Filed 5/9/23 Certified for Publication 6/2/23 (order attached)

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL M.,

Respondent,

v.

ROBIN J.,

Appellant.

 D080707

 (Super. Ct. No. 17FL014460E)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Shereen J. Charlick, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Covington & Burling, Matthew Q. Verdin, Wendy L. Feng; Family 

Violence Appellate Project, Jodi Lewis, Shuray Ghorishi, Jennafer D. 

Wagner, and Eric C. Smith for Appellant.

No appearance for respondent.

Robin J. appeals from an order denying her request to renew a 

domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Michael M., the father of 
2

their two children.1 (Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) We conclude that the 

trial court misapplied the law in denying Robin’s renewal request, and that 

Robin established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. Accordingly, 

we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to 

grant the renewal request and decide whether the DVRO should be renewed 

for five or more years, or permanently. (Ibid.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Incident of October 5, 2017

On October 5, 2017, Robin and Michael had been dating for a year and 

a half and had a one-month-old baby, M.M. They got into an argument and 

Robin threatened to call law enforcement. Michael grabbed Robin’s cell 

phone out of her hand, threw it, and started to leave the house. When Robin 

followed him to the door with the baby in her arms, Michael turned around,

grabbed Robin, and bit her ear. 

Robin called law enforcement. The deputy sheriffs who responded 

observed significant redness to her right ear. Robin also showed them photos 

of a bruise she said she had sustained on her arm from an unreported 

incident of domestic violence that occurred the prior week. The deputy 

sheriffs arrested Michael. 

B. Incident of September 2, 2018

By September 2018, Robin and Michael were separated and she was 

five months pregnant with their second child. 

On September 2, 2018, during a meeting at a public park for Robin to 

take custody of one-year-old M.M., Michael shoved Robin aside and forced her 

1 We grant Robin’s motion to use pseudonyms in this opinion. We refer 

to the parties by their first name and last initial and their minor children by 

their initials.
3

car door open after she had put M.M. in the car. Michael grabbed M.M. and 

walked away with her. Law enforcement arrested Michael for domestic 

violence.

C. DVRO

Two days after the incident of September 2, 2018, Robin filed a pro per 

request for a DVRO against Michael in their pending family law case. In a 

sworn declaration, she stated that she had previously asked for a DVRO in 

July 2018, in which she “documented all forms and history of abuse.” After

the court denied her prior DVRO request, however, “the abuse continuously 

worsened . . . from provoking texts, manipulation, threats and eventually 

escalating to the assault which occurred over the weekend.” Robin stated 

that “[w]ith everything that has happened I am extremely scared and fearful 

for the safety of [M.M.], myself and my unborn child as of now I am currently 

5 months pregnant.” 

After a hearing, the court granted a three-year DVRO on September 21, 

2018. The DVRO included a stay-away order requiring Michael to stay at 

least 100 yards away from Robin. It also included personal conduct orders 

prohibiting Michael from harassing, attacking, striking, threatening, or 

assaulting Robin, or contacting Robin directly or indirectly by any means, 

including electronic. The stay-away and personal conduct orders included an 

exception for brief and peaceful contact as required for court-ordered 

visitation of children. 

The DVRO also had an attached child custody and visitation order that 

was identified as “part of” the DVRO. The attached order gave legal custody 

of M.M. to Robin and physical custody to Robin and Michael, with Michael 

having exclusive custody of M.M. every other weekend. The order also 

directed the parties “to enroll in Talking Parents” and ordered “that all 
4

nonemergency communication between the parties take place on this email 

platform.” 

D. Incident of February 26, 2019

Robin gave birth to the parties’ second daughter, N.M., in late January 

2019. On February 26, 2019, Robin and Michael got into another argument

at a residence in Ramona.2 Michael threw her to the ground about 10 times, 

strangled her from behind, pulled a knife, and ran the knife across her 

neck—all in the presence of one-year-old M.M. while Robin was holding onemonth-old N.M. The knife scraped Robin’s neck but did not cut her. Robin

struggled to breathe throughout the assault. Michael also threatened to kill 

Robin. Robin believed that Michael was trying to kill her and that she would 

die in front of her daughters. M.M. screamed and cried during the incident. 

When law enforcement arrived, Michael fled the scene. Sheriff’s 

deputies observed that Robin had many abrasions and bruises on her neck 

and chest and a red line across her neck. They collected a knife from the 

scene that Robin identified as the one Michael had used. 

Robin requested and the court issued an emergency protective order

(EPO). The EPO directed Michael to move out of the Ramona residence and 

stay away from it and Robin. 

The next day, law enforcement arrested Michael after he returned to 

the Ramona residence. In a back pocket, they found another knife identical 

to the one they had recovered at the scene. After they served Michael with 

2 The police report identified Michael, his mother, M.M., and N.M. as 

residents of the Ramona residence and Robin as a resident at a different 

address in Fallbrook. However, an emergency protective order issued the 

next day stated that the protected persons (Robin, M.M., and N.M.) lived with 

the person to be restrained (Michael) and ordered Michael to vacate the 

Ramona residence. 
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the EPO, he made numerous statements that he intended to violate the EPO 

by returning to the residence once he was released and did not care about the 

ramifications. 

E. Robin’s Request for Renewal of DVRO and Michael’s Response

On September 17, 2021, four days before the DVRO was set to expire, 

Robin filed a pro per request to renew the DVRO. The court set a hearing for 

October 8, 2021 and issued a notice and order extending the existing DVRO 

until the end of the hearing.3

Robin filed a declaration and supporting exhibits in support of her 

renewal request. The declaration and attached police reports described the 

domestic violence incidents of October 5, 2017, September 2, 2018, and 

February 26, 2019. 

In her declaration, Robin stated that Michael constantly texted her,

and she provided a copy of his most recent text on October 2, 2021, which 

stated as follows: “I think it’s absolutely wrong what you are doing to the 

girls you constantly call cws even tho you are the corrupt one trying to pull bs 

it’s absolutely not cool of you trying to pull that on our girls . . . you are one 

sick individual and should be checked[.] It’s very unfortunate you are doing 

this to our daughters.” Robin felt threatened by this text and reported it to 

law enforcement. 

Robin also stated that after the issuance of the DVRO, she had moved 

to a new address and been accepted to the Safe at Home program to keep her 

3 At the time, rule 8 of the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rules Related to 

COVID-19 provided: “Upon the filing of a request to renew a restraining 

order after hearing that is set to expire during the state of emergency related 

to the COVID-19 pandemic, the current restraining order after hearing must 

remain in effect until a hearing on the renewal can occur, for up to 90 days 

from the date of expiration.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Appx. I, Emergency rule 

8(b)(4) [effective April 2020 through June 2022].)
6

address confidential. In July 2021, the Secretary of State sent Michael a 

letter notifying him that her office had been designated as the agent for 

service of process on Robin and providing a post office box address for service 

by mail. On September 9, 2021, however, Michael’s attorney served Robin by 

mail with papers at her new confidential address. As a result, Robin was 

“terrified” that Michael knew her new address. She stated: “[I am] literally 

scared to death of this guy and what he has put me and the children through. 

Now I’m living in fear with him knowing where I live even though I went to 

great lengths to provide my family with a safe haven to call home.” 

Robin further asserted that M.M. had to be taken to the emergency 

room in August 2021 and September 2021 “because she was reporting her 

father hit her and she had bruises.” Robin attached hospital records showing 

that M.M. had tenderness to her right knee as a result of an injury that 

allegedly occurred while she was with Michael on September 19, 2021. The 

hospital records quoted Robin as saying “that [M.M.] told her that ‘she was 

bad and daddy hit my knee.’ ” 

Finally, Robin submitted evidence that Michael was delinquent in child 

support payments totaling about $8,000. She asserted that this was “causing 

a severe financial strain.” 

Michael filed a declaration in opposition to the renewal request. 

Without giving any specifics, Michael asserted that Robin had “conveniently 

ignored significant events and issues” and “exaggerated virtually every 

incident she describes in her declaration.” He asserted that Robin’s “primary 

motivation” for seeking a renewal of the DVRO was “to ‘punish me’ for my 

alleged nonpayment of child support.” Michael also stated that the domestic 

violence incidents “occurred years ago” and “[t]here have been no incidents 
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justifying or supporting the need for the existence of a [DVRO] in almost 3 

years.” 

F. Hearing and Ruling on Renewal Request

The parties’ family law case was reassigned to Judge Shereen Charlick 

in January 2021. Between January and September 2021, before the hearing 

on Robin’s DVRO renewal request, Judge Charlick presided over four ex 

parte hearings regarding child custody and visitation. She also presided over 

the October 8, 2021 hearing on the renewal request. 

Robin represented herself at the renewal hearing and Michael 

appeared with counsel. The court began by asking Robin “why recent events

have you continuing to be afraid of [Michael].” Robin responded by 

mentioning Michael’s violations of the DVRO and the fact that he had 

somehow obtained her confidential address. 

The court told Robin, “the address doesn’t concern me as much as how 

did he violate the order recently.” Robin testified that Michael had violated 

the DVRO by texting her and calling her, including the text of October 2, 

2021 six days before the hearing. She also referred to his failure to pay child 

support, the “pretty severe attack” he committed on February 26, 2019, and 

Michael’s statements to law enforcement that he intended to violate the EPO 

and did not care about the ramifications. The only question the court asked 

Robin about the February 2019 incident was, “This is from 2019?” 

The court then questioned whether Robin was seeking renewal of the 

DVRO as retaliation against Michael for seeking child custody. The court 

stated: “I have seen the two of you in court on multiple competing ex-parties 

[sic] where you were each trying to get custody from each other. And I noted 

that the last time you were here and you were -- actually, he tried to take 
8

custody from you, you filed this renewal request the very next day after he 

didn’t obtain custody because of your DUI . . . .” 

Robin asserted that she had filed the renewal request when she did 

because she saw her confidential address listed on Michael’s papers served 

September 9, 2021. She explained, “as soon as I saw that, I cannot allow this 

restraining order to lapse without seeking the protection, you know, to keep 

him away from me and my family . . . .” She stated: “I am just asking for you 

to understand my fear of this person, and, you know, I don’t text him. He 

continues to text me directly. There is a huge history of every way that he 

abused me financially, emotionally, physically.” Robin also mentioned the 

“child abuse” that “disturbs my peace” and “causes fear of future abuse to 

both me and the kids.” According to Robin, “the fear that I have of his man is 

real . . . .” 

In response, Michael’s counsel argued that Robin’s renewal request was 

“clear retaliation for [Michael] seeking to change custody when [Robin] was 

arrested for driving under the influence with children in the car.” He also 

asserted that “all of the points that she raises that might fall under violations 

of the Domestic Violence Protection Act occurred years ago.” According to 

defense counsel, Robin was “upset” that Michael “sought custody and brought 

her DUI to light,” “that he got her address,” and “that he is not paying child 

support,” but defense counsel argued that none of this was a basis for 

renewing the DVRO. 

Robin again argued that Michael was violating the DVRO by 

continuing to text her directly. She also noted that in the incident of 

February 2019, “my life was in danger” because “he put a knife to my throat 

while his children were present.” 
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Michael did not testify at the hearing, other than to answer one 

question from the court about whether he had been convicted of the February 

2019 assault with a knife. Michael responded, “All of the ones she has --

three -- I have been arrested three times and not one time have I been 

convicted.” The court did not ask Michael any other questions about the

February 2019 incident, not even to inquire whether he had in fact held a 

knife to Robin’s throat. Robin asserted that Michael had not been convicted 

only because she had declined to cooperate with prosecutors. 

The trial court then denied Robin’s request for renewal from the bench. 

The court ruled as follows:

“So, at this time, . . . I am denying your renewal request. I 

do not find that you need this protection anymore. I 

understand you had it in the past. I understand there was 

a great deal of difficulty when you and [Michael] had an 

ongoing relationship. I find that in the past several years, 

other than that one text message, which it’s not necessarily 

custody related, and it was not necessary, but I’m 

exercising my discretion to find it really isn’t a violation in 

this court’s view. I do not find that your fear is reasonable. 

I do find that there is a history of retaliatory behavior 

between the two of you as to custody, as to child support.

“Of course, if there were any future incidents that could 

constitute abuse, [Michael] is on notice and I would expect 

that [his counsel] has given him similar warnings and 

advice . . . .

“I am finding that your fear isn’t credible because I find 

there are other circumstances that prompted this renewal, 

and I am aware of them. With the history of this case, I am 

denying this request.

“[Michael] is on notice that were there really to be any 

event that he precipitates that could cause you reasonable 

fear, you will take appropriate action. So I’m denying the 

request. I find you have not met your burden of 
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demonstrating reasonable fear under the totality of the 

circumstances in light of the history. I find that this -- that

your renewal request was prompted by other actions that 

[Michael] took with respect to custody and the DUI, so I’m 

denying this.”

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We generally review an order denying a request to renew a DVRO for 

abuse of discretion. (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509 (Ashby).) 

But the question whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in 

exercising its discretion is a question of law requiring de novo review. (Ibid.) 

If the court’s decision to deny a renewal request is influenced by an erroneous 

understanding of the law, the court has not properly exercised its discretion 

under the law. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463 (Eneaji).)

B. Governing Law

Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a) provides that a DVRO shall 

have an initial duration not exceeding five years, but “may be renewed, upon 

the request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the 

discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance 

of the original order. . . . The request for renewal may be brought at any time 

within the three months before the expiration of the orders.” (Italics added.)

The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected 

party entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. (Ritchie v. 

Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290 (Ritchie).) “[T]his does not mean 

the court must find it is more likely than not that abuse will occur if the 

protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it 

is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the 

protected party’s apprehension genuine and reasonable.” (Ibid.) An
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imminent and present danger of abuse is not required; there must only be a 

reasonable apprehension that “abuse will occur at some time in the future if 

the protective order is allowed to expire.” (Id. at p. 1288.) 

For a DVRO renewal, the protected party need not show a reasonable 

apprehension of future physical abuse. (Eneaji, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1464.) The statute defines “abuse” broadly to include any behavior that 

could be enjoined under Family Code section 6320, such as harassing or 

disturbing the peace of the other party. (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a); In re 

Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 536.) This 

definition encompasses “a multitude of behaviors” that do “not involve any 

physical injury or assaultive acts.” (Eneaji, at p. 1464.) Thus, “there is no 

requirement that the party requesting a renewal have a fear of physical

abuse.” (Ibid.; accord Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 864, 875 

(Rybolt).)

“[Family Code] [s]ection 6345 makes it unnecessary for the protected 

party to introduce or the court to consider actual acts of abuse the restrained 

party committed after the original order went into effect.” (Ritchie, supra, 

115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Ritchie explained: “It would be anomalous to 

require the protected party to prove further abuse occurred in order to justify 

renewal of that original order. If this were the standard, the protected party 

would have to demonstrate the initial order had proved ineffectual in halting 

the restrained party’s abusive conduct just to obtain an extension of that 

ineffectual order.” (Ibid.)

In evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable 

apprehension of future abuse, the trial court ordinarily should consider the 

evidence and findings on which the initial DVRO was based. (Ritchie, supra, 

115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) “[T]he underlying findings and facts supporting 
12

that order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof 

to satisfy that test.” (Id. at p. 1291.) “Also potentially relevant are any 

significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying 

the initial protective order. For instance, have the restrained and protected 

parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of 

future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal 

of the order?” (Ibid.) “Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, 

such as whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the 

protective order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with 

job opportunities.” (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333 (Lister).)

A DVRO renewal may not be denied solely on the ground that no 

additional abuse has occurred since the issuance of the original DVRO. In

Eneaji, for example, the Court of Appeal ruled that “the trial court erred in 

concluding that the denial was appropriate because nothing happened in the 

three years since the restraining order.” (Eneaji, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1464.) The court reasoned that the trial court’s ruling conflicted with

Ritchie and Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a). (Eneaji, at p. 1464.) 

“Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that the absence of further abuse in the 

three-year period was a sufficient basis for denying renewal is not supported 

by the law.” (Ibid.) 

“The key consideration for the court is not the type or timing of abuse, 

but whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future abuse.” 

(Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 397 (Perez) [following 

Eneaji in ruling that the trial court had similarly erred by denying a request 

for renewal of a DVRO on the ground that there was no evidence of further 

abuse after its issuance].)
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C. Trial Court’s Misapplication of Law

Robin contends that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to 

the renewal request and erroneously inferred a retaliatory motive solely from 

the timing of her request. We agree that the trial court’s ruling was 

prejudicially influenced by a misunderstanding of the law in several respects.

First and foremost, the trial court erred by requiring a showing of 

recent abuse or a recent violation of the DVRO. From the outset of the 

hearing, the trial court quizzed Robin on what “recent events have you 

continuing to be afraid” and “how did [Michael] violate the order recently.” In 

its final ruling, the court found that Robin’s fear was not objectively 

reasonable because there had been no violation of the DVRO “in the past 

several years, other than that one text message” of October 2, 2021 (which 

the court decided “really isn’t a violation”). As we have discussed, however, a 

showing of recent abuse is not required to demonstrate a reasonable 

apprehension of future abuse. (Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 397; Eneaji, 

supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464.) 

The trial court’s mistaken insistence on evidence of recent abuse caused 

it to give no apparent consideration to either the abuse preceding the 2018 

DVRO or the subsequent domestic violence incident of February 2019. As 

noted, a trial court ruling on a renewal request should consider the evidence 

and findings on which the original DVRO was based, which will often be 

enough in themselves to support a renewal. (Ritchie, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1290–1291.) Here, Robin presented evidence of two different domestic 

violence incidents that occurred before the issuance of the DVRO: one in 

October 2017 when she was holding one-month-old M.M. and another in 

September 2018 when she was five months pregnant with N.M. and 

attempting to exchange custody of one-year-old M.M. By requiring a showing 
14

of more recent abuse and failing to analyze whether the original abuse was 

sufficient, the trial court misapplied the law.

The trial court’s restrictive focus on recent events also caused it to 

disregard Michael’s assault on Robin with a knife in February 2019, five 

months after the DVRO was issued. “It almost goes without saying that any 

violation of a restraining order is very serious, and gives very significant 

support for renewal of a restraining order.” (Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 335; accord Rybolt, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 876.) A violation involving 

a knife to the victim’s throat is particularly disturbing. Such an incident 

could reasonably be expected to give rise to a long-lasting fear of the 

perpetrator that could continue for many years. Yet the trial court found it 

unnecessary to consider anything “other than that one text message” of 

October 2, 2021 because it deemed everything else to be too remote in time. 

Second, the trial court erred by “exercising [its] discretion to find” that 

Michael’s text of October 2, 2021 “really isn’t a violation in this court’s view.” 

This text—which accused Robin of being “corrupt” and “sick”—was a clear 

violation of the DVRO because it did not relate to court-ordered visitation and 

it was nonemergency communication conducted outside the Talking Parents 

platform. The trial court had no “discretion” to treat an unquestionable

violation of the DVRO as if it were not “really” a violation. (See Perez, supra, 

1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 398–399 [trial court erred by finding that father’s calls 

and texts to mother in violation of DVRO did not constitute continuing abuse 

under the statute]; N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 603 [“A knowing 

violation of a DVRO cannot be characterized ‘as a de minimis and technical 

violation.’ ”].)

Finally, the trial court erred by inferring a retaliatory motive from the 

mere timing of Robin’s renewal request—and rejecting her claim of genuine 
15

fear on that basis alone. The DVRO statute required Robin to file her 

renewal request within three months before the DVRO’s expiration. (Fam. 

Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) She filed her renewal request within this statutory 

window period, four days before the DVRO was set to expire. If Robin had 

filed her renewal request earlier, while the parties were still litigating 

Michael’s application for emergency child custody orders, she could well have 

been accused of doing so for strategic purposes to influence the custody 

dispute. Considering the totality of the record, the mere fact that Robin 

waited to file her renewal request until after the court had ruled on Michael’s 

custody request is not sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of a 

retaliatory motive. And even if it were, the mere existence of a retaliatory 

motive still would not negate the compelling evidence that Robin had a 

reasonable basis to fear Michael. Anger and fear are not mutually exclusive; 

they often go hand in hand.

D. Reasonable Apprehension of Future Abuse

Having determined that the trial court misapplied the law, we must 

now decide on the appropriate remedy. In some cases when appellate courts 

have reversed orders denying renewal of a DVRO, they have remanded for 

the trial court to reconsider the renewal request. (See, e.g., Eneaji, supra, 

229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465; N.T. v. H.T., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 603.) In

others, however, appellate courts have ordered a renewal of the DVRO and 

concluded as a matter of law that the record demonstrates a reasonable 

apprehension of future abuse. (Cueto v. Dozier (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 550, 

562 (Cueto); Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 398, 401.)

We conclude that the latter cases are controlling here. In Cueto, the 

trial court issued a two-year DVRO in 2012 based on evidence of physical 

abuse perpetrated by a father (Dozier) against the mother (Cueto). (Cueto, 
16

supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 553–555.) In 2014, before the DVRO expired, 

Cueto filed a request to renew it based in part on evidence that Dozier had 

twice violated the order by driving past her home, which Dozier denied. 

(Id. at pp. 555–556.) Dozier also denied any history of abuse or violence. 

(Id. at pp. 557–558.) The trial court ultimately denied the renewal request, 

finding that Dozier had not driven by Cueto’s house or committed any 

violation of the DVRO, and that Cueto did not show a reasonable 

apprehension of physical or mental abuse. (Id. at p. 558.)

On review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court had 

applied the correct legal standard, but had still “abused its discretion in 

finding that Cueto had not demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of future 

abuse.” (Cueto, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 562.) The court reasoned that 

“[e]ach factor articulated by the court in Ritchie supported renewal of the 

restraining order.” (Ibid.) “First, Cueto obtained the initial restraining order 

after a violent incident at the baseball game in April 2012 [in which Dozier 

grabbed Cueto and tried to punch her] and evidence of a troubling history of 

physical abuse, including [Cueto] being punched in the face in 2002, and 

threatened on two occasions in 2010 and 2011.” (Ibid.) “Second, there is 

nothing in the record to suggest that circumstances have changed and that 

Dozier has ‘moved on with [his] li[fe] so far that the opportunity and 

likelihood of future abuse has diminished.’ ” (Ibid.) “Further we are troubled 

by the comments the trial court made to Dozier at the conclusion of the 

hearing after denying the application to renew the protective order . . . . 

These comments suggest that the trial court believed there was a need to 

admonish Dozier from the bench that he must continue to stay away and 

have no contact with Cueto, but without giving Cueto the legal protection of a 

restraining order.” (Ibid.)
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All three of these factors (and more) are present here as well. First, 

Robin presented evidence of a history of physical abuse before the DVRO was 

issued, including incidents that occurred in the presence of their young 

daughter M.M. and when Robin was five months pregnant with N.M. Worse 

yet, Michael’s violence escalated after the DVRO was issued, when he threw 

Robin to the ground 10 times, strangled her, threatened to kill her, and held 

a knife to her throat—all while she was holding their one-month-old daughter 

and in the presence of their one-year-old daughter. This egregious violation 

of the DVRO makes this case even worse than Cueto—in which the Court of 

Appeal did not disturb the trial court’s finding that there was no violation of 

the DVRO. Thus, the “seriousness and degree of risk” factor (including 

“whether it involves potential physical abuse”) strongly supports a renewal of 

the DVRO. (Lister, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.)

Second, nothing in the record suggests that Michael had moved on with 

his life. On the contrary, his hostile text of October 2, 2021 (the week before 

the renewal hearing) demonstrated that he was still consumed with anger

against Robin. As Robin explained, she felt threatened by this text. Given 

the prior history of domestic violence, it was reasonable for Robin to feel 

apprehensive for her safety as a result of Michael’s hostile text in violation of 

the DVRO. (Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 399.) This additional violation 

of the DVRO the week before the renewal hearing also makes this case a 

stronger one for renewal than Cueto. (See also Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 517 [former husband’s “noncompliance with court orders further 

illustrates he has not moved on and the power and control dynamic of the 

abusive relationship is ongoing”].)

Third, the trial court found it necessary to warn Michael when it denied 

Robin’s renewal request. The court stated: “Of course, if there were any 
18

future incidents that could constitute abuse, [Michael] is on notice and I 

would expect that [his counsel] has given him similar warnings and 

advice . . . . [Michael] is on notice that were there really to be any event that 

he precipitates that could cause [Robin] reasonable fear, [Robin] will take 

appropriate action.” As in Cueto, these comments suggest that the trial court 

believed there was a need to admonish Michael, “but without giving [Robin] 

the legal protection of a restraining order.” (Cueto, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 562.) Thus, all the factors cited in Cueto likewise establish that Robin had 

a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.

In addition, Robin’s unrefuted evidence that Michael hit and injured 

M.M. shortly before the renewal hearing further demonstrates that she had a 

reasonable apprehension of future abuse. (Perez, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 400–401 [holding that father’s abuse of the couple’s children also 

constituted abuse of mother because it “destroyed [her] emotional calm and 

made her fear for her safety and the safety of her children”].) As Robin 

explained, this “disturbs my peace and it causes fear of future abuse to both 

me and the kids.” Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude 

that Robin established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse and is 

therefore entitled to a renewal of the DVRO. 

DISPOSITION

The order denying Robin’s request for renewal of the DVRO is reversed 

and remanded with instructions to grant the renewal request. On remand, 

the trial court is instructed to decide in the first instance whether the DVRO 
19

should be renewed for five years or more, or permanently. Robin is awarded 

her costs on appeal.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.
Filed 6/2/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL M.,

Respondent,

v.

ROBIN J.,

Appellant.

 D080707

 (Super. Ct. No. 17FL014460E)

THE COURT:

The opinion in this case filed May 9, 2023, was not certified for 

publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication 

specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to 

rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for 

publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
2

ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”

appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be 

published in the Official Reports.

McCONNELL, P. J.

Copies to: All parties