In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3171

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE SOLIS JORDAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 CR 814--Blanche M. Manning, Judge.

Argued April 13, 2000--Decided August 17, 2000

 Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and HARLINGTON WOOD, JR.

and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

 HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge. The ten

issues on appeal range from the voluntariness of

the defendant’s confession to "colonialism."

Except for the defendant’s assertion that, as a

colonial power, the courts of this country lack

jurisdiction to try a citizen of Puerto Rico who

has been charged with four related federal crimes

committed in this country, there is nothing

unusual about the other issues except for the

context in which they arise. The defendantappellant, Dr. Jose Solis Jordan ("Solis"), is a

professor of educational philosophy at the

University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico,

but was residing in Chicago, Illinois at the time

of the alleged offenses. He was charged for his

role in the bombing of a military recruitment

center in Chicago, with one count of conspiracy

to commit offenses against the United States in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 371, two counts of

attempted destruction of government property in

violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 844(f), and one count

of illegal possession of explosives in violation

of 26 U.S.C. sec. 5861(d). 

 The defendant was found guilty on all counts by

a jury on July 13, 1999. Before examining the

specific issues, we will set them in an

evidentiary context. The defendant argues, among

other things, that the evidence was insufficient

to prove his involvement.
I. BACKGROUND

 The story begins in 1992 when Jose Lopez, the

head of Chicago’s Puerto Rican Cultural Center

("PRCC"), asked Rafael Marrero to form a

clandestine political organization advocating

independence for Puerto Rico from the United

States to be accomplished, if necessary, by

violent means. That organization came to be known

as the Frente Revolucionario Boricua/1 ("FRB").

Beginning in 1988, Marrero worked at the Puerto

Rican Alternative High School in Chicago. He had

joined the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional/2

("MLN") which was already advocating Puerto Rican

independence. Marrero was a member of MLN’s

propaganda endeavors under Lopez. The objectives

of MLN were to promote Puerto Rico’s independence

from the United States, but also to secure the

release by the United States of individuals

referred to as "political prisoners." The

"political prisoners" were those individuals who

had been convicted in federal court of acts of

violence against the United States government.

Their convictions, among other things, were for

armed robbery, attempted kidnapping, and bombing

of government facilities, all claimed to be an

effort to gain independence for Puerto Rico.

 According to Marrero, he and Lopez began

discussing the use of violence in their political

efforts. Lopez told Marrero that an "experiment"

had been approved at the highest levels of the

MLN to "test the waters" with violence to see if

it would cause a positive reaction in favor of

the "political prisoners." The target to be

chosen would be a military, government, or

financial institution. Lopez instructed Marrero

to contact Dr. Solis.

 Marrero had met Dr. Solis in 1989 at an MLNsponsored protest march in New York. They became

better acquainted when Dr. Solis moved to Chicago

in 1991. Lopez told Marrero that Dr. Solis could

be trusted. Dr. Solis had pressed Lopez on the

use of violence to achieve Puerto Rican

independence, inquiring why violence had not been

used previously. Marrero and Dr. Solis, according

to Marrero’s testimony, began to discuss

political targets, with Dr. Solis suggesting the

use of a bomb. Recruiting others to help was

discussed. Dr. Solis advised that the FRB’s

membership should not exceed five in order to

avoid suspicion. Dr. Solis recommended his wife

be selected as one of the five, but Marrero

instead recommended two others as recruits,

Edward Brooks and Diana Vasquez, both supporters

of the Puerto Rican independence movement. Brooks

was already acquainted with Dr. Solis as they had

worked together on the radio to raise public
awareness of the Puerto Rican "political

prisoners" and Puerto Rican independence. Brooks

later testified at trial that the FRB was to plan

for some type of violent and illegal act.

 In the spring of 1992, the FRB had its first

meeting. Marrero explained the FRB’s purpose. Dr.

Solis emphasized secrecy. The meetings continued

from time to time. Dr. Solis demonstrated

technical knowledge about bomb construction and

became the group’s instructor. He provided

manuals and other materials along with

illustrations to explain the bomb manufacturing

process. Dr. Solis made some small test bombs of

different kinds from different materials, being

careful not to leave fingerprints on the parts.

Marrero testified that Dr. Solis had constructed

a pipe bomb which he tested in a Chicago-area

forest preserve. Based on Dr. Solis’s knowledge

and experiments, he recommended to the group that

a time-delay pipe bomb be made and used.

 Marrero testified that the plans for the actual

bombing then proceeded. The date of July 25,

1992, was first chosen because it was the

anniversary of the initial landing of United

States troops in Puerto Rico, but that date came

and went. October 12, 1992 was then chosen

because it was the 500th anniversary of

Columbus’s landing in this hemisphere. Specific

bombing sites were discussed, including the

Dirksen Federal Building (which houses this

court), but it was considered too difficult. The

Citibank building in Chicago was then surveilled

as a possible target. It was claimed the bank had

taken advantage of the Puerto Rican people./3

Plans for the bank site advanced to the point

where Dr. Solis sketched the bank building and

drafted a "communique."/4 The communique was to

be left at the bomb site so the public would know

that the bombing was in support of Puerto Rican

independence. However, that plan was abandoned as

the group broke ranks. Brooks withdrew from the

FRB both because he was under pressure from his

girlfriend and because he was not personally

enthusiastic about the use of violence. After

Brooks’s departure, the others decided they

should continue anyway, but with a new target. It

was Dr. Solis, Marrero testified, who suggested

the new target, a particular military recruiting

office in Chicago. The basis for the

recommendation of Dr. Solis was that the

recruiting station was secluded and had no

security cameras. The group’s bombing plans then

went ahead, concentrating on the recruiting

station.

 With the planning and testing complete, Dr.

Solis, Marrero, and Vasquez prepared for the

actual bombing. The new date was to be December
10, 1992, International Human Rights Day. After

surveilling the recruiting station, they decided

to place one pipe bomb in front of the recruiting

station and another under a government car at the

site. The bombs would be placed late at night so

they would detonate early in the morning. Dr.

Solis would do the driving and Marrero and

Vasquez would plant the bombs and leave the

communique. This routine was rehearsed several

times. The communique to be left at the site was

drafted by Dr. Solis and Marrero. Marrero and Dr.

Solis constructed the two bombs at Dr. Solis’s

home using propane tanks, pipes, gun powder,

clocks, and other materials.

 On the night of December 9, 1992, Dr. Solis

picked up Marrero and returned to Dr. Solis’s

home for the bombs, then picked up Vasquez at her

home. Riding in the back seat, Marrero placed the

battery caps on the devices to activate them.

Then, however, he suffered a change of heart and

began attempting to disarm the bombs by removing

the battery caps. Upon arrival at the recruiting

station, Dr. Solis waited in his car while

Marrero placed one bomb in front of the

recruiting station and Vasquez placed the other

bomb under a nearby government car, all as

planned. Two communiques were posted nearby. Dr.

Solis, Marrero, and Vasquez then drove away,

dropping Vasquez at home. Dr. Solis placed an

anonymous phone call so the FRB would get

appropriate credit for the bombing. He also sent

a copy of the communique to the PRCC to be

forwarded to the "political prisoners." There

must have been great disappointment the next

morning, however, considering all their planning

and preparation. Although it damaged the

government car, the bomb only burned without

fully exploding. The other bomb placed in front

of the recruiting station was disarmed by a

police officer who arrived at the scene.

 Dr. Solis’s response to this evidence, which he

claimed to be insufficient to prove his

participation, is succinctly summarized in his

brief.

Jose Solis Jordan did not destroy government

property. He did not possess an explosive device.

He did not conspire with Rafael Marrero to set

devices by an army recruiting center. Dr. Solis

is a scholar, an intellectual and a man of

integrity.

Appellant’s Brief at 32.

 We shall interrupt the story at this time to

take up Solis’s claim of insufficiency of the

evidence, having just set out the pertinent

facts, and will then proceed to examine what
occurred after the bombing and the remaining nine

issues.

 Our standard of review does not require that we

ignore the government’s evidence and resolve all

credibility issues and inferences in favor of the

defendant. Under our standard of review, we will

"affirm the conviction so long as any rational

trier of fact could have found the defendant to

have committed the essential elements of the

crime." United States v. Masten, 170 F.3d 790,

794 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In United States v.

McVeigh, the Murrah Federal Building bombing case

in Oklahoma City, the Tenth Circuit stated the

rule, "On appeal, we review the evidence--both

direct and circumstantial, together with the

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom--in

the light most favorable to the government." 153

F.3d 1166, 1176 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.

denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999) (citing United

States v. Copus, 110 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir.

1997)). Even without such a high hurdle for a

convicted defendant to clear, there can be little

doubt that the evidence of Dr. Solis’s guilt,

which speaks for itself, is more than sufficient

and deserves no further comment. We reserve for

the moment, however, the other issues raised by

Dr. Solis relating to the evidence.

 We now return briefly to the factual

developments. Over two years after the unsolved

bombing, Marrero agreed to cooperate with the

FBI, not only in this case but in others. In the

meantime, Dr. Solis had moved back to Puerto Rico

with his wife, Martha Gonzales. Marrero, now

cooperating with the government, met Dr. Solis

and his wife in a San Juan restaurant and

covertly tape recorded their dinner conversation.

Marrero advised them that the FBI had been making

some inquiries. (Those tape recordings are a

separate issue which will be discussed later.)

There was some discussion of the applicable

statute of limitations for murder, so it was a

serious "bombing" discussion. There was also

interest expressed about any reactions of the

"political prisoners." On an early morning in

November of 1997, Dr. Solis was arrested by FBI

agents at his home in Puerto Rico and later

transported to Chicago for trial./5

 Other pertinent evidence will be discussed in

relation to the particular issues.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

A. Alleged Request for an Attorney

 After his arrest in Puerto Rico, Dr. Solis

signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and

substantially admitted his participation in the
bombing plot as recited above. Dr. Solis now

maintains that, because he repeatedly requested

an attorney prior to and during his

interrogation, his confession was not voluntary

and should have been suppressed. "[T]he ultimate

question of whether a confession is voluntary is

a matter of law that must be reviewed de novo in

this court. Nevertheless . . . the determination

of the historical facts of the case are the

proper domain of the trial court and [ ] our

review of its finding in that regard will be for

clear error." United States v. D.F., 115 F.3d

413, 419 (7th Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted).

 Dr. Solis’s admissions after his arrest

generally covered his initial contacts with his

associates, the construction of the bombs, and

his role in the actual bombing, and were set

forth in an FBI report. Dr. Solis and his wife

Martha, however, testified otherwise at his

trial. She, nevertheless, conceded they both were

ardent supporters of Puerto Rican independence

and the "political prisoners." She also admitted

that her husband believed in the right to use

violence against the United States. During a

difficult cross-examination, when it appeared

that Gonzales was being impeached, she became

evasive and defensive of her husband. Dr. Solis,

as we have mentioned, denied any complicity.

 It was claimed that Dr. Solis requested counsel

at the time of his arrest, but the testimony

varied considerably. Dr. Solis testified he had

asked his wife in Spanish to call a lawyer for

him as he was being arrested and that, also in

Spanish, he told the agents as he was being taken

away that he wanted to see an attorney right

away. The agents present during the arrest, most

of whom were Spanish-speaking, denied having

heard Dr. Solis give such an instruction to his

wife, or make any request for an attorney in

either Spanish or English. After his arrest, Dr.

Solis was taken to FBI headquarters in San Juan

where he was photographed and fingerprinted. This

process for a major case took about one-and-ahalf to two hours. An agent who had been with Dr.

Solis from the time of his arrest through the

booking process, described Dr. Solis as "very

cooperative, very friendly, relaxed," and cordial

all day. Dr. Solis, the agent testified, spoke

only in English and did not ask for an attorney.

Following the booking process, three government

agents began an interview with Dr. Solis at about

9:30 a.m. The agents explained to Dr. Solis why

he had been arrested and informed him of his

rights, with one of them reading his Miranda

rights to him using the FBI’s standard "Advice of

Rights." Dr. Solis was then asked to read the

rights statement form for himself, which he did.

After that, one of the agents testified Dr. Solis
signed the form, which stated, "At this time, I

am willing to answer questions without a lawyer

present." The two other agents signed the form as

witnesses. Dr. Solis then proceeded to relate

many of the facts about his role in the bombing.

At about 11:15 a.m., the agents learned a lawyer

named Rafael Anglada had arrived at FBI

headquarters who advised them he was Dr. Solis’s

lawyer. The agents asked Dr. Solis if he had ever

heard of Anglada. They testified that Dr. Solis

responded he had never heard the name before,

that he was not his attorney, that Anglada did

not represent him, that he did not wish to speak

to Anglada, and that he did not have a lawyer.

Although the agents testified that Dr. Solis had

not asked for a lawyer at any time, shortly after

the inquiry from Anglada, the interview was

terminated and Dr. Solis was taken to Pretrial

Services.

 Before trial, Dr. Solis filed a motion to

suppress his incriminating post-arrest

statements, and the court set his motion for

hearing. Dr. Solis testified that he had

requested an attorney on numerous occasions

during the arrest process. However, all eight FBI

agents, most of whom spoke both English and

Spanish, who had any substantial contact with Dr.

Solis at that time, testified that Dr. Solis

never asked for a lawyer. At the conclusion of

the motion hearing during which Dr. Solis

testified, the district judge denied the motion

and specifically found that Dr. Solis had not

requested counsel. Dr. Solis admitted signing the

waiver form and does not claim he did not

understand it. The district court, after noting

the educational background and achievements of

Dr. Solis, found that Dr. Solis had understood

what he was doing. A mistake about the time of

signing was corrected and initialed on the form

by Dr. Solis. Dr. Solis maintains that the

initials were not made by him and that the time

difference was critical to show the FBI could not

have had time to obtain his lengthy confession.

He argues that the agents fabricated the change

to make their story of the confession more

believable. The alleged time difference was not

a sufficient basis for Dr. Solis’s counsel to

impeach the agents.

 This court does not in the usual circumstances

undertake to make credibility findings, as that

is better left to the fact finder, be it judge or

jury. In any event, there is absolutely not the

slightest basis in this case for this court to

overturn the district court’s credibility

findings.

B. Venue
 Dr. Solis objected to conducting his trial in

the United States instead of Puerto Rico, where

he was working and living with his family at the

time of his arrest. He made the necessary motions

pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure 21(a) and (b). Under subsection (a) of

Rule 21, transfer to another district can be

ordered "if the court is satisfied that there

exists in the district where the prosecution is

pending so great a prejudice against the

defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair

and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for

holding court in that district." In support of

the motion, defense counsel argued that negative

pretrial publicity in the local press and

existing prejudices against Puerto Ricans in

general and against those who support Puerto

Rico’s independence could be obviated by transfer

to Puerto Rico. In Puerto Rico, it was argued, a

bilingual Puerto Rican jury could better judge

the case which was anticipated would involve

disputes about language translations, as in fact

it did. It was further argued that a Puerto Rican

jury would be free of the prejudice and

discrimination against Puerto Ricans. It was also

claimed that a Puerto Rican jury could better

"judge the case in the context of a history of

political persecution and fabricated charges

against independentistas."/6 The government

defends the court’s ruling denying the venue

transfer on the basis that the alleged crimes

were committed in Chicago, not Puerto Rico, and

that most of the witnesses would be from Chicago.

 It was explained in the district court that Dr.

Solis was not moving separately for transfer

under Rule 21(a) on the grounds of pretrial

publicity, but wanted the pretrial publicity to

be weighed with his Rule 21(b)/7 arguments. In

fact, as the district court noted, Dr. Solis

conceded that the press reports referenced by him

did not entitle him to relief under Rule 21(a).

The government claims the defendant, therefore,

waived his Rule 21(a) motion. However, we will

consider his Rule 21(a) and (b) motions together.

In behalf of his 21(b) motion, the defendant

claims that in denying his motions, the district

court failed to consider the factors set forth in

Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S.

240, 244-45 (1964). Those factors range broadly

from the location of the defendant and possible

witnesses, to disruption of the defendant’s

business unless the case is transferred, to the

expenses which might be incurred by the parties,

the location of counsel, and accessibility of the

place of trial, to the docket conditions in the

districts involved as well as other special

considerations. Id. Those factors which could

realistically affect the decision in this case

were fully considered by the district court. The

government concedes, however, there were factors
on both sides of the issue. The court

acknowledged that Dr. Solis and his family

resided in Puerto Rico at the time of trial and

that a Chicago trial would "impose extreme

economic, emotional and logistic hardship on the

defendant and his entire family." The court also

noted that while the defendant "posits" that many

witnesses will be Puerto Rican, Dr. Solis failed

to specify who the Puerto Rican witnesses would

be and what their testimony would relate to. The

court took note of the fact that, because Dr.

Solis’s motion for additional counsel was granted

by the court, he now had both a Puerto Rican

attorney and a Chicago attorney, alleviating

problems Dr. Solis raised concerning language and

knowledge of Puerto Rico. Dr. Solis’s Puerto

Rican counsel and his Chicago counsel both

represented Dr. Solis at trial and argued this

appeal. His Puerto Rican counsel was not the same

counsel who appeared at the time of Dr. Solis’s

arrest in Puerto Rico claiming to be his

attorney. 

 Our standard of review for this issue is for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Robinson,

20 F.3d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1994). This court

observed that the consideration of a Rule 21(b)

motion "is one of those areas in which the

question for the court of appeals is whether the

discretion granted to the district court has been

exercised. If it has been, it will be almost

impossible to show that it has been abused . . .

." Matter of Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 187 (7th Cir.

1995). We cannot say, considering all the

arguments advanced, that the district judge

abused her discretion by requiring the trial to

be held in the district where the alleged crimes

were committed. Venue is not the defendant’s

choice to be determined on the basis of where he

believes a jury might be more sympathetic to his

political views. The district judge considered

what needed to be considered and, after weighing

those factors, kept the trial in Chicago. We see

no abuse of discretion.

C. Peremptory Challenges

 Next, the defendant raises a jury issue

claiming the government was permitted to

peremptorily excuse two Latino venirepersons

without sufficient justification./8 That

justification is needed to show that the

government’s peremptory challenges are not

motivated by purposeful discrimination, and in

effect were not pretextual. Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).

 Contrary to what the defendant argues by

relying on Mahaffey v. Page, 162 F.3d 481, 484

(7th Cir. 1998), our standard of review is not de
novo. The standard of review remains as set forth

in United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849

(7th Cir. 1991), which states that the appellate

court "will only overturn the trial court’s

determination that a prosecutor’s use of

peremptory challenges was not motivated by

purposeful discrimination if that determination

is clearly erroneous." Mahaffey applies to a

different Batson situation. Normally, a Batson

review involves three stages: (1) a prima facie

showing of discrimination must be made by the

defendant, (2) with a prima facie showing, the

prosecution must present a race-neutral

explanation for striking the jurors, and (3) the

trial court must decide whether the prosecution’s

reasons are pretextual and whether the defendant

has proven purposeful discrimination. Mahaffey,

162 F.3d at 482-83 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at

96-98). In Mahaffey, the court never proceeded

beyond the prima facie determination; therefore,

because the question of whether a prima facie

case has been shown presents mixed questions of

fact and law, a de novo review must be conducted.

Id. at 483, 484. The court in Mahaffey held that

because Mahaffey made a prima facie showing, the

State was required to present race-neutral

explanations. Id. at 486. The state judgment in

that habeas corpus case was therefore reversed

and remanded for a new Batson hearing to allow

the State to advance any race-neutral

explanations for the challenged strikes. Id.

 In the present case, however, the government

did advance its race-neutral explanations at the

time the issue was raised. The trial court

accepted the government’s explanations. Two male

Latino jurors had been peremptorily excused. The

first juror was excused, the government

explained, because the particular juror’s wife

taught Spanish at DePaul University in Chicago

where Dr. Solis and some of his possible

character witnesses had also taught. It was also

claimed that at DePaul there was a "hotbed of

dissent regarding the defendant."

 One of the government’s objections to this

juror was that he was fluent in Spanish, but had

difficulty with English. The government expressed

the concern that the juror might refuse to defer

to the government’s translations of what it was

that Dr. Solis may have been heard to say on the

controversial tapes (problems which did develop

and will be discussed later). The district court

did not accept this explanation, because the

government failed to question the Spanishspeaking venirepersons about their willingness to

defer to expert witnesses’ translations of the

tape. We agree with the district court on this

particular point. Under the plurality opinion

authored by Justice Kennedy in Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), it appears to us that

the key question is whether the prospective juror

would be willing to follow the court’s

instructions and thus be willing to defer to the

authorized translation. The plurality went out of

its way to avoid suggesting that bilingualism

itself is a race-neutral ground for striking a

juror. Id. at 361. Thus, the government’s failure

to ask how the jurors would react to the

testimony was an important omission.

 As to this juror, the district court found,

however, that the juror’s wife taught Spanish at

DePaul and that, further, Dr. Solis’s case was

being hotly debated in her department. The court

also noted that this juror had had some bad

experiences with the military in Argentina.

Relying on our Williams standard of review, we

see no peremptory challenge Batson error. We have

in other cases approved reasons given by the

prosecution that included merely "intuitive

assumptions that are not fairly quantifiable."

Williams, 934 F.2d at 850 (quoting United States

v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489 (7th Cir. 1990)).

In Williams, this court found that the

explanations for challenge were credible and,

given the deference due the trial court, could

not say, based on the record, that the ruling was

clearly erroneous. Id. The same is true in the

present case. Based on the record and in view of

the government’s explanations, we have no basis

to hold that the district court’s decision was

clearly erroneous. That some of the anticipated

government testimony, which might have caused

difficulty for this juror, never materialized, is

irrelevant in that pretrial setting. 

 The second juror peremptorily excused by the

government was also fluent in Spanish but, again,

as with the first juror, this was not the court’s

reason for finding that the peremptory challenge

was not tainted. The second juror had done

campaign work in two Chicago wards, working for

the campaigns of a current alderman and a

previous alderman (who at the time of trial was

a congressman), both of whom were Hispanic. The

government claimed that these two politicians had

not only spoken out publicly on numerous

occasions against Marrero, who was to be a

principal government witness, but had attempted

to have Marrero removed from his job. The

government also stated that the defense was

planning to question Marrero about the attempt to

have him removed from his job, which involved one

of the politicians. In addition, tapes were to be

submitted to the jury on which Marrero made

derogatory comments about these two men. The two

aldermen had also been disparagingly depicted as

"Spice Girls" in a publication associated with

Marrero, to which he had contributed articles. 
 Applying our Williams standard of review in

these circumstances, we find no error in the

ruling of the district court that both of the

peremptory challenges were based on individual

bias and not race related. Peremptory challenges

have become limited in their use in certain

circumstances, but have not been restricted to

the point of being equated to challenges for

cause. The Supreme Court in Hernandez noted that

deference is given to the trial court findings on

the issue of discriminatory intent because "the

finding largely will turn on evaluation of

credibility." 500 U.S. at 365 (internal

quotations and citation omitted). The defense

arguments about these jurors are not sufficient

under our standard of review to fairly

characterize the government challenges as racebased challenges. We find no error.

D. Tape Recordings

 Dr. Solis next objects that the tape recording

of his and his wife’s conversation with Marrero

about the bombing and events both before and

after, which was made in a restaurant in Puerto

Rico on June 28, 1997, should not have been

allowed into evidence because it is inaudible.

After Dr. Solis was indicted, the government

provided him with a copy of the pertinent parts

of the controversial tape, together with a

transcript in English to serve as an aid to the

jury. The defense notified the government in

advance of trial that it would dispute the

transcript. In response, the government hired an

independent court interpreter, Roberto Mendoza,

to prepare another transcript of the tape. This

new transcript was also provided to the defense.

The defense then requested a transcript of the

entire tape which would reflect the Spanish

language on the tape instead of the English

translation of the conversations in Spanish.

There was not time to prepare the transcript of

the whole tape, and most of the tape was

irrelevant anyway. The parties endeavored to

agree on a translation of about four minutes of

the tape mutually considered to be relevant. The

interpreter then prepared transcripts of the

relevant portion both in Spanish and in English.

Defense counsel made suggestions about the

translation, some of which were incorporated into

the new transcripts. However, the consensus

effort failed and the defense moved to suppress

the tapes as inaudible.

 In considering the problem with the tapes, the

district court judge listened to the tapes in

camera, as we have, and found the tapes

sufficiently audible, holding that the tapes

would be admitted upon government authentication.
Both sides, it was ruled, would be permitted to

present their own experts and translations and

transcripts. The jury was to be allowed to rely

on the transcript it found to be most credible in

correctly reflecting the conversations. There

could be no fairer way for the district court to

present this tape problem for jury consideration.

However, during opening arguments, defense

counsel suggested to the jury that the government

was only going to produce "a snippet" of the

conversation, the inference being the government

was hiding something or taking the comments out

of context. In response, the government offered

the transcript of the full tape.

 At trial the government called two certified

court interpreters, Mendoza and Gloria Domenech,

who both testified that the transcript accurately

reflected the conversations on the tape. Any

inaudible portions, it was explained, were only

a matter of a few seconds or fractions of

seconds. Although the defendant produced no

expert or any other transcript in rebuttal, the

burden of proof remained with the government. We

held in United States v. Powers, 75 F.3d 335, 341

(7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citation

omitted), "A recording that is only partly

unintelligible is admissible unless the

unintelligible portions are so substantial as to

render the recording as a whole untrustworthy."

The decision whether to admit a recording with

some unintelligible portions is left to the

district court’s sound discretion. See id.

(citation omitted). We continue to follow that

standard. United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d

1097, 1104 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that district

court has broad discretion in deciding whether to

allow the use of written transcripts to aid the

jury in listening to recorded conversations). If

the tape is generally audible, but only partially

inaudible, the inaudible portions may affect its

weight, a determination to be left to the jury.

United States v. Robinson, 956 F.2d 1388, 1395

(7th Cir. 1992). The tape’s admissibility,

however, is a matter for the court to decide. See

Powers, 75 F.3d at 341. Conclusory arguments made

by counsel about the tape or transcript

inaccuracies, with no indication that the verdict

was adversely affected, are not sufficient.

United States v. Fuentes-Montijo, 68 F.3d 352,

355 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. PenaEspinoza, 47 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1995)). We

find no clear abuse of discretion by the district

court.

E. Jury Instruction on Tape

Recording/Transcripts

 The previous section does not dispose of all

the tape recording issues as the defense also
objects to the district court’s jury instruction

regarding the tape and transcripts. Two Seventh

Circuit Federal Criminal Jury Instructions are at

issue, sec. 3.17--Recordings/Transcripts of

Recordings,/9 and sec. 3.18--Foreign Language

Recordings/Transcripts in English./10

Defendant requested the two instructions be given

separately and in full. The government presented,

and the district court accepted, a combination

instruction, with sec. 3.18 given in full but

combined with sec. 3.17, omitting only

duplicative language of sec. 3.17.

 Among the exhibits admitted during the trial

were recordings that contained conversations that

took place partially in the Spanish language. You

were also provided with English transcripts of

those conversations. The transcripts were

provided to you so that you could consider the

content of the conversations of [sic] the

recordings. 

 Whether the transcripts contain accurate

translations of the Spanish language portions of

the recordings in whole or in part is for you to

decide. In considering whether a transcript

accurately describes the meaning of a

conversation, you should consider the testimony

presented to you regarding how and by whom the

transcript was made. You may consider the

knowledge, training, and experience of the

translator, as well as the nature of the

conversation and the reasonableness of the

translation in light of all the evidence in the

case. 

 With respect to the Spanish language portions

of the recordings, you should not rely in any way

on any knowledge you may have of the Spanish

language spoken on the recording. Your

consideration of the transcripts should be based

on the evidence introduced in the trial.

 With respect to the English language portion of

the recordings, the tape recordings themselves

are the evidence of what was and was not recorded

on the tapes. With respect to the English

portions, English language portions of the

recordings, the transcripts were provided to you

solely as a listening aid. If from your hearing

of the English portion of a particular recording

you perceive any variation between the cassette

and the corresponding transcript, you will be

guided solely by the cassette and not by the

transcript.

Dr. Solis maintains that this jury instruction

not only directs the jury to consider the

Spanish-language translations as the evidence,

not the tape, but that having the written
translation sent into the jury room as evidence

unduly emphasizes that portion of the tape. 

 Effectively combining multiple instructions into

one instruction is an accepted practice. United

States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.

1995). We do not see that the combination of

instructions misstated the law, omitted any

relevant part of the law, or unduly emphasized

any part of the evidence. We have held that if

the instructions in their entirety are fair,

accurate, and sufficient for the jury to have an

understanding of the issues to be decided and

includes a fair and accurate statement of the

law, we will accept the judge’s instruction

determinations. United States v. Lanzotti, 205

F.3d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 2000). We do not find that

the combined instruction misled the jury and

believe the instruction provided a clear

understanding of the issues and the jury’s duty

to determine those issues. See id. And so it is

in this case, we find no error in the judge’s

exercise of discretion.

F. Evidence of Government Payments to Marrero

 Dr. Solis seeks a new trial on the basis that

government counsel in his opening statements

advised the jury of the FBI’s payments made to

Marrero, which were to cover his relocation

costs, lost wages, and for Marrero’s help in the

investigation. Marrero testified that several

events occurred which were sufficient for Marrero

to believe his life was in danger. Given the

factual circumstances of this case, that was not

an unreasonable concern. The government spent

about $119,000 in relation to Marrero, which the

evidence was expected to show, and did show. 

 Evidentiary rulings of the trial court will be

reversed only if there has been a clear abuse of

discretion, such that no reasonable person could

agree with the district court’s ruling. United

States v. Adames, 56 F.3d 737, 746 (7th Cir. 1995)

(citing United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476,

1490 (7th Cir. 1990)). The defense argument seems

to be that the government’s payment information

in its opening statement was premature even

though it could be explored in direct and on

cross-examination. Defense counsel had indicated

in advance that he intended to tell the jury in

his opening statement that "[Marrero] was paid

over $100,000 for his testimony." That payment

information, of course, could have a bearing on

Marrero’s credibility. Once the defense had

indicated it would make a statement about Marrero

and the FBI money, the government was entitled to

address the issue prior to the defense. See

United States v. Holly, 167 F.3d 393, 395 (7th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Robinzine, 80 F.3d
246, 252 (7th Cir. 1996). Government counsel was

not required to wait for defense counsel to bring

up the payments to Marrero. That possibly could

have given the initial impression to the jury

that otherwise the government had intended to

keep that relevant payment information from the

jury. 

 It is somewhat difficult to understand what

defense counsel is now objecting to since, at the

time the objection was made, she advised the

district court that she "would have no objection

if the prosecution says in its opening statement

after leaving this group that Mr. Marrero felt

that his life was in danger and [he] turned to

the FBI for protection. We would have no problem

with that." Furthermore, the government attorney

agreed to the defense’s restrictions and

suggestion that he confine his remarks to the

fact that "[Marrero] felt he was threatened, and

the FBI assessed the situation and put him into

a program" for safety purposes. Those concessions

seem generally to permit what the government said

in its opening, but to which the defense now

objects. Marrero was subject to cross-examination

during trial and defense counsel had ample

opportunity to argue that Marrero was biased due

to the FBI payments. Defense counsel summed it up

in his closing argument by saying that Marrero

was "on the dole for $118,000 from the

government, and his interpretation of the tapes

is not to be truthful. We know that he would

choke on the truth. . . . Marrero cares little,

if anything, for the truth."

 We see no abuse of discretion.

G. Trial Misconduct

1. "Terrorism"

 The defense raises some additional questions

about the government’s trial of the case. The

defendant now claims that the government’s use of

the word "terrorism," though infrequent, and the

government’s questioning of witnesses regarding

their views about the possible violent overthrow

of the government of the United States, was

prejudicial error. We do not find that there was

any objection by defense counsel at the

time,/11 so our standard of review is for

plain error. See United States v. Hardamon, 188

F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 1999). Reversal for plain

error is exercised in only the most exceptional

of circumstances. United States v. Jackson, 542

F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted). 

 Regardless of the applicable standard of review,

we see no error in the limited use by the

government of the word "terrorism," which is the

term generally and publically applied to charges
similar to those made against Dr. Solis. The

simple definition of terrorism found in the Oxford

American Dictionary 709 (1980) is the "use of violence

and intimidation, especially for political

purposes." That is what this is. In any event,

the jury was instructed that what the lawyers

might say is not evidence for the jury to

consider. Further, it was defense counsel who

first introduced the word "terrorist" into the

trial by inquiring during voir dire if the use of

the word "terror" or "terrorist" would unduly

influence the jury’s judgment. No prospective

juror indicated it would cause any prejudice.

 We see no error in the infrequent use by the

government of the word "terrorism," particularly

in a case dealing with the attempted bombing of

a government building.

2. Puerto Rican Independence

 Another aspect of the objection has to do with

the government’s questioning of witnesses about

their views as to the use of violence to protest

the United States involvement in Puerto Rico.

Again, because defense counsel never objected to

this line of questioning,/12 this issue is

reviewed for plain error. See Hardamon, 188 F.3d

at 849. Dr. Solis testified about his own views

on Puerto Rican independence and his support for

the "political prisoners" who had advocated

violence against the United States government. We

therefore find nothing improper of sufficient

consequence to have adversely affected the

fairness of the trial.

H. "Special Caution" Jury Instruction

 There is an additional issue raised by the

defense about a jury instruction. The defense

proposed an accomplice or "special caution" jury

instruction/13 because the government called

Edward Brooks as a witness. Brooks had been one

of the original participants but, as we have

mentioned, he withdrew from the FRB. He did so

because he apparently had some personal objection

to the degree of violence involved and because

his girlfriend pressured him with some good

advice which he decided to follow. Brooks

testified about the FRB and others in the group

up until the time he disassociated himself in the

fall of 1992. The defense argues that the lack of

an accomplice instruction suggests Brooks was an

impartial, objective witness. The defense

maintains that even though there was no evidence

Brooks negotiated with the government for freedom

from prosecution in exchange for testifying, the

fact that he was not prosecuted cast doubt on his

credibility.
 This court dealt with a similar situation in

United States v. Cook, 102 F.3d 249 (7th Cir.

1996). In that case, an informant had been paid

for cooperating with the FBI and for wearing a

wire to record conversations with the defendant.

The district court declined to give a "special

caution" instruction. The panel stated that a

separate jury instruction is not required "as a

matter of course" where there is testimony of a

paid informer, and affirmed the district court’s

decision to not give the special instruction,

holding that the use of that type of instruction

is "committed to the discretion of the district

court, which is best situated to detect and deal

with threats of unreliable testimony, and that

appellate review is deferential." Id. at 252. The

court in Cook also noted that the Seventh Circuit

had never reversed a criminal conviction for

failure to give a special instruction for an

informant’s testimony, and held that "a general

credibility instruction referring to the

possibility of bias, which coupled with crossexamination and closing argument by counsel will

put the subject before the jury for decision."

Id. at 253. 

 In the present case there is no basis to find

fault with the district court’s exercise of

discretion. Brooks was not paid nor given

anything on the basis of his testimony. There was

no government agreement not to prosecute him. He

appeared at trial subject to a government

subpoena. With or without the cautionary

instruction, defense counsel cross-examined

Brooks as to his motivations for testifying and

addressed the issue in his closing argument. The

district court gave the jury the standard

instruction on witness credibility. We find no

error in the district court’s discretion in

declining to give the "special caution"

instruction.

I. Jurisdiction

 The last of the ten issues Dr. Solis raises on

appeal is one of jurisdiction. As the issue is

stated in his brief: "International Law, Binding

Upon The Courts Of The United States, Deprives

The Courts Of The Colonial Power To Try Citizens

Of The Nation Subjected To Colonialism For Its

Offenses Alleged In The Indictment." Dr. Solis

maintains "[his] conviction, in defiance of

international law and the Constitution of the

United States, must be reversed." Basically, Dr.

Solis argues that the district court lacked

personal jurisdiction over him because he is a

resident of Puerto Rico.

 Ordinarily, one would expect a jurisdictional

argument to be raised first, but defense counsel
recognized that the established law of this

country was contrary to his position. See United

States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.

1991); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255,

259 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Koliboski,

732 F.2d 1328, 1329 (7th Cir. 1984). Dr. Solis’s

attempt to argue that an international treaty

destroys the jurisdiction of the courts of this

country in itself raises a more substantial

question about the defendant’s standing to allege

a violation of international treaties. As we have

stated, "It is well established that individuals

have no standing to challenge violations of

international treaties in the absence of a

protest by the sovereigns involved." MattaBallesteros, 896 F.2d at 259.

 Dr. Solis and his counsel nevertheless have

provided the court with an extensive historical

and legal analysis of the claim that the district

court lacks jurisdiction. They argue that 18

U.S.C. sec. 3231 applies only to the fifty states

and is unconstitutional and illegal under

international law as applied to Puerto Rico. The

theory which they endeavor to support is that

"international law, binding upon the courts of

the United States, deprives the court of the

colonial power to try citizens of the nation

subjected to colonialism for its offenses alleged

in the indictment." The United States, it is

claimed, is the colonial power and Puerto Rico

has been subject to that colonialism dating back

to the United States occupation of Puerto Rico in

1898. Therefore, it is argued, "the status of the

United States in Puerto Rico is that of a

belligerent occupant, not the sovereign." Dr.

Solis further asserts that his prosecution

"violates the customary norms of international

law." The defense first filed a pre-trial motion

in the district court to dismiss the indictment

for lack of jurisdiction and later filed a motion

in arrest of judgment for lack of jurisdiction.

The government responded that Dr. Solis could not

invoke a treaty to assert lack of jurisdiction.

 Contrary to Dr. Solis’s assertion that he is

protected by international law, well established

principles of international law make it clear

that a state/14 "has jurisdiction to prescribe

law with respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or

in substantial part, takes place within its

territory . . . ." Restatement (Third) of the Foreign

Relations Law of the United States sec. 402(1)(a) (1987).

In addition, a state is entitled to exercise

jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a

person if, among other things, "the person . . .

had carried on activity in the state, but only in

respect of such activity." Id. sec. 421(2)(i).

Finally, a state has jurisdiction to "employ

judicial or nonjudicial measures to . . . punish
noncompliance with its laws or regulations,

provided it has jurisdiction to prescribe . . .

." Id. sec. 431(1).

 Title 18 prohibits attacks on federal facilities

located on our own territory. These laws fall

well within the boundaries of sec. 402, and are

in no way unreasonable under the limitations

placed on jurisdiction to prescribe of sec. 403

(listing relevant factors of when jurisdiction

over a person or activity is unreasonable). There

is jurisdiction to adjudicate, or personal

jurisdiction, over Dr. Solis because he undertook

the activities involved while residing in this

country. Finally, as stated in the Restatement of

Foreign Relations, because the United States has

jurisdiction to prescribe, there is clearly

jurisdiction to enforce the laws of the country

through judicial proceedings.

 Dr. Solis, regardless of his political

motivation, was not selectively singled out for

prosecution because of his political views. He

may, however, now view himself as another of this

country’s "political prisoners," as he calls

them, but there was no politics involved so far

as the government is concerned, only criminal

acts contrary to federal laws which are

applicable to all. Dr. Solis even invokes the

Boston Tea Party./15 The political future of

Puerto Rico, whatever it may be, is not the issue

before this court.

III. CONCLUSION

 Defense counsel have raised every conceivable

argument in behalf of their client. Much of the

defense case rests on credibility, attacking the

credibility of prosecution witnesses and

defending the credibility of defense witnesses.

In closing argument to the jury, defense counsel

said, "I am given great comfort by the thin line

of protection that stands between a lie and an

innocent man, and that thin line of protection is

you, a jury, a jury sworn to impose on the

government a burden of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt." Now, however, the defense finds fault

with the jury’s adverse determination. We find no

basis to overturn the jury’s verdict. Defense

counsel also raised other details in connection

with the issues discussed, but they are not

specifically mentioned here as we viewed them as

irrelevant or without merit.

AFFIRMED.

/1 According to Marrero, the translation is "Puerto

Rican Revolutionary Front."
/2 Again, according to Marrero, the translation is

"Puerto Rican National Liberation Movement."

/3 Marrero testified that Dr. Solis told the group

that Citibank had benefitted from its tax-exempt

status in Puerto Rico and had taken advantage of

the Puerto Rican people and was part of the

colonial problem in Puerto Rico.

/4 Defined by Marrero as "a press statement, a

declaration."

/5 Dr. Solis was not abducted in Puerto Rico and

brought to the United States for trial of a crime

committed in Puerto Rico. See United States v.

Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).

/6 According to testimony from Martha Gonzalez at

trial, an independentista would be an ardent

supporter of Puerto Rican independence; one of

the prominent independentistas was a woman who

was in jail for a seditious conspiracy to

overthrow the United States government.

/7 Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b) provides for transfer of

venue "for the convenience of parties and

witnesses, and in the interest of justice . . .

."

/8 One of the prospective jurors who was stricken

for cause turned out to be the aunt of two of the

Puerto Rican political prisoners and the aunt of

Marrero’s ex-wife.

/9 Seventh Circuit Federal Criminal Jury

Instructions (West 1999), sec. 3.17 reads as

follows:

 You have heard recorded conversations. These

recorded conversations are proper evidence and

you may consider them, just as any other

evidence.

 When the recordings were played during the

trial, you were furnished transcripts of the

recorded conversations.

 The recordings are the evidence, and the

transcripts were provided to you only as a guide

to help you follow as you listen to the

recordings. The transcripts are not evidence of

what was actually said or who said it. It is up

to you to decide whether the transcripts

correctly reflect what was said and who said it.

If you noticed any difference between what you

heard on the recordings and what you read in the

transcripts, you must rely on what you heard, not

what you read. And if after careful listening,

you could not hear or understand certain parts of
the recordings, you must ignore the transcripts

as far as those parts are concerned.

/10 Seventh Circuit Federal Criminal Jury

Instructions, sec. 3.18 reads as follows:

 Among the exhibits admitted during the trial

were recordings that contained conversations in

the ________ language. You were also provided

with English transcripts of those conversations.

The transcripts were provided to you [by the

government] so that you could consider the

content of the conversations on the recordings. 

 Whether a transcript is an accurate translation,

in whole or in part, is for you to decide. In

considering whether a transcript accurately

describes the meaning of a conversation, you

should consider the testimony presented to you

regarding how, and by whom, the transcript was

made. You may consider the knowledge, training,

and experience of the translator, as well as the

nature of the conversation and the reasonableness

of the translation in light of all the evidence

in the case. You should not rely in any way on

any knowledge you may have of the language spoken

on the recording; your consideration of the

transcripts should be based on the evidence

introduced in the trial.

/11 In its Memorandum and Order responding to Dr.

Solis’s Motion in Arrest of Judgment and Motion

for a New Trial, the district court noted,

"Solis-Jordan never objected--before, during or

after the government’s closing--to the terrorist

comments. . . . Defense counsel certainly could

[also] have objected [at sidebar], but did not,

and therefore, waived the objection." 

/12 The defense did object during the government’s

cross-examination of a defense witness when the

government was asking the witness if he had been

the guest of honor at an MLN People’s Parade,

which was reported in an MLN newspaper. The

defense objected to "commie-baiting in the

courtroom," arguing the government was presenting

the annual Puerto Rican Day Parade as an MLNsponsored event. The court terminated that line

of questioning at that point.

/13 Seventh Circuit Federal Criminal Jury

Instructions, sec. 3.13(e) reads as follows:

 You have heard testimony from __________ who:

has pleaded guilty to an offense arising out of

the same occurrence for which the defendant is

now on trial. His/her guilty plea is not to be

considered as evidence against the defendant.

 You may give his/her testimony such weight as
you feel it deserves, keeping in mind that it

must be considered with caution and great care.

/14 The Restatement of Foreign Relations, sec. 201

defines a "state" as follows:

Under international law, a state is an entity

that has a defined territory and a permanent

population, under the control of its own

government, and that engages in, or has the

capacity to engage in, formal relations with

other such entities.

/15 Disguised as Indians, a group of citizens in 1773

forced their way on to some British ships docked

in Boston Harbor. The ships carried a cargo of

tea transported from England for sale in the

Colonies. The tea was dumped overboard into the

harbor and the "Indians" departed. However, no

attempt was made to blow up the ship.