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BEIJING AS AN EMERGING POWER IN THE

SOUTH CHINA SEA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 12, 2012

Serial No. 112–178

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D., professor, John A. Van Beuren chair of Asia-Pacific 

studies, U.S. Naval War College ......................................................................... 7

Ms. Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow, Freeman chair in China studies, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 14

Richard Cronin, Ph.D., director, Southeast Asia Program, Stimson Center ...... 24

Mr. Peter Brookes, senior fellow, National Security Affairs, The Heritage 

Foundation (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 

Pacific Affairs) ...................................................................................................... 44

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 9

Ms. Bonnie Glaser: Prepared statement ................................................................ 16

Richard Cronin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 26

Mr. Peter Brookes: Prepared statement ................................................................ 46

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 76

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 77

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 79

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 81

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana ........................................... 82

Written responses to questions submitted by the Honorable Dan Burton 

received from: 

Toshi Yoshihara, Ph.D. ................................................................................. 83

Ms. Bonnie Glaser ......................................................................................... 85

Richard Cronin, Ph.D. .................................................................................. 87

(1)

BEIJING AS AN EMERGING POWER IN THE 

SOUTH CHINA SEA 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 

7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize for 3 

minutes the vice chair and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia. I will then recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record. And members may have 5 days to insert 

statements or questions for the record. The Chair now recognizes 

herself for 7 minutes. 

This hearing convenes just as the long festering issue of the 

South China Sea has once again boiled to the surface. While the 

world’s attention has turned to other crises, including Iran’s nuclear program and concerns over the faltering euro, China has 

upped the ante, playing the role of a schoolyard bully toward its 

maritime neighbors. From one end to the other of the South China 

Sea, Beijing has increased both in belligerence and in bellicosity. 

Even Chinese Government officials, press, and bloggers incited 

anti-Japanese feelings to such a fever pitch that there were antiJapanese riots in Chinese cities just last month. 

We have news for those bullies in Beijing. The United States 

stands by our friends and allies in the Philippines and Japan. The 

United States Navy will continue to preserve the peace in the Pacific waters, including the South China Sea, as it has done since 

the end of the Second World War. Beijing also apparently looked 

with trepidation on the Secretary of State’s visit to the Cook Islands to attend a Pacific Islands conference before her stop in Beijing. Beijing has hoped, since 2005, to entice our Pacific allies away 

from a honey pot of $600 million in economic assistance and low 

interest loans. Our greatest generation, however, did not fight its 

way from island to island across the Pacific, from Midway to Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima only to see their descendants pushed back 

across the Pacific by a flood of Chinese cash. 

Why are the South China Sea and other waters so central to the 

Chinese communist mandarins’ aspirations to reestablish the MidVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:38 Oct 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091212\75858 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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dle Kingdom as the dominant power in Asia? Well, these are the 

waterways which control the trade and commerce for some of the 

most dynamic economies in the world, located in both Southeast 

and Northeast Asia. These are the sea lanes through which vast 

amounts of fossil fuel are shipped, which energize the economies of 

Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Whoever controls these sea lanes 

can dominate Asia and beyond by choking off that commerce of oil 

shipments to the major stakeholders in the Asian economic miracle. 

China, traditionally a land power as symbolized by its great wall 

land barrier, has only recently turned its eyes to the seas. This 

emerging Chinese sea power was originally directed toward eventual domination of Taiwan by a potential naval blockade. The rumored name of Beijing’s first aircraft carrier is to be that of a Chinese Admiral who led a sea invasion of Taiwan over three centuries 

ago. But Beijing’s ambitions for a blue water Navy now extend far 

beyond the Taiwan Strait. China has forward deployed its sea 

power in the resource-rich South China Sea, engaging in naval confrontation in 2009 with not only the U.S. Naval ship Impeccable, 

built in my home State of Florida, but more recently, with the Philippines and Vietnam as well. 

Beijing has adopted an equally aggressive stance toward America’s ally Japan in the East China Sea, and has objected to U.S. 

Naval cooperation in the Yellow Sea with our South Korean ally. 

Beijing seeks to dominate its maritime negotiations with its neighbors by picking them off one by one rather than engaging in the 

code of conduct regarding the South China Sea. 

Nationalistic young Chinese military officers also have reportedly 

been eagerly studying the century-old writings on sea power of an 

American Admiral. Admiral Mahan’s theory, as discussed in Red 

Star Over the Pacific, written by one of our witnesses today, reportedly drew the connection between thriving commerce and naval supremacy. As the United States seeks to restore our citizens’ economic well-being, commercial ties with the dynamic economies of 

East and Southeast Asia become paramount. Beijing seeks domination of not only the South China Sea, but also of the Western Pacific. Therefore, the possibility of naval clashes steadily increases. 

A situation where the escalating naval arms race takes place in 

order to control the ocean highways of global commerce is not in 

the interests of the people of the United States, nor of the people 

of Asia. 

Other global crises must not distract from our vital national security interests in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. 

We cannot be indifferent to the potential placement in harm’s way 

of our sailors and those of our allies like the 46 young South Korean sailors who perished at sea 2 years ago. We should take a moment to honor the men and women in our Armed Forces who, since 

the days of Pearl Harbor, have served to maintain the peace in the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

As an old naval hymn States, ‘‘Oh, hear us when we cry to Thee, 

for those in peril on the sea.’’ I look forward to hearing from our 

distinguished set of panelists on how best to address China’s growing challenge to America’s naval strategy. 

3

And now I turn to my friend from California, the distinguished 

ranking member, for his opening remarks. Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And my 

poetry will not be up to yours today, but I thank you very much 

for calling the timely hearing. Over the past few months, tensions 

in the South China Sea have escalated. In the past, territorial disputes in the region have been contained after cooler heads prevailed and diplomatic solutions achieved. And I hope this current 

situation follows a similar pattern. But what is different this time 

is that the tensions have been stoked by China’s increasingly aggressive actions. 

Five other countries, along with China, claim ownership of parts 

of the South China Sea. But China’s territorial claims are unusually expansive and intentionally vague. And while China is not the 

only claiming country to take unilateral actions to assert its control 

over territory and resources, Beijing’s actions are, by far, the most 

provocative. China has threatened and damaged foreign ships, unilaterally declared a fishing ban for part of the year in half of the 

South China Sea, and arrested foreign fishermen who did not comply. 

Beijing has also increasingly militarized the region. It has established a new military garrison in the Paracel Islands, and announced the beginning of regular combat-ready patrols in disputed 

areas of the South China Sea. These actions run directly counter 

to the diplomatic efforts to resolve differences, and risk further 

heightening regional tensions. They also undermine Beijing’s assurances to its neighbors and the world that China seeks a peaceful 

rise. The immediate priority in the South China Sea is to deescalate tensions and to encourage all parties to refrain from taking titfor-tat actions that could lead to conflict. Stepping back from the 

crisis is in all parties’ interests, as the potential costs of conflict in 

the region far outweigh any of the potential economic benefits contained in the sea bed of the South China Sea. 

The political leadership in the claiming countries should also 

make efforts to cool domestic public opinion, which is stoked by 

strident nationalist sentiments. The United States has a strong national interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, freedom 

of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and ensuring a peaceful resolution of claims in the South China Sea accepted by all 

countries. 

Secretary Clinton and other top officials in the Obama administration have repeatedly made clear to Beijing that we will not allow 

China to assert its hegemony over the region, and we must continue to press China to resolve its claims peacefully. 

I thank the panel of experts for being here with us today. I look 

forward to your testimony and hearing what steps can be taken to 

ensure that the South China Sea does not devolve into hostile conflict. And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. Obviously, China is an issue, 

4

and the Chinese expansionism is an issue that I have been deeply 

involved in over the years. But let me just state, in light of today’s 

horrible news from the Middle East, that this administration’s response to the murder of our Ambassador, and yes, his staff, in 

Libya, as well as the burning down of the consulate there and the 

storming of our Embassy in Cairo, the response of this administration has not been acceptable. It suggested, the response suggested 

an understanding of Muslim rage toward a negative portrayal of 

their religion. There is no understanding of that type of violence. 

And this is not seen as a sensitivity by the Muslim world. It is seen 

as a weakness toward their most radical elements. 

This administration has refused to call these type of murders 

over the years, whether it is a Muslim terrorist or whether it is 

Chinese militarists in the South China Sea, by their right name. 

We should have the courage to stand up or we will not have a 

peaceful world. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Faleomavaega is recognized. He is the ranking member on 

the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Chair, I want to thank you and our 

ranking member, Mr. Berman, for your leadership and support of 

H.R. 6313. I would also like to ask unanimous consent that the full 

text of my statement be added to the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And I want to thank you. For the 30 seconds that I have remaining, I don’t have much else to say other 

than to express my deepest——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Faleomavaega, excuse me if I interrupt, you have more time because of your position as the ranking member. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As I was saying, even though things like 

this happen, I want to say that for those of us as members of the 

committee who have had opportunities in visiting our Embassies 

and consulates throughout the world, I know and I share with your 

sentiments, and Ranking Member Berman, of what has happened 

in this tragedy. And as a member of the committee, I do want to 

express our deepest condolences and sympathies to the late Ambassador, Chris Stevens, and the three members of our Embassy staff 

who were killed in this senseless violence that just occurred. 

As I am sure those feelings are the same for all the members of 

the committee. Madam Chair, not wanting to detract from the purpose of our meeting this morning, the United States does have a 

national security and economic interest in what is happening now 

in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or the Yellow Sea, 

or has often occurred. 

South China Sea contains vital commercial shipping lanes and 

points of access between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. 

It provides maritime lifeline to Taiwan, to Japan, and to the Korean Peninsula. While China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, 

Malaysia and Brunei have disputed territorial claims, China claims 

most of the 648,000 square miles of the South China Sea, more 

than any other Nation involved in these disputes. China’s claim, if 

enacted, would make Vietnam a land-locked country, and this is 

neither right nor fair. Madam Chair, I look forward to hearing from 

5

our witnesses this morning. This issue is very serious. I certainly 

hope that China would use better discretion to finding a resolution 

to this very serious matter. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. Turner of New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am interested in hearing what our expert witnesses have to say, particularly in regard 

to the consequences of a reduced Navy presence and a reduced 

Navy budget. Also, I would like to hear what they have to say 

about the potential of cooperation with Japan and South Korea, 

rich nations that could do more in naval defense, and if there is 

a great potential for that. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Keating is recognized. 

Mr. KEATING. Madam Chair, I will yield back my time. I would 

like to hear from our witnesses. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Murphy? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mrs. Schmidt. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. First, I want to send my condolences to the people 

in Libya, our American Embassy people who have been mortally 

wounded and those that have died. It was an unthinkable act. And 

we all need to pray for their families as we go forward. I am looking forward to the hearing today. It is very important to keep all 

waters open as we move toward global trade more and more actively every day. So I am looking forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will echo all of those who have expressed our regret and sadness at the events in Benghazi, the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens. As it happens, my wife is a diplomat with the 

State Department. I have always known that that is both important and sometimes dangerous work. As to the issue that is before 

us today, I echo Mr. Turner in stating that we ought to be focusing 

a bit on burden sharing. We did in the Cold War against the Soviet 

Union. And those nations in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly 

those that have concerns about Chinese expansionary claims, ought 

to be devoting a reasonable portion of their GDP to their own naval 

defense. And I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Duncan 

of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I echo my colleagues’ concern about the events on the ground in Libya and 

Egypt, and just want to express my sympathy for those who have 

lost lives and families that are concerned around the world. I visited with the Filipinos in June 2011. And their concerns were the 

Chinese excursion into the South China Sea, specifically around 

the Spratlys. And while the Chinese were there, the available, potential resources that might be available there. We see China going 

all around the world gobbling up access to minerals. And I think 

6

this is an example. I would love to hear more about that in this 

hearing. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. 

Fortenberry, the vice chair on the Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights, is recognized. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for 

earlier having a moment of silence in memory of our lost diplomats. 

I would like to turn my opening comments and my opening here 

to that situation. Last year an intense debate was underway in 

Congress as to how to respond to the turmoil in Libya. The imminent slaughter of the people of Benghazi by former dictator Qadhafi led the United States to sustain a NATO coalition to stop the 

bloodshed. Now our Ambassador, Chris Stevens, is dead, killed by 

the very people that we saved. Americans can tolerate ingratitude, 

we can tolerate insult, but we cannot tolerate the senseless killing 

of the official representative of our country and those who served 

with him, three others. 

The governing structures of Libya must respond in the strongest 

way. They should publicly state their condemnation and commitment to restoring order. Democracy is not an election, it is the understanding of the protection of the inherent dignity and rights of 

each person within the structures that bring about the just rule of 

law. We honor Ambassador Stevens, Foreign Service Officer Sean 

Smith, and two others whose names I do not yet have for their heroic service. And may they rest in peace. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Fortenberry. Well said. And the Chair—I am sorry, Mr. Kelly. Mr. 

Kelly yields back. Thank you. The Chair is pleased to welcome our 

witnesses. First we welcome Professor Toshi Yoshihara. Thank you, 

Professor. He is the John A. Van Beuren chair of the Asia-Pacific 

studies at the U.S. Naval War College, and an affiliate member of 

the China Maritime Studies Institute at the War College. Dr. 

Yoshihara is most recently the co-author of ‘‘Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy,’’ 

to which I referred to in my remarks. His articles on maritime 

issues and naval strategy have appeared in numerous journals and 

periodicals. We welcomes you, Professor. 

Then we will hear from Bonnie Glaser, who is a senior fellow and 

the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr. Glaser served as 

a consultant for various U.S. Government offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. She is currently a board member 

of the U.S. Committee on the Council for Security Cooperation in 

Asia-Pacific, and is a member of the Council of Foreign Relations. 

I am pleased to welcome Dr. Richard Cronin, the director of the 

Southeast Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Dr. Cronin works 

on trans-boundary and nontraditional security issues in Southeast 

Asia from a political economic standpoint. He joined the Stimson 

Center after a long career at the Congressional Research Service. 

We welcome you, Dr. Cronin. 

And we welcome back Mr. Peter Brookes to our committee, a senior fellow for national security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. 

Previously, Mr. Brookes served as the deputy assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the George W. Bush adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:38 Oct 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091212\75858 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ministration, and previously a professional staff member of this 

committee. A retired decorated Navy commander, Mr. Brookes 

served in active duty in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. 

So we will welcome all of our witnesses today. And I ask that you 

keep your presentations to no more than 5 minutes. And without 

objection, your entire statements will be inserted into the hearing 

record. Dr. Yoshihara, we will proceed with you. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF TOSHI YOSHIHARA, PH.D., PROFESSOR, JOHN 

A. VAN BEUREN CHAIR OF ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES, U.S. 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Thank you for having me. Madam Chair and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share 

my views on China’s maritime strategy and what it means for the 

future of the South China Sea. The following remarks, which express my views alone and do not represent the views of the U.S. 

Navy, summarize the prepared statement submitted to the committee. 

In my judgment, China’s recent assertiveness in the South China 

Sea is a harbinger of things to come. Beijing’s sea power project 

has opened up new strategic vistas for Chinese leaders and military commanders. With larger and more capable seagoing forces at 

its disposal, Beijing is well positioned to fashion sophisticated 

strategies that will be more effective and equally difficult to 

counter. 

Before delving into Chinese strategy, I think it is worth emphasizing the material dimension of Chinese sea power, which is providing Beijing with the tools to pursue its ambitions. Sea power is 

more than just a navy. Rather, it is a continuum that gives Beijing 

a range of options. And China is modernizing and expanding across 

the board, from its navy to its sister services, to its civilian agencies. In short, Beijing already possesses diverse elements of sea 

power to defends its nautical prerogatives. 

Let me now turn to the challenges that Beijing’s burgeoning sea 

power already poses to the region. For the purposes of this testimony, I would like to confine my remarks to strategies that China 

has already employed or is in a position to implement vis-a`-vis 

weaker local players in Southeast Asia. 

In the event of crises between China and relatively weak southeast Asian powers, innovative combinations of military forces could 

be used to compel the will of Beijing’s southern neighbors. Consider 

the anti-ship ballistic missile, a maneuverable ballistic missile capable of hitting moving targets at sea. If it performs as advertised, 

the reach of such shore fire support over the entire South China 

Sea would ease the burdens on the Chinese fleet, while applying 

constant pressure on challengers to Beijing’s interests in peacetime. 

This type of gunboat diplomacy with Chinese characteristics is conceivable in the future. 

China’s ability to exercise the nonmilitary elements of its sea 

power was on full display during the standoff with the Philippines 

this past spring. The Scarborough Shoal face-off involved Coast 

Guard-like noncombat vessels. Employing non-navy assets revealed 

a sophisticated, methodical strategy for securing China’s maritime 

claims. The use of nonmilitary means eschews escalation, while enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:38 Oct 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091212\75858 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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suring that disputes remain localized. Specifically, it deprives the 

United States the rationales to step in on behalf of embattled capitals in the region. 

At the same time, noncombat ships empower Beijing to exert low 

grade but unremitting pressure on rival claimants to South China 

Sea islands and waters. Constant patrols can probe weaknesses 

while testing political resolve. Keeping disputes at a low simmer, 

moreover, grants China the diplomatic initiative to turn up or 

down the heat as strategic circumstances warrant. 

A series of showdowns may pass without an end in sight, or any 

tangible gain for China. But the cumulative effects of a continuing 

stalemate could induce strategic fatigue that, in turn, advances 

China’s aims. Short of a shooting war, Chinese provocations are too 

slight for the United States to intervene militarily. 

As China pushes and probes, the prospects of recurring confrontations with little hope of direct U.S. intervention could weigh 

heavily on Southeast Asian capitals. Applied with discipline and 

patience, such a strategy of exhaustion could gradually erode regional confidence and undermine the political will to resist. 

Fortunately, there is still time. China is at least a decade from 

amassing the type of preponderant sea power that can keep the 

United States out of the South China Sea while running roughshod 

over Southeast Asian states. In the meantime, Washington can 

adopt measures to ensure that regional submission to China’s wishes is not a foregone conclusion. 

First, Washington and its allies and friends should actively help 

Southeast Asian states help themselves. Local actors must possess 

some indigenous capability to cope with Chinese encroachments at 

sea. 

Second, the United States should encourage the development of 

a region-wide information sharing arrangement to keep track of 

China’s maritime forces. 

Third, the United States should draw up plans that would enable 

the rapid deployment of units armed with maritime strike capability on friendly or allied soil. Finally, the U.S. Navy should revisit 

prevailing assumptions about sea control. A far more lethal nautical environment lies in store for a service long accustomed to 

uncontested waters. 

Raising the cost of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea 

would complicate Beijing’s calculus, while inclining Chinese leaders 

to think twice before they act. Inducing Chinese caution, moreover, 

would apply a brake to Beijing’s momentum at sea, brightening the 

prospects for restoring equilibrium to the region and for retaking 

the strategic initiative. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Professor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoshihara follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. Glaser, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR FELLOW, FREEMAN CHAIR IN CHINA STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC 

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. GLASER. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to appear before 

your committee today to provide testimony on China as an emerging power in the South China Sea. The territorial and maritime 

disputes in the South China Sea pose a major test of China’s peaceful rise. In my written testimony, I list numerous examples of recent destabilizing activity in the region. And I conclude that there 

is a negative action-reaction cycle in the South China Sea. However, it is important to note that China’s claims, policies, ambitions, behavior, and capabilities are significantly different from 

those of other actors. 

China’s 9-dash line claim is expansive and vague. Beijing resists 

engaging in multilateral discussions on the territorial and maritime disputes in the region, preferring bilateral mechanisms where 

it can apply leverage over smaller, weaker parties. 

China’s behavior in the South China Sea is deliberate and systematic. Its actions are not the unintentional result of bureaucratic 

politics and poor coordination. The clear pattern of bullying and intimidation of other claimants is evidence of a top leadership decision to escalate China’s coercive diplomacy. This has implications 

not only for the Philippines and Vietnam, the primary targets of 

China’s coercive efforts, it also has broader regional and global implications. 

First, China’s propensity to flout international laws and norms 

is worrisome, and it sets bad precedents. The result of Beijing’s refusal to abide by its verbal agreement with Manila to withdraw all 

of its ships from the lagoon in the area around Scarborough Shoal 

is that a new status quo has been established that favors Chinese 

interests. No country has publicly condemned this action, and this 

has set a dangerous precedent. 

Second, China’s increased willingness to employ economic leverage to coerce countries to modify their policies in accordance with 

Beijing’s wishes is a worrying trend. China’s move to quarantine 

imported tropical fruit from the Philippines to pressure it to cede 

control over Scarborough Shoal was a flagrant breach of international norms. And this follows Chinese blocking of rare earth 

minerals to Japan in retaliation for Tokyo’s detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler in 2010. 

If China’s economic coercion continues to go unchallenged, undoubtedly such tactics will be used again and again. And a growing 

number of nations in the world whose economies are increasingly 

dependent on trade with China are vulnerable to such pressure. 

Third, China’s unwillingness to undertake serious diplomacy to resolve disputes should be a cause for concern, along with its rejection of a rules-based framework that would restrain the actions of 

all parties. In the future, China will not only be a major economic 

power, but also a major political and military power. Beijing calculates that time is on its side, and it does not want to be constrained by binding agreements. 

15

It is my estimation that China’s pattern of assertive behavior on 

issues related to sovereignty will continue after the Chinese leadership transition takes place for the following reasons: First, legitimacy. Because the party bases its legitimacy in large part on nationalist credentials, no Chinese leaders will take early steps to 

curb domestic pressure to firmly defend Chinese sovereignty territorial integrity. Second, personality. Xi Jinping is widely believed 

to be highly self-confident. He is likely to stand up for Chinese interests in the international arena, especially those deemed to be 

China’s core interests, which include issues related to sovereignty. 

And third, interests. Beijing has drawn the conclusion that Deng 

Xiaoping’s policy toward managing the South China Sea disputes 

has failed. A new, tougher policy will likely emerge after the leadership transition. 

Finally, I would like to offer a few policy recommendations. The 

Obama administration has rightfully enunciated a set of principles 

to guide behavior in the South China Sea. It is important that the 

U.S. hew closely to these principles and censure any party that 

acts contrary to them. Being objective and fair will give credibility 

to the U.S. policy. Secondly, the U.S. should urge all claimants to 

the South China Sea to bring their maritime claims in conformity 

with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. It should then 

encourage joint development agreements to extract resources. 

Third, the U.S. should continue to press China and ASEAN to 

initiate negotiations on a code of conduct that contains a dispute 

settlement mechanism. Once the process of negotiation begins, it is 

likely to have a calming effect that will defuse tensions. Fourth, it 

is imperative that the U.S. continue to strengthen our economic, 

diplomatic, and military engagement in East Asia. The rebalancing 

of U.S. strategic priorities to Asia is essential to ensure that the 

peace and stability that has prevailed in the region for the past two 

decades endures. 

And finally, the United States should ratify the U.N. Convention 

on the Law of the Sea to increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts 

to pursue a rules-based approach to managing and resolving disputes over maritime jurisdiction. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Cronin. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD CRONIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM, STIMSON CENTER 

Mr. CRONIN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Bring the microphone closer to you. 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes, I will. Thank you. I am pleased and honored 

to have an opportunity to testify on this very important and even 

urgent issue. If I may say a word about the Stimson Center. We 

are a non-profit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing 

international peace and security through a unique combination of 

rigorous analysis and outreach. Stimson’s approach is pragmatic, 

geared toward providing policy alternatives, solving problems, and 

overcoming obstacles to a more peaceful and secure world. I am 

speaking for myself, and not Stimson, but my remarks are intended 

to contribute to these objectives. 

China’s rise and its ambitions to make up for past centuries of 

humiliation and become the dominant power in East Asia and 

Southeast Asia is probably the most important geostrategic issue 

facing the United States in the 21st century. In the South China 

Sea and elsewhere, including other parts of East Asia, the maritime territorial disputes are the product of a shrinking world and 

a combination of natural resources that have ever increasing value 

because of the fast growing imbalances between supply and demand. For the United States, as well as China’s neighbors, the 

most challenging aspect is its lack of commitment to a rules-based 

international system except as serves its perceived national interests. This aspect of Beijing’s policies and actions is nowhere more 

apparent and challenging than in the case of the South China Sea, 

which is a locus of serious and potentially volatile maritime territorial disputes. 

Of particular concern to the United States, which maintains a 

significant military presence in the region, is the fact that China 

is seeking to redefine the very definition of international waters, 

traditionally known as the high seas, by asserting rights of sovereignty where none exist. While the Chinese Government has negotiated and committed to numerous international agreements, 

based on prevailing international laws, rules and practices, its 

strong preference, as Bonnie has already pointed out, is for bilateral agreements based on political relationships and power disparities that favor China rather than multilateral agreements that are 

based on established rules and norms. These tendencies are particularly troubling in China’s expansive claims in the semi-enclosed 

South China Sea, one of the world’s most geographically and commercially important bodies. The South China Sea has globally important fisheries and undersea oil deposits and gas, which are still 

largely unexplored, but already vital to the energy needs and 

economies of five other coastal and archipelagic neighbors, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. 

Since about 2009, incidents at sea involving China and several 

neighbors, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, have become 

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stacle to resolving maritime disputes in the South China Sea is a 

fundamental divide between China on one side and the Southeast 

Asian claimants on the other over both competing territorial claims 

and the rights to the seas around them. Most of the current issues 

relate to provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 

of the Sea, commonly known as UNCLOS, as has already been 

mentioned. 

The main purpose of UNCLOS was to bring order to a chaotic 

rush involving numerous coastal nations, including the United 

States, during the Truman administration to lay claim to offshore 

natural resources that was already underway. UNCLOS has served 

its purpose well in generating recognized EEZs, that is exclusive 

economic zones, and facilitating resolution of disputes in many 

parts of the world that has become a huge source of contention in 

the South China Sea. 

The most controversial issue of principle in international law is 

China’s claim to roughly 90 percent of the South China Sea on the 

basis of past discovery and historical use. To the consternation of 

every other South China Sea neighbor, and with no basis under 

UNCLOS or any other international law, China’s maps include a 

so-called U-shaped line colloquially known as the Cow’s Tongue because of its drooping shape. There is a map in my testimony on 

this with this line. And on one hand it is a subject of derision by 

every country, but on the other hand, the Chinese are not only—

it is not only a nominal notion of their claim, but as you may know 

recently, China actually announced the opening of nine oil development blocks essentially where the line cuts deeply into Vietnam’s 

economic zone in the Continental Shelf. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could wrap up, Dr. Cronin. 

Mr. CRONIN. Pardon? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could wrap up. 

Mr. CRONIN. Okay. I will wrap up. Thank you very much. In my 

statement, I talk about the negative impact on ASEAN, which I 

think everyone is aware, including the failure to achieve a communique, a final communique at the ASEAN meetings in Phnom Penh 

this summer, this July. The other thing that I have written about 

and would mention is simply that China’s declaration of the socalled Sansha City, which is on a tiny Yongxing Island, otherwise 

known as Woody Island, that effectively creates an administrative 

zone over not only the islands of the South China Sea, but also 

submerged areas like the Macclesfield Bank, and of course the 

Scarborough Shoal. 

In my testimony, there is a map showing which countries occupy 

which islands in the sea. So, okay, let me just wrap up then in this 

way. 

U.S. policy implications—in my statement, I have kept remarks 

on U.S. policy relatively brief, thinking it might be more useful to 

discuss this issue in response to your questions and comments. 

With its rising naval power, China could, in theory, enforce its 

claims despite the complaints of its neighbors, but only at serious 

risk to other important equities, Chinese equities, starting with the 

desire not to unite its neighbors against it. The commitment of the 

United States not to be pushed out of the South China Sea, including the so-called rebalancing of U.S. military forces toward the 

26

Asia-Pacific region, also has a deterrent effect, much as China rails 

against what it sees as a growing U.S. effort to contain China and 

deny it the fruits of its rising power status. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Cronin. 

Mr. CRONIN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Brookes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BROOKES, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

(FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS) 

Mr. BROOKES. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the 

committee. Thank you for the kind invitation to appear today. It 

is great to be back in the committee room after an absence. I want 

to commend the committee for holding this timely hearing today. 

It is very important. I am glad you are here doing that. The views 

I express today are mine, and do not reflect those of any of the organizations I may be associated with, including the Heritage Foundation. Based on the thoughtful testimony so far, I feel like everything has been said, but not everybody has said it. With that in 

mind, let me make a few points which I think will complement my 

written testimony. 

First, I would suggest that China is not an emerging power. Outside the United States, it is the major or dominant power in the 

South China Sea. We should fully recognize that. As a major 

power, China has arrived. China is developing a navy and air force, 

including missiles, that will be able to assert China’s claims in the 

South China Sea. Their aircraft carrier, of which there may eventually be a number, their ballistic missile programs, stealth fighters, 

destroyers, and submarines. Absent significant U.S. basing in 

Southeast Asia, China’s aircraft carrier program, when fully operational, I think could be a game changer. While China will seek to 

assert its claims peacefully, Beijing could easily militarize the situation. 

In any case, other regional players already know of China’s growing military capabilities and will be deterred by them. I think the 

Chinese actions in the South China Sea put the matter of China’s 

peaceful rise into serious question. The question, of course, is what 

to do about it. Here are some ideas which go beyond my written 

testimony. It is my sense that friends and allies in the region need 

diplomatic reassurance about our enduring presence in the region. 

I sense we are trying do this. The question is about its effectiveness. Do they really believe it? I sense people are really, really 

nervous about the American presence, future presence in the region, as well as the rise of China. But my real concern is our ability 

to project force into the South China Sea with the looming budget 

cuts and sequestration that face us in January under the Budget 

Control Act. 

You all know the numbers. I don’t need to tell you about the defense budget and the effects on our force structure and what they 

might be, especially for our Navy, especially as a Navy veteran. 

With budget cuts and other global commitments and obligations, 

that powerful pivot we talk about may be little more than a pirouette. Diplomacy is always more effective when backed up by a 

strong national defense. We also must take steps to distance ourselves from the notion that America is in decline, especially in 

Asia. Unfortunately, in some corners I think that is the perception. 

Strong American leadership is required, whether we are talking 

about Asia or anywhere else in the world. Of course, any and all 

45

of these actions meant to stem perceptions of the Sun setting on 

America in the Pacific will be helped by returning this Nation to 

economic vitality, which undergirds our political and military 

power. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you for 

excellent testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brookes follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I will begin the question and answer 

segment. Our Defense Department issued an annual report on military and security developments in the People’s Republic of China. 

And it discussed in detail the construction of this new naval base 

in the South China Sea. And our report states that the base is 

large enough to accommodate the mix of nuclear power attack and 

ballistic missile submarines and advanced surface combatants, including aircraft carriers. 

Submarine tunnel facilities at the base could also enable deployments from this facility with reduced risk of detection. So I ask the 

panelists, could the continued Chinese naval build-up in the South 

China Sea and the Western Pacific eventually limit our U.S. Navy 

ability to patrol these waters, which would, of course, adversely impact the security and economic well-being of the American people 

and our allies in the Asian and Pacific region? 

And secondly, about the U.S. allies’ naval confrontation with 

China, looking at what has just been happening recently, in April 

Chinese maritime surveillance vessels began a 10-day standoff with 

a Philippine coast guard cutter in the South China Sea. Then in 

July, Chinese patrol boats had a similar confrontation with the 

Japanese coast guard in the East China Sea. And last December, 

the captain of a Chinese fishing boat, illegally poaching in the Yellow Sea, killed a South Korean coast guard officer. 

So if a naval confrontation between Chinese vessels and a U.S. 

treaty ally such as the Philippines, Japan, or South Korea ever results in an exchange of gunfire, what are the treaty obligations of 

the United States Navy to come to the assistance of these allies? 

We will begin with the professor. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Thank you for those questions. Let me focus my 

attention on your first question about the Chinese naval buildup in 

the South China Sea. I think it is very important to note as a 

premise that the South China Sea is sort of a strategic pivot. It is 

a body of water that connects the Western Pacific and the Indian 

Ocean. It is at the junction of these two very important oceans that 

supports trade between Europe, Middle East, and East Asia, as 

well as trans-Pacific trade. So having command or having the capacity to control events in the South China Sea would give China 

tremendous amounts of strategic influence and power. Here are a 

couple of things that motivate China to, in fact, continue this buildup. 

First of all, having a naval base in Sanya on Hainan Island gives 

China an additional naval option with their nuclear attack submarines. These nuclear attack submarines can be used, for example, to break out into the Western Pacific to deter U.S. naval operations and air operations and other military operations related——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I going to interrupt you there, Professor, just to give the others a chance, if I may. Thank you. Ms. 

Glaser. 

Ms. GLASER. Yes. First, I would say briefly the United States 

overall will face Chinese growing military capabilities a less permissive environment. It will be more costly for the United States 

to exercise the kind of sea control we have now in the future. And 

we will have to think through what is the best way to address that. 

52

The capabilities that China is deploying in Hainan is just among 

those capabilities. 

There are, of course, many more: Development of ballistic and 

cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, et cetera. Regarding your 

second question, I am not an attorney, and the interpretation of the 

law is important when we look at treaties. But administration officials of course have made clear that we do have treaty obligations 

to Japan in the case of the Senkakus. 

We remain neutral, of course, on the sovereignty over those islands. But we do recognize that the Japanese have administrative 

control over those islands. And so if the islands were attacked, the 

United States, my understanding, is obligated under Article 5 of 

that treaty. It is a bit less certain I think in the case of the Philippines. There isn’t the same language in the treaty that refers to 

administrative control. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I will just interrupt you 

there a second. 

Ms. GLASER. Can I just finish just this sentence? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. 

Ms. GLASER. Sorry. I was just going to add if the Philippines’ 

naval forces were attacked, regardless of where they were, I do believe that we would have an obligation to come to their defense. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Dr. Cronin, a minute. 

Mr. CRONIN. I will just leave the military issues to the military 

experts, except to say that obviously, the U.S.-China military balance, if you will, is a distinct issue, but it is also connected to the 

politics of the region and our relationships with not only China, but 

with our allies and partners. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Brookes. 

Mr. BROOKES. We face the tyranny of distance in the Pacific. And 

if we don’t have the correct number of platforms——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Tyranny of distance. 

Mr. BROOKES. Tyranny of distance, that is right, when people 

talk about that because it is such a big theater. If we don’t have 

the numbers of platforms needed to project that power, if we don’t 

have the basing for refurbishment and replenishment, we can’t be 

a player. On the treaty, I would suggest that you ask the Congressional Research Service to tell you that. I have always operated 

under the belief that all of our treaty obligations, including those 

of NATO, require us to go through our constitutional processes of 

each country before any action would be taken, military or otherwise. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. I am pleased to 

yield to Mr. Berman for his question-and-answer period. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Dr. 

Cronin near the end of his testimony seemed to be saying that China’s activities in the South China Sea sort of are constrained by its 

desire not to see all of its neighbors united against it. I would like 

the panelists to react to that. I look at it, and I am wondering does 

China really have that constraint on them these days, or do they 

not think that they can pretty much do what they want to do here 

because of some combination of their military power and their economic power and their political power is going to keep that from 

happening? I am curious. 

53

Ms. Glaser, perhaps you or others could just react to this constraint that presumably exists on China’s behavior. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Just very briefly, at least in terms of certain 

segments of China’s strategic community, there is a belief that China’s time has come, that China has already risen, and that it is 

time to shed this notion that China should keep low until it becomes powerful enough. I think there are those in China’s strategic 

community that believe that China is already powerful enough. 

And some of the disturbing statements that we have heard that 

small powers had better listen to big powers are thinly veiled sort 

of, you know, threats to the smaller states that the power that 

China has accrued has increasingly given it the capacity to essentially coerce and intimidate its neighbors. 

Mr. BERMAN. Is that an open question in China, or is that a 

strategy that has been now incorporated? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. It certainly is an active debate. I think there are 

those who have said that Chinese actions today are really jumping 

the gun, and that China should slow down and seek to walk the 

dog back. But there is clearly an active component of that debate 

that says that China should push forward. 

Ms. GLASER. Yes, Congressman Berman, very good question. 

Thank you for that question. I agree with Dr. Yoshihara in some 

regards, but I believe that the resource question here is very critical. The Chinese believe that other countries in the region are developing these resources in what the Chinese view as disputed 

areas. And they are no longer going to tolerate it. 

The leadership does have to balance the growing nationalist sentiments against the longer term need to have good relations with 

its neighbors. But I think that the Chinese believe that if they can 

intimidate the United States, and I would agree with Mr. Brookes 

that they see the United States as weak and potentially in decline, 

they can compel their neighbors to accommodate to China’s rise 

and to respect Chinese core interests. And I do believe that we 

need to stand up to that, and the nations in the region need to 

stand up to that. 

Mr. BERMAN. But does that provide an opening for a strategy of 

joint resource development, something that the U.S. could seek to 

encourage and facilitate? 

Ms. GLASER. Absolutely. And I mentioned that in my oral remarks. I do believe that resource development by all the countries, 

all of the claimants, would be a very, very good outcome. But the 

preconditions are that there must be a setting aside of sovereignty 

claims. And at the moment, that appears to be quite difficult. 

If we can get all of the claimants first to agree to set aside sovereignty and begin to put forward some good models of resource development—and there are a few that already exist, for example—

but none that include China, then perhaps China could be brought 

along. But I think joint resource development would be a very positive outcome. 

Mr. CRONIN. Thank you, Congressman Berman. 

In the interest of time, I didn’t round out my full statement, 

which is in my written statement, but it would seem at this point 

yes, China is sort of losing, running amuck and losing a sense of 

54

the politics of the region and what kind of relationship it wants to 

have with its neighbors. 

But I also think this is a very peculiar time right now. This has 

been a summer of many different voices in China, many different 

power centers being active. And now we have this very strange situation of the presumed next premier and party leader disappearing. 

Mr. BERMAN. It is a bad back. Everybody can understand that. 

Mr. CRONIN. A bad back, right. 

I mean, a lot of things are going on in China’s politics right now. 

And one of the things, the international crisis group, a point that 

they have made and others have made, there are like seven different agencies and departments involved in making and carrying 

out Chinese policy in the South China Sea, maritime policy. There 

is a big coordination issue there. 

Now, having said that, you know, it does look like this is receding right now in terms of China’s concerns, that is relations with 

its neighbors. However, there are a couple of practical issues, I 

think, that do argue for the possibility of joint development. And 

one is, for instance, all of the countries understand the issue, including China, of fishery depletion and the need to do something 

about that. And China imposes unilaterally fishing bans and the 

neighbors don’t like that. But in general, the neighbors have a common interest in that. 

The other thing is the oil and gas. You can’t just barge in and 

get the oil and gas out without big problems. Just if I could to say, 

one thing about setting aside sovereignty, which Bonnie has mentioned, yes, the problem so far, though, is there have been three 

or four different initiatives with co-development, including one with 

the Japanese. And in every case, the issue is China keeps insisting—in other words, China is saying to its neighbors what is mine 

is mine; what is yours, we can co-develop because it keeps insisting 

on the sovereignty issue. 

Mr. BERMAN. Got it. Mr. Brookes. 

Mr. BROOKES. In Beijing’s mind, the South China Sea is not disputed; it is Chinese territory. I mean, this goes back to when they 

would have their historic claims, they would base this on the Republic of China’s claim going back to the 1930s and maps that were 

developed then, and even in the 1940s. They are hoping for acquiescence. 

These fishery ships, these maritime patrol vessels are basically 

wolves in sheep’s clothing. They will militarize the situation if they 

have to. But my view is they are trying to prevent 

counterbalancing because this falls into everybody’s fears about 

China. And so what they are doing is if people will give, they will 

take. What they really don’t want is major powers and the United 

States to seriously counterbalance against China’s efforts in Asia, 

East Asia generally. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. 

Mr. Kelly, the vice chair on the Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific is recognized. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for 

being here today. 

55

On August 6, Taiwan’s President Ma issued an East China Sea 

Peace Initiative which calls upon all the parties to—the chair will 

dispute—in the East China Sea, to put aside their differences, embark on a peaceful dialogue and cooperate to develop natural resources in the area. We will start with you, Mr. Brookes, how do 

you assess President Ma’s initiative? 

Mr. BROOKES. I was actually in Taiwan last week. He also made 

a trip to the Diaoyutai Islands, which some people consider to be 

somewhat provocative. I have looked at this East Asian Peace Initiative, and he basically says put sovereignty aside and let’s try to 

co-develop these sort of things. China and Taiwan’s claims are basically the same, going back to the Republic of China. I think any 

good idea should be looked at. 

The question is whether the Chinese are willing to work along 

with them, or work with them. In fact, I understand the Chinese 

have actually approached the Taiwanese about working together 

because their claims are the same. 

I think we should look at any opportunity. Unfortunately, I am 

a bit skeptical about the possibilities of negotiations based on what 

we have seen through ASEAN most recently. Efforts at code of conduct, China’s unwillingness to work multilaterally and preference 

for bilateral talks. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you. 

Dr. Cronin, any feeling on that? 

Mr. CRONIN. Again, that is out of my area. 

Mr. KELLY. Okay. Ms. Glaser? 

Ms. GLASER. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I also 

was just in Taiwan a couple of weeks ago, and discussed this proposal with President Ma and his advisers. 

I would agree with Peter that any good proposal should be looked 

at. But truthfully, it is quite difficult for Taiwan to be an actor regionally, or in the international community if there is to be a code 

of conduct that will guide behavior in the South China Sea, Taiwan 

is likely to be excluded, and that is really quite unfortunate. 

I think the most useful thing that Taiwan could do would be to 

bring this nine dash line, which was originally an 11 dash line, created in 1947 by the Republic of China, if they could bring their 

claim into in accordance with international law, it would set a 

model for the mainland, and I think that then the ASEAN countries perhaps would be more willing to work with it because they 

would see Taiwan as a constructive actor in a very important way. 

Mr. KELLY. Doctor, anything different? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. I actually see the China’s sort of very, very expansive claims as part of its strategy. It is trying to move the ball 

forward by making all kinds of extravagant claims, whether it is 

historic or whether the entire South China Sea is a territorial sea. 

So I think it would be very, very difficult to negotiate on that basis. 

Mr. KELLY. My question, I guess, would be okay, so everybody 

does come to the table, the reality of that really working, and who 

would broker it? Who would be the arbiter? Who would sit down 

and work this out? Because the feeling I am getting is it is nice 

to talk about things in settings like this, but the reality of it is the 

toughest guy in the neighborhood kind of runs the policy for the 

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cause we sometimes don’t think it is politically correct. I don’t 

think there is any question about what China’s intentions are and 

where they are going. 

Mr. Brookes, thanks for saying it is not an emerging power; it 

is a power. And I would also suggest that with our continuing loss 

of sovereignty and our own debt, we have weakened ourselves to 

the point where it is hard; it is hard to police the world when you 

are not the strongest guy in the world. And when you do resolution 

after resolution, we have become kind of a toothless tiger who continues to say what we are going to do and then backs off in the 

end. 

I am concerned, though, and you hit on it, because without a dynamic and robust economy, we cannot continue our presence in the 

world. It is just that simple. Now, sequestration is going to lead to 

the smallest Navy since 1915, the smallest ground force since 1940, 

the smallest Air Force in our history. That is not Mike Kelly saying 

it, that is Secretary of Defense Panetta. I just think at some point, 

we better wake up and smell the coffee. We are well past the midnight hour in this country to continue to talk about our role in the 

world when we have a diminished influence because we really don’t 

have the ability at times to do what we say we are going to do. 

Now, having said all of that, where do we go with this? Seriously, 

where do we go with this? I don’t see any reason for China to negotiate with anybody. Why would they? If they hold a lot of your debt 

and they are the strongest player in that area in the world, who 

would influence the Chinese? 

Mr. BROOKES. I think the point here is that we have to work 

with like-minded powers in the region. We are just talking about 

the South China Sea today, but we have disputes in the East 

China Sea and the Sea of Japan. I think, once again, diplomatic 

reassurance, economic strength, and the ability to project military 

power into the region, and working with our friends and allies are 

the only things that can do it. 

I think the thing that China most fears is counterbalancing 

against it. And right now I think China has pursued a divide-andconquer sort of strategy. That is why they were successful in the 

last ASEAN meeting where they were able to prevent the South 

China Sea issue from being drawn up. But I think that we have 

to show leadership. We have to gather our friends and allies, and 

we have to oppose China on a number of fronts. 

Mr. KELLY. Doctor? I am really concerned about this. I think our 

ability to build coalitions is dwindling very quickly, when our allies 

continue to question our ability to really show up and help them 

on the day that they need the help. 

Mr. CRONIN. Well, if I may, Congressman, I still don’t think anybody in the region, and I will speak from what I know from people 

I have talked to in Southeast Asia, that believes that the U.S. isn’t 

the strongest power still. And I don’t think there is anybody in the 

U.S. military that doesn’t believe that we are greatly, by multiples, 

stronger than China at this point in time. Whether or not they are 

a rising power, a current power, have been a power, I wouldn’t 

want to trade the U.S. Navy and Air Force for any existing force. 

Mr. KELLY. I am not suggesting that. But I am suggesting this: 

If we ever go into a fair fight, shame on us. When we have the abilVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:38 Oct 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091212\75858 HFA PsN: SHIRL
57

ity to be greater than anybody else in the world and defend ourselves better than anybody else, to go into it and saying we just 

want to be on an equal basis, believe me, I don’t want them to 

come out of the locker room. I don’t want them to get on the bus 

to come to even play the game. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Kelly, thank you Dr 

Cronin. 

Before I recognize Mr. Faleomavaega, I would like to recognize 

our distinguished guests. We have 12 members of Parliament from 

Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia who are in attendance as part 

of the House Democracy Partnership, so we welcome all of you. 

Please stand. Welcome. Thank you. 

With that, Mr. Faleomavaega, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is recognized. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I always have tremendous reluctance when we discuss this important issue concerning China because it is not as simple as we 

make it to be. I always try to remind my colleagues that when 

China became an independent nation in 1949, there were 400 million Chinese living in China. It took us 226 years to reach a population of only 320-some million. So now we are dealing with a country that is 1.3 billion people. So if you want to look at it from that 

perspective, I think we have to be a little more soul-searching in 

terms of what we are trying to do in handling this important nation. 

I want to ask Dr. Yoshihara, we currently operate the largest 

military command in the world. It used to be called CINCPAC but 

it is now Pacific Command. It stretches from Madagascar, the entire Indian Ocean and the entire Pacific Ocean, and it goes all of 

the way to Central and South America, with about 220 ships and 

240,000 Marines, Army and military personnel and is administered 

by a four star admiral out of Pearl Harbor. 

It is my understanding, and correct me, Dr. Yoshihara, maybe 

the others can correct me on this, the United States currently has 

over 700 military installations both in and outside the United 

States. My understanding is that China does not have one military 

base anywhere outside of China. Now, I don’t know if that balances. I liked Mr. Brookes’ comment about counterbalancing. We 

used to think of the Monroe Doctrine—remember the Monroe Doctrine? Any country that dares come to our hemisphere of influence, 

get out. And now this pivoting, new—and I don’t consider it new 

foreign policy that we have, that we are now trying to contain 

China. China just barely got this aircraft carrier from the Ukraine. 

We have 11 aircraft carriers. What are we doing with them? So to 

suggest that we are becoming a declining world power, I beg to differ with this assertion. 

Dr. Yoshihara, is Admiral Mahan’s theory still relevant today? 

The country that controls the seas controls the world, just as the 

British have proven it to be in their history? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Certainly the Chinese think so. The Chinese 

read Admiral Mahan’s theory. I have an entire bookshelf that has 

multiple translations of his works in China. And we really only 

have one. And the only reason why that one is in print is because 

of the Naval War College. So there is a real intellectual shift and 

58

enthusiasm for Mahan’s theory, and in particular this notion that 

wealth begets power, power begets more wealth. 

As to your point about U.S. naval power, yes, it is true. On 

paper, the United States is much more powerful than China. But 

I think if you look at our global—the range of operations that we 

have to conduct around the globe, we are stretched thin. And the 

prospects of our shipbuilding patterns to increase are fairly low. 

And of course, we have to fight the tyranny of distance, which was 

just mentioned. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So are you suggesting that we should reduce the $500 billion reduction that President Obama suggested for the 

10-year period of our defense budget? Do you think that maybe our 

defense budget needs to be part of the overall deficit reduction 

process that we should be going through as a country? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. I would suggest that in the environment which 

we will be facing in the China seas, it is going to be much tougher 

to maintain presence and to maintain our operations. So we need 

to have redundancy, and we need to have the capacity essentially 

to take greater risk in China’s maritime domain. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Ms. Glaser? 

Ms. GLASER. Yes, thank you, Congressman. I agree with you we 

shouldn’t make the Chinese 10 feet tall; but we do have to, I think, 

be aware that the Chinese take advantage of what they see as U.S. 

weakness when they see it. We can look back in the period in the 

Vietnam War when the United States pulled out. We can also look 

at when the U.S. withdrew from Clark and Subic bases in the Philippines. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time is running out. I would love to continue that dialogue. 

Here is the problem: The 10 ASEAN countries are weak militarily. They are looking to the United States for help. The point 

here is are we going to be able to do this? In my humble opinion, 

we have got some very serious problems. We are literally the policemen of the world, if you want to put it that way. And I want 

to ask Mr. Brookes, is this what we should be doing continuously? 

We fought two world wars. We got into Vietnam and Korea. For 10 

years we have been in this quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan. So 

what does this do with our overall defense posture? Is it really defending the interests of our people? 

Mr. BROOKES. Quickly, I guess I have 10 seconds, that is the purpose of our national defense, to protect and advance American interests. Now, we can disagree on what those interests are. But I 

think that is where we should be. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am sorry, Madam Chair, my time is up. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. Mr. Turner of New York is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Just a brief question, if you would, on North Korea. It has always been the tool or the surrogate of the Chinese since 1950. 

What is that relationship right now? Is it strained with continued 

North Korean irrationality? What do we see going forward? Dr. 

Yoshihara, if you would? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. That is not my area, so I will defer to the other 

panelists. 

59

Ms. GLASER. Thank you, Congressman, I will be happy to comment. I talk to a lot of Chinese about their relationship with North 

Korea. There were some signs of strain in the immediate aftermath 

of the death of Kim Jong-il. We have seen a warming trend in the 

relationship. There are suspicions on both sides, and the North Koreans in particular feel uncomfortable about their excessive dependence on the Chinese. The Chinese are not happy with North 

Korea’s nuclear program. But at the end of the day, they prioritize 

stability. The Chinese are going to continue to maintain that relationship. It is a mutually dependent one. And the North Koreans 

will also continue to maintain that relationship. I think fairly soon, 

after the 18-party Congress in China, we will likely see the visit 

by the new North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, to Beijing. 

Mr. CRONIN. I think, Congressman, if you asked the Chinese, 

they would say they wished that North Korea was a tool or surrogate for them. But Bonnie is right, definitely there is a power relationship there. The status of North Korea is a buffer as far as 

China is concerned. But they are not exactly a country that can 

easily be manipulated by anybody, unfortunately. 

Mr. BROOKES. I think in many ways North Korea serves China’s 

purposes strategically. It serves as a buffer state, as Rich just mentioned, and I think there is a reluctance on the part of the Chinese, 

despite the problems that North Korea has provided for them, to 

allow a unification of the Korean peninsula. I think they are very 

concerned about a powerful Korea. They have some history as well. 

There is a lot of history in Asia, as we know, some of it very unpleasant. And I think they are worried about a united Korea that 

might be a friend to the United States and having American 

troops, perhaps U.S. Troops north of the 38th parallel. Remember 

what happened in 1950 with that. 

So I think there is a strategic element there as well. I mean, you 

can’t change geography; geography is destiny. The Korean peninsula is attached to China, and they have strong strategic concerns 

about what happens there. 

Mr. TURNER. Is there still a degree of trust? The North Koreans 

seem often irrational. 

Mr. BROOKES. I would say that North Korea is quite rational in 

its own way. We see the world through a different paradigm, 

through a different lens, but they have been very successful in 

maintaining that repressive state for many, many years despite 

deprivation. Their rational may not be your rational; but they do 

have a thought process and a certain logic to what they do. And 

they have been successful in many ways in pursuing that. 

Mr. TURNER. Would it be fair to say that you anticipate no 

change in that relationship in the foreseeable future? 

Mr. BROOKES. I think we are all trying to find out what is going 

to happen with the new North Korean leader. There is always talk 

of reform. But every time I hear that, I say we have seen this 

movie before. 

I was in North Korea in 1988 as a Hill staffer for this committee, 

actually. And there were the same sort of little openings going on 

and private markets and things like that, but it was eventually 

shut down. So the last thing that they want to do is lose control, 

and regime survival is their highest calling, as it is with the ChiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:38 Oct 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091212\75858 HFA PsN: SHIRL
60

nese communist party. So I think they might do some things. This 

is a young leader, but I sense power is probably what will most 

drive him. 

Mr. TURNER. Anything to add? Otherwise, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Turner. Mr. Connolly 

of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to 

our panel. My friend from Pennsylvania, Mr. Kelly, is so articulate 

and so persuasive, he almost persuaded me that we are a thirdrate power in the world. And then I listened to my friend, Mr. 

Faleomavaega, and I was reminded that actually we are the ones 

with global reach. We are the ones with 11 carrier groups. And we 

are the ones that spend more money on any basis you want to 

measure it by than anybody on the planet in terms of defense. 

So, Dr. Cronin, you were trying to respond and you ran out of 

time to Mr. Kelly’s assertions that we were apparently in decline, 

and he cited a number of statistics that he attributed to Secretary 

of Defense Panetta. I think Mr. Panetta was warning that if these 

trends continue, that may be where we end up. I hardly think Secretary Panetta was saying that our Air Force is now at the level 

of 1915 and our Navy at 1940 and so forth. Would you comment 

briefly to clear up the prowess, or lack thereof, of the United States 

military in the world? 

Mr. CRONIN. Well, thank you. I don’t think I can clear up that 

entirely because it would get involved in arguments about forces 

and force structures and capabilities, et cetera. But definitely, I 

don’t think many people, including the Secretary of Defense, think 

that the United States is in any way in decline. And more as a political economist, I don’t believe the United States economically is 

in the kind of decline that some people despair about. So I think 

we still have resilience. We certainly have military capabilities. 

The 1940s, let’s say a 1940 F–4 fighter, you could buy a lot of them 

today for the same money as a top of the line front line aircraft. 

But which one would you rather have? It is a different world. 

So I do think that the Secretary of Defense has been concerned, 

very concerned about the sequestration issue, and with good reason. But overall, I am not a declinist. I think that there are questions about sustainability in the long term, but I don’t see any sign 

of a growing weakness on the part of the United States. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And if you might permit me an editorial comment, if sequestration is the crisis some of our colleagues make it 

out to be, and I am certainly concerned about it, then surely we 

would not have taken a 5-week recess in August, and surely, we 

are not prepared to take a 7-week, 4-day recess starting next week 

because it is a crisis. But that is a different matter. 

Ms. Glaser, I wonder if you can comment, we have sort of focused 

on what is our responsibility and what are our strengths and what 

are China’s strengths. But what is the responsibility of countries 

in the region of the South China Sea? What is Japan prepared to 

do? What are the Philippines prepared to do? What is Vietnam prepared to do when they believe that their sovereignty has been encroached upon? Ms. Glaser, and I see Dr. Yoshihara is also prepared to comment. 

61

Ms. GLASER. I will be brief and leave some time for my colleague. 

I think you are absolutely right, that the countries in the region 

do have obligations as well. One obligation they have is to have 

greater situational awareness in their waters. This is something 

that the United States is trying to assist the Philippines in doing. 

Right now we are helping them, for example, by intelligence sharing. We are actually also helping them to develop the capability to 

do that by themselves. We have also transferred a cutter to the 

Philippines. They have an obligation to maintain that equipment 

now that they have acquired it. 

The other thing that I would say is that all of these countries in 

ASEAN have the obligation to work together, to be more proactive 

and to agree how they are going to cope with the pressure that 

China is putting on them, because if they are not united, the Chinese will easily be able to divide them and win in this game. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Before Dr. Yoshihara comments, Mr. Brookes 

made the point, and I thought a very insightful one, the Chinese 

are counting on acquiescence, and it seems to me the key in the 

region is not to acquiesce. And that requires a strategy. That requires intestinal fortitude. The United States can be part of that 

strategy, but the idea that we are the substitute for that strategy 

is just not going to work. 

Ms. GLASER. Absolutely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No matter how strong we are or the Chinese are 

weak. Dr. Yoshihara. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Absolutely. We need to make the regional partners basically the first responders to Chinese encroachments and 

maneuvers at sea. And I think our help with the Philippines is a 

good start, but it is really a very modest move. What we need to 

do is to give the Philippines more capabilities that would give them 

the capacity both to monitor, but also to challenge Chinese movements at sea. 

With regard to Japan, I think the keyword is resilience. The capacity essentially to withstand a first Chinese strike, for example, 

and enable the alliance to rapidly recover and retake command of 

the commons, for example. I think those are the kinds of things 

that are not only necessary, but, in fact, imminently doable in financial terms. 

Mr. CRONIN. If I could, one of the problems with the Philippines, 

of course, is we can try to help them build their capacity, but they 

can’t afford to operate what we want to give them or sell to them 

at cut-rate prices. 

When it comes to acquiescence, there is a certain element here 

that needs to be kept in mind, and that is that China can push and 

China can bully and China can try to dominate, but at some point 

they back countries into a corner. And I would give Vietnam as an 

example. They are not going to acquiesce. I am a Vietnam veteran. 

It is quite a turn of the world to see our evolving relationship with 

the Vietnamese right now. There are some problems with it, but 

nonetheless, they have joined the TPP talks, they are talking to us 

about weapons acquisition, et cetera. But even more than that, if 

you look, you can find on YouTube a Chinese film of their attack 

on Vietnam’s forces in the Spratlys in 1988. It is a brutal thing to 

watch. They mow down the Vietnamese standing in waist-deep 

62

water on a reef. But if you look at that and you see what the Vietnamese have done with that film, they are not going to be pushed 

out. Again, you can’t just go drill on someone else’s continental 

shelf or EEZ without big problems because drilling is a much more 

vulnerable activity. Fishing, that is a different matter. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Wasn’t it the Paracel Islands that the Vietnamese and the Chinese had to face off and not the other islands? 

Mr. CRONIN. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Wasn’t it the Paracel Islands that you were 

talking about? 

Mr. CRONIN. Well, in 1974, China attacked the waning South Vietnamese Government and captured some important reefs on the 

Paracels, which gave them control of the Paracels. In 1988, they attacked, I think, it was Johnson Reef in the Spratlys. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So it was the Spratlys. So the video you were 

talking about——

Mr. CRONIN. That was on the Spratlys in 1988. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, it is. I have seen that video. 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes. It is pretty rough, isn’t it? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, it certainly is. 

Dr. Yoshihara, you mentioned that we have seen double digit 

hikes in military spending in shipbuilding on the part of China 

over this last decade or two, while at the same time, American 

shipbuilding is going down and our Navy is shrinking. Don’t you 

think there is another dynamic to what is going on here? The fact 

is, how is China paying for those ships? We have seen decades 

where we have sat and watched the most historic transfer of 

wealth and power from one country to another, from the United 

States to China, and we were told that we had these trading rules 

and these rules of economy because it would promote a more peaceful world. They would become more benevolent as they became 

more prosperous. Is what we are saying now is that theory that 

has been proven totally wrong, and in fact, that money that was 

transferred, the wealth that was created in China by our investment, by the permitting of the technology transfers, et cetera, now 

hasn’t that resulted in a less peaceful world and a more risky 

world? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Right. I think one of the enduring assumptions 

underlying U.S. policy toward China has been that long-term engagement, both economic, diplomatic, and otherwise will essentially 

sort of mellow out the Chinese regime. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Tame the dragon? 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. That it will gradually change China from within. 

That has been a consistent policy, I think, across all administrations. But now what I think we are beginning to hear is whether 

this is really more of feeding the beast? I think the point about 

that is that this resource mismatch is beginning to put pressure on 

us. We like to talk about the pivot and the rebalance. We have to 

keep in mind that the pivot or the rebalance is really a redistribution of existing forces; right? This is not really a major buildup on 

63

our part overall; whereas China has the deep pockets to keep building across the board, all kinds of capabilities that can go to sea and 

take to the air. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And their deep pockets was what I was trying to stress, comes from the fact that we have accepted economic 

policies that resulted in this massive transfer of wealth. It is no 

surprise that this has happened. I mean, some of us have been 

talking about it for decades. I have been here for two decades talking about this. We are giving them, they are using all of our R&D. 

They are stealing it, or our own companies are investing there and 

building high-tech companies and providing them what they need 

to develop more wealth for their society. And like you say, instead 

of taming the dragon, we have been feeding the beast. 

Let me see what I have here. I am sorry, but I been running 

back and forth between two hearings today. 

Do you think that the Chinese, at this point, unless the United 

States, and we are talking about this pivot to the Pacific, if we 

don’t show our military strength and are unwilling to actually have 

some of these confrontations, like in the Spratlys, will that lead to 

an even more dangerous world? Or are we talking about maybe the 

United States shouldn’t be confronting this greater Chinese Navy? 

Whoever wants to answer that. 

Ms. GLASER. Congressman, I think it is very important for the 

United States not just to have a military presence, but also the economic and the diplomatic engagement. I would say especially economic. We really need to expand our economic relationships with 

these countries to move forward with TPP. We are being 

marginalized by all of the other countries negotiating very low 

quality FTA agreements. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s note that we have engaged and we have 

encouraged our businessmen to invest in a dictatorship, the world’s 

biggest human rights abuser, while other countries like the Philippines and other countries that are democratic, have been struggling along. That type of skewed value system is coming back to 

haunt us now. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. As this discussion continues, I become 

more concerned, and I need more education on the issue. My concern is understanding China is a long-term thinker, and so it will 

create a strategy in the region so that it can overtake it at a time 

when the rest of the world is least prepared to act. What I am saying is we are seeing, with President Ma of Taiwan, a more cozying 

up of a relationship with China. You saw that with the Beijing 

Olympics and being able to have air flights from Taiwan to China 

to make it easier for those that were going over there. Now you are 

seeing it with the waterways, trying to resolve those issues. And 

you are also seeing a much more direct link to economic ties where 

Taiwanese businessmen are actually setting up factories in China. 

That is one pivot there. 

But then you are also looking at the neighborhood and its inability, or its ability, to be able to handle its own affairs against China, 

64

including military affairs. Do they have enough military strength, 

military smarts, military capabilities? Also, what is their economic 

relationship in the area and how much of a tie do they have to 

China? 

Then you look at the United States and our indebtedness to 

China beyond the issue of sequestration, which may reduce our 

military overall strength, both in the short and the long run. My 

concern is that with all of these issues coming to attention here in 

this committee, what is our best way forward out of this in the 31⁄2

minutes that I have left. And I probably would like to start with 

Mr. Brookes, because you have the military expertise, and then go 

on down the line. 

Mr. BROOKES. Thank you. As I mentioned previously, I think one 

of the things is we have to provide diplomatic reassurance to our 

friends and allies in the region that we are going to have an enduring presence there. I think people are very nervous, not surprisingly so, and I think there are questions about the durability of 

American commitment in that part of the world considering there 

are so many other commitments; Iran, for instance, and the Persian Gulf and the issues there. And of course, our ability to project 

power, as you have talked about, the defense cuts that are looming. 

I mean, this is a big theater. We have talked about how many aircraft carriers we have, but they are not just operating in the South 

China Sea, they are operating around the world because America 

is a global power with global interests. 

But once again, and this is getting a little bit beyond my portfolio, but I think we need to revitalize our economic strength here 

at home, which will allow us to have that the diplomatic influence, 

diplomatic power, as well as being able to build a military capable 

of supporting or protecting and advancing American interests. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Let me add to it. I know that there is an economic 

dance between the U.S. and China because they could call in the 

loan at any time, and yet they need our goods and services over 

there at the moment to satisfy their emerging middle class. But at 

some point, they may pull that trigger which will undercut our 

ability to operate as a superpower; am I correct in that? 

Mr. BROOKES. I have a different view of that. I think it is very 

unlikely that China will call the debt because since their currency 

is not convertible, they have to buy American dollars. When Chinese firms repatriate profits back to China, since they can’t trade 

them, they have to trade them for RMB or yuan, and the Chinese 

have to buy something with it. So they can buy goods, American 

goods, agricultural, things like that, or they have to buy American 

debt. So I don’t think that sort of threat is something that—it 

would probably collapse the American economy. I am not an economist, so this is a general—and I don’t think that is in China’s interest, considering we are a large export market of theirs. So I 

think it is a standoff. 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes, thank you, if I could. 

On the issue of the debt, I think, and Peter started to go that 

direction, that it is actually a relatively small part of the total debt. 

There is no way to really call it in. The problem the Chinese have 

is something that we used to call a dollar trap. That is, you sell 

Treasury bonds and the value of the U.S. dollar goes down, and so 

65

you are cutting your own throat. The other point is, more basic, 

and it is, really, this is our policy, don’t blame it on China, China 

is saying we buy stuff from them and they are saying okay, here, 

take our dollars and buy more. And the way they do that is by buying U.S. debt. And we are going along with that. So you want to 

blame Penneys, you want to blame Sears, you want to blame 

Costco, whoever, or the U.S. Government for those policies. 

But the other point is, and I think more important, is that China 

has a lot of problems, and China’s manufacturing is falling. Exports are falling. Exports, in general, are falling. They have this 

huge domestic political issue. And the benefits of China’s wealth 

have not been spread much beyond the coast and the military. So 

it is a very skewed and unbalanced political and economic system, 

and I think it is far less sustainable in the way that it is going 

right now than our economy for all its problems. 

Thank you. 

Ms. GLASER. I will just briefly speak, if I could, Congresswoman, 

to the military issue. 

Regardless of how much power projection capability we have, we 

do face a growing anti-access area denial threat. It will be more difficult for the United States, more costly, for us to operate in a conflict close to Chinese shores. As a result, we do need to take steps 

to improve the survivability of U.S. forces in the zones of potential 

conflict to prepare to operate effectively from greater ranges in the 

event that we have to do that. 

We have to encourage regional states to develop their own antiaccess area denial capabilities. And then we have to work with the 

states in the region to develop asymmetrical capabilities and operations to counter these threats. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Ms. Glaser, you note that China’s behavior in the South China 

Sea is deliberate and systematic. Dr. Yoshihara, you said that China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea is the harbinger 

of things to come. And China has a coherent strategy approach, including the rise of an intellectual military complex. And, Mr. 

Brookes, you said that some in the Chinese elite view the U.S. as 

a declining power, and the perceptions are growing regarding 

America’s lack of capabilities. 

My first question is, how well or poorly in your opinion has the 

Obama administration understood this ominous threat? Has there 

been a difference at the Pentagon versus the Department of State, 

and have we responded in an adequate way to this, as you put it, 

this ominous—this harbinger of what is happening? Whoever would 

like to start. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. I believe that the pivot and the rebalancing is 

a good start. What it does is it signals our resolve. It also bolsters 

the confidence of our allies and our partners and friends in the region. But I think more can be done. 

As I said, the pivot and the rebalancing is really largely a redistribution of existing forces. When we send the littoral combat ship 

to Singapore, for example, that is actually read potentially as a 

sign of weakness on the part of the Chinese because they know 

that the littoral combat ship is not a ship for high-end conventional 

66

combat. And so some of our actions actually could be seen as a 

weakness and potentially more of a provocation than as a reassurance. 

So I think we need to be thinking about maintaining our resilience, maintaining our capacity to survive the anti-access zone and 

to essentially conduct operations continuously. 

Let me just add one other point. I think we need to show the 

Chinese that the open commons is a good thing for China because 

if China’s neighbors adopted the same policies that the Chinese are 

implementing now, the biggest loser is China because of China’s 

own tyranny of geography which is that it is close to choke points, 

and China cannot escape those choke points. And so what we need 

to do is demonstrate our confidence in the region by continuing our 

freedom-of-navigation operations to show that this is something 

that the Chinese can do too. So when the Chinese conduct freedomof-navigation operations, we won’t make a fuss about it and say 

this is potentially a win/win situation if we all have a stake in 

maintaining the open commons. Thank you. 

Ms. GLASER. Thank you, Congressman. I think that the Obama 

administration in its first year in office was perhaps a little bit 

naive about China and expected that the Chinese would step up 

and take a bigger role in helping to solve problems such as global 

warming and global proliferation of WMD. I think that the Chinese 

proved that they were not willing to work too closely with the 

Obama administration in some of these areas. 

I think that after that, the U.S. did get tougher. I would really 

commend the State Department and Secretary Clinton, I think that 

she has done an enormous amount of work, put in great effort, 

going to the region and trying to engage with all of these countries 

and demonstrate U.S. commitment. But our staying power is still 

in doubt. 

One of the most difficult challenges is that if we are too tough 

with the Chinese, then smaller states in the region get worried because they don’t want to see U.S.-Chinese competition in their back 

yard. They don’t want to be forced to choose between the U.S. and 

China. So it is a very difficult balancing act for the United States. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask a second question if nobody else wants 

to touch on that one. 

I have held a number of hearings, and you said it yourself, Ms. 

Glaser, that China’s propensity to flout international law and 

norms is worsening, and it sets bad precedents. Nowhere is that 

more apparent than in human rights. And, unfortunately, there 

has been a poor record in my opinion on the part of the Obama administration toward China on being consistent, transparent, and 

very aggressive in promoting fundamental human rights. With that 

said, and then that carries into the law of the sea and all of the 

other kinds of flouting that we see going on. 

One of the hearings I had last year around this time, we had 

Valerie Hudson who wrote a book called ‘‘Bare Branches.’’ That 

book is an insight into what the terrible consequences of population 

control will be in a whole host of areas. We know on trafficking it 

is a huge problem with the missing girls. But when it comes to instability at home, and the willingness and even the perceived necessity of projecting power, which the Chinese are creating the caVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:38 Oct 23, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\091212\75858 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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pability to do, and already have it, is another worrisome detail. 

Maybe you can shed some light on this, the State Department and 

the Pentagon, do they understand this instability? They have an 

economy that could implode soon because of the workers and the 

number of young people vis-a`-vis older, and the missing girls. 

Huge, huge problems of instability. How is that playing? Do they 

understand it? 

Mr. CRONIN. Well, I can’t speak for whether they understand it 

or not. I would say that the most distinguishing feature of the last 

2 years is that the State and Defense have been so close together 

on how they perceive the world and how they approach it from a 

policy point of view. 

I share your feeling, frankly, that China is a huge—has a huge 

internal problem. So I am actually not a fan of the idea that they 

will get richer and become more middle class and then their political system will change. So I do think China remains a very dangerous situation, if you will, creates a very dangerous situation. 

And has an unpredictability that we have to worry about which is 

why we need to keep our powder dry and why we need to, I think 

as Bonnie pointed out, there are certain particular strategic military responses that we have to make to China’s growing capabilities, but we can do that. And I guess I am a little more confident 

that we can take care of that. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Brookes, you talked about in my last question, 

and I know I am out of time, about the aircraft carrier and that 

Beijing has a significant power projection platform to assert its interest along its periphery. How far does that periphery go, in your 

opinion? And you in your testimony, Dr. Yoshihara, you talked 

about the anti-ship ballistic missile and the other tools and weapons that Beijing has. Does anybody remember the Sheffield and the 

Exocet that took it out in the Falkland Islands. I read your testimony very carefully, Doctor. The last big sea battle was back in 

World War II. Do we have an undo sense of bravado and capability 

when other things could very seriously undermine it? Can you 

speak to, again, the aircraft carrier issue and the fact that they 

have other things? 

Mr. BROOKES. China’s power projection capability continues to 

expand. Once they put an aircraft carrier to sea, and my understanding is they have several others that are being looked at, and 

they have a fully operational air wing. It is just like ours. They still 

have that capability. And then when they put more, their ballistic 

missile capability is increasing significantly. They supposedly have 

a capability to take out a large, high-value target like and aircraft 

carrier with a land-based ballistic missile. That is very troubling. 

I think the range is about 1,000 miles is what we are speculating 

at this point. They can cover the South China Sea. In fact, some 

people have speculated in the Department of Defense that some of 

the platforms that they are building are able to cover the South 

China Sea. 

The other issue, of course, is it is starting with the South China 

Sea. We can’t ignore what is happening in the East China Sea 

where they have claims as well. So we have to look at it holistically 

and not just limit ourselves to what is going on down there. 

68

Mr. YOSHIHARA. If I may quickly comment, the Chinese actually 

have written extensively about the Falkland Islands War and trying to learn lessons from that particular conflict. One of the 

takeaways from that particular conflict was that it was a close-run 

thing. If the Argentineans had actually struck more ships, if they 

had been a little bit more aggressive in their use of their missiles 

and their aircraft and more ships were sunk, Britain would have 

been in a lot of trouble. And so I think this is a lesson that they 

are learning, that if they put our ships at risk at the same rate, 

for example, then we may be compelled to sort of back down. 

So again, I think we are cognizant of this challenge. We are exercising and thinking more about how to assert sea control and also 

to operate in a sea-denied environment. So I think we are moving 

in the right direction, but I think more work needs to be done. 

Mr. SMITH. You did talk about littoral ships being deployed. Are 

you concerned that the Pentagon is buying aluminum ships? It is 

buying some steel, but some aluminum as well? I mean, that is 

what the Sheffield was. One Exocet missile took it out, and it 

burned like a Roman candle. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Right. I don’t know sort of the technical aspects 

of it. But again, as I mentioned, the Chinese—some Chinese do not 

seem to take the littoral combat ship very seriously. They see that 

as more as a sign of weakness than a sign of strength. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan, the gentleman from South 

Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One thing about sitting this far down on the dais is that most 

of the gritty questions have been asked. I think we have beat the 

issue up pretty good today about understanding that China is a 

presence that is exerting its influence all over. I believe that is 

gunboat diplomacy, and I think we are witnessing that in modern 

times. 

I think Ms. Glaser is correct, we don’t need to make the Chinese 

out to be 10 foot tall. That is a great comment. 

But in basic grade school playground-style bullying, we are seeing the biggest player on the playground, so to speak, using its size 

and strength to exert their influence and try to get its way. I think 

the way to counter that and the way that we have been able to 

counter that is with the United States’ strength both economically 

and militarily. So I just want to lend my voice to really the concern 

over sequestration and what that is going to do to the United 

States military. That has been brought out by a number of my colleagues today. 

I want to go back real quickly to my concern over the United 

States debt. We hit a milestone of $16 trillion in debt. I just want 

to remind the folks on the panel today that Proverbs is pretty clear 

in 22:7 that the borrower is servant to the lender. At what point 

in time will our debt be so large, and so large to one creditor that 

we are doing their bidding, so to speak? I think we have to be 

aware of that. 

The Chinese are building temporary structures in the Spratlys—

pole buildings. They are driving T posts in atolls, putting signs up 

that it is Chinese territorial waters, I believe to try to claim the 

69

natural resources that everyone believes are there. The Philippines, 

the Filipinos are very, very concerned about that. They believe 

those resources are theirs, and they hope to garner that resource 

at some point in time. So we have talked about all of this. I guess 

the question I have for the panel, give me some solutions. What 

can we do? What should be done? I think the last question earlier 

I guess what Mrs. Schmidt was asking, you all answered that. Give 

me some solutions, Mr. Brookes. 

Mr. BROOKES. I thought some of the things that have been said 

here today would be very constructive. I have tried to do it at the 

macro level, but some of the things Bonnie talked about were important. In other words, to make sure that we have the capabilities 

for the threats that we face, we need to mobilize our allies and 

friends to be able to deal with the potential for Chinese aggression. 

And another important thing is, of course, unfortunately, there 

are some stumbling blocks along the way, such as the capabilities 

of some of the potential partners in Southeast Asia and Japan. 

They have some treaty issues that would potentially prevent them 

from operating alongside others under collective self-defense in the 

South China Sea. 

But I think we have to do a strong effort, and I imagine it is 

probably being done, for people to understand, even in northeast 

Asia, that what happens in the South China Sea is going to affect 

them. Japan, I am not sure if this is still true, some 80 percent of 

their energy is imported and passes through the South China Sea 

area. If this becomes a Chinese lake effectively, I think there will 

be significant problems potentially down the road for Japan and 

Korea. So I think working together with allies and pooling our defense capabilities, and having a strategy is a basic thing that needs 

to be done. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Dr. Cronin. 

Mr. CRONIN. One thing to think about is that these structures 

that they are building are very vulnerable. So it is not a case that 

they are building up something that is some impregnable thing. I 

think in this case we should keep in mind, and work with our allies 

and friends on the issue of the rule of law and the fact that those 

structures under the U.N. conference on the Law of the Sea, they 

are entitled to nothing but a 500-yard safety zone. In other words, 

they are on Philippines EEZ, some of them, on their economic zone, 

so they shouldn’t be there. But technically, they have a right to be 

there so long as they don’t try to exploit the resources. Well, obviously, they have more reason. It is not that they are going to follow 

those rules, if they have to, if they can avoid it. But I do think that 

there is a combination——

Mr. DUNCAN. They are not a signer to any sort of U.N. treaty 

like that? 

Mr. CRONIN. Pardon? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Even if China is not a signer, a signatory party to 

any sort of treaty? 

Mr. CRONIN. They signed it but with the reservation that their 

nine dash line and all of their claims precede. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Gave them an out? 

Mr. CRONIN. Right. But with the other countries, though, there 

is an affinity now between the U.S. and all of the other countries 

70

in the region which China has created. And that affinity is that all 

of the other countries accept sort of a rules-based international 

order. I think there are two different poles on this issue. One is the 

sort of very practical matter of what do you do about somebody sitting on an atoll and building this structure. But other is the issue 

of not what kind of world that we want, but what kind of world 

do the other countries in the region want? And so, you know, was 

it Bismarck who said politics of war is politics by other means. 

Well, politics is still a factor here, and relationships are a factor 

here. So, I think the United States has to take a strong position 

on these issues. 

China doesn’t want an escalated conflict. That would totally create a problem. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me give Ms. Glaser a chance to answer. 

Mr. CRONIN. So they are trying to get what they can without 

paying a price. 

Ms. GLASER. Thank you. I will be brief and concrete. 

First, I think, we do need a code of conduct. The 2002 declaration 

on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea that was signed 

is not legally binding. It is voluntary. It has some useful provisions, 

but they are just not mandatory. We need a code of conduct that 

has a dispute settlement mechanism so if we have an incident like 

Scarborough Shoal, there is some panel, there is some way that the 

dispute can by diffused and resolved. 

Second, a mechanism on cooperating on fishing would be very, 

very useful. There is a serious problem with fish depletion. People 

are fishing further from their shores. Fishermen, their livelihood is 

being affected. So enabling fishermen to fish in these disputed waters I think would be useful. 

Finally, I will repeat what I said earlier, that I think there is a 

need for every claimant to define its territorial and maritime 

claims clearly. The Chinese are the most egregious in this regard, 

though there are some others that are not completely clear. And 

then agree to set aside these disputes and find models of joint development. Brunei and Malaysia, for example, are engaging in a 

joint oil development project, and we need to have more of these. 

If ASEAN can do this effectively, I think China can be brought into 

those kinds of arrangements. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Dr. Yoshihara. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. Yes, I think we can think creatively. In fact, we 

can think asymmetrically about the problems. In fact, we can turn 

the tables on the Chinese by, I think, developing and focusing on 

our own anti-access forces in the region. We have heard from the 

panelists that China is not 10 feet tall. So, therefore, we should 

focus on some of their structural weaknesses, and they are weaknesses that they cannot repair in time. And there are two weaknesses—their anti-submarine warfare capability and their mine 

countermeasure capability. These are areas that they have always 

been very bad in, and they will not have the resources to fix those 

areas rapidly enough. 

Those areas happen to be our strengths. Our submarine force is 

one of the best in the world. And in fact, Japan has already made 

a decision to increase it submarine force by over 30 percent. That 

71

is how worried the Japanese are, and we should, I think, be also 

focused on submarine warfare. 

And I would suggest that with the second element, that we need 

to revisit offensive mine warfare which we employed very effectively during World War II. These are the kinds of high-end military capabilities that, again, would seek to deter the Chinese from 

taking on potentially dangerous, destabilizing actions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. The Chair recognizes Mr. Kelly for one final question. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brookes, I know there has been some conversation, not an 

awful lot, but about the Law of the Sea. And I know there is differing opinions on good, bad, indifferent and what it would be. This 

is a treaty that while we have been involved, we have never ratified. President Reagan was one of the ones who said he did not 

want to do it. Mr. Cronin, you kind of like it. This could probably 

be a whole panel discussion. Just plus and minuses. 

Mr. BROOKES. I oppose it, and the reason I oppose it is the international seabed authority. I have no problem with the navigational 

matters, and we abide by those matters as a standard maritime 

practice. But I am opposed to the international seabed authority 

which is this U.N. body which is based in Kingston, Jamaica, and 

the effects that might have on our extended continental shelf. But 

I have no problem with the maritime guidelines and territorial——

Mr. KELLY. So that is your main objection? 

Mr. BROOKES. That is my objection. 

Mr. KELLY. Very good. I will say this. Because some of the conversation over our debt, I have actually had the unique experience 

of actually running a business in the private sector, which a lot of 

my colleagues have not. The relationship to debt to equity, are you 

kidding me? It is not an issue? Only in this town do we really believe that debt is not an issue in our ability to sustain our way of 

life and our form of government. This has become incredibly amazing to me, that we sit back and think that you can just keep borrowing and borrowing and borrowing, and it really doesn’t matter. 

And I know why the Chinese invest. Of course, we are still the best 

investment in the world. I don’t think anybody is putting money in 

Greece right now. 

So a lot of this stuff is just kind of common sense. But what bothers me is if we really do believe that not controlling, not having 

sovereignty, control of our debt is not important, we have been 

asleep for way too long, way, way too long. This is just practical 

economics. This is economics 101. I hate to phrase it that way, but 

I have been amazed in my 20 months here that there is somehow 

a disconnect between the amount of money that you owe and your 

future and your sustainability. So that is something that is incredible. 

Now, the other thing I want to say, we quote a lot of people 

today, and there was a Spanish philosopher, Santayana, who says, 

‘‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’’ 

This is not a new issue in the world, what we are seeing happening. And I am very much concerned that somehow we believe 

that if we just pull the covers up over our head, that we will get 

past the midnight hour, and the skies will be blue again and the 

72

sky will shine and everything will just be hunky dory. It not going 

to work that way. I think, Ms. Glaser—oh, it is Doctor, you say, 

‘‘Fortunately, there is still time to maximize the convergence of interests and organize an effective response. China is at least a decade away from amassing the type of preponderant sea power that 

keep the United States out of the South China Sea.’’

Now, my references early on to Secretary of Defense Panetta deal 

with 10 years away. There is kind of a convergence that is happening. In 10 years, you say China could be at that rate. In 10 

years, the Secretary of Defense says that we will have the smallest 

Navy since 1915, the smallest ground force since 1940, and the 

smallest Air Force in our history. There is in the future a coming 

together with history and the facts of the past. And I really am 

concerned, as we look into the future, that we somehow seem to 

think that we can have a blind eye to what is happening and think 

it is going to be all right. We have seen this happen before. There 

is countless examples throughout history. And to sit back now and 

think that somehow we can wish this away. I will tell you this: In 

my lifetime, what I have experienced in this part of the world, they 

are wired differently than we are. Okay? 

Playing nice is fine. But a lot of people consider our kindness as 

weakness. And when the United States stops being the strongest 

player in the world, our allies stop looking to us because we really 

can’t protect them. So a lot of the things that we see coming I think 

are absolutely essential that we recognize what the new dawn is 

bringing. And to sit here and think that we don’t have to address 

that. It is great to have these discussions in a panel like this. In 

the real world, if you don’t come to some really strong conclusions 

and some strong responses to it, you are doomed. 

I thank you all for being here today. I really do. And I don’t know 

how long it is going to take before we wake up. There is things 

happening around the world, we have just seen it the last couple 

days, this is absolutely crazy what is going on. And we continue to 

think it is going to be all right. It is not going to be all right. We 

need to be the strongest player in the world, not because we wasn’t 

to take over the world, but that we are the only ones that can protect the rest of those out there that are weak. So I thank you all 

for being here. Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me. 

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelly. Let me 

just conclude, and perhaps you might want to speak to this very 

briefly, but the issue of China’s motive. We know there is a profit 

motive, there always is, the need for oil, the need for scarce resources. But I have been struck for years by the hearkening back 

to the opium wars that I hear all the time. I watch China’s channel 

here in Washington and I am amazed how many documentaries 

there seem to be on that. When the big censorship issue was very 

front and center, it has not abated one bit, but now it is no longer 

Google, it is others, if you typed in torture, you got the horrific 

atrocities committed by Japan against Chinese citizens. Nothing 

about their systematic use of torture, of course. And you got something about Guantanamo. But that is all you got. And it seems to 

me that Japan really needs to have a great deal of concern, which 

as you pointed out, Doctor, they are beefing up their expenditures 

for defense. But perhaps you could take it and write back, because 

73

it is late, but the issue of motive. This is not—you know, a democratic China we have no fear of. But a dictatorship that controls 

the propaganda machine and does so as effectively and adroitly as 

Beijing does, we have reason to be concerned. And especially when 

they bring up these pasts as if they were yesterday. Your thoughts? 

Does that drive them? 

Mr. BROOKES. I think we have to be conscious of history. You can 

deny it, but you can’t escape it. That is all I would say on that. 

And we have to be understanding of other cultures. I think it is 

critically important to get a sense of where they are coming from, 

and to better understand and to increase the chances for peace and 

stability. 

Ms. GLASER. I would share your concerns about essentially the 

victim mentality in China, this looking back at the period where 

they were exploited. This is a function, in large part, of education 

in the Chinese system. So it is access to information and the lack 

of it, absolutely. And then it is also education in the schools. I have 

heard 5-year-old children singing anti-Japanese songs. Surely they 

don’t really know what they mean, but they grow up to understand 

that. And they watch these documentaries on TV. So the nationalism is really stoked by the government. And I think that is really 

quite dangerous. 

Mr. YOSHIHARA. If you read mainstream Chinese scholars about 

what China wants to be when it grows up, there is a growing 

school of thought that China does, in fact, want to be a world 

power, if you are talking about motives. Many of them say they 

like the system run by the United States, this liberal international 

order. But all of them say, I think with the caveat, that yes, they 

like the system—after all, China has benefited most from it—but 

that they would like to change this from within when they get 

strong enough, because China was not present at the making. And 

that they want to make the rules change so they benefit China because the rules currently benefit the United States. 

So if you want to think broadly about what China really wants 

when it becomes a world power, those are the kind of things that 

I think we should be looking out for. And China’s claims over the 

EEZ, I think, is part of this pattern of eroding and changing the 

rules that have underwritten this current liberal international 

order. 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes, I agree. I think that it is easy enough to say 

remember history, but history has different interpretations. And so 

we need to put each other—it is helpful for us to put ourselves in 

the other countries’ shoes only to understand where they are coming from, how does their mind work? How do they process these 

issues? And I think really the most important thing the United 

States can do, and particularly relatively cheaply, is try to understand where these guys are coming from, what is driving them. 

And also, to remember that we have got some problems with our 

alliance relationships as well. I mean, the Japanese, you can criticize the Chinese for bringing up history, but go talk to the right 

wing in Japan and you will find that, you know, some of them 

haven’t learned anything since World War II. So that is also a 

problem. But I do think understanding the other party, the enemy, 

however you want to call it, is vital. And understanding ourselves 

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and being honest with ourselves about what we want and what we 

are willing to pay for. 

Mr. SMITH. On that note, thank you so very much for your extraordinary testimony and incisive comments. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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[NOTE: Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, is not reprinted here due to 

length limitations but is available in committee records.]

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