NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ADAM E., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.E., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0128 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD533332

The Honorable Ashley V. Halvorson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Michelle R. Nimmo

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 9-22-2022
ADAM E. v. DCS, A.E.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Adam E. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his son (“Child”). Mother is not a party to 

this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child was born in September 2009. In April 2020, the 

Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a dependency petition, alleging 

Father’s inability to parent due to his incarceration. The Department of 

Corrections released Father from prison in June 2020. DCS sent Father a 

letter the following month stating it would provide substance-abuse 

testing, substance-abuse treatment, and parent aide services. DCS struggled 

to maintain contact with Father. 

¶3 In August 2021, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental 

rights on abandonment and nine months’ time-in-care grounds. DCS 

learned four months later that police arrested Father for aggravated driving 

under the influence earlier that year. The juvenile court held a two-day 

contested termination hearing in February and March 2022. 

¶4 DCS’s case specialist testified that DCS offered Father parent 

aide services and substance-abuse testing, but both services closed his 

referrals for lack of engagement. The case specialist also testified that Father 

never sent Child any cards, gifts, or letters, and Father failed to maintain a 

normal relationship with Child. DCS’s case supervisor testified that Father 

never visited Child after his release from prison. 

¶5 The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights on both 

grounds and found termination was in Child’s best interests. Father timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-

120.21(A)(1). 
ADAM E. v. DCS, A.E.

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of 

discretion. Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 15 (App. 

2018). 

¶7 The juvenile court may terminate a parental relationship 

upon proof of one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and 

convincing evidence. Id. Parental rights may be terminated if a parent 

abandons their child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment includes, “the 

failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular 

contact with the child, including providing normal supervision. 

Abandonment includes a judicial finding that the parent has made only 

minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” A.R.S. § 8-

531(1). The failure of a parent to maintain a “normal parental relationship” 

for six months is “prima facie evidence of abandonment.” Id.

¶8 Father does not dispute the juvenile court’s finding that he 

abandoned Child. He merely challenges whether DCS made reasonable 

efforts to provide him with reunification services. The record supports the 

court’s finding that Father never had a normal parent-child relationship 

with Child. DCS therefore was not obligated to provide reunification 

services when it sought termination on the abandonment ground. See Toni 

W. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 61, 66, ¶ 15 (App. 1999) (diligent 

efforts to provide reunification services are not required in abandonment 

cases because of the absence of an existing parent-child relationship). We 

find no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶9 We affirm.