[H.A.S.C. No. 111–77] 

CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE 

ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT OF 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PANEL ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 9, 2009 
CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT OF 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 
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1 

51–959 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–77] 

CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE 

ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT OF 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PANEL ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 9, 2009 
(II) 

PANEL ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey, Chairman 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

ALICIA HALEY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, July 9, 2009, Challenges to Effective Acquisition and Management 

of Information Technology Systems .................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, July 9, 2009 ............................................................................................ 25 

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2009 

CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT OF 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Andrews, Hon. Robert, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Panel 

on Defense Acquisition Reform ........................................................................... 1 

Conaway, Hon. K. Michael, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, 

Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform ................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Harp, Timothy J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, 

Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Information Technology Acquisition, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Networks and Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer ... 5 

Kerber, Dr. Ronald L., Co-Chair, Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology .................................................................................................... 9 

Nielsen, Dr. Paul D., Director and Chief Executive Officer, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon ..................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Andrews, Hon. Robert ...................................................................................... 29 

Conaway, Hon. K. Michael .............................................................................. 30 

Harp, Timothy J. .............................................................................................. 34 

Kerber, Dr. Ronald L. ....................................................................................... 62 

Nielsen, Dr. Paul D. ......................................................................................... 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on Information Management 

for Net-Centric Operations, Volume I, Main Report, April 2007 .............. 234 

Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on Information Management 

for Net-Centric Operations, Volume II, Operations Panel Report, April 

2007 ................................................................................................................ 352 

Report of the Defense Science Board: Creating a DOD Strategic Acquisition Platform, April 2009 ............................................................................. 87 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued 

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology, March 2009 ....................................................................................... 133 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 433 
(1) 

CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, PANEL ON DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 9, 2009. 

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 8:00 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Andrews (chairman of the 

panel) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, PANEL ON 

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 

Mr. ANDREWS. We are very happy to have you with us this morning. The witnesses have done a really good job preparing their written testimony. We look forward to hearing them elaborate on that 

testimony this morning so we can learn more. The panel is focused 

on the difference, if any, that exists between cost and value for our 

uniformed personnel, their support personnel, and the taxpayers of 

the country. 

We spend an enormous amount of money in the defense of our 

country, and we should. It is our responsibility to make sure that 

that money is spent prudently and wisely, so those who step forward to defend our country have the best technology available, the 

best tools available to do their jobs for our country so that the taxpayers are receiving full and robust value for their investment in 

the defense of the country. 

The panel’s work project has proceeded in several steps. We had 

begun with the question of whether there are adequate metrics to 

measure the difference, if any, between cost and value. We are now 

proceeding in a second mode of analysis, which deals with 

hypotheses about why differences between cost and value have 

emerged. The third section of our inquiry will deal with proposed 

solutions to deal with those problems. Then, finally, the panel will 

convene toward the end of our term and come up with recommendations, which we look forward to advocating in the fiscal 

year 2011 armed services authorization bill. 

This morning, we are going to focus on a critical hypothesis 

about the difference between cost and value, and that is the inadequacies through which the United States Department of Defense 

(DOD) purchases information technology (IT) and the challenges 

that we face in doing that. This is sort of a collision of two cultures, 

as I see it. 

For good reasons, we have a culture of deliberation and care in 

the purchase of equipment and systems and supplies in our De-
2 

partment of Defense, and we should. We want to be very careful 

to be sure that things work right. We want to be sure that we are 

doing things in an honest and proper way in the procurement process so that the process matches the requirements and budgeting 

needs of the Department of Defense. This culture which is understandably based upon due deliberation and process clashes with the 

hyperventilated culture of the tech world where, as Moore’s Law 

would tell us, things always change in a big hurry, usually for the 

better. 

So, when you combine the dynamic of the tech world with the 

more deliberative culture of Department of Defense procurement, 

you get some trouble. You get some challenges, and that is what 

we are here to talk about this morning. 

I want to say from the very outset that the gap that has been 

identified between cost and value I do not ascribe to any weakness 

or deficiency by any individual or institution in the procurement 

process. I am not here this morning to say that someone has 

dropped the ball or has not done his or her job. I am sure that is 

true in some instances, but my sense here is that there is a systemic problem which owes itself to this culture clash that I mentioned a few minutes before, that it is a very hard thing to capture 

a whirling dervish, which is this technology dynamic, and tame it. 

It is a very difficult thing to do, and we do not want to go to either 

extreme, right? 

We do not want an extreme where we say, buy the next thing 

that comes out, it will probably work. Well, that is really not a very 

good way to serve our uniformed personnel or our taxpayers. 

On the other hand, we do not want to say we do not care how 

fast technology is moving. If something looked like it was the right 

thing to do in 2004, buy it in 2009 or 2010 or 2011 or 2012. We 

are looking for a happy medium between those two polarizing positions. 

Now, the data would certainly show that we need that happy medium. Work by the Defense Science Board (DSB) task force, which 

dates back to November of 2000, tells us some very forboding statistics: Only 16 percent of all IT projects were completed on time 

and on budget; 31 percent of those projects were cancelled before 

completion; 53 percent were late and over budget with the typical 

cost growth exceeding the original budget by more than 89 percent, 

which is a very significant number; and of the IT projects that are 

completed, the final product typically contains only 61 percent of 

the original specified features. Now, that could be a good thing or 

bad thing. 

I know one of the things that we are going to talk about this 

morning is how requirements creep, which in other areas of procurement is regarded as a bad thing, may well be a necessary and 

good thing in this field because of that technological dynamic that 

I talked about earlier. 

At any rate, we have assembled a panel of three gentlemen who 

thoroughly know this subject, who, I think, will contribute much to 

our discussion this morning. We look forward to welcoming them. 

At this time, I am going to turn to my friend, the ranking member from Texas, Mr. Conaway, for his comments. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Andrews can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, PANEL ON DEFENSE 

ACQUISITION REFORM 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel for coming out this morning and for sharing 

your thoughts with us. 

Today’s hearing is going to focus on helping us understand how 

IT acquisition systems versus the normal, traditional hardware acquisition systems differ and how they should and getting a better 

understanding of the impact that different styles, for lack of a better phrase, go at this issue. 

Clearly, information technology and the hardware attached to 

that is marketed differently. If you look at the F–4, which had 

about 8 percent of its systems run by computers, versus the F–22, 

of which like 80 percent of its systems are run by computer, it is 

a different world and growing. 

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Peter Chiarelli, has said 

that the antiquated system we operate is an albatross around the 

neck of the Army. The chairman has already mentioned the Defense Science Board’s findings from the March 2009 report that 

says, in short, that the report found that the fundamental problem 

the Department of Defense faces is that the deliberate process 

through which weapons systems and information technology are acquired does not match the speed at which new IT capabilities are 

being introduced in today’s information age. The report’s principal 

recommendation is that the Department needs a new acquisition 

system for information technology. 

While it is certainly easy to recognize that the introduction of 

new IT capabilities outpaces the speed of the acquisition system, 

what is less clear is what such a new acquisition system for IT 

would look like. Time will have to be a critical factor. 

How will the Department minimize time of delivery while ensuring proper oversight and avoiding wasteful spending? 

Another question is, is there a reason to believe that the DOD 

can be successful at such a new approach? If so, why wouldn’t a 

similar approach work for traditional weapons systems? 

This is particularly true as our weapons systems get more and 

more IT content. At some point, how does one distinguish between 

an automated information system, like a business system or 

Intranet, and an aircraft that has 80 percent of its functionality delivered from electronic sensors and information processing capability? 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I want to thank the 

chairman for starting this hearing right on time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conaway can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, my friend. 

I am going to, at this point, introduce our three witnesses. 

Without objection, your opening statements will be included in 

the record of the hearing, and we would ask you to synopsize your 

written statements for us so we can proceed to questions. 
4 

I would also say that any member of the panel who wishes to 

have an opening statement entered, without objection, will be permitted to do so. 

So I am going to read the biographies of the witnesses, and then 

we will proceed with synopses of your statements and then get on 

to questions and answers from the members of the panel. 

Timothy J. Harp is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

C3ISR and IT Acquisition. Mr. Harp is responsible for the review 

of major acquisition programs for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, space and information technology programs. In addition, he leads reviews of major 

defense acquisition programs and major automated information 

systems as chairman of the command, control, communications, 

and intelligence overarching integrated product team in support of 

the Defense Acquisition Board and Information Technology Acquisition Board. 

Mr. Harp received his bachelor’s of science (BS) degree in business administration from Penn State University—he is a Nittany 

Lion—and a master’s of business administration degree in financial 

management from the George Washington University. He is Defense Acquisition Workforce Integrity Act Level III certified in program management, business, cost-estimating and financial management and acquisition logistics. His awards include the Defense 

Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, the Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Medal, and the Defense Superior Service Medal. 

Mr. Harp resides in Manassas, Virginia. 

Welcome. Glad you are with us. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you get that all on one business card—the 

command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, space and information technology? 

Mr. ANDREWS. We might have to introduce legislation that limits 

the name of any group to no more than three or four words. That 

would probably save us quite a bit of money in business card printing. 

Dr. Paul Nielsen is director and chief executive officer of the 

Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a federally funded research 

and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University. 

The SEI advances software engineering principles and practices 

through focused research and development, which is transitioned to 

the broad software engineering community. 

The SEI serves as a global leader in process improvement and 

networked systems survivability. Additionally, the SEI is a key innovator in software architecture, software product lines, interoperability, the integration of software-intensive systems, and the increasing overlap of software and systems engineering. 

In a very distinguished career in the United States Air Force, Dr. 

Nielsen served in the U.S. Air Force, retiring as a Major General 

after 32 years of distinguished service for which we thank him. In 

2004, Dr. Nielsen became a fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). He served as the AIAA president from 2007–2008. He serves on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and is a member of the board of directors for the Hertz 

Foundation, a nonprofit that awards graduate school fellowships in 

the applied sciences. 
5 

Thank you, Dr. Nielsen, for your service and for being with us 

this morning. 

Finally, Dr. Ronald Kerber is an experienced executive with a 

successful record of leading and growing domestic and global businesses. His leadership responsibilities have included general management, innovation, product development, procurement, cost reduction, and profitability in diverse global organizations. He currently splits his time among a variety of entrepreneurial and pro 

bono activities as president of Small Business Development Center 

(SBDC), a small consulting firm; as partner and cofounder of Dominion Development Company and Profit Station, LLC; as visiting 

professor at the Darden Business School at the University of Virginia; and as a member of the Department of Defense Science 

Board. 

Dr. Kerber received his BS degree from Purdue University and 

his master’s of science (MS) and Ph.D. degrees in engineering 

science from the California Institute of Technology. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your meticulous preparation. As I said, 

your written statements are considered to be part of the record. 

Mr. Harp, we will begin with your oral testimony. We would ask 

you to summarize in about five minutes so we can get to questions 

from the panel. 

Good morning. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. HARP, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE 

AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION, OFFICE OF 

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS 

AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/DOD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER 

Mr. HARP. Good morning Chairman Andrews, Representative 

Conaway and other members of the Defense Acquisition Reform 

Panel. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on challenges to effective acquisition and management of information technology systems. I have submitted my written statement, as you mentioned, 

for the record, and will now briefly highlight a few key points. 

Specifically, I would like to point out some challenges within the 

information technology environment that differentiate information 

technology acquisition from the major weapons systems acquisition 

that I experienced throughout my 22-year Navy career as a weapons system acquisition professional. I would like to contrast this to 

my recent experience over the past six years as a member of the 

IT culture that you mentioned. 

Based on my experience, the traditional DOD acquisition process 

is far too slow to keep pace with the extremely rapid pace of information technology change. Even the different phases of the acquisition process, as set forth for weapons systems, are ill-suited for information technology systems. Phase A is intended to mature technology; yet our underlying information technologies are now largely 

matured in the commercial sector. Phase B is intended to ready a 

program for production; yet information technologies typically are 

not produced in quantity. Phase C is a production phase, which 
6 

again is generally not relevant to information technology that is 

not produced in quantity. 

The term ‘‘life cycle’’ has also become ambiguous because, similar 

to the B–52 experience where we build an airframe and then update the pieces over time rather than build a full replacement, the 

inherent modularity and dynamics of information technology and 

the pace of commercial information technology development allow 

us to build or adopt the information technology equivalent of an 

airframe and continue to modify it indefinitely rather than replace 

an entire system in a predetermined period of time. 

As noted by the recent DSB report, acquisition reform studies 

have been ongoing almost continuously since the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation was passed in 1986. Most often, acquisition-related problems in those reports have been attributed to requirements creep and funding instability. 

With regard to information technology requirements creep, 

Moore’s Law, the hypothesis that the power of information technology will double every 18 months, has proven to be valid with regard to the information technologies that we acquire. This puts 

pressure on information technology acquirers to change the systemlevel requirements during the design process to enable the fielding 

of relevant technology. 

In addition, combat operations are being conducted in rapidly 

changing circumstances, placing pressure to change requirements 

during information system acquisition to respond to adversary tactics. Also our customers, the warfighters of today, are informationtechnology savvy, often termed digital natives, with expectations to 

leverage the unprecedented innovation in the commercial market to 

enhance our information systems and capability in terms of agility, 

flexibility, responsiveness, and effectiveness, adding to the requirements creep pressure. 

The combination of these three very real forces leads to significant requirements change pressure on our information technology 

process. We should begin to embrace the concept that changing requirements might actually be desirable for information technology 

acquisitions rather than to follow the inherent weapons system acquisition process assumption of stable requirements over time. 

Funding stability in this dynamic environment is also a significant challenge to information technology acquisition. A large portion of the Department’s discretionary funding is allocated to acquisition. Within the acquisition accounts, information technology programs are relatively more flexible because, unlike weapons system 

programs, information technology programs typically do not have 

significant out-year production quantities to amplify near-term 

changes in the execution of budget year funding. So, when faced 

with a Hobson’s choice, the Department will defer to information 

technology more often than weapons system technology. This aspect of information technology programs tends to drive a degree of 

funding instability that adds to the requirements stability. 

In short, the weapons system acquisition process is optimized to 

manage production risk and does not really fit information technology acquisition that does not lead to significant production 

quantities. Also, a foundational weapons system acquisition as-
7 

sumption of requirements and funding stability is ill-suited for the 

information technology acquisition. 

The information technology acquisition model proposed by the 

Defense Science Board recognizes the unique aspects of information 

technology, and addresses the requirements and funding challenges 

through the application of agile processes and exploitation of the 

inherent modular nature of the information technology to build 

smaller capability releases rather than large programs. 

The Department welcomes the House Armed Services Committee 

(HASC) Fiscal Year 2010 defense language that gives the DOD the 

authority to establish 10 pilot programs to rapidly acquire information technology capabilities under an alternative acquisition process, and we look forward to working with this panel in the future 

to create an effective acquisition and management construct for the 

information technology systems. We also appreciate the committee’s inclusion of section 1111, which would allow us to bring industry IT experts to DOD on an exchange basis to help with this effort. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harp can be found in the Appendix on page 34.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, Mr. Harp. We appreciate 

that. 

Dr. Nielsen, welcome to the committee. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL D. NIELSEN, DIRECTOR AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE, 

CARNEGIE MELLON 

Dr. NIELSEN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Andrews, Ranking Member Conaway, and other committee members, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before 

this panel, talking about a very important subject for our country. 

There have been a number of excellent studies on defense acquisition over the years. They all pretty much agree on the findings 

and on the recommendations, and I know you are well aware of all 

of them. Rather than re-plow this sort of well-furrowed ground, I 

would like to talk about one aspect that, I think, is important and 

central to all of defense acquisition, and that is the whole side of 

software in defense systems. That is true in weapons systems, enterprise business systems, and IT systems. 

Software is almost everywhere now, and the amount of software 

continues to grow, as was mentioned by Representative Conaway. 

Software engineering is a young discipline, and it is not rooted in 

the physical world like some of the other engineering disciplines 

such as civil engineering, aeronautical engineering, mechanical engineering, and electrical engineering. 

Without physical constraints, the design space is so vast for 

these large programs, which need strong architectural principles, 

disciplined processes and talented people to be successful. The larger the program, the more important this is, and we know the Department has some of the larger programs. 

The software engineering community has made major advances 

in the last 50 years, but the size, function and complexity of software has continued to grow. The bar keeps getting higher in these 
8 

areas. As mentioned, Moore’s Law has helped us a lot by giving us 

more computational throughput, a lot of storage, but this has led 

to more and more functionality resting in software in all of our defense systems, and sometimes the line between what is an IT system and what is a major weapons system gets a little blurred now. 

This is true not only in the defense world. This is true in the 

commercial world, aerospace, telecommunication, automotive, medical. Software is just everywhere. Cars now have almost 100 million lines of software in them. Telephones and cell phones that 

each of us has have 2 million to 10 million lines of software. 

Tremendously innovative concepts keep opening up in the software engineering world and new challenges as well. We are now 

in an era when an increasing number of systems are linking via 

networks, such as the Internet. The convenience, power, and cost 

benefits of these approaches are compelling, but the complexity of 

architecting, developing, testing, and operating these ultra-large 

systems is daunting, and we are all becoming more and more 

aware of the pervasive cyber implications of these connective systems. We have to worry about that, too. 

More than ever, we need strong quality built into our systems 

from the initial design and architecture. This is a major theme in 

software engineering over these last 20–30 years that, through 

strong architectures, disciplined processes and pervasive attention 

to quality, you can deliver complex systems on time and within 

budget. And yet, by following these principles, you will also develop 

software and IT systems that are more secure. 

To accomplish this, we really need the entire community to understand software engineering principles and to work together to 

address the acquisition problems we face immediately and also to 

have some forward-looking research to address the problems that 

are coming down in the future. We will have even larger systems 

with even more connectivity. 

IT systems have their own unique characteristics. We really have 

to worry about the different tempo that IT systems have and the 

ubiquity of IT systems, but we also need to worry about the systemic issues that affect IT and weapons systems programs as well. 

As we look to the future, the bar is going to keep getting higher. 

There is no doubt about that. We are going to need government engineers and program managers who are trained and experienced to 

handle the systems we build, who understand the architectural 

principles and trades that are made and who have the expertise 

and passion for this business. We will need industry engineers and 

managers on the IT as well as on the weapons systems side who 

have kept up with the latest techniques and who have contributed 

to the best practices and innovations in software and systems engineering. We need robust research programs at our universities to 

address the opportunities and problems that are yet to come. 

Mr. Chairman and committee members, with that, I will end my 

statement, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nielsen can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Nielsen, thank you very much. We appreciate 

your testimony. 

Dr. Kerber, welcome. 
9 

STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD L. KERBER, CO-CHAIR, DEFENSE 

SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ACQUISITION 

OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

Dr. KERBER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman and members, it is a pleasure to appear before 

your panel. I am a member of the Defense Science Board, and I 

have submitted to you copies of three reports that inform my testimony. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Without objection, they will be entered into the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 87.] 

Dr. KERBER. Okay. I must also state that I am appearing as a 

private individual, and my comments do not necessarily reflect 

those of the views of the Department. 

We have looked at the defense acquisition process, and as you 

well know, there have been many reports and many studies, and 

the question is: Why do these activities not address the problem 

that has lasted for so long? We would say that it does not address 

the root causes of the problem. 

The problems appear to be caused by immature technology, requirements creep, funding instability, but we would argue most of 

that is caused by inexperienced and unproven leadership, and programs are not structured and initiated in a way that can be successfully completed. There is no silver bullet to solving this problem. It is really a commonsense approach. 

We also think the problem is beyond the scope of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD– 

AT&L). It is really a problem of the scope of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and it should be because many of those players 

who perform in the acquisition arena do not report to the Under 

Secretary of Acquisition. 

So what is needed? 

It seems simple, but we need to buy the right things. We need 

to select an effective leadership team. We need to reform and 

streamline the acquisition process, and we need to improve acquisition execution. We also need your support in helping the Department to do this, and we need to instill a sense of urgency. 

Just a couple of comments on buying the right things: That 

seems simple, but we really need a resource-balanced business 

plan-type concept for the DOD that includes funded acquisition. We 

need to specify the capability needs to support our National Security Strategy. Then we need to also effectively represent the combatant commanders in the process of determining what we buy. 

Then we need to use comprehensive systems engineering and analysis early and throughout the process to determine what we are 

buying and how we are buying it. We need to avoid hard requirements without extensive analysis and trade-off. 

Then we need to, secondly, select an effective leadership team. 

Acquisition cannot be fixed without a proven effective leadership 

team, and that goes back to the recommendation of the Packard 

Commission. Signs of poor leadership include poorly designed product development strategies, poor management of technical risk, the 
10 

selection of inexperienced contractors, poor contract incentives, and 

reward for change orders. Skills in program administration are 

often confused in the acquisition community with management 

ability. Managers manage what they understand. Proven experience should lead to better judgment and execution. 

Another point that is equally important is that the Secretary of 

Defense has many offices that contribute to the decision process 

and acquisition, such as Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), 

the Chief Information Officer (CIO), the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), the Comptroller, and the Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), plus the services, of course. 

Often these groups are not aligned. These groups must be aligned 

once a decision is made to have an acquisition or to buy something 

in the Department, and their constructive input should be early 

and continuous, not just at decision milestones. 

We need to improve acquisition processes for major systems, 

commercial derivatives, information technology, and services. We 

need to establish more streamlined processes with in-depth analysis up front, planned spiral development and block upgrades, and 

the use of competitive prototypes. 

For IT acquisition, these systems continue to grow both in size 

and in content in embedded systems. The DOD acquisition process 

is inconsistent with the rapid change of commercial IT technology. 

You, Congress, have imposed new requirements to shorten the 

acquisition IT cycle time for all but national security systems. That 

is important, but the Department needs processes and the capability to do that. 

We have recommended for the IT acquisition process a new 

streamlined decision process, and we have also recommended how 

and when to use it. We also want to point out that, as has been 

mentioned earlier, IT systems do not satisfy the laws of physics, 

and so we do not always know what we are buying, so we need to 

minimize the acquired system vulnerabilities. We need to adopt an 

IT acquisition strategy that confounds the enemy, using variety, 

change and rapid acquisition. The Joint Chiefs must assure that 

field commanders are trained to test information technology systems for authenticity and to operate them in degraded modes. We 

need to clarify IT off-site accountability. We need to strengthen the 

CIO authority for the enterprise to provide IT vision, policy and architecture, and we need to make sure that we identify clearly who 

has oversight accountability for all systems. As the growth of IT 

systems continues, that percentage of the total acquisition will 

grow, and we feel that that needs to be managed under the Office 

of the USD (AT&L). 

We need to improve acquisition execution. I have talked about 

that in the report. I would just say a significant point is we need 

to right-size the acquisition workforce with experience. We can do 

that by process mapping the process and the workflow to determine 

the right size and to assure clear accountability and authority for 

everyone. Finally, we need to develop process metrics for all that 

we do. 

Just one final comment. In the private sector, there are different 

characteristics for acquisition. The customer is clearly defined. The 

decision authority is more clear. Accountability is more clear. In-
11 

centives are more clear. Yet it is very difficult to do this process 

even in the private sector, and few private companies really do it 

well. Especially for the DOD, it is very difficult to do this kind of 

process on a public stage. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kerber can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, thank you very much. 

We appreciate the statements from each of the witnesses, and we 

will begin the questioning. 

Mr. Harp, you made reference to the language that would authorize 10 pilot programs for an alternative acquisition process in 

IT, which the committee has supported. 

Can you give us some thoughts about what principles you might 

rely on in that pilot process and what kinds of differences you 

would institute in the acquisition process? 

Mr. HARP. Well, as we look to the inventory systems that we are 

considering, there seem to be four natural types of systems. We 

have some systems where we are buying just commercial, off-theshelf hardware, and that is considered an IT system. That does not 

require the same process as a system where we are actually developing and writing software code and developing a capability by 

writing code. 

Another type of acquisition that we do is we buy software that 

is commercial software, and we put it together, and we build the 

interfaces between the systems, so we develop a system of systems, 

if you will, using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS). So that would be 

a different approach as well. 

So we are looking at some different templates on how we might 

approach that, but some of this becomes—I mentioned the B–52 

model. If you get to a system where you do not really need to replace the core system—there have been studies that show, when 

you build a new system, up to 60 percent of the code you have to 

write to make it work does not get used over time, so we do not 

want to replicate building that 60 percent. A lot of times, we can 

take the core system that we have and just fix the piece that is broken or can add the capability that you need by building modules, 

right? With the funding discussion that I had, we have seen 

through our experience that many of these programs are levelfunded over time, and the decision on how much you are going to 

fund in an acquisition program is actually made during execution 

rather than—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. But, in layperson’s terms, what would you try to 

do differently in the pilot as opposed to what is being done now? 

How are you going to use the pilot to break new ground? 

Mr. HARP. What I would do is take a larger system, identify the 

modules of that system and the interfaces, the commercial or 

standards that exist for those modules to talk together, and would 

approach each module as if it were a separate release, or a separate part of a system, rather than waiting for all the modules to 

be developed before we go to test. So you can test and release individual systems in an agile fashion, individual releases in an agile 

fashion, rather than waiting for the entire thing to be completed, 

because oftentimes we will have several modules under develop-
12 

ment in parallel, and we cannot get to the final test until we complete the final module, and other modules that could be used 

are—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. I think it was your testimony that said that the 

average time to get to the finish line was about 81 months. Was 

that in your statement? 

Mr. HARP. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you think a plausible goal is to reduce 

that to? In an optimal world, if the pilot worked great and became 

a great success, by how much time would we reduce that 81 

months? 

Mr. HARP. Well, conceivably, you could reduce it to 12 to 18 

months, but again, you are not talking about delivering the same 

thing. The 81 months is a large system with several releases, with 

several modules, all delivering at the same time. In 12 to 18 

months, you could deliver capability in pieces of that large system, 

so it is not really an apples-to-apples comparison. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume this is where the open architecture and 

the standards become important. 

Mr. HARP. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. If your first release in month 18 becomes obsolete 

by month 36, you have got to have a platform where it can easily 

be modified, an architecture where it can easily be modified, and 

not tear it up and start all over again. Am I right about that? 

Mr. HARP. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Nielsen, one of the ideas that you talked 

about, and it really followed on Mr. Harp’s testimony, was sort of 

changing the presumption of purchasing and procurement in the IT 

world. In the regular procurement world, although it is rarely met, 

the presumption is that the requirements you start out with should 

not change and that there has to be some burden of proof on he 

or she who wants to change the requirements. You are suggesting 

a different presumption, I think, in the IT purchasing world where 

you presume there are going to be changes because of Moore’s Law, 

and you have a different question, but you also said that the line 

between software procurement and weapons systems is blurred. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Yes. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So how do we reconcile that problem? 

If we were to take your idea and institutionalize in the law a different set of presumptions about requirements in the IT purchasing, where would we draw the line between the IT purchasing 

and the weapons system purchasing so we do not exempt weapons 

system purchasing from some very important adherence to requirements that we start out with? 

Dr. NIELSEN. Well, sir, I think there are some things that are 

clearly pure IT systems, and I think Mr. Harp mentioned that. You 

know, if you look at the desktops of everybody in the Department 

of Defense, they have desktops that are commercially procured 

desktops for the most part—Dell, IBM, whoever—computers with 

Microsoft or Apple or whatever software. That is kind of clearly in 

the IT world. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

Dr. NIELSEN. But as you migrate more to command-and-control 

systems, which have an information technology kind of function, 
13 

you start to get to where life-and-death decisions are made based 

on these things, so it starts to migrate into the weapons system. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I mean, is the data system in the cockpit of an 

airplane an IT acquisition, or is it a weapons system acquisition? 

Dr. NIELSEN. You know, I would consider it a weapons system 

myself. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. 

Dr. NIELSEN. But yet it certainly has some IT—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. You understand the importance of that question 

is not simply metaphysical. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. One of the driving forces in cost overruns and 

weapons systems is requirement changes. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Right. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Requirement creep. 

If we want to wrestle that problem to the ground, we certainly 

want to keep the present presumption, which is that the requirements you start out with do not change. 

On the other hand—and I hear what you are saying—if Moore’s 

Law has pushed the envelope and, by year six of a procurement 

process, the system we are going to put in the cockpit is not the 

best one, we do not want to be stuck with that either. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Yes, sir. 

I remember, you know, I was the vice commander of the Aeronautical Systems Center, which buys the airplanes for the U.S. Air 

Force, from 1999 to 2000. At that point, even as the F–22 was coming into production, there were some parts that were no longer 

made for it that were baselined into the system because they were 

IT kinds of parts that were designed in the 1980s, and you know, 

in the year 2000, you are not going to have those parts anymore. 

So we have a pace problem in all of our systems right now. I 

would like to see us experiment on the IT systems, especially with 

the ones that are more on the pure IT side; but if we find principles 

that work there—gosh knows we have some issues in the weapons 

system acquisition world, too—then maybe we can take those good 

ideas and best practices—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. This is what we are hoping, that Mr. Harp’s pilot 

will lead us to some good data and to some good conclusions about 

that. My time is up for now. 

I will turn to my friend Mr. Conaway for his questions. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thanks, gentlemen, for being here. 

You know, anecdotes drive a lot of stuff. I recall, in 2005–2006, 

the Army had a requirement for a biometric tool they could use in 

Iraq to capture fingerprints. There was an elaborate process of designing what that ought to look like, how much it ought to weigh, 

the battery. One of the deals was weight. They said it had to weigh 

seven pounds. 

While they were trying to work that out, the commercial side of 

the world had a three- or four-pound thumbprint/fingerprint model 

that was available. You know, I do not know if it was at 

RadioShack, but it was available out there, so that kind of exemplifies the struggle that we have got. 
14 

Mr. Nielsen, you mentioned the laptops that everybody at the 

Pentagon is using and the struggle that most organizations have 

of making sure every three or four years those are, you know, 

redone or replaced or whatever. That is the mundane side of what 

we are talking about. Then you have got the clear message you 

mentioned about the F–22 in that, you know, it was 21 years between the start to the first time it landed at Langley to go to work. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. There is a whole world of difference in the size 

and in the power of that deal. 

The key, though, is people. Mr. Kerber, you mentioned that. At 

Price Waterhouse, if I could get the really bright staffers to work 

my jobs, my life was real easy. If I got the less—you know, the 

brand new rookies, my life was not very easy. So it all gets down 

to people. You know, your stereotypical IT person does not wear a 

uniform and does not work the same hours. I mean, it is a different 

culture altogether. 

How do you get the right people who are willing to make those 

commitments? If you have got that background, how does the Defense Department keep them and incent them to stay on board? 

How do you address that? 

Any of you. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Perhaps I will answer a little bit on that. 

When I was the commander of the Air Force Research Lab, we 

were always looking for great people, and we were competing with 

industry lots of times for the smartest people we could find. We 

found that there were lots of people who wanted to come work for 

the government. There are lots of people in our country who feel 

a commitment, and they want to provide some service for our country, whether it is in uniform or as civilians. 

There are some impediments. One of the impediments we had 

that, I think, this committee is trying to address is, when we tried 

to hire people, it could take 9 to 12 months before we could bring 

them on board. Even if they were committed to us, if they were 

staring at an offer from a company that was ready to respond in 

two or three months, it was hard for them to wait for all that time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is that because of security clearances or what? 

Dr. NIELSEN. It is for all kinds of reasons, sir. It is not just security clearances. Some of it is just the personnel system itself. We 

have to be able to respond faster, and I think there are some innovative proposals that are being made for how we might respond 

faster to hire the kind of people who want to provide some service 

to our country. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Kerber, any thoughts? You are out in the real 

world. 

Dr. KERBER. I would think, first of all, the Department does offer 

very interesting and challenging problems, so that, by itself, is a 

little bit of a draw. Strong recognition would help. Also, you have 

several special programs to hire a specialist, if you will, and when 

we have looked at it, those programs have really been underutilized. You do also have a bonus structure that you can award bonuses for outstanding performance. So, between bonuses, recognition and giving challenging problems, you have an opportunity, if 
15 

managed right and effectively, plus the special hiring capability, to 

do that. 

Mr. HARP. Today, the HASC section 821 is enhancing the expedited hiring authority for defense acquisition workforce personnel. 

One of the things we could do to get these two cultures to cross 

the two cultures would be to expand that to include the IT workforce, including the Information Assurance (IA) personnel, who are 

trying to build up for our cybersecurity and that kind of thing. So, 

if we could expand that provision to include the IT workforce, that 

would be helpful to us. We have a parallel challenge in the IT culture that you mentioned in the acquisition culture. We need to 

bring them both along at the same time. So, if we could get that 

expanded to the IT workforce, that would be helpful. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes. 

Mr. HARP. I will mention, though, that I feel that there are some 

examples of where the weapons systems have successfully embraced the commercial technology. We have a submarine combat 

system that is based on commercial technology. The only hardware 

components in there that are not commercial are the transducers 

and the racks. The racks have to be special because they have to 

be water-cooled because of the fans, and air-cooled makes too much 

noise for the submarine. Other than that, all the cables, all the 

screens, all the circuit cards, everything in that system, and 80 

percent of the software in that system is commercially procured. 

The program has a lab-like environment, the program office that 

they have been running for almost 10 years now, that watches over 

the commercial industry and that follows the commercial industry. 

When one of those components is upgraded, they bring the piece in 

and test it and make sure that it does what it says it will do and 

that it has all the right requirements for our environment. When 

it gets a green light, then they plan on which submarine it will go 

in next, and they orchestrate that whole process. 

So there are models out there that are like, as you mentioned, 

anecdotal, that show that we can make progress in this area. Now, 

there are some challenges with that model, and we are looking at 

that, but that is the kind of thing that we are trying to move towards to address this IT in the weapons system world. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Ellsworth for five minutes. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I benefit in the downside of being number three, as Mr. Conaway 

asked my first question about personnel and about finding that talent. 

Mr. Kerber, I do not know when the last time was that you were 

in West Lafayette, but it is still alive and well. 

Welcome to the Boilermaker. 

Dr. KERBER. Good. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Since we had the Nittany Lion comment earlier, 

I thought I had to throw one out there for Hoosiers. 

Dr. KERBER. Thank you. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. We do that all the time, don’t we? 

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand. That is right. 
16 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Dr. Kerber, could you talk a little bit more 

about—you made a comment about quick change to confound the 

enemy. I know, again, everything we are talking about is counterintuitive to what we are saying of finding something that works 

and something that takes long to initiate. Then again, we want to 

change it because we know the enemy is constantly changing also. 

I guess I just would like you to explore it a little more. I guess 

it goes back to Mr. Harp’s module, which is that we get the base, 

and then we are plugging in new modules to change it. Is that kind 

of what we are talking about? Maybe you would like to elaborate 

more on that. 

Dr. KERBER. Yes, let me just explain that in context. 

First, we did one study where we said that the information management system of the Department needs to be considered part a 

weapons system because of the importance of it in managing combat and in managing our troops and their logistics, their availability, including precision weapons, et cetera. So, whether it is in 

the fighter aircraft or it is a handheld or it is a personal computer 

(PC), it should be managed as a weapons system and protected 

that way. 

The issue you have when you change systems too rapidly, of 

course, is every time you change a software system, you need to 

take with that some training. And you can really have chaos in the 

field if you are not careful about how you manage training along 

with the introduction of new systems. 

I would argue, whether it is in a fighter aircraft or in any other 

system, that you do need to plan for upgrades at the start of any 

program so that you can continually upgrade it in an orderly way. 

It does not have to absolutely track commercial technology, but it 

certainly does have to track it well enough so that you can keep 

current with replacement parts and the capability you would like. 

With that, you would like to do things rapidly enough so that the 

enemy who is trying to penetrate your systems, especially some of 

the larger, sophisticated command-and-control systems, you would 

like to change parts of that so that their penetration of those systems is more difficult. So you have to balance the acquisition, the 

training and the confounding the enemy, if you will, as a group in 

order to have an effective weapons system. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Dr. Nielsen. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Yes, I would like to add just a little bit to that because he is right on in this regard. 

One of the things, in the software engineering world, we talk 

about something called quality attributes. In the systems engineering world, they talk about nonfunctional requirements. One of the 

big quality attributes of nonfunctional requirements for all of our 

systems is actually the ability to evolve. I think that, when we see 

the IT systems, this may be one of the most important requirements that is out there; yet it is one that is often not specified. But 

we do not really start from scratch in any of these systems. We 

have systems that have to evolve over time, and I think if we start 

paying attention to more of that and architecting for the evolution 

of our systems, we would be in a lot better shape. 

With respect to some diversity in our systems, we have, for the 

large part, what we now call a monoculture. A lot of our systems, 
17 

especially our IT systems, are Intel- and Windows-based. That 

means that if you are an enemy, if you are a cyber enemy, you 

know what you have to go against. It would be a lot better for us 

to have a little more of a diverse culture there and to have some 

systems that are not Windows-based and that are not Intel-based 

because that makes it harder for people to attack, and if they can 

bring something down, they cannot bring the whole system down. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, we have got a tough road. I yield back. 

Mr. ANDREWS. It is one we will traverse together. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There has been a movement afoot to say that we have outsourced 

too much in terms of the technical expertise engaged in the contracting process and that to improve the process, that we are going 

to bring a lot of that expertise back in and have them as Federal 

employees as opposed to private-sector individuals under contract. 

Some of you have addressed the issue about competing for expertise in the private sector versus the public sector. 

Is that, in the world of the IT professional of needing to move 

this process along, bringing that expertise in-house versus having 

it available on a contractual basis as needed, is that movement 

going to hurt or help moving the IT process forward in defense acquisition? 

Mr. HARP. Well, this argument is interesting in the IT world because, in the IT world, what we outsourced largely were people who 

were writing code, and what we are trying to bring in are software 

systems engineers who can manage contracts where the vendor is 

writing the code, but they understand the necessary hard points to 

make sure that it is done right and that it fits into the open environment we are trying to develop. 

So we are not bringing back the same skill set that we 

outsourced, and we are bringing it back in a lesser quantity, and 

we will still be dependent upon industry to do the code writing and 

the things that are more dynamic while we maintain an ability to 

understand what we are asking for and an understanding of what 

they are delivering. So that is the balance we are trying to achieve, 

but we have a ways to go. 

Dr. NIELSEN. Sir, I think you have really no alternative but to 

have people in the government who are educated at some level. 

They perhaps do not have to be the design engineers, but they have 

to have engineering awareness if they are making complex decisions. If they are managing programs that have engineering challenges in them, they have to know enough to know if what they 

are being told is right to make good decisions. 

Another thing that is very important in this regard is that you 

cannot just rest on a person’s education, you know, when they finish school in 1981 or in 1985 or whatever. This is an area that is 

expanding so fast that you have to have continuous education in 

this, so the government has to continue to send these people to 

short courses, long courses, whatever it is, to maintain their currency in this regard. 

Dr. KERBER. Maybe I will make a couple of comments. 
18 

One is, I think you clearly need the leadership in the Department who understands the problem, who has actually done it well, 

and who can provide oversight and guidance and understand when 

things are in trouble and how to start and manage programs. So 

you certainly need that within the Department. 

If you talk about, as was mentioned, creating code or creating 

even new ideas, I think you are really going to have to rely on the 

private sector for that because that is where that really comes in. 

I just think back to my many cases of managing technical people. 

If you have a large cadre of technical people in-house, they become 

very defensive of what they have designed and have developed. 

That is called the NIH problem, not invented here, and they are 

very resistant to ideas that come from outside. And so you need a 

capability to reach out, because if you do not reach out, you will 

never keep up with the private sector. So I would say there is a 

danger of having too much development inside that would actually 

thwart your ability to keep current on the outside. 

Dr. NIELSEN. That is true. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

We have had testimony in prior meetings in defense acquisition 

whereby the issue about requirement changes would come up, and 

it might be that, you know, somebody just felt that they had a better way of doing it or that there was an analysis of current threat 

conditions and they had changed or something was left out, but 

that requirement changes were out of control, and that they were 

driving costs, and you know, that we needed to just kind of close 

the door at some point and say, this system is good enough. Let’s 

just go forward. 

On the IT side of that, is that just more straightforward in terms 

of the changing requirements for IT versus the hardware weapons 

acquisition process, itself? 

Dr. KERBER. Maybe I will comment. A couple things. 

One is I do know that our attention was brought to the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA) and them bringing in a new logistics system. The person in charge of that, I cannot remember his name. 

But anyway, he basically froze the requirements, brought in a system, and then opened it up for improvement. We would argue that 

the smart way to do that is at some point freeze requirements— 

I do not even like the word—freeze capabilities, introduce the system, make a list, then do a spiral development or block upgrade 

and have that planned from the get-go. Then you have an orderly 

way of bringing in new ideas. And you cannot continually just dribble them in. You have got to bring them in, in blocks, and maybe 

in the 12 or 18 month sequence, you bring in the new ideas you 

have. It is a very orderly way to do it. You can train your workforce. You can deliver the systems capability much quicker, and it 

is always essentially current. 

Mr. HARP. Where that is a challenge is when you freeze the system for too long a period of time. You start running into Moore’s 

Law. You start running into people that are saying, I cannot wait 

for this; I have got to do it now to get my job done, and they work 

around you. That is where some of that requirements churn comes 

in. 
19 

So I agree. You need to freeze it at some point, but you do not 

want to freeze it for a period of time so, when you deliver it, it is 

obsolete and you have got a huge cost to fix it and to implement 

it. So there is a balance there. 

Again, it argues back to the DSB model that says, have shorter, 

smaller programs, and deliver things in modules rather than freezing an entire capability until you get the entire capability built, 

right? So, for each module, you might freeze that capability until 

you build it in the short period of time. That has more chance of 

success than freezing the entire capability until you deliver the entire system. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cooper is recognized. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

I am worried that you IT guys basically are at the frontlines of 

a cyber war that is already happening, whether declared or 

undeclared. You get some attention but not that much. This is a 

war that is hard for people to comprehend because it is regardless 

of national boundaries or timetables or nationality or anything like 

that. So, with all the bureaucratic gobbledygook that we hear in 

these reports, there tends to be a certain lack of urgency and 

awareness. There also seems to be no more difference between capability and vulnerability because any system is attackable. 

Dr. Nielsen mentioned, wouldn’t it be nice to have diverse cultures? You know, we are so wedded to chips made primarily in 

mainland China that are so almost infinitely complex, that you add 

an infinitely complex software overlay of it with a couple hundred 

million lines of code, who knows? And are we hiring the best students from the best schools? You know, Mr. Conaway’s question. 

This is an area that should be focusing more national attention. 

So I am grateful for your all’s expertise, but even in your testimony, I feel a certain lack of urgency. I appreciate Dr. Kerber’s recent reports, excellent work for the Defense Science Board, but I 

have this nagging feeling that our defense establishment is not getting the best that the private sector has to offer and that we are 

having difficulty recruiting the best to join the government service. 

I know there are a lot of wonderful people who have been patriotic enough to join and to survive the 9- to 12-month delay in hiring and all the bureaucratic rules, but I think we should be working as strenuously as possible to make it much easier for the best 

to come work for Uncle Sam and to stay working for Uncle Sam 

and to achieve things that leave Google and Microsoft and all these 

other high companies awestruck. 

Yet I get the sense that we are more awestruck by them than 

they are by us. I know their compensation packages can be larger 

than we can imagine and things like that, but there has got to be 

a way so that we feel the urgency of this struggle because, when 

the Pentagon is hacked 35,000 times a day, when there is an allegation that someone has already stolen F–22 code, and various government departments were hacked just two or three days ago, you 

know, we are dangerously somnolent about this. 
20 

When I have talked to our defense friends and have asked them 

what kind of computers they have at home, it is never the system 

that is in the office. Never. I am not knowledgeable to know which 

one is better, but it is getting pretty scary here. 

So I hope you gentlemen bring to your jobs a sense of urgency, 

and if these are truly SECDEF-level issues that are beyond, you 

know, under secretaries or assistant secretaries or anything like 

that, well, let’s make sure the SECDEF is paying attention. 

I think Gates, overall, is doing a great job, but for issues of this 

importance, it should not be, you know, a few sleepy folks at eight 

o’clock in the morning who are talking jargon that most people cannot understand. This is as important as Iraq or Afghanistan or 

anything because this is everything. This is every weapons system. 

This is the security of every American. This is the security of our 

banking system and tons of things so that these are no longer technical issues. These are life and death survival issues that, unfortunately, due to the science involved or the math or the technicalities, a lot of folks just are not getting. 

So maybe to the extent you could help us translate these issues 

into plain, everyday English, it would be good because people have 

to enlarge their imaginations to be able to cope with the challenges 

they are facing. Right now, this is far more difficult for them to 

think of than biological warfare or things like that that are also exotic, but at least people have a sense of disease. They are less 

aware of viruses, computer viruses. 

So this is more of a statement than a question, but I appreciate 

your all’s expertise. Really, challenge this committee. Challenge 

your superiors to be the best that they can be. 

That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I congratulate the gentleman for using the word 

somnolent, which is the first time it has been used in the committee’s proceedings. I am very impressed by that. 

Mr. COOPER. It is not a New Jersey word. 

Mr. ANDREWS. No, it is not. You can’t use a lot of New Jersey 

words here in this sort of place. 

With the indulgence of my colleagues and the panel, we would 

like to offer people a second round of questioning. I am going to 

take that option myself. 

The disturbing news is evident. And as I said at the outset, that 

53 percent of the IT projects are late and over budget. Typical cost 

growth exceeds the target budget by 89 percent. This is at a time 

when our reliance upon software and IT work is growing in importance. An interesting chart, I believe it is from DSB task force. The 

F–4, 8 percent of its functions were performed by software in 1960. 

By 1970, the F–111 had 20 percent of its functions performed by 

software. By 1982, the F–16 had 45 percent of its functions performed by software. Then you get to 2000, the F–22, 80 percent. 

And I am sure that number is growing. 

So the importance of this is growing, but the problem is worsening. I want to focus for a minute on the success stories. And I 

guess I would ask you which entities, if any, within the DOD world 

have different results? Which entities have proven to be successful 

models at the acquisition of IT products? Are there some corners 

of our system right now that are working well or at least better 
21 

than these data? If so, who are they? Where are they? And what 

have they gotten right that the rest of the system hasn’t? 

Dr. KERBER. I will just comment, Mr. Harp mentioned the submarine program, which is designed to be changed out with COT 

systems in an orderly way. And as we looked at it, it was one of 

the top managed programs in IT in the Department. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, Dr. Kerber, to what do you ascribe the relative success of that program? I think I know, but I would like to 

hear you answer the question. 

Dr. KERBER. Well, they do have strong leaders, and the leaders 

come up through a program in the Navy that is—trains them basically. But also they have designed the whole system and process 

around the concept that they need to refresh it periodically. And 

so they can do that in an orderly way by the way they set the capabilities that they need, how they acquire them, et cetera. So the 

whole program is structured for success basically. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know offhand the data that would compare, the data I just used about how they matched up with respect 

to time and budget in the submarine program? 

Dr. KERBER. I don’t, but I know they were doing a good job. I 

don’t know the numbers. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I think what we will do is ask the staff to just 

supplement the record. That was kind of a pop quiz. I wouldn’t expect you to know it. 

Dr. KERBER. I don’t work for the Department incidentally. 

Mr. ANDREWS. One of the things we want to do in this panel is 

to look at problem areas without question, but also look at some 

success areas and try to learn from those best practices. 

One of the statements, I am not sure which, said it is very important not to use problems as a stick to beat people over the head 

with. I am not sure whose testimony that was in, but I appreciate 

that. I said at the outset, I don’t think we have a lot of incompetent, ill-intentioned people creating these problems. I think the 

opposite is true. We have a lot of really dedicated, competent people who are working within a system that is just not serving them 

very well. So we want to find the instances where there has been 

success and learn from those instances and try to replicate them. 

Would either of the other two witnesses want to answer that 

question. 

Mr. HARP. We have had some success. We are kind of in what 

I call an interim ugly period right now. Because we are going from 

these large systems that evolved using proprietary software, millions of lines of code; we are trying to evolve to a system that is 

more of a layered process, as service oriented architecture (SOA) or 

cloud computing or some of these new concepts. And as we progress 

into those new realms, it gives us much more ability to control the 

dynamics of the IT world. Where if you are in a proprietary environment, it is very difficult to do that. 

One of the agencies that is out in front in that area right now 

that is making some progress is the National Security Agency 

(NSA). They have a couple of programs that are not—I don’t want 

to say they are—I don’t want to hold them up as saying complete, 

but they are making progress in the right direction here. And they 

are a little bit out in front on that. So I would hold them up as 
22 

a good example. They turned around their process in the last few 

years and have made some good strides. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Nielsen, do you have any—— 

Dr. NIELSEN. Sure. Sure. This is an area that teaches a lot of 

people humility, and as Churchill once said, we have a lot to be 

humble about in this business. 

Mr. ANDREWS. We in the Congress fully understand that. 

Dr. NIELSEN. But there are some success stories out there. They 

are too isolated. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has done 

some wonderful work, especially on reengineering software on some 

of the maintenance software that they build for systems that are 

already in existence. 

Warner Robins in the Air Force has done a really wonderful job 

on elevating their software game and doing pretty well on some of 

the software that they provide. 

The Army has had a really interesting story over the last five or 

six years where they have crafted an education program for all 

their senior leaders, acquisition leaders, to be more aware of software engineering principles, architecture and such. And we are 

seeing some effect of that as it—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that done through the War College? 

Dr. NIELSEN. It is done some through DAU, the Defense Acquisition University, and some through an Army-specific program. And 

the people at Army Redstone in Huntsville have particularly benefited from that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I know Chairman Skelton has an acute interest 

in military education. He will be interested in that. 

Dr. NIELSEN. And then there are some in the intel community, 

too, that is a little harder to talk about. But there have been some 

successes in the intel community as well. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Very good. We are going to look more closely at 

those examples, because, again, we want to identify places where 

people are making progress and try to replicate those models. 

Mr. Conaway, did you have follow-up questions? 

Mr. CONAWAY. One other question, real quick question, is in line 

with the successes. But does DOD have an enterprise-wide set of 

metrics that says, here is what success would look like in the IT 

world? And then, do they actually systematically and comprehensively collect data over time to measure various systems against 

those metrics to say—in fact, flush out who the good guys—who are 

having successes and who have been humbled is a better way to 

put it? 

Mr. HARP. The metrics that we have been using have been the 

financial metrics and the acquisition process metrics. And the 

whole purpose of this study in committee is that we found they 

don’t work very well in measuring IT success. Because of the churn 

in the technology, if you say I want to have an acquisition baseline 

and, five years later, I am going to deliver something, five years 

later you can deliver something that the warfighter thinks is great 

but is totally broken from an acquisition perspective because it was 

successful. 

We have built systems for a small group, and it worked so well 

in other groups that say, hey, I want that, too. And pretty soon the 

system that was intended for 10 people is now being used by 1,000, 
23 

right? So the cost went up tenfold, and it generates a statistic like 

we are mentioning here that you add cost growth, but in fact, it 

was a successful system because it expanded beyond what they 

imagined it would do. 

So I don’t think we have a good set of metrics, and that is part 

of what we are trying to develop here as part of this effort. And 

I guess I will just leave it at that. I think that the financial metrics 

and I think the milestone metrics for a fixed big program are the 

wrong metrics. I know we have been successful—you will see a correlation between the successful programs that we find and mention 

and size. Smaller programs are more successful. If we are delivering—we can compete with industry delivering programs of 75,000 

lines of code or less. When you start getting up into the million 

lines of code, even industry can’t deliver them on time and schedule. And so that kind of suggests that this whole direction that we 

are going with the small modular approach may lend itself to more 

successes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Anybody else? 

Dr. NIELSEN. Yes, sir. 

Sir, I am a strong proponent of earned value management. The 

DOD uses that, but sometimes not to the level of fidelity that they 

need early in a program. We found that if you do this where you 

really get credit—you plan what your work is going to be, you 

budget what your work is going to be and then you measure 

against how that is being done, you have to do that at a fine 

enough level of detail to get an early indication of whether you are 

successful. It is not good enough to find out five years into a program, because then you are really in trouble. We have had some 

successes with that in the military. 

The Navy program has done that somewhat. NAVAIR has done 

that. But in addition, we have worked with some of the commercial 

companies and had great success with this. The one we are most 

proud of I think is some of the work we have done with Intuit, that 

of course works on Turbo Tax and Quicken and some of those products that follow some of these principles and has seen a remarkable 

improvement in their productivity and in their ability to meet their 

schedules, which obviously for tax software was very important. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Ellsworth, any follow-up? I am sure you are 

going to say that the good example is these Boilermakers. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I was just going to say that, now that Mr. Cooper is gone, I think what he was really trying to say, and being 

from Tennessee he will understand, that everybody wants to shoot 

the rabbit, but nobody wants to skin it, is an old saying. And that 

makes it much more simple for me being from Indiana. 

I guess my question then is, who do we need to skin the rabbit? 

Like you said, is it the SECDEF? Is it you, Mr. Harp? Is it us? Is 

it all of us together? Are we moving in the right direction? I keep 

hearing we need to, we need to, we need to. And like Dr. Kerber 

said, all the studies—who needs to be skinning the rabbit, and how 

do we implement that? Let’s move forward. That is what this panel 

is convened to do, is kick this ball down the court in the right direction. So help us implement what we need to be doing. 
24 

Dr. NIELSEN. I think it is a combined responsibility. And the 

DSB is right on about the importance at the very senior leadership 

levels how important this is. And even that at some points the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics isn’t high enough; that it requires everybody to be in this. 

But I also believe that a lot of acquisition is done at the contact 

point. And so you need smart program managers, smart system engineers kind of working on this as well. I mentioned in my statement, this requires the whole community to do this. And everybody 

has to feel responsible. 

Mr. ELLSWORTH. If there are specific things that you all see 

about that, the hiring of folks—and I know that taking the nine 

months versus three, whatever it is that you can see to put a bug 

in our ear of people we can get to, we would be glad to take that 

on and try to speed that up to do exactly these things you are saying that we need to do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield back. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman, any follow-up. 

Mr. COFFMAN. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would like to thank the witnesses, as I 

said, for a very thorough, well thought-out testimony this morning. 

We are going to be calling upon you again as the committee proceeds. Our intention is to explore these areas for the balance of 

2009 and then convene early in 2010 and identify the best practices 

and recommendations that we will make in the form of legislative 

recommendations for the fiscal year 2011 authorization bill. So that 

is the timetable we are on. 

I think this morning was both confirmatory, and it opened up 

some new areas of inquiry for us that certainly confirm, Dr. 

Kerber, our sense that the quality of the people, the human leadership is the pivotal point. I just think that can’t be said enough. 

Dr. Nielsen, I think that you identified and confirmed a point 

that we understand, that the acquisition process for IT is just very 

different than it is for lots of other things, and we can’t superimpose that same orthodox model. 

And then, Mr. Harp, the reason the committee supported the language for these pilots is we want you to be innovative and creative, 

and we are encouraged that you are going to do that. 

What I found interesting and somewhat groundbreaking this 

morning was some of the testimony about the successes that we 

have had. We do want to learn more about that because we think 

that there can be successes that need to be highlighted and learned 

from so that we can find the best practices that these better leaders are implementing and replicating it and do more of it. 

Again, we would welcome comments from the witnesses as we 

proceed in this process. It is our goal not to write a whole bunch 

of new rules, but to produce some legislative recommendations that 

would help fix this problem. 

And I would like to thank our colleagues for their time and attention this morning and invite the witnesses to continue to correspond with the panel. 

And with that, I declare the hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:12 a.m., the panel was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 9, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 9, 2009 

(433) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS 

Mr. ANDREWS. What incentives does the DoD have to attract and retain quality 

skilled IT personnel? How do those incentives compare with the private sector? 

Mr. HARP. The DoD must compete with the rest of the Federal Government and 

the private sector for highly skilled talent with the necessary business, technology 

and acquisition competencies. Many of the skills that DoD has defined as ‘‘mission 

critical’’ mirror those defined by the private sector. Generally, and not surprising, 

some of the most highly sought after skills are those that involve information technology/data architecture and information/Cyber Security (IA). Additionally, knowledge of government practices and DoD regulations, and possession of required security clearances, are lucrative commodities. 

The DoD has limited incentives targeted to IT personnel, which are described 

below. Those it does have often provide only a partial solution. The DoD CIO, the 

newly appointed IT Functional Community Manager for the DoD civilian IT community, has been working to create a comprehensive strategy that can be used universally to support the management of defense IT occupations. The DoD also has the 

opportunity to use federal-wide authorities such as recruiting, retention, and relocation bonuses and the student loan repayment program. The challenge is the ability 

to deploy these tools in a strategic manner for maximum benefit. Unlike the military community where recruiting and retention programs are funded and managed 

centrally, or DoD’s centrally funded Defense Acquisition Workforce Development 

Fund, almost no DoD IT civilian workforce incentives are managed or funded centrally. 

Scholarships 

Information Assurance Scholarship Program (IASP). In 2001, with Congressional support, the DoD CIO established the IASP, a cooperative venture with numerous educational institutions to award scholarships to undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 

Education. The IASP enables DoD to recruit top students majoring in various disciplines to fill critical IT/Cyber Security (IA) billets and create a continuous pool of 

skilled IT professionals to meet current and future work requirements. Current 

IASP issues: 

• Funding levels resulted in only 50% of Components’ requested quotas for the 

2009–2010 academic years being filled. 

• Lack of a specific hiring authority associated with the IASP has created unintended inefficiencies and inequities such as limiting the applicant pool to students who can complete internships, limiting the appointment term of the graduates, or causing individuals to have to compete for hiring to fulfill their service 

payback. Creating a simplified and easily understood hiring authority for IASP 

students would greatly smooth the transition of these students to DoD. DoD 

supports draft IASP direct hire authority legislation contained in H.R. 2647, 

sec. 1103 which would resolve this issue. 

Direct Hire Authority. 

Whenever the IT job market demand increases for new skill sets or additional personnel, it is difficult for most DoD Components to respond quickly as the private 

sector. Most are not adequately funded to provide recruitment and retention incentives, and as a further complication, Components must comply with the long, onerous recruiting process. DoD (and the rest of the Federal Government) has limited 

direct hire authority for IT personnel which is targeted solely to ‘‘select’’ information 

security individuals as described below. To be effective, this authority must be 

granted to address all the IT occupations that support the critical missions of DoD. 

Information Assurance (IA) Direct Hire. This authority is limited to those individuals performing managerial information security functions in grades GS–9 and 

above within the 2210 series. Those individuals comprise a small number of DoD’s 

full-time civilian Cyber Security (IA) workforce. Not covered under this authority 

are key individuals performing technical IA functions including systems administra-
434 

tors and network services providers or individuals performing Cyber Security (IA) 

functions in other occupation series. 

The DoD CIO supports the availability of a comprehensive, expedited IT hiring 

authority such as that afforded to the Acquisition Workforce in the FY09 National 

Defense Authorization Act, which modified Section 1705 of title 10, United States 

Code. Such an authority, judiciously implemented through consultation and direction from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, would enable DoD to move more quickly to address challenges such as standing up its new 

Cyber Command, finding replacement personnel for individuals in IT-intensive commands who will not relocate in conjunction with BRAC, addressing insourcing initiatives, or responding to other Component-level hiring issues. 

Special Salary Rates. 

At DoD, three IT occupations currently have special salary rates for individuals 

in the general schedule who are not in pay banded salary programs: IT Specialists, 

Computer Scientists and Computer Engineers. Although the Special Salary Rates 

(SSR) were originally designed to be greater than locality pay rates, annual increases to the locality pay tables have outstripped increases to the SSR in many locations, causing significant erosion and even discontinuation of IT SSR for many individuals, both within DoD and across the Federal Government. For example, a GS– 

9, Step 5, IT Management Specialist in Columbus, Ohio, received a $7,535 salary 

differential in 2002 due to SSR; that benefit has eroded to $6,210 in 2009. A GS– 

11, Step 5, in the Washington metropolitan area received $4,025 additional in special salary compensation in 2002. That benefit is gone in 2009 as a result of locality 

pay outstripping the IT SSR. 

Reinstatement of a stronger IT special salary rate would largely impact the GS– 

2210 series (GS–12 and below) as only 34 percent of DoD 2210 population was in 

a pay-banded compensation plan at the end of FY2008. Significantly smaller numbers of Computer Scientists and Computer Engineers would be impacted as more 

of these individuals are in pay banded and demonstration projects already established, providing more comparable salary rates with the private sector. The eroding 

IT SSR impacts some of DoD’s most critical IT workers, including systems administrators, applications software personnel, network services providers, and IT project 

managers, many of whom are also part of the Cyber Security (IA) workforce. 

Lifelong Learning. The rate of change in information technology requires robust 

professional development programs that provide continuous learning opportunities 

for DoD IT personnel. These include traditional education and training programs at 

DoD technical schoolhouses and academic institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Information Resources Management College at the National Defense University; tuition reimbursement programs; a commercially aligned certification program for the Cyber Security 

(IA) segment of the IT workforce; and a retention-focused facet of the Information 

Assurance Scholarship Program. At the Component level, several organizations have 

implemented internship programs to attract and develop younger talent to the IT 

workforce as part of their strategic human capital planning. The goal is to grow 

these programs to ensure that a continuous pool of skilled IT professionals is available to meet DoD’s diverse mission critical requirements. 

The biggest differences between DoD and the private sector is the emphasis that 

the private sector places on the need for pay differentials within the IT sector and 

their greater flexibility to offer necessary targeted incentives. For instance, while 

DoD and the IT private sector have offered comparable salary increases of 3.5% in 

the recent past, average salary increases for select IT positions in the private sector, 

such as Security Analysts (one of the harder IT jobs to fill) have been as high as 

7.7%. The average signing bonus for a private sector IT Manager is typically about 

$1,000 higher, however, few in DoD actually receive one. For example, only 55, or 

3% of new IT Specialists (which include Cyber Security (IA) personnel, IT project 

managers, enterprise architects and other critical roles), received a recruitment 

bonus in FY2007 and less than 70 IT Specialists were enrolled in DoD’s loan repayment program that year. Approximately 800 IT Specialists (3% of the 28,000 individuals in the 2210 occupational series) received a retention bonus. These low numbers in DoD are also reflective of the low usage of incentives in federal workforce 

at large. Many federal Chief Human Capital Officers, when surveyed, have cited 

lack of funding as hampering their ability to use incentive programs. 

Both DoD and the private sector value IT certification programs which have been 

shown to be particularly attractive to employees under age 35, a key demographic 

to fill behind retiring baby boomers. If DoD can gain momentum in certifying its 

Cyber Security (IA) workforce, this is a significant area where DoD may gain traction in attracting and retaining mission critical employees. Recognizing the impor-
435 

tance of this certification program to both individuals’ career development and to 

DoD mission readiness, the DoD CIO, in a May 2009 report to Congress on the DoD 

Civilian IT Workforce, recommended new legislation which would establish a Department-wide incentive program to encourage individuals to obtain key Cyber Security credentials. 

A strong training program and consistently applied incentives, properly resourced, 

would separate DoD from its civilian counterparts during this recession. In a recent 

Gartner IT salary survey, 31% of the population surveyed indicated IT training 

budgets were dropping; another 58% reported their budget would be stagnant. 

Gartner cautioned that failure to adequately staff and develop IT personnel during 

this economic downturn could result in significant organizational turnover and loss 

of critical IT talent as the economy improves. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What incentives does the DoD have to attract and retain quality 

skilled IT personnel? How do these incentives compare with the private sector? 

Dr. NIELSEN. I’m happy to answer this based on my experiences in the government and since leaving the government. I’d like to make it clear that I am not 

speaking for the Department of Defense. In addition, I left government service in 

2004 and I’m sure some personnel programs have changed since that time. 

The largest incentive DoD has to attract and retain quality skilled IT personnel 

is that the work DoD does is important to our country. During my time as the commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory (2000–2004), we recruited scientists 

and engineers at all levels—men and women just completing their bachelors’ degrees as well as senior, well-experienced, well-proven, professionals. Inevitably, they 

would mention a desire to serve their country as one of the key reasons, if not the 

primary reason, for why they joined our uniform or civilian workforce. 

Among the more senior men and women who joined us, they would also mention 

the ability to shape and lead research and acquisition programs that were important 

to them professionally. By working for the government, they thought they could 

have more control over the direction of key programs and therefore have more impact to the country and their profession. In general, these individuals were very conscientious and hard working with clear ideas for the strategic impact of their work. 

The government has been an especially good employer for scientific and technical 

men and women with respect to continuing education. The government supports the 

development of their IT personnel via short courses, attendance at professional conferences, and graduate education. These are all highly valued by IT personnel as 

well as all scientific and engineering professionals and lead to greater technical 

depth as well as technical and managerial breadth. This is true for both uniformed 

and civilian IT personnel. 

DoD professionals also often cite the strong sense of mission and camaraderie as 

a reason for their continued service and retention. Often people think this is only 

true of the uniformed members, but throughout most of my career in research and 

development, most of my colleagues and subordinates were civilian government 

workers. I can say unequivocally that these civil service workers felt the same commitment to mission, the same dedication to their colleagues, the same passion for 

service to their country. I believe this plays a large role in retention of talented men 

and women who could have higher salaries elsewhere. 

Having mentioned salaries, it is true, in general, that government salaries are not 

usually as high as industry salaries, especially for the top performers. Industry has 

more latitude on financial incentives—larger bonuses, stock and stock options—than 

the government has. In general, industry can advance top performers faster than 

the government can and this can be frustrating for a top performing government 

worker. 

This has been addressed to some extent in the various personnel demonstrations 

programs that have been authorized over the past 10–15 years. I am, of course, 

most familiar with the laboratory demonstration program implemented by the Air 

Force Research Laboratory in 1997. Instead of the well known civil service grades 

and steps, the civilian scientific and engineering workforce at AFRL was managed 

in four large groups with broad pay bands. Within broad guidance for overall salary 

growth, individuals were assessed annually on their contributions and their salary 

was adjusted based on the extent of their contributions. Under this system a new 

engineer who caught fire could receive substantial pay raises early in his or her career. Conversely, an individual who was not performing as expected might receive 

no raise at all, not even a cost of living adjustment—a clear sign that better performance was expected. 

One topic I addressed in my oral testimony that relates to recruitment was the 

difference in the way the government and industry can respond to an applicant for 

a job. During my AFRL days, we occasionally lost a great applicant to industry because we could not make a firm offer as fast as industry could. When you’re looking 
436 

for that first job or if you are an established IT professional who is looking for a 

career change, a quick and responsive offer might make the difference in which job 

you will accept. The government has improved its processes for making employment 

offers, but is usually not as quick and agile as industry is. 

Overall, I believe DoD has the tools in place to recruit, retain, and develop its 

IT and acquisition workforces. It is a large and complex organization with a unique 

and challenging mission for our country. The expectations of the men and women 

it seeks to recruit and retain continue to evolve and, consequently, it must continue 

to evolve its processes to compete in the marketplace. It can do this through a thorough analysis of its work force goals, benchmarking against other organizations that 

manage their people well, and an honest assessment of its existing processes. 

We ask our DoD IT and acquisition men and women to shoulder significant responsibilities and we need to reciprocate with the processes and infrastructure that 

support them. 

Mr. ANDREWS. One of your recommendations is ‘‘selecting an effective leadership 

team.’’ What are the critical skills or attributes needed by acquisition personnel 

overseeing IT programs? What questions should we be asking of leaders during the 

confirmation process to ensure we get the right people in key acquisition positions? 

Dr. KERBER. These responses do not necessarily reflect the position of the Department of Defense and in some cases do not reflect the position of the Defense Science 

Board. I have tried to clearly identify those positions which are my own. 

A. The Department should select individuals that have exhibited proven success 

in leading and managing IT programs and acquisition or product development. 

Although DoD possesses a pool of talented individuals it does not have a sufficient number to meet all of its needs. DoD compensates for this shortfall with 

short assignments and inadequate screening of individuals by sometimes 

equating certification with competence. Certification can not be used as the 

sole factor for assigning an individual as a Program Manager. In my view, the 

private sector is the best model for finding this talent. The private sector encourages clear accountability and can only survive by having individuals that 

can develop and utilize state of the art technology. These two factors make it 

easy for the private sector to identify successful Program Managers. The Government often lacks clear accountability, drags programs on for years and 

therefore identifying the successful Program Manager becomes much more difficult. 

B. In addition to the traditional political vetting process, appointments should be 

accompanied with references of former supervisors and peers just like they are 

in the private sector. These references should include the typical areas such 

as leadership ability, teamwork skills, specific relevant key accomplishments, 

limitations, etc. Without references, one does not know if the experience listed 

by any potential employee, government or private sector, was successful or not. 

Mr. ANDREWS. What incentives does the DoD have to attract and retain quality 

skilled IT personnel? How do those incentives compare with the private sector? 

Dr. KERBER. The Department has many interesting and challenging programs to 

attract and retain quality skilled IT individuals. Quite often the work itself is so 

unique that it is its own incentive and DoD should do a better job of emphasizing 

the unique nature of its work. The Interagency Personnel Agreement (IPA) and 

other special programs for individuals of special talent are available that either offer 

monetary incentives or mobility. Our studies have shown that these programs are 

underutilized. Consistently our studies have shown that the best performance is 

when individuals have a lot of accountability and authority like at DARPA, Special 

Operations Command (SOCOM) or other special programs with small select staff. 

I submitted 3 reports during my testimony. I would call your attention to a fourth 

DSB report ‘‘Management Oversight in Acquisition Organizations, March, 2005.’’ 

This report covers topics associated with ethics in acquisition and other personnel 

issues. To acquire individuals with experience from the private sector, one by necessity needs to consider individuals that work in the industry that supplies the Department. While we all are concerned about improper behavior, corruption and revolving door issues, the private sector effectively manages these issues as people 

change companies sometimes moving from suppliers to procurers and from one competitor to the other. The Congress needs to remove onerous requirements placed on 

individuals moving from the private sector to government while keeping in place 

processes that prohibit one from making any decision that could impact their personal wealth or that of relatives and former colleagues. There is a large reservoir 

of recently retired, experienced and successful talent that is underutilized in the 

country. 
437 

When one compares the incentives for government service versus the private sector, for all but political appointees, job security is a big incentive. It is also a negative for the government since poor performers are hard and often impossible to remove. The positive incentives for individuals in the private sector are: 1) The customer can be clearly identified. 2) Decision authority is clearer and decisions are 

made relatively quickly and decisively. 3) Accountability is clearer. 4) Financial rewards are more closely tied to performance. 4) Incentives are clear. 5) Career planning is more interactive with the employer. Personal freedoms are encouraged and 

supported. 

Æ