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76–031PDF 2012

SAFEGUARDING ISRAEL’S SECURITY IN A

VOLATILE REGION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 20, 2012

Serial No. 112–182

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations ..... 8

Mr. James Phillips, senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs, The 

Heritage Foundation ............................................................................................ 14

The Honorable Martin S. Indyk, director, Saban Center for Middle East 

Policy, The Brookings Institution ....................................................................... 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elliott Abrams: Prepared statement ............................................ 10

Mr. James Phillips: Prepared statement ............................................................... 16

The Honorable Martin S. Indyk: Prepared statement .......................................... 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

(1)

SAFEGUARDING ISRAEL’S SECURITY IN A 

VOLATILE REGION 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon. This is the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and South Asia of the Foreign Affairs Committee. And 

the subject of our hearing today is ‘‘Safeguarding Israel’s Security 

in a Volatile Region.’’

We started the hearing 30 minutes earlier than originally scheduled, and we appreciate the panel for being here to accommodate 

members who plan to attend a bipartisan briefing with Secretary 

Clinton and others at 3 o’clock o’clock this afternoon. And we may 

be interrupted by votes shortly as well. So we are going to try to 

get in as much as we can. I want to thank our witnesses for agreeing to come in a little early. I will try to keep my opening remarks 

a little shorter than usual. I will try to speak faster. And I hope 

that the witnesses will be willing to summarize their statements as 

best they can so that members will have time to ask questions. 

I want to take a brief moment to make a comment about my colleague from New York, the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman. We 

are not sure what the future schedule of this subcommittee is for 

the remainder of this Congress, but barring any post-election activity, this may be the gentleman’s last hearing in the Middle East 

and South Asia Subcommittee, a subcommittee, of course, that he 

chaired. 

I have served with the gentleman on this subcommittee for a 

good part of my service in this body. And I have always enjoyed 

working with him. Sometimes I have even agreed with him. Some 

have said that the Congress has lost some of its real personalities 

from a bygone era. Well, I think it would be fair to say that my 

friend from New York is a real personality. [Laughter.] 

He will be missed, won’t he, Mr. Rohrabacher? And I hope he is 

not a stranger to these halls in the years to come. He certainly has 

been an asset to this institution and as much disagreement. We actually have gotten along quite well in this committee. And even 

when we disagree, we haven’t been disagreeable about it. And he 

will be missed. And so the best of luck in whatever endeavors that 

2

you may have in the future, Gary. And it has been an honor to 

serve with you. 

It has been often said that Israel resides in a very tough neighborhood. And it has been evident in recent weeks and months that 

Israel’s security situation continues to be threatened by what could 

be charitably called political instability in the region. Anti-Israel 

Islamist groups have had electoral success in neighboring nations, 

particularly in Egypt, a critical cog for a generation in the ArabIsraeli peace process. 

And now Egypt’s commitment to preserving stability in the Sinai 

is seriously in question. And its new leadership continues to send 

mixed signals about its intentions toward Israel. 

The raging civil war in Syria threatens the stability of neighboring Lebanon, where Hezbollah, backed by the mullahs in Iran, 

is more than ready to capitalize. And most recently Islamist extremists have violently attacked American facilities in the region, 

destroying property, burning American flags, threatening lives, and 

in Syria murdering four of our finest Americans, whose only crime 

was trying to assist Libyans in securing the peace and promoting 

democracy and fundamental human rights in a nation only recently 

freed from decades of a brutal dictatorship. 

Of course, since 2007, Gaza, with its notorious terror cells, has 

been governed by Hamas, a State Department-designated foreign 

terrorist organization whose charter calls for the obliteration of 

Israel. Thousands of rocket attacks against Israel have been 

launched from Gaza in the last decade. As recently as this summer, 

an estimated 65 Gaza-launched rockets rained in on Israel in a 3-

day period. And today more weapons to be used against Israel continue to be smuggled into Gaza. 

And, finally, the 700-pound gorilla in the room, as we all know, 

is the growing threat of nuclear-armed Iran, led by a tyrant who 

has called for the destruction of the State of Israel. As recently as 

last month, Iran celebrated its annual Quds Day, its annual statesponsored protest against the existence of the State of Israel, an 

event held each year since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran’s 

supreme leader at the time said that Israel should be wiped off the 

map. And his hateful and dangerous rhetoric is still heard today. 

Here is what Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the 

crowd dotted with ‘‘Death to Israel’’ and ‘‘Death to America’’ signs, 

‘‘This was the day of unity among all human beings to remove the 

Zionist black stain from the human society.’’ And that is the leader 

of Iran, who may well unless something is done to stop him have 

nuclear weapons in the very near future. And this is the Iranian 

leader we are supposed to trust when he says that Iran’s nuclear 

intentions are peaceful. 

At every turn, Iranian authorities have worked to thwart the effort of the International Atomic Energy Agency to investigate nuclear sites. IAEA investigators report that they have been unable 

to have access to their Fordow site built under a mountain near 

Qum, where an estimated 2,000 centrifuges have been installed 

and at the Parchin military installation near Teheran, where a suspected nuclear weapons-related project has been covered with 

shrouding. 

3

Olli Heinonen, a former top IAEA inspector in a September 6 

Wall street Journal article co-written with Simon Henderson from 

the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, wrote, ‘‘Judging 

from this report, Iran seems to be determined to achieve the capability of producing nuclear materials suitable for nuclear weapons. 

Whether he has made a decision to produce a fully operational nuclear weapon is unclear.’’ Not very reassuring. 

As one who has always believed that Israel is our closest friend 

and ally in the Middle East, I have grown increasingly concerned 

over the last several months about the future of the U.S.-Israel security relationship. 

From what some thought was the administration’s clumsy response to the Palestinian attempt for statehood recognition last 

September at the U.N. to the most recent dust-ups concerning the 

status of Jerusalem in President Obama’s campaign platform to the 

fact that he has, at least at this point, been unwilling to meet with 

the Prime Minister of Israel here in the United States, I fear we 

are sending conflicting messages, both to our friends and those of 

Israel’s enemies who may question our resolve. I think that would 

be unfortunate and potentially dangerous. I hope it is not the case, 

but I fear that it is. 

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses this afternoon who 

are well-versed on these issues and my colleagues and I look very 

much forward to hearing from them. And I will now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, my friend from New York, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. First let me say thank 

you for your very kind comments. I am going to miss this place. 

I am going to miss this committee. I am going to miss you, Mr. 

Chairman, and so many of the members. Actually, I am going to 

miss all of the members that are here. 

I have always found that Members of Congress don’t get enough 

credit for being as thoughtful as most of us have been. And certainly some of the most thoughtful Members wind up on this full 

committee and specifically on our subcommittee. And while we 

have disagreements sometimes, not as much you and I maybe, but 

among some of the members, it is with the best intentions of approving American foreign policy and doing what is right in the interest of this country. And I am sure that is going to go on without 

me. And whatever field of endeavor I wind up in, I am sure that 

our paths are going to cross again. 

Today the Middle East is a very different region than the one I 

first encountered as a new Member of Congress in 1983. Many of 

our longstanding relationships are now being recast, a democracy 

and Islam are being forced to engage each other as they never before have in the region. Instability and violence are now endemic 

in places that were once stable under the concrete blanket of repression. But the fundamentals of Israeli security have not significantly changed, even with these changes, as well as the transformations created by the Oslo peace process and the two Intifadas. 

Israel’s first and foundational security principle is that Israel 

must have the means to defend itself by itself. The self-reliance has 

always been at the heart of Israel’s national identity and the ethos 

4

of the Israel Defense Forces, and this sense of responsibility has 

not changed. 

America’s primary contributions are financial and strategic. Our 

assistance enables Israel to procure the defense equipment that it 

needs. And, by ensuring that Israel’s defense capabilities are qualitatively better than potential adversaries, we make the conflict less 

likely. Maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge, or the QME, 

is not only an enduring American commitment but a clear self-interest as well. 

Today, the threat of an Iranian nuclear capability looms over the 

entire region and because of the ayatollah regime’s unceasing animosity toward Israel and to Jews, it poses a threat of special significance to the Jewish State. As Congress has wrestled with this 

issue over the years and through the course of several administrations, two points have become very clear to me. First, anyone genuinely committed to preventing Iran from crossing the threshold of 

nuclear weapons capability and avoiding war must support the 

most crushing, crippling, strangulating sanctions possible. Only 

sanctions severe enough to jeopardize the mullahs’ grip on power 

can bring the ayatollahs to even consider ending their military nuclear program. And that is just a maybe. 

Secondly, we have to stop playing with euphemisms and magical 

thinking. The time for referring to metaphorical tables set with options has passed. Likewise, trivializing the term ‘‘unacceptable’’ has 

to stop. When the President says—and he has—that it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, what we are talking about, 

provided he is not bluffing and the Iranians do not change course, 

is sending our armed forces into Iran to attack and destroy key facilities, materials, and capabilities. There is a name for such a 

thing. It is called war, and we need to honestly face up to what it 

could cost us in lives, chaos, and cash because that is what averting the unacceptable may require. 

As someone who truly believes that Iran must not be allowed to 

acquire a nuclear weapons capability, I think anyone who supposes 

that a strike on Iran will be surgical or a brief episode without severe consequences is delusional. And while the Iranian threat is of 

particular salience to Israel, anyone who thinks it is just Israel’s 

problem needs to explain why Iran has expended such tremendous 

efforts to develop ballistic missiles with ranges well beyond that 

needed to reach Israel. A private conversation with some of our 

friends in the Gulf might also be useful in dispelling the myth that 

a nuclear Iran would change very little in the region already 

wracked with suspicion, instability, and religious tension. This is 

deadly serious business, and it needs to be treated as such. 

At this point, both Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace 

processes are stagnant. I remain convinced, however, that for purely self-interested reasons, Israel needs to separate itself from the 

Palestinians and to normalize its relations with the Arab states. 

Common sense tells us that if you need to cut a deal, do it when 

you are strong and the other party is relatively weak. Regardless 

of future leadership, I can not foresee a scenario where Israel’s current comparative advantages, militarily, technologically, demographically, economically, or political, would be as good as or better 

than they are now. And I have not heard as yet of any alternative 

5

to two states that will sustain both Israel’s democracy as well as 

its Jewish identity. Time might not be exactly ripe today, but I 

know that if you wait long enough, anything that is ripe will get 

rotten. 

Generations of Israeli leaders have recognized American support 

for Israel as a vital national interest. In addition to the many billions in military assistance, the United States provides a unique 

diplomatic shield and leadership in the international community. 

Moreover, while there is no formal mutual defense treaty, which is 

an Israeli preference, it should be noted, American leaders have 

long let it be known that any threat to Israel’s survival would be 

a matter of the gravest concern for the United States, which substantially enhances Israel’s own deterrent capabilities. 

For as long as Israeli leaders have recognized that their special 

relationship with the United States is truly a vital national interest, they have recognized that it is essential for American support 

to be bipartisan. Israeli leaders, regardless of party, have recognized this need and have consistently restated that position. 

Sadly, American politics has changed, and Israel’s American support is challenged by entities openly and aggressively seeking to 

make Israel a wedge issue in American politics. 

The most insidious of these efforts involve characterizing as antiIsrael some options that, while different from Israel’s current government, even though those American opinions easily fit within the 

spectrum of Israel’s own Zionist parties, agreeing with 

Ahmadinejad is anti-Israel. Agreeing with Kadima or Labor is 

banal. If unchecked, I fear these smear campaigns will not take 

long to poison the well of bipartisan support that Israel has justifiably and critically relied upon. 

I am all in favor, to be sure, of Democrats and Republicans competing to highlight their support for Israel. And for more than 

three decades in politics, I am well aware that neither campaigns 

nor public office are meant for the thin-skinned. But feckless 

Israeli appeals for restraint from those intent on making Israel an 

election-year football are insufficient. If the bipartisan nature of 

American support is, as they say, a truly vital national interest, 

then more needs to be done. Israel’s leaders should carefully consider whether those responsible for these wedge campaigns need to 

be publicly condemned and if they persist, isolated from Israel’s decision-makers. 

There are serious challenges facing the region and our two nations, most notably, Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons, which 

absolutely must be prevented. But unless we look after the fundamentals of our relationship, this challenge as well as many others will be made much harder than necessary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back. 

It is the preference of the committee to recognize members for 1 

minute if they would like to make a statement. The gentleman 

from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And one personality to the other, it has 

been a pleasure kibitzing with you all of this time. 

One question that is clear today. And people want to ask it, and 

they say, ‘‘Should we ask this about foreign policy and other poliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Nov 02, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\MESA\092012\76031 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cies? Are we better off than we were 4 years ago. I think the answer, are we better off in the Middle East? Is peace more likely? 

Is Israel more secure? Is the United States more likely to have a 

good relationship with the countries in the Middle East?’’ The answer is no. We are not better off today than we were 4 years ago. 

Whatever political implications that has, let’s face reality. 

We have been for the last 4 years treating our friends like enemies and our enemies like friends. And then everybody sounds 

and acts really surprised when that creates a great destabilization. 

And that is what we have experienced in the last 4 years, not a 

destabilization leading to more prosperity and a better life for the 

people but, instead, a destabilization that has led to radicalism and 

a more likely chance of conflict in that region. 

I am looking forward to reading your testimony. I am going to 

be running in and out for the next 11⁄2 hours or so. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from New York is recognized if he would like to 

make a statement. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last week’s events in the Middle East and Africa underline the 

vitriol that America is facing and a sad reminder of the state of affairs. For a long time, Iran has made its intentions clear to eliminate Israel and to destroy American interests abroad. Violent antiAmerican, anti-Israeli demonstrations have continued throughout 

the Middle East and Asia. And while the administration blamed 

the violence on a movie, it has now recanted that, in fact, it was 

a well-planned terrorist attack. 

Last week’s attacks and uprisings are not isolated events based 

on a movie. The underpinnings of these attacks are part of an overarching terrorist philosophy, which lays dormant but never quite 

goes away. They represent a threat to the United States and our 

close ally Israel. And I am looking forward to expert testimony in 

this regard. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Nebraska is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing to discuss Israel’s security situation at a difficult time of 

transition throughout the Middle East. We would like to all see a 

stable and prosperous outcome for the people of this region. And 

the security of our ally Israel is essential to achieving that overarching goal. 

There are so many developments and points of concern lately 

that it is difficult in order to know where to begin, Mr. Chairman, 

but many of the complicated dimensions of the region’s security situation have a common denominator. And that is the Country of 

Iran. 

The civil war in Syria, where the Assad government is closely allied to its patriot in Teheran, poses serious international security 

as well as profoundly grave humanitarian concerns. 

After years of outreach by the United States and other nations, 

the quest to find a diplomatic solution to the security threat posed 

by Iran’s controversial nuclear program remains elusive. The proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Nov 02, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\MESA\092012\76031 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gram continues to advance, despite multiple rounds of international sanctioned. And, in tandem, Iran’s regime persists in 

using hostile rhetoric, posing an international and one must assume credible existential threat to Israel as well as regional stability in the well-being of people throughout the area. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And the Chair will now introduce the panel. And then we are 

going to have to head over for votes. And we will try to get back 

here right after the votes and get in the testimony then and questions because we do have a briefing that I think most of us want 

to attend. 

I will start with Elliott Abrams, who is a senior fellow for Middle 

Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, served as 

Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security 

Adviser in the administration of George W. Bush, where he supervised U.S. policy in the Middle East for the White House. Prior to 

that position, Mr. Abrams spent 4 years working for the United 

States Senate and served in the State Department during the 

Reagan administration. In 1988, Mr. Abrams received the Secretary of State’s distinguished service award from Secretary George 

P. Shultz for his work in the State Department. Mr. Abrams was 

educated at Harvard College, the London School of Economics, and 

Harvard Law School. And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. 

Abrams. 

Next we will have James Phillips, who is the senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison 

Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. He 

is a former research fellow at the Congressional Research Service 

of the Library of Congress and a former joint doctoral research fellow at the East-West Center. He also is a member of the Board of 

Editors of Middle East Quarterly, the leading conservative journal 

of Middle Eastern Policy Studies. We welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Phillips. 

And last, but not least, is Ambassador Martin S. Indyk. Martin 

S. Indyk is vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at The Brookings Institution. He served as U.S. Ambassador 

to Israel from 1995 to ’97 and from 2000 to 2001. Mr. Indyk served 

as Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for 

Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council from ’93 to ’95 and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in the U.S. Department of State ’97 through 2000. Before entering U.S. Government, Mr. Indyk was founding executive 

director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy for 8 

years. Ambassador Indyk received a bachelor’s degree in economics 

from Sydney University and a Ph.D. from the Australian National 

University. We welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Ambassador. 

So, as I indicated, we have to head over for votes. That is what 

the buzzers were about there. And so as soon as votes are over, we 

will be back and take your testimony and ask questions. 

And at this point, we are in recess. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come back to order. I know 

Mr. Ackerman will be here shortly and probably other members as 

8

well. We do have a briefing at 3 o’clock o’clock I know that a lot 

of us are interested in. So we are going to get right to the panel. 

We will begin with Mr. Abrams. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 

here. 

I would like to submit my written testimony for the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS, SENIOR 

FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. ABRAMS. Israel’s security, as you mentioned in your remarks, 

is under threat today. Just stand in Israel and look around north 

to the turmoil in Syria; concerns about the future of Jordan, recent 

demonstrations there; the situation in Egypt and in Sinai, where 

there has been great disorder; and, of course, the Iranian nuclear 

program. Seen from Jerusalem, I think the region appears to be 

much more dangerous than it did just a few years ago. 

I think there are three key elements to safeguarding Israel’s security in this new context. The first is the military edge, the qualitative military edge. And I think this is the part where things are 

looking pretty good. U.S.-Israel military and intelligence cooperation have been very good for years. And it remains very good. The 

President frequently says this. And I think it is a fair comment. 

That cooperation is excellent. 

The problem I have is that I think that the administration believes that is the end of the story. If you have good military and 

intelligence cooperation, that is it. Israel’s security is safeguarded. 

It isn’t because I think the second element of safeguarding Israel’s 

security is maintaining excellent political and personal cooperation 

between the Government of Israel and the Government of the 

United States. 

But our political and personal relations are not good. In fact, 

they are worse than they have been for many years and, arguably, 

for two decades. The problem, in part, is that that military and intelligence cooperation is secret and invisible while the political 

distancing and the political arguments and confrontations are very 

visible, including to Iran. A part of the problem is that this 

distancing is a deliberate policy on the part of the administration. 

There is a very famous incident involving the head of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations 

early in the administration, who said that he feared that there 

would be some daylight and that there didn’t use to be any daylight and the President’s reply was under Bush, there was no daylight, but there was also no progress, a remark that I think is unfair, but it does I think reflect the administration’s view that perhaps Israel and we would be better off with more distance. Of 

course, I think we have seen that distance, and I think it is very 

unfortunate because in the Middle East, that distance is perceived 

as a source of Israeli weakness. And we have seen this distancing 

not only in the relationship between, unfortunately, the Prime Minister and the President but other things. 

For example, I remember last year the administration finally vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution on settlements, but then 

9

the U.S. delegate delivered an explanation of vote that was really 

an attack on Israel, February 18th, 2011. That kind of distancing 

is noticed. And, of course, the distancing on Iran is also noticed between the United States and Israel, where we seem to have very 

different views. 

I would think a good way to judge it is what is in the mind of 

the people running the Iranian regime. The people running the Iranian regime are not scared. They have moved forward with their 

nuclear weapons program at least since 2003 without a pause, enriching more uranium, running more centrifuges in more locations, 

including the underground one at Fordow, so enriched uranium, 

centrifuges, testing more missiles, working on the warhead. They 

are obviously not afraid of us. The messaging that they have gotten 

so far does not lead them to suspend this program. 

Very briefly, the third element I think of safeguarding Israel’s security is a strong policy on our part in fostering moderate regimes 

in the Arab countries that have gone through the Arab Spring. 

It was only in July that Secretary Clinton visited Cairo. Much 

of the Coptic leadership would not meet with her. And there was 

a demonstration against her by Egyptians who felt we were favoring the Muslim Brotherhood, we have got to give up the fight, and 

we are abandoning secular Egyptians, Centras, Copts. That is their 

view. That is at least bad messaging, but I think it also really 

threatens Israel’s security if we are not very much in the struggle 

against radical and Islamist governments in the neighboring countries. 

I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any 

questions the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abrams follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And next we will go to Mr. Phillips for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES PHILLIPS, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE 

FOUNDATION 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I would like to thank the chairman, members of 

the committee for this opportunity to testify. 

Israel faces many threats to its security, but I would like to focus 

in on——

Mr. CHABOT. Could you pull that mike a little bit closer? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Okay. 

Mr. CHABOT. It will just make folks in the room a little easier 

to hear. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Okay. And in my written testimony, which I would 

like to submit for the record, I covered some of these other threats, 

but in my oral statement, I would like to focus on the Iranian nuclear threat, which I think is the most critical long-term threat to 

Israel. 

Although sanctions have imposed an increasingly steep price on 

Teheran, sanctions alone are unlikely to halt Iran’s nuclear push 

any more than they halted North Korea’s. Only sanctions backed 

by the credible threat of the use of force are likely to dissuade Teheran from continuing on its nuclear path. 

Yet, the administration continues to stress its commitment to 

open-ended diplomacy and reluctance to use the military option. Although administration officials dutifully have repeated that all options are on the table, they frequently have gone out of their way 

to publicly devalue the prospects for success of a U.S. military 

strike and, to make matters worse, have publicly warned against 

an Israeli military strike. 

This counterproductive behavior only reduces the chances of resolving the problem satisfactorily through diplomacy because it reduces international leverage on Teheran. By reducing the perceived 

likelihood of a preventive military attack, the administration lowers Iran’s perceived costs for continuing its nuclear efforts. And 

that ultimately increases the chance of war in my estimation, either to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear capability or, worse 

yet, after it does so. 

Both Jerusalem and Washington have publicly aired their differences on Iran, with the administration warning that an Israeli 

preventive strike would be premature and destabilizing while the 

Israeli Government has signaled that it can’t wait much longer. 

These increasingly public spats reveal I think a glaring lack of 

trust. 

President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu need to forge 

a common understanding of how best to defuse Iran’s ticking nuclear time bomb and present Teheran with a credible military 

threat to dissuade it from continuing. Absent such a common understanding, I think it is increasingly likely that Israel will go it 

alone and launch a preventive strike. 

Instead of pressuring Israel to refrain from an attack, I think the 

administration would be better focused on bringing maximum pressure to bear on Iran. And, therefore, I would have four recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Nov 02, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\MESA\092012\76031 HFA PsN: SHIRL
15

ommendations: First, make every effort to present a common front 

against Iran. 

And here I think the White House’s rejection of Prime Minister 

Netanyahu’s request to meet with the President next week during 

his trip to the U.S. has deepened doubts about whether the administration will take timely action to prevent Iran from developing a 

nuclear capability. The President should adjust his schedule and 

meet with the Prime Minister to hear out his concerns and address 

them forthrightly. I think ruling out a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu sends an unfortunate and dangerous signal to 

Iran that Washington may not be serious about halting its nuclear 

weapons program. 

Secondly, I think the administration should demonstrate a greater resolve in halting that program. The administration’s mantra 

that every option is on the table has become increasingly stale and 

unconvincing, not only to Israel but to Iran. So I think the President should clarify in a public statement that he will actually use 

the military option, if necessary, not just leave it on the table. And 

this will help ease Israeli concerns and put greater pressure on Teheran. 

Thirdly, Washington also needs to set strict conditions on any 

last-ditch diplomatic talks. This would help alleviate concerns that 

the administration would paint itself into a corner by entering into 

open-ended diplomatic talks that allow Teheran to run out the 

clock. 

My last recommendation is that the administration should recognize Israel’s right to take military action in anticipatory self-defense. Instead of sniping at the idea of an Israeli preventive strike, 

I think it should acknowledge Israel’s right to take action against 

what it regards to be an existential threat. This would increase 

pressure on Teheran and disabuse it of any notion that it could depend on Washington to restrain Jerusalem. The U.S. does not have 

the power to guarantee that Israel would not be attacked by a nuclear Iran in the future. So it should not betray the trust of an ally 

by tieing its hands now. Although an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program would entail increased risks for the U.S., these risks 

would be dwarfed by the threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. 

I think the bottom line is that Iran defiantly continues to enrich 

uranium; issue threats; and order terrorist attacks, including a terrorist attack here in Washington, DC. If Teheran is willing to risk 

such a terrorist attack before it gains nuclear weapons, what 

threats is it likely to pose after it attains nuclear weapons? And I 

think that the U.S., Israel, and our other allies can’t afford to wait 

and find out. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phillips follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And, Ambassador Indyk, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ambassador INDYK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for having this hearing. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARTIN S. INDYK, DIRECTOR, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE 

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ambassador INDYK. I think we can all agree that Israel’s security 

survival and well-being is of paramount interest of the United 

States. And we can all agree that Iran poses a great threat to that 

objective and that paramount interest of the United States. But, 

starting from that common ground, I will tend to differ with the 

other speakers here in terms of some of the things that they have 

said. 

I have outlined in my written testimony essentially the key elements of Israel’s deteriorating security situation. And, as my friend 

Elliott Abrams has outlined, it is a very disturbing picture on all 

of Israel’s borders that I have laid out there. 

On the other hand, there are factors that should also be put into 

the balance when one looks at Israel’s situation. It is, by far, the 

strongest military power in the Middle East. And its strength derives in good part from the bipartisan support that the Congress 

has provided for Israel over many decades and the support that 

successive administrations, both Republican and Democrat, have 

provided. And that is no less the case, as Elliott has suggested, 

than for the Obama administration. 

And the President, notwithstanding this approach of his in the 

early years of his administration, of seeking to distance the United 

States from Israel in order to carry some favor with the Arabs, a 

theory of the case that I believe was fundamentally mistaken, but, 

nevertheless, while doing that, he made absolutely clear, publicly 

and privately, that he was completely committed and steadfast in 

his commitment to Israel’s security and did a whole range of 

things, both visible and in the covert realm, to manifest that commitment, to the point where you have former Prime Minister, now 

Defense Minister Ehud Barak declaring just last year that the relationship between the United States and Israel on the strategic level 

is better now than he can remember. 

And it is all realms, in qualitative military edge, in intelligence 

cooperation, in strategic cooperation, and coordination. And it includes cooperation and coordination on the common threat that 

Iran poses to Israel and to the United States. And that cooperation 

recently revealed in a book by David Singer on the covert level also 

extends to extraordinarily close coordination on how to deal with 

Iran. 

Channels have been established for that coordination between 

national security advisers meeting on a monthly basis, between the 

Secretary of State and her counterpart, between the Secretary of 

Defense, between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his 

counterparts. And this has gone on for years now. And I think 

there is a high degree of coordination and a high degree of comfort 

between the two governments in terms of common strategy. 

24

The differences that arise are differences that I believe are generated more by the structure of the situation than they are by personalities. The structure of the situation is such that Israel is 

threatened on a regular basis with annihilation by Iran. Iran cannot threaten the United States with annihilation. Israel’s margin 

for security is much less than the United States, our thousands of 

nuclear weapons and our distance from Iran. Israel lives in Iran’s 

neighborhood. And Israel’s particular history as the Jewish state 

that was once destroyed and its people that once were almost destroyed lead it to be particularly sensitive about such threats and 

particularly sensitive about capabilities that might back up those 

threats. 

So, as Iran draws closer to the nuclear threshold, Israel is inevitably going to be more nervous than the United States. The United 

States, after all, lives with nuclear weapons from Pakistan or 

China, North Korea. Israel could not live in Iran with nuclear 

weapons. And I think that that is understood. 

The President has been very clear in his commitment, which, 

again, I think is a bipartisan commitment, that Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. He has built a military capability and deployed it to ensure that that will not happen. And I 

think that there is every reason to believe that the President is serious in that commitment that he has Israel’s back. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Indyk follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you very 

much. 

The panel now will have time to ask questions. I will begin with 

myself. I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I would like to ask our witnesses about their views on the campaign that we often refer to as the delegitimization of Israel, particularly at the United Nations. Year after year, more than 25 percent of the resolutions adopted by rollcall vote in the General Assembly are aimed at delegitimizing Israel. Many are the usual antiIsrael declaratory resolutions, but a few, in particular, bear special 

attention. Those are the mandates and funding authorizations that 

use the U.N. umbrella to conduct a worldwide propaganda campaign against Israel. I will give just a couple of examples: The 

Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; another, the Division for Palestinian Rights; and, finally, the Special 

Committee to Investigate Israeli Human Rights Practices Affecting 

the Palestinian People. 

My question is, what can we do better at the U.N. to steer the 

U.N. away from its all Israel bashing all the time policies or agenda? And what can we do to convince member states, who should 

be voting with us against these resolutions, that, for one reason or 

not, do not? Mr. Abrams, if you would like to take that one? 

Mr. ABRAMS. This has been a long-running battle, Mr. Chairman. 

The problem, in part, is we need to make this a piece of our bilateral relationship with those countries, and we most often don’t do 

it. We view it as ‘‘Oh, yeah. It is just a U.N. vote. It is not a very 

big deal,’’ instead of saying, ‘‘This will affect whether your prime 

minister or foreign minister is invited to Washington and whom he 

or she sees there. This will affect your level of foreign aid. This 

matters to us.’’ I think they see it as a kind of free vote. And we 

need to make sure that there is a price for those votes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. 

Let me go to my next question. It is perceived that our political 

relationship with Israel is currently in the worst shape in two decades, in the words of Mr. Abrams. In your opinion, what is the implied message that Israel received when President Obama apparently refused a meeting request for Prime Minister Netanyahu? 

And how do Israel’s neighbors in Iran view the current state of relations between Israel and the U.S.? And how does this impact 

Israel’s security? And I will go to you on that, Mr. Phillips. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, I think unfortunately, the way Iran would 

perceive that is drifting away or splitting between U.S. and Israel. 

And that would feed on a sense of weakness. And I think that too 

often, U.S. restraint, either in defending vocally its own interests 

or those of its allies, are perceived as weakness in the Middle East 

and especially by Iran. And I think that is one reason I called for 

the President to reconsider his scheduling and meet with the Prime 

Minister. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Indyk, let me ask you this question. There has been a lot of 

confusion recently about the administration’s position on Jerusalem 

as the capital of Israel. There was even a flap about this, the convention, and a vote, which many people thought the results were 

not what was reflected on the floor. But that happens on the floor 

29

here occasionally as well. But, nonetheless, it was pretty embarrassing, I thought. 

Is Jerusalem the capital of Israel? And would you like to comment on the administration’s position on this? 

Ambassador INDYK. As a twice Ambassador to Israel, Mr. Chairman, I have learned the hard way that nothing good comes of raising this issue. I actually think that people in the pro-Israel community in this country are completely skeptical of this being raised by 

our Presidential candidates as a way to somehow curry favor because they have seen it so many times before. 

Every Presidential candidate, Republican or Democrat, says that 

‘‘Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. And I will move the Embassy 

to Israel if I become President.’’ And, lo and behold, they could become President. And they find very good reasons, the reason to 

state, not to do anything to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. 

And so, regardless of party, nothing has changed on this issue. Regardless of platform, regardless of commitments made, nothing has 

changed on this platform, on this policy——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. My time has actually——

Ambassador INDYK [continuing]. Since the time that the Congress passed legislation——

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. My time has expired. 

Ambassador INDYK [continuing]. To exclude——

Mr. CHABOT. So I want to get the other members. Just let me, 

in conclusion—and I normally ask this in a second panel, but we 

are not going to have time for that—the recent instability. I was 

in Libya about a month ago and had meetings in which Chris Stevens was an important part. And I stayed at the residence there 

in Tripoli. And we were at Cairo later on in the trip as well. But 

this was truly a fine individual who served our country very, very 

well. And it is just a terrible thing which happened to him and the 

other diplomats and security personnel as well. 

My comment would be that I am very concerned that what we 

are seeing right now with this turmoil in the Middle East is the 

perception at least—whether it is a reality or not we can argue but 

the perception at least that the U.S. is retreating from that region, 

that we are not going to play as big a role. And there was this idea 

from the administration that we are going to shift from there to 

southeast Asia, which is important. China is a clear rival. I don’t 

want to say enemy but rival for the next 100 years. But nature abhors a vacuum, and the vacuum is being filled by elements which 

are not friendly to the United States. 

But I don’t really have time to ask for your response. And so I 

will at this point turn to Mr. Ackerman and grant him 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I still find it intriguing that people who are such really brilliant 

thinkers will sometimes reach conclusions that one might legitimately disagree with, spend so much time and energy of late—and 

I underscore ‘‘of late’’—trying to blame the problems of the world 

and the region on the current administration, rather than try to 

figure out how we go forward. Something bad happens somewhere 

else because someone did this to that. Therefore, how do we blame 

it on President Obama? This is very counterproductive and really 

not helpful to our American interests. 

30

I mean, the riots in the streets and the discontent over whatever 

the reasons and it is a tinderbox there and it has been that way 

for a long time, to try to blame that on the administration is like 

me trying to blame President Bush for Pluto being thrown out of 

the list of planets or blame his father for losing America’s Cup. I 

mean, it makes no sense. Things happen during your watch for 

which you have no responsibility. 

And if, indeed, the military relationship between Israel and the 

United States—and if you ask the Israelis, they will tell you it is 

not just good; it has never been better. The intelligence-to-intelligence relationship has never been better. The cooperation has 

never been better. The money, materiel, and everything else has 

never been better. 

So the problem is the personalities don’t get along. Which is 

more important: The sizzle or the steak? You know, it is a public 

relations thing. You know, you draw the picture of the restaurant. 

You make the steak attractive. Whether it is a real steak or not, 

it doesn’t matter. It is the image. And I think we are spending a 

lot of time on the notion, ‘‘Let’s discredit the administration,’’ instead of ‘‘Let’s fix the Middle East.’’

Friends of Israel try to make Israel more secure, rather than try 

to make their own country more weak because they may not like 

the administration. The rush to judgment that the President isn’t 

as engaged in things, I didn’t see that happening when President 

Bush was President for 8 years. There was no engagement whatsoever as things slowly started to come to the boil that it is at now. 

You know, the question isn’t, are we better off now than we 

were—why 4 years ago? How about 5 years ago or 7 years ago? You 

know, it is a political reason to pick the number ‘‘four.’’ Let’s get 

serious. 

Question. Mr. Phillips, you had said the administration has a reluctance to use the military option. Do you think we should use the 

military option? And what day should we use it? Would it be a day 

this month or next month or special day of the week? Should it be 

a Thursday? Should it be the third Wednesday after the first Monday in November? Should it be January 24th, after the President 

is sworn in? What day should we use the military action? And what 

day should we announce it? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Okay. I would not specify a certain day, but I 

would say it should be done before Iran attains enough highly enriched——

Mr. ACKERMAN. How much? Would you quantify the amount? 

Would you say, ‘‘If you have 27 pounds, 2 ounces’’? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I wouldn’t quantify it in such specifics. And I understand that the administration——

Mr. ACKERMAN. You would say that the military option is on the 

table? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. And it would be used, not just that it is on the 

table but it will be used. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, if it is on the table, you know, you don’t 

set the table unless you are going to eat the meal. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. No. You don’t always use every implement that is 

on the table, though, when the table is set. 

31

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did President Bush say he was going to use the 

military option or did he just say there should be a two-state solution? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, I think he did support the two-state solution, 

but——

Mr. ACKERMAN. No. He created the two-state option. He is the 

one who first announced it. No President had uttered those words 

before,——

Mr. PHILLIPS. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Democrat or Republican. I am not 

blaming President Bush. I am just pointing out that the pointing 

fingers is not really helpful. 

Now, how do we fix this? How do we get Iran—I think—and 

maybe it is because I am prejudiced—but I really believe that we 

have to be constantly engaged in the region. I don’t believe we 

could move forward using a military option without putting together a coalition of support, both for ourselves and Israel, for the 

region’s sake and the world’s sake, which would include some of 

our Islamic friends and some of our Arab friends. How do you do 

that unless you demonstrate that you are willing to talk for us, 

rather than just burst into somebody’s country without giving 

peace a shot? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Was that question directed at anyone in particular? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Only if somebody knows how to answer it? 

Mr. CHABOT. Does anyone know how to answer it? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Very briefly, I would say, Mr. Ackerman, it is not 

going to work unless the Iranians believe it. And today there is no 

evidence that they believe that there is a real risk of an American 

military attack. Until they believe that, I don’t think the negotiations are going to go anywhere. 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I would just say that it is not just Israel that is 

threatened by an Iranian nuclear weapon. There are many Arab allies, too, that are equally concerned and——

Mr. ACKERMAN. But they have asked us to try to use the negotiation process first to try to——

Mr. PHILLIPS. Yes. And behind the scenes, they say other things. 

I mean, this isn’t——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Oh. Everybody would be happy if we—most people would be happy to do that. Most of them agree that they would 

be thrilled in the morning having the dream at night come true 

that Israel wiped out, but they can’t really say it. But we have to 

line them up because they are responsible to their streets as well. 

And their street wants to see a little talk before we invade some 

country. 

Mr. CHABOT. Ambassador Indyk, if you could comment very briefly? 

Ambassador INDYK. I will be very quick, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for the opportunity. 

I think, first of all, that the military option is a real option. I 

think that the Iranians can see exactly what we have deployed 

around them in terms of the two carrier battle groups that are now 

off the shores of Iran, including the array of aircraft that we have 

32

deployed in the region. It is a robust military option that the 

Israelis also recognize as a robust military option. 

So I think that the deployments are far more important than the 

words, but I agree with Congressman Ackerman that if it is going 

to come to war with Iran—and I fear that it will, next year—then 

we have to be able to show, not just for the international community but for the people of this country who have been supporting 

wars in the greater Middle East for more than 10 years—that we 

have done everything possible to try to convince the Iranians to 

make a strategic decision to give up their nuclear weapons aspirations. 

And if we fail at that, then we will be justified. And I believe we 

will have the American people behind us to use the military option 

that has already been developed. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chair would 

just note in a very quick response to the gentleman’s point about 

being critical of this administration about things happening around 

the world, I would just note that when the Bush administration 

was in charge and the folks from the other side of the aisle were 

in charge of this committee and other committees, there was no restraint in criticizing Mr. Bush for everything that was happening 

around the world. So it is not unusual to do that. 

Mr. Turner from New York is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Many of our diplomatic and economic options are pretty much exhausted. We have been doing this for quite a while. The question 

was raised, at what point should our conversations begin with the 

strategic and tactical? 

The centrifuges produce so many grams of fissionable material, 

high-grade, per week. I think we know how many we have. Somebody can do the math. 

Last year, late last year, at some of these committee hearings, 

we were told September is the critical month. They would have 

enough material there to produce two implosive type devices. I 

don’t know what has changed, but it seems that the clock is running out. And when is a kitten a cat? More than 8 weeks but certainly not a year. This kitten is getting pretty fat. 

What is the date? We do know. Somebody knows. I don’t know 

if the CIA has been that forthcoming on what they know or even 

the Israelis on when this material is producible. And the production facilities are only in three sites. What are our plans? And what 

are the consequences? Who is doing this or who should be doing 

this? 

Anybody like to comment, please? Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador INDYK. Well, I think the first response would be that 

Iran does not today have a nuclear weapon. According to the IAEA, 

which has inspectors on the ground and is able to measure their 

stockpiles, those stockpiles are growing. And they have—I think it 

is roughly enough low-enriched uranium if it were enriched to 

high-enriched, weapons-grade uranium to build perhaps four or five 

bombs, but it has to be enriched from 3.5 percent to over 90 percent in order for them to be able to make a nuclear weapon. And 

that is the critical difference. 

33

And I agree with you that they are advancing toward that 

threshold. And they are also enriching to 20 percent. And they 

have now in terms of enrichment of 20 percent. They are moving 

toward one bomb’s worth. They are doing that in a deeply embedded facility in Fordow, which will be hard to destroy from the air 

but not impossible by the United States. 

So all of these things are very disturbing, which is why I say I 

think we are entering the period in 2013 where if we fail to convince Iran that it will be far worse off if it continues down this 

track than if it decides to make a strategic decision to give up its 

nuclear weapons aspirations. 

But if we fail at that—and I think it is more likely that we will 

fail—then we are going to be in a situation next year where we will 

have to make a very hard decision, whether it is to let Israel take 

care of its problem or whether we decide to take care of the problem ourselves. And I think we should. It is not just a threat to 

Israel, but that decision doesn’t have to be made now. There is still 

time to test whether we can turn the Iranians around. There is not 

a lot of time. 

Mr. TURNER. If I may? Mr. Abrams, do you concur that this 

should be given more time? Is there any softening? Is there any 

hope? 

Mr. ABRAMS. There has been no softening in the Iranian position. 

I think it has been a great disappointment to the European negotiators, in particular, that when we have met over the past year, 

they have gotten nothing from Iran. The Iranians have not budged. 

I think that one cannot pick a sort of magic date and say, ‘‘It is 

February 15th, no problem on the 15th, great danger on the 16th.’’ 

You can’t do that. But we are approaching first the point at which 

they will have everything they need to make a series of deliverable 

nuclear weapons. 

And, second, of course, we are approaching the point at which 

Israel will no longer be able to act. And then Israel needs to make 

a decision before we do. 

I would agree with Ambassador Indyk it is really very odd for us 

as a great superpower to say, ‘‘This is a global problem, with which 

we are deeply engaged. But we are not going to handle it. We are 

going to just turn it over to a nation of 7 million.’’ Now, I would 

hope that if we reach that point, the United States makes the decision, rather than handing it to Israel. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Deutch, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Abrams, I think your characterization of the administration’s 

position is just wrong. I don’t believe that the administration’s position is that this is only a problem for Israel that should be handled 

by Israel. I think that the President’s position, as he has outlined 

repeatedly, is that this is a global problem, that this is a problem 

that the United States is prepared to use military force to handle. 

And the difference between Mr. Phillips saying that every option 

is on the table and saying that that includes military options and 

saying, ‘‘I am willing to use it’’ I think gets at the bigger point I 

wanted to raise with you, Mr. Abrams, which is, you know, on this 

committee, we spend a lot of time working in a bipartisan way on 

34

these issues, trying to pass, as we have done multiple times, tough 

sanctions after more tough sanctions, funding issues, working to 

ensure that Israel’s security assistance remains in place. And that 

support that you see in this committee is consistent with the history of the support in this body for the security of the State of 

Israel. 

Now, suggesting, as you do in your testimony, that while it is 

true that the military cooperation, intelligence cooperation is the 

best it has ever been, that, despite our deficit, we have managed 

to increase security assistance to Israel to unprecedented levels, 

hundreds of millions of dollars additional for Iron Dome and other 

missile defense systems, which I would point out are saving Israeli 

lives right now, conducting the largest showing military exercises, 

while all of that is true, as you acknowledge, you seem to dismiss 

it in your testimony as well, ‘‘Any administration would do that.’’ 

And what we also need to look at, you tell us, is the politics of the 

relationship. And that is what I would just like to pursue a bit with 

the panel. 

For those of us who work so hard and struggle so hard to make 

this a bipartisan issue, I wonder whether you would agree that in 

terms of ensuring that bipartisan support, that, despite everything 

we both agree that this administration has done for Israel, that for 

the Republican nominee for President to announce to the world, not 

just to his convention but to the world, that the United States, the 

United States, despite everything we agree has happened, has 

thrown Israel under the bus, injects into the relationship the type 

of politics heretofore unseen. We have never seen that type of politics in the middle of this relationship. That is number one. 

I wonder if you would agree with me that since politics is a fundamental part, according to your testimony, of the relationship, 

that that type of politics raises issues around the rest of the world 

that calls into question that bipartisan support that has historically existed and that exists, even today; and that, number two,—

and I would open this to anyone on the panel—I wonder if you also 

think that it is appropriate. I would just like an honest assessment 

of this. Along the same lines, given the importance of the politics 

and the bipartisan nature of the relationship, I wonder if it is appropriate for a political group to support a candidate in the Presidential election using footage of the Prime Minister of Israel. I just 

worry about what that does to infect the political process, how that 

seeps into even some of the discussion that takes place here. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I will take a first crack at it, Mr. Deutch. I 

would bet that if you go back to the Clinton campaign, you will find 

criticism of the way the George H. W. Bush administration dealt 

with Israel. If there wasn’t, there should have been in my opinion. 

And I don’t think that is off limits. We want bipartisanship, but we 

also have the right to say a policy is wrong. It is wrong for—let me 

just say the chairman of the Joint Chiefs——

Mr. DEUTCH. I am going to stop you for 1 second. I have got to 

stop you for a second because there is a fundamental difference. 

You have to agree there is a fundamental difference with questioning the policy. I don’t have any objection to that. I have no objection with questioning a policy of this administration or any other 

on Israel or any other issue. There is a difference between quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:16 Nov 02, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\MESA\092012\76031 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tioning a policy and the approach that an administration takes and 

a blanket statement that this administration has, despite everything that you and I agree has happened has, nevertheless, thrown 

Israel under the bus. 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I don’t agree. And I think that we are in the 

middle of a political campaign. And what you are asking, in essence, is that there not be politics. There is going to be politics. 

I worked for Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. And I laugh 

when I hear people say, frankly, that politics stopped at the water’s 

edge when they were running for President. That is not what I recall. I recall vicious attacks on their foreign policy. 

And just one tiny comment on the Iran sanctions. What you have 

done on Iran sanctions is fabulous. And you know better than I do 

that in many cases, you were fighting the White House to get those 

Iran sanctions through, and they were trying to hold you back. So 

they don’t get credit for that. You get credit for it. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but the gentleman, I will give him an additional 30 seconds. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Abrams, two things I would note. First of all, those tough 

sanctions that we passed don’t become law because the House 

passes them and the Senate passes them. They become law because 

they are passed in the Congress and the President signs them. 

That is number one. 

Number two, all of the tough sanctions that have been imposed 

are imposed again not because they are in a law but because the 

administration imposes them. I wish—and I will just finish with 

this, Mr. Chairman. I wish that sanctions had been imposed in a 

serious way under the last administration or the administration before that, frankly. Finally they are being imposed and we are seeing the results. 

And I would love to continue this conversation when we have an 

opportunity. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Indyk, I am going to play a little devil’s advocate here with 

you. You stated, I think it was—I don’t know who my colleague 

was that—I think it was Mr. Ackerman brought some issues up 

concerning time, but how much time do you think we have left with 

Iran? When will we know the time is right to react to the situation, 

whatever the moment calls for? Is it, again, a day? Is it next 

month? Is it 6 months from now? Put not necessarily a time limit, 

but give me some facts that will indicate the time to move was 

based on certain points. 

Ambassador INDYK. Well, I think the clearest answer that I can 

give you, Congressman, is that the time to strike would be in my 

opinion when we saw Iran enriching uranium to 90 percent. 

Mr. MARINO. Do you think we have our arms around that? Do 

you think we really know what is going on over there as far as 

what has been enriched and what will be enriched in the near future? 

Ambassador INDYK. We do now because we have inspectors there 

who are able to measure. 

36

Mr. MARINO. I am sorry. I can’t help but chuckle a little bit. Do 

you think the Iranians are going to actually open up everything to 

the inspectors? 

Ambassador INDYK. Well, it is always possible, of course——

Mr. MARINO. Yes, of course. 

Ambassador INDYK. Excuse me, Mr.——

Mr. MARINO. Of course. 

Ambassador INDYK. It is always possible that the Iranians have 

clandestine production. That is certainly possible. They certainly 

have tried to do things in a clandestine way. But we have been 

able to discover them. And the fact that there are inspectors on the 

ground and intensive efforts by the United States, by Israel, and 

by allied intelligence services to watch them like a hawk, I think 

there is a degree of confidence that we do know. But, of course, 

there could be places where it is being done. 

But let me say that a military——

Mr. MARINO. I only have 1 more minute. 

Ambassador INDYK [continuing]. A military strike is not going to 

find those. By definition, we are not going to be able to solve that 

problem with a military strike. 

Mr. MARINO. So your position is that we wait until some way it 

is proven that they have enough of the uranium that they need to 

produce a bomb? 

Ambassador INDYK. Yes. I think that the difference between 

what I understand to be your position and my position could be all 

of 6 months. I said very clearly that I think next year is the time 

when we will come to a conclusion as to whether the Iranians are 

willing to make a strategic decision to give up their nuclear weapons, believe it or not. 

Mr. MARINO. If I were a betting man, I would not bet on the Iranians. 

Ambassador INDYK. I am not betting. I am not a betting man. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Obama, President Obama, suggested that the 

borders in Israel move back to the pre-1967 lines, leaving Israel 

less than 9 miles wide. Ambassador Abrams, could you give me 

some insight on that, please? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Well, I think the Israeli objection, Congressman, is 

that that kind of gives away a negotiating position for them. They 

will want to negotiate to some extent from where they are, not 

from borders that the United States, among others, have said are 

impossible to defend. And their objection to what the President 

said was that it suggested that you start not today but in ’67. And 

that puts them at a disadvantage. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Phillips, why should the United States not respect Israel’s sovereign decision concerning Jerusalem as its capital? 

Mr. PHILLIPS. I think it should respect. I think every country 

should be able to determine where its capital is, although, you 

know, I understand that Jerusalem does have aspects in east Jerusalem. But to me, you know, I think we should recognize west Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but I don’t think there is a reason not 

to aside from the peace process, which I don’t see going anywhere 

too fast anyway, that there is a reason not to respect that. 

Mr. MARINO. And——

37

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. I will give him 

an additional 30 seconds if he wanted to make a final point. 

Mr. MARINO. Just one final point. In the Oval Office in March 

2001, 6 months before 9/11, President Bush told Sharon that he, 

Bush, will use force to protect Israel. 

I yield my time back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. The gentleman yields back. And the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to the 

panel. 

Just an observation, maybe particularly for you, Mr. Abrams. 

You and I go back a long time. There are a lot of us on both sides 

of the aisle with staunch 100 percent voting records in support of 

Israel. I think my colleague Mr. Deutch was making a broader 

point then—because your point is well-taken, shock, shock, politics 

in an election year, but there ought to be limits, self-imposed limits. Questioning the motivation of the President of the United 

States with respect to Israel and actually saying he is compromising the security of another sovereign state is a very serious 

charge. And once the dust settles from an election, the consequences of that—if we want to make this a partisan issue, the 

only loser in that is Israel. 

And so I would just suggest, respectfully, that both sides need to 

show some restraint, even in the political arena, when it comes to 

this delicate subject matter, for the sake of the security we seek to 

protect, just an observation. 

Mr. Ambassador, you were starting to say in response to one of 

my colleagues’ queries we have time, not a lot of time but some 

time. And I think you were referring to the red line. I want to give 

you an opportunity maybe to expand on that. It would appear, you 

know, that there is a difference between Israel and the United 

States on where that red line ought to be, not on the ultimate goal. 

And, to my way of thinking, not unsympathetically, Israel has more 

reason to be concerned immediately than we do. And, therefore, 

some deference might be shown to their anxiety about where the 

red line is. And we have got to be ever vigilant and ever sensitive 

about that. On the other hand, we have to protect U.S. interests 

and not run pell-mell into yet another war in the Middle East. 

Your views on that difference between the red line? And I welcome the other panelists as well, but I thought I would start with 

the Ambassador since I think you were starting to talk about that. 

Ambassador INDYK. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

I think that what I was trying to say was that there is a structural difference between a small power living in Iran’s neighborhood and a superpower that doesn’t live in that neighborhood. And 

it is all the difference in the world when it comes to crossing red 

lines. 

We naturally can survive with a greater degree of ambiguity and 

a greater assurance that we can take care of the problem if Iran 

tries to break out. Israel has greater difficulty doing that. And 

given its more limited military capabilities, by definition, because 

it is a small power, regional power, it has naturally to want to go 

earlier in terms of using force. 

38

If you look at what Israel did in the case of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Syrian nuclear reactor, they attacked at points where 

their nuclear programs were far, far less advanced than the Iranian nuclear program. So they have actually been exercising a good 

deal of restraint, partly because we are telling them to do so, partly 

because they recognize that in the case of Iran, it is not a clear 

shot. And there are a lot of other interests and other powers that 

have interest at stake and that it is not just about Israel and that 

it is from their point of view important that this be an international responsibility, not just an Israeli’s responsibility. And, 

frankly, they have succeeded in making that case and getting the 

international community, led by the United States, to take on this 

responsibility in a much more serious way than would have been 

the case if the Israelis hadn’t been saying, ‘‘We are going to do 

something about this if you don’t.’’

But now we are reaching a kind of crunch point. And essentially 

what the Prime Minister of Israel is saying is, ‘‘I am going to lose 

my chance to act independently, to defend my country by myself. 

And I am then going to have to put the fate of my country in the 

hands of another leader. And that is a very difficult proposition for 

an Israeli prime minister to handle.’’ And I think that is why we 

have seen the Prime Minister say some things which I think were 

impolitic because of the nervousness that he feels about this. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I respect very much what you said. I would 

note, however, that his is not the only voice in Israel. There are 

many other Israeli leaders, very high-level leaders, who would take 

issue, respectfully, with the Prime Minister on this issue. So it is 

not that there is only one point of view. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am sorry the 

other panelists didn’t get a chance to maybe comment on that. 

Mr. CHABOT. I can give you 30 seconds if you would like to extend that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would so much appreciate that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Either 30 seconds, Mr. Abrams or Mr. Phillips? 

Mr. ABRAMS. Sure. I find myself in a very good bipartisan agreement with Martin Indyk on this. I think you used the word ‘‘structural’’ before. There is a mismatch here between the moment that 

the Israelis have to act and the pledge they want. If they want a 

pledge from any President of the United States that by a date certain, we will attack another country, they are not going to get it. 

No President would give it to them. I understand why they are 

asking. 

I would just say on the question of Israeli agreement and disagreement, there is some disagreement on timing. I think many of 

the people who were saying, ‘‘This is not the moment to act against 

Iran’’ believe that next year is the moment to attack. When I talk 

to many of the retired military people, I find unanimity that unless 

the United States can solve this problem, they will have to address 

it themselves next year. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

In wrapping up, the chair would just note for the records that 

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cupied. The subcommittee extended an invitation—no, we are not 

having a mystery actor coming in, but the administration was extended an invitation to testify here this afternoon, and they declined to testify this afternoon. 

And, then finally, members will have 5 days——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. CHABOT [continuing]. To amend their remarks or to submit 

materials for the record. 

Yes? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to you this is 

the second subcommittee hearing I have been to in the last week 

in which the administration has declined to participate on this 

committee. And, you know, I was a staffer in the Senate. I just 

don’t think that is acceptable. You know, when a committee is trying to pursue in this case a profound policy issue, I think they need 

to be at the table. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I am distressed. There may be circumstances. I don’t know. But I am distressed that the administration is not sending witnesses at the request of the subcommittee. 

And I would certainly join the chairman in renewing such request. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And once again I find myself in complete agreement with the gentleman from Virginia. So it is bipartisan. And is the spirit moving the gentleman from New York here 

his last meeting? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It sounds like you guys have got the same complaint as the Prime Minister. 

Mr. CHABOT. I guess we do. All right. 

Well, if there is no further business to come before the committee—and once again we extend the best wishes to Mr. Ackerman in the future—we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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