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i 

75–143 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–134] 

ADDRESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR 

CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING THE 

MILITARY OPTIONS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 20, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, June 20, 2012, Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge: Understanding the Military Options ....................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, June 20, 2012 ...................................................................................... 43 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2012 

ADDRESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING 

THE MILITARY OPTIONS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Albright, David, President, Institute for Science and International Security .... 9 

Rademaker, Stephen, Task Force Member, National Security Project, Bipartisan Policy Center ............................................................................................... 5 

Robb, Charles, Task Force Co-Chair, National Security Project, Bipartisan 

Policy Center ........................................................................................................ 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Albright, David ................................................................................................. 71 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 47 

Rademaker, Stephen ........................................................................................ 61 

Robb, Charles .................................................................................................... 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 85 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 85 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 90 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 93 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 92 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 89 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 93 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 95 

(1) 

ADDRESSING THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE: 

UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY OPTIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 20, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services 

Committee meets today to receive testimony from experts on the 

nuclear challenge from Iran. 

The expert panel includes former Senator Charles Robb, a task 

force co-chair of the National Security Project with the Bipartisan 

Policy Center; Mr. Steven Rademaker, a task force member of the 

National Security Project with the Bipartisan Policy Center; and 

Mr. David Albright, the President of the Institute for Science and 

International Security. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here today. 

The Iranian nuclear program is among the most complex foreign 

policy and national security challenges that the United States faces 

today. Intensive diplomatic and economic steps focused on Iran’s 

nuclear program have been undertaken over the last decade to dissuade Iran from pursuing a military nuclear program. Unfortunately, it does not appear that these efforts have succeeded in convincing the Iranians to abandon its military nuclear ambitions. 

The United States’ stated policy remains that Iran should not 

process a nuclear weapon, as reflected by President Obama’s recent 

comments in which he stated, ‘‘I think both the Iranian and Israeli 

governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say.’’ 

Moreover, President Obama has explicitly declared that his Administration would use force—a ‘‘military component’’—as a last resort 

to prevent Tehran from acquiring a bomb. However, this message 

has not always been consistent across administrations, and, unfortunately, it is not clear that the Iranian regime is deterred by such 

statements. 

I personally agree that all elements of national power should be 

brought to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

I certainly recognize that no military operation is without risk, but 

given the fact that the President has stated that military options 
2 

may have to be utilized to thwart Iran from obtaining a nuclear 

weapon, it is the committee’s responsibility to ensure that the military option is credible. Moreover, any consideration of a U.S. military response to Iran’s nuclear developments requires rigorous and 

thoughtful evaluation, which is why we are holding this hearing 

today. 

If diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon capability, then a military option may be 

the only recourse. Therefore, it is critical to rigorously study and 

understand all facets of any military option, including how it supports our vital national security interests, its potential for effectiveness, its risks, Iran’s potential responses, the implications for the 

region. 

Likewise, effective military capability in the region could be a 

useful deterrent and improve regional stability, negating the need 

for a military strike. 

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the committee today, 

and I look forward to your testimony and insights into the nuclear 

challenge from Iran. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think your opening 

remarks set the stage very well. 

And I do look forward to the testimony. This is a very thorny and 

difficult problem. We need all the expert advice we can get. So we 

are very happy to have you gentlemen here today, and, as I said, 

we look forward to your testimony. 

It is not an easy problem, because we all recognize the fact we 

do not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. I think there is bipartisan agreement on that. Certainly, the President has stated his 

policy very strongly, and so have the national security leaders in 

the Republican Party that containment is not an option. We can’t 

say it is okay if Iran gets a nuclear weapon and then we will figure 

out how to deal with it. It is our policy to stop them from getting 

a nuclear weapon and to put all options on the table, including the 

option of military action if that is necessary, to achieve our policy 

of stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. 

The difficulty, of course, is that the military option is costly and 

risky, and there is not even a guarantee that it would necessarily 

stop Iran from developing the nuclear weapon. It is worth noting 

that even the very much celebrated military option that Israel used 

against Iraq in the early 1980s ultimately did not stop Iraq, as we 

discovered when we went in in 1991. They were much further 

along toward a nuclear weapon than we had even realized. 

So the risks of the military option are very real, not to mention 

the potential for destabilizing the region in a full-scale war that I 

don’t think any of us want and certainly no one in the region 

wants, which is why it is so critical that we be as aggressive as 

possible on the sanctions side to put maximum pressure on Iran to 
3 

force them to the negotiating table and force them to not take this 

step. 

I think it is also, however, worth noting that Iran has not yet 

said, ‘‘We are building a nuclear weapon.’’ And all of the expert testimony we have received has said they have not stepped across 

that line. In fact, I am always mindful of the fact that—and I could 

be off a little bit here, but I think it was 7 years ago when I first 

heard that Iran would have a nuclear weapon within 6 months. 

They didn’t, and they don’t. 

And it is a very complicated decision for Iran to figure out whether or not to step across that line. Our job is to make sure that they 

understand clearly the maximum cost that they will pay if they do 

step across that line, both in terms of sanctions and in terms of 

saying that the military option remains on the table. 

But given all the risks associated with the military option, it is 

my opinion that right now we need to aggressively pursue the sanctions and diplomacy option and should not lightly walk away from 

that option. Because the consequences of walking away from that 

option are either, A, Iran gets a nuclear weapon or, B, we face the 

possibility of a war that none of us want. 

It is not an easy problem to solve. I don’t think we are going to 

solve it this morning. But I do look forward to the testimony because it is something that every Member of this committee needs 

to get a very strong understanding of. These are critical, critical 

policy decisions going forward. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Robb, we will hear from you first, then Mr. Rademaker, 

then Mr. Albright, please. 

Senator. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES ROBB, TASK FORCE CO-CHAIR, 

NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 

Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Smith and Members of the committee. 

I would have to observe from your opening statements that I 

don’t think this is going to be a particularly contentious hearing. 

And we appreciate very much the fact that, in crafting your legislation, you have borrowed or at least used some of the phraseology 

and certainly some of the intent and explanation that we had included in some of our reports. 

I am here, as is Steve Rademaker, representing the Bipartisan 

Policy Center. This was formed in 2007 by four former majority 

leaders over on the other side of the Hill: Howard Baker and Bob 

Dole on the Republican side and George Mitchell and Tom Daschle 

on the Democratic side. And it has been working to find ways to 

promote evidence-based, politically viable solutions to some of the 

most pressing policy challenges that face our country. And, certainly, this particular challenge is as serious as anything we are 

facing today. 

I have had the privilege of co-chairing the Iran Nuclear Task 

Force for the last 4 years. Initially, the co-chair on the other side 

was Dan Coats when he was a former Senator. When he opted to 
4 

return to the Senate, General Chuck Wald has been the co-chairman since that period of time. 

But the Bipartisan Policy Center always works in a bipartisan 

way so that members of both sides of the aisle are represented and 

tries to work in ways that advance the causes rather than gets 

bogged down in what sometimes would be described as the political 

crossfire. But we don’t attempt to run away from the tough issues 

it faces. 

Our first task force, as a matter of fact, 4 years ago included two 

members, Dennis Ross and Ash Carter, who were subsequently 

asked by President-elect Obama to come into his Administration. 

But we have had bipartisan representation on the committee at all 

times. Our current committee has four former Democratic Members 

of Congress. It has three retired four-star generals and admirals, 

and specific policy experts, like Steve Rademaker on my left, who 

will be testifying momentarily, and others who constitute a group 

of people who are experienced and understand the challenges. 

There is, as you said and as Mr. Smith said, there is widespread 

agreement that preventing Iran nuclear weapons capability is our 

most urgent national security challenge, but there is less agreement on how best to meet that challenge. Despite sanctions, 

Stuxnet, and now Flame, Iran continues to enrich uranium faster 

and to higher levels than ever before. A peaceful, viable, negotiated 

solution has always been, in our judgment, in the United States’ 

best interest. But the dual approach of diplomacy and sanctions 

simply have not proved to be enough. We need the third track, and 

that is credible and visible preparations for a military option. An 

additional leverage is the only way to enable a peaceful and negotiated credible settlement, in the view of this particular task force. 

History shows us that the best chance for inducing Iran concessions is when it is in a dire and military threat. The Iran-Iraq war 

is one example. More recently, Iran suspended its nuclear program 

in 2003 after Saddam Hussein was toppled. It is the credible threat 

of force when pursued together with diplomacy and sanctions that 

proves the best hope for peace, in the judgment of this particular 

task force. 

The three components of a military threat are: first, an information and messaging strategy, sending strong public signals about 

American resolve and visible preparation for potential conflict. Congress can certainly help the U.S. public in a serious and frank discussion of the risk of a nuclear-capable Iran by holding hearings 

on this subject, just as you are doing today, and we applaud the 

committee for holding this hearing. 

Second, economic preparations. The U.S. has to work to mitigate 

the economic impact of a strike on Iran’s nuclear capability, which 

would undoubtedly halt Iran’s oil exports, at least temporarily. And 

the DOE [Department of Energy] needs to conduct a study to determine a realistic rate of release for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 

The third element is credible military readiness activities, like 

augmenting the Fifth Fleet’s capacity by procuring and deploying 

force-protection munitions to defend U.S. naval forces against potential Iranian retaliation; by prepositioning military supplies 

across the region, including strategic bombers, bunker-buster munitions and fuel; by exploring strategic partnerships with countries 
5 

on Iran’s northern perimeter, such as Azerbaijan; by conducting 

broad military exercises with the regional allies—some of these 

things have been done, are being done; by strengthening the U.S. 

Air Force capabilities for an effective strike, including expediting 

production and deployment of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator; by 

augmenting Israeli offensive and defensive capabilities, including 

the sale to Israel of three KC–135 aerial refueling tankers and 200 

GBU–31 bunker-busting munitions needed and whatever missile 

defense systems are needed. 

We are not urging Israel to take unilateral military action 

against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but we need to make their capability to do so stronger so that Iran will take that threat more seriously. 

Mr. Chairman, we are not advocating another war in this region. 

We would like to see this perilous situation resolved peacefully. We 

applaud the President for offering an open hand to a closed fist in 

his very first few minutes as President, but diplomacy simply 

hasn’t done the job. Iran has refused to negotiate in good faith, 

while it continues to ignore U.N. [United Nations] resolutions, 

threatens to wipe out our strongest ally in the region off the face 

of this earth, and keeps those centrifuges spinning. 

Our Nation’s credibility is at stake. Two successive administrations have said that a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran is unacceptable and that all elements of our Nation’s power will be employed 

to keep it from happening. Merely talking about red lines and 

keeping everything on the table, however, is not by itself enough. 

We have to have the resolve to act if necessary, or our ability to 

protect our allies, much less our own interests in the region and 

around the world, will be dramatically reduced and will simply kill 

the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. It will cause nations 

like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and other regional partners to 

feel compelled to initiate their own nuclear programs, and we will 

end up with two nuclear states, without a neutral intermediary, 

facing what could be Armageddon. 

That may be a slightly overdramatic summary of what we see as 

the problem, but there is bipartisan agreement on the challenge 

that we face. And we very much appreciate the fact that this committee has invited us to come and share some thoughts and to respond to whatever questions you and the other Members of the 

committee may have. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will turn it over to Steve Rademaker 

to take up some of the technical questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Robb can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rademaker. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN RADEMAKER, TASK FORCE MEMBER, NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT, BIPARTISAN POLICY 

CENTER 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Smith, for the opportunity to testify before you today on this very 

important subject. 
6 

It has been my privilege for over 4 years now to serve with Senator Robb and some other very distinguished individuals on the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Task Force on Iran. And I am, again, 

grateful for the opportunity to be able to present some of our findings and recommendations to you today. 

We issued our first report in September of 2008, and, at that 

time, we concluded that ‘‘a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran is strategically untenable.’’ And that was carefully negotiated language 

within our task force, as Senator Robb knows. And we also recommended a triple-track strategy for addressing that threat. And 

as Senator Robb indicated, those three tracks are diplomacy, sanctions, and the credible threat that, should the first two tracks fail 

to solve the problem, military force could be used. 

The consistent view of our task force over the last 4 years as we 

have issued successive reports on this issue has been that, of the 

three tracks that we recommend, the third one, the threat that 

force would be used if the other tracks fail, is the most underdeveloped of the three tracks. And by that, I think I would stress 

that it is pretty evident that the United States is interested in a 

diplomatic solution. Our negotiators have been in Moscow this 

week seeking to achieve a negotiated settlement to this problem. So 

I don’t think the Iranians doubt that there is a willingness on the 

part of the United States to engage in diplomacy on this. 

Likewise, sanctions. Both the Obama administration and the 

U.S. Congress have been actively seeking to tighten U.S. sanctions 

on Iran. And in that regard, I do want to say as a former congressional staffer, I think the role of the United States Congress in 

tightening U.S. sanctions has been absolutely critical. And I know 

there is additional sanctions legislation pending, but I think it is 

something that has been and will continue to be essential to bringing the kind of pressure to bear on Iran that will be needed to 

bring about a solution to this problem. 

But, again, we feel that the third element is, at this point, underdeveloped. And by that, I think what we mean is that we don’t 

think that Iran is sufficiently persuaded that military force really 

is in prospect should they fail to come to an acceptable solution, an 

acceptable agreement to the problem. And our most recent report, 

issued in February, outlines some measures that we think would 

be necessary to make that threat more credible to the Iranians. 

And, in our judgment, should we succeed in doing that, the likelihood of a successful diplomatic solution would increase. 

Senator Robb has outlined what some of those steps might be, 

and I am not going to belabor them again, except to echo him in 

saying that the role of this committee has been very helpful on 

that. The provisions you included in the National Defense Authorization Act that are consistent with some of the recommendations 

we made in February I think are very important and very timely, 

and I hope that the Senate will agree to them when you ultimately 

reach conference on that bill. 

Now, the real focus of my testimony is to be not so much on the 

steps that the U.S. might take to increase the credibility of the 

third track but, rather, to focus on the nature of the Iranian threat. 

And there I need to make a point at the outset that for Iran, as 

for any country that seeks nuclear weapons, the biggest challenge 
7 

is obtaining the fissile material necessary to produce a weapon. 

And that is typically either enriched uranium or plutonium. And 

that is why Iran’s uranium-enrichment program is so critically important, because that is the pathway that they have developed that 

would enable them to produce the fissile material that they would 

need for a weapon. 

And so, ever since that program was discovered in 2002, it has 

been the focus of international efforts to get them to end their uranium-enrichment program. And I note in that regard that since 

2006 their continued operation of that program has been illegal 

under international law, because beginning in 2006, the U.N. Security Council began adopting binding resolutions demanding that— 

legally binding resolutions demanding that Iran suspend uranium 

enrichment. And, at this point, a total of six such resolutions have 

been adopted by the U.N. Security Council. Iran has simply ignored 

all those resolutions. But the upshot is that what Iran is doing 

today is a violation of international law. 

At the Bipartisan Policy Center, we have monitored the progress 

of Iran’s enrichment program because that is a good measure of the 

degree to which they are succeeding in achieving the nuclear weapons capability that we said is untenable in our first report. And we 

are very much assisted in trying to monitor that program by the 

work of the International Atomic Energy Agency because they issue 

quarterly reports on the progress of Iran’s enrichment program. 

The most recent IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] report came out on May 25th of this year, and in some ways it is the 

most troubling of any of the reports we have seen in recent years. 

It indicated that, as of May, Iran had produced 3,345 kilograms of 

uranium enriched to 3.5 percent. That is 10 times as much enriched uranium as they had at the time we issued our first report 

in 2008. And with further enrichment, we calculate that that is 

enough 3.5-percent enriched uranium to produce at least two nuclear weapons. I believe David Albright’s organization estimates 

that is actually enough for five nuclear weapons. But it is a substantial amount of enriched uranium that they have accumulated 

at this point. 

The rate at which they are producing enriched uranium, according to the last report, is the highest rate ever. It was 158 kilograms 

per month, which is 37 percent higher than they had achieved in 

any previous reporting period. And it is three times the rate of production prior to the Stuxnet virus, which many people have suggested somehow crippled their program. But today they are enriching uranium three times faster than they were able to enrich it 

prior to Stuxnet. So Stuxnet may have set them back but not by 

very much, at least not sufficiently. 

They are operating more centrifuges today than ever, although 

the increase in the number of centrifuges in the last reporting period was very modest. And, as a result, that 37 percent increase in 

the production rate wasn’t because they had deployed additional 

centrifuges. It is because they are managing to operate their existing centrifuges more efficiently, which is, in some ways, even more 

troubling than deploying additional centrifuges. 

They are also enriching to a higher level, the 20-percent level, 

which gets them closing to bomb-grade enriched uranium. And 
8 

their production rate of that was 25 percent higher during the last 

reporting period, 25 percent higher than in any previous reporting 

period. Taken together with what they are doing in uranium enrichment, they are now able to produce at least one bomb’s worth 

of enriched material every year, enough 3.5-percent enriched uranium to ultimately produce a weapon with it with further enrichment. 

Also troubling, in the last report, the IAEA revealed that they 

had discovered uranium particles enriched to the level of 27 percent, which is a higher level than Iran has declared that it is prepared to enrich to. The meaning of that is not readily apparent, but 

it certainly underscores that Iran has the ability to enrich to much 

higher levels than 20 percent. 

And you may have noted yesterday, their negotiator in Iran insisted that they have an inalienable right under international law 

to enrich to whatever level they want to. And they have demonstrated that they are prepared to go—or, at least, they can go 

above 20 percent. 

As a result of all of the progress that has been measured by the 

IAEA, it is clear that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon very 

quickly should it wish to do so. The Bipartisan Policy Center has 

engaged an expert in this area named Gregory Jones, and he has 

undertaken a number of calculations for us. He calculates that with 

their existing stockpile of enriched material, they could, if they 

were bound and determined to do it, produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within 35 to 106 days. From a decision 

to go forward, it would take them 35 to 106 days to actually have 

the fissile material for a weapon. I think David Albright’s organization calculates a slightly different number. They estimate 4 

months, I believe, or 120 days—a slight difference there but not a 

profound difference, I would argue. 

Also, according to Gregory Jones’ calculation, this more highly 

enriched uranium, this 20-percent enriched uranium, by the end of 

this year they are predicted to have enough of that that, with further enrichment of just that 20-percent material, they could have 

a weapon within 8 days, should they wish to go full speed in that 

direction. Again, David Albright’s organization comes up with a 

slightly different number for that. I think your number is 30 days, 

but—minimum of 30 days to produce a weapon. Not today, but 

probably by the end of the year. 

Anyway, we don’t throw these numbers out because we predict 

that Iran is going to do these things. In fact, there are a lot of reasons why it wouldn’t make much sense for Iran to proceed in that 

manner. But it does provide a measurement of their progress and 

how far they have come in the direction of achieving the nuclear 

weapons capability that we have contended for 4 years now would 

be strategically untenable. 

And I think, with that, I will end my testimony and entertain 

questions after the testimony of Mr. Albright. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker can be found in the 

Appendix on page 61.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Albright. 
9 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE 

FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Smith, for giving me the opportunity to testified today. 

I agree with my colleagues—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Is your mike on? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Is it on? Is it better now? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think it was on; I wasn’t close enough. 

I agree with my colleagues and with you that one of the greatest 

national security challenges facing the United States is Iran’s nuclear effort. We really don’t know if they are going to decide to 

build a nuclear weapon, but the indications are at least that they 

are on a trajectory to do so. I personally believe that they are being 

deterred now from moving forward. They would be much further 

along now if there hadn’t been this deterrence and also a great deal 

of actions that have slowed down their program. 

Now, does that mean that we can find a negotiated solution that 

provides assurance that Iran will not build nuclear weapons? And, 

like many, I am not sure about that. I do have hopes. And I think 

that is the correct course of action, is to pursue negotiations. 

As was pointed out, President Obama has stated that the U.S. 

will prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. And that policy 

means that if Iran moves to build nuclear weapons, the United 

States will act to stop it from succeeding. I think that is fairly 

clear. And I also believe that he means it when he says that military options are on the table, and I would judge that he probably 

would use them. And so I view his threat of military actions as 

genuine. 

Now, as the point has been made, though, there has been little 

discussion of the implementation or implications of this U.S. policy. 

And, clearly, military strikes are risky, potentially very costly, 

could start a war that we don’t want. And there is also no easy 

military way to end Iran’s nuclear program. Surgical strikes, I 

would argue, will simply not work, at least by themselves. A sustained widespread bombing attack can likely stop an Iranian 

breakout to build nuclear weapons. And that is really dependent on 

the current status and nature of Iran’s nuclear program today and 

as we would envision it would be in the next year or so. 

But how will Iran respond? As I said, will we enter a lengthy 

war? And what do we do the day after military strikes or even a 

campaign? And, certainly, I am no expert on the first two, judging 

whether Iran will launch a war or trying to figure out exactly their 

response. But I would like to make one statement about the last 

question, that if military strikes do occur, despite all attempts to 

avoid them, and it follows an Iranian breakout, there is a real necessity to try to figure out a way or a strategy that would impose 

conditions on Iran to ensure that it does not try to build nuclear 

weapons in the future, that we can’t just bomb and walk away. 

And so I think that is an extreme challenge but an absolutely necessary one to consider and start putting into place long before we 

think of actually carrying out any kind of military strike, if that 

is the way it develops. 
10 

Now, one question I was asked to look at is, will the President 

know if Iran moves to build nuclear weapons in the immediate future? And I would say that it is extremely important to know if 

Iran can, in a sense, sneak out, where we don’t have any idea that 

they have built nuclear weapons. And I think our assessments 

would say, not in the near future. And I would put the timeframe 

as this year and next that the President will likely know. And, 

again, it is because of the current status of Iran’s nuclear program. 

Moreover, the U.S. will have enough time for a range of responses. Although, as time progresses, these response times will 

likely start to shrink absent either a negotiated reduction in Iranian nuclear capabilities or other actions that precipitate a slowdown in Iran’s nuclear programs. And that could be caused by 

themselves. 

And a key consideration in evaluating U.S. policy is the timeline 

for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons following the decision to do so. 

And Steve has talked about these various timelines, and I would 

like to just go through some of ours. He actually did capture most 

of them, but I would like to just expand on them a little bit. 

Right now, we think that Iran would need about a year, give a 

couple of months, to actually build a crude nuclear explosive, and 

longer if it needed to put one on a missile. It could be significantly 

longer than a year. But as Steve pointed out, the long pole in the 

tent of an Iranian effort is Iran’s lack of sufficient weapon-grade 

uranium. We assess that they don’t have any in sufficient quantity 

for a bomb and that that remains their priority if they were to 

break out. 

Now, there is a question, is one weapon enough? And in discussing breakout, many argue that they wouldn’t even try until 

they had enough, or a pathway, and I would say a pathway in 

order to get several nuclear weapons. And one component is lowenriched uranium, but there are other components to that pathway 

also that Iran needs to put in place. And an ideal pathway for them 

is a secret centrifuge plant, fully operational, outfitted with advanced centrifuges able to produce weapon-grade uranium at a far 

faster rate than they are today. And I will mention that, at the 

end, they are not there yet, and we don’t think they will be for at 

least a year, if not longer. 

So Iran is limited in its ability to break out. And, as Steve pointed out, it would depend on the stock of LEU [low-enriched uranium] to speed up its, you know, what is often called the dash to 

the bomb. Because we don’t think they have a secret centrifuge 

plant, they are going to have to use their existing centrifuge plants 

to carry out a breakout. And today, if Iran decided to build a nuclear weapon, decided to dash to weapon-grade uranium, we think 

would it take Iran at least 4 months in order to have sufficient 

weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear explosive device. 

Our calculations are done by a University of Virginia faculty 

member of the engineering department who used to head the U.S. 

centrifuge program, or at least the theoretical division, I am sorry, 

of the centrifuge program, and has decades of experience doing 

these calculations. And one of the things that he emphasizes—his 

name is Houston Wood. But one of the things he emphasizes is 

that there is a lot of problems in making weapon-grade uranium. 
11 

A lot of inefficiencies develop as you try to do that that slow you 

down. And that is one of the reasons why we are at 4 months. I 

think Greg Jones is at a lower rate, although his upper bound is 

in response, I think, to our prodding on this issue, and we appreciate that. 

But, nonetheless, it is a challenging chore, and the theoretical 

calculations suggest a longer period of time necessary. And that is 

setting aside the inherent problems in these types of Iranian centrifuges. They call it the IR–1. It actually dates back to a Dutch 

centrifuge built in the 1970s that was stolen by a Pakistani and 

then eventually delivered to Iran. And that centrifuge lost out in 

the competition inside this enrichment program in Europe to a 

German design. And the reason it lost out is it breaks a lot. 

And that has been one of the persistent problems with the Iranian centrifuge program, is unexpected stoppage of centrifuges and 

breakage, excessive breakage, of the centrifuges. And if you are 

rushing to make weapon-grade uranium, your supplies of, let’s say, 

20 percent are just enough, you may not end up with enough weapon-grade uranium once you start turning on those centrifuges to 

make the weapon-grade uranium. 

There are a lot of problems. And I can go into more detail about 

that, but it is one of the reasons we think Iran will not break out 

soon but is concentrating on developing advanced centrifuges which 

are based on the German design that beat out this Dutch design. 

And that Iran is trying in its own way, modifying it to try to develop that. 

Now, Steve mentioned the 20 percent and that is what we are 

all watching because again, the closer you get, the faster you can 

get to weapon-grade uranium. And so we are watching that. We 

agree with their estimates, end of this year, early next year, they 

could have enough of this—it is near 20 percent, we call it for a 

nuclear weapon in the sense that if further enriched they would 

have enough weapon-grade uranium. 

However, in our calculations—again, these are based on Houston 

Wood’s calculations—we see that they are going to need a longer 

time. And if they want to do a rapid breakout, down to a month, 

let’s say—and this, again, is in theory; we view it as a minimal— 

they are going to have to use the Natanz fuel-enrichment plant to 

do that. Fordow will not do it fast enough. And we are not even 

sure how many centrifuges will be at Fordow at that time. It may 

not be fully outfitted. And so you may be talking months and 

months to break out at Fordow at the start of next year. 

Now, at Natanz, they can do it much quicker because they have 

many, many more centrifuges there. But Natanz remains very vulnerable to military strikes, and this breakout will be detected. It 

may not be the first day or the first week, but certainly by the second week, third week, either IAEA monitoring or U.S. intelligence 

will likely detect this kind of breakout and be able to respond. So 

I think even as the response times come down, there is still time 

to respond promptly. But I will grant that detection of a breakout 

becomes more difficult and the preparation for response needs to 

be accelerated. 

Now, one of the issues we are wrestling with is if Iran can built 

a secret centrifuge plant and develop the advanced centrifuges. 
12 

Right now, Iran is having trouble with its advanced centrifuges. 

One of the benefits of sanctions has been forcing them to face material shortages of raw materials. They have been forced to make design changes in the centrifuge design. In the case of one that they 

have been trying to develop, it looks like the centrifuge may not 

work because their design change may be flawed. They are having 

a hard time getting certain raw materials that allow them to build 

large numbers of these modified advanced centrifuges. 

And so we can’t predict when they will succeed, but, again, the 

program is moving much slower than I think we expected, and we 

expect delays to continue. But, nonetheless, at some point they will 

succeed. And I think in our own estimations, the end of next year 

becomes a much bigger problem in order to predict—or let me say 

this, detect and respond to an Iranian breakout. 

In our own assessments, we feel pretty confident that the next 

year the President will clearly detect a breakout. Breakout times 

will be sufficiently long to allow a response. And what that would 

do, we think, is will deter Iran from even trying, because they understand that the United States military response could actually 

stop their ability to build nuclear weapons. 

Now, we certainly would recommend that whatever efforts can be 

done to improve our detection capabilities, either through the IAEA 

insisting on better safeguards at the enrichment plants—in a 

sense, they are there more often, so they can detect a diversion 

more quickly, I think is very desirable. U.S. intelligence capability 

certainly should be—and you would obviously do this—supported to 

improve detection times. And so I think there is a range of those 

kinds of things that need to be done. 

Now, the twin goals should be preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons while avoiding military actions. And I believe this 

can be done, but more needs to be done to ensure that both goals 

are accomplished. And I would agree with my colleagues that, ironically, to prevent war, Iran must believe in its heart that the U.S. 

will strike if it moves to build nuclear weapons. And I think in 

doing that, the United States can deter Iran from even trying. But, 

nonetheless, this puts U.S. policy on a knife’s edge. 

So thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright can be found in the Appendix on page 71.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Robb and Mr. Rademaker, enhancing the credibility of 

the military option, such as prepositioning military assets and supplies in the regions, as you advocate in your BPC [Bipartisan Policy 

Center] report, in concert with vigorous diplomacy and crippling 

economic sanctions should be a key component of the overall strategy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon capability. 

Representative Conaway, a Member of the committee here, introduced a bill, H.R. 4485, that reflects many of the BPC’s recommendations. Much of the bill was incorporated as part of this 

year’s Defense Authorization Act, which we have passed through 

the House. We are waiting for the Senate to take their action. 

Do you support these legislative actions? And are there other 

specific legislative actions that the U.S. Congress should be taking 

to enhance the credibility of the military option? 
13 

Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, we support those aspects—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Is your mike on? 

Mr. ROBB. It is not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, we support those aspects of the defense authorization bill that incorporate the recommendations that have been 

made by the Bipartisan Policy Center. We would not, since we have 

not taken up some of the other provisions of the defense authorization bill, would not comment on those. 

But we, number one, support and appreciate the fact that this 

committee has taken the recommendations that were contained in 

this, which is our most recent publication—I brought two of the 

other publications with me. I couldn’t find the third in that list of 

publications. But while there have been tweaks and variations that 

have been discovered with additional intelligence, with additional 

technical understanding of the issues, the reports have really been 

consistent. 

And so, to the extent that the language that you have included 

adopts language which is either very similar to or at least supports 

the same approach, we are very much in support of that provision 

of the defense authorization bill that you have crafted. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes, if I could add to that, we were very much 

gratified to see Mr. Conaway’s bill and the decision of this committee to incorporate much of that bill into your Defense Authorization Act. 

In response to your question of whether there is more that Congress could do, the answer is, yes, there is more that Congress 

could do. 

One of our other recommendations related to strengthening the 

credibility of the Israeli military threat against Iran, as well as the 

U.S. military threat—and I am pleased to say that those recommendations have also been picked up in legislation that has already passed the House of Representatives. That was a bill, H.R. 

4133, that was cosponsored by Mr. Cantor, the majority leader, and 

Mr. Hoyer, the Democratic whip. It was called the United States– 

Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012. And among 

other things, it called on the United States to provide Israel with 

additional aerial refueling tankers, missile defense capabilities, and 

specialized munitions such as bunker busters. And, again, that was 

one of our recommendations in our most recent report. 

So, hopefully—that bill is now before the Senate, or corresponding legislation is before the Senate. And, last week, the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously voted it out of 

committee. So I think there is a good chance that this is one bill 

that will actually reach the President’s desk. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. 

Some have suggested that Congress should pass an Authorization for the Use of Military Force to prevent Iran from obtaining 

a nuclear weapon, thereby sending a signal that Congress supports 

all options at the President’s disposal. Others might say that this 

legislative action is premature and too provocative. 

In your view, under what circumstances would an authorization 

for the use of military force be appropriate? 
14 

Mr. ROBB. Well, Mr. Chairman, to the extent that any bill passed 

by Congress supports the President’s ability to carry out whatever 

military actions that he and the Defense Department, in consultation with Congress, hopefully, in all areas, believes is necessary, we 

would support. 

If the bill were to actually require a specific either declaration 

of—would provide a specific declaration of war or would require a 

time specific for action to be taken without some leeway for discretion and the evaluation of the circumstances, we would not suggest—or at least on the basis of my own judgment, I think it would 

be unwise to attempt to tie the President’s hands. But to the extent 

that you demonstrated that Congress is fully supportive of his 

using all of the powers that are available to him to carry out the 

mandate that has been put before the international community, 

and for a failure to respond on the part of Iran, we would support 

that—or I would support that. Again, this specific question does 

not come to the full Bipartisan Policy Center or to the task force, 

so I am speaking only for myself. But I would be supportive of anything that gives evidence of support. 

Because, at this point, the credibility of the United States is the 

most important factor that is being questioned. There is no question, I don’t think, in the minds of the Iranian Government or the 

international community that the United States has the capability 

to inflict serious damage. No one is suggesting that they can wipe 

out the program all together, but they can certainly inflict serious 

damage which would slow it down and would cause very significant 

actions and reactions to occur. 

But the question is whether or not the United States would, in 

fact, initiate such action. And that is one of the reasons that we 

have placed so much emphasis, from the very beginning, on credible, visible preparation to indicate not only an ability but a willingness. 

And if we fail to follow through with respect to our credibility in 

this area, any attempt we might make to resolve other questions 

in this area or around the world, all of our treaty obligations, all 

of our understandings with allies on both ends of this particular 

question would immediately be subject to intense scrutiny and 

doubt, which would, in our judgment, cause the governments involved to believe that they had no choice because of the uncertainty 

as to whether or not the United States would actually fulfill the 

threat that is implicit, certainly, in everything that has been said, 

particularly about nothing is taken from the table or there are red 

lines and whatever. 

But if there is assurance on the part of those who depend on this 

guarantee that we will, in fact, follow through, I think the likelihood that you will see proliferation extend to other areas goes 

down, the likelihood that Iran will actually challenge to this point 

goes down, and the likelihood for a peaceful resolution goes up. 

So sometimes the best preparation combined with the demonstrated willingness to follow through is sufficient to keep a conflict, a kinetic exchange of some sort from occurring in the first 

place. And it certainly would be our hope. We are not advocating 

war. We are advocating a peaceful resolution to the question. But 

the only way you can be credible is to indicate that you are not 
15 

simply talking about some of these consequences but that you are 

prepared and willing to follow through. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah, I would like to take a different point of 

view. I think it is premature. 

And I mentioned that this policy that is developing is a knife’s 

edge. And I think one of the ways you can fall off is that it starts 

to look like the United States will attack Iran, or at least that Iran 

will perceive that. And what it will do, I would predict, is start to 

build—or make a decision of how it is going to secretly build nuclear weapons. 

And, again, Iran is very patient. It may not do it this year; it 

may not even do it next year. But you may be faced with an adversary that is going to get nuclear weapons before you can attack, or 

the United States can attack, and it assumes it is going to happen. 

And so you create an inevitability about an Iranian nuclear weapon 

that is not in our interest. 

And I think the other part of it is, I think, frankly, looking back, 

it was a mistake for Congress to give the authorization to President Bush about the Iraq war so early in the debate, that Congress 

lost its valuable oversight on a critical question that, I think we 

would all agree, has been a very difficult process. And so I think 

Congress should not give away anything that has to do with having 

oversight over this process. 

Now, I would also agree with Senator Robb that, because of the 

nature of the policy President Obama is sculpting, it is very hard 

to predict when a war would happen or a military strike would 

happen, because it depends fundamentally on Iranian actions, in 

the sense that he said he would ‘‘prevent’’ Iran. That means that 

Iran has to make a step to get nuclear weapons and then there is 

a reaction. So I think the President needs quite a bit of leeway on 

this, but with extensive oversight by Congress. 

The CHAIRMAN. It just seems to me that if Iran’s sole interest 

was just to develop nuclear capability for a power plant or some 

other such source, they would not have to bury under a mountain 

their facilities to avoid the possibility of an attack. It just—it 

stretches, I think, credibility on their part. 

And while I am not advocating that we move forward on a resolution of this nature, it seems that it would be good to show that 

we are acting as one, that we do support the President. Because 

this should not be politicized in any way, and it should be something that we do in a bipartisan way. And people understand that 

the House is under Republican leadership while the President is a 

Democrat, and we should not be separating the parties. 

And, like I say, I am not at any point advocating; I am just trying to get your impressions on this. So thank you. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple quick comments on that and then one or two questions. 

I think Mr. Albright does point out, it is a delicate balance to 

strike. I mean, if Iran thinks we are coming at them no matter 

what, then they better be as strong as possible, and you have to 

strike that balance. 
16 

I also think that what is really interesting about this situation 

is, I don’t think Iran has decided yet. I think the chairman is right. 

I mean, certainly there is a big part of them that is thinking, ‘‘We 

better be in a position to get a nuclear weapon,’’ and that is why 

all the cautious steps have been taken, the underground bunkers 

and all that. But I think all the evidence we have seen is they have 

not decided at this point to step over that line. 

And, you know, regardless of what they are developing it for, you 

know, they have cause to be concerned that we might attack them 

anyway. So I guess, I don’t think that the fact that they buried it 

that deep means that they are 100 percent decided they are building a nuclear weapon. That is all I would say about that. 

The two questions I have, one for Mr. Rademaker. You had commented when we were talking about how quickly Iran could get 

there if they decided to basically make the dash for the finish line, 

and we went through all of the different numbers on that, but then 

you said something interesting. You said, it doesn’t make much 

sense for Iran to proceed in that manner. It doesn’t make sense for 

them to actually take the steps that would get us on that 60-day 

or 105-day or 4 months or 8 days after that. 

Why do you say that? Why do you say that doesn’t make much 

sense for them to proceed in that manner? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

First, let me comment about, sort of, this larger question of secret facilities and underground facilities. I think the first point we 

have to bear in mind is Iran has a long history of proceeding with 

secret underground facilities. The Natanz facility was originally a 

secret facility that was revealed against their wishes in 2002. The 

Fordow facility, which is a much more—and Natanz is an underground, secure bunker, but it is probably at risk to bunker-buster 

munitions. Subsequently, they constructed a much more secure, 

more deeply buried underground facility at Fordow. And, again, 

that was a secret facility which was revealed contrary to their 

wishes. 

And so the notion that—I am responding here to Mr. Albright— 

but the notion that they might respond to the threat of U.S. military force by building secret underground facilities, you know, I 

think there is reason to think, based on past behavior, that they 

are already planning to do that and may already have started 

doing it. 

Mr. SMITH. I don’t think that was Mr. Albright’s larger point, 

but—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, I think the point was that—well, one of 

his points was, we don’t think—I think he was saying we don’t 

think they have a secret facility because we don’t know of any secret facilities. And I guess I would point out that is something of 

a tautology because, of course, if we knew about it, it wouldn’t be 

a secret facility. And given their track record, I think there is a 

considerable risk that—— 

Mr. SMITH. I have a question on that, actually, but if we could 

get back for the moment to the question—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Okay. The—but I would—and this goes to the 

first part of your question. You say you don’t think they have made 

a decision to go forward or not. I think it depends on what it is 
17 

we are talking about. If we mean, or if you mean you don’t think 

they have made a decision to actually produce a nuclear weapon, 

I think—— 

Mr. SMITH. Well—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. I think that is true. It is unclear 

whether they have made that decision. But I think—— 

Mr. SMITH. That is my only point. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, but at the Bipartisan Policy Center, we 

have always been focused at least as much on the question of nuclear weapons capability. And there I think it is crystal-clear, given 

the construction of these very expensive underground facilities—— 

Mr. SMITH. Oh, yes. They want to—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. That they made a decision a long 

time ago to create a nuclear weapons capability. They want us and 

the rest of the countries in their region to be profoundly fearful 

that they either have a weapon or are extremely close to having 

one. And, therefore, they want to be treated as a nuclear weapons 

state. I mean, that is the point of achieving nuclear weapons capability: to create ambiguity about whether and when they will actually produce a weapon, and thereby be treated as—— 

Mr. SMITH. Up to a point. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Because of that doubt, to be treated as if they had one. 

Mr. SMITH. If I may, up to a point. But they also don’t want to 

put themselves in a position where they a treated like a pariah 

state for no particular gain; that they wind up being under the 

threat of, you know, massive sanctions or potentially military action. 

But, again, if we could meander back to my question—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Okay. On that, I think they have actually put 

themselves in the position of being treated as a pariah—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. State. And they continually make 

the decision to stay in that position rather than—— 

Mr. SMITH. At the moment, yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Satisfy the Security Council. 

Mr. SMITH. My question is, you said that you didn’t think it 

would make sense for Iran to walk down that step to get to that 

4-month point at this stage. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yeah. On that—— 

Mr. SMITH. Why? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. On that, my reasons are pretty much the ones 

that were articulated by Mr. Albright. These are theoretical calculations about what they could do, but why would any country 

want to make a mad dash to have one nuclear weapon? Most countries that produce a nuclear weapon—take North Korea—at some 

point they want to demonstrate to the world that they have it—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. Exactly. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. And the way you demonstrate it is 

by testing. 

Mr. SMITH. You blow it up and you—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. So, to make a mad dash to produce one weapon 

that then people will say doesn’t actually work, and to show that 

it works, they will want to test it—— 
18 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. You know, they haven’t really done 

very much. 

Mr. SMITH. So walking down that particular math problem, how 

long would it take—because, theoretically, I mean, if you want to 

declare yourself as a nuclear power, you are going to need more 

than one. You are probably going to need more than two. You are 

going to need to demonstrate one and then say we have a stockpile 

of, I don’t know, four, five, something like that. 

How long would it take for them to get to the point where—to 

that point. And then I guess the second piece of that question is, 

how much would we know about how far they are walking down 

this road? 

I mean, and that gets us to the secret issue. I mean, the big 

issue—and then to sort of bounce back to this—is, will we know 

when they have stepped over a line and they are trying to build 

a bomb? And I have heard testimony in a variety of different forums that we are pretty confident that we would. Nothing is 100 

percent, but that the effort that it would take to spin up the plutonium to get to 90 percent or whatever it is that you need to get 

to the weapons-grade, we are pretty confident that we would know. 

What is your take on that? And then work back from that to, sort 

of, the math of how long it would take them to get to a reasonable 

point. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. We have thrown a lot of numbers out. For your 

question, perhaps the most important number is one we haven’t 

dwelt on up to this point, and that is the amount of low-enriched 

uranium that they currently have. How many bombs could they 

produce from that low-enriched uranium if they wished to do so? 

And David Albright’s calculations on that are that they today have 

five bombs’ worth. 

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned that, two to five. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And our calculations are actually more conservative, based on different methodology. But—and then the further 

point is that, at current production rates, they are producing more 

than a bomb’s worth of low-enriched uranium every year, so—— 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And the rate of production is increasing. It increased 37 percent in the last 3 months, as compared to the previous 3 months. So, you know, all of the numbers we have thrown 

out, had we been here 6 months ago or a year ago, would have been 

less troubling. 

Mr. SMITH. So, reasonably—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And I would predict that if we are going to be 

here 6 months or a year from now, they will be more troubling still. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. So, reasonably, they are not that far away 

from being in a position to make a mad dash to five or six, is a 

fair thing to say. 

So if they were to make that mad dash, again, the real question 

is, would we know? And how much—well, I guess the other question is, how much longer would it take them to make five to six 

than it would to make one? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, this is why the question of a secret facility becomes so important, because our ability to detect it of course 
19 

depends on there not being a secret facility at which they are doing 

this. And, you know, I think the main reason that experts will 

come to you and say we are pretty confident they don’t have a secret facility is that the last two times that they tried to build a secret facility—— 

Mr. SMITH. We knew. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. They got caught. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And so we surmise from that that they are not 

very good at keeping that secret and we will catch them if they do 

it again. I hope that is true. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. It is also worth pointing out—and then I will 

close on this; I want to throw it to other people—it is worth pointing out, we actually knew that they had those secret facilities before, quite a bit before, we told everyone that we knew, without 

getting into it. So, you know, there is some confidence that we can, 

in fact, figure it out. But it is a very thorny policy problem. 

I am sorry, I am taking too much time. I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here today. 

And for Senator Robb, a question that I have: What do you believe is the current pace of Iran’s nuclear weapons program? Do 

you believe that the Iranians have decided to build a nuclear weapon? Are the Iranians building a breakout capability to allow for the 

option to build a weapon in the future? When might the Iranians 

actually possess a nuclear weapon? Could the Iranians accelerate 

their efforts? And if so, to what degree? 

Mr. ROBB. I think that a large part of the series of questions that 

you just asked have just been discussed at some length by the two 

technical experts here. 

We don’t know in absolute terms how fast it is producing. And 

each of our reports have indicated that there were—the estimates, 

both in terms of technical capability, speed of production, and our 

understanding of the amount of HEU [highly-enriched uranium] or 

other material, was not certain. But, as Mr. Rademaker just indicated, we believe and hope that we will have enough information 

so that we would recognize it in a relatively short period of time. 

And because we have discovered previous efforts to construct underground facilities and they have been discovered, we don’t think 

that they can go on for an unlimited period of time with a very significant increase in production. 

But it all ultimately boils down to how much HEU they are able 

to refine so that they could make a weapon or weapons. And that 

is probably never going to be knowable in an absolute sense unless 

we do it through some technical means that we obviously wouldn’t 

be discussing. So we are going to have to be prepared for the worst 

case. 

One of the elements of this equation that has not been dwelt 

upon this morning to any extent is, what does the Israeli Government think about the situation, how might they react, and is their 

calculation as to how much time, how much fissile material, how 

close to breakout they might be the same as ours? And the ulti-
20 

mate question, even, is whether they would share their estimate 

and/or their decision to intervene. They have made it clear that 

they see this as an existential threat and take that very seriously. 

And much of our effort has been designed to try to make it possible to show the folks, the leadership in Tehran that both the 

United States and Israel, if they believe they reach whatever point 

represents in their judgment the crossing of a red line, that they 

have the capability, more so on the Israeli side and will more so 

on the U.S. side. 

I don’t know if I covered all of your questions, but—— 

Mr. WILSON. Well, you did. And I appreciate, actually, you raising Israel’s estimation and, indeed, the threat to their existence. So 

thank you for raising that. 

Mr. Rademaker, a question: Apart from the ability to conduct a 

military strike to delay or end Iran’s nuclear weapons program, 

what other benefits result from enhancing the credibility of the 

military option? For example, do we know how Iran would view increased military readiness? Would it enhance our diplomatic efforts? How would our regional allies respond? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Those are very interesting questions. 

The first point I would make is that our recommendations, the 

Bipartisan Policy Center recommendations, are not a call to war 

with Iran. We are not calling for a military strike. We are calling 

for credible indications that force is in prospect. 

You know, President Obama and President Bush before him both 

used this term, that ‘‘all options are on the table.’’ And by that, 

they mean to imply that the threat of military force is also on the 

table. Our concern is that we don’t think the Iranians actually believe that. And for every time that President Obama has said, ‘‘All 

options are on the table,’’ there has been a statement by some other 

senior Cabinet official or some other official of the United States 

Government suggesting that the military option really isn’t a very 

serious option for the United States. And we worry, our task force 

worries that Iranians actually pay more attention to those signs of 

equivocation than they do to the mouthing of these words, that all 

options are on the table. So our call has been to make that statement by both President Obama and President Bush more credible. 

And we believe that if it becomes more credible, if the Iranians 

believe that continued pursuit by them of a nuclear weapon, continued defiance by them of the legally binding demands of the U.N. 

Security Council will ultimately lead to the use of force against 

them unless they come to a diplomatic resolution of the crisis, that 

that will increase the likelihood that we will actually achieve a 

peaceful, diplomatic resolution, which is what I think all of us believe would be the best solution to this problem. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

I am going to throw a question out, and whoever wants to respond. We have talked about the Iranians and what they may do. 

I am curious as to what your opinion is of who ‘‘they’’ are. We know 

President Ahmadinejad, we know what he talks, but what is the 
21 

true power base in Iran? Where would these decisions that we are 

talking about need to be made? And how much chance is there that 

these kind of things we are talking about can influence that power 

base? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, even though most of the attention is focused on 

either the—and I am suddenly forgetting his title—in any event, 

Ahmadinejad, it is the Revolutionary Guard that holds the power. 

And they are stationed at Qom and will ultimately dictate what 

takes place. 

The public face is on—what am I thinking?—comity. 

Ahmadinejad has no real power, and of course he is going to be 

going out of office before too long in any event. But he has always 

been the most outspoken and has had the most provacative language, but he doesn’t really have the power. 

But there is a general consensus that whatever power structure 

might evolve after that is still going to want to find a way to become credible as a member of the nuclear club, so to speak. And 

it doesn’t necessarily mean that they have actually built or even 

formally tested. As long as the international community believes 

that they have the ability within some short period of time to 

achieve breakout, they will probably get almost as much as they 

would get from actually testing or certainly from launching a nuclear warhead. 

At this point, it is a matter for—the real struggle in the eyes of 

most of the leadership in Tehran and Qom and elsewhere is to become a member of this club and use the influence that that would 

gain. They look at what happens to those other powers in the general vicinity that have achieved nuclear status and believe that 

they can achieve that, as well. It is—— 

Mr. KISSELL. But, ultimately, how consolidated is that decisionmaking base? Is it just there in the Revolutionary Guard within 

just a very few people? How consolidated or how broad is that base 

of decisionmaking? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Could I add to this? 

Mr. KISSELL. Yes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I mean, ultimately, the supreme leader decides, 

and he is very tough to deal with. 

Mr. KISSELL. Yes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But I would answer it a little differently. Because, 

again, I don’t see a consolidated base in Iran on building nuclear 

weapons, making the decision to do so. I see a consolidated—or, a 

near consensus that they want the capability to do it. 

But I think they can be effective. And I think if you look at what 

happened in 2003, the U.S. intelligence community says the nuclear weaponization program was shut down. The International 

Atomic Energy Agency, in its November 2011 report, said there 

was an abrupt halt to a great deal of nuclear weaponization activities. There was a suspension in their enrichment program. That 

was due to pressure. They understood that, and they stopped to 

avoid worse consequences. 

I would argue that Fordow—and, again, this is an assessment 

based on our collection of evidence—that Fordow was probably 

being designed to make weapon-grade uranium. We can’t prove it. 

The information that supports that is mainly right now from two 
22 

sources; one is some past behavior of Iranian entities that were creating a parallel military nuclear program in the 1990’s, and then 

what the IAEA inspectors observed when they went into that plant 

soon after they were allowed to do. But the detection of that plant 

stopped them cold. They rapidly—they removed piping from one 

whole hall—— 

Mr. KISSELL. And I am going to interrupt you just one second. 

My time is running out. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay, sorry. 

Mr. KISSELL. I guess the point I want to make is, the folks that 

we are targeting and trying to get them to make a decision to back 

away from this, how flexible, how much can we influence them? 

You know, who are those folks, and just, you know, how much can 

we influence them? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think we can. There are two things—— 

Mr. KISSELL. And my time is out. You answered my question. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. There are two parts to that. One is, can you effect 

them to make concessions in negotiations? That is a very tough 

problem. The other is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Oh, does that mean I should be quiet? I am sorry. 

I am not used to some of these rules. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. I think it is a crucial hearing for us to have. 

And thank you for your leadership on that. 

And to each of you three gentlemen, I have enormous respect, 

and I just appreciate you sharing your ideas with us today. I am 

going to direct my question to Senator Robb because he was my 

Governor and my Senator, but I would love to have any of your responses there. 

Senator, you have stated in your testimony that you believe that 

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the most urgent national security threat facing the United States. I don’t disagree with that at 

all. And then also you talked about the need for us to have evidence-based issues. It is not enough just to talk about it; we have 

to show we have the resolve to do something. And then another 

line that I thought was very important was when you said, ‘‘It is 

only the credible threat of force combined with sanctions that affords any realistic hope of an acceptable diplomatic resolution.’’ 

And here is my question. As we realize that—and I think all of 

us would concur with those statements, and I think the three of 

you on the panel would do that—what kind of conflict do we have 

in sending that message of a credible threat of force when Iran is 

watching us with these huge defense cuts that we are doing, $487 

billion and then sequestration looming out there, which certainly 

sends a message to the world that we may not have that kind of 

credible force. 

We then look at another statement that you made which talked 

about beefing up the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf 

of Oman. How does that conflict with the new strategy of this pivot 

to the Asia-Pacific area? We can’t have it, kind of, both ways. 
23 

The third thing you talked about, and I agree with you 100 percent, prepositioning military supplies. And yet we are moving our 

prepositioned stocks back out of the Pacific and the Asia area. 

And then you talked about the need to strengthen the Air Force 

capabilities to require an effective strike. But General Breedlove 

has testified that the Air Force now is on the ragged edge, and, 

with these cuts, we are not going to get any better. 

So I would love to have the assessment from the three of you on 

if you think they have any impact on our credible force. 

And then if you have time, also, we see yet today another leak 

out of the White House of stuff we are doing in Iran. How detrimental is that in what we are doing? 

Senator, I would love to have your thoughts on those. 

Mr. ROBB. Well, first of all, leaks of sensitive intelligence information don’t help the United States in any way, shape, or form. 

And we ought to do everything within our power—again, I am not 

excepting the necessary attribution in terms of who leaked or how, 

but leaks of sensitive information about capabilities, about plans, 

about other activities that might be under consideration ought to 

be avoided at all cost. I will just leave it at that. 

The other question about our capability being eroded by the defense cuts and the sequestration and whatever, there is no question 

that those present enormous challenges to our United States military forces in each of the areas that you have outlined. And that 

is one of the reasons why it is especially important right now that 

we not appear to relax our apparent guard or our apparent willingness to follow through with that particular, I will use the word 

‘‘threat’’ in the event of an action which is simply unacceptable. 

And, incidentally, we argued 4 years ago, in beginning this, between ‘‘untenable’’ and ‘‘unacceptable.’’ We had 1 whole day of discussing which word to use. And we used ‘‘untenable’’ because we 

didn’t want to imply a red line at that point in the process that 

would require the United States to either take military action or 

lose credibility. 

But both administrations—and that was done before the last 

election, so we didn’t know which administration was going to be 

following up on this action—but both administrations have used 

the word ‘‘unacceptable,’’ and senior representatives of those services. 

So when you use that word, as far as I am concerned your credibility is now at stake. And it is that much more important that we 

use our commitments wisely. We may have to—and we make some 

reference in the paper—divert some current military assets to 

strengthen our ability to respond in this particular area, but that 

is not an attractive option by—— 

Mr. FORBES. My time is up, but thank you. And we would love 

to have any response that you have for the record so that we could 

use that. It would be wonderful. And thank you so much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
24 

Mr. Albright, do you believe with the statement of the Bipartisan 

Policy Center that we are calling for a triple-track strategy? And 

if you do, what is your opinion of the credible preparedness of the 

military option, which Mr. Rademaker says has fallen short? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I haven’t studied it in detail. I mean, you are outlining three ways forward that I think most who are worried about 

Iran’s nuclear program would agree with. I mean—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Albright, could you please talk into the 

microphone? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Oh, okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think that there is—I have broad agreement 

with the three areas. I mean, where I think there may be a problem is overemphasizing the military. I will repeat what I said earlier, that you run a real risk that Iran thinks that we intend to attack them regardless, and that that can have some very negative 

consequences. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Would I be correct in assuming that your analysis is that if we do what Mr. Rademaker is saying is that we have 

fallen short and we begin to enhance that, that your belief is that 

Iran would then interpret it as an offensive action and then do this 

breakout? More probability? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Or pursue a secret route. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And you feel that that would be almost the unintended consequence of what is being proposed. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Now, Mr. Rademaker or Senator Robb, I see and 

what your position is is that we have fallen short in terms of the 

military option. 

And I think, Senator, in your written testimony you have spoken 

to building the Fifth Fleet. And I am just—I am trying to understand, when you want to enhance the Fifth Fleet, what does that 

exactly look like? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, with the exception of specifying what munitions 

that we ought to sell to Israel to shore up their capability, we have 

not tried to specify how many warships, how many aircraft, how 

many whatever the case may be in this particular case. The objective of the Bipartisan Policy Center is not to create an entire punch 

list for the Government to check off. We think that ought to come 

from the military commanders in the area, in consultation with the 

civilian leadership. 

What we are suggesting is that these are areas that can and 

ought to be shored up so that we make more credible and give 

greater emphasis to our willingness to follow through in the event 

that Iran does not take our threat—again I use that word—seriously. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that, Senator. And I guess what I 

hear is that—and what I read was that it is sort of a joint effort. 

In other words, if we are not, the United States is not willing to 

provide whatever enhancement or security that Israel may need, 

that we then have an obligation—or if we want to prevent this 

buildup, we then should then focus on our own presence, in terms 

of the building up of the Fifth Fleet. 
25 

But I still assume that to make the analysis that we have fallen 

short or it is somehow inadequate, there must be some measurement in your mind that we are not reaching. And I am just trying 

to get an understanding of what that level is that leads to the conclusion by Mr. Rademaker in his testimony that we have fallen 

short. 

How have we fallen short? I mean, without getting into that we 

need another carrier or we need whatever or we need to give Israel 

X, Y, and Z, why do you think conclude that we have fallen short? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Let me make a threshold point here, which is— 

and some of the others witnesses have referred to this. The last 

time that Iran perceived a credible threat that military force was 

going to be used against them, they suspended uranium enrichment. That was right after the Iraq war in 2003. And not coincidentally, Libya did the same thing. Qadhafi gave up his nuclear 

weapons program at the same time. 

Because in that initial 6- to, you know, 12-month period after the 

U.S. went into Iraq, the threat to—you know, President Bush had 

given his ‘‘axis of evil’’ speech. The perception in Tehran, we believe, was that what had just been done to Iraq might happen to 

them, and they were genuinely worried about it. And one of the 

things they did was they suspended uranium enrichment and engaged in a fairly serious, fairly intensive diplomatic process with 

the Europeans. 

And, of course, we all know what happened next. The Iraq war 

headed south, and the U.S. became bogged down and—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I am out of time. Could you put that in writing, 

what you were going to finish with that statement all the way 

through to the—Mr. Chair, if that is okay—with the final assessment of how we have fallen short? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think I can finish in one sentence. 

Once they stopped believing that there was a serious risk that 

the U.S. would conduct military activities against them because of 

the way this was playing out in Iraq, they ended their suspension 

of enrichment and have never returned to it and have persisted 

with their nuclear program ever since. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our panelists for their dedication and commitment to trying to provide some overall description and understanding on a bipartisan basis on what really is an important 

issue. 

I want to underscore, though, that I am very concerned about 

how the tenor of the hearing and the message of the hearing has 

gone if someone had only been watching this hearing. So I want 

to sort of backtrack and reverse a little bit on what our topic has 

been. 

Because there have been a lot of statements that we have had, 

both from Members and on the panelists, of things like, you know, 

‘‘Well, we think they will stop, it doesn’t make much sense for them 

to proceed’’—a lot of statements that I think would lead one to be-
26 

lieve that we don’t really have to do anything and we are not going 

to be facing a nuclear Iran. 

So I want to backtrack a bit on this whole issue because of two 

things: One, I think it would be incredibly naive for anybody to believe that we need to do nothing—and I don’t believe our panelists 

believe that—to avoid a nuclear Iran. 

I recall, and I am certain you all do, the discussions during 

North Korea’s pursuit for nuclear weapons, that it wasn’t just enrichment, it was nuclear weapons, and their pursuit currently for 

ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] technology that, as you 

know, our Secretary—former Secretary Gates said is an absolute 

threat to the mainland of the United States. And I recall the people 

who said North Korea would never go as far as to have nuclear 

weapons capability, they would never have a test, they would never 

have a weapon, that they were starving their people, that the outcry of the international community would have such a great effect 

that North Korea would not be a nuclear weapons state. Today 

they are. 

So those statements, that thought process of ‘‘surely, a nation 

wouldn’t, because the price is just too great’’ has been proven, with 

the most recent pursuit by North Korea, as not to be sufficient to 

deter someone from doing that. 

Military action, as you have just mentioned, Mr. Rademaker— 

and I know that Mr. Albright mentioned that the National Intelligence Assessment of 2003 indicated a belief—again, it was just a 

belief—that the nuclear weapon that was suspended by Iran in 

2003 was, as you were just describing, Mr. Rademaker, a basis of 

the action that Iraq had been invaded and they had a military sitting next to them and that the threat of credible force caused them 

to suspend. 

But the reason why I wanted to back up, besides just the issue 

of North Korea, is to put in context as to why we really care. Iran 

is not Canada. Iran is a terrorist-supporting nation, regime, both 

through Hamas and Hezbollah. They have made aggressive statements against Israel and the United States. They have continued 

to make threatening statements or gestures with respect to the 

Straits of Hormuz, which would have significant world impact if 

they were to take any action there. 

So the issues that we are talking about here are very serious and 

not ones which we should just say that we have a belief that it 

would not make much sense for them to proceed. Because I would 

venture to say, and I think everybody in this room would individually agree, no one, not one person in this room can ever say what 

another nation thinks or is going to do. We can only do an assessment of what we have studied and, from that, what we can ascertain. 

But I think the purpose of this hearing is the to-do list for avoiding that, right? I mean, it is not for us to just conclude, we don’t 

have to worry about this. It is, what do we need to do? 

And I was very pleased with the Washington Post editorial today. 

The Washington Post editorial says an impasse with Iran—which 

is why this is so important we are doing it; it is even the lead editorial. And it says—it concludes with, ‘‘Israel may press for military action,’’ but it goes on to say—it concludes, ‘‘If that option is 
27 

to be resisted, there must be a credible and robust alternative.’’ 

And that is that issue of the to-do list. What do we have to do to 

make certain that they are deterred so that they don’t have to just 

merely be impacted by military action? 

Now, back to this issue of what they are doing. We can’t say 

what they are thinking. We can only say what they are doing in 

order to ascertain this to-do list. I am the chairman of Strategic 

Forces, and I know that—and I know the panelists know that Iran 

is pursuing vigorously missile technology. 

In the missile technology that they are pursuing, certainly it 

would lend itself to a belief that there are capabilities that they are 

seeking of ICBM. If they were to seek ICBM capability, wouldn’t 

be that be an indication that they are seeking a nuclear weapons 

program? Because you can’t have an ICBM that is just conventional for their program. 

Could you just talk for a moment about what we see them actually doing, not what we believe that they are doing, and how that 

goes directly to the imperative action that we take on our to-do 

list? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Let me say something. 

I mean, I think they are trying to develop nuclear weapons. I 

mean, I see them on a trajectory to get nuclear weapons—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But let me—oh, I am sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. What I would like you to do is put it for the 

record, please. Because there really isn’t—he used his whole time. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I think the answer we got, though, was 

pretty important, is that you do believe that they are seeking nuclear weapons. And so, if we could get the answers for the 

record—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. On a trajectory. 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. That would be really helpful. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you gentlemen for being here today. 

I understand that the organization is bipartisan, no question 

about that. It is bipartisan in terms of the politicians who founded 

it and those who speak for it, that is true. And whenever you have 

politics—and whenever you have politicians, you have politics. And 

I love politics. I am a politician myself. But I understand how it 

works. 

I am really skeptical about the timing of this report. It seems 

that it could have some effect in the upcoming political races 

around the country. And, you know, it really appears to me to have 

parallels with the run-up toward the invasion of Iraq, which, by the 

way, was they say now based on faulty intelligence, the decision to 

go in, based on faulty intelligence. 

What I am wondering is whether or not—or, really, what I am 

wondering is, what level of intelligence was used in coming to your 

conclusions in this report? 
28 

Either Mr. Robb or Mr. Rademaker. 

Mr. ROBB. Well, let me first of all say that I had a little something to do with examining the intelligence that led to the invasion 

in Iraq. Judge Silberman and I co-chaired the WMD [weapons of 

mass destruction] commission that explored the intelligence community in detail. 

This report, however, is not based on any classified information. 

It is based solely on open-source information, matters that have 

been reported, and, more importantly, on the expertise of the people who make up the various task forces. In this particular case, 

we have people who are very knowledgeable. 

Certainly, you have politicians in addition to many other subjectmatter experts and others who have something to contribute in a 

significant way. But to suggest that this was done for an election 

or whatever, I am showing you, three out of the four reports that 

preceded the last Presidential election, they have continued 

throughout. We have updated some of the information as it has become available. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, I am not accusing the—— 

Mr. ROBB. I just wanted to assure—— 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Organization of playing politics. I did 

not mean to do that, and I am sorry if I—— 

Mr. ROBB. No, I just wanted to make sure that there wasn’t any 

perception—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROBB [continuing]. On the part of anyone. But I accept 

your—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. But, you know, I mean—and I came into this with 

healthy skepticism because I do not want to see us proceed along 

a drumming—a tightening, you know, a louder drumming toward 

war. And I know that one of the things that you all talk about is 

the fact that, you know, diplomacy is not working and so, therefore, 

we need to start rattling the sword, the sabres, and we need to 

start showing more military preparation. And we already have substantial military assets that have been ratcheted up and are in 

place in the region, ready to strike if need be. 

These things are kind of—so when we start saying that diplomacy has failed—and, really, the Moscow talks right now are not— 

they have not failed. They are still discussing things. But it seems 

like you all are ratcheting up the pressure to force the President 

to make a move that even he with his military advisors and superior intelligence assets do not think is important right now. 

And this comes after the President has imposed sanctions that 

are unprecedented against Iran. Is that true? 

Mr. ROBB. We give the President full credit for what he has done, 

for his negotiations, for his diplomacy, for his increase in sanctions. 

What we are saying is, the bottom line is this hasn’t yet proven 

to be enough. While these discussions and negotiations have taken 

place, there has been no evidence that Iran is prepared to make 

any kind of good-faith effort to resolve this question. But they have 

continued to keep the centrifuges running. They have continued to 

increase their ability—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do they have a right to produce nuclear energy? 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 
29 

Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. This would be a question for the entire panel. Could 

you please provide some more specifics about America’s military capability that need to be enhanced and the benefit of increasing the 

United States Fifth Fleet presence in the region in order to address 

the Iranian problem? 

Mr. ROBB. I am sorry, I am just consulting because the question 

was so fast that I couldn’t pick it all up. But if the question is, do 

we believe that additional steps need to be taken in the course of 

this ongoing negotiation, the answer would be yes. 

Mr. BROOKS. No, no, I am talking about America’s military capability. I will reread the question, and I will go slower. 

Could you provide some more specifics about America’s military 

capabilities that need to be enhanced and the benefit of increasing 

the United States Fifth Fleet’s presence in the region? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Congressman, one of the contributions of the 

Bipartisan Policy Center to this debate was the publication of a 

paper that I think addresses that very question. So perhaps what 

we should do is submit that paper for the record, because it goes 

through in a more detailed fashion, outlining some of those steps. 

Mr. BROOKS. If you would do that, that would be appreciated. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 86.] 

Mr. BROOKS. And do any of you have a judgment as to how sequestration, which currently is scheduled to take effect on January 

1st of 2013, will affect the needed military capabilities to address 

the Iranian issue, if we get to that point? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, I think we have indicated that it will make it 

much more difficult. There is no question about that. And—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Is there some way you can quantify what you mean 

when you say ‘‘much more difficult’’? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, we have attempted to do that in the papers that 

we have discussed, although because sequestration was not an 

issue earlier on, it is not addressed in a straightforward way. But 

there is no question that you can’t cut down significantly in all of 

the elements of force that are necessary to carry out our responsibilities in this area and elsewhere around the world without severe strain. 

When you start talking about taking 80,000 troops in the Army 

and the Marine Corps, or taking the level down by that much, you 

are making a significant reduction in your capability and your ability to rotate, et cetera. To the extent that you cancel weapons systems or reduce the number of individual weapons that you buy or 

other units that you buy, you are clearly putting additional stress. 

Almost everything that Congress does, that the President does 

has to do with tradeoffs and choices. And what we are doing is 

pointing out that we can’t let those kinds of challenges completely 

undermine our ability to thwart what could be a far more disastrous consequence if Iran were to achieve the nuclear weapons capability which they seek and we are unable to provide credible evidence of our ability to follow up on what we say we are going to 

do. 

So, sure, it is a tremendous challenge that we face. But we can’t, 

simply because we have a significant possibility of serious reduc-
30 

tions in many areas, abandon the need for eternal vigilance in this 

area. 

Mr. BROOKS. Let me make a statement, then I would like your 

reaction to it. If you agree with it, that is fine. If you disagree with 

it, that is fine. But you have greater insight than I do, so it would 

be beneficial for the record to have your reaction. 

If sequestration takes effect, that is going to adversely affect our 

military. We have had some judgments in the neighborhood of 

700,000 fewer uniformed personnel, DOD [Department of Defense], 

civilian support workers, private-sector and military support personnel. 

Right now our military capability has a twofold positive in this 

issue. One is it creates a credible deterrent. We have the military 

capability in the eyes of the Iranians, so they have to consider that. 

Second, if the Iranians actually get to the point of developing nuclear weapons and it is in the United States’ interest to stop that 

development, we have the capability to succeed in stopping Iranian 

acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

However, if sequestration goes into effect, then we have decreased our capability and decreased our deterrence and, in fact, 

have actually increased the probability that Iran will be able to acquire nuclear weapons and use them as they wish. What is your 

reaction to that? 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. If you could 

please answer that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think we agree. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Maybe not completely. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here on a serious topic. 

I appreciate the fact that my colleague is asking the question, 

but I think we have to put that in a context—this isn’t the place 

to necessarily do that—in terms of how we face the challenges that 

we see, whether it is in the military or whether it is in other aspects of our economy and, certainly, of the services that our people 

anticipate and know that exist here in this country. 

I wanted to go back to the discussion of the Fifth Fleet and 

whether or not we would need to preposition additional resources 

from CENTCOM [Central Command] in that area. I think I was 

hearing that you thought that would be a good thing. And that 

raises the question of whether or not you feel that we have sufficient resources to surge forces in the area if we needed them, or 

you felt that we needed to bring those resources into the area today 

or, you know, down the line and take them away from other areas 

where I think that the Pentagon has decided those resources really 

need to be. 

Are you suggesting a prepositioning, or are you suggesting at 

some point that might be something that we need to look at? 

Mr. ROBB. I think most of that question was answered in response to a previous question, but what we are trying to do is to 

illuminate some of the things that the United States can do to increase its ability and credibility to respond if necessary. And there 
31 

are always going to be some tradeoffs. We are not trying to proscribe that you put two more DDGs [guided missile destroyers], X 

number of whatever in a particular area. We are saying, these are 

things you can do to make the argument that we are making more 

credible. 

And the credibility, if it doesn’t have evidence of capability, is not 

going to be increased. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. Are you suggesting, though, that that would 

be an additional deterrence? Does Iran really need more from us 

that would suggest that we need to have more deterrence? 

Mr. ROBB. With all due respect, what we are trying to say is that 

we need to be credible in our ability to use kinetic force, if necessary, to thwart the Iranian quest to achieve nuclear weapons capability. And that is really what it amounts to. 

And we are not suggesting that there are not very difficult 

choices that are going to have to be made with respect to weapons 

systems, weapons, et cetera, manpower, whatever the case may be, 

but that we need to focus on creating an understanding in the eyes 

particularly of the Iranians, but also the Israelis, the rest of the 

neighbors, and the international community, that if we say we are 

serious, we are, in fact, serious and that we are not reducing our 

capability at the same time that we are suggesting that we are serious. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. But you are acknowledging there is tremendous capability in the region today. 

Mr. ROBB. Oh, yes, there is no question about the fact that— 

there is no nation on Earth that has the kind of capability that we 

have in all regions of the world. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that because—— 

Mr. ROBB. Okay. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. It came across a little differently. Thank 

you. I appreciate that. 

I think we also know that there are possibilities of Iran having 

biological weapons. There are ways in which they leverage proxy 

groups. Your focus today, I appreciate that, is on the nuclear, but 

I wondered if you wanted to comment on that, and Mr. Albright as 

well, if you wanted to say anything regarding those issues and how 

important that is for us to have that understanding as well. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Maybe I will just make one comment quickly 

and then turn it over to David. 

The question was asked earlier about the potential of an Iranian 

ICBM threat and what could we confer from that. And I don’t think 

any of us have access to current intelligence on what exactly Iran 

is doing in the missile area except we know that they consistently 

sought missiles with increasingly greater ranges. 

But the question was, if they are seeking an ICBM, what can we 

confer about their nuclear weapons or other WMD intentions? And 

I think the answer to that is, it would make no sense for Iran to 

pursue an ICBM unless they intended to mount either a nuclear 

weapon or a biological weapon, potentially a chemical weapon, but 

a weapon of mass destruction, because the accuracy of their ICBMs 

would be such that a conventional warhead would make no sense 

on that kind of weapons systems for them. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 
32 

Mrs. Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your testimony. This has been really important today and, obviously, very timely for all of us. And so we 

appreciate your time today. 

Of course, it has already been mentioned that Iran announced 

yesterday its plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine. And so 

my question would be, based on your information, does it have the 

ability to build the atomic sub? And if so, what would be the significance both as an offensive platform as well as its ability to disrupt the maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz? 

So, you know, is this—or the alternative being, is this plan simply just refining—to justify refining uranium to higher levels? 

And all of you or any one of you can respond. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I don’t think they can build a nuclear-powered 

submarine. I mean, Brazil has been trying since the 1980s to do 

it. So I think it is more posturing on their part to send their own 

types of messages. They are struggling to build a reactor on land. 

To try to put one in a submarine is a much more challenging feat. 

Now, one thing—they may be trying to signal to higher enrichment levels, but there is no need for higher enrichment levels in 

a nuclear-powered submarine. I mean, the United States uses 90- 

, 97-, 98-percent enriched uranium in its. The French use low-enriched uranium. The Brazilians, if they ever build one, are going 

to be using low-enriched uranium. 

So one thing that certainly needs to be said is that a nuclearpowered submarine provides no justification for producing highly 

enriched uranium. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I would simply add to that, though, it provides 

no necessary justification, but I do worry, personally, that Iran for 

a long time has been seeking pretexts to enrich to higher levels. I 

believe their enrichment to 20 percent is based fundamentally on 

a pretext that they have a medical research reactor that requires 

it, and they are producing vastly more 20-percent enriched uranium than that reactor will ever require. And I think that is the 

proof that they are proceeding on the basis of a pretext. 

I think there is every reason to think that, just as we sit among 

ourselves and ask how can we pressure the Iranians, let’s do more 

in the area of sanctions, let’s do more on the military option, in 

Tehran they are doing the same thing. They are saying, okay, how 

do we pressure the—their strategy isn’t, okay, how do we hunker 

down and withstand American sanctions? Their strategy is, what 

can we do to pressure them back? 

Mrs. ROBY. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Enriching to 20 percent I think has proven to 

be a very effective way for them to pressure us back. If they can 

come up with a peaceful, that is to say non-weapons, rationale for 

enriching to even higher levels than 20 percent, that will turn the 

pressure up on us to even greater levels. 

So the fact that American nuclear submarines use highly enriched uranium as their fuel potentially would be all the justification they would need if they ostensibly were embarked on a nuclear 

submarine program; to say, well, they need the same type of fuel 
33 

that the Americans have, and therefore that is why they are now 

enriching to 90 percent. 

Now, of course, 90-percent enriched uranium also is weaponsgrade and could potentially have a non-peaceful use. But if they 

are searching for justifications to do this in order to pressure us, 

I worry that this—— 

Mrs. ROBY. That would be a good one. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. Nuclear submarine—because I 

agree with David. Realistically, they are decades away from being 

able to do that. If they announced they have already begun producing the fuel for it, to me, that is a very troubling sign. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah. And just to emphasize, I mean, I think people, when we were engaged in these debates, said they would never 

move to make 20-percent enriched uranium. It just isn’t conceivable. 

Mrs. ROBY. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And so they did. So I think it is a very big concern that they will try to find a way to make highly enriched uranium. 

And so I think the—but it raises one of the more troubling scenarios or pathways to the bomb which really no one has an answer 

to. Thank God it is slow-moving, but it really is what we call at 

ISIS [Institute for Science and International Security] in our reports ‘‘cheating in plain sight,’’ where they will just move to—they 

won’t even bother to break out. They will just move to find a justification to make highly enriched uranium—— 

Mrs. ROBY. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. First maybe, whatever, 30 percent, 

50 percent, and then just try to work their way up the ladder. And 

it is one of the more perplexing problems to deal with. 

Mrs. ROBY. Very quickly, does Iran have the ability to strike the 

United States on our own soil? And if so, how? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, through terrorist means. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, sure. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I don’t think they have a means to attack us. Certainly, even if they developed a nuclear explosive device, they 

would be a long way from being able to attack us with that. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Delivery would be the problem with a nuclear 

weapon. But, you know, through terrorist groups or loaded on a 

ship. 

Mrs. ROBY. Sure. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. But attacking us with a missile, I don’t think 

that is within their capability currently. 

Mr. ROBB. I think it is generally agreed that there is very little 

likelihood that they would attempt to launch from their own soil 

or in a way that could be directly attributed to them any kind of 

a weapon of mass destruction to the United States. 

Mrs. ROBY. And that goes to whether they have the will to do 

it. And my time has expired. Thank you so much. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your presentations here today and 

for your leadership. 
34 

I am one of those that would like to get an assessment on the 

limited strike efforts. 

Mr. Rademaker, in reading through your report, I find it difficult 

to believe that a surgical strike alone would somehow be sufficient 

to prevent Iran from continuing its nuclear enrichment efforts. Do 

you think a surgical strike is sufficient? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The military option is not a particularly satisfying option. It affords no permanent solution to the problem, and 

I think that is what your question gets at. It would buy time. 

And, you know, I think what President Obama means when he 

says, ‘‘All options are on the table,’’ what he means is, if the only 

way we can—if diplomacy has failed and nothing else is working 

and they are about to get a nuclear weapon, then we are going to 

buy time through a military strike. And I think our recommendation is that that is right, but the problem at the moment is the Iranians don’t really believe that that military option is available or 

seriously contemplated by the United States. And so we are recommending measures to eliminate doubts that the Iranians might 

have that that is a serious option. 

But I think your question gets to the issue of, through military 

force alone, you know, short of an invasion, an occupation of the 

country, can we be satisfied that a precise air operation that takes 

out the Natanz facility, the Fordow facility, that that will solve the 

Iranian nuclear problem? And of course it won’t, because Iran has 

an uranium-enrichment-based program, and today they manufacture the centrifuges. They have the blueprints, they have the manufacturing capability. So we can destroy all the centrifuges they 

have, but they can make more, they can stand them up again. 

So, I mean, if you game this out, if we end up relying on military 

force to solve this problem, probably we buy a year or two, but then 

after that, if the program is back where it was before, then potentially we have to use military force again. 

That is why it is not anyone’s preferred solution to the problem. 

The preferred solution is diplomacy that achieves suspension of 

Iran’s enrichment capability, as the U.N. Security Council has demanded. And that is what we all hope to see. Our recommendation 

is that more be done to strengthen sanctions, more be done to 

strengthen the credibility of the military option, in hopes that collectively those kinds of measures will increase the prospects for diplomacy to succeed. 

Mr. ROBB. If I might just add—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Yes, go ahead, Senator Robb. 

Mr. ROBB. One of the—— 

Ms. SPEIER. I have very little time, so—— 

Mr. ROBB. Okay. 

One of the objectives here is to continue to increase the sanctions 

to the point that, at some point, although it is very unlike to occur 

through direct negotiations, that whoever is in charge at that particular time in Iran will come to the conclusion that it is in our best 

interest to suspend an attempt to get a nuclear weapons capability 

and that the pressure that would—the political pressure inside the 

country would be so great, or the other consequences that would 

take place, that they would simply, instead of negotiating, would 

change their course of action and that the United States could then 
35 

slow down, or if they rolled back, then the United States could roll 

back sanctions. 

But until that time occurs, we want to continue to increase the 

pressure with sanctions to continue to tighten the noose so that 

they will ultimately conclude that it is in their long-term best interest to adopt a different course of action. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And let me just add—can I? 

Ms. SPEIER. Please, go ahead, Mr. Albright. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. There is no magic strike that is going to solve this 

problem. But there is also time now to consider, you know, if military options are being thought about, how do they fit into an overall strategy to keep Iran from getting nuclear weapons? And there 

is going to have to be something the day after, and that is going 

to be an incredibly important part of this. 

There is also time to look further at how do you stop them from 

getting nuclear weapons through non-military means? And I think 

the leak in The Washington Post today—and, again, I am against 

all leaks, but one thing it did do is it sent a signal to Iran that, 

you know, you better worry, we are in all your computers, and we 

can turn on your cameras and we can turn on the microphones. 

And it is a signal that says, look, don’t even try something secret. 

Now, again, that is an exaggerated example, but there is a whole 

range of things going on—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. That could be expanded that are nonmilitary, essentially. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would just like to make a couple points. 

One is, Iran is the second-largest country in the Middle East, if 

I am not mistaken, size-wise, geographically. And I guess my question is, what is the minimum number of facilities that we would 

strike if we went in? And how far are those facilities apart? Is that 

something that can be discussed in this forum? 

Mr. ROBB. I was going to say, this is not the proper—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Mr. ROBB [continuing]. Forum for a discussion of targeting. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. We will leave it at that. But I do think that 

the geographical size of the country leaves some question. 

Mr. ROBB. In a very general sense, that is one of the reasons that 

we are recommend that additional KC–135s be supplied, so that 

the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROBB [continuing]. Credibility of the Israeli response to 

crossing a red line that they have laid down would be taken more 

seriously. Because you do have very significant distances, and the 

ability to strike and return without refuelers is very much in question. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. And we as a country cannot expect Israel 

to take this challenge on by themselves. We have got to stand by 

them. They are our true ally over there. 

I guess I say that to get to this next point. You have the U.S., 

you have Britain, you have France, you have Germany, and you 
36 

have Russia and China all engaging in the talks right now in Moscow, if I am correct. If those countries can’t influence Iran, who can 

have any influence on Iran? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, they have influence on Iran. I mean, Iran 

would, I think, be much further along on nuclear weapons if that 

influence hadn’t been exerted. And so I think there is a lot going 

on beyond the negotiations to slow them down and deter them from 

breaking out. So I think a lot is going on. Now—— 

Mr. SCOTT. We are not just trying to slow them down, though. 

We are trying to stop them. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No, that is right. And that is right, and that is 

the goal. Or prevent them, I mean, if they do make the break. 

But I think the expectation is that more pressure will be applied, 

that sanctions—from what I understand, the U.S. Congress is masters at developing sanctions on Iran. And I would expect more. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think, Congressman, my personal belief is 

that, if all those countries you named made this their highest priority and brought to bear, as President Obama said the United 

States would do, all elements of their national power to make sure 

Iran changed course, I think collectively those nations could succeed. The problem is that, even though they are engaged diplomatically, not all of those countries are using all elements of their national power to persuade the Iranians to change course. 

I mean, it is wonderful that on July 1st a European Union oil 

embargo is going to go into effect. But, you know, why is it, you 

know, the summer of 2012 before that has happened? Because in 

Europe there has been hesitation up until now to accept the economic costs that come from imposing that oil embargo. Now, thank 

goodness they have made the decision to move forward with that, 

but it is awfully late in coming. 

At the U.N. Security Council, there is certainly more that could 

be done against Iran—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me—— 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. But Russia and China have used 

their veto—— 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Interrupt, if I could, because I am down 

to a minute and a half. I apologize. 

They border seven countries, the Caspian Sea, and the Gulf of 

Oman. They share the Caspian Sea with Russia. I, quite honestly, 

think their nuclear threat is much greater to other countries than 

it is to the United States. And I have no doubt that if they get a 

weapon, they can get it out of that country and then probably into 

wherever they want. 

But there is a difference in talking and taking action. Would 

Russia and China, while they are willing to engage in talks, support the United States in an action that actually stopped the construction of a nuclear weapon in Iran? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, obviously, if Russia and China were to be in full 

agreement, this whole discussion would probably be moot. The 

problem is that there are ongoing relationships with both countries 

that would be put in jeopardy by their taking a more aggressive 

stance. And so in the U.N. Security Council, the resolutions that 

actually get passed tend to be less intimidating toward Iran than 

the ones that—if you had those two superpowers in sync with the 
37 

United States in terms of their understanding of the risks that a 

nuclear-capable Iran poses to the region and to the international 

community, we wouldn’t probably be having this hearing today. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Robb, thank you for you and General Wald’s continued 

attention to this issue and the work that you did. We shamelessly 

used it to introduce legislation to try to augment this effort to 

make sure that anyone who is even looking at all could see that 

we are serious about a military option, that we have the resources 

in place and the training and all of those other kinds of things. 

Mr. ROBB. We noticed, and we thank you. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Your written testimony added some additional 

specificity to some of that. And we don’t need to go through what 

it is, but is there something that—you talked about additional surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarines, prepositioning the strategic 

bombers from Diego Garcia. 

Is there something that has happened since your original report 

that led you to put this additional specificity in your written comments today, or is it more of the same? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, you always look to what you have, what assets 

you have in place and whether or not they appear to be sufficient 

to fulfill whatever mission they are designed to support. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Well, I do think that your work is helping continue to put a time-is-of-the-essence kind of cloak on all of 

this. Some of the comments on the other side I have disagreed with 

this morning, in which they seem to take a little more innocent 

view that this thing can be solved. 

All of us hold certain truths or certain ideas that we are willing 

to die for, willing to absorb just incredible deprivations in order to 

stick to those convictions. Is the idea of a nuclear power, a nuclear 

weapon of such a national identity for the Persians in Iran that it 

is one of those things that, at the end of the day, they are just simply never going to give that up no matter what we do to them? 

Mr. ROBB. Well, I don’t believe that the position of the international community is that it is an absolutely hopeless cause, if 

that is what you are—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, no, we will continue to sanction and we will 

continue in the military option. We will stop them, ideally, from 

getting one. 

But the idea that they would voluntarily give up this quest and 

the impact it has on their international standing, you know, at any 

point in time does anybody realistically think that—I mean, I am 

pro-life, and I am not giving that up, period, no matter what you 

do to me. I am a Christian. Jesus Christ is my personal savior. I 

am not giving that up for anything. That is one of those core beliefs. 

Is the core belief that they want a nuclear weapon, is it such a 

core belief with them that—and, as Rademaker said earlier, we 

can—I mean, the military option only takes it out for a short period 

of time—will they ever really give this up? Or is it just in the leadership, and the people themselves are not really that keen on it? 
38 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yeah, I don’t see a united regime on that. I think 

we have seen constituencies, I mean, more the technical side, that 

appear to really want nuclear weapons. There are other constituencies that have questions about that. So I don’t think they are 

united on the value of having nuclear weapons. I mean, I think 

they are only united on the desire to have the capability to do that. 

And I think they can—they may make a different decision down 

the road. Also, there may be personnel changes at the top of the 

whole hierarchy that could lead to a different decision. There are 

forces that do—you know, don’t just want to be an isolated pariah 

state. So I think it is very hard to—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, all that is pretty obvious to us, and it ought 

to be pretty obvious to them. And most of us operate on the 

premise that we operate in our own best interests. These folks appear to be going counter to operating in their own best interests, 

because of the sanctions that have been put in place and are about 

to be put in place, all those kinds of things, and yet, they are really 

pretty recalcitrant about making—— 

Mr. ROBB. But that is the point of continuing to increase the 

sanctions. At some point, it is at least my personal belief that the 

powers that be in Tehran will come to the conclusion that it is in 

their long-term and short-term best interests to adopt a different 

course of action. 

I don’t think they are going to—you used the word ‘‘voluntarily.’’ 

I don’t think anyone suggests they are going to voluntarily abandon 

the quest to be a nuclear-capable nation. They want to be in that 

club. And that is a pretty widely held view in the various factions 

that are identifiable inside Iran. 

But they are ultimately pragmatists, as most—even the leaders 

in other countries that appear to be irrational, at some point there 

is an element of pragmatism that comes in. And it is our hope that 

at some point that will permeate the thinking and they will arrange—I don’t think it will come through a negotiated settlement. 

I think that they will take some action that causes the international community to say, we have accomplished our goal. We no 

longer feel as threatened. We are going to have to be eternally vigilant, but we don’t have to continue to increase the capability and/ 

or the threat of taking military action. 

And if, in fact, they go through with the exercise which has been 

offered, that they export all of their HEU, et cetera, and give intrusive 24/7 inspections, then the international community, certainly 

the United States, would be in a position then, and only then, to 

begin to roll back some of the sanctions and allow Iran to come into 

the world community as a credible player rather than a pariah 

state. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, again, thanks you for your work on this, and 

I hope you are spot-on right. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you very much for your testimony. I think 

this discussion has been very helpful. 

And I think where Iran is at right now is that, as you said, Mr. 

Albright, they would like to be nuclear-weapons-capable because of 

the credibility it gives them. They would also like to not be a pa-
39 

riah state, and I think that is what makes them different from 

North Korea. I mean, North Korea was a pariah state, has been 

for a while. They didn’t care. There was really nothing we could do 

to them. They starve 2 million of their people every year. They did 

that before they had a nuclear weapon, and they keep doing it. 

The hope with Iran is, given Iran’s, you know, centuries of history and at different times being a relatively prominent player on 

at least the regional if not the global stage, they don’t want to be 

a pariah state. And right now they are trying to figure out how to 

have their cake and eat it too. This is what they are trying to figure out. 

And what we have to make plain to them is that the cost is 

going—you will be a pariah state if you don’t take a step back. 

Now, as you have all described very well, that is easier said than 

done, but I think that is what our policy goal has to be. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We have had a wide-ranging discussion. And I am thinking of 

one of the points that Mr. Turner was making, that if somebody 

tuned in at some point, we would be talking about lots of different 

actions that we would take against Iran for various things depending on how they are moving along on something that we really 

don’t know. We think we know, we hope we know, but we can 

never know totally what they are doing. 

What I would like to ask, to kind of bring this back to the whole 

purpose of this hearing, is, what do you believe are the strategic 

consequences, what would they be for the United States and for our 

allies if Iran were to achieve a nuclear weapon capability? 

Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chairman, we lay out what we believe are the 

strategic consequences in—really, in each of the papers, but the 

most recent one, in ‘‘Stopping the Clock,’’ we list a number of activities. 

Certainly, you have—the immediate neighborhood is going to feel 

compelled to take up its own nuclear programs, and so you are 

going to have a proliferation that would take place in the immediate community. You are going to have a great deal of interruption 

in terms of the international energy supply, given the fact that so 

much of the world’s petroleum passes through the Strait of 

Hormuz, et cetera. 

You are going to have an instability which will be exacerbated 

beyond anything we are experiencing right now in terms of the 

economy. Most of Europe is very much on the edge right now. The 

United States is attempting to keep from being drawn into that 

same type of economic collapse that is occurring state by state in 

the European Union right now. 

All of these consequences are going to be enormous and are going 

to put any chance for a peaceful resolution of the long-term interest 

of both the United States and the other major powers in that region at risk for a very long period of time. And the cost in individual lives and treasure would be enormous. 

It just—it is one of those situations where the status quo, if you 

can’t—or if you have to choose between the near-term costs of depriving Iran of a nuclear capability and the long-term costs of al-
40 

lowing them to have it, it is not a difficult choice. I think that is 

probably—I probably ought to leave it. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can think of no positive consequences of Iranian achievement of nuclear weapons capability or Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon. 

Senator Robb has pointed to one of the most serious consequences, which would be the unravelling of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as other countries felt threatened by the Iranian nuclear capability and felt they needed to take steps to protect 

themselves. 

Another very important and very dire consequence that I will 

highlight is the fact that Iran is already the world’s most active 

supporter of international terrorism. And they act in a very unrestrained way already when it comes to promoting international terrorism. I personally believe that one of the attractions to the Iranian regime of having nuclear weapons is that it would increase 

their ability to proceed recklessly in the promotion of terrorism in 

their region and internationally. 

If you take what happened in 2006 in Lebanon as an example, 

there was an escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, which is an 

Iranian-backed terrorist group, in Lebanon. And it escalated. 

Iran—I am sorry, Israel sent forces into southern Lebanon. 

Hezbollah started firing increasingly long-range missiles at Israel. 

Those missiles were provided by Iran. But Iran had to be restrained in the degree of support it provided to Hezbollah because 

there was always the risk that Israel might ultimately hold Iran 

accountable and undertake some military action against Iran. 

I believe one of the reasons Iran would like nuclear weapons is 

they believe that if they had such weapons in a scenario like that, 

Israel would essentially lose that option. They would become fearful of using military force against the sponsor of these terrorist 

groups. And, as a result, Iran could be much more unrestrained in 

the level of support that it gave to such groups. 

And that is just one particular example, but I think worldwide 

you would see them feeling that they had a nuclear shield behind 

which they could hide and behave in an increasingly reckless manner in their support for international terrorism. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I also view Iran with nuclear weapons as a very 

grave strategic threat to the United States. 

I would distinguish between having a nuclear weapons capability, which I would judge they have now, and we are living with 

it. So, I mean, we perceive it as particularly a threat if they cross 

the line and have nuclear weapons. What we have been talking 

about is if they seek those weapons, then we are going to try to 

stop them. 

Now, I think to be fair, though, I mean, it is—I think we need 

to start to consider, what if all this doesn’t work out well? And I 

don’t want to in any way encourage that as a policy, but I do think 

we need to start thinking through this. What if Iran does get nuclear weapons, you know, 2 or 3 years from now, and it is in the 

range of time that we are worried about, is we wake up and there 

has just been a nuclear test by Iran? 

And so I think while the policy should remain on preventing Iran 

from getting nuclear weapons, I do believe we need to start think-
41 

ing through, what if they do? Because you just heard why that 

world is going to be so dangerous. But, unfortunately, if they do, 

we are still going to have to live in it. And we need to think 

through what are the U.S. responses to that world, while at the 

same time—again, I want to emphasize—not changing our current 

policy to prevent Iran from getting there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is an interesting idea. But our policy 

is based on what the Senator and Mr. Rademaker say. They gave 

some pretty positive reasons why it would be detrimental to society 

if they had nuclear weapons. And—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I agree with that. And I agree with that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Then our policy probably shouldn’t change. 

Our policy is that they do not—that we do everything possible to 

make sure that they do not get that capability. And that, I think, 

is the whole purpose of this hearing, is to strengthen that and to 

make sure that we have the capability to make sure that we don’t 

have to change that policy. Because I think that if we back off from 

the policy that they do not attain nuclear capability, then the overall threat to the world is something we do not want to even contemplate. 

We realize that there are other countries around the world that 

have nuclear abilities, but none of them have expressed the bellicose nature of Iran as far as supporting terrorism and other things. 

And in that particular neighborhood, it could be unsettling for the 

whole world forever. 

And I think that this has been a good hearing. I appreciate you 

being here. I appreciate the work that you are doing on this. And 

I think that we need to move forward sustaining that policy and 

do whatever we can to support whoever the President is in making 

sure that we have the means necessary to make sure that that policy stays in place. 

Thank you very much. 

And that concludes this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 20, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 20, 2012 

(47) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge: 

Understanding the Military Options 

June 20, 2012 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony from experts on the nuclear challenge from Iran. The expert panel includes former Senator Charles Robb, a task force cochair of the National Security Project with the Bipartisan Policy 

Center; Mr. Stephen Rademaker, a task force member of the National Security Project with the Bipartisan Policy Center; and Mr. 

David Albright, the President of the Institute for Science and International Security. Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today. 

The Iranian nuclear program is among the most complex foreign 

policy and national security challenges that the United States faces 

today. Intensive diplomatic and economic steps focused on Iran’s 

nuclear program have been undertaken over the last decade to dissuade Iran from pursuing a military nuclear program. Unfortunately, it does not appear that these efforts have succeeded in convincing the Iranian Government to abandon its military nuclear 

ambitions. 

The United States’ stated policy remains that Iran should not 

possess a nuclear weapon, as reflected by President Obama’s recent 

comments in which he stated: ‘‘I think both the Iranian and the 

Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it 

is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what 

we say.’’ Moreover, President Obama has explicitly declared that 

his administration would use force—a ‘‘military component’’—as a 

last resort to prevent Tehran from acquiring a bomb. However, this 

message has not always been consistent—across administrations— 

and unfortunately it is not clear that the Iranian regime is deterred by such statements. 

I personally agree that all elements of national power should be 

brought to bear to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

I certainly recognize that no military operation is without risk. But 

given the fact that the President has stated that military option 

may have to be utilized to thwart Iran from obtaining a nuclear 

weapon, it is the committee’s responsibility to ensure that the military option is credible. 

Moreover, any consideration of U.S. military response to Iran’s 

nuclear developments requires rigorous and thoughtful evaluation, 

which is why are holding this hearing today. If diplomacy and eco-
48 

nomic sanctions fail to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon 

capability, then a military option may be the only recourse. Therefore, it is critical to rigorously study and understand all facets of 

any military option, including how it supports our vital national security interests, its potential for effectiveness, its risks, Iran’s potential responses, the implications for the region. Likewise, effective military capability in the region could be a useful deterrent 

and improve regional stability, negating the need for a military 

strike. 

Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before the committee today. 

I look forward to your testimony and insights into the nuclear challenge from Iran. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 20, 2012 

(85) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. Regarding your question about the effect of defense cuts on the credibility of the U.S. military option, there’s no question sequestration presents enormous challenges to U.S. military forces, and that’s one of the 

reasons it’s especially important right now that we not appear to relax our guard 

or our apparent willingness to follow through with a military option in the event 

it becomes necessary. The United States has already undermined its credibility 

when it comes to preventing a nuclear-capable Iran; haphazard defense cuts like the 

sequester will only exacerbate the perception—in Tehran and among our own allies—that the credibility of U.S. commitments is declining. In reference to your 

question about potential tradeoffs between augmenting U.S. Fifth Fleet and Air 

Force capacity on the one hand, and the DOD Strategic Guidance’s emphasis on rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region on the other, the sequester will affect both 

by forcing the military to either rely on older existing weapons systems or make do 

with fewer of the new capabilities the Pentagon deems necessary. That being said, 

Iran’s continued progress toward nuclear weapons capability is the most immediate 

national security challenge facing the United States. Potential threats to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region are less pressing and/or of lower magnitude; this realignment of U.S. global force posture is a grand strategic shift that will occur over 

the medium-to-long-term, while Iran’s rapid recent advances means time is running 

out. Dealing with the Iranian threat must take precedence over the serious, but 

more gradual, changes required to address threats in the Asia-Pacific region. This 

applies both to augmenting U.S. naval and air capabilities in the Middle East, and 

to prepositioning supplies in that region (these supplies could be transferred to AsiaPacific later). 

Moreover, many of the measures we recommend in a BPC task force paper to augment U.S. Fifth Fleet and Air Force capacity can be accomplished by reprogramming funds in the FY2011 Omnibus Spending Bill, instead of drawing funds from 

the military’s priorities for FY2012 and FY 2013 spending. In fact, some of these 

measures—such as strengthening mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities in the 

region—are already being undertaken. 

Regarding your question about leaks, leaks about capabilities, plans and other activities that might be under consideration ought to be avoided at all costs. They 

don’t help the United States in any way, shape or form. [See page 23.] 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 23.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 27.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. ROBB. The arbitrary nature of sequestration will hurt the U.S. military’s ability to fulfill its missions, including providing a credible deterrent to aggression from 

a range of threats. However, the United States lacks the key elements of a successful containment strategy for dealing with Iran if and when it gains nuclear-weapons 

capability: credibility; robust, reliable and coordinated allies; and a deterrable 

enemy. U.S. credibility is hampered by the lack of certain response—officials from 

successive Administrations have failed to punish Iranian transgressions of previous 

redlines, including converting yellowcake into uranium and spinning new centrifuges. Imagining a nuclear-capable Iran presupposes that Tehran has crossed an 

even more significant line in the sand. Furthermore, Washington has repeatedly 

downplayed the viability of the U.S. military option. Thus Tehran has little reason 

to believe the United States would punish aggression by Iran if the latter had the 

cover of a nuclear capability or weapon. 
86 

The United States also lacks reliable allies to help deter a nuclear-capable Iran. 

With the exception of Israel, U.S. Middle Eastern allies are not strong enough to 

deter aggression with any certainty. Furthermore, the United States cannot bolster 

its credibility or compensate for weak allies by creating tripwires to trigger automatic responses to Iranian aggression, especially if U.S. forces pivot away from 

ground units in the Middle East to naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Finally, the messianic leadership of the Islamic Republic may not be ideological 

to the point of national suicide, but historically it has pursued expansive regional 

aspirations. These have proven difficult enough to contain even when Iran lacked 

a nuclear deterrent and its regime was not dominated by hardliners. Moreover, the 

intentions and motivations of the Iranian regime—especially those individuals in 

charge of any nuclear weapons—remain opaque to the United States. 

Regarding your question about the sequester’s effect on a U.S. military option, 

there’s no question that you can’t cut down significantly in all of the elements of 

force that are necessary to carry out our responsibilities in this area and elsewhere 

around the world without severe strain. Because the current and previous Administrations have used the word ‘‘unacceptable’’ to describe a nuclear Iran, U.S. credibility is now at stake—this implies a red line requiring the United States to either 

take military action or lose credibility. Sequestration could undermine perceptions 

of U.S. resolve in addition to cutting forces and spending, and thus damage credibility. [See page 30.] 

Mr. RADEMAKER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 29.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 20, 2012 

(89) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you view Iran’s recent announcement that they are pursuing 

development of a nuclear submarine as a complicating factor to international efforts 

to constrain Iran’s highly enriched uranium production? 

Mr. ROBB. I would echo Mr. Rademaker’s comment that Iran has sought pretexts 

to enrich uranium to higher levels for a long time, and I don’t see how developing 

a nuclear-powered submarine provides such a justification. Tehran’s announcement 

does point to a larger issue we cover in our report, which is Iran’s long history of 

acting inimically to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In addition to its opposition 

to the Middle East peace process and support for terrorism and proxy warfare 

across the region, Iran is actively pursuing naval and ballistic missile capabilities 

to threaten U.S. forces and allies. Announcing plans to develop a nuclear-powered 

submarine could perhaps been seen as a longer-term aspect of this military buildup. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Any potential military action would of course not occur in a vacuum, but would greatly affect an extremely complex geopolitical situation in the 

broader region. How might a strike affect our work with nations such as Russia and 

China in other areas—for example, the conflict in Syria? Can you walk us through 

the ramifications of a strike on Iran for our allies in the region—most specifically, 

Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq? 

Mr. ROBB. While Syria is a concern, the BPC Iran Initiative (which I co-chair) has 

not addressed the potential effects of the military option on such issues. 

In reference to your question about the ramifications of a strike on Iran for our 

regional allies, our BPC Iran Initiative has discussed the potential consequences in 

our 2010 and 2012 reports on Iran’s nuclear program. While it would be difficult 

to predict accurately the specific outcomes of any strike, Iran could retaliate by attempting to attack Persian Gulf energy installations or fulfill its threat to close the 

Strait of Hormuz. These actions would imperil Iraq and our GCC allies. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might also attempt to unleash its proxy 

forces—most worryingly, Lebanese Hezbollah—against Israel and other U.S. regional allies. There would be the potential for any such conflict to spill over to Jordan, Turkey and elsewhere in the region. This could be aggravated by the instability 

in Syria, which is Iran’s main Arab state ally and Tehran’s primary lifeline to 

Hezbollah. 

In the immediate aftermath of a strike, U.S. policymakers would have to make 

crystal clear that the United States will stand by our regional allies in any conflict 

with Iran. The Pentagon should augment its military capabilities in the region— 

particularly air and naval forces—to protect the Strait of Hormuz, reassure allies 

and prevent or respond to Iranian retaliation. The President would also need to 

make clear to the world that Iran’s actions have been in longstanding violation of 

United Nations resolutions and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 

Beyond managing a post-strike crisis, Washington would need to work with these 

allies to strengthen their defenses against possible Iranian and/or proxy counterattacks. U.S. policymakers should also be prepared to release oil from the Strategic 

Petroleum Reserve (SPR), work closely with Saudi Arabia to produce more oil and 

cooperate with regional allies to ensure maximum possible oil exports through the 

Persian Gulf, Turkey or the Red Sea. 

These costs—of a strike and its aftermath—must be weighed against the costs of 

living with a nuclear-capable Iran. A nuclear-capable Iran would threaten U.S. and 

regional security and set off a proliferation cascade across the Middle East. Iran and 

Israel would be locked into an unstable confrontation resembling a perpetual Cuban 

Missile Crisis. Iran would be in a position to transfer nuclear materials to its terrorist proxies, threaten Israel’s existence, embolden radicals, increase its opposition 

to the Middle East peace process and destabilize moderate Arab regimes. It would 

also seek to dominate the energy-rich Persian Gulf emirates and OPEC, which 

would heighten the risk to secure oil supplies. This would have serious negative implications for the U.S. economy: every $10 rise in annual oil prices equates to a 

nearly 0.5 percent decline in U.S. GDP. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you know, additional U.S. sanctions are scheduled to go into 

place on June 28th, targeted against Iran’s central bank, and an EU oil embargo 
90 

will begin on July 1st. It is reasonable to assume that these sanctions will compound the difficulties experienced by the Iranian regime. How long, in your view, 

will it take for these additional sanctions to reach full effect? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The effects of these sanctions are already being felt. European 

Union consumers of Iranian oil—accounting for roughly one-fifth of Iran’s exports 

in 2011—have already diminished to near-zero as member countries reduced purchases in advance of the E.U. oil embargo beginning July 1. Similarly, Iran’s major 

Asian buyers (China, India, Japan and South Korea, which combined for 70 percent 

of Iran’s exports in 2011) cut imports from Iran to receive sanctions waivers from 

the United States. These customers will likely increase their purchases over the second half of 2012. Therefore, in terms of their impact on the main source of Tehran’s 

revenue, the high-water mark for U.S. and E.U. sanctions may have already occurred, just as the sanctions officially come into force. 

Our Task Force maintains that sanctions against Iran can be a useful tool in pressuring Iran and demonstrating resolve, as long as they are enforced completely and 

have a near-term deadline. Because they are not fully enforced, and because they 

are not part of a comprehensive triple-track strategy, these sanctions may lull policymakers into the false belief of progress and thus waste more time as Tehran gets 

closer its nuclear goal. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Statements by the intelligence community seem to indicate that 

there is a consensus of belief that Iran has not yet decided to make a nuclear bomb. 

How confident are you in this assessment and do you believe the intelligence community will accurately predict if and when Iran does make that decision? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. Assuming it acquires all the necessary components, it may be difficult to discern whether, or when, Iran decides to actually assemble a working nuclear bomb. Our Iran Initiative at BPC maintains that Iran is 

pursuing—and advancing toward—a nuclear weapons capability. Iran is most likely 

to amass the components of a nuclear device without assembling them or conducting 

a test explosion, thus remaining ‘‘a screwdriver’s turn’’ away from a weapon, while 

promoting ambiguity about its true intentions and status. In this way, Tehran can 

gain the benefits of a de facto nuclear deterrent without incurring legal and political 

repercussions. It is this eventuality that the United States should be aiming to prevent, as suggested by bipartisan resolutions in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. 

The difference in language between ‘‘developing a nuclear weapon’’ and achieving 

‘‘nuclear weapons capability’’ is significant, so the confusion is potentially dangerous. A country can be considered to have developed a nuclear weapon once it has 

assembled the three main components of a nuclear weapon and successfully tested 

it. First, fissile material: either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, that 

can release massive, destructive amounts of energy. Second, the device, or ‘‘weapon,’’ 

which creates the nuclear explosion by triggering a nuclear chain reaction in the 

fissile material. Third, a delivery mechanism—bomb, missile, or some unconventional means—that gets the weapon to its target. A nuclear weapons capability is 

achieved when a country has all the requisite technology and components, but has 

not yet assembled them or tested a weapon. Iran already possesses delivery mechanisms, both in the form of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads and 

an extensive network of terrorist organizations that could deliver a nuclear weapon 

by other, less conventional means. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 

which is tasked with monitoring and reporting Iran’s enrichment activities, has expressed serious concerns about Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear explosive device, 

including Tehran’s denial of access to a military base where explosives testing for 

a nuclear device may have occurred. More important, Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapons capability is more easily verified than weaponization, and it is its enrichment program that is the best indicator of Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability. Fissile material production has historically been the most difficult 

and time-intensive hurdle to developing nuclear weapons. Thus, if Iran begins producing highly enriched uranium, policymakers will have to assume Iran has 

achieved nuclear weapons capability. Once Iran acquires fissile material, U.S. policymakers, military leaders and strategic planners should assume that Tehran has 

a nuclear weapons capability, even if it chooses not to test its device. U.S. intelligence agencies have never before predicted any country’s initial test of a nuclear 

weapon. The Soviet Union’s nuclear test in 1949, France’s test in 1960, China’s acquisition of nuclear bombs in 1964, India’s tests in 1974 and 1998, and advanced 

Libyan, Syrian and Iraqi programs each surprised the U.S. intelligence community. 
91 

U.S. government agencies still lack a robust capability to detect the development or 

transfer of nuclear weapons capabilities by Iran. Accordingly, if Iran sought to assemble a nuclear weapon, we would likely only detect it after the weapon was tested, by which time it would be too late. If the administration’s intent is to prevent 

a nuclear Iran, it should draw a red line that is clear, verifiable and preventable 

before it is too late. The red line should be nuclear weapons capability, not the imperceptible turning of the screwdriver to assemble a weapon. 

Mr. FRANKS. What is the current state of Iranian launch vehicle technology and 

what can we do to eliminate or degrade that technology to ensure it is not used to 

deliver a nuclear weapon whether by ICBM, or MRBM launched from an offshore 

ship? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. Iran is known to possess the largest deployed arsenal of short- (SRBM) and medium-range (MRBM) ballistic missiles in the Middle 

East. These vehicles are capable of reaching targets across the Middle East, South 

Asia and Eastern Europe, including U.S. and allied military installations. I don’t 

think any of us have access to current intelligence on what exactly Iran is doing 

to develop intermediate- (IRBM) or intercontinental-range (ICBM) ballistic missiles 

that could strike Western Europe or the U.S. homeland. We only know that they’ve 

consistently sought missiles with increasingly greater ranges, as evidenced by their 

February 2010 test launch of a satellite rocket. They are likely years, if not a decade 

or more, away from developing booster rockets capable of carrying an ICBM to the 

U.S. eastern seaboard. Iran is not known to possess any submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability; its Russian-made Kilo-class diesel submarines cannot launch such weapons. Its entire ballistic missile arsenal must instead be 

launched from land-based silos and road-mobile launch systems. 

These missiles could be used as delivery vehicles for a nuclear weapon, if Iran develops a nuclear warhead and sufficient fissile material for a bomb. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile 

is enough to produce two nuclear bombs, with further enrichment. The IAEA also 

stated it believes Iran has conducted work on an explosive device that could be utilized in a warhead. 

To eliminate or degrade Iran’s launch vehicle technology, the United States and 

its international partners have passed U.N. Security Council Resolutions sanctioning Iran’s ballistic missile program: 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 

(2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010). The United States has also deployed, or supported the deployment of, a range of missile defense capabilities to deter or deny 

Iranian ballistic missile launches against potential U.S. and allied targets. These include: two Aegis-equipped U.S. Navy cruisers in the Persian Gulf; Patriot interceptor batteries in Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 

Arab Emirates; X-band missile-defense radars in Israel, Qatar and Turkey; and U.S. 

funding for Israel’s Arrow missile defense system. Moreover, in May 2012 the House 

of Representatives passed H.R. 4133 (The United States-Israel Enhanced Security 

Cooperation Act of 2012). In addition to echoing our BPC task force paper’s strong 

recommendations on the necessity of bolstering Israel’s military option by providing 

it with aerial refueling tankers and bunker busting munitions, this legislation called 

on the United States to assist Israel in procuring the Iron Dome missile defense system to intercept rockets and artillery launched by Iranian proxy forces in Lebanon, 

Gaza and elsewhere. 

Ultimately the United States can only eliminate this threat by demonstrating an 

ironclad resolve to prevent a nuclear-weapons capable Iran, ideally through a peaceful, diplomatic resolution. Such a negotiated solution would include stipulations requiring Iran to make its weaponization activities much more transparent to the 

international community and answer the questions raised by the IAEA about its 

work on weapons design. These concerns of the international community have been 

captured in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions listed above. 

Mr. FRANKS. How are we responding, and might we better respond, to China’s and 

India’s circumventing economic sanctions by using their own currencies rather than 

dollars to buy Iranian oil? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. We applaud the work of Congress and the Administration to enact tough sanctions against financial institutions transacting with the 

Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Oil Company and the Naftiran Intertrade Company. Since coming into effect at the end of 2011, the threat of such sanctions has forced consumers of Iranian oil exports to avoid sanctions by reducing purchases, using non-convertible currencies and bartering to finance those purchases. 

This has devalued Iran’s currency (rial) and cut into its oil export revenue. However, 

despite being tough, these sanctions are weakened by loopholes allowing for waivers 

for countries who significantly reduce their purchases of Iranian oil—even if they 

don’t fully halt imports from Iran. Tehran is hurting financially, but its nuclear pro-
92 

gram has not slowed. This lulls policymakers into the false belief of progress, thus 

wasting more time as Tehran gets closer to its nuclear goal. 

At this point, additional pressure on the Iranian regime to negotiate in good faith 

can come from U.S. efforts to underscore that, if all else fails, it is prepared and 

willing to launch an effective strike against Iran’s nuclear program. Boosting the 

visibility and credibility of the military option through an effective information and 

messaging strategy, economic preparations and military readiness activities would 

help persuade buyers of Iran’s oil, such as China, to support U.S. sanctions more 

fully as a way to peacefully resolve this crisis or face the possibility of a significant 

disruption of oil supply from the Persian Gulf. Strengthening Israel’s ability to 

mount an effective attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would serve the same purpose. 

Mr. FRANKS. Do the sanction waivers provided by the Administration to a number 

of countries degrade the impact and effectiveness of the sanctions on Iran? Should 

those waivers be revoked? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. The waivers provided by the Administration degrade the impact of sanctions by allowing the main buyers of Iranian crude—China, 

India, Japan and South Korea—and others to continue importing oil from Iran, albeit at reduced levels. The threat of U.S. and E.U. sanctions caused Iran’s oil exports to contract 15 percent year-on-year in the first half of 2012, but this decrease 

would likely be even greater if the Administration did not provide waivers to countries that must only pledge to decrease imports from Iran by 20 percent. 

While the waivers thus affect the impact of U.S. sanctions, this is separate from 

the issue of the actual effectiveness of such measures. Our Task Force supports 

tough sanctions as long as the United States enforces them completely and sets a 

near-term deadline for them to be effective. Neither the Obama nor Bush Administrations did this. Even if they had, the dual approach of diplomacy and sanctions 

would not be enough. Creating additional leverage for a peaceful, viable negotiated 

solution requires the United States to pursue the triple-track approach called for in 

our BPC Task Force reports: diplomacy, robust sanctions and credible, visible preparations for a military option of last resort. 

Mr. FRANKS. Will U.S. national security be seriously undermined if the U.S. accepts a policy of containment of a nuclear Iran? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. As we argue in our BPC Task Force reports, we 

believe that a nuclear-weapons capable Iran cannot be contained. Even if all the 

necessary elements of a containment strategy were in place—U.S. credibility; robust, reliable and coordinated allies; and a deterrable enemy in Tehran—this could 

not limit the negative eventualities sparked by an Iranian breakout. 

The most worrying consequences of a nuclear weapons-capable Iran would be: a 

proliferation cascade across the Middle East, which would effectively end the international nonproliferation regime; a sustained spike in global oil prices, which would 

negatively impact the fragile U.S. economy; an emboldened and more secure sponsor 

of terrorism, which would put Tehran in a position to transfer nuclear materials to 

its extremist allies; and an unstable Iran-Israel confrontation resembling a perpetual Cuban Missile Crisis, which would almost certainly draw in the United 

States. 

Mr. FRANKS. How are we responding, and might we better respond, to China’s and 

India’s circumventing economic sanctions by using their own currencies rather than 

dollars to buy Iranian oil? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. KISSELL. What is the stance towards Iran’s Nuclear endeavors from their regional and bordering nations? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. The United States’ Arab and Israeli allies very 

clearly perceive a nuclear Iran as an existential threat, as revealed by the November 2010 WikiLeaks publication of secret U.S. diplomatic cables. In conversation 

with U.S. officials, leaders from Israel and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) compare the Iranian threat to that posed by Hitler in the 1930s, and warn of a proliferation cascade in the region if Iran gains nuclear capability. Even without a nuclear-capable Iran, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and senior Egyptian military and 

Kuwaiti leaders express fear about growing Iranian influence in Iran and Lebanon 

and Tehran’s ability to stoke sectarian violence across the region. 

U.S. allies are thus exhorting the United States to increase pressure on Iran, including through the use of force. Saudi King Abdullah urged the United States to 

‘‘cut off the head of the snake,’’ while U.A.E. officials call on the United States to 

communicate red lines to Iran and warn that sanctions will be insufficient. For 
93 

years Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense 

Minister Ehud Barak, have publicly stated they will keep all options on the table— 

including preemptive military action—to prevent or delay Iran’s achievement of nuclear weapons capability. 

Mr. KISSELL. What is the stance towards Iran’s Nuclear endeavors from their regional and bordering nations? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

Ms. HANABUSA. In your testimony, you say that of the three-prong approach to 

Iran, our military option is underdeveloped. What is the benchmark being used to 

judge that? Precisely what would be needed to ensure adequate capability? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. The benchmark is sufficient leverage to induce 

Iranian concessions in its negotiations with the P5+1 that would enable a peaceful 

and credible negotiated settlement of its nuclear weapons program. History shows 

that the best chance for inducing Iranian concessions is when its leadership faces 

a dire military threat. However, since 2010 the United States and its P5+1 negotiating partners have in effect pursued a dual-track approach of diplomacy and sanctions toward Iran. This has been insufficient to compel Tehran to negotiate in good 

faith, and instead offers the regime an opportunity to drag out negotiations as a delaying tactic to advance its nuclear weapons efforts. Throughout this period, Iran 

continues to ignore U.N. resolutions, threatens to wipe out our strongest ally in the 

region, enriches uranium faster than ever and to ever higher levels, tests more effective centrifuge models, undertakes operations at a previously undisclosed underground facility and continues its weaponization activities. 

With the exception of specifying what munitions we ought to sell to Israel to shore 

up their capability, our BPC Task Force has not tried to specify how many specific 

platforms or weapons the United States would need. We think that ought to come 

from the military commanders in the area, in consultation with the civilian leadership. With that in mind, our Task Force recently issued a paper laying out a variety 

of steps U.S. policymakers should undertake to create additional leverage. 

Ms. HANABUSA. When you say that without ramping up our forces in the region 

we should supply Israel with the full support needed to counter an Iranian nuclear 

threat, what precisely would be needed to meet the full support you address? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. There are three principal means by which the 

United States can usefully strengthen Israel’s strike capabilities against Iranian nuclear facilities: by transferring to it three KC–135 refueling tankers and 200 GBU– 

31 advanced bunker busters, and by upgrading Israel’s anti-missile defense systems. 

The House of Representatives should be commended for passing H.R. 4133 (The 

United States–Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012). In addition to 

echoing our task force paper’s strong recommendations on the necessity of bolstering 

Israel’s military option by providing it with aerial refueling tankers and bunker 

busting munitions, this legislation called on the United States to assist Israel in 

procuring the Iron Dome missile defense system to intercept rockets and artillery 

launched by Iranian proxy forces in Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere. 

Ms. HANABUSA. In your response to a question during the hearing, you said that 

Iran has not responded to any international requests to stop their nuclear program 

besides the time when the U.S. invaded Iraq. If this is the case, then you seem to 

be inferring that military intervention or the imminent threat of military intervention is needed to stop Iran’s nuclear program. Why then in your testimony, do you 

believe that diplomacy and sanctions could still have an impact in this situation? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. The best way to prevent a nuclear Iran is for the United States 

to lead and demonstrate its resolve to do whatever is necessary, including taking 

military action. This is why our BPC Task Force endorses the triple-track approach 

of diplomacy, robust sanctions, and credible, visible preparations for a military option of a last resort. At this late date, it is only the threat of force, combined with 

sanctions, that affords any realistic hope of an acceptable diplomatic resolution. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. Given the asymetric tactics we anticipate Iran will employ in and 

around the Strait of Hormuz, would you address the specific threat posed by the 

C–802 Qader sea-skimming missile and our ability to defend against it? 

Mr. ROBB. Iran’s acquisition of the C–802 Qader anti-ship cruise missile is emblematic of a larger shift in the country’s naval warfare doctrine, capabilities and 
94 

command structure from a surface fleet controlled by the traditional navy toward 

an unconventional force dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC). This new approach utilizes asymmetric capabilities and tactics—large numbers of anti-ship mines, cruise missiles, and swarming high-speed patrol and light 

attack craft—to threaten shipping, overwhelm enemy vessels and deny access to 

U.S. naval units operating in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden. 

Our BPC Task Force has recommended the United States procure and deploy 

force protection munitions and other systems to reinforce existing U.S. naval capabilities in the Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility, including surface-to-air missiles, 

ship gun modifications and ammunition and electronic and cyber warfare support. 

The Task Force has not tried to specify how many specific platforms or weapons the 

United States would need. We think that ought to come from the military commanders in the area, in consultation with the civilian leadership. 

In the larger picture, such measures are an important part of what must be a 

broader spectrum of credible military readiness activities. Boosting the visibility and 

credibility of the military option strengthens the chance for sanctions and diplomacy 

to succeed in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear 

program. 

Mrs. ROBY. Given the asymmetric tactics we anticipate Iran will employ in and 

around the Strait of Hormuz, would you address the specific threat posed by the 

Russian Kilo Class and North Korean Midget Class submarines and our ability to 

defend against it? 

Mr. ROBB. Along with anti-ship mines, cruise missiles and swarming high-speed 

patrol and light attack craft, Iran’s submarine fleet is a key element of its anti-access/area denial strategy to prevent the U.S. Navy from projecting power into the 

Persian Gulf region. 

With this threat in mind, our BPC Task Force has recommended the United 

States procure and deploy force protection munitions and other systems to reinforce 

existing U.S. naval capabilities in the Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility, including 

anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and electronic and cyber warfare support. The Task Force has not tried to specify how many specific platforms or weapons the United States would need. We think that ought to come from the military 

commanders in the area, in consultation with the civilian leadership. 

In the larger picture, such measures are an important part of what must be a 

broader spectrum of credible military readiness activities. Boosting the visibility and 

credibility of the military option strengthens the chance for sanctions and diplomacy 

to succeed in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear 

program. 

Mrs. ROBY. Is there any credible evidence that Iran could acquire an S300 Air Defense System and if so potentially from who? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. There does not appear to credible evidence Iran 

could acquire such a system at the current time, especially since the passage of U.N. 

Security Resolution 1929 (June 2010), which banned the sale of missile systems 

(among other weapons) to Iran. However, Iran appears to desire strongly the S–300 

for its advanced surface-to-air missile capabilities which could potentially deter or 

deny air strikes on its nuclear program. 

Russia produces the S–300 system and has exported it to more than a dozen, primarily former communist bloc countries and their allies. Rumors occasionally surface of S–300 sales from these countries to Iran, most recently from Russia in 2009 

and Belarus in 2010. However, there is no evidence of such transfers occurring, or 

of Iran possessing the S–300 or any comparable system. 

While the S–300 would strengthen Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear sites against 

air attack, this should not obscure the fact that Tehran’s nuclear program has actually accelerated in recent years without such defenses. Moreover, the regime has 

long acted inimically to U.S. interests, even as its nuclear program remains vulnerable to an effective surgical strike by the United States. 

Mrs. ROBY. How does the Iranian Bavar 373 System compare with the Russian 

S300 system? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. Iran has claimed to develop a domestic replacement for the S–300, which it refers to as Bavar 373. While our Task Force has not 

analyzed Iran’s air-defense capabilities or defense-industrial capacity in depth, 

Tehran’s claims to produce such a system would be in keeping with its well-established intentions to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. 

Mrs. ROBY. Is there any credible evidence that Iran could acquire an S300 Air Defense System and if so potentially from who? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
95 

Mrs. ROBY. How does the Iranian Bavar 373 System compare with the Russian 

S300 system? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Sanctions seem to be bringing Iran back to the negotiating table, and 

at least somewhat increasing their willingness to grant the IAEA access to Parchin 

and other facilities. Would a strike make Iran more likely to cooperate with the 

IAEA? 

Mr. ROBB and Mr. RADEMAKER. It is the belief of our BPC Task Force that the 

dual approach of diplomacy and sanctions simply has not proved to be enough to 

compel Iran to negotiate in good faith over its nuclear weapons program. While our 

Task Force does not have a position on whether a military strike would make Iran 

more likely cooperate with the IAEA, preventing Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability requires demonstrating resolve to do whatever it takes to achieve that 

goal. At this late date it is only the threat of force, combined with sanctions and 

diplomacy, that affords any realistic hope of an acceptable diplomatic solution to 

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you believe threats of military action are helping negotiations? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SPEIER. What impact would a strike likely have on the international community’s ability to access and monitor Iran’s capabilities? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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