COUNTERING 

VIOLENT 

EXTREMISM

Additional Actions 

Could Strengthen 

Training Efforts

Report to the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

United States Senate 

October 2012

GAO-13-79

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 United States Government Accountability Office 

 

Highlights of GAO-13-79, a report to 

 the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, United States Senate 

October 2012 

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 

Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training 

Efforts 

Why GAO Did This Study 

DHS and DOJ have responsibility for 

training state and local law 

enforcement and community members 

on how to defend against violent 

extremism—ideologically motivated 

violence to further political goals. 

Community members and advocacy 

organizations have raised concerns 

about the quality of some CVE-related 

training that DOJ and DHS provide or 

fund. As requested, GAO examined (1) 

the extent to which DHS and DOJ have 

identified and communicated topics 

that CVE-related training should 

address to their components and state 

and local partners, (2) any concerns 

raised by state and local partners who 

have participated in CVE-related 

training provided or funded by DHS or 

DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ 

have taken to improve the quality of 

CVE-related training. GAO reviewed 

relevant documents, such as training 

participant feedback forms and DHS 

and DOJ guidance; and interviewed 

relevant officials from DHS and DOJ 

components. This is a public version of 

a sensitive report that GAO issued in 

September 2012. Information that the 

FBI deemed sensitive has been 

redacted. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO recommends that DOJ identify 

and communicate principal CVErelated training topics and that FBI field 

offices and USAOs consider soliciting 

feedback more consistently. DOJ 

agreed that it should more consistently 

solicit feedback, but disagreed that it 

should identify CVE training topics 

because DOJ does not have primary 

responsibility for CVE-related training, 

among other things. GAO believes this 

recommendation remains valid as 

discussed further in this report. 

What GAO Found 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to 

its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering 

violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its 

CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS’s CVE efforts, 

identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS’s CVE-related 

training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically 

identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand 

internally which of the department’s training is CVE-related and contributes either 

directly or indirectly to the department’s training responsibilities under the CVE 

national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally 

relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to 

determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has 

not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in 

determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ’s 

responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated 

in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality 

stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training 

because agencies’ views differed as to what CVE-related training includes. 

The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ 

provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, 

but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive 

material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in 

CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77—less than 1 

percent—provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and 

DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. 

DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit 

feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this 

for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not 

consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ’s United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) 

do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field 

offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all 

participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through 

these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs 

chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that 

agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain 

accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less 

formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their 

quality. 

DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the 

quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy 

Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their 

training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with 

DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best 

practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the 

funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the 

departments’ reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are 

relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness. 

View GAO-13-79. For more information, 

contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or 

larencee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Letter 1 

Background 5

DHS Has Identified CVE-Related Training Topics but DOJ Has Not, 

Making It Difficult for DOJ to Demonstrate How It Is Meeting Its 

CVE Responsibilities 9

Few Participants Raised Concerns about DHS and DOJ CVERelated Training, but the FBI and USAOs Could Help Ensure 

Quality of Training by More Consistently Soliciting Feedback 16

DOJ Has Undertaken Reviews and DHS and DOJ Have Developed 

Guidance to Improve Training Quality 25

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix II CVE-Related Training the Departments of Homeland Security 

and Justice Are Developing 43

Appendix III CVE-Related Training Provided or Funded during Fiscal Years 

2010 and 2011 46

Appendix IV Types of Concerns Raised about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training 57

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 58

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Justice 60

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 64

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Tables

Table 1: Primary Federal Departments, Agencies, and Components 

to Which the Implementation Plan for the CVE National 

Strategy Assigns CVE-Related Responsibilities 7

Table 2: Concerns Raised in Letters Submitted to DHS and DOJ 

during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Regarding CVE-Related 

Training and Agency Perspectives 24

Table 3: Components and Offices Interviewed 35

Table 4: CVE-Related Training FBI Provided to State and Local 

Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 48

Table 5: CVE-Related Training CRS Provided to State and Local 

Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 51

Table 6: CVE-Related Training USAOs Provided to State and Local 

Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 52

Table 7: CVE-Related Training DHS Provided to State and Local 

Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 54

Table 8: CVE-Related Training That the SLATT Program Provided 

in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 56

Table 9: Types of Concerns State and Local Participants Raised 

about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training That Occurred 

during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 57

Figure

Figure 1: DHS and DOJ Components and Programs That Provided 

CVE-Related Training during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 18
Page iii GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Abbreviations

ATAC Antiterrorism Advisory Council

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

COPS Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

CPD Community Policing Development

CREST Community Relations Executive Seminar Training

CRS Community Relations Service

CVE countering violent extremism

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

EOUSA Executive Office for United States Attorneys

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council

HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program

HVEB Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

JAG Justice Assistance Grant 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

MCC Major Cities Chiefs Association 

NCAP National Consortium for Advanced Policing 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NJTTF National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

S&T Science and Technology Directorate

SLATT State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program

USAO United States Attorney’s Office

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

October 18, 2012

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman

Chairman

The Honorable Susan Collins

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

State and local law enforcement and homeland security officials, in 

partnership with local community members, are the first line of defense 

against the evolving threat posed by violent extremism—ideologically 

motivated violence to further political goals.1 In recent history, the United 

States has faced violent extremist plots by neo-Nazis and other antiSemitic hate groups, racial supremacists, and international and domestic 

terrorist groups. These events included the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood in 

Texas, the 2010 attempted bombing at Times Square in New York City, 

and the 2011 attempt by a white supremacist to injure participants of a 

Martin Luther King, Jr., Day parade with an explosive device in the state 

of Washington. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, al Qaeda 

and its affiliates and adherents, as well as other extremists, have inspired 

or directed an expanded range of plots and attacks in the United States. 

For example, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism, using open sources, developed a database with 

information on 210 violent Islamic extremists known to have radicalized in 

North America from 1989 through 2011 to the point of supporting 

violence. Of these individuals, 80 percent began their radicalization after 

the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Global War on 

Terrorism.2

 

1

See White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 

United States, (Washington, D.C: August 2011), for a definition of “violent extremism.”

The United States government identifies al Qaeda as the 

preeminent terrorist threat to the country, and the Executive Office of the 

President has emphasized that the prevalence of particular violent 

extremist ideologies changes over time and new threats will undoubtedly 

2

University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 

Terrorism, Profiles of Islamic Radicalization in North America Database (College Park, 

MD: 2010-2011). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

arise in the future. Accordingly, the United States government must 

ensure that its approach to countering violent extremism (CVE) is flexible 

enough to address a variety of current and possible future threats, 

whether they are posed by al Qaeda or other groups.

Given the critical role state and local law enforcement officers play in 

CVE, it is important that they receive high-quality CVE-related training. 

The Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) have 

responsibility for executing several programs and activities related to 

CVE, some of which include providing or funding CVE-related training for 

state and local law enforcement officers or community members who 

partner with law enforcement. However, some community members and 

advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of CVErelated training, including training that DHS and DOJ provide or fund. In 

particular, letters that individuals and advocacy organizations submitted to 

DHS and DOJ have indicated anecdotally that some of the individuals 

who provide training to state and local law enforcement agencies and 

community members misunderstand the ideology of violent Islamist 

extremism and cast aspersions on the vast majority of Muslim Americans 

who pose no threat to the United States. According to the implementation 

plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 

United States (CVE national strategy), the instances of federally 

sponsored or funded CVE and counterterrorism training that used 

offensive and inaccurate information underscored a need to improve 

CVE-related training and develop standards for such training. Further, 

according to the CVE national strategy, misinformation about the threat 

and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm security by sending 

local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating 

tensions with potential community partners.

You requested that we assess DHS and DOJ efforts to ensure the quality 

of violent extremism training that the departments provide or fund for 

state and local partners. Specifically, we addressed the following 

questions:

• To what extent have DHS and DOJ identified and communicated 

topics that CVE-related training addresses to their components and 

state and local partners?

• What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners 

who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by 

DHS and DOJ?

• What actions, if any, have DHS and DOJ taken to improve the quality 

of CVE-related training?
 

Page 3 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 

provided to you. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) determined 

that some of the information in the prior report was For Official Use Only 

and Law Enforcement Sensitive, which must be protected from public 

disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about CVErelated training that the FBI provided, including associated costs, and the 

results of a review that the FBI undertook to assess the quality of its 

counterterrorism training materials, some of which included CVE-related 

content. Although the information provided in this report is more limited in 

scope, it addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the 

overall methodology used for both reports is the same.

To address our objectives, we met with DHS and DOJ officials to 

determine how the departments define and communicate CVE-related 

training topics, and which departmental training programs were relevant 

to our review. We analyzed this information to assess the extent to which 

the departments’ efforts allow them to demonstrate fulfillment of their 

CVE-related training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. 

During these initial interviews, DHS and DOJ officials expressed difficulty 

in responding to our request for CVE-related training materials, in part 

because agency officials were not clear on which training should be 

considered CVE-related. Therefore, for the purposes of this review, we 

developed a framework for what constitutes CVE-related training. This 

framework identifies three distinct content areas CVE-related training 

likely addresses: (1) radicalization, (2) cultural competency, and (3) 

community engagement. We discuss these content areas in greater detail 

later in this report. We solicited feedback on this framework from DHS 

and DOJ. DHS officials generally agreed with the content areas we 

identified, and we incorporated feedback DHS provided, as appropriate. 

DOJ officials stated that they view the framework as reasonable for the 

purpose of our review. We focused generally on training provided in fiscal 

years 2010 and 2011 because “countering violent extremism” is a 

relatively nascent term. In addition, we focused on training provided to 

state and local entities because the CVE national strategy identifies CVErelated training for these entities as a major component of the national 

CVE approach.

For the purpose of this review, we considered training to include 

instruction, presentations, or briefings. We asked DHS and DOJ 

components to identify CVE-related offices and programs that would be 

appropriate to include in the scope of our review utilizing the framework 

for CVE-related training that we developed. We also asked DHS and DOJ 

to identify and provide all materials for any training that DHS and DOJ 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

provided or funded through grant programs for state and local entities, 

including law enforcement officers and community members, that 

agencies assumed to be CVE-related based on our framework. We 

considered the training to be CVE-related if all or a portion of it addressed 

one or more of the three content areas.3 For training that we determined 

was CVE-related, we requested information on the approximate number 

and type of participants that attended each training and the estimated 

cost of providing the training.4 In addition, in July 2012, GAO conducted a 

web-based survey of training points of contact within 51 state 

administrative agencies regarding the clarity of guidance DHS provides to 

recipients of grant funds that can be used for CVE-related training.5

To obtain participant perspectives about CVE-related training, two 

analysts independently reviewed 8,424 evaluations completed by 

participants of six DHS and DOJ training programs that were CVE-related 

according to our framework to identify and categorize any complaints or 

concerns about this training. To identify complaints or concerns that were

submitted to the agencies outside of course evaluations, we asked DHS 

and DOJ to identify concerns that were submitted to them in writing, 

conducted keyword searches of LexisNexis and Google, and interviewed 

representatives, including leaders, of advocacy groups that raised the 

concerns we identified through our searches. We also interviewed DHS 

and DOJ officials who oversee these training programs to obtain their 

Of 

the 51 state administrative agencies to which we sent a survey, 30 

responded for an overall response rate of 59 percent. On the basis of a 

comparison of the geographic regions and state populations of state 

administrative agencies that did and did not respond to our survey, we 

concluded that the experiences of state administrative agencies from 

some of the larger states may not be captured in our survey results. 

Nevertheless, the survey results provide insight into the level of clarity 

about DHS CVE guidance among grantees.

 

3

We refer to training we identified to address one or more of these three content areas as 

“CVE-related” throughout this report. In addition, whether the training was specifically 

developed for CVE purposes or if the training was primarily developed for another purpose 

but addresses at least one of the CVE content areas, we refer to it as “CVE-related.”

4

The cost of providing some of the training is law enforcement sensitive and not included 

in this report.

5

The state administrative agencies that we surveyed are responsible for managing DHS 

grant awards to states and the District of Columbia and ensuring that grant recipients 

comply with grant requirements.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

perspectives on any concerns or complaints that were raised about the 

CVE-related training and to learn about any actions agencies took in 

response to these incidents.

To address what actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the overall 

quality of CVE-related training, we reviewed relevant documents, 

including recently released guidance and best practices for training that 

DHS, DOJ, and the FBI developed. We also analyzed the 

counterterrorism training materials that were CVE-related according to 

our framework that the FBI determined were inappropriate as a result of 

its internal review, which the FBI undertook to identify and purge 

potentially objectionable training materials. This analysis enabled us to 

better understand the review results with regard to training materials that 

were CVE-related according to our framework, and provided context for 

the quality assurance steps the FBI has taken in response to the review. 

The FBI considers the methodology it used to conduct its internal review 

and our analysis of the training materials that the FBI considered 

objectionable to be For Official Use Only; therefore, we did not include 

that information in this report. In addition, we interviewed DHS and DOJ 

officials and inquired about guidance agencies adhere to when vetting or 

reviewing training materials and instructors, as well as other actions they 

have taken to ensure CVE-related training quality. Appendix I contains 

additional details on our scope and methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 through October

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The past decade has seen an increasing emphasis in the United States 

on the role of state and local entities in the fight against violent 

extremism. More recently, in August 2011, the White House issued the 

nation’s first CVE strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 

Extremism in the United States, and in December 2011, it issued an 

Background
 

Page 6 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

implementation plan for the CVE national strategy.6 The strategy 

leverages existing programs and structures in order to counter 

radicalization that leads to violence, rather than creating new programs 

and funding streams.7 The strategy highlights three major areas of 

activity: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities 

that violent extremists may target, (2) building government and law 

enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3) 

countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting U.S. ideals. The 

strategy also identifies the provision of training to federal, state, and local 

entities as a major component of the national CVE approach, and the 

implementation plan notes that the federal government will enhance CVErelated training offered to federal, state, and local agencies. The 

implementation plan states that this is necessary because of “a small 

number of instances of federally-sponsored or funded CVE and 

counterterrorism training that used offensive and inaccurate information.”8

The implementation plan designates federal departments, agencies, and 

components as leaders and partners regarding certain aspects of CVE, 

and DHS and DOJ have principal roles in implementing the CVE national 

strategy. Table 1 identifies the primary federal departments and agencies 

Accordingly, one of the objectives of the implementation plan is to 

improve the development and use of standardized training with rigorous 

curricula that imparts information about violent extremism, improves 

cultural competency, and conveys best practices and lessons for effective 

community engagement and partnerships.

 

6

The White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 

United States, (Washington, D.C.: August 2011); and the White House, Strategic 

Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 

United States, (Washington, D.C: December 2011).

7

One such program is the Building Communities of Trust Initiative. Established by DOJ 

and DHS, this initiative is intended to improve trust among local police, fusion centers, and 

the communities they serve in order to address the challenges of crime and terrorism 

prevention. A fusion center is generally a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 

provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing 

their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 

See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing 

and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and 

Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels—Law Enforcement 

Intelligence, Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006).

8

The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 

Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 15. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

with CVE-related responsibilities and their respective missions. Other 

agencies involved in implementing the strategy include the Departments 

of the Treasury, Education, and Commerce, among others.

Table 1: Primary Federal Departments, Agencies, and Components to Which the Implementation Plan for the CVE National 

Strategy Assigns CVE-Related Responsibilities 

Department/ 

agency

Implementing 

component Component mission

Examples of CVE activities described in the 

implementation plan

DHS Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil 

Liberties

• Advise DHS leadership, personnel, and 

partners about civil rights and civil liberties 

issues. 

• Communicate with individuals and 

communities whose civil rights and civil 

liberties may be affected by DHS activities, 

informing these entities about policies and 

avenues of redress, and promoting 

appropriate attention within DHS to these 

entities’ experiences and concerns. 

• Investigate and resolve civil rights and civil 

liberties complaints filed by the public.

• Conduct outreach to communities and 

quarterly engagement roundtables that 

include CVE-related topics

• Implement a campus youth community 

engagement plan intended to engage 

young adults on the topic of violent 

extremism

• Train law enforcement officials on CVE and 

cultural issues

Office of 

Intelligence and 

Analysis (I&A)

• Equip the Homeland Security Enterprise 

with the intelligence and information it 

needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, 

and resilient.

• Assess the capacity of state correctional 

institutions to detect and share information 

regarding individuals who demonstrate 

behaviors associated with violent extremism while in the correctional system

a

Federal 

Emergency 

Management 

Agency (FEMA)

• Provide assistance, training support, and 

leadership to help federal, state, tribal, and 

local governments and the private sector 

build the operational capabilities needed to 

successfully implement preparedness 

strategies. 

• Administer grants to fund training 

concerning CVE

• Leverage existing mechanisms to hold 

grantees and subgrantees accountable for 

training related to CVE that they pay for 

using DHS grant funds

Science and 

Technology

Directorate (S&T) 

• Strengthen America’s security and 

resiliency by providing knowledge products 

and innovative technology solutions for the 

Homeland Security Enterprise.

• Support research on CVE

b

Office of Policy • Strengthen homeland security by 

developing and integrating DHS-wide 

policies, planning, and programs in order to 

better coordinate the department’s 

prevention, protection, response, and 

recovery missions.

• Establish a Faith-Based Community 

Information Sharing Working Group to 

determine how DHS can (1) better share 

information with faith communities and (2) 

support the development of faith-based 

community information-sharing networks
 

Page 8 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Department/ 

agency

Implementing 

component Component mission

Examples of CVE activities described in the 

implementation plan

DOJ FBI • Protect and defend the United States 

against terrorist and foreign intelligence 

threats.

• Uphold and enforce the federal laws of the 

United States not exclusively assigned to 

another federal agency. 

• Provide leadership and criminal justice 

services to federal, state, municipal, and 

international agencies and partners.

• Establish the FBI CVE Coordination Office 

to help assess and leverage existing FBI 

efforts to better understand and counter 

violent extremism

• Coordinate with the National Task Force to 

develop CVE-specific education and 

awareness modules

• Disseminate information about violent 

extremism to state and local entities

c

United States 

Attorneys’ Offices

(USAO) 

• The U.S. Attorney is the chief prosecutor 

for the United States in a particular 

jurisdiction in criminal law cases, and 

represents the United States in civil law 

cases as either the defendant or plaintiff, as 

appropriate.

• Under the leadership of the U.S. Attorney 

General, USAOs investigate and prosecute 

a wide range of criminal activities, including 

domestic and international terrorism. 

• Coordinate CVE engagement with 

communities that may be targeted by 

violent extremist radicalization

• Raise awareness about the threat of violent 

extremism

• Facilitate partnerships to help identify and 

prevent radicalization to violence

Office of the 

Director of 

National of 

National 

Intelligence 

(ODNI)

National 

Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC)

• Integrate and analyze intelligence 

pertaining to counterterrorism (except for 

information pertaining exclusively to 

domestic terrorism).

• Conduct strategic operational planning for 

counterterrorism activities across the U.S. 

government.

• Expand briefings and information sharing 

about violent extremism with state and 

local law enforcement and government

• Facilitate a “train the trainer” program to 

increase the reach of CVE training

• Review information-sharing protocols to 

identify ways of increasing dissemination of 

products to state, local, and tribal 

authorities

Department of 

Defense 

(DOD)

Not specified • Provide the military forces needed to deter 

war and to protect the security of the United 

States.

• Coordinate nontraditional partners’ activities 

within DOD (e.g., counterintelligence and 

behavioral health) to better understand how 

to identify and prevent violent extremism 

within the military

Sources: DHS, DOJ, ODNI, DOD, CVE national strategy, and the CVE national strategy implementation plan.

a

DHS defines the Homeland Security Enterprise as the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 

nongovernmental, and private sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who 

share a common national interest in the safety and security of the United States and the American 

population. 

b

According to DHS, knowledge products could include resources such as standards and protocols. 

First responders are individuals responsible for protecting and preserving life, property, evidence, and 

the environment in the early stages of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other large-scale 

emergency. They include federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental emergency 

public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, and emergency medical personnel. See 6 

U.S.C. § 101(6) (defining “emergency response providers”). 

c

The National Task Force is led by DOJ and DHS and was established in November 2010 to help 

coordinate community engagement at the national level. It includes all departments and agencies 

involved in relevant community engagement efforts and focuses on compiling and disseminating 

local, national, and international best practices. It is also responsible for connecting regionally and 

field-based federal components to the full range of federal officials involved in community 

engagement to maximize partnerships, coordination, and resource sharing. 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

The CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns both DHS and 

DOJ responsibility for supporting national CVE-related training efforts and 

emphasizes the importance of collaboration among federal, state, local,

and tribal government agencies in order to achieve the goals of the 

strategy. In order for DHS and DOJ components to determine the extent 

to which they are fulfilling departmental CVE-related responsibilities, they 

must be able to identify which of the training they conduct is CVE-related, 

which requires that they understand what constitutes CVE-related 

training. The DHS Counterterrorism Working Group, the entity 

responsible for leading DHS’s CVE efforts under the direction of the 

Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, has identified topics to be 

addressed in CVE-related training that DHS develops, provides, or funds. 

The group has also undertaken efforts to communicate these topics to 

other DHS components, state and local law enforcement officials, and 

grant recipients who may allocate DHS funding for CVE-related training 

within their states. DHS’s communication efforts have helped DHS 

components and state and local partners to better understand what 

constitutes CVE-related training, but some DHS grantees who responded 

to our survey reported that they were not clear as to what topics should 

be addressed in CVE-related training, and most indicated that it would be 

helpful for DHS to provide additional information or guidance on topics 

covered under CVE. DHS plans to undertake additional communication 

efforts with these grantees to educate them about the principal topics 

CVE-related training addresses. In contrast, DOJ has not identified topics 

it considers as CVE-related training. Consequently, DOJ is unable to 

demonstrate how it is meeting its CVE responsibilities under the CVE 

national strategy.

In February 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the 

Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) with developing 

recommendations regarding how DHS can better support communitybased efforts to combat violent extremism domestically, focusing on the 

issues of training, information sharing, and the adoption of communityoriented law enforcement approaches.9

 

9

HSAC provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security. It is 

composed of leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the 

private sector, and academia.

The council established the 

HSAC CVE Working Group to carry out this tasking, and the working 

group issued its findings in summer 2010. The HSAC CVE Working 

DHS Has Identified 

CVE-Related Training 

Topics but DOJ Has 

Not, Making It 

Difficult for DOJ to 

Demonstrate How It 

Is Meeting Its CVE 

Responsibilities

DHS Has Identified 

Principal CVE-Related 

Training Topics and Made 

Efforts to Communicate 

Them
 

Page 10 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Group determined that CVE-related training should focus on (1) improving 

the capacity of law enforcement and other government personnel to 

communicate and collaborate with individuals from diverse religious, 

ethnic, and racial communities, and (2) promoting understanding of the 

threats facing a local community and recognizing behavior and indicators 

associated with those threats. The DHS Counterterrorism Working Group 

subsequently determined that, in order to support implementation of the 

CVE national strategy and the HSAC CVE Working Group findings, CVErelated training should address the following: violent extremism (e.g., the 

threat it poses), cultural demystification (e.g., education on culture and 

religion), community partnerships (e.g., how to build them), and 

community policing efforts (e.g., how to apply community policing efforts 

to CVE). According to the DHS Principal Deputy Counterterrorism 

Coordinator, identifying these topics helped to provide a logical structure 

for DHS’s CVE-related training–related efforts.

The Counterterrorism Working Group has undertaken efforts to 

communicate these topics to DHS components that contribute to DHS 

CVE-related training.10 Toward the beginning of our review officials from 

DHS components that contributed to training in fiscal years 2010 and 

2011 that was CVE-related according to our framework cited lack of 

clarity regarding what topics CVE-related training is to address; however, 

by August 2012, the components reported that the topics were clear, a 

fact that they attributed to these communications efforts. The 

Counterterrorism Working Group communicated CVE-related training 

topics to relevant DHS components during weekly meetings as well as by 

involving the components in the development of new CVE-related 

training.11

 

10During fiscal years 2010 and 2011, components that contributed to CVE-related training 

included the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and I&A, which provided CVE-related 

training; FEMA, which administered grants that could be used for CVE-related training; 

and S&T, which oversaw research on CVE that was relevant to CVE-related training 

content. These components are all members of DHS’s internal CVE Working Group, 

which the department established in October 2011 in order to coordinate all CVE 

activities, policies, and operations across DHS. More than 20 DHS components and 

offices are represented in the working group. 

For example, the Counterterrorism Working Group has invited 

relevant components to participate in workshops on CVE-related training, 

provided them with briefings and updates on its CVE-related training 

11These include trainings for experienced state and local law enforcement officers and 

recruits, correctional facility officers, and federal law enforcement officers. For more 

information about these trainings, see appendix II.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

development efforts, and included them in review of draft CVE curricula. 

According to Counterterrorism Working Group officials, the group led a 

series of meetings with these components to communicate and review 

the content of multiple CVE-related trainings the group is working to 

develop. According to officials from relevant DHS components, these 

communication efforts have helped to clarify topics CVE-related training 

addresses. For example, according to the official that leads CVE-related 

training that the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides, 

reviewing the CVE curricula under development involves ensuring that 

training topics are clear and well understood. In addition, according to the 

S&T official who oversees research on CVE that is to inform CVE-related 

training content, DHS officials have clearly communicated topics that 

CVE-related training is to include during weekly meetings that the 

Counterterrorism Working Group leads involving all DHS CVE Working 

Group members.

The Counterterrorism Working Group also communicated with state and 

local partners and associations that DHS collaborates with to achieve 

national CVE goals regarding DHS’s CVE-related training topics. For 

example, according to the director of a state police academy and a police 

department lieutenant, the Counterterrorism Working Group has 

consistently consulted with them in developing training modules 

addressing CVE topics. The Counterterrorism Working Group is also 

collaborating to develop and implement CVE-related training curricula 

with the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), the National Consortium 

for Advanced Policing (NCAP), and the International Association of Chiefs 

of Police (IACP).12

 

12MCC is a professional association of police chiefs and sheriffs that is to provide a forum 

for executives to share ideas, experiences, and strategies for addressing the challenges of 

policing in large urban communities. MCC membership is composed of chiefs and sheriffs 

of the 63 largest law enforcement agencies in the United States and 7 largest in Canada. 

NCAP works to bring together top-tier professionals with backgrounds in law enforcement, 

academia, the intelligence community, government service, and homeland security to 

provide law enforcement training and technical assistance programs. IACP is a nonprofit 

membership organization of police executives, with over 20,000 members in over 100 

countries. IACP’s leadership consists of the operating chief executives of international, 

federal, state, and local agencies of all sizes.

As reported by the official who oversees CVE-related 

training that the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties provides, 

such collaboration inherently entails discussion of topics CVE-related 

training is to address.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

DHS’s communication efforts have helped DHS components and state 

and local partners to better understand what constitutes CVE-related 

training, but our review indicates that some state administrative agency 

representatives are not clear about the principal topics CVE-related 

training addresses, making it difficult for them to determine what CVErelated training best supports national CVE efforts. According to officials 

from FEMA, which administers DHS grant funding, the agency has 

increased grant funding available for CVE-related training because the 

Secretary of Homeland Security has identified CVE efforts as a priority for 

the department. In particular, in fiscal year 2011, FEMA began to allow 

state and local entities to use funds awarded through the Homeland 

Security Grant Program for CVE-related training. Further, in fiscal year 

2012, FEMA explicitly stated in its Homeland Security Grant Program 

funding announcement that grantees could use program funds for CVErelated training, and retroactively allowed recipients to use program funds 

from prior years for CVE activities. In July 2012, we surveyed the 51 

training points of contact within state administrative agencies—which are 

responsible for managing Homeland Security Grant Program funds that 

DHS awards—about the extent to which they understand what is meant 

by CVE training. Of the 30 training points of contact who responded to our 

survey, 11 indicated that they were not at all clear or were somewhat 

clear on what is meant by CVE-related training. Further, 26 agreed or 

strongly agreed that it would be helpful for DHS to provide additional 

information or guidance on topics covered under CVE. As long as FEMA 

continues to make grant funding available for CVE-related training, but 

grantees do not have an understanding of what topics CVE-related 

training should address, it will be difficult for grantees to determine what 

training best supports the national CVE objective of improving CVErelated training and use funds appropriately toward those efforts.

DHS Counterterrorism Working Group officials stated that the group had 

made efforts to communicate CVE-related training topics to state 

administrative agencies, but in light of our survey results, the group plans 

to expand its efforts. In winter 2011, the Principal Deputy 

Counterterrorism Coordinator, who leads DHS CVE efforts, participated in 

a conference call with State Homeland Security Program advisers and 

staff who administer DHS grants that can be used for CVE-related 

training, during which this official highlighted DHS’s CVE-related training 

efforts and associated guidance. Nonetheless, according to the Principal 

Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, some training points of contact 

may not be aware of what topics CVE-related training should address 

because the working group’s coordination efforts have focused on state 

and local representatives who administer law enforcement training 

DHS Is Undertaking 

Additional Communication 

to Help Ensure Grantees 

Fund CVE-Related 

Training That Is Consistent 

with the Goals of the CVE 

National Strategy
 

Page 13 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

programs (e.g., at police academies), not state administrative agencies. 

The Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator also emphasized that 

DHS has focused its efforts on developing high-quality CVE-related 

training that state and local entities can readily access and that FEMA will 

pre approve as eligible for DHS grant funding. As a result, according to 

this official, grantees will rarely have to independently identify appropriate 

CVE-related training to fund or undertake steps to ensure the quality of 

CVE-related training they fund.

Nevertheless, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator agreed 

that our survey results revealed that it is important for DHS to undertake 

additional efforts to educate state administrative agency officials on the 

principal topics CVE-related training addresses. To that end, in August 

2012, the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator held an 

additional meeting with more than 100 state administrative agency 

representatives and other federal, state, and local officials, during which 

the Coordinator provided information on DHS CVE-related training 

development efforts and the content of DHS’s CVE-related training, 

among other things. In addition, in August 2012, DHS, in partnership with 

the FBI, launched an online portal for a select group of law enforcement 

training partners that is intended to provide federal, state, local, tribal, 

territorial, and correctional law enforcement with access to CVE-related 

training materials. DHS aims to broaden access to the portal to trainers 

nationwide by the end of September 2012. Further, the Principal Deputy 

Counterterrorism Coordinator stated that the Counterterrorism Working 

Group is developing an outreach strategy for communicating with state 

and local entities about DHS’s CVE-related training efforts. Given the 

recency of these efforts, we are not able to assess their effectiveness as 

part of our review. However, they are positive steps that should contribute 

to educating state administrative agency representatives about CVE 

topics, and thereby help them to fund CVE-related training that is 

consistent with the goals of the CVE national strategy.

As with DHS, the CVE national strategy implementation plan has 

identified DOJ, including the FBI, as among the federal departments and 

agencies responsible for conducting CVE-related training. However, DOJ 

has not yet identified topics that should be covered in its CVE-related 

training. In addition, DOJ has not generally identified which of its existing 

training could be categorized as CVE-related training, thus limiting DOJ’s 

ability to demonstrate how it is fulfilling its training responsibilities under 

the CVE national strategy.

DOJ Has Not Identified 

CVE-Related Training 

Topics, Which Could 

Preclude DOJ from 

Demonstrating How It Is 

Implementing the CVE 

National Strategy
 

Page 14 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

According to senior DOJ officials, even though the department has not 

identified CVE-related training topics, they understand internally which of 

the department’s training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or 

indirectly to the department’s training responsibilities under the CVE 

national strategy. However, because DOJ has not identified what 

constitutes CVE-related training, CVE-related efforts undertaken at the 

direction of the President’s National Security Staff have been hindered, 

according to DHS officials who participated in an Interagency Policy 

Committee Working Group on Law Enforcement Training Regarding 

Domestic Radicalization and CVE. This group, which is chaired by DHS 

and NCTC, was formed at the direction of the President’s National 

Security Staff to identify and coordinate CVE-related training that federal 

agencies deliver or fund. The group’s principal objective was twofold: (1) 

to determine how agencies are currently developing training and (2) to 

identify options for ensuring that the Intelligence Community’s current 

analysis of radicalization informs training for federal, state, local, and 

tribal officials, and that customers of this type of training receive highquality training and information consistent with U.S. government 

analysis.13

 

13The U.S. Intelligence Community comprises 17 components, including DHS I&A and the 

FBI, and is overseen by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 401a(4).

As part of this effort, the Interagency Policy Committee 

Working Group on Law Enforcement Training Regarding Domestic 

Radicalization and CVE endeavored to create an inventory of CVErelated training that the federal government offers. However, according to 

DHS officials that participated in the working group, members who led this 

effort found it challenging to do so because agencies’ views differed as to 

what CVE-related training includes when providing information on their 

training. More specifically, according to one DHS official, some 

components found it difficult to differentiate between counterterrorism and 

CVE-related training, and trying to categorize training that was not 

developed for CVE purposes but that can benefit CVE can be confusing. 

We observed this problem firsthand during our review when the DOJ 

components that the department identified as potentially relevant to our 

work, including the FBI, Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services could not readily respond 

to our requests for information about CVE-related training they provide or 

fund. According to these officials, they found it difficult to respond to our 

requests because DOJ has not established a definition for “CVE” or 

“CVE-related training,” and therefore they were not sure what constitutes 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

CVE-related training.14

DOJ officials also said that it would be inappropriate to label certain types 

of the department’s training, such as community outreach training, as 

CVE-related because doing so would be imprecise and misleading. 

These officials explained that DOJ CVE activities include efforts that are 

specifically designed for CVE-related purposes as well as efforts that are 

not specifically designed for CVE-related purposes, but that may indirectly 

benefit the department’s CVE efforts. For example, the DOJ Community 

Relations Service conducts outreach in communities and invites 

community members to assist in providing cultural competency training to 

enhance law enforcement officers’ understanding of and sensitivity to 

cultural and religious practices of the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh American 

communities.

Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) officials

acknowledged that training that BJA funds under the State and Local 

Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program could be considered CVErelated training, but they also acknowledged that what constitutes CVErelated training was not clear, in part because CVE is a relatively new 

term. The other DOJ components, however, relied upon a framework that 

we developed for the purpose of this review to determine which of their 

existing training was CVE-related. 

15

 

14The Executive Office for United States Attorneys is to act as a liaison between DOJ and 

the 93 United States Attorneys’ offices, which may partake in CVE-related activities. The 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services works to advance the practice of 

community policing in America’s state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies by 

sharing information and making grants to police departments around the United States. 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance’s mission is to provide leadership and services in grant 

administration and criminal justice policy development to support local, state, and tribal 

justice strategies to achieve safer communities.

However, DOJ officials expressed concern that labeling 

outreach, or training on how to conduct outreach, as CVE-related would 

imply that these efforts are driven by security efforts when they are not. 

Nevertheless, the CVE national strategy and implementation plan publicly 

15The Community Relations Service is DOJ’s “peacemaker” for community conflicts and 

tensions arising from differences of race, color, and national origin. It is dedicated to 

assisting state and local units of government, private and public organizations, and 

community groups with preventing and resolving racial and ethnic tensions, incidents, and 

civil disorders, and in restoring racial stability and harmony. According to DOJ, pursuant to 

the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the Community 

Relations Service also works with communities to develop strategies to prevent and 

respond more effectively to alleged violent hate crimes committed on the basis of race, 

color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, or disability. See 

generally Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009). See also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 249. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

and explicitly emphasize the importance of community engagement in 

CVE efforts while recognizing that such engagement should focus on a 

full range of community concerns, and not just on issues such as national 

security. Further, the implementation plan has assigned DOJ 

responsibility for supporting national CVE-related training efforts. 

However, because DOJ has not identified what topics it thinks should be 

addressed by CVE-related training, it is difficult to identify which of DOJ’s 

current training is related to CVE—either directly or indirectly, which also 

makes it difficult to determine whether and how DOJ is fulfilling its training 

responsibilities per the CVE national strategy. 

If departments are unclear regarding what constitutes CVE-related 

training, they will also have difficulty accounting for their CVE-related 

training responsibilities. By not identifying and communicating CVErelated training topics to its components, DOJ is not able to demonstrate 

how it is fulfilling its CVE-related training responsibilities and ensure that it 

is carrying out its responsibilities as established in the CVE national 

strategy implementation plan.

Less than 1 percent of state and local participants in CVE-related training 

that DHS and DOJ provided or funded who provided feedback to the 

departments expressed concerns about information included in the 

course materials or that instructors presented during training. In addition, 

while DOJ generally solicits feedback from all participants for programs 

that provide formal, curriculum-based CVE-related training, the FBI and 

USAOs do not always solicit feedback for programs that provide less 

formal CVE-related training (e.g., presentations by guest speakers), even 

though such training was provided to about 9,900 participants in fiscal 

years 2010 and 2011. Finally, apart from the training participants, some 

individuals and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about DHS 

and DOJ CVE-related training.

As previously discussed, because DHS and DOJ components were 

unclear regarding what constitutes CVE-related training, for the purposes 

of conducting this review, we developed a framework for determining 

which training may be CVE-related. Our framework identifies training as 

CVE-related if it addressed one or more of the following three content 

Few Participants 

Raised Concerns 

about DHS and DOJ 

CVE-Related Training, 

but the FBI and 

USAOs Could Help 

Ensure Quality of 

Training by More 

Consistently Soliciting 

Feedback
 

Page 17 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

areas: (1) radicalization, (2) cultural competency, and (3) community 

engagement.16

DHS Counterterrorism Working Group officials generally agreed with the 

content areas we identified, and we incorporated feedback the group 

provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials stated that they view the 

framework as reasonable for the purpose of our review. However, as 

previously discussed, DOJ officials do not think it is appropriate for DOJ 

to identify topics as addressed in CVE-related training.17

We applied our framework to identify CVE-related training DOJ and DHS 

components provided to state and local entities during fiscal years 2010 

and 2011. Figure 1 presents the DOJ and DHS programs that provided 

the CVE-related training we identified, and appendix III provides more 

detailed information about the training, including the number of 

participants and associated costs.

 

16Radicalization addresses approaches that are based on research and accurate 

information to understanding the threat radicalization poses, how individuals may become 

radicalized, how individuals seek to radicalize Americans (threat of violent extremist 

recruitment), behaviors exhibited by radicalized individuals, or what works to prevent 

radicalization that results in violence. Cultural competency seeks to enhance state and 

local law enforcement’s understanding of culture or religion, and civil rights and civil 

liberties, or their ability to distinguish, using information-driven and standardized 

approaches, between violent extremism and legal behavior. Community engagement 

addresses ways to build effective community partnerships, such as through outreach, and 

community capacity for the purpose of, among other things, mitigating threats posed by 

violent extremism. See appendix I for more detailed information about how we developed 

and applied the framework.

17According to the FBI, while the bureau has conducted counterterrorism training in the 

past, it would not be appropriate to categorize any of what FBI considers to be 

counterterrorism training as CVE-related training because the term “CVE” is relatively 

nascent, neither the FBI nor DOJ has defined what constitutes CVE-related training, and 

there is a distinction between counterterrorism and CVE. However, the CVE national 

strategy implementation plan identifies certain activities that the FBI has undertaken as 

CVE-related. For instance, the implementation plan cites briefings that the FBI provided in 

collaboration with DHS, NCTC, and the National Intelligence Council—which serves as a 

bridge between the intelligence and policy communities—on violent extremism as an 

example of national CVE efforts. In addition, our framework does not identify CVE-related 

training and counterterrorism training as mutually exclusive. For instance, if the primary 

focus of training is counterterrorism, certain topics addressed by the training may be CVErelated. As FBI training programs described in figure 1 used course materials during fiscal 

years 2010 and 2011 that addressed at least one of the CVE content areas identified by 

our framework, we are nonetheless categorizing them as CVE-related for the purpose of 

our review.
 

Page 18 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Figure 1: DHS and DOJ Components and Programs That Provided CVE-Related 

Training during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

The majority of participant feedback on CVE-related training that DHS 

and DOJ provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 was 

positive or neutral; a minority of participants expressed concerns about 

information included in course materials or that instructors presented. 

DHS and DOJ collected and retained feedback forms from 8,424 of the 

more than 28,000 participants—including state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement officials, prison officials, and community members—of 

training they provided or funded in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that was 

CVE-related according to our framework.18

 

18The departments did not collect feedback from all participants that attended CVE-related 

training during this period. For example, while the FBI requires solicitation of feedback for 

its centrally administered, curriculum-based courses, it does not require the solicitation of 

feedback for its Community Relations Executive Seminar Training and Citizens’ Academy 

outreach programs, or other briefings or presentations that FBI field offices provide, 

because it does not consider these programs and activities as training. Similarly, USAOs 

are not required to obtain feedback from recipients of presentations and briefings that their 

individual offices provide. In addition, some of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training 

Program, National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and USAO trainings for which we reviewed 

feedback forms included federal participants. In these instances, as participants did not 

indicate their affiliated agency on the feedback forms, we reviewed all completed forms, 

including those that may have been filled out by federal officials. 

We analyzed all of these 

State and Local 

Participants’ Perspectives 

on CVE-Related Training 

Were Mostly Positive or 

Neutral
 

Page 19 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

evaluations and found that the vast majority of participants submitted 

comments about the training that were positive or neutral. For example, 

participants commented that the courses were among the most 

challenging they had taken, that the instructors were professional and 

knowledgeable, or that the course materials were well assembled. In 

addition, participants stated that the training was informative with regard 

to the threat posed by, and how to best counter, violent extremists or 

provided a valuable overview of an extremist group. In another instance, 

a participant stated that the course was helpful in understanding the 

beliefs and concerns of a particular community. Some participants also 

said that the training would be worthwhile to provide to a broader 

audience, that they intended to share what they learned with colleagues, 

or that they would like to see the course length expanded. We also 

identified 77 participant evaluations—less than 1 percent—that included 

comments that expressed concern of any sort. For example, we identified 

concerns that a training was too politically correct, as well as concerns 

that a training was one-sided, with regard to issues of religion and culture. 

The concerns the participants expressed fell into the following three 

categories:

1. The course information or instruction was politically or culturally 

biased (54 evaluations). For example, participant comments that fell 

into this category were that the instructor had a liberal bias, and other 

comments were that the instructor too often relayed his or her 

personal views.

2. The course information or instruction was offensive (12 evaluations). 

For example, one concern raised in this category was that an 

instructor presented Islam in a negative manner, whereas another 

concern was that a guest presenter spoke disrespectfully about the 

United States.

3. The course information was inaccurate (11 evaluations). For example, 

comments that fell into this category raised concern that an instructor 

provided misinformation about dressing norms for Middle Eastern 

women and that an instructor cited incorrect information about a 

criminal case discussed during the class.

The concerns that were raised varied across different training providers 

and, although few, most of the concerns stemmed from the evaluation 

records documenting feedback from DOJ SLATT Program and FBI 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program participants. See appendix 

IV for additional details on the types of concerns by training provider.
 

Page 20 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

DOJ and DHS officials who oversee these training programs indicated 

that they review the feedback participants provide and assess if it 

warrants action. However, these officials stated that determining how to 

respond to feedback can be difficult when the feedback is subjective or 

not actionable. For example, the SLATT Program Director stated that if a 

comment simply says “one-sided information,” he cannot take action on it 

because he does not know which side the person is referring to or what 

the person thinks should be changed. However, if there is a trend in clear 

feedback participants provided, he will take action. Further, according to 

SLATT and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties officials, perceptions 

regarding what is biased vary by audience and even by the participants 

within a given audience. Therefore, DHS and DOJ officials stated that 

they take action to address participant feedback on a case-by-case basis, 

as they and their staff deem appropriate. For example, the SLATT 

Director explained that there is no specific threshold to determine whether 

a participant’s comment warrants further action, but generally, if a similar 

concern has been submitted by multiple participants, over multiple 

courses, SLATT officials will review the substance of the comment and 

devise a plan to correct the issue. For example, the SLATT Director noted 

that in response to a comment that a course title did not reflect the 

material taught in the course, he suggested a change to the title.

Most of the CVE-related training that DHS and DOJ components provided 

was formal, classroom-based or curriculum-based training, and the 

components generally solicited participant feedback for this type of 

training, which we describe above.19

 

19According to CRS officials, the service has used evaluations in the past, but too few 

participants returned course evaluations, thus limiting the service’s ability to analyze them 

effectively. The service is in the process of instituting new procedures for distributing, 

collecting, and reviewing course evaluations that it expects will improve the number of 

evaluations returned, according to these officials. 

In addition, two DOJ components—

FBI and USAOs—also provided informal CVE-related training consisting 

of briefings and presentations at workshops, conferences, and other 

venues to about 9,900 participants in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. 

However, these components did not consistently solicit participant 

feedback for this type of training, which makes it difficult for them to 

assess the quality of the training, determine whether the training is 

achieving expected outcomes, and make changes where appropriate.

More Consistently 

Soliciting Feedback on 

Informal CVE-Related 

Training Could Provide 

Information to Help 

Ensure Its Quality
 

Page 21 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

According to FBI officials, training that the FBI centrally administers—

including that provided under the National Academy and National Joint 

Terrorism Task Force programs—is to adhere to the Kirkpatrick model to 

help ensure its quality.20 The standards this model prescribes require the 

solicitation of student feedback. As a result, the FBI collects feedback 

through evaluations on the formal, classroom-based courses it provides 

through its National Academy. The FBI does not require entities providing 

informal training, such as briefings and presentations during outreach, to 

solicit feedback.21 Specifically, officials from the FBI’s Office of Public 

Affairs told us that the bureau does not solicit feedback on presentations, 

briefings, or its Citizens’ Academy and Community Relations Executive 

Seminar Training (CREST) outreach programs because doing so is not 

required, and the officials noted that the FBI does not classify these 

programs and activities as training.22

 

20The Kirkpatrick model is a multilevel approach to evaluate an organization’s training and 

development efforts. Soliciting feedback from course participants is a key element in this 

model, which consists of four levels of evaluation. The first level measures the training 

participants’ reaction to, and satisfaction with, the training program through the collection 

of feedback. The second level measures the extent to which learning has occurred 

because of the training effort. The third level measures the application of this learning to 

the work environment through changes in behavior that trainees exhibit on the job 

because of training. Finally, the fourth level measures the impact of the training program 

on the agency’s program or organizational results. 

Officials also noted that some field 

offices, which administer the programs, do solicit feedback from 

participants although they are not required to do so. For example, 4 of 21 

FBI field offices that provided Citizens’ Academy training that was CVErelated according to our framework collected evaluations. However, none 

of the 3 FBI field offices that provided CREST training or the 5 FBI field 

offices that provided other training that was CVE-related according to our 

framework solicited feedback from course participants. Similarly, USAOs 

are not required to obtain feedback from recipients of training that their 

individual offices provide. According to Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys 

officials, USAOs do not typically solicit feedback from participants on the 

21The FBI’s Citizens’ Academy and CREST programs are provided to business and 

religious leaders and members of the community to provide them with firsthand 

experience with how the FBI investigates crimes and threats to national security, as well 

as to educate them about the various tools and techniques it employs to carry out its 

mission. Some Citizens’ Academy and CREST sessions include CVE-related 

presentations. For more information, see appendix III. 

22The CREST and Citizens’ Academy programs are provided directly by FBI field offices. 

However, the Office of Public Affairs provides administrative and logistical support and 

suggestions for program execution.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

presentations that our framework identified as CVE-related that they 

provide in their districts, particularly with respect to threat-related briefings 

for law enforcement officials that are intended to address a particular area 

of concern for that region at a particular time. Under these circumstances, 

according to these officials, feedback may be less useful than it would be 

for curriculum-based trainings, because the presentation is less likely to 

be repeated for many different audiences. We identified 39 USAOs that 

provided or facilitated training that was CVE-related according to our 

framework, excluding training that was facilitated by a USAO, but 

provided by another federal entity (such as SLATT).23

We have previously reported that evaluating training is important and that 

agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to 

obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training.

Out of these 39 

USAOs, 15 collected feedback from CVE-related training participants.

24

 

23Officials noted that SLATT is a program administered by the Bureau of Justice 

Assistance but often is hosted and facilitated by USAOs. Feedback is solicited from 

SLATT training participants, which is considered to be formal training. 

We 

recognize the distinction between formal training programs and less 

formal training, such as presentations. However, the CREST and 

Citizens’ Academy programs, other FBI field office initiatives, and USAOs 

collectively trained about 39 percent (about 9,900) of all training 

participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 

2011. Soliciting feedback on informal training could help the FBI and 

USAOs obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which 

these programs are yielding desired outcomes (e.g., whether the FBI’s 

Citizens’ Academy is projecting a positive image of the FBI in the 

communities it serves) as well as complying with the CVE national 

strategy. Such feedback could also be obtained without incurring 

significant costs. According to officials at a FBI field office that distributes 

feedback forms and the DHS official who oversees the Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties CVE-related training, agencies can solicit 

feedback from training participants at minimal cost (e.g., the paper on 

which the form is distributed and the employee time associated with 

reviewing the forms), feedback is critical to ensure the training is 

communicating its intended messages effectively, and soliciting feedback 

is a worthwhile undertaking given the significant time and resources their 

offices invest in providing CVE-related training.

24GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development 

Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2004). 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

In addition to the concerns we identified in participant evaluations, 

individuals and advocacy organizations submitted at least six letters of 

complaint to DHS, DOJ, the Executive Office of the President, and other 

federal government entities regarding 18 alleged incidents of biased CVE 

and counterterrorism training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded during 

fiscal years 2010 and 2011.25 Representatives of the advocacy 

organizations that submitted the letters generally did not participate in the 

training that generated these concerns. Rather, their concerns were 

derived from information reported in the media and individuals who 

attended a training session and expressed concern about the training to 

the organizations. We determined that 7 of the alleged incidents 

described in five of the letters were relevant to this review because they 

pertained to CVE-related training provided to state and local officials and 

community members, not training that was exclusively provided to federal 

officials.26 The 7 incidents described in these letters, some of which the 

media initially reported, articulated similar concerns as those identified in 

the participant evaluations we reviewed. That is, the allegations made in 

the letters raised concerns that course information and instructors were 

biased, offensive, or inaccurate. Table 2 summarizes the concerns raised 

in these five letters and the agency’s perspectives about the concerns.

 

25To identify these letters of concern, we reviewed open source information, contacted 

advocacy organizations, and requested all complaints regarding CVE-related training sent 

to DHS and DOJ during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. See appendix I for more information 

regarding our methodology. 

26The other 11 incidents discussed in the letters cited were outside of the scope of this 

review because, for example, they pertained to training that was provided exclusively to 

federal officials or occurred before fiscal year 2010. As a result, they are excluded from 

this analysis. 

Some Individuals and 

Advocacy Organizations 

Have Raised Some 

Concerns about CVERelated Training
 

Page 24 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 2: Concerns Raised in Letters Submitted to DHS and DOJ during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Regarding CVE-Related 

Training and Agency Perspectives

Training 

provider Concern raised Agency perspective

FBI local-level 

Joint Terrorism 

Task Force 

(JTTF)

Two letters sent to the FBI signed by 28 

organizations alleged, among other things, that 

a known anti-Islamic speaker was invited by 

FBI’s Virginia Tidewater JTTF to provide 

training to state and federal law enforcement 

officers. 

a

According to the FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the 

office that arranged the presentation, the speaker was brought in 

as an “enrichment speaker” to present his perspective on Islam, 

and the speaker did not provide formal training. According to this 

official, although no audience members voiced concern about the 

presentation, the field office will not invite the speaker to present in 

the future.

FBI Citizens’ 

Academy

A letter sent to the FBI by a community 

member who attended a Seattle-based 

Citizens’ Academy and a letter undersigned by 

18 organizations alleged that course materials 

compared Islamic religious materials to 

propaganda used by Nazis.

According to the Special Agent in Charge of the office that 

provided the training, the information cited in the concern was not 

part of the established course materials or presentation. Rather, a 

participant had asked the instructor a question by email following 

the class, which the instructor responded to in writing and this 

response was distributed to all course participants. The office no 

longer distributes such responses. According to field office 

officials, the instructor’s response did not make a link between 

Islam and Nazism as alleged in the letter. Rather, according to 

field office officials, the instructor’s response made a link between 

propaganda used in Islamism (which officials identified as a 

political ideology that can include jihad) and Nazism. 

FBI field office A letter sent to the FBI that was signed by 18 

organizations alleged that two FBI agents 

participating in an outreach workshop provided 

to community members in Seattle delivered a 

presentation to members of the East African, 

Muslim, Sikh, and Arab communities 

addressing terrorist groups and community 

members with an almost exclusive focus on 

Islamic groups. According to this letter, when 

audience members asked the agents if a photo 

of a figure in the presentation was of Ayatollah 

Ruhollah Khomeini, a political and religious 

leader, they did not know who he was.

The Special Agent in Charge of the field office explained that the 

field office provided the presentation referred to in the letter at the 

request of a local law enforcement agency that specifically asked 

the office to provide an international terrorism presentation. 

According to the Special Agent in Charge, the presentation 

provided was a valid reflection of current intelligence information 

pertaining to the types of individuals who have engaged in 

international terrorism. However, officials stated that, moving 

forward, the office would also include information on domestic 

terrorism, which will lend itself to presenting information about a 

greater variety of terrorist groups. Officials also acknowledged that 

the agents should have been able to identify the individual in the 

photo. Following this incident, the Special Agent in Charge 

organized meetings with local advocacy organizations and 

individuals to discuss the incident. 

FBI National 

Joint Terrorism 

Task Force 

Program

A letter was submitted to the Executive Office 

of the President’s Deputy National Security 

Advisor and a copy was also sent to DOJ. It 

was signed by 57 organizations and alleged 

that orientation material for all 4,400 members 

of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force stated 

that “Sunni Muslims have been prolific in 

spawning numerous and varied fundamentalist 

extremist terrorist organizations. Sunni core 

doctrine and end state have remained the 

same and they continue to strive for Sunni 

Islamic domination of the world ...”

FBI officials from the Counterterrorism Division, which includes the 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force Program, told us they were 

not familiar with this concern, and looked into it upon GAO’s

inquiring about the FBI’s position on it. They found that the FBI 

Inspection Division reviewed the training material that was the 

subject of this complaint as part of its internal review of 

counterterrorism training materials, described in further detail later 

in this report, and determined that the material was consistent with 

the FBI’s guiding principles for training. That is, the FBI assessed 

the materials to, among other things, conform to constitutional 

principles, adhere to the FBI’s core values, be tailored to the 

intended audience, and focused to ensure message clarity.
 

Page 25 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Training 

provider Concern raised Agency perspective

FBI analyst A letter was submitted to DOJ and signed by 

18 organizations. It alleged that an individual 

identified as an FBI analyst delivered a lecture 

to law enforcement officials in New York City in 

June 2011 during which the analyst asserted 

that the fight against al Qaeda is a waste 

compared with the threat presented by the 

ideology of Islam, and that it would be a waste 

of time to turn to the American Muslim 

community for assistance in finding and 

stopping radical terrorists. 

According to FBI officials, the FBI analyst who provided this 

presentation did not do so on behalf of the FBI. Rather, according 

to these officials, the analyst served as an adjunct professor 

independent of the FBI, and provided the presentation in that 

independent capacity. Nonetheless, FBI officials stated that the 

information the analyst presented was taken out of context. FBI 

officials further stated that the analyst has only provided training 

on behalf of the FBI on one occasion, in April 2011. Following the 

training, the FBI determined that the analyst was not sufficiently 

effective at teaching the course, and he has not provided training 

on behalf of the FBI since that time.

DHS Homeland 

Security Grant 

Program 

recipient 

A letter of concern was sent to DHS by one 

organization and alleged that DHS funds were 

used to pay an anti-Islamic author $5,000 to 

appear at a conference in South Dakota that 

was sponsored by the South Dakota 

Department of Public Safety.

DHS officials verified that a grantee used DHS grant funds to pay 

the speaker to appear at a conference, and stated that the grantee 

was not aware of the speaker’s controversial stature and was not 

required to obtain pre approval from DHS to use grant funds to 

hire the speaker. Once the state learned of the speaker’s 

controversial stature, according to DHS officials, it ended its 

contract with the speaker as an approved training provider for the 

state. DHS explained that if the same situation were to occur 

again, in light of grant guidance DHS subsequently issued related 

to ensuring the quality of CVE-related training, it would likely 

require the grantee to repay the department the funds it used to 

pay the speaker, as spending money to hire the speaker would be 

inconsistent with DHS guidance.

USAO A letter sent to DOJ by three organizations 

alleged that a USAO intelligence specialist 

made inaccurate and biased claims against 

Muslims during a training. For example, the 

letter alleged that the specialist asserted that 

American Muslims are waging a “Civilizational 

Jihad” against the United States through 

“civilians, juries, lawyers, media, academia and 

charities” who threaten “our values.”

The U.S. Attorney for the district that provided this training stated 

that upon becoming aware that there were concerns about the 

content of the slides used for the presentation, the office 

immediately discontinued providing the presentation. The U.S. 

Attorney also explained that the controversial text on the slide was 

a direct quote from an exhibit entered into evidence during a 

counterterrorism prosecution, and that the presentations slides 

were not intended for public dissemination (they were labeled 

sensitive), where they could be misinterpreted by individuals who 

were not privy to the context in which they were presented.

Source: GAO analysis of open source information and information provided by DHS, DOJ, and advocacy organizations.

a

A JTTF is an investigative unit consisting of law enforcement and other specialists from federal, 

state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, led by DOJ and the FBI. Each of the FBI’s 

56 main field offices has a task force, and additional task forces are located in smaller FBI offices. 

Although the number of concerns and complaints raised about CVErelated training may have been small, according to DHS and DOJ 

officials, the departments have generally considered the complaints as 

serious issues that warranted action to better ensure the quality of future 

training, particularly given the negative effects that such incidents can 

have on the departments’ reputations and trust with the communities they 

serve. For example, according to the DHS Principal Deputy 

Counterterrorism Coordinator, developing CVE-related training is a 

DOJ Has Undertaken 

Reviews and DHS and 

DOJ Have Developed 

Guidance to Improve 

Training Quality
 

Page 26 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

priority for the department because inappropriate and inaccurate training 

undermines community partnerships that are critical to preventing crime 

and negatively impacts efforts of law enforcement to identify legitimate 

behaviors and indicators of violent extremism. DOJ has undertaken 

quality reviews of existing training materials that are CVE-related 

according to our framework, and both DOJ and DHS have developed 

guidance for CVE-related training and developed other quality assurance 

mechanisms for this training.

DOJ components have conducted or are currently conducting internal 

reviews of their training materials, including those with topics that our 

framework identified as related to CVE, in an effort to identify and purge 

potentially objectionable materials. 

In September 2011, the FBI launched a review of all FBI counterterrorism 

training materials, including materials that were CVE-related according to 

our framework. This review included approximately 160,000 pages of 

training materials, and the FBI determined that less than one percent of 

the pages contained factually inaccurate or imprecise information or used 

stereotypes. 

The Office of the Deputy Attorney General has also ordered a 

departmentwide review of training materials. Unlike the FBI’s internal 

review, which focused on counterterrorism training materials, a 

memorandum issued by the Deputy Attorney General to heads of DOJ 

components and U.S. Attorneys in September 2011 directed them to 

carefully review all training material and presentations that their personnel 

provided. The memorandum stated components particularly should 

review training related to combating terrorism, CVE, and other subjects 

that may relate to ongoing outreach efforts in Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South 

Asian, and other communities. The purpose of the review was to ensure 

that the material and information presented are consistent with DOJ 

standards, goals, and instructions. Officials from the four DOJ 

components that we identified as having provided or funded CVE-related 

training reported that their components have completed, or intend to 

complete, the review the Deputy Attorney General ordered. According to 

DOJ officials, as of August 2012, some components are still reviewing 

relevant materials and the Deputy Attorney General asked components to 

provide any questionable training materials to the Deputy Attorney 

DOJ Components Have 

Undertaken Reviews of 

CVE-Related Training
 

Page 27 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

General’s office.27 DOJ officials also told us that each DOJ component is 

to make its own determination on what materials are appropriate, but that 

components are to review all training materials, even if the components 

do not have specific plans to present the materials in the future.

DHS, DOJ, and the FBI have developed guidance to avoid future 

incidences or allegations of biased or otherwise inappropriate training. In 

October 2011, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issued 

Countering Violent Extremism Training Guidance & Best Practices (DHS 

CVE Guidance), which acknowledges that it is important for law 

enforcement personnel to be appropriately trained in understanding and 

detecting ideologically motivated criminal behavior and in working with 

communities and local law enforcement to counter domestic violent 

extremism.28

Following the release of DHS’s CVE Guidance, FEMA issued an 

information bulletin to its state, local, and private sector partners and 

grantees to emphasize the importance of ensuring that all CVE-related 

The DHS CVE guidance states that training must be 

accurate, based on current intelligence, and include cultural competency 

training. To this end, its goals are to help ensure that (1) trainers are 

experts and well regarded; (2) training is sensitive to constitutional values; 

(3) training facilitates further dialogue and learning; (4) training adheres to 

government standards and efforts; and (5) training and objectives are 

appropriately tailored, focused, and supported. The guidance provides 

best practices for federal, state, and local officials organizing CVE, 

cultural awareness, or counterterrorism training to adhere to in support of 

these goals. Best practices include reviewing a prospective trainer’s 

résumé; reviewing the training program to ensure that it uses examples to 

demonstrate that terrorists and violent extremists vary in ethnicity, race, 

gender, and religion; and reaching out to sponsors of existing government 

training efforts for input.

 

27Although some USAOs reported that they have not yet reviewed training materials they 

used in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that we identified as CVE-related, officials from the 

Executive Office for United States Attorneys stated that the office will continue to work 

with the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to execute any further review of training materials that is

required by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

28DHS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 

Training Guidance and Best Practices. October 2011.

DHS and DOJ Have 

Developed Guidance 

Intended to Avoid Future 

Incidences of Biased or 

Otherwise Inappropriate 

Training
 

Page 28 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

training is consistent with DHS and U.S. government policy.29

DHS is also developing additional mechanisms to ensure the quality of 

CVE-related training. Specifically, Counterterrorism Working Group 

officials told us that in June 2012 DHS established a CVE-related training 

Working Group within the department to develop a framework to (1) 

ensure that training DHS components provide meets DHS and the U.S. 

government’s CVE standards; (2) ensure that grantees using grant funds 

for training utilize certified trainers; and (3) disseminate DHS training 

through agency partners, such as the International Association of Chiefs 

of Police. In July 2012, this working group proposed recommendations for 

meeting these goals in a memorandum to the DHS Deputy 

This bulletin 

referenced the DHS CVE Guidance and stated, among other things, that 

grant-funded training should avoid the use of hostile, stereotypical, or 

factually inaccurate information about Muslims and Islam or any 

community. The bulletin also emphasized the importance of community 

engagement and interaction to promote communities as part of the 

solution. According to FEMA officials, if a grantee were to provide CVErelated training and not follow the DHS CVE guidance, DHS may require 

that the grantee repay any grant funds that were spent on the training. 

However, several DHS grantees indicated that they would not necessarily 

know when to apply the best practices for ensuring the quality of CVErelated training described in the informational bulletin. Specifically, of the 

30 Homeland Security Grant Program training points of contact who 

responded to our survey, 18 said that they were not at all clear or only 

somewhat clear about when to apply the principles in the FEMA bulletin. 

In addition, 20 said that topics that may be covered during CVE-related 

training are not at all clear or only somewhat clear in the bulletin. As a 

result, these grantees could have difficulty in determining when to apply 

the principles. As previously discussed, the additional efforts DHS is 

undertaking to educate state administrative agency officials on the 

principal topics CVE-related training addresses could further enable the 

officials to fund training that supports the CVE national strategy. These 

survey results indicate that such educational efforts should help grantees 

more readily identify topics that may be covered during CVE-related 

training, and thus more appropriately apply DHS CVE-related training 

quality assurance guidance.

 

29FEMA Information Bulletin #373, Ensuring Training on Counter Terrorism and 

Countering Violent Extremism is Consistent with USG and DHS Policy (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 7, 2011).
 

Page 29 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Counterterrorism Coordinator. For example, the group recommended that 

the department establish and maintain a database of certified CVE 

instructors and appoint a CVE program coordinator to oversee the 

instructor vetting and training process. According to Counterterrorism 

Working Group officials, DHS is working on plans to implement these 

recommendations. As these recommendations were made recently and 

DHS has just decided to implement them, it is too early to assess any 

quality assurance impact they will have on CVE-related training.

DOJ also developed guidance applicable to all training, including CVErelated training, conducted or funded by DOJ to help ensure its quality. 

DOJ formed a working group on training issues chaired by its Civil Rights 

Division within the Attorney General’s Arab-Muslim Engagement Advisory 

Group.30

Also in March 2012, the FBI published The FBI’s Guiding Principles 

Touchstone Document on Training. This document is intended to be 

consistent with the March 2012 Deputy Attorney General guidance, but 

elaborates on each training principle outlined in the document. The FBI’s 

guidance states that training must (1) conform to constitutional principles 

and adhere to the FBI’s core values; (2) be tailored to the intended 

audience, focused to ensure message clarity, and supported with the 

The working group developed the DOJ training principles to 

guide DOJ’s training and to ensure that all communities that DOJ serves 

are respected. In March 2012, the Deputy Attorney General issued a 

memorandum for DOJ heads of components and USAOs outlining 

guiding principles to which all training that DOJ conducted or funded must 

adhere. Specifically, it stated that (1) training must be consistent with the 

U.S. Constitution and DOJ values; (2) the content of training and training 

materials must be accurate, appropriately tailored, and focused; (3) 

trainers must be well qualified in the subject area and skilled in presenting 

it; (4) trainers must demonstrate the highest standards of professionalism; 

and (5) training must meet department standards.

 

30The Arab-Muslim Engagement Advisory Group was established to help identify more 

effective ways for DOJ to foster greater communication and collaboration, as well as a 

new level of respect and understanding, between law enforcement and Muslim and ArabAmerican communities. The group includes representatives from the Office of Legal 

Policy, the Civil Rights Division, the Office of Justice Policy, the Community Relations 

Service, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the National Security Division, 

the FBI, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Bureau of Prisons, and 

members of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee. 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

appropriate course materials; and (3) be reviewed, and trainers must be 

knowledgeable of applicable subject material.

DOJ officials also told us that the department’s guiding principles are 

meant to memorialize department training standards and values and are 

the group’s first step for ongoing work to ensure the quality of future 

counterterrorism and CVE-related training. Although developing these 

principles marks an important first step, we were unable to assess the 

extent to which they can help ensure the quality of CVE-related training 

moving forward because the review is ongoing and DOJ officials are in 

the process of planning additional efforts.

Providing high-quality and balanced CVE-related training is a difficult task 

given the complexity and sensitivities surrounding the phenomenon of 

violent extremism. However, misinformation about the threat and 

dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm security efforts by 

unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners. The 

CVE national strategy implementation plan commits the federal 

government, including DHS and DOJ, to supporting state and local 

partners in their efforts to prevent violent extremism by providing CVErelated training. By identifying and communicating CVE-related training 

topics, DOJ could better demonstrate the extent to which it is fulfilling 

departmental CVE-related responsibilities as established in the 

implementation plan for the CVE national strategy. In addition, by 

proactively soliciting feedback from participants in informal CVE-related 

training on a more consistent basis, FBI field offices and USAOs could 

more effectively obtain information on the strengths and weaknesses of 

their presentations and briefings, and thus better ensure their quality.

To better enable DOJ to demonstrate the extent to which it is fulfilling its 

CVE-related training responsibilities, we recommend that the Deputy 

Attorney General identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related 

training—including training that is directly related to CVE or that has 

ancillary benefits for CVE—and communicate the topics to DOJ 

components.

To obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which CVErelated programs are yielding the desired outcomes and complying with 

the CVE national strategy, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney 

General direct USAOs and the Director of the FBI’s Office of Public 

Affairs direct FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more 

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 31 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

consistently from participants in informal training, such as presentations 

and briefings, that covers the type of information addressed in the CVE 

national strategy.

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, 

ODNI, and DOD for their review and comment. We received written 

comments from DHS and DOJ, which are reproduced in full in 

appendixes V and VI, respectively. DHS generally agreed with the

findings in its comments, and DOJ agreed with one of the 

recommendations in this report, but disagreed with the other

recommendation. ODNI and DOD did not provide written comments on 

the draft report. However, ODNI provided technical comments, as did 

DHS and DOJ, which we incorporated throughout the report as 

appropriate. 

In its written comments, DHS noted that the report recognizes DHS’s 

efforts to develop and improve the quality of CVE training and identified 

additional efforts that the department is taking to improve communication 

with its various CVE stakeholders and to implement the priorities outlined 

in its framework for vetting CVE training. For example, DHS stated that it 

will be hosting a CVE train-the-trainer workshop in September 2012, and 

identifying trainers on its online CVE training portal who meet the 

standards included in DHS’s training guidance and best practices. DHS 

also stated that it remains committed to improving and expanding its 

development of CVE resources and providing information about those 

resources to state and local partners.

DOJ stated that it generally agrees with the recommendation that the 

Deputy Attorney General and the Director of FBI’s Office of Public Affairs 

direct USAOs and FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more 

consistently from participants in informal training that covers the type of 

information addressed in the CVE national strategy. The department 

stated that it will develop a plan of action that describes how USAOs and 

FBI field offices will implement this recommendation. Developing such a 

plan should address the intent of our recommendations. 

DOJ, however, disagreed with the recommendation that the Deputy 

Attorney General identify principal topics that encompass CVE-related 

training and communicate those topics to DOJ components. According to 

DOJ, the CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns DOJ, 

through its USAOs, primary responsibility for expanding the scope of 

engagement and outreach events and initiatives that may have direct or 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

indirect benefits for CVE; however, the plan does not assign the 

department primary responsibility for developing specific CVE-related 

training. We recognize that DOJ is not the lead agency for the subsection 

of the implementation plan related to the development of standardized 

CVE training; however, the CVE implementation plan nonetheless 

assigns DOJ as a lead or partner agency for other CVE training-related 

activities. For example, the implementation plan states that the FBI will 

lead the development of CVE-specific education modules and that DOJ 

will colead (1) the expansion of briefings about violent extremism for state 

and local law enforcement and government, and (2) the expansion of 

briefing efforts to raise community awareness about the threat of 

radicalization to violence. In addition, the implementation plan directs the 

FBI to develop a CVE Coordination Office, and according to the FBI, that 

office is in the process of developing CVE-related training. Given that 

DOJ has been identified as a lead or partner agency for several training 

related activities identified in the implementation plan, identifying CVE 

training topics could help DOJ demonstrate the extent to which it is 

fulfilling its responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. Identifying 

CVE training topics could also help the FBI determine what issues it 

should be addressing in the training that its CVE Coordination Office is 

developing, and assist the department in being able to publicly account 

for the CVE-related training that the department provides or funds.

DOJ also stated in its comments that the draft report recommended that 

DOJ redefine its cultural competency training and community outreach 

efforts (which may have benefits for CVE) as “CVE.” DOJ then stated that 

redefining these efforts as such would be imprecise and potentially 

counterproductive, and that labeling these efforts as CVE would suggest 

that they are driven by security efforts, when they are not. To clarify, the 

report does not include a recommendation that DOJ redefine or label its 

cultural competency training and community outreach efforts as CVE. 

Although we included these topics in the framework we used to identify

potentially CVE-related training for the purpose of this review, the

recommendation was that DOJ identify principal topics that encompass 

CVE-related training and communicate such topics to DOJ components. 

We defer to the department to determine which topics are appropriate to 

cover in its CVE-related training.
 

Page 33 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate 

congressional committees. We will also send copies to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and 

the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, this report will be made 

publicly available at no extra charge on the GAO Website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix VII.

Eileen R. Larence

Director

Homeland Security and Justice
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

This report answers the following questions:

1. To what extent have the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified and communicated topics 

that countering violent extremism-related (CVE-related) training 

addresses to their components and state and local partners?

2. What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners 

who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by 

DHS and DOJ?

3. What actions, if any, have DHS and DOJ taken to improve the quality 

of CVE-related training?

To determine the extent to which DHS and DOJ identified and 

communicated topics that should be addressed by CVE-related training, 

we met with officials from both departments to discuss how they define 

CVE-related training, which departmental training programs were relevant 

to our review, and how the departments communicated principal CVErelated training topics to relevant components and state and local 

partners. We then analyzed this information to assess the extent to which 

the departments’ efforts allow them to demonstrate fulfillment of their 

CVE-related training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. We 

also met with officials from the Department of Defense (DOD) and Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) who possess knowledge 

about CVE-related training and who are involved in interagency efforts 

related to CVE. More specifically, we met with officials from the 

components and offices listed in table 3.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 3: Components and Offices Interviewed 

DHS Office of the Secretary, Counterterrorism Working Group

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

DOJ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Counterterrorism Division

Inspection Division

Office of Public Affairs

Training Division

National Security Branch

Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA)

Community Relations Service (CRS)

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

DOD Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

ODNI National Counterterrorism Center

Source: GAO.

To obtain additional views on CVE-related training provided or funded by 

DHS or DOJ, we interviewed representatives from nine state and local 

law enforcement agencies and law enforcement representative 

organizations involved with federal CVE-related training efforts. They 

included the Minneapolis Police Department, the Los Angeles Police 

Department, the Las Vegas Sheriff’s Department, the Arkansas State 

Police Program, the Dearborn Police Department, the National Sheriff’s 

Association, the Major City Chief’s Association, the International 

Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, and the National 

Consortium for Advanced Policing. We selected these agencies and 

organizations based on their involvement with CVE-related training efforts 

and the extent to which they collaborate with DHS or DOJ on CVE-related 

training. While the views of these entities do not represent the views of all 

agencies and organizations involved in CVE-related training, these 

entities were able to offer helpful perspectives for the purpose of this 

review. We also interviewed individuals with expertise in CVE, such as 

academic researchers who have published on CVE-related topics and 

researchers from organizations that study CVE-related topics, to obtain 

their views on topics CVE-related training should address and identify 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

potential training programs to include in our review. They included 

individuals from the Georgetown University Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal 

Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, the RAND Corporation, the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the International Centre for the 

Study of Radicalisation, and the National Consortium for the Study of 

Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.1

In addition, we obtained the views of state and local grantees regarding 

the clarity of guidance FEMA provides to recipients of grant funds that are 

eligible for CVE-related training by conducting a web-based survey of 51 

training points of contact within state administrative agencies.

We selected these individuals 

based on the depth of their experience with, and knowledge of, CVE; the 

relevance of their publications; referrals from other practitioners; and to 

develop a sample that represented various sectors (e.g., academic, 

advocacy, etc.). They provided valuable insight even though the 

perspectives they offered are not generalizable.

2

 

1

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism is an 

independent consortium funded in part by DHS S&T.

To help 

develop our questionnaire, we conducted pretests with officials from three 

state administrative agencies and made modifications to the 

questionnaire as necessary based on their input. In July 2012, we sent emails with links to our web-based questionnaire and unique login 

information to each member of our sample. Nonresponding state 

administrative agencies were sent additional e-mails, and we also made 

telephone calls to nonrespondents encouraging them to respond. Our 

survey closed at the end of July 2012. We received a total of 30 complete 

responses, for an overall response rate of 59 percent. To assess whether 

there are consistent differences between respondents and 

nonrespondents that might affect conclusions drawn based on our survey 

results, we examined the geographic regions and sizes of states of the 

state administrative agencies. We found that the state administrative 

agencies that responded to our survey come from a mix of different states 

in terms of size and region of the country. For example, state 

administrative agencies from some states with large populations, such as 

New York and Pennsylvania, responded to the survey, but state 

administrative agencies from some other states with large populations, 

2

The state administrative agencies that we surveyed are responsible for managing DHS 

grant awards to states and the District of Columbia that are eligible for CVE-related 

training and ensuring that grant recipients comply with grant requirements.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

such as California and Texas, did not. As a result, the experiences of 

state administrative agencies from some of the larger states may not be 

captured in our survey results. Nevertheless, the survey results provide 

insights into the level of clarity about DHS CVE-related guidance for other 

grantees.

To obtain a better understanding of the departments’ CVE-related training 

responsibilities, we requested information from DOJ and DHS on the 

approximate number and type of participants that attended training we 

determined was CVE-related and the estimated cost. We provide 

additional details on how we classified training as CVE-related below. We 

assessed the reliability of the training data provided by interviewing 

agency officials familiar with the data to learn more about the processes 

used to collect, record, and analyze the data. For example, we found that 

several training providers collected information on the number and type of 

participants through sign-in sheets. We used these data to approximate 

the dollar amount spent by agencies on CVE-related training in appendix 

III.3 As described above, we determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for showing general trends in attendance and spending, but some 

agencies either did not record participant data, and thus could not provide 

them; did not record participant figures and provided estimates of 

attendance based on the instructor’s recall; or recorded participant 

figures, but not the participants’ places of employment, so they could not 

specify how many of the attendees were from state and local versus 

federal entities. We noted these instances in our report.

During our initial interviews with DHS and DOJ, officials expressed 

difficulty in responding to our request for CVE-related training materials, 

in part because agency officials were not clear on which training should 

be considered CVE-related. To facilitate our request for course materials 

for CVE-related training, we developed a framework to classify training as 

CVE-related based on our review and analysis of information from the 

following sources: (1) federal strategies related to violent extremism, such 

as Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 

 

3

We did not include the cost estimates for some of the training in appendix III because the 

FBI considers those estimates to be law enforcement sensitive. 

Identifying CVE-Related 

Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

States4 and its associated implementation plan;5

1. Radicalization addresses approaches that are based on research and 

accurate information to understanding the threat radicalization poses, 

how individuals may become radicalized, how individuals seek to 

radicalize Americans (threat of violent extremist recruitment), 

behaviors exhibited by radicalized individuals, or what works to 

prevent radicalization that results in violence.

(2) DHS and DOJ plans, 

reports, or strategies that address CVE-related training topics such as 

DHS’s CVE-related training Guidance and Best Practices; and (3) 

perspectives provided by individuals with CVE expertise. Specifically, we 

conducted a content analysis of our transcripts of interviews with experts 

and CVE-related documents to determine the current understanding of 

the content areas covered by CVE-related training and the knowledge 

state and local officials should possess or principles they should 

understand to effectively carry out CVE efforts. We then analyzed this 

information to identify similar themes and principles across the sources 

and grouped them together into three distinct content areas CVE-related 

training likely addresses:

2. Cultural competency seeks to enhance state and local law 

enforcement’s understanding of culture or religion, and civil rights and 

civil liberties, or their ability to distinguish, using information driven 

and standardized approaches, between violent extremism and legal 

behavior.

3. Community engagement addresses ways to build effective community 

partnerships, such as through outreach, and community capacity for 

the purpose of, among other things, mitigating threats posed by 

violent extremism.

We solicited feedback on this framework from DHS and DOJ. DHS 

Counterterrorism Working Group officials generally agreed with the 

content areas we identified, and we incorporated feedback the group 

provided, as appropriate. DOJ officials stated that they view the 

 

4

The White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 

United States, (Washington, D.C: August 2011), 1. The strategy defines violent extremists 

as individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political 

goals.

5

The White House, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to 

Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, (Washington, D.C: December 2011).
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

framework as reasonable for the purpose of our review. For this review, 

we considered CVE-related training to include instruction, presentations, 

briefings, or related outreach efforts conducted, sponsored, promoted, or 

otherwise supported by DOJ, DHS, or a respective component, to help 

state, local, or tribal entities related to the three aforementioned content 

areas.

We asked DHS and DOJ to identify and provide all course materials for 

any courses that they provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 

2011 through grant programs for state and local entities, including law 

enforcement officers and community members, assumed to be CVErelated based on GAO’s framework. We focused generally on training 

provided in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 because “countering violent 

extremism” is a relatively nascent term. In addition, we focused on 

training provided to state and local entities because the CVE national 

strategy emphasizes the importance of providing CVE-related training to 

these entities. While the FBI identified its National Academy as providing 

training that could be considered CVE-related, it did not identify any of its 

other programs as germane to our review. However, complaint letters 

raised concerns about FBI training that was CVE-related according to our 

framework that was provided through two other FBI programs— the 

Citizens’ Academy and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force. We 

assessed some of the training provided through these programs and 

determined the training to be CVE-related according to our framework. In 

addition, the FBI’s internal review of counterterrorism training, which 

included the FBI programs within the scope of our review, assessed the 

training materials against criteria for CVE-related training, thereby 

suggesting that these programs may have provided training that was 

CVE-related. Accordingly, we requested course materials on these 

programs, as well as the Community Relations Executive Seminar 

Training Program, which is an abbreviated version of the Citizens’ 

Academy.

We received approximately 290 presentations, briefings, and course 

materials from two components within DHS and four within DOJ. In some 

cases, DHS and DOJ offices provided us only with course abstracts or 

agendas instead of the full presentations or course materials because (1) 

they contracted the training with an outside provider and did not retain all 

of the associated training materials or (2) the training materials were 

particularly voluminous and, on the basis of discussions with the offices, 

we agreed that the course abstracts or agendas would enable us to 

sufficiently determine the relevancy of the training to our review. In those 

cases, we determined CVE-relevancy based on the agenda or abstract 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

alone. We reviewed these training materials to assess whether each of 

the individual courses, presentations, briefings, and other training-related 

activities undertaken or funded by DHS and DOJ agencies addressed 

one or more of the three content areas described above. If they 

addressed any of these content areas, we considered them CVE-related, 

even if the primary focus of the materials was not CVE-related. To ensure 

consistency in our analysis, two analysts independently reviewed the 

materials for each training and recorded their assessment of whether the 

training addressed each content area. Any discrepancies in the initial 

determinations were then discussed and reconciled.

To determine what concerns, if any, participants raised about CVErelated training, we reviewed course evaluations completed by 

participants of CVE-related training offered by DHS I&A, DHS Office for

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DOJ BJA, and the FBI, and identified 

complaints or concerns about CVE-related training made formally in 

writing. We limited our analysis to training that was provided or funded by 

DHS or DOJ during fiscal years 2010 or 2011 and provided to a state or 

local entity (e.g., police department, community group, or fusion center).6

To identify formally submitted or documented complaints or concerns 

participants expressed, we asked DHS and DOJ to identify those 

submitted in writing to DHS or DOJ, or articulated to DHS or DOJ through 

other means but subsequently documented by the agency, from fiscal 

years 2010 through 2011. We also conducted keyword searches using 

LexisNexis and Google to identify concerns that were raised by either 

Two analysts independently reviewed 8,424 course evaluations from six 

training programs to consistently determine which ones included 

concerns or complaints. The analysts also assessed the nature of the 

concerns and complaints and assigned each complaint to one of three 

categories: (1) politically or culturally biased, (2) offensive, or (3) 

inaccurate. Where there were discrepancies between the analysts, they 

were resolved through supervisory review.

 

6

A fusion center is generally a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 

resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability 

to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. See Global 

Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing 

Information and Intelligence in a New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating 

Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels—Law Enforcement Intelligence, 

Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006).

Identifying Concerns about 

CVE-Related Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

individuals or advocacy groups that were submitted in writing to DHS or 

DOJ. In addition, we interviewed representatives, including leaders, of 

select advocacy groups that raised concerns about CVE-related training 

to identify what concerns and complaints, if any, they submitted in writing 

to DHS or DOJ on behalf of training participants. The advocacy and civil 

liberties organizations we interviewed included the American Civil 

Liberties Union, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the 

Council on American Islamic Relations, and the Muslim Public Affairs 

Council. We selected these organizations based on their leadership in 

raising concerns we identified (e.g., by virtue of being the primary 

signatories) and upon the recommendation of other advocacy groups. 

These interviews also enabled us to confirm or obtain additional views on 

the formally documented complaints DHS or DOJ provided. Through 

these approaches, we identified a total of six letters of complaint 

regarding 18 alleged incidents of biased CVE and counterterrorism 

training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded during fiscal years 2010 and 

2011. Given that the scope of this review is limited to CVE-related training 

provided to state and local officials and community members, and not 

training that is exclusively provided to federal officials, we determined that 

7 of the alleged incidents described in five of the letters were relevant to 

this review. We also interviewed relevant DHS and DOJ officials to obtain 

their perspectives on the concerns raised in the written complaints and 

information on any actions agencies took in response to these incidents.

To address what actions, if any, DHS and DOJ have taken overall to 

improve the quality of CVE-related training, we interviewed DHS and DOJ 

officials responsible for providing or funding CVE-related training to 

inquire about any current or pending guidance, whether documented or 

undocumented, they adhere to when vetting training materials and 

instructors and other actions they have taken to ensure the quality of 

CVE-related training. We reviewed relevant DHS and DOJ documents 

including recently released guidance and best practices for training that 

DHS, DOJ, and the FBI developed. We also analyzed FBI and DOJ data 

from training reviews and information on how DHS and DOJ review and 

vet training curricula and instructors. Specifically, we analyzed the 

counterterrorism training materials that the FBI determined were 

inappropriate as a result of its internal review, which the FBI undertook to 

identify and purge potentially objectionable training materials. This 

analysis enabled us to better understand the review results with regard to 

training materials that were CVE-related under our framework, and 

provided context for the quality assurance steps FBI has taken in 

response to the review. To focus our analysis on training materials 

Identifying DHS and DOJ 

Efforts to Improve the 

Quality of CVE-Related 

Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

included in the FBI’s review that were CVE-related, one analyst assessed 

which of these training materials were CVE-related, according to our 

framework, and if the materials were CVE-related, the analyst entered the 

FBI’s observations and additional data about that training into a data 

collection form. A second analyst then reviewed these results. When 

there was disagreement, the two reviewers discussed the material, 

reached agreement, and modified the entries as necessary to ensure 

concurrence regarding which of the training materials included in the 

FBI’s review were germane to our review. The FBI considers the 

methodology it used to conduct its internal review and our analysis of the 

training materials that the FBI considered objectionable to be For Official 

Use Only; therefore, we did not include that information in this report.

In addition, we conducted a site visit in San Diego, California, in January 

2012, where DHS hosted a pilot of a CVE-related course under 

development. During the site visit, we observed the pilot training, and 

interviewed DHS officials who were sponsoring the training and local 

agencies that had developed and delivered the course curriculum. On the 

basis of the information we collected, we evaluated DHS’s adherence to 

its own CVE-related training guidance. We also assessed DHS and DOJ 

guidance and actions related to guidance provided by departmental 

leadership, such as DOJ training guidance issued to its components.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 through October

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the 

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice 

Are Developing

Page 43 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

DHS is currently working with its components and relevant state and local 

entities to develop and implement CVE-focused training for state and 

local law enforcement officers, state police academy recruits, correctional 

facility officers, and new federal law enforcement officers. DHS’s Principal 

Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, who heads the department’s CVE 

efforts, has testified that developing CVE-related training is a priority for 

the department because inappropriate or inaccurate training undermines 

community partnerships and negatively affects efforts of law enforcement 

to identify legitimate behaviors and indicators of violent extremism.1

• A continuing education CVE curriculum for frontline and executive 

state and local law enforcement that DHS is developing with the Los 

Angeles Police Department, Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC), 

and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP).

DHS 

has determined that CVE-related training should address: violent 

extremism (e.g., the threat it poses), cultural demystification (e.g., 

education on culture and religion), community partnerships (e.g., how to 

build them), and community policing efforts (e.g., how to apply community 

policing efforts to CVE). Accordingly, the DHS Counterterrorism Working 

Group, which is overseen by the Principal Deputy Counterterrorism 

Coordinator, is developing training that addresses these topics. These 

trainings include the following:

2

 

1

The American Muslim Response to Hearings on Radicalization within their Community, 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of John 

Cohen, Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator and Senior Advisor to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security).

DHS 

hosted a first pilot for this course in San Diego, California, in January 

2012 that 45 state and local law enforcement officials attended. The 

pilot consisted of 3 days of classroom instruction and student 

participation activities. According to Counterterrorism Working Group 

officials, DHS held a second pilot in the National Capital Region in 

July 2012, and a third pilot in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in August 2012. 

In July 2012, DHS also presented the curriculum at a CVE conference 

it hosted in Washington, D.C., and according to Counterterrorism 

2

MCC is a professional association that is to provide a forum for executives to share 

ideas, experiences, and strategies for addressing the challenges of policing large urban 

communities. MCC membership is composed of police chiefs and sheriffs of the 63 largest 

law enforcement agencies in the United States and 7 largest in Canada. The National 

Consortium for Advanced Policing brings together professionals with backgrounds in law 

enforcement, academia, intelligence, government service, and homeland security to 

provide law enforcement training and technical assistance programs. 

Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the 

Departments of Homeland Security and 

Justice Are Developing
Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the 

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice 

Are Developing

Page 44 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Working Group officials, the department is working to enhance the 

curriculum based on feedback that conference attendees provided. 

MCC has passed a motion to adopt the curriculum, which DHS aims 

to implement in collaboration with state and local partners in 2013.

• CVE-related training modules for state police academies, which DHS 

is developing in collaboration with the International Association of 

Chiefs of Police (IACP).3

• A CVE awareness training for correctional facility, probation, and 

patrol officers at the state and local levels that DHS is working to 

develop in collaboration with the Bureau of Prisons, the FBI National 

Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Interagency Threat Assessment 

Coordination Group.

These training modules will be 1 to 2 hours 

in length, and are intended for police recruits. DHS plans for police 

academies to introduce the modules into their training and to make 

them available online for police recruits by the end of 2012.

4

Further, according to DHS officials, the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center has finalized a CVE-related training course that it 

integrated into its existing training for recruits. In February 2012, DHS 

hosted a symposium on the curriculum, and as of July 2012, FLETC had 

taught the curriculum to about 190 students. In addition, according to 

DHS officials, FLETC is also in the process of integrating aspects of the 

DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberty’s cultural competency 

training, which is described in detail in appendix III, into all new CVE 

curriculum and training efforts.

Counterterrorism Working Group officials 

reported that DHS completed pilots for this training in Maryland in 

March 2012 and in California in July 2012. FEMA is also developing a 

curriculum for rural correctional facility management.

Within DOJ, the FBI is also developing CVE-related training. The CVE 

national strategy implementation plan tasks FBI with establishing a CVE 

 

3

IACP is a nonprofit membership organization of police executives, with over 20,000 

members in over 100 countries. IACP’s leadership consists of the operating chief 

executives of international, federal, state, and local agencies of all sizes.

4

The FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force, among other things, coordinates 

information and intelligence gathering initiatives and synthesizes terrorism intelligence for 

use by FBI entities, as well as other agencies in the Intelligence Community. The 

Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group was established at the National 

Counterterrorism Center to help DHS, the FBI, and other agencies produce federally 

coordinated, terrorism-related information products tailored to the needs of state, local, 

tribal, and territorial governments and private sector partners.
Appendix II: CVE-Related Training the 

Departments of Homeland Security and Justice 

Are Developing

Page 45 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Coordination Office that will, as part of its activities, coordinate with the 

National Task Force on CVE-specific education and awareness 

modules.5

 

5

The National Task Force, led by DOJ and DHS, was established in November 2010 to 

help coordinate community engagement at the national level. It includes all departments 

and agencies involved in relevant community engagement efforts and focuses on 

compiling local, national, and international best practices and disseminating these to the 

field. The task force is also responsible for connecting field-based federal components to 

the full range of U.S. government officials involved in community engagement to maximize 

partnerships, coordination, and resource sharing.

According to FBI officials, the FBI established a CVE office in 

January 2012, and as of August 2012, had assigned staff to the office and 

was in the process of developing CVE-related training modules. In 

particular, the CVE Office developed and presented a CVE-related 

training module to FBI public affairs specialists and community outreach 

coordinators and specialists in FBI field offices from April through August, 

2012, according to FBI officials. FBI officials also reported that the CVE 

Office is collaborating with the FBI Counterterrorism Division to develop a 

CVE-related training module for FBI special agents and mid- and seniorlevel managers that it plans to complete in December 2012 and 

implement in early 2013.
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 46 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

DOJ and DHS components provided training that was CVE-related 

according to our framework to more than 28,000 state and local entities, 

including law enforcement officials, fusion center personnel, and 

community members, during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. That is, DOJ 

and DHS components provided training, including courses, briefings, 

presentations, and workshops, that addressed one or more of the three 

CVE-related training topical areas we identified: (1) the phenomenon of 

violent extremism and the threat posed by radicalization that leads to 

violence; (2) cultural competency and how to distinguish between criminal 

and constitutionally protected cultural and religious behaviors; and (3) 

how to build effective community partnerships to, among other things, 

mitigate threats posed by violent extremism.1 The majority of these 

trainings did not have the term “CVE” in their titles, a fact that DOJ and 

DHS officials attributed to CVE being a relatively new concept, or that the 

trainings had been developed for purposes other than CVE. Nonetheless, 

they provided some instruction on at least one of the three CVE-related 

training topics we identified, and thus are considered CVE-related for the 

purpose of this review. Although the CVE-related trainings that DOJ and 

DHS provided collectively addressed all three CVE-related training topics, 

the trainings more frequently addressed the phenomenon of violent 

extremism and cultural competency than community engagement. The 

specific topics addressed by each training DOJ and DHS components 

provided during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 are described in the tables 

that follow. In addition, the DOJ grant-funded State and Local AntiTerrorism Training (SLATT) Program provided CVE-related training to 

approximately 11,000 state and local law enforcement officials.

 

1

For information about this framework and how we identified these topical areas, see 

appendix I. 

Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided 

or Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 47 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Within DOJ, the FBI, CRS, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) provided 

CVE-related training directly to state and local entities during fiscal years 

2010 and 2011.2 In total, these entities provided CVE-related training to 

more than 15,000 state and local law enforcement and community 

members. More specifically, the FBI National Academy, the FBI National 

Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) Program, select FBI field offices, 

CRS, and about half of USAOs (48 of 93 offices) provided CVE-related 

training to law enforcement. In addition, the FBI’s Citizens’ Academy and 

Community Relations Executive Seminar Training (CREST) outreach 

programs provided CVE-related training to community members. Tables 

4, 5, and 6 provide more detailed information on these programs and 

trainings.

 

2

The FBI’s mission is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign 

intelligence threats, uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and provide 

leadership and criminal justice services to agencies and partners. CRS is DOJ’s DOJ’s 

“peacemaker” for community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, 

and national origin. It is dedicated to assisting state and local units of government, private 

and public organizations, and community groups with preventing and resolving racial and 

ethnic tensions, incidents, and civil disorders, and in restoring racial stability and harmony. 

According to DOJ, pursuant to the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes 

Prevention Act, CRS also works with communities to develop strategies to prevent and 

respond more effectively to alleged violent hate crimes committed on the basis of race, 

color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, or disability. See 

generally Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E, 123 Stat. 2190, 2835 (2009). See also 18 U.S.C. 

§ 249. 

CVE-Related Training That 

DOJ Components Provided
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 48 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 4: CVE-Related Training FBI Provided to State and Local Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

Training program and description Audience

CVE content areas 

addressed

Approximate 

number of state 

and local 

participants

National Academy

The FBI National Academy provides undergraduate and graduate 

courses through 10-week training sessions on a range of topics, 

such as terrorism, law, and leadership development. Participation 

is by invitation only, and the academy offers four sessions of 

courses each year. Three National Academy courses were 

provided in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that were CVE-related:

Mid- to seniorlevel federal, 

state, local, and 

international law 

enforcement 

officials. 

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

Community 

engagement

Total across three 

trainings described 

below: 323

Legal Aspects of Policing in Today’s War on Terrorism focuses on 

policing during the current war on terrorism, and is intended to 

provide officers with a comprehensive understanding of judicial 

and legislative trends affecting policing and policy development. It 

also emphasizes the importance of protecting civil liberties. 

Cultural competency 78

Leadership in Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, 

familiarize officers with various types of U.S. domestic terrorist 

groups and educate them on the historical development of violent 

Islamic extremism. This course is taught in a symposium format 

and includes sessions on Middle Eastern culture and basic Islamic 

beliefs.a 

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

83

Understanding Terrorism: Mindset, Methodology, and Response

aims to provide students with an understanding of government 

responses to domestic terrorism. Topics addressed by this course 

include, among other things, definitions for terrorism and the 

mindset and grievances of terrorists, including violent extremists.

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

Community 

engagement

162

NJTTF Program

The FBI has more than 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) 

across the United States, in which more than 4,000 

representatives from state, local, and federal agencies work 

together to combat terrorism at a regional level. The NJTTF is 

responsible for managing the JTTF program and coordinating the 

efforts of regional task forces. It also provides training to task force 

officers and members. Three NJTTF courses were provided in 

fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that were CVE-related:

State and local 

task force 

officers; campus 

liaison agents, 

who serve as an 

FBI resource and 

point of contact 

for academic 

institutions; and 

FBI personnel.

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

Community 

engagement

Total across three 

trainings described 

below: up to 1,393

Campus Liaison Agents Conference—2-day conference intended 

to, among other things, increase awareness and provide insight 

into the detection and deterrence of radicalization and recruitment 

of college students. 

Campus liaison 

agents, state and 

local officials, 

and other federal 

employees. 

Violent radicalization 43

JTTF Task Force Officer Orientation and Operations Course—

course that the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, 

DHS, and the FBI taught that included a 4-hour block of instruction 

on CVE that addressed topics including Islamic culture, 

radicalization, and Islamism.b

State and local 

task force officers

and members. 

 

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

Community 

engagement

672
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 49 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Training program and description Audience

CVE content areas 

addressed

Approximate 

number of state 

and local 

participants

International Terrorism Origins, Ideologies, and Methods Regional 

Courses—courses that CTC and the FBI taught to increase the 

knowledge base of counterterrorism practitioners. The specific 

topics covered in each course varied, but examples of topics they 

addressed included the origins of Islam, the diversity of cultures 

among Muslim Americans, the process by which individuals may 

be radicalized for jihad, and how extremists use the Internet for 

recruitment purposes. 

FBI personnel 

working on 

counterterrorism 

issues and task 

force members.

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

up to 678

Citizens’ Academy

c

Ten-session program FBI field offices teach one or two times per 

year that provides business, religious, civil, and community 

leaders with an overview of the FBI. Each field office develops its 

own curriculum addressing a range of topics, which can include a 

session on counterterrorism that addresses CVE topics. GAO 

reviewed the topics addressed at Citizens’ Academy programs 

provided by 42 of FBI’s 56 field offices in fiscal years 2010 and 

2011, and these offices provided a total of 61 presentations 

related to counterterrorism. FBI was able to provide GAO with 56 

of these presentations, 35 of which were CVE-related. For 

example, these presentations addressed various types of violent 

extremists and the threats they pose, as well as FBI tenets for 

ensuring civil rights and civil liberties when undertaking 

investigations.

d

e

Business, 

religious, civil, 

and community 

leaders.

 

Violent radicalization

Cultural competency

945

CREST

CREST is a 3- to 4-hour, more focused version of the Citizens’ 

Academy that FBI field offices teach and conducted in partnership 

with a specific community group or organization. The topical focus 

of CREST sessions is customized to meet the needs of each 

organization. GAO’s review of CREST agendas from 17 FBI field 

offices revealed that they provided a total of eight CREST 

sessions that related to counterterrorism during fiscal years 2010 

and 2011. FBI was able to provide GAO with four of these 

presentations, all of which were CVE-related because they, for 

example, educated participants about various types of violent 

extremists and extremist groups.

Community 

group and 

organization 

members. 

Violent radicalization

Community 

engagement

165

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information.

Notes: Although this table identifies the CVE topics each training addressed, this is not meant to 

suggest CVE was their explicit or primary focus. Some of the trainings described in the table may 

have also addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified because they are not the focus 

of this review. In addition, this table excludes any training these programs provided that was not CVErelated according to our framework. The table also excludes data on training costs and information on 

additional trainings that FBI field offices provided that were CVE-related according to our framework 

because the FBI considered this information to be law enforcement sensitive. 

a

This course is a combined effort of the FBI and the SLATT Program, which is described in table 8, 

and SLATT program instructors teach some National Academy course modules. To avoid double 

counting participants and costs, training SLATT provided at the National Academy is not included in 

the SLATT data presented in table 8. 
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 50 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

b

CTC is part of the Department of Defense. It directs multiple graduate-level seminars on terrorism 

and counterterrorism and directs counterterrorism educational programs for partner government 

agencies, among other things. 

c

This figure includes all course participants because the FBI could not provide data specific to state 

and local attendees. According to the FBI, even though it collects the names and positions of 

participants, it does not collect the names of the organizations for which they work, and the FBI would 

need this information to specify the number of state and local participants. 

d

According to the FBI, the mission of its Community Outreach Program, of which the Citizens’ 

Academy and CREST programs are a part, is to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI in 

order to enlist the cooperation and support of the public in the common interest of fighting terrorism 

and other criminal activity. Even though, according to the FBI, its outreach programs may produce a 

“CVE impact” on community partners by helping to build trust and empower communities to identify 

problems on their own, the Citizens’ Academy is a community relations outreach effort that is not 

undertaken specifically for CVE and no formal CVE-related training curriculum is provided within the 

Citizens’ Academy sessions. Although we agree that the FBI’s outreach programs may have a CVE 

impact, according to our framework for CVE-related training, instruction provided through the Citizens’ 

Academy in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 also constituted CVE-related training. Accordingly, we are 

categorizing it as CVE-related in our analysis. 

e

According to the FBI, field offices could not provide presentation materials in some instances 

because the presenter no longer has a copy of them, the presenter retired or transferred away from 

the field office, or the field office could otherwise not locate the presentation materials. 

Although we determined that CRS provided CVE-related training 

according to our framework, CRS officials emphasized that the service’s 

mission does not include any national security, counterterrorism, or CVErelated training efforts. CRS works with communities to help address 

tension associated with allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, 

color, or national origin. CRS also works with communities to develop 

strategies to prevent and respond more effectively to alleged violent hate 

crimes on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, 

sexual orientation, religion, or disability. According to CRS officials, 

through its work preventing hate crimes, CRS helps develop relationships 

among Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities who may be targeted for 

hate violence by violent extremists, including supremacists, and other 

community members, as well as local government and law enforcement 

officials. As a result, CRS does not conduct activities or programs with the 

express goal of CVE, but recognizes that its ability to help promote 

dialogue and develop strong relationships to create a sense of inclusion 

in communities may have ancillary CVE benefits in preventing violent 

extremism.
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 51 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 5: CVE-Related Training CRS Provided to State and Local Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

Description Audience 

CVE content 

areas 

addressed

Approximate 

number of state 

and local 

participants

Estimated

cost

Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Course

Course provided to enhance law enforcement officers’ 

understanding of and sensitivity to cultural and religious 

practices of Arab, Muslim, and Sikh American communities. 

This course is 2-4 hours in duration and is generally 

provided through two modules, one of which focuses on the 

cultural and religious practices of Arab-Americans and 

Muslims and the other of which focuses on cultural and 

religious practices of Sikhs. 

State and local law 

enforcement 

officers

Cultural 

competency

Community 

engagement

2,765 $7,900 a

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information.

b

a

CRS does not systematically collect or use the number of attendees at CRS-delivered training as a 

data reference point or reporting requirement. CRS estimated the number of participants based on 

CRS staffs’ observations at the time they delivered the course. While some staff recorded the 

information in their individual office files, others relied upon their memory to provide the data. 

b

This estimate includes expenses CRS instructors who traveled to provide instruction incurred. It does 

not include the cost of instructors’ time or the cost to develop the course. Although CRS paid a 

contractor to develop the course content in 2003 that was delivered in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, 

CRS cannot provide information on the cost of course development because CRS disposed of this 

information according to its record retention schedule. 
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 52 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 6: CVE-Related Training USAOs Provided to State and Local Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

Training description Audience

CVE content areas 

addressed

Approximate 

number of 

participants

DOJ has 93 USAOs across the United States, 48 (52%) of which provided, 

cohosted, or facilitated approximately 100 CVE-related trainings to state and 

local entities during fiscal years 2010 and 2011.a According to EOUSA officials, 

these trainings were generally provided through the Antiterrorism Advisory 

Council (ATAC) program. Each USAO has an ATAC, which includes a 

crosssection of federal, state, and local law enforcement; first responders; and 

private sector security personnel who work together to coordinate 

counterterrorism efforts in their communities by, among other things, conducting 

trainings. Each USAO has an ATAC coordinator who is responsible for initiating 

training programs, and law enforcement coordinators within offices may also 

help facilitate trainings in their districts. CVE-related trainings may be offered as 

stand-alone courses or at workshops or conferences, and may be provided by a 

USAO representative, a private contractor, or in coordination with another 

federal office or program, such as FBI JTTF, SLATT (described below), the 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute (described below), CRS, 

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), or CTC.

Of the 100 CVE-related trainings, about a third—34—were facilitated by USAOs 

but provided by SLATT, CRS, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, NCTC, 

or CTC, as follows:

b

• Twenty-one were provided by SLATT.

• Five were provided by CRS.

• Four were provided by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.

• Four were provided by NCTC.

• Two were provided by CTC.

c

USAO representatives or a third party provided the remaining two-thirds of 

CVE-related training at events that USAOs hosted or cohosted. For example:

d

• Two USAOs cosponsored a conference on counterterrorism in 2010 and 

2011 with FBI and the state in which their districts are located. The 2010 

conference included a presentation on terrorism recruitment that addressed 

the radicalization of American-based Somalis, and the 2011 conference 

included a presentation on the ideologies of domestic terrorists, including 

violent extremists.

• One USAO hosted a 3-hour symposium on homegrown terrorism that 

provided state and local law enforcement professionals with information on 

how to recognize and protect against the threat it poses. For example, 

during the symposium, a presenter provided a review of how terrorists use 

the Internet to recruit jihadists and case studies of U.S. citizens that were 

recruited.

• Another USAO sponsored a conference on global terrorism in 2010 and 

2011. The 2010 conference included a presentation on threats posed by 

radicalization and Islamic extremism in the United States, and the 2011 

conference included a presentation made by an FBI agent and a former 

defendant charged with providing material support to al Qaeda that 

addressed radicalization. 

Federal, 

state, and 

local law 

enforcement 

officers

USAOs provided or 

facilitated 66 CVErelated trainings in 

fiscal years 2010 

and 2011 excluding 

trainings provided by 

CRS, SLATT, the 

Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties

Institute, CTC, and 

NCTC. Of these 66 

trainings:

• 60 addressed 

violent 

radicalization,

• 43 addressed 

cultural 

competency, 

and

• 8 addressed 

community 

engagement. e

7,700 

 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by EOUSA and USAOs.

f
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 53 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Notes: Even though this table identifies the CVE topics USAO trainings addressed, this is not meant 

to suggest CVE was their explicit or primary focus. Some of the trainings described in the table also 

addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified because they are not the focus of this 

review. In addition, even though USAOs provided us with the total cost for the trainings that they 

provided or sponsored, they were not able to provide the cost of the portion of the course that was 

CVE-related. As a result, according to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the estimates 

provided are likely significantly larger than should be attributed to CVE-related training. Accordingly, 

we are not including them in this table. 

a

Of the 93 USAOs, 50 indicated that they may have provided training that was CVE-related according 

to our framework. Upon reviewing training materials from these 50 offices, we determined that 48 

offices provided CVE-related training according to our framework. 

b

NCTC is an additional federal entity that provided CVE-related training to state and local entities 

during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. We are not presenting detailed information on these trainings 

given that the focus of this review is on DOJ and DHS. In addition to CVE-related training described 

in this report, NCTC’s Radicalization and Extremist Messages Group provided briefings on 25 

occasions to groups of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials during fiscal years 2010 and 

2011 on the dynamics of radicalization. In addition, NCTC reported that its Directorate of Strategic 

Operational Planning CVE Group provided an awareness briefing to community leaders, educators, 

and others on more than 15 occasions. The purpose of the briefings was to share information on the 

threat of terrorist recruitment in the United States, listen to the perspectives and insights of 

community members, and foster discussion on ways the federal government and communities can 

work together to protect youth and at-risk individuals from extremist radicalization efforts. 

c

According to NCTC officials, the center provided two additional briefings to USAO ATACs. 

d

Trainings sum to 36 rather than 34 because two federal providers contributed to 2 of the trainings. 

e

Numbers do not sum to 66 because some trainings addressed multiple content areas. 

f

The number of approximate participants is based on participant information provided by USAOs. It 

excludes participants in trainings organized by USAOs but provided by other federal entities (e.g., the 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties) to avoid double counting participants that are reported in 

other tables in this appendix. In some instances, USAOs were able to report the total number of 

participants, but not the number of total participants who were state and local versus federal officials. 

In addition, in some instances USAOs reported attendance by “other” officials, but did not specify the 

officials’ affiliations. Further, in select instances, USAOs reported a range of participants. To balance 

the potential impact of a differential over- or undercount on the estimates of the total number of 

participants, our estimates (1) include federal officials where they were grouped together with state 

and local officials (which may lead to overestimation), and (2) exclude “other” participants and use the 

low end of participant ranges (which may lead to underestimation). 

Within DHS, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute and I&A 

provided CVE-related training to approximately 3,410 state and local 

intelligence and law enforcement officials during fiscal years 2010 and 

2011.3

 

3

The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute provides training on issues at the 

intersection of homeland security and civil rights and civil liberties. I&A’s mission is to 

provide intelligence and information needed to keep the homeland safe, secure, and 

resilient, and the Homegrown Violent Extremism Branch is responsible for carrying out this 

mission as it pertains to homegrown violent extremism. 

This training consisted of two classroom-based courses that the 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute provided on about 40 

occasions; one CVE-focused workshop that the I&A State and Local 

CVE-Related Training That 

DHS Components 

Provided
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 54 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Program Office hosted; and 17 briefings that the I&A Homegrown Violent 

Extremism Branch (HVEB) provided in coordination with the FBI and 

NCTC at fusion centers and fusion center conferences. Table 7 provides 

more detailed information on each of these trainings.

Table 7: CVE-Related Training DHS Provided to State and Local Entities in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

DHS entity Training/description

Audience (state, 

local, and other 

participants)

CVE topical 

areas 

addressed 

Approximate 

number of 

state and local 

participants

Estimated

cost

Office for

Civil Rights 

and Civil 

Liberties 

Institute

State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center 

Training, Cultural Tactics for Intelligence 

Professionals module: 1-hour module that is part 

of a broader training course focused on, among 

other things, the diversity of the threat violent 

extremists pose and building cultural competency, 

including dispelling misconceptions about Islam.

Fusion center 

personnel

Violent 

radicalization

Cultural 

competency

Community 

engagement

736 $274,300

CVE through Community Partnerships course: 4 

to 8-hour course focused on the threat posed by 

violent extremism; building cultural competency, 

including dispelling misconceptions about Islam; 

and the role of communities in CVE, including 

contributions of Muslim communities in thwarting 

violent extremist plots and tips for interacting with 

community members.

Federal, state, 

local, and 

international law 

enforcement 

officers

Violent 

radicalization

Cultural 

competency

Community 

engagement

1,021 $444,800

CVE through Community Partnerships 

conference presentations: abbreviated version of 

CVE through Community Partnerships course 

curriculum presented at law enforcement 

conferences.

Federal, state and 

local law 

enforcement 

officers

Violent 

radicalization

Cultural 

competency

Community 

engagement

585 $108,500

I&A HVEB 

and State 

and Local 

Program

Office

Fusion center briefings: briefings provided by 

HVEB in collaboration with the FBI and NCTC to 

build awareness of the threat posed by, and 

indicators of, violent extremism, and to improve 

sharing of information related to violent extremism 

among federal, state, and local partners.

Fusion center 

personnel and 

other state and 

local law 

enforcement and 

intelligence 

professionals

Violent 

radicalization

930 $24,000 a b

National CVE Workshop: 2-day workshop led by 

the State and Local Program Office to build 

understanding of violent extremism and share best 

practices to understand the phenomenon of violent 

extremism in the United States, build awareness of 

the violent extremism threat to local communities, 

and support fusion centers to develop better 

intelligence products to support law enforcement 

customers. 

Fusion center 

personnel, 

intelligence 

commanders, and 

other federal 

partners 

Violent 

radicalization

Community 

engagement

138 $108,500c

Total 3,410 $960,100

Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 55 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Note: Even though this table identifies the CVE topics that each training addressed, this is not meant 

to suggest CVE was their explicit or primary focus. Some of the trainings described in the table may 

have also addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified because they are not the focus 

of this review. In addition, I&A officials do not identify I&A training presented in this table as CVErelated because I&A’s focus is on describing threats from an intelligence perspective and not on 

countering the phenomenon of violent extremism. Nonetheless, as the HVEB trainings described 

above address the topics of violent radicalization and community engagement, they constitute CVErelated training as conceived by our framework, and thus constitute CVE-related training for the 

purpose of our review. 

a

I&A provided the briefings at various fusion centers, and the approximate number of participants 

reflects the sum of estimated attendees at all of the briefings. I&A did not maintain records on the 

number of participants in the briefings because, according to I&A officials, I&A was generally invited 

to speak by fusion centers and did not sponsor the event. Accordingly, participant data are based on 

the recollection of I&A participants. 

b

I&A fusion center briefing costs exclude money spent on local travel. In addition to costs incurred by 

I&A, the FBI spent approximately $8,800 to attend and provide these fusion center briefings. 

c

The FBI spent approximately $6,300 to attend, and provide briefings at, the National CVE Workshop. 

DOJ and DHS also administered four grant programs during fiscal years 

2010 and 2011 that provided funding for which CVE-related training was 

an eligible expense: (1) the DOJ Community Policing Development (CPD) 

Program, (2) the DOJ Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant 

(JAG) Program, (3) the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), 

and (4) the DOJ SLATT Program. We reviewed grant documentation for 

CPD grant projects that DOJ identified as potentially CVE-related and 

determined that they were not used to pay for training that was CVErelated according to our framework. Information DHS and DOJ collect on 

grant projects funded through the HSGP and JAG programs suggests 

that minimal, if any, funds from these programs were used for CVErelated training purposes; however, the level of detail in the information 

the departments collect from HSGP and JAG grantees is not sufficient to 

reliably and conclusively make this determination. In fiscal years 2010 

and 2011, SLATT provided CVE-related training to approximately 11,000 

state and local officials. Additional details regarding this training are 

provided in table 8.

DOJ and DHS Grant 

Programs That Provided 

Funding That Could Be 

Used for CVE-Related 

Training
Appendix III: CVE-Related Training Provided or 

Funded during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Page 56 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 8: CVE-Related Training That the SLATT Program Provided in Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011

Description Audience

CVE topical areas 

addressed

Approximate 

number of state, 

local, and tribal 

participants

Estimated

cost

SLATT provides funding to a single grantee 

through a cooperative agreement to provide 

training in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting 

extremist criminal activity, including activity that is 

inspired by international events. SLATT training 

consists of about 26 modules that address a range 

of topics, such as Arabic culture and Islam, violent 

criminal extremism in the prison system, and 

radicalization on college campuses. Training is 

provided through either a 3.5-day course or 

through workshops that are 1 or 2 days in duration. 

The content is tailored to the particular needs of 

the officers to who attend. 

State, local, and 

tribal law 

enforcement 

personnel

Among the 19 CVErelated SLATT modules,

• 16 addressed violent 

radicalization,

• 14 addressed 

cultural competency, 

and

• 6 addressed 

community 

engagement.a

11,000

 

$4,615,100 b

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Justice Programs information.

c

Notes: Although this table identifies the CVE topics that SLATT modules addressed, this is not meant 

to suggest that CVE was the explicit or primary focus of each module. Some SLATT modules also 

addressed topics unrelated to CVE, which are not identified because they are not the focus of this 

review. 

a

Numbers do not sum to 19 because some trainings addressed multiple content areas. 

b

We assessed 19 of the 26 SLATT training modules as CVE-related. The number of participants 

reflects total state, local, and tribal attendees at courses in which one or more of the 19 modules were 

taught. SLATT provided training to approximately 900 additional participants that was not CVErelated according to our framework. 

c

SLATT training costs include expenses associated with delivering all facets of the SLATT Program, 

such as research, administration, and production of materials. They also include the cost of delivering 

the 7 training modules that are not-CVE as conceptualized by our review. According to the SLATT 

program officials, although the program currently tracks the cost of providing specific trainings, it did 

not track their individual costs during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. In addition, according to SLATT 

officials, is difficult to estimate the costs associated with providing the CVE-related portion of a 

training that covers both CVE and other topics. 
Appendix IV: Types of Concerns Raised about 

DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training 

Page 57 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 9 presents a summary of the 77 state and local participant 

concerns that we identified during our review of course evaluation forms 

that DHS and DOJ provided to us.1

Table 9: Types of Concerns State and Local Participants Raised about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training That Occurred 

during Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 

Training provider

Approximate total number 

of state and local

participants in CVE-related 

trainings (rounded to the 

nearest hundred) a

Number of 

participants that 

provided feedback b

Number of participants that raised concerns

c Politically or 

culturally biased Offensive Inaccurate

DOJ SLATT 11,000 5,005 17 1 4 

FBI National Academy 300 248 4 2 1 

FBI Citizens’ Academy 900 d 121 0 0 0 

FBI NJTTF Program 1,400 1,053 26 5 3 

DOJ USAOs 7,700 1,185 3 1 2 

DHS I&A 1,100 28 0 0 0 

DHS Office for Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties Institute

2,300 784 4 3 1 

Total 24,700 8,424 54 12 11

Source: GAO analysis of DHS and DOJ participant evaluations.

a

For more information about the training these programs provided, see appendix III. 

b

The total number of participants for each program is the sum of all state and local participants in 

training that was CVE-related according to our framework, and the programs may have provided 

additional training to participants that was not CVE-related. Participants may be counted more than 

once if they attended multiple CVE-related training courses.

c

Some programs solicited participant feedback on only select courses. This table excludes CVErelated training provided by FBI field offices through the Community Relations Executive Seminar 

Training Program and other initiatives on which the offices did not solicit participant feedback. It also 

excludes the Community Relations Service, which reported that it has used evaluations in the past, 

but too few participants returned course evaluations, thus limiting the service’s ability to analyze them 

effectively. According to Community Relations Service officials, the service is in the process of 

instituting new procedures for distributing, collecting, and reviewing course evaluations that it expects 

will improve the number of evaluations returned. 

d

 

1

We did not independently assess the validity of the concerns raised by participants. 

Therefore, the data presented represent only the participants’ perspectives. 

The FBI provided us with information on trainings provided through the Citizens’ Academy by 42 of 

the FBI’s 56 field offices. Accordingly, the total number of Citizens’ Academy participants excludes 

training provided by the 14 remaining field offices. 

Appendix IV: Types of Concerns Raised about 

DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 58 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 59 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 60 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Justice 
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 61 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 62 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 63 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments

Page 64 GAO-13-79 Countering Violent Extremism

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kristy N. Brown, Assistant 

Director, and Taylor Matheson, Analyst-In-Charge, managed this 

assignment. Melissa Bogar and Lerone Reid made significant 

contributions to this report. Gustavo Crosetto, Pamela Davidson, Richard, 

Eiserman, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Linda Miller, Jan 

Montgomery, and Anthony Pordes also provided valuable assistance.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(441115)
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