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Strategic Studies Institute Monograph

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND CRIMINALIZED STATES 

IN LATIN AMERICA: AN EMERGING 

TIER-ONE NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY

Douglas Farah

August 2012

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-539-9
iii

FOREWORD

 In July 2011, President Barack Obama unveiled 

his Transnational Organized Crime Strategy, the first 

comprehensive national policy effort to articulate 

and combat illicit economies that, cumulatively, have 

grown to more than $1 trillion. Although quite serious, this ever-increasing problem garnered relatively 

little attention. The primary reasons for the lack of attention are the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 

(9/11), the two ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and the overall Global War on Terrorism, the changes 

wrought by globalization and access to resources and 

technology, and a general lack of understanding of 

the phenomenon by the law enforcement and intelligence communities in most countries. The security 

challenges and the geostrategic environment left few 

resources to monitor, much less combat, transnational 

organized crime (TOC) organizations.

Across the globe, TOC groups continued to grow in 

power, influence, and resources, as President Obama's 

strategy indicates. The George W. Bush administration's initial focus on the problem during its last few 

years in office, ultimately led to the Obama strategy.

Over the past decade, the International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC) has maintained a 

focus on TOC issues and the growing ties between 

traditional criminal structures and various terrorist 

organizations. Extensive IASC field research documented the following developments: (1) the changing 

nature of TOC organizations in Latin America and 

West Africa; (2) the growing hybrid nature of criminal and terrorist groups; (3) the alliances with regional 

and extra-regional state and nonstate actors; and, (4) 

the growing involvement of the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states of Latin America whose governments 
sanctioned criminal activities as part of coherent, multistate instruments of statecraft.

This monograph synthesizes research on such 

criminalized states in Latin America. It documents 

how, through the growing alliance with Iran and 

other external actors, these governments have developed a clearly articulated view hostile to the United 

States. That view also adopts a military doctrine of 

asymmetric warfare that embraces the use of weapons of mass destruction. The associated doctrine is 

further underpinned by a small group of intellectuals 

who articulate a need for radical Shi’a Islam and the 

armed, revolutionary Left to unite in order to defeat 

the United States—a message that has been welcomed 

by Bolivarian states.

Taken together, the emergence of criminalized, 

strongly anti-American governments in the Western 

Hemisphere, in alliance with Iran and other states 

who sponsor terrorist organizations and consider the 

United States to be the Great Satan, now represent a 

tier-one threat to the security of the U.S. Homeland. 

This monograph offers a template for examining similar developments in other parts of the world, as well 

as recommendations on how to begin to confront the 

emerging threat. The first step in the long process of 

dealing with a multifaceted set of enemies with unlimited resources is to understand the nature of that 

threat.

 

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS FARAH is the International Assessment 

and Strategy Center’s (IASC) Senior Fellow, Financial Investigations and Transparency. He specializes 

in research, writing, and training on transnational 

criminal organizations and armed groups, and their 

effects on states and corruption; terrorism, terror finance, and proliferation; and, illicit financial flows, 

with a particular focus on the Western Hemisphere, 

Africa, and globalized networks. A veteran investigator with more than 25 years experience, Mr. Farah is 

a consultant on these and related issues to numerous 

U.S. Government departments, agencies, combatant 

commands, as well as private groups. He also applies 

his expertise on subjects such as drug trafficking and 

investigative journalism with leading academic centers in the United States and abroad, including the 

World Bank, Woodrow Wilson International Center 

for Scholars, National Endowment for Democracy, 

Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, and the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 

where he is an Adjunct Fellow. Mr. Farah has testified numerous times before Congress, including the 

House Committees on Foreign Affairs; Financial Services; Oversight and Government Reform; Homeland 

Security; and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 

He is a member of the Princeton Project for National 

Security. In 1992, Mr. Farah joined the Washington Post

as a staff correspondent and was named bureau chief 

for Central America and the Caribbean where, until 

1997, he covered the drug wars in Colombia, Haiti, 

and Cuba, among other issues. From 1997 to 2000, he 

took on broader responsibilities at the Post as an international investigative reporter covering drug traffick-
vi

ing and organized crime, including the emergence of 

Russian organized crime groups in the western Hemisphere as well as the growth of Mexican drug cartels 

within the United States. In 2000, Farah again resumed 

the role of Post bureau chief, this time for West Africa, 

and was based in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. After breaking 

the story of al Qaeda’s ties to “blood diamonds” and 

Liberia’s Charles Taylor, death threats compelled him 

to leave Africa in 2003. He remained with the Washington Post until early 2004, investigating radical Islamic 

groups and terror finance. Mr. Farah is the author of 

Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (2004) and Merchant of Death: Money, Guns, Planes, 

and the Man Who Makes War Possible (2007). His work 

has also been published by The Financial Times, Foreign 

Policy, The New Republic, The Journal of International 

Security Affairs, National Defense University-PRISM, 

and the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, among others, and he is featured frequently in 

major U.S. and international media such as the Economist, CNN, Reuters, BBC, The New York Times, NPR, 

Univision, and Newsweek. In 1980 Farah enrolled at the 

University of Kansas, at which time he began working for United Press International (UPI). In 1985, he 

was named UPI bureau chief in El Salvador, covering 

the civil war there. In 1987 he left UPI to freelance for 

The Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and US News & 

World Report. Mr. Farah holds a B.A. in Latin American studies and a B.S. in journalism.
vii

SUMMARY

The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) 

transnational criminal and terrorist franchises in Latin 

America poses a tier-one security threat for the United 

States. These organizations operate under broad state 

protection and undermine democratic governance, 

sovereignty, growth, trade, and stability. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts 

of the world, which makes understanding their new 

dynamics essential, as they are an important element 

in the broader global security context.

This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate transnational organized crime (TOC) activity, 

which includes drug trafficking, money laundering, 

and human trafficking. It also encompasses trafficking in and the use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) by designated terrorist organizations and 

their sponsors.

These activities are carried out with the support of 

regional and extra-regional state actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, yielding billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year 

in the region, and trillions globally. Leaders of these 

organizations share a publicly articulated doctrine to 

employ asymmetric warfare against the United States 

and its allies that explicitly endorses the use of WMD 

as a legitimate tactic.

The threat centers around an improbable alliance 

of groups that often seem to have irreconcilable world 

views and ideologies; e.g., Iran, a conservative Islamist theocracy and primary state sponsor of Hezbollah and the Bolivarian alliance espousing 21st-century 

socialism, led by Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. Such alliances, in turn, offer material and political support to 
viii

the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 

[FARC]). This group, designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, 

produces more than two-thirds of the world’s cocaine 

and is rapidly strengthening its ties to Mexican cartels.

Such illicit forces in Latin America within criminalized states have begun using tactical operations 

centers as a means of pursuing their view of statecraft. 

That brings new elements to the “dangerous spaces” 

where nonstate actors intersect with regions characterized by weak sovereignty and alternative governance 

systems. This new dynamic fundamentally alters the 

structure underpinning global order.

Being capable of understanding and mitigating this 

threat requires a whole-of-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy, 

and programming. The traditional state/nonstate dichotomy is no longer useful for an adequate illumination of these problems. Similarly, the historical divide 

between transnational organized crime and terrorism 

is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
1

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND CRIMINALIZED STATES 

IN LATIN AMERICA: AN EMERGING 

TIER-ONE NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY

INTRODUCTION AND 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

The Changing Nature of the Threat.

The purpose of this monograph is to identify and 

discuss the role played by transnational organized 

crime groups (TOCs) in Latin America, and the interplay of these groups with criminalizing state structures, “stateless” regions, extra-regional actors, and 

the multiple networks that exploit them. It particularly 

focuses on those areas that pose, or potentially pose, a 

threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad; and, it can 

be used as a model for understanding similar threats 

in other parts of the world. 

This threat includes not only traditional TOC activities such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, but others, including the potential for weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD)-related trafficking. These 

activities are carried out with the participation of regional and extra-regional state actors whose leaders 

are deeply enmeshed in criminal activities. These 

same leaders espouse a publicly articulated doctrine 

of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and 

its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use 

of WMD. 

This emerging combination of threats comprises 

a hybrid of criminal-terrorist, and state and nonstate 

franchises, combining multiple nations acting in con-
2

cert, and traditional TOCs and terrorist groups acting 

as proxies for the nation-states that sponsor them. 

These hybrid franchises should now be viewed as a 

tier-one security threat for the United States. Understanding and mitigating the threat requires a wholeof-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy, and programming. No 

longer is the state/nonstate dichotomy useful in illuminating these problems, just as the TOC/terrorism 

divide is increasingly disappearing.

These franchises operate in, and control, specific 

geographic territories which allow them to function 

in a relatively safe environment. These pipelines, or 

recombinant chains of networks, are highly adaptive 

and able to move a multiplicity of illicit products (cocaine, weapons, humans, and bulk cash) that ultimately cross U.S. borders undetected thousands of times 

each day. The actors along the pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly, occupy both physical and cyber space, and use both highly developed and modern 

institutions, including the global financial system, as 

well as ancient smuggling routes and methods.

The profits of global TOC activities, even before 

factoring in the growing efficiencies derived from state 

sponsorship and protection, are enormous. The sheer 

scale of the enterprise, and the impact it has on legal 

economies, argues for sustained national and international attention and resources as a tier-one security 

threat. These new factors further increase the threat. 

The most recent comprehensive studies of global 

criminal proceeds demonstrate the magnitude of 

the challenge. The White House estimates in its 2011 

Transnational Organized Crime Strategy that money 

laundering accounts for $1.3 trillion to $3.3 trillion—or 

between 2 percent and 5 percent of the world’s gross 
3

domestic product (GDP). Bribery from TOCs adds 

close to $1 trillion to that amount, while drug trafficking generates an estimated $750 billion to $1 trillion, 

counterfeited and pirated goods add another $500 billion, and illicit firearms sales generate from $170 billion to $320 billion. This totals to some $6.2 trillion—

fully 10 percent of the world’s GDP, placing it behind 

only the United States and the European Union (EU), 

but well ahead of China, in terms of global GDP ranking.1

 Other estimates of global criminal proceeds range 

from a low of about 4 percent to a high of 15 percent of 

global GDP.2

Most of the goods and services that generate this 

wealth pass through geographic regions that are often 

described as “stateless” or “lawless.” However, these 

regions are far from ungoverned. In fact, they represent a powerful component of the threat from TOCs 

and other nonstate actors which control them, either 

at the expense of weak host states and their neighbors, 

or in alliance with stronger ones which host them, tolerate them, or use them as instruments of statecraft.

While looking here specifically at Latin America, 

the same analytical framework can be used in other 

parts of the world in order to understand TOC structures and relationships to each other, and to the states 

in which they operate. Latin American networks now 

extend not only to the United States and Canada, but 

outward to Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia, 

where they have begun to form alliances with other 

networks. A clear understanding of how these relationships evolve, and the relative benefits derived 

from the relationships among and between state and 

nonstate actors, will greatly enhance the understanding of this new hybrid threat.
4

Defining Terms.

There is no universally accepted definition of 

“transnational organized crime.” Here it is defined 

as, at a minimum, serious crimes or offenses spanning 

at least one border, undertaken by self-perpetuating 

associations of individuals who cooperate transnationally, motivated primarily by the desire to obtain a 

financial or other material benefit and/or power and 

influence.3

 This definition can encompass a number of 

vitally important phenomena not usually addressed 

by studies of TOC: 

• A spectrum or continuum of state participation in TOC, ranging from strong but “criminalized” states to weak and “captured” states, 

with various intermediate stages of state criminal behavior.

• A nexus between TOCs on the one hand, and 

terrorist and insurgent groups on the other, 

with a shifting balance between terrorist and 

criminal activity on both sides of the divide.

• Recombinant networks of criminal agents, potentially including not only multiple TOCs, but 

also terrorist groups as well as states and proxies.

• Enduring geographical “pipelines” for moving 

various kinds of commodities and illicit profits 

in multiple directions, to and from a major destination.

We have also crafted this definition to be broadly 

inclusive:

• It can potentially encompass the virtual world 

of TOC, e.g., cybercrime;
5

• It can be applied to other regions; the recombinant pipelines and networks model offers an 

analytical framework which can be applied to 

multiple regions and circumstances.

The term “criminalized state” used in this monograph refers to states where the senior leadership is 

aware of and involved—either actively or through 

passive acquiescence—on behalf of the state in transnational criminal enterprises, where TOC is used as 

an instrument of statecraft, and where levers of state 

power are incorporated into the operational structure 

of one or more TOC groups. The benefits may be for a 

particular political movement, theocratic goals, terrorist operations, or personal gain of those involved, or a 

combination of these factors.

Few states are wholly criminalized. Most in this 

category operate along a continuum. At one end are 

strong but criminal states, with the state acting as a 

TOC partner or an important component of a TOC 

network. On the other end, are weak and captured 

states, where certain nodes of governmental authority, whether local or central, have been seized by 

TOCs, who in turn are the primary beneficiaries of the 

proceeds from the criminal activity—but the state, as 

an entity, is not part of the enterprise. 

As will be discussed below, this construct differs 

in important ways from the traditional look at “weak” 

or “failed” states, which assumes that a government 

that is not exercising a positive presence and fulfilling certain basic functions (public security, education, 

and infrastructure) is not a functioning state. In fact, 

such states can be highly efficient at the functions they 

choose to perform, particularly if they choose to participate in an ongoing criminal enterprise. By choice, 
6

their weakness exists in the fields of positive state 

function, but not in other important areas.

New Actors in Latin American TOC-State 

Relations.

Significant TOC organizations, principally drug 

trafficking groups, have posed serious challenges for 

U.S. security since the rise of the Medellín cartel in 

the early 1980s, and the growth of the Mexican drug 

trafficking organizations in the 1990s. In addition, 

Latin America has a long history of revolutionary 

movements, from the earliest days of independence, 

to the Marxist movements that sprouted up across 

the region in the 1960s to 1980s. Within this context, 

these groups often served as elements of governance, 

primarily to advance or defeat the spread of Marxism 

in the region. These Marxist revolutions were victorious in Cuba and Nicaragua, which, in turn, became 

state sponsors of external revolutionary movements, 

themselves relying on significant economic and military support from the Soviet Union and its network 

of aligned states’ intelligence and security services. 

The movements held a strong popular appeal across 

the continent, sparking numerous proxy wars during 

the Cold War in which the United States sponsored 

armed groups such as the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. 

With the end of the Cold War, the negotiated end 

to numerous armed conflicts (the Farabund Marti 

National Liberation Front [FMLN] in El Salvador; the 

Contra rebels in Nicaragua; the Popular Liberation 

Army [EPL], M-19, and other small groups in Colombia), and the collapse of Marxism, most of the armed 

groups moved into the democratic process. However, 

this was not true for all groups, and armed nonstate 
7

groups are again being sponsored in Latin America 

under the banner of the “Bolivarian Revolution.”4

There has also been, for the past 2 decades, an overlap and interaction of Latin American TOC groups 

across multiple continents, mostly on a relatively 

small scale and largely confined to the exchange of 

goods (cocaine for heroin) and services (money laundering, weapons, safe havens). In recent years, these 

many emergent relationships have grown to include 

the support of terrorist organizations as well. In the 

particular cases of Latin America and West Africa, 

there have been documented cases of illicit weapons 

purchases and transfers to nonstate armed actors.5

Other cases, such as ties of the Colombian drug trafficking organizations to Australian weapons traffickers, have been identified but not fully examined, and 

presumably many others have yet to come to the attention of authorities at all. 

More recently there has been increased awareness of the flow of South American cocaine through 

Venezuela to West Africa, particularly through Mali, 

Guinea Bissau, and other fragile states, possibly benefitting not only the traditional regional TOC structures 

and their Colombian and Mexican allies, but several 

terrorist entities including al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah,6

 and the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Columbia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]).7

Other states that traditionally have had little interest or influence in Latin America have emerged over 

the past decade, primarily at the invitation of the selfdescribed Bolivarian states seeking to establish 21stcentury socialism. This bloc of nations—led by Hugo 

Chávez of Venezuela, also including Rafael Correa of 

Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of 
8

Nicaragua—seeks to break the traditional ties of the 

region to the United States. To this end, the Bolivarian alliance has formed numerous organizations and 

military alliances—including a military academy in 

Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training—

which explicitly exclude the United States.8

As discussed at length below, Iran, identified by 

successive U.S. administrations as a state sponsor of 

terrorism, has expanded its political alliances, diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and military and 

intelligence programs in the Bolivarian axis. The U.S. 

intelligence community has recently concluded that 

Iranian leadership is now more willing to launch a 

terrorist attack inside the U.S. homeland in response 

to perceived threats from the United States.9

This press for expanded ties comes despite the almost complete lack of cultural or religious ties to the 

region, linguistic affinity, or traditional economic logic and rationale in the relationships. This is one of the 

main focuses of this monograph, but multiple other 

actors are also becoming more involved.

Russia is a growing force, particularly in Mexico 

and the Bolivarian states, where it is building up a regional presence through rapidly rising weapons sales, 

naval and air force visits, increasing diplomatic presence, and nuclear cooperation agreements with Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In addition to the growing presence of a state itself, which is increasingly 

viewed as criminalized, there has been a significant 

increase in the presence of Russian nonstate actors in 

the form of TOCs, which are widely involved in drug 

trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering activities.10

China is aggressively and successfully acquiring 

access to many of the region’s natural resources, and 
9

trade between Latin America and China is growing 

exponentially. Over the past decade, China’s trade 

with Latin America has jumped from $10 billion to 

$179 billion.11 With the increased presence has come 

a significantly enhanced Chinese intelligence capacity and access across Latin America. At the same time, 

Chinese Triads—modern remnants of ancient Chinese 

secret societies that evolved into criminal organizations—are now operating extensive money laundering services for drug trafficking organizations via Chinese banks. 

China also has shown a distinct willingness to bail 

out financially strapped authoritarian governments 

if the price is right. For example, China lent Venezuela $20 billion, in the form of a joint venture with a 

company to pump crude oil that China then locked up 

for a decade at an average price of about $18 a barrel. 

The money came as Chávez was facing a financial crisis, rolling blackouts, and a severe liquidity shortage 

across the economy.12 Since then, China has extended 

several other significant loans to Venezuela, Ecuador, 

and Bolivia.

The dynamics of the relationship between China 

and the Bolivarian bloc and its nonstate proxies will 

be one of the key determinants of the future of Latin 

America and the survival of the Bolivarian project. 

Without significant material support from China, the 

economic model of the Bolivarian alliance will likely 

collapse under its own weight of statist inefficiency 

and massive corruption, despite being richly endowed 

with natural resources. 

However, Chinese leaders likely understand that 

any real replacement of the Bolivarian structure leadership by truly democratic forces could result in a 

significant loss of access to the region, and a cancel-
10

lation of existing contracts. This, in turn, gives China 

an incentive to continue to support some form of the 

Bolivarian project going forward, even if ailing leaders such as Chávez and Fidel Castro are no longer on 

the scene.

Nigerian TOC groups have been particularly active in Ecuador, where they drew police attention because of the unusual violence of the group, including 

the beheading of competitors.13

These developments indicate that multiple groups, 

both terrorist and criminal, as well as some extra-regional states, are expanding their relationships both 

in breadth and scope, leading to the suspicion that the 

Latin America case is far from unique. While there 

have been criminalized states in the past (the García 

Meza regime of “cocaine colonels” in Bolivia in 1980, 

and Desi Bouterse in Suriname in the 1980s, for example), what is new with the Bolivarian structure is 

the simultaneous and mutually supporting merger 

of state with TOC activities across multiple state and 

nonstate platforms. While García Meza, Bouterse, and 

others were generally treated as international pariahs with little outside support, the new criminalized 

states offer each other economic, diplomatic, political, 

and military support that shields them from international isolation and allows for mutually reinforcing 

structures to be built.

One of the aims of this monograph is to show the 

connectivity among these disparate groups operating 

along different geographic parts of the overall criminal-terrorist pipeline. Rather than operating in isolation, these groups have complex but significant interaction with each other, based primarily on the ability 

of each actor or set of actors to provide a critical service while profiting mutually from the transactions.
11

This conceptualization builds on the hybrid model 

developed by Louise Shelley et al. to describe the relationship among terrorist groups and TOC,14 adding 

the element of the criminalized state appropriating, 

and sometimes merging with, those hybrid groups 

such as the FARC in Colombia and ETA in Spain. 

There is a shared overarching political vision that justifies the state support of TOC as another device in the 

toolbox of 21st-century revolutionaries.

THE CURRENT U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 

TO TOC

This growing TOC threat in multiple theaters was 

recognized in President Barack Obama’s recent Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, released 

in July 2011. It was the first such strategy released 

since the end of the Bill Clinton administration, an indication of how other priorities have eclipsed TOC in 

recent times.15 The strategy states that TOC networks 

“are proliferating, striking new and powerful alliances, and engaging in a range of illicit activities as never 

before. The result is a convergence of threats that have 

evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing.”16 The TOC threat (Figure 1) is portrayed in 

President Obama’s Transnational Organized Crime 

Strategy.
12

Figure 1. Transnational Organized Crime Threat.
13

While not directly addressing the threat from 

criminalized states, the Strategy notes that:

• TOC penetration of states is deepening and 

leading to co-option in some states and weakening of governance in many others. TOC networks insinuate themselves into the political 

process through bribery and in some cases have 

become alternate providers of governance, security, and livelihoods to win popular support. 

The nexus in some states among TOC groups 

and elements of government—including intelligence services and personnel—and big business figures, threatens the rule of law.

• TOC threatens U.S. economic interests and can 

cause significant damage to the world financial 

system by subverting legitimate markets. The 

World Bank estimates that about $1 trillion is 

spent each year to bribe public officials. TOC 

groups, through their state relationships, could 

gain influence over strategic markets.

• Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to crime and criminal networks for funding 

and logistics. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, 29 of the 

63 top drug trafficking organizations identified 

by the Department of Justice had links to terrorist organizations. While many terrorist links to 

TOC are opportunistic, this nexus is dangerous, 

especially if it leads a TOC network to facilitate 

the transfer of WMD material to terrorists.17

While such recognition of the enormous and rapidly evolving threat is helpful and significant, it falls 

short of recognizing the true dimensions of the TOCstate hybrid relationship in many regions, and the 
14

emergence of criminalized states, particularly in Latin 

America. It therefore does not fully articulate the new 

level of threat beyond the economic sphere, the criminal-terrorist nexus, and the danger posed by “failed” 

states. 

Stewart Patrick and others correctly argue that, 

contrary to the predominant thinking that emerged 

immediately after September 11, 2001 (9/11) (i.e., 

failed states are a magnet for terrorist organizations), 

failed or nonfunctional states are actually less attractive to terrorist organizations and TOC groups than 

“weak but functional” states.18 But there is another 

category, perhaps the most attractive of all to TOC 

and terrorist groups they are allied with: strong and 

functional states that participate in TOC activities.

The Unrecognized Role of the Criminalized States.

While it is true that TOC penetration of the state 

threatens the rule of law, as the administration’s strategy notes, it also poses significant new threats to the 

homeland. Criminalized states frequently use TOCs as 

a form of statecraft, bringing new elements to the dangerous spaces where nonstate actors intersect with regions of weak sovereignty and alternative governance 

systems.19 This fundamentally alters the structure of 

global order. 

The possibility of TOC networks facilitating the 

transfer of WMD for terrorists, as described in the National Security Council (NSC) strategy, is very troubling, but assumes that the TOC groups and terrorists 

are in confrontation with states and their multiple law 

enforcement and intelligence entities. With the emergence of criminalized states, we face the prospect of 

TOC networks facilitating such transfers under the 
15

explicit or implicit protection of one or more states, 

thus greatly increasing the chances of success. Parts 

of this pipeline are already being developed in Latin 

America.

As the state relationships consolidate, the recombinant criminal-terrorist pipelines become more rooted 

and thus more dangerous. Rather than being pursued 

by state law enforcement and intelligence services in 

an effort to impede their activities, TOC groups (and 

perhaps terrorist groups) are able to operate in a more 

stable, secure environment, something that most businesses, both licit and illicit, crave.

Rather than operating on the margins of the state or 

seeking to co-opt small pieces of the state machinery, 

the TOC groups in this construct operate in concert 

with the state on multiple levels. Within that stable environment, a host of new options open, from the sale 

of weapons, to the use of national aircraft and shipping registries, to easy use of banking structures, to 

the use of national airlines and shipping lines to move 

large quantities of unregistered goods, and the acquisition of diplomatic passports and other identification 

means.

Examples of the benefits of a criminal state can be 

seen across the globe. For example, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, near Moldova, known as “Europe’s Black Hole,” is a notorious weapons trafficking 

center from which dozens of surface-to-air missiles 

have disappeared; it is run by former Russian secret 

police (KGB) officials. Under state auspices, the republic—unrecognized by any outside country but on 

friendly terms with Russia—runs one of the largest 

human trafficking networks in world, among other 

criminal enterprises. U.S. and European intelligence 

reports have repeatedly linked Transnistria with at-
16

tempts to sell black market nuclear weapons to a variety of potential buyers.20

Charles Taylor in Liberia is another example. At 

his peak (1998-2003), he had Russian, Israeli, and 

South African TOCs operating in a country the size 

of Maryland. The state, while failing to meet the basic 

needs of its people and fulfilling virtually none of the 

traditional roles of states (defending national borders, 

providing basic education and health services, sanitation, garbage collection, and mail delivery), had a 

virtual monopoly on power as well as control of the 

honey pots of natural resources. 

Under Taylor’s direction, the extraction of timber, 

diamonds, and gold was carried out with relative efficiency, but the benefits went to Taylor, his inner circle, 

and those outsiders doing business with him. Hezbollah and al-Qaeda operated without threat of interference in the blood diamond trade, greatly enhancing 

their financial structures. The Liberian aircraft registry was used by the Russian weapons merchant Viktor Bout, whose sales fanned numerous wars in the 

region to unprecedented heights of brutality. Liberian 

diplomatic passports were issued to notorious international criminals.21

While not yet as vertically integrated as Taylor’s 

Liberia or other criminalized states, the nations under 

the rule of autocratic Bolivarian leaders (Venezuela, 

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) are rapidly moving 

in that direction, with the state itself playing an everlarger role in TOC/terrorist activities.

Each leader in this bloc of nations has publicly and 

privately supported the FARC rebels in Colombia—a 

prototypical hybrid organization that is both a designated terrorist organization and TOC group that 

produces some 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in 
17

the United States. This support, in the form of money, 

weapons, sanctuary, and joint business enterprises, 

helps enable FARC-produced cocaine to flow to the 

outside world, and survive the military battering the 

group has undergone at the hands of the Colombian 

military and police.22

Chávez and his allies have allowed Iran, a state 

sponsor of terror, to open financial facilities, front 

companies, and dedicated shipping lines to evade 

sanctions on its nuclear program. At the same time, 

Iran is carrying out multiple mining activities in Latin 

America that directly benefit its missile and nuclear 

programs, all without normal transparency and with 

no public scrutiny, while moving aggressively to expand intelligence-gathering capacities and military 

access.23

In order for the different components of this complex equation to function as a whole, each side must 

get what it wants in order to make it profitable enough 

to continue. The FARC needs to move cocaine to U.S. 

and European markets in order to obtain the money 

necessary to maintain its army of some 9,000 troops. 

In order to do that, the FARC, with the help of traditional drug trafficking organizations, must move 

its product through Central America and Mexico to 

the United States—the same route used by those who 

want to move illegal aliens to the United States, and 

those who want to move bulk cash shipments, stolen 

cars, and weapons from the United States southward. 

All of these goods traverse the same territory, pass 

through the same gatekeepers, and are often interchangeable along the way. A kilo of cocaine can be 

traded for roughly one ton of AK-47 assault rifles before either of the goods reaches what would normally 

be its final destination.
18

A report by the Centre for Strategic Studies noted 

that terrorists (and TOC groups) often operate in “soft 

spots” that generally overlap more than one state. 

They: 

seek out the soft spots, the weak seams of the Westphalian nation-state and the international order that 

it has created. Sometimes the territory’s boundaries 

coincide with the entire territory of a state, as with Somalia, but mostly this is not the case. Traditional weak 

spots, like border areas are more likely. Terrorist organizations operate on the fringes of this Westphalian 

system, in the grey areas of territoriality.24

Though the presence of a state government (as opposed to its absence) is ordinarily considered to be a 

positive situation, the presence of the state is beneficial or positive only if it meets the needs of its people. 

If the state, as it is in many parts of Latin America 

and many other parts of the world, is present but is 

viewed, with good reason, as corrupt, incompetent, 

and/or predatory, then its presence is not beneficial 

in terms of creating state strength or state capacity. In 

fact, where the state is strongest but least accountable 

for abuses, people often prefer nonstate actors to exercise authority.25

This has led to an underlying conceptual problem 

in much of the current literature describing regions or 

territories as “governed” or “ungoverned,” a framework that presents a false dichotomy suggesting that 

the lack of state presence means a lack of a governing 

authority. “Ungoverned spaces” connotes a lawless 

region with no controlling authority. In reality, the 

stateless regions in question almost always fall under 

the control of nonstate actors who have sufficient force 

or popular support (or a mixture of both), to impose 
19

their decisions and norms, thus creating alternate 

power structures that directly challenge the state, or 

that take the role of the state in its absence. 

As Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas rightly 

note, the essential issue:

is not lack of governance per se, but rather who governs the spaces. Governance de facto exists in areas 

frequently claimed as ungoverned spaces, such as 

feral cities, failed states, offshore financial markets, 

marginally regulated reaches of the internet, and tribal 

areas such as those found on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border, yet it is mostly exercised by non-state actors 

ranging from insurgents to warlords to clans to private 

corporations. The notion of ungoverned spaces can be 

more broadly applied to legal, functional, virtual, and 

social arenas that either are not regulated by states or 

are contested by non-state actors and spoilers.26

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 

IN THE AMERICAS

Old Paradigms Are Not Enough.

Control of broad swaths of land by these nonstate 

groups in Latin America not only facilitates the movement of illegal products, both northward and southward, through transcontinental pipelines, but also 

undermines the stability of an entire region of great 

strategic interest to the United States. The traditional 

threat is broadly understood to be posed by the illicit 

movement of goods (drugs, money, weapons, and 

stolen cars), people (human traffic, gang members, 

and drug cartel enforcers), and the billions of dollars 

these illicit activities generate in an area where states 

have few resources and little legal or law enforcement 

capacity. 
20

As Moisés Naim wrote:

Ultimately, it is the fabric of society which is at stake. 

Global illicit trade is sinking entire industries while 

boosting others, ravaging countries and sparking 

booms, making and breaking political careers, destabilizing some governments and propping up others.27

The threat increases dramatically with the nesting 

of criminal/terrorist groups within governments that 

are closely aligned ideologically, such as Iran and the 

Bolivarian states in Latin America, and that are identified sponsors of designated terrorist groups, including 

those that actively participate in the cocaine trafficking trade. These states have publicly declared nuclear 

aspirations and the ability to move large quantities of 

virtually anything—including WMD and WMD components through their network.

These hybrid groups control significant portions 

of transnational illicit pipelines along with other TOC 

groups (particularly Mexican, but also Colombian and 

Central American) that regularly cross the U.S.-Mexico border with impunity thousands of times each day 

with billions of dollars in clandestine, illegal products. 

Many of these pipelines brush up against vital shipping lanes and areas of vital commercial importance 

for the United States.

While Robert Killebrew28 and Max Manwaring29

make compelling cases that specific parts of this dangerous cocktail could be defined as insurgencies (narco-insurgency in Mexico and gangs in Central America, 

respectively), the new combination of TOC, criminalized states, and terrorist organizations presents a new 

reality that breaks the traditional paradigms. The state 

support for TOC, and the multifaceted avenues of cooperation, competition, and common and competing 
21

interests among the actors, has significantly reshaped 

the state-TOC/terrorism landscape. While Mexico is 

not the focus of this monograph, the regional convulsions from Mexico through Central America are not 

viewed as a narco-insurgency. Instead, this hybrid 

mixture of groups with a variety of motives, including 

those engaged in TOC, insurgencies, and criminalized 

states with a declared hatred for the United States, is 

something new and in many ways more dangerous 

than a traditional insurgency.30

The New Geopolitical Alignment.

The visible TOC threats are only a part of the geostrategic threats to the United States emerging from 

Latin America’s current geopolitical alignment. The 

criminalized states are already extending their grip 

on power through strengthened alliances with hostile 

outside state and quasi-state actors such as Iran and 

Hezbollah. The primary unifying theme among these 

groups is a deep hatred for the United States.

Hezbollah’s doctrine of “asymmetrical” warfare, 

including suicide bombing as the “poor man’s atomic 

bomb” and adapted to justify the use of WMD in any 

form, has gained tremendous influence over the military thinking of Venezuela and its fellow “Bolivarian” 

states espousing 21st-century socialism. They collectively rose to electoral victories following the deep 

social, political, and economic turmoil that shook the 

region in the wake of the free market reforms of the 

1990s. 

Since then, they have carried out a similar pattern 

of rewriting the constitution to concentrate powers in 

the executive and to allow for unlimited reelection; 

a systematic takeover of the judiciary by the execu-
22

tive and the subsequent criminalizing of the opposition through vaguely worded laws and constitutional 

amendments that make it illegal to oppose the revolution; systematic attacks on independent news media, 

and the use of criminal libel prosecutions to silence 

media critics; and, overall, the increasing criminalization of the state. These measures are officially justified 

as necessary to ensure the revolution can be carried 

out without U.S. “lackeys” sabotaging it.31

Part of the vision of the Bolivarians includes recreating the original “Gran Colombia,” the country 

founded by Bolivar which includes present day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama—as well as 

the other countries he liberated, Peru and Bolivia. This 

vision is used to support Chávez’s open intervention 

and funding of political allies in other countries, and 

their justification for accepting his funds.

As will be discussed, the alliance of Iran and the 

Bolivarian states and their nonstate proxies marks a 

significant shift in Latin America, given the assumption that Iran seeks nuclear weapons and safe haven 

from international sanctions, in large part to allow the 

nuclear program to move forward. While presently 

WMD production in Latin America may seem a remote possibility, the agreement of Iran and Russia to 

help Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia obtain nuclear 

capacity offers ill omens for the future. 32

Many of the statements of intent for these joint 

ventures come from official government sources. 

While such statements do not necessarily reflect the 

capacity to undertake the stated actions, they appear 

to be statements of intention to be taken seriously as 

the joint Iran-Bolivarian project consolidates.

International Assessment and Strategy Center 

(IASC) field research over the past 2 years has found 

that the actions and lines of effort of Iran and the gov-
23

ernments of the Bolivarian states, in conjunction with 

nonstate armed actors in the region designated as terrorist entities, comprise a pattern of activity designed 

to aid Iran’s nuclear ambitions and facilitate the potential movement of WMD components. (Contrary 

to some other reporting, IASC investigations found 

no evidence that uranium was being mined, a view 

shared in reporting by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].33) 

These activities include: 

• The clandestine or disguised extraction of minerals useful for nuclear and missile programs, 

largely of the coltan family, useful for missile 

production and other military applications;

• Access to a series of safe havens currently controlled by nonstate actors for illicit trafficking 

activities, particularly in border regions, that 

would allow for the free movement of virtually 

any product across the northern tier of South 

America through Central America and across 

the Homeland’s southern border;

• The creation of numerous financial institutions 

and monetary mechanisms designed to aid Iran 

in avoiding the impact of multilateral sanctions;

• The expansion of diplomatic ties across the region with credible reports that these facilities 

are being used as sanctuary for accredited diplomats who belong to the Quds Force and other 

Iranian intelligence services;

• The establishment of multiple agreements to 

permit economically unwarranted Iranian shipping activities in the region, primarily run by 

sanctioned shipping lines controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and 

known to be used to further Iran’s illicit nuclear 

ambitions;
24

• The potential use of semi-submersible and fully 

submersible craft with multi-ton carrying capacities, now being used by nonstate actors to 

move drugs (or WMD or WMD components) in 

a way that is almost impossible to detect.

There have been clear statements of intent by the 

Bolivarian states to aid Iran in avoiding the internationally mandated sanctions regime. In a joint statement, 

the foreign ministers of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, 

Nicaragua, and other members of the Chávez-led 

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America 

(Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 

[ALBA]) vowed to “continue and expand their economic ties with Iran.” “We are confident that Iran can 

give a crushing response to the threats and sanctions 

imposed by the West and imperialism,” Venezuelan 

foreign minister David Velásquez said at a joint press 

conference in Tehran.34

In addition, each of the Bolivarian states has lifted 

visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing 

any public record of the Iranian citizens that come and 

go to these countries. Given the extremely small number of tourists that ply the routes from Iran to Latin 

America, and the relatively small number of businessmen who are not tied to the Iranian state, we assume 

most of the travel is related to Iranian officials.

The Model: Recombinant Networks and 

Geographical Pipelines.

To understand the full significance of the new 

geopolitical reality in Latin America, it is necessary 

to think in terms of the geopolitics of TOC. Because 

of the clandestine nature of the criminal and terror-
25

ist activities, designed to be as opaque as possible, 

one must start from the assumption that, whatever is 

known of specific operations along the criminal-terrorist pipeline, or whatever combinations of links are 

seen, represents merely a snapshot in time, not a video 

of continuing events. Moreover, it is often out of date 

by the time it is assessed.

Nonstate armed actors as treated in this monograph are defined as: 

• Terrorist groups, motivated by religion, politics, ethnic forces, or at times, even by financial 

considerations;

• Transnational criminal organizations, both 

structured and disaggregated, including third 

generation gangs as defined by Manwaring;35

• Militias that control “black hole” or “stateless” 

sectors of one or more national territories;

• Insurgencies, which have more well-defined 

and specific political aims within a particular 

national territory, but may operate from outside of that national territory.

Each of these groups has different operational 

characteristics that must be understood in order to appreciate the challenges they pose.36 It is also important 

to note that these lines are blurry in reality, with few 

groups falling neatly into one category or even two. 

For example, insurgencies in Colombia and Peru are 

also designated terrorist groups by the United States 

and other governments, and engage in parts of the 

transnational criminal structure. These emerging hybrid structures change quickly, and the pace of change 

has accelerated in the era of instantaneous communication, the Internet, and the criminalization of religious and/or ideological groups.
26

These nexuses are well explored in the groundbreaking work of Louise Shelley et al., in Methods and 

Motives (2005), developing a five-step evolutionary 

process to show that “terrorists and criminals often 

use the same method, most often for divergent motives—but not always.”37 This useful model challenges 

the conventional view that criminal groups seek personal profit and terrorist groups seek political upheaval. As they noted, “In some cases, the terrorists 

simply imitate the criminal behavior they see around 

them, borrowing techniques such as credit card fraud 

and extortion in a phenomenon we refer to as activity 

appropriation. This is a shared approach rather than 

true interaction, but it often leads to more intimate 

connections within a short time.” This can evolve into 

a more symbiotic relationship, which in turn can (but 

many do not) turn into hybrid groups.38

While the groups that overlap in different networks are not necessarily allies, and in fact occasionally are enemies, they often can and do make alliances 

of convenience that are short-lived and shifting. Even 

violent drug cartels, which regularly engage in bloody 

turf battles, also frequently engage in truces and alliances, although most end when they are no longer 

mutually beneficial or the balance of power shifts 

among them. 

A clear example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among criminal and terrorist groups emerged 

from Operation TITAN, executed by Colombian and 

U.S. officials in 2008. After a 2-year investigation, 

they dismantled a drug trafficking organization that 

stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West 

Africa, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the 

key money launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb, 
27

aka “Taliban,” acted as the central go-between among 

Latin American division transportation offices (DTOs) 

and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah. Among the groups participating in Harb’s operation in Colombia were members of the Northern 

Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups, and 

the FARC. This mixture of enemies and competitors 

working through a common facilitator or in loose alliance for mutual benefit is a pattern that is becoming 

more common, and one that significantly complicates 

the ability of law enforcement and intelligence operatives to combat these groups.39

Another indication of the scope of the emerging 

alliances is the dramatic rise of Latin American drug 

trafficking organizations operating in West Africa, 

for onward shipment to Western Europe. Among the 

drug trafficking organizations found to be working 

on the ground in West Africa are the FARC, Mexican 

drug cartels, Colombian organizations, and Italian 

organized crime. It is worth bearing in mind that almost every major load of cocaine seized in West Africa in recent years has been traced to Venezuela as the 

point of origin.40 This overlapping web of networks 

was described in a July 2010 federal indictment from 

the Southern District of New York, which showed 

that drug trafficking organizations in Colombia and 

Venezuela, including the FARC, had agreed to move 

several multi-ton loads of cocaine through Liberia en 

route to Europe. 

The head of Liberian security forces, who is also 

the son of the president, negotiated the transshipment 

deals with a Colombian, a Russian, and three West Africans. According to the indictment, two of the loads, 

one of 4,000 kilos and one of 1,500, were to be flown to 

Monrovia from Venezuela and Panama, respectively. 

A third load of 500 kilos was to arrive aboard a Ven-
28

ezuelan ship. In exchange for transshipment rights the 

drug traffickers agreed to pay in both cash and product.

What the drug traffickers did not know was that 

the head of the security forces they were dealing with 

was acting as an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and had secretly recorded all the conversations, leaving the clearest body of 

evidence to date of the growing ties between known 

Latin American terrorist organizations/drug cartels 

and emerging West African criminal syndicates that 

move the cocaine northward to lucrative and growing 

markets in Europe and the former Soviet Union.41 The 

West African criminal syndicates, in turn, are often allied and cooperate in illicit smuggling operations with 

operatives of AQIM, a radical Islamist group that has 

declared its allegiance to Osama bin Ladenism and its 

alliance with al-Qaeda.42

A more recent example was the alleged October 

2011 plot by elements of the Quds Force, the elite arm 

of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, to hire a 

hit man from a Mexican cartel to assassinate the Saudi 

ambassador in the United States. The plot could be the 

first instance that members of an official Iranian institution, albeit a secretive one long known to support 

terrorist activities, dealt directly with a Mexican cartel 

to carry out an attack in the United States.43

Some context for the dealings of the Iranian government with Mexicans was provided in a recent investigative report by Univision, the Spanish-language 

TV network. On December 8, 2011, it aired footage 

of the Iranian ambassador in Mexico urging a group 

of Mexican university students who were hackers to 

launch broad cyber attacks against U.S. defense and 

intelligence facilities, claiming such an attack would 

be “bigger than 9/11.”44
29

While there has been little public acknowledgement of the Hezbollah ties to Latin American TOC 

groups, recent indictments based on DEA cases point 

to the growing overlap of the groups. In December 

2011, U.S. officials charged Ayman Joumaa, an accused Lebanese drug kingpin and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling tons of U.S.-bound cocaine and 

laundering hundreds of millions of dollars with the 

Zetas cartel of Mexico while operating in Panama, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 

and elsewhere. “Ayman Joumaa is one of top guys in 

the world at what he does: international drug trafficking and money laundering,” a U.S. anti-drug official 

said. “He has interaction with Hezbollah. There’s no 

indication that it’s ideological. It’s business.”45

Geographical “Pipelines.”

The central feature binding together these disparate organizations and networks which, in aggregate, 

make up the bulk of nonstate armed actors, is the informal (meaning outside legitimate state control and 

competence) “pipeline” or series of overlapping pipelines that these operations need to move products, 

money, weapons, personnel, and goods. The pipelines 

often form well-worn, customary, geographical routes 

and conduits developed during past conflicts, or traditionally used to smuggle goods without paying taxes 

to the state. Their exploitation by various communities, organizations, and networks yields recognizable 

patterns of activity.

The geography of the pipelines may be seen as 

both physical (i.e., terrain and topography), and human (i.e., historical and sociological patterns of local 

criminal activity). An area for further exploration is 

the degree to which pipelines are characterized by 
30

traditional smuggling routes in rugged border regions governed in the absence or defiance of the state. 

These regions may develop their own cultures that 

accept what the state considers to be illicit activities 

as normal and desirable. This is especially true in areas where the state has been considered an enemy for 

generations.46

The geopolitical dimensions to the problem of 

pipelines and alternatively governed spaces extend to 

the value of the geographical spaces, which become, as 

in interstate geopolitics, the object of competition and 

war. So, in turn, do the commodities moving through 

the pipelines on their way into the supply chain of the 

illicit economy. 

Many of the Mexican cartel wars are, in essence, 

resource wars, with the resources in dispute being not 

only the illicit merchandise being transported north 

and south, but the physical drug trafficking hubs or 

plazas through which the illicit goods must pass. The 

criminal pipeline itself is often a resource in dispute, 

and one of the primary sources of violence. Control of 

the pipeline can dramatically alter the relative power 

among different trafficking groups, as has been seen 

in the ongoing war between the Juarez and Sinaloa 

cartels in Mexico.47 Because of the lucrative nature of 

control of the actual physical space of the pipeline, 

these types of conflicts are increasingly carried out 

in gruesome fashion in Guatemala, Honduras, and El 

Salvador.

The impact of TOC control of pipeline territory, 

and capture of state functions, has been especially visible in states that are already close to collapse, including many outside of Latin America, making them apt 

candidates for future study. Among the most notable 

are countries in West Africa such as Guinea Bissau, 
31

Guinea (Conakry), Liberia, and Sierra Leone—all integral parts of the traditional diamond and contraband 

routes, and now part of the new cocaine highway.48 A 

United Nations (UN) Threat Assessment for West Africa found that the rapidly escalating amount of South 

American cocaine transiting through West Africa has 

produced the following results:

Poor countries like Guinea Bissau—that are at the bottom of the human development index—are unable to 

control their coasts or airspace. Police are almost helpless against well-equipped and well-connected traffickers. Drug seizures are growing dramatically—at 

least 46 tons of cocaine have been seized en route to 

Europe via West Africa since 2005. Prior to that time, 

the entire continent combined rarely seized a ton. But 

most of these seizures occurred by chance. Prosecutors 

and judges lack the evidence or the will to bring to 

justice powerful criminals with powerful friends.

These states are not collapsing. They risk becoming 

shell-states: sovereign in name, but hollowed out from 

the inside by criminals in collusion with corrupt officials in the government and the security services. This 

not only jeopardizes their survival, it poses a serious 

threat to regional security because of the trans-national nature of the crimes.49

As the TOC groups continue to grow in financial 

strength, territorial control, and political alliances, the 

same dark scenario is already well underway in much 

of Central America. While not yet as visible, the same 

forces, in some regions backed by surrounding states, 

largely spread outward from the borderlands.

In the cases of the West African nations, there are 

largely traditional “weak state” scenarios playing 

out, where different groups attack different vulner-
32

abilities in the state structure for specific needs, rather 

than taking over the state and attempting to use the 

state as a partner in the enterprise. In fact, in many 

of the states there remain pockets of political will, including at the very top, to avoid collapse and reassert 

state sovereignty (the Liberian government, as noted, 

helped thwart major shipments). The exception has 

been Guinea Bissau, where the rapid-fire assassinations in 2009 of the army chief of staff and the president may have been the result of a drug trafficking 

dispute within the state.50

Both the actors and the territory, or portion of the 

pipelines they control, are constantly in flux, meaning 

that tracking them in a meaningful way is difficult at 

best and seldom done well. As shown by the inter- and 

intra-cartel warfare in Mexico, smaller sub-groups can 

either overthrow the existing order inside their own 

structures or break off and form entirely new structures. They can break existing alliances and enter into 

new ones, depending on the advantages of a specific 

time, place, and operation.

An example of the changing balance of power is 

that of Los Zetas—a group of special operations soldiers who became hit men for the Gulf Cartel before 

branching out and becoming a separate organization—often now in direct conflict with their former 

bosses of the Gulf organization.

CRIMINALIZING STATES AS NEW 

REGIONAL ACTORS

While nonstate actors make up the bulk of criminal 

agents engaged in illicit activities, state actors play an 

increasingly important yet under-reported role. That 

role pertains in part to the availability of pipeline terri-
33

tory, and in part to the sponsorship and even direction 

of criminal activity. TOC groups can certainly exploit 

the geographical vulnerabilities of weak or failing 

states, but they also thrive on the services provided by 

stronger states.51

There are traditional categories for describing state 

performance as developed by Robert Rotberg and 

others in the wake of state failures at the end of the 

Cold War. The premise is that that “nation-states fail 

because they are convulsed by internal violence and 

can no longer deliver positive political goods to their 

inhabitants.”52 These categories are:

• Strong, i.e., able to control its territory and offer 

quality political goods to its people;

• Weak, i.e., filled with social tensions, the state 

has only a limited monopoly on the use of force;

• Failed, i.e., in a state of conflict with a predatory ruler, with no state monopoly on the use 

of force;

• Collapsed, i.e., no functioning state institutions 

and a vacuum of authority.53

This conceptualization, while useful, is extremely 

limited, as is the underlying premise. It fails to make 

a critical distinction between countries where the state 

has little or no power in certain areas and may be 

fighting to assert that control, and countries where the 

government, in fact, has a virtual monopoly on power 

and the use of force, but turns the state into a functioning criminal enterprise for the benefit of a small elite. 

The 4-tier categorization also suffers from a significant omission with regard to geographical areas of 

operation rather than criminal actors. The model presupposes that stateless regions are largely confined 

within the borders of a single state. As noted above, 
34

this is hardly ever the case: border areas form vital 

territory in the geographical pipelines controlled by 

networks of TOCs.

The definition of a geographic black hole as provided by Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt is useful 

in conceptualizing the use of border regions:

A black hole is a geographic entity where, due to the 

absence or ineffective exercise of state governance, 

criminal and terrorist elements can deploy activities in 

support of, or otherwise directly relating to, criminal 

or terrorist acts, including the act itself.54

State absence can be the product of a successful bid 

for local dominance by TOC groups, but it can also result from a perception on the part of the local population that the state poses a threat to their communities, 

livelihoods, or interests. Such perceptions may result 

not so much from weak or failing states as from strong 

or recovering states that are trying to root out corruption.

Latin America is almost absent from leading indexes of failed states, with the exception of Haiti. This 

is in large part because the indexes are state-centric 

and not designed to look at regions that spill over several borders but do not cause any one state to collapse. 

For example, only Colombia (ranked 41) and Bolivia 

(ranked 51) are among the top 60 countries in the Foreign Policy Magazine and Fund For Peace 2009 Failed 

State Index,55 although the governability of certain areas inside of Mexico, Guatemala, and several border 

regions has deteriorated markedly, and drug trafficking organizations have taken over significant portions 

of the national territory of several states.
35

This development can be explained in terms of the 

advantages offered by border regions. A 2001 Naval 

War College report insightfully described some of the 

reasons in terms of “commercial” and “political” insurgencies. These are applicable to organized criminal 

groups as well and have grown in importance since 

then:

The border zones offer obvious advantages for political and economic insurgencies. Political insurgents 

prefer to set up in adjacent territories that are poorly 

integrated, while the commercial insurgents favor active border areas, preferring to blend in amid business 

and government activity and corruption. The border 

offers a safe place to the political insurgent and easier access to communications, weapons, provisions, 

transport, and banks.

For the commercial insurgency, the frontier creates a 

fluid, trade-friendly environment. Border controls are 

perfunctory in ‘free trade’ areas, and there is a great 

demand for goods that are linked to smuggling, document fraud, illegal immigration, and money laundering.

For the political insurgency, terrain and topography 

often favor the narco-guerilla. Jungles permit him 

to hide massive bases and training camps, and also 

laboratories, plantations, and clandestine runways. 

The Amazon region, huge and impenetrable, is a clear 

example of the shelter that the jungle areas give. On 

all of Colombia’s borders—with Panama, Ecuador, 

Brazil, and Venezuela—jungles cloak illegal activity.56

This is a particularly useful description of the advantages enjoyed by the FARC, operating as both a 

political and commercial insurgency, in the Colombian border areas with Ecuador and Venezuela.
36

The Weak State-Criminal State Continuum.

One may array the degree of state control of, or participation in, criminal activity along a spectrum (see 

Figure 2). At one end are strong but criminal states, 

with the state acting as a TOC element or an important 

component of a TOC group. The regime is strongly 

functional but, in a limited sense, caters primarily to 

the needs and interests of the leadership or a political 

cause, and is the primary beneficiary of proceeds from 

the criminal activity. Such activity is directed from the 

top down. A criminal state relies on the integration of 

the state’s leadership into the criminal enterprise.

Figure 2. Continuum from Weak States 

to Criminal States.

There have been notable examples of criminal 

states in the recent past. As discussed, the case of 

Charles Taylor’s Liberia is an example of the criminal 

state.57 In Latin America, the government of Suriname 

(formerly Dutch Guiana) in the 1980s and early 1990s 

under Desi Bouterse, a convicted drug trafficker with 

strong ties to the FARC, was (and perhaps still is) an 

Weak State with vulnerable 

borders, weak institutions, 

pockets of TOC territorial 

control

Fragile State, with little control 

over national 

territory but where the state has 

little TOC activity

Criminal State, where a strong 

government directly participates in TOC activity, benefits 

from it and embeds criminals 

within state organs
37

operational player in an ongoing criminal enterprise 

and benefited from it.58 Bouterse, convicted in absentia

in Holland for masterminding the shipment of hundreds of kilograms of cocaine to Europe and facing 

murder charges in his own country, nonetheless was 

reelected to the presidency of Suriname in 2010. In 

addition to aiding and abetting drug traffickers in his 

own country, there are credible reports that he aided 

the FARC in the acquisition of weapons, and gave safe 

haven to senior FARC commanders. The president’s 

son, Dino, was also convicted of drug trafficking and 

weapons sales, as head of the elite Counterterrorism 

Unit.59 Bouterse’s only public defender in the region is 

Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

Again, the elements of TOC as statecraft can be 

seen. Chávez reportedly funded Bouterse’s improbable electoral comeback in Suriname, funneling 

money to his campaign and hosting him in Venezuela on several visits.60 While no other heads of state 

accepted Bouterse’s invitation to attend his inauguration, Chávez did, although he had to cancel at the last 

minute. In recompense, he promised to host Bouterse 

on a state visit to Venezuela.61

Bolivarian states, particularly Venezuela and Bolivia, meet the criteria of highly criminalized states due 

to the significant involvement of high-level officials in 

the cocaine trade, including senior military and police 

officials, senior government officials, and elements of 

the state apparatus itself. While they have not reached 

the same level of vertical integration in the criminal 

enterprise as Taylor’s in Liberia, or Bouterse’s first regime in Suriname, the TOC function is at the service 

of both a broader Bolivarian political project and for 

personal enrichment of Bolivarian elites.
38

One of the key differences between the Bolivarian 

alliance and earlier criminalized states in the region 

is the mutually reinforcing structure of the alliance. 

While other criminalized states have been widely 

viewed as international pariahs and broadly shunned, 

thus hastening their demise, the new Bolivarian structures unite several states in a joint, if loosely-knit, 

criminal enterprise. This ensures these mutually supporting regimes can endure for much longer.

At the other end are weak and captured states, 

where certain nodes of governmental authority, 

whether local or central, have been seized by TOCs, 

who in turn are the primary beneficiaries of the proceeds from the criminal activity. Penetration of the 

state usually centers on one or more of three functions: judiciary (to ensure impunity), border control 

and customs (to ensure the safe passage of persons 

and goods), and legislature (to codify the structures 

necessary to TOC organizations, such as a ban on extradition, weak asset forfeiture laws, etc.). It also is 

more local in its focus, rather than national.

A good example of this is the operations of the Zetas and more local drug trafficking organizations in 

Guatemala, where the interest is not in taking control 

of the central government, but in territorial control of 

specific trafficking routes or plazas. El Salvador and 

Los Perrones offer another example of this model.62

Typically, TOC elements aim at dislodging the 

state from local territory, rather than assuming the 

role of the state in overall political authority across the 

country. As Shelley noted, “Older crime groups, often 

in long-established states, have developed along with 

their states and are dependent on existing institutional and financial structures to move their products and 

invest their profits.”63
39

This point is of critical importance in differentiating the role of TOC groups (possibly numerous TOCs 

in haphazard fashion) that seek the piecemeal control 

of territory from the aims of insurgent groups. By definition, insurgents aim to wrest political control from 

the state and transfer it to their own leadership. 

The criminal state is similar in concept to a captured state, as described by Phil Williams,64 but differs in an important way. “Captured states” are taken 

hostage by criminal organizations, often through intimidation and threats, giving the criminal enterprise 

access to some parts of the state apparatus. Guatemala 

would be an example: the government lacks control 

of roughly 60 percent of the national territory, with 

the cartels enjoying local power and free access to the 

border; but the central government itself is not under 

siege.

To a certain extent, traditional TOC groups need to 

displace or discredit the state locally, often by means 

of extreme violence, so as to establish and perpetuate 

their own territorial control. This is especially true 

in stateless border areas. When the state apparatus 

begins to function in the interest of the TOC groups, 

however, “capture” has occurred. 

Currently, local and state governments in parts of 

Mexico have been captured by cocaine-driven DTOs 

that are diversifying their criminal portfolios, and 

parts of Mexico’s central government appear to have 

been targeted as well. If unchecked, this could lead, 

over time, to a significant piecemeal hollowing out of 

the state from within, as described above.

In the middle range between the extremes, more 

criminalized cases include participation in criminal 

activity by state leaders, some acting out of personal 

interest, others in the interest of financing the services 
40

or the ideology of the state. A variant of this category occurs when a functioning state essentially turns 

over, or “franchises out” part of its territory to nonstate groups to carry out their own agenda with the 

blessing and protection of the central government or 

a regional power. Both state and nonstate actors share 

in the profits and proceeds from criminal activity thus 

generated. Venezuela under Hugo Chávez is perhaps 

the clearest example of this model in the region, given 

his relationship with the FARC.

Hugo Chávez and the FARC: 

The Franchising Model.

Following the model pioneered by Iran and Hezbollah, senior Venezuelan military and political leaders have allowed the FARC to traffic cocaine through 

Venezuela to West Africa, sharing in the profits. Almost every major shipment of cocaine to West Africa 

that U.S. law enforcement officials have been able to 

trace back has originated from or passed through Venezuelan territory.65

It is important to note that Chávez’s most active 

support for the FARC came after the FARC had already become primarily a drug trafficking organization vice political insurgency. The FARC has also 

traditionally earned considerable income (and wide 

international condemnation) from the kidnapping for 

ransom of hundreds of individuals, in violation of the 

Geneva Convention and other international conventions governing armed conflicts. It was impossible, by 

the early part of the 21st century, to separate support 

for the FARC from support for TOC, as these two activities were the insurgent group’s primary source of 

income. In addition, the FARC had been designated 
41

a terrorist organization by the United States in 1997, 

and by the EU in 2001, for its indiscriminate attacks 

on civilians, ties to international drug trafficking, and 

massive documented human rights abuses.66

Despite this, Chávez had cultivated a relationship 

with the FARC long before becoming president. As 

one recent study of internal FARC documents noted:

When Chávez became president of Venezuela in February 1999, FARC had not only enjoyed a relationship 

with him for at least some of the previous seven years 

but had also penetrated and learned how to best use 

Venezuelan territory and politics, manipulating and 

building alliances with new and traditional Venezuelan political sectors, traversing the Colombia-Venezuela border in areas ranging from coastal desert to 

Amazonian jungle and building cooperative relationships with the Venezuelan armed forces. Once Chávez 

was inaugurated, Venezuelan border security and foreign policies shifted in the FARC’s favor.67

In this context, there is also growing evidence that 

the Venezuela government under Chávez is actively 

promoting drug trafficking and TOC/terrorist groups, 

particularly the FARC and Hezbollah.68 Perhaps the 

strongest public evidence of the importance of Venezuela to the FARC is the public fingering of three 

of Chávez’s closest advisers and senior government 

officials by the U.S Treasury Department’s Office of 

Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 

OFAC said the three—Hugo Armando Carvajál, 

director of Venezuelan Military Intelligence; Henry de 

Jesus Rangél, director of the Venezuelan Directorate 

of Intelligence and Prevention Services; and Ramón 

Emilio Rodriguez Chacín, former minister of justice 

and former minister of interior—were responsible for 
42

“materially supporting the FARC, a narco-terrorist 

organization.” It specifically accused Carvajál and 

Rangél of protecting FARC cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacín, 

who resigned his government position just a few days 

before the designations, was the “Venezuelan government’s main weapons contact for the FARC.”69 In 

November 2010, Rangél was promoted to the overall 

commander of the Venezuelan armed forces70 and in 

January 2012 was named defense minister as part of 

of Chávez’s promotion of close associates tied to drug 

trafficking and the FARC.71

As the respected Manhattan district attorney Robert M. Morgenthau warned as he left office in 2009 

after decades of public service, including pursuit of 

numerous (and ongoing) criminal investigations into 

the Chávez government’s role in TOC:

. . . [L]et there be no doubt that Hugo Chávez leads not 

only a corrupt government but one staffed by terrorist 

sympathizers. The government has strong ties to narco-trafficking and money laundering, and reportedly 

plays an active role in the transshipment of narcotics 

and the laundering of narcotics proceeds in exchange 

for payments to corrupt government officials.72

OFAC charges were buttressed by three other developments: A public presentation of Colombian intelligence on FARC camps in Venezuela and the meeting 

of high-level FARC commanders with senior Venezuelan officials, delivered at a session of the Organization 

of American States in July 2010;73 the public release 

of an analysis of all the FARC documents—captured 

by the Colombian military, from the March 1, 2008, 

killing of senior FARC commander Raúl Reyes—by 

a respected British security think that outlined some 
43

of the same ties;74 and the public statements of Walid 

Makled, a Venezuelan who was formally designated a 

drug kingpin by the U.S. Government. 

Arrested by Colombian police after he fled Venezuela, Makled was eventually extradited back to Venezuela. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern 

District of New York, dubbed Makled, also known as 

“The Turk,” a “king among kingpins.” While in Colombian custody, Makled gave multiple interviews 

and displayed documents that he claimed showed 

that he acquired control of one of Venezuela’s main 

ports, as well as an airline used for cocaine trafficking, by paying millions of dollars in bribes to senior 

Venezuelan official. 

According to the U.S. indictment against him, 

Makled exported at least 10 tons of cocaine a month 

to the United States by keeping more than 40 Venezuelan generals and senior government officials on 

his payroll. “All my business associates are generals. 

The highest,” Makled said. “I am telling you, we dispatched 300,000 kilos of coke. I couldn’t have done 

it without the top of the government.”75 What added 

credibility to Makled’s claims were the documents he 

presented showing what appear to be the signatures 

of several generals and senior Ministry of Interior officials accepting payment from Makled. “I have enough 

evidence to justify the invasion of Venezuela” as a 

criminal state, he said.76

The FARC and Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.

Since the electoral victories of Correa in Ecuador 

and Morales in Bolivia, and the re-election of Daniel 

Ortega in Nicaragua, their governments have actively supported FARC rebels in their war of more than 
44

4 decades against the Colombian state, as well as significant drug trafficking activities.77 While Ecuador 

and Venezuela have allowed their territory to be used 

for years as rear guard and transshipment stations for 

the FARC and other drug trafficking organizations, 

Bolivia has become a recruitment hub and safe haven; and Nicaragua, a key safe haven and weapons 

procurement center. In addition, several senior members of both the Correa and Morales administrations 

have been directly implicated in drug trafficking incidents, showing the complicity of the state in the criminal 

enterprises.

In Bolivia, the Morales government, which has 

maintained cordial ties with the FARC at senior levels,78 has, as noted, faced an escalating series of drug 

trafficking scandals at the highest levels.79 It is worth 

noting that Alvaro García Linera, the nation’s vice 

president and a major power center in the Morales 

administration, was a member of the armed Tupac 

Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari [MRTK]), an ally of the FARC, 

and served several years in prison.80

In Ecuador, the minister for internal and external 

security, as well as his deputy, have a documented relationship not only with the FARC but with a major 

drug trafficking organization that was directly helping the FARC move its product to Mexican buyers. 

Among the many scandals to shake the Ecuadoran 

government is the fact that several of Correa’s senior 

advisers, including Gustavo Larrea, the super-minister 

for internal and external security, and his deputy, José 

Ignacio Chauvín, met with the FARC on numerous 

occasions and may well have served as the conduits 

for some $400,000 in FARC money to enter the Correa presidential campaign.81 Other senior government 
45

officials were part of the small “Alfaro Vive, Carajo” 

armed movement in the 1980s.

Chauvín, in turn, was closely tied to the Ostaiza 

brothers, leaders of a major drug trafficking organization in Ecuador as well as the FARC and Mexican 

cartels.82 The president’s sister was also photographed 

meeting with the jailed Ostaiza brothers, and later 

claimed she was asking them to stop making public 

declarations incriminating government officials in exchange for arranging their release from custody.83

An analysis of the Reyes computer documents 

concluded that the FARC donated several hundred 

thousand dollars to Correa’s campaign,84 a conclusion 

drawn by other national and international investigations.85 The Reyes documents show senior Ecuadoran 

officials meeting with FARC commanders and offering 

to remove certain commanders in the border region so 

the FARC would not be under so much pressure on 

the Ecuadoran side.86

In Bolivia, numerous senior officials have been 

linked to the drug trade. Internal intelligence documents obtained by the author show that senior cabinet 

officials, members of the vice president’s family, and 

senior military and police officials all hide behind immunity accorded by the state for criminal activities. 

Among the cases that have become public is that of 

Margarita Terán, the staunch party leader who was in 

charge of the committee dealing with drug trafficking 

in the Constituent Assembly, who was caught with 

more than 100 kilos of cocaine in her home, and freed 

3 weeks later.87

Morales’s chief spiritual adviser and close friend, 

who handed him the ceremonial baton when he took 

office, was caught with more than 350 kilos of liquid 

cocaine.88 And most damaging of all, Morales’ police 
46

chief in charge of the anti-narcotics forces, was arrested in Panama in February 2011 and extradited to 

the United States for drug trafficking.89 General René 

Sanabria, who was heading an elite intelligence unit 

for the Interior Ministry at the time of his arrest, has 

since reached a plea bargain agreement in a U.S. court.

Morales has also maintained ties to the FARC. In 

one 2007 missive, Reyes asks a member of the FARC’s 

International Commission to “take good care of our 

relations with Evo and the rest of our friends in that 

government.”90 One of those friends appears to be Antonio Peredo, a senator for the Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo [MAS]).91 who, the FARC 

notes, signed a letter at their request, supporting the 

FARC’s demand to be granted status as a legitimate 

belligerent force rather than a terrorist group.92

A closer friend, at least for a time, was Hugo Moldis, who helped found the MAS and has been one of 

the movement’s intellectual guides, and was seriously 

considered for senior cabinet positions. Instead, he 

was given the job as leader of the government-backed 

confederation of unions and social groups called the 

“People’s High Command” (Estado Mayor del Pueblo

[EMP]),93 and he maintains a fairly high profile as 

journalist and writer for several Marxist publications. 

The EMP was one of the principal vehicles of the 

MAS and its supporters in forcing the 2003 resignation of the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, 

and Morales, as president, named it the organization 

responsible for giving social movements a voice in 

the government. “If I am wrong, correct me,” Morales 

said in a speech to the organization after his election. 

“If I am tired, revive me; if I am demoralized, encourage me.”94 Moldiz told the group that “our purpose is 

to defend the government, defend the political process of change, which we have conquered with blood, 
47

strikes, marches, sacrifice, and pain. Our main enemy 

is called United States imperialism and the Bolivian 

oligarchy.”95

These relationships and others, including those 

with the Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta 

Askatasuna [ETA]) separatist movement which is also 

designated a terrorist entity (hosted officially by both 

Chávez and Correa), have been publicly documented, 

but the extent of the relationships is seldom noticed in 

policymaking circles.

The Regional Infrastructure.

Brazil and Peru, while not actively supporting the 

FARC, have serious drug trafficking issues to contend 

with on their own and exercise little real control over 

their border regions. Despite this geographic and geopolitical reality, Colombia has undertaken a costly and 

somewhat successful effort to reestablish state control 

in many long-abandoned regions of its own national 

territory. Yet the Colombian experience offers an object lesson in the limits of what can be done even if the 

political will exists and if significant national treasure 

is invested in reestablishing a positive state presence. 

Once nonstate actors have established uncontested 

authority over significant parts of the national territory, the cost of recouping control and establishing a 

functional state presence is enormous.

It becomes even more costly when criminal/terrorist groups such as the FARC become instruments 

of regional statecraft. The FARC has been using its 

ideological affinity with Correa, Morales, Chávez, and 

Nicaragua’s Ortega to press for a change in status to 

“belligerent group” in lieu of terrorist entity or simple 

insurgency. “Belligerent” status is a less pejorative 

term and brings certain international protections.
48

In turn, the Bolivarian leaders have encouraged and 

supported the FARC in order to weaken the Colombian government (which has waged an enormously successful military campaign against the FARC) and consistently portrayed Colombia in international forums, 

and domestically as a U.S. puppet and servant of the 

“empire”—as they routinely call the United States.96

In addition, the FARC and its political arm, the Continental Bolivarian Movement (Movimiento Continental 

Bolivariano [MCB] discussed below), has become a vehicle for a broader-based alliance of nonstate armed 

groups seeking to end the traditional democratic representative government model and replace it with an 

ideology centered on Marxism, anti-globalization, and 

anti-United States.

As criminal agents, states are obviously only part 

of the picture. They collude with both TOCs and terrorist groups and insurgents, two sets of actors who 

in turn collude between themselves. As Figure 3 indicates, not all states are criminal, not all TOCs are 

engaged in terrorism or collude with terrorist groups, 

and not all terrorist groups conduct criminal activities. The overlap between all three groups constitutes 

a small but highly dangerous subset of cases, and applies most particularly to the Bolivarian states.

Figure 3. Overlap of the State, Terror Groups,

and TOC groups in the Bolivarian States.
49

Many criminal organizations today employ violence on a terroristic level to discredit the state and 

destroy its authority over strategically vital territory, 

while many terrorist organizations and insurgencies 

today engage in criminal activity to finance operations, whether local or worldwide. Some criminal enterprises likewise are headed by leaders who eventually seek political influence and prestige, while some 

terrorist organizations morph over time into criminal 

enterprises. The distinction between terrorist organization and TOC thus involves another spectrum of 

activity, with a shifting balance between primarily 

profit-driven and primarily ideology-driven motivations and behavior.

The TOC-Terrorist State Alliance.

At the center of the nexus of the Bolivarian movement with TOC, terrorism, and armed revolution is 

the FARC, and its political wing, the Continental Bolivarian Coordinator (Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana [CCB]), a continental political movement founded 

in 2003, funded and directed by the FARC. In 2009, 

the CCB officially changed its name to the MCB to reflect its growth across Latin America. For purposes of 

consistency, we refer to the organization as the CCB 

throughout this monograph.

In a November 24, 2004, letter from Raúl Reyes, the 

FARC’s second-in-command, to another member of 

the FARC General Secretariat, he laid out the FARC’s 

role in the CCB, as well as the Chávez government’s 

role, in the following unambiguous terms:

The CCB has the following structure: an executive, 

some chapters by region . . . and a “foreign legion.” 
50

Headquarters: Caracas. It has a newspaper called 

“Correo Bolivariano,” [Bolivarian Mail] and Internet 

site and an FM radio station heard throughout Caracas. . . . This is an example of coordinated struggle for 

the creation of the Bolivarian project. We do not exclude any forms of struggle. It was founded in Fuerte 

Tiuna in Caracas. [Author’s Note: Fuerte Tiuna is the 

main government military and intelligence center in 

Venezuela, and this is a clear indication that the Venezuelan government fully supported the founding of 

the organization.] The political ammunition and the 

leadership is provided by the FARC. 97

According to an internal FARC report dated March 

11, 2005, on the CCB’s activities in 2004, there were 

already active groups in Mexico, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Chile. International brigades from the Basque region of Spain, Italy, France, 

and Denmark were operational. Work was underway 

in Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil. The number of 

organizations that were being actively coordinated by 

the CCB was listed at 63, and there were “political relations” with 45 groups and 25 institutions. The CCB 

database contained 500 e-mails.98

In an April 1, 2006, letter from Reyes to “Aleyda,” 

identified by Colombian authorities as Mariana López 

de la Vega of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement 

(Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionaria [MIR]) of Chile, 

the FARC leader states,

the CCB is part of movement of masses of the FARC, 

and as such receives all of our support. However, we 

are not deluded or confused, and understand that the 

CCB is broader than just our cells, as the CCB has a 

broad roof , which allows us, if we are politically agile, 

to reach other sectors of society and create more Communist militants.99
51

Numerous other documents show that different 

Bolivarian governments directly supported the CCB, 

whose president is always the FARC leader. In 1998 

Daniel Ortega, then the leader of the opposition in 

Nicaragua, traveled to FARC territory in Colombia to 

award the Augusto Sandino medal, his party’s highest honor, to Manuel Marulanda (aka Tirofijo, or Sure 

Shot), the FARC’s supreme commander at the time.100

The government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador officially hosted the second congress of the organization 

in Quito in late February 2008. The meeting was attended by members of Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac 

Amaru [MRTA]); the Mapuches and MIR of Chile; 

Spain’s ETA, and other terrorist and insurgent groups. 

The videotaped keynote address to the assembly was 

given by Raúl Reyes, deputy commander of the FARC, 

who was killed a few days later, and his computers 

and hard drives captured, giving a window into many 

of the FARC’s internal workings and its international 

ties.

The 2009 meeting at which the CCB became the 

MCB was held in Caracas and the keynote address 

was given Alfonso Cano, the current FARC leader. 

Past FARC leaders are honorary presidents of the organization.101 This places the FARC—a well-identified 

drug trafficking organization with significant ties to 

the major Mexican drug cartels102 and a designated 

terrorist entity with a broad-based alliance that spans 

the globe—directly in the center of a state-sponsored 

project to fundamentally reshape Latin America and 

its political structure and culture. 

The FARC-CCB alliance serves key functions of 

statecraft for Chávez and his allies beyond simply 

providing a common political space and a charter for 
52

revolutionary change in the region. The Venezuelan 

government is able to profit from the transit of cocaine 

and weapons through the national territory at a time 

when oil revenues are low and the budget is under 

significant stress. 

The importance of the cocaine transit increase 

through Venezuela was documented by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which estimates that 

the product transit rose fourfold from 2004 to 2007, 

from 60 metric tons to 240 metric tons.103 At the same 

time, the report noted the symbiotic relationship with 

the FARC, where “Venezuelan government officials 

have provided material support, primarily to the 

FARC, which has helped to sustain the Colombian 

insurgency and threaten security gains achieved in 

Colombia.”104 This was further substantiated, as noted 

earlier, by the Makled testimony, and the OFAC actions against senior Venezuelan officials.

Finally, the CCB, as a revolutionary meeting house 

for “anti-imperialist” forces around the world, provides the political and ideological underpinning and 

justification for the growing alliance among the Bolivarian states, again led by Chávez, and Iran, led by 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The nature of the threat to 

the United States is not merely the drugs in the pipeline, or even the deals with Russia and China, but also 

the establishment of political influence and military 

presence by Hezbollah, a radical Shiite Muslim terrorist organization that enjoys the state sponsorship of 

Iran and, to a lesser degree, Syria. Hezbollah’s influence extends to the nature of the war and diplomacy 

pursued by Chávez and his Bolivarian comrades. The 

franchising model strongly resembles the template 

pioneered by Hezbollah. 
53

THE BOLIVARIAN AND IRANIAN 

REVOLUTIONS: THE TIES THAT BIND

The most common assumption among those who 

view the Iran-Bolivarian alliance as troublesome, and 

many do not view it as a significant threat at all, is 

that there are two points of convergence between the 

radical and reactionary theocratic Iranian government 

and the self-proclaimed socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution. These assumed points of convergence are: 1) an overt and often stated hatred for the 

United States and a shared belief in how to destroy 

a common enemy; and 2) a shared acceptance of authoritarian state structures that tolerate little dissent 

and encroach on all aspects of a citizen’s life.105

These assumptions are valid but do not acknowledge the broader underpinnings of the relationship. 

While Iran’s revolutionary rulers view the 1979 revolution in theological terms as a miracle of divine intervention in which the United States, the Great Satan, 

was defeated, the Bolivarians view it from a secular 

point of view as a roadmap to defeat the United States 

as the Evil Empire. To both, it has strong political connotations and serves as a model for how asymmetrical 

leverage, whether applied by Allah or humans, can 

conjure the equivalent of a David defeating a Goliath 

on the world stage.

Ortega has declared the Iranian and Nicaraguan 

revolutions to be “twin revolutions, with the same objectives of justice, liberty, sovereignty and peace . . .

despite the aggressions of the imperialist policies.” 

Ahmadinejad couched the alliances as part of “a large 

anti-imperialist movement that has emerged in the 

region.”
54

Among the first to articulate the possible merging 

of radical Shite Islamic thought with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism and U.S. hegemony was 

Illich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as the terrorist 

leader, “Carlos the Jackal,” a Venezuelan citizen who 

was, until his arrest in 1994, one of the world’s most 

wanted terrorists. In his writings, Sánchez Ramirez 

espouses Marxism tied to revolutionary, violent Palestinian uprisings, and, in the early 2000s after becoming a Muslim, to militant Islamism. Yet he did not 

abandon his Marxist roots, believing that Islamism 

and Marxism combined would form a global antiimperialist front that would definitively destroy the 

United States, globalization, and imperialism.

In his 2003 book Revolutionary Islam, written from 

prison where he is serving a life sentence for killing 

two French policemen, Sánchez Ramirez praises Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks on the United States 

as a “lofty feat of arms” and part of a justified armed 

struggle of Islam against the West. “From now on terrorism is going to be more or less a daily part of the 

landscape of your rotting democracies,” he writes.106

In this context, the repeated public praise of Sánchez Ramirez by Chávez can be seen as a crucial element of the Bolivarian ideology and an acceptance 

of Ramirez’s underlying premise as important to 

Chávez’s ideological framework. Chávez ordered his 

ambassador to France to seek the release of Sánchez 

Ramirez and on multiple occasions referred to the 

convicted terrorist as a “friend” and “true revolutionary.”107 In a 1999 letter to Sánchez Ramirez, Chávez 

greeted the terrorist as a “Distinguished Compatriot,” 

writing that:
55

Swimming in the depths of your letter of solidarity I 

could hear the pulse of our shared insight that everything has its due time: time to pile up stones or hurl 

them, to ignite revolution or to ignore it; to pursue 

dialectically a unity between our warring classes or 

to stir the conflict between them—a time when you 

can fight outright for principles and a time when you 

must choose the proper fight, lying in wait with a keen 

sense for the moment of truth, in the same way that 

Ariadne, invested with these same principles, lays the 

thread that leads her out of the labyrinth. . . .

I feel that my spirit’s own strength will always rise to 

the magnitude of the dangers that threaten it. My doctor has told me that my spirit must nourish itself on 

danger to preserve my sanity, in the manner that God 

intended, with this stormy revolution to guide me in 

my great destiny.

With profound faith in our cause and our mission, 

now and forever! 108

In fact, the Bolivarian fascination with militant 

Islamist thought and Marxism did not end with the 

friendship between Chávez and the jailed terrorist. 

Acolytes of Sánchez Ramirez continued to develop his 

ideology of Marxism and radical Islamism rooted in 

the Iranian revolution. 

The emerging military doctrine of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” officially adopted in Venezuela and 

rapidly spreading to Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model 

of asymmetrical or “fourth generation warfare,” and 

its heavy reliance on suicide bombings and different 

types of terrorism, including the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. This is occurring at a time when 

Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America is growing and 
56

becoming more identifiable.109 Chávez has adopted 

as his military doctrine the concepts and strategies 

articulated in Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare

(Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, 

Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica ) by the Spanish 

politician and ideologue, Jorge Verstrynge (see Figure 

4).110 The tract is a continuation of and exploration of 

Sánchez Ramirez’s thoughts, incorporating an explicit 

endorsement of the use of WMD to destroy the United 

States. Verstrynge argues for the destruction of the 

United States through a series of asymmetrical attacks 

like those of 9/11, in the belief that the United States 

will simply crumble when its vast military strength 

cannot be used to combat its enemies. 

Figure 4. Cover of Jorge Verstrynge’s Revolution 

Handbook.
57

Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not 

written directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves beyond Sánchez Ramirez to 

embrace all strands of radical Islam for helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should 

encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the collateral civilian casualties among the enemy. Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is the belief in the sacredness of 

fighters sacrificing their lives in pursuit of their goals. 

Before writing extensively on how to make chemical 

weapons and listing helpful places to find information 

on the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs 

that “someone with a high school education could 

make,” Verstrynge writes:

We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical 

warfare to guerrilla warfare, although it is important. 

However, it is not a mistake to also use things that are 

classified as terrorism and use them in asymmetrical 

warfare. And we have super terrorism, divided into 

chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and bacteriological methods), and nuclear terrorism, which means “the type of terrorism uses the 

threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.”111

In a December 12, 2008, interview with Venezuelan 

state television, Verstrynge lauded Osama bin Laden 

and al-Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is 

“de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized,” 

a war where suicide bombers act as “atomic bombs for 

the poor.”112 Chávez liked the Verstrynge book so well 

he had a special pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to the officer corps with express orders that it 

be read from cover to cover.
58

An Alliance of Mutual Benefit.

This ideological framework of a combined Marxism and radical Islamic methodology for successfully 

attacking the United States is an important, though little examined, underpinning for the greatly enhanced 

relationships among the Bolivarian states and Iran. 

These relationships are being expanded, absorbing 

significant resources despite the fact that there is little 

economic rationale to the ties and little in terms of 

legitimate commerce. For Iran, however, the benefits 

are numerous, particularly in building alliances with 

nations to break its international isolation. It also affords Iran the opportunity to mine strategic minerals 

for its missile and nuclear programs, position Quds 

Force and Revolutionary Guard operatives under diplomatic cover, greatly expand and enhance its intelligence gathering, and operate state-to-state enterprises 

that allow for the movement of just about any type of 

goods and material. One glimpse at the type of shipments such a relationship can be used for came to light 

in 2009, when Turkish authorities randomly inspected 

some crates being shipped from Iran to Venezuela at 

the port of Mersin. The 22 crates were labeled “tractor 

parts” but in fact carried equipment for manufacturing explosives.113

One need only look at how rapidly Iran has increased its diplomatic, economic, and intelligence 

presence in Latin America to see the priority it places 

on this emerging axis, given that it is an area where it 

has virtually no trade, no historic or cultural ties, and 

no obvious strategic interests. The gains, in financial 

institutions, bilateral trade agreements, and state visits (eight state visits between Chávez and Ahmadinejad alone since 2006), are almost entirely within the 
59

Bolivarian orbit; and, as noted, the Bolivarian states 

have jointly declared their intention to help Iran break 

international sanctions.

Iran is also spending scarce resources on expanding its cultural influence, partly through a strong 

Spanish-language, Latin American-based Internet 

presence, with websites in most countries. The sites 

generally laud Hezbollah, extol the teachings of Iran’s 

revolutionary leaders, stress the peaceful nature of its 

nuclear program, and include Spanish-language literature on Shi’ia Islam.114 The most recent salvo by Iran 

is the launching of a Spanish language satellite TV station, Hispan TV, aimed at Latin America. Bolivia and 

Venezuela are collaborating in producing documentaries for the station. Mohammed Sarafraz, deputy director of international affairs, said Iran was “launching a channel to act as a bridge between Iran and the 

countries of Latin America [there being] a need to help 

familiarize Spanish-speaking citizens with the Iranian 

nation.” He said that Hispan TV was launched with 

the aim of reinforcing cultural ties with the Spanishspeaking nations and helping to introduce the traditions, customs, and beliefs of the Iranian people. Attempting to show the similarities between Islam and 

Christianity, the first program broadcast was “Saint 

Mary,” depicting “the life of Saint Mary and the birth 

of Jesus Christ from an Islamic point of view.”115 What 

is of particular concern is that many of the bilateral 

and multilateral agreements signed between Iran and 

Bolivarian nations, such as the creation of a dedicated 

shipping line between Iran and Ecuador, or the deposit of $120 million by an internationally sanctioned Iranian bank into the Central Bank of Ecuador, are based 

on no economic rationale.116
60

There is growing evidence of the merging of the 

Bolivarian Revolution’s criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the criminal-terrorist pipeline of 

radical Islamist groups (Hezbollah, in particular) supported by the Iranian regime. The possibility opens a 

series of new security challenges for the United States 

and its allies in Latin America. The 1994 Hezbollah 

and Iranian bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a useful reminder that these 

groups can and do operate in Latin America.

As noted earlier, Operation TITAN provides clear 

evidence of the merging of drug trafficking organizations with strong ties to the FARC on one hand, and 

purchasers and money launderers with close ties to 

Hezbollah on the other. Additional cases include:

• In 2008, OFAC cited senior Venezuelan diplomats for facilitating the funding of Hezbollah. 

One of those cited, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served 

as the charge d’affaires of the Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, and then served in the 

Venezuelan embassy in London. According to 

the OFAC statement in late January 2008, al Din 

facilitated the travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese parliament to solicit 

donations and announce the opening of a Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office 

in Venezuela. The second individual, Fawzi 

Kan’an, is described as a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a “significant provider 

of financial support to Hizbollah.” He met with 

senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss 

operational issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist attacks.117
61

• In April 2009, police in the island country of 

Curacao arrested 17 people for alleged involvement in cocaine trafficking with some of the 

proceeds being funneled through Middle Eastern banks to Hezbollah.118

• A July 6, 2009, indictment of Jamal Yousef in the 

U.S. Southern District of New York alleges that 

the defendant, a former Syrian military officer 

arrested in Honduras, sought to sell weapons 

to the FARC—weapons he claimed came from 

Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.119

Such a relationship between nonstate and state 

actors provides numerous benefits to both. In Latin 

America, for example, the FARC gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most importantly, it acquires access to routes for 

exporting cocaine to Europe and the United States—

while using the same routes to import quantities of sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. 

In return, the Chávez government offers state protection, while reaping rewards in the form of financial 

benefits for individuals as well as institutions, derived 

from the cocaine trade.

Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are 

largely barred from the Western financial systems, 

benefits from access to the international financial market through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, and Bolivian financial institutions, which act as proxies by moving 

Iranian money as if it originated in their own legal 

financial systems.120 Venezuela also agreed to provide 

Iran with 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day, leading to 

U.S. sanctions against the state petroleum company.121
62

In addition, Chávez maintains his revolutionary credentials in the radical axis comprised of leftist populists and Islamic fundamentalists, primarily Iran. As a 

head of state, he is able to introduce external (non-regional) actors into the region for a variety of purposes, 

some of which directly benefit nonstate actors. 

Iran is not the only extra-territorial actor that 

Chávez has courted and whose interests diverge notably from U.S. interests. Of primary concern are Russia and China, with Russia acting in a dual capacity 

as weapons facilitator and the provider of choice for 

nuclear development in conjunction with Iran. China 

has served as both a market for goods from all of Latin 

America, as well as provider of billions of dollars in 

investments, loans, military sales, and advanced satellite services. 

In late September 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir 

Putin of Russia and Chávez announced joint plans to 

build nuclear plants in Venezuela. Atomstroyexport, 

the same company building the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, will be the project operator.122 In September 2009, Chávez announced that Venezuela and 

Iran would jointly build a nuclear village in Venezuela and pursue nuclear technology together.123 Ecuador 

and Russia also inked an agreement on civilian nuclear power cooperation and uranium exploration,124

and Russia has offered similar assistance to Bolivia. 

In 2009, Ecuador and Iran signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding to carry out joint mining activities and 

geological mapping.125

None of these agreements violate international 

sanctions, but the constellation of actors and the fervor with which the agreements have been embraced 

raise many questions. Given the opaque nature of the 

agreements, and the history of some of the principals 
63

involved in supporting the use of WMD to annihilate 

states viewed as the enemy (Israel and the United 

States), and flouting international regulatory regimes, 

it is both reasonable and prudent to approach these 

developments warily.

CONCLUSIONS

Latin America, while not generally viewed as 

part of the stateless regions phenomenon, or part of 

the failed state discussion, presents multiple threats 

that center on criminalized states, their hybrid alliance with extra-regional sponsors of terrorism, and 

nonstate TOC actors. The groups within this hybrid 

threat—often rivals, but willing to work in temporary 

alliances—are part of the recombinant criminal/terrorist pipeline, and their violence is often aimed at 

gaining control of specific territory or parts of that 

pipeline, either from state forces or other nonstate 

groups. 

In areas outside effective government control, the 

state is either absent or ineffective, contributing to the 

governance problem through corruption and negligence. Only Colombia has made significant progress 

in recouping internal space for the government, and 

that progress is fragile and in danger of being reversed.126 While the basic model of the pipeline holds 

up well, the emerging situation can be likened to new 

branches of the pipeline being built in regions where 

it previously had no access.

The combination of ungoverned spaces, criminalized states, and TOC groups poses a growing, dangerous, and immediate threat to the security of the United States. The traffic in drugs, weapons, and humans 

from Latin American northward relies on the same ba-
64

sic pipeline structures to move. The same recombinant 

chains also move bulk cash, stolen cars, and weapons 

from the United States southward. This demonstrates 

that these groups can successfully cross our border, 

and do, multiple times each day, in both directions. 

The pipelines are seldom disrupted for more than a 

minimal amount of time, in part because the critical 

human nodes in the chain, and key chokepoints in 

the pipelines, are not identified, and the relationships 

among the different actors and groups are not understood adequately. As noted, pipelines are adaptable 

and versatile as to product—the epitome of modern 

management systems—often intersecting with formal 

commercial institutions (banks, commodity exchanges, legitimate companies, etc.), both in a physical and 

virtual/cyber manner, in ways difficult to determine, 

collect intelligence on, or disaggregate from protected 

commercial activities which may be both domestic 

and international in nature, with built-in legal and secrecy protections.

While the situation is already critical, it is likely to 

get worse quickly. There is growing evidence of Russian and Chinese organized crime penetration of the 

region, particularly in Mexico and Central America, 

greatly strengthening the criminal organizations and 

allowing them to diversify their portfolios and supply routes—a particular example being precursor 

chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamines 

and cocaine. The Chinese efforts to acquire ports, resources, and intelligence-gathering capacity in the region demonstrate just how quickly the situation can 

develop, given that China was not a major player in 

the region 5 years ago. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese 

banks operating in the region all offer new ways to 

move money into unregulated channels that benefit 
65

both terrorist and criminal organizations, along with 

corrupt officials.

At the same time, there is strong evidence that 

states of the Bolivarian Axis, led by Venezuela and including Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, not only tolerate increased criminal activities in their territories, 

but also sponsor nonstate armed groups designated 

as terrorist entities by the United States, including the 

FARC in Colombia, and Hezbollah. These states appear to allow their stateless areas to be franchised out 

to these groups in order for the nonstate actors to both 

fund their activities and spread unrest throughout the 

region.

Of particular concern is the relationship of these 

Bolivarian states, which support nonstate actors in the 

hemisphere, with Iran, a state that has for many years 

funded, trained, and protected Hezbollah, one of the 

most effective and efficient nonstate (or quasi-state) 

terrorist actors in the world. The growing presence 

of Hezbollah in the Latin American drug trade—both 

directly and through its proxies in West Africa and 

Southern Eurasia—presents a new and important 

threat to U.S. security. 

The only thing the Bolivarian nations proclaiming 

“21st-century socialism” and the reactionary theocratic regime in Iran, have in common is a stated hatred 

for the United States and the desire to inflict damage 

on the nation they view as the “Evil Empire” or the 

“Great Satan.” This is a new type of alliance of secular (self-proclaimed socialist and Marxist) and radical 

Islamist organizations with a common goal directly 

aimed at challenging and undermining the security of 

the United States and its primary allies in the region 

(Colombia, Chile, Peru, Panama, and Guatemala). 

This represents a fundamental change because both 
66

primary state allies in the alliance (the governments of 

Venezuela and Iran) host and support nonstate actors, 

allowing the nonstate actors to thrive in ways that 

would be impossible without state protection.

Given this reality, it is imperative that U.S. intelligence community, military, and law enforcement 

agencies develop a much deeper and more nuanced 

understanding of how the criminalized state/TOC/

terrorist groups and foreign hostile state and nonstate 

foreign actors exploit the ungoverned or stateless 

spaces in areas of close proximity to U.S. borders—

and the dangers they represent both in their current 

configuration, and their future iterations. Understanding how these groups develop, and how they 

relate to each other and to groups from outside the 

region, is vital—particularly given the rapid pace with 

which they are expanding their control across the continent, across the hemisphere, and beyond. Developing a predictive capacity can be done based only on a 

more realistic understanding of the shifting networks 

of actors exploiting the pipelines; the nature and location of the geographic space in which they operate; 

the critical nodes where these groups are most vulnerable; and their behaviors in adapting to new political 

and economic developments, market opportunities 

and setbacks, internal competition, and the countering actions of governments. 

In turn, an effective strategy for combating TOC 

must rest on a solid foundation of regional intelligence 

which, while cognizant of the overarching transnational connections, remains sensitive to unique local realities behind seemingly ubiquitous behaviors. 

A one-size-fits-all policy will not suffice. It is not a 

problem that is only, or primarily, a matter of state 

or regional security, narcotics, money laundering, ter-
67

rorism, human smuggling, weakening governance, 

democracy reversal, trade and energy, counterfeiting 

and contraband, immigration and refugees, hostile 

states seeking advantage, or alterations in the military 

balance and alliances. It is increasingly a combination of all of these. It is a comprehensive threat that 

requires analysis and management within a comprehensive, integrated whole-of-government approach. 

At the same time, however expansive in global terms, 

a strategy based on geopolitics—the fundamental understanding of how human behavior relates to geographic space—must always be rooted in the local.

ENDNOTES

1. “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, the White 

House, July 25, 2011.

2. On the lower end, the United Nations (UN) Office of Drugs 

and Crime estimate transnational organized crime (TOC) earnings for 2009 at $2.1 trillion, or 3.6 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). Of that, typical TOC activities such as drug 

trafficking, counterfeiting, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, and oil smuggling, account for about $1 trillion or 1.5 percent of global GDP. For details, see “Estimating Illicit Financial 

Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational 

Organized Crimes,” Washington, DC: UN Office of Drugs and 

Crime, September 2011. On the higher end, in a speech to Interpol 

in Singapore in 2009, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Ogden cited 

15 percent of world GDP as total annual turnover of TOC. See 

Josh Meyer, “U.S. attorney general calls for global effort to fight 

organized crime,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2009, available 

from articles.latimes.com/print/2009/oct/13/nation/na-crime13.

3. This definition is adapted from the 1998 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and Protocols Thereto, 

UNODC, Vienna, Austria; and the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, available from www.whitehouse.gov/

administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/definition. 
68

4. The self-proclaimed “Bolivarian” states (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) take their name from Simón Bolivar, 

the revered 19th-century leader of South American independence 

from Spain. They espouse 21st-century socialism, a vague notion 

that is deeply hostile to free market reforms, to the United States 

as an imperial power, and toward traditional liberal democratic 

concepts, as will be described in detail.

5. One of the most detailed cases involved the 2001 weapons 

transfers among Hezbollah operatives in Liberia, a retired Israeli 

officer in Panama, and a Russian weapons merchant in Guatemala. A portion of the weapons, mostly AK-47 assault rifles, ended 

up with the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas 

Unidads de Colombia [AUC]), a designated terrorist organization 

heavily involved in cocaine trafficking. The rest of the weapons, 

including anti-tank systems and anti-aircraft weapons, likely ended up with Hezbollah. For details, see Douglas Farah, Blood From 

Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway 

Books, 2004.

6. For a detailed look at this development, see Antonio L. 

Mazzitelli, “The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10,” North Miami, FL: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, March 2011.

7. The FARC is the oldest insurgency in the Western hemisphere, launched in 1964 by Colombia’s Liberal Party militias, 

and enduring to the present as a self-described Marxist revolutionary movement. For a more detailed look at the history of the 

FARC, see Douglas Farah, “The FARC in Transition: The Fatal 

Weakening of the Western Hemisphere’s Oldest Guerrilla Movement,” NEFA Foundation, July 2, 2008, available from www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefafarc0708.pdf.

8. These include recently founded Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos 

y Caribeños [CELAC]), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 

of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra 

América [ALBA]).

9. James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assess-
69

ment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence,” January 31, 2012, p. 6.

10. For the most comprehensive look at Russian Organized 

Crime in Latin America, see Bruce Bagley, “Globalization, Ungoverned Spaces and Transnational Organized Crime in the Western 

Hemisphere: The Russian Mafia,” paper prepared for International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, March 2, 2005.

11. Ruth Morris, “China: Latin America Trade Jumps,” Latin 

American Business Chronicle, May 9, 2011, available from www.

latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=4893. 

12. Daniel Cancel, “China Lends Venezuela $20 Billion, Secures Oil Supply,” Bloomberg News Service, April 18, 2010. By 

the end of August 2011, Venezuela’s publicly acknowledged debt 

to China stood at some $36 billion, equal to the rest of its outstanding international debt. See Benedict Mander, “More Chinese 

Loans for Venezuela,” FT Blog, September 16, 2011, available 

from blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/09/16/more-chinese-loans-4bnworth-for-venezuela/#axzz1Z3km4bdg. 

13. “Quito y Buenos Aires, Ciudades preferidas para narcos 

nigerianos” (“Quito and Buenos Aires, Favorite Cities of Narco 

Nigerians”), El Universo Guayaquil, Ecuador, January 3, 2011.

14. Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, 

Corruption and Terrorism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XI, 

Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2005.

15. National Security Council, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to 

National Security,” Washington, DC: Office of the President, July 

2011. The Strategy grew out of a National Intelligence Estimate 

inititated by the Bush administration and completed in December 

2008, and is a comprehensive government review of transnational 

organized crime, the first since 1995.

16. “Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime,” Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, the White 

House, July 25, 2011.
70

17. Ibid.

18. Stewart Patrick, Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats 

and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2011.

19. The phrase “dangerous spaces” was used by Phil Williams 

to describe 21st-century security challenges in terms of spaces and 

gaps, including geographical, functional, social, economic, legal, 

and regulatory holes. See Phil Williams, “Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security,” Anne L. Clunan and 

Harold A. Trinkunas eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State 

Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2010, pp. 34-37.

20. For a more complete look at Transnistria and an excellent 

overview of the global illicit trade, see Misha Glenny, McMafia: A 

Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld, New York: Alfred 

A. Knopf, 2008.

21. For a complete look at the operations of Taylor, recently 

convicted in the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Hague for 

crimes against humanity, see Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: 

The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: Broadway Books, 

2004.

22. For a look at the weapons transfers, see “Los ‘rockets’ 

Venezolanos” Semana, Colombia, July 28, 2009. For a look at documented financial and logistical support of Chávez and Correa 

for the FARC, see “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador, and the 

Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes,’” An IISS Strategic Dossier, Washington, DC: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2011. 

To see FARC connections to Evo Morales, see Douglas Farah, 

“Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the MAS,” Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009.

23. Douglas Farah, “Iran in Latin America: Strategic Security 

Issues,” Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy 

Center, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems 

and Concept Office, May 2011.
71

24. Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, “Terrorist Black 

Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental 

Weakness,” The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael Centre for 

Strategic Studies, November 2005, p. 22.

25. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International 

Relations and the Third World, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Jackson defines negative sovereignty as freedom 

from outside interference, the ability of a sovereign state to act independently, both in its external relations and internally, towards 

its people. Positive sovereignty is the acquisition and enjoyment 

of capacities, not merely immunities. In Jackson’s definition, it 

presupposes “capabilities which enable governments to be their 

own masters” (p. 29). The absence of either type of sovereignty 

can lead to the collapse of or absence of state control.

26. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas eds., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened 

Sovereignty, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 19.

27. Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, New York: Anchor Books, 

2006, p. 33.

28. Robert Killebrew and Jennifer Bernal, “Crime Wars: 

Gangs, Cartels and U.S. National Security,” Washington, DC: 

Center for New American Security, September 2010, available 

from www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CrimeWars_

KillebrewBernal_3.pdf.

29. Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, March 2005.

30. As is true in much of Central America and Colombia, in 

Mexico there are centuries-old sanctuaries used by outlaws where 

the state had little authority. For a more complete explanation, 

see Gary Moore, “Mexico, the Un-failed State: A Geography 

Lesson,” InsightCrime, November 9, 2011, available from insightcrime.com/insight-latest-news/item/1820-mexico-the-un-failed-state-ageography-lesson. 
72

31. For a look at the factors that led to the rise of the Bolivarian leaders, see Eduardo Gamarra, “Bolivia on the Brink: Center 

for Preventative Action, Council on Foreign Relations, February 

2007; Cynthia J. Arnson et al., La Nueva Izquierda en América Latina: 

Derechos Humanos, Participación Política y Sociedad Civil (The New 

Left in Latin America: Human Rights, Political Participation and Civil 

Society), Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, January 2009; Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia 

Under Evo Morales and the MAS”; Farah and Simpson.

32. See “Iran to Help Bolivia Build Peaceful Nuclear Power 

Plant,” Xinhua, October 31, 2010; Russia Izvestia Information, 

September 30, 2008; and Agence France Presse, “Venezuela Wants 

to Work With Russia on Nuclear Energy: Chávez,” September 29, 

2008.

33. Author interview with IAEA member in November, 2011. 

The official said the agency had found that Iran possessed enough 

uranium stockpiled to last a decade. Moreover, he said the evidence pointed to acquisition of minerals useful in missile production. He also stressed that dual-use technologies or items specifically used in the nuclear program had often been shipped to Iran 

as automotive or tractor parts. Some of the principal investments 

Iran has made in the Bolivarian states have been in a tractor factory that is barely operational, a bicycle factory that does not seem 

to produce bicycles, and automotive factories that have yet to be 

built.

34. “Venezuela/Iran ALBA Resolved to Continue Economic 

Ties with Iran,” Financial Times Information Service, July 15, 2010.

35. Manwaring.

36. These typologies were developed and discussed more 

completely, including the national security implications of their 

growth, in Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,” USAF 

Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 57, September 2004.
73

37. Louise I. Shelley, John T. Picarelli et al., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime and 

International Terrorism, Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 

September 2005.

38. Ibid., p. 5.

39. While much of Operation TITAN remains classified, there 

has been significant open source reporting, in part because the 

Colombian government announced the most important arrests. 

For the most complete look at the case, see Jo Becker, “Investigation into bank reveals links to major South American cartels,” 

International Herald Tribune, December 15, 2011. See also Chris 

Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Colombian Cocaine Ring Linked to 

Hezbollah,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2008; and “Por Lavar 

Activos de Narcos y Paramilitares, Capturados Integrantes de Organización Internatcional” (“Members of an International Organization Captured for Laundering Money for Narcos and Paramilitaries”), Fiscalía General de la Republica (Colombia) (Attorney 

General’s Office of Colombia), October 21, 2008.

40. Among the reasons for the increase in cocaine trafficking 

to Western Europe is the price. While the cost of a kilo of cocaine 

averages about $17,000 in the United States, it is $37,000 in the 

EU. Shipping via Africa is relatively inexpensive and relatively 

attractive, given the enhanced interdiction efforts in Mexico and 

the Caribbean. See Antonio Mazzitelli, “The Drug Trade: Africa’s 

Expanding Role,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 

presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International 

Scholars, May 28, 2009.

41. Benjamin Weiser and William K. Rashbaum, “Liberian Officials Worked with U.S. Agency to Block Drug Traffic,” New York 

Times, June 2, 2010.

42. For a history of AQIM, see “Algerian Group Backs al 

Qaeda,” BBC News, October 23, 2003, available from news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/africa/3207363.stm. For an understanding of the relationship among the different ethnic groups, particularly the Tuareg, 

and AQIM, see Terrorism Monitor, “Tuareg Rebels Joining Fight 

Against AQIM?” Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 8, Issue 40, November 4, 2010.
74

43. Evan Perez, “U.S. Accuses Iran in Plot: Two Charged in 

Alleged Conspiracy to Enlist Drug Cartel to Kill Saudi Ambassador,” The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2011.

44. “La Amenaza Iraní” (“The Iranian Threat”), Univision 

Documentales, aired December 8, 2011.

45. Sebastian Rotella, “Government says Hezbollah Profits 

From U.S. Cocaine Market via Link to Mexican Cartel,” ProPublica, December 11, 2011.

46. For an examination of the “cultures of contraband” and 

their implications in the region, see Rebecca B. Galemba, “Cultures 

of Contraband: Contesting the Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala 

Border,” Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University Department of Anthropology, May 2009. For a look at the use of traditional smuggling routes in TOC structures in Central America, see Douglas Farah, “Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New 

Trends and Lessons From Colombia,” North Miami, FL: Western 

Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, August 2011.

47. For a more complete look at that conflict and other conflicts over plazas, see Samuel Logan and John P. Sullivan, “The 

Gulf-Zeta Split and the Praetroian Revolt,” International Relations 

and Security Network, April 7, 2010, available from www.isn.ethz.

ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-b3db-1461-

98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=114551.

48. Mazzitelli.

49. “Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa,” 

New York: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2008.

50. For a look at the chaos in Guinea Bissau, see “GuineaBissau president shot dead,” BBC News, March 2, 2009, available 

from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7918061.stm. 

51. Patrick.

52. See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” Failure and 
75

State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 2003.

53. Rotberg.

54. Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, “Terrorist Black 

Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental 

Weakness,” The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael Centre for 

Strategic Studies, November 2005, p. 26.

55. “The Failed States Index 2009,” Foreign Policy Magazine, 

July/August 2009, pp. 80-93, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_

rankings.

56. Julio A. Cirino et al., “Latin America’s Lawless Areas and 

Failed States,” in Paul D. Taylor, ed., Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, Newport, RI: 

Naval War College, Newport Papers 21, 2004. Commercial insurgencies are defined as engaging in “for-profit organized crime 

without a predominate political agenda,” leaving unclear how 

that differs from groups defined as organized criminal organizations.

57. For details of Taylor’s activities, see Douglas Farah, Blood 

From Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, New York: 

Broadway Books, 2004.

58. Hannah Stone, “The Comeback of Suriname’s ‘NarcoPresident’,” Insightcrime.org, Mar 4, 2011, available from insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/865-the-comeback-of-surinamesnarco-president. 

59. Simon Romero, “Returned to Power, a Leader Celebrates a 

Checkered Past,” The New York Times, May 2, 2011.

60. “Wikileaks: Chávez funded Bouterse,” The Nation (Barbados), February 2, 2011.

61. Harmen Boerboom, “Absence of Chávez a blessing for Suriname,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, August 12, 2010.
76

62. For a look at the Zetas in Guatemala, see Steven Dudley, 

“The Zetas in Guatemala,” InSight Crime, September 8, 2011. For a 

look at Los Perrones in El Salvador, see Douglas Farah, “Organized 

Crime in El Salvador: Homegrown and Transnational Dimensions,” Organized Crime in Central America: The Northern Triangle, 

Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas #29, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 

November 2011, pp. 104-139, available from www.wilsoncenter.org/

sites/default/files/LAP_single_page.pdf.

63. Louise Shelley, “The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, 

Corruption and Terrorism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XI, 

Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2005, p. 101.

64. See Bill Lahneman and Matt Lewis, “Summary of Proceedings: Organized Crime and the Corruption of State Institutions,” 

College Park, MD: University of Maryland, November 18, 2002, 

available from www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/organizedcrime.pdf.

65. Author interviews with Drug Enforcement Administration and National Security Council officials; for example, two 

aircraft carrying more than 500 kgs of cocaine were stopped in 

Guinea Bissau after arriving from Venezuela. See “Bissau Police 

Seize Venezuelan cocaine smuggling planes,” Agence France 

Presse, July 19, 2008.

66. “FARC Terrorist Indicted for 2003 Grenade Attack 

on Americans in Colombia,” Department of Justice Press Release, September 7, 2004. available from www.usdoj.gov/opa/

pr/2004/September/04_crm_599.htm; and Official Journal of the 

European Union, Council Decision of December 21, 2005, 

available from eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_340/l_

34020051223en00640066.pdf.

67. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’,” Washington, DC: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies,” May 2011.

68. The strongest documentary evidence of Chávez’s support 

for the FARC comes from the Reyes documents, which contained 

the internal communications of senior FARC commanders with 

senior Venezuelan officials. These documents discuss everything 
77

from security arrangements in hostage exchanges to the possibility of joint training exercises and the purchasing of weapons. For 

full details of these documents and their interpretation, see Ibid.

69. “Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Support of the FARC,” Washington, DC: U.S. Treasury Department, 

Office of Public Affairs, September 12, 2008. The designations 

came on the heels of the decision of the Bolivian government of 

Evo Morales to expel the U.S. ambassador, allegedly for supporting armed movements against the Morales government. In solidarity, Chávez then expelled the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela. 

In addition to the citations of the Venezuelan officials, the United 

States also expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian ambassadors to 

Washington.

70. “Chávez Shores up Military Support,” Stratfor, November 

12, 2010. 

71. “Venezuela: Asume Nuevo Ministro De Defensa Acusado 

de Narco por EEUU” (“Venezuela: New Minister Accused by the 

United States of Drug Trafficking Takes Office”), Agence France 

Presse, January 17, 2012.

72. Robert M. Morgenthau, “The Link Between Iran and Venezuela: A Crisis in the Making,” speech at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, September 8, 2009.

73. Colombia, Venezuela: Another Round of Diplomatic Furor,” Strafor, July 29, 2010.

74. The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.”

75. The Colombian decision to extradite Makled to Venezuela rather than the United States caused significant tension between the two countries and probably means that the bulk of 

the evidence he claims to possess will never see the light of day. 

Among the documents he presented in prison were his checks 

cashed by senior generals and government officials and videos 

of what appear to be senior government officials in his home discussing cash transactions. For details of the case, see José de Córdoba and Darcy Crowe, “U.S. Losing Big Drug Catch,” The Wall 
78

Street Journal, April 1, 2011; “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces 

Indictment of one of World’s Most Significant Narcotics 

Kingpins,” United States Attorney, Southern District of New 

York, November 4, 2010. 

76. “Makled: Tengo suficientes pruebas sobre corrupción y 

narcotráfico para que intervengan a Venezuela” (“Makled: I have 

Enough Evidence of Corruption and Drug Trafficking to justify an 

invasion of Venezuela”), NTN24 TV (Colombia), April 11, 2011.

77. For a more comprehensive look at the history of the 

FARC; its relations with Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador; and 

its involvement in drug trafficking, see “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’”; Douglas Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and the 

MAS,” Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy 

Center, June 2009; Douglas Farah and Glenn Simpson, “Ecuador 

at Risk: Drugs, Thugs, Guerrillas and the ‘Citizens’ Revolution,” 

Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 

January 2010. 

78. Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and 

the MAS.” 

79. Martin Arostegui, “Smuggling Scandal Shakes Bolivia,” 

The Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2011.

80. Farah, “Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo Morales and 

the MAS.”

81. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Secret Archives of ‘Raul Reyes’’’; Farah and Simpson; and Francisco Huerta Montalvo et al., “Informe Comisión de Transparencia y Verdad: 

Caso Angostura” (“Report of the Commission on Transparency 

and Truth: The Angostura Case”), December 10, 2009, available 

from www.scribd.com/doc/24329223/informe-angostura.

82. Farah and Simpson.

83. For details of the relationships among these officials 

the president’s sister, and the Ostaiza brothers, see Farah and 

Simpson. 
79

84. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.” 

85. See, for example, Farah and Simpson; Huerta Montalvo; 

Arturo Torres, Juego del Camaleón: Los secretos de Angostura (The 

Chameleon’s Game: The Secrets of Angostura), 2009.

86. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.” 

87. Farah, “Into the Abyss.”

88. Eugene Roxas, “Spiritual Guide who gave Evo Baton 

caught with 350 kilos of liquid cocaine,” The Achacachi Post (Bolivia), July 28, 2010.

89. “Panama arrests Bolivia ex-drugs police chief Sanabria,” 

BBC News, February 26, 2011.

90. “Las FARC Buscaron el Respaldo de Boliva Para Lograr 

Su Expansión” (“The FARC Looked for Bolivian Support in Order 

to Expand”).

91. The MAS is the coalition of indigenous and coca growing 

organizations that propelled Morales to his electoral victory. The 

movement, closely aligned with Chávez and funded by the Venezuelan government, has defined itself as Marxist, socialist, and 

anti-imperilist.

92. It is interesting to note that Peredo’s brothers Roberto (aka 

Coco) and Guido (aka Inti) were the Bolivian contacts of Che Guevara, and died in combat with him. The two are buried with Guevara in Santa Clara, Cuba.

93. A copy of the founding manifesto of the EMP and its adherents is available from bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/osal/

osal10/documentos.pdf.

94. Prensa Latina, “President Boliviano Anunica Creación de 

Estado Mayor Popular” (“Bolivian President Announces the Formation of a People’s High Command”), February 2, 2006.
80

95. “Estado Mayor del Pueblo Convoca a Defender Al Gobierno de Evo” (“People’s High Command Calls for the Defense of 

Evo’s Government”), Agencia Boliviana de Informacion, April 17, 

2006, available from www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2006041721.

96. The situation has changed dramatically with the election 

of Juan Manuel Santos as President of Colombia in 2010. Despite 

serving as Uribe’s defense minister during the most successful 

operations against the FARC and developing a deeply antagonistic relationship with Chávez in that capacity, relations between 

Santos and the Bolivarian heads of state have been surprisingly 

cordial since he took office. This is due in part to Santos’ agreeing 

to turn over copies of the Reyes hard drives to Correa, and his expressed desire to normalize relations with Chávez. A particularly 

sensitive concession was allowing the extradition of Walid Makled, a designated drug kingpin by the United States, to be extradited to Venezuela rather than to stand trial in the United States. 

97. “The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archives of ‘Raúl Reyes’.” 

98. March 11, 2005, e-mail from Iván Ríos to Raúl Reyes, provided by Colombia officials, in possession of the author.

99. April 1, 2006, e-mail from Raúl Reyes to Aleyda, provided 

by Colombia officials, in possession of the author.

100. Following Ortega’s disputed electoral triumph in November 2011, the FARC published a congratulatory communiqué 

lauding Ortega and recalling their historically close relationship. 

“In this moment of triumph how can we fail to recall that memorable scene in Caguán when you gave the Augusto Cesar Sandino medal to our unforgettable leader Manuel Marulanda. We 

have always carried pride in our chests for that deep honor which 

speaks to us of the broad vision of a man who considers himself 

to be a spiritual son of Bolivar.” Available from anncol.info/index.

php?option=com_content&view=article&id=695:saludo-a-daniel-orteg

a&catid=71:movies&Itemid=589. 

101. Reyes was killed a few days after the CCB assembly 

when the Colombian military bombed his camp, which was in Ecuadoran territory. The bombing of La Angostura caused a severe 
81

diplomatic rift between Colombia and Ecuador, but the raid also 

yielded several hundred gigabytes of data from the computers 

Reyes kept in the camp, where he lived in a hardened structure 

and had been stationary for several months. 

102. Farah and Simpson.

103. “U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has 

Declined,” Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 

July 2009, GAO-09-806.

104. Ibid., p. 12.

105. For a more detailed look at this debate, see Iran in Latin 

America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance? in which the author has a 

chapter arguing for the view that Iran is a significant threat.

106. “‘Jackal’ book praises bin Laden,” BBC News, June 26, 

2003.

107. See, for example, Associated Press, “Chávez: ‘Carlos the 

Jackal’ a ‘Good Friend’,” June 3, 2006.

108. Raúl Reyes (trans.) and Hugo Chávez, “My Struggle,” 

from a March 23, 1999, letter to Illich Ramirez Sánchez, the 

Venezuelan terrorist known as “Carlos the Jackal,” from Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, in response to a previous letter from Ramirez, who is serving a life sentence in France for 

murder. Harper’s, October 1999, available from harpers.org/

archive/1999/10/0060674. 

109. In addition to Operation TITAN, there have been numerous incidents in the past 18 months in which operatives being 

directly linked to Hezbollah have been identified or arrested in 

Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Aruba, and elsewhere in Latin 

America.

110. Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish 

parents, began his political career on the far right of the Spanish 

political spectrum as a disciple of Manuel Fraga, and served in a 

national and several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. 

By his own admission he then migrated to the Socialist Party, but 
82

never rose through the ranks. He is widely associated with radical 

anti-globalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating 

that the United States is creating a new global empire and must be 

defeated. Although he has no military training or experience, he 

has written extensively on asymmetrical warfare.

111. Verstrynge., pp. 56-57. 

112. Bartolomé. See also John Sweeny, “Jorge Verstrynge: 

The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,” September 9, 2005 

available from www.vcrisis.com; and “Troops Get Provocative 

Book,” Miami Herald, November 11, 2005.

113. “Turkey holds suspicious Iran-Venezuela shipment,” 

Associated Press, June 1, 2009, available from www.ynetnews.com/

articles/0,7340,L-3651706,00.html. 

114. For a fuller examination of the use of websites, see Douglas Farah, “Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin 

America,” North Miami, FL: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International University, September 2011.

115. “Hispan TV begins with ‘Saint Mary’,” Tehran Times, 

December 23, 2011, available from www.tehrantimes.com/arts-andculture/93793-hispan-tv-begins-with-saint-mary.

116. For a more complete look at Iran’s presence in Latin 

America, see Douglas Farah, “Iran in Latin America: An Overview,” Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center 

for Scholars, Summer 2009 (to be published as a chapter in Iran in 

Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance? Cynthia J. Arnson et al., 

eds., 2010. For a look at the anomalies in the economic relations, 

see also Farah and Simpson.

117. “Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,” Washington, DC: United States Department of Treasury Press Center, June 

18, 2008, available from www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1036.aspx. 

118. Orlando Cuales, “17 arrested in Curacao on suspicion of 

drug trafficking links with Hezbollah,” Associated Press, April 

29, 2009.
83

119. United States District Court, Southern District of New 

York, The United States of America v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, 

July 6, 2009.

120. For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks 

function as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Development Bank of Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran’s 

nuclear program, and the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see 

Farah and Simpson.

121. Office of the Spokesman, “Seven Companies Sanctioned 

Under Amended Iran Sanctions Act,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2011, available from www.state.gov/r/

pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164132.htm. 

122. Russia Izvestia Information, September 30, 2008, and 

Agence France Presse, “Venezuela Wants to Work With Russia 

on Nuclear Energy: Chávez,” September 29, 2008.

123. Simon Romero, “Venezuela Says Iran is Helping it Look 

for Uranium,” New York Times, September 25, 2009.

124. Nikolai Spassky, “Russia, Ecuador strike deal on nuclear 

power cooperation,” RIA Novosti, August 21, 2009.

125. José R. Cárdenas, “Iran’s Man in Ecuador,” Foreign Policy, February 15, 2011, available from shadow.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2011/02/15/irans_man_in_ecuador. 

126. The primary problem has been the inability of the Colombian government to deliver promised services and infrastructure 

after the military has cleared the area. See John Otis, “Decades 

of Work but No Land Titles to Show for It,” GlobalPost, November 30, 2009. For a more complete look at the challenges posed by 

the reemergence and adaptability of armed groups, see Fundación

Arco Iris, Informe 2009: El Declive de la Seguridad Democratica? (Report 2009: The Decline of Democratic Security?), available from www.

nuevoarcoiris.org.co/sac/?q=node/605.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Mr. Douglas Farah

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil