Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DC-2674 | May 22, 2020 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kevin J. Moser

Kevin Moser Law PLLC

Fort Mitchell, Kentucky

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Leanna K. Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jack Putnick,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

Laura (Iles) Putnick,

Appellee-Respondent

May 22, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-DC-2674

Appeal from the Switzerland 

Circuit Court

The Honorable W. Gregory Coy, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

78C01-1709-DC-242

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DC-2674 | May 22, 2020 Page 2 of 13

Case Summary

[1] The trial court entered an order dissolving the marriage between Jack Putnick 

(Husband) and Laura (Iles) Putnick (Wife). Husband appeals the court’s 

decision to grant primary physical custody of the parties’ minor son, J.P., to 

Wife, and its order that he pay $750 of Wife’s attorney’s fees, arguing that those 

decisions were clearly erroneous and/or an abuse of discretion. We disagree

and therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband and Wife married in April 2004. One child, J.P., was born of the 

marriage in November 2012. The parties separated in July 2017 when Wife left 

the marital home and moved with J.P. to northern Kentucky. Husband filed a 

petition for dissolution of marriage in September 2017 that came before the trial 

court for final hearing on August 8, 2018. Thereafter, the trial court entered its 

dissolution decree with specific findings of fact that provided in relevant part as 

follows:

1

8. Husband lives at the marital residence; the residence is located 

on property that had been in Husband’s family for some time.

9. Husband and Wife lived at the marital residence for twelve 

years.

1 Where appropriate, we replace any reference to the parties’ and the minor child’s names with the 

aforementioned designations.
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10. Husband testified that Wife left [with J.P.] on July 3, 2017,

and that it was several days before he found out where she was.

11. He also testified that Wife has moved at least twice 

subsequently thereafter without notifying him of when and where 

she intended to move.

....

13. Wife moved ... to her current [northern Kentucky] residence 

on Banklick Street.

14. Husband works at Autozone [making gross income of 

approximately $56,000 per year] and sets his own schedule; he

has other store managers that can cover for him in the event he

gains custody and would need to be away from the store.

15. If Husband gains custody, J.P. will attend school at Rising 

Sun Elementary.

16. Husband’s mother would also be available to care for J.P. in 

the event he needed coverage; his sister would as well.

17. Husband does not intend to move from [the marital] 

residence in the near future and posits that J.P. would likely 

graduate from Rising Sun.

18. As for J.P.’s best interests, Husband points to his stability, 

security, and to the fact that the home he is in now is where J.P. 

has lived since birth other than for the time of separation, and 

will continue to do so.

19. Wife testified that where she lives now is her “forever home”

and that it is a stable home environment for J.P.; she resides 

there with a Mr. Tomlinson who pays some of the costs of living.
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20. Wife is disabled and receives $1245 per month due to a 

debilitating back injury.

....

22. Wife has had custody of her grandson [A] since he was born; 

he and J.P. think of one another as brothers.

23. The boys each have their own rooms and three acres to play 

on.

....

26. Wife also testified that J.P. will be attending Florence 

Elementary and that it is within minutes of where she lives.

....

28. As to the custody of the child, the court is required to 

consider the factors set forth in I.C. § 31-17-2-8.

29. As to the age and sex of the child, the court finds that the

child is five (5) years old and has resided primarily with his 

mother since the date of separation; and that she has been the 

primary caregiver for the child since birth; whereas Husband has 

been the primary wage earner for the family during that time.

30. As to the wishes of the parents, each seeks joint legal custody 

with primary physical custody.

31. The wishes of the child are not considered due to his tender 

age.

32. The child’s interaction with his parents is unknown but 

based on the testimony, the court finds that each parent has an 

outstanding relationship with the child.
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33. The child’s adjustment to the home is unknown; he is just 

starting kindergarten.

34. All parties are in good mental health; the only physical issue

is Wife’s disability but the court finds that to be a [nonfactor] in 

deciding custody.

35. There has been no physical violence between the parents.

Appealed Order at 2-3. Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that it 

was in J.P.’s best interests that the parties be granted joint legal custody with 

Wife having primary physical custody. Husband was granted parenting time in 

accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines and was ordered to 

pay $129 per week in child support. Husband was further ordered to pay Wife’s 

attorney $750 in fees within sixty days of the court’s decree.

[3] Husband filed a motion to correct error, which was deemed denied on October 

25, 2018. He filed a notice of appeal on November 9, 2018. However, the trial 

court clerk thereafter failed to timely file a notice of completion of clerk’s 

record. Because Husband never sought an order compelling such completion

pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 10(F), this Court dismissed the appeal with 

prejudice on August 26, 2019. Husband filed an amended appellate motion to 

correct error on October 1, 2019, requesting that the appeal be reinstated. Our 

motions panel granted Husband’s motion and reinstated the appeal. Wife filed 

a motion to dismiss the reinstated appeal, which was subsequently denied by 
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the motions panel, and the parties proceeded to file their respective briefs 

herein.2

 We will provide additional facts as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court neither abused its discretion nor 

clearly erred in granting Wife primary physical custody of J.P.

[4] Husband challenges the trial court’s physical custody determination. Our 

standard of review of initial child custody determinations is well settled. 

Determinations regarding child custody fall within the trial court’s sound 

discretion. Swadner v. Swadner, 897 N.E.2d 966, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In 

an initial custody determination, both parents are presumed equally entitled to

custody. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. 

2 Wife urges us to reconsider the ruling of our motions panel and dismiss this appeal for Husband’s failure to 

timely file a motion to compel completion of the trial court clerk’s record pursuant to our appellate rules. 

Specifically, Indiana Appellate Rule 10(F) requires that, in the event the trial court clerk “fails to issue, file, 

and serve a timely Notice of Completion of Clerk’s Record,” an appellant shall seek an order from this Court 

compelling the clerk to complete the record and file such notice. Failure to do so subjects the appellant’s 

appeal to dismissal. Ind. Appellate Rule 10(F). As noted above, Husband’s appeal was originally dismissed 

due to his failure to timely file a motion to compel pursuant to Rule 10(F).

In his amended motion to correct error, Husband provided detail regarding his communications with the trial 

court clerk, her purported backlog, and his belief that the record would be completed timely. He explained

that his failure to seek a motion to compel when the record was not, in fact, completed, was simply due to 

inadvertence as opposed to a willful disregard of the appellate rules. Wife suggests that Husband’s claim of 

inadvertence is insufficient to justify reinstatement of his appeal. However, Wife made this argument to the 

motions panel, and the panel rejected it. See Order on Wife’s Motion to Dismiss, Cause No. 18A-DC–2674 

(Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2020). We acknowledge that the writing panel has the inherent authority to 

reconsider any decision of the motions panel while an appeal remains pending. Milbank Ins. Co. v. Indiana Ins. 

Co., 56 N.E.3d 1222, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). But, we generally do so only where a more complete record 

reveals clear authority establishing that the motions panel ruling was in error. Id. That is not the case here. 

We do not minimize Husband’s neglect in failing to follow up with the trial court, and we agree with Wife 

that cases involving children ideally should be resolved swiftly and without delay. Still, given our longstanding preference for deciding cases on the merits, see id., and given that the motions panel reinstated the 

appeal and the parties have now fully briefed this case, we proceed to consider the merits of the parties’

arguments.
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denied. The trial court shall determine custody and enter a custody order in 

accordance with the best interests of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, including:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the 

child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child’s parent or parents;

(B) the child’s sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best 

interests.

(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either

parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto 

custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall 

consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. In deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, 

we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses.

Hughes v. Rogusta, 830 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Instead, we 

consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment, with all reasonable 

inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id. We will affirm the trial court’s 

custody determination absent an abuse of discretion. Swadner, 897 N.E.2d at 

973.
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[5] The trial court here entered specific findings of fact to support its custody 

determination. Therefore, upon review, first we determine whether the 

evidence supports the court’s findings, and second, we determine whether the 

findings support the judgment. Lechien v. Wren, 950 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011). We will set aside the trial court’s specific findings only if they are 

clearly erroneous, that is, when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom 

to support them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the 

record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

[6] Husband concedes that the trial court considered the required statutory factors 

in making its custody determination. Indeed, the trial court found that the 

evidence indicated that the parties each had an outstanding relationship with 

J.P. and that they were relatively equal with regard to each of the statutory

factors. However, in determining that five-year-old J.P.’s interests would best 

be served in the primary physical custody of Wife, the court considered 

evidence that Wife had been J.P.’s primary caregiver since birth, and that Wife 

has custody of her grandson of similar age, with whom J.P. shares a sibling-like 

relationship. 

[7] Husband first complains that, in giving weight to this evidence, the court 

improperly presumed that Wife, as a mother, is better suited to have primary 

physical custody and that Husband is being punished for filling the traditional 

role of being the breadwinner during the marriage. We disagree with 

Husband’s contention that the trial court engaged in improper presumptions or 

punishment, and we remind him that, in considering child custody, trial courts
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are “often called upon to make Solomon-like decisions in complex and sensitive 

matters.” Pawlik v. Pawlik, 823 N.E.2d 328, 329-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)

(citation omitted), trans. denied. Where, as in this case, each parent seeks sole 

primary physical custody of a child, the trial court must weigh the evidence and 

make a choice in the best interests of the child. The court did so here and 

determined that the evidence weighed in Wife’s favor. The value of the trial

court’s close proximity to the parties and the issues in child custody cases 

cannot be overstated, see id., and we are mindful that the trial court was in a 

better position than we are to make a decision on the merits. Id. Husband

effectively invites us to reweigh the evidence as to J.P.’s best interests, which we 

will not do. See id. (emphasizing that this Court will not reweigh evidence 

when reviewing trial court’s custody determination).

[8] Husband further asserts that, in addition to unjustifiably favoring Wife in its 

best interests analysis, the trial court abused its discretion and clearly erred in 

failing to consider Wife’s “misconduct, interference with [Husband’s] 

relationship with [J.P.], and lack of communication” in making its custody 

determination. Appellant’s Br. at 11. However, Wife’s testimony 

unequivocally contradicted Husband’s version of events and characterization of 

her behavior (she testified Husband was fully aware that she was leaving him, 

that they communicate regularly, and that she does not interfere with the fatherson relationship), and it was the trial court’s prerogative to weigh the evidence 

and assess credibility. Indeed, although insisting that Wife’s testimony was 

evasive and dishonest, Husband concedes that only the trial court, in observing
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live testimony, can capture the “nuance[s] of an exchange.” Id. at 12 n.2. 

Again, Husband effectively invites us to reweigh the evidence, and we will not.

[9] Regarding the trial court’s findings of fact, Husband specifically challenges only

finding number 33, that “the child’s adjustment to the home is unknown; he is

just starting kindergarten.” Appealed Order at 3. Husband claims that this

finding is clearly erroneous because “it is not possible to find that a child is not 

adjusted to [Husband’s] residence where he lived ... for the first four or five 

years of life ....” Appellant’s Br. at 16. While perhaps not as detailed as it 

could have been, we understand this finding to simply be an acknowledgement

by the trial court that, due to J.P.’s young age and adaptability, his adjustment 

to his former primary residence when compared to his new primary residence

was not a factor that weighed in favor of either party. This finding is not clearly 

erroneous. Moreover, as Husband does not specifically challenge the 

remaining findings of fact, we accept them as true. McMaster v. McMaster, 681 

N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

[10] In sum, the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court’s findings 

and its ultimate conclusion that it is in J.P.’s best interests that Wife be granted 

primary physical custody, and our review of the record does not leaves us with 
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a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. The trial court’s custody order 

is neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.

3

Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding Wife $750 in attorney’s fees.

[11] Husband also challenges the trial court’s order that he pay $750 of Wife’s 

attorney’s fees. A court may order a party to pay “a reasonable amount ... to 

the other party” for attorney’s fees associated with a dissolution action. Ind. 

Code § 31-15-10-1(a). The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to 

award attorney’s fees, and we will reverse its decision only upon a showing of 

an abuse of discretion. Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 665 (Ind. 2007). 

That is to say, we will reverse such an award only if it “is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Mason v. 

Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003). 

[12] Here, Wife requested $1000 in fees and the trial court awarded $750. Husband 

suggests that the trial court did so “without justification or reasoning.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 18. First, “the trial court need not give its reasons for its 

decision to award attorney’s fees.” Bessolo v. Rosario, 966 N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ind. 

3 Husband briefly suggests that, aside from the physical custody issue, an order of joint legal custody is not in 

J.P.’s best interests due to Wife’s alleged failures to effectively communicate with Husband. We note that the 

parties specifically requested joint legal custody, and it is well settled that a trial court shall consider it a 

matter of primary importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal 

custody. Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Besides, we will reverse an 

award of joint legal custody only when the evidence indicates “a clear abuse of trial court discretion in that 

the joint custody award constitutes an imposition of an intolerable situation upon two persons who have 

made child rearing a battleground.” Swadner, 897 N.E.2d at 974 (citation omitted). The evidence reflects no 

such imposition here.
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Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “In determining whether to award attorney’s fees 

in a dissolution proceeding, trial courts should consider the parties’ resources, 

their economic condition, their ability to engage in gainful employment and 

earn income, and other factors bearing on the reasonableness of the award.”

Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The trial court here 

specifically considered the parties’ respective abilities to engage in gainful 

employment and earn income and found that Husband earns more than

$50,000 per year in income, while Wife is unable to work and collects only 

$1245 per month in disability. This evidence of the parties’ economic condition

and their respective abilities to engage in gainful employment more than 

justifies the trial court’s decision to award Wife a portion of her attorney’s fees.

[13] Husband maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in again failing to 

consider Wife’s alleged misconduct (“abscond[ing]” with J.P., “concealing” his 

whereabouts, and now “ransoming” him) in awarding fees. Appellant’s Br. at 

19-20. Husband is correct that any misconduct on the part of a party that 

directly results in the other party incurring additional fees may be taken into 

consideration. See Bessolo, 966 N.E.2d at 733. However, as discussed above, the

trial court clearly did not agree with Husband’s characterization of Wife’s 

behavior, and we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility

on this issue. We find no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed in all respects.
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[14] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.