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TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT: 

ARE WE SAFER? 

(112–101) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

VACANCY 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

VACANCY 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL 1 

Rear Admiral Joseph A. Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, United States Coast Guard .......................................................................... 4 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 4 

PANEL 2 

Bethann Rooney, Manager of Port Security, Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey, testifying on behalf of the American Association of Port 

Authorities ............................................................................................................ 13 

Christopher Koch, President and CEO, World Shipping Council ........................ 13 

PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY MEMBER OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington ........................................................................... 21 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Rear Admiral Joseph A. Servidio ........................................................................... 23 

Stephen L. Caldwell ................................................................................................ 30 

Bethann Rooney ....................................................................................................... 84 

Christopher Koch ..................................................................................................... 92 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Rear Admiral Joseph A. Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, United States Coast Guard, response to information request from Hon. 

Frank A. LoBiondo, a Representative in Congress from the State of New 

Jersey, on the availability of the Coast Guard’s maritime security risk 

assessment model ................................................................................................. 8 

ADDITION TO THE RECORD 

Passenger Vessel Association, written statement ................................................. 100 

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(1) 

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MARITIME 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT: 

ARE WE SAFER? 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND

MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank LoBiondo 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Today marks the 11th anniversary of that horrible day that 

changed America and changed the world, the terrorist attacks of 

September 11th. I would like to take a moment to remember those 

who perished on that day and those whose lives were changed forever because of it. 

I also want to express our gratitude to the brave men and women 

working so hard both at home and overseas to improve our ability 

to prevent anything like that from ever happening again. 

We are also approaching the 10th anniversary of the enactment 

of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. It was a landmark 

piece of legislation that established a framework to improve the security of the Nation’s ports, waterways, and vessels from potential 

terrorist attacks. 

The importance of keeping our ports and waterways secure cannot be overstated. Approximately 90 percent of all global trade and 

25 percent of our gross domestic product move via the sea. A terrorist attack at any of our ports could severely disrupt the supply 

chain, which would be catastrophic to our fragile economy. 

However, as we recognize in the MTSA, improving security at 

our ports and aboard our vessels means understanding how the industry operates. When MTSA imposed new security mandates on 

the maritime industry, it was done in a manner which did not undermine the free flow of commerce or the economic viability of the 

maritime sector. 

I would like to praise the Coast Guard for following that critical 

balancing act in their efforts in implementing MTSA. Throughout 

the process, the Service has been fair, transparent, and relatively 

flexible with the large number of stakeholders in our maritime 

transportation system. Thanks to the leadership of the Coast 

Guard and the commitment from industry and their employees, I 

2 

believe our ports and waterways are much safer than they were 11 

years ago. 

However, although MTSA has been largely a success story, there 

are a couple of areas where concern remains. As has been documented in numerous hearings at both the subcommittee and full 

committee level, regulations governing the deployment of the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC, readers 

have still not been set. The Service is now telling us that it expects 

to publish proposed regulations sometime this fall, well over 3 

years later than the original deadline for issuing a final rule. 

As we continue to wait out these delays, the TWICs are no more 

than a flash pass. Without the readers in place, we are forcing 

maritime employees to pay for something that does not serve its intended purpose and we are undermining security at our Nation’s 

ports. The administration needs to move forward on these regulations as soon as possible. 

As we highlighted at our hearing in July, concerns persist with 

regard to implementation of requirements to improve maritime domain awareness. Specifically, the Service’s inability to sufficiently 

tie its different MDA systems into one common operating picture 

as well as its somewhat duplicative approaches to tracking the 

same vessels have been a source of frustration. Additionally, we remain concerned that the efforts to share MDA information among 

stakeholders may suffer as the initiative to build physical Interagency Operations Centers at our ports wanes. 

Finally, and more broadly, I remain worried about the Coast 

Guard’s ability to continue to carry out their core maritime security 

responsibilities with an ever-increasing workload and a shrinking 

budget. The administration has proposed slashing the Service’s 

budget by $350 million and cutting the number of servicemembers 

by over 1,000, yet we have never asked the Service to do more than 

they are doing now. 

Cutting funding while adding new responsibility is a formula for 

failure; and, unfortunately, we saw this formula playing out in the 

1990s when the Coast Guard had been continually asked to do 

more, was given less, and then we were surprised when they 

couldn’t meet all the mandates that were imposed by Congress. 

This is a very, very serious situation, and I don’t believe that we 

in Congress can ever allow that to take place again. So we must 

be seriously on guard now. 

Admiral, I hope you can speak to some of my concerns this morning, and I look forward to hearing from the GAO and the privatesector witnesses on some of these matters as well. I want to thank 

the witnesses for appearing today, and I look forward to their testimony. 

Now I would like to yield to Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this morning’s hearing to assess the effectiveness of the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act, or MTSA, after 10 years of 

implementation. It is entirely appropriate that we evaluate MTSA 

today as we observe the 11th anniversary of the September 11, 

2001, attacks. There can be no more sobering reminder that our 

work to protect our shores from terrorist threats and organizations 

requires our constant attention, creativity, and dedication. 

3 

I also want to acknowledge the contributions made by the U.S. 

Coast Guard on that day to secure New York harbor and to oversee 

the successful evacuation of over 300,000 people from Lower Manhattan after the collapse of the World Trade Center. 

I want to thank you, Admiral. If you could pass that on to the 

entire Coast Guard family as well. On that day, the true definition 

of the Coast Guard motto, Semper Paratus, was made evident to 

all. 

Mr. Chairman, border and transportation security is a pivotal 

function of the Federal Government in protecting the American 

people from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. The 

maritime domain is particularly daunting in scale, totaling over 

95,000 miles of shoreline, 300,000 square miles of waterways, and 

10,000 miles of navigable waterways. There are over 360 ports, approximately 3,100 critical facilities, and more than 14,000 vessels 

in the domestic fleet alone. Each one of these can present a potential target for terrorist activities, so the complexity of securing 

these assets is a huge responsibility. 

Aside from infrastructure, over 60 million Americans are employed within 100 miles of our coasts and coastline and contribute 

over $4 billion annually to the national economy. 

The response of Congress to the attacks of September 11, 2001, 

was followed by specific targeted measures to protect the country, 

such as the creation of the Transportation Security Administration. 

It also included the passage of MTSA, which addressed the maritime domain with new requirements for passenger, crew, and cargo 

screening; the successful Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C–TPAT; and the MegaPorts Initiative that has systematically enhanced detection capabilities for special, nuclear, and 

other radioactive materials in containerized cargo. 

Additionally, the greater use of technology to identify and track 

vessel movements, implementation of comprehensive biometric security measures, and the initiation of vulnerability assessments 

and creation of site-specific security plans were all new innovations. 

The question asked today, though, is are we safer? That question 

is as valid now as it was in the days and weeks following the attacks of September 11th. This basic question raises some fundamental questions for which I will be interested to hear responses 

from our witnesses today. 

Specifically, how do we know that we are in fact safer? By what 

metrics are we making such determinations? What are the economic effects on foreign and domestic maritime commerce and the 

cost to the U.S. taxpayer measured against security? I would also 

be interested in learning whether our witnesses believe that adequate resources are being provided to support these responsibilities. 

As I mentioned during our hearing on maritime domain awareness in July, when resources were freely available to address the 

deficiencies in homeland security after September 11, 2001, it was 

fairly easy to get those dollars. But now we operate in an entirely 

different budget environment. Present fiscal constraints leave us 

little choice but to examine carefully the assets and resources we 

devote to maritime security, especially to the Coast Guard, whose 

4 

budget is already stretched thin over several different competing 

missions. 

I have said before, and I will keep saying it: We cannot expect 

the Coast Guard to do more with less. The sad reality is the Coast 

Guard will be doing less with less given the current budget’s trajectory. That is why we must spend effectively and wisely on those activities which provide the greatest risk reduction at the lowest cost. 

Obviously, challenges remain. TWIC readers and cargo scanning 

requirements immediately come to mind. Yet, as our present maritime security strategies continue to evolve, we must not allow frustration over some aspects to deter other efforts. We must press on 

to develop a maritime security strategy that is comprehensive in 

scope, flexible in implementation, and adaptable to the changing 

tactics of those extremists who would seek to do us harm. For if 

there is one truth we have learned over the past 10 years, it is that 

terrorists and terrorist organizations will not tire in their efforts to 

probe, adapt, and exploit our vulnerabilities; and, like the Coast 

Guard, we must remain Semper Paratus. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 

Our first panel today we have Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, and Mr. Stephen 

Caldwell, director of the GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice 

team. 

Admiral, welcome. You are on. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH A. SERVIDIO, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, UNITED 

STATES COAST GUARD; AND STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Good morning, Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking 

Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role 

in securing our maritime infrastructure since the events of 9/11 

and the subsequent passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

The Coast Guard has made tremendous progress in securing 

America’s waterways and supporting an efficient and resilient commercial environment. The men and women of the Coast Guard and 

the Department of Homeland Security and its components are committed to improving maritime security through continued cooperation and collaboration with State, Federal, local, international, and 

industry partners. 

To help prevent terrorist attacks, we developed and continue to 

improve on an effective domestic and international maritime security regime. Our layered security strategy includes initiatives related to MTSA regulatory enforcement, identity and security processes, the international ship and port facilities security code, 

deployable specialized forces, and global supply chain security. 

Before 9/11 we had no formal structured maritime security regimes for ports, port facilities, or ships, with the exception of cruise 

ships in the United States. With Congress’ support and through 

our expansive partnerships, we now have strong and comprehenVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:06 Oct 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\9-11-1~1\75850.TXT JEAN
5 

sive domestic and international security regimes in place. By successfully executing the requirements of MTSA and the ISPS Code, 

we have reduced vulnerabilities within the global maritime transportation system. 

Specifically, the Coast Guard has reviewed and approved over 

11,000 domestic vessel security plans and 3,100 domestic facility 

security plans, overseen the development of 43 port-specific area 

maritime security plans and committees, completed port security 

assessments for all U.S. ports using the maritime security risk 

analysis model while collaborating with local officials and stakeholders, visited almost 160 foreign countries to assess the effectiveness of their port security measures and ISPS Code implementation, and overseen the continued development of the National Maritime Security Plan which supports the National Strategy for Maritime Security. 

Implementation of MTSA requirements such as mandatory access control measures, designated restricted areas, and screening 

protocols for persons and vehicles entering facilities have hardened 

physical security in our ports. Our continued work with TSA to implement the biometrically enabled Transportation Worker Identification Credential is an important part of this effort, and we are 

biometrically verifying almost 100 TWICs daily at facilities and on 

vessels. We work closely with Customs and Border Protection to 

identify and evaluate cargo risks before arrival and, when necessary, control vessels and cargo that may pose a threat. 

Finally, response and recovery protocols established and exercised with Federal, State, local, and industry partners build a resilient maritime community, one able to recover more quickly from 

any disruption. 

In closing, I was the captain of the port in San Juan, Puerto 

Rico, on September 11, 2001, and my brother Larry was working 

at the Number Three World Financial Center, a building seriously 

damaged in the terrorist attacks. I did not know he survived the 

attack and lost many friends until late that night. I was transferred from San Juan to Coast Guard headquarters, and I served 

on the team responsible for implementing MTSA and the ISPS 

Code. I am deeply committed to protecting our Nation and our people, and I know firsthand how far we have come since MTSA was 

passed. 

I look forward to continuing to work with Congress in enhancing 

maritime security and providing oversight. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am happy to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Caldwell. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, 

and Mr. Cummings, good to see you today and thank you for inviting GAO to testify on MTSA as we approach the 10th anniversary 

of this landmark legislation. 

My written statement summarizes almost 10 years of GAO work 

evaluating programs to provide for maritime security, and in our 

statement we include a detailed appendix on some of the individual 

programs with information on what the programs were designed to 

6 

do, what GAO found and recommended, and what those programs 

cost where we were able to find cost information. 

As noted by Admiral Servidio, Federal agencies, particularly 

DHS and its components, have made substantial progress in implementing maritime security programs such as MTSA. 

Agencies have developed or facilitated the development of security plans at the national, port, facility, and vessel level. 

Agencies have screened inbound foreign-flagged vessels as well 

as foreign seafarers to ensure compliance with security regulations. 

Agencies have enhanced their awareness of the maritime domain 

through extensive risk assessments with MSRAM, through vessel 

tracking, and for information sharing through both formal and informal means. 

Agencies developed partnerships to get advanced information on 

incoming cargo to identify the highest risk cargo and to ensure 

that, as appropriate, it was screened or scanned at domestic or 

overseas ports. 

DHS encountered many challenges along the way in implementing these programs. Many of these challenges have hindered 

or delayed MTSA. There has already been some discussion of that. 

At the high level, some programs had a lack of planning, weak program management, and lax implementation. Some programs also 

experienced a lack of or difficulties in coordinating with a multitude of maritime stakeholders. 

As Mr. Larsen discussed, there were also limits on the level of 

resources available to start, operate, and sustain many of these 

programs; and today’s more austere budget requirements has exacerbated many of these resource challenges. 

Finally, there have been and still are difficulties measuring the 

results of the security programs. 

Because of these problems, there is still some unfinished business in implementing MTSA. Chairman LoBiondo has already 

talked about TWIC. I will talk about three other examples. 

Soon after 9/11, Interagency Operations Centers showed great 

promise in Charleston, Norfolk, and San Diego. Congress mandated 

that DHS replicate such centers at all high-risk ports. But the efforts have been plagued by limited and irregular funding, delays in 

developing detailed requirements, a lack of input from some of the 

key stakeholders, and weak management of the acquisition. It remains an open question whether the still-planned IOCs will be 

more than just single-agency command centers or the ‘‘Interagency’’ 

Operations Centers that Congress had intended. 

The Port Security Grant Program was another program enacted 

soon after 9/11 with good intentions to provide funding for security 

improvements. While these monies have been distributed, the program has suffered from a number of problems. Program management has moved among several different agencies over the years 

which has reduced long-term accountability; the procedure for 

awarding and distributing funds was complex and slow, leading to 

a large accumulation of unspent funds; and, finally, despite assurances since our 2005 recommendation that the program would develop performance measures, there has been little progress determining what the $2 billion program has actually bought. 

7 

Several different container security and scanning technologies 

were pursued with high hopes that they would allow us to sufficiently scan every container bound for the United States. But some 

premature efforts to move from research and development directly 

into full deployment of new technologies as well as several unsuccessful pilots at foreign ports have shown we clearly have to reevaluate what we can actually do within the existing technical, 

logistical, economic, and diplomatic realities of the container-based 

international supply chain. 

I would like to end on a positive note and acknowledge there has 

been substantial progress in that, collectively, these programs have 

improved the security of our ports. GAO will continue to evaluate 

a number of maritime security programs for this committee and 

others in Congress with the common goal of ensuring that ports remain safe and efficient engines for economic prosperity. 

I would be happy to respond to any questions now. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. 

Admiral, the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget would cut fund- ing for the Coast Guard by nearly $350 million and over 1,000 

service men and women. Talk to us about what you see these proposed cuts meaning, their impact. What does it mean to the Service’s ability to conduct port security? How does it impact traditional 

missions? I am very concerned about this. I would like to hear your 

take on it. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Chairman, with increasing responsibilities 

and a declining budget, we will be challenged to continue all that 

we are doing. As Ranking Member Larsen said, we are going to 

have to look at risk-based decisions. We are going to have to look 

at how we best address those risks and focus our resources on 

those activities we are performing that have the greatest impact. 

We do continue to use various metrics and tools, such as 

MSRAM, to look at the risks that we have and to drive those risks 

down; and once we have seen that, we can devote resources to 

other areas. But, as you highlighted, sir, it will be a challenge to 

continue to do more if the budget is less. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The Coast Guard’s authorization act of 2010 required the Coast Guard to make their maritime security risk assessment model available in an unclassified version to facility and 

vessel owners to assist in the development of their risk assessments. The deadline on the Service to do this was 180 days. Why 

has the Coast Guard not met this legal requirement? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Mr. Chairman, I was unaware of that, but I 

can speak firsthand when I was captain of the port in St. Petersburg, Florida, all of the maritime industry—the stakeholders, the 

members of the Area Maritime Security Committee, and likewise 

the members of the Harbor Safety Committee—knew what was the 

factors in MSRAM. They were active parts in our development of 

the MSRAM each and every year and the revalidation of where we 

saw the risks are and what our action plans were to reduce those 

risks. 

Likewise, we shared the MSRAM data with the Urban Area Security Initiative, the Florida Regional Domestic Security Task 

Force, and other law enforcement agencies so that together in the 

port complex we could see what the greatest risks are and how we 

8 

could utilize all of our different funding sources and our resources 

and our authorities to drive down those risks. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I am not sure that that is an answer to the question. Maybe you need to try to get back to us. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. I will get back to you, sir, on the specifics of 

that. 

[The information follows:] 

This requirement has been met by the Coast Guard. In 

November 2011, the U.S. Coast Guard released a nonclassified version of the Maritime Security Risk Analysis 

Model (MSRAM) titled the Industry Risk Analysis Model 

(IRAM). IRAM is a terrorism risk analysis tool that employs a similar scenario-based construct as MSRAM and 

calculates a relative risk index number for scenarios based 

on threat, consequence, and vulnerability factors. The data 

for each factor is entered by the owner-operator of the regulated facility or vessel and then IRAM calculates the risk 

index number, which can be sorted to identify high-risk 

scenarios. IRAM allows owner-operators to perform a terrorism-focused, security risk analysis of their facilities/vessels, provides a risk-based planning capability for updating 

operations plans, and provides a means to communicate 

risk information between owner-operators and first responders. To date, six owner-operators have requested and 

been provided the IRAM tool. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Moving to TWIC, can you tell us when the final 

rules on the use of TWIC biometric readers and the implementation of Section 809 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 

will be published? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Sir, it has the Department’s highest priority, 

and it is presently in internal clearance. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, Admiral, I guess I am expecting you sort 

of had to say that, but it is almost laughable. It has had the Department’s highest priority for years; and if that is the highest priority and how they are dealing with it, I do know the frustration 

that we share here of how poorly this has been managed. We just 

can’t get answers out of them, and I guess I was hoping beyond 

hope there would be a little bit more specifics about this. 

It is beyond frustrating. We have got a law that is in place. It 

has been ignored. It has been passed over. Congress—it is almost 

as if we are not asking questions, and the Department just doesn’t 

seem to care about this. 

And I don’t put all this blame on the Coast Guard. You are 

forced to react to what the boss says. But I don’t know whether 

maybe we should go on a tantrum and a tirade and Rick Larsen 

and I figure out how to pound our shoe on the table together or 

something. 

Mr. LARSEN. You don’t want shoes off. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. We don’t want shoes off. OK. We will figure out 

something else. Because I think I speak for everybody on the committee, this is a high level of frustration here. 

9 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Mr. Chairman, sir, with regards to 809, we 

did put a policy in place in December of 2011; and over 500 merchant mariners have been able to receive merchant mariner credentials without having a TWIC. That is about 250 or more received it just the last month. So we are doing what we can from 

a policy standpoint, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. OK. Mr. Caldwell, since enactment of MTSA, has 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard or Customs developed any metrics or performance measures to determine 

the effectiveness of their efforts to secure the Nation’s ports and 

waterways? 

Mr. CALDWELL. There have been a couple of performance measures put in place. MSRAM is probably the most positive one at an 

individual facility level. MSRAM has been mentioned by Admiral 

Servidio. And we have done a recent report on MSRAM. It was 

very positive, and MSRAM is probably one of the better risk management tools in the Department. 

Measuring the larger issue of security at the port level, this has 

been a tougher issue. The Coast Guard developed a metric to look 

at the percentage of risk that its activities have reduced in the 

maritime domain and in ports. Last year when we looked at 

MSRAM we also looked at this metric. We thought methodologically the measure was adequate, but it overstates the accuracy 

since it is really based on judgment of a lot of Coast Guard experts. 

So to say they have reduced exactly 85 percent or 30 percent of the 

risk was perhaps overstating the case. Coast Guard has agreed to 

keep using that measure but to use it at a reduced level. But that 

metric has probably one of the more serious attempts to look at it 

portwide. 

As far as CPB, most of the metrics have been at the individual 

program level, and those metrics have generally measured their activities as opposed to measuring the results in terms of reductions 

in actual risk. As you know, it is hard to measure security, particularly deterrence, which is probably one of the positive accomplishments of a lot of these programs that we have now. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The SAFE Port Act of 2006 set a deadline of not 

later than April 2009, for the issuance of final regulations governing the deployment of technology at ports and aboard vessels to 

read TWICs. Now, more than 2 years later, there are still no TWIC 

readers. Until the readers are in place, can you give us any level 

of assurance that TWICs are providing adequate access, control, or 

improved security at our ports? 

Mr. CALDWELL. TWIC acts as a fast pass right now. We did some 

work last year which showed that it is relatively easy for our investigators to use fraudulent TWICs or to obtain them fraudulently 

and then use them to get into secure facilities. We have work right 

now that is looking at the pilots in detail which will shed light soon 

on where DHS is in terms of actually using TWICs as biometric 

identification, as was originally intended. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral, thanks again for coming and helping us 

out this morning. 

10 

With regards to container screening in the SAFE Port Act, we required 100 percent screening of containers entering the U.S. earlier 

this year, but Secretary Napolitano deferred meeting this requirement until 2014. 

In your opinion—if the Coast Guard has an opinion on this 

issue—can this be done in an economical and cost-effective manner 

and is the problem less with technology and more with increased 

cost to shippers and delays and disruptions to the flow of commerce? What are the hurdles to achieving 100 percent screening? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Ranking Member, I don’t think I am in a position to best answer that question. I can say that we work with Customs and Border Protection to screen every person, every vessel, 

and all of the cargo that comes into the U.S. We do that electronically. We do that looking at the history, using a number of different 

tools. That is what we are doing at present. But I am really not 

in a position to comment on physically inspecting all of the containers, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to performance measures—I am not 

going to ask you to talk percentages or so on—but it strikes me everything we have asked the Coast Guard and many other agencies 

to do—and this is going back to 2002, which is a long time for me 

to think back—still, how much of that in any way, shape, or form 

were we doing before we passed MTSA, to give an idea of the advances that we have made? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Sir, I had no tool that could calculate what 

the risks were in the various—I had 21 commercial ports when I 

was down in San Juan, including the largest oil terminal and the 

largest cruise ship port in the U.S., and we really had no measures 

of seeing what those vulnerabilities were and we had no systematic 

way of reviewing them or addressing what those risks were. 

I think MSRAM is an important tool in looking at a metric on 

how we are reducing risk. We see that at the port level each year 

when we revalidate it. We can determine how the risks have been 

reduced. 

Likewise, we have seen detention rates for security violations 

each year going down, the number of vessels we are detaining for 

security requirements are also going down, and the number of facilities we need to take control actions on are likewise going down 

each year. 

Mr. LARSEN. And going down because of—— 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Because of MTSA, because of the training 

that we have done, because of the exercises we have done, because 

of the socialization, the fact that security is now part of what is expected in the maritime environment and it is part of our day-today operations, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. And we didn’t see that nearly as much pre-2001? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. No, sir. 

Firsthand, other than cruise ships, we had very little security. I 

know in Florida at the time, in 2000, they were talking about actions to be taken to reduce theft, pilferage, other types of things at 

the maritime—in the maritime environment and facilities. And as 

a result of MTSA, those discussions are no longer going on. 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to ISPS screening, you noted the 

Coast Guard has visited almost 160 foreign countries to assess the 

11 

effectiveness of port security measures and implementation of ISPS 

Code requirements. Can you shed some light on that process a little further for us? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, Ranking Member. At present, it is approximately every 2 years we look to visit foreign countries to ascertain their implementation of the ISPS Code, what they are physically doing, and it is also to establish a relationship. 

For example, just yesterday, we had representatives from 

Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia that were part of a reciprocal visit. 

We visited their countries, except for Somalia. At the present time, 

due to security reasons, we aren’t sending anyone to their country. 

But we visited their countries, and they come here, and we go over 

our program. We highlight what we are doing, how we are doing 

it. And it is this exchange of both information, of training, that we 

feel has substantially increased the security level. 

What we do is we ensure that the countries are fully implementing the ISPS Code. If they are not, it goes through an interagency process, sir; and if it is determined that the country has not 

effectively implemented it, there are conditions of entry that are required for vessels that have called on that country in the last five 

port calls. We could potentially delay the vessel’s arrival, verify security precautions, screen them, or do a number of other control actions before that vessel actually enters the U.S. 

Mr. LARSEN. And you are meeting with port representatives? Because some of these countries either have much weaker Coast 

Guards or no Coast Guard. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, sir. Yesterday was the commandant of 

the Djibouti Coast Guard. It was their port facility leader for 

Kenya. It was their minister responsible for port security. And for 

Somalia it was one of their port managers that was visiting with 

us. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Caldwell, with regards to MSRAM, considering the Coast 

Guard depends upon MSRAM, we have heard what an important 

tool it is in its risk-based security framework, if Coast Guard officials are saying now—and they are saying—that personnel cuts are 

limiting the use of MSRAM data, what are the implications if the 

Coast Guard’s budget were to continue to be cut? It is one thing 

to have a great tool to use. It is another thing not to be able to 

use it. 

Mr. CALDWELL. Well, in a recent report on MSRAM we did have 

some concerns about whether Coast Guard field staff who worked 

on MSRAM at the sectors had the time to use the tool accurately 

and to update the data in it. One of the strengths of MSRAM that 

we found at the Coast Guard is that on an annual basis they are 

revalidating the data. So it wasn’t just a one-time entry process. 

Mr. LARSEN. And the Admiral mentioned that. 

Mr. CALDWELL. In terms of the training. 

The biggest concern we have with MSRAM is not as much in the 

analysis. It is to what extent is it actually useful for making decisions at an operational level. For example, MSRAM can tell you the 

risk at a facility and what you might do to reduce vulnerabilities 

at a facility. What is harder is for that captain of the port to then 

make decisions of how to use that risk information from MSRAM. 

12 

Because, of course, the captain of the port has 10 other statutory 

missions to engage. So while MSRAM might indicate it is a good 

idea to escort this cruise ship or this tanker that is coming into 

port, the captain of the port, he or she may have a search and rescue case going on or some military out-load to escort or other 

things, other priorities. But there will obviously be a little less fidelity in the model if we reduce the resources dedicated to keep it 

current. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, if you are following the Coast Guard on Twitter like I do, you will note that they are pretty busy all over the 

country every day doing a lot of things that probably don’t have 

anything to do with MSRAM, including up in the Northwest. So we 

have to do a better job ourselves up there. 

Mr. Caldwell, you have written—I noted in your written statement about the WatchKeeper Program. This new information management and sharing system has been dogged since its inception 

due to the lack of good engagement between the Federal, State, 

and local agencies and port partners with the Coast Guard in developing the requirements. Furthermore, you assert the situation 

has had a negative impact on the formation of these IOCs. 

At this point, is it possible for the Coast Guard to reconfigure 

WatchKeeper or better engage partner agencies and stakeholders 

to provide the type of information that was first envisioned under 

MTSA when it was passed from an outside GAO point of view? 

Mr. CALDWELL. If you think of these centers and what they were 

intended to be originally, I don’t think they are going to be ‘‘centers’’ at all. They are not going to be a physical place where people 

actually gather. Given the costs associated with building those 

physical centers, the next best thing is to move to a virtual model 

where you could share information via WatchKeeper. 

The beauty of the physical centers is that every agency could 

bring in their own IT tools and have it there, and it might not be 

all systems on one screen, but they all have their equipment there 

and can share information by looking at things and look at their 

own systems. 

With WatchKeeper, there is some way to salvage it, but it will 

require a lot of attention, and the Coast Guard has not requested 

funds beyond 2013 to continue implementing that. It would take a 

pretty strong outreach effort. We found that 82 percent of the 

stakeholders that were given access to WatchKeeper had never 

even logged on. So the Coast Guard has a long way to go to fix 

that. 

It is the outreach piece they are going to have to work on. Even 

the Federal agencies are not participating. 

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral, do you have comments both on 

WatchKeeper and on the brick and mortar IOC versus the virtual 

IOC issue? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Ranking Member, I recognize there are going 

to be some challenges in getting ports to fully utilize WatchKeeper, 

because over the last 10 years there has been other systems that 

have been developed for some of that internal communications. 

Going back to when I was in St. Petersburg, we had a joint teleconference every morning with Customs and Border Protection, 

with the local sheriffs, with the Tampa Police Department, where 

13 

we would go over who is going to be patrolling in what areas, what 

the risks were, what high-risk activities were taking place, who 

would be providing patrols and escorts and other types of things. 

Translating some of that into WatchKeeper now that that system 

has been rolled out, it is going to take some change in people’s attitudes. And in most of our ports likewise there have been other systems that we have used. But I think as WatchKeeper goes to 20 

different ports by the end of this fiscal year we will see that it is 

going to be a tool that will be used more in the ports. But, right 

now, I think there are other tools and communication structures 

that some people are using. So we are going to have to build to it, 

sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. All right. I would like to thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. We will take a brief break while we reconfigure for the second panel. 

OK. We will reconvene. The second panel this morning is Ms. 

Bethann Rooney, manager of port security of the Port Authority of 

New York and New Jersey, who is testifying on behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities. 

We also have Mr. Chris Koch, who is president and CEO of the 

World Shipping Council. 

Both Mr. Koch and Ms. Rooney were tremendously—very, very, 

very helpful to this subcommittee as we went about our business 

and the process of drafting MTSA 10 years ago and trying to get 

it right and understand how it works in the real world. So I want 

to thank you for your help then and thank you for being here 

today. 

Ms. Rooney, you are recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF BETHANN ROONEY, MANAGER OF PORT SECURITY, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, 

TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 

OF PORT AUTHORITIES; AND CHRISTOPHER KOCH, PRESIDENT AND CEO, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL 

Ms. ROONEY. Good morning Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, subcommittee members. Thank you for inviting us here 

today to discuss MTSA over the past decade. 

Prior to 9/11, security was not a top concern for most U.S. ports. 

Eleven years ago today, that all changed. Congress and the administration took quick and decisive action to focus on the risk to our 

seaports. Enhancing maritime security and protecting our ports 

from acts of terrorism and other crime remains a top priority for 

the American Association of Port Authorities and our members. 

Protecting America’s ports is critical to our Nation’s economic 

growth and vitality and is an integral part of homeland security 

and national defense. 

The challenge for the past 10 years, however, has been to integrate security into the efficient and economic flow of commerce. We 

commend the Coast Guard for its excellent job in developing the 

regulations and working in partnership with industry to secure our 

ports. 

14 

Maritime security is a continuous activity that requires the attention of many individuals. The cost of meeting and maintaining 

the requirements of the security regulations is significant. Implementing MTSA is not a one-time expense. Rather, it requires recurring costs to operate, maintain, and staff the equipment and systems that were put in place. My agency alone has spent $166 million on port security in the past 11 years. 

As was mentioned, the foundation of a good security program is 

a risk assessment tool. MSRAM should be used by all Federal 

agencies to assess the risks in the maritime environment, and, as 

has also been mentioned, we would like to see MSRAM made available to regulated entities to assess the risk of their own facilities. 

Key to enhancing and maintaining security in ports is the Port 

Security Grant Program. Our economy, safety, and national defense depend largely on how well we can protect our seaports, and 

cuts in Federal funding present significant challenges to the security of our ports. We urge Congress to provide full funding for the 

Port Security Grant Program. 

DHS is proposing to merge all grant programs into a single program that would be managed by the States. We encourage your 

committee’s continued support to voice opposition to this new structure. 

The Port Security Grant Program is one of just a few security 

grants that requires a cost-share. At a minimum, we urge Congress 

to direct the Department to eliminate the cost-share for public 

agencies and our tenants. We also ask for this committee’s assistance to ensure that the performance period for port security grants 

is no less than 3 years. 

While the MTSA authorized grant funding to be used for equipment that detects weapons of mass destruction and conventional 

explosives, grant funding cannot be used to fund Federal functions 

such as cargo inspection to ensure that the goods entering the 

United States are in fact free of restricted and prohibited items. 

Today, DNDO and CPB are fiscally constrained and are asking 

port operators to pay for Radiation Portal Monitors. As imports increase and container terminals reconfigure and expand, we need to 

ensure that we can continue to scan all of the cargo that is entering the United States. We would like to work with Congress and 

DHS to develop a plan to upgrade the obsolete equipment in our 

ports. Ports should not be responsible for paying for DHS owned, 

operated, and maintained equipment. If we are, we should be able 

to use grant funding to help offset those costs. 

There has been a lot of discussion this morning about TWIC already, and we have worked closely with TSA and Coast Guard for 

many years on this important program. We strongly support TWIC 

and look forward to the day when it will be fully implemented. 

The majority of TWICs will expire in the next 6 to 9 months. We 

are pleased that TSA has taken steps to address the issue of offering a reduced cost 3-year renewal option. However, our members 

are concerned that the lack of an updated threat assessment could 

compromise the security of our facilities. 

We are also concerned that the renewal or extension process be 

convenient and efficient. TSA and their new contractor should 

again work closely with the maritime community on such issues as 

15 

enrollment center locations, bulk payment, and the availability of 

onsite enrollment and activation. When the reader rule is finally 

published, it is imperative that sufficient time be given to ports to 

implement the requirements and that adequate port security grant 

funding be available. 

TWIC projects should be a top priority of the grant program once 

the reader rule is released. We encourage the Coast Guard to continue their proposed rulemaking process and for TSA to complete 

the reader testing and publish a qualified technology list. 

Finally, as this committee considers future enhancements to the 

MTSA, we respectfully request you also consider a number of additional areas of concern that were outlined in my written statement. 

Thank you for inviting us to testify on the 10th anniversary of 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act. We are indeed safer 

than we were 10 years ago, and the AAPA and its members remain 

committed to doing its part to protect America. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. Koch. 

Mr. KOCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Larsen, 

for having this hearing. It is always appropriate to review where 

we are and where we are going. 

My testimony, like other testimony here today, tries to set forth 

and discuss the multilayer risk assessment strategy that the DHS 

has developed cooperatively between CBP and the U.S. Coast 

Guard. 

There is obviously a sophisticated system in place for vessel 

tracking using LRIT and other technology, obviously a regime in 

place to look at people and the security of the people, both on the 

ships that are coming in and out of U.S. ports as well as those 

working in the ports. There is a good strategy for vessel security 

plans, for port security plans, and, importantly, which we know has 

been an issue to this committee and Congress in general, for the 

cargo security as well, particularly containerized cargo. And I think 

DHS deserves credit for having constructed a system that is clearly 

the most sophisticated system of any trading nation in the world 

in terms of what data it acquires before vessel loading from the 

people who should have the best information available to them, so 

that Customs can undertake its cargo screening before vessel loading. 

We continue to believe that before vessel loading screening is the 

proper strategy. Obviously, that requires getting the best data possible, and we think improvements have been made in that, and we 

think CBP is on the right track. 

I guess what this basically says is that we believe that the strategy that has been put together makes sense. It is a sound strategy. 

The question really now should focus on the implementation of that 

strategy. Are we doing what we need to do to make that strategy 

actually effective? 

Perhaps the most prominent question in that regard is the one 

that the subcommittee has already identified here today, and that 

is the TWIC, in terms of the personnel security. That obviously 

needs work, and I think everybody is looking forward to seeing 

16 

DHS deliver on the high priority it said it has on this and to having the proposed rule out before the end of this year. 

One of the issues in terms of getting better information to the 

Government is how the Government uses that information. Obviously, you would probably be interested in having a sit-down with 

CBP to talk about how the National Targeting Center deals with 

all of the cargo information it gets. Our understanding is it has improved their screening capability quite a bit. 

Obviously, the high-volume shippers of repetitive products are 

really not the kind of risk that is probably prominent in their 

minds. Whether it is Ford auto parts or Heineken beer coming in, 

those repetitive high-volume shippers are probably pretty low risk. 

It is the cargo from people you see less often, the shippers who 

don’t have a good track record or who may appear in consolidated 

boxes coming through, that requires the kind of attention, requires 

the scanning of those boxes if CBP is not satisfied that it has 

enough information. 

Our understanding is that the risk assessment system is working 

pretty well. Our understanding is that Customs is getting the information it wants. But that would be something you may want to be 

looking at as well. 

One of the issues we have identified, which we also identified in 

the last hearing at which we were asked to testify, is getting CBP 

even better information about container cargo weights. We have a 

proposal at the IMO for that. We thank both you for having supported that proposal. It will be debated later this month at the 

IMO. The U.S. Government has agreed to cosponsor that proposal. 

We think it makes good sense, certainly from a safety perspective, but we also believe that there is security value on this, and 

we understand that CBP has informed Coast Guard of their support for container weight verification for security risk screening 

purposes. 

So all of those things being said, we believe the partnership between the industry and CBP and the Coast Guard is working quite 

well. There is good, open, honest dialogue. If there is a risk, it is 

communicated and people can act on it when they are reviewing 

vessel security plans or port security plans, and we continue to believe that the focus should be on the implementation of the strategy which we believe is a sound strategy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to take any questions. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Koch. 

Well, based on what you just said about working together and 

sharing ideas, do you feel the Government has reached out to the 

industry to understand how it works in the real world so that they 

can get a better perspective on what can be done for maritime security? You are pleased with that communications and reach-out? 

Mr. KOCH. Yes, we are. I think when MTSA was just being rolled 

out there were bumps in the road which you might expect when a 

regime like that is coming together and being implemented. But 

the experience our members have had has been both the Coast 

Guard and CBP are quite professional; and when they have issues, 

the relationships are good. 

Liner shipping might be a little bit different than other sectors 

because the vessels—the container ships and liner shipping vessels 

17 

are coming into ports every week—are regularly scheduled services. It is the same crews. It is the same captains. They are there 

time and time again. Schedule reliability is key, so the operators 

will bend over backwards to make sure the Government has got 

whatever it needs so they can stay on schedule; and if there is a 

question, the operators bend over backwards to try to make sure 

that the Coast Guard or CBP has what they need. We think that 

goes on in other sectors as well, but at least our experience has 

been the cooperation has been excellent. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. On the TWICs, only U.S. mariners carry them. 

What in your view could be done to improve the security of the 

Merchant Marine credentials carried by foreign mariners? 

Mr. KOCH. Well, it is a difficult diplomatic question. The U.S. 

Government has taken a position which is far more strict than 

many trading nations, which is that crewmen coming in on a foreign-flagged ship, if they are going to get off the ship in the U.S., 

have to have a visa. The ILO Maritime Labor Convention, which 

is about to enter into force internationally, takes a different view, 

which is that seafarers ought to be able to get off the ship without 

a visa. The U.S. Government, Australia, several other governments 

have said, no, the security of the United States requires that you 

go through the visa process and you have an interview and that 

that process be pursued. 

So we believe the visa process satisfies the objectives of the Department of State and DHS in terms of ensuring that the crew on 

the ships coming to the U.S. have passed a sufficient security check 

that they are trustworthy. 

I would point out that is different than many nations who have 

less security screening requirements on crewmen than the U.S. 

does. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Ms. Rooney, your port hosted a pilot program for the TWIC reader. Can you give us kind of a thumbnail sketch or a brief discussion 

on the pitfalls that the port encountered on that? 

Ms. ROONEY. Yes, sir. There were a number of issues that we encountered with the pilot program, some of which were able to be 

worked out during the course of the pilot program and others that 

were still unresolved. But, in essence, they were technology issues. 

They were issues that allowed the reader to make a positive confirmation of the biometric that was stored in the card within a 

timely manner. 

Many of the issues that were overcome had to do with user training and user knowledge and experience. So the first couple of times 

that a mariner or a truck driver or a longshoreman was presented 

with a TWIC reader, they fumbled over the process; and, over time, 

those were resolved. We are confident that those issues can be addressed and successfully overcome and we can move from this flash 

pass to the biometric credential that was originally intended. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Rooney, with regards to both port security grant funding and 

the cost-share requirement, I have a couple questions. 

18 

First off, just some context. The Congress passed and the President signed recently a transportation bill where we went from 110 

separate surface transportation accounts to approximately 30 or 40. 

We had to gore some oxes to make that happen, but we thought, 

over time, even going back to the Democratic majority, to the Republican majority, that we needed to consolidate some of these accounts to give some more flexibility to recipients of the Federal dollars so they could choose more what they wanted to do, as opposed 

to saying this dollar can only do this and that dollar can only do 

that. 

So that is the context of the question with regards to port security grant funding. I would just like to hear the point you want to 

make about why port security grant funding needs to stay separate, as opposed to being consolidated with other accounts other 

than it just should because it is. 

Ms. ROONEY. I think the point that it needs to be separate is, by 

and large, because the maritime industry is largely owned and operated by the private sector. And the private sector is responsible 

for the security of the ports first and foremost in connection with 

their Federal, State, and local partners. 

So when those private-sector entities—and, for example, in my 

port there are 185 facilities that are regulated by the Coast Guard. 

Approximately 170 of them are owned by private-sector operators. 

When those private-sector companies come forward in an environment where they are competing with the New York City Police Department, with the New York City Fire Department, with the Port 

Authority and others for dollars, they will be challenged to truly secure their facilities when other high-risk assets and activities are 

taking place in an area such as New York and New Jersey. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. All right. 

And then with regards to the cost-share requirement, again, we 

have cost-share on surface transportation as well. Can you discuss 

a little bit more about the challenge of the cost-share in your situation? 

Ms. ROONEY. Again, while many of the—while much of the responsibility at the facility level for security is with the private owners and operators, the public agencies provide layers of security 

over and above that. And when you look at the history of where 

the port security grant dollars have gone to in the last 4 or 5 years, 

much of that is going to public-sector agencies, all of whom are constrained with their own budgets today. So it becomes very difficult 

for public-sector agencies to provide the cost-share that is necessary. And, as a result, what we have seen historically for many 

years now is public-sector agencies pulling out of those grants and 

those risks no longer being mitigated because they cannot afford 

the cost-share. 

Mr. LARSEN. OK. Thank you. 

Sounds like everything is great in the World Shipping Council, 

Mr. Koch. 

Mr. KOCH. If the companies could just learn how to be profitable, 

it would be even better. 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to MTSA, your attitude in the last 

hearing was the same as this one. It is like if it is a problem, we 

are going to fix it, we are going to work this thing out, we are going 

19 

to find a way to move cargo, because that is the job of the industry. 

And that is great. But can you talk a little bit about screening protocols under MTSA that shippers and carriers have to abide by to 

import cargoes in the U.S.? 

This gets back to the 100 percent scanning of containers entering 

the U.S. Is the scanning—do you see that scanning as unnecessary, 

given cargo screening protocols, the 10 + 2 cargo screening protocols? Is 100 percent screening necessary? Should it be all riskbased? Where do you think we ought to be moving? 

Mr. KOCH. Well, I think the 10 + 2 initiative did give CBP, obviously, a lot more information to do effective screening. And there 

is a semantic issue here. I think CBP would say they are screening 

100 percent of all cargo before vessel loading. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Mr. KOCH. Screening meaning analyzing the information and 

making a judgment about risk. 

It is the 100 percent scanning of a box, usually meant to be both 

radiation scanning and a kind of visual scan via x ray, gamma ray, 

or analogous technology. And frankly, the problem with such visual 

scanning of all containerized cargo is it is just not practical. 

Whether it is needed or not I think is also a debate. Without 

meaning to be glib about it, I really don’t think you need to scan 

every box of Heineken beer coming into the U.S., as an example, 

or Toyota auto parts coming into the U.S. I mean, I think the risk 

would not justify the expense of doing that. 

The other problem, obviously, with the 100 percent proposal is it 

is an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction, and you are asking 

foreign governments to do something and incur the costs to do all 

of it. And there is resistance to that. They point out, with some degree of fairness, the U.S. doesn’t undertake any such scanning for 

any of its exports, so why is it fair to require them to do that for 

their exports? And so there is a reciprocity issue there. 

And then there is also the technology issue. The technology has 

not yet developed to a point where you could process that many 

containers through the system and continue to have the efficient 

flow of commerce. 

The risk-based strategy is a strategy that from a practical perspective is your only choice. And so the question really I think is 

not to question the risk-based strategy so much as is to ensure that 

the agency, CBP, in charge of this, is getting the data that really 

makes sense. Is there data that they should be getting that they 

are not getting? And are they enforcing the existing obligations on 

people to give them the data? 

In other words, you have an obligation for ocean carriers to file 

their manifests, their stowage plans, and all their container status 

messages. You have obligations on NVOs to file all of their manifests before vessel loading. And you have obligations on importers 

to file the 10 data elements identified in the 10 + 2 reg. Are they 

doing that? 

Our understanding is they are. But I mean it would be worth 

checking into to make sure that they are getting the data that the 

strategy calls for. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

20 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Ms. Rooney, Mr. Koch, I would like to thank you 

for being here this morning; and the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:31 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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Æ 


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