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ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF THE 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 29, 2010 

Serial No. 111–140 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

JARED POLIS, Colorado 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

BOBBY VASSAR, Chief Counsel 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 29, 2010 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 2 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Mark Sullivan, Director, United States Secret Service, United States 

Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on 

the Judiciary ......................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member, Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, and Homeland Security .................................................................... 32 

Response to Questions from Mark Sullivan, Director, United States Secret 

Service, United States Department of Homeland Security .............................. 35 

(1) 

ROLE AND OPERATIONS OF THE 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert C. 

‘‘Bobby’’ Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Scott, Conyers, Pierluisi, Jackson Lee, 

Quigley, Gohmert, and Goodlatte. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief 

Counsel; Joe Graupensperger, Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member; (Minority) Caroline Lynch, Counsel; and 

Kelsey Whitlock, Minority Legislative Assistant. 

Mr. SCOTT. The Subcommittee will come to order. And I am 

pleased to welcome you today on the hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, an oversight hearing on the United States Secret Service. 

The role of the Secret Service has expanded greatly since it was 

created in 1865 to fight counterfeiting U.S. currency. The Service 

became part of the Treasury Department in 1883 and took many 

additional investigative responsibilities with respect to safeguarding the payment and financial systems of the United States. 

It wasn’t until 1894 that the Secret Service started protecting our 

Presidents on a part-time basis and in 1901 on a full-time basis. 

That protective role has grown substantially since that time. 

Now, as a component of the Department of Homeland Security, 

the Service continues to focus on the investigation of counterfeiting 

and a wide variety of other schemes which financially defraud individuals, organizations, and our government. The Secret Service has 

led in the investigation of some of the most extensive instances of 

computer intrusion and data theft ever uncovered, such as the TJX 

and the Heartland cases. The TJX case involved a breach of more 

than 45 million credit cards. In the Heartland Payment Systems 

case, 130 million credit card accounts were compromised. 

With increasing frequency of such breaches, the high volume of 

consumer data compromised, the Subcommittee will want to know 

what challenges law enforcement faces in preventing and investigating these crimes. While the size of some of these cases is astounding, I am also interested to know how we can have law enVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:26 Dec 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\062910\57153.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
2 

forcement do more to assist individual citizens whose credit cards 

or other personal information is stolen. The impact of these thefts 

on individuals can be very damaging, if not devastating. 

I believe the key reason for such crime proliferating is that the 

perpetrators know that they are unlikely to be caught or even have 

their cases investigated. They know that thefts below certain 

threshold amounts do not get the attention of law enforcement. The 

result is a credit card company doesn’t charge the customer who 

proves that the charge is unauthorized, the card holding victim is 

made whole because they don’t have to pay, and the perpetrator 

keeps the proceeds of the crime without having to face any serious 

risk of consequences. 

These cases aren’t so complicated that they can’t be solved if the 

appropriate amount of resources is devoted to them, and I want to 

know from the Director why more cases are not pursued. 

I also want to mention something of interest to me that is not 

part of the usual investigative or protective mission of the Secret 

Service, and that is because of the Secret Service’s unique experience in threat assessment and protection of individuals at national 

security special events. 

The Service was called upon recently to assist in the preparation 

of a report studying threat assessment and preventing violence in 

institutions of higher education. A report was prepared in the wake 

of the 2007 tragedy at Virginia Tech. As the author of the Housepassed Campus Safety Act, which has been waiting for 2 years for 

the Senate to act upon it, I am very interested in this issue. 

The Secret Service has an important and varied mission, and the 

Subcommittee is pleased to have the opportunity to discuss these 

and other issues relating to the agency. Today we will have one 

witness, Mark Sullivan, the Director of the Secret Service. And before we proceed with his statement, it is my pleasure to recognize 

the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from 

Texas, Judge Gohmert. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Chairman Scott. Welcome, Director 

Sullivan. Thank you for joining us today for this hearing. 

The Secret Service was formed in 1865 to address the prevalence 

of counterfeit U.S. currency. An estimated one-third to one-half of 

all the currency in circulation following the Civil War was counterfeit. And at the recommendation of Treasury Secretary Hugh 

McCulloch, President Lincoln established a commission to study 

this rapidly growing problem. And on April 14, 1865, he created the 

U.S. Secret Service to implement the commission’s recommendations. Ironically, this was one of President Lincoln’s last official 

acts. He was assassinated later that same day. 

Housed within the Treasury Department, the Secret Service 

began this operation July 5, 1865, and shut down more than 200 

counterfeiting plants in its first year. But it would take 36 years 

and two more presidential assassinations, James Garfield in 1881 

and William McKinley in 1901, for Congress to expand the Service’s mission to include protection of the President. Every President 

since 1901 has been protected by the Secret Service. The Service’s 

protection responsibilities have expanded since then to include the 

First Family, the Vice President, former Presidents, visiting heads 

of states and others. The Service’s investigative authority has also 

3 

expanded over the years to include other financial crimes such as 

identity theft, credit and debit card fraud, and financial institution 

fraud. 

The Service continues its original task of shutting down counterfeiting operations both here and abroad. Through the Project Colombia Initiative and Peruvian Counterfeit Task Force, the Service 

provides support to local law enforcement investigations in Colombia, the largest producer of counterfeit U.S. currency, and Peru a 

growing competitor. 

Since 1994, the Service provided forensic and technical support 

to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, including polygraph exams, handwriting, and fingerprint analysis and 

voice print comparisons. The Service operates Electronic Crimes 

Task Forces to investigate hacking, phishing, skimming, malware 

attacks, and other electronic crimes. 

The Service also operates a national network of 38 Financial 

Crime Task Forces to investigate crimes associated with the Nation’s economic crisis, particularly mortgage fraud. Since 2006, the 

Service has referred over 400 mortgage fraud cases for prosecution. 

These are but a few of the Service’s investigative responsibilities. 

It is clear that the Secret Service is not merely in charge of protecting our President, but also plays a major important role in investigating large scale financial electronic crimes. For that reason, 

I do look forward to the testimony of our witness and would yield 

back at this time. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. We have been joined by the Chairman of 

the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Scott and Judge Gohmert. 

I am glad we have so many of our Members of the Committee out. 

Director Sullivan, I have a confession to make to you. I was prepared to suggest that you be reassigned because of what happened 

at the White House, but my able staff has persuaded me that that 

would be no more fair than holding someone responsible for something that they thought was being covered properly. So I have revised my statement so that—we just want to say this. I don’t know 

how we lost the Social Secretary at the White House, but blaming 

her is misplaced. The protection of the President of the United 

States is a job for Secret Service. It is not the Secretary’s job or 

anybody else’s. And what I need to know is whether this is preventible. Nobody is perfect. But we are talking about in effect the 

most influential, if not most powerful single human being on the 

planet. We don’t have time to get his protection right the second 

time. And I have got to find out whether we can get some certainty 

that this can never happen again, especially at the White House 

itself. 

The other part of your duties that Chairman Scott referred to, 

I would like your able men and women behind you to just let me 

know how many—what was the disposition of all the mortgage 

fraud cases. We have got so much rip-off coming from the mortgage 

companies and all the lines of—they resell them, then go out of 

business. No one can even find them to work out any kind of compromise. We have got foreclosures going on at a record rate in 

4 

many of our cities, and that is an area of your responsibility I 

would like you to deal with. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. If other Members have a statement for 

the record, by unanimous consent, without objection, so ordered. 

Our witness today is Mark Sullivan, the Director of the United 

States Secret Service, who was sworn in as the 22nd Director in 

2006. Immediately prior to that he served as Assistant Director of 

the Office of Protective Operations. He began his Secret Service career as a special agent in the Detroit field office in 1983. 

Mr. Sullivan, your total written statement we entered into the 

record in its entirety. So I would ask you to summarize your testimony. It is usually 5 minutes. But since you are the only witness, 

do the best you can. We will have the timing light on, but feel free 

to make your complete statement that you think we need to hear. 

We have your complete written statement. And so at this point, 

you may begin your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES 

SECRET SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Conyers, 

Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert. It is my privilege to 

appear before you today to discuss the current state of the U.S. Secret Service. I will offer brief remarks and ask that my full statement be included in the record. 

Before I begin, I would like to recognize the great relationship we 

have enjoyed with the staff of this Subcommittee for years. Whether it was working to expand our successful Electronic Crime Task 

Force program or addressing the spike in mortgage and other financial frauds in recent years, your staff has always demonstrated 

a level of cooperation and professionalism that is appreciated by all 

of us at the U.S. Secret Service. 

Since the majority of our statutory authorities fall under Title 18 

of the U.S. Code, the Judiciary Committee has a long distinguished 

history of working with the U.S. Secret Service on investigative priorities that many in the general public may not recognize we cover. 

While most people associate the U.S. Secret Service with the protection of the President and Vice President, the special agents in 

our field offices around the world who make that protection possible also spend roughly half of their time protecting our country’s 

banking and financial system from criminals who seek to harm us. 

Although these may appear to be disparate missions on the surface, our protective responsibilities are reliant on the experienced 

staffing and assets from our investigative field offices to cover daily 

presidential, vice presidential or other protective travel. They also 

provide a surge capacity for the U.N. General Assembly, designated 

NSSEs, and presidential campaigns. Special agents in the field are 

on the front lines of protecting intelligence cases, responding 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week to every threat made toward a Secret 

Service protectee. In addition, Secret Service field office personnel 

are responsible for maintaining the excellent relationships we have 

built through the years with our State and local law enforcement 

partners. 

5 

Finally, but important to understand, is that the special agents 

you see in close proximity to the President, Vice President or other 

protectee are not fresh out of our training academy. These agents 

have spent years in our field offices honing their investigative 

skills by conducting criminal and protective intelligence investigations. They have also developed their protective skills by performing advance work, providing physical security for visiting 

heads of state, as well as supporting our permanent protective details. It is through these assignments that special agents in the 

field develop the expertise, maturity, and judgment needed to succeed in the next phase of their career, a permanent protection assignment. 

From our original mandate in 1865 to suppress the counterfeiting of U.S. currency to the complex transnational financial 

crimes we are investigating today, the U.S. Secret Service has always held two things as sacrosanct, our relationship with law enforcement and other partners and intensive training as a means to 

prevent bad things from happening. One example of this is our 

Electronic Crimes Task Force program, or ECTF, that started in 

our New York field office but has since been replicated in 28 other 

locations, to include our first internationally ECTF based in Rome, 

Italy. Membership in our ECTF program includes over 2,100 State, 

local, Federal and international law enforcement partners, over 

3,100 private sector partners, and nearly 300 academic partners. 

These partnerships are critical to the success of the ECTF program’s preventive approach. 

Effective collaboration with the banking and financial sector to 

protect their system networks has led to a stronger business continuity plan and routine risk management assessments of their 

electronic infrastructure. This collaborative approach also affords 

the business community direct access to law enforcement if an intrusion is detected. In addition, the research and development that 

our academic partners bring to the table ensure that all ECTF 

members are on the cutting edge of technology. 

At the core of our ECTF program is the training provided 

through our Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program, or ECSAP. 

Nearly 1,200 special agents or 35 percent of the agent workforce 

has received at least one of three levels of ECSAP training. These 

special agents are deployed in 98 offices throughout the world and 

are experts in computer forensics and the preservation and retrieval of electronic evidence. Given the success of ECSAP, the U.S. 

Secret Service identified a growing need for our State and local law 

enforcement partners, as well as prosecutors and judges to receive 

similar training. While this training was provided on an ad hoc 

basis for years through our electronic crimes State and local program, the Secret Service in partnership with DHS stood up the National Computer Forensic Institute, or NCFI, with the goal of providing a national standard of training for a variety of electronic 

crimes investigations. By the end of this fiscal year, the U.S. Secret 

Service through the NCFI will have provided training to 932 State 

and local law enforcement officials, representing 300 agencies from 

50 States and the two U.S. territories. 

Since moving to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, 

the benefits of our investigative program have been evident. 

6 

Whether it was the successful investigation and prosecution of the 

two largest network intrusion cases in U.S. history or the seizure 

of more than $20 million of counterfeit U.S. Currency in Lima, 

Peru during the first year of our operation there, we have contributed to the success of the Department by protecting the banking 

and financial infrastructure of our country. 

Let me be clear, the U.S. Secret Service would be unable to effectively meet our protective mandate if not for the expertise that our 

special agents develop through conducting criminal investigations 

in our field offices both here and abroad. If the President schedules 

a trip to the Pacific Northwest 2 days from now, we would be able 

to immediately conduct the necessary advance work, including liaison with local law enforcement, to ensure the President’s safety. 

This would not be possible without the strong support of our State 

and local law enforcement partners and the dedicated men and 

women across the United States and around the world who serve 

with distinction as special agents, uniform division officers, and administrative professional and technical personnel. 

Despite the demands of our dual mission, the men and women 

of the U.S. Secret Service are ever vigilant and prepared for the 

challenges that lie ahead. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, this 

concludes my opening statement. I would be more than happy to 

answer any questions at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:] 

7 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK SULLIVAN


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. We will begin and recognize 

ourselves under the 5-minute rule. I will begin with the gentleman 

from Puerto Rico. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Thank you very much, Chairman Scott. Thank 

you, Director Sullivan, for appearing before us. 


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18 

Beyond its protective function, the Secret Service plays other key 

roles, some of which you have mentioned. I am particularly interested in its work in the area of financial crimes as it may relate 

to money laundering, And I will tell you where I am coming from. 

I represent Puerto Rico, and we have had a lot of drug trafficking 

in Puerto Rico, as well as the Caribbean since the mid ’90’s. Back 

then I was Attorney General. We were designated as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area as a result of efforts on my part, and 

I am particularly interested in what, if anything, you are doing, 

your agency is doing in the Caribbean relating to money laundering, which I know is happening. 

I know—let me say up front—that your agency participates in Financial Crime Task Forces throughout the Nation. I wonder whether you are participating in High Intensity Drug Traffic Area programs throughout the Nation, including in Puerto Rico. And I want 

to see what commitment you have regarding this terrible crime 

that happens and that generates violence, among other things. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you for that question. Sir, what we instruct 

all of our agents in the field to do is to have an impact in that community where they oversee for that particular office. Nationally we 

are in partnership with DEA for that very reason when it comes 

to drug trafficking and the other financial type crimes that are involved with drug trafficking. 

Now, I can’t give you the particulars as far as what we are doing 

in the Caribbean. I can tell you that we are very active down there. 

We do see a lot of money laundering that our people are involved 

in. I can tell you that it is evident to me just in the seizures that 

I see, the asset forfeiture seizures that I see—last year, our asset 

forfeitures were up 35 percent. 90 percent of those asset forfeitures 

are going back to the victim. 

But I can tell you that that is an area that we do pay attention 

to, that we do ensure that we do partner up. As you know, we have 

an office in Puerto Rico. And I do believe that our people down 

there are very involved in this particular type of criminal activity, 

as well as our office in Miami, which is the office that, you know, 

San Juan reports to. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I tell you, one thing that concerns me is that with 

all of this attention—and it is due attention—that the Mexican border is receiving from us, I hope that we don’t forget that the southern most border of the U.S. Is the one you have in Puerto Rico and 

the USVI, and that these drug trafficking organizations and the related money laundering organizations are like moving targets. If 

you do not have a global or regional approach, you are wasting 

your time and effort. To the extent you are paying attention to, 

let’s say, the Mexican border, you cannot forget that they simply 

change routes, they change their focus. So I just urge you to keep 

an eye on the Caribbean as well because otherwise your efforts 

could be fruitless. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Congressman, what we are seeing—and you have 

hit on a very important point—everything now is transnational. I 

mean, all of our crimes are of borderless type crimes. And that is 

why we have seen again—we are looking to replicate the Financial 

Crime and the Electronic Crime Task Forces we have here domestically. We are looking to expand those internationally. And, you 

19 

know, that is part of our foreign field office strategy, is for these 

financial—it fits very well within both our protective mission and 

with our investigative mission. 

So I agree with you wholeheartedly and I would be more than 

happy to get some information for you on what we are doing down 

in Puerto Rico. And we can get it back to your staff if you like. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I thank you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 

Texas. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Director Sullivan, it is good to see you again. 

I understand one of the many things that your agency gets into 

investigating at least is mortgage fraud. What is the most common 

form of mortgage fraud that your department ends up investigating? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, I would say straw buyers. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Straw buyers? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. We just were involved in a task force 

that went—it was Broken Dreams. It was generated by the Attorney General along with—the FBI was involved, several other Federal and State and local law enforcement agencies, a nationwide 

initiative. It went from, I believe, March through April. During the 

course of that time, I believe we had about 22 officers working 

about 40 different mortgage fraud investigations. We arrested, I believe—or charged 70 people and we uncovered about $135 million 

worth of fraud and mortgage fraud. And I would say for the most 

part what we are seeing is straw buyers. 

Mr. GOHMERT. One of the things that we have seen going 

through September and October of 2008 were the mortgage-backed 

securities. And it seemed that one type of fraud was straw buyers, 

as you mentioned. But one is people approaching fraud in the manner in which they pushed people into loans they couldn’t afford and 

ultimately loans that had no chance of succeeding and then banding—another type seemed to me in cases where it appears they 

knowingly put together a whole bunch of really bad loans and put 

a big thick document with it to make it a security and then sold 

the securities as mortgage-backed securities and unfortunately 

without recourse, so that even though they were bad loans all packaged together and it certainly seems they should have been knowingly put together, they are sold, people left with millions and millions of dollars and left others holding those bad papers and bad 

securities. And then the credit default swaps to insure the MBSs 

and all that kind of thing. 

But I was just wondering through the course of your investigations if you saw any of the laws that needed to be tightened up to 

help prevent that kind of thing? I have wondered about eliminating 

the ability to sell mortgage-backed securities without recourse. It 

seems as if maybe if the generators of these loans had recourse 

back against them, they would be a whole lot more careful. 

But I was just curious if you saw some things we maybe could 

do to help cut back on loan fraud. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You hit on a very good point, you know, because 

we are seeing collusive—you know, there are collusive people. 

20 

There are insiders there that are manipulating documents to qualify people that just aren’t qualified for that particular loan. You 

know, one of the things I have seen is, you know, that various people are going in and claiming bankruptcy. And bankruptcy will 

delay the system in that the call on these loans now will be delayed. And I think that is an area that maybe we might want to 

look at, is these people claiming bankruptcy as a technique to put 

off the inevitable before the debt loan has to be called in. So all 

payment now is forgiven or delayed. And to me that was an area 

that I believed we should take another look at. 

Mr. GOHMERT. And I appreciate that. One of the things that has 

come up this week, of course, is making public the arrest of Russian spies. And we know the President, with whom your agency is 

charged with protecting, had just met with and sat down with the 

President from Russia. And I am curious. Is the Secret Service in 

their role as protectors of the President made aware of information 

indicating we are meeting with the President who has spies all 

around? Is that part of your packet of knowledge when you protect 

a President? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. I could not ask for better cooperation 

than we get from the intelligence components and from the FBI. 

We get very good information from their very good briefings from 

them. I am briefed every single day. But our partners out there are 

very good about providing any information to us that will enable 

us to do our job better and protect the President better. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I am glad. So would the President be made aware 

of that, too, so he knows what exactly he is dealing with? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, that would not be our role to provide him 

with that information. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But you may have the information but the man 

you are protecting may not? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. I would say, sir, that that information would 

be provided to him by the people that provide him with intelligence 

information. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. I thank the Chair. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Director. You mentioned in your opening statement—I believe it was $20 

million that was counterfeit money from Peru; is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe that is correct, sir. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. I understand that Peru and Colombia are major 

sources of counterfeit money coming into the United States. Forgive the 101 question. Is it just the drug trade or is it other money 

launderers that are the people they are dancing with here to bring 

money into this country? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think it is a combination of both of those things. 

You know, back in 2001, we saw that there was a large quantity 

of counterfeit money coming into this country being manufactured 

in Colombia. And at that time, we formed a partnership with the 

Colombian law enforcement, with a vetted group of Colombian law 

enforcement. And over the next 8 to 9 years, we have seized, I believe, about $250 million in counterfeit coming out of Colombia. We 

have arrested about 700 people. And I believe we have made about 

21 

100 or so counterfeit plant seizures down there. And the majority 

of those all do involve some nexus to the drug trade. 

Meanwhile, the fastest growing region now in South America for 

the manufacture of counterfeit currency is Lima, Peru. And so we 

have pretty much mimicked the same strategy that we did in Colombia back in 2001. And back in March of 2009, we entered into 

a partnership with our Peruvian law enforcement partners. And so 

far, that has yielded about $20.5 million, I believe. I think we have 

arrested somewhere around 35 or 40 people. And I think we have 

about maybe 17 or 18 plant seizures. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. So does the new technology in our currency, do 

they just keep matching it somehow? Or is it easier to catch because of the new technology, the water marks and so forth? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, they do try to replicate that. What is 

interesting is when we first began—and up until about maybe 15 

years ago—the majority of all the counterfeit currency that we saw 

being manufactured here in the U.S. was all offset printing. All the 

offset printing we see now is being done in foreign countries, 

whether it be in Europe or in South America. All of that counterfeit 

currency that is offset printing is coming mainly foreign. And that 

is where all of our plant seizures are coming from. 

The majority of the counterfeit currency that we see here domestically is mainly computer or ink jet generated. And as I said, they 

do attempt to replicate the security features. Some people do a fair 

job with it, other people not as well. And the bottom line is we tell 

all people who come in contact with money to take a real hard look 

at the money that they are handling. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. And it is your understanding or you get briefed as 

to where the next generation of our currency is going? It is more 

advances coming as well? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, they just rolled out the new $100 bill. It will be coming out, I believe, in February of 

2011. But we work with our partners at Treasury, at the Bureau 

of Engraving and Printing, and with the FRB to make sure that 

we have the right security features in our currency and keep up 

with anyone who is trying to defeat those features. 

Mr. QUIGLEY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Sullivan, 

thank you for joining us today. 

It seems to me that your work in the Electronic Crimes Task 

Force gives your service a unique insight into some of the 

vulnerabilities in our Nation’s critical infrastructure. As a member 

dedicated to making sure we get any cybersecurity legislation right, 

I would be interested in hearing from you what you believe are 

some of the most important things we need to do to secure our Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. One of the things that we see when you look at 

the two identity theft cases that we worked back in 2008/2009, one 

was a cyber intrusion where 40 million identities were stolen. The 

next one was a cyber intrusion with about 130, 140 identities stolen. And I think the one thing is that people have to evaluate the 

systems and they have to make sure that they are protected as 

well as they can be protected. 

22 

I think it goes back to—I think you also have to look at partnerships. I think all of us have to look at this as a collaborative effort. 

That is why I believe, sir, that these Electronic Crime Task Forces 

are so important, because we bring into play here not only State 

and local law enforcement, we also bring in academia, we bring in 

the business community, we bring in a wide range of people. It is 

not just the traditional law enforcement effort, but it is a true community effort. And I think it is really important for us to take that 

approach. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. Would you be willing to work with 

me to explore this issue further? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. Could you go into more detail about 

electronics benefits transfer fraud? Is this related to food stamp 

benefits? Is that—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think it can be anything, you know. You look at 

again the evolution of our investigations. 20 years ago if somebody 

was getting a Social Security benefit, they got it via a Treasury 

check. And we used to see Treasury checks stolen, forged, cashed. 

You know, today those benefits are, you know, transferred via wire. 

You know, everything now is being done via wire. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That is a broader category than just the cards 

that people carry when they purchase foods under the SNAP program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think just about any type of payment you can 

think of would be included in that category. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Are there any trends in terms of the type of perpetrator who commits this type of fraud? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Do you mean as far as the electronic fund transfers? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Yeah, EBT fraud. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think these are all people that are just looking 

for vulnerabilities. I think these are the type of people that have 

a high degree of a technology background, which again there is 

more and more increasing in our population now. But again, I look 

at this as a crime of opportunity, the same as I looked at these type 

of crimes when it was paper. You know, now it is electronic. You 

know, 50 years ago if somebody was going to rob a bank, they used 

a gun. Today they use a keyboard. Again, that is why I go back 

to it is so important for us to protect our critical infrastructure and 

our payment systems. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. What criteria does this task force use to 

prioritize the field investigations that it conducts? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, we want to make an impact on the community. So we leave it up to our agents in charge working with their 

State and local law enforcement partners, with the business community, with the financial industry, with academia to determine 

what the impact is there. We meet with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

We get the guidelines for prosecution. But we also look to State 

and local prosecution. And one of the things that we have found is 

that an investigation initially may not appear to be a large high 

dollar or large dollar investigation. It might appear to be only 

$1,000 fraud. But what we have found is as we start to peel back 

on that, we realize that maybe this group is affiliated with a bigger 

23 

group. So we do take a pretty hard look at everything that is referred to us and then we prioritize and make sure that whatever 

we are working does have an impact on the community. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman yields back. Does the Chairman have 

questions? Okay. 

Ms. Jackson Lee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Sullivan, welcome. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Nice to see you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Since I am going to start off with a question 

of the state dinner, thank you for the manner in which the Secret 

Service addressed its responsibility and the manner in which you 

appeared before a number of Committees, I believe. And we appreciate that kind of stand-up-manship, if you will. And I know you 

prefer not to have to do that on a regular basis, but I do appreciate 

it very much. 

I am just going to start off with you telling us what you have 

learned from the Indian Prime Minister’s state dinner and that series of incidents as it relates to staffing and procedures that may 

now be in place or generally so in any manner surrounding the 

White House. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. Thank you for the 

question. 

First of all, as I have said from the very beginning, this was a 

mistake. This was our fault that happened. Somebody made a judgment call and it wasn’t the right judgment call. And some individuals got into the White House who shouldn’t have gotten in there. 

One thing I do want to make clear is these people that did get 

in did go through every level of security that all the other individuals went through. But it was a mistake, an error. It was a mistake in judgment. It never should have happened, and nobody was 

more disappointed that that happened than me. And believe me, 

nobody has been more difficult or harder on us than ourselves regarding those people getting into the White House on that evening. 

As I have told you before, this continues to be under investigation, criminal investigation. And I will share with you as much as 

I can. 

One of the things that immediately happened is we did review 

our procedures, we did review all of our policies. You know, at the 

White House we put close to 100,000 people through there every 

month. We have thousands of pass holders at the White House. We 

have all kinds of workers coming and going from the White House 

every day. For us, we have to be right though 100 times out of 100. 

We don’t have the luxury of being right 99 times out of 100. 

I believe that our policies, our procedures, I believe that they 

were correct. Again, I just believe that they were not followed. In 

the meantime, we have worked with our partners at the White 

House. We have worked with our partners at the State Department. We have worked with all of our partners when it comes to 

granting access to the White House. 

I can tell you since that time, we have had numerous events at 

the White House. Right after that state dinner, we had numerous 

Christmas parties at the White House. We have had numerous 

24 

events at the White House. We had a state dinner, the Mexican 

state dinner back in May. All of these have gone off without a flaw. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you feel comfortable that you had a sufficient wake-up call, that you are moving toward, you are moving— 

I do realize there is a criminal investigation. I would hope that it 

is indictable to have a reality show. That might be one offense that 

we might charge those individuals with. But in any event, you just 

feel that the T’s are crossed and the I’s are dotted? That is what 

I think is very important for the American people to hear. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe so. You know, Congresswoman, as I told 

you before, protecting the President is our number one priority, 

and we are not going to let anything happen to him or his family. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I understand that. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That was a wake-up call. And I feel very comfortable with our procedures at the White House now, what we are 

doing at the White House now. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me give you these quick questions. If you 

can expand on how effective the Electronic Crimes Special Agent 

Program is because that certainly is—from cybersecurity breaches 

to fraud on electronic facilities is very important. And then also, as 

I understand it, you have involvement in the report on the issues 

raised by the Virginia Tech tragedy, if I am not mistaken. And a 

number of incidents have happened on our college campuses, from 

Virginia Tech, Morehouse, UNC. A number of our children attend 

those schools, and I am wondering where we are with those kinds 

of incidents. 

Lastly, you just mentioned it earlier, your commitment to securing and protecting the White House. Do you have enough resources 

and staffing as relates to the increased amount of threats that we 

hear against the White House and, of course, the President? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. If it is okay, I will start with the Electronic Crime 

Task Forces. For us, these have been a huge success, not only the 

Electronic Crime Task Forces but our Financial Crime Task Forces. 

As I have said before, we have 29 Electronic Crime Task Forces 

and 38 Financial Crime Task Forces. Last year, we opened about 

1,100 electronic crime cases and we closed about 1,140. The potential loss that we saw in these investigations was about $533 million. The actual fraud that our investigators saw was about $100 

million. And we arrested about 510 people via the Electronic Crime 

Task Force concept. And we also did 5,450 cyber forensic exams. 

And out of that, about 42 percent were for State and local law enforcement. 

So I would say that these Electronic Crime Task Forces we have 

around the country have been very successful and have been very 

collaborative with all of our partners. And also as a result of the 

Electronic Crime Task Force—and I mentioned it in my opening 

statement—you know, the National Computer Forensic Institute in 

Hoover, Alabama, the opening of the NCFI a few years ago has allowed us to train by the end of this year about 940 State and local 

law enforcement, as well as State and local prosecutors. This for 

us is a force multiplier. Now these State and local law enforcement, 

they get the training, they get the equipment that they need to go 

back out and do their own forensic exams. And again, as I menVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:26 Dec 21, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\062910\57153.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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tioned before, every State has been represented as well as, you 

know, the two U.S. Territories. 

As far as Virginia Tech, this was a study that we conducted with 

the FBI and the Department of Education. What we looked at here, 

we looked at going back to 1900, I believe, up through 2005, 2007, 

I believe. We looked at about 150,000—I am sorry. We looked at 

about 300 incidents from a total of about 150,000 incidents that 

had transpired during that time to see if we could come up with 

some type of behavior pattern, to see, you know, exactly what type 

of individuals we were looking at here, to see if there is any clues 

prior to the event that maybe could have been identified that could 

help identify these people as being a potential problem. I do believe 

that one of the big issues here is that you, you know, do need to 

have people come forward when they see things about people that 

may trouble them. And that was one of the things we saw in the 

study, that there were people after the fact that came back and 

said that there was some behavior there that they had noticed and 

just didn’t report it to anybody. 

But these are really important issues to us. Again, it goes back 

to us wanting to make an impact on the community. You know, we 

have people in our Protective Research Division who were involved 

in this study, and I would like to have them come up and brief, you 

know, you or your staff and any of the Members on the full findings of the study. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have enough resources to protect the 

President? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Ma’am, as I said, our number one priority is to 

protect the President and we will never compromise on that. And 

every resource we have is available to protect him. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield 

back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. That 

doesn’t really answer the question. 

Are you using all the resources you have? Are there any sources 

you have asked for and haven’t gotten? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. I don’t know an agency head out there 

that would ever tell you that they have enough resources. Any additional resource, any additional funding that you would support us 

on, I would be more than happy to take. 

Mr. SCOTT. On the question of protecting the President, are there 

any resources that you think you need that you haven’t gotten? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I work very hard and diligently with the Secretary to ensure that we have all the resources we need to protect 

the President. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what are the results of all of that communication? Do you get the resources you need or don’t you? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, right now as a matter of fact I am working 

with the Secretary on a reprogramming initiative to get some additional resources to protect the President. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if you don’t get what you need, would you let us 

know? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You will be the first one to know, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. In response to the question from the gentleman from Texas on these loans, some of these loans were called 

26 

NINJA loans, N-I-N-J-A, no income, no job or assets. They subsequently, as he indicated, have gotten into the public stream. 

Are you pursuing any prosecution for fraud in these packages 

and loans that had limited value being passed off as bona fide 

loans? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, if it is a mortgage fraud, it is a criminal violation. We are going to pursue it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are you pursuing those cases now? I mean, it has a 

name. So people knew what they were doing. Are there cases being 

pursued now? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I am not familiar with that. Again, I would 

say if we are working in mortgage fraud, no matter what name 

they give it, if it is a fraud, we are pursuing prosecution on that 

fraud. 

Mr. SCOTT. Could you get back with us with a little more specifics? On individual identity theft, what is the role of Secret Service on individual identity theft cases? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. On a one person identity theft? 

Mr. SCOTT. Yeah. Just run of the mill—well, you steal a lot of 

credit cards, but for the individual it is an individual case. What 

usually happens is the bank writes it off and nobody does anything. 

That is why these guys—why it is such a profitable business. What 

is the role on individual identity theft? What is the role of the Secret Service on cases like that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, sir, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that we 

look at every single investigation as they are referred to us. And 

we have to prioritize all of our investigations. But as I said before, 

we sometimes have taken a one individual, it looked to be one victim and that has turned into 100 victims. And again, I go back to 

our Financial Crime Task Forces. And that is why many times 

those individual type investigations are able to be pursued, because 

of our partnership with the State and local law enforcements. 

Mr. SCOTT. The problem you run into with the individual ID 

theft, if you get thousands of credit card numbers, if you don’t get 

greedy and only milk each one for a couple of thousand dollars, you 

are pretty much risk free. What I am asking is, does the Secret 

Service have any role in creating a risk? And if it is for lack of resources, could you let us know what you would need to pursue 

these cases so that someone who is milking credit card numbers for 

just a couple of thousand dollars would incur some risk of investigation and prosecution? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, that is a great point. And believe me, every 

one of us would love to go after every single person out there. One 

of the issues we have as well, though, is prosecution of these people. And I think that the issue here is not just us having enough 

assets to go after these individuals, but also the U.S. Attorney’s Office, as well as at State and local prosecutors. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, can you give us an idea what it would cost to 

create risk for people who are promoting individual credit card 

fraud? Do you have some idea what we would be talking about if 

we—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, we can look at that and get back to you on 

that. 

27 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. You mentioned the campus attacks, targeted 

violence affects institutions of higher learning. The Campus Safety 

Act has passed the House twice which would create a research in 

best practices and training opportunities. You indicated that things 

aren’t happening the way they should be happening. That is what 

the Campus Safety Act is supposed to cure. Your report just reports it. Don’t we need some ongoing training available for institutions of higher education and research for best practices? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I think that is happening. Again our report 

went into what happened prior to 2007. I do believe that there is 

a much greater awareness right now than there was before. I know 

that we have gone out and done training for some college police, 

not as much as we would like to do, but for campus police. But I 

do think that there is a much greater awareness now. I do believe 

that people are being much more proactive now. 

Mr. SCOTT. The campus police officers have endorsed the Campus 

Safety Act. So maybe we need to look at that and get the Senate 

to move on it. 

The final question is you mentioned protection of the President. 

You also have the responsibility of protecting former Presidents. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. And that protection for Presidents from Clinton back 

is for their life. And beginning with former President George W. 

Bush, it is only for 10 years? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there any reason to limit protection of Presidents 

beginning with that presidency for 10 years or should we repeal 

that limitation? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is something that we all have to take 

a hard look at. It is something I have given a lot of thought to. As 

you know, that law was passed over 10 years ago now, I believe. 

I think that the times are much different than—I think given the 

current environment, I believe that that is something that we really need to work together on because I do think that the prudent 

thing to do would be to consider making it lifetime. 

Mr. SCOTT. Has any report or recommendation been made? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have talked to our Congressional Affairs people 

who are putting something together right now about that very 

issue, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. We will look forward to hearing it. 

Any other questions? The gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. And I think that is a great idea at 

this day and time with former Presidents potentially being targets 

for people who don’t mind blowing themselves up to hurt innocent 

people. That is a good idea. 

But I was hearing the discussion about the Indian state dinner, 

and it has affected the way things are done over there in getting 

tour groups in. But in talking to someone on the Oversight Committee, it was my understanding that the Social Secretary—although the White House did not allow her to come, apparently it 

was a matter of national security, executive privilege or something—that the Social Secretary wouldn’t come testify. But she apparently made her own decision not to show up for the dinner 

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cret Service in a terrible quandary as to whether someone would 

be allowed. 

Is that your understanding of why she did not show up that 

night for the state dinner? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. We had—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Did somebody from Secret Service tell her don’t 

come, we will take care of it, you don’t have to be there to say people are okay and approved to come in? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, what I was going to say is we agreed to be 

the individual—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. The scapegoat? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Secret Service agreed to be the people that 

would be the name checkers. And—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, you are always the name checkers, right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sometimes it is a shared responsibility, whether 

it is at the White House or at a function outside of the White 

House. 

Mr. SCOTT. Have you gotten it straight? I mean, do we have to 

go through this again? I mean, do we have any reason to be concerned that the coordination between the Social Secretary’s office 

and the Secret Service, do we have any reason to be concerned that 

that coordination is not taking place now? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I can tell you that the coordination between 

us and this White House, as well as every other White House before, is outstanding. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, Mr. Chairman, the thing is now we have 

gone in the mornings when there is tours from having one checkpoint to having two checkpoints a block apart and making hundreds of people wait, much longer than before, having doubled the 

number of people, now all in uniform instead of plainclothes, when 

the whole problem was not the morning tours, it was a state dinner. And so I am curious—and I realize our time is up and we’ve 

got to go vote, but I would really like to know why it was necessary 

to completely double the hassle of getting in for a morning tour because of something that happened at a state dinner when, as I understand it, there hadn’t been a problem with somebody getting in 

that wasn’t supposed to for a tour. Is that not correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. You know, our methodology has always 

been a redundant checkpoint and there should always—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, if it was always redundant, now it is doubly 

redundant. So anyway, I would appreciate knowing why it was necessary and if we could get a follow-up statement in writing as to 

why it was necessary to double the redundancy basically for the 

morning tours. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman’s time has expired. No other questions, I would like to thank the Director for your testimony today. 

Members may have additional written questions which we will forward to you and ask that you answer as promptly as possible so 

that the answer may be a part of the hearing record. The record 

will remain open for 1 week for submission of additional materials. 

Without objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM MARK SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES SECRET

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