste; and 

WHEREAS, the Esmeralda County Board of Commissioners ("Board") recognizes that 

further delays in the development of a permanent geologic repository will result in significant 

public expenditures, the incurring of great liability, and potentially jeopardizes the future 

expansion of nuclear power production and U.S. energy independence; and 
171 

WHEREAS, the Board is convinced that until such time as the NRC completes Its review 

of the LA, Esmeralda County, the State if Nevada and the nation will be denied a scientific and 

technical determination of the potential of the Yucca Mountain repository to be built and 

operated safelv and successfully; and 

NOW THEREFORE, it hereby is resolved as follows: 

1. The Yucca Mountain licensing proceedings should continue and the NRC should 

complete a thorough and detailed review of the License Application. 

APPROVED, PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Esmeralda Countv Board of Commissioners this 5th 

day of April, 2011 

ESMERALDA COUNTY BOARD OF 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 

~~~ Nancy~ oland, Chair 

Dominic 

A~/& Pappalardo, Vice Chair 

.~ 

District Attorney 

11/ 
172 

Board of 

MINERAL C01~OMMISSIONERS 

Tdc Bone: 775·945-2446 

Fi)."':t7!75.&45~01.06 

PO Box 1450.'ilJnwthornei NV 89415 

mincocommissione mlneralcount nv.or 

Go\'crllin Board ror the Towns of Hnwthorne, 

LUllin ,Mina and Walker Lake; 

Li nor Board and Gamin Board: 

County Hi hwa Commission 

Resolution No, / / -CI/d--

MINER~ COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

COUNTY OF MINERAL. STATE OF NEVADA 

RESOLlITlON SUPPORTING COMPLETION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF 

THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN LICENSE APPICATION 

WHEREAS, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, ("Act") selected Yucca Mountain, 

located in Nye County as the only site to be characterized as the nation~s fIrst high-level radioactive waste 

repository; and 

WHEREAS, Congress in July 2002, in accordance with provisions of the 

Act, as amended, over-rode Nevada's notice of disapproval; and 

WHEREAS, Yucca Mountain was designated to be the site for development of a permanent repository 

for United States spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste; and 

WHEREAS, the U.S. Department ofEnergy,("USDOE"), in accordance with the Act, submitted a 

License Application (LA) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and 

WHEREAS, that LA, in accordance with NRC regulations, was accepted for review by the NRC; and 

'WHEREAS, the USDOE has since requested withdrawal of its submission of the LA "with prejudice"; 

and 

WHEREAS, the request for withdrawal has been denied by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

(ASLB) and challenged in Federal Court; and 

WHEREAS, the Conurussioners of the NRC have so far failed to review the ASLB decision that USDOE 

does not have the legal anthority to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application; and 

WHEREAS, the Chainnan ofthe NRC unilaterally directed the NRC staff to temlinate review of the LA 

without ruling on the ASLB decision; and 
173 

Page 2 

WHEREAS, with NRC's failure to act in a timely manner -with respect to the ASLB decision, the Federal 

Court of Appeals for the D.C Circuit has scheduled and heard challenges to USDOE's authority to tenninate 

work on Yucca Mountain and withdraw the Yucca Mountain LA; and. 

WHEREAS, the nation needs to move forward on the established strategy to provide pem1anent storage 

of spent nuclear fuel and high level waste; and, 

\Vhereas, the Mineral County Board of Commissioners (Board) recognizes that further delays in the 

development of a pennanent geologic repository will result in significant public expenditures and potentially 

jeopardizes the future expansion of nuclear power production and energy independence; and 

WHEREAS, the Board is convinced that until such time as the NRC completes its review of the LA, 

Miner<3:1 County, the State of Nevada and the nation will be denied a scientific and technical determination of the 

potential of the Yucca Mountain repository to be built and operated safely and successfully; ,md 

\VHEREAS we are a nation governed with respect for laws we impose on ourselves, 

NOW THEREFORE, it hereby is resolved as follows: 

That absent changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, NRC should complete a thorough and 

detailed review afthe Yucca Mountain License Application; 

APPROVED THIS 6TH DAY OF APRlL, 2011. 

MllirnRAL COUNTY BOARD OF 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: 

;;:-mes Essenpreis, Chairman 

AITEST: 

Cherne George, Clerk ofthe Board 
174 

R"'oMion No. 2011-5 

LANDER COUNTY aOARO OF COMMISSIONERS 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

COUNTY OF LANDER STATE OF NEV ADA 

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING COMPLBTION OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN LICENSE APPICATION 

WHEREAS, the N~cloar Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, ("Act") s.loctil(\ Vucca 

Mountain, located in Nye County as the only sito to b. ch~rficterizod uS lli. nation', first highlevel radioa.ctive Wfl..ste repository; an,d 

WHEREAS, Congress in July 2002, in .ceord."ce with provision, of the 

Act, as amended, over-rode Nevada's notice of disapproval; and 

WHEREAS, Yucca MOIIn/ain was designaled to bc the ,ite for development of. 

permat\ent repository for United States spent nlldeor fuel and high level radioactive waste; and 

WHEREAS, the U.S. Department or EIl.rll)' ("USDOE"), in accordance with the /let, 

submitted a License Applicotiol1 (LA) to lhe Nuclear Regulatory Coml11issio" (NRC); "nd 

WHEREAS, lhat LA, in ~ccordance with NRC regulations, was aceoplOd for roview by 

the NRC; and 

WH};;REAS, the USOOIl has since req"ested withdrawal of its submission of tile LA 

"with prejudice"; and 

WHEREAS, the roque,t for withdrawal has been denied by the Atomic Safery and 

Licensing Board (AShE) and challenged in Federal Court; and 

WHEREAS, tho Commissioners oftlte NRC have so far failed to revicw the ASLB 

decision thit USDOE does nN have the legal authority to withdraw the Ylleca Mountain license 

application, and 
175 

wnEREAS, the Chainn~11 of the NRC unilaterally directed the NRC surffto terminate 

review of the '~A withollt I\lling on the ASLB decision; and 

WHEREAS, with NRC's tbiluTe to act in if timely mam1er with respect to the ASLB 

decision, the Fcder~.1 Court of Appeuls for tile D.C. Circliit will schedule and hear ch.llenges to 

USDOE's allthol'ity to terminate work 011 Yuoca Mountain ~nd withdraw the Yucca MQuntain 

LA; and. 

WHEREAS, the na+ion needs to move forwand 01\ the established sll'.logy to provide 

permAnent storage of spent nuolear fuel and high level waste; and, 

Whereas, the Lander County Board ofCOlumissioners (Board) recognizes th.t further 

delays in the dev~lopmenl of a penMnelit geologic repOSitory will reS\1lt ifl signiflcant public 

expenditures and pOlentially jeopardizes the r.llme expansion of nucleor power production and 

energy h,dependellce; a,\d 

WHEREAS, the Board is convinced that \\ntil SI)ch lime as the NRC completes its 

revMlw oflhe LA. Lander CQuntY,the Slale of Nevllda a\1d the "atlon will be denied n scientific 

and technical deterouinetion of the potential oft"e Yucca Mounta;'1 repository to be built and 

operated safely and $uoces:lf\dly;.~nd 

WHEREAS we are a nation governed with respect for laws we impose on our,elves, 

NOW rllEREFORt, it hereby is resolved as follow,: 

l, Thnt ubsent changes to thQ Nuclear Wast~ Policy Act. as n1l1ended, NRC should 

oomplete a uloro\lgh find detailed review of~le Yucca MO\lnt~in License 

Applioation. 
176 

APPROVED this 24'1> day ofM.rch. 2011 

ATTE~ 

Jly: .20(1)\211 0 Qj \IOrv~ Sadie Sllil iva.n, lander County Clerk 

And Ex-Officio Clerk of the Board 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

COliNTY OF LANDER, STATE OF N6V ADA 
177 

/. 

STATUTES OF NEVADA Iq7~ 

FIFTY-EIGHTH SESSION 

Senate Resolution No. 19-5enator Brown 

FILE NUMBER 183 

1993 

SENATE RESOLunON-Desipatm, certaln members of the senate u memben 

of the legislative commission in tho legislative COUlIICI bURaU. 

Resolved by the Senate of the State of Nevada, That pursuant to the 

provisions of NRS 218.660 and the joint rules of the legislature. Senators 

Ricbard H. Bryan, Melvin D. Close, lr., Cad F. Dodge, lames I. Gibson, 

Lee E. Walker and Thomas R. C. WUson are desi~ated as the regular 

senate members; Senator William 1. Raggio is dmgnated the alternate 

member for Senator Dodge; and Senators Norman Ty Hilbrecbt, Richard 

E. Blakemore, Mary L. Gojack, Joe Neal and Gary A. Sheerin are designated as first,· second, third, fourth and fifth alternate members respectively for the other members, to serve until their successors are designated. 

Assembly 10int Resolution No. IS-Assemblymen Mann, Robinson, PrIce, Hlcby, May. Getto, JllcobSen, Hay~ Moody, Chaney, Schofteld, Benkovic:h, Dreyer, 

Howard, Heaney. Bennett, Christensen, leffrey, Veraiel., Sena and Brookman 

FILE NUMBER 184 

ASSEMBLY JOINT RESOLunON-Urcin, tho F.nerB)' Research and Dovolop- ment Administration to chOO$O the Nenda Test Site for the storase and proceosin, of nuclear material and for solar cnerIY research UDder tho Solar F.nersY 

Rcsoarc:h, Development and DemOllltration Act of 1974. 

WHEREAS, The now supplanted Atomic Energy Commission bas, over the years, demonstrated an outstanding concern for nuclear safety and 

has compiled, at the Nevada Test Site, an equally outstanding safety record; and . 

WHl!REAS, The people of Southern Nevada have confidence. in the 

safety record of the Nevada Test Site and in the ability of the staif of 

the SIte to maintain safety in the handling of nuclear materials; and 

WHEREAS, The unemployment rate in Clark County, Nevada, is 20.7 

percent higher than the disturbingly high national unemployment rate; 

and 

WHEREAS, The people and the leaders in many states being considered as sites for the storage and processing of nuclear material have serious 

anxieties and doubts about providing storage and processing sites: and 

WHEREAS, The existing f~cllities and the years of expertise in nuclear 

material bandling at the Nevada Test Site are a tremendous existing 

resource; and 

WHERE~\Southern, NI! ... ~da also offers an excellent environment in 

which to ex~oiethe: P9ti.Htial of solar energy; and WHBREAS~ NationaJ'eliergy independence and a clean environment are dependent upon tapping nonfossil fuel sources of energy for beating. cooling and electricity; and 

WHEREAS, The existing facilities of the Nevada Test Site and its support infrastructure are available and well suited to scientific research m addition to Ducleat projects; and 
178 

1994 RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS 

WHEREAS, The storage and processing of nuclear material, and solar 

energy research can both be carried out at the Nevada Test Site with 

minimal capital investment relative to other locationsj now, therefore, 

be it 

Resolved by the Assembly and the Senate of the State of Nevada, 

jointly, That the legislature of the State of Nevada strongly urges the 

Energy Research and Development Administration to choose the Nevada 

Test Site for the storage and processing of nuclear material provided that 

there is an acceptance by the Energy Research and Development Admin- . istration of the following conditions: 

1. Air cooling is used at the storage facility; 

2. Rail transportation avoiding the Las Vegas metropolitan area is 

established to the sitej , 3. Appropriate state agencies and local governments can cooperate 

in, and contribute to, the development of the Energy Research and 

Development Administration's site-specific environmental impact statement; 

4. It is satisfactorily demonstrated that adequate radiation safeguards . for storage and transportation can be developed and will be implementedj 

5. Public hearings are held in at least four counties in the state prior 

to choosing a specific site for the facilityj and be it further 

Resolved, That under the provisions of the Solar Energy Research. 

Development and Demonstration Act of 1974 the Energy Research and 

Development Administration utilize the extensive resources and facilities 

of the Nevada Test Site to explore the potential uses of solar energyj and 

be it further 

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be prepared and transmitted 

by the legislative counsel to the administrator of the Energy Research and 

Development Administration, to the assistant administrators for nuclear 

energy and for solar, geothermal and advanced energy systems and to all 

members of Nevada's congressional delegation; and be it further 

Resolved, That this act shall become effective upon passage and 

approval. 

Assembly 10int Resolution No. 38--Assemblymen Coulter, Manu, Sena, Murphy, 

Hayes, Dreyer, Benkovich, Polish, Glover, Mello, Wittenberg, Weise, Bennett 

and Christensen 

FILE NUMBER 185 

ASSEMBLY 10INT RESOLUflON-Memoria1izing Congre&a to authorize and 

fund .. veterans' hospital in Southern Nevada. 

WHEREAS, There are 92,000 veterans living in Nevada who have honorably served their country; and 

WHEREAS, Approximately 50,000 of these veterans reside in Southern 

Nevadajand 

WHEREAS, The closest veterans' hospitals for these 50,000 veterans are in Los Angeles and Reno, a fact which makes hospital care for any ot 

these veterans an extreme inconvenience and even a real hardship; and 
179 

What’s Next for Nuclear Waste? A New Strategy for the CSRA 

WHAT'S NEXT FOR 

NUCLEAR WASTE? 

A New Strategy for the CSRA 

September 2009 
180 

R ,,) !~(; \ ~ I / '\ 1 

November 9, 2009 

Dear Community Stakeholder: 

The Federal Government's decision to abandon Yucca Mountain as its preferred 

method for permanent disposal of defense nuclear waste and commercial spent nuclear 

fuel represents a critical challenge for our two-state region. 

Simply put, the decision means that, unless a promised Federal solution is 

provided, the Savannah River Site will likely become a de facto permanent repository for 

the waste that is currently stored there - waste the government assured us would 

eventually be moved to its permanent home in the remote Nevada desert. 

As a regional voice for issues related to the Savannah River Site. the SRS 

Community Reuse Organization is raising awareness of this important topic among 

community leaders. We want to serve as a catalyst for dialog designed to protect the 

region's long~term interests. Our Board of Directors recently adopted the enclosed 

White Paper which outlines the issue and the implications for our region, 

Those responsible for public safety, job creation, image enhancement and citizen 

confidence must now lead in a new reality. We must come to terms with our 

community's lingering - perhaps permanent -- role as caretaker for the Nation's highly 

radioactive waste, It is the goa! and intent of the SRS Community Reuse Organization to 

assist the communities in our region in reaching consensus concerning a path forward In 

addressing with the Federal govemment the impacts on our region resulting from the 

absence of a promised permanent repository for nuclear waste. 

The ideas expressed in this paper are intended for information and education 

and a platform for public diseussion as interested citizens and groups work together to 

arrive at a community consensus and a strategy for communicating our common position 

known to key decision makers. 

Thank you in advance for your interest in this topic and your willingness to invest 

some time and effort in reviewing this information and partiCipating in developing a 

workable strategy that protects the long-term interests of our two-state region. 

Jj;~I~UWilli~:CRiCk) Toole 

Chairman 

J. David Jameson 

Vice Chairman 

EO. Box 69G, Aiken, Soulh Carolina 29802 P: 803.595.9954 ext, 1409 F: 803:593.4296 WWw.srsl·m.org 

Serving (he Counties of ,\iken SC, Allendale SC, Barnwell Sc, Columbia GA, <lnd Richmond GA 
181 

Sf\S 

PREFACE 

This White Paper was prepared by the Savannah River Site Community Reuse 

Organization (SRSCRO) to serve as a catalyst for public dialog concerning the implications of 

the Obama Administration's decision to halt more than two decades of work on Yucca Mountain 

in Nevada as the nation's permanent nuclear waste repository. 

United States policies governing the permanent disposal of high level waste are defined 

by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. This Act specifies that high-level waste 

will be disposed of underground, in a deep geologic repository, and that Yucca Mountain, 

Nevada, will be the single candidate site for characterization as a potential geologic repository. 

The government's about face on this critical issue leaves state and local leaders with 

more questions than answers. Those responsible for public safety, job creation, image 

enhancement and citizen confidence must now lead in a new reality. They must come to terms 

with their community's lingering - perhaps permanent -- role as caretaker for the Nation's highly 

radioactive waste. 

As a region, we are now left wondering what's next? How we will come together in unity 

to address a path forward in the wake of this broken promise - one that has implications of the 

longest possible term and a potential chilling effect on the region's future growth and prosperity? 

It is the goal and intent of the SRS Community Reuse Organization to assist the 

communities in our region in reaching consensus concerning a path forward in addressing with 

the Federal government the impacts on our region resulting from the absence of a promised 

permanent repository for nuclear waste. 

The ideas expressed in this paper are intended for information and education and a 

platform for public discussion as interested citizens and groups work together to arrive at a 

community consensus and a strategy for communicating our common position known to key 

decision makers. 
182 

What's Next for Nuclear Waste? 

A New Strategy for the CSRA 

An Unwilling Long-Term Landlord 

The Obama Administration's 2009 announcement that 

it would abandon Yucca Mountain in the Nevada desert as 

the Government's preferred solution for long-term storage of 

nuclear waste swept across the landscape like the rippling 

aftershock of a feared atomic blast. 

The news was sudden and abrupt - terse in its 

language and far-reaching in its impact. Secretary of Energy 

Steven Chu said Yucca Mountain is no longer an option for 

storing highly radioactive waste, including spent nuclear fuel 

from commercial and governmental programs as well as 

legacy materials from the Cold War effort. A blue ribbon 

panel would be created, the Secretary said, to determine a 

new strategy for the ultimate disposal of these wastes. 

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid hailed the decision 

as "our most significant victory to date in our battle to protect 

Nevada from becoming the country's toxic wasteland." 

Then he added: "President Obama recognizes that 

the proposed dump threatens the health and safety of 

Nevadans and millions of Americans. His commitment to 

stop this terrible project could not be clearer." 

Even now, the Government's rejection of its only 

answer to long term storage resounds in communities across 

the country, including our own, as local leaders reluctantly 

are forced to see their hometowns for what they may now 

have become - an unwilling permanent landlord for what 

many Americans consider to be the world's deadliest legacy. 

We are not alone. High-level nuclear waste from the U. 

S. nuclear weapons complex currently resides at 16 sites in 

13 states and totals 7,000 metric tons. This is approximately 

ten percent of the estimated capacity of the Yucca Mountain 

repository. There is also some 63,000 metric tons of used 

commercial nuclear fuel stored in 41 states that has also 

been designated for Yucca Mountain. 

2 
183 

Figure 1: U. S. Sites Where High-Level Defense Waste and Spent Fuel arc 

stored. 

What Kind of Nuclear Waste Are We Talking About? 

Two types of waste products are usually included in 

any discussion of a permanent repository - spent nuclear 

fuel and high-level defense waste. 

Spent nuclear fuel is used fuel from a reactor that is no 

longer efficient in creating electricity, because its fission 

process has slowed. However, it is still thermally hot, highly 

radioactive, and potentially harmful. Until a permanent 

disposal repository for spent nuclear fuel is built, nuclear 

power plant operators must safely store this fuel at their 

reactor sites. 

One alternative for dealing with spent nuclear fuel is 

"reprocessing." Reprocessing extracts isotopes from spent 

fuel that can be used again as reactor fuel. Although this 

would extend the life of our nuclear fuel resources and help in 

our national goal of energy independence, commercial 

reprocessing is currently not practiced in the United States, 

although it has been allowed in the past. 
184 

Significant quantities of high-level radioactive waste 

are produced by the defense reprocessing programs at 

Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, such as Savannah 

River, Hanford and Washington state and by commercial 

reprocessing operations at West Valley, New York. These 

wastes, which are generally managed by DOE, are not 

regulated by NRC. However they must be included in any 

high-level radioactive waste disposal plans, along with all 

high-level waste from spent reactor fuel. 

Because of their highly radioactive fission products, 

high-level waste and spent fuel must be handled and stored 

with care. Since the only way radioactive waste finally 

becomes harmless is through decay, which for high-level 

wastes can take hundreds of thousands of years, the wastes 

must be stored and finally disposed of in a way that provides 

adequate protection of the public for a very long time. 

United States policies governing the permanent 

disposal of high level waste are defined by the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act of 1982, as amended. This Act specifies that highlevel waste will be disposed of underground, in a deep 

geologic repository, and that Yucca Mountain, Nevada, will 

be the single candidate site for characterization as a potential 

geologic repository. 

4 
185 

FRONT END BACK END 

, .... ' ~,~ SPE~T ASSEM~LY ~... Reactor fE!!il 

.... 

~ FUEL ASSEMBLY , Interim ~ Stora!le 

.. - If .. CWJ., .= SPENT ASSEMSL Y - - 231U Fuel 

• 

Fabrlcallon 

_ .NR UFo 

• 

• ••••••••• 

,.. • ••••••• ,. 

_. m~ 

~ 

ReprocessIng 

- FtUTONIUM # 

~rnn l Enrichment _ ~, 

t . ., .. ,'" , U UF. • .. _ .............. .... 

"'"'~ Z3\J Plocessing 

t V'lIo""'h 

u,o, 

~ MUling 

explorlltion Mining 

HiGH-LEVEL 

WASTE 

Figure 2: This dra\"ing shows the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle from initial mining and production to use in 

the reactor, reprocessing and final disposition. 

The challenge of properly disposing of nuclear waste touches every man, woman 

and child in America. It speaks to public safety, to energy independence, to technology 

and innovation, to global competitiveness and economic leadership and to the political 

will to do what is right -- what must be done for the good of our communities today and 

of future generations tomorrow. 

The Winds of Change 
186 

The announcement to jettison Yucca Mountain as 

the preferred storage option came only a few days into the 

new Obama Administration which came to power on the 

winds of change. The news was not completely 

unexpected. The signs had been building for years amid 

construction delays and growing public opposition and the 

increasing political clout of Nevada's senior senator. 

As Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid became a 

force to be reckoned with and one whose opposition would 

ultimately seal the repository's fate. With more than $7 

billion invested by nuclear power consumers and taxpayers 

since its inception, many saw Yucca's cancellation as the 

most expensive "Not in my Backyard" protest ever, despite 

the fact that state and local governments in Nevada had 

received over $400 million in "mitigation" payments since 

the early 1980s. 

A Day of Reckoning 

But when it finally came, the decision still hit hard in 

our region and others whose economy depended for years 

on federal paychecks and promises. Now, one of the 

biggest promises appears broken. The President says 

Yucca Mountain is gone. For all those communities across 

the country who believed and followed - for all of those 

who thought the waste was just passing through -- the Day 

of Reckoning has arrived. 

What was unspoken is now clear. When it comes to 

disposal of high-level nuclear waste from the nation's 

nuclear defense program, there is no Plan B. No alternate 

location. No secondary geologic formation. No backup 

technology. No other plan. It was always Yucca Mountain. 

Nothing else. 

The government's about face on this critical issue 

leaves state and local leaders with more questions than 

answers. Those responsible for public safety, job creation, 

image enhancement and citizen confidence must now lead 

in a new reality. They must come to terms with their 

community's lingering perhaps permanent -- role as 

caretaker for the Nation's highly radioactive waste. 

6 
187 

As a region, we are now left wondering what's next? 

How we will come together in unity to address a path 

forward in the wake of this broken promise - one that has 

implications of the longest possible term and a potential 

chilling effect on the region's future growth and prosperity? 

H~~=C~:~="'· 

~ I J il 

... I I - ~~~;:-

--.. - Figure 3: \Vil.!>tc forms !lnd packages to he stored in Yucca Mountain 

(Collrtes),: CNT A). 

Seeking a New Strategy 

For our region, whose economy was shaken by the 

dramatic post-Cold War downsizing of its largest employer 

and now seeks to diversify, hard choices lie ahead. The 

SRS Community Reuse Organization (SRSCRO) 

encourages regional dialog on this important issue in a 

constructive way that can help lead to consensus 

concerning a new strategy that is now required in light of 

the Administration's decision. 

Local communities like ours had for years embraced 

their limited, defined role in nuclear waste storage -- one 

that was always clear in our minds and, therefore, 

acceptable. We were willing temporary hosts, agreeable 

short-term custodians. 
188 

In storing high-level nuclear waste, we saw 

ourselves as a hotel. Our guests were transient - staying 

for a while and then moving on. We never envisioned 

building a permanent retirement home for them. We 

viewed our role as a way station for nuclear waste, a place 

where it could stay overnight while its ultimate home was 

being prepared "somewhere else" - a remote desert place 

called Yucca Mountain. 

When the waste finally reached the depths of Yucca 

Mountain, it would be safe and secure. It was a solution 

forever sealed from human intervention. The waste would 

permanently reside in a highly engineered hole in the 

ground impervious to water and worry. For most 

Americans, it was a place where out of sight definitely 

meant out of mind. For most, it seemed the perfect 

solution. 

WastePat-"'kilQes 

=;~ .. =o/ 011""'""11""""0>1 

e."....,.sp"'"' 

Pallet 

S"""""""~"'nlt 

=~,:=:~ """"""",,",..,.,,,,,,, 

WastePackag'l'lS 

P'~_""""~""""~ J<o<lx.es""'."rom""",act ... , ... ''' .... 'a~'· 

Fi~lIre 4: There is a natural tendency for any w:lter to move around huge 

openings or CXC1IVation in rock. The emplacement tunnels or "drifts" shown 

above pro\'idc II stabl~ environment for other engineered barrier system features 

at Yucca Mountain. (Courtesy: CNT A). 
189 

What Now? 

For community leaders in the Central Savannah 

River Area and in other Department of Energy 

communities around the country, one question remains: 

What do we do now? 

The high-level nuclear waste we so readily 

accepted as temporary now seems much more 

permanent, and community leaders in the Central 

Savannah River Area today find themselves at a 

crossroads - torn between accepting the announced fate 

of the government's only solution or continuing to fight for 

permanent storage at Yucca Mountain. 

There are powerful advocates who remain 

committed to the fight. In a recent letter to Secretary Chu, 

17 Republican Senators took the Administration to task for 

its quick decision to scuttle Yucca Mountain. The group 

was led by Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), ranking member 

of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 

and included South Carolina Senator Jim DeMint. They 

wrote to Secretary Chu: 

"The American taxpayer has invested too much money 

in Yucca Mountain to simply have it pushed aside without 

explanation. Over $7.7 billion has been spent researching 

Yucca Mountain as a potential repository site, and neither the 

National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Waste Technical 

Review Board, nor any of our National Labs involved in 

conducting the studies and evaluating data have concluded that 

there is any evidence to disqualify Yucca Mountain as a 

repository," the Senators wrote. 

"As recently as August 2008, all ten National Lab 

directors, including you, signed a letter on the essential role of 

nuclear energy which advocated continuing the licensing of a 

geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. 

"Given this history, President Obama's memoranda that 

science should govern public policy and his commitment to an 

unprecedented level of openness, we find it difficult to reconcile 

your statement that Yucca Mountain "is not an option" made 

after only six weeks in office." 

9 
190 

The Senators also noted that since the first National 

Academy of Science (NAS) study in 1957, deep geologic 

disposal has been viewed as the safest approach to 

disposal of nuclear waste. In 1983, the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act (NWPA) was signed into law providing for the 

siting and development of a repository for our nation's used 

nuclear fuel and nuclear waste culminating in the 

recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site. 

In accordance with that law, electricity consumers 

have contributed $30 billion for the disposal of civilian spent 

fuel and taxpayers have paid $3.5 billion for the disposal of 

the nuclear waste legacy of the Cold War. Courts have 

affirmed the federal government's obligation to dispose of 

spent fuel. Taxpayers face up to $11 billion in liability costs 

even if the Department of Energy begins accepting used 

fuel and nuclear waste in 2020 and an additional $500 

million with each passing year of delay. At present, the 

nuclear industry has nearly 63,000 metric tons of civilian 

used fuel awaiting disposal in addition to 7,000 metric tons 

of defense waste stored at Department of Energy facilities. 

The pro-Yucca sentiments in the lawmakers' letter 

were underscored in a Washington Post editorial following 

the President's action: 

"By stripping the funding for the nuclear repository at 

Nevada's Yucca Mountain, President Obama has succeeded in 

killing the contentious project that remains unfinished 22 years 

after Congress selected the site. He compounds the error by not 

offering an alternative. If the president's vision for a clean energy 

future is to be believed or is to come to fruition, nuclear energy 

must be a part of the mix, and the safe disposal of its radioactive 

waste must be given more serious consideration." 

We Have a Huge Stake in this Issue 

If and when a "blue ribbon panel" is assembled to 

chart a new strategy for nuclear waste storage, our region 

deserves and demands - a seat at the table as part of 

this committee. 

10 
191 

In a March 18, 2009, letter to South Carolina Governor 

Mark Sanford, the Governor's Nuclear Advisory Council 

outlined four reasons why South Carolina is a key 

stakeholder in this issue: 

The state has seven operating nuclear 

reactors at four sites. Four additional reactors 

at two sites are planned. Each of these 

reactors produces spent nuclear fuel which 

must be ultimately disposed of by the 

Department of Energy; however, until such 

time as a repository is available, the spent 

fuel will be stored at each site. Only Illinois 

and Pennsylvania have more commercial 

nuclear power reactors than South Carolina. 

The Savannah River Site has approximately 

3,000 canisters of stabilized legacy high level 

waste from the Cold War stored on site, and 

another 3,000 to 4,000 canisters will be 

generated in the process of stabilizing the 

remaining liquid radioactive waste now in 

aging tank farms at SRS. This stabilized high 

level waste must be disposed in a federal 

repository, but until a federal repository is 

available, it will be stored at SRS. New York, 

Washington and Idaho have similar high level 

waste. 

Savannah River Site is the receipt and 

storage site for aluminum-clad research 

reactor spent fuel from decommissioned 

research reactors worldwide. Based on 

approved operational plans, SRS will process 

this fuel in H Canyon to recover the enriched 

uranium for use as fuel in commercial nuclear 

reactors. The high level waste resulting from 

processing the fuel will be stabilized along 

with other high level waste at SRS and stored 

until a repository is available. 

Savannah River Site was selected by DOE to 

provide interim storage for surplus non-pit 

plutonium in the United States. The 

plutonium originally located at Rocky Flats, 

Hanford, Los Alamos and several weapons 

11 
192 

research laboratories will be consolidated at 

SRS by about 2012. Approximately 60 

percent of the weight of the plutonium is 

destined to be converted to commercial 

nuclear fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility (MOX). 

However, DOE planned to dispose of the remaining 40 

percent in the federal repository by dissolving in H Canyon, 

incorporating the plutonium into borosilicate glass in the 

Defense Waste Processing Facility with existing high level 

liquid waste, and storing in the Glass Waste Storage 

Buildings at SRS until a repository is available. 

Chairman Ben Rusche wrote that while the Council 

has no concerns about the ability to store and maintain 

these materials in the near term, the impacts of long-term 

interim storage, including continued safety, have not been 

evaluated. 

He further stated that "it is the opinion of the Council 

that South Carolina will continue to host much of the 

material destined for the federal repository until one 

becomes available, and will bear a disproportionate share 

of any adverse consequences of our Nation's inability to 

develop a repository. For these reasons, South Carolina's 

participation in any federally-supported studies or 

discussions of alternatives to Yucca Mountain is vital to the 

state's well-being and the common good of the state and 

the Nation." 

The SRSCRO Board of Directors wholeheartedly 

endorses the viewpoint expressed by the Governor's 

Nuclear Advisory Council and adds its voice to the call for 

our two-state region to be appropriately represented on any 

panel formed to review this critical issue. 

The Demise of Yucca Mountain: Problem or 

Opportunity? 

The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word 

"Crisis". One brush stroke stands for "danger", the other for 

"opportunity". Which is it for our region? True, the 

Government's apparent rejection of Yucca Mountain as a 

12 
193 

permanent repository for nuclear waste creates something 

of a crisis. But for us, does it mean "opportunity" or 

"danger"? 

There are those who see both. Some see 

tremendous opportunity in our half century history of 

nuclear accomplishment and in the reservoir of stellar 

talent that has already created and deployed technology 

designed to ensure safe storage of nuclear waste, creating 

jobs and international focus on our capabilities. 

Supporters point to the Savannah River Site's half 

century of experience in nuclear fuel cycle programs. They 

highlight an extensive commercial nuclear energy supply 

centered on Plant Vogtle in Georgia and on seven nuclear 

reactors on four sites in South Carolina. They remind us of 

the presence in our region of the world's premier nuclear 

power engineering and construction companies, of our 

central location with respect to the resurgence of nuclear 

power in the Southeast and a government, business and 

community base that understands and appreciates the 

benefits of nuclear energy. 

Others see dangerously dark days ahead for a 

region whose potential is marred by the prolonged 

presence of nuclear waste and crippled by the unappealing 

specter of a worldwide reputation as a "nuclear waste 

dump". To them, it deters industry, crimps job growth, 

numbs entrepreneurship and innovation, tarnishes civic 

pride and ultimately fuels the widespread perception of an 

unsafe place to live and work. 

Forming a New Strategy 

Both viewpoints have advocates, and both have 

merit. It is up to the region's leaders - elected officials, 

business owners, economic development professionals, 

educators, heads of community organizations, labor 

leaders and others - to join together to form a consensus 

concerning the new reality of nuclear waste management 

that has dawned in recent days and that, undoubtedly, will 

remain at the forefront of our agenda for months and years 

to come. 

13 
194 

The seeds of dialog and consensus have already 

been planted. Local community groups, including area 

Chambers of Commerce and Citizens for Nuclear 

Technology Awareness, have prepared documents 

addressing this critical issue. The chamber document 

suggests that Yucca Mountain be preserved as a disposal 

pathway for Spent Nuclear Fuel "unless and until a better 

option is approved". It calls for establishing reprocessing 

as the national policy option for management of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel. 

The document underscores the fact that capabilities 

already existing in the region provide a "unique 

opportunity for public/private partnerships in developing 

non-polluting nuclear power as an increasingly important 

part of our nation's energy mix." 

In a separate document, Citizens for Nuclear 

Technology Awareness (CNTA), a regional grassroots 

educational organization, echoed its support for continued 

development of Yucca Mountain as the ultimate 

repository. 

"The Yucca Mountain repository is a safe, 

scientifically sound solution to the storage of used nuclear 

fuel and high level defense waste," the paper concludes. 

"There has been no suggestion by more than 50 scientific 

reviews of the Yucca Mountain project that this option is 

not suitable for its intended purpose. We urge compliance 

with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and that the necessary 

funding be restored to pursue the Yucca Mountain 

Repository project." 

As part of our regional dialog, local leaders should 

work together to examine key questions related both to 

the status of Yucca Mountain and to the future of 

reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. For ease of reference, 

these questions are divided into categories 

CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN and 

ADOPTION OF REPROCESSING AS NA TlONAL 

POLICY. 

14 
195 

Specifically, these questions include: 

I. CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN 

A. Should Congress reaffirm the 2002 legislation 

which specifies that Yucca Mountain is to be 

developed as the national repository? 

DOE has submitted a license application to NRC to 

construct the Yucca Mountain repository. NRC has up to 

four years to review the application. We anticipate that 

funding in the President's 2010 budget proposal will not be 

adequate to support the application review process, and 

the Yucca Mountain project will fail. A funding level of 

about $350 Million (a continuation of past funding trends) 

will allow the license review process to remain on 

schedule. 

Electric utility ratepayers in 35 states have paid $30 

Billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund to develop Yucca 

Mountain. South Carolina and Georgia ratepayers have 

paid $1.2 Billion and $675 Million respectively. In addition 

39 states have commercial reactor SNF or DOE high level 

radioactive wastes scheduled for disposal in Yucca 

Mountain. 

Consideration should be given to designating the 

CSRA as an "affected unit of government" as defined in 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

B. Should the Governors of the 39 states with either 

commercial SNF and/or DOE high level radioactive 

nuclear waste contact their federal delegations to 

express their concern and request that the Yucca 

Mountain disposition pathway for SNF and DOE 

high level radioactive wastes be reestablished? 

15 
196 

C. Should stakeholders from South Carolina and 

Georgia be included as members of the Blue Ribbon 

Commission being assembled by DOE to consider 

alternatives to Yucca Mountain? 

Many believe processing is a betler spent nuclear 

fuel management option than direct disposal. Processing 

of spent nuclear fuel will have two significant benefits: (1) it 

will reduce (but not eliminate) the need for deep geologic 

disposal of wastes from nuclear power production and (2) 

the unburned fuel materials in spent nuclear fuel can be 

separated and returned to a nuclear reactor as fresh fuel. 

16 
197 

II. Adoption of Reprocessing as National Policy 

A. Should Congress approve legislation which 

establishes processing as the national policy for 

management of spent fuel? 

If processing of spent nuclear fuel is authorized 

today, commercial-scale plants will probably use the 

'PUREX' process, a proven process which results in liquid 

wastes and separates plutonium in its pure form. Improved 

spent nuclear fuel processing methods can reduce the 

amount of wastes generated and provide improved security 

for plutonium contained in SNF. These are worthwhile 

objectives, and are the type of program ideally suited for 

research and engineering development at SRS. 

B. Should DOE and the Congress approve a 

vigorous program to (1) select a new spent nuclear fuel 

process and (2) develop and demonstrate the new 

process at the engineering scale on SRS as soon as 

possible? 

A portion of the energy-bearing materials separated 

from spent nuclear fuel are not suitable for use in 

conventional nuclear power reactors. A new type of reactor 

which can 'burn' this otherwise unburnable fuel is needed 

to (1) reduce security concerns, (2) reduce waste requiring 

geologic disposal and (3) recover the maximum energy 

content from spent nuclear fuel. Commercial reactor 

vendors and DOE have been performing low-budget 

research on alternate reactor types. Some of these 

concepts are ready for scale-up and a publici private 

partnership at SRS is an ideal location to demonstrate a 

new reactor type, Construction and operation of a new 

reactor type is not required immediately, 

C. Should DOE and the Congress approve a 

program to develop alternate reactor types which can 

burn the portion of recovered fuel which is not suitable 

for use in conventional nuclear power reactors? 

Without Yucca Mountain or an acceptable alternate, 

commercial spent nuclear fuel and glass logs from the SRS 

Defense Waste Processing Facility will remain at their 

existing locations - this is an unacceptable long-term 

situation, In addition, DOE is contractually committed to 

17 
198 

take spent nuclear fuel from commercial utilities and the 

unavai[ability of Yucca Mountain or commercial spent 

nuclear fuel processing might result in DOE forcing 

consolidation of commercial spent nuclear fuel at its field 

locations, including SRS. Therefore, we believe it is in the 

community's best interest to (1) aggressively pursue 

opening of Yucca Mountain and (2) establish processing as 

an acceptable spent nuclear fuel management option. 

The completion of Yucca Mountain and reprocessing 

are both important, and both should be part of any Spent 

Nuclear Fue[ management policy. While the processing 

option can recover unburned fuel, it also generates high 

[evel radioactive wastes which require geologic disposal 

(with less volume and less radiotoxicity than direct 

disposal). [n addition Yucca Mountain can receive and 

dispose of 6,000 canisters of vitrified high level radioactive 

waste currently being produced and stored on SRS. 

Without Yucca Mountain there is no approved disposition 

pathway for this SRS waste. 

Other Considerations 

In addition to the questions raised above, there are 

other considerations for the community as wei!. 

1. As affected units of government, should we 

advocate that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 

1982 as amended be reopened to address our 

region's prolonged role as host to high-[evel 

nuclear waste? Specifically, should the law be 

changed to require the Federal Government to 

compensate local units of government for their 

willingness to continue to serve as host while the 

Government develops other, more permanent 

storage options? 

2. Should the region retain the services of 

Washington, DC-based firm to represent its 

interests with Federa[ agencies and elected 

officials on Capitol Hill? As we face a lengthy 

delay in progress toward an ultimate solution for 

nuclear waste storage, is it time to ensure that 

18 
199 

our voice is amplified and our case is presented 

in the strongest possible terms with Government 

decision makers? 

3. What groups should be brought together to 

develop regional consensus and how is this done 

(e.g. CNTA, CAB, Economic Development 

Groups, County Councils?) 

4. Since resolution of this critical challenge impacts 

many regions besides ours, should we 

coordinate with affected units of government in 

other states to amplify our voice, maximize our 

ability to communicate with policy makers and 

ensure that the final resolution addresses 

national needs and concerns in a comprehensive 

way? 

Life After Yucca 

In the coming months, the SRS Community Reuse 

Organization will seek to assist our region in developing 

consensus concerning a national strategy for safe, 

permanent nuclear waste disposal. 

We will reach out to elected officials, business 

leaders, economic development groups, state and local 

governments, the Department of Energy and its 

contractors, community groups with a perspective on 

nuclear issues and the long-term betterment of the 

community, and citizens at-large. Our purpose is to inform 

and create dialog leading to consensus and a plan of 

action. 

As we wrestle with the implications of "life after 

Yucca", we must consider the full impact of the 

Administration's decision on our community, our economy, 

our way of life, our ability to attract new jobs and the way 

we view ourselves -- as well as how others see us. 

It is a complex tapestry of interrelated issues 

unprecedented in their scope and impact - the 

convergence of strongly-held ideology, social conscience 

and political compromise, a questioning reliance on 

technology, the quest for energy independence, and the 

tension between raw emotion and the long-term well-being 

19 
200 

of our nation as we seek to manage and maximize the 

legacy of our historic commitment to harness the power of 

the atom. 

The public discourse in the months ahead must 

respect the viewpoints of all parties and must be focused 

on blending disparate positions into a common, unified 

approach the community can embrace and support. That 

work is already underway. The SRSCRO - representing 

five counties and two states closely tied to the future of the 

Savannah River Site - stands ready to lead and partner 

with others in a cooperative regional effort to forge a 

nuclear waste strategy that will serve our best interests and 

those of the nation for generations to come. 

### 

20 
201 

U.S. State by State Commercial Nuclear Used Fuel 

and Payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund 

"tEl 

State Metric Tons of Uranium Nuclear Waste Fund Contributions ($ M) 

Alabama 

Arizona 

Arkansas 

California 

Colorado 

Connecticut 

Florida 

Georgia 

Idaho 

Illinois 

Iowa 

Kansas 

louisiana 

Maine 

Maryland 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Mississippi 

Missouri 

Nebraska 

New Hampshire 

New Jersey 

New York 

North Carolina 

Ohio 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

South Carolina 

Tennessee 

Texas 

Vermont 

Virginia 

Washington 

Wisconsin 

Other 

Total 

Idaho is holding used fuel from Thra& Mile Island 2 

2,79;:) 

1,710 

1,180 

2590 

30 

1,890 

2,720 

2,330 

90 

7,420 

430 

570 

1,080 

550 

1,220 

610 

2,310 

1,090 

730 

610 

790 

480 

2,280 

3,280 

3,220 

980 

350 

5,410 

3,610 

1,350 

1,810 

580 

2,240 

570 

1,250 

NA 

60,150 

119,7 

508,7 

285,6 

795,7 

0,2 

353,0 

743.4 

662,3 

NA 

1,706,9 

108,7 

180,9 

309,5 

65,5 

343,5 

156,8 

503,0 

375,9 

194,0 

187,3 

252,5 

146,3 

574,8 

762,9 

801.7 

287,5 

75,5 

1,502.4 

1,197,9 

439,5 

580,3 

89.8 

672,1 

152.8 

344,2 

7,6 

16,088,3 

Used Fuel Data is rounded up to the nearest ten and is as of January 2009, Nuclear Waste Fund Contributions as of June 30, 2008 

Source· ACI Nuclear Energy Solutions and Department of Energy 

Updated: 4/09 
202 

Glossary of Nuclear Waste Terms 

Atom 

The basic component of all matter; it is the smallest part of an element having all the chemical 

properties of that element. Atoms are made up of protons and neutrons (in the nucleus) and 

electronics. 

Background Radiation 

Radiation arising from natural radioactive material and always present in the environment, 

including solar and cosmic radiation and radioactive elements in the upper atmosphere, the 

ground, building materials and the human body. 

Canister 

The outermost container into which vitrified high-level waste or spent fuel rods are to be 

placed. Made of stainless steel or inert alloy. 

Cask 

Container that provides shielding during transportation of canisters of radioactive material. 

Usually measures 12 feet in diameter by 22 feet long and weighs 200 tons. 

Chain Reaction 

A self-sustaining series of nuclear fissions taking place in a reactor core. Neutrons produced in 

one fission cause the next fission. 

Civilian Waste 

Low-level and high-level (including spent fuel) radioactive waste generated by commercial 

nuclear power plants, manufacturing industries and institutions (hospitals, universities and 

research institutions.) 

Cladding 

Protective alloy shielding in which fissionable fuel is inserted. Cladding is relatively resistant to 

radiation and to the physical and chemical conditions in a reactor core. Cladding may be made 

of stainless steel or an alloy such as zircaloy. 

Closed Fuel Cycle 

A closed fuel cycle includes chemical reprocessing to recover the fissionable material remaining 

in the spent fuel. An open fuel cycle does not. (See Fuel Cycle). 
203 

Curie 

A measure of the rate of radioactive decay; it is equivalent to the radioactivity of one gram of 

radium or 37 billion disintegrations per second. A nanocurie is one billionth of a curie; a 

picocurie is one trillionth of a curie. 

Daughter Product 

Nuclides resulting from the radioactive decay of other nuclides. A daughter product may be 

either stable or radioactive. 

Decay 

Disintegration of the nucleus of an unstable nuclide by spontaneous emission of charged 

particles, photons or both. 

Decommissioning 

Preparations taken for retirement of a nuclear facility from active service, accompanied by a 

program to reduce or stabilize radioactive contamination. 

Decontamination 

The removal of radioactive material from the surface of or from within another material. 

Defense Waste 

Radioactive waste resulting from weapons research and development, the operation of naval 

reactors, the production of weapons material, the reprocessing of defense spent fuel and the 

decommissioning of nuclear-powered ships and submarines. 

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) 

The largest radioactive waste glassification plant in the world, the Defense Waste Processing 

Facility (DWPF) converts the liquid nuclear waste currently stored at the Savannah River Site 

(SRS) into a solid glass form suitable for long-term storage and disposal. 

Disposal 

Permanent removal from the human environment with no provision for continuous human 

control and maintenance. 
204 

Dose 

A quantity of radiation or energy absorbed; measured in rads. 

Dry Cask Storage 

Heavily shielded, air-cooled storage casks for storing spent fuel. 

Exposure 

A measure of ionization produced in air by X-rays or by gamma radiation. Acute exposure 

generally refers to a high level of exposure of short duration; chronic exposure is lower-level 

exposure of long duration. 

Fissile 

Able to be split by a low-energy neutron, for example, U-235. 

Fission 

The splitting or breaking apart of a heavy atom such as uranium. When a uranium atom is split, 

large amounts of energy and one or more neutrons are released. 

Fission Products 

A general term for the complex mixture of nuclides produced as a result of nuclear fission. 

Most, but not all, nuclides in the mixture are radioactive, and they decay, forming additional 

(daughter) products. The complex mixture of fission products contains about 200 different 

isotopes of over 35 elements. 

Fuel Cycle 

The complete series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear reactors. It includes mining, 

refining, the fabrication of fuel elements, their use in a reactor and management of spent fuel 

and radioactive waste. 
205 

Half-Life 

Time required for a radioactive substance to lose 50 percent of its activity by decay. The halflife of the radioisotope plutonium-239, for example, is about 24,000 years. Starting with a 

pound of plutonium-239, in 24,000 years there will be one-half pound of plutonium-239, in 

another 24,000 years there will be Y. pound, and so on. (A pound of actual material remains 

but it gradually becomes a stable element.) 

High level Waste 

Highly radioactive material containing fission products, traces of uranium and plutonium and 

other transuranic elements; it results from chemical reprocessing of spent fuel. Originally 

produced in liquid form, high level waste must be solidified before disposal. 

Interim Storage 

The temporary holding of waste on or away from the generator's site when disposal space is 

not available. Monitoring and human control are provided and subsequent action involving 

treatment, transportation or final disposition is expected. 

low level Waste 

Radioactive waste not classified as high level waste, transuranic waste, spent fuel or by-product 

material. Most are generally short-lived and have low radioactivity. An example is protective 

gloves used by workers in a nuclear facility. 

Mixed Waste 

Waste that contains both radioactive and hazardous chemical components. 

Radiation 

Particles or waves from atomic or nuclear processes (or from certain machines). Prolonged 

exposure to these particles or rays may be harmful. 

4 
206 

Radioactive Waste 

Liquid, solid, or gaseous waste resulting from mining of radioactive ore, production of reactor 

fuel materials, reactor operation, processing of irradiated reactor fuels, and related operations, 

and from use of radioactive materials in research, industry, and medicine. 

Radioactivity 

The spontaneous emission of radiation from the nucleus of an atom. Radioisotopes of 

elements lose particles and energy through the process of radioactive decay. 

Repository 

A permanent disposal facility for high-level of transuranic waste and spent fuel. 

Reprocessing 

The process by which spent fuel is separated into waste material for disposal and into material 

such as uranium and plutonium to be reused as fuel. 

Spent Fuel 

Fuel that has been "burned" (irradiated) in a nuclear power plant's reactor to the point where it 

no longer contributes efficiently to the nuclear chain reaction. Spent fuel is thermally hot and 

highly radioactive. 

Storage 

Operations that are designed to provide isolation and easy recovery of radioactive material and 

which rely on continuous human monitoring, maintenance and protection from human 

intrusion for a specified period of time. 

Tank Farms 

Underground storage tanks at some Department of Energy facilities used to store liquid 

radioactive waste prior to vitrification. The liquid nuclear waste in tank storage exists in two 

forms, a sludge form and a salt form. The sludge form, while comprising only about 10% of the 

5 
207 

volume in the tanks, contains about half of the radioactivity. The salt form readily dissolves in 

water, comprises about 90% of the volume and contains the balance of the radioactivity 

Transuranic Waste (TRU) 

Waste material contaminated with U-233 (and its daughter products), certain isotopes of 

plutonium and nuclides with an atomic number greater than 92 (uranium). It is produced 

primarily from reprocessing spent fuel and from use of plutonium in fabrication of nuclear 

weapons. 

Vitrification 

The conversion of high-level waste into a glassy or non-crystalline solid for subsequent disposal. 

Volume Reduction 

Various methods of waste treatment, such as evaporation for liquids or compaction for solids, 

aimed at reducing the volume of waste. 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - known as WIPP - in New Mexico is the world's first 

underground repository licensed to safely and permanently dispose of transuranic radioactive 

waste left from the research and production of nuclear weapons. 

Yucca Mountain 

Yucca Mountain is located in a remote desert on federally protected land within the secure 

boundaries of the Nevada Test Site in Nye County, Nevada. It is approximately 90 miles 

northwest of Las Vegas. The U. S. Department of Energy began studying Yucca Mountain in 

1978 to determine whether it would be suitable for the nation's first long-term geologic 

repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Currently stored at 121 sites 

around the nation, these materials are a result of nuclear power generation and national 

defense programs. 

6 
208 

LETTER FROM DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PERTAINING TO

YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY LICENSE APPLICATION
209 

2 

The complete LA iTIcludes the following documents: 

• General Infonnation. 

• Safety Analysis.Report (8AR) - the SAR, while not containing any classified infonnation, 

contalns certain infonnation that the DOE has detennined to be Official Use Only (OUO) 

information. Such information IS exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of· 

Information Act and 10 C.F.R. § 2.390 and is appropriately marked. DOE has segregated 

those pages of the 8AR containing OUO information into Appendix A of the SAR, which has 

been printed as • separate volume, and requests that such infol1llation be withheld from public 

disclosure. 

• Naval Nuclear Propulsion Progr!lIl1 (NNPP) Technical Support Document (TSD), which DOE 

is transmitting under separ.te cover (classified: 214 pages). 

Becausc the NNPP TSD contains classified information related to !)aval fuel, the DOE has 

separated this part of the LA-from the unclassified 8AR in accordance with 10 C.F.R.·§ 6321(a). 

The DOE is submitting the NNPP TSD concurrently with the unclassified LA, but under separate 

cover along with a r~quest to withhold from public disclosure pursuant to 10 C.P.R. § 2.390. 

Pmsuant to Section 1I4(f) of the Nuclear Waste PolicyAct, as amended, and 10 C.P.R. 

Part 63.22; accompanying the LA in this submittal is the DOE's FifU/1 Environmental Impact 

Statement for a GeolOgic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 

Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada (FElS) (February 2002) (Enclosure 

2). DOE will submit under separate cover the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent NucieGJ' Fuel and High-Level 

Radioactive Waste al Yucca Mountain, Nye County. Nevada (Repository SEIS), which currently 

is in the processofbeing.fmalized and is expected to be available on or before )une 30, 2008. 

Because thc Repository SEIS incorporates by reference portions of the Final Supplemental 

Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear 

Fuel and High-Level Radioai:tive Waste at Yucca Mountain,Nye County, Nevad£J - N~vada Rail 

TriInsportation Corridor (Rail Corridor SEIS) and the Final Environmental Impact Statement for 

a Rail Alignment for the Construclion and Operation of a Railroad in Nevada to a Geologie 

Repository ai Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevad£J (Rail Aligrunent EIS), DOE will also 

provide copies of those documents to the NRC for infonnation at the same time it provides the 

Repository SEIS. . 

On October 19,2007, DOE certified to the Pre-License ApplicatioJJ Presiding Officer (PAPO) 

Board compliance v.oth the Licensing Support Network (LSN) requirements pursuant to . 

10 C,P.R. § 2. I 009(b). Today, DOE is updating its certification with the PAPO Board pursuant 

to 10 C.F.R. § 2.1009(b). DOE is providing a hard copy ofits updated certification to the NRC 

under separate cover, in compliance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.ioi2(a). 

_As required by 10 C.P.R. § 63.22(d),the DOE is also making paper and electronic copies of the 

public version of the LA available at appropriate locations near the proposed geologic repository 

operations area. Those loc.tions are identified in Enclosure 3. DOE will make paper and 
210 

electronic copies of the Repository SEIS, the Rail Corridor SEIS, and the Rail Alignment EIS 

available for public inspection at these Same locations. The public version of the LA has also 

been included in DOE's LSN·collection. 

Finally, for informational purposes, the DOE is also' submitting as an enclosure In this letter, but 

not part of the LA, the following; copies of primary reference documents in electronic format 

(Enclosure 4); and Ii matrix cross-referencing sections of the SAR to 10 C.F.R. Part 63 and 

NUREG·1804 (Enclosure 5). A listing o[the electronic files in this submittal is provided as 

Enclosure 6. 

If you have iIjIy questions regarding your review and acceptance of this application, please 

contact William J. Boyle, Director, Regulatory Authority Office, Office of Civilian Radioactive 

Wasre Management, or e-mail > • 

6 Enclosures: 

Sincerely, 

Edward F. Sproat, IJI, Director 

Office of Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management· 

~ucca Mountain Repository License Application . 

(3 originals and 31 copies in paper; 34 DVDs marked "Official Use Only" (OUO) containing 

all three components belo;'" (to be withheld from public release); I D:VD marked "For 

Public Release" containing the General Information and non-OUO portions oflbe Safety 

Analysis Report, but omitting the OUO Appendix. A oflbe Safety Analysis Report) 

a. General Information 

b. Safety Analysis Report (non-OUO volumes) 

c. Safely Analysis Report Appendix A (OUO volume) 

2. FEIS (33 copies - paper and e1e-"Ironic) 

3. Locations of LA for Public Availability 

4. Primary Reference Documents (34 sets of2 DVDs marked "Official Use Only" containing 

some references to·be withheld from public release and I set of2 DVDs marked "for 

PubliC Release" containing Ibose references except ihose considered OUO, which are 

omitted) 

5. Yucca Mountain Review Plan Cross Reference Matrix (34 CDs) 

6. Listing of electronic files provided on enclosed DVDs 'and CDs 
211 

cc: 

A. C. Eitrei(D, NRC, Rockville, MD 

1. E. Kokajko, l'<'RC, Rockville, MD 

J. D. Parrott, NRC, Las Vegas, NY 

D. B. Spitzberg, NRC, Arlington, TX 

Rosemary Ryan, CNWRA, Rockville, MD 

Mike Simpson, CNWRA, San Antonio, TX 

ce: With enclosures (except Enclosure l(c»: 

Tbe Honorable James A. Gibbons, Office of the Governor, Carson City, NV 

R. R. Loux, State of Nevada , Carson City, NY 

Nevada State Legis;lil~, Slate of Nevada, CarSQll City, NY 

Alan Kalt, Churchill County, Fallon, I\'V . 

Irene Navis, Clark County, Las Vegas, NY 

Ed Mueller, Esmeralda County, Goldfidd, NY 

Ron Damele, Eureka County, Eureka, NY 

Jim Bilyeu, Inyo County, Independence, (})\ 

Chuck Chapin, Laoder County, Battle MounJain, NY Wade Poulsen, Lincoln County, Pioche, NV 

Linda Mathias, Mineral County, Hawthorne, NY 

Darrell Lacy, Nye County, Pahrump,1'N 

Joe Kennedy, Tirnbisha Shoshone Tribe, Death Valley, CA 

Clinton Eldridge, White Pine County, Ely, I\-v 

W. D. Barnard, NWTRB, Arlington, VA 

4 
212 

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213 

‘‘FEDERAL REPORT: NUCLEAR WASTE: CAN NEVADA KEEP AMERICA’S

SIZZLING NUCLEAR WASTE OUT OF ITS BACKYARD?’’ 

Governing Magazine, April 1990 
214 

For U.S. Representative James Bilbray of Nevada, the cold truth came 

in a whispered acknowledgment outside a congressional committee room 

in December 1987. 

A freshman Democrat from Las Vegas, he was a former state legislator 

and the son of a county assessor. Savvy about the ways oflocal 

politics, he was still cautiously feeling his way through the halls of 

the Capitol. 

A Senate-House conference committee was about tc convene to take up a 

massive budget bill. Included among its many proviSions werc 

amendmcnts to the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Three states, Nevada, 

Texas and Washington, were under consideration for the nuclear waste 

dump. All three had 10 bbled furiously against being chosen. 

The version approved by the Senate came close to excluding any state 

but Nevada from consideration, but it did not designate Nevada by 

name. That gave Bilbray some encouragement to continue the fight.. So 

did the conversations he had had earlier with powerful House 

Democrats, including Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley of Washington, 

Whip Tony Coelho of California and Energy Committee Chairman John D. 

Dingell of Michigan. 

"They were reassuring me all along that no matter how it looked, 

everything would come out in the wash," he recalls. But he knew 

something was up when a conference committee member pulled him aside 

before the committee session began. 

"Listen," the man murmured. "1 hope you understand what is going 

on here. There are three sites under review--Texas, Nevada and 

Washington. And the speaker [of the House, Jim Wright] is a Texan and 

the majority leader [Tom Foley] is a Washingtonian." He noted the 

weak status of the small Nevada delegation. Three of the four Were in 

their first terms. Furtbennore, none served on thc conference 

committee. 

"1 hope you understand," he concluded. "It is no! going to 

Washington. And it is not going to Texas." It was a lesson in power 

politics that Bilbray would not soon forget. 

With a speed that surprised even Senate conferees, the House 

conferees proposed accepting most of the Senate language and taking it 

a step further. The Nevada site would be chosen by name, and the other 

two potential sites that had been recommended by the U.S. Department 

of Energy, Deaf Smith County, Texas, and the Hanford Site in 

Washington, would be dropped. 

Bilbray stalked from the room. "Nevada was treated very shabbily, 

and our delegation was treated very shabbily," he recalls bitterly. 

"1 resent it to this day." 

Even Representative Al Swift, a Washington Democrat who served on the 

conference committee and whose state was protected by the choice of 

Nevada, recoiled from the naked power play. 

"What you are watching is an exercise in pure politics/! he told a 
215 

reporter when the committee adjourned. "I am participating in a 

nonscientific process~-sticlcing it to Nevada This is as bad a case as 

I have seen in 10 years" in Congress. 

The bill that passed directed the Department of Energy to make a 

scientific study of Yucca Mountain, a block of federally owned land 

100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, to determine its safety as the dump 

site. 

Today, in Nevada, politicians, newspaper editorial vvriters and 

ordinary citizens all call what came out of that conference committee 

"The Screw Nevada BilL" The anger embedded in the words speaks to a 

sense of vvrong that does not focus on the site's scientific 

suitability. Few argue that Yucca Mountain should not be considered, 

although it is an area of potential volcanic and earthquake activity 

and some believe that explosions from the underground nuclear test 

site nearby could shake the deep rock caverns where waste would be 

stored. But it is also far from population centers, high above the 

water table and settled on volcanic rock. The nearest surface water is 

30 miles away. Other sites in rock and salt formations would appear 

equally suitable in the absence of detailed investigation .. 

Nor do Nevadans deny that conducting the scientific study at only one 

site rather than three, as envisioned in the 1982 legislation, would 

save money. It win cost an estimated $2 billion to make the necessary 

tests of rock stability, hydrology and other factors collectively 

knO\V11 as "characterization" of the site. The purpose of 

investigating multiple sites, they argue, should be to find the best 

site--not the best site in the politically weakest state at the 

cheapest price. 

The determination ofN evadans to fight back built slowly against an 

initial sense of inevitability. A 1987 poll by the University of 

Nevada showed that while only 24 percent of Nevadans believed their 

state was the safest place to store the waste, 89 percent thought it 

likely or very likely that the federal government would have its way. 

Some key politicians had committed themselves to the fight even 

before Congress officially designated Nevada as the only site. 

Governor Richard Bryan, a Democrat, was one. Another was former 

Governor Grant Sawyer, likewise a Democrat, who went before the Senate 

Energy and Natural Resources Committee early in 1987 to argue against 

Nevada's selection and was stung by the disdain that he felt from the 

committee. He had expected courtesy, at the least, especially from two 

other former governors on the committee, Republicans Mark O. Hatfield 

of Oregon and Daniel J. Evans of Washington. 

"I came away with the feeling that the fix was absolutely in," he 

recalls. Louisiana Senator Bennett Johnston's brusque remark that 

Nevada "is not a pristine national park" was especially galling. 

Johnston, a Democrat, was the committee chairman. Evans and Hatfield, 
216 

maneuvering to prevent the dump from being drilled into the basalt 

rock of the Hanford Site near the Columbia River, were no better. 

, 'That is when I adopted the policy that... we had to be militant in 

our opposition at every tum," Sawyer says. "Our only solution is to 

become such a pain that it will not be feasible to use Yucca 

Mountain." Sawyer returned to Nevada detennined to rally opposition 

and work with Bryan, who since 1983 had laid his political reputation 

on the line as the dump's harshest opponent. 

But the legislature, as well as the public, had to be turned around 

on the issue. Two earlier efforts, in 1985 and 1987, to get 

resolutions passed opposing the dump had died in committee. 

Then, a prank further undercut the anti-dump forces. As the 

legislature rushed to adjournment in mid-1987, it approved a bill 

carving out the desolate Yucca Mountain site from Nye County and 

declaring the creation of Bullfrog County. The new entity was to 

include neither courthouse nor jail--nor citizens. The county seat was 

placed 250 miles away in Carson City, the state capital. 

The basic purpose behind the legislation was simply to find a way to 

impose a higher tax rate on the dump site than on the rest ofNye 

County, thus reaping some economic benefits for the state. But the 

bill sent a peculiar, jokey message to Congress at a critical time in 

the 1987 deliberations: Even if Nevada opposed the dump, it was still 

prepared to accept it and cut the best deal it could. Bryan signed the 

bill and later regretted it. Although the measure was subsequently 

found to violate the state constitution, the damage had been done. 

It took a political campaign to galvanize opposition across the 

state. In 1988, Bryan challenged first-term Republican Senator Chic 

Hecht for the Senate, contrasting his 0\\,11 fight· against the dump as 

governor with Hecht's weak performance on the Senate Energy Committee 

where the 1987 amendments were drafted. 

The approach "hit a raw nerve," says Attorney General Brian McKay, 

a Republican. "When in 30-second sound bites you say that your 

children will grow up glowing in the clark, you have a very powerful 

political issue." When the Nevada legislature met the following year. 

no one could doubt that the political atmosphere had changed. A bilI 

creating a commission to negotiate with the federal govemment--which 

suggested that Nevadans were willing to take the dump if the price was 

right--went down overwhelmingly. After that, legislation prohibiting 

the storage of high-level radioactive waste in the state passed 

easily, along \:vith two resolutions declaring state opposition to the· 

dmnp. 

The oPPQnents now had the legal tools they needed, in Sawyer's words, 

to show Congress that' 'we are just too much of a problem for them, 

and they had better find another sucker someplace." 

In order to "characterize" the site, the U.S. Department of Energy 

must dig into the mountain, studying it from every conceivable angle. 
217 

Two l,200-foot vertical shafts 12 feet in diameter need to be drilled, 

along with about 300 other holes. 

To proceed, the Energy Department requires permits from the state: a 

surface disturbance permit to move dirt around, a pennit from the 

state Division of Environmental Protection to use chemical tracers in 

the groundwater and water rights from the Nevada state water engineer 

to conduct site characterization. 

At Bryan's direction, the state delayed issuirig the permits when the 

Energy Department requested them in 1988. And with the passage of the 

two resolutions, Governor Bob Miller--the Democrat who replaced Bryan 

when he was elected to the Senate later that yearN-believed that he 

had his legal basis for blocking the characterization. 

The hardline view against granting even minor permits was bolstered 

by an official opinion from Attorney General McKay. He said the 

legislative resolutions constituted a veto of the site. Under the 

tenns of the 1987 amendments, a state chosen to become the dump site 

may veto the decision and Congress has only 90 days to overturn the 

veto. Since Congress did not act, McKay declared that the veto had 

taken effect and that the Energy Department could not legally proceed 

with the dump. Miller promptly instructed his agencies to box up the 

pennit requests and send them back to the Department of Energy. 

Then, last November, events took an unexpected tum. Energy Secretary 

James D. Watkins announced that he had lost confidence in the work 

that had been done at Yucca Mountain by his ovm department's people. 

Nothing except some surface work would be done until the whole program 

was restructured. This would delay the projected opening of the site, 

which was originally set for 1998 and subsequently postponed to 2003, 

to 2010. 

No one argues that Nevada's resistance was the only factor that 

prompted WatkIDs 10 start over. Independent scientists and staff at 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--which must ultimately license the 

repository--had already criticized the Energy Department's work on the 

site. \Vhat is more, Watkins had repeatedly, publicly and in blunt 

terms expressed contempt for the past management of his department. 

The sloppy, secretive management "culture," which he said penneated 

the department's nuclear bomb plants, may also have colored his view 

of its management at Yucca Mountain. 

But Admiral Watkins, a fonner commander of nuclear ships, is also a 

strong advocate of commercial uses of nuclear energy and, furthermore, 

he knew he had a directive from Congress to do the work that would 

result in designation of a dump site. He had to get the testing done, 

whatever Nevada's objections. 

On January 25, he took action to force Nevada to give his people the 

necessary pennits. The department filed suit in U.S. District Court in 

Nevada, arguing that the state's veto was premature and invalid, since 

Yucca MountaID has not been recommended by the president to become the 
218 

site but is only being studied. 

Nevada, meanwhile, had launched a vigorous counterattack with its ovm 

lawsuits challenging many different aspects of what Wasbington had 

done. The most important of these, following the opinion of Attorney 

General McKay, argues that the legislative resolutions do constitute a 

veto of the site and that the deadline for Congress to override the 

state's ban has irrevocably passed. 

Lawyers and constitutional experts generally agree that the standoff 

between Nevada and the federal government raises crucial issues of 

state-federal relations. 

Should a state's political weakness in Congress be a factor in a 

siting decision? Does creation of a dump to store commercial waste lie 

within the powers of the federal government enumerated in the 

Constitution? And is the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which 

affirms the primacy of federal laws, applicable to a decision that 

could affect the health and welfare of a state's citizens, 

particularly if the state has been placed at a disadvantage compared 

with others? 

"We are not discussing a normal usage ofland," says Governor 

Miller. "We are discussing a usage that could have severe health and 

welfare effects on the people nearby." 

But many constitutional experts believe N evada's case will be tough, 

to argue. 

"I would have to say it is uphill for Nevada,'! says University of 

Virginia law professor A.E. Dick Howard. The Supreme Court; he notes, 

has been deferential to Congress in deciding what is included in its 

enumerated powers. But Howard suggests that an argument might be found 

in the lOth Amendment, which reserves to the states or the people 

powers not granted the federal government. The argument would be that 

states have certain intrinsic powers; if Nevada could show that 

Congress followed a flawed process in choosing the site, it could 

argue that these essential powers were violated .. 

Others disagree. "I don't know of any constitutional grounds on 

which Congress would be blocked from enacting this legislation," says 

Frederick R Anderson, who teaches environmental and constitutional 

law at American University. "There might be some infIrmity in the 

statute. But in principle, Congress should be able to direct that 

federal land be used for a site.!l Still others suggest that the 

federal government, by attempting to push a site on an unwilling state 

through a naked power play, may already have lost the upper hand. 

Roger E. Kasperson, as director of the Center for Technology, 

Environment and Development at Clark University, has watched the 

repository issue for almost 20 years. The question, he believes, is 

not whether the federal government has the legal right to build the 

repository where it wishes, but whether it realistically can do so. 

"A competent attorney general in a state, backed by an unhappy 
219 

legislature, probably has the capacity to give endless grief to an 

attempt at federal supremacy,1l he says. "I think the arrogance and 

the disregard that went into the whole process was terrible .... The 

statement was that we are going to do this to· you, and can you resist 

it? Now they are getting the answer." 

Prevailing in court may be only one of the possible ways Nevada could 

win; the state is well aware of the advantages of delay .. 

Increasingly, scientists are asking whether building a repository, at 

an estimated cost of $25 billion, is wise or even feasible. Geologic 

conditions can change drastically over 10,000 years, possibly making 

the effort futile. Many argue that it would be best to drop the 

repository idea and instead entomb the waste above ground on site or 

in a central location until the next century. By that time, techniques 

to reprocess waste or render it harmless may have been developed. 

Nevada's protests--its recalcitrance and its legal and legislative 

maneuvers--could force that option, or at least force delay until it 

becomes widely accepted. 

Says Governor Miller, "lfwe continue to delay and costs mount, the 

nuclear power industry will reconsider its solution. We are looking to 

resolve for 10,000 years a problem that technicians have considered 

for only 50 years. Every day they delay, Nevada looks worse.1! 

Copyright 1990, Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Reproduction in any form 

Mthout the written pennission of the publisher is prohibited. 

Governing, City & State and Governing.com are registered trademarks of 

Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 

http://governing.com 
220 

TESTIMONY OF MARTIN G. MALSCH, 

SPECIAL DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA
221 

under the 1982 NWPA; the 1987 NWPA amendments; and current NRC legal proceedings associated 

with the filing of DOE's license application. 

In the 19605 a clamor arose over the potential that high-level radioactive wastes would leak 

from Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) storage facilities located at the National Reactor Testing Station 

in Idaho, the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and the Hanford Site in Washington. As a result, the 

AEC promised Idaho Senator Church that the Idaho wastes would be transferred out of Idaho to a 

permanent geologic repository by the end ofthe 1970s. The AEC pinned its hopes on an abandoned salt 

mine in Lyons, Kansas, However, ratherthan taking the time to complete necessary scientific 

investigations, the AEC offered disputable safety conclusions and pressed ahead. Ultimately, the Lyons, 

Kansas site proved to be unsuitable. The AEC also bungled the political aspects of the debate. It knew 

that State and local support was essential, but it lostthat support when it failed to give any credence to 

the legitimate concerns of Kansas experts and it effectively committed to the project before the 

scientific studies were completed. 1 

Two lessons may be learned from Lyons, Kansas. The first is that the Federal Government 

should not commit or even appearto commit to a repository site unless the necessary scientific 

investigations are completed and the legitimate safety concerns of State and local experts are addressed 

satisfactorily. The second is that State and local support is critical to success.' 

After Lyons, Kansas, failed, the AEC's successor agencies continued to investigate other possible 

repository sites and the Congress enacted the NWPA in 1982. In accordance with the NWPA, DOE 

selected five sites for more detailed stUdy (characterization): salt deposits in Mississippi, Texas, and 

l J. Samuel Walker, "The Road to Yucca Mountain," UniversIty of California Press, 2009 (Walker), at 50~51, 74w75. 

Mr. Walker was the NRC Historjan, and this book is the fjfth in a series of volumes on the history of nuclear 

regulation sponsor!;'d by the NRC. The book does not represent the official position of the NRC. 

~ Waiker at pp. 74-75 
222 

Utah; basalt formations in Hanford, Washington; and volcanic tuff rock in Nevada.' In perhaps a hint of 

what was to come, potential sites in louisiana were excluded based on a political side agreement 

between Louisiana Senator Johnston and the Secretary of DOE, known to Congress when the NWPA was 

enacted.' The NWPA then called upon ODE to narrow the choices to three, all three of which were to be 

fuliy characterized (studied) so that anyone failure would not prematurely destroy the whole repository 

program. 5 

In 1986, the DOE Secretary announced that the final three choices were the ones in Deaf Smith 

County, Texas; Yucca Mountain, Nevada; and Hanford, Washington. The designation prompted angry 

protests from aU three areas, whose representatives believed that the scientific investigations were not 

completed, and the protests became part of a nationwide movement when DOE cancelled the search for 

an eastern site, notwithstanding a dear informal agreement among NWPAsupporters that the second 

site called for by the NWPA would be located in an eastern State.' 

The program was now in shambles, program costs were increasing, and the nuclear power 

industry argued (incorrectlY, as it turned out) that the Nation faced CI spent fuel storage crisis that might 

require shutdown of nuclear power plants. Congress reacted by enacting the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 

Amendments Act of 1987. That Act directed DOE to limit its future site characterization and selection 

efforts to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, notwithstanding the advice from NRC (and others) that the scientific 

information was insufficient to make an informed safety conclusion about the suitability of the site.7 In 

'Walker at 181-182. 

4 The ;;lgreement was discussed during Senate debates on the enactment of the NWPA 128 Congo Rec. D485 

S41430, Aprii28, 1982. 

5 42 U.S.c. § 10132 (b) and 10133. 

6 Walker at 182, 

742 U.S.C.10172; prepared testimony of Robert Bernero, June 29, 1987, appearing in S. Rep. No. 100·152, lOOth 

Cong., 1;::' Se5s. at 194 ("At the Yucca Mountain site, the major issues include geologjcal concerns such as the 

presence of potentially active faults and related groi..lnd motion, the potential for volcanism, and the origin and 

significance of mineral veins in the area. Hydrology is also a concern in the saturated and unsaturated zones; 

groundwater flow patterns and regimes and travel times have yet to be fully determined. As at Hanford, the abHlty 

3 
223 

fact, the selection of the Yucca Mountain site was based on DOE's so-called jlMultiattribute Utility 

Analysis of Sites," which depended in important part on the assumption that little groundwater would 

move downward from the Mountain top and seep into the tunnels where the waste would be disposed 

of} and this assumption later proved to be false.s 

The NWPA Amendments Act of 1987 attempted to place the entire high-level waste disposal 

burden on one western state with no nuclear power plants or other hi~h-Jeve! waste generating 

facilities. The supporters of the NWPA Amendments Act of 1987 flagrantly ignDred both of the lessons 

learned from Lyons, Kansas. First, they effe!Aively committed the Nation to a single disposal site not 

only before the necessary scientific investigations were completed, but also before any final licenSing 

standards were in place.' Second, supporters ignored the objections of the host State, which believed 

(with good reason) that Nevada had been singled out simply because it was "the small kid on the 

block.,,10 

By 2001, DOE had spent about $4.5 billion characterizing the Yucca Mountain site, and its efforts 

establlshed that the site was more complex than originally thought and that (as indicated above) the 

underground environment was not as dry as Yucca proponents had expected. 1.1 But DOE pressed 

of the medium (tuff) to retard movement of ;-adionudides is not yet well understood." Mr. Bernero was the 

Deputy Director oft1e NRC Office in charge of evaluating the safety of ~ighMlevel waste disposal facilities. NRC did 

not object to studying (characterizing) Yucca Mountain further. 

S Compare the June 29, 1987 testimony of Donald L. Vieth, DOE Project Manager, Waste Management Project 

Office, Nevada Operations Office, appearing In S. Rep. NO.l00M152, looth Cong., 1

st 5ess. at 133, 138 "[LJitlle 

groundwater is expected to be available to dissolve and move the waste even if a waste canister is damaged," with 

DOE's June 2008 license application a~ 2.1-21 ("On average over all waste packages, the amount of seeping water 

is 1.2, 4.6, and 14.4 kg/yr per waste package forthe present-day, monsoor., and glacial-transition climate states, 

respectively," Tnere are 11,000 waste packages (ZOOS application at 1-10), so this means the total seepage ranges 

from 13,200 to 158,400 leg of wate .. per yea", Accordingly, DOE plans to install thousands of titanium alloy drip 

shields in -.:he tunnels lito divert seepage away from the waste packages." June 2008 license application tit 2-7, 

However, eventually the drip shield and waste packages are all degraded by corrosion.ld. 

S Final and complEtE NRC llcensing regulations were not in place until 2009. See 74 Fed. Reg. 10811 (March 13, 

2009). 

10 Walker at 182. 

11 Walker at 183. 

4 
224 

forward with Yucca Mountain much like its predecessor AEC pressed forward with Lyons, Kansas, In 

February 2002, DOE Secretary Abraham formally recommended the Yucca Mountain site to President 

Bush, notwithstanding the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's conciusion that DOE "has yet to 

make a convincing case that nuelearwaste can safely be buried at Yucca Mountain,,,n President Bush 

promptly agreed with Secretary Abraham and recommended the site to the Congress. Citing numerous 

scientific flaws, Nevada Governor Guinn formally disapproved of the site, using the state veto procedure 

set forth in the NWPA.13 Congress then formally overrode Nevada's veto by enacting H.J. Res. 87, The 

designation of Yucca Mountain as a repository site then became effective on July 23, 2002, when the 

President signed S.J, Res. 34 into law," 

The NWPA required DOE to file its license application within 90 days after the President's site 

recommendation became effective, or by October 21,2002. 15 October 21,2002 came, went, and 

receded into history without any application being filed. This was not a surprising development, given 

the scientific and engineering challenges DOE still faced when Nevada's veto was overridden, DOE also 

failed to plan adequately to meet NRC's pre-application discovery requirements." DOE's plan to file its 

application in 2004 (one of many such plans with progressively later filing dates) was aborted and the 

application was not filed and docketed by the NRC until September 8,2008, more than five years after 

the statutory deadline. 

1: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on S.J. Res. 34, May 23, 2001, at 157. 

The Board elaborated that DOE's safety case was only "weak to moderate." Id. The Board was established by 

Congress to advIse DOE on reposItory safety. Jts members were (and are) Clppointed by the President based on 

recommendations from the National Academy of Scl~nces. 42 U.S.c. §§ 10261-64. 

l;l Walker at 183. 

14 42 U,S,c. § 10135 note. 

15 42 U.s,C, § 10134(b), 

~6 U.s. Department of Energy (Hjgh~Level Waste Repository, Pre-Application Matters), LBP-04-20, 60 NRC 300 

12004), 
225 

The NRC then admitted over 300 contentions (formal objections to the application) as matters in 

controversy in the NRC Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding, more than in any other case in the history 

of NRC licensing." All of the technical contentions were supported by the equivalent of an expert report 

under F. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(2)(8) and, accordingly, the NRC found that each of them presented a "genuine 

dispute" supported by "facts Dr expert opinions."" DOE faced other serious obstacles. For example. at 

the time DOE's motion to withdraw its license application was filed on March 3, 2010, no significant 

progress had been made on funding or constructing the enormously expensive rail line that would be 

necessary to transport high-level nuclear waste through Nevada to the site in the safest manner. 

Construction and operation of a repository would require the appropriation of waterresources owned 

by the public and administrated by the State of Nevada, and the State vigorously opposed the granting 

ofthe necessary State water use permits. A disinterested observer would reasonably conclude that a 

repository at Yucca Mountain would probably never be built and operated, even if the necessary NRC 

licenses were granted. 

In the meantime, the near crisis atmosphere that permeated the Congressional debates over 

the original NWPA has completely dissipated. In 1982, NRC licensees and the Congress were gravely 

concerned that nuclear power plants would shut down because ofa lack of adequate storage space for 

spent reactor fuel that was piling up in storage pools pending disposal." When DOE moved to withdraw 

its application twenty eight years later, more than 50 independent spent fuel storage installations across 

the United States stored more than 45,000 spent fuel assemblies and greater-than-{;Iass C waste in 

17 See U.s. Department of Energy (High Level Waste RepOSitory), CU-09-14,_ NRC _ (2009). 

1810 C.F.R. § 2309 (l)(l)(v) and (vi). 

19 See NWPA section l11(a)(Z}, 42 U.s.c. § l0131(a)(2}. Senator Alan Simpson, a key supporter 01 the NWPA, 

declared in 1982 that U[w]eJre about to bring the nuclear industry to its knees unless we act now." Walker at 176. 

6 
226 

more than 1,200 dry storage casks." The NRC opined that such dry storage would be safe for at least 

100 years and is evaluating whether it may be safe for 300 years." 

Loss of Program Credibility 

The original Act sought to assure the extent possible that potential repository sites would be 

identified and evaluated based on objective technical and scientific criteria. It also sought fairness and 

redundancy by requiring mUltiple sites from which to choose ultimate locations for repositories, and it 

strove for regional equity by setting up site selection programs for two facilities - one in the west and 

one in the east. In 1987, Congress scrapped both the multi-site process and the concept of regional 

equity that were the cornerstones ofthe 1982 law. It directed that all repository development efforts 

focus on just one site in Nevada, notwithstanding the incompleteness of the scientific information and 

the fact that spent reactorfuel and high-level waste from every region of the Country would be sent to a 

single western State with no nuclear power plants or high-level radioactive waste generating facilities. 

The 1987 amendments lead to a devastating loss of trust in the overall program and ever 

increasing opposition on the part ofthe State of Nevada and its citizens. Further actions by DOE, EPA, 

and NRCthen further undermined the credibility of the program. Prior to 1987, DOE's focus - while 

certainly not without problems - W2S essentially on identifying safe and suitable sites Tor a repository. 

The question that gulded investigations at each of the candidate sites was, "!s this site suitable for 

development as a repository?i' 

After 1987, that changed drastically. Now there was only one possible site, and the focus 

changed to efforts to vindicate Congress' choice. Inevitably, as more and more dollars were spent, it 

became progressively more important to avoid admitting that the selection of Yucca Mountain had been 

20 NRC "Plan for Integrating Spent Nuclear Fuel Regulatory Activities;' Revision 00, June 21, 2010, at C-1. 

2:. Supra note 20 and COMSECY-IO-1007, Enclosure 1 at 10. 

7 
227 

a mistake. Technical problems, even site conditions previously considered to be disqualifying, became 

obstacles to be overcome by ever-more-exotic engineering fixes, some designed to protect the waste 

from adverse conditions in the mountain, contrary to the original concept that site geology would 

protect man and the environment from the waste. When it appeared likely that the Yucca Mountain 

site could not satisfy certain NRC licensing requirements designed to achieve safety defense-in·depth, 

NRC eliminated the requirements. And, when DOE safety analyses showing that releases of radioactive 

materials in groundwater would result in doses in excess of EPA safety standards after 10,000 years, EPA 

and NRC unlawfully declared that releases after 10,000 years would not count in determining 

compliance. All of these actions, by Congress and then by DOE, EPA, and NRC, utterly destroyed the 

credibility of the program. 

Opposition to the Yucca Mountain project in Nevada was not always a given. Early on while the 

NWPA of 1982 was being put together and immediately subsequent to its passage, Nevada, while 

skeptical of DOE's ability to implement a scientifically credible site screening process,essentially took a 

wait-and-see approach. In 1986, the first chairman of the Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects, 

former Governor Grant Sawyer, laid down the criteria .by which the state would judge DOE: 

" ... [A} nuclear waste repository should not be built until it can be shown, beyond the shadow oj 

a doubt that the facility can, in fact ... isolate radioactive materials from the biosphere for more 

than 10,000 years - and that ... such a repository will be benign in its effects upon the people, the 

environment and the economy of the state or region within which it would be Ioeated." 

When DOE and Congress abandoned the site selection process ofthe original Act in 1987, things 

changed drastically. Public opinion, which until then had been mixed with regard to Yucca Mountain, 

solidified into strong, across-the-board opposition. In biannual surveys done between 1989 and 2010, 

opposition to the project has remained constant at between 63% and over 70%. 

8 
228 

While there has been and continues to be some local government support for the project in 

small rural counties surrounding the site (although according to survey data, that support is by no 

means overwhelming or shared by a/l residents), such support should not be extrapolated to the wider 

Nevada population. Nevada's population is roughly 2.6 million, with over 1.8 million in Clark County 

and the greater Las Vegas area. By contrast Nye County; where Yucca Mountain is located, has less than 

45,000 people. Taken together, the six counties sometimes cited as evincing some level of support for 

DOE's program comprise only a tiny fraction of the overall State citizenry. 

In 2002, the State of Nevada carefully evaluated the effects a prospective Yucca repository 

would have on the State and its communities and economl2

. That report documents the potential, 

among other things, for major economic consequences arising out of the Yucca project; including 

significant risks to Nevada's unique tourism-based economy, property value losses due to the 

transportation of spent fuel and high-level waste through the state, as weI! as disastrous consequences 

in the event of accidents or incidents of terrorism related to waste being s hipped to the facility. The 

report concluded: 

UGiven the unique reliance of the Nevada economy on the Stotel's ability to attract tens of 

millions of tourists and visitors annually, any impacts that reduce the number of visitors, 

especially to southern Nevada, would have major consequences for the Statel's economy. 

Consequently, the most serious and possibly catastrophic economic risk for Nevada stemming 

directly from the Yucca Mountain project;s the potential for stigma impacts on the tourist and 

visitor industry. Such impacts would produce significant losses to an economy dominated by 

visitor~based revenues." 

22 A Mountain ofTrollble A Nation at Risk: Report on Impacts of the Proposed Yucca Mountain High~Leve! NucL~~ 

Waste Program (February 2002) Ref. http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/yucca/impactreport.pdf 
229 

This broad perspective on how the project would affect the State provides a critical basis for the 

State of Nevada's determined opposition to locating a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. 

The GAO Report, "Effects of a Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons 

Learned," and the Situation Today 

In its recent report, GAO report states that DOE's decision to seek withdrawal ofthe Yucca 

Mountain license application was made for non-safety reasons. However, GAO made no systematic 

effort to evaluate the many safety problems that remain unresolved. These problems go to the heart of 

Yucca Mountain's suitability as a repository and Nevada's opposition to it. They include: 

the rapid movement of water within the subsurface and fast radioactive waste pathways to the 

accessible environment; 

the likelihood of major waste package corrosion; 

the unstable and highly fractured nature of the host rock and the problems that causes for 

safety analyses, waste isolation, retrieval, the installation of engineered barriers; and 

the risk of volcanic eruptions below and then through the repository that would disperse 

radioactive materials to the environment 

Accordingly, from Nevada's perspective, DOE's decision to seek a withdrawal ofthe license application 

avoided both significant safety problems and further wasting of taxpayer and ratepayer dollars on a 

flawed and hopeless project. 

Some Lessons Learned 

10 
230 

In its 2010 report to the Nevada Governor and Legislature", the Nevada Commission on Nuclear 

Projects identified some of the key findings and lessons to be learned from the Yucca Mountain 

experience. The findings indude: 

While Yucca Mountain failed for many reasons, a critical element was unquestionably the forced 

nature of the site selection process. 

If DDE had been required to obtain the State's informed consent to continue with the project, 

Yucca Mountain would have been disqualified years eariier, and billions of dollars and years of 

effort would have been saved. 

Yucca Mountain was an extremely poor site from the beginning. 

DDE was probably the wrong entity to implement the federal high-level radioactive waste 

program and placing the program within DDE may have doomed it from the start. 

The lessons learned indude: 

A successful repository facility siting program must be premised on the fully informed consent of 

the host state, tribe (if applicable) and local community. 

Any future siting effort must be based on and motivated by irrefutably sound science. 

A scientifically credible repository Siting process must have as its foundation objective and 

rigorous criteria against which the geotechnical suitability of a site would be evaluated. 

The criteria must be established in advance olthe siting effort and not structured so as to apply 

only to specific sites. The application olthe criteria to candidate sites m"st be objective and 

above reproach, and criteria cannot be changed based on conditions found when studying or 

characterizing various sites. 

Conclusion 

2S Report of the Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects to the Governor and Legislature of the State of Nevada 

(December 2010) Ref. htto;Uwww.state.nv.us/nucw2ste/newsZOl1/pdf/comm2010summaN. pdf 

11 
231 

It is sometimes difficult to terminate a Federal project when large amounts of money have been 

spent. But there is no sense in adding good money after bad. What's done is done and we should look 

to the future for better solutions, guided by the lessons of Lyons Kansas and Yucca Mountain, and the 

recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. DOE's finding that 

Yucca is unworkable, the decision to seek withdrawal of the license application, and the establishment 

of the Blue Ribbon Commission to look for alternatives for the management and storage of spent 

nuelearluel, were the right things to do. They have the potential to put the Country on a path to a 

safer, more cost-effective and expeditious solution to managing spent fuel and high-level waste. 

A key lesson to be learned from Nevada's experience with DOE and the Yucca program is that the 

Federal Government cannot seek to force a geologic repOSitory on an unwilling state based on 

incomplete information, press forward with the repository in the face of growing scientific difficulties, 

and still expect the effort to be successful. At the least, there must be a steadfast and unwavering 

commitment to scientific credibility, openness and transparency, and a Willingness to allow the science 

to take its course and let the chips fall where they may. 

Thank you forthe opportunity to address the Subcommittee today. I would be happy to answer any 

questions. 

12 
232 

‘‘NUCLEAR WASTE PROGRAM FACES POLITICAL BURIAL’’ 

Science, 22 August 1986 
233 

Æ 

DO light on the rnnking of western sires.. 

Meanwhile, according to me Gene.ral &.-

counting Office, 19 lawsuits have Ixm filed 

against: the nudea.r waste prognun., many 

broughr by stare govcrnmems. One of the 

marc .'Iignificant, Tenne;ttee v. Hentsgwn, 

seeks ro prevent DOE from ~ending a proposal ro Congress on a wastc-haruiling site 

knDwn as me monitored retrievable storage 

(MRS) center. DOE has proposed three 

sites for MRS, all in Tennessee. MRS would 

serve as a wane p~g, packaging, and 

transfer point. Ir is also att:ractive to DOE 

planners because it could ston: up to 15,000 

metric tons of 1V"aSte pending completion of 

rht repository. And, because irisin t:heEast, 

it lends a me3.'lure of regional balance. But 

Trnnc:sseearu; are sh-arply divided on in merits. The state's Jegal action thus far has 

prevented DOE from sending an MR.S proposal to Congress. 

AI> wc:stern politicians threaten to halt the 

program to restOre regional balance, enviIDrnncrlW and antinuclear groups have 

moved in as well. calling for a moratorium 

'This fueled the recent proposals to cur: all 

site-specific research ar DOE. 

However, me origins of this trouble lie in 

decisions raken earlier, back in the w1nR'T 

when DOE firsr released a list of possible 

waste sites in the .East. The seven states DOE named on 16 January as having cryslIine rock (granite) suitable for a second 

"pository were Georgia, Maine (two sires), 

Minnesota (three sites), New Hampshire" 

North Carolina (;;wo sites), Virg:inl2 (two 

mw), ond W~ronsin. Although the p= 

of choosing an eastern site had reccived.little 

anenrion until men, as one activist said, 

~::n they finally put the pins in the map, 

the inreosity of the response rook everyooe 

by surprise." DOE collecrcd 60,000 commenrs, most of them negative. 

The Governor of Maine, Joseph Brennan 

(D), who had said little on the subject, 

snddenly found himself at the head of a 

furious local prorest. He cune out strongly 

agai.nst DOE's selections. The Governor of 

me granire SIare of New Hampshire, engineer John Swtunu (R), described by press 

secrerary Frank Haley as "not om: who aCtl 

on rnlOtion,'" traveled to Washingmn in 

J mua!)' to argue his case "'strictly on me 

fam.'" Sununu argued thar a second repository was not needed and that, in any case, 

the granite in New Hampshire is too p0-

rous. A Republican candidate in a close race 

for a Senate seat in North Carolina, Representative James Broyhill., also sent dist:rcM 

signals to DOE, 

Lo~ obtained by Markey show that 

DOE's nuclear waste officials had 32 meetings or phone conversations with distraught 

easrem sen::tton;, congn-s.')men, governors., 

8,6 

and their srafiS betwttn 15 January and 28 

M.y 1986. 

A small campaign orchemated by Cooper 

Brown, an attorney at: the finn of Baron & 

Budd in Washington, D.C., illUSttate:5 bow 

wme of these protests made an impact. 

A group in Sebago Lakes., Maioe, known 

as Cirizem Against Nuclear Trash. (CAm) 

hired Brown in February . .After co.nsulting 

with Brown, CANT chairperson Boonie 

Titl:omb and other mcrnbc:rs of the group arnnged to meet Vice Pmlidenr George 

Bwb on 22 April when he was 1n Maine fur 

a fund raiser. Bush met: with them, lincm:d, 

and invited. them to sec.his staff in Washing· 

toll. In mid·May, Tit:comb and Brown mer 

with vir;e·presidt:ntial aide Ldtmann Li at 

me Old Exerurive Office Building on Penn· 

sylvania AVl:JUle. 

"Baore January, most people in Maine 

had DO knowledge of what DOE was proMom. Udall. It will "'" • milihty effort tv pNt this program. badt togaher. 

~," said Titronlb. They were snod:ed 

to learn that Sebago Lakes was on me list of 

proposed disposal sites. Tiroomb argues mat DOE's process was fI.:twed. 0[1 tttho.icat grouruis, citing the mer thar an aquifcthrough Sebago provides drinking water for 

200,000 people. ""We have people in Maine 

who are willing to die to keep DOE out of 

here," she said.. mat:ing it dear that she 

'P"k< lir_y. 

According to Brown, if DOE had persist. 

ed with its plans for Maine and New Hampshire, "':it would have been very difficuJr for 

any Republican candidatt a.ssociated with 

this Adminisrrarion [to win] in the upc0ming presidential primaries. The Bush people 

saw the handwriting on the ~ and saw 

that somerhing had to be done.'" 

BIUWlJ ccmtinued; 1 poiutt:d Out to Li 

thar we wen: looking for help from the 

Whire House to go ro DOE and point OUt 

tbar they were off cmrtt." He asked Li to 

persuade the DOE to «suspend the proa:ss 

and go back and start: all O".'er.'" Brown said 

ir would be poliric:illy difficu1r to rescue 

Maine and New Hampsbire alone, so be 

suggested to Li that ir "would make. more 

political scrJSe if DOE would drop tbe 

whole second round [of eastern site sekc· 

cion]." 

A list of calls and visits obtained. by 

Representative Markey's commIttee shows 

thar: on 26 March, Li called DOE's Office of 

Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 1:0 

wove,., $OIl1C comments from the Maine 

group. Li declined to diScuss this ortbe later 

meeting in May. Two weeks after the Maine 

cirizem visited Li in Washington, Herring· 

ton announced that he would "inddinirdy 

postpone" work on an eastem site. 

Vice-presidential spokesman Stephen 

Hart sa}'6 Bush's staff senr DOE many com- 0 

IIW1'CS it received: including those from N 

Maine, but thar none could be characterized ~-

:=e~da~~~ces!t!e;~ ~ "lisn:n'" and "pass along the ~ of pea- ..§ 

plehe mects." 0 

Hmingron insists that he did nor change § the v.'aSte program to suit the Vice Pn:si~ ~ 

dent"plansfud988orthe=dsofRepub- ~ 

Iican candid.a.tes running in the East this &II. ~ 

Politics played no pan in ir, he told the ~ House lnterior Committee on 31 July. "It g w.as a managerial decision made in the De- .~ 

partmenr," Herrington said, aimed. at saving 

money. ~ In the spring, DOE reviewo:i ncw, low 3: 

figurts on waste production and learned. E 

!hat the first repository would provid< .d<- .g quare sror.tge space fOr 10 to 15 ye:us longer ~ 

t:hao previously realized. The stannOry limit 16 of 70,000 metric tons for the first site will ~ 

not be reached until 2020. DOE will not ~ 

have to decide on building a second teposi- 0 

tory unti11995. 'crt is not prudent to spend 

hundreds of millions of dollan; on sire investigation and identification now,"" Herring· 

ton said. Slowing the pace will allow DOE 

ro restructure rhc prog:rnm ttdullcally and 

investigate Dew disposal rechnologies. 

Wharever valid tt:dmical reasons mere 

may b< fur <hanging the schedule, DOE', 

ann~r on 28 May had an Obvi0U5 

political ilimerulion. Hc:rringron's rone 

aroused suspicions that eastern stateS would 

tX! Ier off the book inddinitelv and was read. 

by westerners as a betrayal. DoE now CODrrotm potenrial delays in both me East and 

the West. The Adminimation will have to 

repair t:.b.is badly SQ!'red prog:rnn or propose 

a new om; just at a time when Congress is 

least intc:rat:ed in taking up the subject. • 

ELIor~HALL 

SCIENCE, VOL. 233