COMBATING 

NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING

Megaports Initiative 

Faces Funding and 

Sustainability 

Challenges

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 2012

GAO-13-37

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-37, a report to 

congressional requesters 

October 2012 

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and 

Sustainability Challenges

Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA established the Megaports 

Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and 

interdict nuclear or other radiological

materials smuggled through foreign 

seaports. The Initiative funds the 

installation of radiation detection 

equipment at select seaports overseas 

and trains foreign personnel to use this 

equipment to scan shipping containers 

entering and leaving these seaports—

regardless of destination. NNSA 

provides partner countries with 

maintenance and technical support for 

about 3 years, after which it transfers 

the equipment and all related 

responsibilities to partner countries. 

GAO was asked to examine (1) the 

status of the Megaports Initiative and 

NNSA’s plans for completing and 

sustaining it and (2) the benefits of the 

Initiative and factors that reduce its 

effectiveness. GAO analyzed key 

documents; interviewed agency 

officials; and visited eight Megaports in 

five countries, selected on the basis of

port size and unique characteristics, 

among other things. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA take 

actions, including (1) finalizing its longterm plan for ensuring the sustainability 

of Megaports operations after NNSA’s 

final transfer of equipment to partner 

countries and (2) developing and 

maintaining useful and reliable 

measures to assess the performance 

of the Initiative. GAO also recommends 

that NNSA and DHS jointly assess the 

extent to which the two Initiatives are 

effectively coordinating. NNSA and 

DHS agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

As of August 2012, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had 

completed 42 of 100 planned Megaports projects in 31 countries and, as of 

December 2011, NNSA had spent about $850 million on the Megaports Initiative

(Initiative). NNSA’s Initiative has equipped these seaports with radiation detection 

equipment, established training programs for foreign personnel, and created a 

sustainability program to help countries operate and maintain the equipment. 

However, the administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal would reduce the 

Initiative’s budget by about 85 percent, and NNSA plans to shift the Initiative’s

focus from establishing new Megaports to sustaining existing ones. As a result, 

NNSA has suspended ongoing negotiations and cancelled planned deployments 

of equipment in five countries. 

Officials from the five countries GAO visited reported benefits of the Megaports 

Initiative, including increased capacity to interdict nuclear and radiological 

materials. However, GAO identified several factors that reduce the Initiative’s

effectiveness. For example, NNSA has not finalized a long-term plan for ensuring 

the sustainability of Megaports operations after NNSA transfers radiation 

detection equipment to partner countries. Without a long-term plan for ensuring

countries’ ability to continue Megaports operations, NNSA cannot be assured 

that its $850 million investment will be sustained. Moreover, the Initiative’s 

performance measures do not provide sufficient information for decision making 

because they do not evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Initiative. GAO 

has previously reported that agencies successfully assess performance when 

they use measures that demonstrate results, cover multiple program priorities, 

and provide useful information for decision making. GAO also found that the 

Megaports Initiative and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

Container Security Initiative (CSI)—a related program that examines high-risk 

shipping containers for weapons of mass destruction before they are shipped to 

the United States—are not sufficiently coordinating. The two Initiatives are colocated at 29 foreign seaports. In two countries, DHS officials told GAO that they 

were using personal radiation detectors—a type of equipment intended for 

personal safety but not appropriate for scanning containers—to inspect 

containers if their radiation detection equipment is broken. However, in both 

countries, the Megaports Initiative had more suitable equipment that DHS 

officials could have used. 

Megaports Radiation Detection Equipment at Foreign Seaports 

View GAO-13-37. For more information, 

contact David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 

trimbled@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Letter 1 

Background 5

NNSA Plans to Complete 45 Megaports, but Future Implementation 

Is Uncertain Because of Administration-Proposed Budget Cuts 9

Countries Cite Benefits of the Megaports Initiative, but Several 

Factors Limit Its Effectiveness 24

Conclusions 36

Recommendations for Executive Action 38

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41

Appendix II Radiation Detection Equipment Used by the Megaports Initiative 44

Appendix III Information about NNSA Megaports 46

Appendix IV List of Operational Megaports and Megaports Being Implemented 49

Appendix V Megaports Initiative’s Total Budget and Expenditures, Fiscal 

Years 2003 through 2012 51

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Energy 52

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 63

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 65

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Tables

Table 1: Key Attributes of the Megaports and Container Security 

Initiatives 6

Table 2: Roles of SLD, DOE National Laboratories, and Private 

Contractors Involved in the Megaports Initiative 7

Table 3: Megaports Initiative’s Expenditures by Country, Fiscal 

Year 2003 through December 2011 16

Table 4: Estimated Partner Country Cost-sharing Contributions 19

Table 5: SLD Budget for Fiscal Year 2012 and Budget Request for 

Fiscal Year 2013 21

Figures

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of SLD 5

Figure 2: Countries with Operational Megaports 11

Figure 3: Truck Driving through a Mobile Radiation Detection and 

Identification System 14

Figure 4: Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier Scanning Shipping 

Containers 15

Figure 5: A Spectroscopic Portal Monitor Used for Secondary 

Radiation Detection Scanning 26

Figure 6: CSI Nonintrusive Imaging System Next to the Megaports 

Initiative’s Radiation Detection Scanning Equipment 34
Page iii GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Abbreviations

ASP Advanced Spectroscopic Portal

CSI Container Security Initiative

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOE Department of Energy

MRDIS Mobile Radiation Detection and Identification System

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

PRD Personal Radiation Detector

RDSC Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier

RIID Radioisotope Identification Device

RPM Radiation Portal Monitor

SLD Second Line of Defense

SPM Spectroscopic Portal Monitor

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

October 31, 2012

The Honorable Elijah Cummings

Ranking Member

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Edolphus Towns

House of Representatives

Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly 

concerned about the threat posed by unsecured weapon-usable nuclear 

material,1

Seaports are critical gateways for international commerce, and maritime 

shipping containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between 

global trading partners. In 2009, for example, world maritime container 

which could be stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or 

countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. According to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 to 2011, there were 2,164 

confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological 

materials. Even small amounts of nuclear materials are of concern—as 

little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of 

plutonium could be placed inside containers aboard cargo ships and 

ultimately be used to build a nuclear weapon known as an improvised 

nuclear device. An improvised nuclear device could create an explosion 

producing extreme heat, powerful shock waves, and intense radiation that 

would be immediately lethal to individuals within miles of the explosion, as 

well as radioactive fallout over thousands of square miles. Radiological 

materials, such as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90, also pose a 

significant security threat. These materials are used worldwide for many 

legitimate medical and industrial purposes. However, they could also be 

used by a terrorist to produce a simple and crude, but potentially 

dangerous weapon, known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty 

bomb. Experts believe that a dirty bomb detonation could result in a 

limited number of deaths but that it could have severe economic, 

psychological, and social consequences.

 

1

Weapon-usable nuclear materials are highly enriched uranium, uranium-233, and any 

plutonium containing less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238. Such materials 

are often referred to as strategic special nuclear materials.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

traffic (loaded and empty) was estimated at over 432 million twenty-foot 

equivalent units.2 The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA)3 established the Megaports Initiative in 

2003 so that foreign personnel at select seaports could use radiation 

detection equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving 

these seaports—regardless of the containers’ destination—for nuclear or 

radiological material. The Megaports Initiative (Initiative) is implemented 

by NNSA’s Office of the Second Line of Defense (SLD), which aims to 

strengthen foreign countries’ capability to deter, detect, and interdict illicit 

smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials across international 

borders. Through the Initiative, NNSA partners with foreign governments 

to fund the installation of radiation detection equipment at foreign 

seaports and train foreign personnel to operate this equipment. In some 

cases, partner countries also contribute funding to the design, 

construction, or installation of radiation detection equipment. The installed 

radiation detection equipment is then operated by foreign personnel. In 

addition, the Initiative provides maintenance and technical support for the 

equipment for about 3 years, after which NNSA transfers all 

responsibilities—including operations and maintenance of the equipment 

and all related financial responsibilities—to partner countries. NNSA 

selects seaports for participation in the Initiative using a prioritization 

model that ranks seaports on the basis of scannable shipping volume and 

threat factors, such as the origin and destination of container movement 

through a port and proximity to special nuclear material.4

We reported in March 2005 that the Megaports Initiative had limited 

success in initiating work at seaports identified as high priority.5

 

2

Twenty-foot shipping containers, referred to as a twenty-foot equivalent unit, are the 

industry standard, and now cargo volume and vessel capacity are commonly measured in 

twenty-foot equivalent units.

Among 

3

NNSA was created by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 

Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). It is a separate semi-autonomous agency within DOE, with 

responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors 

programs.

4

Scannable shipping volume refers to the amount of inbound, outbound, and transshipped 

containers that NNSA estimates can be scanned using existing radiation detection 

equipment. Transshipped containers are containers that are unloaded from one ship to a 

seaport for a short period of time before being loaded onto another ship.

5

GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing 

Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

other things, we reported that it was difficult to gain the cooperation of 

foreign governments, in part because some countries were concerned 

that scanning large volumes of containers would create delays, thereby 

inhibiting the flow of commerce at their ports. Moreover, the Initiative did 

not have a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the Initiative’s efforts 

and faced several operational and technical challenges in installing 

radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports. We recommended that 

DOE (1) develop a comprehensive long-term plan for the Initiative that 

identifies criteria for deciding how to strategically set priorities for 

establishing Megaports and (2) reevaluate cost estimates and adjust 

long-term projections as necessary. DOE has implemented both 

recommendations.

In this context, you asked us to update information on the Megaports 

Initiative since our 2005 report. Accordingly, we examined (1) the status 

of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA’s plans for completing and 

sustaining it and (2) the benefits of the Initiative and factors, if any, that 

reduce its effectiveness.

For both objectives, we obtained and analyzed relevant NNSA 

documentation, including program plans and implementation strategies, 

memorandums of understanding, and cost-sharing arrangements 

between NNSA and partner countries, as well as sustainability plans. We 

interviewed NNSA officials about the status of the program, its future 

plans, and challenges associated with its implementation. Moreover, we 

interviewed contractors who help implement the Initiative at two DOE

national laboratories—Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and 

Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In addition, we visited a nonprobability 

sample of eight seaports in five countries6

—Belgium, the Dominican 

Republic, Jamaica, Panama, and Spain—to observe scanning operations 

and interview foreign government and port officials.7

 

6

These seaports included in Belgium: Antwerp and Zeebrugge; in Dominican Republic: 

Caucedo; in Jamaica: Kingston; in Panama: Balboa, Colon Container Terminal, and 

Manzanillo International Terminal; and in Spain: Barcelona.

We selected these 

seaports on the basis of port size, NNSA’s priority ranking, NNSA’s 

expenditures at the port, history of cost-sharing with NNSA, length of time 

in the Megaports Initiative, joint presence with the Department of 

7

For our 2005 report, we visited Megaports in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus, 

Greece.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Container Security Initiative (CSI),8

To assess the status of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA’s plans for 

completing and sustaining it, we analyzed the Megaports Initiative’s 

budget information and expenditures for fiscal years 2003 through 2012, 

as well as projected costs through fiscal year 2018. We interviewed 

knowledgeable NNSA officials to assess the reliability of the data, 

including the issues of data entry, access, quality control procedures, and 

the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also requested and 

analyzed data on Megaports partner countries’ cost-sharing contributions. 

These cost-sharing data are of undetermined reliability because we did 

not have a way to verify NNSA’s and partner countries’ estimates. We 

also reviewed NNSA’s budget request and related budget documents for 

fiscal year 2013 and spoke with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

staff about proposed changes to the Megaports Initiative’s fiscal year 

2013 budget. To assess the benefits of the Initiative and any factors that 

may reduce its effectiveness, we also interviewed NNSA headquarters, 

PNNL, and foreign officials about the benefits and challenges they have 

encountered in implementing the Initiative. Additional details on our 

objective, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I.

and

unique characteristics of specific locations. Because we used a 

nonprobability sample to select the eight Megaports we visited, the 

observations we made are not generalizeable to other Megaports but 

serve as examples of challenges and concerns that may affect Megaports 

operations and sustainability. At the seaports visited, we interviewed 

foreign government officials and terminal operators using a standard set 

of questions about their participation in and perspective on the Megaports 

Initiative. We also interviewed DHS officials co-located at these seaports 

and U.S. embassy officials in these countries.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to October 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

 

8

CSI targets and examines high-risk containers for weapons of mass destruction before 

they are shipped to the United States.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

SLD manages three programs: the Megaports Initiative, the Core 

Program, and the Sustainability Program. The Core Program funds the 

installation of radiation detection equipment at land borders, airports, and 

strategic seaports—primarily in Russia, other former Soviet Union 

countries, and Eastern Europe. The Sustainability Program supports both 

the Megaports Initiative and the Core Program by overseeing the 

transition of radiation detection equipment from NNSA to partner 

countries. Figure 1 shows the organization of SLD.

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of SLD

The Megaports Initiative is part of a broader U.S. government effort to 

prevent terrorists from acquiring, smuggling, and using special nuclear 

and other radioactive materials to develop a weapon of mass destruction 

or a dirty bomb. The Megaports Initiative coordinates with and 

complements DHS’s Container Security Initiative (CSI), a related program 

that targets and examines high-risk containers for weapons of mass 

destruction before they are shipped to the United States. CSI began 

operating in January 2002 and is active at 58 seaports around the world, 

including 29 seaports where the Megaports Initiative had completed 

Megaports as of August 2012. Under CSI, DHS places U.S. Customs and 

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Border Protection officials at foreign seaports to review the cargo 

manifests of U.S.-bound shipping containers and identify high-risk 

containers for scanning with nonintrusive imaging systems—which use 

X-rays or gamma rays to scan a container and create images of the 

container’s contents without opening it. In some cases, CSI officers use 

handheld radiation detection equipment to collect additional information 

about the selected shipping containers. The Megaports Initiative and the 

CSI programs have some similarities, but they also have key differences, 

which are outlined in table 1.

Table 1: Key Attributes of the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives

Program

Lead U.S. 

agency Mission

Personnel 

involved 

Containers 

scanned

Equipment 

used Goal

Megaports 

Initiative

NNSA NNSA funds or cost-shares 

the installation of radiation 

detection systems at select 

foreign seaports and trains 

foreign personnel to scan 

shipping containers for 

nuclear and other radioactive 

materials.

Foreign 

personnel 

trained by the 

Megaports 

Initiative

As many 

containers as 

possible, 

regardless of 

destination

Radiation 

detection 

equipment: 

radiation portal 

monitors and 

handheld 

detection 

equipment

Detect nuclear or 

other radioactive 

material

Container 

Security 

Initiative

DHS U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection officials posted at 

foreign seaports identify highrisk shipping containers and 

request that foreign 

authorities examine the 

containers with nonintrusive 

imaging systems or physical 

inspections before they are 

loaded on vessels destined 

for the United States. 

U.S. Customs

and Border 

Protection

officials and 

foreign 

personnel

Selected U.S.-

bound containers 

only

Nonintrusive 

imaging 

systems and 

handheld 

radiation 

detection 

equipment

Detect potentially 

dangerous cargo, 

such as weapons 

of mass 

destruction and 

illicit drugs 

Sources: GAO analysis of NNSA and DHS documents.

The Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan states that the Initiative has 

committed to providing radiation detection capability at all CSI ports, 

which will give CSI officials additional information in assessing high-risk 

containers.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

SLD, numerous DOE national laboratories,9

Table 2: Roles of SLD, DOE National Laboratories, and Private Contractors Involved 

in the Megaports Initiative

and private contractors each 

play a role in implementing the Megaports Initiative, as described in 

table 2.

Responsible 

Megaports entity Role

NNSA’s SLD Develops the overall strategic direction and identifies the priority 

goals and objectives for the Initiative. 

Oversees and manages all aspects of Megaports implementation 

through the entire project life cycle.

Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory

Provides project management, training, and sustainability support, 

and conducts some equipment procurements.

Project managers oversee implementation and sustainability 

activities, including the scope, schedule, and budget of Megaports.

Sandia National 

Laboratories 

Conduct site and communications surveys for new Megaports.

Prepare design and communications requirements for new 

Megaports.

Conducts testing on the communications systems that will be 

deployed to Megaports and leads in-country testing of entire 

radiation detection systems. 

Los Alamos National 

Laboratory

Conducts background radiation survey at new Megaports. Makes 

technical recommendations on settings for radiation detection 

equipment.

Conducts equipment testing at completed Megaports.

Conducts laboratory-based testing on equipment and new and 

emerging technologies to determine detection capabilities and 

performance. 

Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory

Conducts a monthly analysis of data from radiation detection 

equipment from operational Megaports to ensure that the equipment 

is functioning properly.

Small-Business 

U.S. Contractors

Provide design, integration, construction, communication, and 

engineering expertise to support deployment of new Megaports. a

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA documents.

a

 

9

DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The mission of 

DOE’s 22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to design and build atomic 

weapons, these laboratories have since expanded to conduct research in many 

disciplines—from high-energy physics to advanced computing.

For each new Megaport, NNSA selects one of three preapproved contractors using a competitive bid 

process. 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

The Megaports team generally implements the Initiative at foreign 

seaports in three phases: (1) engagement, (2) implementation, and (3) 

sustainability.

• Engagement: Before installing equipment at a seaport, NNSA and the 

appropriate agency in the partner country enter into an arrangement

that outlines the expectations, roles, and responsibilities of all 

stakeholders involved. When possible, NNSA attempts to establish a 

cost-sharing arrangement with partner countries.

• Implementation: This phase involves several different activities. The 

Megaports team surveys the port to help plan for the installation of 

radiation detection equipment. Moreover, the Megaports team begins, 

among other things, training foreign officials on operating radiation 

detection equipment, resolving alarms, and maintaining this 

equipment. During this phase, the Megaports team also (1) hires one 

of three approved private contractors that will lead the construction 

and communications services at the new Megaport, (2) drafts a 

sustainability and a joint transition plan, and (3) installs and tests the 

radiation detection equipment and prepares the equipment for 

operations.

• Sustainability: The Megaports team works with the partner country to 

develop the capabilities needed to sustain equipment operations and 

maintenance over the long-term. For example, the Megaports 

Initiative funds the maintenance of equipment during this phase and 

conducts additional training of foreign officials. NNSA officials also 

regularly visit the port to ensure that the equipment is properly 

calibrated and being used as intended. NNSA typically transfers 

ownership of and responsibility for radiation detection equipment 

operations and maintenance to partner countries after about 3 years.

The Megaports Initiative provides partner countries with several types of 

radiation detection equipment that is used to scan shipping containers in 

primary or secondary scanning inspections. NNSA’s goal is to scan as 

much container traffic as possible with primary radiation detection 

equipment—including Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), which are large 

stationary systems through which cargo containers and trucks pass as 

they are entering or exiting the port; Mobile Radiation Detection and 

Identification Systems (MRDIS), which are mobile radiation detection 

systems that can be driven to different locations at a seaport; and 

Radiation Detection Straddle Carriers (RDSC), which are mobile radiation 

detection systems that can scan rows of containers stacked up to three
 

Page 9 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

high. These types of equipment detect both gamma and neutron 

radiation, which is important for detecting the presence of highly enriched 

uranium and plutonium. When a container is scanned with primary 

equipment, an alarm will sound if the equipment detects the presence of 

radiation. However, during primary scanning, the equipment cannot 

identify what type of material triggered the alarm. If they determine it is 

necessary, foreign customs officials will then conduct a secondary 

inspection with a handheld Radioisotope Identification Device (RIID) or a 

Spectroscopic Portal Monitor (SPM) to specifically identify the source and 

location of the radiation. If the foreign customs officials cannot determine 

the content of the container after the secondary inspection, they may 

manually inspect the container or request assistance from other agencies 

within their government. NNSA also provides partner countries with 

Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD), or pagers, which are small detectors 

that can be worn on an individual’s belt to continuously monitor radiation 

levels in the immediate area. PRDs help to ensure personal safety. For 

more detailed information about and photographs of the equipment NNSA 

provides partner countries, see appendix II.

NNSA completed 42 Megaports as of August 2012 and plans to complete 

work at 3 additional ports by the end of fiscal year 2012, for a total of 45 

Megaports at a cost of about $850 million.10 However, if proposed budget 

cuts are enacted, the Initiative’s plans to establish new Megaports would 

cease. As a result, NNSA has halted the implementation of new 

Megaports and is working with an interagency work group to determine 

an appropriate future scope for the program.

NNSA had completed 42 Megaports as of August 2012 and plans to 

complete 3 additional ports by September 2012, according to NNSA 

officials, bringing the total to 45 operational Megaports by the end of fiscal 

year 2012. To ensure that countries are able to independently operate 

and maintain the radiation detection equipment after NNSA transfers the 

equipment, NNSA has (1) implemented a training program for foreign 

 

10NNSA had spent about $850 million on Megaports Initiative activities as of December 

2011. Unless otherwise indicated, all dollars are in 2012 constant dollars.

NNSA Plans to 

Complete 45

Megaports, but Future 

Implementation Is 

Uncertain Because of 

AdministrationProposed Budget Cuts

NNSA Plans to Complete 

45 Megaports and Has 

Spent about $850 Million
 

Page 10 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

personnel operating the radiation detection equipment, (2) developed a 

sustainability program, and (3) developed new technology to address 

challenges faced at some ports. As of December 2011, NNSA had spent 

about $850 million on Megaports Initiative activities.

The 42 completed Megaports and the 3 additional Megaports that are 

planned for completion by September 2012 are located in 33 countries 

throughout Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. 

Figure 2 shows the countries where NNSA has either established a 

Megaport or plans to have completed work for one by the end of fiscal 

year 2012. (See app. III for a complete list of the Megaports and 

information about each port.)

Status of the Megaports 

Initiative
 

Page 11 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 2: Countries with Operational Megaports 

Instructions: Online, hover over the country names in the graphic for more information. For print version, see appendix IV. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

To help decision makers identify and prioritize foreign seaports for 

participation in the Megaports Initiative, NNSA uses a model that ranks 

foreign ports according to their relative attractiveness to potential nuclear 

smugglers. Currently, the model scores 1,100 foreign seaports on the 

basis of two categories: (1) scannable shipping volume,11

According to our analysis of NNSA’s priority list of ports, 18 of the 45 

Megaports that are completed or under way (or 40 percent) are ranked 

lower in priority than the top 100 highest priority seaports NNSA 

identified. NNSA officials told us that the Initiative uses the priority list 

generated by the model as a targeting guide but noted that various 

factors affect which ports they can equip with radiation detection 

equipment. For example, some foreign governments with seaports 

identified as being of high-priority have been unwilling to participate in the 

Initiative because of internal political sensitivities. NNSA officials also told 

us that the DHS CSI ports are always added to the list regardless of 

ranking because of an arrangement between NNSA and DHS for the 

Megaports Initiative to provide radiation detection equipment at these 

ports. In addition, NNSA officials said that they choose some lower 

ranked ports if there are cost-sharing opportunities, if partner countries 

specifically request partnerships, or if NNSA is given an opportunity to 

demonstrate a new scanning approach—such as using the MRDIS to 

scan transshipped containers in Salalah, Oman.

which accounts 

for 75 percent of the score, and (2) potential threat, which accounts for 25 

percent of the score. Potential threat is determined on the basis of several 

factors, including the capabilities of terrorist groups within a country, 

amount of special nuclear material within a country, and the freedom of 

criminal groups to operate within a country. This information is then 

combined to provide each port with an overall score. Ports receiving 

higher scores are considered more attractive to a nuclear material 

smuggler and, therefore, of potentially higher interest for inclusion in the 

Initiative. The model is also updated regularly to incorporate new 

information. After the model produces a ranked list of ports that takes into 

consideration these factors and assumptions, NNSA officials work with 

the Department of State to ensure that U.S. diplomatic concerns are 

considered. For example, NNSA may not pursue ports in countries that 

do not have diplomatic relations with the United States.

 

11Scannable volume refers to the estimated amount of inbound, outbound, and 

transshipped cargo that can be scanned utilizing existing Megaports Initiative equipment.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

We last reported on the Megaports Initiative in March 2005. At that time, 

NNSA had completed work on two Megaports and faced diplomatic and 

other impediments that limited its ability to complete more Megaports in 

its first 2 years.12

To ensure that countries are able to independently operate and maintain 

the radiation detection equipment after NNSA transfers it, PNNL 

implements a training program for foreign personnel operating the 

radiation detection equipment. PNNL officials told us that, as of 

December 2011, they had trained 1,038 foreign officials at DOE’s 

Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response training 

facility in Washington State, as well as 1,521 foreign officials in their 

respective countries. These training courses include instruction on, 

among other things, operating radiation detection equipment at ports, 

responding to alarms generated by radiation detection equipment, using 

handheld instruments for secondary inspections, and maintaining the 

radiation detection equipment.

In addition, we reported that NNSA officials faced 

difficulties reaching agreement with foreign countries due to political 

considerations outside of NNSA’s control. In October 2011, NNSA 

officials told us they continue to face these same limitations. For example, 

NNSA officials said that they had been negotiating with one country’s 

government on installing a Megaport when one of that country’s citizens 

was killed by U.S. armed forces in Iraq. According to NNSA officials, this 

incident prompted that country’s government to cease negotiations. After 

9 months, negotiations resumed, but the progress previously made was 

lost, and NNSA and the officials in that country had to start negotiations 

over.

Through the SLD Sustainability Program, NNSA works with foreign 

partners to develop a joint transition and a sustainability plan that lays out 

actions needed at the port before NNSA transfers the equipment. These 

plans may include, among other things, steps for scheduled maintenance 

and refresher training. NNSA also provides ongoing support for the 

Megaports equipment through the SLD help desk managed by PNNL. 

The help desk provides partner countries with access to technical 

expertise—even after the equipment is transferred—so that they can 

resolve problems they may experience with the radiation detection 

equipment.

 

12GAO-05-375. 

The Megaports Initiative Has 

Implemented a Training and 

Sustainability Program and 

Developed New Technology 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

The Megaports Initiative has developed new technologies to address 

transshipment challenges, as well as to improve overall scanning 

effectiveness and minimize the impact on seaport operations. According 

to the Initiative’s program plan, transshipped cargo presents a significant 

challenge to a port’s ability to scan containers because of the (1) shorter 

transfer time for those containers to be at the seaport before they are 

moved to another location or port, (2) space constraints, (3) lack of 

shipping data, and (4) difficulty of identifying fixed locations to place 

RPMs within terminals that do not impede seaport operations. To address 

these challenges at seaports with high transshipment volumes, NNSA 

developed the MRDIS and the RDSC, which are two types of mobile 

radiation detection equipment that can be driven to different locations 

within a seaport (see figs. 3 and 4). Appendix II provides additional details 

on these and other types of equipment used by the Megaports Initiative.

Figure 3: Truck Driving through a Mobile Radiation Detection and Identification 

System
 

Page 15 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 4: Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier Scanning Shipping Containers

As of December 2011, NNSA had spent about $850 million on Megaports 

Initiative activities, according to our analysis of NNSA expenditures. Of 

this total, NNSA spent 64 percent, or about $547 million, in countries 

where it has installed radiation detection equipment and 36 percent, or 

about $303 million, on expenditures related to program integration 

activities, secondary equipment, and outreach to countries. (See app. V 

for information on the Initiative’s total budget and expenditures for fiscal 

years 2003 through 2012.) Program integration activities include 

expenditures for project management, technical support, equipment 

testing, and equipment storage. NNSA officials told us the costs of 

installing equipment at individual seaports vary and are influenced by 

factors such as a seaport’s size, its physical layout, existing infrastructure, 

and the type of radiation detection equipment deployed. Table 3 shows 

the Initiative’s expenditures by country from fiscal year 2003 through 

December 2011. We found that the amount of money NNSA spent per 

country ranged from about $1 million to $59 million, with an average of 

$16.6 million.

Megaports Initiative 

Expenditures
 

Page 16 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Table 3: Megaports Initiative’s Expenditures by Country, Fiscal Year 2003 through 

December 2011

Constant dollars in thousands

Country Number of operational Megaports NNSA expenditures

Belgium 2 $59,307

Taiwan 1 51,973

Malaysia 2 41,511

Spain 3 34,238

Philippines 2 a 29,436

Sri Lanka 1 28,188

Bahamas 1 25,500

Mexico 4 25,365

Thailand 1 19,830

Oman 1 19,154

China 1 19,078

Jordan 1 b 16,879

Panama 4 16,508

Kenya 1 14,476

Bangladesh 1 13,010

United Kingdom 1 12,811

Israel 2 12,298

South Korea 1 11,571

Portugal 1 10,018

Jamaica 1 10,000

Djibouti 1 9,727

Lebanon 1 9,549

Singapore 1 9,513

Argentina 1 a 8,801 

Dominican Republic 1 8,290

Honduras 1 6,082

Colombia 1 5,287

Cambodia 1 5,121 

Netherlands 1 4,252

Pakistan 1 3,025

Greece 1 2,988

Vietnam 1 a 2,202

Malta 1 1,248
 

Page 17 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Constant dollars in thousands

Country Number of operational Megaports NNSA expenditures

Additional costsc 302,550

Total 45 $849,784

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA documents.

d

a

DOE expects a new Megaport in each of these three countries to be operational as of September 

2012. 

b

The Megaports Initiative installed equipment at four different locations in Jordan, including at one 

port in Aqaba and at three land border sites. NNSA considers all work in Jordan as one Megaport, 

and the costs listed for Jordan include the costs for all four sites. 

c

Additional costs include costs related to program integration activities ($267.7 million), secondary 

equipment (about $19.7 million), and outreach to countries (about $15.2 million). Program integration 

activities include expenditures for project management, training, and equipment testing. 

d

Amounts may not total due to rounding. 

According to NNSA data, eight foreign countries have contributed an 

estimated $44 million to support Megaports at 15 foreign ports (see table 

4 for a list of these countries and their estimated contributions). According 

to NNSA, partner country cost-sharing estimates are derived from 

educated estimates and partner country-provided data.13

NNSA’s cost-sharing estimates do not, however, include informal 

contributions by countries or other foreign partners, such as seaport 

terminal operators. Both NNSA officials and foreign partners stated that 

foreign partners have made contributions that were not specified in a 

cost-sharing arrangement. In reviewing NNSA documents, we identified 

at least nine instances where there were no formal cost-sharing 

arrangements in place, but NNSA had acknowledged informal 

contributions from foreign partners that could be identified as monetary 

Cost-sharing 

arrangements typically include the partner country funding the design, 

construction, and installation of the radiation detection equipment and 

NNSA providing equipment, training, and technical and maintenance 

support. According to the Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan, NNSA 

employs a formal cost-sharing approach with a partner country whenever 

possible. Moreover, according to the Initiative’s program plan, when a 

partner country contributes a percentage of the cost and work to install 

the equipment, the country develops a greater sense of ownership for the 

program and contributes to the Initiative’s success.

 

13These data are of undetermined reliability. Because these are NNSA and foreign 

country estimates, we did not have a way to verify this information.

Partner Countries’ Cost-Sharing 

Contributions
 

Page 18 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

savings for the Initiative. For example, the Dominican Republic does not 

have a formal cost-sharing arrangement in place, but the terminal 

operator contributed fiber optic cables for the Megaports Initiative at the 

port of Caucedo, which, according to NNSA officials, contributed to 

monetary savings. In another case, a terminal operator in the Philippines 

provided power and the infrastructure for fiber optic cables to support the 

Initiative, which ultimately saved the Initiative both financial resources and 

construction time.

In December 2011, we reported that NNSA does not systematically track 

and verify foreign cost sharing for the Megaports Initiative and that a 

NNSA official told us that the Megaports Initiative cost-sharing values are 

estimates and are not validated or audited.14 In that report, we 

recommended that NNSA develop ways to better track and maintain 

information on foreign cost sharing for nuclear nonproliferation projects 

overseas. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation.

 

14GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Action Needed to Address NNSA’s Program 

Management and Coordination Challenges. GAO-12-71 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 

2011).
 

Page 19 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Table 4: Estimated Partner Country Cost-sharing Contributions

Dollars in thousands

Country Megaport

NNSA 

expenditures

Estimated total partner 

country contributions a

Belgium

b

Antwerp $51,448 $10,363 

Belgium Zeebrugge 7,859 7,000 

China Shanghai 19,078 256 

Colombia Cartagena 5,287 325 

Israel Ashdod 5,847 400 

Israel Haifa 6,450 1,240 

Mexico Altamira 3,909 2,400 

Mexico Lazaro Cardenas 5,268 7,100 

Mexico Manzanillo 8,713 9,560 

Mexico Veracruz 7,475 375 

Panama Manzanillo 

International 

Terminal

3,223 73 

Singapore Singapore 9,513 160 

Spain Algeciras 19,882 1,500 

Spain Barcelona 6,808 1,150 

Spain Valencia 7,548 2,170 

Total $168,308 $44,072 

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA documents.

a

Expenditures are from fiscal year 2003 through December 2011. Expenditures include training, 

project management, and sustainability. NNSA expenditures are in constant dollars. 

b

Cost-sharing data are from fiscal year 2003 through February 2012. Contributions listed are for those 

countries with formal cost-sharing arrangements with NNSA. Country contributions are not adjusted 

for inflation because the years of expenditures were not known. 

As the table shows, Mexico, Belgium, and Spain shared the most costs 

with the Megaports Initiative, contributing about $19 million, $17 million, 

and $5 million, respectively. Conversely, Panama and China contributed 

the least amount of funding: $72,600 and $256,000, respectively. In 

January 2007, we reported that nuclear nonproliferation is a shared 

responsibility and that some countries should be willing to contribute more 

resources to secure nuclear and radiological materials.15

 

15GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s International Radiological Threat Reduction 

Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological 

Sources, 

We 

GAO-07-282 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

recommended that DOE develop strategies to encourage cost sharing 

with recipient countries. DOE stated that the recommendation was very 

helpful and would further strengthen its program.

NNSA had planned to establish a total of 100 Megaports by 2018, which 

NNSA officials told us would cost an additional $1.26 billion.16 These 

plans have been halted, however, because the administration’s fiscal year 

2013 budget proposal would reduce the SLD program budget from 

$262.1 million to $92.6 million, of which $19.6 million would be allocated 

to the Megaports Initiative.17 This is an 85 percent reduction for the 

Megaports Initiative—which had a $132.7 million budget in fiscal year 

2012.18 As a result, DOE’s fiscal year 2013 Congressional Budget 

Request states that DOE plans to shift the program’s focus from 

establishing new Megaports to sustaining existing ones. See table 5 for a 

summary of SLD’s budget for fiscal year 2012 and budget request for 

fiscal year 2013.

 

16NNSA’s projected costs are in current dollars.

17The other $73.0 million would be allocated to the Core Program. As discussed above, 

Core Program activities include funding the installation of radiation detection equipment at 

land borders, airports, and strategic seaports in Russia, other former Soviet Union 

countries, and Eastern Europe.

18As of October 2012, Congress had passed a continuing resolution generally funding 

agencies at fiscal year 2012 levels through March of 2013 but had passed no full-year 

appropriation for DOE reflecting the proposed budget cuts. The House Committee on 

Appropriations, in the report accompanying H.R. 5325, an Energy and Water 

Development Appropriations Bill that passed the House of Representatives in April, 

recommended enactment of the administration-proposed budget cuts for the Megaports 

Initiative. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in the report accompanying S. 2465, an 

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill that has not passed the Senate, 

expressed concern over the proposed cuts to SLD activities, including the Megaports 

Initiative, and recommended an increase in funding of $57 million for International Nuclear 

Materials Protection and Cooperation activities as a whole. Specifically, the Senate 

committee expressed the view that the budget level proposed for the Megaports Initiative 

would not be sufficient to sustain already deployed systems, retain expert personnel, and 

meet international obligations to deploy additional radiation detection equipment.

Due to Proposed Budget 

Cuts, NNSA Plans to Shift 

the Initiative’s Focus to 

Sustainment Rather than 

Expansion
 

Page 21 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Table 5: SLD Budget for Fiscal Year 2012 and Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2013

Current dollars in thousands

Fiscal year 2012 

budget enacted

Fiscal year 2013 

budget request

Percentage 

decrease

Megaports $132,670 $19,574 85.2

Core Program $129,402 $73,000 43.6

Total (SLD Program) $262,072 $92,574 64.7

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA documents.

NNSA has taken a number of actions as a result of proposed budget cuts, 

including suspending ongoing negotiations for installing Megaports in 17 

countries and cancelling planned deployments of new equipment in 5 

other countries. NNSA officials told us that arrangements with 2 of these 

countries were imminent, and the Initiative’s former program manager 

stated that cancelling program activities would affect the agency’s 

credibility. According to NNSA officials, it would also significantly diminish 

countries’ trust in working with NNSA in the future. Moreover, NNSA 

typically funds maintenance of Megaports in transition on a yearly basis, 

but because of the expected budget cuts, NNSA has decided to fund 

maintenance contracts up to 3 years in advance of transferring the 

radiation detection equipment for some countries in order to honor its 

commitments.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff,19

• Diminishing impact: The Megaports Initiative generally follows a 

prioritized scope of work for installing radiation detection equipment

and has already equipped many of the world’s most important 

seaports. As the Megaports Initiative completes the installation of new 

Megaports, the benefit of any significant expansion, except at certain 

priority sites, diminishes.

who examined the 

SLD budget as part of their role in preparing the administration’s budget, 

cited several reasons for reducing the Megaports budget, including the 

following:

 

19OMB works with the President of the United States and executive branch departments 

and agencies to, among other things, manage the administration’s budget development 

each fiscal year.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

• Questionable program effectiveness: The technologies used in 

radiation detection equipment may have some limitations because 

they may not be able to detect nuclear or other radiological material 

that has been shielded or masked, and terrorists could also bypass 

the Megaports Initiative’s equipment.20

• Lack of performance measures: It is difficult to measure the 

Megaports Initiative’s progress in achieving its mission using its 

existing performance measures. Specifically, the program has limited 

performance measures—the total number of foreign seaports where 

NNSA has installed radiation detection equipment and the cumulative 

number of Megaports with partner country cost-sharing. Moreover, 

NNSA does not report on what has been interdicted as a result of the 

Megaports Initiative, although it does internally collect this information 

from willing partner countries. OMB staff said that reporting the

number of interdictions and what has been interdicted would be useful 

to help assess the Initiative’s effectiveness in the future.

• Limited monitoring of equipment: It is difficult for NNSA to monitor how 

partner countries, as sovereign nations, are using the radiation 

detection equipment once it transfers the equipment to a partner 

country.

• Potential duplication: The federal government has 21 nonproliferation 

programs, including the Megaports Initiative. Because of the current 

fiscally constrained environment, OMB staff examined national 

security programs and identified priorities for funding according to 

which programs are most effective in combating nuclear smuggling.

According to OMB staff, within the fiscal constraints of the Budget 

Control Act of 2011, this strategic prioritization enabled the 

administration to protect its highest priority nonproliferation activities, 

most importantly those that directly secure or remove material.

Notwithstanding the reasons they identified for reducing the Initiative’s 

budget, OMB staff told us that there are benefits to the Megaports 

Initiative, such as providing a public health benefit. For example, they said 

that using the Megaports radiation detection equipment, countries have 

interdicted scrap metal contaminated with radiological material, thereby 

 

20Masking is the use of naturally occurring radioactive material to make the radiation 

emitted by smuggled material appear to be caused by innocent cargo. In contrast, 

shielding blocks radiation from being emitted.
 

Page 23 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

preventing it from circulating within the country or beyond its borders. 

Additionally, OMB staff told us that the Initiative helps deter terrorists from 

smuggling nuclear materials through the global shipping network. 

Furthermore, the Initiative has helped to build relationships with partner 

countries and has demonstrated the U.S. commitment to combating 

nuclear terrorism. OMB staff said that they weighed the program’s 

benefits and potential repercussions from foreign partners resulting from 

NNSA’s cancellation of arrangements. However, they determined that the 

Initiative could not demonstrate that further expansion would have a 

significant impact on preventing nuclear or radiological materials from 

entering the United States.

The administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposes that NNSA, in 

coordination with members of an interagency work group, conduct a 

strategic review of SLD—including the Megaports Initiative—to determine 

an appropriate future scope for the Initiative and how it may affect other 

national security programs. NNSA officials told us that the interagency 

work group is led by the White House National Security Staff and includes 

officials from DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Department 

of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Counterterrorism 

Center.

According to NNSA officials and OMB staff, NNSA is continuing its 

strategic review of the Megaports Initiative to ensure that the Initiative, 

under a constrained budget environment, is most effectively and 

efficiently detecting, deterring, and interdicting nuclear and radiological 

material. Through its strategic review, NNSA is assessing how to best 

leverage and sustain existing capabilities, and whether installing 

additional radiation detection systems at strategically selected ports is 

warranted to further strengthen detection and deterrence at key hubs and 

spokes in the global maritime shipping network. The strategic review is 

assessing the threat of terrorists shipping nuclear materials through the 

maritime shipping network. NNSA’s strategic review also includes an 

assessment of the Megaports Initiative’s port prioritization methodology, 

in which NNSA updated its model with 2011 data. To generate a list of 

ports that would be realistic for consideration if expansion is warranted, 

NNSA is also considering additional factors, including a country’s 

likelihood of entering into an arrangement, the type of equipment 

appropriate for each port, cost-sharing arrangements, and whether a 

country participates in other nuclear nonproliferation programs. According 

to NNSA’s strategic review, through technical exchanges, the Megaports 

Initiative could provide assistance with technical aspects of the project 

Interagency Group Has 

Been Established to 

Review Megaports 

Initiative’s Future Role
 

Page 24 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

involving the transfer of knowledge only. The results of the strategic 

review will be reflected in the fiscal year 2014 budget.

Foreign officials from countries that we visited reported benefits of the 

Megaports Initiative, such as gaining a greater capacity to interdict 

radiological materials, but we also identified several factors that reduce 

the Initiative’s effectiveness. These factors include partner countries that 

are not fully using radiation detection equipment or fully participating in 

the Initiative. The program also faces several management weaknesses, 

including having insufficient performance measures and limited testing of 

spectroscopic portal monitors and deployment of radiation detection 

equipment.

Foreign officials from the five countries we visited highlighted several 

benefits of the Megaports Initiative. For example, foreign government 

officials from four countries—Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, 

and Spain—told us that the Initiative has helped their respective countries 

interdict radiological materials found in containers using the Megaports 

radiation detection equipment. For example, Spanish customs officials 

told us that they interdicted medical isotopes that had not been properly 

disposed of, and Jamaican officials told us that they interdicted 

contaminated scrap metal.21

 

21Medical isotopes are used to treat cancer or conduct medical diagnoses.

Moreover, officials from these four countries 

also told us that the radiation scanning equipment was used to ensure 

that goods imported from Japan were not contaminated in the wake of the 

2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident. For example, Belgian customs 

officials told us that they interdicted 15 containers contaminated with 

radioactive material originating from Japan. In addition, according to 

foreign government officials, as part of the Initiative, NNSA officials 

helped both Jamaica and Spain develop a response plan in the event that 

their officials interdict nuclear or radiological material. Jamaican officials 

told us that seven different government agencies play a role in 

responding to a radioactive emergency and that the centralized response 

plan will help them better coordinate a response if they interdict 

radiological materials.

Countries Cite 

Benefits of the 

Megaports Initiative, 

but Several Factors 

Limit Its Effectiveness

Benefits of the Megaports 

Initiative Cited by Partner 

Countries
 

Page 25 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

NNSA officials also identified other program benefits. For example, 

according to NNSA officials, 13 countries with Megaports have reported 

about 155 interdictions of radiological materials. In addition, 19 countries 

have taken steps to supplement, or have expressed interest in 

supplementing, the Megaports Initiative by acquiring their own radiation 

detection equipment. According to the Initiative’s program plan, based on 

the success of Megaports Initiative in the Netherlands, the Dutch 

government replaced four U.S.-provided RPM units with more than 40 

RPMs at that country’s expense to be able to scan all imports and exports 

at the Port of Rotterdam—which is the largest seaport in Europe. Spanish 

customs officials also told us that the Initiative provided a foundation for 

beginning radiation detection scanning in Spain. Spanish customs 

purchased handheld radiation detection equipment to use in airports and 

scanning equipment for six other seaports after the Fukushima accident.

Notwithstanding these benefits, we identified several factors that reduce 

the Initiative’s effectiveness. Specifically, some partner countries are not 

fully using radiation detection equipment, and some foreign partners are 

not fully participating in the Initiative.

In four of the five countries we visited—and seven of the eight seaports—

countries were using the Megaports-funded secondary radiation detection 

equipment on a limited basis, and foreign officials told us that they are 

conducting secondary scanning for a small percentage of the containers 

that triggered an initial alarm. For example, customs officials from one 

country that we visited told us that they limit the containers that they refer 

for secondary scanning because they want to minimize interruptions to 

port operations. According to these officials, the day before we visited in 

January 2012, they referred one container for secondary scanning out of 

17 containers that triggered alarms during primary scanning. Customs 

officials from this country select containers for secondary scanning by 

comparing the initial alarm information with a container’s shipping 

information. For example, the shipping information should indicate what 

cargo the container holds, and on the basis of the information, officials 

assess whether that cargo naturally emits radiation.22

 

22Natural sources of radiation, which are usually harmless, occur in a wide variety of 

common items and consumer goods, such as fertilizer, bananas, and ceramic tiles.

If the shipping 

information matches the alarm information, they allow the container to 

Several Factors Have 

Impeded the Initiative’s 

Effectiveness

Some Partner Countries Not 

Fully Using Radiation 

Detection Equipment
 

Page 26 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

proceed. Similarly, customs officials in another country we visited stated 

that if a container triggers a primary alarm, they compare the container’s 

shipping information with the alarm information to determine whether the 

container should be scanned by secondary equipment. According to the 

Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan, one port in this country scans 

about 73 percent of containers with primary equipment; however, foreign 

officials from this port said that they conduct secondary scanning for only 

a small number of containers—about 2 to 3 containers per day out of 

about 200 primary alarms. (See fig. 5 for a photograph of a SPM radiation 

detection scanning unit, which is used for secondary scanning.)

Figure 5: A Spectroscopic Portal Monitor Used for Secondary Radiation Detection 

Scanning

The Megaports Initiative encourages partner countries to conduct as 

many secondary inspections as possible, according to NNSA officials. 

However, NNSA officials also told us that they recognize that there are 

practical challenges to conducting secondary inspections on 100 percent 

of containers that trigger a primary alarm. For example, the flow of 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

commerce may be affected when a truck is diverted from its normal route 

to a secondary inspection area or because of the time that it takes to 

conduct a secondary inspection. As a result, NNSA trains partner 

countries to set priorities for selecting containers for secondary inspection 

by assessing a container’s shipping information, including, among other 

things, the commodity being shipped, the shipper, and the country of 

origin and destination.

In contrast, at U.S. ports of entry, 100 percent of containers that produce 

an initial alarm must be verified with more precise secondary scanning 

equipment, according to DHS guidance. DHS officials, who manage the 

domestic radiation detection program, told us that secondary scanning is 

important to reduce the risk that containers may be masking or shielding 

nuclear material. In addition, the Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan

states that, although RPMs are the most sensitive radiation detection 

technology deployed by the Megaports Initiative, they do not have the 

ability to unambiguously characterize the location, distribution, and 

identity of a radiation source in a container that triggers an alarm. The 

program plan also states that this type of information is determined by a 

secondary inspection. Furthermore, a senior official for a global terminal 

operator told us that it is “very easy” for exporters to lie about the contents 

of a shipping container. According to this official, smugglers could also 

place materials into a container after it leaves an exporter’s facilities, and 

the container’s shipping information would still appear to be legitimate.

Some partner countries are not fully participating in the Megaports 

Initiative, which raises questions about their long-term commitment to the 

Initiative and may compromise the security gains expected. For example, 

Panamanian customs officials—who expressed support for the Initiative—

told us that the four Megaports in Panama currently scan less than 1 

percent of their container traffic, but terminal operators at two Megaports 

in Panama stated that they are not willing to conduct additional scanning 

because they do not believe there are economic benefits to participating 

in the Initiative. Panamanian customs officials told us that about 85 

percent of containers passing through the Panama Canal are 

transshipped containers. According to the Initiative’s program plan, it is 

difficult to scan transshipped containers because of space and 

operational constraints. NNSA officials told us that they plan to add a 

MRDIS unit—a type of mobile radiation detection equipment—to one of 

the Megaports in Panama to help increase the volume of containers 

scanned. However, a senior official for the terminal operator at this port 

told us that they have not yet agreed to the placement of the MRDIS and 

are concerned about it delaying port operations. Panamanian customs 

Some Megaports Partner 

Countries Not Fully 

Participating in the Initiative
 

Page 28 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

officials told us that a nuclear or radiological incident affecting the 

Panama Canal would take years to clean up and would cause worldwide 

economic chaos.

Other Megaports partners are also not fully participating in the Megaports 

Initiative. For example, the Chinese government has agreed to install 

radiation detection scanning equipment at one port. However, 12 Chinese 

seaports are ranked in the top 100 highest priority ports, according to 

NNSA’s port prioritization model. NNSA officials told us that they have 

discussed installing radiation detection equipment at additional seaports 

in China with Chinese officials, but that future cooperation is uncertain 

because of the proposed decreases to the Initiative’s budget. In addition, 

China is one of the few countries that does not share scanning data with 

the Initiative because, according to NNSA officials, the Chinese 

government believes that trade information contained in the data is 

proprietary. Oak Ridge National Laboratory analyzes scanning data for 

Megaports countries on a monthly basis to assess, among other things, 

whether the monitors are installed and working properly, as well as to 

collect information on alarm rates and the number of containers scanned. 

Furthermore, DOE laboratory officials told us that the Chinese 

government has agreed to scan only exports—not imports, which most 

other Megaports scan—and required NNSA to purchase Chinese 

radiation detection equipment instead of U.S. equipment. The Initiative 

tested the Chinese radiation detection equipment in 2006 with a budget of 

$180,000 to certify it as reliable for use. In addition, Pakistan—a country 

of significant nonproliferation concern—has not agreed to install 

equipment at more than one seaport. NNSA officials told us that they 

began negotiating in 2006 to expand the program in Pakistan.

We also identified several management weaknesses that reduce the 

Initiative’s effectiveness. Specifically, we have concerns that NNSA 

(1) has not finalized a long-term plan for ensuring the Initiative’s 

sustainability, (2) does not have sufficient performance measures, and 

(3) has performed limited testing and deployment of SPM radiation 

detection equipment. In addition, we found limited coordination between 

the Megaports Initiative and the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which 

is implemented by DHS.

NNSA has taken steps to help partner countries prepare to take 

responsibility for Megaports operations after NNSA transfers the 

equipment to them. However, NNSA does not have a long-term plan for 

ensuring the ongoing sustainability of these Megaports operations. For 

Management Weaknesses 

Impede the Initiative’s 

Effectiveness

NNSA Has Not Finalized a 

Long-Term Plan for Ensuring 

the Initiative’s Sustainability
 

Page 29 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

example, NNSA is not systematically following up with partner countries 

to ensure that they are effectively operating and maintaining Megaportsfunded equipment after NNSA’s final transfer of equipment, maintenance, 

and related financial responsibilities. According to the Initiative’s program 

plan, it is “critical” that the installed systems are appropriately overseen to 

help counter possible corruption and to ensure that the systems are being 

used as intended. During a July 2012 meeting with senior officials for the 

Megaports Initiative, we discussed whether the Initiative had a long-term 

sustainability plan. After that meeting, NNSA officials provided us with a 

draft sustainability plan, which addresses how SLD will engage partner 

countries after the final transfer of radiation detection equipment. For 

example, the plan states that the Sustainability Program will use a list of 

metrics to assess how well a country is maintaining its capacity to sustain 

Megaports operations and that SLD will provide narrowly tailored support 

to partner countries, if needed, to ensure continued sustainability of 

operations. For example, SLD might provide technical advice, analyze 

RPM scanning data, or provide help desk support. According to the 

Initiative’s acting program manager, NNSA plans to finalize this plan in 

October 2012.

We also found that several impediments could compromise the 

sustainability of Megaports operations. According to NNSA officials, 

several countries—including Bangladesh, Djibouti, and Kenya—will likely 

require ongoing assistance at the end of their 3-year transition periods. 

Other countries, including Sri Lanka and Colombia, have requested 

extensions to their 3-year sustainability period, and NNSA officials expect 

that additional training will be needed to fully transfer Megaports 

operations to Pakistan. Officials in two countries we visited—the 

Dominican Republic and Panama—reported concerns about funding the 

operations and maintenance of Megaports equipment after NNSA 

transfers responsibility. Furthermore, officials in the five countries we 

visited reported staffing challenges, including recruiting, retaining, and 

funding staff who operate Megaports equipment and respond to alarms. 

For example, CSI officials in one Caribbean country told us that they 

observed staffing shortages among the partner country’s customs officials 

who work on the Megaports Initiative and that alarms for Megaports 

RPMs periodically go off for several hours to a week without a response 

from local customs officials. According to NNSA officials, the partner 

country has taken steps to resolve these staffing issues by hiring a new 

lead Megaports officer and new Megaports employees who are to be 

trained in September 2012. However, a senior official who works for a 

global terminal operator told us that he is not confident that countries will 

continue operating the Megaports equipment if the Initiative is eliminated 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

because these countries would not have any diplomatic or economic 

incentives to continue scanning containers. In fact, this official said that 

this global terminal operator has already begun looking into the costs of 

removing radiation scanning equipment in case some governments 

decide not to continue Megaports operations.

Performance measures are important to ensure that NNSA can evaluate 

the Initiative’s effectiveness and progress. We have previously reported 

that agencies successfully assess performance when they use measures 

that demonstrate results, cover multiple program priorities, and provide 

useful information for decision making.23

These two performance measures, however, have limitations and do not 

provide sufficient information for decision making. For example, using the 

number of foreign seaports where the Initiative has installed radiation 

detection equipment as a key performance measure does not evaluate 

the impact and effectiveness of the Initiative. This measure does not, for 

example, demonstrate whether the equipment is effective, account for the 

volume of containers being scanned, or indicate whether countries are 

continuing to use the equipment. As of August 2012, NNSA reported 

having 42 operational Megaports, but NNSA decommissioned 1 of those 

Megaports—Southampton in the United Kingdom—in June 2010. In 

addition, Panamanian customs officials told us that the four Megaports in 

Panama currently scan less than 1 percent of their container traffic. As 

such, this performance measure does not provide NNSA decision-makers 

with adequate information to assess the extent to which the Initiative is 

fulfilling its mission to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of 

special nuclear and other radioactive materials in the global maritime 

system.

According to DOE’s Fiscal Year 

2011 Annual Performance Report, NNSA has two performance measures 

for the Initiative—the total number of foreign seaports where it has 

installed radiation detection equipment and the cumulative number of 

Megaports with partner country cost-sharing.

Furthermore, using the cumulative number of Megaports with country 

cost-sharing as a measure of the Initiative’s performance is not reliable 

because, as we reported in December 2011, NNSA does not 

 

23GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996).

Performance Measures Are Not 

Sufficient
 

Page 31 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

systematically track and verify foreign cost-sharing for the Megaports 

Initiative, and these estimates are neither validated nor audited.24

According to a 2011 House Committee on Appropriations report, the 

committee is concerned that the Initiative’s performance measures are 

not adequate to assess the effectiveness of SLD’s activities, and the 

report states, “the true effectiveness of [radiation] detectors in preventing 

proliferation is largely dependent on how well individual countries employ 

these capabilities in their security operations.”

NNSA 

officials told us that they do not have the authority to audit countries’ costsharing estimates. In our December 2011 report, we noted that NNSA 

officials told us that this performance measure was difficult to quantify and 

that it would be eliminated for fiscal year 2012 as a result of a DOE 

“performance measures streamlining initiative.”

25

In February 2012, we met with senior NNSA program officials to discuss 

the status of the Megaports Initiative. These officials told us that the 

Initiative’s current performance measures are insufficient and that they 

need to develop more effective and useful metrics. For example, NNSA 

officials told us that one of the primary benefits of the Initiative is deterring 

terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials through 

seaports, but it is difficult to measure the deterrent value of the Initiative.

OMB staff also told us 

that it is difficult to measure the Megaports Initiative’s outcomes because 

of its limited performance measures and said that the Initiative does not 

routinely report what materials it has successfully interdicted.

We identified numerous issues related to NNSA’s plans for deploying 

radiation detection equipment. According to the Initiative’s Alternative 

Detection Technology Strategy, SLD acquired 44 SPM units in total—12 

purchased by NNSA in 2006 and 32 given to NNSA by DHS in 2010 and 

2011.26

 

24

We have reported several times over the last 6 years that SPM 

technology—also known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASP)—is 

GAO-12-71. 

25H.R. Rep. No. 112-118 at 137 (accompanying H.R. 2354, Energy and Water 

Development Appropriations Bill, 2012). 

26According to NNSA, in 2006 the average cost of an SPM unit was about $600,000.

Limited Testing and 

Deployment of Radiation 

Detection Equipment
 

Page 32 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

not proven.27

The Megaports Initiative planned to spend $8.9 million to test and 

evaluate radiation detection equipment from fiscal years 2006 through 

2011, including about $5.2 million for SPM technology. NNSA officials told 

us that the Initiative does not have a dedicated budget for testing and 

evaluating radiation detection equipment because the program does not 

have a technology development mission. However, NNSA also has a 

program office—the Office of Nonproliferation Research and 

Development—that, among other things, conducts research, 

development, and testing of new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities 

to detect nuclear weapon-usable materials. This office’s Proliferation 

Detection program has an annual budget of more than $200 million, 

which conducts research and provides technical expertise on nextgeneration detection capabilities for nuclear materials.

One of the principal findings of our past work reviewing 

DHS’s efforts to develop and procure ASPs was that initial testing was not 

rigorous enough. Once the testing became more rigorous, ASPs did not 

perform well enough to warrant development, and the DHS program was 

subsequently canceled. NNSA officials told us that, after receiving the 

ASPs from DHS, they changed the name of the equipment to SPMs to 

avoid the negative connotations associated with the ASP program. NNSA 

officials also said that they viewed the receipt of the SPMs as an 

opportunity to test and evaluate this type of technology exclusively for 

secondary scanning purposes at an actual seaport. However, we visited 

one foreign seaport where NNSA had deployed an SPM, but the unit was 

getting limited use as a secondary inspection tool. Local customs officials 

in this country told us that they only use the SPM about two to three times 

per day, even though the primary radiation detection equipment triggers 

about 200 alarms each day.

 

27In prior reports, we have questioned DHS’s plans to deploy spectroscopic technology to 

scan cargo at ports of entry because (1) DHS’s cost analysis of the ASP program was not 

sound and (2) DHS did not fully disclose the limitations of the technology’s test results. In 

February 2010, DHS announced that it was scaling back its plan for development and use 

of this technology. See, for example: GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons 

Learned from DHS Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, 

GAO-09-804T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2009); GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: 

DHS’s Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced Portal Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the 

Limitations of the Test Results, GAO-08-979 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2008); and 

GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global Nuclear 

Detection Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying Equipment, GAO-12-941T 

(Washington, D.C., July 26, 2012).
 

Page 33 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Moreover, the Megaports Initiative has not deployed a significant amount 

of the equipment for testing, as evidenced by its storing unused radiation 

detection equipment at a total cost of about $1.3 million each year in both 

2010 and 2011.28

In addition, in 2008, NNSA purchased a new type of radiation detection 

equipment—four RDSCs at a total cost of about $18 million—but two of 

the units are not currently being used. According to NNSA officials, the 

Initiative purchased these two units with the intention of deploying one to 

Taiwan and giving one to DHS to address a scanning challenge at a U.S. 

seaport. However, the Taiwanese port was reconfigured, and the new 

layout was no longer suitable for using the RDSC. Moreover, DHS 

decided that it did not want to use the RDSC after conducting an 

alternatives analysis because DHS did not consider the RDSC to be a

viable system suitable for use by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

NNSA officials told us that, as of February 2012, NNSA 

had deployed only 16 of the 44 SPMs to foreign seaports and DOE 

national laboratories. The agency has not deployed any SPMs to Core 

Program land border sites. NNSA placed the remaining 28 units in 

storage along with other types of equipment. In August 2012, the 

Megaports program manager told us that they were looking into options 

for removing this equipment from storage by, for example, giving some of 

the equipment to partner countries or by removing usable components 

and declaring the rest as surplus inventory. 

29

 

28According to the Initiative’s former program manager, the Megaports Initiative and the 

Core Program each pay half of these costs.

NNSA considered deploying one of the RDSCs to a port in Italy, but that 

port lost a major shipping client and decided to reconfigure the port in a 

way that would eliminate use of straddle carriers. As a result, NNSA is 

spending an additional $33,000 in 2012 on storage fees for these two idle 

RDSCs while NNSA officials explore other options for deploying them.

29According to DHS officials, the department was undergoing an alternatives analysis for 

the on-dock rail program, in which the RDSC was one of the alternatives. DHS decided 

not to take the RDSC until the alternatives analysis was concluded and only if the RDSC 

was determined to be a viable alternative. Through its analysis, DHS determined there 

were cost and sustainability issues associated with the RDSC—including high acquisition, 

operations, and maintenance costs, as well as costs associated with paying RDSC 

drivers. DHS officials also said that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has since 

developed cost-sharing initiatives with its stakeholders, which may allow the RDSC to 

become a viable scanning solution.
 

Page 34 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

The Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan states that the Initiative has 

committed to providing radiation detection capability at all CSI ports, 

which will give CSI additional information in assessing the security risks of 

maritime containers. (See fig. 6 for a photograph of CSI’s nonintrusive 

imaging system and the Megaports Initiative’s radiation detection 

scanning equipment at a Megaport.) From 2005 through 2008, DOE and 

DHS signed eight joint declarations of principles with partner countries for 

eight Megaports to establish coordination on enhancing the security of 

cargo containers. NNSA officials told us that they provide CSI officials, 

who are co-located with Megaports, with access to alarm information and 

that the CSI officials are invited to participate in Megaports training.

Figure 6: CSI Nonintrusive Imaging System Next to the Megaports Initiative’s 

Radiation Detection Scanning Equipment

However, we found two cases at ports in the Caribbean where the 

Megaports Initiative and CSI programs were co-located but were not 

coordinating their efforts to scan containers. DOE and DHS signed joint 

declarations of principles with the local customs offices in both of these 

Limited Coordination between 

Megaports and CSI
 

Page 35 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

countries. In both countries, CSI officials told us that they use their 

personal radiation detectors—a type of equipment intended for personal 

safety but not appropriate for scanning containers—to inspect containers 

if their primary detection equipment is broken. However, in both countries, 

the Megaports Initiative had functioning RPMs and handheld radiation 

detection equipment that, according to the Megaports Initiative’s former 

program manager, CSI officials could have used if they had asked 

Megaports equipment operators. In addition, CSI officials in one of these 

countries—who work in a room adjacent to Megaports equipment 

operators—told us that they periodically observed Megaports alarms 

going off for several hours to a week without answer. CSI officials told us 

that they eventually became “annoyed” by the alarms and called the 

partner country’s customs office to report the issue. Moreover, CSI 

officials said that they do not know if the containers that triggered the 

alarms were eventually inspected. CSI officials’ reluctance to resolve the 

alarms or contact NNSA officials about this issue raises questions about 

whether NNSA and DHS are leveraging resources of these two U.S. 

programs with similar missions.

In an October 2005 report on practices that can help enhance and sustain 

collaboration among federal agencies, we stated that a focus on results, 

as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 

implies that federal programs contributing to the same or similar results 

should collaborate to ensure that goals are consistent and, as 

appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcing. As we reported, 

agencies can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by identifying and 

addressing needs by leveraging resources to support the common 

outcome.30

Furthermore, NNSA and DHS have entered into joint arrangements with 

partner countries, but the two agencies do not have written policies or 

procedures on how to coordinate their activities at ports to best leverage 

their resources. Without written procedures, the two initiatives may not be 

taking advantage of an opportunity to more effectively implement their 

It is unclear to what extent NNSA and DHS are coordinating 

or collaborating at other seaports where they are co-located to ensure 

that their program efforts are mutually reinforcing as envisioned by the 

Government Performance and Results Act.

 

30GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
 

Page 36 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

mutual goal of combating nuclear smuggling overseas. In June 2010, we 

reported that agencies can strengthen their commitment to work 

collaboratively by articulating their roles and responsibilities in formal 

documents to facilitate decision making.31 Such formal documents can 

include memorandums of understanding, interagency guidance, or 

interagency planning documents, signed by senior officials in the 

respective agencies.

Under its Megaports Initiative, NNSA has installed radiation detection 

equipment at more than 40 foreign seaports since 2003 and has trained 

foreign personnel in partner countries to scan shipping containers 

entering and leaving these seaports—regardless of the containers’ 

destination—for nuclear or radiological material. However, recent 

proposed budget cuts have created an uncertain future for the Megaports 

Initiative. NNSA is working with an interagency work group to evaluate the 

Megaports Initiative and adjust future plans accordingly. This evaluation 

and adjustment period provides NNSA with an opportunity to address 

management weaknesses that we identified during the course of our 

review and seek to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

Initiative whatever its construct in the future.

We found that several Megaports partner countries have not entered into 

a formal cost-sharing arrangement with NNSA but nonetheless have 

made contributions to the Initiative. However, NNSA is not systematically 

tracking information on the amount of funding or other contributions that 

partner countries informally contribute to the Initiative. We continue to 

believe that our previous recommendation—that NNSA develop better 

ways to track and maintain information on foreign cost-sharing—could, if 

implemented, provide a tangible measure of foreign governments’ 

commitment to NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation programs.

NNSA has not finalized a long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of 

Megaports operations after NNSA transfers all equipment maintenance, 

operations, and related financial responsibilities to partner countries. As 

we found, several countries have raised concerns about funding the 

 

31GAO, National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency 

Collaboration, GAO-10-822T (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2010) and GAO, Live Animal 

Imports: Agencies Need Better Collaboration to Reduce the Risk of Animal-Related 

Diseases, GAO-11-9 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2010).

Conclusions
 

Page 37 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

operations and maintenance of Megaports equipment after the United 

States transfers responsibility. Without a plan in place to ensure the 

sustainability of Megaports operations in the future, NNSA cannot be 

confident that this equipment will continue to be used for the purposes 

intended or if it will be used at all.

NNSA has also not developed performance measures that sufficiently 

demonstrate the extent to which the Megaports Initiative is effectively 

fulfilling its mission to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit trafficking of 

special nuclear and other radioactive materials in the global maritime 

system. Its current measures of performance—the total number of foreign 

seaports where NNSA has installed radiation detection equipment and 

the cumulative number of Megaports with partner country cost-sharing—

are not useful or reliable for decision making. Specifically, these 

measures do not demonstrate whether the equipment is effective, 

account for the volume of containers being scanned, or indicate whether 

countries are continuing to use the equipment. As a result, NNSA 

decision makers and policymakers do not have the necessary information 

to assess the nonproliferation and deterrent benefits of the Initiative. 

Without meaningful performance measures, it is difficult to measure the 

Megaports Initiative’s outcomes, which may have contributed to the 

administration’s proposed budget cuts to it.

We found that the Megaports Initiative has planned more than $5 million 

in spending to test and evaluate SPM radiation detection equipment, 

which we previously reported is an unproven technology. The Megaports 

Initiative also does not have a technology development mission; whereas, 

another NNSA program office does have a mission specifically dedicated 

to testing and evaluating radiation detection equipment. As a result, we 

question whether this is an appropriate investment of the Initiative’s 

limited funding, particularly given its uncertain future.

Furthermore, NNSA has not deployed a significant amount of the 

Megaports Initiative’s equipment, as evidenced by the more than $1 

million SLD spent in both 2010 and 2011 to store radiation detection 

scanning equipment—including SPMs and other equipment—that it was 

unable to install in foreign countries—either through the Megaports 

Initiative or at Core Program land border sites. As of the time of our 

review, NNSA officials had not taken steps to remove the remaining 28 

SPMs and 2 RDSCs from storage, although they are considering options 

to do so. Without deploying this equipment for the intended purposes, 

providing it to other NNSA or DOE offices for research and further testing, 

or declaring the equipment as surplus inventory, NNSA will continue 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

spending the Initiative’s limited resources to store idle equipment, even as 

the Initiative expects significant budget cuts in fiscal year 2013.

Finally, the Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan states that the 

Initiative has committed to providing radiation detection capability at all 

CSI ports, but we found that NNSA and DHS have engaged in limited 

coordination at two seaports that we visited where the Megaports 

Initiative and CSI are co-located. CSI officials in two countries told us that 

they were using personal radiation detectors—which is a type of 

equipment intended for personal safety but not appropriate for scanning 

containers—to scan containers, while more appropriate radiation 

detection equipment that the Megaports Initiative has provided its 

partners is located at the same port. It is unclear to what extent NNSA 

and DHS are coordinating or collaborating at other seaports where they 

are co-located to ensure that their program efforts are mutually reinforcing 

as envisioned by the Government Performance and Results Act or how 

localized the problem is. However, while NNSA and DHS have signed 

joint arrangements with some partner countries, the two agencies do not 

have written policies or procedures on how to coordinate at ports to best 

leverage their resources. Without such written procedures, the Megaports 

Initiative and CSI may not be taking advantage of an opportunity to more 

effectively combat nuclear smuggling overseas.

We are making the following five recommendations.

To ensure that the Megaports Initiative is maximizing resources and 

protecting its investments of $850 million, we recommend that the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the 

following four actions:

• Finalize its draft sustainability plan for ensuring ongoing sustainability 

of Megaports operations after NNSA transfers all equipment, 

maintenance, operations, and related financial responsibilities to 

partner countries.

• Develop and maintain useful and reliable measures to assess the 

performance of the Megaports Initiative. These measures might 

include the number and type of interdictions, percentage of global 

maritime container traffic scanned, or length of time that countries 

sustain operations of the Megaports equipment.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 39 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

• Terminate additional expenditures from the Megaports Initiative’s 

budget for testing and evaluating SPMs. Additional testing and 

evaluation activities, if warranted, should be funded through other 

NNSA programs with a research and development mission.

• Remove unused Megaports radiation detection equipment—

particularly SPMs and RDSCs—from storage on an expedited basis. 

This could be done, for example, by (1) providing the equipment to 

DOE national laboratories for research and further testing or (2) 

declaring the equipment as surplus inventory.

To strengthen efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, we also 

recommend that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration and the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following 

action: 

• On a periodic basis, jointly assess the extent to which the Megaports 

Initiative and CSI are effectively leveraging resources and 

coordinating at foreign seaports where the two Initiatives are colocated. If the agencies determine based on these joint assessments 

that there is a need for increased coordination, they should develop 

written policies or procedures that formally document how to 

coordinate at ports to best leverage their resources.

We provided the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security and the 

Office of Management and Budget a draft of this report for their review 

and comment. In written comments, DOE and DHS agreed with our 

recommendations; their comments on the draft report are presented in 

appendixes VI and VII, respectively. DOE and DHS also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. On October 

3, 2012, we received oral comments from OMB staff, including an OMB 

branch chief, a program examiner, and staff from the Office of General 

Counsel. These staff agreed with the facts presented in this report and 

stated that they concurred with our findings and recommendations. In 

addition, OMB provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretaries of Energy and Homeland Security; the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget; the appropriate congressional committees; 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 40 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found

on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

David C. Trimble

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the status of the 

Megaports Initiative (Initiative) and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) plans for completing and sustaining it and (2) 

benefits of the Initiative and factors, if any, that reduce its effectiveness.

For both objectives, we obtained and analyzed relevant NNSA 

documentation, including the Megaports Initiative Program Plans for 2011 

and 2010, the 2011 Second Line of Defense Implementation Strategy, 

and the 2006 Second Line of Defense Strategic Plan. We also reviewed 

memorandums of understanding and cost-sharing arrangements between 

the Department of Energy (DOE) and partner countries, as well as 

sustainability and joint transition plans. Furthermore, we reviewed and 

met with NNSA officials responsible for the Initiative’s prioritization model, 

which NNSA developed to help prioritize and select ports for participation 

in the Initiative. We also analyzed information about the ports NNSA has 

completed thus far, including information about their cost-sharing, 

transition dates, and rankings. In addition, we interviewed NNSA officials 

responsible for implementing and managing the Megaports Initiative 

about the status of the program, its future plans, sustainability activities, 

and challenges associated with implementation. We also interviewed 

NNSA country managers about operational Megaports. Moreover, we 

interviewed contractors who help implement the Initiative at two DOE 

national laboratories: (1) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory about 

equipment, training, and procurement activities and (2) Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory about its analysis of equipment performance data 

and alarms. We interviewed officials at the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and the Department of State about coordination with the 

Megaports Initiative. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from two global 

terminal operators—DP World and Hutchinson Port Holdings—regarding 

their perspectives on the Megaports Initiative.

In addition, we visited a nonprobability sample of eight seaports in five 

countries1

—Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, and 

Spain—to observe scanning operations and interview foreign government 

and port officials.2

 

1

These seaports included: Belgium: Antwerp and Zeebrugge; Dominican Republic: 

Caucedo; Jamaica: Kingston; Panama: Balboa, Colon Container Terminal, and Manzanillo 

International Terminal; and Spain: Barcelona.

We selected these seaports on the basis of port size, 

2

For our 2005 report, we visited Megaports in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and Piraeus, 

Greece.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

NNSA’s priority ranking, NNSA’s expenditures at the port, history of costsharing with NNSA, length of time in the Megaports Initiative, joint 

presence with DHS’s Container Security Initiative (CSI), and unique 

characteristics of specific locations. At the seaports we visited, we 

interviewed foreign government officials using a standard set of questions 

about their participation in and perspective on the Megaports Initiative. 

These officials included those from customs offices and offices who 

handle the response to nuclear emergencies, as well as terminal 

operators and port authorities. Because we used a nonprobability sample 

to select the eight Megaports we visited, the observations we made are

not generalizeable to other Megaports but serve as examples of 

challenges and concerns that may affect Megaports operations and 

sustainability. We also interviewed DHS officials co-located at these 

seaports and U.S. embassy officials in these countries.

To assess the status of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA’s plans for 

completing and sustaining it, we analyzed the Megaports Initiative’s 

budget information and expenditure data for fiscal years 2003 through 

2012, as well as projected costs through fiscal year 2018. We interviewed 

knowledgeable NNSA officials to assess the reliability of the data and 

discussed such issues as data entry, access, quality control procedures, 

and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined that the 

data provided to us were of sufficient reliability for the purposes of this 

review. Moreover, we reviewed NNSA’s budget request and related 

budget documents for fiscal year 2013 and spoke with Office of 

Management and Budget staff about proposed changes to the Megaports 

Initiative’s fiscal year 2013 budget. We also requested and analyzed data 

on Megaports partner countries’ cost-sharing contributions. Because 

these contributions are a combination of NNSA and foreign country 

estimates, we did not have a way to verify these data. As such, these 

data are of undetermined reliability. We are nonetheless reporting these 

cost-sharing data to provide some context on cost-sharing contributions 

made by partner countries.

To assess the benefits of the Megaports Initiative and any factors that 

reduce its effectiveness, we obtained and reviewed lessons learned that 

NNSA officials document in a central database, performance measures in 

DOE’s fiscal year 2011 Annual Performance Report, plans for radiation 

detection equipment outlined in the Megaports Initiative’s 2012 Alternative 

Detection Technology Strategy, and information on the Initiative’s costs 

for storing radiation detection equipment. We also reviewed DHS’s U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection’s directive on its domestic radiation 

detection program. In addition to the interviews listed above, we also 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

interviewed NNSA headquarters, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 

and foreign officials about the benefits and challenges they have 

encountered in implementing the Initiative. We also conducted an 

interview with officials from DOE’s Office of Intelligence and 

Counterintelligence regarding the Megaports Initiative’s process for 

selecting ports.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to October 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Radiation Detection Equipment 

Used by the Megaports Initiative 

Page 44 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix II: Radiation Detection Equipment 

Used by the Megaports Initiative
Appendix II: Radiation Detection Equipment 

Used by the Megaports Initiative 

Page 45 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

a

SPMs are formerly known as advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) monitors. b

NNSA has also deployed four SPM units to DOE’s national laboratories for testing and evaluation 

purposes. 

c

GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New 

Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not 

Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits, GAO-07-133R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2007). 
Appendix III: Information about NNSA 

Megaports

Page 46 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Country Megaport

Priority 

ranking, 

by tier Size a Operational 

date b Transition 

date c CSI 

port d

Percentage of total 

container volume 

scanned (estimated) 

Argentina Buenos Aires 50-100 Medium Sept. 2012 Sept. 2015 e Yes 97

Bahamas

f

Freeport 50-100 Small June 2006 Sept. 2014 Yes g 85

Bangladesh Chittagong 1-50 Medium June 2011 July 2014 No 81

Belgium Antwerp 1-50 Large April 2007 Jan. 2010 Yes 73

Zeebrugge 100-150 Medium April 2009 Sept. 2010 Yes 75

Cambodia Sihanoukville 50-100 Small Sept. 2011 Sept. 2014 No 100

China Shanghai 1-50 Medium Dec. 2011 Dec. 2014 Yes 81

Colombia Cartagena 100-150 Small Sept. 2008 Apr. 2012 Yes h 33

Djibouti Djibouti 50-100 Small March 2011 March 2014 No 65

Dominican Republic Caucedo 100-150 Small Sept. 2008 Sept. 2011 Yes 99

Greece Piraeus 150-200 i Medium Aug. 2004 Oct. 2007 Yes 80

Honduras Puerto Cortes 100-150 Small April 2007 Sept. 2012 Yes j 100

Israel Ashdod 1-50 Medium Nov. 2010 Nov. 2013 Yes 95

Haifa 1-50 Small Jan. 2008 Dec. 2015 Yes k 31

Jamaica Kingston 50-100 Small June 2009 March 2015 Yes l 85

Jordan Aqaba 50-100 Small Sept. 2010 Sept. 2013 No m 100

Kenya Mombasa 50-100 Medium Feb. 2011 Feb. 2014 No 65

Lebanon Beirut 1-50 Small Aug. 2010 July 2013 No 47

Malaysia Klang 1-50 Large Sept. 2009 Sept. 2013 Yes 70

Tanjung Pelepas 1-50 Medium Sept. 2010 Sept. 2013 Yes 90

Malta Marsaxlokk 50-100 Small June 2012 June 2015 No 49

Mexico Altamira 150-200 i Small Dec. 2011 May 2013 No 82

Lazaro Cardenas 150-200 i Small June 2009 May 2013 No 50

Manzanillo 100-150 Small Nov. 2009 May 2013 No 76

Veracruz 100-150 Small March 2009 May 2013 No 85

Netherlands Rotterdam 1-50 Small April 2004 Oct. 2007 Yes 70

Oman Salalah 100-150 Medium Sept. 2008 Oct. 2015 Yes n 36

Pakistan Qasim 50-100 Small Oct. 2007 TBD Yes o 10

Panama Balboa 100-150 Small Sept. 2008 Dec. 2011 Yes 20p

Colon Container 

Terminal

150-200 i Small Jan. 2010 Jan. 2013 Yes 5p

Cristobal 150-200 i Small Jan. 2010 Jan. 2013 No 5p

Manzanillo 

International 

Terminal

150-200

i

Small Sept. 2008 Dec. 2011 Yes 10

Appendix III: Information about NNSA 

Megaports 

p
Appendix III: Information about NNSA 

Megaports

Page 47 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Country Megaport

Priority 

ranking, 

by tier Size a Operational date b Transition date c CSI port d

Percentage of total 

container volume 

scanned (estimated) 

Philippines Manila 1-50 Medium Feb. 2007 Sept. 2014 No 100

Port of Cebu 50-100 Small Sept. 2012 Sept. 2014 e No 99

Portugal

f

Lisbon 150-200 i Medium Sept. 2009 June 2013 Yes q 90

Singapore Singapore 1-50 Small April 2006 June 2012 Yes 14

South Korea Busan 1-50 Small March 2009 March 2014 Yes r 28

Spain Algeciras 150-200 i Medium March 2006 July 2014 Yes s 9 

Barcelona 100-150 Medium June 2011 July 2014 Yes 55

Valencia 50-100 Medium Sept. 2010 Apr. 2014 Yes 49

Sri Lanka Colombo 1-50 Medium Jan. 2006 Apr. 2013 Yes t 31

Taiwan Kaohsiung 1-50 Large Sept. 2009 Sept. 2012 Yes 98

Thailand Laem Chabang 1-50 Large May 2007 Apr. 2014 Yes u 96

United Kingdom Southampton 1-50 v Small Oct. 2007 June 2010 Yes 0 

Vietnam Cai Mep 150-200 i Medium Sept. 2012 Sept. 2015 e No 95

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA documents.

f

a

The priority ranking listed is NNSA’s prioritization ranking by countries’ adjusted score. NNSA 

prioritizes countries with a raw score and then adjusts the rankings by removing countries from the list 

that (1) have low container volume, (2) NNSA cannot work with for diplomatic or policy reasons, or (3) 

NNSA or other organizations conduct similar work at that port. For security purposes, we have 

clustered the rankings into tiers: 1-50, 50-100, 100-150, and 150-200. 

b

NNSA estimates the size of the Megaports installation—small, medium, or large—based on the 

number of RPM units needed to scan as many shipping containers as possible. This may be different 

from the physical size of the port. 

c

The operational date is the date that the partner country begins operating the Megaports radiation 

detection scanning equipment. 

d

The transition date is the date that NNSA currently plans to transfer all equipment, maintenance, 

operations, and related financial responsibilities to partner countries. 

e

These dates are NNSA’s current estimates. 

f

These ports were constructed during fiscal year 2012 and, therefore, the percentages of containers 

scanned are NNSA’s expected scanning volumes, rather than actual estimated figures. 

g

From 2006 through 2010, NNSA tested a prototype of the RDSC in Freeport. NNSA began operating 

a second generation RDSC in June 2010. NNSA had discussions with the Bahamian government in 

June 2012 and intends to transfer responsibility for the RDSC in September 2014. 

h

NNSA officials told us that Colombian Customs requested an extension of the transition date in June 

2010. 

i

According to NNSA documents, these countries were added to the Megaports prioritization list 

because they were (1) already operational prior to NNSA developing its prioritization model or (2) a 

specific port of interest for the Megaports Initiative. 

j

According to NNSA officials, the sustainability period was extended from 2009 through 2012 because 

of political turmoil in Honduras. 

k

The Megaports Initiative began a pilot project at the Port of Haifa in January 2008, which it 

dismantled in January 2012. NNSA expects to complete full installation at Haifa in December 2012 

and plans to transition the equipment in December 2015. 

l

The Megaports Initiative has installed radiation detection equipment at two terminals in Kingston. The 

first terminal began operations in June 2009, and NNSA transitioned the equipment to Jamaican 
Appendix III: Information about NNSA 

Megaports

Page 48 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Customs in June 2012. The second terminal began operations in March 2012, and NNSA expects to 

transition the equipment in March 2015. 

mThe Megaports Initiative installed equipment at four different locations in Jordan—including at one 

port in Aqaba and at three land border sites—and will provide each location with 3 years of 

maintenance, as follows: Aqaba, September 2010 through September 2013; Jaber crossing, March 

2011 through March 2014; Al Karama crossing, June 2011 through June 2014; and Al Omari 

crossing, May 2012 through May 2015. NNSA considers all work in Jordan as one Megaport. 

n

NNSA installed radiation detection equipment at the Port of Salalah, Oman, in September 2008 but 

has since updated some of the MRDIS radiation detection equipment with second generation units, 

which NNSA expects to be operational by October 2012. NNSA intends to transfer the equipment to 

the government of Oman in October 2015. 

o

The Port of Qasim is the only port remaining under the Secure Freight Initiative and, according to 

NNSA, there is no planned transition date at this time. The Secure Freight Initiative is a DHS and 

DOE program at selected ports that aims to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo for 

nuclear and radiological materials overseas using non-intrusive imaging systems and radiation 

detection equipment. 

p

These scanning estimates are according to the Megaports Initiative 2011 Program Plan. However, 

Panamanian customs officials that we met with told us that they currently scan less than 1 percent of 

their container traffic at their four Megaports. 

q

NNSA installed Megaports equipment at the Port of Lisbon, Portugal, in two phases. The first phase 

began operating in September 2009, and the second began operating in June 2010. NNSA plans to 

transfer the equipment to the Portuguese government in June 2013. 

r

NNSA and DHS started the Secure Freight Initiative at the Port of Busan in March 2009, and DHS 

decommissioned its equipment in March 2010. The Megaports Initiative signed a new Memorandum 

of Understanding in September 2010 and restarted the radiation detection system in March 2011. 

s

NNSA transitioned responsibility for RPM units at Algeciras to Spanish Customs in December 2010 

and plans to transition responsibility for a SPM unit in July 2014. 

t

NNSA added a SPM unit in fiscal year 2009, and in fiscal year 2010 NNSA began an upgrade project 

to improve Megaports operations at Colombo. NNSA aims to transition responsibility of the equipment 

to the Sri Lankan government in April 2013. 

u

NNSA and the Thai government negotiated a longer transition period because of initial system 

issues and a request from the Thai government to have a 5-year transition period. 

v

NNSA began operations in Southampton in October 2007 through the Secure Freight Initiative, but 

DHS concluded Secure Freight Initiative operations in June 2010. NNSA terminated operations of the 

radiation detection equipment in June 2010 and gave an SPM unit to the United Kingdom Border 

Agency, which relocated the equipment to another port. 
Appendix IV: List of Operational Megaports 

and Megaports Being Implemented

Page 49 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Country Megaport

Argentina Buenos Aires

Bahamas

a

Freeport

Bangladesh Chittagong

Belgium Antwerp 

Zeebrugge

Cambodia Sihanoukville

China Shanghai

Colombia Cartagena

Djibouti Djibouti

Dominican Republic Caucedo

Greece Piraeus

Honduras Puerto Cortes

Israel Ashdod

Haifa

Jamaica Kingston

Jordan Aqaba

Kenya Mombasa

Lebanon Beirut

Malaysia Klang

Tanjung Pelepas

Malta Marsaxlokk 

Mexico Altamira 

Lazaro Cardenas

Manzanillo

Veracruz 

Netherlands Rotterdam

Oman Salalah

Pakistan Qasim

Panama Balboa

Colon Container Terminal

Cristobal

Manzanillo International Terminal

Philippines Manila

Port of Cebu

Portugal

a

Lisbon

Appendix IV: List of Operational Megaports 

and Megaports Being Implemented
Appendix IV: List of Operational Megaports 

and Megaports Being Implemented

Page 50 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Country Megaport

Singapore Singapore

South Korea Busan

Spain Algeciras

Barcelona

Valencia

Sri Lanka Colombo

Taiwan Kaohsiung

Thailand Laem Chabang

United Kingdom Southampton

Vietnam Cai Mep

Source: NNSA.

a

a

NNSA expects these Megaports to become operational in September 2012. 
Appendix V: Megaports Initiative’s Total 

Budget and Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2003 

through 2012

Page 51 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Dollars in thousands

Fiscal year

Enacted 

budget 

(current 

dollars)

Supplemental 

funding (current 

dollars)

Enacted budget 

(constant dollars) 

Supplemental 

funding 

(constant 

dollars)

Total budget 

(constant 

dollars)

Total 

expenditures 

(constant 

dollars)

2003 $15,000 $84,000 $18,340 $102,702 $121,042 $1,341

2004 13,000 0 15,501 0 15,501 56,381

2005 15,000 29,000 17,323 33,492 50,815 60,921

2006 73,929 0 82,575 0 82,575 57,065

2007 40,118 71,000 43, 522 77,025 120,547 88,673

2008 132,047 0 140,003 0 140,003 102,749

2009 108,091 0 112,973 0 112,973 136,397

2010 174,264 0 180,461 0 180,461 167,344

2011 124,884 0 126,824 0 126,824 145,126

2012 132,670 0 132,670 0 132,670 33,787

Total

a

$829,003 $184,000 $870,193 $213,219 $1,083,412 $849,784

Source: GAO analysis of NNSA data.

a

Fiscal year 2012 expenditures are as of December 2011. 

Appendix V: Megaports Initiative’s Total 

Budget and Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2003 

through 2012
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 52 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Energy

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 53 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 54 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 55 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

See comment 2.

See comment 1.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 56 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

See comment 5.

See comment 4.

See comment 3.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 57 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

See comment 7.

See comment 6.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 58 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

See comment 10.

See comment 9.

See comment 8.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 59 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

The following are GAO’s comments on NNSA’s letter dated October 12, 

2012.

1. We agree that NNSA has made progress installing additional 

Megaports, and we state several times throughout our report that 

NNSA had completed 42 Megaports as of August 2012. However, we 

also believe it is important to discuss challenges facing the Initiative, 

such as foreign political considerations that are outside of NNSA’s 

control and have affected the agency’s ability to implement the 

Initiative.

2. NNSA commented that it takes exception to five issues related to our 

finding that China has not fully embraced the Megaports Initiative: 

(1) the number of operational Chinese Megaports, (2) China’s 

scanning of only exports, (3) the use of Chinese radiation detection 

equipment instead of U.S. equipment, (4) China’s lack of sharing data 

related to the performance of equipment with NNSA, and (5) China’s 

limited cost-sharing. We continue to believe that, collectively, these 

conditions we observed associated with the Chinese Megaport 

indicate that the Chinese government is not fully participating in the 

Initiative. Specifically:

• As we state in our report, the Initiative has established only 1 

Megaport in China out of the 12 Chinese ports that are ranked in 

the Initiative’s top 100 highest priority ports. In our view, this 

indicates that much more needs to be done in China to address 

the potential risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive 

material. However, as NNSA states in its written comments, the 

agency has discussed with the Chinese government adding 

additional Megaports in the future and, as a result, we have 

revised our report to include this information.

• In its written comments, NNSA states that, as part of the pilot 

Megaport in China, NNSA and the Chinese government had 

agreed to equip 17 export lanes. Notwithstanding that fact, as we 

state in our report, most other partner countries scan exports and 

imports. As a result, it is important to scan both exports and 

imports because the goal of the Megaports Initiative is to scan as 

many shipping containers as possible, regardless of destination to 

meet the Initiative’s most basic goal—combating nuclear 

smuggling.

GAO Comments
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 60 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

• In its written comments, NNSA states that the Initiative does not 

require partners to use a certain brand of radiation detection 

equipment and that there are benefits to partners using 

indigenous equipment, such as strengthening sustainability. While 

we agree that there could be advantages to using indigenous 

equipment, nearly all partner countries use Megaports-provided 

equipment, which gives the United States greater assurance in the 

capabilities and reliability of the equipment. In the case of China, 

the Initiative had to spend additional funding to test and certify the 

Chinese equipment. In fact, senior NNSA officials told us in 

February 2012 that they believe the Initiative’s certification of this 

equipment gives the Chinese company an advantage in the global 

market. For these reasons, we stand by our finding that China’s 

insistence that the Initiative uses Chinese equipment reflects a 

lack of commitment to the Initiative.

• In its written comments, NNSA states that its arrangement with 

China allows for the sharing of information on the detection or 

seizure of illicitly trafficked special nuclear material or other 

radioactive materials. This may be true, but China is one of the 

few Megaports partner countries that does not share scanning 

data with the United States. Without these data, NNSA does not 

have a consistent way to ensure that the equipment is being used 

properly or being used at all. In our view, routinely sharing these 

data is a gesture of goodwill, commitment, and cooperation on the 

part of the partner country.

• In its written comments, NNSA responds to our finding that the 

Chinese provided a small amount of funding for the Megaports 

Initiative—$256,000 as of February 2012. NNSA states in its 

comments that the Chinese government has contributed $20 

million to a training center for customs officers. The training

center, however, is not part of the Megaports Initiative, and it does 

not help the Initiative in reaching its goals to scan shipping 

containers for nuclear and radiological material. In addition, senior 

NNSA officials told us that the Chinese contributions to the 

training center were a rough estimate and that they did not have 

great confidence in the accuracy or validity of the Chinese costsharing data.

3. We modified our report to clarify that our finding regarding the testing 

of radiation detection equipment is specific to SPMs and not radiation 

portal monitors.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 61 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

4. In its comments, NNSA states that it wanted to clarify our finding that 

some partner countries are not fully using radiation detection 

equipment. We reiterate our finding that seven of the eight seaports 

we visited were using the secondary radiation detection equipment on 

a limited basis. As NNSA highlighted in its comments, we also state in 

our report that NNSA recognizes that there are practical challenges to 

conducting secondary inspections on 100 percent of containers that 

trigger a primary alarm. However, as we state in our report, at U.S. 

ports of entry, 100 percent of containers that produce an initial alarm 

must be verified with more precise secondary scanning equipment. 

Moreover, according to DHS officials who manage the domestic 

radiation detection program, secondary scanning reduces the risk that 

containers may be masking or shielding nuclear material.

5. NNSA states in its comments that it takes exception to our finding that 

Panama is not fully participating in the Megaports Initiative. 

Specifically, NNSA stated that Panama is an example of a country 

where NNSA signed a joint arrangement with DHS’s Container 

Security Initiative. Moreover, according to NNSA, as implementation 

plans were developed, Megaports agreed, as a first step, to place 

radiation detection monitors near Container Security Initiative 

equipment so that all of DHS’s targeted containers would be scanned 

by RPMs. This resulted in a small fraction of containers being 

scanned. Nevertheless, according to Panamanian officials, the four 

Megaports in Panama scan less than 1 percent of container traffic. 

Moreover, two terminal operators in Panama told us that they are not 

interested in conducting additional scanning. Officials from the 

terminal operator for the port where NNSA plans to add a MRDIS also 

told us in March 2012 that they have not yet agreed to the placement 

of the MRDIS and were concerned about it delaying port operations. 

In its comments, NNSA stated that Panamanian Customs officials 

support the Megaports Initiative—we agree. However, the example 

that we give to show that the Panama is not a full participant in the 

Initiative is that the terminal operators—who play a critical role in 

implementing the Initiative—expressed strong reservations about 

participating in the Initiative. As a result of our discussion with terminal 

operators in Panama, we continue to believe that Panama’s four 

Megaports are not fully participating in the Initiative, as evidenced by 

the less than 1 percent of container traffic scanned—far from the 

Initiative’s goal of scanning as many shipping containers as possible, 

regardless of destination.
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Energy

Page 62 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

6. NNSA states that SLD has taken several steps to help partner 

countries with sustainability, such as providing partner countries with 

3 years of maintenance and sustainability support and regularly

assessing countries’ progress in operations and management, 

training, and maintenance and logistics. We state in the first section of 

our report that NNSA has developed the SLD Sustainability Program, 

and we discuss in detail the various components of this program.

7. We continue to believe that sustainability is a challenge for the 

Megaports Initiative. For example, officials in two of the countries we 

visited reported concerns about funding the operations and 

maintenance of Megaports equipment after NNSA transfers 

responsibility, and officials in all five countries we visited reported 

various staffing issues, such as recruiting, retaining, and funding staff 

who operate Megaports equipment and respond to alarms. 

Furthermore, a senior official who works for a global terminal operator 

told us that he is not confident that countries will continue operating 

the Megaports equipment if the Initiative is eliminated. As such, we 

continue to believe that, without a plan in place to ensure the 

sustainability of Megaports operations in the future, NNSA cannot be 

confident that this equipment will continue to be used for the purposes 

intended or if it will be used at all. NNSA agreed with this 

recommendation and stated that it intends to finalize the sustainability 

plan.

8. NNSA commented that SLD began using the term SPM instead of 

ASP because it is a general term for all spectroscopic portal monitors. 

This statement is in direct contradiction to what we were told by NNSA 

officials during the course of our review. At that time, NNSA officials 

stated that they changed the name of spectroscopic equipment from 

ASP to SPM to avoid the negative connotations associated with the 

ASP program. As a result, we are not revising the text.

9. In its comments, NNSA pointed out that we reported that one port we 

visited uses its SPM unit as a secondary scanning tool on a limited 

basis. To counter our finding, NNSA commented that Thailand uses 

its SPM unit on 100 percent of alarming containers. We did not 

independently verify that Thailand is using its SPM for 100 percent of 

containers that trigger a primary alarm. 

10. We have modified this statement in the report to clarify that NNSA’s 

storage costs of over $1 million include SPMs, as well as other types 

of equipment. However, the larger point remains that SPMs are part of 

this unused inventory, and NNSA has agreed with our 

recommendation to remove SPM units from storage on an expedited 

basis.
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

Page 63 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 

Page 64 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 65 GAO-13-37 Combating Nuclear Smuggling

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.

In addition to the individual named above, Gene Aloise; Glen Levis, 

Assistant Director; Amanda Krause Kolling; Timothy Persons, Chief 

Scientist; Emily Suarez-Harris; and Holly Williams made key contributions 

to this report.

Technical assistance was also provided by Steve Caldwell, Antoinette 

Capaccio, Rebecca Shea, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman.

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(361328)
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