THE JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE’S 

MANAGEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENT 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS PROGRAM 

NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED 

Research and Innovative Technology Administration 

Report Number: AV-2009-040 

Date Issued: March 11, 2009 
U.S. Department of 

Memorandum

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: The Joint Program Office’s 

Management of the Intelligent Transportation 

Systems Program Needs To Be Improved 

Research and Innovative Technology 

Administration 

Report Number AV-2009-040 

Date: March 11, 2009 

From: Lou E. Dixon 

Assistant Inspector General 

 for Aviation and Special Audit Programs 

Reply to 

Attn. of: 

JA-10 

To: Research and Innovative Technology 

Administrator 

Director, Intelligent Transportation Systems 

Joint Program Office 

In November 2007, the Administrator of the Research and Innovative Technology 

Administration (RITA) expressed concerns to our office about the Joint Program 

Office’s (JPO) management and oversight of the Intelligent Transportation 

Systems (ITS) program. In particular, he questioned the JPO’s ability to measure 

project results, manage program costs, and fulfill departmental goals. 

Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the JPO is under the direction of 

RITA but is administratively supported by the Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA). The JPO serves as the primary advocate for the ITS program and is 

responsible for general program and budgetary oversight. The purpose of the ITS 

program is to improve transportation safety, mobility, and productivity by 

investing Federal funds in research initiatives. 

Our audit objective was to assess whether the JPO is effectively managing and 

overseeing the ITS program by (a) tracking project results and outcomes, 

(b) managing the ITS budget and overseeing contracts, and (c) providing direction 

and cross-modal coordination. We conducted the audit from February 2008 

through December 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States. 

Exhibit A details our audit scope and methodology. 
2

BACKGROUND 

Congress established the ITS program in 1991 and, at DOT’s recommendation, the 

JPO in 1994. The JPO’s early mission was to provide DOT-wide research, 

development, and operational testing of ITS systems. In 1998, Congress 

earmarked over $900 million to deploy hundreds of ITS applications.1

 In support 

of this effort, Congress directed the JPO to develop guidance for evaluating the 

results of these deployments, collect safety and technical data, and make this 

information available via an electronic clearinghouse. 

In 2005, Congress provided the JPO with an annual budget of $110 million 

through fiscal year 2009.2

 In doing so, Congress directed the JPO to establish 

research initiatives in the following areas: (1) traffic management, (2) incidents, 

(3) transit, (4) freight, (5) road weather, (6) toll collection, (7) traveler 

information, (8) development of highway operations systems, and (9) remote 

sensing products. In 2006, the Secretary of Transportation added a 10th major 

initiative to the JPO’s portfolio—the Urban Partnership Agreement program—a 

$100 million, 3-year project using ITS technologies to relieve highway congestion 

in 6 major cities. 

With a staff of 17 authorized positions, the JPO relies on contractors to conduct 

ITS research, and support contractors to assist in technical management, oversight, 

and program assessment.3

 For instance, the JPO uses support contractors to 

perform various administrative and oversight services, including evaluating 

programmatic results, collecting performance data, and managing publicly 

available ITS databases. Other contractors conduct project-specific activities, 

including system planning, design, execution, and testing. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Since its creation, the JPO has overseen the allocation and expenditure of more 

than $3 billion for deploying ITS applications and researching new technologies. 

This investment has led to widespread use of various ITS systems, such as 

electronic tolling and centrally controlled traffic signals. During our review, 

senior DOT officials commended the JPO’s new leadership and its efforts to 

coordinate various ITS research initiatives across the Department since being 

installed a year ago. Nevertheless, we identified three key areas for improvement 

in the JPO’s management of the ITS research program. While the JPO recognizes 

 

1

 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178 (1998), provided funding for 

deploying over 700 ITS applications. In December 2007, Congress rescinded unused deployment funds for nearly 

200 of these applications. 2

 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act - A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 

109-59 (2005). 3

 Modal partners also assist in administering and overseeing ITS research and deployment projects. In some cases, 

daily oversight and project management are executed by modal administration staff in coordination with the JPO. 
3

the need to address these areas and is taking corrective actions, much more 

remains to be done. 

First, the JPO needs to strengthen its assessment program for measuring ITS 

project results and eliminate costly, duplicative support contractor services. 

After Congress earmarked hundreds of ITS deployment projects in TEA-21 in 

1998, the JPO established a project assessment program relying on the use of 

support contractors. These contractors generated ITS project evaluations and 

summaries for annual obligated costs averaging $7.4 million. However, we found 

that the JPO had not provided adequate oversight of the assessment program. As a 

result, support contractors were producing evaluations and project summaries that 

were incomplete, costly, and outdated. These support contractors also provided 

duplicative services, such as resubmitting products written by other contractors 

and overseeing each other’s work. 

In addition, the JPO has been slow to downsize the assessment program even 

though the number of new ITS systems requiring evaluations has declined since 

earmarked deployments were discontinued in SAFETEA-LU in 2005. After we 

brought these issues to her attention, the JPO Director stated that she plans to 

restructure support contracts in 2009 to streamline operations and eliminate 

duplicative services. The JPO also recently hired a certified project management 

professional to oversee the restructured assessment program. Such actions, if 

properly implemented, should go far to improve oversight of the assessment 

program and reduce duplicative services; however, additional work will be needed 

to improve the quality of project evaluations and summaries. 

Second, the JPO needs to strengthen its budget management process by 

ensuring financial procedures and internal controls are fully documented and 

implemented. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires 

documented budget execution and internal control procedures to increase 

assurance that agency financial reports are reliable and operations are effective 

and efficient. During our audit, however, we found several areas where the JPO 

either had no procedures in place or had not documented them. For instance, the 

JPO had not documented procedures for overseeing and managing various budget 

activities. As a result, the JPO budget officer failed to conduct monthly financial 

reconciliations (a basic control procedure) during a 5-month period. 

In addition, the JPO lacked internal controls governing the allocation of year-end 

funds, which have averaged nearly $24 million, or over one-fifth of the entire JPO 

budget, for the last 5 fiscal years. Leaving large amounts of unallocated funds idle 

rather than assigning them to specific projects increases the risk that they could be 

improperly redirected or rescinded. Since we identified these issues, the new JPO 

Director has hired a consultant to assist the budget manager in documenting 

budget procedures and conducting financial reconciliations. The Director has also 
4

implemented procedures for allocating year-end funds. While these procedures 

are good steps, the JPO still needs to document them to ensure its staff adheres to 

the new procedures instead of relying on previous practices. 

We also found that the JPO lacks documented procedures for coordinating with 

FHWA to annually identify and prioritize the closure of old contracts and 

agreements with large remaining balances. Since 1999, DOT policy has 

emphasized the need to annually review contracts and agreements to ensure 

remaining funds were not left idle after projects were completed, canceled, or 

reduced in scope. We sampled 120 old contracts and agreements4

 and identified 

nearly $20 million that needs to be de-obligated and put to better use or returned to 

the Treasury. This includes one project that was approved in June 2003, with 

$1.78 million obligated, but canceled 3 months later. Although the JPO officials 

advised us that they subsequently asked FHWA to de-obligate these funds, more 

than 5 years later, the DOT accounting system showed the entire $1.78 million 

was still obligated. The JPO, therefore, needs to coordinate with FHWA to 

identify and review old ITS contacts and agreements and de-obligate nearly 

$20 million in unneeded funds. 

Third, the JPO needs to improve ITS project direction and coordination by 

adopting uniform project management standards, conducting benefit-cost 

analyses, and eliminating conflicts of interest among its contractors. These 

steps would have reduced the risk of delays and cost overruns that have affected 

several ITS initiatives. For instance, in 2004, the JPO began its largest research 

program, Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII).5

 However, VII did not undergo 

several steps that standardized project management would have required, such as 

development of a project management plan. This plan would have required the 

VII program to have a clearly defined scope, deliverables, funding requirements, 

and milestones at project initiation. Instead, VII started with an unrealistically low 

budget estimate of $49 million, which has risen to over $100 million. Moreover, 

the program’s proof-of-concept phase6

 encountered a schedule delay of nearly 

1 year and a cost overrun of $7.3 million. An early benefit-cost analysis would 

have helped the JPO provide a more realistic cost estimate for VII as well as 

determine the likelihood of a positive return on investment. The JPO is now 

restructuring VII to better define deliverables and establish clear milestones and is 

working with Volpe to identify anticipated benefits and costs. 

We also found that the JPO needs to address conflicts of interest among its support 

contractors. These conflicts raise questions about the support contractors’ abilities 

to render impartial advice and services to the ITS program. For instance, Citizant 

 

4

 These included interagency, cooperative, and grant agreements. 

5 The VII program is developing an advanced information infrastructure to be installed at intersections and in vehicles 

with the goal of improving safety and mobility by providing early warning to reduce vehicle crashes. 6

 “Proof of concept” establishes that an idea, invention, process, or business model is feasible. 
5

provides technical support to Integrated Vehicle Based Safety Systems (IVBSS)7

but is also involved in contract management and the JPO assessment program. 

Similarly, a new JPO-funded project, Safe Trip-21,8

 is being both administered 

and overseen by the Volpe Center. According to DOT Order 2300.8, Volpe 

cannot oversee projects that it administers. This situation creates a conflict of 

interest for Volpe and sets a troubling precedent because no other ITS research 

project is exempted from JPO oversight. 

After we began this audit, the JPO initiated several corrective actions. For 

example, the JPO now requires monthly status reporting for all ITS projects. The 

JPO is also establishing a Program Management Office (PMO) to develop and 

enforce uniform standards for project management and contractor oversight. 

While these are good steps, follow through will be needed to ensure past project 

management weaknesses do not continue. 

Our recommendations to the JPO include (1) strengthening the ITS assessment 

program to effectively measure and report the results of ITS research (i.e., 

benefits, costs, and lessons learned); (2) restructuring support contractor services 

to reduce costs and eliminate duplicative services; (3) documenting procedures to 

ensure effective budget execution, contract closeout, and de-obligation of prioryear funds; (4) coordinating with FHWA to de-obligate nearly $20 million in 

unneeded funds on old contracts and agreements; and (5) strengthening project 

management by requiring uniform procedures, performance data, and benefit-cost 

analyses and eliminating conflicts of interest. We also recommend that the RITA 

Administrator transfer oversight of the Safe Trip-21 project from Volpe to the 

JPO to comply with DOT Order 2300.8. We are making a total of 

10 recommendations, which are listed at page 19. 

FINDINGS 

While ITS initiatives have achieved DOT-wide support, we found weaknesses in 

how the JPO measures project results, executes budget and contract procedures, 

and manages ITS research. Specifically, the JPO has not ensured that ITS project 

assessments—essential information for Congress and other decision makers—

have been useful, timely, or complete. Without adequate oversight, the JPO’s 

assessment program contractors were also producing costly, duplicative work. In 

addition, we found the JPO has historically operated without documented budget 

procedures, which offers little assurance that ITS project funds are expended 

effectively. As a result, ITS financial reports were not consistently reconciled in 

2008, more than one-fifth of the JPO’s annual budget was left unallocated for the 

 

7

 IVBSS is intended to demonstrate that vehicles equipped with warning sensors can help drivers avoid the most 

common types of deadly crashes. 8

 Safe Trip-21 is a demonstration project designed to prevent motor vehicle crashes by providing real-time safety 

warnings to drivers. 
6

last 5 years, and nearly $20 million in unneeded funds was left on old contracts 

and agreements. We also found that adopting uniform project management 

standards and benefit cost analyses may have mitigated cost overruns and delays 

experienced by several ITS initiatives. 

To correct these issues, the JPO must restructure its assessment program, 

document budget procedures, and ensure unneeded funds are identified and 

de-obligated. In addition, the JPO must clearly define project management 

standards to reduce the risk of delays and cost overruns and ensure its contractors 

do not create conflicts of interest in the services they provide. 

The JPO’s Assessment Program Is Not Effectively Measuring ITS 

Project Results 

In 1998, Congress expanded the JPO’s mission by funding hundreds of earmarked 

ITS deployment projects. Congress also required the JPO to develop guidance for 

evaluating the results of these deployments, collecting safety and technical data, 

and making this information available via an electronic clearinghouse. In addition 

to developing evaluation guidelines, the JPO established an extensive assessment 

program using six support contractors9

 at an annual cost of approximately 

$7.4 million. According to the JPO, the assessment program had to rely on 

significant contractor support due to limited JPO staff resources (only 1 of 17 staff 

positions was assigned to oversee the assessment program) and the large number 

of required evaluations. 

Under the assessment program, JPO support contractors produce evaluation 

reports10 and project summaries of ITS deployments and distribute the resulting 

information on several contractor-operated websites or the National Transportation 

Library. Evaluation reports document the results of ITS project testing, and 

project summaries are synopses of the evaluation reports or other ITS-related 

documents.11 The JPO issued a procedures guide in 2001 for completing 

evaluations. According to this guide, evaluations should address how ITS 

technology has improved safety, mobility, efficiency, productivity, or energy and 

the environment. 

However, we found that support contractors’ evaluations typically did not measure 

or report in compliance with the JPO guidelines. According to JPO officials, this 

was due in part to the difficulty in measuring the effects of deployed ITS 

technology and the many factors that can influence test results. Nevertheless, the 

 

9

 With a staff of only 17 positions, the JPO came to rely on six support contractors (i.e., Battelle, Citizant, Noblis, 

Oak Ridge, SAIC, and Volpe) to carry out its assessment program. 10 In addition to evaluations produced by its support contractors, the JPO also receives self-evaluations from the 

recipients of ITS deployment funds. 11 Thirty-seven percent (196 of 529) of ITS projects have been evaluated since 1998. Of those projects evaluated, less 

than half (87 of 196) have reports stored in the National Transportation Library. 
7

JPO needs to provide closer oversight of contractor evaluation efforts, reinforce its 

own guidance to fulfill the congressional intent for the ITS program, and 

restructure its assessment program to eliminate costly, duplicative contractor 

services. 

Assessment Program Support Contractors Are Not Producing Quality 

Evaluations and Summaries 

Many of the support contractors’ evaluation reports and project summaries were 

too general or outdated to be useful or to justify the sizeable cost. Also, we found 

that these work products did not clearly show how ITS technologies may have 

improved safety, mobility, efficiency, productivity, or energy and the 

environment. As the following examples show, the absence of measurable and 

reportable results increases the burden on decision makers to determine which 

projects merit continued funding and whether congressional goals for the ITS 

program are being achieved. 

• Under the Metropolitan Model Deployment Initiative, the New York 

Metropolitan area received a Federal grant of $10.4 million to fund Trips 123, 

a web-based traveler information service. In 1998, a pre-deployment 

evaluation report criticized project management and highlighted breakdowns in 

communication between participants. However, when Trips 123 was finally 

deployed 7 years later in 2005, no final report was ever written. Without 

measurable and reportable results, any benefit from the $10.4 million invested 

remains unknown. 

• In June 2008, the JPO obligated $500,000 for contractors to develop 60 new 

project summaries. Over a 3-month period, the support contractor, Noblis, 

delivered only 26 summaries. These summaries were too brief and did not 

provide a sufficient level of detail to be of value. Further, the summaries were 

based on previously published reports or journal articles that were otherwise 

available and merely restated general information from the source; no unique 

analysis was included, and several summaries were redundant. In fact, 4 of the 

26 summaries were written from just one source document. 

Because none of the summaries was based on new information and the quality was 

poor, we asked the JPO to clarify its criteria for reviewing and accepting Noblis’s 

work. Rather than respond to us, the JPO directed our questions to a second 

support contractor, SAIC, who failed to provide evidence that the JPO possessed 

any criteria for acceptance or had even reviewed the summaries in question. 

We also questioned Noblis about its project summaries, specifically the numbers 

of summaries produced in a performance period, and Noblis’s tracking of labor 

hours associated with each summary. A Noblis official responded that its contract 
8

is based on level of effort (i.e., billable hours) and that the JPO had not modified 

the contract to specify a level of performance. We subsequently reviewed a 

$200,000 modification to this contract and found the contractor’s claim to be 

accurate. The contract modification did not add any new deliverables or increase 

the scope of the contract’s work. Without specifying what additional work was 

required, it is unclear what services or products the JPO received for the $200,000, 

let alone whether these services or products were of any value. 

Because of the large number of billable hours (i.e., 1,750) and the small number of 

summaries, we also asked Noblis to show evidence that hours billed were in fact 

spent working on those summaries. The contractor replied that it does not track 

labor hours against the number of summaries produced. In our view, JPO 

managers need to increase their oversight of products delivered by support 

contractors. 

Without requiring useful information from its contractors, the JPO cannot know 

whether it has paid too much for project summaries. This type of situation is 

precisely why the OMB warns that a labor hours contract is not appropriate when 

it is possible to estimate the extent or duration of work.12 Because the JPO can 

and does estimate the number of summaries, funding requirements, and 

completion timeframes, it has the ability to move to a performance-based contract 

structure and should consider doing so. 

JPO Assessment Program Support Contractors Are Engaged in 

Duplicative Work 

We found that the JPO’s assessment program support contractors provided 

services that were frequently duplicative—services that the JPO continues to pay 

for and should eliminate: 

• First, multiple support contractors are summarizing evaluation reports written 

by other support contractors. This is unnecessary because each evaluation 

report already includes an executive summary written by the team that 

performed the evaluation. 

• Second, ITS evaluations are stored in and made publicly available through 

DOT’s National Transportation Library; yet, two JPO support contractors have 

created and maintained multiple databases to store the same project 

summaries. To help reduce costs, the JPO could explore the feasibility of 

storing all ITS information in the National Transportation Library. 

• Third, multiple support contractors are reviewing the others’ evaluations and 

project summaries. Since JPO managers are also responsible for reviewing 

 

12 OMB Circular A-11 “Preparing, Submitting, and Executing the Budget,” June 26, 2008. 
9

their work, the support contractors’ reviews are unnecessary. For example, 

Volpe project summaries are submitted to Noblis for review before being 

reviewed again by the JPO. 

Further, we found several instances of multiple summaries produced from the 

same source documents. For example, SAIC evaluated a product called Advanced 

Parking Management Systems developed by the private sector that identifies 

empty parking spaces in garages. SAIC’s report includes an executive summary, 

and the full report is available electronically through DOT’s National 

Transportation Library. Nevertheless, Noblis summarized the SAIC report three 

times, posting its summaries to two Noblis-maintained ITS websites. Volpe 

produced four more summaries of the SAIC report, which were posted to a third 

Noblis-maintained ITS website. Finally, Oak Ridge summarized the SAIC report 

and posted it to an Oak Ridge-maintained ITS website. Since the full SAIC report 

is available from DOT’s National Transportation Library, we found no compelling 

reason for eight additional summaries or for the JPO’s continued support of 

multiple contractor-operated ITS websites. 

During our review, we raised concerns about the assessment program support 

contractors’ difficulty in producing measurable and reportable results and their 

duplicative services. JPO officials agreed with our concerns, noting that in 

May 2008 they had tasked Volpe with determining the benefits of the $3 billion 

invested in ITS research and deployments since 1991. JPO officials also noted 

that they plan to restructure their support contracts as they begin expiring in 2009. 

The JPO also recently hired a certified project management professional to 

oversee the restructured assessment program. Such actions, if properly 

implemented, should go far to improve oversight of the assessment program and 

reduce duplicative services; however, additional work will be needed to improve 

the quality of project evaluations and summaries. 

The JPO Lacks Documented Procedures for Managing Its Budget and 

Ensuring Funds Are Not Left Idle on Old Contracts and Agreements 

We found that the JPO needs to strengthen its budget management process in two 

key areas: (1) documenting procedures for budget management and internal 

controls and (2) identifying and prioritizing ITS contracts and agreements that 

need to be closed and have unneeded funds that should be de-obligated. OMB 

requires these budget management procedures to increase assurance that agency 

financial reports are reliable and operations are effective and efficient. For 

instance, when the previous JPO budget manager left in May 2008, the new 

manager had significant difficulty with budget management and execution due to a 

lack of documented procedures. As a result, the budget manager was unable to 

reconcile monthly financial reports—a basic control procedure required by OMB. 
10

We also found that for the past 5 years, the JPO ended each fiscal year with 

significant amounts of unallocated funds. Yet, it had no documented internal 

controls to govern how those funds would be allocated to specific project 

accounts. Allocating year-end funds to specific accounts is necessary to reduce 

the risk of improper redirection later or exposing the funds to potential rescission. 

Additionally, DOT policy requires that old contracts and agreements be reviewed 

annually. However, we found the JPO lacks procedures for consistently 

identifying old ITS contracts and agreements that need to be closed out and have 

funds requiring de-obligation. Based on our sample, we identified nearly 

$20 million in unneeded funds remaining on old contracts and agreements. 

The JPO Has Not Documented Procedures and Internal Controls To 

Reconcile Expenditures and Ensure Year-End Funds Are Obligated 

During our review of the JPO’s budget management, we identified several key 

areas that would benefit from improved documentation and internal controls. 

First, we found that the JPO did not conduct monthly financial system 

reconciliations over a 5-month period. According to OMB, monthly financial 

system reconciliation is a basic control procedure needed to ensure expenditures 

and obligations do not exceed an agency’s budgetary authority and are accurate 

and reliable. Since May 2008, when its budget manager left, the JPO had not done 

reconciliations between Delphi and its Financial Management System. 

Recognizing this shortcoming, the JPO recently hired an experienced consultant to 

help train the new budget manager, develop a budget guide, and help reconcile 

fiscal year 2008 accounts. One positive outcome to date has been the 

identification of nearly $13 million in unallocated funds that can now be put to 

better use on ITS projects. This situation demonstrates why documented control 

procedures are necessary to prevent the waste, loss, or misuse of JPO research 

funds. 

Second, we found that the JPO has not documented its policies for governing 

use of unobligated prior-year funds. Instead of allocating remaining year-end 

funds, until recently, the JPO had been transferring the funds into a general 

account (a “contingency” fund) where funds were held until obligated to JPO 

projects. From fiscal years 2004 through 2008, this account averaged nearly 

$24 million, or over one-fifth of the JPO annual budget (see table 1 on the next 

page). Allocating year-end funds to specific accounts is necessary to reduce the 

risk of the funds being improperly redirected or rescinded. 
11

After we brought this issue to 

the JPO’s attention, the Director 

began allocating unobligated 

funds to specific ITS research 

projects. The Director has also 

limited the contingency fund to 

approximately 10 percent of the 

JPO’s annual budget (i.e., 

$10 million). According to the 

Director, the contingency fund 

is needed to cover unanticipated 

new projects or funding 

shortfalls. While these steps 

represent improvements, the JPO still needs to ensure these procedural 

improvements are documented and consistently applied in the future. 

Table 1. JPO “Contingency” Fund Balances 

FY 2004-FY 2008

Fiscal Year Dollar 

Amount 

Percent of 

Annual Budget 

($110 million) 

September 2004 $20,987,373 19.1% 

September 2005 $9,349,057 8.5% 

September 2006 $28,892,418 26.3% 

September 2007 $25,938,421 23.6% 

September 2008 $34,608,421 31.5% 

5-Year Average $23,955,138 21.8% 

Source: ITS JPO Financial Management System 

Third, we found that the JPO needs to improve its adherence to existing 

internal controls and document them so that funds are not obligated and 

expended without proper approval. The RITA Administrator requires multiple 

RITA signatures, including his own, on purchase requests to commit JPO funds. 

However, the JPO made a $200,000 obligation on May 2, 2008, to fund an 

Assessment Program task order without getting approval from the RITA 

Administrator or his designee. This was disconcerting because the Administrator 

had previously disapproved a $475,000 request for this same Assessment Program 

task order just 3 months earlier.13

Upon further review, we found JPO managers had acquired the $200,000 for the 

Assessment Program by authorizing an equal amount to be de-obligated from a 

different JPO account. According to the JPO Director, the Administrator’s 

disapproval did not apply to reallocating previously obligated funds. 

Nevertheless, we believe that because the JPO was aware the Administrator had 

disapproved additional spending on this particular task order, JPO managers 

should have acquired RITA’s approval before transferring the $200,000.14 

Because the JPO budget manager was able to approve this purchase request 

without written senior management approval, this situation demonstrates the need 

for documented internal controls. The JPO Director stated that she now has a 

policy requiring that all purchase requests either have her or her deputy’s 

signature. However, as with the other examples discussed above, this policy is not 

documented, and the JPO must do so to ensure the procedure is enforced. 

 

13 On January 31, 2008, the RITA Administrator disapproved a $475,000 request for this task order. Two weeks later, 

he approved only $300,000. The May 2, 2008, obligation of $200,000 increased the total for this task order to 

$500,000—more than the amount the Administrator originally disapproved. 14 The JPO submitted a purchase request in October 2008 to obligate $200,000 to replace the funds transferred from the 

first JPO account. 
12

The JPO and FHWA Are Not Ensuring the Timely De-Obligation of 

Unneeded Funds on Old Contracts and Agreements 

We found that the JPO lacked procedures for identifying and prioritizing old ITS 

contracts and agreements that need to be closed by FHWA and have remaining 

funds that should be de-obligated. As a result, we estimated that nearly 

$20 million remains on idle projects that could be de-obligated and put to better 

use or returned to the Treasury. 

The JPO and FHWA need to conduct annual reviews to close old contracts 

and agreements with large remaining balances. Since 1999, DOT policy has 

emphasized the need to annually review contracts and agreements to ensure 

remaining funds were not left idle after projects were completed, canceled, or 

reduced in scope.15 However, we found that neither the JPO nor FHWA were 

ensuring this policy was fully implemented. For example, while the JPO has 

requested that some old contracts and agreements be closed, FHWA has not 

always been responsive due to a large backlog of old FHWA and ITS contracts 

and agreements. As a result, significant amounts of funds remain on old contracts 

and agreements. The JPO, therefore, needs to follow up to ensure that it and 

FHWA consistently identify and prioritize for closure those old contracts and 

agreements with large remaining balances. 

The JPO needs to coordinate with FHWA to de-obligate nearly $20 million on 

old ITS contracts and agreements. Without regular, annual reviews of contracts 

and agreements, ITS funds are being left idle instead of being redirected to other 

ITS priorities or, after exceeding the appropriation period, returned to the 

Treasury. We reviewed a sample of 120 old ITS contracts and agreements (i.e., 

3 or more years) and found that 56 should be deemed inactive.16 We analyzed the 

56 inactive contracts and agreements and found that more than $11.7 million of 

$46.8 million (or 25 percent) obligated was unneeded (see exhibit B for a list of 

these contracts and agreements). 

For example, one project was approved in June 2003 with $1.78 million obligated, 

but it was quickly canceled in September 2003. Although JPO officials stated that 

they subsequently asked FHWA to de-obligate these funds, more than 5 years 

later, the DOT accounting system showed the entire $1.78 million was still 

obligated. Moreover, because the contracts and agreements we analyzed were part 

of a statistically valid sample selected from the entire universe of 447 active ITS 

contracts and agreements, we can project that there is an additional $7.5 million in 

unneeded funds. The JPO needs to work with FHWA to ensure the timely deobligation of all unneeded funds remaining on old contracts and agreements. 

 

15 DOT Policy Memorandum “Validation of Obligations,” December 28, 1999. 16 Our sample was pulled from a universe of 447 active ITS contracts and agreements, some more than 10 years old. 
13

In addition, we could not analyze six of the old contracts and agreements in our 

sample because FHWA Acquisition staff could not find the files. According to 

Delphi, these contracts and agreements are active and have a total of about 

$734,600 still obligated (see exhibit C for a list of these contracts and agreements). 

However, after a search in June 2008, 

FHWA reported it was unable to find 

the files. By December 2008, FHWA 

had still not located the files. 

Without contract files, FHWA cannot 

show that the obligations in Delphi 

were still needed. Thus, the JPO also 

needs to work with FHWA to deobligate the $734,600 unless it can 

find the missing files and verify the funds are still needed. Overall, we estimate 

nearly $20 million is unneeded and should be de-obligated and put to better use or 

returned to the Treasury (see table 2). 

Table 2. Estimated Funds Requiring 

De-Obligation

Category Amount 

OIG Verified $11.7 million 

OIG Statistical Inference $7.5 million 

Miscellaneous $0.7 million 

TOTAL $19.9 million 

Source: OIG Analysis 

The JPO and FHWA need to validate $3.9 million in questionable 

reimbursements. While analyzing old agreements, we learned the Federal 

Transit Administration (FTA) drew down $3.9 million in obligated funds from 

five old ITS agreements. For example, FTA made electronic draws on one 

agreement totaling $581,406 in June 2008, even though the agreement file showed 

this project was canceled 3 years earlier in May 2005. Because the timing of the 

$3.9 million in draws coincided with our review of the old agreements, we asked 

FTA to demonstrate that these draws were done in accordance with policy, rather 

than from concern that our office would recommend the funds be de-obligated. 

FTA officials responded that these draws were valid because they were 

reimbursements for previously paid invoices. However, FTA did not provide 

evidence that the invoices were associated with these five agreements or that the 

work occurred within the performance periods of the agreements. In fact, one of 

the agreements was canceled in 2005, the performance periods for the other four 

expired between 2004 and 2006, and each agreement had been idle without 

payment activity for 2 or more years. 

If FTA considered these agreements active and expected to continue to draw 

funds, the Agency had ample opportunity to extend the performance periods via 

formal modifications during the years the agreements were idle. However, our 

review of agreement files shows no indication that FTA attempted to extend the 

performance periods before drawing the $3.9 million. Instead, on June 30, 2008, 

FTA wrote to FHWA in an attempt to extend the performance periods after we 

identified the agreements as idle. Unless FTA can provide supporting 

documentation that the $3.9 million is related to invoices showing work during the 
14

performance period and associated with the five agreements, FTA should return 

these funds. Further, the JPO, as provider of the funds, and FHWA, as initiator of 

the agreements, need to carefully review any documentation FTA provides. If the 

documentation does not support the draws, FHWA needs to recover the 

$3.9 million from FTA. 

Until the JPO completes steps to document all budget procedures and internal 

controls and increases its efforts to close contracts and agreements with large 

remaining balances, decision makers will not have assurance that the JPO’s budget 

is being effectively executed, financial reports are accurate, or that funds 

remaining on old contracts and agreements are still needed. 

The JPO’s Ability To Provide Effective Direction and Coordination of 

ITS Activities Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses 

The JPO’s ability to effectively direct and coordinate ITS projects has been 

hampered by management weaknesses. Specifically, the JPO lacks uniform 

project management standards that would prevent projects from being approved 

without critical elements such as clearly defined statements of work, deliverables, 

and plans. Further, by not requiring benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) before new 

projects are approved, the JPO has either undertaken projects without determining 

the likelihood of a positive return on investment or significantly underestimated 

future costs. Additionally, the JPO has not provided sufficient oversight of its 

support contractors to prevent potential conflicts of interest. To address these 

weaknesses, the JPO needs to adopt uniform project management standards, 

require benefit-cost analyses where feasible, and ensure its contractors do not 

create conflicts of interest in the services they provide. 

The JPO’s Effectiveness Is Hampered by a Lack of Uniform Project 

Management and Tracking Procedures 

The JPO lacks a comprehensive process for managing and tracking ITS research 

initiatives. In 2004, we reported on similar project management weaknesses at the 

Volpe Center, which is also part of RITA.17 In response to our report, Volpe 

adopted a uniform approach advocated by the Project Management Institute. This 

guidance, which is published as the “Project Manager’s Body of Knowledge,” is 

generally recognized as good project management practices. To improve project 

management and tracking, the JPO needs to adopt a uniform project management 

process, similar to the process implemented by Volpe. 

The JPO’s largest research initiative, VII, is an example of a program that would 

have benefited from a uniform project management process. This program was 

 

17 OIG Report Number SC-2004-100, “Volpe’s Project Management Oversight,” September 30, 2004. OIG reports are 

available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov. 
15

initiated without undergoing several standardized project management steps, 

including development of a project management plan. Such a plan would have 

required the VII program to have a clearly defined scope, deliverables, funding 

requirements, and milestones at project initiation. Instead, VII began with an 

unrealistically low budget estimate of $49 million, which has risen to over 

$100 million. Moreover, the program’s proof-of-concept phase encountered a 

schedule delay of nearly 1 year and a cost overrun of $7.3 million. The significant 

growth in program costs, plus recognition that VII’s deployment plan was not 

realistically affordable, led to JPO’s recent decision to restructure the program. 

According to JPO officials, the VII restructuring will lead to developing a clear set 

of deliverables, an end date for research, and a realistic deployment plan. A 

uniform project management approach would have required these steps much 

earlier in the program. 

The JPO could also benefit from requiring uniform performance reporting by its 

contractors. For example, some JPO contractors provide quarterly performance 

reports while others report their progress monthly. Regular contractor 

performance reporting is of critical importance to JPO managers because these 

reports provide status and trend data on projects and deliverables; further, these 

reports often are the deliverables that determine whether contractors should be 

paid. If a contractor bills monthly but provides quarterly reports, the JPO manager 

overseeing the project may not have all the information needed to make a good 

determination about payment. For example, during our review, we noted that one 

contractor’s invoices were paid in July and August of 2008, but the quarterly 

progress report describing the work accomplished for these payments was not 

delivered until October 2008. At the time of payment, the JPO reviewing official 

had no indication of what was received in return. 

About a year ago, the JPO—under new leadership—recognized that the current 

project management process was neither systematic nor uniform. To strengthen 

project management, the JPO established monthly project status tracking and 

reporting in early 2008. Previously, JPO project managers were not required to 

produce monthly status reports tracking cost, schedule, and performance data for 

JPO managers or other decision makers. The JPO is also establishing a program 

management office, or PMO. The PMO will help to standardize procedures, 

project documentation, performance data, and contract management. Finally, the 

JPO has hired a certified Project Management Professional and plans to certify 

several other managers. 

Overall, to address project management weaknesses, the JPO needs to continue its 

progress toward increased uniformity, complete VII restructuring, and conclude 

the PMO contractor selection process. While we support the PMO in concept, we 

are concerned that the statement of work does not fully define staff roles and 
16

responsibilities. We are also concerned that the PMO contract will be based on 

billable hours rather than performance. Because the JPO has not closely overseen 

other support contractors paid on billable hours, we believe the JPO should clearly 

define the duties, roles, and responsibilities of the PMO staff and use a 

performance-based contract to ensure the PMO costs are identified at the outset.

The JPO Does Not Conduct Benefit-Cost Analyses Before Initiating New 

ITS Research Projects 

Currently, neither DOT nor the JPO require a benefit-cost analysis, or BCA, 

before initiating a new ITS research project. However, OMB suggests using 

BCAs at key project decision points, as well as including alternative approaches to 

achieving project goals.18 For example, a BCA could calculate the benefits and 

costs of replacing versus repairing an old bridge or funding another alternative, 

such as a tunnel. DOT’s Chief Economist also supports the use of BCAs to justify 

investment in new projects (including ITS research) before senior decision makers 

commit DOT funding to a project. 

According to the JPO Director, because research projects tend to be less defined 

than construction projects, it may prove more challenging to complete a BCA. 

Nevertheless, it is important that such efforts be taken whenever feasible. Given 

the sizeable DOT investment in ITS research, the JPO needs to conduct BCAs on 

all major ITS research projects as early in the process as possible and at key 

decision points. As noted by DOT’s Chief Economist, such information will allow 

the JPO and senior DOT officials to make well-informed decisions on all future 

ITS research investments. 

Problems with the JPO’s largest research program, VII, demonstrate the 

importance of conducting BCAs for all major ITS research initiatives before 

investing significant resources. In 2005, the JPO commissioned the Volpe Center 

to conduct a BCA of the VII program—which had been initiated 1 year earlier. 

The decision to do a BCA was based on the realization that VII technology would 

cost more than $1 billion per year to deploy. The JPO also needed to demonstrate 

to senior decision makers and stakeholders that projected benefits would exceed 

costs. After nearly 3 years, Volpe’s draft BCA projected more than $44 billion in 

benefits (e.g., reduced travel time, accidents, and injuries) versus $30 billion in 

estimated deployment costs.19 Unfortunately, this information came some 4 years 

after VII was approved, with a budget that is now more than $100 million. 

Recognizing the significant funding challenges to VII, the JPO is working to 

restructure the program. 

 

18 OMB Circular A-11 “Preparation, Submission and Execution of the Budget,” June 26, 2008. 19 Volpe’s BCA for the VII program was titled: “Vehicle-Infrastructure Integration (VII) Initiative Benefit-Cost 

Analysis, April 2008. According to the JPO Director, this BCA underestimates the benefits and overestimated the 

costs for this program and is being reworked. 
17

With the expiration of SAFETEA-LU and the resulting reauthorization in 2009, 

the JPO will be proposing new research initiatives as well as updating its 5-year 

ITS strategic plan. To assist decision makers and avoid costly mistakes, the JPO 

should make BCAs mandatory at all key decision points for future high-dollar ITS 

initiatives and particularly before committing significant DOT funds. 

The JPO Has Not Ensured Its Support Contractors Are Free of Conflicts of 

Interest 

Because the JPO has only a small number of staff, it relies heavily on contractors 

to provide a wide variety of technical and support services.20 Government 

agencies typically use support contractors to obtain special knowledge and skills 

that may not be available through their existing Federal staff. In doing so, 

however, agencies must adhere to OMB guidelines, which prohibit support 

contractors from performing overlapping tasks that create conflicts of interest or 

that could be considered inherently governmental activities.21

During our review, we found that the JPO needs to address conflicts of interest 

among its support contractors.22 These conflicts raise questions about the support 

contractors’ abilities to render impartial advice and services to the ITS program. 

Since FY 2005, the JPO provided $83 million to its six main support contractors 

for assessment, technical, and management support activities. Of this amount, the 

JPO expended $22 million on program assessments. The amount of funding 

involved provides little incentive for these contractors to identify problems or cost 

savings in ITS projects while they are also benefitting by providing other technical 

and management support. For example: 

• Noblis is involved in a variety of activities for which it provides both technical 

and management support for the VII and Cooperative Intersection Collision 

Avoidance System (CICAS) programs. However, Noblis is also involved in 

program assessment support, an activity that requires independence and 

objectivity. Examples of Noblis support services include preparing annual 

work plans, budgets, spending plans, and statements of work; evaluating 

contract proposals; monitoring contracts; and reviewing technical reports. 

• Citizant is also involved with the assessment program, even though it provides 

contract management services, oversees other contractors’ performance, and 

provides technical support to VII and IVBSS. 

 

20 The JPO is authorized 17 full-time equivalent staff. During our review, 3 positions were vacant. 21 OMB Policy Letter 92-1 “Inherently Governmental Functions,” September 23, 1992. An “inherently governmental 

function” is one so intimately related to public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees. 22 OMB Policy Letter 93-1 “Management Oversight of Service Contracting,” May 18, 1994. Under this policy, agency 

officials must ensure that any actual or potential conflicts of interest are identified and that appropriate steps are 

taken to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate them. Service contracts are not to be awarded to any individual or 

organization that is unable, or potentially unable, to render impartial advice or assistance to the Government. 
18

• Volpe is involved in the assessment program while also supporting VII and 

managing and overseeing Safe Trip-21.23 Also, Volpe has a vested interest in 

the VII program (providing technical and management support); yet, Volpe 

conducted the BCA, which should be conducted by an independent party. 

In each of these cases, the contractor is expected to simultaneously provide 

objective and independent advice to the JPO while also receiving significant funds 

for overseeing and managing various JPO projects and activities. To avoid 

potential conflicts of interest, the JPO needs to ensure a clear separation of duties 

among the various support contractors so that those contractors involved in project 

assessment are not also involved in related ITS research activities. Moreover, 

because the JPO is defining the roles, responsibilities, and duties of its new Project 

Management Office contractor, it needs to ensure that it does not create additional 

conflicts of interest. 

Current Oversight of Safe Trip-21 Represents Both an Infringement of JPO 

Responsibilities and a Conflict of Interest 

In October 2007, the RITA Administrator became concerned about the JPO’s 

project management weaknesses as well as the cost of VII. The Administrator 

then directed the Volpe Center, not the JPO, to both manage and provide technical 

oversight for Safe Trip-21, a new ITS demonstration project administered by 

Volpe and funded by the JPO (i.e., $10 million). Safe Trip-21 is designed to 

prevent motor vehicle crashes by providing real-time safety warnings to drivers. 

This creates a troubling precedent because no other JPO-funded research project is 

exempted from JPO oversight. Moreover, by directing Volpe to manage Safe 

Trip-21 without JPO oversight, Volpe is overseeing itself, a violation of 

DOT Order 2300.8.24 According to this order, the customer is responsible for 

activities such as (1) preparing statements of work, (2) defining desired outcomes, 

(3) overseeing the project, and (4) reviewing deliverables. While JPO officials 

told us that the RITA Administrator performed the above functions, we question 

whether the Administrator or his staff had the time or specific technical knowledge 

to adequately oversee Volpe’s performance on Safe Trip-21. 

To address project management weaknesses overall, the JPO needs to adopt a 

uniform approach to project management, require benefit-cost analyses for all new 

high-dollar projects when feasible, and increase contractor oversight. In 

particular, adopting uniform project management standards will make the JPO 

more effective because it will increase discipline among its project managers. The 

 

23 Although Volpe is housed within RITA, we consider its operations and support to the JPO as being comparable to a 

contractor. Much like a contractor, Volpe is a fee-for-service organization, earning its revenue by performing 

various technical and support services for clients both within and outside DOT. 24 DOT Order 2300.8. Financing Activities at the Department of Transportation/Research and Innovative Technology 

Administration’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, September 27, 2007. 
19

RITA Administrator also needs to transfer oversight responsibility for the Safe 

Trip-21 project to the JPO to avoid inherent conflicts of interest with Volpe’s 

handling of this project and to comply with DOT Order 2300.8. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

To improve the effectiveness of ITS program management, we recommend that 

the JPO Director: 

1. Strengthen the ITS assessment program and require that support contractors 

more effectively measure and report on the ITS research project results (i.e., 

benefits, costs, and lessons learned). 

2. Restructure assessment program support service contracts to reduce costs and 

eliminate duplicative activities. 

3. Establish and document procedures for ensuring effective budget execution, 

contract and agreement closeout, and de-obligation of prior-year funds. 

4. Coordinate with FHWA to identify and review old ITS contracts and 

agreements and de-obligate nearly $20 million in unneeded funds. 

5. Coordinate with FHWA to review documentation supporting FTA’s 

questionable $3.9 million in reimbursements on five expired agreements and 

seek recovery of those funds that cannot be verified. 

6. Strengthen project management by requiring uniform procedures, 

documentation, performance data, and timely benefit-cost analyses. 

7. Ensure support contractor tasks are clearly defined and sufficiently separated to 

avoid any conflicts of interest. 

8. Ensure the PMO’s duties, roles, and responsibilities as well as deliverables are 

clearly defined in the contract. 

9. Use performance-based (versus billable hours) contracts for all future support 

services where it is possible to estimate the extent or the duration of the work. 

We also recommend that the RITA Administrator: 

10.Transfer oversight of the Safe Trip-21 project from Volpe to the JPO to avoid 

conflicts of interest and to comply with DOT Order 2300.8. 
20

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE 

We provided RITA and the JPO with our draft report on January 9, 2009. On 

January 15, 2009, RITA provided us with its formal response to our 

recommendations, which is included in its entirety in the appendix to this report. 

In addition, the JPO provided several technical comments, which we have 

addressed as appropriate in our final report. 

RITA concurred with all 10 recommendations, and the JPO has begun corrective 

actions. While most of these actions are responsive, we are requesting additional 

information from the JPO to ensure all planned actions meet the intent of our 

recommendations. 

The JPO has begun addressing recommendations 1 through 6. Specifically: 

• To strengthen the ITS assessment program, the JPO has restructured the ITS 

organization and appointed a new team leader to oversee the program. To 

restructure support contractor services, the JPO is reviewing databases, 

support, and services associated with the assessment program to identify those 

that can be consolidated (recommendations 1 and 2). 

We request that the JPO clarify how the assessment program will now more 

effectively measure and report ITS research results. In addition, the JPO’s 

response stated that its contractors were not duplicating evaluations; however, 

this did not pertain to our finding, which focused on a separate product 

(contractors’ duplicative summaries of these project evaluations). 

• The JPO has begun documenting its financial processes and plans to complete 

this effort over the next several weeks. The JPO has not yet validated the 

$20 million dollars we identified but is working with FHWA’s Office of 

Acquisitions Management (HAAM) to close out old contracts and prioritize 

needed de-obligations. The JPO also verified that all five FTA reimbursements 

are old ITS JPO projects and will develop a process to address all charges in a 

timely manner. We consider these actions responsive to recommendations 3, 

4, and 5. 

• To implement uniform program management, the JPO is establishing a Project 

Management Office (PMO) for the entire research portfolio. The JPO has also 

hired a PMP-certified team leader for the Program Evaluation team. Finally, 

the JPO agreed to use benefit-cost analyses at appropriate points in the life of a 

research project. We consider these actions responsive to recommendation 6.
21

RITA and the JPO also cited planned actions to address recommendations 7 

through 10: 

• To correct its contract practices, the JPO will strengthen existing conflict of 

interest clauses that already apply to some contractors. In addition, the JPO 

will consult with HAAM to better identify potential conflicts of interest among 

its contractors. The JPO will also serve as the approving authority for the new 

PMO contractors’ roles and responsibilities. We consider these actions 

responsive to recommendations 7 and 8. 

Furthermore, the JPO will consult with HAAM to pursue performance-based 

contracts where they apply to the specific contract type (recommendation 9). 

We request that the JPO clarify how it will use performance-based contracts, 

given OMB’s guidance that a labor hours contract is not appropriate when it is 

possible to estimate the extent or duration of work. Because the JPO can make 

such estimates for most projects, it has the ability to move to a largely 

performance-based contract structure and should consider doing so. 

• The JPO stated that it will begin the update of the interagency agreement with 

Volpe to transfer oversight of Safe Trip-21 to the JPO in January 2009. This 

action is responsive to recommendation 10. 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

We consider the JPO’s corrective actions for recommendations 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 

10 to be responsive; however, these recommendations will remain open pending 

completion of the actions. In accordance with DOT Order 8000.1C, we request a 

more detailed response from the JPO regarding recommendations 1, 2, and 9. We 

also request that the JPO provide target dates for completing all corrective actions 

and notify us when they are complete. 

We appreciate the cooperation of RITA and JPO representatives during this audit. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 

366-0500, or Darren Murphy, Program Director, at (206) 220-6503. 

# 

cc: RITA Acting Administrator 

RITA Audit Liaison 

Chief, FHWA Acquisitions 

FHWA Audit Liaison 
22

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We conducted the audit between February 2008 

and December 2008 and included such tests of procedures and records as we 

considered necessary, including those providing reasonable assurance of detecting 

abuse and illegal acts. 

During the audit, we met with numerous DOT and non-DOT officials involved in 

the ITS program. Specifically, we interviewed key JPO officials, including the 

current Director and her two predecessors, the Deputy Director, the current and 

former Budget Managers, and various program and project managers. Within 

RITA, we interviewed the Administrator, Associate Administrator in the Office of 

Administration, Chief Counsel, and Chief Financial Officer. Within FHWA, we 

interviewed the Chief Financial Officer, Chief of Contracts Division, Chief of 

Acquisitions Division, and the Contracting Officer and Agreements Officers 

responsible for various ITS contracts and agreements. Within OST, we 

interviewed the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, the Senior 

Budget Examiner, and Chief Economist. We also interviewed various DOT 

officials within FTA, the Maritime Administration, and the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Finally, we interviewed the JPO’s six 

main support contractors: Citizant, Battelle, Noblis, Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory, Science Appliance International Corporation (SAIC), and the Volpe 

Center. We also interviewed ITS America, Washington State DOT, and the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).25

To assess the JPO’s ability to track project results and outcomes, we reviewed 

relevant laws, regulations, policies, and memoranda of understanding. We 

reviewed the organizational structure of JPO’s assessment program and 

interviewed key participants, including representatives from each of the six main 

support contractors. We reviewed and analyzed documents from the National 

Transportation Library, as well as project summaries and evaluation reports from 

support contractor databases. We also gathered and analyzed numerous projectand contract-related documents, contractor performance reports, and JPO monthly 

status reports. 

 

25 Once completed, the JPO’s Clarus program will be transferred to the National Weather Service, an agency within 

NOAA. 

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology 
Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

23

To assess the JPO’s ability to manage the ITS budget, we reviewed budget, 

financial, and internal control policies. We analyzed financial documents from 

Delphi and the JPO’s financial management system, funding memos, purchase 

requests, invoices, and relevant supporting documentation. To verify the accuracy 

of financial data, we compared and analyzed financial reports used to track 

budgeted, obligated, and expended funds. 

To assess the effectiveness of JPO’s contract oversight, we selected a statistical 

sample of 120 active contracts and agreements more than 3 years old to determine 

whether obligated funds were needed. From this sample, we identified and 

analyzed 56 contracts and agreements that either had expired or showed no 

payment activity for at least 3 years. From this list of the 56 contracts and 

agreements, we reviewed relevant files and interviewed JPO, FHWA, and FTA 

officials to verify what funds were no longer needed and required de-obligation. 

To assess the JPO’s ability to provide direction and cross-modal coordination, we 

compared congressional guidance and OMB’s planning criteria with the JPO’s 

5-year strategic plan. We attended an ITS Strategic Planning Group meeting and a 

cross-modal Urban Partnership Agreement coordination meeting and interviewed 

relevant participants. To assess the importance of uniform project management, 

we identified criteria from the Project Management Institute’s Project 

Management Body of Knowledge and contacted the Volpe Center’s Program 

Management Office. Lastly, we analyzed monthly status reports and other 

performance documents from the JPO, FHWA, NHTSA, and Volpe, which 

covered multiple ITS projects, including VII, Clarus, and Safe Trip-21. 

To assess the importance of conducting benefit-cost analyses, we identified OMB 

criteria, interviewed the DOT’s Chief Economist, and analyzed the benefit-cost 

analysis for the VII program. 

Finally, to determine whether JPO support contractors complied with OMB 

policies covering inherently governmental activities and conflicts of interest, we 

compared OMB criteria with contractors’ statements of work and progress reports. 
23

EXHIBIT B. CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS THAT NEED TO 

BE CLOSED WITH ASSOCIATED FUNDS DE-OBLIGATED 

No. 

Contract or Agreement 

Number Year Signed

Remaining 

Obligations 

1 DTFH61-93-X-00017 1993 $28,034.22 

2 DTFH61-94-C-00207 1994 $54,711.00 

3 DTFH61-95-Y-00105 1995 $130,793.11 

4 DTFH61-95-Y-00105 1995 $125,000.00 

5 DTFH61-96-Y-30059 1996 $1,057.92 

6 DTFH61-96-C-00103 1996 $11, 604.47 

7 DTFH61-96-C-00047 1996 $10,000.00 

8 DTFH61-96-C-00094 1996 $23,848.74 

9 DTFH61-97-Y-30124 1997 $1,186.00 

10 DTFH61-98-C-00059 1998 $40,000.00 

11 DTFH61-98-C-00073 1998 $105,439.00 

12 DTFH61-98-C-00073 1998 $2,673.45 

13 DTFH61-98-C-00073 1998 $23,243.00 

14 DTFH61-98-C-00079 1998 $1,419.89 

15 DTFH61-99-T-56009 1999 $2,113.01 

16 DTFH61-99-X-00101 1999 $213,874.74 

17 DTFH61-99-Y-30078* 1999 $205,796.09 

18 DTFH61-99-X-00101 1999 $394,487.01 

19 DTFH61-00-Y-30124 2000 $110,000.00 

20 DTFH61-00-X-00006 2000 $93,437.00 

21 DTFH61-00-X-00006 2000 $61,113.00 

22 DTFH61-00-X-00006 2000 $52,994.00 

23 DTFH61-00-Y-30106* 2000 $537,708.88 

24 DTFH61-00-Y-30014 2000 $566,061.31 

25 DTFH61-C-01-00036 2001 $115,307.16 

26 DTFH61-01-C-00181 2001 $38,398.10 

27 DTFH61-01-T-56030 2001 $28,504.31 

28 DTFH61-01-D-00105 2001 $145,626.87 

29 DTFH61-01-Y-30120* 2001 $651,852.10 

30 DTFH61-01-C-00183 2001 $12,053.00 

31 DTFH61-01-C-00005 2001 $26,982.00 

32 DTFH61-01-T-56035 2001 $38,539.18 

33 DTFH61-01-Y-30120 2001 $275,000.00 

34 DTFH61-01-T-56036 2001 $8,929.00 

35 DTFH61-02-X-00104 2002 $266,696.23 

36 DTFH61-02-X-00011 2002 $86,339.17 

(Table continues on page 24.) 

Exhibit B. Contracts and Agreements That Need To Be Closed With 

Associated Funds De-Obligated
24

No. 

Contract or Agreement 

Number Year Signed

Remaining 

Obligations 

37 DTFH61-03-X-30112* 2003 $700,307.80 

38 DTFH61-03-X-30125 2003 $200,000.00 

39 DTFH61-03-X-30129 2003 $1,779,928.00 

40 DTFH61-03-X-30108 2003 $150,000.00 

41 DTFH61-03-X-30103 2003 $500,000.00 

42 DTFH61-03-X-30124 2003 $443,000.00 

43 DTFH61-03-X-30128 2003 $700,000.00 

44 DTFH61-03-X-30127 2003 $250,000.00 

45 DTFH61-04-X-30063 2004 $147,360.00 

46 DTFH61-04-X-30044 2004 $1,205,000.00 

47 DTFH61-04-T-86015 2004 $42,426.16 

48 DTFH61-05-D-00002 2005 $1,533.60 

49 DTFH61-05-D-00002 2005 $9,042.03 

50 DTFH61-05-D-00002 2005 $1,842.28 

51 DTFH61-05-D-00002 2005 $26,571.93 

52 DTFH61-05-D-00002 2005 $5,757.15 

53 DTFH61-05-D-00002 2005 $8,274.31 

54 DTFH61-05-X-30050* 2005 $352,672.47 

55 DTFH61-05-X-30025 2005 $465,065.00 

56 DTFH61-05-X-30048 2005 $250,000.00 

Total: $11,729,600.69 

* In addition to funds remaining on these five old agreements, we question FTA’s receipt of 

$3.9 million in reimbursements years after the period of performance for these agreements 

had expired. 

Exhibit B. Contracts and Agreements That Need To Be Closed With 

Associated Funds De-Obligated
25

EXHIBIT C. SIX OLD CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS THAT 

NEED TO BE CLOSED WITH FUNDS DE-OBLIGATED 

No. 

Agreement Number or 

Recipient Year Signed

Remaining 

Obligations 

1 DTFH61-01-SA-0010 2001 $99,632.00 

2 DTFH61-03-Y-30020 2003 $130,000.00 

3 DTFH61-03-SA-0388 2003 $250,000.00 

4 DTFH61-03-Y-00001 2003 $192,000.00 

5 DTFH61-04-T-56004 2004 $63,000.00 

6 National Academy of Sciences Unknown $8.19 

Total: $734,640.19 

Exhibit C. Six Old Contracts and Agreements That Need To Be 

Closed With Funds De-Obligated
26

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

Name Title 

Darren Murphy Program Director 

Charles Ward Project Manager 

Deborah Kloppenburg Senior Auditor 

Diane Brattain Auditor 

Gloria Echols Auditor 

Earl Kindley Auditor 

Teri Vogliardo Analyst 

Susan Zimmerman Auditor 

Petra Swartzlander Senior Statistician 

Andrea Nossaman Writer-Editor 

Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report
27

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS 

U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

The Administrator 1200 New Jersey Ave. S.E 

Washington, DC 20590

Research and 

Innovative Technology 

Administration

January 15, 2009 

Lou E. Dixon 

Assistant Inspector General for Aviation 

 and Special Program Audits 

1200 New Jersey Ave, SE 

Room W76-481 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Dear Ms. Dixon, 

On behalf of the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), I would 

like to thank the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for executing the baseline audit of 

the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office (JPO) and for 

delivering the Draft Report. In short, RITA strongly concurs with the OIG 

recommendations. Due to the diligence, hard work, and professionalism of the OIG staff, 

as well as the changes that have already been implemented within the ITS JPO, we feel 

confident that the ITS JPO is well-positioned to continue efforts to strengthen overall 

management practices and implement these OIG recommendations. 

Last December, the ITS Program was directed to begin the adoption of rigorous and 

disciplined project management principles, restructure the Vehicle Infrastructure 

Initiative (VII) initiative, develop a focused safety research agenda, and restructure the 

organization to be better aligned to achieve these objectives. I am pleased to report that 

these efforts have paid dividends. For example, the ITS JPO has reorganized its entire 

office structure, hired new PMP-certified staff, implemented a Project Management 

Office (PMO) with a contract award imminent, and restructured and rebranded the VII 

initiative - now known as IntelliDrive. As well, the ITS JPO has developed a central 

focus on safety to achieve measurable improvements in safety for the general public. 

The efforts of the OIG staff will be critical to the continued efforts of the ITS JPO over 

the next year in making needed improvements to meet their important mission. Among 

one of my last actions as RITA Administrator, the ITS Program has been directed to 

immediately begin the implementation of all the OIG recommendations. 

Regards, 

Paul R. Brubaker

Appendix. Agency Comments
28

RITA Response to the Office of Inspector General Audit Draft Report dated 

January 9, 2009 

This document reflects the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office 

(JPO) response to the Draft Report prepared by the Office of Inspector General (IG). 

Executive Summary Response:

In general, the ITS JPO strongly concurs with the overall IG recommendations. The ITS 

JPO fully supports the adoption of nationally-recognized project management best 

practices, documenting internal procedures, restructuring the program assessment area, 

closing out old contracts, and eliminating potential conflicts of interest, to name but a few 

recommendations. The ITS JPO feels that implementing these recommendations will 

yield substantial benefits to the ITS program and will improve overall research results. 

The ITS JPO would like to recognize and thank the IG staff for their dedication and hard 

work in completing their audit. The IG staff spent considerable time on a complex 

program that has spanned 17 years across three authorizing legislations, with numerous 

contract vehicles and projects. Due to the scope and diversity of the program, the IG staff 

was faced with an extremely large workload. They worked diligently to conduct 

numerous interviews, research vast amounts of data, and spent long hours to complete 

this report in a compressed timeframe. 

As noted in the IG report, the ITS JPO has already begun to implement several 

improvements to correct a number of the issues identified in the report. Going forward, 

the ITS JPO will also work with the other DOT offices identified in the report to address 

the multi-modal financial and contractual issues. The ITS JPO looks forward to 

continuing efforts to address the areas for improvement highlighted in the IG report. 

Listed below are the specific responses to each of the individual IG recommendations 

presented on page 19 of the report, along with a brief description of the planned actions 

to implement the recommendations. Additionally, to assist with the accuracy and 

thoroughness of this report, all technical corrections and clarifying information are 

contained in Addendum A. 

IG Recommendations Response:

The ITS JPO has the following response to the IG recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: Strengthen the ITS assessment program and require that 

support contractors more effectively measure and report on the results (i.e., 

benefits, costs, and lessons learned) of ITS research. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur with comment: The ITS JPO concurs that the assessment 

program can be strengthened. Since the ITS Deployment program has been rescinded, 

the earmarked deployment projects will begin to come to an end during the next few 

years. Evaluation plans are already in place for the ITS Management Council-approved 

Appendix. Agency Comments
29

major research initiatives. Also, due to technology evolution, industry trends, new 

national needs, and emerging issues, it is an appropriate time to reassess what data is 

needed to provide the most essential and relevant information to decision makers and 

stakeholders. Also, the JPO has restructured the entire ITS organization, and a new team 

leader has been selected to oversee the Program Assessment area. 

Comment: The ITS JPO wishes to clarify our belief that the assessment program has met 

and exceeded the legislative requirements for evaluation and for an information 

clearinghouse. The ITS JPO was responsible for overseeing hundreds of projects from 

the earmarked ITS Deployment Program alone. The scale of work was large and federal 

staff was small (one full time employee). Therefore, the JPO program manager, in 

coordination with modal partners, developed a robust and well documented independent 

verification and validation (IV&V) structure of oversight by federal personnel supported 

by the services of contractors who were directed by Federal task managers. Because of 

the projects were earmarked, the ITS JPO had no influence or control over the projects, 

and was largely dependent on data from the earmark recipient. Thus, the assessment 

program attempted, to the extent practicable, to mine the most useful and relevant data 

possible under these circumstances and share this information with the deployment 

community. 

Recommendation 2: Restructure assessment support service contracts to reduce 

costs and eliminate duplicative services. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur with comment: The ITS JPO concurs that the assessment 

program should be restructured to reduce costs. Since the ITS deployment program has 

ended, there is no longer a need for as extensive contractor roles as was the case in the 

previous years. The ITS JPO has begun to reassess the entire Program Assessment web 

environment to consolidate databases, support, and services. An independent contractor 

will be hired to conduct a thorough review of all web content. The draft SOW for this 

assessment has been developed and shared with the other affected USDOT offices. The 

ITS JPO anticipates contract award shortly and look forward to systematically 

consolidating the program assessment based on the results of the independent contract 

tasking. 

Comment: The ITS JPO would like to note that the assessment program support 

contractors were not duplicating evaluations. Rather, they were tasked to read evaluation 

reports (some more than 100 pages long) sent in from ITS earmarked deployment project 

recipients; find and extract relevant benefits, costs, and lessons learned; summarize them; 

and post them into a relational database. This database fulfills the legislative requirement 

for an information clearinghouse. These searchable databases are not duplicative of the 

National Transportation Library, but rather they house short summaries for use by 

deployment agencies. 

Recommendation 3: Establish and document procedures for ensuring effective 

budget execution, contract and agreement closeout, and de-obligation of prior year 

funds. 

Appendix. Agency Comments
30

ITS JPO Response: Concur in part: The JPO strongly concurs that existing financial 

and contracting processes should be well documented. Work is underway to document 

the existing financial processes. The ITS JPO will continue these efforts over the next 

several weeks to complete this activity. 

However, the ITS JPO is concerned about the statements that financial procedures are not 

in place and that internal controls are lacking. The ITS JPO has long-standing financial 

procedures; however, they lack documentation. This lack of documentation resulted in a 

five month lapse in reconciliations when the JPO financial manager left and before the 

new financial manager was hired and trained. Contract and agreement closeout is 

addressed in the response to Recommendation #4 below. 

Recommendation 4: Coordinate with FHWA to identify and review old ITS 

contracts and agreements and de-obligate nearly $20 million in unneeded funds. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur: Whereas the ITS JPO has not had an opportunity to 

validate the $20 million dollars identified in the draft report at this time, we do concur 

that old contracts must be closed out and remaining funds deobligated in a timely 

fashion. The ITS JPO has and will continue to work with the FHWA Office of 

Acquisitions Management (HAAM) to execute the closeouts of old contracts. The ITS 

JPO will consult with HAAM to attempt to prioritize the needed deobligations and to 

ensure the execution of the current fiscal year ITS procurement actions are not adversely 

impacted. 

Recommendation 5: Coordinate with FHWA to review documentation supporting 

FTA’s questionable $3.9 million in reimbursements on 5 expired agreements and 

seek recovery of those funds that can not be verified.

ITS JPO Response: Concur. The ITS JPO has verified that all 5 reimbursements are, in 

fact, old ITS JPO projects. The ITS JPO intends to consult with HAAM and the FTA 

Acquisitions Office to propose a process to ensure all charges for reimbursable 

agreements are completed in a timely manner to avoid this issue in the future. 

Recommendation 6: Strengthen project management by requiring uniform 

procedures, documentation, performance data, and timely cost-benefit analyses. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur: The ITS JPO strongly concurs that the JPO can do more to 

strengthen project management processes. As noted in the report, several actions have 

been completed to address this issue. The ITS JPO has hired a PMP-certified team leader 

for the Program Evaluation team. Additionally, the JPO is actively establishing a Project 

Management Office (PMO) for the entire research portfolio. The contract evaluation 

process is completed, and the ITS JPO expects award of the PMO contract to occur 

imminently. We strongly concur in the appropriate use of cost-benefit analyses at 

appropriate points in the life of a research project when data is available. We note that, in 

Appendix. Agency Comments
Appendix. Agency Comments

31

many cases, cost-benefit data does not exist at the start of research. Indeed, cost-benefit 

data is often an output of the research. 

Recommendation 7: Ensure support contractor tasks are clearly defined and 

sufficiently separated to avoid any conflict of interests. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur: The ITS JPO strongly concurs that support contractors on 

a specific ITS research initiative should not be in a position to also monitor the evaluation 

of the same initiative. Clauses are and have been in effect for some JPO support 

contractors, but the arrangement deserves to be revisited and strengthened. The ITS JPO 

will consult with HAAM to better identify potential conflicts of interest from a 

programmatic and acquisition perspective to avoid this issue in the future. 

Recommendation 8: Ensure the PMO’s duties, roles, and responsibilities as well as 

deliverables are clearly defined in the contract. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur: The ITS JPO believes the list of deliverables and due dates 

in the PMO SOW meet this recommendation. Further, the first deliverable of the PMO 

contract is the PMO Program Plan which defines the specific roles and responsibilities of 

the PMO contractors. The PMO Program Plan first draft is due 30 days from contract 

award. The final draft is due 45 days from contract award. The ITS JPO is the final 

approving authority for this deliverable. 

Recommendation 9: Use performance-based (versus billable hours) contracts for all 

future support services where it is possible to estimate the extent or the duration of 

the work. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur: The ITS JPO agrees that performance-based contracting 

offers clear benefits, where applicable. Going forward, the ITS JPO will consult with 

HAAM to pursue performance-based contracts where they are applicable to the specific 

contract type. 

Recommendation 10: Transfer oversight of SafeTrip-21 from Volpe to the JPO to 

comply with DOT Order 2300:8. 

ITS JPO Response: Concur: The ITS JPO believes this is the consistent interpretation 

of DOT Order 2300.8. The ITS JPO will begin the update of the interagency agreement 

with Volpe to transfer oversight to the JPO in January of 2009. 
The following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts included in 

this document. These pages were not in the original document but have been 

added here to accommodate assistive technology. 
The Joint Program Office’s Management of the Intelligent Transportation 

Systems Program Needs To Be Improved 

Section 508 Compliant Presentation 

Table 1. Joint Program Office “Contingency” Fund Balances, Fiscal Year 

2004 through Fiscal Year 2008 

• In September 2004, the contingency fund balance was $20,987,373, or 

19.1 percent of the Joint Program Office’s annual budget of $110 million. 

• In September 2005, the contingency fund balance was $$9,349,057, or 

8.5 percent of the Joint Program Office’s annual budget of $110 million. 

• In September 2006, the contingency fund balance was $28,892,418, or 

26.3 percent of the Joint Program Office’s annual budget of $110 million. 

• In September 2007, the contingency fund balance was $25,938,421, or 

23.6 percent of the Joint Program Office’s annual budget of $110 million. 

• In September 2008, the contingency fund balance was $34,608,421, or 

21.8percent of the Joint Program Office’s 

• The 5-year average balance of the contingency fund was $23,955,138, or 

21.9 percent of the Joint Program Office’s annual budget of $110 million. 

Source: ITS JPO Financial Management System 

Exhibit B. Contracts and Agreements That Need To Be Closed With 

Associated Funds De-Obligated 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-93-X-00017 

Year Signed:

1993 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $28,034.22 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-94-C-00207 

Year Signed:

1994 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $54,711.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-95-Y-00105 

Year Signed:

1995 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$130,793.11 
Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-95-Y-00105 

Year Signed:

1995 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$125,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-96-Y-30059 

Year Signed:

1996 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $1,057.92 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-96-C-00103 

Year Signed:

1996 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $11,604.47 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-96-C-00047 

Year Signed:

1996 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $10,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-96-C-00094 

Year Signed:

1996 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $23,848.74 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-97-Y-30124 

Year Signed:

1997 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $1,186.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-98-C-00059 

Year Signed:

1998 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $40,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-98-C-00073 

Year Signed:

1998 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$105,439.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-98-C-00073 

Year Signed:

1998 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $2,673.45 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-98-C-00073 

Year Signed:

1998 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $23,243.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-98-C-00079 

Year Signed:

1998 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $1,419.89 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-99-T-56009 

Year Signed:

1999 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $2,113.01 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-99-X-00101 

Year Signed:

1999 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$213,874.74 
(Old Federal Transit Administration 

Agreement) Contract or Agreement 

Number: DTFH61-99-Y-30078 

Year Signed:

1999 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$205,796.09 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-99-X-00101 

Year Signed:

1999 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$394,487.01 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-00-Y-30124 

Year Signed:

2000 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$110,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-00-X-00006 

Year Signed:

2000 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $93,437.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-00-X-00006 

Year Signed:

2000 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $61,113.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-00-X-00006 

Year Signed:

2000 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $52,994.00 

(Old Federal Transit Administration 

Agreement) Contract or Agreement 

Number: DTFH61-00-Y-30106 

Year Signed:

2000 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$537,708.88 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-00-Y-30014 

Year Signed:

2000 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$566,061.31 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-C-01-00036 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$115,307.16 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-C-00181 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $38,398.10 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-T-56030 

Year Signed: 

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $28,504.31 
Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-D-00105 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$145,626.87 

(Old Federal Transit Administration 

Agreement) Contract or Agreement 

Number: DTFH61-01-Y-30120 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$651,852.10 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-C-00183 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $12,053.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-C-00005 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $26,982.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-T-56035 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $38,539.18 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-Y-30120 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$275,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-01-T-56036 

Year Signed:

2001 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $8,929.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-02-X-00104 

Year Signed:

2002 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$266,696.23 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-02-X-00011 

Year Signed:

2002 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $86,339.17 

(Old Federal Transit Administration 

Agreement) Contract or Agreement 

Number: DTFH61-03-X-30112 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$700,307.80 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30125 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$200,000.00 
Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30129 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$1,779,928.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30108 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$150,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30103 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$500,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30124 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$443,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30128 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$700,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-03-X-30127 

Year Signed: 

2003 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$250,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-04-X-30063 

Year Signed: 

2004 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$147,360.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-04-X-30044 

Year Signed: 

2004 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$1,205,000.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-04-T-86015 

Year Signed: 

2004 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $42,426.16 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-D-00002 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $1,533.60 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-D-00002 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $9,042.03 
Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-D-00002 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $1,842.28 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-D-00002 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $26,571.93 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-D-00002 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $5,757.15 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-D-00002 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled $8,274.31 

(Old Federal Transit Administration 

Agreement) Contract or Agreement 

Number: DTFH61-05-X-30050 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$352,672.47 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-X-30025 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$465,065.00 

Contract or Agreement Number: 

DTFH61-05-X-30048 

Year Signed: 

2005 

Remaining 

Obligations 

Totaled 

$250,000.00 

TOTAL REMAINING OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL OF THESE 

CONTRACTS OR AGREEMENTS: $11,729,600.69. 

Note: In addition to funds remaining on the five old Federal Transit 

Administration agreements, we question the Federal Transit Administration’s 

receipt of $3.9 million in reimbursements years after the period of performance for 

these agreements had expired. 

Exhibit C. Six Old Contracts and Agreements That Need To Be Closed With 

Funds De-Obligated 

Agreement Number or Recipient: 

DTFH61-01-SA-0010 

Year 

Signed: 2001 

Remaining 

Obligations Totaled 

$99,632.00 

Agreement Number or Recipient: 

DTFH61-03-Y-30020 

Year 

Signed: 2003 

Remaining 

Obligations Totaled 

$130,000.00 
Agreement Number or Recipient: 

DTFH61-03-SA-0388 

Year 

Signed: 2003 

Remaining 

Obligations Totaled 

$250,000.00 

Agreement Number or Recipient: 

DTFH61-03-Y-00001 

Year 

Signed: 2003 

Remaining 

Obligations Totaled 

$192,000.00 

Agreement Number or Recipient: 

DTFH61-04-T-56004 

Year 

Signed: 2004 

Remaining 

Obligations Totaled 

$63,000.00 

Agreement Number or Recipient: 

National Academy of Sciences 

Year 

Signed: 

Unknown 

Remaining 

Obligations Totaled 

$8.19 

TOTAL REMAINING OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL OF THESE 

CONTRACTS OR RECIPIENTS: $734,640.19