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76–711 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–621 

OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 25, 2012 

Serial No. J–112–73 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 217 

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 209 

WITNESSES 

Napolitano, Janet, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .............. 4 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Janet Napolitano to questions submitted by Senators 

Whitehouse, Sessions, Franken, Grassley, and Leahy ...................................... 44 

Question 12, December 15, 2011, Final Report .............................................. 116 

Question 27, Memorandum of Understanding ............................................... 200 

Question 31, I–765 Application for Employment Authorization ................... 202 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Napolitano, Janet, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, statement ...................................................................................................................... 219 

Peacock, Nelson, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Homeland Security, Washington, DC, April 24, 2012, letter ...................................................... 243 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Feinstein, Schumer, Durbin, 

Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Franken, Coons, Blumenthal, Grassley, 

Sessions, Kyl, Graham, Cornyn, and Lee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning. We will let the photographers 

get all their shots, but then I am going to ask you, once you have 

done that, to step back so we can get started. 

OK. I think we can get started. Senator Graham is here. I know 

Senator Schumer dropped in briefly before from the Rules Committee and will be back. Senator Grassley has told me he is over 

on the House side—is that correct?—and will be joining us. Senator 

Kyl is here. Senator Grassley said to go ahead, and we will. 

Secretary, you know Senator Kyl is from the State of Arizona, I 

believe. 

Secretary Napolitano. I think we know he is. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Yes, I suspect you do. 

I want to welcome Secretary Napolitano back to the Judiciary 

Committee. We are continuing our important oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. She has testified here before, and 

I think I can speak for every member of the Committee that she 

has also been responsive if we have called with questions in between the testimony. 

This is our oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

and the work that the women and men of the agencies within the 

Department do every day to keep Americans safe. 

Now, much attention has been focused on an incident prior to 

President Obama’s attendance at the recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. I have spoken a number of times with 

Secret Service Director Sullivan about this. In fact, we met privately for about an hour yesterday, and we probably have been on 

the phone half a dozen or a dozen times. I have known the Director 

from the time when he was an agent. I knew him when President 
2 

Bush appointed him as Director of the Secret Service and when 

President Obama reappointed him. I know that he shares my view 

that the alleged conduct was unacceptable. I think he is doing all 

he can to ensure a timely and thorough investigation and accountability for behavior that failed to meet the standards he expects 

and certainly the standards that the President of the United States 

and the American people deserve. He has taken action on 12 

agents who it is claimed have been involved in misconduct. 

Last week, I arranged for a bipartisan briefing for Judiciary 

Committee staff, Republican and Democratic, with the Secret Service and officials of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office 

of Inspector General. I have asked the Director to be sure he is 

available to members of this Committee as the investigation continues. He assured me he will be and that he will make sure that 

we know exactly when they finish the investigation and everything 

they have found. 

Now, I have no doubt you are treating this situation with equal 

seriousness. Certainly in my conversations with you, you have 

talked a great deal with the Director during this time. Nobody 

wants to see the President’s security compromised; nobody wants 

to see America embarrassed. 

I pointed out to the Director that not only does the Secret Service 

protect the President of the United States, but they are also going 

to be and are protecting the man who is going to be the Republican 

nominee for President, Governor Romney. I cannot think of anything, aside from the personal tragedy, that would look worse to 

the rest of the world if something happened either to President 

Obama or Governor Romney, especially during a Presidential election. I think everybody here would agree with that. 

Now, you told us at your first appearance as Secretary you would 

focus on using limited Federal law enforcement resources in a 

smarter, more effective manner when enforcing our immigration 

laws. You and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director 

John Morton are following through. The implementation of ICE’s 

prosecutorial discretion policy is a positive step forward. If this new 

policy has the effect of apprehending more individuals who are legitimate threats to public safety and providing some measure of relief to those who pose no threat, then that is an improvement. And 

you are standing by your commitment to focus first and foremost 

on the most dangerous among the undocumented population. Mr. 

Morton was in Vermont, and we discussed that then, too. 

And I think you are doing the best you can in the absence of 

Congress taking up meaningful and comprehensive immigration reform. As you know, I supported President Bush’s efforts for meaningful and comprehensive immigration reform, and I still would 

like to see that. Even though that has very little impact on my 

State of Vermont, it has an enormous impact on the rest of the 

country. 

In fact, as we hold this hearing today, the Supreme Court is 

hearing argument on the constitutionality of an Arizona immigration enforcement law. The Constitution of the U.S. declares that 

Congress and the Federal Government shall have the power to establish a uniform ‘‘Rule of Naturalization. ‘‘So national immigration 

policy is properly a subject we should act upon. It should not be 
3 

left to a hodgepodge of conflicting State laws. I hope we can get 

back to where we can do good, strong, comprehensive, bipartisan 

immigration policy. 

In 2010, we passed an emergency appropriations measure to pro- vide $600 million for border security enhancements. You have reported that we have made significant strides there. I understand 

that illegal border crossings on the southern border have declined, 

and we have seen steady increases in the numbers of Border Patrol 

and Customs and Border Protection officers monitoring our borders. And I take special notice as well that you are working with 

Canadian officials on the Beyond the Border Initiative, coordinating on our shared northern border, and I am impressed with 

that. 

If I can be parochial—and it is very rare that somebody is parochial in any one of these committees, but in Vermont, many people 

look forward to our friends from Canada visiting and enjoying all 

that Vermont has to offer. And at least when I was a youngster, 

if you just felt like going to a different—another State, it is that 

easy going back and forth across the border. We take that for 

granted, and I hope that we can work on that—to protect our security but keep that border as open as possible. 

I was pleased to see that the EB–5 Regional Center Program was 

among your recommendations and those of the President’s Council 

on Jobs and Competitiveness. We have worked with that in 

Vermont. I look forward to working for reauthorization of this program. Senator Grassley and I have been working together to get 

this and other expiring visa programs reauthorized in a bipartisan 

manner. I will continue to work with you and with USCIS Director 

Mayorkas to strengthen and improve the EB–5 program. 

I have raised the issue of screening procedures and technology in 

our airports. I continue to have questions about these policies, their 

impact on the privacy and health of Americans, and whether this 

technology is the most effective use of resources. Obviously, when 

you see an elderly person in a wheelchair going through all kinds 

of screening, I am not quite sure how that is keeping us safer, but 

we can talk about it. 

I want to make sure that as we go to national cybersecurity we 

protect our rights and civil liberties. And, finally, I want to commend the women and men who work in the agencies of your Department. I have met so many of them, all different branches. I 

know they work very, very hard and care about our country. Many 

are Vermonters who are working hard to adjudicate immigration 

benefits at the Vermont Service Center, but that can be said of all 

our States. We will expand the workforce in St. Albans, Vermont, 

the Vermont Service Center, but I just am constantly impressed 

every time I see the men and women that work there. 

In the absence of Senator Grassley, Senator Kyl, did you wish to 

make an opening statement before we go to the Secretary? 

Senator KYL. No, Mr. Chairman. I think we want to hear from 

the Secretary, and then we will all have questions, but thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, Madam Secretary, the floor is open to 

you, and then we will go to 7-minute rounds. We will rotate in the 

usual manner from side and side in the order in which people arrived. 
4 

Secretary Napolitano, please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JANET S. NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Chairman Leahy and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be with you today, and I 

thank the Committee for your support of the Department over 

these past 3 years and, indeed, since the Department was founded 

more than 9 years ago. 

Before I begin, I want to address the allegations of misconduct 

by Secret Service agents in Colombia. The allegations are inexcusable, and we take them very seriously. 

Since the allegations first surfaced, I have been in close touch 

with Director Sullivan. The Director took immediate action to remove the agents involved, and a full and thorough investigation is 

underway to determine exactly what transpired and actions we 

need to take to ensure that this kind of conduct does not happen 

again. 

Director Sullivan has the President’s and my full confidence as 

this investigation proceeds. The investigation will be complete and 

thorough, and we will leave no stone unturned. 

Thus far, the investigation has implicated 12 Secret Service personnel. Eight individuals are now separated from the agency. The 

Secret Service is moving to permanently revoke the security clearance of another, and three of the employees involved have been 

cleared of serious misconduct but will face appropriate administration action. At this time, therefore, all 12 Secret Service personnel 

identified in the investigation have either faced personnel action or 

been cleared of serious misconduct. 

Let me be clear. We will not allow the actions of a few to tarnish 

the proud legacy of the Secret Service, an agency that has served 

numerous Presidents and whose men and women execute their 

mission with great professionalism, honor, and integrity every single day. I have nothing but respect for these men and women, 

many of whom put their own lives at risk for the President and 

many other public leaders. 

We expect all DHS employees, in the Secret Service and throughout the Department, to adhere to the highest professional and ethical standards, and we will continue to update the Committee as 

the investigation proceeds and more information becomes available. 

Let me now move to the Department’s progress since 9/11. Ten 

years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, America is 

stronger and more secure today thanks to the support of the Congress, the work of the men and women of the DHS, and our Federal, State, and local, partners who work across the homeland security enterprise. 

As I have said many times, homeland security begins with hometown security. As part of our commitment to strengthening hometown security, we have worked to get information, tools, and resources out of Washington, D.C., and into the hands of State and 

local officials and first responders. 

This has led to significant advances. For example, we have made 

great progress in improving our domestic capabilities to detect and 

prevent terrorist attacks against our people, our communities, and 
5 

our critical infrastructure. We have increased our ability to analyze 

and distribute threat information at all levels through fusion centers, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, the 

National Terrorism Advisory System, and other means. 

We have invested in training for local law enforcement and first 

responders in order to increase expertise and capacity at the local 

level. We have supported preparedness and response across our 

country through approximately $35 billion in homeland security 

grants since 2002. And we have proposed important adjustments to 

our grant programs for fiscal year 2013 to continue to develop, sustain, and leverage these core capabilities. 

Our experience over the past several years has made us smarter 

about the terrorist threats we face and how best to deal with them. 

We have learned that an engaged, vigilant public is essential to efforts to prevent acts of terrorism, which is why we have continued 

to expand the ‘‘If You See Something, Say Something’’ campaign 

nationally. 

We have also expanded our risk-based, intelligence-driven security efforts across the transportation sector, the global supply 

chain, and critical infrastructure. By sharing and leveraging information with our many partners, we can make better informed decisions about how to best mitigate risk. 

Over the past several years, we also have deployed unprecedented levels of personnel, technology, and resources to protect our 

Nation’s borders. These efforts, too, have achieved significant results, including historic decreases in illegal immigration as measured by total apprehensions and increases in seizures of illegal 

drugs, weapons, cash, and other contraband. In fact, illegal immigration attempts are at their lowest levels since 1971 while violent 

crime in U.S. border communities has remained flat or has fallen 

over the past decade. 

We also have focused on smart and effective enforcement of immigration laws while streamlining and facilitating the legal immigration process. Last year, ICE removed record numbers of illegal 

aliens from the country, 90 percent of whom fell within our priority 

categories of criminal aliens and repeat immigration law violators, 

recent border entrants, and immigration fugitives. We have focused 

on identifying and sanctioning employers who knowingly hire 

workers not authorized to work in the United States. 

We have made important reforms in our immigration detention 

system so that every individual in custody is treated in a fair, safe, 

and humane manner consistent with ICE detention standards. And 

we have worked to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies in visa programs, streamlined the path for entrepreneurs who wish to bring 

business to the United States, and improved systems for immigration benefits and services. 

In the critical area of cybersecurity, we also continue to lead the 

Federal Government’s efforts to secure civilian government networks while working with industry, State, and local governments 

to secure critical infrastructure and information systems. We are 

deploying the latest tools across the Federal Government to protect 

critical civilian systems while sharing timely and actionable security information with public and private sector partners to help 

them protect their own operations. With these partners, we are 
6 

also protecting the systems and networks that support the financial 

services industry, the electric power industry, and the telecommunications industry, to name just a few. 

We stand ready to work with the Congress to pass legislation 

that will further enhance our ability to combat threats in the cyber 

domain. Specifically, we support legislation that would, among 

other things, establish baseline performance standards for the Nation’s critical core infrastructure; remove barriers to information 

sharing between Government and industry so that we can more 

quickly respond to and mitigate cyber threats or intrusions; ensure 

robust privacy oversight to ensure that voluntarily shared information does not impinge on individual privacy and civil liberties, including criminal penalties for misuse; and provide DHS with the 

hiring flexibility to attract and retain the cybersecurity professionals we need to execute our complex and challenging mission. 

Mr. Chairman, threats against our Nation, whether from terrorists, criminals, or cyber adversaries, continue to evolve. And DHS 

must continue to evolve as well. I look forward to working with you 

and members of the Committee to build on the progress we have 

achieved across these and many other mission areas. We remain 

ever vigilant to threats as we continue to promote the free movement of goods and peoples essential to our economy and protect our 

essential rights and liberties. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears as a 

submission for the record] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, and, of course, we will put your 

full statement in the record. 

As I told you, with our jurisdiction over the U. S. Secret Service, 

we did want to ask you some questions there. I am, of course, like 

all Americans, concerned about the safety of our President, whether it could have been jeopardized by this kind of behavior, just as 

I am concerned about the safety of any of the protectees. I mentioned Governor Romney, but there are several others. 

The misconduct we have heard about, did that pose any risk to 

the President’s security when in Colombia or to national security? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, that was my first question to Director Sullivan when he called me, and the answer is no, 

there was no risk to the President. 

Chairman LEAHY. And you made that assessment? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, based on the information supplied to 

me by the Director. 

Chairman LEAHY. And is the Secret Service coordinating its internal investigation with the Department of Defense or any other 

U.S. agency that might have been involved in Cartagena preparing 

for the President’s arrival? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, we are coordinating the 

investigation with the Inspector General. We have an existing 

MOA with the IG, between the Secret Service and the IG, so they 

are, in effect, supervising the investigation even though it is being 

done by Secret Service agents. 

Chairman LEAHY. And was there any evidence that the President’s advance team was involved in this misconduct? 
7 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I have not been informed of any such evidence. 

Chairman LEAHY. And as we continue to look at this, we know 

the agents are trained as to what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. Are there standards in place governing appropriate conduct for agents on foreign trips and how they may interact with 

locals when they are on foreign assignments? And if there are such 

standards, how are they conveyed to the agents? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. There are standards. They are conveyed 

through training and through supervision. But one of the things we 

are doing, Mr. Chairman, is looking at the standards, the training, 

the supervision to see what, if anything, needs to be tightened up, 

because, again, we do not want this to be repeated. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, is there training given to agents relating 

to private or intimate contact with foreign nationals when traveling 

for security work? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The training is focused on professionalism, on conduct consistent with the highest moral values and 

standards, and I think that would include your question. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, Madam Secretary, I know that when we 

travel, when Members of Congress travel to different countries we 

go to, we are given security and foreign intelligence threat 

advisories. I have been in some countries where, for example, we 

will leave all our communication gear dismantled with U.S. security officers and so forth. Are agents given training in security and 

foreign intelligence threats for a particular country they might go 

into? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that is part of the advance process, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. So if they thought there was an intelligence 

threat in a particular country, they would be advised of that? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Chairman LEAHY. And I began my career here during the cold 

war period. Some of the assessments we were given then are somewhat different than they are today, but then some of the assessments today because of our increased types of communication gear 

and electronic gear are different. I assume that is geared based on 

today’s real threats? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. You mean how to secure our communications equipment and the other types—— 

Chairman LEAHY. I mean what things an individual must look 

for. Is this a country that—are they going to be a threat from 

agents of another country? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The agents are informed as to what the 

intel is, what country-specific measures need to be taken. And, 

again, in this instance, Mr. Chairman, there was no impinging on 

the security of the President and no access to any secure information by the people involved. 

Chairman LEAHY. You know, like you, I have been in many occasions where the Secret Service is around. I have watched very professional men and women. I have traveled with several different 

Presidents over the course of my career and have watched the Secret Service, again, with very professional men and women there. 

So when I heard the number of the agents involved in this, I found 
8 

it particularly alarming when I got my first call at home from the 

Director and then as my staff looked into it and the bipartisan staff 

of the Committee looked into it. I found the numbers shocking. 

Do you know, is this the first time something like this has happened, or have you had reports of similar incidences in the past? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, I asked the same question, and over the past 21⁄2 years, the Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility has not received any such complaint. Over 

that same period, the Secret Service has provided protection to over 

900 foreign trips and over 13,000 domestic trips. So from that 

standpoint, there was nothing in the record to suggest that this behavior would happen, and it really was, I think, a huge disappointment to the men and women of the Secret Service to begin with 

who uphold very high standards and who feel their own reputations are now besmirched by the actions of a few. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, and to the extent that any of them are 

listening to this hearing, I would hope they will not be distracted 

from their jobs, those who are protecting Governor Romney and 

those who are protecting President Obama, and all the other 

protectees. That is going to be their first responsibility. 

But then you and the Director have the job of seeing where we 

go from here. Can you assure us that it will be made very clear 

to Secret Service agents in their training elsewhere that this kind 

of conduct will not be condoned? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is our goal, Mr. Chairman. There 

are really three things that I immediately discussed with the Director: one was to make sure the President’s security was never at 

risk; two was to make sure that we instituted a prompt and thorough investigation into the actual allegations in Colombia; and, 

three, what other steps we need to take for the future to make sure 

this behavior is not repeated. 

Chairman LEAHY. On a different matter, we are going to turn to 

the reauthorization of VAWA, the Violence Against Women Act. A 

provision in this year’s reauthorization would modestly increase 

the number of U-visas, the temporary visas available to immigrant 

victims who have cooperated with law enforcement officers in the 

prosecution of criminal offenses. Sometimes they are our best 

sources of information, including domestic violence and sexual assault cases. I have heard from law enforcement all over the country 

saying they support this. 

Does the Department of Homeland Security support this provision of this increase of U-visas for the purpose of cooperating in 

criminal cases? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. And I have told you—and I realize 

I have gone over my time, but we have the question I have raised 

with you before about the technology used for screening. I was very 

concerned about the earlier ones that the X-ray type machines 

that, in effect—my words, not yours—did a virtual strip search of 

people with very graphic images of the people going through. 

Now, those first machines, how much did DHS spend on acquiring them? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Mr. Chairman, the machines themselves are at a unit cost of approximately $175,000.00 and we can 
9 

get you the exact number, but I think the expenditure is probably 

total, with some installation and other things, about $130 million. 

Chairman LEAHY. And then the changes, I am told the changes, 

after the reaction on the original ones, the retrofits, that upgrades 

cost about $12 million? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I am not sure they cost that much 

because part of the criteria with the vendor was as the software 

changed, the hardware would be able to accept the software. But 

I will verify if it was $12 million or not. 

Chairman LEAHY. What companies were awarded contracts to 

provide this? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Rapiscan and L–3 are the two major vendors. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Graham, I apologize for taking the 

extra time. Please go ahead, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Welcome, Madam Secretary. I have really enjoyed working with your office on things unique to South Carolina 

and the country’s security issues as a whole. My experience with 

the Secret Service is very similar to what Senator Leahy said. 

Really, it is basically the time I traveled with Senator McCain during the last Presidential election, and I was very impressed by the 

people, very hard-working, a lot of time away from families and 

long hours. So anytime you have military discipline problems, you 

do not want to paint with a broad brush the 99 percent, and let 

us start with that baseline. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I concur, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. But just like in the military, Abu Ghraib and 

other situations, systems obviously fell then, and obviously there is 

a system failure here. The likelihood that this was the first and 

only time that such behavior occurred, do you think that is great 

or not so great? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I think part of our investigation is 

confirming that this was an aberration or not. But I agree with 

you, Senator. The Secret Service does a marvelous job. I have 

worked closely with them and—— 

Senator GRAHAM. The only reason I suggest that we need to 

maybe look at little harder is because we are lucky to have found 

out about this. If there had not been an argument between one of 

the agents and, I guess, a prostitute, for lack of a better word, 

about money, we would probably have never known about this. So 

the point is that I think you have got a good order and discipline 

problem. 

Do you believe the agent were confused that their conduct was 

wrong? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. They should not have been. 

Senator GRAHAM. No, I do not think it is a lack of training. I do 

not think anybody—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You know, I think the conduct was unacceptable, it was unprofessional. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. And as I said in my statement, I think 

that the people who are most disappointed are the other men and 

women of the Secret Service. 
10 

Senator GRAHAM. I could not agree more, but, you know, human 

beings being human beings, we all make mistakes, and sometimes 

organizations can get loose. Being a military lawyer for 30 years, 

one of the first things that we would advise new commanders, a 

new squadron commander, is: You have got a bunch of young people in the military for the first time away from home. Go to the 

barracks 1 day they least expect you to go. Show up at 3 in the 

morning with the first sergeant, and word will get out pretty quick 

you have got to watch what you do in the barracks because you 

never know when the commander is going to show up. 

Is there any similar program where supervisors from the home 

duty station would go out and visit people in the field on a random 

basis? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You know, I am not aware of that, which 

is not to say there is not one. I just do not know the answer. That 

is one of the reasons that we are continuing our work and want to 

continue to brief the Committee. 

Senator GRAHAM. Could I suggest that you may look at a program very similar to what the military does where people from the 

command, the central body, would show up on an unannounced 

basis throughout the world and just let people know that somebody 

back home is watching. It might do some good in the future. 

Is there any exit interviews done for people who are leaving the 

organization when you ask them, ‘‘Does anything bother you, have 

you seen anything during your time that bothers you? ’’ Because we 

do that in the military trying to find out how the unit actually 

works when people are leaving. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Right, in a civilian agency. Senator, I 

know there are exit interviews done. Whether that specific question 

is asked or something like it, again, I do not know the answer, but 

I can find the answer out for you. 

Senator GRAHAM. I would just suggest that maybe we look at 

changing the system a bit so that people who are away from home 

never really believe they are away from home, that somebody is always watching. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we are looking at this from the 

aspect of, as I said earlier: one, was the President’s security impinged; two, discipline for the agents involved; and, three, what do 

we need to do to tighten any standards that need to be tightened. 

So I take your suggestions very seriously. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, and I think this is a bipartisan—you, 

know, Mr. Sullivan, I have never met the MA, but everybody who 

knows him seems to have nothing but good things to say about 

him, and we want to get this behind us and not have the problem 

emerge again. 

Homegrown terrorism, you mentioned that in your opening statement. Would you agree that probably the idea of homegrown terrorism and attack from within is greater today than it was, say, 

maybe 5 years ago, the radicalization? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that is right. I think we have 

seen—when I say terrorism continues to evolve, that is one of the 

evolutions that we are seeing, radicalization—radicalization to the 

point of terrorist violence—and we have seen several episodes 

across the United States in the past several years. 
11 

Senator GRAHAM. Let us go to the recent tragedy in France 

where you had a young French citizen, a Muslim, who went to, I 

think, Pakistan to study at a madrassa there, came back to France 

and engaged in horrific acts of terrorism. Do you worry about that 

happening here in the United States? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. One of the things we did in the wake of 

the Merah incident in Toulouse was to analyze what happened in 

that case and were there any early signs, indicators, anything that 

would give us an early tripwire that somebody in the United States 

was getting ready to do the same thing. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I think some of these terrorist organizations are actually trying to come to our country and recruit within 

our own. Is that a fair statement? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think there is recruitment. It does not 

really require a visit. You can do it online. 

Senator GRAHAM. That is exactly right. You do not have to come 

here. But you can talk to our people through the Internet and 

through the cyber world to try to recruit them to their cause. And, 

unfortunately, there are some takers, and we need to be vigilant 

about that. 

Now, immigration is—we have got a case before the Supreme 

Court today. Each person can make their own mind up about, you 

know, South Carolina, Arizona, and the laws and what we need to 

be doing. But President Obama in his campaign in 2008 promised 

comprehensive immigration reform in his first year. Do you believe 

there was a real genuine effort to make that happen? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. As someone who spent a lot of hours visiting Members of Congress on the Hill to see if there was any room 

for negotiation of a comprehensive bill, I would say, yes, there was 

a serious effort. 

Senator GRAHAM. So it is Congress’ fault? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I think all of us have a responsibility to deal in a bipartisan way with a national problem. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, we did not deal in a bipartisan way with 

health care. Not one Republican in the Senate voted for the health 

care bill. You had 60 U.S. Senators on the Democratic side. You 

had a huge majority in the House. So I guess my point is that I 

do not believe there was much of an effort to deliver comprehensive 

immigration reform in the first year, and I do not think it is Congress’ fault. I think the President failed the country by not making 

this a priority. He had a large majority he could have worked with, 

and he chose health care over immigration. And here we are. So 

not to say that my party is blameless. We are not. But I just want 

to understand that when people talk about this issue that we remember exactly what happened-–60 Democratic Senators, a large 

majority in the House. Do you remember any bills coming out of 

the House of Representatives dealing with immigration reform? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You know, Senator, I am not familiar 

with any, and I obviously disagree with kind of how you are putting the issue, but I think we can both agree that at some point 

we are going to have to deal with comprehensive immigration reform. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much for your service. 
12 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. I would just note parenthetically, 

I sat in on the meetings with former President Bush on immigration reform. I strongly supported his efforts. I sat in on the bipartisan meetings that President Obama had with some of the same 

people who were at the President Bush ones in the follow-up, and 

I recall being told, ‘‘Do not bring it up because it is not going to 

go anywhere. ‘‘But I hope, and I still hope, at least while I am still 

in the Senate, that we will have comprehensive immigration policy. 

We need it. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Madam Secretary, I am one that thinks you are doing a very 

good job. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. In an agency that is perhaps too large. I 

think it is 22 departments and over a couple hundred thousand 

people. It is a very big job. 

I wanted to concentrate my questioning on three areas. The first 

is student visa and fraud, and earlier last year, I joined in a letter 

with Senator Schumer on this program, and I am concerned that 

ICE is not adequately certifying each educational institution. In 

May of 2011, we have a case of Tri-Valley University in 

Pleasanton, a sham school certified for 30 students, bringing 1,555 

students in, making $4 million. The head is now being prosecuted. 

To make a long story short, the United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, known around here as ICE, wrote an interesting letter on May 3, 2011, saying this: ‘‘The student SEVP does 

not have the statutory authority to close noncompliant schools immediately, nor does it have the authority to restrict DSO access to 

SEVIS.’’ And it goes on to say they have done a risk analysis of 

the 6,487 SEVP-certified schools with active records, and they had 

schools fitting into low-, medium-, or high-risk categories. 

Here is the breakdown: Low risk, 4,794, 74 percent; medium risk, 

1,276 schools, 20 percent; and then there is high risk, 417 schools, 

or 6 percent of all the schools examined. 

Now, here is what they say: ‘‘Many of the noncompliant schools 

are already the subject of criminal investigations, forestalling any 

administrative action to limit access to SEVIS to issue the Form 

I–20. Please know that SEVP can begin immediately such assessments and site reviews once cleared to do so.’’ Can’t they be cleared 

to do this early on? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me just say one other—I think we have 

to remember the 9/11 hijackers came in on student visas, went to 

schools that taught them how to fly but not to land, and nobody 

thought it was unusual. 

So I am really concerned about sham schools and that we have 

a good sense of who is coming in under a foreign student visa, 

whether they are attending the school at all. I have been at this, 

Madam Secretary, for about 12 years, and, you know, initially everybody objected to it. Then they began to do it. Now I see it easing 

up. And so I wanted to bring it to your attention. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I share that concern. These sham schools 

should not be allowed to operate. We have increased our efforts 
13 

against them. That particular letter I suspect is that we are coordinating with U.S. Attorney offices in the relevant districts, and they 

have asked us to postpone administrative action until their criminal case was ready to go. But I will follow up on that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Can you take a look at it? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And let me know. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. OK. The second thing is agriculture enforcement audits. Obviously, I have a bias. We have 81,000 farms in 

California. Virtually all of the labor is undocumented. What happens is in harvest season, canning season, ICE swoops in. We have 

got a problem. I have tried for 10 years to get an ag jobs bill 

through, and I cannot get it through. The fact of the matter is that 

if we want American produce, the labor is generally undocumented, 

and we have to find a solution to this. 

So I am hopeful—and I know that you are doing aggressive I– 

9 audits of ag employers. I am very concerned that these are going 

to decimate on-farm and farm-dependent jobs. Do you have any 

thoughts? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. I think the base of the problem is 

that there is no provision under the current immigration law that 

enables more agricultural workers to be documented. And so we 

have some employers—and we try to pick those who are really 

knowingly and intentionally violating the law when they have 

other options. We are trying to focus on them through the audit 

process. But the underlying issue goes back to the immigration law 

itself. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Senator Schumer just murmured to me that 

most do not have any other options. California is a State that cannot use the H–2A program, the visitor program. So it depends on 

a large, skilled, rotating, generally undocumented coterie of about 

600,000 workers for 81,000 farms. If ICE swoops in, farmers cannot 

plant, they cannot harvest, they cannot can. And this has been 

happening. I want to bring it to your attention. You know, it is a 

hard problem. But if this body will not take action, we are going 

to put ag out of business, and I am really concerned about it. So 

if there are any thoughts you might have, I would very much appreciate them. 

And the last point I wanted to raise with you is another longstanding issue of mine, and it is the Visa Waiver Program and biometric exit. For many years I have been trying to get data on visa 

overstays for each country, to no avail thus far. Last month, DHS 

Assistant Secretary David Heyman informed me that by June of 

this year, DHS will have a fully operational biographic exit system 

in place. It is going to provide real-time information on those who 

exit United States airports. This new exit system is expected to 

allow you to calculate overstays per country by May of this year. 

Here is the question. I think this is very important because we 

have got 15 million people that come in every year, and we do not 

know whether they leave or not on a visa waiver. Is DHS on track 

to have a fully operational biographic exit system by June of 2012? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I believe we are. The final plan 

is in the clearance process with OMB, but that is our intent. 
14 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good. Will DHS be able to provide overstay 

rates per country by May of 2012? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We should be able to provide some of 

that information, if not all. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, and what we will do now, we will 

go to Senator Grassley. Senator Kyl would have been next, but— 

no, we will go to Senator Kyl next. Senator Grassley would have 

been next, but he is yielding to Senator Kyl, which is fine with me, 

and then we will go to Senator Schumer. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator 

Grassley. 

This is not the first time that Senator Feinstein and I seem to 

have been thinking about exactly the same thing, so let me just 

quickly touch on the three things that she mentioned, which were 

also of concern to me. 

On student visas, I think it is not just a matter of the sham 

schools but also the failure of ICE to follow up with students who 

have overstayed their visas and the very poor record of schools providing information to ICE. 

Second, on the ag workers, the H–2A regs could be reformed. It 

is not just a matter of our failure to pass legislation here. H–2A 

regulations were reformed toward the end of the Bush administration. They were more workable, I am told. That was then changed 

with the Obama administration. If we could work more toward the 

kind of regs that existed toward the end of the Bush administration, I think that might be at least a help for some. 

And on the visa overstays and the exit system, I was going to ask 

about that. I think your budget actually was denied $30 million by 

the Appropriations Committee because of its frustration with the 

lack of a plan. We need to get that plan implemented as well as 

up here. 

Let me go on to—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. If I might, Senator. 

Senator KYL. Yes, sure. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Can I talk about the visa overstay issue 

with you a bit? 

Senator KYL. Sure. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. One of the things that we have done over 

the last few years is we have added data bases and been able to 

link them so that before visas are issued, there is a check against 

our data, NCTC’s data, and certain NSA data. We have done now 

the same thing. We have gone backwards to find visa overstays, 

and we have looked at and prioritized those that provide any kind 

of public safety or security risk. And we have now looked at the entire backlog, and I will give you the inventory of what we have 

found, and we are prioritizing those visa overstays within ICE. 

Senator KYL. I understand that. What is your estimate now, just 

approximately, of the number of the visa overstayers as a percentage of the total of illegal immigrants in the country today as opposed to those who have crossed the border illegally? The number 

you usually hear is around 40 percent. Is that—— 
15 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That may be a high number because 

what we have found is a lot of people who were marked as visa 

overstays had, in fact, left. 

Senator KYL. So 40 percent might be too high an estimate? That 

is the number that is usually given when we complain about the 

lack of security at the border. They say, well, remember, 40 percent 

of the people here illegally is actually overstayed visas. You think 

that number is a little high. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. It may be a little high. 

Senator KYL. All right. In either event, it is a big problem, and 

it is fine to prioritize for criminals, but that is a very small percentage of the people who have overstay visas. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, what we have done is say, look, 

we have to make the best use of those ICE resources we have and 

pick up—— 

Senator KYL. Well, that is fine, Madam Secretary. Excuse me for 

interrupting, but every year I say if you need more resources, ask 

for them. ‘‘No, we have got everything we need.’’ And then the excuse of not moving forward on something is, ‘‘We do not have 

enough resources.’’ You cannot have it both ways. If you need more 

resources, ask for them. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, thank you. As you know, we are 

all working under the constraints of the Budget Control Act. That 

is the deal that was struck. But to your point, yes, and to Senator 

Feinstein’s point, yes, we believe visa overstays are a keen interest. 

Senator KYL. So do we, and we appreciate that. 

Another very parochial but very important point, and I know you 

appreciate this. Every time I go to the border, the first thing people 

talk about is not illegal immigration. It is the incredible delays at 

the ports of entry. We need a lot of things, including more officials 

at the border on the American side. That is not the total solution 

to the problem. A lot has to do with the inadequate link-up on the 

Mexican side of the border. But at the Mariposa point of entry and 

San Luis, both of which I know you are intimately familiar with, 

we need more agents. That is what they tell us down there. And 

yet that was not in the budget request. 

I would just ask you to please either ask for the agents that we 

need there—and this is just to facilitate commerce between the two 

countries. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Senator KYL. And to make life a little bit easier for people that 

have to cross every day. Either ask for it in the budget or find some 

other place where we can get it or make a recommendation to us 

as to how we can move money around to provide for those additional agents. The estimate at Mariposa, for example, is about 250. 

It does not seem like that many. We ought to be able to find the 

money for that. Would you agree to help try to work with us on 

that? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We will definitely work with you on that, 

Senator. 

Senator KYL. I appreciate it, because I know you know the problem. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Very well. 
16 

Senator KYL. And it is not a partisan problem. We all agree we 

need to resolve it. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, and we want to facilitate that trade 

and commerce. 

Senator KYL. Absolutely. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. There are a lot of jobs depending on it. 

Senator KYL. Absolutely. Now, the last point that I wanted to 

make, 6 months ago you were written a letter, and then another 

3 months ago, about the lack of enforcement of Federal detainers, 

specifically, for example, in Cook County. Last night, at 6:30, we 

finally received a response to our letter, and it certainly is a good 

response in terms of pointing out the problem. Where I fail to see 

the response is in what you are doing about it other than writing 

letters. 

This letter, dated April 24th, from Nelson Peacock, I will ask 

unanimous consent to put in the record because, as I said, I think 

it lays out the problem from ICE’s perspective and your perspective 

very well. 

[The letter appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator KYL. Cook County is simply not abiding by Federal law 

in detaining officials who have criminal records that you have 

asked them to detain. For example, since the ordinance was enacted, ICE has, according to this letter, lodged detainers against 

more than 432 removable aliens in Cook County’s custody who 

have been charged or convicted of crime, including serious and violent offenses. Cook County has not honored any of these 432 detainers, and they point out a case of particular gravity recently reported in the Chicago Tribune. And Mr. Peacock notes that this 

probably violates Federal law. 

The only action that I can see taken here is that two letters have 

been written, and Cook County has been encouraged to change its 

policy and has been advised that if it continues this policy, it may 

result in denial of reimbursement to the State of costs under the 

SCAP program. 

You know, the Federal Government has been very aggressive in 

filing lawsuits against States that are trying to actually do something about illegal immigration, but it does not look to me like the 

Government is doing that much to enforce the law that currently 

exists with respect to detainers. What more do you plan to do with 

entities like Cook County who are obviously flouting Federal law 

and jeopardizing American security in the process. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I agree. I think Cook County’s ordinance is terribly misguided. It is a public safety issue. We are evaluating a lot of options right now. You know, we always start off 

trying to work with the local authorities and work things out. We 

to date have had no success there, so we are evaluating all options. 

Senator KYL. And I hope more than evaluating, you will take 

some action pretty soon. Will you report to us as soon as you have 

decided what kind of action to take, just kind of keep us advised 

rather than waiting for correspondence from us? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We will keep the Committee staff—I 

think that is probably the best way to do it—advised of how we are 

proceeding there. 

Senator KYL. I appreciate that very much. 
17 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Kyl. 

I would also note that today is Senator Kyl’s birthday. 

Senator SCHUMER. Oh, happy birthday. 

Chairman LEAHY. Happy birthday to you. Please do not sing. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KYL. That is one thing you and I can agree on. 

Senator SCHUMER. Last birthday as a Senator. 

Chairman LEAHY. It is his birthday, and I appreciate him being 

here. 

Senator Schumer. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish Senator Kyl 

a happy birthday. I guess it will be the last one as Senator, so your 

next birthday may be even happier than this one. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KYL. But I will miss you. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you. Mutually, seriously. Senator Feinstein and I were just mentioning that a second ago. 

First, two points of housekeeping. Good news for you. I am not 

going to ask you any questions on the Secret Service. I have a lot 

of faith in your ability to get to the bottom of this. All of us are 

shocked and terribly troubled by it, but I think the kind of investigation you and your Department will do I have a lot of faith in. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Senator SCHUMER. Second, Senator Feinstein mentioned the student visa issue, and I believe she mentioned—I came in in the middle of her testimony, unfortunately. She and I have asked for a 

GAO report, which is coming out in about a month, and our Subcommittee on Immigration with the Chairman’s permission will 

have hearings on that GAO report when it comes out. So I will let 

you know about that. 

I have two questions here on other issues in your vast jurisdiction. The first relates to passenger advocates. Over the past several 

months, there have been an increasing number of news stories 

about passenger complaints over TSA screening procedures, and 

these complaints include, for instance, a female passenger being 

told she could not carry her breast pump on board the plane while 

the milk bottles were empty, imagine how her child is that way; 

asking female passengers to submit to repeated inspections 

through body scanner machines for non-security reasons; asking elderly and disabled passengers to remove critical medical equipment 

and undergo strip searches prior to clearing security. 

I like the TSA, and I think they do a good job, and I was involved 

in setting them up. It is a hard job to balance security and commerce, but you can always make it better without one impeding the 

other. TSA’s original response at the lower levels here was to first 

deny wrongdoing and then issue apologies. So in light of these 

incidences, Senator Collins and I decided to introduce legislation 

called the Rights Act, and the Rights Act will help curb abuses in 

the TSA screening simply by requiring the TSA ombudsman office 

to establish a Passenger Advocate Program to resolve public complaints and conduct training of TSA officers to resolve frequently 

occurring passenger complaints. It would also require that every 

Category X airport—is that Category X or 10? Big airport. Let us 
18 

strike Category X. It is a funny category. What are A through V? 

We do not know. 

Anyway, every Category X airport to at least have one TSA passenger advocate on duty at all times. So if somebody is faced with 

the choice, they are lined up, they are asked for an intrusive exam, 

they think that is uncalled for. I do not expect every TSA agent to 

be schooled in each thing, but if, you know, at Kennedy Airport, a 

large airport that handles tens of thousands a week, there is someone who is trained who can just come over within 10 minutes—just 

one, no new people, no new cost, one of the existing employees who 

knows about how to do this and can resolve a sticky situation. It 

avoids the passenger the choice of undergoing an examination that 

they think is intrusive or humiliating or not going on the flight. 

So do you support the creation of passenger advocates at airports? And will you work to roll those out at airports without the 

need for an act of Congress? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Absolutely. And if I might, just to go 

through, first, as you know, TSA I think does a very good job, and 

it is a very difficult job. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You know, every morning I start my 

morning with a threat brief of what is facing us in the evolving 

world of terrorism, and aviation security still remains the No. 1 

threat. But we have taken steps to try to make it less onerous. We 

have taken those over 75, children under 12 out of the routine 

lines. The breast pump incident you mentioned was not in accord 

with how we do that, and the employee received appropriate retraining. So we keep trying to do that. 

But the idea of having cross-trained advocates among our TSA 

personnel in the Category X airports is something we support and 

TSA is already moving toward that goal. 

Senator SCHUMER. That is great news. Thank you, and it will 

avoid Senator Collins and I having to pass legislation, which is 

good. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, we are happy to keep you informed 

of—— 

Senator SCHUMER. Since legislation moves so quickly these days 

through the Senate. 

OK. Second is a parochial issue but of great importance to western New York. It is the Niagara Air Force Base, air base. I want 

to ask you about the possibility of constructing a new Border Patrol 

station at Niagara Air Base to replace the existing Niagara Falls 

Border Patrol station. As you know, the existing station is insufficient for your current needs. We all agree to that given all the new 

security. We have had terrorists cross over the Buffalo border. It 

lacks the capacity needed to accommodate the number of agents 

now housed at the station. It does not have the space and resources 

your agents need to do the job. 

A new station at Niagara Air Base can comfortably accommodate 

50 agents, could be modified to accommodate even 75. It will also 

include critical items that the Border Patrol needs, such as the 

main administration building will be suited for mustering and 

training, will include an armory and necessary storage space, ancillary buildings that will house vehicle maintenance, enclosed park-
19 

ing, and kennels. Obviously, we have the dogs at the border, too. 

This new station would be a win for the Border Patrol and the Niagara Air Force Base, whose mission is being curtailed because of 

the cutbacks in the military. 

Would you support the creation of a new Border Patrol station 

at the Niagara Air Base? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Niagara is very much under consideration, Senator. The issue is money for construction of a new facility, but certainly Niagara is under consideration. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. So, in other words, you think it is a good 

idea to have it there, and we have to find the funds for it. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is one way to put it, yes, sir. 

Senator SCHUMER. Yes. I like the ‘‘yes’’ part of that answer. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I am finished with my—I would yield back my remaining time. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, just a statement. I wanted to give you an update on some 

of the—well, first of all, I want to put a statement in the record. 

I was going to have a long statement. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley appears as a submission for the record.] 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I do not know that your microphone is on. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I am not talking into it. That is the problem. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I an surprised you want to hear me, but 

thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRASSLEY. First, an update. About 99 percent of the 

time when I write you, I do not get a response directly from you. 

The response comes Leg. Affairs. 

Second, and more frustrating, many times my questions are rarely, if ever, answered. 

Third, the delays are unacceptable, and just last night, I received 

a response from the Department about Cook County 6 months after 

my initial letter of inquiry. And, also, you just responded to questions we posed at the last Judiciary Committee oversight hearing, 

which took place last October. That is just to bring you up to date. 

That is not a question. I do not want a response to that. 

Both the Chairman and I want to get to the bottom of this Secret 

Service matter, and I know the Chairman has covered a lot of the 

issues I wanted to cover, so I am not going to go back over that, 

and I thank the Chairman for asking those questions. 

I was briefed by the Secret Service Director, and he responded 

about the Inspector General being involved, and I have asked for 

that involvement. But he said he was already involved before I 

asked for it, so I compliment Director Sullivan on that. 

Director Sullivan has included the Inspector General in the investigation up to this point, but I want to know if the Inspector 

General is truly conducting an independent and impartial investigation. I think the same independent investigation is necessary 
20 

from the Inspector General in Defense and from the White House 

to get to the bottom of the story for all the advance team staff that 

was in Colombia. 

In previous answers to questions, you mentioned that the IG is 

supervising the investigation. Do you agree that the Inspector General should conduct a full-scope investigation to determine if this 

is a cultural problem routinely occurring in additional cities instead of just reviewing what occurred in Colombia? Question No. 

1. 

Question No. 2: Do you have any reason to believe that the Inspector General is not receiving full and complete access to the Secret Service investigation? 

And, three, you referred to previous answers that, as far as you 

know, in the last 21⁄2 years this has not been a cultural issue. Why 

do you keep saying just 21⁄2 years? And don’t you think we ought 

to make sure before 21⁄2 years that it was not a problem as much 

as not being in the last 21⁄2 years? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, Senator. Let me address that. I use 

that timeframe because, you know, we are going back now through 

all of the records, and we have gone back that far, probably even 

further at this point. 

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. In terms of the IG’s involvement and supervision of the investigation, I am sure the IG would be willing 

to answer those questions. But we have an MOA, a Memorandum 

of Agreement, with the IG and the Secret Service that they are— 

in these kinds of cases where there is alleged misconduct, they actually—‘‘they’’ meaning the IG supervising the investigation, but 

they use the investigatory resources of the Secret Service. That is 

how we are managing this one, and I believe the IG has been with 

the Director during the Congressional briefings to confirm that 

point. So we expect the IG to be conducting a full investigation. 

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. On another matter dealing with 

cybersecurity, specifically one cybersecurity proposal would place at 

your Department the lead agency in overseeing regulations for covered critical infrastructure. I have concerns about this proposal because it creates a new regulatory bureaucracy. I am also concerned 

that this new regulatory power giving DHS background on overseeing the chemical facilities security, CFATS program. Congress 

gave your Department regulatory power over chemical facilities. 

Regulations were issued in 2007. Five years later, nearly 4,200 

chemical facilities have complied with the regulations, but your Department has yet to approve a single security plan, so far spending 

half a billion dollars and not getting anything approved. 

I have obtained a copy of an internal review by Under Secretary 

Rand Beers by two subordinates that details the problems DHS 

faces in implementing CFATS. This memorandum is the most candid review of a failed Federal Government program I have seen. 

This memorandum details failures at an unprecedented level, poor 

hiring, hiring people not skilled, poor staff morale, management 

leadership failures, lack of subject matter expertise, union problems, and ‘‘catastrophic failure to ensure personal and professional 

accountability.’’ 
21 

The memorandum also states that inspectors lacked expertise to 

effectively evaluate site compliance with cybersecurity requirements. On top of this memorandum, the Department has failed to 

implement ten outstanding GAO recommendations. 

So taken together, these reports paint an agency that cannot control costs, manage employees, and effectively implement the mission. If it costs DHS $480 million to effectively regulate zero chemical facilities, how much can we expect that it costs the taxpayers 

for the Department to regulate cybersecurity among thousands of 

private businesses? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, let me take those issues, both of 

them. First, the CFATS, or chemical facilities, yes, we did a candid 

internal review because we were not satisfied that we were achieving the results that we need to achieve, which is the safety and security of our chemical facilities and the possible security issues 

with them. We now have a very aggressive corrective plan in place. 

I would be happy to brief you or your staff on that. We have been 

approving site-specific plans. If they are not at final approval, they 

just about are. But that process is really moving forward with 

great alacrity. So we have learned a lot from CFATS, and we are 

fixing those problems. We have put new people in charge, done all 

the things one needs to do to make sure that a program moves forward effectively. 

With respect to cyber, this is an area where our deep concern is 

that the Nation’s core critical infrastructure on which farmers depend and small business depend and everyone depends is very susceptible to attack, and the attacks can occur in a variety of ways. 

And we are seeking some means to, A, have basic performance 

standards by that core critical infrastructure, have real-time information sharing so that we can swiftly move in to help mitigate and 

share information if need be, and we are actually asking the Congress to give us some hiring authority so it is easier for us to hire 

people who are experts in the cyber field. 

So as the Congress begins to consider and the Senate begins to 

consider this legislation, we hope they do it in the sense of what 

the risk posed is really to the country right now. 

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Next, Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and thank you, Secretary Napolitano, for being here and the good 

work that you have done. I share in Senator Feinstein’s views that 

you have done a good job with very difficult challenges. 

I also wanted to thank you for being here to answer questions 

about what happened in Colombia. In my old job as a prosecutor, 

I had very positive interactions with the Secret Service, and I am 

hopeful that the actions of a few will not overshadow all of the good 

work that they do every single day. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. But I do want to ask some questions about 

that because I think it really shook the trust of a lot of people, and 

I think the way you make sure that the actions of a few do not 

overshadow the actions of many, the good actions and how they 

sacrifice their lives every day and put them on the line, is by making sure that we clear up what happened, but also make sure that 
22 

it does not happen again, and that we have a clear understanding 

of what is going on. 

I know one of the Senators asked about this, but there was a 

Washington Post report recently that talked about the fact that 

this may have been going on before. In fact, one of the—the person 

is not identified, but one agent that was not implicated in the matter remarked that, ‘‘Of course it has happened before. This is not 

the first time. It really only blew up in this case because the U.S. 

embassy was alerted.’’ And I just wondered if you could comment 

on that, how you think we need to move forward, and how—to me, 

this does seem to create a risk when you are in a country like Colombia and you have people doing things where they could potentially be bribed. If you could just generally comment about that. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Right. Well, again, the actions were unacceptable, and they were unacceptable taken by themselves. I 

think every mother of a teenager knows that a common defense is, 

‘‘Well, everybody else was doing it, you know, so I get to do it. 

‘‘First, not everybody else was doing it. And, second, this behavior 

is not part of the Secret Service way of doing business. They are 

very professional. 

But we are going to get to the bottom of this. We are going to 

make sure that standards and training, if they need to be tightened 

up, are tightened. And we have moved with great speed to deal in 

a disciplinary fashion with the 12 agents involved. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I do not expect you to reveal things that are 

not public, but have there been other incidences where people have 

tried to bribe or blackmail agents because they believed or they 

had some kind of interaction with prostitutes or someone with 

some kind of illegal activity? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I am not aware of any. As I said 

before, the Office of Professional Responsibility in the Secret Service went back 21⁄2 years. That covers 900 foreign trips and 13,000 

domestic trips and did not have in that period any kind of a complaint. That does not, obviously, include the IG. That is an independent entity. But we are looking to see and make sure this was 

not some kind of systemic problem and, most importantly, to fix it. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And there was one agent that was in the 

President’s hotel. Is that correct? That was also—that was just 

identified? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I believe that is correct. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. Another question on a completely different incident, and I think every employer has had incidences of 

people posting things on the Internet and pictures of them, like 

maybe in their boss’ chair drinking a beer. That happened to me 

5 years ago with an intern. It was innocent, but—I think he never 

thought we would see it. But these are things that happen. But 

when they happen with law enforcement, it seems a step above and 

I think much more of a security risk. 

I know that recently one of the Secret Service agents has reportedly posted photos on Facebook depicting himself on duty protecting—I think it was then Vice Presidential candidate Sarah 

Palin. Could you talk about the Secret Service rules regarding 

agents sharing details of their assignments, online or otherwise? 
23 

And does the Secret Service have policies regarding agents’ use of 

Facebook and other social media websites? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, we do have a social media policy, 

and we would be happy to provide you with a copy of that. And, 

yes, to the extent there was such a posting, unprofessional and unacceptable. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. Very good. 

I wanted to ask you a little bit about, you know, we are working 

very hard on cybersecurity initiatives here going forward, and can 

you talk about how Homeland Security is currently working with 

State and local law enforcement to prevent and mitigate cyber 

threats and discuss the Stop, Think, Connect campaign and your 

efforts to educate the public on the role that they have to play in 

this important fight? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Right. We are trying, just as we have the 

See Something, Say Something campaign, Stop, Think, Connect is 

one of our efforts to educate the public about everyone’s shared responsibility who is on the Internet. Everyone has a responsibility 

to have good cyber habits. Just like when you get in a car, you 

should buckle your seat belt, it should be reflexive above anything 

else. So we continue to push on that. 

With respect to our coordination with State and local governments, we do that quite a bit, Senator. We have the NCIC out of 

Northern Virginia. We actually have representatives on the floor. 

That is our 24/7 watch center where cyber is concerned. So we are 

working with them very extensively on that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. And now turning to our borders, 

I am Chair, as you know, of the U.S.-Canadian Interparliamentarian Group. They are actually coming to Washington next month, 

and I know you have been working on some cross-border crime 

issues. But I did want to thank you for an issue that I have been 

raising for a few years, and that is the issue of the Canadian baggage screening, which has finally been resolved as part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan. So thank you for working on that. 

And then I wanted to ask—I know Senator Schumer asked some 

things about the TSA. Again, I understand that there are always 

incidences that need to be resolved and new things come up. But 

overall I think they also, like yourself, have a very challenging job, 

and I have been proud of the work that they do, at least in the 

Minneapolis airport where I work with them. You just brought in 

the PreCheck Pilot Program in our State. Do you know how that 

has been going? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The PreCheck Pilot Programs are very 

popular. This is the domestic branch of the kind of Trusted Traveler programs that we began with the Global Entry Program internationally. So we are expanding that PreCheck Program as rapidly 

as we can. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. And then, last, the JOLT Act, 

I would just call your attention to that. This is bipartisan legislation that we have introduced with Senators Schumer, Rubio, Blunt, 

Mikulski, Kirk, and Lee, and I think it is very important to move 

ahead with that. We have appreciated some of the work you have 

done on tourism, and as you know, we are working with the State 

Department to improve the visa wait times. But there are also 
24 

other things that we can do that are contained in this Act, so we 

would love to have your help and support with that bill. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would be happy to take a look at it. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. Madam Secretary, good morning. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Good morning. 

Senator CORNYN. Good to see you. We can all stipulate you have 

an extraordinarily challenging job. I want to ask you a question 

about DNA testing of detainees, and I know you are a former Federal prosecutor and Attorney General, so you know how powerful 

a tool DNA can be in a law enforcement investigation. 

As a matter of fact, to digress a moment, we are going to have 

an important Violence Against Women reauthorization on the bill 

probably this afternoon or tomorrow, and I am offering a bipartisan 

amendment that will address the 400,000 estimated untested rape 

kits that currently are sitting in police lockers and elsewhere, 

which, as we all know, is a powerful tool to help identify what in 

many instances are serial perpetrators of sexual assault. But let 

me bring you back to 2005. Senator Kyl and I sponsored the DNA 

Fingerprint Act during the last reauthorization of the Violence 

Against Women Act. This legislation gave Federal law enforcement 

authority to collect small DNA samples from all Federal arrestees 

and detainees, just like we take fingerprints but, as you know more 

accurate. 

These DNA samples, again as you know, can be checked against 

the FBI’s nationwide DNA data base, CODIS, to determine whether the arrestee or detainee has committed other crimes perhaps in 

other jurisdictions. So far, CODIS, we are told, has assisted law enforcement officials with more than 169,000 investigations, including 10,000 in my State of Texas. So we have seen it to be a powerful tool. 

At your 2009 confirmation hearing, I asked if you would see to 

it that the alien deportee DNA testing regulations were fully and 

promptly implemented by the Department, and you replied, appropriately, that DHS will fully comply with the applicable statutory 

and regulatory framework. 

Nearly 3 years after the hearing, how do you feel like that is 

going? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I think, Senator, we have deported 

a record number of individuals, as you know. I will be happy to go 

back and look at all the regulations governing that to make sure 

we are in compliance. But we have had a very aggressive plan to 

deport those who should be removed from the country. 

Senator CORNYN. And my question is a little more narrow because what we want to do is identify whether these detainees have 

perhaps committed other crimes and aid those law enforcement 

agencies in the course of those other investigations, not just enforce 

the immigration laws, which is important but is not the complete 

rationale. 

Would you be willing to on a voluntary basis submit to the Committee sort of the Department’s evaluation of how it has complied 
25 

and handled this requirement of 2005 into the DNA Fingerprint 

Act? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would be happy to supply that. 

Senator CORNYN. That would be very helpful. 

[The information referred to appears as a submission for the 

record.] 

Senator CORNYN. Let me tell you the reason for my concern. Of 

course, we know the FBI has used a great deal of taxpayer money 

and crime lab resources to prepare for hundreds of thousands of 

DNA samples as a result of the passage of this Act in 2005. We 

are told that the FBI is prepared for and expected to receive between 120,000 and 240,000 samples from the Department of Homeland Security in the year 2012. To date, they report only having 

received 4,000 samples. So I hope you will help us—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, let us get to the bottom of that. 

Senator CORNYN.—identify what the disparity is between the 

number of samples and the number anticipated by the FBI as a result of this, because while I am aware that, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq, when our military captures high-value detainees, 

they do get biometric identifiers from them that could be used, can 

be used by law enforcement agencies and the Department in the 

United States when identifying people coming across, let us say, 

the southwestern border without the appropriate visas to make 

sure that they are not coming in to commit acts of terrorism and 

other violence. It—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, if I might, that is a somewhat 

different question. 

Senator CORNYN. It strikes me that this DNA evidence—and I 

will be glad to let you answer. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Sure. 

Senator CORNYN. That this DNA information would be vitally important and enormously useful not only in assisting your Department in terms of border security and immigration enforcement, but 

also to help law enforcement, writ large, in terms of identifying 

people who come into the country and commit crimes that currently 

are unsolved. Please go ahead. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Senator, and I did not mean 

to interrupt. But we do run illegal immigrants against a variety of 

data bases, and I think I should supply you with that information. 

And then I will look specifically into the issue of DNA with the 

FBI. 

Senator CORNYN. To my knowledge—and I will look forward to 

your report—that is more in the nature of fingerprint and other biometric identifiers and does not extend—did not extend to DNA 

testing of detainees until Congress passed the DNA fingerprint law 

in 2005. So you understand, I know, the issue, and I would very 

much welcome your response to me and the Committee so we can 

help get to the bottom of that. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Good. 

[The information referred to appears as a submission for the 

record.] 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my remaining 

time. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator. 
26 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Just one question on the Secret Service 

episode. What opportunities did this behavior create for compromise of the President’s security, for instance, had the prostitutes had connections with Colombian criminal networks or foreign intelligence services? I am not saying that it did, but it seems 

like it is the kind of behavior that would render an agent vulnerable to blackmail and influence if criminal networks and foreign intelligence services were aware of it and that is a potential avenue 

for compromise of the President’s security. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we are still completing the entire investigation, and there are still interviews to be conducted. 

But I think we have planned to keep the Committee briefed on 

what we find and whether there could on a future basis be that 

kind of risk. But as I testified earlier, the first question I posed to 

the Director was: Was there any breach to the President’s security 

in this instance? And the answer was no. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But there was a risk of breach along those 

lines if those connections existed, correct? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. There may be a risk, and that is why this 

behavior cannot be tolerated. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. Let me switch to cyber, and let me 

thank you for your energetic work and persistence on this issue as 

we in Congress try to pass the legislation that we need. 

There are a variety of different approaches that are being looked 

at here. Let me ask you this: If we were to pass a bill that failed 

to protect American critical infrastructure in private hands, like 

our electric grid, our financial processing systems, our communications networks, and so forth; and, indeed, if that bill even failed to 

define critical infrastructure or provide a process for defining critical infrastructure so we actually knew what it was and what it 

was not, how well would that bill have met the threat that you see 

us facing in this realm? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, it would leave a significant gap 

given the kinds of attacks we already see. That is why we think 

the Nation’s core critical infrastructure should have some basic performance standards to meet. That is why we think a bill needs to 

have real-time information sharing in it and incentivize that information sharing. And so those are the kinds of things that really 

should go into a comprehensive cyber bill. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And would you be able to say that the national security needs of the United States had been met by a bill 

that did not include any protection for our critical infrastructure? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I would say based on what we 

know now and the risks that we already see now and the kinds of 

attacks that we already see now, the failure to address core critical 

infrastructure would be a significant gap in any legislation. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you. 

My last question on this same subject, but switching from the national security and public safety side of cyber attack to the intellectual property and economic competitiveness side of our cyber vul-
27 

nerability, I said about 2 years ago that I thought we were on the 

losing end of the biggest transfer of wealth in the history of humankind through theft and piracy because of the attacks on our industrial base and our technological base from overseas for the purpose of industrial espionage and stealing intellectual property. 

Since then, General Alexander has used virtually the same language. McAfee has issued a report that uses virtually the same language. Mike McConnell has used virtually the same language. This 

is a very big deal for us from the point of view of economic competitiveness, and you have been an Attorney General—in fact, we were 

Attorneys General together. You have been a U.S. Attorney. In 

fact, we were U.S. Attorneys together. You have had a lot of experience with law enforcement, also as Governor and in your role as 

Secretary of Homeland Security. 

I do not yet believe that we are resourced adequately in law enforcement to address that aspect of our cyber liability. And I hear 

from companies in all sorts of industries that when they can get, 

for instance, the FBI’s attention, they are very impressed with the 

capabilities that are involved. But it is very rare that you can turn 

over a case of intellectual property theft to the FBI and say go. 

They simply do not have the staff. They simply do not have the resources, as much as this part of law enforcement has grown both 

in U.S. Attorney’s Offices and at the FBI. 

So I would like to ask that you participate in discussions that we 

are going to be having around the cybersecurity legislation about 

how we should better organize our cyber resources. It is both criminal and civil because a lot of what gets done is done through civil 

law. The Coreflood botnet was taken down by a civil case. A lot of 

the cleanup on the Net of crooked websites can be done through 

civil proceedings. But it is a law enforcement function because you 

are getting rid of very bad actors on the Net who are attacking 

American businesses and the American economy. 

So that was a little bit more of a speech than a question, but 

what I would like to do is to invite you to, based on your experience, participate in that discussion. I do not know if we need the 

equivalent of a cyber DEA or ATF, an entire organization, or if we 

need the equivalent of a cyber OCDETF, a different way of organizing law enforcement activity, or whether we need the cyber 

equivalent of an Organized Crime Strike Force. Those were set up 

many, many years ago, and there are a variety of different structures, but I do not think the private sector is getting the support 

it needs from law enforcement because of lack of resources, and 

there is an awful lot of money going out the door. We are standing 

by one of the biggest robberies in history, and I would love to have 

your support in pursuing that concern. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, first of all, I agree with your 

statement of the scope of the problem. It is severe, it is endemic, 

and it is a transfer of wealth, as you put it. We work with the FBI, 

Secret Service and ICE all have cybersecurity and do criminal 

cases in that area as well as some others. So I would be happy to 

participate as we—I think in the context of comprehensively looking at the protection of the country in cyber, how we organize our 

law enforcement resources and make sure particularly the FBI has 
28 

what it needs to handle some of this work is a good question, and 

I would be happy to participate. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I appreciate it. 

Chairman, thank you very much. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, as you have noticed, we have had Senators on 

both sides of the aisle that have come in and have left during this 

hearing because most of us have about three different Committee 

meetings going on. You do not get that luxury, and I do want to 

applaud you, one, for keeping your answers as brief and to the 

point and, I might say, as accurate as you have, which is typical 

of your appearance, and I appreciate that. 

I am going to have to leave. I would just note that Senator Lee 

will go next. I am going to turn the gavel over to Senator Coons. 

I am doing this so that we are trying to keep similar hairlines—— 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Sorry about that. But Senator Coons has 

worked very, very hard on this subject, and I have asked him to 

take over as Chair. We will go to Senator Lee next, but I do appreciate what you said. 

I would add—and I think I can speak for Senator Grassley and 

others here—we would want to keep in touch with you and the Director of the Secret Service as this whole matter goes on, not just 

on what has happened now, but what is happening in the future 

and what will happen in the future. We will do it because of our 

obvious oversight interests and the need to do it, the protection of 

key people, in this case in a Presidential election year, both the 

President and the Republican nominee, but also because we have 

so many good men and women in the Secret Service that I hope 

we will be able to demonstrate that if there are a few bad apples, 

they are weeded out so that the others who are extraordinarily 

dedicated, highly trained professionals can continue on the work 

they do. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Lee, thank you for that. Please go 

ahead, sir. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Secretary Napolitano, for joining us. 

In March of this year, John Cohen, who I believe is your Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, testified before a 

House Subcommittee that the Department should have a biometric 

exit system designed and ready to go—at least ready to roll out, 

and announced and described some time within the next few 

weeks, in the coming weeks. In your written testimony today, I believe you said that a biometric exit system should be ready for deployment and use within 4 years. How confident are you about that 

timeframe? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. What we are planning—and, Senator, the 

actual plan is in final clearance with OMB so it should be out 

shortly. But given our ability now to do enhanced biographic exit, 

immediately moving and deploying that, and then we will move 

and use that as the platform for adding on the biometric. But the 

plan is done from our standpoint. We are just working through the 

final nuts and bolts with OMB. 
29 

Senator LEE. And why does it take so long to get it deployed? Is 

it just the development of a technology? In other words, the fact 

that it takes 4 years to get it going, is that—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, it is cost, it is the scope of the 

issue. We have so many ways that people can exit the United 

States. We are very different from other countries in that regard. 

And manpower and other resources, yes. 

Senator LEE. What kind of an impact do you think this will have 

on visa overstays once you get it deployed? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think it will help us, although we have 

already used our enhanced biographic to go backwards to identify 

overstays and to prioritize those that we want ICE to really focus 

on finding and removing. 

Senator LEE. Can you give us any sort of brief specifics, a brief 

thumbnail sketch on how the system will work? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would prefer to do that in a classified 

setting, Senator, and we would be able to do that, yes. 

Senator LEE. Understood. Understood. 

Now, on a different topic, last year John Morton, the Director of 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, issued a couple of 

memoranda that between them set out certain priorities that would 

govern the use of—the exercise of prosecutorial discretion within 

ICE. And within that memorandum, there were a number of considerations outlined which ended up mirroring to a very significant 

degree the same factors that were outlined in the DREAM Act, the 

same version of the DREAM Act that the Senate refused to pass 

a couple years ago. It came up for a vote and did not get the necessary number of votes to pass. 

Among those factors that the agents were instructed to consider 

in exercising prosecutorial discretion included the alien’s length of 

presence in the United States, which mirrored the factor in Section 

3(b)(1)(A) of the DREAM Act; the circumstances of the alien’s arrival in the United States, particularly if it happened at a time 

when the alien was a young child, which mirrors what can be 

found in 3(b)(1)(B) of the DREAM Act; the alien’s criminal history, 

mirroring the factor in 3(b)(1)(D) of the DREAM Act; the alien’s 

pursuit of education in the United States with particular consideration given to those who have graduated from a U.S. high school 

or who have successfully pursued or are pursuing college or advanced degrees at a legitimate institution of higher education in 

the United States, and that, of course, mirrors Section 3(b)(1)(E) of 

the DREAM Act; the alien’s age with particular consideration given 

for minors, mirroring Section 3(b)(1)(F) of the DREAM Act; and 

whether the alien has served in the military of the United States, 

mirroring Section 5(a)(1)(D)(ii) of the DREAM Act. 

So given these prosecutorial discretion standards which match up 

somewhat closely to the same factors put forth in the DREAM Act, 

and given the fact that the DREAM Act was not passed into law, 

what assurances can you give us or what assurances can I give to 

my constituents when they approach me and suggest that perhaps 

there might be an effort under way to back-door these same factors 

in through regulatory channels that could not be passed through 

Congress? 
30 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, first let me begin by saying, 

having worked in this field for decades now, we strongly need overall reform, and we strongly support the DREAM Act as a legislative enactment. You are right it failed by four or five votes to get 

cloture here. It was passed by the House. 

That being said, what we have the capacity or only jurisdiction 

to do is to administratively close a case. That does not give the person involved any kind of a green card or anything of that sort. It 

simply means their case is effectively suspended and they can remain in the United States. That is very different from the DREAM 

Act, which would allow an actual pathway to citizenship, and, you 

know, one of the things I think we should be doing is really focusing our enforcement resources on those who are real risks to the 

public safety of the United States. And those who meet the standards of the DREAM Act, if they really meet those standards, are 

not. 

Senator LEE. OK. So the overlap between them is coincidental, 

and your response to that is essentially that these are two different 

layers of analysis. One in the DREAM Act would be focusing on a 

pathway toward citizenship. This is focused on how to allocate 

scarce prosecutorial and law enforcement resources. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that is an accurate statement. 

Senator LEE. OK. And you are not concerned or convinced that 

these could spill over into something larger? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We are in the process of looking at all of 

the cases on the immigration docket to see which, if any, should 

be administratively closed, and those that meet the criteria you 

just named are those that we would consider for administrative closure. 

Senator LEE. OK. Finally, is there any chance that in my lifetime 

we will see a time when passengers before boarding a plane do not 

have to remove their shoes going through TSA? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Senator, we have already—you 

know, we are looking at everything from what is the threat and 

what is the risk, and we have already made changes for passengers 

over the age of 75 and children under the age of 12 where, except 

for on a random basis—and we always have to have some unpredictability in the system—they can be expedited through the lines 

without their shoes being taken off. 

From a technology standpoint, the technology still does not exist 

that allows us to easily identify non-metallic matter in shoes or in 

liquids, which is why we are doing some of the things we are doing. 

And it is all based on the intelligence we have about the terrorist 

threats we face. 

Senator LEE. I see my time has expired. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Senator COONS [presiding.] Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, this week the House of Representatives is considering several cybersecurity proposals, but this morning I want 

to talk with you about the cybersecurity proposals that are here in 

the Senate, because while there has been a lot of talk about privacy 
31 

and civil liberties implications of the House proposals, and rightly 

so, fewer people are talking about the two bills here in the Senate. 

The fact is that, as they are currently drafted, both of the 

cybersecurity proposals here in the Senate present very serious 

threats to our privacy and civil liberties. Both bills allow companies 

the near unfettered ability to monitor the e-mails and files of their 

customers. Both bills may allow companies to share that information directly with the military. Both bills generally allow the Federal Government to freely share that information with law enforcement. And both bills immunize companies against grossly negligent 

and knowing violations of the few privacy protections that apply to 

this process. 

In doing all of this, both of these bills sweep aside decades of privacy laws, many of which this Committee wrote, in many cases 

with Chairman Leahy at the helm. I am talking about the Wiretap 

Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the pen register statute. 

Now, I have been working together with Senator Durbin and 

with the sponsors of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, and they have 

been working with us in good faith, and I sincerely hope that we 

can fix these problems before the bill even gets to the floor. But I 

think it is really important that everyone knows that we have real 

civil liberties problems not just in the House but also here in the 

Senate bills. 

I am saying all of this to you, Madam Secretary, because the administration’s cybersecurity proposal from last May does not have 

many of these problems. It is in several ways more protective of 

our privacy than either proposal here in the Senate, and I want to 

use the remaining time I have here to tease out those differences 

and, frankly, just make the case that we should pay attention to 

what the administration did in its proposal. 

First of all, Madam Secretary, as I mentioned, both the 

Cybersecurity Act and the Secure IT Act would allow the military 

to be the initial recipient of any information being shared by a private company, but it is my understanding that it is the official position of this administration that a civilian entity, not a military 

entity, should always be in the initial recipient of cybersecurity 

data from the private sector. 

Can you explain why this is the administration’s position? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, the administration’s position mirrors how we have actually organized ourselves in the absence of 

cyber legislation, and the way we have organized ourselves is that 

DOD has responsibility for military networks, but DHS has responsibility for civilian and for the intersection with the private sector. 

We both use the technology resources of the NSA, but we use them 

under different authorities and with more restrictions, particularly 

on the privacy side, than you would in an international military 

sort of context. So the position that we have is to make sure that 

the statute mirrors what actually is happening on the ground. 

Senator FRANKEN. Well, thank you. 

Second, Madam Secretary, both of the bills in the Senate give 

private companies a new authority to freely monitor the communications and files on their systems, many of which would be private. These bills create this new sweeping authority despite exist-
32 

ing provisions in the Wiretap Act that allow companies to perform 

monitoring to protect their systems. 

The administration’s proposal does not contain that broad new 

authority. Can you tell us why it does not? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. What we are looking for and part of the 

protection of critical infrastructure, we are looking for the code, we 

are looking for the fact of the attack, the methodology used, the 

code or signatures that were employed, so that we can then check 

and see whether that is being done elsewhere and also mitigate 

and also communicate with other companies about this type of attack. So we are not looking at content. We are looking at the how. 

Senator FRANKEN. Great. Thank you. 

Why does the administration—let me back up. Third, the administration’s proposal only allows the Federal Cybersecurity Center to 

share the information it receives from private companies with law 

enforcement authorities if the information constitutes actual evidence of a crime, which I think is good. 

In comparison, one of the Senate bills allows the disclosure of information received by the Federal Government to law enforcement 

if it ‘‘appears to relate to a crime.’’ Why does the administration 

have a heightened standard for disclosures to law enforcement? 

Was this done to protect civil liberties? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I do not know the reason for the 

difference in the language between those two things. I think what 

both are getting at is use of information for a non-law enforcement 

purpose would not be immunized or would not be permitted. But 

I would have to follow up with you on why the difference between 

the two phrases. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Thank you. Let us do that. 

I want to thank you, Madam Secretary. Before I finish, I do want 

to say that I agree with my colleagues who say that we need to do 

something about cybersecurity. There is no question about that. I 

just think we need to get the legislation right such that the bill 

does not unnecessarily sacrifice civil liberties, and I thank you so 

much for your service and for being here and for your answers. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Franken. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your meteoric rise 

to the chairmanship exceeds even Senator Franken’s. 

Senator FRANKEN. Mine was, actually, if you remember, more 

meteoric. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. But that is neither here nor there for the purposes of this hearing. We have the Secretary, and I do not think 

we should squabble over that. 

Senator SESSIONS. We are glad to have both of you fine Senators 

here. 

Madam Secretary, Homeland Security is a big operation. I guess 

it is the third largest personnel operation, or second, in our Government. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think it is the third largest, yes, sir. 
33 

Senator SESSIONS. Third? Over 200,000 people. It is cobbled together, and I have got to say I was uneasy about that bill. As I recall, the Democrats said we should consolidate, and President Bush 

said no, and then he finally said yes and did it, and we passed it 

without a whole lot of consideration, in my view. So you have a lot 

of agencies.You have got the Coast Guard, Secret Service, TSA, all 

sorts of agencies with different histories and cultures. So I know 

the challenge is hard. I just truly believe you have not—I do not 

think that it is completely together yet. Do you agree that there is 

still cultural and bureaucratic efficiencies that could be obtained if 

focused on today? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we continue to—we operate 

under the caption ‘‘One DHS,’’ and we continue to excavate differences in systems, in cultures, in protocols and procedures. There 

has been a lot accomplished over the past 9 years by my two predecessors and over the past 3-plus years now that I have been Secretary. But given the size and scope of the merger that is underway, it does take time. The Department of Defense took by most 

accounts 40 years to really become unified as a Department. My 

goal is to substantially beat that record. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think so. I just would say every dollar 

the taxpayers send us, they need and have a right to expect is 

wisely spent. And when we have got duplication, mismanagement, 

and competition unwisely within departments and agencies, it just 

needs to be confronted, and strong leadership. I will just throw that 

out. I would suggest that you focus on that. 

Senator Kyl I believe raised the question of Chicago and their refusal to honor detainers placed on prisoners, which I find, Cook 

County’s policy at least, is unacceptable. You have written letters 

about it. I hope that you will follow through on it. They are, I believe, on track to obtain their Secure Communities money and program through 2013. But Alabama, who has been sued by the administration for trying to have laws that help America enforce its 

immigration laws, not block the enforcement of immigration laws, 

has had its Secure Communities money stopped or not continued 

for counties that have asked for it. 

Can you tell us where you stand on that? And when can Alabama expect that they would be able to have their Secure Communities funding? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, as I shared with Senator Kyl, I believe the Cook County ordinance is unwise, it is overbroad. We are 

evaluating all options there. We have been trying to work with the 

county to see if there is a resolution. 

With respect to Alabama, given the litigation and what was enjoined and not enjoined, what we did was simply to stop the expansion of Secure Communities to the final—I think we cover now 75 

percent of the foreign-born population, so it is the final quarter. 

But our plan, Senator, is to complete implementation of Secure 

Communities nationwide by the end of 2013. 

Senator SESSIONS. And that would include Alabama? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That would include Alabama. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is a problem for me, and maybe I 

will file some written questions to make sure we are clear about 

where that is heading. I am uneasy about it. It seems to me that 
34 

the State was targeted because their law was not popular with the 

Department, with the President; whereas, you have not taken to 

date any firm action against Cook County, which clearly endangers, I think, the people of Cook County and the country. 

But with regard to the visa exit program, this is a plan that was 

designed and required by law in 1996. I have observed it and have 

seen it since I have been in the Senate and the difficulties that 

have occurred. We have the Visa Waiver Program up and working, 

the entry program up and working. I do not believe it is that difficult to implement an exit program. I said that when the Bush administration was in office, and I will say it again. I think reports 

from the Government Accountability Office, GAO, validate that, 

and I hope that we can make some progress on it. 

First, you indicated earlier that you have a biographic plan that 

has some capabilities. But is it not true that biometric—fingerprint, DNA, or some other such system, fingerprint clearly being 

the most logical from my perspective—that a fingerprint or other 

biometric exit system is what is needed to have this system up and 

working? Otherwise, somebody could walk out without a card that 

has their name on it and their biographical data, but there would 

be no way to verify the person holding that card is the person actually exiting? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, let me offer to have our staff 

come and brief you personally. It is enhanced biographic. It is not 

simply a card. But I will make sure that you get briefed on that. 

With the biometric, the issue is going to be whether the Congress 

wants to appropriate the money for whatever margin is left after 

the enhanced biographic. Our plan, our plan to use enhanced biographic as a platform for that, is in final clearance, and we will 

share that with you as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I had a long—a year or more—intense 

discussion on this subject with Secretary Ridge, and they met with 

international stakeholders, and it went on months and months and 

months. And I insisted that the only system that really works 

based on your experience as a Federal and State prosecutor, as I 

have had that same experience, it is the fingerprints that are in 

every police officer’s file. It is the fingerprint that is taken when 

a person is arrested somewhere in the United States and becomes 

a fugitive. And the fingerprint is the basic basis for identifying fugitives. 

So when he left, after refusing to commit, he left one bit of advice. He said we should have a biographic system that should be— 

the biometric system should be the fingerprint, to his successors. 

And I do believe that that is the system that works. 

Is there any plan not to have that? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. What we are planning is to go in 

phases. The first phase is the enhanced biographic, which we are 

a long way toward implementing right now, and then use that as 

a platform for the biometric. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I would just say that in my view it 

should have been the biometric all along. You should have been 

working on that, and we would have had that done a lot sooner 

than 4 years. Otherwise, when you indicate you are not going to 

look for people who have overstayed, then you basically are saying 
35 

we do not intend to take any effort to enforce really an entry-exit 

system in the United States. And that allows the countries that are 

approved for visa waiver, I think, to have an unfair, unlimited 

entry to the United States. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we have gone back and looked 

at visa overstays, and we have racked and stacked them according 

to biographic information we have about the overstays, turning 

that information over to ICE to prioritize its enforcement operations. And that work is already underway. 

The problem or the logistical—the reason why there is no biometric system at exit, quite frankly, is it is not easy. The lanes and 

the ports have never—they have always been designed for entry. 

The architecture has never really been designed for exit. So that 

is an issue. And then cost and manpower are issues. 

Senator SESSIONS. Maybe a briefing from your staff would be 

helpful to me. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We would be happy to provide that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am over my time. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Blumenthal, I will defer to you. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Secretary, 

for your service and for your very steadfast and effective work on 

behalf of our national security and your words earlier on behalf of 

the Secret Service. I think all of us share your view that they do, 

to use your word, a ‘‘marvelous’’ job of protecting the President and 

many other law enforcement functions. 

I want to follow up on a line of questioning that Senator Graham 

began in terms of looking forward, the kinds of systems, maybe 

analogizing the Secret Service to the military, that are used in that 

context. And I wonder if you have given any thought to additional 

steps that can be taken to safeguard against but also monitor the 

kinds of abuses that obviously occurred—or allegedly occurred here. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We are intent, Senator, on doing a thorough examination of how we do it now and what we need to do to 

improve, to make sure this never happens again. So all those kinds 

of options are on the table. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Switching to a different subject, I was recently approached by a 

couple, a same-sex couple who are married under Connecticut law. 

One of them is a citizen of the United States; the other is not. And 

I wrote to you, and I want to thank you for your assistance in connection with their application for a green card to be held in abeyance. You are probably familiar with the problems that arise under 

these circumstances. But, eventually, we need a solution like the 

Uniting Families in America Act that can provide some longer-term 

solution to this problem. 

But I wonder whether we can establish a policy of not deporting 

or, in other words, holding green cards for same-sex couples, one 

of whom is here, the other seeking a green card. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, the legal advice we have been 

given is that unless and until the law is overturned by the court— 

and I am talking as to DOMA—which the Department of Justice 

has urged be done, but until that happens, we cannot unilaterally 

give green cards based on that. What we have done, however, is 
36 

when we have same-sex couples, if they fall within the other criteria of our priority memo, our prosecutorial discretion memo, that 

allows us to intercede with removal and some of the other actions. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am a strong supporter, as are other 

members of this Committee, of repealing DOMA, the respect for 

marriage act, which would provide a comprehensive solution. I 

have been approached by other similar couples who have enormous 

contributions to make to this country and whose families are every 

bit deserving of the kind of recognition that we accord to heterosexual couples. And so I hope that I can work with you on this area 

of trying to devise solutions in the meantime that will enable those 

couples to continue to be families here, as we need and they deserve. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Durbin, I will defer to you. 

Senator DURBIN. Madam Secretary, thank you. I have been trying to juggle schedules, and you have been very patient waiting 

here. Thank you for your service. I would like to ask you a few 

questions about the DREAM Act, which you and I have talked 

about from time to time. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Senator DURBIN. Yesterday Senator Schumer and I held a hearing on Senate bill 1070, the controversial Arizona law, and I talked 

about seven Arizona residents who would qualify for the DREAM 

Act, but also would be the targets of the Arizona law. It is beyond 

reasonable suspicion that they are undocumented. They have stated it publicly. All of them are either attending college or are graduates of Arizona State University with degrees in engineering as 

an example. 

You were asked by a bipartisan group of Senators to suspend deportations of DREAM Act students, and in response, you and the 

President have established a new deportation policy. And under 

this policy, as I understand it, it is a high priority to deport those 

who have committed serious crimes or are a threat to the public 

while it is a low priority to deport individuals who have been in 

the United States since childhood, like those who are eligible for 

the DREAM Act. 

Last night, we received updated statistics I requested on the review of deportations that DHS is conducting under your policy. 

There are currently more than 300,000 pending deportation cases. 

Of these, ICE has reviewed 219,554. Approximately 16,544 cases— 

7.5 percent—have been identified as eligible for administrative closure. Of these cases, 2,722, or 1.2 percent, have actually been 

closed. 

Please explain the difference between the 7.5 percent of deportation cases eligible to be closed and the 1.2 percent of cases actually 

closed. When do you expect the percentage of cases being closed to 

rise—or do you expect it to rise as the review progresses? And 

when do you expect the review to be complete? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Right, I think the difference is primarily 

attributable to time. You know, we have been doing this case-by- 
37 

case review. We just started the pilots right after Christmas, and 

we have moved now to go across the country since then. So that 

is part of it. And part of it is that, as we offer administrative closure, oftentimes the recipient of the offer will ask for time to think 

about it. 

So I think that will catch up, and I think we will be closed with 

the case review by the end of the calendar year, and then we will 

see what the numbers show. 

Senator DURBIN. You and I had another conversation about work 

authorization, and this to me is a very basic issue which would 

should discuss in this hearing. Historically, by interpretation of the 

Department and under the previous President, George W. Bush, in 

cases where there was deferred action, these individuals were allowed to work, given a work authorization. Now under the new policy, these individuals are offered administrative closure, and your 

Department has taken the position that individuals whose cases 

are administratively closed cannot apply for work authorization. It 

creates a real problem. You are saying to qualified individuals they 

will not be deported, but they cannot work to support themselves 

or their families. Many are going to end up in the underground 

economy, which puts them at risk of exploitation and undercuts the 

labor market. Only a few thousand people have had their deportations halted so far, so I cannot imagine this will have any significant impact on employment in America. 

I ask you then why we are not at least making certain that if 

we have deferred action or administrative closure that a person is 

allowed to work. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, first, just to make sure we have a 

common understanding of the record, we have continued deferred 

actions and do that before cases get into the administrative system. 

The administrative closure are cases that are already on the docket 

and most of which are on the non-detained docket, but a certain 

number are on the detained docket. And those are the ones we are 

going through in addition to evaluating new cases as they come in 

to see that they meet the priorities that we have set. 

So with respect to the work authorization, we are going back 

now, in light of your concerns, and in light of the fact that we now 

have some numbers to look at as opposed to when we started this 

whole process, to see if we should make some adjustments. So I 

would be willing to keep you apprised of our efforts in that regard, 

but I thought about your concerns after we spoke, and I thought 

they were serious concerns, and we are exploring how best to address them. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Madam Secretary. You and I both 

know that the President is committed to the DREAM Act. He was 

a cosponsor when he served in the U.S. Senate, and he has made 

some important decisions to help these DREAM Act students. So 

I hope that we can find a way to go further when it comes to giving 

them an opportunity to work. 

I also asked you about the Special Registration Program that 

was created after 9/11. Arab Americans, American Muslims, and 

South Asian Americans faced national origin and religious 

profiling. At least that is what was suggested at a recent hearing 

I held in this same room 2 weeks ago. The Special Registration 
38 

Program targeted Arab and Muslim visitors, requiring them to 

promptly register with the INS or face deportation. At the time I 

called for the program to be terminated because there were serious 

doubts it would even help combat terrorism. 

We heard testimony that terrorism experts have concluded that 

special registration wasted Homeland Security resources and ended 

up alienating Arab Americans and some Muslims. More than 

80,000 people registered, more than 13,000 placed in deportation. 

How many terrorists were identified by special registration? None. 

So last year, DHS terminated all special registration requirements. However, because of special registration, many innocent 

Arabs and Muslims still face deportation or are barred from applying for citizenship. Last week, you issued a memo to address the 

situation with these individuals. It provides the individuals who 

failed to comply that they would not be penalized if their noncompliance was involuntary, unintentional, or otherwise reasonably 

excusable. 

Will you ensure that the standards for noncompliance with special registration are going to be applied fairly and generously? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I will, and I will make sure that ICE 

reports to me how that is being implemented. 

Senator DURBIN. I visited an immigration detention facility in 

my State, the Tri-County Detention Center in deep southern Illinois, and I applaud ICE for issuing its revised detention standards 

recently. I am in the process of looking those over. I am still concerned about some of the conditions I noted. Some of them will 

take a deep investigation before I can say with any certainty that 

there are violations that need to be addressed. 

But there was one thing that was very basic that caught my attention, and that was lack of access to the telephone. It turns out 

many of these people who are being detained, not charged with a 

crime but being detained, are basically 200 or 300 miles away from 

family. It may seem like a small issue, but to these immigration 

detainees, it is not. Currently, these immigration detainees do not 

have the right to an appointed attorney, and approximately 80 percent go forward without one. And basically none of them have access to e-mail, unlike Federal prisoners. And many of them are in 

remote facilities such as the one I visited. 

They repeatedly raised with me the concern about their inability 

to communicate with the outside world, including their family. 

They said they could not afford the phone calls that cost well upwards of $1 or $2 a minute that they are being charged. These are 

not wealthy people, you can imagine. They are very poor. 

We tried to use the phones, local phones, just to see how they 

would work, and they did not. So there was spotty service and high 

cost. A large number of county jails with which ICE contracts actually profit by taking a cut of the exorbitant fees that phone companies charge detainees, commissions of 30 to 60 percent on phone 

call charges. My office has been working with your staff to come 

up with a solution. Do you have any report of progress on this 

issue? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Not as I sit here, but I will follow up. 

You are right to raise the concern, so let me follow up with our 

staff, and I will be happy to get back to you. 
39 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. Thanks for appearing today, and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

Madam Secretary, I think I have the honor of the last questions 

of the oversight hearing today, and I appreciate your patience and 

your diligence before the Committee today. I was reminded in your 

opening testimony just how challenging your job is by the fact that 

you casually referenced that you have a daily threat brief. You supervise the third largest Federal agency. You have a scope of responsibility that I think is awesome. And the challenge that you 

and your leadership team face of striking an appropriate balance 

between security, privacy, and commerce is a very difficult and 

delicate balance, and I just want to start by thanking you for your 

service. I have known you since you were an Attorney General and 

have always been impressed with your record of service. 

First, just on the Secret Service scandal, if I might, there has 

been some suggestion in the press today, I think in the Washington 

Post, that this is actually part of a longstanding pattern or practice. In my previous role, I had the honor of supervising a local law 

enforcement agency, and I know how devastating to morale and 

even to operations such incidents can be. This particular incident 

is very troubling, and I know that there is an aggressive and farreaching investigation underway. 

But have there been allegations of comparably serious misconduct related to the Office of Professional Responsibility in the 

past? And what steps specifically have you directed Secret Service 

Director Sullivan to take to ensure that this particular type of misconduct does not occur again? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. To my knowledge, there have been no 

similar type incidents reported to the Office of Professional Responsibility. I cannot speak to the Inspector General, that is a separate 

department, but not as to OPR. 

What the Director is doing is really reviewing training, supervision, going back, talking to other agents, really trying to ferret 

out whether this is a systemic problem. If it is, that would be a 

surprise to me. I must say, as someone who has been the Service 

Secretary for 3–1/2 years now, I have found the men and women 

I work with to be extremely professional and the men and women 

I come into contact with to be extremely professional. 

But we want to make sure that we get to the bottom of this, that 

we deal strongly with those who committed the misconduct and 

gave the report—that has already been dealt with quite a lot of 

speed—and that we ferret out any other problems, because, you 

know, the men and women of the Secret Service do not deserve to 

have their reputations besmirched. 

Senator COONS. I want to commend you for how swiftly the investigations proceeded. I just wanted to reassert what I think we 

share, which is a conviction that it needs to be not just this incident but a far-reaching investigation that can reassure the American public that this is not somehow an agency where this was routinely tolerated or broadly practiced, that this truly is an outlier incident. 

I also at the outset just want to thank you. The last time you 

were before us, I asked a question about Customs and Border Pa-
40 

trol and the interdiction of counterfeit or allegedly counterfeit materials. You have just implemented a new administration policy 

that allows CBP agents, when they seize goods at the border that 

are believed to be possibly counterfeit, to share that information 

with the rights holders. And I think that is a good and strong advance. I had introduced legislation, but given how swiftly legislation is moving here, I am glad that the administration has embraced that change in practice and policy. 

I wanted to dedicate most of our time to cybersecurity. I share 

Senator Franken’s deep concerns about privacy and how we strike 

an appropriate balance, but also Senator Whitehouse’s grave concerns that if we fail to effectively legislate in this field, we leave 

our critical national infrastructure gravely vulnerable and at risk. 

I note that in your fiscal year 2013 budget, cybersecurity gets a 

nearly 75-percent increase in funding while the rest of the Department overall stays flat, so I just want to commend that you are, 

in fact, prioritizing delivering appropriate resources. 

First, if I could, we talked about partnerships, fusion centers. 

US-CERT is an impressive DHS cyber resource, and I wondered 

how you see State and local resources in the law enforcement community, in the National Guard. As we have discussed before, Delaware and Rhode Island have network warfare squadrons in the National Guard that I think can and should play a positive role here. 

What sorts of resource constraints do we have in terms of effectively responding in the law enforcement community and in the 

first responder community? My concern about a cyber threat is that 

it will emerge—well, A, it is very broad and a very serious threat 

today, but, second, a critical infrastructure threat will emerge very 

quickly and require very rapid response. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think a couple of things, Senator. I 

think obviously I share your concern. Working with State and 

locals who are on the floor at the NCIC, the 24/7 watch center, but 

it is helping with training, it is providing lots of information. I 

think we provided 5,000 actionable bulletins last year. CERT responded to 106,000 incidents itself. And so training, information 

sharing, and then across the country in certain locations we have 

Centers of Excellence, which are helping us refine what we are 

doing, but also think ahead, what is the next thing that is going 

to happen in the cyber world. 

Senator COONS. I also am familiar with the CFATS program, 

which has had some challenges. I think it has been successful in 

promoting site safety at those sites that deal with dangerous 

chemicals but really has significantly underperformed, particularly 

in cybersecurity, and I just wanted to encourage attention on that 

particular area that was brought up in previous questioning by 

Senator Grassley. 

Given the evolving cyber attack risk to our Nation’s critical infrastructure and given the debated provisions in different bills, please 

just, if you would, explain for us the particular strengths that DHS 

has regarding its capability and capacity to administer potential 

regulations and protect our infrastructure. Are you confident that 

DHS has the capacity, as opposed to NSA or DOD, required to handle this critical national threat? 
41 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, and, in fact, as you noted, the budget increase has been requested. We have had multiple additions in 

the cyber area over the last 3 years. We already are the Department that deals primarily with the private sector and with critical 

infrastructure, and those mechanisms with which to do that are already in place. And so on the civilian side and on the dotcom side, 

as it were, DHS already has that systemic protection role. 

I think General Alexander testified to that several times. DOD 

has it, of course, as to the dotmil environment. 

So the resources are there. The experience is there, meaning at 

DHS. We do have lessons learned from CFATS, no doubt, but those 

lessons have been learned, and those lessons learned give us greater confidence that we can administer this properly. 

Senator COONS. Last, if I could, some concerns about privacy and 

then about bringing the public into this conversation. I think it was 

Senator Lee who previously asked about future attribute screening 

technology and its development, something I would be happy to get 

a briefing on about its trajectory. Recognizing that a lot of what is 

going on in the dialog between the administration and Congress 

about the cyber threat is occurring in secure briefings and that a 

lot of the information that at least I, and I think many other Senators, have received that makes it clear to us just how big a threat 

this is and just how much loss there is here of intellectual property 

and how much potential risk there is, most of that critical information is shared with us in a secure setting. 

My concern is that this Committee previously legislated on intellectual property theft through the PROTECT IP Act and a comparable committee in the House legislated, some would argue overreached, in the Stop Online Piracy Act. And there was a very broad 

and unexpectedly strong national response to that by engaged and 

motivated citizens who were deeply concerned, with some legitimacy, that there was some real threat to their privacy and to the 

vibrancy of the Internet. 

My real concern here is that if we are not sufficiently bringing 

the public along in striking an appropriate balance here between 

privacy, security, and commerce, we may face a comparable unexpected, abrupt national backlash against these legislative efforts. 

And given how rarely we legislate on issues this critical, I am deeply concerned that we not then lose a moment, that we not create 

a moment of real vulnerability when you have worked so hard to 

craft a structure that works. 

Senator Franken asked you previously about how the administration in its proposals maybe has done a stronger job of recognizing and validating privacy concerns. Any advice for me about 

how we can, while recognizing the limitations of information that 

must be held secure, more effectively engage the public in this dialog on the balance between security and liberty? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, we have tried to do it by sharing 

information with the public through a variety of means. I think it 

is significant that when there have been briefings in a classified 

setting, you had sitting there the head of the Joint Chiefs, the head 

of the NSA, the head of the FBI, the second in charge of the DNI, 

the second in charge of the DOJ, and myself, all saying the same 

thing: This is a big risk, it is on us. We need some way to protect 
42 

the Nation’s core critical infrastructure. We need some way to have 

information sharing. We need to update and streamline some of the 

statutes that exist now. 

In terms of privacy, I think that was built into particularly the 

Collins-Lieberman bill, the bipartisan bill in this chamber, providing for privacy, for independent privacy oversight, limitations on 

how information can be used, and the like. I think we just need to 

continue to emphasize the differences between that and some of the 

other approaches. 

Senator COONS. I agree with you. Those secure briefings have 

been successful. They have been in my case hair raising, at times 

alarming. But the unified and broad engagement by this administration in ensuring that the Senate is briefed is commendable. I 

just am concerned that when I go and talk in my home State of 

Delaware, I do not hear the same level of broadly shared understanding of just how real, just how constant, and just how present 

a threat this is to our intellectual property, to our critical infrastructure, and to the vibrancy of our Nation. 

Let me just ask a last question or area, and that would be immigration. I was struck—there was a recent Pew report that came 

out, I believe, saying that for the first time in 30 years there are 

more illegal immigrants returning to Mexico from the United 

States than coming here, and I think that is in part due to 

strengthening of the economy there, but it is also, I think, the unprecedented action of this administration to hire more border 

guards, deport more undocumented workers than ever before, and 

really bear down and engage in strong, smart, and effective border 

security and enforcement. And I wondered if you had any comment 

on that. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I do. In fact, I looked at the Pew study 

yesterday, and what it is talking about are long-term migration 

trends, and what it identifies is exactly what you said: that the 

trend now is more out-migration than in-migration. And it attributes at least part of that to the record amount of personnel and 

technology infrastructure put on the border, in part because there 

was bipartisan agreement by the Congress to appropriate an additional $600 million to let us do that job. 

Our efforts now are sustaining that and making sure we stay 

ahead of any surge or movement in illegal traffic along that border 

and keep that border as safe and secure as we can. 

Senator COONS. I think you have done a commendable job on 

this, and it is, I think, important that the general public realize 

that my side of the aisle, which is sometimes mischaracterized as 

not being sufficiently vigorous in our support of enforcement, 

shares that, that this was a bipartisan effort. I hope you will make 

real progress in the enhanced biographic exit program, and there 

was some real dialog about that, but I do think I am cautiously optimistic we will find a new common ground on a host of immigration issues, whether the DREAM Act—I am a cosponsor along with 

Senator Durbin—H–1B reform, STEM immigration, or uniting families. 

Last, just a question on FEMA response. I think that retaining 

airlift capacity in local National Guards and State National Guards 

was critical in the State of Vermont, represented by the real Chair-
43 

man of this Committee, as well as my State in the past when there 

were hurricanes or flooding or other issues. I wondered if you had 

any comment about how the President’s funding request might affect the ability of State National Guards to play an active, supportive role in disaster response. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, let me get back to you on that 

because—are you asking about how our request with respect to reforming the grants overall would affect first responders? Are you 

asking specific to the National Guard? 

Senator COONS. I think this is more a National Guard capacity 

within the branch issue. So I may have asked a question that is 

not directly in your—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I think that is probably more appropriately addressed to the Department of Defense. But I will say our 

entire work with FEMA has been to be a team with local and State 

responders as opposed to the Feds being in charge. And I think 

that teamwork approach has been well received and has worked 

very effectively. 

Senator COONS. I would agree, and I hear all the time from our 

first responder community in Delaware how grateful they have 

been for the shared training, the equipment, the grants programs. 

I actually helped one of our local volunteer fire companies write 

their annual grant in a memorable all-nighter, and I just wanted 

to close by thanking you for your strong leadership of the Department and for the Department’s sustained and significant contribution to the security and liberty of the people of the United States. 

Thank you very much for your testimony, Madam Secretary. We 

will leave the record open for a week for members of the Committee who were not able to join us but might want to submit additional questions for the record. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Senator COONS. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 
44 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Questionll: 1 

Topic: NPG 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: The FY 2013 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security 

proposes significant changes to FEMA's homeland security grant programs. Under the 

new plan, 16 state and local homeland security grant programs would be consolidated 

into one state block grant program called the National Preparedness Grant (NPG) 

program. Please explain how FEMA plans to ensure that the capability areas that were 

developed under each of the previous 16 individual grant programs will be sustained 

under the current program. Specifically, please describe how communities will continue 

preparedness activities that were previously funded under the State Homeland Security 

Program, the Metropolitan Medical Response System grants, the Port Security Grant 

Program, the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program, the Citizen Corps 

Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative and the Transit Security Grant Program. 

Response: As we look ahead, in order to address evolving threats and make the most of 

limited resources, FEMA proposed a new vision for homeland security grants in the FY 

2013 President's budget that focuses on building and sustaining core capabilities 

associated with the five mission areas within the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) that 

are readily deployable and cross-jurisdictional, helping to elevate nationwide 

preparedness. This proposal reflects the lessons FEMA has learned in grants management 

and execution over the past ten years. Using a competitive, risk-based model, this 

proposal envisions a comprehensive process to assess gaps, identify and prioritize 

deployable capabilities, limit periods ofperfonnance to put funding to work quickly, and 

require grantees to regularly report progress in the acquisition and development of these 

capabilities. 

Consolidating grant programs will support the recommendations of the Redundancy 

Elimination and Enhanced Perfonnance for Preparedness Grants Act (REEPPG) and 

streamline the grant application process. This increased efficiency will enable grantees to 

focus on how federal funds can add value to the jurisdiction'S prioritization of threats, 

risks and consequences while contributing to national preparedness capabilities. In 

addition, all states and territories receiving homeland security grant funding are required 

to complete a comprehensive Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 

(THIRA) which provides an approach for identifying and assessing risks and associated 

impacts across their state/territory. The coordination element described in the new grants 

vision will assist grantees in their efforts to address the gaps identified in their THlRA, 

while building important statewide and national capabilities. 

The Department believes that the increased flexibility offered by NPGP, along with the 

emphasis on building and sustaining core capabilities, will provide states, tribes, and 

communities with ability to maintain the capability gains achieved to date and provide 

opportunities to expand those capabilities that need additional funding to grow. 
45 

Question#: 2 

Topic: THIRj\. 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: According to the new guidance for FEMA's homeland security grant 

programs, each state and territory will receive a base level of funding allocated in 

accordance with a population driven formula. and additional funds will be distributed 

competitively based on a risk assessment by each state called a Threat Hazard 

Identification Risk Assessment (THlRA). The THIRA also provides the basis for 

determining ajurisdiction's current level of capability for the risks it faces and 

identifying goals for improvement and capability gaps. According to a GAO report 

entitled 'Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National Capabilities: Continuing 

Challenges Impede fEMA's Progress'. which was released on March 20, 2012, "nearly a 

year after the THIRA concept was first introduced as part of the fiscal year 2011 grant 

guidance. grantees have yet to receive guidance on how to conduct the THIRA process." 

The report also outlines concerns about local participation stating, "[q]uestions also 

remain as to how local stakeholders would be involved in the THIRA process at the state 

level." I would like to know what steps FEMA is taking to ensure that local communities 

are part of the assessment process and how FEMA intends to ensure that each state has 

the resources it needs to develop its TIIIRA consistent with Department guidance? 

Response: The comments in the GAO report cited have been since addressed and 

resolved by FEMA. tn April, FEMA released Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201: 

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THtRA) Guide. which outlines a 

five-step process for identifying and assessing risks and associated impacts on 

communities. That guidance expands on existing state, local. tribal, and territorial 

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (I lIRA) and other risk methodologies by 

broadening the factors considered. and incorporating the whole community throughout 

the entire process. Step one of the THIRA process-identifying threats and hazards of 

concern-specifically identifies local fire, police, health departments. and local hazard 

mitigation offices as sources of data and infonnation. 

In conjunction with CPG 201. FEMA also released a document entitled "Use of Threat 

and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment for Preparedness Grants." That 

document outlines validation criteria for the state THIRA. specifically alignment with 

ePG 201. To that end. as part of the submission, states will identify the local 

departments and agencies, as well as other whole community partners, who participated 

in the development of the THIRA. FEMA Grant Programs Directorate Information 

Bulletin #385a was issued 011 June I. 2012 which specified that all 56 states and 

territories and all 31 urban areas eligible for funding under the FY 2012 Urban Area 

Security Initiative are required to complete a THIRA by December 31, 2012. The 
46 

Queslion#: 2 

Topic: THIRA 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Information Bulletin also encouraged tribal nations to also complete a THIRA by the 

same date. 

[n order to ensure that the states have the resources they need to complete a THIRA in 

accordance 'With Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201. FEMA has taken 

several steps to provide assistance. First. along 'With the guidance itself. FEMA released 

a CPG 201 Toolkit that provides resources and information, data sources, and templates 

to support the conduct of a THIRA. Second. FEMA streamlined the THIRA and State 

Preparedness Report (SPR) processes. Recognizing that the steps of the THIRA feed 

directly into the steps of the SPR. the SPR tool has been aligned to begin with the 

capability targets identified in the THIRA to reduce reporting burden and duplication of 

efforts. Third. FEMA conducted 10 technical assistance deliveries on the THIRA process 

for all states and territories between May 8.20]2 and June 15.2012. Lastly, FEMA is 

developing an Independent Study course on THIRA that will allo'W states. locals and 

tribes to access training on conducting a THIRA online and at their o'Wn pace. 
47 

Qucstion#: 3 

Topic: aliens I 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable JeifSessions 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: After your appearance before the Judiciary Committee last October. I 

submitted a question to you regarding those aliens whose cases have been 

administratively closed under the Department's prosecutorial discretion policy. Part of 

my question asked whether any analysis was conducted to determine the effect that 

providing work authorizations to these individuals would have on the job market and 

American workers. You stated in response: "Individuals whose cases are 

administratively closed, the preferred mechanism for exercising prosecutorial discretion 

in the case-by-casc review initiative, arc not eligible to receive employment authorization 

on the basis of the administrative closure alone:' Your answer did not address the 

question asked. Has your Department or any other agency of the federal government 

done any analysis to detennine how the work authorizations isslled to illegal aliens whose 

cases are administratively closed will affect the job market and American workers? If so, 

please provide the details of that analysis. 

Response: Aliens for whom DHS has decided to exercise prosecutorial discretion do not 

automatically qualify for an Employment Authorization Document (EAD). Pursuant to 

longstanding regulations sllch as 8, C.F.R. § 274a.12 which lists the classes of aliens 

eligible to apply for work authorization and accept employment, individuals whose cases 

are administratively closed are not eligible for employment authorization solely on the 

basis of the administrative closure. DHS has not conducted a labor impact study to 

determine the effect of issuing EADs to aliens whose cases are administratively closed in 

the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
48 

Queslion#: 4 

Topic: aliens 2 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorabic Jeff Sessions 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: In implementing the prosecutorial discretion policy. how many incoming 

immigration cases have been reviewed. and how many have bcen administratively 

closed? 

Response: As of September 24.2012. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (lCE) 

had reviewed 376.094 pending detained and non-detained immigration cases. Of the 

cases that were reviewed. 9,716 non-detained cases have been administratively closed. 16 

detained cases have been dismissed. and 26.980 have been identified as appropriate for 

closure. 

Question: How many of the illegal aliens who have had their case administratively 

closed have ever been convicted of a crime? 

Response: Prior to considering whether to file a motion for administrative closure. ICE 

conducts both national security and criminal background checks. The ICE Office of the 

Principal Legal Advisor's (OPLA) Offices of Chief Counsel carefully evaluate the results 

of criminal background checks to ensure that aliens who fall under our civil enforcement 

priorities are aggressively pursued for immigration enforcement. In some circumstances. 

aliens with a criminal conviction may still be considered eligible for prosecutorial 

discretion on a case-by-case basis, after weighing all of the factors present in the alicn's 

case. 

To determine how many of the 9,732 aliens who have had their cases administratively 

closed have been convicted of a crime. ICE needs more time to review its records as it 

rcquires a case-by-case review. 

Question: Has your Department established a way to keep track of the aliens whose 

cases are administratively closed? 

Response: Once an immigration judge administratively closes a case, OPLA annotates 

the case file and transfers the case file to ICE's Office of Enforcement and Removal 

Operations (ERO). This administrative closure information is then manually entered into 

ICE's Enforce Alien Removal Module (EARM) records management system. 

Administratively closed cases will remain in the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR) system, although in an inactive status. EOIR requires aliens to maintain 

an updated address and contact information for cases that are administratively closed. 
49 

Question#: 5 

Topic: ICE agents 

Hearing: Oversight ofrhe Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: How much in total has the Department spent on implementing the 

prosecutorial discretion policy, including the cost of training ICE agents and attorneys, 

establishing a working group with members from the Departments ofl-lomeland Security 

and Justice, conducting a nationwide review of all incoming cases, and the pilot programs 

that have been launched to implement this policy? If you do not know the exact dollar 

amount, please provide an estimate. 

Response: The implementation of the prosecutorial discretion initiative has not required 

additional funding. In all of the 26 ICE Offices of Chief Counsel (OCCs), the review of 

pending immigration cases for the exercise of prose cut oria I discretion is an ongoing part 

of the case preparation process for anticipated immigration court hearings. In the two 

OCCs where the two-month pilot programs were completed earlier this year, the 

functions and duties in the offices were shifted, but no additional expense was incurred 

by ICE. Similarly, there were no extra expenditures incurred in training on prosccutorial 

discretion as ongoing training on any Department initiative is part of standard attorney 

and managerial development. 
50 

Question#: 6 

Topic: biometric I 

Hearing: Oversight of the DepaI1ment of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SE:"ATE) 

Question: You have testified that establishing a biometric exit program has proven more 

challenging for DHS, "Iargely because infrastructure present at ports of entry is 

completely absent on departure." What infrastructure changes are necessary to complete 

the system? What is the estimated cost to implement a completed biometric exit system? 

Response: Unlike in many other countries. U.S. airports were not built for the control of 

the departure of aliens-there are no statutory or regulatory requirements to provide to 

the government space at no cost from which to collect information on aliens departing the 

United States (as is the case for arrival). Accordingly, U.S. airports currently are not 

built to separate international passengers from domestic passengers, and often have 

international flights co-mingled with domestic flights in the same terminal. Because any 

biometric air exit system must be able to tell with a high level of certainty that an alien 

actually departed the United States. it must collect biometric information at the closest 

point of departure, which is the airline gate. DHS has found it challenging to develop 

cost-effective ways to collect this information while also not interfering with the airlines 

existing business processes. DHS estimates that a biometric air exit system would cost 

$3 billion over ten years, and that economic analysis is publicly available as part of the 

DHS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Collection of Alien Biometric Data upon Exit 

from the United States at Air and Sea Ports of Departure" 73 Fed. Reg. 22065 [April 24. 

2008]. RIN 1601-AA34) on biometric exit. Similarly. building biometric exit at land 

border ports of entry would also pose a significant cost increase due to the number of 

land ports and the infrastructure challenges at land ports of entry that are not applicable to 

air and sea ports. Official cost estimates for a land biometric exit program using current 

technology are not available, but have been estimated at tens of billions of dollars. 

The Secretary has charged the DBS Science and Technology Directorate with 

researching and exploring emerging technologies to facilitate a more cost effective 

biometric exit system. This work is ongoing as the Department continues 10 implement 

the enhanced biographic exit program. This program was explained in a DHS report to 

the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in May 2012. and will enhance the 

ability of DHS to identify and sanction those who overstay their lawful period of 

admission in the United States. Aspects to the plan include development of an entry/exit 

system on the northern land border through cooperation with the government of Canada, 

to be complete inmind-2013, and enhancements to the existing Arrival-Departure 

Information System (ADIS) that currently matches entry and exit records lIsing 

biographic information. 
51 

Question#: 6 

Topic: biometric J 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable jeff Sessions 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

As DHS develops its enhanced biographic exit program. it will also continue to research 

ways to collect biometric exit data upon exit from the United States in a cost-effective 

ways. and is already exploring several different options. DHS will continue to respond to 

Congressional inquiries regarding this issue. The Secretary of Homeland Security has 

authority to designate airports as able to accept foreign nationals seeking admission to the 

United States. 5;ee 8 U.S.c. § 1224; 8 C.F.R. § 234.4. Pursuant to these authorities. the 

Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) may designate air pOl1S of 

entry for the inspection of aliens if necessary or advisable and adequate facilities have 

been or will be provided at no cost to the federal govemment. 
52 

Queslion#: 7 

Topic: biometric 2 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: You estimated that implementation of a biometric exit system would cost 

around $3 billion over 10 years. Nearly 170 million foreign visitors enter the country 

each year. If these numbcrs remain unchanged. in ten years. around 1.7 billion foreign 

visitors will enter the country. Each of these visitors must register their fingerprints upon 

entry and would do so upon exiting if an exit program is established. Do you agree that if 

each foreign visitor was charged a fee, those funds could be used to pay for a biometric 

exit system? In your estimation. how much would that fee have to be in order to cover 

the cost of a biometric exit system? 

Response: The Secretary has charged the DHS Science and Technology Directorate with 

researching and exploring emerging technologies to facilitate a more cost effective 

biometric exit system. This work is ongoing as the Department continues implementing 

its phased approached of an enhanced biometric exit program. 
53 

Question#: 8 

Topio: Visa \Vaiver 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable JcffSessions 

Committee: JLjDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: In the interest of national security, DHS is required to evaluate all Visa 

Waiver countries at least every two years and report their findings to Congress. 

Currently, the Department has completed evaluations and reports on only halfofthe 

required countries. Nine reports are more than a year overdue and two are four years 

overdue. Why has DHS failed to submit these reports to Congress and when do you plan 

to submit them'? 

Response: Since May 20 I l. the Department of Homeland Security has submitted 19 

reports on Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries' reviews to Congress pursuant to the 

statutory reporting requirements of Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(INA). These submissions include a number of reports that the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) reported were overdue in their May 2011 VWP audit. 

To address the issue the GAO identified in their May 2011 audit, the DHS Visa Waiver 

Program Office (VWPO) developed a reporting timeline to address delays in completing 

VWP reviews and associated reports. The VWPO also conducted outreach to DHS and 

interagency partners that are involved in the review process to ensure their a\\areness of 

the reporting timeline and to discuss related worktlolV issues. Lastly, the VWPO has 

identified a mechanism by which to infollll Congress of potential delays in a particular 

VWP Report to Congress. The repOlting timeline and notification process will be fully 

implemented in 2013. 
54 

Question#: 9 

Topic: dctainers 

Hearing: Oversight of tile Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Committee: JCDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: You testified that that the first step that DHS takes to address problems caused 

by the actions of local governments is to attempt to work with them directly. You 

testified that you were taking this approach in dealing with Cook County's refusal to 

honor ICE detainers. What steps were taken by DI-IS to work with the counties in 

Alabama that requested and expected Secure Communities to be implemented by the end 

of last year to address the Department's concerns as you have expressed them to this 

Committee? 

Response: Secure Communities is currently active in 37 of 67 Alabama jurisdictions 

with an estimated 76 percent of Alabama's non-citizens residing within jurisdictions 

where Secure Communities has been activated. ICE plans to activate Secure 

Communities in the remaining Alabamajurisdictions no later than Fiscal Year 2013. ICE 

is evaluating the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 

ICE will continue (0 operate Secure Communities in each of the Alabamajurisdictions 

where interoperability has already been activated and will enforce federal immigration 

law in Alabama in line with our priorities. 

Furthermore, ICE's Criminal Alien Program conducts outreach with law enforcement 

officials in Alabama and continues to enforce federal immigration laws against criminal 

aliens and others who fall within ICE's civil immigration enforcement priorities. 
55 

Question#: 10 

Topic: training 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable AI Franken 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SE;\JATE) 

Question: Last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disclosed that some of the 

training materials it was using for its agents contained bigoted and racist descriptions of 

Arabs and Muslims. For example. presentations described Muhammad as a "cult leader" 

and said that Muslims are likely to be terrorist sympathizers. Meanwhile, in April 2012, 

the Defense Department (DOD) suspended a training course for military officers \\hen it 

realized that the course relied on inflammatory and inaccurate materials, including a 

presentation which said that the United States is at war with Islam. The FBI and DOD 

materials not only arc offensive, they compromise federal law enforcement's 

relationships \\·ith minority communities. What is the Department of Homeland Security 

doing to ensure that its training materials are free of racist, bigoted, offensive, and 

inaccurate statements about Arabs, Muslims, and other minority popUlations? Is the 

Department of Homeland Security conducting a review of its training materials? Has the 

Department of Homeland Security adopted standards for its training materials? 

Response: DHS is committed to ensuring that DHS supported training is accurate and 

helps foster strong partnerships at the local level. which are critical to preventing crime. 

To this end, OIlS has taken a number of steps to: I) develop accurate and professional 

training for Federal. State. Local. Tribal. and Correctional Facility law enforcement at the 

recruit and management level; and 2) communicate best practices and standards for CYE 

training to State and Local entities. 

The Department is working closely on multiple interagency efforts and with state. local. 

tribal. and territorial and correctional facility law enforcement to develop CVE training 

curricula and ensure that these trainings are compliant with USG and DHS CVE 

approaches. Over the past year. DHS has worked closely with State and Local panners. 

including the State and Provincial Police Academy Directors (SPPADS), the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). the Major City Chiefs Association 

(MCCA). the Major County Sheriffs Association (MCSA). as well as NCTC. DOJ, and 

the FBI to develop training for Federal. State and Local. and Correctional Facility law 

enforcement officers. as well as a training block for State and Municipal Police 

Academics. The key goal of the training is to help law enforcement recognize the 

indicators of violent extremist activity and distinguish between those behaviors that are 

potentially related to crime and those that are constitutionally protected. 

The Department has hosted four workshops to receive feedback from frontline officers on 

the State and Local CYE training materials. Workshops were also conducted to review 

the eYE training cLiITiculum for Correctional Facility law enforcement. Additionally. the 
56 

Question#: 10 

Topic: training 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable AI Franken 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SEl'ATE) 

Department has held mUltiple review sessions with the State and Provincial Policy 

Academy Directors and IACP to receive input on the training materials focused for State 

Academy Training facilities. 

DHS is now in the tlnal stages of reviewing and implementing this CYE training for 

State, Local, Tribal, Federal, and Correctional Facility law enforcement officers, as well 

as a training block for State Police Academics. Through the DHS CYE Working Group. 

the Department is working to ensure that all of these training materials and content are 

being reviewed by the appropriate CYE representatives. including the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL). 

the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the Office of Policy (PLCY). the Office 

of the General Counsel (OGC). the Office of Privacy (PRIY). and other members of the 

CYE Working Group for accuracy and compliance with civil rights and civil liberties. 

DHS also co-chairs a bi-monthly Sub-IPC Working Group on CYE Law Enforcement 

Training with NCTC. This group works to ensure that trainings are consistent and in 

accordance with the standards outlined in the USG and DHS CYE approaches. DIlS 

aims to make all of the CYE training materials available to law enforcement online 

through a Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) CYE portal by September. 

2012. 

We are also working with the IACP, SPPADS, FLETC, and other DHS Components to 

plan a "Train-the-Trainer" session for state and local training authorities across the 

country on the CVE training resources that have been developed. DHS has actively 

worked to develop a set of best practices and standards for CYE training. and to 

communicate CVE training priorities and best practices to State and Locals and grant 

recipients in three key ways. First, in response to reports of inappropriate and inaccurate 

training, CRCL released its eVE Training Guidance and Best Practices which 

specitlcally outlines that training should focus on behavior and not appearance or 

membership in particular ethnic or religious communities, and should support the 

protection of civil rights and civil liberties. This guidance was incorporated into a FEMA 

Information Bulletin that was distributed to a/l State Administrative Agency (SA A) 

Heads, State Homeland Security Directors, State Emergency Management Agency 

Advisors (HSAs), and Tribal Nation Points of Contact nationwide in October 2011. This 

FEMA Bulletin emphasized the importance of ensuring that all grant funds, training. 

presentations, and speakers on CVE are consistent with the Department's CYE 

guidelines. Moreover, CRCL regularly trains state and local law enforcement on issues 

related to: I) understanding violent extremism: 2) cultural differences: and 3) community 

engagement. 

Second, DIlS is also working closely with interagency partners, and law cnforcement 

associations. such as the MCCA and senior law enforcement officials natioll\\ide to 
57 

Question#: 10 

Topic: training 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable AI Franken 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

improve CVE training standards. In January, 2012. the MCCA adopted a motion to 

ensure that all CYE training is operationally appropriate and accurate. DHS has 

expanded FY2012 grant guidance to include funding for eVE training, partnerships with 

local communities, and local CVE engagemcnt in support of the White !louse's Srrategic 

Implemenrarion Plan to Empower Local Partners to Prevent Violent Exrremism in the 

United Stares. 

Third, the Department is working to develop an accreditation process for CYE trainers 

and develop a train-the-trainer program by FY 2013, FLETC. FEMA, and the CYE 

Working Group are working to achieve the following three goals: I) Ensure Federal 

training provided by Components meets DHS and the USG's CYE standards; 2) Ensurc 

that grantees and State and Locals using DHS funds for training are utilizing trainers that 

are certified with specific qualifications and meet DHS and the USG's CYE standards; 

and 3) Disseminate our DHS training through specific accredited partners. 
58 

Question#: II 

Topic: grant program I 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable AI Franken 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: I am concerned about security at rural and suburban courthouses. In 

December 2011. a man shot a prosecuting attorney and a witness in the Cook County 

courthouse in my home state of Minnesota. There has been about one courthouse 

shooting per month over the past two years. In response to an inquiry that I sent to you in 

February, the Assistant Administrator of the Grants Program Directorate sent me a letter 

slating as follows: "The costs associated with some security enhancements at courthouse 

facilities are allowable under the [State Homeland Security Grant Program]. Allowable 

physical security enhancement equipment commonly used for courthouse security 

includes, but is not limited to. camera-based security systems, access and intrusion 

control technology, remote sensing devices, and impact resistant systems for doors and 

gates. In addition, [State Homeland Security Grant Program] funds may be used to 

conduct risk assessments and provide training for key personnel to perfonn homeland 

security related activities. Hov.ever, the cost associated with hiring personl1eito secure 

courthouse facilities is not authorized," Does the letter that I received from your 

Assistant Administrator for the Grants Program Directorate reflect your views about 

allowable uses under the State Homeland Security Grant Program? 

Response: Yes, the information that you received in February is correct. 
59 

Question#: 12 

Topic: corruption 

Uearing: Oversight ofthe Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: On March 30, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Assistant 

Inspector General for Investigations, Tom Frost and the Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Investigations, John Ryan were placed on administrative leave pending the 

conclusion of an investigation by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and the Department 

of Justice's Public Integrity Section into allegations of obstruction of justice. 

Since its inception, CBP has more than doubled. While this growth is a positive step, 

with it has come increased corruption. For example, in just one year, from FY 2010 to 

FY 201 I, open or assigned cases ofCBP corruption almost doubled from 103 to 205. 

This is particularly true of agents on the southwest border. For example, of the current 

570 open or assigned cases DHS OIG is investigating related to CBP agents, 338 or 59% 

relate to corruption. Problems in prosecuting CBP corruption also appear to be at the root 

of this dispute between the FBI and DHS OIG, including a large backlog ofCBP 

corruption cases. What steps are you taking to make sure that DHS OIG has the 

resources sufficient to investigate these cases? 

Response: The Department is committed to ensuring that every aTlegation of misconduct 

is swiftly and fully investigated. On August 12,201 I, the OIG and CBP entered into a 

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) whereby CBP will augment the OIG's 

investigations of corruption allegations against CBP personnel by detailing CBP Internal 

Affairs (IA) agents to the OIG's Office ofInvestigations. Under the terms of the MOU, 

CBP IA has 13 agents currently detailed to the OIG. In addition, the OIG is in the 

process of transferring approximately 47 percent of its existing caseIoad to ICE OPR 

agents who will investigate the cases with the support ofCBP IA. DHS expects these 

efforts will lead to a significant acceleration in the investigation of corruption allegations. 

Question: Why didn't DHS do a better job of screening CBP agents on the front end of 

the hiring process? 

Response: CBP applicants undergo a stringent pre-employment process including a 

background check and interview through multiple layers of review. This robust 

candidate screening has been enhanced through the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 20 I 0 

(Pub. L. No. I I 1-376), which requires CBP to conduct polygraph examinations on all law 

enforcement officer applicants. 

Question: Please provide all reports prepared for DHS by the Homeland Security 

Institute related to combating CBP corruption or the backlog ofCBP corruption cases. 

Response: A copy of the Final Report produced by the Homeland Security Institute 

entitled "U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study" is 

attached. 
60 

Question#: 13 

Topic: Ninth Circuit Order I 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: On February 6, 2012. the Ninth Circuit put five deportation cases on hold and 

asked the government how the illegal aliens in the cases fit into the administration's 

immigration enforcement priorities. In relevant part. the order in each case states: 

In light ofiCE Director John Morton's June 17,2011 memo regarding prosecutorial 

discretion. and the November 17,20 II follow-up memo providing guidance to ICE 

Attorneys. the government shall advise the couli by March 19.2012. whether the 

government intends to exercise proseeutorial discretion in this case and, if so, the effect. 

if any, of the exercise of such discretion on any action to be taken by this eourt with 

regard to Petitioner's pending petition for rehearing. 

On March 1,2012, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith and I sent a letter 

to you and Attorney General Eric Holder expressing concern about the Ninth Circuit's 

order. Moreover, the letter asked the DOJ and DHS to respond to questions about how 

they were handling cases before immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA) and the federal eourts of appeals. In particular, our letter contained four specific 

questions or requests for information: 

For each of the cases that is subject to the order(s) issued by the Ninth Circuit on 

February 6, 2012. identify the following: (a) the date the case was commenced before an 

immigration judge or trial judge, (b) the date the appeal to the Ninth Circuit was filed. (c) 

the date the government's merits brief in the Ninth Circuit was filed. (d) the status of the 

case in the Ninth Circuit. (e) whether the government has argued that the Ninth Circuit 

should affirm a removal order. (f) the number of hours worked on the case by 

government attorneys before the case reached the Ninth Circuit, (g) the number of hours 

worked on the case by government attorneys since the case was filed in the Ninth Circuit, 

(h) an estimate of the number of hours worked on the case by immigration judges. B IA 

judges and federal judges and (i) the amount of tax payer dollars spent on the case to 

date, including the portion of the salaries of the government attorneys. judges and court 

staff who have worked on the case. 

Does the government seek to have immigration judges enter removal orders even though 

those orders may subsequently be disregarded pursuant to prosecutorial discretion? If so. 

how does the administration justify wasting millions in taxpayer dollars and wasting the 

time of the government attorneys working to achieve removal orders and the immigration 

judges presiding over the cases? 
61 

Queslion#: 13 

Topic: Ninth Circuit Order I 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department ofHomciand Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Response: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not initiate removal 

proceedings before an immigration judge with the intention of eventually having those 

proceedings suspended or dismissed. Facts may come to light during the litigation or 

adjudication of an immigration case that may warrant the exercise of prosecutorial 

discretion. DHS is committed to continuing this Administration's enforcement priorities 

which ensure that v.e optimize our resources by targeting for removal those aliens who 

pose a danger to public safety or pose a threat to national security, including convicted 

criminals, as well as repeat immigration violators. recent border crossers, and 

immigration fugitives. 

Some of the specific questions asked in your March I, 2012 letter were addressed in DHS 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Nelson Peacock's April 23, 2012 letter to you. 

Between the months of April to June 2012 the U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit issued 

mandates in all five civil cases. dismissing each of the plaintiffs' lawsuits. DHS did not 

track thc specific number of hours worked by the attorneys involved in each part of the 

litigation process or the costs associated with litigating each case as was requested in 

your March I. 2012 letter. 
62 

Question#: 14 

TO(lic: Ninth Circuit Order 2 

flea ring: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Does the government seek to have the BIA affirm removal orders even though 

the affirmances may subsequently be disregarded pursuant to prosecutorial discretion? If 

so, how does the administration justify wasting millions in taxpayer dollars and wasting 

the time of the government attomcys working to achieve removal orders and the BIA 

judges presid i ng over the cases? 

Does the government seck to have federal courts of appeals affirm removal orders, even 

though those orders may subsequently be disregard pursuant to prosecutorial discretion? 

If so, how does the administration justify wasting millions in taxpayer dollars and 

wasting the time of the government attorneys working to achieve removal orders and the 

federal judges presiding over the cases? 

Response: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) docs not initiate removal 

proceedings before an immigration judge with the intention of eventually having those 

proceedings suspended or dismissed. Facts may come to light during the litigation or 

adjudication of an immigration case that may warrant the exercise of prosecutorial 

discretion. DHS is committed to continuing this Administration's enforcement efforts, 

while ensuring that we optimize our resources by targeting for removal those aliens who 

are convicted criminals, pose a threat to national security, pose a danger to public safety, 

repeat immigration violators, recent border crossers, or immigration fugitives. DHS 

defends removal orders before the Board of Immigration Appeals with the intention of 

ultimately executing the removal orders. 
63 

Question#: 15 

Topic: Ninth Circuit Order 3 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: rhe Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: According to some reports, there are at least 1.6 million immigration cases 

pending before immigration judges. the BIA and the federal courts of appeals. Also, 

according to reports, the DHS and/or 001 are "reviewing" 300,000 or more cases under 

the "prosecutorial discretion" initiative. 

The DOJ and the DHS are supposed to be prosecuting these cases and seeking to have 

illegal aliens deported. As part of that effort. line attorneys from the DOJ and DHS spend 

thousands of hours working on these cases. Simultaneously, immigration judges and 

federal judges. assisted by court staff, spend hundreds of hours adjudicating these cases. 

Tens of millions of taxpayer dollars, ifnot more, arc spent to pay the salaries of those 

attorneys. judges and court staff. 

The answer to the Ninth Circuit's question set forth in the government's pleadings was 

nonresponsive. The government's pleadings tell the Court that the government does not 

presently intend to use prosecutorial discretion with the cases, but that the matter is 

totally within the discretion of the Executive Branch. If the government decides to lise 

prosecutorial discretion while any of the cases arc pending, it will inform the Court. 

What is unwritten is that the Obama administration can still use prosecutorial discretion 

after a case is concluded. even if a Court has issued a depoliation order and after all the 

time, effort and money has been expended. 

The DHS responded to the March I letter with a one-page letter dated April 23, 2012 and 

signed by Nelson Peacock, the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs. The April 23 

letter does not answer the four specific questions or requests for information in the March 

I letter. 

Did you review the April 23 letter before it was sent? 

Did you authorize the April 23 letter? 

Is the DHS refusing to answer the questions and requests for information from the March 

I letter? [fso, what is the legal authority for the DHS's refusal? [fthe DHS is not 

refusing to answer. how do you explain the April 23 letter's failure to answer the 

questions? 
64 

Question#: 15 

Topic: Ninth Circuit Order 3 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grasslcy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Provide complete and detailed answers to the all of the questions and requests for 

information from the March I letter, which are quoted above. 

Response: As the Department explained in its letter of April 23, 2012, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) must retain its llexibility to exercise prosecutorial 

discretion as appropriate at any stage of the enforcement process. In cases where 

prosecutorial discretion is appropriate, ICE aims to exercise it as early in the enforcement 

process as possible in order to conserve the greatest number of resources. However, ICE 

retains the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion at later stages of the enforcement 

process, including after federal courts have completed review of a case. Even \\hen an 

individual has received a final order and a federal court has reviewed his or her case, 

additional resources must be expended to execute that order and remove that individual 

from the United States. As a result the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in appropriate 

cases at later stages of the enforcement process also helps conserve agency resources, 

which permits ICE to focus those resources on cases that are enforcement priorities, 

including convicted criminals, public safety or national security threats, repeat 

immigration violators, recent border crossers. and immigration fugitives. Nevertheless, 

proseeutorial discretion is purely a prerogative of the Executive Branch and, as a result, is 

not a matter appropriate for a court's consideration - a point which the Department of 

Justice made clear in its filings in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
65 

Question#: 16 

Topic: rOIA 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: On March 30. 20J 1. the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform released its I 53-page report on its investigation of the DHS's political vetting of 

requests under the Freedom of Infonnation Act (FOIA), The Committee reviewed 

thousands of pages of internal DHS e-mails and memoranda and conducted six 

transcribed witness interviews. It learned through the course of an eight-month 

investigation that DHS political staff has exerted pressure on FOIA compliance officers, 

and undennined the federal government's accountability to the American people. 

The report by Chairman's Issa's Committee reproduces and quotes email from political 

staff at the DHS, The report also quotes the transcripts of witness interviews. The 

statements made by the political staff at the DHS are disturbing. 

What is your response to each of the findings contained on pages 5-7 of the report? 

What is your response to the disturbing statements made by DHS political staff, who are 

quoted in the report? In particular, what is your response to political appointees in your 

office rcferring to a career FOIA employee, who was attempting to organize a FOIA 

training session. as a "lunatic" and to attending the training session, for the "comic 

relief'? 

What actions, if any, have you personally taken in response to Chairman Issa's report? 

Set forth in detail your involvement in the FOIA vetting process implemented by the 

Oftice of the Secretary at the DHS in or about July 2009, which was the subject of 

Chainnan Issa' s report/investigation and which was described in a July 20 I 0 article by 

Ted Bridis of the Associated Press? 

Did you authorize the implementation of the FOIA vetting process? 

If you did not authorize it, when did you first learn of the FOIA vetting process and what 

was your response at that time? 

Chairman Issa's report and a report prepared by the Inspector General of the DHS tind 

that political staffat the DHS lacks a fundamental understanding ofFOIA. What. if 

anything, have you personally done to address this situation? If you have not done 

anything personally, acknowledge that fact. 
66 

Question#: 16 

Topic: FOIA 

Hearing: Oversight oflhe Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grasslcy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Response: The Department respectfully disputes the findings. The Department of 

Homeland Security's (DHS) Privacy Office administers policies, procedures, and 

programs to ensure overall compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 

the Privacy Act. In fiscal year 2010, less than one-halfof I percent of more than 138,000 

FOJA requests processed were deemed significant by career FOIA officers pursuant to 

Department standards established in 2006. The significant requests include those related 

to ongoing litigation, sensitive topics, requests made by the media, and requests related to 

Presidential or agency priorities. In these relatively few cases. senior department 

management was and is provided an opportunity to become aware of the contents of a 

release prior to its issuance to the public through a FOIA notification process to enable 

them to respond to inquiries from Membcrs of Congress, their staffs. the media, and the 

public, and to engage the public on the merits of an underlying policy issuc. 

No one other than career staff made substantive changes to proposed FOIA releases. No 

information deemed releasable by the FOIA office or the Office of General Counscl, has 

at any point. been withheld. and responsive documents have neither been abridged nor 

edited. The Department's Inspector General (IG) provided an independent analysis on 

this issue which made many critical findings. including that the significant FOIA request 

review process did not prevent the eventual release of infonnation; no FOJA requesters 

were disadvantaged because of their political party or particular area of interest; the 

Office of the Secretary is responsible for overseeing DHS operations, and thus is well 

within its rights to oversee the FOIA process; and DHS has made important progress in 

promoting openness, including through proactive disclosure. We coneurred with all of 

the IG's recommendations, and have implemented a series of process improvements to 

address the recommendations. The Inspector General has closed his six 

recommendations for improving the efficiency of FOJA processing, acknowledging the 

steps the Department has taken. The Department remains fully committed to 

implementing the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act effectively and efficiently 

and with the highest standards for exceptional customer service. 

Beginning in 2011, the Chief FOIA Officer directed the Deputy Chief FOJA Officer, to 

undertake a comprehensive review of departmental FOIA operations, meeting with all 

Component-level FOIA Officers to discuss the challenges they faced. As a result of these 

and other reviews on March 16. 2010, the Chief Privacy Officer issued a memo directing 

the Department to continue to actively implement the Administration's FOJA policy 

changes. The memo reiterated the importance of the presumption of disclosure and 

proactive disclosure requirements and noted specific progress in Components' proactive 

disclosure activity. 
67 

Question#: 16 

Topic: fOIA 

Hearing: Oversight of tile Department of Homeland Security 

Primar}': The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

In total in FY 20 I I, DHS proactively released 8.903 pages of material, a 43-percent 

increase from the previous fiscal year. In FY 2012. the FOIA Office anticipates 

additional growth in proactive disclosure. by implementing new recommendations from 

the pro-active disclosure team. 

The Department has made a signi ficant effort in educating and training its workforce on 

the importance of the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act. In its periodic 

training of new and current employees on the requirements of FOIA. the Privacy Office 

emphasizes the contents of the President's FOIA memorandum of January 21. 2009. 

particularly regarding his policy that "[tJhe Government should not keep information 

confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure. because 

errors and failures might be revealed. or because of speculative or abstract fears." Our 

components also provide training on these important points. Thus. not only FOIA staff 

but also DHS personnel. as a whole, are repeatedly advised of these important points. 

The Privacy Office also undertook a systematic review of Exemption 5 usage. reviewing 

current guidance and consistent with Delegation 1300 I, by memorandum issued to all of 

DHS on January 31. 2012, the Chief FOIA Officer reiterated that: "[W]e do not assert 

FOIA exemptions to prevent embarrassment of public officials or possible revelations of 

errors or failures. or because of speculative or abstract fears," 
68 

Question#: 17 

Topic: DHS Policies 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: According to news reports, a 20 II reference guide for DHS analysts 

monitoring the media reveals that the DHS is tracking opponents of its policies. In 

particular. the DHS is directing its analysts to identify and monitor media reports (and 

socialmcdia) that reflect adversely on the DHS. Analysts are also apparently directed to 

track reports on the Obama administration's policy changes in immigration and the term 

"illegal immigration" in particular. 

Is the DHS monitoring. tracking and/or researching U.S. citizens or organizations that 

criticize or question the policies of the Obama administration or the DHS, solely because 

of the individual's or organization's criticism/questioning? If so. when did this start? 

And if so, for what purposes has this mon itoring. tracking and/or research been 

undertaken and what is the justification for it? 

Have you authorized the monitoring, tracking and/or researching of U.S. citizens or 

organizations that criticize or question the policies of the Obama administration or the 

DHS. solely because of the individual's or organization's criticism/questioning? Ifso. 

when did you authorize this and why did you authorize it? Also, if so. what is the 

justification for this monitoring, tracking or research? 

Who is reviewing the information collected by DHS analysts? Are the same political 

appointees who were involved in the FOJA political vetting process. and who are 

identified in Chairman Issa's report reviewing the information? 

How is the infonnation that is collected being used? 

Response: In support of its statutory mission to provide situational awareness and a 

common operating picture for the federal government and for other homeland security 

enterprise partners, the National Operations Center (NOC) within the DHS Office of 

Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) reviews publicly available traditional and 

social media postings to gain an enhanced awareness ofrapidly emerging or evolving 

incidents and events concerning homeland security. emergency management. and 

national health. By examining open source infonnation and comparing it with other 

sources of information. the NOC provides enhanced situational awareness and greater 

detail for the common operating picture to DHS leadership and homeland security 

enterprise partners. 

The NOes social media initiative (Initiative) is not designed to actively collect 

personally identifiable infonnation (Pll) and remains focused on reporting on event 
69 

Question#: J 7 

Topic: DHS Policies 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The f lonorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

categories that are operationally relevant to DHS. Beginning in January 20 II. the 

Initiative was first permitted to collect Pilon seven defined categories of individuals 

when doing so lends credibility to the report or facilitates coordination with interagency 

or international partners. The seven categories are: 1) U.S. and foreign individuals in 

extremis. i.e., in situations involving potential life or death circumstances: 2) senior U.S. 

and foreign government officials who make public statements or provide public updates; 

3) U.S. and foreign government spokespersons who make public statements or provide 

public updates; 4) U.S. and foreign private sector officials and spokespersons who make 

public statements or provide public updates; 5) names of anchors, newscasters. or onscene reporters who are known or identified as reporters in their posts or articles. or who 

use traditional and/or social media in real time to provide their audience situational 

awareness and information; 6) current and former public officials who are victims of 

incidents or activities related to homeland security; and 7) terrorists, drug cartelleadcrs, 

or other persons known to have been involved in major crimes of homeland security 

interest, who are killed or found dead. This PII is relevant to the NOCs reporting 

because ajournalist, government representative or private sector spokesperson creating a 

public posting in his or her professional capacity is considered to have greater credibility 

than an individual bystander posting information on a publicly available social media 

site. Other PII is collected to better ensure public safety and national security. 

In addition. the DHS Privacy Office recently completed its fourth Privacy Compliance 

Review (PCR) of the Initiative. As part of the review. the DHS Privacy Office reviewed 

the NOCs 2011 Analyst's Desktop Binder and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 

and found these documents reflected the purpose and scope of the initiative. However. as 

some language could have been interpreted differently by those outside the Initiative who 

have not undergone its extensive training. the DHS Privacy Office recommended changes 

to reconiirm that monitoring of certain activities is outside the scope and purpose of the 

initiative. The NOC has already implemented these clarifications. 

To maintain a capability focused on reviewing incident and event information. OPS trains 

analysts to review information in compliance with the parameters set forth in the Privacy 

Impact Assessments (PIAs). OPS uses a layered approach to ensuring unauthorized PII is 

not included in reports. During the report production process, reports arc reviewed 

multiple times to ensure PII is not inadvertently included. All reports distributed during 

each 24-hour period are checked by a media monitoring capability senior reviewer. and 

the media monitoring capability's quality control leads conduct weekly reviews of all 

distributed reports to ensure any inadvertent PII inclusions are identified and corrective 

action is taken. The DHS Privacy Ofiice conducts Privacy Compliance Reviews every 

six months to ensure OPS is complying with the PIAs. This review process is wholly 

unrelated to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) processes. 
70 

Question#: 17 

Topic: DHS Policies 

Hearing: Oversight of the Depaliment of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

All NOC social media initiative PIAs and PCRs arc available to the public at 

www.dhs.gov/privacy. The report on the results of the foul1h PCR of the NOC Publicly 

Available Media Monitoring and Situational Awareness Initiative 

(http://www .dh s.gov /x library/ assets/privacy /pri vacy_pri vcom rev _ ops _mon i toringi n itiativ 

e_ 05082012.pdf) contains Appendices with a random sample of media monitoring 

reports distributed by the NOC during the review period as well as a February 2012 

Media Monitoring Guidance Reminder. 
71 

Question#: 18 

Topic: cybersecurity I 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SlCNATE) 

Question: You have vocally campaigned for legislation which would designate DHS as 

the lead agency for cybersecurity and which would grant it extraordinary (regulatory) 

powers and massive new funding. [n addition to concems about the approach you have 

advocated, there are significant reservations about the DHS's ability to handle primary 

responsibility for cybersecurity. One of those reservations is based on the DHS's failure 

to implement ten fundamental recommendations made by the Govemment Accountability 

Office (GAO) in 2008. After four years, the OilS has yet to confirm that it has 

implemented the GAO's cybersecurity recommendations. 

The GAO's recommendations broke down into two categories. In the first category, the 

GAO recommended that the DHS should address the challenges that impede it from fully 

implementing key attributes of cybersecurity. including: 

Response: As its cybersecurity mission continues to evolve. the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) has increased funding of key programs to keep pace with 

emerging threats through innovative technologies and services. The President's fiscal 

year (FY) 20]3 Budget request makes significant investments to expedite the deployment 

of intrusion prevention technologies on govemment computer systems. increase Federal 

network security of large and small agencies. and continue to develop a robust 

eybersecurity workforce to protect against and respond to national cybersecurity threats 

and hazards. 

Since 2010, DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has been 

providing documentation to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to support the 

closure of recommendations contained in GAO-OS-5SS. By the end of August 2011, 

DHS had provided all agreed upon documentation to GAO and has followed up with 

GAO several times on our submissions. The following summaries relate to each of the 

10 recommendations. 

Question: Filling key management positions and developing strategies for hiring and 

retaining those officials 

Response: On August 12.2011. the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) provided 

an organizational chart to GAO, which reflectcd the status of key managcll1ent positions 

as of that date. Per GAO's request. NCSD updated the status ofkey managcll1ent 

positions on July 24. 2012. 
72 

Question#: 18 

Topk: cybersecurity J 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department ofHomeiand Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Developing predictive analysis capabilities by defining terminology, 

methodologies. and indicators, and engaging appropriate stakeholders in other federal and 

nonfederal entities 

Response: In July 201 J. GAO and NCSD agreed that the envisioned predictive analysis 

capabilities require participation from a set of agencies broader than DHS. GAO 

indicated that it would either eliminate this recommendation or close it as "not 

implemented." 

Question: Identifying and acquiring technological tools to strengthen cyber analytical 

capabilities and handling the steadily increasing workload 

Response: NCSD continues to acquire tools to strengthen cyber analytical capabilities 

and handle the steadily increasing workload as part of the National Cybcrsecurity 

Protection System (NCPS). NCSD's United States Computer Emergency Readiness 

Team (US-CERT) has grown its analytic capabilities while developing the Cyber 

Indicators Analysis Platform (ClAP). These and other tools enable automated analytical 

capabilities. which are especially important as US-CERT's workload increases. During 

July and August 2011, NPPD provided GAO with samples from ClAP and other tools 

and products. 

Question: Expeditiously hiring sufficiently trained cyber analysts and developing 

strategies for hiring and retaining highly qualified cyber analysts 

Response: Since the issuance of GAO-08-588, NCSD has increased the size of its 

workforce by approximately 600% with more people in the hiring pipeline. Through our 

Cybersecurity Workforce Initiative. NCSD is hiring a diverse group of eybersecurity 

professionals to secure the nation's digital assets, critical infrastructure, and key 

resources. NCSD seeks prospective hires through a variety of mechanisms and has 

established Individual Development plans (IDPs) for all new and current employees. The 

lOPs are unique for each employee and are based on specific skill set that the employee 

needs to leam or improve to accomplish the cybersecurity mission. 

In 20 10 and 20 II. NCSD provided GAO with updates to the size of its workforce, and on 

May 25, 2010. and again on February 16,2011. NCSD provided GAO with documents 

relating to its lOP requirements for all employees and training and mentoring 

opportunities available to its employees. In August 2011, NCSD also provided GAO the 

redacted hiring strategy from the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative fiscal 

year (FY) 2009 report. which helped drive NCSD's hiring initiatives. 
73 

Question#: 18 

Topic: cybersecurity I 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SEl"ATE) 

Question: Engaging appropriate stakeholders in federal and nonfederal entities to 

determine ways to develop closer working and more trusted relationships 

Response: Since 2008. NCSD has engaged Federal and non-Federal stakeholders 

through numerous forums to develop closer working relationships. These include. but are 

not limited to, monthly meetings of the Cross-Sector Cyber Security Working Group: 

sponsorship of the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group; and increased 

Federal, state, local, and private seClOr participation in the Cyber Storm exercises. More 

recently, NPPD's Office ofCybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) began executing 

Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with companies and 

information sharing organizations. such as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. to 

facilitate increased information sharing and to enable state. local and private-sector 

stakeholders to maintain a presence on the watch floor of DHS's National Cybersecurity 

and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). 

Question: Ensuring that there are distinct and transparent lines of authority and 

responsibility assigned to DflS organizations with cybersecurity roles and 

responsibilities. 

Response: When GAO issued its report, the National Cybersecurity Center (NCSC). 

which was the focus of this recommendation, operated separately from NPPD. The 

functions and mission of the NCSC are now executed by DHS through mechanisms like 

the NCCIC. In August 2011. NCSD provided GAO with a copy of July 26, 2011. 

testimony on the cybersecurity environment and mission, which described the 

realignment of functions and missions. This is further reflected in NCSD's FY 2012 

Expenditure Plan and the President's Budget Request for FY 2013. 
74 

Question#: 19 

Topic: cybersecurity 2 

Ilea ring: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: [n the second category, the GAO recommended that to fully establish a 

national cyber analysis and warning capability, the DHS should address deficiencies in 

each of the attributes identified for: 

response, including ensuring that US-CERT provides assistance in the mitigation of and 

recovery from simultaneous severe incidents. including incidents ofnalional significance: 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) worked with its Federal, state. 

local, and private sector stakeholders to develop and exercise the National Cyber Incident 

Response Plan (NCIRP). which provides a strategy for rapidly coordinating the 

operational response activities of Federal. state. local. tribal, and territorial governments, 

the private sector, and international partners during cyber incidents. The NCIRP is 

consistent with the National Response Framework and the principle of"unified 

command" for multj.jurisdictional response activities. [n accordance with the NCIRP. 

the National Cyber Security Division's (NCSD) United States Computer Emergency 

Readiness Team (US-CERT) has enhanced its ability to provide onsite and remote 

assistance during cyber incidents. [n 20 II, US-CERT handled over 106.000 cyber 

incidents involving Federal agencies. critical infrastructure. and our industry partners. So 

far in 2012, US-CERT has responded to over 65,000 incident reports, which reflects a 35 

percent increase from the same period in 2011. OHS provided GAO with a sample of USCERrs Quick Response Incident Response Kit in August 20 II. 

Question: Warning. including ensuring consistent notifications that are targeted. 

actionable. and timely 

Response: OHS shares actionable threat and vulnerability information with a broad set of 

partners through the distribution of diverse products. such as Early Warning and Indicator 

Notices (EWINs) and Security Awareness Reports (SARs). US-CERT also reaches end 

users through products released through the National Cyber Alert System (NCAS), which 

includes the US-CERT Web Portal, In August 2011, NCSD provided GAO with copics 

of EWINs and SARs as well as US-CERT Web Portal membership as of July 201 I. 

NCSD also provided GAO with a copy of US-CERrs Standard Operating Procedures on 

Information Sharing with Law Enforcement and Intelligence. 

Question: Analysis. including expanding its capabilities to investigate incidents 
75 

Question#: 19 

Topic: cybersecurity 2 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Response: US-CERT has greatly improved its analysis capabilities including developing 

the Advanced Malware Analysis Center. which analyzes the current state of digital 

artifacts, conducts static and behavior analysis of malicious code types, and manages the 

development of the unclassified/classified lab and its evolution support US-CER r s 

operations and mission. In August 201 I. NCSD provided GAO with a copy of the signed 

program requirements for the Malware Lab's expansion. 

In addition, US-CERT provides data and analysis of observed cyberactivity to Federal 

Agencies and partners by reporting specific incidents and aggregated data to senior 

cybersecurity officials throughout the Government who maintain awareness of suspicious 

activity affecting their networks. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 

also provides attribution support and shares the data from reports. NCPS. and other 

sources with the Intelligence Community to enhance understanding of tactics. techniques, 

and procedures as well as supporting US-CERT's development of signatures to better 

identify malicious activity on U.S. Government networks. 

Question: Monitoring. including establishing a comprehensive baseline understanding of 

the nation's critical information infrastructure and engaging appropriate nonfederal 

stakeholders to support a national-level cyber monitoring capability. 

Response: US-CERT monitors and analyzes intrusion detection system sensor data 

observed across the dot-gov. For example, EINSTEIN is a system we use to conduct 

continuous diagnostics of the traffic flowing to and from the Federal civilian enterprise. 

EINSTEIN helps analysts identify and combat malicious cyber activity that may thrcaten 

government network systems. data protection. and communications infrastructure. 

EINSTEIN 2 has provided US-CERT with a baseline understanding of network flow 

activity and supplements this data with signature-based alerts when network traffic. 

indicative of malicious activity, is detected. DHS also derives signatures from numerous 

sources, such as commercial or public computer security information, incidents reportcd 

to US-CERT. information from Federal partners, or independent in-depth analysis by USCERT. 

To support infonnation sharing. DHS regularly shares situational awareness information. 

threat products. and Liaison Officer (LNO) exchange with the Department of Defense 

(DOD), which is responsible for the .mil domain. In addition, numerous NPPD 

components are collocated on the NCCIC watch floor along with other Federal partners. 

such as members orthe law enforcement and intelligence communities. The NCCIC also 

co-locates Federal staff with non-Federal and private sector stakeholders to fuse 

situational awareness resulting from independent diagnostics. For example, the MultiState Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) provides diagnostics services 
76 

Question#: 19 

Topic: cybersecurity 2 

Hearing: Oversight of the Depanment of Homeland Security 

Primar),': The Honorable Charles E. Grasslcy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

to state and local governments and contributes to the larger common operational picture 

at the NCCIC. 

In order to elose this recommendation, DHS provided GAO with a copy of a legal 

memorandum titled "The Legality oflntrusion Detection System to Protect Unclassified 

Computer Networks in the Executive Branch" in August 20 II. At the same time. DHS 

provided GAO with the Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for EINSTEIN 2. a copy of the 

US-CERT Concept of Operations, and the EINSTEIN 2 deployment status as of July 

20 II. 

Question: In addition to GAO report GAO-08-588, DHS also has a number of additional 

outstanding recommendations related to Cybersecurity. For example, DHS currently has 

four reports with a total of 19 open recommendations related to Cybersecurity. What is 

the status of these 19 outstanding recommendations related to Cybersecurity? When does 

DHS plan to implement these recommendations to satisfy the concerns expressed by 

GAO? 

Response: By the end of August 20 II, DHS had provided all agreed-upon 

documentation to GAO on actions implemented and milestones completed in accordance 

with DHS's corrective action plan submitted to Congress and GAO for GAO-I 0-628. 

DHS has followed up with GAO several times on the submittal. and GAO is continuing 

to perform analysis. 

The other two GAO reports, GAO-12-8 and GAO-12-92. were issued more recently. 

DHS is on track to implement each of the recommendations pursuant to the corrective 

action plans. which are included in the associated 60-day leners. 
77 

Question#: 20 

Topic: CFATS 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENA TEl 

Question: Congress is continuing to debate Cybersecurity legislation. A number of 

different bills provide DIIS additional authority to regulate the public and private sector 

networks. Specifically. one proposal would place DHS as the lead agency in overseeing 

baseline regulations for entities that DHS determines qualify as covered critical 

infrastructure. 

I have serious concerns with this proposal because it creates a new regulatory 

bureaucracy at DHS. I am also concerned about this new regulatory power given DHS's 

background on overseeing Chemical Facility Security under the CFATS program. 

Congress gave DHS regulatory power over chemical facilities in 2006 and regulations 

were issued in 2007. However. live years later. nearly 4,200 chemical facilities have 

complied with the regulations, but DHS has yet to approve a single security plan. 

Despite failing to approve a single plan, DHS has spent nearly half-a-billion taxpayer 

dollars to effectively do nothing. 

I have obtaincd a copy of an internal review conducted for Undersecretary Rand Beers by 

two subordinates that details the problems DHS faces in implementing CFA TS. To be 

honest, this memorandum is the most candid review of a failed federal government 

program I have seen. 

For example, the memorandum states: 

There a '"number of people in leadership positions who lack managerial 

experience/knowledge." 

The Department had hired "people who do not have the necessary skills to 

perform key mission and essential functions." 

"While the vast majority of employees are talented. hardworking people. there arc 

many numerous exceptions." 

Employees have "demanded that they be paid if we expect them to answer their 

cell phones during lunch. or to carry their cell phones outside duty hours." 

"There is a catastrophic failure to ensure personal and professional 

accountability" among agency employees. 
78 

Question#: 20 

Topic: CFATS 

Hearing: Oversight of the Depanment of I 10m eland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

"Our lack offocus and vision has resulted in problems with how we have spent 

our money, and how we are managing those funds:' 

This memorandum details failures of an unprecedented level. The memo cites: poor 

hiring decisions, hiring workers who lack skills to do the job, poor staffmorale, 

management and leadership failures, lack of subject matter experts. union problems, and 

a "catastrophic failure to ensure personal and professional accountability." 

The memorandum also states that inspectors lack expertise to effectively evaluate site 

compliance \lith cybersecurity requirements. This report paints the picture of an agency 

that cannot control costs. manage its employees. or effectively implement its mission. 

If it cost DHS $480 million to effectively regulate zero chemical facilities. how much can 

\Ie expect it to cost taxpayers for DHS to regulate cybersecurity among thousands of 

private businesses? 

Response: Since the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CF ATS) program was 

adopted. DHS has made substantial progress in identifying and regulating high-risk 

facilities. As of July 25.2012, CFATS covers 4.425 high-risk facilities nationwide; of 

these 4.425 facilities. 3.662 are currently subject to final high-risk detenninations and 

submission of an SSP or Alternative Security Program (ASP). The remaining facilities 

are awaiting final tier detenninations based on their SV A submissions. ISCD continues to 

issue final tier notifications to facilities across all four risk tiers as it makes additional 

final tier detenninations. 

As of August 16.2012, the Department has: 

• Conducted 14 authorization inspections (A Is), which occur after a covered 

facility receives a Letter of Authorization for its SSP or ASP, but before OilS 

issues a Letter of Approval for the facility's SSP. Als arc conducted to verify 

that the descriptions of measures in the facility's authorized SSP or ASP arc 

accurate and complete and that the equipment, processes, and procedures 

described in the SSP or ASP meet applicable CFA TS risk-based performance 

standards. ISCD evaluates the AI results to determine whether DHS should 

issue a Letter of Approval. 

• Conditionally authorized SSPs for 63 Tier 1 facilities, although two of those 

facilities subsequently had their lier reduced. For the remaining 53 Tier I 
79 

Question#: 20 

Topic: CFATS 

"earing: Oversight ofth. Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

SSPs reviewed. \lie are either validating results or reaching out to these 

facilities to obtain additional infonnation. 

Conducted more than 1.060 Compliance Assistance Visits (CA Vs) at 

regulated or potentially regulated chemical facilities. CAVs are visits at 

regulated or potentially regulated chemical facilities that seek to provide 

compliance and technical assistance. 

Since the inception of CFATS. more than 2.700 facilities have eliminated, reduced. or 

otherwise made modifications to their holdings of potentially dangerous chemicals and 

are now no longer considered high-risk. These actions have helped reducc the number of 

high-risk chemical facilities located throughout the Nation and have enabled facilities to 

take actions that minimize their requirements under CFATS. 

The cost of not taking action to better secure our Nation's most critical networks is 

unacceptably high. Private-sector estimates range from $28 billion to $340 billion in 

annual losses from cyber attacks. However. this estimate is based on known financial 

and intellectual property theft and therefore cannot be fully reflective of unreported 

incidents. The potential cost of a significant disruption to one or more of our 

interdependent critical services. such as electricity, communications or transportation, 

would be much higher. For example. in the cybersecurity scenario the Administration 

presented to the Senate on March 7, 2012, \lihich reviewed the federal response to a 

three-day power outage in a large metropolitan area. the impact to GDP was estimated at 

$1 billion per day. HO\liever. this scenario was contained to one metro area; losses would 

be much greater if additional parts of the country were impacted and the duration of the 

attack. extended. While there will be a cost of securing these facilities. DIIS believes it 

will be significantly less than the expected losses that could be suffered if action is not 

taken. 

Question: Given the documented failures highlighted by this memo, why do you feel that 

DHS can handle the additional responsibilities you have advocated for in Cybersecurity 

legislation? 

Response: While DHS does not agree that the internal memorandum highlights 

"failures" in the CF ATS program, the Department is working to remedy programmatic 

and management challenges in the CFA TS program. Some areas of progress include the 

follo\liing: 
80 

Question#: 20 

Topic: ('FATS 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

• Hiring: The Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ICSD) is leading an 

internal analysis to ensure that the proper staffing and qualification needs of the 

Division are met. 

• Training and lmpeclion: [n June 2012. ISCD finished updating its internal 

inspections policy and guidance materials for inspectors. ISCD also began 

providing additional training that focuses on the updated policy and guidance 

materials to prepare Chemical Security Inspectors to resume authorization 

inspections at facilities with authorized or conditionally authorized Site Security 

Plans (SSPs). As a rcsult. as of July 16. 2012. ISCD has resumed authorization 

inspections at Tier I facilities. This is a vital step for moving the CFATS program 

toward a regular cycle of approving SSPs and conducting compliance inspections 

for facilities with approved SSPs. 

Question: It has taken four years and DIIS has yet to rcgulate any chemical facilities. 

How long would it take to regulate thousands of businesses under a c}bersecurity bill? 

Response: The timeline for implementing a process to designate covered critical 

infrastructure and establishing risk-based performance requirements would be determined 

by the Department's engagemcnt ",ith other partners. Establishing new frameworks for 

critical infrastructure would be a collaborative process that enhances the existing publicprivatc partnership for securing critical networks. In order to leverage the expertisc of 

stakeholders. the Department of Homeland Security believes that close interaction will be 

necessary going forward. 

Question: When will DHS approve all 4.200 site security plans? How much more 

taxpayer money will it cost to achieve 100% approval? 

Response: There are a number of variables with regard to authorizing and approving 

facilities" site security plans (SSPs). including ensuring that ISCD continues to have 

sufficient resources to review SSP submissions and continuing to train our inspector 

cadre to conduct authorization and compliance inspections. 

The SSP review. inspection, and approval process has several steps that must occur 

before an SSP can be approved. First. DHS must review the SSP to preliminarily 

determine", hether the SSP is sufficient to satisfy applicable risk-based performance 

standards and. when necessary. work with a facility to improve its SSP. Once DHS 

preliminarily determines the SSP is sufficient to satisfy the applicable standards, as 

appropriate for the facility's tier assignment. DHS can authorize. with or without 

conditions. the SSP. Not every SSP submitted to DHS necessarily meets these 
81 

Question#: 20 

Topic: CFATS 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

requirements. With regard to the SSPs that do not warrant authorization, DI-IS first works 

with the facility to revise the SSP so that it meets applicable risk-based performance 

standards; but if these efforts are not successful, DHS may ultimately have to disapprove 

the SSP. 

Following an authorization or a conditional authorization of an SSP, an authorization 

inspection is conducted to verify that the descriptions of current and planned measures in 

the facility's SSP arc accurate and complete. If, in reviewing/evaluating the results of the 

authorization inspection and other information. DHS detennines that the security plan 

satisfies the CFA TS requirements, DHS then approves the SSP and the facility is notified 

that it should carry through with the planned security measures and continue to 

implement existing measures. 

Given the dynamic nature of chemical facilities. new facilities can become regulated. and 

currently covered facilities can add. change. reduce. or remove chemicals of interest. 

which can lead to changes in their risk tiers or even to becoming unregulated under 

GATS. 

Since the inception of CFA TS. more than 2,700 facilities have eliminated. reduced. or 

modified their holdings of potentially dangerous chemicals to the point that the facilities 

are no longer considered high-risk. We believe these actions have reduced the risk from 

chemical facilities and increased the safety of surrounding communities. 

Question: When will DHS conduct the first inspection of an approved chemical facility 

under CFATS? 

Response: In September 20 II, ISCD established an Inspector Tools Working Group to 

ensure the Chemical Security Inspectors have up-to-date and, where appropriate. 

improved inspections procedures. policies. equipment, and guidance. In June 2012. 

lSCD finished updating its internal inspections policy and guidance materials for 

inspectors. ISCD also began providing additional training that focuses on the updated 

policy and guidance materials to prepare Chemical Security Inspectors to resume 

authorization inspections at facilities with authorized or conditionally authorized SSPs. 

As a result. [am pleased to announce that as of July 16.2012. lSCD has resumed 

authorization inspections at Tier I facilities. This is a vital step for moving the CFATS 

program toward a regular cycle of approving SSPs and conducting compliance 

inspections for facilities with approved SSPs. 
82 

Question#: 21 

Topic: grant program 2 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JLDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: On February 28, 2012 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released 

its second annual report to Congress under a requirement that GAO identify federal 

programs. agencies. offices. and initiatives in the federal government that have 

duplicative goals or activities. With regard to OHS specifically, the report described the 

results of a separate. in-depth study of OHS's management of disaster preparedness 

programs, which have provided more than $20 billion to state, local, tribal. and teITitorial 

governments since 2003. OHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

allocated these funds through four programs: the State Homeland Security Program, the 

Urban Areas Security Initiative. the Port Security Grant Program. and the Transit 

Security Grant Program. Although no actual cases of duplicative funding were found for 

Fiscal Year 2011. GAO considered that multiple factors contributed at least to the risk of 

FEMA funding unnecessarily duplicative projects. including overlap among grant 

recipients. goals. and geographic locations. combined with the limited project 

information that FEMA had available regarding grant funding levels. grant recipients. 

and grant purposes. OHS responded to the finding by noting that it had determined that 

starting in FY 2013. it will merge all four programs into a single one. to be called the 

National Preparedness Grant Program. You mentioned this consolidation in your 

testimony as well as in your responses to my Questions for the Record (QFRs) from your 

last appearance before the Committee. 

Please describe in detail the structure of the National Preparedness Grant Program. 

including its methods for preventing overlap and duplication offunding (I note that you 

referred to MOUs among OHS components in your responses to the QFRs: please 

describe what kind of coordination they require.) 

Will this program require authorization from Congress in legislation? 

According to OHA OIG audits of grants to California. New York. and Nevada under the 

Urban Areas Security Grant Program. these states did not prepare contingency plans for 

funding if federal money was not available for future planned expenditures. OIG stated 

that several years' worth of funding by OI-lS "has created a perception that this funding 

will continue indefinitely as would be the case for entitlement programs, such as 

Medicare and Social Security." How will the consolidated grant program prevent this 

from happening? 

According to OIG reports on Louisiana, Maryland. Missouri, Pennsylvania, Nevada. New 

Jersey. New York, South Carolina, and Texas, these states did not have "measurable 
83 

Question#: 21 

Topic: grant program 2 

He-aring: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JIJDICIARY (SENATE) 

goals and objectives" for their strategic plans for homeland security, in accordance with 

DHS's guidance requiring such goals and objectives. How will the consolidated grant 

program ensure that grantees have measurable goals and objectives for their homeland 

security strategies? 

Numerous OIG audits of states revealed failures to monitor subgrantees' use of grant 

funds, leading to lack of compliance by subgrantees with appropriate grant management 

requirements. How will this consolidated program ensure compliance by subgrantees? 

Response: The FY 2013 President's Budget outlined a vision for a new National 

Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) designed to develop. sustain, and leverage core 

capabilities across the country in support of national preparedness. DHS has been 

supporting state. local, tribal, and territorial efforts across the homeland security 

enterprise to build capabilities for the past nine years, awarding more than $35 billion in 

funding. Through these federal investments, grantees have developed significant 

capabilities at the local level to prevent protect against, mitigate, prepare for, respond to 

and recover from threats and hazards of all kinds. As we look ahead, in order to address 

evolving threats and make the most of limited resources, the NPGP will utilize existing 

governance structures to focus on building and sustaining core capabilities associated 

with the five mission areas within the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) that are both 

readily deployable and cross-jurisdictional. helping to elevate nationwide preparedness. 

FEMA is currently soliciting feedback from our partners on this proposal to help guide 

further development of the proposal. The Administration looks forward to working with 

Congress and stakeholders to ensure the NPGP enables the whole community to build 

and sustain, in a collaborative \\ay, the core capabilities necessary to prepare for 

incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. 

NPGP consolidates current grant programs into one overarching program (excluding 

Emergency Management Perfonnance Grants and fire grants), which will support the 

recommendations of the Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for 

Preparedness Grants Act (REEPPG) and stream line the grant application process. This 

will enable grantees to build and sustain core capabilities outlined in the National 

Preparedness (joal instead of requiring grantees to meet the mandates from multiple 

individual, often disconnected. grant programs. NPGP also provides grantees with 

maximum visibility ofal! of the projects being implemented with federal preparedness 

grant funding, which reduces overlap and duplication of spending, This increased 

efficiency will enable grantees to focus on how federal funds can add value to the 

jurisdiction's prioritization of threats, risks and consequences while contributing to 

national preparedness capabilities. 
84 

Queslion#: 21 

Topic: grant program 2 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SE~A TE) 

In addition, all states and territories receiving homeland security grant funding are 

required to complete a comprehensive Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 

(THIRA) which provides an approach for identifying and assessing risks and associated 

impacts across their state/territory. The coordination element described in the new grants 

vision will assist grantees in their efforts to address the gaps identified in their Til IRA 

while building important statewide and national capabilities. This incentivizes grantees 

to fund areas that are in the greatest need of supplemental homeland security funding, and 

discourages the practice of continually funding areas that may not need continued 

funding. 

Finally. NPGP requires grantees to match their proposed investments to one or more 

specific core capabilities and incorporates effectiveness measures that facilitate 

accountability. To facilitate the sharing of capabilities via mutual aid. the NPGP requires 

that capabilities built with grant funding be made available for use in a mutual aid system 

and requires grantees to maintain membership in the Emcrgency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC). 

In response to the other questions, all of the grantees identified in the OIG reports as 

lacking measureable goals and objectives in their state strategies are required to update 

their strategies to meet this requiremcnt. Along with the THIRA. grantees will be 

required to maintain a state strategy and a formalized monitoring process in place in order 

to ensure their sub-grantees are compliant with all grant requirements. 

FEMA/GPD has developed several MOUs with other agencies including the Department 

of Transportation. DBS/Office of Infrastructure Protection, Transportation Security 

Administration. and Customs and Border Protection. The purpose of these MOUs is to 

further establish formal relationships with partnering agencies 10 identify gaps in funding 

as well as improve coordination and reduce redundancy. 
85 

Question#: 22 

Topic: grant program 3 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: The DHS Inspector-General wrote in its annual report on major management 

challenges lilCing DHS. "FEMA faces challenges in mitigating redundancy and 

duplication among preparedness grant programs ... Since grant programs may have 

overlapping goals or activities. FEMA risks funding potentially duplicative or redundant 

projects." I was gratified to see that DHS is taking steps to reduce duplication through 

creation of the National Preparedness Grant Program. However. just as FEMA must be 

aware of. and avoid. duplicative grant-making within DHS. it must also ensure that its 

grants and other STTL support do not overlap with those of DOJ (as well as other 

government departments and agencies). In your responses to my QRFs from your last 

appearance before the Committee. you refer to discussions between FEMA and DOJ 

regarding coordination of grant programs and that these discussions "will hopefully lead 

to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)." 

What is the status of those discussions and possible MOU? 

Is DHS aware of any overlap between SHSP- and UASI-funded activities with similar 

activities funded by DOJ? Has DHS shared infornlation on these programs with DOJ? 

What is the relationship between DHS's training programs funded through the SHSP and 

UASI and DOrs State and Local Anti-'rerrorism Training (SLA TT) Program? 

Is DHS aware of any overlap between DHS training activities with similar activities 

perfonned through the SLA TT Program? Has DHS shared information about its training 

programs with DOJ? 

Response: During the development of the annual Funding Opportunity Announcements 

(FOA) for each of its grant programs. FEMA conducts regular outreach to Agencies and 

programs within the Federal Government including DOJ and litiS to ensure that our 

grant programs are complementary. 

FEMA is participating in the 00.1 sponsored National Institute of Justice Standards 

Steering Committee in order to coordinate development of equipment performance 

standards for law enforcement and corrections responders. The inaugural meeting of this 

group took place in January. 

DHS preparedness grants complement those of the Department of lustice (DOl) in areas 

related to law enforcement such as interoperable communications and support to fusion 
86 

Question#: 11 

Topic: grant program 3 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SEN .. HE) 

centers. Whereas DO] grants focLis solely on law enforcement, DHS complements those 

efforts by encouraging the engagement of the entire first responder community including 

the fire service, emergency management. public health, health care and law enforcement 

in programs such as the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI), the See 

Something, Say Something campaign, etc. 

All Homeland Security National Training Program and Continuing Training Grantprovided curricula undergo a rigorous certification process to ensure content accuracy 

and validity, including cross-agency outreach to ensure courses are not duplicative. 

FEMA's National Training and Education Division (NTED) coordinate its law 

enforcement-relatcd training with its training partners at DOrs Office of Justice 

Program's (OJP) and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Program 

Management Office. NTED also coordinates training programs with the OJP State and 

Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program. as well as National Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative Analytic Training programs. FEMA also maintains the Federal 

Course Catalogue that tracks available, approved course curricula that may be provided 

with Homeland Security Grant Program funds. Inter-agency collaboration has allowed 

numerous agency partner-developed curricula to be added to this central depository, 

further minimizing the risk of duplicative course development. 
87 

Question#: 7' _0 

Topic: fusion center 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Please delineate precisely the resource contributions of DHS and DO] to the 

Fusion Center Technical Assistance Program, including which department provides 

which services and how those delineations have been determined. 

Response: DHS sponsors nine of the thirteen technical assistance services under the 

joint DHS/DO] Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. DHS is responsible for 

development and delivery of those services that are specifically intended to support the 

development and operation of fusion centers, including: 

• Fusion Process Orientation and Development 

• Fusion Center Security 

• Fusion Liaison Officer Program 

• Fusion Center and Fire Service Infomlation Sharing 

• Fusion Center and Emergency Operations Center Information Sharing and 

Coordination 

• Fusion Center Communications and Outreach 

• Fusion Center and Health Security Information Sharing and Coordination 

• Fusion Center and Critical Infrastructure and Key resources Protection 

Information Sharing and Coordination 

• Fusion Center Exchange Program 

In FY 2011, over $1.6 million was allocated to the Fusion Process Technical Assistance 

Program through partnerships bctween the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Office of Infrastructure 

Protection, the Office of Health Affairs. the Privacy Office, and the Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil Libcrties. 

DOJ sponsors the remaining four technical assistance services, which are more narrowly 

focused on information exchange and encourage the development of common 

information sharing systems and models, including: 

• Privacy Training and Technical Assistance 

• State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training 

Nationallnfol1nation Exchange Model 

• Fusion Center Technology Technical Assistance 
88 

Question#: )' -.' 

Topic: fusion center 

Ilea ring: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

While DI-IS leads the development and delivery offusion ccnter specific services. and 

DOJ leads the delivery of information sharing/information technology scrvices. all 

activities are jointly coordinated and often include participation from both Departments. 

Additionally. all materials devcloped and delivered in support of this program are 

reviewed through intra- and interagency partners. including the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment. and state and local partners through the Criminal 

Intelligence Coordinating Council. 
89 

Question#: 24 

Topic: NSI 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: rhe Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENA TE) 

Question: Regarding the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative 

(NSI): 

Please delineate precisely the resource contributions of DHS and DOJ to the Nationwide 

Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). 

Response: The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is a 

collaborative effort between a number of federal, state, local, and tribal agencies and 

organizations with countelierrorism responsibilities. The NSI strategy is to develop, 

evaluate, and implement common processes and policies for gathering, documenting. 

processing. analyzing, and sharing infonmation about activities potentially related to 

terrorism. The long-term goal is for state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement 

organizations, as well as private sector entities, to participate in the NS I, allowing them to 

share information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the NSI by helping to develop 

training courses for frontline personnel to recognize behavior potentially associated with 

terrorism, executive leadership regarding the purposc and function of the NSI, and 

analysts to better understand indicators of terrorism-related activity and how to vet SAR. 

The Department also contributes support to the NSI in three specific areas: assignment of 

personnel, implementation of the NSI methodology throughout DHS operational 

Components, and analysis of information within the NSI. 

DHS defers to DOJ for their expenditures related to NSI. 

Question: How many Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) have been sent to DHS and 

DO] through the NSI? 

Response: Suspicious Activity Reporting from NSI partners is made available to the 

Department via the Federated Search Tool which is managed by the NSI PMO. As of 

August 10,2012. there were 28.901 SAR in the NSI Federated Search. 

Question: How many SARs have resulted in intelligence products being written for 

distribution to Fusion Centers or other consumers? 

Response: DHS I&A analysts have produced several NSI-derived intelligence products 
90 

Question#: 24 

Topic: NSI 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

to date. They include: 

• 6 SAR Indicators Roll Call Release (RCR) products. An additional II SAR 

Indicator RCRs are currently in various stages of coordination; 

• 2 SAR-related Homeland Intelligence Today (HIT) articles; 

• Provided responses to 33 SAR-related Requests for Information (3 external, 

30 internal); and 

• 3 editions of the SAR Top-Five, which highlights the five behavioral 

indicators associated with SAR that are of particular interest to DHS I&A at 

that time. 

• 2 SAR Indicator Training Workshops on HS-SLIC Weekly Analj1ic Chat. An 

additional 14 monthly presentations are scheduled to occur in the future. 

Additionally, since July 201 L a group of DHS analysts in I&A's Homeland Counter 

Terrorism Division have analyzed approximately 7,600 reports from 27 agencies/fusion 

centers. This effort will develop a baseline of the reporting in NSI to assess any patterns, 

trends, tactics, techniques, and procedures. At the end of the project, the analysts will 

have reviewed and assessed a representative sample of over 7,800 reports that were 

submitted through the NSI. 

Question: How many SARs have resulted in DHS or FBI investigations being opened? 

Response: DHS defers to the FBI as the statutory lead for all counter terrorism 

investigations. 

Question: How many of those investigations have resulted in legitimate threats being 

identified? 

Response: DHS defers to the FBI as the statutory lead for all counter terrorism 

investigations. 

Question: How many of those investigations have resulted in criminal indictments being 

brought? 

Response: DHS defers to the FBI as the statutory lead for all counter terrorism 

investigations. 

Question: How many of those criminal indictments have led to convictions or guilty 

pleas? 

Response: DHS defers to the FBI as the statutory lead for all counter terrorism 

investigations. 
91 

Question#: 25 

Topic: CICC 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Please describe DHS's role in the operations of the Criminal Intelligence 

Coordinating Council (CICC) and the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG). led 

by DOl's Bureau of Justice Assistancc. 

Response: DHS is an active partner with the CICC and GIWG. DHS personnel 

participate in monthly conference calls and quarterly meetings. including the CICC 

Privacy Committee and Training Committee meetings. DHS utilizes the CICC and 

GIWG as a mechanism to provide feedback on the development phase of new services 

and materials for the joint DHS/DOJ Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. as 

well as other interagcncy resourccs that are used to standardize training across 

Departmcnts and agencies (e.g. Common Compelenciesfor Intelligence Analysts; 

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Verijicationj(Jr the Inlelligence 

Enterprise; 28 CFR Part 23 training; etc.). 
92 

Question#: 26 

Topic: Fast & Furious 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The f lonorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: When you visited Arizona after Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry's death. you 

met with individuals from the FBI and U.S. Attorney's office who were aware the guns 

found at Agent Terry's murder scene were tied to an ongoing Phoenix ATF investigation. 

Documents produced by the Justice Department suggest that at the DHS press conference 

announcing Agent Terry's death that morning. FBI Special Agent in Charge Nate Grey 

advised Tucson Assistant U.S. Attorney Shelley Clemens that the two guns v~ere tied to 

an ongoing Phoenix ATF investigation. Clemens immediately notified her supervisor, 

U.S. Attorney Dennis Burke. who confirmed that evening that the guns tied back to 

Operation Fast and Furious. I understand these events on December 15, 20 I O. to be two 

days before your visit to Arizona. 

While you were in Arizona. did anyone mention to you any connection between the guns 

found at the scene of Agent Terry's death to an A TF investigation, even if not by the 

name Fast and Furious? If yes, please describe in detail all individuals who 

communicated this information as well as the full substance of what they communicated. 

When did you first learn of this connection? Please describe in detail from what source 

you first learned this information. the circumstances of your learning it. and the full 

substance of what you learned. 

Response: To the best of my recollection. no one mentioned to me any connection 

between the guns found at the scene of Agent Terry's death to an ATF investigation 

v\hile I was in Arizona in December 2010. I do not specifically recall when I did learn 

of this connection. However. I believe I became aware of it in March 2011. 
93 

Question#: 27 

Topic: cooperation 

Hearing: Oversight of tile Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: When my staff was initially briefed on April 20, 2012, Secret Service's Office 

of Professional Responsibility (OPR) indicated that according to a Memorandum of 

Agreement with the DHS Inspector General (lG). OPR would be conducting the 

investigation of Secret Service on their own and only providing summaries of their 

interviews to the IG. However. when I asked you at the hearing about the IG's 

involvement, you replied that you "expeet the IG to be conducting a full investigation:' 

My staffs understanding is that the IG's entrance conference on the matter did not take 

place until May 2. 2012. 

Please provide the Memorandum of Agreement bctween Secret Service and thc DHS 

Office of the Inspector General. 

Response: Please sec attached MOA. 

Question: When was the decision made for the IG to conduct a full investigation. rather 

than merely observing the Secret Service OPR investigation? 

Response: April 26.2012. 

Question: When were you informcd of that decision? 

Response: April 27, 2012. 
94 

Question#: 28 

Topic: Cook County 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primarl: The Honorable Charles E. Grasslcy 

Committee: JLDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: There was a lot of discussion during the hearing about Cook County's 

ordinance, and how your Department was handling the issue. Despite the strong stance 

taken by you and Director Morton, nothing has changed and the safety of the public is 

still at risk. Please provide an update on what options are being discussed on how to deal 

with the ordinance and its impediment on ICE's mission. Also, please outline what 

discussions have taken place with the Department of Justice about withholding SCAAP 

funds for places like Cook County. 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is engaged with the Cook 

County Board of Commissioners on this issue. ICE has discussed several alternatives 

regarding the ordinance to address Cook County's concerns including the formation ofa 

joint working group, the admission of ICE officers into the Cook County detention 

facility in exchange for ICE bearing any associated costs, and the assurances that ICE 

will either assume custody of aliens on their scheduled release date (with 24 hours notice) 

or, as permitted by law. reimburse the county for prolonged detention expenses (to be 

negotiated with the Cook County Sheriff). DHS and ICE are committed to ensuring the 

safety of American communities and will continue to consider all options. both financial 

and legal. to encourage Cook County officials to honor ICE detainers. 

On September 21. 20 I 2. ICE sent a letter to the Bureau of J uslice Assistance. within the 

Office of Justice Programs at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). indicating that ICE 

has completed its review of the fiscal year (FY) 2012 State Criminal Alien Assistance 

Program (SCAAP) funding requests. The letter informed 001 that the agency's ability to 

accurately verify the immigration status of criminal aliens detained by jurisdictions that 

restrict ICE's access to information and persons who may be in the country unlawfully is 

unreliable. Accordingly. while ICE did complete its review of all FY 2012 SCAAP 

requests received from DOJ, ICE could not accurately verify submissions from Cook 

County, Illinois, and Santa Clara County, California. Both counties have adopted local 

policies that greatly restrict cooperation with ICE and prohibit law enforcement from 

honoring ICE detainers placed on aliens held in county facilities. 
95 

Question#: 29 

Topic: detention standards 

Hearing: Oversight of tile Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDI('JARY (SEl'o;ATE) 

Question: In February. ICE announced changes to its detention standards, providing 

more accommodations and benefits to illegal aliens. The manual says that transgender 

detainees who were already receiving hormone therapy when taken into ICE custody 

shall have continued access. Does that mean taxpayers will be paying for these therapies. 

or will the costs of the therapy be the burden of the detainee? 

Response: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pays for medically 

necessary expenses of all detainees while they are in ICE custody, including hormone 

therapy for detainees who were already receiving honnone therapy, and where continued 

use is determined medically necessary to prevent adverse medical complications. This 

policy is in line with the policy of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons. and is 

the accepted industry standard. 

The 20 II Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) state: 

··Transgender detainees who were already receiving hormone therapy when taken into 

ICE custody shall have continued access. All transgender detainees shall have access to 

mental health care. and other transgender-related health care and medication based on 

medical need. Treatment shall follow accepted guidelines regarding medically necessary 

transition-related care:' 
96 

Question#: 30 

Topic: immigration reform 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: The draft memo written by four USCIS employees in 2010 titled, 

"Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform," included several 

options "to promote family unity, foster economic growth, achieve significant process 

improvements and reduce the threat of removal for certain individuals present in the 

United States without authorization." Please outline which options have been 

implemented (whether in the form described in the memo or otherwise), and which 

options are being considered or discussed internally. 

Response: DRS does not comment on draft documents that do not and should not be 

equated as official action or policy, nor does it share internal deliberations which do not 

constitute official policy. 

Questionll: 31 

Topic: work authorizations 

Hearing: Oversight of the Departmen! of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: For the last five years, please provide all statistics available regarding 

employment authorizations issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274A.12, broken down by class 

of aliens, including those issued employment authorizations after being granted deferred 

action, parole, or if their case was administratively closed. 

Response: The attached 1-765 Approvals by Class Preference workbook contains the 

infonnation requested. The second tab explains the various employment authorization 

codes. 
97 

Question#: 32 

Topic: L- J Visa Fraud 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDIllARY (SENATE) 

Question: Please provide a status update on the L-l Visa Benefit Fraud and Compliance 

Assessment. 

Response: In late September 20 II, USCIS awarded a contract to an outside finn, Booz 

Allen Hamilton, to assess the methodology and scientific rigor of the L-I A visa Benefit 

Fraud and Compliance Assessment (BFCA) report. In the near future, USCIS expects a 

drati report from the contractor that will analyze the analytical scope, sample size, and 

relevance of the earlier L-IA visa SFCA study. Based upon the findings in the draft 

report about the methodology used in the BFCA, USCIS will detennine the appropriate 

next steps. 
98 

Question#: 3.1 

Topic: Visa Security Program 

lIearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: What is the status orthe Visa Security Program, specifically how many units 

are deployed and where are they deployed? Do you believe that the Visa Security 

Program should be expanded to all 57 visa-issuing posts determined to be high risk by 

DHS and the Department of State? If so, how much would it cost to expand the VSP to 

all high-risk posts? Why haven't you asked Congress for that amount as part of your 

proposed budget? 

Response: 

"LA VI E'iFORCDlE:'\T SE'iSHI\E ST\RT"" 

I 

! 

i 

I 

I 
99 

Question#: 33 

Topic: Visa Security Program 

Hearing: Oversight orth. Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JLDJCJARY (SENATE) 

The total estimated initial cost to expand the VSP to all high-risk posts is approximately 

$79.2 million. with an additional $68.4 million in annual recurring operational costs 

thereafter; however. VSP deployment depends on NSDD-38 request approval and the 

approval of chiefs of mission at post. Both of these approval processes can contribute to 

significant deployment delays, with the entire process taking up to two years for each 

location. 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcemcnt (lCE) continues to conduct multiple jointsite visits with DOS to determine the best opportunities for deployment. including the 

availability of physical space at post. The estimated costs to expand to additional highrisk posts accounts for $2.2 million required to open each office at the remaining 36 highrisk. visa-issuing posts. Once opened. each post requires estimated recurring costs of 

$1.9 million each year in order to sustain operations. 

There has been significant expansion in the VSP in recent years, and ICE remains 

committed to fully staffing and equipping the program. The FY 2013 Budget supports 

efforts to leverage IT solutions and the capabilities of our law enforcement and 

intelligence community partners to increase ICE's etliciency in screening visa 

applications in order to identify patterns and potential national security threats. This will 

establish greater efficiencies to our Visa Security Program, allowing for research and 

analytic activities to be carried out in thc United States and investigative and law 

enforcement liaison work overseas. 

i 

I 

I 
100 

Question#: 34 

Topic: Guatemala 

Hearing: Oversight of the Depanment of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: The country of Guatemala has officially requested that the administration 

provide TPS to residents of their country. Are there internal discussions taking place to 

provide Temporary Protected Status to Guatemalans? Please explain the Department's 

position on any such proposals. 

Response: DHS is in the process of evaluating Guatemala's request for TPS by carefully 

considering the conditions in Guatemala, including reviewing the information provided 

by the Government of Guatemala. In addition to its own evaluation of conditions. DHS 

also consults with the Department of State and considers its independent assessment. 

DHS may consult with other federal agencies as well. DHS continues to monitor 

whether it is safe for nationals to return to Guatemala. While DHS completes its 

statutorily mandated assessment of the conditions in Guatemala in order to make a final 

determination regarding TPS for Guatemala. Guatemalans affected may be assisted by 

policies offered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a component of DHS. 

These policies can be found on the "Special Situations" page of the humanitarian section 

of the website at www.uscis.gov. 
101 

Question#: 35 

Topic: misconduct 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick 1. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: J appreciate your commitment to a prompt and thorough investigation of 

misconduct by U.S. Secret Service agents in Colombia. At the hearing. in response to my 

question of whether the April 2012 incident in Colombia was the first time something 

like this has happened. you stated that "over the past 2-1/2 years, the Secret Service 

Office of Professional Responsibility has not received any such complaint." You also 

said that the Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) was going back 

beyond that timeframe and would be going through "all of the records." 

The Secret Service has been housed within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

since the Department was established in 2003. Does OPR have full access to its records 

prior to 2003? 

Response: Yes. 

Question: Assuming that OPR currently has full access to its records how far back in 

time do the records of complaints kept by OPR go? 

Response: The Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility was previously 

known as the Office of Inspection and was established in 1950. The Secret Service Office 

of Professional Responsibility currently has cases that date back to 1963 and created a 

database for these cases in 1997. 

Question: What is the breakdown by year of the number of complaints received by OPR? 
102 

30 

20 

10 

o 

Questiou#: 35 

Topic: misconduct 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

------ Primary: The Honorahle Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Number of Cases Reported to the Office of Professional Responsibility 

by Year 

Question: What is the breakdown by the nature of the allegation of the complaints 

received by OPR each year? 

Response: 

Question: What percentage of the complaints received by OPR each year result in 

disciplinary action? Please specify the action taken. 
103 

! Que~tion#; 35 , 

Topic: misconduct 

Hearing: I Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SE:-<ATE) 

Response: 

Calendar 

Year :.:000 ::!OOl 2002 2003 2004 ::W05 211116 2007 2008 2009 I 2010 I 2011 I Total I 

Inspection 

Cases 39 42 26 32 29 49 38 '6 19 34 I 20 

Emplo)cc 

I 

Relations 

Board 

(ERB) 

Cases 17 27 20 19 21 '5 13 17 10 19 8 

I 

Percent 43.6% 643~o 76.9% 59.4%.1 72.4% 51.00;(! 60.5°/0 65Ao/

o 52.6% 55.9% 40.0%) 

Actions taken ranged from reprimand to removal from employment, and in some cases 

employees resigned prior to administrative action being affected. 

i I ! 44 398 

I I 

I 

I 

I 

24 230 I 

154.5% 57.8% I 
104 

Question#: 36 

Topic: dispute 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Ifnot for the dispute that an agent reportedly had with a foreign national 

woman who he brought back to his hotel room. \\ce might have never known about what 

happened in Colombia. The number of agents found to have brought foreign national 

women back to their rooms-v,hile only a small percentage of the agents who were in 

Colombia for President Obama's trip--was shocking. 

In addition to reviewing the historical complaints received by OPR. what else is being 

done to investigate whether there is a cultural problem within the Secret Service that 

allowed the incident in Colombia to happen? 

Response: In April of2012. Director Sullivan established the Professionalism 

Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG). The PR WG is conducting a comprehensive 

review of the Secret Services' values and professional standards of conduct. This process 

will include evaluation of policy related to employment standards and background 

investigations; patterns of discipline related to misconduct; ethics training; and all law. 

policies. procedures and practices related to the same. To facilitate this effort. the PRWG 

will undergo the following actions: 

I) Collect and analyze comprehensive information related to organizational performance 

and accountability. 

2) Identify best practices of other federal law enforcement agencies. 

3) Prepare an action plan with recommendations for reinforcing professional conduct. 

4) Provide additional ethics training courses for all employees. The goal is to provide 

enhanced ethics training to all supervisors. mid-level managers and front line field agents. 

Officers and Administrative. Professional and Technical employees. 
105 

Question#: 37 

Topic: press reports 

Ilea ring: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primar)': The Honorable Patrick J, Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Following your appearance before the Committee, there were press reports 

about alleged misconduct by U.s. Secret Service agents in connection with President 

Obama's visit to EI Salvador in March 20 II, 

Is the Departillent investigating this allegation as well? 

Response: At this time the U.S. Secret Service is unaware if the DHS-OIG 

will investigate this matter. Respectfully, DHS-OIG would bc best suited to answer this 

question. 

Question: Can you assure us that if additional allegations regarding misconduct of U.S. 

Secret Service agents emerge that those allegations will be fully investigated? 

Response: Yes, absolutely. The Secret Service is committed to investigating any 

allegation of misconduct where witnesses are willing to come forward with facts, provide 

infonnation. be interviewed and assist Secret Service Inspectors. 

If anyone has personal knowledge concerning misconduct by a Secret Service employee. 

they may contact the OPR directly or the DHS-OIG, 
106 

Question#: 38 

Topic: Arizona v. United Stales 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: The Supreme Court is recently heard arguments about the constitutionality of 

a controversial law enacted in Arizona dealing with state-level immigration enforcement. 

There has been a lot of rhetoric around the efforts of some states to enact this type of 

legislation. Much of that rhetoric involves claims that the Federal Government is 

refusing to deal with immigration. For example, when the Governor of Arizona signed 

the legislation, she stated that it was needed because the "crisis" of illegal immigration 

was something the Federal Government has "refused" to fix. 

Do you think this is a fair characterization of your efforts as the Secretary of Homeland 

Security or our efforts in Congress? 

Is it an accurate statement of the administration's position on this issue? 

Response: We believe the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States serves 

as an important reminder of the federal government's central role in effective 

administration of our borders and immigration system. Over the past three and a half 

years, the Department of Homeland Security (OilS) has dedicated historic levels of 

personnel, technology. and resources in support of the enforcement of our immigration 

laws and bordcr security efforts. Most recently. the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 

Budget Request continues these efforts by supporting the largest deployment of law 

enforcement officers to the frontline in our agency's history: 2 I ,3 70 Border Patrol agents. 

over 1,200 Air and Marine agents, and 21.186 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) officers, \\ho work with state, local. and federal law enforcement in targeting 

illicit networks trafficking in people, drugs. weapons, and money. Over the last year. we 

have brought greater unity to our enforcement efforts. expanded collaboration with other 

agencies. and improved response times. 

The results ofDHS's comprehensive and coordinated efforts are clear. Border Patrol 

apprehensions-a key indicator of illegal immigration-have decreased 53 percent in the 

last three years and are less than 20 percent of what they were at their peak. Indeed. 

illegal immigration attempts have not been this low since 1971. Violent crime in border 

communities also has remained flat or fallen over the past decade, and statistics have 

shown that some of the safest communities in America are along the border. From Fiscal 

Years 2009 to 201 L DIlS also seized 74 percent more currency, 41 percent more drugs, 

and 159 percent more weapons along the Southwest border as compared to Fiscal Years 

2006 to 2008. 
107 

Question#: 38 

Topic: Arizona v, United States 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: .JCDICIARY (SENATE) 

DHS has undertaken an historic effot1 to enforce immigration laws in a way that is sman, 

effective, and that maximizes the resources to enhance public safety. border security, and 

the integrity of the immigration system by focusing on the removal of convicted 

criminals. threats to public safety and national security, repeat immigration violators, 

recent border crossers. and immigration fugitives. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) expanded the use and frequency of 

investigations and programs, like Secure Communities, that help ICE identify criminals 

and gang members in our jails and removc them from our streets from 14 jurisdictions in 

2008 to 3.074 today, which represents 97% of all jurisdictions. including all jurisdictions 

along the Southwest border. ICE plans to expand this program to all law enforcement 

jurisdictions nationwide by 2013. As of July 31, 2012, more than 159,400 illegal aliens 

convicted of crimes. including more than 58,750 convicted of multiple felony offenses or 

aggravated felony offenses like murder, rape and the sexual abuse of children were 

removed fi'om the United States after identification through Secure Communities. 

ICE is also committed to ensuring the Secure Communities program respects civil rights 

and civil libenies. ICE works closely with law enforcement agencies and stakeholders 

across the country to ensure the program operates in the most effective manner possible. 

To further deter individuals from illegally crossing our border. ICE has prioritized the 

apprehension of recent illegal aliens and repeat immigration violators. Between Fiscal 

Y cars 2009 to 20 II, ICE made over 30,936 criminal arrests along the Southwest border. 

including 19.563 arrests of drug smugglers and 4,151 arrests of human smugglers. 

Overall, in Fiscal Year 2011. ICE removed nearly 397,000 individuals - the largest 

number in the agency's history. Ninety percent of these removals fell within one of 

ICE's priority categories. and 55 percent, or more than 216,000 of the people removed. 

were convicted criminal aliens an 89 percent increase in the removal of criminals from 

Fiscal Year 2008. This total includes more than 87.000 individuals convicted of 

homicide. sexual offenses. dangerous drugs. and driving under the influence. Of those 

removed without a criminal conviction. more than two-thirds in Fiscal Year 2011 fell into 

our priority categories of recent border crossers or repeat immigration law violators. 
108 

Question#: 39 

Topic: repol1 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Two major newspapers reported recently about a report from the Pew 

Hispanic Center, which finds tremendous decline in migration from Mexico to the United 

States. The report and articles cited a number of factors, including increased immigration 

enforcement efforts as responsible for this trend. 

Are you seeing evidence that your efforts are making a difference? 

Response: Border Patrol apprehensions-a key indicator of illegal immigration-have 

decreased 53 percent in the last three years and are less than 20 percent of what they were 

at their peak. Illegal immigration attempts have not been this low since 1971. 
109 

Question#: 40 

Topic: Border staffing 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Your department has increased overall security staffing levels along the 

Northern Border over the past decade. But it appears that the vast majority of these new 

positions are with the Border Patrol. not with CBP officers and agriculture specialists at 

the ports-of-entry. 

! appreciate the budget constrains you face now - and the increasing demands along the 

Southern Border but! remain concerned about the low staffing levels at Vennont's 

ports-of-entry. where I have received some troubling reports involving overall safety 

practices. security procedures. and the morale and welfare of CBP officers. 

In addition, Autoroute 35. a new highway the Canadians are building between Montreal 

and the U.S.-Canada border at Highgate Springs. could bring 30 percent more traffic to 

Vermont's border crossings starting next year. 

Are planning efforts underway to address the staffing and infrastructure needs at 

Vermont's ports-of-entry and at other ports along the Northern Border? 

Response: Planning effOlis are underway to address the infrastructure needs at land ports 

of entry (LPOE) along the northern border to include select ports located in Vennont. 

Though no immediate infrastructure planning activities arc in place for the Highgate 

Springs LPOE. CBP will be closely monitoring a Vermont Agency of Transportation led 

transportation study to reevaluate the anticipated traffic impact associated with the 

opening of Autoroute 35. This study. scheduled to conclude in July 2013, will take into 

consideration the latest cross-border traffic updates from 20 II and evaluate the impact of 

recent LPOE modernization efforts, to include the replacement of the Pinnacle Road. 

Vermont LPOE using funds received through the 2009 American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act. 
110 

Question#: 41 

Topic: prosecutorial discretion 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: You and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director John Morton have 

developed and are implementing a policy to exercise prosecutorial discretion in some 

immigration enforcement cases with respect to very low priority aliens. This policy is 

consistent with your broader policy to use law enforcement resources in a smarter. more 

effective manner. You have been criticized for this policy. with some suggesting that you 

are bypassing Congress. 

Could you explain how this policy assists your immigration enforcement efforts? Is it 

fair to say that this policy is primarily directed toward improving the use of law 

enforcement resources in order to prioritize the worst otTenders? 

How would you respond to criticism that this policy is an attempt to circumvent Congress 

in order to provide undocumented immigrants with relief or benefits? 

Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must prioritize the use of its 

immigration enforcement resources to ensure the removal of those aliens who represent 

our enforcement priorities. specifically convicted criminals. repeat immigration violators. 

recent border crossers. and immigration fugitives. 

The exercise of prose cut oria I discretion is inherent in the execution of our immigration 

laws and practiced by DHS special agents, officers. and attomeys. For decades. DHS, 

and previously the Immigration and \Iaturalization Service. has exercised prosecutorial 

discretion in order to prioritize the use of its immigration enforcement resources. As the 

U.S. Supreme Court noted in its recent decision on the Arizona immigration law. "A 

principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration 

officials:' Moreover. the use of prosccutorial discretion, as embodied in D1-IS's policy 

guidance. aligns fully with the spirit of the November 4. 1999 letter signed by a 

bipartisan group of 27 Members of Congress,' which referred to the exercise of discretion 

as a means of alleviating "hardship" and to some deportations as "unfair." It is important 

to note that this initiative is conducted on a case-by-case basis and provides no legal 

immigration statlls. 

I See Guidelines/or ese oj'Proseclltol'ia! Discretion ill Remora! Proceedings. letter to Janet Reno. 

Altorney General. and Doris M. Meissner. Commissioner. Immigration and Naturalization Service. from 

Representatives Hyde, Frank. Smith. Jackson Lee. McCollum. Frost. Barrett. [lerman. Bilbray. Brown. 

Canady. Cubin, Deal, Diaz-Balart, Dreier. Filner, E.B. Johnson, S. Johnson, Kennedy, Mal1inez, 

McGovern, Meehan, Sensenbrenncr. Shays, Waxman, Granger, Green. and Rodriguez (l"ovembcr 4. 1999). 
111 

Question#: 42 

Topic: Officers 

Hearing: Oversight oftbe Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SE~ATE) 

Question: In recent reports and congressional testimony. the OHS Inspector General has 

reported a substantial number of open corruption and other investigations into C BP and 

Border Patrol personnel. And there have been recent reports of what appears to involve 

the use of exeessive force by CBP personnel. I recognize and appreciate the very 

difficult job these officials have. but it is critical that all Federal law enforcement officials 

maintain a very high level of professionalism and integrity. 

Are you concerned about the number of investigations that the Inspector General has 

reported and is pursuing? 

Response: The Oepaltment of Homeland Security (OtiS) takes seriously allegations of 

excessive usc of force and employee misconduct. We do not tolerate abuse within our 

ranks. Such allegations arc thoroughly investigated, and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) fully cooperates in investigations involving use of force issues. If 

employee misconduct is substantiated, timely and appropriate corrective action will be 

initiated. 

All allegations of misconduct are documented and referred to the Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) for independent review and assessment. Some cases are retained by the 

OIG for investigation while others are referred back to the component for appropriate 

handling. The OIG is in the process of transferring 478 cases to ICE's Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR) agents who will investigate eases with the support of 

CBP's Office of Internal Affairs (IA). In addition. OHS's Office for Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties (CRCL) investigatcs civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the 

public regarding DHS policies or activities. or actions taken by OHS personnel. 

Question: What steps have you taken in response to the Inspector General's work to 

ensure that along \\ ith rapid growth in the ranks of CBP and Border Patrol personllel, 

your screening and training procedures are keeping pace? 

Response: In accordance with The Anti-Border Corruption Act of201 0 (Pub. L. No. 

111-376), CBP is on track to implement polygraph examinations on 100 percent of law 

enforcement officer candidates by the end of FY 2012. The Agency will fllliher comply 

with Pub. L. No. 111-376 by continuing timely initiation of all periodic reinvestigations. 

In addition. CBP has a robust integrity training program for all employees. Throughout 

an employee'S career, CBP provides training that focLises on integrity, ethics. and ethical 
112 

Question#: 42 

Topir: Officers 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primar}'; The Honorable Patrick J, Leahy 

Committee: JLDIC1ARY (SENATE) 

decision making as part of an anti-corruption continuum. When employees initially join 

CBP they receive training promoting workforce integrity as part ofCBP's New 

Employee Orientation program. Newly hired CBP law enforcement officers receive an 

expanded level of mandatory integrity and ethics instruction as part of the basic train ing 

curriculum, 

Recurring integrity training is also an integral part of the advanced and specialized 

training for CBP employees beyond their initial entry on duty. This training. combined 

with proper leadership. oversight, and management at all levels of the agency fosters a 

culture of personal accountability and integrity within CBP. It clearly communicates the 

standards of conduct with which all CBP employees must comply and identifies the 

consequences of engaging in inappropriate behavior. Most importantly. periodic inservice training equips CBP employees with the tools they need to recognize. report. and 

respond to integrity challenges they will encounter both on- and off-duty. 

Our focus on integrity is not limited to our non-supervisory personnel. CBP supervisory 

and leadership training programs such as Supervisory Leadership Training, Incumbent 

Supervisory Training, the Second Level Command Preparation, the CBP Leadership 

Institute, and the Depal1ment's Senior Executive Service Candidate Development 

Program incorporate classroom instruction and a series of practical exercises that prepare 

CBP leaders to guide and direct the workforce in a manner that promotes personal 

integrity and accountability through critical thinking and integrity-based, ethical decision 

making. 
113 

Question#: 43 

Topic: NCTC 

Hearing: Oversight oftbe Department of Homeland Securit) 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence recently 

released new guidelines governing the acquisition and retention of data by the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Under these new guidelines, it is nov. conceivable that 

the NCTC could retain vast amounts of data regarding U.S. persons for up to 5 yearswell beyond the six months that was allowed under the previous guidelines. I am 

concerned that 5 years seems like an awfully long time to be retaining and sifting through 

data about U.S. persons who may have no connection whatsoever to terrorism. 

As DHS could be one of the agencies sharing entire datasets of infonnation with the 

NCTC, do you agree that such vast amounts of data should be retained for up to five 

years? 

What privacy laws. criteria. and factors will you consider in determining the length of 

time that DHS will permit NCTC to retain your Department's data? 

Response: The Attorney General of the United States recently approved Guidelinesfor 

Access. Retenfion. Use and Dissemination by the National COllnterterrorism Center and 

other Agencies olin/ormation in Datasets Containing Non-Terrorism in/ormation (AG 

Guidelines) that establish an outside limit for temporary retention-that is. retention of 

data for the purpose of determining whether it is terrorism-related-of five years for U.S. 

Person information obtained from certain datasets of other federal departments and 

agencies. These guidelines also preserve my authority to negotiate with NCTC the terms 

and conditions \\ithin Infonnation Sharing Access Agreements (ISAAs) relating to. 

among other things, "privacy or civil rights or civil liberties concerns and protections." 

With this in mind. [ tasked a DIIS Working Group. chaired by a representative from the 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis and comprised of representatives from the Office of 

the General Counsel. the Privacy Office. the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. 

the Office of Policy. and the various Departlllental data stewards, to establish a 

framework for evaluating NCTCs data access requests and to make recolllmendations 

for the appropriate temporary retention periods for various datasets. The Working Group 

has settled on six factors for evaluating NCTCs request on a system-by-system basis: 

Data Sensitivity Factors 

• Factor I: Circumstances of Collection 

• Factor 2: U.S. Citizen and U.S. Legal Permanent Resident Content 

• Factor 3: Sensitivity of Data Fields Requested 
114 

Question#: 43 

Topic: NCT(' 

Ilea ring: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committee: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Operational Factors 

Factor 4: NCTC Operational Mission Benefits 

Factor 5: DHS Operational Mission Benefits 

• Factor 6: DHS Steward Dataset Limits 

As indicated by our development of this framework, the Department does not reflexively 

permit our datasets containing U.S. Person infonnation to be held in temporary retention 

by NCTC for five years. 

All sharing between DHS and NCTC must be consistent with both agencies' authorities 

as well as 'With the Privacy Act. Last year, NCTC and DHS completed five ISAAs \\hich 

transferred five DHS travel and immigration benefit-related datasets to NCTC in bulk. 

The ISAA for each dataset includes express privacy provisions and reflects the Fair 

Information Practice Principles in a number of ways: establishing the authority of both 

DHS to share the data and NCTC to receive it; defining which directorates at NCTC 

could access the data and for what purposes; containing an explicit reference to the 

applicable Routine Use 'Within the system's Privacy Act System of Record Notice; 

requiring NCTC to report to DHS on their use of oLir data; and permitting audits of their 

compliance with the terms of the agreements. In addition, after the agreements 'Were 

signed. to enhance transparency. the DHS Privacy Office published Privacy Impact 

Assessment Llpdates for four of the five impacted systems, disclosing the sharing and the 

terms and conditions within the agreements that protect privacy. The fifth system already 

had a PIA providing general transparency of this type of sharing. 

I am confident that the continued engagement of both the Privacy Office and the Office 

for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties will ensure that DI-IS considers appropriate privacy. 

civil rights, and civil liberties protections in our information-sharing activities. 
115 

Qu~stion#: 44 

Topic: 287(g) 

Hearing: Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

Primary: The !lonorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Committ~~: JUDICIARY (SENATE) 

Question: Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act pennits DHS to enter 

agreements with state and local law enforcement entities to assist in the enforcement of 

immigration laws. Following the Justice Department's investigation and findings into the 

policing practices in the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office. released in December of 

20 II. you terminated the County" s 287(g) agreement. 

Could you describe what led to your decision to terminate the County"s 287(g) 

agreement? 

You have also announced your intention not to enter any new 287(g) agreements going 

forward. 

What was the basis for this decision? 

Response: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has followed closely the 

U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) investigation and findings related to the policing 

practices of the Maricopa County Sheriffs Offiee (MCSO) and subsequent lawsuit 

alleging a pattern or practice of discriminatory and unconstitutional law enforcement 

practices. Discrimination undermines law enforcement and erodes the public trust. DHS 

first terminated MCSO's 287(g) task force task force agreement when DOJ initiated its 

investigation of MCSO. and then tenninated MCSO's jail model agreement and restricted 

the MCSO's access to Secure Communities technology when DOJ issued its findings of 

unconstitutional and discriminatory policing by MCSO. 

Further, ICE is discontinuing the least productive 287(g) task force agreements and \vill 

also suspend consideration of any requests for new 287(g) task forces. The basis for this 

decision is that task force agreements are less efficient than jail model agreements at 

identifying and removing criminal aliens. For example. for 20 Il. task force model 

agreements resulted in an average of 35 removals per agreement. whereas jail model 

agreements resulted in an average of450 removals per agreement. DHS will continue to 

focus our limited resources on enforcement priorities including criminal aliens. recent 

border crossers. repeat and egregious immigration law violators. immigration fugitives 

and employers who knowingly hire illegal labor. 
116 
117 

TASK LEAD 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

STUDIES & ANALYSIS 

INSTITUTE 

George Murphy 

TASK TEAM 

INSTmITE 

Catherine Meszaros 

Anita Epstein 

Eric Conklin 

Michael Parkyn 

Division Manager, 

Workforce Analysis Division 

Richard Kohout 

Mission Area Director, 

Counterterrorism, Borders and 

Immigration 

HILLARD HEINTZE CONSULTANTS 

Arnette Heintze 

Terry Hillard 

Matthew Doherty 

Kenneth Bouche 

Senior Leadership Council 

Robert Davis 

Thomas Streicher 

u.s. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION (CBP) 

WORKFORCE INTEGRITY 

STUDY 

Final Report 

December 15, 2011 

Prepared for 

Department of Homeland Security, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
118 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

The Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute - Hillard Heintze study team 

expresses its gratitude to Major General Michael Lehnert. USMC (Ret.). Senior Policy 

Advisor in the Office of the Commissioner, who sponsored the project and advocated its 

objectivity throughout the work. The team also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of 

Jorge Gonzalez, Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of Policy and Planning, who 

facilitated information gathering and access t~including interviews with-principals, 

staff and subject matter experts both within CBP and the federal interagency. 

The study team is deeply appreciative of the assistant commissioners, executive directors, 

division directors and chiefs, and their staffs, both within CBP Headquarters and in the 

field, who graciously shared their ideas. perspectives, and time with us. We would also 

like to recognize those officials whom we consulted across the federal interagency. 

Uniformly, all the professionals the study team spoke with shared the same concerns for 

workforce integrity and the firm commitment to stem corruption. 

The study team expresses a special thanks to the CBP leadership for the opportunity to 

study and offer its perspectives on ways to promote integrity and counter corruption in 

the CBP workforce. 

HOMELAND SECURITY STUDIES AND ANALYSIS INSTITUTE 

Analytic Services Incorporated 

2900 S. Quincy Street 

Arlington, VA 22206 

Tel (703) 416·3550 • Fax (703) 416-3530 

www.homelandsecurity.org 

Publication Number: RPll-17-04 
119 

U.~i CU$/oms ilnd Border ('ro/,;d/()f; {:,!;;'j W(Jrkfvl'ce illtegrity !itrHly _ ..... _. .iiM.,._.~;ftt""<1. =.,; 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Contents 

E..ecutive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 3 

Background ................................................................................................................................ 3 

Scope ...................................................................................................................................... .4 

Methodology ............................................................................ . .................................. .4 

Report Structure ............................. " .................. , ...................................................................... 6 

Section I. CBP Operational and Organizational Structure ......................................................... 7 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations ......................................................................... 7 

CBP Worliforce lntegrity Strategy.... . , ... 7 

CBP Disciplinary System..... .. ........... ".... .. .... 9 

DHS OlG - CBP Organizational Structure .... l4 

Border Corroption Task Force. . . .19 

Section II. Employee Recruitment and Vetting Process ............................................................ 22 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations ......................................................................... 22 

Recruitment and Veiling Process..... ..".22 

Suitability Determinations.. .. .. 26 

Surge Hiring..... . ................... ,.. .18 

Entry-Level Polygraphs ....... . . .......... 30 

Section III. Inte2r1ty Training Process and Pro2rams ............................................................... 34 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations ......................................................................... 34 

Assessmenl. .......................................... , .................................................. , ........... ,., .......... , ....... 34 

Ethics and Integrity Training Programs.. ... , , .... 34 

Ethics and Integrity Training Themes.. ' ........... 36 

CBPnet Content and Messaging.. . .. " ..... 39 

Section IV. Metrics and Inrormation Sharing Process ............................................................... 41 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations ............ ' ........................................................... .41 

Assessment ............................................................................................................................... 4 I 

Data Collection and Reporting.. . .41 

Data Analysis.... . .. ,..... ...... .. ......................... ...... 4J 

Seetion V. Prevention, Detection, Monltonng, and Investigative Programs and Initiatives .. 47 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations ....................................... , ................................ .4 7 

Assessment ................ , ........................ , ................................ , ................................... , .. , ............ 48 

Random Drug Testing Program................. .. ... "............ .. ......... 49 

Analytical Management Systems Control Office Program . .. ... ...... ".50 

Integrity Officer Program. . ................ 51 

U.S. Border Patrol Integrity Advisory Commillee.. .... .... 52 

Office of lnternal Affairs. Integrity Programs Division (multiple programs and 

initiatives) ..... . ...... 52 

Integrated Policy Coordination Cellfor Integrity.. , .. 55 

See lion VI. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 56 

Areas for Further Study....... . ................................................................ 56 

Disciplinary Process ..... .... ........... ..,,56 

iii 
120 

Ethics and Integrity Training 

"Code of Silence "", 

Surge Hiring .. , 

Disciplinary Data Requirements, 

Early Warning Systems Implementation .. 

Future Threats and Vulnerabilities, 

,,57 

.. """",,57 

,57 

", .. ,,57 

57 

58 

Appendix A. Interview Issues and QUestions for CRP Headquarters Officials ....................... 59 

Appendix R. CRP Offices and Activities and ,Federal Interagency Counterparts Interviewed61 

CBP Headquarters Offices and Divisions ................................................................................ 61 

CBP Field Activities - EI Paso. Texas .................................................................................... 62 

DHS and Federal Interagency .................................................................................................. 63 

Appendix C. Workforce Integrity and Counter-Corruption Programs and Initiatives ......... 64 

Appendix D: Hillard Heintze Proliles .......................................................................................... 69 

Appendix E. CRP Disciplinary Flow Chart ................................................................................ 72 

Appendix F. Recruiting and Veiling Flow Diagram .................................................................. 7J 

Appendb G. CRP Training Materials Reviewed and Next-step Recommendatlons ............... 74 

Training Materials Reviewed and Considered in the Study ................ : .................................... 74 

Recommendations for Next Steps ............................................................................................ 74 

Appendix H. CDP Statement of Policy and Intent: Integrity ............................... »0 .................. 77 

List of Tables 

TABLE I. DHS INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES AND CASE INVENTORIES ........................................... 17 

TABLE 2. CBP RECRUITMENT ATTRITION RAms ........................................................................... 24 

List of Figures 

FIGURE I. WORKFORCE INTEGRITY STRATEGY OUTLINE .................................................................. 9 

FIGURE 2. TIMELINESS PRIOR TO DISCIPLINE REVIEW BOARD SESSION .......................................... II 

FIGURE 3. TIMELINESS OF THE DISCIPLINE REVIEW BOARD PROCESS ............................................. 12 

FIGURE 4. DISCIPLINE REVIEW BOARD SESSIONS AND PROPOSALS! AcnONs FOR FY 10 13 

FIGURE 5. RECRUITMENT AND VETTING PROCESS OVERVIEW ................................................... 23 

iv 
121 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The deployment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) technOlOgy, physical 

infrastructure, and manpower along the border has made it more difficult now for drug 

trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations to conduct their illicit activities. 

This had led these organizations to infiltrate CBP through conspired hiring operations and 

compromise of the agency's existing officers and agents. Isolated acts of corruption have 

occurred. 

The overwhelming majority of CBP officers and agents demonstrate the highest levels of 

integrity and perform their duties with honor and distinction every day. The wide range 

and number ofCBP programs and initiatives on workforce integrity and countercorruption also testifY to the concern and attention that the agency places on these 

matters. But since October I, 2004, 134 CBP agents and officers have been arrested, 

charged with, and convicted of mission critical corruption charges, including bribery, 

alien and/or narcotics smuggling, conspiracy, and fraud. This is a small minority of the 

workforce, but it represents a threat to our national security. 

To address this threat, the Office of the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security asked the Homeland Security 

Studies and Analysis Institute (the Institute) to evaluate existing integrity and countercorruption programs within CBP, provide feedback on their effectiveness, identifY areas 

of vulnerability, and recommend best practices and strategies for improving or replacing 

existing programs. 

The Institute's study team, which included the law enforcement expertise of Hillard 

Heintze, approached this study according to five focal areas given by CBP: the 

operational and organizational structure, the employee recruitment and vetting process, 

the integrity training process and programs, the metrics and information sharing process, 

and the prevention, detection, monitoring, and investigation process. Through interviews 

and research of materials, the study team spent six months (the sponsor-directed length of 

this task) evaluating CBP's efforts, gathering findings on what works, what does not 

work, and what needs improvement-to help CBP deal better with corruption by better 

instilling integrity in its workforce. 

The following highlights some of the key findings and recommendations of the study 

team. 

There is no comprehensive guidance for integrity programs and initiatives across 

the CBP organization. CBP therefore should implement an agency-wide 

workforce integrity strategy-{)ne that establishes and articulates core concepts, 

approaches, control mechanisms, roles and responsibilities. 

The CBP's disciplinary system has so many processes that it does not foster 

timely discipline or exoneration. The agency therefore should rethink its 

disciplinary system toward more efficiency. 
122 

2 

• The number of open cases and the protracted periods until many of them are 

closed (if ever) attest to the inefficiencies of the present DHS Office of Inspector 

General (orG) ... CBP organizational structure. The Commissioner should 

approach DHS leadership to change that structure for more efficient reporting, 

assignment, investigation and disposition ofCBP workforce investigations. 

• The FBI-led border corruption task forces (BCTFs) are effective in countering 

public corruption on the borders, including the corruption of CBP employees. 

The continued inclusion ofCBP Office of Internal Affairs special agents in the 

national and regional BCTFs will foster effective criminal investigations and 

introduce efficiencies in combined counter-corruption efforts. 

• Follow-on refresher ethics, integrity and counter-corruption training offered in 

the field take on a variety of forms. CBP should designate one authority on ethics 

and integrity training to coordinate courseware content and messaging 

throughout the agency. 

• Emphasis in exactly what things CBP wants its employees to be doing in regards 

to the day-to-day application of ethics appears to be missing from the training 

materials/lesson plans. CBP should emphasize the practical application of ethics 

concepts within the day-to-day work of both first-line employees and 

supervisors, and better inform CBP staff of any organization-wide training. 

• There is no comprehensive picture of workforce misconduct and corruption. CBP 

should consider implementing a central, unified tracking system for all the 

important disciplinary data that could be used to prevent, detect and deter 

misconduct and corruption. 

• The organi7Ation of disciplinary data is lacking in several significant ways (e.g., 

some types of discipline appear to be missing from the data). CBP Labor and 

Employee Relations Division (LER) should consider the collection, breakdown 

and analysis of the disciplinary data sets discussed in this paper, and conduct 

further study to determine other data requirements. 

• The Analytical Management Systems Control Office (AMSCO) has, for the three 

years since its inception, identifled and corrected operational vulnerabilities that 

would have allowed potential opportunities for employee corruption. CBP should 

continue to pursue the AMSCO program's full potential. 

The Integrated Policy Coordination Cell for Integrity (Integrity IPCC) has yet to 

adopt and implement a charter governing its activities-without which there is no 

clear articulation of the cell's vision, purpose, goals, objectives, structure and 

methodologies. The Integrity !PCC should develop and implement a charter, 

including consideration of its activities since inception to broaden the scope of its 

initial intent. 
123 

INTRODUCTION 

Since its inception, CBP has been dealing with corrupt individuals within its workforce, 

despite having an array of programs, initiatives, and other efforts aimed at instilling 

integrity and stemming corruption. In response to this persistent problem, the Office of 

the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security asked the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to examine the 

nature of the corruption problem within this eBP workforce and existing vulnerabilities. 

Specifically, eBP asked the Institute to evaluate existing integrity and counter-corruption 

programs within eBP, provide feedback on their effectiveness, identify areas of 

vulnerability, and recommend best practices and strategies for improving or replacing 

existing programs. 

The focus ofthis study is the law enforcement eBP workforce-CBP officers and Border 

Patrol agents-primarily at and between land ports of entry along the U.S. Southwest 

border. 

Background 

eBP is the largest unifonned federal law enforcement agency in the country, with about 

59,000 employees. Law enforcement elements comprise the vast majority of this 

workforce, broken down as follows: 

• 20,500 Border Patrol agents between the ports of entry (POEs) 

20,600 eBP officers at air, land, and sea ports of entry 

2,300 agricultural specialists 

1,200 Air and Marine officersl 

As a component of DHS, eBP is specifically charged with border and port security and 

administration and enforcement of customs and immigration laws and regulations. eB P 

employees routinely and frequently are in contact with both U.S. citizens and foreign 

nationals. In fiscal year (FY) 2009 alone, CBP officers and agents 

• processed more than 352 million travelers at POEs; 

apprehended 463,000 illegal aliens at the border; 

• arrested more than 84,000 fugitives wanted for crimes including murder, rape, 

and child molestation; 

• seized more than 1.7 million prohibited agricultural materials and by-products; 

and 

1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Fiscal Year 20 10 

Accomplishments" (briefing, released March 2011). 

3 
124 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

• intercepted more than $147 million in currency.2 

The deployment of DHS technology, physical infrastructure, and manpower to counter 

smuggling along the border has made it more difficult for drug trafficking and other 

transnational criminal organizations to conduct their illicit activities. This had led these 

organizations to infiltrate CBP tnrough conspired hiring operations and compromise of 

the agency's existing officers and agents. The overwhelming majority of CBP officers 

and agents demonstrate the highest levels of integrity and perfonn their duties with honor 

and distinction every day, but isolated acts of corruption do occur. Since October I, 2004, 

134 CBP agents and officers have been arrested, charged with, and convicted of missioncritical corruption charges, including bribery, alien and/or narcotics smuggling, 

conspiracy, and fraud.] This is a small minority of the workforce, but it represents a threat 

to our national security-hence CBP's move to ask the Institute to study this corruption 

problem. 

Scope 

This study focuses on workforce integrity and, more specifically, law enforcement 

workforce integrity. For the purposes of this study, integrity is regarded as: 

A series of concepts and beliefs that, combined, provide structure 10 an agency's 

operation and officers' professional and personal ethics. These concepts and 

beliefs include, but are not limited to, honesty, honor, morality, allegiance, 

principled behavior, and dedication to mission.4 

Given the relatively short six-month duration of the project and resources made available 

for the work, the study team conducted a high-level analysis across the agency, rather 

than in-depth case-study analyses on how CBP is handling its workforce corruption 

problem. Due to these limitations, anecdotal infonnation corroborated by multiple 

sources was applied to some findings. 

Methodology 

The study team characterized workforce ethics, integrity, and corruption through research 

of relevant open source studies, authoritative documentation, and other materials.' 

Interviews with key CBP officials and their interagency partners involved in workforce 

integrity and corruption issues provided background and context for the work. Those 

discussions also offered infonned perspectives on coordination, interactions, and 

constraints in dealing with workforce corruption and integrity matters, as well as issues 

for further exploration. (A list of standard questions used in the initial CBP interviews 

2 Ibid. 

leBP Office ofIntemal Affairs, reported as of November 11,2011. 

4 Stephen 1. Gaffigan and Phyllis P. McDonald, &I.D., "Police Integrity: Public Service with 

Honor," National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of justice, NJe 163811 (January 1997), 

www.ncjrs.govfpdffilesf163811.pdf. 

l Much of this research was completed under the Institute's Workforce Integrity and Ethics 

Analysis core task. 

4 
125 

___ ~U_.~~II.::;~!; ')11<1 tloHf~! • .f'rotectio/J (CBP) Workfol';(~ Integrity :;t 11(1y 

appears in appendix A. A listing of CBP offices and activities, and federal interagency 

counterparts consulted over the course of the study appears in appendix B. 6) 

Based on the initial findings derived from the opening interviews, the team studied and 

assessed CBP workforce integrity and counter-comlption programs and initiatives to 

identifY vulnerabilities and possible solutions. The team then augmented its preliminary 

research and findings with further targeted study and consultations with subject matter 

experts. The aim was to identifY relevant best practices and make recommendations 

regarding how to optimize CBP's programs, processes and technologies for countering 

corruption and heightening workforce integrity. This final report is a comprehensive 

summary of the work perfonned, findings, and recommendations. 

The sponsor tasked the study team to direct the aforementioned efforts in the following 

five focal areas. 

1. CBP Operational and Organizational Structure. The initial intra-agency and 

interagency consultations provided background necessary to examine the existing 

internal and external CBP organizational structures for maintaining workforce 

integrity, and investigating and dealing with allegations of misconduct against 

CBP employees. 

2. Employee Recruitment and Vetting Process. The study team explored the process 

to identifY potential vulnerabilities in existing employee recruitment and vetting 

procedures, including the process, frequency, and types of data collected during 

background investigations and re-investigations. 

3. Integrity Training Process and Programs. The team reviewed existing training 

programs to detennine the content and extent to which ethical behavior, 

workforce integrity, and counter-corruption themes are integrated into Border 

Patrol and Field Operations curricula and courseware at entry and supervisory 

levels. This sub-task also considered continuing profeSSional education as well as 

messaging programs to reinforce integrity and counter-corruption themes within 

the CBP workforce. 7 

4. Metrics and Information Sharing Process. The study team evaluated CBP's 

existing metrics for identifYing and determining the level of corruption and 

measures of discipline in the workforce. 

5. Prevention, Detection, Monitoring, and Investigation Process. This broad subtask considered over forty programs and initiatives across the agency in 

6 The CBP employee labor unions-the National Border Patrol Council and the National Treasury 

Employees Union-did not reply to the srudy team's request for interviews in time for this 

report. 

7 The study team was unable to visit training facilities and witness classroom instruction due to 

constraints on time and travel. 

5 
126 

determining their effectiveness. A listing of those programs and initiatives 

appears at appendix C.' 

In order to meet these requirements and attain the desired outcomes, the Institute 

assembled a team of seasoned analysts, some of whom have law enforcement and 

vulnerability assessment experience and have worked with CBP officials on related 

projects. We collaborated with Hillard Heintze, a highly experienced firm oflaw 

enforcement (LE) and organizational security professionals uniquely well-suited to 

partner with the Institute on the study. The Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council 

(SLC) is an independent cOWlcil of retired federal, state and major city police chiefs and 

law enforcement executives dedicated to advancing excellence in policing and public 

safety. SLC subject matter experts focus on law enforcement and security issues ranging 

from ethics, integrity and public trust to law enforcement technologies, workforce 

management systems and best practices. In addition to the data collected, we relied 

heavily on the judgment of Hillard Heintze and its SLC in particular on whether or not a 

CBP activity constituted a best practice. Appendix D profiles Hillard Heintze and its 

contributors to this project. 

Report Structure 

As noted above, the report progresses through the five sponsor-directed focal areas, first 

otTering a brief statement of the team's findings and recommendations in each area. A 

discussion of each of those findings-how the team arrived at each recommendation 

(analyzing current practices, efficiencies, etc.)--follows. That discussion of each finding 

then concludes with a full explanation of each recommendation-actions, strategies, 

and/or best practices-that CBP should focus on to optimize the agency's workforce 

integrity and counter-corruption programs, processes, and technologies. 

The conclusion of this report summarizes the key findings and recommendations, and 

suggests areas for further study that were beyond the scope of this project. Appendices E 

through H otTer further detailed listings and ancillary treatments of topics (e.g., the CBP 

Disciplinary Flow Chart) not accommodated in the body of the report. 

, Appendix C is an adaptation ofa lune 2011 "Current CBP Corruption and Integrity Initiatives" 

matrix developed by the Office of Human Resource Management Labor and Employee Relations 

Division. 

6 
127 

__ {~5_ Custom',· illld Bo(der Protecti()/J (~:!!.!::.) WorktorCf! Irrteyu!y SIUflY 

SECTION I. CBP OPERATIONAL AND 

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 

We examined the existing internal and external CB P organizational structures9 for 

maintaining workforce integrity, and for investigating and dealing with allegations of 

misconduct against CBP employees. That led the study team throughout the CBP 

organization and across the federal interagency to broadly survey existing approaches to 

workforce integrity and counter-conuption measures, and perspectives on efficiencies 

(and inefficiencies) in various processes. Further research and analysis, plus consultations 

with subject matter experts, complemented the initial discussions. 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations 

• There is no comprehensive guidance for integrity programs and initiatives across 

the CBP organization. CBP therefore should implement an agency-wide 

workforce integrity strategy--one that establishes and articulates core concepts, 

approaches, control mechanisms, roles and responsibilities. 

• The CBP's disciplinary system has so many processes that it does not foster 

timely discipline or exoneration. The agency therefore should rethink its 

disciplinary system toward more efficiency. 

• The number of open cases and the protracted periods until many of them are 

closed (if ever) attest to the inefficiencies of the present DHS Office ofInspector 

General (DIG) - CBP organizational structure. The Commissioner should 

approach DHS leadership to change that structure for more efficient reporting, 

assignment, investigation and disposition ofCBP workforce investigations. 

• The FBI-led border corruption task forces (BCTFs) are effective in countering 

public corruption on the borders, including the corruption of CBP employees. 

The continued inclusion of CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA) special agents in 

the national and regional BCTFs will foster effective criminal investigations and 

introduce efficiencies in combined counter-corruption efforts. 

The following is a discussion, in order, of those findings and recommendations. 

CBP Workforce Integrity Strategy 

Discussion of Findings 

In discussing the workforce integrity/counter-corruption enterprise with personnel across 

the agency, the study team looked for comprehensive guidance on the subject and found 

none. We learned of many programs and initiatives to address these matters, but saw that 

9 Internal organizational structures reside within the agency; external structures extend beyond the 

agency. 

7 
128 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

these ongoing actions were largely distinct and independent of one another. We asked 

interviewees, "Where is the nexus of the workforce integrity/counter-corruption 

enterprise within CBP?" and did not get a ready articulation of the answer. 

Even the word "integrity" is unclear among CBP personnel. While "integrity" is often 

mentioned, including in the CBP core values, we did not find an agency-wide definition 

of this fundamental principle. 10 Our research confirmed that the proverbial "code of 

silence"--an unwritten rule not to report another colleague's errors, misconducts or 

crimes-is common within the law enforcement profession. II Multiple agency 

interviewees indicated anecdotally that it exists within CBP. Our review of many CBP 

papers, pamphlets, and quick-reference cards that address workforce integrity did not 

address this "code." The "code" presents an insidious challenge to workforce integrity, 

and requires explicit, targeted and sustained attention. 

CSP's sustained attention to workforce integrity activities is itself a challenge. There are 

over forty workforce integrity and counter-corruption programs and initiatives across the 

agency.12 There is no central coordination of these related and dynamic activities. While 

much communication and information sharing occurs across the organization, many of 

these exchanges are informal and personality based, and assurances that the right 

information is getting to the right parties are lacking. 

What coordination of the many programs and initiatives does exist is splintered. Formal 

workforce integrity and counter-corruption training, for example, is administered by no 

less than five different entities, yet there is no mechanism to ensure that the training 

themes are consistent across all training efforts. 13 Lines of responsibility are not always 

clearly defined, which presents the potential for redundancies and unintended 

interference. For example, it is not clear when the Office of Field Operations (OFO) 

Analytical Management Control System Office (AMSCO) analysis of a workplace data 

anomaly ends and the OIA investigation of potential employee malfeasance begins. An 

articulation of roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication across the workforce 

integrity - counter-corruption enterprise is necessary. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CDr should Implement an agency-wide workforce integrity strategy---ilne that 

establishes and articulates core concepts, approaches, control mechanisms, roles aDd 

responsibilities. The insidious "code of silence," for one, requires explicit, targeted and 

10 A flashcard distributed within the agency listing fifty qualities with definitions that describe an 

ideal agent or officer does not list or define "integrity." 

1 I Neal Trautman, "Police Code of Silence Facts Revealed," Paper for the Annual Conference of 

the International Association of Police Chiefs, The National Institute of Ethics, 2000, 

http://www·aele.org/loscode2000.html. 

12 Appendix C contains lists and briefly describes these programs. 

13 Fonnal integrity and counter-corruption training is developed and provided to the workforce by 

the following: the Office of Training and Development, OIA Integrity Programs Division; Field 

Operations (FO) and Border Patrol academies; OIA special agents; DHS 010 special agents; and 

CBP supervisors and FO integrity officers at shift musters. 

8 
129 

sustained attention-the kind of attention that a strategy like this would give the agency's 

workforce integrity/counter-corruption efforts. The study team recommends that the CBP 

commissioner consider chartering a cross-agency working group to develop and maintain 

this strategy.14 We believe the Commissioner BeTSin's March 2011 "Statement of Policy 

and Intent: Integrity" provides an excellent prologue to such a strategy and, furthermore, 

establishes that office as the much-needed nexus of the workforce integrity/countercorruption enterprise. Figure I outlines what that strategy might include. 

Workforce Integrity Strategy Outline 

• Commissioner's Statement 

a Clearly articulated, agency-wide definition of integrity 

a Declaration of organizational culture of integrity 

a Integrity initiatives, goals, and principles 

a Establishment of lines of criminal behavior, strict 

accountability, and punishment 

Articulation of "Bright Line" misconduct 

'Code of silence" unacceptable 

• Central coordination of integrity and counter-corruption programs 

and initiatives 

a Control mechanisms 

• Information sharing and communications protocols 

• Recruitment and vetting approaches and programs 

• Training and education approaches and programs 

• Professional development approaches and programs 

• Roles and responsibilities 

Figure 1. Workforce Integrity Strategy Outline 

The cross-agency working group we suggest for developing the strategy might be internal 

to the CBP Integrity Integrated Policy Coordination Committee (Integrity IPCC), with a 

dedicated support element. 

CBP Disciplinary System 

Discussion of Findings 

Discipline implies the systematic conduct of an organization'S enterprise by its members 

adhering to essential rules and regulations. Employee behavior is the basis of discipline in 

an organization, entailing compliance with the organization's code of conduct. Such 

discipline promotes productivity and efficiency, and encourages harmony and 

cooperation among the workforce. Key to the etTectiveness of an organization's 

14 Incidental to our research, the study team learned that the CBP Strategic Plan/or 2009-20/4 

calls for "a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates prevention, detection, and 

investigation." 

9 
130 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

disciplinary system is timely action to correct a condition when a breach of the code of 

conduct has occurred. I' 

The CBP disciplinary system has many processes-each taking time; some less efficient 

than others-that, in total, do not foster timely discipline or exoneration. The net result is 

a compromised management tool with detrimental effects not only on workforce integrity 

but also on employee morale. 16 The CBP Disciplinary Flow Diagram at appendix E 

depicts the many processes which a disciplinary case may go through. Misconduct 

incidents that are considered non-reportable under CBP OIA guidelines can be managed 

efficiently at the local, supervisory level. The nature of these non-reportable offenses 

warrants non-adverse disciplinary actions. 17 Those instances of misconduct deemed 

reportable may be subject to a number of processes at the CBP Headquarters level and 

above. 

The reporting of a misconduct incident to the CBP OIA - Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Office of Professional Responsibility (ICE OPR) loint Intake Center (JIC) 

initiates a number of reviews adding up to a lengthy process. Current guidance requires 

that all incidents reported to the IIC be referred to the DHS OIG within five days of 

receipt. Those referrals are forwarded through the ICE OPR Case Management Group 

(CMG), which screens cases for data integrity and proper classification. Upon receipt of 

the case file, the DHS OIG will, in tum, notifY the IIC within five working days if it will 

retain the case for investigation or refer it to ICE OPR for disposition. IS Cases referred to 

ICE OPR (again through the CMG) are either retained for investigation of criminal 

allegations or referred to CBP OJA for lesser offenses. 19 

DHS OIG has demonstrated a practice of retaining a broad spectrum of cases of both 

criminal and non-criminal allegations. Currently, the DHS OIG maintains an inventory of 

well over 1,000 cases20 involving CBP employees, some dating back to 2004.21 This 

backlog presents the most significant impediment to timely disposition of CBP 

disciplinary cases. ICE OPR is currently investigating about 140 cases involving criminal 

allegations against CBP employees in cooperation with CBP IA special agent detailees, 

and strives to close cases within established CBP orA goals. 22 CBP OIA's goal for 

15 "Employee Discipline and Features ofa Sound Disciplinary System," Management Study 

Guide, hl1p:llwww.managementstudyguide.comlemployee-discjpline.htm. accessed on 

November 25,2011. 

i6 The 2011 CBP Employee Viewpoint Survey rated among the most negative responses: WSteps 

are taken to deal with poor performers ~ 28%." 

11 Non-adverse disciplinary actions include letters of reprimand up to a 14-day suspension. 

is See DBS Management Directive 0810.1, "The Office of the Inspector General," Appendix A, 

June 2011. 

19 See DHS Delegation Number 7030.2, "Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary for 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement," Article 2(E), November 13, 2004. 

20 Case inventory refers to currently open, active investigations. 

2i Interview with ICE OPR ~ CBP OIA Joint Intake Center staff, October 6, 2011. 

22 Ibid. 

10 
131 

U.S. Customs ilnd I:lo/(ier ProU~d/()'1 (U3FJ) Workfon:o integrity Study 

investigation of allegations against eBP employees is 90 to 120 days; it currently has 860 

active cases of a broad range of malli:asance allegations. 23 

All instances of misconduct reported to the He and the results of investigations of eBP 

employees are referred to the eBP Office of Human Resources Management Labor and 

Employee Relations Division (HRM LER) for disposition. LER remands cases that do 

not warrant proposed adverse action to the respective principal field officer/principal 

headquarters officer (PFOIPHO) for appropriate lesser action. LER prepares any case 

warranting adverse action for presentation to a Discipline Review Board (DRB).24 

(Figure 2 provides the time frame from the incident date to receipt in LER for review.) 

DRBs are three-person boards ofOS-14, OS-15, and Senior Executive Service (SES) 

managers and supervisors who serve as a collateral duty under appointment by their 

PFOIPHO. Boards meet about every four weeks with an average of fifteen cases 

reviewed per session.n (Figure 3 profiles the timeliness of the DRB process.) 

r TIMELINESS PRIOR TO THE DISCIPLINE REVIEW BOARD I 

SESSION 

Of all cases presented to the ORB, the time frame from incident date to 

receipt in LER for review is as follows: 

• 42% cases received within six months of the incident (52% 

In FY-09) 

• 28% cases received between six months and one year of 

the incident (29% in FY-09) 

• 17% cases received between one and two years of the 

incident (14% in FY-09 

13% cases received after two years of the incident (5% in 

FY-09) 

Figure 2. Timeliness Prior to Discipline Review Board Sessionl6 

2J Ibid. 

24 Adverse action is defined as a removal, reduction in grade or pay, or a suspension of more than 

14 days. For a detailed discussion of the DRB process see "U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Discipline Review Board," Directive No. 51751-002A, June 21, 2004. 

250ffice of Human Resources Management Employee Relations Division, US. Cus/oms and 

Border Pro/ection Discipline Repor/jor Fiscal Year 2010, slide 35. Due to study time and 

resource constraints, we could not independently verify the CBP statistics. A more detailed 

analysis should rely on primary data sources. 

26 Ibid, slide 31. 

11 
132 

I),S :,tI~(um,; Wlf/ BOHler i'rutecilon ICBP) Wor}{tolce IlIIewity"'::::'_:_d .. ', __ _ 

TIMELINESS OF THE DISCIPLINE REVIEW BOARD I PROCESS , 

Average Number Fiscal Year J Fiscal Year I Change I I 

of days for: 2009 2010 2009 to 2010 I --

, ORB to Counsel 1_~_d_aY!-S'---1_--=-14_.,-9c-=d:.:-a~y..:.s_-+ __ -.--=1_.9,-d.=.a,,-,y,-,s'-----;1 

I-coun,., Review 13.7 d.y. 16.4 da,.. I 2.7 day~ , DRS to Issuance 

of Proposal 51.6 days I 46.9 days -4.7 days 

,- ORB to Final I l 

152.1 days I 151.6 days I -0.5 days ' , Decision I I 

I.While there are significant decreases in the amount of time to process a case through 

I the issuance of the proposal letter, there is only a small decrease in the length of time 

, to process a case based on delays caused by union information requests, scheduling 

i oral replies, Douglas Factor discussions, and changes of Deciding Officials, 

Figure 3. TImeliness of the Discipline Review Board Process" 

Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the protracted amount of time it takes from the date of an 

incident to the actual meting out ofpunislunent-from months to years, These lengthy 

periods pose challenges to CBP management in maintaining the security mission, good 

order, and discipline--that is, this problem challenges workforce integrity, which stands 

to incite or facilitate corruption. The following explains: 

• CBP employees suspected of corruption may remain in critical security positions 

until allegations are proven or disproven, or criminal investigations gain 

sufficient evidence or grounds for prosecution, 

• CBP employees found innocent ofaJlegations may have had their professional 

reputations tainted and advancement impeded by lengthy leave and 

administrative duties, suspension, andlor reassignment. 

• Fellow CBP employees aware of a colleague under suspicion and observant of an 

apparent lack of action on the part of management and law enforcement may 

consider the enforcement system "broken" and disregard professional 

responsibilities to report malfeasance. 

• Lengthy times may violate norms of speedy disposition of cases and lead to the 

subject "walking" without receiving final discipline appropriate for the 

misconduct. 

27 Ibid, slide 32. 

12 
133 

___ us" Customs and Border PrcWC(101I (eBl') WarMoree Integrity Study ....... _n . .. ._ ... M','*_t ...... ·III'IiW... __ 111_,_ 

Furthermore, the LER-DRB process itself is flawed. Initially established by the U.S. 

Customs Service in 1999 to service a population of 22,000 employees, the process now 

deals with a 59,000-member workforce, many of whom operate in a highly volatile 

border environment. LER staffis overburdened with case loads. The 151 days in FY 10 

from "Discipline review Board to Final Decision" shown in Figure 3 reflect the 

inordinate amount of time it takes to get to the final decision----due to labor union 

requests, oral replies, Douglas Factor documentation,28 deciding official penalty changes, 

and other administrative processes. 

Discussion of Recom mendation 

The agency should rethink its disciplinary processes toward more efficiency. Process 

improvements should include realistic timelines to ensure that cases are tracked and 

receive due, timely attention. Reforms should give greater delegation of disciplinary 

authorities to PFOsIPHOs-to allow more administration of discipline at the local level 

and lessen headquarters requirements. A review of FY I 0 ORB sessions and proposals or 

related actions (see figure 4) suggests that penalties up to and including long suspensions 

could be administered at the PFOIPHO level to allow more timely discipline in those 

cases, and to ease the caseload of the LER staff. Cases in which the employee admits to 

having committed the offense and accepts the penalty offered by the PFOIPHO should be 

handled at the PFO/PHO level and not require a ORB review . 

• DISCIPLINE REVIEW BOARD SESSIONS AND PROPOSALS/ACTIONS I 

21 Boards convened (Includes 5 special boards) 

• 273 Cases presented to Discipline Review Board 

o 167 Removals 

o 7 Demotions/demotions with suspensions 

o 37 Long suspensions 

o 34 Short suspensions 

o 6 Letters of reprimand 

o 9 Letters of counseling/letters of caution 

l o 11 No action 

Figure 4. Discipline Review Board Sessions and Proposais/Actions for FYI019 

These delegations would give the senior officials more authority to manage their 

workforces, and offer significant efficiencies to the process. The local LER and Office of 

2g "Douglas Factors" are criteria established by the Merit Systems Protection Board that 

supervisors or, in some instances, deciding officials must consider in determining an appropriate 

penalty to impose for an act of employee misconduct. 

29 Office of Human Resources Management Employee Relations Division, Us. Customs and 

Border Protection Discipline Report/or Fiscal Year 2010, slide 30. 

13 
134 

Chief Counsel representatives would continue to advise the deciding official and review 

case penalties for consistency and propriety. 

CBP should undertake a study to consider these and other revisions to the current CBP 

disciplinary system. 

DRS OIG - CBP Organizational Structure 

Discussion of Findings 

In the initial organization of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, the "Bureau 

of Customs and Border Protection" (CBP) brought together approximately 30,000 

employees including 17,000 inspectors in the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection 

program, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) inspection services, Border 

Patrol, and Customs Service. This new bureau focused its operations on the movement of 

goods and people across U.S. borders, and the enforcement of applicable laws and 

regulations. 3D A "Bureau oflmmigration and Customs Enforcement" (ICE) organized the 

enforcement and investigative arms of the Customs Service, and the investigative and 

enforcement functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal 

Protective Services (FPS). The reorgani7-3tion involved approximately 14,000 employees 

to focus on the mission of enforcing the full range of immigration and customs laws 

within the interior of the United States in addition to protecting specified buildings. By 

unifying previously fragmented investigative functions, ICE would enhance information 

sharing with the FBI and develop stronger relationships with the U.S. Attorney's Office.lI 

This early reorganization ofDHS border-related functions left CBP-the nation's largest 

law enforcement agency-without an internal investigative capability.32 DHS organizers 

thought, at that time, that CBP's internal investigative needs would be met by other 

resources. DHS Management Directive 0810.1, dated June 2004, gave the department's 

Office of Inspector General the authority to accept and retain a broad range of allegations 

of criminal and non-criminal misconduct ofCBP employees for investigation?3 The DHS 

Secretary's Delegation Number 7030.2 gave the Assistant Secretary of ICE the authority 

to investigate allegations of misconduct against officers, agents, and employees of CBP." 

In practice, ICE OPR investigates allegations ofCBP employee misconduct referred by 

DHSOIG. 

The reliance upon external organizations for CBP's internal corruption investigations 

contravenes the conventional federal law enforcement model for internal affairs. That 

30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Border Reorganization Fact Sheet," January 30, 2003, 

http:/www.xnews/releases/pressJelease_0073.shlm. 

31 Ibid. ICE has ceded the practice of sharing DHS employee-related infonnation with FBI to DHS 

OIG. 

n CBP retained a small staff of about eight persons to conduct internal inspections. 

13 DHS, "Office of Inspector General," MD 0810.1, June 2004. 

]4 Department of Homeland Security, "Delegation Number 7030.2: Delegation of Authority to the 

Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement," Article 2(E), November 

13,2004. 

14 
135 

~~l.a 

V.S. ClJstOIiiS ami Bonier PrulPc(/[J(/ (CBP! \I'/')II-(')I'r'(, ItHp.!I';(y' "leidy '01 ~~~'Il!I!I~" _______ _ 

model calls for the placement of the internal investigative function within the agency 

which bears the strongest institutional interest in deterring and detecting corrupt behavior. 

The Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, Coast Guard and ICE 

maintain internal criminal investigative capabilities within their respective organizations. 

CBP, which operates in a high threat and corruption prone border environment, requires 

these same capabilities. 

In 2003, one of the reasons put forward by then-CBP Commissioner Robert C. Bonner 

for not splitting off INS and Customs special agents into a separate investigative agency 

was that such a move would seriously undermine CBP and the commissioner's ability to 

ensure workforce integrity. 15 This matter was even more vital given the national security 

implications of a corrupt CBP frontline officer in collusion with terrorists or other 

criminal elements. The foremost concern was that failure to implement a fully functional 

internal investigative capability within CBP would likely make it impossible for the 

commissioner to contain, control, deter, and eradicate corrupt frontline border officers. 

The fact that 134 current or former CBP employees have been arrested or indicted on 

corruption-related charges since October I, 2004 validates Commissioner Bonner's 

concerns. 

To countermand these threats to U.S. national security and the CllP workforce, CBP's 

Office of Internal Affair.> has, since 2006, hired over 200 special agents to constitute an 

intra-agency investigative capability. These agents on average possess more than 20 

years of experience as investigators in a variety of federal law enforcement agencies. 

Investigative per.>onnel are stationed at 22 field offices located across the nation.3E CllP 

IA special agents work co\laboratively with the FBI as part of the National Border 

Corruption Task Force (NBCTF), participating in 21 FBI-led border corruption task 

forces and/or public corruption task forces nationwide.37 

Over the year.>, CBP commissioners have requested the Department of Homeland 

Security's permission to delegate to this highly qualified force full investigative 

authorities, while at the same time complying with prerogatives provided to DHS OIG 

under the Inspector General Act of 1978, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and DHS 

Management Directive 0810.1. In July 2008, then-Commissioner W. Ralph Basham 

requested permission to convert lA's OS-180 I general investigators to OS-ISII criminal 

investigators to give CBP those full investigative authorities. Then-Secretary of 

Homeland Security Michael Chertoff denied that request, reasoning that border-related 

criminal investigative functions had been vested in ICE, and expressing concerns about 

potential overlap in ICE and CBP missions.'s The Secretary noted that "it is axiomatic 

3' U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office ofIntemal Affairs Study, November 2004. 

36 The CBP Statement of Objectives for this task contains these facts and figures. 

31 This cooperative arrangement is under review as a condition of the "Memorandum of 

Understanding between U.S. Department of Homeland Security Inspector General and U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection on Border corrupiion Initiative," August 12, 20 II. 

38 Department of Homeland Security Office ofInspector General, "CBP Corruption Investigations 

to the House Appropriations Committee staff" (briefing, 2011). 

15 
136 

that border-related corruption will be tied to potential violations of core ICE smuggling 

and trafficking statues. ,,39 In the course of the research for this report, the Institute study 

team did not find any evidence substantiating that assumption. Such a predicament 

illustrates that, insofar as CBP IA investigative resources lack any authorities they need, 

the full potential of those resources remains unrealized. 

The DHS OIG, meanwhile, remains the more fully vested authority in investigations 

concerning CBP workforce-and the case load represents a significant backlog. The 

intent ofDHS Management Directive 0810.1 is for the OIG to serve as the primary entity 

within DHS for investigating all criminal allegations of waste, fraud, abuse and 

mismanagement, allegations of misconduct against all political appointees and personnel 

at the level of GS-15 and above, and any allegations that indicate systemic problems 

within the department or otherwise affect public health or safety .40 As noted above, the 

Inspector General Act, Homeland Security Act, and Delegation Number 7030.2 further 

vest investigative authority in the DHS OIG, with the ICE OPR having authority to 

investigate those allegations involving CBP and ICE employees referred to it by 01G.41 

In practice, DHS OIG accepts cases involving both criminal and non-criminal allegations 

against all grades ofCBP employees. The study team could not correlate the OIG 

acceptance of these cases to any particular pattern or rationale. Of the remaining cases 

referred by OIG to ICE OPR, OPR retains the cases of criminal allegations and refers the 

non-criminal cases to CBP OIA for investigation. Table I illustrates DHS investigative 

resources, workforce populations serviced by those resources, and current CBP case 

inventories. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Ibid. 

41 Ibid. 

16 
137 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

Table 1. DHS Investigative Resources and Case Inventories41 

DHSOffice Workforce I Agents Workforce - CBPCase Notes Population i Assigned Agent Ratio Inventories --- - i I Workforce 

population not 

DHSOIG 225,000 213 1,056:1 1,330 inclusive of 

200,000DHS 

contractors 

I i Workforce I population I 

I I includes 59,000 

I ICE OPR 79,000 230/256 343:1/309:1 140 CBP employees; 

assigned agents 

I and ratios renect 

I without and with 

28 CBP detailees 

I 

I I 

Criminal and non- CBP OIA I 59,000 210 281:1 860 criminal cases 

As Table 1 illustrates, the inventory ofCBP cases that DHS OIG currently holds is 

exorbitant.43 These backlogs represent months to years taken to close investigations,44 

presenting significant workforce management challenges for the CBP commissioner. 

Some measures have been taken to alleviate CBP case backlogs. In December 2010, the 

ICE director and CBP commissioner signed a memorandum of WIder standing (MOU) 

that allowed for CBP IA agents to augment ICE aPR agents in the investigation of 

criminal allegations against CBP employees. Under the terms of that agreement, "CBP IA 

agents are authorized to exercise the full range of their authority as federal law 

enforcement officers WIder the direct supervision of the presiding aPR manager .... ,,4~ 

Since the signing oftha! MOU, CBP disciplinary functionaries have noted more timely 

submissions of investigation reporting from ICE OPR_ 

42 As a point of reference, prior to the DRS reorganization, the Customs Office of Internal Affairs 

was staffed with approximately 162 criminal investigators who investigated allegations of 

corruption within a legacy workforce of 22,000 employees. This represented an approximate 

ratio of I investigator for every 136 employees. 

43 These statistics are derived from cases processed through the ICE OPR - CBP OIA Joint Intake 

Center (TIC). -These statistics do not include allegations against CBP employees reported 

directly to DHS OIG for which neither the TIC nor CBP have any visibility or awareness. 

44 Seethe discussion of disciplinary process investigations on p. 16. 

45 ICE Director John Morton and CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin, "Memorandum of 

Understanding Between U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection," December 2010. 

17 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 
138 

Then, on August 12,2011, the CBP commissioner and DHS Inspector General signed a 

memorandwn of understanding under which CBP IA detailees to OIG field locations will 

similarly "assist and meaningfully participate in the investigation of each border-related 

criminal misconduct case in which a CBP employee or contractor is subject to a criminal 

investigation .... Such participation will be under the supervision and direction of OIG 

INY (Office ofInvestigations) ... .'''' CBP OIA and DHS OIG are presently engaged in a 

small pilot program based on this MOU, prior to full implementation of the tenns of the 

MOU. Nonetheless, case backlogs persist. 

Both of these MOU arrangements represent patchwork attempts to address the 

unintended consequences of a DHS OIG - CBP organizational structure developed in 

2003 that now, eight years later, has proven to be largely ineffective. The scrutiny applied 

in the ICE OPR and DHS OIG acceptance ofCBP IA detailees bears testimony to their 

professional qualifications. However, in their "under direct supervision" and "assist and 

meaningfully participate" roles, IA detailees are constrained in applying their full 

capabilities and potential. The detailing of CBP lA investigators to other organizations in 

order to conduct criminal investigations on CBP employees defies the common logic of 

the federal investigative arena-where, as noted earlier, organizations like the 

Transportation Security Administration maintain internal criminal investigative 

capabilities within their respective organizations. 

To effectively manage the CBP workforce, including monitoring and addressing integrity 

and counter-corruption concerns, the CBP commissioner and his management team 

require full situational awareness, which comes from the reporting of disciplinary 

incidents and criminal investigations through the lIC. However, as noted above, 

allegations ofCBP employee misconduct may in fact be reported directly to DHS OIG. 

In such instances, the DHS OIG has not shared that information with the CBP 

commissioner-who therefore remains unaware of the existence of such cases and their 

disposition. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

The Commissioner should approach DRS leadership to cbange the existing DBS 

DIG - CBP organizational structure for the reporting, assignment, investigation 

and disposition of CBP workforce investigations. The number of open cases, for one, 

and the protracted periods until many of them are closed (if ever) attest to the 

inefficiencies of the present DHS OIG - CBP organizational structure. Further, the 

restrictions placed on a highly qualified cadre ofCBP IA special investigators who have 

proven their professional qualifications and skills, cause suboptimal utilization of this 

valuable counter-corruption asset. Finally, the CBP commissioner, who is ultimately 

responsible for the workforce and its integrity, should be fully cognizant ofthe ongoing 

cases against his employees; to address the workforce corruption problem, he must know 

46 DHS Inspector General Charles K. Edwards and CBP Commissioner Alan D. Bersin, 

"Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Department of Homeland Security Inspector 

General and U.S. Customs and Border Protection on Border Corruption [nitiative," August 12, 

201 I. 

18 
139 

___ ',!~~=:::!Jd l~~~,:!!:;_P ... /_O_ie_'(_:t_io_n_I:..'C_B_P~)_W_O;..'k_f_(J_'~..;'e .... 1;..II.;.r.;;;eg;:.;r_it .. Y_'';,;..'t_/I..;,d.:.~'_, 

the extent of the problem. The DHS OIG practice of withholding from the CBP 

commissioner infonnation on CBP corruption cases is not in the best interests of the 

agency or the department. The DHS OlG - CBP MOU allows CBP IA detailees to report 

cases involving CBP employees to the commissioner. Its provisions also state, "OIG is 

committed to providing CBP with full awareness of border-related criminal misconduct 

cases for which OIG is the lead investigative agency.,,47 DHS OIG has yet to 

demonstrate that commitment. 

The CBP commissioner should consider further developing these issues and additional 

reasoning, The commissioner could then bring forward to DHS leadership the rationale 

for implementing a fully functional CBP internal affairs office----to include the capability 

to conduct independent criminal investigations ofCBP employees. The provisions of the 

Inspector General Act, Homeland Security Act, and Management Directive 0810.1 

accommodate this proposal. 

While previous commissioners at the agency have presented much of the same reasoning 

in making their cases for such changes to the organizational structure, circumstances have 

changed. Failing to provide the commissioner the necessary capabilities and situational 

awareness to eliminate corruption in a workforce that operates in a high-threat 

environment, the existing DHS OlG - CBP organizational structure has clearly 

demonstrated, over eight years, that it is ill-suited for present circumstances. 

Border Co"uption Task Force 

Discussion of Findings 

The FBI organized border corruption task forces (BCTFs) counter public corruption on 

the border-including the corruption of CBP employees. That fact alone warrants 

discussion of CBP IA special agents' participation in the BCTFs to address the agency's 

corruption problem. 

Cooperation among law enforcement agencies at all levels represents an important 

component of a comprehensive response to terrorism, organized crime and public 

corruption. The FBI-led task force concept has proven effective in a number of 

applications, combining federal, state and local resources to leverage one another's 

unique capabilities and adds synergies to criminal investigations. By combining the assets 

of multiple law enforcement agencies in a common pursuit, task forces serve as force 

multipliers. 

The task force concept increases the effectiveness and productivity of limited personnel 

and logistical resources, avoids duplication ofinvestigations and consequent wasteful 

expenditure of resources in matters of concurrent jurisdiction, and expands the 

cooperation and communication among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. 

Federal elements of the task force allow the application of sophisticated investigative 

techniques nonnally associated with complex organized crime and racketeering 

47 Ibid. 

19 
140 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

investigations. Such techniques are frequently unavailable to other federal, state and local 

members of the task force. 48 

Conversely, criminal investigations conducted independently ofthe task force and 

without full transparency between those agencies and the task force introduce a 

duplication of effort and lost efficiencies. Parallel, uncoordinated efforts risk exposing 

informants, compromising investigations and, in worst case situations, causing "blue-onblue" encounters. 49 

The Attorney General Guidelines read as follows about the FBI's responsibilities 

regarding investigations-indicating the bureau's prioritization of tackling corruption: 

The Department of Justice has primary responsibility for enforcement of 

violations of federal laws by prosecution in the United States district courts. The 

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation is charged with investigating violations of 

federal laws. Offices of the Inspector General have primary responsibility for the 

prevention and detection of waste and abuse, and concurrent responsibility for 

the prevention and detection of fraud and other criminal activity within their 

agencies and their agencies programs. 

As the primary investigative arm of the Department of Justice, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation has jurisdiction in all matters involving fraud against the 

Federal Government, and shares jurisdiction with Offices of Inspector General in 

the investigation offraud against the Office oflnspector General's agency.50 

Charged with the primary responsibility for investigating fraud, the FBI places particular 

emphasis on public corruption as their top criminal investigative priority. Corrupt public 

officials undermine national security, jeopardize safety, erode public trust and confidence 

in the federal government, and waste billion of dollars.'1 

BCTFs combine CBP IA special agents, the resources of the FBI, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of Inspections, and state and local 

48 Hearing on Combating Gang Violence in America: Examining Effective Federal, State and 

Local Law Enforcement Strategies before the Senate Judiciary Committee [lOg" Congress] 

(2003) (statement of Grant D. Ashley, Assistant Director Criminal Investigative Division, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation), bttp:lfwww.fbi.govfnewsftestimonvllhe-safe-streets-violentcrimes-initiative. 

49 "Blue-on-blue" is a common tenn in law enforcement thai describes the potential for a tragic act 

of violence that can potentially occur between law enforcement officers when they are not 

aware of each other's presence during an investigation. 

50 John Ashcroft, .. Attorney General Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with Statutory 

Law Enforcement Authority," Office of the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C., December 8, 2003. 

51 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Public Corruption: Why It's Our #1 Criminal Priority," 

http://www.tbLgov/news/stories/2010/march/corruption 032610, accessed on November 23, 

2011. 

20 
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

agencies to investigate public corruption along the borders. Twenty-one BCTFs exist 

today, thirteen of which are on the Southwest Border alone. Of the 700 FBI agents 

assigned to public corruption nationwide, approximately 120 of them are located in the 

Southwest region. Through this regional cooperation, more than 400 public corruption 

cases were originated, and in FY09 more than 100 arrests and about 130 state and federal 

cases were prosecuted n 

Assertions of the Secretary's "One Face at the Border" axiom applying to independent 

OHS investigations of criminal misconduct against OHS employees is totally out of 

context.53 On September 2, 2003, then-OHS Secretary Tom Ridge announced the "One 

Face at the Border" initiative, directed toward travelers and commerce crossing U.S. 

borders. The intent was to eliminate the previous separation of immigration, customs, and 

agriculture functions at U.S. land, sea, and air ports of entry, and institute a unified border 

inspection process.54 In fact, criminal investigations are conducted out of the public eye. 

When conducted efficiently, they require cooperation and coordination among numerous 

law enforcement organizations, including BCTF members, OHS, and its components. 

"One Face at the Border" is not a rationale for DHS and its components to conduct 

investigations into public corruption against its employees independent of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation and other agencies with cross-jurisdiction. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

The continued inclusion of CDP IA special agents in the national and regional 

BCTFs will foster effective criminal investigations and introduce efficiencies in 

combined counter-corruption efforts. The BCTFs have been effective in countering 

public corruption on the borders, including the corruption ofCBP employees. The DHS 

OIG - CBP MOU on Border Corruption Initiative recognizes CBP OIA' s agreements 

with the FBI's NBCTF and local BCTFs. Under the terms of the agreement (and in the 

absence of a separate MOU between OHS and the Department of Justice), CBP and OIG 

will provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with recommendations regarding CBP's 

continued participation in those task forces. Based on those recommendations, "the 

Secretary ofOHS or her designee will make a decision '" based on the Department's 

desire to ensure that all allegations of employee corruption are fully and promptly 

investigated."" The commissioner should recommend to the DHS leadership CBP's full 

participation in the national and regional BCTFs. 

52 Federal Bureau ofinvestigation, "On the Southwest Border - Public Corruption: A Few Bad 

Apples," http://www.fbi.gov/newslstoriesl2010Iaugust!southwest-border2, accessed on 

November 22, 2011. 

B See Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, "CBP Corruption 

Investigations to the House Appropriations Committee staff' (briefing, 2011), and DHS OIGCBPMOU. 

'4 Deborah Waller Meyers, "One Face at the Border; Behind the Slogan," Migration Policy 

Institute, Washington, D.C., June 2005, www.migrationpolicy.orglpubslMeYers Report.pdf. 

55 DHS OIG - CBP MOV. 

21 
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SECTION II. EMPLOYEE RECRUITMENT AND 

VETTING PROCESS 

We looked at the entire recruitment and vetting process to determine how integrity is 

incorporated into assessments of job candidates. We were interested in determining what, 

if any, vulnerabilities might exist that would allow corrupt individuals---{lr those with the 

potential for corruption-to enter the workforce. We also wanted to identify any 

limitations in the process, due to either internal or external factors. Finally, with the help 

of the Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council, we sought to determine if there were 

any best practices for vetting law enforcement personnel that could be useful to CBP in 

bolstering the candidate selection process. 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations 

• CBP should follow through with its intent to conduct entry level polygraph 

examinations prior to the more expensive and time-consuming background 

investigation. The sequential recruitment and vetting process as a whole appears 

to be practical, with the relatively less expensive assessment tools that result in 

the higher fallout rates being on the front end of the process. 

• Some CBP officials we spoke with expressed concerns that Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) suitability determination guidelines are rather permissive 

when considering placement of applicants in the agency's national security 

positions. CBP should open discussions with OPM to address those shortfalls. 

• Surge hiring and corruption cases in recent years have led some to associate the 

two occurrences without certain evidence. CBP should consider conducting a 

conclusive analysis of the tenure of employees arrested or convicted for 

corruption--specifically, to consider the most likely career points for this 

malfeasance and the effects of surge hiring. 

• Psychological examinations are not a standard part of the candidate vetting 

process. CBP should consider implementing pre-employment psychological (and 

additional) testing. 

• There is strong data to support the use of polygraph examinations in vetting CBP 

law enforcement job candidates. CBP OIA Credibility Assessment Division 

should continue steadily accumulating a cadre of 85 polygraphers to meet the 

Anti-Border Corruption Act mandate of testing prior to January I, 22013 all CBP 

officer and agent recruits before employment. 

The following is a discussion. in order, of those findings and recommendations. 

Recruitment and Vetting Process 

Discussion of Findings 

22 
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u.s. Customs and Border Proteclion (CBP) Workforce Integrfty Study 

We found that the sequential process56 for recruiting and vetting eBP officers and Border 

Patrol agents is extensive and involves multiple measures that seek to ensure the integrity 

of job candidates. From the initial application through the written test; the medical, 

fitness, and drug tests; the scenario-based interview; the polygraph examination; and the 

background investigation-attempts to assess integrity and ethical behavior are woven 

througho ut the process, both directly and indirectly. 

Based on our research and discussions with relevant personnel, we developed a schematic 

overview (figure 6) of the recruitment and vetting process. (A more detailed version is 

provided in appendix F.) 

CBP Hlnl~g Process 

Figure S. Recruitment and Vetting Process Overview 

C md da!l~ 'lJ~~ ts 

r .. quit! PH'n t <', hl'gill" 

f..rl'lcr tc,;!' 1'1 

The recruitment and vetting process takes an average of six to nine months from start to 

finish, each step of the process having measures designed to identity individuals who 

may not be fit for duty. On average, it takes 52 applicants for the Border Patrol Agent 

position to get one candidate through the entire recruitment and vetting process and 

determined suitable for entry on duty (EOD). It takes 28 applicants for the eBP Officer 

56 The sequential process involves various steps of the process occurring one at a time. A 

concurrent process involves various steps occurring simultaneously. The trade-offs are time 

(sequential being longer) versus cost (concurrent being costlier). 

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;.", ~iJ:,!()fns. anti BL,rdel ProL·t.lIon {CBP} WorkJuii;V )!/teqllty SClIar .• __ ,..t.".,.,.....u-~u:___ ::ClLllld _ ____ -..: _ ~ • 

j 

I 

I 

position to get one candidate suitable for EOD. 17 Candidates fallout at various parts of 

the vetting process, as demonstrated by the recruitment attrition rates provided in table Z. 

Table 2. CBP Recruitment Attrition Rates" 

Attrition Rates 

Stage of RecruitmenWetting Field Border Patrol I Cost per 

Operations Recruit 

Process 

OffICers Agents I 

I 

Written Test 50% I I 50% $80 

VideO-Based Test and 

• Structured Interview 20% -- I Unknown 

I Oral Hiring Board -- 15% Unknown 

I Medical Test 25% 25% $480 

Fitness Test 20% 15% $270 

Drug Test <1% <1% $n 

Polygraph Examination' 75% 74% $800 

I Backg!~und Inve~tigation·· 45% 56% I $3200-3600 

• Includes no-show rate (Le., non·pass rate) . 

•• Includes drop-out rate (i.e., non-pass rate) of background investigations completed in FYs 08-

10. 

Some of the assessment tools used in the vetting process that are explicitly deSigned to 

address the candidate's integrity and ethical behavior include the following: 

• At the onsel of the application process, "Eight Questions" about personal 

judgment and conscientiousness are used to make an initial decision as to 

whether the candidate is eligible to proceed to the written test.59 

• Once candidates pass the written test (which examines the applicant's reasoning 

skills, writing skills, and experience record), they participate in scenario-based 

exercises or interviews designed to addresses integrity and ethical decision 

making. 

• Candidates for Border Patrol agent positions are interviewed by the Oral Hiring 

Board, which is a panel of three trained agents who discuss scenarios that 

candidates are likely to encounter on the job. The board then assesses each 

candidate's response to how he or she might handle the situation. 

57 Interview with CBP Minneapolis Hiring Center staff, November 4, 20 II. 

5S Minneapolis Hiring Center. "Unknown" denotes that the study team did not receive the 

information during the course of the discussions, and does not necessarily mean the information 

does not exist. 

59 The sensitive nature of the content of the initial "Eight Questions" and scenario-based 

interviews prevented the study team from evaluating (or eVen having access to) these tools. 

24 

: 

i 

i 

I 

t 

I 

I 

I 

I 

i 

i 

l 
145 

I).S Customs and lill/(wr Protection (car') Workforcp Integri'Y <:;lUdy _...... tn~III$ .. a:r&_"" ._~~ 

• Candidates for CBP positions are required to take a video-based test (VET), 

where they are asked to respond to job-related scenarios. Candidates who pass 

the VBT go on to participate in a face-to-face structured interview with a panel of 

two trained CBP officers. Both assessments measure competencies that are 

critical to job success, including integrity. Candidates receive a pass/fail grade 

for their performance. Those who pass go on to the next step of the vetting 

process. 

• The polygraph examination involves the administration of the Law Enforcement 

Pre-Employment Test (LEPET). The exam includes questions designed to 

determine the suitability of the candidate, including whether they are fit to hold a 

national security position. The exam covers topics such as involvement in serious 

crimes, illegal drugs, terrorism, and espionage, as well as unauthorized disclosure 

of classified information or unreported/unauthorized foreign contacts.6O 

• Subsequent to their submission of an SF-86 Questionnaire for National Security 

Positions, all candidates undergo a background investigation. That investigation 

covers such areas as finances, drug/alcohol abuse, arrest history, misconduct in 

prior employment, associations with persons involved in illegal activities (e.g., 

drug use, trafficking), and demonstrated lack of integrity or honesty in providing 

complete and comprehensive information about current or past behaviors which 

may be unfavorable.61 

CBP is currently building up to a corps of 85 polygraphers to meet the Congressional 

Anti-Border Corruption Act mandate to conduct pre-employment testing of all candidates 

by January 1,2013. While building up to that capacity, some candidates receive 

polygraphs subsequent to the initiation of the background investigation. It is CBP's 

intent, once the agency reaches sufficient polygraph capacity, to conduct the less 

expensive polygraphs before initiating the more costly and time-consuming background 

investigations. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

COP should follow through with its intent to conduct polygraph examinations prior 

to the more expensive and time-consuming background investigation. The sequential 

recruitment and vetting process as a whole appears to be practical, with the relatively less 

expensive assessment tools that result in the higher fallout rates being on the front end of 

the process. 

60 CBP OIA Integrity Programs Division and Credibility Assessment Division, Final Report: A + 

Case File Srudy: An Etp/oration of the Statements Made Against Persona/Interest in Law 

Enforcemenl Applicanl Screening Polygraph Etaminations, (March 31, 2009), page 2. 

61 Customs and Border Protection, "CBP Officer Frequently Asked Questions," 

http://www.cbp.govllinkhandler/cgov/careers/customs careerS/officer/cass fag.ctVcass 9 a.pdf 

, accessed on September 5, 2011. 

25 
146 

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Suitability Determinations 

Discussion of Findings 

CBP adjudicators apply prescribed OPM guidelines to determine the suitability of 

applicants for employment. Some CBP officials we spoke with expressed concerns that 

these guidelines are rather permissive. For example, background investigations and 

follow-up inquiries by CBP Office of Internal Affairs agents discovered some applicants 

with associations with known felons or suspicious persons. Nevertheless, the OPM 

guidelines listed below do not regard associations as unsuitable behavior. Per OPM 

guidelines (5 CFR 73 1.202), the only factors that can be considered as a basis for finding 

a person unsuitable are as follows: 

• Misconduct or negligence in employment 

• Criminal or dishonest conduct 

• Material, intentional false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or 

appointment 

• Refusal to furnish testimony as required by Section 5.4 of CFR 731.202 

• Alcohol abuse, without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, of a nature and 

duration that suggests that the applicant or appointee would be prevented from 

performing the duties of the position in question. or would constitute a direct 

threat to the property or safety of the applicant or appointee or others 

• Illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances without evidence of 

substantial rehabilitation 

• Knowing and willful engagement in acts or activities designed to overthrow the 

U.S. Government by force 

• Any statutory or regulatory bar which prevents the lawful employment ofthe 

person involved in the position in question62 

Additional suitability considerations, if pertinent to the case, include the nature of the 

position for which the person is applying or in which the person is employed; the nature 

and seriousness of the conduct; the circumstances surrounding the conduct; the recency 

of the conduct; the age of the person involved at the time of the conduct; contributing 

societal conditions; and the absence or presence of rehabilitation or efforts toward 

rehabilitation.63 

Another expressed concern is that there are no distinctions made in terms of suitability 

criteria for different types of job positions. The current qualification criteria are similar 

62 Code of Federal Regulations, "Criteria for Making Suitability Determinations," 5 CFR 731.202, 

htl]:lIfrwebgate.access gpo eoy/cgi·binlgel-cfr.c~i. 

63 Ibid. 

26 
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across all positions, so that an individual applying for an administrative assistant position 

would be subject to the same level of investigation as someone applying for a law 

enforcement or national security position. 

Suitability reciprocity is another issue that impacts the vetting process. DHS 

headquarters' policy accepts suitability determinations from all components, thus 

minimizing the administrative burdens and costs of separate background investigations 

and adjudications. However, DHS components perform different types of suitability 

checks dependent on their varying missions. Consequently, the components do not 

always recognize one another's suitability determinations. An example provided on 

multiple occasions was the lack of reciprocity between TSA and CBP, with CBP not 

honoring suitability detenninations made by TSA. This lack of reciprocity forestalls an 

individual's full employment until a determination can be made by the new component. 

The shortfalls continue, as other persons we spoke with who are involved in vetting job 

candidates suggested that even current DHS policies regarding suitability introduce 

potential vulnerabilities. They cited, for example, the department's current policy to 

recognize background investigations previously conducted under another agency for 

employment within CBP, which presents a loophole for possibly "corrupted" candidates. 

The following example was offered: 

An individual is hired by DHS Agency X for a management analyst position. A 

background investigation (BI) is completed with a favorable determination on 

1/1110. The individual is arrested on 6/1/10 on a felony charge of driving under 

the influence causing bodily injury. Two months later, on S/IIJO, the individual 

is aware that Agency X may be about to terminate his employment during his 

probationary period so he applies and is selected for a lateral transfer to eBP. 

eBP is prohibited by DHS policy from requesting a new BI package. eBP 

requests the prior investigative file from Agency X. That file does not contain the 

record of the 611110 arrest since the file was completed prior to the arrest. eBP 

may run new background checks, but if the felony case has not yet been brought 

to trial or resolution, it may not have been entered by the arresting police 

department into the national database. Based on the information contained in the 

l/1/IO BI, the CBP adjudicator clears the individual for an appointment. The 

individual is later convicted of the offense, and eBP now has a convicted felon 

on its rolls." 

Given that example, some interviewees expressed concerns that a follow-on policy 

requiring acceptance of other components' adjudications could further present potential 

vulnerabilities. 

Recommendation 

CBP sbould open discussions with OPM to address sbortfalls in suitability 

guidelines wben considering placement in tbe agency's national security positions. 

64lnterview with OIA, Personnel Security Division (PSD) staff, November 22, 2011. 

27 
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

OPM guidelines for suitability detennination may be overly pennissive for the types of 

responsibilities inherent in CBP national security positions. Additionally, the Department 

of Homeland Security and its components may want to reconsider the current DHS policy 

of accepting potentially dated prior agency background investigations for intradepartmental transfers, especially for national security positions. 

Surge Hiring 

Discussion of Findings 

The corruption problems that CBP faces today are often attributed, at least in the media, 

to the surge in hiring that occurred between 2006 and 2008, as the following example 

attests: 

Critics, including the union representing agents, warned ... the agency was 

moving too fast, shortcutting background checks, lowering hiring standards and 

truncating the training time at the Border Patrol Academy in New Mexico. They 

warned one unintended consequence could be more cases of misconduct and 

corruption. 6J 

Two compelling points arose in the study team's findings on this subject. First, persons 

we spoke with for this study disagreed as to whether corruption is actually attributable to 

the attempts in the 2006 - 2008 time frame to hire more law enforcement officers to meet 

congressional mandates. Several persons suggested that many of the 134 employees 

implicated on corruption charges were not hired during the surge, but rather were several 

years into their careers with the agency. The orA Integrity Programs Division (IPD) 

Behavioral Research Branch has studied the tenures of the 134 and demonstrated that 

nine percent (twelve persons) were surge hires.66 However, this analysis is inconclusive 

given the fact that CBP and its [PO analysts do not have any knowledge of cases 

currently under investigation by the DHS Office of Inspector General. 

(There have also been reports in the media suggesting that personnel have been hired 

prior to the completion of their background investigations. However, persons we spoke 

with indicated that 100 percent of applicants' background investigations are completed 

prior to their appointment.) 

The other compelling point in the study team's findings is that surge hires have yet to 

reach that point in their careers where individuals appear to be more likely to become 

corrupt. For example, further analysis may reveal that corrupt frontline CBP employees 

typically conduct these felonious acts in the 8-12 year points in their careers. Those surge 

hires appointed in the 2007·2009 time frame have yet to reach that point in their careers. 

65 O. Moran, "Hiring Practices Questioned after Border Agent's Arrest," Sign On San Diego, I 

April 20 II, hllp:llwww.signonsandiego.comlnewsl20! l/iIPr/O Ilhiring-practices-guestionedafter-border-agents-ar/. 

66 Of the 134 cases, tenures ranged between one year to 33.5 years ofCBP (and legacy agency) 

service at the time of the arrest/indictment, with the mean CBP tenure of 8.75 years and median 

7.42 years. 

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Discussion of Recommeudation 

CBP should consider conducting a conclusive analysis of the tenure of employees 

arrested or convicted for corruption-specifically, to consider tbe most likely career 

points for tbis malfeasance and tbe effects ofsurge hiring. The agency may wish to 

defer this initiative until DHS 010 provides CBP with information of the cases it is 

currently holds. The compiled data may be able to confirm, deny, or otherwise support 

further development of the hypothesis of a link between surge hiring and workforce 

corruption. If it is found that a statistically significant portion of the sample was recruited 

during the hiring surge, additional research should be undertaken to determine if there 

were any aspects of the vetting process that may have led to some unsuitable candidates 

being hired. 

Psychological Evaluations 

Discussion of Findings 

Law enforcement agencies commonly use psychological evaluations in vetting job 

candidates. These evaluations assess the candidate's "psychological suitability," which 

refers to both the absence of job-relevant risk factors as well as the presence of jobcritical personal and interpersonal qualities.'7 A variety of tests seek to ensure law 

enforcement candidates are able to tolerate the stresses of their work environment, follow 

rules, use resources responsibly, behave in a trustworthy manner, use good judgment, and 

refrain from off-duty behavior that would reflect poorly on their department.,8 

CBP candidates do not receive a formal psychological evaluation as part of the applicant 

screening process. According to the persons we spoke with, the medical examinations 

required of all recruits do ask some questions about the candidates' mental health. 

However, we were told that, in order for a psychological evaluation to occur, the 

candidate must have a history of depression or counseling that comes up as part of the 

medical examination. 

When we asked why psychological evaluations are not a standard part of the candidate 

vetting process, we learned that the large volume of job candidates as well as resource 

constraints prevents CBP from administering such evaluations. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CDP should consider implementing pre-employment psychological (and additional) 

testing. Most progressive local law enforcement agencies have been performing pre· 

screening psychological evaluations on their applicants for decades. The iPD Behavioral 

Research Branch (BRB) has looked into the use of psychological evaluations for CBP job 

'7 Y.S. Ben-Porath et aI., "Assessing the Psychological Suitability of Candidates for Law 

Enforcement Positions," Police Chief Magazine, no.78, August 2011, 

http;//www.po licechiefmagazi ne.orglmagazinelindex.cfm?fuseaction=print displav&article id= 

2448&issue id=8201l. 

,I Ibid. 

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candidates and concluded "there is a demonstrated value in assessing the psychological 

suitability of law enforcement applicants and including it in a multi-layered approach to 

personnel screening." 69 

The Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council also indicated they are firm supporters 

and advocates for the use of psychological evaluations. The council suggests that the 

evaluation may be one of the most important phases of the hiring process, as the 

following explains: 

• Many local law enforcement agencies also require internal candidates for some 

highly sensitive positions to undergo such examinations both going into and 

coming out of certain types of units, such as Special Weapons and Assault Teams 

(SWA n and Child Exploitation Investigation Units. 

• Many local law enforcement agencies also reserve management's right to require 

certain employees to submit to psychological evaluations (sometimes called 

Fitness for Duty Examinations) under certain circumstances. Instances in which 

an employee has engaged either in some unusual behavior While at work or 

actual misconduct may warrant an exam to determine the employee's 

psychological state. 

• The nation's litigious society has come to the point that failure to conduct such 

examinations on prospective employees, as well as failure to conduct such 

examinations for current employees under the other circumstances already noted, 

could open up an agency to "negligent retention" lawsuits. 

Any efforts to incorporate psychological screening would benefit from the research 

already conducted by IPD, as well as from the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police (IACP) Police Psychological Services. The IACP has developed guidelines for 

conducting pre-employment psychological evaluations. These guidelines take into 

consideration various restrictions imposed by the Americans with Disabilities Act, to 

include the stipulation that psychological examinations can only be conducted after a 

conditional offer of employment has been made. 70 Other guidelines developed by IACP 

address the need for the psychologist to be familiar with the specific working conditions 

of the job and the usefulness ofintegrating findings from a candidate's background 

investigation and polygraph examination into the interview process.71 

Entry-Level Polygraphs 

Discussion of Findings 

,. IPD Behavioral Research Branch, "Project Two of the Internal Affairs Best Practices Initiative: 

Pre-Employment Psychological Evaluations," September 30, 2010, p. 5. 

70 IACP Police Psychological Services Section, "Guidelines for Police Psychological Service," 

Police Chief Magazine, vol. 72, no. 9, September 2005. 

71 Ibid. 

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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

The Anti-Border Corruption Act of2010 established a policy calling for all CBP law 

enforcement position applicants to undergo a polygraph examination and a background 

investigation before being offered employment. As noted in the first finding and 

recommendation here-on doing polygraphs prior to background checks as a way to save 

time and resources in the vetting process-polygraphs are critical to recruitment for 

organizations like CBP. Yet, based on our interviews for this study, it was apparent there 

has been some organizational resistance to entry-level polygraphs. Several of the persons 

we spoke with at headquarters expressed some level of opposition to such polygraphs, 

while most of the persons we spoke with in the field expressed support for this 

assessment tool. There were no apparent correlations to these diverse opinions. 

Whether or not the use of the polygraph examination is supported by staff, there is strong 

data to support its effectiveness in vetting job candidates. Polygraphs have been detecting 

matters that would not have been exposed through other vetting tools. The IPD BRB A + 

Case File Study (figure 6) attests to this finding. 

The A+ Ca$e File Study: An exploration of the Statemena Made Against Personal 

Interest In Law Enforcement Screening Polygraph Examinations (2009) 

Conducted by: The Office of Internal Affairs. Integrity Programs Division (iPD) Behavioral 

Research Branch and the Credibility Assessment Division (CAD) 

This e>eploratory study reviewed 24 failed applicant polygraph examlnatfons to describe the 

""lUre of Infonn.tion revealed during polygraph exams and Identfly any (amIDon .Iements. 

Findings: 

Figure 6. Findings from the 2009 IPD A+ Case FUe Study about polygraphs" 

We reviewed data and studies developed by lPD that indicated polygraphs have led to 

admissions in the following areas: 

• organized crime (involvement with drug-trafficking organizations, human 

smuggling/trafficking, other criminal associations) 

• citizenship issues (self or family) 

• crimes against persons 

72 A + Case Study, p. 9. 

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u.s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

property crimes 

illegal drug activity 

counterintelligence issues (compromise of classified information) 

• countenneasures (attempts to "game" the polygraph or cover up things they have 

done)73 

Furthennore, BRB found that, for many of the individuals who have admitted to 

participating in illicit activities such as those listed above, the activities "were not 

youthful indiscretions or one-time mistakes, but rather represented a pattern of 

behaviors.,,7' 

We also learned from CBP stafTthat polygraph examinations have identified at least 

fifteen individuals who were deliberately trying to infiltrate the organization for illicit 

purposes. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

Tbe CDP OlA Credibility Assessment Division should continue steadily 

accumulating a cadre of 85 polygrapbers to meet tbe congressioDlil Anti-Border 

Corruption Act mandate of being able to, by January 1, 2013, test all CDP omcer 

and agent recruits before employment. 

The Test/No-Test Study (2010) 

Conducted by: The Office oflnternal Affairs,Integrity Programs Division (JPO) Behavioral Research Branch 

Using a random sample, the Behavioral Research Branch compared the employment records of persons who did 

and did not take a pre-employment polygraph e.amlnation to identify negative conduct of the employees. 

Figure 7. Findings from the 2010 IPD TestINo-Test Study about polygraphS'S 

CBP should also consider periodic polygraphs for its law enforcement employees once 

the polygraphers' cadre is at full capacity. This testing could be conducted on five-year 

1) Ibid., pp. 6-7. 

14 Ibid., p. 10. 

7S CBP OIA Integrity Progrnms Division Behavioral Research Branch, Test vs. No-Test: PreEmployment Polygraph Exams and Subsequent Record with internal Affairs, (September 16, 

2010). page 2. 

32 
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

intervals in conjunction with the periodic background investigation (BI) to avert any 

deceptions in the BI process. If this method exceeds testing capacities, a more strategic 

approach may be required. An "early warning system" could prove valuable and perhaps 

more cost-effective by randomly subjecting to such tests those most likely to be 

experiencing problems. 76 CBP should also consider the testing of specific employee 

populations, e.g., national security positions, with random polygraph examinations, much 

like random drug testing. 

76 "Early warning systems" are data-based police management tools designed to identifY officers 

whose behavior is problematic and provide a fonn of intervention to correcl that performance. 

Samuel Walker, Geoffrey Alpert, and Dennis KelUley, "Early Warning Systems: Responding to 

the Problem Police Officer" Research in Brief, National Inslitute of Justice, U.S. Department of 

justice, NJC 188565 (July 2001), www.n~jrs.goy/pdffilesl/nijlI88565.pdf. 

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SECTION III. INTEGRITY TRAINING PROCESS 

AND PROGRAMS 

The study team assessed existing training programs designed to develop ethical behavior 

in both Border Patrol agents and CBP officers at the entry and supervisory levels, and the 

rest of the continuum of an agent/officer's career. We conducted this evaluation through 

discussions with Office of Training and Development (OTD) leadership, as well as 

representatives of the Field Operations Academy (FOA). Border Patrol Academy (BPA). 

and the Advanced Training Center (A TC) who directly oversee workforce 

integrity/counter-corruption-related academic programs and curricula. We also reviewed 

associated courseware provided to us by OTD. (See appendix G for a list of that 

courseware, and recommendations for a comprehensive review of CBP ethics and 

integrity training programs.) Finally. the team considered "messaging" (how topics are 

woven thematically into communicative materials) as a subset of continuing training and 

education by discussing training themes in the field and reviewing CBP intranet (CBPnet) 

content. 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations 

• Follow-on refresher ethics, integrity and counter-corruption training offered in 

the field take on a variety of fonns. CBP should designate one authority on ethics 

and integrity training to coordinate courseware content and messaging 

throughout the agency. 

• Emphasis in exactly what things CBP wants its employees to be doing in regards 

to the day-to-day application of ethics appears to be missing from the training 

materials/lesson plans. CBP should emphasize the practical application of ethics 

concepts within the day-to-day work of both first-line employees and 

supervisors, and better infonn CBP staff of any organization-wide training. 

• The CBPnet web content for integrity and counter-corruption is spread across 

several pages of the website. Integrity and counter-corruption messaging on the 

CBPnet would benefit by having a central site for all of this information. 

The following is a discussion, in order, of those findings and recommendations. 

Assessment 

Ethics and Integrity Training Programs 

Discussion of Findings 

CBP provides training focused on ethics, integrity and ethical decision making 

throughout an employee's career, since---as with any organizatiofr-training is essential 

to establishing and reaff1l111ing an organizations' values, ethos and code of conduct. 

Entry-level training ingrains in the recruits the fundamental precepts by which the 

organization conducts itself, and offers standards to which they should aspire. 

34 
155 

Supervisory training prepares mid-level managers to lead and look after their personnel, 

and foster expected perfonnance and behavior. Continuing education and training 

reinforces and reaffinns organizational goals and standards. 

Covering these various levels of training for CBP are a handful of entities. As noted 

earlier, fonnal integrity and counter-corruption training is developed and provided to the 

workforce by OTD, OIA Integrity Programs Division, the Field Officer and Border Patrol 

Academies, CBP lA special agents, DHS OIG special agents, and supervisors and CBP 

integrity officers at shift musters. The Office of Chief Counsel also administers ethics 

training. 

The variety of training entities presents a variety of training on ethics. The New 

Employee Orientation Program, for example, provides at least two hours of workforce 

integrity training for all CBP personnel. Newly hired CBP law enforcement officers 

receive expanded ethics and integrity instruction tailored to their workplaces, as part of 

their basic training curricula. 

Beyond their initial entry on duty, CBP employees receive advanced and specialized 

training which includes integrity elements. CBP supervisory and leadership training 

programs include Supervisory Leadership Training, Incumbent Supervisory Training, the 

CBP Leadership Institute, the Command Leadership Academy, and the DHS Senior 

Executive Service Candidate Development Program. Those programs include seminars, 

classroom instruction, and practical exercises that prepare CBP leadership to direct the 

workforce in a manner that advances integrity and accountability through critical thinking 

and ethical decision making.17 

The training activities at the Field Operations Academy in Glynco, GA, Border Patrol 

Academy in Artesia, NM, and the Advanced Training Center in Harpers Ferry, WV, 

include ethics and integrity modules and themes explicitly and implicitly. In addition, 

themes such as CBP's core values of "Vigilance, Service and Integrity"; OTD's guiding 

principles of "MESH (Mission Focused, Esprit de Corps, Sustained Excellence and 

Honesty)"; and the Border Patrol motto "Honor First" receive prominent treatment. In 

some courses, Commissioner Alan Bersin's theme, "Corruption is the dagger pointing at 

the heart of Customs and Border Protection," receives emphasis. 

Follow-on refresher ethics, integrity, and counter-corruption training offered in the field 

take on a variety of fonns. Standardized training modules developed by OTD's Training 

Production and Standards Division (TPSD) and offered online and by local instructors 

appear to be of high quality and consistency. However, in our discussions in the field, we 

were told that the quality of the training varies with the organization offering the 

instruction and the individual instructors. 

71 Hearing on Border Corruption: Assessing Customs and Border Protection and the Department 

of Homeland Security Inspectar General's Office Collaboration in the Fight to Prevent 

Corruption, Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Ad 

Hoc Subcommillee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, I 12th Congress (June 

9,2011) (statement of Alan D. Bersin, CBP Commissioner). 

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Discussion of Recommendation 

CBP sbould designate one autbority on ethics and integrity training to coordinate 

courseware content and messaging tbrougbout tbe agency. Covering so many levels 

of training in any subject, in an organization this large, without a single authority 

overseeing it all presents the potential for inconsistencies. The consistency of the 

instruction and themes may suffer when multiple organizations with different interests 

lecture field-activity personnel. 

Ethics and Integrity Training Themei' 

Discussion 

While we note a variety of positive aspects of the training as outlined in the training 

materials provided, there were also a number of questions that arose during our review 

that suggest further analysis and consideration - answers to which could serve to enhance 

the overall effectiveness of CBP ethics training. A few of these concerns follow: 

• Universal Definition of Ethics: While it was readily apparent that the CBP 

courses each dedicated a portion of their training to defining ethics and integrity 

and to highlighting the importance of ethics to their agencies' work, it was not 

apparent that there is a universal defmition of ethics for the greater CBP 

organization that is emphasized in each and every CBP course. In other words, it 

is not clear if each basic academy and advanced training course speaks with one 

overall CBP voice in terms of an ethics definition and expectations. 

Questions for consideration are: 

o Is there a coordinated effort within each of the CBP's training delivery 

groups to ensure they are addressing the same ethics concepts, using the 

same defmition, as the other CBP training groups, with a goal to set a 

CBP-wide standard for ethical expectations and behavior? 

o Are CBP's organization-wide goals and objectives for addressing 

corruption identified, and if so are they to be found within each training 

course? 

Root Cause Analysis ofConuption and a Focus on Ethics Application: While a 

number of the courses did highlight discussions of some real-life cases in which 

corruption had been identified, the discussion did not seem to do much more than 

highlight how some corruption cases came to light and how they damaged the 

l' The following is the Hillard Heintze SLC training subject matter experts' (SMEs) initial 

assessment of how the various materials above interrelate and how they appear to address CBP's 

current concerns. These are only the initial impressions and opinions oflhe SMEs-including the 

recommendations they give at the end of this assessment. Given the gravity of the lopic and the 

complexities of the material, additional review and analysis should be done to yield concrete 

recommendations regarding training methodologies and their effectiveness. 

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reputation ofCB? It was unclear if the discussion moved from simply discussing 

the outcomes of corruption to clearly emphasizing a CBP·wide strategy about 

how to prevent, detect, investigate and report corruption. 

For example, in the Second-Level Command Preparation course, it was apparent 

that a number of different situations involving ethical lapses were discussed (Abu 

Ghraib prison, the Rodney King incident, the Kitty Genovese incident, My Lai 

Massacre, Tailhook scandal, etc.). Yet these course materials did not seem to go 

much beyond such philosophical discussions. It did not appear that the major 

emphasis was on what actions eBP supervisors could or should take on a daily 

basis to prevent, detect, investigate and/or report corruption. 

While this particular course's material does discuss paying attention to issues that 

should lead a supervisor to detect corruption (described at times as "red flag" 

issues), the material leaves readers with the sense that a relatively small portion 

of the overall training time focused on this very important component of being a 

supervisor. 

Indeed, even the fmal essay that the Second-Level Command Preparation Course 

attendees are required to write---<lescribing a real· life, work-related ethical 

dilemma each trainee had experienced-seemed to highlight discussion about 

what could be done to improve the response to the dilemma, rather than proactive 

measures that could be taken to prevent or detect it. Instead, the essay's emphasis 

included answering the following questions (taken from page 4·89): 

What is the nature of the ethical problem? 

Was the action taken appropriate? 

If the action taken was not appropriate, what should have happened? 

What lessons were learned? 

Would the information provided in this lesson have been applicable, and 

would it have resulted in a better/different outcome? 

Missing from this course's material were such questions as the following, which 

emphasize proactive efforts on the part of supervisors to prevent such dilemmas 

in the first place: 

What actions might I as a supervisor have taken to prevent this ethical 

dilemma from occurring in the first place? 

Did I share this dilemma with my own supervisor as soon as possible? 

• "Bright Line" Behaviors: Because of the concerns that CBP has regarding workforce 

integrity and corruption within its organization, it would seem extremely important to 

place the greatest emphasis in its training courses on the specific behaviors it expects 

from its members. Hence, while there was a great deal of commendable philosophical 

discussion about the importance of values and ethics in the course overviews and 

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___ (l .. ':i. {'U"ltUI1IS all!.' 8u/dfn Protucf!uli iCI:::JPJ ~V!)lX!(1/1 C jf;tr:."qULV 5tu(/I,' "'_'1 ~i>ft+1 

38 

instructor's guide we reviewed, it was unclear whether CBP has drawn a "bright line" 

about what is acceptable (and what is not) in terms of ethical behavior. Bright line 

standards are a means of ensuring that all employees are very clear about some very 

specific types of misconduct that will result in very specific levels of discipline. 

This seems especially important given the fact that there has been such a rapid 

increase in the number of CBP employees in recent years, and because it appears that 

so many newer employees are being promoted so much sooner within their careers to 

keep pace with the organizational growth. Hence, what appears to be missing from 

the training materials/lesson plans is emphasis in exactly what things CBP wants its 

employees to be doing in regards to the day-to-day application of ethics, as well as 

an emphasis on training supervisors on the nuts-and-bolts, day-to-day tasks that one 

would expect them to engage in to prevent, detect, investigate and report unethical 

behavior. 

For instance, using the Second-Level Command Preparation Ethics course as just one 

example, the following might be a few samples of training components of great value 

that could be incorporated, for the supervisor trainees as well as for the organization 

itself: 

A description and review of IPD's Corruption Case Study, which 

discusses employment histories and perfomtance, demographics, social 

contacts, misconduct and discipline, and other important data points. 

Simply having a better understanding of what the organization is actually 

doing to address corruption issues, as well as a discussion of how such 

efforts can be of use to CBP supervisors on their "home turf," can go a 

long way in helping the staff feel that there is an organization-wide plan 

to address corruption issues. It can also help boost morale and instill a 

sense that they, as supervisors, are part of the organization's solutions to 

corruption. 

A review of CBP's Annual Report on Employee Delinquency would be 

of value when highlighting what real-time problems are occurring within 

eBP, which would tend to highlight what supervisors specifically need 

to be addreSSing back in their part of the organization. 

An IA investigator's perspective on what they wish CBP supervisors in 

the field would be doing to address corruption issues on a day-to-day 

basis, with an emphasis on preventing corruption cases. 

A checklist of specific "red flags," or things to watch out for with 

employees that might tend to indicate ethical issues when reviewing their 

subordinates' work-related perfomtance on a day-to-day basis. Smallgroup discussions could then be initiated in which scenarios could be 

presented that require the supervisors to detemtine what ethical problems 

might exist, what specific steps they would take to address it, and how to 

communicate the problem with their chain of command. 
159 

A very candid discussion of what their specific roles and responsibilities 

are as supervisors, with emphasis on the accountability that CBP expects 

of them. Trainees should leave the course with a very clear 

understanding of what, specifically, are their roles and responsibilities 

and what is expected of them regarding CBP's anti-corruption efforts. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CBP should empbaslze tbe practical application ofethiCli concepts witbin the day-today work of both first-line employees and supervisors, and better inform CBP staff 

ofany organization-wide training. This emphasis, in exactly what things CBP wants its 

employees to be doing in regards to the day-to-day application of ethics, appears to be 

missing from the training materials/lesson plans. 

The study team further recommends a review more in-depth than the one accomplished 

here of training issues, to determine what additional steps could be taken to ensure that 

CBP's ethics/integrity training highlights the practical application of ethics as stated 

above. Such a review should also inform CBP of what organization-wide efforts can help 

bolster training efforts to meet the expectations set by CBP management (e.g., 

Commissioner Bersin's theme implying that CBP "stop the dagger"). Appendix G 

suggests an approach to this review. 

CBPnet Content and Messaging 

Discussion of Findings 

The study team wanted to determine the extent to which less formal, non-training 

communications conveyed workforce integrity and counter-corruption themes. To do this 

they surveyed the agency-wide CBPnet for content and messaging, and noted that 

CBPnet features the following relevant sites: 

• "Commissioner's Message: Assuring the Highest Standards of Integrity" 

The text version of this message, housed on the commissioner's page, was easily 

accessible. There were also two linked videos related to the written statement: (I) 

Commissioner Bersin formally presenting the message from a podium at CBP 

headquarters; and (2) a subsequent video entitled "Integrity Town Hall Meeting". 

• "Message from Chief Fisher: Wellton Station Border Patrol Agent Arrested" 

Posted on U.S. Border Patrol Chief Fisher's webpage, the written message offers 

a basic description of the AprilS, 2011 arrest. A linked audio recording from 

Chief Fisher included after the written message offers a more personal message 

condemning the agent's actions. 

• "Trust Betrayed" 

Located on the CBP Office ofInternal Affairs website, the official title of this 

page is "Trust Betrayed: As Guardians of Our Nation's Borders, We Cannot 

Afford a Weak Link." The section offers "snapshots" of information related to 

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individual field officer or Border Patrol officers and agents who have been 

convicted of corruption-related offenses. It also includes instructions for 

reporting attempted bribes and other corruption-related behavior. 

• "Vigilance, Service, Honor" 

This theme is located in the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) portion of the COP 

intranet website. The opening segment of this section states, "Every day, 

outstanding, CBP courageousness brings respect and honor to us all." It goes on 

to offer profiles offield officer and Border Patrol officers and agents who have 

distinguished themselves by acts of heroism and high integrity. Interestingly, if 

considered as the counterpoint to "Trust Betrayed," this site does not experience 

nearly as many "hits" as "Trust.. .. " 

• Anti-Corruption Training Videos 

Three anti-corruption training videos produced by CBP's Field Communications 

Branch appear on the Office of Border Patrol page. The first video focuses on onduty malfeasance; the second deals with a Border Patrol agent using his badge 

and personal relationship with a bouncer to obtain access to a nightclub; the third 

addresses debt issues. The videos all offer good overviews of potential corruption 

pitfalls. They are well made and provide a good tool to bridge the gap between 

other types of ethics/integrity instruction. 

• Video Message from former Border Patrol Chief Ron Colburn 

Posted to the Office of Border Patrol in March of 2009, former Chief Colburn 

delivers a stem anti-corruption message with a forceful warning to Border Patrol 

agents that corruption is treason. 

The CBPnet content is, overall, informative, interesting, and timely. However, the 

information is spread across several pages of the website. 

Discussion ofRecommeodalioo 

Integrity and counter-corruption messaging 00 the CBPnet would benefit by having 

a ceotralsite for all of this information. One way to centralize the content is to build an 

"integrity website" or webpage with links to the other related sites. This also stands to 

add uniformity and decrease duplication of effort. 

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U.S. C-Ilstoms Ilnd Burdp.! I'rotel'l.'0n (esP) l!VorkTt'l'l'e Ir~"':,,9rit~· Study 

SECTION IV. METRICS AND INFORMATION 

SHARING PROCESS 

The study team, including Hillard Heintze SLC SMEs, considered CBP's existing metrics 

for identitying and detennining the level of corruption in the workforce, focusing on 

whether they are sufficient to meet the infonnation needs ofCBP offices and partner 

agencies responsible for countering corruption and heightening integrity. We consulted 

with the CBP Office of Human Resources Management (HRM) and its Labor and 

Employee Relations Division (LER) as well as [PD. We placed particular emphasis on 

areas we believe could assist upper-level management and supervisors in collecting and 

reviewing specific data to help them be more proactive in preventing or discovering 

discipline violations. We also extensively reviewed the HRM LER "U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection Discipline Report for Fiscal Year 20 I 0" briefing for content and 

statistics, as an example of disciplinary data being collected and reported. 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations 

• There is no comprehensive picture of workforce corruption. CBP should consider 

implementing a central, unified tracking system for all the important data that 

could be used to prevent, detect, and deter misconduct and corruption. 

o CBP should also emphasize to DHS OlG the need for transparency in 

cases involving CBP employees. 

o Finally, [PO Behavioral Research Branch should undertake a "Code of 

Silence" study. 

• The organization of disciplinary data is lacking in several significant ways (e.g., 

some types of discipline appear to be missing from the data). CBP LER should 

consider the collection, breakdown, and analysis of the data sets discussed in this 

paper, and conduct further study to detennine other data requirements. 

The following is a discussion, in order, of those findings and recommendations. 

Assessment 

Data Collection and Reporting 

Discussion of Findings 

The study team found, in their research of this particular area, that there is no 

comprehensive picture of workforce corruption-that is, enough data to gauge the 

breadth and depth of this corruption problem in CBP. Without that full situational 

awareness, 

the extent of corruption cannot be detennined, and 

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• the most efficient measures to address the problem cannot be detennined (e.g., 

either prioritization of investigations, "breakpoints" for administrative 

adjudication, or criminal investigation and prosecution are undetennined). 

CBP's greatest impediment to gathering this infonnation is, as noted earlier, the lack of 

visibility of all instances of malfeasance within the agency, due to DHS OIG's 

withholding of allegations against CBP personnel that they have received directly. It is 

unclear whether an organization-wide process is in place to ensure that all cases of 

misconduct are being reported to the Joint Intake Center in accordance with prescribed 

criteria. A potential impediment to reporting misconduct is--as noted earlier, as wellthe extent to which the "code of silence" exists among the workforce. 

The OIA Integrity Programs Division tracks known cases of corruption as evidenced by 

arrests and indictments. OIA maintains a database of employee delinquency defined as all 

arrests, indictments, citations, and detainments for violations of law reported to the Joint 

Intake Center. Variables include employee demographics, organizational assignment, 

geographic location, and charges/offenses among many other fields. [n cases of 

corruption and mission-compromising corruption,'9 OIA keeps a record of the 

investigative entity as well as any other agencies involved in the case, plus the 

investigative time line from the date of the first report of investigation (ROI) to the date of 

arrest. 

Based on these collected metrics, IPD generates the following reports: 

• Annual Report on Delinquency - a yearly report addressing both corruption 

and mission-compromising corruption, distributed within OIA 

• Commissioner's Snapshot- a monthly report on the number of each level 

of employee delinquency, based on a year-to-date comparison to the same 

time in previous fiscal years, distributed to the CBP commissioner and OIA 

internally 

• Weekly Update on DHS OIG Cases - prepared jointly by OIA's IPD and 

Investigative Operations Division (100) on DHS OIG involvement in cases 

on CBP employees submitted to the commissioner. The report contains the 

total number and status (open/closed) ofDHS OIG cases on CBP 

employees uploaded into the Joint Integrity Case Management System 

(JICMS), as well as the nature ofDHS OIG involvement. 

• Ad Hoc Data Calls - fPD responds to numerous questions posed by CBP 

constituents (e.g., commissioner and deputy commissioner offices, OIA 

19 Corruption is defined as a violation oflaw in which a CBP employee misuses or abuses the 

knowledge, access, or authority granted by virtue of official position for personal gain. Missioncompromising corruption is a violation oflaw in which a CBP employee misuses or abuses the 

knowledge, access, or authority granted by virtue of official position for personal gain, and the 

activity violates or facilitates the violation of laws that CBP enforces. 

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U.S. ClJo;toms :wrlBordt!r Prolf>ctjon (CEJP) W .. rklof'.·" Intf'grllY SWdy ..... 1oIIS •• ~ _ • • IS 

assistant commissioner [AC] and deputy AC) and external entities related to 

employee delinquency (e.g., DHS, Congress, and the media). 

The HRM Labor and Employee Relations Division tracks the broad spectrum of 

disciplinary reports and actions, from removals to formal counseling to cases closed 

without action. This data is reported in the annual HRM LER Discipline Report provided 

to the commissioner and deputy commissioner. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CBP should coosider implementing a central, unified tracking system for all the 

importaot data that could be used to prevent, detect, and deter misconduct and 

corruption. CBP should emphasize to DHS OIG the need for transparency in cases 

involving CBP employees-to further add to such data to be tracked, Furthermore, the 

IPD Behaviora! Research Branch should undertake a "Code of Silence" study. 

In order to address workforce integrity issues and counter corruption, the extent of the 

problems must be determined. With the extent of the problems known, CBP management 

can identify specific measures and strategies to deal with the prevalent issues. A unified 

tracking system would combine OIA IPD's tracking of employee delinquency. 

Optimally, this data would include information on cases held by DHS OIG currently 

withheld from the agency. 

A comprehensive picture of workforce delinquency and discipline would inform CBP 

training units in their development of informed measures and strategies to promote 

workforce integrity. The "Code of Silence Study" would not only assess the extent of the 

code within the CBP workforce, but also help gauge workforce integrity. Such studies are 

common to state and local law enforcement agencies. iQ 

Data Analysis 

Discussion of Findings 

The OIA Integrity Programs Division conducts intelligence analysis of enforcement 

actions, data, and trends, and performs analysis in support of OIA investigations and preemployment screening operations. Within IPD, the Behavioral Research Branch is a 

multidisciplinary unit that conducts behavioral research focused on the CBP workforce. 

Such research is intended to address operational issues and challenges, and to enhance the 

background investigation process. This nexus of the comprehensive ICE-CBP Joint 

Integrity Case Management System (JICMS) and other law enforcement databases, and 

targeted IPD analysis is an innovative best practice not seen in the vast majority of law 

enforcement agencies. 

80 Carl B. Klockars et aI., "The Measurement of Police integrity" Research in Brief, U.S. 

Department of Justice National Institute of Justice, NCJ 181465 (May 2000). 

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The HR.lIv1 LER "U.S. Customs and Border Protection Discipline Report for Fiscal Year 

20 I 0" briefing provided content and statistics sufficient for an example here of 

disciplinary data being collected and reported. The results of that review are as follows: 

While the reporting data illustrates the types of violations and disciplinary outcomes, 

these two areas are not linked together in any significant way. For example, a "lack 

of candor" case does not indicate whether it resulted in a termination, nor does a 

"misuse of TECS31 " case indicate whether it resulted in a short-term suspension. 

Furthermore, the gravity of cases is not made clear. Data indicates, for example, a 

high number of misconduct cases in San Diego, Rio Grande, Tucson and EI Rio, but 

an area with fewer cases might have a greater percentage of the more serious ones. 

• Some types of discipline appear to be missing from the data that are typically found 

in law enforcement agencies that do a good job of tracking their discipline cases. The 

most important missing item is what most agencies term a "Failure to Supervise." We 

found no data indicating that CBP was initiating disciplinary cases against 

supervisors who fail to do their jobs. There does not even appear to be a separate 

classification for this level of misconduct. Instead, violations such as these are most 

likely categorized as policy and procedures violations. 

• A specific misconduct violation commonly defined as Failure to Report Misconduct 

also appears to be missing from the CBP discipline process. While this might fall 

under the Failure to Follow Policies and Procedures section of misconduct that could 

result in disciplinary or adverse actions, most progressive state and local law 

enforcement agencies highlight this type of misconduct in their programs. 

• Another type of misconduct missing from the reporting documents is Sexual 

Harassment. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CDP LER should consider the collection, breakdown and analysis of data sets in a 

way thaI Is helpful for analyzing workforce corruption, as discussed above. For 

example, data points should be broken down and reported for each type of violation and 

individual CBP office or geographic location, and the gravity of the different cases made 

clear. 

3,058 cases ofCBP personnel misconduct were closed in FY 2010 without action. 

Knowing the specific outcomes for each specific misconduct violation in each location 

would allow management the ability to evaluate consistency in how discipline is meted 

out. Collecting and reporting such data would also send a message to all CBP offices that 

upper-level management is paying attention to these concerns at each location. 

CBP should also, if they do not already do so, initiate disciplinary cases against 

supervisors who fail to do their jobs, and create a separate classification for this level of 

81 TECS is the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, 8 law enforcement database 

utilized by CBP and other federal agencies. 

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misconduct (i.e., "Failure to Supervise").We believe that there is a general consensus 

among state and local police administrators that an agency's first-line supervisors are the 

key to ensuring adherence to policies and procedures. Progressive agencies ensure that 

supervisors are trained well and then held accountable for their performance. 

If eBP is initiating misconduct cases for "Failure to Supervise" in its "Failure to Follow 

Policy" sections, eBP should consider breaking this out and highlighting it as a separate 

misconduct violation so that its importance is emphasized to the organization. Moreover, 

by specifically defining this type of misconduct, any failure to supervise misconduct 

would require formal action by management. 

Sexual Harassment should also be included in the reporting documents as a type of 

misconduct, as this ethical problem-like any ethical problem-stands to be traced to 

other ethical problems, like corruption. While it is unclear ifthese are being handled 

under the section dealing with Policy Violations, we believe eBP should highlight its 

proactive efforts in addressing concerns in this area. Given the number ofeBP 

employees-{)ver 59,00o--there are presumably some sexual harassment violations. 

It would also be helpful to have data indicating the number of discipline cases for 

personnel whose supervisors had also been disciplined. Correlating poor performance on 

the part of employees as a result of poor supervision could be helpful for a variety of 

management reasons, including training. 

Although the number of misconduct cases for drug violations is identified, along with the 

results for random drug testing, we suggest breaking this data down even further. What 

drugs were involved? In which eBP offices and locations do these employees work-and 

has management in these offices been informed? Has eBP management taken any steps 

to determine whether the drugs employees were using in any given area were those most 

likely being transported illegally at the specific locations where the employees are 

working? For example, are eBP employees, stationed in certain offices along the 

Southwest Border, using cocaine in proportions greater than other types of drugs, and is 

cocaine the most predominant drug being smuggled in their assigned area? Data 

providing answers to these kinds of questions might provide red flags for management, 

indicating that some eBP employees might be acquiring their drugs through their eBP 

positions. 

Identifying employees with a disciplinary record receiving further discipline is another 

extremely valuable piece of information warranting further analysis. For example, in FY 

2010, among the general observations reported on the outcomes of the Discipline Review 

Boards, one indicated that 44 percent of the DRB cases involved employees with a prior 

disciplinary record. We recommend making this category a subject for further analysis 

with the following data provided: 

• Types of misconduct involved, both in the present cases and in the prior cases 

Number of misconduct cases involving employees with either one, two, three or 

more prior cases 

• Number of cases involving front-line employees and, separately, supervisors 

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• Average length of time between prior and current misconduct cases 

The length of the DRB process itselfalso warrants scrutiny. The following data would 

reveal potential inefficiencies and reasons for protracted cases: 

• The number of union requests for information and the types of cases involved 

Specific data on the time it took to schedule oral replies and the types of cases 

involved 

• The number of Doug\as Factors cases, and the types of cases involved 

• The number of cases in which a case was delayed due to a change by a deciding 

official as well as the location and type of cases involved 

If management is to be proactive in its efforts to address misconduct in a timely manner 

and track the effectiveness ofits discipline process, this data is critical. 

CBP should also conduct further study to determine other data requirements. There are 

data-related best practices currently being implemented within state and local law 

enforcement agencies that could provide CBP with the ability to do a much better job of 

informing it about the real-time state of its integrity assurance efforts. 

Finally, HRM LER should consider a unit dedicated to analyzing data, with the goal of 

providing guidelines to upper-level management and supervisors on ways to deter, 

prevent, and mitigate misconduct. This analysis unit could also provide inputs to CBP 

training programs to assist in the development of training curricula and modules dealing 

with workforce integrity and counter-corruption subjects. 

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___ \ .. J. .. S_, _C_/J;:;!,.{~'.~ ;:':;;lp0f(fer Proteclion (CBP) WOikiOl~ rnt"gnty ~:Wdy 

SECTION V. PREVENTION, DETECTION, 

MONITORING, AND INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS 

AND INITIATIVES 

In addition to the focal areas addressed thus far, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has 

a broad array of programs and initiatives designed to promote workforce integrity, and to 

prevent, detect, monitor and investigate corruption. The expanse of programs and 

initiatives across the agency is significant and testifies to the concern and attention that 

CBP leadership and management place on workforce integrity and counter-corruption 

measures. To help frame our survey of these activities, the CBP Office ofHurnan 

Resource Management provided the study team with a matrix of programs and initiatives 

developed by the Labor and Employee Relations Division in June 2Q 11. Expanding that 

list to over 40 agency-wide programs and initiatives, we sought to get a better 

understanding of these endeavors-as well as to identify any other related programmatic 

efforts-through interviews and further research. Our goal was to determine if there are 

any gaps in current integrity and counter-corruption programs and initiatives. 

Rather than discuss all of the programs and initiatives (see appendix C for the list), we 

chose to highlight a few that we believe merit further attention, either because they 

represent a best practice or because they may offer opportunities for more improvement 

and examination. 

Overview of Findings and Recommendations 

The Employee Assistance Program (EAP) demonstrates that CBP has taken 

seriously its responsibility to provide remediation, education, and work-life 

support to its employees-including the types of counseling that can help CBP 

prevent or mitigate misconduct and corruption. CBP should consider 

implementing two additional programs that would complement the CBP EAP's 

other work-life support initiatives: Peer Support Programs (PSPs) and Crisis 

intervention Teams (CITs). 

• The HRM Benefits, Medical and Worldife (BMWL) Division administers a 

random drug testing program that results in less than one percent positive results 

in FY 2010. Random drug testing should continue across the agency. Any 

changes in testing should contemplate a more strategic approach and ought to 

consider the inclusion of testing for commonly abused prescription drugs. The 

program may more appropriately belong in another part of the agency to avert 

any potential stigma of this detection program on BMWL employee assistance 

initiatives. 

• The Analytical Management Systems Control Office (AMSCO) has, for the three 

years since its inception, identified and corrected operational vulnerabilities that 

would have allowed potential opportunities for employee corruption. CBP should 

continue to pursue the AMSCO program's full potential. 

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• The training currently provided to CBP integrity officers includes infonnal 

training at headquarters, largely on-the-job training within AMSCO. Integrity 

Officer Program managers should consider a more structured training syllabus, to 

include instruction in the broad range of workforce integrity and countercorruption programs and initiatives that could assist and infonn activities in the 

field. 

• The operational environment that the U.S. Border Patrol's Integrity Advisory 

Committee monitors and addresses in their deliberations is dynamic. The 

committee and its chair should consider more frequent meetings. 

• There are a number of noteworthy research initiatives within the two programs of 

the OIA Office of Integrity Programs that contribute to the CBP's efforts to 

prevent, detect, monitor. and investigate integrity and corruption issues. The 

proactive research, analysis, and reporting conducted by OIA !PD should be 

regarded as a best practice for consideration throughout the law enforcement 

community. 

• The Integrated Policy Coordination Cell for Integrity (Integrity IPCC) has yet to 

adopt and implement a charter governing its activities--without which there is no 

clear articulation of the cell's vision, purpose, goals, objectives, structure and 

methodologies. The Integrity IPCC should develop and implement a charter, 

including consideration of its activities since inception to broaden the scope of its 

initial intent. 

The following is a discussion, in order. of those findings and recommendations. 

Assessment 

Employee Assistance Program 

Discussion of Findings 

The CBP Employee Assistance Program administered by the BMWL Division offers 

employees and their family members counseling regarding issues that, ifnot dealt with, 

could foster corruption. The services are available 2417 via an 800 number or on the 

dedicated EAP website. The voluntary confidential counseling services cover workrelated problems, marital and family issues, life adjustments, medical situations, alcohol 

and drug abuse, and crisis intervention." The EAP website has a special section 

dedicated to helping supervisors recognize personal problems that their employees may 

be experiencing, providing online training as well as guidance for making referrals. There 

is also a section on the website dedicated to suicide prevention, which is an excellent 

resource to address the agency's trOUbling suicide rate.S3 

82 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Employee Assistance Program" (brochure, n.d.). 

83 The CY 2010 suicide rate in CBP was 20.73 suicides per 100,000 people. CBP's rates exceed 

those of several comparison groups, most notably the general population (11.26), law 

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U.S. ' .. lis/om, il/ld !:lorder' Protection (Cflf') Workforce !;Itegrity Slu(!y ..... ~ .. ,... _- _ t~'P'll~_'''';'' __ _ 

The program in its entirety demonstrates that CBP has taken seriously its responsibility to 

provide remediation, education, and work-life support to its employees. The EAP website 

appears to be a best practice, as it meets or exceeds the quality of similar websites widely 

recognized within local and state law enforcement as being models.S< 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CBP sbould consider implementing two additional programs tbat would 

complement tbe CBP EAP's otber work-life support initiatives: Peer Support 

Programs (PSP) and Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs. Progressive law 

enforcement agencies across the nation have implemented PSPs to provide training to 

rank and file employees, so they are able to support colleagues that are struggling to 

address various personal issues outlined in the EAP. Similarly, CIT programs provide 

specialized training to members of an organization who have gone through highly 

stressful experiences, either on- or off-duty, so they are able to offer assistance and 

mentoring to other employees going through similar experiences. We recommend CBP 

explore these programs and consider them for CBP due to the immense value they have 

provided to other law enforcement agencies, Peer support and CIT programs go a long 

way in signaling to all members of an organization that top management places a great 

value on the well being of each individual within the larger organization; such programs 

become even more important when managing an organization as large as CBP. 

Random Drug Testing Program 

Discussion of Findings 

HRM BMWL administers the random drug testing program for the CBP workforce with 

ten percent of the population tested aruJually. The testing not only detects employees who 

use certain illicit substances, but also serves as a deterrent to those considering the use of 

drugs. In FY 2010,5,083 random drug tests were conducted with 8 positive results (.16 

percent; 7 actual positive results and I refusal to submit to the test).8l While recognizing 

such yield is very small, it is critical for a law enforcement agency the size of CBPwhich is involved in drug interdiction at so many levels-to continue to conduct such 

testing. 

Supervisors may request authorization for employee drug testing by phone, but must 

follow up with a written request shortly thereafter. 86 Standard random drug testing 

includes a sampling of personnel at all levels of rank within the CBP organization. This is 

standard practice for most local law enforcement agencies-based on the premise that 

enforcement (18.1), and the U,S. Army (20.6). Interview with eBP OIA IPD staff, November 

22,2011. 

84 Hillard Heintze subject matter experts, who specifically analyzed the EAP's offerings, 

suggested this about the EAP website, 

8lu.S Customs and Border Protection Discipline Report/or Fiscal Year 2010, slide 25. 

86 During their EI Paso activities field visit, members of the study team spoke with eBP 

supervisors who were unaware of the availability of this testing. 

49 
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leaders should be modeling the way their organization takes a stand against the use of 

illegal drugs. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

Random drug testing should continue across the agency. Any changes in testing 

should contemplate a more strategic approach and ought to consider the inclusion of 

testing for commonly abused prescription drugs. The program may more 

appropriately belong in another part of the agency to avert any potential stigma of this 

detection program on BMWL employee assistance initiatives. Each of these 

recommendations is discussed in order below. 

First, we present the "more strategic approach." Rather than increasing the number of 

random drug tests that are administered, we believe it would be wiser and more costeffective to be more strategic in tenns of detennining who is tested. CBP management 

should detennine which employees are most at risk for exposure to illegal drugs and test 

them. Some agencies make such drug testing a condition of entry into high-risk units 

(e.g., many local law enforcement agencies test those who go into narcotics enforcement 

or vice squads). Implementing such a policy may require interaction and potential 

negotiation with CBP employee labor representatives, but local law enforcement has laid 

the groundwork for such policies. We also suggest consideration be given to testing these 

high-profile individuals annually. 

Additionally, because the abuse oflegally prescribed drugs has become a major issue in 

law enforcement agencies across the country, CBP should consider including testing for 

such drugs and reporting such abuse. While various legal considerations would need to be 

addressed, it may be worthwhile to consider developing a policy requiring employees to 

self-report when they are taking legally prescribed drugs that may have an intoxicating 

effect on an employee while at work (such as muscle relaxers or other pain medications). 

That would work to support the testing for the commonly abused prescription drugs. 

Steroid abuse is another ongoing problem for law enforcement agencies, so CBP should 

consider testing for steroids as well. 

Finally, we recommend that CBP consider relocating the random drug testing program to 

an office or another division more suitable to its mission. The program, a misconduct 

detection and deterrence effort, currently resides in the Benefits, Medical and Worklife 

Division. This dichotomy has the potential to present a stigma on the employee assistance 

initiatives. 

Analytical Management Systems Control Office Program 

Discussion of Findings 

AMSCO uses CBP's automated systems to analyze crossing, referral, and results data to 

identify anomalies that may be indicative of integrity issues. OFO works collaboratively 

with the local integrity officer and, if necessary, the Office of Internal Affairs to resolve 

any anomalies identified by AMSCO and to detennine the nature ofthe aberration. By 

developing and leveraging programs such as the Enforcement Link Mobile Operations -

Red Flag (ELMO-RF), ASMCO works with field integrity components to monitor 

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U.S. Clntom., ami Bord,y (J,(lt'1c/mn (CBP) v'lorkfol'IOc fntpgrity Stl/cly iSU ...... =_:;& ... '" ... ~I"~ 

frontline activity through the use of integrity-based rule sets, ELMO-RF uses CBP data 

and systems capabilities to provide frontline supervisors immediate feedback on 

processing anomalies, This allows supervisors to have immediate interaction with front 

line staff to discuss transaction anomalies. 

In the three years since its inception, AMSCO has identified and corrected operational 

vulnerabilities that would have allowed potential opportunities for employee corruption. 

Insights gained through AMSCO operations have also allowed the development of new 

methodologies and applications that bear the potential to identify performance 

deficiencies and to counter acts of corruption in the field, as well as to serve as a training 

and instructional tool. The Border Patrol has a pilot program underway to look into the 

applicability of AMSCO to its operations. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

CBP should continue to pursue the AMSCO program's full potential. AMSCO has 

proven to be a highly effective tool to identify field operations workplace vulnerabilities 

and cOWlter workforce integrity issues, AMSCO is a best practice with the potential for 

adaptation to other high-volume, structured enterprises. 

The effectiveness of AMSCO operations is dependent on teamwork between the OFO 

staff, integrity officers in the field, and IA special agents, For example, the study team 

has learned anecdotally there have been occasions when the point at which AMSCO data 

inquiry ends and the IA investigative work begins is not well understood by the parties. 

The AMSCO collaborators should develop guidelines to resolve these ambiguities. 

Integrity Officer Program 

Discussion of Findings 

OFO has implemented an Integrity Officer Program that assigns experienced, supervisory 

level (GS I3s) officers to each of the 18 field offices. Integrity officers focus explicitly on 

integrity-related matters. Working directly for the port of entry (POE) director of field 

operations (DFO), the integrity officer addresses the DFO's concerns and acts as a liaison 

to the workforce at the POEs and headquarters integrity cOWlterparts, These officers 

provide training in classrooms and musters, support AMSCO headquarters inquiries, and 

provide law enforcement agencies with technical assistance on opeTlltional matters and 

investigations. Other duties include post-corruption case analysis and vulnerability 

assessments in the field. 

In addition to having previous supervisory experience, integrity officers must have 

technical expertise with the CBP data collection systems, inspections, analysis, 

intelligence examinations and enforcement activities. Selectees for the program receive 

informal training at headquarters (where they are provided job aids), in addition to an onthe-job training period within the AMSCO office. That experience acquaints the trainees 

with A MSCO systems, databases, and techniques, Once in the field, the integrity officer 

corps is kept informed on program developments through regular correspondence and 

conference calls. 

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:/:, L U::ii.()I!;~; ,J/llj ('·)11.1(;'/ f:Tote(;(fI'/; '(:':'-:"-'1 'fVl)tht(Jt (' C lJ]lcgnty -StUflv 

___ m_ IW.:-·H'I __ _ 

Discussion of Recommendation 

Integrity Officer Program managers sbould consider a more structured training 

syllabus, to include instruction in tbe broad range of workforce integrity and 

counter-corruption programs and initiatives tbat could assist and inform activities 

in tbe field. The study team considers a dedicated integrity officer at each OFO field 

office as a best practice. However, we believe that training for such officers could be 

enhanced by drawing upon additional resources and knowledge existing throughout CBP, 

to include many of the programs and initiatives discussed within this section. 

U.S. Border Patrol Integrity Advisory Committee 

Discussion of Findings 

The Integrity Advisory Committee's (lAC) mission is to "create strategic 

recommendations to combat corruption and promote integrity among all U.S. Border 

Patrol employees.,,81 A review of the committee's charter indicates a well-structured 

organization and methodology, and defined goals and objectives. The committee provides 

strategic analysis of the Border Patrol's vulnerabilities as they relate to mission critical 

corruption: smuggling, bribery, conspiracy, and money laundering. The committee is 

responsible for developing options and recommendations to effectively combat 

corruption with the Border Patrol, addressing concerns related to agent and civilian 

employees. They also provide a variety of analyses (vulnerability analysis and postcorruption analysis), as well as develop recommendations regarding training and 

awareness programs. All Border Patrol workforce integrity and counter-corruption 

initiatives that are brought to the attention of the lAC as best practices are shared with the 

sectors. The Border Patrol chief receives any strategic recommendations that the 

committee makes. 

Discnssion of Recommendation 

Tbe committee and its cbair sbould consider more frequent meetings. The lAC 

charter calls for quarterly meetings; however, in practice, meetings are held 

semiannually. Given the dynamic operational environment that the lAC monitors and 

addresses in their deliberations, it might be beneficial to convene more frequently. 

Office of Internal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division (multiple programs and 

initiatives) 

Discussion of Findings 

The Office oflnternal Affairs' Integrity Programs Division (lPO) conducts research and 

analysis and develops education programs aimed at preventing, deterring, and detecting 

employee misconduct and corruption. There are two programs within the OIA Office of 

Integrity Programs that are of special interest to the study team: the Proactive Research 

81 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Integrity Advisory Committee briefing, 

May 201 J. 

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u.s. Customs iJnd Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

and Analysis Operational Teams and the Behavioral Research Branch. Both of these 

programs leverage the division's existing research and resources in order to better 

understand and detect vulnerabilities in the CBP workforce. 

Determining the effectiveness of these programs, as weU as how their information is 

used, is not within the scope of the current task. However, there are a number of 

noteworthy research initiatives within the two programs that contribute to the CBP's 

efforts to prevent, detect, monitor, and investigate integrity and corruption issues. The 

following discusses some of them. 

Proactive Research and Analysis Operational Teams 

The Proactive Research and Analysis Operational (PROA) Teams were established to 

provide research aimed at detecting, deterring, and preventing corruption within the CBP 

workforce. The teams concentrate their efforts and expertise on a single operational area 

of vulnerability to determine where potential instances of misconduct or corruption may 

exist.ss Research areas to date have included the following: 

• Operation Side Door - evaluates the data and lead information from the 

Credibility and Assessment Division (CAD) polygraph examinations, where the 

applicants admitted to significant involvement with drugs or aliens. The data is 

examined to identify any nexus to existing CBP employees. PROA also looks for 

links between existing employees and any applicants who declined to take the 

polygraph.s

, 

• Operation Red Flag - evaluates data derived from AMSCO (described above) 

and a variety of other CBP systems to identify potential anomalies or areas of 

vulnerability within the workforce.9O 

• Operation Hometown - evaluates the vulnerability of deployment of CBP and 

Border Patrol personnel to their respective "hometowns," focusing on high-threat 

areas along the Southwest border.' l 

• Operation Southern Exposure - the PROA Team evaluates post-seizure data from 

internal and external sources to identify possible indicators of CBP employee 

misconduct.92 

88 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office oflntemal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division, 

"Proactive Research and Analysis Operational Teams," [PO Standard Operating Procedure #7, 

n.d. 

8' U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office oflntemal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division, 

"Proactive Research and Analysis Operational Teams, Operation Side Door," [PO Standard 

Operating Procedure #7a, n.d. 

90 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Internal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division, 

!PO Standard Operating Procedures, "Proactive Research and Analysis Operational Teams, 

Operation Red Flag," !PO Standard Operating Procedure #7b, n.d . 

• 1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office ofIntemal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division, 

!PO Standard Operating Procedures, "Proactive Research and Analysis Operational Teams, 

Operation Hometown," !PO Standard Operating Procedure #7d, n.d. 

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U.S. CustOIf)S oml Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

When applicable, the PROA tearns use their research and analysis to generate IPD cases 

for further investigation by the DHS OIG, feE OPR, and/or the OIAIIPD. The teams look 

at other areas as well, such as financial analysis, toll analysis, and asset forfeiture. 

Behavioral Research Branch 

The Behavioral Research Branch is a multidisciplinary research unit that studies internal 

threats (at the individual, cultural, and organizational levels) that may compromise the 

integrity of CBP. The branch is comprised of individuals with experience in forensic 

psychology, criminology, sociology, and psychology. StatTmembers conduct research 

and analysis, perform evaluation, mine data, and provide consultations and training. The 

branch responds to ad hoc requests for data from the Office of Internal Affairs, other CBP 

constituents (e.g., the commissioner's office), as well as Congress and DHS. 

The BRB's research agenda addresses various aspects of prevention (e.g. studying ways 

to build a better background investigation), detection (e.g., examining data from 

polygraphs to detect misconduct), and investigation (e.g., providing real time situational 

awareness on the prevalence of employee delinquency reported to the JIC and identifying 

trends over time). The branch provides monthly snapshots on delinquency, weekly DHS 

OIG case inventories, and annual reports on delinquency in the agency. The BRB's 

Corruption Case Studies research provides operational analysis of all known cases in 

which a CBP employee misused or otherwise abused his or her official position for 

personal gain, providing useful information to IA personnel in their work to prevent, 

detect, and investigate corruption in the CBP workforce. 93 The branch has also looked 

into a number of important issues surrounding integrity and corruption, to include 

studying code of silence issues and employee suicides, and identifying relevant best 

practices from other organizations. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

The proactive research, analysis and reporting conducted by OIA IPD should be 

regarded as a best practice for consideration throughout tbe law enforcement 

community. Their capabilities and products are a valuable resource both internally and 

externally, and should be promoted as such. The placement oflPD within OIA and colocated with complementary databases and functions--the Investigative Operations 

Division, the Joint Intake Center, the Personnel Security Division, and the Credibility 

Assessment Divisiorr-allows synergies uncommon in law enforcement. The OIA 

organization is a law enforcement best practice. 

It is important to ensure that the information developed by the PROA teams and the BRB 

are shared with individuals who are responsible for promoting integrity and deterring 

corruption throughout the organization. Their analyses have direct implications for hiring, 

92 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office oflntemal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division, 

IPD Standard Operating Procedures, "Proactive Research and Analysis Operational Teams, 

Operation Southern Exposure," IPD Standard Operating Procedure #1c, n.d. 

93 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office ofIntemal Affairs, Integrity Programs Division, 

"Behavioral Research Branch" (PowerPoint presentation, n.d.). 

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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

training, detecting, and investigating corruption and misconduct and could help inform 

efforts to develop an agency-wide integrity strategy. 

Integrated Policy Coordination Cell for Integrity 

Discussion of Findings 

On March 28, 20 II CDP Commissioner Alan Dersin issued a "CDP Statement of Policy 

and Intent: Integrity" that clarified the integrity initiatives and goals under his leadership 

and outlined the principles that serve as a basis for all operational, staffing, budget, and 

resource decisions across CDP. (See appendix H for the full statement.) In order to ensure 

the implementation of the provisions ofthat policy, the commissioner established the 

Integrity IPCC under his office shortly thereafter. The cell's membership includes 

workforce integrity and counter-corruption functionaries from across CBP, and its 

departmental and interagency partners-including the DHS Office oflnspector General, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Office of Professional Responsibility, and the 

FBI's Public Corruption Unit. 

Since its inception, the Integrity IPCC has yet to adopt and implement a charter 

governing its activities. Without a charter, there is no clear articulation of the cell's 

vision, purpose, goals, objectives, structure and methodologies. 

Discussion of Recommendation 

Tbe Integrity IPCe sbould develop and implement a cbarter. The charter should 

include the commissioner's "Statement of Policy and Intent: Integrity" initiatives, goals, 

and principles, and the methods to ensure their implementation. The charter should also 

consider the activities the cell has engaged in since inception to determine if it needs to 

broaden the scope beyond its initial intent. The lPeC should review its membership for 

inclusiveness to ensure that it is comprised of all the divisions that have roles in 

promoting integrity and addressing corruption. For example, the Integrity Programs 

Division-with its many integrity-related programs and initiatives-is not a standing 

member. 

Given the members' broad representation and common interests in workforce integrity 

and counter-corruption, the cell could act as the nexus (Le., point of coordination) of all 

related programs and initiatives across the agency. 

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U.S. Customs allo Burder Prot<?CliOfl(CBP) WorHon:e ilJ!f'gllty SllJlly 

SECTION VI. CONCLUSIONS 

The wide range and number ofCBP programs and initiatives on workforce integrity and 

counter-corruption measures testify to the concern and attention that CBP leadership and 

management give to the critical attribute-and issue-that is integrity. 

Ethics and integrity training and continuing education at the entry, supervisory, and other 

leadership levels imbue and promote these principles in the workforce throughout their 

careers. Programs are in place to prevent and deter the occurrence of corruption in the 

workplace. Internal controls are set up to detect corruption or ill intent, and to monitor 

and administer the workforce for misconduct that indicates or could lead to corruption. 

Processes and resources focus on the investigation of both criminal and non-criminal 

allegations. CBP's aggressive approach to workforce integrity and counter-corruption 

measures has resulted in a number of law enforcement community best practices. 

Nevertheless, corruption exists in CBP, as the arrest, charge, or conviction of over one 

hundred agents and officers in the past seven years testifies. Improvements and 

enhancements are possible, both internally and externally, in CBP's efforts to stem 

corruption. CBP's considerable number of programs and initiatives need comprehensive 

guidance in the form of a workforce integrity strategy. The agency should not only 

rethink its disciplinary system (including the way disciplinary data is handled), but also 

the organizational structure it shares with DHS OIG for the reporting, assignment, 

investigation, and disposition of CBP workforce investigations. Organizational matters 

external to CBP that bear on CBP need rethinking as well: OPM suitability guidelines for 

CBP national security positions, for example. Including CBP lA special agents in the 

national and regional BCTFs is an "organizational structure" that need no rethinking-it 

should continue, fostering further effective criminal investigations and efficiencies in 

combined counter-corruption efforts. 

Perhaps the greatest enhancement can come from the individual CBP themselves, across 

the organization: CBP should emphasize in its ethics and integrity training exactly what 

the agency wants its employees to be doing daily in applying those principles. 

CBP is neither alone nor unique in confronting issues with workforce integrity. State and 

local law enforcement agencies over the last several years have spent a great deal of time 

reviewing and improving their internal affairs and workforce management processes. 

CBP is poised to do the same. 

Areas for Further Study 

In the course ofthis project, the study team realized a number of areas that were beyond 

the scope of the task yet merit further study. The following subjects are recommended for 

CBP consideration. 

Disciplinary Process 

CBP should undertake a study to consider revisions to the current CBP disciplinary 

process. Initially established by the U.S. Customs Service in 1999 to service a population 

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U.S. Customs and Borrler Protection (CBP) WorJc:IOIce Integrity Study to: t:llllO;llln • 

of22,000 employees, the process now deals with a 59,000-member workforce, many of 

whom operate in a highly volatile border environment. LER staff are overburdened with 

caseloads. The lSI days in FYIO from a Discipline Review Board to a final decision, 

noted earlier, is an inordinate amount of time. A study should consider measures 

introducing efficiencies whife ensuring fairness. 

Ethics and Integrity Training 

The study team recommends that the Office of Training and Development consider a 

more in-depth review of training issues to help to determine what additional steps could 

be taken to enhance CBP's training in the areas of ethics and integrity. Such an effort 

should assist in highlighting the practical application of ethics concepts within the day-today work of both first-line employees and supervisors, as well as inform CBP of what 

organization-wide efforts may be taken to help bolster training efforts to meet the 

expectations set by CBP management. 

"Code of Silence" 

A proposed "Code of Silence Study" should be undertaken by the Integrity Programs 

Division Behavioral Research Branch in order to gauge workforce integrity and 

determine the extent the code exists within CBP ranks. 

Surge Hiring 

IfDHS oro provides CBP with information of the cases it currently holds, then the 

agency may wish to consider conducting analyses of the tenure of the persons who are 

currently under investigation, to assess when these individuals were hired. The compiled 

data may confirm or deny any links to the hiring surge and workforce corruption. If it is 

found that a statistically significant portion of the sample was recruited during the hiring 

surge, additional research should be undertaken to determine if there were any aspects of 

the vetting process that may have led to the hiring of unsuitable candidates. 

Disciplinary Data Requirements 

We recommend CBP consider a study to further determine the collection, breakdown, 

and analysis of the disciplinary data requirements toward more substantive analysis-to 

inform CBP leadership, management, supervisors, and the training establishment. 

Early Warning Systems Implementation 

One of the ways that state and local law enforcement agencies have improved their 

internal affairs and workforce management processes is in gathering, analyzing, and 

reporting their misconduct case statistics. These developments have led to the 

implementation of early warning systems (data-based police management tools designed 

to identifY officers whose behavior is problematic, and to provide a measure for 

intervention to correct that performance). As existing employ behavior-related database 

systems are adapted and improved, CBP should consider the future implementation of an 

early warning system. 

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U.S. Customs and Border Proreclhm rCBP) Workforce Imegrity Srudy 

Future Threats and Vulnerabilities 

CBP should consider a study to explore where future threats and vulnerabilities might lie. 

For example, ifCBP considers the current corruption problem as an example of threatshifting-we hardened our borders, making it more difficult for people to get in on their 

own, so they're relying upon insiders to help them-then the agency should consider 

conducting an analysis to determine what other types of threat-shifting behaviors may 

occur in the future that CBP will need to be prepared to address. The key to success is to 

think ahead to prevention versus reactionary response. 

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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) WorkfarC!] Integrity Study 

ApPENDIX A. INTERVIEW ISSUES AND 

QUESTIONS FOR CBP HEADQUARTERS 

OFFICIALS 

General Issues and Questions 

1. What is the role of your organization/office in the CBP workforce integrity/countercorruption enterprise? 

a. Are there particular aspects of the enterprise that you see as partie ularly 

effective or efficient? 

2. What do you see as the key workforce integrity/counter-corruption issues facing CBP 

today? What are the highest-priority workforce integrity/counter-corruption issues 

facing your office? 

a. What do you feel are the solutions to these issues? 

b. Why? 

3. What constraints or obstacles (if any) limit your office's ability to carry out its 

workforce integrity/counter-corruption role? 

a. These may include legal constraints and regulations, CBP and 

interagency policies, access to or budget for particular technologies, etc. 

b. Are you able to gather and/or access the information you need to support 

your efforts to counter corruption? 

4. Are you aware of any external or internal influences that make you more or less 

concerned about corruption in the CBP workforce? 

a. If so, what are these influences? 

5. Regarding the CBP workforce integrity/counter-corruption enterprise: 

a. Are there particular aspects that you see as in need of improvement, or 

areas in which you think CBP could benefit from understanding 

interagency best practices? 

b. Of the policies and procedures your office ha~ in place in implementing 

your role, which do you see as most effective? Does your office have a 

particular program or policy that you see as a best practice applicable to 

other CBP offices? 

6. How does your office define corruption? Integrity? Ethics? 

a. Does your definition(s) differ from the definitions used by others within 

CBP? 

b. If so, how? Why do you use this definition versus those being used by 

others within CBP? 

7. With which offices do you collaborate or exchange information as part of efforts to 

counter corruption? 

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U.S. Customs and Border ProteLllOn (Cap) Workforce Integrity Study 

a. Include offices within CBP as well as interagency offices. 

8. What workforce integrity/counter-corruption issuesllines ofinquiry do you feel the 

Institute should pursue? 

a Why? 

h. Whom should we talk to/where should we go to explore these issues? 

9. Regarding the workforce integri ty/counter-corruption enterprise, are there any best 

practices which you are aware of and would recommend for CBP implementation? 

10. The Institute intends to conduct field studies as part of our research. 

a Would you recommend any particular activities which would best infonn 

our work? 

h. Why? 

11. What other CBP organizations/offices do you recommend we confer with? 

a. Why? 

h. Is there any individual in particular whom you recommend? 

12. Are there any interagency organizations/offices that you recommend we confer with? 

a. Why? 

h. Is there any individual in particular whom you recommend? 

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u.s. Customs ilnd Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Stlidy 

ApPENDIX B. CBP OFFICES AND ACTIVITIES 

AND FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COUNTERPARTS 

INTERVIEWED 

CBP Headquarters Offices and Divisions 

Deputy Commissioner 

Chief Counsel 

Associate Chief Counsel, Houston, TX 

Assistant Commissioner (AC) Office ofField 

Operations 

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) 

Executive Director for Field Operations 

Analytic Management Systems Control 

Office (AMSCO) 

Incident Management Division 

Deputy Chief Office of Border Patrol 

Strategic Planning, Policy and Analysis 

Division 

Integrity Advisory Committee 

A C Office of Air and Marine 

AC Office of intelligence and Investigative 

Liaison (OIIL) 

• Deputy Assistant Commissioner OIiL 

AC Office of Human Resources Management 

Labor and Employee Relations Division 

Benefits, Medical and Worklife Division 

Personnel Research and Assessment 

Division 

Hiring Operations, Programs and Policy 

Division 

o Minneapolis Hiring Center 

AC Office of Training and Development 

DAC Office of Training and Development 

Executive Director 

o Field Operations Academy 

o Border Patrol Academy 

o Advanced Training Center 

AC Office of Internal Affairs 

DAC Office of Internal Affairs 

o Integrity Programs Division 

Behavioral Research Branch 

o Investigative Operations Division 

Joint Intake Center 

o Personnel Security Division 

o Credibility Assessment Division 

A C Office of Congressional Affairs 

Integrated Policy Coordination Cen for Integrity 

(integrity IPeC) 

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u.s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

CBP Field Activities - EI Paso, Texas 

Office of Field Operations Field Office 

Assistant Director 

Line supervisors 

Integrity Officer 

u.s. Border Patrol Sector 

• Chief 

• Integrity representative 

Field supervisors 

Office oflntemal Affairs Field Office 

• Special agent in charge (SAC) 

• Deputy SAC 

• Resident agents 

El Paso Border Corruption Task Force 

• FBI resident agent 

Los Cruces, New Mexico Border Corruption Task Force 

• FBI resident agent 

• CBP Internal Affairs resident agent 

DHS Office of Inspector General special agent 

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U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

DHS and Federal Interagency 

Department of Homeland Security 

• Office of Inspector General- Assistant IG for Investigations 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

o Office of Professional Responsibility 

Transportation Security Administration 

o Office of Professional Responsibility 

o Inspections and Investigations Division 

Department of Justice 

• Office ofInspector General 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

o Criminal Investigative Division 

Public Corruption Unit 

• National Border Corruption Task Force 

o Inspections Section Internal Investigative Unit 

Department of the Treasury 

• Office oflnspector General 

Department of Defense 

• Office of Inspector General 

Environmental Protection Agency 

• Office of Inspector General- Assistant IG for Investigations 

63 
u.s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

ApPENDIX C. WORKFORCE INTEGRITY AND COUNTER-CORRUPTION 

PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 

64 

P.o.,graJn/lnitiath c 

Integrity Officer Program 

Integrity Committee 

Integrity AdvUoty Cou.ncil 

(lAC) 

Lead 

HR.'I1IBMWL 

OFO 

'iti'Aee:reltt&"g"t¥¥r 

OFO 

USBP 

Description 

The EAP provides aU employees with un rree, cODfidcoti.1 counseling, 

WorklJre4You provides employees with 24n iafonuatioD, evenu, and ac

that support work"life-balancc aod help employees become more resilien

to-day challeages in the job and at home. 

Integrity Oflkcn are field opentioDS officers who are specially sdected 

trained to promote intqrity in the field offices. Special training iodudca 

months working with AMSCO oflicen to lean the sophisticated IT toob 

The purpOJe of the Iotqrity Committee is to etlJure tbat the AmeriuD p

absolute confidence in the integrity or eBP OFO employees. The comm

reviews miscoodud £aIelIDokiag for vulnerabilities in order to pnvcot 

corruption. The committee is compriJed of CUP penoDocl from the cnt

include representatives from the &nlcr Patrol tbe EmploYK Assistanu 

The lAC makes strategic rec:ommendations Bonier Patrol Cbier to comb

wrruptioo and promote integrity among all US Border Patrol employee

council has broad reprcuntation from the USBP and hal Idvisors and s

matter expert! auon CDP offices. The council is responsible for strBte

offour iadividual, opcntionll, organizational, and lead

t tr mtrrpt'? . § r·· trW"'!. 

Mandatory Supervisor 

Rotation 

Electronic Integrity Mus.ging 

OFOIUSBP 

USBP 

Tbe mandatory supuvisor rotation policy ",u rec:om.meadcd by tbe US

Integrity Advisory Council The poticy requirn 15 percent or the DP'II f

Jlu.penison'to rotate aDDually. 

14n integrity messages delivered to USBP stations via tbe [nlonnatioD D

System (IDS). Tbe mCS'sagiDg includes videos On integrity that are based 
u.s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

Program/lnitiath c Lead Description 

: ", .... ... .., '1fkAilllX@£tJi&&&ilIII!U\}&QOOMiij iiidiiilfi •• 

potential background investigation issues. Applicants Jcif-admitting to a

Scr:eeniDg HRMIlA 

PH-employment Polygraphs OlAJIPD 

who are :tcltded art: given an .Itemak teatativc teled th-at ltatts t

the sell-admitted iuut't tlJey may be DD!luiablc for employment. At that 

are given 110 Opportabity 10 respood (explain) to tbe suitability Issac or o

the proUS! by dec:liniog to respond. 

qc;., U¥lAIlC!Q1Z!LAM.Pfi!#J·Lw:

........... - tr. ....,. .............. nih ty for entp'loymcM WItD -P. 

The Anti-border COrruptiOD Act of 2010 requires that by Jan_,., 1,201

law enforcement applicant! receive a polygraph euminatioll befon bein

+)1;;f· :c'F .i \04",.;". U; .j, fL ?=1 4.; ,: , ..... JAtu' .,j _.', s;:;;a;a;a4'!4f4k&

Vulnerability A ..... m.nt. USBP bas.d " .... n .. {Of" ......... jltloll; iii. OIl'dy.li bdp' ti>di6dn.te gaps throu

proadanl chall.geto, policy, ovenidt-t,. aad review (e.g., Lia

eDture further vetting of penoDoel). 

Field Office Vulnerability 

MJeSJllleDts OFO A vulnerability au:tssDu!ot of rlCld operatioDS belp!l to identify areas tha

possible threat of wrruptioo. 

l4l# iifiWMldftgtiit9tVJtifi1!W-"""" 3A .::caa;;s*,*wa&;."".'*)\4l,i#i\t¥'#F'?":, $6$!ffAcz:¥¥ .?¥ "if.;:- AJ+?

Inttgrity Awareness Training OIAJIPD The integrity hriefing is incorporated into the New Employee Orientatio

for New Employ... (NEOp). i" .W.;U.,.;';. ;g ¥ Q (Q442£L' irtl!!Iri ....... iDg'f .... mt OlAJIPD 

LiDe Silpervisors 

Integrity Traioing for 

Iacu.mbent Second-Level 

Supemon 

OIAIIPD 

•• ,..., • " : _, • • ,." ,,,. 

fint lioe supervison) IlIlGet'gO iaU:grity iraoog.. The briefing b eadtled 

uLeaderShip for Pl'e'Yenting Corruption." 

The objectives oCthls trainiDg art to: (1) define ethics aDd etbicalleaden

recognize aDd .void ethical tnps iD the workplace and ebewher:e; ..and (3

proecss Cor ethic.al decision IWlking aDd apply it in fUture leadenllip dec

4t,.4JiJt:4Hf,:;.;tiilfif%,hV44 . .... . ..... " •.. .. . Post! aJSignmtDt loutiOllJ wJth·.Ji.fo·cu"i "o1I.tSoJKAiDer SCC\lrity. ££ue£ 

Integrated Policy Coordiaatioo 

c.n OD IDtcgrity (Integrity 

1l'CC) 

Comm.issioner's Office 

Commmioner Benio establiJhed the Iotegrity IPCe to eDlnre' the impleoftbe "Principles ofPoUcy" articabted iu his March 2011 "CBP Statem

Polic:y and InteDt: lotecrity'"'. Those propositioDs form the buis for all 

operatioult staffing, bodget aDd resource decisioDII aero,. CBP. 
66 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

Ann •• 1 VLC rDlegri,>, 

Awareness TniaiDg 

"Tbink YOII. Act" Offduty Arrest Initiatives 

OIAJIPD 

HRM 

Dl'scription 

Tbis onliae tnudD&: fulfilb tbe mandatory aDBaal t.ertificatioD requinm

issues that is delivered via the CBP Virtual Luruing Center (V

Tbe "nink Before Yoo Act'" initiative dissemiaates ruuniag iDtegrity-

mftlages from die Assistant Comm.issioner, HRM. The messagu are di

via email.adloa.multers. TheH m.essages addrea. tbe obligadoo to re

corruption. aJ"l'ats, aDd otber related mismnducL I.ilial initiative begainformation aad raourca nlated to alcobol aDd impaired driving inciud

guidilDte, red asphalt videos, and goggle:J wbkb simulate dmiag uDder 

Cej '.- .... eiMl!.!..;-t*.;";;p,-' .u.i.iw.:eQitH"ntctfw:..W4t. te, 5 _rtt 'f 1 

DisdpUDary peoaWet - advene actioD! aDd d1scipliDIrY ac:tion. - are im

HRMILER correct bebavior and teacb tbe subject and othen that certain aetiollll ar

(Doesn't go beR) unauept.ble for CBP employees. Tbe Table of Offenses and Penaltiea s

*f<i",," h" Ftbt.,£i:;'¥5ri'-··'·'''«l¢ifWt''Jt

HRMJB!\fWL Random drue ttstia.g iJ conducted aD teD perunt of the incumbent COP 

pcryear. 

IFD teams conduct researcb, evaluarioD and analysis On employen. enfo

OIA!IPD amaas. and otber .tratq:ic fadon, ,ucb as posl-seizuR data, AMSCO i

__ ... '·· .. 

Tbe Behavioral Researeb Dnucb is a multidiscipliDary researcb uDit thainternal threats to the integrity of CDP at the individual. cultural, aDd 

OlAJIPD otp.aizatioDd In-eb. The braDch conducts raeareb, evaluatioD, dati m

t;na"n:t The repres

"' •• 1'#1 . . " ". , 

.• ....... ...:.",_.:"", __ ._ • .• 
u.s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

I'rogram/lllitialilc 

Operational Systems Analysis 

(AMSCO) 

SOPs (or Reporting Possible 

Corruption 

Amendments to CBP 

Standards of Conduct (or 

Reporting On-Duty ArnsQ 

Lead 

USBP 

HRMILER 

Dcscriptiull 

Tbe SOP! provide guidance for reporting suspicious activity or potentia

corruption. The ameodmc.ntJ provide increased specificity on reporting requirement

Periodic Reinvestigations OIAlPSD 

COP employee" are mandated to uodngo periodic reinvestigatioIU to cuemployee is suitable for tontinued employment with CDP. These investi

initiated eYery five yean. 

" aE&i22Z£tEgm MAl·ibM?A. 4· am .. _ .' I.. ,," "'" • "'I ,,,,,, -.:: .. , 

Anal)'!is trends and pattenu.;. 

.¥A!!LSi¥JR iMP' HJ!i!&F¥!!_ ;: l@.J'i

OFO USBP and OFO IClField USPB ord post IS a "Lesson Learned" field re

Corruption Analysts Man;gen corru.ptlOD cases followlag coDVIction. 

¥k -4)+ > > kL-Zf4i? ,.;;:;:p".¥ ,.%* .• i, *.E:;;;:P;.f* :a;;;;16¥!PH¥ ,A.t;!f@J,4"i;tL "<" £$,Q}44?lfA£lR4N.U f.J.!). J?f;;:)J!¥VJii¥4f. 

Management Inquiry Team USBP 

Tbese USBf teams conduct pest corruption on'mission critical corruptio

lIector .. leveL The teams look for "'red nags" for detecting cOrl'1lption afl

has been identified as engagiag in corrupt activities. 

ZiP! '4Mi!2Uggsg £ ! ';Ol,CzaaZ d 4tH.. ...... . .. . . < 

1ft lIer CUe Behavioral Researtb empioyees «ir 

til Y Brancb focused on idmtifying behavior that is indicative of corrupt activity. 

OIAJll'DI 

Employee Delinquency Study Behavioral Research 

Brancb 

, 

-

The study tncks and 8naiYza incidentU'eporied to tbe JIC in order to 

situational awareness on threats to tbe integrity of CBP employees. The 

informs integrity messaging efforts and aids in the development of the a

campaigns. 
68 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

l'rogram/lnitiatht, Lead Identi!) J)l'scription 

OIAJlPDJ This initiative evaluates data and lead informatioD from the Credibility M

o . S' d D Proactive Research Division (CAD) polygraph uammatiODI when the applicant has admitte

peratio .. D .. 1 e. o.or... aod Analysil sigaificaot,.iDvo!!'en;-ent. drul;r Side. Door alto s

1:1 PO' 7 aster 1 an 7 nemzMw-

OWIPDJ This aoalytic study evaluattl dati aoomala and Iud i.formation from 

Proactive Research to determine if there is aoy misconduct. 

aDd Analysis OpcralioD Red Flag 

Operational Teams 

OIAlIPDJ This study evaluates the vulnerability of deploying CBO aod Border Pat

o 'H Proactive Rt.:search penonnel to their respective "hometowns." Whue applicable, team gen

persnoD ometbWI1 and Analysis CAses for further investigation by DHS-OIG, lCE-OPR aod/or CDP OlA 

. .. on , nwWdrtr ttt a i{a::(·'irii6*r ...... 'mt 

Operation Sontbem Exposure 

Misc:oDduct and Corruption 

Inve.stiganon5 

OWIPDI This sn.dy evaluates the post-scizure data derived from the Offic:e of Inte

Proadiu Renarc:h and Operations Coordination and state and local Is .. enforcement. 

and Analysis 

Operational Tums 

DRS OIG, ICE OPR, 

OIAIOD 

Investiptionlll conducted to determioe if an employee has engaged in cri

... 

C· . al AD 1· d Resarch and .nalyais conducted in support of pre-employmcnt screenin

OIAlIPD <;:SP who are under investigation by DHS-OIG, an

.. ,-,-•. :...,. ... .. , 

lo't'cstigative Polygraph OWCAD Polygraph examinatioDs conducU!d in support of misc:oDduct andJor corr

Euminati.on innstigatioD oC CBP employea. 

f6t dt#± tfitttdlIttirt "373m; 777FTrrnt7SQR 7" ] mrn 
189 

u.s, Customs dlla ',JordeI' i'rot(Jciio!7 ,CBP) \tVf)f'kl()ITO Intl2griiy $Wdy i ",lI,lIIIP;"'~~~ J .IIIUo1.~_~. _a 

ApPENDIX D: HILLARD HEINTZE PROFILES 

Hillard Heintze believes that immediate access to trusted counsel, critical insights, and the 

full scope of information vital to strategic decision making is absolutely essential. As a key 

component of the firm, the Hillard Heintze Senior Leadership Council is an independent 

panel of retired major city police chiefs and senior federal, state and local law enforcement 

leaders. Comprised of select senior law enforcement executives with outstanding career-long 

records of leadership and achievement, the council is dedicated to bringing national and 

international best practices to the pursuit of excellence in policing and public safety, It 

supports the ability of mayors, police chiefs, sheriffs, city managers, council members and 

regulators in goverrunent agencies, as well as their executive decision-making teams 

worldwide, to identify, evaluate, prioritize and implement opportunities to enhance and 

improve policing and public safety. Key focus areas include command, control and 

communications; recruitment and training; information sharing and intelligence; 

collaboration and public/private partnerships; use of technology; and ethics, workforce 

integrity and public trust. 

Six members of the Hillard Heintze team, including the Senior Leadership Council, 

contributed directly to the analysis, assessment and research at the core of this study. 

These individuals are: 

Robert Davis - As a 30-year veteran of the San Jose, California Police Department 

(SJPD), Davis rose from patrol officer to Chief of Police of the tenth-largest city in the 

nation (2004-2010) as a result of factors such as his progressive use of technology, 

sensitivity to the diversity of the citizens under his protection, and internationally lauded 

model of gang prevention, intervention and suppression. Davis oversaw what has 

historically been the lowest-staffed police department of any major city in the country -

with only 1.2 sworn officers per 1,000 residents (the national average is approximately 

2.6 officers per 1,000 residents). According to the FBI, San Jose is routinely ranked one 

of the safest "big cities" in America. This distinction is even more remarkable given that 

the Department received this 3C1:olade amid seven straight years of budget cuts while 

fighting crime in a city that adds 15,000 to 20,000 new residents every year. Davis has 

earned international recognition as an expen in addressing gangs and gang violence, 

having served as a consultant for the U.S. State Department on five separate occasions. 

Davis is a fO!Tl1er President ofthe Major Cities Chiefs Association. 

Tbomas Streicber - As the fO!Tl1er Chief of the Cincinnati Police Department, a position 

he held for over ten years, Streicher earned the Department both local and national 

recognition for his leadership and accomplishments. With Streicher at the helm, the 

Department has been awarded a number of distinctions, such as the ACLU Leadership 

Award (2000), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (lACP) Weber Seavey 

Award (2008) and the lACP West Award for Investigative Excellent (2009). During this 

period, Cincinnati was also recognized by the United States Department of Justice for 

successfully meeting the requirements of a Memorandum of Agreement designed to 

improve aspects of policing including, but not limited to use of force procedures, use of 

canines, procedures dictating citizen complaint processing, training, inspection and 

police-community relations. Additionally, the Cincinnati Police Department has been 

recognized for successfully completing the historic Collaborative Agreement, under the 

,auspices of the United States Court for the Southern District of Ohio, in what former 

69 
190 

U.S. Clistoms and Border Protection (CBP) Worktorce Integrity Stll<ly 

United States Attorney General John Ashcroft termed a historic agreement, which has 

never before been attempted by any law enforcement agency in the United States. 

Mattbew W. Doberty - Widely rerognized across the United States as among the most 

experienced senior experts in assessing an individual's potential for danger and 

preventing targeted violence against our nation's leaders and national critical 

infrastructure as well as major events and the corporate workplace, Doherty has managed 

training on threat assessment and targeted violence prevention for over 70,000 federal, 

state and local law enforcement personnel. He created the first information-sharing 

database (T A VISS) for the prevention of violence against protected officials, including 

the U.S. President, Vice-President, cabinet secretaries and governors. He developed and 

supervised numerous research projects on targeted violence including the Secret Service 

partnerships with Carnegie Mellon University for the Insider Threat Study (ITS) and with 

Harvard University and the Department Education for the Bystander Study. Frequently 

called on to testify as an expert before Congress, Doherty has also routinely briefed 

Justice Department officials and members of Congress on threat assessment 

methodologies. Featured in numerous magazines, newspapers and television news media 

for major articles on insider threats, assassinations and school shootings, Doherty also 

serves on two Advisory Boards: the U.S. Marshal Service Judicial Threats Center and the 

U.S. Capitol Police Threat Assessment Section. 

Kenneth A. Bouche - Over nearly two decades, Bouche has established a career as an 

executive leader and senior advisor at the forefront of applying best practices in 

technology, information sharing and intelligence to the highly specialized needs of law 

enforcement, homeland security, justice, emergency preparedness and crisis response. In 

addition to his executive responsibilities, Bouche leads the firm's focus in two areas: (\) 

helping government clients Oustice and homeland security decision-makers) understand 

and embrace strategic information-sharing opportunities to advance their missions of 

understanding trends, preventing crime and terrorism. and catching criminals. and (2) 

helping the firm's commercial clients and partners align their value offerings and service 

delivery with the needs of specific public sector organizations. From 200 I to 2006, 

Bouche was the chairman of the Global Justice Infonnation Sharing Initiative. In this 

capacity, he served as a national leader in improving America's infonnation-sharing 

capacity and implementing post 9/11 intelligence refonns. 

Terry G. Hillard - Until 2003, as Chicago Police Superintendent, Terry Hillard led 

13,500 officers in protecting one of the country's largest metropolitan centers. Hillard is 

nationally regarded for his results-driven leadership as well as his intensely personal 

commitment to individuals. At the helm of the Chicago Police Department, he created 

one of the most collaborative cultures in the history oflaw enforcement. During his 

tenure as the head of the nation's second largest police department, he initiated 

innovative, community-sponsored crime-prevention programs to protect and serve the 

citizens of Chicago - programs that today still help define national standards in 

community-based policing. Hillard earned the CPO's highest rank and distinction the 

old-fashioned way: one step at a time - evolving first from a Patrol Officer to a Gang 

Crimes Specialist and member of the mayoral Executive Security Detail and later to 

Intelligence Division Sergeant, District Commander, Chief of Detectives, Coordinator of 

the Chicago Terrorist Task Force and Lieutenant in Gang Crimes and Narcotics Sections. 

In fact, the programs and initiatives of his administration transformed the CPO into a best 

practice-setting, 21st Century law enforcement agency - with changes that spanned 

70 
191 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

critical law enforcement domains such as technology, infonnation exchange, community 

policing and police accountability. 

Arnette F. Heintze - Based on nearly three decades of experience working at the highest 

levels of Federal, state and local law enforcement, Arnette Heintze has an exceptionally 

strategic perspective on security. As the U.S. Secret Service Special Agent in Charge in 

Chicago, Heintze planned, designed and implemented successful security strategies for 

U.S. presidents, world leaders, events of national significance and the nation's most 

critically sensitive assets. Earlier in his distinguished public service career, Heintze 

served with the Louisiana State Police, Louisiana Attorney General's Office, and the 

Baton Rouge City Police. In 1990, Heintze was part of the Presidential Protective 

Division, where he served for more than foW' years on the pennanent detail protecting 

President and Mrs. Bush and President and Mrs. Clinton. In Washington D.C., Heintze 

also coordinated the 160 foreign embassies in the city and acted as the Secret Service 

spokesperson and agent in charge of the Public Affairs Office, where he led the crisis 

communications team during some of the nation's most trying times. In 1998, Heintze 

was accorded the honor of being chosen as the Treasury Department's representative to 

attend the National War College'S elite program for select military officers and ranking 

federal civilians, where he earned a Master of Science degree in national security 

strategy. in 2000, Heintze's strategic leadership qualifications led to his appointment as a 

member ofthe Senior Executive Service and his selection as the Special Agent in Charge 

of the Chicago field office. 

71 
192 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

ApPENDIX E. CBP DISCIPLINARY FLOW 

CHART 

72 

CBP Dlsclpllna'Y Flow Diagram 

CBp·OIA Inl'tJfffl6(1 

!O.~'c ... ~ll"'"P I OHS-OIG NolrflC.morl 

'~,,"F<_ 

Dec/lnes Case I : A~p48 elISa 

rQli,~~:' .~.] L. ~l<J_ 

lM:;l/,.,S Csu <. : Accept$ c;.$e 

A."'T.;'.C.~ ~.J l .• I~~~ 

I I . I ~~~~_ 

., ••• " L£'O ..... I ' ..ol' ,~ .. ~ t 

\~... ti:i.,\~.>" -.-i l· ......t-l .......................... .1 ~'" : <~:' .. , .. - ~ 

• LER CaM Pl"eMI"d..8bOn 

* DRS OeIlbtnltion 

• CoI..nMI Rallll!P!¥ at Draft Proposal 

• FIn" PropouIIQ ORB for SlgoaIUI'e 

__ ~ """~_ ::J*rH r······· .... •·•·· .. ····• 

p __ -.J L '''~~ Pr __ 

• 8o:1end Req\.>e8110 

Pr.,....,..R.plletl 

• Emptoy_ oral Reply 

• EmpIQoj .. W"itte" Reply 

-'lsyot ... PI"lJtedjc.18oard 

I ........ *_I,Le&* 

• 00u0W Factor RevMIw 

andFlrwl~ 

• Draft DecIIion L.n.I' 

'oC~ 

·~~l.e(tOfe.g.; 

laLER 

• Final. OecI_on L.tter toD,O, 

• D.O. luun DeelalOn '0 __ 

".."...-

_-....,Ion 

-I -,) 

_;"Lele 
193 

u.s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

ApPENDIX F. RECRUITING AND VETTING FLOW 

DIAGRAM 

CBP HIring Process 

C.mrll,l,l{e I It (!<'~ Hql r'j', I t') 

h\}111511 [\1'1.." II'C.· prj 

73 
194 

U.S. Customs and Border Protectloll I Cap) Workforce Integrity Study 

ApPENDIX G. CBP TRAINING MATERIALS 

REVI.EWED AND NEXT-STEP 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Training Materials Reviewed and Considered in the Study 

As noted at the start of section III, OTD provided courseware on CBP's training on 

workforce integrity/ethics/code of conduct. The Hillard Heintze SLC training subject 

matter experts (SMEs) reviewed the material-specifically, the following: 

1. Overview of the Border Patrol Academy's IntegritylEthicslCode of Conduct 

Training, as prepared by Mark Brazill, Training Operations Specialist, dated 

April 27, 2011 

2. Overview of the Advance Training Center's IntegritylEthicslCode of Conduct 

Training, as prepared by Todd Fraser, Course DeveloperfInstructor, dated May 2, 

2011 

3. Overview of the Field Operations Academy's IntegritylEthics/Code of Conduct 

Training, as prepared by Joseph E. Trevathan, Branch Chief, dated May 3 I, 20 II 

4. Overview of the Training Production and Standards Division's Integrity Plus 

IPCC, as prepared by Susan Farrell, Instructional Systems Specialist, dated May 

31,201 I 

5. Instructor's Guide for the Second-Level Command Preparation Course on Ethical 

Decision Making (Lesson Four: Ethical Decision Making), dated September 

2011 

The findings and recommendations from the review of these materials are in section III of 

the report. 

Recommendations for Next Steps 

While a more in-depth review of training issues would help determine what additional 

measures should be taken, the following are some of the steps that could be taken to 

assist in this effort: 

74 

• Conduct face-to-face interviews with CBP training instructors who actually 

deliver the ethics training at one or more ofCBP's training academies or 

supervisors' courses. Of specific interest would be the trainers' take on how 

effective the training is, what constraints there are in presenting the course 

material, how much interaction and coordination exists between them and other 

CBP training groups in terms of training design and delivery, what kinds of 

question they field from trainees, and a review of the trainees' post-course 

evaluations on the effectiveness of the training. Such information would serve 

not only to inform the trainers about what could be improved in their sessions, 

but could also serve to inform CBP management about what steps they may need 
195 

U.S. Customs illld 8vrder Protection (CSP) Workforce Integriry Study 

to take to provide the training groups with specific CBP·wide expectations 

regarding "bright line" behavior expectations. 

• Conduct interviews with members of the CBP Office of Internal Affairs and the 

DHS Office of the Inspector General's to determine what they would like CBP· 

wide training to cover in their ethics courses. Focus particularly on determining 

exactly what proactive steps could be taken by first-line employees and their 

supervisors to address corruption. 

• Conduct interviews with some field office and sector managers to determine 

what they see lacking in the performance of their supervisors that could be 

addressed through training that emphasizes the practical application of anticorruption efforts. 

Conduct interviews with both senior and new supervisors to determine what they 

feel may be needed in terms of providing them with the training necessary to be 

part of a CBP·wide effort to address corruption. This learning-needs assessment 

could go a long way not only to enhance the quality of the training they receive, 

but also to boost their morale when they recognize that CBP management is very 

interested in including them in the organization-wide effort to combat corruption 

within their ranks. 

• Attend a presentation of at least one of CBP' s courses on ethics to determine 

whether the training is in sync with the lesson plans, as well as to observe the 

effectiveness of the course material and delivery. Emphasis on such reviews 

should be placed upon the basic academy courses and the supervisors' ethics 

training sessions, if possible, as these would seem to hold the most opportunity to 

provide a positive impact for CBP. 

• Review some of the written evaluations that trainees may have completed at the 

end of a CBP course on ethics. Also get access to the student critiques of all 

ethics instruction courses to include the DHS OIG courses. 

Make written recommendations to CBP, based on the results of the reviews noted 

above, about what additional or alternative material or learning methodologies 

could be incorporated into CBP's ethics training that addresses the current needs 

of CBP. Specifically, the focus should be on the proactive steps CBP is taking to 

address corruption issues. 

• Consider conducting the same type of reviews as outlined above for the courses 

that address training CBP's Intemal Affairs and the Integrity Programs Division 

personnel on how to do their jobs more effectively. Review whether the training 

focuses on how they can perform their duties more effectively in an environment 

that requires a great deal of interaction, communication, and cooperation with 

other government agencies and a host of different field offices. 

• Meet with some managers at an organizational level identified by CBP 

management and determine what characteristics and qualities the ideal supervisor 

possesses who successfully prevents or handles ethical dilemmas and corruption 

75 
196 

76 

U.S. Customs ami Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integnty SWdy 

issues in the field. Using this information, tailor specific checklists that 

emphasize these characteristics and qualities for consideration in incorporating 

them in the ethics training for CBP supervisors. 

• Coordinate these reviews and recommendations with the efforts of others 

working the CBP Vulnerability Analysis. Determine what recommendations 

could be made to CBP management to enhance their ability to speak with one 

voice to all of their employees in the effort to combat corruption. 
197 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

ApPENDIX H. CBP STATEMENT OF POLICY AND 

INTENT: INTEGRITY 

U.S. ~putm ... t of Hom<land Serurit y 

Washington. DC 20229 

u.s. Customs and 

Border Protection 

rSPI-ll-OAJ 

CDP Statement of Policy and Intent; Integrity 

Epd State; 

• Our workforce ill strengthened when every member of the tcem CllIl be counted on to 

perform according to the highest standards ofintegrity. From the most junioc member of 

the organization to the Commiuioner, there is only one standBl'd for integrity: the CBP 

standard as set forth herein. It is absolute. We do not compromise our oath. We do not 

lie. We do not cheat. We do not steal. We are accountable to the nation and to one 

another. 

• Each member of our workforce is accountable for his or her choices and actions. 

Employees who violate the public trust for personal gain or other personal molives in 

individual casel pose as muc;h of. threat to the integrity of CBP as employees who 

choose to assist adversaries seeking to compromise the workforce ill a .ystematic 

manner. 

• Our adversaries must be deterred by the beliefand absolute knowledge that our borders, 

ports of entry and overseas operations are secured by a workforce of the utmost integrity. 

• Our nation must feel Ii profound sense 0 f confldcnce and trust that illl borders are 

protected by the fineS! and best-tlained ofils citiuns who possess the utmost integrity. 

Their. confidence and trust are sacred charges. We shall never bctray that trust. 

FOUDd,Ml!j 

As U.S. Customs and Border I'rolCCtion fulfills its potential and moves from a great agency to a 

greater agency, corruption of the CBP workforce is a dagger pointed aI the heart of our 

organization. Absolute integrity is the keystone of our obligation to protect the United States and 

the American people. 

As Federal civil servants, we take a $OlemA oath of office by which we swear to support and 

defcud the ConstitutiQn of the United StalCS of America, and to faithfully discharlle ow duties. 

lbe very fiB! law pused by the very first Congress implemented Article VI of the Constitution 

by sening out this simple oath in low for members of Congress: "I ... do solemnly swear or 

affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United Stllles." I Stat. 23 

(1789). This commitment continues to be reflected in statute, regulation and policy, including 

the basic obligalioa of ethical SCl"Yice set forth in federal re81l!llti(1115 at 5 C.F.R. § 2365.101. 

Trust and llllegrity are at the very fOUlldatlon of our government, and what sets our nation apar\. 

77 
198 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

Integrity-CBP Statement of Policy and Inlalt 

pqe2 

Failure 10 c.ooliDlIOlI8ly and proactively dcCccI and elimilllle corruption III the cariiest possible 

opportuIIity and 10 our gmIat abiIi1y poICIIa grave risk 10 homeland lCCurity by providing 

truIIDationai and olber aiminaI orpnizIIIIODI with the ability 10 c:imunveat CBP enfOrtaneDt 

dfons III and ~ parll of CIIIIy. Our Idveruries will seek 10 exploit individual, opmtiooa1, 

orpnizatiOlllll, IIDd IeIdenbip vulnIrabilitia u a 100110 undennInc the .ipific:ant enhancements 

in penonne~ tcdJnoIoay and ~ oft'oc:tcd by CBP in rec:eIIl yem and planned for the 

fiduR. The ~on of lOy cmpJ~ - inl:1udiaa IhoIe in IdminiItratiw, prof_ionaI and 

tec:hni.caI positioDl- barru the orpnlzeIion and tInatIIIIs the ability of CDI' 10 fulfill its 

million. 

CBP', commitment 10 inlepity, however, goes fuIther than the need 10 address thi, threat II is a 

way of lifo attd commitmeDl u an orpnizIIIion thai besina 81 the time of application for 

cmploymenl with CBp and continues tJuouabout an employee's c:areer. II defines our 

RllliODlbip with our 8dverwia, OIUI another attd IboIO we serve in thU llllfion. II is mentialla 

the monle and well-boina of the workfureo and 10 aec:urins and retaining the IrIIII of the 

AmeriQUI people. Intepity, BI thai principle is articulated in thU intent llatemenl, IJIPlies with 

equal force 10 all of Ollr pcnonnel. Corruptioa in all of it5 fonne, includins but nol limited 10 

tbeft, fraud, bribery and l1li_ of IJOYeI'DIIIIIIIIt 1)'IIeIIII, illlltitheticaJ 10 the CBp mission and 

the values of Ollr orpnlzatlon. 

CBp illnDlIitioning fiom a Fiod ofblsloric IP'Owtb In ill wwkforce and the integration of 

multiple Iep:y CODIpOJIeIIIIIO a ' .. full operIIIioDaI capability. CBP', sI7..c, geoarapbic, and 

m1a~divenity, non-ItOI' bard. IIIId port operatioIII, IIIId hIgh-thmll enviroJunenl ue unique 

in lawenror-t. We 1ft aWll'O oflho lice IhII "" will conu- 10 be targeted for corruption, 

and will be rdc:ntJ_ in our eft'ortllo combIIIlhIa IIftat. 

ReinforcIns the cullUrO of a hlably ,tbicaI and iIIcomIptibl' woMoree and ta1dna swift, 

unyieldina action in response to 81:\1 of comaption ue amoJII our blgbclt priorities. II is the 

pmiicate for ell of our other initiatives. CBp'slcaders, beiiinnIns with the Commissioner, an: 

responsible fur c:reatIna and maintalnJna 10 orpaizIItion in which all empJoyea have the 

strenath of chancier and support to reject allllltcmpCllII conuption, in whatever form tbe.se !MY 

take. This mindaet bcaina with entry inla tIM CBP workforce and conlinues throlJ8hout the 

Careers of Ollr officel'8, agenII and mlaion-support pcr3OlIIICl. 

The following propositiom IhaII form the bub for ell operational, staffina. budget and reso=e 

deciliOllll_ CDP: 

PrlDcl. 01 Polky 

78 

I. The eaforcement of CBp's intcsrity IWIdardI i. core 10 our miuion and shall be 

designed, prioritized and implemented u IUclI. CBP is responsible for border security 

and the fiIct.Illltion of trade, and WI! shall cooperate with our law enforcemenl putnaI 

to ensure the integrity of the CBP workforce to IchIevc this end. 

2. Upon receipt of credible 1nt00000000n indicetiq !bat an employee Is enp.acd in 

corruption, approprillle and timely ..tminIllnltivw lCIIon IbouId be taken to neutralize 

lOY threaIlo CBP's miulon. Appropriate action WI include pJlICOIDenI of the 

employee on limited admlnISCrative leavo or adminiatnWve duties, indeflnile 
199 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Workforce Integrity Study 

Integrity-CBP Statement of Policy and Inlent 

Page 3 

lII!jlCNion, l'CIIS$ignment, witbdrawal of law enforcement dWes and--in those cases 

when misconduct can be proveR by 8 prepondemn<:e of Ike evidenco-suspe!llion or 

removal. 

3. This default rule should apply unless a decision is made by CBP leadership in 

combination with cSP's law enforeement partnerli to allow a crimlul investigation to 

proceed that illikely to result in a COftviction and/or further indictments of c0-

conspirators, wIIile continuing to take all nm:ssary steps to maintain officer and publi~ 

safety as well as border security. This default in favor of prompt administtative Betion 

will be implemented and deconllicted in a manner thaI does not compromise exilling 

criminal investigations but shall be implemented oggrcs.ively and consistently. CBP 

will continue to make every effOrt \0 support information-sharing and joint task Foree 

law enfun:ement with investigative agencies within DHS and the federal government in 

suppol1 of this policy. 

4. To the maximulR extent possible, operational information and intelligence should 

support integrity efforts, and the results oC integrity analysis, testing and operations 

should be used to support CBP operational efforu. 

5. Integrity testing aad wiaing Mould commence during recruitment at our academics 

and continue throughout on employee's career. 

8. CBP should utilize the maximwn extent of its authority to require testing. 

including polygraph examination. oC officer and agent appticams prior to entering 

on duty as law enforcement officers. 

b. Polygnlph testing, bactground investigations and other pre-employment screening 

should be sequenced in a manner that maximizes the efficiem:y of application and 

integrity lIIJur&ru:e processes. 

c. Advene results of prc-employment sereening should be shared \0 the maximum 

extent possible with investigative agencies in order to support the overall border 

law enforcement efforts of the United States government. 

d. CBP should maintain an aclive program for lISSeSSinll employee integrity 

throIIghout an employee" career, including through llIe effective use of workload 

monitoring programs ... d planned integrity testing. 

6. CBP shall ensure that integrity programs complement employee wellness Md support 

programs, and ue understood as part of a contmuwn of employee well being. 

By the authority vested In me .s Commissioner of U.s. CUltoml and Border Protedlon, I 

dine! the fonplng polley and Intent ngudlng Integrity be eommuRi~ted to tbe 

workforce throup. tbe leadership of CBP and implemellted forthwith • 

.... I~"" Do. loP/! 

79 
200 

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 

BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

AND THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

The United States Secret Service (USSS), an organizational component of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), operates within the Department under the authority 

and responsibilities enumerated in Title vm, Subtitle C of the Homeland Security Act of2002, 

as amended (the Act), and includes those responsibilities described generally in Section 1512 of 

the Act, as well as in various delegations of authority issued by the Secretary of DHS (the 

Secretary). The agency's dual statutory missjons of protection and crimuial investigations are 

more fully enumerated at Title 18, United States Codes, Section 3056 (Section 3056), and Title 

3, United States Code, Section 202 (Section 202). and various other statutes. 

The Office of the Inspector General (OlG), an organizational component ofDHS, 

operates within the Department under the authority and responsibilities enumerated in Title VID, 

Subtitle B of the Act, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

includes authority and responsibility acquired pursuant to Section 1512 ofthe Act. 

To prevent duplication of effort and ensure the most effective, efficient and appropriate 

use of resources, the Secret Service and the OIG enter into this Memorandum of Understanding. 

The categories of misconduct listed below shall be referred to the OIG. Such referrals 

shall be transmitted by the USSS Office of Inspection immediately upon the receipt of adequate 

information or allegations by the USSS Office of Inspection to reasonably conclude that 

misconduct may have occurred, and no investigation shall be conducted by the USSS Office of 

Inspection prior to the referral. In cases involving exigent circumstances, if the OIG decides to 

investigate the allegation but is unable to do so immediately, the USSS Office of Inspection will 

conduct the investigation until the OIG is able to take it over. In cases not involving exigent 

circumstances, the OlG will determine within one business day of the referral whether to 

investigate the allegation itself or to refer tbe matter back to the USSS Office of Inspection for 

investigation. If no determination is communicated to the USSS Office of Inspection within one 

business day of the refelTal, the USSS Office of Inspection may initiate the investigation. The 

acceptance of a refelTal by the orG reflects a determination that available investigative resources 

will be able to conclude the referred investigation within a reasonable time. This will afford the 

agency a reasonable opportunity to act expeditiously, if necessary, regarding the allegations. 

All allegations of criminal misconduct against a USSS employee; 

All allegations of misconduct against employees at the GS·15, GM·15 

level or higher, or against employees in the USSS Office of Inspection; 

AlI allegations regarding misuse or improper discharge of a firearm (other 

than accidental discharge during training, qualifying or practice); 
201 

All allegations of fraud by contractors, grantees or other individuals or 

entities receiving Department funds or otherwise engaged in the 

operation of Departrnent programs or operations. 

In addition, the IG will investigate allegations against individuals or entities who do 

not fit into the categories identified above if the allegations reflect systemic violations, such 

as abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, or racial and ethnic profiling; serious management 

problems within the Department, or otherwise represent a serious danger to public bealth and 

safety. 

With regard to categories of misconduct not specified above, the USSS Office of 

Inspection should initiate investigation upon receipt of the allegation, and shall notifY within 

five business days the OlG's Office of Investigations of such allegation. The OIG shall notifY 

the USSS Office of Inspection if the OlG intends to assume control or become involved in an 

investigation, but absent such notification, the USSS Office of Inspection shall maintain full 

responsibility for these investigations. 

Pursuant to Section 811(a) of the Act, OlG audits, investigations, and subpoenas 

which, in the Secretary's judgment, constitute a serious threat to the protection of any person 

or property afforded protection pursuant to Section 3056 or Section 202, or any provision of 

the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, may be prohibited. Accordingly, to assure 

proper and timely responses to OIG requests for information or records, all OIG plans for 

audits involving the Secret Service shall be communicated via entrance letter by tbe OlG 

either directly to the USSS Office of Inspection or to the Office of the Deputy Director; any 

OIG investigation shall be communicated orally or via e-mail to the same entities. Any 

Secret Service Headquarters' concern under section 811(a) regarding the scope or direction of 

a planned audit or investigation will be raised and resolved expeditiously with OIG officials, 

or immediately communicated to the Secretary in the absence of resolution. 

The USSS Office oflnspection shall provide a monthly report to the OIG on all open 

investigations. In addition, the USSS Office oflnspection, upon request, shall provide the 

OIG with a complete copy of the Report of Investigation, including all exhibits, at the 

completion of the investigation. Similarly, the OlG shall provide the USSS Office of 

Inspection, upon request, with a complete copy of any Report of Investigation relating to the 

Secret Service, including all exhibits, at the completion of the investigation. The OIG shall 

have the right to request more frequent or detailed reports on any investi gations and to 

reassert at any time exclusive authority or other involvement over any matter within its 

jurisdiction. 

This MOU shall be effective upon the signature of both partie 

effect until revoked by one party upon thirty day's wri __ tt_en_n-:L_ic_e,-ct'f0""t-'-' ______ _ 

irector he United States Actin Inspector General 

D.:::

cl 

s~~ Dol" _-l--,f-----''-'').._\-'..-1_I_o_J_ 
202 

(blank) 2 

A02 1,312 

A03 36,341 

A04 351 

A05 71,577 

A06 777 

A07 14 

A08 297 

A09 2,533 

AlO 6,759 

All 38 

A12 250,667 

A13 426 

A14 65 

A15 4,174 

A16 601 

A17 5,995 

A18 15,819 

A19 1 

Cal 1,817 

Call 6 

CO2 58 

C031 80,626 

C032 83 

C033 2,023 

C034 4 

C038 1 

C04 1,752 

cos 8,524 

C06 306 

C07 359 

C08 82,390 

C09 587,272 

C091 15 

CI0 18,331 

Cll 35,006 

C12 11 

C13 2 

C14 17,062 
203 

C16 33 

C171 444 

C172 396 

C173 3 

C1S 6,946 

C19 4,862 

C20 691 

C21 141 

C22 15,569 

C24 4,507 

C25 342 

C29 2 

C30 1 

C31 920 

D 1 

(blank) 4 

A02 559 

A03 63,600 

A04 672 

A05 43,262 

A06 381 

A07 13 

AOS 251 

AD9 1,413 

AlO 9,773 

All 360 

A12 224,996 

A13 82 

A14 9 

A15 1,831 

A16 503 

A17 5,918 

A18 16,509 

A19 63 

A20 12 

COl 1,764 

COll 42 

CO2 51 

C031 53,973 

C032 89 

C033 1,414 

C034 4 

C03A 1,332 
204 

C038 26,291 

C03C 927 

C04 2,071 

C05 7,755 

C06 227 

C07 345 

C08 63,973 

C09 715,970 

C091 5 

ClO 17,501 

C11 29,326 

C12 8 

C13 1 

Cl4 18,145 

Cl6 32 

C16P 1 

Cl71 376 

Cl72 314 

C173 5 

Cl8 9,739 

Cl9 1,317 

C20 421 

C21 185 

C22 5,243 

C24 2,105 

C25 433 

C31 670 

NONE 

A02 377 

A03 79,280 

A04 1,024 

ADS 52,383 

A06 562 

AD7 35 

A08 482 

A09 1,058 

AID 10,026 

All 1,270 

A12 288,958 

A13 65 

A14 14 

A15 1,834 

A16 333 

A17 6,222 
205 

A18 

A19 

A20 

COl 

COll 

CO2 

C031 

C032 

C033 

C034 

C03A 

C03B 

C03C 

C04 

C041 

COS 

C06 

C07 

C08 

C09 

ClO 

Cll 

C12 

C14 

C152 

C16 

Cl71 

CI72 

C173 

C18 

C19 

C20 

e21 

C22 

C24 

C25 

C31 

C9 

MULT 

(blank) 

A02 

A03 

A04 

16,300 

6,033 

797 

2,077 

28 

51 

326 

60 

1,397 

1 

3,370 

81,868 

5,902 

2,106 

1 

8,425 

234 

359 

54,835 

527,047 

19,499 

24,949 

6 

15,528 

1 

82 

363 

354 

4 

11,253 

1,336 

335 

24 

2,993 

1,112 

146 

332 

2 

2 

19 

452 

70,923 

239 
206 

A05 49,267 

A06 336 

A07 19 

A08 509 

AD9 706 

A10 11,823 

All 2,158 

A12 199,686 

A13 43 

A14 8 

A15 1,257 

A16 485 

All 5,074 

A18 13,691 

A19 10,296 

AZO 5,524 

COl 1,688 

CO 11 25 

C012 2 

CO2 32 

C031 95 

C032 59 

C033 1,261 

C03A 3,067 

C03B 83,624 

C03C 10,423 

(04 2,085 

COS 7,068 

C06 220 

C07 303 

C08 47,944 

C09 429,142 

C091 11 

C09P 1 

C10 27,613 

Cll 23,972 

C12 6 

C13 2 

C14 12,022 

C16 20 

C171 372 

C172 308 

C173 3 

C18 14,068 

C19 43,345 

(20 220 

C21 14 
207 

C2.2. 

C2.4 

C25 

C31 

C9 

(blank) 

A02. 

A03 

A04 

A05 

A06 

A07 

AOB 

A09 

Al0 

All 

Al2. 

A13 

A14 

A15 

A16 

A17 

A18 

A19 

A20 

COl 

C011 

CO2 

C03 

C031 

C032 

C033 

C034 

C03A 

C03B 

C03C 

C04 

C05 

C06 

C07 

COB 

C09 

C091 

82.3 

448 

2.72. 

490 

103 

351 

56,772. 

158 

37,691 

134 

2.2. 

410 

192 

12,455 

465 

113,060 

58 

1 

1,445 

585 

5,306 

17,482 

10,389 

6,993 

1,92.9 

11 

35 

1 

50 

30 

1,456 

3 

3,143 

89,237 

13,179 

2,080 

7,141 

165 

371 

47,2.15 

362,599 

11 
208 

(09P 72,678 

ClO 41,476 

(11 27,108 

Cl2 4 

(13 1 

(14 8,690 

(16 23 

(171 345 

C172 297 

Cl73 2 

C18 18,064 

(19 7,482 

(20 177 

(21 38 

(22 684 

(24 155 

(25 395 

(31 746 

C32 1 

(9 3 

NONE 323 

2011 Total 971,420 

Report Created: May 7, 2012, Updated May 10, 2012 

System: CIS Consolidated Operationol Repository (c/SCOR) - DARB 1-765 Receipts/Completions Database 

By: Office of Performance and Quality (OPQ), Data Analysis and Reporting Branch (DARB), AC, Update NP 

Parameter 

Date: FY2007 - FY2011 

Form Type{s): 1-765 

Closs Pref: All 

Location: All 

Data Type: 1-765 Approvals by Class Preference 
209 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

U.S. Senator Chuck • Iowa 

Ranking lvfember • Senate Committee " ""'""'",.". ";, ....... ,", .. " .. ," .. 

I: It 1': /lgrassley.sella te.go I' 

Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Grassley ofIowa 

U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 

Hearing on "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security" 

April 25, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, oversight is a critical function and a constitutional responsibility of the 

legislative branch. Hearings like this one are an avenue for Congress to raise questions, 

concerns, and suggestions for improving government functions. This hearing should also be an 

avenue for us to evaluate how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carries out its 

mission. It should also be an opportunity for the Department to take responsibility for its actions 

and policies. 

Before I begin to discuss the issues that pertain to this committee, I would like to voice 

frustration at the non-responsive letters I have received from DHS. In fact, 99% of the time, 

when I write to the Secretary, I don't get a response directly from her. The responses come from 

the Office of Legislative Affairs. But more frustrating is that my questions are rarely, if ever 

answered. Unbelievably, the Secretary just responded to questions we posed at the last Judiciary 

Committee oversight hearing, which took place in October of last year. I hope the Secretary will 

respect the oversight role that some of us in Congress take seriously. The Department needs to 

be held accountable to Congress and to the American people, and it should be forthcoming so we 

can take steps to ensure the govermnent is acting appropriately in carrying out our laws. 

U.S. SECRET SERVICE INVESTIGATION 

We continue to learn more each day about the ongoing investigation into agents of the 

U.S. Secret Service who were removed from Colombia following allegations that they had 

foreign national prostitutes in their rooms. While I commend Director Sullivan for immediately 

removing these agents from Colombia and for initiating an investigation into tills matter, more 

work remains. For example, the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security 

needs to be involved to make this investigation impartial and credible. The Secret Service has a 

long and distinguished history. This entire incident is a black eye for an agency full of hard 

working and dedicated agents and officers. This matter needs to be resolved soon given the 

serious national security issues associated with this alleged conduct. 

At the beginning of his administration, President Obama released a memorandum entitled 

"Transparency and Open Govermnent" and stated, "My administration is comnlitted to creating 

an unprecedented level of openness in govermnent." We have seen time and again that this 

administration has contradicted that goal set by President Obama. However, it's my hope that 

the White House will provide details to Congress about the internal review that took place last 

weekend with regard to the Secret Service and White House Office of Advance. 
210 

2 

According to the White House spokesman, that investigation was conducted by the White 

House Counsel's Othce, despite the fact that on friday the White House apparently didn't see 

the need to look into this further. This raises a lot of questions about how deep an inquiry was 

conducted, especially given it was completed injust two days. I want to know if the 

investigation involved pulling any hotel records in Colombia or whether we are to simply take 

the White House at their word. This is not a fishing expedition; it is a logical extension of the 

Secret Service investigation. Given the serious national security concerns that any vulnerability 

in the President's protection could come from having unauthorized guests, we need to get to the 

bottom of this and the White House should cooperate immediately. I look forward to hearing 

from the Secretary about her views on this matter and what steps she has taken to help the 

Director and Inspector General get to the bottom of this matter. 

IMMIGRATION 

Today's hearing is an opportunity to assess this administration's immigration policies, 

and to raise questions about whether these policies are consistent with the laws on the books. I 

have serious concerns not only about policies put forth by the Department, but also the manner in 

which such policies have been rolled out. 

The President announced a new campaign slogan called "We Can't Wait" to justify why 

his administration continues to circumvent Congress and the democratic process. The 

administration continues to put out memos and directives that have not gone through the rulemaking process. I got my first glimpse into this campaign when I uncovered the memo titled, 

"Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Refonn." For years, the 

administration has been intent to act unilaterally. and in doing so, they have disregarded the rule 

of law. 

Let's consider the President's immigration policies in the last two years alone. 

In a departmental memo last March, ICE Director John Morton outlined new 

enforcement priorities and encouraged the use of "prosecutorial discretion" for illegal aliens who 

did not meet these priorities. The memo prescribed guidelines for limiting the detention of 

certain illegal aliens. Then, in a memo sent out in June of201 L Director Morton discouraged 

ICE agents from enforcing immigration laws against certain segments of the illegal alien 

population, including aliens who essentially qualify for the DREAM Act. 

Last August, Secretary Napolitano announced a case-by-case review of all aliens 

cun'ently in or who will be entering deportation proceedings in order to determine who will be 

granted administrative amnesty. The Secretary claimed that this process would allow the 

govenmlent to direct resources at higher priority cases. This so-called "pilot" program has been 

carried out in Baltimore and Denver, and will expand to seven additional immigration courts. 

This year. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service unveiled a new policy allowing 

certain aliens to bypass the statutory 3 and 10 year bars on inadmissibility. Generally speaking. 

the 3 and IO-year bars were created to deter illegal immigration and marriage fraud. Yet. the 

2 
211 

administration wants to ignorc the law that Congrcss passed in this regard, and provide waivers 

for an untold number of people who would normally be subject to the bars. 

In January, the President issued an Executivc Order to increase tourism to the United 

States, which would allow visa applicants to undergo less scrutiny by consular officers. Prior to 

Scptember 11,2001, consular officers were allowed to waive an interview for a visa applicant 

seeking entry into the United States. Sadly, only two of the nineteen hijackers had been 

personally interviewed by the U.S. Govemment to get their visa. As a result 01'9/11, Congrcss 

established that all visa applicants be required to go through thc interview process, with limited 

exceptions. The tourism initiative announced by the President would allow officers to waive inperson intervicws for individuals reapplying for temporary admission to the United Statcs. The 

law was written to specifically limit any exceptions to the in-person interview. Once again, the 

Administration is blatantly ignoring the safeguards that Congress put in place to prevent another 

terrorist attack. 

In addition to implementing several initiatives that disregard the rule oflaw, thc 

Administration has taken an inconsistent position on state and local govemmcnts that cnact their 

own immigration laws and ordinances. The Administration has filed suit against Arizona, South 

Carolina, Utah, and Alabama. Moreover, in retaliation for Alabama's state law, the department 

halted the implementation of Secure Communities. 

3 

I find it frustrating that the Administration has challenged sevcral states for passing laws 

that aim to protect their citizens while essentially turning a blind eye to jurisdictions that actively 

promote safe harbor policies. If the Administration truly believes immigration law is only to be 

enforced by the Federal govemment, as it has argued before several courts, it should adhere to 

that position and consider taking action against jurisdictions that actively thwart cffcctive Federal 

cnforcement of the laws. 

Then there are policics that leave taxpayers footing the bill for benefits to people who are 

hcre unlawfully. 

In February, ICE Director Morton announced that illegal immigrants residing in the 

country would havc a lobbyist at headquarters to "serve as a point of contact for individuals, 

including those in immigration proceedings, NGOs, and other community and advocacy groups, 

who have concems, questions, recommendations or important issues they would like to raise." 

The rationale behind this new position is not very clear, and r d be interested in leaming more 

from the Secretary about what this person does on a day-to-day basis. 

Also in February, ICE announced changes to its detention standards, providing more 

accommodations and bcncfits to illegal aliens. For example, aliens will now receive physical 

education classes and intemet access. And, taxpayers will help pay for costs associated with 

abortions and trans gender hormone therapies. Also, taxpayers will be footing the bill for 

luxurics and scrvices that are not atJorded to other criminals. 

r d also likc to hear from the Secretary about the state of thc border. Americans have 

long been demanding that the federal government control its borders. Yet, the Prcsident 

announced last week that 900 ofthc 1.200 National Guard Troops at the Border will be sent 

3 
212 

4 

home. Taxpayers are left questioning the priorities of this President when illegal aliens get an 

advocate in Washington, and when resources from the border are diverted to plush detention 

facilities. 

I also remain concerned about the "Get to Yes" philosophy that U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Service has espoused. In January, an Inspector General's report found that line 

officials at USCIS are pressured to approve applications by supervisors. The report says that a 

quarter of the immigration service otTicers interviewed felt pressure to approve questionable 

applications, and 90 percent of respondents felt they didn't have sufficient time to complete 

interviews of those who seek benefits, concluding that the speed at which these applications must 

be processed leaves ample room for error and leaves the U.S. open to national security dangers. 

I plan to ask the Secretary about this pressure, including information that has come to my 

attention about a particular case highlighted by the mainstream media. I want to know if 

adjudication decisions are being reversed after sympathetic news reports. 

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) 

I also have concerns about how the Depal1ment is treating citizens who oppose the 

administration's policies. U.S. citizens who oppose the administration's policies should not be 

viewed or treated as "enemies." And they shouldn't become the subject of government 

monitoring because they oppose the administration's policies. 

I am troubled by news reports that the Department is monitoring citizens who speak out 

against the Obama administration's policies and, in particular, its immigration policies. 

According to reports, a rcview ofa 2011 reference guidc for Homeland Security analysts revcals 

that DHS is tracking opponents. It appears that the DES may be directing its analysts to identify 

and monitor media reports that reflect adversely on the OilS, and to track reports on the 

administration's policy changes in immigration, and the term "illegal immigration" in particular. 

This monitoring goes beyond reviewing news stories. It apparently includes monitoring social 

media, such as Twittcr and Facebook. 

I have to qucstion why the Department is gathering this information on U.S. citizcns. 

And I have to ask how far the infonnation gathering goes and what the Department is doing with 

this infom1ation? 

These reports renew my concerns about how the DHS treats requesters of information 

under the Frecdom of Information Act (FOJA). 

Perhaps the most dramatic and troubling departure from President Obama's vow to usher 

in "a ncw era of open government" was revealed in Homelalld Security e-mails obtained by the 

Associated Press (AP) in July of201 O. According to the AP, in July 2009, in connection with 

requests under the FOIA. the Department introduced a directive requiring a wide range of 

intonnation to be vetted by political appointees. Career employees were ordered to provide 

Secretary Napolitano's political staff with information about the people who asked tor records 

and about the organizations where they worked. According to the AP, anything related to an 

Obama policy priority was pegged tor this review. Also included was anything that touched on a 

controversial or sensitive subject that could attract media attention. Anything requested by 

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lawmakers, journalists, activist groups or watchdog organizations had to go to the political 

appointees. 

Under the FOIA, people can request copics of records without specifying why they want 

them and arc not obligated to provide personal information about themselves other than their 

name and an address where the records should be sent. Yet political appointees at the DHS 

researched the motives or affiliations of the requesters. 

5 

On March 30, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

released its J53-page report on its investigation of the Department's political vetting ofFOIA 

requests. The Committee reviewed thousands of pages of internal DHS e-maiJs and memoranda 

and conducted six transcribed witness interviews. It learned through the course of an eightmonth investigation that political staff under Secretary Napolitano had exerted pressure on FOIA 

compliance otlicers. and undemlined the federal government's accountability to the American 

people. 

The Department's political screening ofFOIA requests is disturbing and I continue to 

have concerns about it. even though the Department maintains that it has stopped. 

MANAGEMENT AT DRS 

A serious, but often overlooked matter that we all should be concerned with is 

management of the federal government agencies we oversee. Management problems at the top 

of an agency can trickle down to problems in the field. As the buck should stop with the 

Secretary, I think it is worth noting that last month, for the sixth year in a row. DHS was awarded 

an abysmal score by the Partnership for Public Service's Best Place to Work. DHS ranked 31 

out of33 federal organizations. This included a four point drop from last year. DHS placed in 

the bottom three spots in almost every category evaluated, and placed dead last in "effective 

leadership." These are poor scores that indicate serious problems with management at DHS. 

Effective leadership starts at the top and 1 want to hear from Secretary Napolitano what she is 

doing to fix this leadership deficiency at DHS. 

DRS ROLE IN ADDRESSING CYBERSECURITY: 

Congress is currently debating legislation to enhance our national capability to protect and 

defend against cyber-attaeks. There are a number of different proposals pending before the 

House and Senate that contain varying policy approaches. There are a number of areas of 

agreement across party lines on certain provisions, including information sharing, research and 

development, criminal law reforms, and updating the Federal Information Security Management 

Act (FISMA). However, the biggest point of contention remains whether to increase the size of 

the federal government by adding new regulatory powers for oversight of Cybersecurity to the 

mission of the DHS. I strongly oppose any expansion ofDHS's power. The documented 

failures of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFA TS) should be a clear warning 

that the Department is simply not up to the task it was created to do. 

In October 2006. President Bush signed the Department of Borne land Security Appropriations 

Act 01'2007, which provides DBS the authority to regulate the security of high-risk chemical 

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facilities. To implement this authority, in 2007 OIlS issued thc Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards Interim Final Rule (CFATS Final Rule). These regulations required a 

number of regulated industries, including chemical manufacturers and distributors. to prepare 

site security plans (SSPs) to detennine whether a facility would fall under OIlS's regulatory 

authority. These SSPs were expensive and DHS estimated that compliance with the regulations 

could cost up to $5000 per site. just to complete the SSP. SSPs were then to be returned to OilS 

where a detennination would be made as to what additional security would be ordered for a 

specific site. 

Almost immediately after the regulations were issued, problems arose. For example, DHS's 

deternlination as to who qualified for a SSP under the regulations included any site with over 

1,000 gallons of propane. Effectively, this would have required virtually every family fann or 

rural homestead with an individual use propane tank to complete a SSP as a chemical tacility. 

While DHS ultimately corrected this anomaly, it merc1y highlighted problems to come. 

6 

More recently, it has been reported that despite this regulation, DHS has spent nearly $500 

million in the last four years with nothing to show for it. In fact, DHS has yct to approve a single 

site security plan for the 4.200 entities that submitted one. Further, the CF A TS computer 

program at OIlS made significant errors in calculating risk at chemical plants in both 2009 and 

20 I 0, but the errors were not repOlted up the managcment chain and did not come to light until 

just last summer. Further, congrcssional investigators have started to review DHS's actions 

under crAIS to dcternline where nearly $480 million was spent given DHS has yet to approve a 

single SSP. Rand Beers. the Undersecretary in charge of the program, nevertheless claims that 

progress has been made despite the problcms. 

However, a crucial internal document written by DHS officials working for Undersecretary 

Beers tells a much ditTerent story. In a memorandum dated November 10,2011, the Director 

and Deputy Director of the Infrastructurc Security Compliance Division of the Office of 

Infrastructure Protection informed Beers of the total failure of their division in implementing 

CFATS. This document is perhaps the most critical internal review a government agency has 

ever written about itself. 

For example, the document details how after four years DHS has yet to approve a single site 

security plan and is not even ready to conduct a compliance inspection. The memorandum states 

that the reasons for the failure include inadequate training, overreliance on external experts, poor 

hiring decisions including hiring those who do not have the necessary skills to perfornl the job. 

poor staff morale. management and leadership without experience in the field or knowledge of 

the subject-matter, lack of regulatory compliance expclts, lack of transparency, ineffective 

communications, union problems, and a "catastrophic failure to ensure personal and professional 

accountability," 

Most notably. the memorandum states. "It has become apparent that our inspector cadre lacks 

sufficient expertisc to etrectively evaluate chemical facility compliance with Risk Based 

Perfornlance Standard (RBPS) 8, cyber security," Simply put, DHS's own internal review of the 

last major regulatory undertaking Congress authorized the agency to do has found that the 

agency cannot meet its mission. It highlights a bureaucracy so incompetent that it cannot make 

basic hiring and staffing decisions. This memorandum should be praised for its candor and those 

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who authored it should be commended. However, it shows a broken agency with failed 

leadership that needs to be reined in, lest the federal taxpayers provide another half-billion 

dollars and get nothing for it. 

7 

As if this internal review wasn't enough to signal how DHS is unable to take on the 

cybersecurity mission, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in July 

2008 titled, "Cyber Analysis and Warning: DHS Faces Challenges in Establishing a 

Comprchensive National Capability." This report found numerous challenges that DHS faced 

including: filling key management positions, identifying and acquiring technological tools to 

strengthen cyber analytical capabilities, expeditiously hiring sufficiently trained cyber analysts, 

engaging appropriate stakeholders in federal and nonfederal entities to develop trusted 

relationships, and ensuring distinct and transparent lines of authority and responsibility. Further. 

GAO found deficiencies in response by United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

(US-CERT); deficiencies in warning notifications that are targeted and actionable, deficiencies in 

analysis and ability to investigate incidents. and deficiencies in monitoring a comprchensive 

baseline understanding of the nation's critical information infrastructure. Nearly four years at1er 

the issuance of this report, all tcn ofGAO's recommendations to DIlS remain open and 

unimplemented. 

Taken together, the many failures ofCFATS and the outstanding questions GAO highlighted 

lead me to question whether DHS could handle a new regulatory mission addressing 

cybcrsecurity. At the very least, DHS has a lot of house cleaning to do before Congress should 

even consider consolidating cybersecurity matters at OilS, let alone to create an entirely new 

regulatory bureaucracy covering both the public and private sectors. 

FAST AND FURIOUS 

Finatly, I'd like to say something about my Fast and Furious investigation. 

One year ago when we had an oversight hearing with the Secretary, I asked whether she realized 

that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had an agent assigned to Fast and Furious. 

That ICE agent was involved enough in Fast and Furious that he was designated as a co-case 

agent for the operation. ICE kept a totally separate case file from A TF's, and the case file that 

was stored in ICE's system runs to 2,000 pages. 

An ICE agent was there on May 29, 2010, when the main target of Operation Fast and Furious 

was stopped at the border trying to enter Mexico with 74 rounds of ammunition and an illegal 

alien. Hc was part of the interview where the target was caught lying to federal agents, then 

allowed to take his cargo into Mexico after simply agreeing to call a phone number the A TF 

agent wrote on a ten dollar bill. As far as we know, he didn't call. He wasn't arrested until 

seven months later, after the death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry. 

Customs officers were also present for this May 29, 2010, incident. It's unclear what kind of 

pressure they felt from ATF to let this criminal go. No doubt they had no idea that guns he had 

traf1icked would be found at the murder scene of their colleague, Agent Terry. 

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8 

However, ifs clear that Fast and Furious wasn't just a Justice Department problem, I have been 

told that law enforcement from many agencies realized something was fishy with ATF's "big 

case," I would like the Homeland Security Departmcnfs cooperation in getting to the bottom of 

this. 

Thanks to the Secretary for appearing before us today. I look forward to hearing from Secretary 

Napolitano. 

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Opening Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy 

Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security 

April 25, 2012 

Senate judiciary Committee 

We welcome Secretary Napolitano back to the Judiciary Committee as we continue our 

important oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and the work that the women and 

men of the agencies within the Department do every day to keep Americans safe. 

Much attention has been focused on an incident prior to Presidcnt Obama' s attendance at thc 

recent Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. I have spoken privately with Secret 

Service Director Sullivan since the incident and met with him yesterday. I know that he sharcs 

my view that the alleged conduct was unacceptable. He seems to be doing all that he can to 

ensure a timely and thorough investigation and accountability for behavior that failed to meet the 

standards he expects and that the President and the American people deserve. 

Last week I arranged for a bipartisan briefing for Judiciary Committee staff' with the Secret 

Service and officials for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector 

General. I have asked Director Sullivan to be available to come back and meet with Members of 

this Committee as the investigation continues. 

I have no doubt you are treating this situation with equal seriousness. No one wants to see the 

President's security compromised or America embarrassed. Senators on this Committee will be 

very interested to hear from you on this matter today. 

You told this Committee at your first appearance as Secretary that you would focus on using 

limited Federal law enforcement resources in a smarter, more efTective manner when enforcing 

our immigration laws. You and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (lCE) Director John 

Morton are following through. The implementation ofICE's prosecutorial discretion policy is a 

positive step forward in meeting the goal of smarter immigration enforcement. If this new policy 

has the effect of apprehending more individuals who are legitimate threats to public safety, and 

providing some measure of relief to those who pose no threat, then that is an improvement. You 

are standing by your commitment to focus first and foremost on the most dangerous among the 

undocumented population. 

My view is that you are doing the best you can in the absence of Congress taking up meaningful 

and comprehensive immigration reform. As we hold this hearing today, the Supreme Court is 

hearing argument on the constitutionality of an Arizona immigration cnforcement law. The 

Constitution of the United States declares that Congress and the Federal Government shall have 

the power to establish a uniform "Rule of Naturalization." Accordingly, national immigration 

policy is properly a subject we need to act upon. It should not be left to a hodgepodge of 

conflicting state laws. We came close to enacting comprehensive, fair-minded, bipartisan 

immigration reform a few years ago before we were derailed by anti-immigrant forces. llook 

forward to our achieving that goal. 
218 

In 2010, Congress passed an emergency appropriations measure to provide $600 million for 

border security enhancements. You have reported that we have made significant strides in 

securing our borders and in our overall immigration enforcement activities. I understand that 

illegal border crossings on the Southern border have declined, and that we have seen steady 

increases in the numbers of Border Patrol and Customs and Border Protection Officers that are 

monitoring our borders and ports of entry. I take special notice, as well, that you are working 

with Canadian officials on the "Beyond the Border" initiative to coordinate resources and 

address challenges involving the security of our shared northern border. I am encouraged by 

these improvements and llook forward to hearing more about the Department's progress and 

your continuing challenges. 

Tn Vermont many business people look forward to our friends from Canada visiting and enjoying 

all that Vermont has to otTer. We want to continue to improve on that relationship and the ways 

we can safely accommodate foreign trave!, tourism and investment. 

1 was pleased to see that the EB-5 Regional Center Program was among your recommendations 

and those of the President's Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. This job-creating, 

immigration-through-investment visa helps harness our immigration system to strengthen our 

economy and help our business leaders attract talented people from around the world. llook 

forward to the reauthorization of this program. Senator Grasslcy and I have been working 

together to get this and other expiring visa programs reauthorized in a bipartisan manner. As we 

move forward, I also hope to continue working with you and with USClS Director Mayorkas to 

strengthen and improve the EB-5 program so that it may continue to be a job creator for our 

communities, and to ensure that the agency has the tools it needs to maintain the highest level of 

integrity in the program. 

I have raised the issue of screening procedures and tcchnology in our airports and 1 continue to 

have questions about these policies, their impact on the privacy and health of Americans, and 

whether this technology is the most effective use ofresources. I look forward to discussing this 

issue further today. 

I want to work with you to ensure that Americans' privacy rights and civil liberties are 

safeguarded as we work to enhance our national cybersecurity, and also to enact better privacy 

protections to keep Americans' safe from identity thieves in cyberspace. 

Finally, 1 want to commend the women and men who work in the agencies of your Department. 

Many are Vermonters who are working hard to adjudicate immigration benefits at the Vermont 

Service Center, and contributing to our immigration enforcement and border security eHarts at 

the Law EnJarcement Support Center and other ICE and CBP facilities in the State. I understand 

that the Vermont Service Center is cxpanding its workforce in St. Albans, Vermont, which is 

welcome news and is a credit to the dedicated employees and managers at the facility. 

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Statement for tbe Record 

Secretary Janet Napolitano 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Beforetbe 

United States Senate 

Committee on the Judiciary 

April 25, 2012 
220 

Chairman Leahy, Ranking Mcmber Grassley, and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to join you today, and I thank the Committee f(x your strong support for the 

Departmcnt of Homeland Security (DHS) over the past three years and, indeed, since the 

Department's founding more than nine years ago. I look fonvard to continuing to work with you 

to protect the American people as we work to advance our many shared goals. 

Today, ten years after the Scptember II th attacks, America is stronger and more secure, thanks to 

the support of the Congress, the work of the men and women of DBS, and our federal, state, 

local, tribal, and territorial partners across the homeland security enterprise. 

More than 230,000 DBS employees ensure the safety and security of the American pcople every 

day, in jobs that range from law enforcement offieers and agents to disaster response 

coordinators, from those who make sure our watcrways stay open to commerce to those who 

make sure our skies remain safe. The men and womcn of DIlS are committcd to our mission, 

and I thank cvery one of them for their service. 

As I have said many times, homeland security bcgins with hometown security. As part of our 

commitment to strengthening hometown security, wc have workcd to get information, tools, and 

rcsources out of Washington, D.C., and into the hands of state, local, tribal, and territorial 

ollieials and first rcsponders. 

This has led to significant advances. We have made great progrcss in improving our domestic 

capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks against our people, our communities, and our 

critical infrastructure. Wc have increased our ability to analyzc and distribute threat information 

at alllcvcls. We have invested in training for local law enforcement and first rcsponders of all 

types in order to increase cxpertise and capacity at the locallcvel. And we have supported and 

sustained preparedncss and response capabilities across the country through approximately $35 

billion in homeland security grants since 2002. 

We work with a vast array of partners, from loeallaw enforccment, the private sector, and 

community leaders across the country, all of whom understand our shared responsibility for 

public safety and are committed to doing theIr part to hclp keep America safe. 

To continue to build on these efforts, the Administration has proposcd a new homeland security 

grants program in Fiscal Y car 20 I 3 dcsigncd to develop, sustain, and leverage core capabilitics 

across the country in support ofnmional preparcdncss, prevention, and responsc. The Fiscal Ycar 

2013 National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) will help create a robust national 

preparedncss capacity based on cross-jurisdictional and readily deployable state, local, tribal, and 

territorial assets. Using a competitive, risk-based model, the NPGP will use a comprehcnsive 

process for identifying and prioritizing deployable capabilities, limit pcriods of performance to 

put funding to work quickly, and require grantees to regularly report progrcss in the acquisition 

and development of these capabilities. 

Our cx perience over the past several years also has made LIS smarter about the terrorist thrcats we 

face and how best to deal with them. Wc have learned that an engaged, vigilant public is 

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csscntial to cfforts to prcvcnt acts of terrorism, which is why we havc continucd to cxpand thc "If 

You Sce Something, Say SomethingTM'' campaign nationally. Wc also continue to expand our 

risk-bascd, intelligcncc-driven security efforts. By sharing and leveraging infornlation. we can 

makc informed decisions about how to best mitigate risk, and the morc wc know, the better we 

become at providing sccurity that is seamless and efficient. We also frec up morc time and 

resources, giving us the ability to focus those resources on those threats or individuals that we 

know less about. 

Additionally, over the past several years, we have deployed unprecedented levels of personnel, 

technology, and resources to protect our nation's borders. These cff0l1s have achieved significant 

results, ineluding historic decreases in illegal immigration as mcasured by total apprehensions, 

and increases in seizures of illegal drugs, weapons, cash, and contraband. 

We also have focused on smart and effective enforcement of immigration laws while 

streamlining and facilitating the legal immigration process. Our enforcement resources prioritize 

the identification and removal of criminal aliens and repeat immigration law violators, recent 

border entrants, and immigration fugitives. We also are identifying and sanctioning employers 

who knowingly hire workers, not authorized to work in the United States, and--by doing s(}--

undercut employers who follow the mles. 

The Department also continues to lead thc fcderal government's efforts to secure civilian 

government computer systems and works with industry and state, local, tribal, and territorial 

govemments to secure critical infrastructure and information systems. We arc dcploying the 

latest tools across the fcdcral govcrnment to protcet critical civilian systems, while sharing 

timely and actionable security information with public and private sector partners to help them 

protect their own operations. Together with our public and private sector partncrs, we arc 

protecting the systems and networks that support the financial services industry, the electric 

power industry, and the telecommunications industry, to name a few. 

Strengthening homeland security also includes a signi ficant international dimension. To 

most effectively carry out our core missions including preventing terrorism, securing our 

borders and cnforcing immigration laws, and protccting cyberspace - we partner with 

countries around the world. This work ranges from strengthening cargo, aviation, and supply 

chain security to joint investigations, information sharing, and science and technology 

cooperation. Through collaborations with othcr federal agencies and our foreign counterparts, 

we not only enhance our ability to prevent terrorism and transnational crime; we also 

leveragc the resources of our international partners to morc efficiently and cost-etTectively 

secure global trade and travel, in order to ensure that dangerous people and goods do not 

cnter our country. 

In my time today, I would likc to provide an update on the key areas of the DHS mission that 

fall within the Committee's jurisdiction, our priorities for the coming year, and our vision for 

working with thc Congress to build on the substantial progrcss wc have achieved to date and 

mllst continue to sustain in thc months and years ahead. 

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Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 

While the United States has made significant progress, threats from terrorism-~including, but 

not limited to al-Qacda and al-Qaeda affiliated groups-persist and continually evolve, and 

the demands on DHS continue to grow. Today's threats arc not limited to anyone individual, 

group or ideology and are not defined or contained by international borders. Terrorist 

tactics can be as simple as a homemade bomb and as sophisticated as a biological threat or a 

coordinated cyber attack. 

DHS and our partners at the federal, state, tribal, and locallcvels have had success in 

thwarting numerous terrorist plots, including the attempted bombings of the New York City 

subway and Times Square, foiled attacks against air cargo, and uther attempts across the 

country. Nonethelcss, recent attacks overseas, including the attacks in Toulouse, Francc last 

month and the continued thrcat of homegrown terrorism in the United States, demonstratc 

how we must constantly remain vigilant and prepared. 

To address these cvolving threats, DHS employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to 

prcvent tcrrorist attacks. Through a multi-layered detection system focusing on enhanced 

targcting and infonmation sharing, we work to interdict threats and dangerous pcople at thc 

earliest point possible. We also work closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement 

partners on a wide range of critical homeland security issues in order to provide those on the 

frontlines with the infomlation and tools thcy need to address thrcats in their communities, 

Sharing Infonmation, Expanding Training, and Raising Public Awareness 

The effective sharing of information in a way that is timely, actionable whenever possible, and 

adds value to the homeland security cnterprise is essential to protecting the United States. As 

part of our approach, we have changed the way DHS provides infonmation to our partners by 

replacing the old color-coded alert system with the new National Terrorism Advisory System, or 

NTAS, which provides timely, detailed infom1ation about credible terrorist threats and 

recommended security measures. 

We also have continued to enhance our analytic capability through the 77 designated fusion 

centers, resulting in unprecedented infonmation sharing capabilities at the statc and locallevcls. 

DHS has supported the developmcnt of fusion centers through deployed personnel, training, 

technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances, connectivity to federal systems, 

technology, and grant funding. 

We currently have more than 90 DBS intelligence officers deployed to fusion ccnters, working 

side by side with their federal, state, and local counterparts. Sixty-three fusion centers can now 

reccive classified and unclassified threat information through the Homeland Secure Data 

Network, or HSDN, 

We arc also working to ensure that every fusion center supported by DHS maintains a set of core 

capabilities that includes the ability to assess local implications of national intelligence, share 

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information with federal authorities so we can identify emerging national threats, and ensure the 

protection of civil rights, civil liberties and privacy. 

Specifically, we arc encouraging fusion centers to develop and strengthen their grassroots 

analytic capabilities so that national intelligence can be placed into local context, and the 

domestic threat picture can be enhanced based on an understanding of the threats in local 

communities. We arc partnering with fusion centers to establish more rigorous analytic 

processes and analytic production plans, increasing opportunities for training and professional 

development for state and local analysts, and encouraging the development of joint products 

among fusion centers and federal partners. 

Over the past three years, we also have transfonncd how we train our nation's frontline officers 

regarding suspicious activities, through the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. 

This initiative, which we conduct in partnership with the Department ofJustice, is an 

administration effort to train state and local law enforcement to recognize behaviors and 

indicators related to terrorism and terrorism-related crime; standardize how those observations 

are documented and analyzed; and ensure the sharing of those reports with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) for further investigation. 

More than 213,000 law enforcement officers have now received training under this initiative, and 

more are getting trained every week. The training was created 111 collaboration with numerous 

law enforcement agencies, and with privacy, civil rights and civil liberties officials. DHS also 

has expanded the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting fnitiative to include our nation's 18 

critical infrastmcture sectors. lnfraslmcture owners and operators from the 18 sectors are now 

contributing information, vetted by law enforcement through the same screening process 

otherwise uscd to provide ini()rmation to the JTTFs. 

Bccause an engaged and vigilant public is vilal to our efforts to protect our communities from 

violence, including that resulting from terrorism, we also have continued our nationwide 

expansion of the "If You Sce Something, Say SOl1lethingTM'' public awareness campaign. This 

campaign encourages Americans to contact law enforcement if they sec something suspicious or 

potentially dangerous. To date, we have expanded the campaign to federal buildings, transit 

systems, major sports and entertainment venues, some of our nation's largest retailers, as well as 

many law enforcement partners. We will continue to expand the campaign evcn further this 

year. 

Countering Violent Extremism 

At DBS, we believe that local authorities and community members arc often best able to identify 

individuals or groups residing within their communities exhibiting dangerous behaviors--and 

intervene-before they commit an act of violence. Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a 

shared responsibility, and OtiS continues to work with a broad range of partners to gain a better 

understanding of the behaviors, tactics, and other indicators thal could point to terrorist activity, 

and the best ways to mitigate or prevent that activity. 

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The Department's efforts to counter violent extremism arc three-fold, We are working to bettcr 

undcrstand the phenomenon of violent extremism, and assess the threat it poscs to thc Nation as 

a whole, and within speeitle communities. We arc bolstering elTorts to address the dynamics of 

violent extremism and strengthen relationships with thosc communities targeted for recruitment 

by violent extremists. We arc also expanding support for information-driven, communityoriented policing efforts that have proven effective in preventing violent crime across the nation 

for decades. 

As part of this approach, and consistent with the Administration's strategy released in August 

2011and the related Strategic Implementation Plan released in December 2011, we arc 

implementing a CYE curriculum for state and local law cnforeement that is focused on 

community-oriented policing, which will help frontline personnel identify activities that are 

potential indicators of potential terrorist activity and violence. We piloted the curriculum in San 

Diego in January 2012, and we arc working with the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police (IACP) to implement the curriculum in law enforcement academies nationwide. We are 

also developing a similar curriculum with the Federal Law Enlorcemcnt Training Center 

(FLETC) for federal law enforcement officers. 

With local communities and the Department of Justice, we have published b'llidance on bcst 

practices for community partnerships to prevent and mitigate homegrown threats. And we have 

issued, and continue to release, unclassified case studies that examine recent incidents involving 

terrorism so all of us can better understand the potential warning signs of violent extremism. 

Protecting Our Aviation Svstem 

We have continued to strengthen protection of our aviation sector through a layered detection 

system focusing on risk-based screening, enhanecd targeting, and information-sharing efforts to 

interdict threats and dangerolls people at the earliest point possible. 

The Department is focllsed on measures to evolve aviation security from a "one size fits all" 

approach for passenger screening to a risk-based approach to security. In doing so, TSA utilizes 

a range of measures, both seen and unseen. Our nation's aviation sector continues to be a high 

thrcat tcrrorist target. There is currently no silver bullet; however we utilize a layered approach 

that seeks to both protect the aviation system and expedite passcnger travel. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed approximately 650 Advanced 

imaging Technology (A IT) units to airports across the United States to assist our Transportation 

Security Officers in safely screening passengers for metallic and non-metallic threats. TSA has 

now installed new software on all millimeter wave AIT machines to enhance privacy by 

eliminating passenger-specilic images and TSA is working closely with the vendor to deploy this 

capability to backseattcr units as quickly as possible. TSA also continues to deploy Explosives 

Detection Systems to airports to efficicntly screen baggage for explosives while rcdueing the 

number of physical bag searches 

Additionally. TSA has added more canine teams, which serve as an important layer of security to 

complement passenger checkpoint screening at airports. assist in air cargo screening, and 

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enhance security in the mass transit environment. And through Secure Flight, TSA is now prescreening 100 percent of all travelers flying within, to, or from the United States against terrorist 

watch lists before passengers receive their boarding passes. 

As we have taken these actions to strengthen security, we also have focused on expediting trade 

and travel for the millions ofpeoplc who rely on our aviatIOn system every day. One key way 

we have done this is through expansion of trusted traveler programs. 

For instance, the Global Entry program, which is managed by U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CI3P), is allowing us to expedite entry into the United States for pre-approved, lowrisk air travelers. More than one million passengers have already joined Global Entry, and we 

arc expanding the program as part of the Administration's efforts to foster travel and tourism. 

Global Entry participants arc also eligible for TSA PrC'iTM. TSA PrC'i .. M is a domestic expedited 

traveler initiative that enhances security by allowing us to focus on passengers we know less 

about and those who are considered high-risk, while providing expedited screening for travelers 

who volunteer inforn1ation about themselves prior to flying. Efforts like TSA Pre-v'M represent 

an important evolution in the way we handle airline security, as we shin away from the one-sizefits-all model of passenger screening to one that is risk-based. 

In our increasingly interconnected world, we also work beyond our own airports to protect both 

national and economic security through partnerships with international allies and other Federal 

agencies, and enhanced targeting and information-sharing efforts to interdict threats and 

dangerous people and cargo at the earliest point possible. 

For example, through the Pre-Departure Targeting Program and Immigration Advisory Program 

and enhanced in-bound targeting operations, CBP has improved its ability to identify high-risk 

travelers who are likely to be inadmissible into the United States and make reeommcndations to 

commercial carriers to deny boarding bcfi)[e a plane departs. 

Through the Visa Security Program and with Department of State concurrence, U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has deployed trained special agents overseas to high-risk visa 

activity posts to identi fy potential terrorist and criminal threats before they reach the United 

States. 

Through preclearance agreements, CBP is also inspecting passengers internationally prior to 

takeoff through the same process a traveler would undergo upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry, 

allowing us to extend our borders outward while facilitating a more efficient passenger 

experience. 

Our continued use, analysis, and sharing of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data has allowed us 

to better identify passengers we should pay more attention to bcfllrc they arrive at the airport 

they are departing from overseas. In December 20 I I, we signed a new agreement with the 

European Union to continue the transfer of PNR data, an important milestone in our collective 

efforts to protect the international aviation system from terrorism and other threats. 

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Visa Waiver Program 

With our partners overseas, we also havc acted to strengthen thc Visa Waivcr Program (VWP), 

which allows eligible nationals of 36 countries to travel to the United States without a visa and 

rcmain in our country for up to 90 days for tourist or business purposcs. Since its inception in 

the mid-1980s, the VWP has become an essential tool for increasing security standards, 

advancing information sharing, strengthening international relationships, and promoting 

legitimate travel to the United States. 

Ovcr thc last several years, DHS has focused on bringing VWP countries into compliance with 

information sharing agreemcnt rcquircments of The Implementing Recommcndations ofthc 9111 

Commission Act of2007 (9/11 Act), Pub. L. No.1 10-53. As of January 2012, all VWP countries 

have completed an exchangc of diplomatic notes or an equivalent mcchanism for the requirement 

to cntcr into an agreement to share information on lost and stolen passports with the United 

States through INTERPOL or other designated means. 

DHS also has signed Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agrcements with 22 

VWP countries which facilitate thc sharing of infomlation about terrorists and criminals. 

Negotiations on four additional PCSC Agreements with VWP countries have bcen completed, 

and we have an equivalent agreemcnt already in force with the United Kingdom. 

Additionally, DHS deVeloped the Electronic System for Travel Authoritation (ESTA) as a 

proactive online system to detemlinc whether an individual is eligible to travel to the United 

States under the VWP, and whether such travel poses any law enforcement or national security 

risks. The system was created in response to a requirement in the 91 II Act, which mandated that 

all citizens ofVWP eligible countries who plan to travel to the United States under the VWP, 

must obtain an electronic travel authorization prior to boarding a U.S.-bound commercial flight 

or cruise ship. 

Overstays and Exit Capabilities 

Over the past year, we also have worked to better detect and deter those who overstay thcir 

lawful pcriod of admission. The ability to identify and sanction ovcrstays derives from the ability 

to dctcrmine who has arrivcd and departed from the United States. By matching arrival and 

departure records and using additional data collected by DHS, we can better detemline who bas 

overstayed thcir lawful period of admission. 

In May 2011, DHS bcgan a coordinated cffort to vet all potential overstay records against 

Intelligcnce Community and DHS holdings for national security and public safety concems. In 

total, using those parameters, we reviewed the backlog of 1.6 million overstay leads within the 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program and referred leads 

based on national security and public safety priorities to ICE for further investigation. 

A beneficial by-product of this vetting effort has been the identification of efficiencies gained 

through automation, as well as othcr enhancements. Through a new automated system, we will 

be able to enhance automated matching, eliminate gaps in travel history, and aggregate 

information from multiple systems. 

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In Octobcr 20 11, I proposed a strategy to Congress to utilize DHS funds to implement an 

automated vetting and enhanccd biographic exit capability. This strategy will allow thc 

Department to significantly enhance our cxisting capability to identify and target for enforcement 

action those who have overstayed their authorized period of admission, and who represent a 

public safety and/or national security threat by incorporating data contained wifhin law 

cnforeement, military, and intelligence repositories. 

This strategy also will enhance our ability to identify individual overstays and detem1ine 

overstay percentages by country; provide the State Department with information to support visa 

revocation, prohibit Visa Waiver Program travel, and place "lookouts" for individuals, in 

accordance with existing Federal laws; establish greater efficiencies to our Visa Security 

Program; and enhance the core components of an entry-exit and overstay program. 

I have directed the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to establish criteria and promote 

research for emerging technologies that would provide the ability to capture biometrics at a 

significantly lower operational cost. S&T is working closely with the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) on this initiative, and S&T expects to have a report shortly 

detailing potential next steps and a road map for the next several years concerning potential 

capabilities for a future biometric air exit system, including how anticipated technology 

enhancements can fit within the DHS operational environment. 

Following this analysis, we anticipate beginning controlled and scenario-based lab testing within 

the year and operational testing in less than three years. Overall, if the evaluated approach is 

detcnnincd to be cost effective, the Department will be able to consider deployment ofa 

biometric exit capabi lity within four years. 

In addition, we arc working toward a system to create an exit program on the United States 

northern land border to facilitate the exchange of U.S. and Canadian entry records, so that an 

entry to one country becomes an exit tr0111 another. 

We support carefully managed expansion of the VWP to countries that meet the statutory 

requirements, and are willing and able to enter into a close security relationship with the United 

States. To this end, we support current bi-partisan efforts by the Congress to expand VWP 

participation and also to promote international travcl and tourism to the United States while 

maintaining our strong commitment to security. 

Protecting Surface Transportation 

Beyond aviation, we have worked with transportation sector entities and companies across the 

United States to enhance security of surface transportation infrastructure through risk-based 

security assessments, critical infrastructure hardening, and close partnerships with state and local 

law enforcement partners. 

Because of its open access architecture, surface transportation has a fundamentally different 

operational environment than aviation. As a result, our approach is necessarily different. To 

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protect surface transportation, we have conducted compliance inspections throughout thc freight 

rail and mass transit domains; critical tacility security reviews for pipeline lacilities; 

comprehensive mass transit assessments that focus on high-risk transit agencies; and corporate 

security reviews conducted in multiple modes of transportation on a continuous basis to elevate 

standards and identify security gaps. 

We also have continued to support Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, 

including 12 multi-modal teams. V1PR teams are composed of personnel with expertise in 

inspection, behavior detection, security screening, and law enforcement for random, 

unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation sector to prevent potential terrorist and 

criminal acts. 

These efforts have been supported by more than $1.6 billion in DHS grant funding awarded 

through the Transit Security Grant Program to harden assets, improve situational awareness, and 

build national capabilities to prevent and respond to threats and incidents across the 

transportation sector. 

Global Supply Chain Security 

Securing the global supply chain system is intcgral to securing both the lives of people around 

the world, and maintaining the stability of the global economy. We must work to strcngthen the 

security, efficiency, and resilience of this critical system. Supply chains must be able to operate 

effectively, in a secure and efficient fashion, in a time of crisis, recover quickly from disruptions, 

and continue to facilitate international trade and travel. 

Earlicr this year, I announced on the behalf of the President the U.S. National Strategy for Global 

Supply Chain Security. This new Strategy provides a government-wide vision of our goals, 

approach, and priorities to strengthen the global supply chain system. The Strategy establishcs 

two explicit goals: promoting the efficient and secure movement of goods and fostering resilient 

supply chain systems. As we work to achieve tbese goals, we will be guidcd by the overarehing 

principles of risk management and collaborative engagement with key stakeholders who also 

have key supply chain roles and responsibilities. 

DHS is now working in close partnership witb other federal departments and agencies to 

translate the high-level guidance contained in the Stratcgy into concrete actions. We arc 

focusing our immediate efforts on the priority action areas identified in the Strategy. Some of 

these efforts include: 

Threat and Risk: Working in concert with other agencies to develop the nation's first 

Global Supply Chain Threat Assessment and Risk Characterization 

• Infornlation Sharing: advancing the developmcnt and government-wide utilization of the 

International Trade Data System for thc collection, usc, and dissemination of commercial 

data. 

• Targcting Capabilities: Improving the capabilities of targeting systems used to identify 

high-risk cargo by obtaining additional infomlation from stakeholders as early in the 

process as possible. 

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Infrastructure Resilicnce: Exploring expanding OIlS's Resilience ST AR program into the 

transportation sector, to highlight and advance security and resiliency standards for key 

supply chain nodes and in frastrueturc. 

• Partnership Programs: Reviewing the variety of US "public-private" partnership 

programs. with an eye towards opportunities to hanmonize them to enhance efficiencies. 

reduce costs, and better leverage federal resources. 

Technology: Prioritizing research and development needs. hoth within DHS and across 

the interagency, based upon an assessment of currcnt capabilities and an understanding of 

evolving threats and vulnerabilities. 

In addition to some of thcsc specific eff011s to implement the National Strategy for Global 

Supply Chain Sccurity, DHS continues to advance a range of other measures and programs to 

strengthen different components of this vital system. 

We are strengthening the glohal system by working with multilateral organizations such as the 

International Maritime Organization ([Mal, the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO), thc World Customs Organization (WCO). and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) as well as hilaterally with trading partners. Our efforts are not only directed toward 

achieving specific ohjectivcs within the organizations hut also on promoting collaboration 

hetwecn them. 

For example, we arc working with thc IMO, WCO, and APEC on developing glohal systems for 

managing trade recovery in the event of large scale disruptions. Our engagement with APEC has 

resulted in their identification of the specific information that governmcnts and the private sector 

nced to be ready to exchange in ordcr to support trade recovery efforts. 

We are also working closely with industry and foreign government partners to identify and 

address high-risk shipments as early in the shipping process as possible hy collecting and 

analyzing advance electronic commercial data. This allows OHS to makc risk infonned 

decisions about what cargo is safe to be loaded onto vessels and aircraft prior to their departure 

from a foreign port and facilitates the elearance ofthose shipments upon their arrival in the 

United States. 

[n thc aviation environment, we are working with leaders from glohal shipping companies and 

the International Air Transport Association (lATA) to devclop preventive measurcs, including 

terrorism awareness training for employees and vetting personnel with access to cargo. We now 

allow participating shippers to screen air cargo, following strict standards to support the 

requircments of the 9111 Act for cargo transported on passenger aircraft. We are reviewing our 

forcign partners' cargo screening to detennine whether their programs providc a level of security 

commensurate with U.S. air cargo security standards. Those who meet these requirements arc 

ofticially recognized to conduct screening for cargo traveling to the U.S., further strengthening 

the security of the global supply chain while facilitating thc flow oflegitimatc commerce by 

screening eargo throughout the supply chain. 

OHS is also focused on preventing the exploitation of the glohal supply chain hy those seeking to 

usc the system to transport dangerous. illicit, contrahand, contaminated, and counterfeit products. 

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Under Program Global Shield, just one example of these efforts, we arc working with more than 

gO countries to prevent the illegal then or diversion of precursor chemicals that can be used to 

make Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs, Through these cfforts wc have already seized 

more than 62 metric tons of these deadly matcrials, 

DHS, through ICE, also continues to investigate U.S, export control law violations, including 

those related to military items, controllcd "dual-use" commodities, and sanctioned or embargoed 

countries, We are committed to making sure foreign adversaries do not illegally obtain U.S. 

military products and sensitive technology, including weapons of mass destruction and thcir 

componcnts, or attempt to movc these items through the global supply chain. In Fiscal Year 

20 II. ICE initiated 1,780 new investigations into illicit procurement activities, made 583 

criminal arrests, and made 2,332 seizures valued at S 18.9 million. ICE also manages and 

operates thc Export Enforccment Coordination Center (E2C2), an interagency hub for 

streamlining and coordinating export enforccment activities and exchanging information and 

intelligence, 

Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclcar Threats 

Countering biological, nuclear, and radiological threats requires a coordinated, whole-ofgovernment approach, DHS, through the Domestic Nuclear Detcction Office (DNDO) and 

Office of Health Affairs (OBA), works in partnership with agencies across fedcral, state, and 

local govcrnments to prevent and detcr attacks using nuclear and radiological weapons through 

nuclear detection and forensics programs. OHA also provides medical and scientific expertise to 

support bio preparedness and response efforts, 

Through the Securing the Cities program, for example, nearly 11,000 personnel in the New York 

City region have been trained in preventive radiological anclnuelear detection operations and 

nearly 6,000 pieces of radiological detection equipment have been deployed, DNDO also has 

facilitated the delivery of radiological and nuclear detection training to more than 4,700 state and 

local officers and first rcsponders. 

Through thc BioWatch program, an environmental surveillance system that provides early 

detection of biological agents, OI-iA has collected over 200,000 samples in more than 30 cities 

natiollwide to enhance protection and preparedness for high-consequence biological threats, Last 

ycar, OI-iA also conducted the first-ever detailed testing on automated biodctection systems for 

national application. These detectors analyze samples ancl relay results to public health officials, 

and will significantly reduce the time necded to detect a biological attack, potentially saving 

thousands of lives. 

Last year, the DIIS National Biodefense Analysis ancl Countenneasures Center (NBACC) 

laboratory, which is managed by DIIS S&T, also received its accreditation with the Centers for 

Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) and the U,S, Department of Agrieulturc to begin research 

and diagnostics on pathogens to understancl the scientific basis of the risks posed by biological 

threats and to attribute their use in bioterrorism events, 

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Under the leadership of the Oftice of Science and Technology Policy, DHS S&T, in 

collaboration with NIST, also published 'Thc National Strategy for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRN E) Standards," which lays out the federal vision 

and goals to achieve a comprehensive structure for the coordination, prioritization, establishment 

and implementation ofCBRNE equipmcnt standards by 2020. 

Securing and Managing Our Borders 

DHS secures the nation's air, land, and sca bordcrs to prevent illegal activity while facilitating 

lawful travel and trade, The Department's border security and management efforts focus on 

three interrelated goals: effectively securing U ,S. air, land, and sea horders; safeguarding and 

streamlining lawful trade and travel; and disrupting and, in coordination with other federal 

agencies, dismantling transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. 

Southwcst Border 

To secure our nation's Southwest border, we have continued to deploy unprecedented amounts 

of manpower, resourccs, and technology, while expanding partnerships with federal, state, tribal, 

territorial, and local partners, as well as the Government of Mexico. 

Simply put, the Obama administration has undertaken the most serious and sustained actions to 

secure the Southwest border in our nation's history. We have increased the number of Border 

Patrol agents nationwide trom approximately 10,000 in 2004 to more than 21,000 today with 

nearly 18,500 "boots on the ground" along the Southwest border. Working in coordination with 

state and other federal agencies, we have deployed a quarter of all ICE operational personnel to 

the Southwest border region -the most ever to dismantle criminal organizations along the 

border. 

We have doubled the number of ICE personnel assigned to Border Enforcement Security Task 

Forces, which work to dismantle criminal organizations along the border. We have tripled 

deployments of Bordcr Liaison Officers, who facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Mexican 

law enforcement authorities on investigations and enforcement operations, including drug 

trafficking (coordinated with the Drug Enforcement Administration). We also have increased the 

number ofintclligence analysts working along the U.S.-Mexico border 

In addition, we have deployed dual detection canine teams as well as non-intrusive inspection 

systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Remote Video Surveillance Systems, thcrnlal imaging 

systems, radiation portal monitors, and license plate readers to the Southwest border. These 

technologies, combined with increased manpower and infrastructurc, give our personncl better 

awarencss ofthe border environment so they can more quickly act to resolve potential threats or 

illegal activity. We also arc screening southbound rail and vehick traffic looking for the illegal 

weapons and cash that are helping fuel the cartel violcnce in Mexico. 

We also have completed 650 miles of fencing out of nearly 652 miles mandated by Congress as 

identified by Border Patrol field commanders, including 299 miles ofvehiclc barriers and 351 

miles of pedestrian fence. 

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To enhance cooperation among local, tribal, territorial, state and federal law enforcement 

agencies, we have provided nearly $205 million in Operation Stonegarden funding since 2009. In 

that time, Southwest border law enforcement agencies received over $167 million in grants 

through the Operation Stonegarden program. 

Our work along the border has included effective support from our partners at the Department of 

Defense (DOD). In addition to continuing support from DOD's Joint Task Force-North and the 

National Guard, in 2010, President Obama authorized the temporary deployment of up to 1,200 

National Guard troops to the Southwest Border to contribute additional capabilities and capacity 

to assist law enforcement agencies as a bridge to longer-term enhancements in the efforts to 

target illicit networks' smuggling of people, drugs, illegal weapons, money, and the violence 

associated with these illegal activities. 

Beginning in March 2012, DOD's National Guard support to CBP began to transition from 

ground support to air support, essentially moving from boots on the ground to boots in the air 

with state of the art aerial assets equipped with the latest detection and monitoring capabilities. 

These aerial assets, which include both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, supplement the CBP 

Offiee of Air and Marine aerial assets and support the Border Patrol's ability to operate in 

diverse environments, expand our field of vision in places with challenging terrain, and help us 

establish a greater visible presence from a distance, which increases deterrence. 

The U.S. Coast Guard also is continuing its integral role in our border enforcement strategy 

through its maritime operations at the Joint Interagency Task Force (JlATF)-South, the U.s. 

Southern Command entity that coordinates integrated interagency counter drug operations, the 

Caribbean Sea, GulfofMexico, and the eastern Pacific. In Fiscal Year 2011, the Coast Guard 

removed nearly 75 metric tons of cocaine, and more than 17 metric tons of marijuana. CBP 

Office of Air and Marine P-3 aircraft also have been an integral part ofsuceessful countcrnarcotic missions operating in the Source and Transit Zones in coordination with JIA nO-South. 

The results of these comprehensive and coordinated efforts have been striking. Border Patrol 

apprehensions-·a key indicator of illegal immigration-have dCCI"Cased 53 percent in the last 

three years and are less than 20 percent of what they were at their peak. Indeed, illegal 

immigration attempts have not been this low since 197 I, Violent crime in U.S. bordcr 

communities has also remained nat or fallen over the past decade, and statistics have shown that 

some of the safest communities in America are along the border. From Fiscal Years 2009 to 

2011, DHS also seized 74 percent more currency, 41 pereent more drugs, and 159 percent more 

weapons along the Southwest border as compared to Fiscal Years 2006 to 2008. 

To further deter individuals from illcgally crossing our Southwest border, we also directed ICE 

to prioritize the apprchension of recent border erossers and repeat immigration violators, and to 

support and supplement Border Patrol operations. Between Fiscal Years 2009 and 2011, ICE 

made over 30,936 criminal arrests along the Southwest border, including 19,563 arrests of drug 

smugglers and 4,151 arrests ofhllman smugglers. 

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Over the past year wc made sevcral announcements that will continue to support this work and 

expand the collaboration necessary to sustain the progress we have achieved. For example, in 

July 2011, the Obama Administration released the 2011 National Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics Stratcgy, a key component of federal efforts to enhance security along thc 

Southwest border. The strategy outlines fcderal, state, local, ttibal, and international actions to 

reduce the flow of illicit drugs, cash, and weapons across the border, and highlights the Obama 

Administration's supp(1I1 for promoting strong border communities by expanding access to drug 

treatment and supporting programs that break the cycle of drug use, violence, and crime. 

The Dec/aration on 21st Cel1tury Border Management, issued by President Obama and Prcsidcnt 

Calderon last year, signals the United States government's commitment to increase collaboration 

with Mexico; both to facilitate legitimate trade and travel at the border and to continue 

combating transnational crime. As part of this effort, we arc working closely with our Mexican 

counterparts on critical infrastructure protection and expansion of trusted traveler and shipper 

programs. 

[n addition to our efforts to strengthen border security, we made grcat strides in expediting \egal 

trade and travel, working with local leaders to update infrastructure and reduce wait times at our 

Southwest border ports of entry. Along the Southwest border, new initiatives have included 

outbound infrastructure improvements and port hardening, which when completed, will cxpand 

our outbound inspection capabilities, enhance port security, and increase officer safety. We also 

have implemented Active Lane Management, which leverages Ready Lanes, Dedicated 

Commuter Lanes, and LED signage to dynamically monitor primary vehicle lanes and redesignate lanes as traffic conditions and infrastructure limitations warrant. 

These efforts are not only expediting legitimate trade, they are also stopping contraband from 

entering and leaving the country. In Fiscal Year 20 II, DHS interdicted goods representing more 

than $1.1 hillion in Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price. Furthcr, the value of consumer 

safcty seizures including pharnlaceuticals totaled more than S60 million, representing a 41 

pcrccnt increase over Fiscal Year 2010. 

Northern Bordcr 

Along the Northcm border, we have continued to deploy technology and resources to protect the 

border, invest in port of entry improvements to enhance security and improvc trade and travel, 

and deepen our already strong partnership with Canada. 

For instance, CBP cxpanded unmanned aerial survcillance coverage along the Northern border 

into eastern Washington, now covering 950 miles ofthc Northcrn bordcr. In 20] [, CRP Office 

of Air and Marine provided nearly 1,500 hours of unmanned acrial surveillance along the 

Northern Border. 

In 2011, CBP also opcned the Operations Integration Center in Detroit-a multi-agency 

communications center for CBP, DHS, and other fedcral, state, local, and Canadian law 

enforcement agencies on the northern border. The Operations Integration Center increases 

information sharing capabilities leading to seizures of drugs, money and illegal contraband along 

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the U.S - Canada border within the Detroit Sector. S&T is also evaluating new surveillance 

technologies for CBP in Swanton Sector, Vermont that can operate in harsh and remote 

environments and use renewable energy such as solar and wind power. Sharing surveillance data 

with Canada to combat illegal border entries is also in progress. 

We also have continued to invest heavily in infrastmeture improvements at our ports of entry, 

including over $400 million in Recovery Act funds to modernize older facilities along our 

Northern border to meet post-9/ II security standards. 

Through the Beyond the Border Action Plan released by President Obama and Prime Minister 

Harper in December 20 II, we are also enhancing cooperation with Canada through greater 

infonnation sharing, more coordinated passenger and baggage screening, and integrated law 

enforcement operations .. As part of this action plan, we arc working with our U.S. and Canadian 

partners to develop the next generation of integrated cross-border law enforcement, interoperable 

radio communications, border wait time measurements, and enhanced air/land/maritime domain 

awareness, as well as a multitude of initiatives to streamline trusted trader and traveler programs 

and expedite legitimate travel and trade. 

With Canada's Public Safety Minister Vic Toews, 1 announced the Joint Border Threat and Risk 

Assessment, highlighting our nations' shared commitment to identifying and mitigating potential 

threats of terrorism and transnational organized crime along the border. 

Enforcing and Administering our Immigration Laws 

Dl-IS has undertaken a historic effort to enforce and administer immigration laws in a cohesive 

way that is smart, effective, and that maximizes the resources that the Congress has given us to 

do this important job. We have worked, and continue (0 work, to make sure that our limited 

resources are applied consistently and in a manner that enhances public safety, border security, 

and the integrity of the immigration system, while respecting the rule ofJaw and staying true to 

our history as a nation of immigrants. 

Targeting Criminal and Other Priority Aliens 

We have established as a top priority the identification and removal of public safety and national 

security threats. To this end, we have expanded the usc and frequency of investigations and 

programs that track down criminals and other public safety and national security threats on our 

streets and in our jails. 

Overall, in Fiscal Year 2011, ICE removed nearly 397,000 individuals. Ninety percent of these 

removals fell within one of ICE's priority categories, and 55 percent, or more than 216,000 of 

the people removed, were convicted criminal aliens - an 89 percent increase in the removal of 

criminals from Fiscal Year 2008. This total includes more than 87,000 individuals convicted of 

homicide, sexual offenses, dangerous dmgs, and driving under the influence. Of those removed 

in Fiscal Year 20 II without a criminal conviction, more than two-thirds fell into our priority 

categories of recent border crossers or rcpeat immigration law violators. 

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In a single "Cross Check" enforcement operation conducted over a six-day period this year, ICE 

arrested more than 3, I 00 convicted criminal aliens, immil,'fation fugitives and immigration 

violmors. This operation was the largest of its kind, involving the collaboration of more than 

1,900 ICE officers and agents. Arrests occurred in all 50 states, four U.S. territories, and the 

District of Columbia. 

Through the Secure Communities program, ICE uses biometric information to identifY criminal 

and other priority aliens found in state prisons and local jails so that ICE can prioritize them for 

removal. It remains an important tool in ICE's efforts to focus its immigration enforcement 

resources on individuals within ICE's priorities, particularly those who pose a threat to public 

safety or national security. 

We have expanded the Secure Communities program from 14 jurisdictions in 2008 to 2,304 

today, including all jurisdictions along the Southwest border. We are on track to deploy this 

program to all jurisdictions nationwide by 2013. Sinee its inception, more than 135,400 

immigrants convicted of serious crimes, including aggravated felony offenses like murder, rape 

and sexual abuse of children, have been removed from the United States after identification 

through Secure Communities. 

Nevertheless, we recognize that there is always room to improve any program, and we are 

mindful of concerns raised about Secure Communities. Under the leadership of ICE Director 

John Morton, we have taken significant action to improve the program and clarify its goals to 

law enforcement and the pUblic. 

We are committed to ensuring the Secure Communities program respects civil rights and eivil 

liberties. To that end, ICE is working closely with law enforcement agencies and stakeholders 

across the country to ensure the program operates in the most effective manner possible and 

respects community policing efforts critical to public safety. ICE and CRCL are developing 

videos lor state and local law enforcement agencies on how Seeure Communities works and how 

it relates to laws governing civil rights and civil liberties. They also are conducting a regular 

statistical analysis of the program to identify any signs of potential abuse, and they have 

announced a complaint investigation protocol where individuals or organizations who believe 

civil rights violations connected to Secure Communities have occurred can file a complaint with 

ICE or CRCL. We also are reviewing the findings and recommendations oflhe DHS Homeland 

Security Advisory Council (HSAC) Secure Communities Task Force. 

In addition, as part of its enforcement approach, ICE has issued additional guidance to its 

personnel to ensure that those enforcing immigration laws make appropriate llse of the discretion 

they already have in deciding the types of individuals we prioritize tor removal from the country. 

President Obama and I have both made clear that we will continue to cntorce the laws in a smart 

and effective manner, and part (lfthis is exercising discretion on a case by case basis where 

DHS fecls it enhances our ability to meet our priorities. 

With the cooperation of the Department of Justice, we continue to review incoming cases and 

existing caseloads to ensure they correspond with our enforcement priorities and support our 

mission to protect public safety and ensure border security. This effort has led to an 

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unprecedented collaboration among federal agencies to focus taxpayer rCSOllrees devoted to 

immigration enforcement on priority cases. 

Deterring Employment of Aliens Not Authorized to Work 

In the worksite category, we have eliminated high-profile raids that did little to enhance public 

safety, instead promoting compliance with worksite-related laws through criminal proseclltions 

of egregious employer violators, Fonn [-9 inspections, civil tines, and debamlent, as well as 

education and compliance (oo[s. 

Since January 2009, ICE has audited more than 7,001 employers suspected of knowingly hiring 

workers unauthorized to work in the United States, debarred 594 companies and individuals, and 

imposed more than $79.9 million in financial sanctions-more than the total amount of audits 

and debannents during the entire previous administration. 

Employer enrollment in E-Verify, our on-line employee verification system managed by U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USClS), has more than doubled since January 2009, with 

more than 358,000participating companies representing more than 1.1 million hiring sites. 

USCIS has continued to promote and strengthen E-Vcrify, developing a robust customer service 

and outreach staff to increase public awareness of E-Verify's benefits and inform employers and 

employees of their rights and responsibilities. In Fiscal Year 2011 alone, USCIS informed tens 

of millions of people about E- Verify through radio, print, and online ads in English and Spanish, 

and hundreds of thousands more through live presentations, conference exhibitions, live 

webinars, and distribution of informational materials. 

More than 17 million queries were processed in E-Verify in Fiseal Year 2011, allowing 

businesses to verify the cligibility of their employees to work in the United States. Last year, we 

also launched the E-Verify Self Check program, a voluntary, free, fast, and secure online service 

that allows individuals in the United States to confirm the accuracy of govemment records 

related to their employment eligibility status before seeking employment. 

Detention Refonn 

As a part of ongoing detention refom1 efforts, ICE continues to identify systematic ways to 

refoml and improve medieal and mental hcalth care at detention facilities, including an inerease 

in medical case managcment and quality management activities, assigning ficld medical 

coordinators to each ICE Field Office to provide ongoing ease management; simplifying the 

process for detainees to receive authorized health care treatments; and developing a medical 

classification system to support detainees with unique medical or mental health needs. 

ICE also has issued revised detention standards. The new standards, known as PerfotmanceBased National Detention Standards 2011 (PBNDS 2011), refleets ICE's ongoing effort to tailor 

thc conditions of immigration detention while maintaining a safe and secure detention 

environment for stalf and dctainees. In developing the revised standards, ICE incorporated the 

input of many ageney employees and stakeholders, including the perspectives of 

nongovernmental organizations and ICE field offices. PBN OS 2011 is crafted to improvc 

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medical and mcntal health services, increasc acccss to legal services and rcligious opportunities, 

improve communication with detainces with limitcd English proficiency, improvc thc process for 

rcporting and responding to complaints, detcct and prevent sexual assault and abuse, and 

incrcase visitation. 

ICE has hired additional detcnlion scrvicc managers to increase onsite fcdcral ovcrsight and 

ensure that facilitics are in compliance with its detention standards while incrcasing announccd 

and unannounced inspections by other staff. CRCL has assisted in training these ICE employecs 

and revicwing the standards they enforce. CRCL has also stepped up oversight of immigration 

facilities, conducting numerous on-sitc inspections, and additional reviews specifieally relating 

to llledical carc. 

Additionally, instead of housing the vast majority of immigrant detainees in slllall groups in jails 

across the country, ICE has initiated a consolidation effort which includes the addition of larger, 

civil detention facilitIes to its inventory. 

Last year, ICE opened two such facilities in California and New Jersey and opened the first true 

civil detention facility in Texas in February 2012. The acquisition of these facilities has enabled 

ICE to reduce the number of transfers and detain individuals closer to their arrest loeations, 

families, legal service providers, and other community support organizations. 

ICE will continue building on these ongoing detention reform efforts. It expccts to implement a 

new Risk Classification Assessment nationwide to improve transparency and unifornlity in 

detention eustody and classification decisions and to promote identification ofvulnerablc 

populations. Ln addition, ICE will continue its implementation of the new Transfer Directive, 

which is designed to minimize long-distancc transfers of detainees within ICE's detention 

system, especially for those detainees with family members, local attorneys, or pending 

immigration proeeedings in the area where they are detained. 

Improving Legal Immigration 

Our nation's founding is rooted in immigration and immigrants have contributcd to the richness 

of our culture, the strength of our character, and the advancement of our society. To continue to 

promote legal immigration to the United States and the process by which we naturalize ncw 

American citizens each year, we have worked to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies in visa 

programs, streamline the path for entrepreneurs who wish to bring their business to America, and 

improve our systems for providing immigration benefits and services. 

In 2011, USGS held more than 6,000 naturalization ceremonics for approximately 692,000 

lawful pemlanent residents who became U.S. citizens, including more than 10,000 members of 

the U.S. Arnled Forces. 

To help combat fraud and exploitation of our immigration system, USClS launched the 

Unauthorized Practice of Immigration Law (LJPIL) initiative, a national, multi-agency eampaign 

that spotlights immigration-services scams and the problems that can arisc for immigrants whcn 

legal advice or representation is given by people who are not attorneys or accredited 

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238 

representatives. The UPIL initiative began in seven cities in 2011 and will expand nationwide 

in 2012. 

USCIS also launched a series of policy, operational, and outreach efforts to support economic 

growth and stimulate investment by attracting foreign entrepreneurs who can create jobs, f0ml 

startup companies, and invest capital in arcas of high unemployment. 

USCIS also announced thc Entrepreneurs in Residence initiative to cnsure that its policies and 

practices better reflcct business realities of industries that regularly use visa categories for 

immigrant investors, job-creating entrepreneurs, and workers with specialized skills, knowledge, 

or abilities. 

These eff0rts have included enhancements to streamline the Employment Creation immigrant 

visa program, commonly known as the £8-5 Program, including conducting a top to bottom 

review of EB-5 business proccsses, and hiring economists and business analysts to support EB-S 

adjudications. 

USCIS also has provided clarification on how H-I B visas, which allow U.S. employers to 

temporarily employ foreign workers in specialty occupations, and EB-2 Nationallntcrest 

Waivers, which offer a streamlined eligibility for immigrant visas to certain forcign workers with 

advanccd degrees and/or exceptional ability in the arts, sciences, or business, may be utilized by 

foreign-born entrepreneurs. 

In addition, last year USCIS launched the Citizenship Public Education and Awarencss Initiativc 

to promote awarcness ofthc rights, responsibilities and importance of U.S. citizenship and the 

free naturalization preparation resourccs available to permanent residents and immigrant-serving 

organizations. This multilingual effort is designed to reach nearly 8 million permanent residents 

eligible to apply for citizenship. And in September 2011, USCIS awarded $9 million in 

Citizenship and Integration Grants to 42 organizations to expand citizenship preparation 

programs for pcrmanent residents across the country. The President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget 

request includcs $11 million to continue support for USC[S immigrant integration efforts 

through funding of citizenship and integration program activities including competitive grants to 

local immigrant-serving organizations to strengthen citizenship preparation programs for 

permanent residents. 

In January, USCIS also proposed a regulatory change that would significantly reduce the time 

that U.S. citizens arc separated from their spouses and children as they go through the process of 

obtaining visas to become legal immigrants to the United States. The proposcd rule change 

would minimize the extent to which delays separate Americans from their families by allowing 

family members, under certain circumstances, to have their waiver applications processed in the 

United States and receive a provisional waiver detcrmination before they complete the visa 

process outside the United States. 

USCIS also has made significant strides in the development of its Electronic Immigration 

System (ELlS) to begin the agency's transition li'om a papcr-based to an deetronic, online 

organization. USCiS is currently testing the system and will begin its public releases this year. 

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239 

And to further enhance our nation's economic, scicntific and tcchnological competitiveness, last 

year I also announced the launch of the Study in the Statcs initiative, an effort aimed at 

ct1couraging the best and the brightest international students from around the world to study in 

the U.S. by linding new and innovative ways to streamline the international student visa process. 

As part of the initiative, the Study in the States website provides coordinated infonnation in a 

comprehensivc, user-friendly, and interactive way to prospective and current international 

students, exchange visitors and their dependents about opportunities to study in the United States 

and learn about expanded post-graduate opportunities. 

In March 2012, I also announced the fonnation of the Homeland Security Academic Advisory 

Council (HSAAC), comprised of university presidents and academic leaders who will provide 

advice at1d recommcndations to me and senior DHS leadership on issues related to student and 

recent graduate recruitment, international students, academic research, campus and community 

resiliency, security and preparedness, and faculty exchanges. 

Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace 

Our daily Ii fe, economic vitality, and national security depend on a safe, secure, and resilient 

cyberspace. A vast array of interdependent IT networks, systems, services, and resources arc 

critical to communication, travel, powering our homes, running our economy, and obtaining 

government services. 

OilS is the federal government's lead agency for securing civilian government computer systems 

and works with our industry and state, local, tribal, and territorial government partners to secure 

critical infrastructure and information systems. OHS analyzes and mitigates cyber threats and 

vulnerabilities; distributes threat warnings; provides solutions to critical research and 

development needs; and coordinates the vulnerability, mitigation, and consequence management 

response to eybcr incidents to ensure that our computers, networks, and information systems 

remain safe. 

The United States confronts a dangerous combination of known and unknown vulnerabilities in 

the cyber domain, strong and rapidly cxpanding adversary capabilities, and limited threat and 

vulncrabilityawareness. While we arc more network dependcnt than ever before, increased 

interconnectivity increases the risk of theft, fraud, and abuse. No country, industry, community 

or individual is immune to cyber risks. 

Cyber incidents have increased dramatically over the last decade. Therc have been instances of 

theft and compromise of sensitive information from both government and private sector 

networks, undennining confidence in our systems, infonnation sharing processes, and the 

integrity of the data contained within these systems. Last year, the OHS LJ .S. Computer 

Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) received more than 100,000 incident reports, and 

released more than 5,000 actionable cyberseeurity alerts and infornlatioll products. 

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Recognizing the serious nature of this challenge, President Obama made eyberseeurity an 

Administration priority upon taking office. In his Cyberspace Policy Review in 2009, which 

established a strategic framework for advancing the Nation's cybersecurity policies, the 

Presidcnt declared that the "cybcr threat is one of the most serious economic and national 

security challenges we face as a nation." 

DHS works with federal agencies to secure unclassified federal civilian government networks 

and works with owners and operators of critical infrastructure to secure their networks through 

risk assessment, mitigation, and incident response capabilities. 

To protect Federal civilian agency networks, we arc deploying technology to detect and block 

intrusions in those agencies with SUPI'01i from interagency partners. We also work to provide 

agencies with assistance in thc implementation of guidance and standards issued by 01IST. In 

addition, OHS is responsible lor coordinating the national respouse to significant eyber incidents, 

consistent with the National Responsc Framework, and for creating and maintaining a common 

operational picture for cyberspace across the govcrnment. 

With respect to critical infrastructure. DHS and the sector specific agencies work with the private 

sector to help secure the key systems upon which Americans rely, such as the financial sector, 

tbe power grid, water systems, and transportation networks. We do this by sharing actionable 

cyber threat information with the private sector, helping eompanics to identify vulnerabilities 

before a eyber incident occurs, and providing forensic and remediation assistance to help 

response and recovery after we learn of a cyber incident. 

Last year, the DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) 

conducted 78 assessments of control system entities which helped companies identify security 

gaps and prioritize mitigations. We also empower owners and operators to help themselves by 

providing a eyber self-evaluation tool. which was utilized by over 1,000 companies last year, as 

well as in-person and on-line training sessions. 

In addition, OilS S&T works eollaborativcly across federal agencies, private industry, academic 

networks and institutions, and global information technology owners and operators to research, 

develop, test, and transition deployable solutions to secure the nation's current and future eyber 

and critical infrastructures. For example, S&T is partnering with the Financial Services Sector 

Coordinating Council (FSSCC) to provide identity proofing solutions at financial institutions in 

order to reduce identity impersonation. The Financial lnstitution- Verification of Identity 

Credential Service (FI-VICS) effort is focused on creating a single interface from financial 

institutions to authoritative identity crcdential issuers (such as state Department of Motor 

Vehicles) to provide required authentication and authorizations between the financial institution 

requester and government identity credential issuer. 

To combat cyber crime, DHS works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and leverages the 

skills and resources of the U.S. Secret Service, ICE, and CBP to support prosecutions of eyber 

criminals brought by the Departmcnt of Justice. In Fiscal Year 20 II alone. OIlS prevented S 1.5 

billion in potential losses through eyber crime investigations, resulting in prosecutors bringing 

charges against 72 individuals for their alleged participation in an international criminal nctwork 

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241 

that sought the sexual abuse of children and the creation and dissemination of graphic imagcs 

and videos of child sexual abuse throughout thc world. 

DHS also serves as a focal point for national cybersccurity outreach, cyber awareness, and 

workforce development efforts. Raising the eybcr education and awareness of the general public 

creates a more secure environment in which the personal or financial information of individuals 

is better protected. DHS recognizes that partnership and collaboration arc crucial to ensuring 

that all Americans take responsibility for their actions online. To that end, we are continuing to 

grow the Department's Stop. Think.Connect.TM Campaign, which is a year-round national public 

awareness effort desJgned to engage and challenge Americans to join the effort to practice and 

promote safc onlinc practices. 

As we perform this work, we arc mindful that onc of our missions is to cnsurc that privacy, 

confidcntiality, and civil liberties arc not diminished by our efforts. The Dcpartment has 

implemented strong privacy and civil rights and civil liberties standards into all its cybersceurity 

programs and initiatives from the outsct to ensure the highest standards of transparency and 

accountability. DBS has performed Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA,) of our key cybersecurity 

programs such as EINSTEIN, which provides intrusion dctection capabilitics to the civilian 

federal agencies. DHS also receIves regular counsel on cybersecurity activities from the Data 

Privacy and Intcgrity Advisory Committee (OPIAC), a body of outside experts who advise the 

Department on ways to address privacy and civil liberties concerns. This ycar, US-CERT and 

CRCL also launched a training effort for all US-CERT personnel focused on identifying and 

preventing civil rights and civillibertics issues in US-CERT's cybersecurity activities. 

The Dcpartment of Defense is a key partner in our cybcrsecurity mission. In 20 I 0, [ signcd a 

Memorandum of Understanding with then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to formalize the 

interaction between DHS and DOD to protcct against threats to our critical civilian and military 

computer systems and nctworks. Congress mirrored this division of rcsponsibilitics in the 

National Dcfensc Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Wc arc currently working with thc 

Defense Industrial Basc as well as othcr critical infrastructurc sectors, such as thc Banking and 

Finance Scctor, to exchange actionable infornlation about malicious activity. 

While the Administration has taken significant steps to protect against evolving cyber threats, we 

must acknowledge that thc current threat outpaces our current authorities. DHS exccutes its 

portion of the cybersecurity mission undcr an amalgam of existing statutory and exccutive 

authoritics that fail to kcep up with thc rcspom,ibilitJes with which we arc charged. Our 

cyhcrsecurity efforts have made clear that our nation cannot improve its ability to defcnd against 

cybcr threats unless certain laws that govern cybcrsecurity activities arc updated. 

In May 20 II. the Obama Administration provided a pragmatic and focused cybersecurity 

legislativc proposal for Congress to consider. Wc belicve this proposal, as well as the 

Cybcrsecurity Act of20 12, provide important steps in improving the cybersecurity posture of the 

United Statcs. I hope that thc current legislative debate maintains the bipartisan tenor it bas 

benclitted from so far, and builds trom the conscnsus that spans two Administrations and 

Congress' cfforts of the last sevcral years. 

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242 

All sides agree that federal and private networks must be bettcr protected, and infornlation about 

cybcrsecurity threats should be shared more easily while ensuring that privacy and civil liberties 

are protected through a customized framework ofinfonnatiol1 handling policies and oversight. 

Both the Administration's proposa I and the bi-partisan Cybersccurity Act of 2012 currently 

bcfore thc Senate would improvc operations in those arcas by providing DHS with clear statutory 

authority commensurate with our eybcrsccurity rcsponsibilities, although the Administration 

would still like to discuss certain concerns wlth specific parts of the Cyberseeurity Act of 20 12. 

In additlOn, many agree with the House Republican Cyber Task Force when it said, "Congress 

should consider carefully targeted directives for limited regulation of particular critical 

infrastructures to advance the protection of cyberseeurity." Both the Administration's proposal 

and the Senate legislation recognize the severity and urgency to secure critical infrastructurc and 

take some basic steps in this area. 

Accordingly, the Administration has proposed risk mitigation guidance to ensure that companies 

providing the Nation's most essential services are instituting a baseline level ofeybersecurity. 

This proposal would leverage the expertise of the private sector requiring the Nation's most 

critical infrastructure adopt the cybersccurity practices, technologies, and performance standards 

that work best on their networks. 

There is also broad support for increasing the penalties for eyber crimes and for creating a 

uniform data breach reporting regime to protect consumers. The Administration's proposal will 

help protect the American people by enhancing our ability to prosecute cyber criminals and by 

establishing national standards requiring businesses that have sulkred an intrusion to notify 

affected individuals if the intruder had access to the consumers' personal infOlmation. 

I believe we have made great progress toward reaching a consensus that will help protect the 

American people, Federal government networks and systems, and our Nation's critical 

infrastructure. The time to act is now: to improve cyberseeurity coordination, strengthen our 

cyberseeurity posture, and protect all clements of our economy against this serious and growing 

threat, while protecting privacy, confidentiality, and civil liberties. 

Conclusion 

We have come a long way over the past year, and in the ten years since 9111, to enhance 

protection of the United States and engage our full range of partners in this shared responsibility. 

Together, we have made significant progress to better secure our country, but we are aware of 

the challenges that remain. 

Threats against our nation, whether by terrorism or otherwise, continue to exist and evolve. And 

DHS must continue to evolve as well. We continue to be ever vigilant to protect against terrorist 

attacks while promoting the movement of goods and people and protecting our essential rights 

and liberties. 

I thank the Committee for your continued partnership and guidance as together we work to keep 

our nation safe. I look forward to your questions. 

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243 

The Honorable 10n Kyl 

Un i ted States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Senator K yl: 

April 24, 2012 

j"."!l.',flllll Secr .. 'lalT of {nfl,jell/Fe, lft(Ji}'.'! 

li.S. Oepartment· of HO~I{'I::tnd Securit} 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

Thank you for your recent letter regarding policies enacted by local law enforcement 

jurisdictions that undermine enforcement of federal immigration laws. Specifically, you 

expressed concern with the Ordinance passed by the Cook County Board of Commissioners on 

September 7, 2011, entitled "Policy for Responding to ICE [U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement] Detainers" (the Ordinance). The Ordinance directs the Sheriff of Cook County to 

disregard immigration detainers. bars ICE officials from County facilities when enforcing 

immigration laws. and prohibits County personnel from responding to ICE inquiries. The 

Department of I lome land Security (DIIS) shares your concern that this ordinance undennines 

public safety and hinders ICE's ability to enforce the Nation's immigration laws and appreciates 

the opportunity to describe the actions il has taken 10 resolve this issue. 

ICE initially engaged Cook County officials at the local level, explaining that 

jurisdictions that ignore ICE detainers risk exposing their communities to puhlic safety risks 

from suspected sex offenders, weapons violators, drunk drivers, and other violent criminals. 

Because of the gravity of these concerns. ICE requested that the Cook County Board of 

Commissioners amend the Ordinance to avoid any legal conflict with federal law and to restore 

sensible cooperation between Cook County and ICE, especially when it comes to identifying and 

removing criminal aliens incarcerated in Cook County jails. 

Subsequently. as you know. ICE Director John Morton sent letters to Toni Preckwinkle. 

Cook County Board President, on January 4. 2012 and Fcbruary 13,2012, expressing ICE's 

concern and indicating ICE's commitment to work with the County to mitigate costs associated 

with ICE detainers. In his second letter. among other proposals, Director Morton offered to 

reimburse the county for expenses incurred as a result of holding individuals on ICE detainers. 

Ms. Preckwinklc has not meaningfully responded to Director Morton's offl?f. 

Since the Ordinance was enacted on September 7, 20 II. ICE has lodged detainers against 

more than 432 removable aliens in Cook County's custody who have heen charged with or 

convicted of a crime. including serious and violent offenses. Cook County has not honored any 

of these 432 detainers. This has prevented ICE from considering removal proceedings against all 

but 38 of these individuals whom ICE had to locate independently and arrest following their 

release into the community. The potential gravity of Cook County's actions is highlighted in 

very real terms in a recent Chicago Tribune article concerning the case of Saul Chavez. an alien 

who was charged with killing a pedestrian while driving intoxicated. Mr. Chavez fled Cook 

County after being released on bond. despite an ICE detainer that had been lodged. 
244 

Æ 

The Honorable Jon Kyl 

Page 2 

In addition to undermining local public safety, the Ordinance may also violate federal 

law. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a "local government entity may not 

prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving 

from, [ICE] information regarding the citizcnship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of 

any individual." See 8 U .S.c. § 1373(a). This provision is designed to ensure that ICE's ability 

to enforce immigration law in our communities is not unduly obstructed hy state or local laws or 

policies. The Ordinance nevertheless prohibits County personnel from responding to ICE 

inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding an individual's incarceration status or release 

date. 

In addition to engaging Cook County officials directly, ICE has noted that the Ordinance 

inhibits ICE's ability to validate Cook County's annual request for State Criminal Alien Assistance 

Program (SCAAP) funding. Under the auspices of SCAAP, the Federal Government, through 

DOJ, reimbursed Cook County nearly $3.4 million in 2010 and nearly $4.4 million in 2009 for the 

cost of detaining criminal aliens in Cook County detention facilities. In administering SCAAP, 

DOJ requires DHS to verify the immigration status of inmates for whom state and local agencies 

seck reimbursement. Without access to the Cook County jails, ICE's ability to accurately verify 

the immigration status of criminal aliens detained by Cook County becomes more difficult and 

may result in a denial of reimbursement to the State for costs of incarcerating criminal aliens undcr 

SCAAP. Moreover, it is fundamentally inconsistent for Cook County to request federal 

reimbursement for the cost of detaining aliens who commit or are charged with crimes while at the 

same time thwarting ICE's ell'orts to remove those very same aliens from the United States. 

Additionally. in your January 30 letter, you asked DHS to advise you on whethcr DHS 

and ICE will take steps to activate Secure Communities in Cook County earlier than previously 

planned. As you may be aware, Secure Communities is currently active in 26 jurisdictions in 

Illinois and ICE is currently executing activations scheduled for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 with 

nationwide activation, including all remaining Illinois jurisdictions, to bc completed in FY 2013. 

DIIS and ICE are committed to ensuring the safety of American communities and will 

continue to consider all options. both financial and legal. to encourage Cook County officials to 

honor ICE detainers. The Senators who co-signed your letter will receive separatc, identical 

responscs. 

Thank you again for your letters. Should you wish to discuss this fUl1her, please do not 

hesitate to contact me at (202) 447-5890. 

Respectfully, 

Nelson Peacock 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

cc: The Honorable Ronald Weich 

Assistant Attorney General f'or Legislative Affairs