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IS DHS EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY 

TO COUNTER EMERGING THREATS? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 3, 2012 

Serial No. 112–64 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management ........................................................................ 4 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Paul A. Schneider, Principal, The Chertoff Group: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Ms. Sharon L. Caudle, PhD, The Bush School of Government and Public 

Service, Texas A&M University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

PANEL II 

Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst, Emergency Management and Homeland Security 

Policy, Congressional Research Service: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 41 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42 

Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 48 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

Mr. Alan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, Department 

of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 58 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 60 

FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management: 

Statement of the Texas Border Coalition ........................................................... 32 

(1) 

IS DHS EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING A 

STRATEGY TO COUNTER EMERGING 

THREATS? 

Friday, February 3, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND

MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, Keating, Clarke 

of New York, and Davis. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come to order. Good morning. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine the strategy documents 

produced by the Department of Homeland Security pertaining to 

emergency—emerging threats and the implementation of those 

strategies. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

In December 2009 Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano gave a speech to her Department. She said, ‘‘I see one DHS 

as a strong, efficient, and focused department—one where all the 

talents and skills that we possess as individuals and as components come together and come together in new and exciting ways 

to serve our missions.’’ 

The Department of Homeland Security is the third-largest department in the Federal Government, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $40 billion. Its transformation, according to the GAO, is critical to achieving its homeland security mission. However, the agency has been criticized for 

excessive bureaucracy, waste, ineffectiveness, and lack of transparency that have hindered its operations and wasted taxpayer dollars. 

For example, the DHS inspector general, in a November 2011 report, concluded the Department has major challenges, mainly in 

the area of management, including acquisition, information technology, grants, and finances. These challenges hinder the Department’s efforts to become a cohesive, effective, and efficient organization. 

The GAO concludes many DHS management functions are highrisk, including acquisitions, information technology, finances, 

human capital and integration, all resulting in performance problems and mission delays. Unless we fix these types of problems we 
2 

will continue to see failures in DHS programs such as the Secure 

Border Initiative virtual fence, where in the end taxpayers received 

little if any return on a $1 billion investment. Secretary Napolitano 

will certainly not attain her goal of One DHS until financial and 

management systems are integrated. 

Our subcommittee begins a series of hearings examining the 

challenges DHS faces. We will begin focusing the hearings on three 

basic questions: One, what challenges does DHS face? Two, why is 

it taking so long to become One DHS? Three, do DHS shortcomings 

hinder it from carrying out its core mission of securing the homeland? 

Today we begin with the basics by examining the DHS strategy 

and its implementation to counter emerging threats. What is the 

DHS strategy? The Congressional Research Service concludes there 

are several homeland security strategic documents with differing 

goals, priorities, and definitions. These examples incorporate both 

White House and DHS strategy documents including the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security; the National Security Strategy; 

the National Strategy for Counterterrorism; the Strategic Plan— 

One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland; the Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review. 

In the 9/11 Recommendations Act of 2007 Congress mandated 

DHS to develop a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review to upgrade strategies related to homeland security and align the strategy with the Department’s programs and activities. The Department developed a QHSR and supplemented it with a Bottom-Up 

Review. 

The GAO analyzed both of these documents and determined DHS 

only fully addressed three of the nine 9/11 Commission Act reporting requirements. DHS only partially addressed the other six 

through the QHSR and other reports. 

But most notably, DHS did not identify how these reports are 

consistent with other National and DHS strategies. All these different strategies are confusing to both Congress and, more importantly, the components which have to implement these strategies. 

Just as important as identifying what the strategy is, is understanding how DHS will implement it. How does DHS translate 

words into reality? 

The Wharton Business School has a model of best practices for 

successful strategy implementation. Specifically, is there an action 

plan? Is the headquarters’ organizational structure the correct size? 

Is there monitoring and control from headquarters for implementing the strategy? Are core missions and initiatives linked together to prevent duplication? 

The bottom line is that DHS needs a single strategic document 

which subordinate agencies can follow and make sure the strategy 

is effectively and efficiently implemented. This single document 

should conform to the National Security Strategy in the United 

States, and if the agencies do not have a clearly-established list of 

priorities it will be difficult to complete assigned missions. 

We understand DHS has a wide diversity of missions including 

controlling our borders, securing transportation, protecting the 

President, conducting sea search and rescue, and researching radi-
3 

ation technology, to name just a few. Because of this diversity it 

is important to have a single comprehensive strategy. 

Additionally, we must ensure each agency, whether it is Customs 

and Border Protection, Secret Service, TSA, or Coast Guard, is effectively implementing the strategy by making sure headquarters 

has the proper monitoring and controls in place. We ask these 

questions today to assist the Department and determine what Congress can do to move the Department toward the goal, as the Secretary said, of becoming One DHS. 

So with that, I recognize the Ranking Minority Member who appeared at this hearing in just the nick of time. 

Bill, welcome. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

JANUARY 25, 2012 

In December 2009, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano gave a speech 

to her Department. She said, ‘‘I see One DHS as a strong, efficient, and focused Department—one where all the talents and skills that we possess as individuals and 

as components come together and come together in new and exciting ways to serve 

our missions.’’ 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the third-largest Department in 

the Federal Government with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget 

of more than $40 billion. Its transformation, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), is critical to achieving its homeland security mission. However, 

the agency has been criticized for excessive bureaucracy, waste, ineffectiveness, and 

lack of transparency that have hindered its operations and wasted taxpayer dollars. 

For example: 

• The DHS Inspector General, in a November 2011 report, concludes the Department has major challenges mainly in the area of management, including acquisition, information technology, grants, and finances. These challenges hinder 

the Department’s efforts to become a cohesive, effective, and efficient organization. 

• The Government Accountability Office (GAO) concludes many DHS management functions are high-risk, including acquisitions, information technology, finances, human capital, and integration, all resulting in performance problems 

and mission delays. 

Unless we fix these types of problems we will continue to see failures in DHS programs such as the Secure Border Initiative virtual fence, where in the end taxpayers received little if any return on a $1 billion dollar investment. And Secretary 

Napolitano will certainly not attain her goal of ‘‘One DHS’’ until financial and management systems are integrated. 

Our subcommittee begins a series of hearings examining the challenges DHS 

faces. We will be focusing the hearings on three basic questions: 

• What challenges does DHS face? 

• Why is it taking so long to become ‘‘One DHS?’’ and 

• Do DHS shortcomings hinder it from carrying out its core mission of securing 

the homeland? 

Today we begin with the basics by examining the DHS strategy and its implementation to counter emerging threats. What is the DHS strategy? 

The Congressional Research Service concludes there are several homeland security strategic documents with differing goals, priorities, and definitions. These examples incorporate both White House and DHS strategy documents including: 

• 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 

• 2010 National Security Strategy, 

• National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 

• Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland, 

• Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and 

• Bottom-Up Review. 

In the 9/11 Recommendations Act of 2007, Congress mandated DHS develop a 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, a QHSR, to update strategies related to 

homeland security and align the strategy with the Department’s programs and ac-
4 

tivities. The Department developed a QHSR and supplemented it with a BottomUp Review (BUR). 

The GAO analyzed both of these documents and determined DHS only fully addressed three of the nine 9/11 Commission Act reporting requirements in the QSHR. 

DHS only partially addressed the other six through the QHSR and BUR reports. 

Most notably DHS did not identify how these reports are consistent with other National and DHS strategies. 

All these different strategies are confusing to both Congress and more importantly 

the components which have to implement the strategies. 

Just as important as identifying what the strategy is, is understanding how DHS 

will implement it. 

The Wharton School of Business has a model of best practices for successful strategy implementation. Specifically, is there an action plan, is the headquarters’ organizational structure the correct size, is there monitoring and control from headquarters for implementing the strategy and are core missions and initiatives linked 

together to prevent duplication? 

The bottom line is that DHS needs a single strategic document which subordinate 

agencies can follow and make sure the strategy is effectively and efficiently implemented. This single document should conform to the National Security Strategy of 

the United States of America. If the agencies do not have a clearly established list 

of priorities it will be difficult to complete assigned missions. 

We understand DHS has a wide diversity of missions including controlling our 

borders, security transportation, protecting the President, conducting sea search and 

rescue and researching radiation technology, to name just a few. Because of this diversity, it is important to have a single comprehensive strategy. Additionally we 

must insure each agency—whether it is the Customs and Border Protection, Secret 

Service, Transportation Security Administration, or the Coast Guard—is effectively 

implementing the strategy by making sure headquarters has the proper monitoring 

and controls in place. 

We ask these questions today to assist the Department and determine what Congress can do to move the Department toward the goal of becoming ‘‘One DHS.’’ 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

convening this hearing. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for their participation 

and giving their time with us this morning. 

Eleven years ago the heinous attacks of September 11 served as 

the impetus for changing the way we approach homeland security 

in the United States. Following the tragic day, 22 separate agencies, many with challenges all their own, were combined to form 

the Department of Homeland Security. The Department was 

tasked with carrying out the strategy that defined the Nation’s 

homeland security agenda. 

Since that time, numerous National strategies were released and 

further refined through time. Last year the Department of Homeland Security released its first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which we will refer through acronyms, which I hate 

afterwards, so try and remember all that that was. The framework 

of this document, along with the President’s National Security 

Strategy, which, for the first time, included homeland security as 

an integral component of our National security, has set the Nation 

on a course to address not only counterterrorism but emerging 

threats, such as National disasters Nationally, climate change, and 

cybersecurity, as well. 

Now that a more comprehensive National strategy approach is 

defined, what are we doing now to really ensure that this is going 

to be carried out? That is the question we are asking today, but before we do that we have to determine whether the requirements, 

roles, and responsibilities at the Federal, State, and local levels are 

properly aligned, and above all, the proper resources are allocated. 
5 

This past Congress the Department of Homeland Security has 

suffered significant cuts, especially at the management level. Furthermore, the Office of Policy, which is responsible for the preparation of the QHSR and for developing and assessing the implementation of the Department’s long-term strategy, was one of the hardest-hit office in the last rounds of cuts. Adding insult to injury, the 

Department is still without a financial management system that is 

integrated, functional, and up-to-date, resulting in Departmentwide struggles with fund balances, improper payments, and Antideficiency Act violations. 

Although improvements have been made, the workforce responsible for acquisition oversight is understaffed and its procurement, 

information technology, and human capital functions remain high 

on GAO’s risk list. Furthermore, we are still many years and many 

more dollars away from finishing what was started in terms of consolidating the Department’s headquarters at St. Elizabeths. 

These challenges may seem unrelated to strategy, but unless 

these management challenges are fixed-mission execution will suffer. That all being said, I look forward to today’s hearing and testimony, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. We have two very distinguished witnesses on the first panel, and I would like to go 

ahead and introduce them before their testimony. 

The first is the Honorable Paul Schneider. He is a principal at 

the Chertoff Group, which focuses on the defense and aerospace industries, cybersecurity, systems engineering, and major acquisition 

procurement and financial management. 

Prior to joining the Chertoff Group, Mr. Schneider was the deputy secretary for the Department of Homeland Security, where he 

managed the day-to-day operations of a Department with over 

200,000 employees and an annual budget of over $52 billion. While 

at DHS he was also under secretary for management. 

Thank you, and welcome to our committee. 

Next we have Dr. Sharon Caudle, who is the faculty member at 

a school that is near and dear to my heart, the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where she 

teaches in the master of public service and administration program 

and the certificate in homeland security program. Before joining 

the Bush School she was with the U.S. GAO where she focused on 

homeland security and National preparedness strategic policies and 

programs. 

So welcome, both of our witnesses. 

With that, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Schneider for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER, PRINCIPAL, THE 

CHERTOFF GROUP 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

Keating, and Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today. 

Based on my observations, former position, and years of experience, I am here to provide my views about DHS’s current strategy 
6 

and what direction they should be—they should consider taking in 

the future. I believe the most serious dangers facing our Nation 

today involve biological, cyber, and nuclear threats. I know DHS 

takes these threats very seriously and has instituted several programs to address these dangers, but I am concerned that in some 

cases fiscal reality will limit the resources that are available to 

counter these threats. 

Biological is at the top of the list in terms of risk because of the 

relative ease of accessibility to materials and know-how, the potential consequences, and relatively low level of National preparedness. Cyber, because of its pervasiveness and difficulty in pinpointing attribution, has rapidly emerged as a threat to all critical 

infrastructure areas. 

Both nuclear and biological threats—for these what we need is 

a very strong National preparedness posture comprised of a very 

highly integrated group of stakeholders supported by realistic plans 

and frequent exercises that provide confidence in our preparedness 

and ability to respond. 

I have several recommendations. First, emphasize cybersecurity 

in the private sector with practical help. While DHS continues to 

focus its funding on defending the Federal Government networks 

there is an additional need for investment support to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to our mostly privately-owned critical infrastructure and key resource systems as well as the State and 

local governments and infrastructure providers. 

I recommend establishing public-private partnerships in order to 

perform the following: Create and institute IT portals that easily 

convey Government requirements to large and small businesses 

that will enable them to easily explain what they have to offer. 

That is the seat of innovation in this country. 

Set up programs with and for small and mid-size businesses as 

well as State and local governments to educate them about what 

they can do to protect their networks. Help in the creation of private sector-run security operation centers to provide cybersecurity 

services for small and mid-sized businesses and for certain public 

sector utilities and entities that will allow them to protect their 

network. 

Establish a robust modeling and simulation effort. Focus on resilience. Examine the need for more agile contracting strategies to 

work inside of the stimulus-response cycle that is needed for cyber 

issues. 

No. 2: Restructure the focus of science and technology. Significant budget cuts imposed on the Department’s S&T effort has led 

me to conclude that the whole nature of this function has to change 

dramatically. After accounting for the existing manpower levels, 

major laboratories, university research centers, there are very little 

discretionary funds left to use. 

So what I recommend doing in that particular case is to do a restock and prioritization of the efforts that they focus on. I know it 

is hard to make some adjustments, especially in manpower, but in 

this budget scenario it certainly dictates that. 

We need to have a more focused and deliberate test and evaluation effort in order to inform users of whether or not the stuff they 

are buying works. It is not clear to me what State and local and 
7 

private organizations do in terms of buying equipment that there 

is any competent technical authority has said that the stuff is okay. 

That means shifting to threat-based T&E as opposed to standardsbased T&E, which is driven by the industry. 

I think you have to—they have to recognize that the Department 

of Defense has a tremendous amount of talent, and so what I think 

we need to be doing is harvesting that talent. I would put together 

a team of people made up of the laboratories at DOD, FFRDCs, 

DHS operational people, DHS FFRDCs, and look at each of these 

operational areas and see what technology could be immediately 

harvested. 

No. 3: Consolidate the information technology effort under the 

CIO. No matter what system you are talking about, DHS—the 

underpinnings are a massive IT system. Frankly, they all are interdependent, multiple databases, but yet individual programs. 

This needs to be consolidated. Put the funding under the CIO. 

Then not just let programs individually decide what modernization 

has to take place, but rather, let the CIO move the Department in 

an integrative phase approach to maximize the use of resources. 

Fourth, consolidate the operations. When I was the dep sec I was 

asked about basically: Should the Department have a Goldwater 

Nichols? I always said at the time that at some point it should, but 

it was too premature. At this point in time I think it is important 

to start seriously considering how to go do that. 

Department of Defense did that in 1986 followed by the DMR in 

1989, and the fact of the matter is it now works. So from an operational warfare—from an operational law enforcement standpoint 

and from a headquarters integration standpoint that is the thing 

to do. I realize that that is very hard to do, and it would enable 

some operating components to lose some individuality, but the fact 

of the matter is it needs to be done. 

I think the Department has come a long way since its origin and 

will continue to improve over its years. I think as we look to the 

future we need to make some of these improvements. 

I want to conclude by thanking you for the opportunity to be here 

today, your significant support of the Department and its thousands of people, and I would be happy to answer any questions 

that you might have. 

[The statement of Mr. Schneider follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER

FEBRUARY 3, 2012 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congressman Keating, and Members of the subcommittee. It’s a pleasure to appear before you today. 

It has been approximately 3 years since I have left office as the Deputy Secretary 

of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Since that time, I been consulting for the U.S. Government (except for DHS); am a Principal in The Chertoff 

Group which is a company that provides consulting, security, and merger and acquisition (M&A) advisory services for clients in the security, defense, and Government 

services industries around the world; and, I also currently serve on several boards 

and advisory groups, including as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Applied 

Science Foundation for Homeland Security. My role with the Foundation and other 

small companies is done on a pro bono basis. 

Since leaving my position at DHS, I have had the opportunity to observe the 

changing and challenging budget environment and assess its impact on DHS operations and those of the homeland security enterprise. Based on my observations, 
8 

former position, and years of experience, I am here today to provide my views about 

DHS’ current strategy and what direction they should consider taking in the future. 

THREATS

I believe the most serious dangers facing our Nation today involve biological, 

cyber, and nuclear threats. As you know it is very difficult to convince the general 

public of the importance of these threats. I know DHS takes these threats very seriously and has instituted several programs to address these dangers, but I am concerned that in some cases, fiscal reality will limit the financial resources that are 

available to counter these threats. 

Biological is at the top of the list in terms of risk because of the relative ease of 

accessibility to the materials and know-how; the potential consequences; and relatively low level of National preparedness. Cyber because of its pervasiveness and 

difficulty in pinpointing attribution has rapidly emerged as a threat to all critical 

infrastructure areas. 

For both nuclear and biological threats (and the wider range of catastrophic 

threats) what we need is a very strong National preparedness posture comprised of 

a highly integrated group of stakeholders supported by realistic plans and frequent 

exercises that provide confidence in our preparedness and ability to respond. 

I think it is appropriate for DHS to accelerate ‘‘fixing’’ critical infrastructure 

issues. The tiered approach to identifying the critical facilities can serve as a map 

to developing and implementing a mitigation plan. 

EMPHASIZE CYBER SECURITY IN PRIVATE SECTOR WITH PRACTICAL HELP

I am pleased that cyber security continues to receive the political and financial 

support it does from the Congress. However, the extent of this problem is huge. 

While the Department of Homeland Security continues to focus its funding on defending the Federal Government networks (the .gov domain), there is an additional 

need for investment and support to identify, prevent, and mitigate threats to our 

mostly privately-owned critical infrastructure and key resource systems, as well as 

State and local governments and infrastructure providers. 

I find it amazing that within a 50-mile radius of this building there is a nexus 

of expertise in this area that is without peer: The Ft. Meade complex, major cyber 

security centers set up by the major corporations, cyber incubators in the State of 

Maryland, the University of Maryland Cyber Research and Development Center, 

etc. 

To support the constantly evolving and persistent cyber threat, I would recommend establishing a public-private partnership in order to perform the following: 

1. Create and institute IT portals that easily convey Government requirements 

to large and small businesses that enable them to easily explain what they have 

to offer. The rigid small business methods and forums cannot match the nearreal-time speed that is required to keep up in this world; and yet there is a tremendous amount of innovation and capability that can be tapped. 

2. Set up programs with/for small and mid-size businesses, as well as State and 

local governments, to educate them about what they can do to protect their networks. 

3. Help in the creation of private-sector-run security operations centers to provide cybersecurity services for small and mid-sized business, and for certain 

public sector entities, that will allow them to protect their networks. 

4. Establish a more robust modeling and simulation effort that allow relevant 

parties to strategize the threat space, model the implications and determine 

risk mitigation approaches. 

5. Consistent with the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) implementation 

program, focus on resilience to look at means to quickly recover from a cyberincident. 

6. Examine the need for more agile contracting strategies that work inside the 

stimulus-response cycle needed for cyber issues. 

RESTRUCTURE THE FOCUS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The budget cuts imposed on the Department’s Science and Technology Directorate 

(S&T) have led me to conclude that that S&T must change its entire nature in order 

to reflect its new budget reality. After accounting for the existing manpower levels, 

major laboratories that are funded by these appropriations and the University Centers of Excellence, very little discretionary funds are remaining. 

Therefore I believe the focus of DHS S&T should be as follows: 

1. Emphasize a more focused and deliberate test and evaluation program to inform users of the right equipment and systems to deploy for the right mission. 
9 

Work with the users to understand the threat environment, their operational 

concepts for operations to make sure the test procedures and environments are 

relevant. Right now we have public and private institutions around the country 

buying stuff and it is not clear if any competent technical authority knows if 

it is any good. 

2. Based on an aggressive T&E program to meet users’ needs, develop standards for devices and systems that could be procured by the private and public 

sectors, not the devices themselves, because it is impractical to think that the 

Government will get enough procurement dollars to field the equipment themselves. This means using T&E and threat-based standards as the basis to inform users of the right equipment for the right mission application. This moves 

away from the standards-based (industry-driven) approach which is not the correct approach for this situation. 

3. Recognize that State and local governments and the public sector, not just 

the DHS operational components, are the recipients of S&T investment dollars 

and include their priorities in the resource allocation process. 

4. Aggressively harvest the enormous amount of technology that the Department of Defense has been/is developing and with the correct set of innovative 

people look at how to adapt it to DHS uses. In this regard I recommend that 

consideration be given to forming a team with representatives from Department 

of Defense (DoD) laboratories and Federally Funded Research and Develop Centers (FFRDCs) and the DHS Systems Engineering FFRDC with DHS operational personnel to evaluate specific scenarios that DoD technology could be 

readily adapted to enhance mission effectiveness. 

5. While DNDO is a separate organization, these recommendations also apply 

to the work and RDT&E they do.Within DNDO, the process was and I believe 

still is to work with State and local law enforcement to determine how they 

would use detection systems and then to test them using those Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) against threat material and in operationally relevant environments. 

6. Readjust funding allocations from manpower, laboratories, and University 

centers to S&T that directly and more immediately supports the users. 

CONSOLIDATE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) UNDER THE CHIEF INFORMATION

OFFICER (CIO)

The Under Secretary for Management and the Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

has made DHS the leader in data center consolidation and the migration to the 

cloud. Once you have worked with the IT underpinnings of DHS, you realize it is 

one massive IT system that many different operational users use, with the bulk of 

the databases serving multiple users under multiple systems and many are interdependent. 

So, whether it is E-Verify, US–VISIT, TECS, and TTAC with all of its component 

systems, there is interlocking because many of the same databases are accessed in 

order for the Government to make adjudication. Yet, observing on the outside, as 

I have, systems modifications, modernizations, and upgrades are executed by individual components that happen to be responsible for their programs and systems. 

While coordination and oversight can be effective, I think the current environment 

dictates a different business model of centralized command and control. 

The IT area has and will continue to sustain large financial cuts due in some part 

to the belief that IT is an enabler and therefore iris investment ought to achieve 

savings. I agree that IT is enabler, but the business management model that governs is as much of an enabler as the technology itself. 

Therefore I recommend the following: 

1. Consolidate all of the IT funding under the DHS CIO; 

2. Empower the CIO and the Under Secretary for Management to determine 

how best to incrementally phase in a new IT infrastructure building on what 

they have done with the data center integration and cloud migration, by using 

the appropriated funds for the individual systems, modulating individual program priorities for the overall good of the Department and the betterment of 

the overall IT infrastructure. 

For this to succeed DHS will have to continue to make substantive and sustained 

progress in developing a functional command and control, communications, and requirements development. 

CHANGE THE BUSINESS MODEL FOR SCANNING EQUIPMENT

Scanning is an essential part of the security architecture for aviation security and 

in my view the technology is dynamic, driven in large part to significant advances 
10 

in the medical field. And as nano technology emerges, to an even greater extent 

technology enables enhancements in fidelity for screening in terms of quality and 

speed of the throughput which will be highly desired and valued by DHS. Now, 

these systems are procured and upgraded by the Government. 

Given funding realities and the speed of which the commercial sector can quickly 

develop and respond, this dictates shifting to a business model whereby the Government specifies the requirements and leases the equipment with stated service-level 

agreements regarding performance like commercial IT contracts, including upgrade 

and refresh requirements. DHS would essentially pay for this as a fee-for-service 

lease. I am acutely aware that OMB has definite views of this type of arrangement 

that may not be as supportive because of scoring considerations. 

In my view however, the changing nature of the technology, evolving threat scenarios and the budget realities, demand that the current business model be changed 

to one of a more commercial nature. 

CONSOLIDATE OPERATIONS

While serving as the Deputy Secretary, I was frequently asked by those Members 

of Congress who were on Homeland Security Committees and Department of Defense Committees whether or not DHS needed ‘‘Goldwater Nichols (GN)’’ legislation. 

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Pub. 

L. 99–433, made the most sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense since the Department was established in the National Security Act of 1947 

by reworking the command structure of the United States military. It was subsequently followed by the Defense Management Review of 1989 which fully implemented the Packard Commission’s recommendations and the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

to substantially improve the performance of the defense acquisition system; and to 

manage more effectively the Department of Defense and our defense resources. 

I replied that the time was definitely not correct to do that because DHS was still 

in its infancy, not all the requirements of GN were appropriate to be considered for 

DHS, and that the Act’s operational and acquisition fundamental changes should ultimately be considered and adapted for use by DHS, but timing was key. 

At this point in time I think it is appropriate to start thinking seriously about 

how to accomplish a modified version of GN for DHS, since I think only a few major 

provisions as discussed below are applicable at this time. The factor that drives me 

to this conclusion is that I believe currently, no unified command structure exists 

for DHS components in the field. Each component has individual field structures 

with unique geographic boundaries and independent chains of command. These 

lines of authority do not converge until they reach the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. 

Practically speaking, in the field, there are independent operating components. I 

think this hampers operational effectiveness. While I am aware there are several 

informal teaming arrangements in various ports and cities, it is not the same as 

an integrated command-and-control structure. Therefore, I recommend: 

1. Develop a unified field structure with appropriate command-and-control or 

coordination authority. This would provide an opportunity for greater stability 

in State/local relationships and ability to better coordinate DHS operations in 

the field. 

2. Consideration should include various alternatives, such as States, regions, 

ports, interfaces with DOD, and unique State and local considerations and authorities. 

3. Maximizing the collective effectiveness and use of joint assets, both operationally and in the planning and execution of logistics support functions. 

I am aware that certain operating component statutory authorities need to be addressed to make this work, but integration of assets at the pointy end of the spear 

is essential in order to maximize effectiveness in addressing the evolving threat scenarios. 

The second major element of a GN move would be to examine centralizing major 

acquisition programs in a ‘‘DOD Systems Command’’ type of structure separate from 

the Operational Components. This would enable operating components to focus on 

operations and build upon the critical acquisition mass currently available, while 

ensuring major cross-component acquisition initiatives are executed in an integrated 

manner (as many current operations are actually executed). As part of this effort 

a total review of the acquisition process, its successes, lessons learned, and next 

steps would be a useful step to help shape the structure of this organization. All 

of this will eliminate redundancy, while complying with an integrated enterprisewide architecture and offers the potential for tremendous financial economies. 

The basis for this recommendation is simple. The majority of DHS operational 

people wears badges and carry guns. Is it smart to hold a major component head, 
11 

for example the head of CBP, with approximately 65,000 people, responsible for his 

24-hr×7-day law enforcement responsibilities around the world and at the same 

time, ask him to be responsible for developing and fielding complex systems that 

must integrate with other complex systems? Is this the correct model for the future? 

I think the answer to both questions is no and that is why I think this different 

structure is much more conducive to enhancing effective operations. 

In DoD they learned this a long time ago. That is why the Air Force’s Air Combat 

Command deploys planes and does not develop the F–35, and why the Navy’s 

COMSUBLANT operates submarines but does not develop the Virginia Class Submarines. 

I am aware that many organizations within DHS will disagree with these recommendations and argue vociferously against any changes to the status quo to protect their legacy functions and independence. So, it would be the challenge to leadership to steer changes of this magnitude. The DOD was created in 1947; GN was 

authorized in 1986, but really didn’t happen until the DMR in 1989 when the majority of the GN changes took effect. It would be unreasonable to assume that this type 

of change would be any different in time scale in DHS. 

OVERLAPS IN THE ASSIGNMENT/INTERPRETATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY ROLES

I think the issue of ambiguities and overlaps in the assignment/interpretation of 

homeland security roles, responsibilities, and authorities among Federal stakeholders are a continuing obstacle to unity of effort within the Federal Government 

and our allied countries. These overlaps and ambiguities also have the effect of fundamentally undermining the credibility and ability of Federal agencies to effectively 

engage with State and local governments and the private sector. 

As you’re well aware, this is a very difficult and politically charged issue that is 

difficult to rationalize. While, barring some major catalyst, a holistic attempt to 

comprehensively frame and address all roles/responsibilities/authorities issues is 

near impossible. 

What is needed is a systems approach to identifying the overlaps and ambiguities 

having the most significant implications for our strategic outcomes (e.g., DHS/DOJ 

re: terrorism prevention and borders; DHS/HHS re: Bio/mass casualty event preparedness & response; DHS/DOD re: catastrophic response support to civil authorities). The challenges with these issues is that agencies and components would rather live with and work around current ambiguities than risk losing equities they consider vital. Yet these same ambiguities significantly undermine unity of effort, and 

increase risks of failure in preventing or responding to potentially catastrophic 

events. I doubt many in the administration or Congress have energy on this, but 

it is a necessary factor that should be addressed. 

CONCLUSION

I think DHS has come a long way since its inception and will continue to improve 

over the next few years. I believe as we look to the future we need to make refinements along the lines I have recommended before you today to meet the many challenges that lie ahead. 

I urge you to adapt these recommendations and direct their implementation. 

Thank you for your leadership and your continued support of the Department of 

Homeland Security and its programs, and your support and commitment to the 

thousands of men and women who dedicate themselves to the defense of our great 

country. 

Thank you for this opportunity to be here today and I am happy to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I appreciate your comments about our support for the Department. We do. 

The reason we are having these hearings is to find out how we 

can reform the Department so it works more efficiently and better 

for its employees. So I appreciate you saying that. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes Dr. Caudle for her testimony. 
12 

STATEMENT OF SHARON L. CAUDLE, PH D, THE BUSH SCHOOL 

OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 

Ms. CAUDLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

be here today. I will specifically focus my remarks on DHS’s National preparedness approach as components of an overall strategic 

framework, taking a look at what the requirements are, expectations are for the homeland security community—Federal, State, 

local, private sector, non-Governmental, individuals, families, and 

communities. 

First, there are major themes in DHS’s strategy that provide the 

context for challenges I will mention shortly. These themes include, 

for example, homeland security, now clearly a part of National security; the whole homeland security community, including the Federal Government, responsible for preparedness, from prevention to 

recovery, including mitigation; all-hazards and the maximum capacity for a catastrophic event as benchmarks for preparedness; 

core capabilities and performance targets update past prescriptive, 

detailed individual tasks, and target capabilities; and finally, another homeland security management system crafted with performance expectations and assessment mechanisms. 

There are three challenges I see in the overall preparedness 

strategy for subcommittee consideration. The first challenge is 

whether there should be a fundamental change in the capabilitybased approach to achieve National preparedness to confront 

threats. 

Federal policies to date, reinforced by legislation, center on building and sustaining robust capabilities—skilled people, material, 

and processes, and partnerships. This approach drew on the experience of the defense community. 

Over time DHS has attempted to link the billions of dollars spent 

on preparedness with the development of these capabilities. However, valid assessment remains elusive. 

In my view, Federal funding constraints and similar challenges 

for other levels of Government and related homeland security partners present an opportune time to consider the cost-effectiveness of 

other policy options. These would be compared with the current capabilities approach. 

I suggest that one option is adopting National and/or international disaster and emergency management system standards. 

As with management standards, such as the ISO 9000 quality 

standards, these can be applied to all organizations. 

Already in place is DHS’s PS–Prep National voluntary program 

that does apply preparedness standards to the private sector. Also, 

the current Emergency Management Accreditation Program, 

EMAP, also based on standards, is targeted at State and local 

emergency management programs. 

If these disaster and emergency management standards were 

adopted in lieu of the capabilities requirements, the entire homeland security community would share common preparedness standards, language, and assessment parameters. Of course, still to be 

resolved would be if the standards should be mandated as a National standard of care and how certification or accreditation 

against the standards might occur. 
13 

The second challenge is whether implementation by the whole 

community for what FEMA calls maximum of maximums, or megadisaster scenario, is pragmatically achievable. FEMA advocates 

that modern disaster planning should be for a meta-scenario that 

overwhelms all levels of government, including the Federal Government. Worse-case planning under this strategy requires the expertise and resources of the entire emergency management community, from the Federal Government, to the private sector, to the 

NGOs, to individuals and communities. 

One visualizes all preparing for a catastrophe akin to a megaHurricane Katrina, the Japanese earthquake tsunami and nuclear 

event, or world-wide pandemic. It is not clear to me how the Federal Government will operationally craft whole-of-community preparedness for such a mega-disaster scenario. 

Implementation details to date are sparse regarding how members should interact to achieve mega-disaster capability targets or 

make decisions regarding the investment of scarce resources. 

Sound implementation would call for complex, coordinated action, 

assessment, and the commitment of funding that may be overwhelming and marked by imprecision. 

The third challenge is whether DHS should include longer-term 

emerging threats as priorities for action beyond near-term strategies. Current DHS strategies narrowly target threats, including a 

meta-scenario, with a distinct beginning and end—think earthquake or terrorist attack. Left out by design are conditions that are 

longer-term in their emergence as direct threats to National security. 

These include, for example, the impacts of global climate change, 

global illicit trafficking and related transnational crime, social disruptions, and economic and financial instability. It is not clear how 

near-term threat capabilities will prepare the country for the challenges of these longer-term threats, often called ‘‘global shocks.’’ 

DHS certainly understands the need for action anticipating these 

global shocks under FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, currently underway. 

Throughout these three challenges I urge the subcommittee to 

consider the opportunity costs in DHS continuing to pursue a comprehensive capabilities approach, insistence that the whole homeland security community is being prepared for a mega-disaster scenario, and delayed action on confronting longer-term threats. 

Thank you again for the opportunity, and I look forward to any 

questions the subcommittee may have. 

[The statement of Ms. Caudle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHARON L. CAUDLE

FEBRUARY 3, 2012 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today. My name 

is Dr. Sharon Caudle. I am the Younger-Carter Distinguished Policymaker in Residence and Visiting Lecturer, The Bush School of Government and Public Service, 

Texas A&M University. I am also a Senior Fellow at The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute. This testimony represents my personal 

opinions and not necessarily the opinions of the Bush School or the Homeland Security Policy Institute. 

Today’s hearing focuses on whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

is implementing an effective strategy to counter emerging threats to the security of 
14 

1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2010. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland. [February 2010]. 2Obama, Barack. 2010. National Security Strategy. [May 2010]. 3Obama, Barack. 2011. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD–8 National Preparedness. [March 

30, 2011]. 

the Nation. In my statement today, I first highlight the DHS policies and overall 

approach for preparedness—from protection to recovery—currently in place as the 

result of Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD–8 National Preparedness). Then I 

focus on what I see as three challenges the subcommittee should consider: (1) 

Whether there should be a fundamental change in the operational approach to 

meeting a National preparedness goal, (2) whether implementation of capabilities by 

the ‘‘whole of community’’ from the Federal Government to individual citizens to address the ‘‘maximum of maximums’’ threats is pragmatically achievable, and (3) 

whether DHS should include other longer-term, emerging threats as priorities for 

action in its near-term strategies. 

CURRENT NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS STRATEGIES AND APPROACH

In the 5 years following the issuance of President Bush’s first National homeland 

security strategy, the administration and Congress clarified the scope, mission 

areas, and responsibilities for homeland security. National strategy objectives were 

consistent in four areas: (1) Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, (2) protect the 

American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources, (3) respond to and recover from incidents that do occur, and (4) continue to strengthen the management 

foundation of homeland security to ensure long-term success. 

President Obama’s administration has continued the refinement of homeland security policies and strategies, consistent with Congressional action. In February 

2010, DHS released the legislatively-required Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report.1 As was the case with earlier policies, the Report called for a National 

framework of collective efforts and shared responsibilities to build and sustain critical homeland security capabilities. The grave security environment (beyond terrorism) identified in the Report clearly supported a broader security stance: It was 

expected that violent extremist groups would use terrorism to attack United States 

targets, social, and/or political instability would continue, health threats would be 

more difficult to prevent, technological developments, and cyber threats would pose 

threats, climate change would increase weather-related hazards, multiple simultaneous crises were likely, and complacency would be a danger as major crises receded 

from memory. 

As the subcommittee knows, President Obama released a new National Security 

Strategy that reflected the homeland security policies and concepts identified in the 

Report.2 The Strategy reaffirmed the ‘‘whole of Government’’ approach, which is the 

need for all levels of Government, if not the entire country, to strengthen National 

preparedness. The Strategy retained the earlier policy notions of a homeland security enterprise (Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities sharing a common National interest in American safety and security) and a culture of preparedness. 

Presidential Policy Directive-8 

The 2010 Report and the newer National Security Strategy set the stage for both 

a restatement and revitalization of the Presidential direction for National preparedness. President Obama’s March 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 8 National Preparedness (PPD–8) replaced the 2003 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 

(HSPD–8) issued by President Bush,3 which had been codified by Congress. The new 

directive reaffirmed past policies and direction, calling for the development of: (1) 

A National preparedness goal identifying the core capabilities necessary for preparedness, and (2) a National preparedness system guiding activities enabling the 

Nation to achieve the goal. National preparedness was defined as actions taken to 

plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover 

from the threats posing the greatest risk to the Nation’s security. 

Specifically related to the subcommittee’s interest in addressing emerging threats, 

PPD–8 required that a new National preparedness goal address specific threats and 

vulnerabilities. This overtly reduced reliance on National planning scenarios issued 

several years earlier as yardsticks to measure preparedness capabilities. The goal 

was to define the core capabilities necessary to prepare for incidents posing the 

greatest risk to the Nation’s security. This made concrete a new policy emphasis on 

maximum capacity for any major disaster or catastrophe. 
15 

4DHS. 2011. Implementation Plan for Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness. 

[May 2011]. 5Fugate, Craig. 2011. Evolution of Emergency Management and Communication. Statement 

before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security. 

[June 8, 2011]. 6DHS. 2011. National Preparedness Goal First Edition. [September 2011]. 7DHS. 2011. The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive 

Risk-Based Approach Toward a Secure and Resilient Nation. [December 2011]. 

The directive also mandated a new piece to the National preparedness system— 

planning frameworks for each of the five preparedness objectives—from prevention 

to recovery. It was envisioned that each planning framework would include a basic 

plan to address all-hazards. There would be roles and responsibilities at the Federal 

level, but annexes would address unique requirements for particular threats or scenarios. The directive also required a ‘‘campaign’’ to build and sustain preparedness. 

This would integrate community-based, non-profit, and private sector preparedness 

programs, research and development activities, and preparedness assistance. 

The PPD–8 Implementation Documents 

DHS has issued a flurry of documents in response to PPD–8’s mandates. In May 

2011, DHS issued the Implementation Plan for Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness.4 Under the Implementation Plan, DHS was to perform a strategic, National-level risk assessment applicable to National, regional, and local levels. The assessment would help identify where core capabilities and associated performance objectives for the entire homeland security community should be placed, 

topped by the maximum preparedness capacity needed to respond to a catastrophic 

event. 

Thus, developing ‘‘whole of community’’ core capabilities for catastrophes would 

not necessarily be restricted to specific threat and hazard scenarios described in earlier National planning scenarios. FEMA administrator Craig Fugate described the 

change as planning for a ‘‘meta-scenario’’ (or maximum of maximums) disaster. The 

basis for planning was a worst-case scenario involving multiple factors to plan for 

different hazards that challenges preparedness and overwhelms the response capabilities of every Governmental level.5 As I understand it, the scenario, a no-notice 

event, contemplates the impact area of at least 7 million population and 25,000 

square miles, and involving several States and FEMA regions. It results in 190,000 

fatalities in its initial hours, with 265,000 citizens requiring emergency medical attention. There is severe damage to critical infrastructure and key resources, including transportation. The fiscal year 2011 Regional Catastrophic Grant Program guidance uses the meta-scenario to promote preparing for a catastrophe where extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, and disruption overwhelm traditional and 

well-established response and recovery plans and procedures. 

In September 2011, DHS issued the National Preparedness Goal First Edition.6

The new Goal included detailed tables with core capabilities for prevention through 

recovery (called mission areas) and their preliminary targets. For example, prevention capabilities included planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, forensics and attribution, intelligence and information sharing, interdiction and disruption, and screening, search, and detection. Each capability was described; to illustrate, interdiction and disruption is to delay, divert, intercept, halt 

apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards. 

The document made clear that these core capabilities presented an evolution from 

the voluminous target capabilities list developed in response to HSPD–8. The core 

capability targets would be the performance thresholds for each core capability and 

the basis to develop performance measures to evaluate progress in meeting the targets. The description of the core capabilities and their preliminary targets were significantly streamlined from the task and capability lists issued in response to 

HSPD–8 and subsequently tied to Federal homeland security funding. While still 

prescriptive, it appears the notion was that streamlining should create more room 

for members of the homeland security community to craft capabilities tailored to 

local and regional considerations, as well as the National interest. 

The Goal stated that a strategic National risk assessment should confirm the need 

for an all-hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness planning. DHS’ December 2011 unclassified Strategic National Risk Assessment grouped threats and 

hazards into National-level events to test the Nation’s preparedness.7 These included natural, technological/accidental, and adversarial/human-caused threat and 

hazard groups: 

• Natural.—Animal disease outbreak; earthquake; flood; human pandemic outbreak; hurricane; space weather; tsunami; volcanic eruption; wildfire. 
16 

8DHS. 2011. National Preparedness System [November 2011]. 

• Technological or Accidental.—Biological food contamination; chemical substance 

spill or release; dam failure; radiological substance release. 

• Adversarial or Human-Caused.—Aircraft as a weapon; armed assault; biological 

terrorism attack (non-food); chemical/biological food contamination terrorism attack; chemical terrorism attack (non-food); cyber attack against data; cyber attack against physical infrastructure; explosives terrorism attack; nuclear terrorism attack; radiological terrorism attack. 

The Goal did not address emerging or longer-term threats or drivers of threats 

such as climate change identified in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report. This was purposeful. The unclassified Strategic National Risk Assessment said 

it evaluated the risk from known threats and hazards. Those events, it noted, had 

a distinct beginning and end and were clearly linked to homeland security missions. 

Thus, political, economic, and environmental, and societal trends possibly contributing to a risk environment but not National events for homeland security were excluded from the assessment. Nevertheless, the document said non-National-level 

threats, such as droughts and heat waves, could pose risks to jurisdictions and 

should be considered in preparedness planning. 

In November 2011, DHS released a brief description of a new National Preparedness System.8 Its components included: (1) Identifying and assessing risk, (2) estimating capability requirements, (3) building and sustaining capabilities, (4) planning to deliver capabilities, (5) validating capabilities, and (6) reviewing and updating. To identify and assess risk, the System document stated that the Strategic National Risk Assessment would analyze the greatest risks to the Nation. The Threat 

and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment guidance under development at that 

time would provide a common, consistent approach to identify and assess risks and 

associated impacts. 

Measuring progress toward achieving the National Preparedness Goal could be 

done through tools such as exercises, remedial action management programs, and 

assessments. The National Exercise Program was deemed the principal mechanism 

to measure readiness, supplemented by exercises done by individual organizations. 

Training and performance during actual events would test and validate achievement 

of desired capabilities. On-going sharing of lessons learned and monitoring would 

also occur through a remedial action management program and a comprehensive assessment system of the whole community. A National Preparedness Report is due 

in November 2012. 

Major Themes in National Preparedness Expectations 

Up to this point, I have briefly described the current National preparedness policy, strategy, and guidance. It has highlighted a number of major themes: 

• Homeland security placed within National security. 

• All-hazards as the centerpiece for preparedness for threats, including terrorism. 

• Preparedness defined with the full coverage of objectives: Prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, with response and recovery no longer 

the centerpieces of preparedness. 

• The whole homeland security community in addition to the Federal Government 

with the responsibility to protect National interests and way of life. 

• Maximum capacity for a catastrophic event (a meta-scenario) as the benchmark 

for preparedness. 

• Known threats and hazards with a distinct beginning and end central to homeland security risk management and preparedness. 

• Core capabilities and targets for a National effort update past prescriptive, detailed individual tasks and target capabilities. 

• A homeland security management system to accomplish homeland security and 

crafted with specific components, performance expectations, and assessment and 

adjustment requirements. 

• Assessment of preparedness progress primarily through exercises and actual 

events. 

CHALLENGES IN STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Now, I will turn to the challenges I see in the overall preparedness strategy and 

its implementation to counter emerging threats that the subcommittee should consider. The first: Should there be a fundamental change in the operational approach 

to meeting a National preparedness goal? The second: Is implementation of the 

‘‘whole of community’’ for the ‘‘maximum of maximums’’ pragmatically achievable? 

The third: What other emerging threats should DHS set as priorities for action? 
17 

9 Caudle, Sharon L. 2005. Homeland security capabilities-based planning: Lessons from the defense community. Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 2 [Fall 2005]. 10See, for example, the report Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force. 

2010. Perspective on Preparedness: Taking stock since 9/11, Report to Congress [September 

2010]. 11 Jenkins, William O. 2010. FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities. Letter to Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations [October 29, 2010]. 12 U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2011. Department of Homeland Security: Progress 

Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. 

GAO–11–881 [September 2011]. 13 U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2009. National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made 

Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. GAO– 

09–369 [April 2009]. 14 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2011. National Exercise Program [March 18, 

2011]. 

Alternative to the Current Capabilities Development Approach 

The current and earlier National Preparedness Goal and their supporting documents, as well as Federal legislation, have identified the need to build and sustain 

specific preparedness capabilities for the entire homeland security community. Federal, State, and local governments, non-Governmental organizations, private organizations, and the general public are that community. National preparedness comes 

from capabilities across this whole community. 

DHS in large part adopted the capabilities approach from the Department of Defense where it was used by the defense community in many countries.9 HSPD–8 required a National preparedness goal to define measurable readiness (preparedness) 

priorities and targets, but also with a caveat about the resource investments. PPD– 

8 called for actions to achieve a preparedness approach to optimize the use of available resources. 

Developing capabilities may have been the optimal route at that time towards 

achieving preparedness, but whether other alternatives that were better investments were considered was not made explicit—if, in fact, they were even considered. 

In the interim, as the subcommittee knows, DHS has provided billions in preparedness grants intended to aid States, urban areas, Tribal governments, and non-profit 

organizations, supposedly to strengthen their capabilities to meet threats associated 

with potential terrorist attacks and other hazards. Over time, the Department has 

attempted to link dollars spent with the development of capabilities.10

Assessing preparedness based on National preparedness capabilities remains very 

elusive. Summing the difficulties, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) 11 found that evaluation efforts that collected data on National preparedness 

capabilities faced limitations such as data reliability and the lack of standardized 

data collection. According to GAO, FEMA had problems in completing a comprehensive assessment system and developing National preparedness capability requirements based on established metrics. GAO 12 continues to cite these operational and 

implementation weaknesses, even though the assessment of capabilities and evaluation of preparedness is a legislative requirement. In addition, the GAO 13 specifically 

found problems with at least one tool mentioned by the new National Preparedness 

Goal as central to measuring progress—the National Exercise Program. FEMA’s implementation of the National program has consistently run into problems, such as 

ensuring if Federal and State governments had addressed deficiencies identified by 

the exercises. In March 2011, FEMA developed a new National Exercise Program 

Base Plan that extensively revised the program, with major changes in requirements and leadership.14 The verdict is still out whether the past history of the Department of Homeland Security in failing to adequately measure progress will be 

reversed. 

Thus still left unanswered is the most significant question: What preparedness 

did the billions of dollars buy? With Federal funding constraints and similar challenges for other levels of government and other members of the homeland security 

community for the foreseeable future, this is an opportune time to consider if other 

policy options might be more cost-effective, or, at a minimum, justify the current 

policy of capabilities development and sustainability. 

The capabilities approach is not etched in stone. There is at least one policy option the subcommittee might consider to contrast with the capabilities approach. 

This option is already grounded in Congressional legislation and administration 

policies: Simply, it is the application of National and/or international management 
18 

15 Caudle, Sharon L. 2011. ‘‘National Preparedness Requirements: Harnessing Management 

System Standards,’’ Homeland Security Affairs, 7(14) [June 2011]. 16Fugate, Craig. 2011. Evolution of Emergency Management and Communication. Written 

statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security [June 8, 2011]. 

system preparedness standards applicable to all organizations, which I have advocated in the past.15

There are two National voluntary programs where management system preparedness standards, not elusive core capabilities, are used as the benchmark for preparedness requirements. Legislation implementing many of the 9/11 Commission’s 

recommendations (Section 524 of the August 2007 Pub. L. 110–53) called for DHS 

to create a voluntary private sector preparedness program with standards, including 

accreditation and certification processes. In June 2010, DHS produced the Private 

Sector Preparedness Accreditation and Certification Program (PS–Prep). Three management system standards were approved for adoption in the program: ASIS SPC.1– 

2009 Organizational Resilience: Security Preparedness, and Continuity Management 

System; British Standard 25999–2:2007 Business Continuity Management; and National Fire Protection Association 1600: 2007/2010 Standard on Disaster/Emergency 

Management and Business Continuity Programs. At the end of September 2010, 

DHS announced a certification program tailored to the needs of small business. 

The other National effort using management system standards is the current 

Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), a voluntary review process 

for State and local emergency management programs. EMAP certifies Government 

programs against standards directly based on NFPA 1600. State and local entities 

can use Federal homeland security grant funding to pay for EMAP activities. Interestingly, at one time, FEMA used the EMAP standards to administer its National 

Emergency Baseline Capability Assurance Program. If there truly is to be a ‘‘whole 

of community’’ effort, it would seem to be a necessary condition to have a compatible 

approach for all the entities involved. 

Still to be resolved would be whether adoption of the management system preparedness standards should be mandated, perhaps tied to Federal funding or regulations, and how certification or accreditation against the standards would be conducted. Normally, management system standards such as those under the PS–Prep 

program or EMAP are voluntary, although compliance with such standards may be 

seen as part of a legal standard of care across an industry. 

Government agencies such as DHS could implicitly mandate standards by using 

them as guidelines for complying with regulatory requirements. Or the agencies 

may forego a mandatory regulation if they view voluntary compliance as meeting 

policy goals. This seems to be the Legislative and Executive branch approach taken 

with the PS–Prep voluntary standards for the private sector. There are established 

provisions that can be invoked for mandatory adoption as part of National regulatory frameworks or legislation. The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 and resulting Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 

A–119 (revised in 1998) mandated Federal agencies use management system standards developed by either domestic or international standards bodies instead of Federal Government-unique standards (e.g., the National Preparedness Goal) in their 

regulatory or procurement activities. 

Implementing Whole of Community for the Maximum of Maximums 

A second challenge is realistically implementing a ‘‘whole of community’’ effort in 

anticipation of a ‘‘maximum of maximums’’ effort, at least within 72 hours of a catastrophic incident. In June 2011 testimony, FEMA Administrator Fugate 16 stated 

that emergency management historically planned for scenarios to which Government could respond and recover from. Instead, he testified that modern disaster 

planning should be for a ‘‘meta-scenario’’ (or ‘‘maximum of maximums’’ event) destined to overwhelm all levels of Government. Such worst-case planning would require the efforts of a ‘‘whole community’’ approach intended to leverage the expertise and resources of Governmental and non-Governmental stakeholders—the entire 

emergency management community from the Federal Government to individuals, 

families, and communities. 

The definition of ‘‘whole of community’’ is the same as ‘‘all-of-Nation’’ in the new 

National Preparedness Goal: ‘‘a focus on enabling the participation in national preparedness activities of a wider range of players from the private and nonprofit sectors, including nongovernmental organizations and the general public, in conjunction with the participation of Federal, state, and local governmental partners to foster better coordination and working relationships.’’ 

As the subcommittee knows, the emphasis on shared responsibility and coordination is not new. President George W. Bush’s June 2002 proposal to create DHS ex-
19 

17The White House. The Department of Homeland Security. June 2002. p. 3. 18Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. July 2002, p. 2. 19PPD–8. p. 2. 20Local, State, Tribal and Federal Preparedness Task Force. 2010. 21 Caudle, Sharon. 2009. ‘‘National Security Strategies: Security from What, for Whom, and 

by What Means,’’ Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1), article 22. 

pressed hope that the agency would make State, local, and private sector coordination one of its ‘‘key components.’’17 The first National Strategy for Homeland Security viewed homeland security as a concerted National effort. The approach was 

based on shared responsibility and partnership involving the Congress, State and 

local governments, the private sector, and the American people in a concerted National effort to prevent attacks.18

Is the ‘‘whole of community’’ approach rooted in a mega-disaster scenario realistic 

or, more particularly, cost-effective? One visualizes all homeland security actors anticipating a catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina, a nuclear event, or a worldwide 

pandemic, that will overwhelm all local and regional partners for a good length of 

time. It is not clear to me how the Federal Government will actually strategically 

and operationally determine ‘‘whole of community’’ preparedness for a mega-disaster 

going forward. 

PPD–8 calls for planning frameworks with basic plans for all hazards—presumably a maximum of maximum effort, plus specific threat or scenario annexes. The 

Implementation details to date do not provide the information on how members of 

the ‘‘whole community’’ should interact to achieve these capability targets and what 

scarce resources practically can be invested. It is expected that those details will 

await the finalization of the National Preparedness System and the publication of 

all National Planning Frameworks, also required by PPD–8. The National Preparedness System will ‘‘guide domestic efforts of all levels of government, the private and 

nonprofit sectors and the public.’’19

In sum, the focus on ‘‘whole of community’’ may well be noteworthy, but its implementation calls for complexity of coordinated action, assessment, and funding that 

may be overwhelming and marked by imprecision. A return to ‘‘whole of Government’’ may be more realistic, simply because of the ties to Federal funding. Despite 

the uncertainty of Government funding, it is reasonable to assume that preparedness will retain its importance, although not perhaps to the hoped levels of National 

capabilities for a meta-scenario. 

Emerging Threat Priorities 

A third major challenge I see that the subcommittee might consider in the DHS 

strategy is addressing threats that are longer-term in their emergence as a direct 

threat to National security. Among other things, the September 2010 Local, State, 

Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force 20 report to Congress called for: (1) Improving the ability to strategically forecast emerging preparedness requirements and 

associated policies and/or capabilities, and (2) develop a strategic policy planning 

process that prepares for future challenges by performing long-range assessments. 

The Task Force said that the complexity of the envisioned homeland security and 

emergency management enterprise, especially in terms of non-Governmental roles, 

means that desired preparedness outcomes often may take years to achieve. In their 

view, a range of dynamic issues—such as the environment, demographics, economics, and health trends—are likely to play increasingly important roles. Preparedness 

policies, therefore, should be anticipatory, not reactionary, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas. 

As I mentioned earlier, the hazards listed in the National Preparedness Goal reference well-known, specific event hazards and attacks determined by the current 

Strategic National Risk Assessment. However, the current National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report explicitly define a strategic 

threat environment and global trends that appear to have National preparedness 

implications, although they are not described as imminent. These include the gradual emergencies and disasters that result from dependence upon fossil fuels, global 

climate change, fragile and failing states, and global illicit trafficking and related 

transnational crime, and economic and financial instability. 

In a 2009 article on National security strategies,21 I discussed drivers of changes 

in security on a National and global scale, such as pandemics, population changes, 

and economic stress. These drivers translate into threats to security, whether individually or collectively, which countries have incorporated into their strategies. In 

other countries, the security environment includes these longer-term threats. In 

general, their National security strategies (including those covering homeland security or domestic security) incorporate them into the strategies and follow-on policy 
20 

22 Hough, Peter. 2008. Understanding Global Security. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 23OECD. 2011. Future Global Shocks: Improving Risk Governance. OECD Reviews of Risk 

Management Policies, OECD Publishing. 24FEMA. 2012. Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2020: Forging Strategic Action in an 

Age of Uncertainty. Office of Policy and Program Analysis [January 2012]. 

and operational requirements and guidance. For example, climate change or environmental change pose dangers that may occur on a National or global scale, such 

as more frequent heat waves, droughts, flooding, reduced crop yields, and 

wildfires.22 The Goal and supporting documents target building and sustaining capabilities narrowly for the near-term threat of a meta-scenario. It is not clear how 

these capabilities will prepare the country for the challenges of the longer-term 

threats. 

There have been a multitude of studies on these drivers or changes with recommendations for immediate action. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 

and Development (OECD) presented an analysis of ‘‘global shocks’’—cascading risks 

that become active threats as they spread across global systems.23 These included 

pandemics, financial crises, critical infrastructure disruption, and cyber risks, geomagnetic storms, and social unrest. As the OECD study pointed out, surveillance 

is central to risk assessment and management. In addition, security agencies, working with regulatory agencies, should use, adapt, and implement risk-assessment 

tools to design more resilient National and international systems. Emergency management of future global shocks, OECD said, called for policy options such as: (1) 

Surveillance and early warning systems, (2) strategic reserves and stockpiles of critical resources, (3) addressing where countermeasures to systemic threats have been 

weak, and (4) monitoring of future developments that could pose potential risks. 

OECD cited challenges such as insufficient skills and knowledge to manage global 

shocks and obstacles to international cooperation and coordination. 

DHS certainly understands the need for action anticipating these global shocks. 

FEMA’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, initiated in 2010, emphasizes the importance 

of understanding and addressing the drivers of future change.24 FEMA urges the 

emergency management community to establish a foresight capability—identifying 

key future issues, trends, and other factors with an eye to executing an agenda for 

action over the next 20 years. Not surprisingly, FEMA identifies well-known drivers—universal access to and use of information, technological innovation and dependency, shifting U.S. demographics, climate change, global interdependencies and 

globalization, Government budget constraints, critical infrastructure deterioration, 

and the evolving terrorist threat. The FEMA study says that through the foresight 

process, over the next few decades very rapid change and complexity will define the 

emergency management environment. FEMA says that even slow-moving and predictable trends such as demographic changes could be radically changed because of 

drivers such as climate change or pandemics. 

FEMA sees a number of emergency management capabilities as needed as part 

of strategic foresight that could be included in preparedness efforts (pp. 13–20). For 

example, these include addressing dynamic and unprecedented shifts in local and 

regional population characteristics and migratory flows; anticipating emerging challenges and develop appropriate plans and contingencies; employing alternative 

surge models to meet the challenging confluences of social, technological, environmental, economic, and political factors and conditions; and remediating hidden 

vulnerabilities in critical supplies from water to energy to medical products to offset 

threats to the full scope of emergency management activities. 

Throughout these three challenges, I urge the subcommittee to consider if the current DHS strategies overweigh the opportunity costs in continuing to pursue a comprehensive capabilities approach, insisting on the whole of community being prepared for a maximum of maximum event, and delaying action on confronting longerterm threats. 

This concludes my statement. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the 

subcommittee today and look forward to any questions you may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Dr. Caudle. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Yes, Dr. Caudle, in our home State of Texas we have many 

homeland security operations on the ground. We have the largest 

stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border, so we have CBP down there, we 

have ICE—immigrations is obviously a huge issue in the State of 

Texas—and then FEMA. Between hurricanes and the wildfires that 
21 

we saw out at Bastrop and all across the State of Texas FEMA 

plays a huge role. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, though, there are 

about probably five to 10 different, you know, documents of strategies out there that doesn’t unify the DHS mission. So my initial 

question is: How does this lack of a comprehensive strategy impact 

these operations that I talked about on the ground and what can 

we do to fix that strategy so it works? 

Ms. CAUDLE. I think overall is coming up, really, with, what is 

the goal on the border? You know, certainly, as you have mentioned, we are seeing issues around whether or not it is border security, closing the border, stopping illegal immigration or cargo or 

items that are coming across the border, but then we also have a 

policy of immigration enforcement in the interior that sometimes is 

counter to it. 

I think overall, looking at what is the overall goal there in terms 

of the border security and making sure that whether it is ICE or 

the border security agents there, or the technology, as Mr. Schneider talked about, are all ones that are looking to that security aspect. Right now you do have different types of opinion about what 

the actual goals are there, and certainly the Texas Department of 

Public Safety has similar concerns when they talk about border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you. 

Mr. Schneider, you talked a great deal about the DOD model, 

Goldwater-Nichols, and how we could apply that model to the management and strategy of the Department of Homeland Security. I 

have been a big advocate for leveraging existing technologies within the DOD to use within DHS—for instance, sensor surveillance 

equipment that we use in Afghanistan, using that on the Southwest Border. We talked to the generals in Afghanistan on a recent 

CODEL—Mr. Duncan was with me—about that very issue. 

Can you elaborate more on this DOD model that you think would 

be effective? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. Thank you. 

Quick background: The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made very sweeping changes to 

Department of Defense since it was established in 1947. It reworked the command structure of the United States military, and 

that has led to the origin of why you have combatant commanders, 

like CENTCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, TRANSCOM, et cetera. 

That fundamentally removed the responsibility from the service 

chiefs from fighting of the war to these combatant commanders 

that could put together adaptive packages—Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Special Ops, et cetera—in those regions responding to those unique 

threats. A fundamental change. Did not go over easy; very difficult, 

busted a bunch of rice bowls. But the fact of the matter is, if you 

take a look at how that has progressed since the 1990s, to 2000, 

to the way we operate today, I personally think it has been a huge 

success. 

It was subsequently followed by the Defense Management Review in 1989, which fully implemented the Packard Commission 

Report, which led to Goldwater-Nichols. But basically it substantially improved the performance of the defense acquisition system 
22 

and managed acquisition resources across the Department. I think 

by any measure it has worked. 

For example, the Air Force’s Air Combat Command basically operates aircraft. It does not manage the development and production 

of the F–35. The COMSUBLANT operates nuclear submarines. It 

does not manage the acquisition of the junior class submarines. 

So the two questions that I ask in my own mind when I look at 

this relative to the Department is this: Do we want the head of 

CBP, with 65—excuse me, roughly 65,000 people, 24/7 responsibilities, to keep the incorrect people and the bad stuff out of the borders at the same time that we hold him responsible for putting together very complicated C4 audios or persistent surveillance systems along the border? Is that the right model for the future? 

In my mind, the answer to those two questions are absolutely 

not, and that is why I think it is time to take a hard look at what 

the operators do, what the warfighters do, operate, and basically 

provide good law enforcement, and have those people that are 

smart put together integrated systems using the maximum amount 

of technology available and satisfy those user requirements. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is a very interesting concept that I know that 

this committee will be taking a close look at. Have you had any discussions with the Department about using this model? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. When I was in the Department I was—I had the 

opportunity—and part of my blood is probably in on this floor 

somewhere—to have that type of discussion. I was frequently asked 

by Members of the committee that both were in the Homeland Security Committee and very knowledgeable at the Department of 

Defense whether or not it is time for Goldwater-Nichols. 

My answer has always been, at some point in time it is the right 

thing to do. I thought 4 years ago it was not the right thing to do 

because it does create a lot of churn and frankly, the Department 

was still in its infancy. If you take a look at how long it took DOD 

to actually go implement it after it has been started by any measure I thought 4 or 5 years ago was not the right time. So I have 

always been consistent in saying that and talking about that. 

I think at this point in time, roughly 3 or 4 years later since I 

was in the Department, it is probably a good time to start thinking 

about it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Have you had any discussions with the current administration about this? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. No. I really, for the most part, stay hands 

away from the Department. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is by choice. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I see my time has expired. I know the Ranking 

Member is going to follow up on a line of questioning that I am 

very interested in, as well, and that is the recent cyber markup of 

the National Information Sharing Organization. 

So with that, I recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do want to get into those questions, but I do want to follow up 

on just what you were saying, Mr. Schneider, too. You know, I have 

seen CENTCOM work in the counterterrorism and it was a wonderful thing to see, frankly, the way so many different areas of gov-
23 

ernment and the—and defense worked together in one room, in one 

central command. I was so impressed and pleased. 

The trouble I have, as great as that model is—and I have seen 

it happen and I have seen it work—we can’t get the basic jurisdictions of homeland security settled first. So, you know, I agree with 

you in theory about that is a great approach, but do you honestly 

think in this time frame that we mentioned, since we haven’t even 

set the jurisdictional problems that were still there from the 9/11 

recommendations and still unfulfilled. In that framework how could 

we, at this time, ever overcome that without dealing with the jurisdictional issues that have to be dealt with first? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, thank you. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think the way to do that is to accept, basically, something less 

than 100 percent solution. So if you go at—I used to travel a tremendous amount of time on the weekends when I was the deputy 

secretary. If you go visit many of the major ports and key city 

areas—I don’t care whether it is Detroit, San Diego, Charleston, 

Seattle, Miami, et cetera—what you see is, frankly, the individual 

organizations with, I will call it the alphabet soup labels, informally working together—working together. Not just within the 

DHS, but go to San Diego, they work with the Navy, they work 

with the San Diego Harbor Police, they work with local law enforcement. 

The reason is basically is this: You have all these organizations, 

you have sea assets, you have got air assets, and things like that, 

so the smart people that are at a lot of these places informally figure out a way to basically—figure out how to maximize the effective use of all of those assets. So I think you could do it, quite 

frankly, in—at not, maybe, 100 percent, but at least within the context of making substantial progress. That is why I really believe 

that you could do it. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. I would love to see that happen in reality, 

but I would say we would be lucky to get 10 percent the way things 

are going. 

But in any case, I have a question: We had a field hearing earlier 

this year in the Port of Houston, and, you know, there really struck 

me a great deal of how important that is to our security in so many 

respects and the economic impact these could have. Now, the President included the Nation’s homeland security agenda within the 

National Security Strategy, and in that he included climate change 

as well as violent extremism, but also natural disasters. 

Dr. Caudle, how has this, you know, revamped whole-of-government approach to homeland security strengthened the Nation’s preparedness? Because I think we saw first-hand what could happen 

if there was a—not only a terrorist attack but a natural disaster 

in something like the Port of Houston or in Cape Cod. 

Ms. CAUDLE. You know, certainly in theory the whole-of-government, the whole-of-nation, whole-of-community I think is fine as a 

theory. My problem with the language around that is how do you 

practically leverage, really, the resources and goals of all of the different communities all the way down to the individual level? 

It is one of those things that I think it is a principle that we have 

seen consistently, in fact, since 9/11, if not before, about having everyone working together. The practical implications of the new Na-
24 

tional preparedness goal that the President issued that really is a 

continuation, if not an enhancement of what President Bush issued 

in his Presidential Directive. I ask for what does this really look 

like in terms of preparedness on the ground because you still have, 

as you mentioned, jurisdictional issues, you still have issues with 

resources, you still have people that are concerned with existing capabilities, equipment, hazmat suits, and the like. 

How do they sustain that and where is the money going to 

come—anyway, and then the other thing is this whole issue of 

whether or not the Federal Government can put together this preparedness approach that really does not have an existing framework and hasn’t had, really, a strong existing framework for management for the past decade. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. I think, you know, just quickly, and a common 

theme I have seen is the idea that we are retrofitting our security 

issues with budgets. 

You know, what I am afraid of is the next disaster that comes 

we will just start spending and reacting to it and no one will be 

objecting then, but I really think that in the larger sense that this 

is very interesting here, and I appreciate both your efforts to try 

and do what I call retrofitting the budget we have. I really think, 

you know, the explanation has to be more expansive than, say, 

‘‘Here is what we are facing,’’ and I think the American public will 

agree that that is a great investment of our tax resources. 

I have run out of time. If you get to fit into it, you know, Mr. 

Schneider, we did have a hearing and a markup recently on this 

committee where we moved forward with a public-private approach 

to cybersecurity. I don’t know if you have a—can comment now or 

later, but that is something that we have basic agreement on in 

this committee. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I may, briefly, cybersecurity is very, very difficult, and I realize, frankly, from the perspective of the committee 

there are so many different committees with different jurisdictions 

of cyber, and you have to rational—you know, my answer here 

would be this: I would also agree to—or proceed to accept the half 

a loaf or a quarter of the loaf rather than solve the world hunger 

problem. 

The reason is this: You have to rationalize so many different 

things. If we talk about cybersecurity in the utilities, what about 

the FERC? If you talk about cybersecurity and the companies on 

the exchange what about the regulation of the SEC? 

What about the privacy issues? If somebody basically secures a 

network, how are they identified in case there is a problem in this 

massive exfiltration and economic loss? You have the economic 

trade issues and things like that. 

So I would urge you to do this, quite frankly: I know how hard 

this thing is, and I think if you can make some incremental 

progress area by area this year, accept that as success and then 

move on. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I am over my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you for your testimony. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Long. 

Mr. LONG. I have only got 14 seconds left. 
25 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony here today. Just because I am 

an auctioneer they always want me to talk fast. 

But, Mr. Schneider, to follow up a little bit on that, how can we 

better handle cybersecurity? You are talking about all these different committees and all these different cybersecurity jurisdictions, and we all know that it is a huge problem and I think that 

Leon Panetta is the one that said that our next Pearl Harbor is 

going to be a cyber attack. You see attacks every day and they are 

just going to get more egregious so we really, really need to get 

ahead of the curve on this if we can. 

I know in my hometown of Springfield, Missouri we had some folks that—I think it was $440,000, they owned a little tiny title 

company, a land title company, and there was $440,000 removed 

from their bank account over the weekend, and I can’t remember 

now what country it—Afghanistan, I think it ended up in, but what 

is your suggestion? What is your recommendation for getting ahead 

of the curve on this? Everybody gives it a lot of lip service but I 

never really hear anybody drilling down on it. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you for the question. I appreciate that. 

I think you have to do two things. No. 1, you have to recognize— 

and this is my own personal opinion, and I spent most of my life 

in DOD, is that when DOD talks about cybersecurity they are really talking about, in many cases, a potential for cyber warfare, and 

what is the escalation curve—— 

Mr. LONG. You spent most of your life in what? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In Department of Defense. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. I thought you said DOT—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, no, no, no. No, I was—— 

Mr. LONG. I don’t like acronyms. I am still trying to figure out 

what D.C. stands for, so—spell it out for me. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LONG. I thought you said DOT. I am sorry—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, I am sorry. I wasn’t clear. So Department 

of Defense. 

When they talk about cybersecurity a lot of what they are talking 

about has to do with cyber warfare, escalation, attribution, and 

what do you do. When DHS, much to their credit, though they have 

the spearhead responsibilities, a lot of what they talk about is, 

frankly, securing dot-gov. Dot-gov is that domain that basically is 

the Government’s network. The problem is you have the DHS piece 

and then you have all these other departments. 

What I think we need to be doing is to focusing on not the big 

defense companies, because they have millions of dollars to spend 

on network security. I am talking about the small, the mid-sized 

companies. I am talking about the State and local. 

I think we need to figure out a way so that the Government can 

assist in the development of these cyber secure operation centers 

that can be done locally, regionally, in many ways like physical security except it is cybersecurity. Come up with a commoditized 

scheme by which a lot of these State and local, small, mid-sized 

companies in these jurisdictions can have affordable cybersecurity 

for their networks. 
26 

That takes a fundamental shift in focus from the big DOD, DHS, 

dot-gov, dot-mil systems to the rest of the country. I believe that, 

if properly incentivized, the industry, which—with its expertise in 

this area, could make a financial market to invest in this area and 

expand. That is just one thing I would do. 

The other things you could do is just self-education. There is a 

lot of bad information that is out there about what you have to do, 

and if one could sponsor a series of forums—educational events and 

seminars and things like that would have widespread regional and 

local distribution, that would go a long way for basically informing 

the general public of the seriousness of the problem. 

Mr. LONG. Say that again, that last part again. If you had regional what? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Cybersecurity operational centers and educational forums. I think it would help raise the educational level 

of awareness of the public of the severity of this problem. 

I honestly believe that until you personally get hacked and pay 

a price, like happened to me about 2 weeks ago, it becomes real, 

okay? So what you have to do is raise the awareness of the general 

public, not just the high-profile players like DHS and DOD and the 

dot-gov, dot-mil folks, but the rest of the population. 

Mr. LONG. But if we have got too many people trying to watch 

the pot how do we correct that? I mean, if we have—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. You have always got to have—you are always 

going to have the people. There are so many different jurisdictions 

of this and there are so many potential impacts, and to be honest 

with you, you have a reluctance, as happened yesterday, I heard 

on the radio, of companies that have serious problems—cyber attacks—from divulging that. The reason is they don’t want to affect 

their stock price; they don’t want to see a run on their investors, 

and things like that. 

So there has to be some sort of a truth in discussion ground rules 

that are set up for this. This is a massive problem that is not going 

to be solved in a year, and that is why I really think the right 

thing to do is agree on a consensus on a couple small pieces that 

make a difference, approve them, and then start working on the 

next set. 

Mr. LONG. Okay. Thank you. I am past my time. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Just to follow up, the sharing of information, that is something 

we try to put forth in this bill—and I know Intelligence Committee 

has one as well—to protect that information so that these companies can share that with the Government without it being divulged. 

You are right, they have a duty to their stockholders. 

I think on the education and awareness piece, I know NSA has 

said that probably 70 percent of this could be through education 

and awareness computer hygiene—proper, you know, computer hygiene, so—with that, I now recognize—Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank the witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Schneider, in your testimony you propose that the Department should shift its business model for scanning equipment out-
27 

side of the Government and focusing on outsourcing to commercial 

vendors. As you also rightly note, this is a model that is frowned 

upon by the Office of Management and Budget due to the cost. 

Would it not be wiser to keep those funds in house or inside and 

use them to build on science and technology within the Department, and perhaps we get a little bit more mileage out of that? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thanks. Thanks for the question. 

This is one of those situations I feel that unless you had the job 

I had, it is not very obvious to the outside world. When you take 

a look at the budget, this is the budget of reality, and Congress has 

been kind enough to increase, over the years, the amount of operational law enforcement people. 

If you take a look at the Department, the amount of dollars required for salaries, throw in a couple of billion for the Disaster Relief Fund, throw in a couple of billion for the grants, that is about 

70 percent of the dollars that are appropriated. That doesn’t leave 

much money. A big chunk of what that remaining money is is IT. 

So when you are faced with massive scanning equipment that is 

out-of-date and you need to refurbish it or you need to update it 

you are talking about big bills. From my standpoint, when I was 

there and especially today, the Department will never get that 

amount of money to do this. These are very expensive machines. 

We are very fortunate that medical technology—imaging techniques and things like that—drive innovation. I am hopeful that 

with the advent of dental technology and the like it will increase 

the capability of the machines, but the simple fact is when you are 

there you just don’t have the money, and my take is you will not 

have the money in the future, to actually go out and buy these machines and then worry about refresh, update, et cetera, and maintenance. 

So my recommendation would be change the business model. Not 

basically outsource it, but get a long-term lease with—just like the 

IT providers do today, you have service level agreements, reliability, refresh requirements, and things like that, and pay as you 

go. It is a financing matter, in my mind, and it accepts budget reality that you will never get the big chunk of money you will need. 

Frankly, I had great difficulty with the folks at OMB in this matter, and this gets back to—this gets to the issue of whether it is 

a capital lease or an operating lease, and I have been away from 

it too long to remember the differences, but the one that they don’t 

like is what they consider this type of a scheme. I, personally, at 

the time, thought that they were wrong. 

So you are not outsourcing, you are basically leasing. You can 

call that an outsource, but it is no different than your car. 

So I just am heavily biased by the budget reality that I lived 

under, and more importantly, the more stringent budget reality 

today. I think this really needs to be looked at. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, thank you very much. It seems to me that we 

do a great deal of experimenting, I mean, almost every time. I 

mean, the airport that I use most frequently and there seems to 

be a different approach. 

But thank you very much, and let me thank you. 
28 

Dr. Caudle, let me ask you, is it safe to say that the National 

Security Strategy released by President Obama was drastically different from the strategy that was released by President Bush? 

Ms. CAUDLE. In terms of tall—I mean, calling it drastic, I think 

in both strategies there is recognition of the strategic threat environment that the Nation faces. The difference that I saw in what 

President Obama put out was this emphasis on placing homeland 

security within National security. You could see it coming and I 

think it—to my mind it certainly made a lot of sense to do that because homeland security, as you know, doesn’t stop at the borders, 

is a cliche ́ that we normally will say, and so extending the borders 

out in terms of National security and what we do overseas internationally, what we do with our defense establishments, as well, 

has implications for homeland security. So that is what I saw as 

a—the major feature. 

There also was an emphasis on some other areas in engaging 

partners that was a stronger emphasis, but by and large, at least 

from my area of expertise, that encompassing homeland security— 

and what it said to me, as well, was that it was likely we will not 

have a National strategy for homeland security. The Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review report that tended to replace the 2007 

National Strategy for Homeland Security—I think now we will only 

see that National Security Strategy, so taking it as the document 

for, really, what are the goals that are laid out there, but then how 

do you operationalize, you know, as I am sure others will talk 

about. 

Many of these National strategies are almost statements of principle. What the SEVA committee is focusing on is: What is this 

boots on the ground? What are the realities? What is the management scope that you really need to start paying attention to? What 

is the oversight? Where is the money going? Where is the personnel 

going? 

So that is where—the strategies are fine, the new emphasis on 

homeland security, but how do we drive it down now for the preparedness, for the security that the Nation is asking for? 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. It is a little build on what we 

are already doing, I would assume. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the timeliness of this hearing, especially coming in the wake of a hearing 

yesterday in Foreign Affairs where we talked about the Iranian 

threat within the hemisphere and globally. 

I want to thank you for mentioning the trip to Afghanistan because since we were there in November I have given a lot of 

thought to our border security here in this country, and it is, you 

know, no secret that I believe that one of the roles of the United 

States Government is to defend the sovereignty of this country, and 

I look simply at our porous Southern Border and wonder what we 

can do, what we should be doing, what we can do more of, and 

where we are making mistakes. 

So as we talk about the effective implementation of a strategy I 

wonder what is the actual strategy of the Department of Homeland 
29 

Security with regard to the border, because I read report after report that says we should put our emphasis here or should put our 

emphasis here. Mr. Chairman, I think about that Pakistani-Afghan 

border where there is a natural port of entry on Main Highway 1 

that we saw, but then the berm that was created and the, I think, 

60 cuts in that berm that allowed illicit activity to come across. 

When we think about Afghanistan we think about IEDs and 

Taliban fighters and enemy combatants coming across, but what 

we were told is what is trying to circumvent that natural border 

crossing was money, drugs, and weapons. It really wasn’t the 

Taliban or enemy combatants or IEDs, that most of those were attempting to come through that natural port of entry. 

So thinking about that and thinking about the September 2011 

GAO report that cited DOD officials who are concerned that there 

is no comprehensive Southwest Border security strategy and the 

National Guard’s role has been ad hoc, and then I look at this 

Texas Border Coalition’s January 2012 recent report that talks 

about—we have put a lot of our emphasis on border crossings outside of the natural ports of entry. It has really brought my focus 

back to the border crossings and the ports of entry. 

Reading this I learned that there are 52 border crossings in the 

Southwest, eight of which are rail, 43 are roadways, there are 24 

bridges, two dams, 17 roads, and one ferry. So when you go to approach a problem you look at what are the easiest things to do, you 

address those first, then you broaden your scope until you solve the 

problem. 

This year I have had the opportunity to go to Israel and look at 

the West Bank border crossings, what Israelis have done with fencing and ports of entry, and interdiction back in their country and 

the timeliness of it. So the question I have for you guys is why, 

based on this Texas Border Coalition’s report saying our problem, 

most of the drugs and illicit activity that are coming across are not 

circumventing those ports of entry and coming across that no man’s 

land, so to speak, on our border; a lot of it is coming through that 

natural port of entry where we have got the personnel. 

You all have mentioned the number of—the increase in Department of Homeland Security Custom and Border Patrol personnel 

just in the last decade, and my gosh, from $400 million to $3.6 billion we have spent a lot of money on focusing on the Southwest 

Border, but are we not being effective if we are not focusing on the 

easiest thing, and that is where we are funneling that traffic 

through a natural port of entry where we already have systems in 

place? So what should we be doing there? How can we start there 

and then expand it to the fencing, the areas of surveillance and 

other things in the no man’s land, so to speak, where we don’t have 

a port of entry? 

So my question to you, Mr. Schneider, is what should we do on 

the ports of entry? How can we make sure we do the easy things 

first? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Congressman, first, I am a little dated because 

I have been out of office for 3 years, but I can tell you that based 

on what I experienced when I was in the Department that the 

more we basically put up fencing, the more we used air assets, it 

focused people on the ports of entry. That is why what we saw, in 
30 

many cases, at some of the ports, the—I will call it the frustration 

by the bad people to actually force their way, brute force, bad incidents right through the ports of entry. 

So I know what we did at the time was to really beef that up 

relative to the security, beef that up relative to at the ports, the 

entry procedures that they have to do to basically get approval to 

cross, and frankly, rely heavily on intelligence and awareness and 

things like that. That is true of the personnel crossings and that 

is true of especially the border crossings with heavy automobile 

traffics, from the large ones, like at San Ysidro, to some of the 

small ones—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this, because we are about out of 

time, but do you feel like they are just overwhelmed based on the 

amount of traffic that comes through those port of entries? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Traffics are huge, and they are going to get 

huger. I know there is a modernization plan to expand that. 

I think a lot has to do with intel. I don’t know what is classified 

and unclassified; I am removed. But I can tell you, when you start 

talking about interfaces with DEA and ATF and things like that, 

and who passes what, and different analysis techniques and things 

like that, when I was there we were using that and using that effectively. I can only assume that just based on a lot of how that 

technology has evolved over the years and greater workings with 

some of these other organizations on intel that the performance in 

responding to that threat has gotten greater. But again, I am a little dated. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank the gentleman. 

I have been informed we have votes coming up in just a couple 

of minutes. I think this worked out perfectly. 

So the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, from New York. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul. 

Thank you to our panelists for your testimony today. I just wanted to note that with respect to the GAO report, General McCaffrey 

also stated that as part of the strategy we need to include comprehensive immigration reform, and that is always a major part of 

a missing link when we are talking about our border security. 

But my question goes to you, Mr. Schneider, and it is with regards to the references that you have made in your testimony specifically around Goldwater-Nichols. I know that you are a proponent of DHS adopting Goldwater-Nichols. 

Some of us disagree with the assertion that Goldwater-Nichols’ 

framework is applicable at DHS, because as you rightly stated, it 

has still not reached its maturity. By your own testimony, DOD 

was established in 1947 but Goldwater-Nichols, although authorized in 1986, did not take effect until 1989—so 42 years after DOD 

was stood up. 

So given this time frame, do you think that DHS is still not 

ready, especially—don’t you think that it is not ready, especially in 

light of its other challenges, for Goldwater-Nichols? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. I think it is ready, and the reason is if you 

take a look at the long historical basis for a lot of the services— 

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, et cetera—I think it was a 

tougher nut to crack, to put it mildly. I fought the world change, 
31 

quite frankly, when in the late 1980s I was watching TV and I 

think it was Haiti I saw on the helicopters flying off the decks of 

the United States Navy aircraft carrier. So fundamentally things 

worked better, packaging the right amount of people from the different specialties, et cetera. That is why Special Ops gets a lot of 

credit to these days, and that is why I think these combatant commanders do a good job. 

I am not sure that there is any right time, and I am not sure 

how long it is, but the fact of the matter is, the longer you wait 

on something like this the less possibility you are going to have of 

reaching some earlier amount of effectiveness than if you waited. 

So I think it is different, quite frankly. Law enforcement is different than the military, and I learned that from being in the Department. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Dr. Caudle, for the first time ever 

President Obama including the Nation’s homeland security agenda 

within the National Security Strategy. Furthermore, he included in 

his strategy climate change, violent extremism, and National disasters. How has this revamped the whole-of-government approach to 

homeland security and strengthened the Nation’s preparedness? 

Ms. CAUDLE. You know, certainly at present we don’t see the follow-on of those emerging threats in the current National preparedness system that DHS has put up. The new National preparedness 

goal, the capabilities, and so on, specifically talked about only nearterm threats, a beginning and end. So these emerging threats, they 

are saying, are something that will be under consideration with the 

next Strategic National Risk Assessment Review. 

Certainly it is important. FEMA is working on their Strategic 

Foresight Initiative, which has identified that as an issue that 

should be addressed. 

So we will have to wait and see how it is actually incorporated. 

There is some discussion in the National preparedness goal documents about mitigation, but they tend to be still for only a nearterm, beginning-and-end-type disaster. So hopefully we will be seeing that emerge hopefully over the next several years. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Let me ask—and this is to you, Dr. 

Caudle—the previous administration’s National Security Strategy 

and National Strategy for Homeland Security excluded response to 

natural disasters from its definition of homeland security. How has 

the inclusion of this term in new strategies strengthened our response system, and as efforts are taken to further reconcile definitions of homeland security should there be an effort to make sure 

natural disasters continue to be included in the definition? 

Ms. CAUDLE. Well, certainly. The new homeland security definition, although it is not in legislation, really speaks to the all-hazards approach, from terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and the 

like, so you really have encompassed in homeland security all of 

the threats and hazards or drivers of those threats and hazards 

that are important. 

The inclusion or non-inclusion almost became moot after Hurricane Katrina because the country realized that natural disaster— 

the Deepwater Horizon oil spill also was another indicator of these 

are the types of threat and hazards that are not just terrorism that 

the country should be paying attention to. 
32 

1 ‘‘$90 billion spent on border security, with mixed results,’’ Boston Globe, June 26, 2011, Martha Mendoza, Associated Press. 2 Ibid. 

3Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border, GAO–11–856R September 12, 2011. 4 U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center ‘‘National Drug Threat Assessment 2011’’ August 2011. 5Office of National Drug Control Policy, the White House, ‘‘National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy’’, June 2009. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank you. 

Let me just—I would like to enter into the record, if there is no 

objection, the Texas Border Coalition report. It basically says without strategy America’s border security blunders facilitate and empower Mexican drug cartels. It says America’s border security effort 

lacks strategic direction and operates on an ad hoc basis. So without objection, I would like to enter this report into the record, as 

well. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF THE TEXAS BORDER COALITION

JANUARY 12, 2012 

WITHOUT STRATEGY: AMERICA’S BORDER SECURITY BLUNDERS FACILITATE AND

EMPOWER MEXICO’S DRUG CARTELS

The United States Government spent about $90 billion over the past decade to 

secure the U.S.-Mexico border.1 The results are mixed, with apprehension rates up 

to 90 percent for undocumented persons seeking to cross the frontier between designated U.S.-Mexico border crossings, yet the Mexican drug cartels continue to enjoy 

commercial success smuggling more drugs than ever into the country through the 

legal border crossings.2

‘‘America’s border security effort lacks strategic direction and operates on an ad hoc 

basis.’’ 

A significant part of the $90 billion Government expense has been the deployment 

of U.S. military forces, including the National Guard, to supplement Border Patrol 

and Customs and Border Protection forces on the Mexican border. A recent Government Accountability Office briefing on the costs and benefits of the Department of 

Defense role in securing the Southwest land border reported that DOD officials ‘‘are 

concerned that there is no comprehensive southwest border security strategy’’ and 

the National Guard’s role has been ‘‘ad hoc.’’3

As the United States spent $90 billion seeking to secure the Southwest Border, 

the Mexican cartels have continued to smuggle cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine through the legal border crossings in California and South Texas, and marijuana between border crossings in remote areas of Arizona.4 They generally smuggle 

smaller loads of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine in non-commercial vehicles 

(cars, SUVs, and pickup trucks) to blend in with cross-border traffic.5

As the Mexican drug cartels flourish in the face of $90 billion spent to secure the 

border through which they conduct their trade, the United States continues to focus 

on border security tactics grounded in operation that began in the 1990s when an 

anti-immigration backlash fueled crackdowns code-named ‘‘Operation Gatekeeper’’ 

and ‘‘Operation Hold-the-Line.’’ Debates in Congress focus on building more fences 

and walls and whether to snuff environmental protections for public lands on the 

Southwest and Northern Borders. 

‘‘The legal border crossings on the U.S. southwestern border have become America’s 

weakest border security link.’’ 

As reported by the Department of Defense and the Government Accountability Office, America’s border security effort lacks strategic direction and operates on an ad 

hoc basis. Without a strategy, America will continue to lose the border security war 

to the better financed, equipped, more mobile and agile drug cartels. Our National 

success depends on defining and executing a strategy to defeat the cartels attacking 

our Nation. 
33 

6 ‘‘Meeting Land Port of Entry Modernization Needs in Constrained Budgetary Environment,’’ 

presentation by Mikhail Pavlov to the Joint Working Committee, October 2011. 7 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade Division annual report, 

2010, Washington, DC. 

The legal border crossings on the U.S. Southwestern Border have become America’s weakest border security link. Since the cartels choose to smuggle most of their 

products through the border crossings, a sensible strategy would be to attack their 

trade where it occurs and anticipate where their smuggling operations might move 

in response. Yet, the Department of Homeland Security has chosen to ignore these 

developments and refused to develop a strategy to confront them. 

Budget forecasts by Department of Homeland Security officials suggest no new 

funding for border security infrastructure at the official border crossings for many 

years and personnel accounts will essentially remain static during that time.6 While 

new equipment may become available, some cannot be utilized because the electrical 

facilities at the border crossings are outdated and inadequate to support the expensive new tools. 

Congress and the administration confront a choice when considering strategic directions for securing the U.S-Mexican border. At a minimum, the Texas Border Coalition recommends that Congress and the President have a strategy rather than addressing this challenge ad hoc. 

‘‘Spending additional billions of dollars on more fencing-walls or exempting the Border Patrol from the rule of law should be lower priorities until the border crossings can be made functional in securing our borders.’’ 

The strategic paths forward offer a choice between closing the gaps between the 

border crossings, where criminals face a 90 percent likelihood of apprehension, or 

addressing the inadequate infrastructure, technology, and law enforcement personnel at the Southwest Border crossings where criminals are less challenged by an 

apprehension rate of merely 28 percent. 

The Texas Border Coalition suggests that the only reasonable path forward is to 

refocus our border security priorities where our Nation is most vulnerable: At the 

legal border crossings. Spending additional billions of dollars on more Border Patrol 

agents, fencing-walls, or exempting the Border Patrol from the rule of law should 

be lower priorities compared to making the official border crossings functional in securing our borders. 

To choose the other path and continue to fight the border security war where it 

has been won (between the border crossings) and to continue to surrender the war 

where we are losing (at the border crossings) is to threaten our National and border 

security and resign our Nation to defeat. 

This document is focused on the security aspects of border strategy, especially as 

they related to Mexican drug cartels. There are additional benefits to improving the 

security at America’s border crossings, including facilitation of legitimate trade and 

travel with Mexico, providing a major benefit to the American economy and jobs. 

U.S. manufacturers and consumers depend on ready access to Mexican markets 

and goods. U.S. exporters serve the Mexican market and profit from foreign sales. 

Border region businesses in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas tie their 

livelihoods to trade and create jobs for American workers. Mexico is America’s thirdlargest trading partner behind only Canada and China. U.S.-Mexico trade totals $400 billion, a nearly five-fold increase since the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with most goods 

crossing via commercial truck. More than 13,000 trucks bring over $630 million 

worth of goods into the United States from Mexico every day. U.S. exports to Mexico 

total $163 billion.7

As a matter of general strategy, America cannot solve our budgetary problems 

solely by cutting expenses. We must increase our revenues. Making our border 

crossings more efficient in conducting legal trade with both Canada and Mexico will 

increase our National revenues and give us the resources to fight the other problems 

we face in our borders. 

BORDER SECURITY BACKGROUND

The U.S. Government divides its effort to enforce the land border with Mexico into 

two parts: One at the border crossings and the other between them. Along the nearly 2,000-mile border with Mexico, 42 official border crossings—located on bridges in 

Texas and on highways in California, Arizona, and New Mexico—connect the two 

nations, under the command of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The 

CBP has multiple responsibilities, including facilitation of legal travel across the 

borders as well as defending against terrorist intrusions. Within CBP, the U.S. Bor-
34 

8 Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal 2012, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC, February 2009. 9 Ibid. 

10GAO–09–896 Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, Washington, DC, September 2009. 11 Ibid. 12 Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal 2012, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC, February 2009. 

der Patrol has responsibility for policing the vast areas that separate the border 

crossings. CBP Officers handle traffic through the official border crossings. 

‘‘The probability of an illegal crosser being apprehended by law enforcement between 

the border crossings is about 90 percent; the probability of an illegal crosser 

being apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. at the border crossings is about 

30 percent.’’ 

Since 1993, the United States has engaged in a long-term effort to increase enforcement on the Southwest land border with Mexico. It has invested heavily in 

manpower, technology, transportation, and infrastructure to arrange a multi-layered 

defense against illegal activities, but that investment has lacked balance. 

The investment in deterrence has been greatest between the border crossings; in 

contrast, the investment at the border crossings themselves has been relatively 

small. This imbalance has produced a substantial differential of risk to those who 

seek to penetrate the border to cause harm to U.S. security. While there is admitted 

weakness in some of the data, the probability of an illegal crosser being apprehended by law enforcement between the border crossings is about 90 percent; the 

probability of an illegal crosser being apprehended attempting to enter the United 

States at the border crossings is less than 30 percent. 

This imbalanced deterrence contributes to America’s vulnerability to the Mexican 

drug cartels, terrorists, and traffic in people and contraband at the designated border crossings. 

BETWEEN THE BORDER CROSSINGS

Since 1993, the number of agents deployed to secure the borders between the border crossings has more than sextupled from 4,000 to a projected total of 24,285 in 

2012.8 The Border Patrol budget has increased nine-fold over the same period from 

$400 million to $3.6 billion.9

‘‘In 2010, the value of cross-border travel at the U.S. border crossings and exports 

with Mexico and Canada totaled more than $791 billion.’’ 

The vastly expanded effort between the border crossings accelerated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 2003 incorporation of the Border 

Patrol into the new Department of Homeland Security. Prior to September 11, 2001, 

the Border Patrol’s priority was to prevent the illegal entry of people and contraband into the United States between the border crossings. After the September 11 

attacks, fighting terrorism was established as one of the agency’s prime responsibilities. 

In addition, Congress funded construction of 670 miles of border fence, now completed at a cost to taxpayers of over $2.4 billion,10 and an electronic detection system that has been canceled and restarted at a cost exceeding $1 billion.11

AT THE BORDER CROSSINGS

Despite expanded responsibility and an exponential increase in legitimate trade 

and tourism across the Southwestern Border as a result of the North American Free 

Trade Agreement’s ratification in 1993, the enforcement budget for Customs inspection personnel has seen a paltry boost when compared to the sharp increase in funding for the Border Patrol. Funding for inspectors increased from $1.6 billion in 1993 

to $2.9 billion in 2012.12 Of that 80 percent increase over 19 years, nearly threequarters was consumed by rising inflation. 

The United States has 163 official border crossings. The General Services Administration (GSA) owns 96.5 and leases 22.5. The National Park Service owns one. 

CBP owns the remaining 43, of which 39 are located on the Northern Border. The 

CBP border crossings are relatively low-volume entry points, such as those on the 

Canadian border that handle fewer the 100 vehicles a day, while the GSA border 
35 

13OIG–10–05, Review of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Expenditure Plans for the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Depart of Homeland Security Office of the 

Inspector General, Washington, DC, October 22, 2009. 14 Atlas of the Land Entry Ports on the U.S.-Mexico Border, Border Policy Research Institute, 

Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington, Fall 2010. 15 U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Trans-Border 

Freight Data, http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder. 16GAO–08–329T: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s 

Border Crossings: Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues, Washington, DC, January 3, 2008. 17 Evaluating U.S. Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us, Wayne 

Cornelius, Director, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San 

Diego, CA, April 14, 2009. 18 A coyote or pollero is a professional criminal specializing in smuggling humans across the 

United States border from Mexico for a fee paid in advance. 

crossings tend to be larger and have higher traffic volumes, such as at Laredo, 

Texas, which sees several hundred every minute.13

On the U.S.-Mexico border, there are 52 border crossings in all, of which 8 are 

rail lines, 43 are roadways (24 bridges, 2 dams, and 17 roads), and 1 is a ferry. For 

record-keeping purposes, the Government divides the crossings into 26 crossing 

groups, with data from a set of neighboring crossings aggregated under the name 

of a master port.14

‘‘The emphasis on Border Patrol enforcement between the border crossings has shifted 

factors of risk associated with illegal crossings.’’ 

United States and Mexico facilitate 240 million legal crossings a year, nearly 

30,000 per hour. The United States’ two largest export markets are Canada and 

Mexico. In 2010, the value of cross-border travel at the U.S. border crossings and 

exports with Mexico and Canada totaled more than $791 billion.15 Three out of four 

of all legal entries into the United States occur at an official border crossing.16

ROLES NOT INTERCHANGEABLE

The operational roles of the Border Patrol and CBP inspection officers are not 

interchangeable. Few recommend attempting to solve the imbalance between the 

two forces by reassigning Border Patrol agents to the border crossings. Besides 

weakening security between the border crossings, the training and outlook of the 

two forces does not qualify Border Patrol agents to substitute for CBP officers. 

The primary activity of a Border Patrol agent is to Line Watch: To detect, prevent, and apprehend terrorists, undocumented aliens and smugglers. The Border 

Patrol does not recognize any legitimate activity in crossing the border between the 

border crossings. 

‘‘Apprehensions of persons seeking to enter the United States between the border 

crossings—where all entries are illegal—has fallen to levels not seen since 1970s, 

as the enhanced manpower, mobility, communications, technology, and infrastructure have been brought to bear on the traffic.’’ 

While CBP officers also defend against terrorist intrusion by identifying high-risk 

individuals who are attempting to enter into the United States at the border crossings and stopping criminal activities, they have additional responsibilities that are 

quite different from the function of Border Patrol agents. CBP officers are responsible for regulating and facilitating legitimate international trade and travel, collecting import duties, and enforcing hundreds of U.S. regulations, including trade, 

drug, and immigration laws. CBP officers must be able to distinguish between legitimate activities and those that violate our laws as they interact with the public in 

a polite and respectful manner. 

MULTI-LAYERED STRATEGY

The multi-layered strategic deterrence built by the Border Patrol between the border crossings has increased the difficulty of illegal crossings, although controversy 

remains about the deterrence associated with individual layers or whether the effort 

actually deters migrants who are determined to the enter the United States to improve the economic state of their families.17

The emphasis on Border Patrol enforcement between the border crossings has 

shifted factors of risk associated with illegal crossings. Interviews with migrants 

show that the use of ‘‘coyotes’’ 18 for illegal crossings has increased markedly, which 
36 

19 Evaluating U.S. Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us, Wayne 

Cornelius, Director, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San 

Diego, CA, April 14, 2009. 20 Border commissioner touts greater enforcement, San Diego Union Tribune, January 5, 2011 

by Elizabeth Aguilera, and The Border is Safe, Federal Officials Say, Texas Tribune, August 

17, 2011 by Julian Aguilar. 

boosts the probability of successful illegal entry. This demand has also increased the 

cost of services.19

WEAKNESS OF DATA

The lack of statistically reliable data related to the number of undocumented 

aliens residing in or entering the United States year-over-year hampers effective 

analysis related to border security. In addition, in spite of the data’s inherent weakness, Department of Homeland Security agencies consider some volumes of related 

data to be ‘‘law enforcement sensitive’’ and restrict public and academic access to 

it. 

For instance, estimating the flow of undocumented migrants is often an approximation based on apprehension data reported by DHS. The estimated probability of 

apprehension is often based on factors that include the number of Line Patrol hours 

of Border Patrol staff and the relative strengths and weaknesses of U.S. and Central 

American economies. More recently, this data has been supplemented by classified 

data compiled by DHS based on observation from unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling the border. While the comparison of apprehensions at and between the border 

crossings is not as precise as would be optimal, the estimates included in this report 

are based on the best available existing information, some of which has been publicly supplied by Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin. 

BETWEEN THE BORDER CROSSINGS—90 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF APPREHENSION

Apprehensions of persons seeking to enter the United States between the border 

crossings—where all entries are illegal—has fallen to levels not seen since 1970s, 

as the enhanced manpower, mobility, communications, technology, and infrastructure have been brought to bear on the traffic. 

In addition, increased apprehension rates in most Border Patrol sectors, up to 90 

percent according to Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin, 

vastly impedes the trafficking of persons from Mexico to the United States between 

the border crossings.20

Two notes of caution: The data remains weak, and 90 percent apprehension rates 

do not mean only 10 percent of persons seeking illegal entry gain it. In fact, most 
37 

21 ‘‘Immigrant arrests nearing 40-year low’’ The Arizona Daily Star, September 4, 2011 by 

Brady McCombs. 22 A major violation involves serious criminal activity, including possession of narcotics, smuggling of prohibited products, human smuggling, weapons possession, fraudulent U.S. documents, 

and other offenses serious enough to result in arrest. 23Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report for Fiscal Years 2008–2010, 

Department of Homeland Security Office of the Chief Financial Officer Program Analysis and 

Evaluation, Washington, DC, May 7, 2009. 24 A ‘‘New’’ Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas 

and Other Private Armies, Dr. Max G. Manwaring. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies 

Institute, Carlisle, PA, September 25, 2009. 

of those who attempt to enter the United States illegally try more than one time, 

and eventually nearly all make it through. 

Another point: The old belief that for every apprehension, three more gain entry 

(the getaway rate) is being proven untrue. Commissioner Bersin says that as a result of more reliable data provided by airborne surveillance vehicles deployed in the 

past several years by the Border Patrol, the Border Patrol detects far more illegal 

entries and catches a greater percentage of them.21

‘‘Only 28 percent of ‘major violators’ attempting to enter the U.S. at the official border 

crossings are detected and apprehended.’’ 

Finally, as the Border Patrol improvements in manpower, mobility, communications, technology, and infrastructure have made illegal crossings more difficult and 

hazardous, the criminal cartels operating in Mexico have moved into the human 

smuggling market, forcing mom-and-pop smuggling operations out of business and 

increasing the cost of cross-border transport to would-be immigrants. 

Without the infusion of many billions dollars more, the United States has 

achieved about as much control of illegal entries between the border crossings as 

possible without solving the core problem: Our immigration system must be modernized to accommodate immigration needs and provide adequate channels for people 

to legally enter the United States so they do not try to go around a broken system. 

We must have comprehensive immigration reform in order to achieve continued improvement in the effective control of our borders between the border crossings. 

AT THE BORDER CROSSINGS—28 PERCENT PROBABILITY OF APPREHENSION

According to the most recent data released by the DHS, only 28 percent of ‘‘major 

violators’’ attempting to enter the United States at the official border crossings are 

detected and apprehended.22 In addition, CBP reports only 50 to 74 percent success 

in improving the targeting, screening, and apprehension of high-risk international 

cargo and travelers to prevent terrorist attacks, while providing processes to facilitate the flow of safe and legitimate trade and travel.23 The Department, under the 

claim that the statistics are ‘‘law enforcement sensitive,’’ has not released more recent data. 

STRATEGIC RESPONSE OF THE ENEMY

‘‘Nearly all of the drugs smuggled into the U.S., and the guns and bulk cash smuggled into Mexico transits via official border crossings.’’ 

U.S. border security strategy should not operate in a vacuum. The smuggling of 

drugs and humans into the United States and the smuggling of money and firearms 

into Mexico fuel the criminal cartels operating from the Mexican side of the border. 

The cartels are mature organizations, possessing sophisticated communications, 

transportation, and intelligence systems. They are richly informed about the environment in which they conduct their criminal operations and highly skilled at evaluating risk and executing strategic and tactical operations based on risk judgments. 

One cartel, the Zeta organization, ‘‘looks very much like any global business organization that can quickly, flexibly, and effectively respond to virtually any opportunity, challenge, or changing situation.’’24

These criminal organizations are capable of discovering and exploiting weaknesses 

between the border crossings, but the Border Patrol has developed tactical mobility 

and agility to identify and respond to such threats. When presented with a choice 

between one path that presents a less than 30 percent risk of failure and another 

that presents an up to 90 percent risk of capture, the cartels naturally choose the 

less risky path. In the present environment, the cartels are choosing to conduct 

their trade across the bridges and highways, through the sanctioned border crossings and are rejecting the risk of crossing the Rio Grande and open desert between 

the border crossings. 
38 

25 ‘‘Inside the Cartel: Unraveling Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel’’ The Los Angeles Times, July 

24, 2011 by Richard Marosi. 26 Border Security Falls Short In Audit, GAO Criticizes Staffing, Training By Spencer S. Hsu, 

Washington Post, November 6, 2007. 27Wayne A. Cornelius, David Fitzgerald, Pedro Lewin-Fischer, and Leah Muse-Orlinoff, Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic Crisis: A Transnational Perspective (Boulder, CO: Lynne 

Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 61–62. 

As reported by Los Angeles Times writer Richard Marosi, ‘‘One of the Sinaloa cartel’s main pipelines runs through the antiquated U.S. port of entry at Calexico, a 

favorite of smugglers. The inspection station sits almost directly on the border, without the usual buffer zone of several hundred feet, so inspectors have difficulty examining cars in the approach lanes. Drug-sniffing dogs wilt in summer heat that can 

reach 115 degrees... Drugs were brought from Sinaloa state to Mexicali, Mexico, 

in bus tires. (The smuggler’s) job was to move the goods across the border and deliver them to distributors in the Los Angeles area, about 200 miles away. 

‘‘The flow was unceasing, and he employed about 40 drivers, lookouts, and coordinators to keep pace.’’25

According to the U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Threat Assessment 

2010, nearly 90 percent of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, and 

MDMA smuggled into the United States enters through the border crossings. A joint 

project on U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation coordinated by the Mexico Institute at 

the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San 

Diego indicates that bulk cash to fuel the Mexican drug cartels’ illicit and violent 

activities transits through the border crossings. And while data on the smuggling 

of firearms is incomplete, available information points to border crossings as the 

overwhelming point of entry into Mexico. 

The conclusion is irrefutable that nearly all of the drugs smuggled into the United 

States, and the guns and bulk cash smuggled into Mexico, transits via the border 

crossings, a strategic choice made by the Mexican cartels because the likelihood of 

being detected or apprehended is three times more likely between the border crossings than at them. 

STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR THE UNITED STATES

Those who mean our Nation harm have adjusted their strategies and tactics to 

reflect situational changes faster than DHS and Congress can adjust. Because of the 

U.S. Government’s relative lack of nimbleness, DHS and Congress continue to pour 

billions of dollars of our National resources into defending the vast expanses of land 

between the border crossings, a path that the enemy has abandoned, while denying 

resources needed to defend the border crossings that the enemy has chosen to directly assault. 

The choice for U.S. policymakers appears clear: Between (1) continue on the strategic path that wastes resources and produces fewer results by continuing to emphasize border protection between the border crossings and (2) changing our strategy 

to defend against an adroit, responsive enemy that is attacking us at the border 

crossings (while preparing for the enemy’s next logical move, most likely aimed back 

to the water and the skies). 

As Doris Meissner, former commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service, put the choice: ‘‘The more [money] that you pour into the Border Patrol and 

into enforcement between land ports of entry (border crossings)... the more pressure there is for people to misuse the system that gets them through land ports. 

It’s important to have a balance of resources between both.’’26

‘‘The more [money] that you pour into the Border Patrol and into enforcement between border crossings, the more pressure there is for people to misuse the system 

that gets them through the legal border crossings.’’ 

The scenario envisioned by former Commissioner Meissner has already been in 

place for years: A field study conducted in the first quarter of 2009 by the Mexican 

Migration Field Research and Training Program, based at the University of California-San Diego, found that more than one out of four (28 percent) of unauthorized 

Mexican migrants interviewed for the study had entered the United States on their 

most recent trip to the border through a legal border crossing, either concealed in 

vehicles or using false or borrowed documents. The authors noted that ‘‘while crossing the border through a POE costs significantly more than crossing in remote areas 

(people-smugglers can charge $5,000 or more for POE crossings), that mode of entry 

is much more likely to yield success.’’27

Reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have described the situation at the border crossings as inadequate to the task of protecting the Nation. 
39 

28GAO–08–329T: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s 

Border Crossings: Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues, Washington, DC, January 3, 2008. 29 ‘‘Meeting Land Port of Entry Modernization Needs in Constrained Budgetary Environment,’’ 

presentation by Mikhail Pavlov to the Joint Working Committee, October 2011. 30GAO–06–751R, Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs 

and Border Protection, Washington, DC, June 13, 2006. 

GAO found that managers at 19 of 21 border crossing offices cited examples of antiterrorism activities not being carried out, new or expanded facilities that were not 

fully operational, and radiation monitors and other inspection technologies not being 

fully used because of staff shortages. At seven of the eight major border crossings 

GAO visited, officers and managers told of not having sufficient staff, which contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support, and safety issues when 

officers inspect travelers—‘‘increasing the potential that terrorists, inadmissible 

travelers, and illicit goods could enter the country.’’28

Although they refused to make the data publicly available for years because they 

classified it as law enforcement sensitive, DHS officials recently acknowledged publicly that for the border crossings to successfully complete their mission, the agency 

needs 6,000 additional personnel and $6 billion in funding for infrastructure and 

technology.29

‘‘DHS officials recently acknowledged publicly that for the border crossings to successfully complete their mission, the agency needs 6,000 additional personnel 

and $6 billion in funding for infrastructure and technology.’’ 

In response, Congress has allocated zero dollars to border crossing infrastructure 

in fiscal 2011 and is likely to refuse to add funds in fiscal 2012. House and Senate 

appropriators have both approved adding 350 new CBP inspectors in fiscal 2012, but 

acknowledge that declining customs revenues will force a reduction of an equal 

number available to the agency, making the added personnel a net of zero. While 

technology is in the pipeline for delivery to the border crossings, a lack of adequate 

electric infrastructure often makes new equipment useless. 

Instead of dealing with the strategic threat to the United States, Congress has 

chosen to focus legislation to deploy more Border Patrol, build additional walls and 

fences and exempt the Border Patrol from regulations that protect communities’ air 

and water, safeguard our public lands and honor our cultural and historic heritage. 

TEXAS BORDER COALITION RECOMMENDATIONS

The Texas Border Coalition suggests that mandating more Border Patrol, fencing 

and waiving environmental law reflects an ineffective, anachronistic strategy that 

has not kept pace with developments at the border or with the risk assessments 

made by the criminal cartels. TBC urges Congress and the Obama administration 

to restore balance to border security at and between the border crossings by engaging in an emergency program to provide the border crossings with $6 billion in funding for infrastructure and technology and to employ 6,000 new inspectors on America’s front line over the next 4 years. 

It is important that the new inspectors must be assigned to the front lines of the 

border crossings where they are needed, not to supervisory roles. According to GAO, 

prior personnel buildups at the border crossings have resulted in a 17 percent increase in CBP managers and only a 2 percent increase in the number of front-line 

CBP officers.30 Anecdotally, there is evidence of this pattern over a period of many 

years. The Nation’s security cannot afford to see an intended increase in front-line 

inspectors siphoned off to the management level of CBP. 

‘‘TBC urges Congress and the Obama Administration to restore balance to border security at and between the ports by engaging in an emergency program to provide 

the border crossings with $6 billion in funding for infrastructure and technology 

and to employ 6,000 new inspectors on America’s front line over the next four 

years.’’ 

In addition, the TBC commends the leadership of many border Representatives 

in Congress for their attention to developing a real strategy for confronting the 

criminal cartels and security on the U.S.-Mexico border. We especially wish to salute Michigan Representative Candice Miller, Chair of the House Subcommittee on 

Border and Maritime Security, and Texas Representative Henry Cuellar, Ranking 

Democrat on the subcommittee, for advancing legislation requiring the Department 

of Homeland Security to develop strategy for securing borders within 5 years. 
40 

Finally, TBC agrees with CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin that public-private 

partnerships (PPPs) are vital to fund the projects necessary to handle the ever-increasing trade between the United States and Mexico. Since CBP officials have announced that any PPP relationship would require a new law, we propose legislation 

be enacted to authorize public-private partnerships for expenses at border crossings. 

SUMMARY

In a world of asymmetrical threats to U.S. security, the United States cannot rely 

on outmoded tactics rooted in the past to defend the homeland today. It is vital that 

Congress and the Obama administration take immediate action to strengthen our 

Nation’s weakest link in border security: American Southwestern Border crossings 

must be strengthened with a crash program of $6 billion to bring our infrastructure 

up to requirements and the hiring of 6,000 additional Customs inspectors. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I want to thank the witnesses for attending this 

portion of the hearing, and, Dr. Caudle, for you flying all the way 

out from my home State of Texas; I really appreciate your testimony here today. 

We have votes coming up so we are going to adjourn this panel. 

We should be back around 11:45 to begin the testimony of the second panel. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. MCCAUL. The committee will come back to order. I know 

many of us have flights to catch so I would like to—the Ranking 

Member will be here shortly, but I think in the interest of time we 

are going to go ahead and proceed. 

I would like to go ahead and introduce the witnesses and then 

hear their testimony. First we have Mr. Shawn Reese, who is an 

expert on homeland security policy at CRS. He has written numerous reports for Congress at the Federal, State, and local levels on 

homeland security policy issues. 

He has testified before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and the House Homeland Security Committee on 

Federal counterterrorism training programs. Prior to coming to 

CRS Mr. Reese was an officer in the United States Army for 10 

years. 

Welcome, Mr. Reese. 

Next we have Mr. David Maurer, who is the director in the U.S. 

GAO homeland security and justice team, where he leads GAO’s 

work reviewing DHS and DOJ management issues. His recent 

work in these areas includes examining DHS management integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Secret Service financial management, DOJ grant management, the Federal prison 

system, and an assessment of technologies for detecting explosives 

in the passenger rail environment. 

Welcome, Mr. Maurer. 

Last we have Alan Cohn. He is deputy assistant secretary for 

policy at the Department of Homeland Security. He was formerly 

a director of emergency preparedness and response policy in the 

DHS Office of Policy Development and counsel at Akin Gump 

Strauss Hauer & Feld, a very good Texas law firm. 

He took part in the response to the 1993 World Trade Center 

bombing as an emergency medical technician in New York City and 

the response to the 9/11 attacks—and we thank you for your service in that regard—then the 2005 hurricane season as a member 

of FEMA’s National Urban Search and Rescue Response System. 
41 

I want to thank you all for being here today, and the Chairman 

now recognizes Mr. Reese for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE, ANALYST, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. REESE. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and 

Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Congressional Research Service I would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the homeland security strategy. CRS was 

asked to discuss National policy on homeland security as communicated in National strategic documents. 

My written statement addresses key findings, which include the 

absence of a consensus definition of homeland security and varied 

strategic missions that may result in a vague homeland security 

concept. I will briefly discuss the various homeland security definitions and missions identified in National strategic documents. 

A consensus definition is necessary but not sufficient. A clear 

prioritization of strategic missions is what is needed. 

Prior to 9/11 the United States addressed crises primarily 

through separate prisms of National defense, law enforcement, 

emergency management. Nine-eleven prompted a strategic process 

that included the debate over and the development of homeland security policy. 

Today, this homeland security policy debate and development 

has resulted in a plethora of Federal entities with homeland security responsibilities. For example, there are 18 Federal departments with homeland security responsibilities excluding DHS, and 

OMB states that approximately 48 percent of Federal homeland security funding is appropriated to these Federal entities. 

The concept of homeland security evolved over the last decade, 

and this evolution has been communicated in several strategic documents. As stated earlier, they include the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security, the DHS Strategic Plan of 2008, the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review, the 2010 Bottom-Up Review, and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 

While definitions and mission embodied in these strategic documents have commonalities, there are significant differences. Natural disasters are specifically identified as an integral part of 

homeland security in only four of the six documents, and only two 

of the documents—the Bottom-Up Review and the Strategic Plan— 

specifically include border and maritime security and immigration 

in their homeland security definition. 

All of these mentioned issues are important and require significant funding. However, the lack of consensus about the inclusion 

of these areas of policy may have negative or unproductive consequences for National homeland security activities. 

A consensus definition is necessary but not sufficient. A clear priority of strategic missions is what is needed. 

So why is this important to Congress? As deficit reduction causes 

demand for reduced Federal spending Congress will likely pay 

more stringent attention to homeland security funding. With reduced funds comes the need for higher degrees of organization, 
42 

focus, and clarity about the purpose and objectives of homeland security. 

Additionally, if homeland security policy priorities are unclear 

Congress’ ability to provide effective oversight may be hampered. 

For example, how can policymakers determine whether to authorize and fund additional personnel for such areas as border security 

as opposed to aviation security? 

What are the priorities of homeland security and how do such 

priorities help determine the right choice between additional border 

patrol agents or aviation security screeners? Limited resources 

heightens the importance of prioritization. 

Additionally, Congress, due to its oversight function, evaluates 

the execution of current homeland security policies. For example, 

do the DHS homeland security grant programs provide a measurable impact on State and local security? What strategic missions 

are expected to be fulfilled through the expenditure of grant funds? 

Where do those missions fit relative to one another in terms of priority? 

In closing, a vague homeland security concept may hamper Congressional authorization, appropriation, and oversight functions. It 

may also restrict the Executive Branch’s ability to prioritize and 

implement policy initiatives. Failure to effectively prioritize and 

utilize homeland security investments today can affect the Nation’s 

security and potential vulnerability tomorrow. 

I will conclude my testimony here. If CRS may be of further assistance to you I and my colleagues are here to assist. 

Once again, thank you for the privilege to appear before you 

today. 

[The statement of Mr. Reese follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE

FEBRUARY 3, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

on behalf of the Congressional Research Service I would like to thank you for this 

opportunity to appear before you to discuss National homeland security strategy. 

The subcommittee requested that CRS discuss National policy on homeland security as communicated in National strategic documents and the report CRS is developing on Homeland Security Definitions, and Missions. 

Accordingly, my statement summarizes the salient portions of this CRS work, and 

addresses key findings which include the absence of a universal definition of homeland security and varied strategic missions. Ten years after the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government does not have a universal view of ‘‘homeland 

security.’’ 

Currently, different strategic documents and mission statements offer varying 

homeland security missions. The strategic documents framing the U.S. homeland security mission include National strategies produced by the White House and strategy statements developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 

White House has produced documents such as the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2010 National Security Strategy, and the National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism. DHS has developed the Strategic Plan—One Team, One Mission, 

Securing the Homeland; the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review. 

Varied homeland security definitions and missions may impede the development 

of a coherent homeland security strategy, and the effectiveness of Congressional 

oversight may be hampered. This written testimony discusses examples of the varying homeland security definitions and missions identified in the aforementioned 

White House and DHS documents, and analyzes the policy question of how varied 
43 

1 Richard A. Falkenrath, ‘‘Homeland Security: The White House Plan Explained and Examined,’’ Brookings Forum, Washington, DC, September 4, 2002, p. 4. 2Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, The Homeland Security Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1. 3 James Jay Carafano, New Homeland Security Misses the Mark, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, October 10, 2007, http://heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm1659.cfm. 4 Christopher Bellavita, ‘‘Changing Homeland Security: Ten Essential Homeland Security 

Books,’’ Homeland Security Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 2007), pp. 3–4. 5For information on the Gilmore Commission, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html. 

The Gilmore Commission was established prior to 9/11, however, it released its fifth and final 

report in December 2003. 6For information on the U.S. Commission on National Security, see http://www.fas.org/irp/ 

threat/nssg.pdf. The U.S. Commission on National Security was established in 1998 and issued 

its final report in February 2001. 7 Harold C. Relyea, ‘‘Homeland security and information,’’ Government Information Quarterly, 

vol. 19, 2002, p. 219. 8 Nadav Morag, ‘‘Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?,’’ Homeland Security Affairs, vol. 7, September 2011, p. 1. 

homeland security definitions and missions may affect the development National 

homeland security policy. This testimony, however, does not examine DHS’ implementation of strategy. 

ISSUANCE OF HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

The evolution of U.S. homeland security strategy produced a series of White 

House and DHS documents. President George W. Bush’s administration’s issuance 

of a National homeland strategy was foundational in this process. The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security was described as a grand strategy.1 Five 

years later, the administration issued a second version and its purpose was 

‘‘ . . . to guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts.’’2 Some 

critics, however, argued that while the 2002 version had merit, the 2007 version of 

the strategy ‘‘... obfuscates rather than clarifies the government’s homeland security mission. ’’3 Conversely, others state that the 2007 version was a comprehensive effort that attempted to define America’s homeland security mission.4

Subsequent to these two versions of the National homeland security strategy, 

President Barack Obama’s administration issued the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. DHS issued the Strategic 

Plan—One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review. 

These documents, collectively, are an example of the numerous strategies that 

have been issued that address homeland security. These strategic documents provide varied homeland security definitions and missions. Additionally, some of the 

documents do not prioritize resources to address the varied homeland security missions. 

HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINED

It has been argued that homeland security is a ‘‘uniquely’’ American concept, developed because of geography and an American belief in a distinct divide between 

events and issues inside and outside of U.S. borders. Homeland security development as a strategic concept was precipitated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Prior 

to those attacks, National policy was typically described as law enforcement, emergency response, and National defense. Discussions of the need to evolve the way National policy was conceptualized occurred with such entities as the Gilmore Commission 5 and the United States Commission on National Security (which referenced 

homeland security early in 2001).6

After the 9/11, policymakers realized a new approach was needed to address 

large-scale terrorist attacks. The establishment of a Department, a Presidential 

council, and a series of Presidential directives in the name of ‘‘homeland security’’ 

occurring after 9/11 further demonstrated that it was a distinct, although in these 

cases, undefined concept.7 Later, the Federal, State, and local government responses 

to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina expanded the homeland security definition 

to include significant disasters, major public health emergencies, and other events 

that threaten the United States, the economy, and the rule of law, and Government 

operations.8

Homeland Security Definitions 

The debate over the varied definitions persists as the Federal Government continues to issue and implement homeland security strategy. All of the strategic documents discussed in this written testimony define homeland security as security ef-
44 

forts, however, each one defines these efforts in different terms. Examples of these 

documents include the 2007 and 2010 National Security Strategy, the Strategic 

Plan—One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland; the 2010 Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review; and the Bottom-Up Review. 

Additionally, these documents provide further information on the homeland security concept. This information is not necessarily what homeland security is, but 

rather what it entails or how it is achieved. This conceptualization is both explicitly 

and implicitly implied, and includes the following: 

• the homeland security enterprise encompasses a Federal, State, local, Tribal 

government and private sector approach that requires coordination; 

• that homeland security can involve securing against and responding to both 

hazard-specific and all-hazards; 

• that homeland security activities do not imply total protection or complete 

threat reduction; 

• homeland security includes the need to ensure that the U.S. critical infrastructure, key assets, and economy are resilient; and 

• that homeland security includes border, waterway, and marine security. 

The following table provides examples of U.S. strategy documents and their homeland security definitions. 

TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINITIONS 

Document Definition 

2010 National Security 

Strategy.

A seamless coordination among Federal, State, and 

local governments to prevent, protect against and 

respond to threats and natural disasters.1

2007 National Strategy for 

Homeland Security.

A concerted National effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 

vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.2

2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.A concerted National effort to ensure a homeland that 

is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and 

other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and ways of life can thrive.3

2007 U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 

2008–2013.

A unified National effort to prevent and deter terrorist attacks, protect and respond to hazards, and 

to secure the National borders.4

2011 National Strategy For 

Counterterrorism.

Defensive efforts to counter terrorist threats.5

2010 Bottom-Up Review. Preventing terrorism, responding to and recovering 

from natural disasters, customs enforcement and 

collection of customs revenue, administration of 

legal immigration services, safety and stewardship 

of the Nation’s waterways and marine transportation system, as well as other legacy missions of 

the various components of DHS.6

1Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 2. 2Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, The National Homeland Security Strategy, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1. 3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 13. 4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland: 

U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 3. 5Office of the President, National Strategy For Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, June 29, 

2011, p. 11. 6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review, Washington, DC, July 2010, p. 

3. 

Homeland Security Definition: Analysis 

The common themes among the many homeland security definitions are that National homeland security efforts are unified, concerted, and coordinated across all 

levels of government. Thus, the importance of the Federalism approach to homeland 

security is highlighted. This approach is a combined effort of Federal, State, local, 

and Tribal governments, however, individual Federal, State, local, and Tribal government efforts are not identified in the documents. Another common theme across 

all of the documents in defining homeland security is preventing, responding to, and 
45 

9Obviously, the National Strategy For Counterterrorism would not mention any hazard or 

threat other than terrorism. 10 Christopher Bellavita, ‘‘A new perspective on homeland security?’’ Homeland Security 

Watch, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.hlswatch.com/2011/12/20/a-new-perspective-on-homelandsecurity/. 

recovering from terrorist attacks, which is consistent with evolving homeland security policy after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

The focus of the concept of homeland security communicated in the strategy documents differs in regard to two areas that may be considered substantive. Natural 

disasters are specifically identified as an integral part of homeland security in four 

of the six documents, but are not mentioned in the 2007 National Strategy for 

Homeland Security and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.9 Two documents—the Bottom-Up Review and the Strategic Plan—specifically include border 

and maritime security, and immigration in their homeland security definition. 

Homeland security issues such as natural disaster prevention, response, and recovery; border and maritime security, and immigration are important and require significant funding. Failure to have consensus on their importance and role in homeland security may result in the Nation’s efforts being uncoordinated and counterproductive. 

The competing or varied views in these documents may indicate that there is no 

succinct homeland security definition. It is, however, possible that such definition 

exists among relevant policymakers and just isn’t communicated in the strategic 

documents. However, without such a definition, homeland security stakeholders and 

policymakers may not be able to coordinate and resource homeland security missions necessary to secure the Nation. These differing definitions may also be attempting to identify and counter every threat and risk with prioritization. 

In addition to these strategic document examples, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane 

Lute recently stated that homeland security ‘‘ . . . is operation, it’s transactional, 

it’s decentralized, it’s bottom-driven,’’ and influenced by law enforcement, emergency 

management, and the political environment. Conversely, DHS Deputy Secretary 

Lute stated that National security ‘‘ . . . is strategic, it’s centralized, it’s top-driven,’’ and influenced by the military and the intelligence community.10 Some see 

these comments as reflection of a DHS attempt at establishing a homeland security 

definition that is more operational than strategic and an illustration of the complexity of a common understanding of homeland security. 

HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

Varied homeland security definitions may result in all levels of government identifying and executing varied missions. These efforts may be competing rather than 

integrated and result in ineffective or inefficient security. The examples of strategic 

documents in this written testimony provide numerous homeland security missions 

such as terrorism prevention, response, and recovery; critical infrastructure protection and resilience; Federal, State, and local emergency management and preparedness; and border security. As noted earlier, none of these documents specifically task 

a homeland security entity or stakeholder with these missions. The following table 

summarizes the varied missions identified in these strategic documents. 

TABLE 2.—SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS AND GOALS 

Document Missions and Goals 

2007 National Strategy for 

Homeland Security.

-Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. 

-Protect the American people, critical infrastructure 

and key resources. 

-Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur. 

-Strengthen the foundation to ensure long-term success.1

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic 

Plan, Fiscal Years 2008– 

2013.

-Protect the Nation from dangerous people. 

-Protect the Nation from dangerous goods. 

-Protect critical infrastructure. 

-Strengthen the Nation’s preparedness and emergency 

response capabilities. 

-Strengthen and unify the Department’s operations 

and management.2
46 

11 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Charting a Path Forward: The Homeland Security Department’s Quadrennial Review and Bottom-Up 

Review, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., July 21, 2010. 

TABLE 2.—SUMMARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS AND GOALS— 

Continued 

Document Missions and Goals 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.-Prevent terrorism and enhance security. 

-Secure and manage our borders. 

-Enforce and administer our immigration laws. 

-Safeguard and secure cyberspace. 

-Ensure resilience to disasters.3

-Provide essential support to National and economic 

security.4

Bottom-Up Review .............. -Prevent terrorism and enhance security. 

-Secure and manage borders. 

-Enforce and manage immigration laws. 

-Safeguard and secure cyberspace. 

-Ensure resilience to disasters. 

-Improve Departmental management and accountability.5

2010 National Security 

Strategy.

-Strengthen National capacity. 

-Ensure security and prosperity at home. 

-Secure cyberspace. 

-Ensure American economic prosperity.6

National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism.

-Protect the American people, homeland, and American interests. 

-Eliminate threats to the American people’s, homeland’s, and interests’ physical safety. 

-Counter threats to global peace and security. 

-Promote and protect U.S. interests around the 

globe.7

1Office of the President, Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Washington, DC, October 2007, p. 1. 2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland: 

U.S. Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2008–2013, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 6– 

25. 3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, p. 2. 4This mission of providing essential support to National and economic security was not part 

of the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, but has been subsequently added as an 

additional mission. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced Stakeholder Consultation and Use of Risk Information Could Strengthen Future Reviews, GAO–11–873, September 2011, p. 9. 5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Bottom-Up Review, Washington, DC, July 2010, pp. 

i–ii. 6Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 14. 7Office of the President, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Washington, DC, June 

2011, p. 2. 

Homeland Security Missions: Analysis 

The missions in these documents identify a consensus that preventing, responding 

to, recovering from, and being resilient against terrorist attacks are essential in securing the Nation. Additionally, there is an agreement that the Nation’s populace, 

critical infrastructure, and key resources need protection from both terrorism and 

disasters. This protection from both terrorism and disasters is seen as a key homeland security mission. Some, but not all, of the documents include missions related 

to border security, immigration, the economy, and general resilience. 

Some of these documents have been criticized. Senator Susan Collins—current 

Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs—expressed disappointment in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and BottomUp Review because it does not communicate priorities and stated that it does not 

compare favorably to the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. 11 The Quadrennial Defense Review identifies National security and U.S. military priorities and 

these priorities through a process ‘‘... from objectives to capabilities and activi-
47 

12 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC, February 2010, 

p. iii. 13The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security is the most recent National strategy specifically on homeland security. 14Katherine McIntire Peters, ‘‘DHS Bottom-Up Review is long on ambition, short on detail,’’ 

GovernmentExecutive.com, July 2010. 15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, Washington, DC, 

January 2008, p. i. 16Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, 2nd ed., 

Washington, DC, CQPress, 2007, p. 82. 

ties to resources.’’ 12 Furthermore, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are different from the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security13 missions, and neither identifies priorities, or resources, for DHS, or other Federal agencies. Since the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review missions are differing and varied, and because the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review does not specifically identify a strategic process to 

achieve the missions, one may assume that this document is solely operational guidance. Additionally, critics found the Bottom-Up Review lacking in detail and failing 

to meet its intended purpose.14

Overall, strategic documents intended to provide guidance do not identify the 

same missions for any homeland security entity or stakeholder. One example, however, of homeland security entities and stakeholders being tasked with specific missions is the National Response Framework. The National Response Framework is 

not a strategy document but is a ‘‘guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to 

align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, liking all levels of government, 

nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.’’15 Some policy makers may 

view the National Response Framework as effective guidance regarding all-hazards 

response and may be a model to develop a similar guide to National homeland security missions. The National Response Framework, however, does not identify National homeland security missions. 

There is no evidence in the existing homeland security strategic documents that 

supports the aligning and prioritization of the varied missions, nor do any of the 

documents convey how National, State, or local resources are to be allocated to 

achieve these missions. Arguably, without prioritized resource allocation to aligned 

missions, the Nation’s homeland security activities and operations may be haphazard and inconsistent. Another consequence of the absence of clear missions is 

that available funding then tends to govern the priorities. Thus the appropriations 

process may dictate National homeland security missions. 

ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES

Congress may wish to address the issues of homeland security strategy, definitions, and missions, in light of the potential for significant events to occur much like 

those of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 or natural disasters such as 

Hurricane Katrina. These outstanding policy issues result from the varied definitions and missions identified in numerous National strategic documents. Additionally, these documents do not consistently address risk mitigation associated with the 

full range of homeland security threats. Finally, one piece arguably missing from 

these documents, and their guidance, is a discussion of the resources and fiscal costs 

associated with preparing for low-risk, but high-consequence threats. 

Policymakers are faced with a complex and detailed list of risks, or threats to security, for which they then attempt to plan. However, managing those risks 99% of 

the time with even a single failure may lead to significant human and financial 

costs.16 The actual end product of any homeland security strategic process that involves clarifying definitions and missions will invariably aid in this planning process 

though a number of risks may still not be adequately countered. 

Homeland security is essentially about managing risks. The purpose of a strategic 

process is to develop missions to achieve that end. Before risk management can be 

accurate and adequate, policymakers must coordinate and communicate. That work 

begins by developing a foundation of common definitions of key terms and concepts. 

It is also necessary, in order to coordinate and communicate, to ensure stakeholders 

are aware of, trained for, and prepared to meet assigned missions. Finally, this 

analysis leads to the conclusion that missions are most effective when they are the 

product of a prioritization process based on National homeland security interests. 
48 

17 Ibid. 

It has been argued that homeland security, at its core, is about coordination because of the disparate stakeholders and risks.17 Homeland security is not only about 

coordination of resources and actions to counter risks; it is also about the coordination of the strategic process policymakers use in determining the risks, the stakeholders and their missions, and the prioritization of those missions. 

Without a general consensus on the physical and philosophical definition and missions of homeland security, achieved through a strategic process, there will continue 

to be the potential for disjointed and disparate approaches to securing the Nation. 

This general consensus on the homeland security concept starts with a consensus 

definition and an accepted list of prioritized missions that are constantly reevaluated to meet risks of the new paradigm that is homeland security in the 21st Century. These varied definitions and missions, however, may be the result of a strategic process that has developed an approach that adjusts Federal homeland security policy to emerging threats and risks. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Reese. I want to thank the outstanding work that CRS does for the Congress. 

Next, Mr. Maurer is recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MAURER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, 

other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here today to discuss 

the findings from our prior work on strategic planning at the Department of Homeland Security. 

To set the stage a bit, it is important to remember that DHS conducts a wide variety of operations every day—securing the border, 

protecting the President, providing grants to local governments, 

screening airline passengers, researching technologies. DHS does 

all of this and more. 

It costs about $56 billion a year to do this. DHS is now the thirdlargest Department in the Federal Government and its sheer size 

and scope can complicate efforts to develop a common strategy to 

guide it all. 

DHS needs to have a clear strategy because what it does is so 

important. DHS and its various components need to have a clear 

idea of what should be done, how daily operations align with broader priorities, what resources are necessary to achieve those goals, 

and how to assess progress along the way. 

My statement for the record discusses our findings on DHS’s efforts to develop this strategy as well as the Department’s on-going 

work to build a single, unified Department that is greater than the 

sum of its whole. Right now I would like to briefly highlight three 

key points from our work. 

First, DHS’s strategic approach currently resides in three documents. The QHSR explains what DHS should be doing. DHS used 

the BUR to understand what it was actually doing and then developed a budget plan to align resources to keep priorities. 

Our work found that DHS conducted significant outreach to various stakeholders and used their input when developing the QHSR. 

However, we recommended that DHS do a better job next time 

seeking input from non-Federal stakeholders and providing all 

stakeholders more time to comment. 
49 

Second, DHS did not formally consider risk when studying strategic priorities. For example, the QHSR identifies five key missions 

for the entire Department but does not prioritize them as called for 

in the 9/11 Commission Act. The QHSR also discusses threats to 

homeland security but DHS did not conduct a National risk assessment. 

In addition, DHS used the BUR to identify 14 key initiatives 

deemed a priority in the Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget request. While DHS can be commended for identifying a discrete list 

of priorities, the Department did not consider risk information 

when making these key resource decisions. In our September 2011 

report we recommended that DHS improve its consideration of risk 

during the next QHSR process and DHS agreed to do so. 

Finally, effectively implementing a common strategy requires a 

unified Department. DHS has made significant progress knitting 

itself together, but 9 years after its creation DHS has not completed its transformation into an integrated department. 

When DHS opened its doors in 2003 GAO designated it as a 

high-risk because building a new department out of 22 legacy agencies represented a significant challenge. Most significantly, the Department lacked an effective and unified management structure to 

support its critically important daily operations. 

I am pleased to say that in recent years DHS leadership has 

placed considerable attention and effort addressing these issues, 

and as a result, DHS has made important progress recognizing and 

addressing its management challenges. GAO has worked closely 

with the Department in this regard. 

In September 2010 we provided DHS 31 key actions and outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges within and 

across the Department’s management functions. Since then DHS 

has developed a series of plans to achieve these outcomes. 

I believe these plans, if fully implemented, create an off-ramp 

from our high-risk designation, but the key for DHS is execution. 

DHS needs to implement its plans, align resources to support key 

outcomes, and most importantly, demonstrate sustained progress. 

A solid management foundation will help DHS carry out its vital 

missions and help ensure the Department can translate the words 

in its strategies into concrete actions. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this 

morning. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Maurer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER

FEBRUARY 3, 2012 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–12–382T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 

Commission Act) requires that beginning in fiscal year 2009 and every 4 years 

thereafter the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the United 

States. In February 2010, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Re-
50 

view (QHSR) report, outlining a strategic framework for homeland security. In July 

2010 DHS issued a report on the results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a Department-wide assessment to implement the QHSR strategy by aligning DHS’s programmatic activities, such as inspecting cargo at ports of entry, and its organizational structure with the missions and goals identified in the QHSR. This testimony 

addresses DHS’s efforts to: (1) Strategically plan its homeland security missions 

through the QHSR; (2) set strategic priorities and measure performance; and (3) 

build a unified department. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in December 2010, February 2011, and September 2011. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO made recommendations in prior reports for DHS to, among other things, provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process, examine 

additional mechanisms for obtaining input from non-Federal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be used in prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. 

DHS concurred and has actions planned or underway to address them. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.—ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO

STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

WHAT GAO FOUND

DHS’s primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the QHSR. In 

September 2011, GAO reported on the extent to which DHS consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR. DHS solicited input from various stakeholder 

groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, several stakeholders GAO 

contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to non-Federal stakeholders. Specifically, DHS consulted with stakeholders—Federal agencies; Department and component officials; State, local, and Tribal governments; the private sector; academics; 

and policy experts—through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers 

to help frame the QHSR. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these 

consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders 

also identified challenges in the consultation process, such as concerns about the 

limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR and the need to examine additional mechanisms for including more non-Federal stakeholders in consultations. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain non-Federal stakeholders’ input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders’ input during future reviews. 

DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these 

factors, as called for in GAO’s prior work and DHS’s risk-management guidance. 

Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission 

areas to serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas. According to 

DHS officials, DHS did not consider risk information in prioritizing initiatives because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks 

across them, among other things. In September 2011, GAO reported that consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen 

DHS’s prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR. Further, GAO reported that DHS established performance measures for most of the QHSR objectives 

and had plans to develop additional measures. However, with regard to specific programs, GAO’s work has shown that a number of programs and efforts lack outcome 

goals and measures, hindering the Department’s ability to effectively assess results. 

In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high-risk because DHS 

had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one 

department, and failure to effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks 

could have serious consequences for U.S. National and economic security. DHS has 

taken action to implement, transform, and strengthen its management functions, 

such as developing a strategy for addressing this high-risk area and putting in place 

common policies, procedures, and systems within individual management functions, 

such as human capital, that help to integrate its component agencies. However, 

DHS needs to demonstrate measurable, sustainable progress in implementing its 

strategy and corrective actions to address its management challenges. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

strategic planning. Various strategies and plans exist for guiding homeland security 
51 

1DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, 

non-Governmental, and private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share a common National interest in the safety and security of the United States 

and the American population. 2Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 2401(a), 121 Stat. 266, 543–45 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 347). 3DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure 

Homeland (Washington, DC: February 2010). Although the act requires the first QHSR to be 

conducted in 2009—see 6 U.S.C. § 347(c)—the QHSR report was issued in February 2010 and 

we refer to it in this statement as the 2010 QHSR. 4DHS, Bottom-Up Review Report (Washington, DC: July 2010). 5GAO, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced Stakeholder Consultation and Use 

of Risk Information Could Strengthen Future Reviews, GAO–11–873 (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 

2011); Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing 

Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO–11–881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2011); 

High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–11–278 (Washington, DC: February 2011); and Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed, GAO–11–153R (Washington, DC: Dec. 16, 2010). 

efforts across the homeland security enterprise.1 For example, the May 2010 National Security Strategy outlines key security priorities and the 2007 National 

Homeland Security Strategy defined the homeland security mission for the Federal 

Government. More specific to DHS, the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) requires that beginning in fiscal 

year 2009 and every 4 years thereafter DHS conduct a review that provides a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the United States.2 In 

February 2010, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 

(QHSR) report, outlining a strategic framework for homeland security to guide the 

activities of homeland security partners, including Federal, State, local, and Tribal 

government agencies; the private sector; and non-Governmental organizations.3

In addition to the QHSR, in July 2010 DHS issued a report on the results of its 

Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a Department-wide assessment to implement the QHSR 

strategy by aligning DHS’s programmatic activities, such as apprehending fugitive 

aliens and inspecting cargo at ports of entry, and its organizational structure with 

the missions and goals identified in the QHSR.4 The BUR report described DHS’s 

current activities contributing to: (1) QHSR mission performance, (2) Departmental 

management, and (3) accountability. Subsequent to publishing the BUR report, DHS 

identified priority initiatives, such as strengthening aviation security and enhancing 

the Department’s risk management capability, to strengthen DHS’s mission performance, improve departmental management, and increase accountability. 

DHS’s on-going efforts to identify strategic goals and align key missions and resources with those goals are supported by another key Departmental goal: Building 

a unified department. In 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming 

DHS as high-risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with major 

management challenges—into one department. Failure to effectively address DHS’s 

management and mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. National 

and economic security. Our prior work, undertaken before the creation of DHS, 

found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with 

less-strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take years to achieve. DHS is now the 

third-largest Federal department with more than 200,000 employees and $56 billion 

in budget authority, and its transformation is critical to achieving its homeland security missions. 

My testimony today focuses on the findings from our prior work in three key 

areas: 

• DHS’s efforts to strategically plan its homeland security missions Departmentwide through the QHSR, 

• DHS’s efforts to set strategic priorities and measure performance Departmentwide, and: 

• DHS’s efforts to build and implement a unified department. 

This statement is based on four past reports, issued in December 2010, February 

2011, and September 2011, related to DHS’s QHSR, GAO’s high-risk series, and 

DHS mission implementation.5 For these past reports, among other things, we interviewed DHS officials; analyzed DHS strategic documents; and reviewed our past reports, supplemented by DHS Office of Inspector General (IG) reports, issued since 

DHS began its operations in March 2003. We conducted this work in accordance 

with generally accepted Government auditing standards. More detailed information 

on the scope and methodology from our previous work can be found within each specific report. 
52 

6GAO–11–153R. 

7We considered an element addressed if all portions of it were explicitly included in either 

the QHSR or BUR reports, addressed in part if one or more but not all portions of the element 

were included, and not addressed if neither the QHSR nor the BUR reports explicitly addressed 

any part of the element. 8GAO–11–873. 

DHS STRATEGICALLY PLANNED ITS HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS DEPARTMENT-WIDE

THROUGH THE QHSR, BUT STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS COULD BE ENHANCED

The QHSR identified five homeland security missions—(1) Preventing Terrorism 

and Enhancing Security, (2) Securing and Managing Our Borders, (3) Enforcing and 

Administering Our Immigration Laws, (4) Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, 

and (5) Ensuring Resilience to Disasters—and goals and objectives to be achieved 

within each mission. A sixth category of DHS activities—Providing Essential Support to National and Economic Security—was added in the fiscal year 2012 budget 

request but was not included in the 2010 QHSR report. 

DHS’s primary strategic planning effort in recent years has been the QHSR. DHS 

approached the 9/11 Commission Act requirement for a quadrennial homeland security review in three phases. 

• In the first phase, DHS defined the Nation’s homeland security interests, identified the critical homeland security missions, and developed a strategic approach 

to those missions by laying out the principal goals, objectives, and strategic outcomes for the mission areas. DHS reported on the results of this effort in the 

February 2010 QHSR report in which the Department identified 5 homeland security missions, 14 associated goals, and 43 objectives. The QHSR report also 

identified threats and challenges confronting U.S. homeland security, strategic 

objectives for strengthening the homeland security enterprise, and Federal 

agencies’ roles and responsibilities for homeland security. 

• In the second phase—the BUR—DHS identified its component agencies’ activities, aligned those activities with the QHSR missions and goals, and made recommendations for improving the Department’s organizational alignment and 

business processes. DHS reported on the results of this second phase in the July 

2010 BUR report. 

• In the third phase DHS developed its budget plan necessary to execute the 

QHSR missions. DHS presented this budget plan in the President’s fiscal year 

2012 budget request, issued February 14, 2011, and the accompanying Fiscal 

Year 2012–2016 Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), issued in 

May 2011. 

In December 2010, we issued a report on the extent to which the QHSR addressed 

the 9/11 Commission Act’s required reporting elements.6 We reported that of the 

nine 9/11 Commission Act reporting elements for the QHSR, DHS addressed three 

and partially addressed six.7 Elements DHS addressed included a description of 

homeland security threats and an explanation of underlying assumptions for the 

QHSR report. Elements addressed in part included a prioritized list of homeland security missions, an assessment of the alignment of DHS with the QHSR missions, 

and discussions of cooperation between the Federal Government and State, local, 

and Tribal governments. 

In September 2011, we reported on the extent to which DHS consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR.8 DHS solicited input from various stakeholder 

groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided 

for stakeholder consultations and outreach to non-Federal stakeholders. DHS consulted with stakeholders—Federal agencies; Department and component officials; 

State, local, and Tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy experts—through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame 

the QHSR and a web-based discussion forum. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. 

However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process. For example: 

• Sixteen of 63 stakeholders who provided comments to GAO noted concerns 

about the limited time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR. 

• Nine other stakeholders commented that DHS consultations with non-Federal 

stakeholders, such as State, local, and private-sector entities, could be enhanced 

by including more of these stakeholders in QHSR consultations. 

• Reports on the QHSR by the National Academy of Public Administration, which 

administered DHS’s web-based discussion forum, and a DHS advisory committee comprised of non-Federal representatives noted that DHS could provide 
53 

9 6 U.S.C. § 347(c)(2)(C). 10GAO–11–153R. 11GAO–11–873. 12See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO–06–91 (Washington, DC: Dec. 

15, 2005), and Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and Stronger Internal 

Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource Allocation, GAO–09–492 (Washington, DC: Mar. 

27, 2009). For DHS risk-management guidance, see DHS, Risk Management Fundamentals: 

Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine (April 2011). 

more time and strengthen non-Federal outreach during stakeholder consultations. 

By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain non-Federal stakeholders’ input, DHS could strengthen its management of 

stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders’ input during future reviews. We recommended that DHS 

provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR process and 

examine additional mechanisms for obtaining input from non-Federal stakeholders 

during the QHSR process, such as whether panels of State, local, and Tribal government officials or components’ existing advisory or other groups could be useful. DHS 

concurred and reported that it will endeavor to incorporate increased opportunities 

for time and meaningful stakeholder engagement and will examine the use of panels 

of non-Federal stakeholders for the next QHSR. 

DHS DID NOT PRIORITIZE QHSR MISSIONS OR USE RISK ASSESSMENTS TO HELP SET STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND COULD IMPROVE DEPARTMENT-WIDE PERFORMANCE MEASURES

The 9/11 Commission Act called for DHS to prioritize homeland security missions 

in the QHSR.9 As we reported in December 2010, DHS identified five homeland security missions in the QHSR, but did not fully address the 9/11 Commission Act reporting element because the Department did not prioritize the missions.10 According 

to DHS officials, the five missions listed in the QHSR report have equal priority— 

no one mission is given greater priority than another. Moreover, they stated that 

in selecting the five missions from the many potential homeland security mission 

areas upon which DHS could focus its efforts, the five mission areas are DHS’s highest-priority homeland security concerns. 

Risk management has been widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for homeland security, enhancing the Department’s ability to make 

informed decisions and prioritize resource investments. In September 2011, we also 

reported that in the 2010 QHSR report, DHS identified threats confronting homeland security, such as high-consequence weapons of mass destruction and illicit trafficking, but did not conduct a National risk assessment for the QHSR.11 DHS officials stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR, DHS did not have a welldeveloped methodology or the analytical resources to complete a National risk assessment that would include likelihood and consequence assessments—key elements 

of a National risk assessment. The QHSR terms of reference, which established the 

QHSR process, also stated that at the time the QHSR was launched, DHS lacked 

a process and a methodology for consistently and defensibly assessing risk at a National level and using the results of such an assessment to drive strategic 

prioritization and resource decisions. In recognition of a need to develop a National 

risk assessment, DHS created a study group as part of the QHSR process that developed a National risk assessment methodology. DHS officials plan to implement 

a National risk assessment in advance of the next QHSR, which DHS anticipates 

conducting in fiscal year 2013. Consistent with DHS’s plans, we reported that a National risk assessment conducted in advance of the next QHSR could assist DHS in 

developing QHSR missions that target homeland security risks and could allow 

DHS to demonstrate how it is reducing risk across multiple hazards. 

DHS Could Strengthen Its Use of Risk Information in Prioritizing Initiatives and 

Planning and Investment Decision-Making 

DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these 

factors as called for in our prior work and DHS’s risk management guidance.12

Through the BUR, DHS identified 43 initiatives aligned with the QHSR mission 

areas to help strengthen DHS’s activities and serve as mechanisms for implementing those mission areas (see app. I for a complete list). According to DHS officials, the Department could not implement all of these initiatives in fiscal year 2012 

because of, among other things, resource constraints and organizational or legislative changes that would need to be made to implement some of the initiatives. 
54 

13GAO–11–881. 14GAO, National Preparedness: DHS and HHS Can Further Strengthen Coordination for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk Assessments, GAO–11–606 (Washington, 

DC: June 21, 2011). 15GAO, Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations, GAO–12–14 (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 

2011). 16GAO, Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness 

Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO–12–47 (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2011). 

In identifying which BUR initiatives to prioritize for implementation in fiscal year 

2012, DHS leadership considered: (1) ‘‘Importance,’’ that is, how soon the initiative 

needed to be implemented; (2) ‘‘maturity,’’ that is, how soon the initiative could be 

implemented; and (3) ‘‘priority,’’ that is, whether the initiative enhanced Secretarial 

or Presidential priorities. Risk information was not included as an element in any 

of these three criteria, according to DHS officials, because of differences among the 

initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. 

However, DHS officials stated that there are benefits to considering risk information 

in resource allocation decisions. Consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS’s prioritization of mechanisms for 

implementing the QHSR, including assisting in determinations of which initiatives 

should be implemented in the short or longer term. In our September 2011 report, 

we recommended that DHS examine how risk information could be used in 

prioritizing future QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred and reported that DHS intends 

to conduct risk analysis specific to the QHSR in advance of the next review and will 

use the analysis as an input into decision-making related to implementing the 

QHSR. 

Further, in September 2011, we reported on progress made by DHS in implementing its homeland security missions since 9/11.13 As part of this work, we identified various themes that affected DHS’s implementation efforts. One of these themes 

was DHS’s efforts to strategically manage risk across the Department. We reported 

that DHS made important progress in assessing and analyzing risk across sectors. 

For example, in January 2009 DHS published its Integrated Risk Management 

Framework, which, among other things, calls for DHS to use risk assessments to 

inform decision-making. In May 2010, the Secretary issued a Policy Statement on 

Integrated Risk Management, calling for DHS and its partners to manage risks to 

the Nation. 

We also reported that DHS had more work to do in using this information to inform planning and resource-allocation decisions. Our work shows that DHS has conducted risk assessments across a number of areas, but should strengthen the assessments and risk management process. For example: 

• In June 2011, we reported that DHS and Health and Human Services could further strengthen coordination for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) risk assessments. Among other things, we recommended that DHS establish time frames and milestones to better ensure timely development and 

interagency agreement on written procedures for development of DHS’s CBRN 

risk assessments. DHS concurred and stated that the Department had begun 

efforts to develop milestones and time frames for its strategic and implementation plans for interagency risk assessment development.14

• In November 2011, we reported that the U.S. Coast Guard used its Maritime 

Security Risk Assessment Model at the National level to focus resources on the 

highest-priority targets, leading to Coast Guard operating efficiencies, but use 

at the local level for operational and tactical risk-management efforts has been 

limited by a lack of staff time, the complexity of the risk tool, and competing 

mission demands.15 Among other things, we recommended that the Coast 

Guard provide additional training for sector command staff and others involved 

in sector management and operations on how the model can be used as a riskmanagement tool to inform sector-level decision-making. The Coast Guard concurred and stated that it will explore other opportunities to provide risk training to sector command staff, including on-line and webinar training opportunities. 

• In November 2011, we reported that the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) used risk assessments to inform funding-allocation decisions for 

its port security grant program.16 However, we found that FEMA could further 

enhance its risk-analysis model and recommended incorporating the results of 

past security investments and refining other data inputs into the model. DHS 

concurred with the recommendation, but did not provide details on how it plans 

to implement it. 
55 

17GAO. Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying 

Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges. GAO–10–128. 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 7, 2009). 18GAO–11–873. 19GAO–11–881. 20GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO–09–1013T (Washington, DC: Sept. 17, 2009). 21GAO, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More Consistent 

Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness, GAO–09–824 

(Washington, DC: Aug. 31, 2009). 

• In October 2009, we reported that TSA’s strategic plan to guide research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies was not 

risk-based.17 Among other things, we recommended that DHS conduct a complete risk assessment related to TSA’s passenger screening program and incorporate the results into the program’s strategy. DHS concurred, and in July 2011 

reported actions underway to address it, such as beginning to use a risk-management analysis process to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of potential 

countermeasures and effect on the commercial aviation system. 

DHS Has Established Performance Measures, but Has Not Yet Fully Developed Outcome-Based Measures for Many of Its Mission Functions 

In September 2011, we reported that DHS established performance measures for 

most of the QHSR objectives and had plans to develop additional measures.18 Specifically, DHS established new performance measures, or linked existing measures, 

to 13 of 14 QHSR goals, and to 3 of 4 goals for the sixth category of DHS activities— 

Providing Essential Support to National and Economic Security. DHS reported these 

measures in its fiscal years 2010–2012 Annual Performance Report. For goals without measures, DHS officials told us that the Department was developing performance measures and planned to publish them in future budget justifications to Congress. 

In September 2011, we also reported that DHS had not yet fully developed outcome-based measures for assessing progress and performance for many of its mission functions.19 We recognized that DHS faced inherent difficulties in developing 

performance goals and measures to address its unique mission and programs, such 

as in developing measures for the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and deter 

terrorist attacks. While DHS had made progress in strengthening performance 

measurement, our work across the Department has shown that a number of programs lacked outcome goals and measures, which may have hindered the Department’s ability to effectively assess results or fully assess whether the Department 

was using resources effectively and efficiently. For example, our work has shown 

that DHS did not have performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of key 

border security and immigration programs, to include: 

• In September 2009, we reported that U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) had invested $2.4 billion in tactical infrastructure (fencing, roads, and 

lighting) along the Southwest Border under the Secure Border Initiative—a 

multi-year, multi-billion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration.20 However, DHS could not measure the effect of this 

investment in tactical infrastructure on border security. We recommended that 

DHS conduct an evaluation of the effect of tactical infrastructure on effective 

control of the border. DHS concurred with the recommendation and subsequently reported that the on-going analysis is expected to be completed in February 2012. 

• In August 2009, we reported that CBP had established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, which provided some insight 

into checkpoint activity.21 However, the measures did not indicate if checkpoints were operating efficiently and effectively, and data reporting and collection challenges hindered the use of results to inform Congress and the public 

on checkpoint performance. We recommended that CBP improve the measurement and reporting of checkpoint effectiveness. CBP agreed and, as of September 2011, reported plans to develop and better use data on checkpoint effectiveness. 

• Further, we reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 

and CBP did not have measures for assessing the performance of key immigration enforcement programs. For example, in April 2011, we reported that ICE 

did not have measures for its overstay enforcement efforts, and in May 2010 

that CBP did not have measures for its alien smuggling investigative efforts, 

making it difficult for these agencies to determine progress made in these areas 
56 

22GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing 

Data Could Strengthen DHS’s Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO–11–411 (Washington, DC: 

Apr. 15, 2011) and Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources to 

Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border, GAO–10–328 (Washington, DC: May 

24, 2010). 23 A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or a combination of significant deficiencies, 

in internal control such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of 

the entity’s financial statements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a timely 

basis. A significant deficiency is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, in internal control 

that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those 

charged with governance. A deficiency in internal control exists when the design or operation 

of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their 

assigned functions, to prevent, or detect and correct, misstatements on a timely basis. 24GAO–11–278. 25For DHS, obtaining a qualified audit opinion is a first step toward achieving an unqualified 

audit opinion. 

and evaluate possible improvements.22 We recommended that ICE and CBP develop performance measures for these two areas. They generally agreed and reported actions underway to develop these measures. 

DHS HAS TAKEN ACTION TO IMPLEMENT, STRENGTHEN, AND INTEGRATE ITS

MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, BUT NEEDS TO DEMONSTRATE SUSTAINABLE PROGRESS

In 2003, GAO designated the transformation of DHS as high-risk because DHS 

had to transform 22 agencies—several with major management challenges—into one 

department, and failure to effectively address DHS’s management and mission risks 

could have serious consequences for U.S. National and economic security. This highrisk area includes challenges in strengthening DHS’s management functions—financial management, human capital, information technology, and acquisition management—the impact of those challenges on DHS’s mission implementation, and challenges in integrating management functions within and across the Department and 

its components. Addressing these challenges would better position DHS to align resources to its strategic priorities, assess progress in meeting mission goals, enhance 

linkages within and across components, and improve the overall effectiveness and 

efficiency of the Department. 

On the basis of our prior work, in September 2010, we identified and provided 

to DHS 31 key actions and outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges 

within the Department’s management functions and in integrating those functions 

across the Department. These key actions and outcomes include, among others, validating required acquisition documents at major milestones in the acquisition review 

process; obtaining and then sustaining unqualified audit opinions for at least 2 consecutive years on the Department-wide financial statements while demonstrating 

measurable progress in reducing material weaknesses and significant deficiencies; 

and implementing its workforce strategy and linking workforce planning efforts to 

strategic and program-specific planning efforts to identify current and future human 

capital needs.23

In our February 2011 high-risk update, we reported that DHS had taken action 

to implement, transform, and strengthen its management functions, and had begun 

to demonstrate progress in addressing some of the actions and outcomes we identified within each management area.24 For example, we reported that the Secretary 

and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, and other senior officials, have demonstrated commitment and top leadership support to address the Department’s 

management challenges. DHS also put in place common policies, procedures, and 

systems within individual management functions, such as human capital, that help 

to integrate its component agencies. For example, DHS: 

• revised its acquisition management oversight policies to include more detailed 

guidance to inform departmental acquisition decisionmaking. 

• strengthened its enterprise architecture, or blueprint to guide information technology acquisitions, and improved its policies and procedures for investment 

management. 

• developed corrective action plans for its financial management weaknesses, and, 

for the first time since its inception, DHS earned a qualified audit opinion on 

its fiscal year 2011 balance sheet;25 and, 

• issued its Workforce Strategy for Fiscal Years 2011–2016, which contains the 

Department’s workforce goals, objectives, and performance measures for human 

capital management. 

Further, in January 2011, DHS provided us with its Integrated Strategy for High 

Risk Management, which summarized the Department’s preliminary plans for addressing the high-risk area. Specifically, the strategy contained details on the imple-
57 

mentation and transformation of DHS, such as corrective actions to address challenges within each management area, and officials responsible for implementing 

those corrective actions. DHS provided us with updates to this strategy in June and 

December 2011. We provided DHS with written feedback on the January 2011 strategy and the June update, and have worked with the Department to monitor implementation efforts. We noted that both versions of the strategy were generally responsive to actions and outcomes we identified for the Department to address the 

high-risk area. For example, DHS included a management integration plan containing information on initiatives to integrate its management functions across the 

Department. Specifically, DHS plans to establish a framework for managing investments across its components and management functions to strengthen integration 

within and across those functions, as well as to ensure that mission needs drive investment decisions. This framework seeks to enhance DHS resource decision-making 

and oversight by creating new Department-level councils to identify priorities and 

capability gaps, revising how DHS components and lines of business manage acquisition programs, and developing a common framework for monitoring and assessing 

implementation of investment decisions. These actions, if implemented effectively, 

should help to further and more effectively integrate the Department and enhance 

DHS’s ability to implement its strategies. However, we noted in response to the 

June update that specific resources to implement planned corrective actions were 

not consistently identified, making it difficult to assess the extent to which DHS has 

the capacity to implement these actions. Additionally, for both versions, we noted 

that the Department did not provide information on the underlying metrics or factors DHS used to rate its progress, making it difficult for us to assess DHS’s overall 

characterizations of progress. We are currently assessing the December 2011 update 

and plan to provide DHS with feedback shortly. 

Although DHS has made progress in strengthening and integrating its management functions, the Department continues to face significant challenges affecting 

the Department’s transformation efforts and its ability to meet its missions. In particular, challenges within acquisition, information technology, financial, and human 

capital management have resulted in performance problems and mission delays. For 

example, DHS does not yet have enough skilled personnel to carry out activities in 

some key programmatic and management areas, such as for acquisition management. DHS also has not yet implemented an integrated financial management system, impeding its ability to have ready access to information to inform decisionmaking, and has been unable to obtain a clean audit opinion on the audit of its consolidated financial statements since its establishment. 

Going forward, DHS needs to implement its Integrated Strategy for High Risk 

Management, and continue its efforts to: (1) Identify and acquire resources needed 

to achieve key actions and outcomes; (2) implement a program to independently 

monitor and validate corrective measures; and (3) show measurable, sustainable 

progress in implementing corrective actions and achieving key outcomes. Demonstrated, sustained progress in all of these areas will help DHS strengthen and integrate management functions within and across the Department and its components. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, 

this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have. 

APPENDIX I: BOTTOM-UP REVIEW INITIATIVES

Initiatives selected by DHS for implementation in fiscal year 2012 listed in bold. 

MISSION ONE: PREVENTING TERRORISM AND ENHANCING SECURITY

1. Strengthen counterterrorism coordination across DHS 

2. Strengthen aviation security 

3. Create an integrated Departmental information sharing architecture 

4. Deliver infrastructure protection and resilience capabilities to the field 

5. Set National performance standards for identification verification 

6. Increase efforts to detect and counter nuclear and biological weapons and dangerous materials 

7. Leverage the full range of capabilities to address biological and nuclear threats 

8. Standardize and institutionalize the National Fusion Center Network 

9. Promote safeguards for access to secure areas in critical facilities 

10. Establish DHS as a center of excellence for canine training and deployment 

11. Redesign the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to better match mission requirements 
58 

MISSION TWO: SECURING AND MANAGING OUR BORDERS

12. Expand joint operations and intelligence capabilities, including enhanced domain awareness 

13. Prioritize immigration and customs investigations 

14. Enhance the security and resilience of global trade and travel systems 

15. Strengthen and expand DHS-related security assistance internationally (e.g., 

border integrity and customs enforcement security assistance) consistent with U.S. 

Government security, trade promotion, international travel, and foreign assistance 

objectives 

16. Enhance North American security 

MISSION THREE: ENFORCING AND ADMINISTERING OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS

17. Comprehensive immigration reform 

18. Improve DHS immigration services processes 

19. Focus on fraud detection and National security vetting 

20. Target egregious employers who knowingly exploit illegal workers 

21. Dismantle human smuggling organizations 

22. Improve the detention and removal process 

23. Work with new Americans so that they fully transition to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship 

24. Maintain a model detention system commensurate with risk 

MISSION FOUR: SAFEGUARDING AND SECURING CYBERSPACE

25. Increase the focus and integration of DHS’s operational cybersecurity and infrastructure resilience activities 

26. Strengthen DHS ability to protect cyber networks 

27. Increase DHS predictive and forensic capabilities for cyber intrusions 

and attacks 

28. Promote cyber security public awareness 

MISSION FIVE: ENSURING RESILIENCE TO DISASTERS

29. Enhance catastrophic disaster preparedness 

30. Improve DHS’s ability to lead in emergency management 

31. Explore opportunities with the private sector to ‘‘design-in’’ greater resilience 

for critical infrastructure 

32. Make individual and family preparedness and critical facility resilience inherent in community preparedness 

IMPROVING DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT

33. Seek restoration of the Secretary’s reorganization authority for DHS headquarters 

34. Realign component regional configurations into a single DHS regional structure 

35. Improve cross-Departmental management, policy, and functional integration 

36. Strengthen internal DHS counterintelligence capabilities 

37. Enhance the Department’s risk management capability 

38. Strengthen coordination within DHS through cross-Departmental training and 

career paths 

39. Enhance the DHS workforce 

40. Balance the DHS workforce by ensuring strong Federal control of all DHS 

work and reducing reliance on contractors 

INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY

41. Increase Analytic Capability and Capacity 

42. Improve Performance Measurement and Accountability 

43. Strengthen Acquisition Oversight 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Maurer. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cohn for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ALAN COHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

OFFICE OF POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. COHN. Thank you. 
59 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today. You have my written testimony; 

I will provide a brief overview of that testimony in these opening 

remarks and I am happy to take your questions after that. 

As was noted, I am the deputy assistant secretary in the Office 

of Policy. I head the Department’s Strategic Planning Office. I am 

a career member of the Senior Executive Service and I have led the 

Department’s Strategic Planning Office for the past 4 years, since 

January 2008. 

As the subcommittee has requested, I have focused my written 

testimony and I will focus these opening remarks on the Department’s strategy for homeland security. Let me start by stating 

clearly that the strategy that the Department of Homeland Security has pursued for the past 3 years to ensure a safe, secure, and 

resilient homeland is set forth in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report 2010. 

The QHSR provided the Department the opportunity to work 

with its Federal interagency partners and stakeholders across the 

homeland security enterprise in setting a strategic framework for 

achieving a secure homeland. Subsequent planning activities, such 

as the Bottom-Up Review as well as the development of the Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget proposal and accompanying documents, filled in other aspects of the Department’s strategic approach; in particular that the Bottom-Up Review provided the opportunity for the Department to align its activities and its programs to the strategic framework of the Quadrennial Review, and 

that the fiscal year 2012 budget process and the regeneration of 

performance measures that were reported in our annual performance report from that year filled in the budget alignment and performance alignment elements of that strategy. 

The Department’s forthcoming fiscal year 2012 to 2016 strategic 

plan—our third DHS strategic plan—consolidates the QHSR strategic framework with DHS performance measures and BUR initiatives focused on maturing and strengthening DHS. However, as a 

basic matter of understanding, the Department’s strategy for addressing emerging and enduring threats and challenges is and has 

been the approach set forth in the QHSR report, and that approach 

nests within the overall structure of the 2010 National Security 

Strategy. 

The Department has also taken steps to develop and implement 

a comprehensive strategic management approach. The Office of 

Policy supports that approach through several mechanisms, including annual strategic investment guidance, support to capability development through portfolio management bodies such as the 

Screening Coordination Office, and review of major acquisition programs to ensure consistency and alignment of mission needs to Department strategy and policy beginning with the QHSR. 

Finally, the Office of Policy is focused on enhancing the Department’s ability to develop strategy and conduct strategic analysis 

through strengthened analytic techniques and methodologies, including remedying some of the shortfalls that were pointed out by 

the Government Accountability Office relating to the last QHSR. 
60 

Congress’ recent authorization for the Secretary to transfer risk 

management and analysis functions to the Office of Policy will help 

the Department’s risk modeling analysis and strategic planning 

functions and aid in ensuring that risk analysis is most effectively 

informed strategy development and strategic choice. 

Thank you very much for your support of our efforts and our people and hopefully for your support of our future efforts to continue 

strengthening and maturing the Department. I am happy to take 

any questions that you have. 

[The statement of Mr. Cohn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN COHN

FEBRUARY 3, 2012 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 

how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing a strategy to 

counter emerging threats. As the subcommittee has requested, we have focused primarily on how the QHSR has provided a strategic foundation for DHS, and DHS 

strategic management based on the QHSR. 

I serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary and head of the Office of Strategic Plans 

in the DHS Office of Policy within DHS headquarters. One of the key responsibilities of the DHS Office of Policy is to ensure that the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, 

Assistant Secretary for Policy, and the senior headquarters and Component leadership of DHS are provided with objective, analytically rigorous decision support. In 

short, we help ensure that tough policy and strategy decisions are informed by a 

consideration of viable alternatives, with a clear sense of the associated risk and resource implications, and that those decisions, once made, carry through to subsequent decisions concerning investments and operations. For that reason, I am 

pleased to be able to highlight how we do that at DHS and how we intend to continue improving that process in the context of emerging threats. 

The homeland security strategic environment is constantly evolving, and while we 

have made significant progress, threats from terrorism continue to persist. Today’s 

threats are not limited to any one individual or group, are not defined or contained 

by international borders, and are not limited to any single ideology. Terrorist tactics 

can be as simple as a homemade bomb and as sophisticated as a biological threat 

or a coordinated cyber attack. In addition, broader strategic trends such as the dramatic spread of internet and mobile technologies around the world and the growing 

relevance of non-state actors on the world stage suggest new opportunities and challenges that must be accounted for in our current and longer-term homeland security 

strategic planning. 

Another defining characteristic of our strategic environment is the tightening fiscal environment. It is increasingly important to define clear priorities, develop and 

assess viable alternatives, and make well-informed decisions involving difficult 

trade-offs. DHS has made substantial progress in this regard, particularly with respect to establishing an enduring strategic foundation for National homeland security efforts, refining our strategic and policy analysis capabilities and approaches, 

and improving strategic alignment through focused management tools and processes. Together, these improvements have positioned DHS to effectively address today’s security environment while ensuring that we are sufficiently flexible, agile, 

and capable in the face of emerging threats and risks. 

In my testimony, I will highlight our activities in each of these areas. Specifically, 

I will: (1) Describe how the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (2010) 

(QHSR) has provided a strategic foundation and common framework to inform subsequent analysis and planning; (2) describe targeted efforts aimed at enhancing 

strategic alignment that ensure DHS is a strategy and policy-driven organization; 

and (3) outline key improvements in our analytic capabilities and approaches. 

STRATEGIC FOUNDATION: THE QHSR AND BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

QHSR 

The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 directed 

the Department to begin conducting quadrennial reviews in 2009, and every 4 years 
61 

thereafter. The QHSR and subsequent Bottom-Up Review (BUR) were critical first 

steps in the process of examining and addressing fundamental strategic issues that 

concern homeland security, and establishing an enduring strategic foundation. 

As the first review of its kind for DHS, the QHSR clarified the conceptual 

underpinnings of homeland security, described the security environment and the 

Nation’s homeland security interests, identified the critical homeland security enterprise missions, and outlined the principal goals and essential objectives necessary 

for success in those missions. I would like to highlight three elements of the QHSR 

that, in particular, provided the strategy and planning foundation that have positioned DHS to effectively address emerging strategic challenges. 

First, the QHSR clarified the conceptual underpinnings of homeland security. In 

defining homeland security as the intersection of evolving threats and hazards with 

traditional Governmental and civic responsibilities for civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration, the QHSR emphasized the importance of eliminating traditional stovepipes to achieving success 

in homeland security. The QHSR also established the idea of the homeland security 

enterprise, which refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners— 

as well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland security capabilities. Each of these conceptual elements has infused all aspects of our 

strategy and planning. 

Second, the QHSR took a comprehensive approach to threats by expanding the 

focus of homeland security to specifically address high-consequence weapons of mass 

destruction; global violent extremism; mass cyber attacks, intrusions, and disruptions; pandemics and natural disasters; and illegal trafficking and related 

transnational crime. Almost 3 years later, these challenges remain top priorities. At 

the same time, DHS is assessing major trends and drivers in the strategic environment in order to understand how these challenges may be evolving and to anticipate 

emerging threats and risks. 

Third, the QHSR adopted a mission structure designed to endure across inevitable 

changes in the security environment. Our missions are to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce our immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace, enhance resilience to disasters, and provide critical 

support to economic and National security. Because tomorrow’s security environment will not necessarily look like today’s security environment, the missions provide a durable framework to effectively address whatever risks and threats may 

emerge over time. 

This framework has informed all subsequent DHS strategy and planning efforts, 

whether they are DHS products or products that DHS supports with partners across 

the enterprise. For example, the recently-released Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future defines the ends, ways, and means by which DHS and the homeland security 

enterprise will meet the goals and objectives set forth in Mission 4 of the QHSR, 

Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace. 

The BUR and Strategy Implementation 

The QHSR and other strategic guidance within the Department are implemented 

through the programming and budgeting process, and the oversight of major acquisitions. As a first step in this process, the BUR was initiated in November 2009 as 

an immediate follow-on and complement to the QHSR. The BUR focused on three 

elements: (1) How to improve DHS’s operational performance within the five homeland security missions; (2) how to improve Department management; and (3) how 

to increase DHS accountability for the public funds entrusted to us. 

The Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget request began the process of implementing the QHSR and specific BUR initiatives and enhancements, and the corresponding fiscal year 2012–2016 Future Years Homeland Security Plan set forth 

the budget plan required to provide sufficient resources to successfully execute the 

Department’s responsibilities across the full range of homeland security missions as 

described in the QHSR. The Department’s approach to managing its annual performance and its priority goals are guided by the QHSR and BUR, as reflected in 

the fiscal year 2010–2012 Annual Performance Report and Plan. In addition, the 

forthcoming Fiscal Year 2012–2016 DHS Strategic Plan is founded on the framework and methodological approach of the QHSR, reflects performance measures 

aligned against the mission areas of the QHSR, and emphasizes the initiatives concerning Department management and accountability set forth in the BUR. 

Based on the strategic foundation set forth in the QHSR and BUR, DHS’s Components complete their own strategies, strategic plans, and other strategic initiatives. 

These efforts may be legislatively-driven, or may be initiated within the Department 

in order to address a persistent or emerging threat or challenge. However, all strate-
62 

gies and strategic plans should reflect the overall framework set forth in the QHSR 

and BUR. For example, the 2011–2014 FEMA Strategic Plan describes the cascade 

from the National Security Strategy through the Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review Report to the FEMA Administrator’s Intent Priorities. Similarly the 2010– 

2014 ICE Strategic Plan draws its four priorities from the QHSR mission structure. 

Likewise, efforts such as the Border Intelligence Fusion Section at the El Paso Intelligence Center, the supply chain security initiative, and the Balanced Workforce initiative can be traced back to initiatives identified or described in the BUR. DHS 

harmonized its account structure and reworked its suite of performance measures 

as part of the BUR process, which resulted in enhanced management effectiveness 

and accountability. 

The Next QHSR 

Under the schedule set forth in the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, the Department will conduct its next quadrennial review 

in 2013. While the first QHSR set a durable framework of homeland security missions, the next quadrennial review can focus on a more extensive examination of the 

security environment and potential future trends and shocks, and provide a deeper 

review of a few key areas. The review can provide a more in-depth look at those 

key areas with respect to current strategic environment, future strategic environment, National homeland security risk, strategy options and alternatives, and capability and resource implications for changes in strategy. In this way, the next QHSR 

can begin to look much more like the Quadrennial Defense Review on which it is 

modeled. The review will also reflect a greater integration of risk analysis into all 

stages of the quadrennial review, as recommended by the Government Accountability Office in their review of the first QHSR. The Department has begun planning 

for the next QHSR and we look forward to working with Congress going forward 

on executing this second quadrennial review. 

IMPLEMENTING THE QHSR: ENSURING POLICY AND STRATEGY INFORM RESOURCE

ALLOCATION

The Under Secretary for Management is leading the development and implementation of a comprehensive, strategic management approach focused on maturing organizational effectiveness within DHS. The ‘‘front end’’ of this strategic management 

system is really the ‘‘back end’’ of the policy and strategy process. To that end, the 

Office of Policy supports the Under Secretary for Management’s efforts, not only by 

ensuring clear statements of policy and strategy, but by translating strategic guidance into investment guidance in the annual Integrated Planning Guidance, supporting capability development and analysis, and ensuring that the Department’s 

major acquisitions are grounded in mission needs derived from Department policy 

and strategy. 

The Integrated Planning Guidance sets forth the Secretary’s specific investment 

guidance for Components to use in developing their Resource Allocation Plans 

(RAP), consistent with the QHSR and other strategy documents. The Integrated 

Planning Guidance marks the transition from the planning to the programming 

phase of the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

(PPBE) process. The Office of Policy also supports the Management Directorate’s Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation, which administers the PPBE process, in conducting analysis of specific issues for the annual budget cycle, reviewing Component 

RAP submissions for consistency with the IPG, and raising issues as part of the Program Review Board process. 

The Office of Policy also supports capability development through portfolio management bodies such as the Screening Coordination Office (SCO). Portfolio management bodies help identify areas where better coordination and a common set of goals 

can make DHS more efficient and effective. For example, SCO, an element of the 

Office of Policy, establishes standards for Departmental programs which deal with 

the screening of people, and helps the Department meet those standards. Working 

closely with DHS Components and the headquarters programming and budgeting 

staff, SCO has helped increase information flow and reduce duplication among 

screening programs. This not only reduces the overall cost of such programs, it enhances the ability of programs to share information and enhance our Nation’s security. The Office of Policy also conducts strategic requirements planning in support 

of portfolio management efforts involving domain awareness and information sharing. Ultimately, portfolio management bodies become the engines to develop integrated, cross-Departmental requirements for homeland security functions such as 

screening, domain awareness, and information sharing. 

Another place where policy and strategy intersect with Departmental strategic 

management is the major acquisition oversight process. The Office of Policy sup-
63 

ports the Management Directorate in Phase 1 (Need) and Phase 2 (Analyze/Select) 

of the acquisition review process, by reviewing Mission Needs Statements and Operational Requirements Documents for consistency with Department policy and strategy. During these reviews, Policy focuses on the following key questions: 

1. Is the program consistent with approved policy, guidance, and requirements 

(e.g. the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review; applicable laws and regulations)? 

2. Is the program duplicative of other similar capabilities elsewhere in the Department? 

3. Is there a coherent scope for the program, and clear mission-oriented objectives, consistent with the QHSR and other strategy documents? 

4. Are the requirements set forth in the document best fashioned to advance 

mission and functional needs, as articulated in the QHSR and other strategy 

documents? 

This ‘‘back end’’ involvement in the PPBE, portfolio management, and major acquisitions oversight processes is an essential element in the full cycle of policy and 

strategy development and implementation. DHS is committed to ensuring that articulated policy and strategy influences programming and budgeting, capability development, and major acquisition decisions. 

ENHANCING STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Given the complexity of homeland security challenges and our primary role in decision support, a consistent priority within the Office of Policy is the application of 

rigorous and cutting-edge analytic techniques and methodologies. The Office of Policy developed and has been piloting a methodology for developing strategy. Informed 

by best practices and insights from business, academia, the military, and Government, including a highly valuable Government Accountability Office report on developing counter-terrorism strategies, our methodology stresses the importance of 

prioritization and choice, the consideration of resource implications, and analytically-informed insights in any strategy discussion. An anticipatory posture is emphasized through a fulsome examination of both the current and future strategic environment. The methodology is built around four basic elements: (1) Setting the 

foundations for good strategy; (2) establishing appropriate context; (3) developing 

viable alternative solutions; (4) conducting analysis to support decision-making. Key 

steps across these four elements include: 

• Obtaining leadership guidance regarding key priorities and expectations for the 

strategy; 

• Developing a plan to execute the strategy that includes identifying and engaging stakeholders, roles, and important time lines; 

• Identifying the current strategy, including the implicit strategy as expressed 

through the budget; 

• Framing the problem and identifying strategic assumptions given a common understanding of the current and future strategic environment; 

• Defining success through outcomes and strategic level measures; 

• Generating viable alternative strategic approaches; 

• Identifying the resource implications of each alternative approach; and 

• Assessing the degree to which each alternative would achieve success and at 

what cost. 

In addition, the Office of Policy has worked with the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) as RMA has 

developed models for assessing strategic National risk and capability—and programlevel risk reduction. The fiscal year 2012 DHS Appropriations Act authorized the 

Secretary to transfer the risk management and analysis functions performed by 

RMA to the Office of Policy in 2012. Such a transfer will enhance the Department’s 

risk modeling, analysis, and strategic planning functions, and aid in ensuring that 

risk analysis most effectively informs strategy development and strategic choice. 

Effective strategy provides a unifying device through which an organization’s capabilities are integrated and employed efficiently, resources are allocated toward the 

highest priorities, and different organizational elements are collaborating in the 

pursuit of common objectives, all of which are essential for a highly distributed, 

operationally-focused enterprise like DHS. Our strategy methodology represents a 

critical step in producing effective strategy. 

CONCLUSION

The best way to posture the Department to effectively address emerging threats 

is to ensure that tough policy and strategy decisions are informed by a consideration 

of viable alternatives, with a clear sense of the associated risk and resource implica-
64 

tions, and that those decisions once made effectively influence subsequent programming and budgeting, capability development, and major acquisition decisions. 

I look forward to addressing your questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Cohn. 

You know, this is a critical mission of the United States Government. It is clearly within the Constitutional responsibility. I personally wish we could appropriate more dollars, but we live within 

a tough budgetary time and so I think we need to make best use 

out of the dollars that we have and make it more efficient, and I 

think that is part of what these hearings are going to be all about. 

One thing, Mr. Maurer, you mentioned is that implementing this 

strategic plan that risk is not taken into account, I guess, as much 

as it should. Can you explain that a little bit more? 

Mr. MAURER. Sure. In our September 2011 report that we issued 

on the QHSR we talked about risk in sort of two different ways. 

First, in developing the QHSR the Department started going down 

the road of developing a National risk assessment, sort of pulling 

up at the National level what are the risks to homeland security 

and trying to build that into the overall analysis. 

They developed a methodology but they didn’t have the full analytic framework in place in time to complete that for this current 

QHSR. So in our report we recommended that they do it for the 

next QHSR, and our understanding is that the DHS has actions in 

place to do that. 

The second aspect of risk that we looked at was in the Department’s decisions about which of these BUR initiatives to prioritize. 

These were key initiatives coming out of the Bottom-Up Review. 

What were the things that the DHS really wanted to focus on as 

a priority? 

There were a number of things that went into that equation but 

there was not a formal risk assessment that was part of determining what things sort of floated to the top. Part of that reason 

was because some of these BUR initiatives weren’t really applesto-apples comparisons. They ranged from very large things like 

aviation security to more focused, narrow things, like developing— 

improving the capabilities of canines who can detect explosives. 

So again, we recommended that DHS take this into account in 

next year—in the next iteration of the QHSR and they said that 

they would do so. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Do you agree that that would make DHS a more 

efficient agency? 

Mr. MAURER. Absolutely. We think risk is one of several inputs 

in these kinds of strategic decisions, but certainly that is what 

DHS is in the business of doing, protecting the homeland security, 

and risk needs to be part of that equation. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Cohn, are you willing to, in the next, I guess 

this strategic plan will come out again this next year, is that correct? 

Mr. COHN. So the strategic plan will be released with the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget, so on or about February 13. But we 

agreed with the recommendations of the Government Accountability Office and are planning to incorporate both elements into 

the next QHSR, which we will conduct in calendar year 2013. 
65 

If I could just add to what Mr. Maurer said, in terms of the overall strategic National risk assessment, we recognized in the QHSR 

in the terms of reference that the Department did not have the 

methodology to conduct that, and one of the things we did in the 

first QHSR was charter a working group to determine how we 

would go about approaching that problem. That working group reported its results and part of that methodology was actually used 

to develop the strategic National risk assessment that informed our 

preparedness efforts that Dr. Caudle referenced. 

For the next Quadrennial Review we are planning to do a full 

assessment of the homeland security environment to include the 

current strategic environment, future strategic environment, threat 

landscape, strategic National risk assessment for a full-scope look. 

In addition, in terms of the BUR initiatives, the challenge that 

we had was the Department did not have a overall mechanism for 

doing as Mr. Maurer noted, an apples-to-apples comparison of dissimilar activities across missions and across organizations. Certainly most of our organizations use robust risk assessment processes in determining the thrust of their activities. The challenge 

has been for the Department in figuring out a holistic way to use 

risk at the capability, program, or activity level to look not only 

within organizations but across organizations, across missions and 

portfolios. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I look forward to seeing that and I am glad 

that you are taking Mr. Maurer’s advice and his recommendations. 

You know, we heard testimony from Mr. Schneider, who has an interesting background both in the DOD and in DHS, has a lot of experience in management. 

Mr. Cohn, you would probably be the best, and maybe perhaps 

Mr. Maurer, as well—what is your response to his idea of looking 

at kind of a DOD model that is a Goldwater-Nichols approach? 

Mr. COHN. So it is interesting. I think that Deputy Secretary 

Schneider, both in his remarks and his written testimony, pointed 

out the time line that DOD worked on to reach the point of integration that it is at. Created in 1947, 9 years into the Department of 

Defense was 1956 and the Department of Defense struggled with 

a lot of the same issues that have been pointed out here. 

In the early 1960s Secretary Robert McNamara implemented the 

planning, programming, and budgeting process in DOD, which was 

really an effort to get the Department to look holistically across its 

organizations at its Nationally-oriented programs from a mission 

perspective. It was not until 1986 with Goldwater-Nichols and 1989 

with the Defense Management Review that you got to that heightened level of operational integration. 

What the Department is really focused on right now is focusing 

on getting to that first step of being able to look at our investment 

processes from an integrated perspective across our Secretary and 

deputy secretary, the heads of our directorates, our components, 

looking at making sure we have cross-departmental perspectives 

and decisions on strategy and policy, on requirements, on programming and budgeting, and on acquisition oversight. That is a lot of 

the work that the management director is doing and that they are 

working in concert with the—— 
66 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would like to follow up with that. I think it is 

an interesting idea. You know, whether it is workable, I think, you 

know—Mr. Keating and I can discuss that, but I—it is certainly an 

interesting idea to take a look at. 

Mr. Maurer, do you have any thoughts on that? 

Mr. MAURER. Yes. I think it is absolutely an interesting idea to 

look at, and I think that conceptually it makes sense to try to do 

whatever you can to try to break down some of the stovepipes 

across the various operational components of the DHS. The Department is doing some things to go down that road. 

They have, for example, recently consolidated the process for developing an SES class. They used to have four separate processes; 

now it is just—whole Department. One of the BUR initiatives is 

looking at how the different components are having a regional presence and trying to consolidate that across the Department, as well. 

I think there are definitely some lessons learned from GoldwaterNichols that could be applied to DHS, and that would be something 

interesting to follow—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would like to follow up with Mr. Schneider. 

Perhaps, Mr. Cohn, you and I can discuss it more. 

One last question—I see my time is expired—but, Mr. Reese, you 

mentioned an interesting fact that I was not aware of, and how 

many agencies outside of DHS have a homeland security mission? 

Mr. REESE. The Federal department there are a total of 19, just 

based on research that has been done, and that is including Department of Homeland Security. The CRS Homeland Security Department fiscal year 2012 appropriations has a table in the back 

that I will be happy to provide to staff that breaks down funding. 

DHS gets 51.7 percent of the funding and then the rest is broken 

down in those other agencies with Department of Defense being 

second, at approximately—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would like to see those agencies, because what 

you are telling me is Homeland Security Department, which has 

the primary mission of defending the Nation and the homeland, essentially gets 51 percent of the funding for the mission. 

Mr. REESE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is a very interesting fact. I would like to follow up with you on that. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a great segue 

to my question. 

I think this discussion begins with, you know, the first analysis 

being the 9/11 Commission Report. Earlier this year our committee 

heard testimony from Lee Hamilton, from Tom Ridge, and they 

said that one of the primary results of their report is—still remains, even after these—this period of time, unmet, and that is 

breaking down the jurisdictional barriers that exist. I understand, 

you know, I am no novice to Government, how difficult that is, but 

I want to tell you, it is not only the inefficiencies that you are talking about and the inability to get management in place when it is 

so fragmented, but I want you to comment, if you could. 

I think the first view of this is: What is the effect of this fragmentation on our security itself? I look at that as the primary question that remains—and whether we are talking about, you know, 
67 

the approaches that were mentioned by our prior speakers and how 

to deal with it, if someone that was in the trenches saying, ‘‘Well, 

we have to take these small, incremental approaches to work 

around all these’’—how important is it—we know we are wasting 

money; we know we are not being efficient. But in terms of security—anyone—tell me how serious that fragmentation of bureaucracies remains, in terms of our National security. 

Mr. MAURER. I think it is definitely—falls in the realm of, there 

is not really a clear answer to that. You just don’t know, actually, 

what the results are because you can certainly get better efficiency, 

better effectiveness if things are better integrated and pulled together in a more cohesive way. 

But to sort of answer your question, though, it is in the realm 

of the unknowables. I mean, we don’t really know what is being 

lost by not taking advantage of some simple things, like if you have 

a consolidated management approach it would be easier for the Department leadership to understand the tradeoffs when they are 

making resource decisions within the Department of Homeland Security. If you had better performance measures you would have a 

better handle on what parts of the Department are working more 

effectively than others and make changes accordingly. 

When you don’t have that kind of consistent management framework it is really difficult to have an analysis to address the question that you raised, which is a very key question. 

Mr. KEATING. I think it is the fundamental question. You know, 

I look at, you know, with the President did with, you know, incorporating emerging threats and natural disasters under that same 

umbrella, I applaud that approach because I think he is moving in 

that direction. 

But we have to go further. I know there is legislation here in 

front of the Congress that has bipartisan support, yet nothing gets 

moved forward. To me, what we are left with, then, with declining 

revenues—and you have all addressed this—is the fact that we are 

looking at the monies we have and determining our security strategy around those parameters instead of looking at our security 

strategies and our needs and our threats and saying, ‘‘What is it 

going to take to fund safety?’’ 

I mean, the holes are gaping. You know, our primary person in 

the panel this morning talked about his biggest threat being biological threats and that there was no priority to that at all. 

Yet, that was the end of the discussion. We didn’t get into that 

beyond that. We are looking at the cyber threats and we are trying 

to grapple with that on the public-private side, too, and think of 

approaches there. 

But am I wrong? But doesn’t it seem like the tail is wagging the 

dog here, that we are looking at our limited revenues and saying, 

‘‘All right, how are we going to spread this around to all these different agencies and bureaucracies?’’ Lost in all this is, what are we 

doing to really put the premium on our security needs and risk assessment, and then putting the money forward? 

I represent a coastal community. The Chairman, here, represents 

the region that includes Port of Houston, I mentioned before. Those 

kind of natural disaster threats as well as terrorist threats really 

have a fundamental economic and security threat to our country. 
68 

Do you have any advice to us other than just do our job and start 

reorganizing here? Do you have any plans? Can you come out with 

what we should look at as a blueprint for reorganizing, making 

sure we have—we are doing things the right way instead of—there 

is another term that comes to mind; I won’t use it here. 

But what are your thoughts on that? 

Mr. COHN. You know, from the Department’s perspective, we articulated a security environment that recognized the threats that 

Deputy Secretary Schneider laid out. We articulated five National 

missions that we need to engage in and we understand we need to 

engage with almost the entirety of the Federal interagency in accomplishing those goals as well as with a—with an enormous 

stakeholder community across all of those missions. 

Obviously the fiscal environment is what it is. The Department 

has articulated a strategic approach that it follows and a priority 

of goals and objectives that we need to achieve, but the fiscal environment requires us and requires our Secretary to then carefully 

weigh what the relative priorities will be and to allocate resources 

in the best way possible to optimize to those goals and objectives. 

Mr. MAURER. I think historically, in the early days of the Department when it was first being stood up, it was undergoing a period 

of significant growth. There was a recognition that there was a 

substantial threat, and so frankly, there was a lot of money thrown 

at the Department very quickly. 

They are now starting to have to reposition themselves into a 

more austere fiscal environment which forces them to do exactly 

what you are talking about. They have to start—they have to flip 

the lens. They have to start thinking about, what are the predominant risks and the threats facing the Nation, and align the resources and priorities accordingly. That is going to take some time. 

Now, the one thing that is encouraging, I have seen evidence of 

that in some of the plans that DHS has put forward to address the 

high-risk designation, so on paper those things are there to put 

those things in place. But we need to see execution on those plans 

and we need to see sustained progress in doing so. 

Mr. KEATING. Thanks. 

Mr. Chairman, I am over my time. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That was a very good question. 

Gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, is recognized. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ranking Member, and to our panelists. 

My first question is for Mr. Reese: Emerging threats represent 

a broad spectrum of possibilities. In your opinion, are the strategies 

we have in place and the efforts of DHS effective in confronting 

these threats? 

Mr. REESE. Ma’am, first of all, working for CRS I don’t have an 

opinion. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. REESE. I would also say that the definitions identified in the 

documents—getting a succinct definition is sufficient. We can add 

what we want to the definition of homeland security; what is important is identifying the missions that evolve from that definition 

or our concept of homeland security, and then through risk assess-
69 

ment and through threat evaluation then prioritize those missions. 

I believe that is the important step that has to be done here. 

It was stated earlier that these are—these documents provide 

principles or guidance. The next step is actually prioritizing. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. So I guess the follow-up would be: Is 

there anything that you have observed that may be lacking? Are 

there any missing components? I mean, again, you are looking at 

so many different ways in which the homeland is threatened today. 

You know, we have talked about a few areas, but there are so 

many more, whether it is radiological weaponry and things that 

may be already resident in many of our communities. You know, 

we have talked about the radiological transfers for medical facilities. Is there anything that you have observed that seems to be obvious but not so obvious? 

Mr. REESE. Ma’am, everything that—especially when you look at 

the missions and the goals identified in the Bottom-Up Review and 

the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, they do—and as I 

stated earlier, seem to be nested in the 2010 National Security 

Strategy. It seems that we understand what we need to be doing; 

it is just figuring out how do we prioritize and to achieve those 

goals. 

So no, ma’am, I haven’t observed anything that—— 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Very well. 

Mr. Maurer, you sort of, like peeked up a little bit. Would you 

want to comment here? 

Mr. MAURER. Well, it is an interesting topic, of course. Yes, I 

think what is really missing are sort of the things that we have already talked about from the GAO perspective, which is the National risk assessment and a more informed risk-based foundation 

to these kinds of analyses, and the Department says it is taking 

actions to do that, and that is good. 

Also talked about the need for having improvements in getting 

stakeholders more involved in the next process for developing these 

kinds of strategies, giving them more time to comment, as well as 

doing more effective outreach to non-Federal stakeholders. We recognize that that is a key challenge for the Department since there 

are so many. But State, local, Tribal, private sector play a big role 

and we have to make sure that they are a part of developing these 

strategies. 

We would also like to see a little more detail in the implementation plan. But the key thing from a GAO perspective is we want 

to see execution on these plans and an—supported by an integrated 

management foundation. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Very well. 

Mr. Cohn, as a follow-up, it is well settled that the multiple 

agencies must cooperate with each other when it comes to homeland security and terrorism-related issues. The QHSR should have 

included a thorough discussion of the status of cooperation between 

Federal, State, local, and Tribal government in preventing terrorist 

attack and preparing for emergency responses to threats. This was 

not, however, included in the final product, and it appears to be 

outside of the scope of the BUR. 
70 

Does the Department plan to complete this statutorily required 

analysis? If so, when can we expect to have it delivered to Congress? 

Mr. COHN. As I think the GAO found in their review, DHS did 

make an—did undertake to describe the interaction between the 

Department and its external stakeholders as well as other Federal 

agencies in fulfilling its mission to prevent terrorism as well as the 

other missions articulated in the Quadrennial Review. What we did 

not do was assess the status of cooperation by other Federal agencies with their partners as opposed to DHS. 

That is a very difficult thing for an individual agency to do with 

its peer agencies. That is a topic of conversation and something we 

are looking to—to understand how we would fulfill that obligation 

as the requirement to conduct the next quadrennial review is coming up, and we will be looking and working to figure out how we 

complete that portion of the statutory requirement in the upcoming 

2013 review. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Oh boy. That doesn’t sound too good. 

I say that, you know, in all honesty because that is almost at the 

core of your mission, which is to coordinate, right? So if you are not 

getting cooperation from other Federal agencies to meet that mandate, there is a challenge there that has to be met. 

Mr. COHN. We absolutely recognize our obligation, and to coordinate with other agencies, and we do coordinate extensively with 

our Federal interagency partners and with our vast majority of 

stakeholders in the homeland security enterprise. The challenge 

comes in evaluating the actions of other Federal departments and 

agencies, and that is a similar challenge to the challenge, I think, 

of jurisdiction that the Congress is facing, of how different organizations, with their own authorities, might look to one another and 

assess one another’s roles. 

So it is a challenge that the Department recognizes in terms of 

that assessment. It is a difficult process and it is one that we will 

be working through. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Mr. Maurer. 

Mr. MAURER. I certainly understand that DHS faces in trying to 

assess the level of cooperation from other departments. It is an important issue, though, and it is certainly vital to the overall success 

of addressing homeland security threats. 

I mean, we at GAO stand ready to perform that kind of service 

for the Congress if that is something we have been asked to do. We 

certainly have criteria analysis in place to look at overall interagency cooperation. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Very well. 

Mr. Chairman, before I yield back I just want to make a quick 

correction. I was informed by Mr. Keating that a comment I made 

earlier was not accurate, and it was about—with regard to General 

McCaffrey’s comments on comprehensive—the need for comprehensive immigration reform. Those comments were actually made in 

the context of responding to the Texas report that you had submitted into the record. So I just wanted to clarify. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that clarification. 

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
71 

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony. I think this has been a very productive discussion. You 

know, we are not here to play ‘‘gotcha’’ politics. We really want the 

homeland security to succeed. It is the right thing for the American 

people and for the mission. 

I want to commend the witnesses. I also want to commend all of 

the employees in the Department of Homeland Security for their 

hard efforts. It is sometimes a thankless job and it is an easy target sometimes, an easy whipping boy. But the fact of the matter 

is they work long, hard hours. I know the Border Patrol agents 

down on the border have a very difficult job, the ICE agents, and 

really all across the spectrum at DHS. So I want to just take this 

opportunity—they may not hear it very often from Congress, but 

I want to say thank you to all of the employees in the Department 

for your hard work. 

With that, this hearing now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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