FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD WAYNE TAYLOR,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY; ATTORNEY

GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA; AUDREY KING,

*

 Acting

Executive Director, Coalinga State

Hospital,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-55030

D.C. No.

3:10-cv-01122-

LAB-PCL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 17, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed September 9, 2015

* Audrey King is substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Fed. R.

App. P. 43(c)(2).
2 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Barbara M. G. Lynn, District Judge.

**

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

SUMMARY***

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a habeas

corpus petition challenging a state-court order committing the

petitioner indefinitely for involuntary treatment as a sexually

violent predator.

The panel held that the district court did not err in

denying a claim that California’s Sexually Violent Predator

Act violates the Equal Protection Clause because it contains

release procedures that are more onerous than those placed on

other civilly committed detainees. The panel concluded that

individuals committed under California’s Lanterman-Petris

Short Act were not similarly situated to those committed

under the SVPA.

The panel held that, given the absence of established

Supreme Court precedent, the district court also did not err in

** The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, District Judge for the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by

designation.

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 3

denying a claim that the SVPA violates the Due Process

Clause because it contains a burden-shifting scheme requiring

the detainee to prove that he is no longer a sexually violent

predator in order to terminate his commitment.

COUNSEL

Kurt David Hermansen, Law Office of Kurt David

Hermansen, San Diego, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Julie

Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer A.

Jadovitz, Deputy Attorney General, Kevin Vienna (argued),

Supervising DeputyAttorneyGeneral, San Diego, California,

for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, Ronald Taylor (Taylor) seeks federal

habeas corpus relief from a state-court order committing him

indefinitely for involuntary treatment as a sexually violent

predator, in accordance with California law. Two issues were

certified for appeal by a motions panel of this Court. The

first issue is whether California’s Sexually Violent Predator

Act violates the Equal Protection Clause because it contains

release procedures that are more onerous than those placed on

other civilly committed detainees. The second is whether the

statute violates the federal Due Process Clause because it

contains a burden-shifting scheme requiring the detainee to
4 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

prove that he is no longer a sexually violent predator in order

to terminate his commitment.

On habeas review, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Taylor’s habeas petition because the state courts’ denial of

relief was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

controlling Supreme Court precedent.

I. BACKGROUND

Taylor was convicted of committing forcible rape in

1975, 1979, and 1989 against three separate victims. The

state courts determined that Taylor was a sexually violent

predator, and in 2005, Taylor was committed to the State

Department of Mental Health.

The pre-2006 version of the statute limited civil

commitments to two-year terms and only permitted

extensions when the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt

that the committed person remained a sexually violent

predator. See California Welfare and Institutions Code

§ 6604 (2005). In late 2006, the statute was substantially

changed through the initiative process. Among other

changes, Proposition 83 replaced the two-year civil

commitment period with an indefinite term of commitment. 

See California Welfare and Institutions Code (W&I) § 6604

(2006); see also People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 569–70

(Cal. 2010).

Post-2006, at the initial hearing, the state is still required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual meets

the statutory definition of sexually violent predator. SeeW&I

§ 6604; see also McKee, 223 P.3d at 569–70. Additionally,

the 2006 amendment requires the Department of State
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 5

Hospitals to annually examine the committed person and file

a report indicating whether the person still satisfies the

definition of a sexually violent predator, or whether a

conditional release or unconditional discharge is appropriate. 

See id. § 6604.9(a),(b).

If the Department of Mental Health finds that the person

warrants conditional release or unconditional discharge and

the state contests that finding, the state must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the person still meets the definition of

a sexually violent predator. See id. §§ 6604.9(d)–(f); 6605. 

However, a committed person may file a petition for

conditional release before the court, “with or without the

recommendation or concurrence of the Director of State

Hospitals. . . . ” Id. § 6608(a). In that instance, the committed

person must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he

no longer meets the statutory definition of a sexually violent

predator. See id. § 6608(i).

After the statute was amended, the district attorney filed

a civil commitment petition pursuant to the amended statute,

seeking to recommit Taylor for an indeterminate period. The

trial judge found probable cause to believe that the allegations

that Taylor continued to meet the definition of a sexually

violent predator were true. A jury trial was held to determine

whether Taylor actually continued to meet the statutory

definition of a sexually violent predator. During trial,

psychologists who had evaluated Taylor testified.
6 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

A. Trial Testimony.

1. Dr. Dana Putnam

Dr. Putnam explained that examination of a sexually

violent predator includes three prongs: 1) the offense of

conviction; 2) the existence of a qualifying mental disorder;

and 3) the likelihood that the accused will commit future

sexually violent acts due to his mental condition.

Dr. Putnam testified that the sexual offenses committed

by Taylor satisfied the first prong of the evaluation criteria.

Dr. Putnam diagnosed Taylor with “paraphilia not

otherwise specified relating to non-consenting behavior, nonconsenting sexual behavior, with females.”1 He found that

Taylor had a clear history of deviant aspects of rape, not

found in normative behavior, as evidenced by strangling a

fifty-year-old woman before raping her, or placing a

pillowcase over a woman’s head prior to raping her. He also

noted there were “sadistic element[s]” to Taylor’s rapes. In

addition, Dr. Putnam diagnosed Taylor with antisocial

personality disorder, which aggravated the paraphilia

disorder. Dr. Putnam also noted Taylor’s lack of remorse, as

he denied raping the victims or blamed them for the harm he

caused. The combination of disorders satisfied the second

prong of Dr. Putnam’s criteria.

Finally, Dr. Putnam conducted a risk assessment to

determine Taylor’s likelihood to commit and be convicted of

1 Paraphilia generally involves “intense or current sexual fantasies,

urges, or behaviors over a period greater than six months that involve . . .

nonconsenting persons. . . .”
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 7

another sexual offense. Following the assessment, Dr.

Putnam opined “that treatment in the community would not

suffice to reduce [Taylor’s] risk to the point that he would no

longer be likely to commit future sexually violent predatory

offenses.” Thus, Taylor met all three prongs of Dr. Putnam’s

criteria for continued civil commitment.

2. Dr. John Hupka

Dr. Hupka agreed with Dr. Putnam regarding the

appropriate evaluation criteria. He also shared Dr. Putnam’s

views that Taylor committed qualifying crimes, suffered from

paraphilia, a sexual deviance, and from an antisocial

personality disorder. Dr. Hupka joined Dr. Putnam in

predicting that Taylor would likely engage in sexually violent

predatory behavior if released.

The jury returned a verdict finding that Taylor continued

to meet the criteria to be civilly committed as a sexually

violent predator, and Taylor was committed to the State

Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term.

B. State Court Decisions

Among other arguments made before the California Court

of Appeal, Taylor asserted that the civil commitment statute

violated state and federal due process by placing the burden

of proof on him to establish eligibility for conditional release

and violated his state and federal right to equal protection, as

sexually violent predators are treated differently than other

civilly committed offenders. The Court of Appeal rejected

Taylor’s due process and equal protection claims.
8 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

After the CaliforniaSupremeCourt declined discretionary

review, Taylor filed a habeas petition in federal court.

C. Federal Court Decision

Relying on Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 356–57

(1983) and the state court’s findings, the magistrate judge

recommended denial of Taylor’s due process challenge to the

portion of the statute assigning the burden of proof to the

petitioner to establish that he no longer qualified as a sexually

violent predator. The magistrate judge noted the absence of

clearly established federal law prohibiting California from

assigning Taylor the burden of proof. Therefore, the

magistrate judge found that the state court did not

unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.

Citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979), the

magistrate judge noted that to decide Taylor’s equal

protection claim, the appropriate inquiry is whether state law

treated all similarly situated detainees the same. The

magistrate judge mentioned the state appellate court’s

reliance on Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 781–82 (9th Cir.

2004). In Hubbart, this court determined that the state court

reasonably found that sexually violent predators were not

denied equal protection when compared to other civilly

committed offenders. See Hubbart, 379 F.3d at 782. The

Hubbart panel recognized the distinction between sexually

violent predators and mentally disordered offenders, and

discerned no conflict with clearly established federal law. 

See id. Further, the Hubbart panel determined that even if

sexually violent predators were similarly situated to other

civilly committed offenders, the sexually violent predator

statute was narrowly tailored to further the state’s compelling

interest in containing sexually violent predators. See id. at
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 9

781–82. The magistrate judge ultimately determined that the

state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. The district

court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings in their entirety.

This court subsequently granted a certificate of

appealability as to the following issues: “1) whether

California’s SVPA violates the Equal Protection Clause; and

2) whether the SVPA violates the Due Process Clause

because it places a burden on the petitioner to prove he is no

longer dangerous in order to terminate his detention.”

(citations omitted).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA), we review the district court’s denial of a

federal habeas petition de novo. See Hibbler v. Benedetti,

693 F.3d 1140, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2012). To prevail, a habeas

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court’s decision

was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of

United States Supreme Court precedent. See Burt v. Titlow,

134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013). The petitioner must establish that

“the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an

error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement. . . .” Id. at 16 (citation omitted). It is not

within a federal habeas court’s province “to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions. . . .” Hayes v.

Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 517 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

We review the last reasoned decision from the state courts. 

See Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1146.
10 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Equal Protection Claim

Taylor submits that the state court’s denial of his equal

protection claim was contrary to Baxstrom v. Herold,

383 U.S. 107 (1966). Taylor specifically argues that

individuals who are committed under the Lanterman-Petris

Short (LPS) Act2

are similarly situated to those committed

under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, yet the former are

treated more favorably.

Under the LPS Act, an individual may be involuntarily

committed for increasingly longer periods, commencing with

an initial detention of 72 hours for evaluation and treatment

of a person who is a danger to himself or others or gravely

disabled. See In re Smith, 178 P.3d 446, 456 (2008). The

initial commitment may be extended for 14 days of extensive

treatment and an additional 14 days if the individual is

suicidal. See id. An additional 30-day confinement is

available if further intensive treatment is indicated. See id. 

An individual who is determined to be “imminently

dangerous” may be involuntarily committed for 180 days

“beyond the 14-day period.” Id. The 180-day commitment

requires a showing that an individual:

as a result of mental disorder or mental defect,

presents a demonstrated danger of inflicting

substantial physical harm upon others; and

must have attempted, inflicted, or made a

serious threat of substantial physical harm

2 The Lanterman-Petris Short Act is codified at California Welfare &

Institutions Code § 5000, et seq.
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 11

upon another . . . that . . . resulted in his being

taken into custody, or must have expressed a

serious threat of substantial physical harm

upon another within seven days of being taken

into custody and that threat . . . resulted in his

being taken into custody.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Renewable one-year “conservatorships” are provided for

in the LPS Act if an individual is “found to be gravely

disabled either by being manifestly unable to take care of

oneself or being in custody on a criminal charge and found

incompetent to stand trial and having a mental disorder

causing one to be dangerous to others.” Id. (citations

omitted).

Because those committed under the LPS are subject to

one-year renewable periods of detention, rather than the

indeterminate detention available under the Sexually Violent

Predators Act, Taylor asserts an equal protection claim.

The state counters that the California Supreme Court has

affirmed that those detained pursuant to the LPS Act are not

similarly situated to sexually violent predators. See McKee,

223 P.3d at 580–81; see also Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d

1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that mentally

disordered offenders and mentally disordered sex offenders

are not similarly situated to sexually violent predators). The

state maintains that LPS Act detainees do not pose the same

special dangers as sexually violent predators; that sexually

violent predators have not demonstrated the capacity to avoid

future felonious conduct; and that LPS Act detainees are
12 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

gravely disabled and unable to care for themselves, or “so

impaired as to be incompetent to stand trial . . .”

The state’s argument is more compelling. When

conducting an equal protection analysis, we first identify the

groups being compared. “The groups must be comprised of

similarly situated persons so that the factor motivating the

alleged discrimination can be identified. . . .” Arizona Dream

Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted). While the group members may differ in

some respects, they must be similar in the respects pertinent

to the State’s policy. See id.

Although both sexually violent predators and LPS Act

detainees are civilly detained, that is where the similarity

ends in respect to California’s policy concerns. California

has enacted a detailed statutoryscheme distinguishing the two

classifications of mentally ill individuals. Cf. W&I

§ 6600(a)–(h)3; W&I § 5008 (defining the prospective

committed individual as suffering from a “mental health

disorder”).

Taylor’s reliance on Baxstrom is misplaced. Baxstrom

involved a statutory scheme in which mentally ill prisoners

were transferred to civil commitment upon the expiration of

their sentences without a jury trial to demonstrate whether

confinement was still warranted. See Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at

3

See, e.g., W&I § 6600(a)(1): “Sexually violent predator means a

person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one

or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the

person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he

or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 13

111–13. All other mentally ill individuals were afforded a

jury trial “of the question of their sanity.” Id. at 111. The

Supreme Court held that, having made a jury trial available

on the issue of sanity, the state could not arbitrarily withhold

a jury trial from some mentally ill persons. There was no

basis for distinguishing mentally ill persons nearing the end

of a prison term from other mentally ill persons in terms of

“the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at

all.” Id. This reasoning is inapplicable to Taylor’s situation. 

Under California’s statutory scheme, Taylor had the same

opportunity as all other civilly committed persons to

challenge the petition seeking his commitment. See W&I

§ 6604.

Taylor’s reliance on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715

(1972) is similarly unavailing. In Jackson, the petitioner

demonstrated mental defectiveness and had pending criminal

charges filed against him when the trial court civilly

committed him until he was certified as sane. See 406 U.S.

at 717–19. Given Jackson’s condition and the dim prognosis

from the two treating psychologists, he was unlikely to ever

be deemed competent to stand trial. See id. at 718–19. Under

these circumstances, the Supreme Court determined that

“subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard

and to a more stringent standard of release than those

generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses,

and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent

institutionalization without the showing required for

commitment or the opportunity for release” under other

statutory provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.

at 730.

Unlike the facts in Jackson, the SexuallyViolent Predator

Act does not create a capricious custody scheme in violation
14 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

of equal protection tenets. Sexually violent predators are only

designated as such after: 1) two psychologists and/or

psychiatrists evaluate the individual to determine if he has

committed a sexually violent crime and otherwise meets the

sexually violent predator criteria, including likelihood of reoffending; 2) the state files a petition for civil commitment;

3) there is a probable cause hearing to determine whether the

petition allegations are true beyond a reasonable doubt; and

4) a jury renders a verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt

that the accused meets the statutory definition of a sexually

violent predator. See W&I §§ 6601(d)–(i); 6603(a). All of

these conditions were met for Taylor. Most importantly, just

as with other civilly committed detainees, Taylor has an

opportunity for release. See id. at §§ 6604.9(d)–(f);

6605(a)–(c); see also 6608(a)–(k).

California’s expressed legislative policy is to protect the

public from the increased danger posed by sexually violent

predators. See Litmon, 768 F.3d at 1242. Considering this

policy, both we and the state of California have recognized

that sexually violent predators are not similarly situated to

other civilly committed individuals. See id. at 1243; see also

McKee, 223 P.3d at 581 (noting that “those who are

reasonably determined to represent a greater danger may be

treated differently”).

We are not persuaded by Taylor’s attempt to distinguish

Hubbart because that case involved a pre-Proposition 83

version of the Sexually Violent Predator Act. Both the

former and current versions of the statute contain virtually

identical definitions of a sexually violent predator and both

versions aim to identify, treat and detain those individuals

identified under the statute. See W&I § 6600(a)(1) (2005);

see also W&I §§ 6600(a)(1) (2006). Therefore, our ruling in
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 15

Hubbart remains the law of the circuit. See United States v.

Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012). In any event, we

have made the same ruling post-Proposition 83. See Litmon,

768 F.3d at 1243 (holding that sexually violent predators are

not similarly situated to other civil detainees).

Taylor also suggests that we should employ the more

expansive California equal protection analysis. But we are

not bound by state law when deciding an issue raised under

the United States Constitution. See Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d

747, 753 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009).

In sum, the California Court of Appeal did not

unreasonablyapply clearlyestablished federal law to Taylor’s

equal protection claim by determining that sexually violent

predators are not similarly situated to other civilly committed

offenders. See Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099, 1105–06

(9th Cir. 2015) (so holding and similarly rejecting petitioner’s

reliance on Baxstrom).

B. Due Process Claim

Taylor contends that the California Court of Appeal

decision rested on an unreasonable application of Addington

and Jones. He submits that “Jones expressly did not approve

release proceedings that shifted the burden to the committed

individual . . .” He further contends that under Addington,

441 U.S. at 432–33, the Due Process Clause compels a

showing by the state through clear and convincing evidence

that the committed individual is both mentally ill and

dangerous. Specifically, Taylor posits that the Sexually

Violent Predator Act impermissibly shifts the burden of

proof, requiring a committed sexually violent predator to
16 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer

meets the statutory definition of a sexual predator.

The state counters that Taylor’s due process challenge

must fail because no Supreme Court precedent prohibited

amendments to the Sexually Violent Predator Act to change

the burden to the detainee to establish the right to release.

Due process is a flexible standard requiring such

“procedural protections as the particular situation

demands[.]” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005)

(citation omitted). The California Court of Appeal

determined that in Jones, the United States Supreme Court

“implicitly approved a review procedure similar to the one”

used in Taylor’s proceedings. The Court of Appeal noted that

the Jones statutory scheme provided several alternatives for

the detainee to seek release. As in the Sexually Violent

Predator Act, under the procedure at issue in Jones, the

detainee was entitled to a judicial hearing to determine

eligibility for release, where he was required to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was no longer mentally

ill or dangerous. In the alternative, he could obtain a

certificate of recovery from the requisite state agency. See

Jones, 463 U.S. at 356–57. The presence of these procedural

safeguards persuaded the Supreme Court that the statutory

scheme was constitutionally permissible. In similar fashion,

and as described, the Sexually Violent Predator Act also

provides several mechanisms through which a petitioner may

terminate his indefinite term of confinement. Contrary to

Taylor’s argument, the California Court of Appeal reasonably

relied on the Supreme Court’s rationale in Jones as clearly

established federal law.
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 17

Addington is not clearly established federal law on the

issue of re-commitment procedures because Addington

addressed only the state’s burden of proof for initial

commitment. See 441 U.S. at 432–33. Therefore, it cannot

be fairly said that the holding in Addington approving a clear

and convincing standard of proof as constitutionally

permissible applies in the context of a re-commitment. 

Taylor urges us to extend the holding of Addington to the recommitment process. However, the Supreme Court has

recently clarified that a state court is not required to extend

the holding of a Supreme Court case to avoid unreasonably

applying federal law. See White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697,

1706 (2014).

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), does not

constitute clearly established law either. In Foucha, the

defendant was insane and dangerous at the time of his

conviction; he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. 

See id. at 74, 76. However, the defendant was not mentally

ill at the time of his commitment. See id. at 78. The Supreme

Court determined that the Louisiana statute failed to provide

fair and reasonable procedures because Foucha’s continued

confinement was on the basis of dangerousness alone. See id.

at 85–86. To pass constitutional muster, a civil confinement

statute must commit an offender based on a finding of

dangerousness and of a present mental illness. See id. at 86.

Unlike in Foucha, Taylor was not confined based solely

on a finding of dangerousness. Moreover, as noted above,

fair and reasonable procedures and safeguards exist to ensure

that a sexually violent predator is confined only as long as the

person is mentally ill and dangerous. See W&I § 6600(a)(1).
18 TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY.

Importantly, the Supreme Court has not definitively

addressed the constitutionality of release procedures that

place the burden of proof upon the individual challenging

continued commitment. Cf. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432–33

(addressing initial commitment procedures). In this

circumstance, where there is no clearly established federal

law, the state court decision cannot be deemed unreasonable. 

See Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014).

Finally, neither Addington, Jones, nor Foucha were

decided under the AEDPA standard. Accordingly, they offer

no guidance for habeas review under the AEDPA. See Cullen

v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410–11 (2011); Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). As with his equal

protection claim, we conclude that the state court’s denial of

Taylor’s due process claim was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

IV. CONCLUSION

Sexually violent predators are in a special category of

civilly committed offenders because they have a

demonstrated sexually violent criminal history and are

mentally ill, thereby portending the likelihood of future

sexually violent behavior. Given the nature of the harm they

represent to themselves and the community, the state has an

elevated interest in ensuring that they are identified, treated,

and detained for as long as they meet the sexually violent

predator criteria. Because sexually violent predators are not

similarly situated to other categories of mentally impaired

detainees, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of Taylor’s

equal protection claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law.
TAYLOR V. SAN DIEGO CTY. 19

Given the absence of established Supreme Court

precedent regarding the constitutionality of release

procedures that place the burden of proof upon the individual

challenging continued commitment, the California Court of

Appeal could not and did not unreasonably apply federal law

in denying Taylor’s due process claim.

AFFIRMED.