SECURITY 

ASSISTANCE

DOD’s Ongoing 

Reforms Address Some 

Challenges, but 

Additional Information 

Is Needed to Further 

Enhance Program 

Management

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2012

GAO-13-84

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-84, a report to 

congressional committees 

November 2012 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE 

DOD’s Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, 

but Additional Information Is Needed to Further 

Enhance Program Management

Why GAO Did This Study

Congress appropriated approximately 

$18.8 billion in fiscal year 2012 for 

various security cooperation and 

assistance programs that supply military 

equipment and training to more than 

100 partner countries. Amid concerns

that traditional security assistance 

programs were too slow, Congress

established several new programs in 

recent years. DSCA oversees the

security assistance process, with key 

functions in agreement development, 

acquisition, and equipment delivery

performed by U.S. military departments. 

DOD has undertaken a variety of

management reforms since 2010 to 

improve the security assistance 

process. GAO assessed the extent to 

which (1) DOD reforms address 

implementation challenges faced by 

security cooperation officials and (2) 

DSCA performance measures indicate 

improvement in the timeliness of 

security assistance. GAO analyzed 

DOD data and performance measures, 

conducted focus groups and interviews 

with security cooperation officials at all 

six geographic combatant commands, 

and interviewed SCO staff for 17 

countries. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary 

of Defense (1) establish procedures to 

ensure that DOD agencies enter 

needed acquisition and delivery status 

data into security assistance 

information systems and (2) establish 

performance measures to assess 

timeliness for additional phases of the 

security assistance process. 

DOD concurred with GAO’s

recommendations.

What GAO Found

Security cooperation officials report three major types of challenges—training 

and workforce structure, defining partner country requirements, and obtaining 

acquisition and delivery status information—in conducting assistance programs. 

Ongoing Department of Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that DOD 

security cooperation officials reported in meeting staff training needs and 

achieving the optimum workforce structure. The Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency (DSCA) has also initiated efforts to respond to challenges in developing 

assistance requests resulting from the limited expertise of partner countries and 

U.S. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) staff in identifying country 

assistance requirements and the equipment that can meet them. However, 

according to DOD security cooperation officials, information gaps in the 

acquisition and delivery phases of the security assistance process continue to 

hinder the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. Nearly all of GAO’s focus groups and 

interviews reported persistent difficulties obtaining information on the status of 

security assistance acquisitions and deliveries because information systems are 

difficult to access and contain limited information. DOD’s existing delivery 

tracking system provides only limited data on the status of equipment deliveries 

because partner country agents and DOD agencies are not entering the needed 

data into the system. Without advance notice of deliveries, SCO staff have been 

unable to ensure that addresses were correct and that partner countries were 

ready to receive and process deliveries, resulting in delays or increased costs.

DOD is developing a new information system to address information gaps, but it 

is not expected to be fully implemented until 2020.

DSCA’s Security Assistance Process 

DSCA data indicate that DOD has improved timeliness in the initial phases of the 

security assistance process, but these data provide limited information on other 

phases. The average number of days spent developing a security assistance 

agreement has improved from an average of 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 

days in fiscal year 2011. However, assessing the timeliness of the whole security 

assistance process is difficult because DSCA has limited timeliness measures for 

later phases, which often comprise the most time-consuming activities. For 

example, DSCA has not established a performance measure to assess the 

timeliness of acquisition, which can take years. In addition, DSCA does not 

consistently measure delivery performance against estimated delivery dates.

Without such performance measures, DSCA cannot assess historical trends or 

the extent to which reforms impact the timeliness of the security assistance 

process.

View GAO-13-84. For more information, 

contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 

512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Letter 1 

Background 3

DOD Reforms Address Many Challenges, but More Comprehensive 

Acquisition and Delivery Information Is Needed 9

DSCA Data Indicate Improved Timeliness in the Initial Phases of 

the Security Assistance Process, but Provide Limited 

Information on Other Phases 17

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29

Appendix II Challenges Identified by Geographic Combatant Command Security 

Cooperation Officials 34

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 36

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

Related GAO Products 40

Tables

Table 1: Summary of BPC Programs Administered by DSCA 4

Table 2: Average Days for Agreement Development for Sample 

Afghanistan and Iraq BPC, Other BPC, and FMF Programs 

(Fiscal Years 2007-2011) 20

Table 3: On-time Completion of Security Assistance Agreements by 

Type, Fiscal Year 2011 21

Table 4: Challenges within DOD’s Purview to Implementing 

Security Assistance Programs that Were Identified by 

Combatant Command Officials. 34

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Figures

Figure 1: Acting Entities and Steps in FMS and Pseudo-FMS 

Processes 6

Figure 2: Percentage of Intermediate and Final Delivery Points 

Containing Data for Sample Deliveries Originating in 

Fiscal Years 2007-2011 15

Figure 3: Average Days Spent in Agreement Development (FY2007-

FY2011) 19

Figure 4: Open Supply Discrepancy Reports Greater than 1 Year 

Old, Fiscal Years 2007-2011 24

Abbreviations

BPC building partner capacity

DOD Department of Defense

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EFTS Enhanced Freight Tracking System

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMS Foreign Military Sales 

SCO Security Cooperation Organization

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Page 1 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

November 16, 2012

Congressional Committees

U.S. national security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts 

to help foreign partners and allies build their own security capacity. As 

part of these efforts, Congress appropriated $18.75 billion1 in fiscal year 

2012 for various security cooperation and assistance programs that 

supply military equipment and training to more than 100 partner 

countries.2 However, traditional security assistance programs such as 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)3 and Foreign Military Financing (FMF),

4

 

1

See Table 1 for a summary of programs discussed in this report. This appropriated total 

does not include amounts that are authorized from other accounts for security assistance 

and cooperation programs, such as the Section 1206 program, Coalition Readiness 

Support Program, and Global Security Contingency Fund.

while beneficial, have been criticized as being too slow and cumbersome 

to meet needs for training and equipping foreign forces for 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. In recent years 

Congress has expanded the number of funding mechanisms and 

programs to build partner capacity. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) oversees program 

administration for both traditional and newer programs and has 

2

According to DOD, security cooperation is the more encompassing term and includes 

security assistance as one of its components. “Security cooperation” consists of activities 

undertaken by DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the 

United States to achieve strategic objectives, including international armaments 

cooperation, security assistance activities, and provision of U.S. peacetime and 

contingency access to host nations. “Security assistance” refers to the group of programs 

by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defenserelated services in furtherance of national policies and objectives. See DOD Directive 

5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, 

October 24, 2008.

3

Foreign partners using FMS purchase equipment and services using their own funds.

The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751 et seq.) authorizes 

the sale of defense articles and defense services to eligible foreign countries under the 

FMS program. Although DOD implements FMS, the Secretary of State is responsible for 

the continuous supervision and general direction of security assistance programs, 

including FMS.

4

FMF provides financial assistance in the form of credits or guarantees to U.S. allies to 

purchase military equipment, services, and training from the United States. Recipient 

countries can use the assistance to purchase items from the U.S. military departments 

through the FMS process or directly from private U.S. companies.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

undertaken a series of internal reform efforts to address concerns about 

the timeliness of security assistance. In addition, the Secretary of 

Defense convened a Security Cooperation Reform Task Force in fiscal 

year 2010, which made additional recommendations for reform.

In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee mandate5 to review 

DSCA’s program implementation processes, this report assesses the 

extent to which (1) DOD reforms address challenges that security 

cooperation officials face in implementing assistance programs and (2) 

DSCA performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of 

security assistance. While DOD and the Department of State (State) 

manage other U.S. security cooperation and assistance programs, our 

report addresses only those programs where DSCA plays a role.6

To identify ongoing and planned DOD security cooperation reforms, we 

reviewed a DOD task force report,7 analyzed its recommendations, and 

discussed reform efforts with DSCA officials. To identify challenges that 

DOD officials face in implementing security cooperation programs, we 

convened focus groups and conducted interviews of security cooperation 

officials in all six geographic combatant commands.8

 

5

See S. Rep. No. 112-26 (June 22, 2011) accompanying S.1253, National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

We also conducted 

interviews with staff at Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) —

DOD officials located in a foreign country who manage DOD security 

cooperation programs under the guidance of the combatant command—

for 17 countries. We selected these countries based on geographic 

representation, the value of U.S.-funded security assistance the country 

6

For example, DSCA implements a small portion of DOD’s counternarcotics program and 

a portion of State’s Peacekeeping Operations programs, for which $383.8 million was 

appropriated in fiscal year 2012 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (Pub. L. No 

112-74), to provide assistance to enhance the capacity of foreign civilian security forces to 

participate in peacekeeping operations.

7

DOD Security Cooperation Reform Task Force, Phase I Report, July 2011.

8

The geographic combatant commands are the U.S. Northern Command, which includes 

North America and parts of the Caribbean, Southern Command (Central and South 

America, and parts of the Caribbean), European Command (Europe, Russia, Greenland, 

and Israel), Central Command (the Middle East and southwest Asia), Africa Command 

(Africa, excluding Egypt), and Pacific Command (the Pacific Ocean, East and South Asia, 

and Australia). Combatant commands may also be functional rather than geographic in 

nature, such as the Special Operations Command. For the purposes of this report, 

“combatant commands” refers only to the geographic combatant commands.
 

Page 3 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

received from 2006 to 2010, and other factors. We excluded International 

Military Education and Training in order to focus on equipment and 

equipment-associated training and because we had recently issued a 

report specifically assessing International Military Education and 

Training.9

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through 

November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To assess the extent to which DSCA performance measures 

indicate improvement in the timeliness of security assistance, we 

reviewed DSCA performance measures and discussed them with DSCA 

officials and implementing agency officials. We reviewed the first three 

quarterly management reports of performance measures for fiscal year 

2012 to assess the extent that DSCA has performance measures that can 

be used to assess timeliness. Where sample data permitted, we also 

analyzed DOD data to assess performance trends. Appendix I provides 

further details on our scope and methodology.

The United States provides military equipment and training to partner 

countries through a variety of programs. Foreign partners may pay the 

U.S. government to administer the acquisition of materiel and services on 

their behalf through the FMS program. The United States also provides 

grants to some foreign partners through the FMF program to fund the 

partner’s purchase of materiel and services through the process used for 

FMS. In this report, we refer to FMS, FMF, and other State Department 

programs implemented by DOD as “traditional” security assistance 

programs. In recent years, Congress has expanded the number of 

security cooperation programs to include several new programs with 

funds appropriated to DOD, as well as administered and implemented by 

DOD, that focus on building partner capacity (BPC). See table 1 for 

descriptions of the BPC programs included in our report.

 

9

GAO, International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human 

Rights Training and Improve Evaluations, GAO-12-123 (Washington, D.C.: October 2011).

Background
 

Page 4 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Table 1: Summary of BPC Programs Administered by DSCA

Program and fiscal 

year established Summary

Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund

2005

Funds appropriated to the Secretary of Defense to provide 

assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan, including for the 

training, equipping, and maintenance of Afghanistan’s security 

forces. 

Iraq Security Forces 

Fund

2005

Funds appropriated to the Secretary of Defense to provide 

assistance to the security forces of Iraq, including for the 

training, equipping, and maintenance of Iraq’s security forces.

Coalition Support 

Fund

2002

The Coalition Support Fund’s Coalition Readiness Support 

Program is used to provide specialized training, procure supplies 

and specialized equipment, and loan such equipment and 

supplies on a nonreimbursable basis to coalition forces 

supporting U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

Section 1206 Global 

Train and Equip

2006

Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to $350 million 

each year, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to 

build the capacity of foreign military forces of a country in order 

for that country to conduct counterterrorist operations or to 

support military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed 

forces are a participant.

Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency 

Fund / Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency 

Capability Fund

2009

The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund is appropriated to the 

Secretary of Defense. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency 

Capability Fund is appropriated to the Secretary of State but 

may be transferred to the Secretary of Defense. Both funds 

provide assistance for Pakistan’s security forces to bolster their 

counterinsurgency efforts.

Global Security 

Contingency Fund

2012

The Global Security Contingency Fund provides assistance to 

enhance the capabilities of a foreign country’s military and 

security forces to conduct border and maritime security, internal 

defense, and counterterrorism operations; and participate in or 

support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent 

with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.

Sources: GAO analysis of public laws and DOD documents.

DSCA oversees program administration for both traditional programs and 

newer BPC programs. DSCA establishes security assistance procedures 

and systems, provides training, and guides the activities of implementing 

agencies.10

 

10To recover the cost of administering FMS, DOD applies a surcharge to each FMS 

agreement. As of November 1, 2012, the surcharge was 3.5 percent of the value of the 

sale.

Implementing agencies of the military departments—the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force—are responsible for preparing, processing, 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

and executing the vast majority of security assistance agreements.11

Both the traditional and BPC programs that DSCA administers use the 

FMS process to provide security assistance, but, as shown in figure 1, 

some roles, responsibilities, and actors differ. In contrast to traditional 

programs, under the BPC programs, the United States consults with the 

partner country, but takes lead in identifying partner requirements and 

funds, obtains, and delivers equipment on the partner’s behalf. The form 

of the FMS process used to implement BPC programs is referred to as 

the “pseudo-FMS” process. While the many steps of the FMS and 

pseudo-FMS processes can be grouped in different ways, they fall into 

five general phases: assistance request, agreement development, 

acquisition, delivery, and case closure. See figure 1 for a summary of 

selected entities and their roles in these phases of the FMS and pseudoFMS processes.

While these implementing agencies maintain their own unique systems 

and procedures, DSCA provides overall guidance through the Security 

Assistance Management Manual and associated policy memos. DSCA 

provides education and training to security cooperation officials through 

its Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.

 

11The lead agencies within the military departments are the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation, Navy International Programs Office, and 

the Air Force Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs. Additional implementing 

agencies include the Missile Defense Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense 

Logistics Agency.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Figure 1: Acting Entities and Steps in FMS and Pseudo-FMS Processes

Note: This summary of the FMS and pseudo-FMS processes does not encompass all steps and 

actors that may be involved, such as technology releasability reviews that may be required for 

sensitive equipment. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

• Assistance Request. During the assistance request phase, in 

traditional FMS, the partner country identifies its requirements 

(needed materiel or services) and documents them in a formal letter 

of request. Implementing agencies as well as SCOs and officials at 

DOD’s six geographic combatant commands may provide input to the 

assistance request. In the pseudo-FMS process, SCOs and 

combatant commands consult with partner countries and take the lead 

in identifying partner country requirements and drafting the request, 

sometimes with input from the partner country.

• Agreement Development. During the agreement development phase, 

the implementing agency enters the letter of request12

• Acquisition. During the acquisition phase, implementing agencies 

requisition from existing supply or procure equipment and services 

using the same procedures they use to supply the U.S. military. The 

process is the same for both FMS and pseudo-FMS. Case managers 

at implementing agencies monitor acquisitions and enter status 

information into their data systems. Unlike the single information 

system used to develop agreements, the information systems used in 

the acquisition phase are not common across implementing agencies. 

However, DSCA has created a web-based overlay, the Security 

Cooperation Information Portal, which imports some of the information 

available in implementing agency data systems and is accessible over 

the Internet by security cooperation and partner country officials.

into the 

Defense Security Assistance Management System, a DSCA 

information system used by all implementing agencies to process 

letters of request and produce security assistance agreements. DSCA 

reviews the draft agreement and coordinates with the State 

Department before sending any congressional notifications that, for 

the traditional FMS process, may be required based on the dollar 

value or sensitivity of the potential sale but for pseudo-FMS are 

required for all programs. When approvals are in place, DSCA 

conducts a final quality assurance review and State performs a final 

review. In traditional FMS, DSCA authorizes the implementing agency 

to send the agreement to the partner country for acceptance; in the 

pseudo-FMS process, the implementing agency accepts the 

agreement on behalf of the combatant command. 

 

12In pseudo-FMS, the letter of request is referred to as a memorandum of request.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

• Delivery. In the traditional FMS process, the partner country takes 

custody of materiel in the United States and is responsible for 

arranging delivery. The partner country may pay to use the U.S. 

military transportation system, but often uses its own freight 

forwarder—an authorized agent responsible for managing shipment to 

the final destination. If shipments are incomplete or otherwise 

deficient, the partner country may file a supply discrepancy report to 

seek redress. All BPC program shipments use the U.S. military 

transportation system or other U.S. government-procured 

transportation, with the SCO responsible for providing the delivery 

address, ensuring foreign customs requirements can be met, jointly 

checking shipments for completeness with the partner country, and 

preparing any needed supply discrepancy reports. Implementing 

agencies are responsible for conducting BPC deliveries and 

confirming that SCOs are ready to receive a planned delivery. For 

both FMS and pseudo-FMS processes, DOD uses the Enhanced 

Freight Tracking System (EFTS), a secure web-based application 

accessible within the Security Cooperation Information Portal 

designed to provide visibility of the security assistance distribution 

system.

• Case Closure. An FMS case is a candidate for closure when all 

materiel has been delivered, all ordered services have been 

performed, no new orders exist or are forthcoming, and the partner 

has not requested the case be kept open. At case closure, any 

remaining case funds may be made available to the country for further 

use. Pseudo-FMS cases may be submitted for closure as soon as 

supply and services are complete.

DOD has undertaken internal improvement efforts designed to address 

challenges in implementing security cooperation and security assistance 

programs and improving timeliness of U.S. efforts. DSCA has also 

undertaken improvements recommended by its internal improvement 

program, begun in 2008, which has reviewed DSCA and implementing 

agency processes.13

 

13DSCA conducts a quarterly forum where senior officials from DSCA, industry 

associations, partner nation groups, military departments, and others in DOD discuss 

issues in security assistance management, propose improvements, and present and 

review performance data.

In fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of Defense 

initiated a comprehensive review of DOD’s internal processes. The 

results of the task force review led to recommendations focusing on areas 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

for improvement including: identification of partner requirements; 

acquisition and transportation; and training, education, and workforce 

development. DOD and DSCA have initiated a variety of efforts to 

implement the recommendations, and a follow-up task force report 

describes the status of action on the recommendations. In focus groups 

we conducted in 2012 at all six combatant commands14 and interviews 

with the officials at SCOs in 17 countries, security cooperation officials 

reported three types of challenges: (1) optimizing training and workforce 

structure, (2) defining partner country requirements, and (3) obtaining 

information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance 

agreements.

DSCA has undertaken reforms to address challenges associated with (1) 

training and workforce structure, (2) defining partner country 

requirements, and (3) obtaining information on the acquisition and 

delivery status of assistance agreements.15 While ongoing reforms are 

addressing the first two challenges in the short term, reforms to address 

information system gaps are more long-term focused and are expected to 

take years to complete.

 

14See app. I for a description of focus group methodology. We conducted focus groups at 

five of the combatant commands and an interview at Northern Command due to the small 

number of countries and officials involved in security cooperation at the command. This 

interview used the same questions and we used the same method of analysis for the 

results as for the focus groups at the other combatant commands. For the purposes of the 

report we refer to focus groups at all six combatant commands.

15See app. II for a complete list of challenges identified by two or more combatant 

commands and within DOD’s purview. For the purposes of this report, we focused on 

those challenges which lie within DOD’s purview and did not address those challenges 

identified as beyond DOD’s control, such as delays in partner country decisionmaking and 

approvals. SCOs and focus groups also reported that they perceive delays in 

implementation due to slowness of State Department approval of funding and the time 

required for State Department and congressional reviews and notifications.

DOD Reforms 

Address Many 

Challenges, but More 

Comprehensive 

Acquisition and 

Delivery Information 

Is Needed
 

Page 10 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Security cooperation officials reported that the existing training and 

workforce structure presented a challenge to successfully implementing 

security assistance. Specifically, focus groups at four of the six combatant 

commands indicated that training or staffing of SCOs was insufficient, 

limiting SCO effectiveness as they develop assistance requests, build 

relationships in-country, and track assistance agreements through to 

delivery. These focus group participants and officials at the SCOs and 

military departments reported that they felt a number of changes were 

needed, such as including more training on newer security cooperation 

authorities, providing additional refresher courses, and ensuring that 

security cooperation officers meet with their military department points of 

contact as part of their predeployment training for their SCO assignments. 

In addition, according to focus groups and interviews we conducted with 

SCOs, SCOs were insufficiently staffed or rotations in the field were not 

long enough. For example, some SCOs reported having only one security 

cooperation officer, and rotations sometimes lasted only 1 year, which 

was often less than the cycle time to develop and execute a security 

assistance agreement. Focus group participants said a lack of institutional 

memory in these SCOs created challenges for new officers who must 

assume responsibility for ongoing security cooperation efforts.

DSCA has initiated a number of reforms designed to address training and 

workforce structure challenges previously identified by DOD and raised 

again during our focus groups and interviews. DOD recognized the need 

for improved training and workforce management as early as 2009, when 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense included efforts to improve security 

cooperation training in his top 10 Office of Management and Budget highpriority performance goals for 2010 and 2011. DSCA is developing 

several courses to address reported gaps in knowledge and to increase 

the percentage of the security cooperation workforce that receives 

training. For example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense declared in 2009 

that DSCA must plan to educate 95 percent of the security cooperation 

workforce by the end of fiscal year 2011. As of September 2012, DSCA 

has consistently reported that this goal has been met or exceeded since it 

was first achieved in June 2011. DSCA and the Defense Institute of 

Security Assistance Management are currently identifying key positions in 

the security cooperation community and developing improved procedures 

to help ensure the selection of well-qualified candidates for those 

positions.

In addition to monitoring the percentage of people trained, DOD has 

reforms underway to address concerns about the content of the training 

for, and the staffing of, security cooperation positions. In 2011, DOD’s 

DOD Reforms Are 

Addressing Training and 

Workforce Challenges
 

Page 11 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management began expanding a 

required course for DOD personnel responsible for security assistance 

and security cooperation management in overseas positions such as at 

SCOs, combatant commands, and Defense Attaché Offices. Furthermore, 

the course now includes information that security cooperation personnel 

identified as important, such as a section on BPC programs. As of 

September 2012, the Institute reported that students found the initial 

expansion of the required course better covered the planning and 

execution of the wide variety of security cooperation programs. The 

course changes are now complete and, beginning in October 2012, the 

Institute plans to offer the final expanded course. As a result of changes 

to this course, security cooperation officers are now able to meet—in 

person and by video-teleconference—with the DOD points of contact they 

will work with to implement security cooperation programs once they are 

in the field. In addition, these new course offerings introduce the topic of 

security cooperation to U.S. government officials who interact with partner 

countries but do not necessarily work on security cooperation programs.

In addition to improvements to course offerings, DSCA has created 

additional resources for security cooperation officials. In April 2012, 

DSCA added a new chapter devoted specifically to building partner 

capacity to the Security Assistance Management Manual. DSCA and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy have created a tool kit which 

provides points of contact and implementation guidance for each 

assistance program. Mandatory training for security cooperation officers 

includes a review of this tool kit.

Focus group participants in five of six combatant commands and officials 

at 9 of the 17 SCOs noted challenges in identifying and defining partner 

country assistance requirements.16

 

16These challenges are consistent with the 2011 DOD security cooperation reform task 

force findings, which reported that “not all U.S. allies and partners possess the institutions, 

training, and equipment required to tackle the security challenges facing them, or to 

cooperate viably with U.S. forces in a coalition or multinational operating environment.” 

These officials noted that partner 

countries did not have enough experience or expertise to identify their 

requirements or develop an assistance request that DOD can act upon. 

Further, focus groups at four of the six combatant commands reported 

that SCOs lacked the experience or capacity necessary to identify 

equipment to match the partner country’s requirements. For example, 

DOD Reforms Are 

Responding to Challenges 

Defining Partner Country 

Requirements
 

Page 12 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

officials in two focus groups reported that some SCOs lacked staff with 

expertise to develop either traditional or BPC assistance requests.

Since 2009, DOD has initiated reforms to improve the process of 

developing assistance requests intended to reduce implementation 

delays and improve the effectiveness of assistance to partner countries. 

DOD reforms include developing new training courses and providing incountry advisors to help country officials identify short-term and long-term 

requirements and strategies to meet those requirements. DOD has also 

reformed its own processes for defining requirements to improve longterm effectiveness of security cooperation programs and provide shortterm solutions for meeting requirements using assistance requests. For 

example, beginning in 2011, DOD issued new policies and guidance to 

help combatant commands and implementing agencies plan for, and 

better develop, security assistance requests. Also in 2011, DSCA 

established a strategic planning support group to assist combatant 

commands with early identification and resolution of issues related to 

capability requirements and certain types of assistance requests. In 

addition, DSCA established Expeditionary Requirements Generation 

Teams whose purpose is to help the combatant commands, partner 

countries, and security cooperation officers identify and refine a partner 

country’s requirements. These teams are available for both traditional and 

BPC programs upon request by combatant commands. DSCA noted that 

these teams would be particularly useful when a security cooperation 

officer lacks experience or familiarity with the type of equipment in 

question. DSCA provided pilot teams for Bulgaria, Iraq, and Uzbekistan 

and, after the pilot was determined to be successful, sent teams to assist 

Armenia, the Philippines, and again Iraq. The pilot teams produced 34 

assistance letters of request, including some for FMF programs.

DOD officials participating in focus groups at all six combatant commands 

and officials at 16 of the 17 SCOs we interviewed reported difficulties 

obtaining information from DSCA and the implementing agencies of the 

military departments—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—on the status of

assistance agreements throughout the security assistance process. 

These officials reported that obtaining information on acquisition and 

delivery status was particularly problematic. According to DSCA’s 

Security Assistance Management Manual, in order to facilitate information 

sharing regarding assistance agreement status, the implementing 

DOD Efforts Underway 

Will Not Provide 

Comprehensive 

Information on Acquisition 

and Delivery Status until 

2020
 

Page 13 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

agencies must communicate frequently with DSCA, the combatant 

commands, and the security cooperation officers, as well as with other 

entities involved in executing security assistance programs.17

• DSCA and implementing agency information systems were difficult to 

access;

However, 

focus group participants at the commands and the security cooperation 

officers we interviewed reported a number of problems obtaining the 

information they need in order to implement security assistance programs 

throughout the process. Specifically, they reported that:

• implementing agency information systems often did not contain 

current information;

• these systems often did not contain the specific type of information 

the officials needed;

• implementing agencies generally did not proactively provide the 

information that was available;

• shipping documentation was often missing or inadequate; and

• deliveries arrived when the SCOs did not expect them.

Security cooperation officials we interviewed reported examples of this 

lack of information delaying assistance, increasing costs, or negatively 

affecting their ability to keep partner countries and senior officers at the 

combatant commands informed about the progress of the assistance 

agreements. For example, security cooperation officers at four SCOs 

reported that equipment was held by the partner country’s customs 

agency because the delivery lacked proper documentation or proper 

address labels, and additional customs fees were incurred while the 

security cooperation officers found the missing information. Security 

cooperation officers in two SCOs noted instances where shipments were 

warehoused in a customs office for 2 years because they had no 

 

17The manual uses many terms to describe the entities involved in the security assistance 

process. In this instance, the manual mentions the implementing agencies must 

communicate frequently with a list of entities, one of which is the “requesting authority.” It 

also states that the combatant commands often perform the role of the requesting 

authority within DOD. For the purpose of this report, we will refer to the requesting 

authority as the combatant commands. See DSCA 5105.38-M at C15.1.3.8 and C15.1.3.6.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

addresses or were improperly addressed. Security cooperation officers in 

three SCO reported discovering equipment at ports and airports that had 

arrived without advance notice.

In addition to receiving reports of challenges encountered by officials 

using the various DOD information systems, we analyzed the extent to 

which data were available in the delivery tracking information system. 

DOD has created an information system intended to provide a single, 

consolidated, authoritative source for security assistance shipment 

information tracking. However, we found that DOD is not ensuring that 

entities charged with carrying out deliveries are fully providing data for 

this system. The Security Assistance Management Manual recommends 

that SCOs use the EFTS to maintain awareness of incoming shipments to 

the partner country when the items are shipped using the U.S. Defense 

Transportation System. EFTS, accessible through the Security 

Cooperation Information Portal, collects, processes, and integrates 

transportation information generated by the military services, Defense 

Logistics Agency, the U.S. Transportation Command, participating 

carriers, freight forwarders, and partner countries—all of which can play a 

role in the equipment delivery process and in populating the information 

systems.

However, EFTS is not currently populated with sufficient information to 

provide transit visibility. The system currently provides information 

regarding when cargo leaves the supply source for most security 

assistance deliveries, but we found that information availability decreases 

as deliveries transit through intermediate points and on to final 

destinations. EFTS provides limited information documenting, for 

example, the date a shipment departs the United States and arrives at a 

port in the recipient country. In addition, the system documents about 1 

percent of the dates that equipment arrived at the in-country final 

destination. Figure 2 provides percentages of fields in EFTS for which 

participating entities provided data, based on a sample of FMF deliveries, 

for fiscal years 2007-2011.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Figure 2: Percentage of Intermediate and Final Delivery Points Containing Data for 

Sample Deliveries Originating in Fiscal Years 2007-2011

The lack of data in EFTS is caused by inconsistent participation by the 

entities executing deliveries, which need to provide the data that would 

populate the system. Equipment deliveries for traditional security 

assistance programs are often executed by partner country freight 

forwarders. According to DOD officials, some freight forwarders have 

been reluctant to participate in EFTS and must be directed by the partner 

country to do so, possibly requiring a change to the freight forwarder’s 

contract with the partner country. Although DSCA can issue guidance to 

freight forwarders, according to DSCA officials, it has no authority to 

require them to follow the guidance. The 2008 DSCA memo announcing 

the introduction of EFTS notes that the success of the program relies 

greatly on the participation of partner countries and their freight 

forwarders, and DSCA officials have since discussed ways to encourage 

freight forwarders to participate in the EFTS system and report final 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

shipments. DSCA officials have acknowledged that there is still work to 

be done to address challenges in implementing EFTS.

DOD has reforms underway for additional information systems to address 

the lack of information across the process. In an effort to develop more 

complete, comparable, and detailed data on security assistance 

agreement execution, DSCA is developing a new electronic system, the 

Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution, to aggregate data from the 

separate computer management systems used by DOD’s implementing 

agencies and standardize the handling of security assistance agreements 

regardless of the assigned military service. The system is intended to 

improve visibility on the acquisition and later phases of the security 

assistance process. Agency leaders have noted that the Army’s Security 

Assistance Enterprise Management Resource system has already 

contributed to significantly increased management visibility across the 

entire security assistance process for Army-implemented assistance 

agreements and will bolster efforts to make similar management tools 

available across implementing agencies, particularly once incorporated 

into the Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution.

The Security Cooperation Enterprise Solution is intended to be a longterm solution to information management challenges. DSCA officials 

expect to provide the system to one of the implementing agencies in 2015 

and plan to complete system implementation in 2020, when the remaining 

two implementing agencies will have access to the system. DSCA has 

also initiated reforms intended to increase visibility for specific phases of 

the process. For example, in 2010, DSCA undertook an effort to improve 

the quality of the documentation included with each shipment. As a result, 

the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management issued a 

training guide in 2012 to improve the accuracy of addresses on 

shipments. Furthermore, to address problems with the agreement 

development phase, DSCA is working with the Defense Contracting 

Management Agency to develop a way to make contract information 

available to FMS customers via the Security Cooperation Information 

Portal. The stated goal is to allow customers to search for the information 

as well as to create reports containing contract information that can be 

sent to a range of FMS customers. The training and workforce structure 

reforms discussed earlier may also address some of the reported 

challenges regarding information accessibility.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

DSCA has collected data that show improved timeliness in processing 

security assistance requests and developing security assistance 

agreements. However, assessing the timeliness of the entire security 

assistance process is difficult, because DSCA lacks timeliness 

performance measures for the other phases and for the overall process.18

For example, the agency does not measure the timeliness of assistance 

acquisition, delivery, and case closure, which usually comprise the most 

time-consuming activities.

According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

U.S. agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance over 

time.19 Furthermore, the Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993, as amended, requires agencies to develop performance measures, 

monitor progress on achieving goals, and report on their progress in their 

annual performance reports.20 Our previous work has noted that the lack 

of clear, measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and 

staff to link their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency’s intended 

mission.21

DSCA has access to many security assistance management systems that 

implementing agencies use and maintain to manage the security 

assistance process. DSCA routinely extracts selected information from 

these systems to oversee the process and has established some 

performance measures to assess timeliness in various phases.

 

18We have previously commented on DSCA’s limited ability to obtain information to 

effectively administer and oversee the security assistance process in GAO, Defense 

Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls for Exported Items and 

Information for Oversight, GAO-09-454 (Washington, D.C.: May 2009).

19GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

20Pub. L. No. 103-62, as amended by the Government Performance and Results Act 

(GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.111-352. 

21GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for 

Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004).

DSCA Data Indicate 

Improved Timeliness 

in the Initial Phases of 

the Security 

Assistance Process, 

but Provide Limited 

Information on Other 

Phases

DSCA Collects Information 

from Implementing 

Agencies to Monitor 

Performance across the 

Security Assistance 

Process
 

Page 18 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

DSCA data indicate improvements in the timeliness of assistance request 

processing. In the assistance request phase, DSCA measures the 

number of security assistance requests and the time spent processing 

them after they are received. DSCA measures processing time as the 

number of days from the time a request is formally received until it is 

“complete,” or ready for the agreement development phase. According to 

DSCA data, the number of days necessary for processing assistance 

requests once they are formally received has improved from about 22 

days in fiscal year 2008 to about 13 days in fiscal year 2011.

While DOD has improved its response to the formal request, a partner 

country or combatant command’s perspective of the time required to 

develop security assistance requests may be different from the portion of 

that time under the oversight of DSCA. A significant amount of time 

devoted to the development of assistance requests takes place before the 

customer submits an assistance request to an implementing agency or 

DSCA. For example, U.S. officials such as combatant command and 

SCO staff as well as experts on relevant defense equipment may work 

intensively with partner country officials before the request is officially 

submitted.

DSCA data show that implementing agencies have reduced the time 

spent during the agreement development phase of the security 

assistance process. DSCA uses a single data system to collect detailed 

information from implementing agencies on the time required to develop 

security assistance agreements.22

 

22Information regarding key security assistance milestones is collected in the Defense 

Security Assistance Management System. 

This information allows common 

DOD Has Improved 

Request Processing Time, 

but DSCA Cannot Measure 

All Time Spent Developing 

Assistance Requests

DOD Has Improved the 

Timeliness of Agreement 

Development
 

Page 19 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

performance measurement that provides a basis for focused reforms to 

reduce process times in this phase. Aggregate DSCA data for all 

agreements indicate a reduction in the average, or mean, number of days 

for an assistance agreement to be fully developed and offered to partner 

countries from 124 days in fiscal year 2007 to 109 days in fiscal year 

2011, with a fiscal year 2009 low of 103 days (see fig. 3).

Figure 3: Average Days Spent in Agreement Development (FY2007-FY2011)

In addition, sample DSCA data we analyzed indicate that agreement 

development is faster for BPC programs than the traditional FMF security 

assistance program for the 17 countries in our sample.23

 

23We analyzed data on agreement development performance for DSCA-administered BPC 

and traditional FMF security assistance programs for a judgmental sample of 17 countries. 

See app. I for more details.

During fiscal 

years 2007 through 2011, FMF security assistance agreement

development for our 17 sample countries took an average of 89 days, 

whereas agreement development for BPC programs in sample countries 

other than Iraq and Afghanistan took an average of 76 days. Agreement 
 

Page 20 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

development for BPC assistance projects in Afghanistan and Iraq was 

faster still—36 days on average. See table 2.

Table 2: Average Days for Agreement Development for Sample Afghanistan and 

Iraq BPC, Other BPC, and FMF Programs (Fiscal Years 2007-2011) 

Program Average number of days

Afghanistan- and Iraq-related BPC program agreements 36

Other BPC program agreements 76

Traditional (FMF) program agreements 89

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data

DOD officials we interviewed suggested several factors that may be 

contributing to the faster agreement development time for Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and other BPC programs in our sample. For example, funding for 

BPC programs may need to be obligated more quickly than traditional 

security assistance funding;24 intensive management offices for 

Afghanistan and Iraq help expedite agreement development for those 

partner countries; and DOD’s combatant command for the region 

including Iraq and Afghanistan has created a task force to enhance 

communication of command priorities. Furthermore, our analysis of 

sample data did not indicate that the improved timeliness in developing 

BPC security assistance agreements decreased the timeliness of 

developing FMF agreements for our sample countries. We found that the 

time spent developing FMF agreements in our selected countries 

decreased slightly from over 100 days in fiscal year 2007 to less than 90 

days in fiscal year 2011.25

Despite reducing the time spent in the agreement development phase, 

implementing agencies have not consistently met DSCA’s established 

timeliness goal. In 2010, DSCA defined this goal as providing security 

assistance agreements to customers on or before the anticipated offer 

date for at least 85 percent of agreements. The anticipated offer date is 

 

24Several BPC programs are funded with appropriations that are generally available for 

obligation only 1 or 2 years, so the funds must be obligated within a shorter timeframe. 

Funds for traditional FMF programs do not have such time constraints. 

25The results of our analysis may differ from overall DSCA timeliness metrics due to 

factors such as the type of equipment and training requested by sample partner countries 

and the quality of the assistance requests submitted. 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

the target date by which the implementing agency is to complete 

agreement development and offer the agreement for acceptance.26

Table 3: On-time Completion of Security Assistance Agreements by Type, Fiscal 

Year 2011

 As 

shown in table 3, DSCA data indicate that in fiscal year 2011, 

implementing agencies met DSCA’s timeliness goal for BPC agreements, 

88 percent of which were completed by the anticipated offer date. For 

traditional agreements, the implementing agencies fell short of this goal, 

regardless of the complexity of the agreement.

Percentage of agreements 

completed on time

Agreement type Target: 85 percent

Time allotted to 

complete agreement

Traditional

(in order of 

complexity)

Group A 75 days 80 percent

Group B 120 days 72 percent 

Group C >121 days 64 percent 

BPC Group D 75 days 88 percent 

Source: GAO analysis of DSCA data

In the acquisition phase of the security assistance process, DSCA has not 

established performance measures to assess timeliness of acquisitions, 

which are carried out by the implementing agencies. This phase, from 

when implementing agencies begin to make acquisitions needed for 

finalized security assistance agreements until such activities are 

completed and equipment is ready to ship, is often the longest phase of 

the process. DSCA data indicate that acquisitions that required DOD to 

award a contract in fiscal year 2011 took between 376 and 1,085 days, 

but there are limited common data sources across implementing agencies 

 

26Implementing agencies use DSCA policy guidance to assign an anticipated offer date to 

each agreement depending on its type and complexity.

DSCA Does Not Measure 

Acquisition Timeliness
 

Page 22 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

for assessing acquisition performance and documenting trends.27 DOD’s 

implementing agencies manage acquisitions with several unique 

electronic systems, each of which allows for various status updates and 

reporting.28 However, we have previously reported that although the 

systems may provide performance information within each implementing 

agency, the information is not comparable across agencies, thus reducing 

its value to DSCA for overall oversight.29 DSCA plans for the Security 

Cooperation Enterprise Solution to include information from all 

implementing agencies and improve DSCA’s ability to monitor acquisition 

activities across agencies. This new system is intended to be fully 

implemented in 2020.

DSCA does not measure the timeliness of all security assistance 

deliveries. Furthermore, DSCA does not consistently record either the 

original target delivery dates or the actual delivery dates required to 

determine delivery timeliness. DSCA monitors and reports one timeliness 

target that is common across implementing agencies. According to this 

target, estimated delivery dates for major assistance items, established 

by implementing agencies, should be met for 95 percent or more of these 

cases.30

 

27As opposed to agreements that require awarding a contract, the time to provide items 

from DOD stock is typically between 40 days and 8 months. Furthermore, according to 

DSCA officials, acquisition activities for BPC programs can also be faster than the overall 

average, but DSCA does not have data on acquisition time specific to BPC programs. 

However, the usefulness of this measure for assessing or noting 

28The Army has recently developed the Security Assistance Enterprise Management 

Resource which is currently focused on tracking security assistance case performance for 

Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and coalition partners, but the Army plans to expand this tool 

to allow for the tracking of all security assistance cases in both agreement development 

and execution phases. 

29GAO, Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls for 

Exported Items and Information for Oversight, GAO-09-454 (Washington, D.C.:

May 2009).

30Definitions of “major” vary by implementing agency, but generally reflect the relative size 

of the sale or sensitivity of the equipment.

DSCA Does Not Measure 

Delivery Timeliness
 

Page 23 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

improvement in performance is limited. First, it does not cover all security 

assistance agreements. Rather, it is used only for major equipment items 

and excludes all BPC deliveries. Second, estimated delivery dates may 

be extended in some circumstances. For example, DSCA officials have 

noted that implementing agencies frequently change these dates when it 

is determined that the original commitments cannot be met. Therefore, 

the measure monitors timeliness against the most recently updated 

estimated delivery date, not the original date.

The Security Cooperation Information Portal includes a data field for an 

estimated date by which all security assistance materiel and services 

contained in an agreement are envisioned to be delivered, as well as a 

field for the actual date. Implementing agencies update the estimated 

date when schedules change, rather than maintaining the original date. 

Furthermore, while DSCA cannot compel partner nations to provide 

actual receipt information for all traditional security assistance deliveries, 

and U.S. SCO staff are required to record the actual receipt date of BPC 

deliveries, they rarely do.31

Learning that there is a problem with equipment that has been delivered 

is often the only indication of delivery DSCA receives from partner 

countries that use freight forwarders. If a partner country identifies 

delivery errors, such as equipment that is missing or damaged upon 

receipt, it may file a supply discrepancy report to request restitution. It is 

then the implementing agencies’ responsibility, along with the DOD or 

commercial source of the item in question, to address the complaints. 

DSCA does have a performance measure related to adjudication of 

supply discrepancy reports—the number of reports that have not been 

As a result, DSCA does not always have 

information regarding the actual receipt dates of security assistance 

deliveries. Without original estimated delivery dates and actual delivery

receipt dates, DSCA cannot fully assess the timeliness of deliveries. 

Furthermore, DSCA cannot assess historical delivery timeliness 

performance to identify challenges to be addressed or report 

improvements achieved through reform efforts.

 

31We have previously reported that weaknesses in the security assistance shipment 

verification process leave security assistance articles vulnerable to loss, diversion, or 

misuse. GAO, Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls for 

Exported Items and Information for Oversight, GAO-09-454 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 2009). 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

addressed within 1 year.32

Figure 4: Open Supply Discrepancy Reports Greater than 1 Year Old, Fiscal Years 

2007-2011

According to DSCA data, DSCA has reduced 

the number of reports that have taken more than 1 year to address, as 

shown in figure 4. 

 

32While DSCA notes improved performance in resolving customer-identified equipment 

delivery problems, DSCA does not track the frequency with which delivery problems arise. 

Data reported at the August 2010 session of DSCA’s quarterly management forum noted 

that supply discrepancy reports had been submitted for only 1.8 percent of total shipments 

in the previous 5 years. A suggestion to institute a performance measure noting the 

proportion of DSCA shipments that generate supply discrepancy reports had been 

proposed to the forum as early as 2007, but had not been implemented.
 

Page 25 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

DSCA does not measure the time required to close a case—the last 

phase of the security assistance process—and therefore cannot assess 

the extent to which closures are performed in a timely fashion. Closing 

inactive security assistance cases allows residual funds associated with 

those projects to be re-purposed. Officials from the U.S. Africa Command 

noted that even relatively small amounts of residual funds can be very 

helpful to some partner countries. Focus group participants at five of six 

combatant commands noted that closure of completed security 

assistance cases takes too long and may take years. DSCA tracks the 

number of cases closed, but not the time required to close them. In 

addition, DSCA officials noted that the individual implementing agencies 

track other case closure performance measures, but DSCA does not 

incorporate those performance measures into their oversight of the 

security assistance process.

Increasing global threats to U.S. interests abroad make the timely 

provision of U.S. assistance in building foreign partner capacity to 

address transnational threats vital to U.S. national security. Congress has 

created new programs to build partner capacity, and DOD has in turn 

created new procedures to implement those programs. DOD has 

recognized a number of challenges to managing its efforts to build foreign 

partner capacity and has ongoing reforms to address challenges 

associated with personnel training and workforce structure and with 

defining partner country needs. While DOD’s reforms are addressing 

several challenges, existing information systems are not consistently 

populated with needed data. A lack of timely and accurate information for 

partners, combatant commands, and SCO staff on agreement and 

delivery status can delay assistance, impact the costs of fielding 

equipment and training, and may adversely affect U.S. relationships with 

partner countries. Without performance measures to monitor timeliness 

across all phases of the security assistance process—particularly 

acquisition, delivery, and case closure, which comprise some of the most 

time-consuming activities—DSCA cannot assess the results of reforms or 

inform Congress of their progress.

DSCA Does Not Measure 

Timeliness of Case Closure

Conclusions 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

To improve the ability of combatant command and SCO officials to obtain 

information on the acquisition and delivery status of assistance 

agreements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish 

procedures to help ensure that DOD agencies are populating security 

assistance information systems with complete data.

To improve the ability to measure the timeliness and efficiency of the 

security assistance process, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense take the following actions:

• establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the 

acquisition phase of the security assistance process;

• establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the delivery 

phase of the security assistance process; and

• establish a performance measure to assess timeliness for the case 

closure phase of the security assistance process.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and 

Defense for comment. State elected not to provide comments on the draft 

report; DSCA concurred with the report’s recommendations. DSCA stated 

that it would work with military departments to ensure that information 

systems are populated with acquisition and delivery status data and 

continue to promote the use of the EFTS. In addition, DSCA stated that it 

will work with the military departments to assess timeliness during the 

acquisition phase; establish performance measures for the delivery phase 

and encourage adherence to reporting in-country deliveries; and establish 

performance measures to assess the timeliness of case closure. DOD 

also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as 

appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 27 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV. 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.

Director

International Affairs & Trade
 

Page 28 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

In response to a Senate Armed Service Committee mandate to review the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) program implementation 

processes, this report assesses the extent to which (1) Department of 

Defense (DOD) reforms address challenges that security cooperation 

officials face in implementing assistance programs and (2) DSCA 

performance measures indicate improvement in the timeliness of security 

assistance.

To describe the phases and participants in the traditional Foreign Military 

Sales (FMS) process and the pseudo-FMS process used for newer 

programs, we reviewed and summarized the Security Assistance 

Management Manual description of these processes and DSCA flow 

charts that illustrate the FMS process at varying levels of detail. We also 

met with DSCA officials and reviewed system documentation describing

the functions of DSCA information systems. Our summary of the FMS 

and pseudo-FMS processes does not encompass all steps and actors 

that may be involved, such as technology releasability reviews that may 

be required for sensitive equipment. To describe newer building 

partnership capacity programs (BPC), we reviewed summaries of those 

programs in the Security Assistance Management Manual, previous GAO 

reports and appropriations and authorizing legislation creating the 

programs. Our review focuses on those security cooperation programs 

where DSCA plays a role, and it does not assess other security 

assistance programs implemented by the State Department or most DOD 

counternarcotics programs.

To assess the extent to which ongoing DOD security cooperation reforms 

address challenges that security cooperation officials face in 

implementing assistance programs, we compared security assistance 

implementation challenges to DOD reforms that are currently planned or 

in progress. To identify ongoing reform efforts, we reviewed the Security 

Cooperation Reform Phase I Report and analyzed its recommendations 

to identify those that required action by DSCA. To verify our analysis of 

DSCA’s role in addressing the recommendations, we met with the director 

and deputy director of the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force and 

DSCA officials who participated in the Task Force or are involved in 

addressing the recommendations. We also met with DSCA’s Acting Chief 

Performance Officer and the Manager of DSCA’s Continuous Process 

Improvement Program to identify and describe DSCA-directed internal 

process reviews and requested and received documentation of these 

efforts.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 30 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

To identify challenges to the implementation of security assistance, we 

conducted focus groups or interviews with security cooperation officials in 

the six geographic combatant commands and interviewed security 

cooperation officers in Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) in 17 

countries. These officers manage DOD security cooperation programs 

under the guidance of the combatant commands. To select the 17 

countries, we obtained data from DSCA regarding total value of 

transactions per fiscal year from 2006 to 2010 for each country benefitting 

from seven U.S. government-funded programs administered by DSCA: 

Foreign Military Financing; Section 1206; Peacekeeping Operations and 

the Global Peace Operations Initiative; Iraq Security Forces Fund; 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund; 

and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. We did not include the 

Global Security Contingency Fund as part of our data analysis because it 

was newly authorized in fiscal year 2012. We excluded International 

Military Education and Training in order to focus on equipment and 

equipment-associated training and because we had recently issued a 

report specifically assessing International Military Education and 

Training.1

We then selected three countries from each of the combatant commands 

for inclusion in our review based on those countries that received both the 

highest volume of assistance and received the widest diversity of 

programs. For Northern Command, however, we selected the only two 

countries within the combatant command’s area of responsibility, Mexico 

and the Bahamas, which benefitted from one of these programs. For the 

remaining five geographic combatant commands, countries included in 

our review were: Africa Command: Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Tunisia; Central 

Command: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; European Command: 

Albania, Romania, and Ukraine; Pacific Command: Bangladesh, 

Indonesia, and the Philippines; and Southern Command: Belize, the 

Dominican Republic, and Honduras.

Using questions tailored slightly for individual countries where 

appropriate, we interviewed the staff of SCOs in these 17 countries. We 

also interviewed officials at the military departments, and in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense to further clarify these challenges and their 

effects. In addition, at the recommendation of security cooperation 

 

1

GAO-12-123. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 31 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

officials we interviewed at the combatant commands and DSCA, we also 

interviewed the staff of SCOs of two additional countries, Georgia and 

Yemen. These two SCOs each had experience with a specific program, 

the Coalition Readiness Support Program in Georgia and the new Global 

Security Contingency Fund program in Yemen.

Using a single facilitator and common set of questions, we conducted 

eight focus groups with more than 50 security cooperation officials at all 

geographic combatant commands except Northern Command. We 

conducted at least one focus group in each command and two in Pacific 

Command, Central Command, and Africa Command. For Northern 

Command, we conducted the discussion as a phone interview due to the 

small number of officials involved but used the same questions that we 

used with the focus groups. The focus group questions asked security 

cooperation officials to describe challenges they experienced in each 

phase of the security assistance process. For these sessions, we divided 

the process into: creating a case (beginning with the development of a 

letter or memorandum of request and ending with the finalization of a 

letter of offer and acceptance); approvals (including disclosure 

notification, technology transfer, Congressional notifications, and State 

Department concurrence); executing a case (including procurement or 

provision from DOD stock); delivery and case closure, and postdelivery 

sustainment in the form of training and spares. We requested that 

combatant commands identify focus group participants who would be 

able to speak about their experience implementing security cooperation at 

the combatant command as well as having responsibility for one or more 

of the 17 countries selected for SCO interviews. During the focus groups, 

the GAO facilitator wrote comments as they were made so that all focus 

group participants could see them and other GAO staff took notes 

documenting the discussion. No audio recordings were made.

GAO staff then consolidated the notes from each session and two GAO 

staff members independently summarized the challenges and common 

themes identified by each focus group and the Northern Command 

interview. The two independent staff members then met to resolve any 

discrepancies and agreed to a common set of 65 distinct challenges to 

the implementation of U.S. government-funded programs raised in the 

focus group discussions and the Northern Command interview. For 

additional analyses of the challenges, we counted which challenges were 

raised by more than one geographic combatant command. We then 

conducted a second round of coding. Two staff members independently 

analyzed the challenges and identified those that were within DSCA’s 

purview and identified themes under which these challenges could be 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

grouped. The two coders met to resolve any discrepancies and identified 

20 challenges within DSCA’s purview that were raised by more than one 

geographic combatant command. The coders grouped the challenges 

according to categories; along with 2 other challenges that did not fit 

these categories.2

To determine the availability of data on the status of deliveries in process, 

we requested data on all deliveries from fiscal years 2007 to 2011 for the 

17 countries and BPC programs in our sample from DOD’s Enhanced 

Freight Tracking System. We then analyzed the extent to which data in 

the system were populated for key milestones in the delivery process 

from origin to final destination.

Additional challenges fall under the authority of 

government agencies other than DSCA, and others fall beyond the U.S. 

government’s control. The focus group and interview results are not 

generalizable to all recipient countries but represent the experiences of 

security cooperation officials in all combatant commands for the countries 

with the highest transaction values. We also reviewed interviews with the 

SCOs to further document the challenges identified by focus group 

participants.

To identify the extent to which DSCA performance measures indicate 

improvement in the timeliness of security assistance, we reviewed DSCA 

performance measures reported at DSCA’s Security Cooperation 

Business Forum and the discussion of these measures reflected in the 

minutes of these quarterly meetings. We met with DSCA officials and 

implementing agency officials to further understand these measures and 

the systems that implementing agencies have in place to track and report 

data to DSCA. We also inquired of DSCA’s acting Chief Performance 

Officer whether there were any other performance measures routinely 

compiled for senior management review. We reviewed the additional 

measures provided and determined that these did not assess timeliness. 

We reviewed the first three quarterly forum reports for fiscal year 2012 to 

identify the current performance measures that exist for the five phases of 

the FMS process we identified in order to determine whether DSCA has 

data in that phase on the time required to complete it, and performance 

measures to assess the timeliness of the phase. We then analyzed these 

 

2

See app. II for a complete list of the 20 challenges identified by more than two combatant 

commands. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 33 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

data and measures to assess the extent that DSCA has performance 

measures that can be used to assess timeliness.

To determine the timeliness of the phases of the security assistance 

process, we summarized existing DSCA data reporting and performed 

additional analyses of DSCA source data. We also performed an 

independent analysis of the number of days spent by DSCA and 

implementing agencies developing security assistance agreements based 

on security assistance requests received from the 17 partner countries in 

our sample and for BPC programs for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. For 

this analysis we used data from the DSCA’s Defense Security Assistance 

Management System. The system contains information regarding key 

milestone dates that can be used to assess timeliness of some aspects of 

the security assistance process. We determined the DSCA performance 

metrics and data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes by undertaking 

data reliability steps including reviewing system usage and 

documentation guidance; interviewing knowledgeable agency officials; 

conducting electronic and manual data testing to identify missing data, 

outliers, and obvious errors; and by reviewing internal controls. To 

determine the time to develop an agreement, we calculated the number of 

days between the date listed for “Customer Request Complete” and 

“Document Sent,” in accordance with DSCA’s method of measuring 

processing time from the time when a letter of request is complete until 

the release of the security assistance agreement to partner countries for 

signature. Using these data, we analyzed the time frames to develop 

agreements for BPC programs and traditional programs for the 17 sample 

countries. The results of our analysis may differ from overall DSCA 

timeliness metrics due to factors such as the type of equipment and 

training requested by sample partner countries and the quality of the 

assistance request submitted. The results of our work for the BPC 

programs and 17 countries in our sample are not generalizable to all 

countries receiving assistance.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 through 

November 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Challenges Identified by 

Geographic Combatant Command Security 

Cooperation Officials

Page 34 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Between April and June 2012, GAO conducted eight focus groups with 50 

security cooperation officials at all geographic combatant commands 

except Northern Command. For Northern Command, we conducted the 

discussion as an interview in June due to the small number of officials 

involved but used the same questions as for the focus groups. GAO 

analyzed the results and identified 65 distinct challenges to implementing 

security assistance programs, 20 of which were raised in two or more of 

the six commands and are within DOD’s purview. GAO grouped these 20 

challenges into four categories: U.S. training and workforce structure; 

U.S. ability to define partner country requirements; information on 

assistance security agreement status; and other challenges.

Table 4: Challenges within DOD’s Purview to Implementing Security Assistance Programs that Were Identified by Combatant 

Command Officials.

Challenge

Africa 

Command

Central 

Command

European 

Command

Northern 

Command

Pacific 

Command

Southern 

Command

U.S. training and workforce structure x x x x 

1. SCOs do not have sufficient staffing, limiting their 

effectiveness as they produce proposals, build 

relationships in-country, and track cases through to 

delivery.

x x 

2. SCOs do not have sufficient training. x x x 

U.S. ability to define partner country needs x x x x x 

3. SCOs do not adequately define requirements when 

assisting with the preparation of letters or 

memorandums of request.

x x x x 

4. Senior U.S. officials who are not Foreign Military 

Sales experts (such as Defense Attachés) do not 

understand the process and may create unrealistic 

partner country expectations.

x x x x 

Information on assistance security agreement status x x x x x x 

5. The Theater Security Cooperation Management 

Information System currently provides an insufficient 

common operating picture of all security cooperation 

activities.

x x 

6. The Security Cooperation Information Portal is not 

user friendly and requires training partner countries 

may not have received/have access to.

x x 

7. The Security Cooperation Information Portal is not 

user friendly and requires training U.S. personnel 

may not have received.

x x 

8. DSCA staff are insufficiently responsive to requests 

for detailed information or for reliable resources for 

such information.

x x 

Appendix II: Challenges Identified by 

Geographic Combatant Command Security 

Cooperation Officials
Appendix II: Challenges Identified by 

Geographic Combatant Command Security 

Cooperation Officials

Page 35 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Challenge

Africa 

Command

Central 

Command

European 

Command

Northern 

Command

Pacific 

Command

Southern 

Command

9. Implementing agency processes and systems vary, 

which requires additional work by combatant 

command staff.

x x 

10. Combatant commands lack sufficient information 

about the letter of request case history, such as 

access to a copy of the letter for reference.

x x 

11. Inaccurate cost estimates lead to the cancellation or 

reductions in scope of a case.

x x 

12. Combatant commands lack sufficient updates 

regarding DSCA and the implementing agencies’ 

development of letters of offer and acceptance.

x x x 

13. Combatant commands have insufficient information 

on the status of cases in execution.

x x x 

14. There is limited ability to track equipment shipments. x x 

15. U.S. and partner countries communication and 

planning for equipment delivery are insufficient.

x x 

16. Items are delivered to the wrong address. x x x 

17. Deliveries arrive without advance notice. x x 

18. Deliveries do not have sufficient customs and other 

shipping documentation.

x x 

Other challenges

19. Case closure is too slow and residual funds that could 

be used to fill additional requirements are left unused.

x x x x x 

20. Small dollar value cases receive insufficient attention. x x 

Source: GAO analysis of focus group results.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 37 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 38 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 39 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, James B. Michels, Assistant 

Director; Kathryn Bolduc; Martin DeAlteriis; Karen Deans; Katherine 

Forsyth; Mary Moutsos; Michael Silver; and Michael Simon made key 

contributions to this report. C. Etana Finkler provided additional technical 

assistance.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 40 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training 

Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners. GAO-12-548. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012.

Security Force Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Guide 

Geographic Combatant Command and Service Efforts. GAO-12-556. 

Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2012.

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and 

Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military’s Efforts.

GAO-12-359. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2012. 

Persian Gulf: Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of End-Use 

Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for U.S. Military Equipment. 

GAO-12-89. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

International Military Education and Training: Agencies Should 

Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations.

GAO-12-123. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2011.

Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information 

Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. GAO-11-860SU. 

Washington, D.C: May 9, 2012.

International Affairs: Accountability for U.S. Equipment Provided to 

Pakistani Security Forces in the Western Frontier Needs to Be Improved. 

GAO-11-156R. Washington, D.C: February 15, 2011.

Defense Exports: Reporting on Exported Articles and Services Needs to 

Be Improved. GAO-10-952. Washington, D.C.: Sep 21, 2010.

Persian Gulf: U.S. Agencies Need to Improve Licensing Data and to 

Document Reviews of Arms Transfers for U.S. Foreign Policy and 

National Security Goals. GAO-10-918. Washington, D.C: September 20, 

2010.

International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment 

Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 

Assistance Programs. GAO-10-431. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Defense Exports: Foreign Military Sales Program Needs Better Controls 

for Exported Items and Information for Oversight. GAO-09-454. 

Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2009.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 41 GAO-13-84 Security Assistance

Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant 

Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National 

Security Forces. GAO-09-267. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2009. 

Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed 

over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.

GAO-08-806. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2008. 

Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition 

Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. GAO-08-735R. Washington, D.C.: 

May 6, 2008. 

Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has 

Reached Iraqi Security Forces. GAO-07-711. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2007.

Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, 

Coordination, and Implementation. GAO-07-416R. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2007.

Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign 

Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and 

Security Goals. GAO-06-437. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2006.

(320878)
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