How SSAs

Disability Programs

Can Be Improved

Social Security Advisory Board

August 1998
FACTS ABOUT THE DISABILITY PROGRAMS

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE (DI) is an insurance program that

provides disability benefits based on previous employment covered by Social Security. It is financed

out of Social Security payroll taxes (.85 percent each for employees and employers). The cost of the

DI program for fiscal year 1998 is estimated at nearly $50 billion (out of a total of $372 billion for

all Social Security benefits).

To be eligible for DI benefits a worker must:

· have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or is expected

to last at least 12 months or result in death and that prevents him/her from performing any

substantial gainful activity (requirements differ for those disabled because of blindness);

· be fully insured, i.e., have at least one credit for work in employment covered by Social

Security for each year after age 21 and prior to the year he or she becomes disabled; and

· meet a recency of work test, which requires that workers age 31 or older (other than those

disabled by blindness) must have worked in covered employment at least 20 of the 40

calendar quarters ending with the quarter in which the disability began, and that younger

workers have proportionally less recent covered employment.

In 1998, Social Security Disability Insurance is expected to pay:

· benefits to 4.7 million disabled workers;

· family benefits to over 1.6 million spouses and children of disabled workers; and

· an average monthly benefit of $722 to disabled workers.

SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI) is a means-tested income assistance

program for aged, blind, and disabled individuals (regardless of prior workforce participation)

and is funded from general revenues of the Treasury. The SSI program is estimated to pay nearly

$24 billion in disability benefits in fiscal year 1998.

To be eligible for Federal SSI disability benefits an individual:

· must, if age 18 or older, meet the Social Security definition of disability, or, if under age 18,

have an impairment that results in marked or severe functional limitations;

· cannot have monthly countable income in excess of the current Federal benefit rate ($494

for individuals and $741 for a couple);

· cannot own real or personal property (including cash) in excess of a specified amount

($2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples); and

· must meet certain other requirements relating to citizenship, residence, and living

arrangements.

In 1998, Supplemental Security Income is expected to pay:

· benefits to over 4.2 million low income disabled adults and nearly 1 million disabled

children.

At the end of 1997, a total of 10.3 million individuals received either DI or SSI disability

benefits. Of these, 1.6 million received benefits under both programs.

Social Security Advisory Board

An independent, bipartisan Board created by Congress and appointed by the

President and the Congress to advise the President, the Congress, and the Commissioner

of Social Security on matters related to the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income programs.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction............................................................................................................1

A. Brief Description of the Programs...........................................................................1

B. The Long-Standing Difficulties of

Administering the Disability Programs.............................................................3

C. The Agencys Project to Redesign the

Disability Decision Making Process.................................................................7

D. The Work of the Advisory Board..............................................................................8

II. Summary of Recommendations..........................................................................12

III.Making the Disability Determination Process

 More Consistent andEquitable.............................................................. ......15

A. Findings.............................................................................................................15

B. Recommendations................................................................................................19

IV. Making the Application Process Faster,

 More Accessible, and More Understandable

 For Individuals Seeking Help.......................................................................25

A. Findings............................................................................................................25

B. Recommendations...............................................................................................26

V. Strengthening the Publics Trust in the

 Integrity of the Programs.............................................................................31

A. Findings.............................................................................................................31

B. Recommendations................................................................................................32

VI. Helping Disabled Individuals Continue

 or Return to Work........................................................................................36

A. Findings..............................................................................................................36

B. Recommendations................................................................................................38

VII. Providing a Better Understanding of the

 Dynamics of Program C..............................................................................41

A. Findings............................................................................................................41

B. Recommendations...............................................................................................45

VIII. Conclusion.........................................................................................................47

Appendix.....................................................................................................................49

A. The Current Disability Determination Process and How It Would

 Be Changed Under Disability Redesign ..........................................................49

B. Disability Benefits: The International Experience..................................................53

C. Components Within the Social Security Administration With

 Responsibilities in the Disability Process........................................................55

The Social Security Advisory Board.........................................................................58

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DISABILITY PROGRAMS

To most Americans, Social Security is a retirement program. This is understandable, in that

retirees and their dependents or survivors make up 86 percent of all Social Security beneficiaries

and receive 87 percent of all benefits paid. However, 14 percent of Social Security beneficiaries,

or 6.3 million individuals, are receiving benefits either as disabled workers or as dependents of

disabled workers. For them, the Social Security disability program--Disability Insurance (DI)--is

of vital importance to their well being. It is estimated that a young, average-earning disabled

worker and his family will receive about $285,000 over the course of their lifetime. According to

the Social Security actuaries, nearly one out of three young men, and nearly one out of four young

women, who are now age 20 will become disabled before reaching age 67.

Since it was enacted in 1956, the Social Security Disability Insurance program has provided

income protection that is not otherwise readily available to American workers. Private disability

insurance is not a widely provided employee benefit. Only one-fourth of private sector employees

have long-term private disability protection (generally group insurance) that is financed, in whole

or in part, by their employers. Moreover, even the limited number who have such insurance risk

losing it when they change jobs. Thus, for most American workers, the public Disability Insurance

program, by covering all those who meet its eligibility requirements relating to earnings and

impairment, provides an important form of social insurance protection.

The program is also important from the standpoint of those who finance it. The cost of

providing DI benefits in fiscal year 1998 is estimated at nearly $50 billion (out of a total of $372

billion for all Social Security benefits). These costs are paid out of payroll taxes levied equally on

employees and employers.

In addition to the Social Security Disability Insurance program, the Social Security

Administration administers the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability program, which in

1998 is estimated to pay nearly $24 billion in benefits to 5.2 million low income disabled

individuals. The SSI program was enacted in 1972, replacing the former Federal-State programs

of aid to the aged, blind and disabled. It is funded from the general revenues of the Treasury, and

benefits are payable only upon a showing of financial need. In contrast to expectations when the

program was enacted that it would mostly serve the aged, SSI is now primarily a disability

program, with the 5.2 million beneficiaries who receive benefits based on disability greatly

outnumbering the 1.3 million who receive benefits on the basis of age.

The DI and SSI disability programs use the same statutory definition of disability. This

definition has remained essentially unchanged in the last 30 years and is regarded as a strict

Since it was enacted in 1956, the Social Security

Disability Insurance program has provided income

protection that is not otherwise readily

available to American workers.

1
definition by comparison to those used in many other industrialized nations. To be found disabled,

an adult must be found to have a medical impairment that will last a year or result in death and

that causes inability to perform any substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy,

regardless of whether such work exists where the individual lives or whether the individual would

be hired. (There is a separate definition for the SSI child disability program.) Unlike in many

other industrialized nations, there is no provision for partial or short-term disability.

It is the responsibility of the Social Security Administration to develop the medical and

vocational criteria that are used in determining whether an individual meets the statutory

definition. This is a complex task that requires expert judgment and continuing review of medical

developments and changes in the economy. Determining whether specific individuals meet these

criteria is difficult and costly. Making these determinations requires staff who are trained in

making both medical judgments and judgments about how impairments affect the ability to work.

By law, determinations as to whether an individual is disabled are made by State agencies

(Disability Determination Services) under contract with the Social Security Administration.

Although SSA has issued extensive regulations to guide State agency decision making, and also

has established a Federal quality review process, these agencies retain a degree of independence

2

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B. THE LONG-STANDING DIFFICULTIES OF

ADMINISTERING THE DISABILITY PROGRAMS

Administering the Disability Insurance and SSI disability programs has proved to be a difficult

challenge for the Social Security Administration. These programs require a growing portion of the

time and attention of SSA staff at all levels. Many Social Security field offices, particularly those in

urban areas, are now spending more time serving applicants for either DI or SSI disability benefits

than applicants for retirement or survivors benefits. This is reflected in the workloads throughout

the agency. In fiscal year 1997, about $4 billion, or 65.6 percent of the agencys total

administrative costs, was spent on disability work. In 1980, slightly more than half (51.8 percent) of

the agencys total administrative costs was spent on disability work. (See Table 1.)

SSA ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS FOR DISABILITY WORK*

(Obligations in Millions)

 Fiscal Disability SSI Blind & Total LAE Disability as

 Year Insurance Disabled ** Disability Obligations*** % of Total

 1980 $694 $560 $1,254 $2,420 51.8%

 1985 $1,206 $817 $2,023 $3,564 56.8%

 1990 $1,281 $927 $2,208 $3,778 58.4%

 1995 $1,889 $1,625 $3,514 $5,462 64.3%

 1997 $2,175 $1,830 $4,005 $6,106 65.6%

* Includes costs of processing claims, appellate actions, continuing disability reviews, and postentitlement activities.

** Estimates assume 85 percent of the SSI administrative costs are for blind and disabled cases and 15 percent are for aged

cases.

*** The Limitation on Administrative Expenses (LAE) is SSAs basic administrative account. It is an annual appropriation

that is financed from the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds and the SSI appropriations payment to the Trust

Funds for administrative expenses. It provides resources for administering the Social Security program, the SSI

program, and certain aspects of the Medicare program that are administered by SSA.

Source: Social Security Administration, 1998

Table 1

3

in how they conduct the disability determination process. Individuals who disagree with a State

agencys decision may appeal that decision through a multi-level administrative appeals process, which

includes a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In addition, claimants

may appeal to Federal court after the administrative appeals process has been exhausted.

(See Chart 1.)

The law provides for referral of DI applicants and of SSI beneficiaries to State Vocational

Rehabilitation agencies for rehabilitation services. Those who qualify for disability cash benefits are

also generally eligible for medical benefits. Individuals who receive Disability Insurance on the basis

of their own disability are automatically eligible for Medicare after a 24-month waiting period.

Individuals who are eligible for SSI are automatically eligible for Medicaid except in a few States that

are allowed under the law to have more restrictive eligibility rules.
The growing domination of the agencys workloads by the disability programs is not widely

understood by policy makers and the public, and the Social Security Administration has not

emphasized this development in its public statements. It is incontrovertible, however, that these

programs have a significant and growing impact on the agencys ability to serve the general public,

and they need to be taken fully into account in the agencys plans for how it will deliver service in

the future.

Todays problems have a long history. They stem, at least in part, from the complex

administrative structure under which the programs operate, as well as from the fact that

determining whether an individual is disabled is fundamentally a judgmental process in which

different decision makers will frequently have different views. Today, as in the past, there are

serious concerns about the lack of consistency in decision making; unexplained changes in

application and allowance rates; the complexity, slowness and cost of the application and appeals

process; the lack of confidence in the system; and the fact that few beneficiaries are successfully

rehabilitated so that they can become part of the economic mainstream.

At the same time there are several more recent developments that are perceptibly changing the

disability programs. The average age of beneficiaries is falling. The fact that more younger people

are coming onto the rolls heightens concerns about the weaknesses in the present system for

providing services to help them enter or reenter the work force. Individuals with mental

impairments constitute an increasing proportion of cases, particularly in the SSI program where

more than half of beneficiaries have a mental impairment of some kind. The evidence for these

cases is often more difficult to develop, and, because they frequently involve complex

psychological issues, they tend to be more difficult for adjudicators to decide than cases involving

impairments that are more readily measurable.

In addition, the proportion of claimants seeking the assistance of an attorney in pursuing their

claims has nearly doubled over the last 20 years. Currently, about 80 percent of ALJ Disability

Insurance hearings involve attorney participation, making the determination process much more of

an adversarial and legal process than formerly. Finally, the number and influence of private

organizations advocating for the interests of the disabled have grown. These organizations have

had an increasingly important role in the deliberations of both the agency and the Congress.

These more recent developments increase the uncertainty about the future development of the

disability programs. Will these trends abate, continue, or accelerate? Do they call for adjustments

in policy and administration? If so, what changes should be made?

Todays problems have a long history. They stem,

at least in part, from the complex administrative

structure under which the programs operate, as

well as from the fact that determining whether

an individual is disabled is fundamentally a

judgmental process....

4
Disability programs are inherently difficult to administer. The anticipated difficulty of

administering a national disability program was part of the Congressional debate, which began in

the 1930s, over whether the initial Social Security old age insurance program should be expanded

to provide benefits for workers who become severely disabled. In 1965, when the Congress

considered the amendments that created todays Disability Insurance program, Members expressed

concern about the subjectivity of the disability determination process, the proposed Federal-State

administrative structure for the program, and whether the proposals for referring individuals for

rehabilitation would be effective.

Oversight hearings held in the fall of 1959 by the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on

the Administration of the Social Security Laws (the Harrison Subcommittee) centered on questions

about whether disability determinations should be made by State agencies under the supervision of

the Social Security Administration, as the law provided, or whether they should be made by SSA

itself. In addition to this more structural issue, the Subcommittee raised concerns about the

quality of medical evidence used in making determinations, the wide variation among the States in

the percent of applications approved, the tension between reducing processing times and a fuller

development of the evidence, the inadequacy of State fee schedules for the purchase of evidence,

the difficulty for claimants in understanding the complex application process, use of non-medical

criteria in making decisions, and the effectiveness of the process for referring individuals for

vocational rehabilitation.

The Subcommittee issued a report expressing its concerns, but no corrective legislative action

was taken at that time.

In the late 1970s, both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance

Committee took another in-depth look at the administration of the DI and SSI disability programs,

and many of these same issues were raised again. The costs and caseloads of the programs had

grown significantly faster than had been projected, and the Committees examined them in this

context. They focused on the following issues: the effectiveness of Federal oversight of State

agencies, the need for a more effective quality review system, the failure of SSA to carry out

continuing disability reviews of beneficiaries on the rolls, backlogs in ALJ hearings caseloads and

variability in ALJ decision making, the failure of the Appeals Council to review ALJ allowances,

and the lack of success in rehabilitating beneficiaries.

In 1980, the Congress passed legislation that addressed these and related disability issues by

giving SSA authority to set standards for the performance of State Disability Determination

Services (DDS), with the option of taking over the work of DDSs if they fail to follow the

5

The anticipated difficulty of administering a national

disability program was part of the Congressional

debate, which began in the 1930s, over whether the

initial Social Security old age insurance program

should be expanded to provide benefits for workers

who become severely disabled.
Commissioners rules; requiring the agency to review a percentage of DDS decisions before payment

begins; requiring that Disability Insurance beneficiaries whose disability is not permanent be reviewed

every three years; requiring the agency to pay for medical evidence provided by non-Federal sources;

providing certain work incentives for beneficiaries to encourage them to return to work; and making

other changes.

Congress turned its attention to the disability programs again in 1984 and 1996. Legislation in

1984 limited the conditions under which a beneficiarys benefits may be terminated and established

standards for obtaining and using medical evidence. In 1996, the Congress tightened eligibility rules

by eliminating drug and alcohol addiction as conditions that qualify individuals for benefits, providing

a new and stricter definition of disability for children under the SSI program, and requiring continuing

disability reviews every three years for children with nonpermanent impairments.

 Over the years there have been other studies of the disability programs. In 1986, the Congress

passed a law requiring the appointment of a special Disability Advisory Council to study the medical

and vocational aspects of disability under the DI and SSI disability programs. The report of the

Advisory Council stressed the need to improve the quality and availability of vocational rehabilitation

services for beneficiaries, strengthen work incentives, and provide greater uniformity in decision

making by establishing more precise eligibility criteria, ensuring that State agencies comply with

Federal rules, and altering the quality assurance program.

 In 1994, the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) published a study of the disability

programs that had been requested by the House Committee on Ways and Means. The NASI study

included recommendations designed to promote work, such as ways to increase the availability of

Medicare and Medicaid, and a tax credit to compensate disabled workers for the cost of personal

assistance services needed in order to work. It also included recommendations for administrative

actions to promote program integrity, including providing administrative resources sufficient to ensure

stable and effective management of the program and to make periodic updates of medical and

vocational criteria.

Throughout the years the General Accounting Office has issued many reports on the disability

programs. And a number of non-governmental organizations interested in disability issues have issued

their own studies.

In summary, from the standpoint of both policy makers and administrators, the disability

programs present a long and increasingly difficult set of issues that need to be addressed forthrightly

and as promptly as possible.

In 1993, the Social Security Administration established

a Disability Reengineering Team composed of both

State DDS and Federal employees to rethink the

disability claims process and to come up with a

proposal for improvement.

6
C. THE AGENCYS PROJECT TO REDESIGN

THE DISABILITY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

In 1993, the Social Security Administration established a Disability Reengineering Team

composed of both State DDS and Federal employees to rethink the disability claims process and to

come up with a proposal for improvement. The agency set the condition that every aspect of the

process except the statutory definition of disability, individual benefit amounts, the use of an

Administrative Law Judge for administrative hearings, and vocational rehabilitation for

beneficiaries would be within the scope of the reengineering effort.

The reengineering team issued a report outlining its proposal to redesign the disability

determination process in March 1994. After receiving comment, the agency issued a final report in

September 1994. The objectives of the new redesigned process were: making the process user

friendly for claimants, making the right decision the first time, making the decision as quickly as

possible, making the process efficient, and making the work satisfying for employees. Among

other changes, it proposed a new disability decision methodology, major changes in the claims

taking process, a simpler administrative appeals process, and a new quality assurance process.

(For a description of the proposal, see Appendix A.)

The new disability process was to be fully implemented in fiscal year 2001. It was estimated

that service to the public, as defined by average processing time, would improve dramatically, and

that hearing processing time would also improve substantially. Program costs were to remain

unchanged, but it was estimated that there would be a saving in administrative costs of $704

million through fiscal year 2001, and $305 million annually thereafter.

 Since 1994, the agency has been testing many of the changes that were proposed as part of

the Redesign project. The initial very ambitious plan for testing new processes has been scaled

back. At this time few decisions about implementation have been made, although the agency has

indicated that it expects some important decisions to be made before the end of this year. Based

on what the Board has observed, it seems clear at this stage that the projected administrative

savings and improvements in processing times are unlikely to be achieved.

The agencys proposal to redesign the system included major changes in the appeals process

that would have the effect of eliminating both the reconsideration and the Appeals Council steps.

The information we have at this time about the potential effects of these changes is insufficient to

assess their impact on either individuals or the process, and we therefore are making no

recommendations with respect to them.

However, comments that we have heard from participants in the Redesign tests and from

expert observers raise questions about whether eliminating these steps at this time would have the

positive impacts that were originally expected. Indeed, there is concern that they might result in

adverse consequences, including adding to the ALJ work backlogs and increasing the number of

Since 1994, the agency has been testing many of

the changes that were proposed as part of the Redesign

project....At this time few decisions about

implementation have been made....

7
cases being sent to the Federal courts without adequate development. This does not mean that

simplification of the appeals process is not a desirable goal. However, the elimination of steps in the

appeals process should be implemented in the context of a system that can assure consistent, high

quality decision making throughout the nation and at all stages of the process. That circumstance

does not exist today.

Despite the fact that the Redesign project has not moved forward as the agency originally

anticipated, there have been some benefits from the work undertaken. Based on our consultations

with individuals working throughout the disability system, it appears that the information that has

been developed as part of the Redesign project has contributed to a better understanding within the

agency and within the DDSs of the kinds of changes that should be made to improve the way the

programs work. We believe the project has also brought about somewhat improved communication

and cooperation among the major components that have responsibility for the programs: SSAs

Office of Disability (OD), the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and the State agencies.

Although at best only a start, this latter point is important. Historically, one of the major problems

of the disability programs has been the friction and disunity that have existed among the

administering bodies.

The costs of the Redesign project are significant and cannot be sustained indefinitely. A

considerable number of the most experienced and knowledgeable staff both within SSA and the

DDSs have been working outside the regular process. Additionally, the uncertainty that has

surrounded the outcome of the project has raised concerns about job security and future roles and

responsibilities. After five years, it is time to bring the Redesign project to closure by deciding

which elements should be implemented and moving forward with them as promptly as possible, and

by ending the testing of elements that have not shown convincing evidence of succeeding.

D. THE WORK OF THE ADVISORY BOARD

Recognizing the importance of the disability programs to policy makers and the public, the

Board made them one of its first priorities for study as it began its work in the Spring of 1996. Our

studies will be on-going, because we recognize that the complex nature of the disability programs

requires continuing scrutiny and improvements.

We are issuing this report now focusing primarily on recommendations for administrative

improvements because they involve changes that we think are fundamental to improving the way the

disability programs operate. We also think they should be implemented as rapidly as possible,

recognizing that this may take several years. These changes are important irrespective of whether in

the future it is decided that more fundamental changes should be made.

8

We are issuing this report now focusing primarily on

recommendations for administrative improvements because

they involve changes that we think are fundamental to

improving the way the disability programs operate.
Over the longer term, policy makers may want to consider the desirability of structural change.

There have been proposals in the past to make such changes, including proposals to federalize the

existing DDS system, to establish a Social Security court, and to privatize some aspects of the

disability determination process. However, there has never been any consensus on these proposals

and they have never been favorably reported by either the House Ways and Means or Senate Finance

Committees.

There is another important issue for policy makers to consider. In more recent years, there has

been a significant change in attitudes regarding individuals with disabilities, which was reflected in

the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990. The ADA prohibits

discrimination in employment on the basis of disability. It grew out of the desire of many disabled

individuals to have increased opportunities to work, as well as the growing support on the part of the

public to find ways to make employment available to them.

Many people view SSAs disability programs, which base eligibility for benefits on a finding

that an individual is unable to work, as inconsistent with the employment goals of the ADA. It has

been recommended that the definition of disability be changed in some way so that individuals are

not required to prove that they are unable to work as a condition of eligibility for benefits. It has

also been recommended that additional work incentives and rehabilitation opportunities be built into

the disability programs as a way to reduce the inconsistency. In principle, many of these proposals

have merit, and there is need for future study and research on the extent to which they may assist

disabled individuals in gaining and maintaining employment. Earlier this year, SSA submitted a

proposal to Congress that would test the effects of providing disabled beneficiaries with greater

choice of providers of rehabilitation and employment services. The House of Representatives has

passed legislation creating a new ticket to work program that also provides for expanding the

choice of service providers. In addition, the House bill provides for continuation of Medicare

coverage for individuals participating in rehabilitation and employment programs.

In this report, we address the following questions within the existing legislative and

administrative context:

· Can the disability determination process be made more consistent and equitable?

· Can the application process be made faster and more understandable for

 individuals who are seeking help?

· Can the publics trust in the integrity of the programs be strengthened?

· Can steps be taken to help disabled individuals continue or return to work?

· Can the Social Security Administration and the Congress achieve a better

 understanding of the dynamics of program changes?

9

Over the longer term, policy makers may want to

consider the desirability of structural change.
We believe these questions can be answered in the affirmative. We recognize that the

recommendations in this report will pose a challenge for the leadership of the Social Security

Administration and for the many thousands of SSA and State agency employees who will have the

task of implementing them. Implementing our recommendations in fact as well as on paper will

require a major commitment on the part of the Commissioner and other leadership of the agency.

Given past experience, however, it is clear that unless a major effort is made throughout the

system, even the best recommendations will have little effect.

In some cases the improvements resulting from our recommendations will likely be

incremental, but we believe that in others the improvements could be highly significant. If the

agencys objectives are made clear and the necessary resources are provided, progress in meeting

them can be made. This progress is critical to generating a higher level of public trust in these

important programs.

We have referred above to the disunity that has existed within the disability system for many

years. As is described more fully later in this report, although SSAs Office of Disability has the

basic responsibility for disability program policy, there are many other components within SSA

that play important roles in how the programs are actually administered. In addition, there is a

natural tension in the relationship between the agency and the State DDSs, stemming in part from

the fact that although SSA pays the full cost of their operations, the DDSs are under the

administrative direction of the State governors, who have their own interests and concerns. And as

a group, Administrative Law Judges, whose sensitivity about the issue of their decisional

independence was heightened after SSA tried to increase its influence over their operations in the

early 1980s, have long resisted any measure that they view as threatening to that independence.

The result of these conflicting interests and pressures has been the development of a culture

within each of these components of the disability system that makes it difficult for them to work

together. They are likely not to view problems in the same way, or even to identify the same

problems. Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) and DDS decision makers often regard the

decisions of the other as simply incorrect. There is resentment and frustration that they do not

follow the same rules. The Office of Disability does not always have as good communications with

DDS and OHA decision makers as it should. In sum, there is no common vision of how the

program should be administered.

Thus, we cannot make the point too strongly that improved communication and greater

teamwork are needed if the system is to be improved. This is a major challenge to the agencys

leadership. The Commissioner needs to call upon each and every part of the system to work

10

Implementing our recommendations in fact as well as

on paper will require a major commitment on the part of

the Commissioner and other leadership of the agency.

Given past experience, however, it is clear that unless a

major effort is made throughout the system, even the

best recommendations will have little effect.
11

...we cannot make the point too strongly that improved

communication and greater teamwork are needed if the

system is to be improved....The Commissioner needs to call

upon each and every part of the system to work together

in the interest of the individuals who are directly affected

by the disability system and of the public at large.

together in the interest of the individuals who are directly affected by the disability system and of

the public at large.

Any measures that SSA implements will be in the context of constrained administrative

resources. Since 1994, a portion of the disability resources of both SSA and the State agencies

has been directed toward SSAs effort to redesign the disability determination process. It is our

view that resources diverted to Disability Redesign should be returned as soon as possible so that

SSA and the State agencies can fulfill their basic program responsibilities. But in the short term,

at least, additional administrative resources for the disability programs will be needed. Many who

are familiar with how the disability programs have been administered believe that there have been

occasions in the past when limitations on the expenditure of administrative dollars have resulted in

poorer quality decisions and higher program costs. It will be important in the future to avoid this

kind of perverse tradeoff.

SSAs most recent Strategic Plan set out five goals for the agency. One of them is to deliver

customer-responsive, world-class service. Those who have disabilities are a very important part

of the public that the agency has the responsibility to serve. As this report points out, serving

individuals with disabilities is generally more difficult for the agency than serving those who

apply for retirement or survivors benefits. If the agency expects to meet its goal, it will have to

improve the way it delivers services to disabled applicants and beneficiaries. We hope our report

will be helpful to the agency in making needed improvements.

In conducting our study of the disability programs, we have met with hundreds of SSA and

State agency employees as well as program advocates and Congressional staff. The Board or its

staff have visited nine State DDSs, in addition to meeting with administrators from several other

States. We have visited Social Security field offices and have met with numerous experts

specifically on employment and return to work issues. These include State vocational

rehabilitation administrators, program advocates, academicians, researchers, and SSA officials.

The Board held a public hearing in San Francisco on January 13, 1998, and heard expert

testimony on the topic of employment and rehabilitation for the disabled.

We have benefited greatly from the information and insight provided by all of the individuals

with whom we have had the privilege to consult. The views that are reflected in this report,

however, are entirely our own. Those involved in the process will have their own perspectives and

may not agree with all of our findings and recommendations. We have attempted to look at the

programs from the broader perspective of beneficiaries and taxpayers. Our intention is to

stimulate the changes needed to improve these programs which are of vital importance to the

American system of social protection.
II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

MAKING THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION PROCESS

MORE CONSISTENT AND EQUITABLE

· The most important step SSA can take to improve consistency and fairness in the disability

determination process is to develop and implement an on-going joint training program for

all of the 15,000 disability adjudicators, including employees of State disability

determination agencies (DDSs), Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and others in the

Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA), and the quality assessment staff who judge the

accuracy of decisions made by others in the decision making process.

· An effective training program presumes the existence of clear policy rules to provide the

basis for training. The agency needs to speed up its efforts to establish a single

presentation of disability policy that is binding on all decision makers.

· SSA should give high priority to revising its quality assurance system so that it will better

serve the goal of unifying the application of policy throughout the disability determination

system.

· Providing appropriate guidance to those who have the responsibility for determining

whether individuals are disabled requires systematic updating of the listings of medical

impairments and of the vocational standards that are used in evaluating whether an

individual has an impairment that prevents any substantial work. SSA needs to strengthen

its program policy staff in order to be able to perform these basic functions.

· SSA should take steps to improve the development of medical evidence used in determining

disability claims, including improving the quality of consultative examinations and

providing greater consistency between DDSs and ALJs in the development of evidence.

MAKING THE APPLICATION PROCESS FASTER, MORE

EFFICIENT, AND MORE ACCESSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUALS

SEEKING HELP

· SSA should provide claimants with a better understanding of program requirements and

procedures and improve the development of claims as part of the initial disability interview

process.

· A well-designed computer system to support all stages of the disability determination

process could speed up the process and provide a more uniform, efficient, and wellmanaged program. SSA should give high priority to assuring the development and

implementation of a system that will provide adequate support to all elements of the

disability claims process.

12
· Some individuals need special help to negotiate the disability application process. SSA needs

to train its personnel to identify situations where special help is needed and to see that

appropriate assistance is provided.

· Changing the claims and appeals process may be useful, but changes should be implemented

with care and should not distract the agency from its ongoing responsibility for managing the

disability programs.

STRENGTHENING THE PUBLICS TRUST IN THE

INTEGRITY OF THE PROGRAMS

· The Social Security Administration needs to establish strong and consistent leadership of the

disability programs and encourage close teamwork among all components of the disability

determination process.

· Pressures to restrain administrative costs should not be allowed to compromise the quality of

decision making.

· Continuing review of the eligibility of disability beneficiaries should remain an important

commitment for the agency.

HELPING DISABLED INDIVIDUALS CONTINUE

OR RETURN TO WORK

· SSA should help beneficiaries understand the work incentive rules and increase their access to

high quality vocational rehabilitation services and to support services that will help them

maintain employment after rehabilitation. The agency also needs to clarify and improve its

policies for referring individuals for services.

· Disability claimants are often referred for rehabilitation only after they have been found

eligible for benefits. SSA needs to conduct rigorous research on whether and how a policy of

early referral should be implemented. Research is also needed on possible policy options to

help individuals maintain employment by providing retraining or other rehabilitation services

prior to providing long-term disability benefits.

PROVIDING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE

DYNAMICS OF PROGRAM CHANGES

· The Disability Evaluation Study, now in its early phases, should be carefully designed and

conducted. SSA should consider modifying the study to include longitudinal analysis.

· SSA should initiate other research efforts to help policy makers understand changes in

program dynamics and how to respond to them, and the impact of possible future changes in

disability policies and administration.

13
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Chart 2
15

· Both the definition of disability and the

administrative structure of Social

Securitys disability programs make

consistent and equitable decision making

difficult to achieve.

The statutory definition of disability

requires that eligibility for benefits rests on a

determination of whether an individuals

impairment is so severe as to preclude engaging

in any substantial work activity. This is

ultimately a judgmental issue and, at least in

many cases, may reasonably be decided

differently by different decision makers.

In addition, the administrative arrangements

for determining disability are highly

fragmented. Although the Social Security

Administration has overall responsibility for the

program, the law requires that initial

determinations of disability be made by

agencies administered by the 50 States, the

District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and

the Virgin Islands. This State-based

administrative mechanism was established by

the Congress in 1954. The rationale was that

this arrangement would provide coordination

with existing State vocational rehabilitation

agencies, and was necessary in order to secure

the cooperation of the medical profession,

which already had working relationships with

the rehabilitation agencies.

III. MAKING THE DISABILITY DETERMINATION

PROCESS MORE CONSISTENT AND EQUITABLE

A. FINDINGS

Although the State agencies are required

to follow the policy guidance of the Social

Security Administration, they are not under

direct administrative control of that agency.

Rather they are a part of State governments

which establish their own personnel policies,

recruit examiners and medical consultants,

provide most of the training, and determine

reimbursement rates for purchased evidence.

The law provides that an individual whose

claim is denied by the State agency may

appeal that decision at a hearing conducted by

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). This is

in an essentially de novo proceeding that often

requires a complete readjudication of the case.

More than one-quarter (27 percent in fiscal

year 1997)

of all awards for disability benefits are

ultimately made by ALJs at this appeals level.

(See Chart 2.) Although individual ALJs

must follow the agencys regulations and

rulings, the nature of the administrative

appeals process requires that they have

decisional independence.

A claim that is denied at the ALJ level

may be appealed to the Appeals Council,

which is the final step in the administrative

appeals process. The Appeals Council is

within SSA’s Office of Hearings and Appeals.

The law provides that an individual whose claim is

denied by the State agency may appeal that decision at

a hearing conducted by an Administrative Law Judge....More

than one-quarter...of all awards for disability benefits are

ultimately made by ALJs at this appeals level.


















































































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16

The existing structure of the decision

making process contributes to fragmented

decision making by virtue of the fact that

training and other methods of providing policy

guidance for DDSs and the Office of Hearings

and Appeals are not well integrated.

· For many years there have been wide

variations in decision making among

States and between levels of decision

making. These variations remain largely

unexplained.

One of the primary reasons that the

disability programs do not share the level of

public confidence enjoyed by other programs

administered by SSA is the long-standing and

widespread perception that the agency is unable

to apply the statutory definition of disability in

a uniform and consistent manner. As one

individual who is currently engaged in

administering the disability determination

process observed, Disability is not a national

program.

There are many symptoms which give rise to

this view. Allowance and denial rates, both

overall and for specific impairment categories,

can vary widely from State to State and region to

region, as well as over time, often without clear

underlying reasons. For example, in 1997 the

percentage of cases that State agencies decided

favorably to DI and SSI disability claimants

varied from a low of 21 percent in West Virginia

to a high of 48 percent in Minnesota, with a

national average of 32 percent. Six years earlier,

in 1991, the percentage varied from a low of 28

percent in West Virginia to a high of 57 percent

in Vermont, with a national average of 42

percent. (See Chart 3.)

One of the primary reasons that the disability programs

do not share the level of public confidence enjoyed by

other programs administered by SSA is the long-standing

and widespread perception that the agency is unable to

apply the statutory definition of disability

in a uniform and consistent manner.

* Includes initial decisions for both DI and SSI

 disability cases combined.



































































Chart 4

ALJ Allowance Rates*

Fiscal Years 1977-1997

Year

*Includes both DI and SSI initial disability claims.

State Agency Allowance Rates*

Fiscal Years 1981-1997

Chart 3
17

Claims denied by State agencies and

appealed to the hearings level are more likely

than not to be approved at the hearings level.

The percent of cases reversed upon appeal to

an ALJ hearing has varied widely over the

years. Allowance rates by ALJs for DI and SSI

disability claims stood at 51 percent in 1985,

grew to nearly 68 percent in 1992, and fell to

56 percent in 1997. (See Chart 4.) There are

also wide variations in ALJ decision making

among regions of the country, and even larger

variations among individual hearing offices.

These facts raise important questions.

· Do the variations in allowance rates

among States and ALJs mean that the

supposedly uniform definition of disability

is being applied differently by different

decision makers, as well as differently at

different times?

· To what extent are ALJ reversals the result

of a non-uniform application of the law by

the State agency and the ALJ?

· To what extent are those reversals the

result of State agency failure to consider

evidence that should have been available?

· To what extent are they the result of other

factors, such as the worsening of the

claimants condition, or the fact that the

ALJ level represents the first opportunity

for a face-to-face meeting between the

claimant and the decision maker?

· To what extent do denials that are not

appealed differ from denials that are

appealed and allowed?

Although many who are familiar with the

system have strong views about the answers to

these questions, the few studies of the

determination process that have been made do not

provide definitive answers.

The high degree of variability in outcomes

seems, on its face, to be inconsistent with a

program that is intended to operate uniformly

throughout the Nation and is based on a statutory

definition of disability that has not changed for

30 years. There are, of course, many factors

(such as economic change, the impact of court

decisions, and regional differences in income

levels and health status) which might to one

degree or another explain some of the variations

among the States. However, the system cannot

provide good information on whether and the

extent to which the variations represent a failure

to apply program policies and procedures on a

uniform basis throughout the country and

throughout the SSA system.

 The lack of this information is harmful in

two important ways. It contributes to a

perception that the program is not administered

consistently and fairly, and it prevents the policy

makers from knowing what corrective action is

needed.

· The office responsible for disability

program policy has insufficient resources

to keep regulations up to date with medical

and vocational change.

In 1998, the Social Security DI and SSI

disability programs combined are estimated to

spend about $73 billion in benefit payments to

some 10.3 million individuals. Apart from the

Social Security Administration, only the

The high degree of variability in outcomes seems, on its face,

to be inconsistent with a program that is intended to operate

uniformly throughout the Nation and is based on a statutory

definition of disability that has not changed for 30 years.
18

Defense, Health and Human Services, and

Treasury Departments have budgets as large

as these disability programs.

Yet the Office of Disability which

oversees these large and complex programs

and is, in particular, responsible for

development of program operating policy,

has a staff of about 300 persons, including

support staff. Moreover, the ability of even

this small staff to function appropriately has

been compromised in recent years by the

retirement of an aging and experienced

workforce, by the fact that staff have been

diverted from ongoing policy work to the

development and management of the

Disability Redesign plan, and by detailing

about 7 percent of the staff to the Office of

Hearings and Appeals to help with writing

decisions to ease that offices backlogs.

Despite the obvious need to review program

policy rules and keep them up to date, the

Offices level of expertise in the medical and

vocational areas has declined in recent years.

As a result, the Social Security

Administration has been unable to keep the

programs rules up to date with evolving

medical technology and vocational realities

and to provide appropriate guidance for

addressing legislative and regulatory changes

in the program.

The law provides that benefit eligibility

is to be based on the question of whether the

claimant has a medical impairment that

precludes engaging in any substantial work

that exists in the national economy, which

means work that exists in significant numbers

either in the region where the individual lives

or in several regions of the country. Essential

policy updates to track advances in medical

diagnostic techniques, changes in treatment

and rehabilitation realities, and the evolution

of vocational requirements in the workplace

have largely not taken place. The regulations

describing the findings necessary to

determine disability for various types of

impairments have, in most instances, not

been revised since the 1980s or even the

1970s. Some of the childhood listings, for

example, date back to 1977. With the

exception of cardiovascular disease (and

revisions needed to implement statutory

changes in the definition of child disability

that were made in 1996), none of the listings

have been updated or even reviewed by a

panel of experts in the last 5 years. The

vocational standards used for determining

eligibility are based on an obsolete Bureau of

Labor Statistics survey of occupations which

is no longer being conducted.

When policy guidance is allowed to

deteriorate and become obsolete in this way,

the confidence of decision makers in relying

on that guidance is undermined and the

ability of the agency to enforce consistent

standards throughout the system is

compromised.

We urge the Commissioner to make a strong

ongoing training program a centerpiece of the

agencys effort to improve the accuracy, consistency,

and fairness of the disability determination process,

and to see that the necessary resources

are provided to carry it out.
The agency has stated that one of the

objectives of its current Disability Redesign

efforts is to achieve similar results in similar

cases at all stages of the process. It has

developed the capacity to provide interactive

video training across the country, and it has

conducted some joint training efforts for ALJs

and DDS examiners, including a two-day

session which provided training on newly

published disability rulings issued by the

Commissioner, and a briefer training program

on newly issued rules for making determinations

in child disability cases.

These are good first steps, but to have real

and lasting value, SSAs training program must

be both systematic and on-going. At the present

time, the agency does not have qualified staff in

place to develop, implement, or oversee a

comprehensive training program, nor has it

developed relationships with outside entities,

such as universities, that might help to perform

this function.

We urge the Commissioner to make a strong

ongoing training program a centerpiece of the

agencys effort to improve the accuracy,

consistency, and fairness of the disability

determination process, and to see that the

necessary resources are provided to carry it out.

· An effective training program presumes

the existence of policy rules to provide

the basis for training. The agency needs

to speed up its efforts to establish a single

presentation of policy that is binding on

all decision makers.

When SSA first announced its Disability

Redesign project in March 1994 it asserted that

the agency would develop a single presentation

of all substantive policies used in the

disability determination process. It said that

this presentation of policies would be published

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

19

· The most important step SSA can take

to improve consistency and fairness in

the disability determination process is

to develop and implement an on-going

joint training program for all of the

15,000 disability adjudicators, including

employees of State disability

determination agencies (DDSs),

Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and

others in the Office of Hearings and

Appeals (OHA), and the quality

assessment staff who judge the accuracy

of decisions made by others in the

decision making process.

Today, each State disability determination

agency operates its own training program for

DDS personnel. New Administrative Law

Judges are trained by staff in the headquarters

of the Office of Hearings and Appeals. The

staff that perform SSAs quality assurance

reviews in each of SSAs 10 regional offices

generally receive training within their own

individual offices.

The amount and the content of training

these individuals receive varies greatly. For

example, some new disability examiners in

State DDSs receive three months of training

in the medical aspects of making disability

determinations, whereas a new Administrative

Law Judge receives two weeks of medical

training. (SSA increased the amount of ALJ

medical training from one to two weeks earlier

this year.)

It will require considerable effort for SSA

to establish and implement a soundlystructured on-going training program for all

decision makers, but we believe this is an

essential component in establishing a process

that treats people fairly no matter where they

live or who is making the decision.
in the Federal Register in accordance with the

Administrative Procedures Act. In addition, the

agency said that it would develop a single

operating manual.

There is broad agreement that a single

presentation of policy is needed if the goal of

more uniform decision making is to be met.

However, today, as in 1994, decision makers at

different levels follow different sets of rules.

SSA field offices, State DDSs, and quality

assurance reviewers all are bound by

instructions presented in SSAs Program

Operations Manual System (the POMS), which

(according to SSAs description) provides the

substance of the law, regulations, and rulings

issued by the Commissioner, but does not

necessarily follow their wording. The POMS is

supplemented by other administrative issuances

to clarify specific policy issues.

Administrative Law Judges and the Appeals

Council, on the other hand, are bound in their

decision making only by the law, along with

regulations and rulings which have been

published in the Federal Register. There is also

a Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law

Manual that provides operating instructions and

summaries of court decisions to hearing offices

and the Appeals Council.

The agency made a useful and important

step toward a single presentation of rules in July

1996 when it published in the Federal Register a

series of rulings dealing with areas of decision

making that it had identified as major sources of

differences in ALJ and DDS decisions. The

agency has also said that it intends, in issuing all

future rules, to publish them in the Federal

Register so that they will be binding on all levels

of decision makers.

 If SSA is to make substantial progress

toward a single presentation of policy, it will

have to devote considerably more resources

toward this effort than it has so far. The

agency published regulations implementing the

1996 welfare reform legislation regarding

disabled children in February 1997. Over the

last year no significant new regulations relating

to disability policy have been published in the

Federal Register.

Developing a single, clear presentation of

policy is a complex and time-consuming task,

requiring highly skilled and experienced staff.

For example, there are currently about 6,000

pages dealing with disability in the manual used

by DDS examiners. Much of the material is

highly technical. Determining what needs to be

published in the form of regulations or rulings

that will be used by all adjudicators is a

difficult undertaking.

The agency was right in making a single

presentation of policy an essential part of its

Disability Redesign effort. Now it must devote

the resources to make it a reality.

· SSA should give high priority to revising

its quality assurance system so that it will

better serve the goal of unifying the

application of policy throughout the

disability determination system.

The nature of the disability programs is

such that there likely will always be some

degree of variation in the percentages of claims

allowed from year to year, place to place, and

component to component, and some uncertainty

as to the causes of that variation. However, a

well designed quality assurance system should

shed light on whether the

The agency was right in making a single presentation of

policy an essential part of its Disability Redesign effort.

Now it must devote the resources to make it a reality.

20
variations represent an underlying failure to

achieve appropriate uniformity in applying

program policies and procedures. More

importantly, such a system should identify

problems and provide for their correction

through policy clarification and intensified

training.

SSAs quality assurance system should be

structured so as to cover all levels of

adjudication. There are a number of reasons

why a State agency decision may be reversed on

appeal. Additional evidence or insights may be

developed at the formal hearing; the case may

involve a close call which could reasonably be

decided differently by different decision makers;

or the applicants condition may have worsened

during the appeals process. On the other hand,

either the State agency or the Administrative

Law Judge may not have followed prescribed

procedures or applied proper policy. Such a

failure may be an individual lapse, or it may be

representative of errors prevalent within an

office or region. Identifying such problems and

correcting them should be the function of a

quality assurance system that applies as

uniformly as possible to both State agencies and

the Office of Hearings and Appeals.

Today, the quality system as it relates to

State agency decisions operates at three levels.

(1) Each State agency has its own internal

quality system to check the accuracy of case

decisions. (SSA has developed a model for

States to follow, but it allows States to differ in

the way they operate their systems.) (2)

Program quality staff in SSAs regional offices

review a random sample of State agency cases.

(3) A much smaller sub-sample of the cases

reviewed by regional office staff is re-reviewed

at the national level.

In practice, the regional reviews are the

ones that get the most attention and create the

statistics that are used to indicate the relative

accuracy of decision making by the various

State Disability Determination Services.

This regionalization of the review process

and the limited central office re-review raise

serious questions. The existing system may

serve the important purpose of quickly

identifying situations where an individual State

agency begins to experience problems involving

a significant deterioration in its accuracy.

However, there is a question as to whether this

regionally based system provides valid

comparisons of accuracy between States in

different regions. Moreover, statistical accuracy

is only one goal, and perhaps not the most

important goal, of quality assurance. The

quality assurance system should be a major tool

for identifying and correcting errors in policy

and procedure to assure that program policy is

implemented in a manner that is consistent and

fair to individuals, no matter where they may

live, and without undue reliance on the

administrative appeals process.

It is important that the Office of Disability,

which has responsibility for developing policy

for disability program operations, be involved in

the quality assurance process. Currently, the

Federal quality system is operated by a

component within the Office of Finance,

Assessment, and Management. This separation

The quality assurance system should be a major tool for

identifying and correcting errors in policy and procedure to

assure that program policy is implemented in a manner

that is consistent and fair to individuals, no matter where

they may live, and without undue reliance on the

administrative appeals process.

21
of quality assurance from the program policy

office is probably appropriate. However, if the

system is to provide accurate policy guidance,

SSA needs to provide for close coordination

between the two offices in order to assure that the

policy guidance provided by the quality assurance

system does not diverge from program policies

maintained by the Office of Disability. One way to

do this would be to have a system for temporary

assignment of staff from one office to the other, so

that there would be a continual flow of information

and expertise between them. It is also important to

ensure that there is a system that gives State

agencies or other review entities ready access to

the Office of Disability so that they can quickly

raise with that office the quality assurance findings

which appear to them to involve policy issues.

There are a number of possible approaches

that might be considered in making quality review

a better tool for attaining greater consistency and

equitable decision making in State agency

decisions. Consideration could be given to

requiring greater consistency among the States in

how they operate their own quality review systems,

restructuring the regional approach so that each

region reviews decisions from all States,

introducing some degree of State agency review of

decisions from other States, providing a more

intensive level of central office review of cases

reviewed by the regional offices, or some

combination of these approaches.

In July 1998, SSA published final rules in the

Federal Register that establish a process for

identifying and referring ALJ decisions for review

by the Appeals Council. This review will initially

use a random sample of cases, but SSA plans to

modify the review so that eventually the agency

will be able to use case profiling and other

sampling methods to identify cases that involve

problematic issues or fact patterns that increase

the likelihood of error. It will not identify cases

based on the identity of the decision maker or the

identity of the office issuing the decision. The

purpose of the new procedures is to increase the

agencys ability to identify policy issues that need

to be clarified through regulations or rulings.

This represents an important step forward in

improving the agencys quality assurance

procedures. But much more will have to be done

if the quality assurance system for the entire

decision making process is to be viewed as, and

will in fact operate as, a tool for identifying policy

issues which require additional training, policy

guidance, or policy development for all of the

15,000 disability adjudicators.

Designing a quality assurance system to do

this will be a difficult and complex task, and will

require the assistance and cooperation of many

organizational components with widely varying

interests and perspectives. We urge the agency to

consider contracting for outside assistance with

this major undertaking.

· Providing appropriate guidance to those

who have the responsibility for determining

whether individuals are disabled requires

systematic updating of the listings of

medical impairments and of the vocational

standards that are used in evaluating

whether an individual has an impairment

that prevents any substantial work. SSA

needs to strengthen its program policy staff

in order to be able to perform these basic

functions.

22

Designing a quality assurance system...will be a difficult

and complex task, and will require the assistance

and cooperation of many organizational components

with widely varying interests and perspectives.
As noted earlier, many of the regulations

describing the medical findings necessary to

establish that particular impairments are

sufficiently severe to meet the Social Security

definition of disability have not been kept up to

date with developments in medical knowledge

and technology. Similarly, the vocational

guidelines currently in use are in large measure

based on outdated surveys which inadequately

describe an economy that is undergoing

substantial change. At the present time, the

Office of Disability lacks the resources

necessary to address these shortcomings in a

timely way.

The Office of Disability has lost

substantial resources as a result of the agencys

downsizing. In addition, at least part of the

reason why disability policy making has not

been kept up to date may be found in a

diversion of resources from ongoing policy

responsibilities to developing and testing the

Disability Redesign proposals. It is certainly

an important part of the agencys

responsibilities to reexamine its ongoing

policies and procedures and to try to find ways

to improve them. And some elements of the

Redesign effort can be useful in making the

disability determination process more

consistent and equitable. But the exploration

and development of potential future

improvements should not supersede the

responsibility for keeping existing program

policy up to date.

SSA needs to take prompt action to

strengthen its capabilities in this area.

Updating medical listings and assuring an

appropriate base for vocational evaluation are

tasks that must be done carefully, and it will

take time. However, resources need to be

brought to bear so that SSA can fulfill its clear

responsibility for making sure that disability

eligibility determinations are properly made.

The agency also needs to examine why this

important function of policy development was

allowed to lag so badly and to build safeguards

against a recurrence of this situation in the

future.

· SSA should take steps to improve the

development of medical evidence used in

determining disability claims, including

improving the quality of consultative

examinations and providing greater

consistency between DDSs and ALJs in

the development of evidence.

The Board received testimony at its public

hearing in San Francisco, and has heard from

disability decision makers as well, that many

applicants have difficulty in providing the

medical evidence needed to support their

claims. We have also heard that pressures to

meet processing time goals sometimes lead to

unfavorable decisions because the evidence is

not provided in a timely way.

The Disability Redesign plan proposed

several approaches to address these concerns,

including increasing claimant involvement in

obtaining medical evidence, involvement of

third parties, efforts to achieve greater

uniformity in medical reports, working with

custodians of medical records, and ultimately

relying more on electronic transmission of

records. SSA should use every possible tool to

improve the medical evidence that is used in

making the initial decision. To the extent the

agency determines that these elements of the

Redesign plan will improve the quality of

medical evidence, and therefore improve the

quality and fairness of the initial claims

process, they should be implemented.

However, there are other areas where

improvement appears to be badly needed. In

cases where there is not sufficient medical

...resources need to be brought to bear so that SSA

can fulfill its clear responsibility for making sure that

disability eligibility determinations are properly made.

23
evidence to permit a decision on a case, or where

there is conflicting evidence, DDSs and ALJs

may purchase consultative examinations by a

physician. Consultative examinations are

particularly important to applicants who may not

have a current medical provider or who use

public hospitals and clinics which may not have

the resources to provide medical evidence to

State DDSs.

The Board has heard from program

administrators, advocates, and ALJs about the

frequently poor quality of consultative

examinations. The common complaint is that

examinations are too often cursory and of little

value as medical evidence, particularly in mental

impairment cases. Part of the problem is that

many States pay rates that are so low that they

have difficulty in finding doctors or other

medical facilities that are willing to do them.

The Board has also heard reports of fraudulent

claims on the part of unscrupulous providers. At

its public hearing, witnesses suggested that in

mental impairment cases it might be helpful if

evidence were provided by nonprofessionals to

consulting physicians so that they would have

information on how an individuals condition had

changed over time.

We are also aware that there is a need to

improve the quality of vocational evidence that is

provided at ALJ hearings. When an ALJ

determines that an assessment is needed of

whether an individual can perform work in the

national economy, the ALJ calls upon an

individual whose name is on a roster of

vocational experts to provide testimony on this

question. These vocational experts participate in

about half of all ALJ hearings that involve

Disability Insurance, and 41 percent of all cases

that involve SSI disability. While these

individuals may well have expertise in other

matters, there are no requirements to assure

that they have good knowledge of the rules for

determining disability for purposes of the DI and

SSI programs, and there is no provision for

providing them with training on these rules.

The Board is also concerned about the

differences in evidence used by the DDSs and

ALJs. For example, we have heard complaints

that, because of pressures to meet production

goals or limits on the ability to make adequate

payment, there are too many instances in which

DDSs are making decisions without getting all the

medical evidence that may be available from a

claimants treating physician or other sources of

medical treatment. At the hearing level, staff in

the Office of Hearings and Appeals may spend

considerably greater time seeking out this

evidence, which in many instances is the

controlling evidence in rendering a decision.

In another difference between DDS and ALJ

decision making, DDSs train their own examiners

to evaluate a claimants ability to work. Some

also have vocational consultants on their staffs.

In contrast, ALJs, as noted above, do not have inhouse expertise, but must arrange for outside

vocational experts to provide evidence at hearings

when this kind of evidence is needed to make a

decision. In addition, DDSs have medical

consultants on their staffs to advise their

examiners. ALJs do not have medical consultants in

their own offices, but sometimes do contract for

outside medical expert advice.

The Board urges the agency to look for ways

to improve the quality of consultative

examinations and to provide greater consistency

between DDSs and ALJs in the development of

medical and vocational evidence. This should

have a positive impact on the entire system,

helping to assure that claims are decided properly

at the initial decision level, and reducing the

likelihood of costly appeals.

The Board urges the agency to look for ways to improve

the quality of consultative examinations and to provide

greater consistency between DDSs and ALJs in the

development of medical and vocational evidence.

24
IV. MAKING THE APPLICATION PROCESS

FASTER, MORE ACCESSIBLE, AND MORE

UNDERSTANDABLE FOR INDIVIDUALS

SEEKING HELP

A. FINDINGS

· SSAs disability determination process is

difficult for applicants to understand,

and results in too many lengthy appeals

that impose a hardship on disabled

individuals and their families.

From the standpoint of applicants for

benefits, the current disability decision process

is difficult to understand, as well as slow and

fragmented into multiple levels of processing

and decision making. The role of the Social

Security field offices and of the State DDSs in

the decision process is unclear to most who

apply. Staff in Social Security field offices

rarely have the training necessary to assure

that applicants know how to submit all the

medical evidence needed to support their claim.

And many who apply never have any contact

even by telephone with anyone in the State

office where the disability decision is made.

The application process is particularly

formidable for mentally impaired individuals,

who represent a growing portion of those who

are applying for benefits.

From start to finish, most individuals

whose cases go through the initial decision,

reconsideration, and ALJ hearing process will

wait well over a year for a decision. This is

likely to be a period of considerable economic

From the standpoint of applicants for benefits, the

current disability decision process is difficult to

understand, as well as slow and fragmented into

multiple levels of processing and decision making.

hardship for claimants and their families.

Historically, about 65 percent of all cases

denied by the State DDSs at the reconsideration

level are appealed to an ALJ.

In fiscal year 1997, the average length of

time for an initial Disability Insurance decision

by a DDS was 70 days (80 days for an SSI

disability decision). Due to the high backlog of

cases, the average time for an appeal to an

Administrative Law Judge was more than a

year (374 days) from the time the appeal was

filed to the time the decision was rendered.

Although the number of cases pending an ALJ

decision has declined from a high of 526,000 in

1995, it still stands at about 400,000, or more

than two and a half times the backlog that

existed in 1990.

The hearing process can also be costly for

individuals who appeal a DDS decision to the

ALJ hearing level. In 1997, claimants

attorneys participated in about 80 percent of all

hearings that involved a decision regarding DI

benefits. This attorney representation is

usually on a contingency basis and is paid for

by withholding from benefits that are awarded.

About $490 million was spent on attorneys

fees in fiscal year 1997.

25
For cases denied at the hearing step and

appealed to the Appeals Council, the final step

in the administrative appeals process, the current

processing time is also around one year (353

days in 1997). Finally, for the cases that are

appealed to the Federal District Court level

(about 12,500 cases in 1997), the additional

wait can be two or more years. In fiscal year

1997, the courts affirmed 52 percent of the

agencys decisions, reversed 6 percent, and

remanded 42 percent back to the ALJs.

· The disability determination process is

also costly for the agency.

In its visits with Social Security staff at all

levels of the agency, from field offices to the

agencys central office, the Board has been able

to observe the high level of time and attention

that is devoted to the administration of the

disability programs. The complex nature of the

An important element in meeting this goal is

giving the claimant a good understanding of the

process and the evidence needed, and

enlisting his or her cooperation in gathering that

evidence. Ordinarily, the best time to do this is

at the initial interview.

An applicant for Social Security or SSI

disability benefits is unlikely to know the

disability eligibility rules, what is required in

the way of evidence, and how the program is

administered. Unfortunately, the present system

aggravates the problem of taking disability

applications by having the initial interview

conducted by an employee whose special

expertise is in the non-disability aspects

disability determination process is reflected in

the fact that two-thirds of the administrative

costs of the agency are for work related to the

disability programs: initial decisions, appeals,

continuing disability reviews, and other

postentitlement activities.

It is particularly costly when a case is

appealed to the ALJ hearing level. In fiscal

year 1997, the cost of making a decision at the

ALJ level was $1,242, compared to $528 for

making a decision at the initial decision level

(including intake by the Social Security field

office). Reducing the number of cases that go

through the appeals process would reduce the

cost of administering the programs. However,

if DDSs spend more time developing medical

evidence and increase their processing times,

their costs will rise. And if a reduction in ALJ

hearings allowances was more than offset by

allowances at the State agency level, program

costs could increase.

 B. RECOMMENDATIONS

26

...the present system aggravates the problem of

taking disability applications by having the initial

interview conducted by an employee...who often has

little or no training in the kinds of information

needed to process disability claims.

· SSA should provide claimants with a better

understanding of program requirements and

procedures and improve the development of

claims as part of the initial disability

interview process.

In some cases, an application for Social

Security or SSI disability benefits can be quickly

and easily decided on the basis of readily available

medical evidence. In many other cases, however,

the issue will be more complicated, requiring

careful consideration of the individuals medical

and vocational history in order to reach a decision.

It is to the benefit of the claimant and the program

that this decision be reached as quickly and

accurately as possible.
27

The Board believes that

the Social Security

Administration can and

should improve the initial

disability interview process.

of the process and who often has little or no

training in the kinds of information needed to

process disability claims. This limits the ability

of the agency to convey an understanding of

how a particular claimants condition relates to

the requirements for eligibility. In some cases,

the absence from the interview of a disability

specialist may result in requests for irrelevant

medical evidence, or in failure to pursue

evidence that is relevant. The interview

similarly may miss issues that are important for

the disability decision maker to know. And the

best opportunity to enlist the claimants help in

obtaining the most important evidence may be

missed.

The Board believes that the Social Security

Administration can and should improve the

initial disability interview process. We also

believe that there is an advantage to having the

disability part of the interview conducted by the

State agency employee who will be responsible

be stationed in the SSA field office. This

could be a particularly viable option where

the State agency and the field office are

located close to each another. The examiner

might also conduct the interview by

telephone, either while the claimant is in the

field office or at a later time that has been

scheduled with the claimant. Another option

would be to limit dual initial interviews to

cases that have characteristics indicating a

probability that the case will involve a

difficult decision. SSA should work with the

State agencies to make an intensified study of

a range of possible options.

An important criterion for any option

will be whether it can be administered in a

way that will assure consistency and equity

in decision making.

Because it will take time to develop a

new system for taking disability claims that

can be implemented nationwide, SSA should

take immediate steps to improve the initial

disability interview by providing increased

training and supervision of field office

personnel so that they are able to explain the

requirements of the disability programs and

to help claimants provide the necessary

evidence. One option the agency should

consider is to train some claims

representatives as disability specialists.

These claims representatives would receive

special training on the kinds of information

that the DDS needs to make a decision and

how to help the claimant in providing that

information.

The Board is concerned that recent

downsizing initiatives have significantly

reduced the level of supervision in SSA field

offices. In a program with the costs,

importance, and complexity of those

administered by the agency, it is crucial to

assure that field offices have sufficient

supervisory staff to provide necessary

ongoing training of front-line personnel and

to monitor their activities.

for deciding the claim, since that individual is in

the best position to advise the claimant as to the

types of evidence that are needed. Moreover,

the claimants understanding and acceptance of

the process will likely be enhanced if, from the

start, the individual has contact with the two

individuals who will be handling the disability

and nondisability aspects of the claim.

There are several possible options for doing

this, and some options may be more appropriate

in certain circumstances than they are in others.

The State agency examiner might
28

SSA currently has a new, uniform disability

claims process system under development. This is a

complex task since such a system must be able to

function in a uniform manner throughout the entire

program structure. While this system must enforce

a uniformity of processing on all of the entities

involved, it must also be designed so that it meets

their particular system needs. In the case of the

State disability agencies, there is a special

requirement that it be able to communicate

appropriately with the other offices in State

government.

The development of a computer system to

support the entire disability claims process holds

promise as a large step in the direction of a faster

and more uniform, efficient, and well-managed

disability program. However, that promise will be

realized only if the system is carefully designed and

implemented. SSA should give high priority to

developing and implementing such a system and

Medical providers are increasingly using

computerized systems for maintaining their

records and a disability claims system should be

able to allow such providers to provide evidence

more quickly, inexpensively, and perhaps even

more accurately. It should also be possible to

build into such a system a significant level of

technical quality review and of policy guidance,

thus lending support to the overall goal of a more

consistent and unified claims process.

A computer system

supporting all levels of the

disability claims process

would facilitate

communication among

the various entities,

eliminating the delays

that now occur....

SSA is testing another way of handling

disability claims as part of its Disability

Redesign project. This is to train one

individual in both the disability and nondisability aspects of the program, so that one

individual could take the claim and handle it

to completion. This individual would be

known as the Disability Claim Manager. The

Board has discussed this proposal with SSA

claims representatives and with DDS

employees and has heard almost universal

skepticism that it is feasible for the agency to

train a sufficient number of individuals who

will be able to handle both aspects of taking a

claim. The Board recommends that the

agency look to other ways of improving the

initial interview process.

· A well-designed computer system to

support all stages of the disability

determination process could speed up

the process and provide a more

uniform, efficient, and well-managed

program. SSA should give high

priority to assuring the development

and implementation of a system that

will provide adequate support to all

elements of the disability claims

process.

Because the Social Security disability

claims process is highly fragmented, it is

prone to delays and errors as the claim passes

from one entity to another and as

communications are required among the

different entities and outside providers of

evidence. A well designed and implemented

computer system could ameliorate these

problems.

A computer system supporting all levels

of the disability claims process would

facilitate communication among the various

entities, eliminating the delays that now occur

as the case folder is physically shipped from

one location to another. There would be less

likelihood that evidence would go astray, and

a greater capacity to monitor the status of the

claim at any given time.
29

must devote adequate resources to assure that

the system will work as intended.

· Some individuals need special help to

negotiate the disability application

process. SSA needs to train its

personnel to identify situations where

special help is needed and to see that

appropriate assistance is provided.

In 1997, SSA received 1.2 million

applications for Disability Insurance benefits

and 1.4 million applications for SSI disability

benefits. Clearly, in order to deal with this

massive caseload, SSA must have a fairly

standardized system of procedures for

processing these applications. Nonetheless,

each claimant is an individual whose needs

and circumstances are unique. The overall

purpose of the program is to provide disability

income to those persons who meet the

qualifying requirements. To achieve that

objective, the program must be flexible

enough to provide additional assistance in

pursuing claims to individuals who need such

assistance.

claimant has limited facility with the English

language, or where a significant part of the

claimants medical treatment or vocational

experience took place in a different country.

SSA and DDS staff, as well as advocacy

groups, have advised that the agency needs to

train its field office and State agency personnel

to identify situations where the circumstances

of the claimant limit the individuals

understanding of what is needed to support the

claim, or make it necessary to provide special

assistance in obtaining evidence. To some

extent our recommendation for an improved

initial interview process should help respond to

this need. But the agency should take

additional steps to assure that claimants

needing individualized assistance are identified

and that adequate resources are allocated to

assure that such assistance is available at each

stage of the claims process.

· Changing the claims and appeals process

may be useful, but changes should be

implemented with care, and should not

distract the agency from its ongoing

responsibility for managing the disability

programs.

The recommendations made in the

preceding parts of this report relating to

improving the initial contact with the claimant,

better development of medical evidence, more

on-going and unified training, completion of the

single presentation of policy, and a revamped

quality assurance system aimed at unifying the

application of policy should all serve to

improve the claims and appeals process.

However, it may be that there are

improvements that could be achieved by

changing certain features of the existing

process. SSA has been testing a number of

these changes, including eliminating the

requirement that a medical professional

participate in each disability determination at

the State agency level, providing the

opportunity for an interview prior to issuing

...the program must be

flexible enough to provide

additional assistance in

pursuing claims to

individuals who need

such assistance.

Some claimants may have only a vague and

possibly incorrect understanding of the nature of

their disability and may have had limited or no

medical treatment. Treatment providers may

have incomplete records or may be unresponsive

to requests for documentation. Particular

problems may arise in cases where the claimant

suffers from a mental impairment which limits

his or her ability to pursue the claim, where the
an adverse initial determination, the

elimination of the reconsideration stage of the

appeals process, and the introduction of a new

adjudication officer (AO) function to

prepare cases for a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge.

At this time the Board does not have

sufficient information to make

recommendations with regard to these possible

changes. SSA should rigorously review the

results of testing to date to see if any of these

changes are shown to improve the process

without the risk of erroneous allowances or

other adverse consequences. If it decides to

proceed to implementation, however, SSA

needs to be cautious. Results under test

conditions may prove more favorable than the

ultimate results under real world conditions.

Although State DDSs vary in the degree

of medical involvement in decision making,

determinations are now generally made jointly

by a lay examiner and a medical professional.

One element now being tested, called single

decision maker, proposes to have these

decisions made by the lay examiner with

consultation by the medical professionals only

in complex cases. The expectation was that

this approach would reduce administrative

costs. However,

...the time has come for the agency to conclude the testing

of those elements which do not show significant potential

for near term implementation and redirect those resources

to carrying out its ongoing responsibilities and to meeting

the more basic needs for improvements in training,

policy guidance, and quality assurance.

medical judgments are at the heart of the

current disability determination process, and

this change, therefore, carries some risk of

decreased accuracy. If SSA decides that the

test results justify implementing this change,

any such implementation should be gradual,

starting with highly experienced examiners,

and perhaps limited to specific types of cases.

In addition, SSA should build in safeguards to

assure that accuracy is maintained under full

implementation conditions, including

conditions involving large, unanticipated

workloads.

While SSA has a continuing responsibility

to review its processes and procedures with a

view to making them more effective and

efficient, the current large scale

experimentation with modified processes has

been consuming significant administrative

energy and resources for a protracted period of

time. As indicated earlier in this report, the

Board believes that the time has come for the

agency to conclude the testing of those

elements which do not show significant

potential for near term implementation and

redirect those resources to carrying out its

ongoing responsibilities and to meeting the

more basic needs for improvements in training,

policy guidance, and quality assurance.

30
V. STRENGTHENING THE PUBLICS TRUST

IN THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROGRAMS

A. FINDINGS

· The disability programs provide vital

assistance to some of the nations most

vulnerable individuals. If these programs

are to have the public support needed to

maintain protections, they must be

perceived to be accurately and fairly

administered.

For most Americans, the wherewithal to

obtain food, clothing, and shelter and to meet their

other material needs comes primarily from

earnings from employment or self-employment.

When struck with a disabling impairment,

therefore, an individual typically faces economic

as well as health issues. SSAs disability

programs provide an important level of protection

to limit the adverse impact of such calamities.

Eligibility is limited to those with disabling

conditions that can be expected to last for at least

a year or result in death, and the impairment must

be sufficiently severe to preclude the individual

from engaging in any substantial employment.

Eligibility is determined by trained professional

evaluators who review the impairment under

detailed rules that require that allegations of

disability be supported by relevant medical

evidence. In the case of Disability Insurance,

benefits can be paid only if the disabled worker

has had a substantial connection with the work

force. Under the Supplemental Security Income

disability program, benefits are payable only if the

individual is not only disabled, but also has very

little in the way of other income or assets.

Payments under both programs are modest.

In 1998, Disability Insurance benefits average

$722 per month. The Federal payment standard

for an individual receiving SSI in 1998 is $494

per month.

Given the limited nature of these programs

and the important protection they afford, one

might expect that they would enjoy broad public

acceptance and support, and to a considerable

extent that is the case. However, the level of

public confidence in the integrity of these

programs can be and has been undermined by a

number of developments.

In some cases, there has been extensive

press coverage of situations which, although

representing a small part of the caseload, have

tended to raise questions of propriety, such as

instances of benefits being paid to persons in

prison or of children drawing benefits because

of conditions that some may regard as not truly

disabling. The programs are by nature

somewhat susceptible to instances of abuse, and

in the past there has been inadequate funding of

investigations dealing with suspicious situations.

Although SSA has made combatting fraud a

major goal of the agency and funding for the

Office of Inspector General has been increased,

the Board found that even within the agency

itself there is some concern that the effort to

assure the integrity of the program may not be

sufficient.

31

Given the limited nature of these programs and the

important protection they afford, one might expect that they

would enjoy broad public acceptance and support....However,

the level of public confidence in the integrity of these

programs can be and has been undermined....
Fluctuations in caseloads from year to year

in ways that cannot be adequately explained

also have given rise to concern among the

public and in the Congress about the integrity

of the programs. Failure of the agency in the

past to conduct reviews of continuing eligibility

led Congress in 1980 to mandate a specific

schedule for such reviews for Disability

Insurance beneficiaries. This mandate was

often not met in years when budget and

workload problems caused the agency to give

priority to other tasks. Variations from State to

State in allowance rates,

the complexity and length of the appeals process,

and the continuing high level of reversals of State

agency decisions all contribute to the perception of

programs that could be better managed.

It does not help that within the agency itself

the different decision making components disagree

as to what the problems are and who is responsible

for either causing or solving them. The culture of

the programs, as it has evolved, has unfortunately

not encouraged the teamwork that is necessary for

fair, accurate, and consistent decision making.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

· The Social Security Administration needs

to establish strong and consistent

leadership of the disability programs and

encourage close teamwork among all

components of the disability determination

process.

The disability programs represent the smaller

part of the Social Security Administrations

benefit expenditures. The Old-Age and

Survivors Insurance (OASI) program is far and

away the largest element in terms of number of

beneficiaries and the cost of benefits and

therefore has tended to shape the nature of the

agency. The requirements for running the OASI

program are, however, far different from those

for running the disability programs. For the

most part, OASI policies are stable and are

grounded in straightforward, specific statutory

requirements. Administration of the OASI

program is carried out entirely by SSA

employees using agency-wide procedures and

systems.

By contrast, the disability programs are

grounded in complexity and subject to greatly

diverse pressures. While based on a statutory

definition, the actual meaning of disability is to a

considerable extent determined through policies

that need continual review as changes occur in

medical knowledge and technology. Changing

vocational realities also have an impact on how

the disability definition is applied, and, because

disability policy is less objectively grounded, the

agency policy development process has to deal

with sometimes diverse viewpoints within and

outside the agency, including those of the Office of

Disability, the 54 State agencies, the Office of

Hearings and Appeals, the Office of Quality

Assurance and Performance Assessment, the

courts, and organizations representing claimants

and other outside entities.

Even apart from any formal policy making,

the meaning of disability as actually applied can

be affected by administrative developments. The

most obvious example is the common perception

that pressures to reduce backlogs or processing

times or to address growing program costs can

send informal but very significant signals that

result in a tighter or looser application of the

disability definition.

32

The culture of the programs, as it has evolved, has

unfortunately not encouraged the teamwork that

is necessary for fair, accurate, and

consistent decision making.
Both the Office of Disability and the Office

of Hearings and Appeals are within the Office

of Disability and Income Security Programs,

which has overall responsibility for disability

program policy as well as for program policy

for Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and SSI.

However, as described in Appendix C,

important aspects of the disability programs are

spread throughout many other parts of SSA.

The dispersion of functions throughout many

different entities poses a particularly difficult

problem for the disability programs, which lack

the tightly defined policy and administrative

parameters that are typical of the OASI

program. For example, the development of a

redesigned disability computer system may

appropriately rest with the Office of Systems,

but that entity may not be in the best position to

evaluate the impact of that new system on

relationships between hearing offices and the

State Disability Determination Services.

significant ability to shape disability policy and

impact program costs and caseloads through

subtle messages imparted by tighter or looser

reviews, the kinds of decisions selected for

review, or even by increased or decreased

sampling rates.

The existing structure of SSA necessarily

disperses many functions with substantial

impact on the disability programs among

different organizational entities. Although the

Board is not suggesting that a general

reorganization is needed to deal with the

problem, we believe that the leadership of SSA

must be especially cognizant of the potential

that this dispersion of functions has for

significant impact on disability policies,

practices, and caseloads. SSA should consider

establishing a mechanism for monitoring and, as

necessary, coordinating all aspects of disability

program policy and operations, including

assuring that State agencies administer the

programs according to Federal rules.

Accountability needs to be built into the system.

The Commissioner should send a strong and

continuing message throughout the organization

that serving the public requires close teamwork

by all components.

· Pressures to restrain administrative costs

should not be allowed to compromise the

quality of decision making.

In administering the disability programs,

SSA and the State agencies face a number of

competing priorities. By nature the process is

expensive to administer, and there must be a

continuing effort to operate efficiently and to

avoid unnecessary costs. Claimants by

definition have lost income from employment or

are needy, or both, and the system should reach

a decision as promptly as possible. While these

requirements exist and cannot be ignored, SSA

must make sure that the highest priority is to

make the right decision.

SSA faces a difficult reality in that, for

purposes of budgeting, the Administration and

The Commissioner should

send a strong and continuing

message throughout the

organization that serving

the public requires close

teamwork by all components.

33

The disability quality assurance system is

operated by the Office of Quality Assurance and

Performance Assessment. In theory, this system

simply provides a measure of the extent to which

determinations are following agency policy with

respect to standards of eligibility and

documentation requirements. In practice,

because subjective judgments are crucial in the

disability programs, the quality process has a
34

In the long run, getting

decisions right initially

will be the cost-effective

approach.

the Congress consider the costs of administering

the SSA programs as controllable, while benefit

costs are viewed as entitlements not subject to

the full range of budgetary controls. Therefore,

there are pressures on the agency and on the

Congress to reduce SSAs expenditures for

administration. This can undermine program

management in ways that ultimately result in

inappropriate benefit costs that may far exceed

the administrative savings.

There are also pressures to meet processing

time goals, arising partly from administrative

cost concerns and partly from the need to assure

that claimants receive decisions on a timely

basis. These are important concerns. However,

there is always the danger that the pressure to

meet processing time goals, because they are

easily measured, will override program needs

which are also essential but are more difficult to

quantify, such as adequate levels of training,

review, and accuracy.

The inherent difficulties of balancing these

priorities can be aggravated by unanticipated

workload fluctuations. Applications for

disability benefits can rise or fall based on

difficult-to-predict factors such as the state of

the economy. Legislative changes or court

decisions can result in workload increases

without adequate lead time for the necessary

expansion and training of the workforce. In the

past, SSA has had to contend with all of these

factors.

While a perfect balance among competing

priorities may not be achievable, SSA needs to

establish correct decision making as the primary

objective and assure that adequate resources are

provided for all components of the disability

process on a consistent basis. The Congress

must also recognize the need for adequate

resources. In the long run, getting decisions

right initially will be the cost-effective

approach. The benefit costs of an incorrect

allowance will far exceed any administrative

savings from making a decision based on

inadequately developed evidence. If the initial

decision is an incorrect denial, the case is likely

to proceed to the much more costly appeals

process.

· Continuing review of the eligibility of

disability beneficiaries should remain an

important commitment for the agency.

Because the Social Security disability

definition limits eligibility to individuals with

severe impairments, there are many who will

stay on the benefit rolls for their entire

remaining lifetime. However, it is possible to

qualify for benefits on the basis of a temporary

disability, provided that it is expected to last at

least a year. In addition, some beneficiaries

with longer lasting impairments may experience

medical improvements which make them no

longer disabled, or advances in medical

treatment and technology may lessen the

impact of a disabling condition. There is also

the possibility that an individual will have been

awarded benefits erroneously.

The disability programs face a particular

problem because of the difficulty that is

sometimes encountered in gathering evidence.

To arrive at a correct decision, the State

agency must obtain reports from the doctors,

hospitals, and other medical providers who

have treated the claimant and, in some cases,

must request additional consultative

examinations to resolve issues not clearly

addressed by other evidence. However,

medical providers may not always respond

promptly to requests for evidence. Scheduling

of a consultative examination can delay the

processing of a claim. And administrative

costs will be affected by the quantity and

quality of such consultative examinations.
35

SSA has a responsibility to periodically

review the status of individuals on the benefit

rolls and to terminate benefits for individuals

who are found to be no longer disabled. The

Social Security statute establishes standards for

termination so that an individual will not be

removed from the rolls simply because a later

reviewer makes a different judgment call than

the original adjudicator. However, in cases

where there is medical improvement or which

involve medical advances that make the

condition no longer disabling, or where there is

evidence that the original decision was

erroneous, the agency can and should cease

paying benefits.

This responsibility for continuing review of

eligibility is sufficiently important that

Congress has mandated by law that SSA review

the eligibility of Disability Insurance

beneficiaries at least every three years. There

are also requirements to review the eligibility of

SSI children every three years. An

exception is made for individuals found to be

permanently disabled.

 Even though most of those reviewed will be

found to remain eligible, it is important that

continuing disability reviews be carried out,

both because of the large financial impact that

each ineligible recipient has on the program and

also because an effective review program will

tend to increase the confidence of the public in

the integrity of the program.

SSA is currently attempting to meet the

statutory review requirements, and expects to

conduct more than one million reviews in 1998.

This reflects a substantial improvement from the

recent past. In the early part of the 1990s, as

few as 116,000 reviews were conducted and the

average per year from 1990 through 1995 was

less than 200,000. In its Accountability Report

for fiscal year 1997, SSA pledged to process all

legislatively required continuing disability

reviews. This is a commitment that needs to be

continued in future years.

Even though most of those reviewed will be found

to remain eligible, it is important that continuing

disability reviews be carried out, both because of the

large financial impact that each ineligible recipient

has on the program and also because an effective

review program will tend to increase the confidence

of the public in the integrity of the program.
VI. HELPING DISABLED INDIVIDUALS

CONTINUE OR RETURN TO WORK

A. FINDINGS

· Despite Social Security and SSI work

incentive provisions, few beneficiaries are

engaged in work or leave the rolls

because of employment.

The Social Security Disability Insurance

program became law in the mid 1950s and the

SSI disability program was enacted in the early

1970s. From the beginning, both of these

programs have provided for referring

beneficiaries for participation in rehabilitation

services and have included other provisions

aimed at supporting return-to-work efforts.

In recent years, there has been increasing

focus on the value of providing the disabled

with the necessary assistance and

accommodation to enable them to continue or

return to productive employment. The most

widely recognized sign of this growing interest

in rehabilitation and work is the adoption of

the Americans with Disabilities Act. However,

over the years there have also been a number of

significant amendments to the Social Security

disability programs reflecting the objective of

helping disabled individuals to return to work.

In the Disability Insurance program, these

include a temporary extension of Medicare

eligibility for persons returning to work, an

extended eligibility period to provide better

protection against the risks of an unsuccessful

work attempt, and the exclusion of impairment

related work expenses in determining whether an

individual is engaging in substantial work

activity.

In the Supplemental Security Income

program, individuals who return to work despite

continuing severe impairments may now

continue receiving cash benefits as long as they

meet the income standards, and may retain their

Medicaid eligibility as long as it is needed in

most cases. The law provides for reimbursing

State Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) agencies

for the costs of rehabilitation services that result

in a DI or SSI beneficiary performing

substantial gainful work for a period of nine

consecutive months.

Despite the statutory work incentives in

these programs and despite the widespread

acceptance of the principle that rehabilitation is

an important objective, a relatively small

proportion of beneficiaries actually do return to

work. In the SSI program, about six percent of

beneficiaries have work activity. Over threefourths of those working earn below $500 a

month, and nearly a third earn $65 or less. In

the Disability Insurance program, fewer than

one-half of one percent of beneficiaries leave the

rolls because of work. In 1997, out of a

population of about 7 million Social Security

disabled workers and SSI disabled adults,

referrals to State Vocational Rehabilitation

agencies resulted in only 8,337 successful

Despite the statutory work incentives in these

 programs and despite the widespread acceptance

of the principle that rehabilitation is an

 important objective, a relatively small proportion

of beneficiaries actually do return to work.

36
rehabilitations resulting in work that was

sufficient to qualify State agencies for

reimbursement of the services provided.

To a large extent, the small incidence of

return to work on the part of disability

beneficiaries reflects the fact that eligibility is

restricted to those with impairments which

have been found to make them unable to

engage in any substantial work activity. By

definition, therefore, the disability population

is composed of those who appear least

capable of employment. Moreover, since

eligibility depends upon proving the inability

to work, attempted work activity represents a

risk of losing both cash and medical benefits.

While some of this risk has been moderated

by the work incentive features adopted in

recent years, it remains true that the initial

message the program presents is that the

individual must prove that he or she cannot

work in order to qualify for benefits.

The small incidence of return to work on

the part of disability beneficiaries may also

reflect inadequate or ineffective use of the

provisions of law providing for referral to

rehabilitation services.

There are a number of issues that need to

be addressed. The agency has no clear policy

on who should be referred. There are

significant differences among State DDSs in

referring DI and SSI beneficiaries to State

Vocational Rehabilitation agencies, and in the

extent to which these beneficiaries actually

receive services. Only about 297,000

individuals were referred to State VR agencies

by State DDSs in 1997.

While the State rehabilitation programs

have been modified in recent years to place

more emphasis on serving severely disabled

individuals, there remains a perception that

some agencies do not put sufficient emphasis

on serving DI and SSI disability beneficiaries.

In some cases, referrals by State Disability

Determination Services are essentially pro

forma and do not provide useful information to

the rehabilitation agencies. State Vocational

Rehabilitation directors have reported long

delays in reimbursement by SSA for the

rehabilitation services that have been provided

to beneficiaries. Despite wide agreement that

rehabilitation services can be most helpful if

provided as early as possible after the

individual becomes disabled, Social Security

referrals often take place only after the

individual has been found eligiblea process

that can take months and often years to

complete.

37

In 1997, out of a population of about 7 million Social

Security disabled workers and SSI disabled adults,

referrals to State Vocational Rehabilitation agencies

resulted in only 8,337 successful rehabilitations resulting

in work that was sufficient to qualify State agencies for

reimbursement of the services provided.
· SSA should help beneficiaries

understand the work incentive rules and

increase their access to high quality

vocational rehabilitation services and to

support services that will help them

maintain employment after

rehabilitation. The agency also needs to

clarify and strengthen its policies for

referring individuals for services.

For most beneficiaries, rehabilitation to

self sufficiency will represent a challenge

requiring substantial assistance and great

motivation. In many cases, the potential

financial gains of working may compare

poorly with the risk of loss in cash benefits

and medical coverage if the work activity

results in a termination of benefit entitlement.

Expectations about the impact of

increased rehabilitation efforts on Social

Security disability costs and caseloads should

not, therefore, be overly optimistic.

On the other hand, disabled individuals

who have the potential and motivation to

engage in productive employment should be

helped to do so. Under the existing provisions

for reimbursing State rehabilitation agencies,

the cost per person rehabilitated is about

$10,000, while DI benefit costs for a young

average-earning disabled worker and his

family are estimated to be about $285,000

over their lifetime. The importance of

assisting beneficiaries in returning to work is

even greater than in the past, because the

average age of beneficiaries is declining and

more young adults are receiving either DI or

SSI benefits. Without help, these younger

individuals may spend all or a large portion of

their adult lives on disability.

As part of the initial claims interview, applicants should

be made aware of the existence of work incentives and

should be encouraged to take advantage of them.

38

 B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board believes that the Social Security

Administration can and should continue to

improve its efforts to assist beneficiaries in

returning to work.

The Disability Insurance and SSI disability

programs incorporate numerous provisions

designed to provide incentives for work activity.

Unfortunately, the number and complexity of

these incentives tends to make them difficult to

comprehend.

SSA needs to make sure that its field

personnel (and those who answer the 800 line)

have a thorough understanding of these

provisions. As part of the initial claims

interview, applicants should be made aware of

the existence of work incentives and should be

encouraged to take advantage of them. As

necessary, procedures should be adopted to

facilitate claimants use of the provisions. For

example, the Board has received comments

from advocacy organizations indicating that

field offices do not have consistent and

understandable procedures for taking earnings

reports from beneficiaries. This situation

creates confusion which may well translate into

reluctance to risk working.

The Board has been told that many

applicants and beneficiaries are unaware of the

fact that SSA is required to review their

continuing disability on a periodic basis. SSA

needs to make certain that this information is

provided when a claim is filed so that

individuals understand that there are

circumstances under which their benefits may

be terminated at some point in the future. This

must be done in a positive and straightforward

way. The purpose is to help individuals

understand the programs rules, not to
...if SSA is given the statutory authority to

implement a new delivery system it will have to

take considerable care to assure that beneficiaries

receive high quality services, and that providers do

not promise outcomes that they cannot fulfill.

39

intimidate or discourage application. The

knowledge may help some to recognize the

value that rehabilitation services could have

for them in planning their future.

The system of referrals for rehabilitation

services should be thoroughly reviewed with a

view to resolving outstanding issues. SSA

needs to work with State DDSs and Vocational

Rehabilitation agencies to make sure that the

statutory provisions for referring beneficiaries

for services is carried out in a way that serves

beneficiaries in all States. The Board has been

told that SSA has been taking steps to

strengthen its relationship with State

Vocational Rehabilitation agencies and to

encourage greater national consistency in

referral policies. The agency should increase

these efforts, and should also work with the

State agencies to see what other steps can be

taken to improve the provision of services.

Where State Vocational Rehabilitation agencies

provide services that lead to employment

meeting the requirements for reimbursement,

SSA should assure that prompt payment is

made of the amounts due.

Helping disabled individuals find

employment is only half the job. Also

important is helping them to retain

employment. Individuals with disabilities

often face challenges to their continuing

employment that are as difficult to overcome

as securing employment in the first place. If

an employment strategy is to succeed, SSA

will have to assure that the system for

delivering rehabilitation services has built into it

a way to provide support services for those who

need them to remain in their jobs.

In 1994, SSA published a regulation that

permits certified vocational rehabilitation

providers other than State VR agencies to

receive reimbursement for services provided to

DI and SSI disability beneficiaries. So far the

participation by these private providers has been

limited, most likely due to the statutory provision

that allows reimbursement for services only after

successful rehabilitation.

In addition, SSA has submitted a legislative

proposal to restructure the way rehabilitation

services are provided to its beneficiaries so as to

make greater use of private providers, and a bill

to do this has passed the House of

Representatives. There is undoubtedly much to

be gained by increasing the choice of providers

that beneficiaries may turn to for needed

services. But if SSA is given the statutory

authority to implement a new delivery system it

will have to take considerable care to assure that

beneficiaries receive high quality services, and

that providers do not promise outcomes that they

cannot fulfill. Exercising this important quality

control function will require additional

resources, and this should be recognized by both

the agency and the Congress. Even if much of

the responsibility for administration were to be

contracted to outside organizations, SSA would

require additional resources to oversee the

program. It will not help beneficiaries if a new

delivery system does not have the staff to see

that it is properly administered.
40

· Disability claimants are often referred

for rehabilitation only after they have

been found eligible for benefits. SSA

needs to conduct rigorous research on

whether and how a policy of early

referral should be implemented.

Research is also needed on possible

policy options to help individuals

maintain employment by providing

retraining or other rehabilitation

services prior to providing long-term

disability benefits.

The present system of referring individuals

for vocational rehabilitation services is often

the last step in the eligibility determination

process, and many States refer more

individuals who have been found eligible for

benefits than those whose applications for

benefits have been denied. This is consistent

with Social Securitys statutory reimbursement

scheme under which State rehabilitation

programs receive payment only for those

individuals who actually receive benefits and

who subsequently are placed in substantial

gainful activity.

It is not at all clear, however, that this is

the most helpful and appropriate approach.

Many believe that rehabilitation is more likely

to succeed if it is begun soon after the onset of

the disability. Thus, the present approach may,

for some individuals, be losing the best

opportunity to help them find productive

employment. This works to the disadvantage

of both the individual and the program.

SSA should conduct rigorous research to

determine whether and how a policy of early

referral should be implemented.

 The efforts made in other programs to get

individuals who have suffered an illness or

injury quickly back to work should be

examined. These include both State workers

compensation programs and programs

operated by the private sector.

Some countries, such as Germany and

Sweden, have policies that emphasize

intervention through retraining or

rehabilitation services before the provision of

disability benefits, thereby helping individuals

who become disabled to maintain their

employment status. We believe that it would

be valuable to examine how these policies are

working and whether they could or should be

tried in the United States. We urge SSA to

take the lead in initiating this kind of study.

SSA should conduct rigorous research to

determine whether and how a policy of

early referral should be implemented.












































































VII. PROVIDING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING

OF THE DYNAMICS OF PROGRAM CHANGES

A. FINDINGS

· Over the years there have been wide

fluctuations in the number of people

applying for and being awarded disability

benefits, as well as significant changes in

the basis for awards and in other aspects

of the disability programs. The causes of

these variations are poorly understood.

The Disability Insurance incidence rate

(the proportion of the insured population who

qualify for Disability Insurance benefits in a

year) has varied over the last quarter century in

something of a roller coaster fashion. The 1998

OASDI Trustees Report indicates that the rate

increased to a high of 7 per 1000 in 1975, then

declined to a historical low of 3 per 1000 in

1982, rose again to 5.6 percent per 1000 in

1992, and has now declined to about 4.6 per

1000. These swings have resulted in significant

changes in the cost of the program, requiring the

Congress to reallocate funds from the OASI

Trust Fund to the DI Trust Fund so that the DI

program could continue to pay benefits. This

was done most recently in 1994.

In the 1970s, there was a dramatic upswing

in the number of people applying for and being

awarded Disability Insurance benefits, causing

the benefit rolls to double over the course of the

decade. This growth coincided with the

implementation of SSI, which brought an influx

of new claims, and with economic recessions in

1969-70 and in 1974-75. The number of new

disabled-worker benefit awards declined to a low

in 1982 (also a period of economic

recession) then rose and leveled off later in the

1980s. Between 1989 and 1992, both disability

applications and awards again rose sharply. (See

Chart 5.) The number of disabled workers on

the DI program rolls grew from about 2.9

million at the end of calendar year 1989 to

almost 3.5 million at the end of 1992, and DI

benefit costs rose from $23 billion to $31 billion

over that same period. Since 1992 the number of

awards has been declining. However, the total

number of beneficiaries has continued to grow

(to 4.6 million in July 1998) because of a decline

in the disability termination rate.

Since the inception of SSI in 1974,

fluctuations in the number of people entering the

SSI disability rolls have followed a pattern

similar to that for disabled workers. However,

beginning in 1988, the growth in the SSI rolls

was even more rapid than growth in the disabled

worker rolls, and in 1990 through 1996, the

number of new SSI disability awards exceeded

the number of Social Security disability awards.

The Disability Insurance incidence rate...has varied

over the last quarter century in something of a roller

coaster fashion....These swings have resulted in

significant changes in the cost of the program....

41

Disability Awards

1974-1997

 ___ DI

 Worker

 - - - SSI

Chart 5
42

DISABILITY PROGRAM GROWTH

The Social Security Disability Insurance program and the SSI disability program

have grown substantially over the last 20 years, and continued growth is predicted.

DISABILITY INSURANCE

In 1975, the number of disabled workers receiving DI was about 2.5 million. The

estimate for 1998 is 4.7 millionan increase of 88 percent.

By 2005, it is forecast that over 6.3 million disabled workers will receive benefits.

The number will grow to 9.1 million disabled workers by 2020.

The cost of the DI program has grown from $24.9 billion in 1975 to a projected

$49.3 billion in 1998. This number is expected to grow to $67.1 billion in 2005, and

$104.9 billion in 2020. (In constant 1998 dollars.)

SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME

In 1975, the number of individuals receiving SSI based on disability was about 2.0

million. The estimate for 1998 is 5.2 million, an increase of 160 percent.

By 2005, the SSI rolls are predicted to increase to over 5.4 million. The number of

beneficiaries is expected to grow to about 6 million by 2020.

The cost of Federal SSI disability payments has grown from about $7.3 billion in

1975 to a projected $23.8 billion in 1998. This number is expected to grow to $25.7

billion in 2005, and $29 billion in 2020. (In constant 1998 dollars.)

Source: Social Security Administration, 1998

The Social Security Disability Insurance program

and the SSI disability program have grown

substantially over the last 20 years, and

continued growth is predicted.
















     

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There has been long-standing concern about

the wide fluctuations in disability program

statistics. In 1992, concerned about the recent

large increase in the cost of the DI program,

Social Securitys Board of Trustees asked SSA to

conduct a study of the causes. In 1994, the

Congress also passed legislation calling for a

study. The Social Security Administration

contracted for an outside analysis, and

subsequently issued a report which cited

economic slowdown as a factor accounting for

19 percent of the increase in DI applications.

However, the SSA report noted that the

relationship between economic factors and the

increased number of awards was not nearly as

strong as the relationship between these factors

and the increase in the number of applications.

The report cited the following as possible reasons

for the increase in DI award rates that occurred

in this period: regulatory changes, high appeal

rates and high rates of awards at the hearing

level, an increase in HIV/AIDS, efforts by States

to shift beneficiaries from State to Federal

programs, and workload pressures. There was

also a decline in DI termination rates during this

period. This decline was attributed to the

younger average age of beneficiaries (leading to a

lower rate of conversion to retirement benefits),

and a decline in the number of continuing

disability reviews conducted by the agency.

The statistics for the disability programs

show that they have experienced substantial

change in other ways as well.

From 1975 to 1997 the percent of disabled

workers awarded DI benefits by State agencies

on the basis of mental impairments grew from

11 percent to 21 percent, while the percent

awarded benefits on the basis of diseases of the

circulatory system fell from 32 percent to 14

percent. (See Chart 6.)

In 1983, 74 percent of all DI awards were

on the basis that the disability claimant met

SSAs medical listings, and only 18 percent

were on the basis of vocational factors. By

1997, only 53 percent of awards were found to

meet the medical listings, while awards based on

vocational factors had grown to 37 percent.

(See Chart 7.)

In 1980, State DDS initial allowance

rates for DI and SSI disability claims stood at

33 percent. They grew to 43 percent in 1992

and fell to 30 percent in 1997. Allowance

rates by Administrative Law Judges for DI

and SSI disability claims have followed a

similar pattern of growth and contraction.

(See Chart 8.)

43

Chart 7

Basis for State Agency DI Awards

1995-1997

Trend in State Agency DI Awards by

Major Cause of Disability

1975-1997

Chart 6
· Little research has been done to help

policy makers understand the reasons for

these changes in the disability programs.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Social Security

Administration conducted periodic comprehensive

surveys to measure the prevalence of work

disability in the general population and to assess

the role of the disability program in meeting the

needs of people with disabilities. No comparable

data have been collected since 1978.

Subsequently, discrete, limited studies have

been done at various times to ascertain reasons

for the rise and fall in disability incidence rates

and in applications and awards. As noted above,

these studies, including one done under contract

for SSA following the most recent surge in

program growth, point to economic fluctuation as

one factor explaining trends in disability

applications and awards. However, there has

been no systematic exploration of this and other

causative factors. The resulting lack of data and

analysis makes it impossible to project the future

size, cost, and composition of the disability

program with confidence.

Moreover, despite the many problems facing

the disability programs, policy makers do not

have data regarding the size of the potentially

eligible populationthat is, the number of

people with disabilities who might meet the

current (or alternative) medical, functional, and

vocational requirements for becoming eligible

for benefits. In the absence of this information,

little is known about the economic, personal,

and job-related factors that distinguish those

who apply for benefits from those who remain

in the labor force. It is not possible to answer

questions about how such factors as employer

accommodations, access to health insurance,

availability of assistive services, and public

perception about the accessibility and adequacy

of disability benefits affect an individuals

decision to apply for benefits.

There has also been no systematic study of

the reasons for such important changes in

program decision making as those described

above, relating to the reasons for impairment,

medical versus vocational factors, and the level

at which benefits are awarded.

The lack of information on these factors

exacerbates the difficulty of estimating the costs

of the disability programs and limits the ability

of policy makers to assess the impact of policy

options. It also makes it difficult to evaluate

State agency allowance and denial rate

variations to determine whether they reflect a

weakness in administration or are justified by

demographic and economic differences.

Although SSA has conducted several

demonstration projects of various return-towork strategies, there is still a gap in

knowledge about the circumstances under

which beneficiaries leave the rolls due to return

to work without having medically recovered.

For the most part, these experiments have not

been conducted in a rigorous manner and have

not been rigorously evaluated. Thus, they have

yielded little useful information about

beneficiaries capacity to work and the efficacy

of various types of intervention in facilitating

successful work efforts. The lack of knowledge

in this area has meant that policy makers have

largely had to rely on anecdotal evidence to

assess proposals to provide support to

beneficiaries attempting to return to work.

44









































































































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* Includes decisions regarding continued eligibility as well as new

claims. FY 1980-1982 do not include SSI-only cases.

** Includes all OASDI and SSI cases reaching the hearing stage.

 The vast majority involve disability issues.

Percent of DI and SSI Claims Approved

At Each Level of Decision Making

Fiscal Years 1977-1997

Chart 8
45

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

· The Disability Evaluation Study, now in its

early phases, should be carefully designed

and conducted. SSA should consider

modifying the study to include longitudinal

analysis.

The Disability Evaluation Study (DES)

represents an ambitious effort by SSA to obtain

information needed for policy assessment,

particularly data regarding the potential number

of individuals who may be eligible for the

disability programs. The study is based on a

complex nationwide survey design which seeks to

address four general questions: (1) What is the

number of non-beneficiaries who, but for work or

other reasons, are disabled for Social Security

purposes? (2) What enables disabled people to

remain in the workforce? (3) How can SSA costeffectively monitor future changes in disability

incidence? (4) How many persons, and what

types of persons, would be affected by any

change in the disability process? The DES

involves a major investment of SSA research

funds$40 million over a period of 7 years.

SSA needs to assure that such a massive

undertaking is based on statistically sound design

and valid survey methodology. The agency has a

contract with the National Research Council of

the National Academy of Sciences to advise on

survey methodology. The committee reviewing

the DES has expressed concern about conflicting

goals for the study, problems in the survey design

(especially inadequate sample size), the lack of

adequate research capacity within SSA to enable

the agency to undertake the additional research

needed, and unrealistic time frames for

completion of the study and its evaluation.

Although SSA has addressed some of these

concerns, the agency needs to continue to focus

on correcting remaining deficiencies before the

DES has progressed beyond the point where

changes can be made. The public, researchers,

and policy makers will not be well served unless

this very major effort produces data that are

widely accepted as being reliable.

The Board is also aware that the history of

the disability programs suggests that they are

subject to trends and influences that need to be

carefully assessed and monitored over time.

Thus, we believe that the need for the type of

information sought through the DES will be

ongoing and that the value of the DES will be

limited if the survey is not repeated on a subsample basis in future years. Longitudinal data

on the size and characteristics of the disabled

population would be extremely useful to both

policy makers and administrators.

· SSA should initiate other research efforts

to help policy makers understand changes

in program dynamics and how to respond

to them, and the impact of possible future

changes in disability policies and

administration.

The Board believes that SSA should closely

monitor changes in the disability rolls and adapt

its research program so as to be able to explain

to policy makers why they are occurring and

whether they provide the basis for new and

alternative policies to address the needs of

individuals with differing types of disabilities.

Research is needed on whether public

perceptions of the ease or difficulty of obtaining

benefits affect application rates. Other

questions needing answers are the extent to

which changing emphases in program

Longitudinal data on the size and characteristics

of the disabled population would be extremely

useful to both policy makers and administrators.
46

administration (e.g., changes in quality assurance

reviews) influence application rates, award rates,

and the basis for decisions.

Another important area for research is how

future changes in policy, such as different

eligibility criteria, temporary benefit periods,

increased rehabilitation and employment

opportunities, and health insurance coverage,

would affect program participation. There is

also a need for research on the impact on the

employment of disabled individuals of changes in

the nature of work (including skills and

education requirements) as jobs in the services

economy increase and jobs in manufacturing and

production decrease. The disability population is

heterogeneous. Research is needed on specific

populations, including children, women, and

minorities; differences between categories of

impairments; and differences in age groups.

Research is also needed on changes in types of

impairments.

There will be mounting pressures on the

disability programs as the baby boom generation

enters its disability-prone years and as the

scheduled increase in the normal age of eligibility

for full Social Security benefits

(from 65 to 67) begins to be phased in beginning

in 2000. The increase in the retirement age will

mean that Social Security retirement benefits

will replace a lower percentage of benefits for

future retirees than is currently the case, thus

increasing the relative value of acquiring

disability entitlement.

Similarly, the Board expects that proposals

to further increase the retirement age beyond age

67, to accelerate the phase-in of the already

scheduled increase, or to increase the early

retirement age beyond the current age 62 will

continue to be part of the public debate about

ways to restore solvency to the Social Security

retirement program. Policy makers will need

answers to a variety of questions over the next

several years about the interface of disability and

retirement.

The Board recommends, therefore, that SSA

undertake research aimed at developing a better

understanding of the relationship of the health

status of workers to retirement decisions. This

research should also explore the likely responses

of employers to an aging work force, including

to workers who experience a decline in health.

Advance understanding of the motivations of

both workers and employers will be critical to

the timely development of policy options that are

responsible and cost-effective.

Policy makers will need answers to a variety

of questions over the next several years

about the interface of disability and retirement.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Although all of the recommendations in this report are important, they are not of equal weight.

In our view, the agency should give priority to the following recommendations. They are all elements

of SSAs Disability Redesign plan:

47

Little can be achieved...unless the agency

strengthens and rebuilds its disability staff. SSAs

current resources are too few. There are not enough

trained and experienced staff to assess the changing

needs of the disability programs and to oversee change.

We believe these recommendations are essential to fair and consistent decision making and will be

widely supported.

Little can be achieved, however, unless the agency strengthens and rebuilds its disability staff.

SSAs current resources are too few. There are not enough trained and experienced staff to assess the

changing needs of the disability programs and to oversee change. The agency needs to make the

Office of Disability an attractive place to work. For too many years this office has been regarded as a

place where careers cannot flourish and work goes unappreciated. This situation must be turned

around as rapidly as possible. The agency badly needs to recruit and maintain a disability staff with

the highest possible level of expertise. It should look both within and outside the agency for this new

staff.

· development and implementation of an on-going joint training

program for all adjudicators;

· development of a single presentation of disability policy that is

binding on all decision makers, including the updating of

medical listings and vocational standards;

· development and implementation of a quality assurance system

that will unify the application of policy throughout the

disability determination system;

· improvement in the quality of medical evidence that is used in

determining disability claims; and

· development and implementation of a computer system that

will provide adequate support to all elements of the disability

claims process.
48

The agency also needs to consult with all the parties that are involved in the Disability Redesign

project as it brings this project to closure. They should be given access to the Redesign test data so

that they can make their own assessments of the test results. Bringing the Redesign project to a

conclusion openly and forthrightly is an important first step in generating the support of all the

participants in the process so that together they can move forward with the changes that need to be

made.

As we have made clear in this report, the problems of the disability programs have existed over a

long period of time and will be resolved only by steady progress over a number of years. Former

Commissioner of Social Security Shirley Chater undertook an initiative to improve the disability

determination process, but left office before the project was completed. There is a critical need now

to move forward as quickly as possible with the process of change. It will be important for the

present Commissioner to set in motion the changes that he determines need to be made so that there

will be a solid base for making future improvements. Because it will take time to get new staff in

place and to do the complex work that is needed, the job cannot be completed within his remaining

term of a little more than two years. But staff can be put in place, and substantial progress can be

made in updating listings, issuing a single presentation of policy, implementing new programs for

training and quality assurance, improving the quality of medical evidence, and implementing a new

computer system to support all parts of the disability claims process. If all these changes are well

under way, it should be possible for the programs to be transformed during the next statutory term of

the Commissioner which begins in 2001.

If pursued with energy and commitment, we believe our recommendations will be beneficial. But

the Social Security Administration cannot be timid or passive in the face of the challenges it

confronts. It must make bold decisions and carry them out with resolve and dispatch. Creative

leadership will need to be sustained over a considerable period to meet the formidable challenges

presented by the disability programs.

...the problems of the disability programs have existed

over a long period of time and will be resolved only

by steady progress over a number of years....There is a

critical need now to move forward as quickly as

possible with the process of change.
APPENDIX

A. THE CURRENT DISABILITY DETERMINATION

PROCESS AND HOW IT WOULD BE CHANGED

UNDER DISABILITY REDESIGN

BACKGROUND

In 1994, the Social Security Administration

made public a proposal to redesign its process

for making Social Security disability

determinations. Citing that a claimant for

disability benefits from the Social Security

Administration faces a lengthy, bewildering

process and that the agency had reached a

critical juncture; disability claims receipts at the

initial claims and appeals levels have reached all

time highs, SSA proposed to reengineer the

entire processto look at every aspect except:

the statutory definition of disability; individual

benefit amounts; the use of an Administrative

Law Judge as the presiding officer for

administrative hearings; and vocational

rehabilitation for beneficiaries.

The Disability Process Reengineering Team,

the group assigned the redesign effort, focused

its work entirely on the disability process, and

did not address the organizational issues that

might arise. (For example, the redesign

proposal includes new functional positions but

does not indicate which component or

components would carry out these

responsibilities.) The team solicited ideas from

a broad cross section of those who work with

the process, including members of the public.

The objectives of the redesign proposal

were to make the redesigned process user

friendly for claimants and those who assist

them, to make the right decision the first time,

to make the decision and pay claims quickly, to

make the process efficient, and to make the work

satisfying for employees. In addition, SSA

outlined the expectation goals for the proposal as:

the recommendations for change, taken as a whole,

should not cause changes in benefit outlays unless

as a necessary result of improvements in service

(such as more timely processing and payment of

claims); and process changes should improve

service and/or productivity, on a combined basis,

by at least 25 percent by the end of fiscal year

1997 over levels projected in the fiscal year 1994

budget without a decrease in decisional accuracy.

By fiscal year 2000, additional actions, including

any necessary statutory and regulatory changes,

should provide a further 25 percent improvement.

Since 1994, SSA has been testing many of the

initiatives outlined in the proposal, and has said

that decisions will be made in the near future on

whether to implement some of them on a

permanent basis.

THE CURRENT PROCESS

Initial Application

A claimant files an application for Social

Security Disability Insurance (DI) and

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability

benefits in one of SSAs 1,300 field offices. After

the claimant completes the application, SSA staff

49
screen it for nondisability requirements. For DI

cases, these requirements include such factors as

whether the claimant is insured, and, if

appropriate, the claimants relationship to the

wage earner. In SSI cases, individuals must

provide proof of citizenship status, and

document their income and resource status.

The SSA office sends the application to its

State Disability Determination Services (DDS),

which makes disability determinations using

SSAs regulations, performance standards,

administrative requirements and procedures.

There, a team consisting of a disability

evaluation specialist and a physician (or

psychologist) considers the facts in the case and

determines whether the claimant is disabled

under the Social Security law.

A claimant is responsible for providing

medical evidence showing that he or she has an

impairment(s) and how severe the impairments(s)

is. If necessary, DDS officials will help

claimants get medical reports from the

claimants physicians and hospitals, clinics, or

institutions where the person has been treated.

The government pays a reasonable charge (set

by each State) for any medical reports that it

needs and requests.

If additional medical information is needed

before the DDS team can decide a case, the

claimant may be asked to take a special

examination called a consultative examination.

SSA pays for the examination or any other

additional medical tests needed, and for certain

related travel expenses.

Once a decision is rendered, the claimant

receives a written notice from SSA. If the claim

is approved, the notice shows the amount of the

benefit and when payments start. If it is not

approved, the notice explains why.

Appeals

Individuals who receive an unfavorable

initial disability decision have the right to an

appeal. There are four levels of appeal: (1)

50

reconsideration; (2) hearing by an Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ); (3) review by the Appeals

Council; and (4) Federal court review. At each

level of appeal, claimants or their appointed

representative must file the appeal request in

writing within 60 days from the date the notice of

unfavorable decision is received.

Reconsideration

The reconsideration process is similar to the

initial determination process except that a

different team at the DDS reviews the case. The

team examines all of the evidence that was

submitted when the original decision was made

plus any new evidence.

Administrative Law Judge Hearing

If the reconsideration team concurs with the

initial denial of benefits, the individual may

request a formal hearing before an ALJ in the

Office of Hearings and Appeals. There are 143

hearing offices located throughout the nation.

Hearings are usually held within 75 miles of the

claimants home.

The claimant may request either an oral

hearing or have the ALJ issue a decision based on

evidence already in the record. The ALJ may

request medical and vocational experts to testify at

the hearing, and may require the individual to

undergo a consultative medical examination. The

claimant may submit additional evidence, produce

witnesses, and be represented by legal counsel or

lay persons.

Appeals Council Review

The final administrative appeals step is a

request by the claimant for the Appeals Council to

review the ALJ decision. The Appeals Council

may also, on its own motion, review a decision

within 60 days of the ALJs decision.

The Appeals Council considers the evidence

of record, any additional evidence submitted by

the claimant, and the ALJs findings and

conclusions. The Council may grant, deny, or
dismiss a request for review. If it agrees to

review the case, the Council may uphold,

modify, or reverse the ALJs action or remand

the case to an ALJ for further consideration.

Federal District Court

If the Appeals Council affirms the denial of

benefits or refuses to review the case, further

appeal may be made through the Federal District

Courts. In 1997, 12,523 cases, or 18 percent of

Appeals Council denials, were appealed to the

courts.

THE REDESIGNED PROCESS

Initial Application

Under the proposed redesigned process, a

claimant would still file a claim for disability

benefits through the local Social Security office.

However, unlike the current process, the

claimant would have a single point of contact

a Disability Claim Manager (DCM)during the

initial application process. The DCM would

handle all medical and nonmedical aspects of the

claim, including the determination of nonmedical

and medical eligibility. The DCM would be

responsible for the claim throughout the initial

decision making process, and would help the

claimant get additional medical evidence or

other required documents if necessary.

If the DCM decides that the case evidence

does not support an allowance, a predecision

notice would be issued advising the claimant of

what evidence has been considered, and offering

the claimant the opportunity to submit further

evidence. The predecision notice would also

offer the claimant a personal interview to

discuss the case. After reviewing any additional

evidence that the claimant submits, the DCM

would issue a decision.

Appeals

51

Adjudication Officer

The reconsideration process would be

eliminated under the redesigned process. If the

claimant disagrees with the initial determination

made by the DCM, he or she could request a

hearing before an ALJ. Prior to the hearing,

however, the case would be given to an

adjudication officer (AO), who would be the

focal point for all prehearing activities

identifying the issues in dispute, explaining the

hearing process to the claimant, obtaining

additional evidence if needed, and scheduling the

hearing.

The AO would have full authority to issue a

revised favorable decision if the evidence

warrants, without an ALJ hearing. However, if a

favorable decision cannot be issued, the AO

would refer the prepared record, after completing

all evidentiary development, to an ALJ.

Administrative Law Judge Hearing

A hearing before an ALJ would remain an

informal adjudicatory proceeding as it is under

the current process. However, under the new

process, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the

ALJs decision, the claimants next level of

appeal would be to Federal District Court. A

claimants request for Appeals Council review

would no longer be a prerequisite to seeking

judicial review.

Appeals Council Review

As under the current process, the Appeals

Council would continue to have a role in

ensuring that claims subject to judicial review

have properly prepared records and that the

Federal courts only consider claims where

appellate review is warranted. Accordingly,

the Appeals Council, working with SSA counsel,

would evaluate all claims in which a civil action
has been filed and decide, within a fixed time

limit, whether it wished to defend the ALJs

decision as the final decision of the Secretary.

Additionally, the Appeals Council would

have a role in a comprehensive quality

assurance system. The Appeals Council would

conduct own motion reviews of ALJ decisions

(both allowances and denials) and dismissals

prior to effectuation. If it decides to review a

claim on its own motion, the Appeals Council

could affirm, reverse, or remand the ALJs

decision, or vacate the dismissal.

OTHER MAJOR CHANGES

Process Unification

Disability adjudicators currently use

different policy source documents when making

disability determinationsALJs and members

of the Appeals Council rely on regulations,

Social Security Rulings, and Acquiescence

Rulings, while the DDSs use administrative

publications such as the Program Operations

Manual System. SSA would develop a single

presentation of the disability determination

policies with the objective of giving DDS

adjudicators and ALJs a single source of policy,

the One Book.

In addition, the Process Unification

initiative calls for joint training of DDS

adjudicators and ALJs, and enhanced decision

rationales and documentation at the DDS level.

52

New Disability Decision Methodology

SSA currently uses a sequential evaluation

to determine disability. At one step in the

process, adjudicators must determine whether

the claimant meets or equals a highly

detailed set of medical listings that the agency

publishes in regulations. These listings contain

over 100 examples of medical conditions that

would ordinarily prevent an individual from

engaging in any substantial gainful activity.

Under the redesigned disability process,

SSA would develop a new decision

methodology that would largely replace the

medical listings with new, standardized

measures of an individuals ability to function

that are expected to be simpler.

Quality Assurance System

Currently, decisions made by the DDSs and

the ALJs are evaluated by different SSA

reviewers, whose training and experience may

differ widely. The redesigned process would

feature a uniform quality assurance system that

would be applied to both DDS and ALJ

decisions. The new approach would feature an

in-line review system, thus allowing cases to be

reviewed before they are effectuated. In

addition, the new approach would include

comprehensive review of the whole

adjudicatory process to provide feedback on the

application of agency policies at all levels of

the decision making process.
Overview

All modern industrialized countries attempt to

protect workers against economic hardships

caused by job loss due to disability. The level of

protection, the administrative mechanisms used to

provide it, and the role played by the government

in establishing disability policy in each country

vary substantially. However, as reflected in the

table below with respect to five illustrative

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) member nations, most

industrialized countries have experienced

increases in the numbers of workers applying for

and becoming entitled to public disability benefits

over the past 25 years.

Disability Recipients Per Thousand

Active Labor Force Participants

Aged 15-64 in Five OECD Countries,

1970-1995*

 1970 1980 1990 1995

 The Netherlands 55 138 152 142

 United States 27 41 43 64

 United Kingdom 29 31 68 na

 Germany 51 49 55 47

 Sweden 49 68 78 106

*Includes both long-term and short-term disability

 transfers. The U.S. has no public short-term transfers.

There are many theories about the causes of

this phenomenon and no agreement about precise

correlation with economic trends. Nevertheless,

there is some consensus around the theory that

attempts by industrialized countries to integrate

large numbers of women and baby boomers

53

into their economies, without having unacceptably

high unemployment levels, resulted in pressures to

provide greater protection under disability

programs for older and less healthy workers who

were displaced.

The Netherlands, in fact, actively used

disability benefits to reduce unemployment, even

for those under age 45. Germany, Sweden, and the

United Kingdom relaxed eligibility standards for

disability in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but

only for older workers.

In the United States, the disability rolls grew

rapidly in the 1970s. In 1980, Congress initiated

measures to tighten program administration. The

proportion of working age people on the disability

rolls then remained stable in the U.S. and did not

change dramatically until the late 1980s, when a

combination of factors appear to have led to

substantial program expansion.

The reasons for program growth in the United

States that are most commonly cited are: economic

slowdown; aging of the population; legislative,

regulatory and court actions that made it easier to

get on the rolls and harder to be taken off; efforts

by States to move assistance recipients into Federal

programs; SSA outreach efforts; a somewhat more

favorable adjudicative climate; and shifts in

public attitudes toward receipt of benefits.

Role of Disability Policy

There is no evidence that either the underlying

health status of a population or the physical and

mental demands of employment varies much across

industrialized countries. Thus the differences in

disability experience noted appear to stem from

each countrys disability policies and the relative

generosity of disability benefits as compared to

potential earnings from work and to other forms of

income support.

There are notable differences in the disability

policies of the countries looked at by the OECD.

B. DISABILITY BENEFITS:

 THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
54

Most European countries, including the four

looked at by the OECD, provide some type of

sickness benefit to replace lost wages during

short-term illnesses and during the first few weeks

or months of longer-term illnesses. In the United

States such short-term benefits are generally

provided, if at all, by employers or through private

insurance policies held by workers. In addition,

there are some State-sponsored programs.

The percentage of earnings replaced by

disability benefits varies from very high (as much

as 80 to 90 percent) in countries like the

Netherlands and Sweden, to relatively low (about

40 percent) in countries like the United Kingdom

and the United States. Some countries provide

benefits to people with only partial disabilitiesthe

Netherlands, Sweden, and Germany--while others

provide benefits only to those who are fully

disabledthe United States and the United

Kingdom.

In addition, the degree of autonomy of the

administrative gatekeepers who determine who

receives disability benefits varies among countries.

Likewise there are differences in the resources

devoted to and the amount of emphasis put on

rehabilitation in each country, and in the timing of

rehabilitation efforts.

Disability Reform Efforts

The country that has taken the most dramatic

steps to reform its disability program is the

Netherlands. In 1994, for every 5 workers who

were employed in Holland, there was one individual

on the disability rolls, a situation that contributed

greatly to an upward spiral in Social Security

spending (from 11.9 percent of GDP in 1970 to 18

percent in 1994). This situation was unacceptable

to Dutch legislators, who enacted a number of

provisions designed to restrict eligibility to benefits

and to limit the duration and level of compensation.

Specifically, the new law includes provisions which:

· award benefits only on a temporary basis

(up to 5 years) with continuing entitlement

during that period dependent on periodic

examinations ( a new application for

benefits may be filed after 5 years by those

who remain disabled);

· lower the replacement rate to 70 percent

from the previous 80 percent;

· link the amount and duration of benefits for

persons under age 50 to the claimants age

and previous work experience; and

· require all persons under age 50 who were

receiving benefits prior to August 1, 1993

to be reassessed under the new criteria.

Subsequently, major changes were made in the

administrative structure of the Dutch disability

program to eliminate what was seen as lax practice

on the part of the previous administrators.

Taken together, the Dutch reforms appear to

have had some success. In 1994, the year following

enactment, benefit terminations due to recovery

increased by about 40 percent and annual awards

decreased by about 15 percent. However, the

proportion of the working age population that

remained on the rolls was still quite high (about 13

percent).

Both Germany and Sweden introduced changes

in the 1990s that were designed to limit growth in

their disability rolls, but which were more subtle

than the Dutch reforms. In these countries, much

greater emphasis was placed on work continuation

and retraining of workers, with rehabilitation

before pensions being an oft-quoted goal in both

countries. Similarly, the United Kingdom has

expanded its already substantial rehabilitation

programs and has also initiated some eligibility

tightening measures over the last few years.

After several years of modest growth following

the legislation of 1984, the United States again

experienced rapid growth in the disability rolls in

the early 1990s. In response, steps have since been

taken to increase the number of continuing

eligibility reviews, which had declined significantly.

Also, in line with the countrys heightened

awareness of the rights of the disabled as reflected

in the Americans with Disabilities Act, there is

increased interest in developing early intervention

and return-to-work strategies.
C. COMPONENTS WITHIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION WITH RESPONSIBILITIES

IN THE DISABILITY PROCESS

Nearly every staff component of the Social Security Administration has a role in administering the

Social Security disability program. SSA employees are involved in many facets of the process, from

writing informational pamphlets to holding administrative hearings. Outlined below is a list of SSA

staff components and their responsibilities in the disability process. The numbers of staff shown are

totals; not all work on disability issues.

Office of Operations (49,370 employees)

· With input from other SSA components, the Office of Operations oversees the operation of SSAs

field and regional offices

· SSAs front-line to the public: field office staffs take disability claims, provide information to

claimants and potential claimants, and meet with the public to provide information about the

disability programs

· Regional office staffs answer field office and Disability Determination Services (DDS) questions

concerning disability policy

· Regional offices have oversight responsibilities of the DDSs in their regions. They are the frontline liaisons between SSA and the DDSs. Some of their duties include: addressing DDS workload

issues (working with DDSs to prioritize their workloads); addressing DDS technology support

issues; monitoring DDS activity.

Office of Disability (294 employees)

· Serves as primary liaison between SSA and the DDSs on all budgetary, policy and systems issues

· Writes and interprets disability policy for the agency, based on court decisions, Congressional

mandates and agency initiatives

· Works with the Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs and provides policy expertise in

writing legislative proposals

· Answers questions from regional offices and field offices about disability policy

· Submits budget proposals to SSAs Office of Budget for disability programs, initiatives and

mandates. Also submits budgets for DDS operations, based on input from the DDSs

· Handles DDS policy and budget issues. Conducts fiscal reviews of the DDSs

· Works with the DDSs and the Office of Systems on technology issues, such as standardizing

technology used by the DDSs

· Has responsibility for training adjudicators on disability issues

Office of Hearings and Appeals (8,128 employees)

· Manages the hearing offices and the Appeals Council, where Administrative Law Judges and

Administrative Appeals Judges render disability decisions

· With the Office of Disability and often the Litigation Staff, writes and interprets disability policy

for the agency (particularly for the hearing offices and the Appeals Council)

· Keeps statistics on hearing office decisions, most of which relate to disability claims

· Maintains the hearings and appeals procedural manual

· Works with the Office of General Counsel on responding to court cases, and preparing SSAs

defense of court cases

55
56

Litigation Staff (30 employees)

· This component, which is within the Office of Disability and Income Security Programs, works with

the Office of General Counsel on responding to court cases, and preparing SSAs defense of court

cases

· With the Office of Disability and the Office of Hearings and Appeals, assists in developing policies

and procedures to comply with court decisions

Office of Policy (including the Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics (149 employees)

· Studies big picture disability issues (e.g., the effects of raising the retirement age on the Disability

Insurance program) and works with other SSA components, Congress, advocates, and other

government agencies to develop policy alternatives

· Collects data related to Social Security disability programs, such as the number of people receiving

benefits, and their demographic breakouts. Evaluates data for planning and other informational

purposes

· Plans, coordinates, conducts, and contracts out studies of the disability program for planning and

evaluation purposes

· Responsible for the Disability Evaluation Study

Office of the Commissioner (65 employees)

· The Disability Process Redesign Team is responsible for Disability Redesign. This entails

establishing the work plan and strategies for the various initiatives and working with all affected

SSA components (Office of Operations, Office of Disability, DDSs, etc.) to carry them out

· The Office of Strategic Management coordinates with all SSA components to write and manage

SSAs Strategic Plan, including all disability initiatives

Office of General Counsel (505 employees)

· Defends SSA in disability cases before the courts

· Works with other SSA components to write and interpret disability policy for the agency, based on

court decisions, Congressional mandates, agency initiatives

Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs (63 employees)

· With input from other SSA components, develops legislative proposals regarding the disability

programs

· Analyzes Congressional and other proposals for changes in the disability programs

· Responds to Congressional inquiries concerning disability issues

· Meets with Congressional staffs to inform them of SSAs proposals and respond to questions raised

about the disability programs

· Answers questions from other SSA components regarding disability legislation

· Responds to other government organizations (e.g., the White House) about disability issues

Office of Communications (186 employees)

· Produces pamphlets, booklets, fact sheets, videos, information kits about disability benefits

· Responds to public inquiries about disability benefits and claims

· Primary liaison with disability advocates
57

· Acts as a liaison to other government and non-governmental agencies regarding SSA activities

· Works with the Press to address disability issues

· Writes speeches for SSA staff to use when addressing the public

Office of the Chief Actuary (46 employees)

· Prepares long- and short-range estimates regarding prevalence of disability, numbers of

disability applicants, beneficiaries, etc.

· Prepares long- and short-range estimates of the disability trust fund

· Prepares cost estimates for legislative proposals

· Provides program and other statistics to other SSA components for use in conducting studies,

audits, writing policy

Office of Finance, Assessment, and Management (2,500 employees)

· The Office of Budget prepares budgets and FTE allocations for the Offices of Operations,

Disability, and Hearings and Appeals, as well as the DDSs

· The Office of Quality Assurance and Performance Assessment, through Disability Quality

Branches, performs quality assurance reviews, including pre-effectuation reviews, for the

DDSs, and a post-effectuation review of Administrative Law Judge decisions

· The Office of Quality Assurance and Performance Assessment also performs other, more global

reviews of SSA programs, such as looking at discrepancies of disability allowance and

disallowance rates throughout the claims process and among different regions; analyzes the

effects of Disability Redesign initiatives.

· With input from other SSA components, prepares and manages contracts and grants for

research projects, etc. that relate to disability

· Manages office space (Baltimore and Washington, D.C.) where people performing disabilityrelated work are housed. Also works with regional office and field office staff in securing and

managing office space

Office of Inspector General (394 employees)

· Conducts audits of disability programs to ensure program integrity and program directives are

met

· Conducts fraud investigations of disability-related cases and issues

Office of Systems (2,838 employees)

· Coordinates planning and implementation of SSAs computer infrastructure. Most claims

disability claims includedare taken on the computer

· Responsible for development of the Redesigned Disability System which will provide a single

system for field offices, DDSs, and the Office of Hearings and Appeals, with a goal of

eliminating paper processing

· Transmits communications (e.g., emergency instructions, Commissioners broadcasts, and

administrative messages) to all SSA and DDS offices

Office of Human Resources (509 employees)

· Responsible for personnel services for the components that handle disability issues

· Plans and conducts training on non-disability issues
58

THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

Establishment of the Board

In 1994, when the Congress passed legislation establishing the Social Security Administration as

an independent agency, it also created a 7-member bipartisan Advisory Board to advise the President,

the Congress, and the Commissioner of Social Security on matters relating to the Social Security and

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. The conference report on this legislation passed both

Houses of Congress without opposition. President Clinton signed the Social Security Independence

and Program Improvements Act of 1994 into law on August 15, 1994 (P.L. 103-296).

Advisory Board members are appointed to 6-year terms, made up as follows: 3 appointed by the

President (no more than 2 from the same political party); and 2 each (no more than one from the

same political party) by the Speaker of the House (in consultation with the Chairman and Ranking

Minority Member of the Committee on Ways and Means) and by the President pro tempore of the

Senate (in consultation with the Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the Committee on

Finance). Presidential appointees are subject to Senate confirmation.

Board members serve staggered terms. The statute provides that the initial members of the Board

serve terms that expire over the course of the first 6-year period. The first 2 members terms expired

September 30, 1996 and September 30, 1997, respectively. The Board currently has 2 vacancies.

The Chairman of the Board is appointed by the President for a 4-year term, coincident with the

term of the President, or until the designation of a successor.

Members of the Board

Stanford G. Ross, Chair

Stanford Ross is a partner in the law firm of Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C. He has dealt

extensively with public policy issues while serving in the Treasury Department, on the White House

domestic policy staff, as Commissioner of Social Security, and as Public Trustee of the Social

Security and Medicare Trust Funds. He is a Founding Member and a former Director and President

of the National Academy of Social Insurance. He has provided technical assistance on Social

Security and tax issues under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and U.S.

Treasury Department to various foreign countries. He has taught at the law schools of Georgetown

University, Harvard University, New York University, and the University of Virginia, and has been a

Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is the author of many papers on

Federal taxation and income security subjects.

Jo Anne Barnhart

Ms. Barnhart is a political and public policy consultant to State and local governments on

welfare and social services program design, policy, implementation, evaluation, and legislation.

From 1990 to 1993 she served as Assistant Secretary for Children and Families, Department of

Health and Human Services, overseeing more than 65 programs, including Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program, Child Support

Enforcement, and various child care programs. Previously, she was Minority Staff Director for the

U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and legislative assistant for domestic policy issues

for Senator William V. Roth. Most recently, Ms. Barnhart served as Political Director for the

National Republican Senatorial Committee.

Lori L. Hansen

Ms. Hansen is a Policy Analyst at the National Academy of Social Insurance. She was a

Technical Assistant to former Social Security Commissioner Robert Ball in his capacity as a member

of the National Commission on Social Security Reform. She was also a Special Assistant to the

President and Director of Government Affairs at the Legal Services Corporation. In addition,

Ms. Hansen was a senior professional staff member on the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and

Human Resources, Subcommittee on Employment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor, and was legislative

assistant to Senator Gaylord Nelson, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security of the

Senate Committee on Finance. She also served on the professional staff of the Senate Select

Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs.

Martha Keys

Martha Keys served as a U.S. Representative in the 94th and 95th Congresses. She was a

member of the House Ways and Means Committee and its Subcommittees on Health and Public

Assistance and Unemployment Compensation. Ms. Keys also served on the Select Committee on

Welfare Reform. She served in the executive branch as Special Advisor to the Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare and as Assistant Secretary of Education. She was a member of the 1983

National Commission (Greenspan) on Social Security Reform. Martha Keys is currently consulting

on public policy issues. She has held executive positions in the non-profit sector, lectured widely on

public policy in universities, and served on the National Council on Aging and other Boards.

Ms. Keys is the author of Planning for Retirement: Everywomans Legal Guide.

Sylvester J. Schieber

Mr. Schieber is Director of the Research and Information Center at Watson Wyatt Worldwide,

where he specializes in analysis of public and private retirement policy issues and the development of

special surveys and data files. From 1981 to 1983 Mr. Schieber was the Director of Research at the

Employee Benefit Research Institute. Earlier, he worked for the Social Security Administration as an

economic analyst and as Deputy Director at the Office of Policy Analysis. Mr. Schieber is the author

of numerous journal articles, policy analysis papers, and three books including: Retirement Income

Opportunities in An Aging America: Coverage and Benefit Entitlement, and Social Security:

Perspectives on Preserving the System. He served on the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social

Security. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame.

Members of the Staff

Margaret S. Malone, Staff Director

 Peggy S. Fisher

 Joyce Manchester

 Beverly Rollins

 Wayne Sulfridge

 Jean Von Ancken

59
SELECTED READINGS ON THE DISABILITY PROGRAMS

Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. Managing the Social

Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Social

Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, One Hundred

Fourth Congress, First Session, May 23, 24, and August 3, 1995. Serial 104-26.

Congressional Research Service. Status of the Disability Programs of the Social Security

Administration, 1994. June 6, 1994.

Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration. Plan for a New

Disability Claim Process. September 1994.

Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration. Report of the

Disability Advisory Council. March 11, 1988.

General Accounting Office. Social Security: Disability Rolls Keep Growing, While

Explanations Remain Elusive. HEHS-94-34. February 1994.

General Accounting Office. Social Security Disability: Improvements Needed to Continuing

Disability Review Process. HEHS-97-1. October 1997.

General Accounting Office. Social Security Disability: SSA Is Making Progress Toward

Eliminating Continuing Disability Review Backlogs. Testimony before the Subcommittee

on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives. THEHS-97-222. September 25, 1997.

General Accounting Office. Social Security Disability: SSA Must Hold Itself Accountable

for Continued Improvement in Decision-Making. HEHS-97-102. August 1997.

General Accounting Office. SSA Disability Redesign: Focus Needed on Initiatives Most

Crucial to Reducing Costs and Time. HEHS-97-20. December 1997.

General Accounting Office. Supplemental Security Income: SSA Needs a Uniform Standard

for Assessing Childhood Disability. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Social

Security and Family Policy, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate. T-HEHS-98-206.

July 7, 1998.

Lewin-VHI, Inc. Labor Market Conditions, Socioeconomic Factors, and the Growth of

Applications and Awards for SSDI and SSI Disability Benefits. Final Report.

May 23, 1995.

Mashaw, Jerry, Virginia Reno, Richard Burkhauser, & Monroe Berkowitz (Eds.). Disability,

Work, and Cash Benefits. 1996.

National Academy of Social Insurance. Balancing Security and Opportunity: The Challenge

of Disability Income Policy. Report of the Disability Policy Panel. 1996.

Weaver, Carolyn (Ed.). Disability and Work: Incentives, Rights, and Opportunities. 1991.
Social Security Advisory Board

400 Virginia Avenue, SW

Suite 625

Washington, D.C. 20024

Tel: (202) 475-7700

Fax: (202) 475-7715

CHARACTERISTICS OF DISABILITY BENEFICIARIES

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE (DI)

Age:

Disability Insurance benefits are being awarded to workers at a younger age. In 1996, the

average age for a worker awarded DI benefits was about 49, compared to about 52 in 1976,

and about 53 in 1965. In 1996, 23 percent of the males and 20 percent of the females awarded

DI benefits were under age 40. In 1976, 16 percent of males and 14 percent of females were

under age 40. In 1965, 10 percent of males and 8 percent of females were under that age.

Impairment:

Over the years, the basis for award of DI benefits has changed. In 1996, more than one-fifth

(22 percent) of the individuals awarded DI worker benefits received them based on a mental

impairment, up from 10 percent in 1976. Seventeen percent of the benefits awarded in 1996

were based on a diagnosis of cancer, and 14 percent were based on circulatory problems (a

decline from 27 percent in 1976).

Gender:

The proportion of DI awards going to women has increased. In 1996, nearly 43 percent of the

individuals awarded disabled workers benefits were women, up from 31 percent in 1976.

SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI)

Age:

Adult SSI disability beneficiaries tend to be younger than DI beneficiaries. In 1996, 16 percent

of all SSI disabled adults awarded benefits were ages 18-29; and 38 percent were age 39 and

under. That same year, 43 percent of the children awarded SSI disability benefits were under

age 5; 69 percent were age 9 and under. Also in 1996, 21 percent of persons awarded SSI

based on blindness or disability were children.

Impairment:

The largest percentage of adults and children who are awarded SSI disability benefits receive

them based on a mental impairment. Thirty percent of all disabled adults and 63 percent of all

disabled children who were awarded benefits in 1996 received them based on that diagnosis.

Gender:

The number of adult males who are awarded SSI disability benefits is approximately equal to

the number of adult females. However male children are almost twice as likely to be approved

for benefits as female children. In 1996, nearly 51 percent of the adults awarded SSI based on

disability were women, and 49 percent were men. That same year, 62 percent of the children

awarded SSI because of disability were males; 38 percent were females.
STATE AGENCIES

Vocational

Rehabilitation

Agencies

Disability

Determination

Services:

Reconsideration

?? days

Disability

Determination Services

Initial Decision

75 Days

SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

Office of Hearings and

Appeals:

Appeals Council

353 days

Office of Hearings and

Appeals:

Administrative Law Judges

374 days

SSA Field

Offices

Claimant strts here

Chart 1

THE SOCIAL SECURITY DI AND SSI DISABILITY CLAIMS PROCESS:

STEPS AND AVERAGE PROCESSING TIMES, 1997

FEDERAL COURTS

2+ Years

2

5

1

4

3