2022 IL App (1st) 211320-U 

Order filed: September 15, 2022

 FIRST DISTRICT

 FOURTH DIVISION

No. 1-21-1320 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

SEIDEN LAW GROUP, P.C., as successor- ) Appeal from the

in-interest to SEIDEN NETZKY LAW ) Circuit Court of

GROUP, LLC, ) Cook County.

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 2017 L 8529

 ) 

MAQBOOL KHAN, an individual, and ) 

AMERICAN DEVELOPERS CORPORATION, ) 

an Illinois corporation, ) Honorable 

 ) Patrick J. Sherlock, 

 Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Hoffman and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirmed the judgment against Khan on plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees,

holding that no expert testimony was necessary to show the reasonableness of the 

charged fees and that Khan otherwise forfeited the issue of whether the trial court’s 

findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We dismissed ADC’s 

appeal where its rights were not prejudiced by the judgment.

¶ 2 Plaintiff, the Seiden Law Group, P.C. as the successor in interest to the Seiden Netzky Law 

Group, LLC, brought a first-amended, five-count complaint for breach of contract and quantum 

meruit against defendants, Maqbool Khan and American Developers Corporation (ADC), arising 

out of defendants’ alleged failure to pay plaintiff’s legal fees in connection to its representation of 

defendants in three underlying legal matters. The circuit court conducted a bench trial on plaintiff’s 
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amended complaint and found in favor of plaintiff and against one of the defendants, Khan, on two 

of the breach of contract counts (counts I and II) and on one of the quantum meruit counts (count

V) in the total amount of $87,525.07. The court dismissed counts III and IV against Khan (alleging 

claims for quantum meruit) as moot because it found that contracts existed for those claims and it 

already had awarded plaintiff damages for the breach thereof in counts I and II. The court entered 

judgment in favor of the other defendant, ADC, on all five counts because it found that plaintiff 

represented only Khan on the underlying legal matters at issue. Defendants appeal, arguing that 

the judgment against Khan on counts I, II, and V was against the manifest weight of the evidence

because plaintiff offered no expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of its attorney fees. For 

the reasons that follow, we dismiss ADCs appeal for lack of standing and affirm the judgment 

against Khan. 

¶ 3 In its amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that it is a law firm whose members are licensed 

to practice in Illinois. Khan is the president and registered agent of ADC. On June 17, 2014, Khan 

signed a retainer agreement whereby he employed plaintiff to represent his interests in Hase 

Ljubijanac & Senada Ljubijanac v. Lams Re, LLC & ADC (the Ljubijanac matter). Plaintiff 

subsequently litigated the Ljubijanac matter, including “extensive discovery work and numerous 

court appearances over two years.” After Khan failed to pay for its services, plaintiff filed its 

motion to withdraw on August 17, 2016, which was granted.

¶ 4 On or about July 16, 2014, Khan signed a retainer agreement employing plaintiff to 

represent his interests in a second matter, Lams Re, LLC v. ADC (the Lams matter). Plaintiff 

subsequently litigated the Lams matter, including “an extensive discovery process, mediation 

proceedings, and numerous court appearances.” After Khan failed to pay for its services, plaintiff 

filed its motion to withdraw on February 18, 2016, which was granted.
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¶ 5 At Khan’s request, on or about September 22, 2014, plaintiff filed an appearance to 

represent his interests on a third matter, Rauch Clay Corporation v. ADC (the Clay matter). The

Clay matter has concluded, but Khan still owes plaintiff a balance of $48.68, plus costs and interest

for its legal services.

¶ 6 In count I of its complaint, plaintiff asserted a claim for breach of contract against 

defendants in the sum of $70,300.10, plus costs and interest, based on Khan’s failure to pay for 

the legal services provided in the Ljubijanac matter.

¶ 7 In count II, plaintiff asserted a claim for breach of contract against defendants in the sum 

of $17,176.29, plus costs and interest, based on Khan’s failure to pay for the legal services provided 

in the Lams matter.

¶ 8 In count III, plaintiff asserted a quantum meruit claim against defendants in the sum of 

$70,300.10, plus costs and interest, in the Ljubijanac matter.

¶ 9 In count IV, plaintiff asserted a quantum meruit claim against defendants in the sum of 

$17,176.29, plus costs and interest, in the Lams matter.

¶ 10 In count V, plaintiff asserted a quantum meruit claim against defendants in the amount of 

$48.68, plus costs and interest, in the Clay matter.

¶ 11 Prior to trial, plaintiff disclosed two of its attorneys, Glenn Seiden and Brooke Stevens, as 

lay witnesses pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Seiden’s and 

Stevens’s disclosures stated in pertinent part that they each would be expected to testify to their 

familiarity: 

“with the prevailing amounts that lawyers who practice in Cook County charge for the 

types of services that Plaintiff provided to Defendants, and that the amounts that Plaintiff 

charged Defendant for those services are fair, reasonable, and comparable to those charged 
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by other legal professionals of a similar experience level to Plaintiff performing similar 

legal services in Cook County.”

¶ 12 Plaintiff did not disclose any expert witnesses pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

213(f)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). 

¶ 13 At the bench trial, plaintiff attempted to elicit testimony from Seiden and Stevens regarding 

the fairness and reasonableness of the value of the legal services they provided to Khan. Each time, 

defendants objected on the basis that the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees only may be shown 

by expert testimony. Since Seiden and Stevens only had been disclosed as Rule 213(f)(1) lay 

witnesses, and not as Rule 213(f)(3) expert witnesses, defendants argued that they could not give 

expert opinions regarding the reasonableness of the charged attorney fees. The trial court sustained 

all of defendants’ objections to Seiden’s and Stevens’s testimony regarding the reasonableness of 

the charged attorney fees.

¶ 14 Other than Seiden’s and Stevens’s attempted testimony regarding the reasonableness of the 

charged attorney fees and the sustaining of the Rule 213 objections thereto, defendants have failed 

to provide us with any recitation or summary of any other testimony and evidence presented at 

trial. 

¶ 15 At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court asked the parties to brief the issue of whether 

expert testimony was necessary to establish the reasonableness of the attorney fees charged by 

plaintiff, or whether the court could decide the reasonableness of these fees even without expert 

testimony. Plaintiff submitted a brief arguing that expert testimony was unnecessary and that the 

court could use its own knowledge when deciding whether the evidence at trial established the 

reasonableness of the charged attorney fees. Defendants submitted a brief arguing that expert 
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testimony was necessary to show the reasonableness of the attorney fees charged by plaintiff.

Following the submission of the briefs, the trial court entered its judgment on September 15, 2021. 

¶ 16 First, the trial court found that plaintiff entered into written contracts with Kahn to represent 

him in the Ljubijanac and Lams matters. Plaintiff also represented Kahn in the Clay matter without 

an express written contract, based on an implied promise that Khan would pay plaintiff reasonable 

compensation for the services rendered. The written contracts in the Ljubijanac and Lams matters, 

and the implied promise in the Clay matter, only were entered into between plaintiff and Khan; 

ADC was not a party thereto and therefore the court entered judgment in favor of ADC on all five 

counts of plaintiff’s complaint. The court then found:

“Mr. Seiden and Ms. Stevens testified about *** the time and labor required, the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal 

service properly; the amount involved and the results obtained; the nature and length of the 

professional relationship with the client; the experience, reputation, and ability of the 

lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and the nature of the fee agreement with Mr. 

Kahn. The Court has reviewed the invoices submitted in evidence and finds that the 

description of the work and the hours expended is fair. There is no evidence that Seiden 

Law overbilled any time, and indeed, the opposite is true. The hours billed and the rates 

charged are consistent with the nature of the cases litigated.”

¶ 17 The trial court also noted that “Defendant has argued that plaintiff cannot prevail without 

presenting expert testimony. The Court rejects that argument.” 

¶ 18 The court then entered judgment for plaintiffs and against Khan on count I for $70,300.10, 

on count II for $17,176.29, and on count V for $48.68 and dismissed counts III and IV as moot.

Defendants appeal the judgment against Khan on counts I, II, and V. 
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¶ 19 Initially, we note that the right to appeal exists only in favor of the party whose rights have 

been prejudiced by the judgment appealed from. See Knox v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2018 IL 

App (1st) 162265, ¶ 22. In the instant case, the trial court ruled in favor of ADC on all five counts 

of plaintiff’s amended complaint and, as such, its rights were not prejudiced by the judgment and 

therefore it lacks standing to appeal. Id. Accordingly, we dismiss ADC from this appeal and 

proceed to consider Khan’s appeal of the judgment against him on counts I, II, and V of plaintiff’s

amended complaint.

¶ 20 In an action for attorney fees based on a breach of contract or quantum meruit theory, the 

plaintiff-attorney’s prima facie case requires proof of the following: the existence of an attorneyclient relationship; the nature of the services rendered; the amount of time expended; and the result, 

if any, obtained for the client. Wildman, Harrold, Allen and Dixon v. Gaylord, 317 Ill. App. 3d 

590, 598 (2000). The plaintiff-attorney also must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the services rendered were necessary and that the amount of fees sought is fair, just and reasonable. 

Id. 

¶ 21 In a civil trial for attorney fees based on breach of contract or quantum meruit, the necessity 

of the legal services performed and the reasonableness of the amount charged are questions of fact. 

Id. at 599. Sitting as the trier of fact, the trial judge decides these issues based on the weight of the 

competent evidence. Id. We will not reverse the court’s judgment for attorney fees and costs unless 

it was against the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly 

apparent. Id.

¶ 22 Khan argues on appeal that the trial court’s judgment against him for $87,525.07 in 

attorney fees on counts I, II, and V of plaintiff’s amended complaint was against the manifest 
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weight of the evidence because plaintiff provided no expert testimony regarding the 

reasonableness of those fees.

¶ 23 In support, plaintiff cites In re Marriage of Salata, 221 Ill. App. 3d 336 (1991). In Salata, 

David Alspaugh represented Debra Salata in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Id. After the 

judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered, the trial court held a hearing on Alspaugh’s 

petition for attorney fees. Id. at 337. At the hearing, the husband’s attorney informed the trial court 

that Alspaugh did not intend to call an outside expert to testify in support of his fee petition. Id.

Alspaugh stated that he was prepared to present his own testimony to prove the reasonableness of 

his fees. Id. Finding that an outside expert was necessary to testify to the reasonableness of the 

charged fees, the trial court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Id. 

¶ 24 On appeal, the appellate court held that “the reasonableness of an attorney’s fees must be 

shown by expert testimony either by the petitioning attorney, an outside attorney or both.” Id. at 

339. As Alspaugh was prepared to offer his own expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of 

his fees, the trial court erred in also requiring the testimony of an outside expert. Id. Accordingly, 

the appellate court reversed the dismissal order and remanded for a hearing on the petition. Id. at 

340. 

¶ 25 Khan argues that, pursuant to Salata, plaintiff here was required to show the reasonableness 

of its attorney fees by presenting either the expert testimony of the attorneys who charged the fees 

or the expert testimony of an outside attorney. Plaintiff did neither. Plaintiff disclosed its attorneys, 

Seiden and Stevens, only as Rule 213(f)(1) lay witnesses and not as Rule 213(f)(3) experts, and 

therefore the trial court sustained all of Khan’s objections to their testimony regarding the 

reasonableness of the fees charged. Plaintiff did not call an outside attorney to give expert 

testimony regarding the reasonableness of the fees charged. In the absence of any expert testimony 
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regarding the reasonableness of the fees charged, either from plaintiff’s own attorneys or by an 

outside attorney, Khan contends that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case for attorney fees 

either under a breach of contract theory or a quantum meruit theory. Accordingly, Khan asks us to 

reverse the judgment order awarding plaintiff $87,525.07 in attorney fees on counts I, II, and V of 

its amended complaint and enter judgment in his favor on those counts.

¶ 26 We reject Khan’s argument and affirm the judgment order against him, relying on Johns v. 

Klecan, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1013 (1990), Fitzwilliam v. 1220 Iriquois Venture, 233 Ill. App. 3d 221 

(1992), and Bosch Die Casting Co., Inc. v. Lunt Manufacturing Co., Inc., 236 Ill. App. 3d 18 

(1992). 

¶ 27 In Johns, the plaintiffs in a personal injury action against Georgeann Klecan filed a petition 

for adjudication of attorney’s liens, seeking the denial of any attorney fees to respondents, Nicholas 

B. Blase and Fred Lambruschi, in connection with their representation of the plaintiffs in the suit 

against Klecan. Id. at 1016. After an evidentiary hearing at which Blase, Lambruschi, and a 

paralegal testified to the legal work performed and the fees charged, the trial court granted the 

petition and denied respondents any attorney fees. Id

¶ 28 The appellate court held that Blase’s and Lambruschi’s testimony at the hearing, as well as 

the testimony of the paralegal, was sufficient to support an award of fees. Id. at 1021. The appellate 

court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that respondents’ failure to present any expert testimony 

regarding the reasonableness of the value of their services was fatal to their case, because “[w]hile 

it may be proper for an attorney seeking fees to present expert testimony on the issue of what is a 

reasonable fee [citation], he is not required to do so as a matter of law.” Id. at 1024. The appellate 

court also noted that “a trial court is not limited to the evidence presented in arriving at a reasonable 

fee but may also use the knowledge it has acquired in the discharge of professional duties to value 
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legal services rendered.” Id. at 1022. Finding that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to 

determine a reasonable fee for respondents’ time, the appellate court reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings. Id. at 1025.

¶ 29 In Fitzwilliam, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 224, the plaintiffs brought an action for injunctive and 

declaratory relief seeking damages for constructive eviction and the wrongful assessment and 

seizure of property tax prorations. The defendant filed a counterclaim for attorney fees and costs. 

Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant as to each count of the plaintiffs’ 

complaint and as to the defendant’s counterclaim for attorney fees and costs. Id.

¶ 30 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not holding an evidentiary 

hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to the defendant. Id. at 235. The plaintiffs 

maintained that “it was ‘fatal’ to the award of attorney fees ‘that no expert testimony was offered 

as to the reasonableness of the charges.’” Id. The appellate court disagreed, holding that while 

expert testimony properly may be offered as to the reasonableness of the fees, such testimony is 

not required as a matter of law and that the trial judge’s “experience and knowledge may be relied 

upon in determining what constitutes a proper expenditure of time.” Id. at 235-36. 

¶ 31 In Bosch, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 19-21, the defendants moved for attorney fees after judgment 

was entered against the plaintiff in an action concerning ownership of stocks. The trial court 

conducted a hearing and awarded the defendants $382,842.96. Id. at 26. On appeal, the plaintiff 

argued for reversal based on the defendants’ failure to present expert testimony concerning the 

usual, customary charges for legal services in Cook County for the relevant time period. Id. at 30.

The appellate court disagreed, holding that when assessing attorney fees, the trial court may utilize 

its own knowledge regarding the value of the services rendered; expert testimony is not required. 

Id.
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¶ 32 As Johns, Fitzwilliam, and Bosch make clear, judges, as attorneys, have particular expertise 

in evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees. Therefore, expert testimony on that issue, while 

proper, is not required as a matter of law; the court may award attorney fees based on its own 

evaluation of the evidence and its knowledge of the value and reasonableness of the fees sought. 

¶ 33 When considering the reasonableness of the fees sought, the trial court should consider the 

following factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (eff. Jan. 1, 

2010): 

“(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and 

the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment 

will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 

and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”

¶ 34 In its written order, the trial court addressed the Rule 1.5(a) factors, stating that plaintiff’s 

attorneys, Seiden and Stevens, had testified about their time and labor; the novelty and difficulty 

of the questions involved; the amount involved and the results they obtained; the nature and length 

of their professional relationship with Khan; their experience, reputation, and ability; and the 

nature of the fee agreement with Khan. The trial court made no mention of any testimony by Seiden 
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and Stevens with respect to the reasonableness of the fees charged, as the court had sustained all 

of Khan’s objections thereto based on plaintiff’s failure to disclose them as expert witnesses. 

However, even in the absence of any expert testimony, the court found that the fees charged were 

reasonable. In so finding, the court expressly relied on “the invoices submitted in evidence,” stating 

that the description of the work and the hours expended is “fair” and that there was no evidence 

that plaintiff had overbilled for any of its time. The court concluded that the hours billed and rates 

charged were “consistent with the nature of the cases litigated.”

¶ 35 As we have discussed earlier in this order, the absence of any expert testimony regarding 

the reasonableness of the rates charged was not fatal to plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees, as the 

court could consider the evidence presented at trial (namely, the invoices and the testimony 

regarding the Rule 1.5(a) factors) and rely on its own expertise when deciding whether such 

evidence indicated that the fees charged were reasonable. As to whether the court’s finding 

regarding the reasonableness of the fees charged was against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

we note that Khan has provided us with no discussion of the invoices relied on by the trial court 

or even any citation to where the invoices may be found in the appellate record. Nor did Khan 

provide us with any discussion or citation in the record to Seiden’s and Stevens’s testimony about 

the other Rule 1.5(a) factors relevant to the reasonableness determination. As the appellant, Khan 

bears the burden of providing us with a cohesive argument as to why the invoices and Seiden’s 

and Stevens’s testimony did not support the court’s finding regarding the reasonableness of the 

fees charged, with citation to relevant authorities and the pages of the record relied on. See Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Khan’s failure to so comply with Rule 341(h)(7) 

results in forfeiture of the issue. Id.
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¶ 36 For all the foregoing reasons, we dismiss ADC’s appeal for lack of standing and affirm the 

circuit court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Khan on counts I, II, and V of the amended 

complaint. 

¶ 37 Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.