FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ANUARY 28, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N os. 06- 1318 6 & 06- 1330 3

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 02-22451 -CV -D MM LORENDA RODRIGUEZ, VILMA THOMAS, etal., Pl ai nt iff s- App el le es , ve rs us FARM STORES GROCERY, INC., De fendant-T hird-Party Pl ai nt iff -Co un te r-Defe nd an t-Ap pe ll an t, v e r s u s OASIS OUTSOURCING, INC., T hir d- Party -D ef en dant- C ount er -C la im an t.

____ ____ ____ __ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court for the Southern D istrict of Florida

____ ____ ____ _ (J an ua ry28, 200 8) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, CA RN E S an d F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.2

CAR NE S, Circuit Judge: T his appe al in a Fa ir

L ab or S tandard s A ct , 29 U . S. C. §§ 2 01–1 9, c as e invo lves a num

ber of issues arising und er that statute. It also presents us with an i n t e r e s t i n g i s s u e th a ti s n o tF LS A - s p e c i f i c . Wi t h o u to b

je c t i o n f r o m ei t h e r

p a rt y, the dis tr ic t c ourt gave the j ur y an e rr one ous ins tr

uc tio n onhowto ca lc ulate dam ages. The j ury

com poun ded the error by

returning a verdict for a

larger am ount of dam ages than the erroneous instructio n would perm it. I s the correc t rem edy a re m ittitur, reducing the dam ages down to the m axim um am ount that could have been awar ded und er the e rroneous but unob j ected to instruction , or a ne wtr i a l w i t h ap r op e r

i ns t r uc t i ono n c a l c ul a t i ng d a m a ge s?

I. Farm S tor es Co rp or at ionope rate s ac ha in o f 103 fu ll- se rv ic e, f re e- standi ng, drive-through grocery

stores through out Florida. E ach store em ploy s betwee n three and six worker s. O ne worker at eac h store is given th e title “ store m anager” and is paid a wee kly

salary , unlike the others who are “ sales associates” and are pa id an ho ur ly

w ag e. E ac h st or e m an ag er r ep orts t o a“ dis tr ic t m an ag er , ” w ho supe rv ise s be tw ee n te n and tw en ty sto re s. T w en ty -s ix o f the tw en ty -e igh tTwo employ ees w ith the titl e “a ssociate mana g ers” are also plaintiffs. The jury 1 returne d a sepa

rate verdic t form in favor of those two plaintiffs, a

nd the district court include d their dama g es aw ard in the total amount of its final judgment. F arm Sto re s h a s e xplic itl y abandone d any

contention that there was e rror in the judgme nt insofar a s it invol ved the two associate manag ers. 3 pla int if fs are f orm er sto re m an ag er s w ho w er e te rm inate d duri ng a c om pany -w ide re or ganiz at ionin 2002 . 1 A ft er the y w er e te rm inate d f

or r ea sons unr el at ed

to hour s and w ag es , the store m anagers brought th is Fair L abor Standards A ct law suit in feder al district court. T heir com

plaint so ught back pay

for overtim e they

claim Far m Stores ow es t h e m p u r s u a n tt o 2 9 U . S . C . § 2 0 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) , w h i c h r e qu i r e s th a te mp l o ye r s p a y t i me a n da h a l f f o r e a c h h o u r

an e mp l o ye e wo rk s b e yo n df o rt y e a c h we e k . Ge n e r a l l y, em plo y ee s m ay

onl y r ec ove r up t o tw o y ears of ba ck pay und er the F L SA ’ s st at

ute of lim itations . 29 U. S. C. § 255 (a). H owever , the c om plaint alleged that Farm Stores’ violatio n of the FL SAwa s willful, which w ouldentitle the plaintiffs to as m uc h a s o ne ad di ti on al y ear o f ba ckpa y . Farm S tor es ’ answ er

a sse rt ed that the sto re m an ag er s w er e ex em pt f ro m the FL SA ’ s ov er

tim e pr ovi sio n be ca

use the y f el l w ith in the A ct ’ s “ ex ec uti ve ex em pti on. ” T ha t e xe m

pti on a ppl ie s to e m

plo y ee s w ho e ar

n asa lary of a t l ea st $250 aw ee k, w hose pr im ar y duty is m an ag em en t of

ar ec ogni ze d de partm en t or su bd iv is io n, an d wh o re gu la rly dir ecttwo or m or e em pl oyees. 2 9 C .F.R. §Although the DOL has since r evised 29 C.F.R. § 541.1, the ve rsion in place in 2002 2 applies to this case. See Def ining a nd Delimiting the Exemptions for Ex ecutive, A dminist rative, Professional, Outside Sales a nd Computer Employ ees, 69 F ed. Reg . 22,122, 22,122–23 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be c odified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). 4 541. 1( f) ( 2002 ). F ar

m S tor es a lso a sse rt ed

that i t ha d no t w ill fu lly

vio la te d th e 2 FLSA. Af ter the close of discovery , both Farm Stores and the store m anagers m oved for summ ary

j udgm ent on the iss ue of w hether the store m anagers w ere co ve re d by

the e xe cu tiv e ex em

pti on. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d bo th p ar tie s’ m otion s, explaining that: “ It is im poss ible to grant summ ary j udgm ent for either party because the re cord does reveal very hotlydispu ted facts concer ning what [the sto re m an ag er s] did

in the ir day -t o- day

dut ie s a s ‘ sto re m an ag er s, ’ and w he the r tho se a ct ivi tie s br ing the m w ith in the r el ev an t e xe m pti ons as am atte r of law. ” T he c as e the n pr oc ee de d to aj ur y tr ia l. T he m ai n is sue a t tri al w as w he the r the sto re m an ag er s f el l w ith in the executive exem

ption . Both sides p resented evidence on the questio n of whether the store m anagers’ prim ary duty wa s m anagem ent. O n the one hand, Farm Stores intro duc ed

e vid en ce that the sto re m an ag er s in te rv ie w ed , hir ed , tr ai ne d, e va luate d, and discipl ined em

ploy ees; m aintained store invent ory ; and wer e re latively fre e from supervisio n of their daily activities. A dditi onally , its expert w itness testified5

that, based on his review of the store m anagers’ j ob descriptio ns, their prim ary du ty w as m an ag em en t. On the other hand, the store m anagers testified that their prim ary duties w er e sa le s r el at ed , and n ot m an ag er ia l. T he y e xpl ai ne d th at

the y spe nt a lm ost

no tim e perf orm ing m anagerial tasks during m ost weeks, that they lacked re al au tho ri ty ove r the ir

sto re s and e m

plo y ee s, and tha t the y

w er e re qui re d to c onsu lt their district m anagers before m aking m anagem ent decisions . They also testified that their hourly

rate of pay , c alculated by divid ing th eir w eekly

salary by the total num be r of hours the y

w orke d e ac h w ee k, w as e sse nti al ly the sam e as the hourl y rate of pay f or sa le s a sso ci at es . T he ir

e xpe rt w itn es s te sti fi ed

that, ba se d onhis re vie wof a ff idavit s f ro m the sto re m an ag er s, a s w el l a s th ei r j ob d es cr ipt ion s, the ir pr im ary du ty w as no t m an ag em en t. O n th e iss ue of

dam ag es , e ac h st or e m an ag er a lso te sti fi ed

about the a ve ra ge num be r of hours he w orke d e ac h w ee k and the a m ount of his w ee kly

sa lary f ro m 1999 to 2002 . Their

counsel asked each store m anager what his regular rate of pay wa s and asked m ost of them how they calculated it. T he store m anagers w ere virtua lly unanim ous in t es tif

y ing that the y

c al cu la te d th ei r re gul ar

r at e of pay by di vi di ng th ei r week ly sala ry by the to ta l n um

be r of ho ur s t he y

work edeach week . T his m ethod is the one that c ouns el f or the sto re m an ag er s us ed

to expla in and6

ar gue dam ag es to the j ur

y in his ope nin g st at em en t and c los ing arg um en t. I t i s also the way

the district court instructed the jury to calculate dam ages. Ne ither si de ask edforor o bjec te d t o t he in st ru ct io n. T he j ur y r et ur ne d ave rd ic t f

ind ing that the sto re m an ag er s di d no t f al l within the executive exem ption and awarding dam ages to each individ ual store man a g e r . T h e j u ry a l s o f o u n dth a tF a rm S t o r e s ’ v i o l a t i o n o f th e F L S A o v e rt i me provisi on was not willful, a finding which had the effec t of lim iting the store m an ag ers to a m ax im

um of t wo years o f ba ckpa y . The to ta l am ou nt of d am ag es th e jury awarde d was $2 97 ,70 0.0 0. Farm S tor es f ile d tw o po st- tr ia l m oti ons. I n th e fi rs t on e it soug ht j udgm en t as am atte r of

lawor , in the a lte rn at ive , ane wtr ia l, und er F ed er al Ru le of

Ci vil Procedure 50 on the groundthat the j ury ’ s finding on the executive exem ption wa s not sup porte d by

the e vid en ce . I n th e se co nd m oti on F ar m S tor es sou ght

a re m itt itur of

the ve rd ic t be ca

use the dam ag es the j ur

y aw ar de d e xc ee de d th e am ount e sta bli she d by

the e vid en ce . T he dis tr ic t c ourt sum m ar ily de nie d bo th o f th os e m ot io ns . T he sto re m an ag er s a lso f ile d apos t- tr ia l m oti on, se ek ing an aw ar d of li qu id at edda m ag es equa l t o t he am ou nt of t he jury awardun de r 29 U.S.C. § 2 16 . T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th at m oti on. T his is Farm

S tor es ’ appe al .7 II. Farm S tor es f ir st c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in de ny ing it s R

ule 50 m oti on b ec au se sto re m an ag er s, a t l ea st those w ho are a ssi gne d to se parate loc at ion s, c at eg or ic al ly

f al l w ith in the e xe cu tiv e ex em pti on and the re fo re are not entitled to o vertim e under the FL SA . Alter natively , it c ontend s that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain the j ury ’ s finding regar ding that exem ption . The store m anagers counter that the executive exem ption is an inherently

fac t-based inqui ry

that turns on the indiv idual circum stances of eac h ca se , and tha t the y

pr es en te d su ff

ic ie nt e vid en ce f

or the j ur y r ea sona bly to co nc lu de th atth es e sp eci fic st or e m an ag ers were n ot ex em pt em pl oyees. G en er al ly , the F L SAr equir es e m plo y er s to pay

the ir e m plo y ee s ti m e an d a ha lf f or a ll the w ork th ey

do o ve r fo rty

hours aw ee k, 29 U . S. C. § 20 7( a) (1 ), but that r eq uir em en t do es not

appl y to “ an y e m plo y ee e m

plo y ed in a bona f ide executive . . . capacity ,” id. § 213(a)(1). T he De partm ent of L abor has pr om ul ga te d re gu la ti on s d efi ni ng who is an “ ex ecu ti ve ” fo r pu rp os es of t he FLSA. U nde r the appl ic ab le r eg ulatio n, an e m plo y ee is an“ ex ec uti ve ” if he e ar ns at l ea st $250 .00 per w eek and is: (1) paid on a salary basis; (2) m anages, a s his prim ary duty , ar ec ogni ze d de partm en t or sub div isi on; and ( 3) r eg ularl y dir ec ts tw o or m or e em pl oyees. 2 9 C .F.R. § 5 41 .1(f ) (2 00 2) .8

Before trial, the parties stipulated th at the store m anagers w ere paid a salary of a t l ea st $ 250. 00 p er

w ee k. A ft er

he ar ing the e vid en ce , the j ur y f ound that the store m anagers “ custom arily and regularly

directed the w ork of two (2) or m ore em pl oyees a t h is or h er s to re,” an d t he st or e m an ag ers do no t co nt es t t ha t fi nd in g. A cc or din gly , the ove rt im e w ag es iss ue tur ns o n w he the r the sto re m an ag er s’ prim ary duty wa s m anagem ent. T he j ury found that it was not, but Farm Stores arg ue s t ha t fi nd in g i s n ot supp or te d b y th e ev id en ce. T he suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce on tha t i ssu e m ust be vie w ed

a ga ins t the ap pli ca ble D O L r eg ulatio n, w hic h se ts o ut f ive f ac tor s to use in de te rm ini ng w he the r ane m

plo y ee ’ s pr im ar

y duty is m an ag em en t. T he f

ac tor s are : ( 1) the am ount of ti m e spe nt p er fo rm ing m an ag er ia l du tie s; ( 2) the r el at ive im portanc e of ane m plo y ee ’ s m an ag er ia l and n on- m an ag er ia l du tie s; ( 3) the f re que nc y w ith w hic h an e m

plo y ee m ay

e xe rc ise dis cr et ion ar

y pow er s; ( 4) the e m

plo y ee ’ s r el at ive fr ee dom f ro m sup er vis ion ; and ( 5) the r el at ion shi p be tw ee n th e pur porte dly ex em pt e m plo y ee ’ s w ag es and the w ag es pa id t o othe r em plo y ee s pe rf

orm ing sim ilar, non-exem

pt work. 29 C.F .R. § 541.103 (2002). In the fac e of the re gulatio n, Farm Stores insists th at the store m anagers ar e exem pt em ploy ees “ as a m atter of law. ” What we understand th at to m ean is that any em ploy ee who has the respon sibili ty over a f ree- standin g busi ness location , a s9

these plaintiffs did, m

ust com e w ithin the executive exem ption . Farm

Stores cites a num be r of de ci sio ns whe re c ourts c onc lud ed that m an ag er s of

f re e- standi ng busi ne ss unit s f

el l w ith in the e xe cu tiv e ex em pti on, but in ea chof

tho se c as es the court reac hed that conclus ion on ly after thoroug hly

review ing th e specifics of e ach em pl oyee’s du ti es . Non e o f th e co ur ts si m pl y sl ap pe d o n a tal is m an ic ph ras e. Take, f or exam ple, Ba ldwin v. T railer Inns, Inc. , 266 F. 3d 11 04 (9th Cir. 2001 ), w hic h a ff

irm ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of ane m plo y er , c onc lud ing that the m an ag er s inque sti on f el l w ith in the e xe cu tiv e ex em pti on. I d. a t 11 17. I n ana ly zi ng the pr im ar y duty r equir em en t, the Ba ldw in court discuss ed in detail the evidence concerning the am ount of tim e the m anagers spe nt p er fo rm ing m an ag er ia l du tie s, the im portanc e of

tho se dut ie s, the m an ag er s’ ind ep en de nc e an d di sc re tio nary auth or ity , and the dif

fe re nc e be tw ee n th e m an ag er s’ sa lari es and the w ag es pa id t o othe r em plo y ee s. I d. a t 11 13–1 6. T he Baldwin opinion illustrates the necessarily fac t-intensiv e nature of the prim ary duty inquir y . T ha t part ic ulari ze d a

ppr oa chis co nsi ste nt w iththe D O L r eg ulatio n, w hic h pr ovi de s th at

the “ de te rm inatio n of

w he the r ane m

plo y ee ha s m an ag em en t as his prim ary

duty m ust be based on all the fac ts in a particular ca se.” 29 C.F .R. § 541 .103 (2002). When it com es to deciding whether an em ploy ee is an10

executive within the m eaning of the FLS A, the answer is in the details. W e re

j ect Farm Sto res ’ ex em

pt io n a s a m at te r of

law ap pr oa ch . Farm S tor es ’ f al lba ck arg um en t i s th at

e ve n if the e xe m pti on i ssu e is o ne to be de ci de d onthe part ic ulars of the e vid en ce , in thi s c as e the re w as not e noug h ev ide nc e to s uppo rt

the j ur y ’ s f ind ing that the sto re m an ag er s w er e not e xe m pt em ploy ees. T his argum ent prim arily focuses on the evidence from which the j ury could have foun d in Farm Stores’ favor on this issu e. W e agre e w ith Farm Stores that i t pr es en te d a

bund an t do cum en tary

e vid en ce and t es tim ony

a t tri al ind ic at ing that the store m anagers’ prim ary duty wa s m anagem ent. W e w ouldaff irm a j ury ve rd ic t i n t ha t d ire ct io n, b ut th atis no t wh atwe ha ve . Whe re an is sue tur

ns o n th e part ic ular fa ct s and c ir cum stanc es of ac as e, it is not unu sua l f

or the re to be e vid en ce on b othsid es of the que sti on, w iththe r es ult hangin g in the balance. T he result rea ched m ust be left intact if there is evidence fr om w hic h th e de ci sio n m ak er , the j ur y in thi s in stanc e, r ea sona

bly c oul d have re sol ve d th e m atte r the w ay it did . S ee P ic ke tt v. T y son Fr es h M eats, I nc . , 420 F. 3d 1 272, 127 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ; C oll ad o v. U nit ed P ar ce l S er

v. , Co . , 419 F . 3d 1143 , 114 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ; B ogl e v. O range Co unty Bd . of Co unty Co m m ’ rs , 162 F.3d 653 , 659 (11th Cir. 1998). The issue is no t whether the evidence wa s11

suf fi ci en t f or F ar m S tor es to ha ve w on, but

w he the r the e vid en ce w as suf fi ci en t f or it to ha ve lo st . It was . W e w on’ t r ec ount

a ll of the te sti m ony

and o the r ev ide nc e supp ortin g th e ve rd ic t, but

af ewe xa m ple s w ill il lus tr at e howthe j ur y r ea sona bly c oul d have determ ined that the sto re m anagers’ prim ary duty wa s not m anagem ent. O ne store m an ag ert es t i fi ed th at i n a t ypi ca l we ekh i s t i m e w as al l o ca t ed as fo l l o ws : “ [A ]n average 30 perc ent as regar ds cleaning, 50 percent custom er attention or service, 10 p er ce nt i n m er ch an dis e re ce ivi ng, anothe r 10 p er ce nt a ppr oxi m at el y

in sta ck ing up the racks, but the m ain poin t wa s custom er sales. ” Fr om his testim ony

a j ury r e a s o n ab l y c o u l dc o n c l u d e th a ta tl e a s ts o me o f th e s t o r e man a g e r s s p e n tn o t i me perform ing m anagerial duties during m ost weeks. While other m anagers conceded that they spent som e tim e eac h wee k perform ing m anagerial tasks, all of them ins ist ed it w as not the m aj or ity

of the ir w ork, and m or e than on e te sti fi ed to sp en di ng on ly abo ut ten pe rcen t o f th ei r ti m e o n m an ag em en t-r el at eddu ti es . T he j ur y a lso he ar d te sti m ony

that the sto re m an ag er s la ck ed auth or ity and discretion ov er their r espective stores and em ploy ees. Som e of the store m anagers te st ifi edth atth ei r st or es were ac tu al ly run by dis tri ctm an ag ers . T he y tol d ho w em plo y ee e va luatio n f

orm s th at the y w er e re qui re d to sig n w er e ac tua lly f ill ed out by dis tr ic t m an ag er s, and h owthe y c oul d no t m ak e an y

m an ag em en t de ci sio ns12

without first seeking perm issio n from their district m anager. Sever al store m an ag er s te sti fi ed

that the ir hourl y r at e of pay ( co m put ed by div idi ng the ir

w ee kly sa lary by the num be r of hours the y

w orke d e ac h w ee k) w as c om para ble to, and i n one case ac tually

less than, those of the sales associates or assistant m anagers at th ei r st or es . Fi na lly , the sto re m an ag er s’ e xpe rt w itn es s, a ft er

r ev ie w ing the ir

j ob descriptions and affidavits, c onclud ed with “ a re asonable degree of profe ssion al certa inty ” that Far

m Stores could not claim

the store m anagers as exem pt und er the e xe cu tiv e ex em

pti on b ec au se “ the ir

pr im ar y duty w as that of

be ing e nga ge d in sa le s an d s al es rel at edact iv it ie s,” n ot m an ag em en t. Co nsi de ri ng the e vid en ce a s aw hol e, and v ie w ing it in the li ght

m ost favor ab le to the ve rd ic t, the re w as e noug h f or the j ur y r ea sona bly to fi nd, a s it expli ci tly did , that the pr im ar

y duty of the sto re m an ag er s w as not m an ag em en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in de ny ing F ar

m S tor es ’ pos t- ve rd ic t m oti on f or jud gm en t as a m at te r of

law, o r in th e al te rn at iv e, a n ew tr ia l o n t hi s g ro un d.

III . T he ne xt i ssu e ar ise s f

ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of F ar m S tor es ’ m oti on for a r em ittitur. T he court instructed the jury that if it found that Farm Stores had vio la te d th e FL SAove rt im e pr ovi sio n, it m ust aw ar d ba ck

pay dam ag es in the13

am ount of the unpaid ov ertim e. T he court’ s instructio n about h ow those dam ages shou ld be calculated included thi s key passage: The e m ploy ee’ s “ regular r ate” during a particular w ee k is the ba sis f

or c al cu la tin g any

ove rt im e pay

due to the em ploy ee f or that we ek. The “ regular r ate” f or a we ek is determ ined by

divid ing all of the hou rs w orked i n t o th e t o t a l w a g e s p a i df o r th o s e h o u r s . T h e o v e rt i me rate , the n, w oul d be one -h al f of that r at e an d w oul d be ow ing f or e ac h ho ur

in ex ce ss o f 40 h our s w orke d duri ng the w ork w ee k. N ei the r party

obj ec te d to any

part of that i nstru ct ion , inc lud ing the se co nd se nt en ce o f it , whi ch as we sh al l s ee, i s p ro bl em at ic . Farm S tor es ’ c hie f ar gum en t f or ar em itt itur is tha t, e ve n vi ew ing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the store m anagers, the dam ages the j ury ca lc ulate d are ne ar ly

tw ic e the a m ount

the e vid en ce sup ports i f the f orm ula la id out in the dam ages instruction is applied. If the j ury had calculated ea ch store m an ag er ’ s r eg ular rate of pay , in the m an ne r it w as ins tr uc te d, F ar

m S tor es ins ist s that the jury

would have returned an aggregate dam ages aw ard of no m ore than $1 58 ,28 1.6 6, i ns te adof t he $2 97 ,70 0.0 0 i t d id . A. As a general r ule, “ a re m ittitur order reducing a j ury ’ s award to the outer lim it of the proof is the appropriate rem edy wher e the j ury ’ s dam age aw ard14

ex ceed s t he am ou nt est ab li sh edby the ev id en ce.” Go ld st ei n v . Man ha tt an Ind us ., In c. , 758 F . 2d 1 435, 144 8 ( 11th C ir . 198 5) ; se e al so F re de ri ck v. K ir by T an kshi ps, Inc. , 205 F. 3d 12 77, 1284 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (“ The r ule in this circuit states that w he re aj ur

y ’ s de te rm inatio n of

li ab ili ty w as not the pr oduc t of

und ue pa ssi on o r prej udice, w e can order

a re m ittitur to th e m axim um aw ard the evidence can su pp or t.”) . T o de te rm ine w he the r the j ur y ’ s aw ar d is w ith in the r an ge dic ta te d by the evidence, w e view the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the store m anagers and apply the district court’ s instructio ns, w hich wer e not objected to by either party . Af ter independentlyreview ing th e testim ony and evidence presented at tr ia l, w e ha ve no d oubt

that the j ur

y ’ s dam ag es ve rd ic t f

ar e xc ee ds the m ax im

um am ount that c oul d have be enaw ar de d ba se d onthe e vid en ce and the ins tr uc tio ns. T he j ur y ’ s aw ar d to Mi gue l L av as tid a ill ustrate s th e er ro rs . T ak ing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to him , it e stablish ed that he worked an av erag e o f 60 ho ur s p er weekan d t ha t h is week ly sala ry was $ 45 8. Both parties ag ree t ha t, i f Lav as ti da is owed an y ov ert im e, he is en ti tl edto 78 week s o f it . Appl y ing the f

orm ula f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str

uc tio n, L av as tid a’ s w ee kly sa lary of $45 8 sh oul d be div ide d by 60, w hic h is the num

be r of hours he a ct

ua lly w orke d. T his y ie lds ar eg ular hour ly r at e of $7. 63. H is o ve rt im e rate w oul d be15

$3. 82, ha lf

his r eg ular hour ly

r at e. B ec au se L av as tid a w orke d 60 hours aw ee k, he is e nti tle d to 20 h our s of

ove rt im e pe r w ee k. A nd $ 3. 82 m ult ipl ie d by

20 i s $7 6.4 0, wh ic h i s t he am ou nt of o ve rti m e p ay he wou ldbe en ti tl edto each week . Ther efore, Lavastida’ s total awar d shou ld have been $5,959.20 ($76 .40 m ultip lied by 78). T he j ury , how ever, aw arded him $11,700, alm ost twice the am ount he w as en tit le d to und er

the j ur y ins tr uc tio n. T he j ur y ’ s aw ar d to Cl ar ibe l A ltam ir an o pr ovi de s anothe r ex am ple . S he te sti fi ed that sh e w orke d ona ve ra ge 52 t o 60 hours aw ee k f or aw ee kly sa lary of $430 . T he part ie s a gr ee that i f A ltam ir an o is ow ed any ove rt im e, she is en tit le d to 82 w ee ks o f it. Appl y ing the f orm ula c ont ai ne d inthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str uc tio n, Altam irano’ s wee kly

salary of $430 sh ouldbe divided b y som e num

ber of hours betwee n 52 and 6 0. T hat would y ield an hourlyrate betwee n $7.17 and $8 .26 per hour. H er overtim e rate w ouldbe betwe en $3.59 and $4.13, half her r egular hourlyrate. She w ouldbe entitled to between 12 and 20 ho urs of overtim e per we ek. The am ount aw arded to her in back pay , ther efore, shoul d have been be tw ee n $4 , 063. 92 and $ 5, 887. 60. T he j ur y , how ev er , r et

ur ne d ave rd ic t of $12, 350, w hic h is m or e than th re e tim es the low -e nd o f the pos sib le r an ge and m or e than do ubl e the hig h- en d of it .The amount counsel soug ht was ac tually $295,966.18, but that total assumed a jury 3 f i n d i n gth atF ar

mS t o r e s h a d

w i l l f u l l y v i o l at e d th e F LS A . A s c o un s e l e x p l a i n e d t o th e j ur y : “ If for some r eason you think this was a simple mist ake, the n y ou would deduct 33 pe rce nt from the se numbe rs , whic h w ou ld b ri ngit d own to the tw o ye ar l e ve l. A t thre e y e ars the re ’s a c e rt a in number a nd two y ear s is 33 perce nt less than that.” B eca use the jury

did not find a willful violation, the amount reque sted had to be r educe d by one-third, a s counsel explained. The f igur e we ha ve used in the te x t, $197,310.79, refle cts that reduc tion. Th at to ta l is the sum of

the fo llo wi ngind ivi du a l da ma g e s a wa rd s r e qu e ste d b y

the ir counsel: Aida B etanc ourt, $7,362.67; Aurora Caraba llo, $9,004.32; Xiomara Celiz, $8,320; Aida Chaviano, $7,446.40; Maria Chaviano, $10,233.33; Emigdlo F landor, $7,644; Rhina Fone sca, $6,791.20; Violeta Gonzalez, $11,044.80; Edith Guil len, $8,195.20; Fr ancisc o Her rer a, $8 ,4 86 .4 0; M ari a

Inc e r, $4 ,1 60 ; Mi gue l L ava sti da , $ 9, 35 5. 33 ; Ro sa Ma ri n, $8 ,9 85 .6 0; R

uth Matus, $6,777.67; Aida Morale s, $9,360; Tere sa Orte g a, $3,186; Glady s Ortiz, $9,178; L illian Pa iz , $ 6 , 8 5 3 . 3 3 ; M anu e l S ir la s , $ 6 , 2 6 0 . 6 7 ; M ar ia Ri v e r a , $ 6 , 7 3 3 . 3 3 ; C ar lo s Ro dr igu e z, $9 ,7 36 .6 7; L or e na

Rod ri gue z, $ 9, 10 0; R

uth Rom e ro , $ 7, 76 8. 80 ; Sa

nd ra Sha w, $1 ,1 54 .4 0; V ilm a Thomas, $5,010.67; and Sandra Velasque z, $9,162. Aga in, counsel ac tually reque sted one-third more than e ach of

these figures, a ssuming that the jury would find a willful violation, but we have r educe d eac h number by a third to ref

lect the e ffe ct of the jury ’s findingthat the violations wer e not willful. 16 T he f ac t tha t the ve rd ic t e xc ee ds the m ax im um a m ount und er the c al cu la tio n the or ie s onw hic h th e ca se w as tr ie d is a lso e vid en ce d by the c los ing arg um en t of the sto re m an ag er s’ ow n c ouns el . A ft er dis cu ssi ng F ar

m S tor es ’ li ab ili ty

and the m ethod fo r ca lc ulatin g dam ag es , he pr oc ee de d to li st the a m ount s he tho ught the store m anagers w ere entitled to receive based on his vi ewof w hat the evidence w oul d su ppor t. T he tot al of

the dam ag es aw ar ds tha t he a dvoc at ed f or his c lie nts , the sto re m an ag er s, w as onl y $19 7, 310. 79 —a

ppr oxi m at el y

$10 0, 000 le ss than th e 3 $297 ,700 aw arded by

the j ury . W e have tried to re produce the jury ’ s dam ages num be r by pe rf orm ing a ll of

the c al cu la tio ns o ur se lve s, but have not be enable to17

do so. Nonetheless, it r em ains true that the j ury ’ s total dam ages verdict subs tanti al ly

e xc ee ds the a m ount

that the sto re m an ag er s’ ow n a tto rn ey tho ught th ey were en ti tl edto rece iv e. The store m anagers have not even attem pted to defend the jury ’ s dam ages verdict to this Cou rt using th e instructions the j ury wa s given. Instead, they co nte nd tha t w e shou ld a

ppl y the gov er

nin g D O L r eg ulatio n, w hic h c ont ai ne d a differe nt rule for ca lculating th e re gular rate of pay . W e w ill have m ore to say about th at regulation later. For the tim e being, it is enough to say that even as sum ing that w e can a

ppl y the D O L r eg ulatio n, w hic h w as not appl ie d a t tri al , the da m ag es ve rd ic t st ill c an not stand. F or

nin e of the tw en ty -s ix s tor e m an ag er s, the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t e xc ee ds b y

$1, 000 or

m or e the ir

ow n c al cu la tio ns— co nta ine d in th ei r br ie f to us —o f wha t t he y are en ti tl edto rece iv e u nd er t he DOL regu la ti on . T o gi ve the m ost

e xtr em e ex am

ple , f or one of the sto re m an ag er s, the ir ca lc ulatio ns unde r the D O L r eg ulatio n w oul d r es ult in anaw ar d of

$30 7. 50. T he j ury , how ever, returned a ver dict of $11,700 for that m anager—an aw ard thi rty -e igh t t im es gr eate r than th e m an ag er s th em se lve s say sho uld r es ult f ro m ap pl y in g t he DOL regu la ti on . W e re co gni ze , of

c our se , that the j ur

y ha d to m ak e ap pr oxi m at ion s and es tim at es in or de r to arr ive a t a dam ag es ve rd ic t be ca

use F ar m S tor es did

notIn Bonne r v. City of Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), w e 4 a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit that w e re re nd e re d p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 18 m aintain payroll records docum enting th e num ber of hours each store m anager w orke d. T he j ur

y w as r equir ed , how ev er , to ope rate w ith in the bounds of the evidence presented at trial and to calculate dam ages using the form ula they we re instructed to app ly . Ea ch store m anager testified to the aver age num ber of hours he worked e ach w eek and to his salary ; som etim es they testified to ranges, such as 5 2 t o 6 0 h o u r s p e r

w e e k . I n th a tan do t h e r

w a ys th e e v i d e n c e g a v e th e j u ry s o me fle xi bi li ty in co m in g u p wi th a do ll ar am ou nt of d am ag es foreach st or e m an ag er. U nf ortun at el y , the j ur

y ’ s dam ag es ve rd ic t e nde d up w el l ou tsi de the boundari es of th e ev id en ce. Whet he r th e err orres ul te d fr om di sr eg ard in g t he ev id en ce, a m athe m at ic al m ist ak e, c onf usi on, or som e oth er

r ea son, it is sti ll er ro r. A s our pr ed ec es sor

c ourt ob se rv ed , w e cannot “pe rm it da m ag e spe cu la tio n w he re the fo rm ula f or c al cu la tio n is art ic ula

ble and d ef

ina ble . F le xib ili ty

be y ond the r an ge of the e vid en ce w ill not

be tol er at ed . ” Jam iso n C o. v. W es tva co Co rp . , 526 F . 2d 922, 936 (5th Cir. 1976 ). T he dam ages aw ard m ust be set aside. 4 B. If the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j ur

y ins tr uc tio n onc al cu la tin g dam ag es ha d a cc ur at el y refle cted the law , w e could stop here. W e w ouldrever se the order deny ing FarmB oth pa rt ie s n ow a g re e that th is r e gulatio n g ov e rn s th e int e rp re tatio n o f t he F L SA 5 overtime provision. In a

ny e ve nt, we are bo un d to fo llo w the DO L ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he F L SA un de r C he vr on , U .S. A. , Inc . v . N atur a l Re so ur c e s D e fe ns e Counc il, Inc ., 46 7 U .S. 83 7, 10 4 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). “Such leg islative regulations are g iven controllingweig ht unless they are ar b it r ar y , c a p r ic io u s , o r

ma n if e s tl y c o n tr ar y to th e s tatute . ” I d . at 8 4 4 , 1 0 4 S. Ct . at 2 7 8 2 . We have he ld that “the DOL ’s re gulations impl ementingthe FL SA are acc orded Chevr on defe renc e.” Fa lken v. Gly

nn County , Ga., 197 F .3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999). 19 St or es ’ m oti on f

or ar em itt itur an d r em an d th e ca se w ithins tr uc tio ns tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt r ed

uc e the aw ar d to the m ax im um a m ount e sta bli she d by

the ev id en ce. See Gol ds te in , 75 8 F .2dat 1 44 8; see als o F red eri ck , 20 5 F .3dat 1 28 4. W e can no t d o t ha t i n t hi s ca se , ho wev er, b ecau se of t he erro ne ou s i ns tru ct io n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt i nstru ct ed the j ur y that i t sh oul d us e the tot al num be r of ho ur s t he st or e m an ag ers work edin ord er t o c al cu la te th ei r reg ul ar ra te of p ay . That is not the law. Aregulation prom ulgated bythe DO L pr ovid es the corre ct m ethod fo r ca lc ulatin g an e m plo y ee ’ s r eg ular rate of

pay . T ha t r eg ulatio n 5 spe ci fi es that: If the e m plo y ee is em

plo y ed sol el y on a w ee kly sa lary ba sis , his re gul ar hourl y r at e of pay , on whic h ti m e an d aha lf m ust be pa id, is co m put ed by div idi ng the sa lary

by the num be r of hours w hic h th e salary is intended to com

pensate. I f an em

ploy ee is hired at a

salary of $18 2. 70 and i f it is unde rs too d th at thi s sa lary

is co m pe nsa tio n f

or a re gul ar w orkw ee k of

35 h our s, the e m

plo y ee ’ s r eg ular rate of

pay is $182 . 70 d ivi de d by

35 h our s, or

$5. 22 an ho ur , and whe n he w orks overtim e he is entitled to receive $5.22 for each of the f irst 40 ho urs and $7.83 (one and on e-half tim es $5.22) for e ach hour thereaf ter. If ane m plo y ee is hir ed

a t a sa lary of $22 0. 80 f

or a 40- hour w ee k hi s reg ul ar ra te is $5 .52 anho ur .20

29 C . F. R. § 77 8. 113( a) ( 2002 ). I n th e sit ua tio n he re , w he re the e m plo y ee is pa id sol el y on a w ee kly sa lary ba sis , the num

be r of hours the e m

plo y ee ’ s pay

is int en de d to c om

pe nsa te —no t ne ce ssari ly the num be r of hours he a ct

ua lly works —i s t he di vi so r. Farm S tor es arg ue s th at

w e shou ld i nstru ct

the dis tr ic t c ourt onr em an d to or de r a re m itt itur notw ith standi ng the e rr or in the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns, be ca

use the st or e m an ag ers ’ week ly sala ry was i nt en de d t o c ov er al l o f th e h ou rs th ey work ed . If that i s so , the n th e er

ro r in the ins tr

uc tio ns w oul d have no e ff ec t, be ca use the divis or and the result will be the sam e, anyway . The f law in this argum ent is that it re qui re s us to as sum e as af ac t tha t the w ee kly

sa lary w as int en de d to co m pe ns at e th e st or e m an ag ers forho wev er m an y ho ur s t he y

actua ll y work ed . The ev id en ce at tri al do es no t co m pe l t ha t fi nd in g, b ut co nf li ct s. T he e vid en ce on F ar

m S tor es ’ sid e of

thi s is sue inc lud ed

the te sti m ony

of it s chief operating office r that the com pany intended for its sto re m anagers to wor k as m an y hours a s ne ed ed

to fu lf ill the ir r es pons ibi lit ie s, and f

or the ir sa lary to co m pe ns at e th em

foras m an y

ho ur s as th atto ok . On the other side, when asked how m any

hours sto re m anagers w ere required to work, one district m anager te sti fi ed : “ 48 h our s. ” T he re w as a lso te sti m ony that the c om

pany r equir ed the sto re m an ag er s to put

40 h our s onthe ti m e she et s th ey f ill ed out e ac h w ee k. T he21

num ber of hours the store m anagers’ salaries w ere intended to com pensate is an un res ol ve d fa ctua l i ss ue . W e ar e al so unpe rs ua de d by the sto re m an ag er s’ arg um en t tha t de spi te the error in the district court’ s jur y instruction , and the fact that the j ury wa s never as ke d to a ddr es s th e iss ue , w e shou ld f ind that i t de ci de d th at

the sto re m an ag er s’ w ee kly sa lary w as int en de d to c om

pe nsa te the m

f or af orty -h our w ork w ee k. T he ar gum en t i s th at

e ve n th oughthe c ourt go t the laww ro ng i n it s in str uc tio ns, and the sto re m an ag er s’ ow n a tto rn ey got the laww ro ng i n hi s op en ing state m en t and cl os in g a rg um en t, t he jury so m eh ow d iv in edth atth ey were t o fo ll ow t he DOL re gul at ion ’ s a

ppr oa che ve n th oughit

w as ne ve r m en tio ne d to the m . W e w ill not pr es um e that the j ur

y kno w s m or e ab out

the lawthan th e j udge and l awy er s do , es pe ci al ly w he re vir

tua lly a ll of the te sti m ony

w as f ram ed in te rm s of

the erro ne ou s s ta nd ard , and all of t he att orne y ’s arg um en ts rei nf or cedit . C. Insistin g that the jury ’ s dam ages verdict, even if it cannot be explained un de r th e d is tri ctco ur t’s i ns tru ct io n, i s co ns is te nt wit h t he ev id en ce an d t he DOL re gul at ion , the sto re m an ag er s arg ue that w e shou ld a ppl y the “ ri ght

f or the w ro ng reasons” principle and affir m the district court’ s order. A t oral argum ent, c ouns el for the store m anagers directe d us to a line of Florida cases apply ing th at principle,The fir st tim e the F lorida cour ts used that name wa s in Carraw ay v. Armour & Co., 6 156 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1963) , wher e the F lorida Supreme Court quoted f rom Oliver Goldsmith’s po e m “ Re ta liatio n, ” the se lin e s:

T h e p u p i l o f i mp u l s e, i tfo rc ’dh i mal o n g, Hi s co n d u cts t i l l ri gh t , wi thh i s ar gum en twr o n g; Stil l aiming at honour, y et fe aringto roam, The c oachma

n was tipsy , the cha

riot drove home . . . . I d. at 497. The G eorg ia Supreme Court ha d quoted the same poem for the same rule of law more than eig hty

y ear s befor e. See L ee v. Porte r, 63 Ga . 345 (1879). 22 w hic h is a lso kno w n by

the de lig htf

ul t itl e of the “ tip sy

c oa ch m an ” doc tr ine , to the re vie wof j udi ci al r uli ngs an d de ci sio ns. S ee Appl eg at e v. Barn ett B an k of 6 T al laha sse e, 377 S o. 2d 1 150, 115 2 ( Fl a. 197 9) ( “ T he w ri tte n f ina l j udgm en t by the trial court could well be wrong in its rea sonin g, but the decision of the trial co urt i s pr im ar ily

w ha t m atte rs , not

the r ea soni ng u se d. E ve n w he n ba se d on er ro ne ous re as oni ng, ac onc lus ionor de ci sio n of

atr ia l c ourt w ill ge ne ra lly be af fi rm ed if the e vid en ce or

an a lte rn at ive the or

y sup ports i t. ”) ; se e al so Muh am m ad v. S ta te , 782 S o. 2d 3 43, 359 ( Fl a. 200 1) ( “ [T ] he tr ia l c ourt’ s r uli ng on an e vid en tiary

m atte r w ill be a ff

irm ed e ve n if the tr ia l c ourt r

ule d f or the w ro ng re as o n s , a s l o n g as th e e v i d en ce o r a n al t ern at i v e t h eo ry s up p o rt s th e ru l i n g .” ). We ar e al l f or r ule s th at pr om ote j udi ci al e co nom y and e ff ic ie nc y , but

e ve n a ssu m ing th atth e d oc tri ne can be ap pl ie d t o ju ry ve rd ic ts , itcan no t s av e th e o ne in th is cas e.23

T he r ec or d inthi s c as e re m ind s us le ss o f a tip sy c oa ch m anarr ivi ng at the r igh t de st in at io n t ha n o f a b li nd on e who en ds up at t he wron g p la ce. As w e have explained this is n ot a case where the j ury , c onfused byan e rr o n e o u s i n s t r

u c t i o n , s t i l l dr o v e th e c h a r i o tt o th e r i g h th o me. Ni n e o f th e tw e n t ysix awar ds exceeded by

$1,000 or m ore the m axim um am ount that the evidence w oul d su ppor t i f the c or

re ct r ule of lawha d be enappl ie d. Whe re one -thir d of the aw ar ds are gr eate r than e ve n th e sto re m an ag er s’ be st t ak e on the e vid en ce , the res ul t ca nn ot fai rly be ch arac te riz edas c orrect . A tte m pti ng t o pu sh wro ng c los er to ri ght , the sto re m an ag er s r es our ce fu lly poi nt t o th e te sti m ony

of one of the m statin g th at

he a ct ua lly w orke d an e xtr a fi ve hour s e ac h w ee k be y ond tho se he spe nt w orkin g a t the sto re . T ha t e xtr a tim e, he expla ine d, w as spe nt m ak ing bank d ep osi t r uns. H ow ev er , that w as the te sti m ony of only one of the store m anagers. T he others did no t say that the total hou rs they es tim at ed w orkin g e xc lud ed

any of the ti m e the y

spe nt p er fo rm ing dut ie s f or the com pany . In any

event, a ddin g five hours to every store m anager’ s work w eek w oul d on ly

r ed uc e the de gr ee of

e rr or in the j ur y ’ s dam ag es ve rd ic t, not

r em ove it en tir el y . A s c ouns el f

or the sto re m an ag er s c onc ed ed a t or al arg um en t, w e cannot

“ affir m atively tell what [ the j ury ’ s] rea sonin g was. ” Wha t w e do knowis that i t did not f ai thf ull y appl y the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str

uc tio n—e rr one ous as it

w as —t o24

the e vid en ce . T he c hari ot w ound up at the w ro ng h ouse . W e can ne ith er c hart it s co ur se no r le t s ta nd it s d es ti na ti on . D. H av ing c onc lud ed

that the j ur

y ’ s ve rd ic t e xc ee ds the out er bounds of

the ev ide nc e unde r the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e rr one ous ins tr uc tio n, and unde r the c or re ct r ule of lawa s w el l, w e ar

ri ve a t the que sti on w e pose d a t the be gin nin g of thi s op ini on: Shouldwe direct the district court to order a rem ittitur based on the incorrect j ury ins tr uc tio n, the re by

r ed uc ing the dam ag es aw ar d to the m ax im um that c oul d have be enaw ar de d un de r the e rr one ous ins tr uc tio n th at

w as giv enw ith out

obj ec tio n, or shou ld w e or de r a ne wtr ia l ondam ag es w he re the c or re ct standard w oul d be ap pli ed ? W e h av e fo un d n o d eci si on by thi s C ou rt d ire ct ly ans weri ng th atqu es ti on , but our de ci sio ns i n c as es w he re dis tr ic t c ourts h av e giv enunc le ar or c onf usi ng j ur y ins tr uc tio ns p ro vid e som e gui danc e. C onsi de r, f or e xa m ple , O ve rs ea s P ri va te Investm ent Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County , 47 F. 3d 11 11 (11th Cir. 1995 ), w he re aj ur

y f ound tw o de fe ndants li ab le und er br ea chof

c ontra ct , ne gli ge nc e, and strict liabilitytheories for supply ing to xic fertilizer to a far m ing op eration. Id. at 1115 –16. Although th e sam e dam ages shoul d have been aw arded under eac h th eo ry , th e jury retu rn eda di ffer en t d am ag es ve rd ic t o n t he st ric t l iabi li ty the ory .25

Id. at 1115 . Af

ter re viewing the verdicts, special interr ogatories, and j ury ins tr uc tio ns, w e co nc lud ed

that “ the j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns . . . w er e co nf

usi ng and unclear, resulting in confusing dam age aw ards.” Id. at 1116. A s is the case here , th ou gh , “ th e li ab il it y

is su es were p ro pe rly andcle arl y de ci de d b y

th e jury.” Id. Where liability

wa s properly

decided by

the fac tfinder but an erroneous dam ages ve rd ic t w as r et

ur ne d, w e he ld tha t “ the r em edy . . . [ w as ] to re m an d th e ca se to the di st ric t co ur t fo r a n ew tr ia l o n t he am ou nt of d am ag es on ly.” Id. Si m il arl y , in Kin g v . Exx on Co ., 61 8 F .2d11 11 (5t h C ir. 1 98 0) , we co nc lud ed

that the dis tr ic t c ourt gave the j ur y an in co rr ec t i nstru ct ionf or determ ining the period for w hich the plaint iff w as entitled to dam ages under an em plo ym en t c ontra ct . I d. a t 11 18–1 9. B ec au se the c or re ct ins tr uc tio n w oul d have re qui re d th e j ur

y to de te rm ine an in he re ntl y f ac t- ba se d qu es tio n th at

it ha d no t decided, w e re fused to order a re m ittitur. Id. at 1119. Instead, we rem anded for a new tr ial on the dam ages question , dire cting the dis trict court to properly instruct the j ur y about howto ca lc ulate the dam ag es pe ri od. I d. In both OPIC and King, w e concluded that a rem ittitur was not an ap p ro p ri at e w ay t o re m ed y t h e e rr o n eo u s d amag es v er d i ct b ec au s e t h e ju ry’s ca l cu l at i o n s h ad co m e a ft ererro n eo u s i n s t ru ct i o n s . As i n th o s e c as es , t h e ju ry’s verdict in this o ne is excessive when m easured against the evidence presented at26

tr ia l— he re it is ex ce ssi ve w he n m ea sur ed a ga ins t the e rr one ous ins tr uc tio n and ag ai nst the c or re ct r ule of law . Wha te ve r the c au se of the dam ag es ve rd ic t i n th is ca se , it is co nf usi ng and e rr one ous. T he be st w ay to re m edy

it is to s tart ove r on da m ag es , gi ve th e jury the co rrec t l eg al st an da rdto ap pl y , and ho pe forth e b es t. Be ca use of the c ont em

por an eo us o bj ec tio n r

ule , w e pr oba

bly w oul d have af fi rm ed the j udgm en t i n th is c as e if the onl y e rr or w er e in the ins tr

uc tio n—i f the j ur y ha d c or re ct ly appl ie d th e er

ro ne ous standard

to w hic h no one obj ec te d. T he twist here is that the jury

did no t correc tly

apply the wr ong st andard, but instead co m poun de d th e er

ro r. T he j ur

y in ef fe ct too k th e er

ro r to a dif fe re nt l ev el , one bey ond th e level of e rror insulated by the contem

poraneous ob

j ection rule. Ther e was no fai lu re t o o bjec t t o t he erro ne ou s ap pl ic at io n o f th e err on eo us st an da rd . Farm S tor es pr om

ptl y and p ro pe rl y

r ai se d th at

se co nd l ev el e rr or

in its m oti on f

or a rem it ti tu r an d i s en ti tl edto ha ve th atis su e d eci de d, as we are d oi ng . W e do n ot b el ie ve that our re vie wof thi s se co nd l ev el e rr or

iss ue r ew ar ds ei the r party

f or f ai lin g to obj ec t t o th e er

ro ne ous j ur

y ins tr uc tio n, w hic h w as the fi rs t l ev el e rr or . F ar

m S tor es c am e to u s a ski ng tha t w e or de r a re m itt itur unde r the erroneous standard; we are not doing that. T he store m anagers asked us to affirm the dam ages aw ard that w as returned; w e ar e not doin g that either. Both parties w oul d have be enbe tte r of f if the y ha d r ec ogni ze d th e er

ro r in the j ur

y ins tr uc tio n27

and objected to it, so that the dam ages part of the ca se could have been decided unde r the c or

re ct standard to be ginw ith . On re m and, when it condu cts a newtrial on the issue of dam ages, the c ourt shou ld i nstru ct

the j ur y a cc or din g to the r eg ular rate of pay standard c ont ai ne d in the D O L r eg ulatio n. A lth oughw e le av e the f ina l de ci sio n onthi s de ta il to the dis cr et ionof

the e xpe ri en ce d di str ic t c ourt j udge , he m igh t w ishto pr opound specific interrogatories to the j ury that include these qu estions as to each store m an ag er : the w ee kly

sa lary , th e num

be r of hours that sa lary

w as int en de d to com pensate, and the nu m

ber of hours actually

worked. If

the district court decides to u se spe ci al int er

ro ga tor ie s, it

w oul d be f

re e to p hr as e the que sti ons an d in cl ude an y ad di ti on al on es itbe li ev es rel ev an t t o d eci di ng th e am ou nt of d am ag es . IV. T he re is one iss ue le ft

f or us t o de ci de . F ar

m S tor es c ont en ds tha t the district court erre d by

aw arding the store m anagers liquidated or “ doub le” da m ag es und er

29 U . S. C. § 21 6( b) . W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ul tim at e de ci sio n to aw ar d li qui da te d dam ag es onl y f or an a buse of dis cr et ion . S ee 29 U. S. C. § 260 (“ [Adistrict] court m ay , in its sound discretion, aw ard no liquid ated da m ag es or

aw ar d any

a m ount the re of not to ex ce ed

the a m ount

spe ci fi ed in se ct ion216 of

[ the F L SA ] . ”) ; D y

ba chv. F la . D ep ’ t of

Co rr . , 942 F . 2d 1 562, 156 628

(1 1thCi r. 199 1) ( expla ini ng tha t w he the r ane m plo y er a ct ed in good f ai th and w ith a re as ona ble be lie f that i t w as in co m pli an ce w iththe F L SAis a m ixe d qu es tio n of law and fact, but that on ce an e m ploy er e stablish es these elem ents, “ the district co urt’ s r ef

usa l t o aw ar d li qui da te d dam ag es is re vie w ed f or abuse of dis cr et ion ” (citations om itted)). Under the F LS A a

district court generally

m ust awar d a plaintiff liquid ated da m ag es that are e qua l i n am ount to ac tua l dam ag es . T he statut e pr ovi de s: “ A ny em pl oyer who vi ol at es th e p ro vi si on s o f [t he FLSA] . . . sha ll be li ab le to th e . . . em pl oyees a ffec te d i n t he am ou nt of t he ir . . . unpa idov ert im e co m pe ns at io n . . . an d i n a n a dd it io na l eq ua l am ou nt as l iq ui da te d d am ag es .” 29 U.S.C. § 2 16 (b ). The Po rta l t o P or ta l Act , 29 U.S.C. §§ 25 1– 62 , whi ch am en de d t he FLSA, pr ovi de s asa fe harb or

f or an e m plo y er w ho c ane sta

bli sh tha t i t a ct ed

in good f ai th an d u nd er t he reas on ab le be li ef t ha t i t was in co m pl ia nc e wit h t he FLSA. Id. § 260. T he sa fe harb or

pr ovi sio n pr ovi de s: Inany a ct ion. . . to re co ve r . . . unp ai d ov er tim e co m pe nsa tio n, or liquid at ed

dam ag es , und er

the [ FL SA ] . . . , if

the e m plo y er sho w s to the sa tis fa ct ionof

the c ourt tha t the a ct

or om iss iongiv ing r ise to suc h a ct ionw as in good

f ai th and tha t he ha d r ea sona ble gr ound s f

or believing that his act or om issio n was not a violation . . . the c ourt m ay , in it s s ou nd di sc ret io n, awa rdno li qu id at edda m ag es . . . .29

Id. An em

ploy er who vio lates the FL SA ’ s overtim e provision car ries the burden of pr ovi ng i ts e nti tle m en t t o th e sa fe harb or . Joi ne r v. Ci ty of Ma co n, 814 F . 2d 1537 , 1539 (11th Cir. 1987). T o satisfy the goodfaith requirem ent, an em ploy er m ust sho wthat i t a ct ed

w ithboth ob

j ec tiv e an d su

bj ec tiv e good

f ai th. D y ba ch , 94 2 F .2dat 1 56 6– 67 . Farm Stores advances sever al argum ents about why the district court abused its dis cr et ionin aw ar din g li qui da te d dam ag es . F ir st, it c ont en ds tha t the c ourt he ld it to a n e xc es siv el y

hig h e vid en tiary

standard . A cc or din g to F ar m S tor es , to sa il within the safe har

bor all an em

ploy er m ust do is dem onstrate good faith; it need not f ur nis h do cum en tary

e vid en ce of

it s go od f

ai th. S ec ond, F ar

m S tor es sug ge sts that the district court order im posed a safe harbor pre conditi on that em ploy ers co nsul t w iththe D O L be fo re de cl ini ng t o pay ove rt im e, and a sse rt s th at the re is no ba si s fo r req ui rin g t ha t. W e do not sh are Farm

Stores’ view of the district court’ s order. T he court did not r ea d adoc um en tary

e vid en ce or

D O L c onsu ltatio n r equir em en t i nto the sa fe harb or . I nst ea d, it

r ea sone d th at

the abse nc e of

doc um en tary

e vid en ce or te sti m ony that F ar m S tor es c onsu lte d th e D O L or an F L SAe xpe rt

be fo re or dur ing the period of the violatio n weighed against a finding of ob j ective good faith. T hat is s el f ev ide nt f

ro m the f ac t tha t do cum en tary

e vid en ce or

c onsu ltatio n w iththe30

DO L or an outsid e expert w ouldhave we ighed in Far m Stores’ favor. The court did not ind ic at e that the onl y

e vid en ce that w oul d pe rs ua de it of F ar m S tor es ’ goo d faith wa s docum entary

evidence or proof of consultation. The c ourt’ s exam ples were n ot in te nd edas a n e xh au st iv e li st . Farm S tor es a lso c ont en ds tha t un de r the e vid en ce that w as pr es en te d, the district court erre d by

finding th at it had not sh own obje ctive goodfaith. Far m St or es did

pr es en t an e xpe rt

( w hic h it ha d no t c onsu lte d be fo re the li tig at ion be gan) who g av e his opi nio n th at the sto re m an ag er s f

it w ith in the e xe cu tiv e exem ption to the overtim e re quirem ent. T hat expert’ s testim ony , how ever, wa s not unc ont es te d. T he sto re m an ag er s pr es en te d th ei r ow n e xpe rt w ho r ea ch ed

the oppo sit e co nc lus ion . T he dis tr ic t c ourt w as not r equir ed to cr ed it Farm

S tor es ’ expe rt , e ve n to the poi nt o f es ta bli shi ng a goo d f ai th d if fe re nc e of

opi nio n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ar d th e te sti m ony of the e xpe rt s, a s w el l a s th at of the P re sid en t of Farm Stores, on the issu e of good faith, and it wa s in a m uch better positio n than w e ar e to d ec ide thi s f

ac t- int en siv e iss ue and e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n a cc or din gly Finally , F arm

Stores contends that in decidi ng the liq uidated dam ages issue, the dis tr ic t c ourt w as barr ed f ro m f ind ing that the c om

pany ha d no t a ct ed

in good fa ithby the j ur y ’ s pr ior f ind ing on the statut e of

li m itatio ns i ssu e that i t ha d no t w ill fu lly vio la te d th e A ct . T his arg um en t i s tw o- fo ld: th e ab se nc e of w ill fu lne ss31

is i nc onsi ste nt w iththe abse nc e of goo d f ai th; and, w he re the re is ev ide nc e on both si de s of

af ac tua l i ssu e, the c ourt c an not m ak e fi ndi ngs inc onsi ste nt w ith th os e o f th e jury. The par ties cite the decisions of three circ uits sh owing a clear split ov er w he the r the standard s f

or f ind ing w ill fu lne ss and f

or f ind ing the abse nc e of

goo d fa i t h ar e t h e s ame s o th at th e ju ry’s fi n d i n g o n th e f o rmer i s s u e c o n t ro l s th e ju d g e’s fi ndi ng o n th e la tte r one . C om pare Br inkm anv. D ep ’ t of Co rr . , 21 F . 3d 3 70, 373 (1 0thCi r. 199 4) ( “ T he sam e w ill fu lne ss s tandard f or the statut e of

li m itatio ns iss ue appl ie s to the li qui da te d dam ag es iss ue . ” (c itatio n om itt ed )) , w ithBr oa dus v. O.K . I n du s ., I n c. , 2 2 6 F. 3 d9 3 7 , 9 4 4 (8 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( n o t i n g th at th e “jury’ s decision on willfulness is disti nct from the district judge’ s decision to aw ard li qu id at edda m ag es ” (ci ta ti on om it te d) ), an d F owl er v . LandMg m t. Gro up e, In c., 978 F. 2d 1 58, 162 ( 4thCi r. 199 2) ( “ [T ] he e xpl ic it langua ge of [ the sa fe harb or pr ovi sio n] e xpr es sly

ve st[ s] dis cr et ionto aw ar d li qui da te d dam ag es in the hands of the tr ia l j udge . W e do n ot b el ie ve that, in lig ht o f thi s c le ar de le ga tio n of au tho ri ty , Co ngr es sio na l i nte nt w oul d be e ff ec tuate d by

asc he m e in whic h, in ev er y c as e, the tr ia l c ourt’ s di sc re tio n to aw ar d li qui da te d dam ag es w oul d be co m ple te ly c onstra ine d by

the j ur y ’ s de te rm inatio n on‘ w ill fu lne ss’ f or pur pose s of the statute of lim itations .” ).32

In te re sti ng a s th e iss ue is, w e don’ t have to pic k asid e in the c ir cu it spl it in or de r to d ec ide thi s a

ppe al . T he und er ly ing c onc er n of the T en th C ir cu it in Br inkm an , w hic h a ff

irm ed adis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ind ing that go od f

ai th w as abse nt be ca use the j ur

y ha d f ound w ill fu lne ss, w as f

ost er ing c onsi ste nc y

be tw ee n th e fa ct fi ndi ngs of

j udge s and j ur ie s. B ri nkm an , 21 F . 3d at 37 2–73 . T ha t c onc er n is t h e s ame wh et h eri ti s ar t i cu l at ed as a S ev en t hAm en d m en tp ro b l em, s ee i d . ( “ We ha ve he ld tha t w he n f

ac t i ssu es c en tr al to a cl ai m are de ci de d by

aj ur y upo n evidence that would justify its conclusi on, the Seventh A m endm ent right to a jury tr ia l pr ohi bit s th e dis tr ic t c ourt f ro m r ea ch ing ac ontrary

c onc lus ion . ”) , or

a s a co llate ra l e sto ppe l pr obl em . H ow ev er it is ar tic ulate d, that c onc er

n is not im pl ic at edhe re. W e as sum e fo r pr es en t purp ose s th at the abse nc e of

w ill fu lne ss i s e qui va le nt to the pr es en ce of

goo d f ai th. E ve n w iththat a ssu m pti on, in the pr es en t c as e the ju ry’s fi n d i n g an dth e c o u rt ’s fi n d i n g ar e n o tn ec es s ar i l y i n co n s i s t en t . Th e ju ry’s ac tua l f ind ing w as that the sto re m an ag er s ha d f ai le d to c ar

ry the ir bur de n of pr ov in g t ha t Fa rm

Sto res ha d wi ll fu ll y

vi ol at edth e FLSA. T he int er ro ga tor y it re tur ne d, a cc ur at el y

phr as ed in lig ht o f the law , state d th at the sto re m an ag er s di d not prov e “by

a preponderance of

the evidence that [Farm

Stores] knew it w as vio la tin g th e [F L SA ] or

sho w ed r ec kle ss d isr eg ar d a s to w he the r it w as vio la tin g33

the [FL SA ] by

treating its store m anagers as exem pt for purposes of overtim e. ” The c ourt’ s actual finding, in ligh t of the statute, is that Far m Stores did not carry it s b ur de n o f pr ov in g t ha t i t h adact edin go od fai th . T he r ec onc ili at ionpoi nt i s th e bur de n of pr oof , and m or e spe ci fi ca lly , the dif fe re nc es in its pla ce m en t. F or the w ill fu lne ss i ssu e on whic h th e statut e of lim itations turns, the burden is on th e em ploy ee; for the good faith issue on which liquid at ed

dam ag es tur

ns, the bur de n is on the e m plo y er . B ec au se the bur de n of pr oof is pla ce d di ff

er en tly , af

ind ing that w ill fu lne ss w as not pr es en t m ay

c o- ex ist pe ac ef ull y w ithaf ind ing that go od f

ai th w as not

pr es en t. T he r es ult

vari es w ith the bur de n of

pr oof , pr ovi de d th at

af ac tf ind er c oul d c onc lud e that the e vid en ce on the issue is evenlybalanced. See 18 Charles A lan Wright, A rthur R. Miller & E dw ar d H . Co ope r, F ed er al P ra ct ic e an d P ro ce dur e § 44 22 ( 2d e d. 200 2) (e xpl ai nin g th at

w he re the bur de n of

pr oof vari es , c oll at er al e sto ppe l do es not ne ce ssari ly

appl y be ca use “ it is p oss ibl e that the ini tia l de te rm inatio n r es te d ona co nc lus ionthat the e vid en ce w as in ex ac t e qui poi se ”) ; se e al so S te el m et , I nc . v. Cari be T ow ing Co rp . , 747 F . 2d 6 89, 694 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) ( sur ve y ing de ci sio ns o f oth er c ourts, a ca de m ic c om

m en tary , and the Re state m en t ( Se co nd) of Jud gm en ts an d c onc lud ing that “ the c hange in al loc at ionof the bur de n of

pr oof m ak es a di ffer en ce” a s t o t he ap pl ic ab il it y of t he do ct rin e o f co ll at eral est op pe l).34

Inde ci din g w he the r a ratio na l f ac tf ind er c oul d vi ewthe e vid en ce on the w ill fu lne ss/ good

f ai th i ssu es a s e ve nly

ba lanc ed , w e be ar

in m ind that i t i s th e fa ct fi nde r’ s f

unc tio n to r es olv e cr ed ibi lity que sti ons, and w e m

ust vie wthe ev ide nc e thr oughthe c ur at ive le ns o f re sol vin g a ll co nf lic ts i n f av or of the jud gm en t. In th is in st an ce, t ha t m ean s re so lv in g a ll co nf li ct s t owa rdequi po is e. W iththat i n m ind , w e co nc lud e that a ct ing r at ion al ly , af ac tf ind er c oul d have fo un d t he ev id en ce ev en ly bal an ced . O ur ana ly sis and the r es ult

w e re ac h do es not

c onf lic t w iththe T en th Ci rc uit ’ s B ri nkm ande ci sio n. T he c onc lus ionin that c as e w as that a f ind ing by the j udge that th e em

ploy er had proven it acted in good faith would hav e been inconsi stent with the jur

y ’ s finding that the em

ploy ees had proven the em ploy er ac te d w ill fu lly . B ri nkm an , 21 F . 3d at 37 2–73 . I n othe r w or ds, af ind ing that a posi tiv e co ndi tio n ( good

f ai th) ha d be enpr ove n w oul d have be eninc onsi ste nt w ith fin di ng th atth e n eg at iv e o f th e sa m e co nd it io n (wi ll fu ln es s) ha d a ls o b een pro ve n. W e al read y

ha ve ass um ed , aft er al l, t ha t g oo d fa it h a nd wil lfu ln es s ca nn ot co ex is t. By c ontra st, w ha t w e ha ve he re is the f ai lur e of F ar m S tor es to pr ove apos iti ve co ndi tio n ( good

f ai th) . T ha t i s no t i nc onsi ste nt w iththe sto re m an ag er s’ f ai lur e to pr ove the ne ga tiv e of

that sam e co ndi tio n ( w ill fu lne ss) . I t i s no t i nc onsi ste nt,B e c a u s e w e ar e r e v e r s i n gth e p arto f th e j u d g m e n tth ataw ar d e d d am a g e s i ni t s e n t i r e ty, 7 and bec ause the amount of liquidated dama g es depe nds on the other damag es aw arde d, our reve rsal includes the liquidated damag es dete rmination. The district cour t is free to revisit that iss ue a ft e r t

he ne w tri a l on

dama g e s. Our d e c isi on

on the liq uid ate d d ama g e s is su e is c on fi ne d to concludingthat on the evidenc e in the re cord at this t ime, the district court c ould awar d liquidated damag es. We have not addre ssed whethe r it must do so. 35 because if the e videnti ary balance is pointin g straight up , neither side has carrie d it s b ur de n o f pr oo f, no th in g h as be en pro ve n. Fo r t h es e r ea s o n s , we re

je ct Fa rm St o re s ’ co n t ra ry ar g u m en tth at th e ju d g e’s fin di ng th atitlac ke d g oo d fa it h c an no t s ta nd . V. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r de ny ing F ar m S tor es ’ m oti on f

or j udgm en t a s a m atte r of lawis AF FIRMED in al l r es pe ct s, e xc ep t tha t the part of the j udgm en ts aw arding dam ages in favor of the tw enty -six store m anager plaintiffs ar e REV ERS ED , and the c as e is REM AN DED f or ane wtr ia l ondam ag es c onsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. 736

E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, CO N CU RS in the r es ult .