HOMELAND 

DEFENSE

DOD Needs to 

Address Gaps in 

Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support 

Guidance

Report to Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs

October 2012

GAO-13-128

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-128, a report to Senate 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs

October 2012

HOMELAND DEFENSE

DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support Guidance

Why GAO Did This Study

Defending U.S. territory and citizens is 

the highest priority of DOD, and 

providing defense support of civil 

authorities is one of the department’s 

primary missions. DOD is the federal 

agency with lead responsibility for 

homeland defense, whereas for civil 

support missions DOD provides 

assistance to the lead civilian federal 

agency, such as DHS, when requested 

by the agency or directed by the 

President for major disasters, 

emergencies, and special events. This 

report examines the extent to which 

DOD has issued current guidance, 

including doctrine, policy, and strategy, 

for its homeland defense and civil 

support missions. To do this, GAO 

analyzed DOD homeland defense and 

civil support guidance and plans and 

met with select DOD and National 

Guard officials.

What GAO Recommends

This report makes several 

recommendations to address gaps in 

DOD’s guidance for homeland defense 

and civil support, including for DOD to 

assess and, when needed, update its 

primary strategy; develop 

implementation guidance on the dualstatus commander construct; and align 

guidance on preparing for and 

responding to domestic cyber incidents 

with national-level guidance to include 

roles and responsibilities. In comments 

on the draft report, DOD concurred or 

partially concurred with these 

recommendations. DOD concurred 

with our strategy and dual-status 

commander recommendations and 

partially concurred with our domestic 

cyber recommendation. DHS 

concurred with our domestic cyber 

recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) protects the U.S. homeland through two 

distinct but interrelated missions: (1) homeland defense, which defends against 

threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber incidents; and 

(2) civil support, which involves supporting other federal agencies in responding 

to major domestic disasters, emergencies, and special events. DOD has issued 

and updated several key pieces of doctrine, policy, and strategy for homeland 

defense and civil support, but it has not updated its primary Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support since it was initially issued in 2005 and 

does not have a process—similar to that for its joint publications and directives—

to do so. The Joint Staff determined in August 2010 that joint publications on 

homeland defense needed a complete revision. The joint publication on civil 

support is also being revised. U.S. Northern Command, the combatant command 

responsible for homeland defense, is revising these publications to reflect 

changes in national and department priorities and to incorporate lessons learned 

from exercises and events such as Hurricane Katrina. Still, such key nationaland department-level strategies and significant events are not reflected in DOD’s 

strategy, in part because the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs does not have a process for 

periodically assessing the currency of its homeland defense and civil support 

strategy and ensuring that needed updates are completed in a timely manner. 

Reliance on an outdated strategy could hinder DOD’s ability to effectively plan for 

and respond to major disasters and emergencies. 

DOD issued some guidance on the dual-status commander construct—through 

which, during a civil support incident or special event, a single military officer has 

authority over both National Guard and active-duty military personnel, serving as 

a link between state and federal forces. Nevertheless, gaps in guidance remain 

because DOD has not yet developed comprehensive policies and procedures 

regarding the use and availability of dual-status commanders, including specific 

criteria and conditions for when and how a state governor and the Secretary of 

Defense would mutually appoint a commander. For example, DOD has not 

developed guidance for the use of dual-status commanders for incidents 

affecting multiple states and territories, and it does not have a process to 

determine the appropriate mix of National Guard and active duty federal officers 

to meet DOD’s anticipated needs. As a result, DOD’s ability to adequately 

prepare for and effectively use dual-status commanders for a range of civil 

support events, including those affecting multiple states, may be hindered 

While a 2010 DOD Directive, a 2007 joint publication, and an agreement with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide some details on how DOD 

should respond to requests for civil support in the event of a domestic cyber 

incident, they do not address some aspects of how DOD will provide support 

during a response. First, DOD has not clarified its roles and responsibilities, and 

chartering directives for DOD’s Offices of the Assistant Secretaries for Global 

Strategic Affairs and for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs 

outline conflicting and overlapping roles and responsibilities. Second, DOD has 

not ensured that its civil support guidance is aligned with national plans and 

preparations for domestic cyber incidents. Consequently, it is unclear whether 

DOD will be adequately prepared to support DHS during a cyber incident.

View GAO-13-128. For more information, 

contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Letter 1 

Background 3

Some DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Mission Guidance 

Is Outdated or Incomplete, and No Routine Process Exists to 

Ensure Regular Updating 9

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 28

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 32

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Related GAO Products 35

Tables

Table 1: DOD Organizations that have Key Roles and 

Responsibilities in Homeland Defense and Civil Support 7

Table 2: Some Key Department and National Level Policies and 

Guidance that DOD Uses for its Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support Missions 10

Table 3: Offices We Met with During our Review 26

Figures 

Figure 1: Examples of DOD’s Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

Missions 4

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Figure 2: Relevant Areas of Responsibility for U.S. Northern 

Command and U.S. Pacific Command 6

Figure 3: Number of Trained and Certified Dual-Status 

Commanders in the 54 U.S. States and Territories, as of 

June 2012 17

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DHS Department of Homeland Security

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Page 1 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

October 24, 2012

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman

Chairman

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Defending U.S. territory and citizens is the highest priority of the 

Department of Defense (DOD), and providing appropriate defense 

support of civil authorities is one of the department’s primary missions.1

DOD protects the homeland through two distinct but interrelated missions: 

homeland defense—which it conducts through air, land, maritime, space, 

and cyber operations, with other agencies supporting DOD’s efforts—and 

civil support2

—which involves supporting other agencies in responding to 

major disasters and emergencies,3

 

1

Department of Defense Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century 

Defense (Washington, D.C: January, 2012).

significant domestic cyber incidents, 

and special events such as presidential inaugurations and major 

international summits held in the United States. A significant cyber 

incident could include a deliberate act by an organization or individual to 

2

For the purposes of this report, civil support refers to defense support of civil authorities, 

which is DOD’s mission to provide support through the federal military force, National 

Guard, and other resources in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for 

special events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other 

domestic activities. 

3

42 U.S.C. § 5122 defines major disasters and emergencies. A major disaster is any 

natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven 

water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, 

or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United 

States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity 

and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance to supplement the efforts and 

available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 

alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. An emergency is an 

occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is 

needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect 

property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in 

any part of the United States. 

 
Page 2 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

impede computer networks and infrastructure within the United States 

that threatens lives, property, the economy, or national security.

DOD serves as the lead federal agency for homeland defense. For DOD’s 

civil support mission, DOD provides assistance to the lead civilian federal 

agency, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), when 

requested by the agency and when approved by the Secretary of Defense 

or when directed by the President. DOD supports numerous civil support 

missions, such as the recent response to wildfires in Colorado. However, 

since DOD only supports other agencies in these types of missions, DOD 

generally does not train, or equip specifically to satisfy civil support 

mission requirements except for key specialized missions in chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear response. In responding to major 

disasters and emergencies, DOD can use a dual-status commander—a 

military officer who has authority over both active duty federal and state 

National Guard forces and who serves as an intermediate link between 

state and federal chains of command when employed simultaneously. A 

dual-status commander requires specialized training to promote a unity of 

effort between federal and state forces to facilitate a rapid response to 

save lives, prevent human suffering, and protect property in the United 

States.

To date, we have issued several products on the progress DOD has 

made to address issues related to homeland defense and civil support 

since U.S. Northern Command was established in October 2002, after the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Among other things, these reports 

have focused on issues and made recommendations involving 

coordination within DOD, including between U.S. Northern Command and 

U.S. Pacific Command and with other federal agencies in preparing for 

and responding to homeland defense and civil support missions; 

conducting staffing and needs assessments for civil support; DOD’s 

management of its aerospace control alert mission4

 

4

This mission was formerly known as air sovereignty alert.

and chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents; U.S. Northern Command’s 

homeland defense and civil support exercise program; and U.S. Northern 

Command’s homeland defense and civil support guidance development 

and planning efforts. These reports are listed in the Related GAO 

Products section at the end of this report.
Page 3 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

You asked us to examine DOD’s efforts to develop doctrine and assess 

capability requirements for homeland defense and civil support. This 

report is a public version of a sensitive report, issued in September 2012 

and examines the extent to which DOD has issued current guidance, 

including doctrine, policy, and strategy for homeland defense and civil 

support. We are examining DOD’s civil support capabilities in a separate 

report.

To determine the extent to which DOD has issued current and 

comprehensive guidance, we reviewed prior GAO reports and met with 

DOD officials to identify DOD’s doctrine, policy, and strategy used for 

homeland defense and civil support. We reviewed homeland defense and 

civil support doctrine, policy, and strategy and other relevant 

documentation to assess the extent that it was current and identify any 

potential gaps, and met with officials from DOD and DHS to discuss the 

currency of the department’s guidance and gaps in the guidance that may 

exist. To determine potential gaps in DOD’s Strategy for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support and the impact of any identified gaps, we 

compared the strategy against priorities articulated in current, overarching 

national- and department-level strategies and policies. To assess gaps 

within the dual-status commander construct and domestic cyber, we 

identified best practices in prior GAO reports and high-level DOD 

guidance, and to determine the extent that DOD demonstrated these 

practices, we interviewed DOD and DHS officials and reviewed related 

documents. More detailed information on our scope and methodology can 

be found in appendix I of this report.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to September 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD conducts a number of homeland defense and civil support missions. 

Examples of DOD’s homeland defense missions include defending 

against threats to the homeland from, among other things, international 

terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cyber 

operations aimed at DOD computer networks. Examples of DOD’s civil 

Background 

DOD’s Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support Missions
Page 4 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

support missions include responding to major disasters and emergencies 

(both natural and man-made); restoring public health and services and 

civil order, such as animal/plant disease eradication and counterdrug 

operations; and providing support for national special events, such as the 

political conventions and international summits. See figure 1.

Figure 1: Examples of DOD’s Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions

DOD is a supporting agency which provides assistance to the lead federal 

agency for a specific civil support mission. DOD provides support to DHS 

and other federal agencies for the defense portion of the federal response 

to a major disaster or emergency or special event when (1) state, local, 

and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique defense 

capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the lead federal 

agency; or (3) U.S. Northern Command is directed to do so by the 

President or the Secretary of Defense. The federal government’s 

response to major disasters and emergencies in the United States is 

guided by DHS’s National Response Framework, which involves a tiered 

series of responses, beginning with local authorities, state authorities, and 

DOD’s Role in Civil 

Support Missions
Page 5 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

outside assistance from other states.

5 In accordance with the National 

Response Framework and applicable laws including the Robert T. 

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act),6

various federal agencies may play lead or supporting roles, based on 

their authorities and resources, and the nature of the threat or incident. 

For example, DHS manages the federal response to terrorist attacks and 

major disasters. In some instances, national defense assets may be 

needed to assist DHS or another agency in the national response to an 

incident. Defense resources are committed after DOD is directed to do so 

by the President or the Secretary of Defense. When deciding to commit 

defense resources to a request for assistance by a lead federal agency, 

DOD officials evaluate the request against 6 criteria: legality, lethality, 

risk, cost, military readiness, and appropriateness of the circumstances.7

 

5

 The National Response Framework—formerly called the National Response Plan—is a 

national-level guide on how local, state, and federal governments respond to major 

disasters and emergencies. The framework is based on a tiered, graduated response; that 

is, incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional levels and supported by additional 

higher-tiered response capabilities as needed. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: January 2008). 

If it is determined that defense assistance is appropriate, typically U.S. 

Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command are responsible for 

leading DOD’s response within their designated areas of responsibility. In 

most cases, support will be localized, limited, and specific. Figure 2 

illustrates relevant portions of the areas of responsibility for U.S. Northern 

Command and U.S. Pacific Command

6

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-

707 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq.). 

7

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, II-4, (Sept. 14, 2007). 
Page 6 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Figure 2: Relevant Areas of Responsibility for U.S. Northern Command and U.S. 

Pacific Command

A number of DOD organizations have key roles and responsibilities in the 

homeland defense and civil support missions. The Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense 

and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on homeland 

defense and civil support matters, among other things. The Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs is the principal advisor to 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense 

responsible for formulating and coordinating DOD strategy and policy on 

issues such as countering weapons of mass destruction, nuclear 

deterrence and missile defense, cyber security and space policy. The 

Joint Staff oversees joint doctrine development within DOD, including the 

joint publications for homeland defense and civil support. U.S. Northern 

DOD Organizations that 

Have Key Roles and 

Responsibilities in 

Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support
Page 7 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Command and U.S. Pacific Command are the two DOD geographic 

combatant commands primarily responsible for carrying out DOD’s 

homeland defense and civil support missions. U.S. Strategic Command 

and U.S. Cyber Command, a sub-unified combatant command under U.S. 

Strategic Command, coordinate with U.S. Northern Command and DHS 

for domestic incidents with a cyber component. The military services 

typically provide the personnel and equipment to carry out homeland 

defense and civil support missions.

Table 1 describes the DOD organizations that have key roles and 

responsibilities in homeland defense and civil support and the 

organizations’ roles for these missions. 

Table 1: DOD Organizations that have Key Roles and Responsibilities in Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support

Organization Roles and Responsibilities

Office of the 

Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for 

Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ 

Security Affairs

Serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on 

homeland defense activities, civil support, and Western 

Hemisphere security matters.

Office of the 

Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for 

Global Strategic 

Affairs 

Serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense, responsible 

for formulating and coordinating DOD strategy and policy on 

countering weapons of mass destruction, nuclear forces and 

missile defense, cyber security and space issues, and

according to DOD officials, works closely with other assistant 

secretaries of defense to coordinate strategy and policy in 

these areas.

Joint Staff Oversees and advises on the department’s joint training,

exercises, professional military education, doctrine, concept 

development and policy development, including 

counterterrorism and cyber policy.

National Guard 

Bureau

Facilitates and coordinates with other federal agencies 

regarding the use of National Guard resources for operations 

conducted under Title 32. 

U.S. Northern 

Command and U.S. 

Pacific Command

Plan, organize, and as directed execute homeland defense 

operations within their areas of responsibility and provide 

support to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local levels 

as directed.

U.S Strategic 

Command/ U.S. 

Cyber Command

Synchronize planning for cyberspace operations in 

coordination with other combatant commands, the military 

services, and as directed by appropriate federal agencies.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD directives and policies.
Page 8 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders—military officers who 

coordinate state and federal responses to events for civil support 

missions—have been used for select planned and special events since 

2004. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20128

provided that a dual-status commander should be the usual and customary 

command and control arrangement in situations when the armed forces 

and national guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil 

authorities, including missions involving major disasters and emergencies. 

The Act indicates that, when an officer is appointed as a dual-status 

commander, he or she serves on federal active duty, sometimes referred to 

as Title 10 status, as well as on duty in or with the National Guard of a 

state, sometimes referred to as Title 32 status.9 A dual-status commander 

can be appointed in one of two ways: 1) an active duty Army or Air Force 

officer may be detailed to the Army National Guard or Air National Guard 

respectively,10 or 2) an Army or Air National Guard Officer may be called to 

active duty.11

DOD and the Council of Governors are working together to implement the 

dual-status commander construct. The Council of Governors consists of 

10 U.S. state governors who are appointed by the President to a two-year 

term.

The Secretary of Defense must authorize, and the Governor 

must consent to, designation of an officer to serve as a dual-status 

commander. When operating in Title 32 status, National Guard personnel, 

including dual-status commanders, are under the command and control of 

the state governor. DOD and National Guard personnel operating in Title 

10 status, including dual-status commanders, are under the command and 

control of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Dual-status 

commanders—whether Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army or 

Air Force—exercise command on behalf of and receive orders from both 

the Federal and the state chains of command. The dual-status commander 

is the intermediate link between these two separate chains of command. 

12

 

8

Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 515 (2011).

The council’s purpose is to strengthen the partnership between 

the state and federal governments to protect the country, its people, and 

9

Title 10 and Title 32 are titles of the United States Code that govern the operations of the 

Department of Defense and the National Guard respectively.

10See 32 U.S.C. § 315.

11See 32 U.S.C. § 325.

12The Council of Governors was established by Executive Order 13528 in January 2010.

The Dual-Status 

Commander Construct
Page 9 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

its property. The council when called upon, provides views, information, 

and advice on matters involving the National Guard of the various states, 

homeland defense, civil support, synchronization and integration of state 

and federal military activities in the United States, and other matters of 

mutual interest pertaining to National Guard, homeland defense, and civil 

support activities.

DHS leads interagency efforts to identify and mitigate cyber 

vulnerabilities, and DOD provides support to DHS in carrying out its 

responsibilities. DHS developed the interim National Cyber Incident 

Response Plan13, which outlines domestic cyber incident response 

coordination and execution among federal, state and territorial, and local 

governments, and the private sector.

DOD has issued numerous policies and guidance related to its homeland 

defense and civil support missions; however some of it is outdated or 

incomplete, and no process exists to ensure updates are made to its 

primary homeland defense and civil support strategy. Specifically, DOD’s 

primary strategy for how it will respond to an attack on the homeland or 

provide support to civil authorities in the event of a major disaster or 

emergency has not been updated since 2005 and no process exists to 

require such updating. Further, DOD’s existing homeland defense and 

civil support guidance does not incorporate important details related to 

the dual-status commander construct and the department’s response to a 

domestic cyber incident, such as its roles and responsibilities. While gaps 

still exist with DOD’s strategy and guidance related to the dual-status 

command and domestic cyber, DOD has contributed to some nationallevel homeland defense and civil support guidance. Table 2 shows some 

of the key department and national level policies and guidance DOD uses 

to plan for its homeland defense and civil support missions, and when the 

guidance was last issued or updated. 

 

13Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Incident Response Plan, Interim 

Version, (Washington, D.C.: September 2010)

DOD Supports DHS in 

Domestic Cyber 

Preparedness and 

Response 

Some DOD Homeland 

Defense and Civil 

Support Mission 

Guidance Is Outdated 

or Incomplete, and No 

Routine Process 

Exists to Ensure 

Regular Updating
Page 10 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Table 2: Some Key Department and National Level Policies and Guidance that DOD 

Uses for its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions

Guidance (agency that issued guidance)

Date issued

or last updated 

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (DOD) June 2005

Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense (DOD) July 2007

Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (DOD) September 2007

Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

Joint Operating Concept (DOD)

October 2007

National Response Framework (DHS) January 2008

DOD Directive 5111.13, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (DOD)

January 2009

Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort (DOD, DHS, 

Council of Governors)

2010

National Cyber Incident Response Plan, interim (DHS) September 2010

Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace July 2011

Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and DHS regarding 

Cybersecurity (DOD and DHS)

September 2010

DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

(DOD)

December 2010

DOD Directive 5111.18, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Global Strategic Affairs (DOD)

June 2011

Department of Defense Concept of Operations for Dual-Status 

Commander (DOD)

February 2012

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and national level guidance and policies.

DOD has established processes to issue and regularly update its 

directives and joint publications for homeland defense and civil support 

missions, but the department has not updated its primary strategy for 

these missions—the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support—

since it was initially issued in 2005, and it does not have a process similar 

to that for its directives and joint publications to do so.14

 

14Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington, 

D.C: June 2005).

While DOD plans 

to issue an updated strategy in the fall of 2012 in response to a 2010 

GAO recommendation and internal department discussions, it has not yet 

developed a process to assess the need for future updates. DOD 

Instruction 5025.01 DOD Directives Program, issued in 2007 

DOD Has Not Updated Its 

Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support Strategy and 

Does Not Have a Process 

to Ensure Such Updates
Page 11 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

(incorporating changes made in 2010), requires DOD organizations to 

review their directives, instructions, manuals, and administrative 

instructions prior to the 5th anniversary of their publication date to ensure 

that they are necessary, current, and consistent with DOD policy, existing 

law, and statutory authority.15

The Joint Staff has also established a process to update joint doctrine.

As a part of this process, the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs updated its guidance for defense support to civil 

authorities in December 2010 with the issuance of DOD Directive 

3025.18. This directive replaced or supplemented several directives, one 

of which had not been updated since 1993.

16

Joint Staff officials stated that joint doctrine should not be more than 5 

years old to maintain relevancy, and at the time of our review the Joint 

Staff had identified as a goal to have 100 percent of the joint publications 

updated within the last 5 years. According to DOD officials, this process 

includes requesting feedback across DOD regarding the currency of joint 

publications every 2 years. In August 2010, the Joint Staff determined 

that the joint publication on homeland defense, Joint Publication 3-2717

needed a complete revision based on feedback they received from the 

joint doctrine development community.18 The joint publication on civil 

support, Joint Publication 3-28,

19

 

15DOD Instruction 5025.01, DOD Directives Program, § 4.c (Oct. 28, 2007, incorporating 

change 2, Jul. 1, 2010). This instruction superseded a previous DOD directive on updating 

publications from 2004.

is also being revised. U.S. Northern 

Command is leading efforts to update the 2007 joint publications on 

homeland defense and civil support in coordination with the Joint Staff 

and other members of the joint doctrine community. According to Joint 

Staff officials, the revised joint publications are expected to reflect 

changes in national and department priorities and incorporate lessons 

learned from exercises and events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 

16Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine Development 

System (Jan 2012).

17Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-27, Homeland Defense (July 12, 2007). 

18The joint doctrine development community consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, the Joint Staff, the military services, the combatant commands, the National 

Guard Bureau, the combat support agencies, and other select DOD organizations. 

19Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Sept. 14, 2007). 
Page 12 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Joint Staff officials told us that the publications are scheduled to be issued 

in May 2013.

In contrast, DOD’s primary strategy for homeland defense and civil 

support is 7 years old. According to DOD’s joint doctrine development 

instruction,20 national military strategies, such as DOD’s Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and joint doctrine should be closely 

linked because strategies define the desired outcome for joint doctrine. 

Moreover, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government and prior GAO audit work state that, to be effective, 

guidance—including strategies—should be current and complete.21

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and Americas’ Security Affairs has made previous attempts to update its 

2005 homeland defense and civil support strategy. However these 

attempts have been unsuccessful, in part, because DOD does not have a 

process similar to its process for joint doctrine for periodically assessing 

the currency of its strategy and ensuring that updates are completed in a 

timely manner. In 2010, we reported that DOD began a revision of the 

strategy in October 2008, but it was postponed due to the forthcoming 

change in presidential administrations.

In the 

intervening years since the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs issued the Strategy for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support, key national- and department-level guidance 

has been issued and significant civil support events have occurred that 

are not reflected in the department’s primary strategy. For example, the 

homeland defense and civil support strategy does not address U.S. Cyber 

Command’s role in domestic cyber incidents because the command was 

established in 2009, 4 years after the issuance of the strategy. 

Additionally, DOD’s homeland defense and civil support strategy does not 

incorporate the restructured Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Enterprise.

22

 

20Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02C, Joint Doctrine Development 

System (Jan. 13, 2012)

At that time, the office estimated 

21GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C: Nov. 1, 1999). 

22GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency 

Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions. GAO-10-364

(Washington, D.C: Mar. 30, 2010).
Page 13 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

the updated strategy would be completed in March 2011; however, in 

September 2011 the office reported to Congress that the strategy 

remained valid and stated that it would provide updates on its approach to 

homeland defense and civil support through instructions and directives.23

In June 2012, officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs told us that the 

homeland defense and civil support strategy is being updated and is 

scheduled to be reissued by the fall of 2012. These officials also stated 

that the revised strategy will incorporate guidance from current national 

and department-level strategies and policies, such as the 2012 Strategic 

Defense Guidance, and the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive on national 

preparedness,24 among others. An outdated homeland defense and civil 

support strategy cannot fully inform joint planning efforts in several critical 

homeland defense areas, including domestic cyber operations and 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear preparedness. Reliance on 

an outdated strategy that does not reflect the department’s current vision 

and understanding of homeland defense and civil support might hinder 

DOD’s ability to effectively plan for and respond to major disasters and 

other emergencies.

DOD has issued some guidance on the dual-status commander 

construct; however, gaps remain concerning the use and availability of 

dual-status commanders. Dual-status commanders—military officers who 

serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command 

for state and federal forces—have authority over both National Guard 

forces under state control and active duty forces under federal control 

during a civil support incident or special event.25

 

23Department of Defense, Letter from Paul Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs to Carl Levin, Chariman of the

Committee on Armed Services, September 2011.

DOD has been using 

dual-status commanders for select planned and special events since 

24Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness (Mar. 30, 2011).

25The governors of the affected states and the Secretary of Defense must first mutually 

agree on the appointment of a dual-status commander, and the dual-status commander 

must still respect the separate chains of command for both sets of forces. For example, 

the commander may not issue orders to federal military forces while acting pursuant to 

state authority or vice versa. The dual-status commander construct does not give the 

President command of state military forces, or the Governor of a state command of federal 

military forces.

Gaps Remain in Guidance 

Concerning DOD’s DualStatus Commander 

Construct 
Page 14 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

2004. For example, DOD officials stated that dual-status commanders 

were appointed for the 2004 G-8 Summit in Atlanta, Georgia, the 2005 

border security exercise Operation Winter Freeze along the U.S.-

Canadian border, and the 2010 National Scout Jamboree at Fort A.P. Hill, 

Virginia. In addition to these planned events, DOD used the dual-status 

commander for the 2012 Colorado wildfire response.

DOD has coordinated with stakeholders at the state and federal levels to 

issue guidance for the dual-status commander construct. For example, in 

2010, DOD worked with DHS, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, and the Council of Governors to develop the Joint Action Plan for 

Developing Unity of Effort.

26 The plan provides a framework for state and 

federal agencies to coordinate their response to domestic incidents and 

describes the general arrangement of the dual-status commander 

construct. Among other things, the plan discusses how dual-status 

commanders can respond to planned and unplanned events, and it 

identifies the need for specialized training and certification. In addition, 

according to DOD officials, from August 2011 to February 2012, DOD 

signed memoranda of agreement with 51 of 54 states and territories27

Nevertheless, gaps in guidance remain because DOD has not yet 

developed comprehensive policies and procedures regarding the use and 

availability of dual-status commanders. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 states that the dual-status 

commander “should be the usual and customary command and control 

arrangement” when federal military forces and National Guard forces are 

employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United 

States.

. 

Furthermore, in February 2012, U.S. Northern Command issued a 

concept of operations which, among other things, establishes criteria for 

dual-status commander designation and training requirements. U.S. 

Northern Command has also worked with the National Guard Bureau to 

establish a curriculum that includes a sequenced schedule of classes for 

dual-status commander training and certification.

28

 

26 Department of Defense, Council of Governors, Department of Homeland Security, Joint 

Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort (Washington D.C.: 2010). 

However, DOD has not identified specific criteria and conditions 

27The territories include Washington, D.C.; Guam; the U.S. Virgin Islands; and Puerto 

Rico.

28Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 515 (2011).
Page 15 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

for when the Secretary of Defense would agree with the governors of the 

affected states to appoint a dual-status commander. Some combatant 

command officials told us that the dual-status commander construct may 

not be appropriate for all scenarios and that other existing command and 

control arrangements can be used in responding to certain major 

disasters or emergencies. For example, U.S. Pacific Command officials 

stated that in 2011 when the tsunami warning resulting from the 

earthquake that struck Japan was issued in Hawaii, no dual-status 

commander was appointed; rather, U.S. Pacific Command coordinated its 

response in Hawaii directly with that state’s authorities.

Additionally, gaps in guidance remain for the use of dual-status 

commanders for incidents affecting multiple states and territories, 

including complex catastrophes, because DOD has not yet developed 

policies and procedures for these scenarios.29

With respect to the availability of dual-status commanders, while DOD 

has a process for appointing dual-status commanders, it has not 

developed a process for determining the appropriate mix of National 

Guard and active duty federal officers. GAO’s Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government

The Joint Action Plan cites

the significant likelihood that DOD will be called on to support responses 

to major disasters and emergencies affecting multiple states and 

territories. The Joint Action Plan states that past multistate emergencies 

such as Hurricane Katrina demonstrate that a coordinated and 

expeditious state-federal response is crucial to saving and sustaining 

lives, and it indicates that DOD and the several states will address the 

use of the dual-status commanders for such scenarios. However, DOD’s 

concept of operations does not address how to use a dual-status 

commander in these scenarios. According to DOD, they are continuing to 

work with the Council of Governors to address the use of dual-status 

commanders in complex catastrophes affecting multiple states.

30

 

29A complex catastrophe is an incident that has cascading effects, such as an earthquake 

that causes widespread casualties, displaces households, and damages major 

transportation and utilities such as electricity, water, and gas.

emphasizes the importance of 

establishing policies and procedures to effectively manage resources to 

achieve desired results, such as the implementation of the dual-status 

commander construct. At the July 15, 2012 Council of Governor’s 

30GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Page 16 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

meeting, the council and federal officials agreed to a goal of at least 3 

trained and certified dual-status commander candidates with at least one 

being a general officer for each of the 54 U.S. states and territories, thus 

providing primary and alternate dual-status commanders. As figure 4 

shows, all 54 U.S. states and territories have at least one trained and 

certified dual-status commander, 70 percent (38 of 54) have two or more 

trained and certified commanders, and 13 percent (7 of 54) have three or 

more commanders. As of June 2012, all of the trained and certified dualstatus commanders shown in Figure 3 were National Guard officers.
Page 17 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Figure 3: Number of Trained and Certified Dual-Status Commanders in the 54 U.S. States and Territories, as of June 2012

According to Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and National Guard officials, 

maintaining a pipeline of trained and certified dual-status commanders 

drawn exclusively from the National Guard may be a challenge. The 

National Guard has a limited number of officers from which to select dualstatus commanders, and these National Guard officers have other roles 

and responsibilities that may preclude them from being immediately 

available for an unplanned incident requiring a civil support response. For 

example, some individuals trained and certified to be dual-status 

commanders serve as airline pilots and may not be in the area when a 
Page 18 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

dual-status commander is needed. During Hurricane Irene in 2011, the 

trained and certified dual-status commander from one of the affected 

states was at a training exercise and unavailable. While the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 made it clear that dualstatus commanders could be appointed from among the National Guard 

or active duty federal officers, as of May 2012, no active duty dual-status 

commanders have been trained and certified thus far. Office of Secretary 

of Defense and military service officials told us that it may be helpful to 

have an active duty federal dual-status commander for incidents affecting 

multiple states, such as a complex catastrophe. They stated that an 

active duty federal dual-status commander might have greater flexibility 

moving between multiple states and territories affected by an incident and 

might offer a broader, national perspective consistent with the Secretary 

of Defense’s and the President’s priorities. Training and certifying active 

duty dual-status commanders would increase the number of dual-status 

commanders and increase the likelihood that a dual-status commander 

will be available to serve when needed.

Without complete guidance on the use and availability of dual-status 

commanders, including when it is appropriate to deviate from the “usual 

and customary arrangement,” it remains unclear when a different 

command and control arrangement would be more appropriate to provide 

a unity of effort between state and federal forces in civil support events.

Also, without guidance on a process to determine the appropriate mix of 

individuals trained and certified to be dual-status commanders from the 

National Guard and active duty federal officers for the 54 U.S. states and 

territories, DOD’s ability to adequately prepare for and effectively use 

dual-status commanders for a range of civil support events, including 

those affecting multiple states, may be hindered.

DOD has issued some guidance on preparing for and responding to 

domestic cyber incidents. DOD relies on its broad civil support mission 

guidance, which is also used for incidents such as responding to 

hurricanes and forest fires, to prepare for and respond to domestic cyber 

incidents. DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, 

issued in 2010, describes how the department generally responds to 

requests for civil support and includes a broad description of the 

DOD Relies on its Broad 

Civil Support Guidance for 

Domestic Cyber Incidents
Page 19 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

department’s roles and responsibilities for civil support.31 DOD’s 2007 

joint publication on civil support provides further details on the 

department’s civil support mission, including an operational framework of 

how DOD prepares and responds to requests for assistance, a decision 

matrix for evaluating requests, and a broad description of the 

department’s roles and responsibilities.32 In addition to the civil support 

directive and joint publication, in 2010 the Secretaries of Defense and 

Homeland Security signed a memorandum of agreement that outlines 

how the two agencies collaborate and coordinate cyberspace activities 

including those related to a domestic cyber incident.33

Although DOD has some civil support guidance and an agreement with 

DHS for preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents, these 

documents do not provide some aspects of how DOD will support a 

domestic cyber incident. First, DOD’s civil support mission guidance does 

not clearly define the department’s roles and responsibilities during a 

domestic cyber incident. According to GAO’s Standards for Internal 

Control in the Federal Government

Office of Secretary 

of Defense and DHS officials told us that the agreement has helped 

clarify the roles and responsibilities of the agencies. 

34

 

31Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

(Dec. 29, 2010).

and prior GAO audit work, effective 

guidance should be current, complete, and establish roles and 

responsibilities necessary to achieve an organization’s missions and 

objectives. DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

acknowledges that DOD needs more clearly defined roles and 

responsibilities for operating in cyberspace. While DOD’s guidance for its 

civil support mission broadly describes how the department can support 

other federal agencies during a civil support incident, DOD has not 

updated its civil support guidance to reflect current DOD cyber roles and 

responsibilities. For example, DOD’s joint publication on civil support was 

issued 2 years before U.S. Cyber Command was established in 2009.

32Joint Pub. 3-28.

33Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Department of Defense Regarding Cybersecurity (Oct. 12, 2010). 

34GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
Page 20 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

In addition, the chartering directives for the Offices of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs35

Second, DOD has not taken adequate steps to ensure that its guidance 

aligns with national-level guidance and preparations for domestic cyber 

incidents. DOD has contributed to DHS national-level cyber response 

plans, including the National Cyber Incident Response Plan and the 

National Response Framework’s Cyber Annex. However, DOD has not 

updated its own civil support mission guidance to ensure that it is 

consistent with national plans and preparations for domestic cyber 

incidents. Without guidance that aligns with national level plans and 

preparations, DOD’s ability to support DHS during a domestic cyber 

incident could be hindered. 

have assigned overlapping roles and responsibilities for 

preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents. Specifically,

both DOD offices are responsible for coordinating and overseeing the 

department’s cyber policy. Additionally, DOD’s 2010 directive on civil 

support designates the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense and 

Americas’ Security Affairs as the appropriate lead for civil support 

missions in general to include domestic cyber incidents. However, DOD 

officials told us that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 

Strategic Affairs was the appropriate department lead for domestic cyber 

incidents and that this office was created after DOD published its 2009 

chartering directive for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. DOD officials said they plan to 

omit the overlap when they update the 2009 directive. DOD officials told 

us that current national-level exercises involving DOD, DHS, and other 

federal agencies should help DOD clarify its roles and responsibilities and 

subsequently update its guidance for domestic cyber incidents. 

Nonetheless, until DOD clearly defines roles and responsibilities, the 

department risks a delayed response while its officials determine which 

entities to involve in responding to potentially time critical domestic cyber 

incidents. Moreover, multiple DOD entities may be performing 

overlapping planning functions, since it is not clear which office has lead 

responsibility.

 

35Department of Defense Directive 5111.18, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 

Strategic Affairs (June 13, 2011); and Department of Defense Directive 5111.13, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs 

(Jan.16, 2009).
Page 21 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

In the absence of clear and current guidance on DOD’s critical and 

evolving homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD may 

continue to lack the ability to effectively plan and respond to incidents 

such as a domestic cyber attack or major disaster. While DOD has made 

some progress in issuing and updating relevant guidance to support its 

critical homeland defense and civil support missions, DOD still lacks the 

necessary framework for some of its most critical missions and a process 

to assess the currency of its strategy for these missions. Threats to the 

homeland and major disasters and emergencies, such as cyber attacks 

and earthquakes, frequently are unpredictable and occur with little or no 

notice. Maintaining up to date and comprehensive strategy and guidance 

will better position DOD to plan for and respond to myriad homeland 

defense threats and challenges. Without a strategy that accurately 

reflects the department’s current approach to homeland defense and civil 

support, such as the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, DOD officials lack 

essential information to prepare for these critical missions. Further, while 

DOD’s efforts to implement the dual-status commander construct could 

result in a more streamlined, comprehensive response to major disasters 

and emergencies, particularly those affecting multiple states and 

territories, until DOD clarifies how it plans to use dual-status commanders 

and develops a process for determining the appropriate mix of National 

Guard and active duty federal officers that it needs, the value of this 

construct will be diminished. Finally, without specific guidance on DOD’s 

response to domestic cyber incidents, including clearly defined roles and 

responsibilities, DOD may be unable to quickly and effectively support 

DHS during domestic cyber attacks. As a result, DHS’s ability to 

effectively respond to domestic cyber attacks and minimize their impact 

may be hindered. Enhancing DOD’s overall preparedness, including 

developing and maintaining current and complete guidance for its 

homeland defense and civil support missions, would contribute to a more 

efficient national response to major disasters and emergencies and a 

more cost-effective use of federal resources for these critical missions.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, to develop a process 

to periodically assess the currency of its Strategy for Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support and to ensure that updates, when needed, are 

completed in a timely manner.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 22 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and in collaboration 

with other appropriate stakeholders such as U.S. Northern Command, 

U.S. Pacific Command, and the National Guard Bureau, to develop 

implementation guidance on the dual-status commander construct that, at 

a minimum, includes:

• more specific criteria for determining when and how to use dual-status 

commanders, especially for civil support incidents affecting multiple 

states and territories and

• a process for determining the appropriate mix of National Guard and 

active duty federal officers to meet DOD’s anticipated needs.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy to work with U.S. Strategic Command and its subordinate Cyber 

Command, DHS, and other relevant stakeholders to update guidance on 

preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents to align with 

national-level guidance. Such guidance should, at a minimum, include a 

description of DOD’s roles and responsibilities.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 

concurred or partially concurred with all of our recommendations and 

stated that there are ongoing activities to address our recommendations. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In addition, 

DOD provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the 

report as appropriate.

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, through the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security 

Affairs, to develop a process to periodically assess the currency of its 

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support and to ensure that 

updates, when needed, are completed in a timely manner. DOD stated 

that it recognizes the need to ensure that strategic guidance is clear and 

timely, and that going forward it will conduct an annual review to 

determine the currency of the homeland defense and civil support 

strategy. We believe that this review will better position DOD to plan for 

and respond to its critical homeland defense and civil support missions. 

DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, through the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 23 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Security Affairs and in collaboration with other appropriate stakeholders 

such as U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and the 

National Guard Bureau, to develop implementation guidance on the dualstatus commander construct. In its written response, DOD stated that the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 

Security Affairs has drafted a DOD instruction that, among other things, 

establishes specific criteria for determining how and when to use dualstatus commanders, as well as whom to authorize as dual-status 

commanders. We believe this instruction, when it is issued, will fill 

existing gaps in guidance on the use and availability of dual-status 

commanders that should result in a more streamlined, comprehensive 

department response to major disasters and emergencies. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to work with 

U.S. Strategic Command and its subordinate Cyber Command, DHS, and 

other relevant stakeholders to update guidance on preparing for and 

responding to domestic cyber incidents to align with national-level 

guidance. In its written response, DOD agreed that some of its cyber 

guidance needs updating to ensure that the military services, combatant 

commands, and other DOD organizations are aware of their 

responsibilities relative to domestic cyber incidents. Although DOD 

acknowledged that there may be competing guidance within the 

chartering directives for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, it stated that there is no confusion 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding who manages 

cyber policy. However, DOD did agree to further clarify cyber policy 

responsibilities when it next updates these two chartering directives. We 

believe that further clarification of DOD organizations’ roles and 

responsibilities in guidance will enhance the department’s ability to 

support DHS during significant domestic cyber incidents. We believe that

DOD’s response meets the intent of our recommendation. 

We also provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. 

DHS concurred with our recommendation that DOD coordinate with them 

to update guidance on preparing for and responding to a domestic cyber 

incident. DHS said it will coordinate with DOD as it updates its guidance. 

DHS’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix III. 

As agreed with your offices, we plan no further distribution of this report 

until 1 day from the report date. At that time, we will distribute this report 
Page 24 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

to the Secretary of Defense and other relevant DOD officials. We are also 

sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees. The 

report is also available on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

Appendix IV. 

Brian J. Lepore

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

issued current and comprehensive guidance, we reviewed homeland 

defense and civil support doctrine, policy, and strategy and other relevant 

documentation, and met with officials from DOD and Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) to discuss the currency of the department’s 

guidance and identify any potential gaps in the guidance that may exist. 

Specifically, we assessed national-level and DOD homeland defense and 

civil support guidance against emerging issues in our discussions with 

DOD, combatant command, and military service officials including the 

dual-status commander construct and domestic cyber. We also reviewed 

the assessments DOD received from the members of the joint doctrine 

community to determine which emerging issues prompted complete 

revisions of the joint publications on homeland defense and civil support 

and how these issues were addressed in other sources of guidance 

including directives, strategies, joint operating concepts, and nationallevel guidance. In addition, we reviewed recently issued GAO reports on

homeland defense and civil support, and excluded potential gaps in 

guidance that were duplicative to those recently reported. Table 3 lists the 

offices we met with during this review.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 26 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Table 3: Offices We Met with During our Review

Name of Department Office 

Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Directorate of Military Support

Joint Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy

Joint Directorate of Joint Force Development, Joint

Doctrine Branch

U.S. Northern Command

U.S. Army North

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. Strategic Command

U.S. Cyber Command

U.S. Army

Army War Plans Division

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

U.S. Marine Corps

Plans, Policies, and Operations 

U.S. Air Force

Homeland Operations Division

The National Guard Bureau

The Army National Guard

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Department of Homeland Security Policy

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National 

Preparedness Directorate

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Response 

Directorate

National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 

Center

Office of Cyber Security and Communications

National Cybersecurity Division

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team

Source: GAO

To determine potential gaps in DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support and the impact of any identified gaps, we compared the 

strategy against priorities articulated in current, overarching national- and 

department-level strategies and policies—including the National 

Response Framework, the National Security Strategy, the January 2012 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 27 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Defense Strategic Guidance, and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

We also met with DOD officials and assessed relevant documentation, 

such as the instructions on joint doctrine development and updating 

directives, to determine the extent that the department had established and 

utilized a process to maintain current guidance. We used our assessment 

and discussion with DOD officials to determine the impact these 

established processes had on DOD’s ability to maintain current doctrine 

and directives. Finally, we determined which key policy changes occurred 

since the strategy was released and the impact of not incorporating those 

changes in DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. 

To assess gaps within the dual-status commander construct and domestic 

cyber, we identified best practices in prior GAO reports and high-level DOD 

guidance, and to determine the extent that DOD demonstrated these 

practices, we reviewed related documents, and we interviewed DOD and 

DHS officials. Specifically, we analyzed data provided by U.S. Northern 

Command, including the current number of individuals trained and certified 

as dual-status commanders and processes used to train and certify them. 

We used this data to determine how DOD was planning to use dual-status 

commanders and to what extent they determined the appropriate mix of 

active duty and National Guard dual-status commanders. We also 

assessed current guidance against information obtained in interviews with 

knowledgeable Joint Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense, combatant 

command, and military service officials to determine how DOD was 

planning to address identified gaps. To determine the currency and 

completeness of the department’s guidance for domestic cyber incidents, 

we reviewed relevant guidance and met with DOD and DHS officials to 

discuss gaps and the impact of gaps on civil support for cyber incident 

responses. We determined which offices in DOD had a role for domestic 

cyber, reviewed relevant DOD directives outlining those roles, and 

analyzed whether there was any overlap within those offices or additional 

clarification that was needed. We compared this assessment to 

discussions with knowledgeable DOD and DHS officials to determine how 

DOD was planning to address any identified gaps.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to September 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 30 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 31 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 32 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 33 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Brian J. Lepore, Director, 202-512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above Marc Schwartz, Assistant 

Director; Katherine Arnold; Tommy Baril; Jennifer Cheung; Susan Ditto; 

Gina Flacco; William Jenkins; Jennifer Neer; Michael Silver; Amie Steele; 

and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 35 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Homeland Defense: Continued Actions Needed to Improve Management 

of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations. GAO-12-311. Washington, D.C.: 

January 31, 2012.

Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps 

Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life Saving 

Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.

Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 

Coordination for Maritime Operations. GAO-11-661. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 2011.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, 

Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness. 

GAO-11-621. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2011.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency 

Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions. 

GAO-10-364. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to 

Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington, 

D.C.: March 30, 2010.

Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge 

DOD’s Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 

and High-Yield Explosive Incidents. GAO 10-123. Washington, D.C.: 

October 7, 2009.

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise 

Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be 

Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 

Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. 

GAO-09-369. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-08-868T. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 36 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to 

Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process. 

GAO-08-768. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008.

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 

Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, 

but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 

Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other 

Issues. GAO-08-251. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities 

during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. GAO-08-105. Washington, D.C.: 

November 19, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to Address 

Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 

GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007.

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, 

D.C.: July 31, 2007.

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts 

Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 

Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 

GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-903. 

Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support 

Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. GAO-06-498. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006.
Related GAO Products

Page 37 GAO-13-128 Homeland Defense

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 8, 2006.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 23, 2006.

GAO’S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 1, 2006.

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, 

D.C.: July 11, 2005.

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005.

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