Department of Homeland Security
 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border 


Security (Redacted) 


OIG-12-39 February 2012
 
 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

February 13, 2012

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established 

by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector 

General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as 

part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within 

the Department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Department’s information sharing on 

foreign nationals at U.S. borders. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of 

relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, 

and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We trust this report 

will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation 

to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Charles K. Edwards
 

Acting Inspector General
 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................7 


Infrastructure and Resource Issues Continue To Hinder 


Information Sharing Efforts ...........................................................................................7
 

Recommendation .........................................................................................................11
 

Recommendation .........................................................................................................13
 

Coordination Is Essential To Manage the Foreign National Caseload ........................15
 

Recommendation .........................................................................................................21
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................25
 

Multilateral Support Is Developing for Information Sharing ......................................25 


Recommendations........................................................................................................30 


Recommendation .........................................................................................................34
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................34 


Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................41 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................43
 

Appendix C: DHS Border Security Data Systems ....................................................49
 

Appendix D: Asylum Pre-Screening Case Disposition .............................................51
 

Appendix E: Reasonable Fear Case Timeliness ........................................................52
 

Appendix F: Major Contributors to this Report........................................................53
 

Appendix G: Report Distribution ..............................................................................54 


Abbreviations 

AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center 


APIS Advance Passenger Information System 


APSS Asylum Pre-Screening System 


BEST Border Enforcement Security Task Force 


CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 


Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 


ENFORCE Enforcement Case Tracking System
 

ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations 


FY fiscal year 


GAO Government Accountability Office 

HSI 	 ICE Homeland Security Investigations 

IBET 	 Integrated Border Enforcement Team 

ICE 	 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

MOU 	 memorandum of understanding 

NSEERS 	 National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 

OAM	 Office of Air and Marine 

OFO 	 CBP Office of Field Operations 

OIG 	 Office of Inspector General 

RAIO QA 	 Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate Quality 

Assurance 

TECS 	 TECS (not an acronym) 

TSA 	Transportation Security Administration 

USCIS 	 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

US-VISIT 	 U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The Department of Homeland Security has implemented several 

programs to screen foreign nationals who seek entry into the 

United States at air, land, and sea ports of entry, as well as persons 

who seek illegal entry through land and maritime borders. We 

evaluated whether levels of cooperation, resources, and technology 

were adequate for department officers charged with border 

security. This review is the second phase of a three-phase review. 

We have previously reviewed overseas screening (Information 

Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Overseas Screening OIG-11-68, 

April 2011). 

Some DHS components have developed special-purpose, userfriendly interfaces so that computer users performing focused 

operations, such as primary inspections at ports of entry, can 

access DHS databases. However, fragmented data systems and 

inadequate resources and infrastructure remain a challenge for 

many officers involved in border security. 

Relationships among components work well when they are 

adequately resourced and their missions are clearly defined. 

However, some relationships, most notably among law 

enforcement components on the northern and southern borders, 

struggle with mission overlap and inadequate information sharing. 

The U.S. Coast Guard’s effective and efficient information sharing 

approach is an example of how complex multiagency efforts can 

succeed. However, the sharing of information among other 

components is still evolving. 

We are making eight recommendations to use DHS resources 

better and facilitate increased data sharing. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 1 
Background 

DHS OIG Multiphase Review on Information Sharing 

This report is the second phase of a three-phase report on 

information sharing on foreign nationals within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). In our first report, Information 

Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Overseas Screening, we described 

extensive DHS efforts to screen foreign nationals before they 

arrive at a port of entry. Efforts are focused on screening 

passengers and crew on international flights and sea vessels, as 

well as maritime interdiction. Overseas screening programs rely 

on biographical, biometric, and documentary information in DHS 

and other federal data systems. 

In our report, we determined that DHS has improved the 

evaluation of the admissibility of foreign nationals before they 

travel to the United States, and that the level of cooperation among 

DHS components that conduct overseas screening is high. 

However, we determined that DHS overseas screening initiatives 

face serious resource and technological challenges. Information is 

fragmented among more than 17 DHS data systems, and officers 

must conduct labor-intensive, system-by-system checks to verify 

or eliminate each possible match to terrorist watch lists and other 

derogatory information. Although DHS concurred with 17 of the 

18 recommendations, 5 recommendations required resources that 

the programs do not currently have. 

In this report, we focus on information sharing among DHS 

components related to border security. Information sharing within 

DHS on foreign nationals is the responsibility of five of the seven 

major DHS operational components, as well as support offices. 

The operational components are U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), each of which is actively involved in 

sharing information throughout DHS and with other federal, state, 

local, and tribal partners. Four support offices have a role in 

information sharing: 

 The Counterterrorism Section in the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning, 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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 The Office of Policy, which includes the Screening 

Coordination Office, the Office of International Affairs, and 

the Office of Policy Development, 

 The Border and Immigration Analysis Division in the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis, and 

 The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology (US-VISIT) Program in the National Protection 

and Programs Directorate. 

In addition, two support offices have a role in DHS data systems 

integration: 

 The Information Sharing Intelligence Enterprise 

Management Division in the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis, and 

 The Office of Chief Information Officer in the Office of 

Management. 

In our first report, we reviewed the DHS data systems that are 

routinely used by DHS officers who are stationed overseas or are 

stationed in the United States but screen international flights and 

vessels before embarkation. (See appendix C.) These and other 

systems will be discussed in this report. 

This report evaluates the timeliness and quality of information 

shared through DHS data systems, and through communication 

among DHS component agencies. It also discusses how 

interagency working relationships affect the effectiveness and 

efficiency of operations to screen and process foreign nationals. 

We identified agency best practices as well as some of the 

challenges between agencies to cooperate effectively and share 

information. 

Border Security Operations 

Foreign nationals can enter the United States lawfully through any 

of 327 air, sea, or land border ports of entry. Lawful entry requires 

CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers to evaluate 

individuals seeking entry into the United States for compliance 

with numerous immigration, customs, and agricultural laws and 

regulations, a process called an immigration inspection. 1 About 

two-thirds of these inspections involve foreign nationals and about 

one-third involve U.S. citizens. The CBP OFO National Targeting 

1 http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/bs/border_sec_initiatives_lp.xml.

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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Center – Passenger, Passenger Analysis Units at air ports of entry, 

and joint Coast Guard and CBP maritime operations, conduct 

advance screening of most international travelers who arrive by air 

or sea based on passenger or crew manifests. Most noncitizens 

will have obtained a visa or, if eligible, an Electronic System for 

Travel Authorization approval to be allowed to travel to the United 

States and apply for admission at the port of entry. 

At land border ports of entry, where CBP officers rarely have 

advance notice of arrivals, most U.S. citizens and all foreign 

nationals must present government-issued travel and identification 

documents. For most nationalities, a passport is required. Since 

June 2009, U.S. citizens, and citizens of Mexico, Canada, and 

Bermuda must present a document approved under the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative. 2 Categories of foreign nationals 

whose fingerprints are enrolled in the US-VISIT biometric 

database (Automated Biometric Identification System) have 

expanded to include most nationalities and visa categories. 

Fingerprints are now enrolled for many legal permanent residents 

and citizens of countries for which a visa is not required. Some 

foreign nationals, such as diplomats and certain northern and 

southern border crossers, as well as U.S. citizens, are not enrolled 

in US-VISIT. 

In order to protect the United States better after the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks, foreign nationals from certain countries 

were required to register with the National Security Entry-Exit 

Registration System (NSEERS) when they arrived at a port of 

entry. In 2009, DHS made logistical adjustments necessary to 

terminate the NSEERS program in the event of a policy change. 

Data captured in the NSEERS database are transferred 

automatically to other DHS systems or captured initially in other 

systems, including US-VISIT and Enforcement Case Tracking 

System (ENFORCE). DHS encouraged low-threat registrants to 

obtain waivers for up to one year so they do not have to register 

each time they enter or depart from the United States. Waivers 

allow NSEERS registrants to travel for a predetermined period, up 

to a year, without the need for a CBP secondary inspection for 

each entry and exit. Ports of entry with a large NSEERS 

population strongly encouraged frequent travelers to obtain 

waivers. However, some land border crossings still had NSEERS 

registrants, including commercial truck drivers and students, who 

register their entries and exits with CBP as often as twice daily. 

2

 http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/legally_admitted_to_the_u_s.xml; 

http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1200693579776.shtm. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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Although entry and exit registrations have decreased from more 

than 250,000 in 2002 to about 60,000 in 2010, NSEERS remains a 

significant CBP caseload. At several ports of entry, NSEERS 

registrants were the largest caseload handled in secondary 

inspections. 

Most foreign nationals are admitted to the United States after a 

primary inspection of their travel documents and an assessment of 

their purpose for traveling to the United States. Travelers whose 

admissibility cannot be readily determined are referred to 

secondary inspection for additional checks. A secondary 

inspection consists of a more detailed review of travel documents 

and baggage, in-depth questions by a CBP officer, and multiple 

data checks against various immigration and law enforcement data 

systems. The outcome of the secondary inspection will generally 

determine whether the foreign national is permitted to enter the 

United States. Individuals denied entry may be allowed to 

voluntarily return to their country of origin or may be detained 

while their admissibility is determined through formal immigration 

proceedings. If the foreign national has a visa but is denied entry, 

CBP will generally cancel the visa at the port of entry. 

The following are some general exceptions to these procedures: 

 If the local CBP OFO Passenger Analysis Unit or a CBP 

officer at secondary inspection believes that the case 

involves terrorist or criminal issues, the case may be 

referred to ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) or 

other federal, state, or local law enforcement officers, and 

the alien, or foreign national, may be subject to criminal 

prosecution. 

 Aliens who express to the CBP officer that they fear to 

return to their country of nationality because they believe 

they will be subject to persecution or torture are detained 

by ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). 

Either CBP, the Coast Guard, or ICE ERO notifies the 

USCIS Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations 

Directorate, Asylum Division about these individuals. 

Asylum officers conduct an interview to determine whether 

the case has sufficient merit to be referred to an 

immigration judge for a hearing that would consider 

granting relief from removal or other protection, such as 

asylum, deferral or withholding of removal, or relief under 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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the Convention Against Torture. This process is referred to 

as the “credible fear” process. 

 From August 2002 until April 2011, nonimmigrants from 

certain predominantly Arab and Muslim countries were 

required to register under the NSEERS program each time 

they arrived in or departed from the United States, or had to 

obtain a waiver of these requirements. 

Persons sometimes attempt illegal entry into the United States 

between land, sea, and air ports of entry, for example across the 

northern or southern land border, along the coast, or with an 

unregistered aircraft. Protecting the borders and coasts requires 

that the U.S. Border Patrol, the Office of Air and Marine (OAM), 

ICE HSI, and the Coast Guard cooperate with each other as well as 

with the Canadian and Mexican governments, the military, the 

Intelligence Community, other federal agencies, and state, local, 

and tribal governments. Aliens who cannot immediately be 

removed are referred to the ICE ERO immigration detention 

system. The U.S. Border Patrol, ICE HSI, the Coast Guard, or ICE 

ERO may refer detained aliens for a screening interview by an 

asylum officer for protection issues or a hearing before an 

immigration judge for other immigration issues, or they may bring 

criminal charges. 

Although the primary focus of this report is on information sharing 

on foreign nationals who seek to enter the United States, we also 

reviewed some additional operations that support border security 

or involve cooperation among the DHS components that 

participate in border security: 

 Although TSA generally does not screen arriving 

international passengers, it coordinates transportation 

security systems. Both TSA and CBP are increasingly 

involved in screening outbound international flights. 

 TSA receives assistance from CBP OFO and the Coast 

Guard with status checks for seaport workers who carry a 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential. TSA 

conducts background checks on workers who have 

unrestricted access to ports before issuing cards. 

 The CBP Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) 

provides law enforcement entities with domain awareness 

information and coordination to support border safety and 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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security through advance aerial imaging, sensor and 

tracking systems, and monitoring of general aviation. 

 Although ICE ERO detention and removal operations 

include aliens apprehended within the United States as 

well as at the border, we reviewed all cooperation efforts 

between ICE ERO and its DHS partners in this phase of 

the review. 

 Although the USCIS Asylum Division interviews some 

aliens apprehended within the United States as well as at 

the border, we reviewed cooperation between the Asylum 

Division and its DHS partners in this phase of the review. 

Results of Review 

Infrastructure and Resource Issues Continue To Hinder 

Information Sharing Efforts 

DHS has invested resources in data systems and physical infrastructure to 

improve information sharing, but some resource needs are unmet. In our 

report on overseas screening, we noted that information on foreign 

nationals is “fragmented among more than 17 data systems, and officers 

must conduct labor-intensive, system-by-system checks to verify or 

eliminate each possible match to terrorist watch lists and other derogatory 

information.” 3

 In this phase of the review, we determined that CBP OFO, 

the U.S. Border Patrol, and ICE ERO have developed software that 

consolidates and streamlines access to data for large-scale operations such 

as primary inspection, border apprehensions, and enforcement and 

removal. Fragmented data systems remain a challenge for DHS officers 

who conduct more in-depth evaluations, such as secondary inspections and 

law enforcement investigations. 

We identified two areas in which DHS could conserve resources with 

relatively minor changes to data systems. (1) The NSEERS program for 

special registration of certain categories of aliens from predominantly 

Arab and Muslim countries, and the database that supports this program, is 

obsolete and should be terminated. (2) CBP could improve productivity in 

the Passenger Analysis Units by minimizing the number of duplicate flight 

manifests it receives from commercial airlines. For infrastructure resource 

needs, although DHS has invested considerable resources to improve 

3

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Overseas Screening, Department of Homeland Security,

Office of Inspector General (OIG Report-11-68) April 2011. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 7 
staffing and infrastructure, many of the ports of entry and land and marine 

border operations we visited had significant unmet needs. In some 

instances, resource prioritization by one DHS component affected the 

efficiency or effectiveness of other components. DHS-level coordination 

could better prioritize how resources are allocated among components. 

Components Seek To Minimize Adverse Consequences of 

Fragmented DHS Data Systems 

Most databases that DHS uses were developed before the 

Department was created. Each was designed to serve specific 

antiterrorism, law enforcement, immigration, and traveler 

screening missions for its creator. The databases are not 

integrated, and DHS components that screen and vet foreign 

nationals must check information in as many as 17 data systems. 

Three DHS components have developed software to streamline and 

consolidate necessary information contained in these data systems 

to assist their officers and agents whose responsibilities for border 

security are narrowly focused: 

 For officers who conduct immigration inspections, CBP 

has developed software programs that consolidate 

information from various DHS, Department of State, and 

Department of Justice data systems. Programs include the 

Traveler Primary Arrival Client, used for primary 

inspections at airports, and the Vehicle Primary Client, 

used for land border crossings. These programs enable the 

officer to make a timely determination whether a traveler 

should be admitted or referred for a secondary inspection. 

 ICE ERO has developed modules within the ICE system 

called ENFORCE. This system is used to track 

immigration enforcement actions and cases. These 

modules consolidate information necessary to process 

apprehended aliens, track their immigration proceedings, 

and assist with removals. 

 The U.S. Border Patrol has developed e3, which its Border 

Patrol Agents use to in-process aliens apprehended on or 

near the border. e3 has analytic tools that help Border 

Patrol Agents to assess border security based on patterns of 

past apprehensions. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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However, DHS officers with smaller and more complex border 

security caseloads experience the same challenges with data 

systems as do overseas officers and officers at the National 

Targeting Center – Passenger. These officers include CBP officers 

in the Passenger Analysis Units at ports of entry, ICE HSI agents, 

the U.S. Border Patrol agents who conduct investigations, and 

USCIS asylum officers who evaluate aliens in the credible fear and 

reasonable fear processes. 

The recommendations we made to assist overseas screening in the 

first phase of our review, Information Sharing on Foreign 

Nationals: Overseas Screening, will also benefit officers charged 

with more complex border security screening, investigative, and 

adjudications functions, if funds are obtained. 

Terminate the NSEERS Program 

After the September 11 attacks, the Department of Justice 

introduced NSEERS to monitor the arrival, stay, and departure of 

certain nonimmigrant aliens from predominantly Arab and Muslim 

countries that were deemed most likely to pose a terrorist threat to 

the United States. The NSEERS program was transferred to DHS 

when DHS was created in 2003. Although the program may have 

had value in the past, advancements in information technology 

eventually rendered it obsolete. 

We intended to recommend that DHS terminate the NSEERS 

program. Senior DHS officials had been weighing the possibility 

of terminating NSEERS since at least 2006. On April 28, 2011, 

while this report was being prepared, it was announced in the 

Federal Register that DHS was effectively ending the program. 4 

We support the DHS decision. 

Fully implemented in 2004, the US-VISIT Arrival and Departure 

Information System can track both arrivals to and departures from 

the United States. In 2009, US-VISIT largely completed its 

transition from a two-fingerprint enrollment system to a full tenfingerprint enrollment, a capacity that previously had been most 

readily available through ENFORCE. Recent expansion of 

fingerprinting requirements to cover legal permanent residents and 

nationals from visa waiver countries, as well as the more limited 

populations in the NSEERS caseload, make US-VISIT the more 

4 Federal Register Vol. 76, No. 82, Notices, pp. 23830–23831. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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logical system for capturing all biometric information at the ports 

of entry. 

The CBP Automated Targeting System – Passenger and the ICE 

Pattern Analysis and Information Collection System enable more 

sophisticated data analysis and intelligence-driven targeting than 

was available through NSEERS. Both systems can consolidate 

information about an individual from numerous DHS data systems. 

Both can also search across data systems for individuals who might 

match a trend or pattern of concern to the Intelligence Community, 

such as travel routes or associations with known or suspected 

terrorists. In addition, CBP can update its targeting software 

within hours to adjust as the threat environment evolves. In 

contrast, changes to NSEERS required a lengthy notification 

process through the Federal Register. 

Based on our site visits to seven air ports of entry and three land 

border crossings, we determined that there was no longer a value in 

the NSEERS program. The ports of entry with the largest 

NSEERS populations had implemented a 2009 memorandum that 

enabled CBP to conduct registrations through US-VISIT rather 

than through the NSEERS database. Many of the smaller ports of 

entry continued to use the NSEERS database, and struggled with 

the system’s cumbersome design and frequent outages. 

Because the NSEERS database is unreliable and it is difficult for 

NSEERS registrants to adhere to the registration requirements, 

some waivers were granted on an ad hoc basis. Officials at ports 

of entry where NSEERS was still used told us that the system 

frequently did not function properly on some or all computers. We 

observed that when the NSEERS database functioned poorly, ports 

of entry issued one-time waivers to registrants and instructed them 

not to register on their return trip, or issued waivers of the 

NSEERS registration process to allow registrants to catch flights. 

However, at some ports of entry, registrants waited until the 

database resumed functioning, which often took hours. DHS 

estimates that the cost of NSEERS was more than $10 million 

annually at its height, though costs became lower with the 

availability of US-VISIT and waivers. 

We also observed that it was difficult for NSEERS registrants with 

limited English comprehension to understand the instructions for 

the registration process and the specific NSEERS departure 

procedures. Although certain ports of entry are not designated to 

handle NSEERS registrants, officers processed registrants rather 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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than refer them to the designated port of entry. Several of the 

secondary inspections we observed involved registrants who had 

failed to register on their last entry or exit and were processed for a 

one-time waiver. With so many known improvements needed in 

the registration system, it is difficult to separate innocent mistakes 

from intentional violations, which lessens the value of the 

information collected. 

CBP officers also told us that there was little value in the 

interviews they conducted with NSEERS registrants. NSEERS 

interviews rely on self-disclosure, and CBP officers noted that 

information obtained from fingerprints, flight manifests, travel and 

identification documents, and intelligence sources is more valuable 

in determining who poses a potential national security risk. CBP 

officers also noted that the time spent to process NSEERS 

registrations was an inefficient use of resources. They said that 

their time could be better spent on more targeted interviews to 

gather intelligence, identify illegal aliens, or intercept smugglers. 

As a result of the DHS action, the program remains in existence 

after removing from its purview all of the previously listed 

countries subject to NSEERS registration. Leaving the regulatory 

structure of the NSEERS program in place provides no discernable 

public benefit. Deficiencies we identified in the NSEERS program 

were not related to the composition of the list of subject 

nationalities, but rather to the insufficient value of the NSEERS 

data. We encourage DHS to dismantle the vestiges of the program. 

This will require that DHS initiate a notice and comment 

rulemaking to eliminate 8 CFR 264.1(f)(2)-(9) and reinstate the 

prior provisions. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Department of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation #1: Fully terminate the National Security 

Entry-Exit Registration System and reinstate the prior provisions. 

Address Duplicate Flight Manifests 

CBP Passenger Analysis Units at air ports of entry review flight 

manifests to identify any potential matches to terrorist watch lists, 

criminal records, or certain immigration violations. Timely and 

accurate review of arriving passenger information is critical to 

border security. During our site visits from August to November 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

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2010, several Passenger Analysis Units reported an increase in the 

number of duplicate flight manifests. Some duplicate manifests 

have only slight variations, while other pairs diverge more 

significantly, such as one variant listing travel document and 

nationality information that the “duplicate” did not. 

We reviewed the range of technical explanations with assistance 

from CBP’s Office of Information Technology. In late December 

2010, we conducted a survey of each air port of entry we 

previously visited. We provided CBP with a copy of the survey 

responses. The duplicate manifests appear to be related to the 

transition between existing CBP Advance Passenger Information 

System (APIS) Quick Query transmissions and the new TSA 

Secure Flight system. Although all domestic airlines have used 

Secure Flight for more than a year, and most international airlines 

made the transition well before the November 2010 final transition, 

airlines might not have terminated the older APIS Quick Query 

queue. As a result, some flights and certain commercial airlines 

are more likely to produce duplicate manifests than others. 

Because the Passenger Analysis Units are aware of the problem, 

the duplicate manifests represent a drain on resources rather than a 

security risk. Determining which records are duplicates, rather 

than records of two individuals with similar names, and then 

determining which record is the most recent and most accurate, 

adds significant time to the process of vetting inbound flights. 

The greatest concern raised at several ports of entry was the 

difficulty created by the duplicate manifests when placing TECS 

lookouts on passengers who, for instance, have an outstanding 

criminal warrant. Lookouts are used to identify certain passengers 

at primary inspection for possible referral to secondary inspection 

for a more thorough examination and appropriate action, such as 

possible arrest. At one port of entry, officials reported that when 

they placed a lookout on the APIS record that indicated the 

passenger was on board, it would default to the record that 

indicated the passenger was not on board, which meant that a 

primary officer would not be aware of the lookout on the 

passenger. Officers at ports of entry have developed various 

alternatives to lessen the possibility that the issue will become a 

security risk. One port of entry sent CBP officers to meet flights at 

the gate when there was a lookout on a duplicate manifest. Others 

had developed procedures to place the lookout against both records 

within TECS. Nonetheless, passenger screening would be more 

efficient if the accuracy of flight manifests improved. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 12 
Recommendation 

We recommend that United States Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation #2: Collaborate with commercial airlines and 

develop solutions to reduce the incidence of duplicate flight 

manifests. 

Staffing and Infrastructure Investments 

Although DHS has invested considerable resources to improve 

staffing and infrastructure, some of the ports of entry, land, and 

maritime border operations we visited had unmet infrastructure 

needs. In some cases, poor infrastructure affected information 

sharing among DHS components or had a negative effect on the 

operations of several components. We identified the following 

deficiencies and their consequences: 

CBP Land Border Ports of Entry 

 Limited direct access to law enforcement, intelligence, and 

immigration databases and high-speed Internet connections 

 Insufficient lanes dedicated to the trusted traveler programs 

to facilitate business and commercial traffic 

 Inadequate facilities to segregate aliens who have been 

referred for a secondary inspection (or more thorough 

examination) from travelers who seek entry to the United 

States 

 Insufficient space to process passengers from commercial 

buses within the facility 

 Inadequate staff to limit the routine use of overtime 

Consequence: Inadequate facilities can slow tourist and 

commercial cross-border travel without yielding security benefits. 

The U.S. Border Patrol – Southern Border 

 Unreliable communications infrastructure, such as fiber 

optic cables for landlines and Internet connections 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 13
 Inadequate mobile technology that does not allow agents to 

access databases to screen aliens in the field 

Consequence: Officer safety may be compromised in controlling 

large groups waiting to be processed and when violent criminals 

cannot be quickly identified. 

ICE ERO Detention and Removal – Detention Space 

 Insufficient detention space, especially for juveniles 

apprehended near the southern border where consular 

officers from Mexico and Central America are not readily 

available to facilitate return 

 Inadequate detention bed space available to CBP and ICE 

HSI near the San Ysidro Port of Entry and the San Diego 

Sector 

Consequence: Border security may be compromised if aliens are 

not detained because suitable bed space is unavailable. 

ICE ERO Detention and Removal – Detention Management 

 Fingerprinting equipment insufficient or not 

technologically advanced 

 Unreliable high-speed connectivity for data servers 

 Limited processing space in detention centers to prepare 

cases for detention in state and local facilities 

 Insufficient ICE ERO staff to transport aliens apprehended 

by CBP at ports of entry 

Consequence: Facility inadequacy slows detention processing and 

limits the assistance ICE can provide to CBP to manage aliens in 

custody. 

Each DHS component must prioritize among competing demands

for staff and infrastructure improvements. One DHS component’s

choice of priorities may have a direct effect on other DHS

components. For example, inadequate ICE ERO staffing and

processing facilities require CBP to take greater responsibility to 

manage and transport aliens in custody. Inadequate family detention

is a concern for CBP and ICE HSI, as spouses and children may be

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 14
released before issues related to special-interest aliens or potential

trafficking victims can be fully evaluated. Centralized oversight of

DHS-wide needs and priorities might allocate resources more

efficiently.

Coordination Is Essential To Manage the Foreign National 

Caseload 

Several operational components share responsibility for information about, 

and physical custody of, foreign nationals. In all these circumstances, 

information sharing is critical to successful border security operations. 

For example: 

 Illegal aliens apprehended by CBP at or between ports of entry 

may be detained by ICE ERO pending an immigration hearing. 

 The Coast Guard, U.S. Border Patrol, and ICE HSI also apprehend 

illegal aliens at sea or within the United States who may be 

detained by ICE ERO. 

 Some of the aliens apprehended by CBP and ICE request asylum, 

withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention 

Against Torture, which requires the USCIS Asylum Division to 

conduct screening interviews and determinations while ICE ERO 

detains the applicants. 

Overall, we determined that the relationships among the DHS components 

with shared responsibility are professional and cooperative. However, 

DHS officers at the sites we visited raised three areas of concern about 

shared or overlapping missions: (1) The legal documents that ICE ERO 

receives from ICE HSI and CBP OFO to place foreign nationals in 

immigration hearings are not always complete; (2) missions that overlap 

between ICE HSI and the U.S. Border Patrol on the northern and southern 

border have been a source of concern since the establishment of DHS; and 

(3) both ICE ERO and asylum officers expressed frustration regarding the 

length of time required to process some detained asylum cases. DHS-level 

oversight could address these areas where bilateral efforts have not been 

successful. 

Processing Aliens for Immigration Hearings Requires 

Interagency Cooperation 

CBP OFO, U.S. Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, ICE HSI, ICE 

ERO, and USCIS Asylum Division have a shared responsibility to 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 15
apprehend illegal aliens or place them in legal proceedings before a 

Department of Justice immigration judge. During our visits, we 

were told repeatedly that the legal paperwork is a source of 

frustration. Overall, the transfer of aliens and their legal 

paperwork between the U.S. Border Patrol and ICE ERO appeared 

seamless, as both components understood the legal status of the 

apprehended aliens and use e3 to process aliens subject to removal. 

Coast Guard processes also worked well. Lines of authority were 

clearly understood, as the Coast Guard is not limited to enrolling 

aliens apprehended into DHS data systems based on proximity to 

shore. Asylum officers noted that other DHS components may not 

correctly identify whether aliens belong in the asylum, withholding 

of removal, or Convention Against Torture caseloads, but said that 

they can easily differentiate the cases based on the information 

CBP and ICE officers enter in TECS and ENFORCE. 

However, ICE ERO officers responsible for detained aliens said 

that the paperwork from CBP OFO officers and ICE HSI agents is 

not always complete. Some detention offices did not accept 

custody of aliens until their legal counsel had reviewed the 

paperwork for legal sufficiency. This is a source of frustration for 

staff at the CBP port of entry, which retains custody during this 

process. Several ICE ERO officers said that the paperwork they 

received from CBP OFO or ICE HSI was inadequate to place an 

apprehended alien in removal proceedings, and that ICE ERO 

spent considerable time amending legal documents before it could 

present cases to the immigration courts. In a few instances, ICE 

ERO said that it could not bring charges and had to release aliens 

because of incomplete paperwork. In most instances, components 

that experienced difficulty with such shared responsibilities cited a 

loss of institutional knowledge of immigration law as the cause. In 

the eight years since the creation of DHS, the percentage of CBP 

and ICE agents and officers with prior experience in the former 

Immigration and Naturalization Service has declined because of 

attrition and retirements. 

Each of the components with these shared responsibilities sought 

to address these deficiencies. They offered to train other 

components, to provide checklists and point of contact 

information, and even to process cases themselves. Although these 

bilateral efforts are commendable, the program would benefit from 

centralized DHS headquarters-level oversight to resolve training 

and guidance issues that remain. 

Overlapping Missions of U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 16 
One of the primary DHS missions is to secure and manage 

America’s land and maritime borders. According to a 2004 

memorandum of understanding (MOU) between U.S. Border 

Patrol and ICE HSI, the missions of ICE HSI and the U.S. Border 

Patrol are “intricately connected and complementary.”5 The MOU 

noted that the U.S. Border Patrol has primary responsibility for all 

cross-border and border-related interdiction activities between 

ports of entry and ICE HSI has primary responsibility for all 

investigations. An addendum to the MOU, signed in February 

2007, provided additional guidance that requires U.S. Border 

Patrol and ICE HSI to familiarize each other with their missions, 

maintain regular communication, provide notification on potential 

terrorism issues, use data systems to deconflict cases, and collocate 

agents to facilitate communication and cooperation.6 

Despite this guidance, operational challenges between U.S. Border 

Patrol and ICE HSI remain unresolved. In reviews conducted in 

2005 and 2007, we made recommendations to improve 

coordination and cooperation between the components that either 

were not adopted or had limited success.7

 In its December 2010 

report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) also raised 

concerns about systemic U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI 

coordination challenges on the northern border. The GAO report 

stated that if these issues were not resolved, they could have an 

adverse effect on border security.8 

Furthermore, the GAO report stated that current guidance fails to 

clarify roles and responsibilities or successfully delineate the roles in 

interdictions and investigations. GAO said that both U.S. Border 

Patrol and ICE HSI considered the sharing of information between 

the two agencies to be inadequate, causing duplication of missions 

and concerns over officer safety. GAO determined that the 

challenges facing U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI underscore the 

importance of developing and maintaining permanent solutions to 

mitigate conflicts. GAO also determined that DHS headquarters5 Guidelines Governing Interaction Between ICE's Office of Investigations and CBP’s Office of Border 

Patrol, Memorandum from Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, CBP, and Michael J. Garcia, Assistant 

Secretary, ICE, November 16, 2004. 

6 Additional Information on OBP and ICE Negotiations, Memorandum from Chief Border Patrol Agent 

David V. Aguilar, OBP 50/1.1.2, February 26, 2007.

7

 An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (OIG-06-04); DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges between Customs and 

Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (OIG-07-38) April 2007. 8 Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for 

the Northern Border (GAO-11-97) December 2010. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 17 
level guidance is needed to provide the oversight and leadership to

address these coordination issues. 

We conducted our site visits for this review within weeks after the 

GAO site visits, and included both the northern and southern 

borders. We concur with the GAO assessment. The unresolved 

sources of disagreement between ICE HSI and U.S. Border Patrol 

include the following: 

Shared Investigative Territory 

Among the challenges both ICE HSI and U.S. Border Patrol agents 

cited when they conducted interceptions and investigations in the 

same areas on the northern and southern border are the need to— 

 Deconflict access to informants, witnesses, and persons of 

interest 

 Determine when the U.S. Border Patrol intelligence 

gathering becomes a criminal investigation 

 Prioritize controlled cross-border deliveries of drugs, 

weapons, cash, or aliens operations, which the U.S. Border 

Patrol leads to support ICE HSI investigations 

U.S. Border Patrol Relationships With Department of Justice 

Law Enforcement Agencies 

ICE is the largest investigative branch of DHS and, as noted in the 

MOU, has primary responsibility for DHS investigations of 

persons other than DHS employees. (Our office investigates 

allegations of criminal misconduct by DHS employees.) However, 

the MOU notes that the U.S. Border Patrol is also authorized to 

conduct investigations. This overlap is not unique; other federal 

agencies, notably the Department of Justice, are authorized to 

conduct investigations that overlap with the DHS mission. In this 

structure, the missions of ICE HSI and the U.S. Border Patrol are 

not well aligned: 

 Although the U.S. Border Patrol moved from the 

Department of Justice into DHS in 2003, it remains bound 

by a 1996 MOU to refer all of its drug seizures first to the 

Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration 

when such seizures are made under the authority of its Title 

21 designation. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 18
 The U.S. Border Patrol has well-established relationships 

with Department of Justice agencies whose missions 

overlap with ICE’s on the northern and southern borders, 

such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Because of 

these established relationships, these agencies often ask the 

U.S. Border Patrol directly for information and assistance 

rather than work through ICE HSI. 

 ICE’s mandate is broad, and includes issues in the U.S. 

Border Patrol’s mandate (e.g., national security threats, 

human smuggling and trafficking, and narcotics smuggling) 

as well as issues outside its direct mandate (e.g., financial 

crimes, commercial fraud, counterproliferation, child 

pornography and exploitation, and immigration benefit 

fraud). 

Information Sharing Constraints 

Information sharing on potentially overlapping operations is a 

source of disagreement between the U.S. Border Patrol and ICE 

HSI. Both are concerned that gaps in information sharing practices 

could compromise officer safety: 

 The U.S. Border Patrol expected more situational 

intelligence from ICE HSI than it currently receives and 

generates its own intelligence to fill this gap. 

 The U.S. Border Patrol expected more information from 

ICE HSI on open investigations, particularly on cases for 

which the U.S. Border Patrol provided the original lead, but 

ICE HSI considers that information on open investigations 

should be shared on a “need to know” basis. 

 Data entry in TECS is an ineffective method for sharing 

information, as the U.S. Border Patrol does not have access 

to the TECS investigative module, and ICE HSI considers 

some Border Patrol case information to be delayed or 

incorrectly entered into TECS. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 19
Data System Constraints 

The current structure and planned upgrades to the data systems are 

not designed for information sharing on investigations and 

operations that may overlap: 

 The U.S. Border Patrol’s primary data system is e3, an 

ICE-owned biometric-based system used to track 

apprehensions, detentions, immigration hearings, and 

removal of illegal aliens. 

 ICE HSI’s primary data system is TECS, a CBP-owned 

biographic-based system designed to track activities at 

ports of entry, seizures, and (in the TECS III module) 

ongoing investigations. 

 The U.S. Border Patrol created e3, intended for use by both 

ICE HSI and U.S. Border Patrol for border operations. 

However, ICE has not adopted the system. 

 Both ICE HSI and the U.S. Border Patrol expressed 

concern that TECS modernization led by the CBP Office of 

Information Technology did not solicit adequate comments 

on their information sharing needs. 

The GAO December 2010 report recommended DHS-level 

oversight of U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI compliance with the 

provisions of the interagency MOU, to include evaluation of 

outstanding challenges and planned corrective actions. DHS 

concurred with the recommendation, but said it would comply by 

reconstituting the former ICE-CBP Coordination Council, which 

met for a few years after our 2005 report and then became inactive, 

to review compliance. GAO noted that while it existed, the 

Coordination Council “was unable to improve upon the longstanding coordination challenges between U.S. Border Patrol and 

ICE HSI.”9

 Many U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI agents we 

interviewed also expressed concern that enforcement of the MOU, 

even through a Coordination Council, would not address longstanding sources of disagreement. Most said the solution was clear 

DHS-level guidance on missions and priorities. 

9 Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for 

the Northern Border (GAO-11-97) December 2010. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 20
We believe that GAO’s recommendation, if implemented as 

envisaged, would address many of the tensions between the U.S. 

Border Patrol and ICE HSI. We consider that duplication of effort, 

poorly aligned priorities, inadequate methods to share and 

safeguard information, and potential threats to officer safety will 

continue until DHS-level oversight of the MOU is addressed. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Department of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation #3: Establish Department-level oversight to 

address Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol, 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security 

Investigations operational challenges. 

Improve Timeliness of the Reasonable Fear Process 

The asylum pre-screening program also requires cooperation 

between DHS components. The USCIS Asylum Division has 

jurisdiction for two categories of aliens who seek protection after 

being apprehended by CBP or ICE and detained by ICE ERO. 

One category is aliens who seek asylum when they are detained at 

a port of entry by CBP OFO or are apprehended by U.S. Border 

Patrol. Asylum officers determine whether these applicants have a 

“credible fear” of persecution or torture if they are returned to their 

country of nationality. The credible fear standard has a low 

threshold to determine whether the case can be referred to an 

immigration judge for a full asylum hearing: 67% of applicants 

pass the screening standard. (See appendix D.) The forms of relief 

from removal available to credible fear applicants include asylum 

status (which can lead to lawful permanent resident status), 

withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against 

Torture. 

The second category is aliens who are not eligible for asylum but 

might be entitled to other forms of relief, such as withholding or 

deferral of removal. Asylum is not available to aliens who have a 

prior order of removal that is reinstated when they are apprehended 

or have been convicted of an aggravated felony in the United 

States. Some of these aliens are detained at a land border by U.S. 

Border Patrol or OAM; port of entry by CBP OFO; or along the 

coast by the Coast Guard. They may also be apprehended within 

the United States by other means, such as enforcement actions by 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 21 
ICE HSI, or transfer from federal, state, or local prisons to ICE 

ERO custody for removal. If the aliens express a fear of 

persecution or torture after apprehension, they are referred to the 

asylum office for a “reasonable fear” determination. 

In the past year, there has been an increase in the number of 

reasonable fear cases, which asylum officers said might be a result 

of increased interior enforcement efforts by ICE. Asylum officers 

determine whether these applicants meet the reasonable fear 

standard, which has a higher threshold to determine whether the 

case can be referred to an immigration judge: 24% of applicants 

meet the screening standard. (See appendix D.) The forms of 

protection available to the reasonable fear caseload, if granted by 

an immigration judge, are generally intended to be temporary, until 

conditions in the country of nationality improve or a third country 

agrees to take the alien. 

Overall, relationships between the USCIS Asylum Division and its 

partners in CBP OFO, U.S. Border Patrol, ICE HSI, and ICE ERO 

are positive. Asylum officers told us that they are confident that 

CBP and ICE officers refer cases where the individual has 

expressed a fear of return, as well as some discretionary cases 

based on country of origin or unusual behavior. At the local level, 

each asylum office we reviewed offered training to CBP and ICE 

officers on recognizing potential cases. CBP and ICE officers we 

interviewed were familiar with the forms, procedures, and 

notification processes for asylum cases. Asylum offices had also 

developed information sharing mechanisms such as group 

mailboxes, checklists, and regular meetings to support the 

notification process. Asylum officers said that ICE officers readily 

facilitated interviews and would provide security for interviews 

with potentially violent applicants. 

We determined that the Asylum Division generally processes ICE 

ERO detainees for credible fear screening expeditiously. The 

Asylum Division strives to make a decision within 14 days of 

notification by ICE or CBP for at least 85% of cases. Based on 

data the Asylum Division provided us, from June 1, 2005, to June 

30, 2010, credible fear determinations were completed within 14 

days at least 90% of the time. Asylum Division headquarters 

reviews all credible fear denials, but only reviews grants and 

withdrawals in certain circumstances. 

In contrast, both field asylum officers and ICE ERO officers 

expressed frustration with the time it takes the Asylum Division to 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 22 
complete reasonable fear cases. During our fieldwork, there were 

no timeliness standards for completion of reasonable fear cases. 

Asylum officers said that with limited resources and no set 

deadlines, the Asylum Division delays reasonable fear interviews 

to keep current with other caseloads. Of the 4,532 reasonable fear 

cases processed from June 1, 2005, to June 30, 2010, asylum 

officers noted a delay caused by inadequate resources in 1,307 

cases, or 29%. Cases with available data took an average of 72 

days to complete, and 24% took more than 3 months to complete. 

(See appendix E.) 

In light of these timeliness issues, the ability of the Asylum 

Division to track reasonable fear case completions is essential. It 

is generally understood that the Asylum Division considers a 

reasonable fear case complete when the decision is served on the 

applicant by the Immigration Court, as indicated by the “Decision 

Served” field in the Asylum Pre-Screening System (APSS), but 

current reasonable fear procedures do not provide explicit 

instructions for APSS entries for all data fields. Improvements in 

data entry procedures could result in more effective overall case 

management, specifically in the areas of timeliness and 

completions. In particular, the procedures should direct users to 

use the date of service (“Decision served” in APSS) to 

communicate completion of the reasonable fear case (i.e., service 

of the positive or negative decision on the detainee, on ICE ERO, 

and on the Immigration Court) or to use the date the case is 

administratively closed (“Close Effective” date in APSS.) 

Each of the five asylum offices we visited identified the 

headquarters review process as a source of delay for completing 

reasonable fear cases. Asylum officers said that the quality 

assurance program was inadequately staffed for the sharp increase 

in reasonable fear cases, and that it prioritized credible fear cases 

over reasonable fear cases. At the time of our fieldwork, only 

credible fear denials were reviewed, but headquarters reviewed 

100% of grants, denials, and withdrawals for reasonable fear cases. 

For cases with available data, the headquarters review process for 

reasonable fear cases took an average of 29 days to complete. (See 

appendix E.) Information on how long the review process took for 

the remaining cases, including withdrawals, was not available. 

ICE officers at the detention facilities expressed frustration with 

the amount of time it took to resolve cases in the Asylum 

Division’s jurisdiction. One concern was with detainees who had 

asked to withdraw their applications to remain in the United States 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 23 
and awaited permission to return home pending legal disposition of 

their case. Some of this population are discontented about their 

continued detention and are disruptive to other detainees. ICE 

officers said that the daily cost of detention for each detainee can 

range from $60 to more than $200. To detain an asylum applicant 

for a month without an interview in addition to another month 

without a final decision is an inefficient use of detention bed space. 

Since asylum officers cannot predict with any certainty how long 

each case will take, they cannot provide this information to ICE 

ERO. 

With limited asylum resources and no timeliness requirements, 

Asylum Division delays in the reasonable fear caseload are a likely 

result, but ICE ERO bears the costs of such delays. The Asylum 

Division has tried to reduce delays before the initial interview. 

Asylum officers are assigned permanently to some facilities with a 

large caseload. Although asylum officers may schedule interviews 

with less delay by video-teleconference, video-teleconferences 

place an administrative burden on ICE ERO resources. During 

video-teleconferencing interviews, at several points ICE ERO 

officers must obtain and share files, receive faxed documents, 

obtain signatures, and return completed faxed documents. 

Timely interviews will have limited effect unless delays in the 

headquarters review process are also addressed. In January 2011, 

the Asylum Division issued two memorandums on the reasonable 

fear process. The first memorandum instituted processing criteria 

for reasonable fear cases that are similar to those used to measure 

the credible fear cases. All negative determinations are still 

reviewed, but only a sampling of positive determinations is 

taken.10 The second memorandum pertained to applicants who 

have requested to withdraw their application. For these cases, new 

headquarters review criteria for reasonable fear cases are now 

comparable to the prioritized review criteria for credible fear cases. 

Headquarters review is not required before the applicant is allowed 

to withdraw, and quality assurance will be conducted on closed 

cases. 11 Headquarters officers said that a goal for fiscal year (FY) 

2011 was to identify timeliness criteria for the reasonable fear 

caseload. Asylum officers indicated that headquarters was 

developing a methodology to set these criteria. 

10 Revised Reasonable Fear Quality Assurance Review Categories, Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, 


HQRAIO 120/12.16a., January 10, 2011.


11 Further Revised Reasonable Fear Quality Assurance Review Categories, Memorandum from Joseph E.
 

Langlois, HQRAIO 120/12.16a., January 28, 2011. 


Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 24 
We believe that the increased use of video-teleconferencing and 

the streamlined headquarters quality assurance process are key to 

improving the timeliness of reasonable fear adjudications. Field 

site visits by headquarters officers responsible for quality 

assurance and program management may assist in identifying 

training and guidance needs and in developing a practical 

methodology to set timeliness criteria. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services: 

Recommendation #4: Establish timeliness criteria for completing 

reasonable fear cases. 

Recommendation #5: Record in the Asylum Pre-Screening 

System database the date when each reasonable fear case is 

returned to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

jurisdiction. 

Multilateral Support Is Developing for Information Sharing 

Information sharing on foreign nationals at ports of entry and along the 

land and maritime borders is primarily the responsibility of the CBP 

Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, ICE HSI, ICE ERO, the 

Coast Guard, and the USCIS Asylum Division. These components have 

legal authority and access to biometric and biographic data systems 

necessary to decide who is admitted or denied admission to the United 

States, apprehended and placed in immigration or criminal proceedings, or 

ultimately removed from the United States. As the December 2010 GAO 

report noted, many task forces, joint operations, and working groups led 

by ICE and CBP play a fundamental role in information sharing on foreign 

nationals and could be better coordinated. We reached the same 

conclusions. In addition, we observed that other DHS components have 

developed a geographic-based role, which is essential to coordination and 

communication on foreign nationals at ports of entry and land and 

maritime borders. Although the Coast Guard’s role in coordination and 

facilitation of law enforcement and interception activities in the maritime 

environment is the most complex of the components, its partners gave 

Coast Guard uniformly high marks for its information sharing. TSA’s role 

has expanded rapidly at commercial air ports of entry. TSA’s 

Coordination Centers are an innovative contribution to information 

sharing, but TSA involvement with foreign nationals at air ports of entry 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 25 
continues to evolve. Although the CBP AMOC under the OAM has a 

long history of support for border enforcement, its potential has not been 

fully developed. 

CBP and ICE Border Security Operations Would Benefit 

From DHS-Level Oversight 

We described earlier the difficulties that arise from the overlapping 

mandates of CBP and ICE, and the insufficient oversight and 

direction available from DHS. Similar issues diminish the 

effectiveness of two interagency forums: the Integrated Border 

Enforcement Team (IBET) and Border Enforcement Security Task 

Force (BEST).12 IBET is a cooperative binational initiative that 

secures the border between Canada and the United States by 

identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons, organizations, 

and goods that are involved in organized criminal activity.13 BEST 

is a binational forum led by ICE to identify, disrupt, and dismantle 

criminal organizations that pose a significant threat to border 

security.14 In its December 2010 report on northern border security, 

GAO concluded that these forums have enhanced information 

sharing, but also compete for resources and have overlapping 

missions and areas of operation. GAO noted that northern border 

partners cited challenges to allocate sufficient resources for the 

growing number of interagency forums that have been established in 

their geographic area of responsibility. 

Based on our site visits and interviews with the U.S. Border Patrol 

and ICE personnel on the northern border, we share GAO’s 

conclusions. On our site visits to the southern border, where there is 

no IBET presence, similar concerns were expressed about how to 

staff the BEST task forces and the activities of an ICE-led mission. 

Although DHS attempts to maximize its presence on the northern 

and southern borders through interagency forums, concerns were 

raised regarding duplication and overlapping missions. Some of the 

ICE HSI and the U.S. Border Patrol agents we interviewed in the 

field and at headquarters said that the only way to address tensions 

between ICE HSI and the U.S. Border Patrol is by establishing clear 

DHS-level guidance on missions and priorities. 

The GAO December 2010 report recommended that DHS provide 

DHS-level guidance and oversight for interagency forums 

12 Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for 


the Northern Border (GAO-11-97) December 2010. 
 13 http://www rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/index-eng.htm. 
 14 http://www.ice.gov/best/. 


Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 26 
established or sponsored by its components to ensure that the 

missions and locations are not duplicative and to consider the 

downstream burden on northern border partners. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation, but said that the 

structure of the Department precludes accomplishing the goal of 

DHS-level guidance and oversight through a single headquarters 

organization. It said that through strategic and operational 

planning efforts, DHS will review the inventory of interagency 

forums to assess efficiency and identify challenges. GAO 

responded that it encouraged DHS to “provide the guidance and 

oversight necessary” to mitigate duplicative efforts.15 

We believe that GAO’s recommendation, if implemented as GAO 

envisaged, would address many of the tensions between the U.S. 

Border Patrol-coordinated and ICE HSI-led interagency forums on 

both borders. Direct DHS-level guidance and oversight is 

necessary to establish clear goals and priorities to facilitate 

cooperation and coordination. 

U.S. Coast Guard Provides Information and Support When 

Coordinating With Multiple Agencies 

With the exception of its migrant interdiction mission, the Coast 

Guard’s role in information sharing on foreign nationals is an 

indirect consequence of its missions to defend ports, waterways, 

and coastal areas; conduct search and rescue operations; and 

conduct drug interdiction. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard’s strategy 

to fulfill its missions has made it an integral component of DHS 

information sharing on foreign nationals in the maritime 

environment. 

The Coast Guard has established efficient and effective programs 

and processes to share information among DHS components when 

they encounter foreign nationals at sea ports of entry. The Coast 

Guard has stations at most of the coastal and maritime locations 

that are critical to border security, including the rivers and Great 

Lakes that separate the northeastern United States from Canada, 

and major coastal cities such as Miami, New York City, San 

Diego, and Seattle. 

The Coast Guard has developed collaborative information sharing 

relationships with other DHS components and interagency 

15 Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination Is Needed for 

the Northern Border (GAO-11-97) December 2010. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 27 
partners. At each coastal and maritime site we visited, the Coast 

Guard played a key role in facilitating joint law enforcement 

operations. Central to the success of these operations is that they 

host multiagency partnerships that are located onsite to enhance 

information sharing capabilities. For example, at major ports, such 

as New York City, San Diego, and Seattle, the Coast Guard 

facilitates Joint Harbor Operations Centers. These centers 

coordinate as many as 50 federal civilian and military, state, local, 

and business entities involved in commercial and recreational 

maritime transport and in provisions for safety and security. In the 

Los Angeles/San Diego area, the Coast Guard hosts the Maritime 

Unified Command, an innovative multiagency partnership that 

facilitates information sharing and coordination with multiple 

agencies on missions related to maritime activities. 

The Coast Guard and CBP pool resources to assess passengers and 

crews of cruise and cargo ships. The Coast Guard receives 

manifests of passengers and crews of vessels via the Ship Arrival 

Notification System, and works with CBP OFO to screen and 

cross-check information against CBP data systems, such as TECS. 

The Coast Guard has jurisdiction to board vessels to conduct safety 

and security checks, and routinely brings CBP OFO officers on 

board to assist with the evaluation of passengers and crew. With 

CBP on site at Joint Harbor Operations Centers and Coast Guard 

Stations, the Coast Guard can obtain timely information on foreign 

nationals from a broad range of databases. 

As much through voluntary integration as through regulatory 

requirements, the Coast Guard has become an essential element of 

information sharing on foreign nationals. At harbors and ports, the 

Coast Guard assists TSA with the examination of Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential cards issued by TSA to workers 

who have unescorted access to secure areas of ports and harbors. 

The U.S. Border Patrol works closely with the Coast Guard to 

identify persons rescued or apprehended at sea. The Coast Guard 

provides logistics and vessels for many joint investigative and 

interception activities on the northern and southern maritime 

borders, such as joint operations by the U.S. and Canadian 

governments to board vessels, IBET interception operations, and 

BEST investigations. 

Through its coordination centers and joint operations, the Coast 

Guard has enhanced information sharing on foreign nationals. At 

each site we visited, CBP and ICE praised the Coast Guard for its 

ability to both organize command and communication facilities 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 28 
and work cooperatively in shared areas of responsibilities. Both 

the Coast Guard and its partners identified the Coast Guard’s 

clearly delineated role at maritime borders as a central reason for 

its success in joint operations: Although the Coast Guard may 

apprehend foreign nationals, it partners with CBP or ICE to 

determine their status. 

TSA Coordination Centers Provide Real-Time Readiness and 

Awareness 

TSA Coordination Centers play an increasing role in information 

sharing on foreign nationals in commercial airports. The centers 

are a 24/7 information hub for the majority of TSA’s operations, 

with national real-time information sharing through the Domestic 

Event Network and a dedicated telephone network that links the 

centers. The Domestic Event Network enables TSA officers to 

listen to events nationwide as they happen and determine quickly 

whether an event is an isolated local incident or a coordinated 

disruption. The centers are one-stop shops for information used by 

TSA and its federal, state, and local agency partners. 

Transportation Security Officers screen information in real time 

from available data systems, evaluate the information, and 

determine any interrelationships, including those that relate to the 

affected transportation modes. 

Each Coordination Center uses a system of notification matrices to 

distribute information on all incidents that occur at the airport. The 

notification matrix is a quick reference guide for Transportation 

Security Officers to determine the component and method to 

contact based on the severity of the incident. The notification 

matrix is developed in cooperation with the component that 

receives the notification. For example, CBP OFO can specify that 

it wants immediate telephone notification for a no-fly match, while 

ICE HSI can specify that it would prefer email notification after 

the fact for routine confiscation of weapons. The notification 

system has reduced information sharing stovepipes and formalized 

appropriate incident response. 

Nonetheless, we observed major challenges at some of the 

Coordination Centers. Staffing has not increased commensurate 

with the additional workload from the expansion of the no-fly 

watch lists in early 2010. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 29 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration: 

Recommendation #6: Provide all Coordination Centers with live 

video feeds from security cameras in the airport terminals. 

Recommendation #7: Provide all Coordination Centers with 

access to federal law enforcement data systems. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 30 
Increased Outreach Effort Is Needed at the Air and Marine 

Operations Center To Advance Current and Future Expansion 

Initiatives 

The AMOC, in Riverside, California is an operational domain 

awareness center within CBP OAM. The center was established in 

1988 as a state-of-the-art law enforcement radar surveillance center 

to counter the threat of airborne drug smuggling. 

Although OAM, including the AMOC, has limited involvement 

screening foreign nationals, the information that the center provides 

to enforcement officers is valuable to border security. The center 

has a wide range of responsibilities that include detection and 

coordination efforts for OAM. The center also provides aerial 

coverage during natural disasters and humanitarian relief efforts, 

and assistance to the 

U.S. Secret Service with fly-over operations for national special 

security events. 

The technologies that enable the center to provide such support 

include a surveillance system capable of integrating an extensive 

network of ground-based and airborne radar, aerial imaging, and 

streaming video and data from manned and unmanned aerial 

surveillance vehicles, which can observe and record aircraft and 

cross-border activity. Figure 1 illustrates some of the information 

and data sources the AMOC uses. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 31 
Figure 1. Air and Marine Operations Center Sources of Information and Data 

Source: CBP Air and Marine, Federal Aviation Administration Unmanned Aircraft 

System Tech Conference16 

The center’s database includes all registered flights and is therefore 

able to identify unregistered flights and flights that do not follow 

their registered flight plan. The center observes more than 1,000 

flights a day and can closely track small aircraft that have 

anomalous flights. The center also has some ability to track ships 

in U.S. territorial waters. 

With these capabilities, the center is uniquely qualified to support 

CBP, ICE, and other law enforcement entities with information 

sharing on foreign nationals who attempt to enter or exit the United 

States illegally between ports of entry. Illicit cross-border 

activities may involve smuggling drugs, cash, and weapons, as 

well as human trafficking. When the center identifies a plane with 

an unregistered flight plan, OAM launches aircraft to classify the 

target of interest. It also, if necessary, coordinates with ICE HSI or 

the U.S. Border Patrol to check whether the flight termination is a 

drop-off for contraband or illegal aliens. When OAM identifies 

individuals crossing the border between ports of entry, the center 

can notify the appropriate law enforcement organization of their 

approximate location so they can be apprehended. If ICE plans to 

prepare a court case that involves alien smuggling or trafficking, 

16 CBP Air and Marine, FAA UAS Tech Conference, January 2007. 


http://www faa.gov/news/conferences_events/new_tech_2007/presentations/media/day2/pitts.ppt. 


Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 32 
the center can provide radar and video surveillance footage 


captured by OAM aircraft as forensic evidence. The center can 


also notify law enforcement entities of the presence of an 


unidentified ship in U.S. territorial waters.
 

The center has offered its services and resources to components 

within and outside DHS. The center’s wealth of information, 

expertise, and resources can be a valuable asset to DHS 

components and other border security agencies. The information 

available to the center through its radar surveillance and access to 

detailed video imagery is an information sharing force multiplier 

for other law enforcement officers in their investigations and 

interceptions of foreign nationals. 

Despite these assets and information sharing efforts, DHS 

components do not fully understand or use the center’s capabilities. 

Center officials told us that although it has primary responsibility 

to monitor general aviation, more than 50 international, federal, 

state, and local agencies are involved in air domain activities, and 

these agencies do not always communicate and coordinate 

effectively. Even within the federal government, although the 

center has developed a complementary relationship with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration-led government-wide El Paso 

Intelligence Center, it had to deconflict overlapping missions with 

a newly developed intelligence section in the TSA Transportation 

Security Operations Center. 

Overall, the center has established effective relationships with the 

U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI when they request assistance on a 

specific interception or investigation. However, when the center 

develops its own leads based on suspicious flight patterns or border 

crossings, it may contact several DHS entities, as well as other 

federal, state, and local partners, to find a law enforcement 

organization with resources to follow through on the information. 

Center officials and liaisons said that their capabilities are not 

widely known throughout all the other DHS components. They 

also told us that the center’s role to monitor general aviation and 

assist in investigations is not widely understood. Officials said that 

their efforts to promote their capabilities and services to other 

federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities have had 

limited success. Center employees also told us that their priorities 

and mission are not well defined or well aligned with those of the 

DHS components and other agencies they support. The center has 

experienced difficulty recruiting liaisons and balancing its needs 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 33 
with those of the liaisons’ home agencies. Some officials 

expressed the opinion that its operations would be better utilized if 

the entire air and marine program were directly under DHS 

leadership. 

Most DHS joint operations are housed within one DHS 

component, and some, such as the Coast Guard operations 

discussed above, are quite successful. We therefore do not 

recommend that the AMOC be relocated within DHS. However, 

we consider that CBP could, at the headquarters level, provide 

additional support to the center’s outreach efforts to become more 

useful in border security and information sharing initiatives. We 

also believe that the center would benefit from DHS-level 

guidance in establishing priorities and better defining the role of 

DHS liaisons. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that United States Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation #8: Provide federal law enforcement agencies 

updated training or guidance on the operational capabilities the Air 

and Marine Operations Center offers to support border security 

initiatives. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

A copy of the Department response is included as appendix B.
 

The Department concurred with five of our eight 


recommendations. A summary of the Department response to each 


recommendation, and our analysis, is included below. 


Recommendation #1: Fully terminate the National Security 


Entry-Exit Registration System and reinstate the prior provisions. 


Management Response 

The Department said that the Secretary’s authority, as exercised 

under the NSEERS regulations, is broader than the information 

collection program based on country designation described in our 

draft report. The Secretary has chosen to retain this regulatory 

framework to enable prompt action to require registration of a 

category or categories of aliens, if necessary, through rapid 

publication of a Federal Register Notice. The Department noted 

that the retention of this regulatory framework has no direct cost to 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 34 
the Department, while a formal rulemaking to rescind the 

regulations would be costly and time consuming, with the 

possibility that additional costly and time-consuming rulemaking 

would be necessary if registration were needed in the future. The 

Department would keep the regulation in place to ensure that the 

Secretary retains the authority in case it is needed in the future. 

OIG Analysis 

The Department did not concur with Recommendation #1. We 

determined that the Department is making a reasonable policy 

determination to maintain the existing regulatory framework. 

However, there are deficiencies and inefficiencies in the data 

system that was established to track NSEERS data. The 

availability of newer, more capable, DHS data systems argues 

against ever utilizing the NSEERS data system again. It is possible 

that the Department does not disagree, and is simply preserving the 

NSEERS regulatory framework, but would employ the modern 

data systems if it decides someday to require the initiation of some 

new kind of registration program. 

Recommendation #2: Collaborate with commercial airlines and 

develop solutions to reduce the incidence of duplicate flight 

manifests. 

Management Response 

The Department concurred with Recommendation #2. CBP has 

implemented the Flight Close Out message process whereby 

carriers are required to identify who is on the aircraft. CBP 

described the process as reconciliation of the APIS records 

transmitted and distinguishing passengers on board the aircraft 

from those who were transmitted but did not board the aircraft. 

CBP said this effort assists the officers in identifying which set of 

biographic information should be used in the screening process. 

The changes are designed to enhance the officer’s ability to screen 

the correct manifest entry by identifying which set of information 

represents the traveler on board the aircraft; correcting the system 

error that prevented lookouts from displaying when duplicated 

manifests entries existed; and removing from primary processing 

the records of passengers identified as not on board to ensure that 

officers are processing only the screened passenger data. 

OIG Analysis 

CBP’s actions are consistent with the intent of the 


recommendation. In the corrective action plan, CBP should 


Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 35 
provide further details of the discussions with commercial airlines 

to reduce the incidence of duplicate flight manifests. A 

collaborative approach with commercial airlines is necessary. 

CBP relies on the information submitted by commercial airlines to 

conduct the screening process. Additional information that might 

be included in the corrective action plan includes the following: 

 The status of resolving the duplicate flight manifests 

problem identified in the OIG report;

 Whether terminating the transmittal of information via 

APIS Quick Query will eliminate duplicate flight 

manifests; and 

 Information as to whether officers can submit multiple 

lookouts via TECS on the same passenger with a different 

passenger record or unique locator. 

Recommendation #3: Establish department-level oversight to 

address Customs and Border Protection, Office of Border Patrol, 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security 

Investigations operational challenges. 

Management Response 

The Department concurred with Recommendation #3. The 

Department stated that it exercises its oversight and coordination 

responsibility through a variety of forums. These include the 

Information Sharing Governance Board; the Department’s Law 

Enforcement Information Sharing Initiative Executive Director; 

and the Interagency Northern Border Counter Narcotics Strategy. 

Both the U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI will implement the 

following corrective actions: 

 Regular collaboration on quarterly joint intelligence threat 

assessments by geographic area to identify and prioritize 

specific threats common to both agencies; 

 Joint operational planning to disrupt and mitigate priority 

threats identified in the threat assessments; 

 Formalization of a joint information and data sharing 

protocol, to include shared access to agency-specific data 

systems; and 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 36
 Identification of specific objectives within Customs and 

Border Protection to bridge the identified gaps between 

intelligence gathering and operations requiring short-term 

investigations. 

OIG Analysis

We believe that the Department’s effort will improve coordination 

between the U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI. In the corrective 

action plan, please provide, for each of the four areas listed above, 

the following: copies of memorandums, meeting minutes, 

intelligence and strategic planning reports, threat assessments, and 

any other evidence. 

Recommendation #4: Establish timeliness criteria for completing 

reasonable fear cases. 

Management Response 

The Department concurred with Recommendation #4. The 

Department stated that in FY 2011, Headquarters Asylum 

established a performance measure that 85% of reasonable fear 

cases must be completed within 90 days beginning with the referral 

date of the case from ICE ERO and ending with the case 

completion date within the Asylum Office. Also, an additional 

performance measure requires that 95% of pending reasonable fear 

cases must not be pending for more than 150 days and that updates 

be provided every 30 days thereafter regarding the progress on 

resolving the issues preventing decision issuance. 

For FY 2012, Headquarters Asylum has developed two initiatives. 

The first initiative will implement Refugee, Asylum and 

International Operations Directorate Quality Assurance (RAIO 

QA) review of reasonable fear determinations and pilot RAIO QA 

review of credible fear determinations. The second initiative 

consists of implementing the two performance goals stated above. 

In addition, Headquarters Asylum plans to modify APSS, 

reasonable fear procedures, and weekly reports in order to further 

standardize APSS data entry and to assist Asylum Offices with the 

timely completion of reasonable fear determinations. 

OIG Analysis 

In the corrective action plan, please provide the FY 2012 annual 

memorandum to Asylum Office Directors outlining each Asylum 

Office’s performance objectives for the fiscal year to improve the 

processing of reasonable fear determinations. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 37
Recommendation #5: Record in the Asylum Pre-Screening 


System database the date when each reasonable fear case is 


returned to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 


jurisdiction.
 

Management Response 

The Department did not concur with Recommendation #5. During 

the fieldwork stage, we identified a perceived data deficiency in 

the APSS database resulting in the Asylum Division being unable 

to assess reasonable fear case completions. After the exit 

conference, we requested clarifications on the data field 

determined to be deficient. USCIS said that it has a method to 

record and assess reasonable fear timeliness and completions. 

OIG Analysis 

USCIS believes that alternate data entry capabilities and recently 

implemented procedural changes are responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation. The action the Asylum Division describes does 

not specify whether Asylum Officers are recording when each 

reasonable fear case is returned to ICE jurisdiction within the 

APSS database. In the corrective action plan, please provide 

copies of the data fields within APSS and procedures requiring 

Asylum Officers to complete the data fields necessary to track 

timeliness and completions of reasonable fear determinations. 

Upon receipt of the corrective action plan, we anticipate closing 

this recommendation. 

Recommendation #6: Provide all Coordination Centers with live 

video feeds from security cameras in the airport terminals. 

Management Response 

The Department concurred with Recommendation #6. The 

Department said that the Coordination Center is the primary 

communication hub for all TSA activity within the Federal 

Security Director domain. The Department recognizes that the 

Coordination Centers play an important role in information sharing 

on foreign nationals in airports. The Department reported that 

access to closed-circuit television is coordinated on the local level 

through TSA, airport operator, and other entities with a need to 

know. However, because TSA does not own the closed-circuit 

television equipment, granting access to the Coordination Center is 

logistically challenging. The Department stated that in order to 

fully maximize the Coordination Centers' one-stop shop of 

information for TSA and its federal, state, and local agency 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 38 
partners at the local level, TSA will consider the resources 


available and whether or not it can expand such access.
 

OIG Analysis 

In the corrective action plan, please provide copies of the proposals 

submitted to airport owners where a Coordination Center is 

located, requesting access to closed-circuit television. 

Recommendation #7: Provide all Coordination Centers with 


access to federal law enforcement data systems. 


Management Response 

The Department did not concur with Recommendation #7. TSA 

stated that access to criminal records is controlled by statute, 

regulations implemented by the Department of Justice, state laws, 

and policy. Therefore, TSA's ability to conduct a name-based 

criminal records check would depend on the reason for the search 

and type of activity taking place at a Coordination Center. TSA 

noted that, while expanded access to federal law enforcement data 

systems is an overall TSA goal, pushing access to federal law 

enforcement information sources to the Coordination Centers is not 

the most effective solution. The primary role of the Coordination 

Centers is to provide local support to TSA daily mission operations 

while monitoring transportation-related information sources within 

airports. Coordination Centers work in concert with TSA's 

Transportation Security Operations Center, which is charged with 

providing 24/7/365 coordination, communications, intelligence, 

and domain awareness for all DHS transportation-related security 

activities worldwide. When managing an incident requiring 

coordination with federal law enforcement or other specialized 

database checks, Coordination Centers are expected to contact the 

Transportation Security Operations Center to obtain this 

information. This ensures that TSA handles information in 

accordance with relevant criminal history record information based 

on law and policy. 

OIG Analysis 

TSA states that the primary role of the Coordination Centers is to 

provide local support to TSA daily mission operations while 

monitoring transportation-related information sources within 

airports. Coordination Centers play a critical role in information 

sharing on foreign nationals. However, without direct and realtime access to federal law enforcement data systems, the centers 

are hindered in gathering and disseminating information that may 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 39 
adversely affect transportation modes. TSA’s overall goal is to 

expand access to federal law enforcement data systems, but 

statutes and regulations restrict access to criminal records. To 

resolve this issue, we encourage TSA to request a permanent 

Coordination Centers liaison from CBP OFO to improve TSA’s 

access to timely information on foreign nationals via federal law 

enforcement data systems when a need to know is established. 

Both CBP and TSA officials have stated that they would like TSA 

to use DHS systems, particularly TECS, to obtain and share 

information. This collaboration between CBP and TSA would 

further strengthen aviation security and expand local support 

within the airport environment, eliminate delayed responses in an 

emergency, and improve information sharing between the 

components. 

Recommendation #8: Provide federal law enforcement agencies 

updated training or guidance on the operational capabilities the Air 

and Marine Operations Center offers to support border security 

initiatives. 

Management Response 

The Department concurred with Recommendation #8. CBP stated 

that a strategic goal of CBP’s AMOC is to continue to strengthen 

interagency and component partnerships to maximize homeland 

security strategies. One objective of AMOC is to continue to 

promote its missions, capabilities, and operations across 

components and interagency organizations. AMOC hosts more 

than 2,500 visitors annually from various law enforcement 

agencies to which it provides information regarding AMOC 

capabilities. Training is accomplished at law enforcement 

conferences; intelligence meetings; dedicated training on air 

smuggling laws, authorities, and current indicators; as well as 

dedicated AMOC training held at the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center. 

OIG Analysis 

CBP’s plans are responsive to the recommendation. Its efforts to 

inform partners about AMOC’s domain awareness capabilities will 

lead to better cooperation and understanding of AMOC’s role in 

border security. In the corrective action plan, please provide 

copies of meeting minutes, memorandums, outreach program 

agendas, invitations, training manuals, and other evidence to 

indicate that AMOC regularly meets with other components and 

partners at the state and local levels to promote its operational 

capabilities. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 40 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We initiated this review to assess how biometric and biographic 

information is shared among DHS components at the U.S. air, 

land, and sea ports of entry, and land and maritime borders, 

focusing on— 

 How components check and evaluate information when 

they make border determinations on foreign nationals who 

seek admission to the United States; 

 The timeliness and thoroughness of information sharing; 

 Interpersonal relationships among DHS components; and 

 Infrastructure and resources challenges. 

This is the second of three reports on information sharing among 

DHS components when they encounter a foreign national. The 

third report will examine information sharing on foreign nationals 

who are already inside the United States, both legally and illegally. 

Although our recommendations addressed resource challenges and 

professional relationships among DHS components, we limited the 

scope of this report to initiatives to screen foreign nationals at a 

U.S. port of entry or when they are apprehended between ports of 

entry. We did not review measures for U.S. citizens, except for 

programs that cover all travelers, and we did not evaluate cargo 

screening or agricultural inspection programs. We did not focus 

on privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, or redress aspects of the 

systems or processes. We wrote recommendations to improve 

communication and cooperation, policy and procedures, and 

timeliness and thoroughness of information sharing among DHS 

components. 

We conducted fieldwork for this report from August to December 

2010. We conducted 57 individual and group interviews with 

DHS personnel. We interviewed personnel from five DHS 

operational components—CBP, the Coast Guard, ICE, USCIS, and 

TSA—as well as personnel from the headquarters support office, 

Office of Policy. We reviewed documentation provided by DHS 

components and viewed many data systems demonstrations. 

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 41
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We conducted site visits to the following DHS offices: 

During our field visits, our inspectors observed— 

 CBP OFO’s primary and secondary inspections at various 

land, sea, and air port of entry 

 CBP OFO’s Passenger Analysis Units at air ports of entry 

 U.S. Border Patrol’s operations 

 CBP Air and Marine Operations Center 

 CBP outbound passenger screening procedures 

 The Coast Guard Vessel Screening program and Joint 

Harbor Operations Centers 

 ICE ERO detainee intake procedures 

 TSA’s Operation Playbook exercises 

We also conducted interviews with— 

 USCIS Asylum Officers responsible for credible and 

reasonable fear processing 

 CBP Air and Marine agents 

 ICE HSI agents 

This review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality 

Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 42
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Page 43
 

U.5.lkpon",••, of 11_....., s...rl<y W..~i"JI..., DC lf5U

~Homeland V Security

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for lhe opportWlity to review and respond to the Office oflnspt<:lOr General's (OIG)

Draft Report entitled, "Infonnation Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security," (OIG-09-

132a-[SP-DHS, Phase II). This memorandum is in response to your requestlhatthe Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Policy (PLCY), in coordination with Transportation

Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CSP), and United States

Citizenship and Immigration Service (USClS) respond to lhe recommendations contained in the

report.

lbis draft report provides analysis on infonnation sharing among DHS components with border

security missions and evaluates lhe timeliness and quality ofinfonnation shared through DHS

data systems and through communication among DHS component agencies. It also discusses

how interagency working relationships affect operations to screen and process foreign nationals.

010 acknowledges in lhe report that DHS has invested considerable resources to improve

staffing and infiastructure, such as software to consolidate data systems. However, the 0[0

states that there is more work to be done in the area or resource allocation and prioritization in

order to further improve upon infonnation sharing.

The Department generally concurs with five ofthe eight recommendations and appreciates the

opportunity to comment on the draft report. Listed below are the eight OIG recommendations

and corresponding OilS responses.

ReeommendltioD 1'1: Fully tenninate the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System and

reinstate the prior provisions.

DHS Response: Non-Concur. The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System

(NSEERS) regulations were promulgated in the immediate aftermath of91l1 by a fonnal

rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. This rulemaking was an exereise ofthe

Attomey General's authority to require aliens to register in order to bener protect the United

Slates. From March 1,2002 through April 28. 2011, the !kcrclary of Homeland Security

exercised this authority primarily through country designations requiring information collection

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

by the NSEERS program. The Secretary, in her sole discretion, chose to end the collection of

information under country designations by means of an April 28, 2011, Federal Register Notice.

The Secretary's authority, as exercised under the NSEERS regulations, is broader than the

information collection program based on country designation described in the Office of Inspector

Genel'lll's draft report. The Secretary has chosen to retain this regulatory framework to enable

prompt action to require registration ofa category or categories of aliens, if necessary, through

rapid publication of a Federal Register Notice. The retention ofthis regulatory framework has

no direct cost to the Depanment while a formal rulemaldng to rescind the regulations would be

costly and time consuming now, with the possibility that another costly and time consuming

rulemaking would be neeessary ifspecific registration was needed in the future. Indeed, in light

ofthe legally required time to promulgate new regulations, it might not be possible to reestablish

a categorical registration regime in time fully to protect the United States from a future, perhaps

imminent threat. The regulation is being kept in place to ensure that the Secretary retains a legal

discretionary regulatory framework in case it is needed in the future.

Recommendation 112: Collaborate with commercial airlines and develop solutions to reduce the

incidence of duplicate flight manifests.

DHS ResROnse: Concur. CBP believes that it has successfully implemented this

recommendation and respectfully requests closure. Duplicate manifests 8TC largely a result ofthe

implementation oftne TSA Secure Flight program. CBP has taken several steps to resolve the

issues identified in this finding. As part oftne DHS One Solution process, carriers transmit data

to the DHS for both the CBP Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and TSA Secure

Flight programs. Secure Flight and APIS have different time requirements that often result in

carricrs providing manifest information multiple times from multiple systems for the same

passenger.

In 2009, cap began receiving passenger transmissions 72 hours prior to departure due to TSA's

Secure Flight requirement, as well as completed and validated APIS transmissions. CBP

immediately identified the large numbers of duplicate records since several carriers' systems did

not have the technical ability to link 72-hour data with tlte completed APIS manifest submissions

for the same passenger and assisted the carriers with technical solutions to the duplication issue.

CBP implemented thc Flight Closc Out message process whereby carriers are required to

identity who is on the aireraft. The Flight Closc Out message reconciles the APIS records

transmitted and identifies those passengers on board the aircraft from those that were transmitted

but did not board the aircraft. This assists the officers in identifying which set ofbiographie

information should be used in the screening process.

cap has implemented changes to enhance the officer's ability to screen the correct manifest

entry by identifying whieh set of information represents the traveler on board the aircraft;

eorreeted the system error that prevented lookouts from displaying when duplicate manifest

entries existed; and removed thosc records identified as not on board from primary processing to

ensure officers are processing only the sereened passenger data.

2

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 


Page 44
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Recommendation #3: Establish department-level oversight to address Customs and Border

Protection, Office of Border Patrol, and Immigration and CuslOms Enforcement Homeland

Security Investigations operational challenges.

DHS Re~ponse: Concur. 1ne Department cOntinues 10 exercise ils oversight and coordination

responsibility. This capability is presently carried out through a variety of fora and is be=ming

more robust as the Department matures. Of particular note, given the focus ofthis report, is the

Information Sharing Governance Board (ISGB), which is a principal-level, Department-led

coordination body. The ISGB serves as the executive-level decision-making body for all DHS

information sharing matters. Chaired by the Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis, the

ISGB includes DHS operational and headquarters elements. lbe ISGB meets quarterly 10

provide support for the Departmem's information sharing programs and participation in the

National Information Sharing Environment (ISE). Furthermore, DliS selected a Senior

Executive Level Manager to serve as the Department's Law Enforcement Information Sharing

Initiative (LEISI) Executive Director. This selection demonstrated the importance and priority

that DHS has placed on sharing of law enforcement information through various programs such

as the LEIS Service, which has to date, been deployed in multiple locations in the United States

and greatly enhances law enforcement sharing within all levels and entities of US and tribal law

enforcement. DHS LEISI CQntinues to be an active advocate for law enforcement information

sharing within DHS and its CQmponents, and repeatedly coordinates throughout the law

enforcement CQmmunity to improve the understanding of information needs. Additionally, DHS

LEISI provides important leadership in resolving policy issues that may inhibit law enforcement

information sharing and strives to develop approaches to overcome traditional barriers to

information sharing. Additionally, and with specific regard to the U.S. Northern Border, DHS

will soon release its Northern Border Strategy and the Office of National Drug Control Policy

(ONDCP) will soon release the Interagency Northern Border Coumer Narcotics Strategy. These

strategies will lay the groundwork, which will allow DIIS to better coordinate internally between

CBP, ICE, and components; to identify both gaps and duplication; and to achieve effective and

efficient northern border management. Through these and other similar activities, the

Depanment is strengthening its oversight and coordination responsibilities.

With respect to the particular coordination issues raised, CBP and ICE will be laking the

following corrective actions:

- U.S. Border Patrol and ICE Homeland Security Investigations (liS I) will regularly

collaborate on quarterly joim intelligence threat assessments by geographic area 10

idemify and prioritize specific threats common to both agencies.

- U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI will jointly plan operations and allocate resources to

disrupt and mitigate priority threats identified injoint assessments.

- U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI will formalize ajoint information and data sharing

protocol, to include shared access to agency-specific data systems.

- U.S. Border Patrol will cooperate to identify specific objectives within Customs and

Border Protection to bridge the identified gap between intelligence gathering and

operations requiring short-term investigations. This will allow for the efficient utili:l.lltion

3

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 


Page 45
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

of organic resources within Customs and Border Protection, while allowing Homeland

Security Investigations to focus more oftheir resources on their mission priorities.

Recommendation #4: Establish timeliness criteria for completing reasonable fear eases.

PHS RUDonse: Concur. For Fiscal Year 2011, the Asylum Division in USCIS established a

key initiative, "Eslahlish a lime/inen standard/or reasonable fear case!." Pursuant to this key

initiative, Headquarters Asylum (HQASM) consulted with the Asylum Offices and subsequently

developed and executed a survey gathering descriptions of processing problems causing delays,

the lengths, sources, and frequencies oflOOse delays and other feedback. HQASM analy-l.ed

reports ofcase processing data from the Asylum Pre-SCrealing System (APSS) to assist in

determining standards and benchmarks for the reasonable fear process.

In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2011 key initiatives, HQASM established the performance

measure that 85% ofreasonable fear cases must be completed within 90 days. This will measure

the time between the referral date ofthe case from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE) Enforcement and Removal (ERO) to the Asylum Office ("Clock-in Date" in APSS) to case

completion ("Decision Served" or "Close Effective" in APSS). An additional performance

measure is that 95% of pending reasonable fear cases must not be pending for more than 150

days. HQASM will require that Asylum Offices submit written justification for every ease older

than 150 days and provide updates every 30 days thereafter regarding progress on resolving the

issues preventing decision issuance. Funher analysis will assist in developing additional internal

benchmarks.

Additionally, during the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2011. in recognition ofthe headquarters

review delays referenced in the OIG report, HQASM detailed field supervisory asylum officers

and quality assurance/training asylum officers to assist with the review ofreasonable fear cases.

For Fiscal Year 2012, HQASM has developed two key initiatives. The first initiative is to

implement Refugee, Asylum and International Operations Directorate Quality Assurance (RAIO

QA) review of Reasonable Fear determinations and pilot RAIO QA review ofCredible Fear

determinations. The second initiative for Fiscal Year 2012 consists of implementing the two

processing standards for reasonable fear established in Fiscal Year 2011, as described above.

Both ofthese new measures will be promulgated at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2012 through

the annual memorandum to Asylum Office Directors outlinin8 each Asylum Office's

performance objectives for the fiscal year. In addition, HQASM plans to modify APSS,

reasonable fear procedures, and weekly reports in order to further standardize APSS data-entry

and to assist Asylum Offices with the timely completion ofreasonable fear determinations.

Recommendation NS: Record in the Asylum Pre-Screening System database the date when

each reasonable fear ease is returned to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement jurisdiction.

PIIS Responu: Non-concur. As discussed between USCIS Asylum Division and the Office of

Inspector General (DIG), this recommendation was based on a perceived data deficiency in the

Asylum Pre-Screening System (APSS) database resulting in the Asylum Division being Wlable

to assess reasonable fear case completions. The OIG recommendation was for the Asylum

4

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 


Page 46
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Division 10 record ",,'hen each reasonable fear case is returned 10 ICEjurisdietion as indication of

Ctit completion.

After the exit con.fereoce, the DIG requested that USCIS provide additional information on the

APSS database to clarify the etlll'ent data entty procedure in APSS and how the Asylum Division

assesses case completions for reasonable fear. 1l'Ie Asylum Division clarified that the APSS data

field ("Decision SeNed'") is used to assc:ss timeliness and completion for reasonable fear cases.

The "Dceision Served" date encornpasse:$ the change ofjwisdiction from USCIS As,.lum to the

Department ofJustice - Exec:uti~ Office for Immigration Review (OOJIEOIR) and to ICE.

Since: the Asylum Division does have a way to record and assess reasonable fear timeliness and

completioll$. DIG indicated that this recornmeDdation ""1N!d be: closed for cause upon is5llllJlOe

ofthe fmal report.. USCIS agrees with DIG that this reeornmendation should be: closed.

RfCOmmendadon "': Provide all Coordination Centers with live video feeds from security

cameras in the airport tennina1s.

PHS Rtspollle: Concur. The Coordination Center (CC) is the primary comrnWlication hub for

all TSA llC1ivity ""i!hin the FSD domain. 1l'Ie CC continuously monitors. coordinates. and

communicates situational and domain awareness of multimodal transponaIion activities and acts

as the primary information and reporting conduit for security related incidents andfor

emergencies. The CC serves as the focal point for TSA steady state operations. When

applicable, CCs will transition to an Incident Command System (ICS) focusing on Incident

Management (1M) andfor Emergency Management (EM).

TSA recognius that the TSA Coordination Centers can play an inaeasing role in information

sharing on foreign nationals in the: commercial airport environment. CWTtntly, acec:ss to CCTV

is coordinated on the local level through TSA. airport operator and other entities with a need to

know. Acc~ to CClV is airport owned and often this elTort is logistically challenging.

Additionally. due to the variations ofCCs infrastructure oot all CCs an: operationally set-up or

located \0 receive CCTV. In order to fully maximize tnc Coordination Centers' one-stop shop of

information for !SA and its federal. state, and local agency panners at the locallcvcl, TSA will

consider the resources available and whether or not we arc able to expand such access.

Recomm~Ddation 117: Provide all Coordinll1ion Centers (CCl with ElCceSS to federal law

enforcement data systems.

DHS R~~[Ions~: Non-<:oncur. Aecess to criminal rccords is controlled by statute (The National

Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. 14616), regulations implemented

by the Department ofJustice (28 CFR 20.33), SUIte laws, and policy. Individuals engaged in

cenain criminal investigative activities may eonduct name-based eriminal record searches as

necessary. However, certain other activities require the colle<:tion and submission offingerprints

and fees to the FBI in order to conduct a criminal records search. Thus, TSA's ability to conduct

a name-based criminal reoords chock would depend on the reason for the search and type of

activity taking place 111 a Cc.

,

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 


Page 47
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

While expanded access to Federal law enforcement data systems is an overall TSA goal, pushing

access to federal law enforcement information sources to the Coordination Centers is not the

most effective solution. The primary role ofthe CC is to provide local support to TSA daily

mission operations while monitoring transportation-related information sources within an FSD

domain. Coordination Centers facilitate the gathering, dissemination, cornmWlication, and

reporting ofinformation to the Tl1lIlSportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) on a 24n

basis, conduct routine ongoing operations and provide an incident management commWlication

and coordination framework for FSD initial-response: actions.

lbe CCs work in concert with TSA's Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), which

is charged with providing 24 hOlm> a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year coordination,

commWlications, intelligence and domain awareness for all DHS transportation related security

activities worldwide. When managing an incident requiring coordinalion with Federal law

enforcement or other specialized database checks, CCs are expected to contact TSOC to obtain

this information, consistent with TSA Operations Directives. This ensures TSA handles

information in accordance with relevant criminal history record information law and policy.

R«ommendation ItS: Provide federal law enforcement agencies updated training or guidance

on the operational capabilities the Air and Marine Operations Center offers 10 support border

security initiatives.

DHS RtspOnH: Concur. CBP believes thai its ongoing efforts meet the intent of this

recommendation and respectfully requests closure ofthe recommendation. A strategic goal of

CBP's Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) is to continue to strengthen interagency and

component agency partnerships to maximize homeland security strategies. To help accomplish

this, an objective ofthe AMOC is 10 continue to promote AMOC missions, capabilities, and

operalions across component and interagency organizations. AMOC intelligence and law

enforcement tearns, along with AMOC Ambassadors, continuously provide law enforcement

agencies at the federal, slate. and local levels wilh information on AMOC's capabilities. The

AMOC hosts more than 2,500 visitors annually from various law enforcement agencies 10 which

it provides information regarding AMOC capabilities. Training is accomplished allaw

enforcement conferences; intelligence meetings; dedicated training on air smuggling laws,

authorities, and current indicators; as well as dedicated AMOC lraining held at the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center. AMOC will conlinue to be proactive in these outreach and

training efforts.

6

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 


Page 48
 
Appendix C 

DHS Border Security Data Systems 

DHS INFORMATION SYSTEMS 

Owner Manages Information on Foreign Nationals (who may become citizens) 

US-VISIT ADIS 

Arrival and Departure Information System

Collects, matches, and reports on U.S. arrivals and departures

USCIS APSS 

Asylum Pre-Screening System 

Tracks detained and nondetained credible fear and reasonable fear cases 

USCIS CIS 

Central Index System

Documents the existence and status of most aliens known to DHS and the

location of their alien files

USCIS CLAIMS3

Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 3 

Tracks immigrant and nonimmigrant applications/petitions 

USCIS CLAIMS4

Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 4 

Tracks naturalization applications

ICE EARM

Enforce Alien Removal Module

Tracks detained aliens, aliens in removal proceedings, and case histories 

ICE ENFORCE 

Enforcement Case Tracking System 

Tracks immigration enforcement actions and cases

CBP ESTA

Electronic System for Travel Authorization 

Screening mechanism for applications from visa waiver travelers for travel 

authorization 

US-VISIT IDENT

US-VISIT Automated Biometric Identification System 

Enrolls and stores biometrics of foreign nationals

USCIS ISRS 

Image Storage and Retrieval System 

Provides query and retrieval of biometric image sets and biographical data 

USCIS RAPS 

Refugees, Asylum, and Parole System

Tracks affirmative applicants for asylum status

ICE SEVIS 

Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 

Tracks and monitors students, exchange visitors, and dependents

Manages Information on Travelers (including U.S. citizens) 

CBP APIS 

Advance Passenger Information System

Receives air and sea passenger manifests

The Coast

Guard SANS 

Ship Arrival Notification System 

Arrival/departure information from shipping agents from flagged vessels

TSA Secure Flight 

Secure Flight 

Watch list matching for flights into, out of, within, and over the United States

Aggregates/Analyzes Information

CBP ATS-P 

Automated Targeting System – Passenger 

Provides an enforcement and decision support tool

ICE ICEPIC 

ICE Pattern Analysis and Information Collection System

Provides an information analysis tool

ICE Intel Fusion/Avalanche 

Intel Fusion/Avalanche/Virtual Investigative & Intelligence System 

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 49 
Provides access to TECS, ENFORCE, encounters, and arrests 

Manages Law Enforcement Information (including U.S. citizens) 

CBP TECS 

TECS (not an acronym) 

Collects, analyzes, and shares law enforcement information

Source: Database documentation, demonstrations. 

Appendix C 

DHS Border Security Data Systems 

Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 50 
Asylum Pre-Screening Cases 

Current Status Credible Fear 

Cases 

Percentage 

by Case 

Disposition 

Reasonable Fear 

Cases 

Percentage by 

Case 

Disposition 

Fear Established 19,030 67% 1,067 24% 

Fear Not Established 4,792 17% 1,377 30% 

Case Closed: 

Applicant Withdrew 

4,345 15% 1,950 43% 

Case Closed: Other 351 1% 86 2% 

Case Pending 6 0% 52 1% 

Total 28,524 100% 4,532 100% 

Source: USCIS APSS data from June 1, 2005, to June 30, 2010. 

Appendix D 

Asylum Pre-Screening Case Disposition 

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 51 
Reasonable Fear Case Timeliness 

Reasonable Fear Decisions Average Number Percentage Number of Percentage 

Cases 

Decision Stages 

with dates 

entered 

days to 

complete 

stage 

of 

decisions 

over 31 

of decisions 

over 31 

days 

decisions 

over 93 

days 

of decisions 

over 93 

days 

days 

Time Elapsed From the 

Date ICE or CBP Notified 

2,436 33 days 847 35% 158 6% 

the Asylum Program of a 

Claim Until the Date an 

Initial Decision Was Made 

Time Elapsed From the 

Date an Initial Decision 

2,221 11 days 159 7% 25 1% 

Was Made Until the Date 

the Case Was Forwarded 

to Headquarters for 

Review 

Time Elapsed From the 

Date the Case Was 

1,850 29 days 682 37% 59 3% 

Forwarded to 

Headquarters Until the 

Date the Case Was 

Completed 

Asylum Notification to 

Case Completion 

1,904 72 days 1,486 78% 466 24% 

Total Reasonable Fear Decisions (with and without start and end dates) = 2,444 

Total Reasonable Fear Decisions (including withdrawals) = 4,532 

Source: USCIS APSS data from June 1, 2005, to June 30, 2010 

Appendix E 

Reasonable Fear Case Timeliness 

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 52 
Appendix F 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector 

Lorraine Eide, Lead Inspector 

Pharyn Smith, Senior Inspector 

Michael Brooks, Inspector 

LaDana Crowell, Inspector 

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 

Page 53 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Component Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

Information Sharing On Foreign Nationals: Border Security 


Page 54
 
 

 

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