U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON :

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i

74–471 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–130]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS

HEARING HELD

APRIL 17, 2012
(II)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado

MO BROOKS, Alabama

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member

ERIC SMITH, Staff Assistant
(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2012

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, April 17, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for Atomic Energy

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs ............................................. 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, April 17, 2012 .......................................................................................... 51

TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 2012

FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 4

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ......................................................... 7

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, U.S. Department of

Energy ................................................................................................................... 28

Huizenga, David G., Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, U.S.

Department of Energy ......................................................................................... 30

Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 9

Winokur, Hon. Peter S., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ... 32

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R. ............................................................................... 61

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 101

Huizenga, David G. .......................................................................................... 139

Kehler, Gen C. Robert ...................................................................................... 70

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 59

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 55

Winokur, Hon. Peter S. .................................................................................... 150

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Memorandum of Agreement Between Secretary Robert M. Gates (U.S.

Department of Defense) and Secretary Steven Chu (U.S. Department

of Energy) Concerning Modernization of the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure ................................................................................................................. 232

Statement of ADM Kirkland Donald, USN, Director, Naval Reactors,

National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy . 191
Page

IV

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued

Statement of Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S.

Department of Energy .................................................................................. 195

Statement of Dr. Charles F. McMillan, Laboratory Director, Los Alamos

National Laboratory ..................................................................................... 211

Statement of Dr. Paul J. Hommert, President and Director, Sandia National Laboratories ........................................................................................ 200

Statement of Dr. Penrose C. Albright, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory .......................................................................................... 220

Statement of Maj Gen William A. Chambers, USAF, Assistant Chief

of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration ............................. 181

Statement of RADM Terry Benedict, USN, Director, Strategic Systems

Programs ........................................................................................................ 171

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 241

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 241

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 239

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 248

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 246

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 245
(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND NUCLEAR FORCES

PROGRAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 17, 2012.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:24 p.m. in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. TURNER. Good afternoon. We will call to order the hearing

for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I apologize for our tardiness. I know you all are very used to the fact that the votes throw

the schedule off here at the Capitol, and I appreciate your tolerance for our starting late.

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the President’s

fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD [Department of Defense]

and DOE [Department of Energy] nuclear forces, U.S. nuclear

weapons posture, and the fiscal year 2013 budget request from Environmental Management is an incredibly important hearing as we

move forward on looking at the priorities and responsibilities of

this subcommittee.

I want to thank all witnesses for being here today. For those who

follow the sometimes arcane world of nuclear weapons, budgeting

and policy, the witnesses on our two panels are familiar faces. They

are the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense; and

General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

On Panel 2, we have the Honorable Thomas P. D’Agostino, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. David

G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, U.S.

Department of Energy; and the Honorable Peter S. Winokur,

Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

On December 1, 2010, prior to the ratification of the New START

[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, the then-directors of

Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories wrote to Senators Kerry and Lugar and stated: ‘‘We believe

that the proposed budgets,’’ referring to the November 2010 update

to the Section 1251 plan, ‘‘provide adequate support to sustain the

safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of America’s nuclear

deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads es-
2

tablished by the New START Treaty with adequate confidence and

acceptable risk.’’

That plan appears to have been abandoned in the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request, calling into question whether there

still is adequate support for the Nation’s nuclear deterrent to permit the reductions that are called for by the New START Treaty.

There have been those inside and outside of Government who

have challenged the linkage of the New START Treaty and the

modernization plan. There are those who make the argument that

because President Obama has requested more funds than his predecessor, though not the funds that he promised, that he has done

all he is needed to do. Neither of these positions represent serious

thinking that benefits our national security. The question is what

is necessary today and how are we going to accomplish it.

There can be no doubt that reductions proposed by the New

START Treaty are only in our national interest if we complete the

modernization of our nuclear deterrent warheads delivery systems

and infrastructure.

I want to remind those who have forgotten, this was the President’s modernization plan. It was his Nuclear Posture Review,

issued in April 2010 before there was a New START Treaty, and

his 1251 plan. Here are some of the highlights from the President’s

2010 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review].

It was stated: ‘‘Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research

Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace

the existing 50-year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility in 2021.’’

Also from the President’s 2010 NPR: ‘‘Developing a new Uranium

Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to

come online for production operations in 2021.’’

Also from the President’s 2010 NPR: ‘‘The administration will

fully fund the ongoing LEP [Life Extension Program] for the W76

submarine-based warhead for a fiscal year 2017 completion, and

the full scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb

to ensure first production begins in fiscal year 2017.’’

The President’s 1251 plan states that CMRR [Chemistry and

Metallurgy Research Replacement] and UPF [Uranium Processing

Facility] will complete construction by 2021, and will achieve full

operational functionality by 2024.

Further, the inextricable linkage of modernization in the New

START reductions was the basis of Condition Nine of the New

START Treaty. The linkage was the legal basis on which the Senate ratified the treaty. Let me remind everyone that the Senate

said in Condition Nine the following: ‘‘The United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship program,

and to maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities that will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at

the New START Treaty levels. The United States is committed to

providing the resources needed to achieve these objectives at a minimum at the level set forth in the President’s 10-year plan provided

to Congress pursuant to Section 1251.’’

The President agreed to Condition Nine as I just read it.
3

First off, I believe the President is abandoning his commitment

that he ratified or acknowledged in Condition Nine, and I think it

is in part because he already has his treaty and it has already been

ratified. I think implementation is something that he is now putting aside before us. I base that belief on the budget submitted and

that the status report required by Condition Nine has not been

submitted to Congress. Also the Section 1045 report last year from

the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] has not been completed.

Let me remind the subcommittee what Dr. James Miller, the

President’s nominee to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

told us just last November. He said, quote: ‘‘The first is that we understand the requirement to report per Condition Nine if we have

less funding than in the 1251, as requested in the Section 1251 report. Our interpretation of that has been substantially less,’’ meaning that he says that even though we asked for less funding we

don’t have to file a report. We have to ask for substantially less.

In fiscal year 2011 actually slightly less was appropriated than

requested. Back to his words: ‘‘Our judgment was a 1 percent or

less change doesn’t require us to submit the report.’’

Let us dwell on what he just said again. ‘‘Our judgment was that

a 1 percent change or less doesn’t require us to submit the report.’’

The difference we are looking at now in the fiscal year 2012 appropriations bills in both the House and Senate appropriations bills

I think would trigger that. His words, and we would have to examine that question. If there is substantially less funding than requested, we will, of course, provide the report to Congress.

Yet we have no report for either fiscal year 2012 or the President’s own budget request for fiscal year 2013, which underfunds

the 1251 plan.

So what has changed? Is it solely the budget picture? I don’t

mean to dismiss the budget situation and the cuts that DOD has

to make, especially it has made those cuts while transferring large

sums of its own budget to fund the modernization activities at the

NNSA.

But again the question here is whether U.S. nuclear force reductions make sense without modernization. The President’s Nuclear

Posture Review makes the case for this linkage when it stated:

‘‘Implementation of the stockpile stewardship program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the NPR will

allow the United States to shift away from retaining large numbers

of nondeployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile.’’

In the absence of these investments, will the forthcoming NPR

implementation study continue to hurtle toward what seems to be

a prejudged outcome that the U.S. should further reduce its nuclear deterrent? I see no other way to understand the President’s

recent comments at Hankuk University in Seoul, stating: ‘‘Last

summer I directed my national security team to conduct a comprehensive study of our nuclear forces. That study is under way,’’

the President said. ‘‘But even as we have more work to do,’’ the

President speaking, ‘‘we can already say with confidence that we

have more nuclear weapons than we need.’’
4

Need for what?

So the study isn’t done, but we already know the answer supports the President’s goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Either the President already knows the answers to the questions, in

which case the Congress must be informed, or the President wrote

the question to ensure an answer that he wants.

Again, Congress waits for an answer.

Hopefully, our witnesses today will shed some light on this important area. Either way, I assure you this year’s National Defense

Authorization Act will ensure Congress’ oversight of these issues.

I also want to highlight some of the discussion at this subcommittee’s February hearing on governance and management of

the nuclear security enterprise. At that hearing we heard from the

National Academies of Science about a ‘‘broken’’ and ‘‘dysfunctional’’ relationship between NNSA and its laboratories. We also

heard about a system of micromanagement that is costing taxpayers untold millions. The National Academies study and nearly

a dozen others have identified and documented the problems and

suggested possible solutions.

I hope our witnesses on both panels will help us understand

what actions should be taken and when.

Finally, we welcome the opportunity to review the budget and

priorities of DOE’s Defense environmental cleanup efforts. DOE

continues to do good work in nuclear cleanup but also continues to

struggle with technical and management issues at its largest

project. I look forward to hearing about how DOE intends to address these concerns.

With those concerns having been acknowledged, I now turn to

my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for her opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

STRATEGIC FORCES

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming General

Kehler, Ms. Creedon, Mr. D’Agostino, Mr. Huizenga, and Dr.

Winokur.

I am also grateful and thank Ms. Harrington, Dr. Hommert, Dr.

Albright and Dr. McMillan, Admiral Benedict, and Admiral Donald

for the statements in the record that you all have put in and for

being here to participate in our discussion today during the question and answer part of this hearing.

I’d like to preface my comments by noting that the congressionally mandated, voted-on, brought-forward Budget Control Act is reinforcing some difficult decisions, some real soul-searching in all

aspects of our Government spending and our defenses, and our

strategic defenses are no different. We must reexamine and think

about what we really need for the future and decide what we can

afford because it is always about limited resources. Really, it is always about limited resources.
5

So in that context, I would like to touch on a few specific issues

related to sustaining our nuclear deterrent and our nuclear forces,

nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear cleanup efforts.

First, our nuclear weapons activities and operations. President

Obama and Vice President Biden have made clear over and over

the importance of maintaining a safe, a secure, and a reliable nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing while making prudent

progress towards lower numbers. There is no doubt in that, that’s

what they would like to see. Quite frankly, that is what I would

like to see.

The Administration is currently conducting an implementation

study of the Nuclear Posture Review that will inform the requirements. So it is important to note that with over 5,000 deployed and

nondeployed nuclear weapons, the United States still maintains

the ability to destroy the world several times over. So when I hear

my colleague say for what, I mean, we have a lot in hand.

Even with the progress on nuclear reductions, with nuclear modernization plan’s weapons and associated delivery vehicles remaining necessary, we must still think about how to do this in a smart

way, how to make effective investments. That is what we need to

do, because every dollar that goes this way is a dollar that is taken

from somewhere else, whether it is the welfare of our people, the

education of our people, the environment our people live in.

For NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], while

construction of the plutonium research facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory has been delayed, several ongoing or new bigticket items do require close oversight, including, for example, the

construction of the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge,

which is now estimated to cost between $6 to $7 billion, and the

B61 Life Extension for forward-deployed warheads in Europe, so

far estimated to cost around $5 billion.

However, as we prepare this fiscal year 2013 defense authorization bill, our committee has not received from the NNSA the outyear budget estimate or the stockpile stewardship and management plan to inform our deliberations.

As we look at requirements for maintaining a powerful nuclear

deterrent, improved oversight and planning will be crucial to ensure that we can avoid cost overrun and schedule delays. It is part

of what this committee is supposed to do, and it is an important

piece of what we do. And in that I applaud Chairman Turner for

being very diligent about getting to the numbers and trying to

move this committee to do the oversight that I think that we need

to do.

We also have to think about retaining critical skills, about capability and long-term investments in science and technology to ensure that we keep our brightest and our best employed, looking at

this, and making and meeting the standards for nuclear safety.

We will rely on the Department of Defense and STRATCOM

[U.S. Strategic Command] to continue to critically examine Cold

War-derived requirements, assess their continued value and cost

effectiveness, and adaptation to new and likely threats.

This brings me to my second point on nuclear nonproliferation

and nuclear threat reduction. I commend the Administration for its

successes at the nuclear security summit; particularly the U.S.-
6

Russian cooperation to secure potentially vulnerable material in

Kazakhstan. I would also like to note the total removal of highly

enriched uranium from Mexico and the Ukraine, as well as the

progress towards converting Russian research reactors to use lowenriched uranium rather than HEU [highly enriched uranium].

However, in contrast, the budget continues to prioritize the construction of the MOX [mixed oxide fuel] facility at almost $1 billion

annually, despite the absence of a clear path forward.

Another example, the nonproliferation budget also includes $150

million subsidy for low-enriched fuel production, which should be

the weapons activities account, for example, or in the Department’s

nuclear energy account.

Urgent efforts such as including the President’s goal of securing

all vulnerable weapons usable material in 4 years must, I believe,

be a pressing national security priority.

In this context, I would like to hear about interagency coordination and how the Department of Defense is supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

Third, nuclear cleanup remains a critical issue in the aftermath

of the Cold War. Sites like Hanford and Savannah River site

played a unique and important piece in our history in the Cold

War, but we have to be diligent and we have to get this cleanup

done. So I would like to hear about how the Department is addressing the safety culture concerns at the waste treatment plant at

Hanford and the cost increases for that program.

Mr. Chairman, there are obviously, and you and I have discussed

this before, a lot of other issues this year as we try to move forward

in the next couple of weeks and get a mark that is going to work

for what we believe are the priorities.

So I am very grateful to have you in front of us today, and again,

welcome.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Prior to the beginning of your comments, I just want to acknowledge that our committee works very strongly on a bipartisan basis.

We have had an incredible history of strong, unanimous bipartisan

support, one of the few committees or subcommittees that generally

signs letters that include either all members or both leaderships.

As you begin your comments, I do want to note that this committee, subcommittee, has historically on a bipartisan basis unanimously supported the necessity, not just the desirability, but the

necessity of CMRR, the UPF, and the life extension programs. And

with that full support that this subcommittee has provided, we look

forward to your additional insight.

We ask if you will summarize your written testimony which has

been provided to the subcommittee and if you would provide us

your oral statement in a period of 5 minutes, we would greatly appreciate that.

We will begin first with Assistant Secretary Creedon.
7

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary CREEDON. Thank you, Chairman Turner and Ranking

Member Sanchez and distinguished members of the subcommittee.

I am pleased to be here today with General Kehler, Major General

Chambers, and Rear Admiral Benedict, as well as my colleagues

from the Department of Energy and Dr. Winokur, who are on the

second panel, to testify on the important issues of our nuclear

forces and nuclear policies.

I will make just a few remarks today to highlight some of the

topics addressed in my written statement, which I would like to

submit for the record.

The Department plays a crucial role in the President’s vision to

take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons while

maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for the

Nation and our allies. We are working towards this vision while

supporting the demands of a complex global security environment.

We have made and are continuing to make decisions on policy,

strategy and future force structure in a way that ensures we are

meeting key objectives of the Nuclear Posture Review.

These include: Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at

reduced nuclear force levels and strengthening regional deterrence

and reassuring U.S. allies and partners. We are seeking the positive results of these decisions with the entry into force of the New

START Treaty in February of 2011. The timing and framework for

the next round of arms control negotiations have not been set, but

we look forward to discussions with Russia that are broader in

scope and more ambitious. These discussions should include strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

Even after the New START Treaty is fully implemented, the

United States and Russia together will account for more than 90

percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. For this reason, our next

round of arms control efforts will remain focused on Russia, and it

is important that Russia join us in a move to lower numbers.

The Obama administration has made clear that we will uphold

our security guarantees to our allies and partners. In East Asia we

have added new forums to our already robust relationships with

Japan and Republic of Korea. These collaborations strengthen U.S.

extended deterrence.

In the Middle East, we are nurturing long-standing relationships

and expanding new ones to prevent Iran’s development of a nuclear

weapon capability and to counter its destabilizing policies in the region.

And in Europe, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] is

undertaking a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review to determine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense forces that the alliance will need to deter and defend against

the range of 21st-century threats.

To promote transparency, the United States took the unprecedented step of releasing the number of nuclear weapons in the

stockpile to the public. We would welcome similar declarations

from Russia and China. We are also pursuing a high-level dialogue
8

with China aimed at promoting a stable, resilient, and transparent

strategic relationship.

Here at home, as you know, we are assessing deterrence requirements to set a goal for future reductions below New START levels,

while strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries,

enhancing strategic stability vis-a`-vis Russia and China, and assuring our allies and partners.

I won’t go into the further details about the NPR follow-on analysis at this time. The Secretary of Defense has committed to sharing relevant aspects of the new planning guidance with the senior

leaders of the defense authorizing committees when the effort is

complete. To be clear, this commitment has not changed. But it is

clear that this analysis will shape our pathway forward, as will the

budget.

The current fiscal situation is putting pressure on the entire Department, and the Nuclear Enterprise is no exception. For fiscal

year 2013, we have made careful choices to protect high-priority

programs while allowing some efforts to be delayed with acceptable

or manageable risks.

Some programs, including the replacement for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine, will be delayed. Others, such as the new

bomber, remain on schedule.

The Department has done much to ensure a viable plan to sustain and modernize our nuclear forces given the constraints of the

Budget Control Act. In the face of these constraints, DOD has

made tough choices, but ones that continue to meet our national security requirements. We do this by investing in our nuclear enterprise, particularly in the stockpile and nuclear infrastructure, as

well as through modernization of the delivery systems that underpin strategic deterrence. We are also planning on focusing significant resources on an underappreciated but critical component of

strategic deterrence, the nuclear command and control system that

links the triad of nuclear forces.

Finally, DOD remains a leader in ensuring that terrorists and

proliferators cannot access nuclear materials and expertise abroad.

In cooperation with our interagency partners, we are building on

our long history of cooperation with allies and partners to expand

our efforts in the nonproliferation arena.

Let me conclude by coming back to the NPR and the President’s

commitment to a comprehensive and balanced nuclear agenda. Our

nuclear forces remain the foundation of deterrence. Our arsenal

needs significant and immediate investment, and nuclear dangers

today are real.

I am pleased to be here with my colleagues to discuss the concrete steps we have taken to sustain the nuclear deterrent and support the President’s vision. I would also like to underscore the importance of the strong bipartisan support that the chairman has

mentioned on these issues critical to the Nation’s security. We welcome the dialogue and debate on these issues as a way to sustain

and renew a long-term approach to nuclear security.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Creedon can be found in

the Appendix on page 61.]
9

Mr. TURNER. Great. Thank you for your statement. And the subcommittee has received statements from each of the witnesses, and

without objection those statements will be made part of the record.

There are also several other written statements that we have received from various officials on the subject matter of the hearing

that without objection will be added to the record.

General Kehler.

STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER,

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee. We certainly appreciate the opportunity to present my views today on the

United States Strategic Command’s missions and priorities, especially our nuclear responsibilities.

I am pleased to be here with Assistant Secretary Creedon, a

great colleague and someone with tremendous insight into U.S.

strategic policy and programs.

I am also glad that you are going to hear from NNSA Administrator Tom D’Agostino and the other expert panelists in a little

while.

Without question, Mr. Chairman, we continue to face a very challenging global security environment marked by constant change,

enormous complexity, and profound uncertainty. Indeed, change

and surprise have characterized the time that has passed since my

last appearance before this committee.

Over that time, the men and women of STRATCOM have participated in many, many activities, to include the support of operations

in Libya and Japan, and others ranging through the preparation of

the New Defense Strategic Guidance. Through this extraordinary

period of challenge and change, STRATCOM’s focus has remained

constant, to partner with the other combatant commands, to deter,

detect, and prevent strategic attacks on the United States, our allies and partners, and to be prepared to employ force as needed in

support of our national security objectives.

Our priorities are clear: First, to deter attack with a safe, secure,

and effective nuclear deterrent force; second, to partner with the

other commands to support ongoing operations today; third, to respond to the new challenges in space; fourth, to build cyberspace

capability and capacity; and finally, to prepare for uncertainty.

Transcending all these is the threat of nuclear materials or

weapons in the hands of violent extremists. We don’t have a crystal

ball at STRATCOM, but we believe events of the last year can help

us glimpse the type of future conflict that we must prepare for.

Conflict will likely be increasingly hybrid in nature, encompassing

air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. It will likely cross traditional

geographic boundaries, involve multiple participants, and be waged

by actors wielding combinations of capabilities, strategies, and tactics.

I think it is important to note that the same space and cyberspace tools that connect us together to enable global commerce,

navigation, and communication also present tremendous opportunities for disruption and perhaps destruction.
10

In January, the Department of Defense released new strategic

guidance to address these challenges. This new guidance describes

the way ahead for the entire Department, but I believe many portions are especially relevant to STRATCOM and our assigned responsibilities. For example, global presence, succeeding in current

conflicts, deterring and defeating aggression, countering weapons of

mass destruction, effectively operating in cyberspace, space and

across all other domains, and maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent are all important areas in the new strategy

where STRATCOM’s global reach and strategic focus play a vital

role.

No question these are important responsibilities. There are real

risks involved in the scenarios we find ourselves in today. It is my

job to be prepared for those scenarios and to advocate for the

sustainment and modernization efforts we need to meet the challenges. And in that regard, the fiscal year 2013 budget request is

pivotal for our future. We are working hard to improve our planning and better integrate our efforts to counter weapons of mass

destruction.

We need to proceed with planned modernization of our nuclear

delivery and command and control systems. We need to proceed

with life extension programs for our nuclear weapons, and modernize the highly specialized industrial complex that cares for

them.

We need to improve the resilience of our space capabilities, and

enhance our situational awareness of the increasingly congested,

competitive, and contested domain.

We need to improve the protection and resilience of our cyber

networks, enhance our situational awareness, increase our capability and capacity, and work with the entire interagency to increase the protection of our critical infrastructure.

There are other needs as well, but in short, the new national security reality calls for a new strategic approach that promotes agile

decentralized action from fully integrated, I would say fully interdependent and resilient joint forces.

These are tough challenges, but the men and women of

STRATCOM view our challenges as opportunities, the chance to

partner with the other commands to forge better, smarter, and a

faster joint force.

We remain committed to work with this subcommittee, the Services, other agencies, and our international partners to provide the

flexible, agile, and reliable strategic deterrence and mission assurance capabilities that our Nation and our friends need in an increasingly uncertain world.

Mr. Chairman, it is my honor and a privilege to lead America’s

finest men and women. They are our greatest advantage. I am

enormously proud of their bravery and sacrifice, and I pledge to

stand with them and for them to ensure we retain the best force

the world has ever seen. I join with the Secretary of Defense, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior leaders in

thanking you and the committee for the support you have provided

them in the past, present, and on to the future.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sanchez,

and I look forward to your questions.
11

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the

Appendix on page 70.]

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We obviously have a tremendous

amount to cover here today, including a number of members who

are here with some very significant questions. So unfortunately, I

am going to ask that we all, including of course myself, the chairman, have some brevity. But, we do have a lot that is going to have

to be discussed.

Secretary Creedon, I have basically six questions for you that are

divided up into two categories, so I am going to smash them together a bit.

The first category is on budgetary issues with respect to CMRR

and the MOA [memorandum of agreement] between the DOD and

NNSA, which I will give you, and the second one goes to this issue

of Condition Nine, New START, and the mini NPR. So they will

be divided up into those two categories.

With the first one, Secretary Creedon, as you know, the Department of Defense has transferred to the National Nuclear Security

Administration some $1.2 billion in budget authority for specific

purposes as agreed to in that memorandum of agreement that I

referenced between Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, a copy of

which will be added to the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 232.]

Mr. TURNER. I see a total of $4.5 billion that is pledged to be

transferred over 5 years, with another $1.1 billion for naval reactors over that period of time to support their work for the Ohio

class submarine replacement. Reviewing the MOA, I see a total

commitment of $1.2 billion for CMRR, which I understand has been

deferred until at least 5-year budget window.

My three parts to this first question, I would like for you to first

discuss, if you will, why the Department of Defense considered that

it was important enough to provide funding for CMRR?

The second part of that first question: We also see in the MOA

$785 million that was pledged for the B61 and $224 million for the

W76, both of which programs have now been delayed by the NNSA.

So have you gotten your money’s worth from the NNSA on those

two line items?

And then the third is why hasn’t the Department of Defense

used the authority that we provided in the Defense Authorization

Act for the Pentagon to transfer $125 million in appropriated funds

directly to NNSA for use in the modernization program? Is it safe

to say that the DOD is concerned about where this money has

gone?

After your answers to these, we will get to the second component,

which is Condition Nine, the mini NPR, and New START.

Secretary CREEDON. I think I have all of that.

Let me start with the CMRR. So the money that was previously

transferred in fiscal year 2011 and 2012, that money did in fact go

to the intended purpose, and that was to continue to assist with

the design of the CMRR.

As we looked at the overall budget for the fiscal year 2013 budget, both for the Department of Defense and for the National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA, in light of the Budget
12

Control Act, we had to make some difficult choices. And so within

the context of the Nuclear Weapons Council, we looked at the program of modernization and the two construction projects and made

a very conscious decision within the context of the Weapons Council to prioritize the uranium facility at Oak Ridge.

And with that decision came the decision to defer the CMRR for

at least 5 years so that we could focus on the Uranium Processing

Facility, which for DOD was the higher priority.

Now, your second question on that is do we still need CMRR; and

the answer is yes. We need a capability to support the production

of pits. Exactly how many we need in the future; in other words,

what is the future pit requirement, how big CMRR has to be, how

much plutonium it has to hold, those are all decisions that may in

fact change at the completion of the UPF when we once again resume consideration of the funding and the design of the CMRR.

Now, with respect to the B61, again the Weapons Council made

a very conscious decision, and I will let General Kehler address

this as well because he was key to this decision, but the Weapons

Council made a decision that deferring this until 2019 was appropriate. The same with the W76. And at some point Admiral Benedict can also shed some more light on this; but with the extension

of the W76, again that was something that was in the context of

the Weapons Council, was deemed an appropriate, manageable decision in light of the budget constraints.

Okay. Now, with respect to the Condition Nine——

Mr. TURNER. We will get to that one in a second, but I guess

what was missed—and I appreciate your ability to handle all of

this at once. You have done a great job in answering them. I don’t

really have the sense in your answers yet of your level of concern

with respect to the stewardship of the money that is coming from

DOD to NNSA, and there are substantial funding commitments.

There is actually a greater authority than commitments that are

being followed through with DOD. And the testimony that we have

received from just about everyone who has sat in your chair is that

they are highly concerned about what is happening with DOD’s

value of funds in the hands once they are transferred over to

NNSA and the lack of accomplishment of the goals that those funds

are intended for.

Do you want to voice an opinion on that?

Secretary CREEDON. Sir, one of the issues has been in fact the

cost of these various commitments, the 76, the 61, UPF, and

CMRR. And we have noted over time that the costs, the estimated

costs that had been provided some years earlier, have in fact all

increased. And the decisions with respect to the deferral were in

fact largely driven by the increased costs.

So yes, DOD is very concerned about the management of the

money and about the increased costs associated with the two

projects and the two life extensions.

Mr. TURNER. I think that’s important, if you could elaborate just

a moment. You mentioned the word ‘‘management.’’ It really is a

management issue that you are concerned about within NNSA,

right, and not just the issue of the actual cost of these programs,

but the perhaps ineffective management impacting the cost of those

programs and the ability for them to be completed?
13

Secretary CREEDON. I think it’s a little bit of both. I mean, there

is a concern about the cost. Now, I applaud what Tom D’Agostino,

the Administrator of NNSA, is doing to try to get his arms around

the costs, particularly of the UPF and the CMRR. His decision to

go to a 90-percent design basis before he does his cost basis is not

only the absolute right thing to do, but it really is the first time

that the NNSA has really committed to do that.

So from a DOD perspective, that’s hugely important, is to get to

that 90-percent cost design in the UPF, and then understand the

requirements and stick to the requirements. I mean, that is a big

challenge. It is one that DOD hopes the NNSA can clearly implement. But with some of what Tom is doing, I think that’s the right

way to go.

Mr. TURNER. Even though you are concerned, but you are encouraged? You are concerned, though, correct?

Secretary CREEDON. I am concerned.

Mr. TURNER. You do believe that there are management issues

within NNSA that are resulting in delays in programs and increased costs?

Secretary CREEDON. Yes. And, I also believe Mr. D’Agostino is

aware of it, and he is trying very hard to address it, and we are

going to support him in his efforts.

Mr. TURNER. Right. And our goal as a committee, we are going

to have to get way past awareness. This is obviously something

that needs to be addressed, not just awareness.

Secretary Creedon, turning to the issue of Condition Nine, I

quoted before Dr. Miller and his statement that in looking at the

trigger requirement for reporting on Condition Nine, he was going

to interpret the language as requiring reporting only if there is

substantially less funding, before defining that trigger of substantially less as being 1 percent.

We now have a budget request that appears to be substantially

less, and so turning to you with the question of—we believe that

the report should have been provided to Congress in February

when the budgetary request came in substantially less, again using

his standard because I believe that the requirement for Condition

Nine was just less.

So where is the report and is the President committed to providing that to Congress? And, are we actually going to have the Administration arguing that we are not in a substantially less, even

though we are in a significantly, I believe, substantially less request?

Secretary CREEDON. Right now the Department is in the final

processes of reviewing both the Condition Nine report and the related report that is required in the National Defense Authorization

Act for fiscal year 2012. And as we go through the final reviews

of both of these reports, we hope to have these finished very soon.

Mr. TURNER. So you have concluded that you need to provide the

report? You believe that substantially less has been requested

enough to require the Condition Nine report be delivered to Congress?

Secretary CREEDON. We are providing the reports.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.
14

On February 21, 2012, we received a letter that is going to be

provided to you explaining that DOD will not have the New START

force structure plan for the committee as required by the National

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012. We were told that

the New START plan is being held up by the President’s mini NPR

study, and we don’t understand how the mini NPR study and the

New START Treaty are dependent upon one another, and perhaps

you can explain why one would be holding up the other because

they don’t to us appear to be related?

Secretary CREEDON. The NPR implementation study is going forward apace, and we are also at the same time working on the New

START force structural levels. But the New START force structural

levels are still under discussion within the building.

The initial efforts, which again I think General Kehler and General Chambers and Admiral Benedict can share some additional

light on, are the priorities of implementation. So right now the priorities of implementation are those things that have already been

retired. So the 50 Peacekeeper missiles, the 50 Minuteman III missiles that have already been retired out of inventory, that is what

the current focus is right this minute.

Mr. TURNER. So is your answer basically then, and I am sorry,

obviously these are very complex issues to compare, is it a workforce capacity issue? Are they unrelated as we believe they are unrelated? Or, are you saying that they are related significantly

enough for one to impact the completion of the other.

Secretary CREEDON. The focus right now has been on dismantling, addressing those systems that were already retired. So, it is

a bit of a prioritization within the Service budgets that is driving

some of this. I am happy to have General Kehler add something

if he wants.

But at this point, it is a prioritization within the Services’ budget. There will be of course a relationship, but the relationship for

the 2012 budget, the 2013 budget has not been specifically tied to

the implementation study—I am sorry, the analysis of the NPR

and the implementation of the NPR.

Mr. TURNER. I have a number of questions for General Kehler,

but I am going to pass on so that we can get to other members asking questions, and I will turn to a second round to get to my questions for General Kehler.

With that, I go to Ranking Member Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I’ll just remind my chairman here that at 4:30 we

push into the cyber threat special briefing, which I have to leave

for the Democrats. So I know you want to do questions, but we do

have a second panel also.

Let’s just cut to the chase. Are there any of these changes from

the 1251 report plan that were due to budget pressures and the resulting Budget Control Act, meaning that that translates to a less

reliable deterrent? In other words, how high has the risk gone because we’re under these budget constraints? Or, is there something

that we should have that keeps you up at night that you are worried that we’re cutting away from?

To both of you. General.

General KEHLER. Congresswoman Sanchez, I’ll start, anyway.

First of all from an operational perspective, the deployed force
15

today, the deterrent force that is out there deployed today, in the

three words that we use is metrics for safe, secure, and effective.

And I believe that today it is safe, secure, and effective. We are

providing and meeting our deterrence mission responsibilities. And

so, I am comfortable and have confidence in the deployed forces

that sits out there today.

Second, the question is were there adjustments made that resulted in changes to the 2013 budget that were budget driven and

the answer is absolutely there were. There were clearly budget constraints that were placed on us that forced us to make tough

choices in fiscal year 2013.

Having said that, my view is that the 2013 budget still does,

though, maintain the funding for the most critical capabilities that

we have operationally. I think there are some risks, and I believe

that those risks we can address adequately.

My biggest concern is what happens beyond 2013. And, I know

the committee has received a dual letter from both the Secretary

of Defense and Secretary of Energy that reminds the committee

that right now we do not have a comprehensive plan in place for

post fiscal year 2013.

But the force, I wouldn’t want to suggest that the force that is

deployed today is not safe, secure, and effective. It is. I believe it

can achieve its deterrence responsibilities as we sit there today. In

fact, I am extremely confident in that. There were tough choices

that were made in 2013. I think those choices were made with

some amount of prudence. I believe that we can manage the risk

that is associated with those choices, provided that we continue

down the road that has been established in prior budgets and continues in 2013. And what I am most worried about is what happens

after 2013. And the only reason I am worried about that is I just

don’t see the plan yet.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, General.

Madam Secretary.

Secretary CREEDON. I agree with everything General Kehler said.

And, there were some difficult choices. Probably the most difficult

of all was the decision to delay the Ohio class replacement submarine by 2 years. That was a very difficult decision, but one that

we have high confidence that the Navy can manage.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

Madam Secretary, what is your view of the role of the contribution of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board? I know some

of them are in here, probably, but please.

Secretary CREEDON. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

does not have a relationship with the Department of Defense. The

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is an advisory body that

was established by the Congress. It was established in the late

1980s; it was stood up in the early 1990s, to provide advisory opinions to the Department of Energy in the operations, the nuclear operations, at the Department of Energy to ensure that the Department of Energy and now the NNSA were conducting their nuclear

security operations safely and in conformance with the NNSA and

the DOE orders, rules, and requirements.
16

Ms. SANCHEZ. But, I asked you what is your view? Is it needed?

Should the Congress rely more on it? Do we need to beef it up? Has

it done its job, you know, from where you sit?

Secretary CREEDON. From where we sit at DOD, so you want sort

of the DOD view. I think from the pure DOD view there is both

recognition that there is a valuable contribution by the board. But,

I think very often there is a lot of misunderstanding about the role

of the board. And, I think often there is some concern that some

of the views and opinions of the board, and this is again within the

Department, might have caused increased costs with certain

projects. So, I mean, I think the views within DOD vary a little bit.

I am not sure that there is one uniform view of DOD with respect

to the board.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Let me ask just one more. I know we

are trying to move it along down the line.

General, when asked in 2010 if there is a military mission performed by U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe that cannot be

performed by either U.S. strategic or conventional forces, at the

time General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, flatly said, ‘‘No.’’

Do you agree with that assessment; and is there any military

function for tactical nuclear weapons that cannot be accomplished

by strategic weapons?

General KEHLER. I wouldn’t—your question was do I agree with

that statement, and the answer is I agree with that statement partially.

In terms of purely military use in an unlikely scenario where we

would have to use a nuclear weapon, I think that we have the ability, the U.S. force today has the ability to provide extended deterrence through a variety of means, not just forward-deployed aircraft.

The question about forward-deployed aircraft and forward-deployed weapons is really an alliance question, and I am firmly of

the belief that it needs to be discussed and debated and decided in

the context of the alliance.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I’ll pass it down and when we get

to second round, I will ask the rest of my questions.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Lamborn. We will do 5-minute rounds.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for

being here.

Secretary Creedon, does the Obama administration have any

plans to reduce the New START limit on deployed U.S. nuclear

weapons, which is 1,550, and what are these plans?

Secretary CREEDON. Sir, if I understand the question right, the

Administration is committed to complying with the New START

Treaty within the central limits of the treaty which is by 2018. The

plan is to comply with that. That is absolutely true.

Mr. LAMBORN. I mean to go below that in the future, below the

1,550?

Secretary CREEDON. The President has said that there is certainly an interest in making reductions. The Congress has also had

an interest in making reductions, particularly with the nonstrategic warheads. There is a hope, as I mentioned in my opening

statement, that as we go for future reductions, that we can include
17

these non-strategics and that we can look—again with Russia—in

total stockpile levels. And, so there is no plan. There is certainly

the hope that we can get there with Russia.

Mr. LAMBORN. You say an interest, on the part of whom to make

these further reductions?

Secretary CREEDON. In the debate on the START Treaty, one of

the primary considerations was looking at reducing the nonstrategic warheads, which have not been part of treaties heretofore,

and that is a very large consideration in terms of reducing future

stockpiles.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Let me ask you a broad, philosophical question. Do you believe that U.S. nuclear weapons are a threat to

world peace and safety? Just a broad, philosophical question.

Secretary CREEDON. Nuclear weapons?

Mr. LAMBORN. U.S. nuclear weapons?

Secretary CREEDON. U.S. nuclear weapons right now are very important to maintaining deterrence in this world.

Mr. LAMBORN. But the President is talking about reducing them

further, though they play a role, a beneficial role, it sounds like?

Secretary CREEDON. Yes, they do. And the President has said

that as long as there are nuclear weapons, there will be a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent, and it is important

and he’s committed to sustaining that.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you.

Let me shift to what the chairman built on, let me build on

something he pointed out. Ratifying the New START Treaty was

based on at least in part an agreement to adequately fund the modernization of our nuclear stockpile; correct?

Secretary CREEDON. It was a large element of the discussion during the ratification.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And, that was done during a

lame duck session.

Given that if this agreement to adequately fund modernization is

unfulfilled, whether it is by the Administration or Congress or

both, should the U.S. consider withdrawing from the treaty that

was based on doing that?

Secretary CREEDON. That is the topic of the report that the Department is currently submitting. Right now the deterrent is in

fact being maintained, safely, securely, and reliable, and we are in

fact planning and focusing on modernizing both the strategic delivery systems and also the weapons complex. It’s just at a somewhat

lower level, and that’s largely driven by the constraints of the

Budget Control Act.

Mr. LAMBORN. Would you agree that modernization, if it does not

take place, that calls into question our participation in the New

START Treaty?

Secretary CREEDON. And, what I am saying is that with the

budget that we have submitted, we are in fact carrying out the

commitment to modernization.

Mr. LAMBORN. But, should that commitment not be fulfilled in

the future, should that lead to a discussion of withdrawing from

the treaty?

Secretary CREEDON. That is a very hard question to answer in

the abstract and one that would have to look at what exactly that
18

future situation really was. Right now, here, we are committed to

the modernization of both the complex and the delivery systems.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Kehler, I am seeing a lot of risk in the

Administration’s plan for the nuclear stockpile. We’ve talked about

some of the specifics, the Ohio submarine delay, delaying CMRR,

et cetera, et cetera. Where should we draw the line on risk acceptance as we don’t do some of these steps; and how do we know when

we have reached that line?

General KEHLER. Congressman, that’s a situational answer. As

much as I hate to say ‘‘it depends,’’ it depends.

At this point in time, I can look at the modernization efforts, the

sustainment, first of all, efforts that we have for the triad, and by

the way the budget sustains the triad, and I think that is the right

thing to do. As we look to the future, I am convinced that the triad

continues to serve us well. So the budget supports the triad. The

budget continues to support sustainment of the existing triad, although there have been some adjustments made to various pieces

of that. The budget supports modernization of the triad with a

question mark about what we should do with the land-based deterrent, but an analysis of alternatives that’s going to be under way.

So at this point in time, as I look at that, I am comfortable that

we are not at the point where I would stand up and say operationally we can’t meet the objectives that we have. The investment has

to continue in our command and control system. I think that continues to be important. There is a little discussed piece of this for

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance as well. I think that is

important as we go forward. And then there is the issue about the

weapons and the weapons complex where again, as I say, the biggest risk that I think we are taking in that regard, even though

I would have not preferred to see the Ohio replacement slide to the

right, I think that that increases some risk, but I think it’s manageable.

The same with moving the B61 life extension to the right. I think

that increases some risk, but I believe that that’s manageable as

well. I cannot draw firm red lines on a paper for you today.

I can tell you, though, that we need to watch this very carefully

as we go forward, and in particular, in the weapons complex. The

extended complex past 2013, I am still concerned about the lack of

a firm plan as we go forward. In every other case I see the plan.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Mr. TURNER. I am going to take the chairman’s prerogative as we

go on to the next questions and just insert for a second some things

that we all can agree upon that I don’t want to become confusing

as a result of some of the language that is being used in the answers and the discussion.

The Budget Control Act does not dictate any reductions that we

are dealing with in this subcommittee with respect to NNSA or nuclear modernization. They are choices being made by the Administration. The answers that you are providing of the effect of the

Budget Control Act is merely your recognition of the budget pressures that you have. I want to make that clear so that no one believes that the Budget Control Act dictates the choices that the Administration has made that we are now dealing with in the reductions to NNSA and modernization.
19

Secondly, as I had said in my opening statement, the issue of the

timing of modernization to the adoption of New START Treaty was

expressly stated by the Senate in Condition Nine and was expressly concurred with by the President. So it is not merely conjecture or opinion when people question about the issue of New

START and the nexus between modernization.

Thirdly, with respect to the 1251 and the modernization plan,

both the President and NNSA and DOD have identified it with respect to the modernization plan as being necessary and essential,

not merely desirable. That is why we have this issue of the concern

of the Administration’s choices that it made in its implementation

of the Budget Control Act. That struggle that we’re having as to

how these items that had previously been identified as necessary

and essential could fall now to merely desirable is part of what our

essence of our questions are.

With that, I will turn to Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I pass.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the

panel for being here. General Kehler, thank you for your great

service to our country. And Secretary Creedon, thank you for the

work you are doing.

General Kehler, just review for me if you would some of your biggest concerns about the stockpile delivery systems and the weapons

complex itself? And, I guess as part of that, if you would include

your perspective of are these concerns addressed within the fiscal

year 2013 budget and program plan?

General KEHLER. Congressman, I would say if I had to summarize my concern across the board in today’s deployed force, as well

as looking at the future, and particularly in the weapons complex,

the word that I would use is ‘‘aging.’’

When I look across the force today, the force in every aspect of

the triad, the force is aging. What we know is a couple of facts. One

fact that we know is that the current Ohio class ballistic missile

submarines will reach the end of their lifetime. They will reach

that. There is not a hard line to draw in the sand, but it is a risk

assessment. And, the Navy has drawn a risk line and said that beyond this point we do not feel comfortable fielding the current generation of Ohio submarines. So there is a date out there that there

will need to be a replacement.

For the bomber, we are continuing to fly, of course, B–52s that

are aging, and some would say aged, and the same for the B–2A

which is now a platform that gives us great service, and so does

the B–52H model. But both of them, we need to make some investments in for sustainment, and we need to, especially in light of

other activities in the world today. We need to invest in a longrange, strategic strike platform that is going to be dual capable, either conventional or nuclear capable.

So we need to get on with that, to deal with the problems that

we have in the bomber force.

We don’t say much about the tanker, but we need a tanker that

goes with it, by the way.

Regarding the ballistic missile, the land-based ballistic missile,

we believe that we can take the Minuteman to 2030 in its current
20

form with sustainment investment. Beyond that, I think we have

a serious set of questions to ask ourselves about what shape and

form of the next ballistic missiles should look like on the land.

In the weapons complex, the same issue is there. Aging. The

complex itself is aging and the weapons are aging. The B61, which

is going to be needed, we believe, to arm the new bomber platform,

is aging in terms of terms of its electronics components, and it is

time for a life extension program there.

The W76 which arms the vast majority of the submarine force,

also is under way for life extension, but we need to continue and

bring it to conclusion as best we can as soon as we can.

Beyond that, we have other weapons that will come down the

pike that we need to take a hard look at and continue with plans

to modernize them in some way, whether it is a common explosive

package as we go forward or such.

Nuclear command and control is another.

So the question is: are those all supported in the fiscal year 2013

budget. In their critical aspects, the answer is yes, they are supported in the fiscal year 2013 budget. They are not supported the

same way that we saw a couple of budgets ago. We’ve looked at the

risks associated with the various impacts of the budget on those

platforms. And again, my operational assessment is that we can

make the appropriate adjustments. I will be very concerned if we

make more adjustments beyond these.

I think that further delay to the Ohio replacement, for example,

will jeopardize our collateral work with the U.K., for example, and

I think that would be a mistake. I think that taking more risk in

the current Ohio class is not a prudent thing to do.

So, I think that we are reaching some points where further adjustments would cause me to have to reassess whether I believe

that the operational force is being taken care of.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General.

Secretary Creedon, let me turn to the triad, if I could. There has

been much deliberation recently over the need for a triad, including

the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review which considered and rejected, of

course, the elimination of one or more legs of the triad. What are

your views on the need for a triad and do you believe we should

maintain all three legs of the triad indefinitely?

Secretary CREEDON. Sir, we are very supportive of the triad. The

budget supports the triad. The Nuclear Posture Review supports

the triad. We need to sustain and maintain the triad. As General

Kehler detailed, the fiscal year 2013 budget does that. But, there

are clearly some tradeoffs that we have made, and we have to

watch this every year to make sure that the budget requests do in

fact sustain the triad.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, I would agree.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. General Kehler, I have a great deal of

respect for both your intellect, your contributions and service and

your choice of language, but I must ask, being a gentleman of Ohio,

if you would please not refer to an Ohio replacement. It is the Ohio

class sub replacement, and it would make me feel more comfortable

as we go through this.
21

General KEHLER. Congressman, I stand corrected, sir. Thank

you.

[Laughter]

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I turn to Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. General Kehler, again, thank you for your service

to this country. This question will be for you.

According to the information I have received from subcommittee

staff, President Obama’s fiscal year 2013 budget request proposes

to terminate the common vertical lift support platform. This helicopter was to replace the Air Force UH–1N that fill critical roles

in security in the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] field.

Further, according to committee staff, the average aircraft age is

41 years for these helicopters, and the Air Force uses them to provide support for nuclear weapon convoys, emergency security responses, activities in the National Capital Region, and other missions. The Air Force reports that the termination of the program

will save $950 million over the next 5 years and that current UH–

1N helicopters will be unable to fulfill their mission requirements

and will continue to operate under waivers.

The question is: What is the Air Force’s plan to fill the gap and

capability left by cancelation of this program? Is it simply the waiver process, is there something else?

General KEHLER. Sir, I will defer to the Air Force on the answer

to that question. I know we have General Chambers here. I don’t

know if he is prepared to answer that.

But let me address it from a standpoint that I can. About a week

ago, in fact, exactly a week ago, I was airborne in one of those UH–

1s in the missile complex at Francis Warren in Wyoming. I believe

that those helicopters are safe to fly in. I know they are using them

every day even though some would say those are aged platforms

as well.

I am concerned for the long term, and the UH–1 will not meet

the security needs as we go to the future. I believe they are doing

extraordinary things with those platforms today, and I know that

the Air Force is looking very hard at whether they have some nearterm alternatives to help with the security improvement, and then

what to do for the long term.

I understand from talking to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force

that this was very much a budget-driven decision as well.

But I will ask Bill Chambers. Bill, is there anything else?

General CHAMBERS. Congressman Brooks, this was one of the difficult decisions the Air Force made in light of the budget constraints. We are deferring the requirement. The program that you

heard about last year was terminated, but a new acquisition strategy for replacement for the vertical lift requirement both for missile fields and for the National Capital Region and for personnel recovery are all part of a fresh look at a new platform.

Meanwhile, one of General Kehler’s component commanders,

General Kowalski at Global Strike Command is taking steps to

mitigate the effect of the continued use of the UH–1. First of all,

he has applied more money to sustain the platform. He has enhanced remote surveillance of the launch facilities. He has added

structural enhancements to enhance onsite security, and we continue to look at tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance the
22

use of the UH–1, to include putting UH–1s on 24-hour alert to

make them more responsive to security needs.

So, this is a risk we didn’t like accepting. We are working it, and

have some mitigation measures in place.

Mr. BROOKS. If I can just follow up with a question, with respect

to these Hueys, do you have a judgment as to how much longer we

can continue to use them and they meet their mission requirements? They’re 40–41 years average age now.

General KEHLER. I do not have a specific answer. I would like to

provide that for the record if we could.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 241.]

General KEHLER. I will tell you this, though. My assessment and

because I am a combatant commander, ultimately the responsibility for security in the missile complexes and for the rest of our

operational force is my responsibility. I believe that in the ICBM

complex specifically, and if you extend this to other legs of the triad

as well, security is far better today than it has ever been, in the

ICBM complex in particular, through a combination of technology

that has been brought to the missile fields through remote cameras

and other observation methods that have been put in place, plus

additional training, plus additional firepower that has been put

into the missile complexes. I believe that they are far more secure

today than they have ever been.

Mr. BROOKS. Great. Thank you, and I had hoped to have a little

bit more time for this last question, but each of you have talked

about the Budget Control Act. For clarity, your testimony——

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Brooks, actually since it is just currently the

three of us, I will certainly provide you as much time as you would

like.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you.

With respect to your testimony concerning the Budget Control

Act and the cuts, has it been strictly the first tranche of cuts that

you have been referencing, or did your statements also include the

impact of sequestration?

Secretary CREEDON. No, sir. It’s just the first tranche of cuts.

Mr. BROOKS. That being the case, what kind of impact will sequestration have, which is the law of the land, goes into effect January 1, 2013, have on our atomic energy defense activities and nuclear force programs and capabilities?

Secretary CREEDON. You know, that is a very good question and

one frankly for which I don’t have an answer. The Secretary has

been very clear that it would have a devastating effect, and we

have not looked at exactly how that would be spread across the

various elements. I can only reiterate what the Secretary has said,

and it is just a devastating effect. But I don’t know the answer to

that question because we haven’t done that allocation.

General KEHLER. Congressman, nor do I. That would be a question of priorities and it would be a question of depth of cut, and

I would echo Secretary Creedon’s comment with the Secretary of

Defense. He’s used the word ‘‘devastating.’’

Mr. BROOKS. The sequestration is 8

1

⁄2 months away. As I understand the President’s position, he has said he would veto changes

by the Congress to that law. Are you not conducting any drills or
23

do you not have any plans in place for when these cuts occur January 1, 2013, 8

1

⁄2 months away?

Secretary CREEDON. Sir, I think the Secretary has addressed that

in some of his hearings. From a policy perspective, I can tell you

I have not been personally involved in anything. I think the Secretary has made it clear that at the top line it would just be an

extraordinarily devastating outcome. I don’t have an answer for

you.

Mr. BROOKS. General, have there been any drills or plans to

work through the kinds of cuts associated with sequestration on

your command?

General KEHLER. We are not doing anything in my command to

prepare for sequestration.

Mr. BROOKS. Is there any plan to plan? We are talking about

something that is pretty dramatic that is only 8

1

⁄2 months away,

and it’s the law of the land. Do you have a judgment as to when

a plan will be in place? Or, are we just going to wait until December 31 and wake up on January 1 and start planning at that point?

Secretary CREEDON. I don’t know the answer to that question.

We have not, as far as I have seen, we have not done that. Certainly, again, I have not been involved in anything at my level.

General KEHLER. Same for me, Congressman. The Budget Control Act reduction that was taken, the way it was taken inside the

Department, was applied against the new strategy. The new strategy was written, and then the Budget Control Act numbers were

put against it. That’s where we are.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I am going to make a comment in response

to all this then. You know, I am just a freshman, new kid on the

block. But, we are talking about $40–50 billion in cuts, maybe 60,

national defense depending on your definition under the statute of

national defense. And, we’re looking at 8

1

⁄2 months away, and it is

very disconcerting to discern or to hear that the executive branch

may have no plans as to how that is going to be implemented.

We’ve heard different theories before HASC as a whole. For example, over on the Senate side, one person from the Pentagon

talked about it being the equivalent of a Pentagon shutdown. I believe it was an admiral. My memory may be in error, so I don’t

want to use his name, but you could find it out Googling it real

quick.

Then in HASC, we had testimony that there would be a stoppage

of all contracts. Every single contract that the Federal Government

has, that the Department of Defense has, that the Pentagon has

with the private sector, and they would try to work in somewhere

in the neighborhood of 8 to 9 percent on the low side, 13 to 14 percent on the high side, of prorated cuts to every contract. Now how

you do that with a ship or what part of an airplane wing do you

not put on, this is just very disconcerting. It would seem to me that

we need to have a plan, and I understand that you all may not be

the ones in the position to make that kind of a decision, but to the

extent you can communicate my views to higher-ups I would very

much appreciate it.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. We’ll consider the extended time that

you had, if you do not mind, being your second round, which will

then go into the second round.
24

My questions are directed to General Kehler, as I indicated, but

I’m going to first turn to Mr. Lamborn in case he covers some of

the issues on his second round and we don’t have repetition.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. Just two or three questions here.

First of all, I am concerned that the credibility of our extended

deterrent commitments may fall into serious question, especially if

we do unilateral cuts below the New START limit of 1,550. What

steps are we taking or planning to be taking to reassure our allies

of our commitment to providing a credible deterrent? And at what

point will you make unilateral reductions in our nuclear weapons?

Do we increase the discussion, the risk, the commitment of our allies, roughly 29 or 30, who are under our nuclear umbrella right

now, to begin developing their own nuclear weapons programs?

For both of you.

Secretary CREEDON. Sir, the Secretary said last month that, and

this is direct quote, he said: ‘‘We have gone through a nuclear review and presented options to the President. But let me be very

clear that these options are in no way unilateral.’’

Those are the words of the Secretary of Defense. So with that in

mind, the work that we have done, that we did to engage, to reach

out, and to discuss with the allies in support of the START Treaty

was extensive. I was not in the Pentagon at the time that all happened. But having understood a lot of that and having also understood what is going on now with respect to discussions with our allies, we are in very close contact with our allies. And, the concern

that you raised about others developing nuclear weapons is a very

serious concern that we take very seriously. And, clearly that is not

to say the least, that is not a desirable goal. That is not a desirable

outcome. So, we do take that very seriously, and are working very

hard to make sure that that extended deterrence is in fact credible,

believable, real, effective.

Mr. LAMBORN. General.

General KEHLER. Congressman, I would just add that I agree

with what Secretary Creedon just said. The credibility of our extended deterrence begins with our declaratory statements about

our commitment to our allies and our alliances, and it continues

from there through the demonstration that we have of our commitment in terms of capabilities. And in that regard, we still have

dual capable aircraft in Europe. We have weapons forward-deployed in Europe. Those are conversations for the alliance to have

regarding the future of that element of our commitment. But the

other part of our commitment is a continued commitment from our

strategic triad, in particular our ability to have what are essentially dual capable long-range bombers today that have been used

for the last 10 years in conventional operations but are capable of

delivering nuclear weapons.

And so, in both of those regards, we have had a number of our

allies visit with us in Strategic Command. We’ve gone over in great

detail with them our visible commitment as well as our capabilities. And, I think they understand very well that it is a real and

credible commitment that we have and backed up by real and credible capabilities.

Mr. LAMBORN. I believe you both are telling us very openly and

honestly everything that you’re aware of. It is just that when I
25

hear some of the rumors floating around about massive reductions

in our nuclear stockpile and I see our President saying unusual

things in an open microphone it just makes me, you know, really,

really wonder if there is something there that we don’t know about.

So, thank you for your answers. I believe you were giving us everything you are aware of.

What are the advantages or disadvantages of deMIRVing our

ICBMs? Are there only advantages, or are there also disadvantages?

General KEHLER. Congressman, I think the advantages are twofold. First of all, it is one of the ways that we are going forward

to get down to the central limits of the New START Treaty, the

1,550 warheads.

Secondly though, there is a stability issue related to the intercontinental ballistic missiles and how many warheads they carry,

and as part of the policy discussion that goes with the deterrence,

there has been a long-standing view that a highly MIRVed [multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle-equipped] ICBM in

an existing silo can in fact be destabilizing. And, the theory goes

that that is because it is theoretically vulnerable; and, therefore,

the more valuable it is with the number of warheads that you hang

on it, the more likely it is that an adversary of any kind would

want to try to eliminate it quickly and perhaps stimulate some

kind of a response in a crisis.

And so, the idea is to bring them down to one reentry vehicle per

ICBM to essentially reduce their strategic value. That’s the pathway that we have been on for quite some time. I support that. I

think that that is the right way to go forward for both of those reasons. I also believe that maintaining the ability to go back to a

MIRV in the future as a hedge is also the right thing to do.

Mr. LAMBORN. Because it has a deterrent value; right? The more

MIRV capable, the more deterrent value, apart from what you said

a minute ago?

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. A hedge strategy has deterrent value.

I would agree with that, yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. And that kind of leads to my last question. What

is the Air Force’s plans, and if you need to bring someone else up

or I should wait for Panel 2, let me know, to a nuclear-capable airlaunched cruise missile and when is such a capability needed and

where do we stand with that?

General KEHLER. I’ll take that one.

We are committed to retain a standoff weapon for the current

generation of long-range bombers, specifically the B–52. We’re also

committed to have a standoff capability as well as a penetration capability in the new long-range strike platform. By the way, that

will be both conventional and nuclear. So, we will have conventional standoff weapons as well as the ability to penetrate and deliver weapons, et cetera. And, I support both of those.

The current air-launched cruise missile is also aging. We are

keeping it in good shape today with a series of sustainment investments. And so, right now it looks like the long-range standoff

weapon will be necessary in the mid to late 2020s, just depending

on the progress of the new long-range strike platform. And, we believe and the Air Force believes, my Air Force component believes
26

that we can continue to sustain the ALCM [Air-Launched Cruise

Missile] and the W–80 warhead that is in it until then.

We are going to watch that very carefully, though, to make sure

that is true. And, if there are indications that that is not true, then

we intend to work with the Air Force to try to accelerate the longrange standoff weapon.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

General Kehler, you are the combatant commander for nuclear

weapons, and as such, you are the warfighter for implementing the

President’s nuclear weapons employment guidance and the President’s Nuclear Posture View. So, these are your requirements that

you are implementing. So, what I would like to turn to is the first

section of questions that I was asking the Secretary going to the

issue of DOD financial support for NNSA, concerns that you have

concerning both with management and performance of NNSA on

how it goes to the function that you have. We already went through

the long list of things that are being delayed and are not being

completed, and they’re not all budgetary, as were acknowledged in

this hearing. Are you satisfied with NNSA’s performance? Do you

have concerns about management and performance?

General KEHLER. Sir, first of all, have I mentioned the need to

have a replacement for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine,

just so I am clear on that?

Second, Congressman, I would say this: We are always satisfied

with the product that we get from NNSA. The concern that I have

is making sure we are on a path to get the product. That is as

clearly I think as I can describe it.

Mr. TURNER. There are signs that are troubling to you; right?

You would have that concern even if they were performing; right?

But they are not necessarily performing; right? So your concern is

being met with actual performance issues that need to be addressed?

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, the word ‘‘performance’’ troubles me a little bit here because, again, in the product that we get

from NNSA, from the laboratories, through the industrial complex,

I don’t have any complaints.

Mr. TURNER. The product you have?

General KEHLER. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. TURNER. What you have you mean?

General KEHLER. Right.

Mr. TURNER. The thing we are focusing on are the products that

you want to get, the future ones. And those you have from what

I understand concerns about the management structure, performance, and I would like to hear those.

General KEHLER. Yes. What I have are concerns about two

things. Number one, I have a concern about what happens beyond

fiscal year 2013, as I have said a number of times. I think the

words that we have been using here is whether or not we have a

comprehensive and definitive plan, and the answer right now is we

do not. We do not have a comprehensive or definitive plan. That

concerns me as I sit here as the customer, if you will, as the user

of the product that is put out by NNSA.
27

Mr. TURNER. In addition to the absence of the plan, you’d have

concern about the substance of that plan; right? I mean, there are

performance timelines and metrics that you need satisfied?

General KEHLER. Exactly.

Mr. TURNER. And, so both that plan has to be completed, it has

to be substantively sufficient to meet your needs, and then there

has to be the capability of implementing it?

General KEHLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. And I believe you have concerns on those three,

even beyond just the existence of the plan, what the substance of

the plan would be, and the ability of NNSA to implement it?

General KEHLER. To execute it; yes, sir. And, I would throw all

of the stuff you mentioned, when I say I am concerned about the

plan, those are the things that I mean. It is all of those factors, and

then being able to implement it with sufficient investment that

goes behind that. And again, as I said in my opening remarks, my

job is to be the advocate for these things. And, as long as I am the

advocate for these things, I will have concerns until we get to the

point where there is a plan in place that we know we can execute.

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, your new headquarters is being

built through the military construction authorities available to the

Department of Defense and through the oversight of the authorization and appropriations committees of Congress. Do you have confidence in that process and what are the attributes of that process?

I am going to give you a specific.

Would you say that it’s a plus for you to know that going into

a project that 20-percent design stage implementation can occur?

When you are at that 20 percent and you’ve got the approval, the

congressional authorizers and appropriators are all on board with

the project, Congress has committed to providing the authorizations and appropriations needed for the project every year. Would

you be concerned if you didn’t know each year whether the project

was going to be funded because of a continuing resolution or final

appropriations bill that may not come until December or even April

for a fiscal year that has begun on October 1? Basically as you are

looking at your construction, the processes that Congress goes

through affects your confidence and your ability for completion.

You have a standard of a 20-percent design stage and there certainly are some benefits to that, there are some benefits to the current processes that you have. Can you speak to that for a minute

and also then your concerns of how congressional unstable funding

can affect your completion?

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that I believe

that the basic rules of acquisition apply in the case of a major

project, in our case a new command and control complex, that is

supported by military construction. First, you have to have good requirements. And second, you have to have stability. You have to

have stability in requirements and you have to have stability in investment. And so, my answer would be that stability, whether

that’s annual appropriations from Congress to make sure that we

are stable or other kinds of stability are critical to make sure that

we can deliver on time.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.
28

With that, I want to thank this panel for their answers. And we

will be moving on to Panel 2, and so we will take a short recess

as we are changing panels. Thank you.

[Brief recess.]

Mr. TURNER. We will reconvene.

On our second panel, which I would like to welcome, we have the

Honorable Thomas P. D’Agostino, Administrator, NNSA and Under

Secretary for Nuclear Security, U.S. Department of Energy; we

have Mr. David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for Environmental

Management, U.S. Department of Energy; and the Honorable Peter

S. Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

We will begin with Mr. D’Agostino.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Chairman Turner, members of the committee, good afternoon and thank you for having me here today to

discuss the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. Your ongoing support for the men and women of NNSA and the work they

do, as well as your bipartisan leadership on some of the most challenging national security issues of our time has helped keep the

American people safe, protect our allies, and enhance global security.

In February 2013, President Obama released his budget for fiscal

year 2013. Now more than ever before, the fiscal constraints facing

our Nation cause us to ensure that we are targeting the Nation’s

investments in nuclear deterrent and nuclear security with precision and effectiveness.

I want to assure you that the NNSA is being thoughtful, pragmatic, and efficient in how we achieve the President’s nuclear security objectives and shape the future of nuclear security.

President Obama shared his vision for a united approach to our

shared nuclear security goals in Prague in April of 2009. His request for the NNSA in 2013 is $11.5 billion, an increase of $536

million over the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. This demonstrates

a continued affirmation of the Administration’s commitment to investing in a modern, 21st-century nuclear security enterprise. We

are focused on continuing our critical work to maintain the Nation’s nuclear stockpile and ensuring that it remain safe, secure

and effective.

The budget request provides $7.58 billion for the weapons activities account to implement the President’s nuclear deterrent strategy with our partners at the Department of Defense. The President

continues to support our life extension programs, including funding

for the B61 warhead activities. Consistent with the President’s

2012 request, we have requested increased funding for our stockpile systems to support the W–78 and W–88 life extension studies.

Our request for investments in the science, technology, and engineering that support NNSA’s missions will ensure that the national

security laboratories continue to lead the world in advance scientific capabilities. For over a decade, we have been building the

tools and capabilities needed to take care of that stockpile, as well
29

as a large and dynamic range of national security work, before utilizing these tools and capability towards the mission of maintaining

a safe, secure and effective stockpile while performing the necessary life extension work. Additionally, these capabilities provide

a critical base for our nonproliferation and counterterrorism work,

allowing us to apply our investments to the full scope of the nuclear security mission.

This budget includes $2.24 billion to maintain our infrastructure

and execute our construction projects. To support our stockpile and

provide us with world-class capabilities, we need to modernize our

Cold War-era facilities and maintain the Nation’s expertise in uranium processing and plutonium research. We are adjusting our

near-term plutonium strategy by deferring—not canceling—by deferring construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility Project in order to focus our limited resources on the highest priority requirements.

We can meet our plutonium needs on an interim basis, using the

capability and expertise found in existing facilities. Deferring of

this project will have an estimated cost avoidance of approximately

$1.8 billion over the next 5 years, which will help offset the cost

of other priorities such as the weapons lifetime extension programs

and construction of the greatly needed Uranium Processing Facility

at the Y–12 national security complex in Tennessee.

The UPF project is our highest priority capital project requiring

immediate modernization. As you know, our deterrent is only one

part of NNSA’s mission. 2013 will see us continue to advance the

President’s 4-year goal to secure vulnerable nuclear material

around the world. The budget request provides $2.46 billion we

need to continue critical nonproliferation efforts.

Our continued focus on innovative and ambitious nonproliferation and nuclear security is vital. The threat is not gone, and the

consequences of nuclear terrorism and state proliferation would be

devastating. Detonation of a nuclear device anywhere in the world

would lead to overwhelming economic, political and psychological

consequences. We must remain committed to reducing the risk of

nuclear terrorism and state based proliferation.

Anne Harrington and I recently attended the nuclear summit in

Seoul, South Korea, where the President and over 50 world leaders

renewed their commitment to nuclear security. We know there is

no silver bullet solution which is why we continue to implement a

multilayered strategy to strengthen the security of nuclear material around the world and maintaining our commitment to detecting and deterring nuclear smuggling.

$1.1 billion is requested for the Naval reactors program, which

will support the Navy’s effort to complete the Ohio class replacement submarine and modernize key elements of our infrastructure.

Support for the President’s request is essential for our continued

ability to support the mission of the nuclear Navy.

This budget request also gives us the resources we need to maintain our one of a kind emergency response capabilities, allowing us

to respond to a nuclear or radiological incident anywhere in the

world and anticipate the future of nuclear counterterrorism and

counterproliferation.
30

We are committed as well to being responsible stewards of the

taxpayer dollars. We have taken steps to ensure that we are building a capabilities-based infrastructure and enterprise focused on future enterprise requirements. We view this constrained environment as an additional incentive to ask ourselves how can we

rethink the way we are operating, how we can further innovate,

and how we can improve our business processes.

We are not resting on old ideas to solve tomorrow’s problems. We

are shaping the future of security in a fiscally responsible way.

Budget uncertainty adds cost and complexity to how we achieve

our goals. You have been very supportive of our efforts in the past,

and I ask you again for your help in providing the stability we need

to do our jobs efficiently and effectively.

We are improving our business processes by implementing international consensus standards on quality management, and we are

looking forward to shaping the proper workforce through our workforce analysis. For example, taking a look at international standards such as ISO 9001. We are continuously improving, and I look

forward to getting into the details in the question and answer session.

[The prepared statement of Secretary D’Agostino can be found in

the Appendix on page 101.]

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Huizenga.

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. HUIZENGA, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. HUIZENGA. Good afternoon, Chairman Turner and members

of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today with my boss

and with Chairman Winokur as well to discuss the important, positive things we are doing for the Nation through the ongoing efforts

of the environmental management program and to address your

questions regarding our fiscal year 2013 budget request.

Our request of $5.65 billion enables the Office of Environmental

Management to continue the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and Government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Our

cleanup priorities are based on risk and our continuing efforts to

meet our regulatory compliance commitments. Completing cleanup

promotes the economic vitality of the communities surrounding our

sites and enables other crucial daily missions to continue. By reducing the cleanup footprint, we are lowering the cost of security

and other overall activities that would otherwise continue for years

to come.

In August 2011, the Office of Environmental Management was

aligned under the Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. This realignment promotes the natural synergies that exist between the Office of Environmental Management and NNSA.

For example, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, we are

working with NNSA to accelerate the transfer of certain components of the uranium-233 inventory. This inventory is valuable for

national security applications and supports NNSA’s missions related to safety, nuclear emergency response, and special nuclear

material measurement and detection. This innovation and initia-
31

tive will result in cost savings for our program and enable us to

move forward with cleanup of nuclear facilities in the heart of the

Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

Over the years, the Office of Environmental Management has

made significant progress in accelerating environmental cleanup

across the departmental complex. For example, last December at

the Defense Waste Processing Facility in our Savannah River site

in South Carolina, we solidified a record 37 canisters of highly radioactive waste, marking the most canisters filled in 1 month in

the facility’s 15-year history.

Out west at the site in Moab in Utah, we’ve celebrated the removal of 5 million tons of uranium tailings from the site to a safe

location away from the Colorado River.

Through 2011, we safely conducted over 10,000 shipments of

transuranic waste to the waste isolation pilot plant in New Mexico,

the world’s largest operating deep geologic repository. As you can

see from these accomplishments, the Office of Environmental Management has made great progress and will continue to do so with

your help.

We cannot have achieved such notable accomplishments without

an outstanding Federal and contractor workforce. The safety of our

workers is a core value that is incorporated into every aspect of our

program. We have maintained a strong safety record and continuously strive for an accident and incident free workplace. We seek

to continue improvements in the area of safety by instituting corrective actions and aggressively promoting lessons learned across

the sites.

In collaboration with the Department’s Office of Health Safety

and Security and our field sites, we are working to achieve a

stronger safety culture within our program and thereby improve

safe construction and operation of our facilities.

In this regard, on March 22, I attended a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board hearing chaired by my fellow panel member

Chairman Winokur regarding the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at Hanford. At the hearing, we discussed the status

of the board’s technical concern regarding vessel mixing as well as

erosion and corrosion issues. We had an in-depth discussion of safety culture at the WTP project. I believe we are making steady

progress in both addressing the DNFSB’s [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board] technical concerns and promoting the safety culture at WTP.

We will continue to identify opportunities to reduce the lifecycle

cost of our program, including the development of new technologies

and other strategic investments. We continue working with the

Government Accountability Office to institutionalize improvements

in contracting and project management. We have established

project-sponsored positions at headquarters for all capital asset

projects, and conduct regular peer reviews of our most complex

projects. We are including U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel

who have demonstrated experience in project and contract management on these project peer review teams. We are committed to becoming a best in class performer in this area.

Chairman Turner and other members of the subcommittee, we

will continue to apply innovative cleanup strategies so that we can
32

complete quality work safely, on schedule, and within cost, thereby

demonstrating value to the American taxpayers.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga can be found in the

Appendix on page 139.]

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Winokur.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER S. WINOKUR, CHAIRMAN,

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you, Chairman Turner and members of the

subcommittee. I am Peter Winokur, the Chairman of the Defense

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, known as the DNFSB.

I submitted a written statement for the record that describes the

board’s mission and highlights a number of safety issues that are

particularly important to ensuring that the defense nuclear complex can safely accomplish its missions. I will provide a brief summary of my written testimony for your consideration today.

The DNFSB was established by Congress in 1988 to provide safety oversight for the defense nuclear facilities operated by DOE and

NNSA. We are the only agency that provides independent safety

oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities.

As the defense nuclear complex evolves, we cannot ignore the

growing challenges that will define the future of DOE’s nuclear facilities, the need for Federal stewardship of this enterprise, and the

Federal commitment to protect the health and safety of the workers and the public. Today’s challenges of aged infrastructure, design and construction of new replacement facilities, and the undertaking of a wide variety of new activities in defense nuclear facilities requires continued vigilance and safety oversight to ensure

public and worker protection.

The board’s budget is essentially devoted to maintaining and

supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists, nearly all of

whom have technical masters degrees or doctorates to accomplish

our highly specialized work.

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2013 includes

$29.415 million in new budget authority for the board. It will support 120 personnel, the target we have been growing toward for the

last several years. We believe this level of staffing is needed to provided sufficient independent safety oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear complex given the pace and scope of DOE activities.

The board evaluates DOE’s activities in the context of integrated

safety management. Integrated safety management is a processbased approach that builds tailored safety controls into operating

procedures and facility designs as they are developed. Integrated

safety management is efficient and effective for everything from replacing a valve to designing a multibillion dollar facility. DOE has

embraced this process in its policies and directives as a fundamental means of achieving adequate protection of workers and the

public.

Shortcomings in safety and efficiency in DOE’s defense nuclear

facilities can almost always be related to a failure to effectively

apply integrated safety management. For complex, high-hazard nuclear operations, a performance-based outcome approach may appear successful on the surface but underlying weaknesses and proc-
33

esses can lead to serious accidents and unwanted results. It is critical that DOE avoid the low-probability, high-consequence event

that can cripple a facility or program and endanger workers and

the public.

DOE and NNSA are designing and building new defense nuclear

facilities with a total project cost on the order of $20 billion. I cannot overstate the importance of integrating safety into the design

for these facilities at an early stage. Failing to do this will lead to

surprises and costly changes later in the process.

The board is committed to the early resolution of safety issues

with DOE. To that end, we publicly document significant unresolved technical differences between the board and DOE concerning

design and construction projects in quarterly reports to Congress.

Even though the concept of safety and design is embodied in

DOE’s directives and is constantly emphasized by the board, safety

issues have arisen due to DOE and its contractors changing safety

aspects of a design of major new facilities without sufficient basis.

One of the most prominent examples involved the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant under construction at Hanford and

the uranium processing facility plant at the Y–12 national security

complex. Making such changes without adequately understanding

the associated technical difficulties, complexities or project risk involved can reduce the safety margin of the design, create new safety issues, and imperil the success of the project.

The board is continuing to urge NNSA to replace unsound facilities and invest in infrastructure for the future. The 9212 Complex

at Y–12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building at

Los Alamos are both well overdue for replacement.

Since 2004, the board has issued an annual report to Congress

on aging and degrading facilities. We will continue to update this

report periodically to highlight the greatest infrastructure needs affecting safety of DOE and NNSA defense nuclear facilities.

In addition to rebuilding its production infrastructure, DOE is attempting to achieve more efficient operations by creating and testing new governance models that rely more on its line organizations

for safety oversight, reduce its safety directives, and reduce contract requirements. The board has devoted considerable extensive

resources toward reviewing DOE’s changes in directives, governance, and oversight. Safety and efficiency need not be mutually exclusive objectives if carefully managed.

Finally, the need to constantly assess and maintain a strong

safety cultural throughout the DOE defense nuclear complex has

emerged as an imperative for the Department of Energy. The hazards posed by a failed safety culture are real and have led to costly

disasters in industry. Lessons learned from the Fukushima reactor

accident in Japan and the Deepwater Horizon oil well blowout in

the Gulf of Mexico give powerful testament to a strong safety culture.

Mr. TURNER. It looks like we will perhaps be having votes in the

middle of the series of this. So I will have to ask your indulgence

as we are going to at some point during the questioning have to

take a break, so I appreciate that, and perhaps you can incorporate

any additional . . .

Dr. WINOKUR. I am finishing up right now.
34

Let me add in closing that the bulk of issues that the board has

safety concerns about are addressed at the staff level without any

need for a letter or recommendation. I am confident that the board

is working with DOE’s liaison to the board to establish an increasingly effective working relationship between the board and DOE. I

believe the board’s relationship with Deputy Secretary Poneman

has never been better.

That ends my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions

you may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the Appendix on page 150.]

Mr. TURNER. I’ve just been informed that we have about 35 minutes, so perhaps if we can make it through this and conclude.

Throughout all of my questions and my opening statement and

I think concerns that you have heard from members of the panel

has been the issue of the abandonment by the Administration in

this budgetary request of the commitment to the modernization

plan that was put forward both in the New START implementation

and the 1251 plan. We have statements from the President, DOD,

this committee, the Senate and House, and the Senate in the adoption of New START that directly reference the CMRR facility. It

was identified as necessary; not merely desirable, but necessary.

Now, Administrator D’Agostino, you have the benefit of having

appeared before this subcommittee seven times starting in 2006

when you were Deputy NNSA Administrator. Looking through the

record of those appearances, almost every time we see that you

stress to this subcommittee how important the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement, CMRR, Facility is and how the capabilities it will provide are critical to sustaining a stockpile.

Again, not desirable, but critical.

And even today, if you look at the statement that you just read

to us, and in the written statement you provided, for us, the words

‘‘critical,’’ ‘‘vital,’’ ‘‘necessary,’’ appear repeatedly when you talk

about the elements of the issues of the execution of the NNSA performance and our nuclear deterrence.

So, for example, in February 2008, you said that the surveillance

and other capabilities that would be provided by the CMRR would

be ‘‘essential to maintaining the existing stockpile.’’

Your 2008 testimony elaborated, saying, quote: ‘‘A sufficient capacity to produce plutonium pits for nuclear warheads is an essential part of a responsive national security enterprise and is required for as long as we retain a nuclear deterrent. Currently, we

have a very small production capability capacity at Los Alamos National Laboratory, about 10 pits per year, and NNSA has evaluated

a variety of future pit production alternatives. Whether we continue on our existing path or if we move towards an RRW [Reliable

Replacement Warhead]-based stockpile, we will need a capacity to

produce about 50 to 80 pits per year. To do this’’—still your

words—‘‘we would use existing facilities with the addition of a new

CMRR nuclear facility. Our approach would provide sufficient production capability to support smaller stockpile sizes, particularly

when coupled with potential reuse of pits.’’

By these statements, it looks like NNSA evaluated pit reuse previously, but rejected an over-reliance on reuse because it would not
35

meet the requirements for responsive infrastructure. Of course

some would say that was 2008 when you worked for a different

President. But here is what you told this subcommittee just last

April when you did work for President Obama, referring to CMRR

and the Uranium Processing Facility, UPF, you stated: ‘‘These capital projects are key elements for ensuring safe, secure, reliable

uranium and plutonium capabilities for nuclear security and other

important missions.’’

In your comments just last April, you defined responsive as: ‘‘We

have identified that in our plan as having a uranium processing facility that is up and running, having a CMRR facility that is available to do the surveillance work on our stockpile and help support

a modest amount of pit manufacturing capability. But one thing we

have clear with the Defense Department and the National Nuclear

Security Administration is our understanding that it is important

to be able to demonstrate that our infrastructure is responsive.’’

Today, you tell us that the CMRR facility is no longer needed for

at least 5 years. I am not certain as this committee tries to evaluate this how we determine if it is credible. And in fact, I would

want to say it this way. If we take your testimony and if we put

it in front of the committee and allowed it to vote, your testimony

today would be outweighed by your previous testimony. So it begs

a few questions. Who are we to believe, you from now or you 4

years ago? What are the actual requirements for pit production capacity? What do we really need to see in terms of responsiveness?

Why was a reliance on pit reuse insufficient a few years ago but

it is suddenly okay today?

We have heard that you think NNSA has a plan, a revised plutonium strategy. You have provided the committee two pages of bullet points, and we do not believe that this is a plan. We believe it’s

a fig leaf to cover the Administration while it scrambles to figure

out the repercussions of its hasty decision, and it was its decision,

it was not based on the Budget Control Act, to terminate the

CMRR facility.

Now, we have a memorandum dated February 13, 2012, from

Donald Cook and it is for Kevin Smith, Manager, Los Alamos Site

Office. And this letter shows that you don’t actually have a plan.

In fact, it shows that you have given Los Alamos National Laboratory 60 days to scrape together a plan, meanwhile the original plutonium plan, the CMRR plan that was put together over the course

of a decade has been thrown out, and I just want to reference this

memo for a moment, the February 13th memo.

On page 2, it says: ‘‘The assignment is a high-level plan containing a sequence of actions and resources required each fiscal

year over the fiscal year 2014 to 2018 as a result of delay in the

CMRR.’’

The decision had already been made, and now the question is

well, what do we do? There was not a: ‘‘what do we do and then

we can delay the plan.’’ There was: ‘‘let’s delay the plan, now what

do we do?’’

General Kehler, NNSA’s customer in many senses, doesn’t seem

to think that you have a plan either. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee just 3 weeks ago, General Kehler

was asked about deferment of CMRR, and said: ‘‘The plan to up-
36

grade what we call CMRR, or the Chemical and Metallurgy Building, that allows us to process plutonium is not in place. This has

been slipped fairly far to the right, 5 to 7 years depending on which

of the documents you look at. I am concerned about that, and I am

concerned about our ability to provide for the deployed stockpile. I

will be concerned until someone presents a plan.’’

You heard him. He said it before also. There is no plan that we

can look at and be comfortable with and understand that it’s being

supported.

‘‘So I am not saying that there isn’t a way forward. I am hopeful

that there is.’’ This is General Kehler. Hopeful. We have a General

that has to be hopeful. ‘‘We just don’t have it yet; and until we do,

as a customer I am concerned.’’

Based on your testimony to other committees, Administrator

D’Agostino, I understand that the CMRR decision was primarily

budget driven; is that right?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The budget situation that the country

finds itself in very clearly is an element, but there are other factors. And, with your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I would like to explain.

Mr. TURNER. Please.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay. An important point, number one, I

want to be very clear on, the country needs a chemistry and metallurgy replacement facility on a nuclear site. It needs the capabilities that that facility provides. It has to have those capabilities.

And, the capabilities are very simply material characterization in

analytical chemistry work to work on plutonium, in order to do surveillance, as you have mentioned, sir. Those capabilities the country must have, those capabilities the country does have, and those

capabilities exist and can exist in existing facilities that the NNSA

and the country has at its disposal.

The fact is, of course, the budget situation, the financial situation

the country unfortunately finds itself in, the Budget Control Act,

I understood the discussion earlier, but it is a reality.

The other piece of reality I have to deal with is the appropriation

I received from Congress last December, just one month before the

roll-out of the President’s budget for fiscal year 2013, which reduced our budget by over $400 million, including $100 million reduction on the CMRR facility. Pulling all of these pieces together

provide kind of that fiscal incapability background that we had to

deal with, but a couple of things that have changed in the past

year that will illuminate the technical situation on with respect to

this facility and why I believe firmly that we are on solid ground

with the needs that we have on plutonium capability and materials

characterization.

The first is that we have an existing facility, a brand new facility

called a Radiation Laboratory Utility Office Building. This is a facility at Los Alamos right next to PF–4, our plutonium facility, and

this facility we have looked at the safety basis documentation, and

by using modern dose conversion factors, we were able to increase

by a factor of 4 the amount of material we can use in that particular building. That opens the world right up for us in order to

be able to do a significant amount of surveillance work that we

need to do in that facility. This did not exist over a year ago. It
37

exists right now, and that provides the Nation and it provides us

with a lot of flexibility.

The second particular piece that has changed in the last 12

months is a significant—one of the areas that the CMR——

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry, I have to interject here for a second.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure.

Mr. TURNER. This building fell out of the sky? I mean, it wasn’t

a plan, it wasn’t something you knew was going to be there, and

your testimony over the past 7 years, and considering the record

of construction I am certain that there was a significant amount of

lead time. Can you please describe to us how the existence of this

building somehow changes your previous testimony where clearly

that building must have been in the process and its capabilities

must have been in the process, so when you say a year ago, I

am——

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. A year ago—the Radiation Laboratory

Utility Office Building is a brand-new facility that we are placing

into operation right now, Mr. Chairman, and the key here——

Mr. TURNER. There was no period of planning, designing, it just

showed up?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely not. Of course, we planned and

designed this facility, and over many years we ended up putting

this facility in place.

Mr. TURNER. Were you unaware of the capabilities when you

were——

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. No, we are very well aware of the capabilities.

Mr. TURNER. Then how is it that it didn’t affect your testimony

before but it does now when its existence clearly was something

that was anticipated?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, I may not have been very

clear when I was talking earlier. We have used modern dose conversion factors. We have looked at the safety basis documentation

and revised that safety basis documentation within the past year.

This was a significant amount of work. We went through a process,

and as a result of that we were able to increase the amount of plutonium we can use in these facilities significantly, from four grams

of plutonium up to like 34 grams of plutonium. So it is actually a

part and parcel of the project.

Mr. TURNER. Wait a minute. You know, these things are difficult

for us to understand——

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure.

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. Because, you know, obviously we are

not the experts like you guys are, and, you know, when we get your

testimony year after year and time after time, and we go to rely

on it and then we suddenly get testimony that is completely different, I mean, it is not as if we have a different D’Agostino standing in front of us.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Same person, sir.

Mr. TURNER. Same guy. It would—I mean, we just have to apply

logic, right? So if you have this—I mean, you are recommending

that the CMRR be delayed 5 years, not that it be eliminated.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. That is right, the country does need a

long-term sustainable capability in this area. What we have right
38

now is an opportunity by using existing facility to do the work that

we, that the CMRR nuclear facility represents, and the radiation

laboratory is actually a part of the CMRR project. What we have

been able to do with additional analysis is say previously we were

limited by between 4 and 8 grams of certain different isotopes of

plutonium to work in that building. Because we have sharpened

our pencil, we have used modern dose conversion factors, within

the past year we have determined that that amount of plutonium

can now be increased without any increased risk to the public or

the workforce to up in the order of 30 grams. That is a very significant increase in the amount of work we can do in this radiation

laboratory. We didn’t want to take that count on this happening 2

years ago. We weren’t sure that we would be able to do all of the

analysis. But we finished that analysis within the past year. That

provides the country with a lot of flexibility.

I still believe, and I stand by the testimony, that the capabilities

that these facilities provide are absolutely essential in order for us

to do our job.

Mr. TURNER. So your answer is that it is not merely budgetary?

Because that was my question.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The budgetary piece certainly sets the

tone and the environment on this particular area because this is

essentially, particularly given the concerns and looking at the seismic issues, working with the defense board, looking at the seismic

issues, we were talking about a multibillion dollar facility here, as

the committee is well aware, and as a result of that, given the

pressures that we had, we decided instead of going simultaneously

with two large multibillion dollar facilities on top of each other to

move them apart in time, and in essence allow us to focus on the

most important thing that the Nation needs because we know that

this thing that we moved to the right by 5 years or so, the Nation——

Mr. TURNER. Or so. Well, what would the ‘‘or so’’ be?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, we have to finish essentially our

analysis, we have to make sure that we get the uranium processing

facility right and that we still maintain that capability to use the

Superblock facility at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and to stage

material at device assembly facility as well as complete the work

in the CMR radiation building. So we want to take full advantage

of the investments the Nation has made over the last 10 years, particularly building the radiation building as well as take advantage

of the new missions that we have moved to the device assembly facility in Nevada and the reduction in the amount of material at the

Superblock.

Mr. TURNER. You have heard a number of people today, and I am

certain you are aware of prior testimony.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right.

Mr. TURNER. That have been pretty condemning of NNSA.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right.

Mr. TURNER. ‘‘Broken’’ is a word that’s been used frequently. We

have had, you know, in private meetings the representatives from

DOD have said that both they and Congress should be outraged

over the lack of performance by NNSA. When you are trying to

manage something, obviously one of the issues that you look at is
39

what is your metric, right? What are you going to measure and

what is the outcome in that measurement? In this instance with

NNSA, people have a lot of unfinished projects where there is no

ability to measure because there is no performance. There are

areas where people are concerned not only that there is not a plan

to address the fact that there hasn’t been performance, but what

that implementation will be when there is a plan that people

haven’t seen, and many times the plans themselves, as you know,

are late, and I would like you to respond to that.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure. Certainly, I would be glad to.

Mr. TURNER. You have to have some concerns yourself, and if you

echo their sentiments, I would like to know that also.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. I have been looking forward to

taking this question actually after listening to your comments earlier today. Management involves essentially people and processes

focused on getting the mission done, and frankly, in that standpoint, leadership is about establishing that vision. But I take the

measurements from the standpoint of what have we accomplished.

Let’s think about what has actually happened over the last number

of years. The W76——

Mr. TURNER. Just pause for a second. I think we are all familiar

with what happened. What our focus is on, which is why there is

congressional oversight, are the things that aren’t happening, why

they aren’t happening, and when they are going to happen. So perhaps you could give us some focus on—because that I would assume—I mean, your management focus would not be on a victory

lap, it would be on your to-do list, and I am concerned about your

to-do list, so let’s focus on those things that aren’t getting done.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I think it is important, though, since you

started off the question, sir, with talking about lack of performance

that the NNSA has actually performed very well over the last couple of years, and I would like to get on the record the work we have

done on the W76, getting that job done, operationalizing the national ignition facility project, putting the radiation laboratory

building into operation, and in fact increasing the workload by that

facility by a factor of four, moving nuclear material out of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in order——

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry, you were doing that so quickly, we are

having a discussion up here, did you just say W76 completed?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. No.

Mr. TURNER. Okay.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I said the production work and full production mode on the W76.

Mr. TURNER. Because it’s delayed how long?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. We have got a production rate that——

Mr. TURNER. How long is the W76 delayed?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The finishing of the work that we jointly

agreed to with the Defense Department pushes us back to 2019 in

order to meet the Navy’s operational memo.

Mr. TURNER. A 3-year period is my understanding?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Two years. But we are well under way on

production on a very complicated system that the Nation relies

upon. I want to talk about the future, since I think this is the piece
40

that you were interested on what is happening out in the future

from a governance standpoint.

We are focused, and we work with the laboratories, laboratory directors, in fact we met with them earlier this morning on looking

at a revised governance approach consistent with the idea that we

have hired solid companies to put things, bring their best to bear,

using international and national consensus standards, taking advantage of those particular standards, and looking at what directives we can adjust in order to simplify and streamline. This is

about continuous improvement. This is not about a magic pill that

one can take.

So we’ve done this before. We have experience in this area. At

the Kansas City plant, we’ve implemented consensus standards

there, we’ve seen an increase in performance, we’ve seen safety

numbers improve fairly significantly, and we expect as a result of

all of this when our new facility is built to save over $100 million

a year in doing this. We’ve worked with our laboratory directors in,

specifically we’ve identified 28 directives that they considered burdensome directives, 25 of those directives have been resolved. We’ll

be glad to provide the subcommittee with the details of that if

you’re interested.

In the security area specifically we’ve stepped out, we’ve taken

a look at the DOE orders in the security areas, and for the NNSA

we’ve streamlined them into two particular policies in orders and

directives, just two from the whole list in order to streamline those,

in order to clarify what some might consider too much directives,

too many potentially conflicting items. As a result of our stepping

out in that particular area, we have decreased, we have managed

to increase our security performance and decrease the security

costs by over 10 percent in that 2-year period, bringing technology

to bear. So, on governance, I think this is a particularly important

point.

Mr. TURNER. Before you go into the next, you were just talking

about the rules.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Right.

Mr. TURNER. We do have a slide show, it is a 9-minute slide

show that we are going to run during the discussion that have, our

understanding is that there are 270 DOD rules, orders, and directives that apply to NNSA; DOE, I am sorry, 270 DOE rules and

orders and directives that apply to NNSA, and they put together

a slide show of those. Because you have mentioned them as being

a constraint for you, and I would agree.

You can finish.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay. So, what we have stepped out over

the past years, and we are implementing out into the future is a

review board, an order review board where we evaluate each one

of the directives and orders that we have that apply to NNSA contractors, we examine them in detail with our contractors in order

to find out what elements of those orders might be into the ‘‘what’’

category versus ‘‘how.’’ We want to try to separate out the responsibilities to give the flexibilities to our M&O contractors, who are

very capable, to let them figure out the best way to achieve the impact or the net results, and as a result of that 12, we have changed

the contracts on 12 of these particular orders to simplify and
41

streamline them, and we have a number of other particular orders,

another slice of orders, if you will, that we’ve already looked at.

But we have to do a lot more than that, frankly, in my opinion.

We’ve made a few changes in our organizational structure. We’ve

created an acquisition project management organization in order to

address the question of projects being late, to make sure that the

contracts folks and the project people are working together to put

together the best model in place. Bob Raines is the head of that

organization. He has significant experience in this particular area

in order to make that happen.

The other thing we have done from an organizational standpoint,

and we’re not reaping the benefits of all these yet because this is

the things that we have done just within the past year, but we are

moving out on them, is we have hired Michael Lemke from the

Naval reactors organization. He has had experience in combining

site office organizations and driving efficiencies in Naval reactors.

We are going to take that expertise in that area, and we plugged

him in, last week was his first week on the job, and he was with

us this morning with the laboratory directors, and we’re looking at

how do we drive those same types of efficiencies into the weapons

side of the program, particularly addressing the nuclear security

and national security work that we have to do. There is a tremendous amount of opportunity.

Mr. TURNER. Obviously we have been very lenient with your time

period, so we are going to go to our next question.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay.

Mr. TURNER. If you would like to submit for the record the

extention of what you have accomplished, that would be great.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 239.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I would like to. I could talk probably for

hours on this.

Mr. TURNER. Going to the additional issues of the to-do list and

the things at NNSA that need corrected, it is our understanding

that the fiscal year 2013 funding request for the W76 life extension

program has contained an error. Is this true? And if so, is the Administration going to ask Congress to fix this item and is there an

understanding yet what the fix item would be to correct the error?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Within the DO—directed stockpile work

account we have the resources to make sure that we have the right

number in the W76 life extension production rate, and we will

work with the committee on that.

Mr. TURNER. Is the number wrong?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The number reflects an earlier assessment on production rate which we don’t have anymore. So we have

to increase the number.

Mr. TURNER. So it’s wrong?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Within the directed stockpile work account we have the right amount of money in order to fix this problem.

Mr. TURNER. But you are fixing something, a number that is in

error? If you don’t say yes, that is fine, I will say yes for you. I

mean, it obviously, if that—if you are going to have to be fixing it,

I would assume that it is an error.
42

Now, on this issue of NNSA and what needs to be fixed—and by

the way, the 9-minute slide is only of the titles of the rules and regulations that you are under that you were mentioning. It takes 9

minutes just to go through the titles.

On February 16th we held a hearing with the National Academies of Science and the former lab directors, and we received a

number of recommendations. Their statements were very strong

that NNSA needed to be reformed. Some of those included eliminating transactional oversight and instead judging performance

outcomes based on high level metrics, reducing duplication in

health, safety, and security functions between NNSA and the Department of Energy. A few of them I assume show up there. Following national regulations you mentioned international standards

or industry best practices for basic everyday functions instead of

unique DOE guidance, streamlining DOE and NNSA orders, regulations, and directives to eliminate those that are redundant or do

not add value, and also as an example in response to a question

for the record from a hearing last November, you informed us of

these hearings—these rules and regulations.

What are NNSA and the Department of Energy doing to address

these well documented and chronic problems? And, are there cost

savings to be realized in any of these fixes, and there is a performance issue, but there is a monetary issue. Perhaps you could give

us your insight there.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure, and also given the fact I could probably take 10 minutes to answer this question, I will talk and you

can tell me when to stop, and we will just add the rest for the

record, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 241.]

Mr. TURNER. Sure.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay. We are taking fairly significant action in this particular area. Some of the actions I have described

in my earlier response, so not to repeat myself, I won’t repeat myself in this particular area. Beside the organizational changes,

bringing others in that have experience in combining these, we

have combined our site office organization from Pantex and Y–12

site office organization to drive what we think will be about $100

million a year worth of savings in this particular area. We are

going to be shifting our oversight from what has been called a

transactional level oversight. The performance evaluation plans are

the particular pieces that have concerns by the laboratory directors, and what—in order to make that shift to strategic oversight,

we have to have confidence in the management assurance systems

that the laboratories and plants have in place, and we have that

particular set of confidence in the management assurance systems

at Kansas City, at Sandia, and at Y–12, and so we are going to,

specifically for those three sites, and we are going to be carrying

this across all eight sites, we are going to be working on looking

at once those management assurance systems are fully mature,

shifting the performance evaluation plans to strategic level oversight. Our near-term goal, Mr. Chairman, is to get the first of these

done, frankly, in the June timeframe, which is shifting to strategic

level oversight. That in itself alone will, I believe, provide a signifi-
43

cant shift in the way we look at governance in the NNSA, but we

have to do more than that, of course, because we believe that getting this management assurance system, relying on the contractor

wholly to put its items in place is not just enough, we have to actually take a look at the contract requirements themselves, one, and,

two, take a look at, make sure that our workforce, who is doing the

job we have asked them to do, have shifted themselves because it

is not enough for me to say management improvements and driving

change from my position. It has to happen both in the laboratory

and at the site offices and in headquarters. So I would call that,

you know, day-to-day supervisors understanding the direction we

are going into, relying on our M&O contractors and their assurance

systems and having confidence in that, and in monitoring them at

the strategic level versus these transactional pieces like put the

clipboard and the check boxes.

So that’s our goal, Mr. Chairman, is to get something in place

frankly by the June timeframe at one of our laboratories, and that

was a discussion I had earlier this morning.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Franks is going to be taking the gavel for the

hearing, and I want to recognize Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. D’Agostino, way

back in your testimony you spoke about the December appropriations. Could you go back and review that, the cuts that were made

in your budget in that appropriation.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Garamendi, I will. I’ll probably—I

would like to also take it for the record as well to make sure we

get the full details right down to the last million dollar level, and

we can describe the details. From a broad brush stroke, the—we

received about a $400 million or so reduction in the weapons activities account. This is the account that takes care of the stockpile

itself, and as a result of that the—we had to scale back on the finishing up of the design work on the CMRR nuclear facility itself.

Let me see if I can find it.

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is okay. I just wanted to get in place the

nature of the problem. We’ve spent the better part of 2 hours here

going over the changes that have occurred in previous plans. It

seems to me that those changes are a direct result of a significant

reduction in the budget for NNSA and the rest of the nuclear weapons activities. With that in place, you’ve made an effort to try to

explain to this committee the difference between ‘‘must have’’ and

‘‘nice to have.’’ I would hope that we are listening. It appears as

though and I would like to—perhaps you can do this in additional

testimony written without getting into too much detail here, which

you have already done, how you have modified the plans based because of the reduction in budget to accomplish the necessity, the

necessary goals, the necessary activities, and we as a committee

need to recognize that this was, this whole scenario has been put

in place by the effort to reduce Government expenditures in most

every category to meet the Budget Control Act of last summer and

now as it plays out, and it doesn’t seem to me to do us any good

whatsoever to sit here and start blaming everybody in the world

for what is actually a process that has been initiated by the budget

reductions that this Congress has put in place.
44

Now is that correct, that in fact all of these scenarios that have

been laid out here, all of the questions that have been brought to

bear about the CMRR and Y–12 and changes in plans and delays

in helicopters and the rest are a direct result of reduced funding?

Is that correct?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Garamendi, that’s absolutely correct.

Because of the reduced funding situation, we—it forced us, frankly,

to responsibly look at what were we trying to accomplish, what are

we trying to get done, what is the most important thing to do, that

what we are not about is building buildings. We are about providing capability to the country and making sure we have capability to the country. You’ve heard my explanation on the CMR nuclear facility to take this $1.8 billion liability, push it back, and essentially separate out the camel’s humps, if you will, so that we

can get things on a more stable platform. We did the same thing

with the plutonium disposition capability facility and the work at

the K reactor down at the Savannah River site, also took billions

of dollars of liability off the books as a result of using, looking at

a different way to solve a particular problem to provide a capability, and funding stability, as you said, sir, is very important.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Now I want to move to something else

that you and I have had a conversation about. Part of your activities deal with the disposition of weapons material, specifically plutonium. Could you bring me up to date on the MOX facility in

South Carolina?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. The MOX facility project is obviously under way. It is significantly beyond the 60—it is beyond the

60-percent design point. I have Miss Harrington here somewhere—

there she is—who might come up to the table at some point if you

permit to get into the details.

What we have done with the MOX facility project, though, sir,

is take, and this relates to the plutonium disposition capability activity that I mentioned, is look at ways to fully utilize that facility

in order to take advantage of efficiencies that we found in the facility. Space in the facility that allows us to avoid having to build a

plutonium disposition project either at the K reactor or at a brand

new facility. We’ve conducted an internal review of the project. We

do this every year, it is part of our new project management principles where we don’t move forward until we have 90-percent design, but on our projects we do independent reviews on these

projects. We found some challenges, frankly, on this particular

project, and all of our nuclear projects because what we find is that

the country, this country has limited capability to provide the

amount and quantity of nuclear quality assurance materials and

skill sets, people, and equipment necessary to make these projects

successful, and in the South Carolina-Georgia region there are a

number of nuclear projects that are moving up, and so this MOX

project is suffering a bit, frankly, as a result of having to essentially be the lead horse in bringing the nuclear capability of the

country up to speed.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay, excuse me, but let me interrupt you. I

would like to have a detailed description of the current status, not

only the cost but also the timing.
45

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 242.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And my next question goes to so what are you

going to do with the material that has been processed in this MOX

facility if and when it is ever completed?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. When the MOX facility is completed in

the 2016 timeframe, and long before that particular point we are

working with the Tennessee Valley Authority in order to establish

an agreement, and we have to go through certain environmental,

appropriate environmental impact types of a process to get public

input to use this material in TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] reactors. That has not been completed yet. I don’t want to prejudge

the outcome of the work that has to happen by law in that particular area, but this is a path forward on this particular project.

Mr. GARAMENDI. My understanding is you are going to have considerable trouble achieving that goal and that the material is not

desired by the nuclear industry. I would like to hear that also.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, we would be glad to provide the details of our work with the TVA, and maybe we can come to your

office and give you the details or for the committee itself.

Mr. GARAMENDI. You know where to find us. Please do so.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 242.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the NNSA considering any other alternatives

to the disposal of the pits, the several dozen tons that we have

stored?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. We are—the Nation has, the NNSA is

proposing and the Administration is proposing to finish building

the MOX facility and to dispose of it in a way that we have described in our program budget.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, then, back to the question, so what do you

do with the product that is produced at the facility? I would like

to have a detailed answer on that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 242.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. And finally, what efforts is the Administration

making with regard to international agreements or joint projects

internationally with particularly Russia on the disposal of pits?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. We have worked with Russia, of course,

in the plutonium management and disposition area itself, met with

the Russians, most recently Anne and I met with the Russians in

Seoul, they are proceeding forward on—what we are talking about

is the agreement by which the verification that we see that they

have disposed of the same amount of material as we have in this

particular area, and so we have to finish the agreements with the

State Department on moving forward in that area.

Mr. GARAMENDI. My understanding is the Russians do not believe the MOX process is the way to go.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The Russians have chosen a different

path. They are using a fast reactor technology in this particular

area. This is something this country doesn’t have. It would take too
46

long. The Nation has been moving forward in this with a MOX

fashion for a number of years, and I believe it is the right path.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Prove it. I want to hear the proof that it is the

right path, okay?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Sure.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I want to hear why you do not believe the

Russian path is the correct path.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Take that for the record, sir? Or

now?

Mr. GARAMENDI. Not here, not now. That is a long discussion.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. And it won’t be completed here, but I would like

to have a detailed analysis from your organization, these two paths

that are possible.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 241.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. Finally—well, I think I will let it go at that, Mr.

Chairman. I have had more than enough time, more than my allotted time. Not enough time.

Mr. FRANKS. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Garamendi, I appreciate that. We were prepared to extend additional time. Just we

have got some votes coming up here, and I will try to be brief and

we will make sure we get to the floor on time. I thank all of you,

first of all, for being here. You know you are critically important

to the future of two little 3-year-olds that are my children, my little

twins, and I appreciate you working, hope you do a really good job,

and I know, Mr. D’Agostino, that it is a profound responsibility to

make sure that the nuclear deterrent of this Nation is credible and

capable, and so I hope that you will grant me any diplomatic immunity necessary in the questions here, recognizing that you have

a tremendous responsibility.

Evidently there seems to be a little bit of an incongruity between

you and former Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher vis-a`-vis

the link between modernization and reduction of our current stockpile. Now, it is not a gotcha question, but it seems to be one of

great substance in that it is not just an academic issue.

At our November hearing your written statement indicated a

linkage between modernizing the current stockpile in order to

achieve the policy objective of decreasing the number of weapons

in the stockpile. However, in the discussion period of our November

hearing then Under Secretary Ellen Tauscher indicated that the cojoining of modernization and reductions has been, in her opinion,

quote, almost a red herring. Now, that, maybe it is the Republican

in me, I don’t know, but that is a disturbing incongruity in my

opinion. Can you help me understand how to assimilate those two

things?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I’ll talk to my comments because I think

I know who I am and obviously I worked a long time and very

closely with Ellen Tauscher, and I have great respect for her, so I

don’t have the full context of when she said that. You know, I believe that the plan, you know, it is very important to have a plan,

which we do have, on modernization of our stockpile. I mean, that’s

a plan that has been in place. It has been modified, of course, a

little bit, as we discussed earlier, but it has been modified for good
47

reason because, frankly, my budget has been, was appropriated significantly less in this particular area than the President requested,

and it would be irresponsible of me, frankly, to try to jump right

back on to that 1251 curve. That would be like a billion dollar increase in one year. We can’t responsibly spend that kind of money

nor would I ask for it, frankly.

So, I believe that when I speak of this that people talk about

linkage. When I talk about it, it’s the fact that I know the path

that we have going forward on our life extensions on the 76 and

the 61 and the 78 and the 88 work that we are doing on a dayto-day basis with the Defense Department, I see the commitment

by all of the people in that particular front, and we make adjustments when we need to, and therefore the budget piece is an important link into moving forward on our modernization itself.

With respect to the START Treaty itself, my sense would be

whether we have the START Treaty or not, whether we have the

START Treaty or not, we needed to do something in this particular

country, in this country. We had to do something. And what we

have is a plan that lined up with the debate on the New START

Treaty itself. So I would have argued, and I had in previous administrations, on the need to address this problem, and it wasn’t,

frankly, until this administration where we started addressing this

problem in the most real way that I have ever seen in working in

this business, close to 20 years.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I won’t put words in your mouth, but I am assuming that you don’t think that the issue of modernization and

the issue of reduction in our stockpile are unrelated, that they are

not—that the notion of co-joining those is somehow a red herring,

I am assuming that is certainly my own perspective.

From the two pages of bullets you provided to the committee on

CMRR alternative, we see that the NNSA would rely heavily on

reusing plutonium pits that are currently in storage. We’ve had

some relatively recent experience certainly that you understand

and are aware of more than I with the plans that we had to reuse

canned subassemblies, and for the B61 life extension that, as you

again know better than I, didn’t pan out very well, and we have

also been told that the labs need to conduct a substantial study on

reusing pits to see if this is really a viable option. So, tell us what

happens if plutonium pits reuse doesn’t pan out like the, with the

canned subassemblies, and give us some perspective of the technical challenges that must be overcome to make these pits, this

reuse a fully viable option, and how much the study would cost related to the study of reusing the pits.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Franks, the area that is, that we continue to work on and have to do more work on is studying the

aging phenomena of plutonium metal. Uranium, as you were describing earlier, is completely different from an aging standpoint,

different, you know; we have issues, concerns with corrosion on

that side. Plutonium metal is very different and unique. We have

done a tremendous amount of aging studies. It has been checked

by the JASON’s review, and we have a very significant body of

independent technical peer review that says this material can last

85 to 100 years or so, and we continue to evaluate it because we

have to, can’t assume, can’t rest on those laurels. So that work is
48

going to continue. That will inform the question that you raised on

reusing an existing pit, which the Nation has a lot of, or pits, taking advantage of the investments that we have made, frankly, over

those many years, reusing that material. There is a certain amount

of attractiveness to doing that, not because of the dollar value it

saves but because of the amount of handling that you would have

to do on plutonium itself. We are concerned about worker safety,

making sure that the workers are not exposed to this material

longer than necessary. But from my standpoint, we are working

very closely with the Defense Department to examine multiple options, whether it’s a—I don’t want obviously to get classified here,

but whether we proceed forward using W76 pits, W68 pits or any

of the other wide number of pits that we have. And, the good news

by all of this, frankly, is there are a number of options, a number

of different paths that we can proceed. We are not hampered by

saying the Nation has to have a capability right now to make 50

or 80 pits per year in order to take care of the stockpile. That is

great news for the country because we are not forced into making

rash decisions on significant investments in a very short period of

time. So, we have time to evaluate this area, and just recently General Kehler has been working on studies that he needs to have, and

he is going to bring to the Nuclear Weapons Council, we are going

to be getting together a Nuclear Weapons Council in the next few

months to agree on a path forward on how to move forward in the

pit area, but we have to start first with the life extension approach,

make sure it informs what kinds of pits we can use, then go check

the pits at Pantex and continue to do the aging studies on the plutonium itself.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. D’Agostino, again, when I started out

here, was recognizing the challenge of your job, so I have really

just one more question. The oft-repeated notion that national security is the number one job of the Federal Government is never one

that one can overstate or really perhaps often enough, and you

have mentioned a number of times budget constraints and the impact of the budget and certainly, you know, I understand that, but

I will say to you that some of us have been quite concerned that

some of the philosophical changes that occur from election to election are not small issues, and in this case, you know, this potential

sequestration coming, there’s some very serious questions before

this Congress and before the country, and our policy and being able

to protect the national security of this country goes not only to the

obvious of protecting our families, but it also recognizes the need

to have a productive environment or a secure environment for productivity, and I hope that we don’t get these out of order here.

So with that said, first of all, we’re hoping that people like yourselves who have dedicated your life to the cause of human freedom

will make your voice heard regardless of sometimes the political

pressures that you inevitably deal with because a lot is at stake,

and, you know, the budget shouldn’t always—the budget doesn’t

tell us our national security challenges, we certainly have to allot

it according to those challenges, but we should first identify the

need and be very clear about the potential threats it faces and the

necessary responses that we might have to have.
49

So with that, I would like to ask you one last question. What do

you consider the most significant constraint or challenge that you

have in being able to maintain the credibility and the effective deterrent that is so vital and has served this country so well for so

long?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Franks, I believe—thank you for your

comments earlier. I believe the most significant challenge we have,

we have collectively, is ensuring that the people in our organization, both Federal and our M&O [management and operating] laboratory folks, see that the country is committed and sustainable

over a period of time to this particular work. I believe because people in our organization pay attention to these hearings, they listen,

they read the budgets that get put out by the Administration as

well as they read the appropriations and authorization bills as they

come out. They say does the country care about this area. I think

these discussions and debates are a very important part of that.

I will say on behalf of the Administration that—this is not a political statement; this is my view—that the President in this request, we have a 7.2-percent increase in the defense programs portion of the weapons activities account from the appropriation from

last December to the request of fiscal year 2013. There are many

that will say, well, the President is not committed to this area. I

disagree wholeheartedly. I do have an opportunity to make my

voice heard in both the Pentagon and the White House in this particular area, and I do, and I am listened to, and I think the sustained commitment over time to the people is what is the most important thing in my view. Without the people, all these great facilities and capabilities are nothing.

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. Well, I would just suggest to you that some

of us can’t help but have some compunction about some of the

President’s comments related to his veto pen being ready for any

adjustments in the sequestration that could have a very profound

effect on what you do, given your comments about the budget

today, and so our concerns aren’t altogether just a fantasy.

With that, though, I want to thank everyone for coming, and I

hope that we can continue to see the beacon of freedom burn.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 6:07 p.m.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 17, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 17, 2012

(55)

Statement of Hon. Michael Turner

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Hearing on

Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for Atomic Energy

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs

April 17, 2012

Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces subcommittee hearing on

the President’s FY13 budget request for DOD and DOE nuclear

forces, U.S. nuclear weapons posture, and the FY13 budget request

for environmental management will come to order.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. For those

who follow the sometimes arcane world of nuclear weapons budgeting and policy, the witnesses on our two panels are familiar

faces. They are:

Panel 1:

 The Honorable Madelyn R. Creedon, Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense

 General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Panel 2:

 The Honorable Thomas P. D’Agostino, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration

 Mr. David G. Huizenga, Senior Advisor for Environmental

Management, U.S. Department of Energy

 The Honorable Peter S. Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

On December 1, 2010, prior to the ratification of the New START

treaty, the then-Directors of Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and

Sandia National Laboratories wrote to Senators Kerry and Lugar

and stated:

‘‘we believe that the proposed budgets [referring to the November 2010 update to the section 1251 plan] provide adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability and

effectiveness of America’s nuclear deterrent within the limit

of 1550 deployed strategic warheads established by the New

START Treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.’’

That plan appears to have been abandoned in the President’s

FY13 budget request, calling into question whether there is still

‘‘adequate support’’ for the Nation’s nuclear deterrent to permit the

reductions called for by the New START treaty.
56

There have been those inside and outside of Government who

have challenged the linkage of the New START treaty and the

modernization plan. There are those who make the argument that

because President Obama has requested more funds than his predecessor, though not the funds that he’s promised, he’s done all he

needed to do. Neither of these positions represents serious thinking

that befits our national security.

There can be no doubt that reductions proposed by the New

START treaty are only in our national interest if we complete the

modernization of our nuclear deterrent—warheads, delivery systems, and infrastructure.

I want to remind those who have forgotten—this was the President’s modernization plan. It was his nuclear posture review,

issued in April 2010 before there was a New START treaty, and

his 1251 plan. Here are some highlights:

 From the President’s 2010 NPR: ‘‘Funding the Chemistry

and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos

National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility in 2021.’’

 Also from the President’s 2010 NPR: ‘‘Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge,

Tennessee, to come on line for production operations in

2021.’’

 Also from the President’s 2010 NPR: ‘‘The Administration

will fully fund the ongoing LEP for the W–76 submarinebased warhead for a fiscal year 2017 completion, and the full

scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B–61 bomb

to ensure first production begins in FY 2017.’’

 The President’s 1251 plan states that CMRR and UPF will

complete construction by 2021 and will achieve full operational functionality by 2024.

Further, the inextricable linkage of modernization and the New

START reductions was the basis of Condition Nine of the New

START treaty. This linkage was the legal basis on which the Senate ratified the treaty. Let me remind everyone what Condition

Nine stated:

‘‘the United States is committed to proceeding with a robust

stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at the New START

Treaty levels ... the United States is committed to providing

the resources needed to achieve these objectives, at a minimum at the levels set forth in the President’s 10-year plan

provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1251.’’

Not only do I believe is it fair to inquire whether the President’s

commitment to modernization is lacking now that he has his treaty, but I base that belief on the budget submissions and the Condition Nine report that has not been submitted to the Congress, nor

the companion section 1045 report from last year’s NDAA.

Let me remind the subcommittee what Dr. James Miller, the

President’s nominee to be the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, told us last November:
57

‘‘The first is that we understand the requirement to report

[per Condition Nine] if we have less funding than in the Section 1251 as requested in Section 1251 Report. Our interpretation of that has been substantially less. In fiscal year 2011

actually slightly less was appropriated than requested. Our

judgment was that a one percent or less change didn’t require

us to submit the report. The difference we are looking at now

[in the FY12 appropriations bills] in both the House and the

Senate appropriations bill, I think, would trigger that, and we

would have to examine that question ... If there is substantially less funding than requested, we will, of course, provide

the report to Congress.’’

Yet we have no report for either FY12 or the President’s own

budget request for FY13, which underfunds the 1251 plan.

So what’s changed? Is it solely the budget picture? I don’t mean

to dismiss the budget situation and the cuts the DOD has had to

make, especially as it has made those cuts while transferring large

sums of its own budget to fund the modernization activities at the

NNSA.

Again, the question here is whether U.S. nuclear force reductions

make sense without modernization. The President’s Nuclear Posture Review makes the case for this linkage when it stated:

‘‘implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and

the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended in the

NPR will allow the United States to shift away from retaining

large numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against

technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions in

the nuclear stockpile.’’

In the absence of these investments, will the forthcoming NPR

Implementation Study continue to hurtle towards what seems to be

a prejudged outcome that the U.S. should further reduce its nuclear deterrent? I see no other way to understand the President’s

recent comment at Hankuk University in Seoul:

‘‘[L]ast summer, I directed my national security team to conduct a comprehensive study of our nuclear forces. That study

is still under way. But even as we have more work to do, we

can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear

weapons than we need.’’

So the study isn’t done, but we already know the answer supports the President’s goal of a world without nuclear weapons? Either the President already knows the answer to the question, in

which case the Congress must be informed, or, the President wrote

the question to ensure an answer he’d want.

Hopefully our witnesses today will shed some light on this important area. Either way, I assure you, this year’s National Defense

Authorization Act will ensure Congress’ oversight of these issues.

I also want to highlight some of the discussion at this subcommittee’s February hearing on governance and management of

the nuclear security enterprise. At that hearing, we heard from the

National Academies of Science about a ‘‘broken’’ and ‘‘dysfunctional’’ relationship between NNSA and its laboratories. We also

heard about a system of micromanagement that is costing taxpayers untold millions. The National Academies study and nearly

a dozen others have identified and documented the problems and
58

suggested possible solutions. I hope our witnesses, on both panels,

will help us understand what actions should be taken and when.

Finally, we welcome the opportunity to review the budget and

priorities of DOE’s Defense Environmental Cleanup efforts. DOE

continues to do good work in nuclear cleanup, but also continues

to struggle with technical and management issues at its largest

project. I look forward to hearing about how DOE intends to address these concerns.
59

Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Hearing on

Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for Atomic Energy

Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs

April 17, 2012

I would like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming General

Kehler, Ms. Creedon, Mr. D’Agostino, Mr. Huizenga, and Dr.

Winokur.

I am also grateful to Ms. Harrington, Dr. Hommert, Dr. Albright

and Dr. McMillan, Gen. Chambers, Adm. Benedict and Adm. Donald for your statements for the record and for being with us to participate in our discussions today during the question and answer

session.

I would like to preface my comments by noting that the congressionally mandated bipartisan Budget Control Act has imposed a

new fiscal reality that is putting enormous pressure on all Government programs, including the Pentagon and NNSA. The Section

1251 report was crafted pre-Budget Control Act.

In this time of fiscal crisis, we must look at what investments

must be made now, what cost-effective alternatives are available

and what can be delayed with acceptable risk.

So it is in this context that I would like to touch on a few specific

issues related to sustaining our nuclear deterrent and our nuclear

forces, to nuclear nonproliferation, and to nuclear cleanup efforts.

First on nuclear weapons activities and operations.

President Obama and Vice President Biden have made clear the

importance of maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing, while making progress toward lower

numbers. The Administration is currently conducting an implementation study of the Nuclear Posture Review that will inform requirements.

It is important to note that with over 5,000 deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, the United States still maintains the

ability to destroy major cities in the world several times over. A

few hundred weapons would be so disruptive to society and the environment that it would end life as we know it.

Even with progress on nuclear reductions, nuclear modernization

plans for weapons and associated delivery vehicles remain necessary, though we must make smart and effective investments.

For NNSA, while construction of the plutonium research facility

at Los Alamos National Laboratory has been delayed, several bigticket items require close oversight, including for example the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge, estimated to cost over $7 billion, and the B61 life-extension for forward-deployed warheads in Europe so far estimated to cost over $5

billion.

However, as we prepare the FY13 defense authorization bill, our

committee has not received from the NNSA the out-year budget es-
60

timates or the 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan

to inform our deliberations.

As we look at requirements for maintaining a powerful nuclear

deterrent, improved oversight and planning will be crucial to ensure that we can avoid cost overruns and schedule delays, retain

the critical skills, capability and investments in science and technology that we need. In doing so, we must ensure the highest

standards for nuclear safety.

We will rely on the Department of Defense and STRATCOM to

continue to critically examine Cold War-derived requirements, assess their continued value and cost-effectiveness, and adapt to new

likely threats.

This brings me to my second point on nuclear nonproliferation

and nuclear threat reduction.

I commend the Administration for its successes at the Nuclear

Security Summit, particularly the U.S.-Russian cooperation to secure potentially vulnerable material at the former Soviet nuclear

test site in Kazakhstan. I would also like to note the total removal

of highly-enriched uranium from Mexico and Ukraine, as well as

the progress toward converting Russian research reactors to use

low-enriched uranium rather than HEU.

However, the funding requests for securing and removing HEU

and second line of defense have decreased compared to FY12 appropriated levels.

In contrast, the budget continues to prioritize the construction of

the MOX facility at almost $1 billion annually despite the absence

of a clear path forward. As another example, the non-proliferation

budget this year also includes a $150 million subsidy for fuel enrichment.

Urgent efforts, including the President’s goal of securing all vulnerable weapons-usable material in 4 years, must remain a pressing national security priority. In this context, I’d like to hear about

interagency coordination, and how DOD is supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

Third, nuclear cleanup remains a critical issue in the aftermath

of the Cold War. Sites like Hanford and Savannah River Site

played a unique and irreplaceable role during the Cold War and

now we continue to make diligent and expeditious progress toward

cleanup. I would like to hear about how the Department is addressing the safety culture concerns at the Waste Treatment Plant at

Hanford and the cost increases for this program.
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 17, 2012

(171)
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING

APRIL 17, 2012

(239)

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you for your continued support of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent and your interest in the National Nuclear Security Administration

(NNSA). We share a common goal of ensuring our nuclear stockpile remains safe,

secure, and reliable and we look forward to working with you to improve how we

achieve that goal.

As you know, the Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) on H.R. 4310 registered strong objections to provisions of the bill as they relate to the Department

of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). While

we agree on the need to continuously improve NNSA’s performance, the Administration strongly opposes the sections dealing with governance, management, and oversight of the nuclear security enterprise because they would unduly restrict the authority of the Secretary of Energy, weaken safety standards and protections for

workers and the general public; and fundamentally alter the nature of the relationship between the Department and its contractors; in particular the NNSA weapons

labs.

The NNSA, in partnership with the DOE, has been actively working to move beyond the Cold War nuclear weapons complex towards a 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise by: reshaping the relationship between the laboratories, sites and

headquarters; enacting a series of management reforms intended to both improve

the way it does business and increase the efficiency of its operations; maintaining

a safe, secure, and responsible security posture at its sites; and engaging in efforts

to examine and reduce the number of budget reporting categories.

The following examples offer a brief summary of the reform efforts being undertaken by the NNSA to achieve those ends. We believe these and related actions help

address the problems that were identified in the reports that you refer to in your

letter to the President. Therefore, we submit to you that additional legislative actions in H.R. 4310 are unwarranted at this time and could have deleterious effects

in DOE governance of its contractors and the safety and security of workers and

the general public.

NNSA–National Laboratory Relationship Improvements

The February 2012 National Academy of Sciences and previous reports have expressed concerns with the relationship between the NNSA and the Laboratories, including the need to streamline operations. Over the past few years, the NNSA and

DOE have been implementing the following actions to build trust and drive efficiencies and for this important relationship:

 To increase senior level communication, restore trust and foster collaboration on

significant strategic improvements, the NNSA Administrator has initiated

monthly executive forums that include the senior contractor leadership from the

NNSA labs and plants, NNSA Field Offices and senior NNSA headquarters

staff. This forum is currently collaboratively working three major initiatives focused on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA oversight.

1. National Nuclear Security Administration Equivalency Matrix: A multisite

NNSA effort to examine existing DOE contractual requirements and other

nonstatutory requirements that can be adequately achieved through industrial standards and commercial practices.

2. Benchmarking: NNSA has established a cross functional team between

NNSA and Laboratory representatives to review models in place at other

laboratories and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers

(FFRDCs) to document best practices and to make informed recommendations to increase the efficiency of the NNSA complex.

3. Strategic Performance Evaluation Plan Pilot Program: NNSA is undertaking

a pilot program to streamline its evaluation of contractor performance by focusing on strategic outcomes indicative of acceptable overall performance in

lieu of its historic tactical focus.

 Senior NNSA and DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) personnel

visited each of the seven nuclear sites and asked senior contractor and Federal

personnel whether the Department’s nuclear safety requirements were exces-
240

sively burdensome. Site Federal and contractor personnel consistently agreed

that while there have been implementation issues the nuclear safety requirements themselves are not excessive or inappropriate. The review identified

areas for improvement in the nuclear safety directives, which were provided to

the responsible offices and addressed in recent revisions.

 The Secretary’s ‘‘National Laboratory Director’s Council,’’ which includes the

NNSA Labs, was tasked with identifying burdensome requirements for the DOE

and NNSA. Of the 28 burdensome requirements identified to date by the Lab

Directors, 25 have been resolved, two are on hold at the request of the Directors, and one is still being worked.

 NNSA’s Enterprise Operational Requirements Review Board (EORRB) engages

Lab and Plant Directors, Site Managers and Headquarters leadership to look

at requirements and directives in order to ensure the level of prescription is appropriate and that the requirements are not excessively burdensome. This initiative has ensured that comments from NNSA personnel, including contractors,

are adequately addressed. Since using this process, NNSA has been able to obtain a satisfactory resolution of 100% of its concerns during the revision of DOE

directives, further ensuring that the desired balance in oversight is achieved.

 The NNSA Administrator’s Policy (NAP–21) ‘‘Transformational Governance and

Oversight,’’ signed out last year, defined principles, responsibilities, processes

and requirements to help in transforming and improving governance and oversight. NNSA also created a governance board to address governance issues. This

document continues to be revised as additional opportunities for improvements

in efficiency and effectiveness are identified. Using the NAP–21 guiding principles, the Office of Defense Nuclear Security continues to implement transformational governance activities, including major changes in how security policy is developed (using field-led teams), improving efficiency by allowing our site

contractors to approve security plans and procedures themselves instead of requiring Federal officials to approve, and establishing a field-led working group

to review performance and assurance actions and identify gaps, inefficiencies or

inconsistencies with NAP–21, as well as potential inefficiencies.

 NNSA has continued its support for laboratory-directed research and development efforts, an essential scientific component of a laboratory’s ability to recruit

and retain top scientists and engineers, shape the future of nuclear security,

and to seed innovation in critical national security areas.

 A four-party governance charter has been signed by the Departments of Energy,

Defense, Homeland Security and the Office of the Director for National Intelligence to establish a means to examine strategic alignment of science and technology capabilities across agencies in order to prevent failure in critical national

security areas. This helps facilitate the critical Work For Others (WFO) activities of the laboratories for interagency customers.

Organizational & Business Improvements

 In March 2012, NNSA created and filled a new position of Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations. This new organization is responsible

for the integrated management of the NNSA Site Offices and coordination of all

aspects of functional mission support across the NNSA enterprise. This will facilitate an NNSA enterprise approach to infrastructure management and operational support necessary for achievement of the OneNNSA concept.

 After more than 2 years of analysis and outside reviews, NNSA released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the combined management of the Y–12 National

Security Complex and Pantex Plant, with an option for phase in of Tritium Operations performed at the Savannah River Site. Combining contracts and site

offices will allow NNSA to improve performance, reduce the cost of work, and

operate as an integrated enterprise.

 In 2011, NNSA created an Acquisition and Project Management organization to

improve business practices. This represents a fundamental change in NNSA’s

approach to project and construction management. This office focuses on improving the quality of work while keeping projects on time and on budget across

the Enterprise. For example, for the Uranium Processing Facility Phase A scope

of work (rerouting Bear Creek Road and site utilities), the APM analysis of acquisition alternatives identified an alternate acquisition strategy that was subsequently approved resulting in a $9M cost savings. Other similar acquisition

analyses are planned for upcoming NNSA projects.

 NNSA has realigned functions, responsibilities, and authorities in the NNSA

management structure to support implementation of governance reform initiatives. This realignment has provided for clear and direct lines of communication

from the federal work-force to the contractor with a focus on mission execution.
241

 NNSA re-evaluated the assignment of authorities and responsibilities (and its

delegations of authorities) to move decision making to the lowest appropriate

and competent level in the organization. This has resulted in more timely and

better informed actions and decisions which in turn led to increased productivity.

 NNSA is working to develop and implement governance reform metrics. The

metrics will be used as inputs to demonstrate results and benefits of governance

reform and enhance the use of data for Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) decisionmaking.

 NNSA awarded a Blanket Purchase Agreement for Enterprise Construction

Management Services. The agreement will standardize NNSA’s approach to

project management across the enterprise and provide subject matter experts

to provide independent analysis and advice related to the design and construction of facilities.

 NNSA has developed and implemented an integrated assessment process to

minimize duplication of effort in conducting requirements driven assessment activities. Project requirement reviews are coordinated and led by a single office

eliminating duplicative reviews for alternative analysis, cost estimating, acquisition planning, and safety.

 NNSA has affirmed the Contractor Assurance Systems and Site Office Line

Oversight processes at three NNSA Sites. As a result numerous duplicative requirements, (e.g., reporting, approvals, systems, and regulations, directives, or

policies), have been eliminated from the contract. The result is reduced transactional oversight which in turn frees both contractor and federal employees to

focus on mission accomplishment. [See page 41.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 42.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS

General KEHLER. The Air Force is committed to safely operating the aging UH–

1Ns and is exploring a cost-effective strategy to sustain and upgrade these aircraft

until they can be replaced. While there is no established end-of-life, I am confident

the Air Force can life-extend the UH–1N. The Air Force is also exploring a number

of strategies to mitigate the capability gaps in the nuclear security mission. [See

page 22.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Both the U.S. and Russia have each committed to dispose

of 34 metric tons (MT) of weapons plutonium, enough for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. Under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement

(PMDA), both the U.S. and Russia agreed to dispose of the weapon-grade plutonium

by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in commercial reactors.

Weapon-grade plutonium, unlike weapon-grade uranium, cannot be blended with

other materials to make it unusable in weapons. However, it can be fabricated into

MOX fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear power reactors to produce electricity. This

irradiation results in spent fuel, a form that is not usable for weapons or other military purposes.

This approach was endorsed in a 1995 National Academy of Sciences Report,

‘‘Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,’’ which identified the

use of mixed oxide fuel as a means to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium

that posed ‘‘a clear and present danger to national and international security.’’ Additionally, Russia supported the MOX option because it would result in a change in

the isotopic composition of the plutonium making it unusable for weapons, whereas

other alternatives for disposition like immobilization would not.

The Protocol amending the PMDA, signed on the margins of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., provides that this weapon-grade plutonium be

disposed by irradiating it in light water reactors in the United States and in fastneutron reactors operating under certain nonproliferation conditions in the Russian

Federation. Under the Agreement Russia commits to (1) operate its fast reactors

with a breeding ratio of less than one, resulting in a net decrease in the amount

of weapon-grade plutonium and (2) not generate any new stockpiles of weapon-grade

plutonium.

While both countries will be fabricating surplus weapon-grade plutonium into

MOX fuel, the difference in the reactors that will use the fuel is simply based on

the current nuclear energy strategy in each country and availability of commercial
242

reactors. In the U.S., light water reactors are predominant. In Russia, its energy

strategy called for the use of fast-neutron reactors. [See page 46.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Construction of the MOX facility began in August 2007

and significant progress has been made in the nearly five years since construction

began, with design approximately 90% complete and the project is more than 60%

complete. Eleven of the sixteen auxiliary buildings needed to support construction

and operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including a new electrical substation which was completed in September 2010. More than 118,000 cubic yards of

reinforced concrete and 19,000 tons of rebar have been installed by more than 2,000

workers. More than 400,000 feet of process piping and nearly six million feet of electrical cable are currently being installed, while installation of the process tanks is

90 percent complete.

MOX fuel fabrication technology is well established and mature, and MOX fuel

is used in more than 30 commercial reactors worldwide. The design of the U.S. MOX

facility is based on proven French technology currently in use at the MELOX and

LaHague facilities in France. The facility at the Savannah River Site is being designed and built to meet U.S. conventions, codes, standards, and regulatory requirements, and will be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The

NRC authorized construction of the facility in 2005 and is currently reviewing the

contractor’s application for an operating license. Construction is currently scheduled

to be completed in 2016, and has a total project cost of $4.8 billion.

However, there continue to be significant cost and schedule challenges in key

areas, including identifying suppliers and subcontractors with the ability and experience to fabricate and install equipment to the requirements of Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA)1 standards for nuclear work, which has resulted in a lack of competition for work and higher than expected bids. The project is also encountering

significantly greater than expected turnover of experienced personnel due to the expansion of the U.S. commercial nuclear industry.

The Department is in the process of formally evaluating the possible impacts that

these cost challenges have on the schedule for construction and operations of the

MOX facility, and is considering changing the performance baseline if necessary.

[See page 44.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is currently exploring technical and regulatory requirements associated with irradiation of MOX fuel

in five reactors pursuant to an interagency agreement that was signed in 2010.

The current schedule with TVA is to execute a fuel supply agreement for MOX

fuel in 2013, after NNSA completes a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, in which TVA is a cooperating agency.

In addition, NNSA is consulting with various fuel fabricators regarding the option

of having them market MOX fuel to their utility customers. NNSA also continues

to develop strategies to attract other utility customers. [See page 45.]

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The U.S. will sell the fuel that is fabricated at the MOX

Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site to domestic nuclear utilities

to be irradiated in NRC-licensed and regulated commercial power reactors. TVA is

one such utility. Money resulting from the sale of the MOX fuel will be returned

to the U.S. Treasury.

MOX fuel behaves like traditional low enriched uranium fuel in the reactor’s core,

and the irradiation results in spent fuel, a form that is not usable for weapons or

other military purposes. [See page 45.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 17, 2012

(245)

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. 1) What is the cost of the alternative plutonium strategy, including

modifications to PF–4 and RLUOB, shipping material to DAF and Superblock,

cleaning out the PF–4 vault, conducting the pit reuse study, etc.? How much will

it cost to implement this alternative plan? To the extent possible, please break down

the cost by individual actions/projects needed.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The preliminary Los Alamos cost estimate for execution of

the interim plutonium strategy is in the range of $590M–$820M over the next 8

years. This range is the result of a sixty day study to revise the strategy, and NNSA

will work with the laboratory throughout the FY 2014 Budget formulation process

to refine that strategy and the cost estimate. In the interim, we have provided your

staffs with the detailed analysis from the sixty day study.

The estimated $120M of already-appropriated funds remaining after the design

work on the CMRR–NF is closed out is critical to beginning to implement the interim plutonium strategy at Los Alamos, which includes: additional equipment in

RLUOB, relocation of equipment from the original CMR to PF–4, early start up of

radiological laboratory activities in RLUOB, and design work for a secure material

transportation system between RLUOB and PF–4.

In addition, the FY 2013 President’s Budget Request includes $35M to process,

package and ship excess material out of PF–4. The PF–4 vault cleanout work is

planned for FY 2013–FY 2020, with an estimated cost of approximately $35–50M

per year.

Mr. TURNER. 2) Do you still anticipate building CMRR–NF, with work commencing in 5 years? How much more expensive will CMFF–NF be then vs. if we

built it now?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. As part of ongoing program analysis and close coordination

with DOD, the option to begin construction of the CMRR–NF remains available.

The decision to defer construction of the CMRR–NF for at least 5 years enables

us to focus on other key modernization priorities while still ensuring uninterrupted

plutonium operations.

Detailed planning is under way to ensure the Nation possesses continued capability for required analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and nuclear material storage functions.

While program delays often lead to greater costs in the long run, they can also

yield savings by creating the conditions to consider options that may meet requirements at less cost.

Mr. TURNER. 3) Please provide a final estimate cost figure for the CMRR–NF facility, based upon where the design is at right now. We understand that LANL and

NNSA have made strides to reduce the cost of CMRR–NF. How much would

CMRR–NF cost if it were to continue today? What would have been the baseline

cost presented to Congress in FY 2013?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The current Total Project Cost (TPC) range estimate for

the CMRR–NF, as reported in the 1251 Report, is $3.7B–$5.8B. The Los Alamos

project team identified several opportunities in FY 2011 to reduce the project estimate by approximately $450M. As part of design close out efforts in FY 2012, the

project team will update the cost range without the benefit of long-lead equipment

vendor design information. This cost estimate is not expected to be a ‘‘baseline quality’’ estimate, but will reflect best available cost information at the conclusion of design activities.

Mr. TURNER. 4) How much will this alternate plan cost in relation to what CMRR

was expected to cost?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The current Total Project Cost (TPC) range estimate for

the CMRR–NF, as reported in the 1251 Report, was $3.7B–$5.8B. The preliminary

Los Alamos cost estimate for execution of the interim plutonium strategy is in the

range of $590M–$820M over the next 8 years. NNSA will work with the laboratory

throughout the FY 2014 Budget formulation process to refine that strategy and the

corresponding cost estimate.
246

Mr. TURNER. 5) If we have a continuing resolution for the beginning of FY 2013,

will NNSA recommend to the President that he seek an ‘‘anomaly’’ for NNSA—or

any individual NNSA programs?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. It would be premature to state whether I would recommend to the President an anomaly is what’s needed for NNSA programs in the

event of a continuing resolution. Furthermore, any anomaly request would have to

be approved by the Secretary before going to the White House and would be shaped

by the overall funding context as we head into FY 2013.

How would a continuing resolution, without an anomaly, affect the B61 life extension program?

The current program of work for the B61 assumes full funding at the level requested in the President’s Budget by October 1, 2012. Funding at a level less than

the request, or an appropriation that comes well beyond the start of the fiscal year

would unequivocally have implications for the program. That said, it’s difficult to

say what those implications would be without knowing the precise amount of the

funding or the precise timing of the appropriation.

Some aspects of the program that we would have to review closely would be the

ramp-up to phase 6.3 activities including hiring additional technical staff at the national laboratories and production plants, flight tests, and environmental testing.

Ultimately, the magnitude of the impact will depend on the length of the continuing

resolution period.

Mr. TURNER. 6) Will NNSA ask Congress to address the W76 LEP funding issue?

If so, what fix is needed?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is currently considering actions to realign FY 2013

funding to put the program on track to meet the Navy’s operational requirements

by the end of 2018 and complete the overall W76–1 production in FY 2021. This

may include working with the Congress to realign funding before enactment, or reprogramming funds after the start of FY 2013.

Mr. TURNER. 7) NNSA is conducting a review of all of its Federal personnel, with

an intent of possible streamlining. When will this review be complete?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The review will be completed by December 31, 2012. Our

current plans for reshaping the NNSA workforce are being developed in a manner

to ensure, both now and in the foreseeable future, that we are in a position to: support mission execution, ensure high quality project management of several critical

multi-billion dollar construction projects, and transform our Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. The review under way

is a strategic effort to analyze baseline requirements for NNSA’s workforce of the

future that includes plans to maintain and enhance the pipeline of critical talent

for the future, concurrent with changes to the existing workforce.

Mr. TURNER. 8) Please provide further details on the effort to eliminate transactional oversight at certain NNSA sites by June, as mentioned during the hearing.

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is working with its laboratory partners to assess

what is needed for a strategic oversight posture vice a transactional oversight approach. This assessment includes a review of actual functions performed by Federal

staff and the costs and benefits of those functions as they relate to the work at the

labs. The goal is to shift oversight for nonnuclear or lower hazard activities to focus

on overall system performance and not individual transactions. This approach requires fewer resources, is less intrusive, and helps ensure we can hold plant and

laboratory personnel responsible for performance. Experience with this approach at

the Kansas City plant indicates that a Federal focus on performance outcomes and

not individual transactions improves performance across the board (safety, quality,

and production).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

Ms. SANCHEZ. 9) What are the benefits, including cost-savings, and risks of planning to build CMRR when PF4 is replaced?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. In five years, PF–4 will be approximately 40 years old and

NNSA believes there will be a continuing need to provide robust nuclear infrastructure to support a variety of national security missions for the foreseeable future.

Over the next several years, NNSA will continue to evaluate the most effective way

to modernize its infrastructure while maintaining its plutonium capabilities.

CMRR–NF design will be substantially completed by the end of 2012, but construction is delayed. As part of ongoing program analysis and close coordination with

DOD, the option to begin construction of the CMRR–NF remains available. It is too

early to speculate on potential cost savings, or risks, associated with a facility that

could provide any combination of CMRR–NF and PF–4 capabilities.
247

Ms. SANCHEZ. 10) Can NNSA accomplish its mission safely without CMRR?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes. NNSA would not propose to delay CMRR unless we

could safely accomplish our mission in the absence of new construction. The decision

to defer, by at least 5 years, took into account safety concerns and the final decision

was that the risk of delay was tolerable.

PF–4 has undergone a series of upgrades to improve the facility’s response to seismic events, with other upgrades currently being implemented through a capital TA–

55 Reinvestment Project to further enhance reliability and safety of the facility.

Ms. SANCHEZ. 11) Which planned LEPs are expected to require new pit production?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. NNSA has existing Life Extension Programs for the W76

and the B61. The W76–1 and B61–12 do not require new pit production. The W78

and W88 are undergoing a conceptual study for life extension options. Options for

both reuse of existing pits and remanufacture of existing pit designs are being evaluated. A decision for the W78 and W88 will be made during the Phase 6.2/6.2A Feasibility and Cost Study which will begin this fiscal year.

Ms. SANCHEZ. 12) With this sea change in plans, what assurances can you give

us regarding the accuracy and reliability of NNSA’s requirement definition process?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Determining requirements is the process of establishing

and validating need in collaboration with customers and stakeholders. For example,

the requirement to maintain analytical chemistry, materials characterization and

plutonium storage capabilities in support of national security mission work at Los

Alamos has been affirmed by an independent DOD assessment. Over the past year,

NNSA made difficult decisions to align with the fiscal reality of the Budget Control

Act. The decision to defer construction of the CMRR–NF for at least 5 years is fully

consistent with DOD’s 2011 independent assessment that recognized the higher

operational risk of Building 9212 at Y–12 and the difficulty of executing both

CMRR–NF construction and UPF construction under constrained funding scenarios.

The decision to defer CMRR–NF construction does not increase risk to the safety

and security of ongoing operations, and the operational constraints resulting from

the decision do not prevent the NNSA from meeting mission requirements.

Ms. SANCHEZ. 13) The 50–80 pit production capacity requirement was determined

while the NNSA was planning on developing and producing the Reliable Replacement Warhead. What currently drives this requirement?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. There are a number of factors the DOD and NNSA consider when establishing the pit production capacity requirement. These factors include lifetime of the pits; stockpile size (number of warheads); potential pit modification; ability to reuse existing pits; and what is needed to have a responsive production infrastructure.

Ms. SANCHEZ. 14) Was a cost assessment done for all the alternatives to the 3

B option chosen by the Nuclear Weapons Council for the B61 life extension? Why/

why not? If so, how does the cost-range for the 3B option compare to the funding

range for the 3 other options considered?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Several life extension options were considered and assessed by the NWC prior to the decision to proceed with Option 3B. Of the 6 other

options considered, only 4 fully met the military requirements including service life.

These options all exceeded the preliminary Option 3B costs by approximately $1.5–

$2B. Other options considered but not selected ranged from $1.5B–$4B for various

component alteration scopes. These less expensive options had significant shortfalls

in the ability to satisfy military requirements. In addition these options still require

NNSA to begin a future life extension program in the 2020s. The NWC assessment

concluded Option 3B was the most affordable life extension approach that met military requirements and assured no capability gap in our extended nuclear deterrent.

Furthermore, NNSA and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis and

Program Evaluation (CAPE) are jointly undertaking the B61 LEP Option 3B independent cost estimate, as well as the broader DOD–NNSA Strategic Weapons and

Supporting Infrastructure analysis. This broader assessment seeks to ‘‘develop decision framework that balances DOD’s weapon needs and NNSA’s infrastructure and

stockpile stewardship requirements within fiscal constraints for incorporation into

the FY 2014 President’s Budget.’’ The final report for this DOD–NNSA Interagency

Team is expected in November 2012.

Ms. SANCHEZ. 15) Is transactional oversight helpful or necessary to ensure safety,

including nuclear safety? Why or why not? Are there other areas where transactional oversight should be applied for performance-based oversight? Why/why not?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. A transactional approach to Federal oversight seeks to ensure contractor performance by observing operations and reviewing or even approving certain critical documents and activities, and is appropriate where the consequences of a failure are very high or where a performance failure is intolerable.
248

Ensuring the safety of our nuclear operations is one area where transactional oversight may be helpful and necessary. For example, a large radiological release could

significantly jeopardize the health and safety of the public or disrupt the ability of

the Department to conduct its mission. Consequently, the Department approves the

safety basis and startup of operations where such a release, while unlikely, could

occur, and ensures adequate safety is demonstrated prior to operations.

However, not all safety-related decisions require transactional oversight and it

may even impede operations and add unnecessary costs for no benefit. For example,

when a contractor has demonstrated adequate safety performance, the authority to

review and approve restart of low hazard activities is often delegated to the operating contractor. As a general rule, most oversight is a blend of systems-level and

transaction-level oversight. To establish a proper balance of oversight methods,

NNSA is working with its laboratory partners to assess what is needed for a strategic oversight posture vice a transactional oversight approach. This assessment includes a review of actual functions performed by Federal staff and the costs and

benefits of those functions as they relate to the work at the labs.

Ms. SANCHEZ. 16) Why did NNSA’s fiscal year 2013 budget request not seek funding at the 1251 report level? Given the FY 2012 appropriations cuts, can NNSA execute work that had been planned under the 1251 report funding levels?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Last year, Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA)

which limits discretionary spending for the next decade, and caps national security

spending in Fiscal Year 2012 and 2013. In Fiscal Year 2012, Congress also reduced

NNSA’s request for Weapons Activities by $416 million below the President’s request, or 5.4 percent. The BCA reflects a new fiscal climate in Washington, embraced by both Congress and the Administration. Like all agencies, NNSA must adjust to this new reality. The proposed budget allows us to meet DOD’s requirements

by making the necessary investments in nuclear capabilities and the nuclear complex.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) worked directly with the

Department of Defense (DOD) and the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to define

a path forward to support the requirements in the Nuclear Posture Review Report.

The realigned program, with adjustments to the original 1251 program and reflected

in a memorandum on March 27, 2012, can be executed within the resources provided by Congress for FY 2012 and those requested for FY 2013.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. 17) Administrator D’Agostino, earlier this year, this subcommittee

held a hearing that examined the recent National Academies of Science study pertaining to how NNSA governs, manages and oversees the nuclear security enterprise. This is in addition to numerous issues that have been documented through

a long series of reports and studies over the past 10 years. What are the Department of Energy and the NNSA doing to address these issues and what is the budgetary impact of these issues?

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The Department is committed to enhancing the efficiency

of Government oversight while ensuring that critical nuclear security activities are

conducted in a safe and secure environment. The Department takes very seriously

the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences regarding safety and security. Led by Secretary Chu, a former lab director, the Department is working actively to increase the efficiency of our oversight and to improve our approach to

working with our partners. We believe that our ongoing efforts will be more effective

at addressing those issues than prescriptive legislation.

The Department, including the NNSA, is committed to maintaining and improving safety and security standards while improving efficiency. Below is a description

of steps that the Department has recently taken and plans to take to achieve these

goals.

NNSA–National Laboratory Relationship Improvements

The February 2012 National Academy of Sciences and previous reports have expressed concerns with the relationship between the NNSA and the Laboratories, including the need to streamline operations. Over the past few years, the Department,

including the NNSA, has been implementing the following actions to build trust and

drive efficiencies and for this important relationship:

 To increase senior level communication, restore trust and foster collaboration on

significant strategic improvements, the NNSA Administrator has initiated

monthly executive forums that include the senior contractor leadership from the

NNSA labs and plants, NNSA Field Offices, and senior NNSA headquarters
249

staff. This forum is currently collaboratively working three major initiatives focused on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA oversight.

1. National Nuclear Security Administration Equivalency Matrix: A multisite

NNSA effort to examine existing DOE contractual requirements and other

nonstatutory requirements that can be adequately achieved through industrial standards and commercial practices.

2. Benchmarking: NNSA has established a cross functional team between

NNSA and Laboratory representatives to review models in place at other

laboratories and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers

(FFRDCs) to document best practices and to make informed recommendations to increase the efficiency of the NNSA complex.

3. Strategic Performance Evaluation Plan Pilot Program: NNSA is undertaking

a pilot program to streamline its evaluation of contractor performance by focusing on strategic outcomes indicative of acceptable overall performance in

lieu of its historic tactical focus.

 Senior NNSA and DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) personnel

visited each of the seven nuclear sites and asked senior contractor and Federal

personnel whether the Department’s nuclear safety requirements were excessively burdensome. Site Federal and contractor personnel consistently agreed

that while there have been implementation issues the nuclear safety requirements themselves are not excessive or inappropriate. The review identified

areas for improvement in the nuclear safety directives, which were provided to

the responsible offices and addressed in recent revisions. Revisions to governance processes to enhance collaboration will keep this feedback channel open in

the future.

 In response to Secretarial direction, a systematic reform of the Department’s

safety and security directives has been undertaken and resulted in a redesigned, streamlined set of requirements that significantly reduces the level of

prescription, offers flexibility for innovative solutions, and pushes decisionmaking authorities to appropriate levels within the organization. While maintaining requirements sufficient for effective safety and security performance,

the Department revised, consolidated and cancelled directives to achieve a nearly 50% reduction in safety and security directives.

 The Secretary’s ‘‘National Laboratory Director’s Council,’’ which includes the

NNSA Laboratories, was tasked with identifying burdensome requirements for

the Department. Of the 20 burdensome requirements identified to date by the

Laboratory Directors, 14 have been resolved, four are on hold at the request of

the Directors, and two are still in process.

 NNSA’s Enterprise Operating Requirements Review Board (EORRB) engages

Laboratory and Plant Directors, Site Managers, and Headquarters leadership to

look at requirements and directives in order to ensure the level of prescription

is appropriate and that the requirements are not excessively burdensome. This

initiative has ensured that comments from NNSA personnel, including contractors, are adequately addressed. Since using this process, NNSA has been able

to obtain a satisfactory resolution of 100% of its concerns during the revision

of DOE directives, further ensuring that the desired balance in oversight is

achieved.

 The NNSA Administrator’s Policy (NAP–21) ‘‘Transformational Governance and

Oversight,’’ approved last year, defined principles, responsibilities, processes

and requirements to help in transforming and improving governance and oversight. This document is being revised to take advantage of lesson learned

through the governance reform process.

 A four-party governance charter has been signed by the Departments of Energy,

Defense, Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to establish the Mission Executive Council as a means to coordinate

interagency long term strategic planning for unique science, technology and engineering (ST&E) capabilities across agencies in order to ensure that those capabilities will efficiently and effectively support critical national security priorities. This now provides the forum for the joint long-term planning of people,

skills and facilities needed to complement more traditional short-term and tactical Interagency Work activities at the laboratories.

 The Secretary recently approved transitioning DOE’s orders and directives to a

more risk-informed foundation (an Enterprise Risk Model). Future proposals for

new requirements to be issued by DOE for contractor implementation must be

evaluated on the basis of their benefit in terms of risk mitigation as well as

their potential cost.
250

 Upon completion of the governance and oversight transformation effort, NNSA

expects to have:

 Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability,

 Stronger Line Oversight and Contractor Assurance Systems,

 Better balanced, performance and outcome oriented requirements, and

 Improved contractual performance accountability.

Organizational & Business Improvements

 In March 2012, NNSA created and filled a new position of Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Operations. This new organization is responsible

for the integrated management of the NNSA Site Offices and coordination of all

aspects of functional mission support across the NNSA enterprise. This will facilitate an NNSA enterprise approach to infrastructure management and operational support necessary for achievement of the OneNNSA concept.

 After more than 2 years of analysis and outside reviews, NNSA released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the combined management and operations of the

Y–12 National Security Complex and Pantex Plant, with an option for phase in

of Tritium Operations performed at the Savannah River Site and recently established the NNSA Production Office to combine NNSA oversight of both production plants. Combining contracts and site offices will allow NNSA to improve

performance, reduce the cost of work, and operate as an integrated enterprise.

 In 2011, NNSA created an Acquisition and Project Management organization to

improve business practices. This represents a fundamental change in NNSA’s

approach to project and construction management. This office focuses on improving the quality of work while keeping projects on time and on budget across

the Enterprise. For example, for the Uranium Processing Facility Phase A scope

of work (rerouting Bear Creek Road and site utilities), the APM analysis of acquisition alternatives identified an alternate acquisition strategy that was subsequently approved resulting in a cost savings of $9 million. Other similar acquisition analyses are planned for upcoming NNSA projects.

 NNSA has realigned functions, responsibilities, and authorities in the NNSA

management structure to support implementation of governance reform initiatives. This realignment has provided for clear and direct lines of communication

from the Federal workforce to the contractor with a focus on mission execution.

 NNSA re-evaluated the assignment of authorities and responsibilities (and its

delegations of authorities) to move decisionmaking to the lowest appropriate

and competent level in the organization. This has resulted in more timely and

better informed actions and decisions which in turn has led to increased productivity.

 NNSA is working to develop and implement governance reform metrics. The

metrics will be used as inputs to demonstrate results and benefits of governance

reform and enhance the use of data for Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) decisionmaking.

 NNSA awarded a Blanket Purchase Agreement for Enterprise Construction

Management Services. The agreement will standardize NNSA’s approach to

project management across the enterprise and provide subject matter experts

to provide independent analysis and advice related to the design and construction of facilities.

Safety & Security Improvements

The Department is aware of concerns previously raised regarding overly prescriptive safety and security regulations. The following improvements to safety, health

and security oversight, including non-nuclear operations, have been implemented to

streamline directives and improve our standards:

 In response to Secretarial direction, the Office of Health, Safety and Security

(HSS) fundamentally redesigned its Independent Oversight program for safety

and security. HSS now focuses its oversight on high-hazard, high-consequence

operations, the Department’s most significant national security assets, and instances of deficient performance. It has eliminated routine oversight of routine

industrial operations and lower value security assets. With rare exceptions,

large inspections teams have been replaced by a more strategic approach using

smaller teams that focus on specific issues and are better coordinated with DOE

(including NNSA) line management to ensure maximum value and optimal efficiency in data gathering, thus considerably reducing the impact of independent

oversight on mission activities at DOE sites.

 NNSA has adopted a decentralized oversight approach for nuclear and non-nuclear safety, relying on the site offices to provide the primary oversight of its

contractors rather than a burdensome regimen of headquarters oversight. This
251

approach is institutionalized in NAP–21, but will also be captured in the NNSA

Functions, Responsibilities and Authorities (FRA) document, which is nearing

completion. The FRA clearly articulates the regulatory oversight model that

NNSA has implemented for safety and security, and associated regulatory roles

and responsibilities.

 To ensure consistent and balanced implementation of nuclear safety requirements at its site offices, NNSA performs reviews of each site office every 2

years, evaluating 18 nuclear safety areas. Areas reviewed include, for example,

quality assurance and the development and approval of safety documentation.

These reviews are staffed largely by Federal subject matter experts from the

sites, allowing good practices to be shared directly between the sites while developing a common set of expectations amongst the practitioners on how oversight should be done. Headquarters personnel, augment these reviews, further

helping ensure a consistent set of expectations. These reviews have helped

eliminate site-specific implementation issues, driving consistent improvements

in performance. In the first round of reviews, began in 2005, expected performance was found in only 67% of the areas assessed. Two years later, that level

rose to 90%, and to 93% in the most recent series.

 To complement its decentralized execution of oversight, NNSA has implemented

a Central Technical Authority who, among other functions, ensures that DOE

policies are developed and promulgated consistent with the needs of NNSA and

its contractors. The Administrator currently serves this role, and is supported

by an Associate Administrator for Safety and Health with a staff of subject matter experts. DOE requires CTA concurrence on revisions to requirements that

can affect nuclear safety. NNSA has used this authority to ensure that the

needs of NNSA and its contractors are properly reflected in revisions to DOE

nuclear safety directives.

 NNSA completed a security reform initiative to deliver programmatic reform

and provide cost-effective protection of nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, classified information, facilities, and employees that has saved NNSA and

taxpayers over $50 million per year in productivity improvements and cost reductions (several hundreds of millions of dollars over the 5-year FYNSP), while

maintaining a robust security posture. This security reform initiative restructured security governance and oversight to redefine the survey and self-assessment activities. This initiative also had the Site Offices implement a risk-based

model that prioritized and focused resources on high-risk operational activities.

 NNSA has developed NAPs for security with the goal of achieving management

and operational excellence. NNSA’s security NAPs include improvements that

would also benefit other DOE organizations, and that will be incorporated into

a revised set of DOE security directives that provides consistent direction to all

DOE sites. The revisions to DOE directives will focus on establishing security

requirements that are necessary for adequate protection and conform to national standards, while providing flexibility to site organizations to use the most

appropriate methods to meet the security requirements and protection objectives. NNSA is working collaboratively with HSS in the revision process for the

DOE security directives and will cancel current security NAPs upon their incorporation into revised DOE directives.

 NNSA established a Security Commodity Team (SCT) that delivered a common

procurement mechanism with a single provider for uniforms and a wide range

of tactical equipment that produced cost savings, more efficient processing time,

and expedited delivery schedules.

 NNSA initiated a Protective Force (PF) Training Reform Initiative to develop

a corporate PF training program, based upon newly developed and consistent

mission-essential tasks. This initiative will improve the focus, effectiveness, and

efficiency of the annual PF sustainment training program.

Mr. LANGEVIN. 18) Mr. Huizenga, the DOE received $5.1 billion for Defense Environmental Cleanup through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

Can you provide a status of the projects this $5.1 billion funded?

Mr. HUIZENGA. The Environmental Management (EM) American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act Program has demonstrated tremendous success in accelerating

the environmental cleanup of contaminated facilities, lands, and groundwater across

the EM complex. Utilizing the full $5.99 billion received in Recovery Act funds, EM

has completed 92 percent of the projects/cleanup activities on-time and within budget. EM has also reduced its environmental contamination footprint from over 900

square miles to 316 square miles as of March 30, 2012. In total, EM has initiated

126 discrete projects/cleanup activities (85 Defense Environmental Cleanup funded

and 41 Non-Defense funded). To date, 95 projects/cleanup activities have been com-
252

pleted (64 Defense funded and 31 Non-defense funded). Currently, the Defense Environmental Cleanup Recovery Act account has a balance of approximately $215

million that will be utilized to complete 21 remaining projects/cleanup activities.

Mr. LANGEVIN. 19) Mr. Winokur, can you please discuss your safety concerns regarding the Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford, and are there current efforts between the DNFSB and the DOE to address these concerns?

Dr. WINOKUR. For more than a decade, the Board has devoted time and resources

to oversight of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) with two main

safety objectives. First, operation of the plant must not expose the public or workers

to undue risk. Second, the plant must achieve its design objectives to eliminate the

safety and environmental risks posed by continued storage of millions of gallons of

high-level waste in aging underground tanks. Although this is a one-of-a-kind

project with novel technology that requires significant research and development, it

is being designed concurrent with construction (also known as a ‘‘fast track’’ design/

build approach). As a result, timely identification and resolution of technical issues

are paramount to meeting the objectives of the Hanford cleanup effort.

The Board’s safety reviews have focused on ensuring that important safety systems can meet the safety function and safety performance requirements specified in

the project safety basis documents. The Board has identified significant weaknesses

in the design of safety systems and is working closely with DOE to correct them.

The Board has written two Recommendations and numerous letters on this project.

The principal issues that have not yet been resolved are summarized below:

Mixing in Process Vessels. On December 17, 2010, the Board issued Recommendation 2010–2, Pulse Jet Mixing at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant,

to address nuclear safety hazards arising from inadequate mixing of waste in processing tanks. On November 10, 2011, DOE provided the Board with an implementation plan that commits to conduct a test program to determine the capabilities of

WTP’s mixing systems, develop waste acceptance criteria for WTP that will address

safety concerns associated with mixing, and determine the requirements for waste

sampling systems in the Tank Farms and WTP. However, on April 30, 2012, DOE

informed the Board that a key technical assumption used in the planned approach

to testing and modeling was not technically defensible, and that a revision to the

implementation plan is needed. DOE plans to issue the revised plan by the fourth

quarter of 2012.

Erosion and Corrosion of Piping, Vessels, and Pulse Jet Mixer Nozzles. The Board

found that the WTP contactor had not properly justified the wear allowances needed

to ensure that piping, vessels, and mixing equipment (particularly items that will

be inaccessible once radioactive operations commence) will not suffer excessive erosion and corrosion over the 40-year design life of the facility. DOE agrees with the

Board’s evaluation. The WTP contractor is developing a plan for evaluating erosion

and corrosion on a vessel-by-vessel basis that accounts for variations during waste

processing operations.

Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels. The Board is continuing to evaluate

the safety issues associated with the proposed hydrogen control strategy for WTP,

which allows hydrogen explosions in piping under certain conditions. The contractor

recently completed its resolution of technical concerns identified by the Board and

by an independent review team chartered by DOE. DOE is presently reviewing the

revised hydrogen control strategy. The contractor has not yet implemented the revised hydrogen control strategy in WTP’s design or incorporated it in the safety

basis. The contractor also needs to complete a major testing effort to determine the

effect of hydrogen explosions on components such as valves and instrumentation.

Spray Leak Analysis. In 2011, the Board identified technical issues with the WTP

contractor’s approach for determining the consequences to the public of accidents involving sprays of radioactive liquids. DOE acknowledged that the Board’s concerns

were valid and committed to resolve them through a test program. This test program is currently under way.

Heat Transfer Analyses for Process Vessels. The Board found technical issues in

heat transfer analyses that the WTP contractor was using to establish post-accident

mixing requirements to avoid hydrogen explosions in process vessels in the WTP

Pretreatment Facility. DOE has agreed that the technical assumptions in the contractor’s heat transfer model needed better justification and is pursuing appropriate

analyses.

Instrumentation and Control System Design. The Board found that the preliminary safety basis did not ensure the required reliability of safety-significant instrumented systems. DOE had the WTP contractor complete a comprehensive review of

the problem and has committed to revise the appropriate procedures and guides for

engineering and safety analysis to correct the issue.
253

Ammonia Hazards. The Board found that the existing design and safety-related

controls will not adequately protect workers or facilities at WTP from accidents involving the large quantities of ammonia to be stored at the WTP site. In response,

DOE informed the Board that the project team will perform three new hazard analyses to address the Board’s concerns.

Design and Construction of Electrical Distribution System. On April 13, 2012, the

Board issued a letter to DOE identifying safety issues with the design of the electrical distribution system at WTP. The Board is waiting for a response from DOE

on this issue.

Safety Culture. The Board issued Recommendation 2011–1, Safety Culture at the

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, on June 9, 2011, after determining that

serious flaws in the project’s safety culture were inhibiting the identification and

resolution of technical and safety issues. DOE accepted the Board’s recommendation, and has provided an acceptable implementation plan for corrective actions.

DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) independently reviewed the WTP

safety culture, and confirmed the Board’s conclusions in a report issued in January

2012. Both the DOE Office of River Protection and the WTP contractor are pursuing

corrective action plans in response to the issues identified in the Board’s recommendation and by the HSS review.

Æ