NRS 175.015(1)(b) (listing orders from which State may take an appeal); 

NRS 177.015(1)(c), (2) (similar). The district court dismissed the charges 

without prejudice so arguably, the State may refile the charges against 

Ashraf. However, the statute of limitations will continue to run on the 

charges during the time that Ashraf is incompetent, see MRS 178.425(5), 

which may leave the State at a disadvantage depending on when Ashraf 

attains competency.' 

We conclude that the State's petition has demonstrated that 

our intervention is warranted. A defendant may not be tried while 

incompetent. NRS 178.400(1); Scarbo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 125 

Nev. 118, 121, 206 P.3d 975, 977 (2009); see also Oliveras v. State, 124 

Nev. 1142, 1147, 195 P.3d 864, 868 (2008) (noting that Fourteenth 

Amendment prohibits criminal prosecution of an incompetent defendant). 

Accordingly, when doubt as to a defendant's competency arises, the 

district court must suspend the proceedings against him, see MRS 

178.405(1); conduct a hearing to address the doubts, see Scarbo, 125 Nev. 

at 121-22, 206 P.3d at 977; appoint psychological professionals to evaluate 

the defendant and receive the reports from those professionals in a 

hearing during which the parties may examine the appointed 

professionals and introduce other evidence, NRS 178.415(1)-(3); Scarbo, 

125 Nev. at 122-23, 206 P.3d at 978; commit the defendant to evaluation 

and treatment, MRS 178.425(1); and engage in hearings regarding the 

'Although there is no statute of limitations on murder, see NRS 

178.080(1), there is a statute of limitation for child abuse and neglect, see 

NRS 171.085(2). 

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findings of the treatment team, NRS 178.450(2); NRS 178.460(1); 

Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev. 795, 804, 192 P.3d 712, 719 (2008). Thus, in 

order to dispel or confirm doubt as to a defendant's competency, the 

district court must engage in thorough and exhaustive adversarial 

scrutiny of the facts. We conclude that the district court's finding that 

Ashraf was incompetent with no substantial probability of attaining 

competence in the foreseeable future absent such scrutiny amounts to a 

manifest abuse of discretion. The failure to engage in such extensive factfinding resulted in factual finding by the district court that was not based 

on reasoned consideration of the evidence. 

First, the district court failed to adhere to the statutory 

process for evaluating competency in reaching its conclusion. Defense 

counsel raised the issue of Ashracs competence with a report from its 

expert. The report raised sufficient doubt as to Ashrafs competency to 

obligate the court to appoint two psychological professionals to evaluate 

Ashraf and hold a hearing to receive the reports of those professionals. 

NRS 178.415(1)-(3). However, the district court did not appoint the 

necessary professionals to evaluate Ashraf. Instead, it accepted the 

defense expert's report and ordered the State to find an expert. This did 

not alleviate its statutory burden to appoint professionals to evaluate 

Ashraf. Nevertheless, as the State conceded that Ashraf was incompetent 

and that he should be evaluated at Lake's Crossing, the State cannot 

complain that the district court order denied it a meaningful opportunity 

to be heard at this stage of the competency proceedings. See Fergusen, 124 

Nev. at 805, 192 P.3d at 719 (concluding the district court abused its 

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discretion by denying appellant opportunity to be heard during 

competency proceedings). 

However, the district court manifestly abused its discretion at 

the later hearing when it concluded that Ashraf was incompetent with no 

substantial probability of attaining competence in the foreseeable future. 

Once committed to Lake's Crossing, the statutes provide that the 

treatment team submit reports to the district court at six-month intervals 

concerning Ashrafs competency and the likelihood of him attaining 

competency. NRS 178.450(2). It is only when these reports are received 

by the district court and the parties that the district court may make 

another finding regarding Ashrafs competency and the likelihood of his 

attaining competency in the foreseeable future. NRS 178.460(3). The 

district court did not follow the procedure set forth in the statute but 

instead elected to make a finding in the absence of the anticipated report. 

It did so without the event that triggers its obligation to hold a hearing 

and the evidence that would be the subject matter of that hearing. This 

decision denied the parties a meaningful opportunity to advocate for or 

challenge the findings of the treatment team The result of the failure to 

follow the statutory framework for competency proceedings resulted in 

findings by the district court that had not been the subject of adversarial 

testing. 

Second, "an abuse of discretion occurs whenever a court fails 

to give due consideration to the issues at hand." Patterson v. State, 129 

Nev. „ 298 P.3d 433, 439 (2013); see also State v. Eighth Judicial 

Din. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. , 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) ("An 

arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion is one founded on prejudice or 

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preference rather than on reason, or contrary to the evidence or 

established rules of law." (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The 

district court concluded that Ashraf was incompetent based on the defense 

expert's report. In their first six-month report, the Lake's Crossing 

treatment team agreed that Ashraf was incompetent but believed that he 

could attain competence with continued assistance from staff. Based on 

these initial reports, the district court concluded that there was a 

substantial probability that Ashraf would attain competency through his 

treatment. Eight months later the court came to the conclusion that 

Ashraf had no substantial probability of attaining competence in the 

foreseeable future based on virtually the same evidence. Therefore, it 

appeared that the decision was exercised without due consideration of the 

evidence. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK 

OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS instructing the 

district court to VACATE ITS ORDER FINDING REAL PARTY IN 

INTEREST INCOMPETENT WITH NO PROBABILITY OF ATTAINING 

COMPETENCE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND DISMISSING 

THE CRIMINAL CHARGES. 

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cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge 

Clark County District Attorney 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County Public Defender 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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