Strategy Research Project

AN INTEGRATED RARE EARTH 

ELEMENTS SUPPLY CHAIN 

STRATEGY

BY

COLONEL KARL BOPP

United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.

Distribution is Unlimited. 

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the 

requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. 

The views expressed in this student academic research 

paper are those of the author and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of the Department of the 

Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 

USAWC CLASS OF 2011
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association 

of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on 

Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the 

Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the 

data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing 

this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-

4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently 

valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

24-02-2011

2. REPORT TYPE

Strategy Research Project

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

An Integrated Rare Earth Elements Supply Chain Strategy

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

COL Karl Bopp

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Professor Bernard F. Griffard

Center for Strategic Leadership

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT 

 NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

U.S. Army War College

122 Forbes Avenue

122 Forbes Avenue

Carlisle, PA 17013

122 Forbes Avenue

Carlisle, PA 17013 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 

 NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution A: Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

Rare earth element (REE) materials—rare earth ores, oxides, metals, alloys, semi-finished rare earth 

products, and components containing REEs are used in a variety of commercial and military applications, 

such as cell phones, computer hard drives, and Department of Defense (DoD) precision-guided 

munitions. Today, most rare earth materials processing is performed in China, giving it a dominant 

position that could affect worldwide supply and prices. A disruption or manipulation of the rare earth 

elements supply chain will negatively impact DoD’s National Security mission. To mitigate this 

vulnerability, DoD needs an integrated rare earth elements supply chain strategy that addresses the 

vulnerabilities and competing interests in such an integrated supply chain strategy.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Rare Earth Elements, Rare Earth, REE

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 

OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER 

OF PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT

UNCLASSIFED

b. ABSTRACT

UNCLASSIFED

c. THIS PAGE

UNCLASSIFED UNLIMITED 32

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area 

code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN INTEGRATED RARE EARTH ELEMENTS SUPPLY CHAIN STRATEGY

by

Colonel Karl Bopp

United States Army

Professor Bernard F. Griffard

Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic 

Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on 

Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 

Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher 

Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of 

Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. 

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author 

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL Karl Bopp 

TITLE: An Integrated Rare Earth Elements Supply Chain Strategy

DATE: 24 February 2011 WORD COUNT: 5,709 PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Rare Earth Elements, Rare Earth, REE

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Rare earth element (REE) materials—rare earth ores, oxides, metals, alloys, 

semi-finished rare earth products, and components containing REEs are used in a 

variety of commercial and military applications, such as cell phones, computer hard 

drives, and Department of Defense (DoD) precision-guided munitions. Today, most 

rare earth materials processing is performed in China, giving it a dominant position that 

could affect worldwide supply and prices. A disruption or manipulation of the rare earth 

elements supply chain will negatively impact DoD‘s National Security mission. To 

mitigate this vulnerability, DoD needs an integrated rare earth elements supply chain 

strategy that addresses the vulnerabilities and competing interests in such an integrated 

supply chain strategy.

AN INTEGRATED RARE EARTH ELEMENTS SUPPLY CHAIN 

STRATEGY

Disruption in the global supply of rare earths poses a significant concern 

for America‘s energy security and clean energy objectives, its future 

defense needs, and its long-term global competiveness. 

— Mark A. Smith CEO Molycorp Minerals

Testimony to House Science and Technology Committee, March 20101

Rare earth element (REE) materials — ores, oxides, metals, alloys, semi-finished 

products and components containing REEs are used in a variety of commercial and 

military applications, to include cell phones, computer hard drives, hybrid cars and 

Department of Defense (DoD) precision-guided munitions and aircraft. Most REE

processing is currently performed in China, giving it a dominant position that could affect 

worldwide supply and prices.2 The National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 directs

the Secretary of Defense to conduct an immediate review of DoD rare earth 

requirements and establish an ―assured source of supply‖ for rare earth material by 

2015.3

The criticality of REE based applications, coupled with China‘s dominance of the 

global supply chain, raises several strategic questions: Is DoD‘s National Security 

mission vulnerable to a disruption or manipulation of the global REE supply chain? 

What strategy could DoD employ to reduce the vulnerability of a supply chain disruption 

or manipulation? What other national interests must be considered when developing a 

strategy to mitigate a REE supply chain vulnerability? 

A disruption or manipulation of the global REE supply chain would negatively 

impact DoD‘s National Security mission. To mitigate this vulnerability, DoD should 
2

employ a strategy that promotes development of an integrated REE supply chain 

ensuring it‘s‘ industry and technology bases are sufficient, stable and cost efficient.

Such an initiative leverages public and private sector ingenuity to secure our supply 

chains and supports development of clean technology to enhance economic prosperity, 

as described in the 2010 National Security Strategy.4 It also supports the U.S. mineral 

policy goal of promoting an adequate, stable and reliable supply of materials for national 

security, economic well being and industrial production.5

Rare Earth Elements. 

Rare earth elements are 17 chemically similar metallic elements identified as 

atomic numbers 21, 39 and 57-71 on the periodic table. Rare earth elements are 

further classified as ―light‖ or ―heavy‖ based on their atomic weight. Elements with 

atomic numbers 57-63 are considered light while 39 and 64-71 are considered heavy. 

Rare earth elements must be separated from other minerals as they do not occur in 

their elemental state. 6

Rare Earth Element Applications. Rare earth elements are useful for a variety of 

applications as many possess unique mechanical, magnetic or spectral characteristics. 

Examples include: yttrium‘s extremely high affinity for oxygen makes it useful for many 

lighting applications to include computer displays, erbium‘s extremely narrow absorption 

band makes it useful for fiber optic and laser applications, and, samarium based 

magnets have the highest resistance to demagnization known.7 Table one highlights 

select applications by element. 

Rare earth element applications permeate industry however because rare earth 

material is usually far upstream in the supply chain, typically only industry experts 

understand their significance.8 The 2008 REEs end use percentages highlight their
3

diversity and criticality: metallurgical applications and alloys, 29%; electronics, 18%; 

phosphors for computer monitors, lighting, radar, televisions and X-ray film, 12%; 

chemical catalysts, 14%; automotive catalytic converters, 9%; glass polishing and 

ceramics, 6%; permanent magnets, 5%; petroleum catalysts 4%; other, 3%.

9

 

Element Atomic # Select applications and uses

Scandium 21 ceramics, lasers, phosphors

Yttrium 39 ceramics, computer displays, fluorescent lighting

Lanthanum 57 hydrogen batteries, catalysts

Cerium 58 glass polishers, ceramics, phosphors

Praseodymium 59 ceramics 

Neodymium 60 magnets, lasers, glass coloring

Promethium 61

Samarium 62 magnets, lasers, electric components

Europium 63 computer screens, fluorescent lights

Gadolinium 64 magnetic applications, phosphors

Terbium 65 phosphors, projection TV's

Dysprosium 66 magnets

Holmium 67 lasers, magnets

Erbium 68 lasers, fiber optics

Thulium 69 crystals, lasers

Ytterbium 70 fiber optics, lasers

Lutetium 71 x-ray phosphors

Table 1. Rare Earth Element Applications.10

Rare earth elements based applications are critical to many technically advanced 

U.S. military weapons and systems. Some examples include: samarium-cobalt magnet 

motors and actuators in multiple guided missiles; neodymium-iron boron magnets in 

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) smart bombs; neodymium-yttrium-aluminumgarnet lasers and range finders in multiple weapon systems to include the M1A1/2 main 

battle tanks; yttrium stabilized zirconia heat resistant coating applied on high 
4

performance aircraft to include the F15 and F16; rare earth based magnets in satellite 

wave guides; Terfonal-D, a REE alloy, in state of the art ship and submarine sonar;

cerium based polishers used for multiple military optics; yttrium based magnets in phase 

shifters, tuners and filters for the PATRIOT air defense missile system; and, gadolium, 

yttrium and samarium based components in electronic countermeasure equipment.11 

In addition, rare earths are essential for several green technologies to include: 

hybrid and electric car batteries (lanthanum), fluorescent phosphors (terbium) for energy 

efficient lights and magnet generators (samarium and neodymium) for new generation 

wind turbines.12 A critical component of next generation wind turbines is the rare earth 

based magnet generator, which is 70% more efficient and reliable than the current 

industry standard.13

China attributes much of the U.S‘s success in the first Gulf War to REE based 

technology and initiated significant R&D investment in the 1990s. Today, China has 

significantly more scientists and technicians conducting REE R&D than the United 

States. Cindy Hurst, a research analyst at the Fort Leavenworth Foreign Militaries 

Study Office, states ―Most press reports today express concern about the supply and 

demand of REEs and China‘s tightening supplies... Yet there is little mention made 

regarding China‘s research and development efforts, which probably deserve the most 

attention since research and development is the driving force behind China‘s 

success.‖14 

REE Alternatives. Alternatives to many rare earth applications are available, but 

in general provide reduced performance.15 Defense officials acknowledge REE based 

applications for military equipment would be difficult to replace.16 Development of 
5

alternative applications is a long term endeavor requiring sustained funding and 

commitment. A 2010 GAO report advises an alternative application could take up to 15 

years to develop.17 

Global Supply. Rare earth element bearing material is found globally and 

reserves are projected to meet expected demand thru the 21st century (table 2).

18

 

Chemical metallurgy expert, Dr. C.K. Gupta, defines REE reserves as ―the specific 

bodies of rare earth element bearing material of known location, quality and quantity,

from which the rare earth can be extracted presently.‖19 Specific reserves vary for each 

REE, and there are fewer reserves of the heavy elements.

20

 China has the most 

reserves and is the world‘s largest supplier of heavy and light REEs.

21

Reserves Mine Production

2008 2009

United States 13,000,000 0 0

Australia 5,400,000 0 0

Brazil 48,000 650 650

China 36,000,000 120,000 120,000

Commonwealth of Ind. States 19,000,000 NA NA

India 3,100,000 2,700 2,700

Malaysia 30,000 380 380

Other Countries 22,000,000 NA NA

World Total 99,000,000 124,000 124,000

Table 2. Global Rare Earth Reserves and Mine Production (metric tons).22

Many deposits contain several REE bearing minerals, making extraction complex 

and less cost effective. Reserves currently being exploited primarily come from 

deposits of a single REE bearing mineral such as bastnasite or monazite. Significant 

bastnasite deposits are located in Mountain Pass, California and Banyan Obo, China. 

Significant monazite deposits are located in South Africa, China and Australia.

23

 
6

Recycling REE material from scrap applications is not considered a significant 

source of supply.

24

 The U.S. does not possess the capability to reclaim rare earth 

based military or consumer applications.25

Global Demand. World-wide consumption of rare earth elements is currently 

134k metric tons and demand is projected to climb to 180k metric tons by 2012 due to 

projected growth in sectors using REEs.26 China, the world‘s largest REE material 

supplier, projects its‘ demand to outpace production by 2012. Projected sector growth 

includes green technology which is expected to increase as the U.S. seeks energy 

security through renewable sources.27 Dudley Kingsnorth, executive director of the 

Industrial Minerals Company of Australia foresees potential shortages of heavy REEs 

by 2015 due to increased green technology demand.

28

 Keith Bradsher of the New York 

Times stated in a December 2009 article the heavy rare earths dysprosium and terbium 

are already in short supply due to the increase of green technology applications.29 

Increased demand is also a function of the significant volume of rare earth 

material required for some green technology applications. As an example, production of 

a magnet generator for a new generation wind turbine requires up to two tons of 

neodymium. Mark Smith, the CEO for Molycorp Minerals, testified this quantify of 

material for a single application was previously unheard of in the REE industry where 

demand was typically measured in pounds or kilograms.30

The Rare Earth Element Supply Chain. 

The rare earth element processing supply chain consists of: (1) mining rare earth 

ore (2) separating the rare earth ore into oxides (3) refining the oxides into metals (4) 

forming the metals into alloys and (5) manufacturing the alloys into applications. While 
7

the U.S. exports some ores and alloys, China currently dominates all levels of the global 

supply chain.31 

Mining. China accounted for 97% of REE global mining production in 2009 while 

no REE mining was conducted in the U.S. (Table 2).32 As a result of Chinese 

production, enabled by low-cost labor and lax environmental regulation which 

depressed the global price; the last U.S. mine, located in Mountain Pass, California, 

closed in 2002.33 

Assessments to determine the economic feasibility of rare earth mining were 

conducted at various sites in the U.S., and Canada in 2009.34 Regardless of the 

outcome of these assessments, government officials estimate it could take seven or 

more years to bring a new domestic REE mine into production, based on a myriad of 

government regulations and the complexity of REE mining. Due to the diversity of REE 

bearing minerals, a unique processing sequence must be developed for every mine

based on the specific mineral at the site.

35

 

Mines that had previously produced REE material can restart operations much 

more quickly than new mines. Molycorp, the owner of the existing Mountain Pass mine, 

indicates this mine could resume full scale production by 2012.36 A monazite mine in 

Mont Weld, Australia began limited production in 2008 and plans to reach full production 

by the end of 2011. According to Stratfor Global Intelligence, these mines would 

account for 25—30% of global production, if both come into operation as projected.

37

Rare earth elements are seldom the sole product of a mining operation and often 

are a by-product of a mining effort for another mineral. As an example, REEs are a byproduct of the massive iron mine in Banyan Obo, China.38

 The USGS estimates up to 
8

90% of global REE production is either a co-product or by-product of a mining effort.39 

Mining is an expensive, capital intensive endeavor. Organizations considering 

developing a new mine with REE as the primary product would want security another 

depression in the global price would not eliminate their return on investment. 

Separating & Refining The separating and refining functions are complex 

processes due to the nature of REE bearing minerals. Refining REE bearing ore 

produces by-products which are heavily regulated in the U.S. and disposal must be 

addressed. As an example, refining monazite produces the radioactive element 

thorium.40 Since the U.S. ceased development of refining technology when the 

functions migrated to China, today, the refining function is considered China‘s strongest 

competitive advantage.41 Based on their ownership of the technical knowledge and 

infrastructure related to refining, experts expect China will retain the core of the REE 

industry for at least the next two to three years. 

Manufacturing. Down-stream rare earth processing functions require significant 

capital investment. Corporations require reliable sources of supply before they will

invest in downstream processing operations. Like separating and refining, advanced 

manufacturing technology is proprietary and much of this intellectual property is 

controlled by overseas companies. As an example, the technology patents a Japanese 

organization owns for manufacturing neodymium-boron magnets do not expire until 

2014.42 

China’s Supply Chain Strategy. China has the world‘s largest population and is 

interested in creating and protecting manufacturing and processing jobs. To achieve 

this goal, experts believe China is attempting to expand its‘ vertical integration of the 
9

global supply chains, to include REE.

43

 Unlike the U.S. strategy of competing for 

minerals on the global market, China‘s intent is to gain minerals it does not domestically 

produce through purchase of equity ownership of mineral deposits and mining 

companies.

44

China is incentivizing organizations to move their manufacturing functions, and 

associated intellectual property, to China in return for a guaranteed supply of REE 

material. According to industry expert Terrance Stewart, China‘s 2009-2015 draft 

mineral strategy is to macro-manage the rare earth industry, strengthen control of 

strategic resources and strictly control production. No new rare earth mining will be 

approved during this period in China.

45

 

Vulnerability to China

In 2009, rare earths were one of 19 non-fuel minerals for which the U.S. 

completely relied on imports to meet demand. According to the USGS, 91% of the REE 

material imported to the U.S. came from China.46 While reliance on imported material is 

not a useful measure of risk; overreliance on one nation does creates risk. As Dr. Kent

Butts, U.S. Army War College, states:

Minerals that are required to satisfy the needs of essential sectors of the 

economy may be referred to as critical. When such minerals are ―wholly 

or in a large measure imported‖, often through trade from non-secure 

overseas sources, and where the denial of access to these resources is 

possible to the benefit of an adversary, they may referred to as strategic. 

The degree of concern expressed for a given strategic mineral is governed 

by the number of alternative sources from which the resource may be 

obtained; the political and economic stability of the producing countries; 

and the relative self-sufficiency of adversarial nations in the given 

resource.47

The United States singular reliance on China for REE material, coupled with 

China‘s dominance of the supply chain, mark rare earths as a strategic mineral. While 
10

China is economically and politically stable, China‘s words and actions regarding REE‘s 

highlight the risk to U.S. security. 

China’s Information Message and Actions. The Chinese government has made 

bold statements regarding dominating the REE industry for almost 20 years and her 

actions during this period have supported these statements. In 1992 Deng Xiaoping 

famously stated, ―there is oil in the Mid-East, there is rare earth in China‖.48 China‘s 

current dominance of the global REE supply chain represents the culmination of a 

strategic goal described by President Jiang Zemin in 1999, ―improve the development 

and application of rare earth, and change the resource advantage into economic 

superiority.‖49 Having driven competition out of the global market, China is now using its 

market dominance to gain economic superiority through manipulation of global supply 

and price. 

China‘s actions over the last five years are particularly troubling. It limited the 

amount of rare earth material for commercial export since 2005 and most recently 

restricted 2010 export volume to 40% below 2009 volume. China also raised REE 

material export taxes by 15-25% in 2010.50 The Chinese Ministry of Information and 

Technology published a draft report in the Fall of 2009 calling for a ban on exports for 

several varieties of REE.51 Another report in the official China Daily newspaper 

predicted a 30% decline in export volume in 2011. An export minister denied the 

newspaper report, however recent statements and actions demonstrate the potential for 

further restrictions.52

In July 2010, China used this economic weapon as leverage in a maritime 

dispute when it interrupted export of REE material to Japan.

53 This action expanded
11

with a brief blockage of shipment of several REEs to the U.S. and Western Europe in 

October 2010. Keith Bradsher suggests this blockage may have been in retaliation to a 

U.S. investigation to determine whether China was violating World Trade Organization 

rules by limiting clean energy imports, while incentivizing clean energy exports.

54

 If 

accurate, this speculation supports the notion that China views WTO complaints as 

political / strategic challenges rather than as legal actions in the world commerce 

structure.55 

Supply Chain Disruption Impact. The Defense Contract Management Agency‘s

Industrial Analysis Center is preparing a report that will assess military use of rare earth 

materials and associated vulnerabilities based on a supply chain disruption.56 Until this 

report is published, the specific impact of a supply chain disruption to DoD‘s security 

mission is speculative. Previous government reports however imply a REE restriction 

would cause production delays. A modeling scenario in the National Defense Stockpile 

2005 Requirements Report recommended stockpiling yttrium.

57

 A 2008 National 

Defense Stockpile report advised several production delays of weapons systems were 

caused by lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium supply disruptions.

58 Perhaps 

the most clear warning is that according to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, REEs 

material have reached the level of industrial concern and supplier base concerns should 

be investigated.59

Long Time to Establish an Alternative Supply Chain. Some experts argue 

military uses are low enough that restriction of Chinese REE material will not be an 

issue, if Western mining operations come on-line.60 While this assessment may be 

valid, it also implies all levels of the REE supply chain have alternatives other than 
12

China. Mark Smith testified to a Congressional Subcommittee that if his California mine 

were to start production today, much of the ore would have to be shipped to China for 

processing.61 A 2010 GAO report advises the U.S. rare earth supply chain could take 

up to 15 years to rebuild based on the complexity of acquiring patents, making capital 

investments and developing new technology.62 

Increased Technology Cost. China has the ability to manipulate the global REE 

material price due to their dominance of the supply chain. Recent actions such as 

increasing export taxes and establishing export quotas for REE material increases

production costs in competing countries. Increased production costs will translate into 

higher costs for many products. The green technology sector is particularly vulnerable 

to cost increases based on projected growth and the large quantity of REE material 

required for applications such as magnet generators.

63

 China‘s supply chain dominance 

makes competition difficult. By artificially lowering prices, or disrupting supply, China 

has the ability to make REE processing unprofitable.64 

Policies, Strategies and Legislation Related to the REE Supply Chain

The vulnerability to the REE supply chain is a National issue that is being 

addressed by the interagency process and Congress. Broad policy goals are already 

established regarding strategic minerals and the industrial base. Several U.S. 

Government (USG) documents describe national interests and strategic objectives 

related to the REE issue. The DoD has statutory authority to address the REE supply 

chain vulnerability and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011

directs specific actions.

65

 Three bills are being considered by Congress that address 

the rare earth supply chain vulnerability.
13

US Mineral Policy. The U.S. mineral policy goal is to promote an adequate, 

stable and reliable supply of materials for national security, economic and industrial 

production.66 The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 states it is in U.S. national 

interest to foster a domestic mining industry.67 Policy options to achieve the mineral 

policy goal include: promoting conservation of the material, encouraging domestic 

mining by tax policies, funding research and development to develop technology 

requiring alternative sources, providing incentives to promote exploration in other 

countries, and stockpiling strategic materials.68

2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS directs the use of innovation 

and ingenuity to mitigate resource scarcity and secure our supply chains. The NSS 

further declares the U.S. ―has a window of opportunity to lead in the development of 

clean energy technology. If successful, the U.S. will lead in this new Industrial 

Revolution in clean energy that will be a major contributor to our economic prosperity‖.69 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). The 2010 QDR states U.S. security 

is tied to the health of the technology and industrial bases. The QDR further states DoD 

requires a strategy to shape the structure and capabilities of industry and must be 

prepared to intervene when absolutely necessary to create and / or sustain competition, 

innovation and essential industrial capabilities.70 

National Defense Strategy (NDS). The 2008 NDS highlights the fact that 

globalization and growing economic interdependence creates vulnerabilities and that 

Defense policy must account for these vulnerabilities. The NDS also highlights the USG 

strategy regarding relations with China is to provide incentives for constructive behavior 

while dissuading destabilizing actions.71
14

Defense Industrial Policy. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Industrial Policy (DASD- IP) manages industrial base issues for DoD. 

Industrial Policy works to sustain an environment that ensures the industrial base is 

reliable, cost-effective, and sufficient to meet DoD requirements.72 Because rare earth 

based or enhanced applications are typically far upstream, monitoring all their 

applications and sources of supply is difficult. If a vulnerability is identified, DASD-IP 

can recommend stockpiling material in the National Defense Stockpile (NDS) and / or 

the employment of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to spur industrial production.

73

The best option to mitigate the threat of a mineral import cut-off is the NDS, a 

collection of critical or strategic materials stockpiled and managed by the Defense 

Logistics Agency.

74

 The NDS is maintained in order to reduce the possibility of ―a 

dangerous and costly dependence by the U.S. upon foreign sources for supplies of 

such materials in times of national emergency.‖75 The recommendation to stockpile is 

coordinated thru the interagency process.76 Rare earth material could be acquired at 

various levels of the supply chain if the decision is made to stockpile.

The Defense Production Act provides DoD statutory authority to intervene 

domestically if required to support national security requirements. Title III of the Act 

allows the USG to provide financial incentives to create, modernize or expand industrial 

capacity. Financial incentives that could be applied include: purchase and installation of 

production equipment, establishment of a guaranteed market to expand or maintain 

production, loans or loan guarantees or, funding for development of substitutes. The 

DoD can also enter into a non-binding arrangement known as a Security of Supply with 

a foreign partner to provide reciprocal material support.

77

 Title I of the DPA also allows 
15

for prioritization of government contracts. While employment of this Act is a drastic 

measure, it was used extensively in support of the Global War on Terror.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 – H.R. 6523. Critical 

components of H.R. 6523 include direction for the Secretary of Defense to: conduct an 

immediate review of DoD rare earth requirements, establish an ―assured source of 

supply‖ of rare earth material by 2015 and, consider establishing a stockpile.78 H.R. 

6523 became public law January 7, 2011.79

Rare Earth and Critical Materials Revitalization Act of 2010 – H.R. 6160. Critical 

components of H.R. 6160 include direction for the Secretary of Energy to: expand 

research and development of REE technology, make loan guarantee commitments for 

the commercial application of new or significantly improved rare earth supply chain 

technology, and, work with private sector participants to make a complete REE

materials production capability in the U.S. within five years. H.R. 6160 was approved in 

the House and referred to the Senate September 29, 2010.80

Rare Earths Supply Technology and Resources Transformation Act of 2010 – S. 

3521. Critical components of S 3521 include: creation of a task force to expedite review 

and approval of permits related to development of a domestic REE capability, direction 

for the Secretary of Energy to issue guidance regarding obtaining REE industry federal 

loan guarantees, and, direction for the Secretary of Defense to report on past, current 

and future projects to support the domestic rare earth supply chain. Hearings were 

conducted on S. 3521 September 30, 2010.81

Rare Earths Supply-Chain Technology and Resources Transformation Act of 

2010 – H.R. 4866. Critical components of H.R. 4866 include: creation of an interagency 
16

working group to determine which rare earths are critical to national and economic 

security, direction for the Secretary of Defense to procure and stockpile critical rare 

earths, instruction for the U.S. Trade Representative to report to Congress on 

international trade practices in the rare earth market, and, direction for the Secretaries

of Defense and Energy to issue guidance related to obtaining loan guarantees, 

expressing the sense of Congress regarding appropriation of the Defense Production 

Act to develop the rare earth supply chain. Hearings were last conducted March 17, 

2010 on HR 4866.82 

Other Interests Impacting the REE Supply Chain

Environmental Interests. Environmental interests significantly influence the REE 

supply chain and present a problematic dichotomy. As highlighted, the desire to move 

to clean technology is a major factor driving the increase of global REE demand. This 

demand results in increased REE mining, separating and refining; which are all 

decidedly un-environmentally friendly processes. Mitigation measures often require 

improved procedures or technology.83 

Nineteen Federal Acts and regulations promulgate environmental legal 

requirements for mining operations. Compliance often requires added expense.84 As 

an example, Senate committee hearings were conducted in 2009 to consider the 

Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act S796. While not ratified, this Bill would have 

subjected production of relocateable minerals to a 2-5% royalty on the gross income 

from mining.

85

 Environmental laws and regulations are also established at the state 

level. China has begun enforcement of environmental laws which is expected to

contribute to reduced production.

86
17

Economic Interests. National security is built on economic well being. One of 

the leading concerns regarding the health of the U.S. economy is the size of the 

national debt, which has exploded to over $14.2 trillion.

87

 Many call for reducing federal 

spending to lessen the debt. Government willingness to fund development of a 

domestic rare earth supply chain and / or acquire a rare earth material stockpile is 

uncertain. Recent practice has been to generate income thru sales of stockpile assets 

vice acquiring more material.88

The U.S. and China‘s economies are closely intertwined and many agree it is in 

both countries interest for each to be economically healthy. China is the largest holder

of U.S. debt with approximately $1.7 trillion in holdings.

89 China is also one of the U.S‘s 

largest trading partners and the REE supply chain situation is one of many trade issues

between the nations. 

 The U.S. is the global leader in technology and innovation and is competing with 

China for high technology jobs.

90

 Development of a high technology rare earth 

processing chain could spur domestic job creation in the green technology and 

advanced manufacturing sectors. Protection of U.S. innovation and intellectual property 

is critical to meeting U.S. economic goals and is significant issue in U.S. – China 

economic relations, as highlighted by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton:

If the United States does not once again become the leading innovation 

nation, it‘s hard to know where we‘re going to find the jobs that we have to 

produce for people. And yet if we do it wrong, or we do it artificially as in 

some countries are in my view doing that will lead to protectionism. We 

had a very frank conversation led by Secretary Geithner, with our Chinese 

friends in Beijing. They see a very stark problem. They have tens of 

millions of people they‘re still trying to get out of absolute poverty, so they 

want to have an innovation agenda that would in effect capture company‘s 

intellectual property and require companies to operate inside China in a 

way that could undermine the long-term success of those companies. So 
18

we say no, that‘s not a good way to do it. But the debate about how to do 

this is going to be front and center of international economic dialogue.91

Recommendation

The DoD should employ an integrated supply chain strategy, supported by all

elements of National Power, to ensure the REE industrial base remains reliable, costeffective, and sufficient to meet National Security requirements. This strategy would be

aligned with leveraging of public and private sector ingenuity to secure our supply 

chains and would support development of clean technology to enhance economic 

prosperity.

Validate Requirements and Supply Chains. To develop an effective strategy to 

mitigate the supply chain risk, DASD-IP must understand: what military weapons and

systems contain REE applications, what supporting supply chains are vulnerable to a 

disruption, and, where in the supporting supply chain is the disruption most likely to 

occur. Prior to direction by Congress, DASD-IP proactively initiated development of a 

report to assess the REE supply chain vulnerabilities.

92

 The results of this report, 

coupled with the comprehensive review of DoD requirements mandated by the 2011 

National Defense Authorization Act, will serve as the basis for future actions.

Stockpile. Results of the DASD-IP assessment and investigation into supplier 

base concerns, will dictate whether DASD-IP recommends stockpiling REE material. If 

a supply chain vulnerability is identified to a critical weapon or system that could impact 

National Security, REE material should be stockpiled. Stockpiling offers a 

comparatively quick way to mitigate the REE supply chain vulnerability. Because there 

are significant REE reserves in the U.S. and other friendly nations, stockpiling does not 
19

have to be a long term endeavor. Once a more secure supply chain is developed, the 

stocks should be assessed for potential resale on the global economy. 

Japan is a major consumer of REE materials and her actions to confront a similar 

REE supply chain vulnerability are instructive. Japan anticipated a REE supply 

disruption and stockpiled material to mitigate production disruptions prior to the Chinese 

embargo.93 Japan is also now establishing sources in other countries, to include 

Australia and Vietnam, as well as conducting R&D for REEs substitutes.

94

Develop an Integrated Supply Chain. The source of China‘s economic power 

related to REE material comes from their complete dominance of the global supply 

chain. Diversifying and integrating the REE supply chain will reduce China‘s ability to 

restrict material flow and control the market price. 

Foster Domestic Processing. As described in the QDR, DASD-IP should shape 

the structure and capabilities of the domestic REE industry to develop an assured 

source of supply by 2015, as mandated by Congress. Incentivization should focus on 

specific supply chain vulnerabilities related to DoD applications, such as manufacturing 

of neodymium-boron magnets. The DoD should use Title III of the DPA to offer loan 

guarantees for capital and technology investment and guarantee procurement levels of 

critical applications to incentivize processing.

The DoD effort would complement a broader USG strategy, developed through 

the interagency process and Congress, of fostering a domestic REE supply chain. As 

David Sandalow, Department of Energy - Assistant Secretary for International Affairs 

stated regarding REEs, "reopening domestic production is an important part of a 

globalized supply chain."95 Critical components of this strategy are support for domestic 
20

REE mining and support for R&D of rare earth alternatives and processing technology. 

The three bills being considered by Congress provide useful measures to enable this 

strategy.

The USG should immediately incentivize domestic mining in order to stabilize the 

supply chain base and provide organizations security to invest in down-stream 

functions. This action would reverse current government practices as demonstrated by 

the DoE‘s denial of Molycorp‘s request for a guaranteed loan for capital equipment in 

2009. The DoE denied the request because mining was considered too far upstream in 

the supply chain.96 

The USG should spur R&D for processing technology and alternatives to 

developing an integrated, secure supply chain. Advanced processing techniques

enable industry to meet stringent environmental regulations and gain a competitive 

market advantage. Steve Duclos, the Director of G.E. Global Research, testified 

―Corporations will seek to develop alternative materials if they expect an economic 

advantage or if they foresee a supply constraint. The Federal Government can help by 

enabling public-private collaborations that provide both the materials understanding and 

the resources to attempt the higher risk approaches.‖97 

International Processing. The USG should promote supply chain integration with 

reliable partners such as Canada and Australia that does not conflict with efforts to 

foster a domestic supply chain. Integrating the supply chain will increase security by 

promoting international cooperation based on mutual interests. DoD should also 

establish Security of Supply agreements with foreign partners that possess required 

REE material to increase assurance of supply. 
21

Shaping the International Environment. 

All elements of National Power should be employed to shape the international 

environment for successful development of an integrated REE supply chain.

Diplomatic Power. Diplomats should work to strengthen ties with China in areas 

of mutual interest and strengthen relationships with other REE producing nations. By 

strengthening ties in areas of common interest, China may be less likely to act 

irresponsibly regarding REE material. Soft power should be applied to persuade other 

nations to resist China‘s attempts to establish bi-lateral relations to further vertical 

integration. 

Information Power. The U.S. information campaign towards China should 

consistently reinforce two messages: (1) our economies are mutually supporting with 

room for both to be successful, and, (2) China must behave responsibly in the 

international environment to be treated as a world leader. Information power can be 

employed against ―heavy handed‖ actions such as stealing intellectual property and 

placing an REE material embargo on Japan. Robert Suettinger, China specialist and 

former senior policy analyst at RAND, states, ―Public opinion is increasingly effective as 

a means of affecting Chinese behavior. That involves both international opinion –

shaming, exposing human rights abuses, calling into doubt Chinese sincerity, can be 

useful ways of improving compliance...‖98

Military Power. Retaining American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is 

critical to maintaining relationships that provide the foundation for economic security 

and progress. As an example, the U.S. relationship with Australia, who possesses large 

REE reserves, is enhanced by military cooperation. 
22

Economic Power. The United States must carefully employ economic power to 

meet China‘s REE material challenge. The U.S. should include the REE situation in 

broader economic discussions with China. Due to the size of the U.S. debt to China, 

trade actions and WTO protests have limited value. The U.S. can also incentivize REE 

production in countries other than China through tax policies. This action must be 

approached cautiously so it does not conflict with initiatives to foster a domestic supply 

chain.

Conclusion

 REE applications are critical to technically advanced U.S. military weapons and 

systems, and for several green technologies. China‘s dominance of the REE supply

chain and recent willingness to use REE material as an economic weapon create a 

clear and present vulnerability to National Security. To mitigate this risk, DoD should 

foster development of an integrated REE supply chain. This strategy, supported by all 

elements of national power, will ensure the REE industrial base is sufficient, reliable and

cost efficient to support DoD requirements. 

Endnotes

1 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ U.S. Congress, House Science and Technology 

Committee, Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight, Congressional Quarterly, March 16, 

2010, 4.

2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, Briefing for Congressional Committees (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, April 2010), 20.

3 Keith Bradsher, ―Pentagon Must  ̳Buy American,‘ Barring Chinese Solar Panels, The New 

York Times, January 10, 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/business/global/10solar.html (accessed January 15, 2011).

4 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May 

2010), 31.
23

5 Mark Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, Congressional 

Research Service, (Washington, DC, September 30, 2010), 1.

6 C.K. Gupta and N. Krishnamurthy, Extracative Metallurgy of Rare Earths (Boca Raton, FL: 

CRC Press, 2005) 1, 61, 59.

7 Gupta and Krishnamurthy, Extractive Metallurgy of Rare Earths, 21, 22, 32; Cindy A. 

Hurst, ―China‘s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly Issue 59 (4th Qtr 

2010), 123.

8 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ 4.

9 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 2010), 128.

10 Gupta and Krishnamurthy, Extractive Metallurgy of Rare Earths, 9-15, 30-32.

11 James B. Hedrick, U.S. Geological Survey, ―Rare Earths in Selected U.S. Defense 

Applications‖, 40th Forum on the Geology of Industrial Minerals, Bloomington, Indiana, May 2-7, 

2005.

12 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ 4; Gupta and Krishnamurthy, Extractive Metallurgy 

of Rare Earths, 30-32.

13 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ 4.

14 Hurst, ―China‘s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements,” 124, 125.

15 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010, 129.

16 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, Briefing for Congressional Committees, 27.

17 Ibid, 24.

18 Gupta and Krishnamurthy, Extractive Metallurgy of Rare Earths, 57.

19 Ibid, 69-70.

20 U.S. Geological Survey, The Principle Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States 

– A Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective, Scientific Investigations Report 

2010-5220 (Reston, Virginia: 2010) 10-11.

21 Ibid, 15.

22 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010, 129.

23 U.S. Geological Survey, The Principle Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States 

– A Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective, 7.

24

 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010, 128.
24

25 Rare Earths Supply, Technology and Resource Transformation Act of 2010 – S. 3521, 

Section 2. Findings. LexisNexis Congressional (accessed November 24, 2010).

26 Mark Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, 3.

27 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010, 129.

28 Robin Bromby, ―Caution, Rare Earths Ahead‖, April 26, 2010, linked from The Australian, 

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/caution-rare-earths-ahead (accessed 

December 3, 2010).

29 Keith Bradsher, ―Earth Friendly Elements; Mined Destructively‖ Dec 26, 2009, linked from 

The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/business/global/26rare.html 

(accessed January 7, 2011).

30 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ 4.

31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, 19.

32 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010, 129.

33 ―No.22 Rare Earth Elements: A Wrench in the Supply Chain?‖ Center for Strategic & 

International Studies, Current Issues (Washington, DC: Defense Industrial Initiatives Group, 

October 5, 2010).

34 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries - 2010, 129.

35 U.S. Geological Survey, The Principle Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States 

– A Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective, 21, 7.

36 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, 18.

37 STRATFOR Global Intelligence, ―Special Report: China and the Future of Rare Earth 

Elements,‖ (Oct 12, 2010): 3.

38 Gupta and Krishnamurthy, Extractive Metallurgy of Rare Earths, 94.

39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, 11.

40 U.S. Geological Survey, The Principle Rare Earth Elements Deposits of the United States 

– A Summary of Domestic Deposits and a Global Perspective, 7.

41 STRATFOR Global Intelligence, Special Report, ―China and the Future of Rare Earth 

Elements,‖ 4, 5.

42 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, Briefing to Congressional Committees, 24.
25

43 Terence P. Stewart Testimony, ―Rare Earth Materials,‖ U.S. Congress, House Science 

and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight, Congressional 

Quarterly, March 16, 2010; Mark Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,

9.

44 Kent H. Butts & Brent Bankus, ―China and Natural Resource Competition‖ in 

Understanding Africa: A Geographic Approach, (West Point, NY: United States Military 

Academy) 349.

45 Terence P. Stewart Testimony, ―Rare Earth Materials,‖ U.S. Congress, House Science 

and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight, Congressional

Quarterly, March 16, 2010.

46

 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries – 2010: 6, 128.

47

 Kenneth H. Butts, Strategic Minerals in the New World Order, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 11.

48 Jianjun Tu, ―An Economic Assessment of China‘s Rare Earth Policy,‖ The Jamestown 

Foundation, November 8, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/

?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37141&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=414&no_cache=1 (accessed 

November 12, 2010).

49 Hurst, ―China‘s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements,‖ 124; Tu, An Economic 

Assessment of China’s Rare Earth Policy, 2.

50 ―No.22: Rare Earth Elements: A Wrench in the Supply Chain?‖ October 5, 2010.

51

 NYTimes webpage, ―Canadian Firm Steps Up Search for Rare Earth Metals‖, September 

9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/business/global/10mineral.html (accessed January 

29, 2011).

52 Keith Bradsher, ―China Said to Widen its Embargo of Minerals‖, The New York Times, 

October 19, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/business/global/20rare.html (accessed 

January 13, 2011).

53 Paul Krugman, ―Rare and Foolish‖, The New York Times, October 1, 2010 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/opinion/18krugman.html7 (accessed 15 Jan 2011).

54 Keith Bradsher, ―China Said to Widen its Embargo of Minerals‖, The New York Times, 

October 19, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/business/global/20rare.html (accessed 

13 Jan 2011).

55 C. Fred Bergsten et al, China‘s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington DC: 

Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2008), 225.

56 Defense Contract Management Agency Industrial Analysis Center Study Plan, Rare 

Earths Materials (Lanthanoids) Assessment (2010).
26

57 Scott F. Romans, The Role of the National Defense Stockpile in the Supply of Strategic 

and Critical Materials, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, 9 May, 2009), 14.

58 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, Briefing to Congressional Committees, 31.

59 ―No.22 Rare Earth Elements: A Wrench in the Supply Chain?‖ October 5, 2010.

60 Hurst, ―China‘s Ace in the Hole: Rare Earth Elements,‖124. 

61 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ 5.

62 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply 

Chain, Briefing to Congressional Committees, 13.

63 STRATFOR Global Intelligence, ―Special Report: China and the Future of Rare Earth 

Elements,‖ 5-7.

64 Tu, ―An Economic Assessment of China’s Rare Earth Policy”, 2.

65 H.R. 6523, "Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011"

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr6523enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr6523enr.pdf (accessed January 15, 

2010) 28. 

66 Mark Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, 1.

67 Kathleen Clark, Policy Statement, Bureau of Land Management-Energy and Non-Energy 

Mineral Policy, April 21, 2006, http://www.nma.org/pdf/072606_blm.pdf (accessed January 15, 

2011).

68 Butts, Strategic Minerals in the New World Order, ix-xi.

69 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, 31, 30.

70 Robert M. Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington DC: 1000 Defense 

Pentagon, February 2010), xv, 81.

71 Robert M. Gates, National Defense Strategy (Washington DC: 1000 Defense Pentagon, 

June 2008), 4, 5, 11.

 

72 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense - Industrial Policy Home Page, 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/about.shtml (accessed January 15, 2011).

73 David A. Cammarota, Office of Secretary of Defense - Industrial Policy, interview by 

author, November 24, 2010. 

74 Butts, Strategic Minerals in the New World Order, xi.
27

75 Romans, The Role of the National Defense Stockpile in the Supply of Strategic and 

Critical Minerals, 1.

76 Cammarota, interview by author, November 24, 2010. 

77 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Industrial Policy Home Page, The Defense 

Production Act, January 20, 2010, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/about.shtml (accessed January 15, 

2011). 22, 28, 42, 37.

78 Keith Bradsher, ―Pentagon Must  ̳Buy American,‘ Barring Chinese Solar Panels‖, The 

New York Times, January 10, 2011, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/business/global/10solar.html (accessed January 15, 2011).

79 Library of Congress Home Page, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.6523: 

(accessed January 15, 2011).

80

 Rare Earths and Critical Materials Revitalization Act of 2010 - H.R. 6160, LexisNexis 

Congressional (accessed November 24, 2010).

81 Rare Earths Supply, Technology and Resource Transformation Act of 2010 – S. 3521, 

LexisNexis Congressional (accessed November 24, 2010).

82 Rare Earths Supply, Technology and Resource Transformation Act of 2010 – H.R. 4866, 

LexisNexis Congressional (accessed November 24, 2010).

83 Mark A. Smith, ―Rare Earth Minerals,‖ 6. ―No.22 Rare Earth Elements: A Wrench in the 

Supply Chain?‖ Center for Strategic & International Studies, Current Issues (Washington, DC: 

Defense Industrial Initiatives Group, October 5, 2010).

84

 National Mining Association, ―Mining and Environmental Stewardship‖, 

http://www.nma.org/pdf/fact_sheets/env.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).

85 S 796 Hardrock mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, Govtrack website, 

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-796 (accessed January 29, 2011).

86 Leslie Hook, ―China reins in rare earth exports,‖ Financial Times online, October 19, 

2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ae49b354-dba7-11df-a1df00144feabdc0.html#axzz1B9wjBnyE (accessed January 15, 2011).

87 U.S. Debt Clock.org website, January 15, 2011, http://www.usdebtclock.org/# (accessed 

January 15, 2011).

88 Romans, The Role of the National Defense Stockpile in the Supply of Strategic and 

Critical Materials, 6.

89 The Washington Times, March 2, 2010 ―China holds more U.S. debt than indicated,‖ 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/02/chinas-debt-to-us-treasury-more-thanindicated/ (accessed January 15, 2010).
28

90 BloombergBusinessWeek ―Why America Needs an Economic Strategy,‖ October 30, 

2008, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_45/b4107038217112.htm (accessed 

November 13, 2011).

91 Hillary R. Clinton, ―Remarks on the Obama Administration‘s National Security Strategy‖ 

May 27, 2010 http:/www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/05/142312.htm (accessed November 13, 

2010).

92 Cammarota, interview by author, November 24, 2010. 

93 Keith Bradsher, ―China Said to Resume Shipments of Rare Earth Materials‖, The 

NYTimes.com, October 28, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/business/energyenvironment/29rare.html (accessed January 29, 2011).

94

 Wall Street Journal digital network, ―Might the Prius one day get a digital heart?‖ 

September 4, 2009. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/09/04/might-the-prius-one-day-geta-chinese-heart/ (accessed January 15, 2011); STRATFOR Global Intelligence, ―Special 

Report: China and the Future of Rare Earth Elements,‖ 6. 

95 Guardian UK website, December 26, 2010, ―Rare Earths Metal Mine is Key to US Control 

Over High Tech Future‖, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/26/rare-earth-metalsus (accessed January 29, 2011).

96 Mark A. Smtih Testimony, ―Rare Earth Minerals and 21st Century Industry,‖ March 16, 

2010.

97 Steven J. Duclos, Chief Scientist and Manager, GE Global Research, ―Rare Earth 

Minerals‖ Testimony to U.S. Congress, House Science and Technology Committee, 

Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight, March 16, 2010, LexisNexis.com http://weblexisnexis.com/congcomp/document (accessed October 25, 2010).

98 Robert Suettinger ―U.S. China Policy: The Importance of Debate‖ in Economics & 

National Security: The Case of China, editors Kent H. Butts and Edward L. Hughes (Carlisle, 

PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, 2002) 392.