2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty 

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards:

EPA Response to Comments
Assessment and Standards Division

Office of Transportation and Air Quality

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty 

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards:

EPA Response to Comments

EPA-420-R-12-017

August 2012
ii

Introduction

The following is the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Response to Comments 

document for the EPA and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Joint 

Rulemaking: 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 

Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards. The following document contains 

verbatim excerpts of the commenter’s text followed by EPA’s responses. Citizen comments that 

raised unique substantive issues are included. In addition, nearly 300,000 citizens provided 

comments in support of the program and about 400 people provided testimony at three public 

hearings held for the rulemaking; these comments are not listed or summarized individually, but 

rather examples are provided. All of the comments and public hearing transcripts are available in 

docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 and/or NHTSA-2010-0131. The comments and responses are 

organized by topic (see Table of Contents) to help the reader find comments and responses of 

interest. An index of commenters and the associated docket numbers is also provided. 

This is an EPA document and does not contain NHTSA’s responses to comments. 

NHTSA’s responses to comments are contained in the preamble Section IV and the NHTSA 

Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the rule. 
iii

Contents

1. National Program................................................................................................................... 1-1

1.1. General Support for the National Program............................................................. 1-1

1.2. General Opposition for the National Program...................................................... 1-81

2. CO2 Emissions Standards ...................................................................................................... 2-1

2.1. Attribute-based (footprint) approach ...................................................................... 2-1

2.2. Stringency of Standards........................................................................................ 2-12

2.2.1. Overall Stringency ............................................................................................. 2-12

2.2.2. Car and Light Truck Footprint Curve Shapes and Level of the Standards........ 2-52

2.2.3. Backstop Standards.......................................................................................... 2-106

2.3. Additional Flexibility for Intermediate Volume Manufacturers......................... 2-117

2.4. Mid-term Evaluation........................................................................................... 2-125

2.5. Test Procedures................................................................................................... 2-175

3. Air Conditioning System Credits........................................................................................... 3-1

3.1. Credits Related to Reduced Leakage and the Use of Alternative Refrigerants...... 3-5

3.2. Credits Related to Improved A/C system Efficiency............................................ 3-28

3.2.1. A/C Test Procedures.......................................................................................... 3-33

4. Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles 4-1

5. Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks................................................. 5-1

6. GHG Emissions Compliance Treatment of Plug-In Hybrid Electric, Compressed Natural Gas, 

Ethanol, Diesel, and Other Alternative Fueled Vehicles, and CAFE Issues ......................... 6-1

6.1. Plug-In Electric Vehicles........................................................................................ 6-1

6.2. Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles.......................................................................... 6-4

6.3. Ethanol Flexible Fuel Vehicles............................................................................. 6-80

6.4. Comments Regarding the Treatment of Diesel-Fueled Vehicles ....................... 6-137

6.5. Comments Regarding Other Alternative Fuels................................................... 6-148

6.6 Comments Regarding Issues Relevant to Multiple Fuels................................... 6-158

7. Off-Cycle Technology Credits............................................................................................... 7-1

7.1. General Comments.................................................................................................. 7-1

7.2. Pre-Approved Technology List............................................................................... 7-8

7.3. Comments Regarding Using Pre-Approved List in MYs 2012-2016................... 7-96
iv

7.4. Comments Regarding Credit Cap and Sales Thresholds Proposed for Pre-Approved 

List ...................................................................................................................... 7-101

7.5. Step-by-Step Process and Test Procedures......................................................... 7-111

7.6. Comments Regarding Technology Eligibility Criteria ....................................... 7-117

8. A/C, Off-Cycle, and “Game Changing” Technology Fuel Consumption Improvement Values 

in CAFE Program .................................................................................................................. 8-1

9. Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement......................................................................... 9-1

9.1. Base Tire Definition................................................................................................ 9-2

9.2. Car-Truck Definitions............................................................................................. 9-6

9.3. Compliance Data Transparency............................................................................ 9-12

9.4. Harmonization with CAFE ................................................................................... 9-17

9.5. Durability Procedures for Diesel Vehicles ........................................................... 9-20

9.6. Other Certification and Compliance Related Comments...................................... 9-21

10. Additional EPA Program Elements..................................................................................... 10-1

10.1. Average Banking and Trading.............................................................................. 10-1

10.1.1. Carry-Forward and Carry-Back of Credits........................................................ 10-6

10.1.2. Credit Transfers between Cars and Trucks and Credit Trading between 

Manufacturers.................................................................................................... 10-9

10.1.3. Over Compliance Credits for Use in the California ZEV Program................. 10-13

10.2. Nitrous Oxide (N2O) and Methane (CH4) Standard ........................................... 10-18

10.2.1. Flexibility for Compliance with N2O and CH4 Standard................................. 10-18

10.2.2. N2O Measurement and Compliance Statement Option ................................... 10-21

10.2.3. N2O and CH4 Standards Related Comments ................................................... 10-30

10.3. Alternative CO2 Standards for Small Volume Manufacturers with U.S. Sales below 

5,000 Vehicles..................................................................................................... 10-33

10.4. Exemption for Small Businesses ........................................................................ 10-44

10.5. Exemption for Emergency and Police Vehicles ................................................. 10-49

11. Gasoline Fuel Quality .......................................................................................................... 11-1

11.1. Need for Octane .................................................................................................... 11-1

11.2. Aromatics.............................................................................................................. 11-8

11.3. Need to harmonize in-use/certification fuels with LD GHG.............................. 11-17

12. Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards....................................................... 12-1

12.1. Baseline, Reference and Control Fleets for Evaluating Standards....................... 12-2

12.2. Types of Technologies Considered and Their Effectiveness................................ 12-8
v

12.2.1. Engine Technologies........................................................................................ 12-21

12.2.2. Transmission Technologies ............................................................................. 12-34

12.2.3. Vehicle Technologies....................................................................................... 12-34

12.2.4. Electrification, Fuel Cell, and Hybrid Technologies....................................... 12-45

12.2.4.1ANL Battery Model ........................................................................................ 12-60

12.3. Cost of CO2-Reducing Technologies.................................................................. 12-62

12.3.1. Direct Manufacturing Costs............................................................................. 12-70

12.3.2. Indirect Costs................................................................................................... 12-71

12.3.3. Learning ........................................................................................................... 12-77

12.3.4. Maintenance Costs........................................................................................... 12-78

12.3.5. Stranded Capital............................................................................................... 12-78

12.4. Technology Packages, Projected Manufacturer Compliance Costs, Technology 

Penetration, and OMEGA/VOLPE..................................................................... 12-80

13. Vehicle Safety..................................................................................................................... 13-1

13.1. General Comments on Vehicle Safety.................................................................. 13-1

13.2. Comments on NHTSA/EPA’s Engineering Analysis of Vehicle Safety Including 

Light Weight Materials......................................................................................... 13-7

13.3. Comments on NHTSA/EPA’s Statistical Analysis of Vehicle Safety................ 13-26

14. Treatment of Life-Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing ............................. 14-1

15. Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses .......................................................................... 15-1

15.1. On-Road Fuel Economy Gap................................................................................ 15-1

15.2. Vehicle Lifetimes and Survival Rates................................................................... 15-3

15.3. Vehicle Miles Traveled......................................................................................... 15-3

15.3.1. Issues of Car-Truck VMT Used for Credit Transfers........................................ 15-3

15.3.2. VMT Growth Projections .................................................................................. 15-3

15.3.3. Rebound Effect .................................................................................................. 15-3

16. Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects.............................. 16-1

16.1. Impact on GHG emissions.................................................................................... 16-1

16.2. Climate Change Impacts from GHG Emissions and Other Climate-Forcing Agents

............................................................................................................................... 16-3

16.3. Changes in Global Climate Indicators Associated with the GHG Emissions 

Reductions........................................................................................................... 16-14

17. Analysis of Impacts on Non-GHG Emissions..................................................................... 17-1

18. Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts................................................ 18-1
vi

18.1. Consumer Impacts/Consumer Welfare/Consumer Acceptance of Vehicles ........ 18-8

18.2. Analysis of Costs Associated with the Vehicle Standards.................................. 18-75

18.2.1. Per Vehicle Average Costs.............................................................................. 18-99

18.2.2. Annual Aggregate Costs................................................................................ 18-107

18.2.3. Consumer Payback Analysis.......................................................................... 18-107

18.3. Analysis of Reduction in Fuel Consumption and Resulting Fuel Savings....... 18-113

18.4. Benefits of Reduced GHGs and Non-GHG Emissions..................................... 18-130

18.4.1. Estimated GHG Emissions Reductions Benefits (Including Social Cost of Carbon)

........................................................................................................................ 18-130

18.4.2. Estimated Non-GHG Health and Environmental Impacts............................. 18-161

18.5. Energy Security Impacts................................................................................... 18-168

18.6. Other Impacts.................................................................................................... 18-189

18.6.1. Added Costs from Congestion, Accidents, and Noise................................... 18-189

18.6.2. Benefits of Increased Driving ........................................................................ 18-190

18.6.3. Benefits of Less Frequent Refueling.............................................................. 18-190

18.7. U.S. Vehicle Sales Impacts............................................................................... 18-191

18.7.1. Access to Auto Loans and Effects on Low-Income Consumers.................... 18-202

18.8. Employment Impacts........................................................................................ 18-214

19. EPA Statutory Authority...................................................................................................... 19-1

20. Statutory and Executive Orders........................................................................................... 20-1

21. Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text................................................................ 21-1

22. Comments Regarding EPA Tier 3 Rulemaking................................................................... 22-1

22.1. Tier 3 Standards.................................................................................................... 22-2

22.2. Changes to Fuel Specifications............................................................................. 22-4

23. Request for Extension of the Comment Period.................................................................... 23-1

24. Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications and Pending GHG Lawsuits................... 24-1

25. Comments Unrelated to the Proposed Rule ......................................................................... 25-1
vii

Index of Commenters

Commenter Docket ID

25x”25 Alliance EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11818

AAA EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484

Adams, G. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1550-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1550

Addam, Mary NHTSA-2010-0131-0208

Alexandria Hyundai EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10153-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10153-

A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10153, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-

A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0262-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0262, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0271-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0271, NHTSA-2010-0131-0272-A1, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0272

Aluminum Association's Aluminum 

Transportation Group

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0226-A2, NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A3, NHTSA-2010-0131-

0226-A4, NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A5, NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A6, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0226

America's Natural Gas Alliance 

(ANGA) and American Gas 

Association (AGA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548

American Chemistry Council (ACC) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

American Clean Skies Foundation 

(ACSF) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464

American Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy (ACEEE)EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

American Council on Renewable 

Energy (ACORE) and Biomass 

Coordinating Council (BCC)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593

American Forest and Paper 

Association & American Wood 

Council

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537

American Fuel and Petrochemical 

Manufacturers (AFPM) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, NHTSA-2010-0131-0239-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0239

American Iron and Steel Institute 

(AISI)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

American Lung Association EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902

American Lung Association of the 

Mid-Atlantic EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

American Medical Association of 

California EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

American Petroleum Institute (API)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469, NHTSA-2010-0131-0238-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0238-A2, NHTSA-2010-0131-0238

American Petroleum Institute (API), 

National Association of Manufacturers 

(NAM), and American Fuel & 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509
viii

Commenter Docket ID

Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

American Public Gas Association 

(APGA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448

American Road & Transportation 

Builders Association (ARTBA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9451-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9451-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9451, NHTSA-2010-0131-0233-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0233

American Suzuki Motor Corporation EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9523-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9523

AMP Electric Vehicles EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8086-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8086

Anonymous public citizen 4 EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10317

Anonymous Public Citizen 1 NHTSA-2010-0131-0231

Anonymous public citizen 2 EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1359

Anonymous public citizen 3 EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2001

Anonymous public citizen 5 EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2010

Applied Materials EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7292-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7292-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7292, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

Arkema Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468

Association of Global Automakers, 

Inc. (Global Automakers)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0237-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0237

Aston Martin Lagonda Limited, Lotus 

Cars Limited and McLaren 

Automotive

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

Axford, H. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149

Bassett, S. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8123-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8123

Bayer MaterialScience

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9265-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9265, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0228-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0228

Biery-Hamilton, Dr. G. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9033-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9033

BlueGreen Alliance EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786,EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

BMW of North America, LLC

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, NHTSA-2010-0131-0251-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0251

Borg Warner, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320

Bosch EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9462-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9462

Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0242-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0242

Business for Innovative Climate & 

Energy Policy (BICEP) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9450-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9450

Cafagna, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689

California Air Resources Board 

(CARB)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9491-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9491, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-

A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

California Manufacturers & 

Technology Association (CMTA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10012-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10012-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10012, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0252-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0252

California State Sheriffs' Association 
ix

Commenter Docket ID

(CSSA), California Police Chiefs 

Association (CPCA), California 

Narcotic Officers' Association 

(CNOA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488

Capozzelli, J. NHTSA-2010-0131-0221-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0221, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0266-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0266

Center for Biological Diversity

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, NHTSA-2010-0131-0255-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0255-A2, NHTSA-2010-0131-0255-A3, NHTSA-2010-0131-

0255-A4, NHTSA-2010-0131-0255

Center for Sustainable Systems, 

University of Michigan EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9493-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9493

CEO Pipe Organs/Golden Ponds Farm EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9229-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9229

Ceres

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-

A2.pptx, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11798-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11798, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11787

Chrysler Group LLC

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495,

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, NHTSA-2010-0131-0241-A1, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0241

Clean Energy EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0257-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0257

Clean Fuels Development Coalition 

(CDFC)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A10, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-

A11, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A12, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A14, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9574-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A4, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9574-A5, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A6, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9574-A7, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A8, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9574-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574

Climate Institute EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7944-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7944

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552

Consumer Federation of America 

(CFA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A4, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

Consumer Reports EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

Consumers Union EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454

Crime Victims United of California 

(CVUC)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0254-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0254

CTIA - The Wireless Association EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11759-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11759-

A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11759

Cuenca, M. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142

Dawid, I. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6325-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6325

Defour Group LLC EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319

Delphi Corporation EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Denso International America, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0232-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0232

Detroit NAACP EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

E100 Ethanol Group EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7173-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7173, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787
x

Commenter Docket ID

Eaton Corporation EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Ecology Center EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

EcoMotors International, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594

Edison Electric Institute (EEI) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584

Edmunds.com EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

Electric Drive Transportation 

Association EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449

Encana Natural Gas Inc.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585, NHTSA-2010-0131-0265-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0265

Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive 

Association (EPGAA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301

Ennis, M. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5612-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5612

Environmental Consultants of 

Michigan

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-

A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760, NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0166

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

EutecticSolutions Inc. NHTSA-2010-0131-0270

Faria, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834

Feinstein, C. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6745-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6745

Ferrari

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10037-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10037-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10037

Ferrari & Maserati of Seattle EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9197-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9197-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9197

Ferrari of Houston, Texas and Ferrari 

of Austin, Texas

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9230-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9230-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9230

Fisker Automotive, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266

Ford Motor Company

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, NHTSA-2010-0131-0235-A1, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0235

Garmin International Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0245-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0245

General Motors Company

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, NHTSA-2010-0131-0236-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0236

Gilles, B. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8065-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8065

Gordon, Michael EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9625

Governors' Biofuels Coalition EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570

Green, K. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524

Growth Energy

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9540-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9540-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9540, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A10, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A13, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A14, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A15, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A17, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-
xi

Commenter Docket ID

0799-9505-A19, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A20, EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A23, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A24, EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A8, EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A9, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505

Guardian Automotive Products, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299

Haroldson, C. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11137-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11137

Hohenstein, H. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1515-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1515

Honeywell International, Inc.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0244-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0244

Honeywell Transportation Systems EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474

Horst, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6353-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6353

House of Representatives, Congress of 

the United States EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1221-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1221

Houston Tea Party Society EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9583

Howard, P. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10063-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11384-

A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10063, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11384

Hrin, S. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1568

Hyundai America Technical Center

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9542-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9542, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, NHTSA-2010-0131-0250-A1, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0250

ICM Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541

Institute for Energy Research (IER) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573

Institute for Policy Integrity, New 

York University School of Law

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A4, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11485-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11485-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11485-

A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11485-A4, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11485-A5, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11485

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 

(IIHS) NHTSA-2010-0131-0222-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0222

Integrated Consultants, Inc. NHTSA-2010-0131-0217-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0217

International Council on Clean 

Transportation (ICCT)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9364-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9364-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9364, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9365-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9365, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, NHTSA-2010-0131-0225-A1, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0225-A2, NHTSA-2010-0131-0225, NHTSA-2010-0131-0227-A1, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0227, NHTSA-2010-0131-0258-A1, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0258

Investor Network on Climate Risk 

(INCR) - Ceres EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516

Jackson, F.W.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7113-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7113, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785

Jaguar Land Rover North America, 

LLC (JLRNA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8102-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8102

Johnson Controls, Inc. NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0253

Johnson, C. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6528-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6528
xii

Commenter Docket ID

Jordon, A. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9857-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9857

Kendall, A. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

Kia Motors EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Knapp, B. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8255-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8255

Kobus, D. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1370-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1370

Kunz, R. and J. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9562-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9562

Leach, Kyle EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9626

League of Women Voters of Michigan NHTSA-2010-0131-0198

Lennon, S. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019

Links, W. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10348-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10348

Lipetzky, P. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8184-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8184

Magna E-Car Systems EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9263-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9263

Manufacturers of Emission Controls 

Association (MECA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Marks, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1680-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1680

Marlinghaus, E. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1581-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1581

Marshall, C. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917

Marz, Loren C. NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1x, NHTSA-2010-0131-0213

Mass Comment Campaign (1,121) 

(World Wildlife Fund) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5181_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (1,338) 

(Sierra Club-2) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11762-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11762

Mass Comment Campaign (10) 

(National Wildlife Federation Action 

Fund-1)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1244-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1244_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (13,300) 

(National Wildlife Federation Action 

Fund-3)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9965-A1_MASSx, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9965_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (137 

(Citizens for Pennsylvania's Future 

(PennFuture))

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-3114-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

3114_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (15) 

(League of Conservation Voters)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1555-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1555_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (15) (Sierra 

Club-3) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11763-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11763

Mass Comment Campaign (195) 

(Environment New Mexico-1)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9577-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9577_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (2,120) 

(Pew Environmental Group)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1247-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1247_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (2,156) 

(Environment Michigan)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9683-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9683_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (2,851) 

(Unknown Organization)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9591-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9591_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union 

of Concerned Scientists-1)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1558-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1558_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) 

(Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10166-A2_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (213) 

(Environment Virginia)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9576-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9576_MASS
xiii

Commenter Docket ID

Mass Comment Campaign (22,122) 

(Unknown Organization) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9736_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (262) 

(Environment New Mexico-2)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9700-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9700_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (27,108) 

(Unknown Organization)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9596-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9596_MASS

Mass Comment campaign (3,855) 

(National Wildlife Federation Action 

Fund-2)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1557-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1557_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (375) 

(Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1246-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1246_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (39) 

(Unknown Organization)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1245-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1245_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (39,464) 

(Environmental Defense Fund (EDF))

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9590-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9590_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (399) 

(Rhode Island Sierra Club) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11761-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11761

Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) 

(Unknown Organization)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9595-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9595_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (45) 

(Environment Minnesota)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9588-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9588_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (61) (The 

Social Justice Group)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7406-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7406_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (680) 

(PennEvironment)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1556-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1556_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (8,741) 

(Natural Resources Defense Council 

(NRDC))

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9589-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9589_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (80) 

(Unknown Organization)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9682-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9682_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) 

(Unknown Organization)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9578-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9578_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (927) 

(Sierra Club-1)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1554-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1554_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (99) 

(Environment Texas)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9701-A1_MASS, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9701_MASS

Mass Comment Campaign (Multiple 

Submitters) (Unknown Organization) NHTSA-2010-0131-0219-A1_MASS, NHTSA-2010-0131-0219_MASS

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

(MIT) NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0229

Mazda North American Operations EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

Medinger, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9035-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9035

Mehrotra, Rahul NHTSA-2010-0131-0206

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483

Michigan House of Representatives, 

49th District EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7983-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7983

Michigan State House of 

Representatives EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9175

Michigan State Senate, District 18 EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594

Miller Motorcars EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8141-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8141-A2, 
xiv

Commenter Docket ID

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8141

Miller, P. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1755-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1755

Minnesota Department of Commerce EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7363-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7363

Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, 

Inc. (MRDA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

Moravian College EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5536-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5536

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers 

Association (MEMA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478

National Alliance of Forest Owners 

(NAFO)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9534-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9534-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9534

National Association of Clean Air 

Agencies (NACAA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

National Association of Convenience 

Stores (NACS) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543

National Association of Manufacturers 

(NAM)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9587-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9587

National Automobile Dealers 

Association (NADA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A4, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A5, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, NHTSA-2010-0131-0261-A1, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0261-A2, NHTSA-2010-0131-0261-A3, NHTSA-2010-0131-0261-

A4, NHTSA-2010-0131-0261-A5, NHTSA-2010-0131-0261, NHTSA2010-0131-0267-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0267

National Caucus of Environmental 

Legislators EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443

National Corn Growers Association et 

al.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0249-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0249

National Propane Gas Association 

(NPGA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482

National Wildlife Federation (NWF) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Natural Resources Defense Council 

(NRDC)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Necheles, L. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2487-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2487

New Jersey Senate, Third Legislative 

District EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9970-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9970

New York City Council, 35th District EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9901-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9901-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9901

New York State Assembly Committee 

on Government Operations

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9453-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9453-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9453

New York State Senate, 26th District EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9884-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9884

NGV America EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0234-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0234

Nissan North America, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Northeast States for Coordinated Air

Use Management (NESCAUM)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

Oblong Land Conservancy EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9915-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9915
xv

Commenter Docket ID

Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8108-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8108

Parker, M. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017

Paul, M. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027

Pearce, F. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10343-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10343

Pennsylvania Department of 

Environmental Protection EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821

Pennsylvania State Senate et al. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914

Penske Corporation EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9187-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9187-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9187

Pew Charitable Trusts

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A2x, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel 

Systems, Inc.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-

A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A5, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A11, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A12, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-

A13, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A6, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9882-A8, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A9, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9882-A3

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. 

(PCNA)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0224-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0224

Pregibon, D. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8987-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8987

Rafter, M. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11587-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11587

Renewable Energy Long Island EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7933-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7933

Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490

Ross, D. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

Roush Industries, Inc. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7823-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7823-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7823

RVIA EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550

SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Salinas, A. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7119-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7119

Securing America's Future Energy 

(SAFE)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, NHTSA-2010-0131-0259-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0259

Shick, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6215-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6215

Sierra Club, Environment America, 

Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786

Slemp III, R. L. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6314-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6314

Smith, Frank Houston NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, NHTSA-2010-

0131-0240

Smith, G. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8438-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8438

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. 

(SPI) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492

South Coast AQMD EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

St. Clair-Detroit River Sturgeon for 

Tomorrow EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-4151
xvi

Commenter Docket ID

State of New York The Assembly EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10155-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10155

Statman, P. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1472-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1472

Steffanoff, N. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335

Steyn, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724

Stirling, D. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10065-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10065

Sullivan, T. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10341-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10341

Susan R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10792-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10792

Tarazevich, Yegor NHTSA-2010-0131-0199

TechAmerica EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470

Tesla Motors, Inc.

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9592-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9592, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0260-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0260

The Catskill Center for Conservation 

and Development EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9913-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9913

Toyota Motor North America EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586

U.S. Chamber of Commerce EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel 

Cars

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0246

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0248-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0248

United States Senate NHTSA-2010-0131-0264-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0264

United States Steel Corporation EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0256

United Steel Workers (USW) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580

University of Michigan EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986

Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510

Van Coppenolle, J. and L. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284

Van Voorhies, M. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1629-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1629

Varley, R. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1948-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1948

Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985

VNG.Co (VNG)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-

A3, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797, NHTSA-2010-0131-0218-A1, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0218

Volkswagen EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309

Volkswagen Group of America EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569, 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0247-A1, NHTSA-2010-0131-0247

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551, NHTSA-2010-0131-0243-A1, NHTSA2010-0131-0243

Weiner, L. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787
xvii

Commenter Docket ID

Wenzel, T. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787

WESPAC Foundation EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459

Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1x, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447

Wide World Ferrari, Wide World of 

Cars, LLC

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8142-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8142-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8142, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9231-A1, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9231-A2, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9231

World Resources Institute (WRI) EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7086-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7086-A2, 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7086

World Steel Association EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7766-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7766

WorldAutoSteel EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174
National Program

1-1

1. National Program

1.1. General Support for the National Program

Organizations Included in this Section

Alexandria Hyundai

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

American Chemistry Council (ACC) 

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

American Honda Motor Co., Inc

American Lung Association

American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

American Medical Association of California

American Suzuki Motor Corporation

Applied Materials

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Aston Martin Lagonda Limited, Lotus Cars Limited and McLaren Automotive

Biery-Hamilton, Dr. G.

BlueGreen Alliance

BMW of North America, LLC

Borg Warner, Inc.

Business for Innovative Climate & Energy Policy (BICEP)

California Air Resources Board (CARB)

Capozzelli, J.

Center for Biological Diversity

CEO Pipe Organs/Golden Ponds Farm

Ceres

Chrysler Group LLC

Climate Institute

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumer Reports

Consumers Union

Delphi Corporation

Detroit NAACP

E100 Ethanol Group

Eaton Corporation

Ecology Center

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Edmunds.com

Electric Drive Transportation Association

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Ferrari

Fisker Automotive, Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

1-2

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Growth Energy

Guardian Automotive Products, Inc.

Honeywell International, Inc.

Honeywell Transportation Systems

House of Representatives, Congress of the United States

Howard, P.

Hyundai America Technical Center

ICM Inc.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) – Ceres

Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (JLRNA)

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Kendall, A.

Kia Motors

Kobus, D.

League of Women Voters of Michigan

Magna E-Car Systems

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Marshall, C.

Marz, Loren C.

Mass Comment Campaign (1,121) (World Wildlife Fund)

Mass Comment Campaign (1,338) (Sierra Club-2)

Mass Comment Campaign (13,300) (National Wildlife Federation Action Fund-3)

Mass Comment Campaign (137 (Citizens for Pennsylvania's Future (PennFuture))

Mass Comment Campaign (15) (League of Conservation Voters)

Mass Comment Campaign (15) (Sierra Club-3)

Mass Comment Campaign (195) (Environment New Mexico-1)

Mass Comment Campaign (2,120) (Pew Environmental Group)

Mass Comment Campaign (2,156) (Environment Michigan)

Mass Comment Campaign (2,851) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union of Concerned Scientists-1)

Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

Mass Comment Campaign (213) (Environment Virginia)

Mass Comment Campaign (22,122) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (262) (Environment New Mexico-2)

Mass Comment Campaign (27,108) (Unknown Organization

Mass Comment campaign (3,855) (National Wildlife Federation Action Fund-2)

Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

Mass Comment Campaign (39) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (39,464) (Environmental Defense Fund (EDF))

Mass Comment Campaign (399) (Rhode Island Sierra Club)

Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (45) (Environment Minnesota)
National Program

1-3

Mass Comment Campaign (61) (The Social Justice Group)

Mass Comment Campaign (680) (PennEvironment)

Mass Comment Campaign (80) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (927) (Sierra Club-1)

Mass Comment Campaign (99) (Environment Texas)

Mass Comment Campaign (Multiple Submitters) (Unknown Organization)

Mazda North American Operations

Mehrotra, Rahul

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

Michigan State House of Representatives

Michigan State Senate, District 18

Miller, P.

Minnesota Department of Commerce

Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Moravian College

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

National Caucus of Environmental Legislators

National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

New Jersey Senate, Third Legislative District

New York City Council, 35th District

New York State Assembly Committee on Government Operations

New York State Senate, 26th District

Nissan North America, Inc.

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Oblong Land Conservancy

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Pennsylvania State Senate et al.

Pew Charitable Trusts

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Renewable Energy Long Island

Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

Ross, D.

Salinas, A.

Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

South Coast AQMD

State of New York The Assembly

Tarazevich, Yegor

Tesla Motors, Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

1-4

The Catskill Center for Conservation and Development

Toyota Motor North America

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

United States Senate

United States Steel Corporation

United Steel Workers (USW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Weiner, L.

WESPAC Foundation

Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S.

Organization: Alexandria Hyundai

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 63.]

Along with my Hyundai colleague, I appreciate the effort on the part of all agencies in 

developing feasible and harmonized national greenhouse gas and CAFE standards.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Two years ago the Alliance testified and commented in support of the model year (MY) 2012-16 

greenhouse gas (GHG) and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) rule and encouraged EPA, 

NHTSA and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to continue the single National 

Program beyond MY 2016. We continue to support having a single National Program and 

appreciate the agencies’ efforts to pursue this goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 95.]

Organization: Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

We congratulate EPA and NHTSA on the outstanding body of work reflected in the NPRM. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 1]

In sum, we want to thank the agencies for their continued emphasis on reducing fuel 

consumption and GHG emissions and commitment to size-based standards. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0226-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 219-220.]
National Program

1-5

We recognize that developing a comprehensive national fuel economy regulation is a formidable 

task with profound consequences, and we want to sincerely congratulate the agencies on the 

outstanding job. We sincerely see it as an outstanding body of work and the conclusions are 

realistic, attainable and will achieve our national objectives in energy so we think it's an 

outstanding job and a credit to all of the agencies and individuals who are involved. It's been a 

pleasure to work with the organizations.

Organization: American Chemistry Council (ACC)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 264-265.]

We do want to state on the record that we support the CAFE standards moving forward. We 

think that they are aggressive but achievable.

The American Chemistry Council's plastics division would like commend both EPA and 

NHTSA on its approach and on this proposal. We believe the proposal takes a huge step forward 

in increasing fuel efficiency requirements in automobiles.

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) supports the light-duty fuel 

economy and greenhouse gas rule proposed by NHTSA and the EPA for model years 2017-2025. 

The proposal represents a very substantial reduction in fuel consumption and greenhouse gas 

emissions relative to business as usual, as well as enormous saving at the pump for consumers.

The economic impacts of the rule will be substantial and net positive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9528-A2, p.1]

Conclusions

Notwithstanding the multiple recommendations we have made that we believe would strengthen 

the final rule, we reiterate here our strong support for the proposed standards. We believe that the 

joint work done by NHTSA and the EPA, along with the California ARB, has resulted in a 

proposal that is highly significant and sound, from both policy and technical perspectives. We 

thank the agencies for the opportunity to provide comments and hope that our comments can 

help to bring about an even better final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.9]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 108-113.]

On behalf of ACEEE, I'm here to actively support the role of productive investments in more 

energy-efficient technologies as they might positively improve the robustness of the U.S. 

economy. In particular, we applaud the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the administration more generally, and the State of 

California for taking steps that will improve the fuel economy of our nation's light-duty vehicles.
EPA Response to Comments

1-6

So in sum, the rule, we think, will drive further gains in gasoline vehicles and begin to pull 

advanced technologies into the market. Cost-effective investments in more fuel-efficient vehicles 

resulting from this rule should accelerate and optimize benefits, whether jobs, cleaner air and a 

more robust economy, especially when we take recent consumer interest in fuel economy into 

account.

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”) appreciates the efforts made by EPA and NHTSA to

create the single national program to address motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions and fuel 

economy standards for model years 2017 – 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 1]

Honda supports the overarching goal of the NPRM, which is to establish a “coordinated and 

harmonized approach” to implementing the Clean Air Act’s mandate that EPA regulate motor 

vehicle emissions, and the mandate in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) that 

NHTSA regulate motor vehicle fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 115-116.]

This NPRM builds upon the important foundation established by the seminal greenhouse gas and 

CAFE standards adopted for the '12 to '16 model years. These newly proposed standards 

represent an ambitious, challenging, and dramatic set of goals for most of the automobile 

industry.

These proposed regulations set forth in the NPRM when harmonized with the proposed 

regulations now under consideration in California have the potential to simplify and rationalize 

OEM obligations throughout the United States. Without these harmonized regulations, there is a 

significant risk that OEMs would face fragmented, conflicting and burdensome regulation of fuel 

economy and greenhouse gases. There's a strong likelihood that the California regulations, which 

likely would be adopted by additional states, would diverge from the Federal Regulations 

resulting in a patchwork of standards that differed in stringency, testing requirements, and 

flexibilities throughout the country.

Organization: American Lung Association

The American Lung Association is pleased that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency seeks 

to reduce these emissions from light-duty vehicles. The joint proposed Greenhouse Gas Emission 

Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards will reduce carbon dioxide emissions 

to 163 grams per mile while mandating an average economy of 54.5 miles per gallon in 2025. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, p. 1]

While the proposed rule will have significant benefits, there are still areas of critical need. 

Implementation of the proposed rule will benefit from improved testing and calculation of actual 

vehicle emissions, reliable air quality impacts assessments of electric vehicles, and averted costs 

associated with higher projected fuel costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, p. 2]
National Program

1-7

The American Lung Association again thanks the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for 

consideration of our comments and for the Agency’s effort to curb the impacts of air pollution. 

The American Lung Association urges the Agency to promulgate the proposed rule. The true 

cost of pollution from mobile sources is paid in compromised human health. As such, the 

proposed rule will help to reduce those costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, p. 2]

Organization: American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 80-82.]

American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic is pleased that the Environmental Protection 

Agency and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration have jointly proposed more 

stringent national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to increase corporate 

average fuel economy.

When implemented the new standards will be remarkable achievements.

We support the proposed rule, and we encourage EPA and NHTSA to promulgate a final rule 

that achieves at least the degree of reduction in air pollutants as a proposal would accomplish.

Organization: American Medical Association of California

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 44-48.]

The American Lung Association in California applauds the collaborative effort put forth by the 

Obama administration, the State of California, automakers and environmental stakeholders to 

develop this proposal that we believe will have a lasting impact on improving public health. The 

American Lung Association in California encourages the administration to pursue strong, clean 

air programs to improve the health and air of not only Californians, but all Americans.

Increasing fuel economy standards to 54.5 miles per gallon in 2025 and tightening emissions 

standards to halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 compared to today has the potential to 

transform our nation's vehicles into a cleaner, more efficient fleet that will reduce our addiction 

to oil, save consumers at the pump, provide expanded choices in cleaner vehicle technologies, 

and at the same time, cut harmful emissions that endanger the public's health.

The new greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards are an important milestone in the fight 

against climate change, air pollution and the serious public health impacts of our petroleum 

dependency and consumption.

Therefore, we urge you to implement strong rules that will withstand any attempts to undermine 

these goals.

Organization: American Suzuki Motor Corporation
EPA Response to Comments

1-8

Suzuki Motor Corporation ('Suzuki') supports the concept of a harmonized national approach to 

reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and improving fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9523-A1, p.1]

Organization: Applied Materials

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 198-201.]

But we are very supportive of the proposal that's being reviewed today; the NHTSA and EPA 

proposal, and we applaud the Obama Administration for proposing these historic fuel economy 

and greenhouse gas emission standards.

We believe that sound public policy can be a critical accelerator for industrial development, and 

we think that's embodied in this current proposal.

No. 1, we do believe that sound science-based standards can drive innovation.

We think that the standards as proposed are achievable.

Lastly, again, in terms of industrial development, we're very supportive of the mile per gallon 

standard and we believe it's important that there be a domestic industry in this sector as well. 

And we think that while this is going to be a global effort, it's going to lead to our domestic 

industry being stimulated as well.

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

This notice of proposed rulemaking brings us another step closer to the goal of having a long 

term harmonized national program. Global Automakers and its members have always endorsed a 

comprehensive and harmonized national approach to reducing GHG emissions and improving 

fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, letter p. 1]

We have been working diligently with the agencies, including the California Air Resources 

Board, to create a harmonized program that meets our national environmental and energy 

objectives while providing manufacturers the needed flexibility and lead-time to design and build 

a full range of advanced technology vehicles that consumers want to buy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9466-A1, letter p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 65.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 49-50.]

Global Automakers and its members have always endorsed a comprehensive and harmonized 

national approach to reducing GHG emissions and improving fuel economy. The alternative of 
National Program

1-9

having to comply with a patchwork of state requirements would add significant costs resulting in 

higher vehicle prices, with no corresponding environmental or energy security benefits. We have 

been working with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Transportation’s 

(DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and California Air Resources 

Board (ARB) to create a program that meets national environmental and energy objectives while 

providing manufacturers the flexibility and lead-time necessary to design and build advanced 

technology vehicles that will provide consumers a full range of vehicle choices. This notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM) brings us another step closer to the goal of having a long term, 

single national program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda Limited, Lotus Cars Limited and McLaren Automotive

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 117-118.]

We all fully support the EPA and NHTSA proposal.

Organization: Biery-Hamilton, Dr. G.

I strongly support the proposed new fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for cars and 

trucks to require cars and trucks to an average 54.5 miles per gallon by model year 2025. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9033-A1,p.1]

Together with the 'Phase One' model year 2012-2016 rule finalized in 2010, these tough new 

standards would more than double America's average fuel economy and are expected to:

-- Save families an estimated $8,200 in fuel savings over the lifetime of a new vehicle by 2025, 

for a total of $1.7 trillion in national fuel savings over the life of the program.

-- Reduce oil consumption by an estimated 2.2 million barrels a day by 2025 more than our daily 

2010 oil imports from the entire Persian Gulf.

-- Reduce carbon dioxide pollution by over 6 billion metric tons over the life of the program 

equivalent to the emissions from the United States in 2010. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9033-

A1, p.1]

Generating less pollution, putting more money in consumers' wallets, easing our addiction to oil, 

modernizing America's fleet of cars and trucks what's not to like? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9033-A1, p.1]

I am thrilled that this dramatic and bold proposal has earned the support of automakers, 

autoworkers, national security groups, environmental groups, and many other key stakeholders. 

And I am proud to add my support to this important rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9033-A1, 

p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

1-10

I have a small child. Do you have children or grandchildren? If you love them and want them to 

have a good future, you will support ANY measure to reduce the use of fossil fuels, and the 

resulting CO2 emissions. Furthermore, you will support policies to change our industrial farming 

to reduce methane emissions, also, which change the atmosphere around the planet. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9033-A1, p.1]

Organization: BlueGreen Alliance

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 58-60.]

The BlueGreen Alliance strongly supports the light-duty vehicle standards for model year 2017 

to 2025 that will raise fuel efficiency to 54.5 miles per gallon, nearly double what today's fuel 

efficiency standard is and limit the greenhouses gas emissions as it's been noted to 163 grams per 

mile.

We also request continuing federal programs to support these auto industry efforts in retooling to 

meet the demand for cleaner, more efficient cars.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 60-61.]

This is a unique opportunity to fulfill your commitments to create American jobs, protect 

consumers whether they drive a car or truck from high gas prices and to cut America's 

dependence on foreign oil. Our 15 BlueGreen Alliance partners and their 15 million members are 

committed to promoting the fact that green auto jobs are a win-win for all Americans, and we're 

committed to raise awareness among consumers of the significance of these fuel-saving 

technologies.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 37-40.]

We strongly support the proposed vehicle standards, which are a great example of how we can 

achieve simultaneous progress on our economic and environmental challenges. The proposed 

standard offers the opportunity to create quality manufacturing jobs, to reduce our reliance on 

imported energy, to reduce our vulnerability to crude oil price volatility, to lean the air and 

reduce the accumulation of heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere, and to improve our energy 

security and national security.

While job creation is a paramount concern, we should not discount the other benefits that the 

proposal will consider. If we are ever to make meaningful progress on our imported energy 

dependency and avoid accelerated climate destabilization, we will need well-conceived policies 

such as these.

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC
National Program

1-11

BMW is committed to working constructively with both EPA and NHTSA to continue a Single 

National Program for MYs 2017 through 2025 that also realizes the aggressive greenhouse gas 

reductions sought by the State of California in this timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-

A1, p. 1]

The continuation of Single National Program is critical to BMW's ability to plan, design, and 

build the most efficient vehicles for all of America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 1]

BMW is committed to delivering sustainable products and supports such standards because we 

think it is the right step in order to successfully address the global environmental challenge 

facing all nations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 2]

In keeping with our corporate commitment to reduce vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 

BMW commends both EPA and NHTSA for their efforts to continue to refine the program 

established for MYs 2012 through 2016 that permits automakers to build a single light duty 

national fleet, satisfying the requirements of each Agency program as well as those of the State 

of California. We also greatly appreciate the efforts of the State of California to ensure this 

outcome. A Single National Program is critical for us so we can plan, design, and build the most 

efficient vehicles for all of America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 78.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 78-79.]

We commend both the EPA and the NHTSA for the efforts to continue to refine the program that 

was previously established for model years 2012 to 2016.

And that program permits auto makers to build a single light-duty national fleet supplying the 

requirements of each agency program as well as those of the State of California.

Achievable greenhouse gas emission reductions and commensurate fuel economy increases 

depends on both designing more fuel-efficient vehicles and increasing market demand for such 

vehicles. We can build the vehicles, but consumers must buy them.

A comprehensive emission reduction policy needs to consider all aspects, most importantly 

consumer demand.

In conclusion, the BMW Group is committed to working constructively with EPA and NHTSA 

to continue a single national program for model years 2017 to 2025.

We very much appreciate the efforts of the State of California to ensure the continuation of a 

single national program going forward.

Organization: Borg Warner, Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

1-12

BorgWarner would first like to commend the EPA and NHTSA for their combined efforts to 

continue to harmonize these footprint-based standards and give the automotive industry some 

much needed long term clarity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, p. 1]

As a global technology leader focused on improving fuel economy and reducing emissions, 

BorgWarner has experienced what can be achieved in other parts of the world and we are eager 

to help the U.S. market reach the new standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, p. 1]

In closing, BorgWarner is supportive of the EPA’s and NHTSA’s efforts and sees the proposal as 

a major step forward in our desire for energy independence and reduced CO2 emissions. We urge 

the EPA and NHTSA to revisit the proposed rulemaking to ensure it is purely performance 

based, technology neutral and uses accurate measurement and calculation methods. The 

marketplace will see the real world results, making the auto industry more stable, globally 

competitive and a larger contributor to achieving our nation’s goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9320-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Business for Innovative Climate & Energy Policy (BICEP)

As major U.S. businesses representing nearly 500,000 American jobs and over $100 billion in 

annual revenue, we are writing to voice our strong support for the proposed Greenhouse Gas 

(GHG) Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards. These standards 

represent a critical opportunity to strengthen our economy by creating jobs, benefiting the U.S. 

auto industry, saving consumers and businesses money on fuel, and reducing greenhouse gas 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9450-A1, p. 1]

As successful American businesses, we know the importance of recognizing and seizing 

opportunities. This rulemaking is a rare opportunity to strengthen our economy, save consumers 

and businesses money, create jobs, and mitigate climate risk. We urge the adoption of the 

strongest possible fuel economy and GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9450-A1, p. 2]

Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 11-12.]

As you know, the results of our efforts reveal the enormous benefits of the proposed greenhouse 

gas standards. Greenhouse gas emissions of 2025 models will be a third lower than those of 

2016. Fuel savings will be so substantial that the total cost of owning and operating a low 

greenhouse gas vehicle will be less than it is today, despite the higher initial cost of the vehicle. 

And the fuel savings means money that would have gone overseas to produce petroleum will 

stay in our country where it will be spent and create new jobs for Americans. This is truly a winwin proposal that will benefit America.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing 

on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 12-13]
National Program

1-13

As part of our effort to ensure a national program, CARB has committed to accept compliance 

with the EPA greenhouse gas standards as compliance with our state standards. Once this occurs, 

hopefully by this summer, CARB will hold another hearing to consider a regulatory provision to 

formalize our commitment allowing compliance with EPA standards to fully satisfy the states' 

regulation. This is the same process and sequence of events we followed to allow EPA's 

compliance with 2012 to 2016 greenhouse gas standards to satisfy CARB standards for those 

years. Our intent is clear from our proposal and it will be memorialized in a formal resolution 

that would go before our board later this week.

Organization: Capozzelli, J.

The proposed fuel-efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for passenger vehicles and light 

trucks are a good step in reducing dangerous global warming, increasing national security and 

improving our economy. Compared to business as usual, they will prevent millions of tons of 

global warming emissions, save consumers billions of dollars at the gas pump and reduce 

America's dependence on dirty fossil fuels. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0221-A1, p.1]

We can no longer afford to pass up this tremendous opportunity. Setting fuel efficiency 

standards, because curbing global warming pollution from our transportation sector is one of the 

easiest and most effective ways to slow the quickening pace of climate change. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0221-A1, p.1]

Please adopt the strongest possible standards and close the SUV loophole. We must reduce 

carbon pollution from our cars, not increase it.

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 214-216.]

We really appreciate the effort of the EPA in the sense that it should be ruled, and it's a laudable 

effort. 

Organization: CEO Pipe Organs/Golden Ponds Farm

I support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average of 

54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther on a gallon 

of gas and reduce USA dependence on imported oil. The price of gas is once again squeezing the 

budgets of USA families, who already are forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for basic 

transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9229-A1, p.1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements. I 

commend your efforts. I believe it is important to increase USA investment in fuel efficient 
EPA Response to Comments

1-14

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help this country break its dependence on 

foreign oil, and protect the global environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9229-A1, p.1]

Do not let these standards be watered down. Protect and finalize the new fuel efficiency rules. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9229-A1, p.1]

Organization: Ceres

As a national coalition of investors, environmental organizations and other public interest groups 

working with companies to address sustainability challenges such as global climate change, we 

are writing to voice our strong support for the proposed Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 

1]

In sum, independent, credible analysis shows that the proposed standards will both benefit the 

auto industry, especially the Detroit 3, and create jobs. In addition, the proposed standards will 

spur innovation, reduce both our dependence on oil and climate risk, and save businesses and 

consumers money. Accordingly, we urge the adoption of the strongest standards possible. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 74-76.]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Chrysler strongly supports a single, harmonized national greenhouse gas and fuel economy 

performance standard (“National Program”) that allows manufacturers to build “a single fleet of 

U.S. vehicles that [will] satisfy all requirements under both programs as well as under 

California’s [greenhouse gas] program, helping to reduce costs and regulatory complexity while 

providing significant energy and environmental benefits.” In its letter of support for the proposed 

2017-2025 model year (“MY”) National Program, Chrysler committed to the proposed standards 

as substantially described in the agencies’ August 2011 Supplemental Notice of Intent. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 52-53.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 25.]

This rulemaking builds upon the landmark Federal greenhouse gas and CAFE program for model 

year (“MY”) 2012-2016 light-duty vehicles, referred to as the “National Program”. Chrysler has 

long supported both the original National Program and this extension to it. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 5]
National Program

1-15

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 51.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 57-60.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 24-25.]

Chrysler recognizes the benefit for the country of continuing the national program to address fuel 

economy and greenhouse gases. EPA and NHTSA began this program in 2009 with standards for 

model years 2012 through '16, and now the agencies are continuing for model years 2017 

through '25.

Chrysler supports the goals of the program.

The foundation principles are: (1) strong performance requirements, (2) a midterm review to 

assess customer acceptance, and (3) a broad use of incentives to encourage technology 

innovations and early integration into production vehicles.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 52-53.]

However, Chrysler fully supports the goals of this program. Sergio Marchionne, our CEO is also 

the CEO of Fiat, which is the industry's fuel economy leader in Europe. He understands and 

endorses these commitments and is determined to pursue the product actions necessary for 

Chrysler to meet these 2017 and beyond goals.

Chrysler will support the final rules if they reflect the commitments and the foundational 

principles of the framework agreement. These foundational principles are one, strong 

performance requirements; two, a mid-term review to assess customer acceptance; and, three, the 

broad use of incentives to encourage technology innovations and early integration into 

production vehicles.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 55.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 62.]

In conclusion, I reiterate Chrysler's support for a single harmonized national standard for fuel 

economy and greenhouse gas emissions.

Organization: Climate Institute
EPA Response to Comments

1-16

I am writing in support of the strong fuel-efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new cars 

and trucks. Having been the scientist whose brief Justice Stevens cited in his majority opinion in 

Massachusetts et al. v. EPA to justify granting standing, I would reiterate that the damages

occurring now and projected in the future as a result of greenhouse gas emissions are significant 

and the risk of much more severe conditions ahead is very great. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7944-A1, p. 1]

As my brief also made clear, the transport sector is a key contributor to CO2 emissions and they 

must be reduced. Greatly increasing the mileage standards is a critical step and I urge you to 

move forward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7944-A1, p.1]

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

A LANDMARK POLICY SUPPORTED BY AN UNPRECEDENTED CONSENSUS

Seven Presidents have declared the goal of reducing U.S. dependence on oil, but little progress 

has been made. Statements at the public hearings held by the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the recently 

proposed auto standards for 2017-2025 indicate a remarkable shift in the policy landscape with 

the emergence of an unprecedented consensus in support of fuel economy standards that would 

double the efficiency of cars and trucks in less than two decades and dramatically reduce oil 

consumption and imports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 1]

Public witnesses say and consumer advocates present survey and behavioral evidence that 

consumers want and will pay for more fuel efficient vehicles.

Automakers and auto workers say they can and will manufacture those vehicles.

National security experts and environmentalists say the nation will benefit from the standards.

The only stakeholder that does not seem “to get” it is the National Automotive Dealers 

Association. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 1]

Over the course of a decade, the growing public concern about gasoline and its burden on 

household budgets drove a policy consensus in support of higher standards. This consensus 

includes not only almost all of the stakeholders in the industry, but it also crosses the federal and 

state levels, all branches of government, and both political parties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9419-A1, p. 1]

These comments and the attached Technical Appendices explain why the standards have earned 

such widespread support and why the concerns of the dealers, genuine though they may be, are 

unfounded. We present over a dozen reasons that the standards will benefits consumers, the 

economy, national security, and the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 1]

The future of the auto industry lies in developing and delivering more fuel efficient vehicles. The 

future of the American economy lies in using energy much more efficiently. The proposed 
National Program

1-17

standards will help to ensure that the U.S. auto industry and the U.S. economy successfully 

negotiate the transition. These comments show that because these fuel economy standards are the 

most important energy policy in a quarter of century, they deserve the remarkable national 

consensus support they have received. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 1]

CONSUMER GROUP COMMENTERS AND APPROACH

The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and 23 of its member groups appreciate the 

opportunity to submit comments on the proposed standards for cars and light duty trucks. As 

summarized in Exhibit S-1, we have been actively involved in this important area of energy 

policymaking at both the federal and state levels. Over the past seven years, CFA has issued 

dozens of reports on the technology, auto market behavior and consumer economics of auto fuel 

economy, as well as conducted numerous surveys on consumer attitudes about gasoline 

consumption and fuel economy standards. [See Exhibit S-1 on p. 2 of Docket number EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 1]

CFA has analyzed the economics of fuel economy and monitors the development of fuel 

economy standards in an effort to ensure that policymakers set a standard that is good for 

consumers and the nation. These comments build on that background and incorporate several of 

the early analyses as technical appendices. The comments launch from and focus on the key 

factors that impact the consumer, but also reflect the factors that affect the industry and the 

conditions that Congress has required the agencies to take into account in the rulemaking. The 

following list summarizes the analyses we have conducted to reach the conclusion that the 

proposed standards will benefit consumers. The Roman numerals identify the section in the 

technical appendix in which data is presented addressing each issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9419-A1, p. 1]

I. CONSUMER REALITY: CONSUMERS NEED MORE FUEL EFFICIENT VEHICLES

Over the past decade, gasoline prices have gyrated wildly around a strong upward trend. Exhibit 

S-2 shows the average annual expenditure on vehicle ownership (new and used vehicles) 

compared to the expenditure on gasoline, as reported in Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual 

Consumer Expenditure Survey. [See Exhibit S-2 on p. 3 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 3]

Gasoline prices set a record high in 2011 averaging $3.53 per gallon. The average price for 

January 2012 was the highest on record for the month of January. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9419-A1, p. 3]

Household gasoline expenditures set a record last year, reaching an average of over $2,850 per 

year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 3]

Rising gasoline prices have changed the structure of the cost of driving. Ten years ago, the 

average cost of owning a vehicle was the largest single component of the cost of driving. Today, 

the average cost of owning a vehicle has come down approximately 20% and the cost of gasoline 

has tripled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

1-18

In 2011, the cost of gasoline will equal or exceed the cost of owning the vehicle for the first 

time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 3]

In 2011, gasoline expenditures were 40 percent higher than expenditures on home energy 

(electricity, natural gas and heating oil); ten years ago, they were 13% lower. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 3]

II. CONSUMERS ATTITUDES: CONSUMERS WANT MORE FUEL EFFICIENT 

VEHICLES AND SUPPORT FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS.

Given the burden on household budgets and the continuing problem of oil vulnerability, it is not 

surprising to find that 75 percent or more of respondents to our public opinion polls: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 4]

• are concerned about gasoline prices and dependence on Mid-East oil;

• think it is important to reduce oil consumption; and,

• support higher fuel economy standards as a good way to do so.

• In fact, almost two-thirds of the respondents support a 60 mile per gallon standard with a 

payback period of 3-5 years and think it will be good for automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 4]

Exhibit S-3 shows widespread support for fuel economy standards that are even higher than 

those proposed by NHTSA-EPA in a national random sample poll of over 2000 respondents. 

Substantial majorities support standards across different types of states and the political 

spectrum, even with payback periods of ten years. [See Exhibit S-3 on p. 4 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 4]

III. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: CONSUMERS HAVE SHOWN THEY ARE WILLING TO 

PAY FOR MORE FUEL EFFICIENT VEHICLES

Consumers don’t just say they want more fuel efficient vehicles--they have shown they are 

willing to buy them. Looking at the total light duty markets (cars and light trucks) between 2004, 

the year when the worst price increases began, and 2011, the market shares of:] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

• cars increased from 48% to 59% of all vehicles,

• 4-cylinder engines increased from 28% to 48%,

• the use of variable transmissions and the number of gears has increase dramatically, and

• sales of small and mid-sized SUVs increased by more than one-third to almost 21% of all 

vehicles sold, while large SUVs dropped by 70% to less than 2% of vehicles sold.

Looking at cars only, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

• hybrids increased from less than 1% of cars sold to more than 6%, but

• small cars remained constant at 47% of all cars sold. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-

A1, p. 5]
National Program

1-19

THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL POLICY CONSENSUS

The reality of soaring consumer expenditures on gasoline and the response by consumers in the 

marketplace provides the context for the dramatic shift in public policy and the growth of a 

political consensus over the first decade of the 21st century. Although the gasoline price spike of 

2000-2001 proved to be a blip, compared to later developments, it got the attention of the public 

and policy makers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 14]

At least since the National Academy of Sciences concluded in 2002 that technologies exist to 

dramatically increase fuel economy at manageable costs, the public policy debate has been about 

how far and how fast the fuel economy of the vehicle fleet can be raised. In the early 2000s, 

California exercised its authority under the Clean Air Act to propose new standards to cut 

emissions from automobiles, which have the effect of also increasing fuel economy. When 13 

states and the District of Columbia adopted the Clean Cars Program, they created a market that 

ranks in the top five in the world and gave a big push to raising standards.1 The automakers 

could not ignore such a market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 15]

The much more dramatic price spikes of the middle of the decade moved concerns about 

gasoline consumption to center stage, so much so that President Bush made a dramatic statement 

about it in his 2006 State of the Union Address by declaring “here we have a serious problem: 

America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world. The best 

way to break this addiction is through technology.”2 Democrat and Republican legislators, 

federal and state policy makers as well as all three branches came together to support a 

significant increase in fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 15]

In response, Congress, with Republican majorities in both houses, enacted the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). The law, which both the Bush administration 

and the Obama administration moved quickly to implement, reformed and improved the 

approach to standards and restarted the process of setting standards, after almost three decades in 

which the fuel economy standards program had been essentially dormant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9419-A1, p. 15]

Congressional action significantly improved the approach to standard setting in several ways. 

For example, by requiring NHTSA to set an attribute-based standard, the incentive to downsize 

the fleet is reduced. Authorizing several forms of flexibility promotes efficiency in meeting the 

standard. Incentives encourage development of new technologies. The momentum for higher 

standards was reinforced by the courts and legal action. A Supreme Court decision upholding the 

authority of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gasses as 

a pollutant strengthened federal authority. The federal government supported the Clean Cars 

program and the courts upheld state authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 15]

The Obama Administration has used Executive Branch authority to improve the overall process. 

The White House issued an executive order that required EPA and NHTSA to coordinate with 

each other and the California Air Resources Board--coordination that immediately led to 

increases in the standard that will save consumers over $35 billion in the 2012-2015 period 
EPA Response to Comments

1-20

alone. The ongoing effort to set a long-term standard responds to the oft repeated observation 

that the auto industry needs time to adapt. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 15]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 42.]

The simple fact of the matter is that with every scenario considered by the two agencies the 

benefits vastly exceed the costs, and everyone gets that. That's why you heard labor, you have 

heard the environmentalist, you've heard automakers and you've heard consumers support this 

program.

Simply put, these standards may well be the most important energy policy of the last quarter of a 

century. They are a win-win-win for consumers, for the economy, for national security and the 

environment.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 58.]

The proposed standards will deliver major economic security, air quality benefits to consumers 

and the nation while putting the U.S. auto industry back on the path to global success.

We are not alone in the support of this standard. Consumers, automakers and autoworkers 

recognize the important need for achievability of more fuel-efficient vehicles.

It is remarkable that 13 of the 16 major car manufacturers support these standards. Clearly, they 

know they can manufacture the vehicles that meet the standard, and they understand it's what 

their consumers want and will pay for.

The only major opponents of this consumer-backed policy are the car dealers. Their opposition 

shows what I believe to be an incomprehensible reaction to the desires of their customers, the 

capability of manufacturers that they sell the cars for, and the critically important need to reduce 

our dependency on foreign oil. So we appreciate the opportunity to respond to our good friends 

in the auto dealers community.

1 The Clean Cars states (Arizona, Connecticut, Washington D.C., Florida, Maine, Maryland, 

Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 

Washington). account for 40% of U.S. registered vehicles (Bureau of the Census, 

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 

http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2006/transportation/motor_vehicle_registrations/) 

making the market larger than all markets except the rest of the U.S., the European Union and 

Japan,

2 'Here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from 

unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through technology,' he said, 
National Program

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adding that technological advances will help achieve a 'great goal: to replace more than 75 

percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.” http://articles.cnn.com/2006-01-

31/politics/sotu.energy_1_oil-prices-oil-imports-big-oil?_s=PM:POLITICS

Organization: Consumer Reports

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 168-169.]

In summary, we support the proposed fuel economy standards because in addition to achieving 

national security and environmental goals, they will save consumers thousands of dollars, and 

improve the selection of fuel efficient and alternative fuel vehicles and maintain the range of 

wide vehicle options.

Organization: Consumers Union

Introduction

Consumers Union supports the proposed Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards 

and recommends that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) move forward to update the program for 2017-2025 to 

build upon the progress made in the last CAFE rulemaking for model years 2012-2016. While 

we believe a higher CAFE target, particularly for light trucks, would drive even greater fuel 

savings and technological advancement, the proposed target is reasonable and provides excellent 

value for consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.1]

Comments

I. Consumers benefit from the proposed standards

Improving fuel economy standards serves important national security, economic, and 

environmental goals and provides outstanding consumer benefits. Requiring better fuel 

efficiency from every auto manufacturers’ fleet will drive innovation, provide more certainty for 

investment in cleaner and more efficient technologies, and help erode the price premium often 

charged for superior fuel economy. Right now, many automakers charge more for more fuel 

efficient versions of certain vehicles,2 and hybrid power trains often run thousands of dollars 

more expensive than their traditional counterparts. Improving fuel economy standards will spur 

greater investment and deployment of more efficient gasoline engines and create incentive for 

improvements in battery technology that will lower costs and improve performance of electric 

and hybrid-electric power trains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, pp.1-2]

In conclusion, Consumers Union commends NHTSA and EPA for developing robust, forwardlooking CAFE standards that should yield substantial consumer benefits and encourages the 

agencies to head off and monitor any compliance strategies that undermine the projected 

benefits. A more efficient fleet will save consumers thousands of dollars in fuel costs, improve 

selection of fuel efficient and alternative fuel vehicles, and maintain a range of options across 
EPA Response to Comments

1-22

vehicle class. Thank you for considering our views. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, pp.7-

8]

2 - Examples include the Ford Fiesta SFE, Ford Focus SFE and Honda Civic HF.

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 108-112.]

We support the continuation of a national program that incorporates energy efficiency and 

emission reduction benefits, while remaining technology neutral without favoring selective 

approaches.

Again, we feel a national program that incorporates energy efficiency and emission reduction 

benefits should remain technology neutral. I think you can see that Delphi has taken this 

approach in order to provide its customers the broadest range of technologies to meet their 

individual requirements.

Organization: Detroit NAACP

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 139.]

We applaud the EPA, NHTSA as well as DOT as well as California and the Obama 

Administration for taking another large step along a long road to sustainable transportation 

systems.

Organization: E100 Ethanol Group

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 202.]

The E100 Ethanol Group fully supports the objectives of this program as evidenced by the White 

House graphic released last July.

Organization: Eaton Corporation

Our comments are meant to strike a balance between GHG reduction goals and the economic 

realities of the U.S. automotive and transportation industries, taking into account the diverse 

goals of all stakeholders ranging from original equipment manufacturers (OEM), automotive 

technology suppliers, dealers and environmental advocates. We believe that the framework 

outlined in the NPRM is a good step toward a final regulation that will drive innovation and 
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foster both technology and competition, while maintaining fleet diversity and incentivizing overachievement of emissions and fuel economy targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]

We hope that our comments contribute to the current framework outlined in the NPRM and lead 

to a final regulation that will drive innovation and foster both technology and competition, while 

maintaining vehicle performance, safety and affordability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, 

p. 3]

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 191.]

Beyond the direct benefits of the standard, the Ecology Center would like to commend the EPA 

and NHTSA on its successful negotiation that is reflected in the standards we are discussing here 

today. It is no small feat to be able to bring together such a broad representation of interests 

including the automotive, environmental and consumer groups as well as the State of California 

to negotiate a rule that all parties can support. We believe it is important to recognize the 

successful process that the agencies have managed and led, including the cooperation between 

the two agencies itself.

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

EcoMotors supports continuation of a coordinated National Program to reduce GHG emissions 

and improve fuel economy, and generally supports the manner in which the agencies have 

proposed to harmonize their regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 1]

Organization: Edmunds.com

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 100.]

I'd like to first note that the Edmunds.com agrees with the motivation behind the proposed CAFE 

standards; that is, we agree it is necessary for the government to intervene in the market in order 

to significantly reduce vehicle emissions and increase reliance on foreign oil.

Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association

EDTA supports many aspects of this proposal, including the zero-emissions compliance value 

and the inclusion of a multiplier for electric drive vehicles. These incentives will enable 

manufacturers to accelerate the development and deployment of electric drive technologies, 

which will give consumers a wide array of vehicle choices, while also helping to reduce 

emissions and reduce our dependence on petroleum fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, 

p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

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We urge EPA and NHTSA to finalize a rule that retains strong incentives for electric drive 

vehicles, while also addressing the specific concerns raised in these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

We applaud the collaboration between EPA, NHTSA, auto companies, the workers that forge 

cleaner cars and the state of California in building this proposal, together, through tough 

negotiations and an abiding commitment to a common good for our nation. The success of this 

collaboration is reflected in the broad support for this rule from small businesses, consumers, 

veterans, national security experts, and many more across our land. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9519-A1, p.2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 171.]

In 2010, NHTSA and EPA together finalized the first-ever joint greenhouse gas and fuel 

economy standards for light-duty vehicles – a laudable achievement. The Agencies estimate that 

the standards for MY2012-2016 cars and light trucks will save consumers more than $3000 over 

the lifetime of a 2016 vehicle. The rule is also expected to reduce GHG emissions from the lightduty fleet by approximately 21 percent by 2030 and save 1.8 billion barrels of oil over the 

lifetime of the fleet.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p.3]

Following this first phase of fuel economy and GHG standards, in a May 2010 Presidential 

Memorandum, President Obama requested that EPA and NHTSA continue a coordinated 

National Program to improve fuel efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions of light-duty

vehicles for MY2017–2025. The President stated that the second phase should “seek to achieve 

substantial annual progress in reducing transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions and fossil 

fuel consumption” and “strengthen the industry and enhance job creation in the United States.”13 

In this proposal the agencies estimate the second phase of the National Program will save 

approximately 4 billion barrels of oil and 2 billion metric tons of GHG emissions over the 

lifetimes of those vehicles sold in MY 2017-2025. The agencies also estimate that the fuel 

savings will far outweigh higher vehicle costs, and that the net benefits to society of the proposed 

standards will be as much as $421 billion over the lifetime of MY 2017-2025 vehicles.14 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p.3]

If finalized, these standards, together with MY 2012-2016 standards, will create a formidable 

National Program that will greatly reduce our reliance on foreign oil and our contribution to 

climate altering greenhouse gas emissions, while saving Americans over a trillion dollars. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p.3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 287.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 172-173.]
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The proposed rule under consideration today will help to provide energy security, economic 

security and climate security for our nation. Increasing the efficiency of our passenger fleet is 

one of the single most effective solutions we can employ to reduce our dependence on oil, and 

will likely be President Obama's greatest climate and energy security legacy.

Organization: Ferrari

Ferrari appreciates the efforts made by EPA and NHTSA to work closely together and with 

CARB in order to develop a proposal for a single coordinated national program (herewith 

National Program) to regulate greenhouse gases and fuel economy for the period MYs 2017-

2025, as it was done for the final rule for MYs 2012-16. This is a prerequisite that allows auto 

manufacturers to build a single national light-duty fleet that would comply with both the GHG 

and the CAFE standards, and also with CARB GHG regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9535-A2, p.10]

We deem it is essential to have federal regulations on these important topics, to avoid a 

patchwork of different State rules. Accordingly, it is necessary that, once the National Program is 

adopted as final rule, the California will accept the compliance with it and no other State rules on 

this subject will be enacted in the future years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.10]

It is important to define regulations which do not penalize certain types of vehicles, and 

manufacturers to allow consumers to choose from the same mix of vehicles that are currently in 

the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.10]

CO2 emissions and fuel economy are strictly related to each other. Therefore, we appreciate the 

effort of EPA and NHTSA to harmonize the corresponding regulations to the greatest extent 

feasible, taking into account the respective statutory obligations. Hopefully such harmonization 

should be extended to the provisions reserved to small-volume manufacturers and small business 

entities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Fisker Automotive applauds EPA and NHTSA for their leadership in establishing a National 

Program that jointly reduces greenhouse gas emissions and improves fuel economy in the lightduty fleet. This is an important step the builds upon the groundbreaking May 7, 2010 rule to 

establish fleet greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy standards for model years 2012-2016. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 1]

Fisker believes that protecting the environment and the nation’s energy security are important 

goals that play an increasingly prominent role in car buying decisions. We also believe that car 

buyers would like to reduce their impact without compromising the performance, luxury, or 

freedom that they expect from today’s cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 1]

We remain overall strongly supportive of both agencies’ efforts to reduce emissions and fuel 

consumption, and urge them to allow our company to fully participate in these efforts as soon as 

reasonably possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 5]
EPA Response to Comments

1-26

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Just over two years ago we provided comments on the regulation that harmonized greenhouse 

gas emissions and CAFE standards for passenger cars and light duty trucks for model years 2012 

through 2016. At that time we encouraged the Agencies to continue to work together to ensure 

continuation of the harmonized requirements beyond 2016. This proposal seeks to achieve that 

goal. We applaud the combined efforts of EPA and NHTSA in the development of a joint 

proposal to extend One National Program. Only a harmonized, nationwide set of GHG and fuel 

economy standards will enable manufacturers to plan and invest for the future with confidence. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 1]

While the new requirements go far beyond the first regulation, both in the timeframe covered as 

well as the challenges they pose for our industry, we support the national goals for greenhouse 

gas reduction and energy independence that have driven these aggressive targets. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 42-43.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 30-31.]

We applaud the combined efforts of the EPA and NHTSA, as well as the California Air 

Resources Board. This proposal provides our industry both the single program moving forward, 

as well as the regulatory framework that enables manufacturers to plan and invest for the future 

with confidence.

As a result, we are continually investing in our product strategy to improve the fuel economy and 

reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of our fleet.

Starting this year, one-third of our vehicle line up will offer a model that achieve at least 40 

miles per gallon.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 43.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 30-31.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 10-11.]

The standards proposed are aggressive, but so are the demands from our customers for greater 

fuel efficiency.

Organization: General Motors Company
National Program

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General Motors Company recognizes the benefits to the country and to vehicle manufacturers of 

continuing the National Program to address fuel economy and greenhouse gases that the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) began in 2009 with the standards for model years 2012 through 2016, 

and that those agencies are proposing to continue for 2017 and later model years. As indicated in 

our comments at the January 17, 2012 public hearing in Detroit, General Motors Company 

supports the proposal and hopes it serves as the basis for a continued National Program. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 2]

The agencies’ have crafted a proposal that is consistent with the intent of the framework 

announced by the administration on July 29, 2011. We commend the technical staffs of both 

agencies for working together on this highly complex issue, and appreciate their efforts to 

produce a harmonized approach for federal regulation of new vehicle fuel economy and 

greenhouse gas emissions. We further commend the agencies for the leadership that the federal 

government has shown in trying to minimize the disruptive impacts of having multiple and 

different programs at the federal and state levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 34-35.]

GM supports the flexibilities in the proposal. They reflect due consideration of the technical data 

and are appropriately designed to encourage early investment in technologies that will produce 

both fuel consumption and environmental benefits -- the same technologies that will be 

necessary to meet the challenging future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p 3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 38.]

In conclusion, we urge both EPA and NHTSA to continue the strong leadership role they have 

displayed at the federal level with an integrated approach that addresses infrastructure of vehicles 

themselves, fuels, and customer behavior as well as all other sectors of the economy. This 

proposal is a positive first step and a good foundation on which we can all build.

Organization: Growth Energy

Growth Energy and its members salute the efforts by NHTSA and EPA (collectively, “the 

Agencies”) to solicit data, analysis and views on the Joint NPRM, and to respond to the public’s 

comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Guardian Automotive Products, Inc.

Guardian also applauds the harmonization of fuel economy and CO2 emissions credits. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

1-28

Honeywell commends EPA and NHTSA for their hard work and foresight in developing a 

Proposed Rule that responds to 'our country's critical need to address global climate change and 

to reduce oil consumption' for the foreseeable future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 206.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 259.]

Honeywell supports the National Program of increasing fuel economy and reducing greenhouse 

gas emissions. A harmonized regulatory structure allows OEMs to define product pathways 

forward toward compliance. This, in turn, allows suppliers to focus research and development 

in order to provide the most substantial short and long-term benefits.

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

Honeywell appreciates the opportunity to contribute to this rulemaking and remains committed 

to offering solutions to reduce GHG emissions in the United States in a manner that allows the 

nation’s automotive industry to thrive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.6]

Organization: House of Representatives, Congress of the United States

We write to commend you for bringing certainty to fuel economy and tailpipe emission standards 

for model years 2017-25 cars and light trucks to 54.5 miles per gallon (mpg). [EPA–HQ–OAR–

2010–0799-1221-A1, p. 1]

The framework agreement brought together automotive manufacturers, labor, the environmental 

community, and government agencies. Industry groups such as the National Association of 

Manufacturers praised the agreement as a 'positive step.' As a result, automakers will enjoy 

regulatory certainty, which will help them design and build the advanced technology vehicles of 

the future and compete in an increasingly global marketplace. The agreement protects American 

jobs and consumers, and as such was a remarkable achievement. [EPA–HQ–OAR–2010–0799-

1221-A1, p. 1]

These regulations, taken together with the first phase of the standards for model years 2012-16 

vehicles, will remove the need for as much as 3.8 million barrels of petroleum per day by 2030. 

Consumers will save thousands of dollars at the pump for gasoline they will no longer need to 

buy over the lifetime of their vehicles. [EPA–HQ–OAR–2010–0799-1221-A1, p. 1]

In conclusion, we believe that these standards to reduce petroleum use in cars and light trucks 

represent an opportunity to increase our national and economic security in an unprecedented way 

by dramatically decreasing our dependence on foreign sources of petroleum. They also bring a 

certainty to the regulatory framework for the industry and workers who design and build these 

vehicles. [EPA–HQ–OAR–2010–0799-1221-A1, p. 1]
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Organization: Howard, P.

I am writing in support of the strong fuel-efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new cars 

and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10063-A1, p. 1]

The benefits of strong standards are overwhelming. By giving automakers a clear direction for 

improving their new vehicles, EPA and DOT together are ensuring that new vehicles in 2025 

will be almost twice as efficient as new vehicles today. I know the automakers can do better and 

these standards will ensure that automakers innovate and put the best technologies to work to cut 

dangerous carbon pollution and help America move beyond oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10063-A1, p. 1]

I applaud the EPA and DOT for working together to propose these standards that will strengthen 

fuel efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new passenger cars and trucks to 54.5 mpg by 

2025. It matters to me that we take this critical step to curb the dangers of climate disruption, cut 

our addiction to oil, and keep billions of dollars in our economy instead of spending them on oil. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10063-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

The improvement of fuel economy and the control of GHGs are very important to Hyundai. 

Hyundai has long been an industry fuel efficiency leader and, in 2010, we publicly pledged to 

reach fleet-wide performance of 50 plus mpg by 2025. In our discussions with the agencies on 

this rulemaking, we have consistently supported a standard in excess of 50 mpg and we continue 

to support the agencies on this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.1]

We appreciate the significant effort on the part of all the agencies in the difficult task of 

developing feasible and harmonized national greenhouse gas and CAFE standards. We believe 

that it is the right thing to do for the environment and for the nation's energy security. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.1]

In summary, Hyundai applauds the agencies' efforts in putting together a national program to 

reduce GHG emissions and improve fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 172.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 22.]

We continue to support the agencies in this rulemaking. We believe that it's the right thing to do 

for the environment and for the nation's energy security.

Organization: ICM Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

1-30

There are a multitude of reasons for pursuing higher fuel economy fuel standards in light-duty 

trucks and passenger vehicles ranging from energy security to improved air quality to economic 

development. We believe the CAFE Rule presents an opportunity to touch all of these objectives, 

which, of course, begin with the simple notion of reducing our use of imported petroleum. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.1]

Organization: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

As we have done in the past, IIHS supports NHTSA’s efforts to increase fuel economy while 

maintaining vehicle safety through the use of a size-based system. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0222-

A1, p.1]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

This proposed rule builds upon the impressive improvements in the 2012---16 final rules and 

takes another large step towards catching up with vehicle efficiency in Europe, Japan, and other 

nations (Figure 1). We applaud EPA and NHTSA, along with California, the Administration, and 

the vehicle manufacturers, for taking another step along the road to a sustainable transportation 

system and enhancing U.S. credibility worldwide. [See Figure 1 on p. 1 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 1]

There are tremendous opportunities to dramatically reduce climate change emissions from 

passenger vehicles in the near term. Internal combustion engines are over a century old and are 

widely perceived as nearing the end of their development, but the reality is exactly the opposite. 

The same is true for materials that make up the vehicle body and parts. Rapid improvements in 

computer---based tools are opening up technology gains that were never possible before. 

Computer simulations and computer---aided---design are enabling vastly improved designs and 

on---board computers allow unprecedented integration of engine, transmission, and hybrid 

operation. Instead of slowing down, the pace of technology development just keeps accelerating. 

This is especially true of lightweight material design. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 2]

Aggressive standards and long---term signals are needed to fully realize this technology 

potential. ICCT strongly supports a strong federal rule and recognizes and applauds the 

constructive role that California has played in building the technical and public support for this 

critical rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 2]

The proposed 2017---25 rules provide the long---term goals needed for manufacturers to develop 

consistent, long---term technology and product plans, and serves as a valuable precedent for 

other countries worldwide evaluating future efficiency and greenhouse gas standards. The overall 

stringency of the proposed rules is potentially adequate, provided that it is not eroded 

significantly by additional credits or changes in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 2]

As shown in Figure 1, countries worldwide are also adopting efficiency standards and promoting 

technology improvements. Similar standards are needed in the US to ensure that our domestic 

manufacturers remain fully competitive in the world market and maintain domestic employment. 
National Program

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[Figure 1 can be found on p. 1 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 13]

Efficiency standards are a win for consumers, a win for energy security, a win for manufacturers, 

and a win for the economy. It is all paid for by oil exporting countries, as efficiency standards 

will both reduce their oil exports and depress the amount they get paid per barrel. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 13]

Efficiency standards or incentives tied directly to vehicle efficiency are necessary to capture 

these huge benefits for energy security and the economy. There are no other options. Certainly, 

care must be taken to set the standards appropriately, as has been done in the proposed rule, but 

rolling back or stopping the standards is equivalent to shutting down oil wells in the US. In fact, 

it is worse due to the missed opportunity to improve the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 13]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 192.]

We applaud EPA, NHTSA, along with California, the Administration and the vehicle 

manufacturers for taking another large step along the road to a sustainable transportation system.

In closing the ultimate goal is to create a sustainable transportation system. ICCT looks forward 

to working with everyone involved including, first of all, including the federal and state agencies 

and vehicle manufacturers to help shape the best policies and programs to meet our clean air, 

energy security and climate change objectives.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 28-29.]

I want to congratulate you and the staff of EPA, as well as the California Resources Board, 

NHTSA, for building on the earlier rule and aggressively setting the stage so that the U.S. can 

not only catch up but surpass countries in the world in the desire to improve fuel economy, 

reduce greenhouse gases and reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

Organization: Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) - Ceres

As long-term investors, and as members of the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), which 

represents over $10 trillion in assets, we are writing to voice our strong support for the proposed 

Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards. 

 Independent analysis shows that strong standards will lead to job creation across the country, as 

well as increased profitability for the auto industry, a major driver of the economy. Further, 

these standards represent an unprecedented opportunity to shield us from volatile oil price spikes 

as well as to reduce climate risk.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516-A1, p. 1]

In sum, strong standards will strengthen our economy, spur innovation, reduce both our 

dependence on oil and climate risk, save businesses and consumers money, and create jobs. 
EPA Response to Comments

1-32

Accordingly, we urge the adoption of the strongest standards possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9516-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (JLRNA)

We would like to take the opportunity to thank both the Environmental Protection Agency and 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for their efforts in pulling together this proposal 

for a single national standard for 2017 – 2025 model years. Going forward this will continue to 

provide stability to enable future business and product strategy planning to take place. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-8102-A1, cover letter]

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Johnson Controls is encouraged that NHTSA and EPA are continuing to work together on this 

second phase of the national program for MYs 2017-2025. Johnson Controls strongly supports 

the continuation of a uniform national program. It allows vehicle manufacturers to focus 

investments on cost-effective technologies for their fleets in order to meet the requirements of 

the proposed rule, while delivering products that consumers will want and represents a viable 

economic solution. This activity allows the energy storage manufacturer to continually innovate, 

advancing development, and deliver commercially viable products. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-

A1, p. 2]

Furthermore, Johnson Controls supports the efforts of the agencies to harmonize and align their 

respective standards, where appropriate. Synchronizing standards improves regulatory clarity 

and provides certainty. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 4]

• Harmonization for this next phase of the National Program is critical to its long-term success. 

Johnson Controls supports the proposals to harmonize the GHG emissions and CAFE standards.

Organization: Kendall, A.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 166.]

I'd also like to state my support for the rulemaking or proposed rulemaking and offer praise for 

all the in-depth research that's already happened.

Organization: Kia Motors

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 100-101.]

I want to start by saying that Kia emphatically supports the proposal and believes that it is 

important for the agencies to set tough but feasible standards while providing flexibilities which 

allow each automaker to maximize their strengths in achieving the standards.
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Organization: Kobus, D.

As an Environmental Scientist, I know the importance of this kind of policy in turning our future 

toward one of renewables in the time we need to do it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1370-A1, p. 

2]

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

* 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

* 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided

* $45 billion in savings at the gas pump [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1370-A1, p. 2]

I support the proposed standards, and I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a 

reality by keeping these standards free of loopholes that could undermine their environmental 

and economic benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1370-A1, pp. 2-3]

Organization: League of Women Voters of Michigan

The League of Women Voters of Michigan supports the proposed rules for fuel efficiency and 

emissions standards and believes they will have significant public health and economic benefits. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0198, p.1]

We support the new standards because they will substantially reduce pollution caused by vehicle 

emissions. We know that air pollution damages people’s health and causes premature death, 

particularly in children, the elderly, and people with chronic health problems. Air pollution is a 

major trigger of asthma attacks. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0198, p.1]

We support these regulations for the benefit of our children’s health and future. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0198, p.1]

In addition to lives saved and quality of life benefits, air quality improvements have tangible 

economic benefits, due to better health and productivity and reduced medical expenses. The new 

vehicle standards will also spur innovation and investment in new technologies, which will 

create jobs in advanced automotive technology [NHTSA-2010-0131-0198, p.1]

Organization: Magna E-Car Systems

I’m pleased to comment in support of the 54.5 mpg proposed fuel economy standards put 

forward by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9263-A1, p. 1]

The 54.5 mpg fuel economy standards are necessary spur investment and innovation in the 

hybrid and electric vehicle technologies, like Magna E-Car Systems and other automotive 
EPA Response to Comments

1-34

suppliers essential to meeting our growing 21st century transportation energy needs. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9263-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 179-183.]

We believe an important opportunity exists to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 

improve fuel economy from passenger cars, light-duty vehicle trucks and medium duty 

passenger vehicles.

To conclude, MECA commends EPA, NHTSA and California for taking important steps to 

further reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve fuel economy for light-duty vehicles. Our 

industry is prepared to do its part and deliver cost-effective advanced emission 

control technologies to the market for these more fuel efficient vehicles.

Organization: Marshall, C.

When I first read of the goal of 54.5 mpg for the year 2025, my reaction was that I liked the rule, 

but it seemed ambitious. Then I read that the rule was a negotiated rulemaking, and that the auto 

community participated. My spirits soared. I think negotiated rulemakings that include members 

of the affected community make better regulations in the long-run than imposed regulations. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

I think this particular regulation is a win-win-win program because of all the benefits for (1) 

reducing carbon emissions, ozone precursors, and other auto emission pollutants, (2) reducing oil 

consumption, imports, and extraction, and (3) making the U.S. more competitive in this 

technological realm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Organization: Marz, Loren C.

I generally support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy of cars and light trucks from 2017 

to 2025. EPA and NHTSA are to be commended for proposing such significant increases in the 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). Our economy and climate would benefit from such 

reductions in fuel consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0213-A1, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (1,121) (World Wildlife Fund)

I am writing in support of the proposed fuel efficiency standards for new cars and light trucks. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5181_MASS, p.1]

The proposed standards will strengthen fuel efficiency and reduce the carbon pollution 

contributing to climate change. By increasing standards for new passenger cars and light trucks 
National Program

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to 54.5 mpg by 2025, we will show the world that the U.S. is serious about curbing climate 

change and reducing our dependence on oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5181_MASS, p.1]

I urge both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation to 

finalize these strong standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5181_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (1,338) (Sierra Club-2)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you outlined new vehicle 

efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of a 54.5 

mpg fleetwide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11762-A1, p.1]

The projected annual benefits of such a standard by 2030 are enormous:

-$80 billion in savings at the gas pump

-23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

-280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11762-A1, p.1]

Moving forward, I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a reality by keeping

this standard as strong as possible through the rulemaking process, and avoiding loopholes that 

could undermine the standard's environmental and economic benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11762-A1, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (13,300) (National Wildlife Federation Action Fund3)

I am submitting the following comments in support of strong fuel efficiency standards, along 

with the names of the 13,300 supporters of the National Wildlife Federation Action Fund who 

have sent similar comments to the docket via emails to a-and-r-Docket@epa.gov: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9965_MASS, p.1]

I support making our nation's cars and trucks more efficient to cut the carbon pollution from car 

exhaust that is driving global warming, which threatens the future of American wildlife. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9965_MASS, p.1]

Taken together, the new and proposed fuel economy standards will cut our demand for oil by 3.4 

million barrels per day. That equates to nearly a third of today's transportation fuel use and it cuts 

carbon pollution by more than 600 million metric tons per year in 2030--that's about 10% of total 

US carbon pollution today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9965_MASS, p.1]

These deep oil savings also mean less pressure for risky new drilling projects in the Arctic or to 

clear cut forest for Canadian tar sands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9965_MASS, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

1-36

Please move forward with strong fuel efficiency standards that cut oil use and reduce carbon 

pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9965_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (137 (Citizens for Pennsylvania's Future 

(PennFuture))

I applaud you and President Obama for proposing strong new fuel economy and tailpipe 

pollution standards that will result in cleaner cars and cleaner air. The reduction in greenhouse 

gas and criteria pollution that these standards would achieve are critically important in stabilizing 

the climate and protecting human health. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-3114-A1_MASS, p.1]

-By 2030, the standards would cut annual global warming pollution the equivalent of shutting 

down 80 coal-fired power plants for a year. This would be of tremendous benefit in slowing 

climate change.

-The proposed standards would create almost 500,000 jobs across the country, including 21,000 

in Pennsylvania.

-The standards would save as much oil in 2030 alone as we currently import from Saudi Arabia 

and Iraq. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-3114-A1_MASS, p.1]

Please make sure the proposed standards are not weakened in any way before being enacted. I 

am copying my Congressional representatives on this email so that they know how important a 

strong clean cars rule is to me, and that I want them to support a strong rule as well. Thank you 

for your efforts reflected in this proposal that will improve public health, enhance national 

security, protect the environment, and strengthen our economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

3114-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (15) (League of Conservation Voters)

I support the proposed new rules that would increase national fuel economy standards to 54.5 

miles per gallon by the year 2025 and I commend the Obama administration for continuing to 

pursue strong, clean vehicle standards that will reduce our dangerous dependence on oil and cut 

global warming pollution, while creating much-needed jobs and saving drivers money at the 

pump. Additionally, these landmark standards remind us of the valuable role that the federal 

government can play in strengthening the economy and protecting the planet. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-1555-A1_MASS, p.1]

We can do this! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1555-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (15) (Sierra Club-3)

Electric vehicles can help America move beyond oil. I support your effort to improve fuel 

efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new cars and light trucks to 54.5 mpg and 163 

grams per mile carbon pollution in 2025. These standards ensure that Americans will have better 
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fuel efficiency and advanced technology choices in their new vehicles for years to come. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11763-A1, p.1]

Americans can expect real benefits from your standards. In 2030 alone, strong standards will 

deliver:

• $44 billion in net savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of carbon pollution avoided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11763-A1, 

p.1]

A well designed program will help bring electric vehicles to the market while ensuring that the 

pollution reduction, oil savings and consumer benefits of the standards are achieved. I urge you 

to ensure these standards deliver real benefits for America and avoid loopholes that could 

undermine the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11763-A1, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (195) (Environment New Mexico-1)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at risk. Your 

recent proposal of new fuel efficiency standards was a historic step toward addressing this 

problem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9577-A1_MASS, p.1]

The environmental benefits of such a standard by 2030 are enormous. By 2030, we could:

-save more oil than we imported from Saudi Arabia last year, and

-slash global warming pollution by an amount equivalent to shutting down 70 coal-fired power 

plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9577-A1_MASS, p.1]

Moving forward, I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a reality by keeping 

this standard as strong as possible through the rulemaking process, and avoiding loopholes that 

could undermine the standard's environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9577-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (2,120) (Pew Environmental Group)

I support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average of 

54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther on a gallon 

of gas and reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. The price of gas is once again squeezing the 

budgets of American families, who already are forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for 

basic transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1247-A1_MASS, p.1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements. I 
EPA Response to Comments

1-38

commend your efforts. I believe it is important to increase U.S. investment in fuel efficient 

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help this country break its dependence on 

foreign oil, and protect the environment. Don't let these standards be watered down--protect and 

finalize the new fuel efficiency rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1247-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (2,156) (Environment Michigan)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you proposed new global

warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks 

meet the equivalent of a 54.5 mpg fleetwide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9683-A1_MASS, p.1]

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

• $45 billion in savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9683-

A1_MASS, p.1]

I support the proposed standards, and I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a 

reality by keeping these standards free of loopholes that could undermine their environmental 

and economic benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9683-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (2,851) (Unknown Organization)

I'm writing today in support of stronger fuel-economy and carbon pollution standards for new 

cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9591-A1_MASS, p.1]

The EPA and the Department of Transportation have an opportunity to ensure that new vehicles 

in 2025 will be nearly twice as fuel efficient as vehicles today. Adopting stronger standards will 

drive innovation and incentivize automakers to put their best technologies to work. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9591-A1_MASS, p.1]

The proposed 54.5 mpg standard will be a major step forward to reduce our dependence on fossil 

fuels. Additionally, it will save Americans billions of dollars annually which can be reinvested in 

our economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9591-A1_MASS, p.1]

Please adopt the strongest fuel-economy and carbon pollution standards possible. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9591-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union of Concerned Scientists-1)
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As a scientist, I believe it is vitally important to take this major step to reduce global warming 

emissions. As proposed, the standard would reduce U.S. emissions by as much as 290 million 

metric tons in 2030, the equivalent of taking over 40 million of today's typical cars and trucks off 

the road for a year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1558-A1_MASS, p.1]

Strong fuel efficiency and vehicle emissions standards have the potential to cut America's oil 

dependence by 1.5 million barrels per day in 2030, more oil than we currently import from Saudi 

Arabia and Iraq combined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1558-A1_MASS, p.1]

A strong clean car program is good for all Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1558-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

UCS applauds the agencies for proposing standards that represent historic progress for American 

consumers, the U.S. auto industry, clean air, and U.S. energy security. However, key provisions 

in the proposal could erode these benefits if automakers exploit them, and should be addressed 

by the agencies before the standards are finalized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166-

A1_MASS, p.1]

America's dangerous dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at 

risk. That's why I strongly support the proposed fuel efficiency and global warming emissions 

standards for new cars and light trucks sold in model years 2017-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-10166-A2_MASS, p.1]

The proposed standards are achievable and reasonable and will save me money at the pump, curb 

millions of tons of harmful global warming emissions, and save as much oil in 2030 alone as we 

currently import from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. They will also drive innovation in the U.S. auto 

industry, creating new jobs across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166-A2_MASS, 

p.1]

Though I strongly support these standards, I am concerned about possible loopholes that 

automakers could exploit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166-A2_MASS, p.1]

We cannot afford to delay in confronting the threats of climate change and our dangerous oil 

dependence. I urge you to move forward with the strongest possible standards free of harmful 

loopholes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166-A2_MASS, p.2]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (213) (Environment Virginia)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you proposed new global 

warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks 

meet the equivalent of a 54.5 mpg fleetwide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9576-A1_MASS, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

1-40

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

-- 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

-- 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided

-- $45 billion in savings at the gas pump [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9576-A1_MASS, p.1]

I support the proposed standards, and I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a 

reality by keeping these standards free of loopholes that could undermine their environmental 

and economic benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9576-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (22,122) (Unknown Organization)

I support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average of 

54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther on a gallon 

of gas and reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9736_MASS, 

p.1]

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who already are 

forced to cut back in other areas just to pay or basic transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9736_MASS,p.1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements. I 

commend your efforts. I believe it is important to increase U.S. investment in fuel efficient 

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help this country break its dependence on 

foreign oil, and protect the environment. Don't let these standards be watered down -- protect and 

finalize the new fuel efficiency rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9736_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (262) (Environment New Mexico-2)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you proposed new global 

warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks 

meet the equivalent of a 54.5 mpg fleetwide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9700-A1_MASS, p.1]

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

• $45 billion in savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9700-

A1_MASS, p.1]
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I support the proposed standards, and I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a 

reality by keeping these standards free of loopholes that could undermine their environmental 

and economic benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9700-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (27,108) (Unknown Organization)

I am writing in support of the strong fuel-efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new cars 

and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9596-A1_MASS, p.1]

The benefits of strong standards are overwhelming. By giving automakers a clear direction for 

improving their new vehicles, EPA and DOT together are ensuring that new vehicles in 2025 

will be almost twice as efficient as new vehicles today. I know the automakers can do better and 

these standards will ensure that automakers innovate and put the best technologies to work to cut 

dangerous carbon pollution and help America move beyond oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9596-A1_MASS, p.1]

I applaud the EPA and DOT for working together to propose these standards that will strengthen 

fuel efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new passenger cars and trucks to 54.5 mpg by 

2025. It matters to me that we take this critical step to curb the dangers of climate disruption, cut 

our addiction to oil, and keep billions of dollars in our economy instead of spending them on oil. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9596-A1_MASS,p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment campaign (3,855) (National Wildlife Federation Action Fund-2)

I support making our nation's cars and trucks more efficient to cut the carbon pollution from car 

exhaust that is driving global warming, which threatens the future of American wildlife. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-1557-A1_MASS, p.1]

Taken together, the new and proposed fuel economy standards will cut our demand for oil by 3.4 

million barrels per day. That equates to nearly a third of today's transportation fuel use and it cuts 

carbon pollution by more than 600 million metric tons per year in 2030--that's about 10% of total 

US carbon pollution today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1557-A1_MAS, p.1]

These deep oil savings also mean less pressure for risky new drilling projects in the Arctic or to 

clear cut forest for Canadian tar sands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1557-A1_MASS, p.1]

Please move forward with strong fuel efficiency standards that cut oil use and reduce carbon 

pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1557-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

America's dangerous dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at 

risk. That's why I strongly support the proposed fuel efficiency and global warming emissions 

standards for new cars and light trucks sold in model years 2017-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-1246-A1_MASS, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

1-42

The proposed standards are achievable and reasonable and will save me money at the pump, curb 

millions of tons of harmful global warming emissions, and save as much oil in 2030 alone as we 

currently import from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. They will also drive innovation in the U.S. auto 

industry, creating new jobs across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1246-A1_MASS, 

p.1]

Though I strongly support these standards, I am concerned about possible loopholes that 

automakers could exploit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1246-A1_MASS, p.1]

We cannot afford to delay in confronting the threats of climate change and our dangerous oil 

dependence. I urge you to move forward with the strongest possible standards free of harmful 

loopholes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1246-A1_MASS, p.1]

We cannot afford to delay in confronting the threats of climate change and our dangerous oil 

dependence. I urge you to move forward with the strongest possible standards free of harmful 

loopholes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1246-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (39) (Unknown Organization)

I strongly support the proposed CAFE standards for cars and light trucks from 2017 to 2025. The 

goals summarized in these standards (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 and/or NHTSA2010-0131) show a promising future for the nation's health, environment, national security, and 

economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1245-A1_MASS, p.1]

The estimates released by the White House show the potential for an enormous reduction in 

green house gas emissions. The decrease in air pollution will be substantial. I am happy to 

support this strong environmental regulation - one that will directly improve citizen health. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1245-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (39,464) (Environmental Defense Fund (EDF))

I strongly support the proposed new fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for cars and 

trucks to require cars and trucks to an average 54.5 miles per gallon by model year 2025. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9590-A1_MASS, p.1]

Together with the 'Phase One' model year 2012-2016 rule finalized in 2010, these tough new 

standards would more than double America's average fuel economy and are expected to:

-- Save families an estimated $8,200 in fuel savings over the lifetime of a new vehicle by 2025, 

for a total of $1.7 trillion in national fuel savings over the life of the program.

-- Reduce oil consumption by an estimated 2.2 million barrels a day by 2025 more than our daily 

2010 oil imports from the entire Persian Gulf.
National Program

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-- Reduce carbon dioxide pollution by over 6 billion metric tons over the life of the program 

equivalent to the emissions from the United States in 2010. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9590-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Generating less pollution, putting more money in consumers' wallets, easing our addiction to oil, 

modernizing America's fleet of cars and trucks what's not to like? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9590-A1_MASS, p.1]

I am thrilled that this dramatic and bold proposal has earned the support of automakers, 

autoworkers, national security groups, environmental groups, and many other key stakeholders. 

And I am proud to add my support to this important rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9590-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (399) (Rhode Island Sierra Club)

Dear President Obama,

You recently highlighted the urgency of moving beyond oil and pledged to reduce America's 

dependence on foreign oil by one third. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11761-A1, p.1]

You can deliver on your pledge to American people by setting new standards requiring cars and 

light trucks to achieve the standard of at least 60 miles per gallon and emit no more than 143 

grams of global warming pollution per mile by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11761-A1, 

p.1]

Using American ingenuity, we can build cars and trucks that will reduce our dependence on oil 

by 2.5 million barrels each day by 2030 - that's almost 50 percent more oil than we currently 

import from the entire Persian Gulf. We need your leadership to set strong pollution and fuel 

efficiency standards for new cars and trucks that will help break our county's dependence on oil. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11761-A1, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) (Unknown Organization)

The proposed fuel-efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for passenger vehicles and light 

trucks are a laudable step in reducing dangerous global warming, increasing national security and 

improving our economy. Compared to business as usual, they will prevent millions of tons of 

global warming emissions, save consumers billions of dollars at the gas pump and reduce 

America's dependence on dirty fossil fuels. But these rules can and should be significantly 

strengthened. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9595-A1_MASS, p.1]

Increasing the fuel efficiency of our vehicles is the low-hanging fruit in the battle against 

dangerous climate change, and we can no longer afford to pass up this tremendous opportunity. 

Please adopt the strongest possible standards and close the SUV loophole. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9595-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (45) (Environment Minnesota)
EPA Response to Comments

1-44

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at risk. Your 

recent proposal of new fuel efficiency standards was a historic step toward addressing this 

problem. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9588-A1_MASS, p.1]

THANK YOU. Let's please keep working on cutting our dependence on oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9588-A1_MASS, p.1]

The environmental benefits of such a standard by 2030 are enormous:

- save more oil than we imported from Saudi Arabia last year, and

- slash global warming pollution by an amount equivalent to shutting down 70 coal-fired power 

plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9588-A1_MASS, p.1]

Moving forward, I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a reality by keeping 

this standard as strong as possible through the rule-making process, and avoiding loopholes that 

could undermine the standard's environmental benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9588-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (61) (The Social Justice Group))

We support these improved fuel efficiency standards not only for our own personal benefit, but 

also for the sake of our national security, our economy, and the world's environment. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7406-A1_MASS, p.2]

THE ISSUE: Support clean air and fight global warming by endorsing the Obama 

administration's proposal to raise automobile fuel efficiency standards.

The Obama administration has proposed a historic 54.5 miles per gallon fuel efficiency standard. 

Under this new proposal, it is estimated that American drivers would collectively save $80 

billion a year at the pump, a savings that over time would outweigh the cost of the lower 

emission technology. We would make a significant dent in carbon emissions and drastically 

reduce our need for oil consumption in transportation. The new standard would mean that cars 

and trucks would achieve roughly double the fuel economy of the average vehicle on the road 

today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7406-A1_MASS, p.6]

Some cars can already meet these standards, but most do not. This is a huge opportunity for 

American automakers. To remain competitive in the global marketplace. our automakers must 

make more fuel-efficient vehicles. These new standards will encourage investments in 

technology and produce new jobs in our domestic auto industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7406-A1_MASS, p.6]

The EPA estimates the 54.5 mpg standards will:

** save consumers a net of $4,400. based on the expected fuel savings and the cost of the lower 

emissions technology
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** reduce U.S. dependence on oil by 1 .7 million barrels per day. more than we imported from 

Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2010:

** reduce harmful air pollution that causes climate change by 297 million metric tons per year by 

2030, which is equivalent to the annual emissions of 76 coal-fired power plants. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7406-A1_MASS, p.6]

This petition will be forwarded to the administration during the public comment period for these 

proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7406-A1_MASS, p.6]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (680) (PennEvironment)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you proposed new global 

warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks 

meet the equivalent of a 54.5mpg fleetwide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1556-A1_MASS, p.1]

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

* 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

* 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided

* $45 billion in savings at the gas pump [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1556-A1_MASS, p.1]

I support the proposed standards, and I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a 

reality by keeping these standards free of loopholes that could undermine their environmental 

and economic benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1556-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (80) (Unknown Organization)

I support the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) joint proposal with the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to improve fuel economy and reduce 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for passenger cars and light-trucks for model years 2017 

through 2025. The proposed fleet-wide average of 49.6 mpg will create a new generation of 

clean vehicles and respond to our country's critical need to reduce oil consumption. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9682-A1_MASS, p.1]

This proposal will save four billion barrels of oil and two million metric tons of greenhouse gas 

emissions over the lifetime of those vehicles. The proposal also incentivizes the expanded 

production of hybrid and electric vehicles, which will further reduce our dependence on foreign 

oil and cut greenhouse gases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9682-A1_MASS, p.1]

I also strongly urge the agencies to carefully evaluate whether basing these fuel standards on the 

size of a vehicle will incentivize manufacturers to build larger vehicles. Ensuring manufacturers 
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1-46

do not benefit from building larger vehicles that emit more emissions is fundamental to the 

success of the National Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9682-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

The proposed standards are achievable and reasonable and will save me money at the pump, curb 

millions of tons of harmful global warming emissions, and save as much oil in 2030 alone as we 

currently import from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. They will also drive innovation in the U.S. auto 

industry, creating new jobs across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9578-A1_MASS, 

p.1]

Though I strongly support these standards, I am concerned about possible loopholes that 

automakers could exploit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9578-A1_MASS, p.1]

We cannot afford to delay in confronting the threats of climate change and our dangerous oil 

dependence. I urge you to move forward with the strongest possible standards free of harmful 

loopholes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9578-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (927) (Sierra Club-1)

I am writing in support of the proposed fuel-efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new 

cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1554-A1_MASS, p.1]

I applaud the EPA and DOT for working together to propose these standards that will strengthen 

fuel efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new passenger cars and trucks to 54.5 mpg by 

2025. This is a critical step we can take to curb climate disruption, cut our addiction to oil, and 

keep billions of dollars in our economy instead of spending them on oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-1554-A1_MASS, p.1]

In these tough economic times I celebrate these efforts because they will promote innovation and 

job growth not just in the automotive industry but across the nation, all while helping the U.S. 

cut dangerous carbon pollution and our addiction to oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1554-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Once again, I strongly support these vitally important standards that will protect our 

environment, economy, and national security. I urge both the EPA and DOT to finalize these 

strong standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1554-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (99) (Environment Texas)

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you proposed new global 

warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks 

meet the equivalent of a 54.5 mpg fleetwide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9701-A1_MASS, p.1]
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The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

• $45 billion in savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9701-

A1_MASS, p.1]

I support the proposed standards, and I urge you to ensure that these projected benefits become a 

reality by keeping these standards free of loopholes that could undermine their environmental 

and economic benefits.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9701-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (Multiple Submitters) (Unknown Organization)

The rising price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who are being 

forced to cut back in other areas to pay for basic transportation needs. Please take action to 

ensure that cars and light trucks can drive farther on a gallon of gas and reduce our dependence 

on imported oil. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0219-A1_MASS, p.1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade. Fuels efficiency 

standards of up to 60 miles per gallon by 2025 would increase investments in fuel efficient 

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, and help the United States break its cycle of 

addiction to foreign oil by saving more than 1.3 billion barrels. I urge you to support new fuel 

efficiency standards of up to 60 miles per gallon. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0219-A1_MASS,p.1]

The rising price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who are being 

forced to cut back in other areas to pay for basic transportation needs. Please take action to 

ensure that cars and light trucks can drive farther on a gallon of gas and reduce our dependence 

on imported oil. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0219-A1_MASS, p.1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade. Fuels efficiency 

standards of up to 60 miles per gallon by 2025 would increase investments in fuel efficient 

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, and help the United States break its cycle of 

addiction to foreign oil by saving more than 1.3 billion barrels. I urge you to support new fuel 

efficiency standards of up to 60 miles per gallon. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0219-A1_MASS,p.1]

Organization: Mazda North American Operations

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 63.]

As one of the 13 auto makers that signed the letter of commitment, Mazda welcomes the 

opportunity to be a partner in helping to advance a continued, harmonized national program on 

fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions for the 2017 to 2025 model years. While offering 

manufacturers the certainty of knowing the fuel economy targets for many years into the future, 
EPA Response to Comments

1-48

the proposed standards do represent an extreme technical challenge for the auto industry, and 

especially for smaller automakers, such as Mazda, who have more limited resources to develop 

and market advanced technology vehicles. Nonetheless, we are committed to making our best 

efforts to meet the proposed targets.

Organization: Mehrotra, Rahul

Thank you for even considering proposing a rule to raise average fuel economy standards. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0206, p.1]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG fully supports the agencies' effort to create a unified program that allows one product 

pathway towards compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

I’m State Representative Jim Ananich of Flint and I have the distinct honor of serving 

Michigan’s 49th House District. I’m pleased to comment today on and in support of the proposed 

54.5 mpg fuel economy standards proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7983-

A1, p. 1]

Since I took office last year, my top priority has been to improve our economy and help get the 

people of Genesee County and Michigan back to work. The proposed 54.5 mpg fuel economy 

standards will be a significant step forward in accomplishing these goals. These standards will 

help create jobs, save consumers money, and keep the members of our armed services out of 

harm’s way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7983-A1, p. 1]

The Obama Administration and automakers deserve recognition for their collaborative efforts to 

reach an agreement on fuel economy at a time when leaders in Washington cannot seem to agree 

on anything. This shows that we can rise above the divisive rhetoric of our politics and reach 

agreement on commonsense solutions to our most pressing issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7983-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Michigan State House of Representatives

I’m State Rep. Jim Townsend & am pleased to offer my comments on the fuel economy 

standards proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency & National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration.

I serve the 26th Michigan House District, which covers the cities of Madison Heights & Royal 

Oak. My district includes many people who work in the auto industry & many more earn a living 

as a result of those who do. I also have worked in the auto industry & would like to recognize the 
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automakers leadership in reaching an agreement with the Obama Administration that’s as good 

for jobs & the economy as it is for consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9175, p. 1]

The 54.5 mpg fuel economy standard will create good paying jobs for American autoworkers. A 

recent study conducted by the United Auto Workers, Natural Resources Defense Council & 

National Wildlife Federation found that the proposed standards would create over 150,000 jobs 

at over 500 facilities that produce parts for advanced internal combustion engines, hybrid & 

alternative fuel vehicles, plug-in electric vehicles, & shared components. Here in Michigan the 

standards will create a little more than 38,000 jobs at nearly 100 facilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9175, p. 1]

Also, for consumers, who spend about $2,000 a year on fuel, these fuel economy standards can 

quickly add up to big savings. Americans spend over $1.3 billion each day on gas. Greater fuel 

efficiency will save consumers up to $6,600 in fuel costs over the lifecycle of a 2025 

model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9175, p. 1]

Finally, the big growth markets for the auto industry are dominated by countries whose 

consumers expect leadership in fuel economy. These standards will help prepare the industry for 

the export market & give American-made cars a leg up in other countries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9175, pp. 1-2]

These standards will spur innovation & encourage the development the hybrids, electric, & more 

fuel efficient vehicles crucial to the continued success of automakers. I thank the EPA & 

NHTSA for opportunity to comment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9175, p. 2]

Organization: Michigan State Senate, District 18

I’m pleased to comment today on the fuel economy rules proposed by the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Transportation (DOT), and to lend my strong 

support for standards that would increase the fuel efficiency of light duty vehicles to a fleet wide 

average of 54.5 mpg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

In short, as the auto industry enters this new chapter, all the signs point to a market for more fuel 

efficient cars, and all the roads to get there run through Greater Metro Detroit. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Miller, P.

Though I heartily support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles 

to an average of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, we can do better!!! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1755-A1, p. 1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, (make that two-thirds 

and you would be closer to what we need) and in November you proposed fuel efficiency 

standards that will effectively double current requirements. I commend your efforts. I believe it 

is important to increase U.S. investment in fuel efficient technologies, save consumers money at 
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1-50

the pump, help this country break its dependence on foreign oil, and protect the environment. 

Don't let these standards be watered down--protect and finalize the new fuel efficiency rules. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1755-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Minnesota Department of Commerce

I support the stated goals of the proposed rule to improve fuel economy of light-duty vehicles for 

model years 2017–2025 as a means to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reduce oil 

consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7363-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

On May 21, 2010, President Obama issued a Memorandum requesting EPA and NHTSA to 

jointly develop a coordinated National Program to improve fuel efficiency and reduce GHG 

emissions of passenger cars and light-duty trucks for MYs 2017 through 2025. To that end, EPA 

and NHTSA, with continuous consultation from the California Air Resources Board (CARB), 

published several notices leading up to the NPRM. Mitsubishi Motors applauds the efforts of the 

Administration and agencies to follow through on their commitment to continue the National 

Program to regulate GHG emissions and fuel economy of light-duty vehicles for MY 2017 and 

later MYs. For this reason, in July 2011, Mitsubishi Motors demonstrated its support of the 

National Program by signing a letter of commitment to the process and structure of the overall 

program as described in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.2]

Mitsubishi Motors is appreciative of the inclusive rulemaking process. We stand committed to 

the continued development of a National Program based on the technical, economic and 

consumer realities of the United States light-duty automotive market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9507-A1, p.2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 95-99.]

Mitsubishi Motors applauds the efforts of the Obama administration and agency staff to follow 

through on their commitments to continue one national program on the federal level for these 

model years.

Similarly, Mitsubishi Motors is appreciative of the inclusive process that led to the publication of 

this NPRM. Mitsubishi Motors stands committed to continuing the development of the national 

program based on technical, economic and consumer realities in the United States' light-duty 

automotive market. To ensure these realities are fully considered in setting fuel economy and

greenhouse gas standards for these later model years included in this rulemaking, a midterm 

evaluation is critical to this process.

Organization: Moravian College

Please do your part, in bringing our nation of drivers into welcoming a new generation of 

automobiles that are more fuel efficient and burn their fuels more cleanly. We need this for 
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energy independence as well as health benefits of a cleaner environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-5536-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

In order to meet regulatory requirements and consumer demand for cleaner, more fuel-efficient 

advanced vehicles, motor vehicle parts manufacturers have increasingly taken on a significant 

role in the research, development, engineering, and manufacturing of the advanced technologies 

necessary to meet these ever-increasing goals. Working together, suppliers and vehicle 

manufacturers develop an assortment of technologies and products that improve vehicle 

performance, safety, fuel efficiency, and emissions. These components and systems are 

rigorously tested on a range of platforms, each with varying degrees of performance. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.1]

MEMA is encouraged that NHTSA and EPA are continuing to work together on this second 

phase of the National Program for Model Years (MY) 2017-2025. MEMA strongly supports the 

continuation of a uniform, footprint-based National Program because it permits vehicle 

manufacturers to focus their resources on investing in the best technologies available for their 

fleet in order to achieve the levels prescribed by the program. This, in turn, feeds the ability of 

the supplier base to continually innovate, to advance development, and to turn research 

technologies into commercially viable products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, pp.1-2]

Furthermore, MEMA supports the efforts of the agencies to harmonize and align their respective 

standards, where appropriate. Synchronizing improves regulatory clarity and provides certainty. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

Harmonization for this next phase of the National Program is important to its long-term success. 

MEMA supports the proposals to harmonize the GHG emissions and CAFE standards, as 

appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

MEMA welcomes and supports the proposals to harmonize the GHG emissions and CAFE 

standards, as appropriate. Synchronizing improves regulatory clarity and provides certainty. We 

support the agencies’ decision to parallel the efficiency credits and fuel consumption 

improvement values for compliance calculations for their respective GHG emissions and CAFE 

standards programs. Specifically, aligning the air conditioning and off-cycle elements such that 

the efficiency improvement credits have an equivalent fuel consumption improvement in the 

compliance calculations is an appropriate, and needed, improvement to the National Program. 

Credits are an important tool and can be positively applied and provide the industry necessary 

options to achieve future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.4]

Excluding the internal harmonization between the respective EPA and NHTSA programs in this 

NPRM, MEMA asks the agencies to take into account other regulatory endeavors that may 

impact the ultimate efficacy of National Program standards. For example, subtle differences in 

California’s program (compared to the National Program), and the state’s other vehicle-related 

requirements, are just different enough such that suppliers have to conduct multiple compliance 

test regimens. On the global front, a multitude of similar, but different regulations and 
EPA Response to Comments

1-52

requirements for other parts of the world, further burden companies with compounding testing 

and compliance costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.4]

A truly harmonized regulatory framework will help with economies of scale and avert multiple 

layers of compliance programs. Essentially, since motor vehicle parts manufacturers bear a 

significant proportion of research, development and testing costs, any opportunities for 

government entities to synergize, harmonize and align related regulatory frameworks and 

compliance needs are important and should be considered by all stakeholders and, where 

appropriate, take corrective action. Continued cooperation and harmonization of the EPA, 

DOT/NHTSA, the State of California and others is extremely important for the long-term 

success of the Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, pp.4-5]

Motor vehicle parts manufacturers develop a wide variety of technologies and products that 

continually improve vehicle performance, safety, fuel efficiency, and emissions. The entire 

motor vehicle industry needs consistent, long-term policies so that all stakeholders can more 

effectively meet the regulatory requirements and consumer demands for cleaner, efficient 

advanced technology vehicles and thrive in the current economic environment. MEMA and the 

supplier industry are committed to policies that enable the introduction of new technologies 

needed to support sustainable mobility. MEMA strongly supports the continuation of a uniform 

National Program because it permits vehicle manufacturers to focus their resources on investing 

in the best technologies available for their fleet in order to achieve the levels prescribed by the 

program. Furthermore, these standards must be technology-neutral, performance-based, not 

impose “preferred technology” pathways and allow for a fully competitive marketplace. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.13]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

NACAA is very pleased to support this proposal. We note also that there is a broad group of 

stakeholders that supports EPA’s and NHTSA’s actions to continue, and build upon, the national 

programs adopted in 2010 to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from, and improve the 

fuel economy of, model year (MY) 2011 through 2016 light-duty vehicles (LDVs). On July 29, 

2010, 13 major automakers sent letters to EPA and the U.S. Department of Transportation 

expressing their support for a next phase of the national vehicle program to further reduce GHG 

emissions and increase fuel economy. These automakers together manufacture over 90 percent of 

all vehicles sold in the U.S. In their respective letters, the automakers commit to “working with 

EPA and NHTSA, the states, and other stakeholders to help our country address the need to 

reduce dependence on oil, to save consumers money, and to ensure regulatory predictability and 

certainty by developing this kind of strong, coordinated National Program.” The California Air 

Resources Board, the United Auto Workers and numerous environmental and consumer 

organizations have also offered their support for this program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-

A1, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 37.]
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[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 33.]

This proposal to further the LDV GHG emissions and CAFE standards programs is also 

consistent with and complementary to the federal GHG and fuel economy standards for MY 

2014 through 2018 medium and heavy-duty vehicles adopted in 2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8084-A1, p. 2]

In 2007, 31 percent of all U.S. GHGs were emitted by mobile sources, which, since 1990, have 

been the fastest-growing source of U.S. GHG emissions. LDVs emit carbon dioxide (CO2), 

methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and are responsible for almost 60 percent 

of all mobile source GHG emissions. CO2 emissions in 2007 represented approximately 94 

percent of all LDV GHG emissions (including HFCs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 

2]

Relative to the national objective of improving energy and national security by reducing 

dependence on foreign oil, net petroleum imports in 2009 accounted for about 51 percent of U.S. 

petroleum consumption. In that same year, transportation was responsible for approximately 71 

percent of petroleum consumption, with LDVs accounting for about 60 percent of transportation 

oil use, which equates to about 40 percent of all U.S. oil consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8084-A1, p. 2]

The estimated benefits of this proposal (over the lifetime of the MY 2017 through 2025 vehicles) 

are a reduction in oil consumption of 4 billion barrels and a reduction in GHG emissions of 2 

billion metric tons. The anticipated fuel savings amounts to $347 billion to $444 billion (based 

on a gasoline price of $3.38 per gallon in 2015 and $3.64 per gallon in 2020). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 2]

The total estimated costs of this program (over the lifetime of the MY 2017 through 2025 

vehicles) will be around $140 billion and the total monetized benefits will be on the order of 

$449 billion to $561 billion, for a net benefit to society in the range of $311 billion to $421 

billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 2]

Based on EPA’s analysis, the fuel cost savings will “far outweigh” higher vehicle costs. For 

consumers, the new standards would add, on average, about $2,000 to the cost of a new vehicle 

in MY 2025. However, a consumer who pays cash when purchasing a MY 2025 vehicle can 

expect to make up this cost in about three and a half years and, thereafter, continue to accrue 

savings in fuels costs. A consumer who purchases a MY 2025 vehicle using credit will save 

more each year in fuel costs than the amount of the increased payments on the car loan. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 2]

The co-benefits to be derived from such a program extend far beyond climate change, fuel 

savings and energy security, and include the following:

• reduced PM2.5 and NOx emissions due to reduced gasoline distribution emissions 

associated with tanker trucks; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 2]
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• mitigation of some of the disproportionate adverse health impacts (including those 

associated with toxic air pollutants and criteria pollutants) on environmental justice 

communities affected by emissions from high traffic and located near gasoline refining 

and distribution facilities; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 3]

• reduced adverse health impacts near roadways due to the increase in cleaner vehicles;

• reduced risk of accidental spills of volatile crude oil due to proportional reduction in oil 

imports via marine tankers;

• buffering against gasoline price volatility for consumers and a hedge against rising fuel 

prices due to the increased use of domestic and alternative fuel sources;

• economic growth and the creation of high-quality jobs across the country due to the need 

for the innovative automotive technologies upon which the standards rely; and

• reduced hydrocarbon emissions due to lower fuel throughput at retail distribution 

outlets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 3]

Fourth, NACAA is aware that state and local governments are struggling to maintain current 

road infrastructure and to fund enhancements. NACAA believes that the issue of how to provide 

longterm transportation infrastructure funding is a critical national need that should be 

addressed. However, the debate over long-term transportation funding should not affect the level 

or delay adoption of the proposed fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-

A1, p. 4]

Finally, NACAA urges that EPA and NHTSA ensure that this final rule is promulgated by July 

2012, as planned. Further, NACAA encourages EPA, upon promulgation of this rule, to begin 

assessing the efficacy of another phase of standards to apply to post-2025 MY vehicles. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 4]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

NADA continues to believe that a single national light-duty vehicle fuel-economy/GHG program 

is essential to the extent that it avoids any unworkable patchwork of state laws. The EISA 

mandate for a fleet-wide combined fuel economy average of at least 35 miles per gallon by 2020 

(with a commensurate reduction in GHGs of at least 30 percent), followed by standards set to 

achieve maximum achievable performance is Congress’ clear direction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9575-A1, p. 12]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 69.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 92.]

NADA supports a single national program for light vehicle fuel economy.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 56-57.]
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NADA strongly believes that the issues and goals involved in this rulemaking are national in 

scope, and that California regulators should not be dictating national policy or setting fuel 

economy standards.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 69.]

NADA supports the single national program governing light-duty vehicle fuel economy as that is 

what Congress sought in 2007 when it enacted the Energy Independence and Security Act.

Organization: National Caucus of Environmental Legislators

America's deepening dependence on oil puts our economy, environment, and national security at 

risk. The introduction of new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards ensuring 

new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of 54.5 miles per gallon fleet-wide by 2025 is an 

important step in the right direction. These standards will reduce pollution and save Americans 

money through greater fuel efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-A1, p. 1]

Reducing the nation’s reliance on foreign oil is an important objective that these standards can 

help to achieve. It is critical that the consumer and environmental benefits of these standards are 

maximized by rejecting efforts to weaken the standards. We support keeping the standards as 

strong as possible through the rulemaking process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-A1, p. 1]

Americans understand that cleaner, more fuel-efficient vehicles can help break our addiction to 

oil, and they overwhelmingly support strong fuel efficiency and pollution standards. In a recent 

poll, Consumer Reports found that 80 percent of survey respondents favored raising the national 

standard to around 55-mpg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-A1, p. 1]

The standards proposed for 2017-2025 will greatly decrease the average new vehicle's global 

warming pollution, cutting annual nationwide emissions by 280 million metric tons in 2030—

equivalent to the annual emissions from roughly 70 coal-fired power plants. The standards 

outlined will also reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 23 billion gallons in 2030— equivalent 

to the 2010 U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Allowing for loopholes to weaken these 

standards would needlessly send money to foreign countries and extend our dependence on oil. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-A1, pp. 1-2]

These standards will determine the efficiency of cars and trucks our children will drive decades 

from now. As state legislators, on behalf of our constituents we applaud efforts to break 

America's addiction to oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and reduce the threat of 

climate change. We urge your administration to ensure that the standards developed for 2017-

2025 vehicles are as strong as possible, in order to maximize their benefits for our economy, our 

environment and our national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-A1, p. 2]

Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)
EPA Response to Comments

1-56

NPGA supports the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) and the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) goals to further reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 

emissions and improve fuel economy for light-duty vehicles for model years 2017-2025. Further, 

we support the President’s request to address global climate change and reduce our nation’s oil 

consumption. And, we firmly believe the use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), an EPA 

approved clean alternative fuel, will help reduce our nation’s dependency on oil and reduce CO2

emissions, a stated goal of the subject proposed rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-

A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

The standards are also an example of how industry, labor, and conservationists can and must 

continue to work together to use the Clean Air Act as a tool for innovation and to solve critical 

environmental, energy and economic challenges that we face. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-

A2, pp. 1-2]

The proposed 2017-2025 standards will approximately double fuel economy of our cars, SUV’s 

and pickups from today’s levels to an average of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. Vehicles built 

under the standard will save America 4 billion barrels of oil and 2 billion metric tons of carbon 

pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, pp. 2-3]

Taken together with the 2012-2016 light duty standards and the 2014-2018 medium and heavy 

duty standards being implemented now, the proposed standards will cut carbon pollution over 

650 million metric tons a year in 2030 – about 10% of total US carbon pollution today. This is an 

historic step forward to combat our climate challenge. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 

3]

Taken together these standards are also the largest step the nation has ever taken to cut oil use 

and enhance our energy security. As shown in Figure 1, above, these standards together will cut 

our demand for oil by 3.6 million barrels per day; more than all the oil we import today from the 

Persian Gulf, Venezuela and Russia combined. [Figure 1 can be found on p. 2 of Docket number 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 3]

And as we are ensuring that every car and truck uses less fuel, steady expansion of electric and 

advanced vehicle technology can take us even further– to a mass market, high performance 

vehicle fleet that uses little oil and produces near zero pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9887-A2, p. 3]

Deep cuts in the oil we need means less pressure for risky new drilling projects in the Arctic or 

for clear cutting forest for Canadian tar sands. It means less need for new pipelines, fewer leaks 

and threats to people, wildlife and our public and private lands. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9887-A2, p. 3]

These standards show we can take real steps to roll back climate change and protect wildlife for 

generations to come. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 3]
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The proposed standard is also critical to regain and sustain our leadership in the most advanced 

vehicle technologies - including hybrid and electric cars and trucks. The strong long term targets 

embodied in the 2017-2025 rule are essential to justify ongoing investments in hybrid and 

electric technology necessary to combat high fuel prices and environmental challenges, and to 

ensure the competitiveness of the American auto industry in a changing world. Weto [sic] meet

to build robust network of domestic innovators, suppliers and manufacturers ready to meet 

national and global demand, to ensure an industry able to lead the clean global auto industry of 

the future, and to ensure consumers are protected against the real and present risk of rising and 

volatile oil prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, pp. 5-6]

Standards are also strongly supported by the public.

A recent survey by Consumers Reports found 80% of car owners in support of fuel economy 

standards that would achieve 55 mpg by 2025, and the agencies’ recent field hearings were 

swamped with overwhelmingly positive testimony. 14 The public knows fuel economy standards 

work. They work for wildlife, they work American families, they work for the auto industry and 

autoworkers and they work for the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

We thank the agencies for their clarity of vision and perseverance in developing this essential 

standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 27-28.]

America needs a strong, clean industrial sector that employs billions with good jobs while 

producing the most efficient products possible. Our members depend on all kinds of vehicles 

from small hybrids to cars to pick-ups to off-road vehicles. We still believe in the potential of the 

American auto industry.

Over the past two years, the hard working people here in Detroit and in Ohio and Missouri and 

North Carolina and all across the country have been proving dramatically that they have what it 

takes for America to lead in a prosperous clean energy future. Their efforts, combined with these 

new standards, and effective public and private investment show how an industry can be retooled 

to be vibrant in the present and even more relevant and powerful in the future. Strong standards 

through the 2025 year are critical to staying on this path.

The standards are also an example of how an industry and labor and the conservation community 

can and must work together to use the Clean Air Act as a tool for innovation and to solve critical 

and environmental energy and economic changes we face today.

These standards deliver.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 31-32.]
EPA Response to Comments

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The proposed standard is also critical to regain and sustain our leadership in the most advanced 

vehicle technologies including hybrid electric cars and trucks. These technologies will be critical 

to combating high fuel prices and environmental challenges into the future and the 

competitiveness of the American auto industry in a changing world.

Investments in cutting edge electric vehicles and other innovations increase fuel efficiency across 

the board, and long-term targets create certainty in a world tyrannized by volatile oil prices and 

availability.

Together we must work to build a robust network of innovators, suppliers and caring consumers 

to lead in the global economy for the auto industry's future.

14 http://news.consumerreports.org/cars/2011/11/survey-car-owners-want-better-fuel-economysupportincreased- standards.html. This recent survey finds comparable results to many previous 

polls.

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

The U.S. EPA and NHTSA proposed passenger vehicle carbon pollution fuel economy standards 

for model years 2017-2025 is the third historic agreement to bring us cleaner cars and trucks. 

The latest announcement follows on the joint NHSTA and EPA rules for model years 2012 to 

2016 passenger vehicles and for model years 2014 to 2018 medium- and heavy-duty trucks.1,2 

These agreements exemplify how leadership, partnership, and compromise can help solve the 

enormous environmental, economic and energy challenges facing our country. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 2]

The model year 2017-2025 National Program standards will act as a powerful economic stimulus 

by keeping a total of $350 billion in the U.S. economy by 2030 instead of sending it overseas to 

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela and other oil-exporting nations.5 This higher level of investment 

in the U.S. economy, especially auto manufacturing, will result in roughly half a million more 

jobs by 2030.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 3]

American consumers are already benefiting from the more fuel-efficient vehicle options 

available due to the current National Program requirements and will benefit more as the 

standards get stronger. By 2030, the new agreement will provide the equivalent of a $330 tax 

rebate to every American household.12 Compared to today’s average vehicle, a 54.5 mpgequivalent standard will save the average driver $6,600 over the vehicle’s lifetime, with most

drivers seeing benefits immediately in the form of reduced total monthly payments for the car 

and fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 5]

The most recent clean car agreement enjoys an unprecedented breadth and depth of support 

including from almost all of the auto industry14, and from Republicans and Democrats15, 
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consumer advocacy groups16, 17, national security groups18, 19, economists20, business 

leaders21, small business owners22, the UAW23, and environmental organizations24. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 6]

Numerous polls show that a large majority of Americans support substantially strengthening of 

clean car standards. A Consumer Federation of America found 60 percent of American 

consumers support a 60 mpg standard with a payback of three and five years.25 A poll for 

national environmental groups found 83 percent of voters support a 60 mpg standard with a 

payback of four years.26 Polls by the investor group Ceres found 56 percent of Michigan voters 

and 59 percent of Ohio voters support 60 mpg with a payback time of four years.27 According to 

a recent poll by the Consumer Reports National Research Center, 80 percent agreed that fuel 

economy standards should require auto manufacturers to increase the overall fleet average to at 

least 55 miles per gallon by 2025.28 Finally, a poll by the Public Policy Institute of California 

found that an overwhelming 84 percent of Californians support requiring automakers to 

significantly improve fuel efficiency, including 76 percent of Republicans.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, pp. 6-7]

Small business owners – many of whom buy cars and trucks for their businesses – also strongly 

support higher fuel economy standards. A recent poll by the Small Business Majority found that 

87 percent of small business owners overwhelmingly support adopting strong fuel efficiency 

standards now and 80 percent support requiring the auto industry to increase mileage to 60 mpg 

by 2025.30 According to the Small Business Majority poll: “Small business owners say that in 

order to survive and remain competitive, they need automobiles that get better gas mileage and 

cost less to operate.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 198-201.]

The proposed standards are a giant step forward. The standards are good for the environment, 

consumers, and the economy. The standards ensure that as a nation we are investing in our future 

instead of being beholden to a status quo of heavy dependence on oil which is fueling dangerous 

emissions of carbon pollution and draining our economic wealth.

These standards will help protect our economy by helping reduce extreme weather events such as 

hurricanes, heat waves and floods.

The national program and this latest set of standards are examples of good government. Despite 

the gridlock in Congress, the EPA, NHTSA and the California Air Resources Board have 

demonstrated an effective partnership to develop policies that meet the objectives of the Clean 

Air Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

Each agency has played an important and critical role in shaping this proposal. This proposal is 

also a product of discussions with the automotive industry, labor, environmental, and consumer 

stakeholders, and the result is a strong set of standards.
EPA Response to Comments

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1 EPA and NHTSA. “Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 

Average Fuel Economy Standards for MY 2012-2016 (Final Rule).” 75 FR 25324.

2 EPA and NHTSA. “Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for 

Medium- and Heavy-duty Engines and Vehicles.” 76 FR 57106.

5 NRDC calculation based on EPA NPRM (76 FR 74854) estimates of oil consumption 

reduction, import fractions and incremental vehicle costs. Fuel prices from AEO 2011.

6 Ceres. More Jobs per Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG Standards will Fuel American 

Jobs. July 2011.

12 UCS and NRDC. “Saving Money at the Gas Pump: State-by-State Consumer Savings from 

Stronger Fuel Efficiency and Carbon Pollution Standards.” September 2011.

14 Commitment letters from 13 automakers to Secretary LaHood and Administrator Jackson. 

Dated July 2011 . Letters from BMW, Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar Land Rover, 

Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota Volvo. http://epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm

15 Bipartisan Joint Letter to President Obama. Signed by The Honorable Diane Feinstein, US 

state Congress, D-California, et al. Dated July 25, 2011.

16 American Consumer Advocacy Groups. Joint Letter to President Obama. Signed by 

Consumer Federation of American, et al. Dated September 22, 2010.

17 Consumer Union. Consumers Reports Says 56 Miles-Per-Gallon Vehicle Standard is Good, 

but 62 MPG is Better Aggressive Fuel Economy Standard by 2025 Will Save Consumers Money 

and Dramatically Cut Oil Consumption. Press Release. June 30, 2011.

18 Securing America’s Future Energy. Oil Savings from the Proposed 2017–2025 Fuel Economy 

Standards. Issue Brief. June 8, 2011

19 Ashley Howe. Truman Thanks Obama in POLITICO. Blog. Truman Project. August 3, 2011. 

http://www.operationfree.net/2011/08/03/truman-advertisement-featured-in-politico/

20 American Economist Group Joint Letter to President Obama. Signed by Michael Anderson, 

Ph.D. University of California, Berkley, et al. Dated June 7, 2011

21 Environmental Entrepreneurs (E2) Joint Letter to President Obama. Signed by Curtis Abbott, 

Lucesco Lighting Inc., et al. Date June 30, 2011

22 Small Business Majority. Small Businesses Strongly Support Raising Fuel Efficiency 

Standards. Press Release. July 29, 2011

23 UAW. UAW supports administration proposal on light-duty vehicle CAFE and greenhouse 

gas emissions reductions. Press Release. July 29, 2011.
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24 Environmental Advocacy Groups Joint Letter to President Obama. Signed by Cindy Shogan 

Alaskan Wilderness League, et al. Dated September 9, 2010.

25 Consumer Federation of America. The Consumer Case for Strong Fuel Economy Standards: 

56 MPG by 2025 Works. Press Release. June 28, 2011.

26 The Mellman Group, Inc. Memo to Environment America, The National Resources Defense 

Council, Sierra Club, & Union of Concerned Scientists. Voters Overwhelmingly Support Stricter 

Fuel Efficiency Standards. Released September 15, 2010.

27 Ceres. Voters in America’s Auto & Manufacturing Heartland Want 60 MPG Fuel Economy 

Standards by 2025. Press release. May 25, 2011.

28 Consumer Reports National Research Center. Consumer Reports Survey: Large Majority of 

Consumers Support Stronger Fuel Economy Standards to Save Money, Lower Fuel Costs. Press 

Release. November 14, 2011.

29 Public Policy Institute of California. PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and the 

Environment. Press Release of Findings. July 27, 2011.

30 Small Business Majority. Small Businesses Strongly Support Raising Fuel Efficiency 

Standards. Fuel Efficiency Poll. July 29, 2011.

Organization: New Jersey Senate, Third Legislative District

America's deepening dependence on oil puts our economy, environment, and national security at 

risk. I am writing to applaud you for taking an important step to confront the dangers of this 

dependence by proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that 

would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide standard 

by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9970-A1, p. 1]

I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous administration to 

break America's dependence on oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and reduce the threat 

of climate change, I urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of these 

standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process in order 

to maximize their benefits for our economy, our environment and our national security. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9970-A1, p. 1]

Organization: New York City Council, 35th District 

Your administration has taken important steps to confront the dangers of our dependence on 

oil—most recently, proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards 

that would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide 

standard by 2025. I am writing to applaud you for developing these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9901-A2, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

1-62

These standards will determine the efficiency of cars and trucks our children will drive decades 

from now. I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous 

administration to break America's addiction to oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and 

reduce the threat of climate change. I urge you to ensure that the standards your administration 

develops for 2017-2025 vehicles are as strong as possible, in order to maximize their benefits for 

our economy, our environment and our national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9901-A2, 

p. 1]

Organization: New York State Assembly Committee on Government Operations

Your administration has taken important steps to confront the dangers of our dependence on 

oil—most recently, proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards 

that would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide 

standard by 2025. I am writing to applaud you for developing these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9453-A2, p. 1]

These standards will determine the efficiency of cars and trucks our children will drive decades 

from now. I commend you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous 

administration to break America's addiction to oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and 

reduce the threat of global climate change. I urge you to ensure that the standards your 

administration develops for 2017-2025 vehicles are as strong as possible, in order to maximize 

their benefits for our economy, our environment and our national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9453-A2, p. 1]

Organization: New York State Senate, 26th District

Your administration has taken important steps to confront the dangers of our dependence on oilmost recently, proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that 

would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide standard 

by 2025. I am writing to applaud you for developing these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9884-A1, p. 1]

These standards will determine the efficiency of cars and trucks our country's children will drive 

decades from now. I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any 

previous administration to break America's addiction to oil, keep billions of dollars in our 

economy and reduce the threat of climate change. I urge you to ensure that the standards your 

administration develops for 2017-2025 vehicles are as strong as possible. in order to maximize 

their benefits for our economy, our environment, and our national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9884-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

Nissan remains committed to the program and to the terms and conditions set forth in Nissan's 

letter dated July 29, 2011, and in the agencies' Second Supplemental Notice of Intent published 

in the Federal Register on the same date. The following comments further demonstrate the 
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overall benefits and technological underpinning of the proposal, as well as identifying additional 

improvements and corresponding benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.1]

Nissan's environmental commitment extends beyond the regulatory program. As a leader in 

electric powertrains, Nissan brought to market the all-electric Nissan LEAF and will continue to 

drive development and deployment of electric powertrains. Nissan also remains dedicated to 

continued improvements in internal-combustion powered vehicles, safe weight reduction and 

advances in traditional hybrid technology. Nissan expects its fleet during the model years 

covered by this rulemaking to include a diverse array of technologies and powertrains. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.1]

Industry-wide success in meeting the proposed standards will certainly depend on the extent to 

which the market for new vehicle technologies develops during the covered model years. 

Widespread adoption of battery electric vehicles and other advanced powertrains requires not 

only industry to broadly embrace investment in these technologies, but also for consumers to 

adopt these new technologies. Given the planning and lead-times necessary for such a market 

shift, the proposed incentives for battery electric powertrains (multiplier credit and zero 

emissions compliance value) and other proposed incentives are essential. Only through the 

government's support of industrial innovation in the transportation sector can the U.S. achieve its 

long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) public policy objectives. Not including the proposed Incentives 

In the final rulemaking will discourage manufacturer investment in these technologies, and 

signal a significant change in Administration policy and delay the realization of the substantial 

long-term greenhouse gas reductions associated with these transformational, 'game changing' 

vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, pp.1-2]

Nissan believes that the proposed program strikes an appropriate balance between aggressive 

standards and the encouragement of advanced technologies necessary to meet those standards. 

As proposed, the regulatory program recognizes that although the automobile manufacturers 

must invest significantly in technological advances, the economic and market conditions-both 

within the U.S. and globally-must also support such an investment. Thus the structure of the 

proposal-with standards firmly established for MYs 2017-2021 and with a robust mid-term 

evaluation of technological and market feasibility for MYs 2022-2025-is essential. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.2]

Nissan commends the agencies for the comprehensive joint rulemaking, and strongly supports 

global efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Success in reducing the impact of mobile source 

greenhouse gas emissions requires a coordinated and thoughtful effort that goes beyond the 

automobile industry, however. Nissan, for its part, is committed to improving existing internal 

combustion engines and investing in a future of electric vehicles and other advanced powertrains 

to reduce the transportation sector's GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.24]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 126-131.]

Nissan supports the national program and remains committed to the regulatory program as set 

forth in the notices of intent and the proposed rule.
EPA Response to Comments

1-64

The proposal also represents a significant leap forward in advancing more environmentally 

friendly vehicles and zero emissions transportation.

The national program represents a significant step forward in reducing greenhouse gas emissions 

and fuel consumption through a unified federal and state regulatory structure. We appreciate the 

efforts of federal agencies and California in providing a regulatory program that allows for one 

product pathway to compliance and that includes incentives to promote longer term public 

policy.

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 69-74.]

The proposed rule is a positive step that builds on the progress made under the current CAFE 

rules, and will achieve important economic and environmental benefits.

These proposed new standards will significantly reduce fuel consumption and greenhouse gas 

emissions and expand the use of alternative fuels.

We urge EPA to continue to evaluate the greenhouse gas effects of these provisions, and take the 

necessary steps to ensure preservation of the overall goals of the program.

In summary, the joint EPA/NHTSA effort to address greenhouse gas emissions and fuel 

consumption through this rulemaking is a positive step that builds on the progress of the current 

CAFE rules.

Organization: Oblong Land Conservancy

Your agency, with the President's support, is taking the right steps to improve fuel economy in 

America's fleet of vehicles.

In order to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, and all the costs and dangers that this economic 

relationship entails, we must wean ourselves from this wasteful source.

There are immense savings at the gas pumps that will benefit almost all Americans, and 

contribute to economic prosperity.

It will substantially reduce air pollution and reduce the threats of global warming.

Please do your share to maximize the clear benefits to America's economy, our national security 

and our environment.

The Oblong Land Conservancy commends your efforts, and supports these goals. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9915-A1, p. 1]
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Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appreciates the opportunity to submit comments on the 

“2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards” proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on December 1, 2011. 

The proposal is designed to “represent a continued harmonized and consistent National Program” 

(76 FR 74854). We are pleased that EPA and NHTSA (the agencies) continue to work with 

automobile manufacturers to harness the large number of available energy efficient engine 

technologies that offer the potential to increase the nation’s energy efficiency. This continued 

initiative to ensure greater vehicle fuel efficiency will reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign 

sources of energy, help promote an American energy infrastructure that will support the 

country’s transportation needs and save motorists money at the pump. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7821-A1, p. 1]

The benefits of the agencies’ final coordinated rule in terms of fuel savings will be substantial. 

According to the proposed rule, from model years 2017 through 2025, the fuel cost savings will 

outweigh the higher vehicle costs based on today's price of gasoline. A consumer who pays cash 

when purchasing a model year 2025 vehicle can expect to recover the $2,000 extra cost for a 

vehicle through fuel savings in about 3.5 years. Also, according to the proposed rulemaking, 

passenger cars will see an average annualized rate of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reductions 

of five percent. For light trucks, the average annualized rate of CO2 emission reductions would 

be 3.5 percent per year for model years 2017 through 2021 and increase to five percent per year 

for model years 2022 through 2025. Finally, the proposed rule indicates that the new fuel 

economy standards will also result in small reductions in criteria pollutant emissions. The 

Commonwealth urges the agencies to ensure that all of the proposed emission reduction 

milestones are achieved expeditiously. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 2]

It is also imperative that EPA and NHTSA harmonize the National Program with the program 

established by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) for motor vehicles. For example, 

harmonization will allow automobile manufacturers to produce similar vehicles for states that 

require CARB-certified vehicles and those that require Federally-certified vehicles. We support 

harmonization because of its significant benefits for both the environment and consumers. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 2]

We support the agencies’ proposed rulemaking (CAFE and GHG emission standards) for motor 

vehicles including passenger cars and light-duty trucks, which would create more fuel-efficient 

light-duty vehicles in this country as governments in countries around the world are considering 

similar efforts. Keeping the nation’s vehicle fleet fuel efficient is important for reducing our 

dependence on unreliable sources of fossil fuels, promoting a homegrown energy supply and 

infrastructure, and maintaining our nation’s competitiveness and standard of living. We also 

support EPA’s efforts to harmonize Federal light-duty vehicle standards with light-duty vehicle 

standards developed by CARB. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 5]
EPA Response to Comments

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Finally, EPA should properly account for GHG emissions, which includes extending the 

harmonization effort with CARB by adopting the same position on test fuels as the California 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Pennsylvania State Senate et al.

America's deepening dependence on oil puts our economy, environment, and national security at 

risk. Your administration has taken important steps to confront this challenge-most recently, 

announcing an outline for a new phase of fuel efficiency and auto pollution standards through 

2025. I am writing to applaud you for developing these standards, and urge you to maximize the 

consumer and environmental benefits of these standards by keeping the standards as strong as 

possible through the rulemaking process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914-A1, p. 1]

Americans understand that cleaner, more fuel-efficient vehicles can help break our addiction to 

oil, and they overwhelmingly support strong fuel efficiency and pollution standards. In a 

nationwide poll, the Mellman Group found that 83 percent of likely voters favored a 60 milesper-gallon standard -- even if it would add $3,000 to the up-front price of a new vehicle. Strong 

standards maximize consumer savings at the pump. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914-A1, p. 1]

The standards your administration has outlined for 2017-2025 will greatly decrease the average 

new vehicle's global warming pollution, cutting annual nationwide emissions by 280 million 

metric tons in 2030-equivalent to the annual emissions from 72 coal-fired power plants. The 

standards you outlined will also reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 23 billion gallons in 2030-

roughly equivalent to the 2010 U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Allowing for loopholes 

to weaken these standards would needlessly send money to foreign countries and extend our 

dependence on oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914-A1, p. 1]

These standards will determine the efficiency of cars and trucks our children will drive decades 

from now. We applaud you for seizing a historic opportunity to do more than any previous 

president to break America's addiction to oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and reduce 

the threat of climate change. I urge you to ensure that the standards your administration develops 

for 2017-2025 vehicles are as strong as possible, in order to maximize their benefits for our 

economy, our environment and our national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Pew Charitable Trusts

Attached please find comments from The Pew Charitable Trusts and more than 36,000 

Americans in support of the proposed fuel efficiency rules for model years 2017-2025 light duty 

cars and trucks under consideration by the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of 

Transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496, p. 1]

The proposed rule would double passenger vehicle fuel efficiency from the level enacted in 

2007, a significant increase that will save consumers money at the pump, blunt the economic and 

national security threats presented by oil dependence and price volatility, and help American 

manufacturers develop new technologies that spur investment in research, development, and 

production of advanced vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A2, p. 1]
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Pew has long supported higher federal fuel economy standards. In 2007, we worked to help 

achieve overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress on the first fuel economy increase in 30 

years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A2, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-2010-0799-11788, p.17]

In addition to the petition submitted to President Obama on November 1, 2011 and signed by 

more than 31,000 Americans, Pew has, and will continue to, highlight the importance of fuel 

efficiency with auto supply manufacturers, working families, and veterans at events around the 

nation. We have also attached a follow-up petition that includes more than 36,000 signatures of 

Americans that urge EPA and DOT to adopt a strong final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9496-A2, p. 2]

Dear Mr. President:

I support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average of 

54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther on a gallon 

of gas and reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. The price of gas is once again squeezing the 

budgets of American families, who already are forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for 

basic transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A3, p. 1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements. I 

commend your efforts. I believe it is important to increase U.S. investment in fuel efficient 

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help this country break its dependence on 

foreign oil, and protect the environment. Don’t let these standards be watered down—protect and 

finalize the new fuel efficiency rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A3, p. 1]

[Note: This comment was signed by 36,000 Americans.]

We have also sought to inform the public and policymakers across the nation about the dangers 

of U.S. oil dependence to our nation's economy, national security, and to the lives of the U.S. 

servicemen and women who defend oil transit routes and chokepoints around the world. [These 

comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing on 

January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp.17-18.]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Porsche supports the goal of setting ambitious targets for long-range reduction in fuel 

consumption. Most importantly, it is critical to establish a single National standard for GHG so 

that manufacturers are able to integrate technologies consistently. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9264-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Renewable Energy Long Island
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I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous administration to 

break America's dependence on oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and reduce the threat 

of climate change. I urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of these 

standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process, in order 

to maximize their benefits for our economy, our environment and our national security. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7933-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

As detailed in the attached comments, RFA is supportive of the stated goals of the CAFE/GHG 

program. However, we are concerned by several elements of the proposal, as summarized below: 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.1]

While RFA is supportive of the stated goals of the program, which are “to address global climate 

change and to reduce oil consumption,” we are concerned by several elements of the proposal 

that appear to discourage the future production of flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) capable of 

operating on gasoline blends containing greater than 15%vol. fuel ethanol (E15). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.3]

Additionally, we believe the agencies must ensure the final CAFE/GHG regulation is 

harmonized with, and does not undermine the requirements of, other related regulations, such as 

the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and pending “Tier 3” rules. Vehicle engines, emissions 

controls, and motor fuels operate as highly integrated systems. Therefore, as they finalize the 

CAFE/GHG rule, the agencies must carefully consider what fuel properties and characteristics 

will be necessary for automakers to achieve the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9490-A1, p.3]

In closing, RFA remains steadfastly supportive of consistent, science-based policies that reduce 

petroleum consumption, decrease transportation costs, and reduce GHG emissions. These 

objectives work in concert to enhance national energy security, strengthen our economy, and 

protect our environment. While we applaud EPA/NHTSA for endeavoring toward these goals in 

the current CAFE/GHG proposal, we are concerned that progress may be undermined by several 

elements of the proposal that discourage the future production of FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9490-A1, p.8]

Organization: Ross, D.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 240-244.]

In our very imperfect world, the ongoing political grid-lock, the proposed CAFE and greenhouse 

gas standards are the single most effective policy option on the table for addressing our overdependence on fossil fuels.

As an economist and a local government official, I'm clear that the benefits of these standards far 

outweigh the cost for our environment and our economy.
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I thank everyone involved in developing the proposed standards. I thank you for your patience in 

hearing me out, and urge finalization of strong standards for model years 2017, 2025 this 

summer.

Organization: Salinas, A.

With transportation accounting for 20% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, the new fuelefficiency and global warming pollution reduction proposals by the Department of 

Transportation and the EPA are encouraging. However, the proposed rules need strengthening. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7119-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

SAFE has long advocated increasing the fuel economy of the light-duty vehicle (LDV) fleet. 

Doing so is, in the short- to medium-term, one of the most effective ways to decrease the 

petroleum intensity of our economy, thereby enhancing our energy, economic, and national 

security. For that reason, SAFE strongly supports the general framework and overall fuel 

economy and emission reduction goals that were the subject of an agreement between the 

automakers and the regulators last summer, whose components were incorporated into the 

proposed rule. SAFE also believes that the rule has the potential to help support the adoption of 

grid-enabled vehicles (GEVs) (electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 

(PHEVs)), which rely entirely on grid-delivered electricity or use substantially less liquid fuels 

than traditional vehicles with internal combustion engines, substantially enhancing our economic 

and national security by relying on a diverse portfolio of domestic fuels, with stable prices, 

instead of the highly volatile global oil market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 2]

SAFE expresses its appreciation for the agencies ongoing efforts to improve fuel economy in 

order to improve our national and economic security, and hopes that its comments contribute to 

the agencies ongoing efforts to do so as in a responsible and aggressive manner. SAFE is 

committed to providing the regulating agencies any possible assistance that will help them as 

they proceed through this rulemaking process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 19]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 148.]

We strongly support the agreement reached last summer between the administration and 

automakers and its embodiment in the proposed regulation because of the amount of the oil 

savings that it will achieve.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

The Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign and the Clean Air Council 

applaud EPA and NHTSA for proposing to strengthen vehicle fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas 

standards for MY 2017-2025 cars and light trucks – what is now called the National Program. 

Together with standards for 2012-2016 vehicles, this Administration has put new cars on a path 
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to being twice as efficient in 2025 as new vehicles today. More stringent fuel economy and 

greenhouse gas standards are the biggest single step we can take to curb dangerous climate 

change and tackle our addiction to oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 1]

Conclusion: When finalized, strong 2017-2025 standards will provide automakers with a 

longterm direction for safely improving fuel efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions 

from new vehicles. There is no doubt that with these standards, combined with the historic 

standards that these agencies completed for 2012-2016, are the biggest single step we can take to 

help move American beyond oil and curb dangerous carbon pollution. This long-term path that a 

full 14 years of standards offers is critical and will unleash innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9549-A2, p. 11]

As proposed, these standards are demanding significant change in the vehicles automakers make 

and sell with the promise that these vehicles will emit less greenhouse gas emissions. These 

changes will benefit consumers, our economy, national security and environment. A strong final 

rule is needed, with limits on the overall impacts of the flexibilities the proposal offers. To fully 

realize the promised oil savings and emission reductions from these standards the agencies must 

ensure the program continues though 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 11]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 121-126.]

Sierra Club applauds EPA and NHTSA for proposing to strengthen vehicle efficiency and 

greenhouse gas standards for model year 2017 to 2025 cars and light trucks. Together with the 

standards for 2012 to 2016 vehicles this Administration has put new cars on the path of being 

twice as efficient as new cars today. By 2025, the new vehicles are expected to average 54.5 

miles per gallon and emit 162 grams per mile of greenhouse gas pollution delivering to 

consumers vehicles down the road according to the agencies will average 37 miles per gallon.

These standards are the biggest single step we can take to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 

tackle our oil addiction. Cars and light trucks drive our addiction to oil to consume over 8 million 

barrels of oil a day and CO2 nearly 20 percent of U.S. climate-destructing pollution. Our oil 

addiction drains our economy as much as $1 billion every day costing jobs and threatening our 

national security.

There is no doubt with these standards that these are the biggest single steps we can take to move 

Americans beyond oil and curb carbon pollution. However, more needs to be done. Even with 

more efficient vehicle standards, we must increase our transportation choices to reduce how 

much people drive and reduce the carbon content of the fuels we use. When it comes to vehicles, 

however, President Obama and EPA and NHTSA have guaranteed progress for the next 13 

years. We urge EPA and DOT to finalize strong standards in July.

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

SPI appreciates the proposal’s response to the critical need to address global climate change. Our 

policy statement on climate change encourages continued research to develop strategies to 
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conserve energy and reduce emissions, and expresses our belief in the importance of developing 

innovative technologies to minimize the impact on climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9492-A1, pp.1-2]

We thank the EPA and NHTSA for collaborating with vehicle manufacturers in the development 

of the NPRM, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.2]

Organization: South Coast AQMD

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 68-71.]

The South Coast AQMD staff supports overall the proposed greenhouse gas emissions standards 

and timeline. The proposed emissions standards and companion fuel economy standards will 

result in a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, as well as provide crucially 

important co-benefits in reducing criteria emissions in support of attainment of federal and state 

air quality standards for ozone and particulates.

In summary, we strongly urge U.S. EPA and NHTSA to finalize the proposed rule as early as 

possible.

Organization: State of New York The Assembly

Your administration has taken important steps to confront the dangers of our dependence on oil 

most recently, proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that 

would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide standard 

by 2025. I am writing to applaud you for developing these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-10155-A1, p. 1]

These standards will determine the efficiency of cars and trucks our children will drive decades 

from now. I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous 

administration to break America's addiction to oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and 

reduce the threat of climate change. I urge you to ensure that the standards your administration 

develops for 2017-2025 vehicles are as strong as possible, in order to maximize their benefits for 

our economy, our environment and our national security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10155-A1, 

p. 1]

Organization: Tarazevich, Yegor

While I do strongly support reducing air pollution and oil dependency by increasing the fuel 

economy [NHTSA-2010-0131-0199, p.1]

According to a new study from University of Michigan researchers Kate Whitefoot and Steven 

Skerlos, with new CAFE standard it would be more profitable for automakers to keep building 

larger and larger vehicles:
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/cafe-loophole-could-lead-to-biggercars/2011/12/14/gIQA3bGLuO_blog.html [NHTSA-2010-0131-0199, p.1]

Organization: Tesla Motors, Inc.

As a California based manufacturer devoted solely to the development and manufacture of 

electric vehicles and electric vehicle batteries and drivetrain systems, Tesla views EPA's and 

NHTSA's proposal as a step in the right direction. As detailed in these comments, however, 

Tesla believes there is still room for improvement, as well as a better understanding of the 

increasing capabilities and decreasing costs of electric vehicle technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 1]

As an initial matter, Tesla Motors supports the general direction of EPA’s and NHTSA’s 

proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 3]

Tesla Motors again appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments. With reduction of 

our dependence on petroleum as the exclusive source of transportation fuel a national imperative, 

EPA and NHTSA are in a unique position to establish a final rule that encourages the promotes 

the development of alternatives like electric vehicle technology. As Tesla continues to 

demonstrate the feasibility of ever improving EV technology at lower price points, we would 

encourage EPA and NHTSA to continue a leadership position by enacting a final rule that pushes 

technology forward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, pp. 7-8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 90-93.]

We are largely supportive of the effort to increase vehicle efficiency and to reduce greenhouse 

gas emissions, and I thank you for your work in this sector.

Thus, while we applaud EPA and NHTSA's proposal, we believe that it represents a good start, 

but it doesn't properly -- that it doesn't fully take into account the full potential of EV technology. 

And so we believe that standards could, indeed, be much higher.

Organization: The Catskill Center for Conservation and Development

America's deepening dependence on oil puts our economy, environment, and national security at 

risk. I am writing to applaud you for taking an important step to confront the dangers of this 

dependence by proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that 

would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide standard 

by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9913-A1, p. 1]

I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous administration to 

break America's dependence on oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and reduce the threat 

of climate change. I urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of these 

standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process, in order 
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to maximize their benefits for our economy, our environment and our national security. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9913-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Toyota views the joint EPA and NHTSA rulemaking process as a necessary step toward our 

ultimate objective - a true, single national standard governing fuel economy and greenhouse gas 

emissions in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.1]

Toyota appreciates the measures the agencies have taken to further harmonize certain aspects of 

the two regulations. Yet, the different underlying legal frameworks of each agency prevent 

harmonization in a few key areas, resulting in differing levels of stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.2]

Recognizing that Toyota's ultimate goal of a single national standard governing fuel economy 

and GHG's may not be practical under current law, we appreciate the efforts by the agencies to 

harmonize as much as possible the various provisions of NHTSA's CAFE standards and EPA's 

GHG standards. In particular, subject to specific comments provided later in this document, 

Toyota generally supports NHTSA's adoption of the following provisions in order to further 

harmonize with EPA's GHG regulations: (1) full-size hybrid pick-up truck credits; (2) A/C

efficiency credits; and (3) off-cycle technology credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.5]

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

The Coalition expresses its support for federal policies that are aimed at increasing America’s 

twin goals of energy independence and reducing vehicle emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-

A1, p.1]

As stated throughout these comments, the Coalition is strongly in favor of the EPA and

NHTSA’s twin objectives to increase America’s energy independence through better fuel 

economy and attempts to reduce GHG emissions from new vehicles. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-

A1, p.8]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists and our more than 350,000 supporters, please 

accept the attached technical comments regarding the proposed rule for 2017 and later model 

year light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emissions and corporate average fuel economy standards. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, letter p. 1]

UCS strongly supports the proposed standards, and applauds the work of the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and 

the California Air Resources Board (CARB) for their respective roles in the development of the 

proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, letter p. 1]
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Your proposal represents historic progress, simultaneously helping tackle the threat of climate 

change, assisting the recovery of our domestic automotive industry, improving our nation’s 

energy security, and strengthening the economy by saving consumers money at the pump. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, letter p. 1]

Importantly, however, key provisions included in the proposal could erode these benefits, and 

should be addressed by the agencies before the standards are finalized. We provide further detail 

on these issues in our submitted comments. We urge the agencies to address these concerns and 

finalize strong vehicle standards for model years 2017-2025 by July 2012, consistent with the 

timeline issued in the most recent Notice of Intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, letter 

p. 1]

Whether it is the threat of international terrorism, the devastating impacts of global climate 

change, or lost income and jobs due to oil price shocks, the damage caused by America’s heavy 

reliance on oil is clear. Since transportation accounts for the majority of America’s oil 

consumption, making our cars and light trucks cleaner and more fuel efficient is one of the most 

effective steps we can take to cut our reliance on oil, reduce the heat-trapping pollution that 

causes global warming, and put money back into the pockets of American consumers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 1]

The proposed light-duty vehicle standards for model years (MYs) 2017-2025 represent a historic 

step forward. Combined with the existing standards for MYs 2012-2016, the proposed standards 

would nearly double the fuel efficiency and halve the greenhouse gas emissions of light duty 

vehicles sold in MY2025 compared to new vehicles sold today. This represents the most 

significant action ever taken by the federal government to cut America’s oil dependence and curb 

global warming pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 1]

Automakers have the technology to make all new light-duty vehicles cleaner and more fuelefficient. The proposed standards would ensure that this technology is used to finally give 

consumers a real choice of fuel efficient vehicles – in the car, pickups minivan, and SUV 

segments alike – when they purchase a new vehicle. In addition, investing in new fuel-saving 

and pollution control technology will add value to vehicles and enhance the competitiveness of 

the U.S. auto industry. This will help continue the economic recovery of the American auto 

industry, protect existing jobs, and create new good-paying jobs into the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 1]

UCS applauds the important work of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the California Air Resources 

Board (CARB) for their respective roles in the development of the proposed standards. 

Throughout the regulatory process, the agencies have been transparent, relied heavily on 

independent technical analysis, and sought ongoing input from the public and other stakeholders. 

UCS urges the agencies to finalize strong vehicle standards, with attention paid to provisions in 

the proposal (noted in Section II below) that, if exploited by automakers, would reduce the 

program’s anticipated benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 1]
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The agencies have proposed new light-duty vehicle standards for MYs 2017-2025, which would 

result in an anticipated fleetwide average greenhouse gas emissions level of 163 grams-per-mile 

and a fleetwide average CAFE level of 49.6 miles-per-gallon in MY2025. If finalized and fully 

implemented, these standards would deliver significant benefits to consumers, the domestic auto 

industry, the environment, and U.S. energy security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 2]

The National Program Harmonizes Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Standards while 

Maintaining California Authority

The proposed standards for MYs 2017-2025 build on the successful framework established 

originally in the rulemaking for fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards of MY2012-2016 

vehicles. This National Program allows automakers to sell a single national fleet of new lightduty vehicles that comply with federal and state requirements under the Clean Air Act and the 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program. Under this structure, EPA continues to set 

and administer national greenhouse gas standards under the Clean Air Act, while NHTSA sets 

and administers CAFE standards. Throughout this process, both EPA and NHTSA have 

coordinated with CARB, which will establish its own greenhouse gas standards, as allowed 

under the Clean Air Act. However, CARB has indicated that it will once again accept 

compliance with the National Program as compliance with its own program, based on conditions 

articulated in the letters of commitment signed in July 2011 and reiterated in the resolution 

language adopted by the Air Resources Board at their January 27th 2012 hearing.11, 12 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 4]

Since President Obama first directed the agencies to develop the second phase of the National 

Program in May 2010, both EPA and NHTSA have worked constructively to develop the 

proposed standards, based on rigorous technical analysis and public input. The agencies released 

a Notice of Intent (NOI) and supporting Technical Assessment Report (TAR) in September 

2010. This was followed by a supplemental NOI in November 2010. Finally, the agencies 

released a second supplemental NOI in July 2011, and in November 2011 a robust Technical 

Support Document that accompanied the MY2017-2025 proposed rule. Throughout the process, 

both the public and key stakeholders were invited to submit comments to the agencies. In 

addition to the formal regulatory announcements, the agencies met routinely with key 

stakeholders, both individually and through stakeholder panels, throughout the regulatory 

process. UCS commends the agencies for conducting a thorough, transparent, and inclusive 

regulatory process to this point. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 4]

UCS applauds the agencies for proposing standards that represent historic progress for American 

consumers, the U.S. auto industry, clean air, and U.S. energy security. However, key provisions 

included in the proposal could erode these benefits, and should be addressed by the agencies 

before the standards are finalized. We provide further detail on these issues in the remaining 

portion of our comments. We urge the agencies to address these concerns and finalize strong 

standards for model years 2017-2025 by July 2012, consistent with the timeline issued in the 

most recent Notice of Intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 5]

As important and promising as the proposal is, there are several areas that should be improved to 

more accurately reflect current data and research on key issues, while other areas should be 
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changed to avoid opportunities for automakers to exploit several provisions in the proposal. UCS 

encourages the agency to address these items before finalizing standards for model year 2017-

2025 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 5]

Again, UCS commends and thanks the agencies for their diligent work in developing the 

proposed MY2017-2025 standards. We look forward to the agencies addressing the issues noted 

above, and finalizing strong standards through 2025 by July 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 14]

America's dangerous dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at 

risk. That's why I strongly support the proposed fuel efficiency and global warming emissions 

standards for new cars and light trucks sold in model years 2017-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9713-A2, p. 2]

The proposed standards are achievable and reasonable and will save me money at the pump, cur 

millions of tons of harmful global warming emissions, and save as much oil in 2030 alone as we 

currently import from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. They will also drive innovation in the U.S. auto 

industry, creating new jobs across the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A2, p. 2]

We cannot afford to delay in confronting the threats of climate change and our dangerous oil 

dependence. I urge you to move forward with the strongest possible standards free of harmful 

loopholes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A2, p. 2]

We support these efforts to reduce global warming emissions, improve the fuel efficiency of our 

vehicles, reduce our dependence on oil, and protect public health by ensuring drivers have more 

choices for clean cars and light trucks through the use of strong, cost-effective standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A2, p. 3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 214-

220.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 137-

140.]

11 http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/letters.htm

12 Final ARB resolution language had not been posted to ARB’s website at the time of 

submission.

38 Edmunds.com. 2010 Hyundai Elantra SE Features and Specs. Accessed January 5, 2011 

online at http://www.edmunds.com/hyundai/elantra/2010/featuresspecs.html?sub=sedan&style=101197480
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39 Vehicles that Meet or Exceed Proposed Targets With Current Powertrain Designs. Draft Joint 

Regulatory Impact Analysis, Table 3.12-1.

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The UAW applauds NHTSA and EPA for their efforts in developing these proposed standards 

and urges the agencies to issue final regulations based on them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9563-A2, p.1]

These proposed standards are NHTSA’s proposal to implement the continuance of fuel economy 

standards in accordance with the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and 

EPA’s proposal to continue the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from light-duty vehicles 

under the Clean Air Act (CAA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.1]

The UAW commends both agencies and the Obama administration for putting forth proposals 

that extend and strengthen the unified national system of fuel economy and greenhouse gas 

emission regulation established for model years 2012-2016. These proposals provide needed 

regulatory certainty to the automobile industry by removing the threat of a confusing and costly 

patchwork of state and federal regulation of light-duty greenhouse gas emissions beginning in 

model year 2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.1]

The proposed rules will benefit the nation by reducing greenhouse gas pollution and lessening 

the nation’s dependence on foreign oil, while at the same time giving consumers relief from 

rising and volatile fuel prices and lowering the overall cost of owning and operating a light-duty 

vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.1]

The UAW is pleased that the proposals recognize the complexities of the automobile market and 

the wide variety of products that consumers demand. These proposals call for improvements in 

fuel efficiency and reductions in tailpipe pollution that are fair, sensible and achievable across 

the many classes of cars and trucks sold in the United States. The proposed federal programs 

create a level playing field for manufacturers across the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9563-A2, pp.1-2]

In conclusion, the UAW is pleased to offer its strong support for the proposals put forward by 

NHTSA and EPA. We commend the Obama administration for its success in implementing the 

2012-2016 rules and developing these proposed rules for 2017–2025 with an open process of 

stakeholder engagement. It is wise and efficient to gather as much information as possible from a 

wide variety of stakeholders before crafting proposed regulations, especially so when much of 

that information is deeply technical and closely held by the automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9563-A2, p.7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 21-26.]

It's an honor to be here this morning on behalf of our membership to voice UAW's full and 

strong support for the proposed rules, regulating greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy. 
EPA Response to Comments

1-78

The proposed rules are sensible, achievable and needed. They are good for the auto industry and 

its workers, good for the broader economy, good for the environment and good for our national 

security.

Also I want to say that UAW believes that the auto manufacturers, all the companies that 

participated in the technical discussions about these proposals and signed a letter of commitment 

to support its frameworks deserves tremendous credit for their commitment to dramatically 

increase the efficiency and reduce the emissions of vehicles sold in the United States.

This is a testament to good government. It shows how government can bring disparate 

stakeholders together to solve problems that are important to the American public. These 

proposed rules will reduce the pollution that contributes to climate change, significantly reduce 

America's dependence on foreign oil and save American families money at the pump. They will

also create jobs in the auto industry and throughout the economy.

That's an incredible set of positive effects from these proposed rules, and it sums up why the 

United Auto Workers are in strong support of these proposals.

President Obama and his Administration, including the two agencies here today, did a 

tremendous job in developing the proposed rules. We thank the President for all the great work 

he has done to strengthen the American auto industry and automotive communities.

Organization: United States Senate

We are writing to express our support for your efforts to establish a coordinated national 

program for fuel economy and emissions standards for model year 2017 to 2025 cars, light 

trucks, and SUVs. The proposed regulations will increase nationwide fleetwide fuel economy to 

54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. The standards will implement Federal law in a manner that 

provides industry with certainty, saves consumers billions of dollars at the pump, reduces our 

dependence on oil, and improves the health of American communities. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0264-A1, p.1]

These proposed regulations implement the policies set forth in the 2007 Ten in Ten Fuel 

Economy Act (Title I of Public Law 11 0-140) in a manner supported by many automotive 

manufacturers, as well as the labor and environmental community. Industry groups such as the 

National Association of Manufacturers praised the agreement on the proposed standards as a 

'positive step.' The regulatory certainty created by this proposal, which unifies state and Federal 

regulations into a single regime, will help automakers to design and build advanced technology 

vehicles and compete in an increasingly global marketplace. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0264-A1, p.1]

We appreciate your efforts to achieve your statutory mandates of reducing oil use and pollution 

in a manner that will allow the automobile industry to grow and thrive. We encourage you to 

continue working with stakeholders to attain the critical national objectives of reduced pollution, 

improved energy security, and lower consumer gasoline costs while reducing compliance costs. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0264-A1, p.2]
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Organization: United States Steel Corporation

U. S. Steel supports the objectives of the EPA and NHTSA to improve fuel economy and reduce 

the greenhouse gas emissions associated with light vehicles. U. S. Steel also supports the Energy 

Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 and the President’s May 21, 2010 request that 

EPA and NHTSA work together to develop a national program that would “...produce a new 

generation of clean vehicles” and responds to the country’s goal of reducing carbon emissions 

and reducing oil consumption. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 207.]

Organization: United Steel Workers (USW)

The United Steelworkers strongly supports the Administration’s goals to increase fuel efficiency 

standards for America’s cars and trucks. Efficiency measures – whether they pertain to vehicles 

or industry – can have the dual benefit of achieving greenhouse gas emission reductions and 

making American businesses more globally competitive. We believe the vehicle emissions 

reduction and fuel economy improvement as proposed by this joint NHTSA/EPA document will 

serve both of these goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p.1]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Following the establishment of the 2012-2016 National Program, Volkswagen continued to 

engage with agency staff to evaluate and discuss future potential for further improvements in 

light duty GHG emissions and fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, letter p. 1]

Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (Volkswagen) supports the vision expressed by this 

rulemaking which is to continue into the 2017-2025 timeframe a harmonized National GHG and 

CAFE program. Volkswagen would like to acknowledge the effort made by EPA, NHTSA, and 

the State of California in building upon the previous 2012-2016 rulemaking. Volkswagen 

participated in the negotiations during the development of the previous National program and we 

have continued to meet with agency technical staff on a regular basis to provide updates 

regarding our input on future technology trends and efficiency improvements. We are 

appreciative of the opportunity to supply the agencies with these comments and we look forward 

to continued constructive dialogue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 3]

Volkswagen elected not to endorse the Supplemental Notice of Intent (SNOI) released prior to 

this NPRM. We were encouraged that the proposal retains the framework for a single, national 

fuel economy program. However, we were concerned that the framework resulted in an 

unbalanced distribution of burden and that targeted flexibilities further amplified the inequities of 

the program. Volkswagen could not responsibly endorse a proposal that conflicted with our key 

principles stated above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 6]

Volkswagen wishes to once again acknowledge the hard work and dedication by agency staff in 

crafting this proposal. Volkswagen appreciates the enormous complexity involved in evaluating 
EPA Response to Comments

1-80

future technology developments which attempt to balance the needs of diverse stakeholders. We 

are pleased to have the opportunity to provide these comments and look forward to continued 

technical dialogue with agency staff. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 29]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC supported the adoption of a single national program to address both greenhouse gases and 

fuel economy for model years 2012-2016 and commends the federal government for taking a 

leadership role in the evolution of these regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 1]

VCC supports the effort of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to 

work towards the continuation of the single national program. This will allow the long-term 

development of a national program that enables a robust and realistic development process 

towards environmental vehicles which address greenhouse gases and fuel economy for the period 

2017-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 1]

The joint efforts of EPA and NHTSA to achieve harmonized requirements are essential to reach 

the overall objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 4]

Application of Credits for Both GHG - EPA and CARB and CAFE-NHTSA

The proposed EPA and NHTSA requirements are coordinated, but not fully harmonized. They 

are also coordinated with CARB but are not completely harmonized. VCC suggests providing 

equivalent fuel consumption and CO2 credit values toward both the GHG (EPA and CARB) and 

CAFE programs (NHTSA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p.9]

The current economic situation limits the opportunities for financial incentives to deploy new 

environmental innovations. These constraints affect both industry and government opportunities 

and mean we must manage our available resources very carefully. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9551-A2, p. 15]

It is therefore a balancing act and extremely important that the mechanisms built into the EPA 

and NHTSA regulations are flexible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 15]

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 105.]

I'm here today to support proposed standards and grateful to EPA and NHTSA for putting this 

forth.

Organization: WESPAC Foundation
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1-81

America's deepening dependence on oil puts our economy, environment, and national security at 

risk. I am writing to applaud you for taking an important step to confront the dangers of this 

dependence by proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that 

would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleet-wide standard 

by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459-A1, p.1]

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9459-A1, p.1]

$45 billion in savings at the gas pump [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459-A1, p.1]

23 billion gallons of gasoline saved [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459-A1, p.1]

280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459-

A1, p.1]

I applaud you for seizing this historic opportunity to do more than any previous administration to 

break America's dependence on oil, keep billions of dollars in our economy and reduce the threat 

of climate change. I urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of these 

standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rule-making process, in 

order to maximize their benefits for our economy, our environment and our national security. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9459-A1, p.1]

Organization: Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S.

This proposed rule takes important steps toward reducing oil consumption and greenhouse gas 

emissions. However, further measures are needed to ensure that the projected fuel economy 

improvements actually occur, and that incentives to upsize the vehicle fleet are reduced. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

Response:

EPA acknowledges the general support for the proposed rule expressed by a very wide 

range of commenters. The commenters supported the proposal for many reasons, including the 

following: Appreciation of the effort to align the program with NHTSA’s and CARB’s 

programs; the aggressive but achievable standards that send a long-term signal to auto 

manufactures for their future planning; the expectation of significantly reduced CO2 emissions 

and large fuel savings; expectation that the program will benefit businesses (including the auto 

industry), create jobs, benefit consumers, and spur innovation. EPA is maintaining all key 

provisions of the proposed rule that prompted these comments.

1.2. General Opposition for the National Program

Organizations Included in this Section
EPA Response to Comments

1-82

Adams, G.

Addam, Mary 

Anonymous public citizen 4

Anonymous public citizen 5

Axford, H.

Bassett, S.

Cafagna, R.

Cuenca, M.

Defour Group

Ennis, M.

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Faria, R.

Feinstein, C.

Gilles, B.

Gordon, Michael

Green, K.

Haroldson, C.

Hohenstein, H.

Horst, R.

Houston Tea Party Society

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Jordon, A.

Knapp, B.

Kunz, R. and J.

Leach, Kyle

Lennon, S.

Links, W.

Lipetzky, P.

Medinger, R.

Mehrotra, Rahul

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Parker, M.

Paul, M.

Pearce, F.

Pregibon, D.

Rafter, M.

Shick, R.

Slemp III, R. L.

Statman, P.

Steffanoff, N.

Steyn, R.

Sullivan, T.

Van Voorhies, M.

Varley, R.

Organization: Adams, G.
National Program

1-83

I oppose the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average of 

54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther on a gallon 

of gas and reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1550-A1, p. 1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements. I 

question your efforts. I believe it is important to increase U.S. investment in sustainable energy 

technologies including fuel efficient technologies, charge consumers even more money with 

taxes at the pump, help this country break its dependence on foreign oil, and protect the 

environment. Don't let these standards be watered down--protect and finalize new fuel efficiency 

rules in all areas, not only in transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1550-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Addam, Mary

In the face of peak oil and climate change, why are we waiting til 2017 for better fuel standards? 

It should have been done 40 years ago. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0208, p.1]

Organization: Anonymous public citizen 4

I read the letter written by several governors to support this proposal. California is not a wise 

choice to model ourselves after, a bankrupt state. I do not support this proposal. Add this on top 

of everything else we are burdened with and our economy will soon reach the point of no 

recovery. If the future of the automobile industry is restricted to building electric and hybrid 

vehicles, then I will probably be walking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10317, p.1]

Organization: Anonymous public citizen 5

The general public does not want this bill, and it would be irresponsible to pass it. It should not 

be passed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2010, p.1]

Organization: Axford, H.

Mr. President [sic] You leave My Choice of Vehicles Up to My Needs, And What I CAN 

AFFORD. You are destroying our economy by many of your actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9149-A1, p. 1]

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically 

limited by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, p. 2]

These regulations are based on one simple assumption—that federal bureaucrats know better 

than American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which 

cars are best for me and my family and should therefore not limit my choices through 

regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

1-84

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, p. 

2]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Bassett, S.

I strongly do not support the proposed new fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for cars 

and trucks to require cars and trucks to an average 54.5 miles per gallon by model year 2025. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8123-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Cafagna, R.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically 

limited by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689-A1, p. 1]

These regulations are based on one simple assumption—that federal bureaucrats know better 

than American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which 

cars are best for me and my family and should therefore not limit my choices through regulation. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689-A1, p. 1]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Cuenca, M.

The Environmental Protection Agency should NOT increase the CAFE mandate. American 

families should decide which vehicles fit their needs and not have our choices limited by the 

EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, p. 1]

These regulations are based on a single assumption.....federal bureaucrats know better than 

American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. The EPA does NOT know 

which cars are best for me and my family therefore, should not limit my choices through 

regulation! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, p. 1]

When the EPA claims it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, p. 

2]

The EPA should allow people to make vehicle choices for themselves, based on our needs 

instead of imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-

A1, p. 2]
National Program

1-85

Organization: Defour Group

Regarding climate change and CAFE, President Carter’s former White House economic advisor 

on energy policy, William Nordhaus of Yale concludes:

The measure of whether someone is serious about tackling the global warming problem can be 

readily gauged by listening to what they say about the carbon price. Suppose you hear a public 

figure who speaks eloquently of the perils of global warming and proposes that the nation should 

move urgently to slow climate change. Suppose that person proposes regulating the fuel 

efficiency of cars, or requiring high-efficiency light bulbs, or subsidizing ethanol, or providing 

research for solar power – but nowhere mentions the need to raise the price of carbon. You 

should conclude that the proposal is not serious and does not recognize the central economic 

message about how to slow climate change. To a first approximation, raising the price of carbon 

is a necessary and sufficient step for tackling global warming. The rest is largely fluff.19 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 12]

Organization: Ennis, M.

I strongly oppose these standards.

We cannot afford any of these absurd idea's. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5612-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Agency Was Arbitrary and Capricious In the Selection of Policy

The Agency’s stated goal is to achieve important reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and 

fuel consumption from the light-duty vehicle part of the transportation sector claiming that the 

affected vehicles contribute substantially to greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and petroleum fuel 

usage. Since 2002, the Agency has set a goal of carbon neutrality. With this goal in mind, the 

Agency has the obligation to conduct a fair and balanced evaluation of policy options to achieve 

this goal. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 1]

CAFÉ Has Been a Policy Failure [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 1]

We now have over thirty years of history to determine the viability of continuing the use of 

CAFÉ (or its EPA equivalent tailpipe greenhouse gas standards) as a policy tool. In evaluating 

the official government CAFÉ data1 we find that three of the nine highest volume 

manufacturers2, Honda, Nissan and Mercedes Benz have DECREASED their combined car and 

truck fleet average CAFÉ since 1980. Although the Korean based companies were not in the 

market in 1980, they have reduced their CAFÉ since entering the market in 1986. This can 

hardly be considered a successful policy when fully half the major participants have actually 

backslid on CAFÉ over thirty years. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, pp. 1-2]

It is impossible to conclude that CAFÉ has been a successful national policy.
EPA Response to Comments

1-86

• Japanese based companies have increased their CAFÉ performance by only 2 mpg in the 

past 30 years (Figure 12) [Figure 12 can be found on p. 19 of Docket number NHTSA2010-0131-0166-A1]

 o Sales increased by a factor of 2.4

• European based companies have DECREASED their CAFÉ performance by almost a 

mile per gallon (0.9 mpg) in the past 30 years (Figure 13) [Figure 13 can be found on 

p. 20 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1]

 o Sales have been essentially flat

• Korean based companies have DECREASED their CAFÉ performance by one mile per 

gallon since they entered the US market in 1986 (Figure 14) [Figure 14 can be found on 

p. 21 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1]

 o Sales increased by a factor of 4

• The 3 remaining domestic companies have increased their CAFÉ performance by about 5 

mpg (4.8 mpg) in the past 30 years (Figure 15) [Figure 15 can be found on p. 22 of 

Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1]

 o Sales decreased by almost half

• The limited success in increasing fuel economy over the past thirty years was the result of 

fuel price swings (Figure 16) and shifting sales from domestic manufacturers to Asian 

based companies. [Figure 16 can be found on p. 23 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-

0131-0166-A1] [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 2]

In looking at the domestic industry, history shows that there were 5 domestic based companies in 

1980;

• American Motors went bankrupt (only the Jeep brand survived);

• International Harvester (now Navistar) left the segment;

• Chrysler required two federal bailouts and one bankruptcy filing;

• General Motors required one federal bailout and one bankruptcy filing [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0166-A1, p. 2]

Given this history and a complete lack of regional progress it is impossible to conclude that 

CAFÉ has been a successful national policy. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 2]

Conclusion

These proposed standards are unfair to environmentalists, to manufacturers and to consumers. 

Instead of wasting another thirty plus years on CAFÉ and its duplicative tailpipe counterpart, the 

Federal government has no choice but to scrap this proposal and eliminate the existing tailpipe 
National Program

1-87

greenhouse gas standards. EPA should immediately begin work on a National low carbon fuel 

standard. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 8]

1 October 2011 Summary of Fuel Economy Performance – October 28, 2011; U. S. Department 

of Transportation; NHTSA, NVS-220

2 These companies represent over 93% of US sales

Organization: Faria, R.

Environmental Protection Agency must not increase the CAFE mandate. American families will 

decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically limited 

by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, p. 1]

These regulations are based on one simple assumption—that federal bureaucrats know better 

than American families what is best for Americans. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not 

know which cars are best for me and my family and will therefore not limit my choices through 

regulation. The EPA must be disbanded...!!! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, p. 1]

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice”, it 

simply means that they wish to expand their size and control over the American people. Disband 

the EPA now...!!! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, p. 2]

I will not allow the EPA to make my car choices. The EPA only wishes to impose more 

mandates from Washington, D.C. thereby increasing their size and control over Americans. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Feinstein, C.

I do not support the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6745-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Gilles, B.

I strongly oppose the proposed new fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for cars and 

trucks to require cars and trucks to an average 54.5 miles per gallon by model year 2025. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8065-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Gordon, Michael

I oppose these regulations. There is no evidence whatsoever that greenhouse gas emissions harm 

the environment and thus this regulation is not necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9625, p.1]

Organization: Green, K.
EPA Response to Comments

1-88

I question the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average 

of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther on a 

gallon of gas and reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524-A1, 

p. 1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements (for fuel 

efficiency?). I question your efforts. While I agree that it is important to increase U.S. investment 

in fuel efficient technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help this country break its 

dependence on foreign oil, and protect the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524-A1, p. 

1]

Setting standards that are impossible to meet does nothing to help American consumers; nor does 

it ensure future energy independence for the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Haroldson, C.

I am writing in OPPOSITION of the strong fuel-efficiency and carbon pollution standards for 

new cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11137-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Hohenstein, H.

I do NOT support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles.

I do not believe - I think it is important to increase private U.S. investment in fuel efficient 

technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help this country drill more crude in America 

and become less dependence on foreign oil. Consequently our environment will improve. Do 

NOT let these standards be mandated on the American people. They have lost enough freedom.

Organization: Horst, R.

I'm strongly opposed the any governmental agency regulating fuel mileage standards under the 

guise of clean air! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6353-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Houston Tea Party Society

My name is Neal Meyer and I am a member of the Houston Tea Party Society, a Tea Party group 

with some 3,500 members. My comment is in regards to the U.S. EPA rule mandate that motor 

vehicles must achieve greater fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9583, p. 1]

My belief, and I believe I am speaking for many, is that the U.S. government should not be 

setting fuel economy standards for motor vehicles. The price of crude oil has gone up from $20 

per barrel back in 2000, to $100 per barrel in 2012, with the price of gasoline having gone up 

from $1.00 per gallon to $3.50 - $4.00 per gallon during the year 2000 - 2012 time frame. There 

is evidence that this increase in fuel prices has caused Americans to decide to drive fewer vehicle 
National Program

1-89

miles and to start buying motor vehicles that get better fuel economy on their own, without the 

requirement of a mandate from the federal government. It is this sort of meddling, where the 

federal government substitutes its judgment for those of Americans, that has angered many 

Americans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9583, p. 1]

So, in conclusion, on behalf of the Houston Tea Party Society, I would say to the U.S. EPA to no 

not enact, adopt, or enforce this rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9583, p. 1]

Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Lastly, EPA is legally required to consider less restrictive alternatives to achieve their goals of 

greenhouse gas emission reductions from motor vehicles. EPA does not conduct this analysis in 

this proposed rule.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 2]

For these reasons, EPA should not regulate greenhouse gases from vehicles using the Clean Air 

Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 2]

Another problem is that the EPA’s analysis doesn’t ask whether the proposed rules would reduce 

greenhouse gas emissions in the most efficient manner. In the economics of climate change 

literature, it theoretically improves social welfare if governments around the world jointly 

implement a uniform carbon tax equal to the estimated Social Cost of Carbon. The higher price 

on carbon emissions leads to reductions by precisely those emitters that are most able to afford it. 

As a result, this “market-based” (though the term is somewhat of a misnomer since it results 

from government tax policy) approach to fighting climate change would achieve the correct 

reduction in total emissions in the least-cost manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 

22]

In this theoretically optimal scenario, it is very improbable that the worldwide response to the 

new carbon tax regime would consist of U.S. manufacturers sharply increasing the fuel 

efficiency of light duty cars and trucks. There are other, cheaper ways of reducing carbon 

emissions by a desired quantity. By eschewing “market-based” approaches and directly ordering 

the particular form of emission reductions—namely by increasing the fuel efficiency of new 

vehicles in certain classes by specific amounts by specific deadlines—the proposed rules are 

economically inefficient, relative to other possible policies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-

A1, pp. 22-23]

Organization: Jordon, A.

President Obama stop limiting our automobile choices [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9857-A1, p. 

1]

Get Government OUT of my life and BUSINESS [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9857-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Knapp, B.
EPA Response to Comments

1-90

I strongly OPPOSE the proposed new fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards for cars and 

trucks to require cars and trucks to an average 54.5 miles per gallon by model year 2025. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8255-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Kunz, R. and J.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically 

limited by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9562-A1, p. 1]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9562-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Leach, Kyle

I think this rules are too long and basically suck. We will all be driving stupid prius like cars. 

This is AMERICA dang it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9626, p.1]

Organization: Lennon, S.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically 

limited by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019-A1, p. 1]

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019-A1, p. 

1]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Links, W.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically 

limited by EPA.

These regulations are based on one simple assumption—that federal bureaucrats know better 

than American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which 

cars are best for me and my family and should therefore not limit my choices through regulation. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10348-A1, p. 1]

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly.
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EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. President Obama and all you bureaucrats who 

need to just back off on telling us what type of vehicles we should drive. you have no idea. 

Organization: Lipetzky, P.

I NOT support the proposed rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an 

average of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025, which will allow cars and light trucks to drive farther 

on a gallon of gas and reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

8184-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Medinger, R.

Stop all your government 'Big Brother' snooping and intervention. We are really smart enough to 

live our own lives without your socialist agenda. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9035-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Mehrotra, Rahul

I believe these efforts are too little, too late.

We have already scorched our planet beyond the tipping point.

It may help if this standard was made effective right away, with punitive damages for delays. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0206, p.1]

Your leadership and initiative in this matter needs to be dictated by the mess we have caused, 

and not the conveniences of those who have created the mess.

After all, we are only asking to get back to where we were. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0206, p.1]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Yet, the proposal continues to ignore this direction, opting instead for a bureaucratic cobbling 

together of NHTSA’s CAFE standards with EPA’s largely redundant GHG standards. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 12]

The time-honored EPA test procedures used to calculate NHTSA’s CAFE standards rely on 

equations involving a carbon balance technique where fuel economy is calculated from the 

measurement of exhaust emissions, and an assumption that the quantity of carbon in a vehicle's 

exhaust gas is equal to the quantity of carbon consumed by the engine as fuel. The physics and 

chemistry involved spell a direct relationship; controlling fuel economy controls GHGs and 

controlling GHGs controls fuel economy. NADA continues to believe that any further 

rulemakings in this area should involve NHTSA CAFE standards, supplemented by a few 

appropriately tailored EPA rules governing motor vehicle air conditioning, fuels, and vehicle 

use. Moreover, EPA should focus its resources on 'doing no harm,' such as by ensuring that its 
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1-92

emissions standards, including potential Tier III standards, avoid conflicting with mandates 

aimed at achieving fuel economy improvements. Indeed, this is yet another lesson learned from 

the commercial truck experience where the emissions mandates at issue served to severely 

undermine fuel economy performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 12]

Lastly, NADA continues to strongly object to the needless deference being given to the 

California Air Resources Board and to its unnecessary and arguably preempted fuel economy 

rules. NHTSA and EPA should take the policy position that the issuance of a final national rule 

should eliminate, once and for all, any basis for the state regulation of fuel economy. NADA 

strongly suggests that EPCA’s explicit preemption of the adoption or enforcement of state laws 

'related to' fuel economy was necessary to ensure national uniformity and to avoid a patchwork 

of state-by-state mandates that would conflict a 'National Program,' and undermine the safety, 

job loss, equity, and consumer affordability and choice considerations required by EPCA. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, pp. 12-13]

Organization: Parker, M.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices dramatically 

limited by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, p. 2]

These regulations are based on one simple assumption—that federal bureaucrats know better 

than American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which 

cars are best for me and my family and should therefore not limit my choices through 

regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, p. 2]

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, p. 

2]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, p. 2]

Get the overreaching theiving goverment out of the American peoples lives. The last thing this 

country needs is more regulation. You don't enforce the laws we do have so stop making 

ridiculous new ones. This Republic government that has been over taken by democacy (a failing 

government) is failing. The depts that have been set up such as the dept of energy has failed and 

you can't fix it. You are destroying the very freedoms and even the illusion of freedom we still 

have. Government is not the solution, the Constitution is; Freedom and Liberty. The only thing 

that you are succeeding at is destroying this country, but that has been your malicious intent all 

along. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Paul, M.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should ••NOT•• increase the Corporate Average Fuel 

Economy (CAFE) mandates. AMERICAN FAMILIES should be able to decide which cars and 
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light-trucks fit their needs and ••NOT•• HAVE OUR CHOICES DRAMATICALLY 

LIMITED... BY THE EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]

Increased CAFE mandates are based on one simple ASSUMPTION—that federal bureaucrats 

'know better' than American families what is best for us. THIS ASSUMPTION IS WRONG.. 

EPA does ••NOT•• know which cars are best for me and my family AND should therefore 

••NOT•• limit my choices through regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to PRESERVE CONSUMER 

CHOICE”... WHAT 'HOGWASH'!!!. IN FACT, THIS REGULATION WOULD IN FACT, 

ELIMINATE CHOOSING A CAR THAT DIDN'T MEET THE CAFE MANDATE AND...

RAISE THE COSTS ON ALL VEHICLES...,THUS ••ELIMINATING•• CONSUMER 

CHOICE, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]

IT IS THEREFORE ••ANOTHER USELESS REGULATION•• ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER 

CONTROL... THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, THE ECONOMY, AND... IT WILL ONLY HAVE 

NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON OUR COUNTRY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, pp. 2-3]

Organization: Pearce, F.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs. It is unreasonable and against the best 

interests of our nation to have choices limited by the EPA.

It appears that you assume federal bureaucrats know better than American families what is best 

for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which cars are best for me and my family 

and must not limit my choices through such regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10343-A1, 

p.1]

EPA should allow people to make car choices for ourselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10343-A1, p. 1]

Thank you for rescinding this unnecessary burden on the American people. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10343-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Pregibon, D.

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8987-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Rafter, M.

I am writing to oppose the absurd fuel-efficiency and carbon pollution standards for new cars 

and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11587-A1, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

1-94

Organization: Shick, R.

On behalf of U.S. consumers everywhere and as a 24 year automotive industry veteran, I am 

writing to express my profound opposition to the new CAFE requirements proposed by the 

Obama administration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6215-A1, p. 1]

Please do not approve the proposed CAFE regulations in the best interests of the U.S. consumer. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6215-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Slemp III, R. L.

I am NOT in favor of the proposed fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6314-

A1, p. 1]

Organization: Statman, P.

We are so far beyond the (infernal) primitive internal combustion engine of the 18th Century. 

Why are we still burning fossil fuels? This is a joke, right? 54mpg by 2025?

How about 0 emissions by 2013? We know the technology is affordably available.

You won't do it, but it was good to write this down for you to ignore. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-1472-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Steffanoff, N.

If the Government is really concerned about air pollution and consuming petroleum resources 

then the Federal Government needs to consider the energy cost in the manufacture of any 

car/vehicle. In essence we would be better off, collectively, amortizing the energy cost of 

manufacture of vehicles over the longest time period possible. People who are willing to drive 

older cars (20 years old or older) should be 'rewarded' by relaxing the air pollution standards on 

these older cars to encourage their being driven as long as possible to amortize the energy cost of 

their manufacture as far into the future as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, pp. 1-

2]

The Environmental Protection Agency should NOT increase the CAFE mandate. American 

families should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our choices 

dramatically limited by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, p. 2]

These regulations are based on one simple assumption—that federal bureaucrats know better 

than American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which 

cars are best for me and my family and should therefore not limit my choices through regulation. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, p. 2]
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When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, p. 

2]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Steyn, R.

I vehemently oppose the Environmental Protection Agency’s proposal to increase the CAFE 

standards for the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

* American families should decide which cars and light-trucks fit their needs and not have our 

choices dramatically limited by the EPA or any other government bureaucracy. That is called 

FREEDOM, which the Obama administration and its bureaucratic minions are intentionally and 

rapidly stripping from the American people. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Sullivan, T.

Environmental Protection Agency should not increase the CAFE mandate. American families 

should decide which cars and light trucks fit their needs. We should not have our choices 

dramatically limited by EPA or any government agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10341-A1, 

p. 1]

These regulations are based on one simple assumption - that federal bureaucrats know better than 

American families what is best for us. This assumption is wrong. EPA does not know which cars 

are best for me and my family and should therefore not limit my choices through regulation. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10341-A1, pp. 1-2]

When EPA claims that it has “designed proposed standards to preserve consumer choice” this is 

only true if you are rich. The rest of us will pay dearly. The EPA is not being truthful. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10341-A1, p. 2]

EPA should allow people to make our car choices for themselves based on our needs instead of 

imposing more mandates from Washington, D.C. Stop ruining our economy trying to satisfy the 

false theory of global warming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10341-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Van Voorhies, M.

I DO NOT SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1629-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Varley, R.

I have great concern that this is asking far far too little. It seems ridiculous to me that it should 

take 28 years (from 1997 to 2025) to do less than double that mileage. It needs to be done much 
EPA Response to Comments

1-96

faster than this. I hope that by then we will not be using petroleum gas at all. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-1948-A1, p. 1]

Response:

EPA acknowledges several general comments opposing the proposed program. A few of 

these commenters expressed that the program should be more stringent and be implemented 

sooner. Issues of stringency and timing are addressed in RTC Section 2.2 below. 

Most commenters opposing the program express a general belief that the proposed rule is 

unnecessary, in some cases stating that market forces would be sufficient to achieve the 

environmental, fuel savings, and energy security goals of the program. These comments are 

strongly controverted by historic evidence. As discussed in preamble section III.D.1.a, fuel 

economy improvements have historically remained unchanged in periods of flat CAFE standards 

-- absent price spikes in automotive fuels. These historic trends, coupled with the AEO2011 

projection of largely stable gasoline prices through MY 2025, strongly support EPA’s conclusion 

that market forces alone will not result in the improvements projected for the rule. All the 

written public comments on this issue strongly supported EPA’s analysis. See preamble section 

III.D.1.a. In addition, since the MYs 2012-2016 standards are footprint-based, every major 

manufacturer is expected to be constrained by the new standards in 2016, and manufacturers of 

small vehicles will not routinely over-comply as they had with the past universal CAFE 

standards. There are additional factors that reinforce the historical evidence. While it is possible 

that one or two companies may over-comply, any voluntary over-compliance by one company 

would generate credits that could be sold to other companies to substitute for their more 

expensive compliance technologies. This ability to buy and sell credits could eliminate any 

over-compliance for the overall fleet, absent the GHG rule. Throughout the preamble, technical 

documents, and this Response to Comments document, EPA presents its broad analytical 

rationale for the program and will finalize all the major aspects of the proposed rulemaking. 

A number of commenters expressed the belief that the proposed program would limit the 

vehicle choices available to consumers. This is not the case. As discussed in more detail in the 

preamble and in other comment responses, the footprint attribute-based standard tends to force 

improvement across the entire spectrum of vehicle footprints and reduces incentive to downsize 

vehicles as a compliance strategy. In addition, the agencies have included costs of preserving all 

vehicle utility found in the present fleet (see e.g. EPA RIA at p. 1-40), and demonstrated 

feasible, cost-effective compliance paths to meet the standards without eliminating any utility 

found in the present fleet. Consequently, any changes in types of vehicle offered for sale would 

be a result of market forces and manufacturer responses thereto, but would not be a direct 

consequence of this rule. EPA addresses impacts on consumers, including vehicle choice issues, 

in Section 18.1 below. 

One commenter stated that because past CAFE standards had not resulted in significant 

improvements in fuel economy, EPA and NHTSA should not pursue new GHG and CAFE 

standards. On the contrary, EPA has shown in the earlier GHG rulemaking and in this one that 

new, stringent CAFE and GHG standards can be expected to result in large reductions in 

emissions and in fuel consumption in the coming years, precisely because they are more 
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stringent than earlier standards, as described in Section 16.1 below. Also in Section 16.1, EPA 

addresses the need for GHG reductions. 

With respect to comments from the Defour Group and Institute for Energy Research, we 

note that the merits of carbon pricing schemes are outside the scope of this rule. EPA has taken a 

common-sense approach to developing standards for greenhouse gas emissions from mobile 

sources under the Clean Air Act. These actions have focused on reducing greenhouse gas 

emissions by increasing the efficiency of cars and trucks. EPA’s analyses show that these 

regulations will save consumers money at the pump, improve energy security by reducing oil 

consumption, and cut millions of tons of harmful greenhouse gas emissions.

CO2 Emissions Standards

2-1

2. CO2 Emissions Standards

2.1. Attribute-based (footprint) approach

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

BMW of North America, LLC

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumer Reports

Ecology Center

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Continued Use of Footprint Attribute [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

The Alliance agrees that footprint is integral to a vehicle's design and is dictated by the vehicle 

platform, which is typically used for a multi-year model life cycle. As such, it continues to be a 

reasonable choice for setting standards. Further, since footprint was the basis for all regulatory 

discussions, it remains the appropriate attribute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

Analysis of manufacturer data and understanding of the vehicle energy efficiency dependence on 

footprint suggests that linear attribute curves based on gym (gallons per mile) versus footprint is 

an appropriate way to adjust for size differences across the industry. Vehicle efficiency is driven 

by road load, mass, and powertrain/driveline efficiency. Regressions of vehicle road load energy 

over EPA driving cycles, frontal area and mass show strong linear relationships with footprint. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

Weighting and Regression Analysis [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.86]

The Alliance also supports the weighting and regression analysis used to develop the 2017-2021 

model year CAFE and GHG curves. We further support the derived relationships between the 

vehicles’ CO2/fuel consumption and their related footprints as an appropriate attribute. However, 

as mentioned elsewhere in our comments, these weightings and analysis should be reviewed 
EPA Response to Comments

2-2

during the midterm evaluation for the MY 2022-2025 model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.86]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

BMW fully supports the continued use an attribute-based program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9579-A1, p. 1]

With respect to a Single National Program, BMW fully supports the continued use an attributebased program for passenger cars and light trucks as proposed by EPA and NHTSA. Compared 

to a uniform standard for passenger cars and light trucks, an attribute-based standard drives fuel 

efficiency and GHG reduction in all segments while taking into account the manufacturer's 

product portfolio. However, because BMW offers a worldwide product portfolio and most of the 

CO2 and fuel economy regulations worldwide are based on vehicle weight instead of footprint, 

BMW continues to recommend that these regulations be harmonized as much as possible. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

The attribute-based approach ensures that the standards do not require radical changes in the 

types or size of vehicles consumers drive; so, the full range of choices will be available to 

consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 90.]

Third, the approach to setting standards is consumer friendly and facilitates auto maker 

compliance.

The new attribute-based approach as you've heard provides no incentive to change the size of the 

vehicles. Consumers will get the cars they want; they'll all be more fuel efficient.

Organization: Consumer Reports

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 168.]

Because the CAFE standards are now footprint-based, improvements across all vehicle sizes, so 

each class will see an efficiency.

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 188.]
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-3

One is that the proposed standards continue the attribute-based structure and requirements for 

steady improvement that were established in the current standards. When first proposed by the 

agencies in 2009 following the historic 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act, this new 

approach represented a breakthrough in regulation for this sector. Not only were the 

requirements more fairly applied among vehicle manufacturers but the rules also more 

effectively stimulated innovation by requiring improvements across all vehicle sizes and classes. 

The rules also included provisions that help ensure the continued production of domestic fuelefficient vehicles, and we support those as well.

Organization: Ferrari

1) Vehicle attributes to be considered [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

We agree that the CO2 and CAFE standards are based on one or more vehicle attributes. The 

footprint is the attribute selected first by NHTSA since 2011 MY CAFE regulation and then in 

the joint National Program MYs 2012-16 for both CO2 and CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

The footprint alone does not take into account many of a vehicles’ other characteristics that 

greatly affect the fuel economy/ CO2 emissions, like the engine displacement and power, 

transmission, curb weight, aerodynamics, etc. This fact is recognized by both EPA and NHTSA, 

as written in Section II.C.2. (pages 74912 and 74913): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, 

p.11]

There are several policy and technical reasons why NHTSA and EPA believe that footprint is the 

most appropriate attribute on which to base the standards, even though some other vehicle 

attributes (notably curb weight) are better correlated to fuel economy and emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

Further...we recognize that weight is better correlated with fuel economy and CO2 emissions 

than is footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

We sent our comments on this important issue in the previous rulemaking for MYs 2012- 16. We 

would prefer at least a second attribute to be considered, in addition to the footprint. For 

example: the power to curb weight ratio. Nonetheless, we admit that it seems logical to continue 

with the footprint, as proposed, to be consistent with the final regulation enacted for MYs 2012-

16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

We agree to keep the type and shape of curves that define CO2 and fuel economy standards. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

Organization: Ford Motor Company
EPA Response to Comments

2-4

Ford supports the continuation of footprint-based standards with separate car and truck fleets 

based on NHTSA vehicle definitions for both the GHG and CAFE programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]

Ford and the auto industry have long supported separate car and truck attribute-based standards 

because cars and trucks have different functional characteristics, even if they have the same 

footprint and nearly the same base curb weights. For example, the Ford Edge and the Ford 

Taurus have the same footprint, but vastly different capabilities with respect to cargo space and 

towing capacity. Some of the key features incorporated on the Edge that enables the larger tow 

capability include an engine oil cooler, larger radiator and updated cooling fans. This is just one 

of the many examples that show the functional difference between cars and trucks and further 

support the need to maintain separate car and truck attribute-based standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 34.]

Turning now to more specific comments of the proposed rulemaking, we support the relative 

manner in which car and truck targets have been set to reflect their respective capabilities to 

improve fuel economy.

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the proposed footprint-based CO2 and CAFE standards for 2017-2021. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

The agencies should rethink their footprint-based standards, which may be unnecessary to 

respect consumer preferences, may negatively impact safety, and are likely to be overall 

inefficient. Increasing the safety of one car can impose a negative safety externality on others, 

and consumer preferences can adjust as average fleet-wide attributes shift. As a result, trying to 

eliminate the incentive to build smaller cars may block a cost-effective compliance strategy and 

may not guarantee a safer fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

Part II. Vehicle Attributes

The agencies assume that the current market accurately reflects the range of consumer 

preferences for vehicle attributes like performance, carrying capacity, safety, and comfort, failing 

only with respect to fuel economy technology. The agencies want to ensure that the proposed 

rule will preserve both consumer choice and the same mix of vehicle options. If instead the rule 

were to impact vehicle attributes like size and power, the agencies worry that consumers might 

experience a loss in welfare, erasing some of the large net benefits the rule should generate for 

consumers and society. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 12]
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-5

To this end, the agencies take two steps. First, they tie the prescribed standards to vehicle 

footprint, so that larger vehicles will generally be subject to less stringent controls compared to 

smaller vehicles. Second, the agencies apply an assumption of constant performance to their cost 

estimates, believing that manufacturers will spend whatever extra it costs to maintain current 

vehicle attributes as they increase fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 12]

The agencies should rethink both their attribute-based standards and their estimation of costs. 

First, the footprint-based standards may be unnecessary to respect consumer preferences, may 

negatively impact safety, and may be overall inefficient. Several arguments call into question the 

footprint-based approach, but a particularly important one is that large vehicles can impose a 

negative safety externality on other drivers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 12]

Second, the agencies’ constant performance cost estimates represent an upper bound to possible 

consumer welfare losses and are most likely overestimates, because vehicle attributes are partly 

positional and consumer preferences can shift with changing attributes. Similarly, the unlikely 

chance that the agencies’ cost projections underestimate consumer welfare losses is further 

mitigated by the actual nature of consumer preferences. Finally, those same insights from 

positional goods theory and the bandwagon effect should be considered in the agencies’ forecast 

for the future consumer market for new technologies like electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 12]

Footprint-Based Standards May Be Unnecessary to Respect Consumer Preferences, May 

Negatively Impact Safety, and May Be Overall Inefficient

The agencies choose to set regulatory stringency according to vehicle footprint, in part because 

the statute requires NHTSA to base standards on attributes related to fuel economy. The agencies 

offer five justifications for choosing a footprint-based approach: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, p. 13]

• First, they claim the optimal attribute-based standard will achieve greater overall fuel savings 

than the optimal flat standard, since an attribute-based approach encourages all manufacturers to 

add new technologies every year, even those manufacturers with fleets that are already relatively 

efficient.

• Second, out of concerns for safety, the agencies want to remove the incentive to build smaller 

cars in order to comply with the standard.

• Third, the agencies believe the attribute-based approach will be more equitable than a flat 

standard, which could impose disproportionate burdens on some manufacturers.

• Fourth, the agencies want to preserve the current vehicle mix in the marketplace in order to 

respect consumer choice.
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2-6

• Fifth, the agencies believe a footprint-based approach involves a lower risk of manufacturers 

“gaming” the system, at least compared to a weight-based approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9480-A1, p. 13]

All five justifications are problematic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 13]

The first justification assumes that attribute-based approaches will increase overall fuel savings 

since, under a flat standard, manufacturers with fleets that are already relatively fuel efficient 

would have little incentive to continue upgrading. However, this claim very much depends on 

whether the proposed attribute-based standard is actually optimal: an inefficient footprint-based 

standard is unlikely to achieve greater overall fuel savings than the optimal flat standard. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 13]

Moreover, given that reducing vehicle size, weight, and performance are relatively cheap and 

readily available compliance options,84 even the optimal footprint-based standard may suffer 

from inefficiencies by disincentivizing an otherwise cost-effective strategy. Wenzel’s research 

suggests that “a fuel economy standard that discourages vehicles with smaller footprint . . . will 

not be as effective in reducing fuel consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions as a 

single stringent standard applied across all vehicle sizes. . . . A single stringent fuel economy 

standard would discourage the continued use of light trucks (with low fuel economy) as 

essentially substitutes for cars, and encourage greater use of lighter and smaller 

vehicles.”85 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 13]

NHTSA should consider the advantages and disadvantages of all fuel economy-related attributes, 

and choose the attribute-based approach that will allow it to maximize net benefits of the rule; 

EPA should do the same with all possible approaches, including non-attribute, flat standards. 

One fuel economy-related attribute the agencies do not seem to have considered that may 

warrant analysis is vehicle fuel type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 13]

Manufacturers could also decrease weight without decreasing footprint as a compliance strategy. 

The overall effects of such a choice on safety are not immediately clear, though at least some 

evidence suggests that redesigning truck-based SUVs into car-based crossover SUVs resulted in 

both lighter vehicles and decreased safety risks to drivers and others.91 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9480-A1, p. 14]

More importantly, the relationship between size and safety is neither simple nor unidirectional. 

To the extent smaller cars fare worse in crashes with bigger cars, increasing size may improve an 

individual driver’s safety; but it may simultaneously impose a negative safety externality on 

other drivers, whose cars are now relatively smaller compared to the growing average fleet size. 

Decreasing size may have similarly opposing impacts on safety. Therefore, maintaining or 

increasing the average size of the entire fleet does not guarantee the safest outcome, and 

decreasing the fleet’s average size in response to a fuel economy rule might have no overall 

change in safety levels (though at some point, reducing the size or changing attributes could 

affect the vehicle’s intrinsic safety, as distinct from its relative safety). As Wenzel, a leading 

researcher on this subject, has explained, “a fuel economy standard that discourages vehicles 

with smaller footprint, or lower weight, will not necessarily reduce casualties. . . .Details of 
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vehicle design, which can be improved through direct safety regulations, will have a greater 

effect on occupant safety than fuel economy standards that are structured to maintain vehicle size 

or weight.”92 [This comment can also be found in section 13.1 of this comment summary.] 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 14]

The third justification put forward is that a flat standard would inequitably affect some 

manufacturers more. However, to the extent that the fuel economy program can incorporate a 

trading scheme for compliance credits, the market would help smooth out any disproportionate 

impacts on certain manufacturers. Additionally, trading will ensure that manufacturers with 

relatively efficient fleets still have an incentive to continue improving fuel economy (in order to 

generate credits), which will further mitigate the agencies’ first concern, mentioned 

above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 14]

The fourth justification states that the agencies need to preserve the current vehicle mix in order 

to respect consumer choice. The agencies do not, however, adequately explain why maintaining 

the current vehicle mix is necessary to protect consumer welfare. The negative safety externality 

generated by larger vehicles indicates that the vehicle fleet may, on average, be too big; 

furthermore, some vehicle downsizing may represent a cost-effective method for compliance and 

have little impact on consumer welfare (as explained below). 94 Preserving the current vehicle 

mix is therefore not necessary to protect consumer welfare, and there is no reason to preserve the 

current mix as an end unto itself. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 14-15]

The fifth justification sees a footprint-based standard as a way to discourage “gaming” behavior, 

especially compared to a weight-based standard. A weight-based standard may be easier to game 

than a footprint-based standard, but that does not mean that manufacturers will not still game the 

proposed regulation in ways that reduce overall efficiency. In fact, it seems the footprint-based 

standard creates an incentive to expand vehicle size in order to relax the applicable standard. 

Given that automobile manufacturers already respond to very fine-tuned tax incentives for fuel 

economy,95 it certainly seems possible that the proposed rule will encourage some gaming of the 

average footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 15]

NHTSA should remember that footprint and weight are not the only possible fuel economyrelated attributes on which to base policy. For example, it might be much harder for 

manufacturers to game either a much flatter attribute-based standard or a standard differentiated 

by vehicle fuel type. EPA should assess whether a different approach, including a non-attribute, 

flat standard, might be the best at discouraging gaming. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 

15]

In conclusion, a footprint-based standard may be unnecessary to respect consumer preferences, 

and may interfere with downsizing that could be, on the whole, consumer-welfare enhancing; it 

may have negative impacts on safety, given the negative safety externality that relative size can 

generate; and it may simply be inefficient compared to a more optimal, flatter standard. The 

agencies should seriously rethink whether the footprint-based approach is the best option. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 15]
EPA Response to Comments

2-8

If the agencies do go forward with a footprint-based approach, they should study its effects 

carefully and revisit the matter when more evidence is available. The first footprint-based fuel 

economy standards took effect with model year 2012.96The agencies therefore now have an 

opportunity to begin analyzing how the attribute-based standards influence manufacturers’ 

production decisions. The agencies should consider whether the results of such a study challenge 

the footprint-based approach, at least during the planned mid-term evaluation, if not 

sooner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 15]

The agencies should rethink their footprint-based standards, which may be unnecessary to 

respect consumer preferences, may negatively impact safety, and may be overall inefficient. 

Increasing the safety of one car can impose a negative safety externality on others, and consumer 

preferences can adjust as average fleet-wide attributes shift. As a result, trying to eliminate the 

incentive to build smaller cars may block a cost-effective compliance strategy and may not 

guarantee a safer fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 20]

84 See generally Christopher R. Knittel, Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute Trade-Offs 

and Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector (U.C. Davis Inst. of Transportation Studies 

UCD-ITS-RR-09-16, 2009).

85 Tom Wenzel, Analysis of the Relationship Between Vehicle Weight/Size and Safety, and 

Implications for Federal Fuel Economy Regulation, at 43 (Report for the U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Paper LBNL-3143E, 2010).

88 Wenzel, supra note 85, at 7.

89 Id. A very few luxury car models have footprints in the 55-80 square feet range, which also 

have flat standards.

91 Wenzel, supra note 85, at 43.

92 Id.

94 See infra note 99, and accompanying text.

95 James Sallee & Joel Slemrod, Car Notches: Strategic Automaker Responses to Fuel Economy 

Policy (NBER Working PaperNo. 16604, 2010). Also see attached symposium paper on the 

energy paradox, at 11-12.

96 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 74,912.

Organization: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)
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NHTSA has again proposed using vehicle footprint as the measure for varying CAFE 

requirements, and IIHS agrees that this will reduce the incentive for automakers to downweight 

or downsize vehicles to improve fuel economy. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0222-A1, p. 1]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

17) Footprint Curves

We commend EPA and NHTSA for continuing to use a footprint-based adjustment to the CAFE 

standards instead of weight-based adjustments. Footprint-based adjustments fully encourage 

manufacturers to introduce lightweight materials, which can improve vehicle efficiency by 20% 

or more in the long run. Lightweight materials also extend the electric drive range of fuel cell 

and plug-in vehicles by a similar amount. This is one area of policymaking where the U.S. is 

ahead of the rest of the world. Japan, Europe, and China have all adopted standards with weightbased adjustments that effectively discourage the use of lightweight materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 48]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG also supports the overall structure of the attribute-based program and the provisions for 

transferring and trading credits. [This comment can also be found in section 10.1.2 of this 

comment summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

All things being equal, NADA supports a final rule that provides vehicle manufacturers with the 

greatest degree of compliance flexibility. In most instances, compliance flexibilities are nothing 

more than accommodations designed to recognize, harness, and leverage consumer demand. 

Perhaps the best example of a well-designed compliance flexibility is the attribute based 

framework, which recognizes that the motoring public demands a range of light-duty vehicle 

types to meet their needs and desires. By preserving access to an essential mix of cars and trucks, 

the proposal leverages consumer demand to facilitate continuous improvements across all 

vehicle types, regardless of product mix. Moreover, when fuel economy standards are set 

properly, under the direction enacted by Congress, the incentive to downsize or down-weight is 

reduced, helping to preserve passenger safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 11]

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

SPI also supports the agencies’ choice to incentivize the use of advanced lightweight materials 

and structures versus reductions in vehicle size by adopting a “footprint” approach to emission 

reductions. Composite throttle valve housing can be 30 percent lighter than its metal equivalent, 

and high precision engineering is producing replacements for metal parts. Body panels and 

bumpers made of plastic composites that perform comparably to those made of metal can be as 

much as 50 percent lighter, contributing to both greater fuel efficiency and safety by lowering the 
EPA Response to Comments

2-10

vehicle’s center of gravity. And while approximately eight percent of the total vehicle weight of 

the average U.S. light vehicle is plastics and composites, a minimum of 30 percent (by weight; in 

one or more subsystems beyond interior trim) is achievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-

A1, p.4]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

First, the UAW is pleased that the EPA and NHTSA are proposing to continue the joint system 

that preserves in both regulations the attribute-based framework mandated by EISA. This 

structure eliminates the discriminatory impact of the old CAFE system on full-line producers and 

allows for greater fuel savings and greenhouse gas emissions reductions by requiring 

improvements from all manufacturers regardless of their product mix. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9563-A2, p.2]

Response:

Most of the comments received on this issue support the continued use of footprint from the 

MYs 2012-2016 rule as the most appropriate vehicle characteristic for a single-attribute standard

(AAM, Consumer Reports, IIHS, ICCT, NADA, UAW, and others). Commenters requesting 

that EPA use a different approach generally suggested one of two alternatives: either use a 

weight-based standard to harmonize with the standards of other nations, or use a multi-attribute 

standard which accounts for vehicle characteristics that impact performance, such as engine 

power. IPI suggested that the agencies consider a flat standard. Detailed responses to these 

comments are provided in preamble II.C. 

Regarding international harmonization, EPA agrees with BMW that the use of vehicle weight as 

the primary attribute would result in standards that, in that respect, are similar to those in Europe, 

China, and Japan. However, as in the MYs 2012-2016 rule, EPA continues to believe that the 

benefits of harmonization with the European standards do not outweigh the detriments. Setting a 

weight-based GHG standard removes much of the incentive for manufacturers to use weight 

saving materials as a technique to reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. Manufactures 

are currently using various mass reduction techniques across the light-duty fleet, and are likely to 

continue to do so throughout the MYs 2017-2025 rulemaking timeframe. When combined with 

other technologies, EPA believes that manufacturers can achieve compliance with the standards 

by applying mass reduction at levels that do not affect overall societal safety, as discussed in 

chapter 3.3.5 of the Joint TSD and section II.G of the preamble. Significantly, the agencies 

believe that a footprint based standard is also more difficult to game and has inherent advantages 

in terms of providing appropriate compliance options for vehicles at all sizes and cargo carrying 

capabilities, as discussed in preamble II.C.2. 

Regarding the use of a multi-attribute standard, EPA believes that it would be inappropriate to 

base the GHG standard on engine power as an explicit attribute, as requested by Ferrari and 

Porsche. Vehicles with higher engine power tend to have higher CO2 emissions due to their 

typically larger displacements, and the fact that the engines operate at lower average loads over 

the two-cycle test procedure. To base the GHG standard on engine power would encourage 

manufactures to forego technologies and design strategies that decrease fuel economy and CO2 
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-11

emissions, and could encourage vehicles with inherently higher power and consequently innately 

higher CO2 emissions as a means of compliance. 

EPA acknowledges that there is a demand for high performance vehicles and provided a number 

of compliance mechanisms for manufacturers of these vehicles in this regulation. No individual 

vehicle need meet its target, allowing larger manufacturers to account for high performance 

vehicles by averaging with vehicles with more typical levels of acceleration performance. 

Smaller manufacturer provisions such as the intermediate volume and SVM flexibilities provide 

allowances for smaller manufacturers which typically have limited product lines and fewer 

opportunities to average. Due to their performance and luxury features, these vehicles also tend 

to have higher prices and higher profits. Thus it is possible that these vehicles will be better able 

to absorb the cost of higher cost vehicle efficiency technologies than vehicles with lower profit 

margins. Limited line manufacturers may also choose to purchase credits as a compliance 

mechanism. See section III.B.6 and III.C for a greater discussion of these program provisions.

As a further response, the analysis supporting this rule considers the adoption of technologies 

which maintain all vehicle attributes and includes the costs to do so as a cost of the rule. See 

EPA RIA at 1-40. It is important to note that these standards have been appropriately designed 

to maintain consumer choice. See International Harvester v. EPA, 478 F. 2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 

1973) (EPA required to consider issues of basic demand for passenger vehicles in making 

technical feasibility and lead time determinations in section 202 rules). The footprint based 

standards have been designed to discourage changes in vehicle size as a compliance strategy, and 

the agencies’ technology penetration analysis for these standards included costs to preserve the 

utility of vehicles in the current fleet.

IPI presented a number of comments on the form of the standard, and suggested that the agencies 

consider flat standards, or alternatively, a standard whose form maximizes net benefits. These 

issues are discussed in preamble II.C.2. In short, with regard to a flat standard, NHTSA is 

required by statute to issue an attribute based standard, and for purposes of harmonization (in 

addition to those reasons are articulated in TSD 2.1 and 2.2), EPA has also issued an attribute 

based standard. While IPI’s suggestion that the agencies select the attribute-based approach that 

maximizes net benefits may have merit, net benefits are but one of many considerations which 

led to the setting of the standard. Estimations of net benefits in future analyses are subject to 

significant uncertainties, which is among the reasons EPA uses technical analysis and reasonable 

judgement to inform its regulatory policies. 

IPI also commented that “given that reducing vehicle size, weight, and performance are 

relatively cheap and readily available compliance options, even the optimal footprint-based 

standard may suffer from inefficiencies by disincentivizing an otherwise cost-effective strategy.” 

While downsizing and downpowering vehicles may be relatively inexpensive techniques (from a

manufacturer’s perspective) to reduce GHG emissions, changes to these attributes may have 

unintended consequences for consumer welfare. In addition, as many commenters (e.g. NADA) 

have legitimately pointed out, the rule’s benefits only accrue if consumers purchase the new 

vehicles with GHG emission reducing technologies. Removing otherwise desired vehicle 

attributes could lead to less consumer acceptance. See Preamble section III.H.1.a noting that one 

reason for the so-called energy paradox (why consumers have in the past valued fuel economy 
EPA Response to Comments

2-12

less than its actual value) is that consumers might associate higher fuel economy with 

inexpensive, less well designed vehicles. As such, EPA has promulgated a standard and shown a 

compliance path that doesn’t require changes to these attributes.

2.2. Stringency of Standards

2.2.1. Overall Stringency

Organizations Included in this Section

Alexandria Hyundai

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Anonymous public citizen 2

Anonymous public citizen 3

Anonymous public citizen 5

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Bassett, S.

BMW of North America, LLC

California Air Resources Board (CARB)

Capozzelli, J.

Center for Biological Diversity

Chrysler Group LLC

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumer Reports

Consumers Union

Ecology Center

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Growth Energy

Haroldson, C.

Honeywell International, Inc.

Honeywell Transportation Systems

Howard, P.

Hrin, S.

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Jackson, F.W.

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Marlinghaus, E.

Marshall, C.

Mass Comment Campaign (10) (National Wildlife Federation Action Fund-1)

Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) (Unknown Organization)
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-13

Mass Comment Campaign (61) (The Social Justice Group)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Miller, P.

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

RVIA

Smith, Frank Houston

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

Susan R.

Tarazevich, Yegor

Toyota Motor North America

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Van Coppenolle, J. and L.

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alexandria Hyundai

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 66.]

The 54.5 MPG target for 2025 represents a significant advance from where we are as an industry 

today.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The agencies should assure equivalent program stringency. The proposed EPA and NHTSA 

requirements are coordinated, but not fully harmonized. The Alliance believes that adjustments 

to the NHTSA program are needed to ensure that it properly harmonizes with the EPA 

requirements under the differing statutory authorities provided to the agencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.4]

Adjusting for Year-Over-Year Stringency [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.86]

The NPRM describes the methodology for adjusting standard curves for year-over-year 

stringency increases, noting that for the MY 2017-2025 rules, the curves are adjusted on a 

relative basis (applying the same percentage reductions in a given year across the entire footprint 

range). This method is in contrast to the methodology used in the MY 2012-2016 rules, where 

curves were adjusted on an absolute basis (applying the same absolute gram per mile and fuel 

consumption reductions in a given year across the entire footprint range). The agencies request 

comment on their conclusions and invite further recommendations for other means to adjust the 
EPA Response to Comments

2-14

standard curves for year over year stringency increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.86]

Given that many of our member companies support the standards as proposed, the Alliance 

declines to make comments on specific changes. However, we believe that the agencies should 

examine their approach to adjusting the curves for year-over-year stringency as part of the midterm evaluation to determine if actual improvements made in the 2012-2016 model year period 

suggest a declining correlation between the footprint attribute and vehicle emissions/fuel 

consumption (supporting adjustments on a relative basis) or whether the correlation remains 

roughly the same as observed in the 2008 model year fleet (supporting adjustments on an 

absolute basis). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.86]

Organization: American Chemistry Council (ACC)

We do not comment on the CAFE levels proposed except to reaffirm that the levels proposed by 

the agencies are technologically feasible and economically practicable as a matter of statue. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 264.]

We support the specific fuel efficiency goals and time limits proposed in the standard.

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Overall Stringency of Standards

The agencies propose target curves for the standards obtained by adjusting the curves discussed 

in the previous section. We support the agencies’ decision to shift the target curves vertically by 

application of fixed percentages rather than by simply translating them up or down, as was done 

previously (Joint TSD 2-51). The new approach is clearly more consistent with the objective of 

preserving the relationships among stringencies of the targets across footprints. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9528-A2, p.7]

We do, however, have concerns about the agencies’ choice of curves among all the curves 

generated in this way. Section III.D.6 of the NPRM discusses the alternatives considered by 

EPA, a total of four in addition to the proposal and a reference case. Each of the four considers a 

standard for either cars or trucks that is 20 gpm more or less stringent that the proposed 

standards. All four alternatives, in addition to the proposed standards, are found to be achievable, 

except by a single, small-volume manufacturer (Ferrari). Based on this result, it is unclear why 

one of the more stringent alternatives, e.g. Alternative 2, or another more stringent standard, 

would not be superior to the proposed standard. EPA shows that Alternative 2 would cost about 

$500 more per vehicle, but does not make the case that Alternative 2 is not cost-effective. The 

crux of EPA’s lengthy argument that it has chosen the best standard seems to be that more 

stringent alternatives such as Alternative 2 call for a substantially greater penetration of 

advanced technologies, particularly hybrids but also including EVs and PHEVs. These 
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2-15

alternatives adhere to technology penetration rates that fall within the caps set by EPA to ensure 

feasibility, however. Within those parameters, it seems reasonable that an alternative demanding 

higher penetration rates for advances technologies is preferable, especially given that promoting 

the development of advanced technologies is among the objectives of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9528-A2, pp.7-8]

The argument for the superiority of the proposed standards is all the weaker in view of the fact 

that EPA did not take into account the various flexibilities that have been proposed, such as 

credits for plug-in vehicles and hybrid credits for large pickups. We also note that the projected 

percentage of hybrids purchased in 2025 (15 percent, NPRM p.75061) is at the low end of the 

penetration suggested in the NOI (3-14 percent in the 4 percent per year scenario, 25-65 percent 

in the 5 percent per year scenario), once again raising the question of whether the proposed 

standards are the maximum achievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.8]

Recommendations Reconsider whether alternative standards such as Alternative 2 that deliver 

greater benefits than the proposed standards are achievable and cost-effective. Show compliance 

costs by manufacturer for all years in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.8]

Organization: Anonymous public citizen 2

The most obvious and most simple is not to use more corn gasoline, but to double the efficiency 

of vehicles. Lead consumers to purchase smaller cars and trucks. To see what the auto makers 

have done just take a look at pickup trucks. They have discontinued smaller trucks and cars. 

Each year they are just a little bigger. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1359, p.1]

Instead of giving subsidies to grow alternative fuels, lets give incentives to have consumers 

smaller vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1359, p.1]

We also need to develop more efficient vehicles. But reducing the vehicle mass would result in 

less fuel being used. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1359, p.1]

Organization: Anonymous public citizen 3

Increase the goal from 54.5 mpg to 100 mpg. It's time to lead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

2001, p.1]

Organization: Anonymous public citizen 5

The Proposed Legislation is not founded on any sound scientific conclusions. The affects of 

basing legislation on technology that does not exist is irresponsible and irrational. Instead of 

punishing the consumer by forcing pseudoscience based laws onto the manufacturers, why don't 

you create incentives for innovation? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2010, p.1]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)
EPA Response to Comments

2-16

The standards proposed by the agencies are extremely stringent and are based on a large number 

of assumptions about technology and the auto market over the next decade. By extending the 

standards for many years into the future, the agencies provide manufacturers with substantial 

lead-time, which is of great value in compliance planning. On the other hand, the long time 

frame means that standards in the later years will be based on relatively long-range projections 

and assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 65-66.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 50.]

Organization: Bassett, S.

Also a true 54.5 MPG is unrealistic. Have you people never heard of the laws of physics? It will 

take x amount of energy (regardless of fuel type) to move a weight ( auto) a distance of x. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8123-A1, p. 1]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC.

The framework for model years 2017-2025 sets very ambitious GHG and fuel economy 

standards which can only be achieved through the adoption of all proposed compliance 

flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 1]

Compliance will also require significant automaker efforts to reduce vehicle emissions coupled 

with public policy measures for steering market demand towards more fuel efficient vehicles. 

This is particularly true for E-mobility where customer acceptance and future growth in demand 

will depend largely on vehicle affordability, measures to address range concerns, and 

infrastructure availability for public recharging. Significant market penetration of electric 

vehicles, especially in the latter years, is needed to ensure automakers' compliance with these 

proposed standards covering MYs 2017 through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 

2]

As a premium manufacturer, BMW designs and builds vehicles with outstanding product 

characteristics in order to satisfy higher customer expectations compared to other manufacturers, 

yet with similar vehicle footprints. Consequently, our product and specific US premium vehicle 

market characteristics require increased levels of technology in order to meet future standards 

compared to other manufacturers. Many of the technologies mentioned in the draft joint 

Technical Support Document have already been implemented in BMW Group models. 

Therefore, the significant penetration of these advanced conventional technologies in our 

existing fleet will make it even more challenging for BMW to achieve compliance with these 

very stringent standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, pp. 3-4]

Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
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2-17

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 10-12]

As you know, at the President's request, CARB participated in the development of the 

greenhouse gas standards that you are considering today. We shared our knowledge developing 

the nation's first greenhouse gas standards which were adopted back in 2004 and became 

effective in California and 10 other states with the 2009 models. We contributed to new studies 

that form some of the technical underpinnings of the EPA proposal and co-authored with the 

federal agencies the Technical Assessment Report that was issued in late 2010. We continue to 

work with the federal agencies to ensure that the proposed EPA greenhouse gas standards could 

be used as an alternative to California's standards and result in a unified set of regulations that 

would allow vehicle manufacturers to produce a single vehicle model that would meet state and 

federal greenhouse gases and federal fuel economy standards. We believe your proposal is 

consistent with these objectives.

Our proposed greenhouse gas standards are nearly identical to what you are proposing. Our 

analysis of the costs and benefits draws from the many hours of discussion we had with your 

staff on the best information and the latest analytical techniques to use in our respective 

regulatory documents.

For this to become a reality, EPA needs to finalize its standards largely as currently proposed.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 13-15.]

In addition to the greenhouse gas standards, CARB's Advanced Clean Car proposal includes new 

exhaust and evaporative emission standards for hydrocarbons, oxides and nitrogen and 

particulate matter starting with 2015 models. These standards will reduce the said emissions by 

roughly 75 percent by the 2025 models with similar reductions in particulate conditions.

These reductions will help our urban areas meet the more stringent health-based ambient air 

quality standards that are forthcoming. And the costs of achieving these standards is low and the 

technology is readily available. We have tailored the implementation schedule of these standards 

to be compatible with the gradual tightening of greenhouse gas standards, so that the greenhouse 

gas, smog-forming and soot-emission reductions can be addressed in an efficient manner by the 

development engineers of the car companies.

Our Advanced Clean Car package also includes a proposal to strengthen the ZEV mandate. Ten 

other states and the District of Columbia have adopted this program which collectively account 

for a little more than a quarter of all sales of passenger vehicles in the nation. By 2025 we are 

proposing that 15 percent of all passenger vehicles sold in California and its partner states be 

ZEVs, which include battery, hybrid and fuel cell vehicles.

We point this out because the extremely low or nonexistent greenhouse gas emissions of these 

zero-emission vehicles will count towards compliance with the national standards. As you know, 
EPA Response to Comments

2-18

the analysis of the proposed federal standards indicates a significant number of ZEVs will not be 

needed to achieve compliance with the federal rules. Thus, placement of ZEVs in California and 

its partner states to meet the California ZEV mandate provides the emission reduction credits that 

reduce the reductions that must be achieved from the remainder of a vehicle manufacturer's fleet. 

This, of course, is only a side benefit of strengthening the ZEV mandate whose main objective is 

to push technology onto a sustainable pathway that will take us to an 80 percent reduction in 

greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.

Organization: Capozzelli, J.

However. the proposed rules are not strong enough. They contain a dangerous loophole that lets 

SUVs improve gas-mileage standards later than passenger vehicles. This will spur production of 

even more SUVs, and the auto industry is attempting to weaken these already-inadequate 

standards. Increasing the fuel efficiency of our vehicles is essential in the battle against 

dangerous climate change. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0221-A1, p.1]

These standards leave the United States behind Europe. Japan and China in fuel efficiency. In the 

long run, higher standards will benefit both American consumers and manufacturers by pushing 

innovation instead of stagnation. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0221-A1, p.1]

These rules can and should be significantly strengthened. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0221-A1, p.1]

All but one of the alternative standards discussed in the rule's would allow greenhouse gas 

emissions from cars and light trucks to increase through 2025; but dangerous climate change 

cannot be avoided unless greenhouse gases actually, decrease. The rules should adopt 

the alternative that actually decreases carbon pollution ever year through 2025. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0221-A1, p.1]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 214-216.]

We also do believe, though, the rules are not good enough. They are certainly not good enough 

when you look at the scale of the problems we face; and they are also not good enough when you 

look at what is technologically feasible and what is going on around the world.

And so while we really appreciate the fact that the rule is willing to increase fuel efficiency, we 

don't believe they do so fast enough, and they leave the U.S. far behind fuel efficiency standards 

in the European Union, Japan and China.

So we fear that putting these standards, which are a step forward and we appreciate the effort in 

place for the next 13 years until 2025, would still leave the U.S. behind what's happening in the 

EU, China and Japan instead of putting it as a forefront.
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-19

Clearly, the transportation sector is the low hanging fruit here and I realize a lot can be done 

here, a lot is being done, and we appreciate that effort, but we hope that you will look at 

strengthening these rules because of the gravity of the crises we are facing when you issue the 

final rule.

The Center supports the Agencies’ efforts to limit greenhouse gas pollution from new passenger 

vehicles and light trucks, and we appreciate efforts the Agencies have made to respond to our 

comments to earlier CAFE and vehicle greenhouse gas rulemakings. But as we point out below, 

the current NPRM contains a number of significant flaws. We request that the Agencies remedy 

them to bring the forthcoming final MY 2017-2025 vehicle and greenhouse gas rulemaking into 

compliance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), as amended by the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”), and the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 2]

The importance of achieving maximum feasible fuel efficiency, along with maximum feasible 

greenhouse gas reductions, in the 14 years between now and the end of 2025 cannot be 

overstated. As the Agencies themselves observe, “DOE has stated that vehicle efficiency has the 

greatest short-to mid-term impact on oil consumption.” 1 Further, “20% of total U.S. CO2

emissions come from passenger cars and light trucks,” a total that amounts to 4% of global 

emissions. But the CAFE rules issued by the Agencies over the years, and therefore their effect 

on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, has failed to make inroads on the problem: “Passenger 

cars and light trucks . . . account for more than half of U.S. transportation CO2 emissions, and 

CO2 emissions from these vehicles have increased by 17 percent since 1990.” The alternative the 

Agencies prefer would continue to increase greenhouse gas emissions through 2025. The 

Agencies should, for the first time in their history, reverse this trend and promulgate a 

rulemaking that reduces rather than increases greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9479-A1, p. 2]

The targets adopted by the Agencies as the “preferred alternative” do not achieve emissions 

reductions, and do not constitute the maximum feasible fuel efficiency level under EPCA/EISA, 

nor protect the public health and welfare with an adequate margin of safety under the CAA. The 

“preferred” alternative would arrive at what is described in the NPRM as the “equivalent” of 

54.5 mpg in 2025. This number, when expressed without adequate explanation, is misleading. In 

fact, when not inflated by air conditioning credits that lower greenhouse gas emissions but do 

nothing to increase fuel efficiency, the number is 49.6 mpg – though even that number signifies 

only the “estimated average required fleet-wide fuel economy”; once carmakers’ use of various 

“flexibilities” and credits are accounted for, the estimated average “achieved” mileage drops to 

just 46.7 mpg. The actual real-world fleet-wide fuel efficiency number is even lower, translating 

to no more than approximately just 40 mpg (and 223 grams per mile). Because fuel efficiency 

itself, regardless of how it is counted, never exceeds 49.6 mpg, it is simply incorrect to claim a 

fuel efficiency “equivalent to” 54.5 mpg, and we urge the Agencies to clarify the effects of the 

rulemaking without referring to the highly ambiguous concept of equivalency. Equivalency 

relates to calculations of greenhouse gas emissions but in no way to mileage standards, a 

distinction certain to escape the average reader. But whether stated as 46.7 mpg or 49.6 mpg, the 

target is insufficient. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, pp. 2-3]
EPA Response to Comments

2-20

The failure to implement maximum feasible mileage standards through the next 14 years – a 

period exceeding the years between 2010 and 2020 that have been named the “critical decade” 

because of their unparalleled importance in the effort to avoid the most drastic effects of climate 

change – would not only be in violation of Congressional mandates, but would also constitute a 

regulatory failure of potentially irremediable proportions. Only Alternative 4 actually reduces 

greenhouse gas emissions. Adopting any other alternative will also continue to leave the U.S. far 

behind its competitors in the global automotive market. The preferred alternative is far from 

what is both technically and economically feasible to reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign 

oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 3]

Below we point out the various deficiencies inherent in the rulemaking. Among the most 

egregious is the laundry list of near-exemptions, credits, and other give-aways that would be 

provided to the largest and least efficient vehicles covered by the rulemaking: the SUVs, pickup 

trucks and other “light trucks” that have constituted the most profitable vehicle class, and that 

have proliferated on America’s highways while stymieing real progress on fuel efficiency for 

decades. Yet, this rulemaking would reintroduce the SUV loophole with a vengeance. We 

encourage the Agencies to address these deficiencies, abandon the preferred alternative and 

instead drive industry to use the next 14 years to overhaul, rather than merely tinker with, vehicle 

technology and achieve the results the statutes demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 

3]

1. The Agencies must set fuel efficiency standards that achieve maximum fuel efficiency and 

energy conservation

The Agencies’ discussion of the factors that must be considered in setting CAFE standards – and, 

more importantly, the manner in which the Agencies weigh them – must be corrected in a 

number of ways. While noting in passing that they cannot undermine energy conservation, the 

Agencies nonetheless list energy conservation merely as one among many factors to consider, 

failing to discern that it is the overriding purpose of the statutes. That energy conservation has 

been ignored or, at a minimum, arbitrarily relegated to secondary or tertiary importance, is 

evident from the following statement: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

While the GHG emissions targets do become more stringent each year, the emissions targets 

have been selected to allow compliance by vehicles of all sizes and with current levels of vehicle 

attributes such as utility, size, safety, and performance. Accordingly, these proposed standards 

are projected to allow consumers to choose from the same mix of vehicles that are currently in 

the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

In other words, the Agencies have selected standards that value purported consumer choice and 

the continued production of every vehicle in its current form over the need to conserve energy: as 

soon as increased fuel efficiency begins to affect any attribute of any existing vehicle, stringency 

increases cease. That is clearly impermissible and contrary to Congressional purpose.17 Given 

this outcome, it is not surprising that, as has been widely reported, the NPRM is the result of an 

“agreement” between the Agencies and the regulated industries – something that, at a minimum, 

taints the objectivity of the rulemaking process but instead is touted as an accomplishment.18 
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-21

Protecting “the same mix of vehicles currently on the market” or the “current levels of vehicle 

attributes” is decidedly not the Agencies’ task. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 215-216.]

Secondly, all but one of the alternative standards discussed in the rules would allow overall 

greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks to increase in 2025. And given the climate 

crisis, we don't believe we can afford this, and so we would look at pushing for fuel efficiency 

standards in the range of 60 miles per gallon rather than 54, which is the current proposal, and 

real world looks more like something like 49.

G. The Agencies Should Adopt Alternative 4

As we pointed out in our comments to the DEIS, only Alternative 4 would actually reduce 

greenhouse gas emissions from the nation’s vehicle fleet; for all of the reasons stated, adopting 

this standard is a necessity if exceptional damage from climate change is to be avoided. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 23]

Cars achieving and even exceeding the fuel economy level of 69 mpg, reached by Alternative 4 

by 2025, are already on the road today, such as the Toyota Prius and the Nissan Leaf.106 

Accordingly, it is clear that 69 mpg by 2025 is technically feasible 14 years from now. Indeed, it 

is beyond question that a fleet-wide average of 62 mpg (representing approximately a 6% annual 

increase) can be achieved based mostly on existing, off-the-shelf technologies, such as 

downsized turbocharged engines, electric power-train design, regenerative breaking, six-and 

seven-speed transmissions, high strength, high-strength lightweight materials, and enhanced 

aerodynamic designs.107 As stated above, to arrive at a technology-forcing alternative, NHTSA 

must push beyond existing technologies and include those still in the research and development 

stage in its modeling assumptions, which can model uncertainties concerning adoption and fleet 

penetration the Agencies perceive. Doing so demonstrates that Alternative 4 will be 

technologically feasible in the time provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 23]

The Agencies in the past have justified decisions not to adopt higher stringency standards 

because of concerns about economic feasibility. But the economic benefits of the rulemaking 

here would exceed its costs by more than $300 billion, at a minimum. And, even leaving aside 

the huge benefits external to the immediate purchase transaction, it is clear that fuel savings 

alone will more than make up for realistically estimated vehicle cost increases. We note here that 

the Agencies present no analysis of maximized societal benefits, where the benefits most 

optimally compare to the anticipated costs. In other words, there is no rigorous analysis of 

economic feasibility that justifies rejecting Alternative 4 as the appropriate standard for this 

rulemaking. Energy conservation along with the prevention of extreme climate change damages, 

however, demands it. Because Alternative 4 is both technological and economic feasible and best 

promotes energy conservation, it must be adopted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 23]
EPA Response to Comments

2-22

The Agencies’ preferred alternative of 49.6 mpg clearly does not constitute the maximum 

feasible fuel economy level because other countries will surpass that number (and in case of the 

EU, far surpass it) five years earlier, by 2020: by then, the EU will have achieved 64.8 mpg, 

Japan 55.1 mpg, and China 50.1 mpg.108 The following graph demonstrates this point: [See 

figure on p. 24 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9479-A1, p. 24]

Given the accelerating rapidity of technical improvements, reaching 69 mpg by 2025, five years 

after Europe reaches 64.8 mpg, is clearly feasible and is the alternative the Agencies should 

embrace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 24]

106 The Prius, for example, achieves 71 mpg in CAFE testing. See UCS, Translating New Auto 

Standards Into On- Road Fuel Efficiency at 2 (May 2011), available at 

http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/solutions/cleaner_cars_pickups_and_suvs/clean-carstandards-resourcecenter. html. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 23]

107 UCS, The Road Ahead at 3 (Sept. 2010), available at 

http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/solutions/cleaner_cars_pickups_and_suvs/clean-carstandards-resourcecenter. html; see also Interim Joint Technical Assessment Report in this 

docket, which finds that technologies to achieve a 6% annual efficiency increase are available 

today or will become available and, as compared to the other standards it analyzed, would 

provide the largest societal gains, far exceeding costs, and deliver the greatest net lifetime owner 

savings and greenhouse gas reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 23]

108 International Council on Clean Transportation, Global Comparison of Light-Duty Vehicle 

Fuel Economy/GHG Emissions Standards (Aug. 2011), Figure: Historical Fleet Fuel Economy 

Performance and Current or Proposed Standards, available at http://www.theicct.org/globalpassenger-vehicle-standards-update. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 24]

1 Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) 

Standards, Passenger Cars and Light Truck Model Years 2017-2025 (“DEIS”) at S-7. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 2]

17 CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1195. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

18 See, e.g., Jason Plautz, Fuel Economy: Cost Concerns Still Dog Newly Released CAFE 

Standards, GREENWIRE, Nov. 4 2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-23

The challenge of meeting the proposed 2025 MY standards must not be underestimated. We 

believe it’s important to observe that reaching the projected overall average of 163 grams per 

mile of carbon dioxide will require manufacturers to make unprecedented reductions in lightduty vehicle greenhouse gas emissions and fuel consumption following the large improvements 

which will be necessary in the 2012-2016 model years. Market acceptance of the technologies 

required (and costs incurred) to meet these standards will be a critical factor in the success of the 

2017-2025 MY National Program; customer choice and uptake will ultimately determine the 

success of this program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 1]

The proposed 2017-2025 standards are very aggressive. Manufacturers are only beginning their 

compliance with the 2012-2016 National Program, which will drive a 24% improvement over the 

2008 MY baseline to achieve the 2016 MY standard. The proposed standards for 2017-2025 

model years continue this unprecedented rate of improvement, driving an additional 35% 

improvement over roughly two product cycles. These improvements will be made possible, in 

part, through flexibilities such the recognition of air conditioning and off-cycle improvements 

and incentive programs such as the “game-changing” pickup truck incentives and advanced 

technology vehicle multipliers for electric, plug-in hybrid electric and CNG vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 5]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 51-52.]

The challenge of meeting the proposed standards must not be underestimated. We believe it's 

important to observe that reaching the projected overall average of 163 grams per mile of carbon 

dioxide in model year 2025 will have to be achieved within 13 years or approximately two 

product cycles.

[This comment was also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing 

on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 24.]

The proposed 2017-2025 National Program reaches thirteen years into the future. Setting 

standards this far into the future provides long-term fuel economy and greenhouse gas goals to 

automotive manufacturers and suppliers enabling strategic planning for the needed 

improvements. However, this lead-time comes at the cost of less certain estimates for technology 

development, cost, and customer acceptance and demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, 

p. 5]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 58.]

We believe it is important to observe that reaching the projected overall average of 163 grams 

per mile carbon dioxide in model year 2025 will have to be achieved within 13 years or roughly 

two product cycles.

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)
EPA Response to Comments

2-24

The proposed rule recognizes the need to keep the standards in touch with reality in several 

important ways.

The standards are set at a moderately aggressive level that is clearly beneficial and achievable.

The cost estimates are consistent with the results of independent analyses of technology costs 

made over the past decade.

The proposed standards are consistent with the rate of improvement that the auto industry 

achieved in the first decade of the fuel economy standard setting program.

The new approach to setting standards is consumer-friendly and facilitates automaker 

compliance. The standards do not require dramatic shifts in power train technologies or 

reductions in weight and offer flexibility and incentives for new technologies, and include a midterm review.

The setting of a coordinated national standard that lays out a steady rate of increase over a long 

time period gives consumers and the industry certainty and time to adapt to change. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 90-91.]

The standards accelerate the adoption of existing technologies at costs that are widely 

recognized. They provide incentives in flexibility for new technologies.

The setting of a long steady path over a long time period coordinated across all the agencies in 

this country gives consumers and the industry the time they need to adjust.

Fifth, the auto industry has a strong incentive to comply. The standard takes the risk out of 

investing in fuel efficiency. All the auto makers have to do -- you don't have to worry about 

some guy manufacturing cheap fuel inefficient cars. They all have to comply.

Organization: Consumer Reports

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 168.]

The proposed targets are aggressive, but they're also conservative enough to allow the 

manufacturers to increase the deployment of new technologies to meet these requirements.

Organization: Consumers Union

Because the proposed rule provides ample lead time—approximately two and a half design 

cycles by 2025—automakers will be able to incorporate more efficient technologies and 

materials into the vehicles at a measured pace, thus reducing compliance costs and putting 
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-25

everyone on the same playing field in the race to find the best, most efficient way to meet new 

fuel economy targets. The proposed targets are aggressive enough to encourage groundbreaking 

new technological advances, but conservative enough to be attained even with strong 

incremental improvements and increased deployment of existing technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9454-A2, p.2]

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 188-189.]

Second, we do like the longer time frame contained in the proposed rules. By looking out further 

into the future the rules can ensure consistency of approach and allow manufacturers to better 

plan for the vehicles that they will need to develop.

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Tailpipe greenhouse gas standards (the flip side of CAFÉ) cannot achieve the target reductions

Using the latest government greenhouse gas lifecycle model for the transportation sector, 

GREET 2011, one can conclude that achieving carbon neutrality through tailpipe emission 

standards is not within the realm of possibility. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 3]

According to the 2011 Department of Energy greenhouse gas model, replacing the entire on road 

fleet of light duty cars and trucks with gasoline powered vehicles that achieve over 125 miles per 

gallon is necessary to reduce segment GHGs by 80%. This is not a CAFÉ standard of 125 mpg 

but every car and truck on the road would have to achieve this level of on-road efficiency. These 

levels are more than double the proposal. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 3]

Battery electric vehicles are even less useful in reaching the goal of carbon neutrality. Replacing 

every car and truck on the road with electric vehicles would reduce GHG emissions by only 26% 

at a cost of $2.5 trillion plus the cost of additional fuel production. Advocates of the electric

option opine that use of carbon free electricity will be prevalent in the future. The federal 

government recently invested a half trillion dollars in the solar power company Solyndra only to 

have the company go bankrupt. The dream of solar power is a long way off. Others point to wind 

power as the solution for electricity. Already environmentalists are lining up protesting wind 

farms because of the noise pollution and the fact that the turbine blades kill large numbers of 

migratory birds7. Nuclear power is not supported by environmentalists and hydropower can also 

present problems for endangered species. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, pp. 3-4]

Replacing every car and truck on the road with a hydrogen fuel cell powered vehicle would 

reduce GHG emissions by only 41% at a cost of $2.5 trillion not counting the fuel infrastructure 

cost. Hydrogen is one of the most difficult fuels to transport because of the corrosive effect of 

hydrogen on most metals. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

2-26

Agency Was Arbitrary and Capricious In Its Selection of Standards

The Agency suggests the proposed standards of 50 miles per gallon could be achieved at a cost 

of about $2000 per vehicle. Even a cursory look at the data from EPAs 2012 model year fuel 

economy mileage guide demonstrates this review was arbitrary and capricious. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0166-A1, p. 5]

Only seven of the 900 plus models listed in the 2012 model year fuel economy guide would meet 

the 2025 model year proposed standards; one hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, three battery electric 

vehicles and three hybrid electric vehicles. As demonstrated above, hydrogen and electric 

vehicles cannot achieve the necessary greenhouse gas emissions and cost substantially more than 

$2000 per vehicle. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 6]

The median MSRP price increase for a hybrid electric vehicle in the 2011 model year was over 

$7000. Using the EPAs own fuel economy benefit and annual fuel costs published in the fuel 

economy guide it would take over 273,000 miles of driving to pay off the initial price premium 

for the average hybrid10 not counting the battery11 replacement every 10 years. The breakeven 

mileage for the highest selling hybrid electric vehicle, the Toyota Prius, is over 226,000 miles 

not counting the battery replacements. The second highest selling hybrid electric vehicle, the 

Honda Civic, never reaches its breakeven mileage. Over half the hybrid electric vehicles in the 

market last year would never12 reach their breakeven point according to EPA annual fuel costs 

not factoring in the cost of replacement batteries. More than half (60%) of 2012 model year 

hybrid electric vehicles (Table 3) were more than 10 miles per gallon below their 2025 model 

year target and all the hybrid electric vehicles have 6 or more forward gears. The average 

shortfall for all hybrid electric vehicles was over 9 miles per gallon. [Table 3 can be found on p. 

24 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1] [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 6]

Hybrid electric vehicles have been in the market for fourteen years and still represent less than 

2.5% of sales despite generous subsidies. There were 26 hybrid electric vehicles in the market in 

2011 yet over half the sales were a single model. Hybrids are having a difficult time gaining 

acceptance in the marketplace likely due to the economic reality that they do not save consumers 

money. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 6]

The median price increase for a diesel engine in the 2012 model year is over $5000. Using the 

EPA fuel economy benefit and annual fuel costs it would take over 214,000 miles of driving to 

pay off the initial price premium. Eighty-five percent of 2012 model year diesel equipped 

vehicles (Table 4) were more than 10 miles per gallon below their 2025 model year target despite 

having six or more forward gears. The average shortfall was over 12 miles per gallon. Thus 

advanced technology diesel and hybrid technology as currently deployed in the market are 

insufficient to meet the projected standards and cost substantially more than the Agency 

estimates. [Table 4 can be found on p. 25 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-

A1] [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 6]

Ninety percent of the 50 most fuel efficient non-hybrid 2012 model year trucks (Table 7) were 

more than 10 miles per gallon short of their 2025 model year target. The average shortfall was 
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-27

over 23 miles per gallon. [Table 7 can be found on p. 27 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-

0166-A1] [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 7]

Ninety-four percent of the 50 most fuel efficient non-hybrid 2012 model year passenger cars 

(Table 8) were more than 10 miles per gallon short of their 2025 model year target. The average 

shortfall was over 15 miles per gallon. [Table 8 can be found on p. 28 of Docket 

number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1] [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 7]

Collectively, the 2012 model year data clearly demonstrates that the proposed targets cannot be 

achieved at the costs assumed by the Agency or with conventional technology. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0166-A1, p. 7]

Applying the technology already present in the 2012 model year mileage guide to the Agencies 

projected penetration rates result in a sizable shortfall to the proposed standards. Even using the 

best available hybrid technology in the market today, a manufacturer would have to have a 

penetration rate of over 70% hybrid electric vehicle and 3% electric vehicles to achieve the 

proposed standards. This is substantially higher than the rates projected by the Agency. [See 

Table 2 on p. 8 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1] [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, 

pp. 7-8]

7 Wind power is the fastest developing source of energy in the United States and can be an 

important part of the solution to climate change. However, wind farms can kill birds through 

collisions with turbines and associated structures, and also harm them through the loss of habitat 

that birds need for survival. A 2008 Department of Energy report calls for the U.S. to generate 

20% of its electricity from wind by 2030. By then, wind turbines are expected to be killing at 

least one million birds each year, and probably significantly more, depending on the final scale 

of wind build-out. Wind farms are also expected to impact almost 20,000 square miles of 

terrestrial habitat, and over 4,000 square miles of marine habitat by 2030, some critical to 

threatened species. (American Bird Conservancy)

10 Comparisons are to gasoline counterpart similar to consumers’ purchase decisions; the 

proposal counts fuel savings from the fleet average and does not use a comparable vehicle as the 

basis for fuel saving.

11 The Agency values the battery at about $4000; requiring over 150,000 miles of additional 

driving to pay back; Honda also lists the battery at about $4000

12 Defined as having a breakeven mileage in excess of 300,000 miles

Organization: Ferrari

We believe that it is right to propose now a CAFE regulation that covers the entire 9-year period 

MYs 2017-25, but it is necessary to make a mid-term review, to verify the consistency of the 
EPA Response to Comments

2-28

proposed standards, due to the many uncertainties that are implicit in the technical and economic 

assumptions that form the basis for the proposed standards. In case of any changes or mores\

stringent requirements, enough lead-time should be allowed. It is important for vehicle 

manufacturers to have clear and stable regulations, and enough lead-time before they are first 

adopted or modified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

The standards that have been proposed by EPA and NHTSA through the 2025 model year 

represent the most significant federal action ever taken by the US federal government to improve 

fuel economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions – nearly doubling the standards that were in 

place for the 2010 model year. To meet these requirements throughout the 2017-2025 period, 

substantial capital investments will be necessary to meet consumer demand for more fuelefficient vehicles, to incorporate new technologies that consumers want, and to compete against 

other automakers in the marketplace. Some examples of the major planned investments include 

converting three truck and SUV plants to build small cars, re-tooling our powertrain facilities to 

manufacture fuel-efficient EcoBoost engines, offering more advanced six-speed transmissions, 

leveraging our global platforms, increasing our hybrid offerings and production, and moving 

forward with an aggressive electrification strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 33.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 86.]

The proposed rules extend through the 2025 model year, which is an unprecedented time frame 

in the context of fuel economy regulations. This presents a significant challenge for 

manufacturers. While the establishment of longer-term standards provides manufacturers with 

targets for future product planning and investment, the longer time frame leads to greater risk 

that the assumptions underlying the standards do not come to fruition. For example, if the lack of 

adequate infrastructure hinders the introduction of new fuel-saving technologies, or if fuel prices 

turn out to be substantially lower than anticipated, it might be necessary to change the standards 

in order to avoid damage to American auto jobs and the U.S. economy.

Organization: Growth Energy

The fuel economy and GHG standards proposed by the Agencies sent ambitious targets for the 

automobile industry. The standards and other requirements that the Joint NPRM propose, along 

with other safety and emissions programs, will determine how the U.S. automobile industry 

allocates its human and financial resources for the next decade. The new-vehicle market will 

determine whether the automobile industry’s efforts to comply with the Agencies’ GHG and fuel 

economy standards are successful. Greenhouse gas standards of the type being proposed by EPA 

are, for all practical purposes, fuel economy standards, and like fuel economy standards such 

standards affect nearly every attribute of vehicle design and performance, as well as vehicle 

retail and operating costs. One of the most ambitious aspects of the Joint NPRM is that it would 
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set standards for the industry over a much longer time frame than any previous fuel economy 

standards established by NHTSA, including the model-year (“MY”) 2012-2016 GHG standards 

recently promulgated by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 1]

Programs that try to force the market to purchase electric vehicles that the public does not want 

to buy require public subsidies, increases in the prices of conventional vehicles to subsidize the 

manufacturers’ cost, or both. While California may have some discretion under the Clean Air 

Act to experiment with its own new-vehicle market, and while the Joint NPRM’s approach may 

have the support of some stakeholders in addition to California, NHTSA and EPA have 

independent duties to determine whether the standards it adopts are economically practicable and 

take proper account of the state of technology, including the costs of technology. See 49 U.S.C. § 

32902(f); 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(2). If the reliance on electric vehicles is misplaced, because there 

is no statutory mandate for such vehicles in federal law nor any requirement that the Agencies 

rely on such vehicles in writing GHG or fuel economy standards, the proposed standards in the 

Joint NPRM need to be scaled back to conform to levels that are economically practicable and 

also technologically feasible after accounting for costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 

2]

Organization: Haroldson, C.

The proposed standards are too strict [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11137-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 257.]

The program should instead remain technology neutral and recognize all significant performance 

improvements.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 209-210.]

Manufacturers must have confidence in a regulatory approach to take the risks necessary to 

innovate and world's most pressing environment and energy security challenges. We believe that 

better regulatory approaches are performance-driven, technology neutral, and provide some 

flexibility, and they must reflect the best available data and signs incorporating the most up-todate research and technical information.

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

Honeywell strongly endorses a performance-based, technology-neutral approach to regulating 

emissions and fuel consumption. Honeywell believes that government policy should promote all 

technology in the same way. Even at the end of the MY 2025 timeframe, internal combustion 

engine vehicles will continue to dominate the new light duty fleet. Proven, cost-effective 
EPA Response to Comments

2-30

technologies that use the nation’s current infrastructure and numerous breakthroughs in many 

internal combustion engine technologies will become available in the years ahead, substantially 

improving the environmental performance of the vehicle fleet. Yet those benefits could be lost or 

diminished if the government directs investment towards electric vehicles without 

simultaneously encouraging continued investment in advanced ICE technologies. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, pp.1-2]

Although we recognize that the overall stringency of the regulations encourages investment and 

improvement throughout the fleet, it is also true that an OEM may gain significant compliance 

advantage from EVs and PHEVs -- a compliance advantage that would be further enhanced if the 

credit multipliers are finalized. Much of the technology utilized to obtain that advantage is 

limited to the battery technology so that the technological advancement does not necessarily 

transfer to other vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.5]

Organization: Howard, P.

One thing I would like to see is that these standards only apply to newly manufactured vehicles 

and that there will be absolutely no provisions or punishments requiring people to get rid of their 

perfectly good and operating older vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10063-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Hrin, S.

It would be good for our national security if cars were required to get more miles to the gallon. 

I'm not talking about a few miles per gallon more, but much more. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1568, p.1]

I believe car makers should be required to get 100/gallon by 2025. Anything less would be a 

travesty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1568, p.1]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 22.]

In our discussions with the agencies on this rulemaking, we have consistently supported the 

standard in excess of 50 miles per gallon.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 24.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 23.]

Finally, Hyundai appreciates a substantial lead time for these regulations which will 

provide stability for long-term product planning.
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Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

The ICCT has two overall objectives for our comments. First, given the accelerating pace of 

technology development and cost reduction, the proposed standards are not pushing the limits of 

technology and it will not be difficult or expensive for manufacturers to meet them. Second, 

many cost effective technologies may not be adopted should the stringency be weakened due to 

unwarranted credits. Our comments are focused on ensuring that the final rule is as robust as 

possible, including data and information on technology and consumers and suggestions for 

improvements to the credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 196.]

ICCT strongly supports the overall program stringency. However, we are concerned some costeffective reductions may not be achieved due to certain elements found in the performance rule.

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

10. Equating a 54.5 mpgge average EPA proposal 'mix' to 54.5 mpgg vehicle performance, they 

are not interchangeable because the 'mix' vehicles need to consider each vehicles 'weight' while a 

54.5 mpgge average implies no 'weighting'; e.g. to show the point, a 54.5 mpgge vehicle 

performance calcs to 1.835 gge to go 100 miles; whereas one 60 mpgge Volt and one 49 mpg 

HEV also average 54.5 mpgge but the 49 mpg uses 2.04 gg per 100 miles and the 60 mpgge uses 

1.67 gge per 100 miles for 2 vehicles using 3.71 gge for 200 miles or an average of 53.9 gge, i.e., 

not 54.5. Clearly not equivalent. and the farther the vehicles are from the average the more 

impact, e.g., use one Leaf at 97 mpgge and one 12 mpg 'guzzler' and average is still 54.5 but 

'guzzler' alone for 100 miles is by itself 8.33 gge! Then add the 1.03 gge for the Leaf for a 200 

mile total of 9.36 gge, or per 100 miles 4.68 gge (21.4 mpgge), or 155% more gge than a 54.5 

vehicle. While EPA ref 2 shows 6 vehicle mix scenarios, plug in penetrations minor in all 6, 

however the option for manufacturers to sell plug-ins to obtain credits and/or multipliers to allow 

more profitable 'guzzlers' is available and where profitable I expect the profit motive will prevail; 

yet in EPA's Ref. 2 scenarios I did not find a 2025 model year scenario with high plug-in 

penetration! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, pp. 5-6]

2. EPA Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis 'Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty 

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards' 

EPA-420-D-11-004 November 2011

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

The Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA) is pleased to provide comments 

in support of the U.S. EPA’s proposed rulemaking to establish 2017 and later model year lightduty vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards and corporate average fuel economy standards. 
EPA Response to Comments

2-32

We believe an important opportunity exists to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 

improve fuel economy from passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.1]

Controlling greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector is essential to the overall 

efforts to alleviate long-term impacts on the climate. As detailed in EPA’s proposal, there are a 

large set of technology combinations that are available to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 

passenger vehicles and light-duty trucks, including fuel efficient, state-of-the-art and future 

advanced gasoline and diesel powertrains. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, pp.1-2]

In summary, there are significant opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the 

transportation sector through the design of fuel efficient powertrains that include advanced 

exhaust emission controls for meeting even the most stringent criteria pollutant standards. 

MECA believes that advanced emission control systems have a critically important role in future 

policies that aim to reduce mobile source greenhouse gas emissions. These emission control 

technologies allow all high efficiency powertrains to compete in the marketplace by enabling 

these powertrains to meet current and future criteria pollutant standards. In nearly all cases, these 

fuel-efficient powertrain designs, combined with appropriate emission controls, can be optimized 

to either minimize fuel consumption impacts associated with the emission control technology, or, 

in some cases, improve overall fuel consumption of the vehicle. This optimization extends 

beyond carbon dioxide emissions to include other significant greenhouse gases such as methane, 

nitrous oxide, and black carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.6]

MECA commends EPA for taking important steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 

improve fuel economy from light-duty vehicles. Our industry is prepared to do its part and 

deliver cost effective, advanced emission control technologies to the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9452-A3, p.6]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 180.]

MECA, like many commented already today, supports performance-based standards that are 

technology neutral.

Organization: Marlinghaus, E.

The stakes are too high. We must dramatically reduce our consumption of fossil fuels - imported 

or domestic - if we are to prevent catastrophic climate change. Although I support the proposed 

rule to increase fuel economy for new passenger vehicles to an average of 54.5 miles per gallon 

by 2025, personally I feel that the date for reaching this standard should be moved forward to at 

least 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1581-A1, p. 1]

This spring, you set a goal of reducing oil imports by one-third this decade, and in November 

you proposed fuel efficiency standards that will effectively double current requirements. I 

commend your efforts, but urge you to set your goals even higher. I believe it is important to 

increase U.S. investment in fuel efficient technologies, save consumers money at the pump, help 
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this country break its dependence on oil & all fossil/carbon based fuels, and most importantly, 

protect the environment. Do NOT let these standards be watered down--protect and finalize the 

new fuel efficiency rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1581-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Marshall, C.

Promulgating the standard might best be done by also implementing companion federal 

programs involving other agencies, e.g., a financing program allowing U.S. auto manufacturers 

to retool plants and re-train workers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (10) (National Wildlife Federation Action Fund-1)

President Obama pledged to reduce our oil imports by one-third by 2025. Setting strong vehicle 

efficiency and emissions standards is the most effective, common-sense step we can take to 

reduce our dependence on oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1244-A1_MASS, p.1]

These standards would also deeply cut US global warming pollution, and help speed the 

adoption of technology domestically and globally to cut emissions even further. The deep cuts in 

oil use that result from setting the strongest standards are also critical to reducing the need to 

drill for oil in increasingly risky, environmentally destructive and higher emitting locations.

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1244-A1_MASS, p.1]

From more advanced engines to stronger lightweight materials, automakers have the technology 

to reach standards of at least 60 miles per gallon by 2025 and achieve the President's goal. Strong 

standards would also spur American innovation to help our auto industry compete and thrive in a 

global marketplace, while helping households and businesses save money. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-1244-A1_MASS, p.1]

The difference between the strongest and weakest standards you are considering would cost 

Americans $370 billion at the pump (with most of the money ending up outside of the U.S.), and 

add twice as much global warming pollution to the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1244-A1_MASS, p.1]

We need your leadership to set strong fuel economy standards that will break our dependence on 

oil, curb global warming pollution and provide consumers with more choices of fuel efficient our 

cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1244-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) (Unknown Organization)

All but one of the alternative standards discussed in the rules would allow greenhouse gas 

emissions from cars and light trucks to increase through 2025; but dangerous climate change 

cannot be avoided unless greenhouse gases actually decrease. The rules should adopt the 

alternative that actually decreases carbon pollution every year through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9595-A1_MASS, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

2-34

The rules do not push car makers to look for technological innovation; they allow manufacturers 

to simply rely on small improvements to technology that already exists. As a result even 13 years 

from now, in 2025, the U.S. fleet would still do no better than what some cars can already 

achieve today. By 2025 the United States should do better than the European Union, China and 

Japan, not continue to lag behind them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9595-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (61) (The Social Justice Group)

We, the undersigned, applaud the proposed 54.5 miles per gallon carbon and fuel efficiency 

standards for cars and light trucks. We urge you to maintain these strong standards and make 

them final in July of this year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7406-A1_MASS, p.2]

Organization: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

In our Report, we have shown that the proposed regulations are highly demanding on both 

technological and market deployment fronts. Strong coordinated policies in addition to stringent 

CAFE requirements will thus be required to incentivize aggressive development of greatly 

improved propulsion system and vehicle technologies as well as the rapid market penetration of 

that technology, along with increasing deployment of alternative vehicles and fuels, into actual 

use. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1,p.1]

We are submitting our Report titled “U.S. CAFE Standards: Potential for Meeting Light-duty 

Vehicle Fuel Economy Targets, 2016-2025” which we have prepared as our response to the joint 

NHTSA and EPA proposal for extending the U.S. National Program to further improve lightduty vehicle fuel economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, for model years 2017 through 

2025. It is based on our research of the past year or so, using a forwardlooking stochastic fleet 

assessment model for analyzing the impact of uncertainly on projected future light-duty vehicle 

fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions (Bastani, P. Heywood, J.B., Hope, C., SAE paper 2012-

01-0647, SAE 2012 World Congress, Detroit, MI), with appropriate assumptions for future 

average car and light-truck operating characteristics and sales volumes. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0229-A1, p.1] [[ See Docket Number NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1, pp3-35 for the report.]]

We quantitatively analyze three different scenarios. First, we define an “operational space” 

within which we evaluate specific scenarios, using evolving upper and lower bounds on the 

assumed vehicle characteristics, sales volumes of each major technology, and anticipated travel 

demand. Within this context we show that:

1. With our “plausible yet ambitious” scenario, (see Bastani, P., Heywood, J.B., & Hope, C., 

Transportation Research Part A, vol. 46, pp. 517-548, 2012) the likelihood of exceeding the 2016 

fleet average targets is moderate for passenger cars, but very low for the combined car plus lighttruck new vehicle fleets. The prospects of meeting the 2025 targets with this scenario are 

extremely low. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1, p.1]

2. With a more optimistic scenario where, for example, vehicle performance remains unchanged 

(a significant departure from the history of the last two or so decades), the prospects for meeting 

the 2016 fleet targets with passenger cars rises to some 50% but for the combined cars and light 
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2-35

trucks sales are still only a few percent. The potential for the combined car and light truck sales 

meeting the 2025 targets on time is very low indeed. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1,p.1]

3. With the proposed EPA/DOT preferred alternative scenario, as spelled out in the proposed rule 

making, the prospects for meeting these targets are better: some 20% for the combined car and 

light truck fleet meeting the 2016 CAFE fleet-average targets, but still only about 15% for the 

2025 targets. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1, p.1]

We hope that this probabilistic analysis with the logic behind its assumptions carefully explained 

(and referenced), with it’s detailed results and findings, will prove useful to you in your 

deliberations of these proposed CAFE requirements. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0229-A1, p.2]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Despite this overall support, the continuing stringency increases in the proposal are extremely 

aggressive, especially for a company that traditionally sells in the luxury car market and with 

modest volumes over which to spread its compliance obligations. As more fully explained in the 

Attachment to this letter, DAG suggests the following additional flexibilities and provisions. 

These measures would assist companies in overcoming market barriers, bringing new and 

advanced vehicles to market and combining advancements in crash avoidance technology with 

the fuel consumption reduction and emissions benefits they produce: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

The final regulation will impose a set of aggressive and challenging standards. As a technology 

leader, DAG will continue to employ in its fleet all available technological advancements and 

will gain real world CO2 and fuel economy benefits through off-cycle technologies. DAG 

appreciates the opportunity to comment upon the proposal and looks forward to continuing to 

work with the agencies during finalization and implementation of the regulations. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-19]

• DAG supports establishing an alternative compliance pathway for companies to choose more 

stringent standards in the later model years to allow more lead time to diversify their U.S. 

product line-ups and to bring additional advance technology vehicles, such as fuel cell vehicles, 

to the U.S. market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

DAG supports a concept introduced in the proposal to provide an alternative compliance 

pathway to allow manufacturers additional lead time to reconstitute the light duty vehicle fleet. 

This suggestion was raised in the context of explaining that the agency would not extend the 

Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standard ('TLAAS'). The agency requested 

comments on whether the intermediate-volume, limited-line manufacturers should receive 

additional flexibility in the latter years of the proposal, and whether the phase-in should be 

spread over more years for lower volume manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, 

p. A-1]
EPA Response to Comments

2-36

DAG understands the agency's decision not to extend the TLAAS beyond its original terms. 

However, DAG agrees that manufacturers be accorded an option to adopt an alternative 

compliance pathway. The alternative would reduce the grams per mile reduction requirements 

during earlier model years and then make up most, or all of those carbon reductions in later 

model years.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-1]

The alternative pathway would be available to all manufacturers. We anticipate, however, that 

most manufacturers, who are able to spread compliance costs across a broader fleet, would 

continue to choose the basic option since doing so would allow those manufacturers more 

consistency across model years. The alternative pathway would likely be utilized primarily by 

the small number of manufacturers with more concentrated product line-ups in order to diversify 

their U.S. market fleets and to bring more long-ranging advanced technology vehicles, such as 

fuel cell or dedicated CNG vehicles, to market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-1-

A-2]

DAG looks forward to discussing this option with the agencies and to developing an alternative 

compliance pathway that is likely to provide the necessary assistance while maintaining similar 

or equal overall levels of CO2 reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-2]

3 One possibility within the first four model years, MYs 2017-2020, would be to adjust the 

grams per mile reductions during the first two model years with corresponding increases in the 

latter two model years. Another possibility would be to spread the alternative pathway across the 

eight model years covered by the overall rulemaking.

Organization: Miller, P.

This rule should be moved to 2020 with an addition of a separate part which provides far more 

federal R&D for cars that don't use fossil fuels at all -- including hydrogen and advanced electric 

cars, funds for plug ins, etc. This would help global warming by reducing carbon emissions 

while it developed entire new industries that keep our energy dollars in the US = lasting 

industries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1755-A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 42.]

And go to finally, NACAA urges that EPA and NHTSA ensure that this final rule is promulgated 

by July 2012 as planned, and encourages EPA upon promulgation of this rule to begin assessing 

the efficacy of another phase of standards to apply to post 2025 model year vehicles.

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
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These comments do not devote much attention to technological feasibility, largely taking on faith 

the proposal’s assumptions in that regard. Likewise, little attention is paid to the proposal’s 

assumptions regarding program benefits, except to stress that if and to the extent vehicles 

covered by the program rule are not sold and used as predicted, those benefits will be reduced. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 3]

The proposal seeks to establish CAFE and GHG mandates which would take effect with MY 

2017. No statutory mandate requires that standards be set so far in advance, for so long a period 

of time. In fact, the 35.5 mpg standard recently promulgated for MY 2016 will kick in some four 

years earlier than Congress contemplated in EISA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 11]

Absent a specific statutory direction, NHTSA and EPA should be guided by three principal 

factors. First, a timetable should be designed to provide adequate lead-time for manufacturers to 

achieve technologically feasible standards. Statutory language on lead-time is found in both the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Clean Air Act. CAFE standards must be issued at 

least 18 months prior to the model year in question and for no more than 5 model years. In 

addition, new GHG standards may not take effect sooner than the model year commencing 4 

years after they are promulgated. Technological feasibility directly relates to what manufacturers 

can do and when they can do it. The longer out into the future standards are set, the less likely 

NHTSA and EPA will have credible information to accurately predict technological feasibility. 

This is one of the key lessons taught by the heavy-duty truck emissions look-back discussed 

above and found in Exhibit B. Setting standards too far in advance dramatically increases the risk 

that those standards will prove to be technologically infeasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9575-A1, p. 11]

Proposed standards also must be economically practicable. Although NADA has considerable 

confidence that vehicle manufacturers will be able to research, design, manufacture, and 

incorporate technologies and designs aimed to meet the proposed standards, serious questions 

exist regarding whether they will be able to do so in a cost effective or economically practicable 

manner. As discussed at length above, regulatory benefits will not attain unless and until vehicles 

subject to the proposal are bought. And, to the extent they prove unaffordable, they will not be 

bought. There are simply too many variables involved with the reasonable modeling of economic 

practicability to warrant the setting of standards unnecessarily too far in advance. Fuel costs, 

materials costs, general economic conditions, and interest rates are but a few of these very hard 

to forecast, yet critical variables. In short, NHTSA and EPA have no justification for setting 

standards for longer than the statutory five year period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, 

pp. 11-12]

Prospective light-duty vehicle purchasers, and the dealers who sell to them, will be directly 

impacted by the vehicle production mandates under consideration. If no rule were to issue, in-use 

passenger car and light truck fuel economy and GHG performance would continue to improve, 

as older, less fuel-efficient vehicles are replaced by newer ones offering comparable performance 

with improved fuel economy. NHTSA and EPA must preserve this trend by avoiding mandates 

which, through product compromises or high costs, would impede fleet turnover. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 13]
EPA Response to Comments

2-38

The automobile industry has traveled a steep technology path over the last century, resulting in 

astounding improvements to light-duty cars and trucks. Today’s vehicles are lighter and more 

powerful, yet safer and more fuel efficient than ever in history. Fuel economy/GHG standards 

should encourage manufacturers to continue along this technology path, but only if it allows 

them to deliver to new vehicle showrooms products that are acceptable by and affordable to 

consumers. Future light-duty vehicles must be affordable up-front, and must also offer a total 

value package that includes fuel economy, but with no safety or performance trade-offs. Unless 

and until new vehicles sell, regulatory benefits will be unrealized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9575-A1, p. 13]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 69.]

Secondly, NADA wants the highest fuel economy that we can get as long as the mandates are 

feasible and affordable as customers do have choices.

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 32.]

A recent survey by Consumers Reports found that 93 percent of the public is in support of 

stricter fuel economy standards. The public understands how the fuel standards work. They work 

for wildlife, they work for American families and they work for the auto industry and 

autoworkers and for the overall economy.

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Annual Rates of Emissions Reductions

EPA’s proposed rule would incorporate a carbon dioxide equivalent standard that requires annual 

average reduction rates of 5 percent for passenger cars and 3.5 percent for light trucks in model 

years (MY) 2017 to 2021 and 5 percent for all light-duty vehicles for MY 2022 to 2025. For 

reasons set forth herein and in our November 1, 2010 letter (attached), NESCAUM believes a 6 

percent rate for passenger cars is technically feasible and economically practicable. We strongly 

encourage EPA to consider incorporating a more stringent rate of improvement in this 

rule.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 1]

EPA’s technology analysis projects that battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid 

electric vehicles (PHEVs) will account for as little as 1 percent of sales in 2021 and 3 percent of 

sales in 2025. EPA and the NHSTA previously estimated that a 6 percent annual rate of 

improvement for the combined passenger car and truck fleet could be achieved with as little as 4 

percent combined sales share of BEVs and PHEVs in 2025, provided that sales of conventional 

hybrids continue to increase. Given the proposed rule initially establishes a less stringent 

standard for light trucks (3.5 percent reduction rate from MY 2017 to 2021), achieving a 6 

percent reduction rate for passenger cars alone would likely require even lower penetration rates 
CO2 Emissions Standards

2-39

than EPA’s previous estimates. The majority of major auto manufacturers will be selling BEVs 

or PHEVs as part of their offering of passenger cars, beginning with MY 2013. Forecasts of 

significant reductions in the weight and cost of electric vehicle technologies further support our 

conclusion that the modest increase in sales of these advanced technology vehicles required to 

achieve a fleet-wide 6 percent annual rate of improvement for passenger cars is viable.4 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, pp. 1-2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 70-74.]

The proposed rule before us today incorporates carbon dioxide emissions reduction at average 

annual rates in model years 2017 through 2021 of five percent for passenger cars and three point 

five percent for light trucks.

For model years '22 through 2025 the rate is set at five percent for all light-duty vehicles.

NESCAUM states continue to affirm our previous position that a six-percent rate is technically 

feasible and economically practical and encourage EPA to strongly consider incorporating this 

more stringent rate of improvement into the rule.

NESCAUM states encourage EPA to consider the six-percent annual rate of improvement.

4 MIT Energy Initiative. Electrification of the Transportation System. April, 2010.

Organization: RVIA

EPA and NHTSA should closely examine whether they have appropriately considered future 

light vehicle towing trends in setting standards for light duty passenger cars, cross-over vehicles, 

minivans and other vehicles that will be used more in the future to tow RV trailers and similar 

towable products. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.5]

Organization: Smith, Frank Houston

Please note that the current 40 UK gasoline vehicle configurations rated >60 mpg(Imperial) 

combined are generally similar in size to the Fiat 500 or for two. This suggests something more 

than “advanced” gasoline ICE technologies are necessary to accomplish fuel economies above 

45~50 mpg(US) combined for machines currently considered mid and compact sized light 

passenger vehicles in the US. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, p.2]

Here are the 20 US vehicles that have broken the 50 mpg highway barrier since 1984: 

http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/Power...g=50&maxmpg=70 [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, 

p.2]
EPA Response to Comments

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51~53 mpg - Chevy Sprinter ER 1986~1987

51 mpg - Chevy Sprint Metro 1988

52 mpg - Chevy Sprint Metro 1989~1994

51 mpg - Civic CRX HF 1986~1987

50 mpg - Civic HB VX 1994~1995

58~61 mpg - Honda Insight 2001~2006

A total of 20 vehicles in the last 28 years, with nothing post 2006. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-

A1, p.2]

And, here are the only 11 vehicles recognized by 

http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp to have achieved ≥ 50 mpg(US) combined 

since 1984:

50 mpg(US) combined - Toyota Prius C 2012 & Prius 2010 through 2012

52~53 mpg(US) combined - Honda Insight 2000 through 2006 [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, 

p.3]

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

SPI supports the aim to preserve consumer choice in vehicles, and likewise seeks for 

manufacturers to have a fully captured and incentivized range of technological options to reduce 

emissions and increase fuel efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.2]

Organization: Susan R.

Please increase the minimum MPG. If auto makers will routinely offer vehicles that offer a 50+ 

MPG, the gas savings alone would pay for an upgrade in vehicle. PLEASE - for our environment 

and just plain common sense, increase the minimums! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10792-A1, p. 

1]

Organization: Tarazevich, Yegor

There should be one target for everyone (by 2025 it will be CAFE 54.5 MPG which is equal 

EPA 40 MPG). Every new car that does not meet the target should pay a penalty of $500 per 

every MPG under the standard. If one wants to buy a huge 20 MPG gas guzzler he will pay a 

$10,000 penalty for air pollution and oil dependency. This is the only way to eliminate all 

loopholes. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0199,p.1]
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Organization: Toyota Motor North America

The 163 grams per mile (54.5 miles per gallon equivalent) proposed standard for 2025 model 

year is truly groundbreaking and will provide significant environmental and energy savings 

benefits. While Toyota feels confident that our leadership in advanced technology vehicles 

provides a strong foundation, meeting the proposed standards poses a formidable challenge for 

our engineers and product planners. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.2]

The overall level of the proposed standards in 2025 model year is consistent with the agreement 

signed by Toyota last July and the joint Supplemental Notice of Intent (NOI) published last 

August. These standards will pose a substantial challenge our engineers and product planners, 

but Toyota is prepared to make every effort to comply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.5]

Further, subject to specific comments provided later in this document, Toyota generally supports 

the added flexibilities proposed by EPA in the form of the following provisions: (1) sales 

multipliers for advanced technology vehicles; (2) unlimited transfer of credits between fleets; (3) 

A/C system leakage credits; and (4) one-time carry forward of 20102016 model year GHG 

credits through the 2021 model year. Unfortunately, NHTSA does not believe it can propose or 

adopt these same flexibility provisions for the CAFE regulations. To account for these 

differences, NHTSA has proposed to set the CAFE target curves at different (lower) 'MPGe' 

levels than EPA's GHG target curves for a given model year. However, Toyota's understanding 

is that NHTSA's target curves have only been adjusted to account for the lack of sales multiplier 

and A/C system leakage credits in the proposed NHTSA regulations, while no adjustments have 

been made to account the lack of unlimited credit trading and one-time carry forward in the 

proposed NHTSA regulations. The result of this difference in flexibility is a difference in 

.stringency between the programs. Granted, the one-time carry forward is a temporary flexibility 

that has no impact beyond 2021 model year, so the long-term effect of this difference is less 

material. However, the difference in credit trading and transferring is a significant and long-term 

(fixed) difference that substantively affects stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

pp.5-6]

We request that the agencies further evaluate this potential stringency gap and take measures to 

address this gap, either through increased flexibility in the NHTSA program or by adjusting the 

NHTSA curves to account for the difference in stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.6]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(a) Overall Stringency & Technical Feasibility 

In the proposed rule, EPA presents standards yielding a projected fleetwide greenhouse gas 

average of 163 g/mi in model year 2025. NHTSA is proposing a harmonized CAFE standard 

yielding a projected fleet average of 40.9 mpg in MY2021 and 49.6 mpg in MY2025 – due to its 

statutory limitations requiring rulemakings no longer than five model years. While the proposed 
EPA Response to Comments

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standards represent significant progress, the technology exists to establish even more stringent 

standards consistent with the agencies’ statutory obligations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-

A2, p. 5]

The agencies’ original TAR laid out four scenarios ranging from a 3-6% annual reduction in 

greenhouse gas emissions. As stated in our original comments to the NOI, the data continue to 

support a 6% annual reduction (143 g/mi in MY2025) as technically feasible and increasing the 

net societal benefits as demonstrated by our joint technical analysis with the Natural Resources 

Defense Council that has already been submitted to the docket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 5]

Current market conditions reflect that more stringent standards are achievable. According to 

UCS analysis, 39 models sold today – including conventional, hybrid, and advanced technology 

– are already sold in a version that meets their MY2017 proposed targets. Of these models, 

nearly two dozen meet the target for MY2020.26 An analysis in the Draft Joint Regulatory 

Impact Analysis confirms these findings, and identifies another 33 nameplates sold today that 

nearly meet their MY2017 targets, missing them by five percent or less.27 These data, as well as 

the agencies’ data on technology potential, indicate that higher stringencies should be set –

particularly in the light-truck fleet, where the proposed annual rate of improvement is 

exceedingly weak for large footprint models. We provide further detail regarding our concerns 

on the light truck standards in Section II(b) below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, pp. 6-

7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 215.]

UCS urges the agencies to finalize strong vehicle standards with the attention paid to susceptible 

provisions in the proposal that if exploited by auto makers would reduce the programs 

anticipated benefits.

19 Union of Concerned Scientists. Comments Concerning EPA’s and NHTSA's Notice of Intent 

to Conduct a Joint Rulemaking, 2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions 

and CAFE Standards. November 3, 2010. p. 4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 5]

26 http://blog.ucsusa.org/the-future-is-now-39-models-meet-tomorrow%e2%80%99s-fueleconomy-requirements-today

27 Draft Joint Regulatory Analysis, Table 3.12-1

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The UAW believes strongly that the proposed regulations are sensible, achievable and needed. 

They are good for the auto industry and its workers, good for the broader economy, good for the 

environment and good for our national security. Adopting the proposed rules will give an 
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additional boost to the ongoing revitalization of the auto industry, and for those reasons we 

recommend adoption of these proposals in the final rules. Thank you for considering the views of 

the UAW on these important issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.8]

Organization: Van Coppenolle, J. and L.

The need for stringent vehicle performance standards is critical. Vehicles are a major cause of 

poor air quality and adverse climate conditions, and the larger the vehicle, the greater the effect. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-A1, p. 1]

1) The higher standards do not apply to all vehicles across the board, allowing automakers a 

potential loophole if they decide to reclassify cars as SUVs, pick up trucks, etc., which have 

lower proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-A1, p. 1]

2) The new standards take effect only in 2017, though automakers are fully capable of 

implementing them far sooner than that. The effective date should be moved forward, to 2015 at 

the very latest. Please do not allow automakers to deceive you into believing they cannot meet an 

earlier deadline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-A1, p. 1]

Please revise the standards so that the highest ones apply to all vehicles and they take effect 

within the next three years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen provided a framework of what we believe to be an achievable and balanced 

regulatory program aimed at advancing environmental and energy objectives while maintaining 

market feasibility and customer acceptance. In general Volkswagen put forward a concept for a 

regulation with equitable CO2 reductions amongst all segments and sizes of vehicles. We 

combined this with broad incentives targeted at advancing interest by consumers into more 

efficient, lower emitting vehicles. We further proposed incentives to promote use of bio-based 

fuels which would help drive low emitting technology into vehicles while also advancing the 

goals of the US Renewable Fuels Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, letter p. 2]

Volkswagen remains predominantly a passenger cars manufacturer. We believe that cars offering 

a balanced mix of premium features, advanced safety, and invigorating dynamics can deliver a 

first order reduction in CO2 emissions versus other common choices made for daily consumer 

use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, letter p. 2]

The SNOI and subsequent NPRM outline an aggressive advancement of CO2 emission targets. 

However Volkswagen disagrees with details of the framework, primarily the imbalanced 

distribution of burden and the inclusion of targeted, segment and technology specific incentives. 

As such, we were not in a position to endorse the proposal as did many of our industry 

counterparts. Instead, Volkswagen will offer within these comments a suite of proposals aimed at 

improving the overall balance of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, letter p. 2]
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Volkswagen markets a broad range of fuel efficient passenger cars and light trucks in the US. 

We understand the importance of increasing fuel economy with standards that are:

- Aimed at reaching aggressive environmental targets

- Achievable with an assortment of conventional and advanced technology

- Flexible and feature a broad package of flexibility

- Most importantly, affordable for consumers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 3]

We are committed to continually offering fuel efficient vehicles, such as the new mid-size, clean 

diesel Passat TDI, available to the U.S. market.

- Built in our new LEED Platinum Certified factory in Chattanooga, TN

- Passat TDI achieves 43 mpg highway and can travel almost 800 miles on a single tank of fuel

- Volkswagen anticipates that over 30% of our customers will select the fuel-saving TDI Passat 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 3]

In addition, Volkswagen continues to develop vehicles featuring a broad array of fuel saving 

technologies. It is our overall goal to offer a competitive suite of market viable technologies for 

our customers to choose from. We recognize that a full range of affordable technologies and 

vehicles will be needed to fit the diverse needs of our customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 3]

Volkswagen actively engaged with the agencies at a technical level to provide estimates of future 

emissions reduction and fuel economy technology. During this time, Volkswagen outlined a 

series of key principles to help define a balanced regulatory program for 2017+. However, 

following our review of the 2010 Supplemental Notice of Intent (SNOI) and subsequently the 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Volkswagen was concerned that the proposed 

regulation contained elements which would eventually produce an unbalanced, inequitable 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC believes that the current classification framework, the footprint attribute, and the footprint 

cut-points are reasonable and should be retained. Moreover, any changes to these fundamental 

elements of the program could have a major impact on the stringency of the standards 

themselves, and would require extensive reevaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 

12]

Response:
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The majority of comments received on the topic of the stringency of the standards were 

supportive, with many commenters noting that the standards are challenging but achievable, and 

will result in significant reductions in GHG emissions and significant fuel savings. Comments 

on the topic were also received requesting modifications to the stringency of the proposed 

standards, either increasing or decreasing the year-to-year reduction in target emissions, and 

either increasing or decreasing the lead time provided for manufacturers to adopt new 

technologies. A detailed description of the selection of the curve shapes, stringency, and 

alternatives considered are provided in sections II.C, III.B.2, and III.D.6 of the preamble, and 

section 2.5.3 of the joint TSD. These sections contain detailed responses to most of the 

comments received on the topic of stringency and curve shape, while a summary of these 

responses, along with additional information, is provided below. 

Response to comments that standards should be more or less stringent

EPA considered standards that were less stringent and more stringent than those adopted. 

The analysis of technology penetration rates and costs of these alternative standards is described 

in section III.D.6 of the preamble. EPA believes the final standards are preferable to the more 

stringent alternatives based on considerations of cost – both to manufacturers and consumers –

and the potential for exceeding feasible penetration rates with sufficient lead-time for advanced 

technologies, especially given the unknown degree of consumer acceptance of both the increased 

costs and of the technologies themselves. EPA’s analysis of more stringent alternatives as set 

out in section III.D.6 of the preamble, which encompass the alternatives suggested by 

commenters, supports these conclusions. At the same time, EPA believes the final standards are 

preferable to the less stringent alternatives EPA examined, given that the final standards provide 

significant reductions in GHG emissions and save consumers significant fuel – and thereby, 

money – that far exceed the costs. These benefits would be foregone with less stringent 

standards. 

ACEEE stated that the alternative standards demanding higher penetration rates of 

advanced technologies are preferable because “[t]hese alternatives adhere to technology 

penetration rates that fall within the caps set by EPA to ensure feasibility.” EPA agrees with the 

observation, but disagrees that this (by itself) is a justification for increasing the stringency of the 

standards. This is because EPA believes that ACEEE has misinterpreted the purpose of the 

technology caps, which are discussed in detail in chapter 3.4.2 of the joint TSD and section 

III.D.6 of the preamble. As a modeling tool, EPA imposes upper limits on the penetration rates 

allowed under our modeling. These maximum penetration rates are intended to account for the 

physical limits of technical capability in light of conditions such as supplier capacity, up-front 

investment capital requirements, manufacturability, and other factors. While they may reflect 

technical judgments about technology feasibility and availability, consumer acceptance, lead 

time, and other factors, these caps are not meant to imply that rates below that cap are a priori

practical or reasonable. That so many manufacturers are pushing up against those limits for the 

alternative standard advocated by the commenter raises legitimate issues of not only lead time 

and cost, but consumer acceptance as well. 

ACEEE further commented that EPA did not take into account the various proposed 

flexibilities, such as credits for plug-in vehicles and hybrid credits for large pickups. EPA has 
EPA Response to Comments

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certainly considered carefully the role of incentives and flexibilities for advanced technologies 

versus adopting standards predicated on wide-scale use of those technologies. We explained in 

sections III.C.3 and III.D.6 of the preamble that there is a legitimate policy decision to be made 

regarding whether to potentially jeopardize much of the rule’s benefits due to lack of consumer 

acceptance of trucks with advanced technologies (for example due to cost, or discomfort with 

power train electrification on hauling vehicles). EPA has reasonably chosen instead to adopt 

aggressive standards which nonetheless do not force such technologies’ use as sharply but rather 

promote penetration of these technologies by means of incentives and flexibilities. We note the 

comments of the U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Engines, among others, which documented 

the low rates of penetration of hybridization in large footprint trucks in the current fleet as 

evidence of a lack of consumer demand for these technologies. We note further that we have 

incorporated the credits for use of hybrid technologies on pickup trucks into the OMEGA 

modeling (see preamble section III.D.5). Our analysis shows that on a fleet-wide basis, the 

impact of these pickup truck flexibilities in 2025 is small, as shown in Table III.2 of the 

preamble. Therefore, EPA believes it is reasonable to rely on incentives, rather than rely 

exclusively on potentially overly-aggressive standards, to obtain market penetration of these 

potentially game-changing technologies. 

Some commenters (CBD, J. Capozzelli, Mass Campaign) expressed concern that the 

standards will not result in an overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over the rulemaking 

timeframe. However, CBD’s observation that "[t]he alternative the Agencies prefer would 

continue to increase greenhouse gas emissions through 2025" is incorrect. EPA believes that the 

commenters incorrectly read Table 5.4.1-2-B of the DEIS, which shows that even when future 

projected VMT growth is accounted for, net greenhouse gas emissions from light-duty vehicles 

are reduced under the preferred alternative through 2040. As shown in Table III-60 in the 

preamble, without these standards, overall emissions from light-duty vehicles in the U.S. would 

increase from 1,100 MMTCO2 eq. per year in 2010 to 1,600 in 2050. In the analysis conducted 

for this rule, total light-duty vehicle emissions in 2050 are calculated to be reduced by 569

MMTOCO2 eq. per year, as shown in Table III-61. This will result in total light-duty vehicle 

emissions of 1,031 MMTCO2 eq. per year in 2050 – a reduction from the 2010 level. 

CBD, a mass comment campaign, and several individuals commented that these 

standards are not as stringent as certain other standards internationally, specifically those in the 

European Union, Japan, and China. EPA notes that the standards in this rule are not directly 

comparable to foreign fuel economy or emissions standards because 1) the standards are based 

on a footprint attribute whereas foreign standards are based on other attributes, 2) the 

measurement test cycles are different than foreign standards, and 3) the composition of each 

country's vehicle fleet reflects the unique consumer preferences and vehicle usage patterns of 

that country. Regarding the last point, as a result of differences in consumer preference and 

vehicle usage, the fleet make-up in other nations is quite different than that of the United States. 

These regions cited by the commenters have a large fraction of small vehicles (with lower 

average weight, and footprint size) when compared to vehicles in the U.S. Also the U.S. has a 

much greater fraction of light-duty trucks. When looked at from a technology-basis, with the 

exception of the existing large penetration of diesels and manual transmissions in the European 

fleet – there is no unique technology in the European and Japanese markets which leads to lower 

fleet-wide CO2 emissions. The commenters have not provided any detailed analysis of what 
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technologies are available in these regions which EPA is not considering – and indeed, there are 

no such “magic” technologies. The vast majority of the differences between the current and 

future CO2 performance of the Japanese and European light-duty vehicle fleets are due to 

differences in the size and current composition of the vehicle fleets in those two regions – not 

because EPA has ignored technologies which are available for application to the U.S. market 

during the rulemaking time frame.

CBD commented that more stringent standards are possible, stating “it is clear that 69 

mpg by 2025 is technically feasible 14 years from now. Indeed, it is beyond question that a fleetwide average of 62 mpg (representing approximately a 6% annual increase) can be achieved 

based mostly on existing, off-the-shelf technologies ...”. CBD went on to advocate that the 

agencies adopt the most stringent alternative from the DEIS, which would require a 7 percent 

annual increase for the car and truck fleets. UCS proposed more stringent standards of 6 percent 

for cars and trucks, while NESCAUM proposed higher stringency for the car standard only, 

stating that they believe “a 6 percent rate for passenger cars is technically feasible and 

economically practicable”. In support of its position, CBD cited as evidence two of the most 

efficient vehicles currently available (the Toyota Prius and the Nissan Leaf). EPA agrees that 

technologies are currently available that will enable significant reductions in fuel use and 

emissions under this rule. However, EPA does not agree, as the commenter suggests, that 

feasible improvements in smaller footprint cars are representative of gains that can be achieved 

in a cost-effective manner by all vehicles, noting that this rule promulgates standards for 

manufacturers’ fleets which consist of a wide range of vehicles and footprints. 

In the analysis conducted for this rule, among the alternatives considered were 

Alternatives 2 and 4, both of which have higher stringencies than the standards being finalized 

by this rule. While EPA believes that the technology penetration required for these more 

stringent alternatives are, in the narrow sense, technically achievable, they were not selected. 

EPA explains in detail in sections III.D.6 and 7 of the preamble to the final rule that our analyses 

have shown that increasing the stringency beyond the promulgated levels would add significant 

cost with diminishing additional benefit, and for light trucks, potentially leading to overly 

aggressive penetration rates of certain advanced technologies, raising issues of lead time, costs, 

and consumer acceptance, as well as creating incentives to comply by reducing vehicle utility. 

As explained in section III.D.6.d of the preamble, the more stringent alternatives we considered 

would affect penetration rates of MHEVs, HEVs, EVs, and PHEVs, especially in MY2025. 

Alternative 4, which would require a similar increase in car stringency to the NESCAUM’s 

proposed 6 percent, would lead to penetration rates of 7 percent for PHEVs and EVs, and much 

higher penetration (up to 45 percent) for some individual manufacturers, as shown in Table III54 of the preamble. The UCS and CBD proposals for 6 and 7 percent increases, respectively, for 

both cars and trucks would be more stringent than both Alternatives 2 and 4 considered by the 

EPA, with correspondingly higher penetration of PHEVs and EVs. These increases in 

technology penetration rates raise serious concerns about the ability and likelihood 

manufacturers can smoothly implement the increased technology penetration in a fleet that has 

so far seen limited usage of these technologies. While this is more pronounced for 2025, lead 

time issues would also exist for MY 2021 and earlier years. As such, EPA has not made changes 
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to increase or decrease the overall stringency across the car and truck fleets from the levels of the 

proposal, as advocated by these commenters. 

CBD also expressed concern that agencies have “selected standards that value purported 

consumer choice and the continued production of every vehicle in its current form over the need 

to conserve energy: as soon as increased fuel efficiency begins to affect any attribute of any 

existing vehicle, stringency increases cease.” EPA disagrees with this comment. It is important 

to note that the standards do not apply to individual vehicles, so that manufacturers can produce, 

and consumers can purchase, vehicles with attributes that differ from those of existing vehicles. 

Furthermore, in evaluating the costs of the rule, the agencies have included costs to preserve 

vehicle utility (see EPA RIA 1-40) but have not “ceased ... increases in stringency” in the face 

of those costs. Indeed, were the commenter correct, the standards for cars and trucks would not 

increase in stringency at all, much less in each model year. Furthermore, EPA acknowledges 

that multiple pathways exist for manufacturers to come into compliance. One way is through the 

reduction of some vehicle attribute. That attribute may be content, acceleration performance, 

hauling, towing, all wheel drive, NVH, ride height, etc. However, EPA has not captured these 

options in the analysis as we are showing compliance choosing pathways through the addition of 

technology that maintain these consumer desirable attribute(s). A more detailed response to 

CBD’s comment is provided in the introductory portion of section III.D of the preamble.

Several commenters referred to an “SUV loophole” in expressing their concern that these 

standards will encourage the production of more trucks, thereby diminishing the benefits of the 

rule (CBD, J. Capozzelli, J. and L. Van Coppenolle). EPA disagrees with these comments. As 

discussed in section III.D.6 of the preamble and section 2.2.2 of this document, EPA believes the 

car and truck curves appropriately reflect the differences in cost between the car and truck fleets 

for adding efficiency technologies. Moreover, intentional “gaming”, whereby a manufacturer 

modifies a design so that a car can be reclassified as a truck, comes at significant cost to the 

manufacture, with added production and component costs, and to the consumer in the form of 

reduced fuel savings and a higher purchase price. Therefore, EPA does not agree that 

manufacturers will shift production to trucks as a result of this rule.

EPA recognizes that a challenge faced by manufacturers of luxury vehicles will likely be 

higher compliance costs than other manufacturers. BMW commented that the “significant 

penetration of these advanced conventional technologies in our existing fleet will make it even 

more challenging for BMW to achieve compliance.” However, compliance challenges should 

not be interpreted to mean that the standard is unreasonable or infeasible. Furthermore, EPA 

recognizes that each manufacturer’s unique combination of vehicle types, sizes, and previously 

adopted technologies may result in variation among manufacturers in the technologies available 

for achieving compliance and their associated costs. EPA notes that some of this variation is the 

result of product decisions made by the manufacturers to offer consumers additional vehicle 

features and enhanced attributes, such as higher engine power. Some of the variation also 

reflects that these manufacturers for years paid fines (or civil penalties) in lieu of compliance 

with CAFE standards and now have further improvements to make to attain the same level of 

control as other manufacturers. See 75 FR at 25414. In the analysis conducted for this rule, and 

described in section III.D.6 and 8 of the preamble and chapter 3.4.1 of the RIA, we considered 

that manufacturers have already adopted, to varying degrees, some of the advanced technologies 
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that will enable emissions reductions, and demonstrate that a feasible compliance path exists for 

all manufacturers. 

ECM commented that “achieving carbon neutrality through tailpipe emission standards is 

not within the realm of possibility”. EPA notes that the objective of this rule is not to achieve 

“carbon neutrality”, but rather to reduce GHG emissions through technology-based standards, 

while considering issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time, as discussed in 

section I.A.1.b of the preamble. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322

(D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012) slip op. p. 43 (in setting section 202 (a) standards, EPA is not required 

to adopt standards that mitigate a specific quantum of the endangerment caused or contributed to 

by vehicular GHG emissions). Nevertheless, in the context of the standards in this rule, ECM’s 

observations about some of the obstacles to the development of low-carbon technologies for 

electricity generation are still relevant. However, the availability of these electricity generation 

technologies will not have a major impact on a manufacturer’s ability to comply with the 

standard. EPA’s Integrated Planning Model (IPM) predicts that only a small fraction of the 

incremental electricity generation will come from renewable sources in 2030, as described in 

section III.C.2.c.vi. Furthermore, EPA’s analysis shows that manufacturers will be able to 

achieve compliance with relatively modest penetrations of PHEV and EV technologies. At the 

same time, EPA recognizes that the accelerated development of low-carbon electricity sources 

will result in emissions reductions beyond what are projected by the analysis for this rule. 

EPA does not agree with the comments that the proposed targets cannot be achieved 

primarily through improvements in gasoline ICE technologies (Frank Houston Smith) or that 

MY 2012 fuel economy and purchase price data show that “the proposed targets cannot be 

achieved at the costs assumed by the Agency or with conventional technology” (ECM). As 

described in section III.D.8 of the preamble, a significant number of MY 2012 vehicles achieve 

or surpass targets for MYs 2017-2022. The compliance pathways for each manufacturer set 

forth in section III.D.6 of the preamble likewise are predicated largely on improvements to 

internal combustion engines, indicating that ‘conventional technology’ compliance pathways are 

not only feasible, but expected. Additionally, further advancements in technology are likely that 

will enable more manufactures to adopt technologies that currently exist, but are not yet 

implemented in full production, for compliance in the latter years of the rulemaking. For this 

reason, EPA does not agree with ECM’s conclusion that, as evidenced by the low number of 

MY2012 vehicles that comply with MY2025 standards, the standards are not achievable using 

conventional technologies. In the latter years of the rule making, vehicle designs will certainly 

be different from those of today, and manufacturers are expected to adopt additional technologies 

as a result of this rule – indeed that is the primary mechanism of a technology-based standard. 

We also disagree with ECM’s statement that compliance will require a “penetration rate 

of over 70% hybrid electric vehicle and 3% electric vehicles”. According to our technology 

penetration analysis, HEVs, PHEVs, and EVs will comprise only 7 percent of the fleet in 

MY2025, while diesel engines will comprise less than 1 percent, as shown in Table III-52 of the 

preamble and Table 3-25 of EPA’s RIA. Finally, we do not believe that most of major vehicle 

manufacturers would support the standards if basic feasibility was at issue. See, e.g. Comments 
EPA Response to Comments

2-50

of the Alliance quoted above (“Given that many of our member companies support the standards 

as proposed....”).

ECM also argued that the agencies underestimated the costs of the rule, and provided 

their own calculations for payback periods for selected hybrid and diesel vehicles. As noted 

above, our technology penetration analysis concludes that compliance for these standards can be 

achieved primarily through the adoption of technologies applied to internal combustion engines, 

such as turbo downsizing. In cases where more advanced technologies are applied, we do not 

believe the MSRP values used by the commenter in these calculations accurately represent the 

actual costs that will be paid by consumers, now or in the future. For example, while the 

commenter assumes a cost of $7000 for hybrid technology, EPA reasonably has estimated a cost 

of $2,861 for a midsize car in MY2025 (in 2010 dollars, see Table III-23). This basis for this 

estimate is set out in detail in joint TSD section 3. 3.3.6. Furthermore, as discussed in section 

III.H.5 of the preamble, although payback analysis in this rule considers the average number of 

vehicle miles traveled per year, in reality, drivers who travel more than average will incur fuelrelated savings more quickly, and therefore, the payback will come sooner. For these reasons, 

EPA does not agree with the commenter’s assertion that a long payback period for efficiency 

technologies for some drivers will present an obstacle to their adoption. 

Several private citizens commented that the standards are too stringent, while the 

environmental and regional planning organizations mentioned above and private citizens 

requested that the NPRM stringency be increased. As stated earlier, EPA believes that the final 

standards will result in significant reductions in GHG emissions and fuel savings at a reasonable 

cost, and are preferable to the more stringent alternative standards EPA considered (which bound 

the ranges of more stringent standards requested by commenters), taking into account costs, 

manufacturer lead time, product development cycles, and consumer acceptance. See Preamble 

sections III.D.6 and 7 for more details.

Response to comments that lead time is too long or too short

EPA’s analysis of the technologies that will enable manufacturers to achieve the 

emissions reductions required by this rule includes technologies that are either currently 

commercially available, or (for a few technologies) projected to be commercially available 

during the rulemaking timeframe. EPA agrees with comments expressing support for the lead 

time and period covered by this rule (ACC, CFA, Ecology Center, Ferrari, Hyundai), and those 

commenters who noted that the rule provides a reasonable amount of time for manufacturers to 

plan for and implement technologies for reducing emissions (CFA, Consumers Union, Ecology 

Center).

A number of commenters noted that the long lead time and number model years covered 

by this rule will provide a level of certainty that will allow manufacturers to plan and adjust

future product. While EPA agrees with these commenters, we also recognize the difficulty of 
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forecasting consumer preferences into the future (Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Chrysler, NADA1

), and the 

greater uncertainty in the assumptions used for future production planning and investment (Ford, 

Global Automakers) that arise from the longer lead time covered by the rules. The mid-term 

evaluation is planned as the chief mechanism to address uncertainties like those noted by the 

commenters, and at that time, EPA will evaluate the assumptions upon which the rules are based. 

Mercedes-Benz proposed an alternative compliance pathway, which would reduce the 

emissions target levels in early years of the rule, and make up most or all of the reductions in 

later years. EPA agrees that flexibility is an integral part of the standard setting in order to help 

manufacturers phase-in technologies given their typical redesign schedules. In this rule, these 

flexibilities are provided, in part, through the Averaging, Banking, and Trading Provisions 

(ABT) described in detail in section III.B.4 of the preamble. These ABT provisions achieve the 

aim of the commenter, which is to provide additional lead time as necessary without reducing the 

GHG emissions reductions and fuel savings benefits of the rule. For example, ABT provides 

three year credit carry-back provisions which allow a manufacturer to run a deficit and cover that 

deficit with future credits (i.e., carry back credits to a previous year). This is conceptually very 

similar to the alternative pathway approach suggested by the commenter. Therefore EPA, 

believes that additional flexibilities are not justified. 

Porsche, Jaguar Land Rover, and Suzuki raised concerns about feasibility and adequate 

lead time for intermediate volume, limited line manufacturers. As discussed in section III.B.6, 

EPA is providing intermediate volume manufacturers with additional lead time to meet the 

principal standards in response to these comments.

Response to other comments on stringency

RVIA suggested that the agencies “closely examine whether they have appropriately 

considered future light vehicle towing trends in setting standards...”. EPA agrees with the 

commenter that towing is an important attribute for many consumers, and notes the technology 

penetration and cost analyses for this rule were all conducted with the underlying requirement 

that vehicle utility be maintained. EPA believes that there is no contradiction between the 

adoption of certain efficiency technologies to reduce GHG emissions, and the preservation of 

other vehicle attributes, such as towing capability. For example, turbo-downsizing can be 

adopted without reducing performance, as evidenced by the MY2012 Ford F150, for which the 

optional 3.5L EcoBoost® V6 has a higher maximum towing capacity than the 5.0L V8. 

EPA appreciates the work done by the faculty and students of MIT, and their 

probabilistic analysis of the impact of uncertainty on projecting fuel use and GHG emissions. 

We recognize the importance of considering uncertainty, and for that reason conduct sensitivity 

analyses, which is described in chapters 3.11, 4.5, and 8.1 of the EPA RIA.

 1 NADA cited the 2007/2010 heavy-duty emissions rule as an example of how setting standards with a long-lead 

time can cause difficulty in estimating costs. A detailed response to this comment is provided in chapter 18.2 of this 

document.
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EPA agrees with the suggestion of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers to 

“examine [the] approach to adjusting the curves for year-over-year stringency.” As discussed in 

sections II.C.4 and III.D.7 of the preamble, we plan to review the estimation and selection of the 

target curves during the mid-term evaluation. We also plan on reviewing the fleet data as it 

becomes available: this includes footprint distribution, technology content, safety, changes in 

attributes (such as acceleration performance), credit balances etc. to determine what strategies 

manufacturers are employing to come into compliance with the standards. 

2.2.2. Car and Light Truck Footprint Curve Shapes and Level of the Standards

Organizations Included in this Section

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Anonymous Public Citizen 1

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Capozzelli, J.

Center for Biological Diversity

Chrysler Group LLC

Consumers Union

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) (Unknown Organization)

Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Nissan North America, Inc.

RVIA

Salinas, A.

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Smith, Frank Houston

South Coast AQMD

Toyota Motor North America

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Weiner, L.

Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S.

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
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We do have concerns regarding the structure of the proposed rule, especially its lenient treatment 

of large light trucks in the early years and the resulting increase in the slope of the light truck 

target curves. Below we provide comments and recommendations on these issues, among others. 

While we take issue with a few aspects of the analysis, on the whole the process and the analysis 

were thorough, transparent, and well documented. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.1]

The concluding argument regarding the superiority of the proposed standard (NPRM p.75084) is 

not compelling, and Table III-53 begs the question of how the compliance cost differential 

between cars and trucks in 2017-2020 can be justified. This concern would presumably be 

amplified by further disaggregation, showing that in fact incremental costs for large trucks are 

negligible in those years. The proposal appears to favor (in the near term) manufacturers with 

disproportionate production of large trucks during those years. EPA should show compliance 

costs by manufacturer, not just for 2021 and 2025, but for all years. The small improvements 

required of large trucks in 2017-2020, followed by a larger improvement in 2021 is of particular 

concern given the agencies’ plan to conduct a midterm evaluation. This situation raises the 

possibility that the more significant improvements proposed for large trucks in the period 2021-

2025 will never be realized, because manufacturers may allow technology development for these 

vehicles to stagnate in the early years of the rule and use this to influence the outcome of the 

midterm evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.8]Shape of the Light Truck Target 

Curves

An issue of particular concern in the proposal is the lenient treatment of large light trucks. In 

2017-2020, emissions reductions required of the heaviest light trucks are small. This reflects the 

agencies’ recognition of “manufacturers’ technical concerns regarding their abilities to comply 

with a similarly shallow curve after MY2016 given the anticipated mix of light trucks in MYs 

2017–2025.” We have not, however, been able to find a clear technical explanation of the 

justification for these concerns, or of the approach taken, in the proposed rule or in related 

documents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.3]

The agencies refer to the possibility of compromising load-carrying and towing capability of 

full-size pickups (NPRM p.74915), but neither evidence nor quantification of such a problem is 

provided. Similarly, section 2.4.2.2 of the TSD discusses the decision to increase the slope of the 

light truck curve at length, yet the justification remains unclear. The agencies’ methodologies for 

generating the curves and for simulating manufacturers’ compliance strategies are quite capable 

of taking into account any such constraints to the extent that they actually exist. The agencies do 

explain that the aggregation of models in some cases results in treating non-towing vehicles as 

towing vehicles, and vice versa; but this appears to apply mostly to smaller vehicles, and 

certainly not to the large pickups that have prompted the agencies to increase the slopes of the 

target curves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.3]

The agencies also state: “Flatter standards (i.e., curves) increase the risk that both the weight and 

size of vehicles will be reduced, compromising highway safety” (NPRM p.74915). What the 

agencies have proposed, however, is to increase the slope of the truck curve, relative to what it 

would have been using the curve-fitting approach used for MY2012-2016. We do not believe, 
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and presumably the agencies do not believe, that the curves in the rule now in place are 

dangerously flat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.3]

Technical basis for curve / rate of improvement

The approach to selecting the target curves in the current proposal deviates from the approach 

used for the 2012-2016 rule in several respects that substantially alter the relative stringencies of 

small truck and large truck standards. The most significant change is that the agencies have 

adjusted the technology-corrected data points for “density”, i.e., weight-to-footprint ratio. This 

results in a steeper slope for the light truck curve, because pickup trucks, and in particular the 

large pickups that dominate the high end of the footprint spectrum, have low densities due to 

their flat beds (TSD p.2-17). Adjusting the data to reflect this means that large pickup data points 

are pushed up vertically on a footprint vs. emissions/consumption curve to reflect the higher 

weight (and hence higher fuel consumption) that would be expected based on the footprints of 

those trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.3]

The rationale offered for this adjustment is as follows: “The agencies agree with manufacturers 

of full-size pick-up trucks that in order to maintain towing and hauling utility, the engines on 

pick-up trucks must be more powerful, than their low ‘density’ nature would statistically suggest 

based on the agencies’ current MY2008-based market forecast and the agencies’ current 

estimates of the effectiveness of different fuel-saving technologies” (TSD 2043). This suggests 

that the reference fleet, after all available gasoline technologies have been added, is incorrect and 

shows unrealistically low pickup truck fuel consumption, due to the overstatement of the benefits 

of certain technologies. If that is the case, the agencies should revisit the adjustments made to 

generate the reference fleet and remove technologies from pickups that are not suited to those 

trucks. This would be a far more satisfactory approach than the speculative and non-quantitative 

approach of adjusting for vehicle density. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, pp.3-4]

Indeed, it is important to note that the fuel consumption trend that the density adjustment is 

meant to correct appears in the unadjusted fleet as well as the technology-adjusted fleet of light 

trucks (TSD Figures 2-1 and 2-2). That is, the flattening of fuel consumption at higher footprints 

is not a byproduct of unrealistic technology adjustments, but rather a reflection of actual fuel 

economy trends in today’s market. That being the case, adjusting fuel consumption of “lowdensity” trucks upwards before fitting the curve simply does not make sense. It is also puzzling 

that the agencies’ analysis shows that trucks’ HP-to-weight ratio increases only slightly with 

footprint (TSD p.2-17), yet “pick-up trucks must be more powerful, than their low ‘density’ 

nature would statistically suggest.” If pick-up trucks have high horsepower and low weight, their 

HP-to-weight ratios should be especially high. An explanation of this apparent contradiction 

would be helpful. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.4]

The agencies explored a similar adjustment to the curve to reflect increasing HP-to-weight ratios, 

but did not adopt it. This adjustment is effectively the approach used to develop weight-based 

CO2 targets in the EU and results in flatter curves (Mock 2011). In the EU, the adjustment was 

made to ensure that the standards do not provide an incentive to increase vehicle weight. In the 

U.S., the agencies’ decision not to apply this correction in the proposed rule yields steeper curves 

than the alternative choice, as does the decision to apply the correction for density. Both help to 
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ensure that the proposed curves will provide an incentive to upsize vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9528-A2, p.4]

After adjusting the data based on density, the agencies fit lines to the adjusted data. This process 

differs from that used for MY2012-2016 rule, in that the data is sales-weighted and the fit uses 

an ordinary least squares (OLS) method instead of minimum absolute deviation (MAD). In that 

case, the agencies were “concerned that the steeper curves resulting from weighted least-squares 

analysis would increase the risk that energy savings and environmental benefits would be lower 

than projected, because the steeper curves would provide a greater incentive to increase sales of 

larger vehicles with lower fuel economy levels” (MY2012-2016 TSD p.2-13). That concern 

remains valid for the current rulemaking. While we agree with the agencies’ position that either 

method of fitting is technically sound, we note that in this NPRM, the agencies have consistently 

made choices that have the effect of increasing the slopes of the light truck curves, namely to 

adjust for density and not to adjust for HP-to-weight ratio, as well as to alter the curve-fitting 

method, as just mentioned. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.4]

Large truck cutpoint

The problems created by increasing the slope of the truck curve are aggravated by the decision to 

move the right-hand cutpoint (i.e., the point at which the curve becomes flat) out to 74 square 

feet, up from 66 square feet in the MY2012-2016 rule. Not only will targets be less stringent for 

large trucks than they should be, but also the target emissions will continue to rise with truck 

footprint well beyond the point at which they flattened out in the MY2012-2016 rule. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.4]

In the MY2012-16 rule, the agencies rejected the requests of auto manufacturers to raise the 

right-hand truck cutpoint from 66 square feet: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.4]

The agencies also disagree with comments by the Alliance and several individual manufacturers 

that the cut-off point for light trucks should be shifted to 72 square feet (from the proposed 66 

square feet) to ease compliance burdens facing manufacturers serving the large pickup market. 

Such a shift would increase the risk that energy and environmental benefits of the standards 

would be compromised by induced increases in the sales of large pickups, in situations where the 

increased compliance burden is feasible and appropriate. Also, the agencies‘ market forecast 

suggests that most of the light trucks models with footprints larger than 66 square feet have curb 

weights near or above 5,000 pounds. This suggests, in turn, that in terms of highway safety, there 

is little or no need to discourage downsizing of light trucks with footprints larger than 66 square 

feet. Based on these energy, environmental, technological feasibility, economic practicability, 

and safety considerations, the agencies conclude that the light truck curve should be cut off at 66 

square feet, as proposed, rather than at 72 square feet. (2012-2016 Final Rule p.25363) [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, pp.4-5]

Yet this time, the discussion of policy considerations in developing the target curves includes the 

following: “If cutpoints are adopted, given the same industry-wide average required fuel 

economy, moving large-vehicle cutpoints to the right (i.e., down in terms of fuel economy, up in 
EPA Response to Comments

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terms of CO2 emissions) better accommodates the unique design requirements of larger 

vehicles—especially large pickups—and extends the size range over which downsizing is 

discouraged.” (NPRM p.74915). While the agencies note that they had previously 

“underestimate[d] the impact of the different pickup truck model configurations above 66 square 

feet on manufacturers’ fleet average fuel economy and CO2 levels” (NPRM p.74919), this is 

unrelated to the sound reasons they had previously offered for keeping the cutpoint at 66 feet. In 

particular, they previously noted that there is no safety-related reason to discourage downsizing 

of these large trucks. Indeed, given that vehicle compatibility is a major determinant of the 

severity of two-vehicle crashes, reducing the size and weight differential across the vehicle fleet 

should be a priority to improve highway safety. Thus, for environmental, energy, and safety 

reasons, the final rule should restore the 66 square foot cutoff for MY 2017-2025. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.5]

Potential consequences of lenient standards for large light trucks

The agencies seek comment on whether their adjustments to the slope of the target curves “may 

encourage changes other than encouraging the application of technology to improve fuel 

economy and reduce CO2 emissions” (TSD 2-27). The weakness of the standards at the large 

footprint end of the light truck spectrum not only will result in a direct loss in GHG reductions 

relative to what would have been saved with a uniform five percent annual emissions reduction 

across all classes, but also runs the risk of pushing production towards that larger end. Such a 

shift raises safety concerns as well. This concern applies across all large light trucks, including 

SUVs, even though difficulty in reducing emissions at a higher rate was alleged for large pickups 

only. According to agency projections (NOI TAR Appendix), pickups will account for only onequarter of large truck sales in MY 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.5]

A recent analysis appearing in the journal Energy Policy concludes that the curves defining fuel 

economy standards for MY2011-2016 already create an incentive for upsizing, and as a result it 

will likely increase vehicle emissions by 5-15 percent (Whitefoot and Skerlos 2011). This 

analysis found that, assuming “consumer preferences for vehicle size, fuel efficiency, and 

acceleration performance are all at their midpoints,” the slope of light truck curve for MY 2014 

would need to be reduced by 1⁄2 to avoid promoting vehicle upsizing. This result suggests that the 

proposed light truck curve for 2025, for example, will provide a strong incentive to upsize and 

will lead to major losses in benefits for the program. In order to avoid this outcome, the curves 

for 2025 and earlier years would need to be much flatter. Figure 1 shows the MY2014 light truck 

target curve and the flatter curve (dotted blue) that the Whitefoot and Skerlos analysis indicates 

would be necessary to avoid upsizing. The red curves represent the proposed MY2025 targets 

and a curve (dotted red) scaled down from the adjusted MY2014 curve, which could reasonably 

be taken to approximate the slope necessary to avoid upsizing in 2025. The difference in slopes 

between the two 2025 curves is very large. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.5] [For 

Figure 1 please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.6]

The integrity of the analytical basis for the standard depends upon a clear and consistent basis for 

the treatment of all vehicles. In the case of large light trucks, we find that i) the deviations from 

the analytical approach previously adopted are not justified with data provided in the NPRM, and 

ii) the resulting ad hoc adjustments to the curve-fitting process detract from the agencies’ 
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argument for their proposals. Thus, in addition to reducing the fuel and GHG savings that the 

rule will bring, the weakening of standards for large light trucks undermines the technical 

foundation for the rule going forward. The treatment of this issue in the NPRM and related 

documents unfortunately gives the impression that the analytical components of the development 

the target curves are subjective and can be used to justify a very wide range of outcomes. 

Introducing this degree of subjectivity to the technical analysis invites unnecessary challenges to 

the standard-setting process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.6]

Regardless of whether the agencies change the truck curve in the final rule, we believe that 

adjusting the analytical approach to yield curves satisfying certain policy considerations is 

inadvisable. It would be preferable to choose the most robust analytical approach, and then to 

make exceptions as needed for a limited period to accommodate those policy considerations, and 

to explain the targets in those terms. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.6]

Inflating the slope of the truck is counterproductive from a policy perspective as well. The 

domestic auto industry owes its strength today in part to its having been induced by the federal 

government to improve fuel economy, which in turn has enabled it to better compete with the 

other manufacturers. These same domestic manufacturers, by demanding lenient treatment for a 

subset of their products, are repeating their earlier mistake and will suffer the consequences in 

the long run of slowing technological improvement of their large light trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9528-A2, p.6]

We strongly support the agencies’ plan to revisit the choice of curve-fitting options in the final 

rule (TSD p.2-44). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.6]

Recommendations

• Do not apply the density adjustment to the reference fleet data before fitting the light 

truck curve. If necessary to ensure that towing and hauling capability is maintained, 

revisit the process of adding technologies to the reference fleet to ensure that only 

technologies consistent with the functional requirements of the vehicle are added. 

• Starting in 2017, apply the same annual percentage reduction to light trucks as to cars. 

Restore the 66 square foot cutoff for MY 2017-2025 (Figure 2, dotted green). 

• If no such changes are possible in the final rule, introduce a provision to ensure the 

standards do not promote upsizing as follows: once sales of light trucks of 66 square feet 

and above in a given year reach MY 2008 sales of pickups 66 square feet and above, the 

upper bound for the light truck targets should be fixed at the 66 square foot target (Figure 

2, dotted purple). This would ensure that automakers do not increase sales volume at this 

end by producing lower cost, inefficient vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, 

pp.6-7] [For Figure 2 please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.7]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Honda is concerned that the relative stringency between small footprint light trucks and large 

footprint light trucks diverge dramatically from one another, and the stringency increases fall 
EPA Response to Comments

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disproportionately on the smaller foot-print light trucks. One example is comparing the Omega 

package 807 and with package 1804. [See table on p. 1 of Docket number [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9489-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 1]

These similar technology packages respectively are applied to a small footprint light truck and a 

large footprint light truck. While the 2021 costs of these two package sets are relatively similar, 

with the cost/1% CO2 reduction and flat costs both slightly higher for the smaller light truck, the 

increased stringency of the standards for these two vehicles are significantly dissimilar. A small 

footprint light truck such as the Honda CR-V (footprint of 44 square feet) has a proposed 

increased stringency of 18%, while a large truck, like a Ford F150 (footprint of 72.8 square feet) 

has a proposed increased in stringency of less than 5%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 

1]

This pattern repeats elsewhere within the light truck category, all showing that the stringency 

increases are falling disproportionately on small light trucks like the Honda CR-V and its 

competitors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 2]

As noted above in #1, above, the stringency for the larger footprint light trucks is very low, 

compared to the smaller footprint light trucks. The combination of the lower stringency and the 

“game changing” credits cannot be justified as a matter of science, in furtherance of social goals 

and objectives or as a matter of simple fairness and equity. Not only are large footprint pick up 

trucks required to do very little (no stringency increase for a number of years), they are overly 

rewarded if they do increase their performance: in other words, required to do nothing, and 

highly rewarded for doing something. [This comment can also be found in section 5.1 of this 

comment summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 119-120.]

EPA and NHTSA propose for the 2017 to 2025 periods to radically alter the light-duty truck 

curves from their '12 to '16 slopes. The agencies have proposed dramatically increased 

stringency for the smaller footprint truck and little or no stringent increases for the larger 

footprint trucks. Honda previously shared data with the agencies indicating that if any change 

were to be made to the curves, it was more appropriate to flatten out the curves or moderate the 

increase in stringency for the smaller footprint trucks and to increase the stringency for the larger 

trucks. In other words, Honda believes that smaller light trucks are being unfairly singled out for 

increases in their standards, especially compared to the larger vehicles. This obvious -- this is 

obviously because the smallest trucks will have an annual increase of around 4 percent while the 

largest truck will have an annual increase of less than 1 percent.

Subsequent to the publication of the NPRM, on December 7th, 2011, the University of Michigan 

issued a study by Whitefoot and Skerlos. Honda agrees with their conclusion. And I'm quoting: 

'In the near term, the analysis suggests that the slope of the function determining fuel economy 

targets based on vehicle footprint should be flattened for both passenger cars and light trucks and 

even further for light trucks.
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Additionally, the agencies' own data show this to be true. Simply looking at the EPA's and 

NHTSA's estimates for the compliance cost differences between passenger cars and trucks, both 

agencies estimate lower compliance costs for trucks than passenger cars, and this is primarily 

due to an imbalance in the light truck slope and a much more stringent burden being placed on 

the lower sales volumes of the smaller light trucks and little to no additional stringency being put 

on the larger light trucks.

EPA and NHTSA believe that full-sized pickup trucks have unique challenges in improving fuel 

economy and GHG emissions due to payload and towing requirements. Honda believes that 

vehicles other than full-size pickup trucks should receive similar consideration in preserving 

their utility. SUVs and minivans, for example, are often fully loaded by families resulting in 

expectations or coming from expectations of 7- or 8-passenger seating capabilities while 

maintaining payload and towing functionality. Similarly situated vehicles ought to be treated the 

same.

Organization: Anonymous Public Citizen 1

Close the loophole for SUVs. This rule will be only very mildly effective without that loophole 

being closed. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0231, p.1]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

A. Lower “cutpoint” of light truck standard curve

We note that the lower “cutpoint” of the truck standards curve is set at the same footprint point 

(41 square feet) as the passenger car standard. In our view, it would be more appropriate to set 

that cutpoint at the same sales point (i.e., representing approximately 10 percent of sales) as the 

passenger car curve. In this way, the same portion of the respective fleets would fall within the 

flat portions of the footprint curves. The same arguments advanced by the agencies in support of 

the selection of the lower cutpoint of the passenger car curve apply as well to trucks (small 

market segment, minimal incentive to downsize, possible disincentives for manufacturers to 

offer small vehicles if the curve continues to slope downward at the low end). See 76 Federal 

Register (FR) 74919. We believe that this change should be made for consistency of 

methodology and that it should have minimal impact on the standards for light trucks. Therefore, 

we recommend that EPA and NHTSA incorporate this change in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Capozzelli, J.

The proposed rules allow light trucks to increase their fuel efficiency at a much slower rate than 

cars. For many years; this problem led automakers to build bigger vehicles so they could take

advantage of these weaker standards, which caused efficiency standards in the United States to

stagnate. We should not make the same mistake twice, and should strengthen the standards for

light trucks on par with cars. We cannot afford to skew the rules in favor of gas-guzzling SUVs. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0221-A1, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

In setting maximum feasible fuel economy standards, Congress instructed NHTSA to prescribe 

separate standards for passenger and non-passenger vehicles based on one or more vehicle 

attributes related to fuel economy and to express each standard in the form of a mathematical 

function.40 In the NPRM, the Agencies set forth separate targets based on vehicle size, or 

footprint. Using a projected make-up of the nationwide fleet, NHTSA estimates the average fuel 

efficiency for passenger cars and light trucks in each model year (MY).41 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9479-A1, p. 8]

[See Table 1 on p. 8 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1] [See Table 2 on p. 

9 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1]

The fleet-wide fuel economy standards actually achieved in any year, however, depend on each 

individual manufacturer’s choice of vehicles and production volume. Once a manufacturer 

determines its models and production volume for a MY, fuel economy standards for that 

manufacturer are determined using the attribute-based formula of the fleet that has been built 

during the year; every manufacturer must meet only the fuel economy standard that correlates to 

its own fleet mix. Because manufacturers control the size and number of the vehicles they 

produce, their choices also control their fuel economy targets, and the aggregate choice of all 

manufacturers determine the actual fleet-wide fuel economy achieved in any one year. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 9]

The proposed standards substantially and improperly favor light trucks, particularly the largest 

and least fuel efficient trucks, and they provide an economically compelling incentive to upsize 

vehicle footprint. Because the NPRM, without a backstop, creates a system that incentivizes 

manufacturers to produce larger, less fuel efficient vehicles, the Agencies’ mileage projections –

especially over a time span of a decade and a half – are likely to be wrong. These errors must be 

corrected in the final rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 9]

1. The proposed increases for light trucks are back-loaded rather than ratable, contravening 

Congressional intent [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 9]

As the tables above demonstrate, the standards the Agencies propose to set for light trucks are 

dramatically less stringent than the standards for passenger cars. While passenger cars’ 

efficiency increases by 4.3% annually, the increase for light trucks is only 2.9%. In addition, the 

light truck standards increase at a significantly slower rate than the passenger car rate.44 

Together, the minimal increases for light trucks for the first four years of the covered period and 

the overall decreased stringency exacerbate the historical “advantage” enjoyed by SUVs and 

pickup trucks, delay gains in fuel efficiency for the overall fleet, and incentivize gamesmanship 

and an ever-increasing SUV loophole. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

Title 49 U.S.C section 32902 requires NHTSA to prescribe “annual fuel economy standard 

increases that increase the applicable average fuel economy standard ratably.” 45 “Ratably” is 

defined as “in a proportional, well-proportioned or proportionate manner.”46 In other words, the 

statute requires not only that fuel efficiency increase every year, but also that it do so 
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proportionally. The legislative history of the provision demonstrates that Congress intended fuel 

economy standards to “make rapid and consistent annual progress.”47 In requiring “ratable” 

increases, Congress sought “relatively consistent proportional increases in fuel economy 

standards each year.”48 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

Flatly contravening Congressional intent, the Agencies have proposed inconsistent, slow, and 

disproportionally small average fuel economy increases for light duty trucks during the first 

years of the covered period. They propose a mere .6 mpg average increase per year from 2017 

through 2020. As further discussed below, this disproportionality is exacerbated by the fact that 

the heaviest “light” trucks are required to increase their fuel efficiency by the least amount. The 

increase then jumps to 2.1 mpg in 2021, a near four-fold increase, and stays in a higher range for 

the remaining rulemaking period – not coincidentally, the period when of time the Agencies 

propose for a de novo rulemaking review, an event that presents another chance for industry to 

convince the Agencies that the higher standards during the latter period of the rulemaking must 

once again be watered down. 49 These proposed average increases are neither rapid and 

proportional when compared to the increases proposed for passenger cars or to the later 

rulemaking period [see Tables 1 and 2] nor consistent given the sudden jump in 2021. The total 

percentage increase for trucks also is not consistent or proportional with the increase for 

passenger cars. Rather, light cars and trucks will be left even further behind passenger vehicles. 

The Agencies’ own interpretation of “ratable” contradicts their proposed treatment of light 

trucks. They interpret “ratable” to mean that “annual increases should not be disproportionately 

large or small in relation to each other.” Yet the Agencies propose minimal annual increases for 

the first part of the rulemaking, followed by a three- to four-fold jump after 2021. Rather than 

being rapid, consistent or proportional, the proposed light truck increases are overwhelmingly 

backloaded into later years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

The effect of allowing minimal efficiency increases early and demanding larger increases later is 

only to delay efficiency gains that could be achieved much sooner, at a much lower price. As we 

have frequently stated (see our comments to the DEIS), because greenhouse gases remain in the 

atmosphere for centuries and their warming effect is delayed for decades, it is essential to 

decrease their emissions as soon as possible; the benefits of avoiding the emission of a ton of 

carbon today by far exceed the benefits of avoiding the release of the same ton of carbon several 

years from now. The Agencies recognize this to some extent as they increase the social cost of 

carbon over time (though insufficiently so). Conversely, remedial efforts get more expensive the 

longer action is delayed. Even setting aside the triggering of catastrophic events by crossing 

tipping points and assuming arguendo that the social cost of carbon grows by no more than the 

Agencies currently assume, it is undoubtedly vastly preferable to remove a given ton of carbon in 

year 1 rather than year 4, when it has wrought that much more damage. From the CAFE 

perspective, something similar can be said: the longer vehicles retain the same, rather than 

increased, fuel efficiency standards, the more fuel, a finite commodity that Congress mandates 

must be conserved, is wasted. Thus, the Agencies’ failure to comply with the Congressional 

mandate to devise ratable fuel efficiency increases, and its decision to backload achievable gains 

instead, has the additional pernicious effect of increasing the rulemaking’s cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 11]
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The Agencies seek to justify the anemic annual rate of improvement for trucks by referencing the 

“unique challenges in improving the fuel economy . . . of full-size pick-up trucks, while 

preserving the utility of these trucks.” Specifically, they explain that due to characteristics such 

as 4WD and towing and hauling capacity, “the vehicles in the current light truck fleet are 

generally less capable of achieving higher fuel economy levels as compared to vehicles in 

passenger car fleet.” While this reasoning may address the fact that stringency for trucks is 

currently lower than that of cars, it does nothing to explain the lack of the required ratable annual 

increases – i.e., increases that are proportional, lead to rapid and consistent progress, and do not 

create incentives to upsize cars to light trucks and lighter trucks to heavier ones. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 11]

In any event, the explanation lacks merit. Studies show that trucks are indeed capable of 

maintaining towing and hauling capacity with higher fuel economy standards.53 The claim that 

the “unique challenges” faced by trucks justify a slower and disproportional increase in fuel 

economy standards, or any of the other regulatory leniencies the Agencies provide for them in

the NPRM, fails in light of the fact that technologies exist that fully enable trucks to improve fuel 

efficiency while retaining utilities like hauling and towing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, 

p. 11]

The Agencies also cite cost concerns as a reason for setting lower stringencies for trucks than for 

cars. This justification does not withstand scrutiny. It ignores that U.S. manufactured light truck 

models have been the most profitable vehicle for manufacturers since 1990. 54 Moreover, in 

general, because small cars cost almost as much as large cars to design, build and distribute, 

small cars generate small gross margins, while light trucks earn manufacturers greater profit.55 

Ironically, the rulemaking demands the least from the most profitable segment of the automotive 

industry. This result is arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 11]

The Agencies further reason that the different standards for passenger cars and trucks will 

preserve consumer choice and “should not affect consumers’ opportunity to purchase the size of 

vehicle that meets their needs.”56 As discussed above, although the Agencies can consider 

consumer demand, “it would clearly be impermissible for NHTSA to rely on consumer demand 

to such an extent that it ignored the overarching goal of fuel conservation.”57 The Agencies here 

have elevated purported consumer choice for larger, heavier, less efficient vehicles over energy 

conservation and thus violated Congressional intent. Moreover, this choice, improper in itself, 

cannot justify overriding the Congressional mandate to set fuel efficiency standards that increase 

ratably every year. As discussed below, manufacturers created consumer demand to use larger, 

less efficient, and more profitable light trucks as passenger vehicles,58 and a wide range of 

consumer options exist in this category. Consumers who desire to purchase the most fuel 

efficient and least polluting vehicles, on the other hand, are left with far fewer options, and the 

U.S. is left in last place in passenger vehicle and light truck fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 12]

We note here the Agencies’ assertion that the NPRM “will not create significant incentives to 

produce vehicles of particular sizes, and thus there should be no significant effect on the relative 

availability of different vehicle sizes in the fleet due to the proposed standards, which will help 
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maintain consumer choice during the rulemaking timeframe.” This assertion is insupportable. 

Lower efficiency standards for trucks have caused their manufacture and sale to balloon for 

decades, and these differences would be exacerbated by the proposed rule, which goes so far as 

to demand almost no increases of the most inefficient and polluting vehicles in the fleet. The fact 

that incentives for upsizing would be created simply cannot be disputed. The Agencies come 

close to admitting this fact: “[A] steeper slope [in compliance curves] relaxes the stringency of 

targets for larger vehicles relative to those for smaller vehicles, thereby shifting relative 

compliance burdens among manufactures based on their respective product mix.” Indeed. And a 

further shift to the least efficient vehicles in the fleet is inevitable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 12]

Moreover, we strongly disagree with the Agencies’ belief that their regulatory efforts should 

have no effect (and have no effect) on consumer choice or market forces that drive auto sales in 

general. It is EPCA and EISA’s very purpose to change those forces toward the conservation of 

energy. And, in the context of their safety discussion, even the Agencies admit that, “[f]or full

size (i.e. 3/4- and 1-ton) pickups, risk increases as mass increases.” Thus, the more heavy 

vehicles are built, the more risk. Far from having no effect on consumer choice and market 

forces, the NPRM proposes regulations that will create the market forces that drive increased 

production of the least energy efficient vehicles on our highways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, pp. 12-13]

Creating different (and for some years, next to no) efficiency standards for the heaviest trucks 

also plays havoc with the footprint-based attribute system the Agencies have, until now, 

staunchly defended. Tellingly, the Agencies admit as much – they state that they had rejected 

allowing different standards for light pickup trucks based on different attributes, such as power, 

because doing so would introduce’ multi-attribute standards’ that the Agencies had “judged . . . 

to be more subject to gaming than a footprint-only standard.” Influenced by industry comments, 

they abandoned that previously-held line in the sand because the “challenges faced by 

manufacturers of large pickups currently outweigh[] these prior concerns.” As shown above, 

however, the “challenges” allegedly facing these most profitable and least energy efficient 

vehicles in the fleet are bogus. If abandoning the footprint-based attribute system to create this 

loophole was a price for the “agreement” between the regulators and the regulated in July 2011, 

it was too high a price to pay. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 13]

The minimal increases proposed by NHTSA become even more problematic when combined 

with carry-forward credits. Congress allows manufacturers to utilize credits earned after model 

year 2010 for five subsequent years.63 There is a 1.5 mpg credit cap for model year 2017, and a 

2 mpg credit cap for model years 2018 and beyond.64 Given the small increases proposed here, 

the amount of credit that can be carried forward by manufacturers is now greater than the 

average estimated increase for light duty trucks for the first years of the covered period. 

Accordingly, manufacturers with credits available from efficiencies obtained from other 

automobiles can use these credits to avoid implementing any fuel saving technologies on certain 

trucks with larger footprints. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 13]
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Congress intended that use of credits “not in any way reduce the oil savings achieved by the 

standards set for any year.”65 Light duty trucks, and particularly the largest trucks within this 

sector, consume the highest amounts of fuel. Setting minimal increases that can be satisfied with 

available credits provides a disincentive for manufacturers to design more fuel efficient trucks 

and runs counter to statutory mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 13]

The Agencies’ decision to backload increases in fuel efficiency for trucks – as well as for 

passenger vehicles, though to a lesser extent – is arbitrary and capricious. That trucks historically 

have been exempted from proportional efficiency increases does not justify continuing the 

practice and so as to exacerbate the efficiency inequality between the two types of vehicles 

throughout the covered period, providing even more incentive for manufacturers to produce 

more “light trucks.” Moreover, letting consumer choice trump fuel conservation violates the 

statute. A ratable footprint curve for light trucks that contains proportional annual increases and 

is proportional to the passenger car curve is necessary to comport with Congressional 

intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 14]

2. The NPRM creates an SUV loophole that is contrary to Congress’ purpose in enacting EPCA 

– energy conservation

The National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) found that from 1970 to 1982, CAFE standards 

helped contribute to a 50 percent increase in fuel economy for new light trucks.68 This progress 

soon stalled, however. Light trucks became ever more popular in the ensuing decades because 

less stringent CAFE standards for light trucks provided incentives for manufacturers to invest in 

vehicles like SUVs and minivans and to promote them to consumers.69 NAS found that this 

market shift had a “pronounced” negative effect on overall fuel economy.70 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 14]

The NPRM would continue and exacerbate this market shift. Light trucks are disproportionately 

favored in the NPRM; starting off with lower fuel efficiency targets, their targets increase at a 

lower rate than passenger cars, and the heaviest and dirtiest light trucks are near-exempt during 

the first two years of the covered period, making them even more profitable. The Agencies 

repeatedly claim that the attribute-based standards discourage changes in vehicle size.71 Focused 

on safety concerns that have now been largely dispelled, the Agencies state that attribute-based 

standards are laudable because they prevent manufacturers from gaming the system by building 

too many light vehicles.72 That concern, however, has no basis in fact: historically it is the SUV 

segment, not the segment for small and efficient cars, which has shown the largest growth. The 

manufacture of too many fuel efficient cars sadly has never been the problem. Instead, the 

NPRM incentivizes the manufacture of too many gas guzzlers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 15]

3. The NPRM must require ratable fuel efficiency increases for all light trucks

As shown in the tables above, the Agencies provide an estimate of the average fuel economy 

standards per year for all light trucks. In fact, however, the Agencies are proposing the smallest 

increases for the largest and dirtiest trucks for the first two years of the covered period. 73 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 15]
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Not only does this proposal quite obviously remove any incentive to improve the gas mileage of 

these largest vehicles, it may also result in an additional statutory violation. Given the long leadtime between the final rule and 2017, manufacturers have substantial time to adjust to this 

scheme by manufacturing larger light trucks with less stringent fuel economy standards. Because 

the actual national fuel efficiency level is determined not by the standards themselves but by 

what manufacturers decide to build, it is possible that this predictable shift toward larger, less 

fuel efficient cars could prevent the nationwide fleet from reaching the statutory minimum of 35 

mpg in 2020.74 The near-exemption for larger trucks must be dropped for this reason 

alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 15]

4. The NPRM should tighten the definition of light trucks to prevent incentives to reclassify

As has been recognized for some time, because there are separate curves for passenger cars and 

light trucks, manufacturers have incentives to reclassify passenger cars as light trucks to render 

them subject to less stringent fuel economy goals.

The EPCA defines passenger automobiles as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 

15]

[A]ny automobile that the Secretary decides by regulation is manufactured primarily for 

transporting not more than 10 individuals, but does not include an automobile capable of offhighway operation that the Secretary decides by regulation –

(A) has a significant feature (except 4-wheel drive) designed for offhighway operation; and

(B) is a 4-wheel drive automobile or is rated at more than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle 

weight.75 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

Light trucks are defined by exclusion as automobiles that are not passenger automobiles or work 

trucks.76 NHTSA has further defined light trucks as automobiles with greater cargo-carrying 

than passenger-carrying volume, and as automobiles that permit expanded use of the automobile 

for cargo-carrying purposes through removal of seats or stowing of foldable seats.77 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

This statutory definition can already incentivize upsizing as it allows manufacturers to add 4WD 

technology plus any other “off-highway” feature to a vehicle to automatically fall within the less 

stringent light truck classification. The Agencies themselves recognize that this incentive exists 

if the fuel economy standard for a truck with a given footprint is less stringent than that for 

passenger car with the same footprint.78 The issue is particularly significant where a vehicle is 

built with both a 4WD and a 2WD version. The 2WD drive version, if it does not otherwise 

qualify as a truck, is subject to the passenger car curve. The same version with 4WD and some 

other off-road feature such as higher ground clearance, however, becomes subject to the truck 

curve. These circumstances create different fuel economy standards for vehicles with the same 

footprint. Manufacturers thus have incentive to redesign 2WD vehicles by adding 4WD and 

some off-road feature. The even greater disparity in mileage standards between trucks and 
EPA Response to Comments

2-66

passenger cars created by the NPRM provides even larger incentives for this type of abuse of the 

statutory scheme. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

The Agencies have addressed this concern by noting that “despite comments in prior 

rulemakings suggesting that any vehicle that appears to be manufactured ‘primarily’ for 

transporting passengers must be classified as a passenger car, the statute as currently written 

clearly provides that vehicles that are off-highway capable are not passenger cars.”79 Congress, 

however, intended that “passenger automobiles be defined as those used primarily for the 

transport of individuals.” 80 And, as the Ninth Circuit noted, “many light trucks today are 

manufactured primarily for transporting passengers.”81 Indeed, “[c]onsumers use light trucks 

primarily for passenger-carrying purposes in large part because that is precisely the purpose for 

which manufacturers have manufactured and marketed them.”82 EPCA’s drafters surely never 

intended manufacturers to be able to manipulate their products for the sole purpose of escaping 

higher efficiency standards. Accordingly, the Agencies must remove the SUV loophole. 

Moreover, we urge the Agencies to create a single footprint for both passenger vehicles and light 

trucks because that change would eliminate the gamesmanship that has played out historically 

and is sure to continue without it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, pp. 16-17]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 214-216.]

Rather than promoting technological innovations, these rules rely on small improvements in 

existing technology. And, also, rather than pushing industry to make more efficient smaller 

vehicles, these rules create what we're calling an SUV loophole by incentivizing industry to build 

more trucks and SUVs that won't have to increase their fuel efficiency standards at the same rate 

as passenger vehicles. And those are our three very big points of concerns for us in these rules.

And the result of these problems with the rules are they actually could end up with an increase in 

overall greenhouse gas emissions from our transportation center rather than a decrease.

So in regards to what we would like to see done in the final rule, we would like to see these rules 

significantly strengthened.

One of our main concerns is the fact that the proposed rules allow light-duty trucks and SUVs to 

increase their fuel efficiency at a much slower rate and pace than cars, and for many years this 

problem has caused automakers to build bigger vehicles so they could take advantage of these 

weaker standards that have caused our efficiency to stagnate behind the efficiency across the 

world.

And we should not make the same mistake twice; we should strengthen those standards for lightduty trucks and put them on a par with cars, and we can't afford to skew the rules in favor of 

more gas-guzzling SUVs and light trucks.

40 See 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(3)(A). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 8]
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41 See Tables 1 & 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 8]

44 Compare Tables 1 & 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

45 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)(C)(emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

46 Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org (Search 'rateably') 

(last visited Feb. 9, 2012). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

47 153 Cong. Rec. H16659, 16750 (emphasis added) (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

48 Id. (emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

49 See Table 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 10]

53 See Ricardo, Inc., Computer Simulation of Light-Duty Vehicle Technologies for Greenhouse 

Gas Emission Reduction in the 2020-2025 Timeframe, EPA-420-R-11-020, at 66-67 (Nov. 29, 

2011). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 11]

54 Max Warburton, et al., Bernstein Research, “Euro Autos: What Are the 10 Most Profitable 

Cards of Modern Times?, p. 4 (Nov. 15, 2011) (concluding that the top ten most profitable 

vehicles of modern time are led by pick-up trucks manufactured by Ford and GM, due to the 

large volume sold and because they have not undergone frequent technology upgrades). [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 11]

55 Id. at 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 12]

56 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,860. The Agencies’ overemphasis of consumer choice also 

overlooks the fact that each consumer’s choice of a low-efficiency vehicle affects the overall 

fleet’s standards and thus decreases the benefits to society as a whole. The statutes set fuel 

efficiency standards that counteract individual choices that prevent energy conservation. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 12]

57 CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 

1322, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1986). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 12]

58 See CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1207. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 12]

68 National Research Council. Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

(CAFE) Standards, p. 14, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2002. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 14]
EPA Response to Comments

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69 Id. at 18. The fact that domestic manufacturers faced less competition in this category and 

could generate greater profits also contributed to the growth in SUV production. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 14]

70 Id. at 19. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 14]

71 See, e.g., NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,875; 74,913. According to Kate S. Whitefoot and Steven 

J. Skerlos, “NHTSA constructed the foot-print based CAFE standards using a quantitative 

analysis but did not study whether manufacturers would have an incentive to change vehicle size 

as a result of the standards”. See Kate S. Whitefoot and Steven J. Skerlos, Design I incentives to 

Increase Vehicle Size Created from the U.S. Footprint-Based Fuel Economy Standards, 41 

ENERGY POLICY 402, 403 (2012). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 15]

72 Indeed, the Agencies admit that safety considerations that could support any provision of a 

disincentive for downsizing as a compliance strategy “apply weakly, if at all, to the very largest 

vehicles.” 76 Fed. Reg. 74918. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 15]

73 See NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,872, Figure 5-2. Through 2021, the annual fuel economy 

increase for light trucks is 4.0% for these smallest trucks, 2.3% for larger SUVs, and only 0.4% 

for the largest pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 15]

74 “Increasing vehicle footprint leads to a reduction in fuel economy and acceleration 

performance of the vehicle due to the increase in vehicle weight.” Whitefoot, 41 ENERGY 

POLICY at 404. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 15]

75 49 U.S.C. § 32901(a)(18). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

76 See id. at (a)(17). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

77 49 C.F.R. 523.5(4)-(5). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

78 See NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,337. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

79 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,337, n. 218. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

80 See 68 Fed. Reg. 74,908, 74926 (Dec. 29, 2003). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

81 See CBD v, NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1207. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

82 Id. at 1208. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 16]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 54.]
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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 60-61.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 26.]

Chrysler agrees with setting the truck performance requirements based on the underlying physics 

of these types of vehicles. We believe the proposed 2017 through 2025 standards support this 

premise and correct the deficiencies in the 2016 model year rule, which overlooked these factors. 

The 2017 to 2025 truck standards are challenging while respecting the utility of these vehicles 

and their importance to the nation's economy.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 54.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 61.]

The truck standards for 2012 through '16 model year were not supported by fundamental science. 

Accommodating that science will seem to be restricted by statutory direction to not backslide on 

standards from previous years.

Organization: Consumers Union

It is counterintuitive and counterproductive to let the least fuel efficient models improve more 

slowly than more efficient models, and Consumers Union recommends that the light truck 

standard should be made more stringent, particularly in the cross-over range. A delta of 10-15 

mpg by 2025 between passenger cars and light trucks of the same footprint is unreasonable, 

given the range of technologies and designs available for improving fuel economy. The gap in 

the proposed standards grows over time because light trucks are required to improve at a lesser 

rate, in addition to being subject to lower targets in absolute terms. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9454-A2, p.6]

IV. A stricter standard would deliver even greater consumer benefits

The proposed standards will likely save consumers billions of dollars and provide additional 

national security and environmental benefits. However, a higher CAFE target is achievable and 

would save consumers even more money on fuel at a reasonable investment cost. Especially 

given the regulatory flexibility and discrepancy between real-world and test results, a higher 

CAFE target is both achievable and desirable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.6]

As noted in prior comments, Consumers Union believes that allowing manufacturers to avoid 

stringent fuel economy standards by reclassifying passenger vehicles as light trucks as a way to 

game the system erodes consumer and oil saving benefits.18 The current proposal’s use of 

footprint-based curves that require vehicles of all size to improve in fuel economy is a significant 
EPA Response to Comments

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improvement from letting light trucks off the CAFE hook. Indeed, vehicle “footprint” is a 

desirable attribute on which to base standards, for reasons noted in on pages 115-116 of 

NHTSA’s Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA). However, the gap between the 

curves is too large, especially in the cross-over SUV (approximately 42-50 sf) segment. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.6]

There are several strong indicators that the gap between the curves is too large. First, the costper-vehicle to achieve the proposed standards is much lower for light trucks ($1,500) than for 

passenger cars ($1,950). This significant discrepancy indicates that light trucks have additional 

room for improvement at a reasonable cost. In addition, since passenger cars tend to be cheaper 

than light trucks, light trucks get off even easier in terms of compliance cost as a percentage of 

purchase price. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.6]

Secondly, fuel economy savings are logarithmic, so allowing a lower percentage of improvement 

for vehicles that already have the lowest mpg is counterproductive for maximizing fuel savings 

and other benefits. The greatest potential for fuel savings is at the least efficient end of a fleet, 

but the vehicles at the bottom are provided the least stringent targets, even as a percentage of 

their current dismal performance. Third, the large gap provides a greater incentive to game the 

system by altering a vehicle to put it in the light truck category (increasing clearance or adding 

4WD). For some vehicles, the compliance cost could be less than simply altering the vehicle to 

switch categories. Adding all-wheel or four-wheel drive does not generally warrant the extra 

leeway afforded under the proposed rules, especially in the cross-over market segment.19 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.7]

Negative consequences could result from the large gap. Cross-over vehicles are a growing 

market segment, and allowing cross-over vehicles to be counted in the light truck category 

significantly boosts a manufacturer’s achieved CAFE average for light trucks. As a result, the 

larger and heavier vehicles will not need to make as much improvement as they would otherwise, 

even though the greater investment needed to make these improvements in the larger vehicles is 

the reason for a segmented standard in the first place. If the growing cross-over trend continues, 

the large gap between the curves will have deleterious effects on projected consumer savings and 

oil reduction.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.7]

As long as the light truck-passenger vehicle distinction remains in place, our recommended 

course of action is to alter the slope and floor values of the compliance curves so that there is less 

incentive to switch categories and to preserve the projected consumer savings. At the very least, 

the gap between the curves should be narrowed for the cross-over segment, and the gap should 

decrease, instead of increase, over time. The Union of Concerned Scientists has done extensive 

analysis on this topic, and we agree with their analysis and conclusion that a “backstop” would 

be an effective tool to preserve expected consumer savings and prevent exploitation of loopholes. 

If the agencies do not address this potential problem in the current rulemaking, we would urge 

them to perform rigorous analysis of this issue during the mid-term review to make sure that 

consumer benefits are indeed on track and that potential savings are not being squandered 

through manipulation of the standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.7]
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18 - See Appendix F: 'Comments of Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. In response to Advance 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Docket No. 2003-16128 on Reforming the Automobile Fuel 

Economy Standards Program.'

19 - See Appendix G Comparison of Price and Operating Costs for 2WD and 4WD for real 

world examples of fuel economy differences between 2WD and AWD/4WD.

20 - NHTSA notes on page 71 of the PRIA that indeed, the market is expected to shift towards 

light trucks.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

The truck standards previously established for the 2012-2016 model years underestimated the 

unique challenges posed by the standards for the larger trucks, which have unique loadcarrying 

and towing capabilities that can be compromised by the fuel efficiency improvements more 

successfully applied on smaller vehicles. The current proposal will better enable manufacturers 

to develop and apply fuel economy technologies to light trucks without sacrificing the utility for 

which these vehicles are designed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 2 and 5]

Car and Truck Stringencies: The proposed fuel economy and GHG standards for 2017 and 

beyond take into account the particular attributes, needs and customer expectations for light 

trucks relative to passenger cars, and this must carry through to the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 2 and 5]

Ford also believes that the relative stringency levels for the car and truck fleets, as proposed by 

the agencies, are appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]

Although the proposed 2017 – 2021 model year truck standards may appear to be less stringent 

than the car standards for the same years, this is not the case. In terms of the product actions 

necessary to comply, the proposed car and truck standards are roughly equivalent in stringency. 

This is attributable to the unique attributes expected from trucks—particularly the larger work 

trucks that constitute a significant portion of our full-line vehicle fleet offering—and also to the 

overly stringent standards imposed on light duty trucks in the 2012-2016 model year regulation. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]

Heavier pick-up trucks are expected to deliver even more cargo carrying and towing capacity not 

required from passenger vehicles. Such vehicles are used by consumers and small business 

owners for activities such as towing or hauling construction goods and machines, farm goods, 

landscape material, lawn maintenance equipment, home furnishings, animals, vehicles and 

trailers. Ford survey data shows up to 82% of F-150 customers use their vehicles for hauling. Up 

to 41% haul on at least a monthly basis; and 72% of F-150 customers use their vehicles for 

towing. Up to 28% tow on at least a monthly basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

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To achieve this capability, vehicles equipped with trailer tow packages include additional 

features that clearly distinguish them from passenger cars, and can negatively impact fuel 

economy: 

• Auxiliary transmission oil coolers

• Upgraded radiators

• Trailer hitch connectors and wiring harness equipment

• Different steering ratios, upgraded rear bumpers and different springs for heavier tongue 

load (for upgraded 'max' trailer tow packages)

• Body on frame (vs. unibody) construction to support capability and an aggressive duty 

cycle

• Lower axle ratios for better pulling power/capability 

in addition, vehicles with towing capability generally have increased aerodynamic drag caused 

by a modified frontal area, increased rolling resistance, and a heavier frame and suspension to 

support this additional capability.

We are seeing a continuing trend that our customers are purchasing these vehicles for work 

purposes. Based on 2011 segmentation models for our full size pick-up trucks, Business users 

account for approximately 30% of the market. The Business category includes fleet and work 

trucks (e.g. small business owner, farmer, foreman), as well as those customers who use their 

truck for occupational purposes during the week and personal use on the weekend. About 58% of 

the market is comprised of Recreational users, including hunters, boaters, fisherman, etc. These 

consumers rely on their vehicles for hauling and towing to support their recreational activities. 

Only a relatively small segment (12%) of the market is comprised of consumers who do not 

make significant use of the towing/ hauling/off-road capabilities of the truck. Based on the trends 

we have seen in the market, we fully anticipate that such buyers will continue to be a shrinking 

portion of our market. We believe that within a few years, the Business category will increase to 

over 40% of the market, and the combined Business/Recreational users will increase to over 90% 

of the market for full size pick-up trucks.

And to further demonstrate the importance of these vehicles to the American economy, the 

following graph demonstrates that new home construction, a key financial indicator, and the 

sales of the trucks needed to help this industry, go hand in hand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p. 9]

In order to be fair to all manufacturers and avoid creating market imbalances, the stringency of 

the car and truck standards needs to be comparable in terms of the effort and level of investment 

necessary to comply. The imbalance in the relative stringency of the car/truck standards in the 

2012-2016 rules needed to be corrected. In light of the above, we believe that the agencies' 

proposal with respect to car/truck stringency is sound and should be carried through to the final 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 10]

In the proposal, EPA makes reference to the fact that it “underestimated the impact of the 

different pickup truck model configurations” in the model year 2012-2016 rule, and that the 

“very largest light trucks have significant load-carrying and towing capabilities that make it 
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particularly challenging for manufacturers to add fuel economy-improving/CO2-reducing 

technologies in a way that maintains the full functionality of those capabilities.” (76 Fed. Reg. 

74919). We agree with this observation. The 2012-2016 truck standards did not fully account for 

the consumer-driven attributes of larger trucks, which, due to the technology trade-offs discussed 

above, created particular challenges for full-line truck manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9463-A1, p. 10]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 45-46.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 35.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 87.]

In particular, EPA acknowledged it had underestimated the impact of the different pickup truck 

model configurations in the model year 2012 to 2016 rule. They further acknowledged that the 

'very largest light trucks have significant load-carrying and towing capabilities that make it 

particularly challenging for manufacturers to add fuel economy-improving technologies in a way 

that maintains the full functionality of those capabilities.' We concur with the agencies' analysis 

and conclusions

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the target standard curve shapes, the relative car and truck stringency, and the 

statistical analysis used to analyze the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p.2]

GM also urges careful consideration of two key issues raised in the Alliance comments that 

would affect the implementation stringency of the proposal, namely whether NHTSA should 

change the current definition of what constitutes a passenger car and a light truck and whether 

NHTSA needs to further adjust the stringency of its proposed curves to more fully harmonize 

with the EPA proposed requirements and flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 

2]

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

The second justification offered is that a footprint-based approach will avoid negative safety 

impacts. To start, the footprint-based approach does not completely eliminate the incentive to 

build smaller cars to comply with the rule. The mathematical formulas that set the standards are 

only strictly increasing along the range from 40 square feet to either 55 square feet for cars or 75 

square feet for trucks; at other points, the curve is flat. Admittedly, that central range covers most 

vehicle models.88 However, at least several dozen models (mostly subcompacts and sports cars) 

fall in the 30-40 square feet range,89 which are all subject to the same standards. At a minimum, 

the manufacturers of these models may have an incentive to decrease footprints as a compliance 
EPA Response to Comments

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strategy, since doing so would not trigger more stringent standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, p. 14]

Organization: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

IIHS does have some concern regarding the “breakpoint” of the fuel economy curve at the lower 

extreme where footprint is the smallest (see Figure I-1 on page 74871 of the notice). This 

“breakpoint” is the leveling-off point on the fuel economy curve where the fuel economy 

requirement ceases to increase as footprint decreases. Moving this breakpoint farther to the left 

so that even smaller vehicles have increasing fuel economy requirements would reduce the 

chance that manufacturers would downsize the lightest vehicles for further fuel economy credits. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0222-A1, p. 1].

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

17. Separate footprint curves for cars and light trucks distort the requirements by making it easier 

for vehicle classified as light trucks to comply. Unlike the 20122016 requirements, the 2017-

2025 rule increased the gap between cars and light trucks, providing stronger incentives for 

manufacturers to reclassify cars as light trucks and potentially undermining the benefits of the 

rule. A single footprint function would still give larger trucks a less stringent target to meet, 

while avoiding vehicle classification games. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 4]

The proposed 2022-25 standards would set consistent improvements for all cars and light trucks, 

with annual CAFE increases of 4.7% per year and annual GHG reductions of 5.0% per year. 

However, both EPA and NHTSA proposed a lower annual rate of improvement for light-trucks 

in the early years of the program. EPA is proposing an annual GHG reduction for cars of 5%, but 

only 3.5% for light trucks. Similarly, NHTSA is proposing an annual fuel economy increase of 

4.3% for cars, but only 2.9% for light trucks. The required reductions for light trucks are also 

tilted, such that the smallest light trucks have larger increases (but still less than cars), while the 

larger light trucks have smaller increases. Figure 4 illustrates this effect. The annual fuel 

economy increases from 2016 to 2021 for cars is almost flat and ranges from 4.2% to 4.4%. The 

annual fuel economy increase for light trucks starts at 4.0% for the smallest trucks, drops to 2.3% 

for larger SUVs, and falls off to only 0.4% for the largest pickup trucks. Note that the 2012-16 

standards also imposed smaller increases on the larger vehicles than they did on smaller 

vehicles. [Figure 4 can be found on p. 49 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 48-49]

Footprint systems are designed to encourage the use of lightweight materials (unlike weightbased standards) without affecting the mix of vehicles sold in the market. Under a footprintbased system, selling more small vehicles does not necessarily help manufacturers meet the 

standards, as smaller vehicles are subject to more stringent targets. However, the slope of the 

footprint curve and the difference between the car and light truck curves matter. The steeper the 

slope of the footprint curve, the more incentive manufacturers have to increase the size of their 

vehicles. And the larger the difference between the car and light truck curves, the more incentive 

a manufacturer has to add four-wheel drive and jack the vehicle up just enough to meet the 

ground clearance criteria so that the vehicle can be reclassified as a light truck. These are 
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perverse incentives, as increasing the size of the vehicle or reclassifying cars as light trucks 

makes it easier for a manufacturer to meet the requirements while also increasing the fuel 

consumption and CO2 emissions from the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 49]

The tilt in the increase in light truck stringency, as illustrated in Figure 4, increases the incentive 

for manufacturers to increase the size of light trucks, especially pickup trucks. [Figure 4 can be 

found on p. 49 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 49]

More importantly, the lower requirements for all light trucks would increase the incentive to 

reclassify cars as light trucks. As illustrated in Figure 5, the 2012-2016 standards and the 2022-

2025 standards have almost no impact on the relationship between the stringency of the car and 

the light truck targets. However, during the 2017 to 2021 timeframe, when the annual efficiency 

gains for light trucks are much lower than for cars, the difference in stringency between cars and 

trucks grows dramatically. As proposed, the 2017-2021 standards will increase the incentive to 

reclassify cars as light trucks, with a small additional incentive for the smallest cars and 

gradually increasing for larger cars. Fortunately, few cars have a footprint larger than about 54 

sq.ft at present. [Figure 5 can be found on p. 50 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 50]

Single footprint curve

The proposed rule maintains separate footprint curves for cars and light trucks. This subjects 

light trucks with the same footprint to much less stringent standards and gives manufacturers a 

tremendous incentive to reclassify cars as light trucks. In the future it is likely to cause 

manufacturers to drop many 2wd versions of their small SUVs and make less efficient 4wd 

versions standard, so that they can be classified as light trucks instead of cars. This will actually 

increase overall real world fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in two ways. First, it will 

increase 4wd installation and directly increase the fuel consumption of the fleet. Second, it 

makes it easier for manufacturers to meet the standards, so that they do not have to implement as 

much technology on other vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 50]

The large majority of light trucks today are based on car platforms with unibody construction. 

All minivans use unibody construction and cab-and-chassis construction for SUVs is rapidly 

disappearing. Except for pickup trucks, full-size cargo vans, and a few relatively low volume 

SUVs, such as the Jeep Wrangler and the Suburban, in the 2017-25 timeframe of the rule all light 

trucks will be based on car platforms. In addition, due to the empty pickup bed and empty cargo 

box, pickup trucks and cargo vans are considerable lighter than SUVs with the same footprint 

and fit well on a single footprint line. Thus, there is no technical reason to maintain separate 

footprint lines for cars and light trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 50-51]

EPA recognized the importance of this issue when it established a single Tier 2 emission 

standard for all cars and light trucks. The issue here is just as important. It is time to begin the 

process to end this artificial distinction between cars and light trucks for fuel efficiency and 

greenhouse gas emissions. The ICCT recommends a single footprint function, which will still 
EPA Response to Comments

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give larger trucks a less stringent target to meet, while avoiding vehicle classification games and 

helping to ensure fuel consumption and GHG emission goals are actually met. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 51]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 197.]

The separate footprint curve to cars and light trucks also distort the requirements by making it 

easier for vehicles classified as light trucks to comply. A single footprint function would still 

give larger trucks a less stringent target to meet while avoiding vehicle classification games.

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

The proposed standards for light trucks are significantly weaker than for cars. In the past, 

automakers made vehicles bigger to qualify for weaker standards. Light truck standards should 

be strengthened to prevent automakers from gaming the system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10166-A2_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

The proposed standards for light trucks are significantly weaker than for cars. In the past, 

automakers made vehicles bigger to qualify for weaker standards. Light truck standards should 

be strengthened to prevent automakers from gaming the system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1246-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (4,505) (Unknown Organization)

The proposed rules allow light trucks to increase their fuel efficiency at a much slower rate than 

cars. For many years, this problem led automakers to build bigger vehicles so they could take 

advantage of these weaker standards, which caused efficiency standards in the United States to 

stagnate. We should not make the same mistake twice, and should strengthen the standards for 

light trucks on a par with cars. We cannot afford to skew the rules in favor of gas-guzzling 

SUVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9595-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

The proposed standards for light trucks are significantly weaker than for cars. In the past, 

automakers made vehicles bigger to qualify for weaker standards. Light truck standards should 

be strengthened to prevent automakers from gaming the system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9578-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

First, NACAA understands that EPA and NHTSA are proposing that passenger cars have an 

average rate of improvement of 5 percent for MYs 2017 to 2025. However, light-duty trucks will 
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start with an average rate of improvement of 3.5 percent for MYs 2017 through 2021 and 5 

percent for MYs 2022 through 2025. These proposed rates of improvement are envisioned to 

result in an average CO2 emissions rate of 163 grams per mile (g/mile) with an average fleet 

performance of 54.5 miles per gallon (mpg) if every manufacturer incorporates enhanced engine 

technologies. In addition, the proposal provides only a conditional approval of the standards by 

NHTSA for MY 2022 to 2025 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 3]

NACAA supports EPA’s and NHTSA’s goal of a fleetwide performance that will result in 54.5 

mpg fuel efficiency. We are concerned, however, that the approach taken in the proposal may 

undermine achievement of this goal. In fact, in a recently published study, researchers at the 

University of Michigan consider whether allowing a more lenient 3.5-percent rate of 

improvement requirement for larger vehicles creates an incentive for the manufacture of larger 

vehicles to the extent that it could lower the overall fleet performance standard by as much as 

four miles per gallon, thus undermining the goal of a 54.5-mpg fuel economy standard.12

Accordingly, NACAA urges EPA and NHTSA to ensure that the full measure of the reductions 

envisioned by EPA and NHTSA is achieved. In addition, NACAA requests that EPA and 

NHTSA respond to the issues raised in the University of Michigan study. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8084-A1, p. 3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 39-40.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 34-35.]

12 Kate S. Whitefoot and Steven J. Skerlos, “Design Incentives to Increase Vehicle Size Created 

from the U.S. Footprint-based Fuel Economy Standards,” January 2012, available at 

http://designscience.umich.edu/alumni/katie/Whitefoot_Skerlos_Footprint.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

NHTSA should revise truck definitions to reduce the incentive for cars to be reclassified as 

trucks and take advantage of a less stringent compliance regime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9472-A2, p. 3]

2. Fuel Consumption and Pollution Reductions are Undermined by Large Gap between Car and 

Truck Curves; Agencies Should Revise Truck Definitions to Prevent Gaming

The large gap between the car and light truck curves creates an incentive that threatens to 

undermine the predicted oil and GHG reductions of the program. Automakers could have a 

strong incentive to modify vehicles classified as cars today to be reclassified as trucks because 

the truck curve has substantially less stringent compliance levels for the same footprint. NHTSA 
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previously recognized that many crossover vehicles had been inappropriately classified as trucks. 

Starting with MY 2011, NHTSA required two-wheel drive crossovers that were previously 

subject to truck fuel economy standards to be shifted to the car fuel economy compliance 

requirements. NHTSA estimated that over a million vehicles required reclassification from 

trucks to cars.33 It is our concern that many automakers will modify vehicles or shift sales from 

crossovers currently on the car curve to the truck curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 

10]

One way to make the curve shift is by the addition of four-wheel drive (4WD) capability. Adding 

four-wheel drive technology could classify a car into a truck yet have minimal impact on the 

actual fuel efficiency and emissions of the vehicle. By making the shift, a vehicle was previously 

complying with the car curve would immediately overcomply on the truck curve. The 

automaker’s decision to add 4WD capability will largely be influenced by whether or not the 

cost to add the 4WD technology is less than adding the fuel efficiency and emissions technology 

necessary to stay compliant on the car curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 10]

Consider the case of the popular Toyota RAV4 crossover and compliance with GHG emission 

standards. With a footprint of 44.6 square feet (ft2), the two-wheel drive RAV4 car requirement 

in 2016 is 223 g/mi. Adding 4WD will increase emissions by about 5 g/mi to 228 g/mi. If 

reclassified as a truck, the 4WD RAV4 would subject to less stringent compliance standards and 

at 228 g/mi, it would meet the meet the MY 2020 requirement for trucks at the 44.6 ft2 

footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 10]

By immediately complying with the MY 2020 standard, Toyota could avoid adding technologies 

to cut emissions from 2016 to 2020, and save approximately $1000. If Toyota can add 4WD 

technology for less than $1000, then they would have an incentive to shift RAV4 models from 

car classification to truck classification. The difference in MSRP between 2WD and 4WD 

models of the 2012 RAV4 is $1400 but actual costs could be less than $1000. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 10]

NHTSA and EPA should reduce the incentive to reclassify vehicles from the car to truck curves. 

The gap between the car and truck curves should be reduced, especially for footprints of 

crossovers similar to the RAV4. The emissions and fuel efficiency difference between 2WD and 

4WD crossovers on the market today is often less than 10 g/mi yet the car and truck curves differ 

by over 40 g/mi. The agencies should also revise truck definitions to better distinguish truck-only 

capabilities. For example, trucks should be required to have technologies that are necessary for 

true off-road capability vs. typical all-wheel on-road driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-

A2, p. 10]

33 74 FR 14196 at 14204. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 10]

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.
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The standards applicable to the light-duty truck fleet for MYs 2022-2025 are particularly 

challenging. Especially for automakers with more limited volumes in the light truck segment, the 

cost feasibility of implementing more advanced technology is limited. As manufacturers reevaluate their commitment to these market segments, the broad industry-wide investment in 

truck technologies that can be spread through the industry is uncertain. Moreover, the 

willingness of the market to absorb substantial additional costs to ensure achieving the proposed 

standards is questionable as the light-duty truck segment is a cost-sensitive market. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.8]

Organization: RVIA

Towing considerations for full size pickups

RVIA has commented in the past on the importance of considering towing when setting future 

GHG and CAFE standards for full size pickups. RVIA is pleased to see that the proposed 

standards for full size pickups do indeed take towing into consideration and we therefore support 

the standards proposed for the 2017-2021 model years. However, we are concerned that the costs 

associated with the standards proposed for the 2022-2025 model years could potentially hurt full 

size pickup truck sales. This would in turn have a negative effect on sales of towable RVs 

because when a person shopping for a new towable RV cannot afford to buy the vehicle capable 

of towing it, they will not purchase the RV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, pp.1-2]

Towing considerations for large passenger cars, small SUVs and crossover vehicles 

With the price of gasoline hovering around four dollars per gallon today, consumers are buying 

SUVs that ride more like a car, get better fuel economy, but have a greatly diminished towing 

capacity. For example, the consumer who several years ago might have purchased a Chevy 

Tahoe (3 rows of seats and towing capacity of 8,500 lbs) might instead today purchase a Chevy 

Traverse which also has three rows of seats but has a maximum towing capacity of only 5,200 

lbs. Similarly, consumers that previously might have purchased an SUV like a Volkswagen 

Toureg now consider smaller SUVs like the Tiguan, a minivan or even a station wagon. As this 

downsizing trend progresses, consumers (as they are already) will demand that these vehicles 

offer more towing capability than offered today. Therefore, we recommend that EPA and 

NHTSA closely examine whether they have appropriately considered this future light vehicle 

towing trend in setting standards for light duty passenger cars, cross-over vehicles, minivans and 

other vehicles that will be used by consumers to tow RV trailers, boats, ATVs, utility trailers, UHaul rental trailers and the like. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.2] [There are also 

images associated with this paragraph, please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, pp.2-

3]

Organization: Salinas, A.

SUVs are being allowed to improve gas-mileage standards later than passenger vehicles, and that 

has spurred the production of even more SUVs. These standards leave the United States behind 

Europe, Japan, and China in fuel efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7119-A1, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

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Auto makers are being coddled into taking only baby-steps to improve already-existing 

technology. We are much better than that. At this pace, 2025 will not see much more fuelefficiency than what some cars already have. By 2025 the United States should do better than 

the European Union, China and Japan, not continue to lag behind them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7119-A1, p. 1]

We need better, stronger rules to make real progress in the fight to reduce greenhouse gas 

emissions and improve fuel efficiency, and we need for SUVs to be made adhering to the same 

standards as passenger vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7119-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Take steps to address weaker standards for light trucks: Closing the gap between cars and trucks 

has been a long-term concern for our organizations. We remain deeply concerned about the 

lower rate of improvement the light truck curve requires overall, driven by the much less 

stringent curve at the large footprint end of the light truck spectrum. The EPA is proposing lower 

annual emissions reductions of 3.5 percent per year for MY 2017-2021 light duty trucks. 

NHTSA is also proposing a low annual increase in fuel economy for light trucks for the first 

phase of standards which include MY 2017-2021 to be 2.9 percent per year on average (even 

lower for larger light trucks). The proposed rule presumes that additional increases will be 

achievable after 2021 – 5% emissions reductions for trucks and 4.7% annual efficiency 

improvements. This treatment results in the direct loss of greenhouse gas reductions relative to 

reductions that would have been achieved with a uniform 5% annual emissions reduction across 

all classes, and may undermine the benefits of the program. The lower rate of improvement in 

the early years could undermine the mid-term review and achieving the long term stringency of 

the National Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 6]

The agencies are continuing to use an attribute based curve for model years 2017-2025. While 

the car curve is the same as from the 2012-2016 standards, the agencies are changing the light 

truck curve. The proposed changes will increase the slope and extend the large footprint cut off 

point to larger footprints. By increasing the slope the rule will create an incentive to upsize

vehicles that would continue through MY2025. The agencies consider this factor in the NPRM, 

noting that a “steeper footprint based standards may incentivize vehicle upsizing, thus increasing 

the risk that the fuel economy and greenhouse gas reduction benefits will be less than expected. 

Extending the slope part of the target curve will have adverse consequences for both emissions 

and safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 6]

We appreciate the agencies efforts to structure a program to encourage and reward application of 

“game-changing” hybrid technology to the largest pickups. To limit the impact of the proposed 

curves and treatment of light trucks, even with the incentive program in place, we recommend 

that the agencies provide an alternate emissions target for light trucks of 60 sq. feet and above 

that exceed the sales projected in the rule. This alternate emissions target will come into effect in 

the year that sales exceed the projected sales in the rule. By setting an alternate emissions target 

level representing a 4.8 percent annual reduction from the maximum 2016 truck target of 349 g 
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of CO2 per mile, automakers will be discouraged from increasing sales volumes at this end by 

producing lower cost and inefficient vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 6]

The gap between average car and truck emissions would widen due to the differing rates of 

improvements for cars and trucks under the proposed standards. This may further encourage 

manufacturers to reclassify certain large-footprint cars as trucks and/or change the balance of 

two-wheel drive and four wheel-drive SUV production, reducing the emissions benefits of the 

2017-2025 standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 6]

In the past, the light truck loophole resulted in manufactures producing greater numbers of 

trucks. We are concerned that in the early years of the program automakers will take advantage 

of the weaker standards for light trucks, which will make it difficult to produce higher efficiency 

vehicles in the later years of the program setting automakers up for failure. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 7]

Automakers are already gearing up to take advantage of this loophole. A New York Times article 

reported in 2011 that sales of larger vehicles were up by 28.5% compared to an increase in car 

sales of 7% from 2010 sales in the same month.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 7]

Therefore we also urge the agencies to revisit the light truck definition as set by NHTSA in the 

2011 fuel economy rule to further discourage reclassification of cars as trucks and substitution of 

two wheel drive with four wheel drive SUVs, simply to avoid the more stringent car 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 7]

22 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/business/02auto.html

Organization: Smith, Frank Houston

Data is also available for 1472 UK Light 4X4s, Pickups, and Vans rated Euro Step IV Emissions 

and above at http://vanfueldata.dft.gov.uk/Default.aspx. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, p. 3]

There are currently 402 Euro Step V certified vans and pickups ... only 9 gasoline, 14 CNG, and 

379 diesel fueled configurations with gross weights capabilities from 1690 up to 4,560 kg 

providing fuel economies from 19.5 to 78.3 mpg(Imperial) combined based on the NEDC test 

cycle. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, p.3]

Organization: South Coast AQMD

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 69.]

In addition, we want to emphasize that additional assurances are needed to ensure that the overall 

fleet performance of 5 percent is met. The proposal rule allows light-duty trucks produced in 
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2017 to 2021 to improve at a rate of only 3.5 percent. If sales of light-duty trucks during this 

time period exceeds expectations, then the overall fleet performance will be further reduced.

In addition, the use of early credits may lead to the production of light-duty vehicles that do not 

necessarily have to meet the 5 percent improvement rate.

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

While Toyota understands that the utility provided by larger trucks is a factor driving the lower 

overall target increases for trucks as a whole, and the lack of improvement required for larger 

trucks for 2017-2021 model years, the agencies must ensure that purchasers of affordable and 

fuel efficient smaller cars (and smaller trucks) do not bear a disproportionate burden as a result. 

As proposed, the standards may drive manufacturers of smaller footprint cars to add technology 

and cost to vehicles that are already among the most fuel-efficient and price sensitive in the 

market, while requiring little improvement of the largest vehicles on the road. This dilemma 

appears to be an unintended consequence of the shift to an attribute-based fuel economy and 

greenhouse gas regulation scheme and must be considered as standards are increased in this 

rulemaking and in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.2]

In particular, NHTSA should take steps to modify its target curves to account for the limited 

credit trading and transferring allowed under its authorizing statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, p.2]

Nonetheless, we remain concerned about two aspects of the proposed standards. First, the targets 

for trucks require a lower average rate of improvement than for cars. And second, the targets for 

larger trucks require a lower average rate of improvement than smaller trucks. In fact, the target 

curves for the largest trucks remain flat for several years before increasing at all. This 

discrepancy is exacerbated by the availability of several credit opportunities - discussed later in 

these comments - that are applicable to certain large trucks at the exclusion of all other market 

segments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.5] 

While Toyota understands that the utility provided by larger trucks is a factor driving the lower 

overall target increases for trucks as a whole, and the complete lack of improvement required for 

larger trucks for 2017-2021 model years, the agencies must ensure that purchasers of affordable 

and fuel efficient smaller cars (and smaller trucks) do not bear a disproportionate burden as a 

result. The target curves as proposed will drive manufacturers of smaller footprint cars to add 

technology and cost to vehicles that are already among the most fuel efficient in the market, and 

which are also among the most price-sensitive in the market, while requiring virtually nothing of 

the largest vehicles on the road. This dilemma appears to be an unintended consequence of the 

shift to an attribute-based fuel economy and GHG regulation scheme and must be considered as 

standards are increased in this rulemaking and in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.5]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(b) Loss in Benefits from Increased Vehicle Size and Car/Truck Reclassification
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In the proposed rule, the agencies project a sales mix in MY2025 of 66.9% passenger cars and 

33.1% light trucks. This represents a significant consumer shift towards passenger cars from 

today’s sales mix. While we agree that a variety of market and regulatory factors will move sales 

in this direction, the magnitude of this shift will strongly influence the actual outcome of these 

standards. This mix could shift for a host of reasons, including market forces, or because of 

compliance strategies adopted by automakers to either (a) reclassify cars as light trucks or (b) 

add size to vehicle footprints to qualify for weaker standards. According to the California Air 

Resources Board, “the extent to which the future fleet trends move toward larger average vehicle 

sizes and/or more trucks than projected in this analysis could significantly undermine the 

expected GHG benefits.”29 CARB goes on to quantify how as much as a 16 percent loss in 

emissions reduction could result from even a modest shift to larger vehicles and an increase in 

market share of light trucks. And this concern is not without evidence. As Tom Cackette, Chief 

Deputy Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board, noted at a recent public 

hearing, “We have some insight into the [auto industry’s] business plans that suggest that we 

should worry about this.”30 This concern is also consistent with past efforts by automakers such 

as Chrysler and Subaru to reclassify cars as “trucks” as well as the overall shift to SUVs during 

the 1990s as automakers took advantage of the significant difference in the car and light truck 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 7]

Modifying crossover-type vehicles currently defined as cars in order to qualify them as 'nonpassenger vehicles' may pose an attractive strategy to automakers, as they could generate a 

windfall of credits due to weaker trucks standards. The fastest growing segment of vehicles over 

the past decade has been the crossover vehicle segment, growing from less than 5% in 2000 to 

nearly 25% of light-duty vehicles in 2010. The most popular of these vehicles are offered in 2wd 

and 4wd configurations, such as the Ford Escape, Toyota RAV4, and Honda CR-V. Consistent 

with current federal definitions, the 2wd variants of these vehicles are classified as cars while the 

4wd versions are classified as light trucks. If the size of the gap between car and light truck 

standards at a given vehicle footprint is large enough, it alone can provide an incentive to 

automakers to modify the 2wd variant of crossover vehicles to meet the light truck definition. 

Today’s popular 4wd versions of mid-size crossover vehicles emit 2 to 3 percent more global 

warming emissions than their 2wd counterparts. Yet the gap in the proposed standards between 

cars and trucks ranges from about 16 to 19 percent. This large gap presents a sizable loophole in 

the regulation and could result in a large loss in program benefits should manufacturers find it 

more economical to reclassify and migrate models to the less-stringent truck standard. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 8]

An even more troubling, though equally plausible scenario, is that a manufacturer could modify a 

halo vehicle to meet the truck definition with the express intent of minimizing obligations on the 

rest of its light truck fleet. At a January 19, 2012 public hearing in Philadelphia, PA on the 

proposed MY2017-2025 standards, a representative of Toyota Motor North America referred to 

the company’s new Prius V as a crossover vehicle. This model is classified as a station wagon in 

EPA’s fuel economy guide, and should be appropriately held to the more stringent passenger 

vehicle ('car') standard. However, if Toyota chose to apply a third row of seats, or to add a 4wd 

transmission and increase the vehicle’s ground clearance, the Prius V would be close to, if not 

already, meeting the non-passenger ('light truck') definition. Doing so could have a profound 
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effect on Toyota’s remaining truck fleet. According to fueleconomy.gov, the Prius V’s 

unadjusted 2-cycle fuel economy is 58.7 mpg; even assuming a 10 percent loss in (unadjusted) 

fuel consumption from applying 4wd and other modifications, the model would still achieve 53.4 

mpg – more than 20 mpg over the 2017 target specified for the Prius V’s 46.1 ft2 footprint. At a 

reasonable sales volume, this would create a massive windfall of credits, allowing Toyota to 

remain compliant while making very few improvements to the remainder of its light truck 

fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 8]

With examples such as the one above, it is clear that the set of criteria used to differentiate 

passenger and non-passenger vehicles is inadequate, providing automakers ample opportunity to 

game the system and undermine the benefits of the program. One solution is to adjust the target 

curves, particularly in the 45 (+/- 3) ft2 footprint range seen by many crossover vehicles, to 

minimize the gap between car and light truck targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 8]

Though I strongly support these standards, I am concerned about possible loopholes that 

automakers could exploit. Specifically: The proposed standards for light trucks are significantly 

weaker than for cars. In the past, automakers made vehicles bigger to qualify for weaker 

standards. Light truck standards should be strengthened to prevent automakers from gaming the 

systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A2, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 218-219.]

We're also very concerned that significantly weaker standards for light trucks could give auto 

makers an incentive to reclassify passenger vehicles as non-passenger vehicles.

For example, the gap of roughly six to ten MPG exist between car and light truck target 

stringencies in the footprint range seen by many crossover vehicles.

This gap is much larger than the fuel economy loss a crossover would face from adding fourwheel drive, which could enable it to qualify it for a weaker standard as a non-passenger vehicle.

Gaming of the system like this will cut down on the anticipated program benefits giving the 

sizable and growing popularity of the crossover vehicle segment. The agencies cannot afford to 

dismiss this issue.

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

In particular the UAW supports the aspects of the proposals that recognize the importance of 

balancing the challenges of adding fuel-economy improving technologies to the largest light 

trucks with the need to maintain the full functionality of these vehicles across a wide range of 

applications. Second, the UAW believes that the agencies made reasonable determinations 

regarding the shape and slope of the curves that describe the proposed requirement for any 

particular size vehicle. Third, the UAW is pleased that the proposed CAFE regulations maintain 

the alternative minimum standard for domestically manufactured passenger cars. This 

requirement was maintained in EISA as an express mechanism to ensure a certain level of 
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efficiency for the domestically-produced passenger car fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-

A2, p.2]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Through these comments, Volkswagen will outline our main concerns and will define the 

implications of key elements which will lead to the inequitable treatment amongst 

manufacturers. Volkswagen will conclude the comments with a series of proposals aimed at 

improving the overall balance of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 3]

It was Volkswagens’ position that all segments of vehicles within each compliance fleet should 

be capable of carrying an equitable burden in CO2 reduction per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 5]

a. Equal stringency for cars and trucks in the range of 4%/year for 2017-2021

It was Volkswagen’s position based on predictions for technical readiness and consumer 

affordability that an annual reduction in the range of 4% CO2 promoted a balanced regulation for 

both cars and trucks for 2017-2021. An equal stringency equitably distributes the burden for 

reduction across all segments within the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 5]

Further, Volkswagen explained that there are many uncertainties regarding the market 

acceptance, cost and benefits of technologies such as hybrids, plug-in hybrids, lightweight 

materials and advanced combustion engines. It was also Volkswagen’s position that stringency 

in the later phase of 2022-2025 could possibly be adjusted upward or downward following a 

midterm review that would provide more certainty over the cost, benefit and market forces 

surrounding more advanced technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 5]

In summary, Volkswagen’s principles offered an equitable regulation driving aggressive 

reductions from the entire light-duty vehicle market. Importantly, the Volkswagen framework 

did not penalize an auto manufacturer who is more focused on the passenger car market versus 

large work trucks. We also believed that footprint curves based on equal stringency regardless of 

footprint size did not penalize smaller trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 5]

Volkswagen contends that a regulation with equal stringency for both cars and trucks and with 

equal stringency across all footprints would result in a regulation that does not encourage 

manufacturers to increase footprint or change vehicle classifications. Achieving equal 

distribution would help assure that manufacturers focusing on passenger cars would continue to 

market or even expand this segment. Volkswagen also contends that a regulation structured in 

this manner does not place additional burden on affordable high volume vehicles that already 

save the most CO2 per market segment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 5-6]

a. Requires a stringency only for passenger cars that exceeds what Volkswagen predicted as a 

would be a both feasible and balanced requirement;
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2-86

b. Fails to provide equal treatment for all vehicles by requiring higher stringency for cars and 

lower for trucks;

c. Continues with aggressive requirements beyond 2021 based on critical assumptions about the 

market and technologies which are simply too uncertain to appropriately comprehend; [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 6]

With the publication of the SNOI and the subsequent NPRM, the agencies essentially followed 

the Volkswagen vision for reduced stringency in the first phase of the regulation (see Section 

1.1a). However, this only applied to the highest CO2 emitting segment of the light-duty fleet, 

trucks. Larger trucks in particular were provided with minimal CO2 reduction requirements 

through the early years of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 6]

The combination of lower stringency for larger trucks, combined with segment exclusive credit 

opportunities has the potential to distort the future light duty vehicle market. The agencies have 

disputed this claim, stating that work trucks have special needs and are challenged by the 

regulation even at the proposed stringency. In fact the agencies have contended that the work 

truck stringency is so great that even at the proposed levels they expect work truck 

manufacturers to earn credit in the passenger car segment and transfer that credit to the truck 

segment to assist truck segment compliance. If this is the case the agencies could have still 

created a regulation that was more equitable with equal stringency for cars and trucks. A 

regulation with stringency in the range of 4% for both segments would have resulted in extra 

credit in the passenger car segment that would have afforded work truck companies additional 

credit they could transfer to the truck category to offset the increased stringency of a balanced 

regulation compared to the lower stringency for trucks as proposed in the SNOI and NPRM. 

Volkswagen will expand on this argument in the comments that follow. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, pp. 6-7]

In summary, Volkswagen is concerned that the proposal will result in significant competitive 

inequity and will create market distortions affecting consumer purchase decisions. Furthermore, 

the proposal disproportionately impacts manufacturers who market primarily passenger cars 

while in turn benefitting producers of higher emitting large trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 7]

Consumers ultimately will select a vehicle which best balances their needs and wants with 

affordability. The market has evolved to include a broad set of vehicles with a wide variety of 

features and emissions. In spite of the regulations, the choices people make when selecting a 

vehicle will have the most influence on the overall light duty carbon emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 7]

Volkswagen understands that many consumers will continue to demand the utility provided by 

large trucks and pick-ups, either due to work or family requirements. Indeed, once again, two of 

the top-selling vehicles in the United States remain full-size pick-up trucks. Far into the future, 

the utility of these vehicles will continue to make them attractive to consumers. However 

Volkswagen feels that trucks and cars should be held to an equal percent burden for CO2
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reduction. Large trucks and pick-ups should not be singled out and provided a lesser 

requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 7]

Volkswagen contends that the policy reflected in the NPRM may disproportionately drive cost 

into passenger cars versus trucks and may ultimately discourage customer consideration of lower 

CO2 emitting passenger cars. Market segments should compete on the merits of their utility and 

affordability. Environmental regulations such as this CO2 and fuel economy proposal should not 

at the very least create an unintended benefit for higher emitting trucks. This seems 

counterintuitive to environmental and energy goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 7]

Volkswagen will further expand upon our positions within these comments and will offer a series 

of amendments aimed at improving the overall framework of the proposal. Clearly, we would 

like to see a more balanced approach that equalizes the compliance burden across the industry. In 

addition we will offer proposals to modify the flexibilities to recognize a broader set of 

technologies and be available to other market segments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 

7]

As discussed previously, the Volkswagen Group maintains that the stringency and credit 

inequities within this proposal create a serious competitive disadvantage for Volkswagen. The 

framework of the proposal does not align with our key principles for a balanced program. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 7]

The following sections highlight the implications of such an inequitable proposal. Much of the 

competitive disadvantage for Volkswagen stems from the fact that Volkswagen as a group has 

the highest percentage car/truck split of any larger manufacturer (80% cars/20% trucks) in the 

US market. As a result, our fleet will be subjected to the most stringent standards, without the 

benefit of several key credits being offered to higher-emitting segments. This is in spite of the 

fact that due to the high percentage of passenger cars, Volkswagen has some of the 

lowest corporate emissions. Volkswagen remains unconvinced that a fleet composed primarily of 

lower-emitting passenger cars should be subjected to the most stringency standard, and carry 

such a disproportionate burden for CO2 reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 7-8]

Volkswagen is concerned that the differences in stringency levels between passenger cars and 

trucks as proposed within the NPRM creates an inequity in the projected corporate targets that 

each manufacturer must meet. What is immediately evident is that manufacturers who market a 

larger percentage of passenger cars versus light trucks will face a more challenging compliance 

outlook. The practical effect is that passenger car focused manufacturers will face a higher cost 

of compliance and will be at a price disadvantage in the marketplace. The resulting disparity 

amongst manufacturers is illustrated in some of the analysis included within the RIA. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 8]

Chapter 3 of EPA’s RIA provides projections for car and truck targets for major manufacturers

for the proposal and several other alternative scenarios. Volkswagen analyzed Table 3.8-3 from 

the RIA which provides EPA’s projections through 2021. Disregarding several niche 

manufacturers (Aston Martin, Lotus, etc) it is apparent from the table that the proposal creates a 
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higher burden on Volkswagen compared to many of the larger manufacturers, especially those 

with truck-centric fleets such as Ford or GM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 8]

As shown below in Table 2-1, Volkswagen’s 2021 car target is projected by EPA to be 167 g/mi 

CO2 which is 6 g/mi less than the fleet average. When compared to manufacturers such as GM or 

Ford, Volkswagen’s target is expected to be 9-10 g/mi more stringent. Volkswagen’s truck target 

shows a similar situation. [See Table 2-1 on p. 8 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 8]

However analyzing the car and truck fleet separately does not show the full extent of the 

disparity. Table 2-1 also shows the combined sales weighted average target projected by EPA 

and further calculates the car/truck sales mixture. The car/truck split was not shown in the RIA, 

but can be derived from the individual compliance fleet and combined fleet target. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 8]

Table 2-1 shows Volkswagen having a combined sales weighted target of 184 g/mi. EPA is 

estimating Volkswagen to continue into the future with an 80% PC and 20% light truck share. 

This is consistent with Volkswagen’s sales history and current projection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 8]

Ford and GM are shown to have approximate sales weighted targets of 205 and 218 g/mi 

respectively. This is 21 and 34 grams less stringent when compared to Volkswagen. 

Furthermore, it appears that the combined fleet averages for these two OEMs were made 

assuming only 49% truck penetration for GM and 33% truck penetration for Ford. Volkswagen 

notes that these levels of truck penetration are far less than GM and Ford’s current and historic 

sales split between PC and LT. For example, Ford’s 2011 truck share was approximately 63% of 

their total sales, nearly one-third of which is the F150. GM’s truck market share was estimated at 

65% based on 2011 sales data. Projections for major manufacturers are illustrated below in 

Figure 2-1. [See Figure 2-1 on p. 9 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 8]

Volkswagen is concerned that the car/truck split assumed for different manufacturers may be 

unlikely to prove accurate. As illustrated in Table 2-2, had the EPA RIA calculation applied a 

truck estimate more consistent with market trends for both Ford and GM, the combined sales 

weighted fleet average would have approached 232 and 227 g/mi. This would further expand the 

disparity between corporate standards, resulting in Volkswagen being held to a 46 g/mi more 

stringent standard. This is 25% disparity in corporate target levels. This additional 46 g/mi 

translates into approximately 9 metric tons of additional CO2 emissions per vehicle sold by these 

manufacturers than by Volkswagen. [See Table 2-2 on p. 9 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 9]

Volkswagen recognizes that the agencies are privy to confidential product plans supplied by 

manufacturers and that the agencies rely on this data to support future projections. However, the 

US has been averaging a near 50/50% split between cars and trucks for many years. Even at 

times of peak gasoline prices experienced during the past few years, interest in light trucks may 

have waned, however not to such a drastic extent as indicated by this radical shift in future 
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product plans. Most disturbing is the recent trend back to light trucks even with fuel prices 

stabilizing near record highs. Volkswagen sees no evidence that would suggest a near 30% 

decline in truck market share from domestic OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 9]

Volkswagen is not privy to strategic plans by competitors, but we find it unlikely for OEMs 

historically focused on truck sales to so readily abandon what has proven to be a successful and 

profitable market segment. Dropping 30% truck share for a company like Ford would be 

equivalent to Ford cancelling their entire line-up of F150s, a vehicle which has remained a top, if 

not the top, seller in the US for many years. In addition, the proposals preferential treatment for 

large trucks and pick-ups further makes it unlikely that manufacturers would now prefer to 

market cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 9-10]

NHTSA states in the NPRM that 'the increases in technology application necessary to achieve 

the projected improvement in fuel economy will entail considerable monetary outlays'. 

Volkswagen agrees. NHTSA further estimates that the program will require a combined 

car/truck industry outlay of approximately $157 billion for 2017 through 2025. What is lost in 

the broad statement is the disparity in investment required for cars versus trucks. As shown in 

below in Table 2-3, the outlay for passenger cars far outweighs the investment required by light 

trucks. [See Table 2-3 on p. 10 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 10]

It is again important to stress that even within the truck segment, the stringency varies 

significantly. The investment data was not disaggregated to reflect investment requirements 

within the truck segment. Given the minimal requirement on larger trucks, Volkswagen must 

assume that the bulk of the truck investment shown in Table 2-3 is most likely concentrated 

amongst smaller trucks and SUVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 10]

The resulting cost increase disparity amongst manufacturers further illustrates the inequity of the 

program. As shown in Table 2-4, by 2021 the cost to Volkswagen per car as a result of the 2012-

2016 and 2017+ regulation will exceed over $3300 per car. This is more than double the 

expected price increase for the fleet as a whole. [See Table 2-4 on p. 10 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 10]

Volkswagen continues to support a 4% per year stringency reduction from both passenger cars 

and light trucks as being the best balance between environmental objectives and market 

acceptance. However, given the commitments made by stakeholders to the overall framework 

provided within this proposal, Volkswagen offers the following amendments. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 26]

Volkswagen continues to support the concept that equal percent reductions in the order of 4% 

per year can be applied to both the car and truck fleet. In addition, the percent reduction for each 

fleet can also be equally applied across all footprint sizes. However, as mentioned above, given 

the extensive commitments made by stakeholders to the SNOI, Volkswagen finds it unlikely that 

the agencies will incorporate our principle for equal reductions from all cars and trucks. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 27]
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Provide an alternative CO2 reduction pathway for passenger cars which could provide needed 

flexibility and incentives to the segment of the fleet being most challenged with the highest 

annual CO2 percent reductions (5% per year for Cars); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 

2 and 4]

The NPRM requires on average a 5% annual improvement in CO2 emissions from passenger 

cars. This task is spread equitably across the footprint range of cars. Figure 2-2 illustrates yearly 

CO2 targets for cars at the upper cut-point (56 ft2), lower cut-point (41 ft2) and EPA projected 

average car footprint (45 ft2). During the course of technical discussions with agency staff, 

Volkswagen supported a 4% annual percent reduction for passenger cars. Volkswagen based this 

position on both technical and market evidence. [See Figure 2-2 on p. 11 of Docket number 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 11]

EPA has predicted that over the lifetime of passenger cars covered by this rulemaking, the 

increasingly more stringent targets for cars will offset upwards of 1.2 billion metric tons of CO2. 

Light duty trucks which on average face 3.5% annual CO2 reduction will contribute 

approximately 800 million metric tons of reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 11]

EPA predicts that during the 2017-2025 timeframe, the fleet will comprise of roughly 65% 

passenger car and 35% light truck. This is according to vehicle classification as defined by 

NHTSA. Figure 2-3 illustrates an example of EPA’s projected MY2020 fleet distribution along 

with the accompanying CO2 inventory by segment. [See Figure 2-3 on p. 12 of Docket number 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 11]

When normalized on a percent basis of per vehicle emissions (including VMT), passenger cars 

are expected to carry a higher burden of reduction as shown in Table 2-5. [See Table 2-5 on p. 12 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, 

p. 12]

What is apparent in this data is that passenger cars are underweighted in emissions relative to 

their market share and trucks are overweighed in emissions. There is a value to the environment 

in promoting passenger cars and not incentivizing a move towards trucks. Incentivizing a shift 

away from cars and towards trucks will have a contradictory effect on the overall program GHG 

reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 12]

The NPRM extends aggressive reductions for passenger cars into the 2017+ timeframe. Less 

demanding reductions are required for trucks. As discussed previously, Volkswagen contends 

that this will create market distortion and an incentive for a manufacture to reconsider future 

plans. In order to minimize the impact that this inequity could have within the market, an 

alternative pathway could be tailored to encourage manufacturers to continue offering cars, 

especially economy models which may otherwise have become less attractive in the 

marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 26]

Volkswagen proposes that EPA and NHTSA supplement the NPRM by including an alternative 

passenger car percent annual CO2 reduction pathway. This pathway could consist of a series of 

annual reductions applied throughout the time period of the rule in lieu of the 5% per year 
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currently proposed. Volkswagen believes that a combination of annual percent reductions can be 

determined which could help provide additional flexibility for passenger car fleets. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 26]

In principle, the concept of an alternative pathway would include a combination of lower percent 

reductions in early years coupled with increasing reductions in later years should technology and 

market factors make this feasible. Indeed this is similar to the treatment being afforded to the 

truck fleet. Volkswagen asks that a similar approach be offered for cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 26]

In addition to the alternative pathway being a compliance flexibility, Volkswagen believes it 

could also serve as an incentive to promote and provide support for the passenger car fleet. 

Volkswagen believes that a pathway could be developed which would provide support to lowemitting passenger cars to the same degree that other market segments, are being incentivized 

through their unique credit programs. As an example, the agencies could benchmark the degree 

of support being provided to full-size trucks. We contend that this is a reasonable approach and 

would not amount to an excessive 'loophole' or 'give-away' since it would be consistent with 

flexibilities found to be useful elsewhere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 26-27]

d. Requires unequal % CO2 reductions across the truck fleet --large trucks are benefited with 

minimal requirements; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 6]

Volkswagen maintains our original position that 4% per year for both cars and trucks has the 

most potential to create a balanced, effective proposal. Further, our suggestion is that the 4% 

reduction be equally applied to all sizes of vehicles within each compliance category. EPA 

claims that the average truck stringency for 2017-2025 is approximately 3.5% per year. This is 

less than the average reduction suggested by Volkswagen. In addition the 3.5% is a broad 

characterization of the burden being applied to the truck category as a whole. Volkswagen points 

out that upon closer examination the 3.5% is not equally applied across the whole category. As 

illustrated in Table 2-7, it is clear that large light trucks are provided significantly lower percent 

reduction stringencies when compared to the projected average sized truck, or a small truck with 

a footprint closer to the lower curve cut-point. [See Table 2-7 on p. 19 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 18]

This is especially evident within the first several years of the program when the stringency for 

larger trucks hovers around or even less than 1%. The least efficient vehicles offered in the 

market will be given at three years before any significant increases in efficiency are 

required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 19]

The result is inequitable compliance obligations for various types of trucks. Figure 2-8 illustrates 

the decreasing CO2 targets in g/mile CO2 for trucks at the lower and upper footprint ranges. The 

dashed lines illustrate a forward trending projection of the 2012-2016 stringencies carried 

forward into the 2017-2025 timeframe. [See Figure 2-8 on p. 19 of Docket number EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 19]
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In general for the smaller trucks, the reductions for 2017-2025 are roughly in line with the 

reduction trend from 2012-2016. However, for the larger light trucks, the proposed targets 

deviate away from the 2012-2016 trend line becoming less stringent on a percent basis. The blue 

shaded area is a representation of the pullback in the stringency provided for these vehicles. 

Further, the green shaded area in Figure 2-8 includes the additional credits available explicitly to 

'game changing' full-size pick-up trucks that compose the majority of vehicles populating this 

footprint range, i.e. the full-size trucks credits. These credits further expand the area of the 

shaded region, increasing the gap between small and large trucks even further. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 20]

It is important to note that the top two selling vehicles for 2011, the Ford F150 and Chevrolet 

Silverado, with combined sales of nearly 1 million vehicles (approximately 8% of the entire US 

market light duty market) will be eligible to reside within the blue and green region of Figure 2-

8. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 20]

The shaded region in Figure 2-8 not only represents competitive inequity, but also lost 

opportunity for CO2 reduction from the very segment of the fleet with the highest emissions. 

Volkswagen acknowledges that vehicles within this footprint range may feature duty-cycles 

which may preclude adoption of certain fuel saving technologies or features, i.e. heavy duty 

towing or off-road capability. This however is not a unique challenge limited to vehicles with 

larger footprints. Smaller SUVs or trucks in some cases may feature near equal capability and 

consumers are no less demanding to this segment versus others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 20]

Some stakeholders have claimed that the latter half of the 2012-2016 rule created an excessive 

stringency on larger light trucks, and that these vehicles were somehow more challenged than 

other vehicles. The lower stringency being proposed for 2017-2025 is intended to provide 

'breathing room' to allow time for the larger trucks to catch up with the requirements. 

Volkswagen disagrees. We again refer to Table 2-7 which clearly shows for 2012-2016 that 

larger trucks already benefited from lower percent requirements compared to less-emitting 

smaller trucks and SUVs. In addition, the RIA indicates that a leading full-size truck already 

available in 2011 is close to being compliant with standards for the 2017+ timeframe. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 20]

Table 3.12-1 in the EPA RIA showcases vehicles which are at or near compliance with the 

2017+ expected targets. Included in this list is a non-hybridized version of a large pick-up truck 

which remains the number one selling vehicle in the US, selling over 500,000 units per year. 

EPA’s data indicates that the 2011MY of this vehicle achieves 372 g/mi and has about a 4% gap 

from complying with its 2017 targets. EPA included assumptions regarding A/C credit usage in 

making this determination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 20]

Volkswagen created an internal model to project the CO2 performance of this vehicle. The model 

disaggregated the sales into various powertrain and wheelbase (affects footprint) combinations as 

shown in Figure 2-9. For simplification, all the pathways are not shown. The model then applies 

publically available EPA fuel economy and CO2 emissions data for each of the resulting 

pathways and compares them with the resulting footprint target which varies based on 
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wheelbase. Some of the combinations earn credits, while others earn debits. The compliance of 

the model as a whole was then determined assuming credit transfer amongst the 

powertrain/footprint combinations. [See Figure 2-9 on p. 21 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 20]

The RIA compares current model year performance with the expected footprint target for 2017 

and beyond. For this sample vehicle, EPA claims that the truck will fall short of its target by 4%. 

This assumes that the vehicle receives no fuel saving technology upgrades from 2011 to 2017. 

Volkswagen’s calculations confirms the claim that the stringency imposed on this vehicle by the 

2012-2016 program indeed is challenging in the later years and results in a debit for 2015 and 

2016. However, it should be noted that the vehicle earns credits in 2012 and 2013 sufficient to 

cover the debits in 2015 and 2016. Regardless, the credits would be consumed and the vehicle 

still faces a shortfall beginning in 2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 21]

What is important to consider is that the RIA shortfall assumes no application of fuel saving 

technology from 2011 to 2017, a full seven years. Volkswagen exercised the model by using two 

pathways to apply fuel saving technology. The first was to apply an average annual improvement 

for each model year, using the average of 1-2% per year as has been claimed in the past as a 

reasonable annual improvement in fuel economy. The other pathway recognizes that 

improvements may not necessarily be made on an annual basis and instead are applied in 

incremental steps at regular redesign intervals. For this pathway Volkswagen applied a suite of 

low-cost technologies4to the vehicle using EPA assumed costs and effectiveness and waited until 

2017 to make the update. This provides a five year design cycle assuming the sample truck was 

potentially redesigned in 2011. An additional application of technologies is made in 2022, again 

providing for a 5-year design cycle. The approach results in an average year-over-year reduction 

of 1.2%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 21]

Furthermore, Volkswagen refrained from assuming any adoption of HEV technologies for this 

vehicle. Assuming that the minimum deployment thresholds are met, this would have triggered 

the 'game changing' technology credit of 10 or 20 g/mi CO2 depending on the degree of 

hybridization. Volkswagen did not include the HEV incentive because the model showed that the 

credits were simply not needed. Either of the conventional technology pathways provided 

significant compliance margins resulting in the pick-up truck generating credits throughout most 

of the 2012-2025 timeframe. The HEV incentive would have only 'piled on' to the credits being 

earned resulting in a windfall for this vehicle. Unless the credits were needed in another segment 

of the fleet, they would not be worth the investment required to earn them. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 21]

However, EPA has stated in the NPRM that it is their understanding that credits will only be 

transferred from cars to trucks and not vice-versa. Therefore, one can expect limited to no 

hybridization of this full-size truck. This does create doubt regarding the need to create the fullsize truck credit incentive for 'game-changing' technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-

A1, p. 22]
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Modest application of conventional technologies to full-size pick-ups, coupled with the benefit 

of low annual CO2 reduction requirements, more than provides for a comfortable compliance 

margin for this segment of the fleet. Volkswagen questions why the other segments of the truck 

fleet, let alone the car fleet, must then be taxed with the role of carrying the more significant CO2

reduction burden? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 22]

As discussed in Section 2.7, Volkswagen predicts that credits will be accumulated within the 

large truck and full-size truck segment due to the combination of lower stringency and segment 

exclusive benefits. Should this occur, then the fundamental premise upon which the reduced 

stringencies and unique credits are based will need to be reevaluated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 27]

On the other hand, the NPRM and other stakeholders have claimed that large trucks face the 

most challenging reductions. Volkswagen disagrees. However, even if this proves to be true, 

then large trucks would be at or above their CO2 g/mi targets, and would be mired in debits. 

Credits earned by this segment simply would not exist. Therefore there is no need for nonexistent credits to be bankable or transferable to other segments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 27]

Either way, large trucks, by claiming to be more uniquely challenged than any other segment of 

vehicles covered by this regulation are being afforded significant benefits not awarded anywhere 

else. It is therefore reasonable that the agency confine the reach of the benefit within the large 

truck segment which is demanding it. What is unreasonable is to claim such a degree of 

excessive hardship as to warrant less than one-fifth the stringency requirement of other segments 

and then expect that benefit to be transferable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 27]

2 EPA projects the average footprint for trucks at approximately 53.5 sq-ft for MY2017-2025.

3 The upper cut-point of the Light Truck curve changes throughout 2017-2025, therefore VW 

used 72 sq-ft as a representation of vehicles near or above the upper cut-point. This is the 

footprint of a major large pick-up truck representative of vehicles within this class.

4 The technologies include electric power steering (EPS) + improved accessories (IAAC1) + 

aggressive shift logic (ASL-1) + low rolling-resistance tires (LRRT) + and low-drag brakes 

(LDB). Total cost was less than $300 and VW expects that this selection of technologies is 

neither complicated by synergy effects nor degrades towing and off-road capability, except 

possibly for the LRRT which may then be an option. MY2022 applies level-1 mass reduction 

(MR-1) and a high efficiency gearbox (HEG).

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 107.]
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Additionally, in the early years of the proposed standards, pickup trucks are not required to 

improve with the same rate as passenger cars, but there are incentives for manufacturers to apply 

advanced technologies to pickup trucks. So it's critical that the efficiency of the trucks not lag 

behind cars.

Organization: Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S.

To reduce the incentives to upsize the passenger car and light truck fleets, the slopes of the fuel 

economy curves for passenger cars and light trucks should be flattened with corresponding 

changes made to the CO2 curves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

Our recent analysis (attached) suggests that manufacturers likely have a profitable incentive to 

upsize their vehicle fleets in response to the footprint-based standards, through a combination of 

adjusting prices to shift production to larger vehicles and increasing vehicle footprint during 

redesign. [See the attachment in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A2] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

NHTSA and EPA should develop a model to analyze profitable incentives to upsize the vehicle 

fleet in response to the footprint-based standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

The analysis also indicates that the incentive to upsize is greater for light trucks than for 

passenger cars, encouraging a further divergence of the sizes of these two classes. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

The slope for the light truck curves should be flattened by a larger percentage than the slope of 

the passenger car curves to reduce the incentive to upsize light trucks to a larger extent than 

passenger cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

Minimum standards for light trucks should be set at a high-enough level to ensure that fuel 

economy improvements in the total fleet are close to projected levels even if the production of 

light trucks increases relative to passenger cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 1]

NHTSA and EPA should conduct sensitivity analyses of consumer preference scenarios on 

projected improvements of fuel economy and GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9447-A1, p. 1]

Incentives to upsize the vehicle fleet

While we understand that NHTSA and EPA wish to reduce incentives to downsize the vehicle 

fleet, we believe that the proposed standards overshoot that goal and actually create incentives to 

upsize the fleet. We recently conducted an analysis, published in Energy Policy, which tests the 

hypothesis that the footprint-based fuel economy standards do not create a profit incentive for 

manufacturers to increase the average size of their vehicle fleet (attached). The analysis 

considered a very large range of average consumer preferences for vehicle size, fuel economy, 

and acceleration performance so that the set of plausible scenarios of consumer preferences are 
EPA Response to Comments

2-96

captured in the analysis. The findings indicate that the incentive for manufacturers to upsize their 

fleets exists over almost all of these scenarios. Only in the scenarios where average consumer 

preference for footprint is very low ($340 per sq ft) and average preference for acceleration 

performance is very high ($5,500 per 0.01 hp/lb) do the results indicate an incentive to slightly 

downsize the fleet. In all other scenarios, the incentive to upsize the fleet leads to substantially 

(5-15%) higher fuel consumption and GHG emissions than would have otherwise been achieved 

without an incentive to upsize the fleet. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the incentive to 

upsize is larger for light trucks than for passenger cars, increasing the divergence of sizes of 

these two classes. This finding needs to be considered from the traffic safety perspective since 

the relative size of vehicles in collisions is an important risk factor. [See the attachment in 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 

2]

The results of our study suggest that the risk of backsliding during MYs 2017-2025 is 

substantial. Therefore, we encourage NHTSA and EPA to revise the standards to reduce the 

incentives to upsize the U.S. vehicle fleet. The slopes of the fuel economy curves for passenger 

cars and light trucks should be flattened (with corresponding changes made to the CO2 curves) to 

reduce incentives for manufacturers to upsize their passenger car and light truck fleets. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 2]

Furthermore, the fuel economy curve for light trucks should be flattened to a larger extent than 

the passenger car curve to reduce the incentive to upsize light trucks even further than passenger 

cars, thereby increasing the divergence of vehicle size between these two classes. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 2]

Unfortunately, the proposed rule increases the risk of backsliding by making the MY2017-2025 

light truck curves steeper than the MY2011-2016 curves. These steeper curves further raise the 

incentives to produce more light trucks overall (compared to passenger cars) and more large light 

trucks (compared to small light trucks). NHTSA and EPA state that the light truck curve was 

made steeper because large pickup trucks would be less capable of achieving further 

improvements in fuel efficiency without compromising load carrying and towing capacity. 

However, because the standards are fleet average standards, no specific vehicle must meet its 

target as specified by the curve. Therefore, efficiency improvements in smaller light trucks could 

offset the difficulties of improving fuel efficiency of larger light trucks. We encourage NHTSA 

and EPA to revise the light truck curves so that the risks of upsizing are reduced. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 2]

Improve analysis of incentives to upsize the vehicle fleet.

The risk of upsizing the vehicle fleet warrants a greater level of analysis. While NHTSA and 

EPA state that the fuel economy and CO2 curves were chosen to minimize any incentive to 

increase or decrease vehicle size, no quantitative analysis is presented to support this. Potential 

incentives for automakers to upsize their vehicle fleet—by increasing sales of larger vehicles, or 

making vehicle models larger during redesign, or some combination—need to be carefully 

analyzed to ensure that the projected improvements in fuel economy and GHG emissions are 

realized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 3]
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NHTSA and EPA state that they do not consider any incentives to upsize the vehicle fleet in their 

analysis because they believe (1) that production shifts toward larger vehicles would run counter 

to market demand and (2) that redesigning vehicles to increase their footprint would be 

significant enough to be unattractive as a measure to take solely to reduce compliance burdens. 

However, the agencies do not provide any data to support that average vehicle footprint has been 

decreasing over time. By EPA’s own data, production of small cars has been decreasing since the 

1990’s and production of large trucks has been increasing. 2 Furthermore, it is clearly difficult to 

predict future consumer preferences for vehicle size and other relevant vehicle attributes. 

Therefore, sensitivity analyses are needed to assess the impact of changes in consumer 

preferences on the projected improvements in fuel economy and GHG emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 4]

We encourage NHTSA and EPA to develop a model to assess the risks of vehicle upsizing. The 

model should analyze manufacturers’ profitable incentives to adjust vehicle dimensions as well 

as adjust the prices of their vehicles to shift production among their fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9447-A1, p. 4]

1 Attribute-based standards can guarantee that the average fuel economy of the total fleet is at 

least as great as the lower-bound fuel economy of the light truck standard (the minimum fuel 

economy target assigned to any light-duty vehicle). However, in the proposed standards this 

value is only 25.25 mpg for MY2020. Requirements to set the standards such that they are 

technically feasible and economically practicable preclude raising this value to 35 mpg for 

MY2020. Therefore, the only way to ensure that the total fleet has a combined fuel economy 

average of 35 mpg by 2020 is to establish additional “backstops” in the standards.

2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Light Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide 

Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 through 2009. EPA420-R-09-014. pp. 23-24. 

Available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/cert/mpg/fetrends/420r09014.pdf

Response:

EPA received a significant number of detailed comments on the shape of the curves –

many of which questioned the relative stringency of the car and truck curves, and maintained that 

they favor trucks at the expense of cars. Others commented that the slope of the curves will 

create incentives for manufacturers to upsize the fleet, or that the location of cutpoints will 

encourage downsizing of the smallest vehicles. Descriptions of the agencies’ methods for 

determining curve slope, cutpoints, and relative car and truck stringencies are provided in 

sections II.C.4 and 5, section III.B.2, and sections III.D.6 and 7 of the preamble, and chapters

2.4.2, 2.5.1, and 2.5.2 of the joint TSD. Detailed responses to most of the comments received on 

these topics are provided in these sections, while a summary of these responses, along with 

additional information, is provided below. 

Response to comments that the curves are too steep
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ACEEE objected to the agencies’ adjustments to the truck curves based on density, which 

together with the revised curve-fitting methodology (revised from the MYs 2012-2016 rule) had 

the result of increasing the truck curve slope for this rule. The commenter further stated that in 

the proposal, the EPA did not provide evidence that load-carrying and towing capability of fullsize trucks might be compromised. The agencies have added an in-depth explanation of the 

justification for revising the curve fitting methodology in chapter 2.4.2.4 of the Joint TSD and 

III.D.6.c. The main points of this explanation are summarized here: In discussions with large 

truck manufacturers prior to the proposal, they expressed their belief (and EPA agrees) that the 

light truck standard should be somewhat steeper after MY 2016, primarily because, after more 

than ten recent years of progressive increases in the stringency of applicable CAFE standards, 

manufacturers of large pickups would have limited options to comply with more stringent 

standards. Given the relatively few platforms which comprise the majority of the sales at the 

largest truck footprints, inappropriately stringent standards for this important segment of the 

truck fleet would require overly aggressive advanced technology penetration rates. See preamble 

Table III-35 , where under alternative 2, we project that 20% of the light truck vehicle fleet will 

be MHEV or HEV ( the projection is 18% MHEV) in MY 2021; . By comparison, the final rule 

is projected to be 13% MHEV & HEV (11% MHEV). In MY 2025, the rate of strong hybrid 

(HEV) technology more than doubles in the 20g more stringent alternative standard compared to 

the final standard (Table III-37)., The agencies were concerned at proposal, and remain 

concerned, about issues of lead time and cost with regard to manufacturers of these work 

vehicles. EPA further believes that inappropriately stringent standards could create an incentive 

for these manufacturers to choose to downpower, modify the structure, or otherwise reduce the 

utility of these work vehicles. Therefore, the agencies revised the curve-fitting methodology, 

and thus changed the slope of the truck curve from the curve shape in the MY 2016 standards, in 

order to provide a clearer path toward compliance for manufacturers of these vehicles, and 

reduce the potential that new standards would compromise utility characteristics such as loadcarrying and towing capability.

While the comments do not dispute the validity of the curve-fitting method, or the 

appropriateness of considering the unique requirements of trucks, ACEEE objected to the 

contribution that these analysis techniques make towards achieving a policy objective, stating 

“we believe that adjusting the analytical approach to yield curves satisfying certain policy 

considerations is inadvisable. It would be preferable to choose the most robust analytical 

approach, and then to make exceptions as needed for a limited period to accommodate those 

policy considerations, and to explain the targets in those terms.” ACEEE also stated that 

“subjectivity to the technical analysis invites unnecessary challenges to the standard-setting 

process”. EPA notes that a curve fitting process such as the one conducted for this rule will 

inevitably involve choices between various reasonable approaches. EPA maintains that the 

approach used for this rule is both reasonable and appropriate. EPA appropriately considered 

factors of technology cost, feasibility, lead time, and consumer acceptance in applying the 

density adjustment to the truck curve, in order to achieve the policy goal of avoiding incentives 

for manufacturers to reduce the utility of their work vehicles. A more detailed response to 

ACEEE’s comments on this topic are provided in section II.C.4.d of the preamble and chapter 

2.4.2.4 of the Joint TSD.

ACEEE requested further clarification on specific text in chapter 2.4.2.10 of the Joint 

TSD, stating “It is also puzzling that the agencies’ analysis shows that trucks’ HP-to-weight ratio 
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increases only slightly with footprint (TSD p.2-17), yet “pick-up trucks must be more powerful, 

than their low ‘density’ nature would statistically suggest.” If pick-up trucks have high 

horsepower and low weight, their HP-to-weight ratios should be especially high. An explanation 

of this apparent contradiction would be helpful”. In response, EPA’s statistical analysis does 

indeed show that the HP-to-weight rations are especially high. This is not in contradiction with 

the observation that pick-up trucks must be more powerful than would otherwise be expected for 

a low density vehicle. 

Whitefoot and Skerlos submitted their findings supporting commenters’ contention that 

the proposed (and now final) curve shapes create an inherent incentive to upsize the fleet (which 

would dilute the rules’ benefits), and recommended that the curve slopes be flattened to reduce 

this perceived incentive. This paper was referenced by other commenters (ACEEE, CBD, 

NACAA, Honda) in support of their comments urging a flattening of the curves. EPA 

recognizes the significant amount of effort that went into the analysis of Whitefoot and Skerlos, 

and considers that the concepts presented have potential merit. However, EPA notes that the 

authors assumed different inputs than the agencies actually used in the MYs 2012-2016 rule 

regarding the baseline fleet, the cost and efficacy of potential future technologies, and the 

relationship between vehicle footprint and fuel economy. Were the agencies to use the 

Whitefoot and Skerlos methodology with the actual inputs to the MYs 2012-2016 rules, it is 

likely that different results would be obtained from those in the Whitefoot and Skerlos study. 

Whitefoot and Skerlos acknowledged the potential uncertainty when interpreting their results: 

“designing footprint-based fuel-economy standards in practice such that manufacturers have no 

incentive to adjust the size of their vehicles appears elusive at best and impossible at worst.” 

EPA recognizes that based on economic and consumer demand factors that are external to this 

rule, the distribution of footprints in the future may be different (either smaller or larger) than 

what is projected in this rule. However, EPA continues to believe that there will not be 

significant shifts in this distribution as a direct consequence of this rule. 

CBD, in addition to citing the Whitefoot and Skerlos study, commented that the previous 

shift in the fleet from cars to trucks was the result of previous difference in car and truck 

stringencies, and that in this rule, “the fact that incentives for upsizing would be created simply 

cannot be disputed”. EPA disagrees. While no single vehicle need meet its emissions target, for 

manufacturers to comply with these standards, efficiency improvements will be required of all 

vehicles, cars and trucks, large and small. The current standards are different from previous 

standards in terms of stringency, the use of a footprint attribute, and the lack of a provision 

allowing manufacturers to pay a penalty for noncompliance. We therefore do not believe it is 

justifiable to draw conclusions about manufacturers’ responses to this rule based upon responses 

to previous flat CAFE standards.

IPI also maintained that the standards would encourage upsizing, and proposed that the 

curves should be flat. IPI is therefore suggesting that the GHG standard should not be attributebased, although they acknowledged that EPCA/EISA expressly requires that CAFE standards be 

attribute-based and defined in terms of mathematical functions. For purposes of harmonization 

(in addition to the reasons articulated in TSD 2.1 and 2.2), EPA has also issued an attribute based 

standard. The agencies have concluded that a properly designed footprint-based approach 

provides the best means of achieving the basic policy goals, as outlined in section II.C.2 of the 
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preamble, while not creating inappropriate incentives to increase or reduce vehicle size in ways 

that could increase fuel consumption and GHG emissions, or impact overall safety.

Response to comments that the cutpoints should be adjusted

IIHS expressed some concern that the location of the cutpoint at the lower extreme curve 

where footprint is smallest would encourage manufacturers to downsize vehicles at or below the 

cutpoint in order to gain additional credits. The commenter proposed that the cutpoint be moved 

further to left to reduce the likelihood of this type of downsizing. Global Automakers proposed 

setting the cutpoint for the smallest light trucks at approximately ten percent of sales (as for 

passenger cars) rather than at 41 square feet. The comments from IIHS and Global Automakers 

represent two opposing positions on the placement of the left cutpoints. EPA agrees with IIHS 

that moving the 41 square foot cutpoint to an even smaller value would additionally discourage 

downsizing of the smallest vehicles. However, as discussed in section II.C.5.a of the preamble, 

EPA believes that consumer preferences are likely to remain such that manufacturers will be 

unlikely to deliberately respond to today’s standards by downsizing the smallest vehicles. For 

manufacturers, very small footprint vehicles create additional design challenges for the 

packaging of components and occupants, as well as the need for additional safety equipment to 

compensate for reduced crush spaces. In EPA’s judgment, placing the lower cutpoints at 41 

square feet for both car and truck curves continues to strike an appropriate balance between (a) 

not discouraging manufacturers from introducing new small vehicle models in the U.S. and (b) 

not encouraging manufacturers to downsize small vehicles. EPA will review trends in footprint 

size in the car and truck markets and reassess the appropriateness of the lower cutpoint position 

during the mid-term evaluation.

Several commenters maintained that placing the right cutpoint for trucks at 74 square feet 

(compared to 66 square feet in the MYs 2012-2016 rule) would reduce stringency for these 

vehicles (ACEEE) and possibly encourage upsizing (Sierra Club, Volkswagen), even though

there is no safety-related reason to discourage downsizing of these trucks. ACEEE went on to 

point out that in the MY2012-2016 rule, the agencies rejected requests to increase the cutpoint 

from 66 square feet. EPA agrees that the approach used in this rule is different from the curve 

fitting approach used in the MY2012-2016 rule. As a result of this revised curve fitting 

approach, we now account for more truck models that have footprints greater than 66 square feet. 

Specifically, as described in chapter 2.4.2.10 of the Joint TSD, some models of pickup trucks 

which, for example, are available in different cab configurations with different wheelbases, have 

been disaggregated for this rule and are represented individually, which leads to a slightly 

different outcome in the regression results than had they remained aggregated.

Two commenters suggested that the agencies provide an alternate emissions target for 

light trucks larger than 60 square feet (Sierra Club) or 66 square feet (ACEEE) that exceed the 

sales projected in the rule. In response, in EPA’s judgement, there is minimal risk that 

manufacturers would respond to this upward extension of the cutpoint by deliberately increasing 

the size of light trucks that are already at the upper end of marketable vehicle sizes. Such 

vehicles have distinct size, maneuverability, fuel consumption, storage, and other characteristics, 

and are likely not suited for all consumers in all usage scenarios. Further, larger vehicles 

typically also have additional production costs that make it unlikely that these vehicles will 

become the predominant vehicles in the fleet. For this reason, and others described in section 
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II.C.5.b of the preamble and chapter 2.5.2 of the joint TSD, the EPA does not expect that 

gradually extending the cutpoint to 74 square feet will create incentives to upsize large trucks.

Therefore, EPA does not believe that the suggested provision of an alternate emissions target for 

the largest light trucks that exceed projected sales is warranted.

Response to comments on the difference in car and truck stringencies

The comments on the relative car and truck stringency were largely divided between 

NGOs and OEMs that were concerned with the shape and relative rate of increase of the truck 

curve, and OEMs who expressed concern about their ability to comply with a large truck 

standard that continued to increase in stringency at the rate of the MY 2016 standard.

ICCT and CBD commented that the lower annual rate of improvement for light trucks 

from MYs 2017 to 2021 will potentially undermine the benefits of the rule. CBD went on to 

state that the consideration of the unique attributes of trucks “does nothing to explain the lack of 

the required ratable annual increases”, and that “the rulemaking demands the least from the most 

profitable segment of the automotive industry”. CBD further stated that there is no showing that 

light trucks, including pickups, cannot both preserve hauling and towing utility and achieve 

aggressive fuel economy. Toyota similarly commented the standards require “virtually nothing 

of the largest vehicles on the road”. EPA disagrees with this assessment for the reasons below. 

First, as explained in preamble section III.D.6.b, we project relatively little trading 

between the car and truck fleets (and vice versa). From the reference case emission level for 

combined car and truck fleets (sales weighted average of approximately 250 g/mile) to the 

control case (sales weighted average of approximately 163 g/mile) is a drop of approximately 90 

g/mile. In this context, 4 g/mile of credits transferred from the truck fleet to the car fleet is 

relatively small. Disproportionate credit transfers would indicate a lack of balance in relative 

stringencies of the standards, but we see the opposite. This demonstrates an appropriate balance 

between car and truck stringencies. Moreover, in response to CBD, we agree that fuel economy, 

GHG emissions control, and preserving hauling and towing utility are not mutually exclusive. 

Indeed, EPA’s methodology for assessing costs includes costs to preserve those utilities and to 

implement emission control/fuel economy technology. However, EPA remains concerned about 

adopting standards creating strong incentives for manufacturers to choose to reduce hauling and 

towing capacity as a compliance strategy. Of equal or greater significance, EPA has identified 

legitimate concerns with available lead time, especially through MYs 2017-2021, reflecting that 

the large truck segment is dominated by relatively few vehicle platforms with relatively large 

sales, and this limited number of vehicle platforms makes rapid technology changes a greater 

challenge than in other market segments. This is partly due to the lack of platform sharing, a 

flexibility that smaller vehicles have.2 The pick-up trucks also tend to have longer redesign 

 

2 Although certain intermediate volume manufacturers, especially in the luxury car 

market, also have a relatively smaller number of platforms (relative to larger manufacturers), 

EPA believes the concerns are more acute with respect to work trucks, in part because these 

vehicles serve special needs (small businesses, ranchers, farmers, etc.) and that it is important 
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cycles, as discussed in section III.D.6.c of the preamble. The utility requirements of pick-up 

trucks relative to smaller vehicles results in longer development times for validation of a new 

platform. Pick-up truck product validation occurs across a broader range of gross vehicle 

weights for each platform due to a relatively large payload capacity and can include validation of 

trailer towing capability for multiple trailer configurations. There are also issues of consumer 

acceptance of the most advanced technologies in the larger light trucks. See generally preamble 

section III.D.6.

Second, as described in section III.D.6.c of the preamble, the year-to-year stringency of 

the standards were set with consideration of the technical challenges involved in applying 

efficiency technologies to these vehicles as well as lead time concerns in the early years of the 

programs. Additionally, even with these considerations, the trend of a gradually widening gap in 

the early model years of the rule is reversed during the MY 2021-2025 period, as described in 

detail in section III.D.7 of the preamble. EPA believes that the increase in stringency for the 

truck standard in the latter phase of the rule is a reasonable approach for avoiding a large gap 

between car and truck curves while also taking account of the challenges of implementing 

efficiency technologies in trucks during the first phase of the rule. Furthermore, the promulgated 

standards promote similar levels of emission reductions for smaller trucks and for cars of the 

same size. For example, the average year-to-year increase in the target level over the entire MY 

2017-2025 period is identical for cars and trucks at the 41 sq. ft. curve cutpoint (5.1 percent per 

year), and is nearly the same over the initial MY 2017-2021 period (4.8 and 4.5 percent per year, 

for cars and trucks, respectively.) In addition, as shown in preamble Table III-57, by MY 2025 

the gap for larger footprint vehicles is at levels similar to the MY 2012-2016 rule, while for 

smaller footprint vehicles, the gap is less than during the MY 2012-2016 rule. 

ACEEE, citing Table III-53 in the NPRM, also questioned how the proposed standards, 

finalized by this rule, could be superior to the alternatives given the cost differential between cars 

and trucks in MYs 2017-2020. Similarly, Honda and Consumers Union cited the lower fleet 

average compliance cost for trucks as evidence that the truck standard is not stringent enough (or 

from Honda’s comments, for large trucks, in particular). 

EPA does not agree that it is necessarily preferable to have equal compliance costs for 

cars and trucks in each model year. EPA notes that while compliance costs are initially lower for 

trucks than for cars, the costs increase relatively faster for trucks in the latter phase of the 

rulemaking, as shown in Table III-56 and Figure III-5 of the preamble. The lower initial cost for 

trucks is a reflection of the lower initial stringency (relative to cars), which as discussed above, 

and in sections III.D.6.b and III.D.7 of the preamble, is due to considerations of the technical 

challenges and lead time concerns involved in applying efficiency technologies to these vehicles. 

As Ford Motor Co. noted in its comments: vehicles equipped with trailer tow packages include 

 

that this basic market demand not be jeopardized. See International Harvester v. EPA, 478 F. 2d 

615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (EPA required to consider issues of basic demand for passenger 

vehicles in making technical feasibility and lead time determinations; however, EPA need not 

accommodate every single model type )
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additional features that clearly distinguish them from passenger cars, and can negatively impact 

fuel economy:, including auxiliary transmission oil coolers, upgraded radiators, trailer hitch 

connectors and wiring harness equipment, different steering ratios, upgraded rear bumpers and 

different springs for heavier tongue load (for upgraded 'max' trailer tow packages), body on 

frame (vs. unibody) construction to support capability and an aggressive duty cycle, lower axle 

ratios for better pulling power/capability, and greater aerodynamic drag. Even for trucks with 

the same or similar footprint to cars, these features result in greater costs and technical 

challenges to apply GHG emission control/fuel economy technology.

Therefore, EPA does not agree with the commenters that lower compliance costs will 

favor manufacturers with a large proportion of trucks, noting that in the early years, these 

manufacturers will need to invest more in technology development, while in later years, 

compliance costs for trucks are similar to (or even slightly higher than) costs for cars. ACEEE 

requested that EPA provide these cost estimates for all years for each manufacturer’s car and 

truck fleets. This information was available in chapter 5.1 of the draft RIA, and is also provided 

in chapter 5.1 of the final RIA. 

Referring to the lower initial stringency for trucks, ACEEE expressed concern that that 

manufactures will use the initially lower truck standards to delay implementation of efficient 

technologies, and then use this circumstance to argue in the mid-term evaluation for relaxed 

standards. EPA does not believe this concern in justified. Manufacturers must comply with the 

standards on their entire fleet; thus a given vehicle is not required to meet any specific GHG 

standard. Therefore, delaying technologies on any portion of a full-line manufacturer’s fleet will 

hurt their ability to comply across their fleet and thus be non-competitive in other portions of the 

market. Moreover, while we believe that the stringencies of the program can be met (and are 

thus feasible), EPA acknowledges that they will be challenging for all manufacturers and that 

they will all incur significant costs. The likelihood that a manufacturer will slow down the 

implementation of technology on a certain fraction of their (large sales) fleet just prior to 

entering the 2022-2025 period where stringencies are increasing at 5% per year, seems extremely 

unlikely. More likely, if there are cost effective technologies that have not yet been applied, the 

manufacturer will implement them in advance in order to earn credits for the 5%/yr period (this 

is the principle of “multi-year planning”). EPA will carefully monitor this issue during the midterm evaluation.

Others commented more generally that throughout the rulemaking timeframe, the 

difference between car and truck curves is too large, which places manufacturers which mainly 

produce passenger cars at a disadvantage (Volkswagen, Toyota, Honda, and Mercedes). These 

comments are not supported by the analysis conducted for this rule. As just explained there are 

no indications in EPA’s analysis that either the truck or car standards will encourage

manufacturers to choose technology paths that lead to significant over or under compliance for 

cars or trucks, on an industry wide level. A consistent pattern across the industry of 

manufacturers choosing to under or over comply with a car or trucks standard could indicate that 

the car or truck standard should be evaluated further to determine if the relative stringency is

appropriate in light of the technology choices available to manufacturers, and the costs of those 

technology choices. As detailed in section III.D.6.b of the preamble, that is not the case for the 

final car and truck standards, for which we project only a relatively small overall degree of net 
EPA Response to Comments

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credit transfers from the truck fleet to the car fleet. EPA’s evaluation of the alternative standards

led to the same conclusions. EPA thus continues to believe that the relative stringency of the car 

and truck curves is reasonable and appropriate.

Several commenters maintained that the lower stringency of truck standards would 

encourage manufacturers to “game” the rule by adding features such as 4WD for the primary 

purpose of satisfying the requirements for classification as a truck (ICCT, NRDC, UCS). EPA 

recognizes that significant differences in the year-to-year stringency for cars and trucks could 

increase the incentives to reclassify cars as light trucks. However, this reclassification comes at 

significant cost to the manufacture, with added production and component costs, as NRDC 

acknowledged in their comments, and to the consumer in the form of reduced fuel savings and a 

higher purchase price (for example, NRDC quoted an additional cost of $1,400 for the 4WD 

option on the RAV4). EPA thus does not agree with these comments. In any case, EPA believes 

the car and truck curves appropriately reflect the differences in cost between the car and truck 

fleets for adding efficiency technologies, as supported by the analysis conducted for this rule.

In comments related to the topic of “gaming”, CBD expressed concern that the difference 

in stringencies would encourage consumers to shift purchases from cars to trucks (as opposed to 

the comments addressed above that the standards create incentives for manufacturers to “game”). 

EPA does not believe the relative stringencies will result in a shift of this type, given the 

increased costs to the consumer mentioned above, and that the vehicle attributes associated with 

the truck classification may not be desirable to car buyers. Currently, there are many consumers 

that prefer the 2WD car version over the more costly and less fuel efficient 4WD truck version. 

EPA believes that manufacturers will continue to offer the variety of vehicles that satisfy the 

range of attributes that consumers demand, rather than limiting the choices (for example by only 

offering 4wd truck versions of a model), which could in turn lead to loss of customers and 

market share. At the same time, as discussed in the introductory text of section III.D of the 

preamble, EPA acknowledges that manufacturers may decide to alter the utility of the vehicles 

which they sell, but this would not be a consequence of the rule but rather a matter of automaker 

business choice. Finally, on the issue of “gaming”, EPA plans to review trends in the fleet mix 

during the mid-term evaluation (see section III.B.3 of the preamble; see also RTC section 15.3 

response to POP Diesel). 

Honda commented about the relative stringencies of small and large footprint trucks, and 

proposed that “vehicles other than full-size pickup trucks should receive similar consideration in 

preserving their utility”. EPA notes that the technology penetration analysis conducted for this 

rule considered the costs of preserving utility for not only full-size pickup trucks, but for vehicles 

of all footprint sizes. At the same time, EPA believes that pickup trucks are often used in ways 

that are fundamentally different from the typical use of minivans and smaller SUVs cited by the 

commenter. For example, Ford, in its comments, provided data for the usage of the F150: “up to 

82% of F-150 customers use their vehicles for hauling. Up to 41% haul on at least a monthly 

basis; and 72% of F-150 customers use their vehicles for towing. Up to 28% tow on at least a 

monthly basis”. The particular type of vehicle usage is significant, since the additional engine 

power requirements will be greater for vehicles intended to tow and carry heavy loads than for 

vehicles designed for high volume (but lower density) passenger spaces, such as an 8 passenger 

minivan. 
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Honda also commented on the cost per percent CO2 reduction of some of the vehicle 

technology packages in our proposal. Honda uses the comparison of packages to argue that we 

have been unfair to smaller footprint trucks relative to larger footprint trucks. However, the 

packages chosen by Honda were not really appropriate for the specific vehicle models compared 

by Honda—the packages that Honda thought represent the Honda CR-V and the Ford F150 

(among other similar/competing models). Better vehicle types and package choices would have 

been those shown in the table below since, in our proposal, we placed the CR-V in vehicle type 7 

and the higher sales F150s in vehicle types 10 and 14. As shown, the $/% CO2 reduction for the 

CR-V is far more favorable than the F150 at $41 versus $62-$67, respectively. Similarly, in our 

final rule where we place the CR-V in vehicle type 7 and the F150 in vehicle types 17 and 18, 

the $/% CO2 reduction is again far more favorable for the CR-V than the F150 at $39-$43 and 

$61-$64, respectively. This indicates that on a dollars per percent GHG reduction metric, it is 

more cost effective to add technology and improve efficiency on the smaller vehicle type 7 

(small SUV and Multi-Purpose Vehicle) than the larger vehicle type 17 or 18 (pickup trucks).

Veh Class Tech 

Pkg #

Mass 

Red

Engine Trans Cost CO2

%

$/%

NPRM Minivan 707 10% 4V DOHC I4 +EFR2 +LDB +ASL2 +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +TDS18

8sp DCTdry$1,794 43% $41.40

NPRM Minivan 1013 15% 4V DOHC V6 +EFR2 +LDB +ASL2 +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18

8sp AT $2,953 44% $67.52

NPRM Large 

truck

1411 10% 4V DOHC V6 +EFR2 +LDB +ASL2 +IACC2 +EHPS +Aero2 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18

8sp AT $2,587 42% $62.16

FRM Small 

MPV

7.03904 10% MPVnt 4VDI4 +LUB +EFR1 +ASL2 +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2 +LDB 

+LRRT1 +DCP +GDI +TDS18 +WR10% +6sp

6sp DCTdry$1,366 35% $39.18

FRM Small 

MPV

7.05313 10% MPVnt 4VDI4 +EFR2 +ASL2 +IACC1 +EPS +Aero1 +LDB 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18 +WR10% +8sp

8sp DCTdry$1,696 39% $43.45

FRM Small 

MPV

7.05202 10% MPVnt 4VDI4 +LUB +EFR1 +ASL2 +IACC2 +EPS +Aero2 +LDB 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +TDS18 +WR10% +8sp

8sp DCTdry$1,747 41% $43.12

FRM Truck 17.05319 10% PU 4VDV6 +EFR2 +ASL2 +TORQ +IACC2 +EHPS +Aero2 +LDB 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18 +WR10% +8sp

8sp AT $2,654 42% $63.78

FRM Truck 17.04006 10% PU 4VDV6 +LUB +EFR1 +ASL2 +TORQ +IACC1 +EHPS +Aero1 

+LDB +LRRT1 +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18 +WR10% +6sp

6sp AT $2,020 32% $62.94

FRM Truck 18.05319 10% PU 4VDV6 +EFR2 +ASL2 +TORQ +IACC2 +EHPS +Aero2 +LDB 

+LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18 +WR10% +8sp

8sp AT $2,615 42% $62.84

FRM Truck 18.04006 10% PU 4VDV6 +LUB +EFR1 +ASL2 +TORQ +IACC1 +EHPS +Aero1 

+LDB +LRRT1 +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18 +WR10% +6sp

6sp AT $1,982 32% $61.73

FRM Truck 18.05310 10% PU 4VDV6 +LUB +EFR1 +ASL2 +TORQ +IACC2 +EHPS +Aero2 

+LDB +LRRT2 +HEG +DCP +GDI +SAX +TDS18 +WR10% +8sp

8sp AT $2,519 41% $61.35

ICCT commented that with the exception of pickup trucks, full size cargo vans, and a few 

SUVs, the construction of cars and trucks are similar, and there is therefore no technical reason 

to separate car and truck curves. EPA notes that ICCTs list of “exceptions” make up the 

majority of the truck market. However, we acknowledge that there are a number of vehicle 

nameplates that are classified as both car and truck and that their primary attribute difference is 

the 2WD vs the 4WD option (there are other attribute differences such as ground clearance, 

approach angles, etc.). As noted above, the 4WD attribute has a significant impact on fuel 

efficiency, cost, and consequently consumer choice. Ford provided an example of how towing 

requirements can result in differences in fuel efficiency and cost, commenting, “the Ford Edge 

and the Ford Taurus have the same footprint, but vastly different capabilities with respect to 

cargo space and towing capacity. Some of the key features incorporated on the Edge that enables 

the larger tow capability include an engine oil cooler, larger radiator and updated cooling fans.” 
EPA Response to Comments

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The cost and efficiency differences that arise from differences in the utility of cars and trucks are 

real and measureable. Thus, at this time, EPA believes that the classification of these vehicles on 

two separate curves is justifiable and reasonable. 

2.2.3. Backstop Standards

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Center for Biological Diversity

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Toyota Motor North America

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Backstop Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.87]

The NPRM requests comments on whether minimum CAFE levels (so called “backstop 

standards”) should be adopted for import passenger car and light duty truck fleets. The need for 

backstop standards had been assessed during the MY 2012-16 GHG and fuel economy standards 

regulatory process. The agencies noted that substantial comments had been provided on both 

sides of the issue, but in the end determined that backstop standards would not be necessary. 

That decision was primarily based on the confidence the agencies had in their fleet modeling and 

the lack of incentives for manufacturers to “game” their product line-up in such a way to 

undermine the anticipated gains of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.87]

Concerns about backstop standards that were raised by the Alliance in the context of the MY 

2012-2016 rules remain in place today. The concept of backstop standards is inconsistent with 

Reformed CAFE, which is intended to allow manufacturers to build the full range of vehicles 

that consumers demand. Backstop standards are unlikely to come into play in the first place, but 

if they did, they could have the effect of unduly limiting consumer choice and hampering the 

industry’s ability to achieve the goals of continuing the national program as cost-effectively as 

possible. Further, we continue to believe that NHTSA does not have legislative authority to 

adopt backstop standards for the import passenger car and light duty truck fleets. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.87]

Notwithstanding NHTSA's previous decision to forego backstop standards, the question whether 

backstop standards should be reassessed in the context of the MY 2017-2025 rulemaking is 

raised on the basis that NHTSA “recognize[s] that given the time frame of the current 

rulemaking, the agency cannot be as certain about the unlikelihood of future market changes.” 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.87]
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The Alliance concurs that there is increasing uncertainty with respect to market conditions, 

technological advances, consumer demand, etc., as we look further and further into the future. It 

is this uncertainty that gave rise to the mid-term evaluation provisions, which we believe are an 

essential element of the MY 2017-2025 National Program rules. Any necessary adjustments to 

the standards based on market shifts or other unforeseen developments should be addressed 

pursuant to the mid-term evaluation process (for EPA) and the concurrent process of setting 

final, enforceable CAFE standards (for NHTSA). Apart from that, it is not helpful or desirable to 

layer additional requirements on top of the Reformed CAFE standards, since this would only 

serve to reduce flexibility and add complexity to the manufacturers' product planning efforts. We 

therefore oppose any consideration of additional backstop standards at this time and recommend 

that the agencies rely on the mid-term evaluation and the CAFE standard-setting process as their 

primary means for making any necessary adjustments to the stringency and structure of the 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.87-88]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

D. NHTSA Should Adopt a Backstop to Ensure the Nationwide Fleet Moves Towards Greater 

Fuel Efficiency.

As noted above, the rulemaking is currently structured so that the fuel economy standard actually 

reached in each MY depends entirely on each manufacturer’s fleet mix during that year. If 

manufacturers shift towards a greater percentage of light trucks, or increase the size of their 

vehicles to trigger less stringent fuel economy standards, the overall fuel efficiency of the 

nationwide fleet will decrease. But Congress tasked NHTSA with prescribing ratable fuel 

economy standards for passenger automobiles and light trucks, not with merely estimating them. 

Attribute-based standards “plus a backstop would prevent manufacturers from upsizing their 

vehicles or producing too many large vehicle footprint vehicles, if the backstop were set high 

enough.”83 We believe that, without a backstop, the NPRM does not comply with the statutory 

mandate to prescribe ratable increases, particularly given the free pass for the largest trucks and 

the added incentive to shift toward the least efficient vehicles. The Center proposes that the 

Agencies adopt a backstop to rein in shifts towards manufacturing larger vehicles and to ensure 

the standards continue to move the nationwide fleet towards energy conservation. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 17]

NHTSA has resisted adopting a backstop for years, despite losing the argument in Center for 

Biological Diversity v. NHTSA. In that case, the court observed, “Petitioners raise well-founded 

concerns (given the historical trend) that a floating feet mix-based standard would continue to 

permit upsizing – which is not just a function of consumer demand, but also a function of 

manufacturer’s own design and marketing decisions.” 84 The court found that NHTSA had not 

considered fuel conservation in deciding not to adopt a backstop, and had not shown that a 

backstop would be either technologically infeasible or economically impractical. It remanded the 

rulemaking with instructions for NHTSA to “reconsider under the proper standard whether to 

adopt a backstop based on the factors in the statute.”85 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p 

17]
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In subsequent rulemakings, NHTSA justified its continuing refusal to set a backstop based on 

various reasons, including its belief that it could successfully prognosticate fleet mix shifts, that 

its footprint attribute-based standard would prevent gamesmanship and backsliding, that the lack 

of lead time and a growing preference for smaller cars weighed against adopting a backstop, and 

that backstops created inequitable burdens on manufacturers who exceeded the backstop.86 

However, the Agencies did recognize the potential need for a backstop in the current NPRM: 

“[W]e recognize that given the time frame of the current rulemaking, the agency cannot be as 

certain about the unlikelihood of future market changes. Depending on the price of fuel and 

consumer preferences, the ‘kind of industry-wide situation’ described in the MYs 2012– 2016

rule is possible in the 2017–2025 time frame, particularly in the later years.”87 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, pp 17-18]

The Agencies are correct. They cannot possibly predict future market changes or “consumer 

preference” with any degree of certainty over a period spanning some 14 years. Moreover, the 

justifications NHTSA provided in the MY 2011 and MY 2012-2016 final rules for failing to 

adopt backstops are incorrect or no longer apply, and do not in any event consider the relevant 

statutory factors as required by CBD v. NHTSA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p 18]

First, the hypothesis that the attribute-based system does not provide an incentive to increase the 

size of vehicles has been refuted by studies showing the opposite. In fact, considering multiple 

variables, including consumer preferences, a recent study of the MY 2012- 2016 final 

rulemaking concluded that under most scenarios, the attribute-based standards “create an 

incentive to increase vehicle size that undermines gains in fuel economy.”88 In all but two 

simulations, “the sales-weighted average vehicle size increases by 2–32%, undermining gains in 

fuel economy by 1–4 mpg (0.6–1.7km/L). Carbon-dioxide emissions from these vehicles are 5–

15% higher as a result . . . which is equivalent to adding 3–10 coal-fired power plants to the 

electricity grid each year. Furthermore, results suggest that the incentive is larger for light trucks 

than for passenger cars, which could increase traffic safety risks.”89 Moreover, the same study 

found that the incentive to increase vehicle size is greater for light trucks than for passenger cars 

due to the larger impact of the CAFE standards for light trucks on manufacturers’ profits: 

“Because the light truck standard causes larger profit losses than the passenger car standard, 

firms increase the sales-weighted average footprint of light trucks more than passenger cars.” 90 

Thus, the Agencies’ claim that the attribute-based standards serve as backstops and prevent 

backsliding is simply incorrect. The already existing incentives to upsize would now be 

substantially increased. Without a backstop, it is not credible to assume that the fleet will not 

shift to lower efficiency vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p 18]

Second, the claim of insufficient lead time to adjust to backstops is inapplicable to the MY 2017-

2025 NPRM. Manufacturers will have unprecedented lead time to adjust their future fleets to the 

new regulations. The amount of lead time also refutes the argument that the backstop will create 

an inequitable burden on manufacturers currently above it: this problem can be remedied in the 

intervening years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p 18]

Lastly, the Agencies have not based their refusal to implement a backstop on any analysis of the 

statutory factors they must consider: technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect 

of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need for the 
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United States to conserve energy.91 We believe that none of the first three factors could be cited 

as a reason for foregoing a backstop, while the latter convincingly demands one. In short, the 

Agencies must supply annual or at least periodic backstops to comply with statutory mandates 

and dissuade manufacturers from “gaming” the attribute-based curves and avoiding 

implementation of fuel saving technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, pp 18-19]

We also note that the NPRM allows manufacturers to rely on a variety of flexibilities and credits, 

discussed below, to meet annual fuel economy standards. The Agencies prognosticate that these 

features will decrease actually achieved mileage by less than 3 mpg by 2025 (see further 

discussion of credits below); but given the long time span covered by the rulemaking, this 

prediction is, by necessity, highly uncertain. A backstop would also ensure that the various 

credits and flexibilities will not be abused to the detriment of fuel conservation. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p 19]

We agree with the Agencies’ approach to extend exemptions only to small businesses as defined 

by the Small Business Administration and to limit the small volume manufacturers’ exemption to 

business with U.S. annual sales of less than 5,000 vehicles. Given the long lead times of the 

current rulemaking, no further exemptions are warranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, 

p 19]

Congress has effectively set a backstop of 35 mpg in 2020 for the overall fleet. The Agencies’ 

estimated fuel economy standards, however, demonstrate that the fleet can more than meet this 

standard; it can exceed it before 2020 even under the preferred alternative. In setting the 

maximum feasible standards, the Agencies should prescribe annual or at least periodic backstops 

designed to move the fleet to higher standards based on maximum feasible levels. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p 19]

83 See CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1204.

84 CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1206.

85 Id.

86 See, Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 

74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,412 (March 30, 2009); see also Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 

Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule 75 Fed. Reg. 

25,324 25,368-70 (May 7, 2010).

87 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,228.

88 See Whitefoot at 41 ENERGY POLICY 402, 410 (2012).

89 Id. at 402.
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90 See id. at 409.

91 See CBD v, NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1205.

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Minimum 'Backstop' Standards for Imported Passenger Cars and Light Trucks

NHTSA once again raises the possibility of minimum 'backstop' CAFE standards for the 

imported passenger car and light truck compliance categories. Such 'backstop' standards, 

however, are both contrary to NHTSA's statutory authority and inconsistent with the 

Congressional mandate to regulate fuel economy through an attribute based program. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-18]

When amending the EPCA in 2007, Congress both mandated the use of an attribute-based 

program for the CAFE program and created a backstop for the domestic passenger car fleet. 

NHTSA construes the fact that Congress did not include the other compliance categories as 

legislative 'silence.' However, the fact that Congress included only the domestic passenger car 

fleet is determinative evidence that Congress intended not to allow a backstop to be applied to 

the imported passenger car fleet or the light truck fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 

A-18]

This is especially true where, as here, the imposition of a backstop is inherently inconsistent with 

attributes standards. The attribute based system was established as a replacement for a corporate 

average system with one numeric requirement. The proposed standards are aggressive and will 

require extensive technology adoption and market advancements for manufacturers to meet 

them. Manufacturers have no incentive to 'backslide.' The development of a trading market, 

moreover, creates a yet further incentive to continue to advance, especially in light of the overall 

stringency of the standards, because doing so creates a valuable and marketable asset. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-18]

There is no reason for the agencies to consider a backstop in the context of an aggressive and 

carefully constructed attribute based program. Congress continued the concept of a minimum 

standard for the domestic passenger car compliance category and made it clear through omission 

that such a backstop standard was not intended to be applied to the other compliance 

categories. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-18]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA and NHTSA should establish manufacturer-specific 'backstop' standards to ensure that 

environmental objectives are not undermined by shifts in sales mix and average vehicle size. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

E. Compliance and Enforcement Requirements
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1. GHG Standards Need 'Backstop' Standards to Ensure Environmental Objectives Are Not 

Undermined by Shifts in Sales Mix

The proposed GHG and fuel economy standards lack a regulatory 'backstop' mechanism to 

ensure that the 2025 fleetwide average emission level reaches 163 g/mi and that the targeted 

cumulative greenhouse gas and oil consumption reductions are met. Such mechanisms are 

necessary because under an attribute-based system that has separate car and light truck standards, 

the fleet sales mix could shift to larger, higher-emitting vehicles and to a greater proportion of 

light trucks, resulting in greater fleetwide emissions and oil consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9472-A2, p. 17]

Achieving the pollution and oil reduction goals of the program are dependent on the overall 

market achieving the agencies’ forecasted sales and size mixes. To reach a fleetwide average of 

163 g/mi and 49.6 mpg in MY 2025, the agencies have set the individual car and light truck 

standards on the assumption of a specific car/light truck sales split. However, if the automakers 

shift their product mix to more light trucks or if they change the vehicle designs to classify fewer 

models as cars and more models as light trucks, this car/light truck split would be changed and 

the GHG and oil savings goals of the program would be undermined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9472-A2, p. 17]

To prevent intentional and unintentional market shifts from undermining the environmental and 

oil savings benefits of the National Program, we recommend EPA and NHTSA adopt 

manufacturer-specific backstops on the combined car and light truck standards that bar an 

individual automaker from exceeding its forecast GHG emission levels by more than 2 gCO2-

equivalent/mi and forecast fuel economy levels by approximately 0.5 mpg. Manufacturerspecific backstop standards would ensure that specific manufacturers can be held accountable if 

the overall fleet emission targets are missed. A manufacturer should be allowed no more than 

three years to make up any exceedance in its manufacturer-specific backstop standard. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 17]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

As we did in our comments on the 2012-2016 standards, we urge both agencies to consider 

including what we consider necessary “backstops” to the program. The draft rule fails to include 

measures sufficient to ensure that the fleet-wide targets in the rule are met. The draft rule relies 

upon attribute-based curves, whose efficacy will vary with the composition in the fleet. As 

currently written the draft rule would allow shifts in fleet composition to undermine greenhouse 

gas and oil reduction targets. A “backstop,” in the form of a hard fleet-wide limit under-girding 

the attribute curves, should be incorporated in the final rule to insure that the program meets 

President Obama’s stated goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5]

Both NHTSA and EPA are granted broad authority and stern directives to incorporate backstop 

regulatory structures into fuel efficiency rules. For example, NHTSA is required to promulgate 

fuel efficiency regulations in terms of absolute standards, as opposed to mere targets that may or 
EPA Response to Comments

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may not be by the regulatory program.15 Similarly, EPA is directed under the Clean Air Act to 

take measures to that pollution from vehicles is actually prevented.16 Rules promulgated under 

EPA authority, accordingly, should not be undermined by increasing vehicle footprint to dilute 

the overall intent and benefit of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5]

Here, achievement of the target fuel economies and greenhouse gas reductions depend on the 

mix of vehicle classes on the road in the U.S. years in the future. The law governing both 

NHTSA and EPA requires that the uncertainty in those targets be resolved into enforceable 

standards through employment of a backstop. The draft rule should be revised to include such a 

backstop before it becomes final. Backstop mechanisms should be considered during the 

midterm review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, pp. 5-6]

15 See 42 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (standards “shall be the maximum feasible average fuel economy 

level”) (emphasis added); id. at § 32901(a)(6) (defining “average fuel economy standard” as the 

“performance standard specifying a minimum level of average fuel economy applicable to a 

manufacturer”) (emphasis added); see also Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway 

Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1204-06 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that NHTSA acted 

arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing inclusion of a backstop in issuing reformed CAFE 

standards). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5]

16 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (EPA shall propose “standards applicable to the emission of any air 

pollutant” from vehicles that “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (“primary goal” of the 

Clean Air Act is “pollution prevention”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Potential Expansion of Domestic Passenger Car Anti-Backsliding Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.6]

Toyota opposes any expansion of anti-backsliding provisions beyond the domestic passenger car 

fleet in the CAFE program. The clear intent of Congress has been that NHTSA should only 

establish anti-backsliding standards for the domestic car fleet. As such, EPCA (as modified by 

EISA) requires NHTSA to establish anti-backsliding standards for domestic passenger cars and 

does not authorize NHTSA to establish additional anti-backsliding standards for import cars and 

trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.6]

In the case of EPA and the CAA, there is no explicit statutory authority that either compels or 

authorizes EPA to establish anti-backsliding standards for any class of light duty vehicles. While 

EPA's authority may be ambiguous, it is clear that any EPA-issued anti-backsliding standards 

would create new inconsistencies between the NHTSA and EPA programs, rather than support 

the goal of harmonization. NHTSA's anti backsliding standards are limited to domestic passenger 

cars, and the CAA cannot be used to duplicate a similar outcome since EPA's fleet definitions do 
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not distinguish between domestic cars and import cars. The most 'harmonized' outcome is for 

NHTSA to proceed with the required domestic car anti-backsliding standard for the CAFE 

program, and for EPA to forego any attempt to set anti-backsliding standards under the CAA. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.6]

Notwithstanding the legal constraints described above, Toyota outlined in its November 25, 2009 

comments in response to the 2012-2016 model year rulemaking a variety of additional factors 

describing why anti-backsliding standards are unnecessary. Please refer to those comments. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.6]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Finally, the attribute-based system employed in the proposed rule does not guarantee that 

automakers will actually achieve the 163 g/mi and 49.6 mpg standard in MY2025. The agencies 

base these fleetwide projections on a variety of assumptions, including the vehicle footprint of 

future vehicles and the relative sales mix between cars and light-trucks. If these assumptions are 

wrong or if automakers adopt compliance strategies that either reclassify passenger cars as light 

trucks or add size to vehicle footprints in order to qualify for weaker standards, the projected 

benefits of the standards could be sizably eroded, particularly in the first five model years of the 

program, which have the largest gap in car/truck stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-

A2, p. 7]

In order to ensure that model year 2017-2025 vehicles yield anticipated consumer savings, oil 

savings and greenhouse gas reductions, the standards must include a backstop mechanism. Under 

the current attribute-based system, no mechanism exists to adjust individual manufacturers’ fleet 

requirements in the event that product plans or manufacturer-specific performance diverges from 

anticipated levels. Because of these risks and because the model year 2017-2025 standards will 

be finalized before compliance data can be gathered under the new attribute-based system, it is 

critical to include a backstop mechanism to ensure that the fleet maintains its projected fuel 

economy and greenhouse gas emissions trajectory. A backstop could take numerous forms; UCS 

suggests one that includes an automatic re-computation or “ratchet” of stringencies for 

subsequent years, such that the National Program’s cumulative emissions reductions and oil 

savings goals are fully achieved in 2025, even if falling short in early years of the program. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 7]

Finally, in addition to the gap between the car and truck standards, the relative stringency of the

truck standards decreases as vehicle size increases. For the largest pickup trucks, total reductions 

in emissions required between 2016 and 2021 amount to less than 5% versus nearly 18% for the 

smallest trucks. Automakers may find it more economical to add footprint size to qualify for less 

stringent standards rather than add emission control technologies, further eroding benefits.

To prevent a loss in benefits, the agencies should adopt a backstop mechanism to ensure the 

anticipated global warming pollution reductions and oil savings benefits are achieved. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Whitefoot, K. and Skerlos, S.

Additional minimum fuel economy standards are warranted due to the substantial risks of 

backsliding. We encourage NHTSA to establish minimum standards across the combined fleet of 

passenger cars and light trucks to provide a limit to backsliding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9447-A1, p. 1]

Below, we respond to NHTSA’s request for comments on additional minimum standards and 

how they should be structured.

As NHTSA indicates in the proposed rule, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 

(EPCA), as amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 explicitly 

requires NHTSA to establish a minimum standard for domestic passenger cars but is silent as to 

whether the agency should or could establish other minimum standards. We believe that the 

requirement in EPCA (as amended by EISA) that the standards “achieve a combined fuel 

economy average for model year 2020 of at least 35 miles per gallon for the total fleet of 

passenger and non-passenger automobiles manufactured for sale in the United States” effectively 

requires NHTSA to establish additional backstops. This is because attribute-based standards 

(which are required by EPCA as amended by EISA) do not guarantee that any specific combined 

fuel economy average for the total fleet will be met in any year since the attributes of the fleet 

can change. 1 Therefore, additional minimum standards are needed to meet the requirement of 

reaching 35 miles per gallon by 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 3]

The minimum standards for light trucks and imported passenger cars presented in the proposed 

rule for comment would help to limit the risk of backsliding and are warranted. However, these 

minimum standards do not reduce incentives to increase the production of light trucks relative to 

passenger cars, which would lead to higher fuel consumption and GHG emissions. We 

recommend that NHTSA establish a minimum standard across the combined fleet of passenger 

cars and light trucks for each year to limit incentives to increase production of light trucks in 

response to the regulation. Furthermore, we encourage NHTSA to establish minimum standards 

for light trucks at a high-enough level to ensure that fuel economy improvements in the total fleet 

are close to projected levels even if the production of light trucks increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 3]

Further backstops in the standards are warranted due to the substantial risks of backsliding 

during MYs 2017-2025. NHTSA has proposed minimum standards for domestically 

manufactured passenger cars in the proposed rule. We believe this is not enough to ensure that 

actual fuel economy improvements are close to the expected levels that NHTSA projects. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9447-A1, p. 3]

Response:

One undeniable feature of the footprint-based GHG emissions (and fuel economy) 

standard is that the fleet-wide GHG emissions reductions actually realized will depend on the 

average and distribution of vehicle footprint levels in future model years, and those footprint 

levels will not be known with certainty until months after the end of each model year. EPA 
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projections of the average vehicle GHG emissions compliance level and societal GHG emissions 

savings in the future, for example, might prove to be either high or low depending on whether 

the average and distribution of vehicle footprint levels change relative to current projections. In 

response to the inherent uncertainty associated with footprint-based standards, one regulatory 

concept that has emerged is the concept of an emissions “backstop” that would move GHG 

emissions target values lower if vehicle footprint levels increase in the future. See 75 FR 25368-

25370.

The agencies received comments both in support of and in opposition to the concept of a 

GHG emissions backstop.

The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 

Sierra Club et al, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), and the researchers Whitefoot and 

Skerlos all supported the concept of a GHG emissions (and/or fuel economy) backstop. These 

commenters expressed concerns about vehicle footprint levels increasing (“upsizing”) over time, 

as well as a future increasing truck market share. NRDC made a specific proposal for a 

manufacturer-specific backstop that would limit an individual manufacturer’s combined car and 

truck CO2 emissions level to no more than a 2 g/mi increase over that projected by EPA in this 

rulemaking. UCS supported an industry-wide “rachet” backstop approach that would build into 

the final regulations a provision for automatically making future years’ CO2-footprint curves 

more stringent if the data from early years shows higher footprint levels and higher average 

GHG emissions performance than projected by EPA. Other supporters strongly supported the 

concept of a GHG emissions backstop, but did not endorse specific designs. Whitefoot and 

Skerlos have published an academic study, using certain assumptions about key parameters, that 

projects that the MY 2014 footprint-based standards were likely to promote “upsizing” and 

therefore yield lower GHG emissions and oil savings than projected by EPA and NHTSA.

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM), Mercedes-Benz, and Toyota

opposed GHG emissions (and/or fuel economy) backstops. AAM and Mercedes-Benz both 

stated that the concept of a backstop is inconsistent with an attribute-based standard, which by 

definition is intended to be flexible with respect to consumer demand, and AAM suggested that 

any necessary adjustments based on unforeseen developments should be addressed in the midterm evaluation.

EPA is rejecting GHG emissions backstops in this final rule. Explicit and implicit in 

many of the comments is that there is an inherent tension between a footprint-based standard and 

certainty of GHG emissions reductions, and the agency recognizes this tension as well. The 

agency recognizes that factors related to specific design features of the final rule (shape of car 

and truck curves, relative stringency between car and truck curves) as well as factors unrelated to 

specific design features of this final rule (fuel prices, consumer preferences) could affect the 

average and distribution of vehicle footprint levels and therefore average GHG emissions 

requirements. Of course, footprint levels could increase or decrease relative to current 

projections, and GHG emissions reductions could therefore be either lower or higher than 

projected.
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With respect to the design of the CO2-footprint curves, EPA believes we have developed 

curves that maintain a reasonable level of neutrality with respect to technological feasibility 

across different vehicle classes and footprint levels. As discussed in Preamble Section III.D.6.b, 

EPA projects a relatively small overall net credit transfer from the truck fleet to the car fleet, 

which suggests that the relative stringency between the car and truck curves is relatively neutral. 

Accordingly, the agency believes that our projections of future footprint levels are reasonable, 

and that any future changes in average footprint or the distribution of footprint levels due to the 

design of the CO2-footprint curves are not likely to lead to more than modest changes to 

projected GHG emissions reductions. See RTC Section 2.2.2 and joint TSD section 2,4 for a 

longer response to the Whitefoot and Skerlos study.

The agency believes it is more likely that changes unrelated to the design of this rule, 

such as fuel prices or consumer preferences, will affect future vehicle footprint levels and GHG 

emissions requirements. In this regard, we note that AEO2012 Early Release projects relatively 

stable gasoline prices over the next 13 years. The average actual price in the U.S. for the first 

four months of 2012 for regular gasoline was $3.68 per gallon3 with prices approaching $4.00 in 

March and April.4 The AEO2012 Early Release reference case projects the regular gasoline 

price to be $3.87 per gallon in 2025, only slightly higher than the price for the first four months 

of 2012.5 As explained in preamble section III.D. 1.a, this factor strongly supports using a flat 

baseline (no significant voluntary GHG emissions improvement over the MY 2016 standard 

absent further regulation). However, for the same reason, this projection militates against the 

need for a backstop in this rule since no significant shift in fleet mix would be expected under 

these circumstances. Of course if oil prices were to drop to the levels of the 1990s, it is almost 

certain that vehicle footprint levels would rise and GHG emissions requirements would increase 

as well, while if oil prices were to increase significantly above today’s level (and the level 

projected for MY 2025 based on AEO 2012 Early Release), it is quite likely that vehicle 

footprint and GHG emissions requirements would both decrease. (although no such decreases or 

increases are projected by AEO)

There are other drawbacks to adopting backstops (including backstops with ratchets, as 

UCS advocates). As explained in detail in the MYs 2012-2016 rule preamble, stringent 

backstops can compromise some of the advantages of attribute-based standards, especially with 

respect to manufacturers above a backstop, and especially under conditions where the entire 

industry’s performance, taken as a whole, remains consistent with the emissions levels projected 

for the standards. See 75 FR at 25369; see also EPA Response to Comment Document for MY 

2012-2016 rule at pp. 3-99 to 3-102. Under these circumstances, manufacturers would again (as 

under the flat CAFE regime) have the incentive to downsize as a compliance strategy, 

undermining the safety and across-all-footprint improvement objectives of an attribute-based 

standard. These concerns remain here. . EPA notes further that the questions about the potential 

need for a backstop, and if so, the best design of such a backstop, are very complex and difficult 

 3 In 2012 dollars. As 2012 is not yet complete, we are not relating this value to 2010 dollars. See RIA 1 for 

additional details on the conversion between dollar years. 

4 http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/ and click on “full history” for weekly regular gasoline prices through 

May 7, 2012, last accessed on May 8, 2012.

5 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/ last accessed on May 8, 2012.
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to assess as we are at the beginning stages of a 14-year program of more stringent GHG 

emissions standards

For all of these reasons, both related and unrelated to the CO2-footprint curves in this 

final rule, EPA believes it unnecessary to establish a backstop in this rule. EPA commits to 

monitoring vehicle footprint data, and that data will form the basis for an analysis of the potential 

need for a GHG emissions backstop (or different GHG standards) in the mid-term evaluation.

2.3. Additional Flexibility for Intermediate Volume 

Manufacturers 

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Suzuki Motor Corporation

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (JLRNA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Volkswagen

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The program flexibilities in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) will help 

manufacturers introduce new technologies that produce concrete environmental and fuel 

consumption benefits. The Alliance supports the flexibilities in the proposal and understands the 

needs of lower volume, limited line manufacturers. The program flexibilities in the NPRM will 

encourage early investment in technologies that produce concrete environmental and fuel 

consumption benefits that will be necessary to meet these challenging and increasingly stringent 

standards over the longer term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.4]

Organization: American Suzuki Motor Corporation

Suzuki is concerned, however, that the proposed standards do not adequately recognize the lead 

time needs of low-volume, limited-line manufacturers like Suzuki. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9523-A1, p.1] 

California has long recognized that companies with small sales volumes and a limited number of 

models face unique challenges in complying with stringent standards that rely on the 

implementation of advanced technologies. As a result, California has created different 

manufacturer size categories1

, and has used these categories to provide additional 

implementation lead time for smaller-volume manufacturers. This approach helps to address, to 

some extent, the disadvantages that small-volume manufacturers have, compared to larger-
EPA Response to Comments

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volume manufacturers, in introducing advanced technologies across their product lines. Suzuki 

requests that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) adopt a similar approach in regulating GHG emissions and corporate 

average fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9523-A1, p.1] 

Suzuki Proposal 

Suzuki proposes that EPA and NHTSA (1) establish a Limited Line Manufacturer (LLM) size 

category that approximates the California Small Volume Manufacturer (SVM) category scaled 

up to a national level, and (2) establish a three-year implementation lead time allowance for 

LLMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9523-A1, p.1] 

Suzuki suggests that a national average annual sales volume such as 50,000 vehicles (calculated 

as a three-year average) would roughly approximate, on a national level, the threshold to qualify 

as an SVM in California. Suzuki proposes that LLMs be given a three-year implementation lead

time allowance which does not require LLMs to comply with the 2017 model year standards 

until the 2020 model year, and requires LLMs to comply with the 2018-2025 model year 

standards in model years 2021-2028. Under this proposal, LLMs would meet the same GHG/fuel 

economy standards as large manufacturers, but with a moving three-year lead time allowance. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9523-A1, p.1] 

Reason for Suzuki's Proposal 

When small-volume manufacturers need to develop new technology and develop a new 

model/new engine to make the significant improvements necessary to comply with the proposed 

standards, the per-vehicle cost for the special development that is needed specifically for the U.S. 

market is much higher than for manufacturers with larger sales volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9523-A1, p.2] 

Adoption of Suzuki's proposal would have an insignificant impact on nationwide GHG 

emissions, as the combined GHG emissions from vehicles produced by small-volume 

manufacturers are an extremely small percentage of the fleet-wide total. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9523-A1, p.2] 

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Likewise, manufacturers seeking to participate in the expanded Temporary Lead-Time 

Allowance Alternative Standards (TLAAS) “must secure credits to the extent they are reasonably 

available from other manufacturers to offset the difference between their emissions reductions 

obligations under the base TLAAs program and the expanded TLAAS program.” Fisker 

Automotive strongly encourages EPA to hold to the spirit of these provisions. As the only entity 

with complete knowledge of every automaker’s credits and deficits, it is incumbent upon EPA to 

ensure that this provision is fairly enforced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (JLRNA)
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Jaguar Land Rover will meet the 2012-2016MY GHG program by a number of significant 

product actions and through use of the Expanded TLAAS program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

8102-A1, p. 1]

The Unique Challenge Facing Jaguar Land Rover in the Transition to the 2017MY Standard

Even though our company will make substantial CO2 reductions during the 2012-2016MY 

period, the proposed 2017MY standard poses very significant challenges. First, as the Expanded 

TLAAS program comes to a close in 2016MY, companies which participated in this program 

will start 2017MY with either no CO2 credits banked or CO2 debits carrying forward. We 

understand the rationale in this structure but the resulting transition does not allow lower volume, 

limited line manufacturers the same flexibilities as afforded large volume manufacturers. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8102-A1, p. 1]

Given this situation, JLR requests that EPA consider a range of flexibilities aimed at creating a 

fair standard for lower volume, limited line manufacturers. Included amongst these ideas is a 

proposal to phase in the base standard for lower volume, limited line manufacturers toward full 

compliance in 2022MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8102-A1, p. 1]

As a result of this dramatic impact, JLR is inviting the EPA to consider phasing-in the GHG 

program for lower volume, limited line manufacturers, starting in 2017MY and ending with 

2021MY production. We propose that manufacturers in this program be required to come into 

full compliance with the base program from 2022MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8102-A1, p. 

2]

In the NPRM, EPA requested comments on additional lead-time for lower volume, limited line 

manufacturers. In response to this invitation, Jaguar Land Rover requests that EPA consider 

phasing in the 2017MY+ program for lower volume, limited line niche manufacturers when the 

Expanded TLAAS ends. This proposed alternative GHG standard would be designed to ensure 

fair but very stringent CO2 reductions in excess of the industry average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8102-A1, p. 2]

JLR will be delivering very significant CO2 reductions well in excess of industry averages. 

However the required rates of reduction implied by the proposed NPRM curves between 

2016MY and 2017MY are very challenging for lower volume, limited line manufacturers 

coming out of the Expanded TLAAS. JLR's fleet of passenger cars would be required to deliver 

circa [ ] CO2 reduction as required by the NPRM. JLR's fleet of light trucks would be required to 

deliver circa [ ] CO2 reduction as required by the NPRM. [Note: CBI information - [ ] - was 

omitted.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8102-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

4. Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative Standards Should Not be Extended to Model 

Years 2017-2025
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NRDC agrees with the EPA proposal to end the Temporary Leadtime Allowance Alternative 

Standards with the 2016 model year. This exemption from the established 2012-2016 ramp-up—

along with a generous early credit proposal, inclusion of FFV credits for MY 2012-2015, 

transferring credits between car and truck fleets, and 3-year carry forward of deficits—was 

provided so that all manufacturers had a pathway to comply with 2016 GHG standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, pp. 13-14]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Introduction:

On behalf of Dr. Ing, h.c. F. Porsche Aktiengesellschaft (“Porsche AG"), Porsche Cars North 

America Inc. (“PCNA," and, collectively with Porsche AG, "Porsche") is pleased to provide the 

following comments on the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) regarding 2017 and Later 

Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards. 

Porsche submits these comments in view of the fact that it has been recently announced that it is 

no longer realistic to achieve the once-planned merger between Volkswagen AG and Porsche 

Autornobil Holding SE (“'Porsche SE") within the framework and timeframe of the basic 

agreement from 2009. Porsche AG is a wholly owned subsidiary of Porsche Zwischenholding 

GmbH, which in turn is held by Porsche SE (50.1 percent) and Volkswagen AG (49.9 percent).

Nonetheless, Porsche SE and Volkswagen AG each also have reconfirmed their intention by 

some means to become part of an integrated automotive group. Both companies are currently 

examining whether alternatives to the measures provided for in the 2009 basic agreement are 

available. To the extent that such an alternative transaction is identified, and to the extent that 

such a transaction would materially change Porsche's status such that a supplement to these 

comments would be in order, Porsche reserves the possibility that it may do so.

2. Unequal burden: The goal of overall GHG reduction for the industry requires contribution 

from all manufacturers, but must account for the trajectory required for particular manufacturers. 

Transition from TLAAS to the base standards is a disproportionate burden for niche car makers. 

That transition cannot be accomplished by gradual incremental improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 7]

3. Economy of scale: Porsche faces cost challenges due to its size (less than 0.25% of U.S. 

industry sales). Our development costs for new technology cannot be spread over a large fleet to 

take advantage of natural economies of scale. There is a disproportionate financial impact on 

small manufacturers, due to higher per unit cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 7]

4. Skewed competition: Porsche's positioning among our direct competitors in the sports car 

segment is a disadvantage. Our larger competitors can support sports car sales by fleet averaging 

over abroad range of products. EPA has also proposed that our smallest competitors can request 

alternate 'lowest feasible' CO2 standards. Porsche cannot employ either of these options. Thus, 

the playing field is not level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 7]
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5. Availability of credits: We expect that many manufacturers will forego credit banking in order 

to expand sales of more profitable non-compliant models. Further, uncertainty will encourage 

other manufacturers to retain unused credits as insurance against the risk of catastrophic 

noncompliance in future years. Therefore, we believe it is unlikely that GHG credits will be 

readily available for sale on the open market. In fact, during the 2012-2016 GHG rulemaking, the 

Agencies acknowledged that experience shows that manufacturers do not sell credits. A business 

case cannot be built around such uncertainties that threaten our very existence. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 7]

In the absence of alternative standards, current TLAAS manufacturers would face a 25% 

reduction in GHG standards at the expiration of TLAAS following MY 2016. Due to Porsche's 

unique position in the market, we believe that those standards as proposed would create a hurdle 

that would drive us from the marketplace. We urge the agencies to consider alternatives which 

do not unjustly punish small specialty car manufacturers.

Porsche AG is a low volume manufacturer of premium high performance sports vehicles, 

targeted to a very small niche market. To assume that a performance car is in the same category 

as an economy sedan is to impose requirements that ignore the constraints of the laws of physics. 

It is certainly well accepted that it would be inappropriate for SUVs and light trucks to be subject 

to the same standards as passenger cars with similar footprints. Similarly, we believe it is not 

appropriate to set identical GHG standards for small economy vehicles and specialty 

performance machines, because of their vastly different design criteria and different market 

segments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 7]

The consequence of setting uniform standards is illustrated in the following tables taken from the 

NPRM, showing technology penetration for Model Years 2021 and 2025, As these tables show, 

Porsche would be expected to employ far greater electrification than any other manufacturer. 

This absurd compliance path would place us at a severe competitive disadvantage with respect to 

development costs, and in the consumer market. [The tables can be found on p. 8 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 8]

It is essential that a regulatory framework strive to accomplish its goals without interfering with 

natural free·market competition, Fair trade and free commerce demand a rule book that does not 

favor one business model over another. For the rules to be marketplace neutral, accommodation 

is needed for the unique challenge facing low volume niche manufacturers, yet without 

precipitating an unfair advantage over larger manufacturers who compete in those same niche 

markets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, pp. 8-9]

Porsche recommends three possible approaches for setting niche vehicle standards: fixed 

alternative standards, competitive standard setting, and alternate phase-ins. All three models 

would force Porsche to make significant GHG improvement equaling or exceeding the rest of the 

industry, but without imposing unrealistic targets likely to put us out of business.

Alternative Standards
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Porsche suggests that a limited low volume alternative standards model similar to TLAAS is 

appropriate for the niche car market. We applaud the current TLAAS provisions, which require 

Porsche to make an annual GHG improvement comparable to the broader industry, without 

requiring wholesale restructuring of our market presence and without imposing an unfair 

competitive disadvantage either to us or to our competitors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-

A1, p. 9]

We estimate that the size of the industry's TLAAS fleet is on the order of 2% to 3% of total sales. 

The use of TLAAS standards at 125% of the base standards therefore has a minimal net effect on 

industry GHG performance in the 2012-2016 period. We believe that by further reducing the size 

of the TLAAS fleet (e.g., by 50% to 25,000 vehicles per manufacturer per year), the impact on 

industry-wide GHG would be negligible. A program like TLAAS is a sensible approach to 

achieving significant GHG benefits without interfering with the marketplace. We urge the 

agencies to continue to include alternative standards for the niche offerings of both small and 

large manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 9]

Alternatively, we believe it would make sense to set GHG targets based on a sliding scale in 

proportion to market share / sales volume. This model would account for the relative ability of 

each manufacturer to weather increasing stringency, and to realize a return on the required 

technology investment. Conversely, as an OEM's sales and/or market share increase over time, it 

would make sense to adjust to more stringent GHG targets to reflect its increased capabilities. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 9]

Competitive Standard Setting

Standards for small volume niche manufacturers should not be more stringent than the GHG 

performance of their competitors' comparable models. Porsche proposes that small volume 

OEMs would have standards for each model set to the average GHG performance of competitor 

vehicles with similar horsepower, power/weight ratio, and type of technology employed (Diesel, 

Y-6 Turbo, conventional hybrid, PHEY, etc.). This will ensure a level playing field in 

competition with larger manufacturers which are using fleet averaging. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9264-A1, pp. 9-10]

This approach would be modeled after provisions for lower volume car makers described in 

California's LEY-II / Pavley I model, and in the successful ''Top Runner' model used in other 

countries. It is an apples-to-apples variable standard that guarantees a neutral application of 

standards among all competitors. By definition, this strategy will force smaller manufacturers to 

make annual GHG improvements equaling or exceeding the improvement of comparable models, 

and without disrupting healthy competition. The following text outlines LEY-II provisions for 

lower volume manufacturers: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 10]

[§ 1961.1. Greenhouse Gas Exhaust Emission Standards and Test Procedures (D) Requirements 

for Small Volume Manufacturers and Independent Low Volume Manufacturers.

1..... [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 10]
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2. At the beginning of the 2013 model year, each small volume manufacturer and independent 

low volume manufacturer shall identify all 2012 model year vehicle models, certified by a large 

volume manufacturer that are comparable to that small volume manufacturer or independent low 

volume manufacturer's 2016 model year vehicle models, based on horsepower and horsepower to 

weight ratio. The small volume manufacturer and independent low volume manufacturer shall 

demonstrate to the Executive Officer the appropriateness of each comparable vehicle model 

selected. Upon approval of the Executive Officer, s/he shall provide to the small volume 

manufacturer and to the independent low volume manufacturer the CO2- equivalent value for 

each 2012 model year vehicle model that is approved. The small volume manufacturer and 

independent low volume manufacturer shall calculate an average greenhouse gas emissions value 

for each its greenhouse gas vehicle test groups based on the CO2-equivalent values provided by 

the Executive Officer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 10]

3. In the 2016 and subsequent model years, a small volume manufacturer and an independent 

low volume manufacturer shall either: a. not exceed the fleet average greenhouse gas emissions 

value calculated for each GHG vehicle test group for which a comparable vehicle is sold by a 

large volume manufacturer, in accordance with section 1961. Hal(l)(D12: J [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 10]

Porsche believes that such a standards framework upholds the spirit of worldwide GHG policy, 

in that all participants are expected to contribute to the overall emission reduction goals. Even 

niche players in the high powered sports car segment will contribute to innovation and efficiency 

improvement. Indeed, such a framework would ensure a thriving, competitive performance car 

segment, leading to innovations applicable to the entire industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9264-A1, p. 10]

Alternate Phase-In

If long-term alternate standards or competitive standards are unacceptable, we suggest an 

alternate phase-in to the base standards. This would mitigate the potential 25% drop in GHG 

standards at the expiration of TLAAS. It is important to consider that the length of Porsche's 

product cycles is 2- to 3- times the typical industry product cycle, in order to allow recovery of 

investment costs over small annual volume. An extended phase-in would be critical to Porsche's 

survival. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p.11]

The phase-in suggested below is a linear trajectory, starting from MY 2015 TLAAS, and ending 

at the MY 2025 base standards. This example illustrates GHG targets for one subset of Porsche's 

portfolio (small footprint sports cars). Similar curves can be drawn for other TLAAS products. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p.11]

It should be emphasized that this alternate phase-in would require an average 5.2% annual GHG 

reduction for these models, compared to 4.0% for vehicles which are already subject to the base 

standards in MY 2015. While such a phase-in would be a challenge, it does accommodate the 

long range planning needed to develop entire new product lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9264-A1, p.11]
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Volkswagen

Volkswagen also submitted comments noting a gap in the MYs 2012-2016 TLAAS provisions 

involving a situation where TLAAS-eligible companies not participating in TLAAS merge with 

a TLAAS participant and the merged entities sales remain less than 400,000 units. VW 

requested that in such circumstances the companies should have the same administrative options 

as the rules provide for non-TLAAS participants merging with TLAAS participants where the 

merged entities sales exceed 400,000 units.

Response:

EPA did not propose to and is not extending the Temporary Leadtime Allowance 

Alternative standards (TLAAS) program per se. EPA received supportive comments regarding 

not extending TLAAS along the lines of the MYs2012-2016 program and received no comments 

recommending that the full-scale TLAAS program be extended. 

EPA requested comments on whether there is a need to provide some type of additional 

lead time flexibility for intermediate volume, limited line manufacturers. EPA received 

supportive comments regarding providing some flexibility to intermediate volume 

manufacturers. Three manufacturers, Suzuki, Jaguar Land Rover, and Porsche provided specific 

recommendations and supporting rationale. EPA has carefully considered the comments 

regarding the need for additional flexibility for intermediate volume manufacturers. These 

manufacturers are eligible for the expanded TLAAS provisions in the MYs 2012-2016 rules 

which provide less stringent CO2 standards through MY 2016 for manufacturers with U.S. sales 

below 50,000 vehicles. EPA understands the feasibility concerns raised by the manufacturers 

with regard to the significant increase in stringency represented by the change in standards under 

the TLAAS program in MY 2016 and the MY 2017 primary program standards. EPA is 

providing additional lead-time flexibility to these intermediate volume manufacturers through 

MY 2020 to help ease the transition to the MY 2017-2025 program. A more detailed review of 

the comments and EPA’s response is provided in preamble Section III.B.6. The feasibility of the 

standards is discussed in Section III.D.6 of the preamble. As shown there, these intermediate 

manufacturers do face disproportionate compliance challenges in the early model years of this 

program. See Table III- 28 (JLR projected to require 23 % HEV, 2% PHEV, and 7% EV to meet 

MY 2021 combined fleet standard; these technology penetrations are considerably more 

challenging than for larger manufacturers; see also EPA RIA table 5.1.6 showing similarly 

disproportionate costs to meet the MYs 2019-2021 standards, even after the additional lead time 

afforded by the final rule.

Porsche notes that the company submitted comments under the assumption that they 

would remain independent from Volkswagen and that if the status of their relationship changed 

such that a supplement to their comments would be in order, Porsche reserved the possibility that 

it may submit such comments. On August 1, 2012, VW completed its acquisition of 100 percent 

of Porsche’s automotive business.6

 While Porsche has not submitted follow-up comments, it is 

 6 ”Volkswagen and Porsche finalize creation of Integrated Automotive Group,” Volkswagen news release, 

August 1, 2012.
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EPA’s expectation that Porsche will no longer be eligible for the expanded TLAAS program or 

the leadtime provisions discussed above since it will no longer be an intermediate volume 

manufacturer. EPA expects that Porsche’s fleet will be absorbed into VW’s fleet for purposes of 

determining compliance with the GHG standards. Nevertheless, EPA has considered Porsche’s 

comments and recommendations with regard to intermediate volume manufacturers.

Fisker comments that manufacturers using the expanded TLAAS provisions are required 

to make a good faith effort to purchase credits and strongly encourages EPA to hold to the spirit 

of these provisions. In response, although the comments are on the implementation of the MY 

2012-2016 program and not the MY 2017-2025 proposal, EPA understands the commenters 

concerns. The requirements for expanded TLAAS manufacturers to make a good faith effort to 

purchase credits remains in place as a regulatory requirement. EPA notes that the expanded 

TLAAS provisions will not be accessed by eligible manufacturers until the base TLAAS 

program maximum allowance has been reached. The base TLAAS program allows 

manufacturers to place a cumulative total of 100,000 vehicles into TLAAS in MYs 2012-2015. 

Finally, EPA agrees with VW that the TLAAS provisions on mergers contain an 

inadvertent gap, and is clarifying those provisions in response to the comment. See preamble 

section III.E.7.h.

2.4. Mid-term Evaluation

Organizations Included in this Section

Alexandria Hyundai

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

American Medical Association of California

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Center for Biological Diversity

Chrysler Group LLC

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Ecology Center

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Honeywell International, Inc.

Honeywell Transportation Systems

House of Representatives, Congress of the United States

Hyundai America Technical Center

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Kia Motors
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Marshall, C.

Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Nissan North America, Inc.

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Pew Charitable Trusts

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

RVIA

Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Toyota Motor North America

U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

United States Senate

University of Michigan

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Weiner, L.

Organization: Alexandria Hyundai

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 66.]

As a contingency, if consumers in fact reject these vehicle offerings, it is my understanding the 

midterm review provides an opportunity to reset the goals if the needed technology cannot be 

provided at a reasonable price.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The Alliance supports the proposal to include an in-depth mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.3]

This rulemaking reaches an unprecedented 13 years into the future. A mid-term evaluation 

process will allow the agencies to review a broad range of factors and make appropriate 

adjustments. It will provide better data and insight on a range of issues relevant to the 

appropriateness of the MY 2022-2025 standards, including consumers’ willingness to buy the 

vehicles that are required to comply with the standards; future fuel pricing; and technology and 
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raw materials costs. The Alliance comments on the mid-term evaluation include additional topics 

that the agencies should review. We recommend that, in addition to the proposed formal midterm evaluation, the agencies continue their open dialogue and also conduct a series of smaller, 

focused technical evaluations - or “check-ins” - on the key assumptions of the proposal. The 

Alliance also requests a more specific description of the mid-term evaluation process and the 

specifics to be reviewed, including the timeline and procedures for assuring that the studies the 

agencies rely on are appropriately peer reviewed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.3]

The Alliance Supports the Proposal to Include an In-Depth Mid-Term Evaluation. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.6]

The MY 2017-2025 GHG proposal includes provisions requiring EPA to conduct a mid-term 

evaluation of the MY 2022-2025 light-duty GHG standards to determine whether those standards 

remain appropriate in light of technological and other changes that may have occurred since the 

time of proposal. This evaluation process will be coordinated with NHTSA's effort to set final, 

binding CAFE standards for the 2022-2025 model years. The mid-term evaluation will include 

consideration of up to date information, a “holistic assessment of all of the factors considered by 

the agencies in setting standards” and the “expected impact of those factors on the 

manufacturers’ ability to comply.” To facilitate the evaluation, EPA (along with NHTSA and 

CARB) will publish a draft Technical Assessment Report (TAR), which will be peer-reviewed 

and made available for public comment. EPA also will request comment on whether the MY 

2022-2025 standards remain appropriate under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and 

whether the standards should be made more or less stringent. No later than April 1, 2018, EPA 

will make a final determination whether the MY 2022-2025 standards, as adopted in 2012, are 

appropriate. This process also is intended to guide NHTSA’s decision-making regarding its MY 

2022-25 CAFE standards. If EPA concludes that the standards are not appropriate, the agency 

will then initiate a rulemaking to adopt standards that are appropriate under section 202(a). Both 

EPA and NHTSA have stated that that they would issue a joint rulemaking at least 18 months 

prior to the beginning of the 2022 model year, consistent with the statutory directive in the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 2005 (EPCA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.6]

The Alliance consistently has advocated that a mid-term evaluation is more than just appropriate; 

it is a critical component of this rulemaking package if these GHG and CAFE standards are to be 

successful. This rulemaking will govern vehicle production 13 years from now, a particularly 

long time period when predicting technologies, costs, infrastructure, fuels and consumer 

behavior. It comes on the heels of a five-year rulemaking that will, according to the agencies, 

cost automakers almost $52 billion – the highest cost of any rulemaking imposed to date on the 

auto industry. The agencies estimate the additional GHG reductions and fuel economy gains 

from this rule will cost automakers an additional $133-157 billion, bringing the combined cost of 

the MY 2012-25 rules to somewhere between $185 and $209 billion. This unprecedented effort 

and expense will further our country’s energy and environmental goals, but only if consumers 

choose to purchase these fuel-efficient, climate-friendly vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.6]
EPA Response to Comments

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By necessity, the GHG and CAFE standards proposed here are predicated on significant 

assumptions regarding the future - including such factors as the pace of technological innovation, 

deployment of supportive infrastructure for alternative fuels and advanced vehicles, rates of 

market penetration for new vehicle technologies, future costs of emerging technologies, fuel cost 

and availability and consumer acceptance. The agencies have attempted to make reasonable 

projections based on recent data. Nevertheless, the proposed standards cover an unusually long 

time horizon, governing the production of vehicles over a decade into the future. The mid-term 

evaluation will allow the agencies to determine whether the CAFE and GHG standards should be 

adjusted as a result of customers’ willingness to buy vehicles that are required to comply with the 

standards, developments in technology, costs, safety, fuels, infrastructure and other relevant 

factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.7]

Thirteen years into the future, consumer purchasing patterns will be the biggest unknown. 

Besides fuel economy, we know that consumers demand affordability, safety, convenience, 

performance and utility. One challenge we face is that fuel economy considerations often rank 

below these other attributes. Fuel prices, which are especially difficult to project, have a huge 

impact on how consumers weigh fuel economy at the dealership. All of this explains why the 

final rule should include a rigorous mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.9]

Adherence to the Mid-Term Evaluation Process and Timing is Critical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.7]

EPA has proposed that the MY 2022-2025 GHG standards “will remain in effect unless and until 

EPA changes them by rulemaking.” EPA has not specifically provided for expedited judicial 

review of the results of the final mid-term evaluation or any final rule setting revised MY 2022-

2025 GHG standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.7]

The Alliance would like to stress how important it is that both agencies follow the mid-term 

evaluation process laid out in the regulations, including strict adherence to the deadlines. 

Following the process as proposed should enable the agencies to consider all relevant issues, 

make an informed decision about the appropriateness of the MY 2022-2025 standards, and allow 

sufficient time for the promulgation of different standards and/or judicial review, if necessary. 

The purpose of the mid-term evaluation provision is to ensure that the assumptions underlying 

the MY 2022-2025 standards remain valid; to the extent that the assumptions are incorrect and 

the standards are inappropriate, the burden is likely to fall primarily on vehicle manufacturers. If 

EPA fails to follow the mid-term evaluation process or fails to meet the deadlines, it is probable 

that EPA will not have complied with the Section 202(a)(2) mandate to provide adequate time 

for the development and application of the technology required to comply with such standards. 

Moreover, failure to conduct the midterm evaluation or to meet the deadlines would constitute a 

failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty and/or final agency action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, pp.7-8]

In making this comment, we wish to stress that the Alliance does not assume that EPA or 

NHTSA intend to deviate from the mid-term evaluation process or ignore its deadlines. We 

believe that all parties, including the agencies, will work in good faith to follow the process. We 
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merely wish to stress that the success of the mid-term evaluation depends on close adherence to 

the process and the deadlines. If anything is allowed to undermine or delay the process, it creates 

a significant potential for disputes and difficulties in the future, something we all hope to avoid. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.8]

The Agencies Should Conduct Periodic Technical “Check-Ins.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.8]

In the time leading up to the mid-term evaluation - and following the completion of the 

evaluation - the agencies should continue to check the validity of the assumptions upon which 

their standards are based. We suggest not only one formal mid-term evaluation, as the agencies 

have proposed, but also a series of smaller, focused, technical evaluations of, or “check-ins” on, 

the key assumptions of the proposal. These “check-ins” will allow the agencies to consider the 

latest relevant technical information, and thereby help the agencies keep the program on track 

and produce the best long term results. By having these “check-ins” the agencies will be better 

prepared to begin their formal mid-term evaluation and to make appropriate adjustments during 

the second half of the period covered by these regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.8]

The Alliance understands that EPA's mid-term evaluation will take place concurrently, and in 

conjunction with, NHTSA's process for setting final CAFE standards for MY 2022-2025. The 

agencies should jointly examine progress achieved towards compliance with the standards, and 

assess the latest information available on key assumptions and trends used to develop the 

standards, including the criteria set forth for determining maximum feasible fuel economy 

standards in 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f). Factors that should be considered include, but should not be 

limited to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Development of powertrain improvements to gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles; [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Level of employment in U.S. automotive sector; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Availability and implementation of methods to reduce weight while assuring compliance with 

state and Federal safety, emissions and equipment laws and standards, and maintaining 

acceptable performance in consumer information crash testing and manufacturer due care 

testing; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Actual and projected combined sales of alternative fuel vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.17]

Actual and projected availability of public and private charging infrastructure for electric 

vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]
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Actual and projected availability of low carbon and technology-enabling fuels and infrastructure, 

along with adoption and implementation of clean and renewable energy standards; [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Costs, including average costs of technologies to ensure compliance with the standards, such as 

vehicle batteries and power electronics, mass reduction, and alternative fuels, and anticipated 

trends in these costs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Current and expected availability of state and Federal incentives/subsidies for advanced 

technology vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Average payback periods for any incremental vehicle costs associated with meeting the 

standards, as well as up-front cost and impacts on consumer affordability; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Costs for gasoline, diesel fuel and alternative fuels; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Total light-duty vehicle sales and projected fleet mix; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.17]

Consumer demand for and customer acceptance of fuel-efficient technologies, and consumer 

valuation of fuel savings; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

End-of-life costs associated with advanced technology vehicles; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.17]

Any other factors that may be deemed relevant to the review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.17]

Some recent studies attempt to identify opportunities for cost-effective near-term fuel economy 

improvements but also raise important questions about longer-term conditions. These questions 

call for information that is not yet available to EPA, NHTSA, the California Air Resources 

Board or any other party, including automobile manufacturers. The Alliance recommends that 

the mid-term evaluation focus on the issues as detailed below. During the evaluation, the 

agencies should seek expert peer-reviewed data and analysis, including the input of the National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS), to answer the following questions, among others: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.17]

Given how little is known about the “energy paradox,” the Alliance supports NHTSA’s proposal 

to develop a Consumer Vehicle Choice Model to inform the mid-term evaluation. Such a model 

should also look at the other factors identified in the Preliminary RIA as having an impact on 

consumer purchasing decisions: sales taxes, insurance costs, the additional cost of auto loans and 

changes in resale value. To have credibility, the model needs to use real-world data, be 

developed in a transparent manner with full peer review, and should assess uncertainties in its 

predictions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.19]
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Given the considerable uncertainty about future technology development, cost and consumer 

acceptability, the proposed mid-term evaluation is essential in order to assure that the maximum 

feasible fuel economy benefits are obtained in a cost-effective and safety neutral manner. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.22]

Process for Conducting the Mid-Term Evaluation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

The NPRM indicates that a draft Technical Assessment Report will be completed by November 

15, 2017, and that EPA will make a final determination by April 1, 2018. The Alliance believes 

that a more detailed description of the process would be helpful. In particular, the final 

regulatory language should indicate that the agencies intend to perform a thorough analysis of 

consumer purchasing behavior, the single most important factor that will determine whether the 

goals of the program are being met. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

The final regulatory language should also include the following important details: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

start date of the evaluation and a schedule for major milestones to assure that the review is 

completed in time for EPA to make a fully informed regulatory determination; [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

specific studies the agencies plan to conduct; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

details of the peer review process; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

availability of a pubic docket; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

role of NAS in the mid-term evaluation; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

roles of other departments and agencies that provide or regulate alternative fuels and emerging 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.24]

Further, the Alliance suggests that multipliers, like many aspects of the program, be reviewed 

during the mid-term evaluation. Should the mid-term evaluation reveal continuing market 

challenges with advanced technology vehicles, extending the multipliers beyond MY 2021 may 

be necessary to encourage fleet penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 96-97.]

That's why it's critical that the final rule include a rigorous mid-term review with a clearly 

defined process for its implementation.

During the review, the agencies should seek expert peer-reviewed information including the 

input of the National Academy of Sciences to answer these questions: Are the costs of advanced 
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technologies declining as expected? Are researchers making the breakthroughs anticipated? 

What's happening with fuel prices, and how are consumers responding? What impact are the new 

requirements having on sales and on employment? How are the new rules impacting vehicle 

safety? What's happened with fuel quality? Will liquid fuels support the fuel-efficient 

technologies that have been introduced? Will the new charging infrastructure be available to 

enable plug-in hybrids, battery electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles to penetrate the market at 

the levels predicted?

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 121.]

The proposed mid-term review seems appropriate to us and we believe it will be essential to 

checking progress and making necessary adjustments that cannot be foreseen from this early 

date.

Organization: American Medical Association of California

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 48.]

As well as to whether any midterm program review that may be viewed by some as an 

opportunity to weaken the standards previously agreed upon. The midterm review may have 

ramifications for the State of California and the programs in place here. It will align with the 

national standards, and it must remain clear that California maintains its own Clear Air Act 

authority to enact our own rules more stringent than the federal rules due to our extreme air 

quality challenges.

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

For this reason, we support the proposed mid-term review to reassess the stringency of the 

standards, including technology penetration rates, fuel costs, and most importantly, consumer 

acceptance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 66.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 50-51.]

Due to the many uncertainties that are implicit in the technical and economic assumptions that 

form the basis for the proposed standards, we support the proposed mid-term review of the 

standards. We also support the recommendation made at the Detroit public hearing that the final 

rule should specify a clearly defined process for the review, with a designated list of questions to 

be addressed. In addition, we agree with the recommendation (again at the Detroit public 
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hearing) that the agencies consider a series of more narrow reviews of key aspects of the 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 9]

The need for a mid-term review finds ample support in both EISA and the Clean Air Act, as both 

statutes require the promulgation of regulations that are based on the most up-to-date information 

concerning the costs and benefits of the technologies required to meet the standards. Indeed, 

because EISA prohibits the promulgation of fuel economy standards past the MY 2021, a midterm evaluation is required before final CAFE standards can be promulgated for the 2022 

through 2025 MYs. EISA provides that the Secretary shall “issue regulations under this title 

prescribing average fuel economy standards for at least 1, but not more than 5, model years.” 49 

U.S.C. § 32902(b)(3)(b). Congress included the 5 year limit, in part, because it recognized that 

the factors NHTSA must consider in adopting fuel economy standards—technological 

feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the 

Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy, see 49 

U.S.C. §32902(f)—are fluid and vary over time. Consequently, any attempt to weigh these 

factors today for standards that would not apply until the 2022 MY would be fraught with 

uncertainty and inherently arbitrary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, pp. 9-10]

The current rulemaking being jointly undertaken by EPA and NHTSA encompasses nine model 

years (MYs 2017 through 2025). Under the plain terms of the statute, any final fuel economy 

standards that are issued now and are applicable to a model year after 2021 would be invalid. 

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking recognizes this concern and therefore states “[t]he second 

phase of the CAFE program, from MYs 2022–2025, represents conditional proposed standards . . 

.” 76 FR at 74,859. NHTSA correctly recognizes that “conditional” rulemaking in this instance 

“means to say that the proposed standards for MYs 2022–2025 represent the agency’s current 

best estimate of what levels of stringency would be maximum feasible in those model years, but 

in order for the standards for those model years to be legally binding a subsequent rulemaking 

must be undertaken by the agency at a later time.” Id., n.7. According to NHTSA, “[t]he 

passenger car and light truck CAFE standards for MYs 2022–2025 will be determined with 

finality in a subsequent, de novo notice and comment rulemaking conducted in full compliance 

with EPCA/EISA and other applicable law . . .” Id. at 75,166. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-

A1, p. 10]

Global Automakers supports the intent expressed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

concerning the mid-term evaluation. However, we are concerned that the actual language of the 

proposed regulations goes too far in adopting final regulations for MY 2022 through 2025. 

Proposed 49 C.F.R. § 531.5(c) provides that “[f]or model years 2012–2025, a manufacturer’s 

passenger automobile fleet shall comply with the fleet average fuel economy level calculated for 

that model year according to Figure 2 . . .” and provides the parameters for the fuel economy 

targets through the 2025 MY. Viewed in isolation, this provision would constitute final fuel 

economy standards for the 2022 through 2025 MYs. The standards are ostensibly made 

conditional through proposed subsection (e), which provides: “For model years 2022–2025, each 

manufacturer shall comply with the standards set forth in paragraphs (c) and (d) in this section, if 

NHTSA determines in a rulemaking, initiated after January 1, 2017, and conducted in 
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accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902, that the standards in paragraphs (c) and (d) are the maximum 

feasible standards for model years 2022–2025. . . .” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 10]

Global Automakers believes that a mid-term evaluation of the GHG emission standards is 

likewise not only permissible under the Clean Air Act, but also required because of the 

uncertainties inherent in projecting regulatory requirements nine to twelve years into the future. 

First, Section 202(a) plainly provides EPA with the authority for a mid-term evaluation. See 42 

U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (providing that “[t]he Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from 

time to time revise)” motor vehicle emission standards) (emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9466-A1, pp. 10-11]

Moreover, a mid-term evaluation is required under the Clean Air Act in view of the proposed 

regulations’ long regulatory horizon. The Clean Air Act requires that standards “shall take effect 

after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application 

of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within 

such period.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). EPA’s determination concerning the appropriate level of 

stringency for GHG emission standards must be based upon reliable and up-to-date information. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 11]

Given the extremely long time-horizon of these proposed mobile source regulations, EPA has 

conceded a number of uncertainties in the analyses that underlie its current rulemaking. See, e.g., 

76 FR at 74,881 (recognizing the “uncertainties regarding the benefit and cost values presented 

in this proposal”). For example, the NPRM states that EPA and NHTSA “did not consider 

technologies that are currently in an initial stage of research because of the uncertainty involved 

in the availability and feasibility of implementing these technologies with significant penetration 

rates for this analysis. The agencies recognize that due to the relatively long time frame between 

the date of this proposal and 2025, it is very possible that new and innovative technologies will 

make their way into the fleet, perhaps even in significant numbers, that we have not considered 

in this analysis.” Id. at 74,922. Global Automakers believes that the converse may also be true, 

i.e., the proposed standards are based on assumptions concerning the availability and market 

penetration of technologies up to 12 years into the future that may not prove entirely accurate. 

Consequently, Global Automakers believes that it would have been arbitrary and capricious for 

EPA to promulgate GHG emission standards for model years as far into the future as MY 2022-

2025 without providing for a mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 11]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

An in-depth mid-term review is extremely important in order to monitor the development of 

external factors such as customer acceptance of more fuel efficient vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 1]

Therefore, an in-depth mid-term review is an extremely important pillar in the proposed rule in 

order to monitor the development of external factors which are not under the manufacturer's 

direct control. This review is critical for reassessment of what technology can deliver and what 

consumers are willing to buy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 3]
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[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 78-79.]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

H. The Agencies’ Proposed Interim Rulemaking Should, at a Minimum, Be Based on a 

Presumption that the Stringencies of the Standards Will Not Decrease

We have already commented on the Agencies’ proposed mid-term review in our response to the 

DEIS. We add here that the Agencies’ proposed method of undertaking this review is faulty. 

They state they intend the review to be based on “(1) a holistic assessment of all of the factors 

considered by the agencies in setting standards . . . , and (2) the expected impact of those factors 

on the manufacturers’ ability to comply, without placing decisive weight on any particular factor 

or projection.” To the contrary, as fully explained above, the Agencies must place decisive 

weight on energy conservation. Yet, by highlighting manufacturers’ ability to comply in a 

separate category, the Agencies tip their hand about a very different, and improper, weighing of 

the statutory factors. We further note the irony of requests by automakers for “frequent 

evaluations” of the MY 2017-2025 standards in light of their insistence that “certainty” of 

standards and extreme lead times are needed if stringencies are to be increased.110 Efforts to 

water down already insufficient standards by any means must be resisted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9479-A1, pp. 24-25]

110 See Jason Plautz, Fuel Economy: Automakers Urge Frequent Evaluations of 2027-2025 

Program, GREENWIRE, Jan. 17, 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

This rulemaking will affect vehicles over thirteen years into the future. Many key elements such 

as technology development, technology costs, fuel costs, and customer acceptance can be 

difficult to accurately predict. Therefore, Chrysler strongly supports the agencies’ proposal to 

hold a formal mid-term review of the 2022-2025 model year standards and informal monitoring 

of industry progress towards meeting the National Program goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 2]

For this reason the proposed mid-term review of the 2022-2025 MY standards is critical. 

Chrysler strongly supports this provision and encourages EPA and NHTSA (collectively, the 

“Agencies”) to also establish regular informal reviews leading up to and following the formal 

mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 5]

Chrysler notes that the Agencies have a firm legal basis to conduct the mid-term evaluation. 

(Attachment 1)
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The Agencies have legal authority to conduct a formal mid-term evaluation which can affirm or 

modify standards promulgated for the 2022-2025 model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 6]

EPA and NHTSA have a firm legal basis to conduct the mid-term evaluation

EPA and NHTSA have ample authority under Section 307(d) of the Clean Air Act and the 

Administrative Procedure Act to reconsider regulations based on new information. See, e.g., 5 

U.S.C. § 553(e) (providing for petitions to issue, amend or repeal a rule); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) 

(allowing petitions for review of a Clean Air Act rule based on new information); 49 U.S.C. § 

32902(c) (authorizing the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to amend CAFE 

standards following notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 and allowing for oral, 

transcribed presentations). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 7]

As described in the proposed rule, “NHTSA has a statutory obligation to conduct a separate de 

novo rulemaking in order to establish final standards for vehicles for the 2022-2025 model years 

and would conduct a mid-term evaluation as part of that rulemaking.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,861. 

Under the Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”), NHTSA must set fuel economy standards 

at least 18 months before the beginning of each model year, 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a), and “must 

issue regulations ... prescribing average fuel economy standards for at least 1, but not more than 

5, model years.” 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (b)(3)(B). Since NHTSA must go through future rulemaking 

to establish the MY 2022-2025 standards, a full consideration of the standards based on the 

record at the time of the rulemaking is essential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 7]

EPA proposed a commitment to undertake a similar mid-term evaluation under the Clean Air 

Act. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,370 (proposed to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12 (h)) (“Midterm evaluation of standards. No later than April 1, 2018, the Administrator shall determine 

whether the standards established in paragraph (c) of this section for the 2022 through 2025 

model years are appropriate under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, in light of the record then 

before the Administrator. An opportunity for public comment shall be provided before making 

such determination. If the Administrator determines they are not appropriate, the Administrator 

shall initiate a rulemaking to revise the standards, to be either more or less stringent as 

appropriate.”).

As it is, agencies m [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 7]ay not violate their own rules and 

regulations to the prejudice of others. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 

260, 267 (1954); Steenholdt v. F.A.A., 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The Accardi 

doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous procedural rules that 

limit otherwise discretionary actions.”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 7]

The factors to be considered at the mid-term evaluation are the same as those that the agencies 

are obliged to consider in initially setting standards under their respective authorities. See 76 

Fed. Reg. at 75,370 (proposed to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12 (h)) (listing factors EPA 

must consider, including cost to producers and purchasers, as well as the feasibility and 

practicability of the standards and the impact of the standards on the automobile industry). Under 

EPCA, the Secretary is to consider “technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect 
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of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United 

States to conserve energy.” 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 7]

NHTSA has interpreted economic practicability to include consideration of consumer choice, 

economic hardship for the automobile industry, and vehicle safety. 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,897 

(footnote omitted) (discussing NHTSA approach to economic practicability under EPCA and 

explaining: “Consumer acceptability is also an element of economic practicability, one which is 

particularly difficult to gauge during times of uncertain fuel prices.”); see also CEI I, 901 F.2d at 

120, n.11; Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1986). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 7]

Under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPA emissions standards:

“shall take effect after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the 

development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the 

cost of compliance within such period.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 8]

EPA has also acknowledged, at least as to choices among vehicles, the relevance of consumer 

acceptance in evaluating these factors. See MY 2012-2016 Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 

25,467 (“Consumer choice remains a pertinent factor for EPA to consider in balancing the 

relevant statutory factors,” citing International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640 

(D.C. Cir. 1973)). In International Harvester, the court of appeals, recognizing that 

“[a]significant decrease in auto production will have a major economic impact on labor and 

suppliers to the [automobile] companies,” concluded that the Administrator is required to 

consider issues of basic demand for new passenger vehicles in making technical feasibility and 

lead time determinations. Id. at 641. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 8]

Under Section 202, EPA also must consider safety impacts:

“...[N]o emission control device, system, or element of design shall be used in a new motor 

vehicle or new motor vehicle engine for purposes of complying with requirements prescribed 

under this subchapter if such device, system, or element of design will cause or contribute to an 

unreasonable risk to public health, welfare, or safety in its operation or function.” 42 U.S.C. § 

7521(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 8]

As it is, the factors of “the requisite technology” and “appropriate consideration to the cost of 

compliance within such period” encompass the issues related to infrastructure, technology cost, 

consumer acceptance, and the other factors that the proposed rule directs EPA to consider. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 8]

The mid-term evaluation contemplates coordination between EPA and NHTSA, just as they have 

coordinated in developing the MY 2012-2016 rule and in developing the MY 2017-2025 

proposal. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that while the agencies’ 

“obligations may overlap, . . . there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer 
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their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 

(2007). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 53.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 60.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 25-26.]

We believe the midterm review is critical to determining whether the customer's buying, and will 

continue to buy the technology packages needed to comply with the standards year over year. 

Efforts to search for parameters that measure potential customer acceptance must not lose sight 

of the most important question: Are they buying the product? Measuring whether consumers will 

buy what we offer next year is already challenging. Speculating as far as 13 years in the future 

holds significant uncertainty and risk. A midterm assessment of the underlying rulemaking 

assumptions provides a critical and equitable mechanism o adjust standards for future consumer 

and technology uncertainties and is a primary reason Chrysler supports this program.

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 91-92.]

And finally, sixth, the proposed rule recognizes the need to stay in touch with reality.

So we have this midterm review, which I fully support, as you've heard the auto makers insist on 

it. But I actually believe when we get to the midterm review, we're as likely to increase the 

standards as decrease.

Because, one, we've used the very low gasoline price. And so I think it will be higher when we 

get there.

And, two, historically we've seen that the original projections of the cost of meeting technologies 

in every major standard proposed by this agency and NHTSA have always been too high.

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 189.]

While we do have some concerns about the proposed mid-term review providing an opportunity 

to slow progress, we understand the need for potential adjustments due to many unknowns that 
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far into the future. We are hopeful that such a review will show that even more progress is 

achievable.

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

NHTSA is obligated to conduct a separate de novo rulemaking in order to establish final 

standards for MYs 2022-2025 vehicles. The agencies are therefore proposing to conduct a 

comprehensive midterm evaluation to assess the appropriateness of the MY 2022-2025 

standards, based on an updated assessment of all the factors considered in setting the standards 

and the impacts of those factors on the manufacturers' ability to comply.

The auto industry faces great uncertainty over future technology developments and costs, 

customer acceptance of new technologies, and fuel prices. Additionally, it will require more than 

just automotive production for emissions reductions from advanced technology vehicles to be 

realized. There must be a national fueling and service infrastructure available to support these 

technologies if they are to achieve significant market penetration. Developing and establishing 

this infrastructure for the nation and establishing consumer confidence in new technologies will 

take time. All of these factors make it critical that OEMs foresee the ability to cope with 

unexpected events and changes. Given the uncertainty inherent in setting standards over such a 

long time period, EcoMotors supports the agencies' plans to conduct a coordinated mid-term 

evaluation of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, pp. 13-14]

• Specific Recommendation: Conduct a coordinated mid-term evaluation, as proposed.

We look forward to further developments in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-

A2, p. 14]

Organization: Ferrari

Finally, it is essential for EPA and NHTSA to conduct a comprehensive mid-term evaluation, 

taking into account the long period covered by the proposed regulations, regardless the legal 

obligations for NHTSA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.10]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

• Mid term Evaluation: The proposal provides for a thorough mid-term evaluation, by no later 

than April 2018, to assess the appropriateness of the targets for model years 2022 through 2025. 

This provision is essential and must be maintained in the final rule. The market success of our 

industry, and hence that of our new and innovative products, is dependent upon many factors 

outside of our control, such as the price of fuel, the state of the economy, or the availability of 

affordable technologies and materials (for example, to support electrification, or lightweighting). The further we look into the future, the more difficult it is to predict these factors 

with accuracy. This is why the proposed mid-term evaluation of the 2022-2025 model year 

greenhouse gas standards is vital to this joint proposal. The mid-term evaluation provides an 
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essential checkpoint to ensure that the standards for those model years are consistent with 

evolving market conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 2 and 5]

Mid-Term Evaluation

The proposed rules include provisions for a mid-term evaluation of the appropriateness of the 

MY 2022-2025 GHG standards. This mid-term evaluation is to be conducted concurrently with 

NHTSA's actions in setting final, enforceable standards for MYs 2022-2025. Under the proposal, 

EPA and NHTSA, along with CARB, will jointly prepare a draft Technical Assessment Report 

('TAR') on the appropriateness and feasibility of the MY 2022-2025 GHG and Corporate 

Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and make the report available to the public no later 

than November 15, 2017. The agencies will receive public comment on the TAR as well as the 

standards themselves. EPA will then determine, by April 1, 2018, whether the MY 2022-2025 

standards are appropriate, taking into account a number of factors, including but not limited to 

factors specified in the regulatory language. If EPA determines the MY 2022-2025 standards are 

appropriate, it will issue a final decision to that effect, which will be judicially reviewable. If 

EPA determines the MY 2022-2025 standards are not appropriate, it will initiate a rulemaking to 

adopt appropriate standards under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, and any final rule 

resulting from that process would also be judicially reviewable. Any such rulemaking would be 

conducted jointly with NHTSA's de novo notice-and-comment rulemaking to set final CAFE 

standards for MYs 2022-2025. Both agencies would presumably issue final standards for MYs 

2022-2025 on or before April 1, 2020, which would provide the minimum allowable lead time 

for the MY 2022 standards under the CAFE law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 6]

Given the extended timeframe for the rules, the mid-term evaluation provisions are essential to 

Ford's support of this rulemaking package. The proposed standards for model years 2022-2025 

are premised on projected developments in fuel economy technology, anticipated improvements 

in infrastructure to support new kinds of powertrains, the willingness of consumers to accept new 

technologies, and other factors. To the extent that these assumptions turn out to be incorrect, 

adjustments to the MY 2022-2025 standards may be necessary. The mid-term evaluation 

provides a vital checkpoint to ensure that the MY 2022-2025 standards are realistic and that the 

manufacturers have a workable pathway to compliance. It is also essential that the agency 

decisions emerging from the mid-term evaluation be judicially reviewable. While we think it is 

unlikely that the agency's mid-term evaluation determination will be challenged in court, the 

possibility of such a challenge helps to ensure that the evaluation process will be robust and that 

the agencies will give full consideration to all comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, 

p. 6]

Ford supports the mid-term evaluation provisions as proposed by EPA. We also offer the 

following comments, which are fully consistent with the existing provisions: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 6]

• Timing. In conducting the mid-term evaluation, it is very important that the agencies 

meet (if not beat) the deadlines set forth in the proposed rules. The TAR must be issued 

on time to allow for a reasonable public comment period, and the public comment period 

must be completed in a timely fashion for EPA to meet its April 1, 2018 deadline for 
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making its determination. That deadline, in turn, must be met in case EPA needs to 

undertake a joint rulemaking with NHTSA to set new standards for MYs 2022-2025 and 

complete that rulemaking by April 1, 2020, which is NHTSA's statutory deadline for 

setting MY 2022 CAFE standards. If the mid-term evaluation process is allowed to lag, 

stakeholders who are concerned about the appropriateness of the MY 2022-2025 

standards may have little choice but to initiate 'deadline' litigation or take other actions 

they believe to be consistent with their interests. If this occurs, the goal of an orderly, 

thoughtful mid-term evaluation process could be thwarted. Adherence to the timing set 

forth in the proposal is critical. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 6-7]

• Coordination between EPA and NHTSA. Closely related to the timing issue is the 

importance of close coordination between EPA and NHTSA during the mid-term 

evaluation process. Consistent with the overarching goals of the One National Program 

framework, the midterm evaluation process needs to result in a joint rulemaking with 

harmonized CAFE and GHG standards for MYs 2022-2025. The harmonized standards 

should enable manufacturers to comply with both their GHG and CAFE obligations by 

building one fleet of vehicles that can be sold nationwide. In order to accomplish this, the 

degree of coordination between EPA and NHTSA during the mid-term evaluation needs 

to be no less than the degree of coordination involved in the pending joint rulemaking. 

The mid-term evaluation should not be viewed as an opportunity for EPA and NHTSA to 

go in different directions with respect to the GHG and CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 7]

• Factors to be considered. The proposed mid-term evaluation provision states that '...the 

Administrator shall consider information available on the factors relevant to setting 

greenhouse gas emission standards under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act for model 

years 2022 through 2025, including but not limited to...' *emphasis added+. The 

provision goes on to list a number of specific factors that the Administrator must 

consider. In Ford's view, the 'including but not limited to' language is an essential part of 

the mid-term review provisions. The factors that turn out to be most important six years 

from now are not necessarily foreseeable today, and not necessarily the ones listed in the 

proposed rule. As we understand the language, EPA must be open to the consideration of 

relevant factors not specifically listed, including relevant factors that may be raised in 

public comments received by the agencies. We urge EPA to maintain this language in the 

final rule, so that the midterm evaluation is as robust and comprehensive as 

possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 7]

• Holistic View. As part of the mid-term evaluation, the Agencies should take a broad view 

of the opportunities for reducing transportation-related CO2 emissions and fuel 

consumption, with an eye toward determining whether it may be necessary to implement 

measures external to the auto industry in order to support and complement the vehicle 

standards. A holistic approach to GHG reduction and fuel savings has the potential to be 

much more effective than a tunnel-vision focus on vehicles alone. Along these lines, we 

direct your attention to comments submitted by the University of Michigan (Chock, 

Gonzalez, Zeilinski) regarding the importance of considering the role of consumer fuel 

usage as part of any effort to establish policies and regulations related to GHG emissions. 

Ford has been, and continues to be, actively involved in dialogue with a variety of entities 

(including governments, academic institutions, and NGOs) on such subjects as urban 
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planning, congestion reduction, fueling infrastructure, and connectivity technologies to 

facilitate more efficient public and private transport. The ability of manufacturers to 

achieve the proposed vehicle standards may in part depend on the degree of progress our 

society is able to achieve in one or more of these other areas. Also, market fuel quality, 

particularly octane level, can have a significantly positive impact on all on-road vehicles 

and should therefore be a key part of our national strategy to improve energy security. 

These issues need to be on the table as part of the mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 7]

On balance, we believe that the proposed mid-term evaluation provisions set forth a meaningful 

and reasonable process for revisiting the appropriateness of the proposed MY 2022-2025 

standards, with the benefit of the information gathered in the intervening years. Ford supports the 

inclusion of these provisions in the final rule, and we pledge to work with the agencies in a 

constructive manner toward final MY 2022-2025 standards that are workable and 

appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 45.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 34.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 86-87.]

This is why the proposed midterm evaluation of the 2022 to 2025 standards is so vital to this 

joint proposal. As proposed, the midterm evaluation provisions require EPA to make a fresh 

determination regarding the appropriateness of the post-2021 model year standards after 

considering a variety of factors and soliciting public comments. This process will take place 

concurrently with NHTSA's process for setting final standards for the 2022 to 2025 model years. 

The midterm evaluation is an essential checkpoint to ensure that the standards for these model 

years are consistent with evolving market conditions. The existence of a robust, meaningful 

midterm evaluation process is critical to Ford's support for this rulemaking package.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 44-47.]

The proposed rule extends to the 2025 model year which is an unprecedented time frame in the 

context of fuel economy regulations. This presents a significant challenge for manufacturers. 

While the establishment of longer-term standards provide manufacturers with targets for future 

product planning investment, the longer time frame leads to greater risk that the assumptions 

underlying the standards do not come to fruition.

Organization: General Motors Company
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GM understands that the 2022-2025 standards will be evaluated further during the mid-term 

review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 2]

GM supports an in-depth mid-term evaluation, and urges as well, a continuing open dialogue 

among industry and other affected parties, including a series of earlier, focused, technical 

evaluations, or “check-ins”, on the key assumptions upon which the proposed standards are 

based. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 35-38, and 56.]

As this proposal makes many optimistic assumptions and sets goals all the way out to 2025, 13 

years from today, it is imperative that we collectively check the validity of those assumptions as 

we move through that extended period of time. We suggest not only one formal mid-term review 

as the agencies themselves have planned for the proposal, but a series of smaller technical and 

detailed focused check-ins on the key assumptions contained in this proposal. These check-ins 

will allow the program to stay on track and lead to the best long-term results. Of course, the more 

formal mid-term review is also essential since NHTSA must itself conduct a separate rulemaking 

to set the requirements under the CAFE law for the final four years of this period.

But you have my commitment that we will provide whatever data, analysis, and input we can to 

help the agencies to make judgments and course corrections along the way.

Clearly this proposal represents a dramatic attempt to advance the mutual goals of CO2 reduction 

and increased energy diversity. The mid-term review is essential to make sure that we also revisit 

the assumptions inherent in establishing these goals to make sure we have not overwhelmed 

technology development or the needs of consumers or their willingness to accept and pay for the 

associated changes in vehicles.

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 258.]

As the agencies recognize, turbo technologies will contribute significantly during the model 

years covered by this rulemaking, the agencies should commit during the mid-term review to 

evaluate the availability of more advanced turbo technologies and to ensure an equal production 

incentive as any ongoing incentive provided to battery technology.

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

Honeywell also encourages the agencies to commit in the final rule to a detailed review of 

emerging boosting technologies that may considerably advance vehicle emissions and fuel 

economy performance during the later years of the rulemaking. The agencies have already 

committed within the mid-term review to consider powertrain improvements to diesel and 
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gasoline powered vehicles. New, advanced turbo technologies can facilitate those improvements 

and may be ripe for regulatory consideration during the time when the agencies intend to conduct 

the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.6]

Honeywell’s research and development into turbo advancements continues. We expect to 

contribute significantly to support emissions and fuel economy improvements in both the light 

duty and heavy duty fleets during the upcoming model years. We are investing in yet more 

advanced approaches that we expect will allow diesel and gasoline vehicles to compete favorably 

in the marketplace while substantially advancing their environmental performance. While many 

of these technologies are not yet available for regulatory consideration, we anticipate that new, 

additional turbo technologies will be on the technology menu during the mid-term 

review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.6]

The agencies’ consideration of additional flexibilities and credits in the mid-term review should 

include such technologies. While the agencies will reconsider the viability of any incentives 

provided to electric drivetrains in the upcoming final rule, the agencies at the same time should 

consider providing equal treatment to ICE vehicles incorporating the boosting technologies that 

may be ripe for emergence during the model year 2022-2025 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9474-A1, p.6]

Honeywell also requests that the agencies commit to ensuring that future turbocharging 

technology be accorded full consideration and treatment analogous to electric drivetrain 

technology during the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, [p.6]

Organization: House of Representatives, Congress of the United States

In addition, we were pleased that the Administration intends to include a 'midterm' review for the 

2022-2025 requirements. This provides an opportunity for the last set of increases to be revisited to see if the assumptions on technology, costs, fuel prices, consumer acceptance and 

vehicle prices still support the standards that will be proposed, or whether their stringency should 

be revised upwards or downwards. [EPA–HQ–OAR–2010–0799-1221-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

The agencies are proposing a comprehensive mid-term review prior to the final adoption of the 

MY 2022-2025 standards by NHTSA. Hyundai supports the standards as proposed and 

appreciates the substantial lead time provided by the regulations which will provide stability for 

long-term product planning. At the same time, the proposal covers nine model years, out to MY 

2025, which makes it difficult to make accurate assumptions due to market uncertainties such as 

the price and viability of different fuel types, infrastructure availability, technology availability, 

technology penetration rates and cost, and consumer acceptance of technology. Therefore, 

Hyundai supports the mid-term evaluation because it provides an opportunity to ensure that the 

details of the program are appropriate and that the requirements are sound closer to the time of 

implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.2]
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[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 173.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 23.]

We agree with the comments by Global Automakers that the final rule should specify a clearly 

defined process for the mid-term review with a set of specific questions that should be addressed. 

Additionally, we also support additional informal periodic reviews to monitor areas such as the 

state of technology, the effect of the proposed incentives and the viability of testing methods. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 173-174.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 24.]

Although we believe the proposed requirements are feasible, Hyundai recognizes that it is 

difficult to accurately predict out to the 2025 time frame the technologies and the cost and 

consumer acceptance of these technologies that will be necessary.

The mid-term review will help ensure that the requirements are sound closer to the time of 

implementation.

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

Factors for the Mid-Term Evaluation Should Specifically Include Benefit Estimate Revisions 

The agencies should commit to developing better estimates of non-carbon dioxide benefits 

during the SCC revision process, ideally in time to incorporate such estimates in the final 

rulemaking.

Periodic review of ongoing regulations is a valuable check on efficiency,73 and the practice is 

now enshrined in executive order.74 The agencies’ plan to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the 

rule in advance of model year 2022 is commendable. Unfortunately, EPA’s list of relevant 

factors to consider during this review process lacks key elements. While there is a catch-all 

listing of “other factors,” there is no specific mention of reviewing any changes in benefits 

estimates, such as any revised SCC values. The agencies should amend their list of factors to 

specifically reflect any potential changes to benefits estimates, in addition to changes to costs or 

the state of technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 11]

73 See Comments from Policy Integrity to EPA and DOT on Retrospective Review (Mar. 18, 

2011, Apr. 1, 2011, June 27, 2011, July 3, 2011), available at http://www.policyintegrity.org.
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74 Exec. Order 13,563 § 6.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

10. ICCT enthusiastically supports a midterm review, as we believe it will find that costs have 

been significantly overstated. The criteria and analyses used for the midterm review should be 

similar to those used for any CAFE or greenhouse gas rulemaking process. EPA and NHTSA 

should also provide periodic status updates on technology progress and the results of additional 

benefit and cost analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

10) Mid-Term Review

The ICCT enthusiastically supports a midterm review, as we believe the proposed rule 

significantly overstates the cost of compliance. Continued technology advancements will both 

increase the benefits of many technologies, such that not as much technology would need to be 

installed, and reduce the cost of technologies that are used. Capturing these future improvements 

in the midterm review will allow the agencies to increase the stringency of the 2022-2025 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 22]

The process for the midterm review is critical to the 2022-25 standards. It is impossible to define 

all the criteria for the review at this time, just as it is not possible to define all of the criteria for 

any rulemaking process. EPA and NHTSA need latitude to apply their best analyses and base the 

requirements on the results of these analyses. The ICCT believes that the criteria and analyses 

used for the midterm review should be similar to those used for any CAFE or GHG rulemaking 

process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 22-23]

The ICCT also recommends that EPA and NHTSA conduct periodic updates on technology 

progress and consider periodic status reports. Tear-down cost assessments should continue in 

order to assess the cost of newer technologies as they are introduced into the market. Simulation 

modeling also needs to be updated to keep pace with technology development. The scope and 

timing of reports should be up to the Agencies, but we see value in documenting progress in 

technology improvements and implementation. Manufacturers do not release details of their 

technology development, so periodic reports can summarize technology and cost developments 

and technology deployment for all interested parties, including other manufacturers. The ICCT 

also expects continued improvement in the science of assessing technology benefits and costs, 

which can be disseminated through the periodic progress reports. Forward-looking analyses 

would provide a better foundation going into the midterm review and should be updated as 

appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 23]

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Johnson Controls also supports the agencies' inclusion of a mid-term evaluation, which, as 

proposed, will provide all stakeholders with a comprehensive analysis so they may consider the 

current performance and ability to realistically deliver the MY 2017-2025 standards in the public 

docket. Long-term planning is an especially important factor in the battery industry as there are 

likely to be uncertainties in the product development cycle that could directly impact - positively 
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or negatively - the commercial success of new products, as well as the return on investment 

required to expand the U.S. manufacturing base. Providing an opportunity for a thorough 

analysis is a critical and necessary component of this next National Program. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0253-A1, pp. 2-3]

Midterm Review should be supplemented by ongoing review and analysis during the course of 

the National Program. Midterm review is a critical component for this next National Program 

which covers eight years. Since the commencement of the midterm 'review is in the distant 

future, the industry encourages the agencies to be open to ongoing shared analysis and input to 

assess if the goals of the Program are being realized and/or if there are circumstances that 

drastically impact the marketplace or technology development. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 

5]

Organization: Kia Motors

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 102.]

Kia appreciates these substantial lead times for these regulations which will provide stability in 

long-term planning. However, Kia believes it is important for the agencies to include mid-term 

evaluations to allow for revisions if some of the assumptions made in the drafting of the rule are 

not proven to be correct. Even though Kia supports the standards, Kia recognizes it is difficult to 

accurately predict the outcome -- to accurately predict how to deliver the 2025 technology in that 

time frame. Consumer acceptance of those technologies and costs will also be a challenge. The 

mid-term review will help us ensure that the standards are robust for all OEMs near to the time 

frame of implementation.

Organization: Marshall, C.

The idea of a review of the regulation in 2021 is a good concept but I think the lead-times for the 

vehicle manufacturing industry to retool are so long that I would suggest the review be held in 

2019. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

The agencies are proposing a 'mid-term' review that would begin soon after the standards come 

into effect. In the past, automakers have abused similar programs--turning them into off-ramps 

as opposed to reviews. It is critical that this review does not undermine the program through 

2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10166-A2_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

The agencies are proposing a 'mid-term' review that would begin soon after the standards come 

into effect. In the past, automakers have abused similar programs--turning them into off-ramps as 
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opposed to reviews. It is critical that this review does not undermine the program through 2025. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1246-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

The agencies are proposing a 'mid-term' review that would begin soon after the standards come 

into effect. In the past, automakers have abused similar programs--turning them into off-ramps as 

opposed to reviews. It is critical that this review does not undermine the program through 2025. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9578-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

The mid-term review is critical to ensuring that the program remains feasible and is achieving 

GHG and fuel economy reductions without creating unintended economic, market and/or safety 

consequences. DAG strongly endorses the comments of the Auto Alliance with regard to the 

mid-term review. In addition to the various 'unknowns' identified in the Alliance comments, the 

mid-term review is essential to evaluate the structure of the program as applied to companies 

needing to expand their product offerings beyond the addition of advanced technology vehicles. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-2]

DAG also encourages the agencies to engage in periodic evaluations, in addition to the more 

formal and comprehensive mid-term review, to appraise (1) the extent to which the market has 

sustained the continued growth of hybrid vehicles and has accepted electric vehicles, (2) the 

extent to which the infrastructure to support battery electric, fuel cell and CNG vehicles has 

grown, and (3) whether efforts to meet the standards have resulted in adverse market or 

economic losses or product withdrawals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-2]

Organization: Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Supports the inclusion of a mid-term evaluation as fundamental for setting realistic fuel economy 

and GHG stringency levels for MYs 2022 through 2025. Recommends that effects of consumer 

incentives and EV charging infrastructure must be considered in the mid-term evaluation. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.2]

Mitsubishi Motors fully supports the mid-term evaluation, included in proposed language in 

Section 86.1818–12(h), in preparation for setting fuel economy and GHG standards for MYs 

2022 through 2025. This is not only necessary, but fundamental to setting informed and practical 

standards that account for the realities of the U.S. market. Mitsubishi Motors believes the 

following factors must be considered and incorporated into the mid-term evaluation: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.2]

• · What are fuel price trends as compared to what was projected? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9507-A1, p.2]

• · Are consumers buying more fuel efficient vehicles in general? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9507-A1, p.2]
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• · Does sufficient EV infrastructure exist to support current and future EV adoption? Have 

consumers adopted EVs in the numbers as projected by the agencies in the analysis done 

for the NPRM? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.2]

• · Have there been any significant industry-wide economic setbacks making EV and 

overall fuel economy targets as proposed in the NPRM impracticable? [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

• · Are financial and non-financial incentives and compliance flexibilities still necessary to 

continue to advance adoption of EVs? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

• · Have there been significant advances in smart grid development, energy management 

and battery storage? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

This is not an exhaustive list. Given our significant investment and commitment to EV 

commercialization, these are important areas of concern for Mitsubishi Motors in the MY 2022 

through 2025 timeframe. After a thorough analysis and consideration of all necessary factors, 

CAFE and GHG stringency levels for MYs 2022 through 2025 should be set accordingly. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

The agencies have never proposed fuel economy (or GHG) regulations that reach 13 model years 

into the future. Additionally, the agencies? target for finalizing this rule will be well before 

NHTSA?s statutory requirement of publishing finalized requirements at least 18 months prior to 

the beginning of a MY. This unprecedented lead time lends itself to more questions rather than 

providing certainty for OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

Additionally, the mid-term evaluation is necessary since the product plans for MYs 2016 through 

2020 are not as well-defined as the product plans for MYs 2010-2015. And, no OEM has 

detailed product plans for MYs 2021 through 2025. Although the product cycle development 

begins nearly 10 years before the launch of a vehicle, the commitment to product plans does not 

happen 10 years in advance. Product plans are set in general for approximately five years at a 

time. Projecting beyond five years in the future presents incremental uncertainties that those 

projections can be fulfilled for a number of reasons. The mid-term evaluation will help ensure 

that substantive analysis, rather than incrementally uncertain assumptions, support progressive 

yet realistic targets for the later years of this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, 

p.3]

Much of the uncertainty involves making realistic assumptions for consumer acceptance of 

alternative fueled vehicles (AFVs) for MYs 2022 through 2025. In order to make accurate 

assumptions for this timeframe, NHTSA and EPA must evaluate consumer choices made during 

MYs 2017 through 2021. Given historical adoption rates of advanced technology vehicles, there 

needs to be a thorough evaluation for an EV multiplier in MYs 2022 through 2025 in order to 

continue to advance EV market penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

To spur EV industry investment, President Obama established a national goal of 1 million 

electric vehicles on the road by 2015. Localities like the twin cities of Bloomington and Normal 

in central Illinois are working with Mitsubishi Motors and the Eaton Corporation through the EV 

Task Force to educate consumers, install EV charging infrastructure and deploy 1,000 Mitsubishi 
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“i”s by 2014. OEMs are planning for significant increases in consumer adoption rates of EVs and 

PHEVs. These progressive targets and plans are noteworthy and encouraging. Ultimately 

however, only consumers can fulfill these plans. EPA should account for uncertainty regarding 

consumer acceptance by extending the EV multiplier in MYs 2022 through 2025. This will help 

sustain progress towards establishing a mass EV market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, 

p.3]

Overall, NHTSA?s Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) suggests that this 

rulemaking is economically practicable for the industry as a whole. Yet, details in the PRIA 

indicate that manufacturers? costs to incorporate advanced technology in vehicles vary greatly. 

Specifically, Table VII-1a (estimated average cost per passenger car over the adjusted baseline 

for MYs 2017 through 2025) in the PRIA projects that Mitsubishi Motors? projected costs are 

higher than any other manufacturer. By 2025, they are projected to be more than three times 

greater than the average. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.3]

It is evident and expected that some companies will be absorbing more incremental costs to 

remain price competitive, especially manufacturers with fewer product lines. Some increased 

material and component costs can be passed onto a consumer. However, Mitsubishi Motors 

strives to offer competitively priced vehicles, and like other manufacturers, endeavors to limit 

transferring costs to consumers. In addition, some manufacturers, because of size and product 

mix, continually face unique challenges. To that end, the agencies requested comments related to 

challenges that “intermediate volume limited line manufacturers” may face in meeting the fuel 

economy and GHG standards for MYs 2022 through 2025. As noted in the NPRM, these 

challenges include securing competitive supplier contracts and having limited product lines 

across which to spread costs. Mitsubishi Motors? light duty vehicle sales account for 

approximately 0.6% of the U.S. market. As a manufacturer with more limited resources than 

many others in the U.S. market, adding advanced technologies to all vehicle models 

simultaneously is not feasible or practical. The mid-term evaluation should include consideration 

of compliance options specifically for OEMs with limited product lines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9507-A1, pp.3-4]

In the mid-term evaluation, the agencies should also review assumptions about EV market 

penetration based on the availability and effect of consumer purchasing incentives. Although 

outside the scope of this rulemaking, EV incentives will continue to be a pivotal factor in 

spurring EV growth towards a mass market option. Mandating fuel efficiency and GHG 

emissions standards will not guarantee that a consumer will choose an electric drive vehicle. 

Pricing and charging infrastructure availability will be the main drivers in purchasing an EV. 

Financial and nonfinancial consumer incentives at the federal/state/local levels are necessary in 

the early stages of introduction for a distinct and new technology for most customers. It should 

be noted that relying on government tax incentives is not and cannot be a part of a sustainable 

long-term business plan for OEMs selling electric drive vehicles. However, if this technology is 

to become a significant part of the overall fleet, then government tax incentives are necessary for 

the beginning stages of commercialization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.4]

The mid-term evaluation should also consider available EV infrastructure when assessing past 

and future assumptions of EV market penetration. As noted above, charging infrastructure 
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availability is key to a consumer’s decision to purchase an EV. Currently, there is no national 

plan for EV infrastructure development to compliment the federal government’s efforts to 

support EV industry growth and consumer acceptance of EVs. A national plan would help 

develop regional targets to establish EV infrastructure. Specifically, Mitsubishi Motors believes 

that EV charging infrastructure should be developed and prioritized according to the following: 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.4]

1. Home charging is the top priority and permitting processes must be streamlined. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.4]

2. Workplace charging is the next priority because this supports increased EV adoption and 

enables future Vehicle to Grid energy storage concepts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, 

p.4]

3. Public Charging, especially DC quick charging, encourages adoption of EVs with smallersized, more resource efficient battery packs by increasing a vehicle’s effective daily range. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.4]

OEMs must be able to innovate while complying with practicable federal fuel efficiency and 

GHG regulations to match the realities of the U.S. market. Mitsubishi Motors supports the 

inclusion of a mid-term evaluation in order to realistically evaluate the assumptions for setting 

fuel economy and GHG standards in MYs 2022 through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9507-A1, p. 6]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 96.]

Mitsubishi Motors urges the agency to work with stakeholders well in advance of the midterm 

evaluation to develop sound review process and framework.

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

MEMA also strongly supports the agencies’ inclusion of a mid-term evaluation. That way, all 

stakeholders can perform a comprehensive and transparent assessment to see if the goals of the 

Program are being realized and/or if there are circumstances that drastically impact the 

marketplace or technology development, which may call for appropriate revisions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

Midterm Review is a key component of the National Program for MYs2017-2025. We support 

an assessment to ensure that the goals are being realized and/or to address any circumstances that 

drastically impact the marketplace or technology development to warrant revisions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

MEMA strongly supports the agencies’ inclusion of a mid-term evaluation, which, as proposed, 

will provide a complete comprehensive analysis for all stakeholders to consider the current state-
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of-play and practicability of the MY2017-2025 standards in the public docket. Long-term 

planning is an especially important factor in the motor vehicle industry as there are likely to be 

uncertainties in the product development cycle that could directly impact – positively or 

negatively – the commercial success of new products and the return on investment required to 

expand the U.S. manufacturing base. Outside of the formal midterm review, it seems reasonable 

that there should be an ongoing dialogue between all of the stakeholders leading up to the 

midterm review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.5]

MEMA supports a complete assessment of the Program to ensure that the goals are being 

realized and/or if there are any circumstances that drastically impact the marketplace or 

technology development to warrant revisions to the standards. Providing an opportunity for a 

thorough analysis is a critical and necessary component of this next National Program. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.5]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Further, once this program is in place, it is critical that EPA and NHTSA closely track progress 

in meeting the standards. In addition, the mid-term evaluation to be conducted in the 2021-2022 

timeframe should evaluate the use of credits by automobile manufacturers and the impact of 

credit use on average fleet performance. In particular, EPA and NHTSA should evaluate 

whether credit use is allowing the production of a greater number of vehicles that do not meet 

the 5-percent rate of improvement requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 40-41.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 35-36.]

Organization: National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

The NAM submits these comments to address one specific substantive aspect of the proposed 

rule: the mid-term evaluation program. As described below, the NAM supports the inclusion of a 

mid-term evaluation cycle but has a number of concerns regarding the content of the review and 

the procedures through which it will be implemented. We urge the EPA to clarify the content of 

the evaluation and the procedural details of the evaluation and to add additional time to the 

review process so that the EPA can complete a revised rulemaking with sufficient lead time to 

allow regulated entities to achieve compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A2, p. 1]

The Agencies Should Adhere to the Mid-Term Evaluation Process to Ensure That Regulated 

Entities Are Not Subject to Inappropriate Standards

The Associations fully support the Agencies’ proposal to complete a mid-term evaluation of the 

appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 standards. Estimates and projections of future 

costs and the pace of technological development made more than 10 years in advance are fraught 

with uncertainty and the risk of significant deviation from those projections is high. Therefore, a 
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mid-term evaluation is appropriate so that the Agencies can make necessary adjustments to the 

standards to ensure the standards are cost-effective and capable of implementation. The 

Associations generally agree with the proposed content of the mid-term evaluation, particularly 

its focus on the cost and availability of advanced technologies, the standards’ impact on vehicle 

safety, the effect on the economic health of the automotive industry, and “other relevant factors.” 

While the Agencies need not develop an exhaustive list of relevant factors in advance, they 

should include those factors that will necessarily impact the automotive industry’s ability to 

achieve the standards. For example, the Agencies should expressly require consideration of 

consumer purchasing patterns and acceptance of new technologies, the availability of alternative 

fuel infrastructure, and government responses to declining gasoline tax revenue as a result of 

increased fuel efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A2, p. 2]

The Associations also have a number of procedural concerns about how the mid-term evaluation 

and subsequent rulemaking will be conducted. First, the proposed timeline for the review and 

promulgation of new standards is compressed and delays in the review process may threaten the 

industry’s ability to comply with revised standards once they are issued. The proposed rule 

requires the Agencies to make a final determination regarding the appropriateness of the existing 

standards a mere 4.5 months after issuing the draft Technical Assessment Report. In this short 

time period, the Agencies propose to complete a peer assessment of the draft report, solicit 

public comments on the draft report and the appropriateness of the existing standards, and 

respond to the peer assessment and public comments. The peer and public review are critical 

components of the mid-term evaluation and the Agencies must ensure that the comment process 

and their response are not rushed. If the Agencies find that the existing standards are 

inappropriate, they will have little more than two years to promulgate revised standards, leaving 

manufacturers with only 18 months to achieve compliance with the revised standards. While the 

schedule proposed by the Agencies will provide sufficient lead time to allow manufacturers to 

adjust to the revised standards, history has shown that rulemaking deadlines are often missed, 

meaning that manufacturers could be left with even less time to comply with the revised 

standards. As a result, we urge the Agencies to consider additional mechanisms to ensure that 

revised standards will be issued on schedule. For example, the Agencies could provide additional 

flexibility by beginning the review process earlier. To ensure the effectiveness of the review 

process, the Agencies should clarify and make judicially enforceable the proposed timeline and 

details of the public and peer reviews of the draft Technical Assessment Report. We also urge 

the Agencies to set a firm and judicially enforceable timeline (including a commencement date 

and intermediate milestones) for the development of the draft report to ensure that it is completed 

on schedule. With the addition of these procedural safeguards, we are confident that the 

Agencies will be able to complete the mid-term evaluation and subsequent rulemaking while 

adhering to the proposed timeline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A2, pp. 2-3]

Second, the Agencies should not take the default position that the existing 2022-2025 model year 

standards will remain in place unless changed by rulemaking. If the Agencies determine that the 

2022-2025 standards are inappropriate, there is simply no reason to leave them in place during 

the subsequent rulemaking process. Instead the existing standards should be rescinded 

immediately upon a determination that they are inappropriate, leaving the 2021 standards in 

effect until revised standards are finalized. Otherwise, manufacturers would be required to 
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comply with the inappropriate standards in the event that a subsequent rulemaking is not 

finalized by 2022. As noted above, there is always a risk that agencies will be unable to meet 

proposed timelines for review processes and rulemaking proceedings. Moreover, as EPA and 

NHTSA recognize, both the appropriateness determination and any subsequent rulemaking 

would be final agency action subject to judicial review. The proposed rule does not include an 

expedited review procedure and a challenge to either final agency action would add additional 

delay and threaten the Agencies’ ability to complete a final rulemaking before 2022. In light of 

these risks, it would be arbitrary and capricious to leave the 2022-2025 standards in effect after 

they are determined to be inappropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A2, p. 3]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

The proposal contains a so-called 'mid-term evaluation' designed to allow for the reevaluation of 

the key regulatory assumptions. It defies logic that the proposal sets up the need for a 'mid-term 

evaluation' in the first place. In fact, NHTSA and EPA should not even be engaged in 

rulemaking at this time, so soon after having set standards for MYs 2012-2016, and before 

having had the benefit of learning from how those standards work in the real world. A prudent 

strategy would involve engaging in rulemaking in the calendar year 2014 time frame, aimed at 

setting standards for MYs 2017 through 2021 or 2022. Such a timetable would greatly reduce the 

likelihood that mandates will prove to be technologically infeasible or economically impractical. 

As evidenced by the truck emissions experience, NHTSA and EPA should strive to limit any risk 

of foreseeable harms and unforeseeable consequences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 

12]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 70.]

Sure, manufacturers need adequate time to achieve compliance. And as a businessman, dealers 

appreciate regulatory certainty, but we question whether setting fuel economy mandates so far 

out makes sense when critical variables like fuel prices, consumer behavior and creditworthiness 

are paramount. If anything, this contradicts Congress's intent that such standards be set in 5-year 

or fewer intervals. Moreover, any supposed certainty may be fleeting given the proposal's midterm review could result in even stricter mandates for model years 2022 to 2025.

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

D. Mid-Term Evaluation Is Unnecessary but, If Used, Proposed Structure Is Appropriate

NRDC believes that the mid-term evaluation is unnecessary and potentially disruptive to 

automaker product planning. The mid-term review adds uncertainty to what is otherwise a nineyear planning horizon for the automakers. By cutting the planning time line roughly in half, the 

mid-term evaluation undermines investments in technology that will improve efficiency beyond 

2021 required levels. The mid-term review could also disrupt the deployment of vehicle fueling 

infrastructure, for advanced vehicles such as plug-in electric vehicles and hydrogen fuel cell 

vehicles that may be on the verge of a rapid market growth in the post-2020 period. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 16]
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As it is proposed, the mid-term evaluation follows an appropriate structure. There should be only 

a single mid-term evaluation to consider compliance with standards for just model years 2022 to 

2025. The mid-term evaluation should consider the wide-range of factors that affect the 

automotive industry’s ability to comply, including different technology pathways, credit 

mechanisms such as banking, trading and borrowing and market conditions. However, a decision 

to modify the standards should be based on weighing all factors and not mainly on a single 

factor, technology or market projection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 16]

NRDC agrees that mid-term evaluation should occur as close as possible to the beginning of 

model year (MY) 2022 without violating the minimum 18 month leadtime. The close timing will 

ensure that recent advances in technology driven by the MY 2017-2021 standards will be 

considered in the evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 17]

We agree that an assessment of compliance and the development of a technical assessment report 

for the mid-term review should include the close coordination of all three regulatory agencies 

that have developed the National Program since 2009, including EPA, NHTSA and CARB. The 

evaluation should also be open for public participation and comment consistent with this 

proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 17]

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

Mid-Term Review: Nissan’s commitment to the program Is premised on a comprehensive midterm evaluation for MYs 2022-2025. The standards are extremely aggressive, particularly with 

regard to the light truck fleet. The standards assume not only a significant amount of technology 

advancement, but also consumer acceptance and transformation of the vehicle fleet. For both the 

light truck and the passenger car fleets, the extent to which automobile manufacturers are able to 

meet these standards will depend not merely on their ability to cost-effectively incorporate 

additional and transformational technologies, but also on factors external to vehicle design and 

engineering. The mid-term evaluation is essential to ensuring that the standards remain 

technologically and economically feasible. A meaningful review, as set forth in the Notices of 

Intent and the proposal, to evaluate the full range of market, technology and regulatory factors 

for the later model years is not only essential, it is required by law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, p.2]

The Mid-Term Review is Essential to Ensure that the Assumptions Underlying the Proposal are 

Valid for the Later Model Years 

The proposed standards are extremely ambitious. Success in meeting these standards will depend 

not only on the deployment of advanced technologies and materials, but also on consumer 

demand shifts and the economic vitality of the U.S. market. The technological and economic 

uncertainties inherent in setting standards so far into the future make a robust mid-term review 

an essential element of the program. Only through a commitment to a comprehensive mid-term 

evaluation will the government, industry and stakeholders have certainty that the goals 

established for MYs 2022-2025 remain appropriate and feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, pp.4-5]
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Nissan will continue to provide a full range of vehicles, and to incorporate continuous 

improvements throughout its vehicle fleets. This includes advances in internal combustion 

engines (ICEs) as well as the continued deployment of electric drivetrains. Nissan also continues 

to explore appropriate opportunities for mass reduction. A comprehensive mid-term evaluation is 

critical to determining the extent to which the market accepts the additional costs associated with 

more advanced internal combustion vehicles, as well as the extent to which the advanced 

powertrain market develops. In addition, government regulatory programs involving both fuels 

and safety requirements will directly affect future feasibility and must be considered in any 

future review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.5]

Without a robust mid-term evaluation, manufacturers may face standards that have become 

infeasible in light of market movements or economic conditions beyond their control. Investment 

decisions will be focused on short term compliance rather than longer term technology 

advancements. The absence of a mid-term evaluation would subvert the framework embedded 

into the National Program and would create the uncertainty the agencies are trying to overcome 

by providing a starting point for regulatory review covering model years into the future. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.5]

A comprehensive mid-term review is also necessary to review the extent to which the industry is 

able to meet the aggressive light truck standards set forth for MYs 2022-2025. Nissan anticipates 

that the level of improvement established for that vehicle segment will be extremely challenging, 

particularly for companies selling more limited volumes in those market segments or if 

companies curtail their offerings in the light truck fleet. The costs associated with the 

technologies necessary to meet the standards while still providing requisite consumer utility may 

render the light truck standards established for the later model years infeasible and require 

adjustment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.5]

Nor is it feasible to rely on credits generated in the car fleet to cover deficits in the truck fleet. 

While the GHG program properly allows for full credit transfers between the car and truck fleet, 

the ability to generate credits in the car fleet to cover the more challenging requirements in the 

truck fleet are statutorily limited in the CAFE program. It is imperative for the agencies to 

engage in a meaningful mid-term evaluation to ensure that the standards remain feasible for 

companies servicing this market with smaller volume light truck fleets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9471-A1, pp. 8-9]

Both the Clean Air Act and the Energy Policy & Conservation Act require that the agencies 

make a determination that the standards can be met through cost-effective technologies. While 

NHTSA, subject to the five year limitation, will not yet formally adopt final regulations, 

consistent with the National Program the standards formally established by EPA will effectively 

be adopted later and applied to the CAFE program as well. A robust mid-term review is 

necessary to ensure that the standards remain consistent with the statutory underpinnings of both 

programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p. 9]

Accordingly, a robust and comprehensive mid-term review is legally necessary to ensure that the 

standards for the later model years are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary 

and capricious. See Motor Vehicle Mfr's Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (listing 
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examples of arbitrary and capricious agency activity); Association of Data Processing Services 

Organization v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p. 9]

Section 202(a)(2) of the CAA requires that standards promulgated under the Act 'shall take effect 

after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application 

of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within 

such period.' 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a). Similarly, EPCA requires that CAFE standards be established 

at the 'maximum feasible' level taking into account, among other things, 'technological 

feasibility' and 'economic practicability.' 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, p.9]

The proposed standards assume a significant amount of market transformation, both within the 

ICE fleet and with regard to the penetration of new powertrains in order to be able to meet the 

levels established for the later model years. Unlike the situation in which the agencies establish 

aggressive requirements with long-lead times to allow technology and market development, the 

standards for MYs 2022-2025 follow a decade of increasingly stringent requirements already 

demanding substantial technological deployment and market penetration. This layering of new 

requirements renders it virtually impossible for the agencies to be able to determine with the 

requisite level of regulatory certainty that cost-effective, economically-practicable technology 

can be deployed into the fleet and enable compliance with these standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.9]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 127-128.]

Nissan's commitment to the proposed rule is premised on a robust and comprehensive mid-term 

evaluation for the model years 2022 to 2025. The standards are extremely aggressive and extend 

beyond current development planning periods. The agencies have assumed a significant amount 

of technology advancement, consumer acceptance, and fleet shift during these model years 

covered.

The ability of auto manufacturers to meet these standards will depend not only on our 

commitment to incorporate additional and transformational technologies but also on factors 

external to vehicle design and engineering. The mid-term evaluation is essential to ensuring that 

the standards remain technologically and economically feasible during those time periods.

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

EPA should continue to evaluate the GHG effects of these technology incentives to ensure 

preservation of the overall goals of the program. We also expect that EPA will monitor upstream 

emissions from the power grid to ascertain whether the improvements assumed to occur do in 

fact occur. In that regard, we strongly support the proposed mid-term review that will provide the 

opportunity to consider appropriate revisions to these incentives and to other aspects of the 
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program. [This comment can also be found in section 4 of this comment summary.] [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 74.]

Organization: Pew Charitable Trusts

While the proposed requirements set forth by EPA and DOT are aggressive and laudable, Pew 

strongly urges the agencies not to allow the final standards to be weakened during the midterm

review period. Pew understands that fuel efficiency standards produced by DOT are limited by 

statute to five year increments, and also appreciates the value of technological and cost review to 

ensure that standards are achievable. However, we believe that federal fuel efficiency standards 

must remain strong in order to enhance American manufacturing competitiveness in the auto 

industry while protecting consumers and businesses from fuel cost volatility. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9496-A2, p. 2]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Midterm Evaluation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 4]

Porsche strongly supports the proposed mid-term evaluation which will allow the Agencies to 

determine whether adjustment of fuel economy and GHG standards is warranted. The success of 

the program depends on customer acceptance, developments in technology, costs, safety, fuels, 

necessary infrastructure, and other relevant factors. Assumptions that informed the program 

model include significant uncertainties due to the length of time over which the standards apply. 

It is critical to evaluate whether those assumptions are still valid, and therefore whether the 

standards remain appropriate in light of technological and other changes that may have occurred 

since the initial setting of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

In making this comment, we wish to stress that Porsche does not assume that EPA or NHTSA 

intend to deviate from the mid-term evaluation process or ignore its deadlines. We believe that 

all parties, including the Agencies, will work in good faith to follow the process, and will 

perform a serious assessment of the state of the program. But we wish to stress that the success 

of the mid-term evaluation depends on strict adherence to commitments and deadlines. Such 

adherence is essential in order to mitigate a significant potential for disputes and difficulties in 

the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

Organization: RVIA

Therefore, we support the proposed mid-term review and we recommend that the agencies use 

the time leading up to the mid-term review to talk to consumers to better gauge what impact the 

increased costs will have on their new vehicle purchase decisions if prices are increased by the 

amounts projected by EPA and NHTSA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.2]
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With regard to full size pickups, EPA and NHTSA should utilize the time leading up to the midterm review to talk to consumers to better gauge what impact the increased costs will have on 

their new vehicle purchase decisions if prices are increased by the amounts projected by EPA 

and NHTSA for the 2022-2025 model year timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, 

p.4]

Organization: Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Midstream Review: The agencies have proposed standards that extend relatively far into the 

future. In contrast to the last round of regulations issued in 2011 that will affect cars that will 

enter the market within five years, these regulations will affect some cars that will not be 

manufactured for thirteen years. (Thirteen years ago, traditional hybrids were not yet on the 

market in the United States.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 11]

The thirteen years over which these regulations will remain in effect will be a period of great 

uncertainty with respect to at least two factors that will have a substantial effect on the costeffectiveness of more efficient vehicles, particularly if traditional hybrids, PHEVs or EVs are 

needed to meet the new standards: battery prices and oil prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9518-A1, p. 11]

It appears likely that automakers will have to rely on traditional hybrids, and to a lesser degree 

PHEVs and EVs, in order to meet the new standards. Throughout the period over which the 

standards will be tightening, the cost of these vehicles, and their overall cost-effectiveness, will 

remain a function of the price of large-format automotive grade batteries. In an area of such 

rapidly evolving technology, however, it is difficult to forecast with any degree of certainty what 

battery prices might look like in 2020, not to mention 2025. Higher battery prices will make it 

harder to meet the standards, just as lower battery prices will make it easier, perhaps supporting 

even tighter standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 11]

While battery prices are difficult to predict eight to thirteen years into the future, oil prices are 

difficult to predict even months in the future. As we prepare these comments, oil is selling for 

about $100 per barrel. But prices have been as high as $114 and as low as $34 over the past 36 

months, and as low as $11.37 and as high as $145 over the past 13 years. Stated simply, given 

the uncertainty over oil prices of the time during which these rules will be in effect, and the 

consequences of oil prices for the cost-effectiveness of these rules, it is incumbent on the 

regulating agencies to carefully reevaluate the cost effectiveness of the standards in light of 

current oil prices and trends, and tighten or loosen the standards as appropriate at the midstream 

review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 11]

Of equal importance is the possibility that technological innovation over the next several years 

will substantially alter the cost-effectiveness of increasing fuel efficiency or reducing oil 

consumption. For instance, the 2002 National Academies of Science study on fuel economy did 

not even mention plug-in hybrid technology, despite a detailed discussion of traditional hybrid 

technology, yet plug-in hybrids were on the road just eight years later. One can imagine that a 

newly developed battery chemistry, for instance, might substantially alter the cost-effectiveness 
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of the regulations, allowing for an adjustment of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9518-A1, pp. 11-12]

Not only do these regulations extend far into the future, and not only is there substantial 

uncertainty with respect to their cost-effectiveness, the regulations would require percentage 

increases in fuel economy that exceed previous increases, and may be more difficult to achieve 

as the lowest cost improvements in efficiency have already been made. We appreciate that the 

accelerated adoption of new technology may allow automakers to meet the proposed standards 

without any interruption in their product cycles, while delivering vehicles that consumers will 

purchase and enjoy. However, we also recognize that this question is fundamentally one of 

consumer acceptance that can be answered only once new more efficient vehicles are put into 

automobile retailers’ showrooms. A midstream review will enable the agencies to examine the 

consumers’ acceptance of new vehicles and adjust the standards upwards or downwards if and as 

appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 12]

Given the substantial uncertainty regarding the cost of batteries and oil, SAFE believes, that the 

midstream review should be a comprehensive review into which the agencies enter with an open 

mind. In support of that process, the agencies should prepare a new or updated technical support 

document and regulatory impact analysis. It should then affirm or adjust (upwards or downwards 

as appropriate) the standards based on the results of the analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9518-A1, p. 12]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 152.]

Finally, I can't stress enough, as others have already said, the importance of a real midstream 

review. The fuel economy regulations have never been issued so far in advance and asked so 

much of automakers. We don't know where oil prices are going to be. We don't know where 

battery prices are going to be. And these are critical factors in trying to see what can happen. 

And just like it's possible that the rules may not prove cost-effective, it's possible that we may 

find that tightening is also inappropriate. So we stress the importance of having a real review.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Remain strong throughout the program and not end with the midterm review and a backstop 

should be considered: Our transportation system drives our addiction to oil with cars and light 

trucks alone consuming more than 8 million barrels of oil every day. This addiction to oil spews 

out nearly 20% of US climate disrupting pollution. The proposed standards for 2017-2025 

vehicles can help Americans avoid using as much as 1.5 million barrels of oil every day in 2030 

and cut carbon emissions in that year by 280 million metric tons. A consumer who buys an 

average new vehicle in 2025 would keep more than $4,000 in their pocket rather than spending it 

on oil – even after paying for fuel savings technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 

4]
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But to deliver these benefits the program must remain strong through 2025. The program as 

proposed includes a mid-term review that begins in 2017. While EPA’s authority under the 

Clean Air Act permits it to propose and finalize a program for the full nine model years, 

NHTSA’s authority is constrained. This factor among others created pressure for the mid-term 

review which appropriately will involve all three standard setting agencies: EPA, NHTSA and 

CARB. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, pp. 4-5]

Automakers have suggested additional reviews in testimony at the public hearings the agencies 

held in January. We strongly urge that the final rule not open up additional reviews of the 

standards. As it stands, the mid-term review will occur just as this rule is taking affect and would 

therefore be based up on the successful implementation of the 2012-16 program. The agencies 

should ensure transparency and access to data that will allow the public to effectively and timely 

monitor compliance, trends and technology application. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 

5]

In particular, the agencies should provide the public with data, including the following:

Credit use, current balance, and method of credit generation by manufacturer,

Technology penetration, both overall and by manufacturer

Sales by vehicle footprint

Car/truck mix, both overall and by manufacturer [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5]

We appreciate that the proposed rule as structured offers the opportunity for a full assessment of 

progress and technology development but it is necessary for mid-term review to be a check on 

progress and an opportunity to strengthen standards and not become and off-ramp or stop 

sign. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 5]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Also groundbreaking is the scope of the proposed regulations, covering cars and trucks the 

industry will be designing, manufacturing and selling up to 13 years in the future. The agencies 

have made a variety of assumptions underlying the proposed standards that may or may not 

prove accurate. These assumptions include the efficacy and pace of cost reduction for certain 

technologies, as well as consumers' willingness to pay for them. For this reason, Toyota fully 

supports timely completion of the proposed mid-term review to assess our progress toward these 

goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.2]

Mid-term Review [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.7]

In proposing standards through 2025 model year, the agencies have made assumptions about 

numerous key factors including technology cost, technology performance, fuel prices, 

manufacturing efficiency, consumer adoption, and other factors that represent their best 
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estimates of the future based on information available in 2012. The agencies acknowledge the 

significant uncertainty in many of these assumptions, and have proposed a mid-term evaluation 

of the 2022-2025 model year standards to determine whether those standards remain appropriate 

in light of changes that may have occurred since the time of proposal.1 Toyota supports the midterm review but, as discussed below, we request clarifications and additional details as to how 

the review will be administered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.7]

Key Factors/Assumptions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.7]

The agencies proposed eight high-level areas of examination for the mid-term review and the 

preamble discusses additional factors to be evaluated. The Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers (Alliance) has submitted comments addressing the proposal, including a 

recommendation to expand the factors that should be included in the mid-term review. Toyota 

supports the Alliance comments in this area. Beyond the Alliance comments, the agencies should 

consider two additional issues in the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.7]

First, the agencies must ensure that the proper baseline is used when determining the feasibility 

of the 2022-2025 model year standards. This issue is best explained with a simple example. 

Suppose the industry 'compliance level' at the time of the mid-term review (~2018 model year) is 

38 mpg in CAFE space and the agencies determine that cost-effective technology exists to 

support a 4 percent annual improvement rate. A logical conclusion would be that 50 mpg (in 

CAFE space) is an appropriate standard for 2025 model year (a 4 percent annual compounded 

increase applied to 38 mpg for seven years). However, if industry has relied on credits to achieve 

the 38 mpg level, a 50 mpg target would effectively be higher than a 4 percent annual increase. 

In fact, if the industry relied on credits for just 2 mpg of compliance (resulting in a true 

technology baseline of 36 mpg), the annual improvement rate would be nearly 5 percent per year 

- or 25 percent higher than using the 38 mpg baseline. NHTSA is precluded by law from 

considering the availability of credits in establishing maximum feasible CAFE standards. Under 

current law, NHTSA will also be precluded from considering the availability of credits when it 

establishes 2022-2025 model year standards based on the mid-term review. While the CAA does 

not appear to specifically limit EPA's authority in this regard, the shared goal of harmonization 

would dictate EPA similarly not consider the availability of credits when determining the 

appropriateness of the 2022-2025 model year standards during the mid-term review. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.7]

Second, in the course of the mid-term review the agencies should continue EPA's longstanding 

practice of treating vehicles and fuels as a system. While the proposed standards are based on 

currently available fuels, higher octane and/or reduced sulfur can enable additional greenhouse 

reductions and fuel economy improvements from several technologies. For example~ lower 

sulfur gasoline would allow the use of stratified lean-burn engines. Increasing octane in gasoline 

would enable engines to operate at higher compression ratios, and support technology 

approaches such as heavily boosted, downsized engines. Manufacturers may find these options 

increasingly necessary in the 2022 - 2025 model year time frame, and for that reason the role of 

fuels and fuel specifications should be included as part of the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.8]
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Process Details and Schedule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.8]

The proposed regulation requires a Draft Technical Assessment Report to be completed by 

November 2017, and a final determination as to whether the 2022-2025 standards remain 

appropriate to be peer-reviewed and made available for public comment by April 1,2018. If the 

EPA determines the standards are not appropriate as promulgated in this rulemaking, EPA stated 

its intention in the preamble to establish by rulemaking new standards that are appropriate under 

section 202(a) of the CAA. In any case, NHTSA must formally promulgate standards for 2022-

2025 model years by April 1, 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.8]

Toyota understands that soon after promulgating the 2017-2025 model year standards in this 

rulemaking, the agencies intend to begin an ongoing dialogue with the auto manufacturers, 

suppliers~ and other stakeholders about progress toward meeting the joint national standards. 

Toyota supports this type of information sharing because it will provide the agencies the most 

accurate sense of technology advancements, consumer preferences, and economic conditions as 

circumstances evolve. The information derived from this dialogue can serve as building blocks 

toward the mid-term review and afford the agencies and auto manufacturers timely course 

adjustments for items within their control. Toyota believes it would be helpful for the agencies to 

outline this process in as much detail as possible in the preamble to final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.8]

2022-2025 Model Year Default Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.8]

Toyota appreciates the agencies' commitment to a mid-term review and EPA's stated intention to 

finalize any changes in its 2022-2025 model year GHG standards at least 18months prior to the 

beginning of the 2022 model year 

2 (e.g. by April 1, 2020). Notwithstanding the good intentions 

of all parties involved to support timely completion of the mid-term review and timely 

rulemaking as needed, Toyota is concerned about what happens if the agency does not take a 

final agency action by April 1, 2020 to either validate the standards as originally promulgated or 

to revise the standards. As proposed by EPA, the 2022-2025 model year GHG standards would 

remain in effect unless and until EPA changes them by rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, p.8]

However, if EPA misses its self-imposed deadline for final agency action, it will not have met 

the requirement of Section 202(a)(2) of the CAA to provide adequate lead time for development 

of requisite technology for meeting emission standards. Further, given that EPA and NHTSA 

plan to work collaboratively on the mid-term review (with ARB) and to utilize the results to 

jointly assess the 2022-2025 model year standards, failure by EPA to take final agency action 

would likely indicate that NHTSA lacks sufficient information to promulgate its standards for 

2022-2025 model year in a timely manner. In such a case, there would be no new NHTSA 

standards for 2022 model year, and NHTSA would presumably be forced to adopt the 2021 

model year standards for 2022 model year. It is unclear what standards ARB would pursue for 

2022 model year in this case. This would result in major differences between the EPA and 

NHTSA standards, and potentially different standards for ARB and Section 177 states, and 
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would run completely contrary to the objective of a harmonized national program. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.9]

For the reasons described above, Toyota requests that, in the event EPA does not take final 

agency action concerning the 2022-2025 model year standards by April 1, 2020, the 2021 model 

year GHG standards remain as the 'default' standards until such time as EPA does take final 

agency action providing at least 18-months of lead time prior to the applicable mode year. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.9]

California Air Resources Board Participation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.9]

Toyota fully agrees that ARB, as a signatory to the national program for GHG emissions and fuel 

economy standards, will be an important partner in the mid-term review process. We support the 

agencies' intention to coordinate the mid-term review with ARB and condition a waiver for their 

2017-2025 model year standards on ARB accepting any adjustment to the EPA 2022-2025 

model year GHG standards that result from the midterm review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, p.9]

1 - NHTSA's statutory authority prevents it from formally promulgating standards beyond 5-

model years. Toyota's comments on the mid-term review generally refer the 'review' of the 

proposed EPA GHG standards, and to NHTSA's participation in, and use of, the mid-term review 

results as a basis for formally establishing for 2022-2025 model year CAFE standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.7]

2 - NHTSA is required by law to finalize CAFE standards at least IS-months prior to the start of 

the model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.8]

Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce

The Chamber supports reducing emissions from automobile tailpipes, and supports greater 

vehicle fuel economy when needed to address consumer demand. The Chamber is pleased that 

the automobile industry is receiving the regulatory certainty it needs for long-term planning 

purposes. However, given the costs the regulations will require to be built into all new vehicles 

to achieve these goals, a strong 2018 midterm review will be essential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9521-A1, p. 1]

I. The 2018 Mid-Year Review Must Be Strong, Thorough and Realistic

The National Program for fuel economy proposed by EPA and NHTSA is very aggressive, and 

will test the limits of the automobile industry’s technological prowess. This is particularly 

evident in the last four years of the program (2021-2025), when the rate of increase in light truck 

fuel economy standards increases dramatically, from 3.5 percent per year to 5 percent per year. 

This portion of the proposal reaches so far into the future that EPA, NHTSA and automakers 

truly have no certainty as to how technologies will develop and what they will cost. However, at 
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this early juncture, EPA seems to admit that they will cost the bulk of consumers more 

money. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 2]

Fuel economy matters to consumers, but car buyers historically have not valued fuel economy as 

highly as other key attributes such as affordability, safety, convenience and utility. A car buyer’s 

perspective on fuel economy also fluctuates with fuel prices, which are very difficult to predict 

long-term. There is therefore a very real possibility that, for one or more reasons, consumers will 

not want to buy some of the new fuel-efficient vehicles that will have to be brought to market to 

comply with the 2017-25 rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 2]

Moreover, conditions beyond the control of automobile manufacturers will greatly affect 

automakers’ ability to achieve aggressive new fuel economy standards. Gasoline prices are 

virtually impossible to predict long-term. Availability of critical minerals has already become an 

important issue to the automobile industry. The state of the economy certainly has an impact on 

consumers’ car buying habits. And infrastructure for many of the new technologies being 

incentivized by the 2025 standards—such as electric vehicles, fuel cells and alternative fuels—

must actually be built. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, pp. 2-3]

It is therefore of utmost importance that any final rule include a rigorous midterm review in 

2018, with a clearly defined process for conducting the review. If mainstream consumers are not 

buying the newer, fuel-efficient vehicles or are not likely to buy the significantly more efficient 

(and expensive) vehicles slated for the 2021-25 time frame, then the agencies must be able to 

change the rule.2 If conditions change that are outside the control of the automobile industry, 

Federal regulators must be willing and able to take a pragmatic view of the 2021-2025 time 

frame and revise the rule accordingly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 3]

2 And if the agencies wish to change the rule downward, they should not be bound to the will of 

California, which has shown time and again that its fuel economy goals do not represent the 

national interest.

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(d) Mid-Term Evaluation

A great deal of attention to this proposal has been focused on the mid-term evaluation provision, 

and with good reason. Structured properly, it can provide assurance that the nine-year 

rulemaking is both equitable and based on the latest research. Structured improperly, however, it 

can create regulatory uncertainty, disturb the industry’s product planning efforts, and impede 

technological development by undercutting industry investments in technologies slated to serve 

the post-MY2021 vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 10]

According to UCS analysis, nearly 40 percent of the MY2017-2025 Program’s 2030 oil savings 

and emissions reductions benefits would be lost if the mid-term evaluation foreclosed subsequent 
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improvements to vehicle efficiency and GHG emissions reductions post-MY2021. Given what is 

at stake, it is imperative that the agencies structure the mid-term evaluation to ensure that the 

provision is used to support stronger standards moving forward, and not as an opportunity by the 

industry to stall or forego regulatory obligations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 10]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 218.]

For example, the proposal's midterm evaluation provision must be structured to ensure that it is 

used to support strong standards moving forward, and not merely as an opportunity by the 

industry to stall or forego regulatory obligations.

Automobile manufacturers have publicly stressed the importance of tracking progress leading up 

to the mid-term evaluation. As UCS has stated in the past, the mid-term evaluation should occur 

only one time, and it should be conducted as closely to the first year in question (MY2022) as 

legally permitted, to most accurately capture the status of technology and the vehicle market for 

the model years in review. While EPA and NHTSA should remain up to date on technology 

developments, regularly scheduled “progress reports” between now and 2018, as suggested by 

some in industry, would be both time consuming and too premature to judge technology 

readiness of the Model Year 2022-2025 standards. Premature reports would increase speculation 

within the industry about “prevailing winds” of the mid-term evaluation, create unnecessary 

uncertainty, and undermine the intent and effectiveness of the provision itself.

That being said, UCS strongly supports the agencies continuing their work – for instance, the 

impressive teardown cost analysis conducted by EPA, and other assessments documented in the 

Joint Technical Support Document – during the next five years in order to feed those analyses 

into the formal mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 10]

When the mid-term evaluation is conducted to assess possible modification (up or down) of the 

2022-2025 standards, it is critical that the entire suite of factors affecting manufacturers’ ability 

to comply be considered in their totality. UCS agrees that “a holistic assessment of all of the 

factors...without placing decisive weight on any particular factor or projection” is the correct 

approach in conducting the mid-term evaluation. Basing latter year feasibility on an isolated set 

of factors would be turning a blind eye to the reality that the industry has multiple options at its 

disposal in meeting the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 10]

Finally, UCS agrees with the agencies that the mid-term evaluation be a closely coordinated 

process, conducted jointly by EPA, NHTSA, and CARB; that the evaluation be open to public 

participation; and that the agencies seek, consider and respond to public comment on its 

determination prior to invoking any final actions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 10]

Though I strongly support these standards, I am concerned about possible loopholes that 

automakers could exploit. Specifically: The agencies are proposing a 'mid-term' review that 

would begin soon after the standards come into effect. In the past, automakers have abused 

similar programs-turning them into off-ramps as opposed to reviews. It is critical that this 
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review does not undermine the program through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A2, p. 

2]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Finally, the UAW is pleased that EPA is proposing a mid-term review for the proposed standards 

for model years 2022–2025, and that NHTSA will perform a full rule making procedure for those 

years as required under its statutory authority to regulate fuel economy. Given the quickening 

pace of technical innovation and cost reductions in the auto industry, the UAW believes that it is 

wise to continue to evaluate the cost and effectiveness of fuel-saving technologies well in 

advance of the formal mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.4]

The mid-term review is a critical structural feature of the proposed unified national program, and 

a central reason the UAW can be so strongly supportive of the proposals by EPA and NHTSA. 

The UAW believes that the mid-term review should be conducted with the same type of broad 

stakeholder engagement and public participation that occurred in the development and 

presentation of the proposed regulations for 2017–2025. The proposed standards are stronger and 

more achievable because of this process, and they stand as a testament to how we can work 

together to address real issues of national importance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.4]

Organization: United States Senate

In addition, the 'mid-term' review for the model year 2022-2025 standards will require your 

agencies to evaluate whether the stringency required in the second phase of the program is still 

appropriate or whether the standards should be revised upwards or downwards. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0264-A1, p.1]

Organization: University of Michigan

A Call to EPA and NHTSA to Consider the Consumer Fuel Usage Reduction Options in the 

Mid-term Evaluation of the Greenhouse-Gas Emission and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, p. 1] [This comment 

can also be found in section 12 of this comment summary.]

As both the EPA and NHTSA will be undertaking the midterm evaluation of the GHG emission 

and the corporate average fuel economy standard for model year 2022-2025 vehicles in due 

course, we recommend that meaningful incentives for consumer fuel usage reduction be taken 

into consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, p. 2] [This comment can also be found 

in section 11 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC is sympathetic to the numerous environmental challenges that impact the agencies in trying 

to reach their varied goals. However, it is of utmost importance that all agencies, as far as 
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possible, collaborate to achieve common understandings, wherever possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 3]

VCC supports a mid-term evaluation. Amid-term evaluation will allow manufacturers and the 

agencies to consider whether the regulation is reasonable and on track in its assumptions. VCC 

supports a mid-term evaluation because it is very difficult to predict fifteen years into the future 

without making a vast number of assumptions. Customer acceptance, affordability (especially in 

light of the phase-out of many of the federal and state incentives), safety, convenience and utility 

should be examined in the mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 3]

It is therefore imperative that the industry and the agencies review and consider the outcomes of 

our work in 2012 in relation to the joint plan at the midpoint of the regulated period. With regard 

to the midterm evaluation, VCC emphasizes the needs and clarifications outlined in the Alliance 

comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 3]

For VCC, as an intermediate manufacturer, the common understanding and harmonization of 

approaches of the agencies is of great importance, and' ultimately leads to a very high level of 

administrative efficiency. It is critical for smaller manufacturers to reduce administrative costs in 

order to be able to focus on the relevant issues such as developing environmentally advanced 

technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 3]

The following criteria should be considered for the Mid-Term Evaluation:

• Are the costs of Advanced Technology Vehicles declining as predicted in the assessment in the 

NPRM?

• What impact will the new requirements have on sales of passenger cars and light duty trucks?

• How will the new rules impact vehicle safety?

• Is the needed fueling infrastructure available to enable PHEVs, BEVs and fuel cell vehicles to 

penetrate the market at the levels predicted?

• Are consumers purchasing the technologies needed to achieve the goals of the rulemaking?

• Multipliers for the period 2020-2025 need to be evaluated and reevaluated

• Off cycle technology - additional innovations identified between 2012 and 2018

• Harmonization between all agencies both regarding technology demands and administration -

EPA, NHTSA and CARB [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 3]

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 107.]
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So we ask that the midterm review be vigilant, and there should not be an opportunity to delay 

full compliance or, as has occurred occasionally in history, to dismiss part of the program. But 

we look at the mid-reviews to strengthen the compliance.

Response:

Section III.B.3. of the preamble provides a detailed discussion of the mid-term 

evaluation. As described there, the agencies are finalizing the mid-term evaluation and agency 

decision-making process as proposed. As stated in the proposal, both NHTSA and EPA will 

develop and compile up-to-date information for the mid-term evaluation, through a collaborative, 

robust and transparent process, including public notice and comment. The evaluation will be 

based on (1) a holistic assessment of all of the factors considered by the agencies in setting 

standards, including those set forth in this final rule and other relevant factors, and (2) the 

expected impact of those factors on the manufacturers’ ability to comply, without placing 

decisive weight on any particular factor or projection. In order to align the agencies’ proceedings 

for MYs 2022-2025 and to maintain a joint national program, if the EPA determination is that 

standards will not change, NHTSA will issue its final rule concurrently with the EPA 

determination. If the EPA determination is that standards may change, the agencies will issue a 

joint NPRM and joint Final Rule.

Overall support for finalizing the mid-term evaluation

Every automaker and associations representing either auto makers or suppliers who 

commented on the proposed mid-term evaluation indicated that this evaluation was essential to 

their support of the proposal and urged the agencies to finalize a comprehensive mid-term 

evaluation. These commenters included General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, Nissan, Toyota, 

Hyundai America Technical Center, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi Motors, Volvo Car Corporation 

Porsche, Ferrari, KIA, the Alliance of Auto Manufacturers, the Global Automakers, the Motor 

& Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA), National Association of Manufacturers 

(NAM), EcoMotors International, Inc., and Johnson Controls, Inc. Two automakers, Chrysler 

and Nissan, specifically predicated their support of the MY2017-2025 National Program on the 

agencies finalizing the proposed mid-term evaluation. In addition, a number of other 

organizations including the United Auto Workers (UAW), the International Council on Clean 

Transportation (ICCT), U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Securing America’s Future Energy 

(SAFE), as well as 112 members of the U.S. House of Representatives (in a letter to both agency 

heads) expressed strong support for finalizing the proposed mid-term evaluation. 

Many environmental and consumer organizations, as well as many private citizens, both 

at the three public hearings and in written comments, expressed concern that the mid-term 

evaluation might be used as an opportunity to weaken the standards or to delay the 

environmental benefits of the National Program. Many stressed the expectation that the midterm should be used as an opportunity to strengthen the MY2017-2025 standards. These 

commenters included the Pew Charitable Trust, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists 

(UCS), American Medical Association of California, the National Association of Clean Air 

Agencies (NAACA), Ecology Center and more 30,000 individual citizens who submitted letters 

to the docket. The ICCT expressed their strong support for the mid-term evaluation and 
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NESCAUM in discussing the need to evaluate technology incentives on the overall GHG goals 

of the program indicated their support of the mid-term evaluation for this purpose. 

As discussed in section III.B.3 of the preamble, the mid-term evaluation will be a 

comprehensive and robust evaluation of all of the relevant factors. EPA is clear that any 

evaluation of the appropriateness of the standards and any decision to go forward with revising 

the standards will consider making the standards more or less stringent, whatever is most 

appropriate under the circumstances at that time. It would be inappropriate to limit EPA’s 

consideration to either just increasing or just reducing the stringency of the standards. Instead, 

EPA will determine the appropriate course to follow based on all of the information, evidence, 

and views in front of it, including those provided during public notice and comment. 

Two commenters opposed finalizing the mid-term evaluation. Natural Resources 

Defense Council (NRDC) stated that it was both unnecessary and potentially disruptive to 

automakers’ product planning and would add uncertainty to a nine year period. The National 

Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) did not support the mid-term evaluation since it did 

not support the need for the underlying rulemaking “so soon after having set standards for 

MY2012-2016, and before having had the benefit of learning from how those standards work in 

the real world.” EPA believes that the evaluation process will not be disruptive to the 

automakers product planning. Instead it provides a framework that allows manufacturers the 

certainty to go forward and prepare for these standards, as it both adopts them now as final 

standards and establishes a mechanism to evaluate and change them in the future, if appropriate. 

The common support from the manufacturers indicates that this is the case. The opposition by 

NADA is premised on their opposition to adopting standards in this rulemaking, which is 

addressed elsewhere. 

Ensuring Coordination of Mid-term Evaluation 

Ford, Toyota, NRDC and the UCS stressed the importance of a coordinated mid-term 

evaluation by EPA and NHTSA that should also include the California Air Resources Board 

(CARB). EPA agrees with this comment, as indicated by the discussion in section III.B.3 of the 

preamble. In adopting their GHG standards the California Air Resources Board (CARB), 

directed CARB’s Executive Officer to, “participate in U.S. EPA’s mid-term review of the 2022 

through 2025 model year passenger vehicle greenhouse gas standards...” and to also, “continue 

collaborating with EPA and NHTSA as their standards are finalized and in the mid-term 

review.”7 In addition, the Board directed CARB’s Executive Officer that “It is appropriate to 

accept compliance with the 2017 through 2025 model year National Program as compliance with 

California’s greenhouse gas emission standards in the 2017 through 2025 model years, once 

United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) issues their Final Rule on or after its 

current July 2012 planned release, provided that the greenhouse gas reductions set forth in U.S. 

EPA’s December 1, 2011 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for 2017 through 2025 model year 

 7 See California Low-Emission Vehicles (LEV) & GHG 2012 regulations approved by State of California Air 

Resources Board, Resolution 12-11 (March 22, 2012). Available at 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/leviiighg2012/leviiighg2012.htm (last accessed June 5, 2012)
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passenger vehicles are maintained, except that California shall maintain its own reporting 

requirements.” 8

Clean Air Act Authority to conduct a mid-term evaluation

A number of auto manufacturers submitted comments agreeing that section 202(a) of the 

Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes the proposed mid-term evaluation. Chrysler noted that the EPA 

had a “firm legal basis to conduct the mid-term evaluation under section 307(d) of the Clean Air 

Act (CAA) and the Administrative Procedures Act to reconsider regulations based on new 

information as well as under section 202(a) of the CAA under which EPA proposed the mid-term 

evaluation.” The Global Automakers stated that a mid-term evaluation was, “not only 

permissible under the Clean Air Act, but also required because of the uncertainties inherent in 

projecting regulatory requirements nine to twelve years into the future,” continuing that it 

“would have been arbitrary and capricious for EPA to promulgate GHG emissions standards for 

model years as far into the future as MY2022-225 without providing for a mid-term evaluation.” 

Nissan indicated support for the views expressed by the Global Automakers and stated further 

that “a robust and comprehensive mid-term review is legally necessary to ensure that the 

standards for the later model years are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary 

and capricious. (Citing Motor Vehicle Mfr’s Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29,42 (1983) listing 

examples of arbitrary and capricious agency activity).” 

EPA agrees that section 202(a) provides the agency with ample authority to undertake the 

mid-term evaluation. EPA does not agree that the mid-term evaluation is authorized under CAA 

section 307(d), as the mid-term evaluation is not a reconsideration of the standards under that 

provision. Instead the mid-term evaluation will be undertaken under EPA's general authority to 

establish emissions standards under section 202(a). EPA does not agree that the mid-term 

evaluation is legally required, or that the standards adopted today would be arbitrary and 

capricious or without substantial evidence to support them absent such a mid-term evaluation. 

The final rule and supporting information and analysis amply justify the reasonableness and 

appropriateness of the final GHG standards adopted by EPA, irrespective of the provisions for a 

mid-term evaluation. In any case, that issue is not before EPA as EPA is exercising its discretion 

to adopt provisions for a mid-term evaluation, for the reasons discussed above. 

The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) challenged the basis for the mid-term 

evaluation and specifically argued that any interim rulemaking should be based on a presumption 

that the stringencies of the standards will not decrease. As discussed above, the mid-term 

evaluation will be a robust and comprehensive evaluation, and it would be inappropriate to limit 

EPA’s consideration to either just increasing or just reducing the stringency of the standards. 

Instead, EPA will determine the appropriate course to follow based on all of the information, 

evidence, and views in front of it, including those provided during public notice and comment. 

CBD also raised a concern that EPA would be applying a faulty weighting of the statutory 

factors under the CAA. CBD stated that highlighting the manufacturers’ ability to comply was 

improper, and instead decisive weighting should be placed on energy conservation. EPA 

 8

 Id., CARB Resolution 12-11 at 20.
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disagrees that it is improper to carefully consider the impact on manufacturers' ability to comply. 

When EPA conducts the mid-term evaluation, EPA will be evaluating standards that have 

already been adopted and for which manufacturers are required to comply. The ability to comply 

is an important part of determining the appropriateness of these standards. For example, ability 

to comply is directly tied lead time, a factor EPA is required to consider under section 202(a). 

EPA does not agree that it is appropriate to assign decisive weighting to any one factor, such as 

energy conservation. That is contrary to conducting a holistic assessment, where EPA carefully 

considers all of the relevant factors under section 202(a) and gives them the weight that is 

appropriate in light of all of the circumstances. 

Recommendations for Additional “Check-ins” or Periodic Status Reports

Several automakers, auto suppliers and industry associations (General Motors, Chrysler, 

Daimler Automotive Group, Hyundai, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Global 

Automakers, Inc and Johnson Controls) suggested that, in addition to the proposed formal midterm evaluation, the agencies should also undertake a series of smaller, focused technical 

evaluations or “check-ins’ leading up to and potentially following the mid-term evaluation. Such 

check-ins, these commenters asserted, would allow the agencies to consider the latest relevant 

technical information, as well as other key issues. Several environmental organizations (Sierra 

Club, UCS, NRDC, and CBD) submitted comments opposing these focused technical 

evaluations or “check-ins,” arguing that these would be time consuming and too premature to 

judge technology readiness for the MY2022-2025 standards, and would undermine the intent and 

effectiveness of the mid-term evaluation. A number of environmental organizations also 

supported periodic updates on technology progress and compliance trends. The Sierra Club, 

while not supportive of the “check-in” concept, did urge agency transparency and access to data 

that would allow the public to “effectively and timely monitor compliance trends and technology 

applications.” The ICCT recommended that EPA and NHTSA conduct periodic updates on 

technology progress and consider periodic status reports in advance of the mid-term evaluation 

so that all interested parties could have access to key data that would be important in 

documenting progress in technology improvements and implementation.

As discussed above, the agencies will conduct a comprehensive mid-term evaluation and 

agency decision-making process for the MYs 2022-2025 standards as described in the proposal. 

The agencies expect to continue ongoing stakeholder dialogue, including in depth technical 

dialogue with automakers on their confidential technology development efforts and product 

plans for MYs 2022-2025. EPA does not believe that additional or more frequent reports, as 

suggested by some commenters would be an efficient way to prepare for the mid-term 

evaluation. 

Timeline and Process for Mid-term Evaluation

Several auto companies including Ford, Toyota and Porsche noted the importance of the 

agencies meeting the proposed November 15, 2017, deadline for issuing the draft Technical 

Assessment Report (TAR) so that there is adequate time for a reasonable public comment period 

while still insuring that EPA meet its proposed April 1, 2018 deadline for determining whether 

the standards established for MY2022-2025 are appropriate under CAA section 202(a). The 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Global Automakers, and the National Association of 
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Manufacturers also expressed concern with the agencies’ proposed schedule for undertaking the 

mid-term evaluation. These commenters recommended that additional details be written into the 

final regulatory text to provide more procedural certainty including: a start date for the 

evaluation, a schedule of major milestones, specific studies the agencies plan to conduct, and 

details of the peer review process. Toyota, Hyundai and Mercedes-Benz in their comments noted 

their support for these recommendations as well. Mitsubishi urged the agency to work with 

stakeholders well in advance of the mid-term to develop a sound review process and framework. 

Both the Union of Concerned Scientists and NRDC stated that the timing of the mid-term 

evaluation should be conducted as close as possible to the beginning of MY2022 so that the midterm evaluation could most accurately capture the status of technology and the vehicle market for 

those model years under review. 

EPA acknowledges the timing and other concerns raised by all commenters and continues 

to believe that the approach laid out in the proposal provides an appropriate balance between 

certainty and needed flexibility by providing end dates by which it must issue the draft TAR 

(November 15, 2017) and determine whether the MY2022- 2025 standards are appropriate under 

section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (April 1, 2018). Additional regulatory details on the timing 

or content of the mid-term evaluation are not needed and would not be an efficient way to 

prepare for and conduct the mid-term evaluation. 

Additional Evaluation Factors Should be Considered 

In its proposal, EPA indicated that it would consider a range of relevant factors in 

conducting the mid-term evaluation, including but not limited to those listed in the preamble and 

proposed regulatory text. Quite a few commenters suggested that EPA expand the list of these 

high level factors. The Alliance of Automobile Manufactures recommended numerous additions 

to the list of factors including, “current and expected availability of state and Federal 

incentives/subsidies for advanced technology vehicles,” “the end-of-life costs associated with 

advanced technology vehicles,” and “consumer demand for and acceptance of fuel-efficient 

technologies, and consumer valuation of fuel savings.” Honeywell encouraged the agencies to, 

“commit...to a detailed review of emerging boosting technologies that may considerably 

advance vehicle emissions and fuel economy performance during the later years of the 

rulemaking.” The Institute for Policy Integrity commented that the agencies “should amend their 

list of factors to specifically reflect any potential changes to benefits estimates, in addition to 

changes to costs or the state of technology.” Mitsubishi Motors commented that the mid-term 

factors must include an evaluation of the sufficiency of the EV infrastructure, including whether 

there have been any significant industry-wide economic setbacks making EVs and other overall 

fuel economy targets impracticable, consumer acceptance of EVs and a thorough evaluation of 

an EV multiplier in MYs 2022 through 2025 in order to continue EV market penetration. Also, 

Mitsubishi noted that the mid-term should include consideration of compliance options for 

OEMs with limited product lines. The National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA) 

suggested that EPA evaluate the use of credits by automobile manufacturers and the impact of 

credit use on average fleet performance. The Clean Air Association of the Northeast States for 

Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) noted that it expected EPA to monitor upstream 

emissions from the power grid to determine whether the improvements assumed to occur were 

realized. Finally, the Sierra Club recommended that the agencies provide the public with data on 
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credit use by manufacturers, technology penetration both overall and by manufacturers, and sales 

by vehicle footprints. 

The Alliance for Automakers also indicated that the agencies should seek expert peerreviewed information including the National Academy of Sciences to answer a number of 

questions associated with the Mid-term reviews. 

A number of other commenters, including Ford, the UCS and ICCT supported the midterm evaluation provisions as proposed by EPA. Ford commented that they believed the 

agencies had struck an appropriate balance between an exhaustive list and a high-level approach 

and pointed to proposed regulatory language “including but not limited to...” as critical language 

that should be maintained in final rule. Ford further noted that factors that turn out to be most 

important six years from now are not necessarily foreseeable today and not necessarily the ones 

listed in the proposed rule. The ICCT noted that “it is impossible to define all the criteria for 

review at this time...” And UCS agreed that “a holistic assessment of all of the factors... 

without placing decisive weight on any particular factor or projects” is the correct approach in 

conducting the mid-term evaluation.” 

EPA is finalizing the list of factors as proposed.9

 We believe these factors are broad 

enough to encompass all appropriate factors that should be considered during the mid-term 

evaluation, and provide the agency with an appropriate balance in that the list identifies major 

factors to consider and includes a clear provision for inclusion of other appropriate factors. This 

avoids trying to identify in detail at this time the myriad issues and factors that will be of concern 

in the mid-term evaluation. As in this rulemaking, in the mid-term evaluation EPA expects to 

place primary reliance on peer-reviewed studies. Additionally, as NAS reports are published, 

EPA will give careful consideration to reports and their findings as well as any reports and 

findings from other scientific and technical organizations.

As discussed above, the MY2022–2025 GHG standards will remain in effect unless and 

until EPA changes them by rulemaking. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 

commented that EPA should not take the default position that the existing 2022-2025 model year 

standards will remain in place unless changed by rulemaking. Rather, they argued the existing 

standards should be rescinded immediately upon a determination that they are inappropriate, 

leaving the 2021 standards in effect until the revised standards are finalized. Another 

commenter, Toyota, requested that “in the event EPA does not take final agency action 

concerning the 2022-2025 model year standards by April 1, 2020, the 2021 model year GHG 

standards remain as the ‘default’ standards until such time as EPA does take final agency action 

providing at least 18-months of lead time prior to the applicable model year.” EPA believes the 

appropriate approach is what was proposed; EPA is adopting the MY2022-2025 GHG standards 

at this time, and they will go into effect unless EPA revises them. The mid-term evaluation 

process is an effective and timely way to address any concerns that may arise in the future 

concerning the appropriateness of these standards. EPA believes this provides the right degree

of certainty to the standards that are adopted today, along with a clear and effective mechanism 

 9 See §86.1818-12 (h)
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for the timely evaluation of the standards and their revision if EPA determines in the future that 

they are no longer appropriate based on the circumstances at that time. 

2.5. Test Procedures

Organizations Included in this Section

AAA

American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Marz, Loren C.

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Necheles, L.

Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Smith, Frank Houston

Tarazevich, Yegor

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Weiner, L.

Organization: AAA

While it is clear that substantial progress is being made to improve the program, AAA continues 

to have concerns with the real world accuracy of the testing procedures utilized to determine the 

mileage ratings under CAFE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, p. 1]

With this said, AAA continues to have concerns with the testing procedures used to determine 

miles per gallon (mpg) ratings under the CAFE program. AAA maintains that there are existing 

tests that can be used to produce more accurate fuel economy ratings. CAFE ratings in particular 

continue to be based on testing methodology from the 1970s, even though it has been 

acknowledged to be inaccurate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, p. 1]

In 2008, EPA adopted new testing procedures with input from the Automobile Club of Southern 

California’s Automotive Research Center. These procedures combined the results of three new 

dynamometer tests to provide a more accurate method of estimating mpg and showed these new 

ratings to be at least 30 percent lower than the unadjusted test results. In 2011, AAA worked 

closely with EPA and NHTSA to develop new vehicle labels that provide consumers with the 
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clear and accurate information regarding safety, fuel economy, and GHG emission scores 

necessary to facilitate informed vehicle purchase decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-

A1, p. 2]

Unfortunately, CAFE numbers do not reflect these new testing procedures. Until testing 

procedures are harmonized, the discrepancy between the two ratings will only increase. AAA is 

interested in working with EPA and NHTSA to find a solution that provides the most accurate 

consumer information possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, p. 2]

AAA commends NHTSA and EPA for working diligently with auto manufacturers and other 

stakeholders to reach an agreement on the proposed new standards. Having safe, energy-efficient 

vehicles is in everyone’s best interest, but it is equally vital to ensure that the testing used to 

gauge efficiency provides accurate results. Thank you for your consideration of AAA’s views. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, p. 2]

Organization: American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 82.]

We also support changes to testing procedures and calculations that properly reflect actual 

experience.

Organization: Ferrari

2) Test procedures [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

We believe appropriate to continue to measure CO2 emissions and fuel economy using the 

traditional test cycles city (FTP) and highway (HFET) for the present proposal. It is reasonable 

for EPA to address different test procedures in the context of a future rulemaking. Enough leadtime should be given in case of any change in the test procedure for manufacturers to make 

necessary changes to test equipments, carry out tests, and reflect the new procedures in their 

compliance plans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

We also support the proposal that the 5-cycle test procedures would remain the starting point for 

demonstrating off-cycle emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.11]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 46.]

In general, we continue to encourage the agencies to take a holistic view of the transportation 

sector to encourage the implementation of technologies and strategies whose benefits might 

otherwise be reflected in the formal fuel economy test procedures.
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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 35.]

With respect to our elements of the proposal, we will continue to work with the agencies to 

develop the test procedures necessary to validate off-cycle technology.

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Test cycles must be more reflective of the real-world. Johnson Controls is concerned that the 

proposed standards do not address one of the core problems with the standards - outdated 

city/highway drive cycle averages. Johnson Controls recognizes that the drive cycles must be a 

compromise between real world driving and testing workload/complexity. That said, the driving 

patterns and behaviors of American consumers have shifted dramatically in the past 40 years 

since the city/highway drive cycles were developed. The mere fact that the fuel economy 

labeling process for new vehicles has been adjusted twice since its inception is evidence that 

customer driving patterns are no longer properly reflected in the city/highway driving cycles. 

EPA's MOVES model includes an estimate that 13.5% of all driving (in terms of vehicle hours 

operating) nationwide is at idle. This is 50% more idling than the time weighted average idling 

time in the combined city/highway driving cycles of 9%. The Joint Technical Support Document 

(JTSD) issued with this NPRM offers giving 75% of theoretical difference in fuel economy 

benefit between MOVES and the city/highway drive cycles for start-stop technology as an offcycle fuel economy and CO2 credit. The rationale stated in the JTSD only offers 75% of the 

theoretical difference is due to engine warm-up characteristics and that start-stop functionality is 

disabled during that phase of the drive cycle. Johnson Controls believes this is a good start 

towards recognizing the benefit of start-stop technology. However, by placing a limit on the offcycle credits that can be given to start-stop technology, the regulation may unintentionally place 

a limit on the level of innovation that could be employed to improve fuel economy, reduce the 

country's dependence on foreign oil. and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. While not directly 

involved in the business or technology of improving the warm-up characteristics of the engine, 

we do believe that innovations will continue to improve start-stop operation, consistency, and 

predictability. Customers recognize the tangible fuel savings benefits of start-stop technology 

since they can readily recognize the engine is not running and, therefore, not consuming fuel. 

This customer feedback to the OEMs will naturally drive technology and innovation to ensure 

that start-stop functionality is available under more operating conditions - including wider 

ambient temperature and wider engine operating temperature. Johnson Controls recommends 

offering more flexibility to the OEMs for off-cycle credits for start-stop technology if they can 

provide evidence of the operational characteristics of the technology performing better than 75% 

of the theoretical benefits. Johnson Controls also recommends the drive cycles be revisited and 

new drive cycles be developed which reflect the driving styles of today’s driver. To reduce 

workload, global harmonized drive cycles (aka WLTP proposed by the UNECE) should be 

considered. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, pp. 3-4]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)
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Current U.S. light-duty CAFE/greenhouse gas emission requirements both use the FTP and 

highway fuel economy test cycles with specified weighting to determine a vehicle’s fuel 

economy. The current weighting puts a larger emphasis on fuel consumption (or greenhouse gas 

emissions) during urban driving (FTP test cycle) than highway driving (highway fuel economy 

test cycle). EPA recently switched to a 5-cycle approach for light-duty vehicle fuel economy 

labeling. The rulemaking documents associated with EPA’s new fuel economy label 

requirements provide important information and data that supports the choice of this 5-cycle 

approach as more representative of how vehicles are driven by U.S. vehicle owners compared to 

the current CAFE 2-cycle requirement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.3]

MECA believes that any regulatory requirements associated with greenhouse gas emissions 

should be based on real-world driving or usage patterns in order to ensure that regulatory 

standards reflect actual vehicle operations and deliver the greenhouse gas emission reductions 

that are needed. Vehicle manufacturers and emission control technology manufacturers need a 

valid test cycle for greenhouse gas emission to engineer and evaluate vehicles consistent with 

how they are used by the public. The weighting of the test cycle between urban and highway 

driving modes will have a significant influence on the choice and optimization of powertrain 

options that will be used to meet any future greenhouse gas emission or fuel economy standards. 

Work is already underway in Geneva, Switzerland under the United Nations GRPE 

harmonization umbrella to bring forward a new light-duty vehicle test cycle for use in 

quantifying real world greenhouse gas emissions. EPA and California should utilize test cycles 

for the purpose of measuring and controlling vehicle greenhouse gas emissions that are 

representative of real world driving patterns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, pp.3-4]

Organization: Marz, Loren C.

EPA needs to adjust the methodology for calculating 'combined' mileage for the purposes of 

CAFE. The 55% city/45% highway mix is apparently no longer representative based on the 43% 

city/57% highway mix EPA now uses in its MOVES model and also used in Argonne National 

Laboratory's GREET model. Furthermore, Bosch reports that based on a recent GPS study in 

California, the median driving intensity is between the highway (HWFET) and US06 cycles 

(http://www.erc.wisc.edu/documents/symp09-Freitag.pdf - slide #24). Having an 

unrepresentative drive cycle mix will skew how effective the results of proposed rule will be in 

the real world, and inappropriately favors hybrid/EV/PHEV/FCV technology in CAFE 

calculations. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.5]

This is already becoming apparent based on a study by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Lin, Z., 

and Greene, D. 'Predicting Individual Fuel Economy.' SAE Technical Paper #2011-01-0618) as 

the current 5-cycle fuel mileage values underestimate hybrid fuel mileage by an average of about 

10%, while the fuel mileage of diesel vehicles is underestimated by an average of about 25%.

EPA essentially acknowledged this trend in a 2006 publication ('Final Technical Support 

Document - Fuel Economy Labeling of Motor Vehicle Revisions to Improve Calculation of Fuel 

Economy Estimates', page 8). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.5]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)
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Test procedures must be more reflective of the real-world. The current and proposed standards 

do not address one of the core problems with the standards – outdated highway/city drive cycle 

averages. Real-world benefits can only be achieved with real-world measures. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

The current and proposed standards do not address one of the core problems – outdated 

highway/city drive cycle averages (a split of 55 percent city and 45 percent highway). The EPA’s 

own study illustrated the switch in driving behaviors since the original averages were set.2 Realworld benefits can only be achieved with real-world measures. Changing the approach could 

have profound effects on deployment of research funds and capital investment, on the choices of 

vehicle technologies, and on the real-world results for the consumer, emissions reduction, and 

fuel efficiency. Otherwise, the industry will make cost-benefit decisions on technologies to 

maximize the fuel economy numbers with a 55-city/45-highway split and will make long-term 

technology and capital decisions without an assurance that those decisions will produce realworld results for the consumer and the country. Moreover, by continuing to use outdated mileage 

formulas for current, real-world city/highway driving averages, the result is another unintended 

consequence of influencing the market toward “preferred technologies” (because it is slanted 

towards city-like driving). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.4]

While new test procedures would be beneficial for real-world evaluation of CO2 and fuel 

efficiency, until such time they are implemented, off-cycle credits are a good way to ensure 

manufacturers are encouraged to introduce technology(ies) that result in real-world 

improvements. Although, MEMA recognizes the challenges with the tall task of changing the 

FTP/HFET, we urge the agencies to continue to actively work on global harmonization efforts to 

develop test cycles that better reflect real-world driving habits and performance so that, 

ultimately, the root causes can be addressed, resolved and incorporated for future iterations of 

this Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.4]

Test procedures must be more reflective of real-world conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9478-A1, p.13]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

The final rule should be as performance-based as possible and, in doing so, treat all compliance 

technologies as fairly as possible. Unfortunately, the single CAFE test cycle inherently serves to 

disadvantage certain technologies over others to the extent that it fails to account for how those 

technologies are actually used. For example, vehicles with hybrid and plug-in technologies 

benefit from test cycles that emphasize city driving, vehicles with start-stop technologies benefit 

from test cycles with long idling periods, and vehicles with diesel engines benefit from cycles 

with a higher proportion of highway driving. To the extent allowed by law, where NHTSA and 

EPA have data showing that certain technologies are or will be used in a manner that varies from 

the CAFE test, or that are off-cycle, appropriate adjustments should be made. Moreover, 

appropriate adjustments should be made to the final rule to reflect that real world gasoline does 

not offer as much energy potential as the fuel used in the CAFE test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9575-A1, pp. 10-11]
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Organization: Necheles, L.

I am only a Juvenile Attorney so I honestly don't have a science background. What I am 

concerned about and can comment upon, as a lay person, is how the EPA calculates vehicle fuel 

mileage as seen on the stickers of new cars. 'EPA estimated fuel mileage.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-2487-A1, p. 1]

Based upon personal experience and observation, the current calculated gas mileage shown on 

stickers does not reflect reality. The Consumer Reports or Car and Driver 'observed' fuel mileage 

is the best indicator and predictor of fuel mileage that I have at my disposal. Please consider 

testing vehicles under real-world, reliable conditions. For instance, for Highway Driving: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-2487-A1, p. 1]

1. Use ordinary fuel purchased from a local retailer-gas that might be contaminated with water or 

particles or may not be 87 Octane...fill the car with gas like an everyday consumer. 2. Drive the 

car at speeds of 70-75 miles per hour. 3. Use an intestate like the Pennsylvania Turnpike or 

Kansas Turnpike that contain hills. 4. Use full throttle at least once to simulate overtaking a 

truck. 4. Use the AC and CD player and a phone charger..load on the engine. 5. One tire at least 

5 pounds under inflated. 6. 50 pounds of junk in the trunk....i.e. extra coolant, window washer 

fluid, jumper cables, tire inflator, flash light, groceries, kids toys, car seats, etc. (Items people lug 

around everyday) 7. Headwinds and cross winds of at least 10 mph should be factored in. 8. 

Slow down and speed up for 'construction zones' and make a full stop for a simulated rest room 

break:, 9. Use a front plate on the car. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-2487-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Vehicle Testing Procedure: The testing procedure that EPA uses to measure vehicle fuel 

economy is outdated, does not reflect actual driving patterns, confuses the public, undermines 

agency credibility, and ultimately discourages consumers from purchasing efficient and costeffective vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 14]

For the purpose of measuring fuel economy for fuel economy and carbon emission regulations, 

EPA relies of two tests developed in the 1960s and 1970s that simulate urban and highway 

driving at relatively low speeds, in moderate weather, and without operating any vehicle 

accessories. In the 1980s EPA started adjusting the fuel economy measurements downward for 

the purpose of calculating the fuel economy that was placed on vehicle fuel economy labels so 

that the figure would more closely reflect actual driving experiences. As the gap between real 

world fuel economy and the figures on the label continued to grow, the Energy Policy Act of 

2005 required EPA to revise its calculation for fuel economy labels again. Beginning with MY 

2008 vehicles, EPA employed an updated test procedure which added three drive cycles to the 

calculation to evaluate fuel economy at high speeds, in cold weather, and in hot weather. Yet for 

fuel economy and carbon emission regulations, EPA continues to rely solely on the original drive 

cycles that are forty years old. They are estimated to overstate actual fuel economy by about 

twenty percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 14]
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Yet in this proceeding, the characterization of fuel economy is more complex because in addition 

to calculations of fuel economy based on fuel consumption, the proposal reports calculations of 

fuel economy that are really fuel economy equivalents of emission standards. In the proposed 

rule and the accompanying announcements the agencies characterized the requirements that 

automakers will have to achieve by MY 2025 as “equivalent to 54.5 miles per gallon (mpg) if the 

vehicles were to meet this CO2 level all through fuel economy improvements.” It was this level 

of fuel economy that both agencies highlighted in their press materials and which was widely 

reported in the mainstream media. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 14-15]

In reality, all emission reductions will not be achieved through improvements in fuel economy. 

The agencies acknowledge this point, which is reflected in the fact that NHTSA stated that the 

fuel economy actually required pursuant to the rule would be 49.6 MPG. NHTSA then proceeds 

to explain that that estimate, however, also is overstated because it does not account for 

regulatory flexibilities that it is not allowed to consider in establishing the standards. NHTSA 

estimates that the achieved fuel economy under the proposed rule would yield a fleet average of 

47.0 MPG. Yet even that estimate only reflects the estimated achieved fuel economy measured 

using the outdated test procedures. The 47 MPG estimate probably overstates the mileage that 

will be reflected on a vehicle’s fuel economy label by about 20 percent, meaning that the fuel 

economy label would indicate a fuel rating closer to 38-40 MPG. And, even the figure on the 

label often overstates the vehicle’s actual fuel economy, a point that contributed to a Honda 

Civic owner successfully suing Honda because her Civic Hybrid achieved far poorer fuel 

economy that indicated on the vehicle’s label. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 15]

Therefore, in this instance, there may be as many of five different figures by which one could 

characterize the fuel economy requirements in the rule, enough to confuse most any 

consumer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 15]

In the preamble to the rule, the agencies noted that consumers often choose not to make costeffective investments in efficiency. The agencies identified several reasons why consumers 

might not purchase more fuel efficient vehicles that are cost effective, suggesting that consumers 

might be myopic, lack information to estimate the value of fuel savings, or might associate fuel 

efficiency with small poorly made cars, among other reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-

A1, pp. 15-16]

The agencies should consider the extent to which multiple measures of fuel economy undermines 

confidence in the accuracy of the calculations, making it difficult for reasonable consumers to 

have any confidence in any single fuel economy number, or the calculations of cost-effectiveness 

based on them. SAFE believes that EPA should once again revise the test procedures to more 

closely reflect real world driving conditions and use the revised test in its carbon emission 

regulations. Likewise, NHTSA should use an updated test procedure for lightduty trucks, though 

it cannot adjust the test procedure for cars without Congress updating the statute. More 

importantly, however, EPA and NHTSA should work together to determine how to simplify the 

calculation of fuel economy so that it most accurately reflects real world conditions. They should 

then propose to Congress the appropriate changes to the law so that they may replace outdated 

and inconsistent test procedures with more accurate ones that will inspire confidence in the 
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regulation system instead of undermining the public’s confidence in it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9518-A1, p. 16]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Take steps to address testing issues: Both agencies have recognized that the standards do not 

correlate with the mileage or emissions of vehicles consumers should expect to see in dealership 

showrooms or experience on the road. While the standards that are proposed for 2017-2025 

vehicles are anticipated to yield a fleet of new vehicles in 2025 that averages 54.5 mpg (if all 

improvements are made through efficiency) and emits 163 g/mi of CO2, there are various factors 

that reduce this standard to the much lower average of 37 miles per gallon that consumers will 

see on new vehicle labels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 9]

In a report released last summer, Sierra Club detailed the history of CAFE standards and the 

testing regime that is used to set the standards and measure compliance. This testing regime 

remains as it was prescribed in the original fuel economy law. Testing for determining the 

mileage and now greenhouse gas information has gone through several updates with the goal of 

providing consumers shopping for new vehicles more accurate information. As a result of the 

divergent testing regimes, there is a confusing set of numbers - one for standards (i.e., the 

proposed 54.5 mpg and 163 g/mi CO2 fleetwide average in 2025) and another that reflects the 

on-road impact of the program (i.e., consumers should anticipate vehicles averaging 37 mpg in 

2025, not 54.5 mpg). Our report detailed how we ended up with a confusing set of numbers that 

persists with these proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 9]

In the proposed and final rules for 2012-2016 vehicles both EPA and DOT recognized the 

disparity between standards and on-road mileage and pledged to address the issue before issuing 

further standards. The process for further standards launched within weeks of that those 

standards were final and the MPG values used to define the standards and the discrepancy 

between standards and labels is now further impacted by the accounting for AC and off-cycle 

reductions in the standard setting process. In the NPRM, the “on road fuel economy gap is 

recognized, and the agencies continue to apply a 20% discount to the standards to assess real 

world mileage and emissions and in calculating benefits associated with the standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 9]

The agencies are proposing in this rule to revise testing for purposes of measure compliance with 

the standards to account for some changes in air conditioning systems and some “offcycle” 

reductions, but this leaves the actual standards themselves still tied to outdated testing. As we 

noted in our report and in comments to the MY 2012-16 rule, steps could and should be taken to 

address the outdated testing used for setting the standards and to ensure that the public is fully 

and fairly informed. The fact remains that today’s new vehicles average in the low 20 mpg range 

and new vehicles in 2025 will be nearly twice as efficient, on average. Consumers, however, 

who shop for a new vehicle in 2025 should seeing label values average around 37 mpg, not 54.5 

mpg. While the proposed rule indicates that adjustments will be made for testing for compliance 

with fuel efficiency standards, we continue to urge both agencies to take steps to reform testing 
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for setting the standards and to take steps to inform the public about the standards and what 

consumers should expect to see in dealerships. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, pp. 9-10]

Organization: Smith, Frank Houston

EPA versus NEDC Test Cycles

Regarding the relationship between NEDC and EPA test cycles please consider ...

NEDC and fuel frugal diesels: Compare

http://www.autocar.co.uk/SpecsPrices/SpecsAndPricesEdition/Volkswagen-Jetta-2.0-TDI-140-

SE-/62466/ at 58.9 mpg(Imperial) combined ==> converts

to ~49 mpg(US) to US Individual (user) MPG Estimates

http://www.fueleconomy.gov/mpg/MPG.do?action=mpgData&vehicleID=31577&browser=true

&details=on at 45.5 mpg(US) with roughly 75% highway ... with an EPA sticker of 34/42 

mpg(US) combined/highway. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, p.3]

Which better reflects US user estimated average experience, US sticker or the convert NEDC 

value? I believe you will find that the converted NEDC value (for diesels) more closely reflect 

USER Average experience. This appears to be relatively typical for Audi and VW’s This 

tracking relationship between US user AVERAGE mpg experience and the converted NEDC 

combined mpg(Imperial) values seems to be relatively consistent for fuel frugal small 

displacement (Further, these VW/Audi vehicles are certainly NOT the best available diesel fuel 

economies in the world compared to 2.0~1.5 US gallons/100 miles that is more or less standard 

practice for significant portions of the > 49 mpg(US) combined EU offerings as demonstrated by 

Table 5 above... with diesel machines that look and function much like ones already in the US 

... EXCEPT for superior fuel economy. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A1, p.3]

Organization: Tarazevich, Yegor

CAFE should be measured in EPA real world test numbers otherwise manufactures would 

continue to learn tricks to show even higher CAFE numbers which do not translate to real world 

numbers. 30 years ago CAFE MPG were very close to real world MPG but right now, CAFE 

54.5 MPG in real world means only 40 MPG. Otherwise in 2025 CAFE 54.5 MPG could become 

EPA 35 MPG only. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0199, p.1]

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Emissions testing and calculations that: [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]
EPA Response to Comments

2-184

Use market fuel rather than higher energy content laboratory fuel; [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-

A1, p.2]

Employ real-world driving conditions; [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]

Accurately reflect the full environmental impact of each technology (not just at the vehicle’s 

tailpipe); and [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]

The Coalition continues to advocate for fuel economy calculations that provide the clarity 

consumers require to make informed decisions and select a vehicle that best meets individual 

driving needs. This includes up to date calculations for real world driving and steps to limit the 

disparity between fuel economy measurements achieved in the laboratory and the real world. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.10]

Real World Driving [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.10]

During the comment period for the MY 2012-2016 joint rulemaking on CAFE, the Coalition 

called attention to EPA and NHTSA’s failure to utilize real world driving calculations. EPA’s 

own data from a 2006 study confirms that the average American accumulates the majority of 

their miles at highway conditions. In spite of this, calculations that indicate drivers accumulate 

the majority of their miles in urban conditions were utilized for the MY 2012-2016 rule, and are 

again used in the MY 2017-2025 proposed rule. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.10]

Interestingly, EPA is not using its own data and public information to calculate the most accurate 

fuel economy for CAFE despite the fact that it already utilizes the 2006 data to calculate the 

societal benefits resulting from the implementation of advanced vehicle technology. Because the 

calculations inaccurately reflect the driving patterns of the average American, EPA and NHTSA 

are causing automakers to disproportionately employ technologies that perform well in urban 

duty cycles in new vehicles, causing automakers to lean toward technologies that are not 

optimized for the needs of the average American driver. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.10]

The NPRM states that EPA and NHTSA are considering significant changes to test procedures in 

response to the wide array of vehicle technologies available. The agencies have also stated that 

they lack the statutory authority to change some of these calculations. If EPA and NHTSA have 

determined that they lack the statutory authority to update the calculations to reflect the real 

world driving habits of the current American driver, the agencies should educate Congress on the 

impacts of this flawed statute and formally ask for the statutory authority from Congress to 

update the calculations. Instead, the current proposals risk yet another rulemaking process that 

will propagate the outdated and inaccurate 1975 calculations for the next decade and beyond. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.11]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 248-249.]

By continuing to use outdated calculations, it may very well appear that manufacturers have 

reached the new fuel economy and emissions goals, but it is likely that the real-world impact will 
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2-185

fall short of our nation’s targets. Additionally, a significant disparity will continue between 

actual fuel economy and what consumers were expecting when they purchased their vehicles. 

This is evident from the recent class-action and small claims litigation by thousands of hybrid 

owners. In the Detroit Free Press on January 6, 2012, Neil Schmidt, a technical specialist for 

American Honda, explained the disparity between fuel economy on the sticker versus what the 

drivers were actually achieving. 'We have no choice. We have to put these numbers on the label.' 

He noted the small type on the label, which gave a listing of 41 to 57 miles on average, saying, 

'This is more toward the real world.' The important point for this discussion is that government 

standards need to be consistently based on real-world driving patterns for the American 

consumer, and therefore optimized for highway driving, to achieve the greatest real world 

results. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.11]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

CC has put considerable time and effort into maintaining a high degree of accuracy by having 

well-developed arrangements to monitor calibrations, checks, and all critical processes in our 

emission laboratory. We work continuously to monitor and improve the correlation and 

repeatability of our test rooms. Thus, VCC realizes that test procedures, calibrations, and 

instrumentation must be regularly reviewed and renewed to meet new challenges. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p.13]

In the fall of 2011 EPA proposed, under TIER 3, to consolidate all test procedure requirements 

of Parts 86 into Part 1066 in order to improve their organization, including references to Part 

600. In doing this, some test procedures will remain as they are, some will evolve, and new ones 

will be introduced. This will also come to affect procedures that involve CO2 /FE. This has to be 

considered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, pp.13-14]

Along with the industry, VCC pointed out that close industry-EPA collaboration is critical to 

ensuring that test procedures are relevant, adequate, and meet the objective standards so that the 

tests can be reproduced and replicated. The initial EPA proposal would have required major 

investment from VCC, but based on current discussions there appears to be an understanding that 

there are other possible ways to address measurement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-

A2,p.14]

VCC has therefore been actively involved in addressing issues directly with the EPA and through 

the Alliance on the proposal that was presented by EPA in November 2011. Based on VCC's 

ongoing analysis of Part 1066, VCC believes that these proposed processes would benefit from 

thorough revision, in cooperation with the industry, to minimize the risk of creating processes 

that will add very little value to good repeatability and accuracy. EPA has recognized industry's 

challenges and therefore continues to work with industry on this issue. VCC would welcome 

CARB's participation in that dialogue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p.14]

Currently there are crucial differences between CARB and EPA advanced technology vehicle 

test procedures that would benefit from harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, 

p.14]
EPA Response to Comments

2-186

Hybrid Test Procedures

The hybrid test procedures need to be updated to reflect a common approach between EPA and 

CARB. EPA extensively refers to SAE J1711 test procedures updated during 2010. The J1711 

test procedures are the result of many years of cooperative work between industry and 

government, which includes EPA and CARB. CARB's corresponding test procedures are based 

on J1711 of 2008/2009. There are several changes between these two versions which are going 

to generate extensive updating. If the harmonization does not occur, there will be unnecessary 

additional test burdens on the industry as a result of duplication of testing and uncertainty 

concerning the certification requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, [p.14]

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 107-108.]

It's important that agencies develop new, precise test procedures that actively calculate the true 

mileage and not an overestimation, as has happened before.

Response:

EPA received a limited number of comments on test procedure changes being finalized 

by this rule, which are intended to account for impacts on fuel economy not currently included in 

the CAFE test procedures, as described in section III.B.10 of the preamble. 

Several commenters noted that the test procedures used for this rule are different from 

those used for determining fuel economy label values, and requested that the methods be 

harmonized (AAA, U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars). While EPA has broad discretion 

in our authority to calculate average fuel economy across manufacturers’ fleets, we are required 

under EPCA 32904(c) to measure fuel economy for each car using “the same procedures for 

passenger automobiles the Administrator used for model year 1975 ..., or procedures that give 

comparable results”. In response to comments urging Congressional action, Congress was 

certainly aware of this issue in promulgating the EISA amendments to EPCA in 2007 and left 

this provision unamended. A more detailed discussion of the statutory authority is provided in 

section III.B.10 of the preamble. Although there is no outright legal bar to adopting a different 

test procedure for the other light duty vehicles (including MDPVs and light trucks), there are 

significant practical constraints. Virtually all data on control technology efficiency is based on 

performance over the CAFE two-cycle test procedure. See 75 FR at 25332, 25408 (“EPA simply 

lacks the technical basis to project the effectiveness of the available technologies over these three 

test cycles and therefore, could not adequately support a rule which set CO2 standards based on 

the five-cycle formulae.”) In addition, having car standards based (for legal reasons) on twocycle testing and truck standards based on five-cycle testing would raise obvious issues 

regarding implementation and harmonization (for example, crafting an ABT program, assessing 

costs, developing a proper relation between car and truck curves). As a result of these legal and 

practical restrictions, we are not adjusting the test procedures used in this rule to better reflect 

real-world driving. This is in contrast to the approach that EPA has taken for the fuel economy 
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2-187

label, which is not subject to the same statutory restrictions. For the fuel economy label, EPA 

uses the five-cycle test procedure to better account for real-world driving conditions, and address 

issues similar to those expressed by commenter L. Necheles. EPA does not agree with the 

conclusion drawn in comments from SAFE that difference between test procedures for labeling 

and compliance will confuse consumers, noting that test results for individual models used to 

determine manufacturer fleet compliance are not widely publicized, and are likely to be unknown 

to the average consumer.

Furthermore, EPA does not believe the restrictions imposed by EPCA on test procedures 

will have any impact on the level of emissions reductions and fuel savings that will be achieved 

as a result of this rule. EPA notes that the car and truck standards in this rule were determined 

with consideration of cost, feasibility of technology adoption, lead time, and consumer 

acceptance. A change in test procedures for which the primary effect is a proportional decrease 

(or increase) in test values would alter the standard curves, but would not affect the level of 

adoption of efficiency technologies required to comply with the standards. 

Air Conditioning System Credits

3-1

3. Air Conditioning System Credits

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Center for Biological Diversity

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Honeywell International, Inc.

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The proposed rules properly include various provisions offering manufacturers some flexibility 

in developing their plans to comply with the CAFE and GHG standards. Some of these 

provisions enable manufacturers to earn credits that can be used to satisfy part of their 

compliance obligations. While some may think the term 'credits,' as used here, connotes reduced 

stringency or even 'loopholes,' that is not the case. The objective of the CAFE and GHG 

standards is to reduce actual fuel consumption and actual GHG emissions from vehicles driven 

on American roads. In some cases, however, the laboratory testing used by the agencies to 

measure fuel economy and GHG emissions may not fully reflect the improvements built into a 

vehicle by the manufacturer, due to limitations of laboratory-based tests. And improvements to 

reduce MAC system refrigerant loss can reduce GHG emissions from vehicles while having little 

or no impact on fuel economy. It is important for the rules to properly account for such factors. 

Otherwise, manufacturers would be encouraged to focus solely on the test procedures, and 

opportunities for real-world GHG reduction and fuel economy improvement would be lost. The 

Alliance believes that the various credit provisions proposed by EPA and NHTSA are essential 

elements of the rulemaking package. Below we offer our specific comments on the details of 

these provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.10] [[This comment can also be found 

in Outline Heading 7.]]

Introduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.46]

The MAC credit provisions have become an essential piece of EPA’s GHG program. Rapid 

progress is underway as a result of the

MY 2012-2016 provisions to improve MAC efficiency, reduce refrigerant leakage, and switch to 

a new low global warming refrigerant. In order to maintain the progress made in improving 

MAC, as well as the overall integrity of the broader GHG program, the MAC provisions must be 

continued in MY 2017-2025 at unreduced credit levels. This was one of the foundations of the 

consensus to move forward toward the dramatic GHG reduction targets set through MY 2025, as 

the program stringency is designed on the basis of these alternative compliance mechanisms. 

Any obstacles that would prevent maximum attainment of MAC credits are therefore a 
EPA Response to Comments

3-2

fundamental threat to the achievement of the overarching program goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.46]

The Alliance comments are directed toward making a success of the MAC provisions through 

efficient crediting processes that achieve real-world GHG reductions, commensurate with the 

credit levels granted. The Alliance stands ready to work with the agencies to address the 

concerns outlined below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.46]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

The air conditioning system credits provide manufacturers flexibility in pursuing a variety of 

enhancements to system efficiencies and the use of advanced low global warming refrigerants. 

We see the flexibility mechanisms as an essential part of this program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9466-A1, pp. 1-2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 67.]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

Credit generation regarding direct (leakage) and indirect (fuel efficiency) emissions is generally 

supported. Details to be modified from our point of view are listed below. The aim is to ensure 

best objective methods as well as practicability and fairness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-

A1, enclosure p. 1]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

4. A/C credits should be eliminated

We support the use of all technologies that improve the efficiency of air conditioning systems 

and the employment of refrigerants with lower carbon footprints. However, these efficiency 

improvements and greenhouse gas reductions should not be approached by way of credits. The 

technology to accomplish them is or will be readily available and is economically feasible.105 

Their use should be built into the standard rather than merely incentivized. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, pp. 22-23]

105 As ICCT notes, vehicles with low greenhouse gas warming potential refrigerants are already 

being sold in Europe; it is preposterous to assume that the U.S. fleet cannot utilize them in all 

A/C systems by 2017. ICCT Comments at 42. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 23]

Organization: Ferrari
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-3

We agree with EPA’s proposal that allows manufacturers to generate credits by reducing CO2

equivalent emissions due to improved air conditioning systems, for reduced leakage (direct) and 

enhanced A/C system management with consequent reduced tailpipe CO2 (indirect) emissions. 

This is consistent with the goal to reduce the greenhouse gases associated with vehicles 

regardless of the source. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.13]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Ford fully supports all aspects of the Alliance comments on Mobile Air Conditioning (A/C) 

credits. We believe these credits are an integral part of both the EPA and NHTSA programs. The 

stringency of the standards has been set using specific assumptions on a manufacturer’s ability to 

make widespread use of this incentive program. It is therefore imperative that the agencies 

finalize requirements that allow companies who implement these technologies, which result in 

real world CO2 reductions, to receive the appropriate benefit. In support of this overarching goal, 

Ford has the following comments: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 10]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 46-47.]

Manufacturers are developing more innovative in-vehicle systems such as more efficient air 

conditioning, use of refrigerants with lower global warming potential, and improvements in 

energy management and aerodynamics. These technologies provide a real-world benefit for 

drivers but are not fully reflected on the fuel economy label. We commend the agencies for 

acknowledging these technologies in the rulemaking.

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.

Honeywell supports EPA and NHTSA's decision to continue and expand upon the A/C Credit 

Program to provide strong incentive to eliminate the emissions of greenhouse gases ('GHGs') 

from NC systems and improve energy efficiency in A/C operations to reduce fuel consumption. 

Consistency and technology neutrality are critical factors in designing regulations that enable 

businesses to invest in innovative technologies, systems, and controls. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9497-A1, p.3]

We believe that good regulatory approaches are performance driven, technology neutral, and 

provide some flexibility. They must accommodate for new developments and reflect the best 

available science and data. Honeywell believes that EPA should provide flexibility to 

accommodate for new developments in controls and test methods for measuring emissions and 

improvements in energy efficiency in A/C system programs. Incorporating the most up-to-date 

research and technical information will add further credibility to the A/C Credit Program by 

accounting accurately for emission reductions and energy efficiency attributable to alternative 

refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.4]

EPA and NHTSA must continue to maintain a clear regulatory approach that provides businesses 

across the life of a light vehicle's A/C system with the regulatory certainty to commercialize 
EPA Response to Comments

3-4

effectively and transition rapidly to low GWP refrigerants. This confidence in the regulatory 

system enables manufacturers such as Honeywell to take the risks necessary to innovate and 

solve our most pressing environmental and energy security challenges. Currently, markets for 

low GWP refrigerants are highly sensitive to standards, specifications, and incentives such as 

those established in the Proposed Rule. Continuation of the A/C Credit Program beyond 2016 

based upon best available science clearly advances the goals and objectives of fuel economy and 

GHG emissions programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.4]

In sum, Honeywell supports EPA and NHTSA's approach to continue and expand upon the A/C 

Credit Program beyond 2016, and the recognition of the important contribution that alternative 

refrigerants will make toward meeting both fuel economy and GHG emissions objectives. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.12]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 206-

210.]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The UAW also supports EPA’s proposal for air conditioning improvement credits and so-called 

“off-cycle” credits. Air conditioning credits recognize real-world reductions in climate change 

pollution that occur through reduced leakage of chemicals with high global warming potential 

from air conditioning systems, the substitution of less harmful chemicals in air conditioning 

systems, and more efficient systems that draw less power from the engine and result in lower 

CO2 emissions to run the compressor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.3]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

In the GHG regulation for MY 2012-2016 EPA introduced the AC credits as an opportunity to 

achieve some flexibility in compliance with standards equivalent to the opportunity that exists 

within CAFE by paying fines for deviation. Hence rewarding the manufacturer who has a good 

engineering solution, the AC credit has become a very important part of the national GHG 

program. It is therefore important that this momentum is maintained. Also for this part of the 

program, it is critical that EPA and NHTSA interact with CARB in order to enable consistent 

design requirements and reporting requirements for maximum efficiency of both manufacturers 

and government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 8]

Response:

EPA acknowledges comments of general support for the proposed program in the preamble to 

this rule, Section II.F.1. With regard to the comment from CBD that the standards should reflect 

the anticipated widespread use of A/C, we note that the GHG standards do exactly that (as a 

number of commenters, e.g. Ford, noted explicitly and correctly). See joint TSD section 2.5.3.2 

(explaining how the target curves reflect use of A/C technology); preamble section III.C.3. 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-5

3.1. Credits Related to Reduced Leakage and the Use of Alternative 

Refrigerants

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Arkema Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

California Air Resources Board (CARB)

Chrysler Group LLC

Ford Motor Company

Honeywell International, Inc.

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Toyota Motor North America

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The Alliance does not support additional requirements on Low Global Warming Potential 

(GWP) refrigerant systems (i.e., the “high leak disincentive”). Some manufacturers have 

invested millions of dollars to redesign their vehicles and assembly plants for transitioning to 

new low-GWP refrigerants. These companies have counted on a specific level of credits in 

exchange for making this transition earlier than they might otherwise have done. This new 

proposal would potentially reduce the amount of credit, unfairly penalizing early adopters. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.5]

Use of Updated SAE J2727 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.59]

The Alliance supports the proposed adoption of the updated SAE J2727 procedure to calculate 

leak rates. However, at the time the NPRM was written, the updated SAE J2727 was still in draft 

form. Therefore, not all of the changes have been included in the NPRM. Now that the update is 

nearly approved, we recommend that it be fully incorporated into the final rule. Using a lower 

multiplier of 10 (instead of 125) for helium tested connectors makes sense to provide lower leak 

rates for tighter connectors. The Alliance also proposes that this methodology, along with all 

other SAE J2727 updates, be allowed for MY 2012-16 so that manufacturers will be encouraged 

to perform helium testing as soon as possible and develop testing methods in advance. This 

allowance will benefit the environment and support automakers ability to earn credits to meet the 

challenging standards of the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.59]

Use of SAE J2064 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.59]
EPA Response to Comments

3-6

The Alliance supports the adoption of the SAE J2064 procedure for MY 2017 and beyond for 

calculating hose leak rates. The Alliance also proposes to allow this calculation method for MYs 

2012-16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.59]

High Leak Disincentive [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.59]

The Alliance does not support the proposal to reduce the MAC direct credits (up to 1.8 g/mile for 

cars and 2.1 g/mi for trucks) via the “high leak disincentive” if the refrigerant leakage rate is not 

reduced by half from industry average leak rates (in other words, generating debits if the MAC 

fails to achieve the low leak standards). Compared to the MY 2012-2016 regulation, an 

unreduced program for MAC credits was the basis for the consensus GHG targets set for MY 

2017-2025. The major reasons why the high leak disincentive should not be implemented for 

MYs 2017-25 and beyond for the R1234yf refrigerant are: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.59]

1) Manufacturers have invested millions of dollars to change the designs of their vehicles and 

their assembly plants to bear the added cost of the new refrigerant in order to earn these credits. 

This new proposal to potentially reduce the amount of credit from a switch in refrigerant changes 

the cost-benefit equation from making this switch. This unfairly penalizes early adopters by 

undercutting the value derived from the credits from their decisions to switch rapidly to a new 

refrigerant, when a slower changeover might have been preferred under the new proposed rules. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.59-60]

2) EPA is proposing the high leak disincentive should be implemented for a refrigerant that has a 

GWP below 150. R1234yf, the new refrigerant that many auto manufacturers plan to use in this 

timeframe, has a GWP of 4. The global warming impact of R1234yf is 0.0028 times that of 

R134a. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.60]

The actual global warming impact of an average leak air conditioner vs. a low leak air 

conditioner is shown in the table below, where grams/mile of CO2e are calculated based on the 

delta between average leak and low leak. The data suggests that the actual difference in global 

warming impact between a vehicle with an average leak and the same vehicle with a low leak air 

conditioner is 0.002 g/mile for cars and 0.003 g/mile for trucks on a CO2e basis using the 

R1234yf GWP of 4. The high leak disincentives proposed by EPA are 1.8 g/mile for cars and 2.1 

g/mile for trucks, which are not in line with the actual global warming impacts. The data below 

suggests that, assuming manufacturers report CO2 emissions to the nearest tenth of a g/mile so in 

these terms, excess CO2e emissions from these average leak vehicles will be 0.0 g/mile for cars 

and 0.0 g/mile for trucks. This analysis shows that the “high leak disincentive ” proposed by 

EPA has no environmental basis, due to the de minimis environmental impacts of R1234yf 

leakage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.60] [For the table please refer to EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.60]

3) Refrigerant leak rates are historically low for modern MAC systems because automobile 

manufacturers have improved quality in order to meet rising customer expectations and reduce 

warranty expenses. There is no evidence that manufacturers will be backsliding on these leak 

rates to save costs. In fact, given the higher cost of R1234yf - up to ten times the price of R134a -
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-7

manufacturers have an increased incentive to further reduce leaks and thereby retain the 

expensive new refrigerant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.60]

4) EPA has expressed concern about refilling R134a refrigerant in place of the R1234yf 

refrigerant. However, this is not easily achieved, since the service port fittings installed on new 

vehicles with R1234yf refrigerant are totally different from those using R134a. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.61]

5) It is also worth noting that the size of the proposed penalty greatly exceeds the actual scale of 

the GHG impact of potential leakage. Please also note that the closing bracket is placed at the 

wrong place in the formulas that calculate direct MAC credits in section § 86.1866-12.(b)(2)(i) & 

(ii), both for cars and trucks. We recommend that EPA make the correction of these closing 

brackets (as noted below) along with removing the HiLeakDis factor in both formulas. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.61] [For the figure '(noted below)' please refer to EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.61]

Refrigerant Level Monitoring [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.61]

Emission warranty requirements are not appropriate for mobile air conditioners under the 

proposed rule. This is because in-use performance of MAC systems at levels comparable to a 

new vehicle is not needed to achieve the emission levels targeted by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.61]

Warranty requirements were established for tailpipe pollutants, such as CO and NOx, because 

emissions of those pollutants would rise significantly if the pollution control devices such as 

catalytic converters fail. This would typically not be the case for MAC components. First, 

consider the case of indirect emissions from fuel consumed to power the MAC. In the vast 

majority of MAC failure modes, the system stops cooling and ceases operation - either because 

the critical moving parts stop moving or because the system is switched off - thereby actually 

reducing the indirect CO2 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.61]

Emission warranties should not be required in relation to the indirect MAC emissions. The most 

significant item in EPA’s proposed warranty coverage, the compressor, can cost over $1,000 to 

replace. It seems paradoxical and disproportionate to impose such high costs in an emissions 

recall scenario to replace this component, and thereby actually increase indirect emissions. 

Although manufacturer warranties may typically already be longer than the two-year period 

proposed by EPA in this NPRM, in principle there is no sound basis for emission warranty 

coverage to safeguard indirect emission levels, since indirect emissions go down when the 

system fails. Finally, it is worth noting that proper functioning of these parts is not actually 

required to achieve the emissions levels set by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

pp.61-62]

Regarding direct emissions of refrigerant, there is only a negligible environmental impact if 

refrigerants below a GWP of 150 are released from the system, even if the entire charge 

(typically between 1-2 pounds) is released. Therefore, emission warranty coverage of joints, 
EPA Response to Comments

3-8

hoses, seals, etc. is certainly not needed to protect the environmental gains from application of 

low-GWP refrigerants. While the ultimate cost of the new low-GWP refrigerant R1234yf (also 

known as HFO-1234yf)) is higher than the R134a, it is expected to be at a level that would 

severely discourage motorists from repeatedly recharging a system with significant unrepaired 

leaks (e.g., any cost of over $30 per pound). Therefore, there is no emission-based reason to 

mandate warranty coverage to prevent leaks on low-GWP systems, and the potential costs of an 

emission recall would be disproportionate to any environmental impact of leakage of these 

refrigerants. Any emission warranty requirements should specifically exclude emission warranty 

coverage for systems using a refrigerant with a GWP below 150. This is consistent with EPA’s 

position that no emissions warranty is required for zero emissions vehicles. The sole remaining 

MAC environmental impact would be from refrigerant leakage in the current R134a systems. 

Given the prospect for fairly rapid adoption of the low-GWP refrigerants in new vehicles during 

the time frame of this regulation, this would appear to be a very small basis on which to create an 

entirely new area of emissions warranty coverage and all the associated elements of an in-use 

program for air conditioners. EPA should not create a program of warranty coverage for MAC 

components in pursuit of such a small and temporary emissions impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.62]

In conclusion, a properly structured MAC credit program can provide substantial low cost, near 

term GHG reductions. Our recommendations are provided to make the MAC program work as 

effectively as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.62]

Implementation of New Alternative Refrigerants [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.62]

As part of the Single National Program, the current regulations provide incentives to 

manufacturers to implement low-GWP refrigerants and reduce system leakage. Our members 

plan to make use of these incentives, with the degree of use depending on each manufacturer's 

model changeover plans, MAC technology implementation plans and capital investment 

schedules. In fact, we expect some automobile manufacturers to begin use of R1234yf on some 

models as early as 2013. Despite this promising news, there remain prohibitive barriers to 

achieving 100% use of low-GWP refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.62]

At this juncture, it would be premature for EPA to remove R134a from the list of acceptable 

substitutes for CFC-12 in MAC systems. We believe that the key to this transition is to instead 

continue the credits available under the MY 2012-2016 National Program for regulation of lightduty vehicle GHG and fuel economy. This approach would help ease the transition and 

encourage earlier action, to the extent that such action is achievable and cost-effective. It would 

encourage low-leak R134a systems, so long as R134a systems are allowed on new vehicles. It 

would also encourage accelerated introduction of new refrigerants if manufacturers were 

awarded credit for any usage of the new refrigerants in excess of mandated requirements. Should 

R134a become prohibited and R1234yf become mandatory for all vehicle MAC systems, it is 

critical that the MAC credits continue to apply throughout MY 2017-25, since these credits are 

an essential part of manufacturers’ compliance plans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

pp.62-63]

Refrigerant Availability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.63]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-9

Based on current knowledge, the best product that could meet a low-GWP requirement (at or 

below 150 GWP) would be R1234yf. This refrigerant is not yet available in commercial 

quantities, and it is unclear when a sufficient supply will be available in for the U.S. market or 

what the cost of this product will be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.63]

The single manufacturer of R1234yf – a joint venture of Honeywell and DuPont – recently 

announced that it would begin supplying the refrigerant in commercial quantities in the fourth 

quarter of 2012. According to current information, once production is permitted at pilot facilities 

at both Honeywell and DuPont, as well as an intermediate-scale facility in China at DuPont 

affiliate Changshu 3F Zhonghao New Chemical Materials, supplies likely will meet near-term 

EU requirements. A single world-scale plant is expected to follow at an undefined later date as 

demand grows. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.63]

Current EU regulations mandate that automakers switch to low-GWP refrigerants by 2017. This 

EU mandate was phased in over a seven year period beginning in 2011. EU sales of nine million 

MAC-equipped vehicles filled with 600 grams of refrigerant equate to 5400 metric tons of 

refrigerant required for new production. Service and repair will require additional refrigerant. 

Since these regulations are already in place, the ramp-up of R1234yf production and system 

design is expected to fill the EU market first. The supply challenge is exacerbated by the fact that 

Honeywell and DuPont retain exclusive rights to the manufacture of R1234yf, thereby limiting 

the opportunity for other chemical manufacturers to supply the future demand for added 

manufacturing capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.63]

Engineering Resources Needed to Transition to R1234yf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.63]

In evaluating this issue, the agencies should consider both the availability of the new refrigerant 

and the significant automaker resources needed to provide the engineering, logistics, training and 

roll-out. The deployment of these changes over 100% of vehicle models will present 

considerable challenge. In particular, all new systems will require complete revalidation using 

the new lubricants required for R1234yf. This will take time and strain the engineering resources 

throughout the MAC industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.63]

In most cases, manufacturers will implement R1234yf with a revised component layout, 

including additional components that create packaging problems. Therefore, R1234yf is ideally 

implemented during vehicle major redesigns. Finally, there are significant changes to the 

assembly plants that are required to handle R1234yf (especially OSHA rules). These typically 

include relocation of the refrigerant charging area and relocation of refrigerant storage tanks. 

Extensive plant rearrangements such as this are very disruptive to plant operations, and are 

therefore typically performed as part of the changeover that occurs when new models are 

introduced, when extensive replacement of tooling and revised layout of production lines is 

typically required throughout the plant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.64]

Substituting R1234yf for R134a is fundamentally more complex than the change from R12 to 

R134a that was made during the 1990's, and the SNAP usage requirements are more significant. 
EPA Response to Comments

3-10

The changes in the assembly plants will also be much more significant than were the case for 

R134a. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.64]

For these reasons, EPA should not delist R134a from the approved SNAP list of automobile air 

conditioner refrigerants, nor should EPA establish other policies based on the assumption that a 

comprehensive changeover to new refrigerants can occur within the foreseeable future. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.64]

Organization: Arkema Inc.

Arkema supports the EPA's focus on the use of more advanced components and technology to 

reduce the potential for refrigerant leakage and/or the use of alternative refrigerants. In fact, 

Arkema was and is an important contributor to the efforts to develop methods for leak-tight 

components and has an interest in the production of HFO-1234yf and/or other alternative 

refrigerants. The option of using air conditioning credits and the flexibility to choose leak-tight 

components or an alternative refrigerant should remain in the final rule. This choice gives 

flexibility to auto manufacturers, allows prioritization of improvements in vehicles, and 

acknowledges technological advancements that some auto manufacturers may have already 

implemented. For the consumer, the end result is the choice of the newest technology which 

could foster higher acceptance. Finally, for example, Arkema supports proper cooling load 

management to optimize the sizing of an air conditioning unit in motor vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, p.2]

Arkema supplies a number of products into the automotive industry, which will help auto 

manufacturers achieve the proposed requirements. From coatings, refrigerants, plastics, 

polymers, and resins, Arkema serves a number of automobile parts suppliers and manufacturers 

to foster technological advancements for motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, 

p.2]

However, as EPA considers which alternative refrigerants are eligible for use in mobile air 

conditioning systems, we believe that each potential, new refrigerant should be evaluated in 

terms of its full costs and benefits and effects on health, safety and the environment. Additional 

evaluation and information based on the above factors should be included in the final rule 

regarding alternative refrigerants. In addition, as alternative refrigerants play a key role in EPA's 

proposal, it is necessary to also more fully consider the availability, supply and competitiveness 

of such alternative refrigerants. Although potential supply issues are acknowledged in the 

NPRM, in light of other international regulatory efforts such as those previously undertaken by 

the European Union, for example, we believe additional analysis is needed by EPA to understand 

the potential costs and implications that could be posed by an adequate global supply of 

alternative refrigerants. Thus, a discussion on the acceptance of alternative refrigerants on a 

global scale should be included to benchmark other efforts in this area. EPA may also wish to 

consider delaying the use of alternative refrigerant incentives until relevant health, safety, 

environmental and supply issues can be fully and properly analyzed and/or until the mid-term 

evaluation process envisioned by the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, pp.2-

3]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-11

c. Market Penetration of Alternative Refrigerants is the Best Way to Manage Existing Products 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, p.3]

Arkema supports EPA's proposed method of managing the transition to a new refrigerant as long 

as the use of particular refrigerants is not mandated by EPA and the market players have freedom 

of choice. This will ensure that there is adequate supply of the products and that the products will 

operate in a competitive marketplace. If the North American Proposal for HFCs (HFC 

Amendment to the Montreal Protocol) is successful, HFCs would be managed on a global cap 

and trade allocation basis and could still allow room for the market to govern the selection of 

materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, pp.3-4]

EPA's potential Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) rulemaking on HFC-134a is not 

consistent with the proposed method above or the HFC Amendment. The potential SNAP 

rulemaking to potentially de-list HFC-134a manages the process on a chemical by chemical basis 

and makes EPA the market regulator while the HFC Amendment allows competitive forces to 

make choices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9468-A1, p.4]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

B. Availability of HFO-1234yf

As EPA is aware, manufacturers have been evaluating alternative refrigerants with low global 

warming potential (GWP) for many years. HFO-1234yf has emerged as a potential alternative 

that has the potential to be used in new vehicles in the near term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9466-A1, p. 4]

However, while the outlook for the use of HFO-1234yf is promising, the availability of HFO1234yf is still highly uncertain. With only two manufacturers and only one plant to produce this 

refrigerant at this time, there is not yet a guarantee that there will be adequate supplies for the 

U.S. vehicle market, especially since the European Union is moving ahead to adopt alternative 

refrigerants prior to the U.S. As part of the determination of the GHG standards, EPA accounts 

for the expected use of HFO-1234yf, and therefore the likely credits that would be obtained from 

this use, expecting 100% usage prior to 2025. The GHG standards were developed with these 

potential credits in mind. If for some reason HFO-1234yf does not reach commercialization, or 

adequate supplies are not available for all vehicle manufacturers, then it will be necessary for 

EPA to reassess the GHG standards, taking into account that a 100% usage rate will not be met. 

Global Automakers recommends that EPA continue to track the progress for HFO-1234yf and 

reevaluate the potential for 100% usage as part of the mid-term review. Again, if 100% usage is 

not feasible, then EPA should account for this shortfall through a revision of the standards 

following the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 5]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

From our point of view, the adequate availability of HFO-1234yf is highly questionable. 

Therefore, we greatly appreciate EPA's decision regarding the future ;:Adoption of this 
EPA Response to Comments

3-12

refrigerant. Currently, no one knows when the supply will be adequately established in the 

market. To assure that automakers will be able to continue to offer air conditioning to consumers 

in the future, the delisting of HFC-134a as an approved substitute would not be prudent at the 

present time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 1]

Regarding leakage-related credits, we would like EPA to reconsider the so called 'Hi Leak 

Disincentive.' SAE J639 specifically requires unique service fittings for each refrigerant to 

prevent both accidental cross-contamination and intentional tampering by service technicians, 

and EPA's regulations currently do not allow the use of any unintended fluid or refrigerant in any 

A/C system. If someone does so, then it would violate the law. So the effects of illegal 

refrigerant charge cannot be influenced by the manufacturer. Furthermore, this disincentive 

provokes discussions to use unintended refrigerants. We do not expect that vehicle 

manufacturers will shift to higher potential leakage rates when using HFO-1234yf instead of 

HFC-134a; BMW would definitely not do so and our focus will remain on best quality 

refrigerant circuit tightness for any given refrigerant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, 

enclosure p. 2]

Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is supportive of the general structure of the motor 

vehicle air conditioning (AC) leakage credit program in the proposed United States 

Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) 2017-2025 MY light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas 

(GHG) rule. We believe the program will continue leading the automotive industry toward a 

more sustainable future by incentivizing the use of new refrigerants with low climate impact and 

superior refrigerant containment technologies. In the meanwhile, we have three specific 

comments on the U.S. EPA AC leakage credit provisions. The purpose of these comments is to 

accomplish three things:

• Correcting what appears to be an unintentional error in U.S. EPA’s proposed AC leakage 

credit formulas,

• Aligning U.S. EPA’s AC leakage credit formulas with the broad intent of the rule, and

• Fully aligning the U.S. EPA regulation and the CARB regulation with respect to AC 

leakage credit provisions.

The three specific comments are described in the attachment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9491-

A1, p. 1]

Attachment. Specific Comments on AC Leakage Credit Provisions in U.S. EPA’s 2017-2025 

MY Light-duty Vehicle GHG Rule

Comment 1 refers to portions of subsections (i) and (ii) in §86.1866-12(b)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9491-A1, p. 3]

Comment 2 refers to portions of subsections (i) and (ii) in §86.1866-12(b)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9491-A1, p. 4]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-13

Comment 3 refers to portions of subsections (i) and (ii) in §86.1866-12(b)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9491-A1, p. 5]

[See pp. 3-7 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9491-A1 for specific comments on 

AC Leakage Credit Provisions.]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

The updated SAE J2727 and J2064 procedures and their bearing on EPA air conditioning system 

leakage calculations;

Opposition to EPA’s proposed “high leak disincentive”;

Refrigerant level monitoring;

And low-global warming potential (“GWP”) refrigerant availability and the resources necessary 

to transition from R-134a systems to Low-GWP refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-

A1, p. 10]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Ford also supports the continuation of the existing A/C leakage credit opportunities and offers 

the following comments about the proposed program for 2017-2025 MYs. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 14]

We believe that the current design-based “menu” approach to quantifying leakage credits is 

effective and should be retained. We also agree with EPA’s proposal to adopt the latest version 

of SAE J2727 for calculating leak rates, including the lower multiplier for helium tested 

connections as well as all other updates incorporated into the SAE standard at the time the final 

rule is published. In addition, Ford supports the adoption of the hose permeation rates calculated 

from SAE J2064 as part of SAE J2727. For consistency and to encourage helium leak testing, we 

propose that EPA also allow these updated methodologies to be used for 2012-2016 MY 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 14]

Ford supports the mechanisms in place to incentivize the introduction of new low global 

warming potential (GWP) refrigerants, such as R-1234yf. Use of such refrigerants directly 

reduces the climate effects of A/C system leakage. As detailed in the Alliance comments and the 

NPRM preamble, there are still a number of obstacles that must be overcome before new lowGWP refrigerants can be used widely throughout the industry. These include, but are not limited 

to, refrigerant availability and cost, required A/C system hardware updates and testing, and 

assembly plant facility upgrades. Nonetheless, manufacturers are working to pursue this as a 

viable option to directly reduce GHG emissions in the future. Ford believes appropriate credit 

levels must continue through 2025 MY in order to incentivize the introduction of these new 

refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 14]
EPA Response to Comments

3-14

Related to credit amounts, Ford does not support the introduction of the “high leak disincentive” 

proposed in the 2017-2025 MY program for low-GWP refrigerants. This revision makes it 

impossible for manufacturers to obtain the maximum leakage credit amounts for these 

refrigerants, unless they implement a system that achieves the minimum leakage score. Credits 

may be reduced by as much as 1.8 g/mile for cars and 2.1 g/mile for trucks. As detailed in the 

Alliance comments, Ford does not believe that the introduction of R-1234yf will encourage 

backsliding on leakage rates. Retention of the new, more costly refrigerant should serve as an 

incentive to improve or maintain leakage levels. We also have no indication that customers will 

commonly choose to recharge with R-134a or higher-GWP refrigerants. As required by the 

SNAP rule and SAE J639, we will engineer our systems and port fittings to avoid the possibility 

of this occurring. Finally, we do not believe it is appropriate to introduce a disincentive that 

would impact all systems that do not achieve the minimum leak score. This goes above and 

beyond the goal of discouraging backsliding and significantly infringes on manufacturers’ ability 

to obtain the full benefit of introducing low-GWP refrigerants. To encourage implementation of 

the new refrigerants, Ford recommends that the “high leak disincentive” be removed from the 

leakage credit equations. If such a “disincentive” value is retained, Ford believes the score levels 

used in the equation to calculate the value should be re-evaluated to ensure that it accomplishes 

the stated goal of minimizing backsliding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 14-15]

Outside the scope of this NPRM, we understand that a petition has been filed and separate 

regulatory workstreams are in process to potentially remove the current predominant refrigerant, 

R- 134a, from the list of acceptable substitutes for CFC-12 in mobile A/C systems. Due to the 

impediments to R-1234yf introduction described above, Ford does not support efforts to delist R134a. Should R-134a be delisted for new vehicles, or R-1234yf become required in the future, 

the credit opportunities for low-GWP refrigerants should remain in place through 2025 MY. In 

determining the stringency of the GHG standards, EPA assumed manufacturers would make 

widespread use of the alternative refrigerant credits (especially during the later years of the 

program). Therefore, this incentive opportunity must continue through the duration of the entire 

2017-2025 MY rule. Ford believes that removal of this flexibility would necessitate a 

modification to the overall stringency of the GHG targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1,

p. 15]

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.

Continuation of the A/C Credit Program beyond 2016 will accelerate the transition to low global 

warming potential ('GWP') refrigerant technologies and provide clear market signals to 

manufacturers as they incorporate cleaner technologies into their vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9497-A1, p.3]

The A/C Credit Program offers a valuable tool to comply with the fleet-wide CO2 emission 

requirements and corporate average fuel economy standards by providing vehicle manufacturers 

with the flexibility necessary to continue to move ahead on a specific compliance pathway. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.3]

Innovation means investment. In response to the European Union's call for a more 

environmentally friendly refrigerant for cars, Honeywell's team of world-class scientists 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-15

launched an accelerated effort to develop a next generation air conditioning refrigerant. The 

result: SolsticeTM 1234yf, a product that not only exceeded the goals set politically, but one that 

represents a long-term, global, and energy-efficient solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-

A1l, p.3]

EPA and NHTSA properly acknowledge that the large number of light duty vehicles with A/C in 

use today has a substantial impact on the amount of energy vehicles consume and on the amount 

of refrigerant leakage that occurs due to their 'significant use.' With forecasts predicting more 

than 90 million light vehicles to be built per year by 2019, SolsticeTM 1234yf mobile refrigerant 

can serve as an important component in global climate protection. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9497-A1, p.4]

With the development of SolsticeTM 1234yf refrigerant, Honeywell is investing in making 

modern life more comfortable, cost- and energy efficient, and safer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9497-A1, p.4]

Honeywell supports EPA's proposal to continue to allow auto manufacturers to generate credits 

for employing technologies that reduce A/C leakage emissions ('Leakage Credits') that may be 

used for compliance with vehicle emissions standards. The Leakage Credit program can be 

improved upon and Honeywell offers recommendations for EPA to incorporate the best available 

science in its analysis of average leak rates across the life of a vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9497-A1, p.4]

EPA explains that its proposed Leakage Credit is based on the SAE 12727 method. This standard 

does not adequately reflect leakage over the lifecycle of the vehicle. In the Draft Joint Technical 

Support Document ('TSD'), EPA states that it considers SAE J2727 to be an appropriate method 

for quantifying the expected yearly leakage rates from A/C systems, despite EPA's recognition 

that SAE 12727 is a 'surrogate for in-use emissions' and is 'not necessarily an accurate 

representation of real-world emissions Honeywell agrees that the test is appropriate for 

calculating leakage from new, properly constructed vehicles, but this test fails to account 

adequately for the increased leakage as vehicles age. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.5]

Several recent studies indicate that emissions rates in older vehicles are much greater than the 

J2727 scores represent. For example, one study found that the average leakage rate of mobile 

A/C systems that are 1 to 6 years old is 52.4 g/year ± 4.6 g/yr. Another indicates that new 

compressors leak at a rate between 5 and 40 g/year and that aged compressors leak at rates from 

97 to 1800 g/year when pressurized with refrigerant.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.5]

Given that SAE 12727 does not account fully for leakage of refrigerants over the life of a 

vehicle, Honeywell proposes that companies seeking to obtain leakage credits be allowed the 

opportunity to design a component test based on SAE Standard 12763, Test Procedure for 

Determining Refrigerant Emissions from Mobile Air Conditioning Systems. Honeywell suggests 

that the use of SAE Standard 12763 test protocols provides a true indication of the correct 

selection of leakage reduction components and also allows for the development of additional 
EPA Response to Comments

3-16

credit goals for manufacturers to reduce the overall leakage rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9497-A1, p.5]

Honeywell is committed to put in place capacity in the United States to produce SolsticeTM 

1234yf consistent with the requirements of the US automobile manufacturers to meet GHG 

emission and fuel economy standards in the current regulations and the Proposed Rule. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.5]

Compared to other alternative refrigerants referenced in the Proposed Rule, SolsticeTM 1234yf 

has the most favorable climate footprint over its entire life cycle, and transition to SolsticeTM 

1234yf will require relatively few changes to existing air conditioning systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9497-A1, p.5]

SolsticeTM 1234yf refrigerant has a 99.7 percent lower global warming potential than R134a (4 

versus 1430) and breaks down and disappears from the atmosphere within 11 days compared to 

the 13 years that R134a stays in the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.5]

A major part of a refrigerant's global warming potential is due to indirect emissions: CO2 

emissions, caused by increased fuel consumption needed to power the air conditioning system. 

NC systems using SolsticeTM 1234yf refrigerant generally burn less fuel than other low GWP 

technologies. For example, air conditioners equipped with SolsticeTM 1234yf refrigerant use 

markedly less fuel and produce 20 to 30 percent fewer emissions than CO2 used as a refrigerant 

in hot climate zones. These efficiencies offer OEMs additional benefit in meeting the underlying 

fuel economy standards in the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.6]

Adoption of SolsticeTM 1234yf will require few changes to existing NC systems. The operating 

system pressures of SolsticeTM 1234yf are similar to the most popular current refrigerant, R134a. 

This allows for re-use of the recent manufacturing technology advancements that will continue to 

make NC systems affordable into the next generation of SolsticeTM .1234yf refrigerant systems. 

Conversely, CO2 A/C systems require completely new equipment designs that would require 

significant investment in resources to implement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.6]

In the Proposed Rule, EPA and NHTSA generally provide a clear and appropriate process for 

alternative refrigerants with low GWPs to qualify for credits that may be used by OEMs for 

compliance with GHG emission requirements. The agencies also present some plausible 

scenarios for the transition toward commercialization and broad market acceptance of 

alternatives to the status quo refrigerant, R134a. Honeywell appreciates and supports the 

Proposed Rule's recognition of the dual benefits of alternative refrigerants in meeting our climate 

change and energy independence objectives and the incentives to enable the transition to low 

GWP refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1,p.6]

Honeywell Agrees with EPA's Leakage Credit Equation to Determine the Net Fleet Effect of 

Direct Emission Due to Refrigerant Leakage.

Honeywell supports the continuation of credit opportunities for low leakage technologies and 

suggests that to the maximum extent possible the credit program should reflect accurately 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-17

leakage rates in vehicles over time. As vehicles age, the following conditions cause leakage rates 

to increase: seasonal, daily, and in operation thermal cycles; vibrations; hardening of hoses and 

o-rings; drying out of the shaft seal due to non-operation (or continuous operation for clutchless 

models); collisions; service (engine or mobile A/C system); and corrosion leaks. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.6]

Honeywell agrees that the assumed emissions leakage rates of 16.6 and 20.7 g/year are 

representative of refrigerant emission rates for new motor vehicle A/C systems. Honeywell also 

concurs that the MaxCredit term reflects a correct order of magnitude to account for fleet aging 

through the vehicle lifetime. Last, Honeywell agrees that the GWP Refrigerant term accounts for 

the GWP impact of alternative refrigerants compared to the current R134a refrigerant, which has 

a GWP of 1430. In sum, Honeywell concurs with EPA's emission equation to determine the net 

fleet effect of direct emissions due to refrigerant leakage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, 

pp.6-7]

EPA HiLeakDisincentive Term Is Not the Best Approach to Prevent Against Backsliding to 

Higher GWP Refrigerants and Increase GHG Emissions During Ale System Retrofit and 

Recharge.

EPA proposes to add to the existing credit calculation a HiLeakDisincentive term with the 

intention of preventing GHG emissions from systems designed to operate on low GWP 

refrigerants but which potentially could be recharged with a higher GWP refrigerant. This 

method is neither effective nor appropriate for two reasons: it provides an advantage to high 

GWP refrigerants and it raises the cost of credits far vehicle manufacturers without delivering 

demonstrated GHG emissions or fuel economy improvement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-

A1, p.7]

First, if the HiLeakDisincentive term is to account for the loss of efficiency as systems leak, then 

it should apply to all refrigerants and not just refrigerants with a GWP less than 150. EPA 

proposes that the HiLeakDisincentive term for refrigerants with a GWP higher than 150 will 

automatically be zero, regardless of the A/C system's efficiency. Conversely, for lower GWP 

refrigerants, EPA proposes that the term account for A/C system efficiency loss due to leakage. 

Honeywell argues that the disparate treatment of low GWP refrigerants compared to high GWP 

refrigerants for purposes of the HiLeakDisincentive term is inequitable because both high and 

low GWP refrigerant systems sustain some amount of leakage before system performance is 

affected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.7] 

SAE Standard 12765:2008 provides a chart, shown below, that demonstrates this point. 

Conventional systems such as R134a and future systems that utilize low GWP fluids in 

subcritical system design both have optimum charge plateaus, representing a range of refrigerant 

charges where system efficiency is largely independent from system refrigerant amount. 

Typically, auto manufacturers will charge to the right side of the plateau to allow for some

system leakage before system efficiency is affected. Although the chart below represents a 

theoretical bench top system, it demonstrates that a charge amount of nearly 400 grams may be 

lost before the leakage affects system efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.7]
EPA Response to Comments

3-18

The HiLeakDisincentive term should account for this standard leakage, regardless of the 

refrigerant's GWP. Honeywell recommends that EPA either remove the default value of zero for 

refrigerants with GWP higher than 150 or raise the MaxCredit term by an equal amount for 

refrigerants with a GWP lower than 150. Unfortunately, subcritical systems for CO2 do not have 

a charge plateau, and system efficiency correlates directly with refrigerant leakage. 

Consequently, the performance loss disincentive for these systems should be based on the 

science of the system design, rather than a set term.

Second, EPA's proposed HiLeakDisincentive term will raise production costs for vehicle 

manufacturers without reciprocal GHG benefits, penalizing them for the potential actions of 

others without creating any additional efficiency. In order to avoid the HiLeakDisincentive 

penalty in the credit calculation, OEMs must not only purchase more costly low GWP 

refrigerants, but also the more expensive high-efficiency components. One of the strengths of 

the current A/C Leakage Credit system is that it provides OEMs with flexibility to meet 

fleetwide GHG emission requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.8]

The high efficiency components will only render a meaningful fuel savings if the vehicle owner 

and repair shop chooses to recharge the vehicle with a low GWP refrigerant. Honeywell believes 

that the regulations should not penalize OEMs for decisions that they are unable to control, such 

as recharging and retrofitting A/C systems. Instead, Honeywell proposes to collaborate with EPA 

and NHTSA to develop an alternative mechanism to prevent backsliding, including providing 

certain incentive for recharging with low GWP refrigerants, discussed further in Part IV. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.8]

Anti-Backsliding

As discussed in Part II.B., above, the use of low GWP refrigerants brings new challenges in 

developing regulations to prevent backsliding to a higher GWP refrigerant during recharging of a 

low GWP refrigerant system. EPA and NHTSA acknowledge in the Proposed Rule that repeated 

recharging of A/C systems could lead some consumers and/or repair facilities to recharge a 

s1stem designed for use with a low GWP refrigerant with a cheaper high GWP refrigerant. 

Unfortunately, EPA and NHTSA have not set out a strong enough legal case to assure against 

such backsliding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.11]

The agencies' statement that 'recharging with a refrigerant different from that already in the A/C 

system is not authorized under current regulations' is not correct. Per the authority granted to 

EPA under Section 612(c) of the Clean Air Act, the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) 

Program, it may identify acceptable and unacceptable substitutes for ozone-depleting substances, 

including R-12 (Freon). The SNAP program has identified alternatives to R-12 and has granted 

them New system (with or without restriction) or Retrofit (with or without restrictions) status. 

The common refrigerant R -134a is now the focus of the instant rulemaking. SNAP granted R134a both New and Retrofit status for R-12 for its automotive application, including the use 

restriction that the vehicle charging ports should be modified to allow technicians to service that 

vehicle once a retrofit has been carried out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.11]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-19

SNAP has only granted HFO-1234yf new system status, with certain restrictions regarding 

proper vehicle design for the use of a mildly flammable refrigerant, as a replacement to R-12 

systems. The SNAP program has not granted Retrofit status to HFO-1234yf because of the 

design practices of current R-134a systems and do-it-yourselfer ('DIYer') use of the product is 

the subject of current and active judicial matters. One may argue that SNAP approved HFO1234yf as a replacement for R-134a and not R-12 and thus that new vehicles using HFO-1234yf 

cannot be recharged with R-134a. As such, SNAP's approval of HFO-1234yf would not have 

been necessary because R-134a is not an ozone depleting substance and SNAP would not have 

had to exercise its authority under the Clean Air Act to name its acceptable substitutes. 

Thus, because they are both acceptable substitutes for R-12, the reverse retrofit of a system 

designed and filled by a vehicle manufacturer with HFO-1234yf and recharged by a service 

garage or DIYer with R-134a may be considered a legal conversion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9497-A1, pp.11-12]

Given that lack of existing legal mechanisms to prevent against backsliding to higher GWP 

refrigerants during retrofit and recharge, we support regulatory measures that protect against 

reverting to higher GHG emissions over the life of a vehicle. We recommend that EPA and 

NHTSA provide incentives for the aftermarket industry to assure use of compliant, low GWP 

refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.12]

In sum, Honeywell supports, and is willing to assist, EPA and NHTSA in developing a clear and 

appropriate approach to assure the use and maintenance of low GWP refrigerants in the 

aftermarket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.12]

Honeywell appreciates EPA's and NHTSA's recognition of the meaningful contribution that 

refrigerants like SolsticeTM 1234yf offer to carmakers to comply with the Proposed Rule's GHG 

emission and fuel economy requirements throughout the life of the program. Assuring a rapid 

and smooth transition to low GWP refrigerants such as SolsticeTM 1234yf will deliver 

comparable cooling in all climates while saving time, costs, and environmental impact for years 

to come. SolsticeTM 1234yf will serve as a valuable tool for automakers to achieve the GHG 

emissions and fuel economy requirements while advancing our nation's clean energy and 

environmental objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.12]

SolsticeTM 1234yf will contribute significantly to the US economy throughout the life of the 

Proposed Rule. Honeywell is committed to put in place capacity in the United States to produce 

SolsticeTM 1234yf consistent with the requirements of the US automobile manufacturers to meet 

GHG emission and fuel economy standards in the current regulations and the Proposed Rule. 

Building this new capacity will create large numbers of construction, engineering, and 

manufacturing jobs. In addition, plants like a SolsticeTM 1234yf facility typically require 

significant local contractor support for maintenance and other ancillary services and create 

substantial indirect employment in the local community. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 207-

210.]
EPA Response to Comments

3-20

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

HFO-1234yf: EPA has specifically requested comment on the implications for a market 

transition to the new HFO-1234yf refrigerant and the factors that may affect the industry demand 

for refrigerant in the U.S. and internationally. Hyundai agrees with EPA that while the 

technology is very promising, there is uncertainty as to the widespread availability of HFO1234yf. Hyundai believes the A/C credits for HFO-1234yf create an incentive to move toward 

this refrigerant and a phase-out of HFC-134a will ultimately be unnecessary. The uncertainty of 

the availability of HFO-1234yf coupled with a phase-out of HFC-134a could create a market 

distortion. However, Hyundai is not opposed to phasing-out HFC-134a once there is full-scale 

availability of HFO-1234yf and recommends that the agencies wait until this time to take any 

action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.6]

There is a minor typographical error in the calculation of leakage credit on pages 76 FR 75373 & 

75374. The closing bracket is missing in the calculation. We believe the calculation should read 

as follows with the red bracket in the correct position: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.8]

Leakage Credit =MaxCredit x [ 1-(leakScore/16.6)x(GWPref/GWPHFC134a)]-HileakDis [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.8]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

A/C alternative refrigerant credits

The ICCT supports the agencies' proposal to issue credits for alternative refrigerants, which can 

dramatically reduce the potential for greenhouse gas emissions from servicing, leaks, and end-oflife disposal. We commend EPA for tying the leakage credit to the refrigerant being used in the 

vehicle. A flat leakage credit would have potentially overstated or underestimated the climate 

benefit of the intervention, depending on the refrigerant contained in the vehicle. We also 

commend EPA for including a disincentive for systems that utilize a low GWP refrigerant but do 

not also adopt low leakage equipment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 39]

We also agree with US EPA and NHTSA that the credits should account for the possibility of 

dropping in higher GWP refrigerant such as HFC-134a (GWP 1430) as a replacement for 1234f 

in use.69 This potential for backsliding is not fully addressed in the proposed rule. High prices for 

alternative refrigerants will very likely encourage vehicle owners to use lower cost but higher 

GWP replacements. EPA estimates that 49 percent of direct refrigerant leakage occurs during 

servicing and maintenance and nine percent occurs during end of life. This suggests the 

possibility for continued release of these higher GWP refrigerants, particularly among poorly 

maintained vehicles. Meanwhile, EPA assumes in its credit calculation that low GWP refrigerant 

will be used throughout the full life of the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 39-

40]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-21

To address this concern in part, EPA has proposed to reduce the eligible credit available to the 

manufacturer when low-leak hoses and valves are not incorporated into the system (p 75002). 

While we strongly support this proposed anti-leak credit and agree that it may reduce the rate of 

servicing and maintenance, we remain concerned that poorly maintained vehicles or 'super 

emitters' will be re-charged with high GWP refrigerant and contribute substantial emissions over 

the course of the vehicle life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 40]

The ICCT recommends that the credit be further modified to reflect the likelihood of the use of 

higher GWP refrigerant. Currently, the credit assumes that low GWP refrigerants will be used 

throughout the life of the vehicle, such that accidental releases during service events and disposal 

will be releases of only low GWP refrigerant. EPA should instead assume this only for systems 

where manufacturers demonstrate designs that cause the system to fail to operate when recharged 

with higher GWP refrigerants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 40]

EPA should require manufacturers to demonstrate applicability to this criterion. When the 

criterion isn't met, EPA should reduce the amount of the credit to a level that represents only the 

share of total refrigerant consumption represented by the first initial charge of a new vehicle.

This approach may only apply to HFO 1234yf at the moment, since HCF-134a is essentially a 

drop-in replacement. Other systems like HFC-152a and CO2 may not suffer this weakness. For 

HFO 1234yf, automakers would receive credit only for the refrigerant they put in the 

vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 40]

In our view, it is not enough to say that SAE design standards are being met. Additional 

measures are needed to encourage chemical manufacturers and auto manufacturers to find 

solutions that will more reliably deliver climate benefits. Such measures could be patterned after 

the requirements for approval of low viscosity and low friction oils for vehicle testing.71 In this 

way, EPA would further ensure that design and operational limitations adopted by manufacturers 

fully realize the A/C emission reduction credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 40]

Credit Continuity with 2012-2016 Final Rule

EPA describes in the draft TSD that: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 40]

EPA made the policy decision to maintain continuity with the 2012-2016 FRM analysis, and is 

proposing to incorporate this level of the credit in the standard setting process. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 40-41]

This was done despite new information that suggests a need to revise the emissions inventory 

and the leakage credits derived from this. The reason for continuing the previous leakage credits 

is:

'A reduction in A/C credits would artificially increase the stringency of the standard for those 

manufacturers who generated leakage credits in 2016 ... alternatively, the stringency of the 2017 
EPA Response to Comments

3-22

standards would have to be relaxed.' '...need for stability for the standards...'. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 41]

We understand the need for stability of the standards for those manufacturers who generate 

leakage credits in 2016. However, the proposed rule acknowledges that the credits do not 

represent the emission reductions they are designed to represent. We strongly urge that this 

approach be re-evaluated in order to provide manufacturers who generate leakage credits in 2016 

a means to generate alternative emission reductions equivalent to those represented by the credits 

based on the latest understanding of the emissions inventory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 41]

We are concerned that the proposed policy may stimulate manufacturers to pursue these credits 

more aggressively as a means to avoid on-cycle reductions. We recommend that staff quantify 

the differences between a revised leakage credit based on a revised TAR inventory, and the 

credits being proposed, so as to justify the continuation of the existing leakage credits. If the 

differences are considerably larger, we recommend reconsideration of the proposed credits. But 

if they are small, then it is justifiable to maintain the credits as is. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 41]

Lead Time for Low-GWP Refrigerant Penetration

EPA assumes a long lead time for penetration of low GWP refrigerants, claiming that 

automakers expect a full re-design to be necessary. However, automakers in Europe are already 

selling vehicles with low GWP refrigerant. For example, EPA assumes 20 percent penetration in 

2017, while Europe will be requiring 100 percent penetration that year. In addition, some 

refrigerant options like 1234yf require only minor changes to the refrigerant system. EPA cites 

confidential discussions with vehicle manufacturers who say 'it may be possible to modify the 

hardware for some alternative refrigerant systems between redesign periods.' Thus, the ICCT 

strongly recommends harmonization with the European rule. At a minimum, EPA should explain 

its expectation of 20 percent penetration in 2017 and 20 percent additional penetration in each 

subsequent year through 2021. We feel the long lead time is unjustified and recommend that 

EPA expect full adoption of low GWP refrigerant along a more accelerated time frame. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 41]

Refrigerant OBD Monitoring

In its 2012-2016 rulemaking, EPA considered additional leak credits for systems that monitor 

refrigerant charge on-board the vehicle, but these ultimately were not adopted. EPA is again 

opening the door to this type of monitoring, considering that most A/C systems contain sensors 

that detect low refrigerant pressures. The ICCT would be supportive of a refrigerant OBD 

monitoring credit in principle, although it would be challenging to accurately model and estimate 

the emissions benefits of OBD monitoring. Despite this, we think providing such information to 

the vehicle owner would cause many owners to seek repair and maintenance of the A/C system. 

In light of the potential benefits and the difficulty in estimating a credit, the ICCT recommends 

that EPA require such on-board monitoring. Another approach might be to estimate the 

proportion of time that owners would have the A/C system repaired in response to a Malfunction 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-23

Indicator Light (MIL) illumination and multiply this percent by the calculated amount of leakage 

used for other A/C refrigerant credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 42]

Vehicles without air conditioning

The proposed crediting system is designed to mitigate the rather significant climate impacts of 

the air-conditioning unit, based upon both its efficiency and its refrigerant emissions. Based on 

this perspective, a vehicle without an air-conditioning system would have fundamentally lower 

climate impacts, as no refrigerant would be consumed and emitted and no energy would be 

required to operate the A/C system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 42]

A potential concern is aftermarket installation of air conditioning systems, especially kits 

provided by OEMs and installed by dealers at the time of purchase. The ICCT recommends that 

vehicles without air conditioning systems be given an appropriate amount of credits, provided 

that the manufacturer commits to monitoring and reporting on dealer-installed AC 

systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 42]

69 ICCT recognizes that HFC-132 phase-out would diminish the potential for 1234f replacement 

with HFC132a.

71 EPA guidance letter CISO-08-11;Use of OW Multi-grade Engine Oils in Gasoline Fueled 

EPA Test Vehicles, Sept. 18, 2008. EPA guidance letter CCO-04-7; Use of GF-4 Engine Oil in 

EPA Test Vehicles, March 2, 2004

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

The inclusion of credits for air conditioning system improvements provides an opportunity for 

the program to effectively address emissions of hydrofluorocarbons that have a very high global 

warming potential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 72.]

In addition, the inclusion of credits for air-conditioning system improvements provides an 

opportunity for the program to address emissions of a class of high global warming potential 

refrigerants, the hydrofluorocarbons.

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Air Conditioning (A/C) Leakage Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.14]

High Leak Disincentive: Toyota does not agree with EPA's proposal to impose a high leak 

disincentive for refrigerants with a GWP below 150. EPA's proposal will compromise a 
EPA Response to Comments

3-24

manufacturer's ability to maximize credits~ when the manufacturer elects to utilize a global A/C 

system design. To obtain maximum credit, the system would unnecessarily need to be modified 

for the US market, incurring additional expense and resource requirements for no additional 

environmental benefit. Toyota thinks that EPA~s tampering concern, where R134a would be 

refilled in place of R1234yf, is unfounded because the service port fittings for the two 

refrigerants are incompatible which makes tampering highly improbable. Additionally, Toyota 

believes that appropriate measures are already in place that should be used to address any 

attempted tampering that were to occur in the field. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.14]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen contributed to and supports the comments submitted by the Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers (Alliance) regarding Mobile Air Conditioning (MAC) system credits. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 30]

Volkswagen continues to make significant investments in deploying advanced MAC systems 

incorporating low-leak components and advanced low-GWP refrigerants. The successful market 

introduction of these advanced MAC systems relies to a great degree on the treatment of these 

systems within the GHG and CAFE program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 30]

HIGH-LEAK DISINCENTIVE

Volkswagen is concerned by the EPA proposal to add a so called 'High Leak Disincentive'. 

There are two main reasons: Firstly our company as a major EU manufacturer is obliged by 

European law to change to refrigerants <150 GWP. Thus if we make significant investment and 

adapt our systems early to integrate low-GWP refrigerants, we would be penalized as fast mover. 

Secondly, Volkswagen maintains that refilling an updated system with older refrigerant is 

unlikely or even impossible due to differences in the filling systems. Therefore, Volkswagen 

recommends EPA to remove the 'High Leak Disincentive' factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 30]

LEVEL MONITORING

Volkswagen believes that additional refrigerant level monitoring obligations are not appropriate 

for mobile air conditioning systems. As discussed within the Alliance comments, in the case of 

MAC failure modes, the system simply stops operating thereby eliminating indirect CO2

emissions. Figure App-0-1 shows that in case of refrigerant losses the power consumption of the 

A/C system would decrease as well. [See Figure App-0-1 on p. 32 of Docket number EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 31]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC continuously develops the climate system in order to reduce AC natural losses and improve 

durability. The strategy is to keep the rate of natural losses low and also to design the AC-system 

to prevent uncontrolled refrigerant losses during the full vehicle service life. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-25

According to VCC the revised SAE J2727, which is a major improvement compared to the 

version of 2008, does get closer to a real world refrigerant loss rate than the previous version. At 

the assembly of the systems, VCC is testing all components and connections of the AC system 

with Helium to find any leakage before filling of refrigerants. However, VCC believes that the 

actual measured natural losses (according to SAE J2763) could be lower than the calculated 

natural losses, according to SAE J2727: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

• SAE J2727 does not reflect all existing designs and technologies. VCC assumes that the reason 

for this is that such an expansion of the standards would make it very complex to use from a 

practical point of view. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

• VCC uses a 'soft nose' concept of AC-connectors. The VCC technical solution has a low loss 

rate due to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

o Special rubber material used for the o-rings, a special variant of HNBR, specifically formulated 

for this application, where low permeation is one of the more prominent characteristics.

o The geometry of the outer, axially sealing o-ring where the two halves of the blocks are 

clamped together with zero clearance between these two surfaces, minimize the possible 

losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 10]

• The service valves cap in the VCC AC technology solution are equipped with a special seal that 

functions independent of the torque applied. The sealing properties are not a function of torque 

as it is with the standard cap more commonly used. SAE J2727 only includes the standard cap. 

The Standard industry cap seals properly if tightened by 0, 8 - 1, 2 Nm - too loose causes leak, 

and too tight causes seal damage. The service valve cap used by VCC has strong sealing 

capability at 20x of that torque. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 10]

• The part of the total natural losses coming from the compressor is too large according to 

independent measurements made by Ecoles des Mines in Paris (ordered by ACEA in Brussels). 

According to SAE J2727 natural losses of the compressor is 67%. Independent measurements 

indicate that the natural losses from the compressors, depending on brand and actual design} are 

in the range of 40-60%. VCC, therefore, believes that the calculated natural losses from the 

compressor are too large. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 10]

VCC performs physical tests in a mini-SHED according to the test method prescribed as F-gas 

directive 706/2007/EC. VCC strongly believes that physical measurements reflect real vehicle 

emissions more accurately than calculations and estimations. The proposed natural losses 

measurement standard SAE J2763 (Test procedure for determining R134a natural losses rates of 

Mobile Air Conditioning systems in a mini-SHED) is equal to the 706/2007/EC directive. VCC 

considers that natural losses rates < 10 gram/year are possible to measure in a miniSHED. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 10]

CARB and the state of Minnesota allow physical measurements as an alternative to SAE J2727 

calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 10]
EPA Response to Comments

3-26

VCC would also like to point out that CARB has identified the possibility of physical 

measurements as a possibility. VCC supports CARB's intent to allow, as expressed in the draft's 

Appendix D, paragraph 2.5.6.3,l physical measurements of refrigerant leakage as an alternative 

to the latest version of SAE J2727. High Leak Disincentive [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-

A2, p. 10]

VCC does not support the EPA's proposal to reduce the AC direct credits via the 'high leak 

disincentive, if the refrigerant leakage rate is not reduced by half from industry average leak 

rates. This is a major change compared to the 2012-2016 program and reduces the value because 

it alters the rules of the game by adding low GWP for manufacturers considering early 

adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 10]

Response:

Most commenters from the auto industry generally supported the proposed process for 

generating direct A/C credits by using SAE J2727 refrigerant leakage values. Most industry 

commenters, as well as Honeywell, opposed the “High Leak Disincentive” relating to A/C 

leakage credits; ICCT commented in favor of this provision. EPA’s responses to these 

comments are presented in Section III.C.1.a.i of the preamble. EPA is retaining the provision, 

with some revisions. In regard to Honeywell’s comment that the disincentive is not applied to 

HFC-134a and HFO-1234yf refrigerants in an equitable manner, as we discuss in TSD 

5.1.2.3.2.5, the disincentive for low-GWP refrigerants only is intended to reduce the probability 

that the A/C system will be recharged with a high-GWP refrigerant.

EPA responds to comments related to EPA use of the updated SAE J2727 procedure in 

quantifying A/C leakage credits in the Joint TSD, Section 5.1.2.3. EPA is maintaining the use of 

this procedure as the basis for it leakage credits.

EPA responds to comments related to the expected transition to one or more alternative A/C 

refrigerants, including the potential pace of that transition and refrigerant availability, costs, 

vehicle technical issues, and manufacturing issues, in Section III.C.1.a.ii of the preamble. EPA 

continues to believe that the major transition to alternative refrigerants will primarily occur 

beginning around MY2017 and continue at a pace that we approximate by a 20% per year 

conversion through MY2021, based on the typical 5-year vehicle redesign cycle. 

EPA responds to comments on the concept of monitoring refrigerant levels in Section 5.1.l.2.7 of 

the Joint TSD.

Regarding the comments from the California Air Resources Board, we have corrected the error 

in the High Leak Disincentive formula that CARB identified. In response to CARB comment 2), 

we have adjusted the threshold for incurring a High Leak Disincentive to lower values. 

(Specifically, we will reduce the threshold from 16.6 g/yr to 11.0 g/yr for systems with 

refrigerant charges equal to or less than 733g, and reduce the threshold by 1.5%/yr for systems

with charges greater than 733g). In response to CARB comment 3), electric compressor systems 

should have a very low leak score, so we believe that incurring a High Leak Disincentive should 

not be an issue for systems incorporating this technology, and we have not further adjusted the 

proposed values. 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-27

Regarding concerns about the SAE J2727 procedure failing “to account adequately for the 

increased leakage as vehicles age,” J2727 was correlated to JAMA and ACEA vehicle field test 

results (vehicle/shed test results are ~5 g/yr lower than what J2727 predicts. but the trends are 

identical). In addition, the SAE-IMAC study that formed the basis of J2727, "seasoned" the 

systems (10-day static soak at 36 deg C, and 30 minutes of system operation at 23 deg C ambient 

temp), so the components were broken-in, but not new. We continue to believe that deterioration 

of leakage emissions is adequately accounted for in J2727, and that basing leakage credits on 

those values is appropriate. We are also continuing to use a Global Warming Potential of 150 to 

determine whether an alternative refrigerant requires a manufacturer to consider the High Leak 

Disincentive term in the equation, consistent with other programs (CARB and Europe) that 

distinguish higher and lower GWP refrigerants.

Regarding the comment from ICCT about how to treat vehicles without A/C systems installed at 

the factory, we believe that if someone orders a vehicle without A/C, they aren't doing it to 

reduce GHGs - they're doing it because it's a feature they don't need (and consequently, don't 

want to pay for). Further, the use of aftermarket A/C systems in modern vehicles, which have 

tightly-packaged underhood and underdash environments, is highly unlikely. Therefore, as 

proposed, the program will not provide credits for vehicles without factory-installed A/C

systems. In addition, in response to ICCT’s comment regarding a requirement that the HFC1234yf A/C systems “fail to operate” when recharged with another refrigerant, we know of no 

cost-effective, feasible technology that would allow us to incorporate such a requirement, and we 

are not pursuing this concept in this rule. Regarding the comment from Volvo about the option to 

use a “mini-SHED” procedure to establish leakage credits, the new February 2012 version of 

J2727 allows the use of a mini-SHED approach. We are incorporating the new J2727 by 

reference.

We acknowledge Honeywell’s request for new regulatory measures to protect against parties 

reverting to higher GWP refrigerants over the life of a vehicle. It is true that EPA has found 

HFO-1234yf acceptable for use in new systems and not for retrofit in motor vehicle air 

conditioning systems under the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) program. It is also 

true that EPA has found HFC-134a acceptable for use both in new systems and for retrofit in 

motor vehicle air conditioning systems. However, we disagree that this means that users may 

retrofit a system designed for HFO-1234yf with HFC-134a. First, the SNAP listings, both for 

HFO-1234yf and for HFC-134a, are for use as a substitute for CFC-12. The SNAP listings do 

not say that different substitutes are interchangeable, as the commenter implies. Second, the 

regulations for the SNAP program at appendix D to subpart G of 40 CFR part 82 state, “No 

substitute refrigerant may be used to ‘top-off’ a system that uses another refrigerant. The original 

refrigerant must be recovered in accordance with regulations issued under section 609 of the 

CAA prior to charging with a substitute.” Thus, it is not permissible to add HFC-134a to an 

MVAC system that contains HFO-1234yf, as may well occur if a consumer were to service his 

or her own car’s AC system without refrigerant recovery equipment. Third, the regulations at 

appendix D to subpart G of 40 CFR part 82 and the listings for HFO-1234yf and HFC-134a 

require use of a unique set of fittings for a specific alternative refrigerant. The SNAP regulations 

in appendix D also state, “Using an adapter or deliberately modifying a fitting to use a different 

refrigerant is a violation of this use condition.” The SNAP requirements for unique fittings do 
EPA Response to Comments

3-28

not prohibit retrofitting of vehicles using CFC-12, and appendix D to subpart G of 40 CFR part 

82 sets out the conditions for such retrofits.

3.2. Credits Related to Improved A/C system Efficiency

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Delphi Corporation

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Honeywell International, Inc.

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Kia Motors

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Toyota Motor North America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The performance-based Mobile Air Conditioning (MAC) efficiency test needs additional 

technical analysis and testing, and the Alliance stands ready to work with the agencies to address 

these concerns. The proposed MAC efficiency test is likely to interfere with the achievement of 

maximum credit levels for improved system efficiency that were fully included in the agencies’ 

feasibility analysis. The Alliance comments describe these concerns in depth and suggest that the 

test not be established as a strict requirement. Instead, we propose that the agencies continue to 

allow use of the credit menu, and that manufacturers work with EPA and NHTSA to provide 

“reasonable verification” of this progress through selected vehicle testing and other methods. 

Such verification will show that the menu amounts are appropriate, and that commensurate realworld progress is achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.5]

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 110.]

Fourth, the air conditioning system is the highest ancillary load on the system. We highly support 

the EPA's proposed credit system to incentivize energy-efficient HVAC technology that can 

reduce the fuel needed for the air conditioning system by 40 percent.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Ford supports the continuation of the A/C efficiency credit program into the 2017-2025 MY rule. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 10]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-29

In addition, Ford supports the differentiation in credit levels for cars and trucks that are being 

proposed for 2017-2025 MY, based on the simulation work conducted by the EPA (TSD 5-32). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 14]

We support the proposed addition of the A/C efficiency benefits into the CAFE program which 

brings the NHTSA program one important step closer to harmonization with the EPA GHG 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 14]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the Mobile Air Conditioning (MAC) provisions included in the proposal. However, 

we, like the Alliance, have concerns regarding the performance-based MAC efficiency test and 

request that cooperative technical work continue - potentially as part of one of the mid-term 

review “check-ins” - to address the concerns with testing burden and reasonable verification of 

efficiency improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.

Honeywell commends EPA and NHTSA for recognizing the measurable contribution that 

energy-efficient A/C systems and components can have in reducing CO2 emissions and fuel 

consumption attributable to A/C operation. We support the agencies' proposal to allow auto 

manufacturers to generate fuel consumption improvement values for purposes of CAFE 

compliance by using technologies that enable A/C systems to run more efficiently. Honeywell 

offers that incorporating the most up-to-date research and technical information will add further 

credibility to the A/C Efficiency Credit by accounting accurately for the reduced emissions and 

energy efficiency attributable A/C system components. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, 

p.9]

EPA and NHTSA Should Provide Flexibility in the A/C Efficiency Credit Program to Include 

New Performance-Based Test Methods That May Become Available Prior to 2026

EPA and NHTSA propose to allow auto manufacturers to generate credits for employing more 

energy efficient A/C component technologies ('A/C Efficiency Credits'). Honeywell encourages 

EPA and NHTSA to provide flexibility in the A/C Efficiency Credit program to accommodate 

new performance-based tests that may be developed during the life of program. EPA and 

NHTSA state in the Preamble that although they would ideally award A/C Efficiency Credits 

using a performance test, there currently is no reliable performance-based procedure capable of 

accurately quantifying efficiency credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.9]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

A/C Credits: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.6]

1) Hyundai supports the use of the A/C menu for determining air conditioning system credits 

and supports an increase in the maximum amount of credits that will be permitted if we are able 
EPA Response to Comments

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to demonstrate an emission reduction greater than what is available in the menu. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.6]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

16. The ICCT strongly supports off-cycle credits in principle, as they can reduce compliance 

costs and increase benefits. However, the credits must avoid double counting and must be valid 

and verifiable. ICCT has provided detailed suggestions on how to improve the off-cycle credits 

so they are verifiable and do not inadvertently weaken overall standard stringency. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 4]

A/C off-cycle efficiency credits

ICCT appreciates US EPA and NHTSA's efforts to thoroughly document the potential benefits of 

A/C off-cycle credits based on both testing and engineering studies for each of the potential A/C 

technologies. While we have not fully reviewed the test data and studies for each type of credit, 

overall the agencies' basis for inclusion of credits for A/C system efficiency, leak reduction and 

alternative refrigerants is well documented. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 37]

Our primary concern with the air conditioning credits calculation is that methodology changes 

are needed to avoid double-counting the benefits from A/C load reductions and A/C system 

efficiency improvements. Currently, the efficiency credits and the load reduction credits are 

calculated independently. This is not appropriate. The efficiency reductions and the load 

reductions must be treated as a system to avoid double-counting.

To avoid double-counting, the ICCT recommends a multiplicative approach to A/C credit 

generation. Following is how the credit calculations should be done in concept:

A/C efficiency credits (CO2 g/mi) = baseline A/C indirect emissions (CO2 g/mi) improved A/C 

indirect emissions (CO2 g/mi), where A/C indirect emissions are calculated as: A/C indirect 

emissions (CO2 g/mi) = cooling load (degrees) x efficiency (kwhr/degree cooling) x engine 

CO2/kWh [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 38]

The baseline calculation is done using the baseline cooling load and A/C efficiency and the 

improved calculation is done using the improved values for cooling load and A/C efficiency. 

Note that the improved cooling load should include the impacts of solar reflective paint, window 

glazing, and active and passive ventilation, if these technologies are being counted towards offcycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 38]

This approach should apply across the A/C system efficiency credits and the load reduction 

credits contained on the menu of non-A/C default credits. For instance, if an OEM claimed a 

30% improvement in A/C system energy efficiency and a 40% reduction in solar load, the new 

energy consumption rate would be 42% of baseline (70% times 60%) for a total benefit of 58% 

times the engine CO2/kw-hr, rather than a benefit of 70% times the engine CO2/kw-hr. This 

multiplicative assessment should also hold true for determining the cumulative effects of 

individual A/C system efficiency improvement technologies. In addition, future engine 
Air Conditioning System Credits

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efficiency should be verified as proposed including advanced engine technologies such as 

hybrids that may operate the A/C system with the internal combustion engine entirely turned off 

during idle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 38]

US EPA and NHTSA should also account for the system efficiency impact of alternative 

refrigerants. In particular, any system efficiency disbenefit with a new refrigerant should offset 

either any alternative refrigerant credit or A/C system efficiency credit in this case. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 38]

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Specifically, we support the inclusion of fuel consumption reductions resulting from air 

conditioning improvements [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Kia Motors

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 102.]

Additionally, Kia requests the industry -- for industry consistency that EPA set more detailed 

guidelines for the framework to prove out the A/C system durability. It's unclear how A/C 

system durability is defined.

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

1. Oil Separators [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.5]

In the NPRM, there is a credit of 0.5 to 0.7 g CO2/mi proposed for an oil separator in the A/C 

system. This credit is for either an internal or external oil separator and “the baseline component 

for comparison is the version which a manufacturer most recently had in production on the same 

vehicle design or in a similar or related vehicle model.” MEMA asks the agencies to clarify by 

changing this to read: “the baseline component for comparison is the version which a 

manufacturer most recently had in production without an oil separation feature on the same 

vehicle design or in a similar or related vehicle model.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, 

pp.5-6]

2. Improved Condensers / Evaporators [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.6]

In the NPRM, the credit listed for improved condensers and/or evaporators ranges from 1.0 to 

1.4 gCO2/mi. The conditional requirement for this credit is “system analysis on the component(s) 

indicating a coefficient of performance improvement for the system of greater than 10 percent 

when compared to previous industry standard designs.” Based on this prerequisite, MEMA 

believes that early adopters of high performance heat exchangers will not receive the incentive 

for their proactive behavior. Therefore, MEMA recommends that standards for heat transfer and 

pressure drop – at fixed air inlet conditions (temperature, humidity, flow rate) and refrigerant 
EPA Response to Comments

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inlet conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate) – be the prerequisite for the credit. This will 

help prevent content regression and provide equitable treatment to both early and later adopters. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.6]

3. Internal Heat Exchanger [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.6]

There are no conditional requirements listed in the NPRM for the Internal Heat Exchanger credit. 

Similar to the improved condensers and evaporators, MEMA recommends that the agencies 

include a performance threshold for the credit. We note that both the heat transfer and the vapor 

side pressure drop are critical attributes of the internal heat exchanger to improve the energy 

efficiency of the A/C system. A standard for heat transfer performance and vapor side pressure 

drop at fixed inlet refrigerant conditions (temperature, pressure, flow rate) should be set to ensure 

actual improvement in system coefficient of performance. The graph below highlights the 

importance of vapor side pressure drop. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.6] [For the 

associated graph please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.6]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

EPA is proposing to allow manufacturers to generate credits for improvements to air 

conditioning systems that reduce GHG emissions. In the CAFE portion of the joint proposal, 

NHTSA is proposing to allow fuel consumption reductions equivalent to the GHG credits 

allowed by EPA that would be applicable for the credit menus provided for MAC efficiency and 

the use of off-cycle technologies. Toyota believes that the proposals are appropriate and fully 

supports the Alliance comments that address the details of the provisions. However, Toyota 

offers additional comments and concerns on several issues below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, p.13]

Response:

EPA acknowledges the general support for credits related to improved A/C system efficiency 

and the use of a new test cycle to provide “reasonable verification” (Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers) that the efficiency-improving technologies and methods employed produce 

quantifiable reductions in GHG emissions. EPA responses to comments related to the A/C 

efficiency credit program are found in Section II.F.1 and Section III.C.1 of the preamble to the 

rule, as well as in Section 5.1 of the joint TSD. 

Regarding the comment from ICCT that a “multiplicative approach” should be used to avoid 

double-counting the credits (i.e. where A/C load reductions show up as ‘credits’ as well as on the 

5-cycle emissions result), we disagree that our approach will lead to double-counting. Since 

tailpipe CO2 emissions standards are based on a 2-cycle test (FTP and HWY cycles) where the 

A/C system is turned off, the reduction in engine load due to A/C efficiency improvements 

(whether direct A/C compressor load reduction, or system load reduction due to improved solar 

and cabin ventilation technologies) is not measured, and therefore cannot be double-counted. We 

believe that technologies that reduce the cooling load on the vehicle’s A/C system (e.g. glazing, 

cabin ventilation, solar reflective paint, etc.) are best addressed using the off-cycle credit 

provisions of this rule (see preamble Section III.C.5 and TSD Section 5.2).
Air Conditioning System Credits

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Regarding the comment from MEMA that we incorporate specific language to define the 

components and common test conditions to quantify their benefits, in order to generate credits 

for oil separators, improved condensers/evaporators, and internal heat exchangers, we cannot 

incorporate proscriptive language regarding these technologies, as the implementation of these 

technologies is manufacturer-specific. In addition, we do not believe that setting a common set of 

test conditions for demonstrating their performance characteristics or introducing common 

descriptive language regarding their design are is feasible at this time. Should industry 

organizations adopt common methods and procedures regarding the performance of A/C 

technologies, we could consider them in future rules. But until such methods are available, we 

will require manufacturers to demonstrate the effectiveness of these components on a case-bycase basis during the certification process, as proposed. 

3.2.1. A/C Test Procedures

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Chrysler Group LLC

Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association (EPGAA)

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Guardian Automotive Products, Inc.

Honeywell International, Inc.

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Kia Motors

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW)

Toyota Motor North America

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Idle Test [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.46]

The MY 2012-2016 EPA GHG program uses a menu of credits for application of various MAC 

efficiency technologies. However, beginning in MY 2014, an “idle test” requirement is 

superimposed on the credit menu, such that certain emissions thresholds must be achieved on the 

idle test before credits can be granted for application of the technologies on the menu. The 

Alliance, as well as individual manufacturers, supported the credit menu, but commented during 
EPA Response to Comments

3-34

that rulemaking process on the inadvisability of superimposing the idle test. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.46]

One key concern was that the most promising real-world MAC efficiency technologies - those 

that reduce compressor workloads at moderate ambient temperatures - would not have sufficient 

time to show their benefits during the idle test procedure. Although the idle test is not performed 

at a high ambient temperature, the idle test procedure calls for the systems to be operated as if 

they were responding to high ambient temperatures. Automatic systems are set to 9oF below the 

75oF ambient temperature. Thus, in order to get to the unrealistically low 66oF interior setting 

required by the test procedure, the automatic systems work at maximum cooldown through much 

of the 10-minute MAC-on portion of the test. Manual MAC systems are tested at maximum 

cooldown for ten minutes (as if responding to a high ambient temperature) and at a low fan 

setting for ten minutes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.46]

The SAE IMAC study, which was a major basis for EPA’s idle test thresholds, demonstrated a 

30% lifecycle energy efficiency improvement for a nationally representative mix of high, 

moderate and light MAC loads. But the energy efficiency improvements came primarily from 

better moderate temperature technologies. At moderate and light loads, efficiency improvements 

of 40% or more were recorded. An energy efficiency improvement of only 5% to 10% was 

measured at high ambient temperatures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.46-47]

Since the development of the MY 2012-2016 regulation, many idle tests have been run in 

automobile manufacturer laboratories, and the anticipated concerns, as well as other problems, 

have been confirmed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.47]

One of the most prominent issues identified for the idle test is that smaller displacement engines 

will receive significantly less EPA CO2 credit for the same HVAC technology content, compared 

to larger displacement engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.47]

Manufacturer testing also shows that on small engines, even the most sophisticated MAC 

systems will probably receive little EPA CO2 credit because of their idle test results, thereby 

sharply reducing the incentive to apply MAC efficiency technologies to these vehicles. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.47]

Test-to-test variability is large relative to the scale for getting credit, creating an additional 

element of regulatory compliance planning uncertainty, resulting in an additional barrier to MAC 

efficiency technology implementation. High variation is inherent in this test, in part due to the 

higher CVS dilution (low CO2 concentrations) of tailpipe exhaust gases for a vehicle at idle, 

which makes CO2 measurement highly variable being close to the limit of detection of the 

analyzer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.47]

Many of these preliminary idle test results and their implications have been communicated to 

EPA over the past two years, and these issues are discussed by EPA in the NPRM. Although the 

idle test has some relationship to MAC efficiency, it does not sufficiently get at the most 

important area for improvement, the moderate load technologies, since much of the idle test is 

conducted as if the vehicle were in a high ambient temperature, with corresponding high 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-35

demands placed on the MAC system. The thresholds for obtaining full credit were established by 

EPA based on the premise of a 30% efficiency improvement over baseline MAC technologies. 

This is a challenging hurdle that can only be met if moderate and light load technologies are 

allowed to demonstrate their benefits to a substantially greater extent than the idle test allows. 

Based on the tests reported to EPA, no vehicle with an engine below approximately 2.5 liters in 

displacement would receive full credit for its MAC technologies, due to the idle test results (e.g., 

TSD p. 5-40). Unmodified, the idle test poses a potentially insurmountable obstacle to MAC 

improvements for credits on many vehicles, especially those with small engines which are 

anticipated to be predominant in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.47]

The test-to-test variability is an additional obstacle, since it introduces inherent uncertainty as to 

whether technology additions will ultimately result in credits. MAC operation is a fraction of 

overall vehicle fuel consumption, and the fuel consumption difference between a good, advanced 

technology MAC system and a bad MAC system is a matter of only a few grams of CO2 per mile 

(or per minute). On the idle test scale, the total range from maximum credit to no credit is only 

6.4 g CO2/minute. Thus, significant test-to-test variation (even as low as a gram or two) carries 

the potential to negate a large portion of the planned credits for any program to improve MAC 

efficiency technology or to move the vehicle to the next level of credits. In testing reported at the 

United States Council for Automotive Research (US CAR), standard deviations of over 1.0 

gCO2/minute were consistently found from repeated idle testing on the same vehicle. 

Statistically, this shows that inherent test-to-test variation could negate a substantial portion of 

the MAC indirect credits for any vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.47-48]

Idle Test Temperature and Humidity Tolerances [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.48]

The Alliance supports EPA’s effort to broaden the ambient air temperature and humidity 

specifications for the idle test and the optional idle test, from the current requirements for 

humidity levels of 50 ± 5 grains/pound, average temperature 75 ± 2 °F and instantaneous 

temperature: 75 ± 5 °F. We also support the EPA proposal to relax temperature and humidity 

requirements in order to use test cells designed for FTP testing. The data that manufacturers 

shared with EPA on June 30, 2011 (EPA Ann Arbor Meeting) showed that some tests run at a 

manufacturer’s lab failed/exceeded these stringent specifications defined for the idle test on 

temperature and humidity. Automaker emission test facilities are not all designed for tight 

temperature and humidity controls such as are required for SC03 test chambers. Since the 

idle/optional idle test will not require solar loads, these tests will probably not be performed in 

SC03 solar test cells. The non-solar test cells are designed to run standard emission tests such as 

the FTP (EPA75), Highway Fuel Economy (HWFET) and US06 tests, where temperature and 

humidity specifications are less stringent as compared to the current A/C SC03 test 

specifications. If the temperature and humidity range is not widened, it will cause a large 

percentage of void tests that the manufacturers will be forced to repeat simply because of 

seasonal temperature and humidity variation or because the original specifications of test cell 

HVAC system were not designed around the idle test limits. This will add to the manufacturer 

testing burden and costs without any significant benefit to the accuracy of the test results. 

Therefore, the Alliance encourages EPA to widen these temperature and humidity specifications 

limits on the idle/optional idle tests, as proposed, so that they can be performed in the non SC03 
EPA Response to Comments

3-36

chambers without added testing and cost burdens on manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.48]

The Alliance recommends the following humidity and temperature tolerances: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.48]

(1) Ambient humidity within the test cell during all phases of the test sequence shall be 

controlled to an average of 50 ± 10 grains of water/pound of dry air. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.48]

(2) Ambient air temperature within the test cell during all phases of the test sequence shall be 

controlled to 75 ±5 °F on average and 75 ±10 °F as an instantaneous measurement. Air 

temperature shall be recorded continuously at a minimum of 30 second intervals. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.48]

Idle Test Engine Size Adjustment [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.49]

To partially address these concerns, EPA proposes an optional revised set of thresholds for 

performance on the idle test beginning in 2014. The revised thresholds are adjusted for engine 

size, so that smaller engines receive better scores and more ability to earn credits from 

application of MAC technologies on the credit menu. Although we believe all the idle test 

requirements should be discarded from the MAC program, if the idle test is kept, then it is useful 

to add this optional engine-size adjusted set of thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.49]

Adding the engine size adjustment option to the MAC program is an improvement, but it does 

not solve the most fundamental problems with the idle test. The most important technologies for 

real-world energy savings, the moderate load technologies, would continue to show little benefit 

on the idle test, and the test-to-test variability would remain inherently high. We therefore 

believe that both the idle test and the engine size-adjusted idle test contribute little toward the 

goal of ensuring real-world greenhouse gas reduction, and that they will do little to encourage 

improved MAC technology implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.49]

Reasonable Verification [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.49]

The Alliance supports the EPA goal stated in the NPRM of “reasonable verification” that the 

technologies receiving credit from the credit menu are actually producing commensurate levels 

of GHG reduction. Chrysler, Ford and GM have worked with EPA and CARB over the past 

several months at USCAR to evaluate procedures for MAC efficiency testing. This work has 

identified several key criteria and issues for MAC testing that directly relate to the goal of

reasonable verification. This research has resulted in the draft “AC17” test procedure discussed 

in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.49]

Since the creation of the EPA MAC program, automobile manufacturers have believed that the 

MAC technology improvements on the EPA credit menu will result in actual GHG emission 

reductions that significantly surpass the amounts of the credits on the menu. This stems from the 
Air Conditioning System Credits

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methodology used to quantify credits on the menu. EPA began with an overall inventory of 

estimated fuel consumption from MAC operation, then apportioned improvements from that 

inventory to the percentage improvements identified for various prominent MAC efficiency 

technologies, especially those used by the SAE IMAC cooperative research program. EPA 

estimated that MAC operation accounted for 14.3 g CO2/mile on average for each vehicle, 

representing 3.9% of national light duty vehicle GHG emissions. The cap of 5.7 g CO2/mile was 

derived as 40% of the 14.3 g CO2/mile total, and the credit for each technology was roughly 

calculated as a percent improvement of the 14.3 g CO2/mile total. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, pp.49-50]

Automobile manufacturers commented at that time that the EPA inventory of fuel consumed for 

MAC operation was at the low end of the range of estimates by various researchers, such as 

studies by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and

Northeast States Center for a Clean Air Future (NESCCAF)/CARB. For example, NREL 

estimates were that MAC usage consumed 5.5% of national light duty fuel usage. NESCCAF 

and CARB together estimated that MAC operation accounted for 5.3% of a vehicles fuel usage. 

These alternative estimates are at least 70% higher than the 14.3 g CO2/mile figure ultimately 

used by EPA. In the MY 2012-2016 Regulatory Impact Analysis, there is a complicated 

comparison of these studies, and EPA made numerous adjustments and assumptions in arriving 

at its ultimate figures, noting numerous uncertainties along the way. Without fully replaying that 

debate, suffice it to say that automobile manufacturers believed MAC compressors were engaged 

much more often and used more total fuel than EPA estimated, and that the higher estimates 

from relatively sophisticated analyses by NREL and NESCCAF/CARB were closer to the realworld MAC energy consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.50]

If the higher amounts of baseline MAC fuel consumption were used, the reductions from each 

MAC efficiency technology would be expected to be much greater than the figures used in the 

EPA credit menu. EPA finalized the regulation using its own (low) estimate of total MAC fuel 

consumption, resulting in credits on the menu that should be very conservative compared to 

actual vehicle usage, as measured by other researchers and industry data, and as used in the SAE 

IMAC program. This should be kept in mind when considering the need for thorough and precise 

verification procedures, since EPA’s very conservative methodology in creating the credits 

results in a huge margin before real-world emissions reductions might fall short of the credited 

amounts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.50]

AC17 Test [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.50]

The auto industry has shared EPA and CARB’s interest in furthering understanding of these 

issues, and the draft AC17 vehicle test procedure that we jointly developed through USCAR is a 

significant step to aid future research. We therefore strongly support adding an option to use the 

AC17 procedure as a reporting-only alternative to the idle test to demonstrate that a vehicle’s 

MAC system is delivering the efficiency benefits of the new technologies from the credit menu 

in MY 2014-2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.50]
EPA Response to Comments

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During the development of the AC17 procedure, it was shown that a very complicated and 

elaborate procedure would unavoidably be needed to accurately measure MAC energy 

consumption. A high level of vehicle instrumentation is needed, in part to understand what is 

happening throughout the test and identify voided tests where the procedure may have gone 

wrong. A high number of voided tests are to be expected. Also, the procedure cannot be 

conducted in a standard FTP test cell, but needs a climate controlled chamber with solar lamps 

that meets SC03 test specifications. At least four hours is needed for the test, due to the desire to 

include solar soak periods that attempt to comprehend the benefits of reduced thermal load 

technologies. In addition, even with the improved repeatability and added instrumentation of the 

AC17 test, testing has shown that a single AC17 test may not demonstrate the benefit of a single 

or a bundled set of technologies. In order to statistically verify the benefit, multiple tests may 

need to be run and statistically analyzed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.50-51]

In total, although this test is unlike any other used for emission certification (or any other 

regulatory certification program), the high level of complexity was arrived at and determined to 

be necessary in pursuit of the goals of an accurate, reproducible test that could distinguish a good 

MAC system from a bad one under representative ambient climate conditions, and which could 

validate the benefits of the technologies on the EPA credit menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.51]

EPA proposes testing with the relevant technologies turned “on” then turned “off” in order to 

validate the improvements that are awarded from the credit menu. We agree with the principle of 

validating the menu credit amounts through actual vehicle testing, but note the difficulty of doing 

this on a comprehensive basis for every model of vehicle. In actuality, there is typically no 

baseline vehicle and baseline MAC system that is engineered and built without the improved 

MAC technologies for true apples-to-apples comparison of tests with the MAC technologies 

turned “on,” and then turned “off.” For example, if a variable compressor with the associated 

computer controls is engineered for a vehicle platform, it is typically applied across-the-board on 

that platform, and no systems are built with a fixed compressor or with the computer controls 

that would be necessary to get optimized performance from this fixed compressor. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.51]

The exercise suggested by EPA is more appropriately viewed as a research exercise, rather than a 

traditional vehicle emissions certification program. For example, the IMAC program tested a 

baseline Cadillac vehicle, and then added various new MAC technologies, including new, 

smarter computer controls that improved vehicle integration. The improvements from each added 

new technology were measured as the IMAC program progressed. However, IMAC was a 

research program that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, involved experts from 

approximately 40 corporations, government labs and agencies, and spanned approximately two 

years. To expect such a complicated procedure to validate the menu credit amounts for a large 

number of vehicles is simply not feasible and would violate the boundaries of “reasonable 

verification.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.51]

In some circumstances, it may be possible to obtain (or build) baseline vehicles which 

approximate the apples-to-apples technology “on” versus technology “off” comparisons that 

EPA seeks. A research program would seek to identify the best of these vehicle opportunities 
Air Conditioning System Credits

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and, on a selected basis, use them to answer the research questions that are to be studied. Such a 

program would allow for multiple repetitions of the test to be run on the selected vehicles to 

statistically verify results. There are only approximately eight efficiency technologies on the 

MAC credit menu (including the two levels of reduced reheat). This is a manageable number of 

technologies to assess using the AC17 test (or other methods) in a detailed way in order to 

validate the amount of credits provided by the menu. On a survey basis, it can also be used to 

show that the credit amounts from the menu are being consistently achieved, but it is not 

reasonable to require that this be tested on every model or platform. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, pp.51-52]

Due to the complexity of the required tests, the rarity of good baseline comparison opportunities, 

and the overall high test burden of this program in comparison to the amount of credits involved, 

the Alliance recommends that EPA to utilize the AC17 test solely to validate menu credit 

amounts and monitor progress on a sample basis, rather than as a mandatory certification test that 

must be run on every vehicle model or platform in order to achieve MAC efficiency credits. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

AC17 Thresholds [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

EPA raises the possibility of setting an absolute required threshold for the AC17 test, as was 

done in 2014 with the idle test, rather than comparing improvements to case-by-case baselines. 

This raises a host of complex issues. Establishing these standards would be a very complex 

exercise, and two key issues emerge that show this to be a bad idea, even before entering into the 

particular issues related to the standard setting process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.52]

First, the test burden would be overwhelming. The AC17 test is much longer and more 

complicated than other emissions tests, and it cannot be used in the same way. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

Second, the planning uncertainties and implementation difficulties from such a complex program 

would become an insurmountable obstacle to getting better MAC technologies implemented. 

Rather than speeding progress in this area, the tests would slow or stop the progress that is being 

made. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

AC17 Corrections and Clarifications [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

We note the need for the following minor technical corrections and clarifications in the AC17 

procedure written in the NPRM: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

During the soak that occurs between the preconditioning and test cycle (for both the solar-on and 

solar-off portions of the test) we believe that instead of turning the cooling fan off, it should be 

set to 4 mph. The low wind level is a more representative real-world condition. Maintaining that 

fan speed impacts solar glazing technology. This change would impact 40 C.F.R. §86.167(f)(8). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]
EPA Response to Comments

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A solar load tolerance of 850 W/m2 +/- 45W/m2 should be allowed, and the procedure should 

specify 'solar off' for the MAC off test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.52]

If windows are partially cracked during the test in order to accommodate wiring or other test 

instrumentation, a piece of foam or other flexible insulation should be used to keep a tight seal 

when the window should be closed or when wires are inserted through the gap. (Without this, the 

gap is too large where the various cords run through the window and the vehicle will not heat up 

consistently during the solar soak.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.52-53]

In the test procedure flow chart on p. 75359 of the NPRM the word “Nominal” should be added 

to “Time (Minutes)” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.53]

AC17 Test Vehicle Selection [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.53]

Because the AC17 test is so long, expensive and complicated, the number of tests should be 

minimized to a manageable level, no matter what the ultimate purpose of the test. These tests 

must be done in climate-controlled SC03 chambers, not in regular FTP test cells, and test 

capacity is very limited in SC03 chambers. MAC systems generally have consistent designs and 

specifications on each vehicle platform (except that some platforms now have hybrid powertrain 

models, which would usually have a very efficient MAC electric compressor), so performing one 

test per vehicle platform would give a good overview of MAC efficiency performance. However, 

vehicle platforms usually have multiple engine and transmission combinations available, so the 

number of tests would escalate rapidly if various engine and transmission combinations require 

testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.53]

For example, for 2012 model certification, one manufacturer, GM, tested and certified 

approximately 20 vehicle platforms. There were approximately 85 GM platform/engine 

combinations, and this number then approximately doubles if transmission combinations are 

included. Clearly, if various engine/transmission combinations required testing, the MAC testing 

program would surpass the number of tests performed for tailpipe certification, which violates 

the standard of “reasonable “verification,” considering the relatively small environmental 

impacts of MAC indirect GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.53]

We therefore object to the criteria for test vehicle selection proposed in the NPRM, which 

defines a platform as “a group of vehicles with common body floorplan, chassis, engine and 

transmission.” We propose the following “platform” definition, which is adapted from the 

current EPA definition for a “carline”: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.53]

Platform means a group of vehicles within an OEM which has a degree of commonality in 

construction (e.g., body, chassis). Platform does not consider the model name, brand or 

marketing division, does not consider any level of decor or opulence and also does not consider 

characteristics such as roof line, number of doors, seats, or windows. A platform may include 

vehicles from various fuel economy classes, including both cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.53]
Air Conditioning System Credits

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This definition provides the flexibility to combine the large variations which occur within 

platform families that use the same MAC architecture. Intra-platform variation is based on 

“floorplan” such as two-door, four-door and wagon/crossover variants or SUV/pickup variants, 

as well as powertrains. However, the benefit of the menu technologies should not be significantly 

affected by body style or powertrain. We recommend that wherever the term “platform” is used 

in MAC regulations, it be based on the flexible and inclusive definition proposed above by the 

Alliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.53-54]

In addition, in 40 C.F.R. 86.1866-12(c)(6)(iii), EPA proposes that the highest selling subconfiguration within each platform be tested in the first model year for which a MAC system is 

expected to generate credits and then one additional sub-configuration must be tested in each 

subsequent model year until all sub-configurations within the platform have been tested. Given 

the fact that a platform will contain tens, if not hundreds, of sub-configurations, this proposal 

essentially eliminates the possibility for a manufacturer to “carryover” representative data from a 

prior model year and unnecessarily increases a manufacturers overall testing burden. Therefore, 

we urge EPA to allow the use of good engineering judgment when selecting a representative test 

vehicle for each platform and when determining whether carryover of data is appropriate. Also, 

if EPA were to persist on having sales figures be a part of the basis for test vehicle selection, 

sales projections should be clearly allowed as the basis for these test vehicle selections rather 

than waiting for actual sales figures to be finalized at the end of the year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.54]

Finally, we believe that 40 C.F.R. §86.1866-12(c)(6)(iv) is redundant to 40 C.F.R. §86.1866-

12(c)(6)(iii) and should be removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.54]

AC17 Test Burden [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.54]

The AC17 test takes approximately four hours, which is eight times as long as the idle test. 

Further, AC17 requires more technician time to set up the elaborate instrumentation, and it 

requires SC03 climate-controlled test cells. More voided tests are also expected with AC17, due 

to all the complications. The following are specific recommendations to reduce test burden: 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.54]

86.167-17 (a) Overview. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.54]

The reference for humidity should be changed from “...50 percent relative humidity...” to “...69 

grains of water / pound of dry air...” to be consistent with our recommendation for test cell 

ambient conditions (please see our next recommendation). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.54]

86.167-17 (c) Test cell ambient conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

The proposed A17 test procedure limits are extremely stringent. SC03 test facilities were not 

designed to operate at 77 °F at 69 grains of water/pound of dry air humidity at 850 W/m2 solar 
EPA Response to Comments

3-42

load. We recommend that the tolerances be widened to minimize test voids without significantly 

impacting testing accuracy as described below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

§ 86.167–17 (c) Test cell ambient conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

The test cell ambient temperature and humidity recorded values should lie within the 

specifications at least 95% of the time [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

(1) Ambient Air Temperature (i) Temperature = 77 ± 3 °F air temperature on average and 77 ± 5 

°F air temperature instantaneous [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

(2) Ambient Humidity (i) Humidity = 69 ± 5 grains of water/pound of dry air on average and 69 

± 10 grains of water/pound of dry air instantaneous [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

§ 86.167–17(d) Interior temperature measurement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

A thermocouple location tolerance should be added to (d) Interior temperature measurement. The 

current requirement is too restrictive for high volume production testing (language implies a 

location of exactly 30mm and 330 mm). The word “nominally” should be added before each 

measurement tolerance and OEM’s should not be required to validate exact physical location by 

documenting dimensions. Also there may be some vehicles (like 2 seat sports cars or pickup 

trucks) where the distance below the roof or behind the headrest is not achievable due to physical 

constraints of vehicle (example; rear deck lids or window). In these cases language should be 

added to allow OEM’s to use “good engineering judgment” to get a close as possible to these 

prescribed physical locations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

§ 86.167–17(e) Air conditioning system settings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.55]

The requirement for “6 volts at the motor” is too unwieldy a specification to be reliably executed 

in high volume testing and may not even be achievable, given varying motor voltage 

configurations such as vehicles with systems other than 12-volt. We recommend that it be 

reduced to the setting closest to “6 volts at the motor” or the blower switch position at 50% of 

maximum blower speed, or immediately below 50% if there are an odd number of positions. For 

example, position 2 if the maximum is position 4, or position 3 if the maximum is position 7. 

Also, the word “nominal” should be added to the requirement “...to provide 55 degF...” since 

(1) this temperature may change with different segments of the test (idles, accelerations, cruses, 

decelerations) or (2) with some vehicles may not achievable or stable at this idle period, and (3) 

implies a tolerance of ±0.49 degF which may be difficult to set in such a short period of time. 

Finally, on vehicles that 'default to recirculated air above 75 °F,' the OEM should have the option 

to let this feature function as intended and not be required to start in recirculated air and change 

to outside air at the first idle of the SC03. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.55-56]

§ 86.167–17(f)(8) Procedures following the preconditioning cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.56]
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Following the preconditioning cycle, the test vehicle and cooling fan(s) are turned off, all 

windows are rolled up, and the vehicle is allowed to soak in the ambient conditions of paragraph 

(c)(1) of this section for 30 ±1 minutes. The solar heat system must be turned on and generating 

850 W/m2 within 1 minute of turning the engine off. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.56]

This requirement implies that the solar heat system must be turned on and achieves 850 W/m2 

within 1 minute of turning the engine off. This takes four events to accomplish: (1) turn engine 

off, (2) turn solar lamps (heat) load on, (3) set pyrometers up near the vehicle, (4) solar load 

lamps warm up to produce 850 W/m2. One minute (total) is insufficient time to accomplish these 

tasks as just item #4 can take more than five minutes to achieve (produce 850 W/m2). Since this 

short time requirement of one minute is really not a critical element to the test, we recommend 

changing it to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.56]

The solar heat system must be turned on within one minute of turning the engine off. The 30 

minute soak starts immediately after the solar load has achieved 850 ± 45 W/m2. Facility 

calibration data on solar lamp warm-up can be used to establish the start of solar soak time. Total 

soak time would be time to turn on the lights (e.g., one minute) plus lamp warm-up time (from 

calibration data) plus 30 minute solar soak. For example if the facility calibration demonstrates 

the lamps reach 850 W/m2 within two minutes, the soak time can be standardized at 33 minutes 

after engine off for that facility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.56]

§ 86.167–17(f)(10) “Air conditioning off” test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.56]

The air conditioning off test is identical to the steps identified in paragraphs (d)(1) through (9) of 

this section, except that the air conditioning system and fan speeds are set to complete off or the 

lowest. It is preferred that the air conditioning off test be conducted sequentially after the air 

conditioning on test, following a 10–15 minute soak.” We believe this to be a typo, “...set to 

complete off or the lowest (setting).” Also during this SC03 and HFET portion of the air 

conditioning off test, (f)(8) requires “...all windows are rolled up...”. Provisions need to be 

made to allow the driver to get sufficient cooling, such as allowing the windows to be partially or 

fully opened during the “air conditioning off” portion of the test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.56]

The MY 2014-2016 regulation currently allows substantial flexibility based on good engineering 

judgment to limit idle testing to one worst-case vehicle per platform, and carryover data could be 

used from one year to the next if no changes are made to a platform. Under the current 

regulation, although initially all platforms would need testing, over time, the regular cadence of 

vehicle changes over (typical) five-year program lives would mean that only 20% or so of each 

manufacturer’s platforms would need testing in any year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

pp.56-57]

In contrast, the new proposal requires AC17 testing in each year on each platform that receives 

credit. Beginning in 2017, carryover data is effectively disallowed, since a different subconfiguration within the platform must be tested each year. Also, the technology “on” and 

technology “off” testing effectively doubles the number of tests. Thus, the high test burden from 
EPA Response to Comments

3-44

attempting to test every platform every year with the AC17 test exceeds the objective of 

reasonable verification, since the test burden has grown exponentially from the original idle test. 

Disallowing carryover data effectively raises the number of tests approximately five-fold, the 

technology “on” versus “off” requirement then doubles the number of tests, and the AC17 test is 

at least eight times longer than the idle test. Although this is very rough math, it shows that the 

proposed approach would require approximately 80 times more test hours. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.57]

The objectives of menu validation and monitoring real-world progress can be achieved with a 

much lower test burden than this. In view of the complexity of the AC17 test in comparison with 

the idle test as well as other emission certification tests, no manufacturer should be required to 

conduct AC17 testing on more than four platforms in any year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.57]

Bench Testing [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.57]

SAE procedures have been developed for bench testing of MAC systems at a range of steadystate speeds and for the calculation of the Lifecycle Climate Change Performance of the system 

using the steady-state results as input data. These methodologies were used for some analyses 

within the IMAC program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.57]

These procedures have strengths as well as weaknesses. The bench test data is accurate and 

reproducible, although the full battery of SAE tests is very expensive to run (e.g., $80,000 per 

model), and automobile manufacturers are not currently set up to run these tests. Importantly, the 

integration of the MAC system with the vehicle is not comprehended in a sophisticated manner 

by these procedures. Thermal load technologies could not be directly evaluated. As computer 

controls grow more sophisticated, they have become a major factor in reducing energy 

consumption of MAC systems, while also meeting acceptable levels of performance in other 

vehicle parameters. The bench test procedure does not include sophisticated consideration of 

these computer control algorithms, and it would not be a simple task to include this important 

variable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.57]

The bench test methodology would be no better than the AC17 methodology in achieving the 

EPA goal of reasonable verification, and it would probably have deficiencies compared to AC17. 

The bench test methodology was considered within USCAR, but a vehicle test approach was 

selected instead because it was more comprehensive and the OEMs had facilities and 

experienced staffs in place for vehicle testing. Since the AC17 test has shown positive early 

results, it is preferred over bench testing as the basis for future work on these issues. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.57-58]

Once again, even using a bench test approach, the questions to be examined more closely 

resemble a research program than a traditional vehicle emissions certification program. If 

necessary, reasonable verification of the menu credit amounts could probably be achieved by a 

research program using bench test data, and sample-based verification could be used to validate 

that real improvements were occurring on new vehicles. However, comprehensive testing of 

every platform or model using this approach would be enormously burdensome, and the bench 
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test approach does not solve the problem of defining baseline performance or standards. Since 

bench testing offers no clear advantages, we recommend AC17 as the basis for future progress 

on MAC performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.58]

Conclusion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.58]

EPA set the stringency of the overall GHG standards based on maximum achievement by the 

industry of 5.0 g CO2/mile MAC efficiency credits for cars in 2017, followed by maximum 

achievement of the 7.2 g CO2/mile MAC efficiency credits by trucks in 2019. Clearly, this is an 

ambitious forecast, since it requires that no manufacturer encounter obstacles that preclude 

achievement of the maximum credit on any of its vehicles. However, the proposed efficiency 

tests have a high potential to interfere with the achievement of these maximum credit levels. In 

testing thus far, vehicles with engines below 2.5 liters in displacement have consistently shown 

only partial achievement of the idle test thresholds. It is not yet clear what achievement levels 

can be attained on the AC17 test, or how that test may be used. The potential testing burden 

and/or the planning uncertainties created by these tests may by themselves be sufficient to 

prevent maximum achievement of these credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.58]

In view of these considerations, we ask that achievement of certain levels on the MAC efficiency 

tests not be established as a strict requirement in order to gain credits from the MAC technology 

menu. The credit menu is working, and we expect it to continue to generate significant progress, 

provided that these test requirements are not allowed to interfere. We will work with EPA and 

NHTSA to provide “reasonable verification” of this progress through selected vehicle testing and 

other methods to show that the menu amounts are not overstated, and that commensurate realworld progress is achieved. The mid-term review and the 'check-ins' prior to the mid-term review 

will provide an opportunity for EPA to review whether a “reporting-only” AC17 test (instead of 

an AC17 test with thresholds) continues to be adequate. However, the number of tests to achieve 

this should be far less than proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.58]

NHTSA should adopt regulatory language that provides equivalent levels of MAC efficiency 

credits in the CAFE program. We note, however, both the difficulty and the importance of 

keeping the EPA and NHTSA programs aligned. NHTSA CAFE standards will also be based on 

maximum achievement of these credits, while the ability to earn other compliance credits to 

offset MAC efficiency shortfalls will not be the same. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.59]

Finally, we support including MAC credits in fleet averages in a manner consistent with the 

proposal for off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.59]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

5. A/C 17 Test Concerns

“Baseline vehicle” – In section III. C. 1. b) of the preamble, the AC17 test procedure is described 

as requiring an OEM “To determine whether the efficiency improvements of these technologies 
EPA Response to Comments

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are being realized on the vehicle, the results of an AC17 test performed on a new vehicle model 

would be compared to a “baseline” vehicle which does not incorporate the efficiency-improving 

technologies.” Honda believes this is problematic for the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 4]

• Comparator - It may be impossible to re-create a vehicle without the new technology, and 

secondly, all-new and completely re-designed vehicles may not have a proper comparison 

vehicle.

• Fairness – early efficiency is not rewarded, because the prior model (where one exists) is 

the basis for establishing improvements. If prior models are extremely efficient, only 

relative improvements are rewarded.

• Test integrity – Test repeatability is yet to be assured. EPA says that OEM only needs to 

pick one model from vehicles that share common platform. Test result, however, is easily 

affected by vehicle design, such as window size and design, test cell condition (blower 

setting, humidity level control), resulting in test result variability. Thus test method that 

use baseline vehicle cannot be accepted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 4]

AC17 Test Repeatability – In the preamble, the agencies claim that the AC17 test shows good 

repeatability, however, there were limited laboratories used and limited models. Honda proposes 

a solution to this issue. Recognizing that the idle test does not have good repeatability, and that 

the AC17 test data points are not as substantial as they need to be, the agencies could allow 

OEMs to provide AC17 test data during the MY12 – MY16 period, in lieu of the idle test (with 

its questionable repeatability) and the threshold concern. AC17 test data would allow OEMs to 

take advantage of the menu-based credits. This will enable EPA to quickly develop a large 

dataset of AC17 test results, which will accelerate the adoption of performance-based criteria for 

AC credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 4]

The agencies seek comment on the threshold criteria for the AC17 test. Unfortunately, Honda 

doesn’t have any test data or experience at this point. The previous proposal (allowing AC17 test 

in lieu of idle test during the MY12- MY16 period) would provide EPA with enough data to 

make a good determination. Additionally Honda proposes that EPA work with SAE Interior

Climate Control Committee to establish appropriate thresholds values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9489-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

EPA proposes to use a new air conditioning test procedure (AC17) to evaluate potential credits 

for system efficiency improvements by manufacturers. However, it is clear that there could be 

problems resulting from the use of the new test. EPA states that “the appropriateness of the test is 

still being evaluated” and “EPA believes that more testing and development will be necessary 

before the new test could be used directly ...” See 76 FR 74938, 74940. Global Automakers has 

several concerns with AC17 test procedure, which we recommend that EPA address before the 

test procedure is required by the regulations. For instance, it is not clear if the precision of the 

AC17 test procedure is high enough to differentiate between the baseline vehicle and the vehicle 

enhanced with A/C energy saving technologies. If the total precision of the vehicle test is 2 g 

CO2/mi and the enhanced vehicle has A/C-related technologies with menu credits worth that 
Air Conditioning System Credits

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amount or less, the benefit may not be identifiable at all on the vehicle test. Moreover, it is not 

clear that it would be practicable to use the AC17 test to compare the performance of certain 

vehicles with and without the individual efficiency improvements from the EPA menu installed, 

as proposed by EPA. This would be a problem in particular for vehicles that incorporate 

efficiency improvements as part of a major redesign or full model change. In those situations, it 

may not be possible to provide a comparable vehicle having an air conditioning system without 

the efficiency improvements installed. Another issue may result from the comparison of A/C 

systems when the “baseline” system is already efficient. It may be difficult to demonstrate 

improvements between two efficient systems, and it is not clear how to obtain credits for changes 

that resulted in the improved efficiency for the “baseline” system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9466-A1, p. 4]

We understand the goal of ensuring that credits given on the menu system for A/C technologies 

actually translate into real-world emissions reduction and fuel savings on the vehicle. There are 

different methodologies to evaluate the improvement from A/C technologies including menu 

systems, bench testing, simulation, and vehicle testing. Each of these has its own merits and 

challenges. One possible improvement that can be made in the current menu system is to put 

technical specifications relating to efficiency for the individual component technologies. Other 

options may also be appropriate. Nevertheless, the test procedure concerns should be addressed 

before implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 4]

Due to these potential problems, we urge the EPA to collaborate with the SAE Interior Climate 

Control Committee to evaluate options to improve the test procedure and to reassess the test 

procedure as part of the mid-term review. In the interim, we recommend that EPA include in the 

final rule an “off-ramp” procedure to allow the determination of air conditioning credits without 

using the AC17 test procedure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 51.]

Second, the agencies should carefully consider the relationship between the creation of 

incentives under the new standards and the development of alternative test procedures to assess 

the incentivized technologies. Global Automakers strongly supports incentivizing technologies 

whose potential benefits are not fully measured under the 1975 CAFE test procedure. Air 

conditioning efficiency, off-cycle, and advanced technology incentives are justified based on 

their potential long term, real world benefits. Such incentives will typically take the form of 

compliance credits that are assessed using alternative test procedures. In developing incentives 

for the final rule, the agencies need to carefully consider how to reconcile these incentives with 

the testing procedures required by law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p.2]

[[This comment can also be found in Outline Heading 7.4.]]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC
EPA Response to Comments

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Regarding fuel efficiency credits, we provide the following comments and recommend some 

specific changes.

• AC-idle:

- We support the review of AC-idle judgment limits as a function of engine displacement.

- This also supports implementing fuel efficient technologies in smaller vehicles even when fuel 

consumption improvements which definitely have positive effects during overall typical driving 

conditions - are not fully visible during small engine idling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-

A1, enclosure p. 2]

• AC17 Test and Evaluation:

- We carried out our own AC17 tests after the publication of the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 2]

- In our opinion, the AC17 test conditions do not reflect typical average or moderately increased 

air conditioning loads. In particular, the solar load is too high. According to a FAT study, the 

average North American sun load is around 310 Wfm2 already taking into account that driving 

time periods are variable during a day (e.g. less driving at night). We therefore would expect a 

maximum value of around 350 Wfm2 to 400 Wfm2 (instead of 850 Wfm2 ) for the AC17 test. 

Some of the powerful measures to lower all-the-year fuel consumption also can't be evaluated at 

the currently suggested AC17 test load - e.g. significant reduction of reheat. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 2]

- Reliability of test data is expected to be not better but similar to the AC-idle-test.

- Definition of platforms or carlines could be adopted according to the Alliance proposal. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 2]

- We are also concerned about determining fuel consumption improvements and credit 

calculations depending on baseline test results. The generation of baseline car results needs to be 

properly defined. BMW does not have baseline cars - especially focused on 2017 – they have to 

be designed and built up for this single test. Therefore, we propose to test a baseline car once for 

each platform - according to the Alliance carline definition - and the use of these baseline results 

should be allowed during the entire model year 2017 to 2025 timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9579-A1, enclosure pp. 2-3]

• AC17 Test Procedure:

- During the 30 minute soak, it is quite difficult to control temperature and humidity properly. A 

wider tolerance range in this phase of the cycle would help. Even more critical for some modern 

full automatic test benches is the combination of engine off and 4 mph wind speed because this 

has significant impact on exhaust gas analysis measurement devices. We would prefer a soak 

definition with a wider tolerance range of temperature and especially humidity and a speed 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-49

definition of maximum 4 mph (instead of exactly 4 mph). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, 

enclosure p. 3]

- Solar load during MAC off phases causes extreme temperature exposure to test drivers. These 

working conditions are unacceptable and will lead to poor accuracy when trying to meet the 

given drive cycle requirements. We suggest running MAC off phases without solar load. As 

MAC is turned off, this has no impact on MAC off fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 3]

- Drive cycle definitions should be fully equal to currently used cycles (e.g. some seconds time 

shift @ HWFET). This would help to keep accuracy and test quality high and to avoid mistakes. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 3]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Air conditioning system efficiency improvements differ between passenger cars and light-duty 

trucks. It is appropriate to establish separate credit levels for the passenger car and light-duty 

truck fleets. The Agencies have developed this split in an environmental and fuel consumption 

neutral manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 6]

The air conditioning efficiency idle and AC17 test procedures; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 10]

Chrysler supports the Agencies’ development of separate passenger car- and light-duty truckspecific credits for air conditioning system efficiency improvements.

In the DJTSD, the Agencies derive passenger car and light-duty truck specific greenhouse gas 

and fuel consumption benefits associated with air conditioning load demand. Chrysler believes 

that it is a reasonable approximation that opportunities for improvement on passenger cars will 

differ from those on light-duty trucks. Therefore, the Agency’s proposal to establish separate air 

conditioning system efficiency improvement credits for passenger cars and light-duty trucks is 

appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 11]

Organization: Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association (EPGAA)

4. EPGAA supports the proposal to add the AC17 test procedure with certain modifications. 

EPGAA advocates migration toward incorporation of AC load into drive cycles or test 

procedures which can be determined to produce reasonable correlation with real world 

performance. While credits are a good first step to recognizing the untapped benefits of heat load 

reduction, the reality is that the imposed caps and generality of credits will not allow full 

recognition of the potential benefit. To this end EPGAA acknowledges the proposed AC17 test 

cycle as a potential good advancement. There is always some question as to the validity of sun 

lamps to simulate true solar load due to incident angle and emitted spectra variances. However, it 

is also recognized that a repeatable outdoor test, which would be the ideal solution, is difficult to 
EPA Response to Comments

3-50

achieve. Regarding the specifics of the AC17 proposed test protocol, EPGAA would like to offer 

the following comments: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, p. 2]

a. EPGAA suggests that the solar soak period time be increased from 30 minutes to 40-45 

minutes. Studies have shown that consumer do indeed leave their vehicles parked for longer than 

30 minutes, and thermal modeling of some typical passenger vehicles with RadTherm software 

shows that at 30 minutes there is still a fairly steep slope of cabin temperature increase occurring 

in many cases. This slope does tend to taper after about 45 minutes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9301-A1, pp. 2-3]

b. EPGAA supports the test condition of a 72 degree set point for automatic climate control 

systems but has concerns regarding the control logic for manual systems. Any protocol selected 

for the manual systems should be validated by testing a similar or same vehicle configuration 

equipped with an automatic system and subsequently with a manual system and confirming that 

both procedures provide the same or similar results. Regarding the proposed manual system 

procedure, EPGAA agrees that the test should begin at full output with recirculation and also 

agrees that at some reasonable time period the fan speed should be moderated. It is also agreed 

that the recirculation mode should be defeated after the vehicle attains a comfort level. It is 

EPGAA’s recommendation that this adjustment point should be triggered by internal cabin 

temperature rather than simply based on time. Using the temperature control to moderate air 

supply temperature seems flawed as most manual temperature controls when in fresh air mode 

moderate supply temperature by adjusting a mixing damper to introduce partial reheat through 

the heating coil. This will not necessarily result in a true reduction of AC load or hence 

measurement of the attainable efficiency. The AC compressor in most systems will cycle based 

on evaporator coil temperature. Introducing mixed air will ultimately increase evaporator 

sensible load to remove the reheat energy resulting in a poor measure of any heat load reduction 

improvement as the compressor will not shut off as often as was possible without reheat. In this 

scenario, any technology which reduces heat load in the cabin will trigger a response to increase 

the temperature setting which will simply increase the amount of reheat energy. EPGAA 

suggests that for the above reasons, the temperature control must remain in the full cold position 

during the test cycle and cooling air supply should only be regulated via fan speed. The fan speed 

should be adjusted as required at intervals to hold an interior temperature. Furthermore, EPGAA 

suggests that the adjustment should be based on a breath level cabin temperature reading, rather 

than the supply air temperature at a duct outlet, since this will be more representative of the 

usage by an actual driver. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Ferrari

To reduce the certification test burdens for small-volume manufacturers, we request that the A/C 

Idle Test could be used (instead of the new AC17 test) beyond MY 2016. At least, the transition 

from the A/C idle test to the AC17 should be smooth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, 

p.13]

Organization: Ford Motor Company
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-51

We also support proposed changes to the program for 2014-2016 MYs that will allow 

manufacturers to earn credits by reporting results from the new AC17 test, which Ford helped to 

develop jointly with industry (USCAR), EPA and CARB. This option has two primary benefits. 

First, it provides a rich source of data for evaluating the new AC17 test, prior to its proposed 

2017 MY implementation. Second, it provides an alternative to the Idle Test, which has several 

shortcomings, as detailed in the Alliance comments as well as in the NPRM preamble and 

Technical Support Document. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 10-11]

Ford also supports the introduction of the AC17 test procedure as a means of validating credit 

values for the 2017-2025 MYs. As mentioned, Ford has worked with industry and the agencies 

to develop this procedure and will continue to work with these groups in the future to conduct 

additional prove-out on this test. We do however, have some concerns with the 2017-2025 MY 

test requirements, as proposed: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 11]

While the AC17 test is much improved over the Idle Test, we believe that the addition of this test 

is more suited for a research program to validate menu levels, rather than a certification-type test 

requirement. Variability with this test has been reduced, but remains a concern. The charts below 

show that using a single baseline and demonstration test may not always successfully show the 

technology benefit. On the left side of the first chart, test data from a base test, without 

recirculation, and two tests with recirculation technology are shown. On the right side of that 

chart, the difference in CO2 emissions between the base test and the two recirculation tests are 

provided. Based on this data, one of the recirculation tests does not show an improvement over 

the baseline. If this single test were run for certification, no credit would have been earned for a 

technology that clearly should provide a benefit. This shows the importance of running multiple 

repeats when demonstrating the benefits of these technologies. The second chart below shows 

that when multiple baseline and “with technology” tests are averaged and compared, the benefit 

of the recirculation technology is seen and can be quantified. This shows that reliance upon one 

test point may not adequately demonstrate an accurate credit level, nor does it allow for 

acceptable credit planning assessments. Without the ability to reliably estimate credit levels 

during the planning process, decisions to introduce these beneficial technologies will be 

jeopardized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 11]

For certification, the concept of comparison testing a vehicle containing the A/C new technology 

with a similar “baseline vehicle” without the technology will be difficult to accomplish in 

practice. When manufacturers introduce new A/C technology, these changes typically take place 

when other updates are being made to the vehicle. As a result, a comparison of the older baseline 

vehicle to the new vehicle may be influenced by factors other than simply the A/C system 

changes. In general, it is also not rational to test a vehicle with the A/C technologies deactivated 

as a baseline. In many circumstances this is impossible, or would require a great deal of effort to 

accomplish, and would not be optimized for performance. Therefore, it may be difficult to 

identify reasonable baseline vehicles, especially given the large number of tests that are proposed 

to be required for each model year. In the interest of validating menu levels, a more limited 

number of comparison tests should be conducted to evaluate the different A/C technologies, with 

multiple test runs to statistically verify results. This could be done as a research program using 

industry and agency data collected prior to 2017 MY. Once that work is complete, we 
EPA Response to Comments

3-52

recommend that credit levels be awarded on the basis of that validated menu (similar to the 

current process, as well as the proposed off-cycle pre-approved technology list). Additional 

testing should then be limited to survey or confirmatory purposes or for the evaluation of new 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 13]

Ford believes the testing burden associated with the new requirements is excessive, as proposed. 

EPA acknowledges that the AC17 test requires a significant amount of time, using expensive 

SC03-capable facilities, and therefore suggests this testing should be conducted on a limited 

subset of vehicles. The proposal indicates that one vehicle (plus the baseline) per platform must 

be tested. Based on the proposed platform definition, this is problematic because each platform is 

required to have a common body floor plan, chassis, engine and transmission. Ford’s product 

line-up would result in an extremely large number of required tests. For example, using the 

proposed definition on Ford's 2012 MY line-up would result in up to 63 platforms. For 2013 

MY, the number of platforms increases to 66. We do not expect elements like powertrain and 

transmission to have any significant impact on the benefits of the A/C technologies and therefore 

believe the scope of the platform definition should be narrowed. If testing requirements are 

determined on a platform-basis, we agree with the definition proposed in the Alliance comments, 

included below for reference: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 13]

Platform means a group of vehicles within an OEM which has a degree of commonality in 

construction (e.g., body, chassis). Platform does not consider the model name, brand or 

marketing division, does not consider any level of decor or opulence and also does not consider 

characteristics such as roof line, number of doors, seats, or windows. A platform may include 

vehicles from various fuel economy classes, including both cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 13]

Using this updated definition would reduce Ford’s platform counts to 10 and 9 for the 2012 and 

2013 MYs, respectively, which is much more reasonable than the number that would be required 

using the definition proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 13]

Ford also requests the option of allowing manufacturers to use additional instrumentation for 

collecting PCM and other A/C control data during the AC17 testing to study parameters and 

better understand what occurs during the test. This should be an allowable option, but not a 

requirement for recording or reporting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 13]

Ford also supports all of the suggested technical corrections and recommended test procedure 

and tolerance updates to the Idle Test and AC17 Procedures in sections 40 CFR § 86.165-12 and 

§ 86.167-17, as detailed in the Alliance comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 14]

To summarize, Ford believes the inclusion of the new AC17 test is a major step in the right 

direction for helping to quantify A/C technology benefits. As indicated by the above comments, 

additional work remains to resolve various technical and logistical issues for using this test to 

validate credit levels. Ford is committed to continuing our cooperative work with industry and 

the agencies to make the use of this test a success and allow for proper credit achievement with 

planning certainty. As that development work continues, we urge the agencies not to finalize a 

rule that will establish overly burdensome test requirements or thresholds for achieving 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-53

maximum credit levels that have not yet been fully proven out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p. 14]

Organization: Guardian Automotive Products, Inc.

Guardian advocates migration toward incorporation of AC load into drive cycles or test 

procedures which can be determined to produce reasonable correlation with real world 

performance. While credits are a good first step to recognizing the untapped benefits of heat load 

reduction, the reality is that the imposed caps and generality of credits may not allow full 

recognition of the potential benefit. Nonetheless, the proposed AC17 test cycle appears to be a 

step in the right direction. Sun lamps in test chambers do not represent an ideal duplication of 

real world solar load; however, they are perhaps the best available compromise given the 

difficulty of establishing a repeatable outdoor test. Guardian offers the following specific 

comments regarding the proposed AC17 cycle: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 2]

• The solar soak period time should be increased from 30 minutes to 40-45 minutes. Thermal 

modeling of various passenger vehicles with RadTherm software demonstrates that at 30 minutes 

there is still in many cases a fairly steep slope of cabin temperature increase. This slope tends to 

taper only after about 45 minutes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 2]

• We understand the rationale behind the proposed test condition of a 72 degree set point for 

automatic climate control systems left to operate during testing in fully automatic mode. 

However, we have concerns regarding the proposed control logic for manual systems. Any 

protocol selected for manual systems should be verified by testing a similar or same vehicle 

configuration equipped with an automatic system to ensure that the manual system results are 

similar to those of the automatic system. Regarding the proposed manual system procedure, 

Guardian agrees that the test should begin at full output with recirculation and that at some 

reasonable time period the fan speed should be moderated. We also agree that the recirculation 

mode should be defeated after the vehicle attains a comfort level, but this adjustment point 

should be triggered by internal cabin temperature and not a set time period. Using the 

temperature control to moderate air supply temperature seems flawed as most manual 

temperature controls when in fresh air mode moderate supply temperature by adjusting a mixing 

damper to introduce partial reheat through the heating coil. This will not necessarily result in a 

true reduction of AC load or, therefore, measurement of the attainable efficiency. The AC 

compressor in most systems will cycle based on evaporator coil temperature or humidity level.

Introducing mixed air will ultimately increase evaporator sensible load to remove the reheat 

energy resulting in a poor measure of any heat load reduction improvement as the compressor 

will not shut off as often as was possible without reheat. In this scenario, any technology which 

reduces heat load in the cabin will trigger an operator response to increase the temperature 

setting which will simply increase the amount of reheat energy. Guardian suggests that for the 

above reasons the temperature control must remain in the full cold position during the test cycle 

and cooling air supply should only be regulated via fan speed. The fan speed should be adjusted 

as required at intervals to hold an interior temperature. Furthermore, Guardian suggests that the 

adjustment should be based on a cabin temperature reading near one of the headrests rather than 
EPA Response to Comments

3-54

the supply air temperature at a duct outlet since this will be the control input temperature for an 

actual driver. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, pp. 2-3]

Organization: Honeywell International, Inc.

Consequently, the agencies propose to require manufacturers to use the new Air Conditioning, 

2017 ('AC17') tests to demonstrate that new or improved A/C technologies actually result in 

efficiency improvements, while continuing to use the menu-style approach to determine credits 

and fuel consumption improvement values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.9]

Honeywell agrees that a performance-based test is preferable to the proposed menu-style 

approach because it could quantify more accurately the degree of improved efficiency resulting 

from an A/C system, thus providing a more precise measurement of GHG emissions reduction 

and CAFE fuel consumption value. Honeywell believes that by locking in the vehicle menu 

approach for the next 13 years, EPA and NHTSA could prevent the use of new and improved 

performance tests developed during the life of the Proposed Rule. Although EPA and NHTSA 

are obligated to conduct a separate rulemaking for MY 2022-2025 standards, Honeywell 

maintains that the proposed midterm review is still too far into the future to exclude new 

performance tests and recommends providing opportunity for more frequent updating in the final 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.9]

Honeywell offers that EPA and NHTSA should not require manufacturers to use the AC17 test 

to demonstrate the effectiveness of their A/C efficiency technologies until that test has been 

thoroughly evaluated. It is our understanding that EPA and NHTSA propose the use of the fourpart AC 17 performance-based test to quantify efficiency improvements as a prerequisite for 

access to the credit menu. However, EPA and NHTSA note that they are not proposing to replace 

the credit menu with the AC 17 test because the test 'is still being evaluated.' Although 

Honeywell generally prefers the use of a performance-based test when practicable, Honeywell 

discourages the required use of a new test until the agencies can verify the test's accuracy and 

reliability. Honeywell suggests that EPA and NHTSA either conduct more frequent reviews or 

develop a method to evaluate industry suggestions for potential performance tests and to 

incorporate them as they deem appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, pp.9-10]

Honeywell Agrees with the Use Of SAE Standard J 2765 to Establish the Credit for Improved 

Evaporators and Condensers, which EPA Required Specifically for MY 2012·2016 Vehicles, and 

Suggests that EPA Expressly Require Its Use for MY 2017·2025 Vehicles as well [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.10]

EPA and NHTSA propose an A/C Efficiency Credit for the use of improved evaporators and 

condensers. EPA and NHTSA state in the TSD that the credit will be based upon SAE Standard 

12765 - Procedure of Measuring System Coefficient of Performance of a Mobile Air 

Conditioning System on Test Bench Honeywell agrees that Standard J 2765 is the appropriate 

method for showing improvements in the energy efficiency and cooling capacity of systems. 

EPA and NHTSA do not specify, however, in the Proposed Rule, as EPA did in final rule 

establishing vehicle emissions and fuel economy standards for MY 2012-2016 vehicles, that the 

credit for improved condensers and evaporators must be determined using the bench test 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-55

procedures described in SAE 12765. To ensure compliance with this requirement, Honeywell 

suggests that EPA and NHTSA specify expressly in the rule, in addition to the TSD, that the 

credit shall be determined using the SAE 12765 bench test procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9497-A1, p.10]

Honeywell proposes that EPA employ SAE Standard J 2765 for calculation of the oil separators 

credit [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.10]

EPA and NHTSA propose a credit for manufacturers if they prevent oil from circulating 

throughout the A/C system due to inefficiencies resulting from heat transfer effectiveness. 

Honeywell agrees that large amounts of oil circulating throughout the system can negatively 

impact the efficiency of a system, but we disagree that adding an oil separator will necessarily 

improve efficiency. For example, an improperly designed oil separator could negatively impact 

the system's efficiency by restricting the flow of refrigerant through the device, resulting in 

increased pressure losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.10]

Relying on the SAE IMAC team, EPA and NHTSA estimate a standard credit of 0.6 gram/mi 

CO2. Instead, Honeywell suggests that the efficiency improvements of oil separators can be 

measured identically to evaporators and condensers by using SAE Standard 12765 - Procedure of 

Measuring System CO2 of a Mobile Air Conditioning System on a Bench Test. Using SAE 

Standard 12765 will enable manufacturers to more accurately determine the overall efficacy and 

resulting credit of their component technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9497-A1, p.11]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

However, Hyundai has concerns with the new AC17 A/C test procedure that allows 

manufacturers to evaluate potential credits for A/C efficiency improvements. Since the new 

AC17 test procedure has not yet been fully developed, Hyundai recommends that EPA retain the 

idle test as an option until the AC17 procedure has been proven to be reliable rather than 

requiring the use of AC17 procedure beginning in 2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, 

p.6]

2) Hyundai questions the requirement that automakers conduct back-to-back tests with and 

without the credit-generating technologies to determine potential credits. There may be a number 

of scenarios which make it impossible to test without the credit-generating technologies, 

particularly on a full model changeover. For this reason and for consistency, the baseline vehicle 

should be clearly defined. Unless the baseline is defined, some manufacturers could be 

comparing their new A/C technologies against a highly efficient system and generate minimal 

credits while another could be comparing against a less efficient system and show greater 

improvement. Hyundai supports the recommendation made in the Global Automaker's comments 

which would be to rely on the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Interior Climate Control 

Committee to determine the appropriate baseline A/C systems and address any test procedure 

concerns prior to implementation of requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.7]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
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3-56

ICCT also supports combining the menu of credits for specific A/C technologies with 

manufacturer performance testing to justify application of these credits. Creating a menu of 

credit values will help quantify emission reductions for components/technologies that may be 

hard to quantify through testing individually, while performance testing will verify that an 

effective overall package meets the minimum threshold for improvement and achieves the 

claimed emissions reductions. We encourage US EPA's continued work to improve the A/C test 

procedures in parallel with the rulemaking effort. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 37]

We note that the USEPA/NHTSDA November 2011 draft TSD (page 5-51) suggests that only 

one or two vehicles per year may be tested per manufacturer on average. Given the wide range of 

changes in new product offerings, engine technology, A/C system operations, and alternative 

refrigerants, we believe that each significantly changed model should be tested. We recommend 

deleting this statement in the final TSD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 37-38]

Organization: Kia Motors

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 101-102.]

Kia supports the use of A/C menu for determining air conditioning system credits but supports 

an increase in the maximum amounts of credits permitted if we were able to demonstrate an 

emission reduction greater than the items provided in the menu. However, since the new AC17 

test procedure has not yet fully been developed, Kia recommends that EPA retain the idle test as 

an option until the AC17 has been proven to be more reliable rather than requiring the use of the 

AC17 procedure at the beginning of 2017.

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

In particular, we endorse the concept of reviewing the A/C idle values with regard to small 

displacement engines, where fuel consumption improvements may be less visible during idling. 

With regard to the proposed A/C 17 test, DAG is concerned that the test conditions do not reflect 

typical, or even moderately elevated, A/C loads. For example, a 2008 German study of vehicles 

in over 3200 counties in the United States found that the average solar load in the U.S. is below 

350 W/m2 rather than the 850 W/m2 . DAG is concerned that, given these more typical loads, 

the most effective ways to reduce annual MAC fuel consumption may not be recognized or 

evaluated through the proposed A/C 17 test procedure.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 

A-3]

DAG has a number of additional suggestions with regard to the proposed test procedures. These 

include wider tolerances for the climate parameters during the soak period, as it is difficult to 

maintain temperature and humidity within the proposed tolerances. A wider tolerance range can 

be provided without impacting results. A wind speed lower than 4 mph should also be 

established since such a wind speed would improve the accuracy of the exhaust gas 

measurement. Drive cycle definitions should also be consistent with currently used cycles to 

retain accuracy and reduce failures. Correction factors should be applied to retain accuracy. First, 

a correction factor is necessary to overcome the fact that fuel consumption from the MAC 
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-57

system is calculated as the difference between two measured values that are approximately an 

order of magnitude larger than the MAC fuel consumption value. Second, the expected 

efficiency differences related to technical measures, component enhancements and refrigerant 

circuit optimization would fully be hidden by the effect of ambient and operating conditions 

deviations. Therefore, correction factors are needed to recognize ambient enthalpy, system 

settings and driving variations. We also propose that the HVAC system be adjusted at the 

beginning of the preconditioning stage of the MAC test cycle, that target temperatures be defined 

to meet the target temperature and mass air flow values, that A/C recirculation be allowed if 

recirculation is the default, and that the settings of all vent flaps be specified. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-3]

Rather than attempting to correlate the cabin volume and the cabin temperature level during the 

test, DAG suggests that a correction factor be deduced based on vehicle size and later applied to 

the measured MAC fuel consumption. This would allow consideration of vehicle cabin sizes and 

allow all vehicles to be tested with the same MAC settings. Finally, we suggest that the Tts value 

for each glazing plane be calculated in accordance with ISO 13837. This allows glazing quality 

and angle to be accounted for in the Tts value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-4]

We look forward to working with the agencies as the A/C 17 test procedure is further refined and 

fully support the effort to promote more efficient MAC systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9483-A1, p. A-4]

6 We are also concerned about unacceptable work place conditions for the test bench personnel 

due to solar radiation during that portion of the MAC test conducted with the A/C off. We 

therefore recommend that the MAC test be conducted without solar radiation during both the 

A/C off and the A/C on portions of the test.

Organization: Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Recommends the AC17 test on a reporting only basis to verify air conditioning (A/C) efficiency 

improvements as an option in MYs 2014 through 2016, and after MY 2016, as a replacement for 

the A/C Idle test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.2]

Organization: Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW)

3. PGW supports the proposal to add the AC17 test procedure to enable an actual measurement 

of the impact rather than a model-based calculation. PGW recommends certain minor 

modifications to the proposed AC17 test procedure. The AC17 test procedure calls for a 30 

minute soak. PGW recommends a 45 minute soak to better account for “real world” conditions. 

Cabin temperature after 30 minutes is still deviating between cars with heat load technologies 

compared to those without. In addition, solar lamps located overhead do not necessarily provide 

adequate simulation of real world conditions where the sun moves across the horizon over the 

day. The heat load in the mornings and evenings can be very different from the mid-day sun. 
EPA Response to Comments

3-58

Therefore, PGW recommends that test chambers be modified to include solar lamps on the sides 

as well as above the vehicle. Finally, the test procedure for cars with manual air conditioning 

should be modified to require changing the air flow with the cabin temperature rather than 

temperature of the vent air. A simple procedure could be to measure air temperature at a few 

locations (three at a minimum – driver breath, passenger breath, and rear seat breath) and use that 

air temperature to control the air conditioning system. This would be a better simulation of the 

actual air conditioning use by a consumer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, pp. 2-3]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Air Conditioning (A/C) Efficiency Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.13]

Idle Test Thresholds - EPA has proposed to modify the Idle test thresholds from a flat threshold 

to a function of engine displacement. Toyota recommends that an additional threshold be 

considered for dual A/C systems. Under the proposed threshold, it will be difficult for a dual A/C 

system employing state of the art high efficiency technology to comply. Toyota recommends that 

the threshold for vehicles equipped with dual A/C systems be increased to a value of 19 

g/minute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.13]

AC17 Test General- Toyota appreciates EPA's flexibility in allowing manufacturer's to run the 

AC17 test for 2014-2016 model years as a reporting option, in lieu of the Idle test requirements~ 

while still allowing credits to be generated from the menu. However, EPA has proposed AC17 

testing be required to generate credits starting with the 2017 model year. Toyota remains 

concerned with the proposed AC17 test because its complexity will require 8 hours from set-up 

to completion. In addition, the proposed AC17 testing for 2017 model year requires testing in 

each year and on each platform that would receive credit, which would quickly create an 

inordinate test burden. In order to reduce this burden, Toyota requests that EPA consider 

flexibility when addressing carry over allowances, test group configurations, and testing 

requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.14]

Technical Recommendation -Toyota supports the corrections and clarifications provided in the 

Alliance comments. In addition~ per AC17 test procedure §86-167-17 (e)(2) regarding manual 

A/C systems, a manufacturer must manually adjust the airflow setting to 'outside-air' at the first 

idle period of the SC03 drive cycle, even if the airflow setting is automatically set to 

''recirculated-air'' by systems having automatic recirculation control technology. Toyota requests 

to add the option that if the system is equipped with automatic recirculation control~ then it is 

not necessary to change the airflow setting to 'outside-air' at the first idle period of SC03 drive 

cycle in AC17 test. Toyota thinks this recommended option would be consistent with EPA's 

current consideration for A/C systems. As an example, EPA currently allows 'default to 

recirculated air with closed-loop control of the air supply whenever the outside ambient 

temperature is 75F or higher' as an efficiency improvement to current A/C systems. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.14]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

CREDITS FOR EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-59

Volkswagen disagrees with the agencies modifications to the credit levels available for

efficiency improvements within the 2017-2025 proposal. Previously in 2012-2016, both cars and 

trucks were eligible for up to 5.7 g/mi CO2 credit. Within this proposal, the agencies have 

decreased the maximum level of car credit to 5.0 g/mi and increased the maximum truck credit to 

7.2 g/mi. Volkswagen understood that it was the intention of the agencies to continue the base 

flexibilities from 2012-2016 into the 2017-2025 timeframe. The decrease in passenger car and 

increase in truck credits contrasts with this understanding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, 

p. 30]

It is Volkswagen’s position that A/C loading is a function of vehicle attributes rather than 

compliance category. Vehicle mass, interior volume, glazing, etc will determine loading 

requirements and the effects of efficiency improvements rather than whether the vehicle is a car 

or truck. In some cases the exact same A/C system between related or similarly sized cars and 

trucks. Improvements made to particular A/C system would then be integrated into both the car 

and truck at the same point in production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 30]

Efficiency is a reduction in energy use which is independent of the type of vehicle. Trucks will 

feature greater total lifetime CO2 reductions due to the expected higher VMT, however in terms 

of rate (g/mi) there may not be any difference between cars or trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 30]

We simply fail to see enough technical evidence to broadly apply a 2.2 g/mi difference, 

especially for two vehicles in different categories which have the same A/C system. Volkswagen 

proposes that the maximum credit levels for cars and trucks are equalized at 7.2 g/mi. As an 

alternative, an average g/mi reduction could be calculated for the fleet as a whole and applied 

equally for cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 30]

IDLE TEST CONDITIONS

As stated within the Alliance comments, the idle test procedure requires the air conditioning 

system to be operated as if they were working at a high ambient temperature. Thus the air 

conditioning system will work at maximum 'cool down' for a majority of the testing time. These 

temperature conditions are unrealistic and prevent the test from reflecting efficiency gains 

possible at moderate and light load. As demonstrated by the SAE/IMAC study, the efficiency 

improvements at moderate and light loads are 40% or more. The idle test conditions should be 

adapted to include efficiency gains at moderate and light loads within the overall result. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 30-31]

Volkswagen maintains that there are significant test-to-test repeatability issues with the idle test 

due to test cell influences (air movement, etc). Volkswagen requests that EPA provide more 

clearly defined testing parameters to improve the repeatability of the test. Volkswagen has 

conducted internal evaluations of the idle test and would welcome the opportunity to provide 

input on how to improve the definition of these test parameters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 31]
EPA Response to Comments

3-60

IDLE TEST ENGINE DISPLACEMENT FACTOR

EPA has included within the proposal an idle test threshold adjustment based on engine 

displacement. Volkswagen supports the overall comments from the Alliance on the minimal 

contribution of this change to the higher level goals of real world GHG reductions. Volkswagen 

considers this option as a transitional provision until the AC 17 test will be used to quantify 

MAC system efficiency. Volkswagen seeks to clarify that the optional use of this provision is at 

the discretion of the manufacturer, e.g. by model type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 

31]

AC 17 TESTING AND VEHICLE SELECTION

Volkswagen fully supports the concerns over the complexity, length and therefore time and costs 

to run the AC 17 test. Furthermore, there may be difficulties in establishing baseline results from 

which to compare a vehicle equipped with a new A/C system. It is often the case that a new A/C 

system will be integrated into a vehicle which has also undergone a significant refresh, or even a 

complete redesign. In this case, it will be difficult to implement an 'old' baseline A/C system in a 

'new' redesigned car in order to properly establish before/after results. Therefore Volkswagen 

agrees with the alliance proposal to utilize the AC17 test solely to validate menu credit amounts 

and monitor progress. Another option would be to consider the possibility of establishing an 

industry baseline value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 31]

Volkswagen proposes the following definition of a 'vehicle platform' and to restrict the required 

testing to a platform. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 31]

Platform means a group of vehicles within an OEM which has a degree of commonality in 

construction (e.g., body, chassis). Platform does not consider the model name, brand or 

marketing division, does not consider any level of decor or opulence and also does not consider 

characteristics such as roof line, number of doors, seats, or windows. A platform may include 

vehicles from various fuel economy classes, including both cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 31]

Volkswagen supports the concept of eventually allowing the use of detailed simulation as an 

accepted analysis tool in helping to determining credit levels. Simulation tools are broadly 

applied within the vehicle development process and have proven valuable in both enabling faster 

analysis and lower costs. We request EPA to consult with SAE in order to fully explore this 

route. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 31]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC supports the use of the complete vehicle test cycle AC17 instead of the A/C Idle ON/OFF 

test, but would like to see a harmonization of the complete vehicle test cycle AC17 (within the 

US) and the European MAC efficiency test cycle. VCC proposes this to keep the number of tests 

at a minimum because these tests are very resource demanding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9551-A2, p. 8]
Air Conditioning System Credits

3-61

The new GHG regulations have led to substantial enhancements of several test procedures, all to 

achieve more real and credible results. However, it is important that EPA and NHTSA, in 

cooperation with CARB, also realize that these complex test procedures may result in excessive 

costs for manufacturers. VCC therefore asks that EPA and NHTSA, in cooperation with CARB, 

recognize that the SC03 test is a much more complex test format and requires a unique test 

facility, and that manufacturers today have limited capacity. Consideration also should be given 

to how critical these tests are, with a view to limiting the number of tests that are required, while 

achieving quality results in order to identify the efficiency of AC systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 8]

The AC17 test is a long, expensive and complicated test, so it is essential that the number of tests 

should be kept to a reasonable and manageable level. The AC17 test takes approximately four 

hours, which is eight times as long as the AC Idle test. The AC17 test requires more technician 

time to set up the elaborate instrumentation, and it requires SC03 climate-controlled test cells. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

For future technologies, VCC supports the utilization of a system bench test to measure energy 

efficiency of an AC system. In future advanced technology vehicles, active AC cooling of the 

battery pack could be necessary. Therefore, for this type of vehicle a complete vehicle test such 

as the AC17, could prove to be difficult to achieve the necessary repeatability, because it would 

require keeping track of the environment of the battery pack during the test. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

VCC supports the new method for attaining efficiency credits. VCC thinks that the so-called 

credit menu for energy efficient AC system components is somewhat misleading. VCC considers 

that a combination of different technologies in the credit menu could give advantages or 

disadvantages in AC system efficiency depending on how the combination is made. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

VCC's opinion is that the amount of credits should be a result of a suitable full vehicle test or 

bench test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 9]

Response:

EPA acknowledges the general support for a more comprehensive vehicle-based test for 

generating A/C efficiency credits, AC17, instead of the Idle Test. We also recognize the 

manufacturer and industry concerns regarding the burden and accuracy of such a test. As such, 

we have incorporated changes regarding ambient temperature and humidity tolerances the 

environmental test chamber (see TSD Section 5.1.3.6). Modifications regarding the tolerances 

for test cell ambient conditions on the Idle Test have been incorporated as well (see TSD Section 

5.1.3.5). Regarding the burden of the AC17 test, we have implemented a program where a 

maximum of one AC17 test per vehicle platform will be required in a given model year, with the 

ability to carry forward the AC17 test result and A/C credits to future model years. We believe 

that this revision addresses concerns about the number of tests that will need to be performed in 

order to generate credits, while appropriately ensuring sufficient testing to confirm that new 
EPA Response to Comments

3-62

technologies are reducing CO2 emissions as expected. The details regarding the determination of 

how many AC17 tests a manufacturer will need to submit upon certification (see preamble 

Section II.F.1.b.ii and III.D and TSD 5.1.3.8).

In response to comments concerning the accuracy (and test-to-test repeatability) of the AC17 

test, EPA believes that our testing of production vehicles has shown that with proper control of 

the test cell conditions, the AC17 test cycle is capable of producing results that can demonstrate 

differences in A/C load, which are then reflected in tailpipe CO2 emissions. Our analysis of these 

test results is found in TSD 5.1.3.7. In addition, our memo to the docket (see Docket Number 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799) describing the results of USCAR testing -- in which the effect of 

specific A/C technologies are evaluated relative to a baseline technology -- also supports our 

position that the AC17 test is capable of quantifying the effect of efficiency-improving 

technologies. While the USCAR test results may lack the number of repeat tests necessary to 

establish a reduction in CO2 emissions, these preliminary and developmental results serve to 

demonstrate that the effect of the efficiency-improving technologies is always in the direction of 

lower A/C-related CO2 tailpipe emissions relative to a baseline technology. 

In regard to comments which suggested different A/C system control settings or adjustment of 

control settings based on actual interior temperature readings, we believe that such changes 

would add complexity to the test and could result in greater test-to-test variability, as interior 

temperatures can be airflow- and vehicle-dependent, and language to define precise, repeatable 

positioning of vents (which would affect the interior temperature reading) is not feasible at this 

time. As such, we are finalizing the A/C system control settings that were specified in the NPRM 

(see TSD Section 5.1.3.6). 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-1

4. Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and 

Fuel Cell Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Clean Skies Foundation (ACSF)

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Borg Warner, Inc.

Center for Biological Diversity

Center for Sustainable Systems, University of Michigan

Ecology Center

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Edison Electric Institute (EEI)

Electric Drive Transportation Association

Ferrari

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Growth Energy

Honeywell Transportation Systems

Hyundai America Technical Center

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Jackson, F.W.

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Magna E-Car Systems

Marz, Loren C.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Minnesota Department of Commerce

Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Corn Growers Association et al.

National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Nissan North America, Inc.

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Pew Charitable Trusts
EPA Response to Comments

4-2

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

South Coast AQMD

Tesla Motors, Inc.

Toyota Motor North America

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Weiner, L.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Automakers should not be required to account for utility GHG emissions. The proposed rule 

indicates that the agencies expect electric vehicles to become an increasingly large part of the car 

park. Yet the rule leaves open the possibility of requiring manufacturers to account for upstream 

emissions from electricity generation in the event that the Administration is unable to control 

these emissions through other channels. In other words, automakers may now be called on to not 

only make an unprecedented investment into vehicles with lower GHG emissions, but to also fill 

the void between this rulemaking and a comprehensive national energy policy. If Americans 

agree that programs to address upstream GHG emissions are appropriate, then such programs 

should be put in place through appropriate regulation of electricity generators, not by imposing 

additional burdens on vehicle manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.4-5]

Dual Fuel Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.68]

The Alliance supports the continued use of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) cyclespecific utility factor approach for PHEV compliance and label emissions calculations. This 

utility factor approach provides a method for predicting the fractions of total distance driven in 

each mode of operation. In this case the modes of operation would be wall electricity from the 

grid or conventional liquid fuel such as gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.68]

Automakers Should Not be Required to Account for Utility GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.76]

EPA requests comments on several aspects of its proposal regarding accounting for the carbon 

emissions from the use of electricity. These include the conversion process, tons accounting, a 

phase out, costs, the timing, etc. The Alliance strongly recommends that all upstream carbon 

emissions from the use of electricity be quantified as zero for the purposes of automotive GHG 

emissions regulations. This should be the case for all model years and for all vehicle volumes. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.76]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-3

In the NPRM, EPA notes, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.76]

The tailpipe GHG emissions from EVs, PHEVs operated on grid electricity, and hydrogen-fueled

FCVs are zero, and traditionally the emissions of the vehicle itself are all that EPA takes into 

account for purposes of compliance with standards set under Clean Air Act section 202(a). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.76]

The Alliance agrees with this statement and further notes that EPA should, in fact, maintain this 

same logic when dealing with current and future GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.76]

EPA further states, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.76]

Focusing on vehicle tailpipe emissions has not raised any issues for criteria pollutants, as 

upstream emissions associated with production and distribution of the fuel are addressed by 

comprehensive regulatory programs focused on the upstream sources of those emissions. At this 

time, however, there is no such comprehensive program addressing upstream emissions of 

GHGs, and the upstream GHG emissions associated with production and distribution of 

electricity are higher, on a national average basis, than the corresponding upstream GHG 

emissions of gasoline or other petroleum based fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.76]

Again, the Alliance maintains that simply because EPA does not currently regulate upstream 

emissions at the source, this is not reason enough to inappropriately attempt to control them via 

automakers. Clearly automakers have no control over the feedstock’s that power plants use to 

create electricity, nor do we have control over the conversion or transportation processes, or 

where and when a vehicle owner recharges a vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

pp.76-77]

Further, EPA states, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.77]

Manufacturers are unlikely [to invest in PHEVs and EVs] if vehicles with these technologies are 

treated for compliance purposes to be no more advantageous than the best conventional hybrid. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.77]

EPA Data Supports the Alliance Position [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.77]

The agencies’ own analysis and data prove that if upstream carbon emissions from electricity are 

accounted for in automakers compliance calculations, a PHEV or EV costs three to four times 

more than a strong hybrid for the same reduction benefit. While the Alliance is not indicating 

agreement with the agency’s analysis and data, we do believe it is helpful to use that analysis and 

data to show how it supports the Alliance position. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.77]

Table 3.12-1 of EPA’s Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA RIA) shows several 2011 model 

year vehicles with associated data. The table includes manufacturer, vehicle name, footprint, 

unadjusted fuel economy, tailpipe CO2 and powertrain type. In addition to the data in this table, 
EPA Response to Comments

4-4

for select models, below we have also included the associated unadjusted electrical consumption 

and the cost from other sources within the joint TSD and the EPA RIA. Finally, for the analysis, 

we included data from a baseline small car (4-cycle, 6-speed at 41 mpg (216.8 g/mile)) from the 

TSD for comparison purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.77] [For the table please 

refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.77]

# Leaf mpg value is mpge [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

** Costs from EPA documents below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

P2 from Table 1.2-7 Costs for P2-Hybird Technology (pg 24 of 377 of the EPA RIA), large car 

at 10% mass reduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

PHEV40 from Table 1.2-9 Costs for Plug-in Hybrid Technology with 40 Mile EV Range, (pg 25 

of 377 of the EPA RIA), small car at 15% mass reduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.78]

EV75 from Table 1.2-10 Costs for Full Electric Vehicle Technology with 75 Mile Range, or 

EV75, (pg 25 of 377 of the EPA RIA), small car at 10% mass reduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.78]

PSHEV from Table 3-46 Costs for Power-Split Hybrids, small car [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.78]

* 260 w-hr/mi is back-calculated from pg 294 of 893, 'example, as shown in the Regulatory 

Impact Analysis, today’s Nissan Leaf EV would have an upstream GHG emissions value of 161 

grams per mile based on national average electricity' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

* 251.9 Whr/mi is the unadjusted combined electric consumption rate for the Volt as report in 

certification documentation for the 2011MY Chevrolet Volt [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.78]

From this EPA data, a “grams per unit” benefit (with the 0.0 g/mile incentive in place) can be 

calculated, compared to the baseline, for each technology. For example, to improve the 

performance of his fleet, if a manufacturer chose to replace a baseline small car in its fleet with 

an EV75, it would replace a 216.8 g/mile unit with a 0.0 g/mile and have a 216.8 g/unit benefit. 

Similarly, if the manufacturer chose to replace the baseline car with a P2HEV, the benefit would 

only be 46.5 g/unit (216.8-170.3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

Further, by dividing EPA’s cost by the calculated gram per unit benefit, we can determine the 

cost per gram of improvement for the manufacturer’s potential choices. For example, while 

replacing a baseline small car with an EV75 gains the manufacturer 216.8 g/unit of benefit, it 

comes at a cost of $57.7/gram ($12,508/216.8). It is interesting to note, before moving on to 

these same calculations without the 0.0 g/mile upstream incentive in place, that a PSHEV (i.e., a 

strong hybrid that does not use grid electricity) is more effective on a $/gram basis than either 

PHEV40 or an EV75. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-5

The next step in the analysis is to determine both the gram/unit and $/gram values for both the 

PHEV40 and EV75 if the 0.0 g/mile upstream emissions incentive is removed and automakers 

are required to account for power plant emissions. EPA outlines how this calculation is to occur, 

proposing a 4-step methodology for calculating the GHG emissions compliance value for vehicle 

production in excess of the cumulative production cap for an individual automaker.6 For 

example, for an EV in MY 2025, this methodology would include the following steps and 

calculations: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

Measuring the vehicle electricity consumption in watt-hours/mile over the EPA city and highway 

tests (for example, a midsize EV in 2025 might have a 2-cycle test electricity consumption of 

230 watt-hours/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.78]

Adjusting this watt-hours/mile value upward to account for electricity losses during electricity 

transmission (dividing 230 watt-hours/mile by 0.93 to account for grid/transmission losses yields 

a value of 247 watt-hours/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.79]

Multiplying the adjusted watt-hours/mile value by a 2025 nationwide average electricity 

upstream GHG emissions rate of 0.574 grams/watt-hour at the power plant (247 watt-hours/mile 

multiplied by 0.574 grams GHG/watt-hour yields 142 grams/mile). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.79]

Subtracting the upstream GHG emissions of a comparable midsize gasoline vehicle of 39 

grams/mile to reflect a full net increase in upstream GHG emissions (142 grams/mile for the EV 

minus 39 grams/mile for the gasoline vehicle yields a net increase and EV compliance value of 

103 grams/mile). Using this methodology and the data in table 3.12-1, a g/mile value without the 

0.0 g/mile upstream emissions incentive for both the Volt and Leaf can be determined. The 

Leaf’s compliance value without the 0.0 g/mile upstream emissions incentive is 121.5 g/mile 

while the Volt’s is 141.3 g/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.79] [For the table 

referenced please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.79]

Applying the same gram/unit and $/gram values for both these values for Leaf and the Volt 

results in: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.80]

Model Year Vehicle Grams/unit benefit NO 0.0 $/gram NO 0.0

2011 Small Car

2011 Leaf 95.3 131.3

2011 Volt 75.4 155.0 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.80]

On a dollars per gram of benefit basis, using EPA’s own data, an EV75 or PHEV40 costs three to 

four times as much as a strong hybrid (i.e., $43.1/gram for a strong hybrid versus $131.3/gram 

for an EV75). Automakers are businesses, and with the 0.0 g/mile upstream electricity emissions 

incentive, an EV75 or PHEV40 make only marginal business sense. Without the zero upstream 

emissions factor, both an EV75 and a PHEV40 - all PHEV/EV variants for that matter - make no 

business sense. The Alliance strongly recommends that EPA finalize the 0.0 g/mile 
EPA Response to Comments

4-6

quantification incentive for the purposes of automotive GHG emissions regulations, for all model 

years, and for all vehicle volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.80]

Additional Comments Related to Upstream Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.80]

The Agencies request comment on whether or not the 0.0 g/mile value should phase out 

completely in MY 2022 or instead decay at half value or some other rate. They also ask for 

comment regarding the 200,000 unit cap (or 300,000 if certain conditions are met) for MYs 

2012-2016. Consistent with our above comments, upstream electricity emissions should be 

counted at 0.0 g/mile for auto manufacturers for all years - MYs 2012-2025 - with no sales 

volume limits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.80]

The entities with control over those emissions are the federal and state agencies that regulate 

power plant operation and performance, the power companies that buy and sell power from 

different energy sources, and the vehicle operators who decide when to recharge their vehicles --

not the manufacturers who produce the vehicles. Assigning upstream emissions factors to gridpowered vehicles would be economically inefficient. The entity to regulate is the utility, not the 

downstream user. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.80]

Finally, making vehicle manufacturers responsible for emissions over which they have no 

control is contrary to the Clean Air Act. Section 202(a) of the Act gives EPA authority to set 

'standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor 

vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.' Upstream emissions are not emissions 'from' vehicles or 

engines; they are emissions from power plants and other facilities involved in generating energy 

used for many purposes, such as powering vehicles. And even if such legal authority existed, 

with no sound method for assessing comparative upstream emissions effects from grid-powered 

electric vehicles, and significant regional variations in upstream GHG emissions, the attribution 

of upstream emissions impacts to grid-powered vehicles alone would be arbitrary, capricious and 

an abuse of discretion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.80]

The Alliance supports the advanced technology volume multipliers as proposed in the NPRM. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

In addition, the Alliance would support NHTSA’s further evaluation of such multipliers, as their 

inclusion in the NHTSA requirements would help to further harmonize the two programs. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

Also, the agencies proposed minimum electric or equivalent all-electric range for the definition 

of a PHEV for use of this advanced technology volume multiplier. The agencies specify that to 

qualify, a PHEV must “...be required to be able to complete a full EPA highway test (10.2 

miles), without using any conventional fuel, or alternatively, have a minimum equivalent allelectric range of 10.2 miles as measured on the EPA highway cycle.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.82]

The Alliance supports this metric and definition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-7

Additional Attribute(s) for PHEV Incentive Multipliers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.82]

EPA requests comment on whether PHEV incentive multipliers should vary based on range or on 

another PHEV metric such as battery capacity, or ratio of electric motor power to engine or total 

vehicle power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

Basing PHEV incentive multipliers on factors such as battery capacity or power has potential 

unintended consequences. These types of metrics encourage manufacturers to install battery 

capacity or power not demanded by customers thereby increasing vehicle costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

Given the potential unintended consequences of adding additional attributes to determine PHEV 

incentive multiplier credits, the Alliance recommends that a single multiplier be used for all 

PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

Dual Fuel Vehicle CAFE Calculations for MY 2020-2025 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.82]

EPA requests comment on several aspects of dual fuel vehicle CAFE calculations for MY 2020 

and later, including how to weight alternative and conventional fuel use and whether to continue 

use of the petroleum equivalency factor for PHEV equivalent fuel economy and the 0.15 divisor 

for dual fuel vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.82]

EPA proposes to weight dual fuel (but not flexible fuel vehicle) conventional and alternative fuel 

use by applying the SAE-based utility factor approach. This approach equitably weights the 

expected fuel use on conventional and alternative fuels based on national driving pattern surveys, 

and is supported by the Alliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 98.]

Second, the rule needs to fit into comprehensive energy policy. For instance, the proposed rule 

indicates that the agencies expect electric vehicles to become an increasingly large part of the car 

market; yet, the rule leaves open the possibility of requiring manufacturers to account for 

upstream emissions -- this is what Mike Robinson spoke about -- from electricity generation in 

the event that the Administration is unable to control these emissions through other channels. If 

programs to address upstream emissions are needed, then let's put them in place with appropriate 

upstream regulations, not by imposing additional burdens on automakers.

6 - Id. at 75014. The Alliance is using EPA’s methodology only for the sake of analysis. The 

Alliance is not stating it is in agreement with EPA’s methodology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.78]
EPA Response to Comments

4-8

Organization: American Clean Skies Foundation (ACSF)

In the Proposed Rule, EPA plans to allow a '0 grams per mile' incentive to EVS. This incentive is 

subject to certain per-manufacturer and industry-wide production caps. The decision to calculate 

the upstream emissions of EVs at 0 grams per mile (g/mi) is combined with the above multiplier 

incentive to create undue and discriminatory benefits for EVS. For the reasons stated above, 

ACSF believes that the 0 g/mi incentive is inappropriate and it should be eliminated. The 0 g/mi 

is anticompetitive and unnecessarily favors one class of lower carbon vehicle platforms at the 

expense of others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 11]

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Treatment of EVs and PHEVs

ACEEE has previously expressed to the EPA its view that the treatment of EVs and PHEVs in 

the GHG emissions program should be based on emissions performance, both to maximize 

benefits of the rule and to help put plug-in vehicles on a sound environmental footing. Treating 

EVs as zero-emissions vehicles allows unearned increases in emissions from gasoline vehicles, 

thereby undercutting the GHG reductions achieved by the rule. We have also previously 

recommended that, if some EVs are to be treated as zero-emissions vehicles in the 2017-2025 

period, the number of such EVs should be capped at 2 million, based on considerations of annual 

sales volumes and battery cost reductions. The caps on zero-emissions EV proposed in the 

NPRM far exceed our recommendations. In fact, no cap is proposed for the period 2017-2020. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.8]

Most important, however, is that a zero-upstream treatment of plug-in vehicles not be continued 

indefinitely, and that full upstream accounting be applied to these vehicles by a date certain. 

EPA’s proposed treatment of EVs largely accomplishes this, so we strongly support that aspect 

of the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.9]

Recommendations

• In calculating UFs for PHEVs, apply the appropriate shortfall to fuel economy test values 

in charge-depleting mode. Use Fleet UFs, rather than the MDIUFs, for labeling purposes.

• Make UF values for PHEVs publically available, along with other fuel economy and 

emissions performance data for individual vehicle models.

• Begin using UFs to calculate the fuel economy of PHEVs in 2017. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9528-A2, p.9]

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Compliance calculations should be transparent and should not include inappropriate incentives or 

credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.8]

EPA proposed temporary incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs for MYs 2017-2025 (76 FR 

75012). The first is to allow EVs, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs, electric operation), 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-9

and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) to use a GHG compliance value of 0 grams per mile, even though 

upstream GHG emissions for electricity generated by a coal-fired powerplant without carbon 

capture and sequestration or for hydrogen generation can be very high. The second proposed 

alternative is a multiplier for all EVs, PHEVs and FCVs which would allow each of these 

vehicles to “count” as more than one vehicle in the manufacturer’s compliance calculation. 

AFPM objects to these proposed temporary incentives as they distort real world impacts and 

paint a false picture of the proposed fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-

A1, p.8]

These proposed incentives are inappropriate and very misleading considering the current extent 

of electricity generation by coal-fired powerplants without carbon capture and sequestration and 

unknown processes for generating hydrogen. These proposed temporary incentives will not result 

in a substantial reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions if recharging uses coal-fired powerplants 

without carbon capture and sequestration. It is certainly not evident that hydrogen will be 

produced on a low-carbon lifecycle basis. Conversion of fossil fuels like natural gas to produce 

hydrogen results in carbon emissions until carbon capture and sequestration is commercialized 

and deployed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.8]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

EPA requests comment the multiplier incentives, as proposed in Table III-15, for EVs, PHEVs 

and FCEVs. Honda supports these multipliers. EVs, PHEVs and FCVs are expensive 

technologies that hold promising environmental benefits. Honda generally supports incentives 

that are proportionate to the benefits. Alternative fuel vehicles and advanced technologies face 

unique challenges in coming to market; developing appropriate infrastructure and overcoming 

initial consumer resistance to new, unfamiliar technologies. Incentives that are limited in time 

and appropriately phased-out can help accelerate the introduction of these vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 2]

EPA proposes to set the upstream portion of EVs, PHEVs and FCEVs to zero grams/mile. EPA 

requests comments on this approach. Honda believes that EPA should separate incentives and 

credits from the measurement of emissions. Honda believes that without accounting for the 

upstream emissions of all fuels, inaccurate comparisons between technologies will take place. 

Relying upon EPA’s regulation, policy makers – in the U.S. and around the world – may make 

unfavorable technology comparisons and set mis-directed policies as a result. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 3]

A compelling example exists. According to DOE’s GREET model, the upstream emissions of a 

Toyota Prius are 46 grams/mile, and the tailpipe emissions are 198 grams/mile, for a total of 244 

grams/mile. By contrast, the GREET model estimates the average upstream emissions of a 

comparably sized Battery Electric Vehicle (BEV) are 256 grams/mile. Without commenting on 

the merits of creating incentives for electric vehicles, it is clear that zero grams/mile for the BEV 

would lead one to believe that BEVs have a clearly superior greenhouse gas profile compared to 

similarly sized hybrid gasoline vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

4-10

EPA’s regulations need to be comprehensive and transparent. By zeroing out the upstream 

emissions, EPA is conflating incentives and credits with proper emissions accounting. In 

discussions with EPA staff, the question of “double counting” arose. This argument points out 

that electric power generation is under its own regulations, and including the upstream emissions 

in this regulation would result in “double counting.” Honda observes that upstream emissions are 

necessarily correlated with the intensity-based emissions regulation of light duty automobiles. In 

the case of petroleum refineries, significant increases in fuel economy on the part of automobile 

manufacturers could result in a “windfall” for the refineries’ if their tonnage caps were not 

adjusted accordingly. These two arguments suggest that not only the upstream emissions of 

electricity but the upstream emissions of all fuels ought to be included in EPA’s 

regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, pp. 3-4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 116-118.]

Honda has long advocated for technology-neutral performance-based standards. These are 

important principles for several reasons. First, technology-neutral is important because these 

standards would be in place for more than a dozen years into the future. It is impossible to 

predict the potential advances that would be made over this time in each and every technology. 

Technology-neutral standards help to assure that favoritism in 2012 does not lead to failure in 

2020. And just as importantly, each OEM will have different capabilities with respect to each 

technology, and favoritism for a technology necessarily results in, intentionally or not, favoritism 

for an OEM.

Secondly, performance-based standards are the best way to assure that regulations result in the 

greatest advance possible for our social goals.

In the 2012 to '16 regulation EPA set the CO2 value for the electric portion of the plug-in electric 

vehicles and battery electric vehicles to zero as an incentive for OEMs to bring these relatively 

expensive vehicles to market. This incentive was capped both in terms of volume and timing. 

These constraints have been weakened by their extension through 2025. Honda believes that this 

policy is misguided and creates significant incorrect perceptions about the relative merits of 

these technologies. We agree with most of the environmental community that the social benefits 

must be understood and measured on a well-to-wheel basis. It is clear that there are no special 

virtues to be associated with tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions if the well-to-tank emissions are 

high.

Additionally, without a comprehensive well-to-wheel assessment of greenhouse gases, EPA and 

others who rely on EPA's assessments will improperly favor or signal preferred technologies 

rather than providing technology-neutral standards.

We think the solution to quantify well-to-wheel greenhouse gas emissions is already within the 

government's grasp. The Department of Energy uses a respected, widely accepted model called 

GREET, and the NGOs, academics and the federal government itself use GREET to model 

policy choices when considering light-duty vehicles and their impact on the greenhouse gas 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-11

emissions. We believe it makes sense for EPA to adopt DOE's GREET model in order to 

evaluate the well-to-wheel impact on various technologies.

EPA has solicited comments on its proposal for advanced technology multipliers as a means to 

facilitate market penetration of the most advanced vehicle technologies as rapidly as possible. 

Honda supports the proposed multipliers for EV, PHEV, and fuel cell technologies. EPA 

requested comment on the idea of including natural gas vehicles in the technology multipliers. 

Natural gas vehicles can reduce CO2 as much as 25 percent simply through changing the fuel 

from gasoline to natural gas. In addition, there is a new-found abundance of this clean domestic 

fuel. Together these attributes mean it makes sense to include natural gas vehicles in the 

advanced technology multiplier.

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

While API has no comment on the stringency of the proposed fuel economy and CO2 standards, 

we are concerned that the proposal provides a number of incentives that appear to reflect an 

attempt to pick winning and losing technologies in the marketplace, an action which could 

potentially limit consumer choice and increase societal costs. [This comment can also be found 

in sections 5.1 and 6 of this comment summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 1]

Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles—

EPA is proposing an extra credit incentive multiplier for CO2 compliance purposes to promote 

early market penetration for all electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), 

and fuel cell vehicles (FCV) sold in MY 2017 through 2021. EVs and FCVs would start with a 

multiplier value of 2.0 in MY 2017, phasing down to a value of 1.5 in MY 2021. PHEVs would 

start at a multiplier value of 1.6 in MY 2017 and phase down to a value of 1.3 in MY 2021. The 

multiplier is 1.0 for MY 2022-2025 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 1]

For EVs, PHEVs (electricity usage) and FCVs, EPA is proposing to set a tailpipe-only CO2

compliance value of 0 g/mi. Beginning from MY 2022, the 0 g/mi limit would only be allowed 

up to a per-company cumulative sales cap, above which manufacturers would be required to 

account for the net upstream GHG emissions for the electric portion of operation, using 

accounting methodologies set out in the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 1]

As EPA and NHTSA staff should be aware, the history of government agency efforts to dictate 

the pace of technology development and utilization in the market place is usually unsuccessful, 

to the detriment of US taxpayers and, ultimately, consumers. The recent bankruptcy filing of the 

solar panel firm, Solyndra Corp after having received over a half billion dollars in US 

government loan guarantees is one example.3 Continuation of a mandate to force the use of 

millions of gallons of cellulosic biofuels (when the current production is zero) is another.4 

EPA’s faith that NOx adsorbers will be the predominant technology to meet the heavy-duty 

diesel engine emissions standards is a third.5 The incentive to use an artificial 0 g/mi lifecycle 

GHG value for EVs, PHEVs and FCVs and to count this value as much as twice for compliance 

purposes for a period of time is potentially a fourth example. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-

A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

4-12

API opposed the use of multipliers and 0 g/mi lifecycle GHG scores for advanced technology 

vehicles in comments filed on the corporate average fuel economy/GHG rulemaking for MY 

2012 – MY 2016 passenger cars and light trucks, and our opposition remains unchanged.7 

Ignoring the significant contribution of (and extensive compilation of published literature on) 

upstream CO2 emissions from electricity generation, defies principles of transparency and sound 

science and distorts the market for developing transportation fuel alternatives. It incentivizes the 

electrification of the vehicle fleet with a pre-defined specific and costly8 set of technologies 

whose future potential is not measured with the same well-to-wheels methodology against that of 

advanced biofuels or other carbon mitigation strategies. Furthermore, when used in conjunction 

with the car/light truck trading flexibilities proposed for the automakers, this incentive could 

potentially yield unintended consequences that run counter to the intent of the rule to reduce 

GHG emissions attributable to light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, pp. 2-

3]

Although battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) have zero 

tailpipe emissions, they will have significant upstream emissions. Despite the proposed percompany cumulative production cap on the numbers of BEVs and HFCVs that will qualify for 

the zero emissions compliance incentive, the effect of ignoring upstream GHG emissions yields a 

substantial incentive for these qualifying vehicles as we demonstrate below. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 3]

Upstream emissions, coupled with the incentive multipliers described above, will allow well-towheels (WTW) carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emission rates for BEVs and HFCVs that are 

clearly greater than the gasoline vehicles they would replace for model years 2017 to 2021, even 

though they are counted as zero for compliance purposes. Even for model years 2022 to 2025, 

neither BEVs nor HFCVs have a WTW emission rate markedly lower than the gasoline target. 

These results, which are based on the published fuel economy performance and specifications 

(i.e., footprint) of the Nissan Leaf (BEV) and Honda FCX Clarity (HFCV), are shown in Figures 

1 and 2, respectively. Appendix A summarizes the details regarding the calculation of the 

estimated WTW CO2e gram-per-mile emission rates shown in these figures, which reflect U.S. 

average electricity emission rates and hydrogen produced from natural gas via steam methane 

reforming. [Figures 1 and 2 can be found on p. 4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9469-A1.] [Appendix A can be found on pp. 14-18 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9469-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 3]

Regulatory agencies should not be in the business of promoting investments and innovations in 

government-selected technologies applied to government-selected vehicle categories. Regulators 

should instead set broad, performance-based targets that reward innovation directed at achieving 

outcomes, not the implementation of specific technologies. The market, via consumer choice, 

should then be allowed to select the winners and losers. In short, the proposed 0 g/mi CO2

compliance values and multipliers for EVs, PHEVs and FCVs should be removed. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 3]

Calculation of Upstream GHG Emissions
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-13

EPA argues that electricity and hydrogen can be produced from renewable resources with very 

low carbon emissions (e.g., wind energy for electricity and use of that electricity for electrolysis 

of water to H2). The contribution of these carbon-free electricity feedstocks (to the extent that 

they are dedicated to the production of transportation fuels in the timeframe of the proposed rule) 

should be calculated as a percent of their overall contribution to the electricity grid. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 5]

EPA is requesting comment on the appropriate electricity upstream GHG emissions factor or rate 

to use in future projections of EV/PHEV emissions based on the net upstream approach outlined 

in the proposed rule. The Agency is proposing to use a CY 2025 nationwide average electricity 

GHG emissions rate (power plant plus feedstock extraction, transportation, and processing) of 

0.574 grams GHG/watt-hour, based on simulations with the EPA Office of Atmospheric 

Program’s Integrated Planning Model (IPM) in the calculation of upstream GHG emissions for 

EVs and PHEVs. API concurs with the EPA’s observation that there is significant regional as 

well as temporal variation in the fuels and equipment used for electric power generation. 

Consequently, a more robust analysis and representation of upstream electricity GHG emissions 

that incorporates this regional and temporal variability is preferable if the ultimate objective is to 

reflect real-world fuel usage patterns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 5]

EPA notes that the emission factor for electricity was adjusted upwards by 6 percent in order to 

properly capture GHG emissions associated with the feedstock gathering that occurs upstream of 

the power plant. This adjustment apparently was based on the GREET Model Version 1.8.c.0 

and was carried over from the analysis used to support the MY 2012-MY 2016 Final Rule.10 

Using the most recent version of GREET (version 1_2011) yields an adjustment factor of 9.2% 

for the average US electricity mix in calendar year 2020, calculated as shown in Appendix B of 

these comments. However, this revised adjustment factor from GREET masks a wide range of

uncertainty in the underlying data used in the model – a fact recently acknowledged in print.11 If 

EPA continues to rely on GREET for upstream emissions calculations, this further heightens the 

need for the Agency to conduct a more robust and rigorous analysis (as discussed above) to 

increase confidence in the accuracy of the model results. [Appendix B can be found on p. 19 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, pp. 

5-6]

• The government should not pick technology winners - Regulatory agencies should not promote 

investments and innovations in government-selected technologies applied to governmentselected vehicle categories. Regulators should instead set broad, performance-based targets that 

reward innovation directed at achieving outcomes, not the implementation of specific 

technologies. The market, via consumer choice, should then be allowed to select the winners and 

losers. The proposed production and compliance incentives - particularly those for plug-in hybrid 

electric vehicles (PHEVs) full electric vehicles (EVs) fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) and dual-fueled 

vehicles should be removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A2, pp. 1-2]

• The proposal distorts the market and ignores real environmental impacts - Allowing plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles, full electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles to certify to a 0 g/mi CO2

standard does not properly reflect the full well-to-wheels contribution of these technologies to 

the GHG inventory. By not counting the real contribution of upstream CO2 emissions from 
EPA Response to Comments

4-14

electricity generation, the proposal distorts the market for developing transportation fuel 

alternatives. The 0 g/mi CO2 compliance values for EVs, PHEVs and FCVs should be dropped 

from the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A2, p. 2]

3 Bloomberg Business Week, Solyndra Files for Bankruptcy, Looks for Buyer, September 6, 

2011, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9PJ89JG0.htm [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9469-A1, p. 2]

4 US Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Finalizes 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 

December 2011, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/documents/420f11044.pdf [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 2]

5 http://www.epa.gov/otaq/highway-diesel/regs/ria-iii.pdf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, 

p. 2]

7 Isakower, K.B., American Petroleum Institute, November 24, 2009, Comments on the 

Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light Duty Vehicle Green House Gas Emission Standards and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, submitted to Dockets EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472 

and NHTSA-2009-0059 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 2]

8 For instance, Table V-107 of the NHTSA Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment suggests 

that the net accumulated cost of a Mid-Size Passenger Car EV (75 mile range) in MY 2025 is 

anticipated to be $13,517 - exclusive of the incremental costs associated with expanding the EV 

charging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 3]

10 EPA, NHTSA, Draft Joint Technical Support Document: Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-

2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 

Economy Standards, November 2011, p. 4-43 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 5]

11 Burnham, A. et al, Argonne National Laboratory, “Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of 

Shale Gas, Natural Gas, Coal and Petroleum,” Environmental Science & Technology, 2012, 

46,619-627 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

EPA has proposed company specific caps on the 0 grams per mile emissions rate for electric and 

fuel cell vehicles beginning with MY 2022. Global Automakers recommends that EPA 

reconsider the need for these caps as part of the planned mid-term review of the standards. If 

EPA decides to adopt company-specific caps, we recommend that it adopt a simple linear 

function based on vehicle sales levels to establish the caps, rather than using the proposed twostep approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 66-67.]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-15

Advanced technology credit provides an incentive for manufacturers to continue to develop and 

market these technologies which have the potential for substantial long-term improvements in 

fuel efficiency and emission performance.

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

Regarding electric vehicles, automakers can influence tailpipe emissions but not power plant 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 1]

We acknowledge that the upstream impact of electricity generation needs to be addressed in 

order to ensure the credibility of a policy supporting the electrification of road transport; 

therefore, 0g/mi upstream emissions can be the goal. However, as automakers, we accept the 

responsibility for vehicle efficiency, but we have no control over the carbon content of electricity 

generation and cannot be held responsible for energy mix decisions made decades ago. 

Automakers can influence tailpipe emissions but not power plant emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 3]

Multipliers encourage automakers to pull-ahead early generation low CO2 technologies such as 

BEV, PHEV and FCV. Multipliers should be applied on advanced technologies with significant 

GHG reduction potential (which are much more expensive than mature gasoline technologies). 

Therefore, they are a motivation for automakers to move forward with cost-intensive technology 

(low volume, high investments) to reach full market economic viability. Multipliers are a key 

issue because significant market penetration of electric vehicles is needed for compliance with 

the proposed standards. The mid-term evaluation should also reassess the further need of 

multipliers, based on the current market penetration of electric vehicles. BMW is supportive of 

the proposed multipliers and recommends the inclusion of BEVx with a pro-rated multiplier in 

line with the recent CARB proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 3]

Projections by US authorities for overall standard achievement and projections for each OEM are 

all based on the assumption of a 0g/mi upstream approach. It is fundamentally unfair to punish 

the auto industry for power plant decisions made decades ago. Further, public utility 

commissions do not consider electric vehicles when they make decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 4]

The proposed cap for MYs 2022-25 may serve to slow the U.S. market penetration of electric 

vehicles as described below:

• Situation 1: A significant market penetration of E-mobility is needed for compliance with the 

proposed standards through MY2025 (i.e., industry must undertake extensive efforts). If Emobility does not develop as expected today or as projected in the joint draft Technical Support 

Document (TSD), automakers will need to compensate the missing E-mobility contribution 

through the introduction/penetration of additional cost-intensive advanced technologies, thereby 

creating a disadvantage for automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 4]

• Situation 2: If E-Mobility shows a higher success than assumed, then industry will be punished 

for their efforts by inclusion of upstream emissions but without a corresponding correction of the 
EPA Response to Comments

4-16

standards. This increases the stringency of the standards, again disadvantaging

automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 4]

• Result: The inclusion of upstream emissions, even with the proposed exemption for MYs 2022-

25, creates a strong disincentive for future E-mobility activities from automakers. Automakers do 

not control the electric power grid mix and have absolutely no ability to influence upstream 

emissions. Therefore, 0g/mi upstream emissions should be set for electric vehicles without caps 

or other conditions for the duration of the rule and beyond. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-

A1, enclosure p. 4]

However, if the proposed cap for MYs 2022-25 is retained, BMW recommends the adoption of 

the following for the treatment of upstream emissions when the cap is exceeded:

• Manufacturers are responsible for vehicle energy consumption only.

• Therefore, the regulation of energy efficiency should be taken into account by converting the 

electric energy consumed during the cycle into fuel efficiency- or CO2- equivalent by means of a 

MJ based conversion from electricity to gasoline CO2 content. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-

A1, enclosure p. 5]

Organization: Borg Warner, Inc.

In reviewing the proposal we are concerned that the rules contain a lot of language and 

incentives to steer the technologies used to achieve the goals. We feel the rules should focus 

solely on setting the standards and let the marketplace decide which technologies are best to 

meet the consumer needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, p. 1]

The inclusion of performance based credits offered for any vehicle that achieves a rating above 

the standard is the right approach and we commend the EPA and NHTSA for this. However, we 

see no need to also offer credits based on simply using a certain technology regardless of its 

credits for incorporating a technology regardless of the contribution that technology has made in 

improving CO2 performance, and plug-in electric, plug-in hybrid electric and fuel cell vehicles 

that are rated at 0 g/mi CO2 and also receive an inflationary multiplier to vehicle volumes when 

calculating corporate averages. In today’s atmosphere of limited capital this approach to drive a 

certain technology mix could also impede the development and market introduction of more 

conventional, cost-effective solutions that utilize existing infrastructure in large volumes 

resulting in better real-world results. All technologies need to be on equal ground and 

evaluated/incentivized based on their real-world performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-

A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

1. The electric vehicle credits must be removed

The Center supports the development of all forms of non-fossil-fuel based vehicles, including 

electric vehicles (EVs), battery electric vehicles (BEVs), fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-17

plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). Although these vehicles are likely to have tremendous 

advantages in the form of energy conservation and greenhouse gas emissions reductions over 

conventional vehicles and play a critical role in weaning the transportation sector off fossil fuel 

use, those benefits can be lost if manufacturers are given credits for them that exceed the actual 

improvements they bring. In addition, credits lead to lower fuel efficiency standards overall if 

used to evade other efficiency technologies that would otherwise be installed. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 21]

For this reason, it is imperative that the Agencies complete full life-cycle analyses of the 

greenhouse gas emissions of each of these vehicles, accurately account for them in the overall 

vehicle fleet, and limit credits for these vehicles based only on actual emission reductions they 

achieve. We also believe the two “bonus credits” the NPRM envisions for EVs are 

inappropriate.100 These credits are (1) a default greenhouse gas compliance value of zero g/mi 

for BEVs, FCEVs and PHEVs, and (2) a multiplier system that lets manufactures count each EV 

as more than one vehicle in the earlier years of the rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 21]

While we believe that credits may have provided a valuable incentive for electric vehicles during 

the 2012-2016 rulemaking to encourage this relatively new technology, such concerns are now 

misplaced. The 2017-2025 rulemaking years no longer constitute a start-up period for these 

vehicles. Allowing their lifecycle greenhouse gases to be ignored may well lead to substantial 

unintended consequences, encouraging forms of technologies that actual do not reduce 

greenhouse gases to the extent envisioned. Only full, transparent, and accurate accounting can 

guard against this clear possibility, including full modeling of regional variations in grid 

electricity carbon intensity. As pointed out by ICCT, the use of multipliers and windfall credits 

for vehicles required under the California ZEV mandate is particularly problematic and should 

be eliminated, and we incorporate ICCT’s comment on this subject here by reference. 101 ICCT 

calculates that these two forms of credit would eliminate the reduction of 80 to 110 million 

metric tons of greenhouse gases from the MY 2017-2025 rulemaking period.102 This is clearly 

contrary to the statutes’ intent, and we urge the Agencies to remove these credits from the final 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 21]

100 We agree with the Agencies’ assessment that the credits for electric vehicles already 

included in 49 U.S.C. § 32904(a)(2)(B) precludes additional incentives beyond those already 

provided for by Congress. NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74878 n.56. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-

A1, p. 21]

101 ICCT Comments at 29-34. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 21]

102 Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 21]

Organization: Center for Sustainable Systems, University of Michigan
EPA Response to Comments

4-18

We recognize that electrified vehicles, including battery electrics (EVs), and plug-in hybrids 

(PHEVs), have the potential to reduce GHG emissions from the light-duty vehicle fleet. In low 

carbon grid scenarios electrified vehicles have been shown to have a lower emissions profile than 

conventional gasoline and diesel powered vehicles (CVs).1 However, the GHG emissions 

attributable to electrified vehicles charged on the current U.S. electric grid, are significant.2 The 

proposed 2017-2025 GHG emission standards neglect to count these important upstream sources. 

This may result in unintended consequence by incentivizing electrified vehicles which may be 

charged in regional grids of high carbon intensity. Vehicles charged in these grids may do little 

to reduce the total new vehicle fleet GHG emissions, without a significant change in the electric 

grid. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9493-A1, p.1]

1 - Elgowainy, A., et al. (2010). “Well-to-wheels analysis of energy use and greenhouse gas 

emissions of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.” Chicago, IL, Argonne National Laboratory.

2 - MacPherson, N. D., Keoleian, G. A., Kelly, J. C. (2012). ”Fuel Economy and Greenhouse 

Gas Emissions Labeling for Plug in Hybrid Vehicles from a Life Cycle Perspective.” Journal of 

Industrial Ecology. In review.

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 190-191.]

in particular the incentives for electric vehicles, plug-in electrics and fuel cell vehicles.

As I stated earlier, support for these emerging technologies is critical if we are to maintain U.S. 

leadership and encourage new manufacturing opportunities here at home. We do agree, however, 

that the incentives should be phased out over time so the full emissions of these vehicles can be 

accounted for. We, therefore, support the decrease in the incentive multiplier and the proposed 

manufacturer caps on the 0-gram per mile value for upstream emissions.

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

II. Proposed Incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs

In developing the proposed standards, the agencies have considered and accounted for a wide 

range of technologies which they believe are, or will be available for manufacturers to reduce 

GHG emissions and improve fuel economy. These technologies specifically include advances in 

gasoline engines and transmissions - technology already familiar to, and accepted by the vast 

majority of consumers. However, in the Proposed Rule the agencies have chosen to limit 

valuable industry incentives for meeting these standards to a small, select group of vehicles. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 3]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-19

While we agree that including credit mechanisms in the National Program is necessary and 

appropriate, such provisions should not undercut the primary objectives of the program, namely 

achieving significant reductions of GHG emissions and improving fuel economy in the light 

vehicle fleet. Favoring a handful of vehicle technologies over other competing technologies with 

equal or better performance is counter to the intent of the Proposed Rule. EcoMotors urges EPA 

and NHTSA to adopt a significantly more technology-neutral and attribute-based program that 

provides greater opportunities and incentives for OEMs to take advantage of a broader range of 

technologies to meet federal standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 4]

A. EPA's Proposed Multiplier Incentive for EVs, FCVs and PHEVs

In order to encourage commercialization of EVs, FCVs and PHEVs, EPA is proposing an 

incentive multiplier for all EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs sold in MYs 2017-2021. Each 

EV/PHEV/FCV would 'count' as more than one vehicle in a manufacturer's compliance 

calculation. EPA is also considering providing similar multiplier incentives to dedicated and/or 

dual fuel compressed natural gas vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 4]

EcoMotors endorses EPA's institution of temporary regulatory incentives that will promote 

commercialization of game-changing advanced vehicle technologies. However, as drafted, the 

regulations would result in OEMs and consumers being force-fed a select group of costly 

vehicles at the expense of technology neutrality. Other less-costly and equally energy efficient 

and environmentally beneficial vehicle technologies - available today - should be afforded 

equally beneficial regulatory incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 4]

EPA has been very candid about the significant consumer barriers facing EVs, FCVs and PHEVs 

in the Proposed Rule. While it 'remains optimistic' about consumer acceptance of these vehicles 

in the long run, it acknowledges that it is 'less certain' about their near-term market acceptance. 

The unease expressed by the agency is not unfounded. A 2010 study by J.D. Power and 

Associates concluded that the significant obstacles faced by hybrid electric vehicles and battery 

electric vehicles make it unlikely that global demand for these vehicles will reach the levels 

predicted for the industry. The study determined that sales of these advanced vehicles are 

expected to account for only slightly more than 2.2% of global passenger-vehicle sales in 2010, 

and will only account for 7.3% of global passenger-vehicle sales in 2020.6 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 4]

The Proposed Rule, if implemented, will clearly diminish the incentive for automotive 

manufacturers to invest in a range of other technologies that can dramatically reduce GHG 

emissions and improve fuel economy. Yet, as the Boston Consulting Group recently noted, 

'[a]dvanced ICE technologies [which include gasoline- or diesel-based direct injection, reduction 

of engine displacement by turbocharging and reduction of internal engine resistance] will be the 

most cost-effective way to reduce CO2 emissions on a broad scale.' 7 Near-term development 

and commercialization of advanced ICE technologies, such as the opoc engine and other 

advanced vehicle technologies, remains an extremely important path for emissions reduction and 

fuel economy improvements and should be encouraged by national policy, particularly 

considering the challenges that must still be overcome for widespread market acceptance of EVs, 

FCVs and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 5]
EPA Response to Comments

4-20

Other hybrids, such as hydraulic hybrids, should also be targeted for regulatory incentives. 

Certainly EPA's partnership with the Chrysler Group, LLC to apply EPA's hydraulic hybrid 

technology to LDVs is a clear indication that EPA is very optimistic about the GHG and fuel 

economy benefits of this cutting-edge technology. The Final Rule should include language broad 

enough to encompass, and grant incentives to hydraulic hybrid vehicles, as well as all 

mechanical hybrids. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 6]

• Specific Recommendation: EcoMotors strongly encourages EPA to extend comparable 

EV/PHEV/FCV multiplier incentives to OEMs that manufacture mechanical hybrid 

vehicles, hydraulic hybrid vehicles, and similar advanced technology hybrid vehicles 

during MYs 20172021. This would place other significant, game-changing vehicle 

technologies -like the dual-module opoc engine - on a level playing field with EVs, 

PHEVs and FCVs, and continue to encourage innovation in our struggling auto industry. 

EcoMotors stands ready to assist the agencies in crafting appropriate language to embrace 

a range of advanced technology hybrid vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 

7]

EPA is proposing a 0g/mile tailpipe compliance value for all EVs, PHEVs (electricity usage) and 

FCVs in MYs 2017-2021. In MYs 2022-2025, 0g/mi would only be allowed up to a percompany cumulative sales cap, established on a tiered basis. EPA proposes to phase-in the 

change in compliance value, from 0g/mile to a net upstream accounting, for any manufacturer 

that exceeds its cumulative production cap for EV/PHEV/FCVs. Not until MY 2022 would the 

compliance value for EVs, FCVs, and the electric portion of PHEVs in excess of individual 

automaker cumulative production caps begin to be calculated according to a methodology that 

accounts for the full net increase in upstream GHG emissions relative to that of a comparable 

gasoline vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 9]

The EPA proposal to specify 0g/mile for these vehicles' tailpipe emissions continues to 

completely ignore the fact that electric vehicles draw some or all of their fuel from the grid 

which is not GHG free.13 Yet EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that 'the upstream GHG 

emissions associated with production and distribution of electricity are higher than the 

corresponding upstream GHG emissions of gasoline or other petroleum based fuels.” The 

Proposed Rule even notes that 'today's Nissan Leaf EV would have an upstream GHG emissions 

value of 161 grams per mile based on national average electricity, and a value of 89 grams per 

mile based on the average electricity in California, one of the initial markets for the Leaf.' Other 

significant studies, such as the National Academy of Sciences' report, 'Hidden Costs of EnergyUnpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use,' have also recently drawn attention to the 

hidden life-cycle costs associated with electric vehicles - including those associated with energyand material-intensive battery and electric motor production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-

A2, p. 9]

An accurate assessment of the environmental benefits of fuel/propulsion system options requires 

a complete 'well-to-wheels' analysis. The CO2 value for these vehicles should be based on a 

sound scientific approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 10]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-21

The impacts on GHGs and other pollutant emissions from electric vehicles are significant and 

should be quantified by EPA to the extent possible for purposes of this rulemaking. The 

emissions associated with EVs, PHEVs and FCVs should not be ignored for several more years. 

Commencing with MY 2017, EPA should set aside all incentives that falsely suggest that there 

are no environmental repercussions associated with the use of these vehicles. Furthermore, when 

combined with the incentive multipliers proposed for EVs, PHEVs and FCVs (discussed above), 

allocating a 0g/mile emissions value to these vehicles is clearly excessive. EPA is promoting 

these vehicles well beyond their environmental merits. This is inherently inequitable to other 

less-costly and even more environmentally-beneficial vehicle technologies available today -like 

EcoMotors' opoc MDH engine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 11]

• Specific Recommendation: EcoMotors encourages EPA to drop the 0g/mile tailpipe 

compliance value for EVs, PHEVs (electricity usage) and FCVs and to calculate and 

include the full 'well-to-wheels' upstream emissions from fuel production and distribution 

in their CO2 emissions commencing in MY2017 in order to achieve equity across 

different vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 11]

6 J.D. Power and Associates, 'Drive Green 2020: More Hope than Reality?' (November 2010). 

The MIT Electric Vehicle Team has identified significant limitations for electric vehicles in each 

of the following areas: energy and power density, battery charging, lifetime performance, and 

system costs, and recently cautioned: Existing internal combustion powertrains are remarkable in 

that they provide excellent performance... We can drive our cars for more than 300 miles, fill lip 

anywhere in 5 minutes. When treated well, these vehicles can last a decade and travel hundreds 

of thousands of miles before they finally fall apart. This sets quite a high bar for the new EV 

market entrants. MIT Electric Vehicle Team, 'Technology, Challenges, and the Future of Electric 

Drive,' (April 2008), p. 1, http://web.mit.edu/evt/summary future. pdf.

7 The Boston Consulting Group, 'The Comeback of the Electric Car? How Real, How Soon, and 

What Must Happen Next' (2009), p. 2. See also J.D. Power and Associates, supro, p. 68 ('[I)n 

order to safeguard the environment today, it will remain important to pursue continuous 

improvements in ICEs and allow time to map out the future.')

13 EcoMotors commends the agency for attempting to fully account for the upstream GHG 

emissions associated with all electricity used by EVs and PHEVs (and any hydrogen used by 

FCVs) in its regulatory projections of the impacts and benefits of the program, and in all GHG 

emissions inventory accounting.

Organization: Edison Electric Institute (EEI)

More than most other technologies or policy options, EVs offer the U.S. the capability to 

substantially reduce, if not end, its dependence on petroleum fuels. EEI’s comments focus on 

EPA’s regulatory incentives to foster widespread commercial deployment of EVs. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 1-2]
EPA Response to Comments

4-22

I. Executive Summary

Electric vehicles “have significant transportation GHG emissions and oil consumption 

gamechanging potential in the long-run.” Increased deployment of EVs will increase fuel 

efficiency and reduce dependence on petroleum. Increased EV deployment also will reduce 

emissions of GHGs and criteria air pollutants from the transportation sector. These 

environmental benefits will be compounded by the continued reductions in emissions of both 

GHGs and criteria air pollutants related to the generation of the electricity that will fuel EVs. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 2]

EEI supports the decision to use 0.0 g/mile for the EV (and PHEV in all-electric mode) 

compliance value for MY 2017-2021 and to provide a multiplier for manufacturers who produce 

these zero-emitting vehicles. EPA should not “discount” EV incentives for MY 2022-2025 to 

reflect specific upstream GHG emissions related to electricity production. If EPA decides to 

discount EV incentives in the later years of the proposal, the Agency should not calculate an 

upstream electricity GHG emissions factor today for standards that will not take effect for nearly 

10 years. Given the limits of EPA’s modeling and uncertainties about the fuel and emissions 

profile of electric generation in 10 years, there is no way that any emissions factor for MY 2022 

calculated today would bear a reasonable relationship to actual future emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 2]

Moreover, EPA’s proposed approach to assessing upstream GHG emissions in the power sector 

is inappropriate, unfair and based on incorrect data and assumptions. By focusing only on 

upstream electricity GHG emissions and not upstream emissions related to other fuels, EPA is 

not fairly comparing the overall well-to-wheels emissions of EVs with those of conventional 

vehicles. When compared on a well-to-wheels basis, EVs have lower emissions than 

conventional vehicles. If EPA continues to focus on upstream electricity GHG emissions, the 

Agency’s analysis must be based on the most accurate and timely information about the makeup 

of the electric generating fleet and must consider regional variation in generation portfolios, 

particularly in those areas that are likely to be earlier adopters of this important technology. If 

EPA does not revise this approach, the Agency will continue to overestimate EV emissions as 

compared to emissions from conventional fuels, underestimating the environmental, economic 

and energy security benefits of EVs are realized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 2-3]

II. EPA and NHTSA Should Incentivize the Production of All Types of Electric Vehicles for All 

Model Years Covered by the Proposed Rule.

EEI applauds EPA’s determination that incentives are needed to ensure the commercial success 

of electric vehicles because they “have significant transportation GHG emissions and oil 

consumption game-changing potential in the long-run.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 75011. Increased 

deployment of EVs will increase fuel efficiency and reduce dependence on petroleum, consistent 

with the goals of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Increased EV deployment 

also will reduce emissions of GHGs and criteria air pollutants from the transportation sector. 

These environmental benefits will be compounded by the continued reductions in upstream 

emissions of both GHGs and criteria air pollutants related to the generation of the electricity that 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-23

will fuel EVs. See upstream emissions discussion in section III, infra. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9584-A2, p. 3]

At present, as EPA notes in the proposed rule, the missing link between the potential 

environmental and energy independence benefits of EVs and achieving these benefits is the 

widespread deployment of this new technology. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75011. EPA’s proposed 

incentives for EVs will help forge this link. EEI supports providing EV incentives in the context 

of CAFE and GHG vehicle standards, as discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, 

pp. 3-4]

A. EPA Should Finalize the EV Incentives for MY 2017-2021 as Proposed.

EPA proposes different incentives for the different types of electric vehicles and for different 

time periods covered by the MY 2017-2025 standards. For MY 2017-2021, EPA proposes two 

incentives: 1) allowing EVs, including PHEVs in all-electric mode, to use emissions of 0.0 

g/mile for compliance purposes; and 2) providing a multiplier that allows EVs to “count” as 

more than one vehicle in a manufacturer’s compliance calculation. The proposed multiplier for 

PHEVs is discounted, presumably to reflect operations not in all-electric mode. 76 Fed. Reg. at 

75012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 4]

EPA considers counting EV emissions (and PHEV emissions when operating all-electric mode) 

as 0.0 g/mile an “incentive” because of concerns related to the upstream GHG emissions 

associated with electricity production. See upstream emissions discussion, section III, infra. 

While EEI appreciates EPA’s efforts to foster increased EV manufacturing and deployment, it 

must be emphasized that this is not an “incentive” but a recognition of actual EV emissions, 

which are 0.0 g/mile when measured at the tailpipe, the proper point at which to measure 

compliance with vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 4]

Nonetheless, these MY 2017-2021 incentives represent a welcome improvement and departure 

from EPA’s more limited approach to EV incentives for MY 2012-2016, which placed a 

production cap on the number of vehicles for which manufacturers could use 0.0 g/mile for 

compliance purposes and provided no multipliers. See 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010). EEI 

supports the broader “incentives” for MY 2017-2021 proposed by EPA as tools necessary to 

encourage the increased manufacture and ultimate deployment of EVs and PHEVs. EPA should 

finalize these incentives as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 5]

B. EPA’s Approach to Incentives for MYs 2022-2025 Is Fundamentally and Technically Flawed 

and EPA Should Wait to Finalize These Incentives.

For MY 2022-2025, EPA proposes only one “incentive” for EVs: Manufacturers can use 0.0 

g/mile for EVs (and PHEVs in all-electric mode) when calculating compliance averages, but this 

is limited by a manufacturer-specific production cap. The production cap is tiered to provide 

greater incentives to those manufacturers that invest in EV technologies earlier. See 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 75013. EPA states that the production cap also is necessary as a way to limit “the overall 

decrease in program GHG emissions reductions associated with the incentives.” Id. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 5]
EPA Response to Comments

4-24

In the alternative, EPA is considering an industry-wide production cap to provide greater 

certainty as to the number of EVs deployed and the overall impact on GHG emissions. See id. 

EPA suggests that a 2-million vehicle cap would limit the “maximum decrease in GHG 

emissions reduction to about 5 percent of total program GHG savings.” Id. EPA would allocate 

the cap to individual automakers in calendar 2022 based on cumulative EV/PHEV/FCV sales in 

MYs 2019-2021. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 5]

For vehicle production that exceeds the cap, EPA proposes that compliance values for EVs and 

PHEVs be “calculated according to a methodology that accounts for the full net increase in 

upstream emissions relative to that of a comparable gasoline vehicle.” Id. EPA proposes a 

methodology for making this calculation, based on estimated future projections of upstream 

GHG emissions associated with the grid electricity used to charge EVs and PHEVs. See id. at 

75014. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 6]

In order to discount the incentive for any sales above the manufacturer-specific (or industrywide) 

cap for MY 2022-2025, EPA proposes a four-step methodology, which would require, among 

other things, measuring EV electricity consumption in Watt-hours/mile and then multiplying this 

figure by an already pre-determined 2025 nationwide estimated average electricity upstream 

GHG emissions rate of 0.574 grams/Watt-hour. See 76 Fed. Reg. 75014. EPA would use a 

similar approach for PHEVs. See id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 6]

EEI opposes the use of any upstream GHG emissions factor. EV tailpipe emissions are 0.0 

g/mile, and this is the value that should be used for compliance purposes for all time periods 

covered by the proposed vehicle standards. EPA should not “discount” this compliance value to 

reflect upstream GHG emissions related to electricity production. After all, EPA does not 

calculate any value for upstream emissions rates for conventionally-fueled vehicles.3 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 6]

In addition to EEI’s general objection to estimating any discount factor based on upstream 

electricity GHG emissions, there are several issues with EPA’s proposed approach to estimating 

an appropriate discount factor. If EPA persists in using a discount factor, the Agency must 

address these issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 6-7]

First, it is inappropriate for EPA, now in 2012, to calculate any upstream electricity GHG 

emissions rate for 2025, as there is no way that this value could reasonably approximate actual 

electric generating unit (EGU) emissions 13 years in the future. The current version of EPA’s 

Integrated Planning Model (IPM), which is used to generate electricity generation emissions 

data, relies on certain assumptions about the current national electric generating unit (EGU) fleet 

and incorporates some, but not all, regulations affecting EGUs in the near term. The version of 

IPM used for the proposed vehicle standards does not, for example, include EPA’s recently 

promulgated hazardous air pollutant regulations, nor does it include any regulations that are not 

currently on the books, but expected to be final and effective well before MY 2025. These 

include GHG new source performance standards (NSPS) for both new and existing EGUs, new 

effluent guidelines for EGUs, new regulations for EGU cooling water intake structures and new 

regulations affecting the disposal of coal combustion residuals. These regulations will 

dramatically change the makeup of the current EGU fleet, as many coal-based units will retire 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-25

rather than incur the substantial costs associated with air, water and solid waste pollution control 

retrofits. If these units are replaced by those using renewable fuels, or even natural gas, their 

GHG emissions will be much lower than those of existing units. Because no one knows how 

many units will be retired and replaced by cleaner fuels, it is impossible for the 2012 version of 

IPM to predict with any accuracy an upstream electricity GHG emissions rate for 2025. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 7]

EPA notes that it is considering running IPM with “more robust” vehicle and vehicle charging 

specific assumptions to generate a “better” electricity upstream emissions factor for the final 

rule. Id. Unless EPA dramatically changes its assumptions about the makeup of the generating 

fleet in 2025 to better reflect current and expected regulations, any additional IPM runs – even 

those using updated vehicle and charging assumptions – will be equally unable to provide an 

upstream electricity GHG emissions rate that has any relationship to actual emissions in 2025. If 

EPA does decide to conduct additional IPM runs for the final rule, the Agency must do more 

than update vehicle and charging assumptions, and any and all changes in the assumptions must 

be subject to notice and comment. A discussion of appropriate assumptions related to EV 

upstream emissions is included in section III, infra. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 8]

If EPA persists in using an upstream electricity GHG emissions rate, there is no regulatory 

purpose served by calculating a 2025 rate that is, on its face, inaccurate now. The Agency would 

be better served by waiting until MY 2021 to estimate upstream GHG electricity emissions, 

using actual emissions data and the most up-to-date information about the EGU generating fleet. 

EPA easily could conduct this analysis concurrently with the planned midterm evaluation of the 

vehicle standards necessary to support NHTSA’s required, separate rulemaking to establish 

CAFE standards for MY 2022-2025. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 74879. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9584-A2, p. 8]

III. EPA’s Approach To Upstream EV Emissions Related To Electricity Generation Is Flawed 

And Must Be Revised.

The tailpipe emissions of EVs (and PHEVs operating in an all-electric mode) are 0.0 g/mile, for 

both GHG emissions and criteria air pollutant emissions. Despite this, EPA asserts that it must 

consider the upstream GHG emissions related to the grid electricity and that these upstream 

emissions are higher than those associated with the production and distribution of gasoline. See 

76 Fed. Reg. at 75010. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 9]

Upstream GHG emissions related to electricity production are only part of the analysis, however, 

and by focusing on upstream emissions only for EVs, EPA underestimates the overall 

environmental benefits of EVs. Upstream electricity GHG emissions are only relevant to the 

extent that EPA considers all upstream emissions from all fuels, which EPA does not do. When 

compared on a well (EGU)-to-tailpipe basis, EV GHG emissions are less than those of 

conventional vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 10]

Contrary to EPA’s assertions, expanded introduction of EVs into all classes and categories of 

vehicles will serve to reduce GHG emissions significantly from the transportation sector, not 

dilute vehicle emissions standards, as EPA asserts. See Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)-
EPA Response to Comments

4-26

National Resourced Defense Council, Joint Technical Report, Environmental Assessment of 

Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles, Vol. 1: Nationwide Greenhouse Gas Emissions.6 In the Draft 

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (at 6-22), NHTSA concludes that the literature review 

reveals an overarching conclusion about the GHG emissions from EVs compared to conventional 

vehicle: “[E]ven in modeled scenarios in which EVs charge from a carbonintensive grid mix 

(i.e., electricity generated mostly from coal power plants), the vehicle lifecycle emissions from 

EVs are less than conventional gasoline vehicles.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 10]

Even if EPA were to compare the overall emissions of conventional vehicles and EVs fairly, 

EPA first would have to revise its assessment of EV emissions. EPA’s current approach to EV 

emissions is unfair, inappropriate, and based on flawed data and assumptions. If EPA believes 

that upstream emissions must be discussed in the context of vehicle standards and decides to 

consider all emissions from all fuels, EPA must revise the final rule to provide a full and accurate 

discussion that leads to a fair comparison of the upstream emissions for all vehicle fuels and 

recognizes the environmental benefits of EV deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, 

pp. 10-11]

A. EPA Has Failed To Consider the Transition of the Generating Fleet in Response to 

Environmental Regulations.

For many reasons, the U.S. electric generating fleet in MY 2025 will be significantly cleaner 

than the fleet of 2012: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 11]

Increased regulation of criteria air pollutant emissions, via more stringent standards under the 

CAA to address national ambient air quality standards for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, 

particulate matter; new hazardous air pollutant regulations addressing mercury, acid gases, nonmercury metals and other pollutants; new standards to address the interstate transport of air 

pollution; and more stringent standards to address ozone and opacity.

Regulation of GHG emissions from new sources and the existing fleet under two separate

CAA programs, NSPS and the new source review/prevention of significant deterioration preconstruction permitting programs.

Regulation of coal combustion residuals.

More stringent effluent guidelines and cooling water intake structure regulations.

Increased deployment of high-efficiency natural gas combined cycle units to provide additional 

generating capacity and replace retired coal units.

Increased deployment of renewable generation to comply with state renewable portfolio standard 

(RPS) or renewable electricity standard (RES) requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-

A2, p. 11]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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These trends towards increasingly clean generation are evident in the recent projections from the 

Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its Annual Energy Outlook 2011. In EIA’s 

Reference Case, average emissions intensity, per unit of electricity generated, for the U.S. 

electric power sector is projected to fall between 2010 and 2020 by 40.4 percent for sulfur 

dioxide, 26.5 percent for nitrous oxide, 36.9 percent for mercury and 7.9 percent for carbon 

dioxide.7 And because EIA’s Reference Case generally assumes that current laws and 

regulations remain unchanged throughout the projections, these calculated improvements would 

likely be greater if EIA took into consideration all of the air quality rules that have been finalized 

in recent years and are expected to be finalized in the next several years, as well as clean energy 

technology improvements and cost reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 11-12]

EPA also states that it is appropriate to consider upstream EV emissions because currently there 

is no national, comprehensive program addressing GHG emissions from the electric sector. See 

75 Fed. Reg. at 75010, 75011. EPA’s focus on the existence of a “current” national regulatory 

program addressing GHGs related to electricity production and distribution is not appropriate in 

the context of vehicle rules covering MY 2017-2025. But, there are no comprehensive GHG 

emissions control programs for any fuel sector today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 

12]

Moreover, it appears that the electric sector will become subject to GHG regulations sooner than 

other fuel sectors. Under the terms of a settlement agreement signed in late 2010, EPA is in the 

process of designing proposed GHG NSPS for all fossil fuel-based EGUs. These standards will 

apply to new units and major modifications, as well as the existing fleet. While EPA has missed 

the original deadline for proposing the GHG NSPS, at least the new and modified source parts of 

the rule are expected to be released imminently. The entire GHG NSPS program is expected to 

be in place within the next few years, well before the MY 2017 standards take effect. In the 

proposed rule, EPA fails to acknowledge these standards and their effect on electricity generation 

during the time period covered by the proposed MY 2017-2025 standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 12-13]

B. Unless EPA Considers the Upstream Emissions Related to Other Fuels, EPA Cannot Purport 

to Compare EV and Conventional Vehicles.

Moreover, EPA asserts that the “overall GHG emissions” associated with the generation and 

distribution of electricity are higher than the upstream emissions associated with the production 

and distribution of gasoline. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 75010, 75011. Not only is this statement 

unsupported by any facts or analysis, but it difficult to see how EPA can make such a 

comparison when the Agency has failed to include, by its own admission, an examination of the 

overall GHG emissions related to the production and distribution of other transportation fuels. In 

the proposed rule, the Agency acknowledges that 20 percent of the GHG emissions from 

traditional fuel vehicles are related to upstream fuel production and distribution, see id., but 

provides no evidence that these emissions were considered when making comparative statements 

about the upstream emissions for EVs. This undermines EPA’s determination that considering 

upstream GHG emissions related to electric vehicles is appropriate because of the “higher” 

upstream GHG emissions associated with electricity production and distribution. See id. EPA 

cannot compare upstream emissions of the various vehicle fuels unless that comparison is a fair 
EPA Response to Comments

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comparison – and EPA has acknowledged that it is not. At minimum, if EPA is going to consider 

upstream emissions, the Agency should not make broad statements purporting to compare the 

“overall GHG emissions” related to electricity with the “overall GHG emissions” of other fuels 

unless and until the Agency’s analysis includes upstream emissions related to conventional 

fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 13]

C. EPA Does Not Use Recent Electricity Emissions Data and Has Failed to Consider Regional 

Variation in Electricity Generation and Likely EV Charging Timing Patterns.

Even if EPA were to conduct a fair comparison of the upstream GHG emissions between EVs 

and conventional vehicles, EPA first would have to revise significantly how the Agency 

estimates upstream emissions related to electricity generation. EPA’s assumptions about the 

upstream emissions related to the grid electricity that will be used to charge MY 2017-2025 are 

based on outdated and incomplete electricity generation data; do not address regional variability 

in the generating fleet or likely EV charging patterns; and do not take into consideration the 

expected composition of the electric generating fleet during the periods covered by the proposed 

standards. Unless and until EPA revises these assumptions, any comparison between the 

upstream emissions of EVs and conventional vehicles is fundamentally flawed and cannot serve 

as the basis for reasonable regulatory action. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 14]

First, EPA has used outdated data to support its assessment of the upstream GHG emissions 

related to EVs. EPA used eGRID2007 emissions factors, which contains electric generation 

emissions data from calendar year 2005. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75012. Using 2005 data quite 

clearly skewed the national average electricity upstream GHG emissions rate that EPA calculated 

for comparative purposes. For example, according to EIA, total carbon dioxide emissions from 

electric generation were 8.6 percent lower in 2009 compared to 2008 (and declined by nearly 

10.8 percent between 2005 and 2009).8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 14]

But even if EPA used 2011 emissions data, the more current data have no bearing on the GHG 

emissions from electricity production in MY 2017 and beyond. As noted, the electric generation 

in the U.S. has and will continue to become cleaner over time. This results from many factors, 

including renewable energy policies enacted by many states, more stringent EPA regulation, and 

even the low cost of natural gas, which has been displacing coal in many markets. EPA’s 

analysis fails to recognize these changes in the electric generation fleet. At a minimum, EPA 

should wait until the Agency can more reasonably obtain data for the period covered by the 

vehicle standards, considering all environmental requirements that will be in effect, as well as 

fuel generation patterns, as discussed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 15]

Second, EPA’s creation and use of a national average electricity upstream GHG emissions rate 

fails to account for significant regional differences in electricity generation. Emissions associated 

with the generation of electricity vary significantly from utility to utility—with nuclear, wind, 

solar, geothermal and hydroelectric power sources emitting extremely low or no GHGs or 

criteria air pollutants. Any meaningful estimates of upstream emissions associated with 

electricity as a transportation fuel would need to be tailored not only to reflect regional variations 

in current electricity baseload (and peak load) generation and expectations for marginal 

electricity generation mix, but also developments in usage and recharging of the vehicle (as more 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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“smart meters” and “smart chargers” are installed), as well as state and federal electric 

generation policies (such as state RPS and RES requirements)9 and state and regional/federal 

GHG emissions limits and reductions programs (e.g., California’s A.B. 32, the New England 

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the federal CAA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, 

pp. 15-16]

In the proposed rule, EPA acknowledges that there is “significant regional variation with 

upstream GHG emissions associated with electricity production and distribution.” See 76 Fed. 

Reg. at 75010 n.280. Accordingly, given this recognition, it is unreasonable for EPA to continue 

to use a nationwide average emissions rate. Any analysis of upstream electricity GHG emissions 

methodology for estimating upstream emissions rates must take the significant orders of 

magnitude of regional variability into account. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 16]

Regional variations in generating resources must be considered, especially with respect to the 

areas of the country with the highest expected near-term EV deployment rates. For example, 

California’s average upstream GHG electricity emissions rate is significantly lower than that of 

other parts of the country, as EPA recognizes in the proposed rule. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75011. 

California also is expected to have one of the highest rates of EV adoption.10 In 2011, California 

residents purchased more than 60 percent of the Nissan Leafs and about 30 percent of the 

Chevrolet Volts sold in the U.S.11 California also recently adopted aggressive regulations that 

are intended to put 1.4 million EVs, PHEVs and hydrogen vehicles on the state’s roads by 

2025.12 As a result, any analysis that uses national average upstream electricity GHG emissions 

to estimate the environmental impacts of early EV deployment is, by definition, overestimating 

these emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 16-17]

A recent graphic from the California Air Resources Board (CARB) report demonstrates the 

superior emissions benefits of EVs and PHEVs in California.13 [See figure on p. 17 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 17]

In addition, using nationwide average upstream GHG emissions would be inconsistent with 

previous Agency action to address fuel economy labels for LDVs. In that rulemaking, EPA 

concluded that “[d]ue to different electric generation fuels and technologies, this level of 

[regional generation] variation is significant; from one region to another, the highest-to-lowest 

upstream average GHG emission ratios are roughly 3-to-1. If examined from a utility-by-utility 

perspective, the ratio is even greater, at 75-to-1. For a national label to present a single national 

average would be misleading and inaccurate given such a wide range.” Revisions and Additions 

to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Labels, 76 Fed. Reg. 39478, 39493 (July 6, 2011). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 18]

Finally, EPA must also take into consideration the effects on upstream emissions rates of 

expected EV charging patterns. EV charging is likely to take place at night,14 when overall 

national GHG emissions related to electricity generation are lower because most wind power is 

generated at night15 and because baseload nuclear generating units do not cycle and are always 

operating.16 Electric utilities also are incenting night EV charging through time-of-day 

electricity rates and separate EV rates, which are significantly lower at night when overall 

electricity demand is lower. In addition, increased installation and use of smart meters in the 
EPA Response to Comments

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coming years, funded in large measure with stimulus funds administered by DOE, also will help 

to facilitate charging EVs at home at night. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 18-19]

IV. Conclusion

EEI appreciates EPA’s efforts to incentivize the manufacture and deployment of EVs and EPA’s 

recognition of the potential for EVs to revolutionize the transportation sector by reducing GHG 

and other criteria pollutant emissions and reducing U.S. dependence on imported oil. EPA’s 

overall assessment of the environmental impacts of EVs is flawed, however, and should be 

revised. If EPA’s assumptions about the upstream GHG emissions related to the generation of 

the electricity that will be used to power EVs were consistent with scientific literature, used 

appropriate and accurate information about the current and future generating fleet and recognized 

regional variability in electricity generation and expected charging timing patters, EPA would 

conclude that increased EV deployment will enhance GHG reductions in the transportation 

sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 19]

3 Upstream emissions related to oil production have been a central part of the debate over the 

Keystone pipeline.

4 See Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels & Advanced Vehicles Data Center, Natural Gas 

Emissions, available at: http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/vehicles/natural_gas_emissions.html.

5 For an assessment of the upstream emissions related to natural production and transportation 

from the Center for Transportation Research, Argonne National Laboratory, see A. Burnham et 

al., Life-cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Shale Gas, Natural Gas, Coal and Petroleum, 46 

Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 619 (2012), available at: 

http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/EE/797.PDF.

6 Available at: http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001015325. It is 

important to note that the EPRI-NRDC study focused on PHEVs and did not include EVs. If it 

had included EVs, its conclusions about reduced GHG emissions would have been even more 

robust.

7 EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2011 (Apr. 2011), Reference Case Scenario ref2011, Datekey 

d0202011a, compiled from Tables 8, 18, available at: 

http://eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/excel/yearbyyear.xls.

8 EIA, Electric Power Annual 2009 8 (Apr. 2011), available at 

http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf.

9 As of 2011, 29 states and D.C. have RPS or RES requirements and seven additional states have 

non-binding renewable generation goals. Existing RPs or RES requirements applied to 47 

percent of U.S. load in 2010; when these requirements are fully implemented, these obligations 

will apply to 56 percent of load. See R. Wiser, “State of the States: Update on RPS Policies and 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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Progress” (Oct. 20, 2010), available at: 

http://www.renewableenergymarkets.com/docs/presentations/2010/Wed_State%20of%20the%20 

Markets_Ryan%20Wiser.pdf.

10 See EPRI, Transportation Electrification: A Technology Overview 4-10 (2011), available at: 

http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001021334. EPRI also states that 

Oregon and Washington, D.C. are expected to have higher early EV adoption rates.

11 See Jerry Hirsch, Chevrolet Plans Special Volt to Qualify for Carpool Sticker, Rebate, Los 

Angeles Times, Jan. 19, 2012, available at: http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fimochevrolet- volt-20120119,0,6323739.story.

12 For more information, see 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/consumer_info/advanced_clean_cars/consumer_acc.htm.

13 CARB, Advanced Clean Cars: the Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) Regulation, Fact Sheet, 

available at: http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/factsheets/general_zev_2_2012.pdf

14 Researchers at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Argonne National Laboratory used data 

from the 2001 National Household Transportation Study to determine likely charging scenarios. 

They found that more than 60 percent of vehicles end their last trip after 5 p.m. and 70 percent 

after 4 p.m. More than half of these vehicles begin their first trip between 6 and 9 a.m. See A. 

Elgowainy, et al., Well-to-Wheels Analysis of Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions of 

Pug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, Energy Systems Division, Argonne National Laboratory, 

ANL/ESD/10-1 (June 2010), available at: http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/TA/629.PDF.

15 See K. Coughlin & J. Eto, Analysis of Wind Power and Load Data at Multiple Time Scales, 

Environmental Energy Technologies Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL4147E, 4 (Dec. 2010) (noting the “common features of wind power: regular diurnal pattern with 

stronger winds at night...”), available at: http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/ 

reliability/analysiswindpowerload.pdf. Indeed, NHTSA’s analysis also fails to consider how 

EVs, especially PHEVs, can help better integrate more variable resources, like wind, into the 

grid, further de-carbonizing electricity generation. See, e.g., F. Tuffner & M. Kintner-Meyer, 

Using Electric Vehicles to Meet Balancing Requirements Associated with Wind Power, DOE, 

PNNL-20501 (July 2011), available at: http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL20501_Renewables_Integration_Report_Final_7_8_2011.pdf.

16 Nuclear power plants essentially run continuously. This is because their power output cannot 

be ramped up and down readily on a daily and weekly basis. As a result, at night, when electric 

demand is lower, nuclear units continue to run and other forms of generation are backed off. See 

the World Nuclear Association’s website for more information: http://world-nuclear.org/.

Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association

While EDTA supports the overall direction of the proposed regulations, EDTA has three 

significant concerns with the proposal:
EPA Response to Comments

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First, EDTA opposes the proposal to include upstream emissions when determining the 

“compliance value” for light-duty vehicles pursuant to these regulations. The proposal to include 

upstream emissions exceeds EPA’s authority under Title II of the Clean Air Act. This proposal 

also lacks a rational basis because of the inherent uncertainties involved in calculating upstream 

emissions, and is arbitrary because it does not adequately account for the upstream emissions of 

conventionally fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, pp. 1-2]

Second, EDTA opposes the automatic phase-out of the multiplier for electric drive vehicles. The 

phase-out schedule in the proposed regulations is predicated on the assumption that the 

multiplier will become unnecessary by the year 2022. While it is possible that electric drive 

vehicles will gain widespread adoption by that year, the pace of adoption is uncertain and will be 

impacted by economic factors outside of the control of vehicle manufacturers, such as the price 

of conventional motor fuels. Given the inherent uncertainty in predicting the underlying 

economic trends that affect this industry, EDTA recommends that the multiplier be established 

for the full period covered by this rule (through 2025), subject to modification in a separate 

rulemaking following a mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 2]

Third, EDTA opposes NHTSA’s determination that it lacks authority to include a multiplier as 

part of its CAFE standards under EPCA and EISA. While these statutes do provide for certain 

incentives, they do not preclude NHTSA from establishing additional incentives, such as a 

multiplier. Adoption of a multiplier in NHTSA’s rule would promote the fundamental policy of 

developing a harmonized national system in which EPA and NHTSA establish consistent 

regulatory requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 2]

In addition, while we support the use of the utility factor methodology developed by the Society 

for Automotive Engineers (SAE), we encourage EPA to ensure the manufacturers are given an 

adequate opportunity to participate in determining the utility factor for each vehicle model. We 

also encourage EPA to ensure that its approach to determining the utility factor is harmonized 

with the ongoing efforts of the California Air Resources Board. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9449-A1, p. 2]

1. Upstream Emissions.

EPA’s proposed rule would provide a temporary incentive for (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric 

vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) – that is, electric drive vehicles – by allowing 

manufacturers to use a compliance value of 0 grams per mile (g/mile) when calculating GHG 

emissions for those vehicles. This provision will allow the 0 g/mile compliance value to be used 

for an unlimited number of vehicles in MY 2017-2021. But from 2022 onward, there would be a 

cap on the number of vehicles that could qualify for the 0 g/mile assumption. If sales exceed the 

cap in MY 2022 and afterward, the GHG emissions calculation for those vehicles would be 

required to include an amount equivalent to “net upstream emissions.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9449-A1, p. 2]

EDTA supports the proposal to establish a zero-emission compliance value for MYs 2017-2021, 

but opposes the proposal to include upstream emissions in the compliance values for vehicles 

above the cap in MY 2022 and beyond. Upstream emissions should not be included in 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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determining the compliance value because (1) EPA has authority under Title II of the Clean Air 

Act only to set emissions standards based on emissions from the vehicle itself, not upstream 

emissions; (2) EPA has not established an accepted methodology for calculating upstream 

emissions for individual makes and models of light-duty-vehicles; (3) it is arbitrary to include 

upstream emissions for electric drive vehicles, when such emissions are not regulated for other 

types of vehicles; and (4) any method for allocating the proposed cap could create uncertainty 

and adversely affect competition among vehicle manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9449-A1, p. 2]

a. EPA Lacks Authority to Include Upstream Emissions.

The proposed GHG emission standards are based on EPA’s authority to regulate motor vehicle 

emissions under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a). Section 202(a) gives 

EPA authority to set “standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or 

classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines ....” Id. (emphasis added). The 

plain language of Section 202(a) authorizes EPA to set emission standards applicable to 

emissions “from” a vehicle – i.e., tailpipe emissions. There is nothing in Section 202(a) that 

states or implies that EPA can set emission standards for a vehicle based on emissions that come 

from power plants or other upstream sources and are not “from” the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 3]

This reading of Section 202(a) is supported by other provisions in Title II of the Clean Air Act.

For example, Section 206 provides for the testing of vehicles to determine whether they conform 

to the emission standards established by EPA. Section 206 states that EPA “shall” test or require 

to be tested any new motor vehicle or engine upon request of a manufacturer, and “shall” issue a 

certificate of conformity to the manufacturer if the vehicle or engine conforms to the regulations 

issued under Section 202(a). This provision makes clear that EPA is required to issue a 

certificate of conformity for a vehicle if the emissions from the vehicle comply with the EPAprescribed emissions test. Section 206 does not give EPA discretion to establish an emissions 

test that imputes to a vehicle emissions that do not come from the vehicle itself, nor does it give 

EPA discretion to deny a certificate of conformity for a vehicle that passes the emissions test.

Similarly, Section 207 authorizes EPA to establish the emissions test that is used for determining 

“whether, when in actual use throughout its warranty period, each vehicle and engine ... 

complies with the emissions standards” set in the regulations issued under Section 202. This 

language in Section 207 requires the emissions test to be based on emissions from the vehicle 

itself, and leaves no discretion for EPA to establish an emissions test that imputes to a vehicle 

emissions released by power plants or other sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 3]

The overall structure of the Clean Air Act also confirms that Title II only gives EPA authority to 

set standards for emissions that come directly from motor vehicles. Congress created a 

comprehensive scheme to regulate emissions from a wide range of sources. Title I authorizes 

EPA to set emissions standards for stationary sources; Title II authorizes EPA to set emissions 

standards for mobile sources.1 There are many end-users of electricity whose activities could be 

associated with “upstream” emissions from power plants, but to date EPA has not sought to 

impute the power plants’ emissions to the end-users of the power generated by those plants.

Rather, EPA has interpreted the statutory scheme to require regulation of power plant emissions 
EPA Response to Comments

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at the source, not at the end-user. This approach is not only consistent with the structure of the 

Act; it also makes practical sense, because end users have no ability to control upstream 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 3]

Notwithstanding the plain language of Section 202(a) and the structure of the Clean Air Act, 

EPA asserts in this rulemaking that it has authority to include upstream emissions when 

establishing the compliance value for light-duty vehicles. The proposed rule itself does not 

articulate the legal basis for this assertion of authority. In its previous rulemaking for MYs 

2012-2016, EPA asserted in response to a comment that it has “broad discretion” to set GHG 

emission standards for light-duty vehicles under Section 202, including the authority to base 

compliance values on an assumed level of upstream emissions. (See 75 Fed. Reg. 75437). We 

respectfully disagree with that conclusion because it is contrary to the language and intent of the 

Clean Air Act. For the reasons stated above, Title II of the Act only gives EPA authority to set 

standards governing emissions “from” the vehicle itself. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, 

pp. 3-4]

b. EPA's Proposed Methodology for Estimating Upstream Emissions is Arbitrary.

Even if EPA were authorized to include upstream emissions when setting standards for vehicle 

emissions under Title II, such a requirement would be permissible only if EPA could articulate a 

non-arbitrary basis for estimating the upstream emissions for each vehicle model covered by the 

regulations. The “four-step methodology” proposed in this rule falls far short of this 

requirement. Rather than describing a methodology for estimating the upstream emissions 

associated with each vehicle, the proposed rule requires a single national average to be used as 

the basis for estimating upstream emissions for all vehicles. (76 Fed. Reg. 75014) (requiring use 

of “2025 nationwide average electricity upstream GHG emissions rate of 0.574 grams/watt-hour 

at the powerplant”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 4]

This national average – or any national average for that matter – fails to take into account the 

wide variation in actual “upstream emissions” among different regions, demographic groups, and 

vehicle types. The fundamental point is that average GHG emissions from electricity generation 

are not necessarily representative of the incremental emissions resulting from the charging of a

particular vehicle or vehicle model. The additional emissions associated with charging a 

particular vehicle or vehicle model will depend on many factors. First, any estimate of upstream 

emissions would need to take into account the geographic distribution of the users of the 

vehicles, since the electricity generation mix varies considerably by region. In addition, it would 

need to take into account the expected driving habits and charging habits of those users, which 

could vary significantly for different vehicle models. It also would need to take into account a 

host of capital investment and operational decisions made by electric utilities and grid operators, 

including decisions about the electricity generation mix for both base load and peak load that are 

made on a daily basis in managing the grid, and over time, in planning the energy inventory of a 

service territory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 4]

To avoid arbitrariness, any calculation of upstream emissions would need to be customized to 

reflect these factors with regard to each vehicle model in a manufacturer’s fleet. To date, no 

such methodology has been developed, and indeed it may not be possible to credibly do so. In 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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the absence of a statistically reliable methodology for calculating upstream emissions for each 

vehicle model, it would be arbitrary for EPA to require upstream emissions to be included as part 

of the compliance value for electric drive vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 4]

c. EPA's Proposal is Also Flawed Because it Would Not Apply Equally to All Vehicle Types.

An additional flaw in the proposed rule is the fact that it requires upstream emissions to be 

included for electric drive vehicles in spite of the fact that this has never been done for 

conventionally fueled vehicles. Even if EPA were authorized to regulate upstream emissions 

under Title II, any such system would need to apply evenhandedly to all categories of vehicles, 

including those that use petroleum fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 4]

The proposed regulations seek to address this concern by requiring the upstream emissions for a 

“comparable midsize gasoline vehicle” to be deducted from the upstream emissions for an 

electric drive vehicle. (See 76 Fed. Reg. 75014.) This methodology would mitigate, but not 

eliminate, the arbitrariness inherent in requiring upstream emissions to be included for some 

vehicles but not others. By EPA’s own logic, this methodology would understate the GHG 

emissions of both gasoline vehicles and electric drive vehicles. 

In short, we see no justification for imposing this upstream emission requirement on electric vehi

cles alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, pp. 4-5]

d. Allocating a Cap Could Create Uncertainty and Adversely Affect Competition.

Finally, the proposed methods for allocating a cap would create uncertainty among 

manufacturers and could distort competition. An industry-wide cap is especially problematic, 

because each manufacturer’s cap would depend on that manufacturer’s relative share of the 

market, not its absolute sales volume; a cap based on relative share is very difficult for a 

manufacturer to predict, because it is tied to decisions made by other manufacturers. The 

proposed company-specific cap would provide greater certainty, but it has drawbacks as well.

Any company-specific cap is potentially market-distorting, because it could enable a 

manufacturer to lock in a multi-year competitive advantage (in the form of a much higher cap) 

based on that manufacturer’s sales of electric drive vehicles in the years immediately following 

adoption of these regulations. While advantageous to that manufacturer, such a system would 

conflict with the goal of free and open competition. These practical difficulties with allocating a 

cap provide a further basis for eliminating the cap and instead allowing all vehicles to qualify for 

the zero-emissions compliance value.

For all of these reasons, EDTA recommends that the rule provide a zero-emissions compliance 

value for electric drive vehicles for the full period covered by this rule, MYs 2017-2025. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 5]

2. Phase-Out of Multiplier for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs.

For MY 2017-2021, EPA is proposing an incentive multiplier for all electric drive vehicles to 

facilitate market penetration of the most advanced vehicles as rapidly as possible. This 

multiplier approach means that each EV, PHEV, and FCV would count as more than one vehicle 
EPA Response to Comments

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in the manufacturer’s compliance calculation. For EVs and FCVs, the multiplier would be 2.0 

from MY 2017 to MY 2019, at which point it will be phased down to 1.75 in 2020 and 1.50 in 

2021; in 2022 and later, it would be 1.0 (i.e., no multiplier). For qualifying PHEVs, the 

multiplier would be 1.6 from 2017-2019, 1.45 in 2020, 1.3 in 2021, and 1.0 from 2022 onward.

To qualify for the multiplier, a PHEV would need to complete a full EPA highway test (10.2 

miles), without using any conventional fuel, or alternatively, have a minimum equivalent allelectric range of 10.2 miles as measured on the EPA highway cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9449-A1, p. 5]

The rationale for the multiplier, as described in the proposed rule, is that a multiplier is needed as 

an incentive to accelerate the commercialization and widespread adoption of EVs, PHEVs, and 

FCVs. EDTA concurs that this incentive is needed, but opposes automatic termination of this 

incentive in 2021. There is significant uncertainty in making multi-year market predictions; in 

this case, the uncertainty is compounded by the fact that electric drive technology and markets 

are just emerging. Moreover, expanding electric drive vehicle capacity will require substantial 

investments and long-term planning by manufacturers and other industry participants. The 

incentive to encourage those investments should be similarly long-term and not subject to an 

arbitrary time limit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 5]

For these reasons, EDTA recommends that the multiplier be extended at its initial level 

throughout the full time period covered by these regulations (through MY 2025), subject to midterm review. If EPA determines through its mid-term review of actual market conditions that the 

incentive is no longer needed or should be reduced, it could make that change through a separate 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, pp. 5-6]

In short, rather than arbitrarily building in a phase-out schedule, the rule should include a trigger 

for a new rulemaking to reduce the multiplier if EPA determines – based on sales volumes of 

electric drive vehicles – that the multiplier is no longer needed. This approach will ensure that 

the multiplier remains in effect as long as it is needed, while also providing a mechanism to 

reduce or eliminate the multiplier when it is warranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 

6]

3. NHTSA Authority to Establish a Multiplier.

EDTA also objects to NHTSA’s determination that it lacks authority to establish a multiplier in 

the fuel economy regulations under EPCA and EISA. The preamble to the proposed rule states 

that: “NHTSA currently interprets EPCA and EISA as precluding the agency from offering 

additional incentives for EVs, FCVs and PHEVs, except as specified by statute, and thus is not 

proposing incentive multipliers comparable to the EPA incentive multipliers described above.”

(76 Fed. Reg. 74878). This statement is accompanied by a footnote, which states that: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 6]

Because 49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(2)(B) expressly requires EPA to calculate the fuel economy of 

electric vehicles using the Petroleum Equivalency Factor developed by DOE, which contains an 

incentive for electric operation already, and because 49 U.S.C. 32905(a) expressly requires EPA 

to calculate the fuel economy of FCVs using a specified incentive, NHTSA believes that 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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Congress’ having provided clear incentives for these technologies in the CAFE program suggests 

that additional incentives beyond those would not be consistent with Congress’ intent. Similarly, 

because the fuel economy of PHEVs’ electric operation must also be calculated using DOE’s 

PEF, the incentive for electric operation appears to already be inherent in the statutory 

structure.(76 Fed. Reg. 74878, at footnote 56). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 6]

EDTA disagrees that these statutory provisions preclude NHTSA from including an incentive 

multiplier for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs in its CAFE regulations. As NHTSA acknowledges in the 

proposal, “the President’s National Fuel Efficiency Policy announcement of May 19, 

2009...called for harmonized rules for all automakers....” (76 Fed. Reg. 75164). Consistent 

with this directive, NHTSA should, wherever possible, interpret its authority in a manner that is 

consistent with the establishment of a single, consistent national program, with requirements that 

parallel those established by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 6]

The interpretation of EPCA and EISA offered in footnote 56 falls short in this regard. 42 U.S.C 

§ 32904(a)(2)(B) merely directs NHTSA to “include” equivalent petroleum-based fuel economy 

values in its calculation of average fuel economy for electric vehicles. This section contains no 

“exclusivity” language, nor does it even imply an intent to preclude other incentives. From a 

practical standpoint, there is nothing that prevents NHTSA from complying with this statutory 

directive and also promulgating a regulatory incentive multiplier to harmonize with EPA’s 

program. The same holds true for 42 U.S.C. § 32905(a), which directs NHTSA to use a specific 

equivalency factor for liquid alternative fuel. This language does not otherwise constrain 

NHTSA's authority; NHTSA can comply with this statutory directive and comply with the 

President’s directive to harmonize the CAFE and GHG programs. EDTA strongly encourages 

NHTSA to reconsider its interpretation of its governing statutes in light of the President’s 

harmonization policy. EDTA does not believe that EPCA or EISA presents a barrier to the 

adoption by NHTSA of an incentive multiplier for advanced technology vehicles, consistent with 

EPA’s proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 6]

1. In the proposed rule, EPA implies that it needs to address upstream GHG emissions from 

motor vehicles as part of the emission standards under Title II of the Clean Air Act because that 

“[a]t this time ... there is no such comprehensive program addressing upstream emissions of 

GHGs.” (See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75010). In fact, EPA has taken several steps to regulate the GHG 

emissions of stationary sources, including rulemakings under the Prevention of Significant 

Deterioration and Title V Operating Permit programs and the upcoming New Source 

Performance Standard for electric generating units. These programs directly regulate the GHG 

emissions of power plants. The fact that EPA is already regulating upstream GHG emissions 

contradicts the rationale offered in this rulemaking for addressing those emissions through the 

emission standards for motor vehicles.

Organization: Ferrari

We concur with EPA that believes it would be appropriate to provide an incentive to encourage 

the introduction of advanced technology vehicles (Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrids, and Fuel 
EPA Response to Comments

4-38

Cells), FFV and AFV vehicles and off-cycle technologies and that a credit mechanism is an 

effective way to do this. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Fisker’s solution to this conundrum is the electric vehicle with extended range (EVer), a 

powertrain that enables all-electric driving while eliminating the range anxiety that presents a 

hurdle to some buyers. We are proud to offer the Karma as the first electric vehicle with 

extended range in the premium luxury sedan segment. Not only does the Karma offer a worldclass combination of style and luxury, but the Karma would allow Fisker to comply with the 

greenhouse gas standards proposed in this rulemaking for 2025 – today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9266-A1, pp. 1-2]

As stated in the preamble to this rule, plug-in vehicles are one of the technologies that “have 

significant transportation GHG emissions and oil consumption game-changing potential in the 

longer run, and that also face major market barriers in entering a market that has been dominated 

by gasoline vehicle technology and infrastructure for over 100 years.” Fisker Automotive is 

bringing to market today the type of vehicle that this rule is designed to support. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 2]

Encourage re-consideration of upstream emissions in the future

One of the rationales for accounting for upstream emissions (for those vehicles not subject to the 

incentive) is that “there is currently no program in place to reduce GHG emissions from electric 

powerplants.” However, in the recently adopted amendments to California’s GHG program for 

light-duty vehicles, the Air Resources Board (ARB) continued to hold automakers responsible 

for upstream emissions even in the context of a cap-and-trade program in that state to control 

GHG emissions from powerplants. As automakers have no control over the GHG intensity of 

electricity generation, we encourage EPA to consider a pathway in which tailpipe emissions and 

upstream emissions are controlled separately. For instance, if a national cap-and-trade program 

or other GHG control regulation is in place at the time of the proposed mid-term review, we 

would encourage both EPA and NHTSA to reconsider its treatment of upstream emissions. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 4]

Support incentive program for electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell 

vehicles as proposed

In the absence of a means of controlling GHG emissions upstream, Fisker supports the 0 g/mi 

upstream emissions incentive and the multipliers for years 2017-2021 as proposed. We believe 

the requirement that a PHEV be required to complete a full EPA highway test without using any 

conventional fuel – essentially a 10.2 mile All Electric Range (AER) – is an appropriate 

threshold to place for participation in the incentive program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-

A1, p. 5]

Organization: Ford Motor Company
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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Production Volume Multipliers: To promote the research, development and manufacture of 

advanced technology vehicles, Ford supports the proposal to provide production volume 

multipliers for electrified vehicles (full battery electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) and 

fuel cell vehicles, at the levels proposed. As noted in the preamble, it is likely that these 

technologies will become increasingly important toward meeting the aggressive standards, and 

we further recommend that the continuation of the multipliers beyond 2021 model year be 

considered during the mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 18]

Upstream Emissions: Ford also supports the continuation of the accounting of the electric drive 

portion for battery electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles in the GHG equation as 0 

grams/mile. However, just as traditional vehicles are certified based on their measured tailpipe 

emissions over the federal test procedures, without regard to the source of the gasoline on which 

they are operated, we do not believe it is appropriate to include upstream (e.g., utility) emissions 

in the vehicle greenhouse gas compliance calculation for electrified products. Therefore, the 

production volume caps, adopted for 2012-16 model years as well as those proposed for the 

2022-2025 model years should be eliminated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 19]

Auto manufacturers have no control over the emissions of the utility industry, but unique 

solutions for electric vehicles are being investigated which allow the customer to further reduce 

the “carbon footprint” of these vehicles independent of the local energy supply. For example, 

Ford has announced a partnership with SunPower to provide a high-efficiency rooftop solar 

system that could provide Focus Electric owners enough renewable energy production to offset 

the energy used for charging. Ford also has an established a partnership with Microsoft to 

develop technology that will allow the customer to easily charge vehicles when electricity rates 

are lowest, which typically corresponds to when the utilities have excess capacity in their system. 

Balancing utility load in such a manor improves the overall utility industry carbon footprint. 

Requiring manufacturers to bear the burden of another industry’s greenhouse gas emissions is 

not only inappropriate, it could potentially disincentivize innovations like these which provide a 

real world benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 19]

Ford supports the comments provided by the EDTA, which raises the additional issues regarding 

EPA’s authority to include upstream emissions in a vehicle requirement and the proposed 

methodology for estimating the upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 

19]

Definition of PHEV: EPA has proposed that a plug-in hybrid vehicle must meet a minimum “all 

electric range” limit of 10.2 miles in order to be eligible to utilize the production volume 

multiplier, and requested comments on this threshold and whether a different PHEV metric (such 

as battery capacity, ratio of electric motor power to engine, or total vehicle power) would be 

appropriate. Ford supports the minimum range requirement both as the appropriate metric for 

defining a PHEV for the purpose of the use of a volume multiplier, and at the level proposed 

(10.2 miles). Further, we support the proposal, as stated by EPA, that the minimum electric range 

may be optionally measured as equivalent all-electric range as measured on the EPA highway 

cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 19]

NHTSA Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrids, and Fuel Cell Vehicles
EPA Response to Comments

4-40

NHTSA has also expressed the view that it lacks authority to establish an incentive multiplier for 

EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, comparable to the one proposed by EPA, in the fuel economy 

regulations under EPCA and EISA. In this case, we disagree with NHTSA's interpretation of 

EPCA and EISA. In our view, the law does not address this issue, either directly or indirectly. 

Moreover, the President has directed EPA and NHTSA to coordinate and harmonize their 

regulations as much as possible. Consistent with that directive, the agencies should interpret 

statutes so as to optimize the degree of harmonization between the GHG program and the CAFE 

program. Thus, if one agency incorporates a program flexibility into its rules, the other agency 

should adopted a corresponding program flexibility unless expressly prohibited by law. We refer 

the agencies to the comments of EDTA on this point, which we support and incorporate by 

reference. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 21]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the advanced technology volume multipliers as proposed, as well as the proposed 

definitions and metrics for electric, fuel cell and plug-in vehicles. GM recommends that all 

aspects of the advanced technology program should be fully examined in the mid-term review, 

and updated as appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 3]

GM does not believe that requiring automakers to account for upstream electricity carbon 

emissions should ever become a part of the agencies’ vehicle regulatory programs. Vehicle 

compliance has been, and should continue to be, regulated at the vehicle emissions and 

consumption level. For the purposes of calculating a manufacturer’s fleet average performance, 

GM strongly recommends that all upstream carbon emissions from the use of electricity be 

quantified as zero, for all model years, and for all vehicle volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9465-A1, p. 3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 36-37.]

Finally, a specific concern that we have with the proposal is related to the treatment of so-called 

upstream electricity emissions. EPA has couched the quantification of upstream emissions at 0.0 

grams per mile as a 'flexibility' for automakers. This characterization is really inappropriate and 

could lead EPA at some point to reduce or eliminate this so-called flexibility. At its core, the 

problem is that the word flexibility suggests some measure of choice or control. However, 

automakers control neither the feedstocks nor the conversion processes for generating and 

creating electricity. Suggesting that at some point we could or should be responsible for these 

emissions is worrisome to us. To the degree that these emissions are going to be addressed by 

government, legislators and regulators need to create a program to do so directly, not indirectly 

through further restrictions on vehicles. With due respect, we have a tough job ahead of us as it 

is.

Organization: Growth Energy

Although not required by Congress in EISA or in the other statutes governing this rulemaking, 

the proposed standards in the Joint NPRM place great reliance on the production, sale and use of 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-41

vehicles powered from the electrical grid, far exceeding any prior federal regulatory program. As 

noted above, the success or failure of the regulations that the Agencies are proposing will 

ultimately be determined by the consumer market for new motor vehicles. Insofar as the 

Agencies’ program is based on regulatory templates from California, which has attempted for 

more than 20 years to implement requirements for widespread sale and use of pure electric 

vehicles, there is reason for great skepticism about the Joint NPRM’s view that grid-powered 

electric vehicles (pure electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles) can provide a “gamechanging” strategy to reduce GHG emissions and dependence on foreign oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 2]

This Attachment to the Comments of Growth Energy explains why EPA needs to reconsider its 

analysis of the electric vehicle component of the Joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Joint 

NPRM). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 7]

As part of the Joint NPRM, EPA includes incentives for electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid 

electric vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) intended “To facilitate market 

penetration of the most advanced vehicle technologies as rapidly as possible...” EPA goes on to 

provide the following rationale for providing these incentives:

EPA has identified two vehicle powertrain-fuel combinations that have the future potential to 

transform the light-duty vehicle sector by achieving near-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 

and oil consumption in the longer term, but which face major near-term market barriers such as 

vehicle cost, fuel cost (in the case of fuel cell vehicles), the development of low-GHG fuel 

production and distribution infrastructure, and/or consumer acceptance.

• Electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) which would 

operate exclusively or frequently on grid electricity that could be produced from very low 

GHG emission feedstocks or processes.

• Fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) which would operate on hydrogen that could be produced from 

very low GHG emissions feedstocks or processes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

p. 7]

EPA believes that these advanced technologies represent potential game-changers with respect to 

control of transportation GHG emissions as they can combine an efficient vehicle propulsion 

system with the potential to use motor fuels produced from low-GHG emissions feedstocks or 

from fossil feedstocks with carbon capture and sequestration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1, p. 8]

However, EPA also notes that during the 2017 to 2025 time frame that the production of the 

electricity and hydrogen required to power these vehicles:

...will decrease the overall GHG emissions reductions associated with the program as the 

upstream emissions associated with the generation and distribution of electricity are higher than 

the upstream emissions associated with production and distribution of gasoline... [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

4-42

and quantifies the magnitude of these lost emission reductions as between 80 million and 120 

million metric tons of CO2 over the period from 2017 to 2025 alone. According to EPA, the loss 

in benefits associated with EV, PHEV, and FCV incentives equals 4 to 5% of the total GHG 

reductions expected from the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 8]

Given that EPA admits that the incentives it is providing for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs will 

undermine the goal of the GHG regulation at least during the period from 2017 to 2025, the 

obvious question is why are these incentives being provided? The answer to this question is that 

as indicated above, EPA believes these advanced technologies are potential game-changing 

technologies. As discussed in detail below, not only does EPA overstate the potential GHG 

benefits of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, but the Agency fails to accurately address the serious 

challenges facing these vehicle technologies. As a result, EPA’s decision to incentivize these 

technologies seems completely at odds with the goal of the proposed rule, which is to lower 

GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 8]

In contrast, the proposed rule ignores the fact that vehicles designed to operate on ethanolblended fuels are truly “...potential game-changers with respect to control of transportation GHG 

emissions...” Given this, EPA must modify the proposed rule to provide incentives that will 

ensure that vehicles capable of operation on ethanol blends continue to enter the vehicle fleet in 

substantial numbers so that the tremendous “game-changing” GHG benefits of ethanol-blended 

fuels can be realized in the real world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 8]

Another major factor with respect to vehicle costs for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs are the durability 

of batteries and fuel-cells. Most analyses of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVS, including that associated 

with CARB’s recent rulemaking (which used the same data that supports the NPRM) are based 

on two highly uncertain assumptions which are: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 11-

12]

1. The useful lives of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs will be the same as conventional vehicles in terms 

of miles travelled; and

2. Vehicle owners will not have to replace batteries or major fuel cell system components over 

the course of a vehicle’s useful life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 12]

Obviously if either shorter vehicle life or the need to incur replacement costs for batteries or fuel 

cell systems occurs, the costs associated with EV, PHEV and FCV will be even higher than 

described above making these vehicles even less likely to provide “game-changing” reductions 

in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 12]

In supporting the proposed credits for EVs and PHEVs, EPA notes that “...electricity is 

considerably cheaper, on a per mile basis, than gasoline.” While that may be true at present for 

electricity from the existing electrical grid and generation mix, it is not at all clear that will be the 

case for the electricity produced “...from low- GHG emissions feedstocks or from fossil 

feedstocks with carbon capture and sequestration” that EPA makes clear will need to be used to 

power EVs and PHEVs in order for them to provide “game-changing” reductions in GHG 

emissions. Generation costs for electricity from low-GHG sources or fossil-fired sources with 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-43

carbon sequestration may be far higher than current generation costs and need to be carefully 

considered by EPA to the extent that decisions to provide incentives to EVs and PHEVs are 

based on the premise that electricity costs less than gasoline. Evidence that generation costs for 

low-GHG sources are likely to be higher than for existing plants can be seen, for example, in 

substantially higher capital cost estimates for those sources. Again, construction and operation of 

these low-GHG electricity sources are a necessary condition that must be met in order for EVs 

and PHEVs to provide “game-changing” reductions in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, pp. 12-13]

The situation with respect to fuel costs for hydrogen is far less clear than for electricity. 

Hydrogen dispensed as a transportation fuel for use in FCVs is currently more expensive than 

gasoline and even in large scale wide spread production, the cost of low-GHG hydrogen is going 

to be considerably higher than that of central steam reforming of natural gas. Therefore, there 

will likely be substantial cost premiums associated with low GHG hydrogen that will have to be 

paid in order for FCVs to provide “game-changing” reductions in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 13]

In order to put the fuel cost issues for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs into perspective, the “Payback 

Calculator” developed by CARB for its recent rulemaking was used to estimate the prices at 

which fuel costs for EVs and FCVs would equal those for gasoline vehicles based on low and 

average gasoline price forecasts which range from about $3.10 to $4.10 from 2017 to 2025. 

Using this CARB spreadsheet and its optimistic assumptions regarding EV and FCV energy 

efficiency, the electricity price at which electric vehicle fuel costs equal those for gasoline ranges 

from about $0.36 to $0.45 per kilowatt-hour while the hydrogen price ranges from about $7.50 to 

$9.00 per kilogram. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 13]

Although these prices for electricity and hydrogen may seem high relative to current electricity 

prices and prices for hydrogen produced using steam methane reforming at centralized plants, it 

should be recalled that they have to be compared to the prices that will be associated with 

electricity from marginal new ultra-low GHG generation capacity that would not otherwise be 

built and hydrogen production using ultra-low GHG processes. Given this, it is not at all clear 

that when proper cost accounting is made for ultra-low GHG electricity and hydrogen production 

that EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs will provide any meaningful fuel costs savings relative to 

conventional vehicles which in turn will create yet another hurdle to their ever providing “gamechanging” reductions in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 13]

Although it might seem that the situation would be similar with respect to the distribution of 

electricity for use by EVs and PHEVs, that is in fact not the case. First, there are direct costs 

associated with residential charging equipment (referred to as electric vehicle service equipment 

or EVSE) which EPA has estimated range from about $1,300 to $1,500 for equipment and 

installation labor over the 2017 to 2025 period with the lower end of the range applying in the 

later years. These costs must be added on top of the already large incremental purchase prices of 

EVs and PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 14]

Next there is the possibility that additional costs will be incurred to develop public EV and 

PHEV recharging infrastructure. While it is not clear that this infrastructure will be necessary, 
EPA Response to Comments

4-44

CARB will be studying the need for it and may at some point mandate its construction, and EPA 

may have to follow suit in the remainder of the nation. Again, to the extent that public EV and 

PHEV recharging infrastructure does have to be constructed to improve the viability of these 

vehicles those costs will obviously also have to added to the ledger. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 14]

Another potentially substantial cost associated with the deployment of EVs and FCVs is the need 

to upgrade the existing electrical transmission and distribution system. This is a problem that is 

already facing California that will almost certainly have to be dealt with across the country 

before EVs and PHEVs could even be hoped to provide “game-changing” reductions in GHG 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 14]

FCVs face even more serious issues with respect to the development of refueling infrastructure. 

First, refueling stations will either have to be located in reasonably proximity to existing 

hydrogen production facilities and receive hydrogen by truck or pipeline or utilize expensive 

onsite hydrogen generation capability. In addition, there may be significant facility siting and 

permitting issues and concerns regarding the high pressures and special equipment required for 

FCV refueling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 14]

Although EPA has not attempted to analyze the costs associated with the development of the 

hydrogen refueling infrastructure that will be required to support FCVs regardless of how the 

hydrogen they use is produced, CARB has performed an analysis that likely represents a “best 

case” scenario. This analysis includes numerous optimistic assumptions regarding hydrogen 

station costs as well and assumes both that stations can be carefully located using knowledge of 

where FCVs will be sold and in general 100% utilization rates for hydrogen refueling stations. 

Even with these very optimistic assumptions, the direct capital costs for refueling stations 

amount to about $1,700 per FCV over roughly the same period as the 2017 to 2025 period 

considered by EPA. Again, these costs have to be added on top of the already large incremental 

purchase costs for FCVs and must be incurred before it can even be hoped that FCVs will 

provide “game-changing” GHG reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 14-15]

To summarize, EPA has proposed to provide incentives under the GHG regulation for EVs, 

PHEVs, and FCVs because according to EPA these vehicles have the potential to yield “game 

changing” reductions in GHG emissions. However, in order for those reductions to be realized 

the following things all have to occur:

1. The public (directly or indirectly) must be willing to pay substantially higher prices for these 

vehicles;

2. The public (directly or indirectly) must be willing to pay substantial costs in order to develop 

the infrastructure required to provide fuel to these vehicles;

3. The public must be willing (directly or indirectly) to pay the costs associated with low-GHG 

electricity and/or hydrogen, which are not likely to be substantially lower than the costs for 

petroleum based fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 15]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

EPA and NHTSA have historically refrained from adopting prescriptive policies favoring 

technologies, instead aiming to implement regulations favoring innovation and preserving the 

ability of industry to develop new technologies while also encouraging enhancements to current 

technologies. The Council of Economic Advisors has strongly endorsed technology neutrality, 

making clear that “the difficulty in promoting technology adoption through subsidies and other 

tools lies in designing policies that are neutral across all alternative technologies. Weighting the 

size of a subsidy by the degree to which each technology reduces environmental and security 

concerns would help to ensure that the Government is not in the position of picking winners. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.3]

The agencies have proposed various incentive programs. Incentives for electric drivetrains take 

the form of both credit multipliers and a focus on tank-to-wheel emissions rather than accounting 

for the full well-to-wheel emissions of those vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.4]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 173.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 23.]

For example, some OEMs are focusing resources on electric vehicles, and they are receiving 

credit multipliers for expanding that technology.

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

EPA Should Move Quickly Toward Fully Counting Upstream Emissions from Electric 

Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 11]

In the proposed rule, EPA continues its practice of incentivizing electric vehicle technology by 

treating such vehicles as producing zero emissions and by letting manufacturers apply a 

multiplier when counting electric vehicles in their fleet averages. Yet, as EPA knows, electric 

vehicles are not responsible for zero greenhouse gas emissions: electric vehicles run on energy 

from the electric grid, produced largely by carbon-emitting combustion. EPA’s program in 

essence allows for a triple undercounting of greenhouse gas emissions—once by not accounting 

for emissions from electric cars, twice by counting electric cars more than once when averaging, 

and finally by allowing the credits to be traded to other manufacturers—and allowing for 

increases in greenhouse gas emissions at every step. Any form of subsidization of new 

technology should be neutral with respect to greenhouse gas emissions; it should definitely not 

contribute to their increase. Although it may be a valid policy goal to incentivize new 

technology, EPA should achieve this goal by providing grants and subsidies to manufacturers 

and scientists exploring all promising emission-reducing technologies. By giving inflated 

regulatory incentives to a certain type of technology rather than allowing manufacturers to find 
EPA Response to Comments

4-46

the most efficient and effective solution, EPA will disincentivize other forms of technology that 

may be more cost-effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, pp. 11-12]

Fortunately, EPA at least plans to limit these distorting credits starting with model year 2022, 

dropping the multiplier and capping the number of cars that can be counted as having zero 

emissions; any remaining electric vehicles will be assigned their net upstream emissions. The 

agency asks for comments on whether there should be an interim period where only half of 

upstream emissions are counted, whether any changes should be made to the current electric 

vehicle incentive program, and whether similar incentives should be extended to other specific 

technologies. For the reasons given above, EPA should either eliminate these incentives, or at 

least move as quickly as possible toward fully accounting for the upstream emissions of 

alternative fuel vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 12]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

13. While the ICCT strongly supports development of electric and fuel cell vehicles, one of our 

core principles is that efficiency and greenhouse gas emission standards should be technology 

neutral. Default zero upstream electric and fuel cell vehicle credits and multipliers violate this 

principle and reduce the benefits from the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

The provision will also give windfall credits to vehicles required by the CA ZEV mandate, 

reducing benefits from the rule without any additional advanced vehicle sales. Electric and fuel 

cell vehicle credits should at least be limited to vehicles that are additional to those required by 

the ZEV mandate. A proposed system that strikes a balance between providing appropriate 

incentives for advanced vehicles and maintaining the effectiveness of the standards is detailed in 

our comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 3-4]

13) Upstream Plug-in and Fuel Cell Vehicle Credits

The ICCT was founded around the Bellagio Principles37, set forth in 2001 by regulators from 

the largest car markets around the world to help guide the future of worldwide motor vehicle 

technology and transportation fuels. A key principle states: 'Policymakers must...base policies 

solely on performance compared to societal objectives, and not give special consideration to 

specific fuels, technologies, or vehicle types.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 25]

Technology-neutral standards have a number of advantages over policies that specifically target 

distinct technologies. Picking the right 'winners' is challenging, and the wrong choices may 

hinder technologies that could have had the greatest potential benefit over the long run. 

Technology-specific bonuses reduce transparency and at the same time introduce opportunities 

for windfall credits at the expense of alternative technology development, consumer cost savings, 

and GHG reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 25]

EPA has proposed two electric vehicle (EV) technology-specific bonus credits:
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-47

1. A default GHG compliance value of zero g/mi for battery electric vehicles (BEVs), fuel cell 

electric vehicles (FCEVs), and the electric operation fraction of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 

(PHEVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 25]

2. A system of multipliers that allows manufacturers to count EVs as more than one vehicle in 

manufacturers' compliance calculations during the 2017 to 2021 model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 25]

The ICCT strongly agrees with the need to commercialize BEVs, FCEVs and PHEVs. These 

technologies are key components needed to meet the ambitious 2050 GHG reduction targets 

necessary to avert the worst impacts of climate change.39 To promote these vehicles without 

violating the principle of technology neutrality, ICCT is proposing an alternative accounting 

method for EV upstream fuel cycle GHG emissions that strikes a balance between providing 

advanced vehicle credits and maintaining technology-neutral standards. We also propose 

eliminating or restricting the use of multipliers and eliminating windfall credits for vehicles that 

are required under the California ZEV mandate. This would appropriately reward benefits 

inherent to EV technology, while also encouraging a number of other technology options to 

further improve EV efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 25-26]

The NPRM estimates that the two credit types proposed in the rule would erode 80 to 110 

million metric tons of benefits from the MY 2017-2025 GHG standards. Our detailed comments 

below describe the benefits of ICCT's proposed technology-neutral EV emissions accounting 

system, contrasting them with the large windfall credits and unfavorable cost/benefit ratios that 

would result from the currently proposed EV incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, 

p. 26]

Electric Vehicle Net Upstream Fuel Cycle GHG Emissions Accounting

There are a number of compelling reasons why the regulatory proposal should properly account 

for the EV fleet's upstream GHG emissions from grid electricity and/or hydrogen. First, such a 

system would achieve all of the benefits of a technology-neutral standard. As noted earlier, 

transparency would increase and windfall credits would be avoided. Windfall credits are 

discussed in further detail later. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 26]

In addition, full EV upstream net-GHG emissions accounting would incentivize efficiency 

improvements and fully legitimize, for EVs, the application of many important and desirable offcycle incentives proposed by the US EPA. ICCT expects that EVs can earn low or zero g/mile 

compliance values (as shown in Table 4) both because of intrinsic advantages to electric drive 

technology and the ability to capitalize on other improvements such as:

• Inherent efficiency advantages over petroleum combustion engines

• Further efficiency improvements through lightweighting, aerodynamics, and low rolling 

resistance tires

• Displaced petroleum upstream emissions
EPA Response to Comments

4-48

• Reduced air conditioning GHG emissions through low Global Warming Potential (GWP) 

refrigerants, low-leak technologies and/or improved AC system efficiency

• Other off-cycle credits, when justified [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 26]

We recommend that the net EV emissions be calculated in the same way as the example for 

BEVs provided by US EPA, with the explicit addition of off-cycle credits: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 26-27]

net upstream EV emissions = fuel carbon intensity x vehicle efficiency - off-cycle credits -

displaced petroleum upstream emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 27]

EVs with specific technologies not reflected on FTP/HWFET test cycles, upon meeting specific 

criteria, would receive credit for displacing off-cycle internal combustion engine (ICE) GHG 

emissions. As opposed to giving credit for avoided BEV upstream emissions only (based on 

displaced upstream), this approach would not understate the overall BEV benefit compared to a 

conventional ICE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 27]

In response to US EPA's request for comments on FCEV hydrogen carbon intensity, we 

recommend using California's expected carbon intensity values as a default at least until the midterm review of the national GHG standards. California cumulative FCEV deployments are 

expected to reach more than 50,000 by 201742 and California is currently establishing hydrogen 

stations through the use of incentives and regulations.43 We encourage US EPA to establish an 

initial California transportation hydrogen carbon intensity placeholder value based on 67% steam 

methane reformer (SMR) hydrogen production (a widespread method of production in the United 

States today) and 33% hydrogen production from renewable resources. This would be reflective 

of California's approach and could be updated over time as FCEVs spread to other states. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 27]

We encourage US EPA to model regional variations in grid electricity carbon intensity, as 

suggested in the NPRM. Potential reductions in grid carbon intensity, changing over time due to 

mandatory state renewables or other carbon-reduction standards, should be accounted for as well. 

In the meantime, California has conducted extensive analysis estimating electricity carbon 

intensity for 2020, including imported electricity, which could be used for a substantial portion 

of US BEV and PHEV placements. As this information is currently available, US EPA could 

establish an interim California value of270 g/kw-hr44 along with a parallel aggregate value for 

the remaining 49 states. We agree with US EPA's proposed inclusion of transmission and 

distribution losses, as well as upstream fossil fuel production emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 27]

Table 4 provides an example of the ICCT's recommended emission calculations, using a 2020 

BEV fueled by projected California or US average 2020 electricity. We would encourage US 

EPA to determine a similar example with a 49-state electricity carbon value.45 This example is 

not intended to predict future vehicle emissions, but rather to illustrate the methodology 

explained above and show the potential for 'earned zero' net g GHG/mile ZEV compliance 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-49

values. [Table 4 can be found on p. 28 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 27-28]

Windfall Credits for Mandatory ZEV Deployments and Lost Benefits

We agree with the importance of EV technology deployment. However, we emphasize that EV 

credits should be earned based on performance, rather than awarded, independent of 

performance, for the production of a certain vehicle type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, 

pp. 28-29]

The ICCT has two significant issues related to (a) the proposed EV multipliers (also referred to 

as 'supercredits') and (b) the concept of giving vehicles a default zero gram per mile compliance 

score:

1. Large windfall credits for mandatory ZEV deployments.

2. High costs in terms of lost consumer savings and GHG benefits, even for vehicle deployments 

beyond mandatory levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 29]

Incentive programs are normally structured to avoid rewarding activity that is already otherwise 

required.47 The NPRM itself cites this principle, noting in the discussion of off-cycle credits that 

'EPA would not provide credits for a technology required to be used by Federal law, such as tire 

pressure monitoring systems, as EPA would consider such credits to be windfall credits (Le. not 

generated as a results of the rule),'48 We agree with this principle, and in these comments we 

discuss how it can be applied to EV incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 29]

The California Air Resources Board and Section 177 states have adopted the Zero Emission 

Vehicle program, requiring that manufacturers deploy large numbers of EVs.49CARB has 

forecast vehicle deployments out to 2025, although in terms of vehicle numbers the deployments 

are not specific regulatory targets due to flexibilities included in the ZEV rule. US EPA 

projections imply that for model years 2017 through 2025, deployments of BEVs and FCEVs 

mandated under California's ZEV rule are likely to account for 85 to 90+% of such vehicles 

nationally, whereas CARB forecasts show that PHEV deployments would be much higher than 

the US EPA's projection, as shown below in Table 5. Thus the vast majority of 'supercredits' 

generated under the proposed multipliers would likely be awarded to vehicles that manufacturers 

will be required to build even in the absence of the incentive. Furthermore, the total allocation of 

windfall credits seems likely to exceed the high-end scenario considered by US EPA in 

determining potential emission detriments stemming from the multiplier. [Table 5 can be found 

on p. 30 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 29]

While manufacturers receive benefit from bonus GHG credits, as noted below, ICCT finds that 

the societal costs of 'supercredit' multipliers and related default zero g/mi compliance values 

would be significantly greater than any potential incentive to manufacturers. Excess GHG credits 

allow manufacturers to decrease fuel efficiency across non-EVs in the fleet, and the resulting 
EPA Response to Comments

4-50

increase in overall fuel consumption and expenditures is the main factor responsible for this 

result,52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 30]

Higher fleetwide fuel consumption along with related costs are shown in Table 6 below. 

Increased petroleum fuel costs range from $17,200 in MY2017 to $9,400 in MY2021 (in 2009$) 

at a 3 percent discount rate per EV from the proposed excess credits. We also estimate that 

fleetwide CO2 would increase significantly per incremental EV due to the excess credits. Results 

for PHEVs would be scaled down based on different multipliers and the electric fraction of 

mileage. [Table 6 can be found on p. 31 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 30]

Table 7 shows two potential scenarios for the magnitude of the potential incentive manufacturers 

would see from the multiplier and zero upstream credits. ICCT selected scenarios of $25 and $35 

per g CO2/mi for illustrative purposes in Table 7 to represent a range of estimates of the potential 

marginal cost to move below 2020 emission levels for a midsized vehicle.57 As noted in several 

of our earlier comments, we believe that technology development will tend to result in lower 

costs than these estimates, reducing the potential value of bonus credits to manufacturers. ICCT 

used assumptions from NHTSA to calculate the reduction in a manufacturer's sales price for less 

efficient vehicles, which would reduce the net value of a GHG credit to a 

manufacturer.58 [Table 7 can be found on p. 33 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 31-32]

In all of these cost scenarios, the societal cost of the proposed EV incentives (as shown in Table 

6) is significantly higher than the net benefit incentivizing the manufacturer (as shown in Table

7). We also note that the net manufacturer cost savings in these scenarios is less than the 

incremental cost of producing a BEV or FCEV in 2020, which is estimated by ARB to be 

$12,400-$12,900.59 The magnitude and uncertainty of this benefit is such that the EV bonus 

credits are unlikely to be effective in the absence of other types of consumer benefits, incentive 

programs, or manufacturer priorities. [Tables 6 and 7 can be found on pp. 31 and 33 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 32]

We also find that the system proposed in the NPRM could create confusion in the minds of 

consumers by creating a linkage between EV purchases and increased overall GHG emissions. 

Surveys show that drivers in the US, Canada, and 11 other countries overwhelmingly would 

want to know the source of electricity for a plug-in vehicle, and in the US 43% of respondents 

said that the source of electricity would affect their decision of whether to purchase the vehicle 

or not.60 While drivers were not directly asked whether indirect CO2 increases linked to an EV 

purchase would discourage them from buying an EV this could be an unintended side-effect of 

these bonus credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 32]

Alternative Recommendation

If US EPA chooses not to eliminate MY2017-2021 multipliers and does not require EV fuel 

cycle net GHG upstream accounting, we would strongly encourage two modifications to the 

NPRM. First, EV incentives should be eliminated for all mandated vehicles. Direct coordination 

with CARB and Section 177 states would be the preferred approach, or an acceptable alternative 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-51

would be to set a corresponding minimum deployment floor below which vehicles would not 

qualify for the incentives. Table 8 shows a potential scenario of ZEV and PHEV sales in 

California and Section 177 states as a percentage of national passenger vehicle sales, by model 

year. [Table 8 can be found on p. 34 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 33-34]

In addition, we would also recommend setting ambitious performance requirements to restrict 

eligibility for multipliers to the top performers. Real world range is a key determinant of 

environmental impact (due to gasoline vehicle miles displaced) as well as consumer acceptance, 

and could be used to establish performance criteria for each of the multiplier ratios that US EPA 

is considering. An example of this concept is shown in Table 9.64 [Table 9 can be found on p. 34 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, 

p. 34]

Finally we would also encourage US EPA to add a cap on incentives offered for MY 

2017MY2021, and to generally set these caps for those model years as low as possible. In the 

proposed rule, the lack of a cap for MY 2017-2021 leaves open the possibility of significant 

foregone emission reductions in the event that electric vehicle sales greatly exceed US EPA's 

expectations. If such high sales levels occur, then presumably the technology is succeeding 

beyond expectations and the incentive is either unnecessary or excessive. We recommend 

establishing caps, with eligibility on a 'first come-first served' basis, even if US EPA initially 

gives each manufacturer credit eligibility for a minimum number of vehicles in order to 

encourage broader adoption of EV technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 35]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 197.]

One of ICCT's guiding principles is that standards should be technology neutral. The proposed 

provisions to assign zero carbon emissions to electric-only operation and for artificial credits for 

certain pickup truck technologies distort the compliance system and reduce the overall benefits 

of the program.

37 Bellagio Memorandum on Motor Vehicle Policy, Principles for Vehicles and Fuels in 

Response to Global Environmental and Health Imperatives, Consensus Document: 19-21 June, 

2001, Bellagio, Italy

39 See for example California Air Resources Board. 2011 Staff Report: Initial Statement of 

Reasons, Advanced Clean Cars, 2012 Proposed Amendments to the California Zero Emission 

Vehicle Program Regulations; Vehicles.' (ZEV ISOR)

42 Source: CARB. 2011. Initial Statement of Reasons, Advanced Clean Cars 2012 Proposed 

Amendments to the Clean Fuels Outlet Regulation. (CFO ISOR) November. p12. Available at 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/cf02012/cfoisor.pdf. last accessed 2-6-2012. Note that factors 
EPA Response to Comments

4-52

such as transportation hydrogen station infrastructure deployment and the Zero Emission Vehicle 

regulation will favor FCEV deployments in California initially.

43 CARB. 2011. Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking, Public Hearing to 

Consider the 'LEV III Amendments' (LEV III ISOR) etc. p 136. CARB expects that California's 

33% renewable transportation hydrogen requirement (California Senate Bill 1505 of2006) will 

be effective in the 2017-2025 timeframe

44 CARB LEV III ISOR. 2011. p136

45 us EPA us EPA Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis: Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 

Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards (DRIA) RIA p4-31 and 4-32 and Federal Register Volume 76, Number 231, '2017 and 

Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel 

Economy Standards; Proposed Rule', p75014.

47 See for example the California Carl Moyer Memorial Air Quality Standards Attainment 

Program, which 'provides incentive grants for c1eaner-than-required engines, equipment and 

other sources of pollution providing early or extra emission reductions'. (emphasis added)

49 Currently, there are 10 states which have adopted the California ZEV regulation: Connecticut, 

Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts. New Jersey. New Mexico, New York, Oregon. Rhode Island, 

and Vermont CARB, 2011. ZEV ISOR.BEVs and FCEVs are mandatory, and PHEVs can be 

used to partially satisfy the mandate.

52 The zero g/mi compliance value and related multipliers applied to ZEVs allow a de facto 

increase in the fleet average GHG standard that must be met by the conventional (non-ZEV) 

portion of the fleet. Thus each ZEV deployed results in a small increase in allowable emissions 

from the remainder of the fleet, and a related small decrease in mandated fuel economy.

57 As a first-order approximation, ICCT estimated an average cost of $29 per g/mile for midsize 

car technology packages. excluding AC reduction, to reduce emissions from the level of the 2020 

standard. Technology package costs are from the CARB LEV IlIlS0R p124. LEV IlI1S0R 

technology costs generally listed in 2009 dollars, see for instance ES-12. Some packages would 

cost more while others less.

59 CARB. 2011. ZEV ISOR, p. 62.

60 Accenture. 2011. 'Plug-in electric vehicles: Changing perceptions, hedging bets'. 

http:jjwww.accenture.comjus-enjPagesjinsight-plug-in-electric-vehicles-changing-perceptionssummary.aspx last accessed 10-13-2011. pp. 5, 17. 1,000 of 7,000 surveys were conducted in the 

US, 500 in Canada, and 3,502 in Europe.

64 1.45 and 1.5 multiplier categories merged for simplicity. Note that while this suggested table 

would not provide an additional timing incentive, early deployments would generally receive 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-53

greater credits through a more favorable credit due to the higher level of the standards in earlier 

years.

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

Comments:

1. Impressive claims appear based on 'faulty' EPA analyses, see references 2 & 3. Ref 2 page 4 -

32 claim in error. Claims Leaf CO2/mile at 161 g/mile by using average grams CO2 per Kw-hr 

(0.632) but this is a marginal problem and has to use marginal analyses which as documented in 

ref 1 table 3-15 & 3-16 calcs to 1.267 gCO2/added (marginal) Kw-hr. So using the correct 

marginal rate the Leaf g CO2/mile would be 323 g CO2/mile. This should be immediately 

corrected by EPA in their documentation, to not do so raises the question: where else in EPA's 

documentations are they using incorrect analyses & assumptions & methods & credits & 

multipliers to promote a more favorable, albeit incorrect, number. And using the official label's 

0.34 Kw-hrs per mile yields 431 g CO2/mL [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 1]

2. Additionally, the claimed (Ref. 2 on page 4 - 32) for the Leaf of 0.34 Kw-hrs/mile, or at 3412 

btu/Kw-hr yields 1160 btu/mile electrical energy to plug, or at 115,000 btu per gallon gasoline 

makes vehicle mpgge (miles per gallon of gasoline equivalent) at 99 mpgge. However, with 

overnight coal generating & distribution & conversion net efficiency at 28% coal fossil fuel to 

plug Kw-hrs reality is system fossil fuel mpgge is at 28 mpgge. While vehicle performance is 

interesting to make the vehicle go it has to have the fuel, thus information on all it takes to make 

the vehicle go a mile has to be counted, Le., moving the Leaf a mile using overnight coal 

generated Kw-hrs calcs to 28 mpgge fossil fuel (not 99 mpgge) and produces CO2 emissions of 

431 g/mile (not 161)! And at significantly more cost per vehicle mile, so why is Govt promoting 

these expensive to Nation poor system performance vehicles? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-

A1, p. 1]

'Faulty' PHEV & BEV & corn ethanol Promotional analyses often used by others corrected for in 

my data: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 5]

1. Failure to assess all results at National and Consumer/Taxpayer level (all consequences of 

action including taxes & inflation & credits & multipliers & passthroughs impact; all important 

measures)

2. Use of average vs. reality (gCO2 per overnight added/removed Kwhr)

3. pre-2017; classifying Plug-in miles as zero emissions, when they, at National system level, are 

not; and using elec miles to 'allow' vehicles with gas mpgg not meeting CAFE to be sold!

4. benign miles/Kwhr vs real world miles/Kwhr (environment cabin/battery 

conditioning/performance)
EPA Response to Comments

4-54

5. Need full & accurate upstream CO2 & oil & E6Btu & $s & lifestyle accounting, use of 

current/future HEV upstream vs. CV upstream and some reduced upstream gasoline CO2 & fuel 

could be nonUS

6. PHEV vs. CV instead of PHEV vs. HEV; obscures the Plug-in stand alone consequences

7. failure to show all consequences of CAFE credit (cost,CO2,gasoline,E6Btu).

8. failure to evaluate all possible actions, e.g., Mid/Max eft ICE or HEV or PHEV or less 

ethanol, i.e., pick 'poor' competition and not look for most improvement for $:lifestyle, CO2, 

gasoline, E6Btu

9. failure to account for Business/Govt pass throughs, i.e., inflation/taxes (I believe very 

significant, albeit not included in most of my above data). e.g., assuming for every consumer 

vehicle business+Govt also have some then the delta cost (all factors included) would be an 

increase to consumers/taxpayers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 5]

Ref: 1. EPRI 'Environmental Assessment of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles Volume 2' United 

States Air Quality Analysis July 2007 - see Table 3-10 for MWh and Table 3-15 for CO2 ton

2. EPA Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis 'Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty 

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards' 

EPA-420-D-11-004 November 2011

3. EPA Draft Joint Technical Support Document 'Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 LightDuty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards' EPA-420-D-11-901 November 2011

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Standards must be technology-neutral and performance-based. Johnson Controls believes that, in 

some ways, this proposal inadvertently imposes 'preferred technologies' and, in so doing, does 

not consider the full range of technologies available to allow for a fully competitive marketplace. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Magna E-Car Systems

Magna E-Car Systems is engaged in the supply and manufacture of high quality components and 

systems for hybrid and electric vehicles. We at Magna E-Car Systems view our work as central 

to the innovation that automakers will require to reach the 54.5 mpg fuel economy standard 

proposed by the EPA and NHTSA. But more importantly, we view hybrid and electric vehicle 

technology as imperative to the continued growth and reinvention of the automotive industry in 

the United States.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9263-A1, p. 1]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-55

Hybrid and electric vehicles will help automotive manufacturers reach their 54.5 mpg target for 

their corporate average fuel economy. That’s good news for the American economy and workers. 

Already, Magna E-Car Systems manufacture these technologies at our new hybrid and electric 

vehicle development facility in Holly, Michigan. Magna E-Car Systems alone employs over 300 

employees in Michigan. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9263-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Marz, Loren C.

However, I do not support the 'Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles, 

and Fuel Cell Vehicles' unless diesel technology is also included in some fashion. [NHTSA2010-0131-0213-A1, p.1]

Another National Academies report concluded...

'...Electric vehicles and grid-dependent (plug-in) hybrid vehicles showed somewhat higher 

nonclimate damages than many other technologies for both 2005 and 2030. Operating these

vehicles produces few or no emissions, but producing the electricity to power them currently 

relies heavily on fossil fuels; also, energy used in creating the battery and electric motor adds up 

to 20 percent to the manufacturing part of life-cycle damages....' [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, 

p.7]

Source: National Academies, 'Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy 

Production and Use.'

This is supported by GREET1_2011 which shows that WTW emissions of particulate matter 

(PM) are higher for EV, PHEV, and FCV technology, all of which are proposed to receive 

special incentives under the proposed rule, than 'clean diesel' technology. Based on the default 

'mid-sized' car assumed in GREET for the year 2020... [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.7]

WTW PM10 (diesel) = 0.009 (Feedstock) + 0.013 (Fuel) + 0.030 (Vehicle Operation) = 0.052 

g/mi

WTW PM10 (EV) = 0.355 (Feedstock) + 0.017 (Fuel) + 0.021 (Vehicle Operations) = 0.393 g/mi

WTW PM10 (FCV) = 0.001 (Feedstock) + 0.059 (Fuel) + 0.021 (Vehicle Operations) = 0.081 

g/mi

WTW PM2.5 (diesel) = 0.005 (Feedstock) + 0.007 (Fuel) + 0.016 (Vehicle Operations) = 0.028 

g/mi

WTW PM2.5 (EV) = 0.089 (Feedstock) + 0.009 (Fuel) + 0.007 (Vehicle Operations) = 0.119 g/mi

WTW PM2.5 (FCV) = 0.001 (Feedstock) + 0.031 (Fuel) + 0.007 (Vehicle Operations) = 0.039 

g/mi
EPA Response to Comments

4-56

All of these values are based on the U.S. electric generation mix assumed in GREET in 2020.

These values are graphically depicted more or less in a presentation of a previous version of 

GREET at 

http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Environment/EnvironmentalHealthRT/Wan

gGREETPresentationtoInstituteofMedicine1107REVISED.ashx - slides 24-25. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0213-A1, p.8]

Vehicle assumptions in GREET1_2011...

Diesel = 120% mpgge of baseline gasoline car

EV = 375% mpgge of baseline gasoline car

FCV = 237% mpgge of baseline gasoline car

Exhaust PM from the diesel car = 0.009 g/mi (PM10); 0.0084 g/mi (PM2.5).

Based on certified emissions of the 1996 VW Passat TDI (example of an 'old tech' diesel car), 

exhaust PM emissions = 0.06 g/mi 

(http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/onroad/cert/pcldtmdv/1996/volkswagen_pc_a0070189_1d9_1_di

esel.pdf). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.8]

0.06 - 0.009 = 0.051 g/mi more exhaust PM for the 'old tech' diesel than that assumed for 'clean 

diesel' in GREET.

0.052 g/mi + 0.051 g/mi = 0.103 g/mi WTW PM10 for the 'old tech' diesel car, still far less than 

0.393 g/mi WTW PM10, and significantly less than the WTW PM2.5 from EV even assuming all 

PM from 'old tech' diesel exhaust is PM2.5 (0.079 g/mi vs. 0.119 g/mi). [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0213-A1, p.8]

'Old tech' diesel vehicles have been effectively banned for many years under Tier 2/LEV II 

regulations, to EPA's and CARB's credit, yet special incentives are being proposed for vehicle 

technology (e.g., EV) which may actually increase PM emissions from a WTW perspective 

above 'old tech' diesel engine technology. EPA acknowledges in the Draft RIA for this proposed 

rule that all PM2.5 is treated as equally potent in causing premature mortality regardless of source 

(page 6-35 of the Draft RIA), even specifically mentioning PM2.5 from diesel engine sources. So 

there appears to be no valid reason from a public health perspective to displace the reduction in 

PM2.5 emissions from diesel engines with increased PM2.5 emissions from power plants to 

support EV/PHEV/FCV technology. The regulatory push for these 'advanced technologies' 

defies logic from an emissions perspective. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, pp.8-9]

It should also be noted that WTW SOx emissions would also be higher for EV/PHEV/FCV, as 

would WTW NOx emissions for EV/PHEV, than the default diesel car, according to GREET. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.9]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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A massive shift to EV/PHEV/FCV technology could risk offsetting gains made by EPA from 

diesel PM emission reduction mandates, more than offsetting it in the case of EV, and potentially 

reverse downward trends in the National Emission Inventory of PM10 and PM2.5 emissions 

recently highlighted by EPA. Based on this analysis, a massive shift to these 'advanced 

technologies' would not only not be desirable, it may actually be environmentally detrimental, 

and incentives for these technologies are dubious. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.9]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG endorses many aspects of the proposal, including in particular the agencies incentivizing 

advanced technologies such as electric and fuel cell drivetrains and off-cycle technologies. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

DAG's future products will incorporate all aspects of advanced technologies. DAG will offer in 

the United States electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid vehicles, hybrid vehicles, fuel cell vehicles and 

potentially dedicated CNG vehicles as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

• DAG strongly endorses the incentives for electric and fuel cell vehicles. Fuel cell vehicles, in 

particular, offer considerable long term advantages, and yet enjoy less short term public and 

private financial support than electric recharging infrastructure. The agencies should ensure that 

fuel cell vehicles remain a feasible option in the future by increasing the multiplier for fuel cell 

vehicles to 4. In addition, the agencies should provide a multiplier of 3 to dedicated CNG 

vehicles in light of the barriers these vehicles face and the significant role they can play in the 

fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

DAG strongly endorses the proposed incentives for battery-powered vehicles. The potential for 

battery technology in the United States and throughout the world remains strong, with a hesitant 

consumer market beginning to consider advanced technology vehicles. The four major market 

hurdles for battery-powered vehicles are: (l) public perception of electric vehicles as having 

limited range and functionality; (2) attacks based on upstream emissions pending change in the 

electricity supply towards renewable energy sources; (3) battery costs; and (4) limited 

infrastructure. EPA's conclusion that the market requires support to grow consumer confidence, 

build the refueling and servicing infrastructure and reduce battery costs recognizes the 

difficulties of building and sustaining support for 'game-changing' technologies with 

transformational long-term potential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-5]

The concept of providing breathing room within a regulation to help nascent technology 

overcome short-term barriers is not novel.9 EPA, for example, granted waivers through a 

relaxation of the NOx standards in the 1980s in order to encourage diesel vehicles, and diesel 

sales soared. DAG's diesel sales during that period were substantial. More recently DAG 

introduced diesel BlueTEC technology to the United States. Other manufacturers have also 

introduced diesel passenger vehicles to the U.S. market. Public demand for clean diesel vehicles 

is growing.10 The electric vehicle segment is particularly well-suited to such support. The credits 

associated with each type of battery technology should reflect the technology's potential to 

eliminate fossil fuel dependence and the level of the barriers that must be overcome for the 

technology to gain a strong foothold in the consumer marketplace. Thus, EPA has proposed that 
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4-58

the credit multiplier for plug-in hybrids be somewhat less than the credit multiplier for full 

battery electric vehicles. Plug-in hybrids, while certain to playa significant role in building public 

confidence in electric vehicles, continue to have some limited ability to emit greenhouse gases. 

Full battery electric vehicles require a slightly higher incentive because they emit no greenhouse 

gases but will require more infrastructure and further technological advancement and more 

public experience to overcome initial skepticism. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-5]

Fuel cell vehicles are at the ultimate end of the spectrum. Fuel cell vehicles are able to support 

full functionality and dispense with range anxiety. They supply emissions free urban 

transportation as well as the capacity for long distance and interurban driving. Fuel cell vehicles 

can support a wide range of renewable fuels to generate hydrogen and electricity. Advances in 

battery technology will have a synergistic effect, because they will promote fuel cell batteries, as 

well as BEYs and PHEYs. DAG believes that with supporting government incentives, economies 

of scale, and advances in module strategies, fuel cell technology can be made cost competitive 

with diesel-hybrid vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-6]

Support for fuel cell infrastructure in the United States, however, lags behind that for electric 

vehicles. To be sure, California has moved towards revamping the Clean Fuels Outlet to promote 

fuel cell refueling stations.11 The CFO proposal, however, links infrastructure support to the 

volume of fuel cell vehicles in California. Production incentives are therefore especially 

important to sustain the California effort and to ensure that a fuel cell market begins to take root 

and can ultimately grow in California and then spread throughout the United States. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-6]

Accordingly, DAG urges EPA to expand the credit multiplier applicable to fuel cell vehicles 

from 2.0 to 4.0. While PHEYs and BEYs are important, fuel cell technology represents the best 

opportunity over the long term to transform the personal transportation system entirely, to 

eliminate tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions and to service the full range of functionality and 

range demanded in the U.S. market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-6]

9 EPA has long supported advanced diesel technology. While diesel engines expand fuel 

economy range over gasoline engines, they suffer from the carbon penalty when applied in the 

GHG program. This creates an inherent inconsistency between the CAFE and the GHG 

programs. A product with growing public support and the capacity to enhance fuel efficiency, 

reduce dependence on foreign oil and promote the economy provides a substantial compliance 

benefit in CAFE but goes largely unrecognized in the GHG program. This fundamental 

inconsistency creates a public policy disconnect with Europe and penalizes companies, such as 

DAG, that invested substantially in developing advanced diesel technology for the world market 

as well as the additional technology necessary to meet U.S. requirements.

10 Indeed, DAG has found that consumer prefer advanced diesel engines to hybrid vehicles with 

comparable fuel economy performance, at least as applied to DAG's luxury car offerings.
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-59

11 A nationwide effort is also underway in Germany to create a refueling network to support fuel 

cell vehicles.

Organization: Minnesota Department of Commerce

The proposed rule provides Electric vehicles (EVs) with preferential treatment compared with 

conventional or alternative fuel vehicles by means of a “credit” mechanism. The “credit” system 

proposed in the rule does not use life cycle assessment (LCA) methods commonly used for 

evaluating greenhouse gas emissions. Absent use of LCA, the proposed rule grants EVs zero 

greenhouse gas emissions even though U.S. DOE National Energy Technology Laboratory 

(NETL) studies show that electricity produced from fossil fuel may result in higher LCA vehicle 

emissions per mile than produced from gasoline (E10) hybrid electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7363-A1, p. 1]

Assure that the rule drives innovation so that diverse vehicle propulsion and fuel technologies 

can compete to achieve the goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7363-A1, p. 1]

Electric motors have no GHG emissions at point of use. A federal rule that only includes “tail 

pipe” –rather than life cycle emissions – effectively requires electric vehicles for the U.S. 

market. Rather than mandating a technology, the rule should motivate all propulsion and fuel 

technologies to compete to provide diverse, technical and economically optimal solutions for the 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7363-A1, p. 1]

Use LCA methodology for evaluating greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7363-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Supports the inclusion of an EV multiplier for MYs 2017 through 2021, and recommends that an 

EV multiplier be extended for MYs 2022 through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, 

p.2]

Supports the 0 gram per mile compliance value for EVs, and the electric portion of PHEVs for 

MYs 2017 through 2021, and recommends that this compliance value continues in MYs 2022 

through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.2]

Mitsubishi Motors fully supports EPA’s decision to provide an EV multiplier “to facilitate 

market penetration of the most advanced vehicle technologies as rapidly as possible”. (76 FR 

74878) This decision accurately reflects the current status of the EV industry relative to the U.S. 

market. During commercialization, an EV multiplier helps justify necessary capital investments 

to enable, deploy, and advance EV technologies before recouping these costs from vehicle sales. 

These capital investments are in addition to ongoing investments in traditional internal 

combustion engine technologies. As stated earlier, Mitsubishi Motors encourages the agencies to 

extend the EV multiplier in the later years of this rulemaking. Extending the multiplier will 
EPA Response to Comments

4-60

continue to make costs more reasonable and further promote EV technologies, allowing even 

greater GHG emission reductions to be realized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.4]

Mitsubishi Motors capital investments have led to global commercialization of the i-MiEV and 

to the development of quick charging technology. Specifically, we are a founding member of the 

CHAdeMO Association, a private industry association which aims to increase EV infrastructure 

worldwide and to internationally standardize the CHAdeMO protocol for DC quick charging of 

electric vehicles. As of February 2012, 1011 CHAdeMO quick chargers have been installed 

worldwide -- 835 in Japan and over 176 in Europe, Australia and North and South America. One 

of these quick chargers, certified for U.S. sale and public utility, was installed in our solarpowered charging station at our corporate headquarters in Cypress, California. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9507-A1, p.4]

Some of our continued and future capital investments are in the area of innovative charging 

techniques and energy storage management. Currently in Japan, Mitsubishi Motors is 

collaborating with wireless charger manufacturing and technology companies to develop EV 

charging systems enabled through electromagnetic induction. Mitsubishi Motors is also 

researching methods for capitalizing on i-MiEV batteries’ storage capability for non-vehicle 

applications. Later this year, the Smart Grid Demonstration Project (the „V2X? concept) will 

begin at Mitsubishi Motors R&D headquarters in Okazaki, Japan. In the V2X project, electricity 

produced by solar panels will be stored in solar batteries, as well as i-MiEV batteries, and will be 

distributed to the factory power grid. All of these examples demonstrate our ongoing 

commitment and investment in EV vehicles and associated applications. An EV multiplier helps 

companies to sustain this type of research and investment before the establishment of a mass 

market for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, pp.4-5]

Zero gram per mile compliance value [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p.5]

Mitsubishi Motors fully supports EPA’s decision to assign a zero gram per mile compliance 

value to EVs and the electric portion of PHEVs without company level caps for MYs 2017 

through 2021. EPA’s decision is sound public policy and recognizes that geography and regional 

economic factors determine the amount of renewable energy used to generate electricity. OEMs 

do not control these factors. Moreover, stationary source emissions are directly controlled by 

EPA under Title 5. Assigning power generation emissions to vehicles would lead to double 

counting – this is unprecedented and introduces an artificial burden on emerging technologies. 

Historically, fuel production (“well-to-tank”) emissions were never assigned to the vehicle 

utilizing the fuel. Vehicle emissions are currently measured and regulated by the amount of 

compounds directly emitted by the vehicle. Given EVs and the electric portion of PHEVs do not 

emit CO2, the proposed zero gram per mile compliance value is appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9507-A1, p.5]

The factors determining the amount of renewable energy used to generate electricity will not 

change. Therefore, the zero gram per mile compliance value as discussed above should remain in 

place for MYs 2022 through 2025. The regulatory cost of requiring the accounting of upstream 

emissions could create a barrier that would prevent manufacturers from producing and 

introducing newer, more efficient EVs and PHEVs. Furthermore, a company cap as proposed on 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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the amount of vehicles that can use the zero gram per mile compliance factor is an unnecessary 

regulatory limitation, and we recommend that this requirement be removed. A cap could prevent 

a true and effective market penetration rate of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9507-A1, p.5]

The EV multiplier compliance incentive is absolutely necessary to promote EV adoption during 

this rulemaking, and should be extended into the later part of this rulemaking. We support the 

zero gram per mile compliance value for EVs and the electric portion of PHEVs, which reflect 

the real-world GHG emissions at the vehicle level- a factor OEMs can control. Furthermore, this 

compliance value should continue into the later years of the rulemaking without limitations on 

usage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-A1, p. 6]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 95-99.]

Automotive OEMs have little control over the source of electricity. Therefore, like was said 

before, they should not be subject to arbitrary emissions regulations on electric vehicles. These 

need to be accounted for in separate regulations of those regulated industries. And in absence of 

comprehensive national energy policy, Mitsubishi Motors recognizes the challenges and the 

associated risks of developing practical federal and fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards 

for light-duty vehicles. Mitsubishi Motors believes continued inclusive process to develop fuel 

economy and greenhouse gas standards is a realistic goal.

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Standards must be technology-neutral and performance-based. The proposed rule inadvertently 

imposes “preferred technologies” and, in so doing, does not consider the full range of 

technologies available to allow for a fully competitive marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9478-A1, p.2]

Fuel efficiency and GHG emissions standards must be technology-neutral and performancebased. Undoubtedly, the standards proposed by the agencies are well-intended and will continue 

to compel the automotive industry to reach these goals by incorporating a full range of

technological innovations. No specific vehicle technology will meet all of our nation’s driving 

needs. All options must be made available in order to achieve the overall objectives to reduce 

fuel consumption and emissions. Despite the agencies’ assurances that they are not influencing 

the availability of certain vehicles, the proposal inadvertently influences “preferred vehicle 

technologies.” Thus, it constrains the full field of advanced technology vehicles that are available 

to meet the overarching fuel consumption and emissions reduction goals. A solution of today 

may not necessarily be the solution of tomorrow. Unintentionally driving technologies down a 

few narrow paths could possibly set us up for long-term failure to realize the nation’s goals. 

Moreover, such inadvertent preferences stifle technology innovation and constrain the 

competitive marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.3]

Other potential consequences are non-market based imbalances and preferential treatment to 

certain vehicle manufacturers (depending on their use of “preferred technologies” in their fleet 
EPA Response to Comments

4-62

mix), ultimately picking “winners and losers.” Restricting incentives to specific technologies 

could present a market where such vehicles are produced, but not purchased because these 

vehicles may not meet consumers’ needs or value expectations. Again, this may result in lessthan-needed fleet penetration in order to impact the emissions and fuel consumption and meet the 

goals of the Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.3]

Benefits of these technologies should be considered from a well-to-wheel, fuel lifecycle 

perspective. Without this type of comprehensive assessment, the agencies consequently 

improperly favor preferred technologies rather than providing truly technology-neutral standards. 

MEMA would recommend using the existing well-to-wheel assessment of the GREET 

(Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation Model) that is used 

by the U.S. Department of Energy. GREET has been used to shape policy choices that impact 

emissions and evaluates the well-to-wheel impact of various technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9478-A1, p.3]

In the NPRM, EPA discusses two alternatives for the calculation of CAFE for dual fuel vehicles 

for MY2020 and beyond after the expiration of the calculation currently in effect through 

MY2019 (as specified in 49 U.S.C. 32905). EPA has invited comment on both approaches. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.12]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Third, we recognize that this program, proposed by EPA under section 202(a) of the Clean Air 

Act, is a vehicle tailpipe emissions control program. As such, it is appropriate to assign a tailpipe 

emissions level of 0 g/mile CO2 for all electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 

(PHEVs) and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), as EPA does for MYs 2017 through 2021 with a percompany cumulative sales cap for 0 g/mile for MYs 2022 through 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8084-A1, p. 4]

We are pleased that, as EPA states, this program’s focus on vehicle tailpipe emissions does not 

raise issues relative to criteria pollutants because “upstream emissions [of criteria pollutants] 

associated with production and distribution of the fuel are addressed by comprehensive 

regulatory programs focused on the upstream sources of those emissions.” In addition, we 

appreciate the agency’s statement that because “upstream GHG emissions values are generally 

higher than the upstream GHG emissions values associated with gasoline vehicles, and because 

there is currently no national program in place to reduce GHG emissions from electric power 

plants, EPA believes it is appropriate to consider the incremental upstream GHG emissions 

associated with electricity production and distribution.” But, we also believe it is an appropriate 

position to encourage the initial commercialization of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs while monitoring 

the status of upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 36-37.]

Organization: National Corn Growers Association et al.
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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Only vehicle tailpipe emissions are counted toward compliance with GHG standards rather than 

including complete life cycle emissions, excluding emissions generated in the production and 

delivery of the fuel whether electricity, gasoline, natural gas or a renewable fuel such as ethanol. 

As a result, all types of electric vehicles would have “zero” emissions during electric operation 

when this is clearly not the case when electricity production emissions are included. This method 

unfairly advantages electrically fueled vehicles over other technologies, and does not allow for a 

comparison of true emission performance among various propulsion technologies and fuels. For 

example, a BEV generates no tailpipe emissions, but an FFV fueled with E85 might compare 

very favorably to the BEV if GHG emissions were evaluated on a life cycle basis3 as they should 

be in evaluating their contribution to the air. By structuring credits to favor one technology over 

another, the agencies are picking winners and losers rather than allowing technologies to 

compete on a level playing field against a performance standard4 . In addition, the fact that EPA 

chose tailpipe instead of life cycle emission standards for the CAFE/GHG rule is inconsistent 

with EISA and with RFS2 GHG performance threshold standards5

. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9565-A1, p.3]

3 - “Well-to-Wheels Analysis of Advanced Fuel/Vehicle Systems — A North American Study of 

Energy Use, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Criteria Pollutant Emissions”, May 2005, Figure 4-

5. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.3]

4 - The favoring of EV technology over renewable fuels is especially evident in the specific 

denial of credits for FFVs in the proposed rule, Sec. III.C, p311. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9565-A1, p.3]

5 - “EISA required EPA to apply lifecycle greenhouse gas performance threshold standards to 

ensure that each category of renewable fuel emits fewer greenhouse gases than the petroleum 

fuel it replaces.” From http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9565-A1, p.3]

Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)

Government Agency Consistency

The Department of Energy is currently seeking to adopt the recommendation of the National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS) that “DOE shift over time to use of a FFC measure of energy 

consumption for assessment of national and environmental impacts, particularly GHG for 

establishing appliance efficiencies.” In doing so, the NAS also recommended providing more 

comprehensive information to the public through labels and/or other means, such as an enhanced 

website. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 6]

NPGA believes any final rule reducing CAFE and GHG standards for light-duty vehicles for the 

years of 2017 through 2025 absent FFC measurement would easily provide automakers of 

advanced technology vehicles an unfair market advantage for their vehicles. Without FFC 

analysis, using electricity as the dedicated vehicle fuel gives the impression that its use in light-
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4-64

duty vehicles is 100 percent efficient with zero end-use emissions. This conclusion is erroneous 

and analogous to the DOE promulgating energy efficiency standards for building appliances 

finding no GHG emissions associated with turning on a light bulb. Further conveyance of this 

logic will have a compounding effect for any and every year the EPA/NHTSA carries it forward 

through the year 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 6]

Rulemaking that focuses on point-of-use energy creates and maintains an unfair market 

advantage for technologies that already have lower full-fuel-cycle efficiency and higher GHG 

emissions. The overall FFC efficiency for electricity typically results in only about 30 percent of 

usable energy at the point-of-use. However, FFC analysis recognizes the efficiency of the 

autogas delivery process resulting in approximately 87% of the energy produced being delivered 

as usable energy. For these and other reasons, we propose that GHG emissions especially as they 

relate to emissions for electric vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, and the electric portion of plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles be accounted for immediately upon the final rule’s effective date. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 7]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

In principle, we also support incentives for plug-in hybrid electric and electric vehicle 

technology and for real off-cycle CO2 reductions, and we look forward to continuing to work 

with automakers, the agencies and consumers to maximize the effectiveness of these credits and 

other measures which enable rapid adoption of new technology, and to optimize short and long 

term emissions impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4] [[This comment can also be 

found in Outline Headings 5. and 7.]]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA should include emissions associated with upstream electricity or hydrogen production for 

plug-in electric or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in the emission scoring. If incentives remain that 

discount upstream emissions, the structure should be strengthened to ensure greater 

environmental certainty of the incentives and minimize losses of emission reduction benefits. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 3]

B. Program incentives

1. Treating Plug-in Electric and Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles as “Zero” Emissions Undermines 

Pollution and Technology Benefits of Program

In the proposal, EPA acknowledges that awarding plug-in electric vehicles an emissions rate of 0 

g/mi inaccurately reflects their real-world impact and reduces the potential GHG reductions of 

the program by up to 5.4 percent.34 Automakers can comply by producing advanced technology 

vehicles such as plug-in electric or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles which then allows them to apply 

less technology to their conventional vehicle fleet which, in turn, results in a higher average fleet 

emissions rate. To avoid this loss in emissions and fuel savings benefits, NRDC believes that the 

emissions associated with upstream electricity or hydrogen production should be included in the 

compliance scoring. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 11]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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However, if the agencies proceed with their proposed 0 g/mi treatment, other incentives, such as 

off-cycle credits, should not be available for the portion of an advanced vehicle’s driving range 

that is powered by grid electricity or off-board hydrogen. No vehicles should be allowed to have 

negative emissions. For plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, the benefit of additional incentives 

should be calculated based on the emissions or efficiency benefit achieved for only the gasoline 

or diesel operation of the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 11]

NRDC believes EPA underestimates the potential losses in GHG reductions due to plug-in 

electric vehicles. The California Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) program, the latest version of 

which was recently authorized by the California Air Resources Board (CARB), is expect to 

encourage higher sales volumes nationally than those predicted by EPA. EPA estimates up to 2.8 

million vehicles (plug-in electric and fuel cell vehicles) will be sold from 2017 to 2025. 

According to CARB, the ZEV program could result in 1.4 million sold in California during the 

same period.35 Additionally, CARB has estimated that the states which have adopted the ZEV 

program (under Section 177 of the Clean Air Act) could have electric vehicle sales that are twice 

the California level, or 2.8 million vehicles.36 It is also reasonable to assume that another 10 

percent of vehicles would be sold in non-ZEV states as many automakers are focusing sales 

nationally or at least in some states in addition to 177 states. In total, national electric vehicle 

sales could be 4.6 million, or 65 percent greater than EPA’s highest estimate. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 11]

To limit the loss of GHG benefits, EPA should modify the cap on the number of vehicles eligible 

for 0 g/mi treatment. NRDC recommends that EPA adopt an industry-wide cap following the 

structure described in the NPRM as the alternative to the proposed manufacturer-specific cap. 

NRDC recommends the industry-wide cap because it ensures the environmental benefits of the 

program. If set appropriately by considering the higher potential sales as described above, the 

industry-wide cap could ensure that no more than 5 percent of the program GHG reductions are 

lost. NRDC recommends that the industry-wide cap be set based on cumulative plug-in electric 

vehicles produced beginning in 2012 because even these early volumes will help pave the way 

for electric vehicle production cost reductions and greater market acceptance. While 0 g/mi 

treatment could be applied for model years 2017 to 2021, as EPA has proposed, the post 2021 

cap of no more than 2 million vehicles would be lowered by the cumulative sales that occurred 

before 2022 to reflect the technology advancement in the early years of the program. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, pp. 11-12]

If EPA maintains the manufacturer-specific cap, NRDC believes it should be lowered from the 

proposed 600,000 for each manufacturer that sells at least 300,000 from 2019-2021 to ensure that 

no more than 5 percent of the GHG reductions are lost when considering sales volumes in excess 

of 4 million vehicles from 2017-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 12]

NRDC opposes any weakening or removal of the cap on 0 g/mi treatment that exists for model 

years 2012-2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 12]

NRDC supports the requirement of a minimum all-electric range of at least 10 miles for a vehicle 

to be eligible for 0 g/mi treatment. NRDC also agrees that the 0 g/mi treatment should only apply 

to operation on grid-supplied electricity in plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. The use of a utility 
EPA Response to Comments

4-66

factor is a reasonable allocation of the 0 g/mi treatment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 

12]

We also welcome further discussions with EPA on the details of setting upstream emissions 

accounting. EPA notes that there are several factors to consider including marginal versus 

average power plant emissions rates, regional variability and how to project emission rates for 

vehicles that are charging over many years. NRDC provided comments in the 2012-2016 GHG 

proposed rule along these lines and we recognize that on-going analysis could be appropriate to 

most accurately quantify electric vehicle emission rates for real-world operation. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 12]

35 CARB, Staff Report: Initial Statement Of Reasons, Advanced Clean Cars, 2012 Proposed 

Amendments To The California Zero Emission Vehicle Program Regulations, December 7, 

2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 111]

36 Ibid [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 13]

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

Support for Electric Vehicles: The proposal represents a significant leap forward in advancing 

environmentally friendly vehicles and zero emissions transportation. Battery electric technology 

has the ability, over time, to reduce substantially reliance on foreign oil and to provide vehicles 

capable of running on renewable energy sources. While automobile manufacturers cannot control 

the source of fuel, the industry can develop and market vehicles supporting clean energy use and 

can ensure that tailpipe emissions are diminished, or-as in the case of the Nissan LEAFeliminated completely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.2] 

Credit Multiplier: The proposed credit multiplier for battery electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) is critical to the Widespread 

deployment of these advanced powertrain technologies. The adoption of these alternative 

powertrains, beyond their initial purchasers, hinges on significant investment by automobile 

manufacturers in research and development, the appropriate amount of time to create an effective 

deployment strategy, and marketing initiatives that are tailored to new technology deployment. 

Past experiences have shown that regulatory programs that support new technologies Increase 

the availability and rate of adoption of new technologies, making it more likely that new 

technologies reach a critical mass of consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.2] 

Measuring Tailpipe Emissions: Nissan supports EPA's proposal to use a greenhouse gas 

emissions compliance value of 0 grams per mile for EVs, FCVs and the electric portions of 

PHEVs in MYs 20172021 (and certain vehicles in MYs 2022-2025). The compliance value of 

these vehicles should always be measured at zero grams per mile. Including upstream emissions 

in the compliance calculation will cause confusion in the marketplace and will detract from the 

agencies' support for the deployment of battery powered vehicles. The agency should, as a matter 

of public policy, continue to promote the advancement of zero and low-emission vehicles while 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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separately focusing on the development of renewable and/or low emission power sources. This is 

not only the best policy decision to promote EV deployment and increase their rate of adoption, 

it is also legally required. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.3] 

While advancements in petroleum powered vehicles are essential to improving fuel efficiency 

and necessary to achieve immediate goals, battery electric technology offers the promise of yet 

more substantial reductions-and even the elimination-of tailpipe emissions. Nissan anticipates 

that battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles can achieve a significant market share if 

supported by government programs and incentives, and if the industry is provided with the 

necessary incentives to invest in the technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.10] 

Other automakers are also entering the market for battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. 

Most, however, are doing so more cautiously than Nissan and continued investment will depend 

largely on the extent to which consumers adopt the technology and infrastructure is built to 

support the vehicles. As set forth in more detail below, government incentives and support are 

essential to ensuring manufacturer investment and widespread consumer adoption of these 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.10] 

The credits proposed for electric drivetrains and the continued focus on tailpipe emissions when 

calculating GHG emissions are critical to promoting the government's long term policy 

initiatives. Without the incentives and continued focus on tailpipe emissions when calculating 

GHG emissions, as explained more fully below, consumers will be slower to adopt these 

advanced technologies and continue to rely on traditional internal combustion vehicles, which 

will result in higher overall greenhouse gas emissions long term. It is not until consumers adopt 

these technologies that the United States can realize the benefits of these transformational, 'game 

changing' vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.10] 

As EPA recognizes, the proposed regulatory incentives for electric vehicles are 'justified by 

promoting technologies that have significant transportation GHG emissions and oil consumption 

game-changing potential in the longer run, and that also face major market barriers in entering a 

market that has been dominated by gasoline vehicle technology and infrastructure for over 100 

years.' See 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854, 75,011 (Dec. 1, 2011) ('Proposed Rule'). Meaningful market 

penetration of these advanced powertrains hinges not only on increased consumer demand and 

continued infrastructure development, but also on significant investment by automobile 

manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, pp.10-11] 

Automobile manufacturers face an increasingly competitive market, short-term economic 

uncertainties and increasing regulatory costs. Nissan and other automakers must invest in a range 

of technologies to provide certainty in their ability to meet the proposed standards. While Nissan 

remains committed to the promise of battery electric vehicles, the proposed incentives provide 

the requisite support to the industry as a whole to make the early investment required to create a 

more robust market for battery electric vehicles and to spur their adoption rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.11] 

In order for new a technology--especially technologies that disrupt the status quo-to be adopted 

on a meaningful scale, it is essential that the new technology be adopted by a critical mass of 
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consumers. While some new technological innovations diffuse from first use to widespread 

adoption in a matter of years, others may level out at less than 2 percent. See generally Everett 

M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 219 (Free Press 5th ed. 2003) (1962). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.11] 

A widely used depiction of the technology adoption curve is the 'Innovation Adoption Lifecycle' 

developed by Joe M. Bohlen, George M. Beal, and Everett M. Rogers at Iowa State University:

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.11] [For the graphic referenced (technology adoption 

curve) please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.11] 

See Diffusion of Innovations at 281.6 As the bell curve shows, new technologies begin with a 

relatively small number of 'Innovators,' then move to 'Early Adopters' before possibly finding 

acceptance within the pragmatic majority of consumers. Most of the variance in the rate of 

adoption of innovations is explained by five attributes: relative advantage, compatibility, 

complexity, trialability, and observability. Jd. at 221. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, 

pp.11-12] 

As applied to many consumer markets, a disruptive technology is likely to displace more 

traditional technology as it moves along the adoption curve to reach the pragmatic majority of 

consumers. However, as applied to the motor vehicle market, the goal is not for electric 

drivetrains to displace ICE vehicles, but rather for electric vehicles to gain enough of a foothold 

in the marketplace to be able to share the market with more traditional drivetrain technology. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.12] 

A disruptive technology has the best chance of broader adoption when 'opinion leaders adopt, 

which usually occurs somewhere between 3 and 16 percent adoption in most systems.' Jd. at 223. 

The Early Adopters are the opinion leaders in communities, and potential adopters of a new 

technology look to them for advice and information. Jd. at 283. Consistent with this welldeveloped theory of technology adoption, the agency has recognized that 'consumer interest in 

EVs is likely to change over time, as early adopters share their experiences.' Proposed Rule at 

75,117 (emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.12] 

The Innovation Adoption Lifecycle represents what is necessary to enable EVs to move from 

Innovators to Early Adopters in order to gain enough of a foothold to, over time, find acceptance 

amongst early members of the more pragmatic majority. In this context, government production 

incentives are imperative to ensure that electric drivetrains are able to make the critical move 

from the approximate 2.5% of the market where Innovators are willing to experiment with the 

new technology to the next group of consumers where Early Adopters showcase the practical use 

of the technology and begin the process of incorporating the technology into the broader market. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.12] 

Since the motor vehicle market needs to be supported by substantial infrastructure and involves 

substantial investment and up-front costs, movement along the technology adoption curve is 

substantially slower and more precarious. Hybrids, for example, while gaining general 

acceptance as a viable drivetrain, have only just reached a consumer market share where they 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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have transgressed beyond innovative consumers to more widespread early adopters. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.13] 

The chart on the following page depicts the rate of HEV sales from when they were first 

introduced in 1999 through 2007, and also depicts where EVs are on that same production 

schedule: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.13] [To view the chart please refer to EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.14] 

The first hybrid Honda Insight was introduced in the U.S. in 1999 and the first Toyota Prius was 

introduced in the United States in 2000. HEVs comprised only about 0.5% of new car sales 

during the first generation of these vehicles; and, as of2004, only five HEV models were 

available. HEVs reached a key tipping point, increasing their U.S. light-duty vehicle market 

share by 250%, between 2004 and 2005 when multiple automobile manufacturers entered the 

market offering a variety of HEV models. This tipping point coincided with the second 

generation Prius. Yet, today hybrids have just reached a 2.5-3% market share. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.14] 

The hybrid experience represents the extreme challenges of introducing transformational 

drivetrain technology into the new motor vehicle fleet. EVs must not only travel the same earlystage adoption path as HEVs (which still rely on petroleum), but also face more substantial 

market barriers, such as concerns over range and the need to develop support infrastructure. As 

reflected on the graph, the EV market is only in its infancy. It will require substantial support to 

overcome the barriers to broad market penetration and to ensure a solid and long-lasting foothold 

in the automotive marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.14] 

The projected market penetration rates for EVs and PHEVs vary significantly, demonstrating the 

market uncertainty surrounding these technologies. The Boston Consulting Group projects that 

EVs and PHEVs could make up 2% of new light-duty vehicle sales in 2020. A study conducted 

by Google.org using McKinsey & Company’s Low Carbon Economics Tool, on the other hand, 

projects that EVs and PHEVs could make up as much as 70% of new light-duty vehicle sales by 

2030. The Google Study projection assumes rapid decreases in battery costs and increases in 

energy density by 2030, to enable the production of electric vehicles with 300-mile range and a 

total cost of ownership lower than that of conventional gasoline vehicles. See Google Study at 

12. Without a breakthrough in battery technology, however, the Google Study concludes that it 

will be 'much harder for EVs to reach scale.' Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, pp.14-15] 

The HEV experience and the EV market forecasts reflect the uncertainties surrounding the 

successful deployment of transformational drivetrain technologies beyond market innovators. 

'Diffuser incentives'-incentives provided to manufacturers to produce a new technology and to 

persuade consumers to adopt that technology-will provide a strong foundation upon which to 

base that deployment and to redress the market barriers that may otherwise stall or limit a more 

expanded market for advanced vehicle technologies. The proposed production incentives are 

imperative for that technology adoption to occur. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.15] 

Indeed, compliance incentives historically have been successful in generating production and 

creating a market for new light-duty vehicles. When, for example, EPA provided an incentive for 
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diesel vehicles in the 1980s through a relaxed NOx standard, the production and sale of diesel 

vehicles rose considerably.11 As evidenced in the graph below, diesel vehicles saw their best 

sales during those years. For the period during which the waivers were in effect, the percentage 

of new light-duty vehicle sales was approximately four times higher than it was in the 

immediately preceding years: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.15] [To view the graph 

please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.16] 

The experience with light-duty diesel vehicles demonstrates the successful use of compliance 

incentives to generate the manufacture and marketing of advanced and innovative technology in 

the light-duty vehicle market.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.16] 

The Proposed Incentives Will Encourage State and Local Governments and Private Firms to 

Stay the Course, and Continue to Promote Advanced Vehicle Technologies [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.16] 

The successful development of an EV market depends upon the simultaneous growth of vehicle 

production, consumer demand and infrastructure. The proposed incentives offered to 

manufacturers will result in increased production and availability of EVs and PHEVs. They will 

complement an existing array of federal and state consumer incentives and public funds for 

infrastructure and charging14 that have created a viable market in the key and early markets, and 

a budding consumer interest in additional markets throughout the nation. Private investment in 

EV infrastructure is being made as well15, and utilities are offering time-of-use incentives which 

make owning and operating a battery electric vehicle easier.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-

A1, pp.16-17] 

Public and private investment, however, remains uncertain as budget constraints present 

challenges to the federal, state and local governments. Private firms, moreover, must see strong 

government support for electric vehicles to justify investment in electric vehicle infrastructure. 

The proposed incentives will encourage state and local governments and private firms to stay the 

course, and continue to promote advanced vehicle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, p.17] 

The experience to date shows that the market will respond best with a combined support of 

incentives, infrastructure and vehicle availability. The deployment of the Nissan LEAF has been 

initiated in 'waves'. The waves reflect the markets that Nissan considered to be more market 

ready in terms of both consumer demand and local government support. The initial wave (Wave 

1) began in late 2010 and included San Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, Los Angeles, 

Honolulu, Portland, Seattle, Phoenix, Nashville, Dallas, Houston and Austin. The Nissan LEAF 

was introduced in other cities in additional waves throughout 2011. Nissan anticipates a 

nationwide rollout of the Nissan LEAF in 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.17] 

Focusing on the Wave 1 markets where data is more readily available, Nissan has analyzed the 

factors necessary to convert general consumer interest in electric vehicles to the ultimate 

purchase of a Nissan LEAF. Consumer interest in the Nissan LEAF begins with 'Handraisers,' 

those who sign up (bye-mail or otherwise) to receive information about the Nissan LEAF. 

Handraisers can then take the next step and make a 'Reservation,' a refundable $99 deposit that 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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will reserve the consumer's place in line when Nissan LEAFs are made available in the 

consumer's market. Once they are, the consumer can request a quote (RAQ) from a dealer. 

Ultimately, if the consumer decides to purchase the Nissan LEAF, this will lead to an order or 

sale (collectively 'Orders'). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.17] 

The Wave 1 markets demonstrate the importance of consumer incentives. Providing direct 

consumer benefits such as access to HOV lanes and financial support for home electric vehicle 

supply equipment (EVSE) installation significantly increase EV interest and sales. Data from 

Wave 1 of the Nissan LEAF shows that consumers eligible for the EV Project (a public-private 

partnership funded in part by the Department of Energy), through which they would receive 

residential EVSE installation at no cost, were twice as likely to purchase an EV as those who did 

not. Moreover, in states with one monetary consumer incentive, internal data shows that people 

were 216% more likely ultimately to order a Nissan LEAF. In states with two or more consumer 

incentives, data shows that people were 300% more likely ultimately to order a Nissan LEAF. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.18] 

Further, markets with more substantial installed and planned infrastructure exhibit a higher level 

of conversion from Reservations to Orders (35-40%) than those with less infrastructure (23-

30%). The amount of infrastructure needed in the remaining markets, however, remains 

considerable and Nissan's data suggests that a combination of increased vehicle availability and 

growth in infrastructure will combine to increase demand for battery electric vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.18] 

In sum, the proposed incentives will complement an existing array of consumer incentives and 

infrastructure development to enable EVs to overcome near-term market barriers, resulting in an 

accelerated tipping point for EV adoption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.18] 

Upstream Emissions Should Not be Considered When Calculating Greenhouse Gas Emission 

Compliance Values [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.18] 

Nissan has long endorsed measuring the greenhouse gas emissions from EVs, PHEVs and FCVs 

from the tailpipe, and not including the upstream emissions associated with the generation of the 

electricity that powers these vehicles. EPA endorsed this approach in the previous rulemaking 

governing MYs 2012-2016 (up to a specific amount of vehicles), in the labeling rule and has 

proposed that approach for certain EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs in this rulemaking as well. The 

proposal to focus on tailpipe emissions is consistent with the policy objective of fostering electric 

vehicles and with the fact that automobile manufacturers only control tailpipe emissions and 

have no control over the fuel source for electric power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, 

p.18] 

Moreover, any non-regulatory consumer information provided by website, label or otherwise, 

must present any upstream emissions information to consumers in a consistent fashion so that 

consumers will see not only the upstream emissions associated with electric vehicles but also the 

upstream emissions associated with other types of vehicles. The agencies should not provide any 

upstream emissions information to consumers based on a net adjustment for electric vehicles 

because such an approach unfairly suggests that ICE vehicles involve no upstream emissions and 
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creates unnecessary confusion over the question of upstream emissions. If the agencies were to 

provide this information to consumers, the information should reflect the upstream emissions 

associated with each vehicle type and should further provide consumers with insight into how 

their region or location may differ from the national average. 17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, pp.18-19] 

Policy Considerations Mandate Against Including Upstream Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9471-A1, p.19] 

In the prior rulemaking, EPA acknowledged that including consideration of upstream emissions 

would detract from the strong public policy support for encouraging the development of an 

electric vehicle market to enable the long term emissions reductions opportunities associated 

with electric vehicles. See 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323,25,341 (May 7, 2010). EPA stated that the 

agency would reassess the issue of how to address upstream emissions associated with EVs and 

PHEVs for MYs 2017-2025 based on: (1) 'the status of advanced technology commercialization,' 

(2) 'the status of upstream GHG control programs,' and (3) 'other relevant factors.' Id While the 

final rule was issued only twenty months ago, in May 2010, the same considerations leading to a 

focus on tailpipe emissions in that rule are equally applicable to the current proposal. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.19] 

The electric vehicle market remains embryonic and, as the experience with hybrid vehicles 

shows, will still be in its infancy when the proposed standards go into effect. Disparaging the 

substantial benefits associated with EVs, PHEVs and FCVs by focusing on the upstream 

emissions of the utilities that provide electric power detracts from the public policy of fostering 

the manufacture and sale of vehicles capable of emitting little or no tailpipe emissions. The 

proposed standards, furthermore, are aggressive and will require complex compliance planning 

for manufacturers, particularly in light of uncertain economic conditions and the need to invest in 

a variety of technologies; including within the compliance calculation a factor that is beyond the 

control of the automobile manufacturer inserts unnecessary ambiguity into that process. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.19] 

Indeed, EPA's proposal to use a national average does not account for the substantial regional 

differences-up to 3 times as much in the highest regions as compared to the lowest regions. 

Proposed Rule at 75,010, n. 280. EPA properly notes the unfair impact on the Nissan LEAF, 

which, using 2007 data, would have an upstream GHG emissions value of 161 grams per mile 

based on national average electricity, and a value of 89 grams per mile based on the average 

electricity in California, one of the initial Wave 1 markets for the Nissan LEAF and the state 

with the most Nissan LEAF sales to date. Id. at 75,011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, 

pp.19-20] 

That disparity, moreover, may be greater in MYs 2017 and beyond. EPA is proposing to use 

national average GHG emissions rate of .574 grams/watt-hour for MYs 2017 and beyond. 18

Based on the EPA RIA upstream calculation method, the Nissan LEAF's upstream GHG 

emissions would be about 146 grams per mile during that period. Under CARB's recently 

adopted regulations, the Nissan LEAF's upstream GHG emissions value in MYs 2017 and 

beyond would be about 64 grams per mile. Thus, instead of the national average resulting in 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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GHG value 1.8 times higher than it actually is (based on 2007 data), use of the national average 

proposed by EPA projects to result in a GHG value 2.28 times higher than it actually is in MYs 

2017 and beyond. 19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.20] 

California is not the only initial Nissan LEAF market with comparatively low electricity GHG 

emissions; in fact, most initial Nissan LEAF markets have lower-than-average electricity GHG 

emissions. By accounting for upstream emissions using a national average, electric vehicle 

manufacturers would be penalized because their compliance standard will not be reflective of 

actual upstream emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.20] 

The agencies have recognized the need to consider the vitality of the electric vehicle market 

during the mid-term review. At that time, the growth and potential for battery electric vehicles to 

reach critical mass will be better known. While it may remain necessary to continue to encourage 

electric vehicles through further incentives, the current status of the market compels continuation 

of the policy and program elements put into place just 20 months ago. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9471-A1, p.20] 

Another factor weighing in favor of continued focus on tailpipe emissions is the upcoming 

regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from electric utility steam generating units. Although 

EPA has stated that 'there is currently no national program in place to reduce GHG emissions 

from electric powerplants,' the current proposal and the opportunity to focus on utilities between

now and the model years covered by this proposal suggest that the agency should not force 

vehicle manufacturers to carry the burden of utility generators. Id. (emphasis added). Rather, the 

agency should ensure that each producer is responsible for the emissions it can control and costeffectively reduce. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, pp.20-21] 

Not only is EPA's proposal to measure EVs as zero grams per mile the best policy decision to 

promote EV deployment, it is also legally required. EPA and NHTSA have chosen to utilize the 

current federal test procedure for measuring fuel economy in vehicles. Significantly, those 

procedures were designed to measure the tailpipe emissions from ICEs and provide for electric 

vehicles to be assigned a measure according to a petroleum equivalency factor. The testing and 

calculation procedures to be used in the CAFE and GHG programs do not account for upstream 

emissions in the production, refining or delivery of petroleum to vehicles operating on 

petroleum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.21] 

In its previous rulemaking, in response to Nissan's suggestion that excluding upstream GHGs is 

legally required under Section 202(a)(l), EPA stated that Section 202(a)(l) granted it 'broad 

discretion in setting emissions standards,' and that this discretion 'included adjustments to 

compliance values adopted in final rule, the multipliers [EPA] proposed, and other kinds of 

incentives.' 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,437. Nissan agrees that Section 202 gives EPA discretion to 

incentivize new technologies, but Section 202 does not give EPA the authority to consider nonvehicle related emissions when setting compliance standards. Doing so would disrupt the careful 

structure of the CAA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.21] 

The CAA governs emissions from both stationary and mobile sources. Specifically, Title I of the 

CAA regulates stationary sources, while Title II of the CAA regulates mobile sources. 
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Regulation of stationary sources is primarily left to the states, whereas the federal government 

sets nationwide emissions standards for mobile sources. See Jensen Family Farms, Inc. v. 

Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution, 644 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2011 ). EPA relies on Section 

202 of the CAA-located in Title II-as the basis of its authority to regulation upstream emissions. 

See 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,437. Congress never intended that Title II encompass consideration of 

upstream emissions, however, nor has EPA ever considered these emissions. See Proposed Rule 

at 75,010 ('[T]raditionally the emissions of the vehicle itself are all that EPA takes into account 

for purposes of compliance with standards set under Clean Air Act Section 202(a).'). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.21] 

Section 202(a)(l) states that 'the Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to 

time revise) ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes 

of new motor vehicles . .., which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 

reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.' 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (emphasis 

added). That is, Title II is limited to consideration and regulation of emissions from the vehicle, 

not any other source. The House Committee report on Title II of the Clean Air Act similarly 

indicated that Section 202 requires the Secretary to promulgate standards applicable 'to the 

emission of substances from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.' H.R. Rep. No. 

89-899, at 9 (1965) (emphasis added). Nowhere in Title II of the CAA or its legislative history 

does it indicate that EPA can take into account the upstream emission associated with a motor 

vehicle when establishing compliance values under Section 202. Doing so would undermine the 

careful structure of the CAA, which leaves stationary source regulation primarily to the states. 

Jensen Family Farms, Inc., 644 F.3d at 938. Consideration of upstream emissions from EVs 

would amount to an indirect regulation of stationary sources under Title I, which is 

impermissible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, pp.21-22] 

Further, to the extent that EPA does decide to revise its testing procedures and consider upstream 

emissions associated with EVs-which it legally cannot-it is arbitrary to consider the upstream 

emissions associated with one type of vehicle and not the other. As Nissan noted in its comments 

on the previous greenhouse gas rulemaking, when regulating products, 'the overriding principle 

of fairness is always the same: the government must govern with an even hand.' us. v. 

Undetermined Quantities of an Article of Drug Labeled as Exachol, 716 F. Supp. 787, 795 

(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the FDA applied an 'uneven regulatory policy' by not treating one 

product like similar situated other product). It is well-established that an agency cannot treat 

similarly situated parties differently without a reasoned basis for doing so. See, e.g., Burlington 

Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 403 F.3d 771, 776-777 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

('Where an agency applies different standards to similarly situated entities and fails to support 

this disparate treatment with a reasoned explanation and substantial evidence in the record, its 

action is arbitrary and capricious and cannot be upheld.'). There is no rational basis for EPA to 

discriminate in the regulatory program based on the form of fuel used, especially when doing so 

would hold manufacturers of advanced powertrains accountable for emissions they cannot 

control. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.22] 

In sum, the federal test procedure, which measures emissions from a vehicle's tailpipe, measures 

battery electric vehicle GHG emissions at zero grams of CO2 per mile. See Proposed Rule at 

74,964 ('The 0 gram per mile value accurately reflects the tailpipe CO2 gram per mile achieved 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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by [EVs, FCVs and the electric portion of PHEVs].'). Therefore, the compliance value of these 

vehicles should always be measured at zero grams per mile. EPA should not-nor does it have the 

authority to-increase this value based on consideration of upstream emissions associated with 

EV, PHEVs and FCVs, but not other vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.22] 

Additional Issues Relating to Upstream Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.23] 

I. To the Extent Upstream Emissions Are Considered, EPA Should Adopt an Industry Wide Cap 

to Reward Early Investors in Advanced Vehicle Technologies [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-

A1, p.23] 

Although Nissan strongly supports the exclusive focus on emissions from the tailpipe, EPA 

requests comment on elements of the proposed cap structure to the zero grams per mile standard 

for MYs 2022-2025, and in particular on the benefits of an industry wide cap versus a percompany cap. The two-tier, per-company cap would allow manufacturers that sold 300,000 or 

more EVIPHEV/FCVs combined in MYs 2019-2021 a cumulative production cap of 600,000 in 

MYs 2022-2025, and manufacturers that sold less than 300,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs combined in 

MYs 2019-2021 a cumulative production cap of200,000. Proposed Rule at 75,013. The industrywide cap would place an industry-wide cumulative production cap of 2 million EV/PHEV/FCVs 

eligible for the zero grams per mile standard in MYs 2022-2025, which would be allocated to 

individual automakers in calendar year 2022 based on cumulative EVIPHEVIFCV sales in MYs 

2019-2021. Id EPA notes that a small portion of the industry-wide cap may be reserved for 

manufacturers that sold zero EV/PHEVIFCVs in MYs 2019-2021. Id [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9471-A1, p.23] 

Any regulatory cap should be industry based in order to encourage investment in electric 

powertrains now for use in the coming model years, and the cap should not reserve any volume 

for manufacturers selling zero electric vehicles in MYs 2019-2021. Although the per-company 

cap encourages manufacturers to sell at least 600,000 advanced technology vehicles in MYs 

2019-2021, the industry-wide cap will encourage manufacturers to exceed that total to maximize 

its share of the zero grams per mile standard in MYs 2022-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, p.23] 

The per-company cap would also have the perverse effect of rewarding manufacturers that are 

lagging behind and not fully committed to investing in these game-changing technologies by 

allowing a guaranteed amount of vehicles to benefit from the zero grams per mile standard in 

MYs 2022-2025, regardless of whether the manufacturer sold any EVs, PHEVs or FCVs in MYs 

2019-2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.23] 

The purpose of the proposed incentives is to encourage manufacturer investment in potentially 

game-changing technologies now to accelerate their adoption rate. Adopting an industry-wide 

cap will serve that purpose. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.23] 

II. PA's Proposed Phase-in Approach to Measuring Upstream Emissions Beyond the Cap will 

Incentivize Advanced Vehicle Investment and Increase Their Rate of Adoption [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.24] 
EPA Response to Comments

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EPA also requests comment on various approaches for phasing in from a 0 grams per mile value 

to a full net increase in upstream emissions value. Proposed Rule at 75,013. Nissan supports 

EPA's phase-in proposal, both for production beyond the cumulative cap in MYs 2022-2025, as 

well as production beyond the cumulative cap for MYs 20122016. The interim period between a 

zero grams per mile compliance value and full net increase in upstream emissions value should 

be equal to the number of vehicles each manufacturer can assign a zero grams per mile 

compliance value for MYs 2022-2025, and the interim period compliance value should be onehalf of the net increase. Nissan supports a similar approach for MYs 2012-2016 (i.e., the number 

of vehicles subject to the phase in will be equal to the number of vehicles each manufacturer can 

assign a zero grams per mile standard in MYs 2012-2016). This approach would further 

incentivize manufacturers to invest in EVs and other advanced powertrains, increasing the rate of 

adoption of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.24] 

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 129-130.] 

The production credits in the proposed rule are essential to incentivizing continued manufacturer 

investment in these advanced technologies, increasing their rate of adoption and the rate by 

which the United States will realize a zero emission society. 

We also understand that certain groups have raised concerns about upstream emissions from 

energy-producing facilities that power the grids that charge the vast range of consumer goods 

including electric vehicles. The solution to the issue of emissions from energy production 

facilities is not to discourage the proliferation of electric vehicles or other consumer goods by 

devaluing their contribution to a cleaner environment. Discouraging that fleet by diminishing the 

way in which the environmental benefits are presented to the public will only serve to reduce the 

market for electric-powered vehicles, delay further serious advancements in low emissions 

electricity and perpetuate the domination of emission-producing internal combustion engines. 

We support the continued focus on tailpipe emissions in this program. While we have no control 

over the energy production facilities or their emissions, we also support public and private efforts 

to move the power supply towards renewable energy sources. 

6 - The theories presented in Diffusion of Innovations are widely accepted. Indeed, Diffusion of 

Innovations is 'the second most-cited work in social science after Cook and Cambell's (1979) 

treatise on quasi-experimentation.' Arvind Singhal & Sweety Law, A Research Agenda for 

Diffusion of Innovations Scholars in the 21st Century: A Conversation with Everett M Rogers, 8 

J. Develop. Comm. 39, 39 (1997). The various editions of Diffusion of Innovations have 

received numerous awards. 'In 1990, the Institute for Scientific Information designated Diffusion 

of Innovations as a 'Citation Classic' on the basis of the large number of citations (approximately 

7,000) that it received in articles published in social science journals. This book was selected by 

Inc. magazine in 1996 as one of the ten classic books in business and in 2000 was designated as a 

'Significant Journalism and Communication Book of the Twentieth Century' by Journalism and 

Mass Communication Quarterly. It was also awarded the first Fellows Book Award in the Field 

of Communication by the International Communication Association's fellows in 2000,' Diffusion 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

4-77

of Innovations at 551. Diffusion of Innovations has also been cited in two administrative reports 

from the Federal Communications Commission. See In Re: International Comparison 

Requirements Pursuant to the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 26 F.C.C.R. 7378, 7393 n.108 

(May 20, 2011); Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, 2010 WL 972375, *151 n. 

29 (F.C.C. Mar. 16,2010). Finally, a Westlaw.com search of all law review articles and treatises 

revealed 93 law review articles that cite Diffusion of Innovations. 

11 - Section 202(b)(6)(B) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) provided that upon the petition of a 

manufacturer, the EPA Administrator could waive the then-existing 1.0 grams per mile (gpm) 

NOx standard to a level not to exceed 1.5 gpm for diesel-powered light-duty vehicles and engines 

manufactured in MYs 1981-1984. Upon receiving several manufacturer petitions in 1980, EPA 

granted waivers permitting emissions up to 1.5 gpm for MYs 1981-1982 diesel-powered lightduty vehicles manufactured by GM, Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, Volvo, and Peugeot. See 45 

Fed. Reg. 5,480 (January 23, 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 34,719 (May 22, 1980). 

13 - The proposed incentives, moreover, do not favor one technology over another to achieve 

compliance. Traditional ICE vehicles will remain a majority of the fleet and will continue to 

gamer significant investment in improved and advanced technologies. The incentives for electric 

drivetrains instead recognize the existing market barriers and will justify private investment in a 

longer-term, transformational solution to yet more substantial environmental benefits in the 

future. 

14 - Examples of local governments supporting EV infrastructure development include 

Chicago's 'sip and gulp' approach will made available both a limited supply of direct connect 

charging stations and a more expansive number of Level 2 public charging stations. In addition, 

San Francisco recently placed in 20 city-owned garages throughout the city, which are free to use 

through 2013. See Cars.com, Chicago Plans Most-Electrified City in the us. (Feb. 8,2011), 

available at http://blogs.cars.com/kickingtires/20 1l/02/chicago-ev-stations.html (last visited 

January 5, 2012); Smartplanet.com, San Francisco will charge your electric car for free until 

2013 (May 9,2011), available at http://www.smartplanet.comlblog/transportation!san-franciscowi Il-charge-your-electric-car-for- free until- 2013/380 (last visited January 5,2012). 

15 - Walgreens, for instance, has installed or plans to install approximately 800 EV charging 

stations across the country. See Walgreens Newsroom, First Walgreens Electric Vehicle 

Charging Station in Orlando Unveiled (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://news.walgreens.com 

/article_display.cfm?article_id=5482 (last visited January 5, 2012). 

16 - Examples include: Georgia Power offers a Plug-In Electric Vehicle time-of-use electricity 

rate for residential customers who own an EV or PHEV. The Indianapolis Power & Light 

Company offers special plug-in electric vehicle charging rates, including year-round time-of-use 

based options, for residential and fleet customers who own a licensed EV or PHEV. Louisville 

Gas & Electric offers a pilot Low Emission Vehicle time-of-use electricity rate for residential 

customers who own an EV or PHEV (limited to 100 customers). DTE Energy (in Michigan) 

offers a reduced electricity rate to qualified residential customers for charging EVs and PHEVs 

during off-peak hours. Nevada Energy (NV Energy) offers discounted electricity rates to 

residential customers in their Northern and Southern Service Territories who charge EVs or 
EPA Response to Comments

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PHEVs during off-peak hours. See Department of Energy, Alternative Fuels & Advanced 

Vehicles Data Center, available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/laws/ (last visited January 5, 

2012). 

17 - The most recent labeling rule, which applies to MY 2013 and later vehicles, is limited to 

tailpipe-only GHG emissions. 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,492-93 (July 16, 2011). The labels for 

EVs, however, will include a clarifying statement, 'Does not include emissions from producing 

electricity,' and vehicles fueled without grid electricity will include the statement 'Producing and 

distributing fuel also creates emissions; learn more at fueleconomy.gov.' Id. For PHEVs, the text 

'& electricity' will be added after the word 'fuel.' Id. The website will offer detailed information 

on upstream emissions, including regional-specific values, where appropriate. ld. Nissan 

supported this approach in the labeling rulemaking, and continues to do so. If EPA were to 

consider listing the upstream emissions associated with an EVon the vehicle label itself, 

however, it must do the same for all vehicles to prevent consumer confusion. 

18 - Given the uncertainties associated with the electricity GHG emissions rate in MYs 2017 

and beyond, EPA should reassess the appropriateness of the GHG emissions rate of .574 

grams/watt-hour during the mid-term review, and revise it as appropriate. 

19 - Upstream emissions vary not only by region, but also by service territory. For example, the 

utility company Seattle City & Light uses a combination of hydroelectric power and carbon 

offsets for 100% carbon free electricity, unique to the Pacific Northwest Region. Upstream 

emissions also vary by customer. For example, LEAF customers in a coal-heavy region that 

install solar technology on their roof will have an inaccurate measure for upstream GHG 

emissions. 

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Technology Incentives

NESCAUM supports EPA’s proposed zero gram per mile incentive for EVs and PHEVs as a 

reasonable short-term accommodation that recognizes the initial barriers to adoption of these 

technologies. While the zero emission factor for electricity used to power these advanced 

vehicles does not account for upstream emissions from electricity generation, application of this 

zero factor for MY 2017-2021 will provide auto manufacturers with greater incentives to deploy 

these technologies. We in turn support, in principle, EPA’s proposed sales cap, above which 

upstream emissions are included for MY2022-2025. The sales cap will help the program to 

achieve greater GHG emission reductions in the long term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-

A1, p. 2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 72-73.]

EPA should continue to evaluate the GHG effects of these technology incentives to ensure 

preservation of the overall goals of the program. We also expect that EPA will monitor upstream 

emissions from the power grid to ascertain whether the improvements assumed to occur do in 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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fact occur. In that regard, we strongly support the proposed mid-term review that will provide the 

opportunity to consider appropriate revisions to these incentives and to other aspects of the 

program. [This comment can also be found in section 2.4 of this comment summary.] [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 73.]

While for this time frame we support the concept to forego accounting for net upstream electric 

power generation emissions, we in turn support in principle EPA's proposal for sales cap above 

which upstream emissions are included in model years 2022 through 2025.

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Eliminate the Two-for-One Incentive Multiplier. EPA should not increase the manufacturers' 

sales incentives for EVs, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) or fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) 

by including a 2-for-1 incentive multiplier. EPA is proposing that a manufacturer of EV s, 

PHEVs, or FCVs will receive a 2-for-1 incentive multiplier starting in 2017 that will decrease 

over time to 1-for-1 in 2025 for each EV, PHEV, or FCV sold. No cap on the number of vehicles 

sold would exist until 2022. By developing a new sales incentive solely for electrically powered 

vehicles, EPA is creating a disadvantage for vehicles powered by natural gas. In fact, vehicles 

powered by natural gas could have fewer emissions of GHG and have an overall smaller 

environmental footprint than vehicles powered by electricity in some, if not most, parts of the 

country. Congress recognized this fact and provided incentives in the CAFE program to 

manufacturers of all alternately fueled vehicles. In addition, the 2-for-1 incentive would appear 

either to be inconsistent with, or exceed the intent of, Congress as reflected in the CAFE· 

program. EPA has no legal or practical basis for providing this excessive incentive for EVs. We 

believe that the 2-for-1 incentive multiplier offer to manufacturers should be withdrawn, but if 

the incentive multiplier is not withdrawn, then gaseous alternative fuel vehicles should also be 

included in this incentive mechanism. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 4]

In addition, EPA needs to treat all alternative fuels as alternatives and not support EVs over 

vehicles alternatively fueled with gaseous fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Pew Charitable Trusts

The proposed joint rule for model years 2017 to 2025 incentivizes the introduction of advanced 

technologies that seek to decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Incentives designed to spur 

deployment of electric and hybrid vehicle technologies in the U.S. light duty fleet provide a clear 

path for auto manufacturers to invest in research, development, and production, which can 

improve the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing and enhance exports to nations with growing 

demand. Investment in the research, development, production, and deployment of advanced 

vehicle technologies will help vehicle manufacturers located in the United States achieve the 

proposed standards, and present an opportunity for the U.S. to lead in new markets such as 

advanced batteries, which experts predict could be a $100 billion global industry annually by 

2030. Pew is a strong advocate for the deployment of electric and hybrid vehicles and the 
EPA Response to Comments

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necessary charging infrastructure, which could significantly reduce oil consumption and 

consumer fuel costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A2, pp. 1-2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-2010-11788, pp.18-19.]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

2. The Proposed GHG Standards are arbitrary and capricious because their exclusive 

consideration of tailpipe GHG emissions fails to take into account the relative life cycle 

contribution to GHG emissions of various engine technologies and the energy sources that make 

them run. The analysis of the wells-to-wheels energy inputs associated with various technologies 

and fuels set forth herein demonstrates that the Proposed Regulations’ apportionment of GHG 

credits to various technologies and fuels is irrational because it considers only tailpipe emissions. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 2]

c. re-do the weight the Agencies give to various alternative technologies and fuels according to a 

wells-to-wheels approach that corresponds more accurately with their relative contribution to and 

mitigation of atmospheric greenhouse gas accumulation; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, 

pp. 2-3]

The Proposed Regulations base the GHG accounting primarily on tailpipe emissions. The 

Agencies, therefore, deem all electric vehicles to have zero emissions of CO2 and zero fuel 

consumption. 76 Fed. Reg. at 74878. Through model year 2021, electric vehicles, hybrid electric 

vehicles, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles receive a multipliers of between 1.3 to 2.0 times the 

amount of tailpipe CO2 emissions reduced by the technology as compared to the same engine or 

vehicle without the alternative technology installed. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, 

p. 5]

A. Electric and Electric Hybrid Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 6]

The GHG theory behind electric vehicles is that they eliminate GHG emissions from the tailpipe 

and transfer any such emissions to less onerous upstream electricity production. The fallacy 

underlying this theory is stated in the Preamble to EPA’s Proposed Regulations, as 

follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 6-7]

At this time [], there is no [] comprehensive program addressing upstream emissions of GHGs, 

and the upstream GHG emissions associated with production and distribution of electricity are 

higher, on a national average basis, than the corresponding upstream GHG emissions of gasoline 

or other petroleum based fuels. [cite omitted] In the future, if there were a program to 

comprehensively control upstream GHG emissions, then the zero tailpipe levels from these 

vehicles have the potential to contribute to very large GHG reductions, and to transform the 

transportation sector’s contribution to nationwide GHG emissions (as well as oil 

consumption). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 7]
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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76 Fed. Reg. At 75010 (emphasis added). It makes no sense to give electric vehicles any credit, 

much less a 100 percent credit, when “the upstream GHG emissions associated with production 

and distribution of electricity are higher, on a national average basis, than the corresponding 

upstream GHG emissions of [] petroleum based fuels.” Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-

A2, p. 7]

Even comparing solely tailpipe emissions, “[t]he energy efficiency assigned to electric vehicles 

[] does not account for the inefficiency associated with generating electricity from the 

combustion of fossil fuels.” National Energy Technology Laboratory, “Battery-Powered Electric 

and Hybrid Electric Vehicle Projects to Reduce GHG’s: A Resource Guide for Project 

Development” (July 2002), n. 119 (Exhibit 3). Research conducted by Argonne National Labs 

found that, “to achieve significant reductions in GHG emissions, [plug-in and battery-powered 

electric vehicles] must recharge from a generation mix with a large share of non-fossil sources 

(e.g., renewable or nuclear power generation).” A. Elgowainy, et al., “Well-to-Wheels Energy 

Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Analysis of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles,” Argonne 

National Laboratory Report ANL/ESD/09-2 (Feb. 2009). Renewable sources contributed 10 

percent of U.S. electricity generation in 2009. U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”), 

“How much of our electricity is generated from renewable sources?” (Web: Feb. 11, 2012) 

(http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/renewable_energy.cfm). In 2010, 45 percent of U.S. 

electricity was generated from coal. EIA, “What is the role of coal in the United States?” (Web: 

Jan. 30, 2012) (http:// www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/role_coal_us.cfm). The combustion of coal 

produces 25 to 50 percent more CO2 emissions than petroleum. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10337-A2, pp. 7-8]

In the absence of a program to transform emissions from the upstream production of electricity 

to less carbon intensive sources, conferring on electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles a 

preference is irrational. It only encourages the introduction to the market of electric and hybrid 

vehicles that will contribute net more overall GHG emissions. Since a transforming upstream 

program is within EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, the Proposed Regulations’ favoring 

electric and hybrid electric vehicles is illogical and contradicts EPA’s mission under the Clean 

Air Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 8]

B. Hydrogen Fuel Cells [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 8]

The manufacture and sequestration of hydrogen to power a fuel cell requires an energy input and 

engenders some loss of energy content. EIA, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting , 

Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels (“EIA OIAF-OCNEAF”), “The Impact of 

Increased Use of Hydrogen on Petroleum Consumption and Carbon Dioxide Emissions,” at ix 

(Sept. 2008) (Exhibit 4). Reliance on hydrogen to power a mobile engine carries with it the same 

drawback of electricity: “[t]he main sources of hydrogen currently are hydrocarbon feedstocks, 

such as natural gas, coal, and petroleum, all of which also produce CO2.” Id., at xi (Exhibit 4). 

“Significant technical and infrastructure challenges” remain for the development of a large 

market for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. Id., at ix (Exhibit 4) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-

A2, pp.8-9]
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In contrast, as set forth below, POP DieselTM has overcome the technical obstacles to the use of 

100 percent plant oil and low-cost infrastructure that is independent of petroleum infrastructure 

is at hand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 9]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Porsche supports the proposed provisions for advanced technology multipliers. However, we 

believe that larger multipliers are justified, as an incentive for faster penetration of these 

technologies and to offset the significant development costs. The long-range GHG benefits of 

faster penetration far outweigh the effect on short term GHG fleet averages. We also propose that 

there should be no phase-out of AT multipliers for the duration of this rule. Each new application 

of a particular advanced technology requires significant development cost and time. It is not 

appropriate to assign an incentive to development projects over one 5-year period, and provide 

no incentive in the next. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 6]

In addition, we believe it is not appropriate to include upstream emissions in Light Duty GHG 

calculations for electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles. These emissions are not under the control of 

the automakers. We believe that the provisions for zero gram/mile upstream emissions for 

electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids should be made permanent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9264-A1, p. 6]

Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

EPA/NHTSA also propose significant incentives for certain dedicated (i.e. single-fueled) 

vehicles, which effectively creates an un-level playing field for FFVs. Specifically, EPA/NHTSA 

propose a GHG emissions compliance value of 0 for EVs, PHEVs (for the portion of operation 

that is electric), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs). This proposal implies that operating one of these 

vehicles results in no GHG emissions whatsoever, despite EPA/NHTSA’s acknowledgement that 

“[d]epending on how the electricity and hydrogen fuels are produced, these fuels can have very 

high fuel production/distribution GHG emissions (for example, if coal is used with no GHG 

emissions control)...” Indeed, on a full lifecycle basis, production of average electricity for use 

in EVs and PHEVs actually generates nearly 30% more GHG emissions per unit of energy 

delivered than petroleum.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.4]

EPA/NHTSA also propose providing a multiplier for all EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, which would 

allow each of these vehicles to “count” as more than one vehicle in the manufacturer’s 

compliance calculation. The agencies’ reasoning for offering such a multiplier is that these 

vehicles, in their view, offer “the potential for game-changing GHG emissions and oil savings in 

the long term.” We agree that EPA/NHTSA have a role in encouraging the production of 

vehicles that potentially reduce GHG emissions and oil consumption, but we believe favorable 

treatment under the rules should be afforded consistently to all vehicles that offer such potential. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, pp.4-5]

While we strongly agree with EPA/NHTSA that automakers should be encouraged to produce 

vehicles that “[r]educ[e] petroleum consumption to improve energy security”, “save the U.S. 

money” and “[r]educe climate change impacts,” we believe incentives to stimulate the 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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production of such vehicles should be constructed fairly and consistently. With regard to utility 

factors for fuel economy calculations and emissions compliance values, EPA/NHTSA should be 

consistent in the treatment of all dual-fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.5]

A. To ensure consistent treatment of vehicle/fuel options, EPA/NHTSA should consider basing 

emissions compliance values on direct “well-to-wheels” lifecycle GHG emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.5]

In order to accurately portray the GHG emissions impacts of various fuel/vehicle combinations 

when determining emissions compliance values, EPA/NHTSA should consider including 

upstream (“lifecycle”) emissions that are directly related to the production and use of the fuel. 

This is particularly important for electricity because, as EPA/NHTSA acknowledge, “...there is 

currently no national program in place to reduce GHG emissions from electric powerplants.” As 

proposed, compliance values would be based on an incomplete accounting of the vehicle’s actual 

GHG impacts. While the bulk of lifecycle emissions for petroleum fuels occur at the tailpipe 

(i.e., as hydrocarbons are combusted in the internal combustion engine), the bulk of direct 

lifecycle emissions for EVs and the electric operation portion of PHEVs occur upstream and are 

associated with the production of electricity. For biofuels, the bulk of net lifecycle emissions also 

occur upstream during biomass production and conversion, as the principles of lifecycle 

accounting hold that biogenic CO2 emissions at the tailpipe are equivalently offset by the CO2

that was removed from the atmosphere by the biofuel feedstock during growth. Basing 

compliance values on full direct well-to-wheels lifecycle emissions would allow for “apples-toapples” treatment of the GHG emissions associated with different fuel/vehicle options, whereas 

the use of tailpipe-only emissions provides only a partial picture of the GHG impacts of various 

platforms. Impartial GHG accounting misrepresents the true climate impacts of the CAFE/GHG 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.5]

3 - Lifecycle analysis conducted by the California Air Resources Board for the Low Carbon 

Fuels Standard found the well-to-wheels GHG emissions associated with “California average 

electricity” are 124.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per mega joule (g/MJ), compared to 95.85 g/MJ 

for gasoline. In CARB’s analysis, electric vehicles offer GHG savings relative to gasoline only 

after “Energy Economy Ratios” are applied to EVs and PHEVs to account for energy efficiency 

differences between electric drivetrains and internal combustion engines. 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/022709lcfs_elec.pdf

Organization: Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Upstream Emissions: In the proposed rule, EPA is proposing to account for carbon emissions 

from a limited number of EVs, PHEVs, and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), by assigning to then a 

carbon emission value of zero grams per mile, with no limit on the number of vehicles eligible 

for such treatment, through MY 2021. Between model years (MYs) 2022 and 2025, EPA will 

assign a zero grams per mile value to the first 600,000 vehicles for companies that sell 300,000 

EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs in MYs 2019–2021 and 200,000 vehicles for all other manufacturers. 

EPA believes that approximately 2 million cars will benefit from this treatment through MY 
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2025. For additional vehicles, EPA proposes to calculate upstream emissions (using the average 

carbon emissions per kWh of power generated), as estimated by EPA’s Office of Atmospheric 

Programs’ Integrated Planning Model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 7-8]

SAFE believes that upstream emissions resulting from the operation of EVs, PHEVs and FCVs 

should not be attributed to the vehicles, even after MY 2021. For its entire 35-year existence, the 

fuel economy program at NHTSA, and the GHG emission program at EPA that has been 

incorporated into the fuel economy framework in recent years as part of the national program, 

has regulated only the direct consequences of operating a vehicle, whether the volume of fuel 

that the vehicle actually burned or the emissions directly emitted from the vehicle. Automakers 

have never been held responsible for the energy required to produce, process, and transport the 

fuel their vehicles consumed or that was consumed in the process of manufacturing the vehicles 

or any of their parts. Likewise, they have never been held responsible for the upstream emission 

of other regulated pollutants attributable to the production of fuel consumed by vehicles that they 

sold. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 8]

At the most fundamental level, automakers cannot reasonably be held accountable for the 

upstream consequences of power generation for any pollutant. These are emissions that they do 

not cause and over which they have absolutely no control. The emissions will vary for a wide 

range of reasons, from utility to utility, hour of day to hour of day, and customer to customer, 

even more so if a customer purchases “green power,” a decision over which the automakers have 

no influence or control. EPA should consider carefully whether, and the extent to which, it is 

appropriate to hold automakers responsible for other parties’ emissions that they cannot control 

or affect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 8]

Doing so, in fact, would be a sharp departure from how EPA has typically regulated pollution. In 

each of its major programs, EPA has regulated polluters, and subjected them to regulatory 

requirements or penalties as a result of their direct actions. Power plants are responsible for their 

air emissions, water treatment plants for their effluent, and landfills for their leakage. We are 

unaware of other situations in which EPA regulates anyone other than the generator of pollution, 

even if other parties ultimately bear the financial costs of EPA’s regulations. For example, water 

treatment facilities’ customers are not responsible for compliance with the Clean Water Act, 

individuals whose trash haulers dispose of trash in landfills are not responsible for the landfill’s 

compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and consumers of power are not 

held responsible for power plant emissions. Yet in this instance, the regulated party would be 

even further removed from the activity causing the regulated harm. The agency would be

regulating Party A (automakers) for producing a device whose use by Party B (drivers) caused 

Party C (generators) to create carbon emissions. That would be akin to imposing responsibility 

for carbon emissions on Carrier, Dell, and Thermador because their HVAC systems, computers, 

and electric ovens and stoves consumed power whose generation was responsible for carbon 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 8-9]

While we appreciate the difficulty of regulating carbon emissions from power plants in the 

absence of an economy-wide scheme to regulate carbon emissions, we do not believe that the 

political challenge that EPA faces in regulating carbon emissions from power plants should be 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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used to justify deviating from its longstanding approach to regulating pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 9]

EPA also should consider the extent to which regulating upstream emissions would conflict with 

future prospects of developing an economy-wide GHG regulatory system. Once some carbon 

emissions are regulated downstream, at the appliance level, it would be very difficult to regulate 

the remainder of emissions upstream, because of the inherent difficulty in separating upstream 

emissions that were attributable to regulated downstream activities from upstream emissions that 

were attributable to unregulated downstream emissions. Moreover, SAFE believes that 

attributing upstream emissions to the downstream product is a short term approach that will 

complicate EPA’s long-term efforts to develop an approach to economy-wide regulation of 

carbon emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 9]

Finally, if EPA decides to regulate upstream emissions from PHEVs, EVs, or FCVs, it also 

should regulate upstream emissions from all other vehicles to put all vehicles on an equal 

footing. If EPA’s goal is to attribute all emissions resulting from the operation of a vehicle to the 

manufacturer of that vehicle, then that general principle should be fairly and equitably applied 

across all vehicles regardless of technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 9]

Multiplier Credit: To help promote the adoption of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, EPA’s proposal 

creates an incentive multiplier for qualifying vehicles sold in MYs 2017 – MY 2021. The 

multiplier would treat each qualifying vehicle as more than one vehicle in the compliance 

calculation. The value of the multipliers is stated in Table 1. [Table 1 can be found on p. 9 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 

9]

SAFE believes that the multiplier is a valuable incentive to help promote the adoption of electric 

drive vehicles. Further, we believe the incentive is justified because of the critical contribution 

that the technology employed in the qualifying vehicles can make in improving our economic 

and national security. For the vehicles to achieve their potential, however, they will need 

incentives of sufficient size and duration for the vehicles to achieve scale, reduce costs, and 

penetrate the mainstream market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 10]

The agencies’ forecasts regarding the vehicle sales between MYs 2017 and 2021, indicates that 

they do not expect PHEVs and EVs to achieve significant market penetration over this time 

period. Through MY 2021, the agencies forecast cumulative sales of 381,160 EVs and PHEVs. If 

we generously assume that every one of those vehicles were an EV that consumed no gasoline, 

and each one replaced a vehicle with an internal combustion engine that travelled 15,000 miles a 

year and achieved 30 miles per gallon, the vehicles would reduce oil consumption by 12,400 

barrels of oil a day out of nearly 20.63 million barrels per day of liquid fuel that EIA forecasts 

the United States will consume in 2021. Stated simply, this is a modest contribution to our 

economic and energy security, reflecting the fact that EVs and PHEVs will need more time to 

penetrate the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 10]

If the agencies want to provide a sufficient level of assistance to help achieve an important 

national goal, SAFE believes that rather than phasing the vehicle multiplier out before it can help 
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EVs and PHEVs penetrate the mainstream marketplace, that EPA should keep it in place at the 

initial rate of 2.0 for EVs and 1.6 for PHEVs until the midstream review. At that time, the agency

can evaluate its efficacy, and adjust it for the period through MY 2025 as appropriate. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 10]

However, SAFE also believes that EPA’s proposed application of the multiplier credit to PHEVs 

is too narrow. EPA stated that for a PHEV to qualify for the multiplier, the vehicle must be able 

to complete a full 10.2 mile EPA highway test without using any conventional fuel, or have a 

minimum equivalent all-electric range of 10.2 miles as measured on the EPA highway cycle. 

SAFE believes that EPA could simplify this requirement, allowing a PHEV to qualify for the 

multiplier credit if it incorporates a battery with at least 4kWh of storage capacity. A midsize 

PHEV that travelled 2.5 miles per kWh of power would have about 10.2 miles of range. 

Moreover, Congress has determined that the use of PHEVs with a 4kWh battery is of sufficient 

national importance that it is deserving of substantial incentives, in the form of a federal tax 

credit. Changing the criteria to a simple minimum battery size requirement will simplify the 

regulation, and maintain consistency with EPA’s overall goal and the national interest. It also 

would give appropriate credit to a PHEV whose design yielded substantial fuel savings even if it 

operated in a blended mode that made it difficult to travel 0 miles without using any liquid fuel. 

Alternatively, EPA could add a minimum battery size requirement as an alternative qualifying 

criterion that would allow vehicles to qualify for treatment as PHEVs based on a clear, simple, 

and objective criterion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 10-11]

PHEV Utility Factors: While calculation of energy consumption by a single fuel vehicle is 

somewhat straightforward, calculation of fuel consumption of a dual fuel vehicle is more 

complex because one must estimate the amount of each fuel used in the operation of the vehicle. 

To calculate vehicle emissions and fuel consumption, EPA proposes relying on the use of “utility 

factors,” which are ratios or percentages that indicate how much energy used by a PHEV comes 

from the grid and how much comes from onboard fuel. Because the operating cost for PHEVs 

are typically lower than liquid fueled vehicles and their emissions profile is typically better, 

utility factors that are too low will result in an overstatement of emissions, liquid fuel 

consumption, and operating costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 12]

The utility factors that the agencies used in the proposal are based on a standard developed by 

the Society of Automobile Engineers, SAE-J2841. The standard is based on data about daily 

vehicle miles traveled for about 32,000 days of vehicle travel. Briefly, to calculate a utility 

factor, the standard divides the sum of the number of miles each vehicle in the dataset traveled 

that would have been charge-depleting miles by the total vehicle miles traveled for a particular 

sized battery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 13]

This approach makes sense on its face. Yet, SAE likely underestimated the utility factor for two 

separate reasons. First, SAE assumed that people who drive PHEVs will have similar driving 

patterns as those who drive traditional vehicles. SAE acknowledged the issue, even noting in an 

update of the standard that its initial calculation was “highly weighted towards [vehicles making] 

long distance trips.” Second, the SAE standard also assumed that consumers will charge their 

PHEVs only once a day. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 13]
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PHEVs carry a premium purchase price in exchange for lower operating costs. Customers who 

are willing to pay the premium for the vehicle, a substantial one at first, and one that they can 

only hope to recover by driving “electric miles” will have a strong incentive to drive “electric 

miles,” either by using the vehicles for commutes that are largely within their “electric range” or 

by midday charging, usually at work. The first point suggests that people who purchase PHEVs 

are likely to drive fewer miles per day than the average vehicle in the whole fleet, because 

drivers whose driving patterns can maximize the value of the PHEV powertrain are its most 

likely customer. The second point suggests that many PHEVs whose average daily vehicle miles 

travelled exceeds the electric range of the vehicle will have a strong inventive to charge their 

vehicles at work or elsewhere, and that the average driver of a PHEV is likely to charge their 

vehicle more than once a day. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 13]

SAE’s approach fails to recognize this high likelihood of these sales and usage patterns. To the 

extent that EPA’s calculation of utility factors relies on SAE’s methodology, EPA’s use of utility 

factors is flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 13]

SAFE believes that it is reasonable to truncate the data set and eliminate from it trips that exceed 

either an absolute distance or a distance that is some function of the charge depleting range of the 

battery. SAFE also believes that a more appropriate utility factor methodology would recognize 

that some portion of the vehicles that travel more than the electric range each day will be charged 

more than once a day, generally (but not exclusively) at work. Doing so would more accurately 

portray how the PHEVs are likely to actually be used by the people who purchase them. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 13-14]

If the agencies choose not to adjust the utility factor calculation at this point in time, SAFE 

believes that the agencies should commit to evaluating the actual usage patterns of PHEVs 

within the next two years of the issuance of the final rule, and update the calculation of utility 

factors to reflect the manner in which the actual vehicles are really being used. Many of the 

vehicles and charging facilities used collect extensive data about vehicle usage, energy 

consumption, and charging patterns, which is being collected by automakers, charging 

infrastructure providers, and the Department of Energy. The data required to perform such 

analysis should be readily available. As part of that reexamination of utility factors, EPA and 

NHTSA should commit to examining how often PHEV owners charge their vehicles to 

determine if the assumption that they will only charge once a day is appropriate or needs 

updating. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 14]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 150-152.]

That the plug-in vehicles offer these great benefits to the nation justifies the incentives for this 

rule. The multiplier for EVs, for instance, will be an important incentive. We believe, however, it 

should not be phased down, as proposed. 10 years after entering the market the, 2.1 -- 1.9 million 

hybrid vehicles on the road represent about 2.1 of the new-car market. Yet if they are getting an 

average of 35 to 45 miles per gallon, they are saving the nation about 15- to 25,000 barrels a day 

out of the diet of 19 million barrels a day.
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Plug-in vehicles have an opportunity to make a much greater contribution than traditional 

hybrids, but they are going to need some incentives in the meantime so that consumers can 

overcome their concerns about them, help bring demand up, get to economies of scale and bring 

the price down.

Secondly, we believe the upstream emissions should not be attributed to the plug-in vehicles. 

Until this proposal, cars had always been responsible for what comes out of the tailpipe, not the 

fuel that goes into the car. If automakers are held responsible for upstream emissions, they'll be 

unique in the economy as compared to manufacturers of other power-consuming appliance, such 

as air conditioners, well pumps or electric ovens. They cannot control upstream emissions, which 

will, in any event, vary from region to region, from consumer to consumer and over time. And in 

regulating total emissions, it will make it infinitely more difficult to later have a cap and trade 

program that incorporates emissions without endangering the whole count.

If, however, you do decide to regulate upstream emissions, they should be regulated for all 

vehicles, including petroleum-powered vehicles.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Address emissions associated with Electric Vehicles: Sierra Club believes that electric vehicles 

can and will play a critical role in providing Americans with oil free transportation. Automakers 

are bringing electric and plug in vehicles to the market and consumers are eager for the chance to 

drive without oil. Consistent with our position in the prior standards, we continue to have

concerns with the impact failing to account for the emissions associated with EVs has on the 

overall emissions reductions benefits of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 7]

The proposed rule accounts for electric vehicles as “zero-emission” in tabulating fleet-wide 

averages. While electric vehicles do not have tailpipe emissions, they do draw energy from the 

electrical grid, and the majority of electrical energy generation in the United States involves 

emissions of greenhouse gases.27 Thus, electric vehicles - unless powered by carbon-neutral 

sources of electricity, such as wind or solar - still contribute some amount of greenhouse gas 

emissions. By excluding these emissions, as the proposal does, along with a multiplier, the 

proposed rule gives a distorted and overstated picture of the reductions in greenhouse gas 

emissions flowing from the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, pp. 7-8]

EPA and NHTSA should revise the final rule to account for emissions associated with electrical 

generation to charge electric vehicles. In the alternative, the number of electric vehicles 

considered as “zero-emission” for the purpose of calculating fleetwide averages should be 

capped initially, and phased out over the course of the program. This would ensure that the final 

does not deliver distorted “reductions” in greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9549-A2, p. 8]

In this proposal, EPA has adopted an approach of applying a multiplier for MY 2017-2021 while 

capping the quantity of vehicles eligible for 0g/mi accounting in MY 2022-2025. The tiered 

approach proposed by the EPA represents additional sales volumes of vehicles eligible for the 0 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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grams per mile credit as this credit already exists under the 2012-2016 standards. No more than 1 

million electric vehicles should be treated as zero grams per mile vehicles in 2017-2025 to limit 

the pollution that would result from this incentive. Although the cumulative reductions in 

greenhouse gas pollution benefits from 2017-2030 is 4.3% at 1 million EV sales, it is even 

greater at higher sales volume. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 8]

We support the transition to accurate upstream accounting for any manufacturer that exceeds its 

cumulative production cap for EVs and urge that the final rule effectively limit the loss of 

emissions benefits of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 8]

Although an incentive multiplier was proposed for EVs in the 2012-2016 standard it was not 

finalized as this incentive coupled with a zero emissions treatment would have reduce the 

greenhouse gas benefits of the standard. However, in the 2017-2025 standard to facilitate market 

penetration of advanced vehicle technologies as soon as possible, the EPA is again proposing an 

incentive multiplier for compliance purposes for electric vehicles sold in MY 2017 through 2021. 

EPA is proposing that EVs start with a multiplier of 2.0 in 2017 and phase down to 1.5 in MY 

2021. EPA is proposing this multiplier as it deems EVs are necessary for compliance with 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 8]

We recommend a floating industry wide cap for number of EV sales eligible for zero emissions 

treatment in 2022-2025 be set at 1 million minus cumulative sales in 2017-2021 rather than the 2 

million vehicle cap in the proposed rule. If sales exceed 1 million units, the zero emissions 

treatment would discontinue in 2021. There are several ways the agencies can allocate the 

industry wide cap among manufacturers, including an equal distribution among manufacturers 

and weighted allocation based on product plans, or a first come, first served approach. EPA 

proposes to phase-in an emissions factor for electric vehicles after 2022 for automakers that 

exceed their cumulative caps. The agency could phase-in the emissions factor sooner to avoid 

erosion of the overall program benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, pp. 8-9]

Plug-in hybrids should be counted in units of full plug-ins, in the same ratio as the fraction of 

miles they are assumed to operate on electricity from the grid. Plug-in hybrids would be required 

to achieve the same minimum all electric range as in relevant CARB regulations for its Zero 

Emission Vehicle program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 9]

In sum, a strong final rule should ensure that greenhouse gas benefits of the program are 

maximized and the impact of the compliance flexibility afforded by the proposed EV credits 

should be minimized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 9]

27 See U.S. Energy Information Agency, Electric Power 2010, Table ES1, Summary Statistics 

for the United States, 1999 through 2010 (Nov. 2011), available at 

http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/tablees1.pdf (showing that in 2010 approximately 70% 

of U.S. electrical generation was derived from combustion of coal, oil, or natural gas). [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: South Coast AQMD

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 69-70.]

To help alleviate these concerns, the South Coast AQMD staff strongly supports incentives for 

the purchase of light-duty vehicles that are cleaner than the applicable standards in as early as 

possible time frame. Increasing the penetration of cleaner vehicles will not only provide 

additional assurances that the fleet performance will be met, but also help reduce the overall cost 

of the cleaner vehicles in future years. This South Coast AQMD staff welcomes the opportunity 

to work with U.S. EPA and NHTSA on mechanisms to incentivize greater penetration of cleaner 

vehicles, especially zero and near-zero emission and alternative fuel vehicles.

Organization: Tesla Motors, Inc.

• EPA and NHTSA must enact a final rule that incentivizes EV technology but without 

detracting from development through consideration of issues outside the scope of this 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 1]

In particular, Tesla agrees with EDTA’s position that upstream GHG emissions should not be 

included as a part of this rulemaking. In enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress expressly set forth 

a structure of emissions regulation that would address the individual sources of air pollution. The 

so-called “upstream sources” EPA would propose to include in this rulemaking are more 

appropriately regulated under Titles I and V of the Act, with the former establishing stationary 

source limits of air pollutants and the latter establishing a highly structured permitting 

framework under which compliance can be regulated. In fact, EPA has already signaled its intent 

to enact GHG regulation for stationary sources in future rulemakings. Addition of such emission 

sources in the current mobile source rulemaking would be an ultra vires application of the 

Agency’s authority to regulate tailpipe emissions. Such an extension of authority was not 

contemplated by Congress and could otherwise result in the dual regulation of a single source. 

EPA should, instead, focus on regulating GHG from stationary sources under the appropriate 

provisions of the Clean Air Act and limit application of this rulemaking to mobile sources 

only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 6]

In addition, Tesla notes that despite the difficulty recognized by EPA in establishing single 

unified value for GHG emissions from electricity generation in the U.S. for EV’s, the Agency is 

proposing to do so through application of upstream emissions to motor vehicles. However, 

application of a nationalized figure fails to account for regional variability in electricity 

production, as well as the diverse distribution and use of various vehicle types throughout the 

United States. Moreover, such an approach fails to take into account the continuous 

improvement in emissions from major power generators. Accordingly, the attempted “one-sizefits-all” approach is neither appropriate nor accurate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 6]

Tesla also takes issue with the method by which EPA attempts to count upstream emissions for 

internal combustion engines. While Tesla appreciates the Agency’s consideration of our 

comments to the Notice of Intent to Conduct Rulemaking for Model Year 2017 and Higher 
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Motor Vehicles where Tesla noted the failure to account for upstream GHGs for internal 

combustion engines, EPA’s proposed solution is far from complete. Specifically, consideration 

of GHG emissions from refineries accounts for only a part of the emissions. To obtain a true 

accounting in a “wells-to-wheel” manner, EPA must also look to the emissions profile of oil 

exploration, production and transport. Regardless, such efforts are neither necessary nor 

appropriate. Instead, EPA should remove consideration of upstream emissions in a regulation 

enacted under Title II of the Clean Air Act, which should and must address tailpipe emissions 

only. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 6-7]

Tesla also supports the EDTA statements regarding EPA’s proposed automatic termination of the 

credit multiplier for advanced technology vehicles in MY 2021, as well as challenging NHTSA’s 

legal authority to enact such multipliers. Without providing a full restatement of the EDTA 

arguments, Tesla notes that incentives such as credit multipliers not only serve to accelerate the 

commercialization and widespread adoption of advanced technology vehicles like, EVs, they 

provide support for the businesses seeking to introduce such technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9539-A2, p. 7]

Tesla Motors has developed a business model that seeks to introduce EVs in the classic Silicon 

Valley fashion – namely, introducing low volume, high priced new technology with a unique 

value proposition and then rapidly moving down the cost curve by capturing increasing 

economies of scale. Much as the $5,000 cell phone of the 1980’s demonstrated the capability of 

the then nascent cellular network, Tesla demonstrated that long-range, high performance EVs 

were possible utilizing lithium ion technology in a sports car package. This had the desired effect 

of catalyzing a competitive response from major automakers like General Motors. In order to 

continue that mission and move down the cost curve while ramping up the production curve, 

Tesla funneled the profit from Roadster sales into the Model S design and development. This 

alone, however, was insufficient to move to our next vehicle, the Model S. Accordingly, the 

Company was also able to generate additional capital from a variety of sources – including 

through the sale of credits earned under California’s Zero Emissions Vehicle program. By being 

able to monetize ZEV credits, Tesla was able to generate additional capital enabling more rapid 

execution of the Company’s business plan to Model S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 

7]

Like the California ZEV program, GHG and CAFE credits earned from production and sales of 

EVs like the Model S will allow Tesla to generate revenue for more rapid EV development and 

production. This will, in turn, speed the introduction of the next generation of EVs at higher 

volumes and lower price points (i.e., the Gen III). In addition, this will also assist in support of 

Tesla’s power train business as well. EPA’s automatic elimination of the credit multiplier and 

NHTSA’s refusal to consider a CAFE multiplier will only delay the otherwise rapid deployment 

of EV technology not only by Tesla, but others as well. Accordingly, Tesla encourages EPA not 

to automatically eliminate the credit multiplier, but commit, instead to reviewing whether the 

multiplier is still needed as part of the mid-point review already proposed. Similarly, Tesla 

encourages NHTSA to revisit its authority to enact a CAFE multiplier for the reasons provided in 

EDTA’s comments.
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 94-95.]

And second, with respect to the consideration of upstream emissions, we believe that if this were 

to -- number one, it's adequately covered under Title V of the Clean Air Act. Moreover, pursuing 

this, this provision, could result in double counting. But in any event, if this were pursued, that 

we would encourage the agency to consider methodology on a well-to-wheel basis as opposed to 

simply stopping at the point of generation.

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

It is unclear that EPA has authority under Title II of the Clean Air Act to regulate upstream 

emissions from mobile sources. To the extent EPA is concerned with upstream emissions in 

power generation or fuel production resulting from potential expansion of electric and hydrogen 

fueled vehicles, it should regulate those sectors directly under other parts of the Act. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, pp.2-3]

Advanced Technology Vehicle Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.19]

EPA has proposed incentives to promote the commercialization of electric vehicles, fuel cell 

vehicles, and plug-in vehicles. The agency believes these technologies warrant incentives 

because they have the potential to nearly eliminate GHG emissions and petroleum use from 

vehicles, but face significant barriers today in terms of costs, infrastructure, and market 

acceptance. The first incentive allows an unlimited number of these vehicles to use a GHG 

emissions compliance value of 0 grams per mile (only during electric operation for PHEVs) 

through the 2021 model year, at which point upstream emissions are counted when production 

thresholds are exceeded. The second allows these vehicles to count as more than one vehicle for 

the purpose of calculating compliance with the fleet average CO2 standards. The incentives are 

proposed to sunset after the 2021 model year. Toyota generally supports the intent to incentivize 

advanced technology vehicles, but has some concerns that are outlined below. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.19]

Upstream Emissions Accounting [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.19]

Toyota opposes any requirement for automakers to account for upstream emissions in 

determining the compliance level of vehicles. First, automakers have no control over the level of 

upstream emissions and thus no ability to reduce such emissions to enhance compliance. Second, 

it is unclear that EPA has authority under Title II of the CAA to regulate upstream emissions 

from mobile sources. To the extent EPA is concerned with upstream emissions in power 

generation or fuel production resulting from potential expansion of electric and hydrogen fueled 

vehicles~ it should regulate those sectors directly under other parts of the CAA. Third, if EPA 

decides to include such emissions, there could be no end what other emissions automakers will 

be asked to account for~ including steel production emissions, rubber production emissions for 

tires, and so on. Clearly, Title II of the CAA was never intended extend the responsibility to 

automakers for these various emission sources. Finally, as the agencies recognized in the 

preamble, 'manufacturers are unlikely [to invest in PHEVs and EVs] if vehicles with these 
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technologies are treated for compliance purposes to be no more advantageous than the best 

conventional hybrid'. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, pp.19-20]

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

To accomplish these goals, the Coalition supports technology-neutral regulations that create an 

environment of stability and predictability for auto makers and their suppliers. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0246-A1, p.1]

Our comments below assert that technology neutral policies and consumer acceptance are the 

only proven methods for the automotive industry to move forward with certainty and with the 

flexibility to seek and strive for new innovations that will dramatically improve fuel economy 

and reduce emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.1] [This statement also cross-referenced 

with section 18.1]

Members of the Coalition invest in every advanced automotive technology – not just diesel 

technology. We believe, therefore, that changes to Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 

regulations should not be aimed at steering automakers to produce specific types of vehicles. 

Instead, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Transportation 

Safety Administration (NHTSA) should employ technology-neutral policies that are outcome 

and performance based. Without such policies, EPA and NHTSA will be picking winners and 

losers, stifling innovation, limiting consumer choice, preventing significant increases in fuel 

economy today and potentially stunting job growth. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, pp.1-2]

In 2009, the Coalition stated in response to the MY 2012-2016 joint rulemaking that the best way 

to drive innovation and achieve the desired outcomes of reduced petroleum consumption and 

lower greenhouse gas emissions is to provide automakers with regulations that are technology 

neutral. The “2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Proposed Rulemaking” (NPRM) falls short of 

giving automakers a pathway to innovation as EPA and NHTSA clearly attempt to steer future 

vehicle production into technologies that, although promising in the future, will prevent 

American’s from maximizing improved fuel economy and reducing their greenhouse gas (GHG) 

emissions in the near- and medium-term. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]

The auto industry cannot afford to make investment decisions based on inaccurate EPA testing 

data and inaccurate modeling. This is in stark conflict with President Obama’s call for rules that 

will “give our auto companies some long overdue clarity, stability and predictability.” See, Pres. 

Obama (press release) September 15, 2009. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.3]

The Coalition urges EPA and NHTSA to refrain from expanding the system of CAFE credits 

based on specific technologies and instead offer manufacturers ONYLY performance-based 

credits. By supporting only performance-based credits, the agencies will have a greater role in 

incentivizing fuel economy improvements and GHG reductions with improvements in Internal 

Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles. As ICEs are expected to dominate new car sales well beyond 

2025, the agencies are more likely to accomplish their mission in reducing the nation’s 
EPA Response to Comments

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dependency on foreign oil and dramatically reducing GHG emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0246-A1, p.5]

Specific Technology Incentives are Unnecessary: The Coalition disagrees with the agencies’ 

commentary about specific technologies. As stated previously, the goal of EPA and NHTSA 

should not be to identify or incentivize “advanced technologies.” Instead, the focus should be 

solely on advanced fuel savings and GHG emission reductions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, 

p.5]

In stark contrast to the EPA’s findings, researchers have affirmatively stated that technology 

specific incentives are not necessary. Researchers at the University of Michigan’s Energy 

Institute & School of Natural Resources and Environment have stated that substantial 

opportunities exist for ongoing fuel economy gains through evolutionary technology change. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.5]

“...but technology neutral policy provides the best benefit/cost ratios for consumers, industry 

and society. Even over a long-term time horizon — looking at 2025 as a milepost on the road to 

future GHG reduction needs — there is no scientific justification for favoring grid-connected 

vehicle electrification.” (John M. DeCicco, Univ. of Michigan’s Energy Institute & School of 

Natural Resources & Environment.) [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, pp.5-6]

Performance Based Standards Will Lead to Better Market Penetration: New technologies, 

changes to the driving habits of Americans and many other factors will make acceptance of 

certain technologies difficult to predict. We currently have advanced technologies that are 

readily available, reasonable priced and already accepted by consumers that can dramatically 

improve fuel economy and reduce emissions, without the need for infrastructure investment. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.6]

In fact, a performance-based standard could achieve a remarkably higher effect on the 

environment than rules that steer towards certain technologies. What is clear is that the 

percentage of new vehicles sold in 2025 will be powered by internal combustion engines (ICEs). 

Incentivizing alternative technologies like hybrid, EVs and PHEVs will overlook common-sense 

improvements to the powertrain that will remain dominant in the marketplace throughout the 

course of the NPRM. A truly performance-based standard for credits will likely increase 

improvements to the ICE segment. These improvements will lead to greater fuel economy and 

lower emissions much faster than incentives limited to such a small percentage of cars. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.6]

Expand Incentives to Advanced Technologies for ICEs: As stated in the NPRM, “EPA is not 

expanding the list of eligible advanced vehicle technologies primarily because all of these 

technologies utilize internal combustion engines, which have dominated the personal vehicle 

market for the last 100 years and do not present the same level of market challenges to 

automakers as EVs, PHEVs and FCVs.” The goal of CAFE regulations and the Clean Air Act is 

not to overcome market challenges for alternative vehicle technologies. The Coalition requests 

that EPA and NHTSA expand incentives that seek to expand market penetration for all advanced 

vehicle technologies in order to achieve the nation's goals. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.6]
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In the current proposed rulemaking, production multipliers for each EV, PHEV and FCV are 

again proposed. These multipliers are distortive to the marketplace. Each of the “phantom” 

vehicles allowed under a multiplier scheme will result in less technology implementation on a 

real vehicle in the fleet; meaning more fuel consumption and more GHG emissions. The CAFE 

program is intended to control the fuel consumption of vehicles that are actually manufactured 

and sold into commerce, not to create market and competition distorting accounting methods that 

have government picking winners and losers. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.8]

A strictly performance based credit system would allow manufacturers the flexibility to innovate 

and create a vehicle fleet that best suits their vision and customer base. Best of all, the 

manufacturers will be focused on looking at all available options to achieve the higher incentive 

levels with all available technologies. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.8]

Of additional concern to the Coalition is EPA and NHTSA’s decision to not calculate upstream 

emissions when determining incentives (credits) associated with all vehicle technologies. Such a 

decision is clear evidence that the agencies do not intend to proceed in a technology neutral 

manner. Under Section III of the NPRM, the agencies acknowledge the existence of upstream 

emissions but chose to only focus on GHG emissions at the tailpipe. (The NPRM justifies this 

calculation by identifying electric (EV), plug-in hybrid electric (PHEV), and fuel cell (FCV) 

vehicles as “game-changers.' [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.8]

As in the 2012-2016 rule, EPA is proposing temporary regulatory incentives for the 

commercialization of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. EPA believes that these advanced technologies 

represent potential game-changers with respect to control of transportation GHG emissions as 

they can combine an efficient vehicle propulsion system with the potential to use motor fuels 

produced from low-GHG emissions feedstocks or from fossil feedstocks with carbon capture and 

sequestration. EPA recognizes that the use of EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs in the 2017-2025 

timeframe, in conjunction with the incentives, will decrease the overall GHG emissions 

reductions associated with the program as the upstream emissions associated with the generation 

and distribution of electricity are higher than the upstream emissions associated with production 

and distribution of gasoline. EPA accounts for this difference in projections of the overall 

program’s impacts and benefits (see Section III.F). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.8]

The tailpipe GHG emissions from EVs, PHEVs operated on grid electricity, and hydrogen-fueled 

FCVs are zero, and traditionally the emissions of the vehicle itself are all that EPA takes into 

account for purposes of compliance with standards set under Clean Air Act section 202(a). 

Focusing on vehicle tailpipe emissions has not raised any issues for criteria pollutants, as 

upstream emissions associated with production and distribution of the fuel are addressed by 

comprehensive regulatory programs focused on the upstream sources of those emissions. At this 

time, however, there is no such comprehensive program addressing upstream emissions of 

GHGs, and the upstream GHG emissions associated with production and distribution of 

electricity are higher, on a national average basis, than the corresponding upstream GHG 

emissions of gasoline or other petroleum based fuels. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.9]

Stated more simply, EPA acknowledges that: [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.9]
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EVs and PHEVs are responsible for more upstream GHG emissions than ICEs; [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0246-A1, p.9]

New vehicles traditionally have their emissions regulated only at the tailpipe; [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0246-A1, p.9]

The NPRM doesn’t need to regulate EV and PHEV upstream criteria emissions because other 

regulations will do so; and [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.9]

No other program actually exists to account for upstream GHG emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0246-A1, p.9]

Despite the conclusions of the agencies regarding upstream emissions, the Department of 

Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) disproved the conclusions of the EPA and 

NHTSA in January of 2009. In response to a Congressional inquiry, the EIA compared the wellto-wheel GHG emissions of a variety of light duty vehicles. The report clearly compared the 

GHG emissions of different advanced vehicle technologies and proved that the GHG emissions 

of several widely available technologies compare very favorably to EVs, PHEVs and FCVs. 

According to the EIA study in 2009, a well-to-wheel comparison of different vehicle 

technologies ranks electric vehicles, diesel and turbocharged gasoline engine vehicles within a 

10% to 15% performance band. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.9] [There is an associated 

figure, please refer to NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.10]

The study compared vehicles on an equal footing: size and performance were held constant and 

only the powertrain was changed. The performance improvement of the next generation of 

internal combustion engines (ICEs), hybrids and EVs was calculated, and fuel economy and 

emissions were simulated on the usual U.S. standard test cycles. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, 

p.10]

The need to meet aggressive national goals regarding our energy independence should not 

overshadow the reality of today’s limitations faced by many advanced technologies. Primarily, 

car and light truck buyers will buy the vehicles that best meet their needs. We will achieve 

dramatic, game changing fuel savings and emission reductions by providing an evolutionary 

pathway for the advanced technologies that have proven market acceptance and are available 

today. This will provide the opportunity for new technologies to continue to develop into 

reliable, cost effective options that meet consumer needs. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.13]

The investment in future technologies, such as vehicle electrification, go well beyond the engine 

bay to include sourcing and developing raw materials, complex vehicle integration and 

development, infrastructure support on a national level and increased costs for consumers forced 

to the cutting edge of what is still a boutique technology. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.14]

Embracing a strictly performance-based standard will allow America to achieve the fuel savings 

and emissions reductions promised in the NPRM by the end of 2025. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-

A1, p.14]
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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 242-243.]

Federal government's favoritism of hybridization and electrification continues in EPA and 

NHTSA's joint NPRM with two areas of particular concern to the Coalition. First, the NPRM 

presents a process of incentivizing specific technologies by establishing and awarding credits for 

'game changing technologies,' such as a hybrid trucks and electric vehicles. Additionally, the 

NPRM continues to ignore the EPA and NHTSA's own data that shows the majority of miles 

traveled by the average American are on highway conditions instead choosing to favor and 

reward a technology that is best suited to city driving and start/stop conditions. The Coalition 

continues to advocate for policies that incentivize game-changing fuel savings by rewarding 

outcomes, not implementation of a specific technology.

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(c) Electric Drive Vehicle Incentives

Under the current federal vehicles greenhouse gas standards, models relying partially or 

completely on electricity or hydrogen receive significant extra credit towards meeting those 

standards. These extra credits do not represent actual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, but 

rather were created as incentives for automakers to sell electric-drive vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 9]

In the 2017-2025 proposed rule, EPA is proposing compliance ledger accounting of EVs and 

FCVs (and partially for PHEVs) at zero grams per mile (g/mi) through model year 2021, well 

below the 103 g/mi the agency specifies a midsize EV would emit under a 2025 grid mix. Above 

and beyond that, the agency is proposing an additional “incentive multiplier” for EVs, FCVs, and 

PHEVs sold in MYs 2017 through 2021, whereby an advanced technology vehicle sold would 

count as more than one vehicle in the manufacturer’s compliance calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 9]

UCS strongly opposed these incentives during the 2012-2016 rulemaking on the grounds that 

they do not reflect real emissions reductions and thus erode the benefits of the National Program 

and that there are other, more effective ways of accelerating the market for electric cars (e.g. the 

California ZEV program, federal tax credits, loan guarantees, and other state and local 

incentives). We continue to oppose them here for the same reasons, and express grave concern 

that they, like many auto industry incentives over the years, will again be extended and continue 

to undermine the goals of the program they serve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 9]

UCS is particularly disappointed by the agency’s proposal on incentive multipliers, given its 

intellectual inconsistency with an EPA determination on the very same issue made only a year 

and a half earlier. As the agency noted in its May 2010 final rule on MY2012-2016 vehicle 

standards, “EPA is not finalizing a multiplier based on the concerns potentially excessive credits 

using that incentive [sic]. EPA agrees that the multiplier, in combination with the zero 

grams/mile compliance value, would be excessive.” 32 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 

9]
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EPA acknowledges this inconsistency in the proposed 2017-2025 rule, and offers up the 

following as an explanation: “While the Agency rejected a multiplier incentive in the MYs 2012-

2016 final rule, we are proposing a multiplier for MYs 2017-2021 because, while advanced 

technologies were not necessary for compliance in MYs 2012-2016, they are necessary, for some 

manufacturers, to comply with the GHG standards in the MYs 2022-2025 timeframe.” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 9]

This rationale is not supported by EPA’s arguments. First, EPA’s new interest in incentive 

multipliers is, by its own admission, rooted in catering to the industry’s least-capable 

manufacturers. As noted throughout the proposal, numerous compliance pathways exist for 

meeting standards (including trading of credits between manufacturers, which alone should more 

than address the challenge cited by EPA above). EPA should not design and incorporate program 

loopholes to accommodate industry laggards when many other flexibility mechanisms already 

exist. Second, EPA states these multipliers are necessary for certain manufacturers to comply “in 

the MYs 2022-2025 timeframe,” yet EPA is proposing that the multiplier incentive expire at the 

end of MY2021. Logically, this means that either (a) industry laggards expect the agencies (or 

will lobby them) to extend this incentive beyond the proposed 2017-2021 time frame, allowing 

even more time for all manufacturers to take advantage of the multipliers through 2025, further 

eroding National Program benefits; or (b) the industry laggards’ only plan for complying with 

2022-2025 standards is by using banked, inflated credits generated in 2017-2021, and are not 

planning for a technology pathway that will allow them to achieve 2025 standards. Concrete 

product plans for MY2022-2025 vehicles have yet to even begin; EPA should not endorse these 

industry arguments and weaken its program by introducing loopholes that either have the

potential to balloon beyond proposed levels, or that encourage some in the industry to slow-walk 

fuel-saving technology deployment. UCS calls upon EPA to exclude the multiplier incentive in 

the final rule, on the “excessive” grounds noted previously by the agency, as well as to ensure 

that 0 g/mi treatment of these vehicles does not extend beyond MY2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9567-A2, pp. 9-10]

Though I strongly support these standards, I am concerned about possible loopholes that 

automakers could exploit. Specifically: The proposal largely ignores the pollution released from 

power plants when electric cars are recharged. The EPA should require automakers to fully 

account for their vehicles' pollution--whether from petroleum or power plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9713-A2, p. 2]

32 Federal Register Vol. 75, No. 88, p. 25401 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 9]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Likewise, the UAW supports the proposal by EPA to count each electric, plug-in hybrid and fuel 

cell vehicle as more than one vehicle in the manufacturer’s compliance calculation for model 

years 2017–2021. The UAW is in strong agreement with EPA’s proposal to assign a value of 

zero grams per mile for these vehicles when operating on electricity for the same model years 

2017–2021. The UAW believes that zero grams per mile are the most faithful representation of 
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the tailpipe pollution for a vehicle that in many cases has no tailpipe. Accordingly, while the 

UAW believes that the proposed caps for zero gram per mile treatment by the EPA for model 

years 2022–2025 are likely adequate to avoid assigning upstream emissions to large numbers of 

these vehicles, we urge the EPA to reconsider its stance that the emissions of electricity 

producers should be assigned to the products that use electricity. The proper place to measure 

and regulate these emissions is of course where the electricity is produced and the grid system 

that distributes electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, pp.3-4]

At the same time, we believe it is important to understand the changes in electricity sector 

emissions that will be caused by the addition of significant numbers of electric-drive vehicles to 

the fleet, and to be able to account for the net change in emissions in the switch from liquid fuels 

to electricity. To that end, the UAW encourages the EPA to continue to study how real-world 

electric vehicle use impacts the emissions of electricity producers. The efficiency of electricdrive vehicles in converting energy stored as electricity into distance traveled by the vehicle can 

and should be evaluated and eventually regulated. The efficiency of the charging systems for 

electric vehicles should also be measured and eventually regulated, perhaps as an appliance 

under existing Department of Energy authority. Improving the overall efficiency by charging an 

electric vehicle and converting that energy to miles driven will lead to the most effective and 

lowest cost scheme for realizing the most emissions reduction from increased adoption of 

electric-drive vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.4]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

- Expand the range of technologies (beyond only electrification) which would qualify for 

emission incentives within the regulatory program in order to promote a broader set of fuel 

saving, low-CO2 emitting options for consumers, i.e. alternative fueled vehicles, advanced 

combustion engines, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 4]

Volkswagen proposes that the agencies expand the assortment of technologies credited within 

the regulatory program. As we understand, the intention of technology credits are to promote 

market availability of fuel saving and low-emission options for consumers. Currently the 

program achieves this for electrification and for technologies applied to full-size pick-up trucks. 

It is Volkswagen’s position that a general expansion of the technology awarding credits could 

drive a greater number of technologies into the field and into vehicles other than just full-size 

trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 28]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Also, the agencies proposed minimum electric or equivalent all-electric range for the definition 

of a PHEV for use of this advanced technology volume multiplier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9551-A2, p. 12]

VCC supports the Alliance position that, upstream emission should be counted as 0 g/mile for 

the period 2012-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 14]
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VCC supports the advanced technology volume multipliers as proposed in the NPRM. VCC also 

suggests that the proposed multiplier be reviewed during the mid-term evaluation and potentially 

approved for continued use post 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 12]

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 107.]

The cap on electric vehicles should be strong so automakers cannot produce less efficient 

vehicles in other parts of their fleet yet still meet overall standard. Not that it would happen, but 

we want to make sure that no one games the system.

Response:

Introduction

EPA received a very large number of comments with respect to the proposed incentives 

for electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles 

(FCVs). Most of the comments in this section addressed the same fundamental set of issues 

associated with incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. The reader should note that most of the 

comments related to electricity are addressed in this section, while most of the comments related 

to diesel, compressed natural gas, ethanol, and other alternative fuels are in RTC Section 6. 

Many comments raise issues relevant to both this section and Section 6, sometimes even in the 

same sentence, so readers interested in a comprehensive treatment of comments on alternative 

fuel vehicles should read the comments and responses in both sections. In addition, comments 

related to gasoline fuel quality in general, and to ethanol/gasoline blends in particular, are 

addressed in RTC Section 11.

EPA rationale for temporary regulatory incentives for EV/PHEV/FCVs

There was a wide spectrum of comments on the overall appropriateness of regulatory 

incentives, ranging from complete opposition to any incentives whatsoever to support for 

stronger incentives than proposed.

EPA believes that temporary regulatory incentives are permissible under CAA section 

202 (a), and justifiable here. These incentives promote the commercialization of technologies 

that have, or of technologies that can be critical facilitators of next-generation technologies that 

have, the potential to transform the light-duty vehicle sector by achieving zero or near-zero GHG 

emissions and oil consumption, but which face major near-term market barriers. 10 As such, the 

incentives are part of the process of determining the “period ... necessary to permit the 

 10 As BMW stated in its comments, “Multipliers encourage automakers to pull-ahead early generation low 

CO2 technologies such as BEV, PHEV and FCV. Multipliers should be applied on advanced technologies with 

significant GHG reduction potential (which are much more expensive than mature gasoline technologies). 

Therefore, they are a motivation for automakers to move forward with cost-intensive technology (low volume, high 

investments) to reach full market economic viability”
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development and application of the requisite technology” (section 202 (a)(2)) by creating 

regulatory incentives to shorten the time for “development and application”. Although providing 

temporary regulatory incentives for certain advanced technologies will decrease the overall GHG 

emissions reductions associated with the program in the near term, EPA believes it is worthwhile 

to forego modest additional emissions reductions in the near term in order to lay the foundation 

for the potential for much larger “game-changing” GHG emissions and oil reductions in the 

longer term (EPA has adopted this strategy in previous mobile source rulemakings, such as its 

Tier 2 Light-Duty Vehicle, 2007 Heavy-Duty Highway, and Tier 4 Nonroad Diesel rulemakings, 

as well as the MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle GHG rule and the MYs 2014-2018 heavy duty 

vehicle and engine GHG rule). This objective is again fully in accord with the pollutant 

emission reduction goals of section 202(a). EPA accounts for the higher real world GHG 

emissions and lower GHG emissions reductions associated with these temporary regulatory 

incentives in all of our regulatory analyses.

Some proponents of incentives questioned EPA’s legal authority to include upstream 

emissions in any compliance calculation under section 202(a), maintaining that section 202 (a) 

authorizes EPA to regulate only emissions “from ... any motor vehicle[e]” and that upstream 

emissions are not from the vehicle (EDTA comment). EDTA also points to other provisions in 

Title II (sections 206 and 207) which, in the commenter’s view, rest on the same predicate of 

control of tailpipe emissions only. The Alliance and other auto manufacturers argued that by 

including upstream GHG emissions in compliance calculations for EVs and PHEVs de facto 

requires automakers to meet utility GHG standards. A number of commenters also maintained 

that EPA was arbitrary in including upstream emissions in compliance calculations for electric 

vehicles but not for non-electric vehicles.

EPA disagrees with these commenters. Section 202(a) states that EPA must adopt 

“standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class of new... motor 

vehicle....” The provision does not directly address what the “standards applicable to” the 

emissions must be, or how those standards are to be measured. It does not specify how or what 

mechanisms EPA may reasonably use in applying a standard to vehicle emissions. This leaves 

EPA with discretion to develop both elements of the standards and the means of measuring 

compliance with them. See 75 FR at 25437.11 EPA has done so in this rule, developing 

compliance values for use in meeting the attribute-based standards that recognize the overall 

GHG impacts of electric vehicles. Put another way, where appropriate, the standard applicable 

to emissions from electric vehicles reasonably can include use of a compliance value that better 

reflects the overall emissions impact of the vehicle, and this can include net upstream GHG 

emissions attributable to use of the fuel that powers the vehicle. The standard employs a 

compliance value to reflect those emissions when production exceeds the per-company 

production caps. 

EPA has long interpreted section 202(a) as providing EPA the discretion to develop 

appropriate compliance calculations that in some cases differ from the actual tailpipe or leakage 

values for a vehicle. For example, a multiplier or other incentives for EVs are an adjustment to 

 11 CAA sections 206 and 207, also referred to by the commenter, refer back to the section 202 regulations, 

and so do not provide any additional support for the commenters’ argument.
EPA Response to Comments

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the compliance calculation that does not reflect literal tailpipe emissions. EPA has authority to 

apply such adjustments where they are an appropriate mechanism to promote the overall 

emissions reductions achieved by the motor vehicle standards. Likewise, the use of a net 

upstream compliance value for EVs is an adjustment to the compliance calculation that 

appropriately reflects the overall emissions impact of the motor vehicle standards. Both of these 

kinds of adjustments fall within EPA’s broad discretion to determine how a standard should be 

applied to emissions from motor vehicles. In the case of a multiplier for EVs, the standards are 

applied by artificially adjusting the number of times the tailpipe emissions level for an EV is 

used in the compliance calculation. In the case of the net upstream compliance value for EVs, 

the level of the tailpipe emissions are adjusted for use in the compliance calculation. In both 

cases, these adjustments to the actual tailpipe levels reflect reasonable and appropriate policy 

responses that further the emissions goals of the section 202(a) standards. Ironically, if the 

commenters were correct, EPA would have no authority to assign a multiplier or other incentives 

for EVs, since these multipliers also do not reflect literal emissions from a vehicle.

EPA does not believe that in doing so it is requiring auto manufacturers to control GHG 

emissions from utilities. As EPA explained when discussing this issue in the MYs 2012-2016 

light duty vehicle GHG rulemaking, “EPA is not directly regulating upstream GHG emissions 

from stationary sources, but instead is deciding how much value to assign to a motor vehicle for 

purposes of compliance calculations with the motor vehicle standard. While the logical place to 

start is the emissions level measured under the test procedure, section 202 (a)(1) does not require 

that EPA limit itself to only that level.” 75 FR at 25437. 

Nor is EPA arbitrary in including upstream emissions in the compliance calculation for 

the standard applicable to the emissions from electric vehicles. As shown in preamble Table 

III-16 , upstream GHG emissions attributable to increased electricity production to operate EVs 

or PHEVs currently exceed the upstream GHG emissions attributable to gasoline vehicles. See 

preamble section III.C.2.c.v at n. 499; see also 75 FR at 25437. Moreover, as EPA found in the 

MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle rulemaking, the difference in upstream GHG emissions for 

both diesel fuel from oil and CNG from natural gas are relatively small compared to differences 

associated with electricity. 75 FR at 25437. 

EPA thus believes that although section 202 (a)(1) of the Clean Air Act does not require 

the inclusion of upstream GHG emissions in these regulations, the discretion afforded under this 

provision allows EPA to consider upstream GHG emissions, particularly when such emissions 

from new technologies are higher than those from conventional vehicles. There is consequently a 

rational basis for EPA to account for this net difference.

Opponents of incentives emphasized three primary arguments: 1) that regulatory 

incentives are not technology neutral and therefore pick “winners and losers” among various 

advanced technologies, 2) that such incentives reduce the GHG benefits of the program, and 3) 

that incentives are no longer needed for technologies such as EVs.

EPA believes that the issue of technology neutrality is a much more complex issue than 

some commenters suggest when they advocate for a “level playing field,” suggest that a level 

playing field is best achieved by no incentives, and that incentives cannot be “scientifically 

justify[ed].” Given that internal combustion engines and petroleum-based fuels have dominated 
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the U.S. light-duty vehicle market for 100 years, with massive sunk investments, there are major 

barriers for new vehicle technologies and fuels to be able to gain the opportunity to equitably 

compete on any type of level playing field. For example, consider a hypothetical new 

vehicle/fuel technology that could be superior to conventional technology from a consumer 

perspective if, and only if, the vehicles and fuels could be produced at similar economies of 

scale. But, it is very possible that such a hypothetical new technology would never get the 

opportunity to compete at equivalent economies of scale, because of the very large investments 

that are needed, up front, to support the research and development, parts and vehicle production 

facilities, and fuel infrastructure, none of which are needed for conventional technology as these 

investments have been made in the past. In this context, temporary regulatory incentives do not 

so much “pick winners and losers” (as an inefficient or unattractive technology is not going to 

achieve long-term market success based on temporary incentives) as to give new technologies 

more of an opportunity to compete with the established technologies.

The agency agrees that the temporary regulatory incentives will slightly reduce the shortterm benefits of the program and in fact the Agency accounts for the lower benefits in all of our 

regulatory analyses. But, as noted above, EPA believes that it is worth a limited short-term loss 

of benefits to increase the potential for far-greater game-changing benefits in the longer run. 

EPA also believes that temporary regulatory incentives may help bring some technologies to 

market more quickly than in the absence of incentives.

Finally, EPA disagrees that such incentives are no longer needed for EVs. Although it is 

true that several EV and PHEV models are now on the U.S. market, sales of EVs and PHEVs 

amounted to less than 0.2% of all sales in 2011.12 Alternatively, vehicles with internal 

combustion engines that operate primarily on petroleum-based fuels continue to account for over 

99% of all light-duty vehicles sold in the U.S.

At the same time, EPA believes there must be limits on the use of such incentives. For 

example, while temporary incentives can be justified as allowing a new game-changing 

technology, the opportunity to compete in the initial stages of technology commercialization 

when economies of scale are poor, permanent incentives are very different in that they would tilt 

the market even after a new technology has overcome the initial low economies of scale. In this 

case, the agency believes that temporary regulatory incentives best balance our dual objectives of 

achieving near-term GHG emissions reductions and promoting game-changing technologies that 

could provide even greater GHG emissions reductions in the longer-term.

Design of incentive multiplier for EV/PHEV/FCVs for MYs 2017-2021

Public comments on this topic mirrored those of incentives in general, i.e., those 

commenters that opposed incentives in general almost always opposed the proposed incentive 

multiplier for EV/PHEV/FCVs, while those commenters that supported the concept of incentives 

 12 Total 2011 U.S. light-duty vehicle sales were 12.8 million (see 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203513604577140440852581080.html, last accessed on July 10, 

2012). Total 2011 U.S. EV/PHEV sales were less than 20,000 (see http://www.plugincars.com/nissan-leaf-salestrump-chevy-volt-2011-111308.html, last accessed July 10, 2012, for total Leaf EV plus Volt PHEV sales of 

17,345).
EPA Response to Comments

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generally supported the proposed approach. Only a few commenters suggested a different 

multiplier design, i.e., higher multiplier levels or longer duration.

 EPA disagrees with the comment by the Union of Concerned Scientists of “intellectual 

inconsistency” with the MYs 2012-2016 standards. In that rule, EPA did not project that 

advanced technologies like EVs and PHEVs were necessary to meet the MY 2016 standards so 

that no further incentive was needed. In contrast, EPA projects here that, for some 

manufacturers, EVs and PHEVs are in fact projected for meeting the much more stringent MY 

2025 standards. As EPA stated in the proposal, providing multipliers for MYs 2017-2021 can lay 

the foundation for commercialization of these technologies that can then contribute toward 

compliance with standards in MYs 2022-2025. 76 FR at 75012. On the other hand, EPA 

disagrees with those commenters that support higher multipliers and/or multipliers of longer 

duration, as we believe that such incentives could lead to a significant reduction in program 

GHG savings, particularly if the incentives were to remain in effect past MY 2021 and if 

EV/PHEV/FCV sales increase significantly after that year. EPA believes it has struck a 

reasonable balance in finalizing the proposed multipliers for EV/PHEV/FCVs for MYs 2017-

2021 (multipliers for CNG vehicles are discussed in Section 6). EPA reiterates that it is both 

reasonable and appropriate to accept some short-term loss of emissions benefits in the short run 

to increase the potential for far-greater game-changing benefits in the longer run. The agency 

believes that these multipliers may help bring some technologies to market more quickly than in 

the absence of incentives. In addition, the agency agrees with the Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers about the possible unintended consequences of a variable multiplier (e.g., based 

on electric range or battery capacity which, as the Alliance reasonably points out could 

encourage manufacturers to install battery capacity or power not demanded by customers thereby 

increasing vehicle costs), and is finalizing a fixed multiplier for all PHEVs that meet the 

eligibility requirements discussed below.

PHEV eligibility requirements

EPA received only a few comments related to eligibility requirements for PHEVs to be 

able to use the incentive multiplier. EPA agrees with Securing America’s Future Energy that a 4 

kilowatt-hour minimum battery energy storage requirement would be a reasonable approach, but 

because the Agency prefers performance-based metrics when possible, we are finalizing the 

proposed 10.2 miles all-electric or equivalent all-electric range that was supported by the 

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and Ford comments.

0 gram/mile compliance treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs with MYs 2022-2025 percompany cap and net upstream GHG emissions compliance beyond cap

A large number of the above commenters addressed the related issues of the 

appropriateness of the proposed 0 grams/mile (g/mi) compliance treatment for EV/PHEV/FCVs, 

and of the proposed cumulative per-company vehicle production cap for this compliance 

treatment in MYs 2022-2025.

For an extensive summary of the key comments and EPA’s response to the key 

comments, see Preamble Section III.C.2.c.v. As proposed for EV/PHEV/FCVs, EPA is 

finalizing the 0 g/mi compliance treatment with a cumulative per-company vehicle production 
Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

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cap for MYs 2022-2025, and net upstream GHG emissions compliance for production in excess 

of the cap. The cumulative per-company vehicle production cap for MYs 2022-2025 is 600,000 

EV/PHEV/FCVs for those manufacturers that sell at least 300,000 such vehicles in MYs 2019-

2021, and is 200,000 EV/PHEV/FCVs for all other manufacturers.

Methodology for determining net upstream GHG emissions compliance for EV/PHEVs 

beyond the MYs 2022-2025 per-company vehicle production cap

EPA proposed a relatively simplistic approach for calculating the net upstream GHG 

emissions compliance values for EVs and the electric portion of PHEVs, but signaled its 

intention to consider a more technically robust approach in the final rule. EPA received a few 

comments, which directly or indirectly supported a more sophisticated modeling approach based 

on better projections of the future electric power sector, a plausible regional distribution of plugin electric vehicles, etc.

See Preamble Section III.C.2.c.vi for an extensive discussion of the key comments and 

multiple changes that EPA is finalizing, based on new work that EPA has carried out with the 

EPA Integrated Planning Model, a state-of-the-art electric power sector model. The results are 

new projections for the average GHG emissions factor for electricity used to support EV/PHEVs 

in the future, as well as for the multiplicative factor used to project the additional GHG 

emissions associated with electricity feedstocks.

The Edison Electric Institute commented that it would be better for EPA to wait until the 

midterm evaluation to adopt an electricity upstream GHG emissions factor. EPA disagrees with 

this comment. EPA believes it is critical to provide the automobile manufacturers, for their longterm compliance planning, a value that we expect to be used for compliance purposes in MYs 

2022-2025, for those manufacturers who exceed their vehicle production caps for EVs and 

PHEVs since this value will become a part of their standard. We understand that there are many 

factors that could lead to an electricity upstream GHG emissions factor for EVs and PHEVs that 

may be higher or lower than our latest projection, such as future regulations, market forces, 

regional distribution of EV/PHEV sales, and vehicle charging patterns. EPA will continue to 

evaluate these factors, including in the mid-term evaluation. 

Applicability of other program credits for EV/PHEV/FCVs

The Natural Resources Defense Council commented that, if necessary, other program 

credits should be limited such that no vehicle would effectively have a “negative” compliance 

value. EPA is finalizing, as proposed and consistent with the MYs 2012-2016 program, no 

restrictions on the use of GHG emissions credits for those vehicles eligible for the 0 g/mi GHG 

emissions compliance treatment, i.e., EV/PHEV/FCVs can earn air conditioner efficiency, air 

conditioner refrigerant, and off-cycle credits. EPA will be accounting for these credits at the 

manufacturer fleet level, not at the individual vehicle model level, though we accept the point by 

NRDC that, in effect, if one were to assess the actual credits earned on a per vehicle basis, the

overall compliance value would appear to be negative. Because of the relatively small number 

of EV/PHEV/FCVs expected during MYs 2017-2025, EPA expects the fleetwide impact of these 

additional credits to be very small, and EPA does not want to discourage improvements in air 
EPA Response to Comments

4-106

conditioner and other technologies for EV/PHEV/FCVs that provide real world GHG emissions 

benefits.
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-1

5. Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM)

America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

American Petroleum Institute (API)

American Public Gas Association (APGA)

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Center for Biological Diversity

Chrysler Group LLC

Clean Energy

Eaton Corporation

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Encana Natural Gas Inc.

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Honeywell Transportation Systems

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Marz, Loren C.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

NGV America

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Toyota Motor North America

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

VNG.Co (VNG)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM)

The following comments address EPA’s proposed changes to 40 C.F.R. §600.116-12(c) 

for determining the proportion of recovered braking energy for hybrid electric vehicles. In 40 

C.F.R. §600.116-12(c)(1)(i)(A) and (B), it is unclear whether road load power and applied 

deceleration power are to be calculated from scheduled speed or measured speed. We 

recommend that Vmph, V and Vt+1 be defined as “measured velocity in miles/hour, rounded to 

the nearest 0.01 miles/hour...”
EPA Response to Comments

5-2

In 40 C.F.R. §600.116-12(c)(1)(C), EPA proposes to determine braking power by the 

following equation:

Pbrake = Paccel – Proadload

We recommend that the equation be changed to the following:

Pbrake = Paccel + Proadload and if Pbrake >0, set Pbrake = 0

The Proadload should decrease the magnitude of the Pbrake term. As it is currently 

written, the magnitude of Pbrake is not decreased by Proadload during deceleration. If Pbrake 

isn't decreased by Proadload, the Emax equation would assume that the roadload force could be 

recovered by regenerative braking, and this would cause the Emax calculation to give a higher 

value than is possible (thus lowering the eventual Energy Recovered %).

As can be seen in the following chart, the proposed equation would indicate that roadload 

during steady cruising would be able to be recaptured as regeneration (red line). The green line is 

Emax when you replace the "-" sign with a "+" sign in the Pbrake equation and revise the Pbrake 

= 0 criteria. [see figure on p.8, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487, Appendix 7]

Therefore, it would be more appropriate if the equation were written as Pbrake = Paccel + 

Proadload with the additional criteria that Pbrake = 0 whenever the calculation results in a 

positive value.

In addition, the following clerical errors were discovered during our review of the 

NPRM:

§600.116-12(c)(1)(i)(A): Road load equation has an extra “x” between 0.47704 and 4.448

§600.116-12(c)(3)(iii): “battery” is misspelled as “batter”

§600.116-12(c)(4)(3)(iii): Definition of Erec under the Energy Recovered % equation 

references paragraph (c)(2)(iii), should reference paragraph (c)(3)(iii) instead

§600.116-12(c)(4)(3)(iii): Conflicting nomenclature. Energy Recovered % equation uses 

Emax, which appears to be called Ebrake in the paragraph referenced by the Emax definition, 

§600.116-12(c)(2).

Further, prior to the final rule, we plan to engage the agency technical experts to ensure 

that the test procedure specifications and regulatory language for determining the proportion of 

recovered braking energy is clear, accurate and consistent with previous hybrid procedural 

guidance (e.g., SAE J1711, Part 86, Part 600), where applicable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487, Appendix 7, p. 7-9]

Organization: America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

“Game-Changing Pickup Technologies”

EPA has also proposed to “incentivize the penetration into the marketplace of ‘game changing’ 

technologies for full size pickups . . . [and] for that reason, EPA is proposing credits for 

manufacturers that hybridize a significant quantity of their full size pickup trucks, or use other 

technologies that significantly reduce CO2 emissions and fuel consumption.” 76 FR 75016. If the 

agencies do not provide a multiplier incentive for NGVs as requested above, we ask that EPA 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-3

clarify that natural gas-powered pickups would be able to qualify as a technology eligible for the 

proposed credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 8]

Assuming that NGVs are eligible for those credits, we note that for non-hybrid pickups to 

receive the proposed credits, they must achieve a “15 percent or 20 percent, respectively, better 

CO2-reduction than their footprint based target in a given model year.” Id. at 75017. However, 

hybrid pickups do not have to meet any CO2-reduction performance target in order to receive 

comparable credits, and we believe it would be appropriate and consistent to either apply 

identical performance targets to hybrids or, alternatively, eliminate the targets for “other 

technologies” that achieve equal or better GHG reductions. We also believe that the proposed 

thresholds (as a percentage of their full-size pickup production) that a manufacturer must meet 

before being able to receive these credits are way too high: starting at 15% in 2017, and ramping 

up to 40% in 2021 for the 15% CO2-reduction credit and 10% for all model years for the 20% 

CO2- reduction credit. Id. at 75017. If the goal of the incentive is to encourage deployment of 

these technologies, the initial levels should be far more modest. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, p. 8]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

The preamble in the section titled “Incentives for “Game-Changing” Technologies Including Use 

of Hybridization and Other Advanced Technologies for Full-Size Pickup Trucks” notes that “the 

standards under consideration for MY 2017-2025 will be challenging for large trucks, including 

full size pickup trucks that are often used for commercial purposes and have generally higher 

payload and towing capabilities, and cargo volumes than other light-duty vehicles.” Honda 

believes that the same is true for minivans and SUVs and that these similarly situated vehicles 

ought to be treated in a similar fashion. Honda’s Pilot SUV and Odyssey Minivan are among the 

most popular vehicles in their segments. These vehicles have passenger load capabilities of up to 

8 occupants and also are often used by families for the kind of high load usage described in the 

preamble. The 2012 Pilot 4WD, for example, is capable of carrying 8 occupants and also is 

capable of towing loads up to 4,500 lbs with the driver and one passenger. This kind of 

demanding use by consumers is similar in concept to the justification for the pick-up truck 

incentives proposed by the agencies. Honda believes that the incentives for “game changing” 

technologies be applied equally to 7 and 8 passenger vehicles with towing capabilities. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 2]

As noted above in #1, above, the stringency for the larger footprint light trucks is very low, 

compared to the smaller footprint light trucks. The combination of the lower stringency and the 

“game changing” credits cannot be justified as a matter of science, in furtherance of social goals 

and objectives or as a matter of simple fairness and equity. Not only are large footprint pick up 

trucks required to do very little (no stringency increase for a number of years), they are overly 

rewarded if they do increase their performance: in other words, required to do nothing, and 

highly rewarded for doing something. [This comment can also be found in section 2.2.3 of this 

comment summary] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 2]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)
EPA Response to Comments

5-4

While API has no comment on the stringency of the proposed fuel economy and CO2 standards, 

we are concerned that the proposal provides a number of incentives that appear to reflect an 

attempt to pick winning and losing technologies in the marketplace, an action which could 

potentially limit consumer choice and increase societal costs. [This comment can also be found 

in sections 4 and 6 of this comment summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 1]

Incentives for Hybridization for Full-Size Pick-Up Trucks—EPA is proposing an additional CO2

per vehicle credit for mild and strong hybrid electric (HEV) full size pickup trucks if this 

technology is utilized across a designated percentage of a manufacturers’ full size pickup trucks. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 1]

Organization: American Public Gas Association (APGA)

With respect to pickup trucks, EPA also has proposed a special credit for pickup trucks that 

utilize GHG reducing technology. This credit would be worth 10 g/mi or 20 g/mi depending on 

the reductions. In order to get the 20 g/mi credit technology would have to provide a 20% 

reduction in GHG emissions. To qualify, technology would have to be used on at least 10% of 

full size pickups for manufacturers and credits limited to 5 MYs. APGA strongly supports this 

change and believes that it will be very beneficial in aiding the deployment of NGV pickup 

trucks and refueling infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

The advanced technology credits provide an incentive for manufacturers to continue to develop 

and market these technologies, which have the potential for substantial long term improvements 

in fuel efficiency and emissions performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 1]

Global Automakers supports the inclusion of advanced technology incentives as an integral part 

of the MY 2017-25 standards program. As stated in the agencies’ proposal, such vehicles have 

the potential to achieve major emission reductions and improvements in fuel efficiency, but face 

near-term market barriers relating primarily to price and fueling infrastructure. The incentives 

proposed by EPA provide a bridge to overcome these near-term obstacles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 7]

The agencies also propose an incentive for “game-changing” technologies used in large pick-up 

trucks. Also provided as an incentive for larger trucks are certain adjustments to the slope of the 

truck curve, to reduce the stringency of standards for those vehicles. The agencies justify these 

incentives based on what they see as special compliance burdens of these vehicles, including 

“generally higher payload and towing capabilities and cargo volumes than other light duty 

vehicles.” See 76 FR 74944. In our view, other classes of vehicles may face similar compliance 

obstacles, or obstacles that, while different in nature, are still significant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9466-A1, pp. 7-8]

We urge the agencies to consider extending “game-changing credits” to other vehicle classes, 

such as minivans or SUVs with towing capabilities. These credits should also be reassessed as 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-5

part of the mid-term review process, to determine whether they should be modified. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 8]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

In addition to the improper credits discussed below, the NPRM contains yet another sweetener 

that cannot but lead to even more pickup trucks used as passenger vehicles. EPA is seeking 

comment on changing the definition of a full-size pickup truck by reducing the minimum 

wheelhouse width requirement from 48 inches to about 42 inches, as long as the vehicle remains 

capable of towing at least 6,000 lbs. Such a redefinition is entirely inappropriate. The Agencies 

provide no reasonable basis for this request, and entirely overlook the fact that it would enable 

virtually every pickup truck to fall into the full-sized pickup truck definition and escape higher 

fuel efficiency standards. The Agencies must not take this step backward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9479-A1, p. 14]

2. The pickup truck credits must be eliminated

As yet another preference for the dirtiest vehicles in the fleet, the Agencies propose a credit of 10 

g/mile for each pickup truck that either has mild hybrid technology or achieves an emission rate 

15% higher than the standards in any year from MY 2017 to 2021 (if certain minimum 

production rates are met); and a credit of 20 g/mile for each pickup truck that is either uses 

strong hybrid technology or achieves an emission rate 20% higher than the standard for that year 

(if minimum production rates are met). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 22]

This give-away is ill-conceived for a number of reasons. First, hybrid technology is one of the 

most effective technologies to improve these vehicles’ fuel efficiency. It is both technologically 

and economically feasible,103 and failing to require – rather than to incentivize – its use is 

contrary to statutory intent. In fact, none of the factors the Agencies must consider in setting 

standards argues for anything other than immediate and mandatory application of this technology 

across the entire fleet as quickly as possible. In addition, as with all other credits, it would 

displace the implementation of other fuel efficiency measures such as stronger hybrids or EV 

vehicles. Moreover, the Agencies admit that these credits do not correspond to the actual 

improvements obtained.104 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 22]

103 Ford and Toyota have already announced a joint venture to develop the systems for pickup 

trucks. ICCT Comments at 36. The profitability of trucks, discussed above, nullifies any cost 

concerns, even when the hundreds of billions in other benefits flowing from increased fuel 

efficiency standards are disregarded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 22]

104 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74879. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 22]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC
EPA Response to Comments

5-6

Chrysler agrees with the Agencies’ support for “game-changing” full-size pickup truck 

technology and recommends improvements for its regulatory implementation. (Attachment 3)

Chrysler agrees with the Agencies expectation that the proposed standards will be challenging 

for fullsize light-duty trucks. The proposed rules will provide additional incentives to 

manufacturers for early development of the technologies which will be needed to meet 2022-

2025 MY light-duty truck standards. Chrysler recommends that the agencies retain as much 

flexibility as possible both for which light-duty trucks will qualify and for how those light-duty 

trucks are defined. The proposed definitions for qualifying vehicles need to be defined so as to 

capture the intended population of vehicles. Also, establishing minimum penetration rate 

thresholds is an unnecessary additional constraint on the use of these incentives. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 6]

Chrysler supports EPA’s proposed incentives for “game-changing” technologies on fullsize 

pickup trucks and other high-utility light-duty trucks.

Full-size pickup trucks are frequently purchased by customers who need varying combinations of 

payload, trailer towing, four wheel drive, and passenger carrying capability. These utility-adding 

features enable Chrysler’s customers to satisfy their transportation, business, and recreational 

needs. However, adding features to enable increased cargo and trailer tow capabilities can 

challenge high-utility vehicle energy efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 12]

Some “game-changing” technologies already exist, or are under development, but such 

technologies come at a cost-premium and may compromise vehicle utility. For example, vehicle 

hybridization and advanced diesel engines are significantly more expensive than conventional 

gasoline powertrains. These technologies also increase vehicle curb weight, thereby reducing 

payload and towing capability unless further modifications are made to the vehicle. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 12]

It is appropriate to encourage “game-changing” technologies in this segment and help to 

minimize the tradeoffs between efficiency and utility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 

12]

The definitions for a “full-size” vehicle should capture the intended vehicles both now and in the 

future.

The automotive market continues to evolve. Given that this regulation will affect vehicles 

produced far into the future, the agencies should strive to leave vehicle-based definitions as 

broad as possible. Establishing narrow definitions for what vehicles qualify for “full-size” gamechanging technology incentives may lock manufacturers into producing vehicles within these 

design constraints instead of creating innovative ways to provide similar or better utility and 

game-changing fuel economy for future customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 12]

Chrysler agrees that the definitions which qualify light-duty trucks for “game-changing” 

technology incentives should reflect utility-adding features.
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-7

Chrysler agrees that payload and towing capability are two key utility-adding features. EPA and 

NHTSA recognized these features as “work-based attributes” in their medium- and heavy-duty 

truck greenhouse gas and fuel efficiency rules for heavy-duty pickup and van standards. The use 

of payload and towing capability to define a higher utility light-duty truck is a logical extension 

of the reasoning provided by EPA and NHTSA therein. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 

13]

Light-duty trucks which meet minimum payload and/or towing capability should qualify for the 

“full-size” hybrid and performance-based incentives - an open cargo box should not be required.

EPA and NHTSA are proposing that these incentives be applicable only to full-size pickup 

trucks, with one qualification being an “open cargo box”. However, large light-duty trucks 

without open cargo boxes include many of the same utility-adding features as full-size pickup 

trucks. For example, a number of Chrysler’s Dodge Durango and Jeep Grand Cherokee variants 

meet or exceed the capabilities of full-size Ram 1500 pickup trucks, as shown in Figure 1 below. 

[See Figure 1 on p. 13 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 13]

These higher utility vehicles are purchased by customers not only for their passenger-carrying 

capability, but also for their payload and towing utility. Many of Chrysler’s customers desire 

vehicles which can transport both a family and commercial or recreational trailers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 14]

These utility requirements can create the same vehicle efficiency challenges in these other large 

light-duty trucks as they do in full-size pickup trucks. In incentivizing technology which causes 

“game-changing” vehicle efficiency improvements while maintaining vehicle utility, non-pickup 

large light-duty trucks should also be encouraged to make similar improvements. Therefore, 

Chrysler recommends that any light-duty trucks which meet minimum payload or towing 

capability requirements qualify for these incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 14]

If finalized, open cargo box requirements should allow greater flexibility in dimensions and 

“open” criteria; Chrysler recommends reducing minimum box size requirements and permitting 

greater flexibility in bed area coverage.

The agencies propose to set minimum open cargo box dimensions which appear to be based on 

today’s largest pickup trucks. By setting the minimum dimensions to today’s largest pickup 

trucks, the agencies drive the unintended consequence of also incentivizing manufacturers to 

design to these dimensions. If the agencies were to instead reduce or eliminate the minimum 

dimensions of an open cargo box, manufacturers would have more freedom to invent new 

designs which could satisfy customer cargo carrying needs in a more efficient manner. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 14]

The agencies also propose that a full-size pickup include an “open box”, defined as “a vehicle 

where the cargo box does not have a permanent roof.” The restriction that the roof not be 

permanent is a distinction that may encourage manufacturers to make use of potentially less 

aerodynamically efficient designs to qualify a vehicle for the “game-changing” technology 
EPA Response to Comments

5-8

incentives. In contrast, keeping the “open box” definition flexible, for example to allow a design 

with a permanent pickup truck cap (extending the roofline of the cab to rear of the box) could be 

an aerodynamic improvement if designed properly. Chrysler recommends that if the “open cargo 

box” requirement is finalized, the definition also include that “a covered box not readily 

accessible from the passenger compartment will be considered an open cargo box for the 

purposes of this definition”. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 14]

Chrysler recommends that the Agencies set the minimum payload capacity at 1,300 lb. and the 

minimum towing capacity at 3,500 lb.

The agencies propose to limit applicability of “game-changing” full-size pickup truck incentives 

to vehicles which meet a minimum payload capability of 1,700 lb. or which meet a minimum 

towing capability of 5,000 lb. The Agencies intended that these limits would qualify larger 

pickup trucks while excluding smaller pickup trucks.17 However, these limits exclude a number 

of Chrysler’s full-size 2012 MY Ram 1500 pickup truck variants, (as demonstrated in Figure 2), 

that were designed to meet customer utility requirements, and therefore which should not have 

be excluded from the “game-changing” technology incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 14]

Chrysler notes that virtually none of the 2012 MY full-size Ram 1500 pickup trucks are capable 

of meeting the minimum payload requirements as proposed, even though these full-size trucks 

provide significant payload carrying capability and are designed to meet the utility needs of our 

customers. We recommend lowering the minimum payload capability requirement to 1,300 lb. 

[See Figure 2 on p. 15 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 14]

Similarly, Chrysler recommends that the minimum towing capability be lowered to 3,500 lbs if 

the proposed towing capability definition is finalized. Under the proposed definition, certain 

current and potential future Ram full-size trucks with maximum trailer capacities greater than or 

equal to 5,000 lb. are excluded. An alternative to lowering the minimum towing capability would 

be to strike the proposed definition of trailer tow capability (GCWR – GVW) and to define 

towing capability as meaning “the value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum towable 

trailer weight, consistent with good engineering judgment. For example, compliance with SAE 

J2807 is generally considered to be consistent with good engineering judgment.” [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, pp. 14-15]

Minimum penetration rate requirements increase uncertainty for manufacturers and are an 

unnecessary constraint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 15]

The agencies propose that to qualify for the “full-size” hybrid and performance-based incentives, 

a manufacturer must meet a minimum penetration rate. These minimum penetration rates add a 

level of uncertainty for manufacturers and are an unnecessary additional constraint for incentives 

offered on a per-vehicle basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, pp. 15-16]

Minimum penetration rates add a level of uncertainty for manufacturers. If a manufacturer 

invests in the technologies necessary to hybridize a full-size vehicle, or to significantly over-
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-9

perform to a vehicle’s footprint-based target, it still may not meet the required minimum 

penetration rate if market demand is not sufficient. For example, manufacturers could choose to 

invest in the necessary technologies, but if market demand is only 9% against a required 10% 

penetration threshold, those investments would not generate the credits expected by a 

manufacturer. Before approving funding for such investments, manufacturers need certainty that 

their investment will realize expected benefit of making those investments. Introducing the 

uncertainty of minimum penetration rate requirements creates a disincentive to adoption of 

game-changing technologies until market demand is proven. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-

A1, p. 16]

Minimum penetration rate requirements are also an unnecessary additional constraint on the 

proposed incentives. Because the incentives are offered on a per vehicle so-equipped basis, 

manufacturers are incentivized to apply game-changing technologies as broadly as market 

demand allows. Technologies with lower penetration rates will produce less credit than those 

with higher penetration rates. This approach also provides a level playing field for all 

manufacturers. Further discouragement of technologies based on penetration rates actually works 

against the intent of early adoption of game changing technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 16]

Chrysler supports broad technology definitions for mild and strong HEV technology

Given the long-term timeframe of this rulemaking, Chrysler supports maximum flexibility in the 

definition of hybrid technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 16]

The definitions of mild and strong hybrids should not use technology-specific terms; Chrysler 

recommends that the term “mild hybrid vehicle” be used instead of “mild hybrid gasolineelectric vehicle” and “strong hybrid vehicle” be used in place of “strong hybrid gasoline- electric 

vehicle”. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 16]

The agencies refer to mild and strong hybrid technologies which qualify for “game-changing” 

technology credits using the term “gasoline-electric”. The use of this term implies that the only 

hybrid technology acceptable is a gasoline and electric powertrain combination. Not only are 

other fuels possible (e.g. E85, diesel, and CNG), but other “hybrid” types other than electric are 

also possible (e.g. hydraulic hybrids and flywheel energy storage systems). The agencies should 

strive for both fuel and hybrid technology neutrality in this rulemaking and provide this incentive 

to any system that can capture a minimum fraction of otherwise wasted energy and convert it to 

tractive power. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 16]

The required energy recovery rate definition for full-size strong hybrids should be reevaluated.

EPA proposes that a “strong” hybrid must recapture at least 75 percent of available braking 

energy over the Federal Test Procedure. This target may be appropriate for passenger cars, but is 

very aggressive for full-size trucks. For example, hybrid systems for full-size truck applications 

may have difficulty in meeting the proposed 75% energy recovery rate because of the need to 

design the braking system for maximum payload and trailer capability while maintaining 

drivability in the absence of these loads. Chrysler recommends reducing the requirement to 50%. 
EPA Response to Comments

5-10

This value will help maintain the distinction between strong and mild hybrids, but recognizes 

some of the design constraints for large high-utility vehicle hybrid systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 16]

Performance-Based Incentive

Chrysler supports the tiered incentive system based on varying levels of over-performance.

The agencies propose to offer two levels of performance-based incentives, with a greater 

incentive offered for greater levels of performance. This methodology incentivizes 

manufacturers to maximize the fuel economy performance of full-size trucks and to take 

additional incremental steps if possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 17]

Chrysler supports the agencies’ proposal to base the credit on over-performance in the first year 

of production.

The agencies propose to begin the performance-based incentive in the model year of introduction 

and to extend that incentive for up to five years. Chrysler agrees with this approach. Requiring 

the vehicle to make continuous improvements to maintain its original over-performance to a 

standard would not respect automotive design cycles and the resources required to make 

significant improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 17]

Organization: Clean Energy

Advanced Pickup Truck Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.6]

For 2017-2025, EPA and NHTSA have proposed special credits for pickup trucks. There is a 

credit for mild and also for strong-hybrid pickups, and a separate credit for pickups that are able 

to meet prescribed GHG reductions. The description in the proposed rule appears to indicate that 

hybrid pickups and pickups that satisfy the GHG performance criteria will earn GHG and FE 

credits. We recommend that the agencies also consider and include additional credits for 

dedicated, dual-fuel and hybrid NGV applications on pickup trucks. Clean Energy would be 

happy to work with the agencies to develop credits that fully recognize the benefits that natural 

gas can provide on these trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, pp.6-7]

Organization: Eaton Corporation

• Provides incentives to promote the adoption of advanced vehicle technologies that over comply 

with the targets set forth in the rule while not pre-selecting winners and losers in the 

marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]

The rule has the potential of accelerating adoption of game-changing technologies that otherwise 

would not have been adopted. However, we offer the following comments to recommend that the 

concept of 'technology neutral' is adhered to in the Light-Duty Truck Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-11

'Game Changing' Technology Credits for light Duty Trucks

We applaud the inclusion of a credit program that includes mild hybrids. Mild hybrid 

technologies show great promise for cost-effective fuel consumption and GHG reductions. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]

Eaton recommends that the definition of hybrids and mild-hybrids under the 'Game Changing' 

Technologies for Full-Size Pick-up Trucks be technology neutral. The phrase 'gasoline-electric' 

is too narrow and would eliminate other non-battery internal combustion based technologies 

from being considered. All full-hybrid and mild-hybrid technologies should qualify for credits. 

Also, the penetration rate thresholds for full-size pick-up trucks should be significantly reduced 

or eliminated so that market and economic uncertainties do not prevent innovation from being 

introduced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, pp. 2-3]

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

EPA is proposing CO2 credits for manufacturers that hybridize a significant quantity of their fullsize pickup trucks, and the agencies are also proposing that manufacturers be able to include 'fuel 

consumption improvement values' equivalent to EPA CO2 credits in the CAFE program. Access 

to the incentives is conditioned on a minimum penetration of mild and strong hybrid electric 

vehicle (HEV) technologies in an OEM's full-size pickup truck fleet. [This comment can also be 

found in section 8 of this comment summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 8]

EcoMotors endorses the agencies' incentives to promote the use of advanced vehicle 

technologies in both full-size and smaller size pick-up trucks. However, for all of the reasons 

noted above, other less-costly and equally energy efficient and environmentally beneficial 

vehicle technologies - available today - should be afforded equally beneficial regulatory 

incentives. Near-term development and commercialization of advanced ICEs, such as the dualmodule opoc engine performing as a mechanical hybrid, remains an extremely important path for 

emissions reduction and fuel economy improvements in pick-up trucks and should also be 

encouraged by national policy. In a dual-module, mechanical hybrid configuration, the EM100 

base opoc engine would provide fuel savings exceeding 45%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-

A2, p. 8]

EcoMotors believes that the market penetration requirements established for the hybridization 

incentives should be removed in the Final Rule. New technologies typically take years to prove 

themselves and attain significant market penetration. In the past, it has taken a decade for a 

technology to prove itself and attain a sales fraction of 40-50%, and has taken as long as another 

5-10 years to reach maximum market penetration. Thus, establishing a 30% market penetration 

rate threshold for MY2017 (mild HEV pickups) is unrealistic. Even the 10% annual market 

penetration suggested for strong HEV pickups is problematic. It will likely be necessary to 

provide incentives to OEMs just to get within reach of these thresholds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9594-A2, p. 8]

• Specific Recommendation: EcoMotors strongly encourages the agencies to extend CO2

and fuel economy credits to OEMs that manufacture mechanical hybrid pick-up trucks, 
EPA Response to Comments

5-12

hydraulic hybrid pick-up trucks, and similar advanced technology hybrid pick-ups. This 

would place other significant, game-changing vehicle technologies -like the dual-module 

opoc engine - on a level playing field with HEVs. EcoMotors also encourages the 

agencies to completely eliminate the market penetration requirements established for the 

credits, to better reflect historic market penetration issues facing new technologies. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 8]

EPA is proposing performance-based incentive credits and equivalent fuel consumption 

improvement values for CAFE for full-size pickup trucks that achieve an emission level 

significantly below the applicable CO2 target. The performance-enhancing technology must be 

used on a minimum percentage of a manufacturer's full-size pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 12]

EcoMotors strongly endorses this technology-neutral incentive to promote the use of advanced 

vehicle technologies in both full-size and smaller-size pick-up trucks. By establishing 

performance-based incentives, the agencies are enabling OEMs to choose their own costefficient path for achieving CO2 reductions and fuel economy improvements, consistent with 

their specific product plans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 12]

EcoMotors encourages the agencies to remove the market penetration requirements established 

for the credits, to better reflect historic market penetration issues facing new technologies. As 

discussed above, new technologies typically take years to prove themselves and attain significant 

market penetration. Thus, even the lowest rate associated with this incentive - 10% - is likely set 

too high for OEMs to secure these credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 12]

• Specific Recommendation: EcoMotors supports the agencies' performance-based 

incentive program for full-size pick-ups and encourages the agencies to extend it to 

somewhat smaller pickups as well. EcoMotors encourages the agencies to remove the 

market penetration requirements established for the credits in order to better reflect 

historic market penetration issues facing new technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9594-A2, p. 12]

Organization: Encana Natural Gas Inc.

Advanced Pickup Truck Credits

For 2017 - 2025, the EPA and NHTSA have proposed special credits for pickup trucks. There is 

a credit for mild and also for strong hybrid pickups, and a separate credit for pickups that are 

able to meet prescribed GHG reductions. The description in the proposed rule appears to indicate 

that hybrid pickups and pickups that satisfy the GHG performance criteria will earn GHG and FE 

credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 6]

First, we offer the following comments with respect to the hybrid credits. like other credits 

proposed in the rulemaking, the mild and strong hybrid credits are not tied to specific GHG or 

FE performance metrics but rather attempt to incentivize a specific type of technology in order to 

encourage manufactures to sell such vehicles. Encana recommends an approach that regulates all 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-13

alternative fuel technologies equally. In order to provide equitable treatment, the proposed rule 

should provide similarly strong incentives for NGVs. We have outlined the types of incentive we 

believe are necessary to encourage the development and sale of light duty NGVs. Encana 

believes that it is appropriate to provide incentives like those proposed for hybrid trucks as long 

as similarly strong incentives are provided for other technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9585-A2, p. 6]

Second, with respect to the performance-based credits provided for pickup trucks, we offer the 

following comments. We agree that all technologies should have the opportunity to earn credits 

under this provision. Also, we believe that, if specific credits are provided elsewhere in the rules 

for NGVs, that such vehicles, like hybrids, should not earn double credits under those provisions 

and also under the pickup truck credit provision. If no additional credits, as described earlier in 

our Public Comment letter, are provided for NGVs, then they should have the potential to earn 

credits under the Advance Pickup Truck Credits provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-

A2, p. 6]

We also believe that targets for introduction are simply too high with respect to NGVs and that 

the EPA and NHTSA should amend the proposal to provide a lower-threshold. In the Proposed 

Rule, the EPA and NHTSA provide a 10 g/mi GHG credit if advanced pickup truck production is 

at least 15% of a company's full sized pickup production in MY 2017 with a ramp up to at least 

40% in MY 2021. Additionally, a 20 g/mi credit is provided if advanced pickup truck production 

is at least 10% of a company's full sized pickup production in each year over the model years 

2017-2025. These proposed production goals are unattainable for NGVs and simply precludes 

NGVs from receiving this incentive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 6]

The US Energy Information Administration - AEO 2011 projects sales of alternative fueled 

vehicles2

. At no time during the 2017·2025 time period does the EIA project light truck sales to 

exceed even 0.1% of total new light truck sales (sic). Encana proposes that there should be no 

production minimum for MYs 2017 through MY 2020. For MYs 2021 and beyond, a meaningful 

stretch goal would be 0.5% of production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, pp. 6-7]

Encana appreciates the opportunity to provide public comment on this rulemaking. Encana 

requests that the EPA and NHTSA incorporate the additional incentives described in this letter 

for natural gas vehicles. The following summarizes the additional incentives Encana believes 

will provide fair and equitable treatment of NGVs: [This comment can also be found in section 

6.2 of this comment summary] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 7]

• Modify the Advanced Pickup Truck Credit provisions to include NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9585-A2, p. 7]

2

http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=AEO2011&subject=0-AEO2011&table=48-

AEO2011®ion=1-0&cases=ref2011-d020911a

Organization: Ford Motor Company
EPA Response to Comments

5-14

• Auxiliary transmission oil coolers

• Upgraded radiators

• Trailer hitch connectors and wiring harness equipment

• Different steering ratios, upgraded rear bumpers and different springs for heavier tongue 

load (for upgraded 'max' trailer tow packages)

• Body on frame (vs. unibody) construction to support capability and an aggressive duty 

cycle

• Lower axle ratios for better pulling power/capability [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-

A1, p. 9]

In addition, vehicles with towing capability generally have increased aerodynamic drag caused 

by a modified frontal area, increased rolling resistance, and a heavier frame and suspension to 

support this additional capability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 9]

We are seeing a continuing trend that our customers are purchasing these vehicles for work 

purposes. Based on 2011 segmentation models for our full size pick-up trucks, Business users 

account for approximately 30% of the market. The Business category includes fleet and work 

trucks (e.g. small business owner, farmer, foreman), as well as those customers who use their 

truck for occupational purposes during the week and personal use on the weekend. About 58% of 

the market is comprised of Recreational users, including hunters, boaters, fisherman, etc. These 

consumers rely on their vehicles for hauling and towing to support their recreational activities. 

Only a relatively small segment (12%) of the market is comprised of consumers who do not 

make significant use of the towing/ hauling/off-road capabilities of the truck. Based on the trends 

we have seen in the market, we fully anticipate that such buyers will continue to be a shrinking 

portion of our market. We believe that within a few years, the Business category will increase to 

over 40% of the market, and the combined Business/Recreational users will increase to over 90% 

of the market for full size pick-up trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 9]

And to further demonstrate the importance of these vehicles to the American economy, the 

following graph demonstrates that new home construction, a key financial indicator, and the 

sales of the trucks needed to help this industry, go hand in hand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p. 9]

Game Changing Technologies for Full Size Pick-up Trucks

Ford supports the agencies’ proposal to provide additional “game changing technology” 

incentives for full-size pick-up trucks. We agree with the agencies’ statement that this incentive

“...provides the opportunity to begin to transform the most challenging category of vehicles in 

terms of the penetration of advanced technologies, which, if successful at incentivizing these 

‘‘game changing technologies,’’ should allow additional opportunities to successfully achieve 

the higher levels of truck stringencies in MYs 2022–2025.” (76 Fed. Reg. 74879) [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 21]

As noted previously, weight-based vehicle attributes such as payload and towing capability are 

key among the parameters that characterize differences in the design of these work vehicles, as 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-15

well as differences in how the vehicles will be utilized. Vehicles with towing capability generally 

have increased aerodynamic drag caused by a modified frontal area, increased rolling resistance, 

and a heavier frame and suspension to support this additional capability. Manufacturers are faced 

with the challenge of applying technologies to significantly improve fuel economy without 

sacrificing the utility required by our customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 21]

• Pick-up Truck Definition: The current proposal for cargo box size, towing capability and 

payload capability encompasses the majority of full-size pick-up trucks on the road 

today. While it is difficult to forecast future customer needs and expectations for vehicles 

that we will be building 10 years from now, Ford believes the proposal incorporates the 

appropriate size and work factor related attributes to define a full-size pickup 

truck. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp. 21-22]

• Hybrid Electric Vehicle Pick-up Truck Definition: Ford supports the proposed 

performance-based definitions for both mild and strong HEV pick-up trucks, which 

provide manufacturers flexibility in technology deployment, taking into consideration 

customer expectations, while still providing the anticipated efficiency benefit. We also 

support the comments provided by the Alliance on proposed changes to 40 CFR § 

600.116-12 for determining the proportion of recovered braking energy for hybrid 

electric vehicles. However, in addition to those recommendations, we also believe the 

definition of a strong hybrid should be expanded beyond the currently proposed energy 

recovery methodology, which does not allow braking energy to be easily segregated from 

other battery charging sources, such as the engine. As proposed, we believe there is a 

potential for gaming that could allow a mild hybrid to qualify as a strong hybrid. Also, 

the level of capture of regenerative energy is only one of the important functional 

elements delivered by a strong hybrid system. As such, Ford recommends the following 

improvements to the proposed methodology, including the addition of a new metric, 

fedrive, the fraction of electric driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 22]

1. Calculate Erec using the proposed formula, only during deceleration.

2. Calculate Ebrake_max using the proposed formula, from the measured speed trace, in lieu of using the 

scheduled speed trace.

3. Calculate the energy recovered percentage using the values from (1) and (2), as proposed.

4. Calculate a new metric, the percent fraction of electric drive, fedrive, using the formula:

Etractive, Paccel>0, the total tractive energy under positive acceleration conditions is equal to the sum over 

the FTP cycle of the absolute values of Paccel+Proadload for the condition Paccel>0 divided by 36,000 and 

rounded to the nearest 0.01 kW-hr.
EPA Response to Comments

5-16

Ee-tractive, Paccel>0, the total electric drive tractive energy under positive acceleration conditions is equal to 

the sum over the FTP cycle of the absolute values of Paccel+Proadload for the conditions Paccel>0 and engine 

speed = 0 divided by 36,000 and rounded to the nearest 0.01 kW-hr.

To qualify as a strong hybrid, Ford recommends that the following thresholds be used:

Energy Recovered % ≥ 40%

fedrive ≥ 10%

[See calculations on p. 22 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1]

Based on the recommended change to measure Ereconly during deceleration, only braking energy 

will be included in the calculation, as opposed to including energy from the engine or other 

sources. As a result of this procedural revision, the threshold to qualify as a strong hybrid must 

be reduced. Ford believes that 40% is an appropriate level for full size pickup trucks because the 

higher weight of such vehicles and rear wheel braking stability constraints will limit braking 

energy recovery potential. In addition, wheel-to-traction motor losses will be larger for feasible 

full size pick-up truck strong hybrid system architectures compared with smaller front wheel 

drive passenger cars. We also believe setting the fedrive metric at 10% should allow all 

applicable strong hybrids to achieve the credit, but would prevent any mild hybrid from being 

able to meet that target. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 23]

Further, from a technical perspective, certain sections of the proposed regulation were written in 

an inconsistent manner. 40 CFR § 600.116-12(c)(3)(ii) and (iii) reference a confusing mix of 

incompatible units (e.g. “...current in Watt hours...” “....the total energy recovered by the 

hybrid battery system, in kilowatt hours, is the sum of the positive current values...”). The 

equation given for dSOC is also incorrect. The equation as shown represents change in energy, 

not state of charge. Further, battery current in A is measured directly in the test, not state of 

charge (SOC). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 23]

To correct this, we recommend revising 40 CFR 600.116-12(c)(3)(ii) to specify clearly that the 

recovered braking energy should be determined from an integration of the battery charge power 

during decelerations over the course of the drive cycle where the battery charge power is the 

product of measured current and voltage at the battery terminals, i.e.: [See calculation on p. 23 of 

Docket number [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1]

In addition, for nominal voltage, Ford requests that the definition of “nominal” be published 

within the regulations to avoid confusion and the usage of differing methodologies for its 

determination. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 23]

As noted above, the specific technical details of the voltage and current measurements and the 

subsequent calculations with consistent units need to be worked out with appropriate industry 

and EPA technical experts. The goal will be to define test procedure specifications and 

regulatory language for determining the recovered braking energy that are clear, accurate, and 

consistent with previous hybrid procedural guidance (e.g. SAE J1711, Part 86, Part 600). Ford 

plans to discuss these recommendations with the agencies in more detail and would be happy to 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-17

provide additional input to help develop the procedure and appropriate metrics for this important 

regulatory flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 23]

• Performance Based Incentives: Other technologies are available beyond hybridization to 

provide game changing greenhouse gas reduction and fuel economy improvement, for 

full-size pick-up trucks. The performance based incentive offers a technology neutral 

alternative to pursue these other strategies. The provision of the 5 model year carry-over 

of the credit will encourage earlier adoption of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9463-A1, p. 23]

• Incentive Levels: The proposed incentive levels are aligned with the anticipated 

development and implementation costs, as well as the expected benefits, associated with 

implementing game-changing technologies on the full-size pick-up trucks. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 24]

• Minimum Penetration Thresholds: The thresholds proposed pose a significant concern. 

The intent of the credit is to drive advanced technologies that are typically more 

challenging in heavy truck applications, giving manufacturers the opportunity to gain 

experience with these applications and giving consumers the chance to become more 

accustomed to certain advanced technologies in pickup trucks. As these are achieved, the 

expectation is that the technology penetrations will increase and high fuel efficiency can 

be affordably implemented amongst the heavier trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p. 24]

However, the aggressive, minimum penetration rates actually thwart that attempt. First, because 

significant early investment is required to develop and implement the “game changing 

technologies”, manufacturers will need the certainty that the credit will be achievable when the 

product goes to market. The uncertainty of the market acceptance, and affordability of the 

subsequent products make it difficult, if not impossible, to establish the necessary assurance that 

there will be a return on investment. If, for example, we plan on a 10% market penetration of full 

size hybrid pick-up trucks, but external conditions result in a 9% acceptance rate, our investment 

will not have yielded the anticipated credit and could threaten an otherwise compliant 

strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 24]

Similarly, the aggressive year over year increases in the fleet thresholds for mild hybrids and 

performance based technologies do not align with typical product plans and strategies. For 

example, a particular truck platform/engine may be better suited for the application of the game 

changing technology, but requiring large year over year volume increases would require those 

same technologies applied to a broader range of products – some or many of which may not be 

suited to those particular advanced technologies. Again, without assurance that the credits can be 

achieved, the decision to proceed with the development of these game changing technologies 

may not be supportable in a sustainable business strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, 

p. 24]

Organization: General Motors Company
EPA Response to Comments

5-18

GM supports the proposed methodology to incentivize hybridization of pickup trucks. Additional 

supporting information and some technical suggestions are provided in the Appendix of these 

comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 3]

Pickup Truck Credits

General Motors supports the agencies’ proposal to provide additional “game changing 

technology” credits for pickup trucks. We agree with the agencies’ assessment, as noted in the 

Technical Support Document, that the proposed standards are most challenging to the larger 

trucks. Consumers use these vehicles for a wide variety of work purposes and expect them to 

provide durability and reliable towing and hauling capability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-

A1, p. 6]

Weight-based vehicle attributes such as payload and towing capability are key among the 

parameters that characterize differences in the design of these work vehicles, as well as 

differences in how the vehicles will be utilized. Vehicles with towing capability generally have 

increased aerodynamic drag caused by a modified frontal area, increased rolling resistance, and a 

heavier frame and suspension to support this additional capability. Manufacturers are faced with 

the challenge of applying technologies to significantly improve fuel economy without sacrificing 

the utility required by our customers. The incentives proposed by the agencies will encourage the 

development of innovative and more expensive technologies, to achieve breakthroughs in fuel 

consumption improvement on these products. These credits are consistent with the agencies’ 

objectives to foster new and cost-effective technologies to achieve environmental 

benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 6]

Pickup Truck Box Definition

As discussed in the draft Joint TSD (Section 5.3.1) as well as the Section III of the NPRM, EPA 

is seeking comment on expanding the scope of the hybridization credit to slightly smaller 

pickups (with a minimum distance between the wheel wells of 42 inches), provided they have the 

towing capabilities of the larger full-size pickups (for example a minimum towing capacity of 

6,000 pounds). GM agrees with EPA that this could incentivize hybridization on pickups which 

offer much of the utility of the larger pickups, but overall have lower CO2 emissions. GM agrees 

that providing an advanced technology incentive credit for a slightly smaller boxed, but greater 

towing capacity vehicle, would promote the overall objective of the proposed standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 6]

Pickup Truck Utility Definition

The current proposal for towing capability and payload capability include the key parameters to 

define a work vehicle and are appropriate. While it is difficult to forecast future customer needs 

and expectations for vehicles that we will be building 13 years from now, GM supports the 

agencies reliance upon utility-adding features such as towing or payload capability and agrees 

with the agency’s direction to set these thresholds at a level representing significant utility 

capability. Further, we believe that the methodology for calculating the appropriate parameters 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-19

should be tied to SAE J2807. It is also appropriate for these parameters to be evaluated at the 

mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 6]

Hybrid Electric Vehicle Pickup Truck Definition

GM supports the proposed hybrid system definitions for both mild and strong HEV pickup 

trucks. We believe they are technically sound and reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-

A1, p. 7]

Minimum penetration thresholds

The purpose of the “game changing” incentive provisions in the proposed rule is to encourage 

early introduction of advanced technologies. However, the proposed minimum volume 

thresholds for mild hybrid incentives are overly aggressive and may well significantly out-pace 

market demand for these technologies. The proposed minimum penetration rates for mild 

hybridization are not aligned with a historic rate of customer acceptance of any new and/or 

advanced technology. An alternative minimum penetration rate for mild hybrid incentives, which 

is still quite aggressive, but more respectful of historic technology penetration phase-in rates, is 

that which EPA proposed for the performance based incentives in Section II. F. 3 of the proposal 

on page 74,945. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 7]

GM recommends that the agencies harmonize the mild hybrid incentive rates with those 

proposed for the performance based incentives. Further, GM recommends that both the incentive 

level and the appropriate penetration rates be evaluated at the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

The agencies have proposed various incentive programs. Credits for hybridizing full-size pickup 

trucks are also proposed. The truck program also includes an incentive applicable to full-size 

pickup trucks where a credit of either 10 g/m (0.001125 gal/m) or 20 g/m (0.002250 gal/m) 

applies to those vehicles achieving 15 percent or 20 percent better CO2 performance than their 

footprint based target once a fleet penetration target is reached. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9474-A1, pp.4-5]

Should the agencies finalize any of the proposed incentives for electric drivetrains, the agencies 

should also include an incentive for ICE vehicles that achieve substantially better CO2

performance than their footprint based target as measured by the fuel economy test cycles. For 

purposes of this incentive, Honeywell suggests that micro-hybrid technology such as start/stop 

technology not preclude application of the incentive since that technology is available for an offcycle credit regardless of the applicable drivetrain.4 The agencies have offered as much as 10 

g/m for adding off-cycle technologies to vehicles. An OEM should similarly be able to obtain 5 

or 10 g/m (and the equivalent value in the CAFE program) for ICE vehicles that perform 15 

percent or 20 percent better than their applicable footprint-based target. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9474-A1, p.5]
EPA Response to Comments

5-20

An incentive for high performing ICE vehicles would encourage manufacturers to improve their 

vehicles beyond what is necessary for compliance alone and would help to detract from any 

reliance on the EV credit multipliers for fleetwide compliance. In addition, further improvements 

made in an effort to gain these credits can proliferate beyond the individual vehicle and, as a 

result, improve the performance of the fleet overall. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.5]

The performance credit proposed for full-size pickup trucks presents a model to promote 

technology neutrality in the remainder of the fleet as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, 

p.5]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

The agencies have provided two incentives for full size pick-up trucks recognizing it will be 

challenging for manufacturers of these vehicles to meet the proposed targets and because they 

want to incentivize 'game-changing' technologies. One is a technology-based CO2/mpg credit for 

manufacturers that hybridize full-size pick-ups. The other is a performance-based CO2/mpg 

credit for full size pick-up trucks that exceed their applicable target. Hyundai supports 

technology-neutral and performance-based incentives for large pick-up trucks. However, 

Hyundai questions the need for both types of incentives as we believe the performance-based 

incentives achieve the same objective as hybridization incentives. Additionally, Hyundai asks 

that the agencies consider extending the performance-based incentives for pick-up trucks to all 

classes of vehicles. If the agency truly wants to incentivize performance and 'game changing' 

technologies, it makes sense that the agency would support game-changing technology for any 

class of vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.3]

Starting in MY 2017, if a full-size pickup truck achieves either a 15 or 20% fuel efficiency/GHG 

improvement, the agencies will provide credits equivalent to approximately 2 mpg or 4 mpg, 

respectively. The 4 mpg credit would be available from MY 2017 through 2025 as long as the 

fuel efficiency of the first year is maintained. In addition to maintaining the first year's fuel 

efficiency over the entire nine year period in order to be eligible, Hyundai suggests that the 

agencies also consider the possibility of fuel efficiency/GHG improvement during that period. 

(The current proposal requires only increased penetration rates of the fuel efficiency/GHG 

improvement for a model) Additionally, Hyundai notes that if automakers are capable of 

exceeding large truck fuel efficiency targets by 15 or 20%, this will be valuable information to 

the agencies at the time of the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.3]

Finally, while we support performance-based incentives, we do acknowledge that it is possible 

that these incentives could shift the fleet mix toward the full-size truck segment, thus reducing 

the overall benefits of the proposed requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 173.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 23.]
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-21

Others are improving the fuel efficiency of cargo-carrying larger pickup trucks, and the agency is 

providing incentives to provide that technology.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

14. Similarly, the full-size pickup truck credits also violate the principle that efficiency and 

greenhouse gas standards should be technology neutral, and reduce the benefits from the rule. As 

a minimum, the credits should only be given if the sales targets are met each year and the credits 

should be phased out in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 4]

15. Full-size pickups have been defined by the ability to fit four foot wide construction materials 

between the wheel wells at least since the introduction of the F-series pickup in 1948. The fullsize pickup truck credits should not be expanded to pickups with less than 48 inches wheelhouse 

width. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 4]

14) Pickup Truck Credits

A second type of technology-specific bonus credit currently in the proposed rule applies to fullsize pickup trucks. For the same reasons we expressed in the last section on upstream credits, the 

ICCT encourage US EPA to eliminate the proposed bonus credits for pickup trucks. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 35]

The NPRM proposes two types of pick-up bonus credits. First, the NPRM proposes a bonus 

credit of 10 g/mile for each full-sized pickup truck that is either equipped with mild hybrid 

technology, or achieves an emission rate 15% better than the standard in any year from MY2017 

to MY2021 (assuming minimum fleet deployment rates are met). Second, the NPRM proposes a 

bonus credit of 20 g/mile for each full sized pickup that is either equipped with strong hybrid 

technology, or achieves an emission rate 20% better than the standard in any year (assuming 

certain fleet deployment rates are achieved). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 35]

These proposed credits are not related to any additional fuel or CO2 reductions and could hinder, 

rather than promote, additional technology advancement for two reasons. First, there is no 

inherent reason why hybrid systems for pickup trucks would be different from hybrid systems for 

other vehicles. Even if hybrid development proceeded initially on other vehicles, it could easily 

be spread to pickup trucks when it is ready. In fact, Toyota and Ford have already announced a 

joint venture to develop hybrid systems for pickup trucks.65 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 35]

Second, OEMs could use the bonus credit to delay introducing this technology on other models 

and/or delay introduction of stronger hybrids, zero tailpipe emission vehicles, and other superior 

technologies. In addition, once a vehicle qualifies in a given year, future production of the model 

can also qualify for the 10 g/mile credit up until 2021, even as the expected benefit over the 

standard shrinks toward zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 35]

Technology-neutral standards, without the 10 g/mile and 20 g/mile pick-up credits, would best 

achieve the valuable benefits of this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 35]
EPA Response to Comments

5-22

As a minimum, OEMs should be required to achieve a performance standard of 15% (10 g/mile 

credit) or 20% (20 g/mile credit) better than the compliance curve for a given model in each year 

that the credit is awarded to that model. In addition, the pickup truck credits should be phased 

out in the final rule and not be allowed to continue indefinitely. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 36]

15) Pick-up Truck Definition

For the purposes of the full size pickup truck hybrid technology incentive credit or the full size 

pickup truck performance-based incentive credit, EPA is seeking comment on expanding the 

definition of a full-size truck by reducing the minimum wheelhouse width requirement from 48 

inches to a value around 42 inches, provided the vehicle is able to tow at least 6,000 lbs. Note 

that this is 1,000 lbs higher than the requirement for 48 inch wide pickup trucks. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 36]

It is inappropriate to expand the definition of full size pickup trucks to include trucks with less 

than 48 inches between the wheelhouse. The ability to haul standard four foot wide building 

sheets, such as plywood and drywall, between the wheelhouse has been the marketing definition 

of a full size pickup at least since the introduction of the F-series pickup in 1948. Reducing the 

wheelhouse width to 42 includes will allow virtually all pickup trucks to qualify for the artificial 

pickup truck credits, further distorting technology requirements and reducing the benefits of the 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 36]

ICCT strongly opposes expansion of the full size pickup credits to pickups with less than 48 

inches wheelhouse width. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 36]

65 http://www.nytimes.com/2011108123IbusinessIford-and-toyota-to-work-together-onhybridtrucks.html

Organization: Marz, Loren C.

However, I do not support the 'Incentives for Advanced Technologies Including Hybridization 

for Full-Size Pick-Up Trucks' unless diesel technology is also included in some fashion. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.1]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

• DAG supports credits applicable to the hybridization of vehicles with footprints less than 40 

square feet. Additional credit opportunities would provide significant assistance in overcoming 

the cost-benefit barriers to investment in hybrid powertrains in this market segment. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

DAG proposes that EPA provide a further credit to assist manufacturers in hybridizing smaller 

vehicles, i.e., those 40 square feet or less. This category would currently include approximately 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-23

14 vehicles, including the smart car, the Mini Cooper, the Ford Fiesta and the Toyota iQ.29 Only 

Honda is offering hybrid vehicles in this size category.30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1,

p. A-15]

Vehicles within this category generally achieve EPA-combined fuel economy in the range of 30-

35 mpg, primarily by virtue of their size and weight. In comparison, however, hybridization is 

more cost-effective for vehicles in larger segments. Larger vehicles with hybrid engines, such as 

the Prius and the Honda Civic hybrid, achieve substantially greater EPA-combined fuel 

economy, in the range of 40-50 mpg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-15]

For small-size cars, however, the barriers to hybridization include architecture and cost 

impediments to hybridizing smaller vehicles.31 Indeed, press reports indicate that while 

companies have explored hybridizing in this category; as of yet, however, only Honda has thus 

far decided to offer hybrid vehicles in this segment. The vast majority of companies appear to 

have determined that it is not commercially feasible to hybridize in this category. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-15]

Hybridizing this market segment, however, could garner significant benefits. The fuel 

efficiencies of smaller vehicles are generally associated with steady state driving, mostly on 

highways and in rural areas. The power-to-weight ratio of vehicles in this class are typically 15-

20% worse than the next larger vehicle class. As a result, fuel efficiency in fact suffers in smaller 

vehicles when driven in urban settings because in that setting they are being driven outside their 

most fuel-efficient envelopes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-15]

Urban city modes tend to impose greater transient demands on the engine. On urban 

expressways, extended higher-rpm acceleration is often required. Hybrid vehicles offer the 

opportunity to enhance fuel efficiency by supplanting, with hybrid propulsion, the power 

required for acceleration which would otherwise occur at a less than optimum efficiency. Outside 

of urban areas, the hybrid propulsion can serve as a range extender during steady state cruising to 

supply power at times, such as long grades, that would otherwise require the engine to operate at 

less than optimal fuel consumption. As a result, hybridizing smaller vehicles would offer 

substantial fuel efficiency gains and CO2 reductions while providing enhanced consumer 

functionality in both urban and highway settings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-15]

DAG proposes a credit of 10 g/m, consistent with the credit proposed for hybridizing larger 

trucks, for hybrid vehicles in this class once a penetration rate of 10% is reached. The application 

of a penetration rate recognizes that there may be individual companies that are able to invest in 

particular models, but that for most manufacturers investment in this segment is not feasible or 

likely to provide enough benefit to justify the costs. A 30% penetration rate ensures that the 

incentive is in fact encouraging investment. A substantially higher penetration rate requirement 

would render the incentive infeasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-15-A-16]
EPA Response to Comments

5-24

29 The category would also include the Chevrolet Aveo, the Fiat 500, the Toyota Yaris, the 

Mazda2, the Honda Fit, the Hyundai Accent, the Kia Rio, the Ford Fiesta, the Scion xD and the 

Chevrolet Spark 2013. The list is based on EPA's 'small size' car list for MY 2012.

30 Honda currently offers the hybrid CR-Z and has announced plans to offer the hybrid Honda 

Fit. We do not believe other companies will follow in the absence of a government production 

incentive to do so. The Mitsubishi i-MiEV also falls within this size range, but is a full electric 

vehicle.

31 Hybridization in this context should refer to regenerative braking and/or electric motor drive 

assist.

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Incentives for “game changing” technologies performance for full-size pickup trucks including 

hybridization is too limiting and requires revisions. These incentives should not be limited to this 

vehicle segment. Also, incentive metrics for hybrids need to be based on vehicle performance, 

not architecture; other technical possibilities for full-size pickup truck hybrids should be 

considered; and, the penetration rate requirement should be eliminated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9478-A1, p.2]

Essentially, any technology that is “game changing,” as stated in the NPRM, should qualify for 

the same incentives. The quantification of significant improvement is a reasonable definition of 

“game changing,” and should therefore apply to any technology and vehicle segment. No one 

vehicle segment should be the beneficiary of “game-changing” technologies. Such focus on one 

segment could also have unintended consequences. As a hypothetical example, if the OEM 

concentrates their efforts on full-size pickup trucks and thereby generates a large number of 

credits, there is a possibility they may not apply advanced technologies to large SUVs. Instead, 

they may use those credits from the pickup trucks to offset their SUVs that do not meet the 

standard. Thus, the overall effect on emissions and fuel consumption goes in the wrong direction. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.3]

Second, with respect to full-size it is our understanding, that if full-size pick-ups demonstrate a 

15 or 20 percent performance improvement pre-MY2017 (i.e. during MYs2014, -15, -16) then 

those vehicles would not be eligible to be pulled through as a carry-forward credit in the form of 

a full-size pick-up performance improvement credit post-MY2017. Under this scenario, MEMA 

asks that the agencies clarify if these full-size pickups would instead be eligible for an early 

compliance credit. This important point needs to be clarified primarily because the multiplier for 

early credit and the performance improvement credit for this vehicle class would be different 

(flat 1 versus 1.5). If these pickups would not be eligible as a performance improvement credit 

and carried forward as such, then there may not be as large of an incentive to research, develop, 

produce and implement technologies more rapidly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, pp.9-

10]

A. “Game Changing” Technologies Should Apply to All Vehicle Segments [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9478-A1, p.10]
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-25

As MEMA stated earlier in Section II, the credits for “game changing” technologies should not 

be limited to just full-size pickup trucks. Any technology that is “game changing” should qualify 

for the same incentives and have the same hurdles to meet. No one, single segment should be the 

beneficiary of “game changing” technologies. For example, systems like Higher Voltage StopStart/Belt Integrated Starter Generator (BISG), can be utilized in other vehicle categories. If 

there is a technology that improves any vehicle segment by a given percentage or target 

(performance-based criteria) and subsequently the criterion is exceeded, then an incentive/credit 

should apply across the board. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.10]

By making this change, these “game-changing” technologies can be implemented to other 

vehicles, such as large SUVs. In many ways, large SUVs face some of the same challenges as 

full-size pickup trucks. It would be prudent for the agencies to treat all vehicle segments equally 

so that the rule does not drive certain types of vehicles to be made available to consumers. Such 

a constraint not only influences and favors vehicle “winners and losers” and prescribes a 

technology pathway, but also influences the offsets for those vehicles that may not meet the 

standard. This direction is counter to the intent of the Program’s goals. All opportunities to 

improve real-world emissions and fuel consumption should not be limited exclusively to any one 

vehicle segment. Therefore, MEMA urges the agencies to consider applying “game changing” 

performance-based improvements to all vehicle segments and not just full-size pickup trucks. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.10]

B. Mild and Strong Hybrids Should be Based on Vehicle Performance, Not Architecture [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.10]

If the agencies will not apply “game changing” technologies to all vehicle segments, MEMA 

urges that changes are made to the treatment of mild and strong hybrids in the rule. In the 

NPRM, hybrid electric vehicles have been categorized as “mild” or “strong” in a manner based 

more on hybrid architecture than on any specific performance definition. There are many 

different architectures employed using single, dual, or multiple electric motors performing 

various functions including traction drive, power generation (both while driving and braking), 

and battery charging. These electric drive systems cover a continuum of power levels.[EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.10]

In real-world driving, regenerative braking efficiencies can be similar for both mild and strong 

hybrids when the driver coasts to a stop. A strong hybrid is capable of a higher regenerative 

braking level and the vehicle will coast to stop sooner. Thus, the regenerative braking efficiency 

is not a representative metric when classifying mild or strong hybrids. It is recognized that when 

following a defined deceleration rate on a specific driving cycle there will be differences in 

regenerative braking energy levels between mild and strong hybrids. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9478-A1, p.10]

If regenerative braking efficiency is used as a metric for incentives, then vehicle manufacturers 

will focus on this and not the goal of maximizing fuel efficiency at an affordable cost. An 

architecture that could maximize regenerative braking efficiency and meet the 75 percent 

breakpoint is one that uses four-wheel motors. This is unlikely to be used in mass-market 

vehicles due to the high cost of implementation. On a full-size pickup truck with rear-wheel 
EPA Response to Comments

5-26

drive, optimum regenerative braking could use an electric motor on the front axle, commonly 

referred to as a “through-the-road” hybrid. Typical vehicle braking is done with 70 percent on 

the front and 30 percent on the rear, which also provides stability under braking. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.11]

Hybrid architectures for large pickup trucks – both mild and strong – more typically provide 

electrical boost through the drivetrain to the rear wheels. This configuration is able to employ 

regenerative braking on the rear and friction braking on the front to retain vehicle safety and 

stability. In this architecture the system is incapable of meeting a 75 percent regenerative braking 

efficiency, as defined in the NPRM, whether or not it is a mild or strong hybrid. Drivetrain losses 

and engine pumping losses also reduce the amount of recovered energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9478-A1, p.11]

For these reasons, MEMA urges that the calculated incentive be based on vehicle performance 

(i.e. the improvement in fuel efficiency of the hybrid compared to a conventional vehicle) and 

using a formula that provides a continuous value that does not require a breakpoint and a 

definition of “strong” versus “mild.” MEMA further recommends that this incentive is calculated 

using the “Autonomie” modeling and simulation program developed by Argonne National 

Laboratory. This program is widely recognized for its ability to model different architectures to 

determine vehicle performance, including fuel efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, 

p.11]

In this same section, § 86.1866–12 (e) Paragraph (2) (i) and (ii), the proposal defines penetration 

rate thresholds for full-size pickup trucks.11 Based on current penetration rates of light-duty 

hybrid vehicles of 2.4 percent in 2010 and 2.2 percent in 2011, the proposed threshold 

penetration rates are unlikely to be achieved. Further, there is close correlation between the 

number of hybrid vehicles sold and the price of gasoline. MEMA recommends that the 

penetration rate thresholds be eliminated because these factors are impossible to predict. 

Therefore, the credit should be given according to the actual number of vehicles actually 

produced. [[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, pp.11-12]

Incentives for “game-changing” technologies should available to all vehicle segments, not just 

full-size pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.13]

Metrics and terminologies for hybrids should be modified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, 

p.13]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

NWF supports provisions in the rule that encourage more rapid adoption of the most fuel 

efficient technology at scale – especially the incentive for “game changing” technologies for full 

size pickup trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4]

In principle, we also support incentives for plug-in hybrid electric and electric vehicle 

technology and for real off-cycle CO2 reductions, and we look forward to continuing to work 

with automakers, the agencies and consumers to maximize the effectiveness of these credits and 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-27

other measures which enable rapid adoption of new technology, and to optimize short and long 

term emissions impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4] [[This comment can also be 

found in Outline Headings 4. and 7.]]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

2. Incentives for Full-Size Pickup Trucks Should Require Wide Scale Technology Deployment 

and Phase Out during Model Years 2017-2025

NRDC agrees that the proposed truck incentives should be limited to just full-size pickups. 

While full size pickup trucks may often be used for the main purpose of transporting just 

passengers, these trucks are the most likely light-duty vehicles to have legitimate non-passenger 

applications such as handling large and heavy cargo payloads and/or towing. NRDC believes that 

known technologies can be applied to address the payload needs while also significantly 

improving fuel efficiency and reducing GHG emissions. However, these technologies only 

deserve special incentives if they can be scaled up for widespread application. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 12]

NRDC supports the proposed requirement that manufacturers reach minimum volume levels in 

order to be eligible for the full-size pick truck incentives. The minimum volumes require a 

commitment from manufacturers for wide scale production and deployment. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 12]

Among the truck incentives being proposed, NRDC appreciates the inclusion of a technologyneutral, performance-based credit structure. Performance-based targets allow for new innovation 

but can also bring uncertainty in the verification of real-world results. Due to the uncertainty, 

NRDC supports constraining the credit allowance to truck credit to no more than five 

consecutive model years or until emissions increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 

13]

NRDC agrees that vehicles receiving the performance-based credit be prohibited from receiving 

hybrid truck credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 13]

NRDC also agrees that the mild hybrid truck incentive be no more than 10 g/mi. When analyzing 

the effectiveness of the mild hybrid technology—which EPA notes has not been done for the 

NPRM—EPA should consider reducing the maximum credit available to be consistent with the 

analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 13]

Organization: NGV America

Advanced Pickup Truck Credits

For 2017–2025, EPA and NHTSA have proposed special credits for pickup trucks. There is a 

credit for mild- and also for strong-hybrid pickups, and a separate credit for pickups that are able 

to meet prescribed GHG reductions. The description in the proposed rule appears to indicate that 
EPA Response to Comments

5-28

hybrid pickups and pickups that satisfy the GHG performance criteria will earn GHG and FE 

credits. The descriptions of the incentives contained in the proposals are reprinted here:

As with the HEV-based credit, the performance-based credit/value requires that the technology 

be used on a minimum percentage of a manufacturer’s full-size pickup trucks. That minimum 

percentage for the 10 g/mi GHG credit (equivalent to 0.001125 gal/mi fuel consumption 

improvement value) would be 15 percent of a company’s full sized pickup production in MY 

2017 with a ramp up to at least 40 percent of production in MY 2021.

The minimum percentage for the 20 g/mi credit (equivalent to 0.002250 gal/mi fuel consumption 

improvement value) would be 10 percent of a company’s full sized pickup production in each 

year over the model years 2017–2025.

First, we recognize that pickup trucks are among the most challenging in terms of meeting 

aggressive future requirements. As a result, we recommend that the agencies provide the 

broadest array of credits for game changing technologies implemented on these vehicles. The 

agencies have proposed credits for either hybridizing these vehicles or providing superior 

emissions performance. We recommend that the agencies also consider and include additional 

credits for natural gas applications on pickup trucks. We would be happy to work with the 

agencies to develop credits that fully recognize the benefits that natural gas can provide on these 

trucks. We have outlined earlier the types of incentive we believe are necessary and appropriate 

to encourage the development and sale of light-duty NGVs.

Second, with respect to the performance-based credits provided for pickup trucks, we offer the 

following comments. We agree that all technologies should have the opportunity to earn credits 

under this provision, and we expect NGVs will qualify based on the performance levels 

proposed. Also, we believe that, if specific credits are provided elsewhere in the rules for NGVs, 

that such vehicles, like for gasoline-hybrids, should not earn double credits under those 

provisions and also under the pickup truck credit provision. If no additional credits are provided 

for NGVs, then they should have the potential to earn credits under this program. Regardless, we 

believe that the proposed targets -- 10% - 15% of production -- for introduction are simply too 

high with respect to NGVs, and that EPA and NHTSA should amend the proposal to provide a 

lower threshold. We propose that a more reasonable target for NGVs would be tied to 

penetration of the commercial and public fleet market as opposed to the overall market for trucks 

since NGVs and other alternative fuel vehicles likely will be targeted mostly to fleets during 

their initial introduction for a number of reasons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, pp. 13-

14]

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

NESCAUM supports EPA’s proposal to include flexibility mechanisms to provide manufacturers 

with the means to incorporate a range of technologies to meet the requirements of the proposed 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-29

The agencies have proposed to provide 'credits' for deployment of hybrid electric technology on 

full-size pick-up trucks (FSPUs). Toyota appreciates and supports the agencies' objective to 

promote hybrid electric technology in vehicle segments that have proven difficult to penetrate, 

but numerous market segments currently have a lower penetration rate of hybrid electric 

technology than does the FSPU segment. Therefore, limiting the proposed credits to FSPUs 

appears arbitrary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.2]

Full Size Pick Up (FSPU) Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.14]

The agencies have proposed incentives for the adoption of 'game changing' technologies that 

could provide significant environmental and energy benefits for full-size pick-up trucks (FSPUs) 

while preserving their utility characteristics. Two specific credit incentives are proposed; (1) for 

FSPUs that perform 15-20 percent better than the vehicle's CAFEI CO2 attribute targets 

regardless of the technology used on the vehicle~ and (2) for FSPUs using hybrid technology 

once certain sales thresholds are met. As proposed, a given FSPU could not qualify for both of 

these credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, pp.14-15]

Toyota appreciates the challenge of reducing emissions and improving the fuel economy of 

FSPUs. However, as explained in more detail below, Toyota has concerns about both of these 

provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.15]

Credit for FSPUs Achieving 15-20 Percent Better than Target [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.15]

The agencies have proposed a variety of reasonable and necessary flexibilities related to 

advanced technology vehicles that span all vehicle segments, including FSPUs (for example, 

sales multipliers for plug-in hybrids, electric vehicles and fuel cells). The agencies have also 

proposed credits for FSPU hybrids (discussed below). Therefore, it remains unclear to Toyota 

why the credit provision for 15-20 percent above target is needed for the FSPU segment. Toyota 

requests that, based on the myriad other proposed flexibilities available for this segment, and the 

generally less stringent target curves proposed for large trucks, the agencies drop this provision. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.15]

Scope of the FSPU Hybrid Technology Provision [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.15]

The agencies appear to have arbitrarily limited which trucks are eligible for hybrid credits. While 

Toyota appreciates and supports the agencies' objective to promote hybrid technology in vehicle 

segments that have proven difficult to penetrate, numerous market segments currently have a 

lower penetration rate of hybrids than does the FSPU segment. According to EPA-published data 

for 2010 model year4 shown in Appendix 2, the FSPU segment is not unique in terms of low 

hybrid penetration. In fact, a number of car and truck segments have an even lower penetration 

than the 'large' pick-up truck segment. Among all truck segments, hybrid share for 2010 model 

year was only 1.6 percent industry-wide. Clearly, hybrid penetration is an issue for the entire car 

and truck fleet, and particularly so for the truck fleet. Toyota's own data supports this view as 

well. For the 2011 model year, hybrids comprise 1.5 percent of Toyota's entire light-duty truck 
EPA Response to Comments

5-30

product line, which is an order of magnitude less than the 15.6 percent penetration rate for 

Toyota passenger cars during the same model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.15]

Toyota requests that the credit for hybrid FSPUs be extended to all truck segments. 

Notwithstanding this request, the comments below address specific details of the proposed FSPU 

hybrid credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.15]

Minimum Sales Volume Threshold for FSPU Hybrid Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.15]

The agencies are proposing minimum sales percentages of a manufacturer's full-size pick-ups be 

equipped with hybrid technology before credits can be generated. These minimum sales 

percentages vary by model year, and whether the hybrid system is 'strong' or 'mild'. As explained 

previously for off-cycle technology credits, arbitrary sales thresholds, absent market demand, 

will do nothing to speed deployment. The likelihood of falling short of the sales thresholds are 

far greater for hybrids compared to off-cycle technologies given the higher cost of hybrid 

technology and the higher minimum sales percentages required. We again refer the agencies to 

Appendix 1, which contains analysis of technology penetration rates. For additional reference, 

Toyota has only reached 1.5 percent hybrid penetration rate for trucks after nearly 8 years of 

marketing hybrid trucks in the U.S. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, pp.15-16]

We understand the agencies' goal for the thresholds is to reward meaningful hybrid technology 

deployment. However, we are concerned that thresholds will be counterproductive to achieving 

this goal. In fact, a maximum threshold appears more appropriate than the proposed minimums 

because commercially viable technologies eventually attain a level of market acceptance where 

incentives are no longer necessary. The proposed minimum thresholds would guarantee credits 

for extremely high penetration rates that clearly no longer warrant incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.16]

Hybrid Credit Technical Issues [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.16]

To ensure that participating manufacturers employ hybrid technology that meets the intent 

behind the incentives, EPA is proposing definitions of 'mild' and 'strong' hybrid. Toyota supports 

EPA's intention to distinguish between strong and mild hybrids for the purpose of awarding 

FSPU credits. After careful analysis of EPA's metrics being proposed to define strong and mild 

hybrids, Toyota would like to offer the following comments based on our hybrid experience and 

expertise which would enhance the technical accuracy and robustness of this proposed FSPU 

provision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.16]

(i) Total Braking Energy (reference Chapter 5 of the TSD, section 5.3.3.2). The equation for 

determining Ebrake_max is incorrect. Specifically, EPA is proposing: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.16] [There is an associated figure, please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, p.16]

Toyota recommends the following revision: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.17] [There 

is an associated figure, please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.17]
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-31

(ii) Measurement of Recovered Braking Energy (reference TSD, section 5.3.3.1). EPA proposes 

to incorporate a metric - the total percentage of available vehicle braking energy recovered over 

the test cycle (T]recovery) - as a way to define levels of hybrid vehicles. Toyota agrees that this 

metric can be a way to simplify the characterization of a hybrid as a 'mild' or 'strong' hybrid 

because batteries and motors will increase in scale to recover the relative braking energy. EPA's 

metric involves calculating the available braking energy on the FTP city cycle and comparing the 

actual energy recovered by the vehicle during FTP city cycle testing. The measured energy into 

the battery is divided into the total calculated braking energy to determine if the vehicle is a mild 

or strong hybrid. For a mild hybrid, EPA is proposing that the recovered energy must be greater 

than 15 percent and less than 75 percent of the calculated available braking energy. For a strong 

hybrid, EPA is proposing that the recovered braking energy must be greater than 75 percent of 

the calculated available braking energy. Toyota is providing specific comments on three 

particular aspects of the metric being proposed by EPA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.17] [There is an associated figure, please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.17]

(A) EPA's definition of the Erecovered term does not match the equation. Toyota believes that 

Erecovered should be calculated based on charging energy recovered only when the vehicle is in 

deceleration mode. As is currently proposed, EPA's method incorrectly includes battery charge 

energy supplied by the engine. Toyota recommends that EPA revise the methodology to include 

the condition of 'onlv during deceleration' for the Erecovered calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, pp.17-18]

(B) EPA's equation for Ebrake_max is calculated by integrating required braking power at each 

point in the FTP test cycle, over the entire test. For technical accuracy, Toyota recommends that 

Ebrake_max be calculated from the measured vehicle speed trace instead. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.18]

(C) In concert with adoption of the technical change recommended in paragraph (A), EPA's 

strong hybrid threshold of 75 percent would need to be revised because this threshold would be 

too high to be met only by battery charging during regenerative braking. Toyota's assessment of 

future concept hybrid systems shows an energy recovery efficiency threshold (T'\recovery) to be 

within the range of 35- 48 percent. Toyota's analysis shows that 11recovery becomes less as the 

vehicle weight increases. This reduction in recovery efficiency is because the traction motor 

cannot absorb all of the braking energy and the wheel-to-motor losses will increase for heavier 

vehicles. As a result, Toyota recommends that an appropriate threshold for 11recovery >40 

percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.18] [There is an associated figure, please refer 

to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.18]

(iii) Additional Metric Needed. Toyota remains concerned that the proposed llrecovery metric 

and associated thresholds would not be sufficiently robust in distinguishing between strong and 

mild hybrids. To clearly identify a strong hybrid system, Toyota supports inclusion of an 

additional metric, fedrive, to clearly distinguish between strong and mild hybrids. The fedrive

metric would represent the amount of tractive effort a vehicle can achieve with electric drive 

only. A description of this metric and appropriate threshold value is provided below. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, pp.18-19] [There is an associated figure, please refer to EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.19]
EPA Response to Comments

5-32

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

The Coalition embraces the Obama Administration’s support for investments in technologies 

that, in the future, will lead to the wide-spread adoption of new “Game-Changing” technologies. 

Still, these technologies, will not significantly penetrate the marketplace until well beyond 2025 -

the timeline for this rulemaking. This is why the Coalition strongly urges EPA and NHTSA to 

focus more on incentivizing “Game-Changing” fuel savings based on the ability of automakers 

to incorporate as many existing and developing technologies that can have the broadest impact 

for fuel economy for model years 2017 and 2025. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]

Only a performance-based system for awarding credits to manufacturers – specifically with 

regard to full-sized pickup trucks – that is consistent across all technologies; [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0246-A1, p.2]

The Coalition opposes EPA and NHTSA's intention to offer manufacturers incentives for hybrid 

technology utilized in the full-sized pickup truck market. The Coalition supports a single 

performance-based credit and argues that a separate hybrid credit is unnecessary and poorly 

conceived. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.3]

Specifically, incentives, in the form of credits, will be offered in one of two ways - to 

manufacturers that produce hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) pickup trucks and to those that 

produce pickup trucks that meet a performance based standard. As stated earlier, the Coalition 

opposes any credit that is used to incentivize a particular technology in a specific vehicle class as 

opposed to incentives based solely on fuel economy increases and GHG emission reductions. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.3]

In its current form, the hybrid full-sized pickup truck credit should be revised or eliminated from 

the Final Rule for the following reasons. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.3]

GHG Reduction Target for Full-Sized Pickup Trucks' HEV Credit: The NPRM’s description of 

the HEV pickup truck credit does not carry any CO2 reduction requirements whatsoever. 

Although the agency outlines the dimensions of a pickup truck that can qualify for the credit, to 

the NPRM does not mention the volume of CO2 or gallons of fuel these HEV trucks are 

supposed to save for the consumer and for the nation. Furthermore, at no point in the NPRM or 

the Draft Joint Technical Standards Document do the agencies support the need for a separate 

HEV incentive from the Performance Based Incentive. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.3]

The Credit Does Not Include a Minimum Fuel Economy Threshold Provisions: While EPA 

specifies the amount of recovered break-energy these HEV trucks must achieve, EPA does not 

specify how that recovered energy should be used to benefit the environment or reduce national 

petroleum consumption. The proposed rule is void of any language that communicates antibacksliding provisions that were once at the core of EPA’s mobile source rulemaking. Under the 

language of this proposal, a “horsepower war” in the full size pickup truck market could emerge 

as long as these trucks carry a battery pack. EPA’s authority should be used to ensure reduced 

emissions and fuel consumption without ambiguity. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, pp.3-4]
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-33

Larger GHG Footprint and Decreased Fuel Economy: EPA is proposing a 20 g/mile credit for 

hybrid pickup trucks without requiring any GHG reduction or fuel economy improvement over 

the baseline foot print target. Without prescribing technology performance benefits, EPA’s 

proposal could incentivize vehicles that undermine, rather than advance, the nation's policy 

objectives. As such, the Coalition requests that EPA and NHTSA require qualifying vehicles to 

actually reduce CO2 and petroleum use in the real-world by 20 percent below the footprint target. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.4]

Furthermore, the EPA and NHTSA identify the need that these vehicles have for more power 

based on traditional towing and hauling needs yet fail to clarify how the traditional drive cycle of 

the full-sized pickup truck driver would benefit from the hybridization of these vehicles. 

Assuming the need for more towing power and use at highway speeds, these owners will not 

enjoy any improved fuel economy or GHG reduction as a result of the hybridization. While other 

technologies added to the truck may improve fuel economy at highway speeds, there is no 

indication that GHG reductions from the hybrid credit will be “Game-Changing.” [NHTSA2010-0131-0246-A1, p.4]

As such, the Coalition requests that EPA or NHTSA publish any real-world data that indicates 

drivers of full-sized pickup trucks predominately are used in a stop and go driving pattern or that 

the credit as offered will be designed to significantly improve fuel economy and GHG emission 

reductions at highway speeds. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.4]

Erasing Market Challenges: EPA states that it intends to utilize “game changing credits” to 

overcome market challenges faced by hybrid pickup trucks. The agencies have cited the expense 

to bring this technology to the light truck segment. These credits, however, cannot guarantee 

demand. Hybrid powertrains have been available on pickup trucks in the U.S. market since MY 

2005. Since that time, some hybrid variants have been dropped by manufacturers due to the lack 

of customer demand. By 2011, in fact, less than one-quarter of a percent (0.23%) of customers 

selected the hybrid pickup truck option where it was available as an option. In contrast, 

depending on the model, 15% to 50% of customers selected a diesel powertrain when such an 

option was offered. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.4]

The Coalition does not believe that offering the full-sized pickup hybrid trucks a credit will 

overcome the enormous market challenges that these vehicles have faced for the last 7 Model 

Years. We see as evidence that even offering a $7,500 credit has not helped the electric vehicle 

market hit predicted sales targets. The Coalition urges EPA and NHTSA to focus solely on a 

performance based standard aimed at encouraging manufacturers to add all advanced 

technologies to this segment. A technology neutral credit will lead to faster adoption and greater 

fuel economy gains. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.4]

Small Pickup Truck Market: The agencies have requested comments on expanding the scope of 

its performance credits to include somewhat smaller pickup trucks. The Coalition strongly 

supports expansion of this definition to encourage the broadest possible adoption rates for 

advanced, fuel saving technologies in the fleet, but ONLY under the performance-based rules 

where the vehicles that the EPA is incentivizing actually reduce emissions and fuel consumption. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.5]
EPA Response to Comments

5-34

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 243-246.]

In the NPRM, EPA and NHTSA outline proposals that offer manufacturers incentives to 

incorporate game-changing technologies into the full-sized pickup truck market. These 

incentives in the form of credits come in two forms. One will provide credits to manufacturers to 

produce hybrid electric pickup trucks, another will award credits to manufacturers that produce 

pickup trucks that meet a similar performance-based standard.

EPA and NHTSA argue the HEV technology in pickup trucks is an emerging technology that 

faces substantial challenges in gaining initial market penetration. The Coalition finds this 

argument tenuous on a number of levels. First, the Coalition believes the HEV technology, 

which has been on the market for over a decade, is not an emerging technology today, and 

certainly will not be an emerging technology in 2017 when these credits are set to go into effect. 

To the contrary, light-duty HEV's have been a viable option for a number of consumers, 

particularly those who drive in urban conditions. It might be considered an emerging application 

of an existing technology, but it certainly cannot be described as an emerging technology almost 

20 years of being on the market, which will be the case when this rule goes into effect. In fact, 

the GMC Sierra and Chevy Silverado hybrid applications in the truck segment have been on the 

market for nearly a decade.

Second, EPA and NHTSA state that because of the substantial cost required to produce full-sized 

HEV pickup trucks, automakers have difficulty justifying the investments necessary to produce 

these vehicles without a government incentive. The Coalition believes that government 

incentives to create a market for specific technologies are the wrong path to achieve fuel 

efficiency gains and emissions reductions. Examining consumer acceptance of alternative 

vehicle technologies in light-duty vehicles where hybrid technology is already well established 

foreshadows the pratfalls of choosing a single technology winner for the full-sized pickup truck 

segment on a technology neutral approach that promotes all advanced technologies will achieve 

real results.

Despite inquiries to the agencies and with suppliers, we are unaware of any data that 

demonstrates that most full-sized pickup truck owners accumulate the majority of miles under 

urban conditions and duty cycles. Conversely, these light trucks will be burdened with carrying 

the significant weight of the battery technology at highway speeds while using a gasoline or a 

diesel-powered engine.

By driving conditions that do not utilize the benefits of hybridization, it is unclear that the fuel 

economy gains and emissions reductions have predicted to result from this game-changing 

technology are actually attainable.

The Coalition sees no benefit in maintaining a performance-based credit and a separate credit for 

full-sized HEV pickup trucks when the latter can, and should, qualify under a strictly 

performance-based structure. Instead of sending a strong signal to both manufacturers and 

consumers that hybrid trucks represent the best technology option, EPA and NHTSA should 

make the case for any technology that meets the aggressive guidelines set forth by the NPRM.
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-35

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The UAW also believes that the agencies are wise to offer an incentivized path for the 

application of technologies other than hybridization for large pick-up trucks. This technologyneutral option offers CO2 credits and fuel-economy calculation adjustments for vehicles that 

substantially over-comply with the applicable footprint-based target. The proposals take 

appropriate measures to prohibit double counting the available incentives for large pick-up 

trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.3]

The UAW is especially supportive of EPA and NHTSA’s proposed incentives for the addition of 

advanced technologies to large pick-up trucks and the proposed performance-based credits for 

large pick-ups that significantly exceed the applicable footprint-based target. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9563-A2, p.3]

We believe the credits proposed by EPA and the fuel-economy calculation adjustments proposed 

by NHTSA for significant hybridization of a manufacturer’s full-size pick-up fleet are 

worthwhile incentives that will quicken the pace of introduction of these advanced technologies 

in a market segment that faces unique challenges in improving efficiency while maintaining full 

functionality. The proposed incentives are sensible because these technologies can improve 

efficiency without compromising functionality, even though they will certainly be expensive in 

the early years of the proposed rule. The UAW believes that these incentives will hasten the 

transformation of the large pick-up segment, and will ultimately result in a full-size pick-up fleet 

that is significantly more efficient much sooner than would be the case without the additional 

incentive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.3]

Organization: VNG Co. (VNG)

Unlike electricity, natural gas is a viable option for the full range of vehicle c1asses including 

larger vehicles like pickups and other light trucks, which have vehicle envelopes that can easily 

accommodate CNG tanks. Given that light trucks account for slightly more than half of all US 

vehicle sales today (and 60 percent or more of Big Three sales),11 light-truck friendly NGV 

technology can play a major role in ensuring the 'economic practicability' of these rules. As 

defined in the NPRM:

'Economic practicality refers to whether a standard is one 'within the financial capability of the 

industry, but not so stringent as to lead to adverse economic consequences, such as a significant 

loss of jobs or the unreasonable elimination of consumer choice.’” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7941-A2, p. 4]

As discussed below, the Agencies have already acknowledged the importance of the pickup truck 

segment for meeting this economic practicality criterion with their proposal for special credits to 

encourage deployment of 'game-changing' technologies in these vehicles. By extension, the 

economic practicability of these and future regulations will be greatly enhanced if they provide 

appropriate, fair and consistent support for the production of NGVs, which will provide a muchneeded long-term platform for reducing emissions and petroleum consumption for the entire light 

truck segment of the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

5-36

• Incentives for 'game-changing' GHG-reducing technologies deployed in fullsized pickups could 

be a significant benefit to natural gas, which is the most viable alternative fuel for this critical 

vehicle segment; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 5]

Game-Changing Pickup Truck Credits

VNG understands the challenges that automakers face in terms of achieving the 2025 standards 

for full-size pickup trucks and we strongly support the Agencies' decision to provide special 

incentives to facilitate the adoption of advanced technologies in this segment. Moreover, we 

believe that the technology-neutral 'performance-based' credit, based on GHG emission 

reductions, is an important option for automakers that could help facilitate the production of 

significant numbers of natural gas-fueled pickups. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 7]

With tailpipe GHG emission reductions from CNG of 24 percent compared to gasoline,23 both 

dedicated and dual-fuel NGV pickups with significant range (assuming use of utility factor 

methodology) are likely to qualify for the 20 percent GHG reduction threshold. Moreover, unlike 

plug-in electric capability, which is not expected to be achievable for this segment due to 

'tradeoffs in terms of cost, electric range, and utility,” dual-fuel natural gas capability is 

particularly well suited to pickups due to the relative ease of incorporating CNG tanks in large 

vehicle envelopes. Indeed, both GM and Chrysler have already announced plans to produce 

NGV pickup trucks this year.25, 26 Due to their significant fuel use and popularity as fleet 

vehicles, the pickup segment can be the base market for the broader development of NGVs. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 7]

Given the importance of the pickup truck segment to maintaining a full range of consumer 

choice, as well as the desirability of moving as many vehicles as possible towards the use of lowemission, alternative fuels, VNG supports the Agencies' consideration of expanding eligibility 

for these credits to include smaller pickup trucks with similar towing capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 8]

We also believe that the minimum penetration thresholds (of 10 percent for the 20 g/mi credit 

and 15-40 percent for the 10 g/mi credit) for all of the game-changing pickup credits should be 

eliminated. Automakers should be encouraged to produce even limited quantities of these 

vehicles, which may be a necessary first step to test consumer acceptance in early years. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 8]

Finally, the Agencies offer no rationale for imposing a five-year limit on the performance-based 

20 g/mi credit for a specific pickup model, where no such limit exists for equivalent hybridelectrics. Given the similar impacts of both hybrids and performance-based credit pickups on 

emissions, as well as the broader importance of facilitating technological evolution in this 

segment, there is no justification for placing special limits on performance-based credits. Thus, 

the 5-year cap should be eliminated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 8]

11 http://online.wsLcom/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-37

23 http://greet.es.anl.gov/results

25 http://www.csnews.com/top-story-cng_the_fuel_alternative_of_the_future-60215.html

26 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-0 1-13/chrysler-to-begin-natural-gas-truck-salesto-fleets-in-2012.html

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Prescribe restrictions on the use of targeted, segment exclusive credits which we predict will 

provide a windfall for competitors marketing high-emitting large trucks and pick-ups. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, letter p. 2]

Expand the range of technologies included within several flexibilities and incentives in order to 

promote the introduction of a broader set of fuel saving, low-emission options. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, letter p. 2]

- Prescribe restrictions on the use of targeted, segment exclusive credits to avoid a windfall for 

competitors marketing high-emitting large trucks and pick-ups; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 4]

c. Broad flexibilities and program credits available to all fleet segments

Continue to build upon the credits and flexibilities provided in the 2012-2016 regulatory 

program. Credits and flexibilities should be equal for passenger cars and light trucks due to 

similar requirements for investment and overall impact on CO2 reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 5]

Further the trading flexibility within and across compliance fleets should be sufficient to cover 

any vehicles with additional challenges in complying with 4%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 5]

e. includes substantial compliance credits that are available for only a limited range of 

technologies, or are available only for specific segments (Full-Size Pick-Up Trucks); and

f. Fails to provide credit mechanisms that would have encouraged greater use of biofuels. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 6]

In addition, in contrast to Volkswagen’s principle of equal credit opportunities across all 

segments, the proposal once again targeted benefits towards larger trucks by providing a 

significant credit opportunity only available to full-size pick-up trucks. Volkswagen contends 

and will describe below how this segment exclusive credit has the potential to create a windfall 

of excess truck credits that can then be transferred to the passenger car segment. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 6]
EPA Response to Comments

5-38

EPA is proposing a suite of CO2 incentives exclusive to full-size pick-up trucks for 2017-2025. 

This flexibility provides 10 or 20 g/mi for hybridization and a separate 10 or 20 g/mi incentive 

for non-hybrid low emitting vehicles. Volkswagen opposes this provision within the NPRM. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 22]

First, as illustrated above in Section 2.6, it is Volkswagen’s position that the full-size truck 

segment is not uniquely challenged by this proposal and that these vehicles do not face a 

disproportionately more stringent requirement than other segments. Again we refer to Table 2-7 

above which summarizes the continuing minimal reduction requirements for large trucks. [See 

Table 2-7 on p. 19 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 22]

The Joint TSD indicates an approximate effectiveness for mild and P2 hybridization for large 

trucks on the order of 8-15%. Section 2.6 described an example full-size pick-up truck from the 

RIA (Chapter 3) which was 4% above its MY2017 target of 347 g/mi (72ft2 footprint target). 

This includes estimated A/C credits which according to Table III-2 in the NPRM amount to 12 

g/mi. Strong hybridization would provide 56 g/mi (estimated TSD effectives of 15%) reduction 

captured in the two-cycle city/highway test used for compliance. According to the definition for 

Mild and Strong hybrid within the full-size truck credit section, these vehicles must be equipped 

with stop/start technology. Stop/Start technology is also being rewarded an additional 4.5 g/mi 

under the off-cycle technology 'list'. There is no stipulation in the rule that vehicles claiming the 

Full-size Truck hybrid credit cannot also claim the start/stop off-cycle credits even though one is 

required for the other. Therefore we must assume that the credit available is actually 14.5 or 24.5 

g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 22]

As summarized in Table 2-8 this hybridized pick-up would earn upwards of 67.5 g/mi credits 

beyond its footprint target (0.3% stringency from 2016) which if transferred to the passenger car 

fleet would be inflated through VMT to upwards of 77 g/mi. [See Table 2-8 on p. 23 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 22]

This calculation does not include further conventional technology improvements which in 

Section 2.6 illustrated that hybridization would not even be necessary for this vehicle to comply. 

Hybridization of the truck would require a significant investment by the manufacturer and the 

reward in credits is warranted, however in this case the full-size truck credit (in addition to the 

accompanying stop/start credit) amounts to an excessive pool of credits that can be transferred to 

other market segments, including smaller trucks and/or passenger cars. This transfer of excess 

credits may result in a CO2 disbenefit to the extent that the credit transfer reduces the need for 

other segments, many of which face more stringent reductions with fewer qualifying credits 6, to 

make improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 23]

Figure 2-10 illustrates the transfer and maximum potential tailpipe emissions that a 45ft2 

footprint passenger car could have and still remain compliant. Credit transfers will extend the 

reach of the large truck reduced stringency and full-size truck incentives to smaller trucks, or 

passenger cars. Manufacturers with significant quantities of large trucks may accumulate a 

windfall of credits which can then offset the CO2 reduction obligations for their remaining 

smaller truck and car fleet. Companies that do not manufacture large pick-ups will be obligated 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-39

to meet the passenger car targets without the benefit of these offsetting credits. [See Figure 2-10 

on p. 24 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 23]

A car receiving the full transfer of credits from the full-size truck could theoretically retain 

tailpipe emission levels in excess of 300 g/mi. This is higher than 2012 MY standards by a 

significant margin. Even in a case where only the full-size truck credit and stop/start credit were 

transferred to the car fleet (28 g/mi VMT adjusted), the car’s tailpipe level could reach 252 g/mi 

and remain compliant. This is less than the 2013 target. In this scenario the passenger car would 

be able to compete in the marketplace against other vehicles with a 40 g/mi investment 

advantage. This could result in that vehicle having a significant sales price advantage relative to 

other segment competitors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 24]

This not only detracts from program CO2 goals, but also amounts to an economic advantage for 

manufacturers of large trucks. The full-size truck credit does not represent real-world CO2

reductions and in fact may offset real world CO2 savings in other segments. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 24]

This means that the flexibility must be judged in light of the economics instead of environmental 

benefits. This is contrary to some of the other credits being offered within the program. 

Volkswagen does recognize that the same argument can be made with respect to credits being 

provided for electrified vehicles through the EV multiplier. However, in light of the economics 

context, we do note that EPA’s cost estimates for plug-in electrification (either full EV or PHEV) 

far exceeds EPA’s cost estimates for mild or even strong (P2) hybridization. The extent of 

investment needed to take advantage of the EV multiplier far outweighs the investment that 

would be required for a manufacturer to equip a vehicle with an open bed and regenerative 

braking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 24]

In addition, EPA has cast the credit flexibility as incentivizing 'game-changing' technologies. 

Volkswagen disagrees with this notion and believes that this terminology is misleading. 

Hybridization of any vehicle remains an expensive and challenging technical endeavor, but we 

feel that this is equally true amongst all vehicle classes. Employing the term, 'game changing', 

leads one to believe that the technology has never before been attempted or that there has been a 

leap forward in capability to somehow make the technology significantly more effective in its 

application 7. We fail to see how regenerative braking on a vehicle with an open bed represents a 

“leap forward” in automotive technology, at least to the extent that it is awarded such a generous 

credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 24-25]

As previously discussed in Section 2.6, Volkswagen’s analysis of a market leading full-size truck 

indicated that the need to award additional, segment exclusive credits is unwarranted. Even 

without the available HEV incentive, a modest application of low-cost conventional technologies 

to this sample vehicle resulted in a significant pool of credits being generated. This is the simply 

the result of large trucks being provided with a low stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 25]
EPA Response to Comments

5-40

EPA has stated that in the aggregate they predict the full-size truck credits will have around 1 

g/mi impact on the overall industry truck compliance. However, Volkswagen is concerned with 

the effect that large truck credit windfalls may have when examining the implications at the 

manufacturer level. Although EPA’s assessment at the industry level may seem insignificant, at 

the manufacturer level, the level at which we compete, the truck credits may provide significant 

company level advantages. Figure 2-11 shows the disparity in vehicle composition between 

competitors in the marketplace. The manufacturer on the left has a truck heavy fleet composed of 

upwards of 25-30% of a single full-size pick-up model. Clearly the full-size truck benefits would 

provide an economic and competitive benefit for this manufacturer. Volkswagen’s fleet 

illustrated on the right side of Figure 2-11 is dominated by low-emitting small and medium sized 

passenger cars, both of which are subjected to the more stringent standard without the benefit of 

truck credits. [Figure 2-11 can be found on p. 25 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 25]

In some cases, there are some manufacturers who sell more full-size pick-up trucks than 

passenger cars combined. In comparison, the majority of Volkswagen’s sales are passenger cars. 

This segment faces the higher 5% stringency without the benefit of segment specific credits. In 

addition, the car segment is awarded fewer credits than trucks in A/C and off-cycle 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 26]

It is not a stretch to imagine that manufacturers with pick-up focused fleets will easily be able to 

accumulate credits from both the lower stringency and available additional flexibilities. These 

credits can be transferred to offset investment in CO2 reducing technologies for other segments, 

in turn reducing the price for consumers. This is not a transfer of real CO2 from an overcompliant vehicle to under-compliant vehicle, but rather an economic transfer. Manufacturers 

who are not marketing full-size trucks will be offered no such economic benefit. Although 

Volkswagen understands that it is EPA’s intention through this credit to help full-size trucks 

comply, we certainly do not believe it is EPA’s intention to expand the number of OEMs 

marketing full-size pick-up trucks. Regardless that may very well be the result. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 26]

5 S/S is Off-cycle credit for stop/start technology. S/S is a necessary technology for qualification 

for Mild and Strong HEV under the full-size pick-up credits. Valued at 4.5 g/mi for trucks.

6 VW notes that not only are full-size trucks qualified for the 'game-changing' credits, but also 

qualify for higher credits under the A/C and off-cycle programs. This further compounds the 

inequity.

7 An immediate example of 'game changing' technology may be the introduction by Cadillac of 

the electric starter which opened up vehicle operation and ownership to people regardless of 

physical strength and free from the fear of injury.

Response:
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

5-41

Comments For and Against the Credit Program

Most of the commenters supported the large truck credit concept. ICCT, Volkswagen, 

and CBD opposed adopting the proposed incentive, arguing that this vehicle segment is not 

especially challenged by the proposed standards, that hybrid systems would readily transfer to it 

from other vehicle classes, and that the credit essentially amounts to an economic advantage for 

manufacturers of large trucks. CBD also commented that this credit should not be adopted, since 

they believe hybrid technology should be forced by aggressive standards rather than encouraged 

through regulatory incentives. Some environmental organizations also expressed concern about 

the real-world impacts of offering this credit, and suggested various ways to tailor it to ensure 

that fuel savings and emissions reductions associated with it are genuine. 

Arguments made by commenters for not adopting the large truck technology credit are 

not convincing. Although there may not be inherent reasons for a lack of hybrid technology 

migration to large trucks, it is clear that this migration has nevertheless been slow to materialize 

for practical/economic reasons, including in-use duty demands and customer expectations. 

These issues still need to be addressed by the designers of large pickups to successfully introduce 

these technologies in these trucks, and we believe that assistance in the form of a focused, welldefined incentive program is warranted.

CBD expressed concern about how well the credits correspond to the actual 

improvements obtained. As in past EPA incentive programs aimed at encouraging advanced 

technology several years into the future, this is very difficult to assess quantitatively ahead of 

time. We discuss the value of incentive programs such as this one in response to comments 

regarding “level playing field” and short-term vs. long-term benefits of incentives in section 2 of 

this document, and in response to comments regarding the value of temporary regulatory 

incentives in section 4 of this document. We note too that, beyond its value in encouraging 

advanced technology in the full-size pickup truck sector, this credit program has added potential 

benefits because of the possibility of migrating the technology to even larger trucks. (See the 

heavy-duty vehicle GHG final rule for discussion of incentives to encourage the introduction of 

hybrid heavy-duty trucks—76 FR 57106, September 15, 2011.) The concerns expressed by 

Volkswagen and ICCT that the pool of credits generated by hybrid trucks will be excessive, and 

may result in an overall CO2 disbenefit and significant delay in technology introduction to other 

sectors, also seem unwarranted. The relatively small size of the full-size truck fleet compared to 

the rest of the light-duty sector, combined with our criteria for qualifying for the credits, limits 

the likelihood of a flood of market-shifting credits into the lighter vehicle sectors. Obviously, 

manufacturers who do not make full-size trucks will not be able to earn credits, but we believe 

the controls we are exercising in implementing the program (minimum production thresholds, 

truck definitions, limited model years, and performance criteria, etc.) serve to carefully target the 

incentives without creating undue advantages.

Our targeting this incentive program to full-size trucks is based on the challenge of 

applying the advanced technologies to them. As evidence that this challenge is substantial, we 

point to the fact that two companies ranking among the leaders in automotive hybrid technology, 

Ford and Toyota, have found it helpful to team up and work jointly on developing truck and 
EPA Response to Comments

5-42

SUV hybrid technology over a multi-year span.13 We also highlight Chrysler’s comments that a 

major part of the challenge is applying advanced technologies in a way that preserves a truck’s 

utility and accounts for added costs (as considered in the feasibility analysis for this rulemaking), 

both of which are critical for purchaser acceptance. The acceptance issues are especially 

important for large truck hybrids because the smaller engines that facilitate much of a hybrid’s 

benefit are typically at odds with the importance some pickup truck buyers place on engine 

horsepower and torque, whatever the vehicle’s real performance.

The U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars questioned the granting of credits for 

hybrid technology, relying as it does on stop-start and regenerative braking technologies, in light 

of the lack of data on full-size pickup truck driving patterns. We agree that driving pattern data 

specifically for these large trucks are not plentiful, but do not agree with the implication that the 

trucks are driven extensively without sufficient braking and stopping activity so as not to warrant 

application of hybrid technology (and by extension that the credit would not reflect real-world 

environmental benefit). For example, many of these trucks are owned by urban and suburban 

small businesses engaged in construction, home maintenance, lawncare and the like, with daily 

travel activities involving frequent slowing and stopping. Full-size truck use on farms would 

also involve non-highway patterns requiring substantial braking. Furthermore, should hybrid

technology, added at considerable cost, not yield real-world fuel consumption benefits for 

purchasers, it is doubtful that manufacturers would pursue it simply to gain credits. 

By way of clarification prompted by the Coalition’s comments, both the hybrid and 

performance-based credits are equally available for vehicles of all fuel types, including diesel. 

The Coalition also expressed concern that the program does nothing to discourage a “horsepower 

war” among the full-size truck manufacturers, exacerbated by the need for the trucks to carry the 

added weight of battery packs. In response we note that the standards remain on a gram per mile 

basis, so any future increases in horsepower for reasons related to curb weight or marketing will 

not make it easier to comply under our program— the footprint-based standard applies without 

regard to horsepower, and likewise the credit amount does not depend on horsepower.

Definition for Large Pickup Trucks and Extension of Credits to Smaller Vehicles

Some OEM commenters argued that these credits should be extended to other vehicles 

such as SUVs and minivans. We believe that doing so would greatly expand, and therefore 

dilute, the intended credit focus. The agencies do not believe it is necessary to provide such 

incentives for application of hybrid technology in these additional categories, beyond what is 

appropriate to account for off-cycle performance, or that the performance levels required of nonhybrid technologies eligible for credits are of such stringency that extending credits to all or most 

light-duty trucks would amount to anything more than a de facto lowering of overall program 

stringency. Although commenters rightly pointed out that some of these non-truck vehicles do 

have substantial towing capacity, most of them are not much used as towing vehicles, in contrast 

 13 “Ford, Toyota to Collaborate on Developing New Hybrid System for Light Trucks, SUVs; Future 

Telematics Standards”, http://toyotanewsroom.com/releases/ford+toyota+hybrid+trucks+suvs+telematics.htm, 

August 22, 2011.
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

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to full-size pickup trucks that often serve as work vehicles.14 Moreover, the smaller footprint 

vehicles fall on the lower part of the light-duty truck curve, and so have a higher rate of 

improvement (in stringency) than the larger trucks, thus making them more comparable to cars in 

terms of technology access and effectiveness. See preamble section III.D.7.

Mercedes-Benz suggested that the small car market (vehicles with footprints of 40 square 

feet or less) is also challenging for hybrid technology, for reasons of cost and architecture, and 

deserving of similar credit opportunities. Our expectation is that the primary barrier to hybrids in 

this market, the cost of hybrid technology compared to typical vehicle prices, is likely to 

diminish as battery costs decline over time. We do not believe that extension of the full-size 

truck credit program into this small car sector would be especially helpful in this regard. This 

differs from the large truck challenge where others factors such as preserving utility for work 

applications and purchaser acceptance are also key.

EPA sought comment on extending the pickup truck credits to smaller pickup trucks, 

specifically to those with narrower beds, down to 42 inches, but still with towing capability 

comparable to large trucks. This request for comment produced mixed reactions among truck 

manufacturers, and some argued that EPA should go further and drop the bed size limit entirely. 

ICCT and CBD strongly opposed any extension of the provision’s scope to smaller bed trucks, 

arguing that adopting the 42” bed width criterion would allow virtually all pickup trucks to 

qualify, thereby distorting technology requirements and reducing the benefits of the rule. 

Beyond a general expression of support, there were no detailed comments backing the narrower 

bed width limit. 

Chrysler commented that the proposed payload and towing capability minimums are too 

restrictive, making a sizeable number of Ram 1500 configurations ineligible to earn credits. 

However, the company provided no sales information to enable the agencies to reassess this 

issue. Moreover, the agencies did not premise the proposed incentive on every full-size truck 

configuration being eligible. Manufacturers typically offer a variety of truck options to suit 

varied customer needs in the work and recreational truck markets, and the fact that one 

manufacturer (or more) markets to applications lacking the towing and payload demands of the 

core group of vehicles in this segment does not, in the agencies’ view, justify a revision of the 

hauling requirements that were a fundamental consideration in establishing the credit.

Definitions for Strong and Mild Hybrids

EPA received a number of manufacturer comments on these proposed definitions. Some 

industry commenters objected to EPA’s characterization of the credit provisions as applying to 

hybrid “gasoline-electric” vehicles. We agree that this would be an overly narrow 

characterization, and are clarifying that the provisions also apply to non-gasoline (including 

diesel-, ethanol-, and CNG-fueled) hybrids. However, further extension to hybrids employing 

non-electric battery storage (including hydraulic-, capacitive-, and mechanical-energy storage),

as urged by commenters such as EcoMotors, is complicated by the difficulty in developing 

regulatory procedures for all conceivable energy-storage media. We believe that these 

 14 The 2011 segmentation and trend information provided in Ford’s written comments demonstrates the 

ongoing trend toward greater use of full-size trucks for work purposes.
EPA Response to Comments

5-44

technologies are not hampered in participating in the large truck credit program because 

manufacturers using these technologies can utilize the alternative, performance-based pathway to 

gain the credits (assuming significant emissions reductions).

Ford, Toyota, and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers suggested improvements to 

the proposed procedure for determining whether hybrid technology is categorized as strong, 

mild, or having energy recovery too minimal to warrant credits. Most importantly, they argued 

that the proposed approach improperly integrated energy contributions over the entire city cycle 

FTP, thereby capturing more than just the intended recovered braking energy and creating an 

opportunity for gaming through tailoring of the direct addition of energy from the engine. They 

offered alternative procedures and corresponding recovered energy threshold levels based on 

energy input only during decelerations, with the recovery efficiency cutpoint between strong and 

mild hybrids correspondingly reduced from 75% to 40%. Chrysler maintained that a 75% 

energy recovery rate would be challenging for large pickups, even using the proposed procedure,

because of the need to design the braking system for maximum payload and trailer capability 

while maintaining drivability in the absence of loads. Chrysler’s specific recommendation was 

for a cutpoint of 50% energy recovery rate. Ford and Toyota also suggested an additional metric 

for qualifying strong HEVs – that at least 10% of the total tractive energy during positive 

accelerations on the FTP must be from the electric drive with the engine off.

As discussed in detail in section 5.3.3 of the TSD, we have evaluated these concerns and 

the suggested changes and have concluded that the proposed metric remains adequate for our 

purposes, and furthermore has the advantage of being simpler and easier to measure than other 

metrics. However, based on the comments received from Chrysler and follow-up testing 

described in section 5.3.3 of the TSD, showing that the only large hybrid truck currently 

marketed would not satisfy the proposed 75% metric, we believe that 65% is a more appropriate 

threshold for defining strong hybrid energy recovery, and so are adopting this threshold in the 

final regulations. We are retaining the proposed 15% threshold for mild hybrid energy recovery;

we received no comments opposing this threshold. 

Other commenters suggested dropping the hybrid-specific metric altogether, in favor of a 

CO2 performance-based metric instead, effectively removing the hybrid-specific credit. We 

favor retaining the hybrid-specific metric in addition to the more general performance-based 

credit option, because it more directly focuses the performance demonstration on the degree of 

hybrid technology utilization (a known technology with clear promise), while still making room 

for other technologies, including any innovations still beyond the horizon, through the 

performance-based credit option. In response to the Diesel Coalition’s comments, the efficiency 

gains (which correspond to reductions in CO2 and fuel consumption) from hybrid vehicles are 

discussed in section 3.3.3 of the Joint TSD.

Ford, Toyota, and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers also recommended a 

number of edits and technical changes to the proposed hybrid procedures and equations: 

clarification of plus and minus current flows, dropping of incorrect use of battery state of charge, 

corrected references to other regulation paragraphs, spelling corrections, correction of conflicting 

nomenclature and units, and use of measured rather than scheduled speed traces. These changes 

are reflected in Section 5.3.3 of the Joint TSD and in the final regulatory text. Also, in response 
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

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to comments requesting clarification of how nominal voltage is determined, we are defining 

nominal voltage as described in section 5.3.3 of the Joint TSD.

Volkswagen is correct that use of stop-start technology has significance under both the 

off-cycle and full-size truck credit provisions. However, each of these credit programs has its 

own additional criteria that must be met (such as proof of off-cycle performance, minimum 

hybrid sales thresholds, and demonstration of hybrid regenerative braking performance). 

Furthermore, the inclusion of stop-start capability in the hybrid pickup truck definition is 

intended to help distinguish what is and is not a hybrid. In this broad context it is not meant to 

be viewed in isolation, as though it justified a portion of the full-size pickup truck credit all by 

itself and could thereby be construed as double-counted. In fact, of the criteria for qualifying as 

a hybrid, it is of lesser importance than the recovered energy threshold. This contrasts with the 

focus of the off-cycle credit for stop-start technology which does not consider energy recovery 

and usage. Volkswagen also expressed the view that simply introducing regenerative braking on 

open bed trucks does not comprise a leap forward in automotive technology worthy of credits. 

We have taken care to adopt meaningful and verifiable criteria for hybrid performance, truck 

size, and market penetration, to ensure that the credits earned are justified by the technical and 

marketing challenges involved rather than a superficial offering of a niche product claiming to 

use hybrid technology. 

We disagree with MEMA’s view that the credit program’s definitions of mild and strong 

hybrids are too dependent on hybrid architecture. We proposed and are adopting definitions that 

are not specific to hybrid architecture, and are intentionally kept as simple and technologyneutral as reasonably possible. More broadly, a number of commenters contended that our 

proposed hybrid credit program effectively amounted to picking technology or fuel-type 

“winners and losers”. We believe that the above-discussed clarification regarding inclusion of 

non-gasoline hybrids, as well as the inclusion of the two performance-based credit options (with 

identical credit amounts as the hybrid provisions), delivers a program that is fundamentally fueland technology-neutral. We note in response to comments from the natural gas industry in 

particular that, in addition to the natural gas vehicle multiplier, full-size natural gas pickup trucks 

are eligible for both the hybrid and performance-based credits in the same way that gasoline 

vehicles are.

Minimum Market Penetration Thresholds

EPA received comments from NRDC in support of the proposed minimum penetration 

thresholds. Adverse comments came primarily from manufacturers arguing that the thresholds

should be reduced or eliminated. These commenters felt that the requirements run counter to the 

agencies’ goal of creating incentives for technology introduction, because they add uncertainty 

over whether the investment in a technology, a commitment that is made years ahead of time, 

will reap the credits if sales fall short of the minimum in a model year. These commenters also 

noted that new technologies are often phased in at rates lower than the proposed minimum 

penetration rates in order to gauge consumer interest and acceptance. GM specifically objected 

to the proposed rapid ramp up of the mild hybrid penetration rate as not being aligned with 

historic rates of customer acceptance of new and/or advanced technologies. GM requested that 

the levels be instead cut in half to match those proposed for the “15 percent better” performancebased credits. 
EPA Response to Comments

5-46

Our reason for setting ambitious market penetration thresholds remains-- our goal is to 

create an incentive for manufacturers to commit to the large-scale application of hybrids and 

other advanced technologies in the challenging large truck sector and specifically that at least 

mild hybrid or comparable technology becomes a standard technology feature for large pickup 

trucks. Eliminating or greatly tempering the minimum penetration requirements might retain the 

incentive for niche applications but would lose any assurance of widespread “game-changing” 

technology introduction and substantial penetration. We do agree with comments that the 

ambitious penetration levels proposed for mild hybrid credits in the initial model years may be 

counter-productive, as launching a complex new technology on almost a third of first-year sales 

could be a risky business strategy in this highly competitive large truck market segment. As a 

result, we are scaling this requirement back to 20 and 30% in model years 2017 and 2018 

(compared to the proposed levels of 30 and 40% in MY 2017 and 2018, respectively), to help 

facilitate the smooth introduction of mild hybrid technology. However, we are retaining the 

substantial penetration requirements that were proposed for later model years to maintain our 

focus on encouraging this technology to be more or less standard on large trucks. We note that a 

manufacturer that is unable to meet these penetration requirements may continue to generate 

credits through the 2021 model year for mild hybrid trucks under the performance-based credit 

option, assuming the less aggressive penetration threshold requirements for the performancebased credit provision are satisfied. 

Concerns that consumer acceptance uncertainty existing today makes it challenging for 

manufacturers to plan for the sales ramp-ups required under the thresholds are reasonable, but 

the large ramp-ups are only required for the less risky credit options – mild hybrid and 15% 

performance improvement – and we feel that such widespread penetration of these more modest 

technologies is far from out of reach in this timeframe. The issue also tends to be self-limiting; 

that is, even if we were to entirely drop the thresholds, marginal sales would yield only marginal 

credit production and thereby make the credit program inconsequential for a manufacturer.

Toyota’s view that maximum sales thresholds are more appropriate than minimum sales 

thresholds because credits are not warranted once a technology has largely phased in is, we 

believe, better addressed through the limiting of credit availability to certain model years, and to 

a shorter period (through MY 2021) for the less challenging credit options.

Credit Fungibility and Available Model Years

Volkswagen commented that any HEV or performance-based credits generated by large 

trucks should not be transferable to other vehicle segments, arguing that if compliance for the 

large truck segment is really as challenging as predicted, there should be no excess of credits to 

transfer anyway. This may be the case, but we do not agree that it argues for restricting the use 

of large pickup truck credits. We think the sizeable technology hurdle involved and the limited 

model years in which credits are available preclude the potential for credit windfalls. 

Furthermore, neither the size of the large truck market nor the level of the per-vehicle credit are 

so substantial that they could lead to a large pool of credits capable of skewing the competition 

in the lighter vehicle market. As described in Preamble Section III.D, EPA will continue to 

monitor the net level of credit transfers from cars to trucks and vice versa in the MYs 2017-2025 

timeframe.
Advanced Technology Credits for Full-Size Pickup Trucks

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ICCT opposed allowing vehicle models that earn performance-based credits in one year 

to continue receiving them in subsequent years as the increasingly more stringent standards 

progressively diminish the vehicle’s performance margin compared to the standard. We view the 

incentive over the longer term, as a multi-year package, intending it to encourage investment in 

lasting technology shifts. The fact that it is somewhat easier to exceed performance targets by 15 

or 20% in the earlier years, when the bar is set lower, and, once earned, to retain that benefit for a 

fixed number of years (provided sales remain strong), works to focus the credit as intended—on 

creating an incentive for the introduction of new technology as early in the program as possible. 

The mild hybrid credit is available only through MY 2021 because the penetration threshold is 

high enough by then (80%) to essentially constitute fleetwide application of the technology.

VNG questioned the 5-year limit on availability of the 20 g/mi performance-based credit, 

given that the corresponding strong hybrid credit has no such limit. The 5-year limit is intended 

to deal with the general nature of the performance-based credit, which does not involve any 

requirement to identify what technology package is being applied to earn the credit. The vehicle 

design may evolve somewhat in this 5-year period (corresponding to a typical redesign cycle) 

without voiding the credit, unless CO2 emissions increase. A major vehicle redesign triggers 

eligibility for a new 5-year eligibility period (but not past the 2025 model year). No such 

artificial construct is needed in the case of hybrids, as the “game changing” technology being 

introduced (hybrid-electric) is clear.

We agree with MEMA that, although full-size pickup truck technology credits are not 

available in model years 2014-2016, credit for “early compliance” is provided in that these 

pickups can still generate credits like any other vehicle in model years 2014-2016, and these 

credits can be carried forward and used in later model years.

Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-1

6. GHG Emissions Compliance Treatment of Plug-In Hybrid Electric, 

Compressed Natural Gas, Ethanol, Diesel, and Other Alternative 

Fueled Vehicles, and CAFE Issues

Introduction

EPA received a very large set of comments with respect to issues associated with the 

compliance treatment for vehicles that can run on fuels other than gasoline. Section 4 addresses 

those comments that primarily focus on specific issues associated with GHG emissions 

incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. This section addresses those comments that primarily 

relate to the use of utility factors for PHEVs, as well as all comments that primarily focus on

compressed natural gas, ethanol, diesel, and other alternative fuels. In this section, the comments 

are divided into five sub-sections: PHEVs (6.1), CNG (6.2), ethanol (6.3), diesel (6.4), and other 

alternative fuels and miscellaneous comments (6.5). In addition, there is a sixth sub-section (6.6) 

that contains no unique comments, but which addresses issues that are relevant to multiple fuels, 

including CAFE issues (issues discussed here are often included in comments throughout the rest 

of this section). Many comments raise issues relevant to multiple sub-sections of this section as 

well as to Section 4, so readers interested in a comprehensive treatment of comments on 

alternative fuel vehicles should read the comments and responses in both sections, as well as the 

relevant preamble discussions. In addition, comments related to gasoline fuel quality in general, 

and to ethanol/gasoline blends in particular, are addressed in Section 11.

6.1. Plug-In Electric Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

For PHEVs, EPA proposes to use cycle-specific utility factors (UFs) for determining electricity 

use (NPRM p.75018), which we support. EPA also references the fuel economy and 

environmental labeling rule in this context, which raises questions about the details of the 

approach. First, an important step in calculating realistic UFs is applying the shortfall correction 

to the fuel economy test values, or more specifically the miles traveled in charge depleting mode. 

While this is part of the calculation used for labeling purposes, EPA does not indicate in the 

NPRM that any such adjustment is to be made for purposes of the fuel economy and GHG 

emissions rule. While we understand that the EPA does not contemplate switching to “real-
EPA Response to Comments

6-2

world” emissions rates for purposes of this rule, failure to adjust charge-depleting range will lead 

to utility factors that are far too high. Also, while the labeling rule uses Multi-Day Individual 

Utility Factors (MDIUFs), this rule should instead use the lower Fleet UFs, which will better 

capture the expected use of petroleum by the fleet of PHEVs. Information on the values of the 

UFs used to evaluate the performance of each PHEV model under the rule should be publically 

available. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.9]

EPA proposes a lower bound of 10.2 miles for the “all-electric range” of a PHEV to receive the 

special treatment accorded to EVs (for electric operation only). While we do not object to this 

proposal, we believe that, to be treated as an FFV for CAFE purposes prior to 2020, this range is 

not sufficient. A PHEV with an all-electric range of 10 miles has a UF of under 25 percent, yet 

would be treated for CAFE purposes as if it were driven half of the time on electricity.

Moreover, CAFE credits generated by PHEV FFVs, unlike those generated by FFVs of other 

types, are not capped. Hence PHEVs should only be treated as FFVs if they can be expected to 

drive half the time on electricity. On the other hand, PHEVs that drive more than half the time on 

electricity would be disadvantaged by their treatment as FFVs. This problems would best be 

solved by advancing the use of UFs to determine the fuel economy of PHEVs to MY2017. EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.9]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Comments on the Proposed Approach to Measure Compliance with Fuel Economy and GHG 

Standards for Dual-Fuel CNG vehicles

EPA and NHTSA note that the statutory incentive for dual-fueled vehicles in 49 U.S.C 32906 

and the measurement methodology specified in 49 U.S.C 32905 (b) and (d) expire in MY 2019 

and request comment on proposed options going forward. The agencies are proposing to directly 

extend the PHEV utility factor methodology to dual-fuel CNG vehicles, using the same 

assumptions about daily refueling. Under the utility factor approach, the vehicle range on the 

alternative fuel would be used to estimate the fraction of average daily travel that the range 

represents based on SAE Standard J2841. For example, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) 

with an all-electric range of 40 miles would be assigned a utility factor of 0.617, while a dualfuel natural gas vehicle (NGV) with a range on natural gas of 150 miles would be assigned a 

utility factor of 0.925. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]

We have several concerns with this proposed approach. First, it relies on the implicit assumption 

that the driving behavior of owners/operators of PHEVs is identical to that of owners/operators 

of dual-fuel CNG vehicles; an assumption which we do not believe is (or has been) demonstrably 

supported by any underlying data, yet should be. (A related question is whether the driving 

behavior and vehicle use characteristics of that element of the population sometimes termed 

“early technology adopters” is similar to, or different than, the “national average” database of 

travel characteristics from which the Utility Factors were created.)13 Second, although the use of 

the utility factor is an improvement over the simple 50/50 split used previously, this approach

inherently assumes that the vehicle begins each day with a full state of charge (PHEVs) or a full 

natural gas tank (NGVs). It is unclear that this will occur in practice, and it may significantly 

overestimate the calculated benefits of the alternative fuel. Additionally, the vehicle range on the 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-3

alternative fuel is established based on 2-cycle testing (i.e., the FTP and the highway fuel 

economy test) that is used to determine compliance with the CAFE and GHG standards. This 

clearly overestimates the range on the alternative fuel, and the proposed rule should be revised to 

reflect real-world vehicle range based on 5-cycle test results or other data that better represent 

real-world performance. This is not at all inconsistent with the use of 2-cycle tests for CAFE and 

GHG emissions compliance, as the real-world range would only be used to establish the 

appropriate utility factor, which, in turn, was based on real-world driving statistics. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, pp. 6-7]

Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association (EDTA)

4. Use of SAE J2841 to Determine Utility Factor for PHEVs

EPA is proposing to use the utility factor methodology developed by the Society of Automotive 

Engineers (SAE) in the publication SAE J2841, “Utility Factor Definitions for Plug-In Hybrid 

Electric Vehicles Using Travel Survey Data”(Sept. 2010). EPA first adopted SAE J2841 in its 

July 2011 final rule on vehicle labeling requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 7]

EDTA recognizes the need for a utility factor as a means of estimating the portion of the driving 

cycle that involves electric-only operation. EDTA supports using the utility factor methodology 

adopted by the SAE in the publication J2841. EDTA also supports use of a unique utility factor 

for each vehicle model, taking into account the characteristics of the vehicle and the expecting 

operating and charging behavior of the users of that type of vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9449-A1, p. 7]

EDTA urges EPA to ensure that each manufacturer is given an appropriate opportunity to 

provide input into the development of the utility factor for that manufacturer’s PHEV models, 

including notice of the proposed utility factor and an opportunity to submit comments prior to 

final adoption of that utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Support the continued use of the utility factor (UF) approach in calculating GHGs and support 

the adoption of this approach for CAFE calculation as proposed

Fisker believes the utility factor approach is a fair means of weighting the fraction of driving 

performed in electric and gasoline modes. We believe this approach is based on a more robust set 

of assumptions than the current 50-50 weighting in the dual-fuel vehicle approach used currently 

by CAFE standards, so we encourage the application of the utility factor to CAFE standards as 

soon as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

On Page 75018, Col. 2 of the NPRM, “Based on this utility factor approach, EPA calculates the 

GHG emissions compliance value for an individual PHEV as the sum of (1) the GHG emissions 

value for electric operation ... multiplied by the utility factor, and (2) the tailpipe CO2 emissions 
EPA Response to Comments

6-4

value on gasoline multiplied by (1 minus the utility factor).” Please confirm in the final rule that 

where a PHEV has a diesel engine, that the calculation would also apply to diesel. In other 

words, it is not just limited to gasoline. If that is indeed the case, the agencies should consider 

revising that to read “gasoline/diesel.” (Please refer to Section VIII.C. for explanation.) [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.12]

Response:

Issues related to incentives for PHEVs are discussed in Section 4. This sub-section addresses 

issues related to EPA’s adoption of utility factors to weight electricity and gasoline GHG 

emissions in PHEV compliance calculations.

See Preamble Section III.C.4.a.i for a discussion of why the Agency is adopting the cyclespecific fleet-based utility factors as developed by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). 

Commenters raised a few additional issues that were not addressed in Preamble Section 

III.C.4.a.i.

ACEEE and API suggested that PHEV utility factors should be based on 5-cycle range rather 

than 2-cycle range. EPA agrees that this would be a reasonable approach, but EPA is retaining 

the 2-cycle basis at this time because the limited real-world data on electricity and gasoline 

operation from the Chevrolet Volt suggests that the utility factors based on 2-cycle range appear 

to be closer to the real world experience than lower utility factors based on 5-cycle range. Range 

is just one of many assumptions involved in the utility factor methodology, and EPA commits to 

monitoring real world data from PHEV operation to evaluate the overall appropriateness of the 

SAE utility factors based on 2-cycle range.

EDTA suggested a notice and opportunity process for EPA calculation of PHEV utility 

factors. While EPA believes it is neither necessary nor efficient to implement a formal notice and 

opportunity process, EPA does commit to working closely with manufacturers to explain how we 

apply the utility factor regulations to individual vehicles.

Finally, in response to the MEMA comment, EPA will develop GHG emissions compliance 

values for all PHEVs the same way, regardless of whether the PHEV internal combustion engine 

operates on gasoline, diesel, or any other fuel.

6.2. Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

American Clean Skies Foundation (ACSF)

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

American Petroleum Institute (API)

American Public Gas Association (APGA)
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-5

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Chrysler Group LLC

Clean Energy

Edison Electric Institute (EEI)

Encana Natural Gas Inc.

Ford Motor Company

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

NGV America

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

Toyota Motor North America

Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

VNG Co. (VNG)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Dual-Fuel CNG and LPG Gasoline Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.69]

CNG and LPG vehicles are another option that our country has to diversify the vehicle fleet and 

use a domestically available energy source. The Alliance supports the development of a utility 

factor approach very similar to the SAE standard mentioned above for PHEVs. The Alliance is 

also in favor of the option to allow manufacturers to use the proposed utility factor-based 

methodology as a “pull-ahead” option for MYs 2012-2015. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.69]

Based on the added cost of the vehicle technology and the cost advantage of using CNG and 

LPG fuel relative to gasoline, customers that purchase a dual-fuel CNG or LPG vehicle will, to 

the extent possible, use the intended alternative fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.69]

Many companies may leverage global designs in developing dual-fuel CNG and LPG vehicles 

for the U.S. market. It is important that the variety of global design features available be allowed 

into the U.S. market. Rather than making specific design requirements in the rules, a better 

approach would be have these design features be factors in the calculation of the CNG and LPG 

utility factors. The Alliance would like to propose a work group to discuss the constraints 

mentioned in the NPRM for dual-fuel CNG and LPG vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.69]

In the NPRM, EPA specifically requested comments on the merits of providing sales multiplier 

(similar to the EV/PHEV incentives) for dedicated and/or dual-fuel compressed natural gas 

vehicles. The Alliance believes CNG and LPG technology also deserve multipliers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.69]
EPA Response to Comments

6-6

Organization: America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

I. NATURAL GAS VEHICLES FULFILL EACH OF THE GOALS OF THIS PROGRAM

The Presidential Memorandum calling for this program stated that its goals were “to improve 

fuel efficiency and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of passenger cars and light-duty trucks of 

model years 2017–2025’’, and thus take advantage of an “opportunity to lead the world in the 

development of a new generation of clean cars and trucks through innovative technologies and 

manufacturing that will spur economic growth and create high-quality domestic jobs, enhance 

our energy security, and improve our environment.’’ Presidential Memorandum Regarding Fuel 

Efficiency Standards, May 21, 2010, as cited in 76 FR 74862. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-

A1, p. 2]

Cognizant of this opportunity, EPA and NHTSA throughout the Light Duty Rule emphasize the 

importance of the economic impact of these regulations, noting, e.g., that they will “achieve 

important reductions in GHG emissions and fuel consumption from the light duty vehicle part of 

the transportation sector, based on technologies that either are commercially available or that the 

agencies project will be commercially available in the rulemaking timeframe and that can be 

incorporated at a reasonable cost.” 76 FR 74858. See also id. at 74859-60 (same); id. at 74962 

(“This proposal provides important benefits to society and consumers in the form of reduced 

emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), reduced consumption of oil, and fuel savings for 

consumers, all at reasonable costs.”) Indeed, the agencies estimate that the benefits of this 

program outweigh the costs by hundreds of billions of dollars. Id. at 74890. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 2]

By requesting comment on incentives for natural gas vehicles (“NGVs”) (discussed more fully in 

Section II, below), the agencies seem to acknowledge that NGVs can meet the goals of reducing 

both GHG emissions and increasing use of alternatives, in addition to reduced emissions of 

criteria pollutants, while also serving to “spur economic growth” and “create high-quality 

domestic jobs” as the President called for. In fact, in his January 24, 2012 State of the Union 

address, the President repeatedly invoked both the environmental and economic advantages of 

domestic natural gas, e.g., “The development of natural gas will create jobs and power trucks and 

factories that are cleaner and cheaper, proving that we don’t have to choose between our 

environment and our economy.” [Section II can be found on p. 6 of Docket number EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9548-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 2]

What the agencies may not have recognized is that NGVs are, in fact, both the single most costeffective means of achieving these goals in the transportation sector and, if encouraged, will 

create more jobs and economic growth than any other proposed solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9548-A1, p. 2]

A. Natural Gas Vehicles Will Strengthen the U.S. Economy by Utilizing More Domestically 

Produced Resources and Creating Domestic Jobs

Increasing use of domestically produced natural gas is essential to help reduce U.S. dependence 

on foreign sources of energy from geopolitically unstable regions of the world. Despite 35 years 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-7

of rising imports and the agencies’ admission that “the need to reduce energy consumption is 

more crucial today than it was when the Energy Policy and Conservation Act was enacted in the 

mid-1970s” (Interim Joint Technical Assessment Report, “JTAR”, p. 1-1), the Light Duty Rule 

continues to emphasize a policy of incremental improvements in fuel economy. Ignoring a 

domestically-produced transportation fuel in favor of marginal gains in petroleum fuel economy 

is a shortsighted energy security policy. As the U.S. Energy Information Agency points out, in 

2035 the U.S. is still expected to import 16.71 QBtus of oil, down only 17% from the 20.14 

QBtus imported in 2010. EIA, AEO 2012 Early Release Summary, Table AI, attached as Exhibit 

1. Reducing imports by less than 1% a year is too little, too late. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, p. 3]

These are the facts, and that means that fuel switching is the only realistic pathway to energy 

security. Each NGV totally displaces a gasoline vehicle’s lifetime need for petroleum, and as the 

agencies acknowledge, “each gallon of fuel saved as a consequence of the GHG and fuel 

efficiency standards is anticipated to reduce total U.S. imports of petroleum by 0.95 gallon.” 76 

FR at 75135. And the most abundant, efficient and secure replacement fuel is natural gas. The 

U.S. and Canada supply 99% of U.S. natural gas demand, and U.S. gas reserves are 

growing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 3]

U.S. Natural Gas Supplies

The U.S. has enormous natural gas supplies; as the President correctly pointed out in his State of 

the Union Address, “We have a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly 100 years.” 

Indeed, multiple experts agree, the U.S. has enough natural gas to meet growing demand for 

generations to come.1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 3]

In its 2009 Report addressing the supply of technically recoverable natural gas in the United 

States, the Potential Gas Committee reported that the currently available total supply of natural 

gas was 1,836 trillion cubic feet (“Tcf”), which represented an increase of 39% (516 Tcf) over 

the Committee’s year end estimate for 2006. Potential Gas Committee, Potential Supply of 

Natural Gas in the United States (December 31, 2008) (June, 2009). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, p. 3]

The Potential Gas Committee is not alone in its estimates. MIT’s Future of Natural Gas (Interim 

Report) also reviewed U.S. gas resource estimates from several sources, including the Potential 

Gas Committee, and assumed a mean remaining resource base of approximately 2,100 Tcf. Id., 

p. 9. This means that at current levels of consumption the U.S. has more than enough domestic 

natural gas to fuel the light-duty fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 4]

The Economic Advantages of Natural Gas as a Transportation Fuel

Increasing our reliance on domestically produced sources of energy such as natural gas helps 

increase more than US energy security – it benefits our economy as well. According to the 

Department of Commerce, the U.S. trade deficit for 2011 was $558 billion, during which time 

the U.S. imported $432 billion of foreign petroleum. U.S International Trade Statistics, attached 

as Exhibit 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

6-8

In contrast, producing and distributing natural gas as a transportation fuel means keeping this 

money at home and creating American jobs. In 2008, U.S. production of 20 Tcf of natural gas 

created more than 1.3 million jobs, and even a modest increase in demand for natural gas as a 

transportation fuel could create tens of thousands of additional jobs. “The Contributions of The 

Natural Gas Industry to the U.S. National and State Economies”, IHS Global Insight, 2009, p.1, 

attached as Exhibit 3. The rapid growth in shale gas alone supported 600,000 jobs in 2010, a 

number expected to grow to nearly 870,000 in 2015. IHS Global Insight 2011, p. 1, attached as 

Exhibit 4. A significant push to increase NGVs in the U.S. also would create thousands of 

additional jobs related to manufacturing natural gas vehicles and building the relevant 

infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 4]

Finally, we note that natural gas vehicles are just as available as natural gas itself. There are 

more than 12 million NGVs on the road worldwide, and a recent report forecast 28 million 

NGVs by 2015 (Global Industry Analysts, Inc.). Outside the U.S., NGVs are made by, among 

others, Ford, GM, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, Fiat, Volkswagen and Mercedes. Demand 

for U.S. NGVs would thus give domestic manufacturers a base upon which to build an export 

market. And another economic opportunity exists in converting existing petroleum vehicles to 

run on natural gas, yet another well-established technology that can further job creation here at 

home. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 4]

In sum, the only way to fulfill the statutory mandate of reducing U.S. dependence on foreign 

sources of energy is by beginning to move the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet to natural gas as a 

complement to other advanced technology and alternative fuel vehicles, a policy which will also 

significantly assist the U.S. economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 4]

B. NGVs are the Most Cost-Effective Means of Reducing Light-Duty GHG Emissions [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 4]

Each NGV not only utilizes a domestic alternative fuel source, but also has inherently lower 

GHG emissions. On a lifecycle basis (accounting for upstream emissions), NGVs have 30% 

lower GHG emissions than their gasoline-powered counterparts. California Energy Commission, 

Full Fuel Cycle Assessment, p. 30, attached as Exhibit 5. Apropos of lifecycle emissions, AGA 

and ANGA agree with EPA’s position that full lifecycle accounting is necessary for determining 

both actual emissions reductions and vehicle compliance. 76 FR 75011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9548-A1, pp. 4-5]

Moreover, natural gas is getting even cleaner, as renewable natural gas (biomethane from 

landfills and other sources) comes on line. Biomethane achieves nearly a 90 percent reduction in 

GHGs compared to gasoline, and U.S. biomethane production is increasing, with DOE’s 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimating future production of up to 16 billion gasoline 

gallons equivalent. 74 FR 24982. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 5]

Not only will natural gas continue to reduce its GHG emissions, but the efficiency of natural gas 

vehicles will also continue to improve as the result of technological advances. In fact, NGVs will 

benefit equally from the very same technological advances the agencies say are available for 

gasoline vehicles to meet the proposed standards. The vast majority of these improvements,
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-9

whether “vehicle technology”, “transmission technology”, “engine technology” or “vehicle 

electrification” can be used on NGVs to further lower their GHG emissions. Mass and drag 

reduction, low-friction lubricants, cylinder deactivation, variable valve timing, continuous 

variable transmissions, hybridization, etc., will have the exact same effect of reducing fuel 

consumption for NGVs as they do for petroleum ones. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 

5]

Moreover, NGVs are not subject to the trade-off between greater fuel economy and lower safety 

considerations imposed by light-weighting or down-sizing vehicles. Of note, the JTAR presents 

mass reduction as the single largest component for increasing petroleum fuel economy and 

reducing GHG emissions (J-TAR Chapter 6, passim.) but at the same time admits that “the 

agencies believe that the effects of vehicle mass reduction on safety should be evaluated from a 

societal perspective (including an analysis of fatalities and casualties.)” JTAR 3-8. NGVs weigh 

somewhat more than comparable gasoline vehicles due to the weight of the CNG tanks, yet even 

with this weight penalty NGVs continue to reduce GHG emissions while utilizing an alternative 

fuel source. (Compare Honda CNG curb weight of 2,848 lbs with Honda Civic LX curb weight 

of 2721 lbs.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 5]

II. INCENTIVES FOR NGVS

EPA has proposed not only extending the current incentives for electric vehicles (“EVs”), under 

which the agency deems them to have zero GHG emissions, but to add a second category of 

incentives for MY 2017-2021 under which each EV (and fuel cell vehicle) sold would be 

deemed to be equal to between 2.0 such vehicles (MY 2017- 2019) 1.75 vehicles (MY 2020), 

and 1.5 vehicles (MY 2021). Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (“PHEVs”) would get similar, but 

smaller, multipliers: 1.6 for MY 2017-2019, 1.6 for MY 2020, and 1.3 for MY 2021. 76 FR 

75013. EPA’s rationale for these incentives is that “it is appropriate to encourage the initial 

commercialization of EV/PHEV/FCVs as well, in order to retain the potential for game-changing 

GHG emissions and oil savings in the long term.” Id. at 75011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, p. 6]

EPA then asks for “comments on the merits of providing similar multiplier incentives to 

dedicated and/or dual fuel compressed natural gas vehicles”. Id. at 75013. While EPA proposes 

generous incentives for EVs and PHEVs because they represent “potential for game-changing 

GHG emissions and oil savings in the long term”, both dedicated and dual-fuel NGVs represent

actual “game changing GHG emissions and oil savings” right now that justify comparable 

incentives. Moreover, considering NGVs superior cost-benefit performance in reducing GHGs 

compared to EVs, EPA should consider an even larger multiplier incentive, perhaps equal to the 

incentive Congress mandated for NGVs based on their oil-displacement performance. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 6]

According to EPA, the 2012 Nissan Leaf EV has upstream GHG emissions of 161 grams per 

mile. Id. at 75011. If the Leaf were gasoline-powered, the proposed 2017 GHG standard for it 

would be 210 g/mi.2 Assuming, as EPA does (id. at 75011), a 20% upstream GHG value for 

gasoline vehicles (42 g/mi), this “gasoline Leaf” would have total GHG emissions of 252 g/mi. 

Thus the actual GHG emissions difference between the EV Leaf and the gasoline Leaf is 252-
EPA Response to Comments

6-10

161, or 91 g/mi. Using EPA’s figures, simple math shows that the cost of this 91 g/mi advantage 

is a staggering $304 for each g/mi improvement over the comparable gasoline vehicle. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 6]

EPA expects that in 2016, the marginal cost of EV technology for a small size car (such as the 

Leaf) to be $27,628. Draft Joint Technical Support Document, Proposed Rulemaking to 

Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 

Economy Standards, September 2009, p. 3-91. Conservatively assuming that the cost of EV 

technology in the 2012 Leaf is no more than EPA’s estimate for 2016, $27,628 divided by 91 

equals a cost of approximately $304 per g/mi of GHG reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, pp. 6-7]

In contrast, a 2011 Honda Civic NGV vehicle has tailpipe CO2 emissions of 252 g/mi, and the 

comparable 2011 Honda Civic gasoline vehicle has tailpipe emissions of 306 g/mi. 

www.fueleconomy.gov. Even without including the NGV’s smaller upstream GHG emissions, 

the NGV has 54 g/mi less GHG emissions than its gasoline counterpart, and costs $6,935 more. 

Thus the cost of achieving GHG reductions via an NGV is only $128 per g/mi. In other words, 

compared to electric vehicles, NGVs are close to three times more cost efficient in reducing 

GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 7]

Given this, AGA and ANGA believe that it would be reasonable for EPA to not only include 

incentives for NGVs, but to make them significantly larger than the ones proposed for EVs. 

Because the Light Duty Rule is a joint regulatory program designed to reduce both GHGs and oil 

dependency, the most logical basis for an incentive is the one Congress has already mandated for 

NGVs based on their displacement of oil imports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 7]

In the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 (“AMFA”), Congress wrote a specific compliance 

metric favoring natural gas and other alternative fuels into the light-duty fuel economy statute. 

The Conference Report for AMFA could not have been clearer: “[t]he objective of both the 

House and Senate bills is to facilitate the development and use of alternative fuels in the United 

States for purposes of energy security” (House Report 100-929, 134 Cong Rec H 7732, 

September 16, 1988, p. 7736), and the first two legislative findings in the statute itself were “the 

achievement of long-term energy security for the United States is essential to the health of the 

national economy, the well-being of our citizens, and the maintenance of national security” and 

“the displacement of energy derived from imported oil with alternative fuels will help to achieve 

energy security and improve air quality.” P.L. 100-494, Section 2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, p. 7]

Recognizing that every NGV increases utilization of a domestically produced alternative fuel, in 

AMFA Congress encouraged the production of natural gas vehicles by multiplying the fuel 

economy of an NGV relative to that of an equivalent gasoline-powered one. (AMFA Section 

6(a), codified at 49 U.S.C. 32905(c), providing that in fuel-consumption calculations, “[a] gallon 

equivalent of gaseous fuel is deemed to have a fuel content of .15 gallon of fuel”; by multiplying 

natural gas volume by .15, the effect of this is to discount NGV fuel consumption by 85%.)
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-11

Based on the fact that NGVs are more cost-efficient than EVs in delivering GHG reductions, and 

that Congress mandated an incentive multiplier for NGVs of approximately 7 for their fueleconomy benefits, AGA and ANGA believe that an incentive multiplier that provides parity with 

electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles is justified for NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, 

p. 7]

Using the equivalent multiplier for GHGs allows for full recognition of NGV fuel-economy 

benefits. However, any GHG multiplier that is less than the fuel economy one essentially negates 

the Congressional mandate in AMFA to the extent of that difference, a result at odds with the 

very purpose of this joint rulemaking. We strongly encourage EPA to take into account the fuel 

economy goals of this joint program in crafting their GHG standards, and the fact that NGVs are 

more cost-effective than EVs in reducing GHGs should allow for EPA to establish a GHG 

multiplier incentive equivalent to the Congressionally-mandated fuel economy incentive. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 8]

Dual-Fuel NGVs

As described in detail below, AGA and ANGA support EPA’s proposal to “directly extend” to 

dual fuel CNG vehicles the PHEV utility factor methodology described in SAE J2841 ‘‘Utility 

Factor Definitions for Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles Using Travel Survey Data,’’ September 

2010. AGA and ANGA also support extending application of this utility factor methodology 

back to MY 2012-2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 9]

We agree with EPA’s conclusion that “owners of dual fuel CNG vehicles will preferentially seek 

to refuel and operate on CNG fuel as much as possible” because, in part, “CNG fuel is 

considerably cheaper than gasoline on a per mile basis”. 76 FR 75018. In fact, on a per-mile 

basis, CNG retails for approximately one-third to one-half the cost of gasoline. However, we 

note that another basis for EPA’s conclusion (“because the owner paid a much higher price for 

the dual fuel capability”, id.) is somewhat of a conjecture, as no manufacturer has yet to produce 

a duel fuel NGV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 9]

AGA and ANGA also agree with EPA’s observation, which further supports use of the SAE 

utility factor, that “many dual fuel CNG vehicles will likely have smaller gasoline tanks given 

the expectation that gasoline will be used only as an ‘emergency’ fuel”. However, we believe 

that this is precisely what the market will produce, and thus do not believe that there is need for 

any of the agency’s suggested “additional constraints on the designs of dual fuel CNG vehicles 

to maximize the likelihood that consumers will routinely seek to use CNG fuel”, such as “placing 

a minimum value on CNG tank size or CNG range, a maximum value on gasoline tank size or 

gasoline range, a minimum ratio of CNG-to-gasoline range, and requiring an onboard control 

system so that a dual fuel CNG vehicle is only able to access the gasoline fuel tank if the CNG 

tank is empty.” Id. at 75019. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 10]

EPA notes that the same SAE utility factor it proposes to apply to dual fuel NGVs is the one first 

developed for PHEVs, and that there are two potential differences which “might weaken the case 

for using utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles.” AGA and ANGA addressed the first 

(relating to a dual fuel NGV running on gasoline when both fuels are available on board), above. 
EPA Response to Comments

6-12

The second that “it may be much more inconvenient for some private dual fuel CNG vehicle 

owners to fuel every day relative to PHEVs, and there are many fewer CNG refueling stations 

than electrical charging facilities” is not the relevant consideration. Unlike PHEVs, CNG 

vehicles are exactly like gasoline vehicles insofar as they do not need to refuel every day. Based 

on NHTSA’s combined cityhighway fuel economy figure (31 mpg) and vehicle tank size, the 

driving range for the 2012 Honda CNG is 248 miles, which means that, like gasoline vehicles, it 

would only have to be refueled once every few days. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 

10]

1 Sources:

ICF: As reported in MIT Energy Initiative, 2010, The Future of Natural Gas, interim report; 

Table 2.1

EIA: See http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/

PGC: Potential Gas Committee’s Advance Summary and press release of its biennial assessment; 

see www.potentialgas.org

CERA: IHS CERA, 2010, Fueling North America’s Energy Future: The Unconventional Natural 

Gas Revolution and the Carbon Agenda

MIT: MIT Energy Initiative, 2010, The Future of Natural Gas, interim report

NPC: Realizing the Potential of North America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources 

Johns Hopkins University ; Prudent Development Study 2011

2 The GHG standard applicable to a vehicle is determined by its “footprint”, which is “the 

vehicle’s wheelbase multiplied by its track width”. 76 FR 74870. Multiplying the Leaf’s 

wheelbase of 106.3 inches by its track width of 60.6 inches (http://www.vehix.com/carreviews/ 

2011/nissan/leaf/vehicle-specification) equals 6441.78 sq in, or 44.73 sq ft, and thus a GHG 

footprint of 210g/mi. Id. at 74873.

Organization: American Clean Skies Foundation (ACSF)

ACSF strongly supports the energy security and environmental goals underlying the Proposed 

Rule. However, the Foundation believes that these goals can best be met by adopting technology 

neutral incentives that enable natural gas vehicles (NGVs), as well as electric vehicles (EVs), to 

play a larger role. Both technologies can deliver similar well-to-wheel greenhouse gas (GHG) 

emission reductions. See Appendix 1. Accordingly, these comments propose several simple rule 

changes that EPA and NHTSA can make to establish a level regulatory playing field for 

advancing cleaner and more fuel-efficient vehicles, rather than arbitrarily providing incentives 

for selected vehicle powertrains, as the Proposed Rule now does. Consumers and the 

environment will benefit from competition across vehicle technologies. [Appendix 1 can be 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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found on pp. 16-20 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 1]

Given the Administration's recognition of the major energy security and emission benefits that 

NGVs can provide (See Appendix 2), we believe it is essential that any new vehicle standards 

adopted by EPA and NHTSA are consistent with that vision and, at a minimum, do not 

discriminate against NGVs or dual-fuel (natural gas/gasoline) vehicles. [Appendix 2 can be 

found on pp. 21-23 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 1-2]

I. Executive summary

The Proposed Rule has two overarching goals: to reduce GHG emissions and improve our 

nation's security. Encouraging the manufacture and use of more NGVs is one of the very best 

ways to achieve these goals because each new NGV will emit roughly 30% less GHG pollution 

than a gasoline vehicle and displace its lifetime consumption of imported petroleum. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 2]

The new rule will apply to vehicles manufactured in model years 2017 through 2025. This is a 

critical period for deploying alternative fuel vehicles, as it represents a key window of 

opportunity to make progress on environmental and security goals. Any new regulations that 

impact vehicle fuel choices and related infrastructure investments will also have far-reaching 

impacts on the country's transportation mix well before 2017 and after 2025. That is why it is so 

important that the proposed rule not handicap one category of oil-saving or lower carbon vehicle 

technologies versus another. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 2]

Unfortunately, however, in providing incentives for alternative fuel vehicles, the draft rule 

unduly favors EVs to the detriment of NGVs. This shortcoming can and must be addressed to 

create effective competition among alternative fuel vehicles and provide technology-neutral 

incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 2]

To that purpose, ACSF recommends the following rule changes:

1. A technology-neutral pool of alternative fuel vehicle incentives should be created. All 

qualified alternative fuel vehicles, including EVs and NGVs, should qualify for these incentives 

which would use a multiplier to give extra credit for the emission reduction benefits of such 

vehicles in calculating each manufacturer's fleet averages. The incentive would be phased out 

when the annual sales of all qualified alternate fuel vehicles exceeds 10% of total vehicle sales, 

or roughly 1.5 million vehicles in 2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 2]

2. Because production volumes can be rapidly scaled-up, EPA should augment the near-term 

incentives for natural gas dual-fuel vehicles. As with hybrid electric vehicles, the increased 

production of NGVs that can run on both gasoline and CNG as 'dual-fuel vehicles' will 

significantly advance the objectives of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, 

p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

6-14

3. Manufacturers producing NGVs and alternative fuel vehicles that use fuels having superior 

energy security benefits should be explicitly rewarded. Promoting the goal of energy security 

requires explicit targeted incentives. This might be done by using a common metric (e.g., 

imported oil reduced) to rank vehicles and/or fleets and provide a proportionate compliance 

benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 2]

The rationale for these recommendations is discussed below. To provide context, we first 

provide an NGV 'technology overview' and review certain risks regarding EV deployment. We 

also briefly summarize the Proposed Rule's regulatory structure as it applies to alternative fuel 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 3]

II. Technology overview

A. The benefits and worldwide market acceptance of NGVs.

Only last month, President Obama used his 2012 State of the Union speech to call attention to 

America's 'nearly 100 year' supply of natural gas and the major role gas can play in enhancing 

our energy security and reducing GHG emissions. Later he challenged a Nevada audience 

to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 3]

'Think about an America where more cars and trucks are running on domestic natural gas than on 

foreign oil. Think about an America where our companies are leading the world in developing 

natural gas technology and creating a generation of new energy jobs. . .. [L]et's get more of these 

natural gas vehicles on the road.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 3]

We agree. That is why it is so important that the Proposed Rule promote the President's policy 

and be technology neutral so that the rules encourage manufacturers to produce more NGVs and 

dual-fueled vehicles (as well as EVs) capable of delivering similar environmental and security 

benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 3]

NGVs provide a means to achieve the Proposed Rule's emission reduction and energy security 

goals with proven, cost-effective technology 5 that has been widely deployed around the globe. 

More than 12 million NGVs were in use worldwide as of 2010,6 far greater than EV 

deployment.7 In fact, a recent study by Harvard University noted that 'highway-capable BEVs 

[Battery-Electric Vehicles] are not yet in widespread use anywhere in the world.”8 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 3-4]

In the United States, NGVs are widely recognized as providing 'game changing' opportunities 

today for vehicle fleets, reducing both costs and emissions and the use of foreign petroleum. 

There are now over 70,000 CNG vans, light duty trucks and cars in service, including more than 

3,000 NGVs in AT&T's fleet alone.9 Moreover, states and local governments around the country 

are committed to expanded NGV roll outs. For instance, the governors of Colorado, Oklahoma, 

Pennsylvania, and Wyoming recently signed a memorandum of understanding to convert state 

fleets to CNG.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 4]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-15

Of particular relevance to this docket, which targets incentives for the 2017-2025 time period, is 

the prospective build-out of a national NGV infrastructure and the availability of low cost home 

refueling appliances for NGVs. Last year, for example, several companies announced new 

financing commitments totaling $450 million to establish a coast-to-coast highway refueling 

network that, by 2014, could be capable of supporting tens of thousands of LNG-fueled trucks 

and CNG-fueled vehicles.11 By 2017, new 'brand name' home refueling appliances are expected 

to come to market, providing an affordable garage-based CNG option for over 65 million homes 

already connected to natural gas pipelines.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 4]

Beyond that, NGVs do not require the risky 'technological leaps' remaining for EVs and various 

alternative fuel technologies. In fact, most existing vehicles can be modified to utilize natural 

gas, as use of this fuel involves similar internal combustion components. In addition, the 

technological advancements (and associated fuel efficiency gains) that EPA and NHTSA predict 

for petroleum and diesel fueled engines are likely also to benefit NGVs.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 4-5]

NGVs offer significant energy security benefits. As the President has noted, natural gas is an 

abundant domestic energy resource. The United States currently produces almost all of the 

natural gas that it uses and may actually be a net exporter of natural gas by 2021.15 Over 65 

million homes are already connected to the local natural gas distribution network and expanding 

the delivery infrastructure may be more economical than developing similar infrastructure for 

electricity. For instance, a joint study by the Bonneville Power Administration and the Northwest 

Gas Association found that 'natural gas pipelines average between 50 and 60 percent of the cost 

of electric power transmission per unit of energy (or capacity) delivered.”16 Additionally, adding 

new interstate natural gas pipeline capacity averages just three years from announcement date to 

commercial start of operations.17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 5]

Finally, NGVs offer substantial GHG emission reduction benefits over conventional vehicles 

(those that use gasoline and diesel). Again, see Appendix 1. The natural gas-powered Honda 

Civic has regularly been recognized as among the 'greenest cars' on the road.18 While NGVs 

emit small amounts of methane, these emissions are more than offset by substantially reduced 

CO2 emissions versus other vehicles.19 And in the future, larger amounts of bio-methane (a 

renewable fuel with a very low GHG footprint) may become available, further enhancing the 

emission benefits of NGVs.20 [Appendix 1 can be found on pp. 16-20 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 5]

B. The Administration should not pick technology 'winners' and 'losers'.

In a market economy, it is an axiom of regulatory design that the government should avoid trying 

to favor competing technologies (or companies) by picking winners. Such decisions are best left 

to the private sector.21 This is especially true when the technology that may be favored faces 

large uncertainties in research or development for key components, materials supply risks in 

scaling-up production, billion dollar infrastructure hurdles and unproven consumer take 

up. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 6]
EPA Response to Comments

6-16

Qualified alternative fuel vehicles should all be given similar incentives so that they can compete 

on a level playing field in delivering the public benefits the Proposed Rule seeks. EVs may well 

have a very bright future. However, it is also possible that EVs may never be a widely-deployed 

technology. Unlike NGVs, EVs require technology advances in batteries and other components 

and have yet to be produced and deployed at scale.22 By comparison, NGVs utilize existing 

engine technology but merely burn a different fuel. Similarly, auto mechanics accustomed to 

working on typical internal combustion engines face a learning curve when asked to repair 

electric engines, which use a substantially different motor technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9464-A1, p. 6]

In short, the Administration should not create inefficient regulatory structures that pick 

technology winners and losers. That would be unlawfully arbitrary and capricious.23 Rather the 

Proposed Rule should be revised to establish a level playing field for alternative fuel vehicles. 

That is by far the most cost-effective and non-discriminatory way to achieve the rule's desired 

environmental and national security goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 6]

III. Regulatory structure of the Proposed Rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 6]

The Proposed Rule consists of parallel standards issued by EPA and the NHTSA, which seek to 

accomplish similar goals through different regulatory mechanisms. In particular, EPA would 

impose a limit on vehicle GHG emissions pursuant to the Clean Air Act. More specifically, 

EPA's proposed standards require, on an average industry fleet-wide basis, an emissions standard 

of 163 grams/mile of CO2e, which equates to 54.5 mpg, by 2025. Pursuant to CAA § 202, EPA 

has broad discretion to set emissions levels that are 'technology-based' and can be 'technology 

forcing.' Thus, EPA can use its standards to incentivize the deployment of advanced technologies 

such as EVs and NGVs. EPA proposes to include specific limits on three GHGs (CO2, CH4, 

N2O), which can be met individually or through a combined CO2-equivalent standard. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 7]

The NHTSA would increase the stringency of traditional mile-per-gallon (mpg) Corporate 

Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE). NHTSA proposes to tighten these CAFE standards 

pursuant to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which amended the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA). NHTSA considers four statutory factors in 

setting CAFE standards: technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other 

Government standards on fuel economy, and the nation's need to conserve energy. NHTSA's 

proposal would require, on an average fleet wide basis, 49.6 mpg by 2025.24 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 7]

Because EPA and NHTSA both 'address the closely intertwined challenges of energy security 

and climate change,' they closely coordinated their GHG and CAFE standards development. 

Accordingly, both these EPA GHG and NHTSA CAFE standards are issued pursuant to this joint 

Proposed Rule, similar to the joint proposed standards that these agencies previously issued for 

light-duty vehicles for model years 2012-2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 7]

A. NHTSA alternative vehicle incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 7]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-17

Regarding EVs, NHTSA currently uses a statutorily-mandated petroleum equivalence factor 

(PEF) to convert the use of electricity into an equivalent 'miles per gallon.” The PEF for 

electricity includes an adjustment - that is, a discount - so that the mileage for EVs is calculated 

based on only 15% of the actual energy consumed. That adjustment provides a large benefit to 

EVs in calculating the average mileage for a manufacturer's fleet. Because Congress established 

this PEF incentive, NHTSA believes that it may not create additional incentives for EVs. EPA 

does not feel so bound, however, and proposes to create additional incentives for EVs in the 

Proposed Rule (as further described below). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 7-8]

Under the current CAFE standards set by NHTSA, NGVs also receive similar benefits because 

the miles per CNG gallon equivalent are discounted by applying a 0.15 'divisor.' This incentive 

was created under the EISA, and the incentive is not scheduled for expiration. Under this 

incentive scheme, a 15 mpg dedicated alternative fuel vehicle is multiplied by 100/15 so that it 

would be rated as 100 mpg. The 'divisor' consequently has an impact equivalent to the PEF 

mentioned above for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 8]

B. EPA alternative vehicle incentives.

We come now to the nub of the discrimination and market inefficiencies that these comments are 

designed to rectify: Unlike the NHTSA rules, the EPA's new GHG standards contain additional 

EV-only incentives. These supplemental incentives arbitrarily and capriciously favor EVs over 

NGVS.31 For instance, EPA would continue the practice of considering EVs to be zero-emitting 

(up to certain production caps), even though EPA recognizes that generating electricity upstream 

creates substantial GHG emissions (particularly due to the emissions from coal-fired power 

plants). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 8]

EPA's proposal also includes a new incentive multiplier for EVs. Through this multiplier, EPA 

would allow a vehicle manufacturer to reduce its average fleet emissions by initially counting the 

lower emissions of each EV produced as two vehicles (i.e., using a 2 times multiplier). In 

addition, in the Model Year 2012-2016 rule, EPA utilized the same 0.15 'divisor' available in the 

CAFE rules (discussed above) in calculating GHG emissions compliance for NGVs. But, under 

the Proposed Rule, this incentive would expire. As a result, EPA's new rules would abolish the 

benefits NGVs gain under the NHTSA standards from the 0.15 'divisor' incentive. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 8]

C. Dual-fuel vehicle incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 8]

The Proposed Rule also contains additional provisions that specifically address dual-fuel 

vehicles, including hybrid-electric vehicles and those that run on both CNG and gasoline. The 

Proposed Rule would change the assumption in both CAFE and GHG emissions regulations that 

alternative fuels are used 50% of the time in dual-fueled vehicles. Instead, the agencies would 

sensibly replace this 50/50 assumed fuel split with a 'utility factor'-Le., an approach that takes 

into account the actual percentage of alternative fuel use by the average driver. Thus, the 

Proposed Rule recognizes that 'CNG fuel is considerably cheaper than gasoline on a per mile 

basis,' and that CNG is likely to be used in a dual-fueled vehicle significantly more than 50% of 

the time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 8-9]
EPA Response to Comments

6-18

Dual-fuel vehicles also face discrimination related to the proposed use of the 0.15 'divisor.' 

Congress eliminated the 0.15 divisor incentive for non-electric, dual-fuel vehicles after 2019. 

The Proposed CAFE standards would continue the incentives for those dual-fueled vehicles after 

2019. Again, however, EPA and NHTSA send a mixed message regarding CNG vehicles. Under 

EPA's proposal, dual-fuel CNG vehicles would see the 0.15 'divisor' eliminated from the 

alternative-fuel portion of a vehicle's emissions. By not utilizing the same incentive under its 

emissions standards, EPA limits the usefulness of NHTSA's incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9464-A1, p. 9]

Finally, the Proposed Rule includes a significant focus on energy security concerns. We discuss 

these concerns-and how they might be better translated with a more effective set of vehicle 

incentives-at greater length below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 9]

IV. Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule to Promote Technology-Neutral Benefits

A. A technology-neutral pool of alternative fuel incentives should be created. Vehicles in this 

pool, including NGVs, should qualify for the same incentives that are now only available to EVs, 

in particular the incentive 'multiplier.'

Rather than provide incentives to specific vehicle types, EPA should strive to be technology 

neutral in its efforts to reduce GHG emissions. In particular, the Proposed Rule offers two main 

incentives that currently favor EVs: the ability of manufacturers to count EV emissions at 0 

grams/mile in calculating fleet averages; and an 'incentive multiplier' which begins by doublecounting EVs in the overall fleet. This current incentive structure should be revised so that it is 

technology-neutral, and reflects life-cycle impacts, allowing NGVs-which provide comparable 

emission reductions and energy security benefits to EVs-to qualify for the same incentive 

available to EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 9]

1. The incentive 'multiplier' should apply to NGVs and EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-

A1, p. 9]

The Proposed Rule provides a new incentive 'multiplier,' but as drafted would only allow this 

incentive for EVs. More specifically, this 'multiplier' allows manufacturers to multiply, by a 

determined factor, the number of EVs when calculating its fleet emissions profile. EVs would 

start with a multiplier value of 2.0 in Model Year 2017, phasing down to a value of 1.5 in 

2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 9-10]

By providing this incentive to EVs, while failing to provide a similar incentive to NGVs, the 

EPA has inappropriately picked EVs as 'the future' clean-car technology, thereby decreasing 

competition and incurring unnecessary program risks. This is unlawfully arbitrary and 

capricious. The GHG emission benefits on a life-cycle (well-to-wheel) basis are similar for EVs 

and NGVs. See Appendix 1. The EPA's current approach also harms consumers and cuts against 

the goals of the Proposed Rule because, as noted earlier, an NGV buyer likely can reduce her 

GHG vehicle emissions at a lower cost per unit than an EV buyer. [Appendix 1 can be found on 

pp. 16-20 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9464-A1, p. 10]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-19

The GHG emissions of NGVs are approximately 20-30% lower than for vehicles using gasoline. 

Furthermore, current technology can capture and utilize natural gas from renewable sources (e.g., 

landfills, farm animals). Natural gas from these sources (i.e., biomethane) has a carbon intensity 

approximately 85% less than gasoline.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 10]

All 'qualified' alternative fuel vehicles with a similar potential to reduce GHG emissions (on a 

well-to-wheel basis) should be eligible for a multiplier that encourages the production of these 

vehicles until annual vehicle sales reach 10% of total sales for all fleets combined.38 On this 

basis, the incentive would apply to approximately 1.5 million vehicles in 2017. The incentive 

could then be phased down by 2% annually so that it applies to a smaller number of qualified 

vehicles each year but affords a sufficient lead time for manufacturers to plan and begin 

deployment of these qualified vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 10]

Significantly, two other major federal programs for reducing the nation's GHG emissions treat 

the potential benefits of using NGVs and EVs in a similar way. The first provides for federal 

procurement for all qualified alternative fuel vehicles.39 The second, under Executive Order 

13514, requires each federal agency to measure and report reduction targets for direct (Scope 1) 

and indirect (Scope 2) greenhouse gas emissions.40 Because the tailpipe emissions of the 

agency's vehicles are counted in Scope 1 and emissions from electricity used by the agency 

(including recharging EVs) are counted in Scope 2, both NGVs and EVs have emissions 

reflected in the relevant accounts. In addition, both types of alternative fuel vehicles contribute, 

on a technology-neutral basis, to achieving the two-percent annual reduction in petroleum 

consumption required in Section 2(a)(iii) of this Executive Order, and both types of vehicles are 

covered by Section 12's guidance to develop strategies on alternative fuel vehicles.41 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 10-11]

Indeed, EPA acknowledges that the upstream GHG emissions of EVs are a significant negative 

factor and may be worse than gasoline vehicles. EPA states that EVs in the 2017-2025 period 

'will decrease the overall GHG emissions reductions associated with the program as the upstream 

emissions associated with the generation and distribution of electricity are higher than the 

upstream emissions associated with production and distribution of gasoline.” [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 11-12]

On the other hand, the superior emissions benefits of NGVs over gasoline vehicles are 

thoroughly documented. 'The conclusion of recent studies such as those conducted by CARB and 

others is that, when used as transportation fuel, natural gas can reduce greenhouse gas emissions 

by 20 - 29 percent compared with diesel and gasoline fueled vehicles, respectively.”46 When 

compared to EVs, NGVs provide comparable emissions benefits (and NGVs can even provide 

superior emission reduction benefits to EVs depending on the extent to which coal-fired power is 

used to generate electricity for EVs). In addition, while EPA is counting on technological 

advancements to improve EVs, technology for NGVs will also advance if given the same 

opportunities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 12]

The most effective and lawful incentive structure to promote vehicle emission reductions is a 

'multiplier' incentive for all alternative fuel vehicles. Such a program would more strongly 

encourage manufacturers to develop cleaner vehicles through competition between EV and NGV 
EPA Response to Comments

6-20

technologies, and would allow the market to decide the extent of each technology's 

success. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 12]

3. The 0.15 divisor should continue for NGVs.

As noted above in the regulatory overview, in EPA's MY 2012-2016 GHG rule for light-duty 

vehicles, EPA utilized the same 0.15 'divisor' available in the CAFE rules in calculating GHG 

emissions compliance for NGVs. However, EPA has currently scheduled this incentive to expire 

in model year 2016, and the Proposed Rule does not renew this incentive. By not recognizing the 

0.15 'divisor' incentive under its GHG regulations, EPA appears to be undercutting a statutorilymandated incentive (for the CAFE rules) through its proposed GHG rules. By proposing GHG 

rules that work against the CAFE regulatory scheme, EPA is acting in a counterproductive way 

and hindering the development of cleaner technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 

12]

For the joint NHTSA and EPA rulemaking process to be effective, the agencies must work 

together so that the incentives provided by one agency are not limited by the regulations 

proposed by the other.47 Accordingly the 0.15 divisor for NGVs that exists under the CAFE 

rules should also be continued under EPA's GHG rules for light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 12]

B. Because of their potential for rapid scale-up, EPA should incentivize the deployment of CNG 

dual-fuel vehicles to the maximum extent possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 12]

Many CNG vehicles worldwide are equipped to run as dual-fuel vehicles. These vehicles can 

facilitate consumer acceptance of alternative fuel vehicles through the use of a small gasoline 

tank, thus reducing the 'range anxiety' that some consumers may have when choosing a vehicle 

that, as yet, has a limited fueling infrastructure.48 Dual-fuel CNG vehicles have the potential to 

be a 'game-changer' through rapid deployment. They also have a superior combination of 

reliability and the ability to use a domestic, clean-burning fuel, while reducing concerns about 

'range anxiety.' Because CNG is 'considerably cheaper than gasoline on a per mile basis,' for 

dual-fueled vehicles the Proposed Rule includes a 'utility factor' approach that would 'result in a 

compliance assumption of about 95% operation on CNG and about 5 percent operation on 

gasoline' for CNG/gasoline dual-fueled vehicles.49 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 13]

The deployment of dual-fuel CNG vehicles should be encouraged by the agencies through the 

maximum use of incentives. Specifically, EPA should use a standard 'utility factor' that assumes 

these vehicles will run on CNG 95% of the time, as this reflects EPA's 'real-world' projection of 

these vehicles. This 95% figure should be a default value and not require a case-by-case review 

that might otherwise be required to determine the utility factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9464-A1, p. 13]

Furthermore, the incentive multiplier outlined above should apply to dual-fuel CNG vehicles as 

well. A multiplier is already allowed for PHEVs, which are operationally similar to CNG dualfuel vehicles (in the sense that two sources of energy may operate the vehicle, in the case of 

PHEVs this being either electricity or gasoline). If PHEV's qualify for a multiplier, then so too
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-21

should CNG dual-fuel vehicles. Finally, the 0.15 divisor should be available under both the 

CAFE standards and EPA's GHG rules for the portion of the vehicle's operation on natural 

gas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 13]

C. The Proposed Rule should provide incentives for manufacturers producing NGVs and other 

vehicles that use fuels having superior energy security benefits.

'Energy security' is a central focus of the Proposed Rule. However, The Proposed Rule does not 

provide explicit incentives for manufacturing vehicles on the basis of energy security benefits. 

Nothing in either the EPA or NHTSA calculations explicitly considers energy security. By 

providing incentives for vehicles that enhance our energy independence, the agencies could 

ensure that manufacturers consider this factor. These incentives would also spur development 

and advance technology in the area of alternative fuel vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9464-A1, p. 13]

Because the comparative energy security benefits of different fuels can be readily ascertained an 

objective basis can be established for providing incentives. For example, a 'baseline' against 

which to assess energy security benefits could be tied to the current ratio of imported-todomestic oil (which is used to make gasoline and diesel, the dominant fuels in light-duty 

vehicles). Thus, if the current ratio of imported-to-domestic gasoline/diesel used in fleets covered 

by the proposed rules is approximately 50-50, then covered vehicles that use a fuel with a higher 

percentage that is sourced domestically would be assigned a factor between 1 and 2. 51 A 

vehicle's multiplier could then be increased by this factor for the purpose of doing a fleet-wide 

compliance calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 13-14]

Alternatively, each manufacturer could have a fleet wide 'energy security' rating against which to 

measure the benefits/incentives it should receive. A manufacturer's ability to take advantage of 

its 'energy security' incentives could be dependent on its fleetwide GHG emission average: 

should a manufacturer's fleet meet the requirements for an 'energy security' benefit but not meet 

the applicable GHG standards, that manufacturer would be unable to utilize that 

benefit.52 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 14]

Various forms of 'revenue recycling' also could reward manufacturers who produce vehicles that 

enhance energy security. For instance, the revenue from fines collected under various motor 

vehicle regulations could be dedicated to enhance the use of fuels with energy security benefits. 

Since the implementation of CAFE standards, a total of nearly $795 million has been collected. 

In Model Year 2009, the last year data is available, the collected fines totaled approximately $9 

million.53 In 2007, the total of collected fines was more than $37 million.54 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 14]

As noted above, NGVs offer significant energy security benefits. Utilizing natural gas as a fuel 

source is economical and wholly secure, as natural gas is an abundant domestic energy 

resource.55 Although the electricity used to repower EVs is domestic, the batteries on which 

EVs rely may be dependent on lithium and other scarce metals which must be imported from a 

limited range of nations.56 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, pp. 14-15]
EPA Response to Comments

6-22

While EPA and NHTSA may take a variety of approaches in recognizing energy security 

benefits, what does seem clear is that these energy security benefits should be explicitly 

rewarded in order to further the stated energy security goals of the Proposed Rule. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 15]

V. Conclusion

Natural gas is an abundant domestic fuel that produces lower GHG emissions than gasoline and 

diesel on a lifecycle basis, and its use in vehicles involves widely-used, reliable engine 

technology. Encouraging the increased use of natural gas in vehicles will help to achieve EPA's 

goal of reducing GHG emissions from the nation's vehicle fleet. NGVs and dual-fuel CNG 

vehicles can also substantially improve our nation's energy security. Worldwide, millions of 

vehicles run on natural gas and the technology for NGVs is already available. Yet, despite the 

considerable benefits of NGVs, the Proposed Rule offers multiple incentives to EVs while 

overlooking the often superior benefits of NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 15]

The Proposed Rule must be revised so that its incentive structure for alternative fuel vehicles is 

technologically neutral and not anti-competitive. Failure of EPA and NHTSA to do so would be 

arbitrary and capricious. A technologically-neutral incentive scheme will unlock the full 

potential of our nation to utilize alternative fuels to meet both GHG reduction and energy 

security goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9464-A1, p. 15]

5 Based on the EPA's own data, from the consumer's standpoint, it is likely to be far cheaper-as 

measured in vehicle dollars spent to reduce a given amount of greenhouse gas per mile-for a 

driver to acquire a new NGV rather than an EV, given the substantially lower purchase cost of a 

CNG vehicle and the comparable full fuel cycle GHG reductions in emissions versus a gasoline 

powered vehicle. Small-sized EV sedans are expected to cost over $27,000 more in 2016; the 

additional cost for a CNG vehicle is likely to be under $2,500. See Draft Joint Technical Support 

Document, Proposed Rulemaking: Mode/ Year 2012-2016 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, p. 3-91, available at 

www.epa.gov/otag/c1imate/regulations/420d09901.pdf.

6 International Natural Gas Vehicle Association, http://www.iangv.org/toolsresources/statistics.html. Companies that currently offer NGVs worldwide include Fiat, Chrysler, 

GM, Ford, Honda, and Mercedes.

7 A report from Pike Research notes that the 2011 sales of plug-in EVs and battery EVs totaled 

'just under 114,000' worldwide. See http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/cum ulative-plugin-electric-vehicle-sales-to-reach-5-2million- worldwide-by-2017. By way of comparison, 

worldwide sales of NGVs in 2009 (the most recent worldwide data) were over 1.3 million 

vehicles. See http://www.iangv.org/tools-resources/statistics.html. See a/so, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,011 

(noting that sales of the Nissan Leaf have been only approximately 8,000, and sales of the Tesla 

Roadster have been only approximately 1,500).
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-23

8 Henry Lee & Grant Lovellette, 'Will Electric Cars Transform the U.S. Vehicle Market? An 

Analysis of the Key Determinants,' Discussion Paper 2011-08, Belfer Center for Science and 

International Affairs, July 2011, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Lee 

Lovellette Electric Vehicles DP 2011 web. pdf.

9 See Energy Information Administration, Alternatives to Traditional Transportation Fuels 2008 

(2010), http://www.eia.gov/cneaF/alternative/page/atftables/afv_atF2008.pdF; Department of 

Energy, Alternative Fuels and Advanced Fuels Data Center, press release, 

http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/progs/fleet exp cat.php/LDV.

10 See e.g., http://www.cleanvehiclesolutions.com/blog/2011/12/29/governors-signmemorandum-understandingconvert-state-fleets-naturaI-gas/.

11 See e.g., http://www.cleanenergyfuels.com/2011/7-11-11.html.

12 These next-generation appliances will build upon existing home refueling stations 

manufactured by companies such as BRC Fuel Maker (see 

http://www.brcfuelmaker.it/eng/casa/chi siamo.asp) and Gas Fill Limited (see 

http://www.gasfill.com).

13 See IEA-ETSAP Technology Brief, April 2010, available at http://www.ieaetsap.org/web/ETechDS/ PDF/T03 LPG-CH4 eng-GS-gct-AD.pdf

15 EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2012, available at 

http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf.

16 Bonneville Power Administration & Northwest Gas Association, Comparing Pipes and Wires, 

March 2004. http://www.chpcenternw.org/NwChpDocs/Transmission and N Gas Comparing 

Pipes and Wires 032304.pdf. Furthermore, EVs are expected to 'have a significant impact on 

electrical grid strain.' See e.g., Nicholas DeForest, et aI., 'Impact of Widespread Electric Vehicle 

Adoption on the Electrical Utility Business - Threats and Opportunities,' Technical Brief, 

University of California, Berkeley Center for Entrepreneurship & Technology.

17 Implications of Greater Reliance on Natural Gas for Electricity Generation, American Public 

Power Ass'n, https://appanet.cmsplus.com/files/PDFs/lmplicationsOfGreaterRelianceOnNGforElectricityGeneration.pdf.

18 See the annual ratings issued by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy 

(ACEEE) at http://www.greenercars.org/highlights greenest.htm and 

http://www.honda.com/newsandviews/article.aspx?id=5904-enI noting that the CNG-powered 

Honda Civic GX was rated the 'greenest car in America' for eight years in a row (from 2003 to 

2011).

19 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has extensively analyzed this issue and found 

that CNG produces approximately 68 grams of CO2 equivalent emissions per mega joule (MJ) 

burned. By comparison, gasoline and diesel produce approximately 94-95 grams of CO2e/MJ. 
EPA Response to Comments

6-24

These comparisons are based on well-documented, well-to-wheel analyses. Thus, natural gas can 

reduce GHG emissions by 28-29% compared with diesel and gasoline-fueled vehicles. See 

CARB Look Up Table, http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/121409Icfs lutables.pdf

20 As detailed in Appendix 1, an NGV using even a 15% bio-methane blend would significantly 

reduce total GHG emissions. DOE's National Renewable Energy Lab has estimated future 

production of bio-methane will reach up to 16 billion gasoline gallons equivalent (GGEs). 74 

Fed. Reg. 24,982. Bio-methane achieves approximately an 85 percent reduction in GHGs as 

compared to gasoline.

21 The federal government's track record in selecting clean energy winners has been 

questionable, at best. Over the last year, in addition to the well-publicized bankruptcy of the solar 

manufacturer Solyndra (which received a DOE loan guarantee of more than $500 million), a 

manufacturer of lithium-ion batteries for EVs, EnerDel, also filed for bankruptcy after receiving 

a $118 million grant from DOE. In 1971, significant federal funding was authorized for the 

Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project, which was considered to be 'revolutionary' at the time. 

Twelve years and $8 billion later, Congress pulled funding for the project, which was never 

finished. See e.g., http://www.nader.org/template.php?/archives/926-That-Clinches-lt-TheBreeder-Reactor-is-Dead.html.

22 See Lee & Lovellette, Discussion Paper, note 8, supra (noting that 'Batteries may become 

cheaper and lighter, and charging equipment can become more versatile; but these improvements 

are still developing').

23 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that EPA's NOx

emissions trading program unduly favored coal-fired generation over natural-gas generation).

24 NHTSA is expressly prohibited from considering the availability of statutorily-established 

credits (such as for alternative-fueled vehicles) in determining its standards. Thus, NHTSA may 

not raise CAFE standards because manufacturers have enough of those credits to meet higher 

standards. By comparison, EPA's CAA authority does not have such a restriction, which allows 

EPA to set higher standards. 76 Fed. Reg. 75,341.

31 The Proposed Rule separately identifies electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrid electric 

vehicles (PHEVs). However, the regulatory benefits for both of these electric vehicle types are 

generally the same under the Proposed Rule. Therefore, 'EVs' in these comments should be 

understood to include both electric vehicles as well is plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, unless the 

context requires otherwise. Fuel cell vehicles also often share in comparable benefits, though 

because of the limited market deployment of these vehicles, they are not separately discussed 

herein.

37 Again examining CARB's look up table provides an approximate value of 94-95 gCO2e/MJ 

for gasoline and diesel, while renewable natural gas has an approximate value of 11-13 

gCO2e/MJ. See CARB Look Up Table, note 19, supra.
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-25

38 'Qualified alternative fuel vehicles' should include only those vehicles that use an alternative 

fuel a minimum of 50% of the time (i.e., those vehicles that have a 'utility factor' equal to or 

greater than 50%). ACSF believes this qualification criteria is necessary to encourage the 

development of technologies that are truly 'alternative' with the potential to be 'game changing.' 

Thus, if forecast use of an alternative fuel is less than 50% (such as is the case with ethanol flexfuel vehicles), then the vehicle class would not qualify for this incentive.

39 See EPA, 'Guidance for Implementing Section 141 of the Energy Independence and Security 

Act of 2007: Federal Vehicle Fleets and Low Greenhouse Gas-Emitting Vehicles' at 5 (Feb. 22, 

2010).

40 Executive Order 13514, 'Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic 

Performance' Section 2(a) (Oct. 5, 2009), available at 

http:(/www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/2009fedleader eo rel,pdf.

41 See Federal Energy Management Program, 'Executive Order 13514: Federal Leadership in 

Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance; Guidance for Federal Agencies on E.O. 

13514 Section 12, Federal Fleet Management,' at 2 (Apr. 2010), available at 

http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/fas/ExecutiveOrder13514.pdf.

46 NGVAmerica, 'NGVs and the Environment,' available at 

http://www.ngvc.org/aboutngv/ngvenviron.html. Blending renewable sources of natural gas with 

traditional natural gas can further lower NGV GHG emissions.

47 Notably, the 'PEF' for EVs, which provides an equivalent benefit to the 0.15 divisor for EVs 

under the CAFE rules, continues to be in effect and is not impacted by the Proposed Rule.

51 With 1 being the baseline and 2 being equivalent to fuel that is 100% domestically sourced.

52 Another possible means of rewarding energy security is to make energy security benefits one 

of the 'gating' criteria for the existing vehicle multiplier, discussed above in section IVA For 

instance, to qualify for this multiplier EPA would need to determine that a certain minimum 

percentage of a vehicle's fuel is domestically sourced (say 75%), and that the vehicle drive-train 

technology does not require foreign-sourced materials that constitute more than a certain 

percentage of the drive-train's costs. 53 See Summary of CAFE Fines Collected, available at 

www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/CAFE fines collected summary.pdf.

54 As an example of statutory authority for revenue recycling, under 49 U.S.C. § 32912(e)(2), 

the Secretary of Transportation must use 50% of the fines collected 'to carry out a program to 

make grants to manufacturers for retooling, reequipping, or expanding existing manufacturing 

facilities in the United States to produce advanced technology vehicles and components.' Using 

the above 'energy security' factor, the agency could provide funds to manufacturers based upon 

the highest fleet wide 'energy security' factor to encourage development of vehicles that provide 

for a more secure energy future.
EPA Response to Comments

6-26

55 See EIA, 2012 Energy Outlook Early Release, Table A13, which finds that the 2012 supply of 

natural gas is in excess of 25 trillion cubic feet. Available at 

http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/tablebrowser/#release=EARLY2012 &subject:OEARLY2012&tabIe:13EARLY2012& region=0-0&cases=fuI12011-d020911a,early2012-

d121011b. See also Mass. Inst. of Tech., The Future of Natural Gas (noting that in the U.S., 

natural gas resources continue to grow, and the development of low-cost and abundant 

unconventional natural gas resources, particularly shale gas, has a material impact on future 

availability and price.), available at, www.cleanskies.org.

56 See http://www.minerals.usgs.gov/mineraI5/pub5/commodity/lithium/mcs-2011-lithi.pdf.

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Additionally, EPA requested comments about the inclusion of compressed natural gas vehicles 

(NGVs) in these incentives. NGVs have similar environmental and energy security benefits 

compared to EVs and PHEVs, and their marketing challenges (infrastructure and consumer 

acceptance) are similar, as well. Honda supports the addition of dedicated NGVs to the group of 

dedicated vehicle multipliers (EV and FCVs) and bi-fuel NGVs to the bi-fuel vehicle multipliers 

(PHEVs). A differential in the multiplier for dedicated and bifuel natural gas vehicles is fully 

justified because there is no guarantee that the latter will operate on natural gas all of the time. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 3]

Honda recommends revising Table III-15 as follows: [Table III-15 can be found on p. 3 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 

3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 118-119.]

However, EPA intends to use the SAE utility factor in calculating the contribution of each fuel in 

climate change in the future bi-fuel vehicle, which Honda believes will virtually eliminate any 

regulatory differentiation between a dedicated and the bi-fuel natural gas vehicle to detrimental 

effect. Therefore, Honda suggests that EPA instead add dedicated natural gas vehicles to the EV 

and fuel cell electric vehicle group of technologies and add bi-fuel natural gas vehicles to the 

PHEV group of technologies with respect to the multiplier.

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Comments on the Proposed Approach to Measure Compliance with Fuel Economy and GHG 

Standards for Dual-Fuel CNG vehicles

EPA and NHTSA note that the statutory incentive for dual-fueled vehicles in 49 U.S.C 32906 

and the measurement methodology specified in 49 U.S.C 32905 (b) and (d) expire in MY 2019 

and request comment on proposed options going forward. The agencies are proposing to directly 

extend the PHEV utility factor methodology to dual-fuel CNG vehicles, using the same 

assumptions about daily refueling. Under the utility factor approach, the vehicle range on the 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-27

alternative fuel would be used to estimate the fraction of average daily travel that the range 

represents based on SAE Standard J2841. For example, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) 

with an all-electric range of 40 miles would be assigned a utility factor of 0.617, while a dualfuel natural gas vehicle (NGV) with a range on natural gas of 150 miles would be assigned a 

utility factor of 0.925. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]

We have several concerns with this proposed approach. First, it relies on the implicit assumption 

that the driving behavior of owners/operators of PHEVs is identical to that of owners/operators 

of dual-fuel CNG vehicles; an assumption which we do not believe is (or has been) demonstrably 

supported by any underlying data, yet should be. (A related question is whether the driving 

behavior and vehicle use characteristics of that element of the population sometimes termed 

“early technology adopters” is similar to, or different than, the “national average” database of 

travel characteristics from which the Utility Factors were created.)13 Second, although the use of 

the utility factor is an improvement over the simple 50/50 split used previously, this approach 

inherently assumes that the vehicle begins each day with a full state of charge (PHEVs) or a full 

natural gas tank (NGVs). It is unclear that this will occur in practice, and it may significantly 

overestimate the calculated benefits of the alternative fuel. Additionally, the vehicle range on the 

alternative fuel is established based on 2-cycle testing (i.e., the FTP and the highway fuel 

economy test) that is used to determine compliance with the CAFE and GHG standards. This 

clearly overestimates the range on the alternative fuel, and the proposed rule should be revised to 

reflect real-world vehicle range based on 5-cycle test results or other data that better represent 

real-world performance. This is not at all inconsistent with the use of 2-cycle tests for CAFE and 

GHG emissions compliance, as the real-world range would only be used to establish the 

appropriate utility factor, which, in turn, was based on real-world driving statistics. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, pp. 6-7]

EPA and NHTSA Should Not Contravene the Will of Congress by Allowing an Unlimited Fleet 

Fuel Economy Credit for MY 2020 and Later Dual-Fueled Vehicles

EPA and NHTSA also are requesting comment on whether to continue to use the 0.15 divisor for 

CNG and ethanol, and the petroleum equivalency factor for electricity, both of which the statute 

requires to be used through MY 2019, for model years 2020 and later dual-fueled vehicles. The 

use of these factors in conjunction with the utility factor approach discussed above artificially 

and substantially inflates the fuel economy of dual-fueled vehicles and thus provides an incentive 

to the automakers to produce these for CAFE compliance purposes regardless of other

consequences. In essence, the agencies are proposing that automakers may “...increase their 

calculated fleet fuel economy for dual-fueled vehicles by an unlimited amount using these 

flexibilities.”16 However, Section 32906 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 

(EISA 2007) phased-out the maximum fuel economy credit attributable to dual-fuel vehicles 

(except electric vehicles) that could be taken by manufacturers of those vehicles such that the 

credit was reduced from 1.2 mpg in model year 2014 (and previous model years) to 0.2 mpg in 

model year 2019 to “0 miles per gallon for model years after 2019” (Section 32906(a)(7)). 

Clearly, the EPA and NHTSA proposed treatment of model year 2020 and later dual-fueled 

natural gas vehicles is overly generous and inconsistent with the intent and will of Congress. It 

should be set aside. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]
EPA Response to Comments

6-28

It is also useful to note that for the many years that this CAFE credit incentive has been in place, 

dual-fueled vehicles (particularly those using natural gas) have continued to remain a negligible 

fraction of the fleet. In other words, the presence of the incentive has not contributed to the 

influx of dual-fueled CNG vehicles. (In fact, there are no OEM dual-fuel CNG vehicles offered 

today; only a few after-market conversion models.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]

13 Bradley, T.H and Quinn, C.W., Analysis of Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicle Utility Factors, 

Journal of Power Resources, 195 (2010) 5399-5408 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 6]

16 Note that E85 FFVs would need to demonstrate actual use of the alternative fuel to receive 

credit, via national average E85 and gasoline usage or manufacturer-specific data. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]

Organization: American Public Gas Association (APGA)

APGA also sincerely appreciates both agencies’ efforts to make changes to the Greenhouse 

Gas/Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards to further advance the development and 

deployment of alternative fueled vehicles (AFVs). However, APGA respectfully submits that 

both agencies consider changes to the NOPR (detailed below) to ensure that natural gas vehicles 

(NGVs) and infrastructure receive equal treatment to other AFV technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 1]

Natural gas vehicles (NGVs) can play a critical role in reducing America’s energy dependence 

on foreign oil, as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The combination of a secure, 

domestic, affordable fuel source that can be used by existing technology makes NGVs the logical 

choice for replacing our transportation fleet.

In order to ensure that NGVs can make these critical contributions to U.S. energy and national 

security, APGA respectfully submits the following comments on: Current Law, the 

EPA/NHTSA Proposal for 2012-2015, and the Proposal for the 2016-2019 period. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 2]

2012-2015 Current Law: APGA believes that as structured under current law, dedicated and bifuel NGVs appear to receive significant NGV Fuel Economy (FE) and Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions (GHG) credits due to the .15 multiplier. However, because of the fact that E85 Flex 

Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) are eligible to receive these credits and because Original Equipment 

Manufacturers (OEMs) will likely not be required to have additional FE and GHG credits, they 

will be of little value to NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 2]

Additionally, APGA respectfully requests clarification on the following issues:

• Can GHG credits for dedicated and bi-fuel NGVs be carried forward?

• Can the bi-fuel FE credits be carried forward?
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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• Can the FE credits for dedicated vehicles be carried forward? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9448-A1, p. 2]

APGA respectfully requests that clarification be provided for each of these issues. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 2]

EPA/NHTSA Proposal 2012-2015:

Given the issues with current law, APGA respectfully requests that EPA and NHTSA to extend 

the incentives provided in 2012 – 2015 specifically for dedicated and bi-fuel NGVs until NGV 

sales hit a level demonstrating market acceptance or commercialization. APGA is open as to how 

to properly define this metric but suggests that perhaps a sales threshold of 250,000 dedicated 

NGVs per year is practicable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 2]

Moreover, APGA also suggests that EPA and NHTSA establish a separate track for bi-fuel 

vehicles so that the credits for these vehicles are not overwhelmed by the FFV credits and subject 

to the caps of bi-fuel vehicles. APGA believes that the legal justification for this change is the 

same that they are offering for 2020 and beyond – i.e., the Utility Factor (UF) bases performance 

on real-world expectations not the seemingly arbitrary 50/50 allocation established in Energy 

Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 2]

APGA also urges EPA to provide an incentive for OEMs like Ford and GM and others who are 

facilitating the development of the aftermarket industry by offering Natural Gas-ready engines 

and setting up Qualified Vehicle Manufacturer (QVM) programs. The aftermarket vehicles 

largely are not covered by GHG and FE rules so the OEMs should receive some credit for 

facilitating increased availability of aftermarket vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, 

p. 2]

2016-2020 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 3]

APGA appreciates the changes the proposed rules make to current law. However, APGA does 

have two brief suggestions for improvement on two elements under EPA jurisdiction: the 

production multiplier and pickup truck rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 3]

EPA specifically solicited comments on whether it should provide a production multiplier for 

dedicated and bi-fuel NGVs for 2017 - 2021 – which would be a GHG credit. APGA strongly 

believes that this credit would be beneficial for NGVs if they are treated similarly under the rule 

as PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9448-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

EPA invited comments on providing a multiplier incentive for dedicated and/or dual fuel 

compressed natural gas vehicles. Global Automakers supports such an approach, which would 

address the near term price and fueling infrastructure obstacles faced by these vehicles in a 

manner consistent with the approach taken for electric and fuel cell vehicles. Furthermore, 

Global Automakers supports the extension of multiplier incentives to other alternative fuels as 
EPA Response to Comments

6-30

well, such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG) or biodiesel. With regard to dual fueled vehicles in 

general, we urge the agencies to reconsider the treatment of these vehicles as part of the planned 

mid-term review of the standards, at which point the need for particular incentives would be 

clearer. Whatever approach is adopted, we urge that EPA and NHTSA agree on a single, 

harmonized set of incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

First, the joint proposal prioritizes CO2 control at the expense of petroleum import reduction, 

which should be the paramount goal of these regulations. But the joint proposal fails to expressly 

acknowledge its preference; because of that lack of transparency, we fear that it will receive 

insufficient comment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 1]

CO2 VERSUS OIL IMPORT REDUCTION

In this joint rulemaking, both EPA and DOT go to considerable lengths to assert that although 

each agency is governed by different legislative authority, their proposals are for all relevant 

purposes similar in their requirements. Unfortunately this is not the case—the two agencies 

propose to impose fundamentally incompatible requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-

A1, p. 2]

Of course, similarity is not what one would expect from just a cursory familiarity with the 

underlying statutes—the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 

2007 (EISA)—and similarity is not in fact what results. The agencies acknowledge (fleetingly) 

the tradeoffs between climate control and oil import reduction, yet they fail to acknowledge the 

major contradictions that could easily develop under these joint proposed rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 2]

The easiest starting point for explanation is DOT’s own description of the central intent of the 

authorizing 2007 energy legislation: “the overarching purpose of the statute is energy 

conservation and reducing petroleum usage.” To that end, the statute provides for an alternative 

fuel “multiplier” that the 2007 Energy bill requires for model years to 2019 and which the 

agencies propose to continue well beyond. The multiplier—actually a 0.15 divisor—is a very 

powerful regulatory boost for domestically produced alternative fuels such as alcohols, natural 

gas or hydrogen. The mechanism works by dividing the miles per gallon (equivalent of gasoline) 

of the alternative fuel by 0.15, so that a car getting 15 miles per gallon on alternative fuel goes 

into the car company’s fleet average as a 100-mpg vehicle. As the preamble to the proposed rules 

also explains, a typical compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicle that gets 25 miles per 100 cubic 

feet of gas goes into the average as a car getting 203 mpg. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, 

p. 2]

These are big numbers with a potentially significant impact for lowering an automaker’s 

fleetwide average fuel economy if the company sells more than a few alternatively fueled 

vehicles. Assume, for example, that a car company sells 30% of its vehicles to fleet operators 

(limousines, delivery vehicles, taxi cabs, etc.), and that the company decides to convert, by 2025, 

half of those cars (i.e., 15% of total sales) to natural gas.6 If 15% of the company’s sales are 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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CNG-fueled, with a fuel economy of 203 mpg, the company could still achieve NHTSA’s 2025 

fuel economy requirement (49.6 mpg) so long as the remaining 85% of its sales were at least 

43.77 mpg. Similarly, a car company could convert 15% of its total sales in 2025 to vehicles that 

run on E30—a blend of 30% ethanol and 70% gasoline that allows for some increased engine 

efficiency because of its high octane. Given growing awareness of the benefits of E30 as a 

sustainable and cleaner fuel choice, the administrator could grant a multiplier to E30 that 

functions in the same way as the current 0.15 multiplier for alternative fuels.8 A multiplier of 0.7 

for E30, based on the 70% fuel content of E30, would allow the car company to meet NHTSA’s 

2025 requirement of 49.6 mpg with a fleet of cars that achieve only 47.4 mpg, so long as 15% of 

those vehicles were run on E30. These margins—6 mpg in the CNG example and 2.2 mpg in the 

E30 example—would provide car companies with flexibility to experiment with technological 

advances to satisfy consumer demand and reduce traditional pollution without fear of fines. That 

opportunity is precisely the type of incentive that the EISA, amending the Energy Policy and 

Conservation Act, was enacted to create: as NHTSA recognizes in its “portion” of the joint 

rulemaking proposal, EISA was enacted to promote fuel economy and displace foreign oil. It is 

irrelevant that companies may have made downsizing commitments in anticipation of continued 

high oil prices and may therefore never need the maximum leeway theoretically provided. The 

key is at the margins, and the need for car companies to steer clear of problems that cannot be 

anticipated, such as a changing consumer preferences and fluctuating oil prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9506-A1, pp. 2-3]

In practice, NHTSA’s incentive structure is a mirage, because it is nullified in substance by 

EPA’s greenhouse gas emissions regulations. Under the EPA’s proposed rules, a car company 

could not fully utilize the 0.15 multiplier, as hypothesized above, to convert 15% of its sales to 

CNG, because the total emissions for all cars sold, including gasoline-fueled cars making up 

85% of total sales, would far exceed EPA’s maximum emissions limits. The company’s total 

vehicle stock—15% CNG-fueled vehicles, with a statutory fuel economy of 203 mpg; and 85% 

gasoline-fueled vehicles, with a fuel economy of 43.77 mpg—would produce emissions 

averaging approximately 203 g/mi, 25% more than the EPA’s proposed 2025 limit of 163 

g/mi.10 Perhaps more to the point, today’s CNG vehicles could not satisfy EPA’s 2025 CO2

requirements, despite the multiplier, even though CNG vehicles produce almost 30% less CO2

emissions than gasoline vehicles do, because the EPA rules require a CO2 reduction by 2025 

larger than 30% (i.e., 163 g/mi verses 203 g/mi). Put another way, CNG vehicles alone would 

produce more CO2 than a gasoline car that has been downsized and otherwise redesigned to meet 

a163 g/mi CO2 rating.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 3]

In other words, the EPA’s rules eliminate the flexibility that EISA, as implemented by NHTSA, 

is supposed to create for automakers. EPA’s proposal caps car companies’ ability to utilize 

NHTSA’s 0.15 multiplier. EPA’s proposal effectively repeals much of DOT’s import-reduction 

efforts, and the 2007 statute on which DOT’s efforts are based. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9506-A1, p. 4]

As noted above, the agencies cannot avoid this conflict by asserting that car companies are 

unlikely to want to utilize the 0.15 multiplier to an extent that would violate EPA’s greenhouse 

gas limits. In fact, this scenario is much more likely than the agencies might admit, because the 

agencies own efforts to promote electric cars may be unrealistic. While the agencies presume 
EPA Response to Comments

6-32

that a significant segment of the market will move to hybrid and plug-in electric vehicles, actual 

electric car sales have fallen far short of the agencies’ hopes; even going forward, electric 

vehicles’ future is clouded by limited access to low priced rare metals essential to large scale 

battery production. Moreover, the future of solar and wind renewable energy is much less robust 

today than just a year ago, given the well publicized difficulties with solar investments and the 

very low price of natural gas. This could mean a much higher CO2 profile for electric vehicles 

over the long haul (beyond the first 200,000 which are exempt from the life cycle analysis that 

applies to other alternative fuels). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 4]

Indeed, while market forces are making electric vehicles less attractive, market forces are 

making alternative-fueled vehicles more attractive. Natural gas vehicles will benefit from the low 

price of natural gas, which stems largely but not exclusively from the gas shale revolution. At the 

same time, biofuels will become more popular: ethanol produces less CO2 than gasoline, on a 

life-cycle basis; but like natural gas, it still produces much more than a downsized gasoline car. It 

is not hard to envision a combination of natural gas and biofuel growth encouraged by the 2007 

legislation that quickly challenges the CO2 limits imposed by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9506-A1, p. 4]

Which regime takes precedence, EPA’s or DOT’s? The former is based on the Clean Air Act 

(CAA), the latter, on the 2007 EISA. The relevant CAA provisions were enacted as far back as 

1970 and 1990, when climate change policy-making was in its infancy; there has been no 

relevant CAA legislation since 1990. If there is an irreconcilable conflict between the statutes, 

then the EISA will likely control the CAA, because the later enactment ordinarily displaces the 

earlier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 4]

And in this case, the legislative history makes the EISA’s displacement of the CAA even clearer. 

The Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) that CO2 was a “pollutant” within the 

meaning of the CAA and thus subject to regulation upon a finding by EPA that CO2 endangers 

the environment—a finding subsequently made by EPA that is now on appeal. In the 

Massachusetts v. EPA litigation, the EPA had argued that they could not regulate greenhouse gas 

emissions because doing so would be equivalent to regulating fuel economy, a subject committed 

to DOT’s jurisdiction by the Energy Policy Conservation Act. The Supreme Court observed, 

without providing any details, that “there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both 

administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.” That hypothetical co-existence might 

have been possible in 2006, but Congress’s enactment of the EISA later that year ended any hope 

for co-existence. The EISA reaffirmed the 0.15 “multiplier,” and it stated Congress’s position 

that the country must “reduce the dependence of the United States on energy imported from 

volatile regions of the world that are politically unstable,” and that “increased energy production 

from domestic renewable resources would attract substantial new investments in energy 

infrastructure, create economic growth, develop new jobs for the citizens of the United States, 

and increase the income for farm, ranch, and forestry jobs in the rural regions of the United 

States.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, pp. 4-5]

As is often the case in state preemption and federal displacement cases, Congress did not address 

any possible conflict between the new CAFE statute and the much older CAA, which makes no 

mention of climate change or CO2 regulation. But coming after the Supreme Court decision, 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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there can be little question that if there is a conflict between the statutes, then the CAA must 

defer to the highly detailed 2007 legislation. At the very least, it is difficult to argue that EPA’s 

CO2 limits can be allowed to negate the multiplier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 5]

Without acknowledging this potential conflict, EPA does request comment on whether natural 

gas vehicles should receive a CO2 multiplier similar to that which EPA provides for electric 

vehicles. But EPA does not explain the basis for calculating the EV multiplier; it is therefore 

difficult to determine from the EV example how this should be done. An approach more clearly 

rooted in the statute would be to provide a CO2 multiplier equivalent to the 0.15 multiplier EISA 

provides for alternative fuels, and make it similarly available to fuels like ethanol and natural 

gas. The result would be a CO2 averaging number that companies could assign to non-petroleum 

cars in the same way that the 0.15 multiplier results in an mpg number for calculating a 

manufacturer’s fleetwide average fuel economy. The agencies could in this way keep the two 

regulatory regimes from potentially troublesome legal conflict. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9506-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Chrysler supports EPA’s proposals regarding natural gas vehicles and recommends that the 

Agencies take steps to further harmonize the greenhouse gas and CAFE program treatment of the 

vehicles. (Attachment 4)

Current statutes and regulations limit the regulatory support for natural gas vehicles (“NGV”s). 

Chrysler recommends that the agencies establish a category of “extended-range” dual fuel NGVs 

which would be treated as dedicated NGVs. Chrysler supports EPA’s proposal to weight dual 

fuel NGV fuel use using a utility factor-based approach. This approach is consistent with the 

expected real-world CNG utilization of this vehicle type. Given the additional expense of NGVs 

and the state of infrastructure development, Chrysler also supports EPA’s proposed incentive 

multipliers for the production of these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 6]

In his January 24, 2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama laid out a Blueprint for an 

America Built to Last, underscoring his commitment to an all-of-the-above approach that 

develops every available source of American energy. This commitment includes a plan to 

promote the safe, responsible development of the near 100-year supply of natural gas, supporting 

more than 600,000 jobs while ensuring public health and safety. Encouraging the development of 

the CNG refueling infrastructure and CNG vehicles supports this commitment. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 18]

Both dedicated and dual fuel compressed natural gas vehicles (“NGVs”) represent a significant 

opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to improve energy independence. The 

benefits of compressed natural gas include abundant domestic production, lower smog-forming 

and greenhouse gas emissions when burned, and a price advantage over gasoline. However, 

several roadblocks exist to the wide-spread adoption of NGVs. These include limited vehicle 

availability and a lack of public fueling infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 

18]
EPA Response to Comments

6-34

In the NPRM, the Agencies take positive steps towards enabling the successful deployment of 

NGVs, including the establishment of a utility factor-based method for dual fuel CNG vehicles. 

The Agencies can build on these positive first steps by developing a harmonized approach 

between the greenhouse gas and CAFE rules, extending EPA utilization of the NHTSA 15% fuel 

content factor under the greenhouse gas rules, and providing volume multipliers consistent with 

those proposed for electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 18]

A special category of “extended-range” NGVs should be created

Chrysler believes that the creation of a special “extended-range” category for certain dual fuel 

NGVs would be helpful in encouraging manufacturers to produce NGVs while providing 

adequate reserve range where a re-fueling infrastructure is not readily available. This type of 

vehicle could provide significant CNG range, with a reserve of conventional fuel to reduce 

customer range anxiety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 18]

Under current regulations, the incentives to undertake a dual fuel NGV are minimal for 

manufacturers which already meet the maximum dual fuel credit values through the production 

of dual fuel bio-fuel vehicles. If this special category of extended-range NGVs were treated, for 

regulatory purposes, as dedicated alternative fuel vehicles, this barrier would be removed and 

manufacturers would be incentivized to produce a greater number of NGVs, thereby also 

promoting infrastructure development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 18]

Chrysler supports the proposed utility factor-based methodology to weight greenhouse gas 

emissions for dual fuel NGVs.

EPA proposes to apply a utility factor-based methodology to weighting greenhouse gas 

emissions on CNG and conventional fuel for dual fuel NGVs. Chrysler agrees that this approach 

is appropriate for this type of vehicle and will more accurately reflect the relative use of CNG 

and conventional fuels. As noted above, once the proportion of CNG to conventional fuel driving 

range exceeds a certain threshold, the Agencies should treat this type of vehicle as a dedicated 

alternative fuel vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 18]

The utility factor-based calculation should be made available for greenhouse gas and CAFE 

compliance purposes starting 2012MY.

Treatment of NGVs as Advanced Technology Vehicles

EPA requests comment on the merits of providing multipliers to NGVs similar to those for 

electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Chrysler supports this approach to providing 

regulatory incentives for this beneficial technology. Such an approach not only improves the 

business case for NGVs, but also provides a more technology-neutral approach to reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions and oil consumption. Chrysler recommends that dedicated and 

“extended-range” natural gas vehicles receive at least the same multipliers as electric vehicles, 

and that dual fuel NGVs receive at least the same multipliers as plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 19]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-35

EPA is proposing “to allow the option, at the manufacturer’s discretion, to use the proposed 

utility factor-based methodology” for model year 2012-2015 greenhouse gas compliance 

calculations. Chrysler supports this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 19]

EPA further proposes to begin use of the utility factor-based approach for CAFE purposes 

starting in model year 2020. The goal of harmonizing greenhouse gas and CAFE compliance 

requirements would be best served if these vehicles were treated the same under both programs 

by using the utility factor-based approach in CAFE compliance calculations. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 19]

EPA should continue to apply the 15% fuel content factor to greenhouse gas emissions through 

2025 model year.

Under current regulations, for model years 2012 through 2015, the greenhouse gas emissions for 

dual fuel NGVs are multiplied by a 0.15 fuel content factor, similar to their treatment in the 

CAFE program. In the 2016 and later model years, this fuel content factor is discontinued for 

greenhouse gas emission purposes, resulting in reduced harmonization with the CAFE program. 

To increase harmonization of the two programs, and to incentivize production of NGVs, EPA 

should extend this 0.15 fuel content factor through the 2025 model year, consistent with the 

CAFE program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 19]

Organization: Clean Energy

PRESIDENT OBAMA'S COMMENTS ON NATURAL GAS VEHICLES ON JANUARY 26, 

2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.2]

On January 26, 2012, the President of our United States shared his views on the importance of 

natural gas use in vehicles at a Clean Energy refueling station serving the United Parcel Service 

in Las Vegas, Nevada. His remarks were so important, that we felt compelled to include them in 

our comments. Below is an important excerpt of his speech that day (emphasis in 'bold' added). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.2]

Now, part of my blueprint and what I want to focus on a little bit today is for on economy built to 

last with American energy. That's why we're here. For decades, Americans have been talking 

about how do we decrease our dependence on foreign oil. Well, my administration has actually 

begun to do something about it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]

Over the last three years, we negotiated the toughest new efficiency standards for cars and trucks 

in history. We've opened millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration. Right now, American 

oil production is the highest that it's been in eight years. Eight years. Last year, we relied less on 

foreign oil than in any of lost 16 years. That hasn't gotten a lot of attention, but that's important. 

(Applause.) We're moving in the right direction when it comes to oil and gas production. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]
EPA Response to Comments

6-36

And today, I'm announcing that my administration will soon open up around 38 million acres in 

the Gulf of Mexico for additional exploration and development, which could result in a lot more 

production of domestic energy. (Applause.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]

But as I said on Tuesday, and as the folks here at UPS understand, even with all this oil 

production, we only have about 2 percent of the world's oil reserves. So we got to have an allout, all-in, all-of-the-above strategy that develops every source of American energy - a strategy 

that is cleaner and cheaper and full of new jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]

Now, a great place to start is with natural gas. Some of you may not have been following this, 

but because of new technologies, because we can now access natural gas that we couldn't access 

before in an economic way, we've got a supply of natural gas under our feet that can last 

America nearly a hundred years. Nearly a hundred years. Now, when I say under our feet, I don't 

know that there's actually gas right here. (Laughter.) I mean in all the United States. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]

And developing it could power our cars and our homes and our factories in a cleaner and cheaper 

way. The experts believe it could support more than 600,000 jobs by the end of the decade. We, 

it turns out, are the Saudi Arabia of natural gas. (Applause.) We've got a lot of it. We've got a lot 

of it. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]

Now, removing that natural gas obviously has to be done carefully. And I know that there are 

families that are worried about the impact this could have on our environment and on the health 

of our communities. And I share that concern. So that's why I'm requiring - for the first time ever 

-- that aft companies drilling for gas on public lands disclose the chemicals they use. We want to 

make sure that this is done properly and safely. (Applause.) America will develop this resource 

without putting the health and safety of our citizens at risk. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-

A1, p.3]

But we've got to keep at it. We've got to take advantage of this incredible natural resource. And 

think about what could happen if we do. Think about an America where more cars and trucks are 

running on domestic natural gas than on foreign oil. Think about an America where our 

companies are leading the world in developing natural gas technology and creating a generation 

of new energy jobs; where our natural gas resources are helping make our manufacturers more 

competitive for decodes. We can do this. And by the way, natural gas bums cleaner than oil does, 

so it's also potentially good for our environment as we make this shift. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9511-A1, p.3]

So lost April, we issued II challenge to shipping companies /Ike UPS. We sold if you upgrade 

your fleets to run on less oil or no oil at all, we're going to help you succeed. We wont to help 

you with that experiment. So we started out with five companies that accepted the challenge. 

And of course, UPS was one of the first. That's how they roll. (Laughter and applause.) [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]

So less than a year later, we've got 14 companies an board, and together they represent 1 million 

vehicles on the rood. That's a lot of trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.3]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-37

We should do more, though. And that's why we're here today. First, let's get more of these 

natural gas vehicles on the road. Let's get more of them on the road. (Applause.) The federal fleet 

of cars is leading by example. Tums out the federal government has a lot of cars. (Laughter.) We 

buy a lot of cars. So we've got to help not only the federal government but also local 

governments upgrade their fleet. If more of these brown trucks are going green, mare city buses 

should, too. There's no reason why buses can't go in the some direction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9511-A1, p.3]

Second, let's offer new tax Incentives to help companies buy more clean trucks like these. 

(Applause.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.4]

Third, let's make sure all these new trucks that are running on natural gas hove places to refuel. 

That's one of the biggest impediments, is the technology. We know how to make these trucks, 

but if they don't have a place to pull in and fill up, they got problems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9511-A1, p.4]

So we're going to keep working with the private sector to develop up to five natural gas corridors 

along our highways. These are highways that have natural gas fueling stations between cities, 

just like the one that folks at UPS, South Coast Air and Clean Energy Fuels are opening today 

between Las Angeles and Salt Lake City. That's a great start. (Applause.) So now one of these 

trucks can go from Long Beach all the way to Salt Lake City. And they're going to be able to 

refuel along the way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.4]

And finally, to keep America on the cutting edge of clean energy technology, I want my Energy 

secretary, Steven Chu, to launch a new competition that encourages our country's brightest 

scientists and engineers and entrepreneurs to discover new breakthroughs for natural gas 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.4]

So we're going to keep moving on American energy. We're going to keep boosting American 

manufacturing. We're going to keep training our workers for these new jobs. But an economy 

that's built to last also means a renewal of the values that made us who we are: hard work, fair 

play and shared responsibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.4]

The Proposed Regulatory Incentives for NGVs Do Not Reflect the President's Vision [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.4]

Clean Energy found that the incentives outlined in the proposed rule for NGVs are not adequate 

or consistent, especially when compared to electric vehicle incentives, to support greater natural 

gas vehicle adoption and advancement as the President urged his Administration to do last 

month. For dedicated NGVs after 2016, the 0.15 divisor would no longer be available, so GHG 

incentives for manufacturers would be negligible. For dual fuel vehicles, the use of the 0.15 

divisor would end after 2015 - virtually eliminating the value of dual-fuel vehicle GHG benefits. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, pp.4-5]

If the purpose of these regulations is to encourage manufacturers to produce vehicles that 

produce fewer greenhouse gases, this aspect of the proposed rules makes little sense. NGVs 
EPA Response to Comments

6-38

produce less GHGs than comparable gasoline vehicles - especially when the upstream emissions 

are considered. Without continued use of the 0.15 divisor for dual-fuel GHG calculations, the 

incentive for manufacturers to produce NGVs would be significantly reduced. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

Clean Energy's Recommends the Following Changes [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

1. Provide Dual-Fuel NGVs a separate Track from E85 Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9511-A1, p.5]

The large number of E85 vehicles being manufactured, in effect, nullifies the value of other dualfuel vehicle FE credits. Clean Energy recommends that the agencies develop a separate track for 

dual-fuel NGVs to make the incentives truly effective. Dual-fuel NGVs (and any other 

alternative fuel vehicles) certified under this track should earn unlimited (uncapped) FE and 

GHG credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

2. Apply the Utility Factor for Dual-Fuel NGVs for GHG and FE Credits In 2012 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

The utility factor (UF) should apply to dual-fuel vehicles beginning with MY 2012 for GHG and 

FE credits as the agencies have articulated sufficient legal justification for adopting the use of the 

utility factors for fuel economy for MY 2020 forward, and EPA has already proposed making the 

utility factors retroactive back to 2012 for GHG certification. This same rationale supports 

extending the utility factor to the FE calculations prior to 2020. Providing one credit but not the 

other is highly problematic and is not consistent with the intent of harmonization under one 

single national fuel economy/greenhouse gas program. That is why some credit provisions in the 

rules (e.g., FFVs, EVs, hybrid trucks) attempt to provide periods where both incentives overlap. 

Combining the incentives and providing consistent treatment of FE and GHG credits for dualfuel NGVs is extremely important to ensure compliance with these extremely complex 

regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

3. Apply the 0.15 GHG Divisor Beyond 2015 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

The use of the 0.15 divisor for GHGs for both dual-fuel and dedicated NGVs currently 

terminates after 2015 making them ineffective. These credits must be extended beyond 2015 so 

that manufacturers have sufficient time to respond to them and they should remain in place until 

a certain market penetration is achieved. Such a phase-out of incentives would be consistent with 

the approach taken with respect to electric drive vehicles. We believe that providing these credits 

until a manufacturer's sale of NGVs reaches several hundred thousand (300,000 in the case of 

EVs) is warranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.5]

Sales Multipliers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.6]

In its notices, the agencies have asked for comment on whether to provide a production or sales 

multiplier for dedicated and dual-fuel NGVs. The agencies have proposed adopting such 

multipliers for other technologies (e.g., a multiplier of 1.3-2.0 is proposed for EVs, FCVs, and 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-39

PHEVs) for 2017 - 2021. In order to ensure equitable treatment, the agencies should provide 

similar credits to NGVs. And since EVs and other electric-drive vehicles already receive 

extremely generous treatment in the rules, we believe that the provision of a sales multiplier for 

NGVs should be in addition to any other credits also provided for NGVs in order to further 

encourage manufacturers to offer such vehicles. In terms of credit values, we support NGV 

America's proposal that dedicated NGVs should be treated like EVs and that dual fuel NGVs 

should be treated like PHEVs. The result of this more equitable treatment would be to provide a 

level playing field to incentivize the manufacture of all alternative fuel vehicles and not favor 

one technology over another. Therefore, we support NGV America's proposed multiplier credits 

for NGVs: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.6] [For the associated figure, please refer to 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.6]

Clean Energy once again would like to thank EPA and NHTSA for the opportunity to provide 

comments on this important rule. While we certainly appreciate the inclusion of NGV incentives 

in the current proposal, we strongly believe that they need to be enhanced in order to be 

effective. Further, we believe it is in the agencies' best interest to do so as NGVs provide an 

opportunity to significantly displace foreign oil, harness a domestic resource that can help create 

American jobs and boost American businesses, while significantly reducing greenhouse gas 

emissions generated on American roads. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, p.7]

Organization: Edison Electric Institute (EEI)

C. If Offered, Incentives for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles Should Not Be “Equivalent” to 

Incentives for EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 8]

EPA requests comment on the merits of providing similar incentives as proposed for EVs to 

dedicated and/or dual fuel compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75013. 

EPA should not provide similar multiplier incentives for CNG vehicles. While CNG vehicles 

reduce GHG emissions from LDVs, when compared to traditional fuel vehicles, they do not 

reduce tailpipe emissions of all pollutants (GHGs and criteria air pollutants) to 0.0 g/mile.4 

Accordingly, EPA should not allow manufacturers to count CNG emissions as 0.0 g/mile when 

calculating compliance averages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9584-A2, pp. 8-9]

CNG vehicles could play an important role to play in the diversification of transportation-sector 

fuels, particularly in the fleet and medium-duty sectors. If EPA believes that some sort of 

incentive for CNG vehicles is necessary, EPA must take into consideration the fact that CNG is 

comprised primarily of methane, a GHG that has a 100-year global warming potential (GWP) 25 

times greater than that of carbon dioxide. To the extent that EV incentives are discounted to 

reflect the upstream emissions related to electricity generation and transmission, any incentives 

for CNG vehicles also must be discounted to reflect not only methane’s higher GWP, but also 

the upstream emissions related to natural gas production and transportation.5 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9584-A2, p. 9]

Organization: Encana Natural Gas Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

6-40

Natural gas vehicles can play an important role in increasing fuel efficiency and reducing vehicle 

emissions. Compared with traditional and available alternative fuels, natural gas can deliver 

material emission reductions of greenhouse gases ('GHGs'), criteria pollutants and hazardous air 

pollutants. America's affordable, abundant natural gas resources can help the u.s. achieve greater 

energy independence in the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 1] 

As one of the largest producers of natural gas in North America and a strong proponent of clean, 

abundant, affordable, and domestic natural gas. Encana is an example of an early mover by 

adopting natural gas vehicles ('NGVs') in our own fleet. At the end of 2011, Encana had 15% of 

its vehicle fleet transitioned to dedicated or bi-fuel natural gas, along with 6 CNG and 1 LNG 

fueling stations operating to service its own fleet, those of our contractors and the public. Encana 

intends to continue transitioning its fleet vehicles to CNG, as well as opening new stations for 

CNG and LNG. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 1] 

Natural gas as a transportation fuel is not a new concept with growing utilization in U.s. fleet 

vehicles and wide acceptance internationally. Unlike other alternative vehicle technologies, 

natural gas vehicles are not in need of early stage technology support which has an inherently 

uncertain future. In fact, proven technology makes natural gas the recognized leader in 

affordable alternative fuels. To accelerate market acceptance, it is necessary to promote a clean 

domestic energy supply through production incentives. Incentives for Original Equipment 

Manufacturers ('OEMs') are critical to ensure market penetration of NGVs matches the pace of 

natural gas fueling infrastructure build-out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 2] 

As outlined in detail below, Encana respectfully requests that the EPA and NHTSA avoid 

picking technology winners and give all viable alternative fueled vehicles the opportunity for 

accelerated market acceptance. All alternative fueled vehicles should be treated equally. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 2] 

GHG and Other Emission Benefits of Natural Gas Fuel 

Clean burning natural gas offers many advantages over other fossil fuels such as gasoline and 

diesel. Natural gas is composed of nearly 100% methane, which has a simple molecular structure 

with one carbon atom per molecule. Due to this simple molecular structure, natural gas has the 

lowest carbon content of any of the commonly used fuels in the United States. Natural gas 

contains approximately 74% of the carbon content of gasoline per unit of energy produced (EPA 

2010). As such, replacing traditional transportation fuels with natural gas can reduce GHG 

emissions by about 25%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 2] 

Additionally, natural gas combustion produces lower emissions of several other pollutants 

including sulfur dioxide, hazardous air pollutants, volatile organic compounds, and fine 

particulate matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 2] 

Availability and Abundance of Natural Gas 

As noted above, natural gas is an abundant resource in North America presenting over 100 years 

of supply at current consumption levels. The U.s. Energy Information Agency ('EIA') recognizes 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-41

the significant new supplies of natural gas in the Annual Energy Outlook ('AEO') 2012 Early 

Release Overview forecasting greater demand for natural gas and lower prices over the same 

time period. Recent shale gas discoveries, technological innovation and the on-going expansion 

of the natural gas pipeline network are combining to make natural gas available throughout the 

continental United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 2] 

According to the EIA AEO 2011, production from shale formations in the United States grew by 

an average annual rate of 17% per year from 2000 to 2006. While 17% is impressive for those 

years, in the years from 2006 to 2010, United States shale gas production grew by an average 

annual growth rate of 48%1

. The natural gas industry will continue to find new shale gas 

resources and by using enhanced technologies such as horizontal drilling and hydraulic 

fracturing, this success rate will continue to outpace demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-

A2, p. 2] 

Affordability of Natural Gas [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 2] 

According to the AEO 2012 Early Release Overview, with increased domestic natural gas 

production, average annual wellhead prices for natural gas remain below $5 per thousand cubic 

feet (2010 dollars) through 2023 in the AE02012 Reference case. These projections are reflective 

of natural gas decoupling from international crude oil market prices. US consumers can now take 

advantage of the stable and low natural gas prices that will be realized through the life of this 

proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, pp. 2-3] 

Advantages of a Domestic Fuel Supply 

The US is in dire need of job growth to enable an economic recovery and the natural gas industry 

can provide a significant boost towards this end. In fact, during President Barak Obama's 2012 

State of the Union Address, he highlighted a potential to grow 600,000 jobs producing domestic 

oil and gas in this decade alone. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 3] 

Regulatory Incentives for 2012 2015 

Under existing regulations, the EPA and NHTSA attempt to provide incentives to encourage 

manufacturers to produce dual-fuel NGVs in 2012 -2015 by providing favorable treatment of 

greenhouse gas GHG emissions and fuel economy ('FE') credits. This is done, in part, by using a 

multiplier (0.15) to compute GHG credits and a divisor (0.15) to compute FE levels. The use of 

the 0.15 divisor was first authorized for FE calculations as part of the Alternative Motor Fuels 

Act of 1988 (P. 1. No. 100-94). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 3] 

As part of the current rulemaking, the EPA proposed modifying its regulations for MY 2012 and 

later years to improve the GHG credits provided for dual-fuel NGVs. The proposed change 

would include the use of a utility factor ('UF') to determine the percentage of time a vehicle is 

deemed to operate on alternative fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 3] 

Encana supports the EPA and NHTSA's previous decision to use the 0.15 factor to compute 

GHG and FE credits in MYs 2012 - 2015. We also support the proposal in this rulemaking to use 
EPA Response to Comments

6-42

UFs to compute GHG emissions (and eventually FE-see below) for dual-fuel vehicles. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 3] 

However, Encana wishes to point out several inconsistencies in the existing and proposed rules 

that undermine or eliminate the intended benefits of those rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9585-A2, p. 3] 

First, the benefit of the FE credits is limited or non-existent since there currently are restrictions 

on the total amount of fuel economy credits manufacturers can use for dual fuel and flex-fuel 

vehicles. Federal law prescribes an upper bound on the maximum amount of fuel economy credit 

a manufacturer may earn and phases-out the credits after 2019 (although they are reinstated 

without a cap beginning 2020). Because of the significant number of E85 vehicles offered by 

manufacturers, it is expected that manufacturers will reach their fuel economy credit limit 

primarily via their E85 products. Any additional offerings of dual fuel NGVs will probably not 

earn the automakers any usable FE credits in MYs 2012 - 2015. There needs to be another 

avenue - not blocked by E85 vehicles - for manufacturers to take advantage of the FE credits 

generated by dual fuel NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 3] 

Second, it is true that manufacturers that offer dual-fuel NGVs will earn enhanced GHG credits 

for MY 2012 - 2015 vehicles, and the value of these GHG credits will be further improved by the 

use of the proposed utility factors. However, manufacturers are unlikely to find these GHG 

credits sufficiently attractive to produce dual-fuel NGVs (even if the credits can be carried 

forward for use in later years) unless they can simultaneously earn enhanced GHG and FE 

credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 3] 

It should be noted that, for 2012-2015, dedicated NGVs would continue to be of value to OEMs. 

They qualify for FE credits and there is no cap that limits the amount of the credits that 

manufacturers can use. The 0.15 factor also applies to dedicated vehicles' FE and GHG 

calculations. While we certainly support the proposed incentives for dedicated vehicles, it is also 

important to provide meaningful incentives for dual-fuel NGVs. Most consumers and even some 

fleets are likely to prefer dual-fuel vehicles over dedicated vehicles while natural gas fueling 

infrastructure continues to expand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 

Regulatory Incentives for 2016 & Beyond 

The incentives proposed for 2016 and beyond (as explained below) do not provide adequate or 

consistent incentives for NGVs (especially as compared to electric vehicles (EVs')) and, 

therefore, are unlikely to be adequately effective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 

For dedicated NGVs, the proposed rules would continue to use the existing 0.15 FE divisor in 

2016 and beyond (as required by law). For GHG calculations, after 2016, the 0.15 divisor would 

no longer be available, so GHG incentives for manufacturers are negated while EVs, hybrids 

during electric operation and fuel cell vehicles continue to enjoy a 0 g/mi tailpipe emission 

rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-43

For dual fuel vehicles, the proposed rules would also continue to use the existing 0.15 divisor for 

FE in 2016 and beyond (as required by law). For FE purposes during 2016-2019, dual-fuel 

vehicles would be assumed to operate 50/50 on natural gas and petroleum. However, the need for 

FE credits, already limited by the cap and the production of E85 vehicles, would be further 

constrained by declining the cap. From 2020, the 50/50 rule would be replaced by the use of the 

UF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 

For GHG emissions for dual fuel vehicles, the use of the UF also would replace the use of the 

50/50 rule from 2012 and thereafter. However, the use of the 0.15 multiplier would end after 

2015 - virtually eliminating the value of dual fuel vehicle GHG benefits. This aspect of the 

proposed rule fails to satisfy one of the primary drivers of the rule: to encourage manufacturers 

to produce vehicles that produce fewer GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 

Encana's Recommended Changes 

1. Provide a Separate Track for Dual-fuel NGVs 

As discussed above, the large number of E85 vehicles, in effect, nullifies the value of dual-fuel 

vehicle FE credits. Encana recommends that, in order to make the incentives for dual-fuel NGVs 

truly effective, the agencies should develop a separate certification and FE calculation track for 

these vehicles. Dual-fuel NGVs, and any other alternative fuel vehicles except E85 vehicles, 

certified under this track would earn unlimited and uncapped FE and GHG credits. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 

2. Apply the Utility Factor for Both GHG and FE Beginning in 2012 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9585-A2, p. 4] 

The utility factors should apply to dual-fuel vehicles beginning with MY 2012 for GHG and FE 

credits. The agencies have articulated sufficient legal justification for adopting the use of the 

utility factors for fuel economy for MY 2020 forward, and the EPA has already proposed making 

the utility factors retroactive back to 2012 for GHG certification. This same rationale supports 

extending the utility factor to the FE calculations leading up to 2020. The EPA and NHTSA 

appear to understand that providing one credit but not the other is highly problematic. That is 

why some credit provisions in the rules (e.g., FFVs, EVs, hybrid trucks) attempt to provide 

periods where both incentives overlap. Combining the incentives and providing consistent 

treatment of FE and GHG credits for NGVs is extremely important in ensuring compliance with 

these extremely complex regulations and further promoting GHG reductions in the transportation 

sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, pp. 4-5] 

3. Continue the Use of the 0.15 GHG Multiplier Beyond 2015 

As discussed above, the use of the 0.15 multiplier for GHGs for both dual fuel and dedicated 

NGVs currently terminates after 2015. But, these credits in order to be effective must be 

extended beyond 2015. OEMs have already made preparations for MYs 2012-2015 and are 

unlikely to have sufficient time to respond to these incentives in that short timeframe. Therefore, 

to encourage more NGVs, the EPA and NHTSA should extend the credits provided for NGVs 
EPA Response to Comments

6-44

until a certain market penetration is achieved. The phase-out of such incentives should be 

consistent with the approach taken with respect to electric drive vehicles. Enhanced credits for 

NGVs would only expire after reaching a certain level of market penetration. We believe that 

providing these credits until a manufacturer's sale of NGVs reaches several hundred thousand 

(300,000 in the case of EVs) is warranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 5] 

4. Other Credit Provisions 

In addition to urging the agencies to adopt the incentive described above, we offer the following 

comments with respect to several other incentives proposed as part of this rulemaking (i.e., the 

use of sales multipliers, and advanced pickup truck credits). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-

A2, p. 5] 

Sales Multipliers 

In its notices, the agencies have asked for comment on whether to provide a production or sales 

multiplier for dedicated and dual fuel NGVs. The agencies have proposed adopting such 

multipliers for other technologies (e.g., a multiplier of 1.3 - 2.0 is proposed for EVs, FCVs, and 

PHEVs) for 2017 - 2021. These credits appear to be limited to GHG credits. In order to ensure 

equitable treatment, the agencies should provide similar credits to NGVs. We believe that a sales 

multiplier for NGVs should be in addition to any other credits also provided for NGVs in order 

to further encourage manufacturers to offer such vehicles. In terms of credit values, we believe 

that dedicated NGVs should be treated like EVs and that dual-fuel NGVs should be treated like 

PHEVs. Therefore, we propose the following multiplier credits for NGVs: [See table on p. 5 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 

5] 

• For dual fuel NGVs, provide a separate certification and FE calculation track and allow 

unlimited and uncapped FE and GHG credits; 

• Allow UF use for both GHG and FE calculations through 2019; 

• Extend the 0.15 GHG multiplier beyond 2015 and provide a phase out that is similar to EVs; 

• Provide Sales Multipliers for NGVs; 

Encana appreciates the opportunity to provide public comment on this rulemaking. Encana 

requests that the EPA and NHTSA incorporate the additional incentives described in this letter 

for natural gas vehicles. The following summarizes the additional incentives Encana believes 

will provide fair and equitable treatment of NGVs: [This comment can also be found in section 5 

of this comment summary] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9585-A2, p. 7] 

Natural gas vehicles can play an important role in increasing fuel efficiency and reducing vehicle 

emissions. Accelerating NGV market acceptance by providing NGV incentives for the OEMs 

will aid our country's goal of energy independence in the transportation sector. Compared with 

traditional and available alternative fuels, natural gas can also deliver material emission 
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reductions of GHGs, criteria pollutants and hazardous air pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9585-A2, p. 7] 

1 The Annual Energy Outlook 2011 is used since the AEO 2012 Early Release does not provide 

this level of granularity. 

Organization: Ford Motor Company

EPA further requested comment on the merits of providing similar multipliers for dedicated 

and/or dual fuel compressed natural gas vehicles. Ford supports providing multipliers for natural 

gas fueled vehicle, and further requests that the same multiplier be provided for dedicated and/or 

dual fuel liquefied petroleum gas vehicles. Both gaseous fuels provide substantial reductions in 

greenhouse gas emissions, as well as support the diversification of our energy supply, providing 

greater energy security. However, the vehicle technologies required to allow operation on these 

fuels is expensive, and the market availability of the fuel, similar to the availability of public 

charging stations for electric vehicles, remains very limited. Therefore, we believe that the 

multiplier is appropriate to encourage the investment in these technologies for broader new 

vehicles applications, and drive the volumes that will encourage greater investment in the 

necessary re-fueling infrastructure. We further recommend that the credit values for dedicated 

and bi-fuel gaseous vehicles be aligned with those provided for dedicated and bi-fuel electricity 

fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 18]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

MECA also believes that EPA’s proposed advanced technology vehicle credits should be 

expanded to include other ultra-low GHG vehicle technologies beyond battery electric vehicles, 

plug-in hybrids, and fuel cell electric hybrids. MECA believes that it is important for these 

advanced technology vehicle credits to be technology neutral in order to provide a more level 

playing field that encourages vehicle manufacturers to put into the market a range of 

technologies that can offer significant reductions in GHG emissions. Examples of other types of 

advanced vehicles that should also be considered for such credits are dedicated natural gas 

vehicles or vehicles that employ carbon emission capture strategies. MECA believes that it is too 

early in the development process for EPA to pick advanced technology vehicle “winners.” 

MECA urges EPA to expand the vision of advanced technology vehicle credits in its final rule 

with a more technology neutral approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.4]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG also suggests that EPA consider a multiplier for dedicated CNG vehicles. While electric 

and fuel cell vehicles are likely to dominate in the advanced technology vehicle space during this 

timeframe, both dual fueled and dedicated CNG vehicles take advantage of the United States' 

abundant supply of natural gas to provide an alternative energy source. As with battery electric 

and fuel cell vehicles, supporting CNG vehicles in the fleet will take substantial amounts of 

infrastructure development. The potential for CNG vehicles to contribute to the future U.S. 
EPA Response to Comments

6-46

vehicle fleet should be supported along with battery electric vehicles. Incentives should not be 

limited to dual-fueled vehicles using CNG. An incentive program should be applied to dedicated 

CNG vehicles as well.12 In light of the infrastructure needs to support these vehicles, DAG 

suggests that a multiplier of 3 be attached to dedicated CNG vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9483-A1, p. A-6]

12 Factory built CNG vehicles in the United States include the Honda Civic GX, the Chevy 

Express Van and the GMC Savanna Cargo Van. A number of vehicles are also supported by 

EPA Certified Conversion Kits, including the Dodge Ram 1500, Dodge Dakota, Chevy Impala, 

Chevy Silverado, Chevy Tahoe, Chevy Express, GMC Sierra, GMC Yukon, GMC Savanna, 

Cadillac Escalade, Ford Focus, Ford Transit Connect, Ford Fusion, Ford Expedition and Ford FSeries. These vehicles, and others, are candidates for factory built CNG support if provided with 

a GHG compliance credit.

Organization: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)

NPGA believes it is imperative that the proposed rulemaking clearly establish parity among the 

various alternative vehicle fuels, including autogas, thereby removing any fuel bias or 

disincentive toward the production or sale of autogas fueled vehicles. We further believe that any 

manufacturing incentive such as a Gallon-Gasoline Equivalency (GGE) multiplying factor be 

implemented immediately and when authorized by statute, extended through 2025. A GGE value 

for autogas normalizes comparisons of fuel efficiencies5and reduced CO2 emissions on a per 

mile basis for various alternative vehicle fuels. To this end, we believe the following discussion 

provides adequate substantiation to specifically codify a section in the final rule for autogas and 

its (GGE) value based upon energy density. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 3]

The need for a clearly codified GGE value and specific autogas provisions within the regulations 

is demonstrated by misleading government statistics comparing autogas to other alternative 

vehicle fuels. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Agency compares vehicle fuels in 

native units per fuel type6. Using estimates for native units per fuel type, autogas consumption 

for 2009 is found to be 175,177 thousand gallons and CNG is found to be 24,038 million cubic 

feet. However, using EIA’s thousand gasoline-gallon equivalent values7, autogas appears to have 

lost considerable market share disproportional to other fuels that have a GGE value. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 3]

The most dire consequence of omitting a GGE factor for calculating autogas CAFE credits 

results from the compounding effect realized when the Congressional allowance afforded 

alternative fuels to account for only 15% of fuel consumed is applied without the appropriate 

GGE value compensating for AFV energy densities. The 15% rule effectively increases the miles 

per gallon of autogas consumed by a factor of 6.67. And, applying the GGE factor to autogas 

miles per gallon produces a total CAFE credit equal to “miles per 9.2 gallons of propane (1.38 x 

6.667).” For illustrative purposes, this means that for every dedicated propane vehicle that an 

OEM sells it would be able to claim a theoretical CAFE credit of 9.2 times the base vehicle’s 

actual mpg. For every 20 mpg base-gasoline vehicle that an OEM manufactures using autogas, 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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they receive a fleet credit of 6.67 miles per gallon of fuel consumed yielding an effective 133 

mpg for their CAFE number. However, if the GGE factor of 1.38 is provided and applied for 

dedicated autogas fueled vehicles, the combined credits produce an effective CAFE credit of 184 

mpg per vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, pp. 3-4]

The following derivation compares autogas to gasoline on an energy content basis. Based upon 

the energy contents of autogas and gasoline, NPGA proposes that the CAFE standards 

specifically incorporate a GGE factor of 1.38 for autogas. [The derivation and Table 1 can be 

found on p. 4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9482-A1, p. 4]

The need to promote a GGE for propane is further supported by the similar approach for 

evaluating GHG emissions based upon energy density, i.e. “Carbon Equivalent Units” used by 

the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration9

. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9482-A1, p. 4]

Full-Fuel-Cycle Analysis

NPGA believes it is imperative that the EPA/NHTSA establish principles implementing fullfuel- cycle (FFC) analysis consistent with accepted scientific findings and other government 

agencies. Evaluating GHG emissions from the vehicle’s tailpipe is consistent with current 

evaluation methodologies, but does little to accurately measure consumption of primary energy 

resources, emission of GHGs or smog forming pollutants attributable to the production of 

gasoline or the generation of electricity. Full-fuel-cycle measurement (well-to-wheels) captures 

the additional energy consumption and emissions derived from the extraction, processing, 

transportation, conversion, and distribution of energy to the vehicle. For electric and plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles (EV and PHEV) that re-charge their batteries using power from the 

utility grid, point-of-use measurement such as a vehicle’s tailpipe misleads the consumer to 

believe the tailpipe is the only source of emissions and engine efficiency is the only source of 

energy consumption when, in fact, they are not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 4]

NPGA commented on the EPA/NHTSA’s previous proposed rulemaking10 on vehicle labeling 

discussing the positive attributes associated with using full-fuel-cycle energy metrics. We believe 

the EPA/NHTSA vehicle labels should provide consumers the more robust accounting of actual 

GHG emissions and energy efficiencies found with FFC measurement. We strongly believe to 

only present greenhouse gas performance values consistent with emissions measured at the 

tailpipe erodes any desired transparency of evaluating true fuel efficiencies and GHG emissions. 

In our opinion, to continue using point-of-use evaluations for vehicle emissions and fuel 

efficiencies is inaccurate and conveys only a partial story further promoting fuel biases. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, pp. 4-5]

Scientific Findings

NPGA supports the use of the Source Energy and Emissions Analysis Tool11 (SEEAT) 

developed by the Gas Technology Institute (GTI). This computer modeling tool calculates source 

energy and GHG emissions attributable to point-of-use energy consumption by vehicle fuel type. 
EPA Response to Comments

6-48

SEEAT includes a source energy and carbon emission calculation methodology that accounts for 

primary energy consumption and related emissions for the full-fuel-cycle of extraction, 

processing, transportation, conversion, distribution, and consumption of energy. GTI researchers 

have calculated source-based fuel economies for various vehicle options and found more rational 

comparisons of vehicle efficiencies using ‘Source Fuel Economies’ than point-of-use fuel 

economies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 5]

Another scientifically accepted modeling tool is the Greenhouse Gas, Regulated Emissions and 

Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model developed by Argonne National Laboratory12. 

The GREET model estimates the upstream portion of the life-cycle GHG emissions of various 

vehicle fuels. This model calculates emissions in grams per million Btu, of multiple pollutants, 

including CO2, CH4, and N2O to derive a total CO2 equivalent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9482-A1, p. 5]

NPGA supports the Department of Energy’s intended use of the GREET model to perform the 

national impact analyses and environmental assessments included in the review of proposed 

energy conservation appliance standards. Further affirming our support of the GREET model, the 

Propane Educational Research Council (PERC) conducted a study using the GREET model 

(version 1.8c) comparing autogas to other fuel sources. The study, titled “Propane Reduces 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Comparative Analysis 2009” looked at thirteen (13) different 

applications where autogas was used including a GM 6.0L engine, Ford 150, Ford 250, school 

buses, forklifts, and commercial mowers. The comparisons looked at energy end-use and annual 

life-cycle GHG emissions for a variety of fuel sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 

5]

A comparison by GTI found that the GREET and SEEAT vehicle source energy factors indicate 

excellent agreement between the two methodologies for both full-fuel-cycle efficiency factors 

and GHG emission factors. Minor differences appear to be based on underlying data sources and 

default values. Based on the national average fuel mix for electricity calculated using GTI’s 

SEEAT, the source energy conversion factor for electricity is 3.29 Btu/Btu. Conversion factors 

for fossil fuels directly consumed at the point-of-use are as follows: Natural gas: 1.09 Btu/Btu; 

Autogas: 1.12 Btu/Btu; Fuel oil: 1.13 Btu/Btu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, pp. 5-6]

It is NPGA’s contention that establishing a Gallon-Gasoline Equivalency for autogas, a clean 

burning alternative fuel, will provide automakers an incentive to manufacture autogas fueled 

light-duty vehicles. However, due to the lower energy density of autogas compared to gasoline, 

any legislation based upon “miles per gallon” obscures the positive benefits of using autogas. 

The CAFE standards provide a GGE value for CNG comparing equivalent energy densities 

instead of miles per equivalent volume of fuel and 49 U.S. Code 32905 provides gallon 

equivalents for gaseous fuels. In order to achieve parity among other alternative fuels, we believe 

that autogas should be treated comparably to CNG and other alternative fuels by providing its 

own unique section of regulation including its own GGE value based upon energy 

density. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 6]
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NPGA respectfully requests the EPA/NHTSA codify by final rulemaking a Gallons of Gasoline 

Equivalency value of 1.38 for propane autogas establishing unambiguous parity among 

alternative light-duty vehicle fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-A1, p. 6]

We also urge you to evaluate energy efficiency and GHG emission using FFC analysis thereby 

providing a complete and robust energy consumption and GHG emissions profile for all lightduty vehicles. Limiting emissions analysis to point-of-use metrics (tailgate emissions) ignores 

the fact that most energy losses associated with non-gaseous fuels, e.g. electricity, occur 

upstream and ignore greenhouse gas emissions. NPGA urges the EPA/NHTSA to account for 

upstream production and distribution emissions by applying readily available and scientifically 

accepted modeling technologies such as GREET and SEEAT. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9482-

A1, pp. 6-7]

In today’s world, consumers are repeatedly faced with making choices that are environmentally 

friendly and this observation is even more prevalent in the automotive industry. The shift by 

various federal agencies to a full-fuel-cycle analysis facilitates the ability of consumers to make 

informed decisions whom otherwise might not be aware of the environmental shortcomings of 

point-of-use energy analysis and labeling. Accurate and unbiased accounting of motor vehicle 

fuel efficiency and GHG emissions can be achieved today by using tools developed and accepted 

by the scientific community and readily available to the public. We believe these computer 

modeling tools should be harmonized across all federal agencies. And, to that end, we 

recommend that the promulgation of future GHG emissions and CAFE standards be established 

immediately recognizing FFC analysis and GGE energy values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9482-A1, p. 7]

5 49 U.S.C. 32905 § 538.8 Gallon Equivalents for Gaseous Fuels

6 U.S. Energy Information Administration – Independent Statistics & Analysis, Renewable & 

Alternative Fuels, Estimated Consumption of Vehicle Fuels in Native Units, by Fuel Type, 2011

7 U.S. Energy Information Administration – Independent Statistics & Analysis, Renewable & 

Alternative Fuels, Estimated Consumption of Vehicle Fuels in the United States, by Fuel Type, 

2011

9 Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2007. Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 

Program.

10 NPGA 11/22/2010 Comments: (Docket ID Nos. EPA–HQ–OAR–2009–0865 and NHTSA 

2010–0087 Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label)

11 Source Energy and Emissions Analysis Tool, Carbon Management Information Center; Gas 

Technology Institute, July 2011
EPA Response to Comments

6-50

12 The Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) 

Model. Argonne National Laboratory, Center for Transportation Research. UChicago Argonne, 

LLC.

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

3. Dual Fuel Natural Gas Vehicles Require Further Constraints on Eligibility to Demonstrate 

Actual Natural Gas Use

NRDC believes that any emissions credits awarded to natural gas vehicles should be 

commensurate with real-world GHG reductions. Dual fuel natural gas vehicles that can be 

powered by onboard supplies of either natural gas or gasoline must have emission scores that 

reflect the actual use of each fuel. The use of a utility factor to represent the use of each fuel is a 

reasonable approach but further constraints on vehicle design on dual fuel natural gas vehicles 

must be included in the program for them to be eligible for separate natural gas and petroleum 

emissions accounting. If the design constraints are not met, the emissions ratings for dual fuel 

natural gas vehicles should be for operation only on gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-

A2, p. 13]

The design constraints help ensure that the vehicle preferentially operates on natural gas. Dual 

fuel natural gas vehicles are powered by a combustion engine that can switch between gasoline 

and natural gas. If natural supplies are unavailable (or higher priced), then operation on gasoline 

might dominate. EPA has suggested several constraints that should be considered for adoption 

including “placing a minimum value on CNG tank size or CNG range, a maximum value on 

gasoline tank size or gasoline range, a minimum ratio of CNG-to-gasoline range, and requiring 

an onboard control system so that a dual fuel CNG vehicle is only able to access the gasoline fuel 

tank if the CNG tank is empty.”37 NRDC urges the agency to adopt some or all constraints 

before making dual fuel natural gas vehicles eligible for natural gas emissions ratings. The 

agencies should consider prioritizing a minimum requirement for natural gas-to-gasoline range 

of at least 80 percent on natural gas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 13]

Organization: NGV America

These comments primarily focus on the incentives proposed in the rules. We strongly support the 

agencies’ efforts to craft incentives that will encourage automakers to accelerate the introduction 

of transformational technologies like natural gas vehicles (NGVs). In particular, we applaud the 

agencies for the incentives that have been proposed with respect to dedicated and dual-fuel 

NGVs. While much of the focus is on encouraging and facilitating the development of electric 

vehicles, the proposed rules do include some important, comparable provisions regarding the 

development of NGVs. We are encouraged by the inclusion of some incentives and the apparent 

recognition that natural gas fueled cars and trucks can and should be a part of transforming the 

U.S. automotive fleet. However, we believe that the incentives as proposed should be modified 

in order to be effective beyond the time period set out in the proposed rules and also to provide 

equitable treatment for NGVs. Given President’s Obama’s recent remarks concerning the 

benefits of NGVs and his desire to accelerate their use, we are extremely hopeful that the 
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agencies will welcome the proposed changes we have offered here. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, pp. 1-2]

At the outset it is important to clarify what we mean about transformational technologies. 

Transformational technologies in our view are those applications that have the potential to 

greatly change the transportation sector as it exists today. Any technology that has the ability to 

significantly reduce greenhouse gas and other emissions, lessen dependence on foreign oil, 

position the U.S. as an exporter of vehicle technology, and improve the economic well-being of 

our economy should be viewed as transformational. Natural gas and electric vehicles have these 

attributes As such, we believe any effort to stimulate the market for new technologies must be 

equitable in its treatment of natural gas and electric vehicles, and should not favor one over the 

other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 2]

A. Benefits of Encouraging NGVs

An Abundant and Economical Domestic Resource

Reliance on foreign oil exacts a high toll on the U.S. in terms of direct economic costs and 

indirect energy security costs. During the three-year period from 2008 through 2010, the U.S. 

spent nearly $700 billion on imported petroleum. More recently, the cost of imported oil has 

been much higher as oil prices have once again exceeded $100 per barrel. In the coming decade, 

the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) forecasts total expenditures for petroleum imports to 

top $3.3 trillion dollars.1 America’s reliance on oil not only affects our trade balance but makes 

the U.S. vulnerable to price spikes and supply disruptions. And high oil prices results in a 

windfall for regimes that may not be friendly to the America. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-

A1, p. 2]

Fortunately, the U.S. has an unprecedented opportunity to displace petroleum with domestic 

natural gas. As President Obama recently declared, the U.S. is “the Saudi Arabia of natural gas.” 

The EIA, the Potential Gas Committee and other expert bodies now estimate that the U.S. has up 

to a 100 year supply of natural gas. The Potential Gas Committee’s 2011 bi-annual report 

indicates that the U.S. now has a total future supply of 2,170 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 

This is 89 Tcf more than estimated in the 2009 report. As was the case with the 2009 report, the 

2011 report includes the highest resource estimate in the Committee’s history. The availability of 

this significant domestic resource provides an unprecedented opportunity to solve a number of 

pressing national objectives like transforming the transportation sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9461-A1, pp. 2-3]

Increasing the use for natural gas in transportation will keep our economy growing by supporting 

new jobs and economic development. In 2008, U.S. production of 20 Tcf of natural gas 

supported nearly 3 million jobs.2 In his State of the Union remarks before Congress, the 

President indicated that new development of natural gas could result in 600,000 new jobs in this 

decade alone. Thus, increasing demand for natural gas as a transportation fuel will help put more 

people to work and ensure that we put this natural gas to good use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, p. 3]
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Natural gas also benefits our economy because it is a low cost energy that helps businesses grow 

while at the same time controlling costs. Natural gas is priced much lower than petroleum. The 

two fuels no longer track one another -- and haven’t for many years. The current contract price 

for natural gas (NYMEX) is trading at less than $3.00 per million Btu, and some analysts believe 

it could go below $2 per MMBtu. At $3.00 per MMBtu, the price of natural gas equates to a perbarrel of oil price of only $17.40 at a time when oil is trading near $100 a barrel. The low price 

of natural gas translates into significant savings for fleets and consumers who use natural gas to 

fuel their vehicles. In most areas of the country, natural gas sells at about a $1.50 discount 

compared to gasoline and diesel fuel. EIA’s long-term forecast projects that differential between 

natural gas and petroleum fuels will remain as high as $2 per energy-equivalent unit. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 3]

Environmental Benefits

The same clean burning properties that make natural gas an excellent fuel for traditional 

applications like electricity generation, residential heating, and industrial applications, also make 

it an excellent fuel for transportation. Natural gas burns cleaner than gasoline and diesel fuel and 

most other transportation fuels as well. Not surprisingly, the first vehicles certified to the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) ultra-low emission, super-ultra low-emission and Tier 

2/Bin 2 standards were NGVs. The natural gas-powered Honda Civic GX has won numerous 

awards for its outstanding environmental performance. In 2011, the Civic GX was rated the 

“Greenest Car in America” by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy – for an 

amazing eight years in a row! It also was named the 2012 car of the year by the Green Car 

Journal. Compared to the gasoline Civic, the natural gas-powered Civic produces 95 percent 

fewer emissions of volatile organic compounds and 75 percent less emissions of nitrogen oxides 

– pollutants that contribute to ozone formation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, pp. 3-4]

The environmental benefits of NGVs are expected to continue to improve as new automotive 

technologies become available. EPA’s own website describes natural gas as an inherently cleaner 

transportation fuel. That means that given the same amount of emissions control and 

technological advancement, natural gas should always produce lower emission than comparable 

gasoline and diesel-fueled vehicles. As long as the internal combustion engine is with us and as 

long as refinements to it are made, natural gas will be the cleanest transportation fuel to use in it. 

A National Academy of Science (NAS) report3 that analyzed vehicle technologies as of 2005 and 

expected by 2030, projected that, with further expected improvements in vehicle technology and 

fuel efficiency, natural gas powered vehicles will provide superior benefits in terms of criteria 

pollutant reductions compared to nearly all other types of vehicles, even electric and plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles. The reason, in part, is due to the fact that the internal combustion engine 

will continue to get much more fuel-efficient and cleaner, and internal combustion engines can 

always use natural gas. Electric vehicles sometimes use electricity produced from cleaner natural 

gas but they will likely continue to use electricity produced from coal, offsetting the benefits that 

otherwise would be provided by such vehicles. Electric vehicles also require more energy to 

produce them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 4]

Natural gas vehicles will play a key role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Per unit of 

energy, natural gas contains less carbon than any other fossil fuel, and, therefore, produces lower 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-53

carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per vehicle mile traveled. While NGVs do emit methane, 

another principal greenhouse gas, the increase in methane emissions is more than offset by a 

substantial reduction in CO2 emissions compared to other fuels. The California Air Resources 

Board (CARB) has conducted extensive analyses on this issue, and has concluded that burning 

compressed natural gas produces about 22 percent less GHGs than burning diesel, and 29 percent 

less than burning gasoline.4

The comparisons are based on well-to-wheels analyses, and include 

methane emissions. These reductions are equal to -- or better than -- some renewable liquid fuels. 

Most of the available studies show that given similar fuel efficiency, NGVs fueled by domestic 

natural gas will deliver about 20–30 percent improvement in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 4]

Another important benefit of NGVs is that, in addition to the tailpipe reductions, they also 

provide upstream emission reductions of greenhouse gases. Therefore, any direct tailpipe 

reductions provided by introduction of NGVs resulting from this rulemaking will be increased by 

the additional emission offsets associated with upstream activities relative to petroleum upstream 

emissions, which these rules do not take into account. The fact that NGVs deliver these upstream 

emission reductions provides a rationale and quantifiable justification for providing additional 

emission reduction credits for NGVs in this rulemaking. These are real benefits that are provided 

not only by the NGVs incentivized by this rulemaking but also by NGVs sold after any 

incentives have expired. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 5]

The Potential for Natural Gas Vehicles

The current market for NGVs here in the U.S. is relatively small. Today, NGVs (and electric 

vehicles) are not yet economic for most owners of light-duty vehicles. The primary reason is that 

these vehicles have higher initial purchase costs than conventionally fueled vehicles, but are not 

driven enough miles or consume enough lower-cost fuel for the fuel cost savings that they offer 

to offset this higher purchase cost in a reasonable number of years. In fleet applications, 

however, where fuel consumption per vehicle is much greater, NGVs can be economically 

attractive to an increasing percentage of businesses and government agencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 5]

Outside the U.S., demand for NGVs is growing at a rapid pace, and much of this growth is in the 

light-duty vehicle market. In the last seven years, the global market for NGVs has more than 

tripled with a compound growth rate of over 17 percent per year. In fact, NGVs are the fastest 

growing alternative to petroleum vehicles in the world. In 2003, there were only about 2.8 

million NGVs globally. Today, there are over 14 million NGVs in operation worldwide. This 

rapid growth points to the fact that rapid scaling up of NGVs is possible. The NGV Global (the 

international NGV association) forecasts that, by 2020, there will be 65 million NGVs on the 

world’s roads. Unfortunately, the U.S. currently ranks fourteenth in the world in total number of 

NGVs – despite having more vehicles on the road than all the other fourteen countries 

combined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 5]

As noted above, most of the new NGVs sold outside the U.S. are light-duty vehicles. Outside the 

U.S., tax and other government policies make NGVs even more economically attractive to 

consumers. As a result, in overseas markets, NGVs are now available from almost all major 
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OEMs, including: Ford, GM, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, Fiat, Volkswagen and Mercedes. 

In 2009, Fiat offered 14 separate NGV models, and more than 100,000 NGVs were sold in that 

year in Italy alone, comprising some 7 percent of the new vehicle market. Most U.S. 

manufacturers currently offer NGVs in Europe, South America and Asia, but only Honda 

currently offers a light-duty OEM NGV product in the U.S. -- the Honda Civic Natural 

Gas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 5]

General Motor currently offers the GMC medium-duty Savana and Chevrolet Express vans as 

fully- backed, factory produced NGVs rated above 8,500 lbs. GVWR. And later this year, 

General Motors and Chrysler will begin offering factory built natural gas powered pickup trucks. 

As these offerings show, U.S. automakers certainly have the capability to produce NGVs – IF the 

proper incentives are in place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 6]

Recent events are clearly pointing to a viable domestic market for light-duty NGVs. We are 

particularly encouraged by the unprecedented Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 

concerning NGVs that has now been signed by ten state governors. The MOU urges U.S. 

automakers to expand their offerings of NGVs and attempts to stimulate the market for such 

vehicles by signaling the intent of these states to purchase NGVs. As noted above, in just the past 

two years, GM and Chrysler have announced plans to produce NGVs for the U.S. market. Honda 

also has expanded its production capacity for the Honda NGV offering, and is now marketing the 

car to consumers as well as fleets. Another telling factor is the significant growth in the 

aftermarket offerings here in the U.S., where nearly a dozen manufacturers offer systems to 

retrofit light-duty vehicles to operate on natural gas. These offerings include systems for the 

Fusion, Focus, Impala, Malibu, Milan, Transit Connect, in addition to a variety of popular pickup 

truck offerings. Ford, while not offering a factory NGV, has been working closely with the 

aftermarket industry to ensure that aftermarket systems offered for its vehicles meet its 

demanding standards for quality. These activities clearly show that there is very strong interest in 

bringing more NGV products to the U.S. passenger car and light-duty segment. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 6]

NGVAmerica believes that there could be a substantial market for NGVs in all applications, 

including the light-duty passenger car market. The most immediate opportunity for displacing 

petroleum and increasing the use of natural gas as transportation fuel lies with light-, mediumand heavy-duty fleets – especially trucks, buses and other heavier vehicles. America currently 

has a large selection of medium- and heavy-duty NGVs available in the U.S. and the market for 

natural gas trucks is beginning to ramp up. As a result, natural gas fueling infrastructure 

development is once again on the rise, recently exceeding 1,000 stations. More importantly, 

major industry players are now laying the groundwork for a national fueling infrastructure 

connecting major transportation routes across the country. Furthermore, President Obama’s 

Blueprint for Energy, announced on January 26th, now calls for development of additional 

natural gas corridors. In that announcement, the President also called upon the Energy 

Department and national laboratories to focus their energies on bringing about technological 

breakthroughs in the use of natural gas as a transportation fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, p. 6]
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These efforts will directly benefit the light-duty NGV market since increased fueling 

infrastructure is one of the key factors limiting the market for NGVs in the passenger car market. 

The economic outlook appears to be excellent. Lower natural gas prices and lower first cost 

premiums (brought about by mass production, economies of scale and more competition) mean 

that, in the future, even passenger cars could become economic. Adopting policies that 

encourage manufacturers to produce NGVs, just like policies that encourage manufacturers to 

offer EVs, are critically important. Tax policy certainly helps, and many in Congress -- as well as 

the President -- have indicated they support tax incentives for NGVs. But the Administration 

could do even more by adopting incentives for NGVs as part of this rulemaking. Just as with 

EVs, regulatory incentives combined with these other factors would help accelerate the 

introduction of NGVs into the light-duty passenger car market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, pp. 6-7]

Pathway to Hydrogen Fueled Vehicles

In addition to providing many near-term benefits, NGVs also likely will play an important role in 

facilitating the market penetration of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). Since the first wave of 

NGV adoption in the 1990s, the development of NGVs – and particularly natural gas refueling 

infrastructure – has long been recognized as a key bridge technology on a “path to 

hydrogen.”5

Natural gas is largely composed of hydrogen, with four hydrogen atoms for every 

carbon atom in a molecule of methane. Due to the chemical and physical similarities of these two 

gases, they share a number of technology synergies, so that the proliferation of NGVs and 

natural gas fueling infrastructure will facilitate and accelerate deployment of FCEVs. Indeed, the 

development of the NGV market serves to reduce or eliminate all four of the near-term market 

barriers to FCEV adoption identified by the Agencies: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 

7]

• Low-GHG Fuel Production and Distribution Infrastructure: NGV refueling infrastructure 

utilizes most of the same hardware (compressors, storage tanks, dispensers) that will be 

used to dispense hydrogen fuel, allowing natural gas refueling stations to be 

straightforwardly adapted for hydrogen dispensing. In fact, virtually all the hydrogen 

fueling component manufacturers are NGV fueling component manufacturers. Natural 

gas can also be used as a feedstock for hydrogen fuel production via distributed steam 

reforming at the refueling station, a fuel production pathway identified by the U.S. 

Department of Energy’s FreedomCAR & Fuel Partnership as the “most viable approach 

to begin building [the] hydrogen market in near term.” 6Distributed steam reforming of 

natural gas for hydrogen production also yields just half of the lifecycle GHGs as 

production of hydrogen via electrolysis using grid electricity, according to Argonne 

National Laboratories’ GREET model.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 7]

• Fuel Cost: Production of hydrogen from natural gas via distributed steam reformers also 

represents the “lowest current cost” hydrogen pathway compared to electrolysis and other 

methods, according to the FreedomCAR roadmap.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-

A1, p. 8]

• Vehicle Cost: NGV development will help reduce FCEV vehicle costs by advancing onboard gaseous storage and fuel management technologies, allowing more fuel to be 

stored safely with less weight and/or space. In a sense, the FCEV represents the ultimate 
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union of NGVs and EVs, with EVs providing the electric drive-train and NGVs ensuring 

the development of hydrogen storage technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, 

p. 8]

• Consumer Acceptance: By increasing familiarity and comfort with gaseous fuel vehicles 

and refueling, NGVs will help pave the way for consumer acceptance of FCEVs. NGV 

deployment will also serve the role of developing experience with gaseous-fueled 

vehicles for auto dealers, mechanics, and other important stakeholders that directly 

interface with consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 8]

Thus, the market penetration of NGVs helps ensure that the necessary fuel and technologies will 

be in place for FCEVs, accelerating and lowering the costs of this transition. Much like the role 

that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are playing in facilitating adoption of EVs, NGVs – and 

particularly dual-fuel NGVs (which mitigate “range anxiety” for early adopters) are essential for 

facilitating the market penetration of FCEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 8]

B. Adopting Effective Regulatory Incentives

Regulatory Incentives for 2012 – 2015

Under the existing regulations, EPA and NHTSA attempt to provide incentives to encourage 

manufacturers to produce dual-fuel NGVs in 2012-2015 by providing favorable treatment of 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emission and fuel economy (FE) credits. This is done, in part, by using a 

divisor (0.15) to compute GHG and FE levels. The use of the 0.15 divisor was first authorized 

for FE calculations as part of the Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) of 1988 (P. L. No. 100-

94). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 8]

As part of the current rulemaking, EPA also has proposed modifying its regulations for MY 2012 

and later years to improve the GHG credits provided for dual-fuel NGVs, including the use of a 

“utility factor” to determine the percentage of time a vehicle is deemed to operate on alternative 

fuel. The current regulations calculate fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions by assuming 

that dual-fuel vehicles operate only (and always) 50 percent of the time on conventional fuel and 

50 percent of the time on alternative fuel. Like the 0.15 divisor, the 50/50 fuel consumption 

factor is prescribed in AMFA. The benefit of the proposed utility factor (UF)9 is that, for most 

dual-fuel vehicles, the vehicles will be credited for operating more than 50 percent of the time on 

the alternative fuel. The UF takes into account typical consumer range requirements and a 

vehicles operational range on alternative fuel when calculating the percentage of time a vehicle is 

likely to operate on alternative fuel. The effect is that most dual-fuel natural gas vehicles will 

now be given credit for higher use of natural gas and lower GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9461-A1, pp. 8-9]

NGVAmerica supports EPA and NHTSA’s previous decision to use the 0.15 divisor to compute 

GHG and FE credits in MYs 2012 – 2015. We also support the proposal in this rulemaking to 

use UFs to compute GHG emissions (and eventually FE—see below) for dual-fuel vehicles. 

While the fuel economy program’s use of the 0.15 divisor are prescribed by federal law, the 

agencies apparently rely upon their general discretion to use the 0.15 factor to provide GHG 
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credits for dual-fuel vehicles – and NGVAmerica supports that. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, p. 9]

However, NGVAmerica wishes to point out several infirmities in the existing and proposed rules 

that undermine or eliminate the intended benefits of those rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, p. 9]

First, in reality, the benefit of the FE credit is limited or non-existent since there currently are 

restrictions on the total amount of fuel economy credits manufacturers can use for dual fuel and 

flex-fuel vehicles. Federal law prescribes an upper bound on the maximum amount of fuel 

economy credit a manufacturer may earn and phases-out the credits after 2019 (although they are 

reinstated without a cap beginning 2020). Because of the significant number of E85 vehicles 

offered by manufacturers, it is expected that manufacturers will reach their fuel economy credit 

limit primarily via their E85 products. Any additional offerings of dual fuel NGVs will probably 

not earn the automakers any usable FE credits in MYs 2012–2015. There needs to be another 

avenue – not blocked by E85 vehicles – for manufacturers to take advantage of the FE credits 

generated by dual-fuel NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 9]

Second, it is true that manufacturers that offer dual-fuel NGVs will earn enhanced greenhouse 

gas emission credits for MY 2012--2015 vehicles, and the value of these GHG credits will be 

further improved by the use of the proposed utility factors. However, manufacturers are unlikely 

to find these GHG credits sufficiently attractive to produce dual-fuel NGVs (even if the credits 

can be carried forward for use in later years) unless they can simultaneously earn enhanced GHG 

and FE credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, pp. 9-10]

It should be noted that, for 2012-2015, dedicated NGVs would continue to be of value to OEMs 

since they qualify for FE credits and there is no cap that limits the amount of the credits that 

manufacturers can use. (The 0.15 divisor also applies to dedicated vehicles’ FE and GHG 

calculations.) While we certainly support the proposed incentives for dedicated vehicles, it is 

also important to provide useful and effective incentives for dual-fuel NGVs, too. Most 

consumers and even some fleets are likely to prefer dual-fuel vehicles over dedicated vehicles 

until the natural gas fueling infrastructure is significantly expanded. Dual-fuel vehicles will be a 

critical enabler to alleviate consumer concerns with range anxiety and will serve as an important 

vehicle option to help facilitate the transition to alternative fuel vehicles and spur consumer 

willingness to buy the types of vehicles that will be needed to comply with the new 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 10]

Regulatory Incentives for 2016 & Beyond

The incentives proposed for 2016 and beyond (as explained below) do not provide adequate or 

consistent incentives for NGVs (especially as compared to electric vehicles) and, therefore, are 

unlikely to be effective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 10]

For dedicated NGVs, the proposed rules would continue to use the existing 0.15 FE divisor in 

2016 and beyond (as required by law). However, for GHG calculations, after 2016, the 0.15 
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divisor would no longer be available, so GHG incentives for manufacturers would be 

negligible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 10]

For dual fuel vehicles, the proposed rules would also continue to use the existing 0.15 divisor for 

FE in 2016 and beyond (as required by law). For FE purposes during 2016-2019, dual-fuel 

vehicles would be assumed to operate 50/50 on natural gas and petroleum. However, the need for 

FE credits, already limited by the cap and the production of E85 vehicles, would be further 

constrained by declining the cap. From 2020, the 50/50 rule would be replaced by the use of the 

UF. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 10]

For GHG emissions for dual-fuel vehicles, the use of the UF also would replace the use of the 

50/50 rule from 2012 and thereafter. NGV America supports this. However, the use of the 0.15 

divisor would end after 2015 – virtually eliminating the value of dual-fuel vehicle GHG benefits. 

If the purpose of these regulations is to encourage manufacturers to produce vehicles that 

produce fewer greenhouse gases, this aspect of the proposed rules makes little sense. As 

discussed above, NGVs produce less GHGs than comparable gasoline vehicles – especially when 

the upstream emissions are considered. Without continued use of the 0.15 divisor for dual-fuel 

GHG calculations, the incentive for manufacturers to produce NGVs would be significantly 

reduced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 10]

NGV America’s Recommended Changes

1. Provide a Separate Track for Dual-Fuel NGVs

As discussed above, the large number of E85 vehicles being manufactured, in effect, nullifies the 

value of other dual-fuel vehicle FE credits. NGVAmerica recommends that, in order to make the 

incentives for dual-fuel NGVs truly effective, the agencies should develop a separate track for 

these vehicles. Dual-fuel NGVs (and any other alternative fuel vehicles) certified under this track 

would earn unlimited (uncapped) FE and GHG credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 

11]

2. Apply the Utility Factor for Dual-Fuel NGVs for Both GHG and FE Beginning in 2012

The utility factors should apply to dual-fuel vehicles beginning with MY 2012 for GHG and FE 

credits. The agencies have articulated sufficient legal justification for adopting the use of the 

utility factors for fuel economy for MY 2020 forward, and EPA has already proposed making the 

utility factors retroactive back to 2012 for GHG certification. This same rationale supports 

extending the utility factor to the FE calculations prior to 2020. EPA and NHTSA appear to 

understand that providing one credit but not the other is highly problematic and is not consistent 

with the intent of harmonization under one single national fuel economy/greenhouse gas 

program. That is why some credit provisions in the rules (e.g., FFVs, EVs, hybrid trucks) attempt 

to provide periods where both incentives overlap. Combining the incentives and providing 

consistent treatment of FE and GHG credits for dual-fuel NGVs is extremely important in 

ensuring compliance with these extremely complex regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9461-A1, p. 11]
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3. Continue the Use of the 0.15 GHG Divisor Beyond 2015

As discussed above, the use of the 0.15 divisor for GHGs for both dual-fuel and dedicated NGVs 

currently terminates after 2015. But these credits in order to be effective must be extended 

beyond 2015. Manufactures have already made preparations for MYs 2012-2015 and are 

unlikely to have sufficient time to respond to these incentives in that short timeframe. Therefore, 

to encourage more NGVs, EPA and NHTSA should extend the credits provided for NGVs until a 

certain market penetration is achieved. The phase-out of such incentives should be consistent 

with the approach taken with respect to electric drive vehicles. EPA and NHTSA have 

essentially proposed very generous treatment of such vehicles. Enhanced credits for such 

vehicles would only expire after these technologies reach a certain level of market penetration. 

We believe that providing these credits until a manufacturer’s sale of NGVs reaches several 

hundred thousand (300,000 in the case of EVs) is warranted. Alternatively, EPA and NHTSA 

could establish one cap for all alternative fuel vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 

11]

Other Credit Provisions

In addition to urging the agencies to adopt the incentive described above, we offer the following 

comments with respect to several other incentives proposed as part of this rulemaking:.

Sales Multipliers

In its notices, the agencies have asked for comment on whether to provide a production or sales 

multiplier for dedicated and dual-fuel NGVs. The agencies have proposed adopting such 

multipliers for other technologies (e.g., a multiplier of 1.3–2.0 is proposed for EVs, FCVs, and 

PHEVs) for 2017 – 2021. In order to ensure equitable treatment, the agencies should provide 

similar credits to NGVs. And since EVs and other electric-drive vehicles already receive 

extremely generous treatment in the rules, we believe that the provision of a sales multiplier for 

NGVs should be in addition to any other credits also provided for NGVs in order to further 

encourage manufacturers to offer such vehicles. In terms of credit values, we believe that 

dedicated NGVs should be treated like EVs and that dual-fuel NGVs should be treated like 

PHEVs. The result of this more equitable treatment would be to provide a level playing field to 

incentivize the manufacture of all alternative fuel vehicles and not favor one technology over 

another. Therefore, we propose the following multiplier credits for NGVs: [See table on p. 13 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 

12]

NGV America appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments. We applaud the agencies 

for the incentives that have been proposed for NGVs and other alternative fuel technologies. We 

urge the agencies to incorporate the changes we have proposed in our comments. The changes 

we have proposed will further stimulate the market for NGVs and other advanced technologies 

and provide significant economic, energy security and environmental benefits. We realize that 

this rulemaking is an enormously complicated and daunting undertaking and that EPA and 

NHTSA have a significant job ahead of them in terms of reviewing and evaluating the comments 

that have been submitted. We welcome the opportunity for additional dialogue and offer our 
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assistance if necessary in understanding the proposals we have put forward in these comments. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 14]

1 See EIA, 2011 Annual Energy Outlook, Table 11 (April 2011).

2 “The Contributions of the Natural Gas Industry to the U.S. National and State Economies,” 

IHS Global Insight 2009, p.1.

3 National Research Council, “Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy 

Production and Use.” Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010.

4 See California Low Carbon Fuel Standard; 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/121409lcfs_lutables.pdf.

5 Cannon, James S. “Gearing Up for Hydrogen: America’s Road to Sustainable Transportation.” 

Inform. 1998. http://www.informinc.org/gearinghydrogen.php

6 http://205.254.148.40/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/h2_tech_roadmap.pdf

7 http://greet.es.anl.gov/results

8 http://205.254.148.40/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/h2_tech_roadmap.pdf

9 Utility factors look at the driving range of vehicle on alternative fuel and assigns a utility factor 

for alternative fuel use (e.g., 70 miles on NG = 0.785 factor, 100 miles = 0.865, 150 miles = 

0.925).

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 73.]

The NESCAUM states support EPA's proposal to calculate fuel economy for dedicated 

alternative fuel vehicles using only 15 percent of actual energy consumed as this provides a 

strong incentive for increased deployment of compressed national gas and fuel cell vehicles.

In the initial years of the standards, these vehicles will account for a very small fraction of 

overall sales and therefore own a small percentage of overall greenhouse gas emissions from the 

light-duty vehicle fleet.

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Motor vehicles fueled by liquid petroleum remain a significant source of air emissions in 

Pennsylvania and this fact poses challenges to us in meeting and maintaining federal clean air 
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standards. We are, however, seeing some promise from the dramatic increase in supplies and 

availability of domestic natural gas of swapping out our vehicle transportation fuel from 

imported foreign oil to domestic natural gas either directly or via electricity generated from 

domestic natural gas fuel. Indeed, this is the most significant opportunity we have had in our 

lifetime to clean our air, especially in urban areas where the burning of imported liquid 

transportation fuels is the most concentrated. This would dramatically improve the air quality of 

Pennsylvania and would, at the same time, significantly enhance our national security and energy 

independence to boot. We are encouraged by President Obama’s statement made in January that 

natural gas could power America’s long haul trucking fleet. Light-duty fleets could also benefit 

from the use of natural gas and we urge EPA to incorporate strategies in this regulation to 

promote natural gas light-duty vehicle development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 1]

The Agencies Should Provide Similar Incentives to All Alternatively Fueled Vehicles.

We are concerned about the implications for provisions discussed below for encouraging the use 

of natural gas in light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Discard the Petroleum Equivalency Factor. The petroleum equivalency factor (PEF) should 

eventually be discarded in order that a fair and accurate accounting of GHG emissions be 

assessed among all vehicles so that the nation gets the most fuel efficient fleet possible. The 

agencies should work with Congress toward eliminating this statutory requirement. We 

recognize that the agencies are required by statute to count GHG emissions from electric vehicles 

(EV) using the PEF, which allows for only a partial counting of the actual GHG emissions 

produced by EVs. The PEF serves to incentivize manufacturers to produce more EVs. 

Discarding the PEF would level the incentive playing field among vehicles using different fuels, 

including natural gas, and allow for a more accurate accounting of GHG emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, pp. 3-4]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

The Proposed Regulations assign to vehicles equipped to run on compressed natural gas 

(“CNG”) a GHG emissions credit based on the amount of time the vehicle has been estimated by 

the Society of Automotive Engineers to run on CNG, as a function of the carbon emissions 

equivalency of this fuel as compared to petroleum. Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 

6]

C. Natural Gas-Powered Vehicles

While natural gas produces less CO2 per Btu than does coal or petroleum fuel oil, it entails the 

release into the atmosphere of fossilized carbon that constitutes a net addition to GHG’s. EIA, 

“Natural Gas & the Environment,” (Web: Feb. 3, 2012) 

(http://www.eia.gov/kids/energy.cfm?page=natural_gas_home-basics) (117 pounds versus 200 

pounds versus 160 pounds, respectively). Proposed Regulations that encourage the use of a lessintensive GHG producing fossil fuel do not reduce GHG emissions going into the atmosphere; 

they only slow the pace of accumulation, still increasing Global Warming. Such incentives are, 
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thus, contrary to the duty of EPA under the Clean Air Act to slow Global Warming. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 9]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

ATV Multipliers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.20]

EPA requests comment on extending to CNG vehicles a sales multiplier similar to those 

proposed for the advanced technology vehicles listed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.20]

Toyota believes the primary consideration for including any technology in this provision should 

be its CO2 reduction potential. The CAFE regulations already recognize the oil saving benefit of 

CNG vehicles by structuring the fuel economy calculations to provide a significant boost in their 

reported fuel economy. EPA's advanced technology provisions should be squarely focused on 

CO2 benefits of a technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.20]

Toyota opposes including CNG vehicles if it excludes other technologies that are more advanced 

and provide greater CO2 reductions. While CNG vehicles typically emit about 20 percent less 

CO2 compared to a convention gasoline engine, 'strong' gasoline electric hybrids typically emit 

30 percent less. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.20]

Toyota believes hybrid electric vehicles are a critical stepping-stone for the grid-connected 

technologies that are the focus of this proposed incentive. Hybrids share many of the same 

components as electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles (batteries, motors, and power electronics). 

Expanding hybrid vehicle penetration will help create economies of scale for these shared 

components while building manufacturing and supplier capabilities, ultimately supporting

expansion of plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.20]

Therefore, if the agencies decide to grant CNG vehicles a multiplier under this proposed 

incentive, then hybrid vehicles should also be included and should be assigned a larger multiplier 

in recognition of their superior CO2 reduction potential. Similarly, dual-fuel CNG systems 

should receive a lower multiplier than dedicated CNG systems based on expected real world CO2

reductions. Finally, both the CNG and hybrid multipliers should be lower than those for plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.20]

We also request the EPA revisit whether this provision should be continued beyond the 2021 

model year as part of the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.20]

Organization: Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Harmonization of Treatment of CNG Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 creates a government-backed 

loan program for the development of non-petroleum fuels for automotive applications. The 

Department of Energy administers this loan program through private banks. VPG was awarded a 
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loan of approximately $50 million through this program for the development of our CNG 

offering. Among the benefits to OEM’s responsible for compliance with CAFE regulations, and 

as a function of displacing the nation’s dependence on foreign oil, there is a credit for the 

determination of the fuel economy of a dedicated CNG vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7985-A2, p. 3]

Congress has identified CNG for automotive fuel applications as strategically important to the 

extent that the above mentioned CAFE computation credit is granted, and government backed 

loans are offered for the development of CNG fueled vehicles; yet the carbon dioxide emissions 

from CNG fueled vehicles are handled in the same manner as CO2 emissions from petroleum 

sources. Carbon dioxide emissions generated by VPG’s gasoline and CNG vehicles as measured 

by the federal city and highway tests are detailed in Table 1. [See Table 1 on page 3 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 3]

Since CO2 emissions are essentially equivalent to fuel economy, and fuel economy of dedicated 

CNG fueled vehicles is adjusted to create a benefit for the CAFE calculation, VPG suggests the 

application of the same beneficial treatment of CO2 generated from CNG as is given to fuel 

economy. The proposal forwarded by VPG shown in table 1 is an adjustment factor, consistent 

with the factor applied to fuel economy of dedicated CNG fueled vehicles in calculating CAFE. 

The adjustment is the use of a 0.15 factor applied to natural gas generated carbon dioxide 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 3]

Organization: VNG Co. (VNG)

Section 1: Appropriate. Fair. and Consistent Incentives Are Needed for NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 1]

The success of VNG (and other fueling infrastructure providers) will thus be critical to achieving 

the Agencies' long-term environmental and energy security goals. However, the massive capital 

investments that will be required to build this infrastructure are dependent on automakers 

bringing substantial quantities of NGVs to market - and these production decisions are strongly 

influenced by the fuel economy and greenhouse gas ('GHG') regulations that are the subject of 

the present NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 2] 

The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ('NPRM') acknowledges the emissions and energy security 

benefits of NGVs and takes steps to support their production in ways that the Agencies do not in 

the current rules. As explained in more detail below, the NPRM includes several proposals that 

will benefit NGVs, including-

• Utility factors to determine natural gas fuel use for dual-fuel NGVs; 

• Credits for deployment of 'game-changing' technologies for full-size pickups, potentially 

including NGV capability; 

• Option to use new EPA rules for dual-fuel NGVs beginning in 2012; and, 
EPA Response to Comments

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• NHTSA's proposal for a strong regime for measuring fuel economy for dual-fuel NGVs after 

the expiration of statutory credits in 2019. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 2] 

Despite these positive proposals, and despite the Agencies' desire 'to remain scrupulously 

neutral... to avoid picking technology 'winners',' electric vehicles ('EVs') receive far more 

consideration and incentives than NGVs under the NPRM. In order for the Agencies to facilitate 

the 'all out, all of the above' energy strategy advocated by the President in his recent State of the 

Union address,4 NGVs must also be provided with appropriate regulatory incentives relative to 

their unique benefits and contributions to near- and long-term emissions and energy security 

goals. Additional steps are required to establish appropriate, fair, and consistent incentives for 

NGVs: 

• Multipliers for NGVs similar to those offered for PHEVs, EVs, and FCEVs; 

• An extension of the current calculation of NGV GRG emissions as 0.15 times those of gasoline 

emissions (equivalent to CAFE credits), for a similar duration as the 0 g/mile emissions incentive 

for EVs; and, 

• Appropriate fuel economy credits for dual-fuel NGVs between 2012 and 2019. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 2] 

The long-term energy security, environmental, and technology innovation goals of the Agencies 

will have the greatest chance for success if the current NPRM establishes appropriate, fair, and 

consistent incentives for all alternative fuel vehicles, including NGVs, and refrains from picking 

'winners.' Development of the NGV market is particularly important to the achievement of these 

goals because it serves two purposes: 1) NGVs are an essential technology to reduce emissions 

and replace petroleum consumption from ICE vehicles in the near term; and, 2) NGVs create a 

bridge to FCEV market development in the longer term. VNG urges the Agencies to consider 

their proposed rules and the following VNG comments in the context of this broader 

vision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 2-3] 

Section 2: NGVs Will Benefit from New Economics of Natural Gas - But Require Appropriate 

Regulations to Meet Their Potential 

The adoption of NGVs in the US will be driven by two core factors: consumer demand due to the 

new economics of natural gas in the US; and, regulations that recognize the ability of natural gas 

to address national environmental and energy security goals in both the near and long 

term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 3] 

The New Economics of US Gas: VNG - and increasingly, automakers - are optimistic about the 

future of NGVs in the United States due to the shale gas 'revolution.' The combination of 

established hydraulic fracturing techniques and new horizontal drilling technologies has been 

termed 'the biggest energy innovation of the decade' by energy expert Daniel Yergin for allowing 

drillers to economically access vast amounts of previously-untapped supplies of natural gas 

stored in shale rock formations.5 President Obama emphasized the importance of this new 

natural gas production for achieving US energy independence and environmental goals in his 
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recent State of the Union, lauding a 'a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly 100 

years.”6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 3] 

This flood of new domestic natural gas has resulted in a surplus in the market and low prices, 

which are expected to remain much lower and more stable than oil for decades to come. 

Compressed natural gas (CNG) currently costs about $1.50 less per gasoline gallon equivalent 

(GGE) compared to gasoline,7 and according to forecasts from the Energy Information 

Administration (EIA), this pricing advantage is expected to grow to over $2 per GGE by 2020, 

and $3 per GGE by 2035.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 3] 

This durable price advantage has the potential to drive widespread consumer adoption of NGVs, 

which automakers expect can be produced at an incremental cost of $3,000 or less.9 Presenting 

consumers with this favorable price-value proposition will require automakers to move from 

current small-volume, conversion kit production of NGVs to mass-produced, production line 

vehicles - a move that has been key to gaining market success in Europe. Before making 

necessary investments in mass-market NGV production, automakers will require assurance of 

fueling infrastructure availability and a regulatory framework that provides appropriate, fair and 

consistent incentives for NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 3] 

Contributes to Energy Security and Environmental Goals: Natural gas is a 100 percent North 

American fuel that can directly replace imported oil in the transportation sector, in line with the 

energy security goals of the current rulemaking. Natural gas is also much cleaner burning than 

gasoline, making it well-suited to meet the environmental goals of the NPRM as well. Argonne 

National Laboratory's GREET model estimates that NGVs reduce GHG emissions by 24 percent 

compared to gasoline when fueled on conventional natural gas, and GHG emissions can be close 

to zero on a lifecycle basis when natural gas is sourced from landfills or other renewable, 

biogenic sources.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 4] 

These benefits from natural gas operation will be in addition to the efficiency-related fuel 

economy improvements and emissions reductions achieved in the conventional gasoline-fueled 

vehicle fleet, since NGVs use the same ICEs. The added reductions in ICE petroleum use and 

emissions offered by natural gas operation will be valuable to automakers as they seek to comply 

with increasingly stringent future regulations. Although the US vehicle fleet may one day include 

large numbers of EVs and FCEVs, the vast majority of sales will be ICE vehicles for the 

foreseeable future, making it critical to ensure the viability of the natural gas compliance 

pathway for automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 4] 

Contributes to Other Regulations: NGV production and the development of natural gas refueling 

infrastructure can also facilitate compliance with other vehicle regulations. NGVs are well-suited 

to meet the Tier 3 emission standards under development by EPA due to low emissions for all 

criteria pollutants, and renewable biomethane can satisfy the advanced biofuels requirement of 

the EPA-administered Renewable Fuel Standard due to deep lifecycle emission reductions and 

use of non-food feedstocks.14 In California, NGVs qualify as an Advanced Technology Partial 

Zero Emission Vehicle under the Zero Emission Vehicle standard, 15 and CNG has one of the 

lowest carbon intensities of any fuel under the proposed Low Carbon Fuel Standard.16 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 4-5] 
EPA Response to Comments

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Essential Bridge to Hydrogen: In the long term, NGVs will serve as an essential 'bridge' 

technology to FCEVs, which the Agencies recognize as one of the key technology pathways for 

achieving long-term energy and environmental goals. FCEVs and EVs can 'transform' the lightduty vehicle sector, but they face major market barriers including 'vehicle cost, fuel cost, the 

development oflow-GHG fuel production and distribution infrastructure, and/or consumer 

acceptance.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 5] 

The production of NGVs and development of natural gas refueling infrastructure directly address 

all ofthe 'major near-term market barriers' the Agencies identify for FCEVs. This critical context 

for understanding the importance of NGVs in achieving the country's long-term energy and 

environmental goals is summarized in Section 4, within a discussion of the advanced vehicle 

technology multipliers proposed in this NPRM. The role of NGVs as a 'bridge to hydrogen' is 

presented in much greater detail in the attached white paper entitled NATURAL GAS: An 

Essential Bridge To Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles by clean transportation expert James 

Cannon. [The white paper can be found on pp. 19-35 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7941-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 5] 

• New rules for estimating the natural gas fuel use of dual-fuel NGVs developed by the Society 

of Automotive Engineers (SAE) - the 'utility factor' approach - will allow automakers to receive 

credit for the greater potential for alternative fuel use of NGV vehicles compared to dual-fuel 

ethanol (i.e., 'flex-fuel') vehicles; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 5] 

• The option for automakers to use new EPA rules for dual-fuel NGVs beginning in 2012, which 

will allow these vehicles to be eligible for uncapped credits based on the utility factor 

methodology immediately instead of waiting until 2017; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, 

p. 5] 

• NHTSA's proposal for a strong regime for measuring fuel economy for dual-fuel NGVs after 

the expiration of statutory credits in 2019 - which represents an improvement over the current 

rules, since the removal of statutory caps will allow these vehicles to actually receive 

credits; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 6] 

Utility Factors 

In the same manner that PHEVs assuage EV owners' 'range anxiety' concerns, dual-fuel NGVs 

ameliorate 'range anxiety' that might discourage consumers from purchasing dedicated NGVs 

during the early years of natural gas refueling infrastructure build out. VNG therefore applauds 

and fully supports the use of the SAE 'utility factor' methodology to determine expected fuel use 

for both PHEV and dual-fuel NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 6] 

The utility factors are a substantial improvement over the previous formula, which assumed that 

dual-fuel vehicles would only use natural gas for half of vehicle miles traveled. Instead, utility 

factors provide a more accurate calculation of usage because they compare the range of each 

specific natural gas vehicle to the daily travel needs of the average driver, resulting in a higher 

percentage of assumed natural gas fuel use for dual fuel vehicles with significant natural gas 

range. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 6] 
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VNG strongly supports the use of utility factors for dual-fueled NGVs for four reasons: 

• Given the higher purchase price of an NGV and much lower fuel costs for natural gas 

compared to gasoline, drivers will fuel on natural gas as often as possible; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7941-A2, p. 6] 

• The new economics of natural gas will support the build-out of a national, public NGV 

refueling infrastructure by VNG (and our competitors), giving dual-fuel NGV drivers widespread 

access to natural gas fuel; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 6]

• There is significant potential for overnight home natural gas refueling for NGVs, although the 

Agencies only acknowledge the potential for home charging for PHEVs in the NPRM. The 

combination of overnight horne refueling and fast 'on-the-go' fueling at public stations could 

ensure that the vast majority of daily travel for dual-fuel NGVs is fueled by natural gas; 

and, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 6] 

• Adopting the utility factor approach is an important step towards correcting the current, 

statutorily-imposed rules that unfairly treat dual-fuel NGVs in the same fashion as E85 flex-fuel 

vehicles, despite the vastly greater potential for dual-fuel NGVs to make a significant impact on 

real-world petroleum consumption and GHG emissions. Treating dual-fuel NGVs similarly to 

PHEVs rather than FFVs is an important precedent that is also appropriate in the context of NGV 

multipliers, as discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 7] 

Finally, in the event that the utility factors prove to be unrepresentative of real-world natural gas 

fuel use, the SAE and the Agencies will have an opportunity to adjust them appropriately during 

the midterm review period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 7] 

While VNG's business interest is for dual-fuel NGVs to fuel on natural gas as often as possible, 

we do not support the imposition of design requirements for dual-fuel vehicles based on tank size 

or other factors, a possibility the Agencies requested comments on in the NPRM. The utility 

factor approach itself incentivizes automakers to build vehicles with greater CNG range, since 

fuel economy and emissions calculations improve with tank size. However, specific range or 

design requirements would restrict the ability of automakers to design vehicles based on 

consumer preference - a particularly important concern in the early years of developing market 

acceptance of a new technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 7] 

Consistent EPA Regime for Dual-Fuel Vehicles 

EPA has proposed allowing automakers the option of moving immediately to the new regime for

dual-fuel NGVs beginning in 2012, with no cap on emission credits, no CNG range minimum, 

and with utility factors to determine fuel use instead of the 50 percent natural gas fueling 

assumption. VNG strongly supports this proposal, as it will end discrimination against dual-fuel 

NGVs under the current rules, as discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 8] 

In the prior rulemaking for light duty vehicles, EPA adopted the structure of dual-fuel vehicle 

incentives prescribed for NHTSA in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ('EPCA') and 
EPA Response to Comments

6-68

Energy Independence and Security Act ('EISA'), which assumed 50 percent alternative fuel use 

for dual-fueled vehicles and capped the total benefits to a given automaker's overall fuel 

economy calculation from all dual-fuel vehicles including dual-fuel NGVs and E85 'flex fuel' 

vehicles - at 1.2 mpg, declining to 0 in 2019. Because virtually all automakers have opted to 

produce a sufficient quantity of E85 flex-fuel vehicles to reach the maximum allowed credit,31 

dual-fuel NGVs are effectively blocked from receiving their Congressionally authorized 

incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 8] 

Moreover, the statutory definition of dual-fuel NGVs within EPCA is unnecessarily restrictive. 

Dual-fuel NGVs are required to have a CNG-only range of at least 200 miles to qualify for the 

CAFE credit - a requirement equivalent to a 95.4% natural gas usage rate according to the utility 

factor methodology. This effectively results in vehicles expected to fuel on natural gas a large 

majority of the time - a vehicle with a IDO-mile CNG range is expected to fuel on CNG for 

86.5% of total miles, for example - being treated as dedicated gasoline vehicles. The Agencies 

have implicitly acknowledged that this treatment of dual-fuel NGVs is unnecessary in this 

NPRM, as both EPA and NHTSA have opted not to adopt minimum range criteria except when 

required by EPCA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 8-9] 

The Agencies' proposal to allow automakers to take advantage of the new EPA rules in 2012 is 

an important first step towards accelerating the production of dual-fuel NGVs, since NGVs can 

be added to automaker production plans with relatively short lead times and a low incremental 

cost (if automakers move from small-volume conversions to high-volume production line 

vehicles). As a result, NGVs can and should be encouraged to make a positive impact on energy 

security and environmental goals as soon as possible, during the 2012-2016 period. In fact, dualfuel NGVs will have their greatest value during the early years of the build out of the natural gas 

refueling infrastructure due to their ability to eliminate range anxiety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7941-A2, p. 9] 

It should be noted, however, that this productive proposal by EPA is an incomplete solution to 

the unfairness of the current rules for dual-fuel NGVs. Until NHTSA's rules are revised to 

provide appropriate, fair, and consistent incentives for dual-fuel NGVs in 2012-2019 and 

beyond, these vehicles will continue to underachieve their potential and underserve the Agencies' 

objectives. In Section 4, below, VNG discusses ways in which NHTSA might make its rules 

more consistent with EPA's proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 9] 

Strong Post-2019 NHTSA Regime for Dual-Fuel NGVs 

VNG strongly supports NHTSA's proposal for the treatment of dual-fuel NGVs after 2019. As 

the Agencies recognize, without credits for dual-fuel NGVs, automakers might only produce 

dedicated NGVs due to their ongoing regulatory incentives. This in turn could limit development 

of the market for NGVs, since many consumers may prefer a dual-fuel NGV as their first natural 

gas vehicle to eliminate 'range anxiety,' just as many consumers today may prefer PHEVs to 

dedicated EVs due to similar range and recharging concerns. NHTSA should thus continue using 

the Petroleum Equivalency Factor to calculate the fuel economy of dual-fuel NGVs, as with 

dedicated NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 9] 
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The use of utility factors to determine fuel usage and removing the previous statutory caps is also 

appropriate in the post-2019 period, given expectations for maximum possible natural gas fuel 

use by dual-fuel NGVs. Statutory minimums for CNG range for dual-fuel NGVs are also 

appropriately removed, in light of higher expected natural gas fuel use under the utility factor 

methodology as well as the structure of the utility factors, which give automakers greater 

incentives for vehicles with greater CNG ranges. These proposals are also consistent with the 

proposed treatment of dual-fuel NGVs under EPA rules, which will take effect beginning in 

2012 under the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 9-10] 

As discussed above, while the post-2020 regime for dual-fuel NGVs is excellent, the 

effectiveness of this post-2020 regime is severely curtailed by the fact that these vehicles are 

effectively blocked from receiving any incentives through 2019. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7941-A2, p. 10] 

Section 4: Additional Steps Are Needed for Appropriate. Fair and Consistent NGV Incentives 

Although the proposed rules provide increased incentives for NGVs, the overall regulatory 

regime for NGVs is substantially less favorable than the regime for PHEVs and EVs, particularly 

with regard to the EPA rules. Under proposed EPA rules, EVs will receive a 'double incentive' 

that includes both a 0 g/mi GHG incentive and multipliers that magnify the impact of each EV 

on a manufacturer's GHG compliance scores. NGVs do not receive comparable incentives in the 

NPRM, although notably the Agencies do request comments on NGV multipliers in the NPRM 

preamble. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 10] 

The regulatory regime for NGVs is also fraught with inconsistency under both EPA and NHTSA 

rules. For example, EPA incentives are strong through 2015 but disappear in 2016, in contrast to 

the consistent 0 g/mi GHG incentive for EVs, which is retained through 2025 (although phased 

out for automakers producing large numbers of these vehicles starting in 2021). NHTSA 

incentives for dual-fuel NGVs are rendered effectively useless by statutory limits until 2020, 

after which time they become favorable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 10-11] 

Without consistent incentives for NGVs, automakers will be less inclined to make investments in 

these vehicles since they will find it difficult to fit the benefits of these vehicles into their longterm compliance strategies. The Agencies' treatment of NGVs also stands in stark contrast to the 

consistent, long-term, favorable treatment given to EVs as well as the Agencies' goal of not 

'picking technology winners.'38 The importance of establishing appropriate and consistent rules 

that allow all alternative fuels a fair chance to contribute to energy security and environmental 

goals is magnified by the particularly long duration of this rulemaking period compared to 

previous rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 11] 

VNG has several recommendations for providing more appropriate incentives for NGVs, which 

will ensure that consumers have a wide selection of low-emission alternative fuel vehicles and 

that the greatest number of such vehicles are produced and sold: 

• Multipliers for dual-fuel NGVs on par with multipliers for PHEVs, and multipliers for 

dedicated NGVs equal to those for EVs; 
EPA Response to Comments

6-70

• An extension of the current calculation of NGV GHG emissions as 0.15 times those of gasoline 

emissions (equivalent to CAFE credits), for a similar duration as the 0 g/mile emissions incentive 

for EVs. Measured emissions levels would similarly be phased in after 2022 on the same 

schedule that EV emissions begin to be measured according to their upstream emissions; and, 

• Appropriate fuel economy credits for dual-fuel NGVs between 2012 and 2019. Dual-fuel 

NGVs expected to fuel predominantly on natural gas are effectively denied incentives under 

current statutory rules and treated like gasoline vehicles, which the Agencies acknowledge is an 

'absurd result.' We encourage the Agencies to explore whether it is possible to provide 

appropriate fuel economy credits to these vehicles as soon as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7941-A2, p. 11] 

Multipliers for NGVs 

EPA requested comments on 'the merits of providing similar multiplier incentives to dedicated 

and/or dual-fuel compressed natural §as vehicles' as those proposed for EVs, PHEVs, and 

FCEVs under the GHG program.3 These multipliers allow automakers to count each low-or-zero 

emission vehicle as more than one vehicle for the purposes of compliance calculations between 

2017 and 2021, with the express purpose of facilitating market penetration of advanced

technology vehicles.40 While EVs and FCEVs are expected to play crucial roles in achieving 

national energy and environmental goals in the long term, the multipliers are considered 

necessary in the NPRM to help surmount significant near-term market barriers they face, 

including: 'vehicle cost, fuel cost (in the case of fuel cell vehicles), the development of low-GHG 

fuel production and distribution infrastructure, and/or consumer acceptance.” [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 11-12] 

Both dedicated and dual-fuel NGVs should be eligible for similar multipliers as PHEVs and 

EVs. California already recognizes NGVs as an 'advanced technology' vehicle in its Zero 

Emission Vehicle (ZEV) regulation, as noted earlier in these comments. NGVs also contribute 

directly to the Agencies' own advanced technology goals, due to their essential role in facilitating 

the market penetration of FCEVs. Since the first wave of NGV adoption in the 1990s, the 

development of NGVs - and particularly natural gas refueling infrastructure - has long been 

recognized as a key bridge to hydrogen FCEVS.42 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 12] 

Natural gas is largely composed of hydrogen, with four hydrogen atoms for every carbon atom in 

a molecule of methane. Due to the chemical and physical similarities of these two gases, they 

share a number of technology synergies, so that the proliferation of NGVs and natural gas 

fueling infrastructure will facilitate and accelerate deployment of FCEVs. Indeed, the 

development of the NGV market serves to reduce or eliminate all four of the near-term market 

barriers to FCEV adoption identified by the Agencies: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 

12] 

• Low-GHG Fuel Production and Distribution Infrastructure: NGV refueling infrastructure 

utilizes most of the same hardware (compressors, storage tanks, dispensers) that will be used to 

dispense hydrogen fuel, allowing natural gas refueling stations to be straightforwardly adapted 

for hydrogen dispensing. Natural gas can also be used as a feedstock for hydrogen fuel 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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production via distributed steam reforming at the refueling station, a fuel production pathway 

identified by the Department of Energy's FreedomCAR & Fuel Partnership as the 'most viable 

approach to begin building [the] hydrogen market in near term.'43 Distributed steam reforming 

of natural gas for hydrogen production also yields just half of the lifecycle GHGs as production 

of hydrogen via electrolysis usin1 grid electricity, according to Argonne National Laboratories' 

GREET model.44 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 12] 

• Fuel Cost: Production of hydrogen from natural gas via distributed steam reformers also 

represents the 'lowest current cost' hydrogen pathway compared to electrolysis and other 

methods, according to the FreedomCAR roadmap.45 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 

12] 

• Vehicle Cost: NGV development will help reduce FCEV vehicle costs by advancing on-board 

gaseous storage and fuel management technologies, allowing more fuel to be stored safely with 

less weight and/or space. In a sense the FCEV represents the ultimate union of NGVs and EVs, 

with EVs providing the electric drivetrain and NGVs ensuring the development of hydrogen fuel 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 12]

• Consumer Acceptance: By increasing familiarity and comfort with gaseous fuel vehicles and 

refueling, NGVs will help pave the way for consumer acceptance of FCEVs. NGV deployment 

will also serve the role of developing experience with gaseous fuel vehicles for auto dealers, 

mechanics, and other important stakeholders that directly interface with consumers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 13]

Attached to these Comments is a white paper NATURAL GAS: An Essential Bridge To 

Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles authored by clean vehicle technology expert James Cannon, which 

provides detailed background on the synergies between NGVs and FCEVs in a number of key 

areas, including hydrogen production, distribution, storage, and fuel management systems, fuel 

dispensing, natural gas-hydrogen fuel blends, vehicle technologies, and safety standards and 

training. [The white paper can be found on pp. 19-35 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7941-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 13]

In short, the market penetration of NGVs helps ensure that the necessary fuel and technologies 

will be in place for FCEVs, accelerating and lowering the costs of this transition. Much like the 

role that PHEVs play in facilitating adoption of EVs, NGVs and particularly dual-fuel NGVs, 

which mitigate 'range anxiety' for early adopters - are essential for facilitating the market 

penetration of FCEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 13]

Thus, allowing dual-fuel NGVs to receive the same EPA multipliers as PHEVs - with every 

NGV counting as 1.6 vehicles in 2017, then declining to 1.3 vehicles in 2021 would help build a 

similar 'bridge' to the hydrogen future that PHEVs provide for EVs. Dedicated NGVs should be 

eligible for a multiplier level equivalent to EVs and FCEVs, of 2.0x in 2017, declining to 1.5x in 

2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 13]

Our proposed multiplier values assume that the Agencies will also extend GHO incentives for 

NGVs in parallel with their proposed extension of the 0 g/mi GHG incentive for EVs, as we 
EPA Response to Comments

6-72

propose below - in effect, duplicating the 'double incentive' structure given to EVs. However, if 

the GHG incentive for NGVs is not extended, we would propose doubling all the proposed 

multipliers for NGVs and FCEVs in order to balance the EV 'double incentive' (in effect, a 

'doubled single incentive' for NGVs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 13]

Extended GHG Incentive for NGVs

Under the current rules, EPA will begin to count the emissions of vehicles operating on natural 

gas at their tailpipe value in 2016. While this value will recognize the real-world emission 

reductions of approximately 24 percent that natural gas provides compared to gasoline, it ends an 

emission incentive previously given to NGVs. Until 2016, EPA will count natural gas emissions 

as just 0.15 times the level of gasoline emissions, equivalent to the 'CAFE credit' approach of 

NHTSA's Petroleum Equivalency Factor. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 13]

Termination of the natural gas emissions incentive is premature - and disadvantages NGVs 

relative to EVs. The Agencies allowed automakers to count EVs and the electric portion of 

PHEVs as having emissions of 0 g/mi in the 2012-2016 rulemaking, and in this NPRM they 

propose extending this treatment to 2025. This incentive is given despite the Agencies' 

acknowledgement that the use of electric vehicles generates significant upstream emissions from 

power generation: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 13-14]

'Because [EV] upstream emissions values are generally higher than the upstream GHG emissions 

values associated with gasoline vehicles, and because there is currently no national program in 

place to reduce GHG emissions from electric powerplants, EPA believes it is appropriate to 

consider the incremental upstream GHG emissions associated with electricity production and 

distribution.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 14]

While the Agencies intend to eventually calculate EV emissions according to a formula that 

accounts for upstream GHGs, these values will not be phased in until the 2022-2025 period, and 

even then only for automakers that produce more than a specified number of vehicles. VNG does 

not object to this treatment of EVs: we recognize that incentives are needed to encourage 

automakers to take on the risks required to introduce new vehicle technologies. We simply 

believe that NGVs deserve similar treatment so that automakers will be given fair incentives and 

rewards for all clean alternative fuel technologies, instead of facing a regulatory landscape tilted 

towards one pathway. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 14]

Additionally, EPA's treatment of natural gas results in markedly inconsistent incentives between 

the Agencies. Under NHTSA's program, the fuel economy of natural gas will continue to be 

counted as 0.15 times the gasoline-equivalent fuel economy of the vehicle throughout the 2017-

2025 program (although, as discussed below, dual-fuel NGVs may be limited in their ability to 

receive this incentive until 2020). The move away from the harmonized EPA/NHTSA incentive 

to a much lower incentive under the EPA program starting in 2016 will complicate and 

potentially limit the ability of automakers to incorporate NGVs into their compliance 

strategies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 14]
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In order to provide appropriate and fair treatment for NGVs under the EPA program, as well as 

maintain harmonized, consistent rules for automakers between the two Agencies for a longer 

period of time, the Agencies should extend the current GHG incentive for natural gas through 

2025 under the same rules as the GHG incentive for EVs. This would entail continuing to count 

natural gas emissions as 0.15 times the level of gasoline emissions for all NGVs through 2021, 

and then phasing in the tailpipe emission level (e.g., -24 percent below gasoline) between 2022 

and 2025 solely for manufacturers producing over 200,000 vehicles cumulatively over this 

period (or 600,000 vehicles for manufacturers producing over 300,000 vehicles cumulatively 

from 2017-2021). This is in keeping with the principle of fair, qualitatively similar incentives for 

both electric and gaseous-fueled vehicles while maintaining quantitatively differentiated 

incentives based on the characteristics of the technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, 

p. 14]

Appropriate NHTSA Credits for Dual-Fuel NGVs Between 2012 and 2019 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 14]

Due to their ability to alleviate 'range anxiety' for drivers, dual-fuel NGVs are a key transition 

technology for both dedicated NGVs as well as hydrogen FCEVs, in the same way that PHEVs 

are a key transition technology for dedicated EVs. VNG strongly supports all of the steps 

proposed by the Agencies to provide support for dual-fuel NGVs, and particularly the utility 

factor methodology for calculating dual-fuel NGV fuel use noted in Section 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 15]

However, there remains a major gap in the rules for dual-fuel NGVs due to the constraints of 

EPCA and EISA, which effectively prevent dual-fuel NGVs from receiving fuel economy credits 

for natural gas operation under the statutory program until 2020. The current NHTSA rules 

restrict dual-fuel NGV access to credits in two ways: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 

15]

• Shared Cap With Ethanol Dual-Fuel Vehicles: Dual-fuel NGVs are grouped with dual-fuel E85 

vehicles (also known as 'flex-fuel' vehicles) and placed under a cap that limits their combined 

statutory credits for automaker fuel economy calculations. Because dual-fuel E85 vehicles can be 

produced with minimal incremental cost, virtually all automakers have opted to produce enough 

of these vehicles to reach the maximum benefit allowed by statute, leaving no room under the 

cap left for dual-fuel NGVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 15]

• Excessively High Minimum CNG Range: Under the statute (49 USC 32901), in order to 

qualify as a 'dual fueled automobile' the vehicle must meet a prescribed minimum driving range 

of200 miles when driving on alternative fuel. Consequently, dual-fuel NGVs are required to have 

a CNG range of at least 200 miles to qualify for the statutory CAFE credit - a requirement 

equivalent to a 95.4% natural gas usage rate according to the utility factor methodology. No 

statutory credits are given for vehicles with less than a 200 mile CNG range, despite the fact that 

many of these vehicles would be expected to fuel on CNG the large majority of the time under 

the utility factor methodology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 15]
EPA Response to Comments

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Taken together, these restrictions will result in dual-fuel NGVs predominantly fueled on natural 

gas being treated as gasoline vehicles under NHTSA rules until the statutory credit program 

expires in 2019. This is unfair and counterproductive. Indeed, the Agencies recognize that this is 

an 'absurd result' in their rationale for providing dual-fuel NGVs with full access to the new 

utility factor-based rules starting in 2020:

'NHTSA and EPA believe that the expiration of the dual-fueled vehicle measurement 

methodology in the statute leaves a gap to be filled, to avoid the absurd result of dual-fueled 

vehicles' fuel economy being measured like that of conventional gasoline vehicles. If the 

overarching purpose of the statute is energy conservation and reducing petroleum usage, the 

agencies believe that that goal is best met by continuing to reflect through CAFE calculations the 

reduced petroleum usage that dual fueled vehicles achieve.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-

A2, p. 15]

Treating vehicles that will fuel predominantly on natural gas as gasoline vehicles is indeed an 

'absurd' result that runs contrary to the purpose of the statute, and as noted in Section 3 we 

strongly support the steps taken by EPA and NHTSA to bridge this 'gap' fairly for the 2020-2025 

period. However, because of the significant potential of dual-fuel NGVs to make an impact on 

petroleum reduction goals in the near term, it is also important and appropriate for the Agencies 

to attempt to address the gap in the 20122019 period to the extent possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 16]

For example, VNG believes that it may be possible for the Agencies to address the second 

barrier within the context of this rulemaking. The Agencies have implicitly acknowledged that 

this very high minimum range for dual-fuel NGVs is unnecessary in this NPRM, as EPA has not 

adopted a range minimum in its rules, and NHTSA has proposed discarding the range minimum 

beginning in 2020, after the expiration of the statutory dual-fuel regime.5 While NHTSA has 

previously determined that it lacked discretion to set a lower range for dual-fuel vehicles,52 the 

Agencies should consider whether it is possible to establish a new category of vehicle with less 

than a 200 mile range on an alternate fuel- not a 'dual-fueled' automobile as defined in the 

statutes, but not a dedicated gasoline automobile either - which can earn appropriate fuel 

economy credits throughout the period to be governed by the regulations.53 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 16]

Alternatively, the Agencies could explore the extent to which it could allow automakers to 'bank' 

credits that would otherwise be awarded to dual-fueled NGVs in the absence of the statutory 

limitations during the 2012-2019 period for use in 2020 and beyond.

VNG is fully cognizant of the challenges presented by these or other approaches, but 

nevertheless encourages the Agencies to explore all options for providing appropriate fuel 

economy incentives for dual-fuel NGVs prior to 2020. Even a partial solution would be a 

significant incentive for automakers to begin producing dual-fuel NGVs in the near term, and 

would harmonize NHTSA's rules with EPA's to the greatest extent possible for the 2012-2019 

period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 16]
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Section 5: Ensuring a Fair Chance for NGVs and FCEVs is Essential to Achieving National 

Goals [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 16]

The environmental and energy security risks posed by the transportation sector's dependence on 

oil are urgent challenges for the United States, and it would be a mistake for the Agencies to 

inadvertently and prematurely discourage the development of any promising technology that 

could help address these threats -let alone two technologies with the enormous potential of 

NGVs and FCEVs. In the near term, NGVs fueled by newly-abundant domestic natural gas 

supplies offer a unique combination of vehicle choice and affordability for consumers, low 

emissions, and replacement (not just reduction) of petroleum consumption. In the long term,

NGVs are an essential bridge to the commercialization of FCEVs, which can provide the nearzero emission operation of EVs but with much greater range and much faster refueling. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, pp. 16-17]

Despite the promise of both NGVs and FCEVs, the Agencies have not forecasted substantial 

adoption of either technology during the 2017-2025 period.54 While we believe this is due in 

part to flaws in the stakeholder consultation process,55 it also reflects the reality that the status 

quo will not change unless a robust, nationwide gaseous refueling infrastructure is developed. 

VNG believes that it and others can have this robust national natural gas refueling infrastructure 

in place by 2025 if the government broadly and the Agencies specifically support the deployment 

of NGVs with appropriate incentives, similar to EVs. Then, even if FCEVs are still a niche 

technology by 2025, this natural gas infrastructure will provide a foundation to incrementally 

provide hydrogen fuel going forward, ensuring that FCEVs do not encounter the extreme 

'chicken and egg' dilemma that all alternative fuels currently face. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7941-A2, p. 17]

It is critical for the Agencies to provide appropriate support for the natural gas-to-hydrogen path 

so that both NGVs and FCEVs will be a viable option for consumers and automakers from 2017 

to 2025, as well as during the post-2025 period as emission and fuel economy standards become 

ever more stringent. Keeping this gaseous fuel pathway 'open' to automakers is particularly 

important given the Agencies' acknowledged and well-founded concerns over the consumer 

acceptance of EV technology due to cost as well as range and refueling issues.56 It is, simply, 

too soon to put all of the Nation's eggs in the EV basket - and it would be a clear mistake to 

overlook the gaseous fuel pathway just as the supplies and economics of natural gas in the US 

are undergoing a historic transformation. Ultimately, both EVs and FCEVs will be necessary to 

achieve long-term environmental and energy security goals, and NGVs will play an essential role 

in reducing ICE vehicle emissions as well as enabling the transition to hydrogen. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 17]

To summarize, for the reasons explained in these Comments, VNG urges the Agencies to adopt 

the favorable NGV provisions proposed in the NPRM, including:

• Utility factors to determine natural gas fuel use for dual-fuel NGVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7941-A2, p. 17]
EPA Response to Comments

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• Credits for deployment of 'game-changing' technologies for full-size pickups, potentially 

including NGV capability; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 18]

• The option for automakers to use new EPA rules for dual-fuel NGVs beginning in 2012; 

and, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 18]

• NHTSA's proposal for a strong regime for measuring fuel economy for dual-fuel NGVs after 

the expiration of statutory credits in 2019 VNG also urges the Agencies to incorporate the 

following provisions to provide more appropriate, fair, and consistent incentives for 

NGVs: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 18]

• Multipliers for dual-fuel NGVs on par with multipliers for PHEVs, and multipliers for 

dedicated NGVs equal to those for EVs; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 18]

• An extension of the current calculation of NGV GHG emissions as 0.15 times those of gasoline 

emissions (equivalent to CAFE credits), for a similar duration as the 0 g/mile emissions incentive 

for EVs. Measured emissions levels would similarly be phased in after 2022 on the same 

schedule that EV emissions begin to be measured according to their upstream emissions; 

and, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 18]

• Appropriate fuel economy credits for dual-fuel NGVs between 2012 and 2019.

We greatly appreciated having the time to meet last Thursday, and would like to provide more 

extensive comments on our core arguments for improved incentives for natural gas vehicles 

(NGVs) under the above-referenced rulemaking. As we discussed, natural gas can play an 

essential and unique role in achieving EPA’s mandate for long-term reductions in transportation 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as the “All of the Above” energy strategy articulated 

by the President. Because NGVs face market barriers similar to other advanced technologies, 

particularly in terms of fuel distribution, we believe they merit a similarly structured set of 

incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, p. 1]

Natural gas has truly unique “game-changing” potential as an alternative fuel, playing a dual role 

by providing the lowest possible emissions for internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles (and 

light trucks in particular) in the long term while also directly reducing barriers to 

commercialization for hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11797-A1, p. 1]

Long-Term ICE Pathway: Thanks to plentiful domestic supplies and a robust long-distance 

pipeline distribution network, natural gas is the only alternative fuel capable of substantially 

reducing GHG emissions from ICE vehicles on a mass-market, nationwide basis. ICE vehicles 

will continue to dominate the market for the foreseeable future and will make major advances in 

fuel efficiency in the years ahead, making it important to ensure that these vehicles will have the 

opportunity to run on the cleanest fuel possible. In addition to 24% tailpipe reductions of GHGs 

today, natural gas emissions can be reduced even further through blending with biogas and/or 

hydrogen. In particular, NGV capability is very well suited to pickup trucks and other light 

trucks, vehicle classes that are critical to maintaining consumer choice (and thus the economic 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-77

practicability of these regulations) and are unlikely to be a viable application for battery-based 

electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, pp. 1-2]

Bridge to Hydrogen: The deployment of NGVs and CNG refueling structure will directly reduce 

the market barriers to the commercialization of FCEVs. The gaseous fuel management and 

storage technologies used by NGVs are analogous to those that will be used by FCEVs – and, 

perhaps more importantly, the compressed natural gas (CNG) fueling infrastructure developed 

for NGVs can be used as a platform for the production and dispensing of hydrogen fuel. Thus, 

the investments made by companies like VNG for CNG fueling equipment today will directly 

reduce the costs and build-out time of a future hydrogen dispensing network. A transition to 

FCEVs can then proceed incrementally through the introduction of hydrogen-natural gas blends 

and hydrogen-fueled ICE vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, p. 2]

This unique combination of two “game-changing” pathways for NGVs merits a unique set of 

incentives that recognize that, while NGVs are not the same as battery electric vehicles (BEVs) 

or FCEVs, they merit a similarly-structured program of consistent, meaningful incentives over 

the 2017-2025 period. As with BEVs and FCEVs, the NGV program should include: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, p. 2]

Emission Incentive: An extension of the current incentive (0.15x gasoline equivalent) for 

measuring the GHG emissions of CNG through 2021, after which the incentive would be phased 

out on the same production volume basis as the 0 g/mi emissions incentive for BEVs and 

FCEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, p. 2]

While interest in NGVs is growing due to the increasingly compelling economics of U.S. natural 

gas, they face the same barriers to the market as other advanced technologies – particularly with 

regard to infrastructure costs. In referring to incentives for BEVs and FCEVs, the NPRM 

states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, p. 2]

EPA believes that the relatively minor impact on GHG reductions in the near term is justified by 

promoting technologies that have significant transportation GHG emissions and oil consumption 

game-changing potential in the longer run, and that also face major market barriers in entering 

a market that has been dominated by gasoline vehicle technology and infrastructure for over 100 

years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, pp. 2-3]

Given the dual “game-changing” potential of natural gas, as well as the shared barriers posed by 

the historic dominance of gasoline, this rationale also justifies a similarly-structured program of 

incentives for NGVs. As with BEV and FCEV incentives, incentives for NGVs should be limited 

in duration, and these limits combined with the small proportion of NGVs likely to be produced 

compared to gasoline vehicles should ensure that the impact on GHG reductions from NGV 

incentives will also remain low. And, as we noted in our meeting, the mid-term review of the 

regulations in 2018 will also provide an opportunity for an “off-ramp” if unexpectedly rapid 

uptake of NGVs leads to a risk of “catastrophic success” in terms of impacts on the rule’s GHG 

reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A1, p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

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The following attachment will provide greater detail on these arguments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11797-A1, p. 3]

[See Docket Numbers EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11797-A2 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11797-A3 for the above mentioned attachments.]

4 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 12/01/24/remarks-president-state-unionaddress

5 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703399204574507440795971268.html

6 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address

7 http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/pdfs/afur jul 11.pdf

8 http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3a.htm

9 http://www.businessweek.com/news/20 12-01-13/chrvsler-to-begin-natural-gas-truck-sales-toflccts-in2012.html

10 http://greet.es.anl.gov/results 

14 EJSA 2007, Sec. 20J(1)(B)(ii)(V) 

15 http://www.arb.ca.gov/msproglzevproglfactsheets/zev fs.pdf 

16 http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/J21409Icfs Jutables.pdf 

31 The incremental cost of adding E85 'flex fuel' is much lower than the incremental cost of 

adding a dual-fuel capability so automakers have maximized their production of “flex fuel' 

vehicles and exhausted the incentives. 

http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemakinglpdf/Flexible_Fuel Credits 2003 2010.pdf 

42 Cannon, James S. 'Gearing Up for Hydrogen: America's Road to Sustainable Transportation.' 

Inform. 1998. httn://www.informinc.orglgearinghydrogen.php 

43 http://205.254.148.40/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/h2 tech roadmap.pdf 

44 http://greet.es.anl.gov/results 

45 http:/1205.254.148.40/hydrogenandfuelcells/pdfs/h2 tech roadmap.pdf

52 NHTSA may wish to reconsider this earlier decision in light of the changed circumstances 

since 1996 and the need to avoid an absurd result that Congress could not have intended and that 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-79

is contrary to the goals of the regulation. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 

Denial of Petition for Reconsideration in Docket 94-96, August 29, 1996, Federal Register 

Volume 61 Number 173, September 5, 1996.

53 As a practical matter, credits for this new category of vehicles could be administered under 

EPA's EPCA authority in the same fashion as NHTSA credits for improved air conditioner 

efficiency, 'game-changing' technologies for full-size pickups, 'off-cycle' technologies, and the 

post-2020 regime for NHTSA dual fuel NGV credits are proposed to be administered in this 

NPRM.

55 The Agencies' analysis for the rulemaking was driven by automakers' current production 

plans, which themselves are a reaction to previous rulemakings. While this focus is 

understandable, it is important for the achievement of the Agencies' goals, as well as the 

satisfaction of their responsibilities under the Administrative Procedure Act, that they give full 

consideration to all realistically viable alternatives that could playa significant role through 2025 

and beyond - and not just those that enjoyed the most attention from automakers and regulators 

at the time of the rulemaking.

Response:

Arbitrary Distinction Between EVs/PHEVs and CNG Vehicles

A number of commenters argued that providing incentives for EV/PHEV/FCVs and not 

for CNG vehicles was arbitrary and capricious. EPA disagrees. First, EVs perform markedly 

better than CNG vehicles from a greenhouse gas emissions perspective, both on a tailpipe-only 

measurement, and when considering upstream plus tailpipe GHG emissions (see preamble Table 

III-16). For this reason, EPA does not consider CNG vehicles to be a long-term GHG emissions 

game-changer. Second, EVs/PHEVs face greater market barriers, including lower vehicle range, 

higher vehicle cost, and a much different refueling paradigm including a much longer refueling 

time, relative to CNG vehicles. In any case, the final rule provides an incentive, in the form of a 

multiplier, for CNG vehicles as explained immediately below. 

Multiplier incentive for CNG vehicles for MYs 2017-2021

EPA did not propose, but did ask for comment on, incentives for dedicated and dual fuel 

CNG vehicles. A large majority of public commenters supported incentives for all CNG 

vehicles. EPA has finalized temporary incentive multipliers for all dedicated and dual fuel CNG 

vehicles for MYs 2017-2021 equal to those for PHEVs: 1.6 in MYs 2017-2019, 1.45 in MY 

2020, and 1.3 in MY 2021. While EPA does not consider CNG vehicle technology to be a longterm GHG emissions game-changer, the Agency does believe that investments in CNG vehicle 

technology and refueling infrastructure could be valuable in helping to facilitate future 

commercialization of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, which does have the potential to be a longterm GHG emissions game-changer. See Preamble Section III.C.2.c.iv for a much more 

extensive discussion of the GHG emissions benefits of current CNG vehicles relative to current 

gasoline and electric vehicles (see Table III-16), and why we believe CNG vehicle technology 

and refueling infrastructure can facilitate hydrogen fuel cell vehicle commercialization.
EPA Response to Comments

6-80

Toyota commented that, if CNG vehicles were to receive an incentive multiplier, then

conventional hybrid electric vehicles should receive a multiplier as well. Although the Agency 

agrees with Toyota that conventional hybrids share many of the same electric drive components 

of EVs and PHEVs (e.g., batteries, motors, controllers), with respect to consumer acceptance and 

barriers to utilization, the Agency believes that conventional hybrids are much more similar to 

gasoline vehicles than they are to EVs, in that all of the propulsion energy comes from gasoline, 

vehicle range is improved, and hybrids need no new refueling infrastructure. As such there is not 

the same degree of market barriers inhibiting increased use of this technology. Accordingly, 

EPA is not adopting incentive multipliers for conventional hybrid vehicles. This final rule does 

provide a credit mechanism to encourage penetration of hybrid technology into the full-size 

pickup truck class.

See Section 6.6 for a discussion of why EPA is not using the 0.15 factor for GHG 

emissions compliance, but is adopting the 0.15 factor for the CAFE program beginning in MY 

2020, for all nonpetroleum fuels.

Adoption of utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles

Commenters expressed widespread support for the EPA proposal to apply the PHEVbased utility factor methodology for weighting operation of natural gas and gasoline for dual fuel 

CNG vehicle compliance calculations. For a discussion of EPA’s rationale for adopting utility 

factors for dual fuel vehicles, as well as the eligibility requirements that dual fuel vehicles must 

meet in order to use the utility factor approach, see Preamble Section III.C.4.a.ii.

6.3. Ethanol Flexible Fuel Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

25x’25 Alliance

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) and Biomass Coordinating Council 

(BCC)

American Forest and Paper Association & American Wood Council

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

E100 Ethanol Group

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company Growth Energy

Minnesota Department of Commerce

National Alliance of Forest Owners (NAFO)

National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS)

National Corn Growers Association et al.

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)
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Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: 25x’25 Alliance

Introduction and Request for Consideration 

The 25x’25 Alliance, American Council on Renewable Energy, American Seed Trade 

Association, Association of Equipment Manufacturers, American Farm Bureau Federation, 

Biotechnology Industry Organization, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Farmers 

Union and National Sorghum Producers (hereinafter referred to as “25x’25 partners”) seek leave 

to file late comments in the above-referenced dockets and respectfully submit such comments. 

These comments respond to the original notice of the proposed rule, 2017 and Later Model Year 

Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards, published in the Federal Register on December 1, 2011 (76 FR 74854). 25x’25 

partners submit that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) should accept and consider these comments, despite 

their late filing, for the following reasons: 

• Additional comments are, as of this date, still being solicited and accepted electronically on the 

EPA website for this proceeding at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy. 

• In an earlier extension of the comment period in this proceeding issued on January 6, 2012, EPA 

and NHTSA stated that “NHTSA and EPA will consider all comments received before the close of 

business on the comment closing date, and will also consider comments received after that date 

to the extent practicable.” 

• 25x’25 partners submit that it is only in light of recent analyses of market trends and events that 

they could reasonably have understood the implications of the proposed rule as reflected in the 

comments submitted herein. 

• 25x’25 partners have not submitted prior comments. 

• 25x’25 partners accept the record as it is and do not seek any delay in the issuance of a final rule 

in this proceeding. 

• 25x’25 partners have reviewed such submitted comments only insofar as necessary to discern 

whether other commenters have raised the substantive issues 25x’25 partners seek to have EPA 

and NHTSA consider. 

• Consideration of these late-filed comments, to the extent practicable given the timing and the 

otherwise relatively complete state of the record, is therefore in the public interest. 

25x’25 partners, representing a coalition of farm and related public policy organizations, 

understand the importance of flexible fuel vehicles and the greenhouse gas reduction potential of 

biofuels and offer the following comments on the following issues: 

Background Information 

The continued production of flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) and the advancement of biofuels into 

the market are critical to expanding renewable fuel use, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 

emissions, and enhancing air quality. Today, nearly 12 million FFVs operate on American 

roadways. The use of midlevel ethanol blends and E85 in FFVs is a cost-effective and efficient 
EPA Response to Comments

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way to help meet the agencies’ ambitious standards for improving tailpipe emissions through 

biofuels utilization. Ethanol and other advanced biofuels such as biobutanol facilitate CO2 

emission reductions both within the vehicle, and, more importantly, throughout its production 

and combustion life cycle. Furthermore, increased biofuel use contributes to public health: 

Higher ethanol blends reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants such as particulate matter 

(PM 2.5 and ultrafine particles) that result from the burning of aromatic hydrocarbons such as 

benzene, toluene, and xylene found in conventional fuels. 

Despite the many benefits of biofuels, the proposed rule effectively eliminates statutory 

incentives intended to promote their use. Moreover, it appears to pick favorites by providing 

much more generous credits to other “advanced vehicle technologies,” such as electric and plugin hybrid vehicles. After a careful review of the proposed new rule in light of recent 

developments, we believe that the rule: 

1. Does not sufficiently incentivize the production of FFVs; and 

2. Does not adequately value the GHG reduction potential of biofuels. 

Together, these oversights place the rule in conflict with other established national priorities, 

policies, and legislation (such as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and the Energy 

Independence and Security Act (EISA)) while ignoring the economic, public health, and 

environmental benefits that can be achieved through increased biofuel usage. 

Rationale for Modification to the Rule 

The automotive industry is a business characterized by high capital and development costs, and 

long vehicle development and life cycles. The proposed GHG standards are very stringent and 

will drive long-term change in the industry, requiring careful allocation of limited development 

and capital funds to produce the greatest reduction in GHGs. The proposed rule puts forward a 

common-sense approach to establishing the adoption of two selected technologies by making 

their future compliance value clear throughout the life of the rule, which states: 

“EPA is proposing that CO2 compliance values for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and 

bi-fuel compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles will be based on estimated use of the alternative 

fuels, recognizing that, once a consumer has paid several thousand dollars to be able to use a fuel 

that is considerably cheaper than gasoline, it is very likely that the consumer will seek to use the 

cheaper fuel as much as possible. Accordingly, for CO2 emissions compliance, EPA is proposing 

to use the Society of Automotive Engineers ‘‘utility factor’’ methodology (based on vehicle 

range on the alternative fuel and typical daily travel mileage) to determine the assumed 

percentage of operation on gasoline and percentage of operation on the alternative fuel for both 

PHEVs and bi-fuel CNG vehicles, along with the CO2 emissions test values on the alternative 

fuel and gasoline.” (76 FR 74880) 

This approach of forecasting a high usage rate for the selected fuels and fixing the rate for the 

duration of the rules provides certainty as to the future CO2 compliance value of these 

technologies. This certainty is needed by auto manufacturers to enable informed long-term 

investment trade-offs to be developed regarding these technologies. 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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However, EPA does not provide a similar level of certainty with regard to ethanol FFVs. Rather, 

it makes a backward-looking argument to estimate future E85 use. “Actual use,” presumably 

after the fuel has been used, has been proposed as a way to calculate E85 CO2 compliance values. 

EPA cites patterns of historical usage of E85 in FFVs, ignoring the rapidly increasing production 

of renewable fuels needed to comply with the RFS contained in the 2007 Energy Independence 

and Security Act (EISA). Most forecasts of the implementation of this act foresee significant 

increases in the usage of higher ethanol blends in flex-fuel vehicles, as opposed to past ethanol 

usage being constrained by the availability of higher blends than E10. 

While the “actual use” approach that EPA proposes offers the hope that FFVs would be able to 

use the E85 CO2 compliance values once these vehicles are designed, developed, and sold, this 

hope is a poor substitute for the certainty offered for PHEV and bi-fuel CNG vehicles. It is 

unlikely that automakers would invest in FFVs based on the uncertain prospect of a CO2 

compliance benefit when other technologies are certain to yield a CO2 compliance benefit. The 

resulting shortage of FFVs will make EPA’s implementation of the EISA more challenging. 

Unlike natural gas and electricity, ethanol and other potential drop-in biofuels used in FFVs have 

inherent “lifecycle” CO2 reduction benefits. As outlined in the EISA, ethanol must meet one of 

several GHG reduction targets. Taking only the currently predominant fuel, corn-based ethanol, 

EPA itself has found that, on average, corn-based ethanol meets the 20 percent reduction in GHG 

emissions required in the EISA. 

Yet the proposed rule ensures that even if manufacturers could prove that their FFVs ran solely 

on ethanol, they would have no regulatory incentive to include such cars in their fleet. This is 

because the “0.15 divisor,” a statutorily-mandated incentive that boosts the effective fuel 

economy of FFVs under the CAFE program, is omitted by EPA under the proposed CO2 

standards. Since fuel economy and CO2 are directly correlated, the absence of an incentive in the 

EPA portion of the rule eliminates any benefit a manufacturer might gain from utilizing the 

incentive under the CAFE standards. In other words, the proposed rule not only fails to provide 

additional incentives for alternative fuel vehicles, it effectively eliminates existing incentives, 

thereby benefiting petroleum at the expense of cleaner alternatives. In the long run, the removal 

of a statutory incentive for alternative fuel vehicles will harm air quality, increase GHG 

emissions, and slow the development of clean alternatives to petroleum-based fuel. 

Given the considerable influence the final CAFE-GHG rule will have on the synergistic 

relationship between fuels and vehicles between 2017 and 2025, and likely beyond, it is 

imperative the agencies give thoughtful consideration to how future fuels and vehicles can 

seamlessly and cost-effectively comply with the objectives of this rulemaking. With respect to 

biofuels, the use of E10 and E15 in legacy and newer vehicles between 2017 and 2025 will prove 

to be an inadequate substitute for the role FFVs can and should play. If FFVs are adequately 

incentivized in the final rule, use of E85 and other blends of ethanol in these vehicles will ensure 

compliance with the 2017-2025 rulemaking and fulfillment of the RFS by 2022 in a way that 

avoids the infrastructure costs, implementation hang-ups, and legal challenges that have 

surrounded the E15 waiver.
EPA Response to Comments

6-84

Recommended Changes to the Rule 

The remedy for addressing the lack of parity for FFVs and biofuels is clear: The agencies can 

and should provide a level playing field for each vehicle technology. Further, the life-cycle CO2 

reductions that ethanol provides must be recognized, and the CAFE incentive for biofuels must 

be preserved in the combined EPA/NHTSA rule. To these ends, EPA should: 

1. Either: 

a. Use the Society of Automotive Engineers ‘‘utility factor’’ methodology (based on 

vehicle range on the alternative fuel and typical daily travel mileage) to determine the assumed 

percentage of operation on gasoline and percentage of operation on the alternative fuel. This will 

provide equity in treatment of alternative fuels and create a sensible incentive for continued 

production of FFVs. 

Or: 

b. Adopt the recommendation offered by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers to 

maintain meaningful FFV credits in the final rule. By using this alternative methodology based 

on E85 usage in FFVs to calculate GHG emission reductions, a sensible incentive for continued 

production of FFVs is created. 

2. Add the life-cycle CO2 reduction benefits of ethanol to the CO2 compliance standards 

by providing a multiplier showing life-cycle CO2 reduction, rather than simply measuring tailpipe 

CO2 emissions, for all blends containing biofuels. This calculus must take into account at least 

the recognized minimum life-cycle CO2 reduction of 20% for the biofuel portion of any fuel 

blend. This would be a conservative recognition of ethanol’s GHG benefits in light of the fact 

that future ethanol must meet the requirement of advanced biofuels and achieve a 50 percent 

GHG reduction. 

3. At blends of E85 or higher, a 0.15 multiplier must be used for CO2 calculations, in 

order to preserve existing statutory incentives for alternative fuels. The inclusion of this 

multiplier in CO2 standards would align with EPA’s mandate to reduce emissions of GHG and 

other pollutants, because it will promote investment into alternative engines and fuels that reduce 

CO2 on a life-cycle basis, while at the same time reducing a variety of other dangerous criteria 

pollutants. 

These three changes would provide greater certainty in the manufacturing of FFVs and 

additional credit for biofuel usage based on sound science. 

Conclusion 

As written, the rule could have devastating economic consequences. Failure to meet the biofuel 

volume targets of the RFS due to an absence of vehicles, because of the lack of meaningful 

incentives for manufacturers to produce FFVs, would adversely impact America’s agricultural 

and rural economies and our national energy security. EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis of the 

RFS2, released in February of 2010, concluded that the implementation of the Renewable Fuel 

Program would, in the year 2022 (relative to 2007), increase farm income by $13 billion or 36 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-85

percent, improve energy security by $2.6 billion, and reduce our nation’s expenditures on foreign 

oil by $41.5 billion. It would also reduce the cost of corn ethanol production by 13 cents per 

gallon and cut fuel costs by 2.4 cents per gallon for gasoline and 12.1 cents for diesel fuel. In 

addition, the monetized health benefits were estimated to be as high as $2.2 billion. This 

potential, as well as the many gains already made in moving toward the RFS goals, would be 

jeopardized by the proposed rule. 

As noted earlier, the production of FFVs using ethanol and advanced biofuels is a cost-effective 

means for auto manufacturers to achieve GHG reductions. It is important to note that FFV 

incentives represent no cost to taxpayers or the government and no additional costs to 

consumers. Other vehicle technologies, such as natural gas, will require far more resources to 

establish the infrastructure necessary to enable them to have a meaningful impact on the market. 

In summary, the proposed rule will become a self-fulfilling prophecy, one that will create 

negative outcomes both for consumers and for the environment. The rule presupposes that FFV 

owners will not elect to use biofuels on the assumption that ethanol fuel blends will remain as 

expensive as standard gasoline, without the same driving range. Drivers are therefore assumed 

not to take actual advantage of the potential GHG savings their vehicles make possible. There is 

also assumed to be no incremental push toward biofuel blends based on their ability to provide 

the higher octane required for better mileage with lower PM emissions than conventional 

gasoline despite accumulating evidence for major health problems from such PM emissions. 

These assumptions drive the proposed rule to deny the credit for GHG savings that FFVs would 

deserve if they were used with biofuels. The problem is then compounded by the absence of any 

incentive for alternative fuels under EPA’s CO2 standards, even for dedicated vehicles, thus 

eliminating the benefit purportedly offered under the CAFE rules. This loss of credit ensures that 

vehicle manufacturers have no real world incentive to manufacture such vehicles, despite the 

modest incremental cost of making an FFV compared to a standard motor vehicle. The net effect 

will result in dramatic declines in FFV manufacture. The dramatic decline in FFV production 

will then ensure that customers will not be able to purchase FFVs even if biofuel blends are 

available in widespread locations or are available at costs considerably less than standard 

gasoline as a function of the major biofuels production scale-up the RFS calls for. Seeing the 

prospective loss of their major new market and the potential for very poor investment recovery, 

biofuel producers will simply not make the investments required to produce biofuels at scale. 

As a result, the nation will fail to achieve the Renewable Fuel Standard, the rural American 

economy will lose its biggest opportunity for sustained economic health in generations, and the 

high-compression engines required to produce fuel economy will not have a high-octane fuel 

free of the toxic emissions that already comprise a major unaddressed health problem today. 

Only biofuel blends can provide the critical octane while decreasing PM emissions, but this rule 

will ensure it is not available for that purpose. And biofuels offer a better alternative for GHG 

reduction, both in use and in manufacture, than natural gas vehicles or electric vehicles powered 

by electricity generated – as 70 percent currently is – by fossil fuels, with the inherent GHG 

emissions and 33% average energy conversion efficiency of the electric grid. 

In short, the proposed rule sets up a cascade of negative effects that will deprive biofuels of their 

opportunity to make a critical contribution to national policy only they can make, and it does so 
EPA Response to Comments

6-86

simply by embodying an implicit assumption that biofuels will not make that contribution 

because they have not already done so. 25x’25 partners appreciate the opportunity to submit latefiled comments on the proposed rule and urge their consideration to the extent practicable by 

EPA and NHTSA in adopting a final rule. Please feel free to contact us with any questions 

related to information contained within these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11818]

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

In the final rulemaking for MY 2012-2016, EPA created regulations for MY 2016 ethanol flexfuel vehicles (FFVs) that differed significantly from those provided for by EPCA. EPA ended the 

GHG emissions compliance incentives and adopted a methodology based on demonstrated 

vehicle emissions performance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

For MY 2016, EPA proposed awarding CO2 credits upon demonstration of actual usage of E85. 

EPA now proposes extending MY 2016 approach to MYs 2017-2025. In the MY 2012-2016 

rulemaking, EPA offered two options for automobile manufacturers to consider:

(1) a default system based on 100% gasoline operation and (2) fuel economy weightings on 

national E85 use, or on manufacturer-specific data showing the percentage of miles that are 

driven on E85 versus gasoline for that manufacturer’s ethanol FFVs. The Alliance supports the 

determination of CO2 credits based on national E85 usage. The idea of actual national usage 

would be in conjunction with an early issuance of guidance to manufacturers indicating the value 

of the F-factor so that manufacturers can develop their vehicle portfolios and GHG compliance 

plans. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

The “F factor” is used in the calculation of Carbon Related Exhaust Emissions (CREE) of flexfuel vehicle and represents the relative usage of gasoline and E85. The calculation of “F” needs 

to take into account the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

The volume of ethanol used in motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

The volume of ethanol available to the flex-fuel fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.66]

The volume of E85 available to the flex-fuel fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

The fleet of active flex-fuel cars and trucks by model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.66]

The miles traveled by the fleet of active flex-fuel cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.66]

The total grams of CO2 emitted by the fleet of active flex-fuel cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

The CO2 emissions of the flex-fuel fleet on E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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The proportion of the fuel used by the flex-fuel vehicle fleet that is E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.66]

Volume of Ethanol Used in Motor Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.66]

EISA makes clear the volumes of renewable fuels that are to be used in the United States through 

2022 and then maintains this proportion in 2023 and beyond. For example, the total renewable 

fuel requirement for 2016 is 22.25 billion ethanol equivalent gallons. EISA does not give 

guidance as to whether the fuels marketed or imported to meet these requirements will be 

ethanol, biodiesel or some other renewable fuel. Our recommendation is to use the Energy 

Information Agency Annual Energy Outlook Liquid Fuels Supply and Disposition forecasts 

volumes for ethanol, biodiesel and “other biomass-derived liquids.” The ratios between the three 

fuels can be used to determine the amount of ethanol to be used in any given year. For example, 

in 2016, the 2011 reference case forecast is 16.108 million gallons of ethanol, 1.381 million 

gallons of biodiesel and 307 million gallons of other biomass-derived liquids. This gives a ratio 

of 9.54 gallons of ethanol per gallon of other fuels. Assuming that both the biodiesel and other 

biomass-derived liquids have a RIN value of 1.5 and the ethanol has a RIN value of 1.0. The 

volume of ethanol required = 9.54 gallons of ethanol per 11.04 RINs (9.54+1.5) multiplied by 

22.25 billion RINs or 19.23 billion gallons of ethanol. The corresponding volume of biodiesel 

plus other biomass-derived liquids would be 2.01 billion gallons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, pp.66-67]

Volume of Ethanol Available to the Flex-Fuel Fleet [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.67]

This is determined by subtracting the ethanol volumes used for gasoline blending from the total 

volume of ethanol. This is done by determining the total volume of hydrocarbons used in motor 

gasoline (this can be determined using the EIA AEO Liquid Fuels Supply and Disposition 

forecasts volumes) and dividing by 9 to determine the ethanol used for blending E10. For 2016, 

this is 14.30 billion gallons of ethanol used in gasoline blending. When this is subtracted from 

the 19.23 billion gallons of ethanol to be used, the resulting volume of ethanol to be used in the 

flex-fuel fleet is 4.97 billion gallons. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.67]

Volume of E85 Available to the Flex-Fuel Fleet [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.67]

The volume of E85 available to the flex-fuel fleet is determined by dividing the volume of 

ethanol to be used by the flex-fuel fleet by the fractional ethanol content of the E85 certification 

fuel for the model year being evaluated (currently 0.85). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.67]

Fleet of Active Flex-fuel Cars and Trucks by Model Year [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.67]

This can be done by obtaining vehicle registration data from a commercial company such as R. 

L. Polk and screening for flex-fuel vehicles. Alternatively, reported manufacturer FFV 

production by model year can be used, with the volumes reduced using vehicle survival rates 

from Table 4-3, “Survival Rates and Unadjusted Annual Miles Traveled (VMT) by Age for 
EPA Response to Comments

6-88

Passenger Cars” and Table 4-4 “Survival Rates and Unadjusted Annual Vehicle-Miles Traveled 

(VMT) by Age for Light Trucks” from “Final Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle 

Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Joint 

Technical Support Document,” April 2010 (2010 TSD). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.67]

Miles Traveled by the Fleet of Active Flex-fuel Cars and Trucks [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.67]

Multiply the number of flex-fuel cars and trucks of each model year by the appropriate miles 

traveled per year for each model years’ age obtained from Table 4-3, “Survival Rates and 

Unadjusted Annual Miles Traveled (VMT) by Age for Passenger Cars” and Table 4-4 “Survival 

Rates and Unadjusted Annual Vehicle-Miles Traveled (VMT) by Age for Light Trucks” from the 

2010 TSD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.67]

Total Grams of CO2 Emitted by the Fleet of Active Flex-fuel Cars and Trucks [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.68]

Convert the average fuel efficiencies of U.S. light-duty vehicles (available from the Research 

and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, table 4-23) to 

grams of CO2 per mile using the conversion factor of 8,887 grams CO2 per gallon of gasoline. 

For any model year too recent to be included in the Bureau of Transportation Statistics table, use 

the projected fleet-wide emissions compliance levels under the MY 2012-2016 or MY 2017-

2025 final rules, as appropriate. Multiply the vehicle miles traveled for the cars and trucks of 

each model year by the CO2 emissions per mile of the cars and trucks of each model year. Sum 

the CO2 emissions for each model year of cars and trucks on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.68]

CO2 Emissions of the Flex-Fuel Fleet on E85 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.68]

Multiply the E85 volume available by the grams of CO2 per gallon of E85 certification fuel for 

the model year being evaluated (currently 6,295). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.68]

Proportion of the Fuel Used by the Flex-fuel Vehicle Fleet That is E85 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.68]

Divide the CO2 emissions of the flex-fuel fleet on E85 by the total CO2 emissions of the flex-fuel 

fleet. This fraction is the value, F, used in the CREE calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.68]

Organization: American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) and Biomass Coordinating 

Council (BCC)

The proposed rules, NHTSA-2010-0131 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0162, focus almost 

exclusively on automobile efficiency and largely neglect the crucial role of fuels. Considering 

the ambitious fuel efficiency targets proposed under the new GHG and CAFE rules (average US 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-89

fleet fuel economy of 54.5 mpg by 2025), fuels are especially important and deserve inclusion in 

this legislation. If the automobile manufacturers are required to make all the changes necessary 

to meet these targets without any improvement in fuel quality, there is a serious risk that 

technologies will be implemented increasing fuel efficiency by sacrificing air quality, cost 

effectiveness, and consumer choices in terms of size, weight and power of the engine. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 1]

Octane enhancement is necessary for gasoline (refined from petroleum feedstock) to be used as a 

transportation fuel. Octane enhancement can be obtained from a variety of sources, including a 

wide range of domestically produced biofuels. Octane enhancing substances can also be 

produced from petroleum, through a further refining process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-

A2, p. 1]

The principle message of my letter is to submit that there appears to be little substantial rationale 

in continuing with high levels of fossil-based aromatic hydrocarbons (BTX-benzene, toluene and 

xylene) to meet octane needs of gasoline when renewable ethanol, less toxic and damaging to 

human health, is readily available at comparable prices, is domestic and renewable, and already 

used to boost gasoline octane – and can do more at higher blend levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9593-A2, p. 1]

A brief examination of the history of transportation fuels in America reveals that the petroleum 

and petroleum refining industries have exerted considerable effort to ensure that petroleum-based 

products are used to enhance the octane of gasoline. In the process, the domestic biofuels 

industry has been essentially sidelined and the US economy could become increasingly 

dependent on costly imported oil if the ethanol industry is further discounted. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9593-A2, pp. 1-2]

THE RECORD

• In 1864, there was a 9--million gal/yr ethanol industry providing fuel for the “Spirit 

Lamps” that replaced whale oil in oil lamps because of diminishing supplies and rising 

prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• In 1865, oil was discovered in Titusville PA. There was no market for oil, so it was 

refined into kerosene to compete with ethanol in lamps. A $2.00 tax per gallon was levied 

on ethanol to help finance the Civil War. A $0.20 a gallon tax was imposed on Kerosene. 

The ethanol industry faded, over night, back into the cornfields. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• In the 1920s, cars had advanced to the point where they needed more powerful engines 

with higher compression ratios. Henry Ford was promoting ethanol (113 octane) as the 

renewable fuel of the future. However, tetra ethyl lead (a known poison) was more 

profitable. For decades, lead was used and ethanol again faded. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• In the 1970s, the huge human health impact of lead in gasoline became sufficiently clear 

to the public, and the environmental and public health communities. This, coupled with 

the advent of the catalytic converter (the key to cleaner air that is poisoned by lead) 
EPA Response to Comments

6-90

finally, after nearly a half century of damaging public health, spelled the end of lead in 

gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• Adding clean burning ethanol to meet octane needs in newer engines was the logical next 

step from environmental, human health and national security perspectives. However, 

profitability and market share prevailed; and methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was 

used to meet the required octane and oxygen needs. Ethanol was assigned a secondary 

role as an oxygenate to boost octane. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• When MTBE turned out to be unacceptable in the U.S. market due to leaking 

underground storage tanks leading to ground water contamination, the oil industry turned 

to higher levels of aromatics to meet octane needs. Ethanol was again relegated to a 

secondary role in the octane market – a pattern that has been a part of America’s 

transportation fuels history. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• Controlled markets and profit driven forces in the transportation fuel sector have 

overpowered public health, environmental considerations and, too often, national/energy 

security issues – let alone the best interest of the nation. Without public involvement, 

history will likely repeat itself. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

The Biomass Coordinating Council (BCC, of which I am the President) believes that 

domestically produced biofuels are a superior alternative to petroleum-based octane enhancers. 

Not only would the use of biofuels in place of BTX reduce air pollution and save billions of 

dollars each year in health care costs, they would take some of the burden of meeting the EPA’s 

new fuel efficiency goals off the shoulders of automakers. Because the carbon footprint of 

biofuels is much lower than BTX, their use would effectively increase the fuel efficiency and 

decrease the carbon footprint of the cars and light trucks that run on them. Crucially, biofuels are 

now cost-competitive with BTX, and as the price of oil (from which BTX is refined) rises, so 

will the price of BTX. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

Biofuels are superior to petroleum-based compounds for a host of reasons:

1. Use of biofuels enhances our energy security by insulating the economy from geopolitical 

shocks that have and will continue to adversely affect global oil markets. The oil crisis caused by 

the Yom Kippur War in the 1970s is a case in point, but more recent instances include last year’s 

civil war in Libya and the current crisis in the Persian Gulf with Iran.

2. The production of biofuels here in the US creates jobs at a time when unemployment remains 

stubbornly high.

3. Every year, importing oil causes hundreds of billions of dollars to flow out of the US 

economy. Biofuel production would keep some of that money here at home.

4. In a global economy where research and innovation increasingly determine economic 

competitiveness, America must strive to remain at the forefront of renewable energy 

technologies. Investment in the domestic biofuels industry that has made steady progress in 

recent years would ensure a leading role for the US in this crucial 21st century industry.

5. In addition to producing biofuels, the growth of biomass acts as a carbon sink.
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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6. Biofuels burn more cleanly than petroleum-based octane enhancers, and do not produce 

harmful particulate matter that can cause serious health damage

7. Biofuels are cost-competitive with BTX. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

It is imperative that the numerous advantages of clean, renewable, domestic octane enhancement 

be considered during the agencies’ deliberations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

Over the course of ten successful years in advancing renewable energy, the American Council 

On Renewable Energy (ACORE) and the BCC have passionately advocated for all renewable 

energy but have taken no stance against any other form of energy. In addressing the issue of 

fuels, the BCC is for: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

• Improvements to national and energy security and a reduction in the nation’s dependence 

on oil through increased domestic biofuels production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-

A2, p. 4]

• First and second generation biofuels, ethanol and biodiesel, which have been steadily 

improving in terms of advanced farming practices to reach full sustainability; have 

increased feedstock yields and production volumes from these yields; have increased 

byproducts and the market value of these byproducts; have yielded less water and fossil 

fuel use; contributed to job creation; and have shown profitability without subsidies. All 

of these successes obviate the food versus fuel issue while internationally reducing the 

need for grain support programs to the advantage of farmers in developing countries. In 

short, grain, sugar and starch-based ethanol can compete in the transportation fuels 

marketplace, particularly with a “level playing field” and consideration given to their 

reduced carbon footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 4]

• Biofuels from biowaste, cellulosic biomass, algae, and other forms of biomass that are 

now reaching the threshold of commercialization. These gains, coupled with continued 

advances in grain, sugar and starch-based ethanol, will meet the targets of RFS2 as now 

established. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 4]

• Discovering alternate markets for BTX displaced from the gasoline pool (such as high 

value petrochemical markets). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 4]

• Passage of the Open Fuels Standard, which will provide Americans more choice at the 

pump, and accelerated authority for the use of E-15 in later model automobiles to 

increase the number of jobs in domestic biofuel production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9593-A2, p. 4]

• Increased Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, made possible by advanced 

engine designs with higher compression ratio engines and other breakthroughs in flexible 

fuel engines with improved efficiencies and greater variability of clean burning fuels. 

These advances will provide the public with greater choices in terms of bigger, safer, 

more powerful vehicles while still meeting high-mileage and environmental 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 4]

The BCC is particularly in favor of a systems approach in dealing with all of these opportunities 

that can be advanced in ways that improve our economy, create jobs, enhance our environment, 
EPA Response to Comments

6-92

and doing so cost effectively with open and unsubsidized market forces. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9593-A2, p. 4]

That systems approach involves four factors:

1. An expanding market for biofuels starting immediately to help steady the price of oil, maintain 

momentum in the biofuels market, and stimulate the production of cellulosic biomass and algaebased ethanol while encouraging the advance and use of other biofuels, methanol, electricity and 

hydrogen.

2. Rapidly speeding the production of flex fuel vehicles and refueling stations as called for by the 

Open Fuels Standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 4]

3. Reducing the level of aromatics (BTX) in gasoline to limit emissions of highly healthdamaging particulate matter, especially ultrafine particulates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-

A2, p. 5]

4. Forming a working coalition of stakeholders representing the oil, refining and marketing 

industries; the auto manufacturers; the biofuels producers and other alternative fuel producers, 

including advanced biofuels, algae, methanol, natural gas, and hydrogen. This collaborative 

effort would serve the nation, the public, the environment, and the industries involved. The EPA 

and the NHTSA should also participate in this collaborative effort. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9593-A2, p. 5]

While the BCC appreciates the agencies’ efforts to improve the fuel economy of the US car and 

light truck fleet, we regret that the current proposed rules focus almost exclusively on car 

manufacturers, neglecting fuel quality as an important part of the solution. We believe that 

automobiles and the fuels they consume must be regulated in tandem to allow gains in fuel 

efficiency to go hand in hand with improvements in air quality and public health. Replacing a 

portion of the BTX group compounds (aromatics) in gasoline with ethanol or other alcohols is in 

the interests of the public health, national energy security and the domestic economy. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 5]

Congress prudently allowed the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) and the tariff 

on imported ethanol to expire at the end of 2011. The BCC supports unsubsidized transportation 

fuels markets (including subsidies for fossil fuels as well as biofuels) and therefore also supports 

the Open Fuel Standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 5]

Organization: American Forest and Paper Association & American Wood Council

Introduction [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.2]

EPA is proposing tailpipe emission standards that fail to distinguish between CO2 emissions 

from cars using fuels derived from biomass (“biofuels”) and CO2 emissions from use of fossil 

fuels. Treating those two types of emissions the same is inconsistent with both international 

policies as well as existing EPA regulatory programs. EPA should consider modifying the 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-93

proposed regulations so that the motor vehicle emissions from biofuels are not counted the same 

as emissions from fossil fuels in calculating grams of CO2 emissions per mile, to reflect the role 

of the carbon cycle in biofuel production and combustion and to further encourage use of 

renewable fuels. This would (1) make the GHG tailpipe emission standards consistent with the 

endangerment that the standards are supposed to be mitigating and (2) encourage the substitution 

of renewable fuels for fossil fuels, which EPA already is seeking to accomplish through other 

provisions in the proposed GHG tailpipe standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.2]

The Carbon-neutrality of CO2 Emissions from Biofuel Combustion Is Widely Recognized [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.2]

Biomass CO2 “neutrality” is an inherent property of biomass based on the natural carbon cycle. 

The carbon dioxide (CO2) removed from the atmosphere during photosynthesis is converted into 

organic carbon and stored in biomass such as trees and crops. When harvested and combusted or 

left to die and decay, the carbon in the biomass is released as CO2 to be reabsorbed by replanted 

trees and crops, thus completing the carbon cycle.1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.2]

The neutrality of CO2 emissions from biomass combustion has been repeatedly recognized for 

many years by an abundance of studies and is widely accepted by agencies, institutions, 

regulations and legislation. This is true not only of the IPCC Guidelines and Guidance for the 

UNFCCC reporting protocols, but of innumerable other agencies and institutions as well. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.3]

The globally accepted accounting practice for sovereigns of the UN Framework Convention on 

Climate Change Treaty, of which the United States is a signatory, is developed in the IPCC 

Guidelines of 1996 and 2006 and the Guidance of 2003 for Land Use/Land Use Change and 

Forestry (LULUCF). Unequivocally, in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines, Volume 1, Section 1.2, IPCC 

states that “CO2 from the combustion or decay of short-lived biogenic material removed from 

where it is grown, is reported as zero in the Energy, Industrial Processes Product Use (IPPU) and 

Waste Sectors.” EPA, in preparation and submission of the United States annual inventory of 

GHG emissions and sinks adheres to these guidelines and does not report CO2 from biomass 

combustion based on the same neutrality principle and accounting best practices in order to avoid 

double counting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.3]

Similarly, other countries and regional entities follow the same best practices. For example, the 

European Union Climate Change Trade Scheme in its directive on carbon trading, the European 

Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the EU Commission 2004 regulation in Section 

4.2.2.1.6, Emission Factors, states, “Biomass is considered as CO2-neutral. An emission factor of 

0 [t CO2/TJ or t or m3] shall be applied to biomass.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.3]

EPA confirmed its position that the combustion of biomass should be considered as CO2-neutral, 

regardless of the source of the biomass, in its final rule to implement the Energy Independence 

and Security Act of 2007 through a new Renewable Fuel Standard, RFS2 (75 Fed. Reg. 14,669 

(March 26, 2010)). The preamble of the final rule includes that “[f]or renewable fuels, tailpipe 

emissions only include non- CO2 gases, because the carbon emitted as a result of fuel 
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combustion is offset by the uptake of biogenic carbon during feedstock production”. 75 Fed. 

Reg. at 14,787. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.3]

Further, because CO2 emissions from combustion of biofuels are widely considered neutral, they 

are either not reported or reported separately for information purposes only in many protocols 

such as U.S. Department of Energy’s 1605(b), World Resources Institute/World Business 

Council for Sustainable Development, International Standards Organization 14064, IPCC, 

Environment Canada, U.S. EPA Climate Leaders, Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord 

Advisory Board recommendations, and the final EPA Mandatory GHG Reporting Rule. In its 

Mandatory Reporting of GHGs Rule, U.S. EPA makes clear the exclusion of biomass CO2

emissions quantities for the calculation of thresholds for determining regulated facilities. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.3]

Distinguishing Between CO2 Emissions from Vehicles Burning Biofuels and Those Burning 

Fossil Fuels Would Be Consistent with EPA’s Motor Vehicle Endangerment Finding [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.4]

As noted above, a statutory prerequisite for EPA to impose emission limitations on motor 

vehicles is a finding that emissions of the pollutant from domestic motor vehicles cause or 

contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 

welfare. See CAA section 202(a). EPA proposed those findings on April 24, 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 

18,886), and AF&PA filed extensive comments on that proposal on June 23, 2009. As we stated 

in our comments, the proposed findings failed to distinguish explicitly between CO2-neutral 

emissions from cars using biofuels and emissions from cars using fossil fuels, even though the 

emissions inventories that EPA relied on were for CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. The fact is, 

however, that the effects that EPA projected in its findings of endangerment and causation are all 

based on increases in the concentration of the GHGs, and primarily in the concentration of CO2, 

in the global atmosphere that EPA described and predicted based on combustion of fossil fuels. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.4]

To the extent that a motor vehicle’s CO2 emissions merely return CO2 to the global atmosphere 

that was removed when the organic compounds used to power the vehicle were produced 

through plant growth, that motor vehicle would not contribute to an increase in the concentration 

of CO2 in the global atmosphere and could not be said to cause or contribute to the effects EPA 

described in its endangerment finding. Distinguishing between motor vehicle tailpipe emissions 

of CO2 generated by combustion of biofuels would recognize that those emissions do not 

contribute to the harm EPA is attempting to mitigate. It also would further EPA’s stated goals of 

increasing the use of renewable fuels and reducing our nation’s dependence on foreign oil by 

creating an appropriate incentive for car manufacturers to accommodate and encourage the use 

of biofuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.4]

The Proposed GHG Tailpipe Standards Could Be Modified To Differentiate Biofuel CO2

Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.4]

Recognition of the fundamentally different nature, with respect to climate change, of combustion 

of biofuels in motor vehicles could be accomplished within the general regulatory framework 
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EPA has already proposed. AF&PA and AWC are not experts in EPA regulation of motor 

vehicle emissions, and we must defer to others as to the feasibility and appropriateness of the 

detailed requirements EPA has proposed. We can say, however, that recognition of the 

fundamental difference between CO2 emissions from biofuels and those from fossil fuels would 

be consistent with provisions that EPA has included in previous GHG tailpipe standards and in 

the Proposed Fuel Economy and Tailpipe Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.4]

For example, for alternative-fuel vehicles up through MY2015, EPA proposed as an incentive, a 

method of calculating vehicle CO2 emissions that in effect exempts 85% of the CO2 emissions 

from use of alternative fuels such as biofuels or natural gas. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 49,531-32. This 

has the effect of understating the actual CO2 emissions, in order to encourage use of alternative 

fuels. While we still maintain 100% of the CO2 emissions from biofuels should be credited, it is 

illustrative of the mechanisms that can be adopted. There are various other incentives and credits, 

in the MY 2012-2016 light-duty vehicle GHG program and in the proposed MY 2017-2025 

program, that are intended to encourage manufacturers to use technology, or implement it early, 

that will reduce CO2 emissions by reducing the amount of [fossil] fuel used. Without necessarily 

endorsing any particular approach, we note that EPA could adapt one or more of those 

mechanisms to recognize the distinction, in potential effect on global climate, of CO2 emissions 

from motor vehicles burning biofuels.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.5]

In summary, the Proposed Fuel Economy and Tailpipe Standards as written fail to distinguish 

between CO2 emissions from the combustion of biofuels in light-duty motor vehicles and 

emissions from such vehicles burning fossil fuels, despite EPA’s recognition of that distinction 

in other contexts, and the approaches followed by many international bodies. EPA should 

consider how to acknowledge the fundamentally different character of CO2 emissions from use 

of biofuels when setting standards for emissions of CO2 from motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9537-A1, p.5]

1 - From a technical or scientific perspective, biomass CO2 neutrality is independent of any 

consideration of material sustainability of the sources of biomass – the CO2 released back to the 

atmosphere is the same CO2 that was just recently removed or “sequestered” from it. The carbon 

in biomass will return to the atmosphere regardless of whether it is burned for energy or allowed 

to biodegrade. When we burn biomass for energy we are simply inserting a step in the cycle that 

allows us to recover usable energy that can displace fossil fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9537-A1, p.2]

2 - Some have suggested that burning biofuels may indirectly increase atmospheric 

concentrations of CO2 because of loss of forests that may accompany increased demand for 

biomass for fuel or because of other indirect effects. As explained in footnote 1 above, such 

concerns, even if they have some basis, do not contradict the scientific fact that combustion of 

biomass fuel merely completes the carbon cycle and returns to the atmosphere CO2 that was 

removed from the atmosphere by the plant. And in any event, EPA decided not to attempt to 

address a similar, but more directly related, issue in order to further its goal of reducing fossilfuel consumption, by choosing to treat electric vehicles in most cases as having zero CO2
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emissions, disregarding that CO2 may be emitted where the electricity is generated. See 75 Fed. 

Reg. at 25,341. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9537-A1, p.5]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

6. Testing Fuel – E0:

Current fuel economy and GHG testing are conducted with E0 fuels. We understand that it is 

EPA’s intention in future rulemaking to adopt E15 as its test fuel. If and when EPA changes the 

certification fuel to E15, Honda believes it is essential that an adjustment factor be added to the 

GHG and CO2 calculations so that it does not become a de facto fuel economy and GHG 

stringency increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 5]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Comment on the Impacts of Changing Fuel Composition on Costs, Benefits, and Emissions

The EPA and NHTSA point to an unintended consequence relating to the overlay of a regulation 

setting future light-duty vehicle Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards overlay on

top of the separately imposed Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program: The crosssubsidization of costly renewable fuels could eventually result in a reduction of total fuel 

consumption. A CAFE- induced reduction in total fuel consumption will result in more costly 

cross subsidy per gallon of fuel. A reduction in total fuel consumption will lead to increased 

biofuel content (percent volume) which could change the timing and impact the severity of blend 

wall constraints. EPA should recognize that the CAFE standards potentially run counter to 

meeting RFS mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 13]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS. The Agencies have proposed a rule with multiple, and 

potentially competing, objectives. Increasing fuel efficiency and reducing transportation sector 

petroleum use and carbon emissions, without compromising urban air quality, requires a 

balanced approach to both fuels and vehicles. In order to enable the most cost effective 

compliance with these important objectives, we respectfully recommend the following changes 

to the rule as it now stands: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 1]

1. Provide automakers with sufficient incentives to commit to aggressive flex fuel vehicle (FFV) 

production schedules post-MY2016, with robust credit trading mechanisms among vehicle 

classes and among the manufacturers themselves. FFV incentives should be on par with those 

provided by the Agencies to other fuel options incented by this rule, such as electric, CNG, and 

fuel cell-powered vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 1]

2. Properly credit ultra-low emissions, high octane, low sulfur ethanol blends‘ (E30+ blends) 

higher octane; power density; reduced carbon; and RVP control benefits in calculating both 
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Petroleum Equivalency Factor (PEF) and carbon reduction credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, p. 1]

3. Acknowledge the importance of octane in achieving both fuel efficiency and carbon/criteria 

pollutant reduction, and E30+ blends‘ unique ability to transform an 84 sub-octane gasoline 

blend-stock into a high-quality, clean-burning 94 octane (AKI) finished fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 1]

4. Give full weight to E30+ blends‘ ability to substantially reduce both PM and PM2.5 emissions, 

including the associated toxic PAHQ emissions, and thus fairly credit their ability to protect 

against unintended urban air quality impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 1]

6. Recognize ethanol‘s cost advantages compared to gasoline Aromatic Group Compounds, and 

the sufficiency of E30+ ethanol supplies over the term of this rulemaking to both reduce 

Aromatics Group Compounds, and increase U.S. gasoline octane levels, while helping to reduce 

automakers‘ costs of compliance (see Attachment J). [This attachment can be found in Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A14] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 2]

7. Develop commercially practicable methods to measure actual usage of E30+ blends post-MY 

2019, whether it be on-board diagnostic reporting, or other predictable, and transparent, macroaccounting procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 2]

BACKGROUND. Since the enactment of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA), 

U.S. policymakers have recognized that U.S. transportation fuels policy should strive to preserve 

a careful balance between vehicles and the fuels that power them, as they are synergistic pieces 

of an integrated system. Requiring automakers (original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs) to 

improve vehicle hardware and engine technologies without at the same time requiring fuel 

providers to improve fuel quality would be bad policy, and could result in adverse unintended 

consequences that will ultimately undermine the important objectives of this rule. In particular, 

failure to upgrade fuel standards to replace Aromatic Group Compounds with Clean Octane 

alternatives will compromise the nation‘s petroleum use and carbon reduction goals, potentially 

resulting in increased ambient particulate matter (PM2.5, a currently regulated pollutant whose 

constituents include ultrafine particulates, or UFPs). We believe it is of paramount importance 

for the Agencies to ensure that the final rule properly recognizes intermediate ethanol blends‘ 

ability to enhance gasoline octane levels, and significantly reduce emissions of carbon and 

criteria pollutants. In order to take advantage of ethanol‘s unique qualities, the Agencies must 

revise their proposed rule to incent the manufacture of FFVs after MY2016 and require fuel 

quality improvements as Congress intended. This will be the best way to maximize cost effective 

compliance with both fuel efficiency and carbon reduction goals, enable the introduction of 

higher octane in-use fuels, prevent adverse urban air quality impacts, and protect the public 

health and welfare as new engine technologies come to market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, p. 2]

THE AGENCIES HAVE REQUESTED COMMENT ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT 

ISSUES. We commend the Agencies for requesting comment on a number of key issues that 

deserve careful consideration for shaping the final rule. Since we note that the Agencies project a 
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fleet-wide penetration rate of only 1% for plug-in and electric vehicles (PHEVs and EVs) by 

2021, and 7% for hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), we believe that liquid fuel- propelled sparkignition vehicles will continue to dominate the U.S. transportation fuels sector for many years, 

perhaps decades. A 2010 National Research Council (NRC) study was cited in a GM/Coskata 

paper as concluding that “PHEVs will have little impact on oil consumption before 2030 because 

there will not be enough of them in the fleet. More substantial reductions could be achieved by 

2050 but will reduce oil consumption only slightly more than can be achieved by just the hybrid 

vehicles (HEVs).”12 Therefore, we will focus our comments on the important role we believe 

E30+ blends can play in down-sized GDI vehicles with bundled advanced technology packages. 

(The page numbers below identify where in the rulemaking the captioned issue is raised by the 

Agencies.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 5]

• P. 75335, IMPORTANCE OF OCTANE. As mentioned previously, we believe that 

octane should play an extremely important role in meeting the nation‘s transportation 

fuels sector goals between now and 2025 and beyond. There are critical differences 

between the Aromatic Group Compounds (Dirty Octane) and Clean Octane alternatives, 

involving a range of considerations including legal/statutory authority, 

technical/performance, and environmental/health criteria. In the process of finalizing this 

rule, we strongly recommend that the agencies avail themselves of the extensive body of 

third party scientific literature, including recent Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 

and other credible work that has been done on performance and emissions effects of 

E30+ blends compared to the different types of in-use gasoline. [See Attachment C in 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A6.] Well respected experts such as 

Honda Motors, Delphi Powertrain, Oak Ridge National Laboratories, and Southwest 

Research Institute have published findings that contradict many of the conventionally 

accepted assumptions about higher ethanol blends‘ performance based on testing that has 

historically been conducted primarily by petroleum interests or affiliated entities. In 

particular, E30+ blends can help the OEMs more cost effectively comply with the new 

fuel efficiency rules, reduce transportation fuel carbon intensity and CO2eq tailpipe 

emissions, improve advanced engine design performance, and achieve significant 

reductions in harmful pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 5]

• P. 74878, PETROLEUM EQUIVALENCY FACTOR FOR E30+ BLENDS. The 

Agencies state in footnote #56 that EPA is required to calculate fuel economy using 

DOE‘s Petroleum Equivalency Factor (PEF). We are concerned that DOE‘s simplistic 

approach to ethanol‘s PEF based only on energy density comparisons (e.g., dividing 

gasoline‘s 115,000 BTUs into ethanol‘s 76,000 BTUs) significantly and incorrectly 

penalizes ethanol when it comes to both petroleum displacement and, by extension, 

carbon reduction credit calculations. It is important that the Agencies recognize at least 

three distinct facts about ethanol‘s unique octane enhancement properties: 1) it has an 

octane rating as high, or higher, than Aromatic Group Compounds, which means that 

ethanol can reduce the catalytic reformer‘s significant gasoline and other product yield 

losses sufficiently to entirely offset its lower energy density (confirmed by the 2008 

NREL/McKinsey linear program study cited below);32 2) its power density, chemical 

octane, superior octane sensitivity, and charge cooling effects help to further compensate 

for its energy density (BTU) shortcomings; [See Attachment C in Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A6] and 3) as ethanol volumes increase in the future in 
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response to market-based signals, OEMs can optimize advanced engine designs for 

higher compression ratios and other modifications to take even greater advantage of 

ethanol‘s unique performance benefits. Taken together, these benefits result in a greater 

than 1:1 displacement effect from E30+ blend substitution for Aromatic Group 

Compounds. Another important factor that must be considered in any recalculation of 

ethanol‘s PEF is for the Agencies to recognize that as ethanol concentration increases, 

e.g., E30+ blends, depending upon base gasoline properties, ethanol‘s naturally lower 

Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP)34 begins to take over, which allows refiners and blenders to 

more easily control for RVP (one of EPA‘s targets in the anticipated Tier 3 rulemaking). 

In any case, E30+ blends significantly reduce a wide range of tailpipe emissions, 

including NOx, CO, VOCs, weighted average MSATs, and PM/PN that far outweigh any 

evaporative emission increases. [See Attachment C in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9574-A6] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 9]

• ENSURE FULL-SCOPE COST-BENEFIT ACCOUNTING FOR REPLACING DIRTY 

OCTANE WITH CLEAN OCTANE. To our knowledge, the last time EPA did a costbenefit analysis of reducing Aromatic Group Compounds was in the 2007 MSAT 

rulemaking. At that time, EPA‘s model used crude oil price assumptions of 

approximately $20 a barrel, which is of course 80% lower than current prices, making the 

analysis of little value. (Aromatics prices are tied directly to crude oil costs. As crude oil 

costs have soared in recent years, Aromatics Group Compound costs have also escalated 

rapidly.) Another major assumption that skewed the 2007 analysis against the potential of 

E30+ blends to replace Aromatic Group Compounds was EPA‘s adherence to 

conventional wisdom as far as penalizing ethanol for its energy density and RVP 

properties. This resulted in EPA assuming that it took approximately 1.6 barrels of 

ethanol to replace 1.0 barrels of aromatics. In fact, E30+ blends‘ superior octane 

enhancement effects, and the RVP control tendencies of higher blends—coupled with the 

offsets that should be credited to them for their substantial tailpipe emissions 

reductions—should result in E30+ blends being credited for at least a one for one

displacement of Aromatic Group Compounds.36 In addition to the enormous health cost 

savings, there are at least two other costs-benefit considerations worth mentioning. The 

first is to recognize that commercial technologies exist to upgrade Aromatic Group

Compounds and divert them from the gasoline pool to the value-added petrochemical 

market. [See Attachment H in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A12] The 

second consideration anticipates a predictable defense from refiners as to why the 

gasoline Aromatic Group Compounds cannot be reduced, whatever their costs or health 

risks: the catalytic reformer is not only the source of aromatics, but also provides off-gas 

hydrogen used for other operations, such as diesel fuel desulfurization. We believe that 

the best response to this specious argument can be found in the previously mentioned 

2008 NREL/McKinsey linear program study of U.S. refiners, which specifically 

addressed the issue: “The [Linear Programming] model also calculated the input costs for 

each scenario to account for changes in inputs (e.g., as the reformer and isomerization 

unit throughputs are reduced, additional hydrogen will have to be purchased)...We also 

verified that increases in the inputs required, specifically hydrogen, could be met without 

driving up the prices of the inputs.” (Emphasis added.)38 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, pp. 9-10]
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• P. 75103, GHG – CAFE RULEMAKING CAN/SHOULD COMPLEMENT TIER 3 

RULEMAKING. We note EPA‘s statement that for this analysis, they assume “...no 

effect on volumes of ethanol and other renewable fuels because they are mandated under 

the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS2)...However, as a consequence of the fixed volume 

of renewable fuels mandated in the RFS2 rulemaking and the decreasing petroleum 

consumption predicted here, we anticipate that this proposal would in fact increase the 

fraction of U.S. fuel supply that is made up by renewable fuels. Although we are not 

modeling this effect in our analysis of this proposal, the Tier 3 rulemaking will make 

more refined assumptions about future fuel properties, including (in a final Tier 3 rule) 

accounting for the impacts of the LD GHG rule.” Inasmuch as EPA wants to reduce 

gasoline sulfur content, achieve RVP control, and establish a pathway to reducing PM 

emissions from gasoline-powered vehicles, it makes sense for EPA to also strive for 

“increasing the fraction of U.S. fuel supply that is made up by renewable fuels.”39 

However, we would point out that moving U.S. ethanol production and use to the next 

level faces many challenges, most of which will not be solved by simple reliance on 

RFS2 (the volume targets of certain categories of which can be, and often are, 

significantly reduced by EPA edict due to supply shortfalls). Private sector capital 

investment has dried up due to uncertainty driven largely by Blend Wall constraints and 

elimination of longstanding public sector support for new entrants. Now that the ethanol 

industry‘s tax incentives and other support has ended, what is most needed is regulatory 

policy that sends market-based, technology-neutral signals to investors that Clean Octane 

alternatives can compete on a level playing field with the entrenched, higher cost, higher 

carbon intensity, and highly toxic Aromatic Group Compounds. This is what the 

Congress intended in the 1990 CAAA, and it is what would be best for the nation‘s 

economy, energy security, environment, and public health and welfare. We strongly 

recommend that EPA fully consider the substantial benefits E30+ blends would bring in 

terms of: 1) reducing gasoline sulfur levels (a combination of refinery adjustments and 

the sheer dilution benefits of replacing Aromatic Group Compounds with 30+% low 

sulfur ethanol; 2) helping to control RVP, while achieving major reductions in a host of 

tailpipe emissions; and 3) substantially reducing PM, and especially PM2.5, and their 

associated PAHQ toxic emissions, even as the use of GDI engine technologies increases 

in the future. For the OEMs, and the entire nation, to extract full benefit from the use of 

these high-performance, low carbon intensity E30+ blends, it is imperative that the OEMs 

are properly incented to manufacture FFVs after MY2016. While FFV cost differentials 

will be considerably lower than CNG alternative vehicles and/or EVs/PHEVs, the OEMs 

must receive fair and balanced treatment if they are to make the level of commitment 

needed to ensure that American motorists are able to exercise “consumer choice” at the 

pump. This means that, over time, all vehicles should be capable of running on no less 

than E30+ blends, i.e., all FFVS. In the future, as more volumes of ethanol enter the 

marketplace—from a diverse range of sources, feedstocks, and technologies—the OEMs 

will be able to achieve even greater mileage efficiencies, performance enhancements, and 

carbon, PM, toxics, etc. reductions by committing to higher compression engines and 

other forms of optimization. They will not be able to make such a transition, however, 

unless FFVs are replacing older legacy vehicles as the fleet turns over. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9574-A3, pp. 10-11]
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• P. 74878, FAILURE TO EXTEND PARITY TREATMENT TO FFVs. Regrettably, we 

note that the Agencies fail to treat ethanol‘s many Clean Octane benefits equitably 

compared to other alternatives, and to offer the OEMs parity treatment as it relates to 

incentives to manufacture FFVs compared to other types of vehicles. The Agencies state: 

“To facilitate market penetration of the most advanced vehicle technologies as rapidly as 

possible, EPA is proposing an incentive multiplier for compliance purposes of all electric 

vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) 

sold in MYs 2017 through 2021.” (The Agencies are relying on at least one questionable 

assumption to justify the EV incentives, in that they have elected to assume no upstream 

carbon emissions from electricity generating units.)40 CNG vehicles are also being 

incented in this manner. However, in stark contrast, EPA proposes no such incentive 

multiplier for FFVs, even as it also proposes to eliminate the Usage Factor for all FFVs 

after MY2016. Consequently, the OEMs have no incentive to manufacture FFVs in the 

future, which will effectively cap the ethanol industry at its current levels, and thus 

unnecessarily, and unwisely, prevent the realization of the enormous economic, 

environmental/health, and energy security benefits that would accrue from an aggressive 

E30+ Clean Octane program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 11]

• P. 75126, CO2 REDUCTION BENEFITS AND THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON. 

The expanded use of E30+ blends between now and 2025 would achieve substantial 

reductions in mobile source carbon emissions. EPA has confirmed that Aromatic Group 

Compounds are 20% more carbon intensive than gasoline itself, and that based on their 

molecular formulas, ethanol‘s carbon share (% mass) is approximately 40% less than 

Aromatic Group Compounds.41 In addition, an accurate assessment of the carbon 

reduction impacts of a Clean Octane fuel reformulation program would have to recognize 

that the combustion of Aromatic Group Compounds emit orders of magnitude more 

carbon (see Southern California Particle Center chart, Attachment I). In its December 7, 

2011 Technical Support document on PM, CARB provided reinforcement for this 

assertion: “...[B]ased upon the SPN-EC correlation observed in this study, it is likely that 

the inclusion of a strict SPN standard would lead to reductions in EC (i.e., BC) 

emissions.”42 In a recent paper on BC properties, Sierra Nevada Research Institute noted 

that PAH isomers are a major source of urban BC (EPA‘s draft 2011 Report to Congress 

on Black Carbon stated that mobile sources are the source of approximately 60% of BC 

emissions in the U.S.), and that automobiles are a major source of PAH isomers.43 As 

noted above, the Agencies are proposing to generously incent manufacturers to build 

FCVs, even though their commercialization is still many years away, because they can 

utilize hydrogen, which is a fuel that contains no carbon, and therefore would 

theoretically have no CO2eq emissions. Using the same logic, the Agencies should be 

eager to incent the manufacture of FFVs, which can be mass produced today, and which 

are required to enable increased use of a fuel which contains at least 40% less carbon than 

the compounds it replaces, and which is available in large quantities today.44 By 

facilitating the widespread availability of FFVs, the Agencies can remove one of the most 

formidable barriers to E30+ blends‘ commercialization. Increased use of such blends 

would help the OEMs by reducing compliance costs in meeting the rulemaking‘s 2025 

goal of 163 g/mile of CO2eq emissions, due to a combination of their lower carbon 

molecular composition, as well as their ability to substantially reduce high carbon 

intensity combustion byproducts . We believe that this rulemaking fails to properly 
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identify, and credit, E30+ blends‘ cumulative carbon effect. The leading alternatives to 

the Aromatic Group Compounds all have a much lower carbon intensity index than the 

high carbon content they would displace, as suggested by the estimates in the table 

below. [See table on p. 12 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, pp. 11-12]

• P. 75070, TECHNOLOGY PENETRATION AND ADOPTION RATES. We have 

already noted that a range of experts—the NRC, the Agencies, and the OEMs 

themselves—predict that technology adoption challenges will limit the penetration of 

EVs, PHEVs, HEVs, and FCVs well into the future. Meeting this rule‘s important 

objectives will require primary reliance on liquid fuels to power mostly SI engines, 

equipped with advanced engine technologies. Many of the SI engine technology 

advancements are expected to be adopted rapidly. For instance, the Agencies project that 

GDI advances will be incorporated into 85% of new vehicles by 2016, and 100% by 2020 

and beyond. Properly incentivized, the OEMs could make most of their light duty fleet 

flex-fuel capable within a comparable time frame, as the technology is readily available, 

and the costs are relatively low. There are at least two separate considerations involved 

here. The first consideration: whether or not the final rule properly recognizes the value 

of E30+ blends in meeting the petroleum and carbon reduction goals, and therefore 

sufficiently incents the OEMs by way of Incentive Multipliers and/or Utility Factors to 

produce the FFVs needed to use the fuel. The second consideration: whether the OEMs 

realistically expect that sufficient volumes of ethanol will be made available in the 

coming years to make it worth their while to produce such vehicles, especially since by 

MY2019 they must demonstrate that the ethanol is actually being used for their credits to 

be earned? Recognizing that current U.S. ethanol production capacity already stands at 

one million barrels per day (bpd), we believe that this second question can be answered 

affirmatively. Using U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) numbers, we can 

paint the following picture of U.S. transportation fuel demand by 2025: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9574-A3, pp. 12-13]

1. 2009, 245 million LDVs on U.S. roads

2. Based upon VMTs, each vehicle averages approximately 12,000 miles/year, and 22.5 mpg

3. Prior to the Great Recession, fleet turnover averaged 7%/yr. (e.g., entire fleet turns over every 

14 years)

4. Assume only 5.5% replacement rate going forward, with fleet growth only 1%/year, effective 

2013

5. Implies average new vehicles sales of 16.4 million vehicles/year

6. Assume new vehicles hit the 49.6 mpg target by 2025

7. Means that total U.S. LDV fleet would be 276 million vehicles, with an average fuel economy 

of 36 mpg
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8. Equals 2.6 million bpd reduction in U.S. motor fuel consumption [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, p. 13]

If the EIA assumptions are anywhere near correct, the U.S. transportation fleet crude oil demand 

picture is in for a major transformation over the next 10 – 15 years. EIA numbers for 2010 show 

U.S. gasoline consumption at just short of 9 million bpd, which includes ethanol‘s 900,000 bpd. 

Adjusting the 2.6 mmbpd figure downward to net out diesel use yields a net reduction in mogas 

(motor gasoline) usage of approximately 2 mmbpd. That would make 2025 U.S. gasoline 

demand only 7 mmbpd, of which 1 mmbpd would be comprised of U.S. corn ethanol (capacity 

already in place), leaving a net total of approximately 6 million bpd of U.S. gasoline demand in 

2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 13]

That means if the goal is to have a flex-fuel transportation system in place by 2025 that would 

accommodate a national average of E30+ blends, the U.S. would require only 2.1 million bpd of 

ethanol. This translates into an increase in ethanol supplies of only slightly more than double 

2012‘s 1 million bpd of ethanol production capacity over a period of 13 years. To put this into 

perspective, the U.S. ethanol industry tripled its production capacity between 2005—the year 

RFS1 was signed into law—and 2011, or in only six years. Even with the recent elimination of 

ethanol tax incentives and import duty protections, the market-based signals of a properly drawn 

rule would unleash the private sector energies of scientists, investors, and feedstock producers to 

tap into a wide range of sources, technologies, and feedstocks. [See Attachment J in Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A14] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 13]

The table in Attachment J provides a snapshot of how market-based regulatory signals could 

successfully balance a gradual reduction in gasoline Aromatic Group Compounds levels with a 

gradual ramp-up in ethanol levels, until the U.S. has reached a sustainable “equilibrium” of 

nationwide E30+ blends in 2025. [See Attachment J in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9574-A14] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 13]

The graph attached to the table shows how U.S. fuel providers can actually REDUCE (Aromatic 

Group Compounds), REPLACE (with E30+ blends), and INCREASE (the U.S. transportation 

sector octane pool in the process). Such an outcome is achievable, so long as the Agencies 

adequately incent FFV manufacture in this rulemaking, and require higher quality fuel standards 

here and in the upcoming Tier 3 rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 14]

The primary assumptions are set out in the Key Market Driver Criteria column. They include the 

following:

• The fuel efficiency rules will reduce U.S. mogas consumption to 7 mmbpd by 2025

• This means that by 2025, U.S. ethanol use must reach approximately 2.1 mmpbd, or 

slightly more than double current production capacity of 1 mmbpd over the next 13 years 

• That 84 sub-octane blend-stocks average approximately 10 volume % Aromatic Group 

Compounds

• That E30+ blends, when added to 84 sub-octane gasoline, result in a high quality finished 

gasoline of approximately 100 RON (for GDI engines)
EPA Response to Comments

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• That ethanol will displace Aromatic Group Compounds on a one to one, gallon for 

gallon, basis, based upon its ability to reduce gasoline yield loss at the refinery; the RVP 

control benefits of higher levels of ethanol in E30+; the de minimus mileage penalty that 

could occur with E30+ blends (vs. E85), even before the OEMs are able to employ 

optimization techniques, such as increased compression; and the additional miscellaneous 

benefits of ethanol‘s increased power density, chemical octane response, and charge 

cooling effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 14]

Finally, we are also confident that the nation‘s fuel distribution infrastructure can keep pace with 

the FFV manufacturing schedule and the expansion of next-generation ethanol production. Based 

upon typical turnover rates for the nation‘s gasoline dispensers, if flex fuel dispensers were as a 

matter of course substituted as the obsolescent dispensers are phased out (such as has been 

proposed by Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Bingaman), the entire 

U.S. fleet and fuel dispenser system could be flex-fuel compatible by 2025. Consumers would be 

empowered to save billions of dollars on their fuel purchases by having the freedom to select 

which blend of gasoline and ethanol best suited their preferences, depending upon cost 

considerations, environmental impacts, and energy security concerns. Especially when compared 

to the formidable infrastructure and logistical challenges of some of the other alternatives, such 

as electric and CNG vehicles, transitioning to an ethanol flex fuel system can be done smoothly, 

cost effectively, and well within the time frame envisioned by the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9574-A3, p. 14]

CONCLUSION. We respectfully urge the Agencies to make every effort to ensure that the final 

GHG – CAFE rule does not—in its pursuit of important petroleum and carbon reduction goals—

inadvertently create air quality impacts that compromise the public health and welfare, especially 

that of our most vulnerable citizens living in our largest cities. Congressional intent in the 1990 

CAAA is unmistakably clear: the U.S. transportation fuels sector must be managed as a 

synergistic whole, with vehicles and fuels carefully balanced and periodically aligned as the 

science advances and technological opportunities present themselves. This rule will shape the 

U.S. transportation fuels sector for decades to come and has the potential to make dramatic 

contributions to the nation‘s economic, energy security, environmental, and health and welfare 

goals. Failure to act now to match improved fuel standards with improved vehicle technologies 

will unnecessarily expose an entire generation of Americans to increased emissions, especially 

particle-bound toxics, substantially increase the nation‘s health care costs, and represent a missed 

opportunity of enormous proportions. In order to open the door to take full advantage of the 

many benefits of E30+ Clean Octane blends, it is imperative that the Agencies extend equal 

treatment to FFVs compared to electric, fuel cell, and CNG vehicles. The OEMs must be 

adequately incented to manufacture FFVs in the future. If they do not, ethanol use will be 

effectively capped at current levels, and the enormous benefits of a nationwide Clean Octane 

program will never be realized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 14]

12 “Ethanol – the primary renewable liquid fuel,” Datta et al., J Chem Technol Biotechnol 2011; 

86: 473-480.
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32 http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/pdfs/44517.pdf, pp. 17 – 19. Specifically, as shown by the 

McKinsey linear program models, E30+ blends would provide sufficient octane clout to reduce 

refinery gasoline yield loss by approximately 9.9%, which effectively negates the mileage 

penalty predicted for E30+ blends. (The Agencies assume that E85 blends will result in 27% 

lower mileage, based on BTU calculations, although real-world mileage losses have been shown 

to be considerably lower. E30+ blends‘ mileage performance (assuming no engine optimization) 

should thus be approximately one-third of that, or 9 – 10% lower. See also Footnote #30.)

34 When not blended with gasoline, ethanol has an RVP of slightly more than two pounds.

36 For the reasons set forth in Footnote #25 above, we would respectfully suggest that now 

might be an excellent time for EPA to re-run the 2007 MSAT cost-benefit model using more 

current EIA oil price projections, and recognizing the 1:1 displacement factor for ethanol and 

Aromatic Group Compounds.

38 “2.4.2 Findings: As the percentage ethanol with which the CBOB will be blended increases, 

the share of naphtha in the CBOB increases, while the share of isomerate and reformate 

decreases...Overall, we found that refiners producing fossil gasoline for...E20 blending, the 

fossil gasoline yield goes up by...6.7 percent...we found that gasoline prices at the pump could 

fall to...2 to 5 cents... (Footnote 27: The increased gasoline yield is the result of reduced 

throughput in the reformer. A secondary effect of backing down the reformer is reduced 

production of hydrogen, which is required for desulfurization of diesel. For most refineries, this 

will not be a problem as they typically have access to hydrogen produced from natural gas.)” pp. 

18-19. http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/pdfs/44517.pdf

40 A stark example of this unbalanced treatment is the EPA‘s provision of an advanced 

technology vehicle incentive in the form of a 0 g/mile compliance value for MYs 2017 and later 

electric operation. This 0 g/mile assumption was retained despite opposition from some quarters 

during the run-up to the proposed rule. In the September 2010 Interim Joint Technical 

Assessment Report for this rulemaking, the Agencies noted that “[s]ome environmental and 

public interest groups expressed concern that the 0 g/mi value does not adequately capture 

upstream emissions from the charging of electric vehicles, and believe an upstream emissions 

factor should be included.” Pp.5-6. In contrast, the ethanol industry has been subjected to 

rigorous upstream and downstream lifecycle analyses, including applying international Indirect 

Land Use penalties, while other fuels, such as tar sands and oil shale, have been exempted from 

such considerations.

41 See “Final Rule for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases,” Technical Support 

Document, Climate Change Division, U.S. EPA, September 15, 2009, pp. 15, 32. 

http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/documents/SubpartMMPr

42 http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2012/leviiighg2012/levappp.pdf, p. 126

43 “Black Carbon‘s Properties and Role in the Environment: A Comprehensive Review”, 

Shrestha et al., Sustainability 2010, 2, 204-320;doi:10.330-/su2010294, p. 5.
EPA Response to Comments

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44 Some experts have argued that next-generation cellulosic ethanol‘s reduced carbon footprints 

closely resemble the net carbon reduction benefits that have been attributed to the use of 

hydrogen in fuel cell-powered vehicles.

Organization: E100 Ethanol Group

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p.202; pp. 204-206 

and 226-227.]

In conclusion, our proposal: These standards for 2017-2025 are very strong and they are 

exceptionally well-written. We want to compliment the people who wrote the standards. So let's 

keep them in place exactly as written but apply them to only 50 percent of new light-duty 

vehicles.

For the other 50 percent, mandate E100 flex-fuel vehicles with strict mileage requirements.

Taking these two steps will assure complete independence of imported crude oil for the United 

States and lower greenhouse gas emissions far below the 2017 to 2025 standards.

What would be a viable strategy to make the U.S. independent of imported oil? E100 flex-fuel 

vehicles optimized to run on ethanol, not gasoline, are the most straightforward ways to do this.

Brazil did something similar to this several years ago and is now a net crude oil exporter, not an 

importer. The picture in front of you is of a pump at a Shell gas station in Sao Paulo, Brazil I 

took last April. Two grades of gasoline, regular and premium, and one grade of straight ethanol, 

no gasoline.

75 percent of the millions of light-duty vehicles in Brazil can burn this gasoline-free ethanol.

We use 140 billion gallons of gasoline per year. Roughly half, 66 billion gallons, come from 

imported crude oil. So to make the United States independent of imported oil, we need to replace 

66 billion gallons of gasoline.

The fastest, lowest cost way to do this is to make ethanol a primary motor fuel in the United 

States, not a blend with gasoline, but a primary motor fuel for just half of all new vehicle 

inventory, 50 percent. E100 vehicles could still burn gasoline, but since ethanol would cost less 

than gasoline at the pump and since mileage would be better, consumers would flock to these 

vehicles.

E100 engines are applicable to all size vehicles, not just small ones. Cost may be $100 more per 

vehicle. The industry could easily be making 6.5 million such vehicles per year by January 1st, 

2017. 10 years of doing this and now we have 65 million vehicles not burning gasoline, that 

makes a tremendous dent in the problem.
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This ethanol will come from waste cellulose or municipal solid waste, not corn. The Department 

of Energy published a report that incontrovertibly proves that there is a billion tons of waste 

cellulose accessible every year in the Unites States.

Yield is 100 gallons per ton so we could make 100 billion gallons of ethanol without interfering 

with food production or agricultural exports. This is more than enough to provide crude oil 

independence. So for this and carbon already above ground to make this ethanol, not bringing up 

new carbon from underground, the net addition of CO2 in the atmosphere with E100 is zero.

Basically what we're saying is at least mandate 50 percent of the vehicles run on straight ethanol; 

the other 50 percent continue with electric cars, fuel cells and everything.

We shouldn't just settle on gasoline and electric. It's too dangerous to put all our eggs in one 

basket.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Flexible Fueled Vehicles: Consistent with the goals of helping America reduce its dependence on 

oil and reducing harmful pollution, incentives need to be continued for flexible fuel vehicles that 

can operate on alternative and renewable fuels. The federal 2007 Energy Independence and 

Security Act requires increasing use of renewable fuels through the Renewable Fuel Standard 

(RFS). While currently the volume requirements can be absorbed by blending up to 10% ethanol 

in the base gasoline available to conventional vehicles, very soon the mandated volume 

requirements will exceed that level as we proceed into next year. By 2022, the increasing RFS 

requirement will rely heavily on the ability of flexible fueled vehicles, capable of operating on 

gasoline blends containing up to 85% ethanol (E85), or other capable vehicles. These vehicles 

will be required in order to consume the mandated renewable fuel volumes that exceed what can 

be absorbed in the 10% ethanol blended gasoline, and which could be in excess of 20 billion 

gallons of ethanol, as demonstrated on the chart, below: [The chart can be found on p. 20 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp.

19-20]

The benefits of ethanol are well known. Argonne National Laboratory and EPA both 

show/confirm that on a Life Cycle Analysis basis, ethanol produces less GHG than gasoline (M. 

Wang, December 2010). Furthermore, cellulosic ethanol promises much larger CO2 reductions. 

Based on these benefits, we strongly believe that the vehicles designed to operate on ethanol 

blends up to 85% should continue to receive an incentive to help offset the costs associated with 

the technology and calibration development. Therefore, we support the determination of credits 

based on national E85 usage. We look forward to working with the agencies to determine the 

most appropriate pathway forward to acknowledge the synergistic benefits of these technologies. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 20]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the continuation of the quantification of CO2 emissions reduction related to ethanol 

usage based on national E85 actual usage. We further urge the agencies to publish F-factor 
EPA Response to Comments

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guidance, as suggested in the Alliance comments, as soon as possible to provide the basis for 

continued and further development of E85- capable vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-

A1, p. 3]

Organization: Growth Energy

In the RFS 2 regulation, and consistent with EISA, EPA chiefly relies on the production and sale 

of domestically-produced ethanol and flexible fuel vehicles (”FFVs”) to meet the volumetric 

renewable fuels requirements now codified in section 211(o)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act. The 

volumetric requirements were fully considered by Congress, were adopted by strong bipartisan 

majorities, and have been and remain provisions of the statute that representatives of the fossil 

fuel industry do their best to undercut. See, e.g., Nat'l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass'n v. EPA, 

630 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying petitions for review). EPA has a duty to carry out 

EISA’s mandates, and other federal agencies have provided strong financial support with public 

funds authorized by Congress to promote the development of biofuels. Growth Energy’s 

members have invested heavily in the production of renewable fuels, including cellulosic 

biofuels, and Growth Energy has been a staunch defender of the RFS requirements in EISA. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 3]

The GHG and fuel economy standards that the Agencies are now proposing will define, far more 

than any other step that the Agencies can take under federal law, the types of vehicles that the 

automobile industry will produce for many years into the future. EPA, however, has not 

reconciled the options presented for vehicle manufacturers under the regulations proposed in the 

Joint NPRM with the requirements of Title II of EISA and the strategy for achieving the 

volumetric requirements of Title II in the RFS 2 regulations. If the GHG reductions that FFVs 

can be expected to achieve when operated on renewable fuels are not translated into practical 

incentives for vehicle manufacturers to continue and expand production of FFVs, then the 

volumetric requirements in Title II of EISA will not be achieved. The Joint NPRM does not 

propose any program that provides vehicle manufacturers with the necessary incentives, and 

indeed seems to disfavor the use of ethanol as a vehicle GHG reduction strategy in comparison 

with a fossil fuel (natural gas) and electricity. This important issue is examined in Attachment 2 

[pp. 16-21 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] to this letter, which also 

introduces concepts that could bring EPA’s vehicle-based GHG reduction goals back into line 

with EISA and the RFS 2 regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 3]

The problem is not simply that EPA has neglected biofuels in the Joint NPRM. EPA and 

NHTSA are instead embarking on a course that will make the volumetric biofuels requirements 

of Title II in EISA unachievable. Vehicle manufacturers operate in a highly competitive 

environment, face a complex set of regulatory expectations from EPA, NHTSA, and the State of 

California, must plan their compliance strategies many years before the start of a given model 

year, and have no resources to waste on programs that will not help ensure regulatory 

compliance. The Joint NPRM is rooted in the policy preference of one State (California) for 

electric vehicles, and EPA has bifurcated this rulemaking from other emissions and fuels 

rulemakings. The Joint NPRM leaves no room for vehicle manufacturers to rely on biofuels and 

the mandates in Title II of EISA as part of an overall compliance strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, p. 3]
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Notably, EPA does not try to explain in the Joint NPRM or in its regulatory support document 

why and how it thinks the program outlined in the Joint NPRM will ensure compliance with Title 

II of the 2007 Energy Act. Nor does the Agency claim, nor could it claim in light of the scope 

and duration of the standards outlined in the Joint NPRM, that any steps that EPA might take in 

future regulations under the Clean Air Act could address the conflict between its currently 

proposed prescriptions to the automobile the Joint NPRM, the guiding strategy appears to have 

been brokered with California, and not to have been based on the requirements of federal law. 1 

If EPA does not correct the direction it is now setting for the automobile industry with respect to 

FFVs, there will be few FFVs produced after MY 2016. And, in the absence of a large and 

growing fleet of FFVs, the volumetric mandates in Title II of EISA cannot be met. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 3-4]

Given the neglect of the RFS 2 program in the current rulemaking, EPA appears to be setting the 

RFS 2 program on a course that is quite contrary to what Congress expected in EISA. That is 

completely unnecessary, because all EPA has to do in this rulemaking is to give vehicle 

manufacturers practical incentives for continued and expanded production and sale of FFVs that 

would be based on the volumes of biofuel required by Congress. EISA includes provisions 

allowing EPA to make adjustments in the RFS 2 program, if there are proper determinations of 

unforeseen, “severe” economic harm, “severe” unintended environmental impacts, or an 

“inadequate domestic supply” of biofuels. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(A),(F). But those 

provisions merely provide narrowly-drawn “off-ramps” for the renewable fuels program to 

address paramount economic or environmental interests. They are hardly a license for EPA to set 

the RFS 2 program up for failure. It would be ironic in the extreme, and contrary to law, if 

regulations adopted by EPA in the exercise of administrative discretion, like the regulations in 

the Joint NPRM, were to deprive the nation of an adequate supply of biofuels, and thus to 

provide a pretext to abandon or curtail the requirements of Title II in EISA. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 4]

When it enacted EISA, Congress had lengthy experience with the efforts of the fossil fuel 

industry to retard the use of non-fossil fuels, and with the fossil fuel industry’s history of 

resistance to regulation under the mobile-source provisions of the Clean Air Act. Congress 

therefore spoke with clarity about its expectations for the volumetric requirements for biofuels in 

Title II of EISA. EPA was directed in mandatory terms to adopt regulations to “ensure” the sale 

of gasoline with the specified volumes of biofuels. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A) (the 

Administrator “shall” adopt regulations “to ensure” the use of specified volumes of biofuels). 

The only federal court that has needed to construe this provision has stated that the term “ensure” 

as used in EISA means “to make sure, [or] certain.” Nat'l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass'n, supra, 

630 F.3d at 153 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Nat'l Treasury 

Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 863 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (construing “ensure” under 

other statute as mandatory). Congress has left EPA no room to effect a de facto reduction in the 

domestic supply of biofuels when EPA adopts other regulations. EPA must “obey the Clean Air 

Act as written by Congress.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 314 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

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As noted above, Attachment 2 to this letter provides further analysis of the treatment of FFVs in 

the current rulemaking. If EPA decides not to reform the program outlined in the Joint NPRM to 

conform with and to support the RFS 2 program, EPA must at a minimum address fully and in 

detail each of the following questions, in order to explain why it has not done so: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 4]

• EPA should explain how it expects the automobile industry and fuels providers to meet 

the RFS 2 requirements within the framework of the regulations contained in the Joint 

NPRM or in the Final Rule it adopts in this rulemaking;

• If EPA disagrees with Growth Energy’s view that it is unrealistic to expect continued 

significant production of FFVs after model year 2016 if the Joint NPRM’s provisions are 

adopted, the Agency should explain why;

• EPA should explain how it interprets the requirement to “ensure” the use of biofuels 

under the statutory text of EISA (see 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2);

• EPA should explain how the vehicle production plans and strategies assumed in the 

regulatory analysis for the Joint NPRM will “ensure” that the country can meet the 

volumetric mandates for biofuels in Title II of the 2007 Energy Act;

• If EPA believes that it is not obligated in the current rulemaking to take account of and 

comply with its duty to ensure compliance with the biofuels mandate in EISA, EPA 

should explain why it is not required to do so.; and

• EPA should explain whether the absence of an adequate domestic supply of biofuels 

arising from reductions in the production and sale of FFVs could provide, in whole or in 

part, a basis of a waiver of any part of the biofuels mandate in EISA. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 5]

Because such an increase in octane cannot be accomplished by increases in gasoline aromatic 

content without compromising the control of emissions other than GHG emissions, EPA should 

evaluate increases in octane that rely on increases in ethanol content. Increased ethanol content 

for gasoline to obtain higher octane levels, implemented in a manner consistent with the product 

planning and validation cadences of the automobile industry and without disruption to existing 

liquid transportation fuels delivery systems, would have a number of benefits for the public. By 

enabling a greater mix of engine technologies to meet GHG reduction requirements on a fleetwide basis, the automobile industry might be able to reduce the costs of GHG reductions. 

Carefully managed increases in ethanol content can also help reduce engine particulate 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 5-6]

EPA’s proposed greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standard in the Joint Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking provides incentives for electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 

(PHEVs) and fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), but essentially eliminates incentives for flexible fuel 

vehicles (FFVs). The incentives have no clear foundation in a relative comparison of the overall 

GHG emissions or costs of each of these vehicles. EPA should undertake a thorough study of the 

lifecycle emissions and total costs, including the cost of the refueling infrastructure of these 

vehicles, in determining incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 7]

The fact that vehicles operating on ethanol-blends can deliver significant GHG benefits can be 

seen in the results of numerous studies. One straightforward study is a summary of “well to 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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wheels” analysis results published by the U.S. Department of Energy. Selected results from this 

publication are summarized in Table 1. [Table 1 can be found on p. 10 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 8-9]

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the data shown in Table 1. The first of 

these is that the use of E85 derived from corn6 or from cellulosic materials will reduce GHG 

emissions by about 11% and 60%, respectively, relative to gasoline without the need for any 

substantial change in a given vehicle technology. The second is that the use of E85 in hybrid 

vehicles in the near term will result in substantially larger reductions relative to gasoline than 

will EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs. The third is that the use of E85 derived from cellulosic feedstocks 

in any FFV will yield larger reductions in GHG emissions than will be achieved with EVs, 

PHEVs, or FCVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 9]

These data and similar data from other related studies, clearly indicate the potential for ethanolblends to provide “game-changing” reductions in GHG emissions without the need for the 

fundamental changes in vehicle technology associated with EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs or the 

fundamental changes in the technology used to generate electricity and hydrogen that would be 

necessary in order for these vehicles to provide meaningful GHG reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 9]

Further evidence of the inappropriateness of providing incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs 

while failing to do so for vehicles capable of operation on ethanol blends can be seen through 

even a cursory examination of the costs associated with these vehicles, their fuels, and the 

infrastructure required to supply those fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 10]

Beginning with vehicle costs, as noted in the EPA proposal, “owners of ethanol FFVs do not pay 

any more for the E85 fueling capability” that affords the potential for “game-changing” 

reductions in GHG emissions. In contrast, although misguided subsidies and incentives may 

affect the prices consumers pay, the actual incremental costs at a retail cost level for EVs, 

PHEVs, and FVCs during the 2017 to 2025 time frame are expected to be thousands to tens of 

thousands of dollars. That this will be the case can be easily seen in Table 2 presented below 

which is taken (along with original footnotes) from a recently released California Air Resources 

Board (CARB) rulemaking document. As shown, incremental costs for even subcompact 

vehicles in 2025 are forecast by CARB to remain at levels from around $7,500 to $11,000. This 

means that unlike the case with vehicles capable of operation on ethanol-blends, substantial costs 

will have to be incurred before EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs can even be hoped to be capable of 

providing “game-changing” reductions in GHG emissions. [Table 2 can be found on p. 11 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 

10-11]

Turning to the costs of fuel, the production costs of ethanol are well known for corn derived 

ethanol and production costs for much lower carbon intensity ethanol produced from cellulosic 

sources are ultimately expected to be similar or lower than those associated with production from 

corn. The price of E85 and gasoline is expected to be similar to or lower than those associated 

with petroleum based fuels over the 2017 to 2025 period based on the latest fuel price forecasts 

from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Therefore, it does not appear that there will 
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be a significant fuel price related disincentive to operate FFVs on fuels other than E85. 

Moreover, as RFS volumes are ramped-up, as discussed in the next section, the additional 

ethanol beyond E10 will need to go into the available on-road FFVs. Therefore, ethanol vehicles 

do not have to overcome either vehicle price or fuel price barriers in order to provide “gamechanging” reductions in GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 12]

Turning finally to the cost of refueling infrastructure, there will be costs associated with the 

development of a widespread distribution infrastructure for higher ethanol blends. However, that 

infrastructure will be integrated into the existing transportation fuel infrastructure in the U.S. and 

not require revolutionary changes to that infrastructure. Further, as ethanol blends will displace 

petroleum fuels, the capacity of the existing infrastructure will remain relatively constant. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 13]

In contrast, EPA has elected not to provide to incentives for vehicles capable of operating on 

ethanol blends despite the fact that they can provide “game changing” reductions in GHG 

emissions by being used in what are essentially conventional vehicles with little incremental cost 

for either the vehicles or the fuels using an existing refueling infrastructure that needs only to be 

modified to a fairly limited degree. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 15]

Given the above, it is clear that EPA’s policy on providing incentives under the GHG regulation 

makes little sense and must be modified to provide incentives for the use of ethanol blends that 

are at least commensurate with those provided with much less certain and much more expensive 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 15]

EPA’s current GHG proposal would have the effect of eliminating any meaningful incentives for 

vehicle manufacturers to produce flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) capable of operation on both 

gasoline and ethanol for the 2016 and later model years. FFVs are the backbone of the federal 

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), as they are expected to consume most of the ethanol that is 

produced to meet the RFS after the onroad fleet is all operating on E10, a blend of 90% gasoline

and 10% ethanol by volume. One important goal of the RFS program is to help the United States 

do its part to control GHG emissions. If vehicle manufacturers stop selling FFVs after 2016, the 

GHG benefits of the RFS program will be lower than currently anticipated. To address this 

potential problem, Growth Energy recommends that EPA/NHTSA develop and permit the use of 

E85 “usage factors” for FFVs utilizing volumes of ethanol projected by the U.S. Energy 

Information Agency, so that vehicle manufacturers can decide when developing their product 

plans whether to provide FFVs, and to create incentives for the manufacturers to do so. In these 

comments, we lay out a reasonable method of projecting these usage factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 16]

FFVs typically have GHG emissions on E85 that are approximately 5% below the GHG 

emissions on E0, but this can vary between 3-6%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 16]

Automakers currently sell FFVs because they receive fuel economy and GHG credits for these 

vehicles under EPA/NHTSA credit provisions, at least through model year 2015. Automakers 

can receive up to 1.2 miles per gallon in fuel economy credit against the applicable NHTSA 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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CAFÉ standards through 2014. After 2014, this credit declines by 0.2 mpg per year until it is 

fully phased out in 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 16]

EPA’s GHG emission standards between 2012 and 2015 are consistent with the NHTSA fuel 

economy credit. EPA’s current rules for GHG emissions for 2016 model year FFVs, and its 

proposal for 2017 and later FFVs are found in the following discussion: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, p. 16]

Beginning in MY 2016, EPA ended the GHG emissions compliance incentives and adopted a 

methodology based on demonstrated vehicle emissions performance. This methodology 

established a default value assumption where ethanol FFVs are operated 100 percent of the time 

on gasoline, but allows manufacturers to use a relative E85 and gasoline vehicle emissions 

performance weighting based on either national average E85 and gasoline sales data, or 

manufacturer-specific data showing the percentage of miles that are driven on E85 vis-à-vis 

gasoline for that manufacturers’ ethanol FFVs. EPA is not proposing any changes to this 

methodology for MYs 2017-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 17]

Regarding current national average E85 use by FFVs, EPA states:

The data confirm that, on a national average basis for 2008, less than one percent of the ethanol 

FFVs used E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 17]

The reason for the low adoption rate of E85 is that the E10 market was the first to consume all 

the available ethanol. Only now do we have more ethanol supply than is needed for E10 demand, 

so adoption rates should increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 17]

The vast majority of FFVs are sold to the general public (and not fleets that may have more 

control over fuel type), and it would be very difficult for manufacturers to determine the fraction 

of use on E85 for these vehicles. Under either current EPA requirements for 2016 vehicles or the 

proposed EPA requirements for 2017 and later vehicles, manufacturers would have to certify 

FFVs on 100% gasoline, or under the EPA proposal, use some national average E85 use, which 

as EPA indicates is still quite low. Since FFVs have a non-zero cost, but are assumed to have 

zero or very near zero benefit under either California or EPA requirements, the chances of 

automakers providing FFVs after 2016 is also zero, or near zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 17]

EPA expected that when they required model year 2016 FFVs to demonstrate use on E85, that 

this would provide incentive for automakers to optimize their FFVs on E85: However, if a 

manufacturer can demonstrate that a portion of its FFVs are using an alternative fuel in use, then 

the FFV emissions compliance value can be calculated based on the vehicle’s tested value using 

the alternative fuel, prorated based on the percentage of the fleet using the alternative fuel in the 

field....EPA believes this approach will provide an actual incentive to ensure that such fuels are 

used. The incentive arises since actual use of the flexible fuel typically results in lower tailpipe 

GHG emissions than use of gasoline and hence improves the vehicles’ performance, making it 

more likely that its performance will improve a manufacturers’ average fleetwide performance. 

Based on existing certification data, E85 FFV CO2 emissions are typically about 5 percent lower 
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on E85 than CO2 emissions on 100 percent gasoline. Moreover, currently there is little incentive 

to optimize CO2 performance for vehicles when running E85. EPA believes the above approach 

would provide such an incentive to manufacturers and that E85 vehicles could be optimized 

through engine redesign and calibration to provide additional CO2 reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 17-18]

Manufacturers typically utilize at least a four-year lead-time in designing vehicles, therefore, in 

2012 most manufacturers are working with the 2016 model year. While such an approach as 

outlined by the EPA above could provide incentive for manufacturers to optimize 2016 model 

year FFVs on E85, if they have no idea or guidance from the EPA what E85 use could be in 

2016, and current use is close to zero, then it does not matter how much they optimize FFVs on 

E85, a larger GHG benefit times a current zero usage factor is still zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, p. 18]

While current E85 refueling frequencies are quite low, EPA is counting on FFVs to use a 

significant amount of E85 due to the Renewable Fuel Standard requirements, which expand 

biofuel use in the U.S. to 36 billion ethanol equivalent gallons per year by calendar year 2022. 

EPA projected a range of ethanol volumes in the RFS, a “low”, “mid” and “high”. Figure 1.7-11 

from the RFS Regulatory Impact Analysis shows necessary FFV E85 refueling rates in the future 

with the RFS. In 2016, FFV E85 refueling rates are between 38% and 55%, and increase to 40% 

to 70% by 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 18]

The E85 refueling rates shown in Figure 1 were estimated by EPA with the 2012- 2016 GHG 

emission standards, but without the 2017-2025 GHG emission standards. If the 2017-2025 GHG 

emission standards were included, the E85 refueling rates would be higher than shown in Figure 

1. For model year 2016, Figure 1 implies E85 usage factors of between 40-50%. The usage 

factors between for model years 2017-2020 would be higher because the fuel economy of the 

2017-2020 model year vehicles would be higher than was used by EPA to produce Figure 

1. [Figure 1 can be found on p. 19 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 18]

Figure 2 shows the Energy Information Agency’s projection of ethanol volume in the AEO2011 

forecast. We also show the ethanol volume predicted in the latest AEO2012 Early Release 

forecast. EIA’s 2011forecast is very close to EPA’s mid level case through 2023, and then goes 

much higher than the EPA mid case. The early release 2012 forecast is between the low case and 

the mid case prior to 2028, and higher than EPA’s mid case after then. [Figure 2 can be found on 

p. 20 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1, p. 19]

Figure 3 shows FFV fractions of the national on-road car + LDT fleet from 2010 through 2030 

with two assumptions – that FFV sales would continue at about 23% from 2012 on, and that FFV 

sales stop in 2016. In 2020, if FFV sales continue, then 25% of the on-road fleet would be FFVs. 

Alternatively, if FFV sales stop in 2016, then only 12% of the fleet would be FFVs in 2020. 

Clearly, if FFV sales stop in 2016, it may be difficult for the FFV fleet to absorb RFS ethanol 

volumes. [Figure 3 can be found on p. 21 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 20]
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EPA’s RFS benefits analysis depends on E85 being consumed to claim GHG benefits under 

these rules. And yet, EPA is not rolling these use projections into its guidance on FFVs to the 

manufacturers so they can continue to build FFVs to support the RFS. Thus, EPA should either 

provide guidance to the manufacturers on likely E85 use in the 2016-2025 timeframe, or EPA 

should downgrade the GHG benefits of the RFS due to lack of availability of FFVs, and charge 

these benefit downgrades against their current GHG proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1, p. 21]

Growth Energy therefore recommends that EPA develop new default projections of E85 use 

based on EPA’s projections of overall ethanol volumes that will be required under EISA. These 

projections should also incorporate the Agencies’ new fuel economy levels for 2017-2025. The 

projections should be provided to the auto industry as usage factors so that they can make a clear 

determination of whether to optimize FFVs on E85 and whether to continue building FFVs after 

model year 2015. A further projection to calendar year 2025 can be made around calendar year 

2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 21]

Growth Energy’s proposal would provide for a certification and in-use fuel for 2017 and later 

vehicles with an octane value of 94, accomplished with E30 instead of E10. This fuel would only 

be intended for the 2017+ vehicles, and not the legacy fleet (2016 and earlier), although legacy 

FFVs could also use it if doing so was consistent with the vehicle manufacturers’ instructions or 

recommendations to owners and approved by the Agencies on that basis. The non-FFV legacy 

fleet (i.e., Tier 1, Tier 2, and LEVs in Section 177 states) would continue to operate on 

E10. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 22]

It is important that the increase in octane be accomplished with ethanol and not other gasoline 

blending components because of ethanol’s many advantages relative to the other high octane 

blending components as explained below. Ethanol has a very high octane number relative to 

other gasoline hydrocarbons, has a lower carbon content than the gasoline components it 

generally replaces, and has many other benefits that assist in combustion to increase engine 

efficiency and reduce both tailpipe GHG and criteria pollutant emissions. The use of a 94 octane 

E30 blend for 2017+ vehicles would also provide additional GHG and PM emission reductions 

in the U.S., greater than could be achieved by the current Agencies’ proposal. We note that some 

vehicle manufacturers have also requested that EPA study higher octane fuels as a part of the 

GHG program, and have also recommended continued control of multi-substituted alkyl 

aromatics, since they can lead to increased HC and PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, pp. 22-23]

C. Increased ethanol use can decrease PM emissions

There is substantial evidence that increased ethanol use will reduce PM mass and number 

emissions from the vehicle fleet. Szybist et al., 2011 also summarize recent literature for ethanol 

effects in production engines:

A number of investigations have examined the effect of ethanol content on particle emissions in 

vehicles. Storey et al. found that blends of 10 and 20% ethanol in gasoline (E10 and E20) 

decreased particle number emissions during vehicle drive cycles, with the 20% blend decreasing 
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particles by about 40% during the high-load US06 vehicle drive cycle. In comparison to 

gasoline, He et al. found a 20% reduction in particle emissions with E20 but no change with 

E10. Khalek and Bougher showed that E10 increased particle emissions compared to two 

different gasoline formulations, both with higher volatility than the E10. This work showed the 

importance of the hydrocarbon fraction of the E10 blend and suggests that the heavier 

hydrocarbons used to control vapor pressure of E10 may also increase particulate emissions. 

Aakko and Nylund found that the particle mass emissions from 85% ethanol (E85) were 

comparable to those with gasoline in a PFI vehicle but that DI (direct injection) fueling with 

gasoline produced particle emissions that were an order of magnitude higher. (reference 

numbers omitted) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 26]

The Szybist et al. study investigated the effects of fuel type, fueling strategy, and engine 

breathing strategy on particle emissions in a flexible spark ignited engine that was designed for 

optimization with ethanol. They report:

When DI fueling is used for gasoline and E20, the particle number emissions are increased by 1 

to 2 orders of magnitude compared to PFI fueling, depending upon the fuel injection timing. In

contrast, when DI fueling is used with E85, the particle number emissions remain low and 

comparable to PFI fueling. Thus, by using E85, the efficiency and power advantages of DI 

fueling can be gained without generating the increase in particle emissions observed with 

gasoline and E20. The main finding of the study is that use of E85 results in 1 to 2 orders of 

magnitude reduction in particle emissions relative to sDI (spray-guided DI) fueling with gasoline 

and E20. Furthermore, sDI particle emissions with E85 are similar to that for PFI fueling with 

gasoline. Thus, an increase in particle emissions beyond that of PFI engines can be prevented 

while gaining the efficiency of DI engines using E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 

27]

Storey et al., 2010 characterized the emissions, including PM and aldehydes, from a U.S. legal 

stoichiometric direct injected spark ignited (DISI) vehicle operating on E0, E10, and E20. The 

PM emissions were characterized for mass, size, number concentration and OC-EC (organic 

carbon-elemental carbon) content. The DISI particle number-size distribution curves were 

similar in shape to light-duty diesel vehicles without Diesel Particle Filters, but had lower overall 

particle number and mass emissions. The aggressive US06 transient cycle had much higher PM 

mass emissions in comparison to the PM mass emission observed for the FTP. With respect to 

added ethanol, Storey et al. concluded: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 27]

Ethanol blends reduced the PM mass and number concentration emissions for both transient and 

steady-state cycles. By increasing the ethanol blend level from E0 to E20, the average mass 

emissions declined 30% and 42% over the FTP and US06, respectively. Measurements during 

hot cycle transient operation demonstrated that E20 also lowered particle number concentrations. 

The adoption of small displacement, turbocharged DISI engines into the U.S. fleet is likely to 

continue in the future, and the results of this study suggest that increasing ethanol blend levels in 

gasoline will lower DISI PM emissions. In addition, increasing ethanol content significantly 

reduced the number concentration of 50 and 100 nm particles during gradual and wide open 

throttle (WOT) accelerations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 27]
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Maricq et al., 2012 tested a light-duty truck equipped with a 3.5-L V6 gasoline turbocharged 

direct injection engine that is representative of current GDI products, but contained prototype 

elements that allowed changes in engine calibrations. Because PM formation in GDI engines is 

sensitive to a number of operating parameters, two engine calibrations were examined to gauge 

the robustness of the results. The study used four fuels: certification test gasoline (E0), a 

commercial E10 fuel similar to that expected for future certification, a commercial pump grade 

E10, and a commercial E100 fuel used for blending. E100 and E0 were splash-blended to 

produce E17, E32, and E45 fuels. Maricq et al. report: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 

27-28]

As the ethanol level in gasoline increases from 0% to 20%, there is possibly a small (<20%) 

benefit in PM mass and particle number emissions, but this is within test variability. When the 

ethanol content increases to >30%, there is a statistically significant 30%–45% reduction in PM 

mass and number emissions observed for both engine calibrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 28]

The results reported by Zhang are also particularly informative. The key results are shown in 

Figure 1 below. In this testing, a 2008 FFV was tested on a hot Unified Cycle on E6, E35, E65, 

and E85. Ethanol appears to have caused a large reduction in PM emissions (an particularly PN) 

from E6 to E35, with further PM reductions as ethanol concentration increased. However, the 

most significant PM and PN reductions are between E6 and E35. [Figure 1 can be found on p. 29 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

p. 28]

Thus, there are now a substantial number of studies showing that ethanol blends of 20% and 

higher reduce PM mass and number emissions in a variety of engines and vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 29]

In addition to the evidence that increased ethanol use will reduce PM mass and number, the 

Agencies acknowledge that the proposal will increase the fraction of the U.S. fuel supply that is 

made up of renewable fuels. The proposal indicates:

For the purposes of this emission analysis, we assume that all gasoline in the timeframe of the 

analysis is blended with 10 percent ethanol (E10). However, as a consequence of the fixed 

volume of renewable fuels mandated in the RFS2 rulemaking and the decreasing petroleum 

consumption predicted here, we anticipate that this proposal would in fact increase the fraction 

of the U.S. fuel supply that is made up by renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

p. 29]

C. The Ramp-up of Low CI Ethanol and Additional GHG Reductions

For the RFS, EPA estimates that ethanol from cornstarch peaks at 15 bgy in 2014. Additional 

increases in ethanol volumes are projected to come from advanced ethanol and cellulosic 

ethanol. Advanced ethanol is required to have a 50% reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions from 

gasoline, and cellulosic ethanol is required to have a 60% reduction in lifecycle emissions from 
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gasoline. These additional volumes currently are projected to go into FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 35]

The ethanol volumes produced above E10 level could go into the 2017 and later vehicle fleet as 

E30, and additional ethanol volumes (as E85 or E3), would go into FFVs. The amount of ethanol 

needed for the 2017 and later model year vehicles would slowly build as these vehicles are 

introduced. These advanced and cellulosic volumes would increase steadily until the on-road 

fleet is fully turned over to 2017 and later vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 35]

Figure 2 shows the allocation of ethanol into different fleet sectors, assuming the AEO2011 

volumes. This figure was developed using a fuel consumption model for the passenger car and 

LDT fleet, which was adjusted to include the effects of the 2012-2016 regulations and the 2017-

2025 proposed rule. The decision priority for the use of ethanol was: [Figure 2 can be found on 

p. 36 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1]

• E30 in 2017+ vehicles first

• E10 in legacy fleet, including FFVs

• E85 in FFVs (if E30 were used, refueling frequency with E30 would be higher) [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 35]

During the 2005 to 2010 period, E10 is ramping up in the fleet. Between 2010 and 2015, E85 use 

starts to increase. In the 2015-2020 period, E30 use starts in the 2017 and later fleet. This directly 

affects the frequency of E85 use in the FFVs. E10 volumes start to decline because the fleet is 

more fuel efficient, and vehicles using E10 (2016 and earlier) are declining in population. 

Between 2020 and 2025, E30 use is expanding rapidly, and E10 and E85 use continues to decline 

(although E30 could be used in FFVs as well). In 2030, E30 use is still increasing, and E10 use 

and E85 use are low by comparison. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 36]

We performed the same analysis for the AEO2012 Early Release values, and the E30 fleet did 

not utilize all of the ethanol from the FFVs, indicating expected available supplies of 

ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 36]

The addition of 20% more ethanol into E10 to boost octane value is expected to reduce the price 

of the blend relative to regular E10, not increase it. Table 4 shows average octane values for 

three octane blending components (alkylate, toluene, and ethanol) averaged over the period from 

January 2007 through February 2012. These values are determined by the bulk market price 

(Gulf Coast) of each component divided the blending octane of each component. For example, if 

ethanol is priced at 26 cents over unleaded gasoline and ethanol has a 113 blending octane, then 

the octane value of ethanol would be 26 cents divided by 26 (113 ethanol octane less 87 

unleaded gasoline octane) or 1 cent per ethanol octane number. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 36]

The results show that ethanol is the cheapest octane blending component, and that the addition of 

ethanol reduces the price of the blend, and does not increase it like the other blending 

components. [See chart on p. 37 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 37]
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In Figure 3 we evaluated Ethanol, Alkylate and Toluene as components in a gasoline blend. We 

focused on formula octane as the sole value of each component, similar to a refiner evaluation of 

a commercially available stream. The solid black line represents the commercial gasoline value 

of octane as represented in the market by the relative cost of premium 93 FON conventional 

gasoline versus regular 87 FON conventional gasoline in the Gulf Coast spot bulk market. This is 

a good benchmark of octane value to a refiner as they optimize the mix of premium versus 

regular gasoline they make relative to the properties of the blending components they produce or 

purchase. The remaining lines represent Alkylate, Ethanol and Toluene. Over the entire period, 

ethanol is the least expensive octane blending component. [Figure 3 can be found on p. 37 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 

37]

Ethanol has several properties that make it very desirable blendstock with gasoline. These were 

discussed in a paper referred to earlier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 38]

The high octane of ethanol allows the use of higher compression ratios, particularly in dedicated 

ethanol vehicles. The high heat of vaporization produces a charge cooling effect, which is 

particularly effective with direct injection engines that can again allow higher compression 

ratios. This effect is enhanced by the increased volume of fuel that is required to compensate for 

the lower energy content of ethanol. Even when a vehicle is not optimized to take advantage of 

some of ethanol’s attributes, the higher octane and faster flame propagation speeds for ethanol 

result in increased efficiency (miles per BTU of energy present in the fuel used) for high ethanol 

blends relative to gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 38]

The paper goes on to show that there is an approximate 2% efficiency gain for E85 in 2010 FFVs 

on E85, which are not optimized on E85 but on E0, and some companies are able to do better 

than this across their portfolio. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 38]

A second study by Delphi examined changes in performance and efficiency on an engine 

equipped with gasoline direct injection and other control technologies at different 

gasoline/ethanol blend levels. The study investigated methods of improving fuel consumption 

when fueled with E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 38]

The benefit of the improved strategies for reducing the disparity between fuel consumption with 

gasoline and E85 is almost entirely offset on the FTP city cycle but is less effective as the 

demands of the driving conditions increase. At highway cruise speeds the shift schedule has no 

effect since the vehicles is in overdrive in all cases, only the benefits of the lower final driver 

ratio and the engine modifications are evident. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 38]

The paper then goes on to discuss the potential benefits of lower ethanol blends: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 38]

It is also important to consider that many of the techniques used to improve performance on E85 

would also improve fuel consumption with gasoline or lower ethanol blends. Differences will 

show up more in performance and may need a shift schedule dependent on the ethanol blends 

torque capability. Ethanol blends from near E20 provide a good compromise, enabling most of 
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the performance of an E85 blend with a significantly reduced energy penalty. Blends in this 

range would likely be able to offset the fuel density penalties with improved efficiency while 

providing superior performance to gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 38-39]

The above discussions highlight the need to focus more on the power density of ethanol (power 

per unit volume) rather than the energy density (heat content per unit volume). When automakers 

can optimize on a particular ethanol blend, they are able to take increased advantage of ethanol’s 

power density as opposed to its energy density, thereby improving vehicle fuel economy and 

extending vehicle range between refills. Much additional research is taking place in this area 

which will be released in the coming months. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 39]

1 California’s own version of a biofuels strategy, its “low-carbon fuel standards” regulation, will 

be infeasible unless the California new-vehicle market can somehow absorb large numbers of 

pure electric and grid-connected hybrid electric vehicles.

6 The DOE values provided for corn ethanol did not include indirect land use effects. Growth 

Energy does not believe current analytical models and data permit reliable estimation of indirect 

land use effects for Midwest corn ethanol, particularly in regulatory settings. For purposes of this 

analysis, however, the values shown in Table 1 use the latest version of GREET (GREET2011) 

was used to estimate a lifecycle GHG emission rate for corn ethanol that included indirect land 

use effects, which was then used to adjust the DOE corn ethanol values relative to those for 

gasoline.

7 The 11% reduction using GREET is conservative. EPA, in its RFS RIA, estimated a 20% 

reduction for the average corn ethanol dry mill in calendar year 2022.

Organization: Minnesota Department of Commerce

However, I have serious concerns regarding unintended, yet detrimental consequences for the 

energy diversity and economic opportunity needed to most effectively accomplish stated goals. 

The proposed rule is inconsistent with the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) 

which requires the use 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels by 2022 and the national Renewable 

Fuel Standard (RFS2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7363-A1, p. 1]

The proposed rule, in effect, selects one technology pathway – vehicles powered by electric 

motors – as the national powertrain. 1) Due to difficulty anticipated for certifying use of 

renewable fuels in vehicles under anticipated new Tier III vehicle emission regulations; and 2) 

the elimination of vehicle use credits until renewable fuel use is increased by RFS2; 3) the 

opportunity to use renewable fuels as a means to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reduce 

consumption of oil may be effectively eliminated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7363-A1, p. 1]
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In keeping with goal to and further reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reduce oil 

consumption, include the role of EISA and RFS2 in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7363-A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Alliance of Forest Owners (NAFO)

While NAFO does not take issue with or seek to challenge the stringency of the actual fuel 

economy standards that the Agencies propose to impose on light-duty vehicles, NAFO does seek 

to ensure that government rulemakings reflect the role that woody biomass can play in achieving 

our nation’s climate goals and appropriately encourage the use of this climate beneficial fossil 

fuel alternative. As described below, the climate benefits of woody biomass, which derive from 

the natural carbon cycle, are well-established and have already been recognized in a number of 

EPA policies. Moreover, woody biomass-based alternative fuels – and all biofuels – is an 

important part of this administration’s “all-out, all-of-the-above strategy” to achieving energy 

security and energy independence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.2]

As the Agencies complete and ultimately implement this rulemaking, we urge them to seize 

opportunities to encourage the use of climate-beneficial woody biomass-based alternative fuels. 

Specifically, we urge the Agencies to 1) develop a science-based method for quantifying the 

climate benefits of woody biomass-based alternative fuels as compared to fossil fuels; and 2) 

apply the method immediately in model year 2017 or, alternatively, state in the preamble to the 

final rule that the Agencies will use the method in the mid-term evaluation following the 

completion of other ongoing assessments of the carbon benefits of biomass and biofuels. This 

will provide a credible approach for incorporating the carbon benefits of woody biomass-based 

alternative fuels into the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) Standard that does not 

presently appear to exist. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.2]

I. Forest biomass is an important renewable fuel source leading to lower GHG lifecycle 

emissions than conventional fuels [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.2]

Wood from sustainably managed forests provides a renewable, low-carbon alternative to fossil 

fuels. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) data, biomass already 

supplies more than 50% of the nation’s renewable energy.1 Forests can provide ample 

sustainable, domestic supplies of biomass to produce liquid transportation fuels, electricity, 

thermal energy (heat and power for manufacturing and other industrial uses), and synthetic 

natural gas.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.2]

When evaluating the GHG emissions associated with fuels, a lifecycle analysis incorporates all 

steps in a “product system” to evaluate broader environmental impacts of products and 

processes. Using forest biomass as a renewable fuel source has significant carbon benefits 

because its lifecycle analysis GHG emissions are more favorable than those of petroleum and 

other fossil fuels. For example, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) estimates that “[c]ellulosic 

ethanol use could reduce GHGs by as much as 86%.”3 In addition, EPA has determined, in 

conjunction with its Renewable Fuel Standard Program, that the lifecycle GHG emissions 

reductions associated with cellulosic ethanol may be as much as 92.7 percent.4 Lifecycle 

analyses of biomass feedstocks used for electricity generation have produced similar results.5
EPA Response to Comments

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Thus the prevailing science – in both the public and private sectors – acknowledges the 

significant carbon benefits of energy produced using renewable biomass from managed forests. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.3]

II. The combustion of forest biomass is part of the ongoing carbon cycle [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9481-A1, p.3]

The prevailing view in the science community is that, when forests are managed sustainably, 

CO2 emissions from forest biomass are part of the natural carbon cycle and are balanced by 

carbon sequestration as forests grow. In other words the carbon that enters the atmosphere when 

forest biomass is combusted was previously absorbed from the atmosphere by the forest biomass 

and will be reabsorbed when new biomass is growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.3]

As EPA has concluded, there is “[s]cientific consensus . . . that the CO2 emitted from burning 

biomass will not increase total atmospheric CO2 if this consumption is done on a sustainable 

basis.”6 Recognizing that CO2 emissions from biomass combustion are inextricably tied to the 

forests where biomass is grown, EPA follows international convention and does not include 

emissions from biomass combustion in its national emissions totals.7 Instead, EPA accounts for 

CO2 emissions from biomass combustion by measuring changes in forest carbon stocks over 

time, recognizing that there is no net climate impact as long as forest carbon stocks are stable or 

increasing.8 Similarly, DOE’s Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program, authorized by 

Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, provides for exclusion emissions from the 

combustion of biomass fuels.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, pp.3-4]

More recently, EPA has affirmed the climate benefits of biomass energy combustion when 

compared fossil fuels by reconsidering its treatment of biogenic CO2 emissions under the 

Prevention of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) and Title V Programs.10 Recognizing that 

imposing regulatory burdens on the biomass energy sector would discourage development of this 

important renewable fuel supply, EPA has deferred regulation of CO2 emissions from stationary 

sources for three years while it seeks to identify a method to quantify the climate benefits offered 

by biomass energy.11 EPA has also convened a Biogenic Carbon Emissions Panel under the 

auspices of the Science Advisory Board to provide advice and recommendations as EPA 

completes the reconsideration process.12 That process is ongoing, and NAFO is encouraged that 

the SAB will offer recommendations and conclusions that continue to affirm the strong climate 

benefits of biomass as a carbon neutral renewable energy source. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9481-A1, p.4]

EPA has consistently recognized the climate benefits of biomass energy and should remain 

committed to a regulatory approach that recognizes the climate benefits that bioenergy and 

biofuel producers provide in relation to fossil fuels. Similarly, EPA must ensure that the 

treatment of biofuels under this proposed rule is consistent with its overarching regulatory 

approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, pp.4-5]

III. The promotion of renewable energy is a national policy that the Agencies must follow [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.5]
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As described above, forests and forest products can play an important role in reducing and 

managing GHG emissions. Expanding the sources of renewable energy is a central feature of 

both national and international policy to reduce reliance on fossil fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9481-A1, p.5]

EPA, in considering approaches toward addressing climate change, has long recognized that 

responsibly managed forests are considered one of five key “groups of strategies that could 

substantially reduce emissions between now and 2030.”13 Similarly, the United Nation’s 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report on mitigation technologies 

highlights forest management as a primary tool to reduce GHG emissions.14 In fact EIA projects 

that biomass energy will account for 30% of the growth in electricity produced by renewable 

fuels between now and 2035.15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.5]

President Obama has repeatedly emphasized that renewable energy derived from feedstocks such 

as forest biomass hold the key to transitioning the nation to a “sustainable, low carbon energy 

future.”16 Recognizing the benefits of all types of biomass, he recently stated that “another 

substitute for oil that hold tremendous promise is renewable biomass – not just ethanol, but 

biofuels made from things like switchgrass and wood chips and biomass.”17 And in last month’s 

State of the Union Address the President advocated an “all-out, all-of-the-above strategy that 

develops every available source of American energy,” specifically referencing a “clean energy 

standard” that would encourage the development of clean renewable energy including biomass 

fuels.18 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, pp.5-6]

With Presidential endorsement, if not direction, of national renewable energy policy and the role 

of biomass in that policy, the Agencies must conduct their programs in a manner consistent with 

that policy. In light of this policy, the Agencies must ensure that their regulations appropriately 

encourage the use of woody biomass-based fuels as clean, renewable alternatives to fossil fuels 

by distinguishing between GHG emissions from each source. While the proposed rule does 

provide preferential treatment to ethanol as an alternative fuel, the regulations would further 

benefit from the development of a science-based method that quantifies the climate benefits of 

woody biomass-based alternative fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.6]

IV. The Agencies should develop and implement a science-based method to account for the 

climate benefits of woody biomass-based alternative fuels [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, 

p.6]

Although the proposed fuel economy standards apply to manufacturer vehicle fleets and do not 

apply directly to consumers’ fuel purchases, they can still reflect the climate-benefits of woody 

biomass-based alternative fuels, whether used in dedicated biofuel vehicles or in flexfuel 

vehicles. For example, as recognized in the proposed rule, the CAFE Standards calculations for 

flex fuel vehicles are currently governed by 49 U.S.C. § 32905, which assumes that alternative 

fuels are used 50 percent of the time in flex-fuel vehicles and treats each gallon of alternative 

liquid fuel as the equivalent of 0.15 gallons of gasoline. Thus, flex fuel vehicles – and ethanolbased fuels – are currently encouraged by discounting biogenic CO2 emissions in comparison to 

fossil fuel CO2 emissions. However, the 0.15 divisor applies equally to all alternative liquid fuels 

and is not directly related to the carbon benefits of the alternative fuel. Indeed, it may even 
EPA Response to Comments

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underestimate the climate benefits of some alternative fuels such as cellulosic ethanol. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.6]

As noted in the proposed rule, these special calculation procedures in 49 U.S.C. § 32905 are 

being phased out and will expire entirely for model year 2020 vehicles. We agree with the 

Agencies that the light-duty vehicle rule should continue to encourage the use of clean, 

renewable, alternative fuels such as cellulosic ethanol even after the statutory mandate expires in 

2020. It should not treat woody biomass-based and fossil fuels equally. Thus we support the 

Agencies’ proposal to continue to discount CO2 emissions from alternative fuels as compared to 

fossil fuel CO2 emissions. But rather than uniformly applying a 0.15 divisor to all alternative 

liquid fuels, the Agencies should develop a science-based method that quantifies the climate 

benefits of each alternative fuel and provide proper incentives for each alternative liquid fuel in 

comparison to traditional fossil fuels and each other. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, pp.6-

7]

To the extent that either Agency has the opportunity to deviate from the statutory requirements 

of 49 U.S.C. § 32905, now or in the future, it should adopt an approach that is grounded in 

science. Since the 0.15 divisor was enacted in 1994, there have been numerous studies of the 

climate benefits of biomass and EPA has engaged in efforts to quantity the climate benefits 

associated with biomass energy. Two recent examples include a life cycle analysis of cellulosic 

ethanol completed in conjunction with the RFS2 program and EPA’s ongoing reconsideration of 

biogenic CO2 emissions from stationary sources which is currently under review by the Science 

Advisory Board Biogenic Carbon Emissions Panel. Each of these programs offer a means to 

quantify the climate benefits of biomass energy as compared to fossil fuels. In order to aid the 

regulated community and provide consistency among regulatory program, the Agencies should 

adopt a harmonized approach to accounting for the climate benefits of biomass energy. We urge 

the Agencies to use the light-duty vehicle rule as a means to harmonize the findings of existing 

regulatory programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.7]

Given the ongoing nature of EPA’s reconsideration of biogenic CO2 emissions from stationary 

sources and the continued applicability of 49 U.S.C. § 32905(a) to NHTSA’s CAFE Standard 

calculations through model year 2019, the mid-term evaluation process already included in the 

proposed rule provides a means for EPA to harmonize is regulatory approaches to woody 

biomass-based fuels after having the opportunity to complete its scientific review of both mobile 

and stationary sources while allowing EPA and NHTSA to maintain uniform fuel economy 

standards for mobile sources. While a continuation of the 0.15 divisor may be appropriate today 

given NHTSA’s statutory mandate and EPA’s ongoing scientific reviews, EPA should use the 

intervening time before the mid-term review to synthesize its existing approaches to accounting 

for biogenic CO2 emissions and develop a science-based method to account for the climate 

benefits of woody biomass-based alternative fuels as compared to fossil fuels. The EPA should 

then, at the earliest opportunity, apply the method in place of the generic 0.15 divisor and 

provide an exclusion, if appropriate, for vehicles that rely entirely on the combustion of woody 

biomass-based alternative biofuels. We thus urge the Agencies in the preamble to the final rule to 

recognize the opportunities that woody biomass-based alternative fuels can provide to reduce 

CO2 emissions by committing to develop and apply a science-based method to quantify the 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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climate benefits of woody biomass-based alternative fuels as part of their mid-cycle review. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, pp.7-8]

1 - See, EIA, Annual Energy Review (Oct. 19, 2011), available at 

http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/showtext.cfm?t=ptb1001. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9481-A1, p.2]

2 - See NAFO, Carbon Neutrality of Energy from Forest Biomass, available at 

http://nafoalliance.org/carbon-neutrality-of-energy-from-forest-biomass/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9481-A1, p.2]

3 - Department of Energy, Ethanol Benefits, available at 

http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/ethanol/benefits.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.3]

4 - See EPA, DPA420-D-06-008, Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Draft Regulatory Impact 

Analysis at 191 (Sept. 2006). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.3]

5 - Cherubini, et al., Energy- and greenhouse gas-based LCA of biofuel and bioenergy systems: 

Key issues, ranges and recommendations, Resources, Conservation and Recycling 535: 434-447 

(2009) (90-95% emissions reductions relative to fossil fuel systems); Zhang, et al., Life cycle 

emissions and cost of producing electricity from coal, natural gas, and wood pellets in Ontario, 

Canada, Environmental Science and Technology 44(1): 538-544 (2010) (91% and 78% 

emissions reductions relative to coal and natural gas systems); Raymer, A.K.P., A comparison of 

avoided greenhouse gas emissions when using different kinds of wood energy, Biomass and 

Bioenergy 30: 605-617 (2006) (81-89% emissions reductions relative to fossil fuel alternatives). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.3]

6 - Environmental Protection Agency Combined Heat and Power Partnership, Biomass 

Combined Heat and Power Catalog of Technologies, 96 (Sept. 2007), available at 

http://www.epa.gov/chp/documents/biomass_chp_catalog.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9481-A1, p.3]

7 - EPA, Inentory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2009 3-59 (April 15, 

2011). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.4]

8 - Id. Chapter 7. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.4]

9 - See DOE, Technical Guidelines: Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases (1605(b)) 

Program (January 2007) at 77 (“Reporters that operate vehicles using pure biofuels within their 

entity should not add the carbon dioxide emissions from those fuels to their inventory of mobile 

source emissions because such emissions are considered biogenic and the recycling of carbon is 

not credited elsewhere.”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.4]
EPA Response to Comments

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10 - Letter from Gina McCarthy to Roger Martella (Jan. 12, 2011) granting NAFO’s Petition for 

Reconsideration, available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/McCarthytoMartella.pdf. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.4]

11 - Deferral for CO2 Emissions From Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the 

Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 

20, 2011). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.4]

12 - See generally EPA, Carbon Dioxide Accounting for Emissions from Biogenic Sources, 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/SABPRODUCT.NSF/81e39f4c09954fcb85256ead006be86e/2f9b57

2c712ac52e8525783100704886!OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9481-A1, p.4]

13 - Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the CAA, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,405 (July 

30, 2008). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.5]

14 - Id. at 44,405-06; see also, NAFO, Carbon Mitigation Benefits of Working Forests 

(identifying trading platforms and registries that recognize forest management), available at 

http://nafoalliance.org/mitigationbenefits-working-forests/. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-

A1, p.5]

15 - EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2012 Early Relese Overview 7, available at 

http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, 

p.5]

16 - Letter from President Barack Obama to Governors John Hoeven and Chet Culver (May 27, 

2009), available at 

http://www.governorsbiofuelscoalition.org/assets/files/President%20Obama’s@20Response5-

27-09.pdf; see also President Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Secretary of Agriculture, the 

Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 74 Fed. 

Reg. 21,531-32 (May 5, 2009). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.5]

17 - President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on America’s Energy Security, March 

30, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/30/remarkspresident-americas-energysecurity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.5]

18 - President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, January 

24, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarkspresident-state-unionaddress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9481-A1, p.6]

Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS)

CAFE and RFS Compatibility [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 1]

In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), Congress revised the RFS to 

require that a minimum of 36 billion gallons of qualified renewable fuels be integrated into the 
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motor fuels supply by 2022. This objective was expected to represent approximately 21% - 25% 

of the overall gasoline market (based upon 2007 gasoline consumption and assuming an annual 

increase in demand of up to 1%). However, the proposed CAFE revisions could dramatically 

reduce the amount of motor fuel consumed in 2022 and beyond, creating a situation in which 

renewable fuels will be required to represent a significantly greater share of the market than 

originally anticipated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, pp. 1-2]

To illustrate the challenge the two regulations present to the market, NACS has analyzed the 

Energy Information Administration's (EIA) 2011 Annual Energy Outlook. In this report, EIA 

evaluated two different CAFE scenarios - one factoring for an annual average fuel economy 

improvement of 3% and one factoring for an improvement of 6%. The current proposed rule 

calls for an annual improvement of 4.1% to 4.3%. Therefore, it is most sensible to use the more 

conservative model and evaluate market conditions under a 3% scenario. Please note that this 

analysis forecasts a market condition that is less extreme than what is likely to materialize under 

the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 2]

In creating this comparison, NACS has assumed that the RFS will be satisfied by blending 

renewable fuels with gasoline. The RFS requires a specific volume of bio-mass based diesel, but 

this is not a significant component of the program. Whether the renewable fuel brought to market 

is ethanol, butanol, or some other type of additive, it is likely to be optimized by blending with 

gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 2]

Therefore, NACS has compared EIA's projected finished gasoline volumes under a CAFE3 

model with the mandated volumes of the RFS (less the biodiesel component). The following 

chart demonstrates the applicable blend rate required in this market scenario: [See chart on p. 2 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, 

p. 2]

Under a 3% annual improvement in fuel economy, compliance with the RFS will require a blend 

rate of 37.51% in 2022. This level of renewable fuels penetration in the market will impose 

significant economic burdens on the retail fuels market and consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9543-A1, p. 2]

Organization: National Corn Growers Association et al.

The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 called for the reduction of petroleum 

fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), and it specified the use of 36 billion gallons of 

renewable fuels by 2022. In response, EPA promulgated the revised Renewable Fuel Standard 

(RFS2) that required increasing volumes of renewable fuels over a 10 year period from 2012 to 

2022 to reach the 36 billion gallon statutory requirement. The renewable fuels specified in RFS2 

were broken down into categories of conventional renewable biofuel (15 billion gallons), and 

advanced biofuels (21 billion gallons). Advanced biofuels were further divided into biodiesel, 

cellulosic biofuels and other advanced biofuels such as sugar cane ethanol. Each category or 

subcategory had its own requirement for GHG reductions; conventional renewable biofuels, 

primarily corn ethanol were required to reduce GHG by 20%, advanced biofuels by 50% and 

cellulosic biofuels by 60%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.2]
EPA Response to Comments

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Due to substantial advances in crop production and energy efficiency improvements in ethanol 

production, corn starch ethanol significantly exceeds the 20% requirement on average. Indeed, 

the feasibility of meeting the 50% advanced biofuel requirement with corn ethanol has been 

demonstrated. EPA must fully account for these GHG reductions in RFS2 since January 1, 2008 

and ensure that future GHG reductions for corn ethanol are fully credited as well. We further 

encourage EPA to perform a complete GHG inventory assessment of the RFS2 program through 

2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.2]

In its dual goals of reductions in petroleum fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions, EISA was 

concerned with addressing national energy security as well as greenhouse gas emissions 

concerns. Its requirement to displace about 25% of our national gasoline use with renewable 

fuels was a reasonable and effective means of addressing energy security by providing a diverse 

supply base. This diversity of supply is an important way to make the US economy more 

resilient to oil supply and price shocks since a vehicle population composed of sufficient 

numbers of Flexible Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) can easily and quickly switch to petroleum based fuel 

substitutes such as ethanol blends. In fact, vehicle fuel economy standards without petroleum 

fuel substitutes such as those required by EISA can do little to enhance oil security. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.2]

We are concerned that the proposed CAFE/GHG rule is inconsistent with the RFS2 regulation 

and the EISA requirement to use 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2022 in several areas. In 

other regulatory actions, EPA continues to express support for achieving the requirements of 

RFS21

, yet there is no mention in the CAFE/GHG rule concerning the role of renewable 

alternative fuels in achieving the required GHG reductions. Many credits are provided in the rule 

that can be applied by vehicle manufacturers toward achieving the fuel economy and greenhouse 

gas emission requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.2]

Nearly all of these credits either directly or indirectly provide incentives for the production of 

electric vehicles including hybrid electric (HEV), plug-in hybrid electric (PHEV), fuel cell 

electric (FCEV) or battery electric (BEV) vehicles. For example, multiplier factors are provided 

for BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs only, and electric propulsion for light duty trucks is favored over 

diesel or renewable alternative fuels. These credits which arbitrarily favor electric vehicle 

technology may interfere with RFS2 compliance strategies, and may send conflicting signals to 

the marketplace with unknown and potentially adverse economic impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9565-A1, pp.2-3]

In the RFS2 regulation, EPA projects “Low”, “Mid” and “High” volume scenarios for ethanol 

use, and examines FFV fuel usage rates to consume these volumes6

. The scenarios are built on 

the assumption that 15B gallons of ethanol would be consumed as E10. Under EPA’s Mid 

Volume scenario, 22.2 billion gallons of ethanol would be consumed by 2022 to comply with 

RFS2 requirements, FFV production by the Detroit 37 vehicle manufacturers would continue at a 

rate of at least 50% of annual production, 60% of FFVs would require “reasonable” access to 

E85 (24,000 refueling stations) and these FFVs would refuel with E85 at every opportunity. By 

EPA’s analysis, FFV production at a rate of at least 50% of vehicles produced would have to 

continue through 2022 in order to consume RFS2 volumes. A recent analysis by Air 

Improvement Resource examines EPA’s ethanol volume and FFV use scenario projections in 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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detail8

. It concluded that even if the EPA waiver for E15 were extended to all light duty vehicles, 

continued production of FFVs and higher level ethanol blends would be required in order to 

consume RFS2 volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.3]

A major inconsistency between the proposed CAFE/GHG rule and the RFS2 regulation is that 

the production of FFVs is discouraged by the proposed rule which would likely result in 

discontinuing FFV production after 2015. EISA extended fuel economy incentives for FFVs 

until 2020 because Congress wanted to encourage the continued production of vehicles that 

could use higher volume blends of ethanol up to E85. However, beyond 2015, EPA would 

require that the incentive be pro-rated based on use of the alternative fuel (E85 or ethanol blend 

greater than E15). Since E85 is dispensed at less than 2% of US fueling stations, it is not 

surprising that E85 use may still be less than 100 million gallons per year9

. The result is that FFV 

production incentives would cease to exist as a practical matter after 2015. Congress expressed 

concern at a hearing in May 2011 that EPA chose to effectively eliminate FFV incentives after 

2015 in the Supplemental Notice of Intent for the 2017 to 2025 CAFE/GHG rule.10 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, pp.3-4]

The purpose of the FFV incentives, sometimes referred to as CAFE credits created by the 

Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 was to insure that an adequate number of FFVs were 

available in the fleet that could use E85 when it became available. Although E85 has not become 

widely available, the RFS2 regulation requires volumes of renewable fuels including ethanol that 

would require more FFVs than are currently available in the fleet. It is counter to the intent of 

EISA and the purpose of FFV credits to effectively phase them out just when FFVs are needed to 

consume RFS2 renewable fuel volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.4]

Although the proposed CAFE/GHG rule provides many credits for electric vehicles, it disallows 

credits for FFV technology on the basis of fuel cost. The concern for high relative cost of mid or 

high level ethanol blends does not seem to be justified in the term of the CAFE/GHG and RFS2 

rules since at some point in the renewable fuel volume ramp-up of RFS2, market forces would 

result in competitive prices for ethanol and gasoline in order for the required volumes to be sold. 

As a result, the continuation of FFV incentives can be justified in order to consume the required

RFS2 volumes of renewable fuels, and to be consistent with EISA’s intent. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9565-A1, p.4]

We recommend modifications to the proposed rule in the following three areas to achieve a more 

balanced, technology neutral approach to the control of fuel economy and GHG. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.4]

Allow vehicle and fuel technologies to compete on a level playing field to meet fuel economy 

and GHG standards, rather than constructing credits to favor electric vehicle technology over 

renewable fuels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.4]

Provide flexibility within the rule and integrate RFS2 requirements such that renewable fuels can 

contribute to the greenhouse gas emission reduction requirements in the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9565-A1, p.5]
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Provide incentives for the production of FFVs that are needed to consume RFS2 renewable fuel 

volumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.5]

We further believe that modifications in these areas would be more cost-effective and more 

consistent with EISA in addressing energy security, renewable fuel use and greenhouse gas 

emissions. We stand ready to convene a dialog with the agencies in this regard. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9565-A1, p.5]

1 - EPA News Brief, “EPA Finalizes 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards”, December 27, 2011, 

“EPA continues to support greater use of renewable fuels within the transportation sector every 

year through the RFS2 program, which encourages innovation, strengthens American energy 

security, and decreases greenhouse gas pollution.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.2]

6 - Renewable Fuel Standard, Regulatory Impact Analysis, EPA-420-R-10-006, February 2010. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.3]

7 - General Motors, Ford, Chrysler [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.3]

8 - “Flexible-Fuel Vehicle and Refueling Infrastructure Requirements Associated with 

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) Implementation”, Air improvement Resource, March 2011. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.3]

9 - http://www.eia.gov/renewable/alternative_transport_vehicles/pdf/attf_c1.pdf [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.4]

10 - Congress did not add a fuel use requirement as a condition of extending FFV credits in 

EISA, and such a requirement appears to be inconsistent with Congress’ intent. The following 

quotes are taken from comments by Congressman John Shimkus at a U.S. House of 

Representatives, Subcommittee on Energy and Power hearing on May 11, 2011 entitled, “The 

American Energy Initiative”. Congressman Shimkus’ comments are documented in an EPA 

response letter to Congress dated June 22, 2011. Congressman Shimkus: “Please provide this 

Subcommittee with a list of areas in the EPAINHTSA joint rulemaking of May 7, 2010 where 

EPA's rules are contrary to the program designed by Congress in EPCA as amended by EISA, 

and why EPA chose to substitute its judgment over the clear, specific policy preferences passed 

by Congress.” “How can this rule be characterized as ‘harmonized and consistent’ if the way 

EPA treats FFV vehicles is markedly different than the way Congress mandated FFV credits be

treated under CAFE?.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9565-A1, p.4]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

Flex-Fuel Vehicles (“FFV’s”) equipped to run on 85 percent ethanol count as emitting only 15 

percent of the GHG’s that the same vehicle would emit without the FFV capability, even though 

the Agencies admit that, “[H]istorically consumers have only fueled these vehicles with E85 a 
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very small percentage of the time.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 74880. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-

A2, pp. 5-6]

D. Ethanol

At present, the United States produces around 1.5 billion gallons of ethanol per year, 

approximately one-tenth of the 2022 goal for renewable fuels set by the Renewable Fuels 

Standard. U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”), Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 

Energy, Freedom CAR & Vehicle Technologies Program, “Just the Basics: Ethanol” (Feb. 7, 

2012) (www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/basics/jtb_ethanol.pdf). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 9]

Ethanol engenders agricultural practices, such as intensive use of fertilizer, that makes its 

increased use unsustainable for the environment. With Americans now farming more corn than 

in the past sixty years because of rising demand for ethanol derived from corn, nitrogen leaching 

from fertilized corn fields is a primary cause of hypoxia and fish kills in the Gulf of Mexico. 

S.D. Donner and C.J. Kucharik, “Corn-Based Ethanol Production Compromises Goal of 

Reducing Nitrogen Export by The Mississippi River,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 

Sciences (March 18, 2008), at 1 and Abstract 

(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2393748/). Expanding corn-based ethanol 

production would make controlling export of nitrogen to the Gulf practically impossible without 

large changes in food production and agricultural management. Id., Abstract. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 9-10]

Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

The proposal significantly discourages production of flexible fuel vehicles (FFVs) beyond 2016 

by treating FFVs differently than other dual-fueled vehicles. The creation of incentives for 

certain dedicated alternative fuel vehicles also disadvantages FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9490-A1, p.1]

If implemented as proposed, the CAFE/GHG rule would frustrate the goals of the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007 and significantly complicate compliance with the 

Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.1]

THE PROPOSAL SIGNIFICANTLY DISCOURAGES PRODUCTION OF FFVs BEYOND 

2016 BY TREATING FFVs DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER DUAL-FUELED VEHICLES. 

THE CREATION OF INCENTIVES FOR CERTAIN DEDICATED ALTERNATIVE FUEL 

VEHICLES ALSO DISADVANTAGES FFVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.3]

In its final rule regarding MY2012-2016 CAFE/GHG standards, EPA promulgated provisions 

that, beginning in 2016, require automakers to demonstrate alternative fuel (i.e. E85) use in FFVs 

in order to generate fuel economy credits and determine emissions compliance values for those 

vehicles. The methodology established by these provisions assumes FFVs operate on gasoline 

100% of the time, but allows a manufacturer to generate CAFE/GHG credits for its FFVs if it 

can document the percentage of miles driven on E85 versus gasoline for those vehicles. As 
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discussed in comments from the stakeholders to EPA in response to the MY2012-2016 proposal, 

it is highly unlikely automakers have the resources or information necessary to provide proof of 

alternative fuel usage in the FFVs they manufacture. Thus, for all practical intents and purposes, 

fuel economy and emissions credits for FFVs cease to become relevant in MY2016 and 

automakers have no clear incentive to continue producing FFVs. In its current proposal for 

MY2017-2025, EPA/NHTSA state they do not intend to change the methodology for FFVs fuel 

economy calculations and emissions compliance values established in the rule for MY2012-

2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, pp.3-4]

One possible approach to determining utility factors for FFVs would be to base alternative fuel 

use on the levels of ethanol that FFVs will need to consume to comply with future RFS volume 

requirements. Notwithstanding the proposal’s imbalanced application of utility factors, we do 

support EPA/NHTSA’s proposal to continue the use of the 0.15 divisor for ethanol for MY2020 

and later when calculating fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.4]

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 substantially expanded the Renewable Fuel 

Standard originally enacted by Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The expanded RFS 

(known as RFS2) requires the consumption of 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels by 2022, and 

it is widely expected that the requirements will be met predominantly with ethanol. Indeed, in its 

Final Regulatory Impact Analysis for the RFS2, EPA analyzed a case where ethanol accounts for 

33.2 billion gallons (92%) of the 36 billion gallon requirement in 2022. This amount of ethanol 

correlates to roughly 24% of expected gasoline demand in the 2022 timeframe.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9490-A1, pp.5-6]

However, the amount of ethanol that can be used in the United States today is practically limited 

to 10% of the gasoline pool. This is because the Clean Air Act generally limits the amount of 

ethanol that can be consumed by conventional light-duty cars and trucks to 10%vol. (E10). EPA

approved a waiver request allowing the use of E15 (15%vol. ethanol) for conventional light duty 

vehicles MY2007 or newer in November 2010. In January 2011, EPA extended the E15 waiver 

to MY2001. However, several additional regulatory and marketplace obstacles must be 

negotiated before significant volumes of E15 can realistically penetrate the marketplace. Thus, a 

maximum of roughly only 13-14 billion gallons of ethanol can currently be consumed by the 

conventional light-duty car and truck fleet at the E10 level, based on expected gasoline demand 

in the near term. Once E15 is broadly available in the marketplace, the conventional automotive 

fleet may be capable of consuming 18-20 billion gallons of ethanol, still far below the 2022 

requirements of the RFS2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.6]

Based on the AIR study findings, we are confused as to how EPA/NHTSA reached the 

conclusion that the proposed CAFE/GHG emissions rule would have “no effect on volumes of 

ethanol and other renewable fuels,” and we encourage the agency to revisit that portion of its 

analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.6]

Only FFVs may currently consume ethanol blends greater than E15. Thus, accelerated growth of 

FFVs will be necessary to consume the increasing ethanol volumes expected under the RFS2. 

The “Big 3” domestic automakers have committed to a goal of 50% of their new vehicles being 

FFV-capable in 2012 and thereafter. A 2011 study conducted for RFA by Air Improvement 
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Resource, Inc. (AIR) demonstrated that this commitment by the domestic automakers would 

technically enable the U.S. automotive fleet to consume 33.2 bg of ethanol by 2022 (Attachment 

A). The study also showed that a failure to ensure at least 50% of new vehicles are FFV-capable 

in 2012 and thereafter would result in falling short of long-term RFS2 volume requirements. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.6] [For attachment A please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9490-A1, pp.9-54]

We are greatly concerned that by discouraging the continued production of FFVs beyond 

MY2016, the renewable fuel volumes required under the RFS2 likely cannot be consumed by the 

future U.S. automotive fleet. Thus, we encourage EPA to consider actions that place FFVs on a 

level playing field with other dual-fueled and dedicated alternative fuel vehicles for the purposes 

of complying with the proposed MY2017-2025 standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, 

p.6]

Meanwhile, in regard to emissions compliance values and fuel economy calculations for plug-in 

hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and dual-fueled compressed natural gas vehicles (CNGVs), 

EPA/NHTSA are proposing to allow the use of theoretical “utility factors” that assume PHEVs 

and CNGVs operate on gasoline only half of the time. EPA/NHTSA’s rationale for allowing the 

use of these utility factors for some dual-fueled vehicles but not for others is highly questionable. 

EPA/NHTSA state that PHEV and CNGV owners paid a premium for their vehicles and thus 

will seek out and predominantly use alternative fuels more frequently than they will use gasoline. 

EPA/NHTSA also assume the alternative fuels used by PHEVs and CNGVs will be cheaper than 

gasoline on a per mile basis. These assumptions do not take into account that refueling access for 

these vehicles may be limited or unavailable (EPA/NHTSA also assume, without basis, that 

PHEV drivers will always recharge once per day). Further, the cost per mile for these fuels may 

actually prove to be higher than gasoline, and prices may fluctuate as demand increases. If 

theoretical utility factors are to be applied to PHEVs and CNGVs, they should also apply to 

FFVs and any other dual-fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.4]

7 - The Energy Information Administration’s 2011 Annual Energy Outlook projects 2022 motor 

gasoline demand at 139.96 billion gallons.

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

d. Credit mechanisms should be included to encourage greater use of biofuels in both spark 

ignited and compression ignition engines

Volkswagen explained that a bio-fuel credit mechanism would support the RFS II regulation and 

other complementary government policies regarding the reduced use of imported oil. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 5]

Response:

Basing the weighting of ethanol and gasoline use in an ethanol FFV on actual fuel use
EPA Response to Comments

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Many of the above comments addressed this issue. Some commenters advocated for 

EPA to extend the utility factor methodology, adopted for PHEVs and dual fuel CNG vehicles, 

to ethanol FFVs. The agency disagrees with the objections raised by the Renewable Fuels 

Association and other commenters with respect to the selective use of utility factors for various 

dual fuel vehicles. EPA continues to believe that it is appropriate to assume that owners of some 

types of dual fuel vehicles, such as PHEVs and CNG vehicles, will preferentially seek to use the 

alternative fuel when the vehicle is much more expensive to purchase and much less expensive 

to operate on the alternative fuel—why else would the consumer pay more for the vehicle if (s)he 

did not intend to use the cheaper fuel? Similarly, EPA believes it is not appropriate to assume 

that ethanol FFVs will primarily use E85, as there is no extra vehicle cost to purchase an FFV 

(typically a consumer does not choose between an FFV and a non-FFV of the same vehicle 

model), E85 fuel is no cheaper and in fact usually more expensive per mile, and use of E85 

reduces overall vehicle range since there is only one fuel tank (as opposed to PHEVs and dual 

fuel CNG vehicles which have two fuel storage devices and therefore the use of the alternative 

fuel raises overall vehicle range). Further, even with approximately 10 million ethanol FFVs in 

the US car and light truck fleet, fuel use data demonstrate that ethanol FFVs only use E85 less 

than one percent of the time. EPA considers the comment from the Renewable Fuels 

Association about relative fuel prices to be without merit. While it is true that prices of all motor 

fuels can be volatile, CNG prices are approximately one-half those of gasoline15 (and electricity 

prices, per mile, are even lower), and expected to remain low for the foreseeable future (and, if 

CNG prices do rise, it would likely lead to lower dual fuel CNG vehicle sales since the primary 

reason for interest in dual fuel CNG vehicles is to take advantage of lower fuel prices).

Several automakers and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers asked for prospective 

guidance from EPA with respect to the relative weighting of gasoline and E85 emissions 

performance for future FFVs, and specifically recommended that EPA base the relative 

weighting of gasoline and E85 emissions performance on the projected national average use of 

E85 in ethanol FFVs that will be necessary to support compliance with the Renewable Fuel 

Standard in future model years. EPA plans to issue guidance, well in advance of each model 

year, but this guidance will be based on demonstrated E85 sales data from previous years, rather 

than projections of future E85 volumes. EPA believes that there is too much uncertainty 

associated with projections of future ethanol market share (vis-à-vis the market share for nonethanol renewable fuels) in order to be able to base future FFV gasoline and E85 weightings on 

projections of how the Renewable Fuel Standard market will evolve. Our approach is responsive 

to comments from automakers, the 25x’25 Alliance, and the National Corn Growers Association, 

in that if actual use of E85 and other higher-ethanol blends increases, for example in response to 

future RFS requirements and/or due to more competitive pricing, then the regulations and 

guidance will allow automakers to apply a higher E85 weighting consistent with the greater use 

of the fuel.

No incentive multiplier for ethanol FFVs

A few commenters suggested that ethanol FFVs be provided the same incentives as 

EV/PHEV/FCV/CNG vehicles, such as the incentive multipliers. EPA believes it is not 

 15 http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/pdfs/afpr_apr_12.pdf
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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appropriate to adopt incentive multipliers in this rule for manufacturers of ethanol-capable 

vehicles. One, ethanol is not a vehicle GHG emissions game-changer—the tailpipe GHG 

emissions of ethanol FFVs when operated on ethanol are typically only slightly lower than GHG 

emissions from conventional vehicles (and those GHG emissions performance-based reductions 

would be accounted for in EPA compliance calculations based on actual ethanol use). Two, 

ethanol FFVs do not face the same consumer barriers as EV/PHEV/FCV/CNG vehicles—they 

are typically no more expensive than conventional vehicles, and they can, and most often are, 

operated on conventional gasoline-based fuels. Furthermore, there are approximately 10 million 

ethanol FFVs on the road in the U.S. today (far more than any other incentivized vehicle 

technology), and automakers produced approximately 2 million ethanol FFVs in MY 2011 alone. 

Although, as explained in the preceding response, the great majority of ethanol FFVs currently 

use gasoline, there is little reason to believe that automakers are not going to continue to produce 

ethanol FFVs, particularly if more ethanol FFVs begin to use E85 fuel to meet the RFS 

standards. Given the long history of federal incentives for ethanol FFVs, and the fact that 

ethanol FFVs can achieve GHG emissions credits after the GHG emissions incentives expire, the 

Agency believes that there is no need to provide additional incentives for ethanol FFVs in this 

rulemaking, beyond those already provided. Providing an additional incentive in the MYs 2017-

2025 GHG program thus would not achieve any greater use of renewable fuels than is already 

required under the RFS program, and thus would not achieve any greater emissions reductions 

from the use of such fuel. Providing incentives would therefore only dilute the benefits of the 

GHG emissions program. Given that renewable fuel use is already required by and accounted 

for under the RFS program, it therefore would be inappropriate to provide additional incentives 

in the MYs 2017-2025 program.

Nevertheless, with future ethanol FFV credits tied to the actual use of ethanol fuel, there 

will be, for the first time, a motivation for automakers to encourage their customers to use 

ethanol in their FFVs. See Section 6.6 for a discussion of why EPA is not using the 0.15 divisor 

for GHG emissions compliance, but is adopting the 0.15 divisor for the CAFE program 

beginning in MY 2020, for all nonpetroleum fuels.

No accounting of potential upstream GHG emissions benefits due to ethanol/biofuels

Several commenters pointed out that cellulose-based ethanol and other renewable fuels 

have the potential to yield large lifecycle GHG emissions benefits due to the CO2 uptake during 

plant growth, and recommended that such fuels be given credits, or have compliance measured,

to reflect the upstream GHG emissions benefits. The use of biofuels with lower lifecycle GHG 

emissions is already required under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which is 

designed to achieve GHG emissions benefits through the required use of renewable 

transportation fuels that have better lifecycle GHG emissions performance than the gasoline or 

diesel fuel that they displace. EPA has already quantified the GHG emissions benefits associated 

with the RFS program. Therefore, as noted above, providing an additional incentive in the MYs 

2017-2025 GHG program, which is focused on emissions from the vehicle and not lifecycle 

emissions, would not achieve any greater use of renewable fuels than is already required under 

the RFS program, and thus would not achieve any greater emissions reductions from the use of 

such fuel. Thus, providing an additional incentive, or using lifecycle emissions for compliance,

would reduce the need to take other actions and thereby reduce the emissions benefits of the 
EPA Response to Comments

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MYs 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle GHG emissions program given that renewable fuel use is 

already required by and accounted for under the RFS program.16

Interaction between this rule and the Renewable Fuels Standard

Many commenters alluded to a potential conflict between the proposed CAFE/GHG 

standards and the RFS program

EPA sees no such conflict. The MYs 2017-2025 GHG program is designed to achieve 

GHG emission reductions from vehicle operation as measured at the tailpipe. It does this by 

reducing the amount of fuel that the vehicle consumes during operation. For conventional 

gasoline powered vehicles, the standard is based on a test procedure that uses gasoline without 

any ethanol as the test fuel. The GHG standards will require the manufacturers to produce 

vehicles that consume less fuel when operated on gasoline. These same vehicles will also be 

more efficient when operated on blends of gasoline and ethanol. The standards achieve greater 

efficiency in the consumption of the fuel, without affecting one way or the other how much 

renewable fuel is used by the operator. The RFS program is a separate, complementary program 

designed to increase the use of renewable fuels by operators and to achieve GHG emission 

reductions primarily through upstream emission reductions. It affects what fuels are produced 

and sold, but does not affect how efficient the vehicle is in consuming the fuel. The GHG 

standards affect the vehicles and improve their efficiency, while the RFS program achieves the 

goals of increased use of renewable fuels independent of the vehicle GHG standards. They are 

separate but complementary programs.

In addition, the RFS provisions themselves were drafted by Congress to include lifecycle 

GHG performance standards that were neutral to the type of fuel used to meet them. Other than 

subcategories for cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based diesel, EISA does not specify what types 

of renewable fuel must be used. Rather, it is structured to allow the free market to stimulate the 

development of a broad range of renewable fuels from an even broader range of feedstocks. We 

have already seen rapid growth in corn ethanol and soy biodiesel production, and by leveraging 

DOE and USDA programs we are now seeing billions of dollars spent in research, development, 

and now commercialization of “drop-in fuels” such as renewable diesel, biomass-to-liquids 

gasoline and diesel, and biobutanol, as well as biogas and bioelectricity. These fuels are and will 

be coming from an ever broader array of feedstocks, from municipal solid waste to corn stover to 

algae. EPA already has over 30 petitions for new fuel pathways under the RFS program that we 

are currently reviewing. These fuels are also finding markets beyond just cars and trucks, and 

are being introduced into planes, trains, ships, and home furnaces. In short, the opportunities for 

the use of non-ethanol renewable fuels that will meet the requirements of the RFS program are 

expanding quickly.

 16 The plant oil-based fuel produced by POP Diesel is not currently identified as an acceptable renewable fuel under 

the RFS program. EPA is currently considering the company’s petition seeking approval of its product under the 

RFS program. The RFS program established by Congress is the appropriate mechanism for evaluating the full 

lifecycle emissions impact of this type of biofuel use, rather than a program focused principally on vehicle tailpipe 

emissions.
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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The commenters focus narrowly on ethanol as the fuel to be used to meet the RFS 

standard, since ethanol has been the predominant renewable fuel used to date. Since the RFS 

standard increases over time, they then argue that EPA must provide additional mechanisms to 

ensure that gasoline blends with greater than 10% ethanol can be used in both conventional 

vehicles and flexible fuel vehicles. However, the commenters presume that additional EPA 

action is necessary in order for this to occur. While EPA has and will continue to take actions 

within its authority to help the marketplace achieve the RFS standards through the increased use 

of ethanol and all other renewable fuels, ultimately EISA places this responsibility on the parties 

obligated to do so under the RFS program. This makes sense, as the industry is not only capable 

of making all the changes necessary to accommodate both the CAFE/LDGHG standards and the 

RFS volume requirements, but is in the best position to do so in the most efficient manner. For 

instance, in addition to developing drop-in fuels, the marketplace has been also been finding 

ways to increase the use of ethanol. As a result of the commitment of the big 3 domestic vehicle 

manufacturers to the President several years ago, there are now over 10 million flexible fuel 

vehicles (FFVs) on the road capable of burning up to 85 percent ethanol. Similarly, hundreds of 

new retail outlets are being converted every year to market E85 to supply higher level ethanol 

blends to FFVs.

Thus, there are already a wide variety of solutions available to the market that will permit 

the increasing use of renewable fuels to meet the RFS standards. Many, if not all of these 

solutions will be implemented in the marketplace over the course of the next few years. By the 

time the CAFE/LDGHG standards will be implemented for MY2017 and later, the market will 

have sorted out the best mechanisms to expand the use of renewable fuels through both increased 

use of ethanol and non-ethanol renewable fuels. Given the long lead time for this rule, the long 

phase-in, and the long time it will take for the fleet to turn over, we have every confidence that 

the market will assure compliance with both the RFS standards and CAFE/LDGHG standards 

without the need of incentives in this rule.

Finally, while the current incentives for production of FFVs have not been effective at 

increasing the use of renewable fuels by FFVs, the provisions of this rule have the potential to 

provide an incentive for manufacturers to continue production of FFVs and to promote increased 

use of renewable fuels by operators of FFVs, which would help to achieve the RFS volume 

standards.

6.4. Comments Regarding the Treatment of Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

BMW of North America, LLC

Chrysler Group LLC

Delphi Corporation

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Marz, Loren C.

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Volkswagen Group of America
EPA Response to Comments

6-138

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

The joint draft TSD assumes almost negligible diesel market share in 2021 to 2025 (control case) 

which is in contradiction to increasing customer acceptance of diesel technology and automaker 

efforts to improve diesel technology. Clean diesel technology is a further option in the list of 

technologies with significant CO2 reduction potential. Future diesel mix depends on factors such 

as incentives, customer acceptance, fuel price development, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9579-A1, p.9]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Diesel technology can provide significant greenhouse gas and fuel efficiency benefits.

We also request that the Agencies consider incentives for this technology such as volume 

multipliers, or credit for enabling the use of biofuel blends such as B10 or B20. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9495-A1, p.22]

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 111.]

Second, Delphi has a proven track record in achieving energy and emissions reductions in diesel 

technology. Specifically, Delphi's direct injection fuel systems and linear oxygen sensors support 

diesel combustion with urea dosing systems, ammonia sensors and particulate matter or soot 

sensors help meet stringent emissions and on-board diagnostic requirements.

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 181.]

Advanced diesel emission control technologies like particulate filters with lower backpressure 

characteristics, selected reduction catalysts with improved performance at lower exhaust 

temperatures and SCR catalysts coated directly on particulate filter substrates are examples of 

emerging diesel emission control technologies that will allow future diesel powertrains to not 

only be as clean as gasoline engines from a criteria pollutant perspective, but diesel powertrains 

will deliver improved fuel consumption characteristics and lower greenhouse gas emissions. The 

use of diesel particulate filters also delivers significant reductions in black carbon emissions 

from diesel engines, a combustion emission that also has important climate change impact.

Organization: Marz, Loren C.

The projected effectiveness of advanced diesel engine technology relative to advanced gasoline 

engine technology may potentially be underestimated. A cursory review of current diesel 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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technology compared to current turbo-GDI technology in Europe reveals that diesel technology 

retains a significant fuel consumption advantage over identical vehicles with turbo-GDI 

technology in most cases. The following is a list of identical European-spec vehicles available 

with diesel and turbo-GDI technology at equivalent or nearly equivalent performance (based on 

'combined' fuel consumption in the European test cycle (NEDC) and manufacturers' listed 1-100 

km/hour times where those values were readily available (time in parentheses for each vehicle; 

diesel version listed first))... [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.1]

Audi A8 3.0 TDI – 6.6 l/100 km (6.1 sec) (27.5% lower Fuel Consumption)

Audi A8 3.0 TFSI – 9.1 l/100 km (6.1 sec)

MB S350 CDI BlueTEC L – 6.2 l/100 km (7.1 sec) (19.5% lower FC)

MB S350 CGI Blue Efficiency L – 7.7 l/100 km (7.1 sec)

MB C350 CDI Blue Efficiency – 5.9 l/100 km (6.0 sec) (15.7% lower FC)

MB C350 CGI Blue Efficiency – 7.0 l/100 km (6.0 sec)

MB C250 CDI Blue Efficiency – 4.8 l/100 km (7.1 sec) (28.4% lower FC)

MB C250 CGI Blue Efficiency – 6.7 l/100 km (7.2 sec)

Audi A3 2.0 TDI – 4.9 l/100 km (7.6 sec) (24.6% lower FC)

Audi A3 1.8 TFSI – 6.5 l/100 km (7.5 sec)

BMW 520d – 4.7 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (8.1 sec) (26.6% lower FC)

BMW 520i – 6.4 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (8.0 sec)

BMW X3 35d – 6.1 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.8 sec) (30.7% lower FC)

BMW X3 35i – 8.8 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.7 sec)

BMW 640d – 5.4 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.5 sec) (28.9% lower FC)

BMW 640i – 7.6 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.4 sec)

BMW 530d – 5.3 g l/100km (8-speed auto) (6.0 sec) (30.3% lower FC)

BMW 535i – 7.6 g l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.9 sec)

MB E250 CDI Blue Efficiency – 4.9 l/100 km (7.5 sec) (25.8% lower FC)
EPA Response to Comments

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MB E250 CGI Blue Efficiency – 6.6 l/100 km (7.7 sec)

BMW X5 40d – 7.5 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (6.6 sec) (25.7% lower FC)

BMW X5 35i – 10.1 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (6.8 sec)

Audi A8 4.2 TDI – 7.6 l/100 km (5.5 sec) (20.0% lower FC)

Audi A8 4.2 TFSI – 9.5 l/100 km (5.7 sec)

BMW 120d – 4.4 l/100 km (7.3 sec) (21.4% lower FC)

BMW 118i – 5.6 l/100 km (7.5 sec)

VW Golf 2.0 TDI – 4.8 l/100 km (manual) (9.3 sec) (22.6% lower FC)

VW Golf 1.4 TSI – 6.2 l/100 km (manual) (9.5 sec)

BMW 535d xDrive – 5.7 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.5 sec) (28.8% lower FC)

BMW 535i xDrive – 8.0 l/100 km (8-speed auto) (5.8 sec)

 (ave. ~25.1% lower FC)

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, pp.1-2]

Interestingly, this is very close to the relative fuel consumption reduction that the National 

Academies found (25.25%) in their recent study (“Assessment of Fuel Economy Technologies 

for Light-Duty Vehicles.” Committee on the Assessment of Technologies for Improving LightDuty Vehicle Fuel Economy, Board on Energy and Environmental Systems Division on 

Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council of the National Academies, Table 

5.A.1). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.2]

National Academies also conclude in this report...

'...An important characteristic of CI diesel engines is that they provide reductions in fuel 

consumption over the entire vehicle operating range, including city driving, highway driving, hill 

climbing, and towing. This attribute of CI diesel engines is an advantage when compared with 

other technology options that in most cases provide fuel consumption benefits for only part of 

the vehicle operating range....' (Finding 5.3) [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, pp.2-3]

This conclusion is generally supported by a study conducted by Motor Trend Magazine in 2007 

(http://www.motortrend.com/features/112_0705_alternative_fuel_technology/viewall.html), 

which showed that, based on its results, the diesel technology vehicle (a Mercedes-Benz E320 

Bluetec) was the most fuel efficient ('work efficient') of the technologies it studied (gas-electric 

hybrid technology represented by a Toyota Camry Hybrid, 'E85' technology represented by a 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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Chrysler Sebring, and turbo-GDI technology represented by a VW Passat 2.0T), and was very 

close to the Camry Hybrid in 'carbon efficiency'. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.3]

It should be noted that the fuel consumption gap between the European-spec BMW 535d and 

535i has actually widened (from 27.4% to 28.9% for the 2012 model). On top of that, the 

performance gap between the 535d and 535i has increased to 0.4 seconds (0-100 km/hr) in favor 

of the diesel (5.5 sec vs. 5.9 sec) from 0.2 seconds (5.9 sec vs. 6.1 sec) from the previous 

versions, according to the manufacturer's data 

(http://www.bmw.co.uk/bmwuk/pricesandspecifications/0,,1156___bs-NQ%3D%3D%40bbTEkxMA%3D%3D%40sit-bmwuk,00.html). The BMW GDI technology was specifically 

identified in the Draft Joint Technical Support Document supporting this proposed rule as 

already having advanced turbo-GDI technology (Section 3.4.1.5, Variable Valve Lift (VVL), 

page 3-80). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.3]

It is interesting to note that the BMW 535d has lower fuel consumption (and CO2 emissions) 

than the BMW 5-Series hybrid ('ActiveHybrid 5') in the combined European test cycle (NEDC), 

in addition to significantly better 0-100 km/hr performance based on the preceding BMW link.

This, in addition to the two examples in the U.S. of diesel and hybrid technology available in the 

same vehicle (Mercedes-Benz S350 Bluetec/S400 Hybrid and VW Touareg TDI/Hybrid) in 

which the diesel versions have better fuel economy than the hybrid versions in the EPA 5-cycle, 

suggests that the assumption that hybrid technology is a more fuel efficient technology than 

diesel technology is not unequivocal. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.3]

According to specification data provided in a BMW publication ('BMW Technology Day 2009 -

EfficientDynamics'), the minimum brake specific fuel consumption (BSFC) of the BMW 3.0 

liter, 225 kW 'TwinPower' turbo-GDI engine is 245 g/kWh, while the minimum BSFC of the 

previous version of the 3.0 liter, 225 kW 'TwinPower' diesel engine was 197 g/kWh (pages 28 

and 34, respectively). That would equate to an efficiency gap of at least 24.3% (and gasoline 

contains slightly more energy per unit mass than diesel fuel according to Argonne National 

Laboratory's GREET model), and that efficiency advantage has apparently widened even more 

for the 2012, 230 kW version of the BMW 'TwinPower' diesel engine. According to the 

referenced spec data, the 'TwinPower' turbo-GDI gasoline engine incorporates many advanced 

GDI engine technologies, e.g., 'jet guided' high precision injectors, 200 bar injection pressure, 

variable intake valve lift adjustment ('VALVETRONIC') and infinite intake and outlet camshaft 

adjustment ('dual-VANOS'), and 'twin-scroll' turbocharger technology. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0213-A1, p.3]

One Automotive Industry (AID) executive describes the fuel efficiency of gasoline engines as 

having improved by 3.5 percent over the past few years as a result of a shift to turbo-GDI 

technology, but the fuel efficiency of diesel engine technology has improved by 7 percent over 

the same time frame (http://www.wintonsworld.com/cars/carnews/carnews-2011/DieselsPoised.html). He also points out that turbo gasoline cars are 'remarkably thirsty' in the real world 

and generally do not meet their claimed fuel economy levels. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.4]

Bosch has projected that the efficiency of diesel engine technology will increase even more than 

gasoline engine technology (Climate and Transportation Solutions: Findings from the 2009 
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Asilomar Conference on Transportation and Energy Policy, Chapter 10: 'The Case for Diesel 

Cars To Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions.' by Johannes-Joerg Rueger; 'The internalcombustion engine of the future: Excellent economy and high power despite smaller size.' Dr. 

Rolf Leonhard, Executive Vice President Engineering, Diesel Systems, Presentation at the 59th 

International Automotive Press Briefing, Boxberg, June 2009). This appears reasonable since 

FEV has identified the potential for extremely high power density for diesel technology (>100 

kW/liter - http://www.greencarcongress.com/2011/04/fev-20100405.html#more) which may 

allow as aggressive of downsizing as is assumed for advanced turbo-GDI in the proposed rule. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.4]

Whether advanced turbo-GDI technology can close the fuel consumption gap on advanced diesel 

technology as much as estimated in the proposed rule seems very optimistic and speculative.

Furthermore, if diesel technology is capable of improving as much as Bosch estimates, it will 

rival the other technologies considered in terms of fuel economy, especially if combined with 

hybrid technology. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.4]

EPA officials have reportedly stated that a diesel penetration of just 33% could reduce U.S. fuel 

consumption enough to eliminate the need to import the amount of crude oil currently imported 

from Saudi Arabia (http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_08/b3972138.htm).

This penetration appears possible based on recent U.S. sales data showing that diesel 'take rates' 

are 39% in vehicles which offer diesel engines in addition to conventional gasoline engines, 

while hybrid vehicles have a 'take rate' of only about 5% in vehicles in which hybrid technology 

is offered in addition to conventional gasoline engines 

(http://www.cleandieseldelivers.com/upload/CleanDieselDelivers_White_Paper.pdf - page 13).

In the few vehicles in the U.S. that are currently offered with all three of these technologies 

(gasoline, diesel and hybrid technology - the Mercedes-Benz S-class and the VW Touareg SUV), 

the diesel versions are easily outselling the hybrid versions 

(http://www.hybridcars.com/news/december-2011-dashboard-sales-still-climbing-35093.html) 

and in the case of the Touareg, the diesel model has recently been outselling the hybrid and 

gasoline versions combined. It should be noted that this sales mix occurred in a month 

(December 2011) in which the price gap between regular gasoline and diesel fuel increased to 

over $0.50/gallon (national average per EIA). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.4]

Many alternate diesel fuels ('synthetic' diesel fuels) are nearly carbon neutral when produced 

from biomass. According to Argonne National Laboratory's latest version of the GREET model 

released in October 2011 (GREET1_2011 - http://greet.es.anl.gov/), dimethyl ether (DME) 

produced from biomass would generate about 11 grams/mile well-to-wheel (WTW) net GHG 

emissions in the default diesel vehicle assumed in GREET, compared to 451 g/mi for the 

baseline gasoline vehicle, 333 g/mi for an equivalent electric vehicle (EV) based on the assumed 

U.S. electricity mix in GREET, and 253 g/mi for a fuel cell vehicle (FCV) using gaseous 

hydrogen. Renewable diesel fuel produced from biomass using the Fischer-Tropsch process 

(BTL) is not far behind DME at about 36 g/mi net WTW GHG emissions. BTL renewable diesel 

fuel is a direct 'drop-in' replacement for petroleum diesel fuel, is infinitely miscible with 

petroleum diesel fuel, and precludes the need to adopt an entirely new fuel distribution system.

Even the diesel vehicle using first-generation biodiesel (B20) produced from virgin soybean oil 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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generates lower net WTW GHG emissions than EV per GREET (~329 g/mi). [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0213-A1, p.5]

California also has identified biodiesel from 'Conversion of corn oil, extracted from distillers 

grains prior to the drying process, to biodiesel' as having the lowest 'carbon intensity' of all of the 

fuel pathways it has identified in its latest 'carbon intensity lookup table', much lower than either 

the assumed electricity mix in California or any of the hydrogen fuels. This implies that the 

WTW GHG emissions from this source of biodiesel would be significantly lower than 

EV/PHEV/FCV, even taking the much higher 'fuel mileage' of those technologies into account. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.6]

GREET1_2011 shows that for most fuel pathways identified in GREET, WTW emissions of 

criteria pollutants are generally lower for diesel technology/diesel fuel pathways than other 

vehicle technology/fuel pathways, through at least 2020. Furthermore, GREET1_2011 projects 

that DME produced from biomass produces the best overall well-to-wheels energy efficiency (of 

the biomass-based fuels - D. Kittelson et al, “Performance and Emissions of a Second Generation 

Biofuel – DME.” (2010), http://www.me.umn.edu/centers/cdr/reports/E3_Kittelson.pdf), 

petroleum and fossil fuel consumption reductions, GHG emission reductions, and arguably the 

greatest across-the-board criteria pollutant emission reductions of any other combination of fuel 

pathways and vehicle technologies identified in GREET through at least 2020, including any of 

the 'advanced vehicle technologies' identified in the proposed rule as receiving special 

incentives. Again, BTL is very close to DME with respect to aforementioned reductions. Diesel 

engine technologies will be required to take advantage of these advanced biofuels, and should be 

encouraged to the greatest extent possible. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.6]

Diesel vehicles have substantially lower hydrocarbon emissions than gasoline vehicles, both 

directly and indirectly. EPA has mentioned in previous reports that diesel technology has 

'...near-zero evaporative hydrocarbon emissions due to the extremely low vapor pressure of 

diesel fuel....' (e.g., 'Progress Report on Clean and Efficient Automotive Technologies Under 

Development at EPA - Interim Technical Report.' January 2004, page 19). This appears to be a 

very important characteristic in light of the DOE/NREL 'weekend ozone effect' studies which 

suggest that hydrocarbon emissions are a more important factor in the accumulation of groundlevel ozone than NOx emissions in urban locations. Many studies (e.g., Eric Fujita et al, 

'Weekend/Weekday Ozone Study in the South Coast Air Basin.' Proceedings of the 2002 DEER 

Conference; John G. Watson et al, “Review of volatile organic compound source apportionment 

by chemical mass balance.” Atmospheric Environment, Volume 35, Issue 9, March 2001, Pages 

1567-1584; Heidi Hellén et al, “Determination of source contributions of NMHCs in Helsinki 

(60°N, 25°E) using chemical mass balance and the Unmix multivariate receptor models.” 

Atmospheric Environment, Volume 37, Issue 11, April 2003, Pages 1413-1424; Steven G. 

Brown et al, “Source apportionment of VOCs in the Los Angeles area using positive matrix 

factorization.” Atmospheric Environment, Volume 41, Issue 2, January 2007, Pages 227-237) 

have shown that gasoline exhaust and evaporative emissions from gasoline fuel (with 

evaporative emissions being implicated as an increasingly more important source in latter 

studies) account for a majority of hydrocarbon emissions in metropolitan areas where groundlevel ozone is most problematic. Diesel technology along with EV and FCV technology could 
EPA Response to Comments

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have a dramatic impact on improving air quality in metropolitan areas. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0213-A1, p.6]

Associated with this property of gasoline (relatively high evaporation rate) is the utter waste of a 

very valuable resource (petroleum) through evaporation, which would be mitigated by at least a 

partial switch of the U.S. light-duty fleet to diesel technology. Based on Table 4-12 (page 4-42) 

of the Draft Joint Technical Support Document supporting this proposed rule, 'Conventional 

Gasoline' produces about 5.70 grams of VOC per gallon well-to-pump (WTP), while 'Low Sulfur 

Diesel' produces about 0.95 grams of VOC per gallon WTP, using the GREET default 

BTU/gallon values for gasoline and low sulfur diesel fuel. According to EIA 

(http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_home#tab2), 378 million gallons/day 

of gasoline are consumer in the U.S. Assuming most of this consumption is by motor vehicles, 

that's about 138,000,000,000 gallons of gasoline consumed by the U.S. vehicle fleet per year.

138,000,000,000 gallons X 5.70 g/gal = 867,063 tons of VOC WTP per year from the fuel 

gasoline. Switching just 33% of the light-duty vehicles in the U.S. to diesel could reduce WTP 

VOC emissions to (0.67 X 138,000,000,000 gallons X 5.70 g/gal) + (0.33 X 138,000,000,000 

gallons X 0.95 g/gal) = 628,621 tons. 867,063 tons - 628,621 tons = 238,442 tons or almost 

80,000,000 gallons of gasoline not evaporated as VOC. This does not take into account the 

typically much lower fuel consumption of diesel vehicles, so assuming gasoline-hybrid 

technology and diesel technology achieve roughly the same fuel economy on average in the real 

world, as has been addressed previously, 80,000,000 gallons of gasoline/year would not only not 

be wasted, but would not contribute to ozone formation in VOC-limited areas, even in the case of 

gasoline-hybrid technology vehicles, for which special incentives are being proposed in this 

proposed rule. This also does not take into account the demonstrably higher VOC emissions of 

gasoline vehicles during vehicle refueling, diurnal + hot soak, and running loss. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0213-A1, p.7]

If the goal of the proposed rule is to increase fuel economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions 

(and not increase emissions of some criteria pollutants in the process), diesel technology is a 

more effective strategy than GDI, and as potentially 'game-changing' a technology as gasolinehybrid, and even EV, PHEV and FCV technology, possibly even more so in some cases. There 

is no logical reason that diesel technology shouldn't be afforded the same consideration as any 

other of the 'advanced technologies'. Preferably, no artificial incentives should be given to any 

of the technologies considered and all should just stand on their own merits. I urge 

EPA/NHTSA to reconsider the special incentives proposed for EV/PHEV/FCV/gasoline-hybrids, 

or at least put diesel technology on a level playing field with these technologies. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0213-A1, p.9]

As a disclaimer, I am in no way associated with the auto industry or any support industries to the 

auto industry, including diesel engine manufacturers. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, p.9]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.
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2. The Proposed GHG Standards are arbitrary and capricious because their exclusive

consideration of tailpipe GHG emissions fails to take into account the relative life cycle 

contribution to GHG emissions of various engine technologies and the energy sources that make 

them run. The analysis of the wells-to-wheels energy inputs associated with various technologies 

and fuels set forth herein demonstrates that the Proposed Regulations’ apportionment of GHG 

credits to various technologies and fuels is irrational because it considers only tailpipe emissions. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 2]

c. re-do the weight the Agencies give to various alternative technologies and fuels according to a 

wells-to-wheels approach that corresponds more accurately with their relative contribution to and 

mitigation of atmospheric greenhouse gas accumulation; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, 

pp. 2-3]

Although the Renewable Fuel Standard provides incentives for the use of fuels covered by it, 

such as biodiesel, which may have a lower life cycle emissions of carbon than petroleum, such as 

biodiesel, pure plant oil is not eligible for the RFS. Therefore, the Proposed Regulations do not 

provide any incentive for the use of 100 percent plant oil or an engine specially equipped to run 

on this fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 6]

In considering only tailpipe emissions, rather than the full life cycle GHG emissions of a 

technology and fuel that would result from a wells-to-wheels analysis, the Proposed Regulations 

arbitrarily favor and disfavor some alternatives over others. The net effect is that the Proposed 

Regulations are not rationally related to their purpose of reducing or slowing global warming. 

Following is factual analysis of the wells-to-wheels attributes of the relevant alternative 

technologies and fuels, pointing to the idiosyncratic and counter-productive values that the 

Proposed Regulations assign to them insofar as they mitigate GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 6]

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

A national policy that favors specific technologies will prevent America from achieving dramatic 

petroleum reduction in the near- and medium-term. By favoring leap-ahead technologies that 

will not see significant market penetration even by the end of this proposed rule’s term, the 

Administration is choosing a revolutionary path based on assumptions and uncertainties instead 

of an evolutionary path that will achieve similarly dramatic petroleum and emission reductions 

TODAY at a comparatively minimal cost to the consumer and avoid tremendous infrastructure 

costs. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.1]

Focusing on Fuel Savings, Not Market Challenges: The NPRM goes on to state that diesel 

engines are not “advanced technology” per se” (FR 25454). In reality, diesel is the number one 

selling advanced CO2 reduction technology sold in the world and is responsible for billions of 

gallons saved annually. Diesel technology combines high consumer acceptance – both in the 

United States and abroad - high residual values, high demand among used vehicle buyers and 

real-world fuel saving performance that is aligned with consumer expectations. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0246-A1, p.6]
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In 2006, EPA confirmed the benefit of clean diesel vehicles when it stated that if 33% of 

America’s vehicles were diesel-powered cars, the nation’s fuel savings would be equal to the 

amount of fuel America imports from Saudi Arabia. Yet, the NPRM’s analysis and commentary 

discount the role clean diesel vehicles are already playing to reduce national emissions and fuel 

consumption. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, pp.6-7]

CAFE credits offered in the NPRM will bring some of these future technologies to market, but 

will not meet the Administration’s expectations in changing the American vehicle fleet for 

several decades. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.14]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 238-239.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 240.]

To ensure that we spur not only innovation but broad innovation that will include multiple 

technology paths, public policies, regulations and incentive plans must be technology neutral. 

Government should set the goals, even aggressive goals, that inspire the freedom to innovate, 

and then get out of the way. State, federal and public officials and regulators must resist the 

temptation to pick winners and losers; to let politics and fads enter the debate or to engage in 

centralized planning in a highly complex industry.

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen anticipates that some stakeholders will propose to include hybridization 

technologies as applied to all vehicles. Building upon this, Volkswagen proposes that the 

agencies adopt the following:

- Credits for deployment of advanced technology compression ignition engines as applied to both 

passenger cars and light duty trucks

- Credits for vehicles capable of operating on advance bio-fuels such as B20 (Biodiesel)

- Credits to promote combinations of expensive high-investment technologies such as 

electrification of vehicles incorporating advanced compression ignition or bio-fuel capable 

engines

Many technologies which deserve crediting may serve as 'bridging technologies' capable of 

providing near- and mid-term CO2 reductions until such time as technologies and market demand 

for other more effective concepts mature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 28]

Response:

EPA OMEGA Model does not project significant diesel market penetration
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Comments from BMW and Loren Marz suggest that EPA’s OMEGA model was 

pessimistic in its projections of diesel market penetration and that this is inconsistent with 

increasing consumer acceptance and market share for diesel vehicles. EPA emphasizes that the 

OMEGA model is designed to project the most cost effective way, not to mandate a compliance 

pathway, for automakers to meet the EPA GHG emissions standards. It is not designed to 

account for all of the complex elements that, in the aggregate, will determine future market share 

for any individual technology, whether conventional gasoline vehicles, electric vehicles, or diesel 

vehicles. Manufacturers remain free to choose any means of compliance, which of course 

includes use of diesel vehicles. For more discussion of diesel technology issues, see Section 

12.2.

No incentive multiplier for diesel vehicles

Volkswagen, the U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars, and Loren Marz suggested 

that diesel vehicles be provided the same incentives as EV/PHEV/FCV/CNG vehicles, such as 

the incentive multipliers. EPA believes it is not appropriate to adopt incentive multipliers in this 

rule for manufacturers of diesel vehicles. One, diesel technology is not a vehicle GHG emissions 

game-changer—the tailpipe GHG emissions of diesel vehicles are typically 10-20% lower than 

GHG emissions from conventional vehicles (of course, those lower values would be accounted 

for in EPA compliance calculations), while EV/PHEV/FCVs all have the potential for much 

larger game-changing GHG emissions reductions. Two, diesel vehicles do not face the same 

consumer barriers as EV/PHEV/FCV/CNG vehicles—diesel technology has been in the market 

for a long time, diesel fuel is available at a large number of fueling stations, and diesel vehicle 

range is higher than that of gasoline vehicles.

The related comments regarding technology neutrality and “government picking winners 

and losers” are addressed in Section 4.

No accounting of potential upstream GHG emissions benefits due to biodiesel (B20)

Volkswagen and Loren Marz suggested that credits should be available for vehicles that 

can operate on biodiesel blends, such as B20, since the biofuel portion of B20 has the potential to 

yield large lifecycle GHG emissions benefits due to the CO2 uptake during plant growth. 

Likewise, Plant Oil Powered (POP) Diesel Fuel Systems criticized the proposal for considering 

only tailpipe GHG emissions and not accounting for lifecycle GHG emissions. The use of

biofuels with lower lifecycle GHG emissions is already required under the Renewable Fuel 

Standard (RFS) program, which has been in place since 2006 and is designed to achieve GHG 

emissions benefits through the required use of renewable transportation fuels that have better 

lifecycle GHG emissions performance than the gasoline or diesel fuel that they displace. EPA 

has already quantified the GHG emissions benefits associated with the RFS program. Providing 

an additional incentive in the MYs 2017-2025 GHG program, which is focused on vehicle 

tailpipe emissions and not lifecycle emissions, would not achieve any greater use of renewable 

fuels than is already required under the RFS program, and thus would not achieve any greater 

emissions reductions from the use of such fuel. Thus, providing an additional incentive would 

reduce the emissions benefits of the MYs 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle GHG emissions program. 

Given that biofuel fuel use is already required by and accounted for under the RFS program, it 
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therefore would be inappropriate to provide additional incentives in the MYs 2017-2025

program.

Finally, as noted in earlier responses, although the plant oil-based fuel produced by POP 

Diesel Fuel Systems is not currently identified as an acceptable renewable fuel under the RFS 

program, EPA is currently considering the company’s petition seeking approval of its product 

under the RFS program. The RFS program established by Congress is the appropriate 

mechanism for evaluating the full lifecycle emissions impact of this type of biofuel use, rather 

than a program focused principally on vehicle tailpipe emissions.

6.5. Comments Regarding Other Alternative Fuels

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Ford Motor Company

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

St. Clair-Detroit River Sturgeon for Tomorrow

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Credits for Other Alternative Fuel Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.68]

In the effort to continue the development of advanced technology vehicles, the Alliance would 

like to show support of the following technologies, which will help drive our country down the 

road toward energy independence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.68]

Dual-Fuel CNG and LPG Gasoline Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.69]

CNG and LPG vehicles are another option that our country has to diversify the vehicle fleet and 

use a domestically available energy source. The Alliance supports the development of a utility 

factor approach very similar to the SAE standard mentioned above for PHEVs. The Alliance is 

also in favor of the option to allow manufacturers to use the proposed utility factor-based 

methodology as a “pull-ahead” option for MYs 2012-2015. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.69]

Based on the added cost of the vehicle technology and the cost advantage of using CNG and 

LPG fuel relative to gasoline, customers that purchase a dual-fuel CNG or LPG vehicle will, to 

the extent possible, use the intended alternative fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.69]

Many companies may leverage global designs in developing dual-fuel CNG and LPG vehicles 

for the U.S. market. It is important that the variety of global design features available be allowed 

into the U.S. market. Rather than making specific design requirements in the rules, a better 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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approach would be have these design features be factors in the calculation of the CNG and LPG 

utility factors. The Alliance would like to propose a work group to discuss the constraints 

mentioned in the NPRM for dual-fuel CNG and LPG vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.69]

In the NPRM, EPA specifically requested comments on the merits of providing sales multiplier 

(similar to the EV/PHEV incentives) for dedicated and/or dual-fuel compressed natural gas 

vehicles. The Alliance believes CNG and LPG technology also deserve multipliers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.69]

The Alliance also supports EPA’s proposal to continue use of the 0.15 divisor for gaseous and 

liquid alternative fuels and the petroleum equivalency factor for electricity. As noted by the 

Agencies, this approach will maintain consistency between dedicated and dual fuel vehicle 

calculations and will continue to encourage manufacturers to build vehicles capable of operating 

on fuels other than petroleum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Furthermore, Global Automakers supports the extension of multiplier incentives to other 

alternative fuels as well, such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG) or biodiesel. With regard to dual 

fueled vehicles in general, we urge the agencies to reconsider the treatment of these vehicles as 

part of the planned mid-term review of the standards, at which point the need for particular 

incentives would be clearer. Whatever approach is adopted, we urge that EPA and NHTSA agree 

on a single, harmonized set of incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

The Department of Energy lifecycle model demonstrates that switching to a renewable fuel using 

the Fischer-Thropsch process can achieve carbon neutrality without any change to the vehicle 

fleet. The Fischer-Thropsch 8 process has been used around the world since the 1920s to produce 

a very high quality diesel that can be used in existing vehicles. It can also be used to produce a 

high quality gasoline. The technology exists to produce fuels profitably at any crude oil price in 

excess of $17 per barrel of crude oil. This leaves sufficient room for a profitable switch to a 

renewable feedstock at today’s oil prices. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 4]

8 This is not an ethanol fuel but a true, high quality gasoline and diesel product

Organization: Ford Motor Company

EPA further requested comment on the merits of providing similar multipliers for dedicated 

and/or dual fuel compressed natural gas vehicles. Ford supports providing multipliers for natural 

gas fueled vehicle, and further requests that the same multiplier be provided for dedicated and/or 

dual fuel liquefied petroleum gas vehicles. Both gaseous fuels provide substantial reductions in 

greenhouse gas emissions, as well as support the diversification of our energy supply, providing 
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greater energy security. However, the vehicle technologies required to allow operation on these 

fuels is expensive, and the market availability of the fuel, similar to the availability of public 

charging stations for electric vehicles, remains very limited. Therefore, we believe that the 

multiplier is appropriate to encourage the investment in these technologies for broader new 

vehicles applications, and drive the volumes that will encourage greater investment in the 

necessary re-fueling infrastructure. We further recommend that the credit values for dedicated 

and bi-fuel gaseous vehicles be aligned with those provided for dedicated and bi-fuel electricity 

fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 18]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Emission controls for gasoline and diesel engines are also generally compatible with low carbon, 

alternative fuels (e.g., gasoline blends with renewable ethanol or biodiesel blends) that can 

provide additional reductions in mobile source greenhouse gas emissions. Engine operating 

strategies and emission control catalyst formulations, however, often need to be optimized 

depending on fuel composition to ensure that criteria pollutant emission standards are met. It is 

also important that specifications associated with any low carbon fuel should be compatible with 

the use of available exhaust emission control technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, 

p.3]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

3. The Proposed GHG Standards are both inconsistent with law and arbitrary and capricious 

because they, and other EPA Regulations they incorporate by reference, fail to take into account 

in any respect the feasibility of equipping light duty engines to operate on 100 percent 

untransesterified plant oil. If EPA took such feasibility into account, an effective way to regulate 

GHG emissions would be to impose strict manufacturer GHG emissions averages that are 

independent of the corporate average fuel economy standards already in place for light duty 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 2]

d. recognize 100 percent plant oil as a viable renewable diesel engine fuel eligible to receive 

Renewable Identification Number (“RIN”) credits under the Renewable Fuels 2 standard (“RFS 

2”);

e. grant POP DieselTM’s application, submitted separately, for a RIN pathway for 100 percent 

plant oil fuel; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 3]

f. impose strict corporate fleet averages for GHG emissions on all classes of manufacturers as the 

most effective way to ramp down such emissions across the light duty market. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 3]

As set forth below, the Proposed Regulations’ treatment of the alternatives to fossil fuel 

petroleum in light duty vehicles will not have the effect of mitigating greenhouse gasses. As a 

result, even if the Proposed Regulations took into account the full scope of the rebound effect 

arising from reliance on improvements in fuel economy, which they do not do, they fail to 
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establish a framework of incentives to “slow or reduce” Global Warming. Massachusetts v. EPA, 

549 U.S. at 525, 127 S. Ct. at 1457. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 5]

Although the Renewable Fuel Standard provides incentives for the use of fuels covered by it, 

such as biodiesel, which may have a lower life cycle emissions of carbon than petroleum, such as 

biodiesel, pure plant oil is not eligible for the RFS. Therefore, the Proposed Regulations do not 

provide any incentive for the use of 100 percent plant oil or an engine specially equipped to run 

on this fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 6]

In considering only tailpipe emissions, rather than the full life cycle GHG emissions of a 

technology and fuel that would result from a wells-to-wheels analysis, the Proposed Regulations 

arbitrarily favor and disfavor some alternatives over others. The net effect is that the Proposed 

Regulations are not rationally related to their purpose of reducing or slowing global warming. 

Following is factual analysis of the wells-to-wheels attributes of the relevant alternative 

technologies and fuels, pointing to the idiosyncratic and counter-productive values that the 

Proposed Regulations assign to them insofar as they mitigate GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 6]

E Biodiesel

The International Council on Clean Transportation (“ICCT”) has determined that based on 

reliable analyses of the carbon intensity involved in manufacturing biodiesel, “replacing fossil 

diesel with biodiesel would not help to mitigate climate change, unless biodiesel could be 

produced entirely from wastes with no other use, crops grown on low value land [,] or some 

other policy could be put in place to substantially improve performance on emissions.” ICCT 

Briefing: Biodiesel Carbon Intensity, Sustainability and Effects on Vehicles and Emissions 

(2012), at 5 (“ICCT Briefing”) (Exhibit 5). The following ICCT chart depicting Biodiesel Total 

Emissions shows that the life cycle emissions of biodiesel derived from the most common 

triglyceride feedstocks are higher than they are for fossil fuel petroleum. [See chart on p. 11 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 

10]

Source: ICCT Briefing, at 5 (Exhibit 5).

High level officials in the diesel engine and petroleum industries agree that the manufacture of 

100 percent plant oil fuel requires less energy input than biodiesel. Deposition testimony of the 

organizational representative of the Engine Manufacturers Association, Roger Gault (Exhibit 7) 

(“EMA by Gault testimony”), at 170, lines 12-16) (“[T[here’s a relative cost between raw 

vegetable oil and biodiesel where biodiesel will by its nature be more expensive than raw 

vegetable oil because the raw vegetable oil is a component of the biodiesel that’s produced”); 

declaration of Andrew L. Pickard, Ph.D., P. Chem. (“Pickard decl.”), para. 3.6 (Exhibit 9)(“An 

obvious advantage of using triglycerides (such as ‘raw’ vegetable oil) directly as fuel for diesel 

engines is that no energy is spent to convert the ‘raw’ feedstock into an alternative fuel such as 

biodiesel, and there are no by-products or waste products for disposal”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-10337-A2, p. 11]
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The means to avoid the counter-productive carbon intensity of manufacturing biodiesel is to 

leave the triglyceride feedstock as Nature made it, 100 percent plant oil, and to run it through a 

diesel engine that is properly equipped to handle it. The only way that GHG Proposed 

Regulations for mobile sources will slow or reduce Global Warming is if they take into account 

the wells-to-wheels carbon intensity of all of the alternatives and reward or penalize them 

accordingly. Since the Proposed Regulations, instead, expressly reward technologies and fuels on 

the basis only of tailpipe emissions and they rely on other irrational assumptions, they fail 

accomplish the underlying objective. They are, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 12]

F. 100 Percent Plant Oil

The POP Diesel Fuel SystemTM, patented in 2011, may be installed after-market on any diesel 

engine to permit it to operate on 100 percent untransesterified plant oil. The engine starts and 

shuts down on No. 2 diesel drawn from the original tank, but in the interim, it runs on 100 

percent plant oil coming from the auxiliary tank. This approach safeguards engine performance 

and preserves the cleanliness of the crankcase oil, obviating the need for any alteration to service 

intervals, other than monitoring of the plant oil fuel filter. The plant oil fuel is heated prior to 

injection to reduce its viscosity and better assure a finely atomized spray pattern and clean and 

efficient burn. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 12]

Aftertreatment equipment may even function better on plant oil fuel than No. 2 diesel, if 

biodiesel is any indication. A. William, S. Black, and R.L. McCormick, “Biodiesel Fuel Property 

Effects on Particulate Matter Reactivity,” DOE, National Renewable Energy Laboratory 

(“NREL”) (biofuel enhances diesel particulate filter function). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10337-A2, pp. 12-13]

POP DieselTM’s experience in installing its equipment on thirty experimental diesel engines of 

all stripes and sizes demonstrates that this solution can work on any engine. The feasibility of 

POP DieselTM’s basic plant oil technology is proven. Rudolph Diesel himself observed in 2012:

The use of vegetable oils for engine fuels may seem insignificant today. But such oils may 

become in course of time as important as the petroleum and the coal tar products of the present 

time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 13]

A.K. Babu and G. Devaradjane, “Vegetable Oils and Their Derivatives as Fuels for CI Engines: 

An Overview, section 2, SAE 2003-01-0767 (Exhibit 8), at 0605. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10337-A2, p. 13]

1. Exclusion of Untransesterified Plant Oil from Eligibility for the RFS 2

Because the RFS does not apply to untransesterified plant oil fuel, POP DieselTM cannot 

formally petition for a pathway that would entitle its fuel to a RIN and to earn GHG-reducing, 

RIN credits. Therefore, the Proposed Regulations do not afford POP DieselTM the RIN credits 

benefit they contemplate for other biofuels that do qualify for the RFS and RFS 2. In this regard, 

the Proposed Regulations are arbitrary and capricious. POP DieselTM’s separate application for 
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a RIN contains the life cycle information necessary for EPA to designate a pathway under RFS 

2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 13]

2. Institutional Barriers to Introduction of Plant Oil Fuel [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, 

p. 13]

Any plant oil consisting of triglycerides will work in a diesel engine equipped by POP 

DieselTM. Just as, depending on source, there are a variety of crude petroleum oils, there are a 

variety of plant oils that each have slightly different physical properties. “There is no question 

that” all of these plant oils are capable of powering a diesel engine. Sam Jones, and Charles 

Peterson, “Using Unmodified Vegetable Oils as a Diesel Fuel Extender,” U. Of Idaho (Exhibit 8, 

documents 0571 -0578). All of them will deliver undiminished engine performance and 

emissions comparable to No. 2 diesel in any diesel engine equipped by POP DieselTM. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 13-14]

However, imprudent or illogical development of a standard for triglyceride fuel might 

unreasonably restrict the scope of feedstock qualifying for plant oil fuel. For this reason, POP 

DieselTM has opposed adoption of the first triglyceride standard specification by ASTM 

International, to govern this fuel’s use in commercial and industrial burners. An exposition of the 

unreasonable and unjustified barriers this standard erects to the use of triglyceride fuel in the 

diesel fuel market is beyond the scope of this petition. An antitrust lawsuit filed by POP 

DieselTM has, thus far, prevented ASTM from publishing this standard, which event would 

automatically make it, by law, the quality standard for triglyceride burner fuel in most states. 

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc. v. ExxonMobil, et al. (D.N.M. No. 1:11-cv-00103-

JB-LFG) (filed Feb. 1, 2012) (see all versions of the complaint for enumeration of the Standard’s 

unreasonable and unjustified restrictions on triglyceride diesel fuel). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10337-A2, p. 14]

The gist of the antitrust allegations are as follows. The National Biodiesel Board (“NBB”) 

instigated the drafting of the ASTM triglyceride burner fuel standard to purposefully restrict the 

competing biofuel from undercutting its market. ExxonMobil used its dominance of ASTM’s 

Petroleum Products Committee, by expressly making a threat to vote against any triglyceride 

standard that did not include the unreasonable restrictions, to enforce this arrangement. (The 

biodiesel industry enjoys preferred status with the petroleum industry by virtue of the 5 percent 

blending of biodiesel with No. 2 diesel authorized by ASTM D-975, Standard Specification for 

Diesel Fuel Oils. This arrangement allows the petroleum industry to say to the public that it 

supports renewable energy.) ASTM’s Petroleum Products Committee approved the triglyceride 

burner fuel standard without subjecting any of the test methods applied therein to ASTM’s 

validation procedure that would normally apply to a new fuel. Pickard decl., para. 3.12 (Exhibit 

9). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 14-15]

An example of the problems that arise with applying test methods developed for No. 2 diesel to 

triglyceride fuel appears in the lab report that is Exhibit 10 (Confidential Business Information).1 

ASTM Test Method D-1160 distillation “could not be completed beyond” 40 percent recovery 

“after 449 degrees C due to the sample forming a gel that stopped the distillation.” Id., footnote 

(Exhibit 10) (Confidential Business Information). This example calls into question the precision 
EPA Response to Comments

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of all other ASTM petroleum and biodiesel test methods for use with triglyceride fuel, none of 

which have ever been validated for triglyceride fuel via an ASTM interlaboratory study (“ILS”), 

a comprehensive study involving replicate testing done at between six and nine laboratories. See 

Pickard decl., para. 3.12 (Exhibit 9). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 15]

The fact that there have not been any ILS’s conducted, much less successfully concluded, for any 

test methods for triglyceride fuel may make it premature for EPA to designate this fuel for 

registration under 40 C.F.R. part 79. See supra. In the absence of test methods validated for 

triglyceride fuel, a triglyceride fuel manufacturer, such as POP DieselTM, would not have 

benchmarks for determining if its fuel submitted for EPA registration was within specifications 

and EPA would lack rational means to evaluate the same question. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10337-A2, p. 15]

The antitrust allegations are, further, that the conspirators used deception to orchestrate ASTM’s 

development and passage of the triglyceride burner fuel standard. These allegations are that the 

NBB had a surrogate, Ralph Turner, who had previously served as the owner’s representative 

and managing agent of a 45 million gallon per year biodiesel facility, one of the largest in the 

United States, propose to ASTM the drafting of a triglyceride standard. On the pretext that Mr. 

Turner’s ostensibly having used around 4,000 gallons per year of raw vegetable oil to heat 

greenhouses on his farm gave him experience with triglyceride fuel, ASTM appointed him to 

serve as Technical Contact for the ASTM Subcommittee that undertook to draft the standard. 

The result has the primary effects of enshrining false shibboleths and unnecessarily crimping 

restraints into a precedent-setting ASTM triglyceride fuel standard, the laws of most states and 

possibly, federal law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 16]

The federal district judge in New Mexico dismissed the antitrust lawsuit in July 2011 but 

conducted a three-hour hearing on POP DieselTM’s motion to reconsider in mid-December 

2011. He has not issued his ruling yet on whether to reinstate this suit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-10337-A2, p. 16]

3. Overcoming Prejudice Against POP DieselTM’s Use of 100 Percent Plant Oil.

Two organizations, the Engine Manufacturers Association and the National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory, have issued public statements arguing against the use of vegetable oil as fuel in a 

diesel engine. As set forth below, both of these statements are unjustified and based on outdated 

data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 16]

i. Engine Manufacturers Association Statement [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 16]

Research on the use of raw vegetable oil running in a diesel engine dating to the 1970's and early 

1980's found that it caused carbon deposits and other problems. EMA by Gault testimony 

(Exhibit 7) (referring to numbered documents that constitute Exhibit 8). As is evident from the 

testimony of the Engine Manufacturers Association’s representative Mr. Gault, this research, and 

nothing more recent than that, was the primary basis for EMA to adopt a statement in 2006 

condemning the use of raw vegetable oil in a diesel engine. EMA statement (Exhibit 8, document 

0566). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 16-17]
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Based on documents kept in the EMA’s file concerning development of its position statement, 

the NBB’s Steve Howell (“Mr. Howell”) seemed to be the instigator of this statement. EMA by 

Gault testimony, at 171, lines 18-22 (Exhibit 7) (referring to Exhibit 8, documents numbered 

0569, 0579, 0582, 0603 and 0604). As other documents in the same file indicate, Mr. Howell, on 

behalf of the biodiesel industry, also took the lead in agitating for EPA to impose additional 

restrictions on the use of 100 percent plant oil in a diesel engine. Exhibit 8, document 0582 (Mr. 

Gault’s notes of teleconference organized in December 2005 by Mr. Howell with EPA officials 

Jim Caldwell, Dave Kortum and Joseph Sopata); document 0603 (text of email by Mr. Howell to 

EPA officials seeking meeting “on the subject of EPA registration of Straight Vegetable Oil or 

Raw Vegetable Oil”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 17]

POP DieselTM does not advocate, in fact it shuns, the methods of use of plant oil in the failed 

research studies from the 1970's and early 1980's: either blending the vegetable oil with No. 2 

diesel in a single tank, or else, using it at 100 percent concentration, but without the safeguards 

that POP DieselTM has learned are necessary. These necessary safeguards include: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 17]

1. Always starting the engine on 100 percent No. 2 diesel drawn from its own fuel tank, so as to 

prevent excessive blow-by of plant oil fuel past the cold piston rings into the engine crankcase, 

where it will polymerize and gum up the engine; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 17-

18]

2. Always shutting down the engine on 100 percent No. 2 diesel drawn from its own fuel tank, so 

that the plant oil fuel does not remain on the hot metal parts of the fuel injection system to sizzle 

and plasticize and so that, in cooler weather, the plant oil fuel does not congeal upon engine 

cool-down and then cause difficulty on engine start-up; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-

A2, p. 18]

3. Always flushing the engine and fuel system with 100 percent No. 2 diesel drawn from its own 

fuel tank prior to engine shut-down, to take advantage of this fuel’s excellent properties as a 

solvent in removing plant oil from the internal fuel passages of the engine, where it may 

eventually gel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 18]

In fact, more recent studies than the ones from the 1970's and early 1980's speak favorably of 

plant oil fuel. Jones, S. and Peterson, C., “Using Unmodified Vegetable Oils as a Diesel Fuel 

Extender,” U. of Idaho (Exhibit 8, at 0575 (citing Nag et al. (1995) and Sapaum et al. (1996))). 

POP DieselTM has overcome the technical hurdles to warrant that the use of 100 percent plant 

oil in a diesel engine is absolutely feasible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 18]The 

EMA position statement on the use of raw vegetable oil in a diesel engine is further suspect 

because the final draft omitted language included in earlier drafts that seemed to approve of a 

dual tank fuel system like POP DieselTM’s: “Vehicles may be modified to achieve compatibility 

between raw vegetable oil and animal fats with the fuel delivery system (e.g., by heating the fuel 

system to reduce the fuel’s viscosity).” Exhibit 8, document 0596. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10337-A2, p. 18]
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ii. National Renewable Energy Laboratory Statement [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 

18]

Three sentences buried in NREL’s Biodiesel Handling and Use Guide (“NREL statement”), at 

page 8, advise avoiding the use of untransesterified plant oil as diesel fuel. NREL statement 

(Dec. 2009) (Exhibit 11). Both the NREL and EMA statements turn on the conclusion that “the[] 

problems [with plant oil fuel] are caused mostly by the greater viscosity, or thickness, of the raw 

oils.” NREL statement, at 8 (Exhibit 11). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 18-19]

However, the fuel injection equipment manufacturer Bosch states that in contemporary, pressureregulated common rail fuel systems, the higher viscosity of vegetable oil fuel does not exceed 

design thresholds for component strength. Dr. Jorge Ullmann and Dr. Heinz Stutzemberger, 

“Biofuels of the Future – Injection System Requirements in Terms of Quality,” section 2.1, 

Robert Bosch GmbH (Nov. 2007) (Exhibit 12-A); deposition testimony of the organizational 

representative of Bosch, Tom Livingston, at page 74, lines 5-8 and 21-24 (Exhibit 12-B). [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 19]

The NREL statement does not refer to any evidentiary source to justify its advisory against the 

use of plant oil fuel. NREL statement, at page 8 (Exhibit 11). The EMA statement refers as its 

only source to the conclusory NREL statement. EMA statement (Exhibit 8, document 0504). The 

organizational representative of the EMA, trying to justify the sweep of EMA’s statement, could 

only cite to a single example of an engine that suffered a catastrophic – meaning sudden and 

disabling – engine failure, allegedly due to use of untranesterified plant oil in the engine. EMA 

by Gault testimony, at page 202, line 12 - page 203, line 4 (Exhibit 7). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-10337-A2, p. 19]

The close ties that the NBB’s Mr. Howell has with Robert McCormick, the director of NREL’s 

Center for Transportation Technologies and Systems, are evident in the EMA’s background file 

on the development of its statement. Mr. McCormick keeps Mr. Howell apprized of his 

communications with EPA on the subject of vegetable oil fuel. Exhibit 8, document 0569. The 

reader is left to speculate whether Mr. Howell asked Mr. McCormick to speak negatively to EPA 

about this fuel, as Mr. McCormick appears to have done in December 2005. Exhibit 8, document 

0570 (Joe Sopata of EPA to Mr. McCormick: “You mentioned to me during the diesel 

subcommittee meeting that using vegetable oil at any level in a diesel engine would render the 

diesel engine inoperable within one year. Do you have any data on this issue?”). Mr. McCormick 

forwards to Mr. Howell research papers on the topic of plant oil fuel. Exhibit 8, document 0604. 

Mr. Howell uses Mr. McCormick’s intelligence feed in the NBB’s campaigns to get EMA and 

EPA to take action to inhibit the use of plant oil fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 

19-20]

All of the foregoing communications occur, and the EMA and NREL adopted their statements 

condemning the use of raw vegetable oil as fuel based on, old, faulty evidence. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 20]

POP DieselTM agrees that the improper management of plant oil fuel may cause longer term 

problems in a diesel engine. This is no different from the fact that petroleum diesel fuel 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

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functioned less than optimally in compression ignition engines for years, until its properties and 

their behavior in the engine came to be better understood. ASTM D-975, Standard Specification 

for [Petroleum] Diesel Fuel Oils, was not adopted until 1948, four decades after the diesel engine 

came into wide usage on petroleum diesel fuel. Pickard decl., para. 2.9 (Exhibit 9). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 20]

Plant oil fuel is in its infancy, but POP DieselTM has shown that the technology to run it at 100 

percent concentration is feasible and practical. Moreover, given life cycle GHG emissions that 

are better than the alternatives, plant oil fuel is particularly effective at reducing or slowing 

global warming. The Proposed Regulations ought to embrace this solution, rather than ignore it. 

The best way to embrace it would be for EPA to impose strict corporate fleet averages for GHG 

emissions that are divorced from fuel efficiency considerations and that take into account the full 

embodied energy and life cycle emissions inherent in the various engine technologies and fuels. 

This approach would allow EPA to fulfill its duty to ramp down GHG emissions with a certainty 

that is lost in the Agencies’ false trust in fuel economy and myopic focus on tailpipe emissions, 

as embodied in the Proposed GHG Standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 20-21]

1The fuel sample of jatropha plant oil used in this study had relatively high levels of 

phosphorous and sulfur. Normally, virgin plant oils have negligible quantities of these elements 

in them. The high levels got into the fuel sample through the use of fertilizer, herbicide or 

pesticide. The grower will alter its cultivation method to eliminate the presence of these elements 

in his extracted oil.

Organization: St. Clair-Detroit River Sturgeon for Tomorrow

We understand that smaller and lighter vehicles will be part of the equation to accomplish future 

fuel economy standards, however many of us drive larger, heavier vehicles used to tow boats, 

snowmobiles and travel trailers. We support the further development of alternative fuel sources

such as bio-diesel which as renewable energy sources will help to reduce dependence on oil, will 

reduce emissions and will still allow us to drive vehicle suitable for towing and hauling. We are 

glad to see the plan is designed to ensure that we will still have a full range of vehicle choices. 

The development of alternative fuels will also help to control costs due to increasing global 

demand for diminishing fossil fuel resources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-4151, p. 1]

Response:

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Association of Global Automakers, and Ford 

recommended that incentive multipliers be available for manufacturers of liquefied petroleum 

gas (LPG) vehicles. EPA is not adopting incentive multipliers for LPG vehicles because the 

Agency does not believe that LPG vehicles promote the commercialization of technologies that 

have, or technologies whose commercialization can be critical facilitators of next-generation 

technologies that have, the potential to transform the light-duty vehicle sector by achieving zero 

or near-zero GHG emissions and oil consumption.
EPA Response to Comments

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POP Diesel’s comments regarding the merits of its product, and the (asserted) obstacles it 

has faced from competitive interests and others, is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 

However, the comment that EPA should base compliance on fleet wide averaging is misplaced 

since this is precisely how compliance is measured for all manufacturers.

6.6 Comments Regarding Issues Relevant to Multiple Fuels

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM)

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Bosch

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Nissan North America, Inc.

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The Alliance also supports EPA’s proposal to continue use of the 0.15 divisor for gaseous and 

liquid alternative fuels and the petroleum equivalency factor for electricity. As noted by the 

Agencies, this approach will maintain consistency between dedicated and dual fuel vehicle 

calculations and will continue to encourage manufacturers to build vehicles capable of operating 

on fuels other than petroleum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

EPA and NHTSA Should Not Contravene the Will of Congress by Allowing an Unlimited Fleet 

Fuel Economy Credit for MY 2020 and Later Dual-Fueled Vehicles

EPA and NHTSA also are requesting comment on whether to continue to use the 0.15 divisor for 

CNG and ethanol, and the petroleum equivalency factor for electricity, both of which the statute 

requires to be used through MY 2019, for model years 2020 and later dual-fueled vehicles. The 

use of these factors in conjunction with the utility factor approach discussed above artificially 

and substantially inflates the fuel economy of dual-fueled vehicles and thus provides an incentive 

to the automakers to produce these for CAFE compliance purposes regardless of other 

consequences. In essence, the agencies are proposing that automakers may “...increase their 

calculated fleet fuel economy for dual-fueled vehicles by an unlimited amount using these 

flexibilities.”16 However, Section 32906 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 

(EISA 2007) phased-out the maximum fuel economy credit attributable to dual-fuel vehicles 

(except electric vehicles) that could be taken by manufacturers of those vehicles such that the 

credit was reduced from 1.2 mpg in model year 2014 (and previous model years) to 0.2 mpg in 

model year 2019 to “0 miles per gallon for model years after 2019” (Section 32906(a)(7)). 

Clearly, the EPA and NHTSA proposed treatment of model year 2020 and later dual-fueled 

natural gas vehicles is overly generous and inconsistent with the intent and will of Congress. It 

should be set aside. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]
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It is also useful to note that for the many years that this CAFE credit incentive has been in place, 

dual-fueled vehicles (particularly those using natural gas) have continued to remain a negligible 

fraction of the fleet. In other words, the presence of the incentive has not contributed to the 

influx of dual-fueled CNG vehicles. (In fact, there are no OEM dual-fuel CNG vehicles offered 

today; only a few after-market conversion models.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Bosch

EPA has proposed two options for the calculation for CAFE for alternative fuel vehicles in 

MY2020 and beyond (after expiration of the calculation specified in 49 U.S.C. 32905). The

treatment of E85 FFV, CNG and electricity is called out specifically in the NPRM, however 

there are a number of other alternative fuels, such as renewable diesel, in the market today and 

under development. Bosch recommends, regardless of which calculation option the EPA should 

decide on, clarification that all types of alternative fuels, not only E85, CNG and electricity, are 

included and treated in an equivalent manner in the calculation. This recommendation applies to 

treatment of dedicated alternative fuel vehicles as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9462-A1, p. 

4]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

All alternative fuels, such as biodiesel, must be considered equally and not limited to just E85, 

CNG and electricity. Dedicated alternative fuel vehicles should be treated equally, regardless of 

fuel type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

Regardless of which option EPA decides to adopt for MY2020 and beyond, MEMA recommends 

that the agency clarify that all types of alternative fuels, such as biodiesel, are considered and 

treated equivalently in this CAFE calculation, and not only limit it to E85, CNG and electricity. 

In addition, MEMA believes that the treatment of dedicated alternative fuel vehicles should also 

be equivalent regardless of the alternative fuel type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.12]

All alternative fuels should be considered equally and not limited to just E85, CNG and 

electricity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.13]

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

Nissan Supports Continued Use of the Petroleum Equivalency Factor for CAFE Calculations in 

MYs 2020-2025 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1 p.24]

EPA proposes to continue to use the petroleum equivalency factor for MYs 2020 and later. 

Proposed Rule at 75,019. Nissan supports EPA's proposal to continue to use the petroleum 

equivalency factor for electricity in MYs 2020-2025, which is consistent with the purpose of the 

CAFE program-to reduce our country's dependence on foreign oil. See 65 Fed. Reg. 36,986, 

36,986 (June 12, 2000) (establishing the petroleum equivalency factor). Not only is such an 

approach consistent with the purpose of the CAFE Program, continued use of the petroleum 
EPA Response to Comments

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equivalency factor will incentivize manufacturers to invest in EVs and PHEVs, thereby 

increasing the rate of adoption of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1 p.24]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

b. de-couple fuel efficiency policy from GHG emissions policy, since they are distinct and the 

former is not a surrogate for the latter; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 2]

c. re-do the weight the Agencies give to various alternative technologies and fuels according to a 

wells-to-wheels approach that corresponds more accurately with their relative contribution to and 

mitigation of atmospheric greenhouse gas accumulation; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, 

pp. 2-3]

Organization: Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Use of Miles Per Gallon as Appropriate Metric: To calculate fuel economy across vehicles that 

rely on an increasingly diverse portfolio of fuels, NHTSA relies on an alternative fuel vehicle’s 

“miles per gallon equivalent” (MPGe) as a representation of its fuel economy. Doing so, 

however, measures the performance of alternative fuel vehicles in a manner that is not 

particularly meaningful (miles per 115,000 BTU of energy) and is inconsistent with the original 

intent of the CAFE program. But virtually no one understands the meaning of miles per BTU of 

energy, and even if they did it is not particularly meaningful. Most importantly, however, it fails 

to account for the very real value that most alternative fuels provide to the nation by reducing our 

use of oil, helping to delink our economy from the global market, and reducing the economic and 

national security consequence of that dependence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 16]

The MPG metric was really developed to serve as a surrogate for operating costs. That made 

sense when we relied on a single fuel, whose price was volatile. It allowed owners to compare 

the relative efficiency of vehicles so that we could quickly compare their relative operating costs. 

The use of MPG also allowed us to report a common measure of efficiency that isolated the 

effects of fuel price volatility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 16]

Calculating fuel economy on the basis of MPGe is perhaps simple but flawed. In essence, the 

calculation upon which NHTSA relies is intended to promote efficiency for efficiency’s sake. 

SAFE believes, however, that NHTSA should consider whether it makes more sense for its 

calculation to seek to optimize the primary goal of fuel economy regulations, which is to reduce 

oil consumption, which is overconsumed because it is underpriced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9518-A1, p. 16]

A revised method of calculating fuel economy is warranted because using oil to fuel vehicles is 

different than the consumption of other fuels; the unique manner in which oil dependence 

undermines our nation’s energy, economic and national security is different than other fuels. 

Nearly every fuel used in the United States other than those derived from crude oil, including the 

fuels used to generate electricity, is produced in North America. Their production supports 

American jobs and does increase the trade deficit, and their prices are less volatile than the price 

of oil. It was, in fact, concern about our consumption of oil that led to the first fuel economy 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-161

standards, which were required by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. Moreover, 

even as the United States established national policies to reduce our consumption of oil, we also 

established national policies, and spent tens of billions of dollars to promote the production and 

use of other fuels because of their merits relative to oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, 

pp. 16-17]

While several commenters at the public hearings concerning this regulation stated their desire for 

“technology neutral” regulations, SAFE believes that different treatment is justified for 

alternative fuels because their use does not have the same economic or security consequences as 

using oil. In fact, given the importance, and statutory goal, of reducing petroleum consumption, 

SAFE believes that vehicles that do not consume oil should be treated as such in the 

development of these regulatory programs. Such calculations are not possible when fuel 

economy is calculated on the basis of miles per gallon which is calculated as miles traveled 

divided by gallons of fuel consumed, because they do not consume any gallons of fuel and the 

denominator in the MPG calculation cannot be zero. They are, however, possible when fuel 

consumption is calculated on the basis of gallons per mile (or per 100 miles) which is calculated 

as gallons consumed divided by miles travelled, because the numerator in the equation can be 

zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 17]

As demonstrated in Table 2,39 calculating the fleet average fuel consumption while treating 

alternative fuel vehicles as requiring no oil is a simple calculation that accurately reflects their 

contribution to our national goal of reducing oil consumption. Column 2 represents a vehicle’s 

fuel economy measure in miles per gallon, which is calculated by dividing miles travelled per 

gallons of gasoline consumed. Column 3 represents the gallons of fuel consumed by the vehicle 

per 100 miles travelled, which is calculated by dividing 100 by a vehicle’s MPGe. Column 4 

reflects the numbers in column 3 taking into account that that vehicles 8 and 9 were natural gas 

vehicle and electric vehicles that consumed no oil and vehicle 10 was a PHEV that consumed 

less oil than reflected in its MPGe rating. [Table 2 can be found on p. 18 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 17]

SAFE believes that calculating fuel economy as demonstrated in this table is more consistent 

with the original intent of the statute, in that properly emphasizes the goal of reducing petroleum 

consumption, and acknowledges that certain vehicles consume less or no petroleum products. 

SAFE recognizes that the current calculation, which is based in a vehicle’s MPGe, may be 

required by statute at this point in time. SAFE nevertheless encourages NHTSA to evaluate 

calculating fuel economy based on a gallons-per-mile metric, bring this issue to Congress’ 

attention at some point in the near future, and recommend that Congress amend the statute as 

appropriate. This is the first period of time over which NHTSA is likely to be regulating large the 

fuel economy of substantial numbers of electric drive vehicles. It is important to get the 

regulatory approach right at the earliest possible time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 

18]
EPA Response to Comments

6-162

39 The calculation of fuel consumption for a PHEV assumed calculation over a 100 mile trip 

without charging, a combined MPGe of 73, an MPGe in charge depleting mode of 93 MPGe, an 

MPG of 37 in charge sustaining mode, and a utility factor of 0.65.

Response:

Rejecting use of the 0.15 factor for GHG emissions compliance for all fuels

Many comments recommended that EPA use the 0.15 divisor, which has long been used 

for CAFE credits for alternative fuel vehicles, as an incentive for GHG emissions compliance for 

a variety of alternative fuels. Boyden Gray and Associates went so far as to argue that EPA is 

legally compelled to do so because the divisor is included in the 2007 EISA legislation, issued 

after the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. The argument goes that EISA and 

the CAA are in conflict on this point, and since EISA is the later-enacted statute, it must take 

precedence over both the CAA and the Supreme Court’s opinion. EPA does not accept this 

argument. There is no suggestion in either the EISA text establishing the divisor (or elsewhere 

in EISA), or in the legislative history, of any Congressional intent to de facto amend the 

emission-standard setting provisions of the Clean Air Act, or to restrict the scope of the Supreme 

Court’s holding that greenhouse gases are pollutants under the Clean Air Act (and therefore 

potentially subject to all Clean Air Act provisions for “pollutants”). Nor are the statutes in such 

dramatic conflict as the commenter would have it. The statutory divisor disappears for dual fuel 

CNG (and other alternative fuel) vehicles after MY 2019, and the statutory divisor is of little 

practical benefit to any CNG vehicles before then. This is because of a different limitation in 

EISA on the upper limit on credit use under CAFE, and because all available credits are being 

utilized by FFVs. See, e.g., comments of Encana and NGV America (alluding to this practical 

limitation). Moreover, the EPCA/EISA statutory criteria for eligibility for dual fuel CNG 

incentives are more restrictive than under the GHG rule. Under EPCA, dual-fuel CNG vehicles 

are required to have a CNG-only range of at least 200 miles to qualify for the CAFE credit - a 

requirement equivalent to a 95.4% natural gas usage rate according to the utility factor 

methodology. As commenter VNG pointed out, this effectively results in vehicles expected to 

fuel on natural gas a large majority of the time being treated as dedicated gasoline vehicles. 

Thus, had EPA adhered to strict harmonization with EPCA/EISA, the GHG rule would be more 

restrictive with respect to the use of utility factors for dual fuel CNG vehicles. 

EPA thus does not accept that it is legally compelled to offer the 0.15 divisor as an 

incentive under the GHG rules. EPA also rejects this approach for policy reasons. Congress 

provided the 0.15 divisor for CAFE compliance because a vehicle that operates on a nonpetroleum fuel consumes zero or near-zero petroleum, and petroleum conservation is a primary 

objective of the CAFE program. But the tailpipe GHG emissions from most alternative fuel 

vehicles are not zero or near-zero, and in any case EPA believes that GHG emissions compliance 

should simply be based on GHG emissions performance. The primary focus of the GHG 

standards must be GHG emissions performance. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528 

(“But that DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental 

responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare’ [citing 

CAA section 202 (a)], a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote 

energy efficiency.”) Adopting the 0.15 factor for GHG emissions compliance for vehicles with 

substantial tailpipe GHG emissions could yield a significant reduction of GHG programmatic 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-163

benefits that is not warranted by these vehicles. We also disagree with those commenters who 

argued that EPA must adopt the 0.15 factor in order to not “negate the Congressional mandate” 

for CAFE credits. The Congressional mandate still applies for CAFE purposes. EPA’s GHG 

program and NHTSA’s CAFE program are harmonized in numerous ways, but there are a 

number of instances where the programs diverge with respect to incentives and flexibilities. See 

Preamble Section I.B.4. Here, EPA believes that the paramount emission reduction goals of the 

CAA warrant the difference in approach.

Adopting use of the 0.15 factor for CAFE compliance beginning in MY 2020

With one exception, commenters supported the proposal to continue to use the 0.15 

divisor for CAFE compliance beginning in MY 2020. Nissan summarized the most common 

argument for retaining the 0.15 divisor for CAFE compliance, stating that the 0.15 divisor “is 

consistent with the purpose of the CAFE program—to reduce our country’s dependence on 

foreign oil.” The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers argued that “this approach will maintain 

consistency between dedicated and dual fuel vehicle calculations and will continue to encourage 

manufacturers to build vehicles capable of operating on fuels other than petroleum.” There was 

also support for retaining the 0.15 divisor for the CAFE program from other automakers, natural 

gas advocacy groups, and ethanol/renewable fuel groups. The one comment against retaining the 

0.15 divisor was the American Petroleum Institute. It argued: “Section 32906 of the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007 phased-out the maximum fuel economy credit 

attributable to dual fuel vehicles (except electric vehicles) that could be taken by manufacturers 

of those vehicles such that the credit was reduced from 1.2 mpg in model year 2014 (and 

previous model years) to 0.2 mpg in model year 2019 to ‘0 miles per gallon for model years after 

2019.’ Clearly, the EPA and NHTSA proposed treatment of model year 2020 and later dual 

fueled natural gas vehicles is overly generous and inconsistent with the intent and will of 

Congress. It should be set aside.”

EPA, pursuant to its EPCA authority, is finalizing the CAFE compliance treatment for 

MY 2020 and later, as proposed, with one change being the addition of eligibility requirements 

for dual fuel CNG vehicles to be able to use the utility factor approach, as discussed in RTC 

Section 6.2. EPA is adopting the same approaches for weighting the fuel economy compliance 

values for dual fuel vehicles for CAFE compliance as we have done for GHG emissions 

compliance: using utility factors for PHEVs and dual fuel CNG vehicles (the latter must meet 

the eligibility requirements), and providing manufacturers the option of using projected national 

average E85 usage data, manufacturer-specific E85 usage data, or a 100% gasoline default value 

for ethanol FFVs. EPA is adopting the 0.15 divisor, and petroleum equivalency factor for 

PHEVs, for dual fuel vehicle CAFE compliance in MY 2020 and later, for two reasons. One, 

this approach is directionally consistent with the overall petroleum reduction goals of 

EPCA/EISA and the CAFE program, because it reflects the much lower or zero petroleum 

content of alternative fuels and continues to encourage manufacturers to build vehicles capable 

of operating on fuels other than petroleum. Two, the 0.15 divisor and petroleum equivalency 

factor (PEF) are used under EPCA to calculate CAFE compliance values for dedicated 

alternative fuel vehicles, and retaining this approach for dual fuel vehicles maintains consistency, 

for MY 2020 and later, between the approaches for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles and for the 

alternative fuel portion of dual fuel vehicle operation.
EPA Response to Comments

6-164

In response to the comment from the American Petroleum Institute, EPA recognizes that 

use of the 0.15 divisor, and petroleum equivalency factor for PHEVs, will continue to provide a 

large increase in CAFE compliance values for the vehicles previously covered by the special 

calculation procedures in 49 U.S.C. 32905, and that Congress chose both to end the specific 

calculation procedures in that section and over time to reduce the benefit for CAFE purposes of 

the increase in fuel economy mandated by those special calculation procedures. However, the 

MY 2020 and later methodology differs significantly in important ways from the special 

calculation provisions mandated by EPCA. Most importantly, the MY 2020 and later 

methodology reflects actual usage rates of the alternative fuel and does not use the artificial 

50/50 weighting previously mandated by 49 U.S.C. 32905. In practice this means the primary 

vehicles to benefit from the MY 2020 and later methodology will be PHEVs and dual-fuel CNG 

vehicles, and not ethanol FFVs, while the primary source of benefit to manufacturers under the 

statutory provisions came from ethanol FFVs. Changing the weighting to better reflect real 

world usage is a major change from that mandated by 49 U.S.C. 32905, and it orients the 

calculation procedure more to the real world impact on petroleum usage, consistent with the 

statute’s overarching purpose of petroleum conservation. In addition, as noted above, Congress 

maintained the 0.15 divisor in the calculation procedures for dedicated alternative fuel vehicles 

that result in increased fuel economy values. Finalizing the 0.15 divisor for dual fuel vehicles is 

consistent with this, as it uses the same approach for calculating fuel economy on the alternative 

fuel when there is real world usage of the alternative fuel. Since the MY 2020 and later 

methodology is quite different in effect from the specified provisions in 49 U.S.C. 32905, and is 

consistent with the calculation procedures for dedicated vehicles that use the same alternative 

fuel, EPA believes this methodology is an appropriate exercise of discretion under the general 

authority provided in 49 U.S.C. 32904. 

Equivalent treatment of all alternative fuels under CAFE beginning in MY 2020

Bosch and the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association commented that all 

types of alternative fuels, including biodiesel, should be treated “equivalently” under the CAFE 

program. EPA agrees with these comments, and all dedicated alternative fuel vehicles will use 

the 0.15 divisor in CAFE calculations for MY 2020 and later. In addition, vehicles capable of 

operating on diesel containing at least 85% biodiesel (B85), will also use the 0.15 divisor in 

CAFE calculations for MY2020 and later. While B85 may not be considered an alternative fuel 

under EPCA at this time, 20% biodiesel (B20) is recognized by Congress for purposes of section 

32905, and B85 exhibits the same or better petroleum replacement benefits as the 85% alcohol 

blend alternative fuels currently used in FFVs. Several commenters recommended that utility 

factors be used for CAFE calculations prior to 2020. EPA is rejecting this recommendation, as 

EPCA requires the Agency to assume 50% use of the conventional fuel and 50% use of the 

alternative fuel for CAFE calculations through MY 2019. Finally, VNG.Co suggested that the

agencies consider possible ways to provide CAFE credits, in the pre-2020 timeframe, for duel 

fuel CNG vehicles that have a CNG range of less than 200 miles. EPA is rejecting this 

recommendation as well, as the 200-mile minimum range requirement is required under 49 

U.S.C. 32901(c).

Finally, Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems argued that EPA should re-evaluate the 

weight given to various alternative technologies and fuels according to a life-cycle approach, and 
Treatment of Plug-in Hybrids, Alternative-Fueled, and Diesel-Fueled Vehicles

6-165

to decouple fuel efficiency policy from GHG emissions policy. In setting these emissions 

standards, EPA reasonably chose to consider the impact on GHG emissions of the fuels used by 

the different types of vehicles by measuring the tailpipe emissions of vehicles, including 

alternative fuel vehicles (which normally emit less GHG emissions than gasoline or dieselpowered vehicles). POP Diesel’s statement that the rules arbitrarily assign zero emissions and 

zero fuel consumption to electric vehicles is also misplaced. Electric vehicles have zero GHG 

emissions measured at the tailpipe. POP Diesel states further that the standards are arbitrary in 

the GHG-reducing weight given to some alternative technologies and fuels. POP Diesel’s 

complaint that the rule provides incentives for use of certain advanced technologies such as 

hybrid electrification and hydrogen fuel cells questions legitimate policy choices unrelated to the 

issue of fuel use. See also responses in RTC Section 4 above.

In the separate, congressionally mandated, Renewable Fuel Standard program, there are 

strong incentives for use of renewable diesel fuels (the commenter’s specific interest). This 

program is specifically designed to mandate increasing volumes of renewable fuel use in 

transportation fuels. The definition of renewable fuel includes thresholds for reductions in 

lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, compared to petroleum fuel. For example, specified 

volumes of biomass-based diesel fuel must be used in the diesel transportation sector, and 

biomass-based diesel is defined in part as a diesel fuel that achieves a 50% reduction in life-cycle 

greenhouse emissions compared to baseline petroleum diesel fuel. 

Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-1

7. Off-Cycle Technology Credits

7.1. General Comments

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Borg Warner, Inc.

Center for Biological Diversity

Chrysler Group LLC

Delphi Corporation

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Mazda North American Operations

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The Alliance Supports the Credits for Off-Cycle GHG Emission Reductions And Fuel Economy 

Improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.10]

The overall GHG emission reductions proposed in the NPRM are a formidable challenge that 

requires new, creative approaches to emission reduction and energy efficiency. Continuing the 

off-cycle credit program provides an incentive to manufacturers to introduce new technologies 

that produce concrete environmental and fuel consumption benefits, provides flexibility toward 

meeting the increasingly stringent standards and encourages investment in technologies that will 

pay off over the longer term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.10]
EPA Response to Comments

7-2

The program flexibilities in the NPRM will help manufacturers introduce new technologies that 

produce concrete environmental and fuel consumption benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.10]

The proposed rules properly include various provisions offering manufacturers some flexibility 

in developing their plans to comply with the CAFE and GHG standards. Some of these 

provisions enable manufacturers to earn credits that can be used to satisfy part of their 

compliance obligations. While some may think the term 'credits,' as used here, connotes reduced 

stringency or even 'loopholes,' that is not the case. The objective of the CAFE and GHG 

standards is to reduce actual fuel consumption and actual GHG emissions from vehicles driven 

on American roads. In some cases, however, the laboratory testing used by the agencies to 

measure fuel economy and GHG emissions may not fully reflect the improvements built into a 

vehicle by the manufacturer, due to limitations of laboratory-based tests. And improvements to 

reduce MAC system refrigerant loss can reduce GHG emissions from vehicles while having little 

or no impact on fuel economy. It is important for the rules to properly account for such factors. 

Otherwise, manufacturers would be encouraged to focus solely on the test procedures, and 

opportunities for real-world GHG reduction and fuel economy improvement would be lost. The 

Alliance believes that the various credit provisions proposed by EPA and NHTSA are essential 

elements of the rulemaking package. Below we offer our specific comments on the details of 

these provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.10] [[This comment can also be found 

in Outline Heading 3.]]

Substantial GHG improvements should be achievable in off-cycle conditions using new 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.11]

While there are substantial emission reductions that can be achieved through off-cycle 

technologies, it will be essential that the off-cycle program function effectively if the overall 

emission reduction goals are to be achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 121.]

The addition of a thoughtful and reasonable approach to off-cycle credits is exciting to us and we 

believe will result in the introduction of many new and innovative technologies.

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

The off-cycle credits provide incentives for manufacturers to pursue technologies that produce 

benefits in actual on-road driving but are not measured using the Federal Test Procedure (FTP). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 1]

Global Automakers supports the availability of credits for technologies that provide on-road 

efficiency and emissions benefits but whose benefits are not fully measured using the current 

city-highway test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 5]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-3

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 66.]

Off-cycle credits provide incentives for manufacturers to pursue technologies that produce 

benefits in actual on-road driving but are not measured using the FTP.

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

BMW supports both approaches - predefined list and individual OEM applications; furthermore, 

we welcome the proposed extension of the scope for off-cycle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 1]

Organization: Borg Warner, Inc.

BorgWarner supports the inclusion of “off-cycle credits” that attempt to give manufacturers the 

proper motivation for implementing technologies that achieve real world results that are not seen 

on the official rating test cycles. While we support this type of thinking, a more robust solution 

would be to employ updated testing methods that more accurately measure real world results 

seen by the consumer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

3. Off-cycle credits in general

The concept of allowing credit for the installation of new and energy efficient technology that is 

early in the compliance cycle, or that cannot be measured by existing testing mechanisms, is 

sound, as long as the duration of the credit period is brief and provides no disincentive to the 

implementation of other available features. However, all such credits must be carefully vetted to 

ensure that there is no double counting. Any technologies already required to be implemented 

cannot also generate credits, and there must be verified data showing that actual efficiency gains 

equal to the credits are being achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 22]

We disagree with the Agencies’ suggestion that even more off-cycle credits should be allowed, 

without any rulemaking, if some unspecified data supports them. That the Agencies perceive a 

need for this request simply points out the fact that technological innovation will race far ahead 

of the weak standards the Agencies are here proposing, and that the Agencies are aware of this 

fact. Instead, the Agencies must design much stronger standards, rather than requesting the right 

to “catch up” with clearly foreseeable improvements without the requisite notice and comment 

rulemaking process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 22]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 54.]
EPA Response to Comments

7-4

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 61.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 26.]

Secondly, Chrysler supports the additional detail proposed for catching off-cycle fuel economy 

and greenhouse gas improvements. The agency's built on this facet of the 2012 through '16 

model year regulation that recognizes improvements in fuel economy and greenhouse gases that 

are not captured in laboratory tests but do have real-world reductions.

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 108.]

We support the existing credit options

In addition, existing credit options and additional flexibility for off-cycle credits provide an 

incentive for the industry to look across the entire automobile for solutions. [This comment can 

also be found in section 7 of this comment summary.]

We applaud the agencies' efforts to extend additional flexibility for off-cycle credits.

In addition, existing credit options and additional flexibility for off-cycle credits provide an 

incentive for the industry to look across the entire automobile for solutions. [This comment can 

also be found in section 10.1 of this comment summary.]

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

Several significant changes are being proposed to the off-cycle credits program, including some 

modifications to the existing MYs 2012-2016 program. These changes include establishment of a 

list of pre-approved off-cycle technologies with pre-defined CO2 credits, commencing in 

MY2017; removing the requirement that off-cycle technologies must be 'new, innovative, and 

not widespread', and that the benefits of these technologies must not be 'significantly measurable 

over the 2-cycle test'; clarifying several requirements of the current two-tiered process for 

demonstrating the CO2 reductions of off-cycle technologies and instituting this testing 

methodology for MYs 2012-2016 credits as well; establishing a four-step process for reviewing 

and providing a decisions on credits; and starting with MY2017, allowing manufacturers to 

generate 'fuel consumption improvement values' equivalent to CO2 off-cycle credits for use in 

the CAFE program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, pp. 12-13]

The concept of providing credits as a way to further incentivize technology development in key 

areas is a good one. EcoMotors generally supports the changes made to the off-cycle credit 

program to provide manufacturers with more certainty with regard to credit application and 

testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 13]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-5

• Specific Recommendation: EcoMotors generally supports continuation of the off-cycle 

credit program with the changes proposed to the current program, as well as the 

enhancements proposed for the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 13]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

• Encourage application of the pre-approved list for earlier model years [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Ford strongly supports many of the updates that the agencies have proposed to the off-cycle 

technology program, as detailed in the comments provided by the Alliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 15]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the proposal for an updated off-cycle technology framework. Significant detailed 

technical information on off-cycle technologies and the off-cycle framework is contained in the 

Alliance comments. GM recommends that the off-cycle program be fully examined in the midterm review, and updated as appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

Hyundai supports the proposed improvements in accounting for technologies whose benefits are 

not realized on the city and highway cycles. Hyundai believes off-cycle technology is an area 

that is ripe for innovation and can provide important gains in real world fuel economy. However, 

we do have several suggestions for improvements to the off-cycle credit processes. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, pp.4-5]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 172.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 22.]

We support the credit and banking provisions and continued application of off-cycle credits for 

technology whose benefits cannot be accounted for on the city and highway test cycles.

Hyundai believes that off-cycle technology is an area that is ripe for innovation, and can provide 

important gains in real world fuel economy and greenhouse gas reductions.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
EPA Response to Comments

7-6

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 197.]

ICCT supports the concept of off-cycle credits. However, we will provide detailed written 

suggestions on how to better implement them so that they are valid and avoid double counting.

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Rewarding various innovative off-cycle technologies encourages rapid adoption and increases 

deployment into the fleet. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Mazda North American Operations

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 63-64.]

Mazda fully supports the proposed extension of the availability of off-cycle credits for model 

years 2017 to 2025. We agree that continuing the off-cycle credit program provides an incentive 

to manufacturers to introduce new technologies that produce concrete environmental and fuel 

consumption benefits, provides flexibility toward meeting the increasingly stringent standards, 

and encourages investment into technologies that will have a payoff over the longer term.

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG supports the effort to include off-cycle credits that reduce CO2 in ways not measured by 

the fuel economy test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-2]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Taken as a whole, MEMA supports the proposal to provide off-cycle credits for any technologies 

that demonstrate significant, incremental off-cycle CO2 reductions and the corresponding fuel 

consumption improvement values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.7]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

In principle, we also support incentives for plug-in hybrid electric and electric vehicle 

technology and for real off-cycle CO2 reductions, and we look forward to continuing to work 

with automakers, the agencies and consumers to maximize the effectiveness of these credits and 

other measures which enable rapid adoption of new technology, and to optimize short and long 

term emissions impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4] [[This comment can also be 

found in Outline Headings 4. and 5.]]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-7

5. Off-cycle credits: Off-Cycle Technology Credits Should Only Be Awarded for Real and 

Verifiable GHG Reductions

While NRDC appreciates EPA’s efforts to evaluate GHG reduction technologies that are not 

identified under current compliance tests and to encourage continued innovation in this area, 

EPA should only provide credits if such technologies can be verified as providing real and 

enforceable GHG reductions. As GHG reductions are indentified and evaluated, EPA should 

consider the widespread adoption of these technologies when setting the stringency of future 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Porsche strongly supports provisions for off-cycle credits, which encourage creative approaches 

to emission reduction and energy efficiency, provide compliance flexibility amid increasingly 

stringent standards, and encourage investment in technologies for long term benefit. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Off-cycle credits also recognize real-world emission reductions that are not accounted for in the 

current official test procedures to measure vehicle emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-

A2, p.3]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen contributed to and supports the comments submitted by the Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers (Alliance) regarding off-cycle technology credits. Volkswagen continues to make 

significant investments in deploying an array of innovative, fuel saving off-cycle technologies 

for our consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 32]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Off-cycle credits are a good opportunity for manufacturers to get credits for technology that does 

not appear on the normal cycle but favors the overall fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9551-A2, p. 6]

Response:

EPA received widespread support for continuing the off-cycle credits program beyond 

MY 2016. Several manufacturers noted that the program provides additional flexibility and 

encourages the development of technologies that provide real world emissions reductions not 

captured on the 2-cycle test procedure. EPA concurs with these comments and is extending the 

off-cycle credit program to MY 2017 and later. The National Wildlife Federation and Natural 

Resources Defense Council (NRDC) also supported the off-cycle credits program in principle as 

long as credits can be verified as providing real and enforceable GHG reductions. Center for 

Biological Diversity also raised the issue that EPA must ensure that there is no double counting 
EPA Response to Comments

7-8

of credits. As discussed in Section III.C.5.b., EPA believes that the program has been designed 

to ensure credits are real and verifiable and to prevent double counting. Several commenters 

provided comments on the various aspects of the proposed design of the off-cycle credits 

program. These comments are summarized and addressed in this section below. 

NRDC commented that as GHG reductions are indentified and evaluated, EPA should 

consider the widespread adoption of these technologies when setting the stringency of future 

standards. In response, EPA plans to closely monitor the use of the off-cycle credits program 

and expects that it will be one of the factors considered in the mid-term evaluation. In addition, 

EPA notes that the 2017-2025 model year standard stringencies in fact reflect the use of direct 

and indirect air conditioning improvements, as well as the two cycle benefits of stop start and 

active aero dynamic technologies.

ICCT comments in public hearing testimony that they support the concept of off-cycle 

credits and will provide detailed written suggestions on how to better implement them so that 

they are valid and avoid double counting. As discussed in RTC section 7.2 below, ICCT 

provided detailed written comments regarding the proposed off-cycle credit technology list and 

the issue of double counting. 

7.2. Pre-Approved Technology List

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Bayer MaterialScience

Bosch

California Air Resources Board (CARB)

California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA)

California State Sheriffs' Association (CSSA), California Police Chiefs Association 

(CPCA), California Narcotic Officers' Association (CNOA)

Chrysler Group LLC

Crime Victims United of California (CVUC)

CTIA - The Wireless Association

Denso International America, Inc.

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association (EPGAA)

Ford Motor Company

Garmin International Inc.

Guardian Automotive Products, Inc.

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW)
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-9

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

TechAmerica

Toyota Motor North America

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

16) Off-Cycle Credits

ICCT general comment on off-cycle credits and testing

ICCT strongly supports credits for off-cycle reductions in concept. Such credits can reduce the 

cost to manufacturers for compliance in the short run and can create cost-effective pathways for 

greater fuel consumption and GHG emission reductions in the long run. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 36]

However, it is extremely important that the credits properly reflect actual in-use reductions, do 

not duplicate on-cycle benefits, and can be validated. Credits that are artificial and do not 

directly result in comparable in-use reductions can severely undermine the effectiveness and 

credibility of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 36]

The same principle applies to default off-cycle credits. In theory they are a good idea that can 

create incentives for manufacturers to invest in off-cycle technologies, but if not assessed 

properly they create windfall credits that reduce fuel consumption and GHG emissions benefits 

of the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 36]

The ICCT recommends that EPA establish procedures to quantify and validate off-cycle benefits 

before granting a specific default off-cycle credit value. Absent a solid case for default off-cycle 

credit values, traditional case-by-case testing is needed to properly access off-cycle credits. Any 

default credits should be based on: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 36-37]

1. Robust data showing real and quantifiable reductions that are not double counted on the 

regulatory test cycles, and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 37]

2. Effective performance benchmarks and verification that ensure vehicles receiving these credits 

will achieve the potential emission reductions in the real world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 37]

The off-cycle approval procedures adopted by EPA for the 2012-2016 final rule provide accurate 

and appropriate guidelines for approval of off-cycle credits. These procedures should be 

followed both for granting specific approvals to manufacturers for off-cycle credits and for 

establishing default off-cycle credit values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 37]
EPA Response to Comments

7-10

Given the importance of maintaining the benefits of this rulemaking and the ability to make 

additions to the default lists later as additional data is generated, technologies that do not clearly 

meet these requirements should be dropped from the default list during this rulemaking. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 37]

Solar Reflective Paint and Window Glazings

We agree with the criteria used for this category of off-cycle credits. US EPA has determined 

that it will achieve real reductions that are not counted in the regulatory test cycle through 

detailed technical studies including the CARB regulatory development process (these off-cycle 

credits are in lieu of CARB regulation). Specific benchmarks in the draft TSD are based on wellestablished principles of solar gain and OEMs must meet performance criteria to verify the 

emission reductions. Thus, these credits meet the general principle of being verifiable and 

additive off-cycle benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 38]

As noted earlier, the off-cycle credits for solar reflective paint and window glazings must be 

combined with other load reductions and A/C system efficiency in a multiplicative manner in 

cases where an OEM wishes to claim both types of credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 39]

Active or Passive Ventilation

Vehicle active or passive ventilation may have the technical potential to reduce air conditioning 

load, but they do not meet the general criteria discussed above for default credits. The NREL 

report on these technologies was developed based on limited data and states that further 

evaluation is needed.67 The NREL report also notes that floor-level ventilation could allow dust, 

animals, and/or exhaust to enter the vehicles.68 Thus drivers (or dealers) may be motivated to 

close them off. Similarly, the driver's response to ventilated seats is unclear at this time. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 39]

These ventilation technologies could also compete with glazings and paints, which have been 

more thoroughly evaluated, for solar load reduction credits. Default credits for active or passive 

ventilation should be deferred. They can be reconsidered later if there is further study to verify 

real-world performance and if a performance benchmark for verification is developed. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 39]

Should credits be granted, the method of combining AC system efficiency and any such credits 

in cases where an OEM wishes to claim both types of credits must be used, as noted above. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 39]

General Credit Calculation for Reducing or Offsetting Vehicle Load

The draft TSD bases the 'off-cycle' benefits of reducing engine load by 100 W on the simulated 

values provided in table 5-18 of the draft TSD. The benefits calculated on FTP/HWY cycle are 

appropriate. However, the calculations of the 5-cycle benefits of a 100 w load reduction were 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-11

inappropriately applied, as they used a g/mile offset instead of a percentage offset. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 42]

Table 10 compares the benefits of a 100 w load reduction on the FTP/HWY to the benefits on the 

5-cycle. For each vehicle, the benefits on the 5-cycle are less then than the 2-cycle testing 

benefits in terms of percentage CO2 reduction. While the g/mi reductions for 5-cycle testing is 

greater in terms of g/mi that on the 2-cycle testing, this is only because the baseline CO2 is much 

higher on the 5-cycle. The benefits of reducing or offsetting vehicle load on the 5-cycle are 

actually proportionally less than they are on the FTP/HWY. It is not appropriate to apply 5-cycle 

gCO2/mi reductions to FTP/HWY baseline gCO2/mi values. This is mixing apples and 

oranges. [Table 10 can be found on p. 43 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 42-43]

The last row in the table illustrates that using the 5-cycle g/mi instead of the percent benefit 

produces a percentage benefit that is larger than the benefit on either the FTP/HWY or the U506. 

This is artificial and unwarranted. The FTP/HWY percentage benefits must be used for any 

electrical load reduction that does not occur on the test cycles (for instance headlights) and no 

additional credits should be given for any electrical load reduction that occurs on the test cycle 

(for instance thermoelectric generation). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 43]

LED Lighting

We agree that this technology has the potential to reduce emissions that are not captured on 

FTP/highway testing cycles. However, as discussed above, the off-cycle credits must be based 

upon the FTP/HWY percent and g/mile reductions and not on the 5-cycle g/mile reductions. As a 

result the credit value should be 0.8 grams per mile rather than 1.1 g/mile, or 0.9 g/mile with 

headlights, based on actual load reduction scaled to the potential benefits that US EPA modeled 

for FTP/highway testing cycle as shown in Table 11 and Table 12. [Tables 11 and 12 can be 

found on p. 44 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 43]

Thermoelectric and Solar Electrical Generation

Thermoelectric and solar electrical generation could reduce vehicle consumption of energy 

generated by the engine by recharging the battery pack in hybrids or electric vehicles. However, 

the premise that engine load reduction is undercounted on the FTP/HWY is incorrect, as noted 

above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 44]

In addition, the benefits of these technologies would be difficult to quantify and verify. An 

NREL study indicates that potential thermoelectric output changes dramatically based on 

temperature conditions.76 A rating based on theoretical peak output may not reflect real world 

conditions with rapidly varying engine loads, competition for exhaust heat, high thermal stress, 

etc. Similarly, the tailpipe benefits of vehicle rooftop solar electrical generation are highly 

variable. A plug-in Prius may see little solar availability during early and late commute hours, 

and displace grid electricity if parked at a vehicle charger during the day while a delivery vehicle 
EPA Response to Comments

7-12

in use all day may get more benefits. Solar availability also varies hourly, seasonally and 

geographically. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

Appropriate in-use data would be necessary to quantify and verify any proposed off-cycle credit. 

Further any credit, including default credit, granted should be based on the FTP/HWY results in 

Table 5-18, as discussed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

Engine Heat Recovery

The off-cycle benefits for engine heat recovery are entirely based upon the erroneous assumption 

that there are larger benefits off-cycle than on cycle for electricity generation or load reduction, 

as discussed above. The benefits of electricity generation are larger on-cycle than on the 5-cycle 

test. Thus, the proposed default off-cycle credits for engine heat recovery are not 

appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

There is some reason to believe that high vehicle loads will cause engine heat recovery systems 

to operate more efficiently. However, there are at least three different ways to recover exhaust 

heat as electricity; Rankine cycle devices, turbo-compounding, and thermo-electric generators. 

Each operates very differently and has a different profile of energy captured. Thus, credits could 

be appropriate, but only if a performance benchmark for verification is developed and valid data 

is generated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

Active Transmission Warm-Up and Active Engine Warm-Up

The proposed off-cycle credits for active transmission and engine warm-up are highly 

questionable. The primary problem is that EPA assumed no benefit from an active 

transmissions/engine warm-up during the FTP. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

However, normal engine operating temperatures are about 180°F. This is about 105°F above the 

FTP test temperature and about 160°F above the 20°F test temperature. Thus, the benefit of 

active engine warm-up on the FTP should be about two-thirds of the benefit at 20°F and the 

proportional benefit will be even closer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

The statement about transmission warm-up is similarly incorrect:

'In cold temperatures, the exhaust heat warms the transmission fluid much more quickly than if 

the vehicle relies on passive heating alone.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 45]

In reality, the exhaust heat will warm the transmission fluid much more quickly than if the 

vehicle relies on passive heating alone at all ambient temperatures. Thus, most of the benefit of 

the warm-up systems will occur on-cycle during 2-cycle testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 46]

Another concern is the statement about the benefits of active warm-up:
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-13

'The Ricardo data indicates that there is a potential to improve GHG emissions by 7% at 20°F if 

the vehicle is fully warm.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 46]

The ICCT has thoroughly read the Ricardo report and all references to the Ricardo report in the 

draft TSD. There is no reference of any kind to any modeling, detailed or otherwise, on active 

transmission warm-up or accelerating powertrain warm-up from 20°F. More importantly, no data 

is presented by the agencies to show what the improvement in GHG emissions would be at 75°F 

if the vehicle is fully warm, as would also occur with active warm-up. Only if the percentage 

improvement in GHG emissions at 20°F is larger than the percentage improvement at 75°F 

would off-cycle credits be warranted - and even in this case the benefit would only be the 

difference in the percentage improvement, averaged over the annual temperature 

distribution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 46]

Performance benchmarks need to be established and valid data generated before granting credits 

for active engine and transmission warmup. As a minimum, the effect of active warmup needs to 

be evaluated at both 20°F and at 75°F on the 2-cycle and the 5-cycle procedures, and evaluations 

at intermediate temperatures would be helpful. Most vehicles are equipped with engine 

temperature sensors, and usually also transmission temperature sensors, which could be helpful 

in evaluating the length of the warm-up time, but efficiency data associated with warm-up time 

and ambient temperatures is also needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 46]

The ICCT agrees that there may be some incremental off-cycle benefits from active warmup 

systems, but most of the benefit will occur on cycle and it is important to properly evaluate the 

incremental benefits before granting default credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 46]

Active Aerodynamics

Active aerodynamic devices may have real benefits beyond what is measured on the regulatory 

test cycles, but such devices would also improve efficiency on the 2-cycle tests. Thus, additional 

verification is needed to determine whether active aerodynamics would show incremental 

improvement. Benchmarks would also be necessary to quantify any benefits for active 

aerodynamics above and beyond the test cycle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 46]

Coast-down testing for regulatory compliance could either understate or overstate the benefits of 

active aerodynamics. Grill shutters could activate at higher speeds than tested, while on the other 

hand the technology may be more active during the test cycle than when encountering real world 

conditions, such as AC load and deactivation when there is a risk of freezing. 77 In addition, 

quantification and verification would be necessary for any technologies that are not 'active' or 

fully 'active' on the test cycle. For instance, the draft TSD notes that the potential benefits range 

from 0-5%. Thus, we strongly encourage US EPA to develop performance criteria before 

granting any off-cycle credits for active aerodynamics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 

46-47]

Start-Stop Technology
EPA Response to Comments

7-14

We agree with US EPA and NHTSA's principle that technologies inherent to the vehicle (mass, 

tire rolling resistance, etc) are not appropriate for off-cycle credits. This principle also applies to 

start stop technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 47]

The draft TSD states that real world vehicle stop times and start-stop emission benefits are 

higher than reflected on the regulatory test cycle. However, this is based upon two erroneous 

assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 47]

First, the idle rate during the FTP is listed at 16% in Table 5-23 of the draft TSD. This is 

incorrect. Prior EPA documentation lists a 19% idle rate79 and a simple accounting of the LA 

finds a 19.1% idle rate (1372 total seconds with 262 seconds at zero speed). A smaller error is 

that the highway cycle was considered to have zero idle, while a simple accounting shows a 

0.5% idle rate (764 total seconds with 4 seconds at zero speed). Weighted 55% for the FTP and 

45% for the highway cycle, this yields an idle rate of 10.7%, not the 9% listed in the table. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 47]

Second, and more important, the draft TSD improperly accounts for the reduction in idle off 

operation at cold temperatures. The TSD assumes that the engine will continue to run 25% of the 

time to provide cabin heating at cold ambient temperatures (vehicles that reduce this percentage 

can apply for a separate credit). If the engine is also needed to power the air conditioner during 

start stop then further adjustment will be needed. However, the draft TSD first calculates the 

idle-off benefits assuming 100% idle-off time, then applies the 25% reduction only to the 

calculated benefit. This is not appropriate. The proper accounting should reflect the fact that the 

total idle-off time has been reduced by 25% and should apply the 25% reduction to the total inuse idle-off time. The total in-use idle-off time is estimated to be 13.5%, so the actual amount of 

idle-off time in-use is 10.1% (13.5% times 75%). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 47]

To the extent that air conditioning use further causes the engine to stay on at idle, in-use idle 

time will be even lower. Accounting for both heating and air conditioning use, the in use idle-off 

time could be as low as 6%. (This is assuming that the idle-off time from MOVES is accurate. 

No documentation of the source of the 13.5% estimate is presented.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 47]

The amount of idle-off time in-use is significantly less that the idle-off time on the FTP-HWY 

cycles. Thus, the FTP-HWY overstates the benefit of idle-off and no off-cycle credit is warranted 

for idle-off systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 47-48]

Electric Heater Circulation Pumps

We agree that electric heater circulation pumps have the potential for increment benefits for 

start-stop and that further evaluation will help better quantify those benefits. As the base engineoff time was not calculated properly, the assessment of the benefit of electric heater circulation 

pumps needs to be redone as well with the proper assumptions about engine-off time. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 48]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-15

In addition, it is reasonable to reflect the entire idle period when calculating the engine-off time 

on the FTP test cycle, since cabin heating is not active and not captured during FTP under any 

circumstances (which is different than start-stop as noted in our comments on start-stop). 

However, a downward adjustment is needed at colder ambient temperatures to account for some 

idle conditions where the engine may be operated, such as for warm-up purposes and for 

defroster use. Also, the amount of water pump electrical consumption needs to be accounted for 

in calculating the emissions benefit of this technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 

48]

Finally, off-cycle credits should be granted only if the total amount of engine-off time is less 

than occurs on the 2-cycle tests and only for the amount of this reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 48]

Performance criteria need to be developed and valid data generated to quantify the potential 

incremental improvement, including consideration of total engine-off time versus that on the 2-

cycle test, before granting off-cycle credits for electric heater water circulation pumps. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 48]

67 J Rugh and R Farrington, Vehicle Ancillary Load Reduction Project Close-out Report, 

January 2008 p51

68 Ibid p15

76 J Rugh and R Farrington, Vehicle Ancillary Load Reduction Project Close-out Report, 

January 2008 p11.

79 see Table 6-9 of Federal Test Procedure Review Project: Preliminary Technical Report May 

1993 EPA 420R- 93-007

Response:

We appreciate the extensive comments from the International Council on Clean 

Transportation (ICCT) and the effort that went into generating them. We agree with ICCT that 

the off-cycle credit program will “reduce the cost to manufacturers for compliance in the short 

run and can create cost-effective pathways for greater fuel consumption and GHG emission 

reductions in the long run.” In addition, we agree that it is “extremely important that the credits 

properly reflect actual in-use reductions, do not duplicate on-cycle benefits, and can be 

validated.” Lastly, we agree with ICCT “that EPA establish procedures to quantify and validate 

off-cycle benefits” and that any off-cycle credits should be based on “robust data showing real 

and quantifiable reductions that are not double counted on the regulatory test cycles” and 

“Effective performance benchmarks and verification that ensure vehicles receiving these credits 

will achieve the potential emission reductions in the real world.” We believe the off-cycle credit 

program provisions we are finalizing today achieve this.
EPA Response to Comments

7-16

Accordingly, we carefully considered the comments from ICCT on the off-cycle credit 

program and technologies on the off-cycle technology menu. This consideration and our 

responses are reflected throughout the Off-Cycle Program discussion in Section 5.2 of TSD 

Chapter 5 for this final rule. In some cases, we felt that ICCT’s comments had merit and either 

revised the underlying credit analysis and credit value (e.g., engine idle start-stop) or are 

finalizing the credit values as proposed (e.g., solar reflective paint, glazing) after considering and 

responding to the comment in that part of the Joint TSD. In other cases (e.g., active 

aerodynamics, waste heat recovery (formerly engine heat recovery), active and passive cabin 

ventilation, vehicle load reduction offset estimate, electric heater circulation pump, active 

transmission and engine warm-up, high efficiency exterior lights, solar and thermal electrical 

generation), we disagreed with the comments from ICCT. Further, the supplemental comments 

from the Alliance addressed ICCT’s concerns and (as explained specifically in the technologyby-technology discussion in section 5.2 of the Joint TSD) presented data that supported the 

proposed credit values and represented “robust data showing real and quantifiable reductions.”

Therefore, we are finalizing the off-cycle credit program and the off-cycle technology 

menu as discussed on 5.2 of TSD Chapter 5 and Preamble II.F.2. addressing many of the 

concerns expressed by ICCT.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The off-cycle technology credit menu is a necessary addition to the off-cycle program to avoid 

administrative delays and burdensome credit application requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.11]

The procedures for earning off-cycle credits need to be kept simple. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.11]

The pre-defined list will incentivize automakers to apply technologies earlier than they might 

have otherwise. It also offers manufacturers certainty about how much credit they will earn if

they choose to apply one or more of the technologies on the list. The Alliance welcomes the 

agencies’ willingness to add further technologies to the list as additional information becomes 

available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]

The proposed off-cycle credit menu is therefore a great addition to the GHG reduction and 

corporate fuel economy programs, as the experience thus far with separately testing and applying 

for off-cycle credits on each model has shown that the administrative obstacles inherent in this 

approach prohibit an effective program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]

The Alliance supports establishment of credits for all of the proposed technologies, but, in a few 

cases, recommends revisions to the proposed credit amounts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.26]

High Efficiency Exterior Lighting [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-17

The Alliance supports this proposed off-cycle credit, but with modifications. EPA’s calculation 

of the feasibility of a 60 watt total reduction threshold to qualify for this credit contains flaws in 

the calculation. Because of these flaws, achieving a full 60 watt improvement from the lights 

impacted by the credit may not be realistic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]

The 60 watt calculation included benefits from high efficiency low beam and high beam 

headlights, even though these lights are not covered by the credit provision. Due to their high 

wattage, the net benefits from these two high efficiency sets of lights are approximately 9 watts 

of the estimated 60 watt improvement. Creating such an unrealistically high improvement 

threshold for this technology could render the credit provision ineffective. In order to make the 

incentive to implement this technology more functional, this improvement threshold should be 

reduced to no more than 50 watts for the listed package of exterior lights, assuming no other 

changes are made to this provision. The credit amount for this package of lights would need to be 

adjusted accordingly. Also, Center High-Mount Stop Lamps (CHMSL) and brake lights impact 

the two-cycle fuel economy test, and high efficiency CHMSL and brake lights should not be a 

requirement to qualify for this off-cycle credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]

In support of our above analysis, we recommend that the definition of “high efficiency exterior 

lighting” be updated to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.26]

High efficiency exterior lighting means a lighting technology that, when installed on the vehicle, 

is expected to reduce the total electrical demand of the exterior lighting system when compared 

to conventional lighting systems. LED lights specifically qualify. Separate credit values may be 

earned for high efficiency lighting installed in the following components: parking/position, tail 

lights, license plate lights, low beam lights and daytime running lights. Credits may also be 

earned for a high efficiency lighting bundle that is installed in the following components: front 

and rear side markers, and backup/reverse lights. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.26-

27]

Additional changes to this credit provision are also attractive. Roll-out implementation may be 

speeded if portions of the credit were available for separate, individual lights, rather than 

requiring that all exterior lights feature high efficiency before a credit can be gained. This would 

allow each light to be swapped at the earliest possible time, in order to gain credits as quickly as 

possible. The most attractive candidates for individual credits are the largest three savings 

opportunities on the EPA/NHTSA list: parking/position lights, tail lights and license plate lights. 

Scaling the 1.1 gCO2/mile credit proposed in the NPRM to the proportional benefits of these 

individual lights would indicate that individual credits are warranted of 0.2 gCO2/mile for 

substitution of each of these lights individually (i.e., 0.2 gCO2/mile for the parking/position 

lights, 0.2 gCO2/mile for the tail lights and 0.2 gCO2/mile for the license plate lights). The 

remaining 0.5 gCO2/mile could then be earned by applying the package of all the remaining 

listed smaller lights in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.26-27]

Because of their low usage and corresponding low energy consumption, we do not feel that it is 

warranted to include the requirement for more costly high efficiency turn signals in this package 

in order to qualify for the high efficiency lighting off-cycle credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.27]
EPA Response to Comments

7-18

Our experience indicates that an off-cycle credit for low beam lights would also be beneficial. 

The source used by EPA showed potential LED low beam benefits of only a few watts, whereas 

automakers’ recent development experience has identified potential low beam savings 

opportunities of at least 60 watts. Based on EPA’s usage calculations, a low beam savings of 60 

watts should justify an off-cycle credit of 1.1 gCO2/mile. We therefore recommend that a 1.1 

gCO2/mile off-cycle credit be offered on the menu for low beam lights that achieve power levels 

consistent with a savings of 60 watts below the baseline halogen technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.27]

Beneficial emission reductions can also be achieved if a credit is offered for high efficiency 

Daytime Running Lights (DRLs). Based on the calculation below, we estimate a credit of 0.6 

gCO2/mile is justified for application of LED DRLs. Although DRLs are not mandatory, the 

reality is that they are often implemented as standard equipment by many manufacturers to 

improve highway safety. Due to their safety impact, they are a socially beneficial technology that 

has been encouraged by public policies at both EPA and NHTSA. Given that they are widely 

used, and that more efficient LED DRLs are often prohibitively expensive, it makes sense to 

offer an off-cycle credit as an incentive for LED DRLs. More widespread use of LED DRLs will 

result in real-world energy savings and GHG reductions. Because they are illuminated such a 

large portion of the time, they are the single most important exterior light to target for an offcycle credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.27]

Engine Heat Recovery

The Alliance supports EPA’s analysis for this credit. This technology is not yet available for 

commercial implementation. Offering a credit is appropriate and could play an important role in 

bringing this technology into commercial use. However, we believe that the credit amounts 

should be determined by a scalable application of the metric that EPA proposed, rather than a 

step-wise function that awards credits only in increments of 100 watt capacities. Further we 

believe that it is appropriate to award credits for recovered heat that is converted to either 

electrical or mechanical energy to meet vehicle requirements. To simplify implementation and 

fairly reward each application, the credit should be made a linear function, based on the wattage 

generated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.29]

We recommend that the definition be updated to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.29]

Engine heat recovery means a system that captures heat that would otherwise be lost through the 

exhaust system or through the radiator and converting that heat to electrical or mechanical 

energy to meet the requirements of the vehicle. Systems obtain credits according to the following 

formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.29]

Credit (gCO2/mile) = (System watt Capacity / 100) * 0.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.29]

Solar Panels
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-19

The Alliance supports EPA’s analysis for this credit. Based on rough theoretical calculations and 

experimental data, offering a credit as proposed for each 50 watt unit of electricity generation is 

appropriate. Because there is a wide range of potential sizes for these panels, this credit should 

be scalable to reward panels that are smaller or larger than 50W. Also, the credit should not be 

confined to panels installed on the roof, since they may be installed elsewhere on the vehicle. 

This credit should be available for all vehicles, not only for electric-propulsion vehicles, since all 

vehicles can benefit from the additional battery charging to power accessories, even where it is 

not used for propulsion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.29]

Therefore, we suggest the following update to the proposed technology name and definition: 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.29]

Solar Panels means the installation of solar panels on a vehicle to capture and provide energy to 

the vehicle (e.g., provide energy to an electric drive system via battery charging or provide 

power to an electric motor or 12V battery trickle charging or cabin ventilation, etc.). Credit 

levels are granted according to the following formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.29]

Credit (gCO2/mile) = (Equivalent watt Output / 50) * 3.0 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.29]

Active Aerodynamic Improvements

The Alliance supports EPA’s analysis for this credit. Active aerodynamic technologies hold great 

promise and are already entering commercial usage. Offering sizable off-cycle credits will be 

very helpful to stimulate faster adoption. The tables on p. 5-64 of the Draft Joint Technical 

Support Document (TSD) show the relationship between aerodynamic improvement and credit 

amounts. The credits offered by EPA in the credit menu should be scalable, based on the lines in 

this table, rather than simply using one point on the table. Application of multiple active 

aerodynamic technologies can result in a Cd improvement of over 3%, whereas the proposed 

credit amounts are based on a 3% improvement. Therefore, to maintain an incentive to maximize 

the use of these technologies (e.g., active grille shutters plus active air dams), higher credit 

amounts should be allowed on the menu for aerodynamic improvements above 3%. EPA 

acknowledges in the TSD that larger aerodynamic improvements are possible, but suggests using 

model-by-model testing and applications to EPA for situations where greater credit is sought for 

these larger aerodynamic improvements. Case-by-case testing and applications are overly 

burdensome, and it would be much simpler to amend the credit menu to use the tables below, 

from p. 5-64 of the TSD, to award appropriate credit for higher levels of aerodynamic 

improvement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.30] [For table referenced, please refer to 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.30]

In practice, drivers often operate vehicles at sustained, steady-state, high speeds. This condition 

is barely represented in the drive cycles and weighting system used in the 5-cycle fuel economy 

calculations. For a Cd improvement of 3%, this actually warrants a credit in excess of the 

proposed 0.6 gCO2/mile for cars and 1.0 gCO2/mile for trucks. Therefore, EPA should consider 
EPA Response to Comments

7-20

the lines on p. 5-64 of the TSD as minimum possible credit amounts for these technologies. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.31]

We recommend the definition be updated as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.31]

Active aerodynamic improvements means technologies that are actively controlled to improve 

aerodynamic efficiency. Credits are awarded according to the following formulas: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.31]

Car: Credit (gCO2/mile) = (Percent Reduction in Aero Drag, Cd) * 0.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.31]

Truck: Credit (gCO2/mile) = (Percent Reduction in Aero Drag, Cd) * 0.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.31]

Engine Stop-Start

The Alliance supports the creation of a substantial off-cycle credit for this important technology. 

The proposed potential credit of 2.9 gCO2/mile for cars and 4.5 gCO2/mile for trucks, as 

proposed in the NPRM, is a major concern. We believe a credit of 5.5 gCO2/mile is warranted; 

credits for this technology below 2.9/4.5 gCO2/mile could substantially undermine the ability of 

the industry to achieve the overall GHG targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.31] 

Occupant Thermal Comfort Technologies (e.g., Electric Heater Circulation Pump) [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.32]

In 2011, based on actual vehicle tests and 5-cycle calculations, EPA awarded General Motors 

(GM) credits of 1.8 gCO2/mile for GM’s 2009-2012 full-size truck hybrids and 1.5 gCO2/mile 

for its 2012 Buick Lacrosse© and Regal© hybrids. These vehicles use the auxiliary coolant 

pump to keep the stop/start feature working in cold weather, while continuing to provide heat to 

the passenger cabin. In contrast, the proposed credits for this technology are only 1.0 gCO2/mile 

for cars and 1.5 gCO2/mile for trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.32] Using the 5-

cycle methodology, the technology simply provides continued operation of the stop/start feature 

during the idle portions of the cold weather test, and the amount of fuel savings should be fairly 

consistent between applications. The differential between the proposed credit and the actual test 

results is sufficiently large that automobile manufacturers may independently file separate credit 

applications for the larger credit amount justified by actual vehicle testing of each application 

using the 5-cycle provisions of the regulation. This would be a large and unnecessary testing and 

administrative burden for the automobile manufacturers as well as the regulatory agencies. We 

recommend that EPA avoid this unattractive situation by making the menu credit for this 

technology more consistent with actual test values. A menu credit of at least 1.5 gCO2/mile for 

cars and 1.8 gCO2/mile for trucks is justified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.32]

We recommend that the definition be modified slightly to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.31]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-21

Engine stop-start means a technology which enables a vehicle to automatically turn off the 

engine when the vehicle comes to rest and to restart the engine with driver action (e.g., applying 

pressure to the accelerator or releasing the brake). Off-cycle engine stop-start credits will only be 

allowed if the Administrator has made a determination under the testing and calculation 

provisions in 40 C.F.R. part 600 that engine stop-start is the predominant operating mode. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.31]

Various studies and agency literature suggest longer periods are spent at idle than would be 

indicated by the FTP cycle, and support a high off-cycle credit for the stop-start technology. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.31]

To encourage additional technologies that provide similar benefits, the Alliance also 

recommends that the proposed definition be broadened to include other methods of maintaining 

occupant thermal comfort during off-engine periods. Specifically, we propose the following 

technology name and definition updates: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.32]

Occupant thermal comfort technologies means technologies or strategies that maintain occupant 

thermal comfort during off-engine periods in a stop-start equipped vehicle or in a hybrid electric 

vehicle or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (e.g., PTC heater or electric heater circulation pump). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.32]

Active Drivetrain Warm-Up (e.g., Active Transmission Warm-Up)

The Alliance supports EPA’s analysis for the active transmission warm-up off-cycle credit of at 

least 1.8 gCO2/mi. EPA’s proposed definitions for credits for these technologies should, 

however, be broadened to allow the inclusion other methods of driveline fluid warm-up as well 

as other sources of waste heat (perhaps using different credit amounts for other variations of this 

technology). For example, credits should explicitly be allowed for systems that use a coolant 

loop to transfer the heat from the exhaust system to the transmission and/or engine, since this 

may be more practical than directly heating engine oil or transmission oil in a heat exchanger in 

the exhaust system. Also, the performance of the system is not significantly changed by the use 

or non-use of coolant in the heat exchange process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.32]

Provisions should also be made to provide similar credits for other technologies that hasten 

transmission warm-up and viscosity management (perhaps without using exhaust gases). Some 

of these technologies are discussed in the next section of our comments, including quantification 

of potential credit amounts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

In addition, we recommend the following updates to the proposed technology name and

definition: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

Active drivetrain warm-up means a system that uses waste heat or waste energy to warm-up 

driveline fluids quickly and reduces parasitic drivetrain (transmission, axles, PTUs, t-cases) 

system losses related to friction and fluid viscosity. In this category, active transmission warmup would receive credit of at least 1.8gCO2/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]
EPA Response to Comments

7-22

As mentioned in on p. 5-68 of the TSD, it is not necessary to heat the differential in rear-wheeldrive vehicles in order to qualify for this credit. However, we believe that heating the rear 

differential in these vehicles for viscosity management might provide an attractive additional 

credit opportunity, and urge EPA to re-examine this possibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.33]

Active Engine Warm-Up

Our research supports the 1.8 gCO2/mile off-cycle credit proposed by EPA for this technology. 

However, EPA’s definitions for earning this credit should be broadened such that a coolant loop 

may be used to transfer the heat. Provisions should be made to provide similar credits for any 

other technologies that hasten engine warm-up to provide similar benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

We recommend the following updates to the proposed definition: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.33]

Active engine warm-up means a system that uses waste heat, thermal storage, or waste energy to 

warm up targeted sub-systems of the engine such that frictional losses are reduced. It would 

allow a faster transition from colder operation to warm operation, decreasing CO2 emissions and 

increasing fuel economy. In this category, active engine warm-up would receive credit of at least 

1.8 gCO2/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

Thermal Control [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

Substantial benefits are available from thermal management technologies, and we support 

establishing off-cycle credits for these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

Glazing [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.33]

The Alliance supports including glazing as an available off-cycle credit. However, the most 

effective of these technologies (solar reflective) have relatively high cost, weight and functional 

impact hurdles that must be overcome to integrate these technologies into the vehicle. For 

simplicity and clarity, the Alliance recommends that EPA state that the glazing area to be used in 

the calculation is the total glazing surface area. Also, credit should be granted for all vehicles that 

utilize glazing better than 62% Tts (except roof lights), regardless of whether the improved glass 

is marketed as the standard glazing or an optional upgrade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.33]

In addition, we ask that EPA and NHTSA consider the input of suppliers of alternative glazing 

technologies on amendments or additions to the proposed rule. Consideration of a broader range 

of technologies will provide the necessary flexibility to achieve the desirable air conditioningrelated emission reductions, for example, based on reduced glazing thermal conductivity. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

Active Seat Ventilation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-23

The Alliance supports EPA’s analysis for this credit. As a practical matter, only the front seats 

need to be ventilated to qualify for this credit, and this should be stated in the final regulation. 

The analysis EPA uses to quantify the credit is based on two ventilated front seats. Rear seats are 

used much less than front seats, and the cost attractiveness of this credit opportunity would fall 

dramatically if it were required that more than the front seats be ventilated. Also, EPA’s 

definitions should specify that this credit can be earned for systems that either pull air into the 

seat or push air out. The impacts on occupant comfort and energy consumption are the same, and 

both approaches are used. This could be accomplished by making the following minor 

modifications to the proposed definition: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

Active seat ventilation means a device which draws (or pushes) air or transfers heat/energy from 

the seating surface which is in contact with the occupant and exhausts (or pushes) it to a location 

away from the seat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

Solar Reflective Paint [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

The Alliance supports this credit while noting that, as with glazings, the analysis of energy 

benefits may be optimistic because of the “worst case” test conditions used in the studies by the 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

The draft EPA definitions for both active and passive ventilation satisfy that objective, since the 

definitions allow for many ventilation techniques. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

Active Cabin Ventilation

Cabin ventilation can be attractive for reducing air conditioner energy consumption and 

improving comfort upon vehicle entry. Research on ventilation technologies has confirmed that 

interior breath level temperatures can be reduced to the levels that EPA used in its analyses for 

both active and passive ventilation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

There are many approaches that can be used, such as ventilating through slightly open windows 

or sunroofs, existing air conditioner ducts, or new air flow passages with dedicated fans. The 

ventilation may also be continuous or pulsed. Since such a wide range of approaches can be 

applied, the definitions used for this technology should not be overly prescriptive. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

Also, we have found that it is very difficult to physically measure air flow through the vehicle to 

a tight margin, so it is not practical to set air flow thresholds in order to qualify for these 

ventilation credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.34]

The cost of these technologies can be high. For example, active ventilation fans may need to be 

coupled to a photovoltaic panel which powers the fans, so that the system does not drain the 

battery if the vehicle is parked for long periods. The system used in EPA’s analysis featured a 

unique sunroof with several small fans to pull hot air out of the cabin. Because are all very costly 

items, the credit offered for these technologies needs to be ample in order to make the business 

case for their implementation attractive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.35]
EPA Response to Comments

7-24

The Alliance therefore supports the definition of “active cabin ventilation” as proposed. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.35]

Passive Cabin Ventilation

As previously stated in the discussion of active ventilation, cabin ventilation can be attractive for 

reducing air conditioner energy consumption. Research on ventilation technologies has 

confirmed that interior breath level temperatures can be reduced to the levels that EPA used in its 

analyses for passive ventilation. All of our other comments relative to active ventilation also 

apply to passive ventilation. For example, the system analyzed by EPA employed automatic 

sunroof features together with eight new floor vents in the vehicle. These are significant 

hardware changes to the vehicle which would require a significant credit in order to make an 

adequate business case for implementation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.35]

We propose to broaden the definition of Passive Cabin Ventilation slightly as follows: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.35]

Passive cabin ventilation means ducts, devices or methods that utilize convective airflow to 

move heated air from the cabin interior to the exterior of the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.35]

High Efficiency Alternator [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.35]

This was a good recommendation on EPA’s initial off-cycle technology list, as contained in the 

EPA/NHTSA July 2011 Supplemental Notice of Intent. However, this technology subsequently 

did not appear in the proposed credit menu contained in the NPRM. We recommend that it be 

added back to the menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.35]

The standard 2-cycle fuel economy test is performed with accessories “off,” and even the 5-cycle 

tests only activate some accessories, such as the air conditioner on the SCO3 test. In contrast, 

real-world driving has higher average electrical loads from a variety of accessories such as 

radios, lights, rear-seat entertainment systems, wipers, power window motors, etc. 

Conservatively, we estimate that at least a 20 amp average electric load differential exists in 

actual real-world driving over the typical 20 amp load during the 2-cycle test. High efficiency 

alternators provide fuel consumption benefits for this extra 20 amp real-world-driving 

differential which are not captured on the 2-cycle test, and so these benefits should be eligible for 

an off-cycle credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.35-36]

A traditional baseline alternator might have had an efficiency rating under the Verband der 

Automobilindustrie (VDA, the trade association represent German automobile manufacturers) 

test procedure of 60% to 64%, with high efficiency models having ratings above 68% VDA. To 

translate these differences into a GHG-equivalent, GM ran simulations of three different 

alternators on a range of four different vehicles using the NEDC drive cycle. The alternators 

were the Valeo SG11 (61% VDA), Bosch E6 (69% VDA) and Denso DSO (70% VDA). [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.36]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-25

Each of these was simulated using the GM Unified Models for the Cadillac SRX, Chevrolet 

Sonic, Chevrolet Cruze, and the new GM Alpha platform. Actual performance curves for each of 

the alternators were used for one set of simulations. To simplify the comparisons, another set of 

simulations was done for the high efficiency Bosch and Denso alternators, wherein the actual 

performance curves were compared to alternator performance curves set to be exactly 10% lower 

than the actual curves. Also, a very simple set of simulations was done to compare a flat 70% 

efficiency alternator to a 60% efficiency alternator. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.36]

The following chart shows the efficiency curves for the Bosch and Valeo alternators, and also 

shows the curve for the Bosch alternator modified to be exactly 10% below the actual Bosch 

data: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.36] [For the chart please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.36]

Using this approach, the following CO2 savings were estimated for the extra 20 amps typical of 

real word driving, compared to the 2-cycle test’s 20 amp load: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.37] [For the chart please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.37]

As would be expected, the complexity of vehicle operations results in a spread in results from 

this exercise. However, there are consistently CO2 savings, with a representative savings 

appearing to be approximately 1.0 gCO2/mile. We therefore recommend that an off-cycle credit 

of 1.0 gCO2/mile be established for vehicles that use an alternator rated at 68% VDA or better. 

Alternator loads are rising as more electric features are used in vehicles; this credit amount is 

conservative in that it does not account for this trend of increasing vehicle-generated electricity 

usage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.38]

HVAC Eco-Mode

We appreciate the agencies’ willingness to recognize the real-world fuel economy and GHG 

improvements from driver-selectable technologies. We understand that expected usage data will 

be required as a basis for adding these technologies to the menu. Since 2011, GM has featured an

“eco button” on the Chevrolet Equinox® that allows drivers to select a driving mode which 

adjusts powertrain operation to achieve an improvement of approximately one mpg in combined 

city/highway driving. This has proven to be a popular feature with many customers, and GM has 

collected substantial data that documents high customer usage of this driving mode. In a twoweek survey of 3,500 owners of the 2011 Equinox conducted through OnStar® technology, the 

following usage information was collected: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.38]

50.3% of customers were using the eco mode for in excess of 90% of their driving, [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.38]

57.4% of customers were using the eco mode in excess of 50% of the time, and [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.38]

34% had never activated their eco mode. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.38] While the 

fuel economy benefits of the powertrain eco settings appear in the city and highway fuel 

economy tests, the benefits of the new HVAC eco settings do not. These HVAC eco features 
EPA Response to Comments

7-26

should therefore be candidates for off-cycle GHG emissions credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.38]

The driver selectable HVAC eco mode initiates alternative air conditioner settings, such as 

reduced blower speeds and evaporator core temperatures, both of which reduce load on the 

compressor. During cold weather, the blower speed is also reduced, which reduces blower 

energy consumption while also improving powertrain warm-up. Below are tables presenting test 

data from six SCO3 tests and two Cold CO tests on a 2013 Equinox. This data clearly shows the 

different, energy-saving operating characteristics from normal mode to eco mode. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.38]

Based on GM 5-cycle testing on the 2013 Equinox, GM calculated that the HVAC energy 

savings for the eco button are 1.8 g CO2/mile. Based on GM OnStar usage data, 50% usage is an 

appropriate adjustment for this credit, since at least 50% of the drivers are using it at least 90% 

of the time, with another 7% of drivers using it between 50% and 90% of the time, and 13% of 

drivers using it between 0% and 50% of the time. Multiplying 50% usage by GM’s tested 5-

cycle improvement of 1.8 gCO2/mile yields a credit of 0.9 gCO2/mile. The Alliance therefore 

recommends that a 0.9 gCO2/mile credit for an HVAC eco button be established on the EPA 

menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.38-39] [For the figure please refer EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.39]

Bypass Valve for Transmission Oil Cooler

This is an alternative approach to faster transmission warm-up and viscosity management, 

without using exhaust gases. Many vehicles, especially large trucks, feature transmission oil 

coolers that provide increased functionality to operate under heavy loads. One drawback, 

however, of the traditional transmission oil cooler is that it continuously cools the oil, even under 

circumstances when it would be advantageous for fuel economy to have the transmission oil 

gaining heat more rapidly. Adding a bypass valve for the transmission oil cooler allows the oil 

flow to be controlled to provide maximum fuel economy under a wide variety of operating 

conditions such as cold weather. However, bypass valves are not currently commonly used with 

transmission oil coolers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.39]

The Alliance recommends that an off-cycle credit of 0.3 gCO2/mile be established for vehicles 

that have a transmission oil cooler with a bypass valve. This 0.3 gram proposed credit is 

proportional to the 1.8 gram benefit observed for active transmission warm-up using exhaust 

gases, based on the benefits observed during GM engineering development work with these 

technologies. Also, the bypass valve is additive, and even synergistic to the benefits of using 

exhaust gases for faster transmission warm-up, so both of these active transmission warm-up 

credits should be available on a vehicle. For example, a transmission with an oil cooler, 

combined with the bypass valve and exhaust gas-assisted warm-up, allows fine tuning of 

viscosity management, since accelerated heating or cooling of the oil can both be accomplished, 

depending on operating conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.39]

Electronic Thermostat and Electric Water Pump
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-27

This technology provides both faster engine warm-up and tighter continuous control of engine 

block temperature. The variable electric water pump only performs as much work as is 

demanded of it at any given time, based on instructions coming from the thermostat. This allows 

the water pump to work less immediately after startup, thereby warming the engine faster, since 

less heat is taken from the engine by its cooling system. This is especially valuable on the cold 

CO test cycle. The pump also works less under other operating conditions, thereby reducing the 

parasitic drag on the engine when compared to a conventional mechanical belt driven pump. This 

provides for tighter control of the engine temperature to its ideal (which optimizes fuel 

economy), with less energy spent on engine cooling. In an analysis using a conservative 3% on 

FTP City combined cycle, the improvement from a mechanically driven water pump and a 

conventional thermostat produces a 1 gram CO2/ benefit using the 5-cycle calculation method. 

The vehicle used for this analysis was a 2.4L four cylinder SUV. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.40]

As noted above, we also recommend the following updates to the off-cycle technology 

definitions: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.41] [For the figures 'above' please refer to 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.40-41]

High efficiency exterior lighting means a lighting technology that, when installed on the vehicle, 

is expected to reduce the total electrical demand of the exterior lighting system when compared 

to conventional lighting systems. LED lights specifically qualify. Separate credit values may be 

earned for high efficiency lighting installed in the following components: parking/position, tail 

lights, license plate lights, low beam lights, and daytime running lights. Credits may also be 

earned for a high efficiency lighting bundle that is installed in the following components: front 

and rear side markers, and backup/reverse lights. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.41]

Engine heat recovery means a system that captures heat that would otherwise be lost through the 

exhaust system or through the radiator and converting that heat to electrical or mechanical 

energy to meet the requirements of the vehicle. Systems obtain credits according to the following 

formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.41]

Credit (gCO2/mile) = (System watt Capacity / 100) * 0.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.41]

Solar Panels means the installation of solar panels on a vehicle to capture and provide energy to 

the vehicle (e.g., provide energy to an electric drive system via battery charging or provide 

power to an electric motor or 12V battery trickle charging or cabin ventilation, etc.). Credit 

levels are granted according to the following formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.41]

Credit (gCO2/mile) = (Equivalent watt Output / 50) * 3.0 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.41]

Active aerodynamic improvements means technologies that are actively controlled to improve 

aerodynamic efficiency. Credits are awarded according to the following formulas: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.41]
EPA Response to Comments

7-28

Car: Credit (gCO2/mile) = (Percent Reduction in Aero Drag, Cd) * 0.2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.41]

Truck: Credit (gCO2/mile) = (Percent Reduction in Aero Drag, Cd) * 0.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.41]

Engine stop-start means a technology which enables a vehicle to automatically turn off the 

engine when the vehicle comes to rest and restart the engine with driver action (e.g., applies 

pressure to the accelerator or releases the brake). Off-cycle engine stop-start credits will only be 

allowed if the Administrator has made a determination under the testing and calculation 

provisions in 40 C.F.R. part 600 that engine stop-start is the predominant operating mode. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.42]

Occupant thermal comfort technologies means technologies or strategies that maintain occupant 

thermal comfort during off-engine periods in a stop-start equipped vehicle or in a hybrid electric 

vehicle or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (e.g., PTC heater or electric heater circulation pump). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.42]

Active drivetrain warm-up means a system that uses waste heat or waste energy to warm-up 

driveline fluids quickly and reduces parasitic drivetrain (transmission, axles, PTUs, t-cases) 

system losses, related to friction and fluid viscosity. In this category, active transmission warmup would receive credit of at least 1.8 gCO2/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.42]

Active engine warm-up means a system that uses waste heat, thermal storage, or waste energy to 

warm up targeted sub-systems of the engine such that frictional losses are reduced. It would 

allow a faster transition from colder operation to warm operation, decreasing CO2 emissions, and 

increasing fuel economy. In this category, active engine warm-up would receive credit of at least 

1.8 gCO2/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.42]

Active seat ventilation means a device which draws (or pushes) air or transfers heat/energy from 

the seating surface which is in contact with the occupant and exhausts (or pushes) it to a location 

away from the seat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.42]

Passive cabin ventilation means ducts, devices or methods that utilize convective airflow to 

move heated air from the cabin interior to the exterior of the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.42]

Finally, opportunities exist to streamline traffic flow, reduce congestion and reduce emissions 

through better driving. For example, there are technologies that provide the driver or the vehicle 

with information for improved routing, or that provide the driver or the vehicle with information 

for more efficient vehicle operation. GPS technology can play a role in improving both driver 

behavior and vehicle operation. The opportunities for improvements through these eco driving 

technologies are not sufficiently defined for the Alliance to propose specific credit definitions 

and criteria at this time, but the industry hopes that it can work with the agencies in the future to 

create off-cycle credits for these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.44]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-29

The following supplemental comments address the comments of the International Council on 

Clean Transportation (ICCT). While ICCT purports to support the proposed rule, it advocates 

eliminating or rendering de minimis many of the proposed flexibility mechanisms. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.2]

1. ICCT’s Approach Would Delay Important Program Flexibilities Needed to Encourage 

Experimentation and Early Adoption of Innovative Technologies. 

The mechanisms under attack by ICCT are a key feature of the proposed regulation, and have 

helped this rulemaking to proceed on an expedited timeline compared to similar major EPA and 

NHTSA rulemaking processes. Many of ICCT’s comments call for further study before 

compliance credits are granted under the flexibility provisions. There will, in fact, be further 

study of the effectiveness of these technologies, but the timing for establishing the flexibility 

mechanisms cannot be separated from the expedited timing for the overall regulation. With this 

in mind, we encourage EPA to move forward with establishing a broad array of credit 

opportunities in the flexibility provisions of their regulation, to encourage early experimentation 

and early adoption of innovative new technologies. As the Agencies gain experience with the 

new approaches, they can refine the flexibility mechanisms appropriately. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11790-A1, p.2]

2. ICCT’s Approach Would Make It Impossible for Automakers to Achieve the Level of OffCycle Credits that EPA Included in Setting the Stringency of the Overall GHG Regulations. 

Although ICCT states that it “strongly supports” credits for off-cycle emission reductions (ICCT 

Comments, p. 1), the net effect of its specific recommendations would almost completely 

eliminate the off-cycle improvement program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1,p.2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 98.]

Finally, manufacturers should be encouraged through flexibilities and incentives to implement 

verifiable innovations that enhance vehicle safety, that explore new technology applications and 

reduce CO2 emissions.

The following supplemental comments address the comments of the International Council on 

Clean Transportation (ICCT). While ICCT purports to support the proposed rule, it advocates 

eliminating or rendering de minimis many of the proposed flexibility mechanisms. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.2]

For most technologies in EPA’s proposal, ICCT either entirely opposes credits (e.g., stop-start, 

active engine and transmission warm-up, ventilated seats and active and passive ventilation), or 

requests further study (e.g., engine heat recovery, solar panels, active aerodynamic 

improvements, and electric heater circulation pumps). Only three technologies would remain; for 

these, ICCT recommends reducing the credit amounts to levels well below the credit levels 

proposed in the NPRM. The remaining credits that ICCT recommends would be LED lights (at 

0.8 gCO2/mile) and solar reflective paint and glazing (jointly capped at 1.8 gCO2/mile for cars 
EPA Response to Comments

7-30

and 2.6 gCO2/mile for trucks, following a recommended 40% reduction for expected MAC 

efficiency improvements). Based on these ICCT recommendations, the maximum potential offcycle credits for any car would be 2.6 gCO2/mile and the maximum truck off-cycle credit would 

be 3.4 gCO2/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.2]

In contrast, EPA included off-cycle credits for widespread implementation of start-stop and 

active aerodynamic technologies in setting the stringency of the overall GHG standards. The 

combined off-cycle credits for these two technologies are proposed to be 3.5 gCO2/mile for cars 

and 5.5 gCO2/mile for trucks (76 Fed. Reg. 74854, 75022 (Dec. 1, 2011)). Thus, if ICCT 

recommendations were fully implemented, it would be impossible to achieve the level of offcycle credits that EPA included in setting the stringency of the overall greenhouse gas 

regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.3]

1. ICCT’s Approach Would Delay Important Program Flexibilities Needed to Encourage 

Experimentation and Early Adoption of Innovative Technologies. 

The mechanisms under attack by ICCT are a key feature of the proposed regulation, and have 

helped this rulemaking to proceed on an expedited timeline compared to similar major EPA and 

NHTSA rulemaking processes. Many of ICCT’s comments call for further study before 

compliance credits are granted under the flexibility provisions. There will, in fact, be further 

study of the effectiveness of these technologies, but the timing for establishing the flexibility 

mechanisms cannot be separated from the expedited timing for the overall regulation. With this 

in mind, we encourage EPA to move forward with establishing a broad array of credit 

opportunities in the flexibility provisions of their regulation, to encourage early experimentation 

and early adoption of innovative new technologies. As the Agencies gain experience with the 

new approaches, they can refine the flexibility mechanisms appropriately. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11790-A1, p.2]

2. ICCT’s Approach Would Make It Impossible for Automakers to Achieve the Level of OffCycle Credits that EPA Included in Setting the Stringency of the Overall GHG Regulations. 

Although ICCT states that it “strongly supports” credits for off-cycle emission reductions (ICCT 

Comments, p. 1), the net effect of its specific recommendations would almost completely 

eliminate the off-cycle improvement program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1,p.2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 98.]

Finally, manufacturers should be encouraged through flexibilities and incentives to implement 

verifiable innovations that enhance vehicle safety, that explore new technology applications and 

reduce CO2 emissions.

3. Credit Calculation for Specific Off-Cycle Technologies 

a. General Credit Calculation for Reducing Vehicle Load 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-31

EPA states a goal of matching off-cycle credits to real world emission reductions, and ICCT 

endorses the principle that “the credits properly reflect actual in-use reductions” (ICCT 

Comments, p. 36). However, ICCT then states that credits for reductions in electrical load should 

be based on the (lower) electrical loads on the two-cycle FTP/HWY tests, rather than the (higher) 

loads on the five-cycle tests. Yet it is the higher electrical loads on the five-cycle test that are 

more representative of “actual in-use reductions,” since some accessories such as the air 

conditioner are activated in the five-cycle tests, the fuel pump works harder at higher speeds, etc. 

In fact, since there are electrical features such as radios, phones, etc. not activated on the fivecycle procedures, the real world benefits are probably even higher. Despite ICCT’s comments to 

the contrary, there is no reason that grams per mile of CO2 calculated using the five-cycle 

procedure, or any other more “real world” basis, cannot be subtracted from baseline emissions 

measured on the two-cycle tests. Doing so is consistent with the principle of providing off-cycle 

credits that reflect actual in-use reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.3]

b. High Efficiency Exterior Lighting 

ICCT supports off-cycle credits for this technology, although it proposes changes in the 

calculation methodology to base it on the 2-cycle drive cycles, rather than 5-cycle calculations. 

As discussed above, this change would go against the goal of the program to grant credit based 

on real world emission reductions. The 5-cycle procedures are intended to be more representative 

of real world conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.3]

ICCT does not note the two most important changes that are needed to the exterior lighting 

credit, which are to offer credit for LED low beam and daytime running lights. These two sets of 

lights offer the greatest potential emissions reductions in the exterior lighting category. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.3]

c. Electric Heater Circulation Pump 

The Alliance recommendation for these credits was based on actual vehicle testing, quantifying 

the credit as the incremental 5-cycle test benefit over the 2-cycle benefit (although the 2-cycle 

benefit is zero, since the heater would never be “on” for 2-cycle test temperatures). The Alliance 

recommendation should fit ICCT criteria for a credit. All of the ICCT criticisms of EPA’s 

calculations for this technology become moot if the actual vehicle test data are used (e.g., time at 

idle, electricity to run the pump, and any engine warm-up at idle). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11790-A1, p.4]

d. Active Aerodynamic Technologies 

Active aerodynamic features have been in production for some time, and the performance is 

reliable and well understood. The factors that ICCT notes do not create a significant deterioration 

or uncertainty in the benefits. For example, when there is a risk of freezing, active grill shutters 

are typically “deactivated” by placing them in the closed position, which maximizes the 

aerodynamic benefits while also hastening powertrain warm-up. This “ice mode” for active grill 

shutters is typically activated for all temperatures below approximately 40-45oF (vehicle 

temperature sensors typically indicate slightly warmer temperatures than the true ambient, so an 
EPA Response to Comments

7-32

indicated temperature in this range is chosen since the true ambient may be close to the 

temperature for ice formation). The shutters are kept shut, even as the temperature warms, for a 

sufficient time for any ice to melt. So a significant portion of real world vehicle operation is 

conducted in cold weather where the benefits of active grill shutters are actually higher than 

would be measured on the standard FTP/HWY test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-

A1, p.4]

For ambient temperatures above approximately 80oF, active grill shutters are typically kept open 

to provide ample air flow for both the powertrain and the air conditioner. Opening the shutters in 

this condition actually saves fuel compared to the alternative of making the air conditioner and 

engine cooling fan work harder. For mild ambients - between approximately 45-80 oF - active 

grill shutter operation is typically controlled in accordance with the engine cooling fan, so the 

control system is fairly sophisticated in maximizing fuel economy while providing adequate air 

flow. We do not know how EPA simulations for this technology included these various modes, 

but it can be easily seen that this technology provides higher benefits in certain off-cycle 

conditions, such as high speeds and cold weather, and is therefore suitable for an off-cycle credit. 

Further, the conditions where the system is “deactivated” do not uniformly reduce the benefit, 

but would be expected, on balance, to actually increase the net real world benefit, given the large 

proportion of time spent with the shutters closed in “ice mode.” Active air dams operate 

similarly. Adjustable ride height is comparatively simple in operation, with straightforward high 

speed benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.4]

As recommended by the Alliance, a good performance criterion for these credits is the 

coefficient of drag (Cd) of the vehicle when the active aero features are deployed. A close 

relationship exists between Cd and the overall greenhouse gas savings, which can be the basis for 

granting credits based on Cd, thereby encouraging the maximum possible implementation of 

these technologies. It is not realistic to require case-by-case vehicle testing for these 

technologies, which would be prohibitively burdensome, thereby greatly slowing progress in this 

promising area. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.5]

e. Active Engine and Drivetrain Warm-up 

ICCT makes the case that off-cycle credits for active engine and transmission warm-up are 

“highly questionable,” since “most of the benefit of the warm-up systems will occur on-cycle 

during 2-cycle testing” (ICCT Comments, p. 46). ICCT bases this on an assertion that the 

amount of warm-up on the FTP, measured in degrees of engine temperature, is about two-thirds 

of the warm-up on the 20oF cold cycle: 

However, normal engine operating temperatures are about 180oF. This is about 105oF above the 

FTP test temperature and about 160oF above the 20oF test temperature. Thus, the benefit of 

active engine warm-up on the FTP should be about two-thirds of the benefit at 20oF and the 

proportional benefit will be even closer. (ICCT Comments, p. 45). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11790-A1, p.5]

This analysis is grossly incorrect, since it omits the viscosity behavior of fluids such as engine oil 

and transmission fluid at low temperatures. Viscosity is the measure of a fluid’s resistance to 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-33

flow, or fluid friction, and is therefore strongly related to powertrain and driveline efficiency. 

Kinematic viscosity increases exponentially as temperature falls, such that the viscosity of 

engine oil and transmission fluid is many times higher at the start of the cold test compared to the 

FTP. The graph below shows this for some common engine oils. At the starting temperature for 

the cold test (which at 20oF is actually -6.7oC, well below the starting point for this graph), 

viscosity would be above 600 centistokes (cSt). In contrast, at the start of the FTP, around 24oC, 

viscosity is around 125 cSt. Therefore, engine friction could be reduced several times by 

warming the temperature of the engine oil rapidly into the range of the FTP. Transmissions and 

transmission fluids behave similarly, as do rear differentials, etc. That is why accelerated warmup of these components produces significant off-cycle benefits in cold weather. Improvements in 

engine oil viscosity taper off above 50oC, to the normal engine operating temperatures above 

80oC, so most of the benefits of these technologies occur off-cycle and not on the two-cycle 

tests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.5]

f. Ventilated Seats and Other Ventilation Technologies 

ICCT suggests that credits for ventilation technologies are not appropriate because they are 

based on “limited data”, and the driver response is “unclear” (ICCT Comments, p. 39). However, 

there are additional supporting studies and data beyond the series of National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory (NREL) studies that were cited in the EPA analysis. For example, studies of thermal 

comfort from heated and cooled seats were performed at the Technical University of Denmark, 

resulting in technical publications such as the summary in the journal “Ergonomics” in 2007 by 

Zhang, Dyon, Fang and Melikov (Vol. 50, Issue 4, pp. 586-600, “The Influence of Heated or 

Cooled Seats on the Acceptable Ambient Temperature Range”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11790-A1, p.6]

Quoting the abstract of this study: 

In 11 climate chamber experiments at air temperatures ranging from 15 to 45 degrees C, a total 

of 24 subjects, dressed in appropriate clothing for entering a vehicle at these temperatures, were 

each exposed to four different seat temperatures, ranging from cool to warm. In one simulated 

summer series, subjects were preconditioned to be too hot, while in other series they were 

preconditioned to be thermally neutral. They reported their thermal sensations, overall thermal 

acceptability and comfort on visual analogue scales at regular intervals. Instantaneous heat flow 

to the seat was measured continuously. At each ambient room temperature, the percentage 

dissatisfied was found to be a second-order polynomial function of local heat flow. Zero heat 

flow was preferred at an air temperature of 22 degrees C and the heat flow that minimized the 

percentage dissatisfied was found to be a single linear function of air temperature in all 

conditions. The analysis indicates that providing optimal seat temperature would extend the 

conventional 80% acceptable range of air temperature for drivers and passengers in vehicle 

cabins by 9.3 degrees C downwards and by 6.4 degrees C upwards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11790-A1, p.7]

Only 20% of occupants were dissatisfied by the cabin temperature in the range from 10.8o to 

34oC when the seat was heated or cooled optimally, according to a simple control strategy that 

changed seat heat flux as a linear function of ambient temperature. Regarding the potential for 
EPA Response to Comments

7-34

lower air conditioner usage in hot weather, it was concluded that 80% of occupants would be 

satisfied by seats that were cooled even if the cabin temperature was raised by up to 6.4oC. Note 

that this is more than the cabin temperature increases used in the NREL studies as the basis for 

their calculations of the fuel savings from reduced air conditioner usage due to ventilated seats. 

Making a rough estimate based the EPA factors for translating cabin temperature reductions to 

CO2 reductions (Draft Joint Technical Support Document (TSD), p. 5-73), that 6.4oC 

temperature change would equal a 1.9 gCO2/mile credit for cars and a 2.6 gCO2/mile credit for 

trucks. The proposed off-cycle credits of 1.0 gCO2/mile for cars and 1.3 gCO2/mile for trucks, 

based on the NREL study, are modest in comparison. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, 

p.7]

Also, the seat heat flux of 60 W/m2 in the NREL study (Figure 11) equals the optimal flux in the 

Zhang study at about 37oC (Figure 8). Thus, the actual seat heat transfer performance of the 

production seats in the Cadillac STS used in the NREL study is more than sufficient to achieve 

the results seen from the laboratory set-up used by Zhang et al, at least through ambient 

temperatures up to 37oC. Therefore, the comfort results quantified by Zhang et al can be 

achieved using actual ventilated seat components that are already in the market. Moreover, the 

air conditioner energy savings attributed to ventilated seats by NREL are not excessive compared 

to similar estimates for related thermal technologies in the TSD and elsewhere. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11790-A1, p.7]

This Technical University of Denmark data and the resulting polynomial function are 

summarized in the chart below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.7] [[See Docket 

Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.8 for the chart.]]

Ventilated seats are a popular feature on luxury vehicles, despite the typically high price. 

Therefore, if the feature becomes more widespread as a result of the off-cycle credit program, it 

can be expected that the “driver response” will be to learn to appreciate and use this luxury 

feature, which provides quicker cool-down, as well as fuel savings. When the ventilated seats are 

in use, it can be reasonably expected that the air conditioner would be turned down to maintain 

comfort levels, providing the energy savings and emission reductions estimated in these 

analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.8]

g. Active and Passive Ventilation 

As with ventilated seats, more research data and field experience is available for active and 

passive ventilation than was cited in the EPA TSD. Several manufacturers already offer active or 

passive ventilation technologies on production vehicles. The 2010 Toyota Prius began offering 

options of a solar panel ventilation system and a remote air conditioning controls system, both 

designed to reduce cabin temperature when the vehicle is parked in hot ambient conditions. Data 

has been provided by Toyota to the EPA on the performance of the Prius solar panel ventilation, 

corroborating the NREL report which EPA used as the basis for its proposed active ventilation 

off-cycle credit. Furthermore, market experience has already shown these features to be quite 

popular, as the projected installation rate of 3% has been actually running at 12% - which 

equates to about 50,000 units sold. Given the popularity of the solar panel ventilation system and 

the potential for expanding this technology to provide additional electrical energy to power the 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-35

vehicle, it would be prudent for EPA to encourage development via off-cycle credits, rather than 

defer credits as ICCT suggests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, pp.8-9]

In addition, General Motors commissioned NREL in 2008-2009 to analyze over a dozen 

variations of active and passive ventilation, as well as additional combinations of ventilation 

technologies with solar reflective technologies, with the goals of identifying the most effective 

combinations, as well as validating a comprehensive range of improved thermal modeling 

methods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.9]

The ventilation technologies used the existing HVAC blower or additional fans at various power 

levels to provide either continuous or pulsed exchanges of fresh air into the vehicle. Based on a 

standardized solar load of 800 W/m2, among the variations using solely active ventilation, five 

out of twelve applications produced average interior temperature reductions during solar soaks in 

excess of the 6.9oC reduction measured in the older NREL study which was used as the basis for 

the proposed off-cycle credit. The biggest reduction was 11.4oC. Moreover, six of the lowest 

performing active ventilation applications were simply low-wattage versions of a system that 

achieved a 7.2oC average interior temperature reduction in its seventh, most high-powered 

application. Since each version of this system would cost the same, regardless of the wattage, the 

low-performance versions of this system can be disregarded as not commercially attractive when 

compared to the version that achieved a 7.2oC reduction at the same cost. If these low-powered 

systems are disregarded, only one application achieved an interior temperature reduction of less 

than 6.9oC, while five systems surpassed the 6.9oC reduction level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11790-A1, p.9]

In comparison, a very simple passive system that opened the windows 2 cm achieved an average 

interior temperature reduction of 3.5oC, and also provided an additional improvement of 

approximately 1.5oC when combined with one of the active ventilation technologies. While this 

system was not as sophisticated as the one evaluated by EPA as the basis for the passive 

ventilation credit, it shows that there is significant potential for low cost emission reductions 

from this passive ventilation approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11790-A1, p.9]

In summary, the early experience with active and passive ventilation technologies has been 

promising, and the interior temperature data from these experiences supports the levels of offcycle credit proposed by EPA. We therefore urge EPA to offer the proposed credits to encourage 

further progress in implementing and improving these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11790-A1, p.9]

Response:

The EPA agrees with the comments from the Alliance that the “off-cycle technology 

credit menu is a necessary addition to the off-cycle program” and appreciates the accolade that it 

is a “great addition to the GHG reduction and corporate fuel economy programs.” As a result we 

are finalizing this rule with the off-cycle technology credit menu.

Regarding the Alliance comments that “recommend[ed] revisions to the proposed credit 

amounts”, the EPA responded to the comments regarding each of these technologies in greater 

detail in Chapter 5.2 of the TSD and Preamble II.F of this final rule. Specifically, our responses 
EPA Response to Comments

7-36

for each of the technologies on the off-cycle technology menu can be found in TSD Chapter 5 as 

follows: High Efficiency Exterior Lighting (5.2.3), Waste Heat Recovery (5.2.2; formerly 

termed “Engine Heat Recovery”), Solar Panels (5.2.4), Active Aerodynamic Improvements 

(5.2.6), Active Drivetrain Warm-Up (e.g., Active Transmission Warm-Up; 5.2.8.3), Active 

Engine Warm-Up (5.2.8.4), Thermal Control Technologies (5.2.9) including Glazing (5.2.10), 

Solar Reflective Paint (5.2.12), Active Seat Ventilation (5.2.11), Active Cabin Ventilation 

(5.2.13), and Passive Cabin Ventilation (5.2.13). In addition, our responses regarding additional 

technologies that the Alliance recommended we consider adding to the off-cycle technology 

credit menu or allowing credit for including: High Efficiency Alternator, HVAC Eco-Mode, 

Bypass Valve for Transmission Oil Cooler, and Electronic Thermostat and Electric Water Pump; 

are discussed in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule. Finally, our responses to the 

comments from the Alliance regarding clarifying the technology definitions are included in TSD 

Chapter 5 and the definitions for specific off-cycle technologies can be found in 5.2.5, 5.2.7., 

5.2.8.5, and 5.2.15.

The EPA also agrees with and appreciates the supplemental comments from the Alliance. 

The EPA sought to ensure that the off-cycle credits for technologies on the off-cycle technology 

menu were verifiable and supported by data. This supporting information from the Alliance was 

helpful to support the basis for the credit values that we are finalizing in this rule.

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Global Automakers supports the availability of credits for technologies that provide on-road 

efficiency and emissions benefits but whose benefits are not fully measured using the current 

city-highway test. In a number of cases, these technologies are currently known, as indicated by 

the “menu” of credits developed by the agencies for the proposed rule. However, given the long 

time-frame for the proposed standards, it is very possible that additional technologies will be 

identified which should qualify for off-cycle credits, and the characteristics of these technologies 

cannot currently be predicted. In order to provide an incentive for manufacturers to pursue the 

implementation of these technologies and realize the resulting benefits, it is important that the 

agencies provide maximum flexibility to manufacturers to obtain credits. For these reasons, we 

urge the agencies to avoid imposing unnecessary restrictions on qualification for off-cycle 

credits. The proposed rule establishes numerous restrictions on the use of off-cycle credits which 

appear to be arbitrary and unnecessary to the effective functioning of the GHG and CAFE 

programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 5]

(1) The pre-approved technology “menu.” Global Automakers supports the inclusion of the 

menu in the regulations as a default list of pre-approved technologies, with manufacturers being 

authorized to petition for larger credit or credits for additional technologies, based on credible 

data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 5]

The agencies should also update the menu list from time-to-time, as they receive information on 

additional technologies that provide off-cycle benefits. Inclusion of technologies on the preapproved menu provides a significant incentive for manufacturers to implement those 

technologies, so the menu should be as comprehensive as possible. One example of such a 

technology that is mentioned in the comments on the proposed standards is high efficiency 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-37

alternators. This technology provides benefits greater than those measured in 2-cycle testing, 

since its efficiency advantage is applied to the electrical loads of equipment that is operated 

during typical on-road driving but that is not operated during 2-cycle tests (e.g., lighting, radio, 

etc.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, pp. 5-6]

EPA should not maintain any of the restrictions on off-cycle credits in the absence of a strong 

showing of need for the restriction. Additionally, we believe that the agencies should update the 

off-cycle credits menu in the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 7]

Response:

The EPA agrees with the comments from the Global Automakers that it is important to 

“provide an incentive for manufacturers to pursue the implementation of these technologies and 

realize the resulting benefits” and we believe the off-cycle program achieves this. 

In contrast, the EPA disagrees with statements from the Global Automakers that all of the 

eligibility criteria to receive off-cycle credits are “arbitrary and unnecessary to the effective 

functioning of the GHG and CAFE.” We did revise the criteria for receiving off-cycle credit 

menu default values by eliminating the requirement for 10% market penetration for the 

technologies on the off-cycle technology menu (see Preamble III.C.5.b.i.). However, other 

criteria such as the 10 g/mile total cap for menu-based credits have been retained since these 

criteria “balanc[e] the goal of providing a streamlined pathway to encourage significant 

introduction of innovative off-cycle technologies with the uncertainty inherent with the estimated 

level of credits being provided” (see Preamble III.C.5.b.i.). Therefore, other than the 10% 

market penetration rate requirement, we believe that the eligibility criteria for the default credit 

values in the menu are appropriate. Manufacturers may, of course, seek credits in greater 

amounts for the technologies on the menu using the case-by-case demonstration procedures.

The EPA agrees with the comments from the Global Automakers that we should review 

the list of technologies and consider additions to the off-cycle technology menu. EPA will 

continue to closely watch new technologies and evaluate applications for new off cycle credits as 

they come in. 

Finally, the comments from the Global Automaker regarding high efficiency alternators 

are discussed in greater detail in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule.

Organization: Bosch

The agencies have recognized certain technologies, while having a measurable impact on CO2

and fuel economy on the 2-cycle test, have an even greater impact off-cycle and as such the 

agencies have included these technologies on the pre-approved off-cycle technology credit list. 

Bosch commends the agencies for the inclusion of stop/start and active aerodynamics on this offcycle list. In response to the agencies’ request for input regarding the off-cycle credit list, Bosch 

is proposing the addition of brushless technology for engine cooling fans and high efficiency 

alternators to the pre-approved off-cycle technology credit list. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9462-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

7-38

Brushless technology (EC) for Engine Cooling Fans – This high efficiency technology for 

electrical motors / drives should be added to the pre-approved list of technologies for off-cycle 

credits. Most of today’s vehicles utilize brushed motors (DC) in a series-parallel dual fan 

configuration, which allows for only three fan power levels. In a typical high-power system, 

these levels could equate to 0 watts (OFF), 170 watts (Low Speed), and 660 watts (High Speed). 

Transitioning from series-parallel brushed motors to advanced brushless motor technology 

reduces average vehicle electrical power consumption by 81 watts (Appendix A) – resulting in a 

direct fuel economy improvement of 0.27 mpg assuming standard measurements and 

calculations that form a general rule that reducing vehicle electrical consumption by 30 watts 

will result in a fuel economy improvement of 0.1 mpg. Field data at major OEMs have proven 

this relationship over a number of years for both passenger cars and light duty pickups. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9462-A1, pp. 2-3]

High Efficiency Alternators – While Bosch recognizes high efficiency alternators were included 

as an integral technology in the setting of the standards, and are thus precluded from off-cycle 

credits, the fuel savings and CO2 reduction attributable to high efficiency alternators are greater 

in the 5-cycle versus the 2-cycle tests. Alternator efficiency plays an even greater role in real life 

applications and drive cycles where a higher, more realistic vehicle load is encountered. The base 

alternator efficiency assumed in the NPRM is approximately 65%. Increases in alternator 

efficiency to 75% and up to 82% can be realized using a combination of existing and new 

technologies respectively. Alternators with increased efficiency are a drop-in replacement with 

no other changes needed to the vehicle architecture. Bosch therefore recommends the addition of 

high efficiency alternators to the pre-approved off-cycle technology list. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9462-A1, p. 3]

An example demonstrating the effect of a high efficiency alternator is provided in Appendix B. 

In tests on a GM 2.4L 4 cylinder gasoline engine, an increase in alternator efficiency of 10% 

resulted in 1.23% improvement in fuel economy on the 2-cycle test and 1.93% improvement on 

the 5-cycle test. Typical vehicle electrical loads are included in the appendix. At higher, more 

real world electrical loads, this off-cycle benefit would have an even greater impact on fuel 

consumption. Upon request, additional calculations using the MOVES model as well as 

additional 5-cycle test data can be provided. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9462-A1, p. 3]

Response:

We appreciate the comments from Bosch and the supporting information that the 

company supplied. However, we disagree with Bosch that high-efficiency alternators and 

brushless technology for engine cooling fans should be added to the off-cycle technology menu. 

Our detailed responses to the comments from Bosch on additional technologies for the 

off-cycle technology menu are in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule. To 

summarize, we are not adding high efficiency alternators and brushless technology for engine 

cooling fans to the off-cycle credit menu due to the variability in implementation strategy and 

electrical loads for the systems and related components. This makes it difficult to pinpoint a 

single, default value for the off-cycle technology menu. Therefore, we feel that these 

technologies are better suited for off-cycle credit consideration using the alternate case-by-case 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-39

approval process for technologies not on the off-cycle technology menu. As a result, 

manufacturers may seek off-cycle credit for high efficiency alternators and brushless technology 

for engine cooling fans but must make an individualized demonstration in order to obtain such 

credits. 

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

The Agencies have established separate credits for off-cycle technologies which are expected to 

have different greenhouse gas and fuel consumption benefits for passenger cars and light-duty 

truck. Similar to many of the other off-cycle technologies, active engine and transmission warmup technologies are expected to yield a greater absolute benefit for light-duty trucks. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 6]

Recommend improvements to the process for qualifying additional off-cycle technologies; 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 9]

And provide numerous other technical comments and recommendations on off-cycle 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 9]

Support the establishment of a table of pre-approved off-cycle technologies with defined 

greenhouse gas and fuel consumption benefits; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 9]

Support expansion of the pre-approved off-cycle technology list; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9495-A1, p. 9]

The Agencies propose a pre-approved table of greenhouse gas and fuel consumption 

improvement values for GHG and CAFE compliance applicable to the 2017-2025 MYs. The 

Agencies note that this “Off-Cycle Technology Table” would “significantly streamline and 

simplify the [off-cycle credit] program for manufacturers choosing to use it and would provide 

manufacturers with certainty that credits may be generated through the use of pre-approved 

technologies.” EPA further notes that the values in the Off- Cycle Technology Table were 

developed using “a combination of available activity data from the MOVES model, vehicle and 

test data, and EPA’s vehicle simulation tool to estimate a proposed credit value EPA believes to 

be appropriate.” The approach of the Off-Cycle Technology Table makes sense. By providing 

manufacturers certainty that their efforts to improve real-world greenhouse gas emissions and 

fuel economy will be taken into account for compliance purposes, the Agencies encourage the 

adoption of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 9]

Chrysler recommends that the Agencies define separate passenger car- and light-duty truckspecific credits for active engine and transmission warm-up technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9495-A1, p. 10]

EPA is proposing to establish a list of pre-defined and pre-approved off-cycle technologies. This 

list contains three basic technology types according to the Agencies’ Draft Joint Technical 

Support Document7 (“DJTSD”): technologies which reduce or offset electrical loads; active 
EPA Response to Comments

7-40

aerodynamic improvement technologies; and advanced load reduction technologies. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 10]

The advanced load reduction technologies proposed for inclusion in the pre-defined and preapproved list are engine start-stop (idle off), electric heater circulation pump, active transmission 

warm-up, active engine warm-up, and thermal/solar control technologies. All of these advanced 

load reduction technologies, except for active transmission and active engine warm-up, have 

passenger car and light-duty truck-specific credits derived for them based on their relative 

benefit for cars and trucks. In the case of active transmission and engine warm-up, EPA based 

the estimated benefits on a mid-size car only. EPA should treat all advanced load reduction 

technologies in a similar manner by estimating passenger car and light-duty truck-specific credits 

for active transmission and engine warm-up technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, 

p. 10]

If additional technologies are added to the pre-defined and pre-approved off-cycle technology 

list, Chrysler supports passenger car and light-duty truck specific credits where such 

technologies affect vehicle greenhouse gas emission and fuel consumption in a similar manner to 

advanced load reduction technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 10]

Response:

We appreciate the comments from Chrysler Group LLC and agree with the comments on 

establishing a table of pre-approved off-cycle technologies and credit values, and improvements 

to the process for qualifying additional off-cycle technologies. 

Regarding the comments from Chrysler for separate passenger car and light-duty truckspecific credits for active transmission and engine warm-up technologies, we reviewed our 

estimates for active transmission warm-up and active engine warm-up and revised the default 

credit amount as discussed in Section 5.2.8.3 and 5.2.8.4, respectively of Joint TSD Chapter 5 

and Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule.

Based on our revised estimates, we agree with Chrysler that there is a clear difference in 

the benefit of active transmission and engine warm-up technologies between passenger cars and 

light-duty trucks. Therefore, we are including separate car and truck credits on the off-cycle 

technology menu for active transmission and engine warm-up of 1.5 grams/mi for cars and 3.2 

grams/mi for trucks.

Organization: Denso International America, Inc.

DENSO has developed high efficiency alternators for use in light vehicles and, as a result, has 

significant expertise in this technology. These alternators have a higher degree of effectiveness in 

reducing real-world CO2 emissions than is measured using the Federal Test Procedure/Highway 

Fuel Economy Test 2-cycle procedure. This difference in performance levels is similar to that of 

stop-start systems and active grill shutters, which are included in the pre-defined technology 

“menu” list in section 86.1866-12(d)(1)(i) of the agencies’ proposed 2017-25 rule. Therefore, we 

request that EPA and NHTSA add high efficiency alternators to the off-cycle menu list along 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-41

with the other technologies that have similar performance characteristics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9269-A1, p. 1]

We would be pleased to work with EPA and NHTSA to develop any data or other information 

that EPA and NHTSA need in order to make a determination regarding the appropriateness of 

adding high efficiency alternators to add the pre-defined list. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-

A1, p. 1]

I. Background.

EPA and NHTSA published on August 9, 2011 a Supplemental Notice of Intent announcing 

plans to propose stringent federal greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for model year 

(MY) 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles (hereinafter referred to as the SNOI). The SNOI described 

high efficiency alternators as one of candidates for the off-cycle credits. However, the high 

efficiency alternator was not included in an applicable technology list of § 86.1866–12(d)(1) of 

the proposed rule. Therefore, the proposed off-cycle credit program does not allow 

manufacturers to obtain credits of the high efficiency alternator without EPA prior approval. 

Inclusion of the technology in the off-cycle menu is important, since it provides an assurance to 

vehicle manufacturers that they will receive a specified credit for use of the technology, 

significantly improving the marketability of the technology. In this way, the emissions and 

energy benefits of the technology will be maximized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, p. 1]

II. Electrical load over 2 cycle (FTP/HFET) test and real world condition.

High efficiency alternators supply electrical power to vehicle electrical equipment with less 

required engine power than normal efficiency alternators. The reduction of required engine 

power by the high efficiency alternators yields a corresponding reduction of CO2

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, p. 1]

The benefit of the high efficiency alternators over real world condition cannot be sufficiently 

captured by the 2 cycle (FTP/HFET) test procedure, however. This is because the electrical load 

over the 2 cycle test condition is much less than the load over real world condition. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, p. 2]

DENSO estimates that the electrical load of vehicles over 2 cycle test conditions and real world 

conditions are as shown in Table 1. We estimate the electrical load over 2 cycle test conditions is 

240W and over real world condition is 750W. If the electrical load of optional equipment which 

may be selected by the driver is considered, the real world electrical load is increased to 1470W. 

This means that the CO2 reduction benefit by the high efficiency alternator, which we project to 

be 510W (750W – 240W) at minimum, is not captured by the 2 cycle test. Therefore, we believe 

that the high efficiency alternator is qualified as an off-cycle technology. [See Table 1 on page 2 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, 

p. 2]

According to the Draft Technical Support Document (TSD) for the NPRM, section 5.2.1, EPA 

and NHTSA estimate that a reduction of required engine power of 100W yields 3.0g/mi CO2
EPA Response to Comments

7-42

emission reduction over the 2 cycle test and 3.7g/mi CO2 emission reduction over the 5 cycle 

test. Table 2 shows our brief simulation of CO2 reduction benefit by improving the alternator 

efficiency from an average 65% to average 75% and using the EPA and NHTSA study in the 

TSD and our estimation of vehicle electrical load. Based on this simulation, we can estimate that 

a 2.8 g/mi CO2 reduction is available by improving of the alternator efficiency. This constitutes a 

substantial real world CO2 emission reduction. Therefore, the high efficiency alternator should 

be included in the menu list of off-cycle credits to promote the introduction of the technology. 

[See Table 2 on page 3 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9269-A1, pp. 2-3]

III. Off-cycle credit for high efficiency alternators in passenger car CO2 emission regulation in 

Europe.

The European Union (EU) has adopted CO2 emission reduction regulations for passenger cars 

effective in 2012, through their Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009. Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009 

provides “eco-innovation” credits, which are similar to the U.S. proposed off-cycle credits. The 

eco-innovation credits are available for technologies whose CO2 reduction benefit cannot be 

fully measured using the EU CO2 emission test methodology (New European Driving Cycle, 

“NEDC”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, p. 3]

On July 25, 2011, the EU published a regulation (Commission Regulation (EU) No. 725/2011) 

and a technical guideline document to establish type approval procedures for eco-innovation 

credits. The technical guideline document describes the high efficiency alternator as one of the 

technologies that qualifies for eco-innovation credits, and establishes the credit calculation 

methodology for such alternators. This methodology should be considered by EPA and NHTSA 

as a reference for developing an off-cycle credit for high efficiency alternators in the U.S. final 

rule. According to the guideline, because the electrical load of the vehicle over real world 

conditions is larger than the load over NEDC test, the CO2 reduction benefit of the high 

efficiency alternator cannot be sufficiently measured using the NEDC test. Therefore, EU 

determined the high efficiency alternator as one of technologies that qualifies for eco-innovation 

credits. See the technical guideline at 

http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/vehicles/cars/docs/guidelines_en.pdf [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, p. 3]

The eco-innovation credit calculation methodology for the high efficiency alternator is described 

in paragraph 8.4 of the EU technical guideline. The credit of the alternator is calculated as 

follows. [See the calculation on page 4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9269-A1, p. 4]

Response:

We appreciate the comments from Denso International America, Inc. and the supporting 

information that they supplied. However, we disagree with Denso that high-efficiency 

alternators should be added to the off-cycle technology menu. 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-43

Our detailed responses to the comments from Denso on the addition of high-efficiency 

alternators to the off-cycle technology menu are in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final 

rule. To summarize, we are not adding high efficiency alternators to the off-cycle technology 

menu due to variability in implementation strategy and electrical loads for the systems and 

related components. This makes it difficult to pinpoint a single, default value for the off-cycle 

technology menu. Therefore, we feel that this technology is better suited for off-cycle credit 

consideration using the alternate method approval process for technologies not on the off-cycle 

technology menu. As a result, manufacturers seeking off-cycle credit for high efficiency 

alternators must pursue this path.

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

It is vital that EPA continue to evaluate off-cycle technologies and consider adding technologies 

to the pre-approved list even after the Final Rule's adoption. Similarly, manufacturers should 

always have the ability to provide data for pre-approved technologies to demonstrate a credit 

value greater than that assigned on the EPA pre-approved list. EcoMotors encourages EPA to 

continue to provide as much guidance and certainty to OEMs as possible (via guidance letters or 

other mechanisms), as this program continues to evolve and as new technologies emerge and are 

developed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 13]

Response:

The EPA agrees with the comments from EcoMotors International, Inc. The alternate 

method approval process for technologies not on the off-cycle technology menu is a pathway for 

manufacturers to “provide data for pre-approved technologies to demonstrate a credit value 

greater than that assigned on the EPA pre-approved list.” Therefore, we believe the provisions 

for the off-cycle credit program in this final rule address the comments from EcoMotors 

International, Inc.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Further, we believe that there is opportunity to expand the menu beyond the currently proposed 

list to capture other fuel-saving technologies such as high efficiency alternators, HVAC EcoMode, transmission oil cooler bypass valves, and electronic thermostats and electric water 

pumps. The inclusion of these items to the list may encourage more widespread implementation 

of these technologies. The list of technologies (currently proposed and new) and credit levels, as 

proposed by the Alliance and supported by Ford, is shown below: [The list can be found on p. 16 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, 

p. 15]

The addition of the predefined technology menu is extremely beneficial to manufacturers as it 

provides a clear methodology to achieve credits for technologies that provide real world fuel 

economy benefits that are not reflected in the regulated test procedures. To improve this method 

even further, Ford agrees that several of the menu technology definitions should be revised to 

improve clarity or to broaden their scope of applicability. We also propose that some of the 
EPA Response to Comments

7-44

credits should be adjusted to higher levels, based on industry data, as detailed in the Alliance 

comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 15]

In addition to the technologies discussed and listed above, we anticipate working with EPA to 

establish the correct methodologies to account for benefits of in-vehicle systems that provide 

tools for more efficient driving. Driver coaching or feedback systems, such as Ford EcoMode, 

can result in more fuel efficient driver behavior (e.g., less aggressive acceleration or braking, 

more efficient shifting, etc.) and have already deployed successfully in our hybrid electric 

vehicles and the new Ford Focus. Similarly, vehicle maintenance alerts and reminders can help 

drivers ensure that their vehicles are operating efficiently; for example, Ford’s Crew Chief 

program, offered to fleet customers, currently helps drive fleet efficiency through improved 

vehicle maintenance by communicating oil life and low tire pressure to the fleet manager. 

Opportunities to expand these capabilities could provide significant real world fuel savings 

across our customer fleet. Finally, route planning tools can assist drivers in finding the best route 

as well as avoiding (and thus reducing) congestion. Real world benefits to both greenhouse gas 

emissions and fuel economy can be achieved through these technologies, and while quantifying 

the benefit is an acknowledged challenge, we look forward to further discussion with the 

agencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 16]

While the pre-approved technology list is only proposed to apply for 2017 and later MYs, Ford 

would support an allowance to also use it for 2012-2016 MY vehicles. If the same technologies 

are used prior to 2017, we believe they should be eligible for the same benefits. Such an 

extension of the menu would help to encourage earlier implementation of these technologies. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 17]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 44-47.]

Further, we anticipate working together to establish the correct methodologies to account for the 

benefits of driver-activated technologies. For example, coaching systems result in more fuelefficient driver behavior as well as eco-route planning tools can provide a significant 

improvement in real-world fuel economy.

Response:

The EPA agrees with the comments from Ford Motor Company that “the predefined 

technology menu is extremely beneficial to manufacturers as it provides a clear methodology to 

achieve credits for technologies that provide real world fuel economy benefits.” 

Our responses to the comments from Ford Motor Company on additional technologies for 

the off-cycle technology credit menu including High Efficiency Alternators, HVAC Eco-Mode, 

Bypass Valves for Transmission Oil Cooler, and Electronic Thermostat and Electric Water Pump 

are discussed in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule. In summary, we are not 

adding these technologies to the off-cycle technology menu but credit for these technologies may 

be requested using the alternate method approval process for technologies not on the off-cycle 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-45

technology menu. Responses to comments regarding off-cycle credit eligibility for crash 

avoidance and driver interactive technologies are likewise discussed in preamble section II.F 2.

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

1) Modifications to the Off-Cycle Menu: Hyundai supports the menu format for off-cycle 

technologies which will allow for a less burdensome path of accounting for the performance of 

several well-accepted technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.5]

2) Update of Off-Cycle Technology Menu: Hyundai recommends that the agencies conduct an 

annual update of the existing menu technologies to ensure that improvements in the technologies, 

which are likely to occur over the extended time period of the rule, are properly reflected in the 

menu. In addition, Hyundai strongly requests that the menu list be updated annually with new 

technologies that have been approved by the agencies. Hyundai believes it is unnecessary for 

manufacturers to generate burdensome confirmatory data of off-cycle technology benefits if the 

data is already available. Additionally, this has the potential of reducing the agencies' burden in 

reviewing redundant technologies and reducing the time and number of public review requests. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.5]

Response:

We agree with the comments from Hyundai America Technical Center that the off-cycle 

technology menu “will allow for a less burdensome path of accounting for the performance of 

several well-accepted technologies.” However, we disagree with the comments from Hyundai 

that the agencies should “conduct an annual update of the existing menu technologies to ensure 

that improvements are properly reflected in the menu.” 

The off-cycle technology menu was adopted to add a certain level of stability to the offcycle credit program. Continually updating the off-cycle technology menu on an annual basis 

has the complete opposite effect. Further, the menu is part of the rule and can only be amended 

through notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings. 

In addition, the alternate demonstration methods for technologies not on the off-cycle 

technology menu offers a pathway for manufacturers to demonstrate benefits and request credit 

beyond the technologies (or the amounts) offered in the off-cycle technology menu. The offcycle technology menu credit values are based on existing technology and currently available 

information using conservative estimates. As individual manufacturers develop specific 

technology that achieves greater benefits (than those listed on the menu), it would be imprudent 

to reflect this on annual basis in the off-cycle technology menu since not all vehicles are not 

expected to have identical technology effectiveness and implementation. Thus, credit values are 

expected to vary. Therefore, the alternate demonstration method process is better suited for caseby-case evaluations where there is insufficient data to support a default credit or where the level 

of credit may depend on a specific manufacturer’s design.

Finally, regarding the Hyundai comments on burden, it should be noted that the 

information used in the alternate demonstration method process can be used as long as the off-
EPA Response to Comments

7-46

cycle technology and the vehicle application remain unchanged. In this manner, this data can be 

carried over on an annual basis, provided no changes have occurred, thus reducing the burden for 

requesting and approving credit. Further, as Hyundai points out in their comments, if the data is 

already available to the manufacturer, there is no need to “generate burdensome confirmatory 

data of off-cycle technology benefits.”

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG supports credits to encourage vehicle technologies that reduce CO2 emissions by reducing 

collisions resulting in fuel consuming traffic congestion. Below DAG suggests a package menu 

approach with conservatively-based credit opportunities that will encourage the deployment of 

these technologies and considerably reduce CO2 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, p. 2]

With regard to particular off-cycle credits, DAG supports the Alliance proposal for calculating 

the potential for High Efficiency Light Savings. However, in the event that the agencies do not 

adopt the Alliance proposal, DAG suggests that the agencies adopt EPA's methodology, as 

described in the draft Joint Technical Support Document (TSD § 5.2.1.1). DAG believes that all 

cars equipped with LED lighting systems should be eligible for an off-cycle credit, even if LED 

lighting is not used on all lamps throughout the vehicle. DAG proposes both that the credit be 

premised on the real power consumption of the LED-light systems actually incorporated into the 

vehicle, and further that both low and high beam LED light systems be eligible. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-3]

The process DAG envisions to account for this off-cycle credit would be that the manufacturer 

supply the agencies with electric power consumption of each LED light system on the vehicle. 

Using that data, the off-cycle credit can be derived according to the methodology described in 

Table 5.21 in the draft TSD, with the exception that the electric power consumption of the high 

efficiency LED system supplied by the manufacturer be used rather than the values in the table. 

This change in the methodology will not limit the off-cycle credit to vehicles fully equipped with 

high efficiency LED lighting; it will instead allow vehicles partially equipped with high 

efficiency LED lighting to also be eligible for the off-cycle credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9483-A1, p. A-3]

As the agencies began to construct a CO2 program complementing the traditional fuel economy 

program, EPA and NHTSA recognized that the traditional definition of 'fuel economy' is 

restrictive and that significant additional reductions in emissions and fuel consumption can be 

attained by encouraging the advent of vehicle-based technologies that reduce fuel consumption 

in ways that are not reflected in the federal test procedures. As a result, the agencies have 

included within their assessments CO2 and fuel consumption reductions associated with 

enhanced air conditioning efficiencies and reduced refrigerant leakage. The agencies have also 

created an off-cycle CO2 and fuel consumption improvement program to encourage the 

proliferation of technologies capturing these additional benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9483-A1, pp. A-6-A-7]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-47

Similar to off-cycle technologies are technologies that lead directly to CO2 and fuel 

consumptions reductions by avoiding crashes and the associated traffic congestion they cause. 

Crash avoidance technologies serve not only to promote motor vehicle safety, but also to ease the 

flow of traffic and to mitigate traffic congestion that is associated with motor vehicle collisions. 

The real world CO2 and fuel economy benefits of these technologies, when they are not 

mandated through regulation, should be recognized and their widespread deployment encouraged 

within the context of the GHG and fuel economy programs.13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, p. A-7]

Below DAG sets forth the analytic foundation and the suggested elements of a program to 

encourage and to acknowledge the significant CO2 and fuel consumption benefits associated with 

the potential for these technologies to reduce crash-induced congestion. While these benefits are 

derived independently of NHTSA's safety mission, promoting vehicle-based technologies that 

avoid crashes in order to reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions is entirely consistent with 

that mission. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-7]

Significantly, in the context of saving fuel and reducing CO2 emissions, the relevant linkage in 

terms of any technology's effectiveness is whether the agencies can link the technology to crash 

avoidance and enhanced traffic flow, not whether the agencies can link the technology to 

reduced fatalities and injuries. As a result, the technologies encouraged within the GHG and 

CAFE programs need not be premised on technologies already approved by NHTSA within the 

New Car Assessment Program or other safety programs linked to fatalities and injuries. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-7]

DAG acknowledges the inherent limitations in trying to quantify specific levels of CO2

reductions to particular features. There is clear data, however, relating unnecessary fuel 

consumption to traffic congestion and traffic congestion to collisions. There is also data showing 

the effectiveness of certain crash avoidance technologies. The agencies have linked crashinduced congestion to excess fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. With the CO2 benefits of 

crash mitigation clear, the agencies have an opportunity to encourage significant additional 

emissions benefits through promoting crash avoidance technologies, and can do so through a 

process utilizing conservative assumptions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-7]

The fact that crash avoidance technologies are a primary countermeasure within NHTSA's safety 

program should not preclude the agencies from gaining the substantial CO2 and fuel 

consumption benefits associated avoiding crashes and enhancing the efficiency of the 

transportation system. The agencies need not limit their authority to advance the fundamental 

policies embedded in each empowering statute by focusing too narrowly on the specific type of 

regulatory action each has traditionally issued. The National Program in particular represents a 

regulatory transformation. Three government bodies are working together under a historic 

program to harmonize regulatory programs all aimed at common theme; and the historically 

separate considerations of emissions and safety have converged. This convergence is an 

opportunity to improve emissions reductions and fuel economy within the GHG and CAFE 

program with the corollary effect of also advancing motor vehicle safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9483-A1, p. A-7]
EPA Response to Comments

7-48

The Clean Air Act obligates EPA to redress endangerments to public health and welfare arising 

as the result of the emission of air pollutants. The concept of welfare, in particular, is broad and 

encompasses a wide array of potential dangers. As set forth in more detail below, EPA has 

determined that traffic congestion is a substantial contributor endangering public health and 

welfare due to the excessively unnecessary amounts of fuel consumed, and also that climate 

change is leading to more weather-related traffic accidents and delays. Having already linked 

traffic accidents, congestion, climate change and the endangerment to public health and welfare, 

EPA is well within its authority under the Clean Air Act to redress the endangerment posed by 

undue CO2 emissions caused by traffic crashes by encouraging the deployment of crash 

avoidance technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-7-A-8]

Similarly, the CAFE program has long promoted the convergence of safety and fuel economy 

considerations. Not only has NHTSA long taken into account any potentially adverse safety 

implications that might arise from mass reduction, but also NHTSA has affirmatively designed 

the CAFE program with the explicit aim of addressing safety. Specifically, while it is widely 

acknowledged that weight is more closely aligned with fuel economy, the agency chose footprint 

as the attribute upon which to base the CAFE program. The decision to base the fuel economy 

program on a footprint attribute was expressly linked to the fact that doing so promoted motor 

vehicle safety in addition to fuel economy. NHTSA, therefore, has already inexorably linked the 

CAFE program with advancing its safety mission. The provision of congestion mitigation credits 

based on crash avoidance technologies is simply a further extension of the well-received policy 

decisions the agency has previously made. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-8]

EPA has also confirmed the correlation between reducing congestion from motor vehicle crashes 

and reducing emissions. In a recent report aimed at providing information to local governments 

on effective Transportation Control Measures, the agency noted that 'efforts to improve the 

efficiency of transportation ... help reduce air pollution and GHG emissions, improve energy 

security and independence, and save money. One of the specific measures suggested by EPA is 

to: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-9-A-10]

Enhance incident management systems. Incident management systems focus on quickly clearing 

roadways of accidents and stalled vehicles. These systems typically include roving tow or service 

vehicles, motorist aid call boxes, contingency planning, and other means for quickly responding 

to incidents (U.S. EPA, 1998b). Traffic incidents account for about one-quarter of all congestion 

on U.S. roadways, and for every minute that a freeway travel lane is blocked during a peak travel 

period, four minutes of travel delay results after the incident is cleared (National Traffic Incident 

Management Coalition, Undated). Since traffic incident management helps to minimize and 

prevent congestion, these systems can reduce fuel consumption by more than I percent annually 

and save 2,600-7,700 gallons of gasoline per incident, thereby reducing associated vehicle 

emissions [U.S. DOT, Undated(d)]. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-10]

NHTSA's most recent Vehicle Safety and Fuel Economy Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan 

for 2011-2013 identifies the potential for crash avoidance technologies to reduce these 

congestion-causing collisions:
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-49

From the crash avoidance perspective, NHTSA looks at types of crashes that might be mitigated 

by new technologies. Based on the General Estimates System (GES) and the Fatality Analysis 

Reporting System (FARS), four types of crashes total 85 percent of all crashes. These include 

Run-Off-Road (23%), Rear-End (28%), Lane Change (9%), and Crossing Path (25%). [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-10]

Longitudinal assistance, lateral assistance, and driver attention monitoring can alleviate a 

significant number of these collisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-10]

The Agencies can Reasonably Estimate the Fuel Savings Associated with Crash Avoidance 

Technologies

Certain crash avoidance technologies have had enough exposure the market to establish that they 

have a statistically significant impact on reducing collisions. Data from the German insurance 

institute GDV/UDV shows that Advanced Driver Assistance Systems have significantly reduced 

collisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-10]

With 25% of the congestion in the United States due to traffic incidents, and an overall fuel loss 

from congestion of approximately 38 million tons, about 9.5 million tons of CO2 loss annually is 

associated with traffic incidents. Scaling this loss to vehicle miles traveled results in 

approximately 6 grams CO2 per vehicle per mile if all accidents could be avoided. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-10]

The longitudinal assistance technologies Forward Collision Warning and Adaptive Brake Assist 

have already been proven effective in real world field data. Scaling the GDV/UDV field 

experience to U.S. crash data, DAG estimates up to 15% of crashes could be avoided by 

deploying such a Primary Longitudinal Assistance Package. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, pp. A-10-A-11]

Adding to the proven effectiveness of primary longitudinal assistance technology is a more 

Advanced Longitudinal Assistance Package incorporating Autonomous Emergency Braking and 

Adaptive Cruise Control. DAG estimates that such a system could potentially avoid up to 18% of 

crashes. This package provides the most advanced longitudinal anti-collision technology and is 

currently cost-effective only on high priced luxury vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, p. A-11]

There are other technologies where effectiveness estimates are more difficult to attain but where 

data suggests that the technology will have a significant positive impact on avoiding traffic 

collisions. NHTSA has already recognized lane departure warning as an effective crash 

avoidance technology (along with forward collision warning). Active Lane Keeping Assist 

combined with Blind Spot Assist provides a Lane Tracking Package that offers significant 

potential to reduce CO2 both by averting up to 5% of crashes and by maintaining the flow of 

traffic by averting 'near misses.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-11]

Driver Attention Monitor is another promising technology. A survey of owners who have had the 

attention assistance feature in Mercedes vehicles for about a year found that the system was 
EPA Response to Comments

7-50

effective in helping drivers to avoid fatigue. Sixty-eight percent of those surveyed indicated that 

they took a break from driving when the attention assistance alerted them to the fact that their 

driving behavior had become more erratic.20 Fatigue, in turn is a significant factor in traffic 

collisions.21 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-11]

Adaptive Forward Lighting systems provide enhanced visibility in a variety of driving conditions 

which enhance the driver's ability to safely operate their vehicle. Emerging field experience 

suggests these systems may be highly effective in reducing crashes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9483-A1, p. A-11]

There are currently accepted technical understandings regarding the definitional and/or 

performance criteria for many of the technologies listed below. Brake Assist systems are defined 

in ECE regulations (UN-R-13H, Annex 9, Part B). NHTSA's NCAP program already includes 

performance specifications for Forward Collision Warning and Lane Departure Warning, and the 

agency is working towards performance specifications for Dynamic Brake Support and Collision 

Imminent Braking systems. Adaptive Cruise Control and Lane Keeping Assist are subject to 

various ISO definitions which could be applied as appropriate. For those technologies where 

NHTSA is currently working, we would anticipate that the work would be complete well before 

Model Year 20 I7 and further that NHTSA or other standards organizations will address 

additional technologies, such as Attention Assist or Adaptive Forward Lighting. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-11]

Regulation to mandate new technology and/or to link technology directly to fatalities or injuries 

necessitates specific definitions and performance criteria to determine compliance or eligibility. 

DAG understands that NHTSA, SAE, ISO, and others are working towards concrete and 

performance based definitions applicable to ensuring that these features will result in reduced 

fatalities and injuries. However, the level of stringency needed to develop and validate functional 

definitions and objective test procedures for collision avoidance safety systems is necessarily 

causing this process to take a considerable amount of time. In the context of gaining the 

emissions and fuel economy benefits of reducing collision-induced congestion, there is no need 

to link the definitions and performance criteria to reduced fatalities and injuries; instead, 

technologies are appropriate if they can reasonably be shown to avoid accidents, and thereby 

reduce congestion and its associated fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-11-A-12]

The chart below summarizes a proposed credit methodology with technology packages and 

suggested credit opportunities. DAG proposes that NHTSA allow a manufacturer to submit to 

the agency data specific to its product offerings showing that its technology is effective in 

reducing vehicles collisions. NHTSA may approve the application and determine the amount of 

the credit and would be assured that the technology is robust and effective in terms of crash 

avoidance and the consequent fuel savings.22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-12]

DAG conducted an extensive review of the available literature, including published OEM studies 

by, for example, Honda and Bosch, and the German Insurance Institute GDV/UDV 

quantification of brake assist benefits for all crashes (including non-injury crashes) based on 

POL insurance data (20022006) case-by-case simulation. Consistent with DAG's suggestion that 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-51

each company present its package, the benefits may be adjusted slightly to account for which 

features are included. For example, the GDV study finds that an emergency brake assist (EBA2) 

system with Forward Collision Warning and Adaptive Brake Assist results in an approximate 

12% reduction in all passenger vehicle crashes in all crash types with all crash partners within 

the German study. Adaptive Brake Assist with Autonomous Emergency Braking (EBA2+) 

results in an approximate 13.9% reduction in all passenger vehicle crash types with all partners 

within the German study. Adjusting for the percentage of crashes that are rear-end crashes 

(22.2% in GDV vs. 28% in US) renders an effectiveness rate between 15.3% and 17.5% for these 

longitudinal assistance packages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-12]

With regard to the Lane Keeping Package, NHTSA has estimated effectiveness of approximately 

6%. This includes an assumption of 55% availability. Taking a more conservative approach, for 

this purpose it is reasonable to assume a 5% effectiveness rate in reducing crashes. The 

remaining technologies listed below will produce effectiveness data before and through the 

rulemaking model years and should be considered for inclusion in a congestion reduction credit 

program as they are becoming offered in the light duty fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, p. A-12]

Individually and collectively these technologies will measurably diminish traffic incidents, and 

therefore fuel consumption. In light of the significant amount of fuel wasted every year in 

collision-induced congestion, applying maximum credit opportunities of 1 g/m or less per 

package places a conservative value on proliferating these technologies throughout the fleet. 

Manufacturers should be encouraged to incorporate all fuel saving and emissions reducing 

technologies into their offerings, whether those features reduce CO2 emissions on a per vehicle 

basis or whether they reduce CO2 emissions through technologies proven to be effective in 

reducing a significant cause of fuel-consuming congestion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, p. A-13]

The Agencies Have Ample Legal Authority to Provide Congestion Mitigation Credits

Both EPA and NHTSA have ample legal authority to provide credits for fuel consumption 

improvements that lead directly to CO2 reductions. In reviewing this authority, it is important to 

consider that providing credits for technologies that reduce fuel consuming congestion due to 

traffic congestion involves no policy trade-offs. To the contrary, the credits would promote each 

of the policies that both agencies are charged with promoting: environmental protection, fuel 

economy, public health and welfare and motor vehicle safety. As such, the suggested credit 

program is fully consistent with the public objectives underlying each of the agencies' enabling 

statutes and would be fully harmonious with all statutory provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9483-A1, pp. A-13-A-14]

First, the legal authority for congestion reduction credits is similar to that utilized by the agencies 

to establish off-cycle and fuel consumption improvement credits for technologies that reduce 

CO2 in ways that are not measured in the applicable and traditional fuel economy tests. There has 

been no dispute that EPA has the authority to promote further CO2 reductions under the Clean 

Air Act. As the agencies have recognized, the authority to apply such credits under EPCA is 
EPA Response to Comments

7-52

based on EPA's authority to define the methodology to calculate fuel economy for purposes of 

determining compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-14]

Second, the congestion reduction credits are wholly consistent with EPA's obligation to address 

the endangerment to public health and welfare identified as arising from the air pollutant at issue. 

In this case, EPA has found that part of the endangerment to public and welfare arising from 

climate change is a potential increase in traffic incidents. The agency concluded, for example, 

that 'the increase in heavy precipitation will cause increases in weather-related accidents, delays, 

and traffic disruptions in a network that is already being challenged by increasing congestion. 

Traffic congestion leads to excess CO2 emissions and CO2 emissions lead to more traffic 

congestion - creating a circle of endangerment and effect that can be diminished through the 

advent of technologies that help to avert the cause of the emissions and the resulting additional 

endangerment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-14]

Third, a credit program that achieves CO2 reductions while also advancing safety is also 

consistent with both the Clean Air Act and with EPCA. EPA has long considered any adverse 

safety impacts from mandating a particular emissions control technology. The agency, moreover, 

has construed 'effects on welfare' broadly to encompass an array of considerations that may 

result from the consequences of air pollution. The courts have also long upheld NHTSA's 

consideration of safety impacts when determining maximum feasible fuel economy 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-14]

Indeed, the agencies have embedded considerations of safety into the fabric of the regulatory 

program by taking safety considerations into account in deciding upon footprint as the attribute 

and in deciding on the structure of the curves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-14]

The agencies need not base the legal authority to establish congestion reduction credits on the 

advancement of safety. The credits are independently justified by the fuel consumption and CO2

reductions they create. Significantly, however, there is robust precedent for linking together the 

GHG program with advancing motor vehicle safety and promoting both CO2 reductions and 

motor vehicle safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-14-A-15]

13 As with off-cycle credits, the fuel consumption reductions associated with these technologies 

need not be specifically accounted for when establishing the CO2 and CAFE standards. These 

technologies represent another area where significant gains can be made if the agencies 

incentivize the widespread deployment of these technologies.

20 The attention assist operates by analyzing steering wheel movements for the driver and 

providing an alert when steering inputs deviate from that driver's normal pattern. Attention assist 

not only helps alert drivers to the need to rest when fatigued, but also can help alert drivers who 

have become distracted.

21 A NHTSA study showed that 80% of accidents and 65% of near-accidents are caused by the 

inattentiveness of the driver, including drowsiness. See NHTSA, The Impact of Driver 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-53

Inattention on Near-Crash/Crash Risk: An Analysis Using the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving 

Study Data, DOT HS 810 594 (Apr. 2006). Various studies have estimated that between 10 and 

25% of severe traffic accidents can be attributed to driver drowsiness. NHTSA has reported that 

annually about 100,000 crashes in the U.S., with 40,000 persons injured and 1,550 killed, are the 

result of driver sleepiness. NHTSA, Research on Drowsy Driving, 

http://www.nhtsa.gov/Driving+Safety/Distracted+Driving/Research+on+Drowsy+Driving.

22 DAG does not believe that this process would overwhelm the agency. Agency personnel are 

already familiar with the technologies and much of the data relating to these technologies. This 

process would put the onus on each manufacturer to develop robust data regarding its 

technologies and to present that information in a clear and concise manner to enable the agency 

to make a determination as to whether the credit should be applicable. Manufacturers may be 

required to submit this data with their pre-model year report and/or in their EPA certification 

applications. This process is similar to applying for air conditioning credits and DAG believes it 

can be implemented efficiently and without the need for substantial agency resources to be 

devoted to an additional task.

Response:

We appreciate the comments from Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and agree with the 

comments on high efficiency exterior lighting. As discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.3 of 

TSD Chapter 5, we are allowing manufacturers to receive off-cycle credit for partial lighting 

elements and agree that the approach suggested by Mercedes-Benz makes sense. In addition, we 

are allowing scaling of the lighting elements if the benefits achieved exceed those set forth in 

Table 5-21, Section 5.2.3 of TSD Chapter 5.

However, we disagree with the comments from Mercedes-Benz regarding eligibility of 

crash avoidance technologies for off-cycle credits. This issue is discussed further in Section 

II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule. As stated there, the agencies do not believe that a 

“calculable relationship between congestion mitigation and fuel/CO2 savings directly attributable 

to individual vehicles produced by a manufacturer, or even to a manufacturer’s fleet of vehicles” 

and that “for a technology to be “counted” under the credit provisions, it must make direct 

improvements to the performance of the specific vehicle to which it is applied.” In addition, and 

importantly, in the agencies’ judgment, evaluation of crash avoidance technologies is better 

addressed under NHTSA’s vehicle safety authority than under a case-by-case off-cycle credit 

process.

Therefore, we are finalizing today that crash avoidance technologies are not eligible for 

off-cycle credit under any off-cycle credit pathway (e.g., off-cycle technology menu, alternate 

method demonstration process).

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

In response to the agencies’ request for input on off-cycle technologies and the “Pre-Defined 

Credit List,” MEMA has a few proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.7]
EPA Response to Comments

7-54

Second, collectively, the MEMA supports the technologies, emissions and fuel consumption 

estimates in the NPRM’s proposed Pre-Defined Credit List. The estimates presented in the 

NPRM tables are relatively on par, and, in some cases may even be on the conservative side. 

Also, MEMA believes there are other technologies currently in the field with proven off-cycle 

benefits that were not in the NPRM (some examples include high efficiency alternators and 

brushless motor technology for engine cooling fans). These and other technologies, as 

appropriate, should be considered for inclusion on the list. Since MEMA represents a wide 

variety of motor vehicle parts manufacturers that make a huge range of various products, 

components and systems, we fully expect individual member companies to submit comments 

and specific remarks not only about the Pre-Defined technologies list and their corresponding 

ranges in the NPRM, but also about adding to the agencies’ “menu” of technology choices for 

the final rule. MEMA asks that the agencies consider and fully evaluate those requests that have 

comprehensive, valid and confirmed data demonstrating the real-world, off-cycle benefits for 

revision to or inclusion in the final rule’s Pre-Defined Credit List. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9478-A1, p.7]

Fourth, with respect to the “engine heat recovery” technology credit in the tables and in the 

proposed regulatory text definition, MEMA finds the term not very descriptive and confusing; 

also, it is inadvertently interchanged in the NPRM with “exhaust heat recovery” (also see our 

comment in Section IX). The engine heat recovery technology mentioned in the agencies’ 

Technical Support Document (thermoelectric) can, in fact, be used to recover exhaust heat or any 

other source of heat. The industry, academia, and the Department of Energy have called the 

group of technologies that fall under the rulemaking nomenclature of “engine and exhaust heat” 

as “waste heat recovery” (WHR) technologies. Utilizing recovered heat and repurposing for 

other vehicle tasks, increases efficiencies for all types of vehicles – internal combustion engines 

and hybrids, alike. In some cases, the WHR system generates electricity and in other cases it can 

be used to expedite the warm-up of engines, transmissions, rear axles, and even the passenger 

compartment, to reduce ancillary loads and, for hybrid vehicles, to speed up the transition to allelectric mode. The source of the waste heat – whether the exhaust stream, engine coolant EGR 

cooler, or other – is all dependent on numerous criteria selected by the OEM to produce the most 

cost-effective solution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.8]

In keeping with our technology-neutral thesis, MEMA recommends that all these technologies be 

classified as WHR and the credits be listed separately as has been proposed in the NPRM. If the 

technology converts waste heat into 100W of electrical power, regardless of the technology, then 

a 0.7 g/mi credit is applied. If the technology uses waste heat for active transmission or engine 

warm-up, then the 1.8 g/mi credit would be applied. Due to its significant benefit, a credit for 

using waste heat to warm the passenger compartment in hybrid vehicles should be considered. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.8]

Furthermore, MEMA believes that essentially any WHR technology, beyond those listed in the 

proposal (such as, thermal control of electronics and vehicle cabin climate control) that achieves 

the significant improvements, efficiencies and goals of the Program, should be considered for 

credit. If the EPA and NHTSA desire to have separate nomenclature, then we recommend that 

they be more descriptive (but technology-neutral) and be consistent throughout the rule, rather 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-55

than “engine” or “exhaust” heat recovery. For example, engine heat recovery could be labeled as 

“eWHR” for electric WHR. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.8]

There are special cases where even off-cycle technologies are difficult to evaluate using 

traditional test methods (e.g., dynamometer testing, etc.). Advances being made in vehicle 

telematics can very directly influence driving behavior – but it requires active driver inputs. By 

providing information that will aid the driver to drive more efficiently, we propose that there are 

considerations made in the decision-making process to allow technologies that cannot be 

quantified literally, but rather could be argued to have a positive impact on fuel consumption 

reduction and improved emissions. For example, the use of real-time traffic information to avoid 

congestion has been demonstrated to significantly reduce CO2 emissions. Since historical testing 

methodologies cannot accurately quantify these benefits, new test methodologies that currently 

do not exist must be developed. MEMA encourages the agencies to form a working 

“partnership” to develop new test methodologies. The use of existing statistical traffic data 

should be used as much as possible in analytically modeling and quantifying the benefits. 

Instrumented vehicles and road tests would be required to statistically validate the results of any 

analytical models. There is precedent for providing CAFE credits based on a projected usage 

factor of a fuel saving device. Since the actual real-world usage of a traffic avoidance system 

cannot be guaranteed for 100 percent of the time, a similar percentage credit should be applied 

based on the anticipated usage rate. In addition to real-time traffic technologies, the agencies 

should be open to consider other automatic and driver-initiated location content-based 

technologies that have been shown to reduce fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9478-A1, p.9]

Under the Pre-Defined Credit List and related tables, MEMA points out some needed 

clarifications. First, the term “engine heat recovery” – which is used in Tables II-11, III-17 and 

III-18, in the proposed regulatory text (§ 86.1866–12 at page 75383), and in the TSD (at page 5-

62) – is contrary to the NPRM text at page 75023 in Columns 2 and 3, which uses the term 

“exhaust heat recovery” (emphasis added). MEMA believes the unwitting interchange of 

“engine” with “exhaust” in this instance was an error. Therefore, for clarification purposes, 

MEMA asks that as the agencies develop the final rule, they ensure the nomenclature used to 

describe “engine heat recovery” is consistent with the term’s application in the Tables and in the 

regulatory text and is not interchanged with the term “exhaust heat recovery.” (Please refer to 

Section VI.B.2. for more information.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.12]

Response:

The EPA agrees with the comments from the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers 

Association (MEMA) regarding the terminology and range of technologies considered for waste 

heat recovery. This is reflected in our responses in 5.2.2 and 5.2.5 (i.e., definitions) of Joint TSD 

Chapter 5.

Regarding the comments from MEMA on interactive, driver-based technologies, our 

responses on this topic are discussed in Section II.F.2., III.C and III.E.11. of the preamble for this 

final rule. As stated, we believe that there is a high burden of proof from the OEMs that offcycle credits could be justified for these interactive, driver based technologies but manufacturers 
EPA Response to Comments

7-56

may pursue this using the alternate demonstration methods for technologies not on the off-cycle 

technology menu if they choose.

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA should only provide credits for off-cycle technologies if such technologies can be verified 

as providing real and enforceable GHG reductions. Based on data in the Draft Joint Technical 

Support Document, some technologies on the pre-defined list do not meet these criteria. EPA 

needs to scale-back the technologies provided on the pre-defined list until sufficient evidence of 

verifiable real world GHG reductions is available to the public. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9472-A2, p. 3]

In general, NRDC believes EPA should only allow off-cycle credits for measures that meet the 

following conditions: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

The agency has verified that the GHG reductions are real through actual testing and real-world, 

in-use testing data from a statistically representative fleet of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

The magnitude of the credits offered per vehicle should account for any degradation (including 

potential for failure and operator misuse) in the off-cycle technology over the life of the vehicle 

and not base the credits solely on performance during the test or from simulation 

modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

The credits must not double count reductions with that are partially captured over the 2-cycle 

tests. In some cases, technologies will also produce some measurable reductions in the 2-cycle 

test. EPA acknowledges that off-cycle credits are intended for technologies that provide benefits 

that are not fully captured on the 2-cycle test but may be partially captured. It is critical that 

credits awarded for off-cycle operations only account for the portion not captured on the 2-cycle 

test. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

EPA should ensure that the benefits of the technology can be verified and enforced in use. The 

agency should require the manufacturers to collect and provide real-world data on an ongoing 

basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

Additionally, test procedures should be subjected to periodic review to keep up with the latest 

technology advancements both in the off-cycle technologies and the other vehicle characteristics 

as each may impact the level of GHG reductions that should be attributed to the off-cycle 

technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

Meeting the above criteria is especially critical for technologies on the pre-defined list. In 

addition, EPA must ensure the following:

The pre-defined list should require actual, publically available representative test data and not 

just be based on computer simulation or limited data, which appears to be the case for many of 

the technologies on the pre-defined list. The agencies should also require the manufacturers to 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-57

collect and provide real-world measurement data on an ongoing basis to validate the model and 

credit levels going forward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

EPA must verify that there is no double-counting of benefits due to the interaction between 

multiple off-cycle technologies a manufacturer chooses to use. For example, credits for solar 

load reduction through glazing must account for improvements to the A/C system. A vehicle 

with a very efficient, low leak A/C system may only generate very small or insignificant benefits 

from the addition of glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

NRDC does not support the full range of off-cycle credit opportunities in the pre-defined menu 

because some fail to meet criteria for verifiable real world GHG reductions based on data 

presented in the Draft Joint TSD. EPA itself acknowledges that the proposed credits “...were 

largely determined from research, analysis and simulations, rather from full vehicle 

testing...” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 15]

Active grill shutters is an example of a proposed credit that does not appear to be well supported 

by data. It is unclear how EPA developed its assumption of 3 percent improvement in 

aerodynamics, given that it does not provide the underlying manufacturing data that it relies 

upon and does not justify its assumption that the 3 percent improvement can apply over the entire 

drive cycle.40 The 5-cycle benefits are clearly dependent on how the manufacturer chooses to 

design its system and its durability. NRDC believes that the active grill shutters menu credits 

should not be provided at this time until further data is provided and put into the public 

domain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 15]

The same general concerns apply to many of the other technologies on the pre-defined list. 

Before finalizing the pre-defined list, EPA should provide in the public domain much more data 

that it proposes to use to justify credit levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 15]

40 EPA and NHSTA. Draft Joint TSD. Page 5-65. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 15]

Response:

The EPA welcomes the comments from Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and 

agrees with NRDC that off-cycle technology benefits must “be verified as providing real and 

enforceable GHG reductions.” In addition, we agree that it is important that the credits be based 

on actual data, do not duplicate on-cycle benefits, and that “test procedures [for determining 

credits] should be subjected to periodic review to keep up with the latest technology 

advancements.” We believe the off-cycle credit program provisions we are finalizing today 

achieve this and satisfy NRDC’s concerns.

Regarding the NRDC comments that “[t]he magnitude of the credits offered per vehicle 

should account for any degradation (including potential for failure and operator misuse) in the 

off-cycle technology over the life of the vehicle,” we believe such a dynamic approach would 

make administering the off-cycle program nearly untenable since it would require individual 
EPA Response to Comments

7-58

manufacturer’ vehicle-specific failure rates, deterioration curves and failure modes for every offcycle technology, and overlay this onto the off-cycle technology menu. In lieu of this 

complexity, we believe that the certification durability requirements used for other emissions 

components and applied to off-cycle technologies will provide similar results in a less complex 

fashion.

For the comments from NRDC that “EPA must verify that there is no double-counting of 

benefits due to the interaction between multiple off-cycle technologies a manufacturer chooses to 

use,” EPA is finalizing the rule with the provisions for the 10 g/mi cap on off-cycle technology 

menu credits. In addition, we have revised certain technologies as discussed in TSD Chapter 5 

(e.g., engine idle start-stop and electric heater circulation pump, solar panels and active cabin 

ventilation) to account for synergistic affects. Therefore, we believe that these measures will 

account for the interaction between multiple off-cycle technologies and prevent benefits from 

being double counted, where appropriate.

Next, NRDC stated in their comments that: “Active grill shutters is an example of a 

proposed credit that does not appear to be well supported by data. It is unclear how EPA 

developed its assumption of 3 percent improvement in aerodynamics, given that it does not 

provide the underlying manufacturing data that it relies upon and does not justify its assumption 

that the 3 percent improvement can apply over the entire drive cycle. The 5-cycle benefits are 

clearly dependent on how the manufacturer chooses to design its system and its durability. 

NRDC believes that the active grill shutters menu credits should not be provided at this time 

until further data is provided and put into the public domain.” We believe that NRDC has 

misinterpreted this information and would like to clarify this below. 

In the TSD to the proposal, Section 5.2.2, we stated that “the EPA conducted an analysis 

of the reduction in emissions corresponding to a general reduction of aerodynamic drag on a 

vehicle. Using EPA’s full vehicle simulation tool described in EPA’s draft RIA, the agency 

evaluated the change in fuel consumption for increasing reductions in aerodynamic drag.” Later 

in this same section, EPA stated “Based on manufacturer data, active grill shutters provide a 

reduction in aerodynamic drag (Cd) from 0 to 5% when deployed. EPA expects that most other 

active aerodynamic technologies will provide a reduction of drag in the same range as active grill 

shutters. EPA also expects that active aerodynamic technologies may not always be available 

during all operating conditions. Active grill shutters, for example, may not be usable in very cold

temperatures due to concerns that they could freeze in place and cause overheating. Control and 

calibration issues, temperature limitations, air conditioning usage, and other factors may limit the 

usage of grill shutters and other active aerodynamic technologies. Therefore, EPA is proposing 

to provide a credit for active aerodynamic technologies that any of these technologies will 

achieve an aerodynamic drag of at least 3% improvement.” 

Therefore, EPA used the simulation tool to develop a correlation between aerodynamic 

efficiency and CO2 reduction, as shown in Table 5-26 and Figure 5-11, Section 5.2.6 of TSD 

Chapter 5 for this rule, and simply referenced the manufacturer’s data as validation of this 

correlation and to select credit value for active aerodynamics, not to develop the credit. As a 

result, EPA has documented the 3% value for the active aerodynamics credit. Subsequent to this 

rulemaking, the ALPHA (Advanced Light-Duty Powertrain and Hybrid Analysis Tool) that EPA 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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used to perform this simulation will be available to the public and we encourage NRDC to 

examine its potential.

Finally, NRDC made the comments that “Before finalizing the pre-defined list, EPA 

should provide in the public domain much more data that it proposes to use to justify credit 

levels,” and “[t]he pre-defined list should require actual, publically available representative test 

data and not just be based on computer simulation or limited data.” 

In response, we disagree with NRDC since EPA used currently available, public data to 

support the development of the off-cycle technology menu credits. In addition, any additional 

materials used as the basis for the off-cycle credit values are available in the public docket for 

this final rule (see EPA docket #EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). The Alliance also submitted 

supplemental comments in response to the detailed comments from ICCT as discussed in TSD 

Chapter 5 for this rule regarding supporting data (see EPA docket #EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799) 

citing actual manufacturer test data to support the credit values they suggested. Much of the 

Alliance test data and proposed credit values aligned with EPA’s off-cycle credit values and 

serve to bolster the off-cycle technology menu credits that EPA determined. Consequently, the 

EPA feels there is sufficient information in the public domain to justify the credit values we are 

finalizing today.

Regarding the NRDC comments that we based the credits solely on vehicle simulation, 

the EPA light-duty vehicle simulation tool, Advanced Light-Duty Powertrain and Hybrid 

Analysis Tool or ALPHA, is discussed in greater detail in the RIA Chapter 2 of this final rule. 

For all of the off-cycle credits other than solar and thermal control technologies, a mix of actual 

vehicle data and vehicle simulation was used to develop the off-cycle credits. The ALPHA 

model depends on actual vehicle data (e.g., engine torque curves) to provide a reasonable 

(though not absolute) prediction of the fuel economy and GHG emissions of specific vehicles 

produced in the future. Therefore, none of the credit values are based solely on vehicle 

simulation or actual vehicle data since the vehicle simulation depends on actual vehicle data to 

function. Finally, in order to ensure transparency of the models and free public access, EPA has 

developed the tool in MATLAB/Simulink environment with a completely open source code. 

Subsequent to this final rule, this open source code will be made available to the public and we 

encourage NRDC to take advantage of this ability to evaluate the ALPHA tool.

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

• Porsche supports the Alliance's comments on inclusion of additional technologies in the table 

of default off-cycle credits. However, our analysis shows that the potential GHG benefit for high 

efficiency alternators is on the order of 2.0 grams/mile. We therefore request that the Agencies 

allow a default credit of 1.6 grams/mile for this technology. In addition, our analysis shows that 

the potential GHG benefit for electronic thermostat can be realized in configurations which do 

not include an electric water pump. We therefore request that the Agencies not limit this offcycle credit to such configurations, but to instead allow the electronic thermostat credit to stand 

alone regardless of any other cooling system specifics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, pp. 

5-6]
EPA Response to Comments

7-60

Response:

The EPA would like to thank Porsche for their comments. Our responses on high 

efficiency alternators are discussed in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule. To 

summarize, we are not adding high efficiency alternators to the off-cycle credit menu due to the 

variability in implementation strategy and electrical loads for the systems and related 

components. This makes it difficult to pinpoint a single, default value for the off-cycle 

technology menu. Therefore, we feel that high efficiency alternators are better suited for offcycle credit consideration using the alternate case-by-case approval process for technologies not 

on the off-cycle technology menu. 

As a result, Porsche may seek off-cycle credit for high efficiency alternators but must 

make an individualized demonstration in order to obtain such credits. Porsche did not submit the 

underlying data that was used to develop their estimates of benefits for high efficiency 

alternators in their comments. However, the underlying data that Porsche seemingly has can be 

used in this process to request the level of credit they proposed.

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Second, EPA has added a list of off-cycle technologies in §86.1866-12(d)(l) that awards predetermined credit values to all vehicles and manufacturers employing those technologies.

Toyota generally supports the proposed changes to EPA's off-cycle regulations, subject to 

specific comments below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.10]

Off-Cycle Credits: Pre-Determined Credit List [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.11]

EPA has proposed a list of off-cycle technologies with pre-determined levels of credit for each 

technology on a per vehicle basis. The manufacturer would only need to demonstrate in its 

application for certification that a technology meets EPA's proposed definition for that 

technology. However, EPA has proposed to limit the amount of credits that can be earned in a 

given model year to 10 g/mi on a fleet-wide basis. Further, several technologies require a 10 

percent minimum market penetration (combined car and truck production) before credits can be 

generated.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.11]

Toyota supports the proposed pre-determined list of off-cycle technologies. The predetermined 

list provides a level playing field for all manufacturers and uses a conservative per-vehicle credit 

value and an overall 10 g/mi cap that will protect against concerns of unwarranted credit 

generation. Toyota also supports expanding the predetermined list to include additional 

technologies as discussed in more detail in the Alliance comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, p.11]

3 - Because NHTSA has proposed to accept EPA's approval of off-cycle credits for CAFE, 

EPA's proposed restrictions also impact credit generation for CAFE purposes. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.11]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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Response:

The EPA appreciates the comments from Toyota for their support of the off-cycle 

technology menu and the accompanying 10 g/mi cap and 10% market penetration requirements 

on credits. 

The full discussion on comments concerning the 10 g/mi cap and 10% market penetration 

is provided in section III.C.5.b.i and II.F. of the preamble. Briefly, we are retaining the 10 g/mi 

cap and finalizing those provisions in this final rule. However, we are finalizing the off-cycle 

credit program without the 10% threshold requirement due to adverse comments that this 

requirement would be counterproductive and no favorable comments to the contrary. 

Accordingly, we are eliminating the 10% sales threshold to qualify for off-cycle credit for the 

applicable technologies on the off-cycle technology menu.

Finally, regarding Toyota’s support for the Alliance comments for expanding the list of 

technologies on the off-cycle technology menu, our responses to these comments are discussed 

in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule.

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The UAW applauds EPA for proposing a pre-approved list of off-cycle technologies. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.3]

Response:

The EPA would like to thank the UAW for their support of the off-cycle technology 

menu and their continued support for the rule in general. We are finalizing the off-cycle 

technology menu and believe this will sufficiently address the UAW comments.

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen is supportive of the agencies proposal for a list of technologies being made 

available with pre-determined off-cycle credit levels. Based on experience from the European 

Union, having a manageable procedure offers incentives to include CO2 reducing technologies 

earlier and shows real world benefit for consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 32]

Volkswagen understands that the intention is for the list of technologies to be a 'living document' 

and that additional technology may be added over time. Volkswagen further understands that the 

process for how this list will be updated may be fluid as the industry seeks to add new 

technologies. We look forward to a transparent process which will be based on testing and 

technical evidence. Volkswagen supports adding new technologies to the pre-determined credit 

list once benefits have been established under either of the other two pathways. This will help 

reduce redundant testing and further streamline this flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1, p. 32]

HIGH EFFICIENT LIGHTING
EPA Response to Comments

7-62

The Volkswagen Group remains an innovator in advanced, power-saving, lighting technology. 

Audi has been involved in the development of off-cycle credits related to lighting within the 

European Commission 'Eco-Innovations' regulatory system. Volkswagen offers the following 

information based on Audi’s application regarding EU eco-innovation. [See Table APP-1 on p. 

33 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-

A1, p. 33]

Although significant focus has been made with regards to LED lights, Volkswagen suggests that 

several other technologies including Xenon and OLED (Organic LED) will be capable of similar 

savings. Volkswagen offers the following proposal for the High Efficiency Lighting definition to 

clarify the baseline from which improvements are measured (building upon the proposal from 

the Alliance): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 33]

'High efficiency exterior lighting means a lighting technology that, when installed on the vehicle, 

is expected to reduce the total electrical demand of the exterior lighting system when compared 

to conventional lighting systems employing halogen bulb technology. LED lights specifically 

qualify. Separate credit values may be earned for high efficiency lighting installed in the 

following components: parking/position, tail lights, license plate lights, low beam lights, and 

daytime running lights. Credits may also be earned for a high efficiency lighting bundle that is 

installed in the following components: front and rear side markers, and backup/reverse 

lights.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 33]

ENGINE HEAT RECOVERY

Volkswagen proposes that the definition for Engine Heat Recovery be broadened to include 

applications which may convert recovered energy into cooling. Building upon the definition 

proposed by the Alliance:

'... converting that heat to electrical, mechanical energy or other thermal energy ...' [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 33]

ACTIVE DRIVETRAIN WARM UP

Volkswagen proposes that the definition be broadened to include indirect drivetrain warm-up 

such as could be accomplished via secondary water loop.

'.. uses waste heat or waste energy to directly or indirectly warm-up driveline fluids...' [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 33]

HIGH EFFICIENCY ALTERNATOR

Volkswagen supports the proposal by the Alliance to include High Efficiency Alternators as an 

off-cycle option. Volkswagen believes that these components have promising potential for CO2

reductions and will continue to evaluate their potential through technical analysis. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 34]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-63

Response:

We appreciate the comments from Volkswagen and their support for the off-cycle 

technology menu. We provided detailed responses in TSD Chapter 5 on many of the 

technologies that Volkswagen mentioned in their comments as follows: High Efficiency 

Exterior Lighting (5.2.3), Waste Heat Recovery (5.2.2; formerly termed “Engine Heat 

Recovery”), Active Drivetrain Warm-Up (e.g., Active Transmission Warm-Up; 5.2.8.3); and 

High Efficiency Alternators in Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule. In addition, the 

technology definitions we are finalizing for specific off-cycle technologies can be found in 5.2.5, 

5.2.7., 5.2.8.5, and 5.2.15 of TSD Chapter 5.

In short, we agreed with Volkswagen’s comments on expanding the definition for waste 

heat recovery (formerly engine heat recovery) and active drivetrain warm-up. For high 

efficiency exterior lighting, we are allowing credits for separate lighting elements as suggested 

by Volkswagen and others, and expanded the high efficiency exterior lighting definition in a 

similar, but not exact, fashion to Volkswagen’s suggestion. Finally, we agree with Volkswagen 

that the off-cycle credit program will be “a transparent process which will be based on testing 

and technical evidence,” and over time will consider whether or not technologies should be 

added to the off-cycle technology menu.

In contrast, we disagree with Volkswagen on the inclusion of high efficiency alternators 

on the off-cycle technology menu. The variability in implementation strategy and electrical 

loads for the systems and related components makes it difficult to pinpoint a single, default value 

for the off-cycle technology menu. Therefore, we feel that high efficiency alternators are better 

suited for off-cycle credit consideration using the alternate case-by-case approval process for 

technologies not on the off-cycle technology menu and are not adding this technology to the offcycle technology menu at this time.

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC strongly supports the pre-defined list. This is a simple effective way to advance innovations 

and enable manufacturers to take steps that traditionally would not be taken in an early stage of 

development. The proposed regulation will be a challenge for VCC and for small manufacturers, 

because new technology is directly linked to high development costs which limit the choice to 

embark upon an unlimited innovation path. Introducing a new technology, even in small volume, 

is both costly and risky for manufacturers. If customers do not choose the option in sufficient 

volumes, the manufacturers will suffer both from the resulting lack of return of investment and a 

lack of contribution to the fleet's regulatory targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 6]

• Substantial greenhouse gas improvements can be achieved in off-cycle conditions using new 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

• The off-cycle technology credit menu is a necessary addition to the off-cycle program to avoid 

administrative delays and burdensome credit application requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9551-A2, p. 7]
EPA Response to Comments

7-64

A manufacturer that has completed this extensive testing and is first to complete the approval 

process will be first out in utilizing the credits once accepted; off-cycle credits should be 

accessible to applicants without the need to retest the technology. After the technology has been 

approved for one manufacturer, it should become part of the pre-defined list for other 

manufacturers to utilize. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

• If a manufacturer applies and is granted off-cycle credits by EPA for a new technology for one 

model year, this technology should eventually be added to the off-cycle predefined technology 

list within a reasonable timeframe after the approval giving the introducing manufacturers 

opportunities to do their initial introduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

• Criteria for a proven CO2-case should be reasonable and kept at a same level for all 

technologies; enormous testing burdens might be an obstacle which may hinder the development 

toward positive GHG actions rather than evolving them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 

8]

Response:

The EPA would like to thank Volvo for their support of the off-cycle technology menu 

and agrees with Volvo’s comments that it is “is a simple effective way to advance innovations 

and enable manufacturers to take steps that traditionally would not be taken in an early stage of 

development.”

However, we disagree with the comments from Volvo regarding a technology being 

added to the list a year after approval is granted. First, the off-cycle technology menu was 

adopted to add a certain level of stability to the off-cycle credit program. Continually updating 

the off-cycle technology menu on an annual basis has the complete opposite effect. Further, the 

menu is part of the rule and can only be amended through notice-and-comment rulemaking 

proceedings.

Second, the off-cycle technology menu credit values we are finalizing today are based on 

existing technology and currently available information using conservative estimates. In 

contrast, the alternate demonstration methods for technologies not on the off-cycle technology 

menu offers a pathway for manufacturers to demonstrate benefits and request credit beyond the 

technologies (or the amounts) offered in the off-cycle technology menu. As individual 

manufacturers develop specific technology that achieves greater benefits (than those listed on the 

menu), it would be imprudent to reflect this on an annual basis in the off-cycle technology menu 

since not all vehicles are not expected to have identical technology effectiveness and 

implementation. Thus, credit values are expected to vary. In this case, the alternate 

demonstration method process is better suited for case-by-case evaluations where there is 

insufficient data to support a default credit or where the level of credit may depend on a specific 

manufacturer’s design. 

Therefore, we believe a better approach is to address technology improvements that may 

achieve greater benefits than the default values in the off-cycle technology menu on a case-bycase basis using the alternate demonstration method process until this technology, or associated 

level of benefit achieved, is common across the industry. 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-65

Finally, regarding the comments from Volvo that “If customers do not choose the option 

in sufficient volumes, the manufacturers will suffer both from the resulting lack of return of 

investment and a lack of contribution to the fleet's regulatory targets.”, we are eliminating the 

10% sales threshold to qualify for off-cycle credit for the applicable technologies on the offcycle technology menu. This should provide Volvo and other manufacturers the necessary 

flexibility to request credits in the off-cycle credit program.

Organization: American Chemistry Council (ACC)

(5) The final rule should extend the proposed off-cycle credit for thermal control to recognize the 

benefits of glazing materials with superior insulation performance

In addition to lightweighting, polycarbonate (PC) glazing delivers insulating benefits, which 

reduce the demand on a vehicle’s air conditioning (A/C) system. PC glazing’s thermal 

conductivity is approximately five times lower than glass. In simple terms, PC glazing better 

insulates the passenger cabin, thereby reducing the load on the air conditioning associated with 

maintaining a comfortable cabin temperature. The result is an off-cycle benefit analogous to that 

in the proposed credit calculation for glazing reducing solar transmittance into the cabin. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 5]

Certain technologies that reduce A/C demand are not fully captured by current drive test cycles. 

For this reason, the agencies have proposed off-cycle credits for various technologies that 

provide this benefit. Unfortunately, the proposed off-cycle credit for glazing does not explicitly 

recognize the thermal insulation benefits of advanced automotive glazing exemplified by PC. 

The NPRM discusses the benefits of certain types of glazing, exemplified primarily by infrared 

(IR) reflective glass, in reducing solar energy transmission into a parked vehicle. In contrast, 

while PC glazing provides some solar control in relation to the agency’s proposed baseline, it 

generally provides a greater benefit by inhibiting the transfer of heat from warmer outside air 

into a cooler cabin. As such, insulation benefits accrue in a broader range of scenarios including 

those where solar radiation is absent or diminished -- for example, at nighttime and on overcast 

days. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, pp. 5-6]

ACC urges the agencies to make clear that the “Glass” or “Glazing” category for these credits 

includes reduced thermal conductivity, and include within the final rule a calculation to quantify 

credits related to this effect. The intent of the agencies to address benefits such as thermal 

conductivity is clear from the administrative record. The Joint Technical Support Document, for 

example, discusses incentivizing technologies that “reduce the amount of solar energy which 

enters the vehicle’s cabin area, reduce the amount of heat energy build-up within the cabin when 

the vehicle is parked, and/or reduce the amount of cooling/heating energy required through 

measures which improve passenger comfort. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 6]

While glazing with superior insulation value responds to the agencies’ stated intent, the NPRM 

and associated documents neglect to provide a methodology for quantifying thermal conductivity 

benefits. Modifying the existing credit to include appropriate references and a calculation to 

cover RTC benefits is consistent with the scope of the rulemaking and the intent of the agencies 

in the area of thermal control. As such, ACC believes that the agencies can accomplish this in the 
EPA Response to Comments

7-66

present rulemaking, and that a separate petition process is not necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9517-A2, p. 6]

We support and incorporate by reference the detailed written comments separately submitted by 

a member company of ACC’s Plastics Division, SABIC Innovative Plastics, with respect to this 

issue. We believe the methodology proposed by SABIC is sound and will provide the agencies 

with a tool to recognize fully the thermal control benefits of advanced glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 6]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 267-268.]

The proposed rule contains an option for off-cycle technology credit but, unfortunately, the offcycle credit in the proposed rule does not recognize the thermal control benefits of polycarbonate 

in automotive glazing. The formula does recognize the benefits of certain types of glass in 

controlling solar radiation in parked vehicles, but in contrast, while polycarbonate glazing 

provides some solar control in relation to engaging this proposed baseline, the benefits accrue in 

a broader range of scenarios in which the effect of solar radiation is absent or less pronounced. 

These include nighttime and overcast days as well as those times when the vehicle is in motion. 

More detailed comments will be presented by other colleagues later today, but we do urge that 

this will make and consider a parallel credit that fully recognizes thermal control benefits of 

polycarbonate in glazing applications.

Organization: Bayer MaterialScience

The Final Rule Should Expand the Off-Cycle Credit to Account for Thermal Benefits

Bayer MaterialScience is dedicated to developing innovative high performance materials that 

will give automakers a choice of materials when it comes to meeting the CAFE requirements. 

Bayer MaterialScience produces polycarbonate in the United States, thus giving auto 

manufacturers a domestically-made alternative to glass. The off-cycle credit in the proposed rule 

fails to take into account the thermal control benefits of polycarbonate glazing. The final rule 

should take this benefit into account by expanding the off-cycle credit when polycarbonate 

glazing is used. Polycarbonate would help automakers to meet CAFE requirements and reduce 

greenhouse gases by providing increased insulation benefits, contributing to net weight reduction 

of the vehicle, offering more aerodynamic styling options to the manufacturer (and thus 

increasing fuel efficiency) and lowering CO2 emissions over the lifecycle of polycarbonate. As a 

result, for purposes of the current rulemaking, Bayer MaterialScience feels it is appropriate to 

include the additional methodology for calculating thermal conductivity benefits within the Final 

Rule, and that a separate petition process for this rule is not needed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9198-A2, pp. 1-2]

Using polycarbonate as a glazing material will contribute to lower thermal conductivity. This 

benefit of polycarbonate will contribute to better energy efficiency in all vehicle types. Thus, we 

reiterate our support for an expansion of the off-cycle credit to account for this benefit or the 

addition of a new corresponding credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 2]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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Polycarbonate Glazing has Additional Benefits for Automakers and the Environment

For years automotive manufacturers have used polycarbonates and polycarbonates composites in 

the manufacture of their vehicles. Polycarbonate glazing allows for integration of parts that was 

previously not possible (exhibit 1). [See exhibit 1 in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9198-A2, p. 5.] This can contribute to vehicles being lighter in weight without compromising the 

structural integrity of the vehicle. For example, it is now possible to manufacture a clear view 

roof module and window pane or rear side window and window pane using a two-shot injection 

molding process. This injection molding process also allows the manufacturer to functionally 

integrate brackets, ribs and attachment points into the backlight assembly. And, of course, 

polycarbonate can be used for better insulation benefits, which can reduce demand on the 

vehicle’s battery and HVAC units, thereby reducing greenhouse gases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9198-A2, p. 2]

Polycarbonate has an extensive history of serial applications in the automotive glazing industry. 

In fact, the first commercial application was in 1998 with a rear quarter window on the Smart 

ForTwo vehicle. The number of applications has steadily grown through the years as automakers 

have seen the many benefits that polycarbonate can provide. These applications now include rear 

side windows, sun roof systems, panoramic roof systems and transparent rear body parts. I have 

included two slides with the handouts that show the progression of applications since 1998 

(exhibit 2). [See exhibit 2 in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, pp. 6-7.]

Polycarbonate is also recognized as a suitable glazing material by authorities around the world, 

including the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9198-A2, p. 2]

Bayer MaterialScience has developed innovative and sustainable material solutions using 

polycarbonate and polycarbonate composites for glazing applications. These materials enable 

weight reductions of up to 50 percent compared to glass, as already demonstrated by the use of 

polycarbonate in panoramic roofs and fixed side windows already in commercial production 

(BayerNews, October 7, 2011). The density of polycarbonate is less than half the density of glass 

(1200 Kg/m3 for polycarbonate vs. 2500 Kg/m3 for glass) and contributes to the weight 

reduction of up to 50 percent versus glass. This weight reduction contributes to CO2 emissions 

being cut by up to 728 pounds per vehicle over a vehicle’s service life of 95,000 miles compared 

to cases where glass is used. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 3]

With polycarbonate enabling weight reductions of up to 50 percent compared to glass, 

automakers can achieve better fuel efficiency and greater stability by lowering the vehicle’s 

center of gravity. Use of polycarbonate in a panoramic roof, for example, can help to 

significantly lower the vehicle’s center of gravity and improve handling (exhibit 4). [See 

exhibit 4 in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, pp. 24-32.] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 3]

Bayer MaterialScience has developed transparent tinted colors specifically for polycarbonate 

glazing that filter out a large proportion of the sun’s infrared (IR) rays. As a result, the vehicle 

interior does not heat up as much under the effects of sunshine. Appropriately treated glazing 

made of IR grade polycarbonate enables IR light and energy transmission values for dark colors 
EPA Response to Comments

7-68

that are at least as low as commercial thermal insulation pigments for glass. Polycarbonate 

glazing also offers benefits in terms of thermal insulation thanks to the plastic’s thermal 

conductivity, which is roughly five times lower than that of glass. In cold weather conditions, 

this increases the temperature of the internal surfaces of the polycarbonate glazing inside the 

vehicle significantly, which in turn cuts the energy needed to heat the vehicle and also improves 

comfort. This feature, too, can help boost the travel range of electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 3]

The wide choice of styling options with polycarbonate is testing conventional assumptions of 

automotive window design and creating whole new opportunities for advanced vehicle styling. 

This design flexibility of windows can contribute to better aerodynamics for vehicle 

manufacturers, which of course leads to lighter weight vehicles and better fuel economy. The 

ability to add colors to glazing parts, along with sharp corners, smooth corner radii and complex 

three dimensional shapes are among the many other benefits associated with these styling 

options by using polycarbonate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 3]

Polycarbonate Glazing Reduces Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Compared to Glass

An independent study from a renowned Europe-based company indicates that when studying 

polycarbonate vs. glass over the life of the product, which would be from initial production to 

usage of the product to the waste phase, polycarbonate can help to substantially lower CO2

emissions (Exhibit 3). [See exhibit 3 in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, pp. 

8-23.] 1 KG (2.2046 lbs.) of polycarbonate saves 14-22 KG (30.85-48.50 lbs.) of CO2 emission 

over the lifecycle of the material. If all of a car’s windows with the exception of the windshield 

were made of polycarbonate (a total of 33 pounds of the plastic), the lower fuel consumption 

could cut CO2 emissions by up to 728 pounds per vehicle over a vehicle’s service life of 95,000 

miles compared to cases where glass is used. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 4]

Polycarbonate Glazing Enhances Vehicle Safety

You don’t need to start smashing windows to know that polycarbonate has a significant impact 

strength advantage over glass. With polycarbonate’s superior impact resistance it can contribute 

to safety by improving passenger retention in the event of a crash. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9198-A2, p. 4]

In closing, we would like to express our support for the expansion of the off-cycle credit to 

account for the thermal control benefits that polycarbonate glazing can provide for automotive 

manufacturers looking to contribute to the reduction of harmful greenhouse gases. The benefits 

of a material like polycarbonate, such as weight reduction, reduced CO2 emissions and safety 

improvements, would give automotive manufacturers a valuable alternative to consider when 

trying to achieve these valuable CAFE requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9198-A2, p. 4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 271-274.]

Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)
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During the public comment period on the notice of proposed rulemaking for the '2017 and Later 

Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel 

Economy Standards,' U.S. EPA received numerous comments on the proposed off-cycle credits 

for advanced solar load reduction technologies. Unfortunately, several of these comments 

contained inaccuracies with regard to the California Air Resources Board's (CARB or Board) 

prior work on 'the 2009 proposed Cool Gars regulation. I welcome this opportunity to make you 

aware of these inaccuracies and set the record straight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-A2, 

p.1]

The primary inaccuracy was that CARB ceased work on the Cool Cars regulation due to the 

belief that the metallic glazing used to comply with the rule interferes with radio signals, thus 

jeopardizing public safety. While these concerns were brought to the attention of CARB, they 

were not the basis of the decision to cease-work on the regulation. In fact, the decision to cease 

work stemmed from a June 2009 Board hearing during which the Board directed staff to revise 

the proposed regulation and subsequently return with a proposal for a performance-based option, 

which, would have increased the stringency of the rule while also providing greater flexibility in 

achieving the greenhouse gas (GHG) benefits. It was this increase in stringency that could have 

resulted in greater use of metallic glazing, which spurred concerns of public safety advocates. 

Due to the inability to achieve consensus on the best path forward during the timeframe required, 

staff ceased work on the regulation. Instead, it was determined that the direction of the Board 

would be best implemented by folding the objectives of Cool Cars into the Advanced Clean Cars 

regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-A2, pp.1-2]

As you know, staff from ARB and U.S. EPA worked together to craft the off-cycle credit option 

for solar control and thermal load. reduction technologies. Contrary to the comments received, 

this credit option provides increased flexibility to manufacturers to achieve their fleet GHG 

targets. The solar control off-cycle credits are not proscriptive in any way and manufacturers 

may use any glazing technology on the market in order to receive credits, as long as the 

performance of the glazing is better than baseline glass. To date, there are multiple technology 

options available to manufacturers, including solar absorbing (non-metallic) and solar reflective 

(both metallic and nonmetallic) glazing. In addition, there is at least one company with a new 

non-metallic, non-radio interfering reflective product in development that is expected to be in 

production by 2014. Ultimately, a manufacturer may choose not to use solar control glazing and 

achieve their GHG targets through any other means, including mass reduction or improved 

aerodynamics, both of which can be aided by the use of polycarbonate glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11799-A2, p.2]

It is important to note that many manufacturers are already using some level of solar control 

product on their vehicles today. These products are safe, and testing conducted by ARB indicated 

that there were no statistically significant effects pf metallic reflective glazing on the operation of 

GPS ankle bracelets or cell phone operation in an urban environment. Although there may be 

adverse effects of metallic glazing on cell phone connectivity in a rural environment, which was 

not tested by ARB, it is worth repeating that metallic glazing is used today on many vehicles in 

the United States and Europe, both as a manufacturer-installed option and as an aftermarket film, 

without any known public safety impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-A2,p.2]
EPA Response to Comments

7-70

The reason that solar control products are widely used is because of their ability to improve 

occupant comfort and, by extension, reduce GHG emissions and fuel use due to reduced loads on 

the air conditioning system. The analysis conducted by ARB for Cool Cars, and subsequently 

applied by both U.S. EPA and ARB to determine the off cycle credit calculations, demonstrates a 

benefit of solar control glazing of up to three grams per mile for a passenger car. Contrary to the 

comments received by U.S. EPA suggesting that this methodology is 'flawed,' the benefit 

calculations were based on several peer-reviewed reports and refined through consultation with 

industry experts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-A2, p.2]

We therefore maintain that the three gram per mile benefit for passenger cars is an accurate, and 

likely conservative estimate of the true benefit of solar control glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11799-A2, p.3]

In closing, I urge U.S. EPA to retain the structure of the off-cycle credits for solar control 

technologies. Doing so will properly credit the benefits of a wide range of solar load reduction 

products, while still providing manufacturers 'with the flexibility to use any available engine or 

vehicle technology to achieve their fleet GHG targets. It will also appropriately reward the early 

adopters of advanced solar control materials and continue to spur innovation in the glazing 

industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11799-A2, p.3]

Organization: California Manufacturers & Technology Association (CMTA)

CMTA understands that the joint USEPA-National Highway Transportation and Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) notice of proposed rulemaking for fuel economy and greenhouse gas 

emission regulations for model year 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles, dated December 1, 2011, 

includes options under which auto manufacturers may obtain “off-cycle” greenhouse gas 

emission reduction credits. In 2010, we were involved in a similar proposal put forth by the 

California Air Resources Board (CARB) which CARB eventually dropped. The savings in fuel 

was exceptionally small (under 4-1/2 gallons year for the average vehicle) for the amount of 

possible complications that would have occurred. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536-A2, p.1]

While the CARB regulation would have mandated the use of a reflective glazing material in car 

windshields and windows, it would have had a significant negative impact on radio frequency 

transmissions of cell telephones, garage door openers, global positioning system (GPS) 

equipment, toll tag transponders (Fast Track), emergency equipments signals (police, fire, 

ambulance), and even parolee ankle bracelets. While we understand that the decision to choose a 

particular technology to obtain an off-cycle credit will be voluntary, it is reasonable to assume 

that auto manufacturers seeking to maximize credits under the proposed rule would be inclined 

toward use of metallicized reflective materials in the glass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536-

A2, pp.1-2]

In addition, this approach will benefit reflective glass technologies, but fails to recognize other 

technologies which can achieve similar results. For example, off-cycle reduction in air 

conditioning load can also be achieved through use of polycarbonate glazing technologies that 

reduce thermal conductivity, helping to maintain a more comfortable interior temperature. Such 

technologies should also be accommodated in the final federal rule so that vehicle manufacturers 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-71

have greater flexibility in meeting the stringent emission limits contemplated in the draft 

regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536-A2, p.2]

For the above reasons, we believe these incentives need to be more thoroughly evaluated. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9536-A2, p.2]

Organization: California State Sheriffs' Association (CSSA), California Police Chiefs 

Association (CPCA), California Narcotic Officers' Association (CNOA)

On behalf of the California State Sheriffs' Association (CSSA), California Narcotic Officers’ 

Association (CNOA) and the California Police Chiefs Association (CPCA), we write to express 

our concern regarding the joint United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) proposed rule making for fuel 

economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for model year 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles of 

December 1, 2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488-A1, p. 1]

While we support the intended goals of establishing certain GHG emission reduction credits and 

appreciate that this federal proposal takes a voluntary approach relative to ARB’s Cool Cars 

proposal, we remain concerned that the proposal will incentivize the use of metallic reflective 

window technology. There are a number of implications that this regulation will have on GPS 

technology for ankle bracelets used to monitor offenders and the ability of law enforcement, 

parole agents, and probation officers to monitor and track offenders accurately as well as 

Enhanced 9-1-1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488-A1, pp. 1-2]

Over the last year California has made significant changes to the delivery of criminal justice 

services to address its prison overcrowding crisis. This has led the state to take measures to 

reduce the prison population, one of which is to place more offenders on GPS or electronic 

monitoring. The use of metallic reflective window technology presents the potential for 

unintended, and very adverse, consequences associated with RF device interference. ARB’s own 

analysis illustrated a doubling of dropped GPS signals under varying circumstances. Even a 

slight drop or deviance in connectivity and the ability to locate an offender as a result of metallic 

glazing is problematic and concerning, especially in light of the availability of alternative 

solutions that achieve energy savings while not presenting the same public safety impacts. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488-A1, p. 2]

In addition to concerns relative to GPS monitoring, we are concerned that use of metallic 

reflective window technologies can increase the likelihood of interference with reliable operation 

of cell phones and Enhanced 9-1-1 capabilities for PSAP's. This concern is magnified in 

emergency situations where a caller may need to place an emergency 9-1-1 call and where signal 

strength may already be lessened such as in rural areas. Further, in may impact the ability of 

PSAPs to locate a caller via Enhanced 9-1-1. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488-A1, p. 2]

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this regulation and for your consideration of our 

comments. We would be remiss if we did not share these concerns with you and the implications 

of this regulation on public safety. For reasons stated, we ask that you consider reworking the 
EPA Response to Comments

7-72

current proposal and specifically removing the off-cycle credit that incentivizes the use of 

metallic reflective window technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9488-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Crime Victims United of California (CVUC)

On behalf of Crime Victims United, of California(CVUC),I am writing to convey serious 

concerns regarding the joint United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) proposed rulemaking for fuel 

economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for model year 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles of 

December 1, 2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 1]

CVUC is a nonprofit organization that uses education, legislative advocacy and political action 

to enhance public safety, promote effective crime-reduction measures and strengthen the rights 

of crime victims. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 1]

As you may be aware, California is facing a prison overcrowding crisis. Such crisis has led the 

state to take measures to reduce the prison population, one of which is to place more offenders 

on GPS or electronic monitoring. CVUC understands local law enforcement's need for 

alternative custody options and has been generally supportive of providing these alternative 

options; however, our position on the use of this technology is dramatically altered in light of the 

potential consequences of this joint regulatory proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 

1]

As you may know, in 2010 California's Air Resources Board (ARB) proposed a regulation 

known as 'Cool Cars' that would have effectively mandated the use of metallic reflective window 

technology. CVUC adamantly opposed this proposal due to the serious implications for RF 

signal interference and the associated potential for public safety consequences. As a result of 

CVUC and other stakeholders' concerns, California's ARB ultimately abandoned the Cool Cars 

regulation in recognition of the fact theft the emission reduction benefit calculations were based 

on flawed methodology and that use of this technology presented the potential for unintended 

adverse consequences associated with RF device interference. Despite this history, EPA and 

NHTSA appear to be using the same methodology in this proposed regulation for establishing 

certain GHG emission reduction credits. While we understand that this joint federal proposal 

takes a voluntary approach relative to ARB's Cool Cars proposal, we remain concerned that it 

will incentivize use of metallic reflective window technology, giving rise to the same RF 

interference and public safety concerns at issue under the Cool Cars proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9883-A1, pp. 1-2]

ARB's own analysis illustrated a doubling of dropped GPS signals under varying circumstances. 

While this is significant, it is also important to note that the testing was done in an urban area 

where signal strength was very strong. What about in areas where signal strength is not strong 

(i.e. rural areas where our prison facilities are located or foothill/mountain communities where 

signals are lost in canyons)? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 2]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-73

Given the difficulty in adequately monitoring the prison, jail and parolee population in California 

as it is, CVUC feels strongly that the approach under the federal regulation should be reworked 

to address the potential problems for the state in monitoring its GPS population. In these grave 

times of prison overcrowding, the early release of inmates, and more, such an approach to global 

warming is unacceptable and has crime victims in California highly concerned. In our 

discussions with other stakeholders and the ARB in 2010, we came to learn that there are other 

options to achieve GHG emission reductions that do not have to compromise signal strength that 

could ultimately impact the ability to monitor offenders' activities through GPS. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 2]

In addition to concerns relative to GPS monitoring, we are concerned that use of metallic 

reflective window technologies as contemplated in the joint rulemaking - even under limited 

circumstances -can increase the likelihood of interference with reliable operation of cell phones. 

This would be particularly problematic in troubling emergency situations where a motorist might 

need to place an emergency 911 call - especially in rural locations where signal strength may 

already be lessened. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 2]

While increased fuel efficiency and lower greenhouse gas emissions are both laudable goals, 

under the proposed rule these goals could be achieved at the expense of significant potential 

adverse impacts on the ability of consumers, emergency workers and law enforcement personnel 

to contact help in an emergency, communicate life-saving instructions, and track prisoners 

released under electronic surveillance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 2]

For these reasons, we ask EPA and NHTSA to consider reworking the current proposal and 

specifically removing the off-cycle credit that effectively incentivizes use of metallic reflective 

window technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9883-A1, p. 2]

Organization: CTIA - The Wireless Association

On behalf of CTIA-The Wireless Association®, the international trade association representing 

wireless carriers, equipment manufacturers, and Internet service providers, I write to express the 

wireless industry’s concerns regarding potential regulations which would reward “off-cycle” 

GHG credits for the use of a single type of technology for window glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11759-A2, p.1]

The current draft of the regulations would create incentives for the use of metallic films for 

glazing in automobiles. Metallic films can interfere with electronic devices that depend on radio 

frequency (RF) transmissions, such as cellular telephones, GPS systems, and other 

devices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11759-A2, p.1]

While we support lowering greenhouse gas emissions and increasing fuel efficiency, that should 

not be done at the risk of interfering with wireless devices, which are frequently used to 

communicate during emergencies and to provide location assistance for drivers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11759-A2, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

7-74

There are other glazing technologies that offer similar emission reduction benefits without 

compromising the performance of wireless devices or other technologies that rely on RF 

transmissions. One example is polycarbonate glazing which can help reduce air conditioning 

load through superior insulating properties. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11759-A2, p.1]

We ask EPA and NHTSA to consider alternatives that do not encourage solar reflective glazing 

only. We would ask you to consider credits for other types of glazing technologies that are less 

obstructive to wireless devices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11759-A2, p.1]

Organization: Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association (EPGAA)

Member companies of the EPGAA provide glazing products to the automotive market. These 

products include solar control glazing, which include technologies that reduce the solar heat load 

in a vehicle. The reduction of the solar heat load results in lower air conditioning load, which in 

turn results in lower fuel consumed and reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Since the cabin 

comfort requirements are indifferent to the powertrain technology, the solar glazing impact is 

just as valid on Internal Combustion Engine vehicles as it is on Hybrid-Electric or fully electric 

vehicles. Since the glazing technology is a passive technology for the consumer, in that it does 

not require any consumer interface, the benefits to the consumer and to the environment are 

independent of consumer behavior. Finally, the solar control glazing technologies are designed to 

meet or exceed the safety, security, health, and other benefits of glass that are either required by 

regulations or expected by the customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, p. 1]

EPGAA supports the proposed rule for the off-cycle credits for technologies whose impact on 

fuel consumption and emissions cannot be measured in the test cycles. The calculation proposed 

by the EPA on the off-cycle credit for solar glazing provides a simplified model for defining the 

impact of glazing on the heat load reduction and the emissions. EPGAA supports the general 

concept but recommend that the following changes be considered: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9301-A1, p. 1]

1. There should be a method to account for the total glass surface in a vehicle. The credit 

calculation as defined in the NPRM treats all vehicles in a class as being similar in the amount of 

heat load coming through the glass. There has been a trend in the market to have larger size 

glass, which would lead to higher heat load and therefore higher emissions. Therefore, we 

recommend that there be an accounting for the total glass surface. A simple multiplier could be 

applied. See below for an example:

Base line glass surface = 4 sq.m.

Actual glass surface = 4.4 sq.m.

Therefore, total impact = 4.4/4.0 = 1.1 times the baseline impact. Thus the total impact of glazing 

on the emissions would be 110% of the baseline vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, 

p. 2]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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2. The impact captured by the formula as defined in the NPRM was based on several studies of 

internal combustion engine vehicles in drive cycles and modeling studies that the EPGAA 

supports. However, the introduction of technologies such as start/stop, hybrid, electric, etc. 

would provide additional benefits from the use of solar glazing. Additionally, the formula does 

not capture the benefits of solar glazing during the times when the cabin temperature in the 

vehicle may only increase marginally above setpoint due to heat load. In such instances, the use 

of heat load reduction technologies may completely eliminate the need for air conditioning by 

keeping the cabin temperature below setpoint. These benefits have not been captured in the 

formula and EPGAA recommends that further analysis be done to quantify these benefits and 

include them in the regulation at the time of the mid-term evaluation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9301-A1, p. 2]

3. The NPRM puts a maximum limit on the credit from thermal control technologies at 3 g/mi 

for passenger automobiles and 4.3 g/mi for light trucks. The credit for glazing is also limited to 

3.0 g/mi for passenger automobiles and to 4.3 g/mi for light trucks. Since the data used for the 

calculations has been based on currently known technologies, it would be difficult to predict the 

actual savings from the solar glazing in the higher efficiency vehicles. EPGAA recommends that 

the impact of solar glazing on (higher efficiency) vehicles should not be capped. EPGAA 

believes that regulation should promote innovation and is concerned that such a cap could 

potentially stifle innovation in solar glazing rather than promote continued advancement of the 

technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, p. 2]

5. EPGAA supports the use of the off-cycle credits as provided in these regulations and urges the 

Agency to adopt them in the final rule. EPGAA also recommends that these regulations be 

adopted for the MY 2012-2016 without the formal review process as currently required. 

Allowing these credits earlier would encourage the use of the technologies that provide the 

benefits sooner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, p. 3]

In conclusion, the EPGAA supports the agencies in considering the off-cycle technologies and 

specifically the solar glazing technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9301-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Garmin International Inc.

The first area of concern is that the proposed rule would reward (with Thermal Control 'off-cycle' 

GHG credits) only the automobile manufacturers who select a single type of technology for 

window glazing. This is a fundamentally flawed approach because it limits choices, thereby 

stifling innovation and artificially raising prices due to lessened competition. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9508-A1, p.1]

Since 2009, it has been commonly accepted that metallicized reflective glazing that reflects the 

solar rays also attenuates radio frequency (RF) signals. This reflection of RF signals is one of the 

factors that caused California to reject this technology. The lack of flexibility in window 

materials technology that vehicle manufacturers are given by the NPRM--to achieve GHG 

credits--will negatively affect consumers, emergency responders, RF-signal-dependent device 

manufacturers (GPS ankle bracelets and transponders for parolees, mobile phones, GPS devices, 

toll tags, to name a few) and their service providers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

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The proposed rule also provides a disincentive for any manufacturer to utilize off-cycle design 

technologies that are very beneficial in terms of air emissions and exceed (together or separately) 

the 109/mi. threshold imposed by (d)( 1) of the 'CO2 fleet average credit and incentive programs' 

section. We view the threshold as a defacto limit on the investments you will see in off-cycle 

environmental technologies, because some beneficial technologies may not be able to be 

adequately demonstrated using the EPA 5-cycle methodology described by section (d)(2), and 

there is no guarantee the manufacturer will receive the required permission from the EPA, per 

section (d)(3) to perform a technology demonstration using an alternative EPA-approved 

methodology. In addition, the technology demonstrations per (d)(2) and (d)(3) must be 

performed, documented, submitted to, and approved by, the EPA. To follow this regimen for 

several models in the fleet would be prohibitive in terms of time, resources, cost and uncertainty. 

For manufacturers who wish to move forward quickly to improve the CO2 emissions of their 

fleet, we ask that you provide ways to validate a CO2 credit for a technology being adopted in 

many models without having to go through the (d)(2) or (d)(3) demonstration process for every 

model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, pp.2-3]

Strategic development plans and roadmaps for numerous models in the fleet can hardly 

withstand this degree of uncertainty over the lengthy research and development cycles that 

precede the rollout of a car or light truck model. This disincentive that the rule has constructed 

may reduce the investment in breakthrough CO2-reducing technologies that would otherwise be 

deployed in the US automobile market. This brings to light the importance of NHTSA and 

USEPA (1) working with industry to frequently test, validate and add other CO2-reducing 

technologies to the off-cycle technology table, and giving serious consideration to removing the 

109/mi. threshold. We are not in favor of limiting the credits manufacturers' rightly receive for 

innovative, environmentally responsible design features. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, 

p.3]

Research has shown that metallicized reflective glazing will cause significant adverse effects on 

the reception and transmission of E911, mobile phone and GPS navigation signals. Two years 

ago, Garmin and a broad coalition of interested parties field-tested the impact of the 'Cool Cars' 

regulations that were being promoted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) under AB 

32 (the Global Climate Change regulations). At that time, CARB was pursuing a vehicle glass 

requirement which would have required a layer of metallic reflective material in the windshield 

to reflect solar rays. CARB had similar goals as described in the U.S. EPA NPRM, but forcing 

car and light truck manufacturers to use this type of glazing could have been very 

counterproductive. If 10% of drivers quit using GPS because of signal interruptions caused by 

metallicized reflective glazing, the increased GHG emissions from these vehicles more than 

cancels out all GHG reduction benefits of metallicized glazing. Put another way, for every 

theoretical 1 ton decrease of GHG emissions from metallicized glazing, vehicles send 2 extra 

tons of GHG emissions into the atmosphere. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, p. 3]

We see no reason why lower-weight and lower-cost alternative solutions such as non-metallic 

polycarbonate materials are not listed as options in the NPRM. An advanced insulating or solar 

absorbent technology with solar transmittance (Tts) properties of 54% is equally as effective as 

metallic reflective (50% Tts with 10% deletion windows) in blocking the sun's rays from the auto 

interior and has none of the negative shortcomings as far as attenuating signals. We respectfully 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-77

ask EPA and NHTSA to include an off-cycle credit that recognizes the relative benefit of 

insulating glazing for reducing GHG emissions without harming systems such as E911. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, p. 3]

We would be happy to share the results of the coalition's testing and discuss this matter with you 

in greater detail. Our nation's cellular networks and global positioning system are national assets 

in which US taxpayers have invested billions. These systems support our economic growth, as 

well as our personal and public safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, p. 3]

Garmin's second area of concern is that the proposed rule does not give vehicle manufacturers 

the opportunity to generate a defined minimum off-cycle credit for some verifiable real-world 

fuel saving and CO2-reducing technologies. These would include in-dash GPS navigation and indash GPS navigation with traffic avoidance. We respectfully ask that the current literature and 

research be thoroughly explored and reviewed with the goal of facilitating the generation of CO2

credits for these additional technologies in some standardized way. We would be happy to 

discuss this with you. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, p. 3]

In order to assist manufacturers in meeting their 2025 targets ahead of schedule, Garmin believes 

these companies should have no regulatory disincentives to fully utilize every kind of smart 

driving CO2-reducing technology that they are willing to invest in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9508-A1, p.3]

We look forward to working with you towards getting credits placed on the off-cycle technology 

menu for in-dash GPS navigation technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9508-A1, p.3]

Organization: Guardian Automotive Products, Inc.

Guardian commends NHTSA and EPA for recognizing through off cycle credits a variety of 

technologies which can significantly improve fuel economy and emissions, yet were previously 

excluded due to the short falls of the current vehicle test cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9299-A1, p. 1]

Thermal Control and Glazing

Guardian recommends that the formula for solar glazing credits be adjusted to include a factor 

that accounts for the overall surface area of glazing in the vehicle. The proposed formula 

accounts for the incremental area contribution of each glazing aperture with respect to the total, 

but ultimately provides the same potential credit for a vehicle with a small glazing area and no 

sunroof as it does for a vehicle with a large glazing area and large sunroof. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9299-A1, pp. 1-2]

While the 2012-2016 GHG regulation permits an OEM to apply for glazing or heat load 

reduction credit, the glazing credit formula in the 2017 and later regulation should improve and 

simplify this process and be made available for OEMs to use immediately. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

7-78

Solar Roof Panels

Guardian applauds NHTSA's and EPA's recognition of the potential benefits photovoltaics can 

offer, especially as the popularity of hybrids and EV's grows. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-

A1, p. 3]

This technology is rapidly evolving to the point that the 50 Watt threshold required in the 

proposed regulation is likely to be significantly surpassed by the time the regulation takes effect 

in 2017. In fact, there are examples today which already significantly surpass this value. For 

instance, the Fisker Karma today employs a photovoltaic roof panel which produces in excess of 

100 Watts at standard conditions. As a result, Guardian urges NHTSA and EPA to adopt a 

formula based credit for this technology in order to fully recognize future benefits and to 

encourage the development and use of higher power systems. Presuming that the same logic the 

agencies used to arrive at the credit listed for the 50 Watt threshold holds for higher power, is 

this first equation simply a linear relationship based on this value? Guardian acknowledges that 

while it is fairly simple to determine output of any PV panel at any given conditions of direct 

normal solar irradiance combined with angle and temperature, it is not so evident today to predict 

exactly what total benefit will be achievable based on average vehicle use and driving as well as 

parking conditions. We suggest for this reason that at this time a simple equation for credit is 

appropriate, and as systems increase in popularity there will be more data available to refine the 

credit, perhaps at the mid term review. However, given the long timeframe of the proposed 

regulation and the pace of innovation in the photovoltaic industry, it seems imperative that such a 

credit not be simply a fixed value if the true objective is to incentivize further advancement in 

output, and hence potential reduction in GHG emissions and fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 3]

As the primary goal of the regulation is to generate significant improvements to emissions and 

fuel economy (and the associated economic and societal benefits), Guardian also urges that the 

credit for solar roof panels be made available prior to 2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-

A1, p. 3]

Moreover, as a clarification point, Guardian recommends that the proposed credit be allowed for 

any solar panel with appropriate output and not be limited to roof mounted panels, as suggested 

by the term 'solar roof panel'. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 4]

Guardian also requests that the test conditions to establish panel power with respect to the 

proposed rule be defined as part of the rule. For instance, in the photovoltaic industry it is 

common to provide output values at STC (Standard Test Conditions) which are most commonly 

a direct normal solar irradiance of 1000 W/m2 and a panel temperature of 25°C± 2°C. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 4]

Conclusion

In summary, Guardian applauds the efforts of EPA and NHTSA with respect to the treatment of 

off cycle credits in the proposed regulation. These credits will encourage innovation and 

technological advancements as well as corresponding improvements in fuel economy and 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-79

emissions. We hope the agencies find the above comments useful and relevant, and will draw 

upon them to further improve the regulation and drive incentives to maximize benefits offered by 

such technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9299-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW)

Pittsburgh Glass Works (PGW) supports the proposed rule’s provisions for providing credit for 

off-cycle technologies. The benefits of solar glazing, for example, are not measured in any 

current test cycle, but have been proven to reduce emissions and improve fuel efficiency. Solar 

glazing has been proven to reduce interior cabin temperatures by as much as 10 deg C and thus 

reduce the work load of the air conditioning system. Solar glazing technologies provide 

additional benefits to the consumer, such as improved noise reduction, UV protection, better 

security, etc. beside the emissions reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, p. 1]

PGW would like to provide the following suggestions for the agencies’ consideration: 

1. The off-cycle credit for glazing is calculated using a formula that correlates the benefit to the 

glass properties. PGW supports the general concept of the formula used, but would like to offer a 

recommendation to improve the methodology to enable a more accurate accounting of the 

contribution of solar glazing. The formula, as defined in the NPRM, calculates the temperature 

reduction from the glass where the contribution of each piece of glass is measured as a 

percentage of the total glass area. However, there is no accounting for the fact that the total glass 

area in the vehicle is in itself a very large contributor to the heat load in a vehicle. There is a 

general trend of increasing glass size in the vehicles, and the larger amount of glass would 

actually contribute a larger proportion of heat load that would be affected by the kind of glazing. 

Therefore, it is PGW’s recommendation that the agencies introduce a factor that accounts for the 

total glass area in the vehicle. For example, if the average glass surface in a car is 4.0 sq.m., then 

if the glass usage is greater than 4.0 sq.m. the contribution of the solar glazing should be 

proportionately larger. Therefore, the revised equation would be as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9300-A1, p. 2]

Baseline glass size = 4.0 sq.m.

Actual glass used = 5.0 sq.m.

Contribution of glass in actual vehicle = 5.0/4.0 = 125% of baseline glass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9300-A1, p. 2]

2. The off-cycle credit for thermal load reduction technologies is capped at 3.0 g/mile for cars 

and 4.3 g/mile for light-duty trucks. The credit for glazing technologies is also subject to the 

same limitations. The data to support the benefits of the glazing technologies and heat load 

reduction technologies has been gathered from analysis of current technologies. There are likely 

to be innovations in the technologies before and during the time frame of the regulations that 

might surpass the performance of existing technologies. Therefore, applying the limits to the 

benefits could inhibit innovation. PGW urges the agencies to remove these maximum limits so 

that technology innovation is encouraged. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

7-80

4. The data used for the credit calculation has been based on testing and modeling of existing 

technologies primarily on internal combustion engine vehicles. The benefit of the solar glazing 

technologies would be compounded with other technologies such as start/stop, hybrid, electric, 

etc. Therefore, PGW recommends that the agencies continue to consider the full benefit of the 

solar glazing technologies and refine the model at the mid-term review of the regulations. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, p. 3]

5. Finally, PGW strongly urges that the credit be made available in the MY2012-2016 

regulations without the burdensome review process as currently stipulated. This will enable 

earlier implementation of the technologies and the benefits could be accrued much sooner. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, p. 3]

PGW support the agencies’ consideration of off-cycle credits in general, and the impact of solar 

glazing in particular. If there is any further information that can be provided, please do not 

hesitate to contact us. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9300-A1, p. 3]

Organization: SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC

These comments focus on the proposed off-cycle and fuel consumption improvement credits for 

Thermal Control Technologies. Specifically, SABIC-IP requests that the agencies make clear 

that the “Glass or Glazing” category for these credits includes reduced thermal conductivity 

benefits (“RTC” benefits or credits) as well as reduced solar transmittance benefits (“RTts” 

benefits or credits), and further that the agencies include within the regulatory text a calculation 

to quantify credits associated with the RTC benefits. A modification of the proposed credit to 

encompass thermal conductivity benefits is within the scope of the NRPM, and can therefore be 

accomplished during the next stage of this rulemaking. As such, a separate petition process to 

achieve this result is not necessary. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the American 

Chemistry Council, Bayer MaterialScience and the Society of the Plastics Industry support this 

request. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, pp.1-2]

Modifying the existing credit to recognize the additional benefits of other glass or glazing 

technologies generally, and RTC glazing specifically, is consistent with the intent to promote 

advanced energy management within the passenger compartment, or cabin, to reduce air 

conditioning (A/C) loads. Accounting for the RTC benefits also promotes continued innovation 

in glazing technologies. Finally, placing RTC-based technologies on an even footing with RTtsbased technologies ensures that all glass and glazing technologies will be treated similarly within 

the regulatory program and will remain available in the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9467-A1, p.2]

In addition to a calculation to quantify RTC benefits, SABIC-IP presents test data measuring the 

fuel economy benefits of lightweight materials and confirming the traditional estimates that 

vehicle weight reductions of 10% result in approximately 6-7% better fuel economy. Finally, 

SABIC-IP presents information regarding how additional GHG emissions and fuel economy 

benefits from improved aerodynamics and other factors can result from the integration of 

engineering thermoplastics into the front six inches and most of the rear six inches of a light duty 

motor vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.2]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-81

In sum, engineering thermoplastics offer three-fold emissions and fuel economy benefits: (1) 

polycarbonate glazing reduces air conditioning load by substantially reducing window thermal 

conductivity relative to traditional glass; (2) engineering thermoplastics offer significant mass 

reduction opportunities throughout the vehicle; and (3) engineering thermoplastics offer 

aerodynamic design opportunities that further reduce GHG emissions and fuel consumption. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.2]

The agencies propose off-cycle GHG and fuel consumption improvement credits for advanced 

glass or glazing technology and specify a calculation to quantify this benefit based on the ability 

to reduce the amount of solar energy entering the passenger cabin of the vehicle, relative to a 

baseline glazing.1 This technology decreases the “total solar transmittance,” or “Tts”, of the 

glazing and, as a result, lowers the “soak” temperature in the cabin of a “standing” vehicle under 

hot sunny conditions.2 By lowering soak temperature, reduced Tts glass or glazing reduces the 

subsequent demand on the A/C system to cool the cabin air to a comfortable temperature. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.3]

SABIC-IP endorses off-cycle credits for reduced Tts glass or glazing as long as the regulatory 

structure remains technology neutral and does not advantage a particular glazing technology.3 

SABIC-IP therefore requests that the agencies also include a calculation to quantify reduced 

thermal conductivity credits for glazing that provides similar GHG reduction benefits. These 

benefits are independent of those resulting from reductions in Tts. Moreover, RTts and RTC 

benefits can coexist not only within the same vehicle but also within the same window 

application when both Tts and thermal conductivity are reduced below the respective baselines 

for solar transmittance and thermal conductivity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.3]

To support this request, SABIC-IP sets forth below a detailed methodology to account for and 

quantify the RTC benefits associated with advanced glass or glazing. This methodology tracks 

the methodology in the proposed rule for quantifying RTts benefits, adopting the same standards 

and analytical steps applied by the agencies for the RTts credit. The result is an off-cycle credit 

formulation for RTC benefits analogous to that in the proposed rule for RTts benefits. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.3]

Reducing window thermal conductivity inhibits heat transfer between the ambient air outside the 

vehicle and the passenger cabin. Thus, the amount of heat transfer into the cabin is reduced. This 

reduction in heat transfer can be identified with a reduction in A/C load, 4 which in turn yields a 

reduction of the A/C related GHG emissions associated with maintenance of a comfortable cabin 

temperature. PC glazing can provide this benefit because it offers an inherent thermal 

conductivity five times lower than glass, thereby offering a significantly greater insulating 

capacity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.4]

The purpose of the proposed off-cycle credits for Thermal Control Technologies5 is to 

encourage innovations that “reduce the amount of solar energy which enters the vehicle’s cabin 

area, reduce the amount of heat energy build-up within the cabin when the vehicle is parked, 

and/or reduce the amount of cooling/heating energy required through measures which improve 

passenger comfort.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.4]
EPA Response to Comments

7-82

Throughout the process of developing the proposal, EPA and NHTSA sought industry guidance 

regarding a broad category of thermal control technologies. At the outset, the agencies met with 

OEMs to assess major technology areas, including “thermal management technologies.” The 

proposed list of Thermal Control Technologies is indicative of this approach and includes a 

varied list of features that rely on many distinct technological innovations to achieve GHG and 

fuel economy benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.4]

The proposed regulatory text furthers this intent by referring to the off-cycle credits for Thermal 

Control Technologies as applicable to “Glass or Glazing,” and this reference is repeated in the 

TSD. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, pp.4-5]

However, when setting forth the calculation to quantify the credits, the agencies refer only to a 

single glazing attribute, Tts, and do not include thermal conductivity values. Consequently, 

although RTC benefits fall squarely within the stated intent and the scope of the credits as 

expressed in the proposal, the regulation fails to encompass the full range of benefits and credits 

associated with Glass or Glazing Thermal Control Technologies. Extending the existing credit to 

include appropriate references and a calculation to cover RTC benefits is clearly within the scope 

of the proposed rule and a logical extension of the proposed regulatory text. As a result, for 

purposes of the current rulemaking, SABIC-IP believes it is appropriate to include the additional 

methodology for calculating thermal conductivity benefits within the final rule, and that a 

separate petition process is not necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.5]

The comparison in the following table of the mechanisms underlying the RTts and RTC benefits 

illustrates why both should be included on the off-cycle credit menu. The RTts benefit 

recognizes the role of solar energy transmission in generating high soak temperatures in parked 

unoccupied vehicles. RTC glazing insulates the passenger cabin from the effects of higher 

outside air temperatures and reduces the demand on the A/C system to maintain a comfortable 

cabin temperature. Both technologies inhibit energy transfers that tend to increase the cabin 

temperature. Both technologies reduce the amount of fuel required by operation of the A/C 

system, during cool down from the soak state in one case and while maintaining a comfortable 

cabin temperature in the other. The two technologies through different mechanisms provide 

similar benefits in terms of A/C related fuel use and GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9467-A1, p.5] [For the associated table please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-

A1, p.6]

Significantly, RTC glazing does not appreciably influence soak temperature or negatively offset 

the GHG and CAFE benefits estimated for RTts glazing. Thus, because RTC and RTts operate 

through independent, but not mutually exclusive mechanisms, the benefits from RTts glazing and 

RTC glazing are independent and entirely additive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.6]

The agencies’ proposed methodology for RTts-based credits may be applied simultaneously with 

the methodology for the RTC-based credits presented below. The methodology for quantifying 

RTC credits is closely modeled after the approach in the proposed rule for quantifying the RTts 

credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.6]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-83

Quantifying the Benefits of Reduced Tts and Reduced Thermal Conductivity [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9467-A1, p.6]

The RTts credit methodology in the proposal provides a common structure for quantifying the 

GHG reduction benefits of both reduced solar transmission and reduced thermal conductivity. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.6]

The proposed RTts credit calculations rely on National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) 

studies that evaluated technologies to reduce soak temperature for climate control purposes. 

Based on NREL’s finding that reduced Tts glazing decreases the cabin temperature gain when a 

car is left parked in the sun, the proposal calculates GHG reductions based on window Tts values 

relative to location-specific window baseline values. The agencies have proposed an off-cycle 

credit opportunity for glazing of up to 2.9 g/mi for passenger vehicles and 3.9 g/mi for light 

trucks to recognize this benefit.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, pp.6-7]

Vehicles equipped with both RTts glazing and RTC glazing would be entitled to separate and 

cumulative off-cycle credits for each technology, as long as their combined cumulative credit is 

no more than 2.9 g/mi for cars and 3.9 g/mi for trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.7]

Summary of the Proposed Calculation for Reduced Tts [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.7]

The existing glass or glazing credit uses Tts as the measurable attribute to quantify the GHG 

reduction and off-cycle credit amount. This arises from the theory that limiting the amount of 

solar energy transmitted into the passenger cabin during a solar soak will decrease the amount of 

fuel required to subsequently cool the cabin. Tts describes the percentage of the incoming solar 

energy transmitted through the automobile glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.7]

The first step in the proposed RTts-based calculation is to quantify the connection between Tts 

reductions and the reduction in cabin temperature during a standing car’s prolonged sun 

exposure (i.e. the “soak” temperature). Working from NREL data that pairs Tts values with soak 

temperature reductions, the draft Joint TSD assumes a linear correlation to find a relationship 

between Tts and temperature reduction. The equation developed in this step can be used to 

calculate an expected temperature reduction from window Tts values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9467-A1, p.7]

The draft Joint TSD uses a weighted average to combine individual window contributions into a 

temperature reduction average for the entire vehicle.13 This accounts for differences in area and 

Tts values across windows. The proposed methodology, as set forth in the draft Joint TSD and 

the regulatory text, uses each window’s Tts value to calculate an individual window contribution 

to temperature reduction via the relationship between Tts and cabin soak temperature. The draft 

Joint TSD assumes that each window’s contribution to the reduction in soak temperature is 

proportional to its area independent of window orientation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-

A1, pp.7-8]
EPA Response to Comments

7-84

The second analytical step of the proposed Tts analysis quantifies the connection between 

reduced cabin temperature and reduced A/C related fuel use. The draft Joint TSD quotes NREL’s 

published result, based on simulation data, that a 12 degree centigrade reduction in cabin soak 

temperature results in a 26% reduction in A/C fuel consumption. This corresponds to a 2.2% 

reduction in A/C fuel consumption for every 1 degree centigrade reduction in the soak 

temperature.14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.8]

The third and final step connects the decrease in A/C fuel use, expressed in terms of the Tts 

glazing attribute, to a GHG reduction. Working from agency assumptions about the CO2 impact 

of A/C systems (13.8 g/mi for cars and 17.2 g/mi for trucks), the draft Joint TSD calculates a 

CO2 reduction of 0.3 g/mi (cars) and 0.4 g/mi (trucks) for each degree centigrade reduction in air 

cabin temperature. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.8]

The proposed Tts methodology allows the agencies to calculate a vehicle GHG reduction based 

on a set of vehicle window areas and Tts values. Below, we present a methodology using the 

same analytical steps to calculate GHG reductions from the thermal conductivity and thickness 

of a reduced thermal conductivity glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.8]

Calculating the CO2 Benefits of Reduced Thermal Conductivity [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9467-A1, p.8]

SABIC-IP proposes a calculation to quantify the benefits of RTC glazing that is similar to the 

calculations included in the proposal for RTts glazing. The RTC approach set forth below is 

analytically premised on two peer-reviewed SAE papers demonstrating how PC glazing, with its 

lower thermal conductivity as compared to glass, reduces the A/C load required to maintain 

cabin temperature and the lack of any adverse practical impact on the cabin soak temperature 

when PC glazing is used. The RTC credit analysis parallels the proposal’s methodology for the 

RTts credits.17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.8]

After we describe the measurable glazing attribute that underlies the RTC off-cycle glass or 

glazing benefit (here, thermal conductivity normalized to window thickness rather than Tts), the 

RTC credit calculation proceeds in three steps: (1) quantification of the cabin response as a 

function of the measured window attribute (for the RTts credit, the agencies related soak 

temperature reduction to Tts reduction; here, we relate a reduction in the heat transfer into a 

cabin to a reduction in window thermal conductivity normalized to window thickness); (2) 

relating the cabin response to a reduction in A/C fuel use; and (3) relating the reduction in A/C 

fuel use to GHG emission reduction. The net result is a set of equations that match the RTts 

credit’s form and methodology, but which relate the GHG emission reduction to a reduction in 

window thermal conductivity rather than to a reduction in Tts.18 The full calculation is described

in identical steps and in more detail in the attached Annex A. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-

A1, p.9]

RTC glazing’s GHG benefits are derived from a lower thermal conductivity (relative to glass) 

that inhibits heat transfer between the vehicle cabin and the outside air. In the governing physical 

relationships, the glazing thermal conductivity (k) appears with glazing thickness (d) as a 

reciprocal factor (k/d). For example, at a given window location, insulation performance can be 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-85

enhanced by lowering thermal conductivity and/or increasing window thickness. Accordingly, to 

calculate the off-cycle credit for a car with RTC technology, the thermal conductivity normalized 

to window thickness (k/d) is selected as the glazing attribute. This parallels the adoption of Tts as 

the measurable vehicle attribute for the RTts credit calculation. Though thermal conductivity is 

intrinsic to a given material, the typical window thickness generally varies from location to 

location and across different car models.19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.9]

Step 1: Express the Cabin Response (a change in heat transfer) In Terms of the Attribute [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.10]

As in the RTts case, the proposed methodology is based on a linear relationship between the 

cabin response and a change in window attribute. Thus, the cabin response to RTC glazing, 

namely the reduction in steady state heat transfer (in Watts), is related to the change in window 

thermal conductivity normalized to window thickness (k/d). The area-weighting used in the RTts 

credit calculation to account for variations in window size is also used here to account for similar 

variations as well as the selective application of PC glazing to the rooflite and backlite positions 

in the prototype case. This case, studied in the underlying SAE papers, nevertheless provides the 

basis for a general result applicable to other glazing configurations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9467-A1, p.10]

Data from the relevant SAE paper is used to calculate the relationship between (k/d) and the heat 

transfer into the cabin. This data can be found within Annex A as well as in the table below. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.10] [For the table please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9467-A1, p.10]

The above table summarizes glazing parameters for two comparison vehicles. The baseline 

vehicle has standard glass windows at all positions and provides the baseline values for 

calculating the RTC credit. The other vehicle has PC glazing at the backlite and rooflite positions 

and glass windows at all remaining positions. Thermal conductivity (k), thickness (d), and (k/d) 

are listed for each vehicle’s window position. “Change” represents the difference in (k/d) values 

for each window where glass glazing is replaced with PC glazing. Since there is no change in the 

windshield or side window from the baseline vehicle, the corresponding “change” value for those 

positions is zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.10]

Applying parameters presented above and following the reduced Tts approach to account for 

individual window contributions, the area-weighted change in thermal conductivity normalized 

to thickness is 118.6 W/m2-K. Again following the SAE paper’s results which show a heat 

transfer reduction of 107 Watts for the window configuration in the above table, and adopting the 

same linear relationship assumed for the reduced Tts credit, implies a response constant of 

0.9021. Therefore, the following equation quantifies the heat transfer reduction (cabin response) 

due to a change in (k/d):[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, pp.10-11] [For the equation 

please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

The external temperature and solar radiation data used to generate this result incorporate a range 

meant to reflect real-world variations. The data represent mid-day August conditions in Phoenix, 

Arizona averaged over all Augusts from 1991-2005. As such, the data are not limited to a single 
EPA Response to Comments

7-86

sky condition but represent clear sunny days as well as the actual range of cloud cover 

configurations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

Step 2: Use the Cabin Response to Calculate the Resulting Reduction in A/C Fuel Use [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

For vehicles with RTC glazing technology installed at the backlite and rooflite window positions 

and with cabin air recirculating so that the A/C load reduction can be identified with the 

reduction of heat transfer through the glazing, the SAE study demonstrated a decrease in the 

steady state air conditioning load of 107 Watts, or 6.4%. This allows us to use the equation 

developed in Step 1 to calculate individual window contributions to a reduced A/C load. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

A/C load reduction can be related to A/C fuel use reduction by following the NREL 

methodology used for the reduced Tts credit. The RTts credits derived in the proposal rely on 

two separate NREL computer simulations that model, respectively, how a decrease in soak 

temperature reduces the A/C load for subsequent cool down and how, in turn, a decrease in A/C 

load reduces fuel consumption. A/C load was simulated to show a decrease of 29.8% for a 12 

degree centigrade reduction in soak temperature (the latter generated in part by differences from 

the baseline vehicle other than the glazing). Fuel use was simulated to show a 26% decrease for 

this reduction in A/C load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

Adapting these two NREL simulation results (i.e. using the ratio of 26% to 29.8%) to calculate 

fuel reductions attributable to RTC shows a 5.6% percent decrease in fuel use for a 107 Watt 

decrease in air conditioning load. 21 This corresponds to a 0.052% A/C fuel use reduction for 

each Watt reduction in the air conditioning load. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

Step 3: Relate Fuel Use Reductions to CO2 Reductions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.12]

In order to arrive at a final credit amount, the RTC reduction in A/C fuel use must be related to a 

reduction in GHG emissions expressed in grams of CO2 per mile. The proposed calculation for a 

reduced Tts Solar Control credit does this by multiplying the area-weighted average of individual 

window contributions (Step 1) by a conversion factor Z. This conversion factor can be calculated 

by using the relationship between A/C load reduction and fuel use found in Step 2 (a 0.052% 

decrease in A/C/ fuel use for each Watt reduction in A/C load). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9467-A1, p.12]

Applying the same air conditioning CO2 emissions data used in the agencies’ RTts-based credit 

calculation (13.8 g/mi for cars and 17.2 g/mi for trucks), Z values applicable to RTC are derived: 

0.0072 (g/mi)/Watt for cars and 0.0090 (g/mi)/Watt for trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9467-A1, p.12]

Example: RTC-Based Credit Calculation for a Car with PC Glazing [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9467-A1, p.12]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-87

Again working from the above table of glazing parameters, this example calculates a 

representative off-cycle credit for a car22 where half of the glass window area is replaced with 

PC. We chose a value of 220 as a reasonable midpoint between the change values for thermal 

conductivity divided by window thickness in the table above. Since we have chosen an example 

where one-half of the vehicle windows remain unchanged, this introduces a factor of one-half via 

the area-weighted average. Thus, the calculated RTC credit for a car with half of the glass 

window area replaced by PC is: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.12] [For the equation 

please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.12]

This calculated value falls within the range of proposed values on the off-cycle credit menu. It is 

greater than the 0.4 g/mi proposed for solar reflective paint, another Thermal Control 

Technology credit, and close to the proposed credit for active aerodynamics (0.6 g/mi), a credit 

on the general Off-Cycle Technology menu. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.12]

Summary [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.12]

Linking the above steps leads to an RTC off-cycle credit that is consistent with the RTts credit. It 

uses similar factors in the same methodology to calculate an off-cycle credit for RTC glazing. 

Following from the structure and placement of the RTts credit, we propose that the summary 

below be added to the Code of Federal Regulations at 40 C.F.R. 86.1866-12(d)(1)(i)(D) to 

calculate an off-cycle credit (CTC) for RTC glazing as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9467-A1, p.12] [For the associated figure please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.13]

Where ZTC = 0.0072 for passenger automobiles and 0.0090 for light trucks; Gi = the measured 

area of window i, in square meters and rounded to the nearest tenth; G = the total window area of 

the vehicle in square meters and rounded to the nearest tenth; Qi = the steady state load reduction 

for window i, determined by using the following formula: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.13] [For the associated figure please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.13]

Where (k/d)new,i, = the thermal conductivity of window i normalized to thickness d; (k/d)base,i 

= the thermal conductivity for a standard glass window in i’s position normalized to thickness 

(k/d)base,i = 312 for the backlite location, 260 for the rooflite location, and 200 for the 

windshield, side-front, side-rear, and rear quarter locations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-

A1, p.13] [For the associated figure please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.13]

The methodology proposed here for RTC credits closely tracks the methodology proposed in the 

regulation for calculating RTts credits. Adding a calculation applicable to reduced thermal 

conductivity benefits expands the off-cycle credit menu in a way that furthers the express intent 

of the credit program to capture the full range of Thermal Control Technologies, including Glass 

or Glazing able to achieve and/or maintain comfortable cabin temperatures with reduced load on 

the A/C system. SABIC-IP believes it is appropriate to include the additional methodology for 

calculating thermal conductivity benefits within the final rule, and that a separate petition process 

to accomplish this is not necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.13]
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 283-286.]

1 - We use the term “off-cycle” credit as a general reference encompassing the “off-cycle” 

credits provided in EPA’s greenhouse gas program as well as the corollary “fuel consumption 

improvement” credits in the CAFE program. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 75,021. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9467-A1, p.3]

2 - A “standing” vehicle for this purpose is one promoting the maximum soak temperature for a 

given glazing type: the A/C off, the windows closed, no ventilation and no shading. The term 

“standing” is used throughout these comments with the same meaning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9467-A1, p.3]

3 - When regulating products, “the overriding principle of fairness is always the same: the 

government must govern with an even hand.” U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of an Article of 

Drug Labeled as Exachol, 716 F. Supp. 787, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the FDA applied 

an “uneven regulatory policy” by not treating one product like similar situated other product). It 

is well-established that an agency cannot treat similarly situated parties differently without a 

reasoned basis for doing so. See, e.g., Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Surface 

Transp. Bd., 403 F.3d 771, 776-777 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Where an agency applies different 

standards to similarly situated entities and fails to support this disparate treatment with a 

reasoned explanation and substantial evidence in the record, its action is arbitrary and capricious 

and cannot be upheld.”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.3]

4 - For a vehicle equipped with PC glazing technology rather than traditional glass in the backlite 

and rooflite windows, research has demonstrated a 107 Watt or 6.4% reduction in the A/C load 

required to maintain a comfortable cabin temperature for particular solar and temperature 

conditions and with air recirculating. See Reduced Steady State Heating and Air Conditioning 

Loads via Reduced Glazing Thermal Conductivity, SAE Technical Paper 2011-01-0126, 2011. 

Although the benefits of air recirculation and RTC are synergistic, the latter is an independent 

incremental benefit over and above the benefit of recirculation previously recognized by the 

agencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.4]

5 - The Proposed Rule and supporting documents inconsistently categorize some of the proposed 

off-cycle credits as both Thermal and Solar Control technologies. For example, when the 

category is introduced within the draft Joint Technical Support Document (TSD), it is proposed 

as “Thermal (and Solar) Control Technologies.” p.5-69 (Section 5.2.3.5). This categorization is 

consistently applied through that Section. However, the draft Joint TSD later abandons reference 

to the Thermal Control Technologies when it summarizes the proposed off-cycle credits, 

referring only to Solar Control. See draft Joint TSD at 5-74 (table 5-26). Because Solar Control 

fails to accurately characterize all of the technologies listed in the Thermal Control category, the 

terminology should be revised in the final Joint TSD. This would also align it with the proposed 

regulatory language at 76 Fed. Reg. 75,381-2 where Thermal Control is used. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9467-A1, p.4]
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12 - The proposed regulatory language for 40 C.F.R. § 86.1866-12(d)(1)(i)(B) appears to 

mistakenly set the “glass or glazing” credit caps at 3.0 g/mi for passenger automobiles and 4.3 

g/mi for light trucks. See 76 Fed. Reg. 75,382. Conflicting “Glass or glazing” caps of 2.9 g/mi 

(cars) and 3.9 g/mi (trucks) are indicated in the Thermal Control Technology Table on the same 

page of the Federal Register and within the draft Joint TSD. See Draft Joint TSD at 5-73 (Table 

5-25). This seems to arise from an accidental substitution of the categorical Thermal Control 

Technology caps for the specific glass or glazing limit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.7]

13 - Although the draft Joint TSD does not explicitly use area weighting until a later step of its 

analysis, we summarize it here to parallel the RTC calculation discussion. Area-weighting serves 

to preserve the analogy between RTts, where 100% of the glazing area is modified in the 

prototype case from which the off-cycle credit is derived, and RTC, where only 50% of the 

glazing area is modified in the prototype case. The resulting analogous expressions for the 

incremental cabin response to a change in attribute at one window (subject to area weighting) are 

labeled as the “General Case” in the attached Annex A. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.7]

14 - The origin of this result and its reliance on computer simulations is explained in more detail 

below when the RTC-based credit calculation is presented. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-

A1, p.8]

17 - The agencies have not specified any particular approach to calculating off-cycle or fuel 

consumption improvement benefits, and recognize that the demonstration of such benefits may 

involve “on-road testing, modeling, or some other analytic approach,” Instead, the agencies 

require that, regardless of approach, the demonstration must be “robust, verifiable, and capable 

of demonstrating the real-world emissions benefit of the technology with strong statistical 

significance.” 76 Fed. Reg. 75,021; Draft Joint TSD at 5-56 (Section 5.2) (“The estimates of 

these credits were largely determined from research, analysis and simulations, rather than from 

full vehicle testing, which would have been cost and time prohibitive.”) To that end, we propose 

a method of demonstrating the real world benefits associated with the thermal control properties 

of PC glazing that tracks the methodology proposed with regard to Tts technology. As noted 

above, the PC glazing approach is also supported by published peer-reviewed SAE papers. In 

addition, the proposed methodology employs the applicable assumptions in the 2007 NREL 

paper cited frequently in the proposal and the TSD. See Reduction in Vehicle Temperatures and 

Fuel Use from Cabin Ventilation, Solar-Reflective Paint, and New Solar-Reflective Glazing, 

SAE Technical Paper 2007-01-1194. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, pp.8-9]

18 - The agencies have recognized in the context of the proposed Tts methodology that an 

analytic approach is necessary to calculate the benefits for thermal and solar technologies. The 

same is true for RTC glazing. The SC03 test cycle does not capture PC glazing’s benefits which 

are most pronounced when the A/C is maintaining a cabin air temperature much cooler than the 

outside air and the A/C is allowed to run for long periods. The SC03 cycle in the 5-cycle test, 

though it imposes an outside air temperature 12.8 C higher than the cabin temperature 

automatically targeted by the A/C, has a much smaller average temperature difference over the 

test duration because the cycle, only 10 minutes long, immediately follows a soak phase. This is 
EPA Response to Comments

7-90

too short to attain and simulate the steady state cabin conditions (common in the real world) 

where RTC glazing’s benefits are most pronounced. Instead, the SC03 cycle simulates cabin cool 

down from a solar soak state where RTC glazing provides practically no net effect. An analytic 

methodology is therefore appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.9]

19 - An example of how these variations are treated in practice can be seen in the PC glazing 

credit calculation below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.9]

21 - See Annex A for a complete description of how the NREL results are applied to calculate 

the RTC fuel use reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.11]

22 - See id. for a calculation of a representative truck RTC credit value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9467-A1, p.12]

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

We respectfully request modification of the proposed off-cycle credit addressing thermal control 

technology to specifically recognize the insulation benefits of innovative glazing technologies 

such as polycarbonate (PC) glazing, in order to employ a technology neutral approach. This can 

be achieved by clarifying that the “glass or glazing” category includes both reduced thermal 

conductivity benefits (for which a calculation for corresponding credits should be included 

within the regulatory text) and reduced solar transmittance benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9492-A1, p.2]

The Agencies Should Clarify that Glazing with Reduced Thermal Conductivity is Eligible for the 

Proposed Off-Cycle Credit (OCC) for Thermal Control, and Include a Methodology for 

Quantifying This Benefit [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6] 

SPI supports the inclusion of an off-cycle credit (OCC) for thermal control. As the agencies are 

aware, the performance of technologies that reduce air conditioning demand are not captured on 

test drive cycles, and are therefore appropriate for recognition under the OCC program. As 

proposed, the credit appears focused on solar control technologies.29 This phenomenon would be 

relevant to some PC glazing products, including those that filters a proportion of infrared rays. 

However, we note that the proposed glazing credit formulation is inadequate to capture other 

qualities of advanced glazing that reduce A/C load and associated emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6-7]

In particular, SPI respectfully requests consideration for modification of the proposed off-cycle 

credit for thermal control to employ a technology neutral approach, and include the full range of 

glazing with reduced thermal control properties. With a thermal conductivity approximately five 

times lower than glass, PC glazing helps to maintain a comfortable temperature with less air 

conditioning use. The substantial off-cycle reduction on the air conditioning (A/C) load is 

expected to result in improved energy efficiency regardless of vehicle type or power train. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.7]
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The administrative record makes clear the agencies’ intent to encourage innovations that: 

“reduce the amount of solar energy which enters the vehicle’s cabin area, reduce the amount of 

heat energy build-up within the cabin when the vehicle is parked, and/or reduce the amount of 

cooling/heating energy required through measures which improve passenger comfort.” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.7]

This intent is also reflected in the regulatory text and the Technical Support Document, both of 

which refer to thermal control technologies applicable to “glass or glazing.” While glazing with 

superior insulation value clearly responds to the agencies’ stated intent, the NPRM and 

associated documents neglect to provide a methodology for quantifying thermal conductivity 

benefits. Modifying the existing credit to include appropriate references and a calculation to 

cover reduced thermal conductivity benefits is consistent with the scope and intent of the 

agencies in the area of thermal control. As such, SPI believes that providing such a methodology 

can be accomplished in the present rulemaking, and that a separate petition process is not 

necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.7]

SPI understands that comments to be submitted by SABIC Innovative Plastics will provide 

details for quantifying the off-cycle benefits from reduced thermal conductivity, and we urge the 

agencies carefully consider modifying the OCC to incorporate such a calculation. An amended 

credit is appropriate in assuring vehicle manufacturers are provided with appropriate flexibility 

to meet standards. Recognition in an OCC of thermal benefits and other technologies would be 

consistent with agencies’ planned mid-term evaluation, and would not favor a particular material 

or technology over another. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.7]

SPI again expresses its appreciation for the opportunity to comment, in support for the inclusion 

of thermal control benefits in an off-cycle credit for automotive manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9492-A1, p.8]

29 - The equation at 76 FR 75382 includes Tts for total solar transmittance

Organization: TechAmerica

We would like to bring to your attention a concern we have identified in the proposal as it relates 

to the available options through which auto manufacturers may obtain “off-cycle” greenhouse 

gas emission reduction credits. One of the options included in the proposed rule involves 

window glazing technologies to reduce heat buildup in parked cars, which can reduce fuel 

consumption associated with air conditioning use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.1]

To the best of our knowledge, the most effective of these technologies is glass treated with 

metallicized reflective materials. While we understand that the decision to choose a particular 

technology to obtain an off-cycle credit will be voluntary, it is reasonable to assume that auto 

manufacturers seeking to maximize credits under the proposed rule would be inclined toward use 

of the metallicized reflective materials in glass. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

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This incentive is of great concern because metallic films are known to interfere with electronic 

devices that depend on radio frequency (RF) transmissions, such as global positioning systems, 

toll tag transponders and cellular telephones. Even limited use of metallicized reflective 

technology (e.g. only in windshields) can increase the likelihood of interference with reliable

operation of these devices. The potential for cell phone interference or dropped calls is especially 

troubling in emergency situations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.1]

While increased fuel efficiency and lower greenhouse gas emissions are both laudable goals, 

under the proposed rule these goals would be achieved at the expense of significant adverse 

impacts on the ability of consumers, emergency workers and law enforcement personnel to 

contact help in an emergency, communicate life-saving instructions, determine the most direct 

route to a destination, and track prisoners released under electronic surveillance. For these 

reasons, we ask EPA and NHTSA to consider removing the off-cycle credit that effectively 

incentivizes metallicized reflective glazing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]

We also request that the EPA and NHTSA consider the impact of adding metallic film on the 

cost of recycling mass produced windows. With this proposal’s implementation, the EPA and 

NHTSA would need to consider providing recyclers a list of benign metals (similar to the SNAP 

list) that manufacturers can use as a reference for materials that do not need to be recovered. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]

There are also safety considerations that go beyond the interference with RF transmission due to 

the metallic glazing of driver’s windows. This concern is evident in some local laws in North 

America such as in British Columbia that requires that no film is permitted on the driver’s 

compartment right or left. Such legislation indicates a tint of any kind may be considered a 

means to increase the risk of an accident. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]

As an industry, we have dealt with this issue most recently at the state level in California. In 

March of 2010, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) abandoned a regulatory proposal to 

mandate use of this technology in recognition of the fact that the emission reduction benefit 

calculations were based on flawed methodology and that use of this technology presented the 

potential for unintended adverse consequences associated with RF device interference. The 

California Legislature subsequently passed SB 1328 (Lowenthal, 2010), which requires CARB 

to consider the following factors when adopting or amending regulations to reduce motor vehicle 

cabin temperature in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9470-A1, p.2]

(a) Potential reductions in air-conditioning use that can be achieved while a motor vehicle is 

moving, in addition to reductions in air-conditioning use when a motor vehicle is parked. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]

(b) Potential conflicts between, and relative benefits of, motor vehicle cabin temperature 

reduction requirements and technologies that provide motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission 

reductions through various means. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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(c) The flexibility necessary to achieve overall maximum greenhouse gas emission reductions 

from motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]

In light of this history, it is not clear why USEPA is now effectively promoting future use of a 

technology rejected by California because it is known to interfere with RF transmissions. At a 

minimum, we ask that USEPA consider the same factors before adopting any regulation that 

purports to reduce vehicle cabin temperature as a means of achieving greenhouse gas emission 

reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9470-A1, p.2]

Response:

We appreciate all of the comments on the off-cycle credit for glazing from all of the 

commenters. The range of comments fell into three main areas: 1) accounting for the overall 

glazing surface area in the calculations and a minimum level of solar transmittance, 2) concerns 

regarding metallic glazing and incentivizing this technology, and 3) granting of credit for 

polycarbonate (PC) glazing technology. EPA responds to the comments on PC glazing in greater 

detail in Chapter 5 of the TSD for this final rule (See 5.2.10). In addition, we will briefly 

summarize those responses here.

For the comments from the EPGAA, Guardian and PGW regarding accounting for the 

total glass surface in a vehicle, this is discussed further in Section 5.2.10 of TSD Chapter 5. In 

summary, the equation that was included for calculating the glazing benefits includes a variable 

for the total glazing surface area when accounting for each location where glazing is applied. 

Further, the comments advocate for proportional scaling based on data larger glass area. We 

believe that this scaling provides a perverse incentive to increase glass area on vehicles even 

more than levels seen today, which would in turn have deleterious environmental impacts, as the 

interior cabin would experience greater heat loads. Therefore, we are finalizing the format for 

the glazing credit formula as proposed.

Regarding the comments on metallic glazing and incentivizing this technology, this is 

discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2.10 of TSD Chapter 5 and Section II.F.2. of the preamble 

for this final rule. To briefly summarize, we met with the Enhanced Protective Glass 

Automotive Association, which represents the automotive glass manufacturers and suppliers, and 

representatives from the automotive glass industry including PGW, Guardian, and AGC to 

discuss the concerns with metallic glazing and the potential for signal interference and/or radio 

frequency (RF) attenuation (details of this meeting are available in EPA docket # EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799 and NHTSA docket #NHTSA-2010-0131). Based on their feedback and 

supporting data supplied, there was no statistically-significant increase in signal interference or

RF attenuation when reflective (or metallic) glazing was used. They also supplied a list of 

vehicles that currently use metallic glazing was supplied but there have been no wide scale 

reports of signal interference or RF attenuation on these vehicles. 

In addition, we received comments from the California Air Resources Board (CARB) in 

response to the comments on concerns with metallic glazing and it’s affect on the Cool Cars 

Regulation, and supporting the information from automotive glass industry. CARB stated that 

the reason they did not finalize a mandate for metallic glazing in the Cool Cars Regulation was 

primarily the timing for when the signal interference and RF attenuation concerns were raised. 
EPA Response to Comments

7-94

They also clarified that they were not requiring a specific type of glazing and that the 

performance-based approach ultimately adopted in the Advanced Clean Cars Regulation 

accomplished the same objectives as proposed under the Cool Cars Regulation. Finally, CARB 

also performed testing of signal interference and RF attenuation (see test results in EPA docket 

#EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-41752) echoing the findings of the automotive glass industry that 

there is “[n]o effect of reflective glazing observed on monitoring ankle bracelets or cell phones” 

and that any “[e]ffects on GPS navigation devices [are] completely mitigated by use of [the] 

deletion window” placing either the device or the external antennae in this area. CARB urged 

EPA to finalize the proposed credit values for glass and glazing as proposed. Based on these 

statements, the primary reason for CARB ceasing work on the regulation was not due to 

concerns raised regarding reflective/metallic glazing as many of the commenters asserted.

Based on the information supplied by the automotive glass industry and CARB, there is 

no evidence to support the commenters’ claims of significant adverse effects on signal 

interference and RF attenuation. However, to allay the commenters’ concerns, we will 

emphasize that manufacturers strongly consider and evaluate the potential for signal interference 

and RF attenuation in their vehicle design and glazing technology when requesting the solar 

control glazing credit.

Regarding the comments on PC glazing, several commenters (American Chemistry 

Council or ACC, Bayer Material Science, California Manufacturers and Technology 

Association, CTIA-The Wireless Association, Garmin, SABIC Innovative Plastics, and the 

Society of Plastics Industry) touted the benefits of polycarbonate (PC) glazing (e.g., reduced 

thermal conductivity compared to glass reduced weight of PC glazing compared to other 

materials) and suggested that the glazing credit not be restricted to metallic glazing and, further, 

recommended that a separate PC glazing credit should be established. In addition, SABIC 

Innovative Plastics supplied an equation for calculating the thermal conductivity benefits from 

PC glazing similar to the equation for glazing credit in Section 5.2.10 in TSD Chapter 5. 

In response, we believe it is important to note that we are not mandating a particular 

technology to qualify for the off-cycle glazing credit. The off-cycle glazing credit is technology 

neutral and performance based with manufacturers able to select the glazing technologies and 

designs based on desired heat rejection performance and considering signal interference or RF 

attenuation (if any), as discussed above. Therefore, we believe that a separate PC glazing credit 

is not necessary since this credit covers all types of glazing technologies. 

Second, the formula we referenced in Section 5.2.10 of TSD Chapter 5 for solar 

transmittance is an established ISO procedure (ISO 13837) that can be used and referenced to 

ensure a consistent basis for information supporting the credit request. To offer a separate credit 

for PC glazing on the off-cycle technology menu, we would need to have a similar, established 

set of procedures to validate the equations, and substantiate a credit for PC glazing. Therefore, 

we are not including the specific equations used to calculate the benefits of thermal conductivity 

from PC glazing. If manufacturers believe that there is some additional benefit, they may apply 

for additional glazing credit using the demonstration methods for technologies not on the defined 

technology list. See preamble section II.E.5.
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Therefore, we agree with the comments from CARB “to retain the structure of the offcycle credits for solar control technologies.” Accordingly, we are finalizing the off-cycle 

provisions for solar and thermal control technologies, including glazing, as proposed in this final 

rule. More detailed discussion on the solar and thermal technologies can be found in Section 

5.2.9 of TSD Chapter 5 and Section II.F.2. of the preamble for this final rule.

The EPA also agrees with the comments from the Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive 

Association (EPGAA) that the off-cycle credit for solar glazing “provides simplified model for 

defining the impact of glazing on the heat load reduction and the emissions.” and Pittsburgh 

Glass Works (PGW) that “the benefits of solar glazing...have been proven to reduce emissions 

and improve fuel efficiency.”

Regarding the comments from EPGAA and PGW on capturing the additional benefits of

glazing in conjunction with other advanced technologies, we encourage EPGAA, PGW and other 

member companies to develop measurement standards to capture these benefits. If a method for 

demonstrating these benefits can be developed, this process may be used for the alternate 

demonstration methods for technologies not on the off-cycle technology menu.

For the comments from EPGAA and PGW on the 3.0 g/mi for passenger automobiles and 

to 4.3 g/mi for light trucks limit for solar and thermal control technologies, the alternate method 

approval process for technologies not on the off-cycle technology menu is a pathway for 

manufacturers to demonstrate benefits and request credit above and beyond these limits. The 

default values in the off-cycle technology menu were developed based on available information. 

However, it is possible a manufacturer may have data specific to their design that exceeds the 

default values in the off-cycle technology menu. Therefore, the alternate method approval 

process would be the arena to present this information and receive credit beyond the imposed 

solar and thermal control technology limits.

For the comments from EPGAA and PGW regarding extension of the off-cycle 

technology menu to the MY2012-2016 GHG Program are discussed in Section III.C.5 of the 

preamble for this final rule, as well as EPA’s decision to do so under the circumstances described 

in the preamble.

Regarding the comments from Garmin relating to a defined minimum off-cycle credit for 

some technologies such as in-dash GPS navigation traffic avoidance, our response to this is 

discussed in greater detail in Section II.F.2 of the preamble for this final rule. In summary, these 

technologies face a high hurdle in quantifiable associated benefit and demonstrated real-world 

activity. These factors make it difficult to develop a pre-defined minimum off-cycle credit and 

we believe that the technologies are more relevant to a more flexible, open process such as the 

alternate demonstration methods for technologies. As such, EPA is not including these “driver 

selectable” off-cycle technologies on the final rule off cycle menu.

We agree with the comments from Guardian on solar roof panels and the changes they 

recommended as explained in Section 5.2.4 of TSD Chapter 5. In summary, we now use the 

term “Solar Panels” to describe this credit and the definition in 5.2.5 of TSD Chapter 5 reflects 

this revised terminology. In addition, the definition also explicitly states that this credit is 
EPA Response to Comments

7-96

available for “horizontally-oriented” surfaces, not just the roof, and that the rated power for the 

solar panel be determined using standardized test conditions as suggested by Guardian. Finally, 

we agree with Guardian regarding the need to account for different panel power ratings. We 

received similar comments from other commenters advocating for scaling of the solar panel 

credit since panel power may vary. In response to their comments, we developed a formula that 

can be scaled according to the rated solar panel power and takes into account various

environmental factors such as on average vehicle use and driving and parking conditions. These 

revisions are being finalized in today’s action.

In general, we believe the off-cycle technology menu will provide some certainty to 

requesting off-cycle credits. In addition, the technologies on the off-cycle technology menu and 

associated credit values are based on robust data and verifiable methods and produce real-world 

benefits. For technologies not on the off-cycle technology menu, we believe one of the alternate 

methods for approval provides manufacturers the necessary flexibility to have the agency 

consider other technologies.

We believe that the technologies in the off-cycle program also will be durable in-use. As 

noted in section III.C. 5 of the preamble to the final rule, EPA requires off-cycle components to 

be durable in-use and continues to believe that this is an important aspect of the program. See 

86.1866-12 (d)(1)(iii). The technologies upon which the credits are based are subject to full 

useful life compliance provisions, as with other emissions controls. Unless the manufacturer can 

demonstrate that the technology would not be subject to in-use deterioration over the useful life 

of the vehicle, the manufacturer must account for deterioration in the estimation of the credits in 

order to ensure that the credits are based on real in-use emissions reductions over the life of the 

vehicle. In-use requirements apply to technologies generating credits based on the pre-defined 

list as well as to those based on a manufacturer’s demonstration. In addition, the data we used to 

support the credit values is based on actual, real world vehicle data, where available, and 

represents the durability that can be expected on future vehicle applications.

In conclusion, we believe that all of the comments were helpful to improving the offcycle credit program and we are finalizing the off-cycle credit program with the revisions based 

on the comments above in this final rule.

7.3. Comments Regarding Using Pre-Approved List in MYs 2012-

2016

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Chrysler Group LLC

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

General Motors Company
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Hyundai America Technical Center

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Toyota Motor North America

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The improved off-cycle technology framework for MY 2017 and later years should be made 

available for MYs 2012-16. The Alliance supports the additional detail and improved processes 

proposed for capturing off-cycle fuel economy and GHG improvements. This facet of the MY 

2012-16 regulation recognizes improvements in fuel economy and GHGs that are not captured in 

current laboratory tests but do have real-world benefits. Recognizing the real-world 

improvements that these technologies achieve and how challenging it will be to place these 

technologies in the market, the agencies should allow automakers to apply all aspects of the 

revised off-cycle framework to MYs 2012-2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.4]

The improved off-cycle technology framework for MY 2017 and later years should be made 

available for MYs 2012-16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.11]

The Alliance urges the agencies to allow manufacturers to utilize the off-cycle pre-defined 

technology list and values for MYs 2012-2016. Providing this program feature in the earlier 

years improves the usefulness of the credit program and encourages manufacturers to introduce 

the listed technologies sooner, in lieu of postponing them to MY 2017 and beyond. There is 

every reason to incentivize early adoption of these technologies, since this would result in real 

CO2 emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.11]

Additionally, such action would provide manufacturers with the same planning certainty 

regarding available credits as will be provided in 2017 and beyond. This in turn would help 

encourage earlier investments in off-cycle technologies. The alternative that an OEM faces 

(pathway 2 or 3) otherwise would be to make the investment without the certainty provided by 

the list, which may result in postponing investment until 2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.11]

Off-cycle technologies will have to compete with resource demands for other vehicle 

technologies, and knowing that the same credit for the technology available in MY 2017 would 

be available starting in MY 2012 would help the business case for earlier deployment. The result 

could be earlier availability of GHG-reducing technologies for consumers to buy. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.11]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

7. Off-cycle Credits:
EPA Response to Comments

7-98

• Off-cycle Credit Menu for Model Years 2012 – 2016. Honda believes that the off-cycle 

credits identified in the menu represent real, environmentally-beneficial reductions in 

greenhouse gases. Therefore, Honda proposes to allow the applicability of the off-cycle 

credit menu to models prior to model year 2017. Real, effective greenhouse gas 

reductions can be achieved by off-cycle technologies implemented before model year 

2017, and their credits should be recognized. This is good public policy as it is certain 

that earlier, effective environmental benefits are better for society. In the preamble, EPA 

states: “As noted above, EPA proposes to make the list available for credit generation 

starting in MY 2017. Prior to MY 2017, manufacturers would need to demonstrate offcycle emissions reductions in order to generate credits for off-cycle technologies, 

including those on the list.” This has the potential to create significant problems and 

discrepancies. If EPA awards credits higher or lower than the credit menu, it will create 

unfairness. EPA is already modifying the 2012 -2016 requirements by removing the 

language requiring off-cycle technologies to be “new, innovative, and not widespread.” 

The best approach is to allow the inclusion of the off-cycle credit menu in the 2012 –

2016 standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Global Automakers supports the availability of credits for technologies that provide on-road 

efficiency and emissions benefits but whose benefits are not fully measured using the current 

city-highway test. In a number of cases, these technologies are currently known, as indicated by 

the “menu” of credits developed by the agencies for the proposed rule. However, given the long 

time-frame for the proposed standards, it is very possible that additional technologies will be 

identified which should qualify for off-cycle credits, and the characteristics of these technologies 

cannot currently be predicted. In order to provide an incentive for manufacturers to pursue the 

implementation of these technologies and realize the resulting benefits, it is important that the 

agencies provide maximum flexibility to manufacturers to obtain credits. For these reasons, we 

urge the agencies to avoid imposing unnecessary restrictions on qualification for off-cycle 

credits. The proposed rule establishes numerous restrictions on the use of off-cycle credits which 

appear to be arbitrary and unnecessary to the effective functioning of the GHG and CAFE 

programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 5]

(1) The pre-approved technology “menu.” Global Automakers supports the inclusion of the 

menu in the regulations as a default list of pre-approved technologies, with manufacturers being 

authorized to petition for larger credit or credits for additional technologies, based on credible 

data. EPA characterizes the menu credits as being conservative estimates of actual on-road 

benefits, so we see no reason to limit the availability of the menu credits to MY 2017 and 

thereafter. Therefore, we request that EPA revise section 86.1866-12(d)(1) to make the menu 

credits also available in MYs 2012-16. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 5]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

As many of these technologies will be introduced in the timeframe before 2017, we would 

appreciate the ability to use the predefined list as soon as possible. That would avoid unnecessary 

workload on both sides. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 1]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-99

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Recommend establishing the list of pre-approved off-cycle technologies for the 2012-2016 

rule; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 9]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Support the off-cycle technology credits as proposed

Fisker supports the design-based or “menu” approach to accounting for emissions reductions 

benefits from off-cycle technologies proposed to start in model year 2017. This approach is 

simpler and imposes less of a testing burden on automakers than the approach currently in 

place, so we would encourage the implementation of the new approach before model year 

2017. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 5]

Organization: General Motors Company

To help foster these technologies, we urge the agencies to also make all aspects of the updated 

off-cycle framework available for the 2012-2016 model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-

A1, p. 3]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

Additionally, Hyundai asks that EPA and NHTSA allow the menu technologies to be used to 

comply with the MY 2012-2016 regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.5]

[This comment was also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing 

on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 22.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 172.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 22-23.]

Now that the agencies have quantified the value of off-cycle technologies in a menu format, 

Hyundai asks that EPA and NHTSA allow the menu technologies to be used in the 2012 through 

2016 model years.

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Additionally, since the 2012-2016 joint rule on CAFE and CO2 allowed for the usage of offcycle credits to contribute towards compliance, Johnson Controls recommends that any credits 

defined through the NPRM process for 2017-2025 is applied retroactively to the 2012-2016 MY 

regulatory timeframe. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

7-100

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

First, MEMA recommends the agencies consider making available the off-cycle credits for 

MY2012-2016 to encourage early implementation of these technologies without the formal 

review process required under the MY2012-2016 National Program rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9478-A1, pp.9-10]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Substantial greenhouse gas improvements should be achievable in off-cycle conditions using 

new technologies, but procedures for earning credits must be simplified. Porsche submits the 

following comments on the program: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

• The concept of a pre-defined off-cycle technology credit menu is a valuable addition, which 

will prevent administrative delays and eliminate the need for burdensome analyses and credit 

applications. However, we believe that this simplified program should be extended retroactively 

to the 2012-2016 program in order to accelerate innovation during these early years. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Off-Cycle Credits: Availability to 2012-2016 Model Years [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.12]

Toyota requests EPA and NHTSA revise the 2012-2016 model year regulations to allow offcycle credits to be generated using the proposed pre-determined credit list. Such a revision of the 

existing regulations would promote earlier development and deployment of off-cycle 

technologies, which in turn could accelerate real world CO2 reduction and fuel savings by as 

much as five model years. It would also provide further harmonization of the EPA and NHTSA 

regulations for 2012-2016 model years. In addition, the certainty of pre-determined credits for 

the 2012-2016 model year regulations would further minimize the need for the arbitrary sales 

volume threshold proposed for 2017-2025 model years. Finally, this approach is consistent with 

the agency's proposal to make both the revised 5-cycle and non-5-cycle demonstration methods 

discussed below retroactive to the 2012-2016 model year regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.12]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen supports the proposal made by the Alliance to make the credited list of technologies 

available for use in the 2012-2016MY regulatory program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-

A1, p. 32]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-101

VCC also wants to emphasize that the pre-defined list from the proposal for 2017-2025 be 

standard for the MY 2012-2016. The purpose of granting off-cycle credits is to enable early 

introduction of advanced technology, so it is a reasonable strategy to incentivize early adoption 

of these technologies, since this would result in real CO2 emissions reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 6]

The off-cycle credit program in 2012-2016 is difficult for industry to utilize. Since EPA intends 

to maintain and also enhance the off-cycle credit program for 2017-2025, it would be helpful to 

strengthen the overall program by making it available for the entire 2012-2025 period. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 6]

• The off-cycle program should be made available for the entire 2012-2025 period. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 8]

Response:

There is broad support in the comments submitted by manufacturers to allow the use of the 

pre-defined list in MYs 2012-2016. In response to these comments, EPA is allowing 

manufacturers to use the pre-defined list beginning in MY 2014. EPA’s full response and 

discussion of the topic of using the pre-defined list prior to MY 2017 is provided in Section 

III.C.5.b.i.

7.4. Comments Regarding Credit Cap and Sales Thresholds Proposed 

for Pre-Approved List

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Borg Warner, Inc.

Chrysler Group LLC

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Mazda North American Operations

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Toyota Motor North America

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
EPA Response to Comments

7-102

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The proposed fleet penetration requirements and credit cap could slow new technology 

implementation and should therefore be removed. Throughout the NPRM, the agencies suggest 

that an automaker be required to apply advanced technologies to a minimum percentage of its 

fleet before receiving any level of credit. That would be the case even when the addition of an 

advanced technology to a single vehicle results in measurable, real-world GHG emission 

reductions. We propose that all actions be recognized, as they historically have been, on a pervehicle-so-equipped basis. This is an equitable and efficient approach, under which every vehicle 

built with the required technology for our customers receives credit. The prerequisite of specific 

penetration rates and imposition of a credit cap are economically inefficient and inconsistent 

with the goals of the rulemaking and may well have the unintended consequence of delaying the 

introduction of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.4]

However, the 10% minimum penetration threshold and the credit cap are barriers to the success 

of this feature and could result in the level of credits being out of sync with the level of GHG 

reductions that is actually achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.10]

It is counterproductive and unfair to create a 10% sales threshold during the initial phase-in 

period before some technologies can begin earning off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.11]

It is counterproductive to cap off-cycle credit attainment at 10 grams of carbon dioxide 

(gCO2)/mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.11]

The proposed fleet penetration requirements and credit cap could slow new technology 

implementation and should therefore be removed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

While the Alliance strongly supports the concept of a pre-defined list, two proposed limitations -

- the 10% minimum penetration rate and the 10 g/mi cap -- will constrain its ability to incentivize 

technology application. The public policy goal of maximizing early introduction of these 

technologies is at odds with both of these limitations and the NPRM fails to provide a 

compelling justification for either restriction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

Further, the 10% threshold and 10 g/mi cap add an element of planning uncertainty that 

discourages use of the off-cycle program. The threshold also unfairly withholds credit for actual, 

real-world emission reductions that are achieved in the early stages of technology roll-out, before 

a 10% penetration can be achieved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

New, innovative technologies are customarily initially introduced at low volumes in order to 

demonstrate the benefits, reduce costs and work through technology problems before the 

technology is rolled out in larger volumes. To minimize warranty concerns and expense, 

automakers always try to phase-in new technology at a measured pace across their fleets (often 

during the course of major vehicle redesigns). Requiring large step changes to get widespread 

penetration – i.e., above a 10% penetration - is unlikely even with these off-cycle incentives. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-103

Requiring a minimum penetration rate would discourage companies from offering a new 

technology on a limited basis to test the technology and gauge consumer acceptance before 

launching it more broadly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

The 10% minimum penetration threshold – or any other minimum penetration rate − may also 

have the unintended consequence of delaying investment in some technologies, at least until they 

can be applied to higher-volume models. Similarly, the 10 g/mi cap on credits would discourage 

maximum adoption of the pre-defined off-cycle technologies. Manufacturers would have less 

incentive to introduce technologies that would take them beyond the cap, leaving untapped GHG 

emissions reductions on the table. We think it would be productive to have further dialogue with 

the agencies regarding these issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Minimum Fleet Percentages. EPA requested comment on applying a minimum threshold of 10 

percent for several of the listed technologies, and the proposed treatment of HEV/PHEV/EV 

specific technologies and exhaust heat recovery (see Table III-17). Honda believes that the 

minimum threshold concept is unnecessarily restrictive. New, expensive technologies often are 

applied first on more expensive, lower volume models. This process has the salutary affect of 

lowering a manufacturer’s risk. Consumer feedback on lower volume cars can provide: a) 

important consumer feedback, and b) production experience prior to much higher volumes which 

can help lower costs. Additionally, the “minimum fleet percentages” can have the unintended 

consequence of slowing the introduction of new technologies into the market. Honda currently 

has about sixteen models in our U.S. line-up, only three of which account for 10% or more of our 

sales in a given year. If an off-cycle credit technology is ready for market introduction at a time 

when it is not convenient to add it to one of the three models that exceed 10% of sales, there 

would be no credit allowed for adding it to any one of the other thirteen models that Honda sells 

in the U.S. The fact that the credits are weighted to U.S. sales means that there is no windfall for 

an automaker who only manages to apply one of these technologies to less than 10% of its sales. 

We believe that EPA is unnecessarily complicating and constraining the introduction of off-cycle 

credit technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, pp. 5-6]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

(2) Cap on off-cycle credits. EPA proposes several caps on off-cycle credits. Under section 

86.1866(d)(1)(i)(B), EPA establishes maximum allowed credits for thermal control technologies 

and advanced glazing. A cap on menu credits of 10 grams per mile is also established (paragraph 

(d)(1)(ii)). Manufacturers may exceed the 10 gram cap by demonstrating the benefits using 5-

cycle testing or analysis. See preamble page 75023. However, since EPA characterizes the menu 

credits as being based on conservative estimates of benefits, we see no reason to require testing 

when the menu values exceed the 10 gram limit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 6]

The basis for these maximum credits is not clear. EPA should either provide an explanation for 

the need for these caps or eliminate them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 6]
EPA Response to Comments

7-104

(5) Minimum market penetration to qualify for credit. EPA proposes minimum market 

penetration rates of 10 percent of the manufacturer’s combined car-truck fleet for most of the 

off-cycle menu technologies, in order to qualify for credits. The minimum penetration rate 

creates an unnecessary impediment to the introduction of new technologies. The off-cycle 

technologies may be relatively new items, and consumers may not be familiar with these items. 

Implementation of these technologies at low levels may, if successful, lead to substantial benefits 

in the future, and manufacturers should be encouraged to pursue such technologies. A smaller 

penetration rate would create a correspondingly smaller credit, so we see no problem being 

created at lower penetration levels. EPA has failed to demonstrate a clear need for the minimum 

penetration restriction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Borg Warner, Inc.

However, we also believe there should not be a double standard of requiring a 10% market 

penetration threshold for non hybrid-based technologies and no market penetration requirement 

for hybrid-based technologies in order to receive the off-cycle credit. There are technologies that 

are much less proven than hybrids and this threshold could unnecessarily complicate and 

discourage the introduction of new, higher risk, technologies. Credit would only be given for 

those vehicles with the technology, so a lower penetration rate has no artificial benefit.[EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Oppose minimum penetration rates for all technologies and the 10 g/mi maximum cap for using 

the credit table as unnecessary restrictions; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p. 9]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 54-55.]

And, finally, there are references to minimum penetration levels in various aspects of the 

proposed rule. These thresholds are unnecessary in our opinion and serve as potential 

disincentives to invest in new technologies. We propose that all actions be recognized as they 

had historically been on a per-vehicle-so-equipped basis. This is an equitable approach where 

every vehicle built with the required technology for our customers is acknowledged. If a 

minimum penetration rate is required, a manufacturer may be discouraged from pursuing 

innovative technologies with uncertain acceptance and possibly no credit or payback.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 61-62.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 26-27.]

And finally, there are references to minimum penetration levels in various aspects of the 

proposed rule. These thresholds are unnecessary and will serve as potential disincentives to 

investing in new technologies. We propose that all actions be recognized, as they have been 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-105

historically, on a per-vehicle-so-equipped basis. This is an equitable approach where every 

vehicle built with the required technology for our customers is acknowledged.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 62.]

If a minimum penetration rate is required, the manufacturer will be discouraged from pursuing 

innovative technologies with uncertain acceptance and possibly no credit or pay backs.

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

Except for technologies specific to HEVs/PHEVs/EVs (e.g., solar roof panels) and exhaust heat 

recovery, EPA is proposing to require minimum penetration rates for the pre-approved off-cycle 

technologies - 10% of a manufacturer's combined car and light truck production. Again, 

EcoMotors encourages the agencies to remove the market penetration requirements established 

for the credits, to better reflect historic market penetration issues facing new technologies. As 

discussed above, new technologies typically take years to prove themselves and attain significant 

market penetration. Thus, 10% is likely too high a threshold for these technologies during the 

time period in question. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 13]

However, EcoMotors encourages the agencies to remove the market penetration requirements 

established for some of the off-cycle credits in order to better reflect historic market penetration 

issues facing new technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 13]

Organization: Ferrari

It is also necessary to eliminate the minimum market penetration requirement for such 

technologies. If a vehicle is fitted with one or more of such technologies it can reduce the GHG 

emissions, and therefore it make sense to account that, even if only a small percentage of the 

manufacturer fleet is equipped. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Ford is not in favor of the proposed minimum penetration thresholds that have been proposed for 

the menu technologies. As new technologies are developed, they are often introduced on certain 

models or trim levels, as opposed to making them widely available across the entire fleet. The 

gradual introduction of new technologies reflect product cycle plan cadence, the need to gain inuse experience and familiarity with a new technology, and customer acceptance and/or interest in 

a new feature or option. Generally, we anticipate that the technologies will become more 

widespread over time. However, requiring a minimum sales threshold does not incentivize the 

introduction of these technologies, which typically require extensive development at significant 

cost. Instead, manufacturers may choose not to implement new technologies, or to delay 

introduction based on the fact that they cannot know with certainty if they will be able to meet 

the proposed penetration rates. In fact, we find ourselves aligned with the agencies when they 

state that “...for most of these technologies the agencies have no data on what the rates of 

penetration of these technologies would be during the rule timeframe” (76 Fed. Reg. 74941). The 
EPA Response to Comments

7-106

business cases for some of these new technologies will be based on the ability to achieve 

expected credit amounts. If the credit is contingent upon a volume threshold, which in turn is 

contingent upon marketplace factors beyond our control, manufacturers may find it difficult to 

justify the incorporation of the technology. Ford therefore recommends that the agencies award 

credits on a per-vehicle-so-equipped basis, or alternatively consider some flexibility in the 

minimum penetration rates, such as a phase-in over time. We would like the opportunity to 

explore this issue further with the agencies in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 

17]

For similar reasons, Ford also does not support the proposed 10 g/mile fleet-based cap on credits 

earned from using technologies from the pre-approved menu as it may discourage manufacturers 

from maximum adoption of the pre-defined technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, 

p. 17]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 35-36.]

In order to pave the way for such technologies, manufacturers must have confidence that their 

efforts and investment will be evaluated fairly and given appropriate credit.

We also strongly encourage that the agencies to reconsider the production volume thresholds that 

have been established in order to reflect new technology introductions in our compliance 

strategy.

Setting high thresholds, which are entirely dependent on consumer acceptance, may actually 

serve a hindrance to the investment of these new technologies.

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

3) Market Penetration Requirement: EPA has proposed that credits for most off-cycle menu 

technologies will only be available if an automaker achieves a minimum market penetration rate 

of 10% of its combined fleet. Hyundai believes that if the agency wants to encourage new 

technology, such a hurdle should not be included. EPA notes that the 10% threshold does not 

apply to hybrids or electric vehicles because EPA does not want to impede the introduction of 

these technologies. The same should hold true for off-cycle technologies. Often times, off-cycle 

technologies are only introduced in limited production initially until they are proven in the 

marketplace. Yet, there are still benefits available even if a technology is not widely adopted. We 

ask that EPA encourage the introduction of innovative and efficient technologies by eliminating 

minimum penetration levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.5]

EPA plans to implement a 10 gram cap on the menu credits for off-cycle technologies because 

they are based on limited data. However, EPA notes that these credits are conservative and 

Hyundai agrees. For this reason, and because it is possible to exceed 10 grams using the menu 

technologies, we do not believe a cap is necessary and urge the agency to remove it. The industry 

should receive credits for all applications that provide real world benefits without requiring 

additional testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.5]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-107

[This comment was also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing 

on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 22.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 172-174.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 23.]

We recommend also that the agencies eliminate the ten-gram cap on the menu technology.

EPA planned the cap because the menu technology credits are based on limited data. However, 

Hyundai agrees with the agency that the credits offered are conservative and thus a cap is not 

necessary.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Because some uncertainty is inherent even in a well-designed process the ICCT also supports the 

proposed 10 g/mile cap. ICCT’s comments on specific off-cycle credits below are designed to 

make the off-cycle credit system as accurate as possible and to maximize the overall benefits of 

the rule. The NPRM and draft TSD show that some of the technologies meet ICCT’s 

recommended criteria for off-cycle credits, such as some of the proposed AC system credits, 

while other proposed off-cycle credits do not. We note that excluding the later category will not 

affect the very favorable benefit-cost ratio for this rule because the draft TSD did not consider 

these technologies in that analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 37]

Organization: Mazda North American Operations

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 64.]

While we strongly support the concept of a predefined list of off-cycle technologies, we urge the 

agencies to eliminate the proposed 10 percent minimum penetration rate. Requiring a minimum 

penetration rate would discourage companies from offering a new technology on a limited basis 

to test the technology and gauge consumer acceptance before launching it more broadly.

Moreover, new technologies are typically added when a model is redesigned or updated. To give 

a specific example, adding one of the off-cycle technologies on the predefined list to either the 

Mazda2, Mazda5 or the Miata models would result in no credit because they each account for 

less than 10 percent of our fleet. The 10 percent minimum penetration threshold or any other 

minimum penetration rate may well have the unintended consequence of encouraging 

manufacturers to postpone technology application until a model that accounts for the acquired 

percentage is redesigned rather than installing it earlier on a lower volume model.

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
EPA Response to Comments

7-108

The off-cycle credits are necessary to continue to provide an incentive for these technologies to 

assure their continued implementation. Incorporating these technologies into vehicles with lower 

price points and smaller volumes remains challenging from a cost perspective, and the ability to 

do so may require longer lead times before certain technologies proliferate through the fleets. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-2]

The agencies should gain the maximum benefit from off-cycle technologies by applying the 

credits on a vehicle basis, rather than requiring threshold penetrations before the credits can be 

applied. A threshold requirement deters incremental investment, especially on lower volume 

model lines, and may detract from overall, real world CO2 emissions reductions. Manufacturers 

should be recognized for applying off-cycle technologies in all vehicles. Similarly, since offcycle credits must meet demonstrated performance criteria linking them to real world CO2

reductions, imposing caps on the off-cycle credits would be inconsistent with the real world

benefits and a detraction from the incentive that the agencies are intending to provide. 

Accordingly, DAG urges the agencies to apply off-cycle credits on a per vehicle basis without 

threshold penetration rates and without artificial caps. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 

A-2]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

However, the current cap on credits is ultimately limiting. Removing the cap would reward the 

full lot of vehicles/technologies that achieve or exceed the National Program goals of reduced 

emissions and improved fuel consumption. Thus, MEMA urges the agencies to remove the cap 

on credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.5]

First, regarding the off-cycle technologies’ credits, MEMA believes the agencies’ minimum 

penetration requirement of 10 percent of manufacturer’s overall combined car and light truck 

production (with the HEV, PHEV and EV exceptions) is not only a significant hurdle for OEMs 

to meet, but also an undue influence of the market pushing the “preferred vehicle technologies” 

that we discussed earlier in our comments. Therefore, MEMA requests that the penetration rates 

for off-cycle technologies should be eliminated entirely, so that the marketplace can determine 

“winners and losers.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.7]

Penetration rate requirements and caps on credits should be eliminated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9478-A1, p.13]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

While NRDC strongly supports the use of a cap per manufacturer for off-cycle credits, NRDC 

believes it is critical that EPA fully evaluate the adequacy of the 10 g/mi cap level, given the 

uncertainties in real, verifiable emissions reduction. EPA should adopt a lower cap if 

necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 14]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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• Imposing an arbitrary 10 grams/mile cap for total off-cycle credit has no basis in real world 

accounting, and is counterproductive to innovation. The Agencies should encourage maximum 

adoption of all GHG improvements by providing unlimited additive credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

• It is counterproductive and unjust to impose a 10% sales threshold before some technologies 

can earn off-cycle credits. Every gram of GHG improvement is just as valuable as any other. In 

addition, gradual introduction of new technologies is often necessary, and should not be 

penalized. Sensible sales weighting would provide more reasonable credit accounting. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

However, there is no engineering justification for setting arbitrary limits and thresholds for credit 

availability. To be a meaningful feature of the program, the level of off-cycle credit must be in 

sync with the level of actual GHG reductions. Worse, such limits and thresholds are potentially a 

perverse disincentive to introduce valuable innovations or to maximize penetration of known 

technologies. Ironically, it is likely that such disincentives will thus unnecessarily increase actual 

GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Off-Cycle Credits: Pre-Determined Credit List (10 Percent Sales Volume Threshold) [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.11]

EPA's intent is for the 10 percent minimum sales threshold is to encourage companies to more 

rapidly adopt off-cycle technologies for larger volume vehicle models and bring these 

technologies into the mainstream. Toyota opposes a minimum sales volume threshold for 

generating off-cycle credits and we believe a threshold will be counterproductive to achieving 

EPA's goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.11]

If the agencies expand the list of technologies on the pre-determined list in the future and/or as 

more performance data on off-cycle technologies becomes available, Toyota requests that the 10 

g/mi cap be revisited. This could be done as part of the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.11]

First, GHG benefits are realized for each and every vehicle purchased with a given off-cycle 

technology. The accumulation of benefits does not somehow begin when an arbitrary sales 

threshold is met. As such, manufacturers should earn credits for each and every vehicle sold with 

a given off-cycle technology. Second, an arbitrary sales threshold does not recognize the 

potential for high deployment rates on low sales volume vehicles. As proposed, a manufacturer 

could introduce an off-cycle technology over an entire model or configuration, but not be eligible 

for credits if that model or configuration does not make up at least 10 percent of the 

manufacturer's fleet. Third, absent market demand, the arbitrary 10 percent sales threshold will 

do nothing to speed deployment due to significant risks to the manufacturer. Despite the 

motivation for a rapid return on investment, new technologies typically enter the market at a 

slow pace. It is common practice for new automotive technologies to be introduced on a single 

model, or even single configuration within a model. This low production trial period allows 
EPA Response to Comments

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manufacturers to monitor technology performance and reliability, gauge consumer acceptance, 

and make necessary adjustments before expanding the technology to other models. Technology 

is typically integrated into those other models during a redesign, which typically occurs every 

five to seven years. Achieving a 10 percent sales threshold could literally take years to achieve 

depending on the technology. Appendix I shows actual penetration rates for various automotive 

technologies, and while consumer uptake rates vary, achieving a 10 percent market penetration 

can take a decade or more for certain technologies. Finally, the proposed sales threshold could 

actually create a disincentive for manufacturers to deploy off-cycle technologies. The risk of 

forcing off-cycle technology on consumers beyond natural market demand and then falling short 

of the 10 percent threshold provides a substantial disincentive for even trying, unless the 

manufacturer is extremely confident the threshold can be reached. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9586-A1, pp.11-12]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Further, the max fleet improvement, commonly referred to as the 'credit cap', of 10g/mi should 

be increased on a regular basis as new technologies are added to the list. The will further 

improve the value of this flexibility and provided added planning certainty as newer technologies 

are added to the list. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 32-33]

Volkswagen supports the comments of the Alliance that the penetration threshold should be 

removed and that credits are awarded on a per-vehicle equipped basis. We echo the concerns 

raised by the Alliance regarding fleet phase-in trends for new technologies and agree that the 

high threshold may inadvertently create a disincentive to delay new technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 33]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

In the NPRM, the proposed penetration requirements of 10% risk hobbling the entire proposal 

and the program may fail to work in practice. The 10% sales threshold may limit a smaller 

manufacturer from introducing new innovative, but uncertain, technology. VCC supports the 

approach taken in Europe of one car one credit. However, any threshold should start at 0% in 

order to expedite advanced technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 6]

• It is counterproductive to create a 10% sales threshold during the initial phase-in period. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

• The 10% sales threshold may limit the small manufacturer from introducing new technology 

due to the uncertainty around the possible credit situation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, 

p. 7]

Response:

10 Percent Penetration Threshold
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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EPA received many adverse comments from manufacturers regarding the proposed 10% 

production threshold for the pre-defined list and no comments in favor of the proposal. As 

discussed in section III.C.5.b.i of the preamble, EPA understands and agrees with the concerns 

raised by commenters that the proposed requirement could well be counterproductive, and is 

therefore finalizing the off-cycle credits program without the 10% threshold requirement.

10 g/mile Credit Cap

EPA received several comments from manufacturers recommending that EPA eliminate 

the 10 g/mile fleetwide cap on credits that could be generated using the predefined list. EPA also 

received comments from ICCT and NRDC supporting the proposed 10 g/mile cap. Further, 

some commenters commented that the pre-defined list should be revisited and updated on regular 

intervals. EPA is retaining the 10 g/mile cap as proposed. The full discussion on comments is 

provided in section III.C.5.b.i and II.F. of the preamble. As there explained, the cap is only on 

the amount of default credits under the menu. Manufacturers remain free to provide data to 

demonstrate on a case-specific basis through the 5-cycle testing or public review pathways that 

additional credit values are warranted for their technology, even though that technology is 

included on the menu.

7.5. Step-by-Step Process and Test Procedures

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Ford Motor Company

Hyundai America Technical Center

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Toyota Motor North America

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Regarding the EPA approval process for technologies not included in the pre-defined list, the 

Alliance welcomes the efforts to provide a step-by-step process and 60-day timeline for approval 

of new technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.10]

The process changes outlined below would further streamline the program and provide more 

certainty to manufacturers irrespective of which approval process is used. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.10]

Process for Qualifying Off-Cycle Credits from New Technologies [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.42]

EPA originally adopted this program for model years MYs 2012-2016 as an optional credit 

opportunity for new and innovative technologies that reduce vehicle CO2 emissions, but for 
EPA Response to Comments

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which CO2 reduction benefits are not significantly captured over the 2-cycle test procedure. The 

agency adopted the off-cycle credit option to provide an incentive to accelerate the introduction 

of these types of technologies that result in concrete reductions in CO2 emissions. However wellmeaning this program, its actual use has been undermined by uncertainties over which 

technologies would be deemed eligible, how much credit would be provided, and the risks and 

burdens on manufacturers inherent in a cumbersome case-by-case approval process. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.42]

The NPRM would require three complete sets of 5-cycle tests (with technology “on” and 

technology “off”) for relatively large impacts of over 3% GHG reduction. For technologies with 

less than a 3% impact, manufacturers would be required to run five complete 5-cycle tests (with 

technology “on” and technology “off”), plus complete an analysis using EPA’s Vehicle 

Simulation Tool. It can be expected that almost all of the off-cycle technologies will individually 

yield emission reductions of less than 3%, making mandatory the completion of five full test 

series and the simulation analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.42-43]

While an extensive off-cycle credit menu will result in the largest portion of off-cycle emission 

reductions, the regulatory agencies also need to have an open system for submitting and 

evaluating new off-cycle technologies, since an ongoing flow of new technologies can be 

expected. In this regard, simplicity and openness should be the goals, since the program benefits 

from bringing in new approaches that can be developed into future credit menu items for 

widespread implementation. As currently proposed, the provisions for off-cycle credit 

applications require very extensive vehicle testing and modeling. These proposed requirements 

lean towards a very high level of accuracy and proof, but would also serve to hinder the flow of 

new technologies by setting such a high administrative burden. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.43]

Our expectation is that the vast majority of credits would be pursued through the menu, and that 

the process for alternative individual applications will represent a small amount of total credit. It 

may be counterproductive to require a high test and analysis burden, in return for small credits, 

since manufacturers may choose simply not to undertake such unattractive projects. This may 

discourage efforts which, if undertaken, could eventually grow beyond the initial low-volume 

stage into widespread usage, with corresponding broad emission benefits. This was, after all, the 

original goal of the MY 2012-2016 off-cycle program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.43]

The Alliance proposes some simplifications to these provisions. Based on our members’

experiences over the past year evaluating technologies for off-cycle credit in the MY 2012-2016 

timeframe, we would expect that the credit menu would be used almost universally to gain credit 

for any technologies that are listed on the menu, rather than testing and quantifying slightly 

larger credits for each model under this section of the regulation. The overwhelming majority of 

credits would be expected to flow from the menu, and the relatively small amount of credits 

arising through this alternative section of the regulation does not warrant the proposed very high 

level of accuracy and documentation through repeat testing and modeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.43]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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In order to encourage development of new technologies under this section of the regulation, the 

Alliance recommends that only three five-cycle tests be required for all applications, with no 

requirement to use the EPA Vehicle Simulation Tool. This retains a high level of accuracy, but 

with lower administrative obstacles. We expect the mechanism for energy savings to be easily 

explained and, if documented through actual vehicle testing, do not see the need to also conduct 

simulations. Although we have no experience with this particular tool, we anticipate that any 

single simulation tool may not be compatible or easily adaptable to analyze specific, unusual 

technologies, especially technologies which address the proliferation of very diverse sources of 

off-cycle energy losses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.43]

We also recommend that EPA retain discretion to approve applications which forego some of the 

5-cycle tests if such testing is deemed unnecessary. In many cases, technologies would 

reasonably be expected to have no impact on certain test cycles. For example, cold weather 

technologies might be expected to have no impact on the SCO3 cycle. In these cases, it would be 

wasteful to require multiple tests for cycles which do not impact the credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.44]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 51.]

Second, the agencies should carefully consider the relationship between the creation of 

incentives under the new standards and the development of alternative test procedures to assess 

the incentivized technologies. Global Automakers strongly supports incentivizing technologies 

whose potential benefits are not fully measured under the 1975 CAFE test procedure. Air 

conditioning efficiency, off-cycle, and advanced technology incentives are justified based on 

their potential long term, real world benefits. Such incentives will typically take the form of 

compliance credits that are assessed using alternative test procedures. In developing incentives 

for the final rule, the agencies need to carefully consider how to reconcile these incentives with 

the testing procedures required by law. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p.2]

[[This comment can also be found in Outline Heading 3.2.1.]]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Beyond the pre-defined list of off-cycle methods, Ford supports the allowance of alternative 

pathways for achieving off-cycle technology benefits and the efforts the agencies have taken to 

attempt to streamline the process, as compared to the previous method finalized in the 2012-2016 

MY rule. We agree with the Alliance recommendations on how to further refine that process and 

avoid unnecessary test burden. Related specifically to the technology demonstration pathway 

using the EPA 5-cycle methodology, we believe that the proposal to demonstrate at least a three 

percent off-cycle benefit in order to claim credits amounts under 40 CFR § 86.1866-12(d)(2)(iii) 

is too high. EPA suggests a 3% threshold based upon historical test speed vs. time tolerance data 

for chassis dynamometer testing. Given the +/- 1.5% drive cycle energy tolerances outlined in 40 

CFR § 1066.425(c)(1) and described in detail in SAE J2951, future test to test variability will be 
EPA Response to Comments

7-114

substantially reduced. As such, a tolerance of 1.5% is recommended in lieu of the proposed 

3%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 17]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

4) Durability Demonstration: EPA states that 'manufacturers may demonstrate in-use emissions 

durability at the time of certification by submitting an engineering analysis. This demonstration 

may also include component durability testing or whole vehicle aging if the manufacturer has 

such data. The demonstration would be subject to EPA approval prior to credits being awarded. 

Since credits are not actually generated until the final CAFE and GHG reports after the end of 

the model year, Hyundai requests that EPA provide manufacturers additional time to generate the 

durability data, if necessary (e.g. six months after certification). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9547-A1, pp.5-6]

5) Public Notice of New Technologies: The agency proposes that credits for new off-cycle 

technologies benefit from a public comment period. Hyundai supports a process to provide 

transparency for the off-cycle credit approval process. However, it is unclear from the proposal 

language whether the approval process will be completed and credits will be available in the 

same year the automaker provides data and requests approval for new off-cycle technologies. 

Hyundai recommends that the agencies create a standardized and streamlined process to ensure 

that credits are available in the year requested. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.6]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Lastly, in cases where the technologies are not yet fully developed, but are expected to be in the 

future, MEMA agrees that the step-by-step process the agencies outline in the NPRM is an 

appropriate and transparent process. This way, future technologies can be reviewed, vetted and 

considered for approval in a straight-forward and timely process. MEMA believes this is another 

important component to the long-term success of the National Program, to allow for the 

inclusion of and credits for yet-to-be-seen evolutions in off-cycle technologies and related 

efficiency benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.7]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Third, EPA has proposed changes in §86.1866-12(d)(2) and (3) in order to streamline and clarify 

the demonstration process to promote greater manufacturer participation and encourage greater 

deployment of off-cycle technologies.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.10]

Off-Cycle Credits: EPA 2012-2016 Model Year Regulations [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.10]

For the 2012-2016 model year GHG standards, EPA's regulations provide credits for 

technologies that reduce CO2 in real world operation that are not well represented on the test 

procedure used to determine a vehicle's fuel economy or tailpipe GHG emissions. The 2012-

2016 model year provisions are limited to new and innovative technologies, and manufacturers 

can demonstrate the benefits of such technologies using a two-tiered process. First, a 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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manufacturer can demonstrate benefits through EPA's 5-cycle method used for determining fuel 

economy label values. If the 5-cycle method is inadequate for demonstrating benefits, the 

manufacturer can work with EPA to develop a test plan customized for a specific technology. 

EPA approval of both the test plan and demonstrated off-cycle benefits are made on a case-bycase basis. In implementing the current off-cycle provisions, EPA has discovered that 

manufacturers have been discouraged from applying for off-cycle credits because of the 

uncertainty and potential testing burden associated with the current provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.10]

Revised 5-Cycle Demonstration Program [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.12]

For credits not generated by the pre-determined list, but rather through 5-cycle testing, EPA has 

proposed measures to more precisely define both the manufacturer's testing requirements and 

EPA's approval. The proposal involves up to three iterations of demonstration. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.12]

First, a manufacturer must conduct three complete sets of 5-cycle tests, once with the technology 

'off' and once with the technology 'on'. If that testing shows less than three percent improvement, 

two additional 5-cycle tests (with the technology 'on') are required. If at least a 3 percent 

improvement still cannot be demonstrated, EPA's Vehicle Simulation Tool is used to determine 

the technology's benefits. We have several concerns with this approach. Toyota anticipates that 

most off-cycle technologies will individually yield emission reductions of less than three percent, 

as none of the technologies on the pre-determined list alone would meet the three percent 

criteria. This means the full set of five-cycle tests and the simulation analysis would essentially 

become the de facto procedure. This full level of demonstration would require over 40 tests per 

vehicle model. Bundling technologies could reduce test burden, but we assume those 

technologies would then need to be bundled for sale, which could be prohibitively expensive. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.12]

Toyota appreciates that EPA has made the 5-cycle demonstration procedure clearer. However, in 

doing so, the procedure has become is too burdensome to be practical. We request the agency 

consider alternatives to reduce the burden. For example, the second iteration of 5-cycle testing 

seems unlikely to yield significantly different results than the initial testing and should be 

eliminated. We also request EPA consider dropping components of the 5-cycle test if good 

engineering practice suggests that test element is not a factor in demonstrating the benefits for a 

given technology. For example, if it is clear that an active warm up technology does not affect 

greenhouse gas emissions or fuel economy performance over the US06, the US06 should not be 

required. Finally, EPA has not made the simulation tool available; therefore Toyota has no basis 

upon which to comment on this method of verification. If simulation ultimately proves a viable 

method for quantifying off-cycle credits, EPA should allow it to be used in lieu of 5-cycle 

testing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.13]

Demonstration Not Based on 5-Cycle Testing or Simulation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.13]
EPA Response to Comments

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EPA proposes to continue allowing manufacturers to request demonstration of off-cycle credit 

levels using methods other than 5-cycle testing or EPA's simulation method. While the proposal 

to establish an agency decision deadline and agency report provides more transparency in EPA's 

decision making process, what constitutes an acceptable testing program still remains unclear in 

the current proposal. The inherent uncertainty in manufacturer-proposed demonstration makes it 

less appealing to Toyota and reiterates the need for a more inclusive pre-determined technology 

list that is retroactive to the 20122016 model year standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.13]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

We also applaud the EPA’s recognition that other technologies not listed could prove beneficial 

in the future, or that the actual reductions achieved from the listed technologies could exceed 

EPA’s original assessment of them, and proposing that manufacturers may gain additional 

credits by supplying credible and verifiable data about improvements from any particular 

technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.3]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

VCC supports simplifying the verification requirements for off-cycle credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 6]

The proposal is requiring three complete sets of 5-cycle tests, with and without the technology 

for CO2 impacts of over 3% GHG reduction. For technologies with less than a 3% impact, 

manufacturers are required to run five complete 5-cycle tests with and without the technology, 

plus complete an analysis using EPA's Vehicle Simulation Tool. The requirement of 3% is a 

large number for a CO2 effect and most technologies will be around 0.5-1.5 %. This will mean 

that extensive testing will be necessary in order to request off-cycle credits. This extensive 

testing would impact smaller manufacturers disproportionately since the cost per vehicle would 

be higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

To encourage development, the EPA-simulation tool should not be the only permitted means of 

presenting simulations; other simulation for applicable pre-confirming data should be permitted 

if they are reasonably accurate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

To confirm the application, either the EPA Vehicle Simulation Tool or only three five-cycle tests 

should be required. This would ease the burdens on manufacturers by keeping testing to a 

minimum, while maintaining accuracy at a good level. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 

7]

• The procedures for earning off-cycle credits need to be kept simple. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9551-A2, p. 7]

• Once a technology has been approved by an agency it should be applicable for all agencies -

both EPA and CARB. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 7]
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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Response:

EPA received generally supportive comments regarding its proposal to adopt a 

streamlined step-by-step process for credits not based on the pre-defined list. EPA received 

comments that the 5-cycle testing requirements should not include additional testing or vehicle 

simulation beyond the initial three sets of tests. EPA also received comments that manufacturers 

should not be required to run test cycles where the off-cycle technology is known not to provide 

emissions reductions. EPA concurs with these comments. In response to the points raised by 

commenters, EPA will not make additional testing and vehicle simulations mandatory. Rather, 

EPA will have discretion to request additional testing in cases where the agency determines that 

the additional test would provide useful data in verifying credit levels. Further, EPA is not 

requiring manufacturers to use the EPA simulation tool, but EPA may use the simulation tool as 

a check to help verify the level of credits as part of the credit approval process. Also, EPA will 

allow manufacturers to avoid unnecessary testing by instead submitting an engineering analysis 

demonstrating that the technology has no effect (either positive or negative) on emissions for one 

or more of the 5-cycle tests. These comments and provisions are discussed further in preamble 

Section III.C.5.b.iii.

EPA received a mix of comments from manufacturers regarding the use of vehicle 

simulations. The Alliance and Toyota opposed incorporating the EPA Vehicle Simulation Tool 

into the 5-cycle approval process. Volvo supported the use of EPA’s simulation tool (and others) 

and suggested that it should be allowed to be use in lieu of vehicle 5-cycle testing. As noted 

above, EPA is not requiring the use of the vehicle simulation tool but may use it to further 

confirm test results. At this point, EPA is also not prepared to accept vehicle simulation results 

from manufacturers in lieu of 5-cycle testing as the basis for credits not derived from the predefined list. EPA is taking a more conservative approach of requiring 5-cycle testing and using 

vehicle simulations as a tool to further confirm the appropriateness of the credit value. EPA 

notes that vehicle simulations may be part of the methodology for credits based on the public 

process (for credits not based on 5-cycle testing or the pre-defined list).

In response to Hyundai’s concerns regarding the timing of data submittal, EPA is 

clarifying these provisions as discussed in preamble sections III.C.5.b.iv and Section III.C.5.b.v.

7.6. Comments Regarding Technology Eligibility Criteria

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Toyota Motor North America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
EPA Response to Comments

7-118

Finally, opportunities exist to streamline traffic flow, reduce congestion and reduce emissions 

through better driving. For example, there are technologies that provide the driver or the vehicle 

with information for improved routing, or that provide the driver or the vehicle with information 

for more efficient vehicle operation. GPS technology can play a role in improving both driver 

behavior and vehicle operation. The opportunities for improvements through these eco driving 

technologies are not sufficiently defined for the Alliance to propose specific credit definitions 

and criteria at this time, but the industry hopes that it can work with the agencies in the future to 

create off-cycle credits for these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.11]

The minor proposed changes in terminology are directionally correct but do not alleviate the 

overwhelming need to streamline the process by incorporating the pre-defined technology list for 

MYs 2012-2016 as well as the later model years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Dealer-Installed Options. Furthermore, some off-cycle technologies can be installed at the 

dealership. Honda proposes that off-cycle credit technologies that are installed on a vehicle prior 

to its first retail sale, whether at the factory or at a dealership, can be included in the minimum 

percentage calculation and in an OEM’s credit calculation. For example, engine-block heaters 

are sold in cold-weather states as a dealer-installed option. Engine-block heaters keep engine oil 

warm, reducing friction and improving fuel economy and lowering CO2. (Honda recognizes that 

an engine-block heater might not itself qualify for off-cycle credits, it is illustrative of marketspecific, dealer-installed options that could increase marketability of the kinds of technologies 

EPA wants to endorse). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 6]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers).

(3) Credits for “integral” technologies. EPA proposes that technologies that are integral to the 

basic vehicle design, including engine transmission, mass reduction, passive aerodynamic 

design, and base tires, are ineligible for credits. See 76 FR 75024. In other words, the credits 

would only be available for “add-on” technologies. EPA imposes this restriction based on its 

belief that it would be difficult to establish the credit by making a clear comparison of the 

vehicle’s performance using baseline and advanced forms of the technology in question. In our 

view, the difficulty of making a credible demonstration of the benefits of an off-cycle technology 

should not be judged in advance of any data that might be developed by a manufacturer. It may 

well be that making a credible demonstration of benefits for some of these integral technologies 

will be difficult, but that is no reason to deny manufacturers the opportunity to make such a 

demonstration. If EPA finds such a demonstration to lack credibility, it would of course be able 

to deny the manufacturer’s credit request. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 6]

(4) Credits for technologies that are included in the agencies’ standard-setting analysis. EPA 

states in the preamble to the proposal (76 FR 75023) that technologies that are included in the 

agencies’ standard-setting analysis may not generate off-cycle credits (with the exception of 

active aerodynamic devices and engine stop-start systems). EPA states that allowing such credits 

for these technologies would amount to “double-counting” of benefits. However, there may 

emerge by 2025 advanced levels for current technologies that are capable of achieving greater 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

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benefits than current systems. If a manufacturer can demonstrate that an advanced version of one 

of the technologies that is included in the standard-setting analysis can achieve greater benefits 

than projected by the agencies, and those benefits are not captured with the current test 

procedure, there is no justification for excluding these technologies from the off-cycle credit 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 6]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

More specifically, we support EPA's proposal to delete the 'not significantly measureable over 

the 2-cycle test' and to delete the 'new, innovative, not widespread use' as criteria. These new 

approaches make the application for credits for off-cycle technologies more attractive and 

therefore can be seen as a driver for innovation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure 

p. 1]

Organization: Ferrari

Regarding off-cycle technologies, we agree with EPA to remove the criteria in the 2012- 2016 

rule that off-cycle technologies must be “new, innovative, and not widespread” because these 

terms are imprecise and could create implementation issues and uncertainty in the program. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

The three methods outlined in the NPRM to quantity real world fuel consumption benefits are 

helpful and we anticipate they will encourage invention and introduction of new fuel saving 

technologies. One important class of fuel saving technologies to consider are those that are 

impossible to turn-off or disable because they are highly integrated into the system. Examples of 

these technology could be advanced combustion concepts, cam-less engines, variable 

compression ratio engines, air/hydraulic micro hybrids/launch assist devices, advanced 

transmissions, new aftertreatment concepts and other yet to be invented concepts. The proposed 

methods may not adequately cover demonstration of these technologies. As such, we encourage 

the agencies to consider other alternatives, such as an optional pathway that would allow 

manufacturers to demonstrate the off-cycle benefit by simply comparing the 5-cycle results to 

the 2-cycle results with the new technology operating, or perhaps using other analytical methods. 

We look forward to working with the agencies to develop these methodologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 18]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Also, we support the agencies’ decision to remove the criteria initiated under the MY2012-2016 

program (“new, innovative, not widespread use”) for the reasons stated in the NPRM. MEMA 

further supports the option to make eligible for credit those technologies that may only register 

small reductions on the 2-cycle test, but have more significant (and verifiable) off-cycle gains. 

MEMA also supports the agencies’ decision not to sunset the availability of these credits during 

the 2017-2025 timeframe for all of the same reasons stated in the NPRM. Again, overall MEMA 
EPA Response to Comments

7-120

is supportive of the direction the agencies are taking with respect to off-cycle credits. There are 

some key issue areas, however, where either changes or clarifications are needed; these are 

discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.7]

MEMA further proposes any technology resulting in significant, quantifiable benefit off-cycle –

regardless of 2-cycle benefit – should receive credit reflecting the real-world benefit of such 

technology. There will very likely be future technologies – in addition to Stop/Start and Active 

Aerodynamics – that could result in both significant on-cycle and off-cycle benefits. MEMA 

believes that these dual-benefit technologies should not be precluded from consideration. For 

example, if any of the technologies that are considered in setting the standard (in other words, 

baseline technologies for the Program), there could come a time when an on-cycle technology 

may evolve and provide a significant off-cycle benefit. Under this scenario, would EPA preclude 

it from consideration under their step-by-step approval process to be added to the approved list 

of technologies? MEMA recognizes the agency’s concern about potential ‘double counting.’ 

However, we would point out that since off-cycle credits are recognized in the rule – and 

particularly if they were expanded to include any technology that has both on- and off-cycle 

benefit – then the potential unintended consequence of pushing “preferred technologies” and 

“winners and losers” diminishes somewhat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, pp.8-9]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Off-Cycle Credits: New Innovative Technology Criterion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.10]

Toyota supports the agencies' decision to drop the requirement that off-cycle technologies must 

be new, innovative, or not wide spread. We agree that this requirement is confusing and has no 

relevance for technologies that deliver real world benefits regardless of when they are 

implemented or how prevalent they are in the fleet. For the same reason, we support the agencies'

intent to clarify that the eligibility of approved technologies and credits generated will not sunset 

in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.10]

Response:

Commenters were supportive of EPA’s proposal to eliminate the “new, innovative, and 

not in widespread use” as a criteria for eligibility for off-cycle credits, and EPA is finalizing 

these changes as proposed. Comments regarding potential off-cycle credits for integral 

technologies or 2-cycle technologies considered in establishing the standards are discussed in 

section III.C.5.b.ii of the preamble. EPA continues to believe that it would not be appropriate to 

provide off-cycle credits for integral technologies or technologies projected to be used to meet 

the 2-cycle standards, with the exception of stop-start and active aerodynamics which are on the 

pre-defined list and whose two cycle benefits were considered in determining the stringency of 

the standards.

Honda suggests that credits should be available for technologies installed at the 

dealership prior to initial sale. In response, only original equipment may be approved and 

eligible for credits as off-cycle credits are available only to OEMs. The manufacturer is 
Off-cycle Technology Credits

7-121

responsible for the emissions performance of the vehicle and also all of the tracking to ensure 

that credit reporting to EPA is accurate. The standards and other program requirements apply to 

manufacturers and do not apply to dealerships or other (aftermarket) parties. Installations that 

might occur under some type of contractual arrangement with dealerships prior to the sale of the 

vehicle would not be transparent to EPA (i.e., EPA would not be monitoring these activities). 

EPA should note that there are a large number of aftermarket technologies that have a deleterious 

effect on fuel economy and end up in higher GHG emissions. These might include, remote 

starters, lights, powerful stereo systems, rooftop luggage racks and other devices that increase 

weight, aerodynamic, rolling, friction, or electrical load. By this reasoning, EPA might then 

consider taking credits away from manufacturers, for vehicles that have such technologies added. 

Clearly this becomes impractical.

However, the manufacturer is solely responsible for the accurate reporting of credits in 

the end of model year credit report. The manufacturer would need to be able to demonstrate, 

upon request from EPA, that the credits they are claiming are based on technology installed on 

the vehicles. This would likely be a much more straightforward proposition for the manufacturer 

if the technology is installed during vehicle assembly. The burden of proof falls solely on the 

manufacturer and EPA would expect manufacturers to be able to provide a detailed accounting 

of the vehicles on which they are claiming credits so that EPA could verify the validity of the 

credits. Credits that are claimed by the manufacturer and then later found not to be supported by 

evidence or found to be invalid could lead to noncompliance and enforcement action against the 

manufacturer.

Fuel Consumption Improvement Values

8-1

8. A/C, Off-Cycle, and “Game Changing” Technology Fuel Consumption 

Improvement Values in CAFE Program

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Arkema Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Center for Biological Diversity

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Electric Drive Transportation Association

Environmental Defense Fund

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Mazda North American Operations

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Toyota Motor North America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

CAFE Fuel Consumption Improvement Values for MAC Efficiency Improvements and OffCycle Technologies [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

In the GHG portion of the joint rulemaking, EPA is proposing to allow manufacturers to generate 

credits for improvements to MAC systems that reduce GHG emissions. EPA is also proposing to 

allow manufacturers to generate credits for implementing off-cycle technologies that result in 

real-world GHG reductions not fully accounted for under the existing test procedures. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.12]

In the CAFE portion of the joint rulemaking, EPA, in coordination with NHTSA, is proposing to 

allow fuel consumption reductions (also called “fuel consumption improvement values”) 

equivalent to the GHG credits allowed by EPA. These would apply for the credit menus provided 

for MAC efficiency and the use of off-cycle technologies. The proposal makes it clear that in the 

CAFE program manufacturers would only get credit for improvements that lead to better realworld fuel economy; improvements that are aimed at other GHG reductions such as reducing or 

eliminating MAC refrigerant leakage are not tied to fuel economy and would not qualify for 

CAFE program incentives. The expected generation of these MAC credits is accounted for by 

both agencies in setting the level of the overall GHG and CAFE standards they propose, but the 

ability to generate off-cycle credits and fuel consumption reductions is not accounted for in the 

standards. The agencies seek comment on the proposals to allow manufacturers to estimate fuel 
EPA Response to Comments

8-2

consumption reductions from MAC improvements and off-cycle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.13]

While the Alliance has some suggestions for modifying the details of the above-described 

proposals, we firmly believe that the proposals in general are both appropriate and necessary. As 

noted by the agencies in the preamble to the proposed rule, President Obama's Memorandum of 

May 21, 2010 requested that NHTSA and EPA work together to develop “...a coordinated 

national program under the [Clean Air Act] and the [Energy Independence and Security Act of 

2007] to improve fuel efficiency and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of passenger cars and 

light-duty trucks of model years 2017-2025.'9 As the President directed, and as all stakeholders 

recognize, a primary benefit of the single National Program approach is that it provides for 

harmonized EPA and NHTSA regulations so that manufacturers can build one fleet of vehicles 

that complies with both sets of rules. In keeping with that directive, it is important for EPA and 

NHTSA to include common provisions in both sets of rules to the maximum extent possible. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.13]

The Alliance has already expressed its support for the inclusion of provisions allowing for MAC 

credits and off-cycle credits in the context of EPA’s GHG rules, and we have explained why the 

inclusion of such provisions will further the goals of the program. In the interests of promoting 

harmonization, it only makes sense for the agencies to include comparable provisions in the 

CAFE rules. This applies to MAC and off-cycle improvements, as well as to the implementation 

of “game changing-technologies” in full-size pickup trucks and other credits. Failure to do so 

would only lead to increased disparities between the rules, giving rise to the possibility that 

manufacturers would need to undertake different actions to comply with the GHG rule on one 

hand, and the CAFE rule on the other. Of course, in developing these provisions, the agencies 

must be mindful of differences in the statutes underlying the two regulatory programs. Here, the 

agencies are being careful to ensure that the CAFE adjustments are limited to the demonstrated 

fuel economy benefits of the MAC and off-cycle improvements, which is entirely appropriate 

given the scope of the CAFE program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.13]

In light of the above, the Alliance believes that the agencies should proceed to include provisions 

accounting for the fuel economy benefits of MAC improvements and off-cycle technologies in 

the CAFE program, providing equivalent fuel consumption and CO2 credit values toward both 

the GHG and CAFE programs. This step will help to further harmonize one of the many 

remaining differences between the two regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.14]

Organization: Arkema Inc.

The NPRM currently provides an opportunity for auto manufacturers to receive consumption 

improvement values for air conditioning efficiency and off-cycle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9468-A1, p.3]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 51.]
Fuel Consumption Improvement Values

8-3

We urge the agencies to consider two factors in developing compliance incentives under the 

GHG and CAFE standards. First, it is important that the agencies harmonize flexibility 

mechanisms between the GHG and CAFE programs to the maximum possible extent, consistent 

with the goals of the National Program. This principle of harmonization does not apply, 

however, to the measurement of GHG emissions that are not efficiency-related, such as air 

conditioning refrigerant leakage. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p.2]

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

EPA is proposing CO2 credits for manufacturers that hybridize a significant quantity of their fullsize pickup trucks, and the agencies are also proposing that manufacturers be able to include 'fuel 

consumption improvement values' equivalent to EPA CO2 credits in the CAFE program. Access 

to the incentives is conditioned on a minimum penetration of mild and strong hybrid electric 

vehicle (HEV) technologies in an OEM's full-size pickup truck fleet. [This comment can also be 

found in section 5 of this comment summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 8]

Organization: Electric Drive Transportation Association

Third, EDTA opposes NHTSA’s determination that it lacks authority to include a multiplier as 

part of its CAFE standards under EPCA and EISA. While these statutes do provide for certain 

incentives, they do not preclude NHTSA from establishing additional incentives, such as a 

multiplier. Adoption of a multiplier in NHTSA’s rule would promote the fundamental policy of 

developing a harmonized national system in which EPA and NHTSA establish consistent 

regulatory requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9449-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund

C. Constraints on NHTSA’s Authority

In contrast to EPA’s expansive authority under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPCA as 

amended by EISA includes limitations on NHTSA’s authority to regulate fuel economy. 

NHTSA’s authority is focused on fuel economy and not air pollution, and as a result, NHTSA is 

constrained in regulating direct discharges of N20, CH4, and HFC emissions from automobiles. 

76 Fed. Reg. at 74,902. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 6]

Within its focus on fuel economy, EPCA contains additional, limitations on NHTSA’s discretion 

to establish CAFE standards including the nexus to fuel efficiency. And, of particular 

importance, any proposed expansion of NHTSA’s fuel economy analysis must be consistent with 

EPA’s statutorily-mandated procedures to test fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-

A1, p. 6]

EPCA directs the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe CAFE standards, which “shall be the 

maximum feasible average fuel economy level that the Secretary decides the manufacturers can 

achieve in that model year.” 49 U.S.C. § 32902; see also § 32902(f) (directing the Secretary to 

consider statutorily-enumerated factors in making this determination). While NHTSA has 

discretion in standard setting, under EPCA, EPA alone has the authority to measure fuel 
EPA Response to Comments

8-4

economy and to calculate CAFE values, 49 U.S.C. § 32904(a). In doing so, EPA “shall use the 

same procedures for passenger automobiles the Administrator used for model year 1975 . . . or 

procedures that give comparable results.” Id. at 32904(c). The D.C. Circuit has concluded that, to 

produce “comparable results,” “[t]he critical fact is that a procedure . . . was available for 

MY1975 testing, and those manufacturers, however few in number, that found it advantageous to 

do so, employed that procedure.” Center for Auto Safety v. EPA, 806 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 6]

In a previous rulemaking, the agencies concluded that this statutory structure did not allow for 

incorporation of air-conditioning efficiency improvement and off-cycle technology credits into 

NHTSA’s fuel economy analysis. 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,544 (“The CAFE standards and compliance 

testing cannot capture all of the real world CO2 emissions, because EPCA currently requires 

EPA to use the 1975 passenger car test procedures under which vehicle air conditioners are not 

turned on during fuel economy testing.”); 25,663 (requesting comment on including air 

conditioning credits in light-truck testing requirements but emphasizing “that modernizing the 

passenger car test procedures as well would not be possible under EPCA as currently 

written.”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 6]

In this proposal, however, the agencies forward different legal rationales, id. at 74,998, which 

they characterize as “major changes” from past practice, id., that would allow them to 

incorporate air-conditioning efficiency and off-cycle technology improvements into NHTSA 

standard setting. Both the agencies themselves, supra, and regulated industry have raised 

questions regarding this conclusion. See EPA Doc. No. OAR-2009- 0472-7123.1 at 17 

(Comments of Association of International Automakers on LDV Phase I) (noting that the 

Association “does not support fundamentally changing the fuel economy/greenhouse gas test 

procedures at this time”); see also EPA Doc. No. EPA-HQOAR- 2003-0214-0208 at 10 

(Comments of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) (noting that any change in test 

procedures would require EPA “to develop a complex set of test procedure adjustment factors to 

ensure that the new procedures ‘give comparable results’ to the existing ones”). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 6-7]

Organization: Ferrari

Ferrari strongly supports the proposal to allow manufacturers to generate fuel consumption 

improvement values for purposes of CAFE compliance based on the use of A/C efficiency 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.13]

Finally, we support to allow these credits to be counted for the CAFE compliance calculations. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Ferrari appreciates the proposal to gain credits for high efficiency A/C systems and offcycle 

technologies to be used for fuel consumption improvement and CAFE compliance. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.15]

Organization: Ford Motor Company
Fuel Consumption Improvement Values

8-5

In order to provide equivalent fuel consumption benefits for these fuel saving technologies, Ford 

also supports the inclusion of off-cycle credits as part of the NHTSA CAFE program. This 

allowance helps to coordinate the EPA and NHTSA programs in the efforts of 

harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 18]

NHTSA Incentives for Electric Vehicles, Plug-in Hybrids, and Fuel Cell Vehicles

NHTSA has also expressed the view that it lacks authority to establish an incentive multiplier for 

EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, comparable to the one proposed by EPA, in the fuel economy 

regulations under EPCA and EISA. In this case, we disagree with NHTSA's interpretation of 

EPCA and EISA. In our view, the law does not address this issue, either directly or indirectly. 

Moreover, the President has directed EPA and NHTSA to coordinate and harmonize their 

regulations as much as possible. Consistent with that directive, the agencies should interpret 

statutes so as to optimize the degree of harmonization between the GHG program and the CAFE 

program. Thus, if one agency incorporates a program flexibility into its rules, the other agency 

should adopted a corresponding program flexibility unless expressly prohibited by law. We refer 

the agencies to the comments of EDTA on this point, which we support and incorporate by 

reference. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 21]

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Specifically, we support the inclusion of fuel consumption reductions resulting from air 

conditioning improvements and the application of off-cycle credits and equivalent fuel 

consumption improvements in NHTSA's CAFE compliance calculations. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0253-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Mazda North American Operations

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 63-64.]

Additionally, we support providing equivalent fuel consumption and CO2 credit values towards 

both the greenhouse gas and CAFE programs, helping to further harmonize one of the many 

remaining differences between the two regulations.

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG also supports the agencies' decision to provide the analogous fuel consumption 

improvement credits within the CAFE program.4 As set forth in DAG's comments to the MY 

2012-2016 rulemaking, EPA has broad discretion to determine how to calculate fuel economy 

for purposes of the CAFE program and should utilize that discretion as necessary to harmonize 

the CAFE and GHG programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-2]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)
EPA Response to Comments

8-6

Specifically, we support the agencies’ decision to parallel the efficiency credits and fuel 

consumption improvement values for compliance calculations for their respective GHG 

emissions and CAFE standards programs (for example, the air conditioning and off-cycle 

emissions improvements and its equivalent fuel consumption improvement). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

Particularly, MEMA supports the agencies proposal to align EPA credits with NHTSA’s CAFE 

compliance by allowing manufacturers to generate fuel consumption improvement values for air 

conditioning (A/C) technologies and off-cycle technologies. These technologies are not 

otherwise “captured” on traditional test cycles, but they still provide contributing real-world 

benefits that improve vehicle efficiencies. Therefore, rewarding various A/C and innovative offcycle technologies under both components of the rule will encourage faster adoption and 

increase deployment into the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.5]

In the NPRM, Tables II-11, II-18 and IV-117 show a 0.000778 gal/mi consumption improvement 

value for engine heat recovery. We believe the agencies actually intended this to be a value of 

0.0000788 as stated in the Technical Support Document on Table 5-26, page 5-75, where it was 

rounded up to 0.000079. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.12]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

It is widely understood that GHG improvements are equivalent to fuel economy improvements. 

Therefore, we believe it is appropriate to extend all credit provisions in the GHG program to 

equivalent credit in the CAFE program. This additional CAFE credit would also provide 

additional incentive for further advances in efficiency improvement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9264-A1, p. 6]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

The agencies have proposed significant changes to EPA's existing off-cycle credit regulations. 

First, NHTSA has proposed to adopt off-cycle credits for the 2017-2025 model years. While 

EPA will continue to administer the program, NHTSA has proposed to award a corresponding 

level of CAFE credit for any EPA-approved off-cycle technologies. Toyota supports NHTSA's 

proposed adoption of off-cycle credits as a necessary step towards further harmonizing the 

federal regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.10]

Response:

EPA received several comments supporting EPA’s inclusion of fuel economy 

improvement values under CAFE testing and calculations procedures that are equivalent to EPA 

credits for A/C efficiency improvements, off-cycle, and full-size pick-ups. Commenters note 

that these provisions help to further harmonize the programs. EPA is finalizing fuel consumption 

improvement value approach under its EPCA authority as proposed. This is discussed in more 

detail in section III.B.10 of the preamble. EPA appreciates MEMA comments noting an error for 

one of the fuel consumption improvement values in the proposal and EPA has corrected this 

error. 
Fuel Consumption Improvement Values

8-7

Regarding Porsche comments that all GHG credits have a corresponding fuel 

consumption improvement and should receive equivalent credits under CAFE, EPA disagrees. 

A/C credits based on reduced refrigerant leakage and alternative refrigerant use are based on 

reducing HFCs rather than CO2 and therefore do not have a corresponding fuel consumption 

improvement. With regard to incentives under CAFE for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, this involves 

NHTSA’s interpretation of its authority under EPCA/EISA. As noted in the NPRM (see 76 FR 

74878) and discussed in NHTSA’s Preamble Section IV addresses this, NHTSA currently 

interprets EPCA and EISA as precluding the agency from offering additional incentives for these 

vehicles except as specified by statute.

Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-1

9. Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

Organizations Included in this Section

Ford Motor Company

Organization: Ford Motor Company

We support NHTSA’s efforts to receive and retain CAFE projections and related data in 

electronic format. We recommend that NHTSA does not create a new database with new 

requirements, but rather NHTSA should use a database format the same as EPA’s Verify system. 

Manufacturers have spent significant time and money updating our databases to conform to 

EPA’s new requirements commencing with the 2009 MY. (76 Fed. Reg. 75340) [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 25]

In fact, the government of Canada is creating a new database for their new GHG requirements, 

and their system will be based on EPA’s Verify format rather than retaining their current online 

xml reporting system. Their previous fuel consumption database is being converted over to the 

new Verify like format, recognizing the need for consistency among systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 26]

There are no GHG reductions or benefits to be gained by manufacturers spending time and 

resources reformatting complex data. An important aspect of a single, harmonized fuel economy 

and greenhouse gas program is communized reporting formats. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p. 26]

We support NHTSA’s proposal to move to all electronic reporting. We support emailing data in 

Excel format as long as current manufacturer format is acceptable, and support moving to xml as 

long as Verify format is followed (76 Fed. Reg. 75350). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 

26]

We do not support NHTSA’s proposed change to 49 CFR § 537.7(c)(4) which moves credit 

reporting to a configuration level. For example, air conditioning efficiency credits are not going

to vary by fuel economy configuration (basic engine / transmission class / IWC / transmission 

configuration / axle ratio / calibration); they may only vary by vehicle line. This type of vehicle 

characteristic should not be attempted as an overlay on a very specific fuel economy structure. 

Manufacturers should be allowed to delineate the credit applicability specifically, as needed, but 

for cases where credits apply across a much broader section of vehicles, manufacturers should be 

allowed to report on that level. EPA has already developed a credit spreadsheet for tracking 

credits and volumes that provides for accurate credit reporting. This spreadsheet should be 

allowed by NHTSA as well. In the future, should EPA move credit reporting to their Verify 

database, NHTSA’s reporting requirements should be flexible enough to allow manufacturers to 

fulfill data and formatting requirements for both agencies simultaneously. (76 Fed. Reg. 75351-

2) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 26]
EPA Response to Comments

9-2

Similarly, for 49 CFR § 537.7(c)(5) requesting light truck classification data, we support 

NHTSA’s desire to consolidate all truck classification data to one location. We do note that 

requiring cargo-carrying volumes in the truck classification section (5) and also in the 

configuration information (4) is duplicitous. Requiring the same data in multiple places is either 

wasteful or inviting error. We also suggest that this overload of data actually makes it more 

difficult for NHTSA to use manufacturers’ reports due to the unnecessary complexity and added 

length. We recommend that NHTSA’s reporting regulations allow manufacturers to streamline 

reporting, as long as all the data required to confirm CAFE calculations, fleet classification, and 

NHTSA’s fleet analyses are present and easily identified. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, 

p. 26]

Response:

These comments are directed at the NHTSA program, and as such do not require a response from 

EPA. 

9.1. Base Tire Definition

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Hyundai America Technical Center

Toyota Motor North America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Base Tire Definition [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

EPA invites comment on whether changes to the base tire definition are warranted to “ensure a 

more uniform application across manufacturers.” The Alliance recommends that changes to the 

definition of base tire be deferred. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

In 40 C.F.R. §600.002, EPA currently defines base tire as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.83]

Base tire means the tire specified as standard equipment by the manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

In 49 C.F.R. §523.2, NHTSA currently defines base tire as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.83]
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-3

Base tire for passenger automobiles, light trucks and medium-duty passenger vehicles means the 

tire specified as standard equipment by a manufacturer on each vehicle configuration of a model 

type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

Although EPA has not proposed specific language to replace its definition, NHTSA has proposed 

to change its definition to the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

Base tire (for passenger automobiles, light trucks and medium duty passenger vehicles) means 

the tire that has the highest production sales volume that is installed by the vehicle manufacturer 

on each vehicle configuration of a model type. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

The Alliance does not support the proposed change to the NHTSA definition of base tire. 

NHTSA’s proposed definition of base tire ties the footprint to high sales points within the fuel 

economy hierarchy. This can and does change throughout the model year based on many factors 

beyond a manufacturer’s control or foresight. EPA’s definition allows manufacturers to retain 

the direct link between footprint and the physical dimensions of the vehicles. All vehicles should 

be included in the fleet average using a representative footprint based on the physical vehicle, not 

a footprint based on a moving target of sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.83]

Additionally, NHTSA's current definition lends to the confusion by overlaying footprint on the 

fuel economy hierarchy through the inclusion of the defined fuel economy term 'configuration' in 

the base tire definition. Footprint is a function of the vehicle's dimensions. This is not related to 

any fuel economy 'configuration.' The footprint fuel economy target is simply a function of the 

production volume and its associated footprint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.84]

Under the current regulations, the base tire definition has a direct effect on footprint values and 

footprint has a direct effect on a manufacturer's targets. Therefore, any changes to the definition 

of base tire will have an effect on the stringency of a manufacturer's CAFE and CO2 targets. This 

effect may vary from manufacturer to manufacturer. Nevertheless, each manufacturer has 

analyzed many scenarios and made long-range projections regarding its own ability to meet 

CAFE and CO2 standards within a product segment. All of these projections have assumed that 

the base tire and footprint definitions would remain the same and would continue into the future. 

To change any of these definitions at this point in time would render any previous analyses 

regarding projected CAFE and GHG capabilities null and void. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.84]

Therefore, we recommend that changes to any fundamental definitions that could effectively 

increase the stringency of the GHG and CAFE standards be deferred to a separate, future 

rulemaking and that both agencies engage in a joint dialogue with automakers to understand the 

complex technical issues involved. Further, any fundamental changes that could potentially 

increase the stringency of the standards should not be applied retroactively to past model years 

and should only go into effect starting with a future model year. Finally, in order to avoid future 

confusion and misinterpretation, we suggest that EPA and NHTSA endeavor to maintain 

identical definitions wherever possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.84]
EPA Response to Comments

9-4

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

NHTSA also invites comment on its proposed modification to its definition of “base tire,” which 

affects the determination of footprint size in determining compliance with standards. This change 

is proposed due to NHTSA’s concern that the current definition lacks specificity, leading to 

differing interpretations by manufacturers. Global Automakers supports clarification of the 

definition. We also urge that NHTSA and EPA adopt the same definitions of “base tire,” in order 

to increase the harmonization of standards under the national standards program. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 9]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Base Tire

Ford does not support the proposed change to the NHTSA definition of base tire. We believe that 

NHTSA's current definition lends to the confusion by overlaying footprint on the fuel economy 

hierarchy through the inclusion of the defined fuel economy term 'configuration' in the base tire 

definition. Footprint is a function of the vehicle's dimensions. This is not related to any fuel 

economy 'configuration'. The footprint fuel economy target is simply a function of the 

production volume and its associated footprint. We recommend that NHTSA adopt EPA’s 

definition, and hence help maintain the development of a One National Program moving 

forward. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 25]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports further analysis and discussion with industry, EPA and NHTSA, regarding the 

complex task of defining “base tire”. We recommend that changes to the definition of base tire 

be deferred – and taken up potentially as part of one of the mid-term review “check-ins” - to 

minimize the potential for unnecessary complications and unintended consequences. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

Base Tire Definition [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.7]

The agencies have asked whether the definition of base tire should be revised. We agree that 

there should be a definition which would require all automakers to consistently calculate their 

vehicle footprints. NHTSA has proposed the definition of 'tire installed by the vehicle 

manufacturer that is used on the highest production sales volume of vehicles within the 

configuration'. We agree that the tires installed on the vehicle most commonly sold within a 

vehicle configuration should become the basis for setting a manufacturer's fuel economy 

standards. This is a fair and a workable definition. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.7]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-5

Base Tire Definition [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.21]

Under existing and proposed attribute standards, base tire is used to define vehicle footprint, 

which in turn determines a vehicle's fuel economy and CO2 targets. Existing EPA and NHTSA 

definitions of base tire are similar, but differ in their level of specificity.5 In the preamble for the 

2017-2025 model year proposal, NHTSA expresses concern that the current definition of base 

tire is insufficiently descriptive and open to interpretation. In response, NHTSA has proposed 

redefining base tire to be the tire with highest sales within a vehicle configuration. EPA requests 

comment on whether changes to the EPA base tire definition are warranted to 'ensure a more 

uniform application across manufacturers', but does not propose a revised definition. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.21]

Toyota shares the concern that different interpretations of base tire could potentially lead to 

different calculated attribute targets for the different vehicles that otherwise should have the 

same attribute targets. This could create an un-level playing field among manufacturers. Any 

change in definitions that affects vehicle footprint has the potential to impact the stringency of 

the standards. The magnitude of that impact is currently unknown and could vary by 

manufacturer. However, we do not believe enough analysis has been performed to date to 

suggest exactly how the definition should be revised. Further, the comment period for this 

rulemaking does not provide adequate time to carefully explore alternatives to address the 

agencies' concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.22]

As a result, Toyota requests that NHTSA and EPA study this issue further and take appropriate 

action in a future rulemaking to clarify this issue. Any change in regulatory definitions should be 

adopted by both agencies to further the objective of regulatory harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.22]

5 - NHTSA currently defines base tire as the tire specified as standard equipment by a 

manufacturer on each vehicle configuration of a model type (49 C.F.R. §600.2). EPA defines 

base tire as the tire specified as standard equipment by the manufacturer (49 C.F.R. §523.2). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.21]

Response:

One of the factors in a manufacturer’s calculation of vehicle footprint is the base tire. 

Footprint is based on a vehicle’s wheel base and track width, and track width in turn is “the 

lateral distance between the centerlines of the base tires at ground, including the camber 

angle.”17 EPA’s current definition of base tire is the “tire specified as standard equipment by the 

manufacturer.”18 NHTSA proposed a specific change to the base tire definition for the CAFE 

program (see Section IV.I.5.g, and proposed 49 CFR 523.2), and EPA requested comment on 

 17 See 40 CFR 86.1803-01 18 See 40 CFR 86.1803-01, and 40 CFR 600.002. Standard equipment means those features or equipment which are 

marketed on a vehicle over which the purchaser can exercise no choice.
EPA Response to Comments

9-6

whether the base tire definition should be clarified to ensure a more uniform application across 

manufacturers (76 FR 75088, December 1, 2011). 

Vehicle manufacturers were the only parties providing comments on this issue, and they 

were essentially unanimous in stating a desire for a level playing field, while reiterating that the

issue is complex. Several manufacturers pointed out that the proposed NHTSA definition, which 

includes a connection to a vehicle configuration, may not be workable because the definition of a 

configuration is independent of vehicle size, or footprint. Several manufacturers suggested that 

EPA, NHTSA, and the auto companies should postpone action on this issue in this rule and work 

together to ensure a consistent and complete understanding of the issue. Others agreed that the 

definition could benefit from some clarification. After consideration of the comments, and a 

recognition of the importance that the footprint calculation (and therefore all the elements that 

comprise the footprint calculation) be harmonized across EPA and NHTSA, EPA is finalizing a 

revised definition in this final rule, which is consistent with the definition being finalized by 

NHTSA. The revised definition is as follows: 

Base tire means the tire size specified as standard equipment by the manufacturer 

on each unique combination of a vehicle’s footprint and model type. Standard equipment 

is defined in 40 CFR 86.1803-01.

This definition appropriately removes the link to vehicle configuration that was in 

NHTSA’s proposal, and improves upon EPA’s existing definition with additional specificity that 

is consistent with the goal of a footprint-based program, which, as stated by the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers, is that “All vehicles should be included...using a representative 

footprint based on the physical vehicle...” EPA agrees with this broadly stated goal, and we 

believe that the revised definition offers reasonable clarification that should help ensure a 

consistent application of the footprint-based standards across manufacturers. This new 

definition, which is harmonized with the definition being finalized by NHTSA, is also consistent 

with existing regulatory language that specifies how EPA intends that footprint-based standards 

be implemented. For example, EPA regulations currently state that “Each CO2 target value, 

which represents a unique combination of model type and footprint value, shall be multiplied by 

the total production of that model type/footprint combination for the appropriate model year” 

(see 40 CFR 86.1818-12(c)(2)).

9.2. Car-Truck Definitions

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Ford Motor Company

Toyota Motor North America

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-7

The agencies must maintain the current car and truck vehicle classification framework. The 

standards (i.e., footprint curves) that have been established, and the goals that have been placed 

are all based upon the current and known set of harmonized definitions. Any changes to the 

definitions during MYs 2017-2025 necessarily would require a reevaluation of the appropriate 

level of stringency, cost, necessary flexibilities and final standards for any and all years in which 

a change would apply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.4]

The Agencies Must Maintain the Current Car and Truck Vehicle Classification Framework. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.8]

In section IV.H. of the NPRM, NHTSA discusses the existing regulations governing the 

classification of cars and trucks. The agency states, “NHTSA continues to believe that the 

definitions as they currently exist are consistent with the text of [the Energy Independence and 

Security Act of 2007 (EISA)] and with Congress' original intent.'8 Nevertheless, NHTSA 

requests comment on the possibility of changing the vehicle classification definitions, citing the 

long time frame of the rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.8]

First, we agree with NHTSA’s assessment that the existing definitions for classifying vehicles 

are consistent with EISA and the original intent of Congress in EPCA. In past rulemakings, 

NHTSA has made some adjustments to the classification rules and clarified its interpretation of 

certain aspects of the rules. These efforts have accomplished their intended objectives by 

clearing up ambiguities and leveling the playing field. The Alliance is not aware of any further 

systemic problems with respect to the interpretation of the rules, and we do not believe any 

further changes need to be made. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.8]

NHTSA requests comment on whether the current definitions might create an incentive to 

manufacturers to “game” vehicle designs in a way that would reduce potential fuel savings in the 

future. We consider this risk to be minimal because vehicle designs are evaluated primarily 

based upon an assessment of consumer acceptance. In other words, the key issue for 

manufacturers is whether potential purchasers would find the design useful and appealing, not 

how the vehicle would be classified under various regulatory programs. Moreover, the advent of 

'Reformed CAFE' has reduced the incentives for manufacturers to attempt to reclassify vehicles 

from one fleet to another, given the fact that even larger vehicles can be 'CAFE-positive' based 

on their status relative to their footprint target. Finally, the existing definitions simply do not lend 

themselves to gamesmanship, a testament to NHTSA's efforts over the years to improve and 

refine the classification rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.9]

Having developed a robust set of classification rules, NHTSA's priority should be preserving the 

stability of those rules, rather than engaging in continual modification and experimentation. 

Changes to the classification rules could have unintended consequences. For example, they could 

create new ambiguities or open up new opportunities for gamesmanship. If the changes are 

overly restrictive, they could have the effect of discouraging the production of vehicles that 

American consumers want to buy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.9]

A decision to change the classification rules at this point would create other problems. The 

classification rules represent a fundamental building block of the single National Program, and 
EPA Response to Comments

9-8

any attempt to change the car/truck definitions would have far-reaching consequences. All of the 

analyses of the proposed standards that manufacturers have conducted to date have been based 

on the assumption that the existing car/truck definitions would be retained. If the definitions 

applicable to MYs 2017-2025 were changed, it would require a complete reevaluation of 

virtually all other aspects of the proposed rules, including the stringency of the standards, the 

cost of compliance and the adequacy of the program flexibilities. Such a reevaluation would be 

essential because, as a practical matter, a change to the classification definitions can be 

equivalent to a major change to the standards themselves. An amendment to the car/truck 

definitions could easily mean the difference between compliance and non-compliance for many 

manufacturers. Therefore, amendments to the classification rules would necessitate a brand new, 

top-to-bottom reanalysis of the standards by all manufacturers as well as NHTSA and EPA. And 

it is highly probable that large portions of the rulemaking package would need significant 

readjustment as a result of that exercise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.9

In light of the above, the agencies must maintain the current car and truck vehicle classification 

framework. The standards (i.e., footprint curves) that have been established and the goals that 

have been placed are all based upon the current and known set of harmonized definitions. Any 

changes to the definitions during MYs MY 2017-2025 necessarily would require a reevaluation 

of the appropriate level of stringency, cost, necessary flexibilities and final standards for any and 

all years that a change would apply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.9]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

NHTSA invites comment on the reclassification of vehicles with a third row of seats that are 

currently classified as light trucks under NHTSA regulations in title 49 U.S.C. 523.5(a). Global 

Automakers agrees with NHTSA’s conclusion that there would be no clear energy savings 

benefit from reclassifying these vehicles to be passenger automobiles, and we urge the agency to 

maintain the current classification system. Shifting these vehicles into the passenger automobile 

category would likely necessitate changes to the auto standards to make the standards less 

stringent to accommodate these vehicles, potentially reducing fuel savings. Such a shift would 

also impose significant compliance costs on manufacturers as the stringency of both the auto and 

truck standards would change. We also reject the argument presented in the proposal that the 

third row of seats is installed in some crossover vehicles as a gaming strategy, in order to shift 

vehicles into the truck category. There are substantial cost and weight penalties associated with 

the addition of third row seats, so installing these seats cannot be justified in the absence of 

consumer demand for them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, pp.8-9]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Clarification of the Interpretation of 'Running Clearance'

As explained in more detail in the Alliance comments, NHTSA should not change the existing 

framework for vehicle classification. However, NHTSA could assist light truck manufacturers in 

the production of more fuel-efficient light trucks by providing a small clarification with respect 

to the minimum running clearance criterion applicable to vehicles classified as light trucks by 

virtue of their off-highway capability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.28]
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-9

Many SUVs and some crossover vehicles are classified as light trucks because they are 'capable 

of off-highway operation' as defined in 49 CFR § 523.5(b). Such vehicles need either have 4-

wheel drive or be over 6,000 pounds GVWR, and they need to meet four out of five dimensional 

criteria. One of the five criteria is a running clearance of 20 cm; the others relate to approach 

angle, breakover angle, departure angle, and axle clearance. The key terms used in § 523.5(b) are 

defined in 49 CFR § 523.2. 'Running clearance' is defined as 'the distance from the surface on 

which an automobile is standing to the lowest point on the automobile, excluding unsprung 

weight.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.28]

Our concern has to do with the interpretation of the running clearance criterion, and its effect on 

our efforts to make our light trucks as fuel-efficient as possible. As a motor vehicle is driven 

down the highway, the movement of air past the wheels and tires contributes to the aerodynamic 

drag of the vehicle, tending to reduce fuel economy. This aerodynamic drag can be reduced by 

the installation of flexible plastic components in front of the tire and wheel. Ford calls these 

components tire aero deflectors. They help to deflect oncoming air around the tire/wheel 

assembly, reducing aerodynamic drag and improving fuel economy. The fuel economy benefit of 

tire aero deflectors is primarily apparent in real-world highway driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9463-A1, p.28]

The optimal design of a tire aero deflector can vary from vehicle to vehicle, depending on the 

vehicle's design. For some vehicles, the bottom edge of the deflector may need to be less than 20 

cm from the ground (when the vehicle is parked on a flat surface) in order to provide the desired 

deflection of air around the wheels and tires. This raises the issue: if a vehicle that a 

manufacturer intends to classify as a light truck needs to meet the running clearance criterion in 

order to meet the '4-out-of-5' requirement in 49 CFR § 523.5(b)(2); and if the manufacturer 

wishes to install a tire aero deflector that hangs below the 20 cm running clearance line; should 

the installation of such a component prevent the vehicle from being classified as a light truck? 

Another manufacturer raised a similar issue in its comments on the MY 2012-2016 rules. In 

response, NHTSA indicated that it needed further information and would defer consideration of 

the issue to another time. (75 Fed. Reg 25662) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp.28-29]

As noted previously, the optimal design for a tire aero deflector may be such that the bottom of 

the deflector may be less than 20 cm away from the road surface. A tire aero deflector is not 

connected to the vehicle's suspension, so it is not considered 'unsprung weight.' Therefore, under 

a literal reading of the rule, a tire aero deflector whose bottom edge is less than 20 cm from the 

road surface might be considered to infringe upon the 20 cm running clearance criterion. If the 

rule is interpreted in this fashion, it would mean that if a manufacturer installs tire aero deflectors 

on a vehicle that does not meet the approach angle criterion of 28 degrees, the manufacturer 

would be compelled to reclassify the vehicle as a passenger car because the vehicle would not be 

able to meet four of the five dimensional criteria specified 49 CFR 523.5(b). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, p.29]

In reality, if tire aero deflectors whose bottom edge is less than 20 cm from the road surface are 

considered to violate the running clearance criterion, manufacturers simply will not install them 

on the affected light trucks. Typically, whatever fuel economy benefit the deflectors may provide 

will be outweighed by the disadvantages to the manufacturer of reclassifying the vehicle as a 
EPA Response to Comments

9-10

passenger car. Reclassifying the vehicle as a passenger car would mean that the vehicle would 

become subject to the passenger car 'curve,' resulting in a more stringent fuel economy and GHG 

'target' for the vehicle. This could have the effect of hurting the manufacturer's ability to meet 

both the car standards and the truck standards for a given model year. As a result, manufacturers 

will leave the tire aero deflectors off of the vehicles, and the classification rules would end up 

discouraging manufacturers from installing components that help to improve real-world fuel 

efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.29]

One might suggest that the interpretation issue can be avoided if the manufacturer simply 

concedes the running clearance criterion and plans to meet the other four dimensional criteria in 

49 CFR 523.5(b). However, it is not that simple in the real world, particularly for vehicle 

manufacturers concerned with producing fuel-efficient products. One of the other five criteria for 

'off-highway capable' truck classification is an approach angle of not less than 28 degrees. Many 

SUVs and crossovers built today do not meet this criterion. An approach angle of 28 degrees 

means that a vehicle will have a high front fascia. In general, a high front fascia tends to create 

more aerodynamic drag, which is not conducive to better fuel economy and reduced GHG 

emissions. A lower front fascia allows a vehicle to have better aerodynamic characteristics. In 

this era of increasingly stringent CAFE and GHG standards, many manufacturers, including 

Ford, disfavor vehicle designs that would feature a high front fascia. If a manufacturer elects to 

design a SUV or crossover with a lower front fascia for better fuel economy, it must then plan to 

meet all of the remaining four dimensional criteria for off-highway capability in 49 CFR 

523.5(b)(2) in order to classify the vehicle as a light truck. This means that the vehicle would 

need to have a running clearance of at least 20 cm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.29]

Ford designs its tire aero deflectors to be flexible enough to bend without breaking when 

encountering a 20 cm high solid object at relatively low speeds (i.e., off-road driving speeds). In 

our view, this is fully consistent with the spirit and intent of the off-highway-capable criteria. In 

other words, even with the deflectors present, our customers would continue to be able to engage 

in the same kinds of off-highway driving envisioned by the current rules, without damaging their 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp.29-30]

In light of the above, we believe that NHTSA can promote improved fuel economy and reduced 

GHG emissions, without compromising other objectives, by issuing an interpretation clarifying 

that the installation of flexible tire aero deflectors whose bottom edge is less than 20 cm from the 

road surface would not compromise compliance with the running clearance criterion in 49 CFR 

523.5(b)(2). We therefore requests that in the final rule, NHTSA either provide a regulatory 

interpretation in the preamble to the rule, or modify the regulatory language in 49 CFR Part 523, 

to provide the following clarification: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.30]

A flexible component (or components) attached to the undercarriage of a vehicle shall not be 

considered in determining compliance with the running clearance measurement found in 49 CFR 

523.5(b)(2)(iv), provided as follows:

1. The component(s) is/are installed in front of, and in close proximity to, the wheels, tires, and 

associated suspension components that create aerodynamic drag.
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-11

2. The component(s) will flex without damage when a solid obstacle of 20 cm in height is passed 

underneath the component(s) when the vehicle is parked on a flat surface. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9463-A1, p.30]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Vehicle Classification Definitions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.21]

NHTSA is concerned that manufacturers have an incentive to classify passenger cars as lightduty trucks to secure an easier CAFE target. Given the 2017-2025 model year standards are 

being set so far in advance, NHTSA is also concerned that the definitions could eventually lose 

their relevance as the market evolves. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.21]

Toyota believes that changes to the current vehicle classification definitions are unnecessary. 

First, NHTSA itself states that the current definitions are consistent with the text of EISA and 

Congress' original intent. Toyota agrees with NHTSA. Second, there has been no evidence to 

substantiate speculation that §523.5(a)(5) is being 'gamed' by manufacturers through addition of 

3rd row seating. Third, NHTSA's own evaluation concludes that eliminating §523.5(a)(5) may 

actually be counterproductive. NHTSA reports that during the 2012-2016 model year rulemaking 

it evaluated the impact of moving all two-wheel drive SUYs from the truck fleet to the passenger 

car fleet and concluded that such a move would result in lower fuel savings, increased costs, and 

significant disruption to the industry. In the year since the 2012-2016 model year standards were 

finalized, Toyota is unaware of new information that would change this conclusion. Finally, the 

proposed attribute curves are based on extensive analysis of maximum feasible target curves and 

standards using current classification definitions. Any revision to the vehicle classification 

definitions for standards finalized in this rulemaking would change the shape of the footprint 

curves and the stringency of the proposed standards and would necessitate re-proposal of those 

standards. To the extent NHTSA is concerned about whether the classification definitions can 

keep pace with evolving market through the 2017-2025 model year period, we suggest the issue 

be revisited during the mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.21]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(b) Loss in Benefits from Increased Vehicle Size and Car/Truck Reclassification

Another helpful improvement would be to modify the definition of light trucks, adding new 

criteria to better differentiate non-passenger vehicles with true off-road capability from 

passenger vehicles designed to carry individuals. In addition to the current differentiating list, a 

requirement to meet new criteria – a majority subset of the following 5 items: limited slip center 

differential, limited slip rear differential, locking axles, skid plates, and 2-speed transfer cases –

could be added. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 8]

29 CARB, Initial Statement of Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking, Public Hearing to Consider 

the “LEV III” Amendments to the California Greenhouse Gas and Criteria Pollutant Exhaust and 
EPA Response to Comments

9-12

Evaporative Emission Standards and Test Procedures and to the On-Board Diagnostic System 

Requirements for Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty Vehicles, and to the 

Evaporative Emission Requirements for Heavy-Duty Vehicles, p. 159. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9567-A2, p. 7]

30 http://www.cal-span.org/cgi-bin/media.pl?folder=CARB, January 26, 2012, at approx. time 

marker 5:21. Accessed February 3, 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 7]

Response:

These comments are generally directed at NHTSA’s request in the proposed rule 

regarding the definitions of “passenger automobile” and “light truck” (or “non-passenger 

automobile”), and thus EPA is not responding to these comments. Although EPA’s rules 

incorporate the definitions used in the CAFE program (see 40 CFR 86.1818-12(b)), EPA adopted 

these definitions in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking in order to harmonize the GHG rules with 

the CAFE program. EPA did not raise the possibility of revising these definitions in the present 

rulemaking, or otherwise reconsider or reassess its approach of using the harmonized definitions 

in the GHG rules. Consequently, EPA is not responding to these comments here, and views 

them as addressed exclusively to the CAFE program. 

9.3. Compliance Data Transparency

Organizations Included in this Section

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA and NHTSA should create greater public transparency by annually publishing data on each 

manufacturer’s credit status and technology penetration, thus ensuring greater public confidence 

in the program’s effectiveness. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 3]

C. Automaker Credit Balance and Technology Application Should be Transparently Reported 

Annually to Allow for Public Evaluation of Program Effectiveness

Effective public support for the National Program is dependent on transparent data that proves 

that the program is working effectively. To enable the public to evaluate the effectiveness of the 

program, EPA should publish an annual public report that includes at minimum the following 

quantitative information on credits (in megagrams or metric tons and mpg) for each 

manufacturer’s car and light truck fleets: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 15]

The amount of cumulative credits or deficits;

The amount of credit transfers made by a manufacturer between its car and light truck fleets (if 

any);
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-13

The amount of credits traded between manufacturers including which manufacturers were 

involved and the car/truck credit origination and destination; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9472-A2, p. 15]

The amount of credits generated, for each manufacturer’s car and truck fleet, from the additional 

credit opportunities including:

air conditioning related credits;

multipliers for electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles;

full-size pick-up truck hybrid and performance-based incentive credits;

CAFE credits associated with flex fuel vehicles and alternative fuel vehicles and the fuel usage 

assessment that factored into CAFE and GHG calculations; and

off-cycle technology credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 16]

For each of the five additional credit opportunities above, EPA should specify the basis for 

calculating the credits and indicate how many credits were awarded for each mechanism. For 

example, EPA should indicate how many plug-in hybrid electric vehicles earned advanced 

technology multiplier credits for a manufacturer’s car fleet and how EPA calculated the credit 

per vehicle type. For off-cycle technology credits, EPA should specify what technologies earned 

the credit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 16]

The EPA should also enhance technology descriptions to the annual Fuel Economy Trends 

Report and/or Fuel Economy Guide and associated on-line database. Included in the reports 

should be the following:

Footprint per model and manufacturer;

Sales per model;

Car or truck classifications by model and manufacturer; and

Penetrations of efficiency and emission reduction technologies by vehicle class and manufacturer 

to understand what portions of vehicles have which technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9472-A2, p. 16]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(e) Transparency and Compliance Accounting

UCS commends the agencies in general on their noticeable efforts to provide high levels of 

transparency throughout the 2012-2016 and 2017-2025 rulemaking processes. All three 

agencies—EPA, NHTSA, and CARB—have embraced an approach to base findings not upon 
EPA Response to Comments

9-14

confidential business information, but rather upon well-documented, proven, and transparent 

information. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 11]

The agencies could further improve transparency by having a clear public accounting of credits 

and program compliance. Over the years, it has been exceedingly difficult to independently 

verify whether manufacturers are complaint with their CAFE obligations, and as noted in 

previous comment submissions, we have concerns that the same will hold true with 

manufacturers’ vehicle greenhouse gas obligations. Given the numerous compliance flexibility 

mechanisms being proposed by the agencies – as well as a multitude of opportunities for trading, 

transferring, banking, and borrowing of credits – it is critical that manufacturers’ compliance 

ledgers be documented, publicly available, and sufficiently granular to assess by which measures 

companies are complying with the regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 11]

For example, for each model year, this may include (but not be limited to) each manufacturer’s: 

car average greenhouse gas emissions performance; light truck average greenhouse gas 

emissions performance; amount of credits (on at least car and light-truck fleet average basis) 

accrued through advanced technology vehicle credits, early credits, A/C credits, off-cycle 

technology credits, flex fuel vehicle credits, and (in the case of MYs 2012-2016) use of 

temporary lead-time allowance alternative standards; amount of total banks/debits accrued in 

each year; and a running balance of banks/debits. We urge the agencies to undertake an effort to 

provide clear public accounting of credits and program compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 11]

Further, in order for UCS and other public interest groups to effectively assess industry 

compliance and behavior, we request that the agencies expand the public availability and quality 

of disaggregated vehicle data. Because of the new attribute-based standards, it is critical that submodel level data be regularly published that includes not only fuel economy and greenhouse gas 

emissions performance specifications, but at a minimum, finalized sales, vehicle footprint, and 

regulatory vehicle classification. In order to improve the quality of public interest group 

assessments, we request that the following data be regularly published at the sub-model 

level: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 11]

• Model Year

• Make

• Model/Nameplate

• Engine Family

• Transmission Type

• Criteria Pollutant Emission Certification Level(s)

• Number of Cylinders

• Fuel Type

• Drive Type (Fwd/Rwd/4wd)

• Vehicle Weight (ITW, ETW, curb)

• Regulatory Vehicle Classification (Passenger Car, LDT1, LDT2, etc.)

• Horsepower

• Footprint (or wheelbase and front/rear track width)

• Test Greenhouse Gas Emissions – city, highway, and combined
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-15

• Greenhouse Gas Emissions Adjusted for Upstream – city, highway, and combined

• Unadjusted (CAFE) Test Fuel Economy – city, highway, and combined

• Unadjusted (CAFE) Credited Fuel Economy – city, highway, and combined

• Window Label Fuel Economy (for vehicle identification purposes)

• Sales Volume (finalized sales) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 11]

• Sales Origin (domestic passenger, import passenger, non-passenger)

• Market Classification

• EPA Classification

• Identification of whether the vehicle applies under Temporary Lead-time Allowance 

Alternative Standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 12]

UCS requests that the data set include all makes and models covered under EPA and NHTSA 

greenhouse gas and fuel economy regulations, with no exceptions. As this is a request for the 

most recent complete model year of data -- not projected sales, or even existing mid-year sales –

any automaker confidentiality claims on these data are unwarranted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 12]

Finally, UCS suggests that EPA expand its Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide 

Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends report to include annual assessments of car/truck 

designations and vehicle size (by footprint). Doing so will allow the agencies to better track 

whether manufacturers are complying with the standards by deploying clean, fuel-efficient 

technologies in their fleets, or whether they are doing so by upsizing, by reclassifying cars as 

light trucks, or by other regulatory gaming methods. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 12]

Response:

As was the case in the MYs 2012-2016 regulation, EPA received several comments about 

the need for transparency in its implementation of the greenhouse gas program and specifically 

about the need for public access to information about Agency compliance determinations. NRDC 

argued that EPA and NHTSA should publish data on each manufacturer’s credit status and 

technology penetration on an annual basis. They suggested specific data that should be disclosed, 

by car and truck fleets, including the amount of cumulative credits or debits, the withinmanufacturer credit transfers between car and truck fleets, air conditioning credits, use of 

multipliers for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs, full size pick-up truck HEV and performance-based 

credits, and off-cycle technology credits. They further suggested that the Fuel Economy Trends 

Report and the Fuel Economy Guide and associated online database could be enhanced to 

include additional vehicle and technology information, by model and manufacturer. The Union 

of Concerned Scientists (UCS) reiterated these comments, noting that EPA should have a “clear 

public accounting of credits and program compliance.” They specifically request that data at the 

“sub-model level” be published regularly, and that such data include the following: model year, 

make, model/nameplate, engine family, transmission type, criteria pollutant certification levels, 

number of cylinders, fuel type, drive type, horsepower, footprint, GHG emissions and fuel 

economy test results, window label fuel economy, sales volume, sales origin, market 

classification, EPA classification, and whether a vehicle is using the TLAAS program standards. 

Like NRDC, UCS also requested enhancements to the Light-Duty Automotive Technology, 
EPA Response to Comments

9-16

Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends report by adding information on car/truck 

designations and vehicle size/footprint. 

EPA remains committed to the principle of transparency and to disseminating as much 

information as we are reasonably and legally able to provide. Indeed, as explained in section II.F 

of the preamble, one reason the agencies have rejected off-cycle credits for crash avoidance 

technologies are difficulties in quantifying GHG emissions/fuel economy improvements 

attributable to the technology, which would raise issues of transparency and verifiability. Not 

surprisingly, manufacturers have also commented about the need to protect confidential business 

information, a practice to which we also remain committed. As stated in the MYs 2012-2016 

final rule, and in section III.E of the preamble to the final rule, EPA expects that the 

dissemination of GHG program data will possibly take place through the annual Fuel Economy 

Trends report, the annual Compliance Report, or through other means, such as online distribution 

through fueleconomy.gov or other EPA websites, new GHG-specific reports, or through some 

combination of all of these. Given that the data will be released well after the conclusion of a 

given model year, certain information is clearly no longer confidential business information. For 

example, vehicle production volumes by model type are unlikely to be treated as confidential 

given that essentially the same information can be purchased from sources like WardsAuto. But 

production volumes at a finer level of detail, such as at the subconfiguration or configuration 

level, could potentially be considered confidential because those volumes, which are not 

available elsewhere, may potentially reveal something about a manufacturer’s long-term 

strategies. These are issues and questions that EPA expects to be addressing as we move forward 

with publishing our compliance data. 

EPA already releases a considerable amount of information regarding fuel economy, 

emissions, and vehicle characteristics, both at the test level and at the model type level.19 The 

downloadable model type data available at fueleconomy.gov will soon have CO2 emissions 

values (adjusted label values and unadjusted values, similar to the MPG reporting) in addition to 

the 127 columns of data we already provide for each model type. However, we plan to expand 

what we release publicly such that more information is available regarding GHG program 

compliance, For example, EPA intends to publish the applicable fleet average standards (for cars 

and for trucks) and the actual fleet performance for each manufacturer, and the resulting credits 

or debits (in Megagrams, or metric tons). In addition, EPA anticipates publishing the amount of 

credits generated by each manufacturer (separately for each of the car and truck fleets) under the 

optional credit programs, and the associated volumes of vehicles to which those credits apply. 

EPA will also likely publish various credit transactions (transfers among fleets within a 

manufacturer and trades between manufacturers), as well as the total credits or debits 

accumulated in a model year and the resulting overall credit or debit balance, taking into account 

the credit and debit carry-forward provisions. EPA anticipates that the data publication will 

evolve over time, both as the program progresses and as our data systems adapt to the new 

requirements and are able to manage and report data accurately and effectively. For example, our 

first public release of information is likely to be a summary of the early credits generated in the 

2009-2011 model years that, at least initially, may not be as comprehensive as the reporting that 

 19 See http://www.epa.gov/otaq/tcldata.htm and http://www.fueleconomy.gov/.
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-17

follows the 2012 model year.20 EPA is currently assessing how to best release these data (both 

the content and the mechanism), but expects that publication will occur later this year.

9.4. Harmonization with CAFE

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Ford Motor Company

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The Agencies Should Insure that the NHTSA Requirements are Fully Harmonized with the EPA 

Requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.14]

EPA and NHTSA mention several times in the NPRM that they have worked to develop “strong 

and coordinated” Federal GHG and CAFE standards so that manufacturers can build a single 

fleet of vehicles to satisfy requirements under both programs as well as under the California 

program. As the agencies explain, this helps to reduce costs and regulatory complexity while 

achieving significant energy security and environmental benefits. While we appreciate the 

agencies' efforts to harmonize the two programs, more work needs to be done in this area. 

Specifically, NHTSA should modify its CAFE program for MY 2017-2025 to better harmonize 

with EPA's GHG program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.14]

NHTSA's proposed CAFE standards account for many of the same factors that EPA considers in 

setting its proposed GHG standards. However, the proposed CAFE program does not include all 

of the program flexibilities built into the GHG program. NHTSA's program does not account for 

some of the EPA flexibilities, including off-cycle technology benefits, mobile air conditioning 

benefits, and benefits for hybridizing large work trucks. However, there are other important 

flexibilities that are present in the GHG program, but not the CAFE program. These include the 

advanced technology volume multiplier, the difference in quantification for advanced 

technologies with respect to the treatment of electricity, natural gas fuel utility factors, unlimited 

credit transfers between fleets and the one-time carry forward of previous credits through MY 

2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10153-A2, p.1]

By MY 2025, the difference between the EPA's proposed fleet average standard and NHTSA's 

proposed fleet average standard equates to about 4.9 mpg. However, this difference is not large 

enough to offset the benefits of the additional flexible mechanisms included in EPA's program. 

In order to bring the two programs into better alignment, NHTSA needs to either increase the 

program flexibilities offered under the CAFE program or modify its curves to better reflect the 

other differences between the two programs. While the impact of the program differences is 

relatively small in the early years of the program, it will increase with the passage of time, 

particularly as manufacturers rely more and more on vehicle electrification in order to comply 

 20 Reporting of these credits was due from manufacturers at the end of March, 2012, and EPA is currently evaluating 

the data to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. 
EPA Response to Comments

9-18

with the standards. Unless this imbalance is corrected, it will result in significant disharmony in 

the middle and later years of the time period covered by this proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.14]

The Alliance recognizes that, with respect to program flexibilities, EPCA and EISA impose 

some restraints on NHTSA that the Clean Air Act does not impose on EPA. Nevertheless, the 

Alliance believes that increased harmonization between the two programs is both possible and 

necessary. The Alliance strongly recommends that NHTSA undertake further study of its ability 

to include additional, appropriate program flexibilities to provide for equivalent stringency 

between the proposed CAFE standards and the proposed GHG standards.10 To the extent that 

NHTSA cannot fully provide for equivalent stringency through the addition of program 

flexibilities, NHTSA should adjust the proposed CAFE standards themselves to fully account for 

the differences in the two programs. Such an adjustment is necessary to ensure that the 

President's goal of coordinated, harmonized CAFE and GHG programs is realized, and to avoid 

potential future problems due to disparities in the stringency of the two programs. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.14-15]

10 - Please note that the term 'program flexibilities' does not refer to the enforcement provisions 

of the two programs, such as the payment of fines. The agencies' harmonization efforts should 

focus on achieving equivalent stringency in the CAFE and GHG standards, regardless of any 

differences in the enforcement mechanisms for the two programs.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Consistent Geographical Fleets for the CAFE and GHG Programs

As noted repeatedly by the agencies, a key objective of One National Program is harmonization 

of the GHG and CAFE requirements to the greatest extent possible. In that regard, the agencies 

should strive to harmonize the fleets that are used to calculate the GHG and CAFE fleet 

averages, respectively. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.26]

In its comments on the MY 2012-2016 One National Program regulations, Ford raised an issue 

related to GHG-CAFE harmonization. The issue is that there is a geographical discrepancy 

between vehicles covered under the CAFE program and those covered under the Clean Air Act 

(CAA). Under NHTSA's regulations, CAFE compliance is based on vehicles delivered for sale in 

the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. (49 CFR § 525.4(a)(5)) However, under 

Section 302(d) of the CAA, the term 'State' is defined to include vehicles delivered to those 

locations, plus the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of Northern 

Mariana Islands. The result is that, under the existing rules, manufacturers have to use different 

databases of vehicles to calculate their CAFE fleet average and their GHG fleet average, 

respectively. In Ford's case, the additional territories included under the CAA definition means 

that the GHG database has about 1,000 more vehicles than the CAFE database. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9463-A1, pp.26-27]
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-19

Given the size of Ford's fleet, the impact of an additional 1,000 vehicles in the GHG database is 

negligible from a fleet average standpoint. However, the administrative burden caused by the 

need to maintain two databases, and to chase down the relevant information for the vehicles in 

the additional territories covered by the CAA, is not negligible. The additional vehicles are not 

easily identified on a model type, base level, configuration, or subconfiguration level, and it 

represents a significant effort to gather all of this information for the GHG database. In short, the 

geographic discrepancy between the GHG fleet and the CAFE fleet adds administrative burden 

for no real benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.27]

In our comments on the MY 2012-2016 rules, Ford suggested that EPA could amend its 

regulations to clarify that, for purposes of emissions compliance reporting and fleet averaging 

only, the fleet is composed of vehicles for the 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto 

Rico. In promulgating the final MY 2012-2016 rules, EPA responded to this comment as 

follows:

The comment stated that EPA has the discretion under the CAA to align the sales area location 

of production vehicles for the greenhouse gas fleet with the sales area location for the CAFE 

fleet and recommended that EPA amend the definitions in 40 CFR 86.1803 accordingly. This 

would exclude from greenhouse gas requirements production vehicles that are introduced into 

commerce in the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.27]

Although EPA has tried to harmonize greenhouse gas and CAFE requirements in this rule to the 

extent possible, EPA believes that the approach suggested in comment would be contrary to the 

requirements of the Act. EPA does not believe that the Agency has discretion under the CAA to 

exclude from greenhouse gas requirements production vehicles introduced into commerce in the 

Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 

Islands. In addition, this change would introduce an undesirable level of complexity into the 

certification process and result in confusion due to vehicles intended for commerce in separate 

geographical locations being covered under a single certificate. For these reasons, EPA will 

retain the proposed greenhouse gas production vehicle sales area location as defined in the CAA. 

(75 Fed. Reg. 25484) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.27]

Based on EPA's response, it is apparent that Ford's original comment was unclear. It was never 

Ford's intention to exclude vehicles delivered to the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, or 

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands from any certification requirements, or to 

otherwise introduce any complexity or confusion into the certification process. Under our 

concept, the certification process would not change; all vehicles delivered to those locations 

would be fully certified to all applicable standards, just as they are today. The only proposed 

change is that, solely for purposes of calculating and reporting a manufacturer's GHG fleet 

average, the rules would give manufacturers the option not to include the vehicles delivered to 

the specified locations, thereby enabling the manufacturers to harmonize their GHG fleet with 

their CAFE fleet. Such a change would have no adverse environmental consequences; as noted 

above, it would not alter the vehicles sent to the territories in question, and the small number of 

vehicles at issue is not significant enough to affect a manufacturer's fleet average. Meanwhile, 
EPA Response to Comments

9-20

this change would be very beneficial from the standpoint of promoting harmonization and 

reducing unnecessary administrative burdens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, pp.27-28]

There may be a number of ways to accomplish this goal through amendments to the regulatory 

language, but here is our suggestion. After 40 CFR § 86.1865-12 (a)(2), add the following:

(3) As used in this section, the term 'delivered for sale' refers to new passenger automobiles and 

light trucks transported to dealerships for the purpose of retail sales to consumers in the United 

States (including the District of Columbia), Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American 

Samoa, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands. For purposes of this section only, 

manufacturers may elect not to include vehicles delivered for sale in the Virgin Islands, Guam, 

American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands their computation of 

fleet average carbon-related exhaust emissions by notifying EPA of this election in the annual 

report required pursuant to subsection (l)(2)(vi) of this section. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p.28]

This language helps to clarify the universe of vehicles subject to the fleet average carbon-related 

exhaust emission calculation in subsection (h)(3)(1) of § 86.1865-12, and it also provides 

manufacturers with the ability to harmonize this GHG fleet with the fleet of vehicles subject to 

CAFE reporting under EPCA and EISA. We encourage EPA to adopt this amendment in the 

interests of promoting harmonization and minimizing the burden on manufacturers. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.28]

Response:

With regard to the comment from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, EPA finds 

that it is directed towards the NHTSA program, and as such, no EPA response is needed. 

With regard to the comment from Ford, EPA appreciates the company’s willingness to 

continue to certify these non-mainland vehicles. However, it would still be the case that these 

vehicles are not included in the manufacturers’ fleet average for the GHG standard, which is not 

a desirable result. Nor does EPA understand why the associated administrative burden is so 

great. Presumably Ford (and any other manufacturer) would have already identified whatever 

extra-territorial vehicles it sells for purposes of CAFÉ. That is, manufacturers would need to 

know how many and what these vehicles are in order to keep them out of their CAFÉ 

calculations. Given that this information is already being gathered, EPA does not perceive why 

applying that same already-at-hand information to determine the GHG fleet average would add 

significant additional administrative burden. 

9.5. Durability Procedures for Diesel Vehicles

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Treatment of Diesel-Fueled Vehicles Under Emissions Durability Demonstration Test 

Procedures [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p91]
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-21

All technologies should be treated fairly under the exhaust emission durability demonstration 

procedures at 40 CFR 86.1823-08. Within these procedures, however, diesel-fueled vehicles are 

specifically disallowed from making use of bench-aging durability procedures, (40 CFR 

86.1823-08(d)), adding significant and unnecessary expense to the durability demonstration for 

such vehicles. Diesel technology offers a greenhouse gas and fuel consumption reduction 

opportunity and should be allowed similar flexibility to other fuel technologies under the 

durability demonstration procedures. Therefore, the Alliance requests that EPA work with 

manufacturers to develop a bench-aging durability procedure for diesel-fueled vehicles for 

proposal in a future rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p91]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

We urge the agencies to treat diesel vehicles fairly under the EPA durability 

demonstration procedures, as described in depth in the comments from the Alliance. 

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

All technologies should be treated fairly under the exhaust emission durability demonstration 

procedures at 40 CFR 86.1823-08. The procedures, however, specifically disallow the use of 

bench-aging durability procedures for diesel-fueled vehicles. This adds significant and 

unnecessary expense to the durability demonstration for diesel vehicles. Diesel technology offers 

a greenhouse gas and fuel consumption reduction opportunity and should be allowed similar 

flexibility to other fuel technologies under the durability demonstration procedures. DAG 

therefore agrees with others in the industry in the request that EPA work with manufacturers to 

develop a bench-aging durability procedure for diesel fueled vehicles for proposal in a future 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-5]

Response:

Commenters regarding this issue appear to be aware that the issue they are raising cannot be 

resolved in this final rule. EPA did not propose any changes to the exhaust emission durability 

demonstration provisions, and thus is not finalizing any related changes to the regulations. In 

general, EPA strives for emission standards that are applied equitably across technologies, and as 

such, we are willing to consider future discussions regarding this issue, and, if appropriate, a 

future rulemaking action. 

9.6. Other Certification and Compliance Related Comments

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Clean Energy

Ferrari

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

NGV America
EPA Response to Comments

9-22

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Driver Selectable Modes [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

EPA has requested comment on “...whether there is a need to clarify in the regulations how EPA 

treats driver-selectable modes...” We believe that EPA should continue to use its current 

methods for dealing with driver-selectable modes and that no additional regulatory clarification 

is necessary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

The current regulations and guidance, administered at the national level, allow common driverselectable modes to be dealt with in a consistent manner while still allowing flexibility in dealing 

with any new and unusual modes that may develop. EPA should continue to monitor the use and 

application of its driver-selectable mode policies and update or refine its guidance as necessary. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

U.S. Production [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

There are provisions in the proposed regulations that reference U.S. production as a component 

of applicability or eligibility for that provision. For example, in describing the minimum sales 

volume threshold for the list of predetermined off-cycle technologies, §86.1866-12(d)(1)(i) states 

'The manufacturer may generate a CO2/g credit ... provided that each technology is applied to the 

minimum percentage of the manufacturer's U.S. production of passenger automobiles ... for 

which credit is claimed.' Similarly, the provisions for advanced technology vehicles in §86.1866-

12(a)(1) states, “Electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles ... that 

are certified, produced, and delivered for sale in the United States ... may use a value of zero (0) 

grams/mile of CO2 ...” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

A reasonable interpretation of the provisions above could imply they are applicable only to 

vehicles produced in the U.S. It is the understanding of the Alliance that the agencies do not 

intend for the applicability or eligibility of the proposed regulations to depend on a vehicle’s 

origin. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

The Alliance requests that the agencies clarify that the eligibility and applicability of the 

provisions being proposed are not contingent on a manufacturer producing vehicles in the U.S. 

We suggest that where the agencies currently reference “U.S. production” in a provision, that 

language be revised to instead use the term “production for U.S. sale,” which is consistent with 

the intent of the provisions in both the Clean Air Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation 

Act of 2005, as amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.90]

Credits for Aftermarket Sales of Alternative Fuel Systems 

Organization: Clean Energy
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-23

Currently only original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are required to meet fuel economy 

regulations. However, a number of aftermarket conversions to natural gas continue to be 

performed each year. The effect is that a significant supply of potential fuel economy credits for 

dedicated and dual-fuel NGVs are lost to the OEMs. Since most aftermarket systems also are 

exempt for the GHG regulations these credits are also lost to the OEMs. To address this 

situation, EPA and NHTSA should establish procedures to reward the OEMs for aftermarket 

conversions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9511-A1, pp.4-5]

Organization: NGV America

Currently only original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are required to meet fuel economy 

regulations. However, a number of aftermarket conversions to natural gas continue to be 

performed each year. The effect is that a significant supply of potential fuel economy credits for 

dedicated and dual-fuel NGVs are lost to the OEMs. Since most aftermarket systems also are 

exempt for the GHG regulations these credits are also lost to the OEMs. To address this 

situation, EPA and NHTSA should establish procedures to reward the OEMs for aftermarket 

conversions. We propose that converters be able to collect and trade FE and GHG credits with 

the underlying OEM. At each fuel economy reporting interval, the OEM would substitute FE 

data for the base vehicle with that for the converted NGV. For example, a dedicated vehicle 

achieving 18 mpg in gasoline mode would be substituted with an NGV achieving 18/0.15= 120 

mpg. For purposes of compliance, the OEM would be treated as if they were the manufacturer of 

record (MOR) for the converted vehicle. To facilitate this, the converter would have to report to 

the OEM and NHTSA/EPA the number of vehicles sold each reporting period. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9461-A1, p. 12]

Organization: Ferrari

In-use standards and durability 

EPA proposes in-use CO2 standards that would apply throughout a vehicle’s useful life, with the 

standard determined by adding a 10 percent adjustment factor to the model-level emission 

results. We agree to keep the 10% higher CO2 standards to take into account the variability 

involved, such as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

• Normal variability in test results. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

• Variability in the production for the same vehicle configuration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9535-A2, p.12]

• Differences in the equipments with different optional items that can affect CO2 emissions (curb 

weight, wheels, tires, engine lubricant, and state of maintenance). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9535-A2, p.12]

We agree that manufacturers may demonstrate in-use emissions durability of off-cycle 

technologies at time of certification, by submitting an engineering analysis describing why the 
EPA Response to Comments

9-24

technology is durable and expected to last for the full useful life of the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

OBD monitoring of GHG-emissions 

We support EPA that is not proposing any OBD requirements regarding CO2, CH4, and N2O 

emissions, because these GHG emissions should not deteriorate over the full vehicle life. We 

appreciate that EPA does not propose at this time OBD monitoring for off-cycle technologies. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, pp.12-13]

Applicability of high altitude provisions to greenhouse gases 

We agree with EPA that is proposing to retain its current high altitude regulations so 

manufacturers would not normally be required to submit vehicle CO2, CH4, and N2O test data 

for high altitude. Instead, they would submit an engineering evaluation indicating that common 

calibrations will be utilized at high altitude, and therefore the compliance is assured also in these 

conditions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.13]

The main benefit is to reduce the number of emissions tests to be performed (in labs located at 

high altitude or with the capability to simulate such conditions) during vehicles certification,

especially relevant for small-volume manufacturers. This approach is useful to streamline the 

emission certification procedure in U.S.A. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.13]

Civil penalties

Ferrari opposes any increase in civil penalties for CAFE because it will not result in substantial 

energy conservation and could have a negative impact mainly on small businesses. Increasing the 

penalty up to 10.00 $ per tenth-mpg per vehicle will increase the burden mainly on few vehicle 

manufacturers (which already pay a lot of money in fines and/or penalties) which cannot change 

their products because are typical and identify the uniqueness of the makes. For example, Ferrari 

traditionally manufactures high-performance sports vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-

A2, p.15]

We believe that higher penalties are not an effective method to increase the CAFE in U.S.A. 

Historically; the penalties have been paid mainly by foreign manufacturers responsible of a 

relatively limited number of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.15]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

MECA believes that further reductions of hydrocarbon and NOx emissions from the existing 

light-duty vehicle fleet can be achieved by revising the current EPA aftermarket converter 

performance requirements. California has revised their aftermarket converter requirements for 

light-duty, gasoline vehicles by requiring a higher level of emission performance and longer 

durability standards. ARB’s regulation eliminates the sale of older aftermarket converter 

products that have modest performance standards and a limited 25,000 mile warranty, and 

requires that higher performance and more durable OBD-compliant aftermarket converter 
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-25

products be used on both non-OBD and OBD-equipped vehicles (ARB implemented their 

revised aftermarket converter requirements in January 2009). These ARB approved OBDcompliant aftermarket converters are warranted for 50,000 miles based on the use of a more 

aggressive, high temperature, accelerated engine-aging protocol compared to the vehicle 

durability demonstration currently required by EPA for approved aftermarket converter products. 

EPA has not updated its aftermarket converter requirements since 1986 and with more than three 

million aftermarket converters sold per year across the U.S. (based on surveys completed by 

MECA with aftermarket converter manufacturers), significant additional reductions of 

hydrocarbon emissions, including toxic hydrocarbon emissions, and NOx emissions could be 

achieved with a national aftermarket converter policy that made use of the same higher 

performance OBD-compliant aftermarket converters available in California. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9452-A3, p.5]

Response:

Driver-Selectable Modes

EPA requested comments on whether there is a need to clarify in the regulations how 

EPA treats driver-selectable modes (such as multi-mode transmissions and other user-selectable 

buttons or switches) that may impact fuel economy and GHG emissions in certification testing. 

See 76 FR 75089. EPA addresses those comments here. The issue of whether user-selectable 

technologies may be eligible for off-cycle credits is addressed in preamble section II.F and in 

section 7 of this RTC document. Note also that this discussion pertains specifically to 

implementing the testing required on the Federal Test Procedure and the Highway Fuel Economy 

Test as used to generate combined City/Highway GHG and MPG values for each model type for 

use in calculating fleet average GHG and MPG values. For the purpose of assigning off-cycle 

credit values that may be based on a driver-selectable technology (see preamble section II.F), 

where determination of an accurate real-world benefit of the technology is a fundamental goal, 

the policy described here and in current EPA guidance may not be appropriate.

New technologies continue to arrive on the market, with increasing complexity and an 

increasing array of ways a driver can make choices that affect the fuel economy and greenhouse 

gas emissions. For example, some start-stop systems may offer the driver the option of choosing 

whether or not the system is enabled. Similarly, vehicles with ride height adjustment or grill 

shutters may allow drivers to override those features. Under the current regulations, EPA draws a 

distinction between vehicles tested for purposes of CO2 emissions performance and fuel 

economy and vehicles tested for non-CO2 emissions performance. When testing emission data 

vehicles for certification under Part 86 for non-CO2 emissions standards, a vehicle that has 

multiple operating modes must meet the applicable emission standards in all modes, and on all 

fuels. Sometimes testing may occur in all modes, but more frequently the worst-case mode is 

selected for testing to represent the emission test group. For example, a vehicle that allows the 

user to disengage the start-stop capability must meet the standards with and without the start-stop 

system operating. Similarly, a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle is tested in charge-sustaining (i.e., 

gasoline-only) operation. Current regulations require the reporting of CO2 emissions from 

certification tests conducted under Part 86, but EPA regulations also recognize that these values, 

from emission data vehicles that represent a test group, are ultimately not the values that are used 

to establish in-use CO2 standards (which are established on much more detailed sub-
EPA Response to Comments

9-26

configuration-specific level) or the model type CO2 and fuel economy values used for fleet 

averaging under Part 600. 

When EPA tests vehicles for fuel economy and CO2 emissions performance, userselectable modes are treated somewhat differently, where the goals are different and where 

worst-case operation may not be the appropriate choice for testing. For example, EPA does not 

believe that the fuel economy and CO2 emissions value for a PHEV should ignore the use of grid 

electricity, or that other dual fuel vehicles should ignore the real-world use of alternative fuels 

that reduce GHG emissions. For PHEVs and dual fuel CNG vehicles, where the consumer pays 

an up-front premium for the vehicle but can recoup that investment by using a less expensive 

fuel, the regulations allow the use of utility factors to weight the CO2 performance on the 

conventional fuel and the alternative fuel. Similarly, non-CO2 emission certification testing may 

be done in a transmission mode that is not likely to be the predominant mode used by consumers. 

Testing under Part 600 must determine a single fuel economy value for each model type for the 

CAFE program and a single CO2 value for each model type for EPA’s program. With respect to 

transmissions, Part 600 refers to 40 CFR 86.128, which states the following: 

“All test conditions, except as noted, shall be run according to the manufacturer's 

recommendations to the ultimate purchaser, Provided, That: Such recommendations are 

representative of what may reasonably be expected to be followed by the ultimate 

purchaser under in-use conditions.” 

For multi-mode transmissions EPA relies on guidance letter CISD-09-19 (December 3, 

2009) to guide the determination of what is “representative of what may reasonably be expected 

to be followed by the ultimate purchaser under in-use conditions.” If EPA can make a 

determination that a certain mode is the “predominant” mode (meaning nearly total usage), then 

testing may be done in that mode. However, if EPA cannot be convinced that a single mode is 

predominant, then fuel economy and GHG results from each mode are typically averaged with 

equal weighting. There are also detailed provisions that explain how a manufacturer may 

conduct surveys to support a statement that a given mode is predominant. However, CISD-09-19 

only addresses transmissions, and states the following regarding other technologies: 

“Please contact EPA in advance to request guidance for vehicles equipped with 

future technologies not covered by this document, unusual default strategies or driver 

selectable features, e.g., hybrid electric vehicles where the multimode button or switch 

disables or modifies any fuel saving features of the vehicle (such as the stop-start feature, 

air conditioning compressor operation, electric-only operation, etc.).”

The unique operating characteristics of these technologies often requires that EPA 

determine fuel economy and CO2 testing and calculations on a case-by-case basis. Because the 

CAFE and CO2 programs require a single value to represent a model type, EPA must make a 

decision regarding how to account for multiple modes of operation. When a manufacturer brings 

such a technology to us for consideration, we will evaluate the technology (including possibly 

requiring that the manufacturer give us a vehicle to test) and provide the manufacturer with 

instructions on how to determine fuel economy and CO2 emissions. In general we will evaluate 

these technologies in the same way and following the same principles we use to evaluate 

transmissions under CISD-09-19, making a determination as to whether a given operating mode 
Certification, Compliance, and Enforcement

9-27

is predominant or not (using the criteria for predominance described in CISD-09-19). These 

instructions are provided to the manufacturer under the authority for special test procedures 

described in 40 CFR 600.111-08. EPA would apply the same approach to testing for compliance 

with the in-use CO2 standard, so testing for the CO2 fleet average and testing for compliance 

with the in-use CO2 standard would be consistent. 

EPA requested comment on whether the current approach and regulatory provisions are 

sufficient, or whether additional regulations or guidance should be developed to describe EPA’s 

process. Manufacturers, who were the only commenters on this issue, commented that the 

current case-by-case approach is adequate, and EPA agrees. We recognize that no regulation can 

anticipate all options, devices, and operator controls that may arrive in the future, and adequate 

flexibility to address future situations is an important attribute for fuel economy and CO2

emissions testing. We believe it would be difficult at this time to construct regulations that 

adequately and generically address the use of multiple modes in GHG/MPG testing. 

U.S. Production

EPA agrees that requirements are not limited to vehicles produced in the U.S., and are not 

contingent on a manufacturer producing vehicles in the U.S. EPA has revised the regulatory 

language where appropriate to be consistent with the commenter’s suggestion.

Credits for Aftermarket Sales of Alternative Fuel Systems

EPA discusses the applicability of GHG standards to aftermarket conversions in the preamble to 

the final rule in section III.E.7. One of the relevant points is that credits are generated based on 

the determination of a fleet average GHG value, and fleet average standards are generally not 

appropriate for aftermarket conversions. This is because the vehicles that are converted have 

already been included in the fleet calculations for the OEM. It is possible that at some point 

EPA and NHTSA could develop a methodology to appropriately account for the emissions 

impact of aftermarket conversions, but there are a number of other issues that have to be resolved 

and that EPA was not prepared to address in this rulemaking. For example, it is not immediately 

clear how the agencies would account for vehicle conversions that take place mid-way through a 

vehicle’s useful life. Given the complexities involved, and the fact that we did not propose a 

credit program for aftermarket conversions, EPA is not finalizing such a program in this action. 

In-use Standards and Durability

EPA agrees with the commenter. The 10% adjustment used to create the in-use emission 

standard was finalized in the MY 2012-2016 program, and EPA did not propose to change it in 

this rulemaking. Thus it is being maintained for the MY 2017-2025 program. 

OBD Monitoring of GHG Emissions

EPA agrees with the commenter. The MY 2012-2016 program was finalized such that OBD 

monitoring is not required for CO2 ,N2O, and CH4 emissions, and EPA did not propose to change 

these provisions for the 2017 and later model years. Consequently, the exclusion of these 

emission constituents from OBD monitoring continues to be part of the MY 2017 and later 

program. 
EPA Response to Comments

9-28

Applicability of High Altitude Provisions to Greenhouse Gases

EPA agrees with the commenter. Under the current program, vehicles would be required to meet 

the CO2, N2O, and CH4 standards at high altitude, but would not normally be required to submit 

vehicle test data at high altitude. Instead, manufacturers may submit an engineering analysis 

indicating that common calibration approaches will be used at high altitude. EPA did not propose 

to change these provisions for the 2017 and later model years, or otherwise reconsider or reassess 

those provisions. Consequently, the provisions supported by the commenter will continue to be 

part of the MY 2017 and later program. 

Civil Penalties

EPA will not respond to the comments that are directed towards the civil penalties that apply 

under NHTSA’s CAFE program. 

Aftermarket Catalysts

EPA finds that the comment from MECA regarding EPA’s aftermarket catalyst program is not 

relevant to the proposed program, and thus a response is not warranted. 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-1

10. Additional EPA Program Elements

10.1. Average Banking and Trading

Organizations Included in this Section

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

BMW of North America, LLC

Chrysler Group LLC

Eaton Corporation

Ecology Center

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Hyundai America Technical Center

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Toyota Motor North America

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Organization: American Chemistry Council (ACC)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 264.]

We support the credit approach taken by the agencies.

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

We also support the flexibility mechanisms and credits that the agencies propose to make 

available. These provisions enhance the ability of manufacturers to meet market demand, while 

maintaining the emissions and energy security benefits of the program. They also provide 

another means of dealing with the uncertainty associated with the out year standards. The various 

credits work in different ways, all of which are important. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, 

p.1]

The credit banking and trading system provides an incentive for manufacturers to implement 

advanced technologies at early dates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 1]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 66.]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC
EPA Response to Comments

10-2

BMW supports the proposed flexibilities such as averaging, credit banking, extended approach 

for off-cycle technologies as well as retaining the approach for A/C credits. These flexibilities 

are needed in order for manufacturers to achieve overall regulatory compliance in a cost effective 

manner. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p.5]

BMW supports the continuation of the credit banking scheme as proposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 1]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

To provide these levels of improvement in the most cost-effective and customer acceptable 

manner, manufacturers need maximum flexibility. The proposals by the agencies to continue and 

improve flexibility mechanisms and to offer incentives to encourage early adoption of advanced 

technologies are helpful and will be an integral part to meeting the National Program goals. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.2]

Organization: Eaton Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 186-187.]

Eaton believes it is vital that the rule maintains the flexibility to adapt the solutions that can be 

rapidly adopted by OEMs and accepted by consumers. An example is the increased use of 

supercharged and mild hybrid technologies that provide fuel savings and performance with 

return on investments that is acceptable to the average consumer.

The proposed rule provides regulatory incentives that foster innovation and technology 

deployment. We believe that many of the technologies needed to achieve the proposed standards 

are available. Some are already in use, while others will benefit from the new paradigm these 

proposed regulations will provide. Working with our OEM partners, Eaton looks forward to 

providing high performance and cost-effective fuel efficient technologies.

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 190.]

The Ecology Center would also like to express support for the flexibility mechanisms in the 

proposed standards.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Program Flexibilities: Finally, it is important for the rules to include program flexibilities that 

provide manufacturers with compliance options, and that provide appropriate incentives for the 

deployment of technologies offering real-world fuel economy and GHG benefits not reflected in 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-3

the test procedures. The proposal for model years 2017 through 2025 retains and enhances the 

flexibilities of the earlier rulemaking. Opportunities to acknowledge the environmental impact of 

more efficient air-conditioning technologies, new refrigerants, real-world fuel economy benefits 

from non-traditional technologies, and the acceleration of more advanced technologies, will 

encourage the adoption and penetration of the innovations needed to achieve our aggressive 

national goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.2]

Ford applauds the efforts of EPA and NHTSA to incorporate a range of compliance mechanisms 

into the proposed rules. These include credits for innovations such as off-cycle technologies, 

improvements in air-conditioning systems designed to minimize refrigerant leakage, and the 

promotion of advanced technologies that operate on a variety of alternatives to traditional 

gasoline. These compliance mechanisms are fully consistent with the goals of the One National 

Program, and they also provide manufacturers with needed flexibility to comply with a 

demanding set of standards. The agencies have recognized that automobile manufacturers come 

to these regulations with varying product line-ups, different marketing strategies, and a range of 

capabilities with respect to fuel economy technologies. In this context, a one-size-fits-all 

regulatory program would be very problematic. Appropriately, the proposed rule offers 

manufacturers flexibility by enabling them to earn and apply credits for various actions tied to 

the real-world benefit these technologies provide in regard to both fuel efficiency and 

greenhouse gas reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p.10]

Organization: General Motors Company

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 36.]

Moving into my second comment, General Motors fully supports the flexibilities in this 

proposal. Some may criticize them, but the flexibilities included go directly towards real CO2

reduction and the furthering of advanced technologies.

The flexibilities do provide some compliance opportunity for the manufacturers in the future, but 

importantly these are already assumed in both of the agencies' assessment of the future of fuel 

economy levels that are anticipated under this proposal. As a result they are absolutely necessary 

for us to achieve the equivalent compliance levels anticipated.

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

While we believe the standards are achievable, doing so will not be easy and it will depend on 

additional technology breakthroughs and consumer acceptance. Therefore, Hyundai finds the 

flexibilities and incentives included in the proposal to be important. Furthermore, we prefer that 

the incentives be technology-neutral and performance-based so that all OEMs have an equal 

opportunity to develop technology and achieve the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-

A1, p.2]

Hyundai appreciates that there are a number of flexibilities in the proposal that address 

automaker's differing strategies for creating a fuel efficient fleet. For example, some 
EPA Response to Comments

10-4

manufacturers are focusing resources on electric vehicles and will receive credit multipliers for 

expanding that market. Others will improve the fuel efficiency of cargo-carrying full-size pickup trucks and the agency is providing additional incentives for that improvement. Some makers 

plan to focus on fuel efficiency leadership with gasoline vehicles, and CARB has adopted a 

provision to allow those automakers to offset part of the zero emission vehicle mandates for a 

limited time if it is possible to over-comply with these challenging GHG and CAFE standards. 

Should it be possible that automakers are capable of significantly over-complying with the EPA 

and NHTSA requirements; this will be important information to the agencies at the time of the 

mid-term review regarding the feasibility of achieving the standards. We appreciate and support 

the government's recognition of varying automaker strategies by providing a variety of 

incentives to maximize performance in each area. However, we have several comments on areas 

where we believe modifications to the credit methodologies could improve the program. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, pp.3-4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 172-173.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 22-24.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 21-23.]

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.

Credits are an important tool which can be positively applied and provide the industry necessary 

options to achieve future standards. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 2]

Continuing the use of credits and regulatory flexibilities, as proposed, is necessary and 

appropriate, but require some revisions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Continuing the use of credits and regulatory flexibilities, as proposed, is necessary and 

appropriate, but require some revisions. MEMA provides some proposals for the agencies’ 

consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.2]

Continuing the use of credits and regulatory flexibilities, as proposed, is necessary and 

appropriate. Generally, MEMA believes that the agencies have provided adequate program 

flexibilities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.5]

Credits are an important tool and can be positively applied and provide the industry necessary 

options to achieve future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.7]

Continuing the use of credits and regulatory flexibilities is necessary and appropriate, but does 

require some revisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.13]
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-5

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 71-72.]

The NESCAUM states support inclusion of flexibility mechanisms in the proposed rule 

providing manufacturers with pathways to compliance and a range of technologies efficient to 

meet the goal of the program.

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

The agencies have proposed a variety of credit programs and compliance flexibilities, which 

Toyota generally supports. These credits and flexibilities are an import aspect of the proposed 

standards because they allow manufacturers to better manage technology investment and 

deployment while achieving overall environmental and energy goals. Specific comments about 

the programs are provided below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.9]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Fourth, the UAW appreciates and supports the proposed inclusion by EPA of program 

flexibilities that will help automakers comply with the tougher standards at a lower cost. These 

features of the proposal are important for their recognition of the long product cycles of the 

automotive industry and the inherently “clunky” nature of technology upgrades timed to coincide 

with major updates of existing models or the introduction of completely new models. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.2]

The UAW supports the credit averaging, trading and banking provisions proposed separately by 

NHTSA and EPA, which are a continuation of the comprehensive program established for 2012–

2016. NHTSA’s proposal is in line with the dictates of EISA, while EPA has taken advantage of 

the provisions of the Clean Air Act to propose banking and trading provisions that allow more 

flexibility but still maintain the features necessary for a harmonized common system of 

regulation with NHTSA’s proposed rule. The UAW believes that EPA’s proposal is sensible and 

recognizes the real benefits of early over-compliance by manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9563-A2, p.2]

Response: 

The commenters above express support for credits programs and flexibilities in general 

and EPA concurs that these are important aspects of the program. As noted by some 

commenters, these provisions allow manufacturers to better manage technology deployment, 

allowing for a smoother implementation of standards. In addition to comments generally 

supporting flexibilities, many commenters also provided specific comments on the proposed 

flexibilities, which are addressed in other sections of this Response to Comments document, 

including; off-cycle credits in Section 7, incentives for EVs, PHEVs, and FCVs in Section 4, and 

game changing technologies for full size pick-up trucks in Section 5. Specific comments 

regarding averaging, banking, and trading are addressed in this section below.
EPA Response to Comments

10-6

10.1.1. Carry-Forward and Carry-Back of Credits

Organizations Included in this Section

Center for Biological Diversity

Ferrari

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Toyota Motor North America

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

The credit loophole would be made even larger were the Agencies to implement their “one time” 

proposal to extend the credit carry-forward provision even beyond the five-year period Congress 

has permitted.66 In essence, this provision would allow manufacturers to carry forward credits 

earned as early as two years ago, in 2010, all the way through 2021, or for more than a decade. It 

is self-evident that allowing manufacturers to evade increasing fuel efficiency for this long is 

directly contrary to Congressional intent. Nothing in the statute and nothing in the record 

justifies any such extension. To the contrary, the fact that Congress specifically limited the time 

period for carry-forward credits to five years plainly speaks against this industry give-away. We 

request that the Agencies abandon this proposal. Similarly, the Agencies may not increase the 

availability of credit transfers between the two fleets, passenger vehicles and light trucks. The 

existence of statutory caps for these transfers67 is a strong indication of Congressional 

disapproval of extending them further, and the Clean Air Act’s silence on that issue does not 

override EISA’s statutory restriction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, pp. 13-14]

66 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,877. The “justification” for this give-away is ludicrous. Nothing is 

needed to “facilitate the transition to the increasingly more stringent standards” for light trucks: 

these standards are already egregiously lax and will in any event not begin until 2017. See 

NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74877. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 13]

67 49 U.S.C. § 32903(g)(3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 14]

Organization: Ferrari

7) Credits

Ferrari supports all the credit provisions set forth in the present EPA proposal including a onetime carry-forward of any credits generated in MY 2010-2016 to be used anytime through 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-7

MY2021. This would provide greater flexibility for manufacturers in using the credits they have 

generated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.13]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Support the proposal to carry over MY 2010-2015 credits through MY 2021. This proposal 

would provide added utility to credits generated early in the program, which helps to incentivize 

early adoption of fuel saving technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Credit Carry-forward

We support EPA’s proposal to provide a one-time carry-forward of greenhouse gas reduction 

credits through the 2021 model year, thus rewarding early investment and providing better 

flexibility to account for market conditions that may impact year-over-year compliance. We 

concur with the agency’s assessment (76 Fed. Reg. 74968) that, “provisions are not expected to 

change the emissions reductions achieved by the standards, but should significantly reduce the 

cost of achieving those reductions.” While we acknowledge that NHTSA is legislatively bound 

to restrict fuel economy credit carry-forward to only 5 years, it must be noted that this is 

disconnect between the two programs, and may unfortunately drive product strategies for one 

program that would not otherwise be required by the other. We encourage NHTSA to consider 

other alternatives that may enable the agency to offset this difference between the GHG and 

CAFE programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 21]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the proposed EPA provision to allow credit carry forward beyond 5 years, such that 

any credits generated from model year 2010 through model year 2016 will be able to be used any 

time through model year 2021. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

The NPRM clearly states the agencies will allow for carry-back/carry-forward credits, as per 

their respective statutes’ stated limitations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, pp.9-10]

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Flexibility Mechanisms & Credits

NESCAUM supports EPA’s proposal to include flexibility mechanisms to provide manufacturers 

with the means to incorporate a range of technologies to meet the requirements of the proposed 

standards. Allowing credit transfers between a manufacturer’s passenger car and light truck fleet 

will likewise facilitate compliance without reducing the GHG benefits of the program, as do 
EPA Response to Comments

10-8

provisions for carry-forward and carry-back of generated credits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9476-A1, p. 2

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 72.]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Carry-forward and Carry-back Credits [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.9]

EPA and NHTSA propose to continue allowing credits earned by a manufacturer to be applied 

for a period of up to five model years after the model year in which they were earned. Further, 

the agencies propose to continue to offer the flexibility to 'borrow' credits up three years into the 

future to address potential compliance shortfalls in a given model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.9]

These 5-year 'carry-forward' and 3-year 'carry-back' provisions are subject to certain adjustments 

and limits which differ between NHTSA's CAFE regulations and EPA's GHG regulations. 

Toyota supports the 5-year carry-forward and 3-year carry-back proposals. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9586-A1, p.10]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

3.3. FIVE YEAR DEBIT CARRY-BACK

Volkswagen proposes that EPA and NHTSA amend the NPRM to provide for 5 year carry back 

of debits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 28]

Response:

EPA is retaining the credit carry-forward and carry-back credit provisions as proposed. 

Section III.B.4 of the preamble provides EPA’s response to the comments regarding credit carryforward, including both the one-time credit carry-forward of MY 2010-2016 credit to MY 2021, 

VW’s comment regarding five year credit carry-back, and Center for Biological Diversity 

comments regarding unlimited credit transfers in EPA’s program. In addition to the discussion 

in the preamble, we add the following in response to the comments of the Center for Biological 

Diversity. The ABT program does not create a “credit loophole”, as CBD would have it, but 

provides needed flexibility and lead time allowing EPA to adopt standards which are more 

stringent than otherwise would be possible, and reasonably encourages earlier introduction of 

control technology into the fleet. See 76 FR 57127-129. When credits generated under that 

program are carried forward to later model years, the carry forward reflects real-world emission 

reductions, not perpetuation of a loophole. The commenter also argues that, because the Clean 

Air Act is silent on the issue of credit carry forward, the GHG rules cannot extend that period 

beyond what is allowed under EISA. The argument that EPA’s Clean Air Act authority is 

constrained by EPCA/EISA was rejected by the Supreme Court in State of Massachusetts v. 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-9

EPA, 549 U.S. at 531-32, and more recently by the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible 

Regulation v. EPA. See No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012) slip op. pp. 41-42.

10.1.2. Credit Transfers between Cars and Trucks and Credit Trading 

between Manufacturers

Organizations Included in this Section

Ferrari

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Tesla Motors, Inc.

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: Ferrari

We think that there should not be a cap in the amount of credit transferred or traded, in order to 

give manufacturers the greatest flexibility to comply with the CAFE standards and to harmonize 

with the corresponding EPA GHG credit provisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.15]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG also supports the overall structure of the attribute-based program and the provisions for 

transferring and trading credits. [This comment can also be found in section 2.1 of this comment 

summary.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]

DAG supports allowing credits for Class 2b vehicles earned in the medium duty program to be 

applied in the light duty truck programs as well. The medium duty category is similar in 

approach to the light duty program, utilizes similar testing methodology and requires significant 

achievement to reach the requirements. The similarities between the programs support allowing 

for the flexibility of trading credits between them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 3]

Credits for Class 2b Medium Duty Trucks and Vans

EPA and NHTSA recently established new programs aimed at reducing GHG emissions from 

medium and heavy duty trucks and van. The program covers MYs 2014-2018. NHTSA's 

standards are voluntary for MYs 2014-2015, but NHTSA has indicated that it will begin tracking 

credits when a manufacturer opts into the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A16]

The agencies purposely structured the medium/heavy duty truck and van program to be akin to 

the light duty program. The program is attribute based with the standards set pursuant to a 

mathematical function. While the agencies added elements to the footprint based attribute to 

account for the functionality of these vehicles, the agencies also made clear that the measured 

performance values for CO2 will generally be equivalent to fuel consumption. The compliance 
EPA Response to Comments

10-10

with the light duty and medium duty standards will be measured through similar dynamometer 

testing. Indeed, the same engine and after treatment technologies that will be used to comply 

with the Class 2b vehicles in the medium duty program will also be used to comply with the light 

truck program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-16]

DAG considers the standards established for medium duty trucks and vans to be challenging and 

aggressive. For example, as shown in the illustration below, compliance will require that many 6 

cylinder diesel engines be downsized to 4 cylinder diesel engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9483-A1, p. A-16]

There is ample legal authority to apply medium duty truck and van credits within the light duty 

programs. EPA has broad discretion under the Clean Air Act to structure programs to ensure that 

it promotes public health and welfare with cost-effective technology feasibly applied. The 

agency has often created Average, Banking and Trading (ABT) programs as part of its emissions 

regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-17]

In the medium and heavy duty rule, the agencies effectively created three separate programs: 

One for tractor/trailers; one for vocational vehicles; and one for medium and heavy duty trucks 

and vans. The former two programs are similar and involve vehicles where emissions regulation 

has in the past been focused exclusively on engines. In those programs, EPA designed a 

computer model to generate data relating to the vehicle-portion of those regulations. The latter 

program, on the other hand, is vehicle based - just as with the light duty GHG program - and in 

fact involves vehicles in the same weight range but subject to different use. Vehicles that meet 

certain criteria designed to identify 'work trucks' are placed within the medium duty truck and 

van program; while vehicles meeting certain criteria designed to identify 'medium duty 

passenger vehicles' are placed within the light duty program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-

A1, p. A-17]

The agency initially proposed to restrict each ABT program to its own category within the heavy 

duty rule, but in the final rule relaxed this restriction and instead defined three heavy duty 

averaging sets and decided to allow credits to be used within those averaging sets. The first set of 

Light Heavy Duty vehicles is comprised of trucks within Classes 2b-5. While the agency stated 

in that rule that credits could be transferred across the heavy duty averaging sets but not between 

the heavy duty groupings and light trucks, we believe the agency should reconsider that 

statement as applied to Class 2b vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-17]

Allowing credit transfers in this Class between the light duty and light heavy duty vehicle fleets 

is consistent with the agency's general structure to treat like vehicles alike. The basic programs 

categorize vehicles by general type, construction and use. The ABT program recognizes that 

similarly weighted vehicles are likely to utilize the same engine and after-treatment technologies 

to reach and exceed compliance. EPA established a system whereby similar vehicles using 

similar technologies could share credits across the various programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9483-A1, p. A-17]

The same reason allowing credits earned on Class 2b vehicles to be applied within other heavy 

duty categories applies even more strongly with regard to the light duty fleet. Many vehicles 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-11

within the light duty fleet are essentially the same or similar to many of the Class 2b vehicles -

they are either 'work trucks' or 'medium duty passenger vehicles' depending on their particular 

configuration. The same engine, transmission and after-treatment technology will be applied to 

Class 2b vehicles, whether they are in the light duty or the medium and heavy duty 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-17]

Nothing in the Clean Air Act prohibits the agency from using its discretion to harmonize and 

promote its greenhouse gas program across similar vehicles and to promote more broadly the 

application of emissions reducing technology. The agency should exercise this discretion in a 

limited fashion to allow credits earned on Class 2b vehicles in the medium truck and van 

program to be applied in the light duty program as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 

A-17]

NHTSA also has the legal authority to apply credits developed in its Medium and Heavy Duty 

Fuel Consumption Program. As noted above, although NHTSA's program is voluntary for MYs 

2014-2015, the agency has made clear that it will begin to track credits beginning with a 

company's decision to opt into the program. Although the legislation mandating NHTSA's 

program did not expressly authorize a credit program, NHTSA nonetheless exercised its 

discretion to adopt one and to remain harmonious with the EPA program. NHTSA also noted in 

the medium and heavy duty fuel consumption program that it has considerably more leeway 

within the medium and heavy duty program to establish flexibilities and to include consideration 

of credits within its standard setting than it does under the light duty program. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9483-A1, pp. A-17-A-18]

The fact that EPCA's credit provisions at 49 U.S.C. § 32903 do not expressly refer to credits 

earned in the fuel consumption program promulgated under § 32022(k) does not preclude 

NHTSA from exercising this authority. Applying the credits for Class 2b vehicles in the medium 

duty program to the light duty program is an extension of the same discretion that led and 

authorized NHTSA to develop the medium duty credit program initially. NHTSA has long 

construed the EPCA provisions to be limitations on its authority rather than restrictive contours 

of its authority. NHTSA should use this same authority to extend the credits in a limited fashion, 

and along the same lines as EPA, to allow credits generated on Class 2b medium duty trucks and 

vans to be applied in the light duty CAFE program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A18]

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Allowing credit transfers between a manufacturer’s passenger car and light truck fleet will 

likewise facilitate compliance without reducing the GHG benefits of the program [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 72.]

Organization: Tesla Motors, Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

10-12

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 94.]

We applaud the use of inter-tradability of credits. They support very critically the rollout of firstgeneration technology.

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The proposal also contains limits on credit trading and transfers that prohibit the use of trading 

and transfers to satisfy the alternative minimum standard for domestically produced passenger 

cars. This accurately and effectively implements the provisions Congress included in EISA. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.2]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

The transfer of credits is unlimited under EPA’s GHG program. Volkswagen recognizes that the 

transfer from trucks to cars is limited under NHTSA’s CAFE program. However, there is no 

limit for transfer within the truck compliance fleet, meaning unlimited transfer from larger trucks 

to smaller trucks or SUVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 25]

In light of this, Volkswagen is proposing:

Any credits earned by larger trucks and full-size pick-ups due to either the reduced stringency 8 

or the unique full-size truck credit program should remain available only amongst large trucks 

and not be transferable or bankable for use in other segments or compliance fleets. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 27]

Volkswagen expects no reasonable protest from stakeholders to limiting transferability since 

according to EPA’s prediction there would be no need to transfer credits away from noncompliant or debit stricken full-size trucks. Should stakeholders protest and claim that this 

somehow infringes on a flexibility that could be valuable to their future corporate compliance 

strategy, Volkswagen would then suggest that EPA reconsider the expected burden on full-size 

trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 27]

An alternative would be to provide lower annual reduction percentages and 'game-changing' 

credits available to a broader range of vehicles, including other trucks and even passenger cars. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 27]

[See Figure 3-1 on p. 28 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1]

Volkswagen suggests the agency consider a broader range of vehicle capabilities which may 

require additional flexibility in establishing an achievable standard such as cargo volume, seating 

capacity, off-road or all-weather capability, or any other attribute which may preclude the 

adoption of certain fuel saving technologies. This is equally true for trucks of all sizes, minivans, 

and even some passenger cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 28]
Additional EPA Program Elements

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8 Credits earned from the reduced percent stringency relative to what the larger trucks target 

would have been had it been subjected to the fleetwide truck percent reduction for that model 

year.

Response:

While EPA agrees with DAG that transfers between heavy-duty vehicles and light-duty 

vehicles is not precluded by the CAA, EPA does not agree that such trading should be allowed 

at this time. Section III.B.4 of the preamble addresses DAG comments regarding the use of 

heavy-duty vehicle GHG credits in the light-duty vehicle program. In addition, we note that 

DAG further refined its comments in a meeting with EPA Staff on July 18, 2012. The company 

further suggested that a medium heavy duty engine could generate credits which could be used in 

the light duty sector if a 4 cylinder engine is used which engine is also used in light duty 

applications and the total amount of credits is capped. For the reasons stated in preamble section 

III.B.4, this comment still remains outside the scope of the proposal. Among other things, acting 

on it would necessitate amending the heavy duty GHG standards, which allow averaging only 

between specified averaging sets. There was no notice that the agencies might amend the heavy 

duty GHG standards as part of this rulemaking. 

EPA does not agree with VW’s comments that transfers of truck credits to the passenger 

car category should be restricted. VW’s comments regarding truck credits are addressed in 

Section II.F.3 of the preamble and also III.D.6 where the credits program is discussed in the 

context of the stringency of the truck standards.

10.1.3. Over Compliance Credits for Use in the California ZEV Program

Organizations Included in this Section

Chrysler Group LLC

Hyundai America Technical Center

Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

Chrysler also provides comment on California’s 2017-2021MY ZEV Program greenhouse gas 

over-compliance credit provision, the sales projections utilized by the agencies for this proposed 

rule, and treatment of diesel vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.6]

The California Air Resources Board (“ARB”) has approved new Zero Emission Vehicle 

(“ZEV”) regulations for MYs 2018-2021 that, when finalized, will include a provision providing 

that over-compliance with the federal GHG standards in the prior MY may be used to reduce a 

manufacturer’s ZEV obligation in the next MY (the “ZEV Over-Compliance Provision”). The 

proposed federal GHG program does not account for or address the potential impacts of the ZEV 

Over-Compliance Provision on the federal GHG standards. EPA should clarify that the ZEV 
EPA Response to Comments

10-14

Over-Compliance Provision interferes with the EPA standards and is preempted. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.20]

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides EPA with general authority to establish 

emissions standards for motor vehicles and engines. Section 202(a)(2) requires that the EPA 

standards take effect after such period as EPA finds necessary for the development and 

application of the requisite technology, considering cost of compliance within that period. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.20]

EPA has explained both in the MY 2012-2016 rule and the proposal for MY 2017-2025 its 

approach to the statutory factors in setting standards under Section 202(a)(1). In the MY 2017-

2025 proposal, EPA identifies the relevant factors, including availability of technology, cost 

(including impacts on the industry and consumers), energy impacts, and safety. See 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 74,901, 74,903 and 74,905 (MY 2017- 2025 proposal preamble). In both the MY 2012-2016 

final rule and the MY 2017-25 proposal, EPA expressed confidence that the standards at issue 

strike a reasonable balance considering these factors. For MY 2012-16, EPA explained that it 

adopted standards it considers feasible and that “there are compelling reasons not to adopt more 

stringent standards, based on reasonable weight of the statutory factors, including available 

technology, its cost, and the lead time necessary to permit its development and application.” 75 

Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,468 (May 7, 2010). In the MY 2017-25 proposal, EPA explained that it is 

“confident that the standards are an appropriate balance of the factors to consider under section 

202(a).” 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,975. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.20]

Chrysler agrees that the proposed standards strike an appropriate balance of the statutory factors 

as described by EPA in the preamble to the proposal. However, California’s ZEV OverCompliance Provision will make the national standards more difficult to achieve. This is because 

National Program greenhouse gas credits used to reduce ZEV obligations would have to be 

retired,33 and accordingly not be available to offset manufacturer-specific under-compliance in 

the federal program.34 As a result, we would expect overall GHG emissions necessarily to be 

lower (more stringent) than that which would occur absent the California ZEV Over-Compliance 

Provision. Removing over-compliance credits from the federal GHG program makes those 

credits unavailable in the federal GHG “emissions credit market” for automaker’s use in 

complying with the federal standards. This diversion of federal GHG over-compliance credits for 

another purpose makes compliance more difficult because there are fewer credits to use, 

effectively increasing the stringency of the federal GHG standards. As a result, California’s 

2018-2025 MY ZEV Program standards, as promulgated with the ZEV Over-Compliance 

Provision, do impose an additional burden on manufacturers, not accounted for in the balance of 

relevant statutory factors EPA struck to support the federal MY 2017-25 GHG standards. In 

short, the California ZEV Over-Compliance Provision disturbs EPA’s careful balance in setting 

the federal standards, and indeed interferes with that balance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-

A1, pp.20-21]

EPA should address in this rulemaking the effect of the California ZEV Over-compliance 

Provision. Because the EPA standards as proposed, (which Chrysler supports, subject to the 

comments herein), strike an appropriate balance of the statutory factors under Section 202(a), 

EPA should explain that in doing so EPA is effectively precluding the validity of California’s 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-15

ZEV Over-Compliance Provision. Specifically, the California ZEV Program, as revised to add 

this provision, would be preempted under Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act unless granted a 

waiver (or found to be within the scope of an existing waiver) under Section 209(b). Section 

209(b) specifies that no such waiver shall be granted if California’s standards “are not consistent 

with section [202(a)].” The California standards, if revised in final to include the ZEV OverCompliance Provision, would impose an additional burden on standards that EPA already set at a 

level that is appropriate based on the statutory factors under Section 202(a). Accordingly, such 

California standards would interfere and be inconsistent with the federal standards. Thus, EPA 

may not grant a waiver to a California program that contains this component, and the California 

program with that component would remain preempted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, 

p.21]

Were EPA not to conclude that the California Over-Compliance Provision is preempted, EPA 

would theoretically have to relax the federal standards once California adopts its provision to 

apply to the 2017- 2025 federal program, to account for the effective increase in stringency that 

California’s provision would cause. In this manner, EPA might theoretically take into account 

the California provision in setting standards and thereby re-strikes the balance of the Section 

202(a) factors. Chrysler doubts this approach would be lawful, however. In determining its 

proposed standards, EPA did not identify California’s ZEV Over-Compliance Provision as a 

relevant statutory factor. Section 202(a) (and indeed none of the Section 202 provisions), identify 

California regulations as a relevant statutory factor in setting federal standards. 35 We are not 

aware of any time that EPA has set standards under Section 202(a) to account for the impact of 

such a California provision that so directly affects the stringency of the federal program. EPA 

should make clear that the interference that California would cause through its provision is 

preempted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.21]

The impact of California’s proposal should not be underestimated, as the ARB anticipates 

manufacturers accounting for sales up to 50 percent of total California sales to utilize the ZEV 

Over-Compliance Provision. Chrysler reiterates its support of a single national GHG program 

and encourages the EPA to take into account the potential impact of California’s ZEV overcompliance provision and deny any waiver request made by California for its ZEV Program 

insofar as it contains the ZEV Over-Compliance Provision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-

A1, p.21]

33 In addition, by allowing manufacturers to substitute federal GHG program over-compliance 

for compliance with the ZEV program, California would effectively be foregoing a portion of the 

environmental benefits upon which their Clean Air Act waiver for the ZEV Program is premised. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.20]

34 By modeling all light-duty vehicle manufacturers as a single fleet to establish the 2017-2025 

MY federal GHG standards, EPA has implicitly assumed that debits incurred by some companies 

unable to meet the standards would be satisfied by credits earned by other companies that overcomply with the standards. This implicit assumption is explicitly noted in the 2012-2016 

National Program, where in describing the feasibility of the final standards EPA notes that a 
EPA Response to Comments

10-16

company unable to meet the standard could comply by buying credits from another 

manufacturer. 75 Fed. Reg. 25463 (May 7, 2010) Similarly, EPA requires manufacturers to make 

good-faith efforts to purchase credits from other manufacturers prior to qualifying for temporary 

lead-time alternative standards (40 CFR 86.1818-12(e)(3)). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-

A1, p.20]

35 Chrysler further notes that if EPA were to identify the California ZEV Program as a relevant 

statutory factor, the ZEV Program requirements for manufacturers to build specific volumes of 

zero emission and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles would need to be included in EPA’s modeling 

of the technology penetration rates required to meet the National Program standards, thereby 

increasing the costs associated with the National Program with no additional environmental 

benefit. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.21]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 173.]

The California Air Resources Board is proposing to allow those OEMs to offset part of the zero 

emission vehicle mandate for a limited time through over-compliance in challenging 

GHG/CAFE standards.

Organization: Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc. (MRDA)

Mitsubishi Motors proposes that GHG credits should be available to those manufacturers who 

over-comply with the California ZEV Mandate on a NATIONAL BASIS. Mitsubishi Motors 

supports compliance with one harmonized national fuel economy and GHG program. However, 

Mitsubishi Motors must also plan to comply with the ZEV mandate. National and California 

programs regulating vehicle GHG emissions reflect overlapping standards upon a manufacturer’s 

single ZEV fleet. In recognition of these overlapping programs and OEMs’ efforts to deploy 

capital-intensive ZEVs, California allows manufacturers to earn ZEV credits by over-compliance 

with EPA’s GHG standard starting in MY 2018. Similarly, in order to be consistent with the CA 

ZEV Mandate, Mitsubishi Motors recommends that EPA allow manufacturers to gain credits by 

over-compliance with the California ZEV mandate nationwide starting in MY 2018. The midterm evaluation also offers an opportunity for EPA to consider an option to offer manufacturers, 

who demonstrate plans to over-comply with the ZEV Mandate for the entire MY 2022 through 

2025 timeframe, a 2 grams per mile GHG credit. This will allow manufacturers to keep their 

conventional technology fleets in compliance, while introducing and selling advanced ZEV 

technologies nationally. Mitsubishi Motors’ proposal will contribute to reducing GHG emissions 

while providing customers reasonably-priced vehicle choices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9507-

A1, p.5]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 139.]
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-17

This is why policies like California's Zero-Emission Vehicle program are an important 

complement to the proposed greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards being discussed here 

today. The Zero-Emission Vehicle program helps ensure that investments in research, 

development and deployment of advanced vehicle technologies continue.

Response:

In response to Chrysler’s comments, issues of whether a California state provision should 

be preempted are not part of this proceeding, and EPA therefore declines to address this 

comment here. The commenter may resubmit this comment if and when the issue should be 

presented directly to EPA, potentially in a request by the State of California for a waiver 

pursuant to section 209 (b) or in some other direct context. EPA disagrees with Chrysler’s 

assertion that the feasibility of the standards hinge on the availability of credits through banking 

or trading. EPA has shown that the standards being finalized are feasible at reasonable cost 

without assuming carry-forward of banked credits or credit trading between manufacturers. See 

discussion in preamble III.D.6 and RIA Chapter 3 footnote 2. Further, EPA’s requirement that 

SVMs make a good faith effort to seek out credits as part of the MY 2012-2016 SVM exemption 

eligibility provisions does not require SVMs to buy credits unless they are reasonably available 

from other manufacturers. If EPA determines that the SVM has made a good faith effort to 

purchase credit but that credits are not available, the SVM is exempt from meeting CO2

standards with no obligation to purchase credits.

In response to Mitsubishi’s comments regarding additional credits for over-compliance 

with the California ZEV program, EPA is already adopting multiplier incentives for PHEVs, 

EVs and FCVs which we believe are appropriate (see preamble section III.C.2.c.ii). EPA does 

not believe that it is necessary at this time to introduce an additional type of credit for these 

vehicles or tie the availability of incentives for these vehicles to a manufacturer’s performance in 

the California ZEV program. Also, EPA did not seek comments on using over compliance with 

the ZEV program as the basis for an EPA GHG credit. Mitsubishi comments that California 

allows manufacturers to earn ZEV credits by over-compliance with EPA’s GHG standard 

starting in MY 2018, and in order to be consistent with the CA ZEV Mandate, EPA should allow 

manufacturers to gain credits by over-compliance with the California ZEV mandate nationwide 

starting in MY 2018. EPA does not agree that this type of credit is a matter of making the 

programs consistent. The California provision to allow GHG credits to be used in the ZEV 

program would presumably reduce the number of ZEVs that a manufacturer would be required to 

produce. The commenter does not explain how a 2 g/mile credit for ZEV over compliance is 

needed to make the two programs consistent. The commenter also does not offer a basis for why 

2 g/mile is an appropriate credit. Further, the California ZEV provision is limited and only 

available for essentially the same model years as the EPA multiplier incentives for these 

vehicles. Manufacturers will already be effectively receiving credits under the EPA program for 

the same types of vehicles covered by the ZEV program, as noted above. EPA believes the 

additional credit suggested by the commenter would be redundant and is unnecessary. 
EPA Response to Comments

10-18

10.2. Nitrous Oxide (N2O) and Methane (CH4) Standard

10.2.1. Flexibility for Compliance with N2O and CH4 Standard

Organizations Included in this Section

America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers

BMW of North America, LLC

Ferrari

General Motors Company

Toyota Motor North America

VNG Co. (VNG)

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

CO2-Equivalent Option

AGA and ANGA support EPA’s decision, first announced in the preamble to the Heavy Duty 

Rule (76 FR 57123) to include the CO2 -Equivalent Option as part of the light-duty regulations 

through MY 2016, to allow for the Option to be used on a test-group basis instead of having to 

apply a manufacturer’s entire fleet. EPA should now extend the Option through MY 2025, and 

continue the policy of allowing CO2 -equivalent compliance on a test-group basis, which would 

enable manufacturers who offer NGVs to avoid requiring all of their vehicles to be subject to the 

CO2-Equivalent Option. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 8]

However, if the agency adopts its proposal to require that the Option be applied to a 

manufacturer’s entire fleet, we support EPA’s additional proposal to include an offsetting 

“equivalence option adjustment factor”, so that “manufacturers do not have to offset the typical 

N2O and CH4 vehicle emissions, while holding manufacturers responsible for higher than 

average N2O and CH4 emissions levels.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, pp. 8-9]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

With regard to the standards for nitrous oxide and methane, we support the credit-based 

compliance option for the nitrous oxide and methane standards, as well as the new “upward 

adjustment” approach to allow these emissions to be included with carbon dioxide emissions. 

However, we see no need for the limitation on the use of methodologies under 40 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 86.1818-12(f) for nitrous oxide and methane, finalized under 

the MYs 2012-2016 standards and carried over for MYs 2017-2025. We would like to see an 

allowance to use different compliance options for methane and/or nitrous oxide and also for 

passenger car and light truck fleets in the same model year, without the need for prior EPA 

approval. This restriction limits manufacturers’ compliance options but with no clear 

environmental benefit. We urge EPA to eliminate this restriction in the final rule. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, pp. 2-3]
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-19

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 67.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 51.]

We also support the credit-based compliance option for methane and nitrous oxide standards, as 

well as the new upward adjustment approach to allow these standards to be included with carbon 

dioxide emissions. However, we would like to see more flexible -- more flexible compliance 

options and will be addressing that in more detail in our written comments.

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

BMW supports the option to convert measured N2O and CH4 emissions that are above the 

applicable standards into CO2 -equivalent emissions for compliance purposes. The calculation of 

emission debits on this basis allows them to be offset by other GHG reduction measures. While 

leading to the same overall GHG reduction impact, this option provides flexibility and still gives 

an incentive to further work on the reduction of N2O and CH4 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 4]

Organization: Ferrari

We agree with the option proposed by EPA in this rulemaking to use CO2 credits to comply with 

the CH4 and N2O standards, because this measure is consistent with the compliance option to add 

these emissions to those of CO2 (instead to meet specific standards), and increases the flexibility 

to comply. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

Organization: General Motors Company

In the NPRM, EPA requests comments on “establishing an adjustment to the CO2 - equivalent 

standard for manufacturers selecting the CO2 -equivalent option established in the model year 

2012–2016 rulemaking.” (p. 74993). GM disagrees with establishing a blanket adjustment to the 

CO2 -equivalent standard. EPA has gone to great lengths to establish CO2 emission targets based 

on individual manufacturer fleets. Using the average value of all passenger cars and light trucks 

to establish an adjustment factor will inherently and unduly lessen the stringency for some 

manufacturers while increasing the stringency for others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, 

p. 5]

In order to appropriately incorporate a CO2 -equivalent approach into the standard, EPA would 

have to return to the baseline data and develop CO2 target value equations based on CO2 -

equivalent data. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 5]

A second approach would be to modify the CO2 -equivalent equations instead of adjusting the 

CO2 standard. Under the current regulations, if a manufacturer meets the N2O and CH4 emission 

standards, they are not required to include N2O or CH4 emissions in their carbon related exhaust 

emission (CREE) calculations (i.e., the impact of N2O and CH4 emissions on the CREE value is 
EPA Response to Comments

10-20

zero). If a manufacturer chooses the option to use the CO2 -equivalent CREE equations, it has to 

include all CH4 and N2O emissions which would result in an increase of up to approximately 3 

g/mile for vehicles that would have otherwise been able to meet the N2O and CH4 emission 

standards. So, in order to make the CO2 -equivalent option more appealing, EPA would have to 

modify the CO2 -equivalent equations in such a fashion as to not penalize a manufacturer for 

meeting the current CH4 and N2O emission standards while still including a mechanism that 

would allow a manufacturer to account for exceedances of the standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9465-A1, p. 5]

What follows is a suggested modified equation for EPA to consider:

Change the CREE equation from:

CREE = [(CWF/0.273)xNMHC]+(1.571xCO)+CO2 +(298xN2O)+(25xCH4)

To:

CREE = [(CWF/0.273)xNMHC]+(1.571xCO)+CO2 +[298x(N2O-0.010)]+[25x(CH4-0.030)]

And:

Include requirements that negative values for N2O or CH4 contribution shall be set to zero. (An 

allowance would have to be made such that manufacturers could set N2O equal to 0.010 until a 

practical and accurate method of measuring N2O is established.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9465-A1, p. 5]

By subtracting the N2O and CH4 emission standards from their respective emission values and 

setting any negative result to zero, the manufacturer would be required to account for emissions 

in exceedance of the standards and would not benefit from performing at levels lower than the 

emission standards (does not affect the stringency of the fleet-average standard). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Standards and Flexibility - As part of the recently completed heavy-duty GHG rulemaking, EPA 

finalized provisions allowing manufacturers to use CO2 credits, on a CO2- equivalent basis, to 

meet the light-duty N2O and CH4 standards. Toyota appreciates, having the option of using CO2

credits to meet N2O and CH4 standards on a test group basis as needed for 2012-2016 model 

years and supports EPA's current proposal to extend this flexibility through the 2025 model year. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.22]

Organization: VNG Co. (VNG)

Recently-revised alternative compliance options for the methane standard are extended and made 

permanent by this NPRM, which will benefit NGVs whose slightly elevated methane emissions 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-21

compared to gasoline vehicles are more than outweighed by reductions in CO2 emissions. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 6]

Methane Standard Compliance Flexibility

VNG strongly supports the Agencies' decision to allow automakers the same flexible options for 

meeting methane (CH4) standards for light-duty vehicles as are now allowed for heavy-duty 

vehicles. Under these flexible rules, automakers and conversion manufacturers may convert CO2

over-compliance into CO2 equivalents of CH4 (or N2O) that can be used to facilitate compliance 

with these standards. As it is the total global warming potential ('GWP') of all GHGs that is 

important, and not the emissions of any specific pollutant, this flexibility is appropriate and in 

line with EPA's regulatory goal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 10]

This flexibility may be useful for manufacturers of NGVs, particularly converters that will be 

important in developing the market in the early years. Because small quantities of unburned 

natural gas from NGV engines may be emitted as methane, NGVs may have slightly higher 

emissions of this GHG than petroleum-fueled ICE vehicles. However, due to much greater 

reductions of CO2 emissions, NGVs still yield net GHG emission reductions of approximately 24 

percent. These flexible compliance rules will ensure that net GHG reductions are accounted for 

properly, and automakers are not penalized so long as slight increases in methane emissions are 

offset by CO2 over-compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7941-A2, p. 10]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

EPA seeks comment in the NPRM regarding additional flexibility when complying with the N2O 

standards. Volkswagen supports EPA’s proposal to allow the option of using CO2 credits to 

comply with the N2O standards and Volkswagen also supports the option of meeting these 

standards on a test group basis. Furthermore, Volkswagen supports the NPRM proposal to 

extend theses options through all models years of the regulation beyond 2016. Volkswagen also 

supports the concept of an adjustment factor to the CO2 equivalent standard for manufacturers 

selecting the CO2 equivalent option the pathway to compliance with both CH4 and N2O. 

Volkswagen pledges to work with EPA in the future to generate the proper data such that an 

appropriate adjustment factor can be determined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 34]

Response:

EPA received only supportive comments regarding the proposal to permanently allow 

CO2 credits to be used on a CO2-equivalent basis to meet the CH4 and N2O standards and EPA is 

finalizing this provision as proposed. EPA concurs that this provision provides an important 

flexibility to manufacturers while not undermining the overall GHG reductions of the program. 

Additional discussion regarding CO2-equivalent options and comments, including GM’s 

comments, is provided in preamble section III.B.9.a.

10.2.2. N2O Measurement and Compliance Statement Option

Organizations Included in this Section
EPA Response to Comments

10-22

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Ferrari

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Hyundai America Technical Center

Kia Motors

Toyota Motor North America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Additional time is needed for development of a method for measuring nitrous oxide (N2O). EPA 

has recognized the difficulties and complexities of evaluating, procuring and installing the 

equipment that would be needed to measure N2O. But, as our comments explain, EPA still has 

not provided sufficient time for manufacturers to incorporate accurate and robust N2O 

measurement capabilities into their test sites. The deadline for measuring N2O should be 

extended until the N2O measurement issues are resolved, and N2O measurement capabilities 

should be reevaluated during the mid-term and interim evaluations. By so doing, EPA would be 

providing manufacturers with sufficient time to evaluate appropriate test equipment and would 

be aligning possible N2O regulatory changes with possible subsequent changes to other lightduty GHG regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.5]

Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Measurement [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.71]

EPA has recognized the difficulties and complexities of evaluating, procuring and installing the 

equipment that would be needed to measure N2O and has proposed that manufacturers be 

permitted to use compliance statements in lieu of test data through MY 2016. However, as 

explained below, EPA has not provided sufficient time for manufacturers to incorporate accurate 

and robust N2O measurement capabilities into their test sites. We propose that the deadline for 

measuring N2O be extended until the measurement issues are resolved. The N2O measurement

capabilities should be reevaluated during both the mid-term evaluation of standards and the 

“check-ins” occurring prior to the mid-term. By so doing, EPA would be providing 

manufacturers sufficient time to evaluate appropriate test equipment and would be aligning 

possible N2O regulatory changes with possible subsequent changes to other light duty GHG 

regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.71]

The first issue with regard to N2O measurement timing is that there is currently no accurate 

measurement technology available that is suitable for high-volume testing. As one example, the 

gas chromatograph electron capture detector (GC-ECD) is not suitable for high-volume testing 

since it includes an off-line multi-hour long analysis and has robustness issues. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.71]

EPA provided a technical study of the capabilities of currently available and potentially available 

future measurement technologies as a separate memorandum to the docket. The study compares 

instruments by analyzing ambient air and diluted vehicle exhaust samples on a number of 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-23

different vehicles and schedules (FTP and HFET). The EPA technical study highlights the 

continuing difficulties of the currently available measurement technologies to accurately measure 

N2O. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.71]

In the study, EPA compared the Fourier Transform Infrared Spectrometer (FTIR) to the GCECD and concluded that the “FTIR compared very well to GC-ECD, which is considered the 

gold standard,” but the accompanying data actually demonstrates the opposite. The data shows 

significant differences and variability between these two instruments on the order of 

approximately -17 to +25 ppb N2O equivalent for ambient air analysis and approximately -27 to 

+85 ppb N2O equivalent for vehicle exhaust testing. These differences represent a significant 

error at an N2O standard level of 0.010 g/mi. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.71]

In addition, in comparing the FTIR to the Non-Dispersive Infrared (NDIR) analyzer, the study 

states “Both the NDIR and FTIR analyzers performed well, however some questions regarding 

performance remain.” The accompanying data, however, shows significant interferences with 

both analyzers, results which are similar to those of the previously supplied Alliance Technical 

Study (June 2011). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.71]

The study also highlights a potentially promising new N2O measurement technology that is 

based on laser spectroscopy and is made by a few manufacturers. However, N2O analysis is so 

new that most of these instruments are still in the development stages and hence are prototypes. 

Although these instruments show promise for N2O analysis, questions remain as to their 

accuracy and robustness (i.e., reliability) at such low N2O standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.72]

The study contains evaluations of two such laser instruments based on simulated exhaust gas 

(water, carbon monoxide (CO), CO2 and N2O). In comparison to NDIR and FTIR, the data for 

the first laser instrument shows interference errors that were typically lower, ranging from -29 to 

+10 ppb N2O equivalent. Although the errors appear to be reduced, they still represent a 

significant portion of the 10 mg/mi N2O standard. CO and CO2 measurements were likewise 

affected by interference gases but in the opposite direction, i.e., higher levels than that observed 

with N2O. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.72]

For the first laser instrument the study concludes that the instrument “...performed very well and 

does not appear to show any susceptibility to CO, CO2, or water interference...” and “Based on 

CO and CO2 measurement error, we believe that the bulk of the associated N2O measurement 

error is due to bag blending error.” It would seem that if the N2O errors were due to gas blending 

errors, then CO and CO2 would be likewise affected, but the data generally shows an 

underreporting of N2O and an over reporting of CO and CO2. Looking at this limited data, the 

Alliance believes that although the instrument shows promise, it still demonstrates significant 

measurement errors which have not yet been accounted for. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.72]

The second laser instrument evaluation showed similar N2O measurement errors in the presence 

of interference gases but this was attributed to “...the inability to properly zero/span the 

instrument after the initial zero/span at the start of the testing.” In the conclusions it is stated that 
EPA Response to Comments

10-24

“EPA intends to re-evaluate this instrument after the manufacturer has resolved issues...” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.72]

Suffice it to say that until more studies are conducted by multiple facilities, including correlation 

vehicle testing between facilities, the true accuracy of laser based instruments is still to be 

determined. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.72]

The second issue with regard to N2O measurement is emission development and certification 

timing. Taking all things into account, we estimate that it will take approximately 4.5 years to 

properly install a new N2O analyzer into a single test site. Below is a graphical representation of 

the estimated timeline for instrument procurement and installation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.72] [For the 'graphical representation', please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.73]

Included in the above graph are the generic timelines for emission development and certification 

for the individual model years. We estimate that the first test site with N2O measurement 

capabilities would not be available until midway through the emission development process for 

MY 2019. We estimate that the earliest that a manufacturer could certify a limited portion of its 

product line with measured N2O data would be mid-MY 2019. Please note that a manufacturer’s 

ability to certify in MY 2019 will still be limited by the number of available test sites (i.e., it 

would be impossible to certify a full-line manufacturer’s entire product line in the MY 2019 

utilizing only one test site). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.74] [For the 'graph', please 

refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.73]

N2O Data [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.74]

EPA has requested “...city and highway cycle N2O data on current Tier 2 vehicles...” 1 

However, supplying N2O data will not be possible at this time due to lack of accurate and robust 

N2O measurement instrumentation and insufficient lead time to install this instrumentation into 

certification quality test laboratories. As mentioned above, it will take several years to get even 

rudimentary measurement capability that is proven to be both accurate and robust. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.74]

N2O Certification [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.74]

In paragraphs 40 CFR §86.1823-08(m)(2)(iii) and §86.1829-01(b)(1)(iii)(G) of the proposed 

rule, EPA proposes the extension of the use of alternative N2O deterioration factors (DF’s) and 

N2O compliance statements, respectively, through the MY 2016. While the Alliance appreciates 

the extension of these deadlines, setting these deadlines is essentially precluding a manufacturer 

from utilizing the concept of carryover which is critical to the successful implementation of 

emission certification programs. Therefore, the Alliance recommends that the use of alternate 

N2O DFs and compliance statements be further extended and that the requirement to measure 

N2O only be applied to new emission certification programs that are implemented after the 

establishment of proper N2O measurement instrumentation and procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.74]
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-25

In order to balance emission testing burden and certification workload, manufacturers routinely 

“carryover” emission certification and durability data. Carryover essentially means that 

representative emission data that was generated in a previous model year is re-used in the new 

model year in lieu of repeating the same emission tests. Lacking certification quality N2O data in 

early model years means that the emission data will not be viable for carryover into a model year 

that requires actual N2O data. That means that all emission data generated during these years will 

not qualify for carryover into a model year for which actual N2O data is required. Therefore, 

assuming that N2O measurement capabilities are not available until the MY 2017, manufacturers 

would be forced to rerun all of their emission durability and certification testing in one model

year. This would be an unnecessary and unwarranted certification burden for that particular 

model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.74-75]

In-Use N2O [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.75]

Although EPA did not propose any changes to in-use testing requirements, the Alliance requests 

that EPA exclude N2O measurement and reporting from in-use testing (IUVP and IUCP) for all 

model years and test groups that certify to the N2O standards via a compliance statement. 

Because accurate N2O measurement technology is not readily available, manufacturers have 

been forced to rely on theoretical information and/or possibly inaccurate data in order to make 

N2O compliance statements. EPA should not hold the manufacturers accountable for measuring 

N2O utilizing a method that will have been established subsequent to certification, nor should 

EPA hold a manufacturer responsible for meeting a standard for which accurate measurement 

methods were not available at the time of certification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.75]

Heavy Duty N2O [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.75]

Although EPA has not proposed modifications to the heavy-duty GHG regulations, the Alliance 

requests that EPA also modify the heavy-duty GHG N2O measurement requirements to coincide 

with the timing of the light-duty requirements. Heavy-duty chassis GHG testing will be 

performed on the same test sites that are utilized by light-duty and will therefore have the same 

N2O measurement issues. Providing N2O measurement relief solely for the light-duty vehicles 

does not fully address the issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.75]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

With regard to the proposed requirement for testing to measure nitrous oxide emissions 

beginning in MY 2017, we urge EPA to reconsider the cost-effectiveness of this requirement. 

The quantity of these emissions is quite low, and we see no indication that they will become an 

important factor in climate change in the future. Testing for this substance will require expensive 

new analyzers, whose performance remains to be determined. We support the comment of one 

manufacturer at the Detroit public hearing, which noted that the proposed test method for nitrous 

oxides is neither proven nor developed and that the Non-Dispersive Infrared Analyzer (NDIR) 

and Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) bag analysis methods currently have repeatability, 

durability and/or practicality concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

10-26

We urge the agency to allow manufacturers to continue to demonstrate compliance using the preMY 2017 analysis-based methodology in 2017 and thereafter. EPA should monitor these 

emissions and the development of testing analyzers and adopt new test-based requirements in the 

future should the emissions grow in significance or when the testing technology is ready. For 

instance, it would be appropriate to review the testing technology as part of the mid-term review 

and then determine whether testing as part of the regulations should be finalized following the 

mid-term review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 3]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 67-68.]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 51-52.]

Organization: Ferrari

EPA intends to extend the ability for manufacturers to use compliance statements for N2O 

standard based on good engineering judgment in lieu of test data through MY 2016. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

It is fine, but we request EPA to delete the requirement to actually measure N2O emissions for 

the following reasons: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

The quantity of these emissions is quite low, and they should remain a minimal contribution over 

the total GHG inventory in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

The related burdens (laboratory update, testing, reporting) is relevant. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9535-A2, p.12]

There are some concerns on the accuracy of the measurement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-

A2, p.12]

At least small-volume manufacturers should be exempted to carry out the N2O measurement. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.12]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

As noted in the NPRM and support documents, EPA understands that N2O measurement 

complexity remains an important issue to be addressed for both 2012-2016 MY as well as 2017 

MY and beyond. Due to these measurement difficulties, EPA has granted some flexibilities 

through previous rulemakings and is now proposing to extend the timing for requiring N2O 

measurement to the 2017 MY. While Ford acknowledges these allowances, we do not believe 

they sufficiently address all of the concerns related to N2O. We agree with the Alliance 

comments that recommend that N2O measurement requirements be delayed until those 

measurement issues are fully resolved. A number of instruments have been studied with varying 

levels of success. Variability remains a key concern, but we believe that some of these 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-27

technologies show promise. However, much additional work remains to identify viable solutions, 

conduct correlation studies, and upgrade facilities for certification level testing. Until that time, 

there should be no requirement to measure N2O or comply with a standard that cannot be 

accurately assessed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 24]

Ford is in the process of collecting data to further evaluate the capability of N2O measurement 

technologies. Once that information is available, we will review it with EPA to provide 

additional basis for 2012 – 2016 MY interim containment actions and additional flexibilities on 

N2O requirements. Going forward, we look forward to continued data-driven dialogue with EPA 

to resolve the current manufacturer concerns with N2O compliance, beyond the allowances 

outlined in the current proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 25]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports the deferral for N2O measurement until MY2017. As mentioned in the Alliance 

comments, since additional time and evaluation are necessary to develop accurate and repeatable 

N2O measurement capabilities, we recommend that work continue expeditiously – and progress 

be evaluated as part of one of the mid-term review “check-ins.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9465-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

Testing for N2O [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.7]

EPA has proposed a new requirement to measure N2O emissions starting in MY 2017. Based on 

research we have conducted, Hyundai believes the measurement methods suggested by the 

agencies are not fully proven or developed, and are very expensive as they require new 

analyzers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.7]

Hyundai prefers a bag analysis method of measurement to minimize decreased testing 

throughput. The NDIR, FTIR and GC bag analysis methods for N2O currently have repeatability 

or practicality concerns. Therefore, while Hyundai supports the bag methodology for 

measurement, we recommend that the testing issue be revisited at such time when there is a 

proven, accurate and efficient means of measurement. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9547-A1, p.7]

Organization: Kia Motors

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 101.]

Sort of the technical side, based on research that we have conducted, Kia believes the methods 

suggested by the agencies for nitrous oxide which must be measured starting in 2013 are not 

fully proven and developed. Kia prefers the bag method analysis of measurement to minimize 

reduction of testing throughout. However, the NDIR and FTIR bag analysis methods currently 

have repeatability and practicality concerns. We support the measurement but recommend that it 

be revisited in a time when there is improved and accurate and more efficient means available.
EPA Response to Comments

10-28

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

N2O Measurement - Toyota remains concerned that EPA has not provided sufficient time for 

manufacturers to incorporate accurate and robust N2O measurement capabilities into their test 

sites. N2O measurement currently has no accurate measurement technology available that is 

suitable for high-volume testing at this time. Toyota fully supports the comments and 

recommendations submitted by the Alliance on this matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-

A1, p.22]

In the proposed regulation paragraphs 40 CFR §86.1823-08(m)(2)(iii) and §86.182901( 

b)(I)(iii)(G), EPA proposes to extend the use of alternative N2O deterioration factors (DF's) and 

N2O compliance statements, respectively, through the 2016 model year. Toyota appreciates 

EPA's consideration in extending these deadlines, and supports the Alliance recommendation 

that the use of alternate N2O DFs and compliance statements be further extended until the 

establishment of proper N2O measurement instrumentation and procedures. Furthermore, 

because accurate N2O measurement technology is not readily available, Toyota requests that 

EPA extend the N2O compliance statement beyond the 2016 model year, up until the 

establishment of proper N2O measurement instrumentation and procedures has been 

demonstrated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.22]

Due to the fact that accurate N2O measurement technology is not readily available, Toyota 

requests that EPA should exclude N2O measurement and reporting from in-use testing for all 

model years and test groups that certify to the N2O standards via a compliance statement. We 

support the Alliance comments on this matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.22]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

'EPA is also finalizing standards that will cap tailpipe nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) 

emissions at 0.010 and 0.030 grams per mile, respectively. Even after adjusting for the higher 

relative global warming potencies of these two compounds, nitrous oxide and methane emissions 

represent less than one percent of overall vehicle greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles. 

Accordingly, the goal of these two standards is to limit any potential increases of tailpipe 

emissions of these compounds in the future but not to force reductions relative to today's low 

levels.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 11]

In the final Rule, EPA focuses on four important aspects of N2O and CH4:

• EPA wants a cap

• N2O and CH4 are two strong GHG emissions

• EPA wants to ensure that N2O and CH4 do not increase as a consequence of the introduction of 

new technologies.

• N2O and CH4 represent less than 1% of the GHG gases from the vehicle [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9551-A2, p. 11]
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-29

To monitor these potent greenhouse gases against a given value is reasonable when it is not 

possible to predict the consequences that new technology can generate. However, it is a 

significant difference, via a statement providing a declaration of compliance in accordance with 

the standard instead of conducting a full certification and the subsequent protocol. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 11]

It also should be considered that, as noted above, N2O and CH4 represent only 1% of the guarded 

carbonaceous compounds that make up a manufacturer CREE value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9551-A2, p. 11]

Currently, there is no equipment on the market that can measure according to proper certifying 

standard, using 'bag measurement' for N2O with a relevant repeatability. During 2012-2013, new 

technology will be introduced to the market, but this technology is still in the research stage, and 

it would be premature to commit to its use as a certification tool at this time. VCC is concerned 

about technology readiness, instrument availability, measurement accuracy, and implementation 

lead time, including verifying that the instrument is robust enough for certification testing. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 11]

VCC would like to ask EPA, in collaboration with CARB, to consider continuing the practice 

used today (fulfillment of CAP through a written statement). VCC does not think manufacturers 

should have to certify N2O in accordance with procedures similar as those of Criteria Emission. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 11]

The above-required instrumentation to be able to measure N2O in certification facility (bag 

measurement) at the level of 10 mg/mi with a adequate accuracy, is not available on the market 

today. It will probably be possible to order it during 2012. After the order is completed, the 

installation process will take place somewhere in 2013 and method development will be initiated 

which will require some development work for 1-2 years at least. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9551-A2, pp. 11-12]

Response:

EPA is finalizing the additional lead-time for N2O testing essentially as proposed. In 

response to Alliance comments, EPA is temporarily (for MYs 2017 and 2018) allowing 

manufacturers to continue to use compliance statements for test groups certified using carry-over 

data. EPA is also clarifying, in response to Alliance comments, that manufacturers will not be 

required to conduct in-use testing for vehicle test groups certified using a compliance statement.

Section III.B.9.b of the preamble provides EPA’s response to the comments received regarding 

N2O measurement timing and issues. 

Ferrari commented that small volume manufacturers should not be required to measure 

N2O. Ferrari raises issues that are essentially the same as those raised by large volume 

manufacturers, which EPA has addressed in the preamble as noted above. Ferrari does not 

provide any rationale why the sales volume of a manufacturer would be relevant to the 

manufacturer’s ability to measure N2O with the lead time being provided. Also, EPA did not 

receive similar comments from manufacturers that are currently SVMs in the GHG program. 

EPA does not know of any reason, nor did Ferrari provide one, why SVMs, which are large 
EPA Response to Comments

10-30

companies with limited sales in the U.S., would not be able to measure N2O in the same timeframe as the large volume manufacturers and therefore is not differentiating between large and 

small volume manufacturers with regard to N2O measurement.

In response to Alliance comments regarding N2O testing for heavy-duty vehicles, EPA 

did not propose or request comment on heavy-duty vehicle issues in this rulemaking and 

therefore making changes to the heavy-duty vehicle requirements is beyond the scope of this 

rule. However, EPA understands the issue raised by the Alliance and plans to consider heavyduty vehicle N2O testing as part of a future action.

10.2.3. N2O and CH4 Standards Related Comments

Organizations Included in this Section

America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

Ferrari

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Organization: America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

Methane Global Warming Potential

Citing the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, EPA’s uses a Global Warming Potential (“GWP”) 

factor of 25 for the Proposed LD Rule’s methane emissions standards: “CH4 has a 100-year 

GWP of 25 according to the 2007 IPCC AR4.” 76 FR 74993, n.236. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9548-A1, p. 9]

However, while EPA uses the 25 GWP for mobile sources, the rest of EPA’s Office of Air and 

Radiation uses a GWP of 21 for stationary source methane emission standards. See, e.g., the 

Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 FR 

31519, 31522, June 3, 2010 (“CH4 has a GWP of 21”); PSD Permit Number PSD-TX-1244-

GHG, issued November 10, 2011 by EPA Region VI for the Lower Colorado River Authority 

Thomas Ferguson Power Plant, p. 7 (mass-based methane emissions limits of 16.8 and 16.2 tons 

per year are each multiplied by 21 to establish CO2 -equivalent emissions limits of 353.3 and 

327.2 tpy; attached as Exhibit 6.) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 9]

In other words, the proposed LD Rule arbitrarily deems vehicle methane emissions as having 

19% greater heat-trapping characteristics than the chemically identical molecules emitted from 

stationary sources. Unless EPA can explain the scientific basis for this, light duty vehicle 

methane emissions should be regulated with the same GWP as all other U.S. methane sources. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 9]

Organization: Ferrari
Additional EPA Program Elements

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Ferrari supports the EPA proposal not to increase the stringency of the CH4 and N2O standards 

set forth in the MYs 2012-16 GHG final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.2]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Tightening of hydrocarbon and CO2 emission standards over time with the parallel introduction 

of more effective emission control systems have resulted in lower emissions of N2O and CH4

from today’s vehicles compared to older vehicles certified to less stringent hydrocarbon and CO2

standards. The performance of advanced emission control technologies for advanced diesel, 

gasoline, and natural gas-fueled powertrains can also be optimized to minimize N2O and CH4

emissions from future light-duty vehicles consistent with the limits EPA set for these important 

greenhouse gas emissions in their first round of light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas emission 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.3]

Organization: Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Methane emissions

In order for the industry to achieve expanded use of CNG as an automotive fuel, in VPG’s 

opinion, the methane standard must be revisited relative to CNG fuel usage and emissions from 

CNG fueled engines. We do not believe that the methane emissions standards advised in III.6. 

are in line with methane emissions from vehicles running on natural gas. Table 2 details the 

emissions for two dedicated CNG fueled vehicles as well as VPG’s gasoline fueled MV-1 as a 

reference point. [See Table 2. Methane emissions from one gasoline and two CNG certification 

tests in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 4] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7985-A2, p. 3]

VPG notes that, as can be expected, gasoline emissions of methane are significantly less than the 

new standard. More significantly though, VPG’s MV-1 is certified as a LDT 4 light duty truck, 

and has a curb weight of 5250 pounds, yet it is certified at the bin 2 level. Even at this clean 

certification level, the MV- 1 is does not meet the methane standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7985-A2, p. 4]

Additional methane emissions data do not appear to be available in certificate summary 

information reports for CNG fueled vehicles accessed through the EPA Document Index System 

(DIS). One of the better known OEM vehicles certified for dedicated CNG use is the Honda 

Civic. The methane results for this vehicle however (test group BHNXV01.8BDT) are not 

available from the DIS on the EPA website. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 4]

Our evidence indicates that a there are technological feasibility issues with methane standards at 

the current level for CNG fueled vehicles with engines of a displacement similar to VPG’s. VPG 

requests a review of the CH4 standard as applied to dedicated CNG fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 4]

Finally, VPG recommends a review of the methane emissions standards as applied to CNG 

fueled vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

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Response:

In response to AGA and ANGA comments concerning the global warming potential 

(GWP of CH4, the GWPs used in this rule are consistent with the 100-year time frame values in 

the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). 

These AR4 values are based on latest science from the IPCC, they are consistent with the values 

used in the MYs 2012-2016 LD and MYs 2014-2018 HD rulemakings, and we consider them to 

be the most appropriate values for this rule. At this time, the 100-year GWP values from the 

1995 IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) are used in the official U.S. GHG inventory 

submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) per the 

reporting requirements under that international convention. As the commenters note, some EPA 

programs use SAR values since they have deemed consistency with the national GHG inventory 

and other relevant programs to be appropriate for their purposes. For example, the GWP of 21 

was used in a recent oil and gas rulemaking in order to maintain consistency with the SAR GWP 

values used in the national GHG inventory and in the US Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, 

which collects data from emitters in that sector. The UNFCCC recently agreed on revisions to 

the national GHG inventory reporting requirements, and will begin using the 100-year GWP 

values from AR4 for inventory submissions in the future. 

Commenters generally supported EPA’s proposal not to change the CH4 standards and 

supported the flexibilities discussed in section 10.2.1 above. VPG commented that the CH4

standard established in the MY 2012-2016 rule should be revisited for CNG vehicles. VPG 

mentions not being able to find the CH4 data for the Honda dedicated CNG vehicle in the 

certification data. In response, EPA believes that CH4 can be controlled through emissions 

systems optimization and continues to believe that the CH4 standard previously established is 

feasible and appropriate. As noted in comments submitted by the Manufacturers of Emission 

Controls Association (MECA), the performance of advanced emission control technologies for 

advanced diesel, gasoline, and natural gas-fueled powertrains can also be optimized to minimize 

N2O and CH4 emissions from future light-duty vehicles consistent with the limits EPA has set. 

The Honda dedicated CNG vehicle provides an example of the potential for CH4 emissions 

control, with a certification value of 0.015 compared to a CH4 standard of 0.03 g/mile.21 

In addition, EPA is providing the flexibility to use CO2 credits on a CO2-equivalent basis 

to address excess CH4 emissions. Several commenters from the natural gas industry commented 

in support of these provisions (see 10.2.1, above). VNG Co commented that “the flexibility may 

be useful for manufacturers of NGVs, particularly converters that will be important in 

developing the market in the early years. Because small quantities of unburned natural gas from 

NGV engines may be emitted as methane, NGVs may have slightly higher emissions of this 

GHG than petroleum-fueled ICE vehicles. However, due to much greater reductions of CO2

emissions, NGVs still yield net GHG emission reductions of approximately 24 percent. These 

flexible compliance rules will ensure that net GHG reductions are accounted for properly, and 

automakers are not penalized so long as slight increases in methane emissions are offset by CO2

over-compliance.” America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association 

(AGA) also commented in support of this flexibility. EPA concurs with these comments.

 21 MY 2012 certification data is available at: http://www.epa.gov/otaq/crttst.htm. 
Additional EPA Program Elements

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EPA notes further that manufacturers that are small businesses remain exempt from 

meeting the N2O and CH4 standards as well as the CO2 standards under the MY2017-2025 

program, as with the MY 2012-2016 program. It is EPA’s understanding that VPG currently 

qualifies as a small business.

Comments regarding CH4 and N2O standards as they apply to police and emergency 

vehicles are addressed in section 10.5 below.

10.3. Alternative CO2 Standards for Small Volume Manufacturers 

with U.S. Sales below 5,000 Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Aston Martin Lagonda Limited, Lotus Cars Limited and McLaren Automotive

Ferrari

Ferrari & Maserati of Seattle

Ferrari of Houston, Texas and Ferrari of Austin, Texas

Miller Motorcars

Penske Corporation

Volkswagen Group of America

Wide World Ferrari, Wide World of Cars, LLC

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Global Automakers supports the approach proposed by EPA to establish small volume 

manufacturer standards on a company-specific basis. The approach provides the compliance 

flexibility that this small segment of the industry needs while also contributing to the control of 

GHG emissions. This approach would be most efficiently administered if manufacturers may 

petition for, and EPA grants, alternative standards for multiple model years in a single 

proceeding. Such standards should be issued at least 18 months prior to the first affected model 

year. We also urge EPA and NHTSA to work cooperatively to harmonize CAFE and GHG 

standards for these small companies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 8]

Also with regard to the issue of small volume manufacturers, Global Automakers strongly 

supports including regulatory language in the final rules that would amend the existing 40 CFR 

86.1838(b) regarding small volume manufacturers to include the criteria set forth in the preamble 

to this regulatory package at 76 FR 74992 (middle column). These criteria would allow a 

manufacturer to retain SVM status if it can demonstrate that it is 'operationally independent' from 

another manufacturer that may have an ownership interest in that manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 52.]
EPA Response to Comments

10-34

Additionally, Global Automakers supports the case-by-case small-volume manufacturers' 

approach as well as harmonization of the definitions for small-volume manufacturers. The caseby-case approach allows the flexibility that this small segment of the industry needs while 

maintaining requirements necessary to control greenhouse emissions.

Inclusion of the criteria included in the above referenced preamble text would provide necessary 

flexibility for historically independent small manufacturers, while the criteria are sufficiently 

stringent (e.g., strict limits on the total vehicles sold in the US, no joint ownership of intellectual 

property by the manufacturers, separate R&D, testing, and development facilities, independent 

verification, etc) so that there would be virtually no ability to abuse this provision. In addition, 

any manufacturer that meets the criteria set forth in the preamble would still need to comply with

the provisions applicable to all SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 68.]

And, finally, Global Automakers supports the case-by-case small volume manufacturers 

approach. It allows the flexibility that this small segment of the industry needs while also 

mandating requirements necessary to control greenhouse gases. We also support the 

harmonization of the definition of small volume manufacturers.

Organization: Aston Martin Lagonda Limited, Lotus Cars Limited and McLaren Automotive

This comment is submitted on behalf of Aston Martin Lagonda Limited, Lotus Cars Limited and 

McLaren Automotive Limited. Each of these companies is classified as a “small volume 

manufacturer” (SVM) under EPA regulations and is a manufacturer of a very limited number of 

high performance sports cars. See www.astonmartin.com; www.lotuscars.com; 

www.mclarenautomotive.com. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387-A2, p. 1]

We present here the viewpoint of SVMs as regards EPA’s proposal to establish MY 2017-2025 

GHG standards for light-duty vehicles.2 All three manufacturers understand the need to control 

CO2 and support the regulatory efforts of EPA and NHTSA. The three companies further believe 

that small manufacturers must do their fair share to reduce GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

5387-A2, p. 1]

SVMs agree with both the rationale and goal behind the NPRM’s SVM provisions and urge EPA 

to promulgate the proposed mechanism to set SVM GHG standards on an SVM-by-SVM 

basis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387-A2, p. 3]

As recognized by EPA, the case-by-case SVM approach is already found in the CAFÉ law (49 

USC 32902), the EU small volume manufacturer CO2 derogation, and both the California 

existing GHG provision (13 CCR 1961.1) as well as in the recently proposed Advanced Clean 

Car rule. Adopting the case-by-case SVM GHG mechanism would thus align EPA’s approach 

with that of NHTSA, the EU, and CARB, furthering the desirable objective of 

harmonization. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387-A2, p. 3]
Additional EPA Program Elements

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EPA has requested comments on allowing SVMs to apply for a case by case standard for model 

years prior to MY 2017. We fully support the idea of allowing optional application for a case-bycase standard starting with MY 2015 (with application being made no later than July 

2013). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5387-A2, p. 3]

CONCLUSION: The proposed case-by-case SVM mechanism is fair and equitable and also 

meets the necessary goal of appropriate control of GHG. The SVM provisions should be 

promulgated as proposed with optional early opt in starting in MY 2015.

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 118-

119.]

2 The three companies submitting this comment take no position on the issue of expanding the 

GHG SVM rule to small manufacturers that are part of larger groups and are operationally 

independent.

Organization: Ferrari

Ferrari fully supports EPA’s proposal to establish a method for a vehicle manufacturer to 

demonstrate “operational independence” if, under EPA regulations, the manufacturer’s sales 

otherwise would have to be aggregated with those of another vehicle manufacturer. Finalizing 

this provision will benefit truly small, historically independent vehicle manufacturers while still 

protecting the environment and minimizing vehicle greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. As 

proposed, the proposed criteria enumerated at 76 Fed. Reg, 74,992 (middle column) are fully 

sufficient to prevent vehicle manufacturers from “gaming” the system, yet still offer necessary 

flexibility for individual vehicle manufacturers with unique ownership and operational 

structures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, pp.1-2]

Despite the Ownership Structure, Ferrari is Uniquely Positioned as an Operationally Independent 

Vehicle Manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.2]

The existing 40 CFR § 86.1838(b), which governs small volume manufacturer (“SVM”) 

certification procedures, includes a provision regarding “aggregation” of sales which is based on 

the percentage ownership of the SVM by another vehicle manufacturer. Sales of the two 

manufacturers are aggregated when another manufacturer owns more than 10% of the smaller 

manufacturer. At the present time Fiat SpA) owns 90i% of Ferrari SpA. Due to the transactions 

that occurred in 2009 regarding Fiat, the U.S. government and Chrysler Group LLC [[EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10037-A2]], a unit of Fiat SpA now owns more than 10% of Chrysler. As an 

unintended consequence of these transactions, Ferrari could lose its status as an SVM, which it 

has historically held. If that were to occur, the result would be devastating to Ferrari since it 

would need to immediately change its certification, durability testing, as well as making it part of 

a large volume manufacturer for purposes of the GHG rules. This consequence could severely 

limit Ferrari in the U.S. market, despite aggressive efforts to reduce GHG emissions from 
EPA Response to Comments

10-36

vehicles sold in the U.S. It also would ignore the reality of how Ferrari and Fiat operate. For the 

60 years of Ferrari’s existence, the company has always operated independently of any parent 

company or other ownership structure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.2]

Specifically, Ferrari has complete design autonomy from Fiat and every other company in the 

Fiat Automobiles group, including Chrysler. Overall vehicle and powertrain design is overseen 

from the Ferrari Maranello facility; no Fiat personnel are involved in any way with this 

operation. Ferrari is exclusively in charge of all Ferrari research and development, with no 

participation or assistance from Fiat. Ferrari’s budget for R&D is set by Ferrari and is 

independent of any R&D budget for Fiat. Ferrari parts design and procurement are completely 

independent of Fiat Automotive's procurement operations. Ferrari engine and transmission 

design, machining and production, as well as body, paint, interior and final assembly are all 

performed at the Maranello facility— again, completely independent of Fiat design, machining, 

production, and assembly. All Ferrari vehicle testing, evaluation, emission certification and 

documentation are all performed at Maranello, completely independent of Fiat testing, 

certification, and other operations. Marketing, competitive racing and other actions to promote 

the Ferrari brand are all handled by exclusively by Ferrari without control by Fiat. Overall 

management of Ferrari is independent from Fiat. While there are a small number of individuals 

from Fiat SpA who are on Ferrari's Board of Directors, these individuals (separately or 

combined) are not able to exercise exclusive management control over Ferrari or Fiat. In sum, 

despite the ownership of stock, Ferrari operates on a day-to-day and model year-to-model year 

basis as an entity that is entirely separate from Fiat. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.2]

Furthermore, EPA states in the proposal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.3]

[A] small manufacturer under the umbrella of a large manufacturer is fundamentally different 

from other SVMs because the large manufacturer has several options under the GHG program to 

bring the smaller subsidiary into compliance, including the use of averaging or credit transfer 

provisions, purchasing credits from another manufacturer, or providing technical and financial 

assistance to the smaller subsidiary. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.3]

While this may be true in other circumstances, the ownership structure between Fiat and Ferrari 

provides Ferrari with little, if any, preferential access to any credits generated by Fiat. As 

explained above, under the long-standing arrangement between the two companies, Fiat does not 

provide financial or technical assistance to Ferrari. Any such transactions between the two 

companies would be at arms-length and no different than if the two companies had no common 

ownership. Ferrari therefore obtains no preference or benefits through its association with Fiat 

that would advantage Ferrari compared to other SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, 

p.3]

Establishing an “Operational Independence” Option Would Be Consistent with Past EPA and 

California Air Resources Board Practice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.3]

Over the past ten years in determinations under the existing EPA SVM regulations, the Highway 

Safety Act, and the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) regulations, Ferrari has 

consistently been determined to be an independent SVM. Even in the early 2000s, when General 
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Motors owned 20% of Fiat, EPA determined under the then existing SVM regulations, which are 

comparable to the current SVM certification provision that Ferrari was an independent SVM. 

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has made similar 

determinations under the Safety Act. CARB has also considered Ferrari an independent SVM for 

purposes of their vehicle tailpipe emissions and on-board diagnostic (“OBD”) programs. Thus, 

establishing criteria by which a manufacturer can demonstrate that it is operationally independent 

would be fully consistent with past EPA, NHTSA, and CARB practice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9535-A2, p.3]

The Proposed Criteria Are Stringent And Will Not Encourage “Gaming” of the System. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.3]

EPA requested comment on the agency’s concern that some manufacturers could “change their 

corporate structure to take advantage of such provisions (that is, gaming).” Ferrari supports the 

proposed criteria for establishing operational independence and believes that they are sufficiently 

stringent to prevent some manufacturer from attempting to “game” the system. In order to 

attempt to restructure an existing corporate situation, Ferrari believes the cost of separating all, 

R&D, production and testing facilities from the parent company, along with the expense of 

developing completely new powertrains and platforms, would be prohibitively expensive. The 

cost of purchasing any jointly-held patents also could be astronomical. Depending on the 

company, separating all business, administration, legal, purchasing, sales, and marketing 

functions also could be complicated and cost prohibitive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, 

pp.3-4]

Finally, the “new” manufacturer would have to maintain this status for two full years prior to 

applying for operational independence SVM status. During this time, the new manufacturer 

presumably would have to comply with the applicable GHG emission standards without any 

support from the manufacturer from which it is newly separated. The new manufacturer would 

not be eligible to apply for and comply with the more flexible case-by-case SVM standards that 

EPA has proposed. Given that there would be little benefit to a large manufacturer to spin off and 

separate a model line that over-complies with the applicable GHG standard, the new 

manufacturer would likely not be in compliance with the GHG standards during this two-year 

period. Even with the credit carry-forward/carry-back options, it would be exceedingly difficult 

for a new manufacturer to make up this credit deficit if and when it is deemed an operationallyindependent SVM without purchasing credits (which may be a very difficult task, given the 

stringency of the proposed GHG standards for these MYs). In addition, if the newly-created 

SVM applied for case-by-case standards, EPA intends to establish such standards at a 

“challenging but less stringent” level; thus, the SVM would not be generating large numbers of 

credits for each model year that could make up for two years of likely credit deficits. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.4]

Overall, there do not appear to be any scenarios where it would make financial or operating 

sense for a large manufacturer to try to take advantage of the operational independence criteria to 

“spin-off” fewer than 5000 vehicles per year. EPA also has the authority to deny an application 

for operational independent SVM status and can address any concerns about gaming during the 

application and approval process. Because we believe that opportunities for gaming the system 
EPA Response to Comments

10-38

are minimal at best, and that EPA will be able to adequately identify such circumstances, Ferrari 

recommends that EPA finalize the operational independence criteria with only one small 

revision. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.4]

In order to eliminate any confusion regarding the meaning of the requirement, Ferrari 

recommends that EPA revise the proposed 40 CFR § 86.1838-01(b)(4)(a)(iii) as follows: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.4]

(iii) related manufacturers the applicant does not use any vehicle powertrains or platforms 

developed or produced by related manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.4]

This minor change will clarify that the applicant for operationally independent SVM status does 

not rely on other, related manufacturers for powertrains or other vehicle platforms. However, the 

revision would enable the applicant to sell, consistent with (i) and (vii), parts and components to 

a related manufacturer through an open market process at competitive pricing. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9535-A2, pp.4-5]

An Operational Independence Option Will Have Little Overall Effect on Vehicle GHG 

Emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.5]

EPA’s proposal to allow an operationally-independent manufacturer to be considered an SVM 

for purposes of the GHG program will have very little overall effect on vehicle GHG emissions. 

As noted above, Ferrari sells approximately 1500-1800 vehicles in the U.S. each year. Under the 

MY 2012-2016 rules, Ferrari would need to make the requisite showing in 40 CFR § 1801-12(k), 

and under the proposal for MY 2017-2025, as an SVM, Ferrari could seek alternative, case-bycase standards for its fleet. EPA explained in the preamble that the SVM case-by-case standards 

are still intended to be challenging, will still require innovation and development of new 

technologies, and will still require the SVM to do its “fair share” of reducing emissions.5 As 

proposed, the process of obtaining SVM-specific standards includes a comprehensive evaluation 

of all aspects of the SVM’s fleet, use of technology, and projections of sales and introduction of 

new models covering up to five model years. This process will enable EPA and the manufacturer 

to develop SVM-specific standards that are protective of the environment and require 

technological innovation while reflecting the unique characteristics of the SVM’s fleet of 

vehicles. Ferrari supports the approach EPA has proposed and notes that it is consistent in 

concept with the system used in the European Union. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.5]

The Provision on “Attest Engagements” Should Mirror the Provision Contained in EPA’s 

Regulations on Fuel and Fuel Additives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.5]

EPA requested comments on whether to require a manufacturer seeking operationally 

independent SVM status to provide an “attest engagement” from an independent auditor, 

verifying the accuracy of the information contained in the manufacturer’s application. Ferrari 

supports this concept and recommends that EPA adopt a provision that is comparable to the 

provision in the agency’s Fuel and Fuel Additive regulations in 40 C.F.R. Part 80. In those 

regulations, EPA requires refiners and fuel importers subject to Subpart F of 40 C.F.R. Part 80 to 

engage an outside auditor to verify information. Section 80.125 specifies that the CPA shall 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-39

perform the attest engagement in accordance with the Statements on Standards for Attestation 

Engagements, which is incorporated by reference, and allows the assistance of internal auditors 

who are employees or agents of the regulated company, as long as such assistance is consistent 

with the guidelines contained in the Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements. This 

provision further allows the attest engagement to be completed by an auditor who is an employee 

of the regulated company, provided that the employee is an internal auditor certified by the 

Institute of Internal Auditors and completes the internal audits in accordance with the 

Codification of Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. Adopting these 

requirements into the process for demonstrating operational independence will allow some 

measure of flexibility for the manufacturer while ensuring the accuracy of the information and 

the independence of the auditor. Furthermore, Ferrari recommends that EPA clarify in the final 

rule that the auditor performing the attest engagement does not have to be a new auditor hired 

solely for the purposes of conducting this audit. Rather, EPA should allow a manufacturer to

continue to use a CPA or other auditor who has previously performed similar functions for the 

company, as long as the auditor meets the requirements discussed above. Finally, since a number 

of the criteria listed in the preamble involve engineering issues, Ferrari suggests that the entity 

performing the Attest Engagement be allowed to use personnel from outside its organization as 

necessary to assist in this effort. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, pp.5-6]

EPA Should Allow a Time Period for Adjustment If a Manufacturer’s Situation Changes. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.6]

EPA has asked for comment on what should occur in the event a manufacturer who is an SVM 

has changed circumstances that would no longer make it eligible for this status. While Ferrari 

does not anticipate this occurring, if its status or other SVM’s status should change, EPA should 

provide at least a three-year transition period to allow the manufacturer to develop the additional 

testing facilities and time for durability testing, as well as for software, hardware development 

and installation. Such a period will be needed, since it is highly unlikely that any SVM would be 

able to immediately transition from this status to that of a full-line manufacturer. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.6]

Inclusion of a revision to 40 CFR § 86.1838(b) to provide for “operational independence” in this 

package of rules is critically important to Ferrari. As such, Ferrari strongly supports including 

such a provision in the final rule. Attached is proposed text of such a revision. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9535-A2, p.6]

Ferrari agrees with many parts and principles of the proposed regulations, including the specific 

provisions for small-volume manufacturers contained in the EPA GHG proposal. We deem that 

the proposed approach to define specific standards for each single SVM is the best solution, 

because it is possible to take into account the potential technical and economic capabilities of 

each small-volume manufacturer. Moreover, this method is consistent with both the already 

existing CAFE regulation that allows small manufacturers to petition NHTSA for alternative fuel 

economy standards, and also the corresponding European Union Regulation 443/2009/EC on 

CO2. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.10]
EPA Response to Comments

10-40

As noted in the main comments, we strongly recommend introducing the concept of “operational 

independence” for small-volume manufacturers, so that the specific standards reserved to SVMs 

can also be used by this sub-category of small-volume manufacturers that operate independently 

from any other companies, in spite of ownership interests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, 

p.10]

NHTSA’s proposed standards will require passenger cars to meet an estimated average of 49.6 

mpg in MY 2025. This represents an average annual increase of 5 percent from the 34.4 mpg 

average for 2016 MY. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.14]

With reference to the final 2010 MY Ferrari CAFE of 18.3 mpg (the best ever so far) we would 

need to increase our CAFE by approximately 108 % in MY 2017 up to 191 % in MY 2025. We 

are confident to achieve remarkable improvements in the fuel economy and reductions of CO2

emissions with new models which will benefit of further improvements and other technologies in 

the future, but we cannot satisfy the proposed targets and percentages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9535-A2, p.14]

Organization: Ferrari & Maserati of Seattle

We therefore urge EPA to finalize the criteria that would enable a very small volume 

manufacturer (SVM), such as Ferrari, to demonstrate that it is operationally independent from 

related manufacturers and comply with company-specific fleet average greenhouse gas (GHG) 

emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9197-A2, p. 1]

Existing EPA regulations require sales to be aggregated when one vehicle manufacturer holds 

more than a 10% interest in another manufacturer. In the proposed rule, EPA included a list of 

criteria that a SVM could satisfy in order to demonstrate that it is operationally independent, 

despite the ownership structure that would otherwise require sales aggregation. See pages 

74,991-92 of the proposed rule. These criteria are stringent enough to prevent gaming of the 

system, yet would provide a manufacturer like Ferrari with the necessary flexibility to comply 

with case-by-case GHG emission standards. Given the very low number of Ferraris sold in the 

U.S. each year, the proposal would have only negligible effects on overall vehicle GHG 

emissions. If EPA does not finalize the operational independence criteria and Ferrari's sales must 

be aggregated with sales of Fiat in the U.S., sales of Ferrari may be reduced. This would have a 

devastating effect on our business and our employees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9197-A2, p. 

1]

Organization: Ferrari of Houston, Texas and Ferrari of Austin, Texas

In the December 2011 proposal EPA proposed criteria that would allow a vehicle manufacturer 

to demonstrate that it is 'operationally independent' from other related vehicle manufacturers (see 

pages 74,991-92). EPA Regulations currently require sales to be aggregated if a vehicle 

manufacturer owns a 10% or greater share in another manufacturer. The operational 

independence criteria would allow a qualifying manufacturer to be treated as a small volume 

manufacturer (SVM) for the purposes of GHG regulations, including compliance with 

challenging case-by-case emission standards instead of the fleet average standards that would 
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otherwise apply. Ferrari of Houston and Ferrari of Austin urge EPA to finalize this option. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9230-A2, p.1]

EPA's proposal would establish a rigorous process to ensure that a manufacturer applying to be 

treated as an operationally-independent SVM is truly an independent entity. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9230-A2, p.1]

Opportunities to game the system would be limited and, given the very small number of vehicles 

that Ferrari sells each year in the U.S., the effect on the overall vehicle GHG emissions would be 

miniscule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9230-A2, p.2]

However, without this option, the U.S. sales of Ferrari and Fiat would have to be aggregated. 

Aggregation would restrict Ferrari's ability to sell vehicles in the U.S., which would be harmful 

to our business, our employees, and our vendors and suppliers. EPA should therefore finalize the 

operational independence criteria and provide necessary flexibility to SVMs that can 

demonstrate independence from any related manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9230-

A2, p.2]

Organization: Miller Motorcars

EPA has proposed to allow a manufacturer to comply with the small volume manufacturer 

(SVM) GHG emission standards if the manufacturer can show that it is 'operationally 

independent' from other related manufacturers. Under current EPA regulations, sales of two 

related vehicle manufacturers must be aggregated if there is common ownership of 10% or more. 

The EPA proposal would suspend the aggregation requirement if specific, stringent criteria can 

be satisfied. The proposal would provide needed flexibility for very small manufacturers, like 

Ferrari, that are fully independent from any related companies. No environmental harm would 

ensue since the SVM would have to comply with case-by-case GHG emission standards that 

EPA intends to be challenging yet achievable. At the same time, EPA has proposed criteria that 

are difficult to satisfy and which will prevent companies from trying to take advantage of the 

provision or game the system. Without this option, Ferrari may be forced to reduce or limit U.S. 

vehicle sales, which would adversely affect our business and our employees. Miller Motorcars 

therefore urges EPA to finalize this option. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8141-A2, p. 1]

Organization: Penske Corporation

Ferrari of Scottsdale, Ferrari of Central Jersey, and Ferrari of Las Vegas support EPA's proposal 

to allow a manufacturer to demonstrate that it is 'operationally independent' from the other 

automobile manufacturers with which its sales would otherwise have to be aggregated under 

existing EPA regulations. As a small volume manufacturer (SVM), the manufacturer would then 

be able to apply for and comply with case-by-case GHG emission standards that reflect the 

degree of GHG emissions reduction that is challenging but still achievable for the manufacturer's 

fleet. This option would provide necessary flexibility for those small volume manufacturers that 

are truly independent from other automobile manufacturers in their operations and ensure that 

Ferrari's ability to sell vehicles in the U.S. is preserved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9187-A2, p. 

1]
EPA Response to Comments

10-42

If Ferrari does not obtain SVM status and the sale of Ferraris is restricted, then our Ferrari 

business could suffer greatly. Even a modest reduction in the number of vehicles that Ferrari is 

able to sell in the U.S. in a given model year could have a substantial impact on these Ferrari 

dealers and the number of employees we are able to sustain. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9187-

A2, p. 2]

Thus, Ferrari of Scottsdale, Ferrari of Central Jersey, and Ferrari of Las Vegas urge EPA to 

finalize the option described on page 74,992 of the proposal to demonstrate operational 

independence. EPA has proposed stringent criteria that will ensure that a manufacturer seeking to 

establish operational independence is truly independent. As proposed, the criteria and application 

process would make it extraordinarily difficult for a manufacturer to change its existing business 

operation in order to take advantage of the flexibility granted to SVMs. The proposal also would 

be protective of the environment, as the agency would set case-by-case GHG emissions 

standards for a SVM that would be challenging yet achievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9187-A2, p. 2]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

In the NPRM the agencies seek comment on the concept of operational independence for Small 

Volume Manufacturers (SVM), whereby a captured small volume brand that is more than 10% 

owned by another company could petition the agencies for SVM status based on an attestation 

and demonstration of operational independence. As an operationally independent small volume 

manufacturer, a company would then have the option to petition the agencies for a negotiated 

CO2 and fuel economy standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 28-29]

Volkswagen supports the concept of allowing a captured brand with less than 5,000 annual 

vehicle sales to have the flexibility to petition for SVM status. However, Volkswagen is 

concerned that the operational independence criteria listed in the NPRM is too prescriptive and 

difficult to apply across all circumstances of captured small volume brands. For example, while 

it may be common for a small volume brand to use a common platform or engine from a parent 

company, in many cases these systems are altered to accommodate separate features or 

performance characteristics. In addition, such major components would be part of a business 

contract and not merely provided gratis to different brands within a group. As such Volkswagen 

requests that EPA and NHTSA allow this flexibility for demonstration of operational 

independence in the final regulation but requests that the agencies consider the operational 

independence of each manufacturer on an individual basis during the petition process. As such 

the degree of independence could be part of the negotiation process for setting standards for a 

particular SVM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 29]

Organization: Wide World Ferrari, Wide World of Cars, LLC

The proposed language would allow a manufacturer to qualify as a small volume manufacturer 

(SVM) on the basis of its own sales if it can show that it is 'operationally independent' from 

related manufacturers with which its sales would otherwise be aggregated (see pages 75,991-92 

of the proposal). Ferrari of West Palm Beach and Wide World of Cars support EPA’s proposal to 

allow an operationally-independent manufacturer to be considered a SVM for purposes of the 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-43

greenhouse gas (GHG) program. The proposed federal regulatory language contains stringent 

criteria that would ensure strong environmental protections and minimize gaming opportunities, 

while still allowing flexibility for SVMs like Ferrari that cannot offset emissions of their low 

volume high performance vehicles with higher volume, lower emission vehicles in the larger 

fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8142-A2, p. 1]

The proposed language would provide flexibility for small volume manufacturers like Ferrari 

that are truly independent from other automobile manufacturers in the ownership structure. It 

also would preserve Ferrari’s ability to sell vehicles in the U.S. Our business could suffer if 

Ferrari does not obtain SVM status and the sale of Ferraris is restricted. A small change in the 

number of vehicles that Ferrari is able to sell in the U.S. in a given model year could have a 

substantial impact on our bottom line and number of employees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

8142-A2, p. 2]

EPA’s proposal would have very little overall effect on vehicle GHG emissions, because the 

vehicles sold by SVMs would still have to comply with challenging case-by-case GHG emission 

standards. The proposed regulatory language also contains stringent criteria and an application 

process that would make it exceedingly difficult for a manufacturer to alter its existing business 

in order to take advantage of the flexibility granted to SVMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8142-

A1, p. 2]

Thus, Ferrari of West Palm Beach and Wide World of Cars urge EPA to finalize the option to 

demonstrate operational independence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8142-A2, p. 2]

Response:

EPA received only supportive comments for the proposed case-by-case alternative 

standards approach for SVMs. In addition, EPA received only supportive comments on allowing 

manufacturers able to demonstrate operational independence from a parent company to also be 

eligible for SVM provisions under the GHG program. Responses to comments regarding the 

SVM alternative standards are provided in section III.B.5.b and comments regarding operational 

independence are addressed in III.B.5.e.

With regard to Ferrari’s suggestion regarding regulatory text pertaining to the applicant’s 

use of any vehicle powertrains or platforms developed or produced by related manufacturers, 

EPA concurs with the comment and the final regulatory text is consistent with Ferrari’s 

suggestion.

Ferrari recommends that “EPA clarify in the final rule that the auditor performing the 

attest engagement does not have to be a new auditor hired solely for the purposes of conducting 

this audit. Rather, EPA should allow a manufacturer to continue to use a CPA or other auditor 

who has previously performed similar functions for the company, as long as the auditor meets 

the requirements discussed above. Finally, since a number of the criteria listed in the preamble 

involve engineering issues, Ferrari suggests that the entity performing the Attest Engagement be 

allowed to use personnel from outside its organization as necessary to assist in this effort.” EPA 

believes these recommendations are reasonable and has adopted Ferrari’s suggestions regarding 

the attest engagement.
EPA Response to Comments

10-44

Ferrari commented that EPA should provide at least a three-year transition period to 

allow the manufacturer to develop the additional testing facilities and time for durability testing, 

as well as for software, hardware development and installation. EPA is providing 2 full model 

years after the model year in which a manufacturer’s status as operationally independent has 

changed. In total this will provide the manufacturer with 2 to 3 years to comply with the primary 

program depending on the timing of the change. EPA believes that this will be sufficient as the 

parent company and manufacturer would likely have some control over the timing of the change 

in their status.

10.4. Exemption for Small Businesses

Organizations Included in this Section

AMP Electric Vehicles

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Organization: AMP Electric Vehicles

The purpose of this letter is to state our support for the provision in the proposed 2017 LightDuty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas rules that allows small business the opportunity of voluntarily 

opting-in to the GHG standards. Further, it is our contention that the voluntary opt-in option 

should be extended to EV converters and alterers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 1]

As you are aware, in the MY 2012-2016 rule regarding greenhouse gas, EPA exempted entities 

from the emissions standard, “if the entity met the Small Business Administration (SBA) size 

criteria of a small business as described in 13 CFR 121.201.” As we researched this issue, we 

learned that the intent of the exemption was to assist small OEMs that might not have the 

resources necessary to address the CO2 standards in the regulation. An unintended consequence 

of this small business exclusion is that start up companies, such as AMP, are not be able to 

accumulate CO2 credits for converting high emitting internal combustion engine SUVs to 

emission free EVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 1]

In the recently published “2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Rules” an “opt-in” provision 

allowing small businesses to voluntarily waive their small entity exemption to the GHG 

standards is proposed. AMP Electric Vehicles unequivocally supports this proposed rule, request 

that it be made effective immediately and that it be made applicable to converters and 

alterers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 1]

Passage of the 2017 GHG opt-in provision would allow AMP the ability to accumulate 

greenhouse gas credits and market them to larger OEMs. Our intent is to exchange these credits 

with large OEM’s in return for distribution assistance through their dealer networks. This would 

greatly enhance our ability to sell greater volumes of EV’s than we would otherwise. In our 

preliminary discussion with large OEMs in need of credits this concept has received favorable 

consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 1]
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-45

Additionally, approval of the opt-in provision would allow AMP the opportunity to generate 

greater revenue to offset our technology investments and free up capital to invest in additional 

innovative automotive green technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 1]

Further, the provision will afford larger OEM seeking credits a better opportunity to meet their 

compliance obligations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 2]

Finally, and very importantly, the net result of the passage of 2017 Green House Gas Small 

Business Opt-In provision is that it would increase the percentage of low and emission free 

vehicles on America's roads consistent with the intent of this legislation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7984-A1, p. 2]

AMP recognizes that by choosing to opt-in, our company would be subject to all of the 

requirements that would otherwise be applicable under this legislation. However, the net effect 

of its passage would greatly benefit our company and our goal of producing a significant 

quantity of zero emission vehicles allowing us to contribute to our mutual goal of cleaning up 

our country's environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7984-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.

2) Discuss modifications to the optional compliance provision for small entities

Fisker Automotive is a start-up automobile manufacturer employing fewer than 1,000 people, 

which qualifies our company as a small entity under Small Business Administration guidelines. 

The final rule for model years 2012-2016 exempted and excluded small entities from the fleet 

greenhouse gas standards. Without the ability to opt-in to the rule, we would miss an important 

opportunity to market the credits generated by this rule to other manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 2]

Fisker greatly appreciates the proposed optional compliance provision for small entities included 

in the current proposed rule. We fully agree with the rationale stated in the preamble: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 2]

EPA believes that there could be several benefits to this approach, as it would allow small 

businesses an opportunity to generate revenue to offset their technology investments and 

encourage commercialization of the innovative technology, and it would benefit any 

manufacturer seeking those credits to meet their compliance obligations.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9266-A1, p. 2]

As proposed, the provision would make the opt-in available starting in model year 2014. While 

this provision would indeed allow Fisker to access the credits it would have generated for model 

years 2012 and 2013 if it were a large manufacturer, these credits would not be accessible until 

90 days after the end of model year 2014, when final compliance for the model year is 

established. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

10-46

We view the timing required by this proposal as problematic. Fisker would not be able to 

complete a transfer on its earned credits until late in calendar year 2014 at the earliest, or nearly 

three years from today. This would significantly diminish the revenue generating benefit of these 

credits, particularly during the critical early years of our company when they are most 

beneficial. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 2]

For this reason, we highly encourage EPA to modify the language of this provision such that a 

small entity would be allowed to fully demonstrate compliance beginning with the 2012 model 

year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 2]

We believe optional compliance would be feasible beginning with model year 2012 for the 

following reasons: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 3]

1) The proposed rule is expected to go into effect by October of this year (60 days after final 

publication in August). Fisker anticipates its model year 2012 to end around the same time. Final 

compliance for a given model year is demonstrated with an end-of-year report due 90 days after 

the end of the model year. There is sufficient time after the rule takes effect for Fisker to 

demonstrate compliance with its end-of-year report for model year 2012 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9266-A1, p. 3]

2) The Fisker Karma sedan is already EPA-certified for model year 2012 under Federal Tier 2 

exhaust emission standards, and has been issued a certificate of conformity to this effect [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 3]

3) Fisker Automotive has a strong working relationship with EPA’s compliance division [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 3]

4) Fisker is already subject to the CAFE regulation for model year 2012 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9266-A1, p. 3]

5) Since the GHG program “will not impose additional timing or testing requirements on 

manufacturers beyond that required by the CAFE program,” the only additional work required to 

comply with the GHG program would be limited to reporting [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-

A1, p. 3]

6) Fisker already adheres to the existing practice under Tier 2 to provide EPA with a compliance 

plan; for the GHG element of this plan, Fisker’s compliance is trivial since our fleet consists only 

of a vehicle that significantly over-complies with its GHG standard [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9266-A1, p. 3]

Encourage enforcement of the requirement that manufacturers must make a good faith effort to 

secure credits from other manufacturers before becoming exempt from standards or becoming 

eligible for alternative standards As part of establishing eligibility for exemption from the CO2

standards under the greenhouse gas (GHG) program for MY 2012-2016, Small Volume 

Manufacturers (SVMs) “must make a good faith effort to secure credits from other 

manufacturers, if they are reasonably available, to cover the emissions reductions they would 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-47

have otherwise had to achieve under applicable standards.” Fisker Automotive strongly 

encourages EPA to hold to the spirit of these provisions. As the only entity with complete 

knowledge of every automaker’s credits and deficits, it is incumbent upon EPA to ensure that 

this provision is fairly enforced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Limited Line Manufacturer

Among the first decisions in the development of the business model, was the powertrain 

selection. The option for VPG to manufacture its own powertrain was determined not to be 

practical for reasons of cost related to the development of base algorithms for engine controls 

and on-board diagnostics. Following that determination, a study of powertrains which were 

offered for sale was undertaken, which ultimately resulted in VPG securing a supply agreement 

with Ford Motor Company through the Ford Component Sales Division for the supply of 

powertrains and associated emissions equipment. Ford offered to VPG the V-8, 4.6 liter 16 valve 

engine, based upon VPG’s power requirements, structural architecture, CNG compatibility as 

well as the production capacity of Ford’s engine manufacturing operations. VPG’s ability to 

provide wheelchair users with a superior alternative is dependent upon the production capacity 

and offerings of the engine manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 1]

VPG’s place in the automotive market is that we are the OEM manufacturer of vehicles which 

are accessible to wheelchairs. VPG’s vehicle design encompasses ADA guidelines for ingress 

and egress, as well as wheelchair positioning and restraint inside the vehicle. This necessarily 

puts VPG in the role of a limited line manufacturer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 2]

VPG’s fuel economy performance is dependent upon the use of one powertrain. While VPG does 

have the benefit of offering a fueling option in CNG, the public acceptance of this fueling option 

is limited and focused, mostly for reasons of infrastructure. The customer base for the CNG 

option remains the fleet market, where driving patterns are routed near CNG filling stations, 

although this option offers the potential to raise VPG’s CAFE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7985-A2, p. 2]

As EPA advises in the NPRM, there are high risks for limited line manufacturers in 

implementing new technologies. In VPG’s case, access to the technologies are limited or out of 

reach for reasons of market offerings, lead time, or feasibility. For example, EPA counts among 

other technologies, turbocharging as a technology which can be implemented after production 

decisions have been undertaken. However, such technologies are available to VPG only if the 

powertrain supplier offers the technology for sale to VPG. The alternative of VPG implementing 

a technology like turbocharging under the assumption it were added to the engines as a retrofit is 

not feasible. From the standpoint of development of controls and diagnostics algorithms, a 

limited line manufacturer such as VPG would not have the financial resources or expertise to 

implement these technologies with the requisite reliability, durability and timing. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

10-48

We point out that the limited line nature of manufacturers has been used in the regulatory 

environment to differentiate the impact of regulations on smaller entities. Therefore, VPG 

requests institution of exemption from the greenhouse gas regulations based on the limited line 

manufacturer status. VPG suggests a review of the appropriate vehicle line threshold, with 3 

lines or less being a reasonable place to visit this subject. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, 

p. 2]

VPG notes that on page 75161 of this NPRM, potentially affected small entities are discussed in 

terms of three models: 1) small volume manufacturers (SVMs), 2) independent commercial 

importers, (ICIs), and 3) alternative fuel vehicle converters. We believe that the limited line 

manufacturer should be added to this list of types of small entities affected, and that allowances 

should be made for manufacturers in this list. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 2]

VPG requests exemption from this GHG regulation for small entities, limited line manufacturers. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 4]

Response:

EPA is finalizing its proposal to exempt small businesses from the MY 2017-2025 

standards. EPA is also finalizing its proposal to allow small businesses manufacturers to waive 

their small entity exemption and opt-in to the primary GHG standards. Commenters generally 

supported both the exemption and the opt-in provisions. The opt-in will allow small business 

manufacturers to earn CO2 credits under the program. The small business would have to meet 

the primary standard for its fleet (that is, the small business would be allowed to opt-in to the 

primary program standard, but not to the small volume manufacturer standards. Fisker’s 

comments regarding the timing of the opt-in and credit generation are discussed in section III.B.7 

of the preamble. VPGs comments regarding limited line manufacturers are also addressed in 

III.B.7.

In response to AMP’s comments that small business alternative fuel converters should be 

allowed to generate credits, EPA does not view this as a small business issue but as an issue with 

the way alternative fuel conversions are addressed under EPA’s fleet average standards. 

Alternative fuel converters are not required to meet fleet average standards but instead must 

comply with anti-tampering regulations by demonstrating that the conversion does not increase 

emissions. Fleet average standards are not generally appropriate for fuel conversion 

manufacturers because the ‘‘fleet’’ of vehicles to which a conversion system may be applied has 

already been accounted for under the OEM’s fleet average standard. Alternative fuel converters 

are not manufacturing new vehicles, but are converting existing vehicles that have already been 

certified by the OEM. Converters must qualify for a tampering exemption under 40 CFR subpart 

F and fleet average standards do not apply. CO2 credits are available to OEMs based on fleet 

emissions performance compared to the fleet average standards and therefore conversions are not 

eligible for these credits. A small business alternative fuel convertor may opt into the GHG 

program and thus be required to make a showing that they are in compliance with requirements 

of 40 CFR subpart F, but these vehicles would not be subject to the fleet average standards and 

therefore would remain ineligible for credits.
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-49

10.5. Exemption for Emergency and Police Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Police and Emergency Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

The Alliance agrees with EPA’s proposal for the option to exclude police and emergency 

vehicles from fleet-average CO2 standards.10 However, in order to harmonize with the CAFE 

regulations and fully exclude any influence that emergency vehicles may have on fleet average 

CO2, EPA must exempt emergency vehicles from the methane (CH4) and N2O standards as well. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

Per the current regulations, if any vehicle were to exceed the CH4 and/or N2O standards, a 

manufacturer would be required to either include the CH4 and N2O emission values for all 

vehicles in its fleet average calculation or account for the exceedance(s) using CO2 credits. 

Therefore, if a police or emergency vehicle were to be the only vehicle to exceed either of these 

standards, the manufacturer would be incurring an increase in fleet-average CO2 or a decrease in 

CO2 credits solely due to the influence of the emergency vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.88]

The Alliance recommends that the following paragraph be added to 40 C.F.R. §86.1818-12(f): 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

Emergency vehicles. Emergency vehicles that have been excluded from fleet average CO2

exhaust emission standards under paragraph (c)(4) of this section are exempt from the N2O and 

CH4 standards of this paragraph (f). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Emergency Vehicles

EPA has proposed to exclude emergency vehicles, from the greenhouse gas requirement 

effective with the 2012 model year, consistent with the exclusion of emergency vehicles from 

CAFE standards. In our comments on the 2012-2016 rules, Ford urged EPA to exclude 

emergency vehicles from the GHG regulations; we stand by those comments and incorporate 

them herein by reference. Those comments are fully consistent with EPA’s determination that 

the exclusion of these vehicles is appropriate,
EPA Response to Comments

10-50

“...because of the unique features of vehicles designed specifically for law enforcement and 

emergency purposes, which have the effect of raising their GHG emissions and calling into 

question the ability of manufacturers to sufficiently reduce the emissions from these vehicles 

without compromising necessary vehicle features or dropping vehicles from their fleets. (76 Fed. 

Reg. 74880) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 25]

Section 202(a) of the CAA allows EPA to prescribe standards 'applicable to the emission of any 

air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles...' The language 'class or classes' 

indicates that EPA may apply its standards to particular types or categories of vehicles, and 

likewise make exclude particular types or categories of vehicles when there is reason to do so. 

This language gives EPA the authority to incorporate regulatory provisions excluding emergency 

vehicles from the fleet average requirement. The exclusion of emergency vehicles makes sense 

as a matter of policy, and it also promotes the goals of One National Program by harmonizing the 

GHG and CAFE rules on this point. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 25]

Organization: General Motors Company

GM supports EPA’s efforts to further harmonize with the NHTSA program with regard to the 

exclusion of emergency and police vehicles, and joins with the Alliance in suggesting 

modifications to section 40 C.F.R. §86.1818-12(f). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9465-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

The Agencies Should Ensure that the Fleet Averages Reflect Real-World Conditions.

The agencies should, at minimum, include police and emergency vehicles in calculations of 

GHG fleet average standards. The EPA-led advisory committee presents a good case for new 

technologies to generate more horsepower. This extra horsepower can be used to downsize a 

vehicle's engine. No logical reason seems to exist as to why this new technology cannot be used 

for police and emergency vehicles in order to gain fuel efficiency without loss of power. Police 

and emergency vehicles constitute a large fleet in the United States; not including them so they 

can benefit from the same GHG-reducing technology would be unfortunate. If manufacturers are 

not being tasked to develop more fuel-efficient police and emergency vehicles, then at the very 

least, emissions of emergency vehicles should be included in the overall targeted standards. 

Including emissions produced by emergency vehicles would lower the overall emission standard 

of the proposed rulemaking, but would make for a more accurate accounting of the impact of the 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Vehicle Production Group LLC (VPG)

Vehicles Used for the Public Good

EPA advises in III.B.9. that police and emergency response vehicles will be exempted from the 

regulation. This is in following with past regulations and U.S. code which have exempted 

vehicles manufactured “for the public good”. While that exact stipulation is generally phased 

out, the spirit and intent is still a part of the regulatory backdrop. VPG suggests that a vehicle 
Additional EPA Program Elements

10-51

manufactured for the specific purpose of transporting wheelchair users is indeed for the public 

good; and in fact VPG’s vehicle is a unique and robust solution to the needs of the disabled 

community as well as several legal actions relating to wheelchair accessibility of federally 

funded transportation services – most notably in New York City. It is VPG’s proposal to extend 

this exemption beyond police and ambulance vehicles to vehicles whose intended use is for the 

public good. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 2]

VPG also proposed that vehicles used for the public good not be subject to this regulation. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7985-A2, p. 4]

Response:

EPA is finalizing its proposal to exempt police and other emergency vehicles from the 

GHG standards starting in MY2012. Emergency vehicles are also exempt from the N2O and CH4

standards. Thus emergency vehicles are not included in the National Program at this time. 

Comments, including those from Pennsylvania DEP and the Vehicle Production Group, are 

addressed in preamble section III.B.8.

Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-1

11. Gasoline Fuel Quality

11.1. Need for Octane

Some commenters have advocated for a required increase in gasoline octane levels to 

improve vehicle efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, particularly if it would enable 

future vehicles to be designed with higher compression ratios. 

Organizations contained in this section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

Ford Motor Company

Growth Energy

ICM Inc.

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

Volvo Car Corporation

Comments:

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Why the industry’s interest in octane? The proposed rule preamble devotes considerable 

discussion to technology improvements for spark ignition engines, but the agencies do not 

explain in any detail why they have requested comment on whether higher octane fuels are 

needed to comply with increasingly stringent fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9506-A1, p. 6]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

The issue of octane is worth much more than the few words provided by the agencies out of 

hundreds of pages of proposed rule. Octane has a major impact on both the efficiency gains the 

car companies can provide as well as the traditional pollution benefits that the agencies can 

achieve. These improvements, in turn, have a significant impact on the cost-benefit ratios the 

agencies must consider. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 6]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

The agencies should re-evaluate the rulemaking, the Draft Joint Technical Support Document 

(TSD) and the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) in order to assess the future consumer demand 

for higher octane gasoline that will be needed to adequately power technologies that EPA 
EPA Response to Comments

11-2

believes will be used to meet the GHG emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-

A1, p. 3]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

EPA predicts that the burden of meeting these standards will fall on gasoline vehicles since 

diesel vehicles will not penetrate the light-duty fleet significantly and all alternative-fueled 

vehicles will amount to no more than 10 percent of the fleet. EPA believes automobile 

manufacturers will rely heavily on new engine designs that use eight-speed, high-compression, 

turbocharged engines, but typically manufacturers recommend that engines of this type be 

refueled with higher octane gasoline (91- to 93-octane) to avoid potentially damaging engine 

knocking. EPA indicated that using the combination of turbocharging and other technology 

improvements will eliminate the need to use high octane gas and will allow the consumer to use 

87-octane gasoline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

In addition to examining the air quality effects of the factors above [see section 18.2 of this 

comment summary], the increase in volatile organic compounds (VOC) emissions needs to be 

estimated due to the possible increase in Reid vapor pressure in gasoline from the increased use 

of higher octane gasoline. Higher emissions of VOC can lead to increased ground-level ozone 

concentrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

AFPM supports the Administration’s decision not to include gasoline octane rating in this 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.9]

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Automakers have recommended increasing the minimum gasoline octane rating to help meet

future GHG emissions requirements (see Oct. 6, 2011 letter from the Alliance of Automobile 

Manufacturers to Lisa Jackson). The cost implications of such a change are enormous and would 

have serious impacts on U.S. refinery operations. Evidently, the Administration shares our belief 

that an increase in gasoline octane is not necessary and is unsubstantiated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.9]

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

These improvements will better support several technologies and allow introduction of some 

options, like stratified lean burn engines, which otherwise might not be available for U.S. 

consumers. Reduced sulfur will also optimize emission control systems and reduce emissions in 

existing vehicles. Higher octane grades in market fuels would enable optimization of 

combustion/thermal efficiency, for example in certain high compression or turbocharged 

engines. Other fuel-related characteristics to assure timely compatibility with advanced 
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-3

technology vehicles may also need to be addressed during the period covered by this rulemaking. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 44-47.]

Also, market fuel quality, particularly octane level, can have a significant positive impact on all 

on-road vehicles and should, therefore, be a key part of our national strategy to improve energy 

security.

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Higher octane fuel would enable manufacturers to pursue strategies that better support 

development and introduction of advance vehicle technologies, and a consequent reduction in 

greenhouse gases and criteria emissions. To optimize engine fuel efficiency and minimize 

emissions, transitioning to higher octane regular and premium grade market gasoline may be 

necessary. VCC would support establishment of a minimum blend stock octane. In this way, 

adding ethanol would raise fuel octane without risk that blenders would make corresponding 

reductions in base blend stock octane, thereby undoing the octane benefit of ethanol addition. We 

recommend that EPA assess the environmental benefits of higher octane gasoline. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p.15]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF OCTANE. For SI gasoline-powered engines, octane is an 

extremely important fuel property to help the OEMs achieve both efficiency improvement and 

pollution reduction. NHTSA requested comment on whether higher octane fuels “may be 

necessary if certain advanced fuel economy-improving technologies are required by stringent 

CAFE standards” (p. 75335). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 3]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

In a recent letter to EPA Administrator Jackson, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers has 

suggested increasing gasoline octane levels: “...[T]o help achieve future requirements for the 

reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, we also recommend increasing the minimum market 

gasoline octane rating, commensurate with increased use of ethanol.” [See Attachment A in 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A4] The Auto Alliance also has recently 

stressed how important it is for regulators to recognize the differences between the various 

octane sources and the importance of ensuring fuel quality, in addition to controlling vehicle 

hardware and calibration effects. In comments submitted in September 2010 to California EPA 

on its LEV III certification fuel hearing, the Alliance noted that, “[a] Total Aromatics limit alone 

in the cert fuel spec does not preclude the blending of relatively high molecular weight aromatics 

that can lead to increased HC and PM emissions.” [See Attachment C in Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A6] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

11-4

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

While EPA did not specifically request comment on the matter of octane, it is our understanding 

that EPA assumes that the standard for SI engine fuel will be 87 octane (R + M/2), and that 

engine compression will be capped at 10.5:1. We believe this assumption unnecessarily inhibits 

fuel quality and engine design improvements that could be made available by both fuel providers 

and the OEMs, and that it could adversely impact the nation‘s petroleum dependence, carbon 

footprint, and health and welfare goals. Today, Aromatic Group Compounds constitute 

approximately 25% of an average gallon of U.S. gasoline, which refiners synthesize from crude 

oil to increase octane ratings. They are the most toxic, energy inefficient, carbon-intensive, and 

costly components in gasoline, and we believe that the goals of this rulemaking cannot be fully 

and efficiently met unless they are steadily reduced over time. As will be discussed further 

below, it is entirely realistic to reduce Aromatic Group Compounds in the U.S. gasoline pool 

while simultaneously increasing average octane levels over the life of this rulemaking. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 4]

Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

EPA/NHTSA should consider what fuel properties and characteristics, such as minimum octane 

levels, will be necessary to achieve the proposed CAFE/GHG standards. EPA should be mindful 

of these properties and characteristics as it considers both the final CAFE/GHG standards and the 

elements of the upcoming Tier 3 rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.2 and 7]

Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

Similarly, in a letter dated October 6, 2011, to EPA Administrator Jackson, the Alliance of 

Automobile Manufacturers stated, “...to help achieve future requirements for the reduction of 

greenhouse gas emissions, we also recommend increasing the minimum market gasoline octane 

rating, commensurate with increased use of ethanol. Adding ethanol to gasoline increases its 

octane rating” (Attachment B). We agree that EPA should consider including an increased 

minimum octane rating when contemplating changes to the certification test fuel. We fully 

understand that changes to fuel requirements will be primarily undertaken as part of the Tier 3 

rulemaking, and not as part of the CAFE/GHG rule. However, as stated earlier, we believe the 

two rules are tightly connected, and as such, the fuel properties and characteristics needed to 

achieve the 2017-2025 CAFE/GHG requirements must be closely examined as both rulemakings 

are advanced. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, pp.7-8] [For attachment B please refer to 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, pp.55-57]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

However, at this point, no mechanical approach seems to have solved the problem of engine 

knock in a high compression turbocharged engine, and manufacturers are still advising owners to 

use the higher octane fuel. Consumers will most likely follow a manufacturer's recommendation 

or risk a forced reduction in performance, increased maintenance costs, or engine damage. We 

believe that a greater volume of higher octane gasoline will be required to mix with regular high 

compression engines to achieve the GHG standards. This will mean that either higher volumes of 
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-5

ethanol, an oxygenate, will need to be added by gasoline distributors to boost octane levels or the 

refiner will need to supply higher octane base stock gasoline. A higher octane base stock may 

require additional chemical additives like alkylates to be produced and used at the refinery. The 

agencies have not adequately addressed these problems in any of the documentation in the public 

docket for this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

The Agencies Should Evaluate Fuel Costs, Availability, and Impacts of Higher Octane Gasoline.

The agencies should re-evaluate the costs in the proposed rulemaking's RIA to account for the 

increased cost to the consumer to purchase higher octane gasoline. The agencies should also 

examine the likely future availability of ethanol or alkylates needed to meet the standards in the 

proposed rulemaking and the potential for adverse environmental consequences due to increased 

production of higher octane gasoline. The agencies need to examine the ability of refiners to 

supply, and the ability of fuel distribution system to transport, higher octane gasoline. We ask 

that the agencies expand the consideration of costs and air quality impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Costs and Life-Cycle Costs. The extra cost for higher octane gasoline should be used to estimate 

the costs for this rulemaking. It appears that EPA used the cost of regular gasoline in their RIA 

(p. 3-15) for this rulemaking. Also, the increased performance that EPA is expecting to achieve 

from turbocharging and other technologies seems to be based on the vehicle using higher octane 

fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

All potential costs and environmental impacts must be considered such as supply chain burdens, 

transportation availability, market transition costs, capital investments for higher octane gasoline 

and/or for production of additional ethanol or alkylates and the possibility of shortages in some 

areas of the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Nevertheless, we are concerned that much of the nation’s gasoline supply will require higher 

octane levels to meet these GHG standards and that EPA has not considered the implications. 

EPA either needs to address (in the face of manufacturers’ current recommendations) why more 

mid-grade gasoline will not be needed to run turbocharged, high-compression engines or the 

implications of greater use of higher octane gasoline should be fully evaluated. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 5]

Organization: ICM Inc.

Octane. Health and Environmental Impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 

The question was posed in the NPRM as to what other health and environmental impacts 

associated with advancements in vehicle GHG reduction technologies should be considered. To 

the extent that those GHG reduction strategies involve smaller but higher compression engines 

that require higher octane fuels, the impacts could be considerable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9541-A2, p.2] 

Organization: ICM Inc.

Octane. Health and Environmental Impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 
EPA Response to Comments

11-6

In addition to our work in developing food and fuel technologies, ICM has been directly engaged 

in cooperative research with the auto industry, and we have focused much of our effort on 

maximizing the octane value of ethanol. In our ongoing work and discussions with automakers, it 

has become clear there are only a few avenues available to them that would enable them to meet 

the aggressive fuel economy and carbon reduction requirements of this Rule. Foremost among 

them is the likelihood of downsized engines that would have higher compression and require 

higher octane. These smaller engines operating on premium grade fuels can achieve significantly 

greater efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 

Organization: Growth Energy

As explained in Attachment 3 [pp. 22-41 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1] to this letter, there are strong policy reasons for EPA to establish regulations for a new 

gasoline certification fuel at 94 octane (AKI), and to provide for the general commercial 

availability of such a fuel for vehicles produced in or after MY 2017, in the same manner that 

“regular” gasoline at a lower octane level is now currently sold. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Growth Energy

Growth Energy recommends enforceable requirements for the gasoline marketing industry in the 

U.S. that will ensure the commercial availability of gasolines that have an octane value of 94, for 

use in optimizing the GHG performance of new vehicles certified to the proposed GHG emission 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 22]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

In sum, 87-octane fuel is a potentially significant limitation on technology improvement. 

Moreover, clean higher-octane components are lower in CO2 than the current principal source of 

octane in gasoline, as well as lower in traditional pollutants. It is clear that toxic-free premium

fuel is in fact necessitated by the rule, since the rule relies on advanced technologies that can 

only function on higher-octane fuel, and this fuel must be clean burning in order to avoid PM 

increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Two key fuel properties of concern to Alliance members for market fuel gasoline and gasoline 

blends are: (1) the need for continued reductions to minimize sulfur content, and (2) the need to 

transition to higher octane grades (most likely commensurate with higher ethanol or other biobased fuel blend content), and related issues about renewable fuel and base gasoline 

contributions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.84]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-7

Another provision of the 1990 CAAA—the mobile source air toxics (MSAT) provision—

requires EPA to reduce toxics as far as technology will permit. EPA has not enforced this 

section except to reduce benzene by modest amounts in 2007, notwithstanding the fact that the 

U.S. is drowning in non-toxic alternatives to gasoline and diesel (i.e., all of the non-petroleum 

alternatives like alcohols, natural gas, electricity, etc.). There were indications that EPA intended 

to address the issue of aromatics and octane in the Tier III rulemaking, but this may apparently 

longer be the case—hence the letter from the auto companies to EPA referred to above. But if 

EPA is not going to address octane in Tier III, it must do so now in order to allow the car 

companies more flexibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Alternative fuels all have two important characteristics in common. They are all essentially free 

of air toxics, which are the principal source of unhealthy particulate matter (PM). Both air toxics 

and PM are dangerous pollutants that are regulated under the CAA. Alternative fuels also have 

significantly higher octane ratings, which would enable higher compression. This, as the Ricardo 

study notes, allows for “increased thermodynamic efficiency” when used in connection with 

some direct injection technologies.”18 Yet the review does not appear to include a simple standalone compression increase as a proposed advance. The proposed rules provide no explanation 

for this omission. The Ricardo study indicates that the analysis is based throughout on a 10.5:1 

compression ratio,19 and further that the octane of the fuel used for evaluating all new 

technology is 87.20 If the octane available to the auto manufacturers is capped at 87, then they 

cannot seek efficiency gains from compression higher than the ratio identified above. Moreover, 

they may not be able to take advantage of other technologies such as direct fuel injection without 

increasing tailpipe pollution.21 Finally, they will not be able to take advantage of high-octane 

fuels such as alcohols and natural gas, which produce lower levels of both traditional pollutants 

and CO2 than gasoline and diesel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, pp. 6-7]

Response:

As evidenced by the analysis supporting this final action, we believe that the LD GHG 

standards being finalized today are entirely feasible and cost effective without the need for 

increasing the octane of gasoline. . Nor do we agree that higher octane fuel will be necessary 

for turbocharged and downsized engines to prevent the onset of combustion knock. EPA 

assumed no change in the octane of certification or in-use gasoline within its analysis and the 

effectiveness values used for the high BMEP engines reflect that fact. The current Ford 

EcoBoost turbocharged GDI engines do not require the use of premium fuel, although those 

engines are not operating at BMEP levels as high as those expected under our rule. Importantly,

a combination of both intake charge dilution (e.g., cooled EGR) and in-cylinder evaporative fuel 

cooling (e.g., direct injection) are expected to allow higher BMEP GDI engines to operate on 

regular grade gasoline. All packages at 27 bar BMEP analyzed by EPA included cooled EGR to 

allow higher BMEP operation and prevent the onset of combustion knock on current certification 

or in-use fuels. See Joint TSD p. 3-88 (“Use of GDI systems with turbocharged engines and airto-air charge air cooling also reduces the fuel octane requirements for knock limited combustion 

and allows the use of higher compression ratios.”) See also Joint TSD at p. 3-91 (“Use of GDI 

systems with turbocharged engines and air-to-air charge air cooling also reduces the fuel octane 
EPA Response to Comments

11-8

requirements for knock limited combustion and allows the use of higher compression ratios. 

Ford’s “Ecoboost” downsized, turbocharged GDI engines introduced on MY 2010 vehicles allow 

the replacement of V8 engines with V6 engines with improved in 0-60 mph acceleration and 

with fuel economy improvements of up to 12 percent.”) 

Consequently, we do not believe any regulatory action is warranted at this time to 

increase the octane level of all gasoline. Furthermore, any benefits of higher octane gasoline are 

already possible. Were manufacturers to design their vehicles to take advantage of higher octane 

fuel, such fuel - premium gasoline - is already available nationwide for those consumers who 

purchase such vehicles, and production of higher octane gasoline could easily rise to respond to 

market demand. There is not a compelling need to require consumers whose vehicles will not 

benefit appreciably from higher octane gasoline to pay for it.

11.2. Aromatics

The commenters highlight a number of potential health concerns with respect to the 

aromatic content of gasoline. 

Organizations contained in this section

American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) and Biomass Coordinating Council 

(BCC)

Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

Governors’ Biofuels Coalition

Growth Energy

ICM Inc.

Comments:

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

It is especially important to note that, in order to provide an accurate picture of the final rule‘s 

health and welfare impacts, the Agencies cannot evaluate emissions results based only on 

certification fuels and laboratory testing procedures such as the FTP and US06 methods. When 

real-world fuels containing on average 25% Aromatic Group Compounds are combusted under 

real-world driving conditions (e.g., stop-start, acceleration and high speeds, heavy loads, etc.), 

tailpipe emissions of harmful ambient particulate matter increase significantly, as the Aromatic 

Group Compounds‘ extraordinary resistance to complete combustion ultimately stymies the best 

efforts of the vehicles‘ catalytic converter. Even more worrisome is the fact that some of the 

more important new advanced engine technologies (e.g., gasoline direct injection) will make 

these emissions even worse if fuel quality is not improved. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, 

p. 2]

Organization: American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) and Biomass Coordinating 

Council (BCC)
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-9

3. Reducing the level of aromatics (BTX) in gasoline to limit emissions of highly healthdamaging particulate matter, especially ultrafine particulates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-

A2, p. 5]

Organization: American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) and Biomass Coordinating 

Council (BCC)

The continued use of BTX as octane enhancers represents a serious health threat according to 

existing data. BTX group compounds that do not completely combust remain in the air and form 

fine (known as PM2.5, or particulate matter smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter) and ultrafine 

particulate matter (UFP). There is extensive evidence linking PM2.5 and UFP to numerous 

diseases and conditions, including [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• Respiratory diseases such as asthma [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 2]

• Cardiovascular illness and heart diseases [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

• A wide range of cancers [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

• Infant mortality and premature birth [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9593-A2, p. 3]

Organization: ICM Inc.

Octane. Health and Environmental Impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 

Given the documented position of automakers as to their need for increased octane, it would be 

completely consistent to the Rule if a cap on aromatics was imposed, recognizing a failure to do 

so could, in fact, lead to significant increase in overall aromatic content and corresponding 

adverse health impacts as previously described. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.4] 

Organization: ICM Inc.

Octane. Health and Environmental Impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 

Replacing petroleum derived aromatics with 'clean octane,' i.e., ethanol, achieves both a 

petroleum reduction and the energy, economic, and health benefits that result from such a 

reduction, as well as a carbon reduction for the purposes of greenhouse gas mitigation and 

climate change. The cost of ethanol, as compared to current aromatic compounds used in 

gasoline, would favor consumers. As of late January, toluene, the most popular aromatic 

compound sold for octane purposes, was selling for $3.20 per gallon (Gulf Coast) while ethanolwith a higher blending octane value--was selling for $ 2.32 (Gulf Coast). This is a historical 

spread that has remained constant over several years (Fig 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-

A2, p.3] [For the associated figure please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.3] 

Organization: ICM Inc.

Octane. Health and Environmental Impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 

EPA needs to consider the source of that octane, given the increasing body of evidence 

suggesting the relationship between octane, aromatics and particulates. The Agency has long 

documented the relationship of air toxics and particulate matter to various respiratory ailments 

and other health risks. As EPA is well aware from its modeling in the MSAT Rule, ethanol is an 
EPA Response to Comments

11-10

excellent source of octane and, of course, has considerably lower carbon content than gasoline, 

even with full lifecycle penalties applied. Conversely, aromatic compounds, such as benzene, 

toluene, and xylene, are classified as air toxics, and benzene is a known carcinogen. It would 

appear to be in the public's best interest in terms of health and the environment to do everything 

possible to limit the aromatic content in gasoline so that the public is not subjected to these 

harmful compounds. Strictly from a carbon reduction standpoint, aromatic compounds can be 

20% more carbon intensive than gasoline itself. Ethanol can reduce base gasoline by 20%. When 

used to replace an aromatic compound, it would result in a potential total 40% carbon reduction. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, pp.2-3] 

Organization: ICM Inc.

Octane. Health and Environmental Impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.2] 

We believe the critical health impacts need to be considered as a result of higher octane fuels 

center around the under-regulated subset ofpm1iculates which are ultra-fine particulates (UFPs). 

They are produced as a result of the fuel combustion process and are not controlled via current 

vehicle technology, nor are they likely to be. Long thought to be a diesel or stationary source 

problem, increasing data suggests PM does have a relationship to gasoline, specifically UFPs, 

which are considerably smaller than the regulatory benchmark ofPM2.5 . They may actually be 

produced in the combustion process as a result of the higher aromatic content in gasoline, 

according to recent research by Honda.1 These UFPs are suspected of being a much more 

significant health threat as they can essentially bypass the lungs as a filter system and enter the 

bloodstream. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.3] 

Organization: ICM Inc.

1) The likelihood of increased octane needs of the auto industry resulting in higher aromatics; 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9541-A2, p.1] 

Organization: ICM Inc.

2) The negative health and environmental impacts of increasing octane from aromatics, the 

relationship of air toxics and aromatics to particulate formation, and the growing body of 

evidence showing aromatics to be precursors to ultra-fine particulates; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9541-A2, p.1] 

Organization: Growth Energy

Attachment 3 also explains why examination of the potential increases in emissions that EPA has 

regulated for many years (more specifically, fine particulate matter) in the current rulemaking is 

important even if EPA decides that it cannot take regulatory action under section 211 as the 

statute currently exists. The Agencies’ cost-benefit analysis of the standards in the Joint NPRM 

assumes reductions in fine particulate matter. If, as explained in Attachment 3 [pp. 22-41 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1], those standards would have the 

unintended effect of increasing engine PM emissions, then the cost-benefit analysis mandated by 

governing Executive Orders must be revised. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 6]
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-11

Organization: Growth Energy

Among the fuel-related mitigation methods, further regulation of the composition of gasoline 

should be considered since there is evidence that the heavier components of gasoline, i.e., the 

aromatics, contribute substantially to PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 40]

Organization: Governors' Biofuels Coalition

Petroleum refiners produce aromatics, also known as the BTX (benzene, toluene, xylene) Group, 

from crude oil. The BTX Group is the most toxic, energy inefficient, and expensive gasoline 

component. As crude oil costs escalate, BTX Group costs increase the price of gasoline 

disproportionately and affect the nation's economic growth. Lower cost, clean octane alternatives 

to the BTX Group include the use of intermediate ethanol blends and a greater reliance on 

natural gas vehicles and electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Governors' Biofuels Coalition

A final rule that fails to improve U.S. transportation fuel standards by reducing BTX Group 

compounds is the wrong policy for America. On behalf of the Coalition, I respectfully urge you 

to modify the proposed rule so as to provide market-based incentives and encourage the cost 

effective substitution of domestic clean octane alternatives for toxic BTX Group compounds 

derived largely from imported crude oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570-A1, pp. 2-3]

Organization: Governors' Biofuels Coalition

The Wall Street Journal reported on November 8, 2011 that emerging science points to an 

alarming but largely hidden trend: 'As roadways choke on traffic, researchers suspect that the 

tailpipe exhaust from cars and trucks - especially tiny carbon particles already implicated in heart 

disease, cancer and respiratory ailments - may also injure brain cells and synapses key to 

learning.' The article specifically noted the threat to expectant mothers who live near high-traffic 

areas, whose babies' DNA may be significantly harmed by 'prenatal exposure to high levels of 

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in exhaust.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Governors' Biofuels Coalition

The Health Effects Institute has also warned that '[u]ltrafine particles' ...small size and high 

surface area might make [them] especially toxic when inhaled. Many researchers have pointed to 

gasoline octane enhancers - known as aromatics - as the primary source of the urban ultrafine 

particles emissions and the toxic derivatives that coat them. Concern has heightened recently, 

given evidence that emissions of ultrafine particles might increase with greater use of gasoline 

direct-injection engines and other changes in fuels and technology.' For these reasons, European 

regulators have already announced their intention to regulate not only diesel, but also spark 

ignition and particle number emissions, which recent studies have shown are directly linked to 

aromatics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

11-12

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

In its 2007 MSAT Final Rule, EPA observed that “[t]here may be compelling reasons to consider 

aromatics control in the future, especially regarding reduction in secondary PM2.5 emissions, to 

the extent that evidence supports a role for aromatics in secondary PM2.5 emissions.”20 In a 2010 

study, EPA Office of Research and Development experts confirmed that anthropogenic 

pollution, especially mobile source primary carbonaceous particulate matter and NOx emissions, 

“facilitate transformation of naturally emitted VOCs to the particle phase.” EPA’s modeling 

predicted that reducing mobile source emissions could help to reduce biogenic SOA emissions in 

the eastern U.S. by as much as 50% or more.21 This rulemaking provides EPA an opportunity to 

recognize the significant role played by gasoline exhaust, not just diesel exhaust, and the 

dominant role that Aromatic Group Compounds play in gasoline emissions. A May 2010 UCLA 

study noted that “several polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are toxic to living 

organisms, and engine exhaust emissions constitute a major source in urban areas...We focus 

this report on our estimates of vapor-phase naphthalene (NAP) from gasoline and diesel engines

emissions...taking into consideration that SI engines constitute 96% of the estimated 28 million 

California vehicle fleet, and that the NAP content in regular and premium gasoline ranges from 

69 up to 2,600 ppm since 1999, reduction of NAP from SI fuels may constitute an effective 

means of reducing the emissions of a major SOA-forming precursor to the atmosphere of large 

urban centers.”22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, pp. 5-6]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

P. 75104, ULTRAFINE PARTICLES‘ PM AND AIR TOXIC HEALTH EFFECTS. We believe 

it is critically important for the Agencies to recognize the direct connection between the UFP 

fraction of PM2.5 and the deadly toxics that coat them: the polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons + 

quinones (PAHQs). Two of the nation‘s leading UFP authorities released a 2009 study finding 

that “[u]rban UFP contain a higher content per unit mass of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 

which are relevant organic constituents since they can induce oxidative stress...in human tissues 

after conversion to quinones...”25 Over the past decade, advancing science and measurement 

techniques have established that the PAHQs—which experts say are carcinogenic, cytotoxic, and 

genotoxic—”hitchhike” on the tiny particles, which carry them to the bloodstream and 

throughout the body to the organs.26 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 7]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

P. 75112, OTHER HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH 

ADVANCEMENTS IN VEHICLE GHG REDUCTION TECHNOLOGIES. We strongly urge 

the Agencies to recognize the substantial body of evidence that links gasoline Aromatic Group 

Compounds to increasing levels of urban PM (PM2.5 , which includes the UFPs), which are 

coated with highly toxic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and quinones (PAHQs). Attachment 

E summarizes and provides cites for just a few of the leading epidemiological and related studies 

that provide alarming evidence linking gasoline Aromatic Group Compound combustion 

products to premature births and infant mortality, a wide range of cancers, asthma and other 

respiratory diseases, cardiovascular and heart conditions, and even brain disorders and autism. 
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-13

Many of the same PAHs found in secondhand cigarette smoke are found in gasoline exhaust (see 

cites 10, 11, and 12 of Attachment E), and for the tens of millions of Americans who live within 

300 – 2,500 meters of congested roadways, there is no escape from the particle-bound toxics that 

originate from incomplete combustion of Aromatic Group Compounds.23 [Attachment E can be 

found in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A8] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, p. 7]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

In short, Aromatic Group Compounds are expensive to manufacture, and their costs escalate as 

crude oil prices rise. Aromatic Group Compounds would be even less cost competitive compared 

to Clean Octane alternatives if appropriate actions were taken to level the playing field, and 

Aromatic Group Compounds‘ true social costs were fully considered (under current policy, these 

costs are not borne by petroleum refiners as they should be, but rather by taxpayers and other 

industries in the form of higher health care spending and lost productivity, etc.). This is true even 

though budgetary pressures are forcing an end to tax incentives and other forms of public sector 

support for alternative fuel technologies. Examples of commercially available and costcompetitive Clean Octane alternatives to the Aromatic Group Compounds include: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, pp. 4-5]

• Compressed natural gas (CNG), especially in centrally fueled fleets

• Biofuels, especially intermediate ethanol blends (e.g., E30+) [See Attachment B in 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A5] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 

5]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

Consider the many shortcomings of Aromatic Group Compounds:

• Gasoline and finished product yield losses at the refinery due to the energy intensive 

requirements of the catalytic reformer

• High cost component which escalates as crude oil prices increase

• High carbon intensity component

• Incomplete combustion properties exacerbate wide range of tailpipe emissions

• Primary source of urban ambient particulate matter 9

• Primary source of urban polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and quinones 

(oxidative derivatives of Aromatic Group Compounds)10 that coat the UFP particles in PM2.5 

• Major culprit in combustion chamber deposits , which over time reduce vehicle 

efficiency and increase carbon and other harmful tailpipe emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, p. 4]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CFDC)

Congress most certainly did not intend for EPA to reduce one non-health pollutant (CO2) while 

inadvertently increasing emissions of one of the nation‘s more dangerous health pollutants (PM 

2.5). As will be demonstrated below, extensive scientific evidence provides ample basis to 

“reasonably anticipate” that particulate emissions from Aromatic Group Compounds represent a 

serious health threat today, and one that is almost certain to get worse unless new fuel quality 
EPA Response to Comments

11-14

standards that complement new engine technologies are imposed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A3, p. 3]

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

ESTIMATED COST AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS. As referenced in Attachment B 

[see Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A5], the 2008 – 2011 cost comparison of 

USGC spot toluene prices (a reference marker for Aromatic Group Compound pricing in 

general) and USGC ethanol prices shows that toluene prices have exceeded ethanol prices by an 

average of approximately $.70/ gallon over the three-year period, and more than $.80 per gallon 

over the past two years. (Q3 and Q4 in 2008 saw a precipitous drop in crude oil prices, from 

approximately $140 per barrel at its peak to $70+ per barrel at year-end. This global recessioninduced plunge in oil prices had a direct, and aberrational, price depression effect on Aromatic 

Group Compounds.) As a March 2010 United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food, and 

Rural Affairs report confirmed, world corn prices also dropped precipitously during this period, 

in line with oil and other raw commodities, even though U.S. ethanol production actually 

increased, a relationship that clearly refutes the much-publicized but fallacious “food vs. fuel” 

attacks.30 The cost advantages of ethanol‘s Clean Octane compared to the Aromatic Group 

Compound‘s Dirty Octane, while impressive enough, pales in comparison to the enormous health 

benefits as well as reduced petroleum and carbon footprint benefits that would be achieved. 

Attachment F [see Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A10] explains the basis of 

the table that extrapolates from EPA and Energy Future Coalition sources, and suggests that a 

gradual phase-down in Aromatic Group Compounds could save the public and private sectors 

more than $400 billion per year by 2025. [See Attachment G in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9574-A11] In the final rule, we strongly urge the Agencies to take all of its these 

critically important cost-benefit factors into account, especially as the EPA reassesses its PM2.5

SOA apportionment due to mobile sources based upon its new CMAQ modeling results. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, pp. 8-9]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

These factors suggest how EPA can avoid the impermissible side effect of this rulemaking that 

will increase traditional and life endangering PM pollution as the price for reducing CO2. Rather 

than relying on the uncertain possibility of finalizing a future rulemaking to impose tailpipe PM 

restrictions, which may not in fact eliminate the secondary atmospheric reactions that cause most 

fine particle harm, EPA should use fuel efficiency concerns that ARE the subject of this proposal 

to solve this problem. This would involve the obvious step of reducing the most carbon intensive 

fuel components— aromatics—which would have positive outcome of reducing CO2, 

eliminating the impermissible traditional pollutant increases, and providing needed octane, all at 

the same time. This could and should be done in this proceeding, which, as discussed above, 

needs in any event to make available the statutory incentives for the non-petroleum alternatives 

(which are also substitutes for toxic aromatics and the key to increasing clean octane—a 

necessary precursor to innovation in fuel-efficient internal combustion). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9506-A1, pp. 10-11]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-15

Ozone and CO2 itself are also implicated. Reducing aromatics reduces ozone as well as PM, 

since aromatics are highly reactive photochemically even if not highly volatile. Restriction of 

aromatics thus contributes more to ozone reduction than Reid vapor pressure (RVP) controls that 

address only the so-called “light-ends” like butane and pentane, since these are highly volatile 

but virtually unreactive.35 But EPA discourages this shift not only by blocking state VOC 

regulation and capping the effects of the multiplier for purposed of curbing oil imports, but also 

by penalizing ethanol and methanol by not making allowance for their air quality and other 

benefits. In fact, aromatics are 20% more carbon-intensive than gasoline, meaning that direct 

octane substitutes like ethanol and methanol, which are less carbon intensive, provide in fact as 

much as a 50% improvement over gasoline in CO2, in addition to the PM, ozone and mileage 

improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 10]

 Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Finally, it is important to note that aromatics are more wasteful and, therefore, more expensive 

than gasoline, ethanol and methanol. The rule of thumb is that every point of octane generated by 

the reformers’ production of aromatics uses 1% percent of crude. In part as a result, the BTX 

group costs nearly one dollar more per gallon than regular gasoline. Therefore, EPA and DOE 

are incorrect to calculate ethanol’s or methanol’s fuel equivalency solely on the basis of BTU 

content, since upstream fuel consumption and accompanying pollution increases are relevant 

factors along with the increased efficiency allowed by the high octane of ethanol, methanol, and 

CNG. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 10]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

EPA’s failure to address the issue of octane, aromatics and air toxics is curious in light of the 

Presidential directive to do so in Section 3 of the Presidential Memorandum of September 2010. 

Moreover, EPA acknowledges on page 6-32 of its DRIA that it “is important to quantify the 

health and environmental impacts associated with the proposed standard, because a failure to 

adequately consider these ancillary co-pollutant impacts could lead to an incorrect assessment of 

their net costs and benefits.” But the proposed rule itself is silent on the question. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 7]

Response:

In response to comments (most from Boyden Gray and Associates) that EPA should 

reduce the amount of aromatics in vehicular fuels to reduce secondary PM and photochemical 

ozone formation, those issues are beyond the scope of this proceeding. Furthermore, the 

innuendo that EPA is trading CO2 reduction for increases in PM and air toxics under this rule is 

not correct. 

The rule does not result in increases to either the PM, ozone, or air toxics inventories, but 

rather to reductions. For PM, the results indicate that in 2030, a population weighted average 

reduction of approximately 0.01 ug/m3 can be expected (see RIA Chapter 6.3.1). For ozone, we 
EPA Response to Comments

11-16

estimate that in 2030, on a population-weighted basis, there is virtually no change in ambient 

concentrations in ozone. 

In terms of health impacts, however, it is clear that upstream reductions in emissions 

related to ambient concentrations of both direct and indirect PM outweigh the slight emission 

increases associated with rebound driving (and none associated with fuel content, contrary to the 

commenter’s statements). In terms of PM-related health impacts, we estimate that in 2030, 

emission reductions associated with the rule will result in between 110 to 280 fewer premature 

mortalities across the U.S. Compared to the estimate of 1 to 3 additional ozone-related 

premature mortalities associated with rebound-related emission increases, it is clear that 

upstream emission reductions outweigh the slight downstream emission increases and in fact 

improve health on a national basis. 

EPA estimates the full range of pollution impacts from the standards, including emissions 

at the tailpipe and emissions from “upstream” sources such as power plants, refineries, and fuel 

transportation and distribution. Please refer to Preamble Section III.G.1 and RIA Chapter 4 for a 

complete description of the emissions impacts of the rulemaking and the estimation 

methodology. This includes both upstream and tailpipe VOC emissions associated with the final 

standards. We use these non-GHG inventories to estimate the changes in ambient concentrations 

of PM, ozone, and selected air toxics. Please refer to Chapter 6 of the RIA for a description of 

both the air quality modeling and health impact analyses. Taken together, the non-GHG 

emission changes yield a net reduction in human health risk and contribute to the overall benefits 

of the standards.

Furthermore, as ethanol use in gasoline has continued to rise in response to market forces 

and RFS, the additional octane provided by ethanol has been used by refiners to reduce the 

concentration of aromatics (another source of octane) in the gasoline they supply. As shown 

below in figure below, there has been a 15 percent decrease in aromatics with the rise in ethanol 

use over the past decade. With the increased use of ethanol, not only have the aromatic levels in 

gasoline been declining, but we project that they will continue to decline. The average level of 

aromatics in gasoline today is around 22 percent, although it ranges from 3 to 47 percent on a 

batch basis, and 10 to 40 percent on a refinery average basis due to the wide variation in refinery 

configuration, crude oil source, and available product markets. 
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-17

Figure: Aromatics and Gasoline Ethanol Concentration vs. Time

11.3. Need to harmonize in-use/certification fuels with LD GHG

Organizations contained in this section

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Volvo Car Corporation

Comments:

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Changes to the Test Fuel Used for Emissions and Fuel Economy Certification

EPA suggests that it may in the future consider changing the property specifications of the test 

fuel used to certify the emissions and fuel economy performance of new vehicles vis-à-vis the 

standards, and it specifically indicates that the fuel may include some unspecified amount of 

ethanol. API’s fundamental position on the ethanol content of federal gasoline certification test 

26.6 27.1

26 26.5

27.3

26.4

25.6 25.1

23.5 23.6

22.6

1.3 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.0

4.0

4.9

7.2

8.1

9.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Gasoline Concentration (vol%)

Avg. Corrected Aromatics, vol% (AAM)

Avg. EtOH, vol% (EIA)
EPA Response to Comments

11-18

fuel remains unchanged from that conveyed in earlier comments on the MY 2012-2016 

CAFE/GHG rule for light-duty vehicles: “The ethanol concentration of the certification reference 

fuel should match the fuel that vehicles are expected to use.”20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9469-A1, p 9]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Changes to the Test Fuel Used for Emissions and Fuel Economy Certification

EPA suggests that it may in the future consider changing the property specifications of the test 

fuel used to certify the emissions and fuel economy performance of new vehicles vis-à-vis the 

standards, and it specifically indicates that the fuel may include some unspecified amount of 

ethanol. API’s fundamental position on the ethanol content of federal gasoline certification test 

fuel remains unchanged from that conveyed in earlier comments on the MY 2012-2016 

CAFE/GHG rule for light-duty vehicles: “The ethanol concentration of the certification reference 

fuel should match the fuel that vehicles are expected to use.”20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9469-A1, p 9]

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

We believe that EPA should change the test fuel used for certifying emission standards of 

passenger cars and light-duty vehicles in the laboratory. For years, EPA has been using a 

gasoline for emissions testing that is never used by motorists to determine if a vehicle meets 

emission standards. We believe this leads to an unrealistic estimate of emissions and fuel

efficiency. EPA needs to follow CARB’s lead and use a fuel for emissions testing that is more 

representative of what the nation's consumers use, such as a fuel that contains 10 percent ethanol. 

A representative fuel will produce more realistic emissions testing results and promote a firmer 

understanding of what emissions are produced in the mobile sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7821-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

The National Program recognizes the importance of harmonizing regulatory programs. Reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing energy independence depends upon coordinating the 

regulation of tailpipe emissions with the regulation of fuels. This includes not only enhancing the 

amount of renewable energy producing electricity to reduce upstream emissions associated with 

electricity generation, but also ensuring the availability of ultra-low sulfur fuels.7 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-4]

Ultra low sulfur gasoline is a key enabler for the incorporation of lean bum advanced combustion 

technologies that require dedicated lean NOx after-treatment hardware. Ultra low sulfur gasoline 

also permits significant further fuel economy gains (8-10%) in downsized turbocharged engines 

by reducing the frequency and intensity of sulfur 'bum-off' cycles in exhaust after-treatment 

components otherwise needed to keep those devices at peak operating efficiency. DAG believes 

it to be feasible to achieve sulfur reduction in market fuels to 10 ppm. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9483-A1, p. A-4]
Gasoline Fuel Quality

11-19

Ultra low sulfur diesel fuel is also important. DAG, then as part of DaimlerChrysler, played a 

key role in the efforts to bring ultra low sulfur diesel fuel to the United States. These efforts were 

further supported when B5 biodiesel was specified as the factory fill for Jeeps equipped with the 

Mercedes-Benz 3.0L common rail diesel engine. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-4]

DAG remains concerned about state efforts to promote and mandate biodiesel blends of B10 or 

greater and encourages the EPA to employ a federal policy to promote B5 use nationwide. Doing 

so would create a foundation for engine, exhaust after-treatment and biodiesel technologies to 

mature as a system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. A-4]

DAG supports EPA's efforts with regard to Tier 3, and California's efforts with regard to LEV 3, 

and looks forward to continuing to work with the agencies both to promote ultra low sulfur fuels 

and to address remaining concerns with those regulatory programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9483-A1, p. A-4]

7 The agencies properly take a Tank to Wheel approach to electric battery generation, applying a 

factor of 0 g/m for the electric generation. Automobile manufacturers are able to apply 

technology, and base their compliance, only on the vehicles they sell. Automakers have no 

control over the sources of electricity generation, an area that EPA has ample authority to 

regulate independent of tailpipe emissions. Emissions, moreover, should be treated the same. 

Upstream emissions from the production of oil are not included; nor should those from electric 

vehicles be included. Finally, any information relating to upstream emissions provided to the 

public should be provided with regard to all vehicles. The agencies should not include only 'net' 

upstream emissions beyond those applicable to ICE vehicles because doing so would mislead the 

public into believing that only EVs involve upstream emissions.

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

We believe that EPA should change the test fuel used for certifying emission standards of 

passenger cars and light-duty vehicles in the laboratory. For years, EPA has been using a 

gasoline for emissions testing that is never used by motorists to determine if a vehicle meets 

emission standards. We believe this leads to an unrealistic estimate of emissions and fuel 

efficiency. EPA needs to follow CARB’s lead and use a fuel for emissions testing that is more 

representative of what the nation's consumers use, such as a fuel that contains 10 percent ethanol. 

A representative fuel will produce more realistic emissions testing results and promote a firmer 

understanding of what emissions are produced in the mobile sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7821-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

The same criteria that govern the need for new test procedures to measure extremely low 

emissions adequately and correctly also dictate the need for low-sulfur fuel. It is essential to 

avoid sacrificing environmental gains achieved by use of advanced technology by failing to 

recognize the positive effect of higher quality fuel or the impact of sulfur on catalyst efficiency 
EPA Response to Comments

11-20

over time. Lower sulfur in fuel will also result in environmental gains for the existing fleet since 

the catalyst deactivation will be minimized. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p.15]

Response:

The LD GHG standards are based on current certification test fuel qualities and are not 

dependent on any changes occurring to certification test fuel qualities. If the certification test 

fuel is changed through a future rulemaking, EPA would be required to address the need for a 

test procedure adjustment to preserve the level of stringency of the CAFÉ standards. EPA is 

committed to doing so in a timely manner to ensure that any change in certification fuel will not 

affect the stringency of future GHG emission standards.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-1

12. Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

Organizations Included in this Section

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 53.]

What we're hopeful about is that if new technologies come into vehicles are incorporated into 

vehicle design and production earlier, that then it will be shown that the cost of having those 

technologies in vehicles lessens the idea that, you know, you down the cost of -- as you move 

into production, you move down the cost in terms of implementing the technologies and the cost 

drops for production.

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

The agencies based this proposal on rigorous, peer-reviewed technical analysis. We appreciate 

the continued commitment of the agencies to utilize independent technical analysis as well as 

information collected from manufacturers. In particular, UCS acknowledges the importance of 

the tear-down cost studies conducted by FEV, the technology effectiveness modeling conducted 

by Ricardo Engineering, and the mass-reduction and safety potential analysis conducted by 

Lotus. These studies represent the most up-to-date and highest quality work in these areas. 

Studies of these kinds were recommended by the National Academies as important tools in 

improving estimates of the cost and performance of new vehicle technologies.16 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, pp. 5-6]

16 See, for example, Finding 3-3 and Finding 8-4 in the 2011 National Academies report, 

Assessment of Fuel Economy Technologies for Light-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9567-A2, p. 5]

Response:

Regarding comments from NACAA, we fully expect that costs for GHG reducing 

technology will drop as these technologies are introduced and their production numbers increase. 

Our learning curve effect (see joint TSD 3.1.3) captures those anticipated reductions in cost.

Regarding comments from UCS, we fully agree that the many studies conducted and cited in 

support of our final standards—FEV teardowns, technology effectiveness modeling by Ricardo, 
EPA Response to Comments

12-2

and mass reduction studies by Lotus—are extremely important pieces of our rulemaking effort 

and represent the most up-to-date and highest quality work in these areas.

12.1. Baseline, Reference and Control Fleets for Evaluating Standards

Organizations Included in this Section

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Chrysler Group LLC

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) 

BASELINE AND OTHER SCENARIOS

The agencies’ baseline scenario assumes that fuel economy remains at 2016 levels absent the 

proposed new standards. However, NHTSA also “examines the impact of an alternative ‘marketdriven’ baseline, which allows for some increases in fuel economy due to ‘voluntary 

overcompliance’ beyond the MY 2016 levels” (NPRM p.75167). NHTSA requests comment on 

this alternative baseline. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.2]

There is little historical basis for a scenario in which there is a sustained increase in fuel 

economy in the absence of increases in standards. Public interest in fuel economy does shift with 

fuel prices, but even that interest typically has followed from large, rapid changes in price and 

has been short-lived. The fuel prices on which the various agency analyses are largely based are 

EIA projections and do not contain dramatic increases in price. Under these conditions, 

manufacturers not constrained by fuel economy standards historically have employed 

technological advances to increase vehicle power and acceleration, rather than to improve fuel 

economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.2]

Incorrect specification of the baseline scenario will lead to an incorrect valuation of the proposed 

standards. An alternative baseline such as the one considered by NHTSA will reduce 

manufacturers’ costs to meet the standards, because some of the added technology required to 

meet the standard will already appear in the baseline. At the same time, the benefits attributable 

to the standards will decline. The net effect is a reduction in the cost-effectiveness of the 

standards, because the most cost-effective technologies are the ones that will appear in the 

alternative baseline scenario, leaving the more expensive technologies for the rule to bring into 

the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.2]

The same issue arises from EIA’s AEO 2012 Early Release (EIA 2012), which projects an 

increase in new vehicle fuel economy after 2016 without adoption of the proposed rule, and 

without major increases in fuel prices. Roughly one-quarter of the reduction in new vehicles’ 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-3

fuel consumption that would result from the proposed standards appears in the AEO 2012 

Reference Case. Hence it is all the more important that NHTSA clarify that the baseline scenario 

used in the NPRM should be the basis for evaluating the benefits of the final rule. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.2]

Recommendations

Clarify that the baseline scenario used to evaluate the benefits of the rule will not assume 

“voluntary over-compliance” by manufacturers after 2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, 

p.3]

Make available on the EPA web site the OMEGA outputs for the various scenarios considered.

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.3]

Organization: Chrysler Group LLC

The Agencies provide 2008MY and 2025MY sales projections for various manufacturers in 

Table II-1 of the NPRM. These projections show Chrysler with annual sales of ~1.7 million 

light-duty vehicles, dropping to 0.8 million light-duty vehicles in 2025; a 53% decline over 17 

years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.21]

This negative projection of Chrysler’s viability is problematic. In addition, to potentially 

affecting the analyses upon which the Agencies have based the proposed standards, projections 

of this type can also affect Chrysler’s relations with our suppliers and customers. When suppliers 

and customers see projections, supported by Federal agencies, that indicate a 53% decline in 

sales, they are potentially given a highly negative view of the viability of the company. These 

negative views may result in less favorable contracts with suppliers and lower sales to customers. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9495-A1, p.21]

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Advanced Technology Has Already Been Substantially Incorporated Into the Fleet [See Table 1 

on p. 7 of Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1]

The Agency’s arbitrary selection of a four year old data set is unconscionable. Manufacturers 

have already implemented into their product line many of the technologies recommended by the 

Agency at substantially higher costs. At a minimum the Agency must postpone promulgation of 

the final rule until it completely recalibrates their models using up to date data on the cost and 

benefits of new technology along with using an up to date baseline vehicle fleet. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0166-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

B. FLAT 2016 BASELINE

EDF supports EPA’s proposal to assume the reference case fleet in MY 2017–2025 would have 

fleet wide GHG emissions performance no better than that projected to be necessary to meet the 
EPA Response to Comments

12-4

MY 2016 standards. Because EPA is using AEO2011 fuel price forecasts, which project 

relatively stable fuel prices over the next 15 years, it is reasonable to assume that manufacturers 

will not overcomply with the 2016 standards and/or consumers will not demand fuel economy 

greater than the 2016 standard. It is also reasonable to assume that fleetwide overcompliance will 

not occur because any voluntary over-compliance by one company would generate credits that 

could be sold to other companies to substitute for their more expensive compliance technologies. 

Therefore, the ability to buy and sell credits would eliminate any over-compliance for the overall 

fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 8]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

6) Baseline Assumption Sensitivity Case

There is a difference between how EPA and NHTSA handled the modeled Reference Fleet 

Scenario. EPA projects that in the absence of the proposed GHG and CAFE standards, the 

reference case fleet in MY 2017-2025 would have fleetwide GHG emissions performance no 

better than that projected to be necessary to meet the MY 2016 standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 18]

While NHTSA used the same baseline assumptions for their primary analyses, they also 

conducted a sensitivity analysis with an alternative baseline, which assumed that fuel economy 

would continue to increase after 2016 without regulation. NHTSA stated:

'The assumption is that the market would drive manufacturers to put technologies into their 

vehicles that they believe consumers would value and be willing to pay for.' [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 18]

Again, while sensitivity analyses can illuminate the impacts of important uncertainties, there is 

little or no evidence supporting this particular case. Except during the oil crisis in the 1970s and 

a brief period for passenger cars in the late 2010s, the market has never driven improvements in 

vehicle fuel economy. Even these two examples are not relevant to the current situation. The 

demand for higher fuel economy in the 1970s was driven primarily by fears of oil unavailability 

and ongoing future increases in fuel price. The modest increase in passenger cars in the late 

2010s followed 20 years of unchanging CAFE standards. Thus, NHTSA's sensitivity analysis 

inappropriately calculates a lower estimate of net benefits of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 18]

The proposed 2017-25 standards follow aggressive increases in standards from 2011 through 

2016. Further, the change to a footprint-based standard means that all manufacturers must 

increase the efficiency of their vehicles to comply, even manufacturers of primarily smaller 

vehicles. Thus, the 2012-16 standards have already driven the market beyond the level of 

efficiency it would have demanded in the absence of standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 18]

The reason why efficiency standards are effective and needed is consumer discounting of 

uncertain, future fuel savings, as explained above. Efficiency standards move the market from 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-5

the level of efficiency demanded by loss averse consumers to the level of efficiency desired by 

society. It will be many years after 2016 before additional technology development and lower 

cost will finally fall to the level demanded by consumers from the higher level demanded by 

society through efficiency standards. The historical precedent is that it took 20 years of 

unchanging CAFE standards combined with high real and nominal fuel prices before the market 

started to demand additional fuel economy for passenger cars in the late 2000s. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 19]

ICCT recommends that the sensitivity analysis for market-driven increases in efficiency after 

2016 be removed from the Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 19]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

A. Baseline Projection

NRDC supports the baseline forecast for MY 2017 and beyond that assumes manufacturers meet 

but do not exceed the MY 2016 standards. Voluntary overcompliance—in which manufacturers 

apply efficiency technology in excess of what is needed to meet the MY 2016 standard—is 

possible but too uncertain to be incorporated in a baseline projection. Rapidly rising fuel prices 

are potentially a reason for overcompliance but during periods of only modest average annual 

price increases, overcompliance was not widespread. In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, real motor 

gasoline prices rose at an average rate of 4 percent per year yet full-line manufacturers, such as 

the GM, Ford and Chrysler, applied just enough technology to meet the standards. From 2017 to 

2035, EIA projects motor gasoline prices that increase at a lower rate of about 1 percent per year. 

With the projected low rate of annual price growth, the modification of the 2016 baseline is 

unjustified.

Further, NRDC disagrees with NHTSA that a sensitivity analysis of voluntary overcompliance is 

warranted, and we recommend that it be excluded from the final rule. The voluntary 

overcompliance analysis is counter-productive to the goals of maximizing petroleum reductions 

as required by EPCA.

If, in future rulemakings, the baseline was altered to account for voluntary overcompliance—

assuming it can be reasonably justified as highly likely—NHTSA would be inclined to set a 

lower standard than what could be achieved with appropriate cost-effective technology 

application. The achievement of overcompliance assumes that low-cost efficiency technologies 

are applied by manufacturers first (NHTSA assumes a 1-year payback). The remaining 

technologies to be driven by the standard would therefore be more expensive, increasing the 

costs associated with the standards. The standards themselves would also be associated with 

lower benefits because the savings from lower-cost technologies would be assigned to the market 

instead of the standard. The resulting reduced benefit-to-cost ratio would be a dampening force 

on efforts to maximize fuel efficient technology adoption and could push down the standard 

stringency.

If, during this scenario of a weaker standard, automakers did not overcomply, U.S. petroleum 

consumption would be higher and counter to the mandate of EPCA. To avoid this situation, 
EPA Response to Comments

12-6

NHTSA and EPA should continue to use a baseline that assumes automakers do not overcomply. 

This ensures that standards are set as strong as possible, and it provides greater certainty that 

needed oil consumption and GHG emission reductions will be achieved.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Use a flat baseline in assessing post 2016 fuel efficiency: NHTSA is taking comment on the 

notion that the post-2016 baseline for vehicle standards should assume “market driven” 

improvements in fuel economy absent standards and account for those improvements in the 

baseline. The Knittel study, referenced above, in addition to the historic trend are evidence that 

absent standards automakers will not increase gas mileage. Leading up to 2008, automakers were 

not prepared for increasing fuel prices and shifting consumer preferences. The consequences to 

the auto industry and the economy were devastating. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 7]

NHTSA’s consideration that new vehicle labels that will provide consumers with more detailed 

information on mileage and savings and that this will influence consumer choices is insufficient 

basis for using a baseline that presumes automakers will apply technologies to meaningfully 

improve gas mileage beyond 2016 absent strong final 2017-2025 standards. While some 

automakers may voluntarily “over-comply” with the 2012-16 program due to market forces, 

overcompliance in one segment of a fleet (cars for example) could be used to offset lower 

mileage vehicles such as larger pickups and SUVs. In addition, because the compliance with the 

program allows for banking, trading and carry-forward and backward credits, any presumption 

that automakers will improve fuel economy after 2016 could be part of a compliance strategy 

that includes the 2012-16 model years or planned compliance with these proposed standards. 

Over-compliance across the entire fleet heading into the mid-term review included in the NPRM 

would support strengthening the overall program. The agencies should use a flat baseline beyond 

2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 7]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen recognizes that the agencies are privy to confidential product plans supplied by 

manufacturers and that the agencies rely on this data to support future projections. However, the 

US has been averaging a near 50/50% split between cars and trucks for many years. Even at 

times of peak gasoline prices experienced during the past few years, interest in light trucks may 

have waned, however not to such a drastic extent as indicated by this radical shift in future 

product plans. Most disturbing is the recent trend back to light trucks even with fuel prices 

stabilizing near record highs. Volkswagen sees no evidence that would suggest a near 30% 

decline in truck market share from domestic OEMs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 9]

Volkswagen is not privy to strategic plans by competitors, but we find it unlikely for OEMs 

historically focused on truck sales to so readily abandon what has proven to be a successful and 

profitable market segment. Dropping 30% truck share for a company like Ford would be 

equivalent to Ford cancelling their entire line-up of F150s, a vehicle which has remained a top, if 

not the top, seller in the US for many years. In addition, the proposals preferential treatment for 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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large trucks and pick-ups further makes it unlikely that manufacturers would now prefer to 

market cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, pp. 9-10]

Response:

Response to Chrysler LLC:

The agencies’ projection that Chrysler’s sales would steadily decline was primarily 

attributable to the manufacturer- and segment-level forecasts provided in December 2009 by 

CSM. The agencies thought that forecast to have been credible at the time considering economic 

and industry conditions during the months before CSM provided the agencies with a long-range 

forecast, when the overall light vehicle market was severely depressed and Chrysler and GM 

were—with nascent federal assistance—in the process of reorganizing. We recognize that 

Chrysler’s production has since recovered to levels suggesting much better long-term prospects 

than forecast by CSM in 2009. While the agencies are continuing to use the market forecast 

developed for the NPRM (after minor corrections unrelated to Chrysler’s comments), we are also 

using a second market forecast we have developed for today’s final rule, making use of a newer 

forecast (in this case, from LMC) of manufacturer- and segment-level shares, a forecast that 

shows significantly higher sales (more than double that of the earlier forecast) for Chrysler in 

2025. This analysis is shown in Joint TSD Chapter 1.5 and the EPA modeling results are shown 

in RIA Chapter 10. We note further that the agencies have documented the differences in 

volume and characteristics of the MY 2008 based fleet and the MY 2010 based fleet, and these 

differences do not justify any change in the ultimate standards. See Joint TSD section 1.5. 

Likewise, EPA concluded that “these two market forecasts contain certain differences, although 

as discussed in TSD Chapter 1.5, the differences are not significant enough to change the 

agencies’ decision as to the structure and stringency of the final standards, and indeed 

corroborate the reasonableness of the final standards.” See Joint TSD Chapter 1.5.

Response to Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Even though the year of publication of this rule is 2012, model year 2010 was the most 

recent baseline dataset available due to the lag between the actual conclusion of a given model 

year and the submission (for CAFE compliance purposes) of production volumes for that model 

year. Moreover, as explained below in the joint TSD and in our respective RIAs, EPA and 

NHTSA measure the costs and benefits of new standards as incremental levels beyond those that 

would result from the application of technology given continuation of baseline standards (i.e., 

continuation of the standards that will be in place in MY 2016). Therefore, our analysis of 

manufacturers’ capabilities is informed by analysis of technology that could be applied in the 

future even absent the new standards, not just technology that had been applied in 2008 or 2010. 

This can be seen from the similarity in projected costs between the analyses shown in section 

III.D (MY 2008 based forecast) and RIA chapter 10 (MY 2010 based forecast). 

Response to Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), International Council on Clean 

Transportation (ICCT), Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, Natural 

Resources Defense Council (NRDC), American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 
EPA Response to Comments

12-8

(ACEEE), and Clean Air Council is in Preamble section III.D.1.a. In short, we agree with all of 

the commenters addressing the issue that the assumption of a flat baseline absent post-MY 2016 

GHG standards for these vehicles has full historic and empirical justification.22

Response to Volkswagen Group of America

The actual decline agencies projected was 23%, mostly due to falling sales from Chrysler 

(65%). NPRM’s 2008 baseline fleet was created using CSM Automotives 2009 projections 

market share/model mix, and AEO 2011 sales volumes and car/truck split. The forecast from 

CSM was greatly influenced by Chrysler’s bankruptcy and accounts for the majority of the 

decline in trucks. For the final rulemaking, the agencies created an alternative fleet using 2010 

CAFE data, a future fleet projection from LMC (JD Powers) Automotives 2011 projections of 

market share/model mix, and AEO 2012 sales volumes and car/truck split.

12.2. Types of Technologies Considered and Their Effectiveness

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

BMW of North America, LLC

Center for Biological Diversity

Eaton Corporation

Honeywell Transportation Systems

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Jackson, F.W.

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Examples of anticipated battery technology breakthroughs include energy storage and 

management as well as power electronics capabilities; new battery chemistries and materials; 

new types of charging and faster charging; and advances in smart grid technology. Additional 

anticipated breakthroughs include the emergence of new, low-global warming potential fuels; 

high-efficiency transmissions; new down-weighting technologies and light-weight materials. The 

agency should also evaluate the ability to meet increasingly stringent criteria pollutant standards 

using new combustion technologies for advanced internal combustion engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.18-19]

 22 See also Comments of VW p. 14: “As shown in Figure 2-4, following fuel price increases in early 

2000’s, there was a notable uptick in customer interest of hybrid vehicles. The fuel price spikes in 2007-2008 

timeframe even brought about irrational consumer behavior in which customers traded-in large trucks to purchase 

small cars, sometimes at considerable loss. However as fuel prices stabilized in the mid $3 per gallon range, sales in 

larger vehicles and pick-up trucks returned. Often customers who had moved into smaller vehicles complained about 

the lack in comfort and space of the smaller cars”.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

Many of the technologies mentioned in the draft joint TSD are already implemented in BMW 

Group models or will be implemented for compliance with the standards for MYs 2012-16. This 

high implementation rate of advanced conventional technologies will make it more challenging 

for BMW to comply with' proposed future standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, 

enclosure p. 5]

This is confirmed by the projected electrification market share for each automaker by the US 

agencies. The market share of EV, PHEV and HEV for the BMW Group and thus the application 

of very cost-intensive technologies is one of the highest among all automakers. EPA confirms 

that'....larger volume manufacturers have levels of advanced technologies that are below the 

phase-in caps. Smaller 'luxury' volume manufacturers tend to require higher levels of these 

technologies, BMW, Daimler...... all reach the max. penetration cap for HEVs (30%) in 

2021.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 5]

This appears to be a double penalty because in order to comply with the proposed standards, 

those manufacturers must invest in expensive technologies and then force their higher fleet 

penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 5]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

2. The Agencies must set standards that are technology forcing

There is no doubt that EPCA is a technology-forcing statute. EPCA is meant to encourage 

technological innovation – meaning new technologies, not simply better versions of what exists 

today. As the court in Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas noted, “[t]he experience of a decade 

leaves little doubt that the congressional scheme in fact induced manufacturers to achieve major 

technological breakthroughs as they advanced towards the mandated goal.” 19 As explained by 

the court in Kennecott Greens Creek Min. Co. v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., “when a 

statute is technology forcing, the agency can impose a standard which only the most 

technologically advanced plants in an industry have been able to achieve – even if only in some 

of their operations some of the time.”20 With regard to a similar technology-forcing statute, the 

Clean Air Act, legislative history indicates that the primary purpose of the Act was not “to be 

limited by what is or appears to be technologically or economically feasible,” which may mean 

that “industries will be asked to do what seems impossible at the present time.”21 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 5]

Yet, instead of stressing that EPCA and EISA are technology forcing and intended to create 

technological innovation, the Agencies discuss “technological feasibility” by remarking that they 

are “not limited in determining the level of new standards to technology that is already being 

commercially applied at the time of the rulemaking.”22 This formulation of the Agencies’ duties 

entirely misconstrues Congressional intent. To be technology forcing, the Agencies must not 

limit themselves to technology already applied at the time of the rulemaking but instead must 

drive technological innovation. This mandate has become of utmost importance because the next 

ten years or so constitute a critical decade in which to avert the most dangerous consequences of 
EPA Response to Comments

12-10

climate change, and because the Agencies have chosen to set standards over a period spanning 

that entire decade and the following five years, an unprecedented time frame in the history of 

CAFE. Standards that are built solely on technologies already in use today or projected to be in 

use a few years from today, violate this mandate per se. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 

5]

E. The Preferred Alternative Does Not Represent the Maximum Feasible Fuel Efficiency 

Standard

The rulemaking requires insufficiently stringent technological improvements as it does not 

reflect the historical speed of technological improvements in practically every industry over the 

last decades, including in the automotive industry, a trend that will undoubtedly continue in the 

future; as it improperly excludes the impact of technologies under development or in the research 

stage; and as it does nothing to force technological innovation. The failure to take these 

developments into account is especially egregious in a rulemaking spanning the next decade and 

a half. If these factors were properly accounted for, the Agencies would recommend Alternative 

4 rather than the preferred alternative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 19]

The Agencies state that with only a few exceptions, the technologies considered here are the 

same as those in the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking. This approach is completely inadequate for a 

rulemaking reaching nine years beyond that date. They also state that the technologies they have 

considered are limited to currently existing technologies and improvements to them that either 

are or will be available within the rulemaking timeframe. In fact, they have no such thing, as they 

admit that that they have only considered technologies “expected to be in production in the next 

5-10 years.” Since this rulemaking will extend considerably beyond that time frame, this 

approach is inadequate. In addition, because the CAFE statutes are technology forcing and the 

rulemaking period is extraordinarily long, the Agencies must also consider technologies in the 

research phase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 19]

Defending their refusal to consider research stage technologies, the Agencies point to 

uncertainties involved in the availability and feasibility of implementing them with significant 

penetration rates. But since the Agencies have taken it upon themselves to set standards 14 years 

into the future, it is their responsibility to assess those uncertainties within reasonable ranges, and 

include the clearly foreseeable impact of technological innovations rather than to disregard 

research-stage technology altogether. Moreover, it is certain that the rate of innovation will 

continue at least at the speed of the last decade, and that technologies now in the research stage 

and many not yet conceived will be in existence in 2025 and much before then. In turning a blind 

eye to research that is sure to bear results 14 years from now, the Agencies ignore their 

mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

19 847 F.2d 843, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds); see also Green Mt. Chrysler 

Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 358-59 (D. Vt. 2008) (discussing 

technology-forcing character of EPCA and the use of increased fuel efficiency to augment 

performance rather than mileage). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 5]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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20 476 F.3d 946, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2008). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 5]

21 116 Cong. Rec. 32901-32902(1970), Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 

1970 (Committee Pring complied for the Senate Committee of Public Works by the Library of 

Congress), Sr. No. 93-18, p. 227 (1974); see also Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 

531 U.S. 457, 491 (2001). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 5]

92 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74922. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 19]

93 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74958. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 19]

94 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74922. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 19]

95 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74922. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

Organization: Eaton Corporation

• Allows OEM and vehicle component suppliers to provide vehicle solutions that advance fuel 

economy and emissions technologies that are affordable and maintain or increase performance of 

the vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 186.]

Eaton appreciates the agency's use of sound economic analysis and in-depth technology reviews 

during the rulemaking process. We believe that the framework outlined in the NPRM is a good 

step towards the final regulation that will foster innovation, foster both technology and 

competition while maintaining fleet diversity and incentivizing over-achievement of emissions 

and fuel economy targets. It is important that certain principles outlined in the notice are further 

developed in the upcoming period.

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

The agencies have recognized three levels of technology availability: (1) technologies available 

in the market in the near term, (2) technologies that are not yet in production but that are under 

development and that may be available for deployment within the next 5 to 10 years, and (3) 

technologies that are in the initial stages of research. (Draft Joint Technical Support Document, 

p. 3-1). Included within the group of technologies that are currently under development and that 

may be available during the model years covered by this rulemaking are downsized and 

turbocharged engines operating at combustion pressures significantly higher than today’s 

turbocharged engines. Id. A high-performance credit would provide an incentive to encourage 

further deployment and use of these technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.5]

Honeywell strongly supports a technology neutral approach to regulation and to incentivizing 

new technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.6]
EPA Response to Comments

12-12

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

1. Cost-effective opportunities to reduce fuel consumption and climate change emissions in the 

near term are far larger than most people realize. Thanks to computer aided design and computer 

controls, the pace of technology development is accelerating and much of the underlying data in 

the technology assessments is already out of date or is only representative of near term vehicles. 

Meeting the standards will be easier and will cost less than assumed in the proposed rule and no 

rollback of the stringency should be considered. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 2]

1) Technology Benefit and Cost Assessments

The ICCT supports the proposed standard stringency. However, it is important to understand that 

the simulation modeling used to assess future technology benefits is actually quite conservative 

and that the future technology benefits will be larger than projected and the costs lower. This is 

due to rapid improvements in computer-based tools, which are opening up technology gains that 

were never possible before. Computer simulations and computer-aided design are enabling vastly 

improved designs and technologies. On-board computer controls provide unprecedented 

integration of engine, transmission, and hybrid operation. Instead of slowing down, the pace of 

technology development just keeps accelerating. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 4]

The sophistication of assessing technology efficiency improvements has been increasing as well. 

The 2001 National Research Council report applied technologies stepwise to estimate fuel 

economy improvement possible through regulations. Some manufacturers criticized this method, 

claiming it could overestimate fuel economy benefits because it does not account for synergies 

between technologies. This is especially important as more technologies are added to the vehicle. 

The next step in sophistication is the use of 'lumped parameter' models that can account for firstorder interactions between technologies. These models can assess the effects of technology in a 

broad array of vehicle types and for a class of vehicles. However, this method is generally 

limited to 'proven' technologies. This was fine as long as standards were set only a few years in 

advance, but it is not adequate for setting standards with longer leadtimes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 5]

Full-system simulation modeling is needed to capture the physics of the vehicle and powertrain 

system and assess interactions of the various components. It can also assess new technologies or 

combinations of technologies when experimental data are sparse. The 2011 National Research 

Council report on light-duty vehicle technologies supported the need for full-system modeling:

'The committee thinks that the most accurate method of analyzing potential reductions in fuel 

consumption, which considers the extent to which any of the efficiency improvements or energy 

loss reductions identified above can be realized while maintaining energy balance criteria, 

utilizes full system simulation (FSS).'1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 5]

To support development of 2025 standards, EPA contracted with Ricardo Inc. to conduct such 

simulations. Ricardo is a highly respected engineering organization that does the vast majority of 

its work for OEMs and suppliers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 5]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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ICCT was involved with this simulation modeling from the beginning, including providing the 

initial contract for Ricardo to start work, hiring independent experts to review Ricardo's hybrid 

control simulations, and participating along with CARB on an advisory committee. After 

intensive involvement in the simulation process for the last two years, it is clear to us that the 

technologies being assessed by Ricardo are on the conservative side. In fact, this is unavoidable 

due to the restriction to currently available data and engine maps. Engine technology is 

improving much faster than we can keep up with and engines better than those modeled by 

Ricardo are already in development. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 5]

• The diesel maps used by Ricardo for the US simulations are already out of date and ICCT has 

contracted with Ricardo to rerun the diesel simulations for Europe using maps representative of 

the latest diesel technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 5]

• The engine map used by Ricardo for the gasoline engine with boosted-EGR is similar to the 

single-stage turbocharger engine map developed by the HEDGE consortium two years ago, 

which is already out of date. The map used by Ricardo in the simulations for a two-stage 

turbocharger is shown in Figure 2 below. Figure 3 shows a boosted-EGR engine map provided 

by the HEDGE consortium in February 2010 for a single-stage turbocharger. The minimum 

brake-specific fuel consumption (BSFC) for the HEDGE engine is about 4% lower than the map 

used by Ricardo in the simulations. While the engine map used by Ricardo has broader BSFC 

contours and better efficiency at low loads, the single-stage turbocharger could not provide 

sufficient air under all conditions and was boost limited. The HEDGE consortium is already 

working on a two-stage turbocharger system that will enable larger amounts of EGR, higher 

compression ratio, lower minimum BSFC, and a broader range of lower fuel consumption. [See 

Figure 2 on p. 6 and Figure 3 on p. 7 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 5-6]

This rapid technology improvement can also be seen by looking at historical data. For example, 

the 2001 National Research Council report found that turbocharging and downsizing would 

improve fuel economy by 5 to 7 percent. The most recent estimates in the draft RIA found that 

turbocharging and downsizing alone will provide a 12 to 15 percent improvement with 33 

percent downsizing and16 to 20 percent for higher-pressure turbos with 50 percent downsizing. 

This 2 to 3 times increase in the efficiency benefit of turbocharging is not due to the older 

estimates being wrong, but rather to rapid improvements in combustion and turbocharging 

technology over the last 10 years. In addition, adding cooled and boosted EGR, a technology that 

wasn't even considered 10 years ago, is estimated to increase the benefits of turbocharging to 20 

to 24 percent, or a 4 times increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 7]

This dramatic improvement in turbocharger systems also applies to cost. The estimated 

manufacturing cost for a turbocharger system, including downsizing but without a reduction in 

the number of cylinders, for 2017 in the proposed rule is $478. This compares with an estimated 

manufacturing cost of $815 from NHTSA just three years ago for the 2011 CAFE standards. 

Other costs estimates have also fallen dramatically in the last three years:

• 6-speed automatic transmission cost for 2011 CAFE standard was a $215 cost increase, 

compared to a $13 cost decrease in the proposed rule.
EPA Response to Comments

12-14

• Dual-clutch automated transmission was a $145 cost increase for the 2011 standard, compared 

to a $205 cost decrease in the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 8]

It should also be noted that the estimated costs in the proposed rule to comply through 2020 are 

less than half of the estimated costs to comply in 2025. Passenger car costs for 2020 are $885 

compared to $2,023 for 2025 and light truck costs for 2020 are $688 compared to $1,578 for 

2025.3 ICCT is confident that continued technology development will reduce costs in the future 

and that the midterm review will find that the current estimates of compliance costs in 2025 are 

greatly overstated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 8]

ICCT is also paying FEV to do additional teardown cost assessments in connection with our 

work in Europe. These include updating the P2 hybrid costs and new cost assessments for 

advanced diesel engines, basic stop-start systems, manual transmissions, and cooled EGR 

systems. P2 costs in the proposed rule are overstated, as the system size is not reduced to 

maintain constant performance, cost savings from deleting the torque converter are not 

subtracted from the system cost, and future hybrid batteries will be smaller and cheaper due to 

new Li-ion chemistries with much higher power to energy ratios. All of the FEV results will be 

shared with EPA and NHTSA as they become available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, 

p. 8]

The 2025 rules are 13 years away. With the rapid improvements in technology due to computerenhanced development, it would be completely irrational to assume that there will be no further 

technology improvements beyond what is known today. Thus, the efficiency and cost estimates 

in the draft rule are quite conservative and there should be no consideration to rolling them 

back. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 8]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 31.]

Another area where costs included in the draft are too high are those for the parallel or P2 hybrid. 

The P2 systems evaluated by FEV for EPA assumed no reduction in IC engine size, no reduction 

in battery size, and did not account for the cost savings due to removing automatic transmission 

torque converter. The ICCT is presently engaged in an exercise to evaluate the cost of P2 

systems with these issues in mind, and we expect, at least, that the updated P2 costs will be lower 

than the agency estimates. These updated costs should be included in the final rulemaking.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 193-195.]

The opportunities to improve efficiency in the near term are far larger than most people realize. 

The internal combustion engine is widely perceived as century-old technology that is at the end 

of its development, but the reality is exactly the opposite. Computer simulations, computer-aided 

design are enabling vastly improved designs and technologies. On-board computer controls 

provide unprecedented integration of engine, transmission and hybrids operation. Instead of 

slowing down, the pace of technology development just keeps accelerating.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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The sophistication of assessing technology efficiency improvements has been increasing as well. 

To support development of the 2025 standards EPA contracted with Ricardo to conduct fullsystem simulation modeling of the latest technology developments.

ICCT has been intensively involved in the simulation modeling process for the last two years. It 

is very clear to us that the technology being assessed by Ricardo are on the conservative side. In 

fact, this is unavoidable due to the restriction to the currently available data and engine maps.

This rapid technology improvement can also be seen by looking at historical data. The 2001 

Natural Research Council report found that turbocharging and downsizing could improve fuel 

economy by 5 to 7 percent. The most recent estimates in the draft RIA found this benefit is now 

two to three times higher. This is not due to the older estimates being wrong, but rather to rapid 

improvements in combustion and turbocharging technology over the last 10 years.

By comparison, the 2025 rules are 13 years away. The efficiency estimates in the draft rule are 

actually quite conservative and there should not be any consideration of rolling them back.

Computer simulations will especially impact lightweight material design. In the past 

optimization of materials was a long, slow process of gradually changing a few parts of the time 

to avoid unanticipated problems with safety, ride, noise and vibration.

1 Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy; National 

Research Council, ISBN-13: 978-0-309-15607-3, 260 pages, 81/2 x 11, 2011.

3 Preamble, Tables IV-110 and IV-111.

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

5. Comparing against current 2010 poor 27 mpgge fleet is an easy target to look better against; 

vs. currently on books 35.5 mpgge or better yet what other things could be done to, in addition to 

or in lieu of stated EPA designs, Le., how complete and objective is the EPA analyses. While I'd 

agree many of the EPA items in aggregate should improve the product mpgge significantly I also 

believe there are other items not mentioned in EPA's list, see below my lists [see pp. 4-5 of 

Docket number ] for Mid and Max technologies that need to be fairly considered. When all fairly 

considered I believe a 2025 54.5 mpgge can be built without plug-ins and I believe even without 

HEVs and with minimum ethanol! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Implicit in federal and state greenhouse gas emission analyses is the ability of these advanced 

powertrain options to meet the applicable criteria pollutant emission standards, such as CO, 

NOX, and non-methane organic gases (NMOG). All of these advanced, light-duty powertrain 

options combined with the appropriately designed and optimized emission control technologies 

can meet all current and future federal and state criteria emission requirements. In this manner, 
EPA Response to Comments

12-16

advanced emission controls for criteria pollutants enable advanced powertrains to also be viable 

options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A range of powertrain technologies, including 

engine turbochargers, exhaust gas recirculation systems, advanced fuel systems, variable valve 

actuation technology, advanced transmissions, hybrid powertrain components, and powertrain 

control modules that can be applied to both light-duty gasoline and diesel powertrains to help 

improve overall vehicle efficiencies, reduce fuel consumption, both of which can result in lower 

CO2 exhaust emissions. In many cases, the application and optimization of advanced emission 

control technologies on advanced powertrains can be achieved with minimal impacts on overall 

fuel consumption. Auto manufacturers will also take advantage of synergies between advanced 

emission control technologies and advanced powertrains to assist in their efforts to optimize their 

performance with respect to both greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant exhaust emissions. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.2]

Future light-duty diesel powertrains will continue to use emission control technologies like diesel 

particulate filters, NOX adsorber catalysts, and selective catalytic reduction catalysts to meet 

EPA’s light-duty exhaust emission standards. Emission control manufacturers are working with 

their auto manufacturer partners to further optimize these emission control technologies to be 

more effective at reducing criteria pollutants and play a role in reducing vehicle greenhouse gas 

emissions. Advanced diesel emission control technologies like particulate filters with lower 

backpressure characteristics, SCR catalysts with improved performance at lower exhaust 

temperatures, and SCR catalyst coated directly on particulate filter substrates are examples of 

emerging diesel emission control technologies that will allow future diesel powertrains to not 

only be as clean as gasoline engines from a criteria pollutant perspective, but deliver improved 

fuel consumption characteristics and lower greenhouse gas emissions. The use of diesel 

particulate filters also delivers significant reductions in black carbon emissions from diesel 

engines, a combustion emission that also has important climate change impacts. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9452-A3, p.2]

For gasoline vehicles, direct injection technology enables gasoline engines to achieve greater 

fuel efficiency and is expected to be a dominant pathway to meeting future light-duty greenhouse 

gas emission standards. Again emissions controls ensure that these more fuel efficient gasoline 

engines meet tough EPA or California criteria emission regulations. Under stoichiometric 

conditions, three-way catalysts are used to achieve ultra-low emissions of NOX, HC and CO. 

Advanced high performance, three-way catalysts are available and will continue to evolve and be 

optimized to ensure that future gasoline direct injection engines will meet the toughest criteria 

pollutant emissions standards with minimal impacts on overall vehicle exhaust system 

backpressure and fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.2]

Under lean combustion conditions, similar emission control technologies used on diesel vehicles 

can be used to reduce emissions from lean, gasoline direct injection powertrains. These include 

particulate filters to reduce PM emissions, and SCR and/or lean NOX adsorber catalysts to reduce 

NOX emissions. Lean NOX adsorber catalyst performance has a high degree of sensitivity to fuel 

sulfur levels. The current EPA fuel sulfur limits for gasoline (30 ppm average, 80 ppm cap) are 

too high to allow lean NOX adsorber catalysts to be a viable NOX control strategy for fuel 

efficient, gasoline lean-burn engines that employ direct fuel injection technology. MECA 

believes that EPA should lower gasoline fuel sulfur limits to a 10 ppm national average to allow 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-17

NOX adsorber catalysts to be used on such vehicles in the future in order to provide additional 

options for improving the efficiency and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from gasoline 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.3]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

In order to consider the technical feasibility of the proposed standards, EPA evaluated a broad 

range of technologies which an OEM could incorporate to help achieve compliance. Over the 

past several years, Volkswagen held technical meetings with agency staff and provided 

confidential technical details illustrating our projections for future technology:

- Cost

- Readiness

- Effectiveness

- Market Adoption

- Penetration [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 12]

During the discussions, Volkswagen focused on several key technologies including:

- Hybrid and fully electrified vehicles

- Vehicle lightweighting

- Advanced internal combustion engines (ICE) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 12]

Volkswagen provided EPA and NHTSA with confidential future forecasts for technology 

readiness, cost, and practicability. We appreciated the opportunity to present our positions and 

were able to engage in technical dialogue to point out areas which were or were not consistent 

with the agencies understandings. Certain key technologies including electrification, 

lightweighting, and advanced engine technologies presented areas where there were some 

inconsistencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

Response:

Regarding comments from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, we also anticipate 

many breakthroughs and improvements in the area of energy management, transmissions, and 

lightweight materials. As discussed in TSD 3, the agencies considered technologies in many 

categories that manufacturers could use to improve the fuel economy and reduce CO2 emissions 

of their vehicles during the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe, including technologies which may not 

currently be in production, but are under development and are expected to be in production in the 

next five to ten years. Over the next decade, it is possible that there will be advances in vehicle 

technology that are not discussed in this assessment. For more details, please refer to the Joint 
EPA Response to Comments

12-18

TSD Section 3.3.3.9 regarding energy management and storage, Section 3.3.2 regarding 

transmission technologies, and Section 3.3.5.5 regarding mass reduction. We also agree that 

advanced combustion technologies need to be evaluated for compliance as they are developed.

Regarding comments from BMW, we do not disagree that BMW’s costs are likely to be 

higher than the average. In fact, our analysis shows a 2025MY cost of $1910 for BMW, or $74 

higher than the average23. Our analysis also shows a 9% full EV penetration rate for BMW, 

versus the average penetration rate of 3%. This does not mean that BMW is required to use such 

technologies, and we thus disagree with that portion of BMW’s comment (“This appears to be a 

double penalty because in order to comply with the proposed standards, those manufacturers

must invest in expensive technologies and then force their higher fleet penetration “). Our 

analysis seeks only to demonstrate a possible path toward compliance. It does not seek to 

demonstrate the path. BMW correctly points out that many of the technologies we expect will 

allow for compliance are already currently used in BMW vehicles. However, while those 

technologies are used in part for fuel efficiency, they are largely tuned to provide high power in 

relation to the weights of their vehicles (i.e., high power-to-weight ratios. Though the agencies 

do not model such options, and have included the costs of preserving all vehicle utilities found in 

the reference fleet(s), BMW has many compliance options that may prove less costly than those 

EPA modeled. For example, the company could implement more off-cycle credit technologies, 

use more mass reduction than EPA modeled, or reduce the acceleration performance of their 

vehicles and put the resultant efficiency gains to fuel economy. Further, we note that BMW has 

no high BMEP (24/27 bar) engines in their in-use US fleet today, no high efficiency gearbox, no 

shift optimizer, no 12V stop-start, and no mild hybrid. So there are still many technologies that 

BMW is not using that can be used in their future fleet.

Regarding comments from Center for Biological Diversity, we note that many of the 

comments regarding legal authority address EPCA and EISA and are not correct with regard to 

the Clean Air Act. See preamble section I.D.2 (explaining, among other things, that section 202 

(a) is not technology-forcing, and even if it were, that EPA retains considerable discretion in 

weighing issues of technical feasibility, cost, and lead time). In any case, EPA believes that the 

rule is predicated on high penetration rates of advanced technologies, and many of these go 

beyond the technologies on which the MYs 2012-2016 standards are predicated. A primary 

technology upon which our MYs 2017-2025 standards rely is high BMEP turbocharged and 

downsized engines. These engines will operate at 24 and 27 bar BMEP, levels at which no 

current production gasoline engine operates. Although such engines are beyond the singlecylinder test-bench level of development, they are not in the marketplace and considerable work 

remains to bring them to the marketplace.24 Another example is mild hybrid technology. There 

 23 As pointed out in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking, one reason these costs are higher on average is that BMW has 

typically paid fines rather than complying with CAFE standards, and consequently is now required to make more 

improvements than those of its competitors which did comply with CAFE. See 75 FR at 25414. 24 EPA notes that Volkswagen’s comment (p. 17) documents obstacles facing development and deployment of high 

BMEP turbocharged engines beyond the BMEP levels used within our analysis in the TSD (“While Volkswagen 

acknowledges that high BMEP (27 – 31 BMEP) engines with cooled EGR are being researched, we caution that 

additional development is necessary to overcome obstacles to these types of engines. Volkswagen views these 

obstacles as significant – if not overcome the issues could preclude this type of engine as a viable greenhouse gas 

reduction technology.”)
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-19

are vehicles being sold today that include mild hybrid technology but, importantly, not at the cost 

levels included in our analysis. So, while that technology is in the marketplace, it is a new and 

rapidly developing technology used in a very small percentage of MY 2012 sales. Reasonable 

engineering judgement was used to select the technologies that will be available in the timeframe 

of this rulemaking. Many of these technologies are still in the research phase and not planned to 

be in production for several years and will not be broadly applicable until MY2017-2025. The 

midterm review will be used to re-evaluate these technology assumptions and make appropriate 

changes in the analysis.

Regarding comments from Eaton Corporation, we appreciate your comments in support 

of the flexibility allowed in the rulemaking for vehicle manufacturers to meet the standards.

Regarding comments from Honeywell Transportation Systems, and Jackson, F.W., EPA 

believes that the issue of technology neutrality is a much more complex issue than some 

commenters suggest when they advocate for a “level playing field” and suggest that a level 

playing field is best achieved by no incentives. Given that internal combustion engines and 

petroleum-based fuels have dominated the U.S. light-duty vehicle market for 100 years, with 

massive sunk investments, there are major barriers for new vehicle technologies and fuels to be 

able to gain the opportunity to equitably compete on any type of level playing field. For 

example, consider a hypothetical new vehicle/fuel technology that could be superior to 

conventional technology from a consumer perspective if, and only if, the vehicles and fuels could 

be produced at similar economies of scale. But, it is very possible that such a hypothetical new 

technology would never get the opportunity to compete at equivalent economies of scale, 

because of the very large investments that are needed, up front, to support the research and 

development, parts and vehicle production facilities, and fuel infrastructure, none of which are 

needed for conventional technology as these investments have been made in the past. In this 

context, temporary regulatory incentives do not so much “pick winners and losers” (as an 

inefficient or unattractive technology is not going to achieve long-term market success based on 

temporary incentives) as to give new technologies more of an opportunity to compete with the 

established technologies.

Regarding comments from International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) on 

Computer aided modeling, the agencies assume the materials that manufacturers will use in their 

BIW to reduce mass include HSS, AHSS, aluminum and limited magnesium and these materials 

have all been modeled. The extent of modeling for composites is unknown. However, the use of 

composites in the BIW is still being researched with applications primarily only on some limited 

high end vehicles. The simulations are continuing to rapidly improve to the point where they are 

starting to be used to simultaneously optimize the material composition, shape, and thickness of 

every individual part, including secondary weight reductions. With respect to the diesel engine 

maps used by Ricardo, it is possible that the maps could be further optimized. The maps used 

were optimized by compliance with US tailpipe standards which are generally more stringent 

than diesel standards in Europe. That said, if our maps are not fully optimized, it suggests we 

have been conservative with respect to our effectiveness values. The EPA did not rely on diesel 

engine technology as a compliance pathway in our analysis, though that does not preclude their 

use in the real world (i.e. our modeled compliance pathway is not an indication of an agency 

preference for any technology). When the results become available, we welcome ICCT’s 
EPA Response to Comments

12-20

continued work with Ricardo using more optimized diesel engine maps. As for the rapid change 

in cost and effectiveness estimates since the 2001 NRC report, we do not agree that the changes 

from then to today suggest that our technology costs or effectiveness estimates are similarly high 

or low, respectively. In fact, our estimates have been generated through a much more rigorous 

process than the 2001 NRC values which we believe helps to explain why those values are so 

different than values of today. We stand by our effectiveness estimates as representing the best 

estimates available today. As for P2 HEV costs and future batteries being smaller and cheaper 

due to new chemistries, we intend to monitor any future changes in battery chemistries and their 

costs but have chosen not to make any anticipatory changes for the final analysis. Regarding 

failing to include torque converter removal in our costs, we disagree with this comment where 

we have included DCTs as part of the HEV package. Our DCT costs include removal of the 

torque converter (see U.S. EPA, “Light-duty Technology Cost Analysis – Report on Additional 

Case Studies,” EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0472-11604 and FEV, Inc., “Light-Duty Technology Cost 

Analysis, Report on Additional Transmission, Mild Hybrid, and Valvetrain Technology Case 

Studies", Contract No. EP-C-07-069, Work Assignment 3-3. November 2011). Where our 

packages include automatic transmissions—which is the case on towing vehicle types—we have 

chosen to remain conservative and assume that the torque converter will remain and therefore 

there is no cost reduction association with its removal. In these cases—towing vehicles—it is 

possible that the torque converter could be removed but the low end torque assist provided by the 

torque converter would have to be regained from somewhere (e.g., the engine, the electric 

motor), which would incur some costs on the order of the savings realized by torque converter 

removal. Therefore, we believe that the best approach is simply assuming that the torque 

converter will remain. (Incidentally, this is an example of how EPA’s technology effectiveness 

and costing methodologies preserve all utilities found in the current fleet.) Lastly, as regards our 

purported failure to assume smaller engines on P2 HEVs, we point out that we have actually 

assumed downsized engines (with turbocharging) on our towing P2 HEVs. We have not 

assumed downsized engines on our non-towing, Atkinson engine equipped P2 HEVs and have 

done this to ensure maintenance of vehicle utility. We discuss both of these points in our final 

RIA Chapter 1.3. Reasonable engineering judgement was used to select the technologies that 

will be available in the timeframe of this rulemaking. Many of these technologies are still in the 

research phase and not planned to be in production for several years. The midterm review will 

used to re-evaluate these technology assumptions and make appropriate changes in the analysis.

Regarding comments from Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA), we 

agree that future vehicles will be able to comply with existing criteria emission standards in 

addition to the new GHG standards and indeed will be required to do so. The comment 

regarding the reduction of gasoline sulfur to enable lean-burn NOx control aftertreatment is 

outside the scope of this rulemaking since we are not relying on lean-burn gasoline technology to 

demonstrate compliance.

Regarding comments from Volkswagen Group of America, we thank you for your 

comments and providing this additional information. We look forward to obtaining more of this 

type of information to inform our future work.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-21

12.2.1. Engine Technologies

Organizations Included in this Section

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Center for Biological Diversity

Eaton Corporation

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Delphi Corporation 

Honeywell International, Inc.

Honeywell Transportation Systems

Hyundai America Technical Center

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Johnson Controls, Inc.

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

Marz, Loren C.

Nissan North America, Inc.

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Technology Market Penetration

EPA and NHTSA chose to exclude lean burn gasoline direct injection (GDI) engine technology 

in evaluating pathways towards meeting the proposed GHG and CAFE standards for MY 2017 –

MY 2025 light-duty vehicles.17 We concur with this assessment. While EPA and NHTSA 

observe that the “...availability of ultra-low sulfur (ULS less than 15 ppm sulfur) gasoline is a 

key technical requirement for lean-burn GDI engines to meet EPA‘s Tier 2 NOX emissions 

standards,” we note that in regions of the world where 10 ppm sulfur in gasoline was mandated 

(i.e., Europe and Japan), the penetration of lean-burn GDI peaked at 2% and then declined as the 

real-world efficiency benefits of lean-burn GDI were found to be less than promised. A recent 

assessment of the automakers’ technology introduction plans concluded that the opportunity for 

lean GDI in the US was limited to 0-3% market penetration over the next decade and that even a 

10 ppm max sulfur limit in U.S. gasoline would not result in lean burn engine production as the 

automakers would pursue other, more cost-effective technologies for regulatory compliance.18 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 8]

Vehicle technology penetration estimates are unrealistic - Light-duty vehicle technologies 

requiring ultra-low sulfur gasoline are not cost-effective and are unlikely to be used to meet the 

proposed fuel economy and vehicle GHG standards. We note that in regions of the world where 

10 ppm sulfur in gasoline was mandated (i.e., Europe and Japan) the penetration of lean-burn 

GDI peaked at 2% and then declined as the real-world efficiency benefits of lean-burn GDI were 

found to be less than promised. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A2, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

12-22

17 NHTSA, Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy for MY 

2017-MY 2025 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, November 2011, p. 341, 

http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/2017-25_CAFE_PRIA_final.pdf [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 8]

18 McMahon, K.B., et al, The Martec Group, Lean GDI Technology Cost and Adoption 

Forecast: The Impact of Ultra-Low Sulfur Gasoline Standards, Society of Automotive Engineers, 

Paper # 2011-01-1226, April 2011 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 8]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

Examples of technologies improperly excluded from the rulemaking include but are not limited 

to higher voltage stop-start/belt integrated starter generators; integrated motor assist/crank 

integrated starter generators; 2-mode hybrids; and power split hybrids. As stated below, 

providing incentive credits instead of setting standards integrating these technologies does not 

comply with the statute. Among the technologies the Agencies believe are insufficiently 

developed are fuel cell electric vehicles, HCCI, multi-air, and camless valve actuation and other 

advanced engines currently under development. The decision to completely ignore the impact of 

these highly promising technologies, all clearly far beyond the research stage and already under 

development, is stunning. For example, the Agencies admit both that fuel cell electric vehicles 

have “the potential of achieving more than twice the efficiency of conventional internal 

combustion engines” and that “there will be some limited introduction of FCEVs into the market 

place in the time frame of this rule.” But, because the Agencies “expect this introduction to be 

relatively small,” they have completely excluded FCEVs from their modeling analysis. This 

approach is clearly wrong. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

96 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74824. Other examples can be found in the Joint Technical Assessment 

Report found in the docket. We also here incorporate our comments to the Notice of Intent re: 

2017 and Later Mode Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards dated 

October 29, 2010, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0131. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

97 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74925. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

98 Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

99 Id. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 20]

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 109-111.]

First, internal combustion engines, ICE's, both gasoline and diesel, will continue to improve and, 

therefore, be a major propulsion source for years to come. We as an industry and you as a 

government agency should be supporting efforts to improve current internal combustion engine 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-23

technology. And we urge the EPA and NHTSA to take a careful look at the contributions that 

can be made by both gasoline and diesel engines.

As I said earlier, the best potential is with improved internal combustion engine technologies. 

Delphi has a strong portfolio of ICE-compatible technologies including direct injection fuel 

systems and advanced fuel injectors for alternative fuels, such as E-85 ethanol and compressed 

natural gas, variable valve lift and electric cam phasing to improve engine performance over the 

full engine operating range and reduce pumping losses. Multi-strike emissions systems to 

improve advanced high dilution combustion schemes, fuel delivery modules with brushless fuel 

pumps to reduce parasitic losses, and evaporative emissions canisters with heated purge to 

improve canister purge efficiencies under low conditions common with hybrid vehicles.

Organization: Eaton Corporation

Eaton believes that many of the technologies needed to achieve the proposed standards are 

available. Many are already in use, while others need a path into the market. Eaton has been 

developing engine system technologies that enable engine down-sizing and down-speeding that 

help deliver significant fuel economy savings while maintaining or enhancing vehicle 

performance. Examples of product introductions into the market in recent years include the 

Variable Valve Actuation systems (Active Fuel Management) and high-efficiency supercharger 

boosting systems. Several other related valve train and boosting systems developments are under 

way for a range of engine configurations that will assist OEMs in meeting the proposed targets. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

EcoMotors is commercializing a revolutionary internal combustion engine (ICE) in southeast 

Michigan. The opoc engine is a game-changing, advanced technology offering affordable low 

emissions transportation. Across many applications and vehicle classes, the opoc engine 

produces fuel economy improvements superior to today's best electric hybrid vehicles at lower 

cost, and without the large and expensive battery packs required by those vehicles. The engine's 

unique opposed-piston opposed-cylinder architecture provides unparalleled benefits, including: 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 2]

• The ability to deliver 50% or greater fuel efficiency in many applications, while reducing GHG 

emissions by half, with no loss in power, vehicle performance, drivability or utility;

• Low weight and a smaller profile - yielding unparalleled power density and exciting design 

opportunities with no loss of power or performance;

• The ability to run on a number of fuels, including gasoline, diesel and ethanol; and
EPA Response to Comments

12-24

• Functioning as a mechanical hybrid in a dual-module configuration, the opoc engine offers true 

modular displacement, enabling full power when needed, and shutting down one engine module 

when the power is not needed.1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 2]

The opoc engine is manufactured using conventional components, manufacturing systems and 

processes. U.S. auto workers can manufacture the engine today within existing factories and 

without retraining. In addition, the opoc engine has a straightforward assembly, no cylinder 

heads or valve train, and 50% fewer parts than a conventional engine. The simplicity of its 

design reduces materials handling costs, and increases reliability. Moreover, with 50% fewer 

parts than a conventional engine, the opoc engine will cost about 20% less to manufacture.2 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 2]

Advanced ICE technologies, such as EcoMotors' lighter, more efficient and economical opoc 

engine, have the potential to contribute dramatically to our national goals of increased fuel 

economy and decreased GHG emissions from the transportation sector. Advanced ICE 

technology also continues to make good economic sense for the vast majority of consumers, and 

can be provided without the need for continuing subsidies or massive infrastructure investments. 

[See Figure 1 on p. 3 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 2]

Thus, it remains extremely important for national policy and this rulemaking to encourage the 

commercialization and deployment of non-electric vehicles using advanced ICE technologies. 

Non-electric, but state-of-the-art vehicles must have the ability to compete in the market on a 

level playing field with electric vehicles (EVs), plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs), and fuel cell 

vehicles (FCVs) and contribute to near-term GHG reductions and fuel economy improvements. 

The Proposed Rule must be modified to ensure that this level playing field exists. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 3]

EPA should therefore support a variety of pathways for reducing GHG emissions and achieving 

higher fuel economy in the U.S. fleet, including supporting the use of such innovative, advanced 

ICE technologies as mechanical hybrids, like the dual-module opoc engine. EcoMotors' opoc 

engine enables coupling of multiple engine modules to meet a wide range of power needs, while 

dramatically increasing the overall efficiency of the propulsion system. This modular 

displacement hybrid (MDH) system features an electrically-controlled clutch housed between 

two engine modules. When requirements dictate the need for both engine modules, the clutch 

automatically engages to deliver power from both modules to the drivetrain. When the power of 

the second module is not needed, the clutch automatically disengages, and the second engine 

module is completely deactivated. This coupling and de-coupling of the engine cylinders 

effectively provides on-demand functionality for the powertrain and improves fuel economy by 

45%. EcoMotors' MDH system combines the best of a variable displacement engine system with 

a mild EV hybrid operation to provide unparalleled improvement in vehicle fuel 

economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 5]

The benefits of EcoMotors' opoc MDH system can be further extended when paired with an 

electric drive system to create a tribrid system (at low speeds only the electric motor runs). Mild 

hybridization (4-6 kW) provides optimal vehicle fuel economy - a 55% fuel efficiency gain -
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-25

without compromising vehicle performance, drivability and utility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9594-A2, pp. 5-6]

The market will not accept expensive, underpowered vehicles. EcoMotors' opoc engine delivers 

the high mileage and levels of performance, comfort, drivability and utility consumers want - and 

as an ICE, it is technology consumers are familiar with and know how to use. The opoc engine 

has 50% fewer parts than a conventional engine so it is also more economical for consumers to 

maintain. Fewer engine parts means increased reliability and fewer expensive repair incidents. 

EcoMotors' disruptive engine technology offers significant improvements on several attribute 

fronts and will create market draw from the actual customer base. [See Figure 2 on p. 7 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 

6]

A smaller, lighter engine, with a higher power density than a conventional engine, EcoMotors' 

opoc engine also provides OEMs with substantial design freedom for meeting consumer 

preferences. With fewer parts, the engine also costs less to manufacture than conventional 

engines. Low cost and ease of manufacture will enable OEMs to produce and sell vehicles 

profitably and at a price consumers can afford. Additionally, the fact that the opoc engine can be 

manufactured within existing supply chains means that this engine, operating as a mechanical 

hybrid in a dual-module configuration, could have a substantial impact on GHG emissions, fuel 

economy and petroleum reduction today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 7]

In a recent report, the Boston Consulting Group concluded that advanced ICE technologies will 

be the most cost-effective way to reduce CO2 emissions on a broad scale because:

• ICE technologies cost between $70 and $140 for each percentage point reduction in CO2

emissions; and

• Though propulsion systems based partially or entirely on electricity can achieve even 

greater reductions in CO2 emissions, they do so at a higher cost: $140 to $280 per 

percentage point of reduction in CO2 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 

10]

EcoMotors' opoc engine, operating as a mechanical hybrid in a dual-module configuration, offers 

a cost-effective means for achieving significant reductions in emissions. As shown in the chart 

below, the opoc MDH engine offers the lowest GHG emissions footprint of any other propulsion 

system. With its high performance, low production costs, and resulting affordability for 

consumers, this mechanical hybrid is a logical choice for OEMs to meet emissions and fuel 

economy standards. [See Figure 3 on p. 11 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-

A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 10]

1 EPA has long championed this engineering concept as a means of achieving extraordinary fuel 

economy and GHG reduction benefits. See EPA, 'Progress Report on Clean and Efficient 

Automotive Technologies under Development at EPA, Interim Technical Report,' EPA420-R04-002 (January 2004), pp.20-23.
EPA Response to Comments

12-26

2 In contrast, successful commercialization of other emerging vehicle technologies-such as 

volume production of advanced batteries for electric vehicles-requires the establishment and 

growth of entirely new industries, with supporting infrastructure and workforce retraining.

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 257.]

We believe and continue to demonstrate that the internal combustion engine has a lot of potential 

still remaining.

Particularly during the later years covered by this rulemaking, more advanced technologies are 

even more likely to enable compliance with the standards. The movement towards new 

powertrain technologies on the other hand is laudable but limited. The vast majority of the new 

vehicle fleet during the next decade, at least, will likely remain internal combustion engines. 

These are the vehicles which will contribute to the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions 

reductions achieved under these requirements. As such, it is our position that regulatory rules 

should not favor new powertrains or specific technologies at the expense of technologies capable 

of achieving substantial gains in the near and midterm.

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems

Honeywell (formerly Garrett) was the first to develop turbochargers for the automotive sector 

fifty years ago when it supplied Caterpillar’s first turbo engine. Honeywell has been the leader 

and principal innovator of turbo technology ever since. In the 1990s, Honeywell redefined the 

commercial market when it introduced Variable Nozzle Turbine technologies into turbochargers, 

which enabled vehicle manufacturers to fully deploy the torque and fuel economy advantages of 

direct injection diesel engines. Today, Honeywell supplies turbochargers for all sized automotive 

engines from small compact vehicle engines to some of the largest commercial vehicle engines 

and on diesel, gasoline and even hybrid vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.2]

Honeywell works closely with OEMs in accordance with design specifications to manufacture 

and deliver turbochargers. Turbochargers facilitate the reduction of GHG emissions by 

enhancing the fuel economy of the engines in which they are used. Although turbo technologies 

do not directly control or reduce emissions, they offer OEMs the ability to downsize engines or 

implement other designs that lower CO2 output, all while maintaining or improving performance. 

For this reason, turbochargers are traditionally considered to be an emissions-related technology 

and not an emissions-control technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.2]

By delivering more air to the engine, turbochargers facilitate fuel combustion, which results in a 

cleaner engine. Turbocharged diesel engines available in the marketplace produce 50 percent less 

NOX and CO2 emissions than conventional non-turbocharged engines. Moreover, because 

turbochargers capture and recycle energy produced by engines, they are able to transform more 

fuel energy into power. A turbocharged engine can generate up to seven times more power than a 

naturally-aspirated (i.e., non-turbocharged) engine of equivalent displacement. As a result, 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-27

OEMs using turbocharger technology can reduce their fleet engine sizes by 30 to 40 percent. 

This reduction in engine size in turn yields significant fuel cost advantages over naturallyaspirated engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.2]

The proposed regulations account for many of the turbo advancements likely to be incorporated 

into the light duty fleet during the years covered by this rulemaking. Recent and upcoming 

advances in turbo technologies include: 

1. High-Temperature Gasoline Turbocharger: Honeywell has committed substantial resources to 

developing materials for the turbine wheel, turbine housing and turbine end seal that allow 

turbochargers to function optimally and reliably under high temperature conditions. The 

optimum balance of performance and fuel consumption at high speeds require turbochargers to 

operate at turbine inlet temperatures of up to 1050 degrees Celsius. 

2. Twin Scroll Turbine Technology: An emerging technology for energy boosting, this 

technology yields improved turbine performance by delivering high pressure exhaust pulses 

directly to the turbine wheel. It provides enhanced performance and fuel economy at low 

speeds. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.2]

3. Electric-Actuation: Electric actuation in a turbocharger provides more accurate control for a 

wider range of operating conditions, while improving fuel consumption and economy, traction 

control, and performance levels. 

4. Current Generation VNT Turbochargers: This turbo platform offered by Honeywell has 

spawned several high performance innovations that increase the boosting levels of previous 

generation VNT technology by 30%. 

5. Two-Stage Turbocharging: Dual-stage turbo technology is now being applied to passenger 

cars, which can create substantially more torque, improve fuel consumption, and enhance vehicle 

acceleration. 

6. Ball Bearings: Ball bearing technology dramatically reduces friction losses in the bearing 

system, further improves fuel consumption and transient performance, and enhances exhaust gas 

recirculation. Moreover, it converts more energy into aerodynamic power, which leads to better 

NOX control. 

7. Rotary Electric Actuator: This turbo technology provides for the electronic control of air, 

which yields faster response times compared to a conventional pneumatic vacuum system. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.3] 

Honeywell’s concern is that providing incentives exclusively focused on electric drivetrains 

translates into a public policy disfavoring investment in technologies that are able to 

substantially advance the emissions performance of internal combustion engines. This could 

result in significant unrealized gains in emissions and fuel economy improvements for the model 

years where electric vehicles are given unique and special incentives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9474-A1, p.3]
EPA Response to Comments

12-28

It is well recognized that the success of electric drivetrains is uncertain and will depend on the 

growth of infrastructure in the face of public and private budgetary constraints, technological 

breakthroughs to make battery costs commercially viable, and consumer confidence in EV range 

and safety. For example, the Boston Consulting Group projects that EVs and PHEVs could make 

up only 2 percent of new light-duty vehicle sales in 2020. See The Boston Consulting Group, 

Powering Autos to 2020: The Era of the Electric Car? at 18 (July 2011). Similarly, a recent 

survey by Deloitte revealed significant differences between “electric vehicle realities versus 

consumer expectations.” Deloitte concluded that its “study suggests that only a small niche of 

today’s consumers would find current technology acceptable, and that small fraction of 

consumers will not result in mass adoption of pure electric vehicle technology over the next 

decade.” See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited Global Manufacturing Industry Group, 

Unplugged: Electric vehicle realities versus consumer expectations at 20 (2011). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, pp.3-4]

The suggested incentive, moreover, would not give credits for technology that has already been 

taken into consideration. The proposed standards incorporate the technology application, 

including the advanced turbo technologies, that the agencies believe will be cost-effective and 

likely measures toward compliance. This high performance credit would be an additional 

incentive that would encourage yet further technology deployment to achieve performance 

significantly beyond the footprint based target on the applicable curve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9474-A1, p.5]

Honeywell encourages the agencies to adopt an incentive for high-performing ICE vehicles in 

order to ensure that investment in the most prevalent vehicles in the fleet continues and that these 

vehicles reach their full emissions improvement potential. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, 

p.6]

4 Honeywell is developing start/stop turbo technology to meet the needs of the small and micro 

car segments. This technology can offer as much as 25 percent improved fuel economy over 

alternative diesel engines. While micro-turbos are more prevalent in emerging markets for new

motor vehicles, with appropriate incentives micro-turbo technology can permeate through the 

United States fleet. Honeywell therefore endorses the agencies’ proposal to provide an off-cycle 

credit for start/stop and other off-cycle technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.5]

Organization: Hyundai America Technical Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 23.]

Some OEMs plan to focus on fuel efficiency leadership with gasoline vehicles.

Organization: Johnson Controls, Inc.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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Retrofit of vehicles in the car pare with fuel saving Start-Stop technologies can reduce the 

country's dependence on foreign oil and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The existing U.S. car 

parc exceeds 270 million vehicles and the average age of a vehicle on the road is over 10.5 years 

old. Retrofitting existing vehicles on the road to provide modest improvements in fuel economy 

could have a greater impact on reducing petroleum usage and greenhouse gas emissions than 

dramatic increases in fuel economy of new vehicles. Increasing new vehicle fuel economy is 

absolutely necessary for the longterm. However, improving the fuel economy of existing 

vehicles in the car parc can accelerate the reduction of petroleum usage and greenhouse gas 

emissions. Johnson Controls has calculated that over 400 million barrels of oil can be saved over 

the next 10 years if a systematic process for retrofitting existing vehicles with Start-Stop battery 

technology to improve fuel efficiency by 5%. This calculation assumes a retrofitting program 

that would convert 50% of the existing car parc by 2022. A more aggressive approach would 

yield bigger savings. To accomplish this, retrofit companies will need enablers such as a 

simplified emissions certification process. Such processes already exist for certification of some 

existing retrofit technologies. However, type approvals or bundling of solutions to reduce test 

load and certifications cost would greatly improve the ability of Start-Stop technologies to enter 

the market and keep costs affordable, thus supporting mass adoption. Clearer provisions are 

needed for ensuring that OEM warranties and. emissions components warranties are honored 

With the exception of any components that may be directly affected by the retrofit technology. 

Johnson Controls suggests that OEMs may be favorable to these provisions if, in return, they 

receive CAFE and/or CO2 credits for their vehicles which are retrofitted with fuel economy 

technologies. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0253-A1, pp. 5-6]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 180-183.]

Implicit in federal and state greenhouse gas emission analyses is the ability of these advanced 

powertrain options to meet the applicable criteria pollutant emission standards. All of these 

advanced light-duty powertrain options combined with the appropriately designed and optimized 

emission control technologies will be able to meet all current and future federal and state criteria 

emission requirements. In this manner, advanced emission controls for criteria pollutants enable 

advanced powertrains to also be viable options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In many 

cases the application and optimization of advanced emission control technologies on advanced 

powertrains can be achieved with minimal impacts on overall fuel consumption. Auto 

manufacturers will also take advantage of synergies between advanced emission control 

technologies and advanced powertrains to assist in their efforts to optimize their performance 

with respect to both greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant exhaust emissions.

For gasoline vehicles, direct injection technology enables gasoline engines to achieve fuel 

efficiency and is expected to be a dominant pathway to meeting future light-duty gas emission 

standards. Again, emission controls like secondary air injection systems and 3-way catalysts 

ensure that these more fuel-efficient gasoline engines meet tough EPA or California criteria 

emission regulations. Advanced gasoline emission controls catalysts are available and will 

continue to evolve and be optimized to ensure that future gasoline direct injection engines will 
EPA Response to Comments

12-30

meet the toughest criteria pollutant emission standards with minimal impacts on overall vehicle 

exhaust system backpressure and fuel consumption.

Under lean combustion conditions similar emission control technology used on diesel vehicles 

can be used to reduce emissions from lean, gas direct injection powertrains. These include the 

particulate filters to reduce PM emissions, SCR catalysts and/or lean NOX adsorber catalysts 

known to reduce NOX emissions. Lean NOX adsorber catalyst performance has a high degree of 

sensitivity to fuel sulfur levels. The current EPA fuel sulfur limits for gasoline are too high to 

allow lean NOX adsorber catalysts to be a viable NOX control strategy for future fuel-efficient 

gasoline lean burn engines that employ direct fuel injection technologies. MECA believes that 

EPA should lower gasoline fuel sulfur limit to a 10 ppm national average and its pending Tier 3 

light-duty vehicle emission standards proposal to allow NOX adsorber catalysts to be used on 

such vehicles in the future in order to provide additional options for improving the efficiency and 

reducing greenhouse gas emissions from gasoline vehicles.

The performance of advanced emission control technologies for advanced diesel gasoline and 

natural gas-fueled powertrains can also be optimized to minimize nitrous oxide and methane 

greenhouse gas emissions from future light-duty vehicles consistent with the limits EPA set for 

these important greenhouse gas emissions in their initial round of light-duty vehicle greenhouse 

gas emission standards.

Emissions controls for gasoline and diesel engines can also be used with low carbon alternative 

fuels, but it's important that the specifications associated with any low carbon fuel should be 

compatible with the use of available exhaust emission control technology.

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

I. Internal Combustion Engines 

Nissan is working to raise the efficiency of internal combustion engines to the ultimate level. 

Nissan is using three approaches in developing a range of technologies to raise engine 

efficiency:

More efficient combustion (higher cycle efficiency) 

Lower intake and exhaust resistance (less pumping loss) 

Easier rotation (lower friction) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, pp.5-6] 

To this end, Nissan recently announced its new generation XTRONIC CVT (Continuously 

Variable Transmission) for 2.0 to 3.5-liter engine vehicles. This represents an important step in 

Nissan's goals to improve the fuel economy and environmental performance of internalcombustion powered vehicles. The new generation XTRONIC CVT model achieves an 

improvement in fuel economy of up to 10%2 compared to previous CVTs for comparable 

vehicles. The new transmission features a world-leading ratio coverage of7.03, and friction 

reduced by up to 40%. Combined with Adaptive Shift Control (which adapts shifting patterns to 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-31

match each driver's style and the road), the new generation XTRONIC CVT delivers responsive 

and powerful acceleration. These advancements, moreover, keep the engine from revving too 

fast at high speeds and minimize noise. The new generation XTRONIC CVT will be introduced 

in North America in 2012, then globally thereafter. Nissan also launched another next generation 

CVT last year for engines below 2.0 liters. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.6] 

In addition to drivetrain improvements, Nissan is introducing innovations such as the ECO pedal 

system to counteract excessive accelerator pressure and to educate drivers on their driving 

behaviors. Studies have shown that effective driving behavior with ECO pedal drive assist can 

potentially improve fuel efficiency in most driving conditions. Advanced safety technologies 

also contribute to reducing GHG emissions. The Predictive Forward Collision Warning System 

uses millimeter-wave radar to detect the deceleration of a vehicle in front of the driver and even 

alerts the driver in advance of a sudden drop in speed of the vehicle two cars ahead, thereby 

helping to avoid collisions, ensuring more consistent driving behavior and lowering overall GHG 

emissions resulting from even vehicle speed operation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, 

p.6] 

Nissan has established aggressive internal goals for improving the GHG and fuel economy 

performance of its internal combustion fleet. Nissan's investment in electric vehicles in no way 

detracts from this commitment. While Nissan will promote electric vehicles and the growth of 

infrastructure to support it, the vast majority of Nissan's fleet will remain petroleum powered. 

Nissan's research and development in this area has not waned, and cannot wane given market 

demands, even as Nissan continues to progress vehicle technology towards zero emissions 

mobility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.6]

2 - According to Nissan in-house measurements using EPA's combined mode. 

3 - This ratio coverage is specific to 2.0 to 2.5-liter engine vehicles.

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Diesel Technology

Many OEMs, including Porsche, plan to introduce diesel technology as a major component of 

their compliance strategy. The Agency's modeling assessment of potential improvements in 

GHG performance was built on assumptions which did not include diesels. It is not appropriate 

to apply a model based only on gasoline and advanced technologies across a fleet that includes 

significant diesel penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 6]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

In the NPRM the agencies have expressed optimism in advancements in gasoline engine 

technology as an important pathway towards compliance with the proposed regulation. In 

particular, the agencies have forwarded the position that high BMEP engines coupled with 
EPA Response to Comments

12-32

cooled EGR strategies offer significant GHG reduction potential on the order of 3.5% when 

compared to a 24 bar downsized, turbocharged, direct injected engine. Volkswagen cautions that 

uncertainty remains with the viability of these high BMEP engines. This uncertainty in part is 

what compelled Volkswagen to suggest a more moderate stringency during the 2017-2021 phase 

of the regulation than the 5% average stringency proposed in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 17]

While Volkswagen acknowledges that high BMEP (27 – 31 BMEP) engines with cooled EGR 

are being researched, we caution that additional development is necessary to overcome obstacles 

to these types of engines. Volkswagen views these obstacles as significant – if not overcome the 

issues could preclude this type of engine as a viable greenhouse gas reduction technology. 

Further, Volkswagen questions the benefit potential for this type of engine technology. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 17]

Of particular concern is the thermal and mechanical loads imparted on the components of high 

BMEP concepts, requiring additional cost to improve the durability of this type of engine. In 

addition, a radically downsized high BMEP engine may offer benefits at peak torque but may be 

compromised at part load modes of operation, where low-end torque performance may be 

critical. It is Volkswagen’s position that this type of engine may already need a two-stage 

charger system to address low end torque performance, adding additional cost. Considering all 

these factors we believe that the torque curve for future engines will be constrained over the rpm 

range by charging limits, exhaust temperature, peak cylinder pressures and mechanical forces 

that may limit the practicable increase in BMEP as shown in Figure 2-7. [See Figure 2-7 on p. 18 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, 

p. 17]

Further, Volkswagen investigation indicates that while 5-6% CO2 benefit for a high BMEP 

engine is possible for peak torque, the benefit at the engine speed and load range of typical two 

cycle testing results in a potential CO2 benefit of approximately 2.5%. This does not indicate a 

high degree of additional CO2 reduction potential for high BMEP engine concepts. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 18]

Response:

Regarding comments from the American Petroleum Institute (API), and MECA with 

respect to gasoline sulfur and spark-ignition lean-burn combustion, lean-burn combustion 

technology was considered in our analysis but was found to be less cost effective than other 

available technologies and therefore not used in our vehicle packages as shown in section 1.3 of 

the RIA. API’s comment confirms the reasonableness of that assessment.

Regarding comments from Center for Biological Diversity, Delphi Corporation, Eaton 

Corporation, EcoMotors International, Inc., Growth Energy, Honeywell International, Inc.,

Honeywell Transportation Systems, Hyundai America Technical Center, Johnson Controls Inc.,

and Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA), EPA believes that the issue of technology 

neutrality is a much more complex issue than some commenters suggest when they advocate for 

a “level playing field” and suggest that a level playing field is best achieved by no incentives. 

Given that internal combustion engines and petroleum-based fuels have dominated the U.S. 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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light-duty vehicle market for 100 years, with massive sunk investments, there are major barriers 

for new vehicle technologies and fuels to be able to gain the opportunity to equitably compete on 

any type of level playing field. For example, consider a hypothetical new vehicle/fuel 

technology that could be superior to conventional technology from a consumer perspective if, 

and only if, the vehicles and fuels could be produced at similar economies of scale. But, it is very 

possible that such a hypothetical new technology would never get the opportunity to compete at 

equivalent economies of scale, because of the very large investments that are needed, up front, to 

support the research and development, parts and vehicle production facilities, and fuel 

infrastructure, none of which are needed for conventional technology as these investments have 

been made in the past. In this context, temporary regulatory incentives do not so much “pick 

winners and losers” (as an inefficient or unattractive technology is not going to achieve longterm market success based on temporary incentives) as to give new technologies more of an 

opportunity to compete with the established technologies. 

Regarding comments from Delphi Corporation and Nissan North America, Inc., we note 

that our analysis of a potential compliance path for the company is consistent with its prediction 

that most of the improvements can come from improvements to gasoline internal combustion 

engines. See Tables III-28 and III-29 in the preamble to the final rule.

Regarding comments from Volkswagen Group of America, while we agree that higher 

BMEP engine concepts exceeding 27-bar BMEP, such as the recently announced Ricardo 

HyBoost project, are currently undergoing research, we limited BMEP levels to 24-bar and 27-

bar for the vehicle packages used in the OMEGA modeling for the final rule since these engines 

are at a fairly advanced stage of research at those BMEP levels. Ricardo engineering took into 

consideration peak cylinder pressure limits and thermal limits such as a hard limit of 950 oC 

turbine inlet temperature when working with EPA to develop the 24-27 bar BMEP engine maps 

used in the cycle simulation work. The high BMEP engine maps developed by Ricardo were 

comparable to other 24-27 bar BMEP engine maps cited from published literature (see citations 

28-31 referenced in TSD 3.2.1.2.12), with comparable broad areas of high BSFC and relatively 

flat torque available from fairly low RPM, with >80% of peak BMEP available from 1500 –

4500 rpm. The VW comments regarding low-end torque are not consistent with the broad range 

of rpm, including low rpm, at which high BMEP was available for the engines cited from public 

literature within TSD 3.2.1.2.12. The CO2 effectiveness used by EPA and NHTSA at 24 and 27-

bar BMEP was also considerably higher than the 6% peak or 2.5% cycle efficiency cited by VW. 

The CO2 cycle (not peak) effectiveness used by the Agencies ranged from approximately 16% to 

24% depending on the BMEP level and combination of technologies (see TSD 3.3.1.8). The 

levels of effectiveness used by the agencies were also comparable to the 15 to 30% CO2

effectiveness reported in published literature from AVL, Mahle, Ricardo and Lotus cited within 

the TSD. Mechanical and thermal robustness at 24-27 bar BMEP were key considerations in the 

cited literature from Mahle and Ricardo (citations 29 and 31 referenced in TSD 3.2.1.2.12). EPA 

agrees that 2-stage turbocharging may be necessary at high BMEP levels and took the cost of 

two-stage turbocharging into account in packages using 27-bar BMEP engines. EPA also took 

into account additional costs when elevating engines from 18-bar turbocharged GDI to 24-bar or 

27-bar BMEP. The BMEP (or torque) curves and BSFC in the Ricardo simulation modeling and 

in the cited literature were representative of engines under development that are already 
EPA Response to Comments

12-34

constrained with respect to charge temperature limits, exhaust temperature limits, peak cylinder 

pressure and mechanical forces. 

12.2.2. Transmission Technologies

No comments were received on this issue.

12.2.3. Vehicle Technologies

Organizations Included in this Section

Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

Delphi Corporation

SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)United Automobile Workers (UAW)

United Steel Workers (USW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

Downweighting, without downsizing, has become an increasingly more important 

element in most comprehensive OEM vehicle efficiency improvement strategies. As automakers 

transition towards greater use of low weight materials, the focus is increasingly toward system 

cost. Aluminum is widely recognized as a cost-effective choice for reduced weight automotive 

components and structures. As automakers turn to greater aluminum use, secondary weight 

reduction is emerging as a major cost savings opportunity. Vehicle weight reduction with 

aluminum allows a reduction in the size, weight and cost of powertrain and chassis components 

(secondary weight reduction) without sacrificing performance or safety. Cost savings from 

secondary weight reduction can offset a majority of the cost premium associated with conversion 

to aluminum. This allows aluminum to compete successfully with other materials because of the 

advantages it brings in primary and secondary weight savings, fuel savings, structural 

performance and design flexibility. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, pp. 1-2]

Since the aluminum industry provided comments on the agencies’ Notice of Intent (NOI) 

regarding this rulemaking in October 2010, additional studies have been completed that reinforce 

the conclusion that downweighting with aluminum can be done both safely and economically. 

Simply stated, aluminum offers a safe and cost-effective way to reduce fuel consumption and 

reduce greenhouse gas emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 2]

In this regard, we offer four new pieces of evidence: a new survey of North American 

automakers conducted by Ducker Worldwide, a separate and independent survey of automakers 

by DuPont, statements made by a high level Honda executive at the recent International 

Automotive Body Congress, and findings of a new report on life cycle cost analysis 

commissioned by the European Union, titled “Support for the Revision of Regulation (EC) No 

443/2009 on CO2 Emissions from Cars.” [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 2]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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Ducker Worldwide Survey of North American Automakers

A 2011 Ducker Worldwide Survey found that per-vehicle aluminum content will increase by 70 

percent by 2025. The survey found that as lighter vehicles achieve better fuel economy with 

fewer emissions, aluminum is already the leading material in the engine, transmission, 

suspension and wheel markets, and is fast-gaining share in hoods, trunks and doors. The findings 

estimate that automakers will increase their use of aluminum from 327 pounds in 2009 to 550 

pounds in 2025. Continued growth in overall use of aluminum reached an all-time high of 343 

pounds per vehicle in 2012, up five percent from 2009. In fact, aluminum usage has increased 

every year for nearly 40 years (approximately seven pounds per year, per light vehicle). Market 

forces already in place are projected to push aluminum content to 400 pounds per vehicle in 

2015/2016. The survey also confirms aluminum will play an increasingly important role in 

design of future safe and fuel efficient vehicles. Based on the survey and other research, the ATG 

believes that cars and trucks will get lighter but will not have to be made smaller or less safe. A 

copy of the complete Ducker Survey is attached to these comments as Attachment A [see Docket 

number NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A4]. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 2]

DuPont Survey of Automakers and Suppliers

In a separate, independent survey of automakers released last year by DuPont, ‘aluminum’ was 

listed above all other materials by automotive engineers and executives as the “most helpful” 

material in meeting the new fuel economy standards (see page 7 of the DuPont survey, 

Attachment B [see Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A2]). Taken together, these 

surveys make clear a major automotive materials shift is underway. OEM vehicle manufacturers 

recognize that downweighting will complement whatever other technology, design and 

powertrain changes are coming. Downweighting with aluminum will improve vehicle efficiency, 

while enabling a cost-savings from downsized powertrains, without sacrificing either safety or 

performance. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 2]

International Automotive Body Congress

At the recent International Automotive Body Congress held in Troy, Michigan, the senior vice 

president of Honda R&D Americas stated that the automaker is planning to start phasing out 

some steel in vehicle bodies. In a quote from a Ward’s Auto article, Frank Paluch of Honda said: 

“Based on our current understanding, we believe we’re approaching the practical limits of the 

application of high-strength steels.” Since Honda is an industry leader in the use of advanced 

high-strength steels in high-volume mainstream vehicles, that statement is significant. According 

to the same article, Mr. Paluch is among a growing number of engineers who believe it will be 

“increasingly difficult or impossible to meet future fuel-efficiency and carbon-dioxide emissions 

requirements with vehicle bodies made from steel.” [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 2]

The ATG agrees with Mr. Paluch that we are fast-entering a transition stage to a more holistic 

vehicle design approach. That approach is premised on the greater use of lighter, stronger and 

more crash absorbent components utilizing low weight materials, including aluminum. These 

lower weight components will replace higher weight iron and steel components. And, Mr. 
EPA Response to Comments

12-36

Paluch’s statement is reflected in OEM advanced program plans and product orders from our 

automotive customers. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 3]

Organization: American Chemistry Council

(2) In addition to lightweighting, plastics and related materials will also contribute to fuel 

efficiency and emission reductions through more aerodynamic shaping and parts integration.

In addition to lightweighting capabilities, thermoplastics and composites can be molded into 

shapes that provide superior aerodynamics. Aerodynamic drag results from the vehicle having to 

move air out of its way in front, and also from the turbulence created in in back as air refills the 

space voided by the vehicle. About 60 percent of engine power at highway cruising speed is used 

to overcome air resistance. As a result, improved aerodynamics translates into substantial 

improvements in fuel efficiency and emissions, even with vehicle size held constant. Drag 

coefficients (a measurement of drag forces independent of drag area or vehicle size) have 

improved significantly over the years, and an important element of that has been the design 

freedom conferred by thermoplastics and related materials. Injection-molded plastics allow for 

aerodynamic styling and parts integration not possible with metal or glass. Drag coefficients for 

present-day vehicles range between 0.30 and 0.35, but an additional 25 percent reduction in drag 

has been predicted in coming years.7Aerodynamic performance is generally captured in coast 

down testing that informs the calibration of the dynamometer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-

A2, p. 2]

(3) Lightweight plastic and plastic composite components are gaining commercial acceptance 

and providing lightweighting that increases fuel efficiency and reduces emissions. Plastics, 

plastic composites, and other materials will allow Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to 

move toward compliance with the Corporate Average Fuel Economy/Greenhouse Gas 

(CAFE/GHG) targets at a reasonable cost and independent of what power trains are chosen. 

Traditional vehicles will consume less gasoline or diesel; hybrids will be able to operate further 

on battery power, and pure electric vehicles (EVs) will enjoy a greater range, a factor critical to 

consumer acceptance and to their penetration of the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9517-A2, pp. 2-3]

Manufacturers have already moved to the use of plastics and composites extensively in the 

vehicle exoskeleton and in internal components. Recent data indicate that the average vehicle 

already uses about 150 kg of plastics and plastics composites; that the automotive industry 

already uses engineered polymer composites and plastics in a wide range of applications; and 

that plastics are currently in use in about 50 percent of all interior automotive components, 

including safety subsystems and door and seat assemblies.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-

A2, p. 3]

The Joint Technical Support Document (TSD) notes that “many manufacturers have already 

announced proposed future products plans reducing the weight of a vehicle body through the use 

of...composite body panels...”9Composites are in use by Volvo and Renault in tailgates; BMW, 

Peugeot and Maybach in trunk lids; and Bentley for the spare wheel/tire well.10Plastics and 

composites are also increasingly becoming the material of choice in applications where high 

performance is necessary. For example, special heat conductive plastics have been developed by 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-37

DSM for engine bay components, in which metal particles added to the plastic transfer the heat 

and, if needed, can also serve as electromagnetic interference (EMI) shield. Engineering plastics 

like DSM’s polyamide grade Stanyl® keep their high level of stiffness at temperatures up to 

290°C. A joint study of BMW and Mitsubishi Turbochargers demonstrated the feasibility of 

using plastic for the “cold” side of a turbocharger.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 3]

Similarly, polycarbonate is now used extensively in lighting and selectively in rooflite glazing, 

and is expected to make further inroads into backlites and fixed rear windows. Polycarbonate 

glazing is approximately 40 percent lighter than traditional glass, and is capable of removing 25 

pounds of weight reduction for a typical vehicle. Also, because it is injection molded, it can be 

readily combined with other materials and features, yielding parts consolidation and reducing 

assembly costs. These multiple advantages point to a substantial increase in the use of 

polycarbonate in coming years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 3]

The commercialization of plastic and related components into the structure of the vehicle will 

also proceed during the model years covered by this rulemaking. The timeline for 

commercialization of structural plastics was raised at the February 25, 2011 NHTSA workshop 

on vehicle mass, size and safety, at which some commenters cited the relative merits and 

commercial promise of aluminum and high strength steel. We acknowledge that the commercial 

promise of structural plastics, composites and plastic/metal hybrids, is a longer-term proposition. 

However, it should be noted that work is well underway to understand and pursue more 

aggressive use of these materials. NHTSA’s 2007 Report, A Safety Roadmap for Future Plastics 

and Composites Intensive Vehicles, extensively evaluated the potential safety benefits of Plastics 

and Composites Intensive Vehicles (PCIVs) to enable deployment by 2020. That document 

established research priorities and called for the development of test methods and timetables that 

allow for an orderly transition to a fleet making greater use of plastics, composites and related 

materials, including in the vehicle structure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 3]

(4) Increasing supply and production capacity of high-tech composites and hybrid materials 

should be factored into agency cost estimates on an ongoing basis.

Advanced composites such as carbon fiber reinforced thermoplastics will assume a greater role 

in both body and structural components in the MY 2017-2025 time frame. Surveyed automotive 

engineers say it best: there is increasing commercial activity using existing composite 

technologies as well as new developments taking composites to the next level, making advanced 

composites the top material category poised for growth.14 Recent data suggest that the supply of 

plastic composite materials will continue to accelerate with an attendant decrease in costs as 

production processes are refined and economies of scale are realized. There is also the potential 

for a game-changing breakthrough that will advance commercialization, a phenomenon we have 

witnessed with other advanced materials.15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 4]

Numerous producers have recently announced additional capacity or production for high-tech 

automotive plastics, composites, or constituents of high-tech composites such as carbon fiber. In 

March of 2011, Lanxess announced breaking ground on its first U.S.-based compounding facility 

for high-tech automotive plastics in Gastonia, North Carolina, with production scheduled to 

begin in mid-2012.16The Lanxess facility was announced to produce polyamide and 

polybutylene terephthalate. BMW,17 Daimler and Lamborghini18 are all involved in joint 

ventures with suppliers to develop and produce carbon fiber, while Oak Ridge in currently in the 
EPA Response to Comments

12-38

process of building a $35 million dollar pilot plant that will produce up to 25 tons of carbon fiber 

a year.”19 In addition, a new joint venture between Dow and ASKA was formalized on 

December 20, 2011 to manufacture and globally commercialize carbon fiber.20 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 4]

Cost reductions are readily observable in the trade press.21 It has been reported that “carbon 

fiber costs have dropped ten-fold in the last decade,” observing that as new production 

technologies become available, this “will bring the cost down further.”22Benteler SGL in 

Germany has reported reducing cycle times from 20 to 5 minutes to enable large series 

production, and Styron is reported to have developed plastic resins that allow a shorter cycle time 

of 2 1⁄2 minutes.23Assuming 50 weeks of production during the year and 40 hours of production 

during one shift in a week, this cycle time translates into 48,000 units produced a year during one 

shift at a plant. While such production capability will be sufficient for a large majority of the 

vehicle models produced (especially if two shifts are run at a given plant), multiple shifts and 

increased plant capacity will allow for larger production numbers. Lamborghini’s Sesto 

Elemento concept car uses forged composites, which are predicted to be less costly than 

traditional carbon fiber by 'orders of magnitude.'24 Continuing cost reductions of plastic and 

plastic composites will quicken the pace of adoption in the commercial fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 5]

In addition to composites, plastic/metal hybrid components are expected to become 

commercially significant in the structure of vehicles. A hybrid component has constituent parts 

from two or more materials; an example is a hollow metal pillar filled with plastic. Hybrid parts 

can exhibit the best aspects of both materials, for example, combining the load capacity of steel 

with the light weight and impact resistance of plastic. As a result, hybrid components hold 

promise to lower the weight of structural parts without sacrificing crashworthiness.25 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 5]

7 Bandivadekar et. al , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Energy and 

Environment, “On the Road in 2035: Reducing Transportation’s Petroleum Consumption and 

GHG Emissions (July 2008), p. 24, (available online at http://web.mit.edu/sloan-autolab/research/beforeh2/otr2035/)

8 See Dr. Michael Fisher, James Kolb, and Suzanne Cole, Enhancing Future Automotive Safety 

with Plastics (2007), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv20/07-0451-W.pdf

9 TSD at 3.4.2.4.1, p. 3-69; 3.73.

10 Jan Willem van der Wiel, Future of Automotive Design & Materials Trends and 

Developments in Design and Materials, Automotive Technology Centre, 

http://www.acemr.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Trendstudy_ACEMR_Designmaterials.pdf

11 Id.

12 Available at 

www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crashworthiness/Vehicle%20Aggressivity%20and%20Fleet

%20Compatibility %20Research/810863.pdf
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-39

14 Society of Automotive Engineers, Automotive Composites, January 4, 2012, 

http://www.plasticsengineering.org/polymeric/node/5073

15 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Vehicle 

Technologies Program, “Materials Technologies: Goals, Strategies, and Top Accomplishments,” 

DOE/GO-102010-3111, August 2010, 

http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/materials_tech_goals.pdf; see also, Boeing, 

“Coming of Age: Composites Technology in Commercial Aviation,” 2010 

http://www.sampecarolinas.org/boeing.pdf (describing how advanced composites has 

fundamentally changed the aerospace industry)

16 http://www.gaccsouth.com/fileadmin/ahk_atlanta/Dokumente/News/Lanxess.pdf 17 See also, 

Tom’s Style Design & Technology, “BMW Lifts Cover From Carbon Fiber i3 Electric Car,” July 

30, 2011, BMW Lifts Cover From Carbon Fiber i3 Electric Car 

http://www.tomsguide.com/us/BMW-i3-electric-carcarbon- fiber-passenger-shell,news12030.html

18 See also, Autoweek, “New Techniques Cut Cost of Carbon Fiber,” July 11, 2011, 

http://www.autoweek.com/article/20110711/CARNEWS/110719991 (“A joint venture between 

Automobili Lamborghini S.p.A. and Boeing Co. has slashed the cost of carbon fiber used in a 

monocoque, or unibody construction, for the Sesto Elemento concept car. In effect, Lamborghini 

has become a carbon-fiber laboratory for its corporate parent, Volkswagen AG.”)

19 Left Lane, “Cost of Weight-Saving Carbon Fiber to Drop,” (August 1, 2011), 

http://www.leftlanenews.com/costof- weight-saving-carbon-fiber-to-drop.html

20 ICIS Chemical Business, “Innovation in carbon fiber processing technology could lead to a 

breakthrough in the cost competitiveness of the material and consequent growth in applications,” 

January 9, 2012, http://www.icis.com/Articles/2012/01/09/9521417/dow-carbon-fiber.html

21 Automotive News, “Suppliers are cutting the cost of carbon fiber,” August 1, 2011, 

http://www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110801/OEM01/308019975

22 Jan Willem van der Wiel, Future of Automotive Design & Materials Trends and 

Developments in Design and Materials, Automotive Technology Centre, 

http://www.acemr.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Trendstudy_ACEMR_Designmaterials.pdf

23 Id.

24 See also, Autoweek, “New Techniques Cut Cost of Carbon Fiber,” July 11, 2011, 

http://www.autoweek.com/article/20110711/CARNEWS/110719991, quoting Paolo Feraboli, 

assistant professor of aerospace materials at the University of Washington and director of the 

Advanced Composite Structures Laboratory.
EPA Response to Comments

12-40

25 JEC Composites, “High-tech products for green mobility,” January 30, 2012, 

http://www.jeccomposites.com/news/composites-news/high-tech-products-green-mobility 

(“Lanxess estimates that such composites can reduce component weight by another 10 percent 

compared to aluminum sheet hybrid designs. Nylon composite sheet hybrid technology is thus 

ideal for automotive lightweighting.”)

Organization: SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC

Substantial investment is being put into materials research and development. Materials such as 

carbon fiber, magnesium and other composites have the potential to transform vehicle design, 

promote safety and offer considerable emissions and fuel consumption reductions. As a global 

innovator in the plastics industry, SABIC-IP will continue to seek out and promote such 

advances. SABIC-IP will also continue to offer robust technical evaluations to assist the 

government and the industry advance public policy through the application of cost effective 

product solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.15]

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

In addition to energy management systems, the current widespread use of plastics and 

composites in a multitude of applications helps auto designers reduce vehicle weight and 

increase efficiency: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.2]

“For auto manufacturers, plastics are seen as a great way to increase vehicle efficiency. This is 

because... replacing steel with plastic can cut vehicles’ weight. Plastic fuel tank technologies 

have become the tank of choice replacing steel tanks first in Europe and Asia and now North 

America. This is for weight reduction as well as design flexibility, corrosion resistance and 

safety. Plastic fuel lines have also been advancing because they are lighter in weight, lower in 

cost and available in various colors for tracking under the hood. Further, combinations of plastics 

and steel are being developed for weight reduction but also for high load-bearing capacity and 

high-energy absorption for front ends and doors. Similarly, automotive glazing, including both 

side windows and windshields, promises great potential for plastics.” [[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9492-A1, pp.2-3]

The growing potential for plastics, composites and hybrid materials pairing plastics with metal 

are evident at our triennial trade show, NPE. President Obama’s 2009 announcement regarding 

fuel efficiency came one month before NPE 2009, at which innovative companies in the plastics 

industry unveiled new fuel-saving technologies. Automotive applications highlighted in the 

sustainability theme included: component weight reducing technologies (e.g., polycarbonatebased windshields and other glazing), fast-growing application of thermoplastic elastomers, new 

raw material formulations, new plastic/steel hybrid structures, separator films for batteries, and 

applications for fuel tanks such as a high-density polyethylene formulation that is more resistant 

to bio-diesel fuel. Nanocomposites – in which nanoscale fillers are added to standard plastics –

can add strength that results in the use of less material, and therefore helps reduce vehicle weight 

while maintaining performance, in applications such as fuel tanks and fuel lines. SPI recognized 

then as we do now that plastics and associated materials contribute to fuel efficiency, innovative 

design, production economy, and sustainability that will help manufacturers meet their 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-41

regulatory obligations while providing exciting options to their customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9492-A1, p.3]

In coming years, we expect to see even greater adoption of plastics and composites in glazing, 

body panels and interior parts. PC glazing is beginning to make significant inroads into the 

marketplace in this country and already enjoys extensive use in Europe. There, “moulded PC is 

used in nearly all auto glazing functions” and gaining in areas such as the front and rear quarter 

windows, and fixed window sections on the sides and rear doors. Bioplastics are forecasted to 

expand in the automotive sector, contributing to a global demand that is expected to at least triple 

in the next few years. Longer term, multi-material solutions (e.g., hybrid structures) and 

advanced composites (e.g., carbon-fiber reinforced thermoplastic) have the potential to extend 

lightweighting into the body-in-white stage of vehicle production, achieving mass reduction 

while maintaining or enhancing the structural integrity of vehicles. From electric and hybrid cars 

with improved electric range, to driverless pods at airports, the automotive sector will help drive 

a revolution in the use of plastics. SPI is proud that NPE has been a venue of choice for 

manufacturers to unveil their new technologies, and we look forward to the advances to come. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.3]

Advanced Composites are Becoming a Technologically Feasible and Economically Practicable 

Part of Reducing Vehicle Mass [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.5]

SPI notes that the agencies’ mid-term evaluation will allow for consideration of new and 

innovative technologies that could contribute to vehicle mass reduction between now and model 

years 2022 – 2025. We appreciate that this will enable advances with PCIVs to be considered for 

additional credits or incentives if appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.5]

The Increasing Use of Advanced Composites [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.5]

Advanced composites such as carbon fiber reinforced thermoplastics (CFRP) will assume a 

greater role in both body and structural components in the MY 2017-2025 time frame. This is 

clear from the increasing investment and commercial activity surrounding such materials. These 

include joint ventures with carbon fiber producers announced by BMW, Daimler and 

Lamborghini, and both a fully electric city car and a hybrid sports car exhibited last summer 

which make use of CFRP to offset the weight of battery systems. Other companies are working 

with advanced composites, and the development of a practical composite engine block is close if 

not achieved, shedding pounds off the traditional counterpart. Natural fiber composites will have 

the additional benefits of being less sharp compared to glass fiber-reinforced composites in the 

event of a crash, and taking up to 60% less energy to process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-

A1, p.5]

The commercial viability of CFRP and other advanced composites will depend upon increasing 

supply and economies of scale. Here too, progress is visible. Oak Ridge is “in the process of 

building a $35 million dollar pilot plant that will produce up to 25 tons of carbon fiber a year.” A 

new joint venture between Dow and ASKA announced in late 2011 aims to commercialize 

carbon fiber globally. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.5]
EPA Response to Comments

12-42

Economic Benefits of Advanced Composites [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6]

The aforementioned throttle valve housing that is 30 percent lighter than its metal counterpart is 

also 50 percent lower in cost. This is not the case for every component, and there are instances of 

higher material costs for plastics as compared to their metal and glass counterparts. However, the 

Technical Document notes that both EPA and NHTSA recognize that OEMs can realize reduced 

costs as they gain experience and scale with new technologies, through the “the manufacturing 

learning curve” phenomenon. And like plastics, composites offer opportunities for parts 

consolidation, reducing assembly costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6]

Polycarbonate Glazing is Market Ready [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6]

PC automotive glazing for applications such as rooflites, backlites and side windows has been 

available for years and holds great promise. Commercial acceptance in Europe may encourage an 

increasing role in this country’s automotive market. Polycarbonate provides high optical clarity 

and shatter-resistance, and can be formulated to resist deterioration and hold up to weathering 

conditions. Various abrasion-resistance systems allow PC glazing to be used in rooflites, 

backlites, and liftgates, meeting applicable standards. PC in auto glazing applications has 

demonstrated weight reductions of 40-50 percent as compared to traditional glass. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6]

Beyond weight-reduction, injection molding of PC glazing permits design flexibility that can 

contribute to more aerodynamic designs and increased fuel efficiency. Current drag coefficients, 

ranging between 0.30 and 0.35 for a typical vehicle, are likely to improve by 25% in coming 

years. Integration of parts can contribute to aerodynamics and simplify assembly without 

compromising structural integrity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.6]

Organization:United Automobile Workers (UAW)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 23.]

This includes an exciting advance such as 8-, 9-speed automatic transmission, both dual clutch 

and conventional, and engines that feature advanced valve timing and gasoline direct injection, 

downsized and turbocharged engines, and vehicles that are considerably lighter than the previous 

generations but retain the same size. Technology such as start/stop systems and electric-powered 

steering are also making a contribution to vehicle efficiency.

Organization: United Steel Workers (USW)

USW believes advanced high-strength steel (AHSS) vehicle technologies will assist carmakers in 

achieving significant reductions in both vehicle emissions and fuel consumption. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p.2]

New steels and automotive manufacturing techniques continue to be developed by the domestic 

steel industry and will enable significant increases in mass reduction, crashworthiness and fuel 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-43

economy, while enabling reductions in total greenhouse gas emissions, during the period 

specified in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p.3]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen provided technical descriptions and estimates to the agencies regarding vehicle 

lightweight technology potential and cost. Volkswagen remains amongst the industry leaders in 

applying high technology, lightweight designs within both premium and economy vehicles. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 15]

To start, Volkswagen agrees with the agencies that there is a variation in the overall mass 

reduction potential based on the type and market segment of vehicles. Smaller cars and economy 

models have less potential for mass reduction than larger or more premium vehicles. 

Volkswagen projects full vehicle weight reductions during the time period of this regulation on 

average in the order of 7-10%. The NPRM predicts for large cars and some trucks upwards of 

20% mass reduction potential. Volkswagen feels that this may exceed cost effective limits. With 

regards to electrified vehicles, Volkswagen does agree with statements in Section 3.4.5.5 of the 

TSD that electrical component may increase baseline vehicle mass by upwards of approximately 

4-5% depending on battery pack capacity and/or other electric drive components. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 15]

The NPRM includes a revised cost model as described in Section 3.4.5.5 of the TSD which now 

properly reflects the fact that increasing levels of mass reduction results in exponentially 

increasing costs. Figure 2-5 illustrates the cost function for both a 3000lb and 4000lb car. 

Volkswagen generally agrees with the cost being represented by an exponential function. 

However the function remains too conservative in its overall estimate of total price increase, i.e. 

the curve is too 'shallow'. Volkswagen maintains that above 10%, costs accelerate at a faster rate 

making reductions beyond this level less economically practical. [See Figure 2-5 on p. 16 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 

15]

Further, we contend that the price increase for smaller cars may actually be more severe than for 

larger cars or trucks. Smaller cars must meet the same safety requirements and often have fewer, 

more simplistic systems from which to seek weight reductions. The model included in the 

NPRM reflects the opposite, that larger cars may be more challenged to reduce mass. The NPRM 

indicates that a large truck or pick-up would have the most costly pathway for weight reduction, 

while a low-weight passenger car would have the least costly pathway. This in turn would 

indicate that a low weight passenger car could more easily further reduce weight. Volkswagen 

disagrees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 15]

An exponential cost function is appropriate when estimating costs related to mass reduction. In 

many cases moving from a baseline material to a lighter alternative not only require the use of 

more expensive material, but can also trigger significant capital investment needed to upgrade or 

completely replace manufacturing infrastructure. There are periods in which a vehicle is 

completely redesigned and engineers will have the opportunity for a 'clean sheet' evaluation of 

component consolidation and material substitution. However even then, the ability to update 
EPA Response to Comments

12-44

tooling and factory systems may be limited given their longer useful life. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 16]

Volkswagen is also continuing to move towards a greater degree of platform sharing which will 

use common architecture to underpin a broad range of vehicles. An example is the recently 

introduced MQB (Modular Transverse) platform which will be used for Volkswagens Polo, 

Beetle, Golf, Scirocco, Jetta, Tiguan, Touran, Sharan, Passat and CC. In addition several other 

models from various Volkswagen brands will also use the platform. A concept such as MQB 

offers significant savings and standardization of manufacturing processes. However, designers 

must now account for multidimensional requirements that apply to the range of vehicles using 

the platform. A weight reduction technology which may be acceptable in terms of price or 

performance for one model may disrupt the economics or utility of another. [See Figure 2-6 on p. 

16 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-

A1, p. 16]

The materials industry continues to offer an increasing assortment of technologies from ultrahigh strength steels, to alternative materials such as aluminum, magnesium, plastics, and carbon 

fiber. Volkswagen remains at the forefront in evaluating these materials and in some cases being 

first to market with exotic designs on our premium and sport vehicles. Volkswagen has had 

many successes in applying advanced technologies to our economy models as prices and 

complexity decrease, but this process is lengthy and risky. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, 

pp. 16-17]

Volkswagen remains concerned that the price estimates used by the agencies remain low and do 

not fully account for the impact that incorporating weight savings may have on retail price. 

Further, Volkswagen is concerned that the more stringent requirements for passenger cars will 

necessitate more weight reduction technologies to these vehicles and will contribute to the 

imbalance between prices for these cars compared to trucks. Trucks on the other hand with their 

lower stringency and exclusive credits may not be required to incorporate the same degree of 

weight reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 17]

Response:

Regarding comments from the Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group 

Innovative Plastics US LLC and Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI), SABIC Innovative 

Plastics US LLC and Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI), United Steep Workers, and 

American Chemistry Council (ACC), we agree that engineered lightweight materials are a 

potential path to lower CO2 emissions for all classes of vehicles. Please refer to the Joint TSD 

Section 3.3.5.5 for more detail on mass reduction.

Regarding comments from the United Automobile Workers (UAW), we appreciate your 

comments in support of the potential for advanced transmissions to reduce the CO2 emissions for 

all classes of vehicles.

Regarding comments from Volkswagen Group of America on mass reduction costs, the 

agencies’ basis for estimated costs of mass reduction actually appears to be conservative. As 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-45

shown in joint TSD section 3, the detailed studies sponsored by the agencies suggest that 20% 

mass reduction is likely feasible for heavier vehicles for the rulemaking period using 

lightweighting materials and manufacturing technologies that have already been adopted in high 

volume vehicles. See joint TSD pp. 3-238 to 251. The accompanying detailed cost analysis in 

the joint TSD indicates that the cost of reducing mass by 20% can potentially be economical. 

See joint TSD section 3.3.5.5. The assumptions for mass reduction costs will be examined 

during the mid-term evaluation. 

The total amount of mass reduction used in the agencies’ analysis for this rulemaking was 

chosen based on the agencies’ documented assumptions about how much mass reduction is 

technologically feasible without compromising safety. Overall, technical feasibility paths for 

manufacturers identified in this rulemaking include a minimal mass reduction, <5%, for the 

majority of passenger vehicles due to safety constraints discussed in Sec II.G of the preamble. 

Some trucks and CUV’s have up to 15% to 20% mass reduction in the projected compliance 

analysis which would tend to improve highway safety. As explained in preamble section II.G, 

and as noted by a number of commenters (e.g. DRI, CBD), removing weight from heavier 

vehicles should have a positive effect on vehicle safety.

As also described in detail in preamble section II.G, the agencies have carefully 

documented potential compliance paths which are safety neutral, and thus do not depend on 

significant mass reduction from vehicles weighing less than 3,106 pounds. While EPA has 

shown a possible compliance pathway using one set of assumptions about the use of mass 

reduction, there are many alternative pathways for compliance. As discussed in EPA RIA 

section 3.5, this rulemaking is projected to decrease vehicle mass by approximately 4% (on 

average) relative to the reference case. Rather than using mass reduction technology, 

manufacturers could choose to use, for example, additional turbo-charging and downsizing, 

hybridization, or any other available technology. No manufacturer is explicitly required by this 

regulation to reduce the mass of their vehicles. Some manufacturers may choose not to reduce 

mass at all. Others may choose to reduce mass by more than the levels projected here. Using the 

methodology discussed in Section II.G, EPA has shown a compliance pathway that is projected 

to produce no net additional fatalities.

12.2.4. Electrification, Fuel Cell, and Hybrid Technologies

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Delphi Corporation

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Honeywell Transportation Systems

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Nissan North America, Inc.

Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Tesla Motors, Inc.

Toyota Motor North America

United Automobile Workers (UAW)
EPA Response to Comments

12-46

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Is the Needed Fueling Infrastructure Available to Enable PHEVs, BEVs and Fuel Cell Vehicles 

to Penetrate the Market at the Levels Predicted? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.22]

President Obama has set a goal to put one million plug-in electric vehicles on U.S. roads by 

2015. To meet this goal, and to achieve even more ambitious targets for post-2015 

electrification, the U.S. will need to invest heavily in electric charging infrastructure. The Boston 

Consulting Group recently estimated that $8 billion in electric vehicle charging infrastructure 

would be needed by 2020 to support the growing market for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and 

battery electric vehicles. In addition to cost, a variety of other electric mobility infrastructure 

challenges remain, including development of uniform state, federal and local standards and 

protocols. Last year, the Alliance and AIAM issued a paper identifying these specific barriers 

and proposing a series of recommendations for addressing these challenges. Hydrogen 

infrastructure is also needed to support the commercialization of fuel cell vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.22]

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

AFPM believes that these projections of electrification are too high. This problem can be 

corrected by employing smaller values for phase-in caps. In the Draft Joint Technical Support 

Document EPA states that: “Ultimately, phase-in caps are determined by the agencies using 

engineering judgment.”12 This engineering judgment is arbitrary and capricious. It departs from 

reality and is calculated to support the proposed standards. It ignores the finding of the National 

Research Council, with no explanation as to why its assumptions differ. AFPM recommends 

lower values for this important parameter for the electrification technologies. The values used by 

EPA and NHTSA in this proposal are unreasonably high. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, 

p.7] 

Phase-in caps are used in EPA’s Optimization Model for reducing Emissions of Greenhouse 

gases from Automobiles (OMEGA) and in NHTSA’s Compliance and Effects Modeling System. 

Phase-in caps are a user input for individual technologies. For example, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.7] [There are two figures associated with this statement, please refer to EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.7] 

These phase-in caps are optimistic and unrealistic. They contribute to the projected large increase 

in electrification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.7] 

The phase-in caps assumptions may look reasonable and/or small to some, but 20% of millions 

of new cars and light-duty trucks represents millions of new electric cars and trucks. Given 

consumers’ historical rejection of these vehicles, AFPM is doubtful that this penetration will 

occur in this timeframe. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.8] 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-47

This highlights the necessity of a good consumer choice model. The decision by EPA and 

NHTSA to use poor phase-in caps based on inadequate engineering judgment leads to flawed 

analyses. EPA and NHTSA should use a peer-reviewed consumer choice model and re-propose 

standards for new LDVs after MY 2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.8] 

AFPM believes that the use of a realistic consumer choice model and appropriate assumptions 

that model future behavior will lead NHTSA to promulgate lower CAFE standards based on a 

lower expectation of hybrids, plug-in hybrids and all electric vehicles. EPA and NHTSA should 

appreciate and understand the significance and implications of these projections, especially 

consumer acceptance barriers associated with vehicle cost, limited driving range and recharging. 

There is a large difference between the capability of automakers to produce vehicles with these 

technologies, the ability of automakers to sell these vehicles, and the creation and dissemination 

of the necessary recharging infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.8] 

EISA requires NHTSA to increase CAFE standards for passenger and non-passenger 

automobiles “to achieve a combined fuel economy average for model year 2020 of at least 35 

miles per gallon” and to achieve the maximum feasible average standard for the fleet for model 

years 2021-2030 (see section 102). As the discussion above on electrification shows, NHTSA’s 

proposal is not feasible and therefore is in conflict with its statutory authorization. The use of a 

peer-reviewed consumer choice model and a new proposal would assist NHTSA’s development 

of a proposal that is feasible and coincides with Congress’ mandate in this area. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9485-A1, p.8]

12 - EPA, “Draft Joint Technical Support Document: Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 

Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards,” EPA-420-D-11-901, November 2011, page 3-127. 

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 109-110.]

Second, vehicle electrification is shaping the future of automotive power and propulsion and will 

continue to do so for many years to come as more drivers look to hybrid electric vehicles and 

start/stop technology as a way to improve their efficiency and green vehicle choices. This market 

is expected to grow steadily for the foreseeable future and will be affected by global government 

regulations.

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Hybrids Have Known Deficiencies Under Real World Conditions
EPA Response to Comments

12-48

EPA conducted a study in 2006 confirming that hybrids operate substantially differently on the 

road than they do during official testing. Based on a 2006 review of several independent studies 

EPA concluded:

o Hybrid vehicles showed a slightly greater impact of aggressive driving on fuel economy than 

conventional gasoline vehicles (33 percent lower fuel economy versus 29 percent lower fuel 

economy for a conventional vehicle).

o Hybrid vehicles tended to show greater sensitivity to air conditioning operation than 

conventional vehicles. The effect of air conditioning operation reduced hybrid fuel economy by 

31 percent, compared to the 20 percent impact on conventional vehicle fuel economy.

o Overall, conventional gasoline vehicles averaged a cold temperature effect of about 11 percent 

lower fuel economy, while the impact on hybrid vehicles averaged about 32 percent lower fuel 

economy.

o The Cold Federal Test Procedure fuel economy with the heater/defroster on was significantly 

lower than that with the heater/defroster off, ranging from 5.8 percent lower fuel economy (~1 

mile per gallon lower on a non-hybrid vehicle) to 18.4 percent lower fuel economy (~8 miles per 

gallon lower on a hybrid vehicle). Note the fuel economy tests used by EPA for the original fuel 

economy labels were conducted with the air conditioning, heater and defrosters all switched to 

the off position. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, p.8]

Putting this in perspective, the 2012 gasoline powered Toyota Highlander loses about 1.3 miles 

per gallon (mpg) when the air conditioning is on and loses about 0.2 mpg in cold weather with 

the heater on based on EPA test data. The 2012 Highlander Hybrid on the other hand loses 15.2 

mpg with the air conditioning is turned on and 10.1 mpg in cold weather with the heater on. Data 

on the Prius is shown below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, p.8]

The table below shows the recent US EPA data comparing how typical driving conditions may 

adversely impact a vehicle’s fuel economy compared to the optimal driving conditions used in 

the standard EPA laboratory test cycle. Note that the hybrid electric vehicles (HEV) did 

substantially worse with the air conditioning turned on, during cold temperatures or utilizing 

typical urban acceleration rates and high speed driving. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, 

p.9]

These differences in fuel economy equate to higher greenhouse gas emissions on the road. The 

excess emissions documented in the table below demonstrate that hybrids emit more greenhouse 

gases on the road under real world conditions than are counted in their compliance testing (a 

negative number means lower emissions; a positive number means higher emissions). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, p.9]

Hybrids May Contain Defeat Devices
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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The fact that air conditioning operation causes or contributed to lower fuel economy and higher 

greenhouse gases one could argue that this is a “defeat device” which is expressly prohibited by 

statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, p.10]

o According to the Environmental Protection Agency, a defeat device means any device, system 

or element of design which senses operation outside normal emission test conditions and reduces 

emission control effectiveness. A defeat device includes any auxiliary emission control device 

(AECD) that reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which 

may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal operation and use unless such 

conditions are included in the test procedure. A defeat device does not include such items that 

either operate only during engine starting or are necessary to protect the engine (or equipment) 

against damage or accident during its operation. See 40 CFR 89.107-96. An AECD is generally 

deemed to be a defeat device if it is determined by EPA to reduce the effectiveness of an 

emission control system in response to any accessory operating condition not encountered during 

the Federal emission test. (EPA Advisory Circular 24). In simple terms, any time a vehicle 

operates differently on the road than it operates during the official EPA test there is a potential 

that this is due to what EPA defines as a defeat device.

o A classical example is the EPA decision regarding a change in engine operating conditions 

when the air conditioning was turned on (A/C and the heater are turned off during official EPA 

testing.) In 1995 EPA forced General Motors to recall half a million Cadillac’s, GM was to pay 

an $11 million fine, more than $25 million to recall and retrofit the polluting vehicles, and up to 

$8.75 million on projects to offset emissions from these vehicles. These projects may include 

buying back older vehicles or purchasing new school buses that burn cleaner fuels.

o EPA determined that GM relied on a computer chip to increase the engine idle speed by about 

100 revolutions per minute (RPMs) which EPA thought was excessive and beyond what was 

necessary to offset the additional load applied when the air conditioning or heater was turned on. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, p.10]

So one must ask the question, why is hybrid electric vehicle technology not a defeat device? 

During the official EPA testing the HEV typically operated in battery mode for a substantial 

portion of the test with the engine off. During these tests, both the air conditioning and the heater 

are off. When either the cabin heater or the air conditioning is turned on by the customer in real 

world operation the engine turns on (or in the case of the models with electric air conditioners 

the battery discharges faster which results in the engine turning on faster) thereby increasing 

vehicle greenhouse gases and decreasing vehicle fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11760-A2, p.11]

Conclusion

The bottom line is that EPA needs to reevaluate the costs and benefits of hybrid and all electric 

vehicles in its rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A2, p.11]

Organization: Honeywell Transportation Systems
EPA Response to Comments

12-50

The long term environmental benefits of electric vehicles are also unknown once the upstream 

emissions of generating electricity are accounted for. The emissions benefits of an electric 

vehicle fleet are, from a well-to-wheel perspective, highly dependent on reconstituting the 

nation’s base energy structure to rely more exclusively on renewable energy sources and less on 

fossil fuels such as coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.4]

This environmental uncertainty of electric vehicles needs to be viewed against the proven 

environmental and market benefits of enhancing internal combustion engines with innovations 

such as turbochargers and advanced lightweight materials.3 The lead time and financial 

constraints faced by OEMs require the industry to begin to choose investment now with regard to 

vehicles for the model years covered by the first part of this rulemaking. Encouraging investment 

towards electric vehicles at the expense of ICE vehicles places a heavy bet on an uncertain future 

while potentially diminishing the more certain gains to be had through advanced ICE 

technologies. The internal combustion fleet will continue to dominate for the foreseeable future, 

making it a logical choice for investment with the greatest promise of return. EV mandates 

requiring a singular investment approach suggest a solution which at best will be limited and at 

worst wasted given market expectations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.4]

3 Diesel vehicles with turbo technologies offer an especially beneficial approach to securing 

significant emissions gains. OEMs have invested heavily in developing diesel technologies for 

the U.S. market, and there is growing demand for diesel vehicles in the U.S. Diesels offer 

substantially better fuel economy over gasoline. Honeywell strongly supports any incentive that 

would allow the U.S. to capture and benefit from the further deployment of diesel vehicles 

during the model years covered by this regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9474-A1, p.4]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 29.]

I also applaud federal policy in identifying the positive role of electric vehicles as critical 

technology to address urban and greenhouse gas pollution, fuel economy and reduced 

dependence on fossil fuels. Electric drive technologies are inherently clean with zero tailpipe 

emissions, and coupled with renewables, they are capable of zero well-to-wheel emissions and 

will be necessary to reach 2050 greenhouse gas targets of over 80 percent.

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

Nissan is also committed to hybrid technologies. Nissan has developed a modular hybrid unit for 

front wheel drive vehicles that can be applied to varying engine displacements. Mated to a 2.5L 

supercharged 4-cylinder engine, our hybrid powertrain delivers V6-like power with improved 

fuel economy. Mated to a small displacement 4cylinder engine (i.e. 2.0L), our hybrid powertrain 

will deliver the power like a 2.5L engine and offer improved fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.7]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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The proposed standards assume a significant market penetration of both advanced ICE 

technology and hybrid technology. As set forth below, hybrid vehicle market penetration has 

only recently expanded from initial purchasers of new technology, the innovators, to the early 

adopters who can begin to educate and expand awareness about the new technology to a broader, 

national market. Thus, widespread adoption of hybrids into the pragmatic majority of consumers 

remains uncertain at this time. Only through a midterm review can the agencies have the 

requisite certainty that the standards established for GHG emissions and suggested for CAFE 

will in fact be technologically and economically feasible in MYs 2022-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9471-A1, p.7]

The proposed standards also anticipate a serious influx of transformational technology to reach 

compliance. As the agencies made clear in the Second Supplemental Notice of Intent, '[i]n 

achieving the level of standards described above for the 2017-2025 program, the agencies expect 

automakers' use of advanced technologies to be an important element of transforming the vehicle 

fleet.' See 76 Fed. Reg. 48,758, 48,760 (Aug. 9,2011). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.7]

Nissan has led the way: (1) in investing in battery technology for the mass market, (2) in 

working with the governments on every level to prepare the infrastructure, and (3) in supporting 

government programs to ensure the long-term viability of low and zero emission vehicles. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.7]

Nissan began introducing the Nissan LEAF in the United States in December 2010 and has 

already sold more than 10,000 Nissan LEAFs in the United States and over 20,000 worldwide. 

The Nissan LEAF is not a niche vehicle-it is a full-service family sedan designed for range, 

functionality and safety. The Nissan LEAF is a Top Safety Pick by the Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety and the first all-electric car to earn an overall 5 star safety rating from NHTSA. 

The battery contains air-cooled, stacked laminated battery cells and is located below the seats 

and rear foot space, keeping the center of gravity as low as possible and increasing structural 

rigidity compared to a conventional five-door hatchback. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, 

p.7]

In addition to being an industry leader in EV technology and deployment, Nissan recently 

announced its intention to introduce a PHEV model in 2015. Nissan will introduce additional 

battery electric vehicles into the marketplace in the coming years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9471-A1, p.8]

Nissan also recently released its Next Generation Fuel Cell Stack (2011 Model) for FCVs. 

Through improvements to the Membrane Electrode Assembly (MEA) and the separator flow 

path, which make up the structure of Fuel Cell, Nissan significantly improved the power density 

of Fuel Cell Stack to 2.5 times greater than its 2005 model and realized a world's best (among 

auto manufacturers) 2.5 kW per liter. Integrally molding the supporting frame of the MEA 

enabled stable, single-row lamination of the Fuel Cell, thereby significantly reducing its overall 

size by more than half compared to conventional models. Finally, compared with the 2005 

model, both the usage of platinum and parts variation has been reduced by 25%, thereby 

reducing cost of the Next Generation Fuel Cell Stack to one-sixth of the 2005 model. Nissan 
EPA Response to Comments

12-52

continues to work on the development of practical applications of FCVs to realize a zero 

emission society. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.8]

While Nissan has taken leadership in electric vehicles throughout the world, the widespread 

market adoption of the technology depends on broader industry investment and continued 

government support through incentive programs. With state and local governments facing 

budgetary constraints, economic uncertainties and potential market disruptions, the mid-term 

review is necessary to ensure the ability for the industry to incorporate enough advanced 

powertrain technology into the fleet to allow industry-wide compliance with the program in the 

later years. Without such a review, the standards for the later years lack the requisite certainty to 

assure that they will in fact be achievable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.8]

Organization: Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE)

Therefore, in addition to promoting the importance of improving fuel economy, which is of 

critical importance, especially for the short- and medium-term, SAFE is promoting the 

deployment of GEVs to replace petroleum powered vehicles and establish electricity as the 

dominant means of powering our LDV fleet in the long-term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-

A1, p. 6]

SAFE believes that electrifying the light-duty transportation system is the best way to enhance 

our national, economic, and environmental security in the long because:

1) Electrification allows our economy to reduce exposure to the global oil market;

2) Electrification promotes fuel diversity;

3) Electric vehicles will be powered by largely domestic fuels;

4) Electricity prices are generally more stable than oil prices;

5) Electrification has the potential to reduce carbon emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-

A1, p. 6]

Reduce Exposure to the Global Oil Market: As explained above, the United States dependence 

on the global oil market imposes substantial economic and national security costs on the nation. 

Using electricity to power light-duty vehicles can disconnect a portion of the fleet from the 

global oil market and minimize the burdens of that dependence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9518-A1, p. 6]

Promotes Fuel Diversity: Petroleum is essentially the sole fuel for the nation’s cars and trucks 

and fuels 93 percent of our transportation system’s energy needs. This reliance exposes the entire 

transportation sector to the volatility endemic to the world oil market. Electricity, however, is 

generated by a diverse set of fuels, including coal, nuclear, natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, 

geothermal, solar, landfill gas, and others. An electricity-powered transportation system, 

therefore, is one in which an interruption of the supply of one fuel can be made up for by others, 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-53

and price volatility for one fuel is dampened by stability in others—a far cry from today, when a 

single event on the other side of the globe can interrupt the flow of oil and dramatically increase 

the cost of transportation in the United States. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 6-7]

Domestic Portfolio of Fuels: While oil supplies are subject to a wide range of geopolitical risks, 

the fuels that we use to generate electricity are generally sourced domestically. Satisfying our 

transportation energy needs with these domestic fuels will not only reduce the economic risks 

created by highly volatile oil prices, it will significantly lower the trade deficit. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 7]

Reduced Price Volatility: Oil prices are highly volatile. The retail price of electricity is not. 

Power prices reflect a wide range of costs. Generally, the cost of fuel represents a smaller 

percentage of the overall cost of delivered electricity than the cost of crude oil represents as a 

percentage of the cost of retail gasoline. This makes retail power prices less sensitive to any 

volatility in fuel prices. Further, retail power prices are generally set to reflect the average cost of 

wholesale prices over time, promoting retail price stability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-

A1, p. 7]

Reduced Carbon Emissions: As EPA itself noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, EVs and 

PHEVs have the potential to transform the carbon emissions profile of the light duty sector by 

obtaining much or all of their power from grid electricity that could be produced from very low 

GHG emission feedstocks or processes, and the potential for greater transformation if at some 

point in the future there is comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 7]

Because of the role that GEVs can play in disconnecting the nation’s economy from dependence 

on global oil market, and the economic and national security consequences of that dependence, 

SAFE supports a portfolio of policies intended to facilitate their penetration of the automotive 

marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 150.]

We have been promoting plug-in vehicles for four reasons: First, the fuel that is used to power 

them is domestic; second is a diverse portfolio for fuels; third, the price of power is much more 

stable than the price of oil; and fourth, electricity has the potential to be much cleaner in the long 

term.

In short, electricity has the potential to address a giant set of problems for our nation that no 

other fuel can address. Yet, for many years, the cost of this technology is going to be more 

expensive.

Organization: Tesla Motors, Inc.
EPA Response to Comments

12-54

• EV technology is the most promising and cost-effective alternative to traditional internal 

combustion engines. It is available now and at price points already lower than current 

projections; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 1]

EVs are a commercially viable technology presently and are increasingly available in the current 

marketplace due to innovative design and the emergence of new applications for existing 

technologies. Lithium-ion batteries are a proven technology, currently utilized as the standard 

power source for consumer electronics and increasingly identified for its potential in military, 

aerospace and automotive applications. These batteries offer tremendous energy density, low 

weight, and no memory effect. Additional research into lithium-ion batteries consistently yields 

improvements in energy density, durability and intrinsic safety, while continuing to lower 

costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, pp. 4-5]

Tesla’s real world experience demonstrates an EV technology cost that is highly competitive. 

Again, this cost includes not only cells, but the attendant cooling, cell management and 

disconnect unit as well. Specifically, battery costs for production of over 2,500 Tesla Roadsters 

over the life of the program were in the range of $500/kWh. As the technology has improved and 

Tesla has gained greater efficiencies, we have been able to lower the costs for Model S and X 

even further to a point where battery technology is projected in the range of $350/kWh with 

production of at least 20,000 units/year. By the time Tesla Motors projects high volume 

production of Gen III platform at volumes of 100,000 to 200,000 units/year, we believe battery 

costs will be well south of $350kWh. These cost estimates are based not in theory, but the actual 

costs seen by Tesla Motors for EVs and power trains production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9539-A2, p. 5]

To this end, Tesla Motors strongly believes that EVs are a compelling proposition. Not only does 

the Company believe that EVs are cost-effective from a manufacturing standpoint, but also from 

the perspective of the total cost of ownership. When consideration of the cost of gasoline, oil 

changes, and other routine maintenance is factored in, the cost to operate the Model S over eight 

years will be $30,000 less than a comparably equipped (and priced) BMW 535i. Likewise, the 

Tesla Gen III vehicle will cost approximately $17,000 less to operate than a Ford Fusion over 

that same period.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 5]

Of course, while cost is a significant driver of EV adoption, so too is range and vehicle 

efficiency. Tesla continues to push forward on development in these areas as well. By way of 

illustrative example, if the current technology developed for Model S were installed in a Tesla 

Roadster, instead of 245 miles on a single charge, the Roadster would have a range in excess of 

330 miles on a single charge. Improvements are not achieved solely in terms of energy density in 

the pack, but in several aspects of energy storage and power management. Tesla continues to 

push forward on EV technology and predicts even higher battery pack energy density and longer 

ranges as the technology continues to improve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 6]

In sum, from Tesla’s perspective, there is significant advancement both in the current and next 

generation of EVs. Both EPA and NHTSA have a long history of successfully enacting 

challenging standards that the industry can and does meet, from lead free gas and catalytic 

converters, to Tier II emission standards and the existing CAFE standards. Tesla urges both EPA 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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and NHTSA to continue the commendable pattern of pushing industry to drive innovation in the 

area of fuel efficiency and GHG reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 6]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 94.]

The benefits of EV technology are manifest: Zero emissions at point of use. Some of the prior 

testaments have spoken to the national security implications of reduction of foreign oil. But too 

little is said of the economic benefit of a transition away from the oil monopoly and 

transportation, notably the fact that 300 billion a year spent on foreign oil, and this represents 

about half of our trade deficit. It's worth imagining what that money would do if recycled in our 

own economy. It's also a testament -- EV technology, as it's currently being developed, is a 

testament to how American innovation is driving a number of positive developments in national 

security and economics, but also in job creation. Tesla Motors now employs just about 2,000 

folks. And as we ramp up the production, we will be increasing several hundred more in this 

calendar year.

8 Assumes Fusion retails for $25,000 and gets 40mpg at $3.50/gallon over 12,000 miles per year. 

Tesla Gen III assumed to get 225wh/mi at $0.11/kWh and $30,000 selling price over the same 

mileage.

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

Fuel Cell Readiness [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.23]

For this proposed rule, the agencies considered vehicle technologies that manufacturers could 

use to improve the fuel economy and reduce GHGs in the 2017-2025 model year timeframe. In 

doing so, assumptions were made about how currently available technologies could be 

incorporated into vehicle product development programs to help comply with the proposed 

standards. The agencies classified these as 'near-term' technologies, as many are anticipated as 

potential compliance strategies for the 2012-2016 model year final rule. In addition, the agencies 

evaluated other technologies that are not projected to be in production within the next 5 to 10 

years. A number of these advanced technologies are categorized as being beyond the research 

phase and were not considered for the purpose of evaluating the feasibility of the proposed 

standards because of significant uncertainty in their development and ability penetrate the fleet in 

large volumes. Fuel cell vehicles are one such technology, for which the NPRM states: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.22]

'While we expect there will be some limited introduction of FCEVs into the market place in the 

time frame of this rule, we expect this introduction to be relatively small, and thus FCEVs are 

not considered in the modeling analysis conducted for this proposal. ' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.22]
EPA Response to Comments

12-56

We are concerned that this assessment is too cursory and could be misinterpreted. There have 

been significant advances in fuel-cell stacks, dramatic reductions in system cost, and marked 

improvement in system durability and cold weather operation. In addition, manufacturers have 

announced vehicle introduction plans for fuel cell demonstration vehicles, beginning in 2015. 

Automakers have proven the viability of fuel cell vehicles. We believe the biggest remaining 

hurdle is refueling infrastructure. Toyota agrees with the agencies assessment that fuel cell 

technology is one of the key future technologies for GHG reduction. We request that the 

agencies' assessment of fuel cell vehicles in the final rule elaborate on the progress that has been 

made to date and clarify that how infrastructure remains the primary challenge toward 

commercialization. We also strongly encourage the agencies to support hydrogen infrastructure 

development, in order to ensure the timely introduction of these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.22]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 23-24.]

UAW members are also producing new technologies that may not reach large volumes for many 

years but represent the long-term future of the industry. That includes hybrid transmissions, 

electric drive components, lithium ion battery packs, and plug-in and pure electric vehicles.

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Volkswagen compared cost and effectiveness estimates for hybridization with those provided by 

EPA in both the Notice of Intent (Sept-2010) and the Joint Draft Technical Support Document 

(Joint TSD) which accompanied the NPRM. Volkswagen also examined HEV penetration rates 

projected by EPA out to 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

Accurate projections for the cost of advanced technologies, especially vehicle electrification are 

a challenge. Volkswagen believes that significant uncertainty will remain with regards to pricing 

of energy storage for many years to come. Failure to drive down costs of electric storage will 

directly impact the market acceptance and resulting penetration of electrified vehicles. EPA has 

predicted that the NPRM will force upwards of 30% HEV technology into Volkswagen’s 

compliance fleet for 2021 with an additional 6% EV and 1% PHEV being required to achieve 

compliance. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

Volkswagen is concerned that the projected 30% HEV penetration rate is unrealistic and grossly 

exceeds our expectations for hybrid sales rates. Volkswagen recognizes that this is only an 

exercise conducted by the agency to analyze potential compliance pathways. Regardless, HEV 

adoption by consumers remains challenging even when long-term fuel savings can be calculated 

to outweigh the higher upfront vehicle price. US adoption of HEV vehicles remains between 2-

3% per year even in light of recent fuel price increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 

13]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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EPA has projected that the industry on average will increase electrified vehicles sales to 

approximately 7% in 2020 and 18% in 2025 1, the majority of which are hybrid vehicles. 

Increased adoption by consumers of hybrids and other electrics to these levels remains a critical 

and difficult to predict factor. Interest in HEV technologies obviously peaks during times of 

escalated fuel prices. However, this is often followed by receding interest as fuel prices either 

drop or stabilize. It is also important to note that HEV interest is often motivated by factors other 

than fuel savings such as access to High Occupancy Vehicles lanes, premium parking, lower 

property taxes, etc. Recent trends at State and local levels to eliminate some of these perks may 

further deteriorate interest, e.g. California expiration of HOV access for certain hybrids. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

EPA’s base assumption with the proposal is that consumers will react to long-term fuel savings, 

even with higher upfront costs for higher efficiency vehicles, and that the savings will motivate 

consumers to purchase vehicles such as hybrids. The NPRM incorporates AEO fuel price 

predictions as described in Section 4.2.2 of the Joint TSD. AEO predicts gasoline prices as 

shown in Table 2-6. AEO predicts average gasoline prices to remain essentially constant between 

2012 and 2025. This means that consumers will face similar 'price at the pump' in real dollars 

that they see now. Regardless of short-term price swings, AEO sees no significant deviation from 

current pump prices. [See Table 2-6 on p. 14 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9569-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 14]

As shown in Figure 2-4, following fuel price increases in early 2000’s, there was a notable uptick 

in customer interest of hybrid vehicles. The fuel price spikes in 2007-2008 timeframe even 

brought about irrational consumer behavior in which customers traded-in large trucks to 

purchase small cars, sometimes at considerable loss. However as fuel prices stabilized in the mid 

$3 per gallon range, sales in larger vehicles and pick-up trucks returned. Often customers who 

had moved into smaller vehicles complained about the lack in comfort and space of the smaller 

cars. [See Figure 2-4 on p. 14 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 14]

As shown in Figure 2-4, following fuel price increases in early 2000’s, there was a notable uptick 

in customer interest of hybrid vehicles. The fuel price spikes in 2007-2008 timeframe even 

brought about irrational consumer behavior in which customers traded-in large trucks to 

purchase small cars, sometimes at considerable loss. However as fuel prices stabilized in the mid 

$3 per gallon range, sales in larger vehicles and pick-up trucks returned. Often customers who 

had moved into smaller vehicles complained about the lack in comfort and space of the smaller 

cars. [See Figure 2-4 on p. 14 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 14]

Figure 2-4 illustrates some recent market trends combined with projections within the proposal. 

What is most notable is recovery in the truck sector following the late 2007-2009 drop off due 

primarily to the US recession. During this time period the industry as a whole dropped 

significantly from around 16 million units to 10 million units. For 2011, the truck segment has 

seen accelerating recovery, once again outpacing overall car sales. Large pick-ups have seen 

notable gains with the F150 and Silverado/Sierra once again taking the top two sales 

positions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 15]
EPA Response to Comments

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Hybrid penetration rates may then be challenged to move from the 2-3% range to upwards of 7% 

and 18% in 2021 and 2025 respectively. Especially with gains expected to be made with 

conventional engine technology, Volkswagen sees no significant motivation which would drive 

customer interest in hybridization to these extremes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 15]

1 Table 3.9-4 EPA RIA

Response:

The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) commented that our 

phase-in caps for electrification are too high resulting in projections of electrification being too 

high. EPA’s phase-in caps are presented in Table 3-130 of the joint TSD. There we show our 

caps for MYs 2016, 2021 and 2025 as 15%/30%/50% for HEVs, 6%/11%/15% for EVs and 

5%/10%/14% for PHEVs. In the final analysis, we have lumped mild HEVs in with HEVs so 

that the caps limit HEVs+mild HEVs to 15%/30%/50%. We disagree that these caps are too 

high. We remind the commenter that the caps are only maximum limits placed on OMEGA (for 

each manufacturer), they are not our projections for actual technology penetrations for the fleet. 

AFPM suggests that we have used the purportedly high caps to support the standards, implying 

that the standards can only be met with penetration rates that are higher than possible (according 

to AFPM). In fact, we have projected a feasible compliance pathway which relies very little on 

electrification to the strong hybrid (P2 HEV), EV or PHEV level. As shown in preamble Tables 

III-26 through III-29, our control case has essentially the same strong HEV penetration as shown 

in the reference case (i.e. very little addition from 2017 through 2025 beyond what’s already in 

2016), and the combined EV/PHEV penetration is just 2%. In the case of mild HEVs, we have a 

much more significant penetration rate of 26% but we believe that level of penetration can be 

met by industry given that a sizable number of essentially the same technology is being sold 

today (e.g., the GM eAssist sold on the Buick LaCrosse and Regal and the Chevrolet Malibu) 

and the technology is less complex than the strong HEV or EV/PHEV technologies. As regards 

the AFPM comments on consumer choice modeling, we address such issues in section 18.1 of 

this Response to Comments document.

Regarding comments from Delphi Corporation, we appreciate your comments in support 

of the potential for hybrid electric vehicles and start/stop technology to reduce the CO2 emissions 

for all classes of vehicles.

Regarding comments from the Environmental Consultants of Michigan, EPA and 

NHTSA acknowledge and discuss in detail the on-road fuel economy “gap” in secton 4.2.1 of the 

TSD. This gap not only exists for strong HEVs. It also exists for vehicles with more 

conventional drivetrains. Included in this section is a discussion of the gap used by the agencies 

for electric drivetrains (30%) and the gap for the use of liquid fuels (20%) along with a 

discussion of EPA 5-cycle and derived 5-cycle MPG versus 2-cycle MPG. EPA does not need to 

reevaluate the costs and benefits of hybrid and all electric vehicles since the in-use gap for both 

conventional and hybrid vehicles has been accounted for. The agencies also do not project that a 

significant increase in the use of strong-HEVs will be necessary to comply with the 2017-2025 

GHG standards. The commenter’s remarks and specific examples were primarily with regards to 
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-59

strong HEV’s like the Toyota Highlander HEV. Our analysis shows that strong HEVs will see 

only a minor increase from today’s levels of approximately 4% of vehicle sales to approximately 

5% of vehicle sales in 2025. Our analysis projects a much larger increase in sales of mild HEVs 

(approximately 30% of sales). Because the operation of mild HEV applications is limited to 

start/stop and mild launch assist, the differences between 2-cycle and 5-cycle MPG and CO2

emissions would be considerably less than for strong HEVs. The comments with respect to 

HEVs being defeat devices are completely without merit. Like other light-duty vehicles, HEVs 

are subject to SFTP standards and to cold CO standards, and thus are tested under high 

temperature conditions with AC active (SC03 test cycle), under very aggressive driving 

conditions (US06 test cycle) and under cold winter conditions (Cold CO test). CO2 emissions of 

more conventional vehicles also show differences during cold temperature, high temperature/AC 

and aggressive driving conditions, which can be seen in the differences between 2-cycle and 5-

cycle CO2 and MPG results for these vehicles.

Regarding comments from Honeywell Transportation Systems, we thank you for your 

comments and providing this additional information. We look forward to obtaining more of this 

type of information to inform our future work.

Regarding comments from the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT),

and the United Automobile Workers (UAW), we appreciate your comments in support of the 

potential for electric vehicle technology to reduce the CO2 emissions for all classes of vehicles.

Regarding comments from Nissan North America and Toyota Motor North America, 

Inc., we appreciate your comments in support of the potential for electric vehicle technology to 

reduce the CO2 emissions for all classes of vehicles along with your efforts to introduce fuel cell 

vehicles. We agree the mid-term review will be used to evaluate the progress of the technologies 

used to meet the standards.

Regarding comments from Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE), and Tesla Motors, 

Inc., we appreciate your comments in support of the potential for electric vehicle technology to 

reduce the CO2 emissions for all classes of vehicles while simultaneously decreasing our 

dependence on unstable sources of petroleum and increasing our energy security.

Volkswagen Group of America commented that our electrification penetration rates for 

VW in MY2021 were overly aggressive. In the proposal, we estimated VW’s penetration rates 

at 30% HEV, 6% EV and 1% PHEV. In our final analysis, we estimate VW at 15%/0%/0% 

penetration of HEV/EV/PHEV in the MY2021 reference case and 1%/6%/0% penetration of 

HEV/EV/PHEV in the MY2021 control case along with a 29% penetration of mild HEVs. 

Therefore, we are actually projecting a significant decrease in HEV penetration and an increase 

of both mild HEVs and EVs compared to the analysis presented at proposal. We do not believe 

this projected compliance pathway poses the issues of consumer acceptance that VW posits in its 

comments. Moreover, and importantly, this represents one compliance pathway for VW, the 

pathway that we consider to be the most cost effective. VW may choose a different approach 

and is not constrained from doing so. . For example, VW has traditionally been a strong 

supporter of diesel technology. Nothing in the final rule precludes VW from using diesel 

technology to comply if VW believes that this is a more promising compliance pathway. 
EPA Response to Comments

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12.2.4.1. ANL Battery Model

Organizations Included in this Section

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Tesla Motors, Inc.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

8. Many, if not most, future Li-ion batteries will use air-cooling. Future versions of the ANL 

BatPac model should include an option to select either air or liquid cooling. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

8) Battery Cooling System Cost

The ANL report on the BatPac battery cost model 26 includes an Active Cooling System section 

and briefly explains why Water-50% glycol was selected:

'There are several choices of coolant that have been considered for cooling battery packs 

including air from the cabin, which may be heated or cooled, water-ethylene glycol solutions and 

dielectric liquids such as transformer coolants. Air is the least expensive, but it is less effective 

than the liquids because of its poor conductivity, the need for large flow passages and high 

pumping power. Dielectric liquids are expensive, but have the advantage of being compatible 

with terminals and other parts at electrical potential. Water-50% glycol solution is inexpensive 

and has good conductivity; we have selected it as the coolant for this study.' [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 21]

Unfortunately, the general design select for cost analysis does not allow for air cooling:

'We selected a general cell and battery design that can be adapted to all of the electric-drive 

batteries from micro-HEVs packs to EV packs (section 2). This design incorporates a 

hermetically sealed module closure. Unfortunately, the enclosure does not have sufficient surface 

area to be cooled effectively by air.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 21]

Section 5.2.3.3 Balance of Thermal Management System acknowledges that air cooled systems 

are less expensive and are more likely to be used in micro HEVs and HEV-HPs. In addition, aircooling was studied by the authors of the BatPac report (docket item EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1078) and presented at the Electric Vehicle Symposium in 2009 and 2010.27,28 The initial cell 

design for those studies involved flat-wound cells. Flat-wound cells have more surface area and 

can be effectively cooled by air. Finally, it should be noted that the Nissan Leaf battery pack 

does not use liquid cooling, only a circulating fan inside a sealed battery pack. It is inappropriate 

to exclude air-cooling in the modeling of battery cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 

22]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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The ICCT strongly recommends that future versions of the BatPac model include an option to 

select either air or liquid cooling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 22]

26 ANL, 2011, Modeling the Performance and Cost of Lithium-Ion Batteries for Electric-Drive 

Vehicles, Final Report prepared by Paul A. Nelson, Kevin G. Gallagher, Ira Bloom. and Dennis 

W. Dees, Argon National Laboratory, Argonne, IL' Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1078

27 Nelson PA, Santini D. J' Barnes J., Factors Determining the Manufacturing Costs of LithiumIon Batteries for PHEVs, Electric Vehicle Symposium 24, Stavanger, Norway, May 13-16, 2009.

28 Santini D.J., Gallagher K. G., Nelson P.A., Modeling of Manufacturing Costs of Lithium-Ion 

Batteries for HEVs, PHEVs, and EVs, Electric Vehicle Symposium 25, Shenzhen, China, Nov. 

5-9, 2010.

Organization: Tesla Motors, Inc.

The battery packs used by Tesla Motors are the result of innovative systems engineering and the 

Company’s continual drive to forward advances in lithium-ion cell technology. Starting with the 

18650 form-factor cells, Tesla takes advantage of all aspects of cell and pack design to optimize 

not only energy density, but structure and safety as well. For example, the 18650 cells used in 

Tesla vehicles and power trains allow for innovative packaging while providing an incredible 

level of safety not matched by any other lithium ion technology. Specifically, the unique 

properties of the smaller cell size enables efficient heat transfer, allow for precise charge 

management, improve reliability, and extend battery pack life. Tesla has also developed a unique 

and proprietary lithium ion chemistry engineered specifically for EVs. This chemistry has 

resulted in EV quality cells that have the highest energy density in the industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 5]

As noted in the NPRM, EPA and NHTSA have relied upon the battery cost model developed by 

Argonne National Laboratory for the Vehicle Technologies Program of the U.S. Department of 

Energy - Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Tesla understands that this model 

considers the vehicle application’s power and energy requirements, which are two of the 

fundamental parameters when designing a lithium-ion battery for an HEV, PHEV, or EV. 

Though we appreciate the efforts of those at ANL and DOE, Tesla Motors supports a more 

comprehensive approach to assessing the battery cost. When calculating cost values, Tesla does 

not price cells alone, but factors in all the costs of the battery and attendant systems including 

cell management, thermal management and the disconnect unit. Tesla believes this is a more 

accurate method of cost calculation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 5]

Response:

Regarding comments from Tesla Motors Inc, we agree that when analyzing the 

manufacturing costs of future HEV, PHEV and EV battery packs, all of the costs of the battery 

and attendant systems including cell management, thermal management and the disconnect unit 
EPA Response to Comments

12-62

should be included. That is why, in part, that EPA selected the ANL BatPaC model. EPA’s cost 

analysis in the NPRM as described in the draft TSD included cell management, thermal 

management and the safety disconnect. This cost analysis was further refined for the final rule 

(see Chapter 3.3.3.9 of the joint TSD) and included options for selecting either: 

1. Forced cabin-air cooling of the battery pack along with the necessary redesign of cell 

spacing to accommodate air cooling.

2. Liquid-cooling using glycol-water coolant and, in the case of PHEV applications, a 

dedicated lower-temperature coolant loop.

EPA selected the use of air-cooling for micro-HEV and HEV applications similar to the 

systems used for the Li-ion battery pack in the 2012 Hyundai Sonata HEV. EPA selected the use 

of liquid cooling for PHEV and EV applications similar to the cooling systems used for the GM 

Chevrolet Volt and the Ford Focus Electric. While the Agency acknowledges that air-cooled and 

passively-cooled systems may be appropriate for some EV applications, we decided that a more 

conservative approach was necessary to provide battery adequate pack cooling under all ambient 

conditions and for a broader range of vehicle applications than what is currently available.

12.3. Cost of CO2-Reducing Technologies

Organizations Included in this Section

Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

Center for Biological Diversity

Ceres

Delphi Corporation

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Organization: Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 226-227.]

As we think about light-weighting and advanced materials, the other question that comes up after 

safety is cost. Clearly strong, affordable carbon reducing materials are being used at an 

increasing rate to meet down-weighting objectives now and in the future. Aluminum is widely 

recognized as a cost-effective choice for reducing weight in automotive bodies, individual 

components, and vehicle structures. As auto makers turn to greater use of aluminium, secondary 

weight reductions are emerging as a major cost savings enabler. As we get larger and larger 

weight reductions, we're able to make larger and larger reductions in vehicle support systems.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

Moreover, the costs to manufacturers of adding technologies to increase their fuel efficiency are 

significantly overstated. In fact, it will be easier and far less costly to comply with any of the 

alternatives discussed in the NPRM than the Agencies state. The rapidity of improvements in 

fuel efficiency technology and the reduction in the costs of those technologies over the last 

decade has been startling. For example, as discussed in detail by comments submitted to this 

rulemaking by the International Council on Clean Transportation (“ICCT”), the National 

Research Counsel estimated in 2001 that turbocharging and downsizing would improve fuel 

economy by 5-7%, but by 2011 these technologies were estimated to improve efficiency by 12-

20 percent, nearly three times the rate of improvement predicted, all due to accelerating 

technological advances; estimated manufacturing costs for turbocharging systems have fallen 

from $815 to $478 in three years; and adding 6-speed automatic transmission was estimated to 

cost $215 in 2011 but now is estimated to save $13.00. Similarly, the cost of light-weighting is 

significantly overstated. But the Agencies do not take either of these trends – rapid technological 

improvement and significant cost reductions – into account in their cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, 

instead of assuming greater cost reductions in the later years of the rulemaking, the Agencies 

assume larger costs in those years. These errors must be corrected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Ceres

The analysis was also conservative as to assumptions regarding the costs and penetration of plugin technologies; it focused on low cost technologies, although many predict higher penetration 

and decreasing costs of these technologies in 2020. Given the analysis’ focus on low cost 

technologies, the vast majority of improvement in fuel economy was met with improvements in 

internal combustion engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Cuenca, M.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and the EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of 

a new vehicle by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according 

to the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 110.]

Finally, I recommend that the National Research Council technology cost estimates and 

implementation cadence data be included in the agencies' analyses and be considered a primary 

source of information. Industry reports and other analyses can also be used to provide even more 

insight and sensitivity.
EPA Response to Comments

12-64

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

The Agency is proposing stringent greenhouse gas standards that would fundamentally change 

the light duty vehicle and truck market. A look at the 2012 model year vehicles shows seven 

current models; three all electric vehicles, three hybrid electric vehicles and one hydrogen fuel 

cell powered vehicle would meet the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, 

p.1]

While there is scant data on the true costs of all electric vehicles there are data on the hybrids. 

Hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) propulsion systems were first introduced in the United States in 

1999. Since that time over 2 million HEVs have been sold. Eighty-eight percent of these HEVs 

were produced by Toyota and Honda. The Toyota Prius is the single largest selling hybrid 

representing more than half the hybrids on the road today in the United States. The Honda Civic 

represents 11 percent of the hybrids on the road in the United States and is the second highest 

selling hybrid. Both these vehicles would meet the 2025 model year proposed standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.1]

According to two standard valuation guides for estimating the average trade-in value, even 

though the Prius and the Civic carry a substantial premium initial purchase price based on 

manufacturer’s suggested retail price by the time they are eight years old they are actually worth 

less than their gasoline counterparts. The same applies to the next two highest selling hybrids the 

Camry and the Highlander. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.1]

This raises the question, do hybrids really save consumers money? Even though a hybrid will 

save on fuel costs assuming they achieve the EPA fuel economy label value, the higher financing

costs, sales tax, depreciation and insurance costs more than offset the fuel savings according to 

the True Cost of Ownership calculations on the Edmunds.com website. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11760-A1, p.3]

For every mile per gallon the fuel economy label is overstated, an extra $120 is added onto the 

cost of ownership. Conversely, for the Prius to achieve a true cost of ownership lower than the 

Camry, fuel prices would have to exceed $6.55 per gallon. For the Prius to achieve a true cost of 

ownership lower than the Corolla, fuel prices would have to exceed $13.01 per gallon. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.4]

The Honda Civic Hybrid also has a higher true cost to own compared to the gasoline Civic. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.4]

For every mile per gallon the fuel economy label is overstated, an extra $154 is added onto the 

cost of ownership. Conversely, for the Civic Hybrid to achieve a true cost of ownership lower 

than the gasoline version, fuel prices would have to exceed $8 per gallon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11760-A1, p.5]

Looking at the third highest selling hybrid, the Toyota Camry versus the gasoline Camry, the 

cost to own the hybrid is higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.5]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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For every mile per gallon the fuel economy label is overstated, an extra $194 is added onto the 

cost of ownership. Conversely, for the Camry Hybrid to achieve a true cost of ownership lower 

than the gasoline version, fuel prices would have to exceed $10.83 per gallon. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11760-A1, p.6]

Continuing the analysis to the fourth largest selling hybrid, the Toyota Highlander, the true cost 

of the hybrid is higher than the gasoline hybrid. The rationale for all of these cases is the same. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.6]

For every mile per gallon the fuel economy label is overstated, an extra $385 is added onto the 

cost of ownership. Conversely, for the Highlander Hybrid to achieve a true cost of ownership 

lower than the gasoline version, fuel prices would have to exceed $9.22 per gallon. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.7]

The higher initial purchase price of hybrids leads to higher financing costs, higher sales taxes, 

higher insurance costs and because of the added weight of the battery higher registration fees. 

These added costs more than offset the lower fuel costs. All electric vehicles will have higher 

financing costs, higher sales taxes, higher insurance costs and because of the added weight of the 

battery higher registration fees. If the higher depreciation of hybrids is due in part to the 

anticipated battery replacement cost, all electric vehicles will continue this trend of rapid 

depreciation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11760-A1, p.7]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

2. The impact of computer-aided design is especially important for lightweight materials. None 

of the existing studies on lightweight material costs are adequate. The results of Lotus and FEV 

lightweight material studies will be far more accurate for future designs and must be used to 

assess weight reduction costs for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 2]

2) Lightweight Material Costs

The cost of lightweight materials in the proposed rule is roughly twice that in the TAR. It is 

important to understand that computer simulations will especially impact lightweight material 

design. In the past, interactions between the thousands of parts on the vehicles and their impacts 

on safety, ride, noise, and vibration were impossible to predict. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 8]

Optimization of materials was a long, slow process of gradually changing a few parts at a time to 

avoid unanticipated problems. Secondary weight reductions were similarly difficult to achieve. 

The recent development of sophisticated and accurate vehicle simulations is opening up a new 

world. The initial use of these models was to improve safety design. The simulations are so 

effective that 5-star crash ratings became almost universal and NHTSA had to revise their rating 

criteria for the 2011 model year. The simulations are continuing to rapidly improve, to the point 

where they are starting to be used to simultaneously optimize the material composition, shape, 

and thickness of every individual part, including secondary weight reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 9]
EPA Response to Comments

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This shift in material design capabilities also impacts the cost to reduce vehicle weight. Previous 

lightweight material cost studies did not assess part interactions and secondary weight 

reductions. While they may have accurately reflected historical costs for lightweight materials, 

they all overstate the cost of future vehicle weight reduction. Studies in progress by Lotus and 

FEV are using highly sophisticated simulation models to optimize part materials and 

design. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 9]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 195.]

The results of Lotus and FEV lightweight material studies will be far more accurate of future 

designs and must be used to assess weight reduction costs for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 9]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 196-197.]

ICCT is also paying FEV to do additional teardown cost assessments in connection with our 

work in Europe. These include updating the future hybrid costs, new cost assessments for 

advanced diesel engines, basic start/stop systems, manual transmissions and cool EGR systems. 

These results will be shared with EPA and NHTSA as they become available.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 29-31.]

The ICCT agrees that the best way to derive direct technology to cost estimate is to conduct realworld tear-down studies. Not only is this likely to be more accurate than supplier and 

manufacturer estimates, but the results are public, greatly increasing the transparency of the cost 

information.

In our work, as well as the work conducted by the EPA and CARB, the issue of light weighting 

of vehicles has proven to be one of the most exciting and fertile areas for improving fuel 

economy without incurring exorbitant costs or jeopardizing safety. As Mr. German stated, 

previous lightweight material cost studies did not assess part interactions and secondary weight 

reductions.

Studies in progress by Lotus and FEV are using highly sophisticated simulation models to 

optimize part materials and design. The results of these studies will be far more accurate for 

future designs and must be used to assess weight reduction for the final rule. We believe that 

these studies will be available for inclusion in the final rule. They are likely to show costs of 

lightweighting to be lower than envisioned in the proposed NPRM as well as in the final 2012 to 

'16 rule.

These are but two examples where we feel that the costs of the proposal are likely to be too high. 

And we feel fully confident that the technology benefits representative of another 13 years of 

development will result in costs much lower than $2,000.
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

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Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA))

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 41.]

Second, EPA projects the cost of new technology will add on average about $2,000 to the price 

of a vehicle.

We recognize the consumers will recoup this cost. However, if vehicles equipped with the 

technologies needed to meet model years 2025 emissions are introduced earlier, then the 

projected additional cost should be lower than $2000.

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

NHSTA should remove sensitivity analyses that test cost estimates that are inapplicable and 

misleading for the proposed rules timeframe of 2017 and beyond, especially the near-term cost 

estimates from the National Academies of Science. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

Response:

Regarding the comment from the Aluminum Association’s Aluminum Transportation 

Group, we too are concerned with both safety and cost, and have performed detailed analyses on 

both of these topics which are presented in Preamble III.D, II.G and RIA chapters 3 and 4. 

Regarding the comments from the Center for Biological diversity, that we have significantly 

overstated costs, we do not agree. We have made significant effort to make the best possible 

direct cost estimates. Further, we have made significant effort to include only those indirect 

costs that would likely change in response to new regulations. Lastly, we have incorporated 

manufacturer learning at rates used for years by EPA and that are typical for manufacturingheavy industries like the auto industry. As for the comments specific to mass reduction costs, we 

do not disagree that we have perhaps overstated those costs. In fact, we sought to have better 

cost estimates ready in time for the final rule. Unfortunately, that effort was not completed in 

time for inclusion in the final rule and, as such, we were forced to use the same costs as were 

presented in the proposal. As the now final report on that light weighting cost effort shows 

(EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 “Light Duty Vehicle Mass Reduction and Cost Analysis – Midsize 

Crossover Utility Vehicle”, FEV, 2012), the costs used in our proposal and our final rule could 

be high. Importantly, we conducted a sensitivity on weight reduction costs in which the low side 

sensitivity included costs set to 40% below the final rule values. In this case, as in the primary 

analysis, OMEGA projection of the use of weight reduction technology is actually quite low (4% 

mass reduction technology applied in the 2025MY reference case and 8% in the control case, for 

a net of 4%). and is driven not by cost but by safety concerns. Given this safety analysis, having 

lower costs for weight reduction technologies would not produce significantly lower program 

costs or a different resultant standard level. Lastly, we fail to understand the comment that, 

“instead of assuming greater cost reductions in the later years of the rulemaking, the Agencies 

assume larger costs in those years.” In no part of our analysis have we estimated increased unit 
EPA Response to Comments

12-68

costs for any technology. Our analysis might show higher costs for a technology in later years 

due to higher application rates (i.e., 10% weight reduction costs less than 15% and 20%), but 

10% weight reduction (for example) in 2025 will always cost less than in 2016 in our analysis.

As for comments from Ceres, that we have focused our analysis on low cost technology 

and, as such, compliance is done largely via low cost technology, we must disagree. We have 

included a very broad list of technologies ranging from low cost to high cost, from low friction 

lubes to full battery electric. In our analysis, rather than focusing on low cost technologies, as 

suggested by the comment, we have focused on the most cost effective technologies – those 

technologies that provide the most attractive $/% improvement in GHG emissions. This is the 

most likely outcome in an efficient market and a reasonable approach to regulatory cost 

estimation. Lastly, our analysis should not be taken as predicting the future. Instead, our 

analysis seeks to show a possible path to that future. Each manufacturer is able to use its own 

preferred technologies – diesel, hybrid, plug-in hybrid, etc. – provided compliance can be 

achieved. If we have, in fact, been conservative regarding our plug-in cost estimates, then 

perhaps more plug-ins will be sold than our analysis suggests. Presumably, that would occur 

only if plug-ins provide a more cost effective solution than the technologies they replace.

Regarding the comment from M. Cuenca, we note that the NADA estimate of $5,000 is 

based on combining the costs of the MY 2011 CAFE rule, the MYs 2012-2016 CAFE/GHG rule, 

and the proposed MYs 2017-2025 rule. EPA has carefully examined the costs and benefits of 

this rule and has appropriately included the impacts of the MYs 2012-2016 rule in the baseline 

with which those costs and benefits are compared. Thus, the cost of the earlier rule is reflected in 

our analysis. In addition, the NADA estimate assumes that indirect costs for all technologies 

equal the direct costs, by using a retail price equivalent multiplier of 2.0. EPA’s cost estimates 

take into account that indirect costs for new technologies vary with the complexity of the 

technology and the time frame since the technology’s adoption, a more reasonable approach. 

This issue is discussed in detail in TSD Chapter 3.1.2.2.

In any case, that summation is not correct. For example, the MYs 2012-2016 rule 

estimated costs of roughly $950 (2007$) in MY 2016. However, that $950 would be 

considerably lower by the 2025 MY due to learning on the technologies included in that 2016 

MY vehicle. Also, the MY 2011 CAFE rule used an estimate of indirect costs substantially 

higher than that used by EPA in the MYs 2012-2016 and 2017-2025 rules. EPA finds that it is 

inappropriate to use the costs (or benefits) from previous rulemakings to assess the impacts of 

this rule. The costs (and benefits) from previous rules are used in the reference case for this rule. 

In fact, Table 3.9-1 of EPA’s final RIA shows that the 2025MY reference case costs for this final 

rule (i.e., the costs of meeting the 2016MY standards in the 2025MY) are $719 (2010$) relative 

to the 2008 baseline and includes the additional costs of compliance with 2009-2010 CAFE, and 

is still far lower than the $950 (2007$) estimated to meet the 2016MY standard in the 2016MY 

as estimated in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule. As a result, we would roughly estimate the cost 

of meeting the 2025MY standard in the 2025MY as $1836+$719=$2555 relative to a 2025MY 

vehicle meeting the 2008MY standard.25 Clearly, our estimate is far less than NADA’s. Finally, 

 25 The $719 value actually includes costs to meet NHTSA’s MY2011 standards in MY2025. To clarify, in 

the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, we estimated the cost to meet the MY2011 standard in MY2016 at $89 (2007$) (see 
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as discussed in preamble section III.H.2.a, Chapter 3.1.2 of the joint TSD and below in our 

response to comment 12.3.2, EPA does not agree with NADA’s arguments for a markup for 

indirect costs that doubles direct costs. 

Regarding the suggestion from Delphi that the NRC technology cost estimates and 

implementation cadence data be included in our analysis as the primary source of information, 

we have not followed that suggestion. We believe that the cost teardown work conducted by 

FEV for EPA and the battery pack model developed by ANL represent the most up-to-date and 

best information available on the costs of technologies upon which our analysis relies. This issue 

is discussed in the final section of RIA chapter 3. The comments from NRDC are also related to 

the NRC report, and their comment is addressed to NHTSA. 

Regarding the comment from Environmental Consultants of Michigan, the point of the 

comment appears to be that hybrids have higher cost of ownership than do more traditional 

internal combustion engine-only vehicles. These higher costs are claimed to result from higher 

insurance costs, higher registration fees due to higher weights, higher financing costs and sales 

taxes. Without addressing the merits of the metrics provided by the commenter, we wish to point 

out that the MYs 2012-2016 rule and 2017-2015 rules combined include a penetration rate of 

strong hybrid technology of 5% and of mild hybrid technology of 26% (which were not 

addressed by the commenter). As can be seen from this analysis, we are not relying heavily on 

strong hybrid technologies in projecting potential compliance paths. Further, we would expect 

that, at 5% penetration, most of those hybrids will be purchased by people that want the hybrid 

for reasons that may well extend beyond cost of ownership considerations (i.e., image, prestige, 

etc.). Further, the weights of the strong hybrids in our analysis are not expected to be any higher 

(and most are expected to be lower) than in today’s vehicles. Lastly, the commenter suggests 

that hybrids experience more rapid depreciation than non-hybrids due, in part, to anticipated 

battery replacement costs. The commenter fails to consider the possibility that, should the 

assertion be true that depreciation is more rapid on hybrids, the cause may not be due to 

anticipated battery replacement costs but rather the rapid and ongoing improvement of new 

hybrid technologies making new hybrids more attractive than used hybrids. This may well be in 

stark contrast to the non-hybrid case where new non-hybrids are not seen as being demonstrably 

better than their used counterparts. Further, our review of independent reliability data suggests 

that hybrid vehicles are just as reliable, if not more so, than their non-hybrid counterparts (see 

Chapter 5.2.2.2 of the final RIA).

Regarding the comments from ICCT, we agree that the Lotus and FEV lightweight 

vehicle studies that were not completed in time for inclusion in the final rule analysis provide 

better cost estimates than those used in the final analysis. Though this study is complete now, 

unfortunately, we were not able to use those estimated costs, as stated above and in TSD 3.3.5.5. 

We agree with all of the other comments provided by ICCT concerning the Lotus and FEV 

lightweight material studies. We agree with ICCT that teardown studies provide better cost 

estimates than do paper studies. ICCT also commented that our proposed cost estimates were 

 EPA-420-R-10-009, Table 4-6 at page 4-18) which would probably be on the order of $50-$70 (2010$) for meeting 

the MY2011 standard in MY2025. Therefore, the $2555 value stated here is slightly high since it already includes 

the costs of meeting the MY2011 standard in MY2025. 
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too high and should be much lower than $2000. In fact, our final cost estimate (without using 

the teardown results) is $1836, or roughly $110 lower than the cost estimate we used at proposal 

and lower than $2000.

Regarding the comment from the NACAA, we assume that the claim that, if vehicles 

equipped with the technologies needed to meet the MY 2025 emissions were introduced earlier 

then the additional cost should be lower than $2000 is a reference to learning effects starting 

earlier and resulting in lower costs by 2025. While that may be true, one cannot lose sight of the 

need to introduce new technologies at a sustainable and reasonable pace. Our technology phase 

in caps describe what we believe to be the maximum rate at which technologies might be 

introduced. While it’s possible that some manufacturers may introduce technology faster, we 

believe that others may be even slower. The rate of introduction of technology is an important 

aspect of the fleet that we will watch very closely in the future. There are some disadvantages to 

introducing technologies sooner, and manufacturers may not even be capable of doing so 

because of supplier limitations, and product redesign cycles. We have attempted to provide the 

auto makers sufficient time to introduce new technologies on a pace that is consistent with our 

understanding of technology availability and learning. 

12.3.1. Direct Manufacturing Costs

Organizations Included in this Section

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA should continue its current practice of conducting tear-down cost analyses. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

Organization: Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (PCNA)

Battery Costs

Porsche believes that the agencies grossly underestimate the cost of battery technology. This 

error inappropriately inflates the apparent cost effectiveness of the GHG program. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9264-A1, p. 6]

Response:

Regarding the NRDC comment, as we move forward and identify possible future needs 

for further teardown work, we fully intend to do so. We believe that the teardown studies 

conducted in support of our GHG efforts provide the highest quality and most up-to-date cost 

estimates for GHG reducing technologies.
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Regarding the Porsche comment, we have trouble understanding why the commenter 

believes we have underestimated battery costs given the lack of detail provided in the comment. 

We welcome Porsche to submit data publicly that supports their comments. Our battery costs are 

based on the ANL BatPaC model, a peer reviewed model that estimates direct manufacturing 

costs associated with batteries used in hybrids, plug-in hybrids and full electric vehicles. For 

hybrids, we have taken those direct costs as being applicable in the 2017MY, which seems 

appropriate assuming sales of 15 million vehicles and a 3% hybrid penetration rate (the costs we 

used from the ANL BatPaC model assumed 450,000 units, or 3% of 15 million). We have then 

applied our High 1 ICM of 1.56 to those direct costs to estimate the total costs for the batteries. 

Further, we apply learning effects going forward from 2017 through 2025 to arrive at our 

2025MY costs. For hybrids, we have assumed that the batteries are on the flat portion of the 

learning curve by the 2017MY and continuing through 2025 making the 2025MY costs roughly 

78% of the 2017MY costs. We believe this is reasonable given the nine years of learning and 

cost reduction that will undoubtedly take place between 2017 and 2025. 

For plug-ins and full EVs, we have taken the BatPaC direct costs as being applicable in 

the 2025MY, a full 14 years from now. As such, we have applied no learning curve cost 

reductions to plug-in and EV batteries for our 2025MY costs. We “reverse learn” (i.e., back out 

learning effects to increase the costs) for years prior to 2025. Further, for plug-in and full EV 

batteries, we have applied our High 2 ICM of 1.77 to the direct costs to estimate the total costs. 

Again, we believe that these cost estimates are sound. As described in TSD 3.3.3 the BatPac 

model is peer reviewed. 

Lastly, we have conducted several sensitivities that serve to both increase and decrease 

our battery pack cost estimates—battery pack costs, learning effects and ICMs—and for each of 

these sensitivities, we see very little impact on our overall program costs and benefits. This is 

largely due to the low penetration rates of battery-based technologies like strong hybrids, plugins and full EVs. 

12.3.2. Indirect Costs

Organizations Included in this Section

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

7. RPE indiscriminately spreads all indirect costs over all components, while ICMs reflect only 

those elements of indirect costs that would be expected to change in response to a regulatoryinduced technology change. The use of RPE is not appropriate and the sensitivity analyses 

presented in Tables IV-88, IV-89 and IV-90 should be removed from the final rule. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

7) RPE and ICM

ICCT agrees with the use of indirect cost multipliers (ICM) instead of Retail Price Equivalent 

(RPE) and the general approach of assigning technologies to several complexity classes for 
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determining the ICM value. Trying to determine the indirect multiplier for each technology 

would be extremely difficult and time consuming, but it is also important to use more appropriate 

and targeted adjustments than a single, indiscriminant RPE. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 19]

For this rule proposal EPA improved the original ICM factors that have been used in other 

regulatory assessments in two ways. First, the original ICM factors for low and medium 

technology complexity were updated; the updated ICM factors were developed following expert 

panel recommendations on newer technologies (passive aero-reduction, engine downsizing and 

turbocharging and 40-mile range PHEV). Second, the way ICM factors are applied was 

modified, '...resulting in the warranty portion of the indirect costs being applied as a 

multiplicative factor (thereby decreasing going forward as direct manufacturing costs decrease 

due to learning), and the remainder of the indirect costs being applied as an additive factor 

(thereby remaining constant year-over-year and not being reduced due to learning)'. In addition, 

the original RPE values used by EPA were increased from 1.46 to 1.5 as a way to reflect longterm average RPE values. Table 3 shows the evolution of ICM and the change to RPE values on 

the 2017-2025 Rule (High 2, Long term). [Table 3 can be found on p. 20 of Docket number 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 19]

ICMs are a better methodology for indirect cost estimation than the RPE multipliers used in 

previous rulemakings. The development of ICMs as a tool for indirect cost assessment has been 

conducted in a most rigorous way and the study results have been peer reviewed in well known 

scientific journals.24 The most critical distinction between ICMs and RPE is that ICMs have 

been developed 'to reflect only those elements of indirect costs that would be expected to change 

in response to a regulatory-induced technology change.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, 

pp. 19-20]

However, in the Sensitivity Analysis section IV (NHTSA Proposed Rule for Passenger Car and 

Light Truck CAFE Standards for Model Years 2017-2025, page 75307 of the Federal Register), 

the proposal presents two sensitivity calculations that neglect the fundamental advantages of 

using ICMs. The first sensitivity calculation evaluated the economic impact of technology cost 

on CAFE fuel economy using RPE for indirect costs for all technologies instead of ICMs (Table 

IV-88). The second sensitivity calculation (Table IV-89) involves cost values derived from a 

different source, namely the National Academy of Sciences assessment on LDV fuel economy 

technologies; the NAS report uses two sets of RPEs, one for non-electrification technologies and 

another one for electrification technologies (Hybrids and EVS).25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 20]

The use of a single RPE of 1.5 for all technologies, instead of a technology based ICM, inflates 

the costs per vehicle by 24%, from $2023 to $2509. The second method uses a RPE of 1.5 for 

non-electrification technologies, which are mostly low- and medium-complexity options and 

comprise the bulk of the technologies to be adopted in the future; as a result the cost per vehicle 

is inflated by 39%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 20]

The ICCT believes that the use of RPE for these two sensitivity analyses is inappropriate and 

distorts the cost results. The problem stems from lumping indirect costs indiscriminately, as the 
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RPE method does. The RPE method does not consider that new technologies will not necessarily 

incur additional indirect costs. RPE spreads all indirect costs over all components, while ICMs 

reflect only those elements of indirect costs that would be expected to change in response to a 

regulatory-induced technology change. For example, it is appropriate to include warranty costs in 

the indirect costs for new technologies, while marketing costs would not change in response to 

adding many incremental technologies. Unless the technology is directly marketed to consumers, 

it is inappropriate to spread existing marketing costs to the new technology. Many individual 

technologies are small in scale and should reflect only a subset of RPE costs; as a result, for low 

complexity technologies, the ICM should be lower than the RPE. This is not always the case, as 

ICM estimates for particularly complex technologies, specifically hybrid technologies (for near 

term ICMs), and plug-in hybrid battery and full electric vehicle technologies (for near term and 

long term ICMs) reflect higher than average indirect costs. As a result, the ICMs for those 

technologies can equal or even exceed the averaged RPE for the industry.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, pp. 20-21]

The ICCT strongly supports the continued use of ICMs and the adjustments made for the 

proposed rule. The sensitivity analyses presented in Tables IV-88, IV-89 and IV90 should be 

removed from the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 21]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 29-30.]

The ICCT also agrees with EPA's assessment of indirect cost that specifically addresses the 

factors that increase the retail price compared to the direct costs and generally -- and the general 

approach of assigning technologies to several complexity classes for determining the indirect 

cost multipliers. The use of generic retail price equivalency markup to cover a wide range of 

factors that are not consistent over different technologies often results in overestimating those 

costs. And we would recommend the Agency to scrap the sensitivity analysis conducted using 

the RPE markups.

24 Rogozhin, A., Gallaher, M., Helfand, G., McManus,. W., Using Indirect Cost Multipliers to 

Estimate the Total Cost of Adding New Technology in the Automobile Industry, International 

Journal of Production Economics 124 (2010): 360-368.

25 NAS. (2011). Assessment of Technologies for Improving Light Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy. 

National Academy of Sciences, Committee on the Assessment of Technologies for Improving 

Light-Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy; National Research Council. National Academies Press. 

Washington, DC.

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

The proposal fails to fully account for all of the up-front marginal costs prospective new vehicle 

purchasers can expect to face due to the MY 2017-2025 CAFE/GHG mandates. In doing so, it 

fails to appropriately recognize the potential impacts those mandates will have on light-duty 
EPA Response to Comments

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vehicle affordability and sales. Specifically, the proposal uses a non-traditional approach to 

estimating light-duty retail cost/price called the Indirect Cost Multiplier (ICM) method. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 4]

The traditional approach, used for at least 30 years by NHTSA and EPA and vehicle 

manufacturers to calculate the cost of regulations impacting motor vehicles, involves an 

accounting method known as Retail Price Equivalent (RPE). The RPE method appropriately 

estimates the ratio of indirect costs (marketing, indirect labor, etc) to the retail price for the 

whole vehicle, adjusting accordingly the direct costs (engineering, manufacturing, etc.) 

associated with new components. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 4]

The ICM method, which NHTSA and EPA first attempted to use to develop their MY 2012-2016 

program, involves a somewhat arbitrary selection and allocation of indirect costs to certain 

compliance-related components. Under this approach, by no means the standard accounting 

method used by vehicle manufacturers, the whole cost of the vehicle rarely if ever reflects the 

sum of its parts. In addition, as detailed in the attached paper comparing the use of the RPE 

method to the ICM method, NHTSA and EPA use their ICM method differently for this proposal 

than they did for the MY 2012-2016 rule. For these and other reasons detailed in Exhibit A, 

NHTSA and EPA should recalculate average per vehicle costs for the proposal using the RPE 

method of accounting. To assist with that effort, the paper in Exhibit A attempts to do so, and 

even assumes NHTSA and EPA’s projections of the technologies manufacturers will have to 

adopt to achieve compliance with the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, 

p. 4]

Response:

Regarding the comments from ICCT that RPE indiscriminately spreads indirect costs 

over all components, we agree with ICCT and that is a big part of the reason we believe that the 

ICM approach is more appropriate for estimating costs in response to regulatory imposed 

changes. As for removing the RPE sensitivity, that comment is directed at NHTSA’s analysis 

since EPA has not conducted a sensitivity using an RPE rather than ICMs.

We also agree with ICCT that our updated approach to applying ICMs (see Chapter 

3.1.2.2 of the joint TSD), as first presented in the proposal and also used in the final rule—is 

more appropriate than our prior approach of applying the ICM as a simple multiplier.

Regarding the NADA comments, NADA argued that the ICM approach is not valid and 

should be replaced with an RPE approach. Further, it argued that the RPE factor should be 2x 

rather than the 1.5x approach that is supported by filings to the Securities and Exchange 

Commission. We have conducted a thorough analysis of the NADA comments on the RPE vs. 

ICM approach. We disagree with NADA’s arguments for both using the RPE approach and a 2x 

RPE factor, for the following reasons.

NADA’s objections to the ICM approach include: 

1. There is no evidence that the RPE method is flawed.
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2. The ICMs do not include the total costs of complying with the standards, because it does 

not include all the costs included in the RPE.

3. The ICMs use a subjective judgment to adjust indirect costs for different technologies, 

while the RPE uses one value for all components and does not rely on “nearly perfect 

foreknowledge.”

4. The ICMs do not incorporate dealer and OEM profits.

NADA’s arguments for the RPE of 2x include:

5. Several scholarly papers support the use of RPEs in the 2.0 range.

6. A case study comparison of the added content of a 1971 Chevrolet Vega and 2011 Cruze 

shows that an RPE of 2.0 accounts for the change in retail price.

The discussion above provides background on the issue of RPEs and ICMs, and on the 

agencies’ decision to use ICMs to estimate indirect costs for this rulemaking. Our responses here 

address the specific points raised by NADA.

First, the RPE approach applies the same average indirect cost markup across all 

technologies in the redesigned vehicle fleet, regardless of the source of the direct cost (i.e. 

whether a technology is simple or complex; whether the source of the additional cost is a new or 

a mature technology). The RPE methodology also assumes that an indirect cost is associated 

with the rule, even if no relation is apparent. For instance, the RPEs (until recent union contract 

changes) would have included the costs to the domestic auto companies of the health insurance 

for retired auto workers. Because the rulemaking would not affect the current retiree health care 

costs, (which account for about 1.5% of the RPE), they are irrelevant to the rulemaking. The 

ICM approach differs in that it allows indirect costs to vary with the complexity of the 

technology and the time frame. It is a reasonable assumption that simple technologies are 

expected to have fewer indirect costs per dollar than complex technologies. For instance, the use 

of low-rolling-resistance tires, considered by the EPA/NHTSA team to be a low-complexity 

technology, adds costs, but, because they require significantly less vehicle integration effort than 

for example, adding a hybrid powertrain would, the additional indirect costs per dollar of direct 

manufacturing costs may be very low. In contrast, converting a conventional vehicle to a hybridelectric is a far more complex activity, involving increases in indirect costs such as research and 

development disproportionate to its direct costs. Shortly after product introduction, indirect costs 

for components such as warranty and research may be relatively high, but auto makers are 

reasonably expected to be able to reduce the costs of any specific technology over time, as they 

gain experience with them and, thus, redirect those expenditures to other areas of their choosing.

Second, the ICM approach excludes some costs included in the RPE when those costs are 

expected not to be affected by the standards. The ICM approach, as discussed above, begins 

with the RPE and includes all the relevant cost categories. ICMs reflect the indirect costs judged 

by the EPA panel (see above for further explanation) to be incurred for each technology in 

response to regulatory imposed changes. Any “omissions”, or instances where the ICM carries 

no costs for a given technology, are cases where the indirect costs are considered by the EPA 

panel not to be impacted by regulation-imposed changes for that technology. For instance, the 

costs of switching from a standard tire to a low-rolling-resistance tire (the example of a lowcomplexity technology in Rogozhin et al. (2009)) are not expected to lead to an increase in 
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transportation costs (i.e., costs for transporting finished vehicles from production site to retail 

site) because it is not expected to be any more expensive to ship a new vehicle with the new tires 

than with the old tires. 

Third, the RPE approach relies on the assumption that applying the average RPE for the 

vehicle fleet as a whole will produce a reasonable average indirect cost for all technologies in the 

redesigned vehicle fleet resulting from these standards. The agencies believe that using the 

professional judgment and expertise of EPA staff with extensive experience in the auto industry 

provides useful insight into how a given regulation will impact indirect costs and is an 

improvement over ignoring differences among technologies. The agencies have therefore based 

their central analyses on the ICM method. 

Fourth, it is incorrect that the ICMs do not include OEM profit. Although the initial ICM 

report reviewed by NRC did not include OEM profit, the ICM approach applied in this 

rulemaking does incorporate an allowance for profit, at the average corporate profit rate of 6% of 

sales. The inclusion of profit for the Joint NPRM is discussed in the draft Technical Support 

Document, and the agencies have included profit as an element of the indirect costs for the final 

rulemaking as well. See Joint TSD section 3.1.2.2 endnote 19 and sources there cited.

Fifth, the papers cited by NADA to support the use of an RPE of 2x are only a subset of 

the literature. The National Research Council (NRC) discusses the four studies that NADA’s 

Exhibit A cites in its support of an RPE of 2.0. The NRC also notes that NHTSA used an RPE 

of 1.5 for its MY 2011 fuel economy rule; the NRC in 2002 used an RPE of 1.4, as did the 

California Air Resources Board; and EPA has used a markup factor of 1.3. The NRC report then 

discusses work done for the committee itself, doing a detailed analysis of a Honda Accord and a 

Ford F-150 truck; the former had an RPE of “1.39 to market transaction price and 1.49 to 

MSRP,” and the latter had an RPE of “1.52 for market price and 1.54 for MSRP.” Most 

significantly, the NRC does not recommend an RPE of 2.0. Rather, the NRC recommends, for 

technologies where the primary manufacturer of the technology is the automotive supply base, an 

RPE of 1.5, except for hybrid powertrain components from the automotive supply base, where it 

recommends an RPE of 1.3 due to the inclusion of several indirect costs in their base estimate. 

Only in the case of technologies where an automotive OEM is the primary manufacturer does the 

NRC recommend an RPE of 2.0. We note, without specifically commenting on the quality of 

the studies, that none of the papers NADA cites in support of an RPE of 2x was published in a 

peer-reviewed journal, and none of the studies claim to have been peer-reviewed. In contrast, the 

research in Rogozhin et al. (2009) was peer-reviewed twice: as documented in the Peer Review 

Report, and when it was submitted (and accepted) for publication in the International Journal of 

Production Economics. A full reading of the literature on RPEs thus shows little support for a 

value of 2x. Further support for an average RPE lower than 2.0 comes from an examination of 

industry financial statements. NHTSA examined industry 10-K submissions to the Securities 

and Exchange Commission from the period 1972-1997. The cost information in these 

submissions represents all industry operations, including both OEM and supplier-sourced 

technologies. During this period, the RPE averaged 1.5 while varying slightly, but never 

dropped below 1.4 or exceeded 1.6. At no time did the average RPE approach the 2.0 value 

advocated by NADA. 
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Sixth, the comparison of the Vega and the Cruze uses circular logic; it assumes its 

conclusion. The direct costs of the vehicles are calculated using an RPE of 2, and the NADA 

analysis then calculates a quality difference based on the change in direct costs. The magnitude 

of the quality difference is then discovered to correspond to an RPE of 2, although it is also an 

inevitable result of the initial assumption of an RPE of 2. The analysis provided can be 

replicated with any value of RPE. This argument thus provides no evidence on the value of the 

RPE.

For these reasons, we do not accept NADA’s request to use an RPE of 2x, and instead 

continue with our use of ICMs as the basis for our central analysis. However, the agencies 

recognize that there is uncertainty regarding the impact on indirect costs of regulatorily imposed 

changes. For this reason, both agencies have conducted sensitivity analyses using different 

indirect cost estimates. EPA presents its sensitivities in Chapter 3.11 of its final RIA where we 

show costs ranging from roughly $200 less to roughly $200 more than our primary case by 

adjusting ICMs to the low side and the high side, respectively. Therefore, even with the 

considerably higher indirect cost markups, the benefits of the final rule would be significantly 

higher than the costs.

12.3.3. Learning

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Are the Costs of Advanced Technologies Declining as Predicted? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.18]

Future technology costs are among the most difficult things to predict for MY 2020 and beyond. 

Factors that can change significantly over time include the availability and price of materials and 

parts, the number of suppliers and the rate of progress toward the production levels needed to 

achieve economies of scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.18]

Recently, the National Research Council of the NAS issued its Assessment of Technologies for 

Improving Light Duty Vehicle Fuel Economy (“NAS Report”). Although the NAS report 

provides future cost estimates for numerous technologies, the NAS warns that data from 

automobile manufacturers and Tier 1 suppliers suggests a wide range of estimated incremental 

costs “that makes assessments of cost-effectiveness very approximate.” The NAS characterizes 

future technology costs as more difficult to predict than the impact of these technologies on fuel 

consumption. In some cases, the NAS cost estimates were significantly higher than those of the 

agencies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.18]

The uncertainty surrounding the costs of integrating new technologies and then reaching 

economies of scale is illustrated in NHTSA’s discussion of how to assign markup factors for 

“learning.” The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis describes steps that NHTSA would 
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need to take to develop accurate historical “learning” costs estimates for seven new CAFE and 

safety technologies. NHTSA concludes: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.18]

This initial analysis...indicates that adopting a cumulative production basis for learning 

applications could produce cost estimates that are within 4-7% of those used in the NPRM by 

2025, with less variation in earlier years. However, this analysis is based on a very small sample 

of technologies and the data required to more precisely evaluate this issue are currently 

unavailable. Further, these data may not be obtainable without an extensive research effort, if at 

all. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.18]

Response:

We agree that future technology costs are very difficult to predict. We also believe that 

the effort we have made at doing so is unprecedented for EPA transportation-related rules and 

that we have developed the highest quality and most up-to-date technology cost estimates 

available today. EPA will also continue to monitor the costs of key technologies going forward. 

That said, we have conducted several sensitivities that serve to both increase and decrease our 

cost estimates—battery pack costs, learning effects, ICMs, and weight reduction costs—and for 

each of these sensitivities, we see very little impact on our overall program costs and benefits. 

12.3.4. Maintenance Costs

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

The benefits analysis used in the proposal uses an oversimplified pay-back method that 

overstates potential fuel economy savings. Instead, for purposes of calculating any “pay-back,” 

real-world finance, opportunity, and additional maintenance costs should be accounted for. In 

other words, the final rule should evaluate its potential impact on a vehicle’s total cost of 

ownership. An example of such a calculator is found at http://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/Costto-Own. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0639, p.10]

Response:

We have included maintenance costs in the final analysis—in both the benefit-cost 

analysis and the cost of ownership and payback analysis. We present our maintenance intervals 

and costs per interval in Chapter 3.6 of the joint TSD. We present our full analysis of 

maintenance costs in Chapter 5.2.2.1 of our final RIA and our cost of ownership analysis in 

Chapter 5.5 of our final RIA. We also respond more fully to NADA’s comments in Chapter 5.5 

of the final RIA.

12.3.5. Stranded Capital

Organizations Included in this Section

Center for Biological Diversity

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-79

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

Further, the Agencies must delete from their analysis the supposed cost of “stranded capital,” or 

capital invested in manufacturing equipment that cannot be used when new technology is 

introduced. Because this rulemaking stretches over at least two complete redesign cycles, there is 

adequate lead time to amortize such costs within industry’s normal business operations. In other 

words, this and other relics carried over from shorter-term rulemakings that purported to take 

account of concerns about inadequate lead times must be scrapped. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 7]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

9. Given the long lead times in the proposed rule, stranded capital costs will be virtually 

eliminated and should be removed or greatly reduced in the cost analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

9) Stranded Capital Costs

The agencies state that 'potential for stranded capital occurs when manufacturing equipment and 

facilities cannot be used in the production of a new technology'.29 This is a valid concern, but it 

applies primarily to rulemakings with shorter leadtimes. Perhaps the most important purpose of 

proposing standards through 2025 is that it gives manufacturers far more certainty about the 

future standards. This enables the manufacturers to plan and implement technologies and 

products in an orderly manner and minimizes issues with stranded capital. Also, the standards are 

not stringent enough to force technology introduction at a rate faster than normal production 

cycles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 22]

The ICCT recommends that stranded capital costs be eliminated to reflect the long leadtime of 

the proposed standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 22]

29 section 3.2.2.3 of the TSD, Table V-24 of NHTSA RIA, and Sections 3.8.7

Response:

We believe that it is difficult to quantify accurately any capital stranding associated with 

new technology phase-ins, especially given the projected and unprecedented deployment of 

technologies in the rulemaking timeframe. The FEV analysis that looked at potential stranded 

capital attempted to define the possible stranded capital costs for a select set of technologies. 

Since the direct manufacturing costs developed by FEV assumed a 10 year production life (i.e., 

capital costs amortized over 10 years) we applied the FEV derived stranded capital costs 

whenever technologies were replaced prior to being utilized for the full 10 years. The other 

option would have been to assume a 5 year product life (i.e., capital costs amortized over 5 

years), which would have increased the direct manufacturing costs. We have accounted for 
EPA Response to Comments

12-80

stranded capital costs in the instances where our fleet modeling replaced technologies before the 

capital costs were fully amortized. While there is uncertainty about the possible stranded capital 

costs (i.e., understated or overstated), their impact would not call into question the overall results 

of our cost analysis or otherwise affect the stringency of the standards, since costs of stranded 

capital are a relatively minor component of the total estimated costs of the rules. Table 5.1-5 of 

the final RIA presents the stranded capital costs used in our analysis; this table is copied below. 

As shown by this table, the stranded capital costs are relatively low so, even if we have 

overestimated these costs, their impacts are minor.

Table 12-1 Interpolated Estimates of Stranded Capital Costs (2010$)

Company 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

Aston Martin $60 $54 $48 $41 $35 $31 $26 $21 $17

BMW $16 $20 $23 $27 $31 $26 $21 $16 $11

Chrysler/Fiat $53 $45 $38 $31 $24 $22 $20 $18 $16

Daimler $18 $19 $20 $21 $22 $19 $16 $13 $10

Ferrari $9 $16 $24 $32 $40 $35 $31 $26 $22

Ford $16 $17 $19 $20 $21 $18 $15 $12 $9

Geely $16 $20 $23 $26 $30 $25 $21 $16 $12

GM $18 $18 $18 $18 $18 $17 $16 $15 $14

Honda $12 $12 $13 $13 $13 $15 $17 $19 $21

Hyundai $7 $8 $8 $8 $9 $11 $12 $14 $15

Kia $14 $21 $28 $36 $43 $38 $34 $29 $25

Lotus $26 $23 $20 $16 $13 $12 $11 $11 $10

Mazda $17 $22 $28 $33 $38 $32 $26 $20 $13

Mitsubishi $15 $21 $27 $33 $39 $32 $26 $19 $13

Nissan $12 $12 $13 $13 $13 $14 $14 $14 $14

Porsche $19 $21 $23 $25 $27 $24 $21 $18 $15

Spyker $36 $30 $25 $20 $14 $14 $15 $15 $15

Subaru $8 $10 $11 $13 $15 $12 $10 $7 $5

Suzuki $28 $25 $21 $18 $14 $14 $13 $12 $11

Tata-JLR $17 $18 $19 $20 $21 $21 $20 $20 $20

Tesla $1 $1 $1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0

Toyota $5 $9 $12 $16 $19 $21 $22 $24 $25

Volkswagen $14 $17 $19 $22 $25 $20 $15 $10 $5

Fleet $14 $16 $17 $18 $20 $19 $18 $17 $16

Note: Results correspond to the 2008 baseline fleet.

12.4. Technology Packages, Projected Manufacturer Compliance 

Costs, Technology Penetration, and OMEGA/VOLPE

Organizations Included in this Section

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Center for Biological Diversity

Jackson, F.W.

Smith, Frank Houston
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-81

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

The agencies state: “Because both input and output sheets from our modeling are public, 

stakeholders can verify and check EPA’s and NHTSA’s modeling, and perform their own 

analyses with these datasets.” (NPRM p.74904). We were unable to find the relevant OMEGA 

output sheets, however. These should be made available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, 

p.2]

Make available on the EPA web site the OMEGA outputs for the various scenarios considered. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.3]

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

My definitions of Mid and Max technologies: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 4]

InitialMidPkg: half, or less, cylinders 4 plug/cylFlatEng (1.5 & up Dia/StrokeRatio), later 

Ignition, increase cr/egrs/fpm, Fast Warmup, HEV-many more improved & optimized, No Plugins, more supercharge & Atkinson cycle, polish (tbr), MinCornEthanol, Wt Red, 

consumer/driverEd, traffic controls, adequate but not excess power/size/wt, update CAFÉ 

continuous + exclude subsidized, more Transmission speeds & some Auto ManuaI Tran. some 

EPA & NHTSA items, some NG, Efficient AC, HighMileage/yr SpeciaI Attention/Preference, 

Scrub Features/costs[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, pp. 4-5]

Final Mid Pkg: Purge, FRed, Ring, reduced drags (aero, rolling, etc.) and more initial Mid.

Adv Max Ultimate Pkg: more of above with all possibilities seriously considered [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Smith, Frank Houston

It is my hope that the two attachments

1. Proposed 2017 - 2025 CAFÉ, A personal study, The ICE POSSIBILITIES and 

OPPORTUNITIES - COSTS, FUEL ECONOMIES, and Concerns 2/7/2012

2. Supplement Proposed 2017 - 2025 CAFÉ, A personal study, The ICE POSSIBILITIES and 

OPPORTUNITIES - COSTS, FUEL ECONOMIES, and Concerns 2/13/2012

offer a positive and constructive technical and economic contributions toward this US effort to 

address future fuel consumption rates and CO2 emissions reduction. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240, 

pp.1-2]

Opportunities, and Conclusions
EPA Response to Comments

12-82

If these 335 (343?) vehicles were available in the US today, there is a high probability almost 

23% of new US offerings would provide user experience mpg averages approaching, if not 

exceeding, the currently proposed NOMINAL of 54.4 mpg for 2025 CAFÉ ... today ... for the 

light-footed US drivers using these fuel frugal small displacement, generally under 2 Liters, 

diesel models, many already seen on the US roads using their significantly less fuel frugal 

gasoline powertrains, see Table 1 or Table 3 Largest Models ?60 mpg(Imp) combined for some 

of the model configurations studied. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.4]

Of course there are questions of correlation between EPA and NEDC ratings as well as USER 

experience. The US VW/Audi diesels “Shared MPG Estimates” suggest viable correlations exist 

with NEDC. And, 'Predicting Individual Fuel Economy' by Lin, Z., and Greene, D. address other 

related US issues. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Almost all of these fuel frugal vehicles are small displacement diesels, raising issues of 

emissions. Euro Step V should have resolved issues with particulates leaving the NOX concerns 

since ? 180 mg NOX/km is the current EU requirement. Most of these vehicles are currently 

certified between 110 and 150 mg NOX/km. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Starting 4Q 2014 (32 months) Euro Step VI requires ? 80 mg NOX/km for all new certifications 

of these vehicles. That is ? 37 mg/km worst case outside the current US requirement of roughly ? 

43 mg NOX/km. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Could some compromise regarding mg NOX/km levels be allowed as long as annual sales 

volumes for these very fuel frugal vehicles remain below, for sake of discussion, 1 (or 0.5) 

million units/year? That would be an average of ?20k vehicles for each State annually. [NHTSA2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Would that level of market penetration pose an unacceptable risk to man and/or environment 

versus the benefits? The 2011 US clean diesel sales were ?100K, roughly 70% relatively fuel 

frugal from VW/Audi. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Could this be allowed as a temporary legislative regulatory waiver until volumes exceed 1⁄2 

million annually or 2016, whichever comes first, before enforcement of full US emissions 

standards, as a quick, low cost, low risk strategy to educate the US consumer and test market for 

determination of consumer acceptance ... and preferences? [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

This would reduce OEMs’ costs and risks (as well as objections) to introducing this relatively 

lower cost fuel conserving technology without Federal or State funding as a bridge to future 

technologies. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

This could offer a quick, very low cost, low risk path to saving 400~500 gallons of gasoline 

(about 24 barrels of crude) per vehicle year for the life of the vehicle when compared to the 2011 

US fleet average of 22.2 mpg. And, achievable at a lower cost than most proposals currently 

under public consideration. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]
Technical Assessment of the Proposed CO2 Standards

12-83

IF, assembled in the US and reasonably priced, this should expand the current US auto market 

demand, increasing domestic production ... creating NEW US industrial jobs simply by 

changing the current US powertrains to existing fuel frugal European small displacement (? 2 

Liter) turbo diesel technology. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Based on Table 1: Relative UK Cost and Fuel Economy BENEFIT Analysis (gasoline versus 

diesel), these fuel economies can, on average, be achieved with an average ? USD $2k 

technology cost premium per vehicle, IF ... we, as a Nation, are determined ... and the OEMs do 

offer AND deliver to the US consumer these types of fuel frugal machines with comparable EU 

diesel powertrain pricing differentials. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

Unfortunately, if Det3 US are not at parity with world fuel economy and CO2 emissions by post 

2015, they will be under constant threat from “foreign” OEMs like Kia, Hyundai, Mazda, & 

Volvo for importation of fuel frugal choices already offered in the EU and Asia resulting in 

subsequent loss of US market share & US JOBS.

References:

http://carfueldata.direct.gov.uk/

http://vanfueldata.dft.gov.uk/Default.aspx pickups/vans, 30 mpg(US) average Sprinter 2500 in 

US 2013?

http://www.autocar.co.uk/SpecsPrices/SpecsAndPrices.aspx

http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp

http://www.fueleconomy.gov/mpg/MPG.do?action=browseList “Predicting Individual Fuel 

Economy' by Lin, Z., and Greene, D. SAE Technical Papers #2011-01-0618 © 2011 [NHTSA2010-0131-0240-A2, p.5]

It is very important to understand that FUEL FRUGAL small displacement (? 2 Liters) Euro type 

turbo diesels are a potentially viable near term interim bridge solution to allow time for 

ADVANCED transport technologies, whether plug-in, fuel cell, or other yet to be found 

technology, to evolve and mature (cost, reliability, durability, and economies of scale) necessary 

for the broader based US (and WORLD) markets, not just the elite/wealthy ... in order to 

maintain/improve standards of living. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

Does the US want/NEED fuel conserving vehicles NOW? IF, yes, what should WE do to get 

there? This is one way. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

Response:

Regarding the ACEEE comment about our output sheets, these were made available in 

the public docket at document ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1105. 
EPA Response to Comments

12-84

Regarding comments from F.W. Jackson and Frank Houston Smith, we appreciate your 

comments and your interest in our proposal. Regarding relaxing NOx standards to allow for 

diesels to more easily meet US emission standards and, therefore, play a larger role in the US 

auto market, we disagree with this idea. We have set stringent, fuel neutral emission standards 

for purposes of public health and do not believe it is appropriate or necessary to compromise 

public health by relaxing the standards for diesel-fueled vehicles (see 65 FR 6698). We believe 

that diesels can meet our stringent standards, and we welcome diesels as part of the light-duty 

technology mix. The lack of significant diesel penetration in our analysis simply means that we 

do not believe that it provides for the most cost effective path to compliance. It should not be 

interpreted as a condemnation of the technology or a prohibition of it as auto makers are free to 

use whatever technology they choose provided they can comply with applicable standards.
Vehicle Safety

13-1

13. Vehicle Safety

13.1. General Comments on Vehicle Safety

Organizations Included in this Section

Consumer Reports

Consumers Union

Haroldson, C.

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Marshall, C.

Rafter, M.

Ross, D.

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Steyn, R.

Organization: Consumer Reports

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 168.]

Importantly, proposed targets will unlikely compromise vehicle safety. Cars have been getting 

safe as fuel economy has improved. And this trend will continue.

The safety of future vehicles will be dominated by vehicle design, not size and weight. Advanced 

materials can decouple size from mass and therefore give economy, safety and functionality that 

people require.

Organization: Consumers Union

Importantly, the proposed standards are unlikely to compromise vehicle safety. Cars have been 

getting safer as fuel economy has improved, and this trend is likely to continue. The safety of 

future vehicles will be dominated by vehicle design, not size or weight. Advanced materials can 

decouple size from mass (weight), creating important new possibilities for simultaneously 

improving both fuel economy and safety without compromising functionality. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9454-A2, pp.2-3]

Organization: Haroldson, C.

vehicles will necessarily become too small to be safe to drive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11137-A1, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

13-2

Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

One of the most obvious effects of higher fuel efficiency is a lighter vehicle, which (other things 

equal) means a vehicle that provides less safety for its occupants in the event of a crash. 

Anecdotally, it is typical to hear a father explain his vehicle purchase for a daughter going off to 

college in terms of its safety, rather than couching the decision in terms of how much money she 

will save in fuel expenditures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 14]

Scholarly studies have attempted to quantify the extra motorist deaths attributable to the CAFE 

standards first put into place in the 1970s. Depending on the particular assumptions and the time 

frame chosen, the estimates range from 41,600 to 124,800 deaths. A 2002 National Academy of 

Sciences study found that the downsizing effect of CAFE led to 1,300 to 2,600 deaths in a single 

year and ten times that many serious injuries. Also, weight in vehicles still matters and one way 

to get better fuel efficiency is through weight reductions. A study from the Insurance Institute for 

Highway Safety recently found that “strong relationship between vehicle weight and occupant 

safety.” In fact, they found that “Hybrids on average are approximately 10 percent heavier than 

their conventional counterparts and have lower injury rates in a crash. . . the odds of sustaining 

an injury in a hybrid were about 25 percent lower than in a lighter non-hybrid vehicle.” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 14-15]

It is important to note that even if the EPA’s analysis is correct to assume that vehicle consumers 

do not correctly calculate the lifetime savings from higher fuel efficiency, then by the same token 

we must allow for the possibility that vehicle consumers may not correctly estimate the higher 

probability of injury or death from driving a car that is lighter or has less space between the 

steering wheel and driver’s seat, etc. In order to achieve its findings of a pure boon to consumers, 

the EPA analysis assumes that the higher mileage standards are achieved through holding all else 

constant, and increasing the final price of vehicles. But in reality, in the new equilibrium the 

“irrational” and “myopic” consumers may buy vehicles that achieve the new efficiency mandates 

through a combination of less safety and only slightly higher prices. To the extent that this 

calculation is “irrational” and “myopic,” the regulations may reduce one type of inefficiency (i.e. 

excessive fuel consumption) while increasing another one (i.e. excessive crash deaths). EPA 

certainly has offered no argument showing that fuel consumption is a more serious social 

problem than traffic fatalities.37 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 15]

37 To be clear, the text refers to traffic fatalities that result from consumers incorrectly 

estimating the tradeoff between vehicle price and safety. The EPA analysis does incorporate 

costs from traffic accidents, but these appear to include only the accidents due to extra driving, 

not to consumer “irrationality” regarding vehicle safety.

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

More importantly, the relationship between size and safety is neither simple nor unidirectional. 

To the extent smaller cars fare worse in crashes with bigger cars, increasing size may improve an 

individual driver’s safety; but it may simultaneously impose a negative safety externality on 
Vehicle Safety

13-3

other drivers, whose cars are now relatively smaller compared to the growing average fleet size. 

Decreasing size may have similarly opposing impacts on safety. Therefore, maintaining or 

increasing the average size of the entire fleet does not guarantee the safest outcome, and 

decreasing the fleet’s average size in response to a fuel economy rule might have no overall 

change in safety levels (though at some point, reducing the size or changing attributes could 

affect the vehicle’s intrinsic safety, as distinct from its relative safety). As Wenzel, a leading 

researcher on this subject, has explained, “a fuel economy standard that discourages vehicles 

with smaller footprint, or lower weight, will not necessarily reduce casualties. . . .Details of 

vehicle design, which can be improved through direct safety regulations, will have a greater 

effect on occupant safety than fuel economy standards that are structured to maintain vehicle size 

or weight.” [This comment can also be found in section 2.1 of this comment summary.] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 14]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Even more important, all of the historical analyses of the impacts of weight on fatalities are 

based upon vehicles primarily using conventional steel. This means that the results implicitly 

assume that the materials in the vehicle will not change. However, high strength steel (HSS) and 

aluminum both have better crash properties than standard steel. Thus, reducing weight of small 

cars using better materials will reduce fatalities. Aluminum provides more uniform management 

of crash forces. High-strength steel helps prevent intrusion and better absorbs crash forces, which 

is one of the primary reasons for its rapidly increased market penetration in recent years. For 

example, Honda has moved aggressively towards using HSS in small cars in part because of the 

safety benefits: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 12]

'The extensive use of high-strength steel in the Advance Compatibility Engineering (ACE) body 

structure creates a new-generation platform that is safer and stronger, enhancing the vehicle's 

ability to deal with crash energy during impact.'6 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 12]

'A new body design with the ACE Body Structure and extensive use of high strength steel create 

a new generation platform that is safer and stronger.' 7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 

12]

In addition, fatalities are linked more strongly to intrusion into the passenger compartment than

to vehicle mass. Safety experts in Japan and Europe raised this issue previously. Their research 

suggests the main cause of serious injuries and deaths is intrusion due to the failure of loadbearing elements to properly protect occupants in a severe crash: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 12]

'The results from this project have overturned the original views about compatibility, which 

thought that mass and the mass ratio were the dominant factors.'8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 12]

'moreover, if mass appears to be the main parameter linked to aggressivity of cars, it is because 

this is the easiest and universal parameter that is collected in all accident databases.'9 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 12]
EPA Response to Comments

13-4

'The scientific community now agrees that mass does not playa direct role in 

compatibility.'10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 12]

Reducing vehicle weight while maintaining size helps to reduce intrusion, as the lower weight 

reduces crash forces while maintaining size preserves crush space. This also supports that sizebased standards that encourage the use of lightweight materials should reduce intrusion and, 

hence, fatalities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 12-13]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 195-196.]

The recent development of sophisticated and accurate vehicle simulations is opening up a new 

world. The initial use of these models was to improve safety design. The simulations were so 

effective that 5 star crash ratings became almost universal and NHTSA had to revise their rating 

criteria. The simulations are continuing to rapidly improve to the point where they are starting to 

be used to simultaneously optimize the material composition, shape and thickness of every 

individual part, including secondary weight reductions.

Organization: Marshall, C.

Historically, there have been two topics of pushback by those who would oppose this standard. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Regarding highway safety, same-size cars for improving mileage can be made with lighter more 

energy-absorbing materials without increasing risks on the highways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-5917-A2, p. 2]

Organization: Rafter, M.

Car makers have made cars less safe to meet the standards that the government keeps imposing. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11587-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Ross, D.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 242-243.]

Are fuel-efficient vehicles unsafe? Critics anticipate that weight reduction will be a major 

strategy to achieve greater fuel economy in a cost-effective manner, and that this will increase 

the likelihood of injury or death from vehicle collisions.

They point to the 50 percent increase in fatalities resulting from accidents involving passenger 

cars and light-truck SUVs experienced between 1979 and 1999.

But it wasn't so much the decrease in weight of passenger cars as the dramatic increase in the 

light-truck SUV share of all vehicles on the road that drove that statistic.
Vehicle Safety

13-5

The proposed standard limits any further worsening in vehicle weight disparities by linking fuel 

economy standards to vehicle footprint.

If fuel economy gains are concentrated in high-end vehicles through new materials or increasing 

reliance on hybrid technology, then fleet weight disparities may even diminish.

In my view, critics have failed to refute the reasonable NHTSA projections of a modest increase 

in safety under the 2017-25 standards.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Smart fuel economy improvements deliver safety, as well as better mileage and lower emissions: 

Advanced high strength and light weight materials and other recent technological and design 

breakthroughs—along with well-engineered weight reduction—give us the ability to travel safely 

and save money in cars that cut the emission of global warming pollution by 5% and, at 54.5 

mpg, ease our oil addiction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 10]

The improved safety record of crossover vehicles compared to truck-based SUVs, stemming 

from improved technology, teaches us that manufacturers are capable of designing vehicles that 

are lighter, more efficient and safer as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 10]

Technology is the key to better mileage and safer cars. With strong, lightweight materials, we 

can have both. Better engines, transmissions and aerodynamics improve fuel economy; airbags, 

high-strength lightweight steel and better roofs improve safety. And reducing the throw weight 

of vehicles improves the safety of everyone on the road. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 

11]

Organization: Steyn, R.

The new rule also will lead to a significant increase in the number of driving-related deaths and 

injuries because it can be met only by reducing the size and weight of passenger vehicles. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

Response:

Several commenters maintained that decreased vehicle weight could lead to decreased 

vehicle safety. Others commented that vehicle safety is chiefly related to vehicle design, rather 

than to vehicle size or weight. Comments on these issues are addressed principally in section 

II.G of the preamble to the final rule. We add certain supplemental responses below. 

The commenters who state that the standards could lead to a decrease in vehicle safety 

assert that the standards will be met by mass reduction, or in some cases, downsizing, and that 

either strategy carries with it associated safety risks. EIR points to the 1970’s experience as 

evidence that manufacturers’ use of downsizing as a compliance strategy for the flat (i.e. 

universal) CAFE standards can result in increased vehicle fatalities. EPA disagrees with 
EPA Response to Comments

13-6

commenter’s analogy to the current rule. As the agencies explain in preamble section II.G, 

historic field crash data is not necessarily a predictor of safety of the current or future light duty 

vehicle fleets. EPA also notes that three important factors differentiate the rulemaking today 

from the 1970’s: 1) the footprint approach to standards, 2) the presence of crash safety standards 

which were not in existence in the 1970’s, and 3) the advancements in design tools and 

techniques that have occurred over the past few decades. 

Footprint-based standards

After the first CAFE standards were introduced in the 1970’s, manufacturers achieved 

compliance in part by reducing vehicle size. The use of the footprint attribute for this 

rulemaking largely eliminates any incentive for manufacturers to downsize vehicles as a 

compliance strategy, since doing so simply makes their overall fleet average target more 

numerically stringent, as described in section II.C of the preamble. Indeed, this was a prime 

motivator to adopt so-called reformed CAFE, whereby standards would no longer be flat. 

Furthermore, unlike a weight-based standard, a footprint based standard does not create 

disincentives for manufacturers to apply weight-efficient materials and designs. From the 

engineering and statistical safety analyses reviewed by the agencies NHTSA concluded, and 

EPA agrees, that the societal effect of mass reduction while maintaining footprint, if any, is small 

(see section II.G.3 of the preamble). 

Crash safety standards

The commenters did not address the role of federal safety standards, including crash 

standards, to which the current and future vehicle fleet are subject. NHTSA began frontal crash 

testing in 1978 and adopted the five star rating in 1993, adopted the side impact crash test in 

1996 and the rollover test in 2000 with an overhaul of the program in 2008. In addition, there 

are other tests including those by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety tests (IIHS) and 

other countries, including Europe and Japan, which must be met in order to sell vehicles in those 

countries. This continued advancement in safety standards is reflected in the steady decline in 

fatality rates. As shown in the figure in Section 3.3.5.5 of the Joint TSD, the motor vehicle crash 

deaths per billion miles traveled in the late 1970’s were 3 times that of those in 2009 (11.3 per 

billion in 2009). Another figure in the same chapter shows the Light duty fleet weight trends: 

1975-2011. The figure shows that vehicles have increased in weight over the past 30+ years 

since the late 1970’s and while vehicle designs today and in the future may be of similar weights, 

the manufacturers are accountable to safety standards today. Safety standards will stay in place, 

so that it is not possible for auto makers to reduce safety below those requirements in order to 

improve fuel economy.

Advancements in design tools and techniques

EPA agrees with commenters who observed that design plays an important role in safety 

(Consumers Union, D. Ross, Sierra Club). The design tools that are available today are 

significantly more advanced than when fuel economy standards were first established, and 

manufacturers now routinely utilize CAE/CAD tools to simulate crashes prior to a prototype 

build. This allows them to design the vehicle to reduce passenger compartment intrusion and 

distribute crash loads more efficiently, as well as evaluate dummy injury criteria. If all design 
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13-7

concepts were held constant to the early 2000s then lighter cars could possibly mean higher 

dummy accelerations. However, vehicle designs are changing. For example, the more optimal 

management of crash energy in crush zones and design of multiple load paths can minimize 

acceleration pulses experienced in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. In addition, there 

has been continued advancement of restraint system technology, such as air bags that provide 

more complete coverage of the passenger compartment, and restraints that respond according to 

the specific occupant and crash conditions. 

EPA notes that uncertainty still exists about whether this rule will affect how consumers 

evaluate fuel savings or safety. Still, EPA does not believe, as EIR suggests, that this rule will 

cause consumers to value safety less than they do currently. If consumer buying strategies do 

not change, as is very possible, then the rule will not affect how consumers evaluate these issues. 

It is also possible that fleet-wide efficiency increases will reduce the emphasis consumers place 

on fuel economy as a distinguishing attribute, and place greater emphasis on safety features, 

rather than less, as IER argues. Information on vehicle safety, and crashworthiness in particular, 

is readily available to vehicle purchasers. We note that NHTSA assigns crash ratings to each 

vehicle design based on the results of these tests, and this information is commonly part of the 

consumer’s decision process in vehicle choice. Even if consumers seek a less expensive vehicle 

in response to the increased costs, all vehicles will continue to meet the applicable federal safety 

standards. 

13.2. Comments on NHTSA/EPA’s Engineering Analysis of Vehicle 

Safety Including Light Weight Materials

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)

Bayer Material Science

Center for Biological Diversity

Consumers Union

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Nissan North America, Inc.

SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Automakers, in conjunction with NHTSA and others, continue to work toward a common goal of 

reducing the annual number of fatalities and injuries that occur in motor vehicle crashes. The
EPA Response to Comments

13-8

Alliance supports a CAFE and GHG rule structured to allow automakers to balance competing 

requirements in a manner that furthers this progress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.20]

Alliance members recognize that highway traffic safety is a shared responsibility and strive to do 

their part through the continuous improvement of the safety performance of their vehicles. 

NHTSA recently announced that the 2010 road fatality rate reached an historic low of 1.10 

fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. Fatalities declined in most categories in 2010, 

including for occupants of passenger cars, SUVs, minivans and pickup trucks.7 We take pride in 

our contributions toward this historic achievement and continue to work toward future progress 

by developing additional crashworthiness enhancements and introducing crash avoidance 

technologies. As breakthroughs in advanced material and powertrain technologies become 

available and their associated costs meet customer thresholds for affordability, consumers will 

benefit through an increase in vehicle fuel efficiency and a decrease in greenhouse gas 

emissions. However, the Alliance is mindful that such improvements must be implemented in a 

manner that does not compromise the rate of safety improvement that has been achieved to date. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.21]

Achieving the proposed CAFE and GHG standards will rely on the availability of commercially 

viable emerging technologies for manufacturers to adopt. Should these technologies fail to 

mature as anticipated, greater reliance on mass reduction and downsizing in order to achieve 

these standards could occur. The Alliance supports the proposed mid-term evaluation and urges 

EPA and NHTSA to continuously update the safety analysis as part of this review. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.21]

Even though the current rulemaking extends well into the future, there is a possibility that many 

of the advanced technology and mass reduction projections may not be realized in the proposed 

timeframe. Thus, when the agencies conduct their mid-term evaluation, it is critical that the 

safety analysis is updated to reflect the most recent crash data and revised projections regarding 

mass reduction scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.21]

The Alliance supports NHTSA’s intention to examine safety from the perspective of both the 

historical field crash data and the engineering analysis of potential future Advanced Materials 

Concept vehicles. NHTSA’s planned analysis rightly looks backward and forward. However, 

with respect to looking ahead and the evaluation of concept vehicles, the Alliance recognizes that 

it is not sufficient to only consider regulatory and consumer information crash tests. A 

comprehensive evaluation of vehicle safety must also take into account real-world impact 

scenarios and the special requirements of vulnerable populations (e.g., children and elderly). 

These must also be adequately accounted for in any agency policy decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.21]

Analysis of the Lotus and FutureSteelVehicle concepts indicates that although these concept 

vehicles can be designed in a virtual world to perform well in virtual Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standards and virtual Insurance Institute for Highway Safety tests, there remain concerns 

that these concepts yield aggressively stiffer crash pulses that may be detrimental to rear seat 

occupants, vulnerable occupants and potential crash partners. Given the Computer-Aided 

Engineering (CAE) crash modeling uncertainties with respect to advanced materials that may
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possibly be available for mass production in the MY 2017-2025 time-frame, it is possible that the 

real-world crash behavior of these concepts may not match that predicted in those studies. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.21-22]

Further, significant uncertainties exist with respect to both manufacturing and CAE crash 

analysis of potential future advanced materials. CAE capabilities for some potential advanced 

materials that manufacturers are researching are far less mature than for materials currently in 

common use. Progress in these areas is highly competitive and therefore varies throughout the 

industry. As such, it will take considerable time and investment for each manufacturer to develop 

this knowledge and experience. Because agency projections fail to adequately take into account 

the timing and cost for the introduction of advanced materials, these projections are likely overly 

optimistic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.22]

Organization: Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

The aluminum industry shares and supports the agencies’ priority for continuous improvement in 

vehicle safety. We congratulate NHTSA for the thorough, thoughtful and professional approach 

taken in analyzing the relationships between vehicle design attributes and safety performance. 

Mass reduction has been identified as an important part of a comprehensive vehicle fuel 

economy improvement initiative, and must be implemented in a manner that preserves, or 

enhances vehicle safety. Developing an appropriate assessment of potential vehicle weight 

reduction opportunities requires understanding the independent influence of mass, size, design 

and safety features. Limitations of available historical data and currently available safety 

modeling make reliable assessment of individual safety technologies difficult. It is even more 

difficult to reliably anticipate the potential impact of future advancements in vehicle safety 

engineering or deployment of advanced safety enhancing technologies. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0226-A1, pp. 3-4]

Considering the uncertainties involved, we believe the agency’s position on vehicle weight 

reduction is based on an objective and well reasoned assessment of all available information and 

is appropriately conservative. Recent NHTSA studies, and the NPRM indicate downweighting of 

large and mid-size vehicles will have a “neutral or positive” impact on overall fleet safety while 

improving fuel efficiency. In this vehicle segment automakers are using low weight, highstrength materials now and will increase use of these materials in the future. With respect to 

smaller vehicles, data clearly identifying independent impact of mass, size, design and advanced 

safety technologies is not available today. Due to uncertainty about the influence of mass, design 

and size on safety of smaller vehicles, the NPRM does not anticipate significant mass reduction 

in vehicles below 3,000 pounds. Analytical safety studies conducted by the ATG and others 

suggest vehicle size, not weight, has the largest impact on vehicle safety performance. We 

believe advanced small vehicle designs will be developed using aluminum body and structural 

components that will achieve significant weight reduction while preserving vehicle size and 

improving safety performance. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 4]

The ATG also serves on the steering committee for the Center for Automotive Research’s (CAR) 

recently formed Coalition of Automotive Lightweighting Materials (CALM), which supports 

efforts by auto manufacturers to aggressively downweight vehicles to improve performance, fuel 
EPA Response to Comments

13-10

economy and safety. CALM’s purpose is to support the cost-effective integration of mixed 

materials to achieve significant reductions in weight through the collaborative efforts of 

technology providers with the auto manufacturers. Through individual company efforts and 

through the new CALM partnership, the aluminum industry is committed to working with our 

customers and other suppliers to further accelerate and ease the adoption of advanced materials 

options (Attachment E [see Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A5]). [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0226-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 223-227.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 227-228.]

So in conclusion, we see that weight reduction, weight optimized future vehicles and 

components will take maximum advantage of available engineering materials. These materials 

are continually being improved to further enhance the ability of auto designers to design efficient 

vehicles. Materials including aluminum, high-strength steel, magnesium and Aluminum offers a 

unique combination of composites will all find use in the vehicles of the future, they'll work --

live together in more efficient vehicle structures.

Aluminum offers a unique combination of attributes including low weight, high strength, 

excellent energy absorption capability, natural corrosion resistance at a reasonable cost. For 

those reasons, we believe aluminum will play an increasing role in the optimized vehicle of the 

future.

Organization: American Chemistry Council (ACC)

The agencies have stated their intention to achieve lightweighting of the fleet in a manner that 

does not compromise vehicle safety. The agencies have chosen to “provide an incentive to use 

lightweight materials and structures,” rather than “reductions in size,” by adopting a footprint 

approach to emission reductions. We support the agencies’ adoption of the footprint approach, 

and our members are committed to bringing to market materials and technologies that help 

achieve that goal. As an industry that makes modern innovative materials, we have a proud 

history of our many contributions to automotive safety. Plastics are integral to airbags, seat belts, 

shatter resistant sunroofs, and so many more features. We strongly believe that vehicle mass 

reduction and overall fleet safety can be achieved hand-in-hand, and support the agencies’ 

approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 1]

The Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NRPM) also observes that ongoing research may help 

refine our understanding of mass, vehicle size, and safety, particularly in connection with 

improved design and material use. Supporting research on safety is important to us, and the ACC 

Plastics Division’s Auto Team has worked closely with the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) on several initiatives to address automotive safety issues. For example, 

ACC and several member companies are participating in several NHTSA research projects on 

the safety of lightweight vehicles, including the Lotus Engineering and the George Washington 
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13-11

University studies, which seek to refine understanding of mass and crashworthiness.3 The latter 

study, scheduled to conclude in July, 2012, has been highlighted by Secretary LaHood and 

NHTSA as one of the tools they are using to ensure safety while promoting vehicle mass 

reduction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 1]

Through another effort with NHTSA, in November 2005, the American Plastics Council (now 

ACC’s Plastics Division), in cooperation with NHTSA, sponsored a Technology Integration 

Workshop on “Enhancing Future Automotive Safety With Plastics.” Findings from the workshop 

were published in a Technology Integration Report in May 2006, noting the major opportunities 

and challenges for enhancing the safety of next generation vehicles using advanced plastics and 

composite materials in structural and safety applications. In 2005, Congress directed NHTSA to 

explore the potential safety benefits of lightweight, fuel efficient Plastics and Composites 

Intensive Vehicles (PCIVs),4 and develop the foundation for research in cooperation with the 

Department of Energy, industry, universities and other safety stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9517-A2, pp. 1-2]

Significant progress has been made in this effort. NHTSA tasked the Volpe Center to assess the 

current state of knowledge and emerging safety technology opportunities to enhance the crash 

safety of PCIVs by 2020. In November 2007, NHTSA published A Safety Roadmap for Future 

Plastics and Composites Intensive Vehicles, and the agency is in the process of implementing the 

Roadmap.5 In August 2008, NHTSA hosted a workshop entitled, The Safety Characterization of 

Future Plastic and Composites Intensive Vehicles.6 NHTSA has already moved much closer 

towards its goal of facilitating development and deployment of next generation safe and fuel

efficient PCIVs by 2020; we encourage and support NHTSA, in coordination with the private 

sector, to complete its work implementing the roadmap, and integrate relevant findings into this 

rule as appropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 265-266.]

Why is this important? The proposed rule makes clear the relationship between fuel savings and 

lightweight of the vehicle. The proposal acknowledges that mass reductions of vehicle can be 

achieved in many ways, including material substitution, design optimization and part 

consolidation. We agree. PCIV research amply documents the technological feasibility of 

designing and building vehicles with 30% or more plastic and plastic composites, and in our 

view, the agencies' application of mass reduction of up to 20% relative to model year 2008 levels 

is appropriate and achievable.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 266-267.]

But there's more. Plastics are about more than just light-weighting of vehicles, plastics and 

polymer composites have enabled some of the most significant vehicle safety innovations in the 

past several decades including seat belts, airbags, child safety seats, and the same sources of 

these innovations still hold significant untapped potential to further enhance vehicle safety.
EPA Response to Comments

13-12

We agree with the agencies that it is important that the CAFE standards be set in a way that does 

not encourage manufacturers to respond by selling vehicles that are in any way less safe. In 

particular, we agree with and support the standard applied in assessing compliance strategies, 

and this is articulated as no adverse effect on overall fleet safety.

In the last five years the plastics industry has worked aggressively to better understand how 

plastics can be used to enhance safety in automobiles and we will continue to do so. Congress 

recognized the importance of enhanced automobile safety by investing nearly $2 million over a 

four-year period and to building an ongoing partnership between the plastics industry and 

NHTSA, and through this partnership, NHTSA has initiated and is currently implementing a 

safety roadmap for future plastics and plastic composites intensive for vehicles.

This project is already yielding fruit, as ongoing research is helping to improve the performance 

of plastic and composite material components. We support NHTSA'S sustained work to 

implement the safety roadmap.

3 See transcript of NHTSA Mass Size Safety Symposium, February 25, 2011, 

http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/MSS/MSSworkshop_transcript.pdf

4 See Plastic and Composite Intensive Vehicles (PCIVs): An Innovation Platform for Achieving 

National Priorities, September 8, 2009, http://www.plastics-car.com/pcivs

5 A Safety Roadmap for Future Plastics and Composites Intensive Vehicles, sponsored by the 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT HS 8110 863, November 2007, 

www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crashworthiness/Vehicle%20Aggressivity%20and%20Fleet

%20Compatibility %20Research/810863.pdf

6 “The Safety Characterization of Future Plastic and Composites Intensive Vehicles (PCIVs),”

August 2008: a) Workshop prospectus, agenda, and presentations posted at 

www.volpe.dot.gov/safety/pciv/index.html; 

http://www.volpe.dot.gov/safety/pciv/docs/summary_pciv_workshop.pdf

Organization: American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)

Use of Steel in Future Vehicles [Federal Register Vol. 76, No. 231, Pg 74921 et seq.]

New steels and automotive manufacturing techniques continue to be developed by the steel 

industry and will enable significant increases in mass reduction, crashworthiness and fuel 

economy, while enabling reductions in total greenhouse gas emissions, during the period 

specified in the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 8]
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13-13

The new regulations will influence car companies to consider mass reduction as a high priority. 

The steel industry in collaboration with its automotive customers has a long history of providing 

mass reduction solutions for light-duty vehicles, most recently by developing an evolving 

portfolio of advanced high-strength steel (AHSS) grades over the past two decades. These steels 

possess tremendously improved strength over conventional steel and enable parts to be made 

thinner and lighter while still carrying the required loads. At the May 18, 2011, Great Designs in 

Steel Seminar, Ducker Worldwide9 reported that AHSS is now the fastest growing automotive 

material in today’s new cars and trucks. From this report and from the reports of individual car 

companies on specific vehicles, many examples of the effectiveness of AHSS grades in 

achieving affordable mass reduction for carmakers are available today. Ducker10 also forecasted 

accelerated growth of AHSS between now and 2025 due to the proposed regulations. This fact 

emphasizes that, while the growth of AHSS in new vehicles has been significant and averages 

around 17% of the body mass today, more growth is expected in the future and, according to 

Ducker, can possibly triple by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, pp. 8-9]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 87-88.]

Much work was necessary to increase AHSS content from essentially zero to the 17% level 

reported above. It was first made possible because of the global steel industry’s ultra-light steel 

studies, called ULSAB (Ultra Light Steel Auto Body) which were completed in 2002 with the 

release of the final project, ULSAB-AVC (advanced vehicle concepts)11. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9477-A1, p. 9]

This transition from mild steel to AHSS since 2002 in vehicle structures was also facilitated by 

joint engineering projects with the Auto/Steel Partnership through support by the U. S. 

Department of Energy (DOE) and the U. S. Advanced Materials Partnership (USAMP). 

Important projects including Lightweight Front-end Structure12 and Future Generation 

Passenger Compartment13 helped to accelerate use of AHSS. Simultaneously, North American 

steel companies invested in the technologies to manufacture these AHSS grades. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 9]

To prepare for anticipated automobile design requirements for 2017- 2025, AISI together with 

WorldAutoSteel has again conducted a major engineering project, called FutureSteelVehicle14. 

This study examined the most efficient structures for electrified powertrain vehicles like batteryelectric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. Twenty new grades of AHSS were developed, with many 

of the newest AHSS grades having strengths in the gigapascal range, over 1000 MPa. That’s at 

least 5 times stronger than conventional steels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 9]

FutureSteelVehicle (FSV) results were published in May 2011 and showed mass reduction levels 

of about 35% in body/structural applications. Such high mass reductions with steel are now 

possible because of new extremely high-strength grades, new manufacturing processes like tailor 

rolling or hot stamping, and new design optimization CAE (computer-aided engineering) tools. 

The FSV results reinforce the forecast by Ducker that AHSS growth in vehicles should continue 

well past 2020. FSV is an important milestone on the development path of automotive steels—it 

is not the endpoint. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 9]
EPA Response to Comments

13-14

Technological breakthroughs going forward are sure to enable further advances just as they have 

over the past two decades. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 10]

The results of the FSV study have been shared with North American carmakers. Importantly, it 

shows that significantly more mass reduction is possible using steels remains. Equally important, 

this study also evaluates the cost and the carbon emissions consequences of mass reduction 

solutions. It is significant that AHSS mass reduction solutions are often both the least expensive 

and the lowest carbon solutions, based on a calculation of life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions. 

More details on this subject of life-cycle emissions are covered in the first section above. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 10]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 89-90.]

Collision Injury Severity [Federal Register vol. 76, No. 231 Pg. 74949 et seq.]

AISI, WorldAutoSteel, and the Auto/Steel Partnership have conducted many studies on the 

effectiveness of AHSS steels in reducing mass while achieving equal or improved 

crashworthiness versus established steel architectures. The most notable published studies on this 

subject are ULSAB-AVC11 (2002), the Auto/Steel Partnership studies on front-end structure12 

(2004) and on passenger compartment mass reduction13 (2006), and FutureSteelVehicle14 

(2011). All of these studies make use of established vehicle FEA (finite element analysis) 

models, and computer aided engineering (CAE) crash simulation software. In addition, an actual 

vehicle crash test was conducted to validate the Auto/Steel Partnership front-end structure 

project and verify that the AHSS 25% reduced-mass front end behaved equivalently to the 

original design. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 10]

The scope of these steel industry-sponsored studies relied on achieving equivalent or better crash 

simulation performance with criteria based on limits for intrusion (into the passenger 

compartment) and management of the intensity of the crash pulse. Our experience in mass 

reduction is that vehicles can indeed be engineered to achieve equivalent performance at reduced 

mass against the required battery of crash tests including full frontal impact, offset frontal, rear 

impact, side impact, roof crush, and others. The properties of AHSS are particularly well suited 

for this task because of steel’s high strength, high work hardening during deformation and strainrate hardening during impact loading rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, pp. 10-11]

9 Future Growth of AHSS, Abey Abraham, Ducker Worldwide, May 18, 2011, Great Designs in 

Steel Seminar, Livonia MI http://www.autosteel.org/Resources.aspx (available on request from 

Ducker, see www.ducker.com and call 248-644-0086)

10 Light Vehicle Steel Content, Ducker Executive Summary Report, March 2011, (download 

from www.autosteel.org)

11 ULSAB-AVC Engineering Report (download from 

http://www.autosteel.org/en/Programs/ULSAB-AVC.aspx)
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13-15

12 Light-weight Front-end Structure Report, Auto/Steel Partnership Final Report October 2005 

(download from http://www.a-sp.org/publications.htm )

13 Future Generation Steel Passenger Compartment, Auto/Steel Partnership Final Report, June 

2007 (download from http://www.a-sp.org/publications.htm )

14 Future Steel Vehicle Engineering Report, May 17, 2011, (download from 

http://www.autosteel.org/Programs/Future%20Steel%20Vehicle.aspx )

15 Technical Report on Fatality Risk, Mass, and Footprint of Model Year 2000-2007 Passenger 

Cars and LTVs – Preliminary Report, Charles J. Kahane, NHTSA, Docket No. NHTSA-2010-

0152-0023, www.regulations.gov

Organization: Bayer Material Science

We support the agencies’ decision to consider only net weight reduction of vehicles that will not 

compromise overall fleet safety. As a supplier of innovative materials such as polycarbonate for 

vehicle applications such as headlamps, interior consoles and body panels Bayer MaterialScience 

has a rich history of contributing to automotive safety standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9198-A2, p. 1]

Bayer MaterialScience has a rich history for contributing to automotive safety standards and is 

dedicated to developing innovative, high-performance materials giving automakers a choice of 

materials when it comes to meeting the CAFE requirements.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 270-271.]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

3. The Agencies must decrease weight across all vehicles to improve fuel efficiency

The Agencies correctly identify passenger safety as a factor to be considered in setting fuel 

efficiency standards. However, less weight does not equate to less safety. The assumption that 

the safest cars have been heavy and large, and that cars suffering the highest fatality-crash rates 

have been light and small, has led to incorrect conclusions about reducing vehicle weight. In fact, 

the evidence shows that weight reductions in all cars will not affect safety, though it significantly 

improves gas mileage. We urge the Agencies to reexamine their rulemaking and to require 

greater weight reductions over its effective period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 5]

The Agencies themselves now agree that reducing more mass from heavier vehicles reduces 

safety concerns for smaller vehicles. They also note that reports they previously relied upon 

require updating and data correction; accordingly, the Agencies must take updated studies that 

will be available before the final MY 2017-2025 rulemaking into account in that final 

rulemaking.24 The Agencies also note the consistency among reported studies that “reducing the 

overall ranges of masses and mass ratios seems to reduce overall societal harm.”25 Indeed, we 
EPA Response to Comments

13-16

believe the updated evidence will show that mass can safely be reduced in both light trucks and 

passenger vehicles as long as wheelbase and track width are maintained.26 Because light weight 

material can improve vehicle efficiency by 20%, its use must be encouraged. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 6]

The erroneous belief that heavier vehicles increase overall safety has contributed to a large 

increase in the weight of the American vehicle fleet over the last decades – leading to the loss of 

what could have been highly significant efficiency improvements.27 One study has concluded 

that from 1984 to 2004, the average weight of light trucks increased by 26 percent and that, if 

weight, horsepower, and torque had been held at their 1990 levels, fuel economy for both 

passenger cars and light trucks could have increased by nearly 60 percent from 1980 to 2006.28 

The Agencies themselves concede that “MY 2000-2007 vehicles of all types are heavier and 

larger than their MY 1991-1999 counterparts. The average mass of passenger cars increased by 5 

percent from 2000 to 2007 and the average mass of pickup trucks increased by 19 percent.” We 

note that CAFE rulemakings were in effect during all of the referenced period. A correct 

assessment of the relationship between weight, fuel efficiency and safety must reverse this 

perverse trend, which is directly contrary to energy conservation. Because of its large impact on 

fuel efficiency, we urge the Agencies to require significant weight reduction among the vehicle 

fleet as part of its standards; failure to implement light-weighting across the fleet because of 

alleged safety concerns would be contrary to the evidence and arbitrary and capricious. These 

revisions must not simply lead to corrections in the text of the final rule, but also to significant 

increases in fuel efficiency standards in the final rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-

A1, p. 6]

24 The relevant reports include the updated studies from the University of Michigan 

Transportation Research Institute and Dynamic Research, Inc., referenced at 76 Fed. Reg. at 

74,948. See also ICCT Comments in Response to the NPRM, submitted in this docket (Feb.13, 

2012) (“ICCT Comments”) at 9-13. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 6]

25 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,949. See also the studies referenced at 76 Fed. Reg. at 76,957-

58. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 6]

26 NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,950; see report by Dynamic Research, Inc. available in the 

docket. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 6]

27 The lower stringency targets assigned to light trucks is the other driving force of this 

development, as discussed below. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 6]

28 Christopher Knittel, Automobiles on Steroids; Product Attribute Trade-Offs and 

Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 2012 at 

3369 (Dec 2011), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.7.3368. 

The Agencies themselves observe that MY 2000-2007. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 

6]
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13-17

Organization: Consumers Union

In fact, reducing vehicle weight will be essential in improving fuel economy. For example, a 

contemporary family sedan such as the Hyundai Sonata Limited weighs 3,450 pounds and still 

achieves a Top Safety Pick by the IIHS. The new Toyota Camry XLE V6 is even lighter at 3,375 

pounds. These vehicles achieve 25 and 26 overall mpg in CR’s testing. By contrast, a similarly 

equipped Chrysler 200 Limited V6 weighs 3,590 pounds (also a Top-Safety Pick), but with no 

performance or interior room advantage and partially because of the extra weight only achieves 

21 mpg. The new Honda Civic at 2,810 pounds also received a Top Safety Pick and weighs 400 

pounds (about 9%) less than the Chevrolet Cruze, a direct competitor, and again achieves 20% 

better fuel economy partially because of the lower weight. Consumer Reports is confident that 

lighter vehicles will not necessarily compromise vehicle safety—all vehicles will still need to 

conform to improving vehicle safety standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.3]

Organization: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)

From a safety standpoint, IIHS is supportive of the proposed CAFE standards put forth by 

NHTSA in this proposed rule. The continued use of a size-based system will help increase fuel 

economy while keeping manufacturers from significantly downweighting or downsizing 

vehicles, and thus will mitigate the safety costs that might otherwise occur as fuel economy 

increases are required by the federal government. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0222-A1, p. 1]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 195-196.]

The shift in material design capabilities also impacts the cost to reduce vehicle weight. The 

studies in progress by Lotus and FEV are using highly sophisticated simulation models to 

optimize part material and design. The results of these studies will be far more accurate of future 

designs and they must be used to assess the costs of weight reduction for the final rule.

Organization: Nissan North America, Inc.

Nissan will continue to provide a full range of vehicles, and to incorporate continuous

improvements throughout its vehicle fleets. This includes advances in internal combustion 

engines (ICEs) as well as the continued deployment of electric drivetrains. Nissan also continues 

to explore appropriate opportunities for mass reduction. A comprehensive mid-term evaluation 

is critical to determining the extent to which the market accepts the additional costs associated 

with more advanced internal combustion vehicles, as well as the extent to which the advanced 

powertrain market develops. In addition, government regulatory programs involving both fuels 

and safety requirements will directly affect future feasibility and must be considered in any 

future review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9471-A1, p.5]

Organization: SABIC Innovative Plastics US LLC
EPA Response to Comments

13-18

SABIC-IP has been actively engaged in developing solutions to advance fuel economy and 

reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In particular, automotive products made from our 

polymer resins are used to reduce vehicle mass while providing strong structural integrity. 

SABIC-IP has also developed an advanced coating solution allowing polycarbonate (PC) glazing 

to withstand long-term weathering and abrasion conditions. With such coating solutions, PC 

glazing may be used in areas specified for Item 2 glazing behind the windshield. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.1]

The agencies are well aware of the emissions and fuel consumption benefits associated with 

vehicle mass reduction. SABIC-IP supports the inclusion of weight reduction as an available 

technology, as well as the agencies’ ongoing research efforts to quantify better the implications 

of weight reduction for societal safety measures as lighter and smaller vehicles penetrate into the 

fleet. SABIC-IP has actively participated in this research, contributing a number of lightweight 

components, including plastic fenders, plastic front-end modules, polycarbonate glazing for roof 

and backlight applications, and composite liftgates for evaluation and consideration. Many of 

these lightweight solutions also offer component-level safety benefits, offering the capability, for 

example, of mitigating ejections or protecting pedestrians. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, 

p.13]

SABIC-IP verified the traditional estimates that a 10% weight reduction produces a 6-7% 

increase in fuel economy. In 2008, SABIC-IP arranged for vehicles to be tested at the MercedesBenz Research and Development North America, Inc. facility in Ann Arbor, Michigan with two 

configurations – a vehicle with PC glazing and a vehicle with added weight to simulate the glass 

penalty due to glass having a mass density about twice that of PC. The data, which SABIC-IP 

initially presented in our comments to the MY 2012-2016 rulemaking, confirmed these 

estimates: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.14] [For the associated table, please refer to 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.14]

An additional benefit offered by engineering thermoplastics is the ability to offer enhanced 

aerodynamics that can be used to design more front and rear ends with a lower coefficient of 

drag. Drag coefficients for present day vehicles range between 0.30 and 0.35, but an additional 

25% reduction in drag has been predicted in coming years. Part of this progress will derive from 

advances in material science. Injection-molded plastics allow for aerodynamic styling and parts 

integration not possible with metal or glass. Specific applications where drag coefficient 

reductions have been or can be achieved include spoilers, fascias, undertrays, grilles, mirrors, 

and lighting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.14]

In fact, engineering thermoplastics can be utilized in the entire front six inches and most of the 

rear six inches of the vehicle. In the front, these components include lighting (polycarbonate), 

grills (PC blends), fasciae (polypropylene), bumpers and energy absorbers (PC blends), grill 

opening reinforcements (polypropylene) and reflectors (polyetherimide). In the rear, the 

components include structural reinforcements (polypropylene), rear lighting bezels (PC blends), 

spoilers (PC blends), glazing (polycarbonate), liftgates (polyphenylene ether resin (PPO) and PC 

blends) and bumpers and energy absorbers. The aerodynamic benefits available through 

integrated, molded plastic components are likely to contribute substantially as new vehicles are 
Vehicle Safety

13-19

designed with an increasing attention to employing aerodynamics to reduce greenhouse gas 

emissions and fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9467-A1, p.14]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 286-287.]

In addition to polycarbonate glazing technology, SABIC Innovative Plastics offers a number of 

other lightweight products that can advance the goals of this rulemaking. In fact, our various 

plastic products can comprise the entire front six inches and most of the rear six inches of a 

vehicle, including lights, grills, fasciae, bumpers, energy absorbers, structural reinforcements, 

liftgates and more. In addition to these familiar mature parts of the car, we have developed 

products such as the plastic steering wheel which will provide future weight benefits as they're 

incorporated into vehicle designs. We are also developing composite materials that can reduce 

vehicle mass and enhance design.

We believe that the technology of lightweight materials will advance substantially in the years 

covered by this regulation, as will our understanding of the benefits these materials can provide. 

We look forward to working with our OEM and our Tier customers to determine the most costeffective and safest ways to incorporate advanced lightweight components and structural 

elements into the vehicles and components they manufacture.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

A driver in a 2,600-pound Honda Civic has greater chances of surviving an accident a driver in a 

5,100-pound Ford F-150 pickup. Most fatal car crashes are single vehicle accidents where weight 

can be a disadvantage. In fact, the Ford’s driver per fatality rate is 65 deaths per million 

registered vehicle years versus 55 for the 50% lighter Civic. The 3,200 pound Honda Accord is 

far safer than the F-150 with a driver death rate of only 19. Indeed, the mid-size Accord is safer 

than any standard large sedan on the road which shows that engineering, not weight, builds 

safety into a vehicle.35 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 10]

With these standards it is important recognize additional steps that will improve safety: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 10]

. Future vehicles will comply with new standards for electronic stability (ESC), roof crush 

resistance, and control of occupant ejection. These standards will substantially reduce the 

potential for single vehicle crashes (including rollovers) and for injuries in such crashes. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 11]

. New applications of high strength steels, laser welding, advanced adhesives, and nonferrous 

materials (aluminum and plastics) will result in major improvements in structural performance –

occupant compartment integrity and crash energy management – with reduced vehicle 

weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 11]
EPA Response to Comments

13-20

Advances in electronics will lead to increased crash avoidance and better crashworthiness as 

electronic sensors can apply controls to prevent crashes and tune the vehicle for maximum 

crashworthiness by adjusting seats, head restraints, seat belts and airbags for better occupant 

protection when a crash is inevitable. Vehicle to vehicle communication systems can send 

signals to avoid intersection crashes such as when a vehicle runs a traffic light. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 11]

A major consequence of the new safety standards will be a dramatic reduction in rollover 

casualties. Until recently, NHTSA had no significant standards affecting rollover safety. 

Rollover fatalities increased dramatically as light trucks were increasingly used as substitutes for 

passenger cars in the 1980s and 1990s. Rollover fatalities will be reduced from the current level 

of more than 10,000 per year to fewer than 5,000 as a consequence of the new standards. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 11]

35 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, June 9, 2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, 

p. 10]

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

Plastics have extensive innovative automotive applications – including bumpers and energy 

absorbers, consoles, door components, engine covers, housings, instrument panels, lighting, 

grilles, side impact protection, structural reinforcement and sunroofs – that are critical to safe, 

lighter weight and more fuel efficient vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.2]

From airbags to seatbelts, a wide range of plastics materials and processing methods have played 

a role in automotive safety. For example, composites can be produced with different levels of 

reinforcement for specific components to achieve improved mechanical properties that result in 

enhanced safety. In the event of a crash, backrests and headrests are designed to absorb and 

distribute energy, and highly elastic films help provide protection from glass. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9492-A1, p.2]

SPI strongly supports the agencies’ commitment and approach to consider only vehicle mass 

reduction that would not have an adverse effect on overall fleet safety. The NPRM notes the 

historical data suggesting an inverse relationship between vehicle mass and crashworthiness, but 

also points out that the adoption of advanced lightweight materials has the potential to “mitigate 

some of the potential decrease in safety from mass reduction through improved distribution of 

crash pulse energy.” The agencies have wisely supported continuing research into the 

relationship between vehicle mass and crashworthiness at research institutions like George 

Washington University. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.4]

Such advances certainly require evaluation for safety. Congress’ investment in enhanced 

automobile safety, through an ongoing partnership between the plastics industry and NHTSA, 

has led to the initiation and implementation by NHTSA of a Safety Roadmap for Future Plastics 

and Composites Intensive Vehicles. The 2007 report “summarizes the approach, activities, and 
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13-21

results of a study to evaluate the potential safety benefits of Plastics and Composites Intensive 

Vehicles (PCIVs), to enable their deployment by 2020.” The ACC has acknowledged that the 

commercial viability of PCIVs is a longer term proposition, but research is underway, including 

the improvement of predictive tools for reliably modeling component performance. We likewise 

support NHTSA’s ongoing work with the Safety Roadmap and industry’s research on PCIVs. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.4]

The plastics industry is proud of its innovations that contribute to vehicle weight reduction, 

reduced emissions and safety improvements, such as the benefits provided by PC glazing. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.8]

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

To start, Volkswagen agrees with the agencies that there is a variation in the overall mass 

reduction potential based on the type and market segment of vehicles. Smaller cars and economy 

models have less potential for mass reduction than larger or more premium vehicles. 

Volkswagen projects full vehicle weight reductions during the time period of this regulation on 

average in the order of 7-10%. The NPRM predicts for large cars and some trucks upwards of 

20% mass reduction potential. Volkswagen feels that this may exceed cost effective limits. 

With regards to electrified vehicles, Volkswagen does agree with statement sin Section 3.4.5.5. 

of the TSD that electrical component may increase baseline vehicle mass by upwards of 

approximately 4-5% depending on battery pack capacity and/or other electric drive components. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 15]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

During the last 30 years, major breakthroughs have been made in the engineering and 

development of advanced safety technologies. The development, market introduction and 

penetration of more efficient safety technologies, both with respect to occupant protection and 

with respect to cost, is expected to continue, with increased intensity. During the next decade, 

technologies aimed at avoiding or mitigating crashes will be introduced and will achieve 

widespread implementation in the vehicle fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 4]

Regardless of the anticipated development of technologies for improving both the 

crashworthiness and crash avoidance of vehicles towards the year 2025, the basic laws of physics 

still apply for incompatibilities in crashes between vehicles of different sizes and different 

weights. The projection of the effects of the new active safety crash technologies, even though 

raising a lot of future expectations, is not that crashes will be completely avoided, but that the 

frequency and impact of many of these crashes will be reduced. The assumptions of necessary 

weight and footprint reductions for meeting the fuel economy requirements will raise the 

question: what will be the outcome in a crash between a newer smaller vehicle that meets the 

requirements with an older larger heavier vehicle? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 4]

A smaller and lighter vehicle will be subjected to larger change of velocity than the larger 

heavier vehicle and, consequently, this will be reflected in the pulse that the smaller vehicle will 

be subjected to. This is then in turn reflected in the pulse transferred to the vehicle occupants. 
EPA Response to Comments

13-22

Many researchers have been trying to assess the relative injury and fatality risk of occupants in 

two-vehicle crashes in relation to the differences in mass between the vehicles. Everything else 

being equal, several of the studies presented indicate a significant increase, up to a factor ten, in 

the fatality risk for the occupants in the lighter vehicle for a two-to-one weight ratio between the 

colliding vehicles in a head-on crash. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, pp. 4-5]

When trying to assess the consequences of meeting the requirements on reducing the greenhouse 

gases and the resulting expected changes in the size and mass of the vehicle fleet, a number of 

uncertainties will arise that make this task very difficult and open for speculation. Will the whole 

vehicle population move towards lower weight and smaller size or will this only apply to certain 

segments? What will be the effect on size and weight of new alternative drive trains, e.g. hybrids 

and electrical vehicles? What will be the technical development of new safety technologies and 

what will be the market penetration of these systems? What will be the rate of the vehicle turnover and how many older vehicles, pre 2017, will remain in the vehicle fleet by 2025? [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 5]

One possible scenario presents a shift of the larger vehicle population towards a mid-segment of 

the population. This would then result in an overall more compatible passenger vehicle fleet and 

thus, reduce the negative aspects of the present fleet that has a large spread in weight and size. 

However, the weight ratio between larger motor vehicles, such as trucks and buses, and

passenger cars will most likely increase and this incompatibility will have the opposite effect, i.e. 

resulting in a higher fatality risk for the car occupants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 

5]

Other policy actions may also have consequences on the incompatibilities of the vehicle fleet. 

For example, changes in crash protection requirements may result in stiffer front structures 

which in turn will affect the vehicle fleet compatibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 

5]

VCC believes that the development of weight and size compatibilities/incompatibilities should 

be closely monitored and this should be linked to the development of the number of fatalities and 

injuries. VCC highly recommends that the midterm review evaluate safety in order to assure that 

the trend is not in an unfavorable direction and that no other measures are warranted. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 5]

Many of the negative consequences, as discussed above, can be avoided or mitigated by efficient 

active safety technologies. The potential of these systems is to effectively eliminate fatalities and 

serious injuries in traffic. The development of these systems needs, however, to be gradual and 

follow a step-wise approach linking technological advances with field experiences from real-life 

traffic. In order to acquire this knowledge, the penetration of the systems into the vehicle fleet is 

a key parameter. Some of the technologies have added costs due to advanced hardware and 

software developments. For customers who are unaware of the benefits of the systems, this 

added cost will not be attractive and will negatively affect the decision when buying a new 

car. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 5]
Vehicle Safety

13-23

It is therefore essential that customers are informed about these benefits. Consumer information, 

e.g. NCAP (New Car Assessment Program) and the 'Buying a Safer Car' guide should include 

assessments of the systems and clear statements of the benefits. It should also be reflected on the 

'Stars on Cars' statement on the Monroney label. The number of systems included in the 

assessments and protocols should gradually increase following the technical development. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, pp. 5-6]

Response:

As explained in section II.G of the Preamble to the final rule, each agency has outlined a 

technically feasible compliance path available at reasonable cost and cost-effectiveness which is 

safety neutral. The total amount of mass reduction used in the agencies’ analysis for this 

rulemaking was chosen based on the agencies’ documented assumptions about how much mass 

reduction is technologically feasible without compromising safety. Overall, technical feasibility 

paths for manufacturers identified in this rulemaking include a minimal mass reduction, <5%, for 

the majority of passenger vehicles due to safety restraints identified by NHTSA. Some trucks 

and CUV’s have up to 15% to 20% mass reduction in the projected compliance path which 

would lessen the impact of crash with these vehicle types. As explained in preamble section 

II.G, and as noted by a number of commenters (e.g. DRI, CBD), removing weight from heavier 

vehicles should have a positive effect on vehicle safety.

While EPA has shown a possible compliance pathway using one set of assumptions about 

the use of mass reduction, there are many alternative pathways for compliance. As discussed in 

EPA RIA section 3.5, this rulemaking is projected to decrease vehicle mass by approximately 

4% (on average) relative to the reference case. Rather than using mass reduction technology, 

manufacturers could choose to use, for example, additional turbo-charging and downsizing, 

hybridization, or any other available technology. No manufacturer is explicitly required by this 

regulation to reduce the mass of their vehicles. Some manufacturers may choose not to reduce 

mass at all. Others may choose to reduce mass by more than the levels projected here. Using the 

NHTSA methodology discussed in Section II.G, EPA has shown a compliance pathway that is 

projected to produce no net additional fatalities. 

EPA acknowledges the concerns by the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (the 

Alliance), Nissan North America, Inc., and Volvo Car Corporation regarding the mid-term 

evaluation areas of focus. The Alliance states their concern over the availability of commercially 

viable emerging technologies that have been assumed as part of the compliance package for this 

rulemaking. The Alliance supports the proposed mid-term evaluation and urges EPA and 

NHTSA to review the technology availabilities as well as continuously update the safety analysis 

as part of this review, including updating the most recent crash data and revised projections 

regarding mass reduction scenarios. The Alliance also expressed concerns over the Lotus and 

Future Steel Vehicle concepts. While these concepts do redesign body in whites in aluminum 

(Lotus- Toyota Venza) and AHSS (Future Steel Vehicle), EPA is releasing a new mass 

reduction/cost analyses which applies mass reduction ideas and materials already proven in high 

volume production vehicles to a Toyota Venza. The information contained in this project may 

address concerns by the Alliance in regards to CAE modeling with respect to advanced material 

simulations and material production readiness and applicability. Nissan stated that a midterm 

evaluation is critical to determine the extent to which the market accepts the additional costs 
EPA Response to Comments

13-24

associated with more advanced internal combustion vehicles. This issue will be part of the midterm evaluation. Volvo highly recommends that the midterm review evaluate safety in order to 

assure that the trend (of weight and size compatibilities/incompatibilities) is not in an 

unfavorable direction and that no other measures are warranted. The midterm review will 

consider these issues.

Volkswagen stated that the NPRM predicts for large cars and some trucks upwards of 

20% mass reduction potential. Volkswagen feels that this may exceed cost effective limits. The 

agencies’ basis for estimated costs of mass reduction actually appears to be conservative. As 

shown in joint TSD section 3, the detailed studies sponsored by the agencies suggest that 20% 

mass reduction is likely feasible for the rulemaking period using lightweighting materials and 

manufacturing technologies that have already been adopted in high volume vehicles. See joint 

TSD pp. 3-238 to 251. The accompanying detailed cost analysis in the joint TSD indicates that 

the cost of reducing mass by 20% can potentially be economical. See joint TSD section 3.3.5.5. 

The assumptions for mass reduction costs will be examined during the mid-term evaluation. 

The Alliance stated that “it is not sufficient to only consider regulatory and consumer 

information crash tests. A comprehensive evaluation of vehicle safety must also take into 

account real-world impact scenarios and the special requirements of vulnerable populations (e.g., 

children and elderly). These must also be adequately accounted for in any agency policy 

decisions.” Preamble II.G.5.c. states “With respect to NHTSA’s looking-ahead approach1 in 

assessing the feasible amount of mass reduction and the evaluation of concept vehicles, NHTSA 

does its best in the fleet simulation study to consider as many real world crash scenarios as 

possible. In the fleet simulation study, NHTSA is including risk functions for different 

populations. All of the crash results are weighted for their actual occurrence rates. As stated in 

NHTSA’s 2011-2013 research and rulemaking priority plan,1 the agency currently has programs 

looking into the areas of safety for vulnerable occupants. NHTSA will monitor the performance 

of these vulnerable occupants in the context of the changing fleet in response to the fuel 

economy program.”

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers expressed some concerns over how safety 

can be understood through CAE crash modeling due to modeling limitations compared to actual 

vehicle crash data. The mass reduction study funded by EPA (FEV/EDAG/Munro) showed the 

ability to achieve mass reduction through the vast majority use of production proven steel in the 

BIW, which is the main load bearing unit evaluated in the crash models. Discussion with FEV 

and EDAG revealed that there are differences between the CAE model and the actual vehicle 

crash results. However the differences are similar to those within vehicle to vehicle 

manufacturing differences. EDAG stated that the limitations from CAE modeling include 

material differences not modeled such as when metal is bent or cross thicknesses that may 

thinned in production, such as in sheet processing.

The Alliance continues to express concern over the modeling of potential future advanced 

materials in that “Further, significant uncertainties exist with respect to both manufacturing and 

CAE crash analysis of potential future advanced materials. CAE capabilities for some potential 

advanced materials that manufacturers are researching are far less mature than for materials 

currently in common use. Progress in these areas is highly competitive and therefore varies 

throughout the industry. As such, it will take considerable time and investment for each 
Vehicle Safety

13-25

manufacturer to develop this knowledge and experience. Because agency projections fail to 

adequately take into account the timing and cost for the introduction of advanced materials, these 

projections are likely overly optimistic.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.22] The 

materials to which the Alliance is referring in their comment in regards to CAE modeling are not 

stated. The agencies assume the materials that manufacturers will use in their BIW to reduce 

mass include HSS, AHSS, aluminum and limited magnesium and these materials have all been 

modeled. The extent of modeling for composites is unknown, however the use of composites in 

the BIW is still being researched with applications primarily only on some limited high end 

vehicles. 

As stated at Preamble II.G. 4, “The agencies continue to believe that reasonable 

conclusions regarding the safety implication of mass reduction can be drawn from CAE 

simulations. As ICCT stated in their comments, CAE simulations are powerful tools that have 

improved rapidly over the years in terms of their ability to optimize vehicle designs and predict 

material and vehicle behavior in real life. Use of these highly sophisticated CAE tools has 

become standard industry practice in helping to verify and validate designs before real parts and 

vehicles are built. As the Alliance stated, however, CAE capabilities for conventional materials, 

such as steel and aluminum, are more mature than those of advanced materials, such as 

magnesium and composites. Steel and aluminum are the major materials used in some of the 

studies, such as EPA’s and NHTSA’s light-weighting studies that determined that a baseline 

vehicle’s mass could be reduced by approximately 20 percent while maintaining safety 

comparable to the baseline vehicle.” In addition, “even though CAE tools are used heavily, the 

agencies acknowledge the concerns the Alliance raised in its comments about CAE capabilities 

for some potential advanced materials for crashworthiness, and have been mindful of this issue 

in developing our studies.” 

The Center for Biological Diversity expressed the opinion that “the agencies to require 

significant weight reduction among the vehicle fleet as part of its standards; failure to implement 

light-weighting across the fleet because of alleged safety concerns would be contrary to the 

evidence and arbitrary and capricious. These revisions must not simply lead to corrections in the 

text of the final rule, but also to significant increases in fuel efficiency standards in the final 

rulemaking.” Of course, the standards do not require use of any particular technology. 

Manufacturers are left to choose their own compliance paths (meeting all applicable federal 

safety standards in doing so). So the agencies cannot “require” manufacturers to adopt any 

particular compliance path. As described in detail in preamble section II.G, the agencies have 

carefully documented potential compliance paths which are safety neutral, and thus do not 

depend on significant mass reduction from vehicles weighing less than 3,106 pounds. 

The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) commented that “the results 

of these studies (Lotus and FEV) will be far more accurate of future designs and they must be 

used to assess the costs of weight reduction for the final rule.” EPA would have considered the 

use of the results of these studies if they were completed at the time of the analyses for the final 

rulemaking. Unfortunately only the draft reports were complete and the peer review responses 

had not yet been addressed nor the final report completed in time for inclusion of the results into 

the final rulemaking. These reports will be utilized in the midterm review for this rulemaking to 

consider the cost curve for mass reduction. 
EPA Response to Comments

13-26

A number of comments were received from companies and associations with information 

on light weight materials for use in automobiles. Commenters included the Aluminum 

Association, the American Chemistry Council, Bayer Material Science, SABIC Innovative 

Plastics, and the Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. These commenters provide information to 

support the expectations that plastics and other materials being designed today can be used to 

make a car lighter in weight, now and in the future. Plastics can be used for the closures, such 

as the tailgate, and various passenger compartment items such as dash boards and venting piping. 

The areas containing plastic that are exposed to loads typically have an underlying structure 

which is load bearing – such as in doors and dash boards. Composites are being designed in high 

end sports vehicles and are currently too expensive for a high production vehicle. The 

Aluminum Association states that they believe small vehicle designs will be developed using 

aluminum body and structural components that will achieve significant weight reduction while 

preserving vehicle size and improving safety performance. EPA agrees with the commenters 

that significant advancements have been made in lightweight material technologies, and these 

developments are likely to continue in the future. As discussed in chapter 3 of the Joint TSD, the 

agencies believe that manufacturers will be able to meet the MY2017-2025 GHG standards 

through a combination of efficiency technologies, without relying on a level of mass reduction 

that requires a dramatic shift to exotic light-weighting materials. Section 14 of the RTC 

addresses comments urging the agencies to adopt a life-cycle approach whereby manufacturing 

emissions would be considered along with tailpipe emissions to account for reduced GHG 

emissions from using advanced materials

13.3. Comments on NHTSA/EPA’s Statistical Analysis of Vehicle Safety 

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

DRI (filed its study: “Updated Analysis of the Effects of Passenger Vehicle Size and Weight 

on Safety” as the comments to the NPRM)

Wenzel, T.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The Alliance supports NHTSA’s intention to examine safety from the perspective of both the 

historical field crash data and the engineering analysis of potential future Advanced Materials 

Concept vehicles. NHTSA’s planned analysis rightly looks backward and forward. However, 

with respect to looking ahead and the evaluation of concept vehicles, the Alliance recognizes that 

it is not sufficient to only consider regulatory and consumer information crash tests. A 

comprehensive evaluation of vehicle safety must also take into account real-world impact 

scenarios and the special requirements of vulnerable populations (e.g., children and elderly). 

These must also be adequately accounted for in any agency policy decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.21]
Vehicle Safety

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Organization: American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)

Collision Injury Severity [Federal Register vol. 76, No. 231 Pg. 74949 et seq.]

However, the effects of mass reduction on a fleet basis, considering collisions of vehicles of 

unequal mass and of unequal footprint, have not been studied by AISI. We have examined the 

most recent study by C. J. Kahane15 (NHTSA), published in November 2011. The Kahane 

findings put a high value on maintaining vehicle footprint. Essentially, the Kahane report 

suggests that it would be more effective regarding injury performance to improve fuel economy 

throughout the fleet by reducing mass while maintaining vehicle size, or footprint. In our 

experience, this is understandable since vehicle collision performance is primarily influenced by 

crush space, the working distance between the point of impact and the passenger space. Steel 

structures are particularly effective in absorbing energy during a collision over the engineered 

crush space (or crumple zone). Preserving crush space in the design of crashworthy vehicles is 

therefore consistent with our findings in cases where AHSS structures are engineered into 

equivalent spaces previously occupied by heavier steel structures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9477-A1, p. 11]

If the Kahane findings on the importance of footprint prove to be true, new AHSS technology 

has already demonstrated its ability to reduce mass and maintain or improve test crashworthiness 

performance all within the same vehicle footprint. AISI notes the Kahane study does not dispute 

or overturn the inherent advantage of heavier vehicles in collisions of vehicles of the same or 

differing footprints. The study only suggests that if a change is made in a vehicle in order to 

achieve higher fuel economy, it is better to reduce mass for the same footprint rather than 

making the vehicle smaller. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 11]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 103-104.]

I think in general with regard to safety, we have done quite a bit of research over the last 10 or 15 

years in the steel industry. We have proven beyond a doubt that it's very possible to use lighter 

structures and achieve equivalent test performance on safety.

I think that the new Kahane report is very interesting -- we're still analyzing it, by the way -- and 

the vehicle-to-vehicle situation is a different story. But I think that in general we don't have any 

objections to the initial conclusions that were drawn in that study, which really points out the 

importance of the footprint methodology in defining, you know, your basic vehicle structure.

So, again, steel provides with its high strength varieties the opportunity to reduce the mass in a 

given footprint, which I think is critically important as suggested in that Kahane study as being 

probably the primary factor in determining how effectively we can design vehicles to be safe in 

collisions within the fleet among different size vehicles.
EPA Response to Comments

13-28

So without changing the laws of physics, I think that this regulation should not have a serious 

impact on the progress that we're making now on the safety of vehicles on the road.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

3. The use of advanced lightweight materials in smaller cars - or in any vehicle - will not 

increase fatalities. Analyses by DRI suggest Kahane's results are not robust, likely due to 

improperly controlled driver, vehicle, environment or accident factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 2]

Once these factors are appropriately controlled, the effect of weight reduction on fatalities may 

not be statistically significant. More importantly, high-strength steel and aluminum have better 

crash properties than the conventional steel used in most vehicles in the historical analysis and 

their use will reduce fatalities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

3) Safety

The ICCT appreciates the much improved modeling of safety by NHTSA, in particular the 

separation of the impacts of size and weight and the inclusion of non-sporty 2-door cars in the 

analyses. This has addressed many of our comments on safety in response to the 20122016 

proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 9]

Despite the improvements, the latest Kahane study, referenced in the proposed rule, still finds 

that reducing the weight of smaller cars leads to increased fatalities. This issue is important, as 

the proposed rule assumed that small cars will have zero weight reduction due to the concern 

with potential fatality increases. The ICCT believes that this increase in fatalities is an artifact of 

the methodology used by Kahane and that weight reduction using lightweight materials and 

better vehicle design will reduce fatalities for vehicles of all sizes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 9]

Dynamic Research Inc. (DRI) recently completed a Phase 2 report 4 focused on replicating 

Kahane's results with the updated 2000-2007 data. They were able to match Kahane's results 

very closely, indicating that they were able to closely duplicate Kahane's methods and data. The 

Phase 2 report also conducted analyses using DRI's two-stage method, which separates the 

fatality impacts into the number of accidents per exposure and the number of fatalities per 

accident. The two-stage results for lighter passenger vehicles, included in Table 1, below, 

indicate that the increase in fatalities for lighter vehicles is entirely due to an increase in the 

number of accidents per exposure. The crashworthiness and crash compatibility of the smaller 

cars did not contribute to the fatality increase. [Table 1 can be found on p. 10 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 9-10]

These counter-intuitive results strong suggest that Kahane's methodology has some driver, 

vehicle, environment or accident factors that have not been controlled for in the current analyses. 
Vehicle Safety

13-29

Lighter vehicles have theoretical advantages in handling and braking and should be involved in 

slightly few accidents, not more accidents. From a theoretical view, any increase in fatalities 

should be due to compatibility issues in crashes with larger vehicles, yet the results do not show 

any increase in the rate of fatalities once a crash occurs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 

10]

DRI also issued a supplemental report,5 which discussed in further detail two key assumptions 

used in the Kahane report and two alternative assumptions. First, Kahane assumed that the 

effects of vehicle weight and size can be best modeled using curb weight and footprint. DRI 

believes it is more appropriate to model weight and size using curb weight, wheelbase, and track 

width. Wheelbase and track width have different effects on vehicle crashworthiness, crash 

compatibility, and crash avoidance. These effects are confounded when a single 'footprint' index 

is used. DRI also found that using footprint and weight had more multi-collinearly than using 

wheelbase, track width, and weight. As indicated in Table 2, below, the use of wheelbase and 

track width reduced the number of fatalities associated with weight reduction and the coefficients 

for all of the vehicle classes are not statistically significant. [Table 2 can be found on p. 11 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 

10]

Second, Kahane assumed that the crash exposure is best represented by non-culpable vehicle 

induced-exposure data. While there are valid reasons supporting the use of non-culpable vehicle 

induced-exposure data, the DRI report discussed the reasons why it may be better to represent 

crash exposure using stopped vehicle induced-exposure data: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, pp. 10-11]

'Non-culpable vehicle induced-exposure data can include crashes where the nonculpable vehicle 

was moving prior to the crash. Therefore some drivers may be more likely to be involved in 

these crashes than other drivers, even if the driver is not culpable in the crash. This is because 

some drivers may be better able to avoid a crash in which they are not culpable than are other 

drivers, due to driver skill, driver alertness and/or ability to properly react in time to avoid a 

collision. Therefore this under-representation in the non-culpable induced-exposure data of good 

drivers, and over representation of bad drivers, is undesirable and may introduce a numerical bias 

in the results.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 11]

While the necessary data for evaluating the impacts of wheelbase and track width are in the 

updated 2000-2007 database, DRI does not yet have stopped-vehicle induced exposure data for 

the new dataset. Thus, DRI's supplemental report provides a rough evaluation based on the 

differences that DRI observed in the Phase I regression results using the older data. Assuming 

that the correlation in the induced exposure estimates in the new dataset will be similar to the 

correlation in the older data, Table 2 also shows that use of stopped vehicles for inducedexposure data creates a statistically significant reduction in fatalities for weight reduction in 

larger light trucks and an insignificant increase for the other vehicle classes using footprint and 

an insignificant decrease in fatalities for the other vehicle classes using wheelbase and track 

width. [Table 2 can be found on p. 11 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 11]
EPA Response to Comments

13-30

DRI's results strongly indicate that the fatality increase seen on smaller cars in Kahane's analysis 

is not robust and is likely due to improperly controlled driver, vehicle, environment or accident

factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 11]

Further improvements in Kahane's methodology would likely correct the artificial increase in 

fatalities for reducing the weight of smaller cars and, in any case, high-strength steel and 

aluminum have better crash properties than the conventional steel used in most vehicles in the 

historical analysis. Thus, there is no basis to support the idea that using advanced lightweight 

materials in smaller cars - indeed in any vehicle - will increase fatalities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 13]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 195-196.]

I will just make two quick observations. First, every time Kahane reanalyzes the impact of mass 

reduction on fatalities, the fatality increase goes down. More importantly, the coefficients in 

Kahane's modeling reflects the material composition in historical vehicles. This is dominated by 

conventional steel. This modeling implicitly assumes that lighter vehicles do not change material 

composition. However, future weight reduction will be accomplished primarily with use of highstrength steel and aluminum, both of which have better crash properties than the standard steel. 

Their use will improve vehicle crash performance and reduce fatalities, even in small cars. In 

fact, Honda has moved aggressively towards the use of high strength steel in small cars, in part 

due to the safety benefits.

4 DRI, UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF PASSENGER VEHICLE SIZE AND 

WEIGHT ON SAFETY, PHASE II: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS BASED ON 2002 TO 2008 

CALENDAR YEAR DATA FOR 2000 TO 2007 MODEL YEAR LIGHT PASSENGER 

VEHICLES, Volume I: Technical Report DRI-TR-12-01, R. M. Van Auken J. W. Zellner,

January 2012 [This footnote refers to Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9364-A1]

5 Updated Analysis of the Effects of Passenger Vehicle Size and Weight on Safety: 

Supplemental Results on the Sensitivity of the Estimates for 2002 to 2008 Calendar Year Data 

for 2000 to 2007 Model Year Light Passenger Vehicles to Induced-Exposure Data and Vehicle 

Size Variables. DRI-TM-12-09. R. M. Van Auken J. W. Zellner. February 2012 [This footnote 

refers to Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9365-A2]

6 'Honda Civic Captures AISI Great Designs in Steel Automotive Excellence Award', 

http://www.theautochannel.com/news/2008/04/09/083742.html

7 2006 Honda Civic Body, Advanced Personal Compact with ACE Body Structure, 2006 Honda 

Civic Press Information.

8 Edwards, M., Happian-Smith, J., Davies, H., Byard, N., and Hobbs, A., 'The Essential 

Requirements for Compatible Cars in Frontal Collisions (158)', Proceedings of the 17th 
Vehicle Safety

13-31

International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Amsterdam, the 

Netherlands, 2001.

9 Faerber, E., 'EEVC Research in the Filed of Improvement of Crash Compatibility between 

Passenger Cars (444)', Proceedings ofthe 17th International Technical Conference on the 

Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2001.

10 Delannoy, P. and Faure, J., 'Compatibility Assessment Proposal Close from Real Life 

Accident (94)', Proceedings of the 18th International Technical Conference on the Enhanced 

Safety of Vehicles, Nagoya, Japan, 2003.

Organization: Wenzel, T.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 193-197.]

I'm a Research Scientist at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. I appreciate the opportunity 

to provide comments on the NPRM for this joint rulemaking today. My comments today are 

mine alone, and I do not represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Berkeley 

Lab, or the University of California.

For the last two years I have been under contract with DOE to assist NHTSA and EPA in their 

analysis of the effect of vehicle mass reduction on safety.

My work has resulted in two studies: an assessment of NHTSA's 2011 regression analysis of 

U.S. fatality risk per vehicle mile traveled (or VMT), and my own regression analysis of casualty 

risk per police-reported crash. All three of these studies are available in the public docket with 

this rulemaking.

My studies agree with NHTSA's conclusion, that the effect of mass reduction on U.S. fatality 

risk is small and is statistically significant only for lighter-than-average cars.

For lighter-than-average cars, the regression models suggest that a 100-pound reduction in mass 

would increase U.S. fatalities per vehicle mile traveled by less than 2%.

These results are much smaller than those NHTSA estimated in earlier studies in 1998 and 2003. 

Other variables that NHTSA included in their regression models have a larger effect on fatality 

risk than a reduction in vehicle mass.

My analysis by vehicle model indicates that on average, U.S. fatality risk does tend to increase as 

vehicle mass decreases, except for full-size pickups; societal risk actually decreases as full-size 

pickups get heavier. This is because of the high risk that full-size pickups impose on drivers of 

other vehicles.
EPA Response to Comments

13-32

Although risk increases as mass decreases for other types of vehicles, there is very little 

correlation between risk and mass for individual vehicle models, even after accounting for 

differences in other vehicle attributes, driver age and gender, and crash times and locations.

Police-reported crashes can be used to estimate four types of risk: fatality and casualty risk, 

either per vehicle mile traveled or per crash. Casualty risk includes fatalities plus serious or 

incapacitating injuries.

My analysis found comparable results in terms of casualty risk per crash to those from NHTSA's 

analysis of fatality risk per VMT; in most cases, mass reduction resulted in an even lower effect 

on risk in my analysis than in NHTSA's analysis.

I isolated the two components of fatality risk per VMT: the number of crashes per VMT (or 

crash frequency), and fatality risk per crash (or crashworthiness).

Crash frequency consistently increases as vehicles get lighter for all types of vehicles. However, 

mass reduction has only a small effect on fatality risk once a crash has occurred.

In conclusion, the three new analyses suggest the effect of mass reduction on risk is much 

smaller than NHTSA previously estimated and statistically significant only for lighter-thanaverage cars.

The agencies should keep in mind that the regression models in the three analyses are not exactly 

estimating the effect of mass reduction on risk; rather, they are estimating the recent historic 

relationship between mass and risk after accounting for most measurable differences between 

vehicles, drivers, and crash times.

In essence, the models are comparing the risk of a 2600-pound Dodge Neon with that of a 2500-

pound Honda Civic after attempting to account for all other differences between the two 

vehicles. The models are not estimating the effect of literally removing 100 pounds from the 

Neon.

Reduced mass does not inherently decrease vehicle safety; it all depends on where and how the 

mass is reduced; in short, how mass production is incorporated into the overall vehicle design.

Finally, the agencies should recognize that the results of the three new studies are based on 

relationship of vehicle mass and footprint on risk for recent vehicle designs. These relationships 

may or may not continue into the future as manufacturers utilize new vehicle designs and 

incorporate new technologies, such as more extensive use of strong, lightweight materials and 

specific safety technologies.

Response:

The principal response to these comments is found in section II.G.2 and 3 of the 

preamble to the final rule. We supplement those responses briefly here. These comments are 

from (1) Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, (2) American Iron and Steel Institute, (3) DRI, 
Vehicle Safety

13-33

(4) ICCT, (5) Wenzel, T., DRI and Wenzel’s comments are discussed in detail in II. G. 3. h & g 

of the preamble. 

More specifically, ICCT questioned NHTSA’s estimated fatality increase for the weight 

reduction on small cars. ICCT believes that this increase in fatalities is an artifact of the 

methodology used by Kahane and that weight reduction using lightweight materials and better 

vehicle design will reduce fatalities for vehicles of all sizes. EPA has looked closely at the 

issues, and discerns a historical relationship between vehicle mass, size, and safety, including 

small cars, by most recent safety statistical analysis of historical crash data presented at Preamble 

II.G.3. As stated in the preamble (II G.3.i), “the agencies expect that the attribute-based 

standards will likely facilitate the design of vehicles such that manufacturers may reduce mass 

while maintaining footprint. Therefore, it is possible that the analysis for MYs 2000-2007 

vehicles may not be fully representative of the vehicles that will be on the road in 2017 and 

beyond.”

As also stated at the preamble, “we recognize that statistical analysis of historical crash 

data may not be the only way to think about the future relationship between vehicle mass and 

safety. However, we recognize that other assessment methods are also subject to uncertainties, 

which makes statistical analysis of historical data an important starting point if employed 

mindfully and recognized for how it can be useful and what its limitations may be.” 

In addition, we believe that we should assess the safety effect on weight reduction by 

two approaches. One is the statistical analyses approach on historical data to assess societal 

safety effects. Another is the engineering study approach to assess the ability of individual 

designs and new material to comply with the FMVSS, and perform well on NCAP and IIHS 

tests. 

DRI filed its new study: “UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF PASSENGER 

VEHICLE SIZE AND WEIGHT ON SAFETY” as comments to the NPRM. Results of DRI 

study have been briefly summarized at Preamble II.G.3.g. In the Supplemental report, DRI 

discussed in further detail two previous key assumptions that were used in the Kahane (2011), 

Wenzel (2011b), and DRI (2012b) reports, and describes two alternative assumptions. The 

previous key assumptions were that the effects of vehicle weight and size can be best modeled by 

curb weight and footprint; and that the crash exposure is best represented by non-culpable 

vehicle induced-exposure data. The alternative assumptions are that the weight and size can be 

best modeled by curb weight, wheelbase, and track width; and that the crash exposure is best 

represented by stopped-vehicle induced-exposure data (because non-culpable vehicle data may 

under-represent vehicles and drivers that are better at avoiding crashes, even if they would have 

been non-culpable in those crashes). With alternative assumptions, DRI found that estimated 

fatality risk due to weight reduction is much smaller than NHTSA’s results. The agencies 

acknowledge these recommendations, and we believe that significant difference between the 

studies should be closely examined. EPA facilitated technical communications between DRI and 

NHTSA. In response to the comments, NHTSA has implemented additional sensitivity analysis. 

The general results of the sensitivity analysis are presented at Preamble II.G. 3. h. The agencies 

concluded that the difference by DRI’s recommendation was within the range of the confidence 

interval of the estimates, and NHTSA’s primary results should be used for the relationship 

between mass and safety. 
EPA Response to Comments

13-34

In his comment, Wenzel points out that although his study agrees with NHTSA’s 

conclusion, “there is very little correlation between risk and mass for individual vehicle models, 

even after accounting for differences in other vehicle attributes, driver age and gender, and crash 

time and location”. In more detail, Wenzel’s Phase 1 and Phase 2 reports show that when 

fatality or casualty rates are aggregated at the make-model level, differences between the models 

“overwhelm” the effect of mass. Likewise, in the basic regression analyses, the effects of many 

control variables are much stronger than the effect of mass. EPA acknowledges Wenzel’s results 

and believes that Wenzel’s findings are important, and it provides a relative comparison in 

evaluating risk factors between mass and other variables used in the regression. NHTSA 

indicates it does not dispute the validity of these analyses or disagree with these findings. 

However, as it stated at Preamble II G. 3.h, NHTSA believes these results must not be 

misinterpreted. Specifically, it would be wrong to conclude that the effect of mass reduction 

should not be estimated at all because other ambient effects are considerably stronger. 
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-1

14. Treatment of Life-Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle 

Manufacturing

Organizations Included in this Section

Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

American Chemistry Council (ACC)

American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)

Center for Sustainable Systems, University of Michigan

Kendall, A.

Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

United States Steel Corporation

United Steel Workers (USW)

World Resources Institute (WRI)

World Steel Association

WorldAutoSteel

Organization: Aluminum Association's Aluminum Transportation Group

Support for the Revision of Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009 on CO2 Emissions from Cars

In our comments to the NOI on this rulemaking in October 2010, we noted the agencies’ attempt 

to examine the life cycle costs of owning and operating a vehicle in conjunction with the costs 

and benefits of increasing CAFE standards. Since that time, a new life cycle analysis 

commissioned by the European Union has concluded that improvements in the use phase of 

vehicles are found to more than outweigh additional emissions from the manufacturing phase. 

More specifically: [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 3]

“Changes in vehicle technologies not only affect the CO2 emissions in the use phase, but many 

also lead to changes in the GHG emissions occurring in other stages of the vehicle’s life cycle, 

specifically the manufacturing of materials and components, vehicle manufacturing and vehicle 

disposal and recycling. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 3]

For the CO2-reducing technologies that are expected to be applied to conventional vehicles in 

response to CO2 legislation the emission improvements in the use phase are found to more than 

outweigh additional emissions from the manufacturing phase. Application of light weight 

materials is found not to increase CO2 emissions from vehicle production.” [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0226-A1, p. 3]

A copy of this quoted portion of the analysis is attached as Attachment C [see Docket 

number NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A3]. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 3]

Life Cycle Assessment Study – Magnesium Front End Research Development
EPA Response to Comments

14-2

A 2010 life cycle CO2 study by the Magnesium Front End Research Development (MFRED) 

project found that aluminum has the smallest overall carbon footprint for total life cycle 

emissions compared to competing materials including steel. A copy of the complete MFRED 

project is attached to these comments as D [see Docket number NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A6]. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 3]

We obviously were pleased to see in the agencies’ Draft Environmental Impact Statement that 

the agencies agree with the above conclusions, as evidenced in the statement from the 

conclusions section of that document: [NHTSA-2010-0131-0226-A1, p. 3]

“Aluminum and high-strength steel material substitution are both effective at reducing life-cycle 

energy use and GHG Emissions (i.e. the increased energy use and GHG emissions at the vehicle 

production stage are offset by the use-phase savings over the vehicle life).” [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0226-A1, p. 3]

Organization: American Chemistry Council (ACC)

(6) The focus of the rulemaking is properly on tailpipe emissions during vehicle use phase.

ACC strongly supports the use and evaluation of well-developed, comprehensive, and complete 

life cycle analysis tools for materials and products consistent with International Organization for 

Standardization (ISO) Life Cycle Assessment standards. That said, the primary purpose of this 

rulemaking is directed at federal greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards, and NHTSA must 

develop its standards in accordance with Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) criteria. 

These criteria do not directly include life cycle considerations of the materials used in 

automobile construction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, p.6]

We believe the agencies’ focus in this rulemaking – on increasing vehicle fuel economy and 

tailpipe emissions as a source of greenhouse gas emissions – is well supported by statutory 

imperatives, and also prudent. As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notes, mobile 

sources emitted (through tailpipe emissions) 31 percent of all U.S. GHG emissions in 2007 and 

have been the fastest-growing source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions since 1990.27 Certainly 

other phases of the product life of an automobile contribute GHG emissions, from materials 

manufacture, to employees commuting to the auto manufacturing job site, to container, rail and 

road shipment of vehicles after their manufacture, and so forth. But emissions during these other 

phases are nonetheless a fraction of GHG emissions during the operational or use phase of a 

vehicle,28 and the use phase of the vehicle is responsible for emissions of 80-90 percent of life 

cycle GHGs.29 LCA data consistently demonstrates that GHG savings in the use phase from 

using plastics to reduce weight in transportation (e.g., reducing shipping weight of goods, or 

weight of the vehicle used to transport people or goods) significantly outweigh GHG creation in 

other phases of the life cycle. A report comparing two LCA approaches and considering both a 

plastic fuel tank and a steel fuel tank, for example, confirms the fundamental observation 

relevant to automobiles – that “use phase impacts dominate total life-cycle energy use and lifecycle conventional pollutant emissions.”30 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9517-A2, pp.6-7]
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-3

Regulatory measures addressing reduction of emissions during vehicle use phase are thus the 

most effective way to reduce GHGs.31 Some have argued that material-based Life Cycle 

Analysis (LCA) should be considered, but it does not factor into the rulemaking here. Further, 

this type of rulemaking is not an appropriate place to apply LCA because of the lack of 

consensus regarding how to calculate inputs and outputs in an LCA evaluation at this time. With 

respect to any future policy changes, the use of LCA can play a role, but should be evaluated 

carefully. LCA is very useful tool, but it cannot itself be dispositive of public policy, a 

fundamental point for future consideration, in part because it may inadequately address human 

preferences and behavior (e.g., auto selection, operation, length of ownership, and other factors); 

costs, job creation, and other issues important to sound policy development. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9517-A2, p.7]

28 See, e.g., C. Samara and K. Meisterling, “Life Cycle Assessment of Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions from Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles: Implications for Policy,” Environ. Sci. Technol., 2008, 

42 (9), 3170-3176, available at 

http://solar.gwu.edu/index_files/Resources_files/LCA_for_PHEVs.pdf (“The majority of vehicle 

life cycle energy use and GHG emissions result from powering the vehicle with liquid fuel or 

electricity.”)

29 WorldAutoSteel, Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emission Assessments of Automotive 

Materials: The Example of Mild Steel, Advanced High Strength Steel and Aluminum in Body in 

White Applications, December 7, 2007, http://www.worldautosteel.org/Projects/LCAStudy/UCSB-LCA-Study.aspx

30 S. Joshi, “Product Environmental Life-Cycle Assessment Using Input-Output Techniques,” 3 

Journal of Industrial Ecology 2&3, 2000, https://www.msu.edu/~satisJIE%20article-joshipublished.pdf

31 See M. V. Chester and A. Horvath, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 

University of California, “Environmental assessment of passenger transportation should include 

infrastructure and supply chains,” Environ. Res. Lett. 4 (2009), (“The dominant contributions to 

energy consumption and GHG emissions for onroad and air modes are from operational 

components. This suggests that technological advancements to improve fuel economy and 

switches to lower fossil carbon fuels are the most effective for improving environmental 

performance.”)

Organization: American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI)

Requested Action

AISI argues below, based on referenced studies from around the world, that future vehicle 

regulations should be based on life-cycle emissions in order to ensure a net reduction in 

emissions from light-duty vehicles. To accomplish this, considerable collaboration is necessary 

among car companies, regulators and suppliers to establish the methodology for fairly 
EPA Response to Comments

14-4

accounting for life cycle emissions in vehicle regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, 

p. 1]

The steel industry recommends the formation of an advisory committee among EPA, NHTSA, 

automakers and suppliers to address this important challenge in time for the 2018 mid-term 

review with the goal of incorporating life cycle emissions into vehicle regulations for model 

years 2022-2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 2]

Accordingly, we suggest 40 CFR sec 86.1818-12 be amended as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9477-A1, p. 2]

(1) Strike “and” in clause (h)(1)(vii) and insert after clause (h)(1)(vii) the following: “(viii) The 

Life-cycle Assessment Report required in paragraph (i) of this subsection; and”

(2) Strike “and” in clause (h)(2)(iii) and insert after clause (h)(2)(iii) the following: “(iv) The 

Life-cycle Assessment Report required in paragraph (i) of this subsection; and”

(3) Insert after subparagraph (h)(3) the following:

“(4) No later than November 15, 2017, the Administrator shall issue a draft assessment of the 

Life-cycle Assessment Report addressing all issues relevant to the inclusion of a materials lifecycle metric in standards for the 2022 through 2025 model years.”

(4) Insert after paragraph (h) the following new paragraph:

“(i) Life-cycle Assessment Report. “No later than 1 year following the publication of this 

regulation in the Federal Register, the Administrator shall establish an advisory committee to 

evaluate current scientific and technical information regarding life-cycle assessment of the 

greenhouse gas emissions of materials used in the construction of motor vehicles. The advisory 

committee shall consist of representatives from the Environmental Protection Agency, the 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, automakers, suppliers to automakers and other 

qualified individuals with expertise in life-cycle assessment and materials used in motor 

vehicles. The advisory committee shall be required to issue a report by December 31, 2016. The 

report shall:

“(1) Address how the life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of various materials used or planned 

for use in the construction of motor vehicles can be practically quantified.

“(2) Describe appropriate calculations and data sources that can be used to determine the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of various materials; and

“(3) Propose how a materials life-cycle metric can be incorporated within standards for motor 

vehicles in model years 2022-2025.” 

Life-cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-5

Studies at many universities including research by Roland Geyer at the University of California 

at Santa Barbara1 (UCSB) and by Gregory Keoleian at the University of Michigan2 have 

validated the use life cycle assessment (LCA) principles in determining the true impact of 

vehicles on total greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 4]

Building on this base, further LCA case studies compiled by Geyer at UCSB (Sun to Wheels 

Study3) and Ricardo (Preparing for a Life Cycle CO2 Measure4) show that such materials and 

manufacturing-related emissions are likely to grow from 15% of total emissions (today) to 50% 

or more by 2020 as vehicles become more fuel efficient. A tailpipe-only rule which ignores 15% 

of total emissions (today’s situation) is much less problematic than one that ignores 50%. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 4]

This scenario was specifically examined by Alissa Kendall at University of California at Davis5

(UC-Davis). Dr. Kendall examined the consequences of continuing to apply tailpipe-only (that 

is, driving cycle only) regulations and excluding some of the critical other sources of GHG 

emissions such as occur during materials manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, 

p. 4]

A specific example given in the UC Davis study shows the potential consequences of continuing 

tailpipe-only regulations, i.e., that total vehicle emissions may increase. Kendall’s evaluation of a 

modeled future Toyota Venza6 showed how emissions from the use of low density materials, as 

labeled in Figure 1 [See Figure 1, Comparison by Kendall of Vehicle Life cycle GHG Emissions 

from Lotus Study of Toyota Venza, at docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 

5.], can account for about 40% (17.3 mt CO2 eq /43.8 mt CO2 eq) of total emissions (lowest bar, 

11 year life, in Figure 1). Also, it is clear that total emissions for the AHSS version for both 11 

year and 16 year life spans are lowest. In this example, differences in materials emissions 

outweigh differences in driving emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 4]

While the importance of life-cycle emissions in future vehicles has been clear in AISI case 

studies, UC Davis examples, and other academic research, it is important to note other 

organizations, such as Ricardo, mentioned above, Toyota7, Mercedes and domestic original 

equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are using LCA as an important tool to understand and manage 

all aspects of vehicle-related emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 5]

One objection often raised regarding the use of life cycle principles in regulations is the 

perceived complexity. This is a concern to car manufacturers because of the large number of 

parts used to manufacture vehicles and the large number of suppliers in the supply chain. While 

specific details must be worked out, research by Kendall suggests that a bill-of-materials (BOM) 

approach, much like that used by Mercedes8 in its LCA calculations and development of 

Environmental Certificates for its vehicles, represents a simple approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9477-A1, p. 5] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 5]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 90-92.]
EPA Response to Comments

14-6

A schematic of the process for using the BOM for LCA calculations in a vehicle is provided in 

Figure 2. [See Figure 2 at docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 6]

The flow diagram in Figure 2 could establish a life cycle emissions reference point based on 

vehicle footprint by: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 6]

1. Starting with 2018 vehicles of specific footprints and determining use-phase emissions in the 

current, tailpipe method, then expanding the approach by acquiring BOM data for the same 

vehicles.

2. Translating the BOM into life cycle emissions using Argonne National Lab’s GREET model, 

or equivalent and using Oak Ridge National Lab’s “Transportation Energy Data Book,” or 

equivalent, for vehicle lifetime miles, a critical input to the GREET life cycle emissions 

calculation.

3. Using known CO2e equations to establish a footprint-based reference for 2022 vehicles by 

adding the materials-related life cycle emissions to the use-phase emissions, creating a realistic 

total emissions limit. This is shown in Figure 3. [See Figure 3 at docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 7]

In the example above, the line entitled “2022 LCA reference” represents a “shift up” of the car 

curves to account for life cycle emissions using existing BOM data. Please note this is one 

approach and is intended to show only the feasibility of life cycle based regulations. It is likely 

that other methods may be possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 7]

LCA methods are the most straightforward way to account for total emissions. Life cycle 

emission data exist today for automotive materials as do models for calculating life cycle 

emissions of vehicles; this is vitally important as materials will carry with them their emissions 

factors just as they do their strength, density, thickness, etc. The important task is to consider 

how these data and models can be used in future regulations and to use the time available 

between now and the proposed 2018 mid-term review to prepare regulations which will ensure a 

net reduction in emissions from light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 7]

In summary, AISI emphasizes the following points.

1. As vehicles become more fuel efficient, materials manufacturing emissions will become an 

increasingly larger contributor to total life cycle emissions to the point they cannot be ignored. 

Many studies indicate this will begin to occur around 2020.

2. A continued focus on tailpipe-only regulations may lead to an increase in total emissions from 

light-duty vehicles

3. LCA principles and materials life cycle data are well known and should allow regulators to 

introduce life-cycle emissions-based regulations by the time such regulations are needed, around 

2022. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9477-A1, p. 8]
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-7

1 Comparative LCA Model, Roland Geyer, UCSB (download from 

http://www.worldautosteel.org/Projects/LCA-Study/2010-UCSB-model.aspx )

2 Various reports on use of LCA methodology, University of Michigan, Center for Sustainable 

Systems, Greg Keoleian,( download from http://css.snre.umich.edu/publications/all )

3 Photovoltaics Offer Low-Carbon Sun-to-Wheels Transportation without Energy Sprawl, 

Roland Geyer and David Stoms (UCSB Bren School) and James Kallos (Norwegian University 

of Science and Technology, November 4, 2010, (download from 

http://lcacenter.org/lcax/presentations-final/172.pdf )

4 Preparing for a Life Cycle CO2 Measure, A Ricardo Engineering Report released by Low 

Carbon Vehicle Partnership, August 25, 2011 (download from http://www.lowcvp.org.uk

5 Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Passenger Vehicles – The Policy Context, 

Alissa Kendall, Ph. D., and Lindsay Price, University of California, Davis, December 30, 2011

6 An Assessment of Mass Reduction Opportunities for a 2017-2020 Model Year Vehicle 

Program, Lotus Engineering Inc., The International Council on Clean Transportation. (2010)

7 Steps Towards Sustainable Mobility, Bill Reinert, Toyota Motor Sales, May 7, 2007, 

(download from http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDBdownload. 

php?command=download&id=1345.

8 Environmental Certificate Mercedes Benz C-Class http://www.daimler.com/dccom/0-5-

1312394-1-1312442-1-0-0-0-0-0-16158-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0.html

Organization: Center for Sustainable Systems, University of Michigan

Due to the various sources of GHG emissions from electrified vehicles, we feel that a life-cycle 

approach should be considered in order to best evaluate and set standards for all vehicle 

technologies. This is particularly important for EVs since the GHG emissions are upstream, 

while the majority of the emissions for CVs is due to combustion of fuel during vehicle 

operation. A life-cycle approach, to evaluating vehicle emissions, would fully account for 

emission sources due to upstream, vehicle operation and vehicle production life-cycle phases. 

Furthermore, lifecycle analysis would allow for analogous comparisons between vehicle 

technologies to ensure that the overall light-duty vehicle GHG emission reductions are realized. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9493-A1, p.2]

Regional variation in GHG intensity of electricity, as pointed out in Section III-C-2 of the 

proposed 2017-2025 rule, is also an important consideration which should be addressed in 

vehicle standards. As part of the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center for Clean Vehicles, 

we have conducted research on the total life-cycle GHG emissions from conventional and 

electrified vehicles using a total vehicle life-cycle (or cradle-to-grave) approach, the results of 
EPA Response to Comments

14-8

which are currently in review.3 Our analysis of a representative midsize plug-in hybrid vehicle 

has shown that there is over a 100 gram per mile GHG emissions variation between vehicles 

charged in the lowest and highest GHG intensive North American Electric Reliability Council 

(NERC) regions (based on an assumption of 63.5% utilization of electric mode). Our analysis 

showed that the Midwest Reliability Council and Southwest Power Pool North American 

Reliability Council (NERC) regions showed higher life-cycle GHG emissions in electric mode 

than for gasoline mode. Our results further showed that this difference is even greater for a 

representative battery electric vehicle, with a difference of over 150 life-cycle GHG grams per 

mile. These results highlight the importance of a life-cycle approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9493-A1, p.2]

We recognize the difficulty in instituting a life-cycle framework into the proposed GHG 

standards since this type of analysis has not been applied to vehicle standards in past rules. To 

account for the difficulty in incorporating all vehicle life-cycle stages in the standards we 

recommend incorporating life-cycle stages as reliable data and methodology becomes available. 

For instance, data on the upstream GHG emissions from electric power plants is available from 

sources such as EPA’s eGrid database.4 Vehicle production life-cycle data for specific vehicles 

is less established, although frameworks such as Argonne National Laboratory’s GREET Vehicle 

Cycle model, do exist.5 By adding in these other emission sources, which result from a 

significant portion of vehicle emissions shifting upstream, an inclusive approach will result in a 

more complete and robust standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9493-A1, p.2]

Since the contribution of GHG emissions to climate change is the same regardless of the source 

location, we feel that only a complete vehicle life-cycle regulatory approach will result in the 

necessary emissions reductions from the U.S. vehicle fleet. We would be pleased to provide 

more detail regarding our recent analysis of life-cycle GHG emissions for electrified vehicles. 

Please contact Dr. Keoleian by email at gregak@umich.edu or by phone at 734-764-3194. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9493-A1, pp.2-3]

3 - MacPherson, N. D., Keoleian, G. A., Kelly, J. C. (2012). 'Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions Labeling for Plug in Hybrid Vehicles from a Life Cycle Perspective.' Journal of 

Industrial Ecology. In review.

4 - EPA. (2011). “eGRID 2010.” EPA.

5 - Wang, M. (2007). GREET 2, Version 2.7, Argonne National Laboratory.

Organization: Kendall, A.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 166-170.]
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-9

I hope my comments today will demonstrate that the EPA should continue advancing research by 

extending its scope of analysis from the tailpipes to the life cycle, including upstream impacts of 

materials and vehicle technology.

Previous life cycle assessments of passenger vehicles estimated use-phase emissions constitute 

85 to 95 percent of life cycle greenhouse gas emissions. So standards that address fossil fuel 

consumption through fuel economy standards or CO2 from the tailpipe have functioned to 

successfully limit or reduce life cycle emissions and will probably do so in the near future as 

well.

However, two trends suggest that tailpipe-only standards could miss important tradeoffs in 

technology and design decisions in the future. The first trend is that many technologies that 

reduce greenhouse gas emissions during operation increase emissions during production. This 

has been shown for advanced materials used in mass production and also electric power train. 

The second trend is that when we use reduced greenhouse gas emissions during vehicle use, the 

relative importance of production-related emissions increases. These trends have been 

highlighted previously including in the NHTSA draft Environmental Impact Statement and a 

recent CARB report for their advanced Clean Cars program.

EPA's greenhouse gas emission standards and NHTSA'S CAFE standard are performance-based, 

allowing for flexibility in how vehicle producers achieve compliance. They can select from an 

enormous range of technologies and innovations, each of which have unique upstream burdens 

associated with them. This means that among future vehicles, there may be significant 

differences in upstream emissions. And if upstream emissions are significant enough, there's a 

potential for vehicles with lower tailpipe emissions but higher life cycle emissions to be favored.

We undertook research to address these issues. The research was funded by the AISI and the 

World Auto Steel organization and with additional support from U.C. Davis, the U.C. Davis 

Institute of Transportation Studies. A summary of our research and findings is currently 

undergoing peer review in a scholarly journal.

Using a case study approach, we undertook a streamlined LCA for a future vehicle and tested 

whether tailpipe-only standards could result in the preference for vehicles with lower use-phase 

emissions but higher life cycle emissions. We used a vehicle designed -- developed in Lotus 

Engineering 2010 report, a model year 2020 [sic] Toyota Venza. Lotus redesigned the Venza for 

improved fuel economy while meeting predefined cost constraints and targets for equivalent 

consumer performance. They did this through light-weighting and power train actions such as 

hybridization. The high-development vehicle described in Lotus's report was the basis for our 

model.

To perform the LCA, we connected the bill of materials generated by computer-aided 

engineering software to life cycle inventory data. Life cycle inventories characterize the 

upstream emissions associated with material production and forming processes. Using this 

approach, we found the use phase responsible for 71 to 76 percent of life cycle emissions, which 

aligns with many previous studies of advanced power train vehicles.
EPA Response to Comments

14-10

We also performed a variation on the analysis where we altered Lotus's high-development 

vehicle by replacing the lightweight body structure with one that was 100 kilograms heavier. 

This was referred to as the low-development structure in the Lotus report. This heavier body 

structure eliminated some carbon-intensive lightweight materials, primarily magnesium and 

some aluminum. These materials were replaced with mild and advanced high-strength steel. The 

change in vehicle weight led to a decrease in fuel economy of 3 miles per gallon, which in turn 

increased CO2 emissions during operation. Despite these increased emissions during vehicle use, 

the new design reduced total life cycle emissions by a significant amount, which approximated to 

10 to 20 grams of CO2 equivalent per mile, depending on vehicle service life.

To put this in perspective, the difference in emissions between the two designs is greater than 

any of the off-cycle credit provisions and similar in magnitude to many of the air-conditioning 

credits that the EPA has already considered in its rulemaking.

Our research process also demonstrated that by using the detailed bill of materials generated in 

computer-aided engineering software, we could produce a streamlined LCA quite efficiently. 

Since computer-aided engineering tools are widespread in the automotive industry, conducting 

LCAs may be less burdensome than anticipated.

To summarize, our analysis suggests that there is a potential for a tailpipe-only CO2 standard to 

favor vehicles with higher life cycle emissions over those with lower life cycle emissions, 

shifting greenhouse gas emissions from the tailpipe to production sites. Continued research in 

tracking of upstream emissions for future vehicles may help manage the risk of selecting vehicle 

design and technologies where upstream emissions overwhelm use-phase savings. In addition, 

including upstream emissions in the standard could provide vehicle producers with an additional 

degree of flexibility to achieve CO2 production.

Organization: Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (SPI)

Life Cycle Analyses of Plastics Demonstrate Favorable Environmental Performance [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.7]

SPI recognizes that the criteria contained in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), by 

which NHTSA must develop its standards, do not directly address life cycle considerations of the 

materials used in automotive vehicles. As a result, information on energy use during production 

of plastics and their chemical feedstocks, along with data on recyclability, are not directly 

relevant to this rulemaking. However, available information provides support for the life-cycle 

performance of plastics and related materials. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, pp.7-8]

Compared to their alternatives, many plastic products require less energy for production, 

especially for use in automotive parts. Given that the use phase of a vehicle accounts for 80-90% 

of the life cycle GHG emissions, it would seem that regulatory measures that aim to reduce 

emissions during this phase where technologically feasible would be the most effective way to 

reduce vehicle GHG emissions. This is further supported by LCA data which demonstrates a net 

savings in GHG emissions when the weight reduction in the use phase is compared to the 

creation of GHGs elsewhere in the life cycle for the plastic components used, such as with fuel 
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-11

tanks. However, while it is an informative and useful tool, we share the caution and concern 

expressed by the ACC with the use of LCA in public policy applications given the inherent 

subjectivity and limitations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9492-A1, p.8]

Organization: United States Steel Corporation

CAFE was initiated in 1975 in the wake of the 1973 Oil Embargo with the objective reducing 

dependence on foreign oil. That program adopted miles per gallon, measured in equivalent 

tailpipe grams of CO2 per mile, as the metric to achieve reductions in oil consumption. It was the 

right approach to achieve the stated objective. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 1]

However, extending that same metric toward the new objectives of reduction of energy use and 

greenhouse gas emissions associated with vehicles will not achieve the intended outcome, but in 

contrast will result in increased total energy use and CO2 emissions. In fact, the magnitude of 

these unintended consequences will increase as the fuel economy and grams of CO2 per mile 

become more stringent between now and 2025. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 1]

These comments requests the EPA and NHTSA to accomplish a technical assessment of the 

feasibility of incorporating Life Cycle principles into regulation in support of the anticipated 

2018 mid-term evaluation that will lead to an informed final agency action. Attachment 1 

provides a more detailed analysis of this argument as well as the sources of references supporting 

documents. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 1]

To explain, a vehicle consumes energy and emits CO2 during all phases of its life which includes 

manufacturing, driving, and end of life disposal. Considering all phases of a vehicle’s life 

accurately measures its true carbon footprint. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 2]

In today’s vehicles, the driving phase CO2 emissions represent 85 percent of a vehicle’s total 

carbon footprint arguably justifies allowing regulators to ignore the other phases of impact. 

However, as the fuel economy requirements double from 27.5 mpg today to 54.5 mpg in 2025, 

the driving phase emissions will be cut in half, thus increasing the importance of other vehicle 

life phases. Also, consider that many of the technologies (and materials) necessary to achieve 

these fuel economy improvements are energy and CO2 intensive in the manufacturing phase and 

will increase the vehicle manufacturing phase CO2 emissions, altering end-of-life impact in both 

relative and absolute measures. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 2]

Several recent studies demonstrate that vehicles aiming to achieve the future fuel economy and 

tailpipe emissions targets will have a 50-50 split between CO2 emissions associated with the 

driving phase and other phases. Under the proposed regulations 50 percent or more of the total 

CO2 emissions associated with these future vehicles will fall outside of the regulation. [NHTSA2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 2]

Many of the technologies required to achieve the proposed 54.5 miles per gallon target have high 

manufacturing emissions. Examples of this are materials that compete with steel, such as 

aluminum, magnesium, and carbon fiber, which are six to twenty times more energy and carbon 

intensive to produce on a pound per pound basis than steel. While these materials may improve 
EPA Response to Comments

14-12

fuel economy and tailpipe CO2 emissions in the driving phase, those improvements are not 

sufficient to offset the upstream CO2 emissions associated with producing these 

materials. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 2]

To address these unintended consequences and achieve optimal environmental resource 

allocations, future regulations should evaluate the CO2 emissions associated with all of the 

vehicle’s life. This will ensure that technologies are not deployed that improve driving phase 

emissions while increasing a vehicle’s overall carbon footprint. In this regard, we have been 

working with the EPA and NHTSA over the past several years to consider a more appropriate 

methodology which resulted in the section III.G.5 of the NPRM requesting additional 

information on this topic, for which U. S. Steel would like to thank and commend the EPA and 

NHTSA for their open mindedness on this issue. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 2]

There are other advantages to a vehicle CO2 regulatory approach that incorporates life cycle 

principles over the current tailpipe emissions approach beyond the obvious advantage of actually 

achieving the intended outcome of reduced energy use and CO2 emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0256-A1, p. 2]

First, such an approach can enable vehicle makers with increased design flexibility in complying 

with the regulations which will result in lower cost vehicles and improved environmental 

performance. Vehicle makers have provided examples where the lowest life cycle CO2

technology solution is also the low cost solution. In contrast, these examples also demonstrate 

that selection of the technology to improve fuel economy and tail pipe emissions alone would 

have resulted in increase manufacturing costs while increasing the carbon footprint of the 

vehicle. Regulations that drive vehicle makers toward solutions that increase cost and total 

carbon emissions do not make sense. Regulation that incorporates life cycle thinking will address 

such unintended consequences. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, pp. 2-3]

A second advantage is that it would drive the vehicle supply chain to reduce the carbon intensity 

of their products because of the commercial advantage it would provide them. That is low carbon 

suppliers would provide a competitive advantage to their customer, the vehicle manufacturer, in 

complying with the regulations. Regulations, properly executed, would result in a race to the 

CO2 bottom as manufactures competed to be the low carbon supplier. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0256-A1, p. 3]

A study sponsored by the steel industry and conducted by the University of California Davis 

proposes a methodology for CAFE regulation that incorporates life cycle thinking while 

maintaining the simple grams of CO2 per mile metric on current EPA-DOT vehicle stickers 

today and that will dovetail into the existing CAFE regulations. This methodology addresses the 

unintended consequences and results in real carbon reduction associated with vehicles using 

information readily available to and easily executed by the vehicle makers. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0256-A1, p. 3]

This proposed life cycle methodology still needs further development in order to be incorporated 

into regulations, but great strides are being made and should be ready for trial in the coming 
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-13

years. Already, several automakers are utilizing life cycle tools during vehicle design. [NHTSA2010-0131-0256-A1, p. 3]

The steel industry is building a consortium of stakeholders to further develop this life cycle 

methodology and identify the details to ensure its feasibility in regulation. Properly devised, we 

believe life-cycle tools incorporated into the regulation will result in a better framework that 

increases flexibility for auto designers and improves transparency, while enhancing the 

environmental integrity of the underlying regulation. The current 2017- 2025 light duty vehicle 

emission rules call for a mid-term evaluation that will lead to final agency action. We believe 

that a complete evaluation of the feasibility of incorporating life cycle thinking into vehicle 

emissions regulation is possible within the mid-term evaluation phase. We will continue to work 

closely with the EPA and NHTSA on this issue and urge the agencies to actively solicit advice 

and input from multidisciplinary experts prior to the mid-term review. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0256-A1, p. 3]

In 110 year history of United States Steel Corporation, we have conducted our business practices 

according to a framework of sustainable business conduct and corporate citizenship established 

by one of our founders, Judge Elbert H. Gary. These principles, known as the Gary Principles, 

are established in nine uncomplicated statements. The first of these states, “I believe that when a 

thing is right, it will ultimately and permanently succeed”. In light of that principle, life cycle 

thinking applied to climate change regulation is the right thing and we believe it will ultimately 

succeed. However, ultimately can be a long time with unintended and harmful consequences 

occurring before the right thing is finally deployed. There is an opportunity during the course of 

the 2017-2025 vehicle emissions regulations to implement the right solution and avoid 

unintended consequences. Vehicle emissions regulations that incorporate lifecycle principles is 

the right approach to achieve positive environmental and economic objectives. Accordingly, we 

urge regulatory policymakers to begin to investigate the application of life cycle analytics and 

metrics into future vehicle emissions regulations. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0256-A1, pp. 3-4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 207-208.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 209-210.]

So how does this conflict with the national objective of using CO2 emissions and energy use of 

vehicles to address climate change? As I stated, many technologies are required to achieve the 

proposed 54.5 miles per gallon target of high manufacturing emissions. Examples of this: The 

materials that compete with steel such as aluminum, magnesium and carbon fiber, which are 6 to 

20 times more energy- and carbon-intensive in the manufacturing phase on a pound-per-pound 

basis.

While these materials may improve fuel economy and tailpipe CO2 emissions in the driving 

phase, those improvements are not sufficient to offset the upstream CO2 emissions associated 

with producing these materials.
EPA Response to Comments

14-14

To address these unintended consequences and achieve optimal environmental resource 

allocation, future regulations should evaluate CO2 emissions associated with all the vehicle's life. 

This will ensure that technologies are not deployed and improve the driving phase emissions 

while increasing a vehicle's overall carbon footprint.

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 210-213.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 214-215.]

The intent and the examples we provided in our discussions with the EPA and NHTSA would 

include all the materials, but there's a bill of materials that are associated with the vehicle, and it's 

a standard deliverable that every vehicle comes with, and those can be interpreted with the 

database as the materials.

So I agree that for OEM to chase the target footprint for the whole supply chain for the thousands 

of suppliers that produce the vehicle won't be possible. The approach we are recommending uses 

the database which are available such as the national GREET model that have this data already 

included in there and it comes very simplified, and there are examples by the OEM of the 

production vehicles today that have done that.

And, also, we have shared this with, at the recommendation, to the Alliance of Automotive 

Manufacturers and made the same kind of discussion. Of course, adding another layer of 

regulation on top of these ones were not seen very positively.

So, when we got through the presentation of this idea of design increases design flexibility; they 

saw an opportunity in that they would have more ability to comply with the regulations; and, so, 

they were interested in more information, and we will continue to work with them.

Organization: United Steel Workers (USW)

Additionally, life cycle-based vehicle regulations would establish the United States as the world 

leader in manufacturing vehicles with the lowest possible emissions, directly resulting in job 

growth and retention in the domestic manufacturing sector. This is particularly important to the 

more than 350,000 men and women USW represents who make products – like steel - that are 

used in auto and light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, pp. 1-2]

Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 2]

Recent studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara1 (UCSB) and the University of 

Michigan2 have validated the use life-cycle assessment (LCA) principles in determining the true 

impact of vehicles on total greenhouse gas emissions. A University of California at Davis3 (UCDavis) study examined the consequences of continuing to apply tailpipe-only (that is, driving 

cycle only) regulations that exclude other critical sources of GHG emissions such as those that 

occur during materials manufacturing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 2]
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-15

One objection often raised regarding the use of life cycle principles in regulations is the 

perceived complexity. This is a concern to car manufacturers because of the large number of 

parts used to manufacture vehicles and the large number of suppliers in the supply chain. While 

specific details must be worked out, the UC-Davis study3 suggests that a bill-of-materials [BOM] 

approach could simplify the problem. A schematic of the process for using the BOM for LCA 

calculations in a vehicle is provided in Figure 3. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 2] [For 

Figure 3 please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 2]

LCA methods are the most straightforward way to account for total emissions. Life cycle 

emission data exist today for automotive materials [as do models for calculating life-cycle 

emissions of vehicles]; this is vitally important as materials will carry with them their emissions 

data just as they do their strength, density, thickness, etc. The important task is to consider how 

these data and models can be used in future regulations and to use the time available to prepare 

regulations which ensure a net reduction in emissions from light duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 3]

As vehicles become more fuel efficient, materials manufacturing emissions will become an 

increasingly larger contributor to total life cycle emissions. Several studies indicate this will 

begin to occur around 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 3]

LCA principles and materials life-cycle data are well-known and should allow regulators to 

introduce life cycle emissions-based regulations by the time such regulations are needed, around 

2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9580-A2, p. 3]

1 - Comparative LCA Model, Roland Geyer, UCSB (download from 

http://www.worldautosteel.org/Projects/LCA-Study/2010-UCSB-model.aspx )

2 - Various reports on use of LCA methodology, University of Michigan, Center for Sustainable 

Systems, Greg Keoleian,( download from http://css.snre.umich.edu/publications/all )

3 - Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Passenger Vehicles – The Policy 

Context, Alissa Kendall, Ph. D., and Lindsay Price, University of California, Davis, December 

30, 2011

Organization: World Resources Institute (WRI)

The GHG Protocol team at the World Resources Institute (WRI) would like to offer the 

following comment to the inquiry on page 75112, section 5 about the current state of life cycle 

GHG accounting. The GHG Protocol (www.ghgprotocol.org) has recently published two new 

GHG accounting and reporting standards: Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) and Product Life 

Cycle. These standards were initiated based on stakeholder requests for a more comprehensive, 

life cycle based approach to measuring and mitigating GHG emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7086, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

14-16

Both standards were developed with the participation of over 2300 stakeholders including 

industry, academia, NGO, and government representatives. During development, the draft 

standards were road tested by over 60 companies including Ford Motor Company (see the 

enclosed link) and WorldAutoSteel. Since publications, these standards have already been 

adopted and endorsed by several large consumer goods companies. In October 2011, Ford 

announced that they were expanding their GHG measurement program to include scope 3 

emissions based on the GHG Protocol Standard (reference attached). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7086, p. 1]

The support we received throughout this progress shows the need for life cycle based GHG 

accounting. Considering the full life cycle of a product exposes not only additional GHG risk but 

also reduction opportunities along the supply chain that otherwise would not be discovered. 

Additionally, taking a life cycle approach to GHG accounting can help avoid unintended 

consequences associated with shifting GHG burden, especially for new and emerging 

technologies. Given the extensive technical research by leading experts and broad consensus 

developed through a three year long multi-stakeholders process, we think GHG Protocol 

standards provide a much needed tool to help companies, organizations, and governments 

perform life cycle GHG Accounting. We hope you will consider and use our standards as a tool 

to help you assess the life cycle GHG impacts of vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7086, pp. 

1-2]

Organization: World Steel Association

In regard to the referenced Docket, the World Steel Association (worldsteel) commends the 

US EPA for its acknowledgement of the life cycle impacts of vehicle emissions. While we 

recognize that a life-cycle approach to emissions regulations is a significant paradigm shift, we 

believe it is the best methodology to truly realize a vehicle carbon footprint reduction. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7766-A1, p. 1]

Significant investments and efforts have been made over the years to apply Life Cycle 

Assessment (LCA) to products and services to reduce environmental impacts, not only through 

industry efforts, but through government-driven initiatives as well. While LCA is well known 

and accepted in scientific circles and government circles around the world, both the United 

Nations Environment Programme’s Life Cycle Initiative and the Society of Environment 

Toxicology and Chemistry’s regional LCA groups (LCA Advisory Group in North America and 

LCA Advisory Committee in Europe) have organized independently to study and advise on 

LCA. The World Steel Association is a Board member of this UNEP/SETAC Life Cycle 

Initiative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7766-A1, p. 1]

However, the lack of consistency in incorporating LCA into policy and legislative measures fails 

to recognize these significant achievements, but most importantly fails to capitalize on 

the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction potential or comprehend the significant 

unintended consequences of increased CO2 emissions that are likely to occur unless it is 

addressed. The automotive industry is a clear example of this: tailpipe emissions remain the 

overwhelming measurement for GHG emissions in the sector. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7766-

A1, p. 1]
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-17

Life Cycle inventory data for automotive material applications such as steel, aluminum and 

other competing products is robust and continues to improve and expand. Considerable academic 

work is being done to support the application of LCA to regulatory policies such as those aimed 

at improving the environmental performance of light duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7766-A1, p. 1]

As detailed in the comments submitted by WorldAutoSteel, and the American Iron and Steel 

Institute (AISI), more advanced internal combustion engine (ICE) technologies emerging in 

today’s cars as well as the future direction of greener vehicles, will reduce tailpipe emissions, 

calling for a more integrated approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7766-A1, p. 1]

• As advanced technologies in ICE progress, tailpipe emissions will lessen, and the 

relative importance of vehicle manufacturing emissions will increase. The introduction of 

alternative powertrains, such as Battery Electric vehicles will leave more than half of the 

total vehicle life cycle emissions unaccounted for in the regulations. Regulations based 

on the tailpipe will become obsolete. Also, automaker measures taken in an effort to 

address tailpipe-focused regulations have a great potential to actually cause more harm 

through unintended consequences.

• LCA is the best methodology to encompass the full vehicle carbon footprint.

• LCA encourages the entire supply chain to optimize their environmental performance as 

this will become a qualifier in order to be an automotive industry supplier. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7766-A1, p. 2]

A life-cycle approach will drive design and manufacturing flexibility in complying with 

the regulations, opening the door for even more holistic, creative solutions. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7766-A1, p. 2]

Organization: WorldAutoSteel

WorldAutoSteel and its member companies are keenly aware of vehicle emissions regulations in 

the world today and would like to take this opportunity to commend the U.S. EPA for their 

consideration of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) as you develop the next generation of 

U.S. emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1]

We believe that a Life Cycle Assessment approach is the only way to effectively reduce vehicle 

carbon footprint. Regulating only tailpipe or use phase emissions could lead to industry 

responses that actually make things worse. Consider the use of light weight materials to reduce 

vehicle mass: It does decrease use-phase emissions, but since the production of light weight 

materials is typically GHG intensive, the emissions during vehicle production are likely to 

increase significantly. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1]

If the increase in embedded production emissions is greater than the decrease in usephase emissions, this approach to vehicle light-weighting actually increases total emissions -

an unintended consequence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

14-18

Vehicle light-weighting is also costly, since it typically relies on expensive materials and 

requires retooling of manufacturing lines. There is evidence that redesigning power trains offers 

a better environmental return on investment than light-weighting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7174-A1, p. 1]

The problems created by ignoring emissions from vehicle production will be further aggravated 

by future low-carbon fuels and drive-train technologies. While a typical gasoline-powered 

vehicle currently emits only around 15% of its GHG during production, the use of cellulosic 

ethanol or a shift towards battery or hybrid electric vehicles would dramatically increase the 

share of vehicle production emissions. A recent Ricardo Study commissioned by the U.K.’s Low 

Carbon Vehicle Partnership estimates that vehicle production will grow to 57% of the total life 

cycle emissions due in large part to the introduction of the battery electric powertrain 

technology. The production portion of these embedded emissions therefore becomes more 

dominant and decisions made, such as material selection, become far more critical. For a battery 

electric vehicle powered entirely by renewable electricity, vehicle production emissions could 

account for as much as 85% - a complete reversal from today’s ICE-powered vehicles. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1]

Without a life cycle assessment strategy in place, decisions will be made that may decrease 

fuel consumption, but with the unintended consequence of significantly increasing these 

embedded emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1]

A more thorough way of measuring automotive GHG emissions is by using LCA, which takes 

into account all of the emissions created during the life of a product from raw material 

production to product end-of-life. Only when a vehicle’s total life-cycle emissions are accounted 

for can the net environmental impact of different designs be compared. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-7174-A1, p. 1]

LCA methodology and practice have been developing since the early 1970s. Today, it is a 

mature assessment tool with global standards. Independent of legislation many car manufacturers 

are already using life cycle thinking and LCA, recognizing its importance and effectiveness in 

product and process design. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]

LCA is equally accepted and used by material producers. In fact, together with many of their 

member companies, the trade associations of the steel, aluminum, and plastic industries 

are among the most active members of the global LCA community. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]

Many environmental agencies around the world support life cycle assessment, including the 

European Commission which calls it “the best framework for assessing the potential 

environmental impacts of products currently available.” Environmental regulators and policy 

makers have begun to draft legislation with a life cycle perspective, such as California’s Low 

Carbon Fuel Standard3, but need to do so more frequently and consistently. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-19

Life-cycle-based automotive GHG regulation is feasible and can be achieved by amending rather 

than replacing current standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]

An automotive life cycle GHG emission standard accounts for the joint emissions from fuel 

combustion, fuel production, and vehicle production and recycling. Fuel production emissions 

need to be included so that driving fuel cell or battery electric vehicles do not appear emission 

free, even though hydrogen and electricity production can be fairly GHG-intensive. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]

[See figure on page 2 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]

The main task of accounting for vehicle production is to avoid unintended consequences such as 

the one discussed earlier. Science-based rules need to be established about how to measure 

emissions from vehicle production. A good starting point would be to multiply the materials 

composition of a vehicle, which is readily available in automaker bill of materials, with the GHG 

intensity of each material, also readily available, which would include adjustments due to 

materials recycling. This would cover the majority of emissions from vehicle production and 

recycling. Dividing the emissions from vehicle production and recycling by total driven distance, 

also readily available, yields a measure in grams of CO2 equivalent per km and can be readily 

added to the fuel cycle measure. This is illustrated in the figure above for two compact class 

vehicles with differing materials compositions. This approach is simple for the vehicle makers to 

implement and is sufficient to avoid the unintended consequences that will occur with tailpipe 

only emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 2]

Automotive life cycle GHG emission standards are feasible and will benefit the climate. Life 

Cycle Assessment is included in other industry emissions standards; however, life-cycle-based 

environmental regulation is in its infancy and requires an investment of resources to bring this 

approach to a mature state. We feel this can be accomplished in support of the interim review 

period anticipated in 2018. Nevertheless, the regulation of automotive GHG emissions provides a 

unique opportunity to align regulatory practice with the state of the art in environmental product 

policy and launch a new area of enlightened and successful environmental legislation. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7174-A1, p. 1, p. 3]

Response:

EPA recognizes that there are GHG emissions associated with vehicles beyond those 

emitted during vehicle operation or the “use” phase, including emissions from component and 

vehicle manufacturing and end-of-life disposal.26 We thank the commenters who responded to 

our request for studies on this topic by providing information on their own or external research. 

We also appreciate the World Resources Institute’s comment highlighting two recent GHG 

accounting and reporting standards related to life-cycle assessments. EPA is glad to see the 

advances in research on this important issue and plans to continue to monitor new work in this 

area.

 26 For a discussion of GHG emissions associated with the production and distribution of fuel (including 

emissions due to electricity generation used to power EVs and PHEVs), see Sections 4 and 6 of this document.
EPA Response to Comments

14-20

The GHG standards we are finalizing for MY2017-MY2025 do not incorporate vehicle 

manufacturing or end-of-life emissions. We agree with comments by the American Chemistry 

Council and the Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. that these emissions are typically small 

relative to GHG emissions from vehicle operation, and therefore regulating emissions from the 

use phase is an effective method for reducing GHG emissions from vehicles. 

However, we acknowledge the point made by other commenters that the relative 

significance of manufacturing emissions, and other non-use phase emissions, will increase as 

vehicles’ fuel economy improves over time. Some advanced vehicle technologies and materials 

designed to reduce GHG emissions at the tailpipe may also be more energy and carbon intensive 

to manufacture than conventional vehicles and result in vehicle production accounting for a 

higher fraction of total life-cycle GHG emissions (e.g., electric vehicles powered by a lowcarbon grid or certain light-weighting materials). 

Kendall highlighted one such example from her research at the University of California, 

Davis comparing life-cycle emissions from two modeled MY2020 vehicle designs. She found a 

more fuel-efficient vehicle (which utilizes magnesium and aluminum to reduce mass) to have 

higher overall life-cycle GHG emissions than a heavier, less fuel-efficient model that 

incorporates less of these materials. We recognize that such tradeoffs are possible and plan to 

monitor how materials usage for future vehicles changes over time. However, as discussed in 

chapter 3 of the Joint TSD, the agencies believe that manufacturers will be able to meet the 

MY2017-2025 GHG standards through a combination of technologies, without relying on a level 

of mass reduction that requires a high penetration of these light-weighting materials. Therefore, 

EPA believes that these standards are unlikely to significantly impact vehicle production 

emissions and the overall balance of GHG emissions (i.e., production versus use phase) for the 

light-duty fleet due to the use of these materials. 

We also believe there is currently too much uncertainty about the life-cycle impacts of 

future advanced technologies to conduct the type of detailed, transparent, and replicable vehiclespecific assessments that would be needed in a regulatory context. The GHG standards being 

finalized in this rule are based on uniform test procedures that hold automobile manufacturers 

accountable for emissions during vehicle operation. By contrast, full life-cycle accounting 

would require automobile manufacturers to account for GHG emissions associated with a 

vehicle’s complete material supply chain and would require assumptions about how materials 

and components would be used at the end of a vehicle’s life, which are particularly uncertain for 

future and emerging technologies such as electric vehicle batteries. 

Kendall and several organizations from the steel industry suggested a possible approach 

for incorporating vehicle production emissions into GHG standards by linking a vehicle’s bill of 

materials to an established GHG emissions model. While such a framework may be possible, it 

would not eliminate many of the challenges associated with finding a comprehensive and 

consistent set of emissions data and assumptions that would be fair and robust across all 

technologies. Also, the bill of materials may not capture differences in material origin that could 

impact GHG emissions (e.g., the percentage of recycled content, and the location and processes 

used for production). NHTSA conducted a literature review of life-cycle studies for certain 
Treatment of Life Cycle Emissions Related to Vehicle Manufacturing

14-21

vehicle technologies as part of its Environmental Impact Statement for this rulemaking.

27 The 

range of different models and approaches utilized in the surveyed studies and the sensitivity of 

the results to study assumptions further illustrate these challenges.

Moreover, in addition to the evident difficulties in accounting for life-cycle emissions 

relating to upstream manufacturing in a reliable, transparent, and replicable manner, these 

section 202 (a) standards are in the end for control of vehicular emissions. Compliance in 

virtually all instances is measured at the tailpipe.28 Standards reflecting manufacturing life-cycle 

GHG emissions would be more wide-ranging, changing the focus of the program at least in part 

from vehicular emissions to manufacturing emissions. The Clean Air Act provides direct means 

for control of stationary source GHG emissions, and EPA does not believe it appropriate, at least 

at this time, to approach these issues indirectly by means of section 202 (a) vehicle emission 

standards. See also the discussion in preamble section III.C.2.c.v, related to upstream accounting 

of emissions from sources generating electricity used to power electric and plug-in hybrid 

electric vehicles explaining that this rule establishes a vehicle emission program, not a fuel based 

program.

We note the recommendation of several organizations to further investigate incorporating 

life-cycle emissions, including manufacturing emissions, into later model year vehicle 

regulations as part of the agency’s mid-term evaluation. EPA plans to consider a broad range of 

factors in its mid-term evaluation in order to determine whether the MY2022-2025 GHG 

standards are appropriate under section 202(a) of the CAA. EPA will develop and compile upto-date information for the review through a collaborative and transparent process, including 

public notice and comment. See section III.B.3 of the preamble for more information on the 

mid-term evaluation. As noted above, EPA intends to continue to monitor new research related 

to vehicle life-cycle assessment and would therefore be interested in reviewing any additional 

work conducted to evaluate vehicle-specific production and end-of-life GHG emissions based on 

the bill of materials (BOM) or other approaches.

 27 See Ch. 6, “Literature Synthesis of Life-cycle Environmental Impacts of Certain Vehicle Materials and 

Technologies,” Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0056. 28 As explained in section III.C.2.c.v of the preamble, the rule accounts for upstream emissions attributable 

to energy use by EVs and PHEVs in limited circumstances. While this upstream value does not reflect a single 

means of generating electricity, the aggregated emissions from electricity generating facilities and their various fuels 

can be estimated with reasonable certainty, and so differ from evaluating the upstream GHG emissions attributable 

to the vast range of individual manufacturing facilities and processes.

Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-1

15. Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15.1. On-Road Fuel Economy Gap

Organizations Included in this Section

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Accurately account for the on-road Miles Per Gallon (MPG) gap. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, 

p.2]

On-Road MPG Gap [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.11]

EPA is fully aware that the gap between CAFE certification and on-road fuel economy in the real 

world has been growing for years. The following table, which is derived from data as published 

in EPA’s annual Light Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Fuel 

Economy Trends: 1975-2010 (“Trends Report”) demonstrates the growing gap. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0246-A1, p.11]

As shown above, the gap between CAFE and 5-cycle label mpg, which was just 2.2 miles per 

gallon in 1975, has increased to 5.8 mpg through 2010, or a gap of more than 20.5 percent. 

While the fleet average gap was an even 20% in 2005, it jumped to 20.5% in 2010, following a 

decade’s long upward trend. In terms of GHG emissions, the gap is now close to 26 percent 

between emissions that are measured under certification tests and emissions that occur in realworld driving. EPA is aware of this growing gap and also is aware that certain technologies are 

driving the fleet average gap to increase much faster than others. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, 

p.12] [For the figure referenced 'above', please refer to NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.11]

“This greater impact occurs primarily because a number of the fuel efficient aspects of hybrid 

vehicles produce their maximum benefit under conditions akin to the FTP and HFET tests, and 

are somewhat less beneficial during aggressive driving, colder ambient temperatures and when 

the air conditioner is turned on.” [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.12]

The following exhibit shows the growing gap between the 2-cycle CAFE tests and 5-cycle label 

fuel economy, based on EPA’s 2012 Fuel Economy.gov database of all light duty vehicles 

available in the U.S. market.12 [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.12] [For the associated 'exhibit' 

please refer to NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.12]

Just as EPA found in its 2006 analysis, the fuel economy gap for hybrid electric vehicles is far 

greater than the fleet average. In fact, the on-road gap for several HEVs is well above 30%. 

Under rapidly increasing fuel economy standards, the on-the road gap will continue to grow 

unless test procedures are brought up to date. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, pp.12-13]
EPA Response to Comments

15-2

When calculating the benefits of the proposed rule, EPA fails to recognize the diminishing 

correlation between lab and on-the-road fuel economy. Instead, EPA risks to freeze the gap at 20 

percent for purposes of measuring benefits consumers will realize under the rules, where the 

CAFE mpg is multiplied by 0.80 to estimate on-road fuel economy. As shown in the table above, 

although the Trends Report shows a gap of 20% for 2005, by 2010 the gap had risen to 20.5%. 

Instead of relying on fleet average label values from the Trends report, EPA and NHTSA, 

beginning on page 4-4 of the Joint TSD, explain that they are relying on the Federal Highway 

Administration’s (FHWA) estimation of the fuel economy cars and light-duty trucks achieve as 

Americans drive in the real world. In describing the reasons that they are using a constant 20% 

on-the-road gap, rather than a growing gap as evidenced in the Trends Report, the agencies state: 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.13]

'We are not aware of the precise methodology used to develop the distinct on-road fuel economy 

estimates for cars and trucks developed by FHWA.” [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.13]

The Coalition recommends that the agencies look at U.S. DOT Publication No. FHWA-PL-121-

031, published August, 2011. This document provides a detailed description of the methodology 

FHWA uses to estimate on-the-road fuel economy for light duty vehicles as it attempts to 

mathematically allocate how much fuel is consumed by each class of vehicle in the nation (cars, 

motorcycles, busses and heavy trucks, etc.) On page 8 of this report, FHWA states that the EPA 

Trends Report 5-cycle label values are the source for estimating on-the-road fuel economy for 

vehicles in the fleet. In summary, FHWA uses EPA 5-cycle label fuel economy as an input to its 

complex model to allocate fuel use by vehicle type while EPA does not use the same procedure. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.13]

Since EPA is actively promoting hybridization through its rulemaking, we question why it has 

elected to freeze the on-road gap at 20% when calculating benefits, since its own data shows this 

gap has and will continue to expand through the duration of the rule. If the EPA is not planning 

to update test procedures for purposes of administering fleet average rules and reporting fuel 

economy to consumers on EPA labels, then we urge the agency to show the range of benefits it is 

able to calculate as the gap between laboratory and real, on the road fuel economy continues to 

grow through 2025. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.13]

12 - Data from EPA/DOE www.fueleconomy.gov 2012 Fuel Economy Datafile. Analysis by the 

Martec Group.

Response:

This comment is discussed in TSD 4.2.1. As noted there, the U.S. Coalition for Advanced 

Diesel Cars suggested that the on-road gap used in the proposal was overly conservative, and that 

advanced technology vehicles may have on-road gaps larger than 20%. The agencies recognize 

this potential issue – future changes in driver behavior or vehicle technology may change the onroad gap. The Coalition states that the EPA 2012 Trends Report shows that the gap for gasoline 

vehicles grew from 20% in 2005 to 20.5% in 2010, and that therefore the 20% value used by the 

agencies is understated. We note that in recognition of the potentially greater gap for 
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-3

electrification technologies, the agencies are using a 30% adjustment for wall electricity; but 

more broadly, to the extent that the Coalition is suggesting that the agencies extrapolate the 

growth trend in the gap into the future, the agencies do not agree that the estimate of the future 

on-road gap would be appropriately estimated by extrapolating the historical relationship 

between the test procedure and real world fuel consumption and emissions. That historical rate 

of change occurred as a result of the specific technological changes in vehicles over that 

timeframe. In the future, different technologies will be employed, that are likely to affect the gap 

differently. As an example, while some technologies such as electrification may increase the onroad gap, other off-cycle technologies such as tire pressure management systems, air 

conditioning improvements and aerodynamic improvements may decrease it. Thus, the agencies 

are continuing to use the same on-road gap methodology as in the proposal for this final 

rulemaking, but will monitor the EPA fuel economy database as these vehicles enter the fleet. 

With regard to the comments regarding FHWA-PL-121-031, we appreciate the reference, 

although, we believe the commenters mean FHWA-PL-11-031. We have removed the relevant 

sentences from the text.

15.2. Vehicle Lifetimes and Survival Rates

No comments were received on this topic.

15.3. Vehicle Miles Traveled

15.3.1. Issues of Car-Truck VMT Used for Credit Transfers

No comments were received on this topic.

15.3.2. VMT Growth Projections

No comments were received on this topic.

15.3.3. Rebound Effect

Organizations Included in this Section

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Defour Group LLC

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

• The rebound effect in the national cost-benefit analysis should be smaller. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 14] 

Rebound effect: When U.S. consumers drive vehicles that get more miles to the gallon, they save 

money on their gasoline bills. They have more money in their pockets to spend. Whether or not 
EPA Response to Comments

15-4

they choose to use some of that extra spending money to drive more, they are still better off.19 

From a national cost-benefit point of view, the rebound effect should be subtracted from the fuel 

savings, but from the point of view of the individual consumer, the analysis must assume that all 

of the savings increase consumer welfare and that consumers choose to use those savings in a 

manner that maximizes their individual welfare. For this reason, the rebound effect should be 

subtracted in the national cost benefits analysis but not the consumer pocketbook analysis.[EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 52]

 

 

19 We have argued that the rebound effect should be taken into account only in the 

national cost-benefit analysis and then modelled as an income effect, not a price effect. That is, 

the consumer would devote extra dollars of disposable income to gasoline expenditures 

reflecting the marginal value of gasoline. This would put the current rebound effect in the range 

of 5%, which is what more recent studies have found.

Organization: Defour Group LLC

V. Social Benefits and Costs of the 49.6 mpg Standard 

In Table VIII-27b, page 715 of the PRIA, the agencies estimate a net social loss of $2.2 billion in 

MY 2025, which in a 17 million unit sales year comes to a loss of just over $100 per vehicle. 

This estimate is the sum of $2.5 billion in “Reduced Health Benefits from Criteria Emissions,” 

$9.7 billion in “Climate Damages from CO2 Emissions,” and $4.4 billion in “Reduced Petroleum 

Market Externalities,” less a $9.6 billion “Change in [loss of] Fuel Tax Revenues” and $9.3 

billion in “Increased Costs of Congestion, etc.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 10] 

These estimates reflect a rebound effect – the impact of reduced fuel costs on increased vehicle 

driving and thus increased fuel consumption -- of just 10% and totally ignore the impact of the 

so-called clunker effect, which is the effect of higher vehicle prices and consumer welfare losses 

on the retention of older and higher emitting used vehicles.12 If, consistent with the mainstream 

literature, we assume a 20% rebound effect (see Part VII) and, following Goulder et al, a clunker 

effect of 31.5%,13 the estimates of emissions reductions and fuel tax revenue losses in the table 

should be reduced by 45% and the estimates of congestion and other externality costs (including 

highway accident externality costs) should be increased by a factor of 2.14 The net result is a 

social welfare loss of $900 per vehicle (as always, rounded to the nearest $100 per vehicle).15 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 10] 

This initial estimate is substantially understated. The higher rebound effect combined with the 

clunker effect means that criteria pollution emissions will actually increase as a result of the 

standard, as criteria pollution is the product of vehicles miles traveled, which increases with the 

rebound effect, and emissions per vehicle on the road, which rises because of the clunker effect 

as more higher emitting used vehicles remain on the road. Gruenspecht found, for example, that 

because of the clunker effect, California’s Zero Emission Standard for MY 2003 would actually 
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-5

increase criteria pollution emissions by 3 to 15 times the amount of the estimated emissions 

reductions for new vehicles.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 10] 

VIII. The Rebound Effect: Crucial Determinant of Private and Social Welfare Effects 

As we have shown, estimates of the rebound effect – the offsetting increase in fuel consumption 

caused by increased driving in response to higher fuel economy and thus lower fuel costs –are 

critical to the estimates of both private and social benefits of the standards. A higher rebound 

effect means lower private fuel savings and lower estimates of climate and energy security 

benefits. It also means proportionately higher estimates of congestion and accident externality 

costs that must be subtracted from the nowreduced climate and energy security estimates. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 16] 

We find that the agencies’ use of a 10% rebound effect understates the actual level by at least a 

factor of two. The agencies justify their 10% estimate on the basis of two studies: a forthcoming 

study of rebound effects that is as yet unavailable to the public, but which the author, Dr. Greene, 

graciously provided to these reviewers, and an earlier study by Small and Van Dender, which 

Greene (appropriately) rejects as an inadequate reflection of reality and as a violation of 

economic first principles. Dr. Greene found a negative (albeit statistically insignificant), 

relationship between fuel economy (mpg) and vehicle miles traveled (vmt) as opposed to the 

predicted, intuitively appealing positive value. However, when several errors in his study are 

corrected, it supports other recent studies that imply fuel price elasticities and thus rebound 

effects of 30% and higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 16] 

Of particular concern in Greene’s study is the aggregation problem – a problem that can cause 

dramatic over estimates of implicit consumer discount rates and underestimates of the 

responsiveness of automotive fuel economy levels to fuel prices.26 Work by Resources for the 

Future economist Elsheba Spiller, for example, shows that Greene’s use of one overall car and 

light truck light-duty fleet could bias his results downward by as much as 51%. That is because it 

fails to allow enough margins over which auto buyers can adjust their purchasing decisions in 

response to changing fuel prices and levels of fuel economy. If there is only one level of 

aggregation – the entire fleet of cars and light trucks, it may not be possible to tell whether a 

rising level of fuel prices or fuel costs is causing a shift within the aggregate fleet to more fuelefficient vehicles. The modeler’s regression study could show little or no response on the 

aggregate when there has been a substantial movement to higher mpg vehicles at lower levels of 

aggregation.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 16] 

In Greene’s study light truck vehicle miles traveled (vmt) exceeded that of passenger cars by as 

much as 1,500 miles per year, which has nothing to do with the influence of fuel cost on vmt. So 

as the light truck market share and thus vmt increased over the period, Greene’s proxy for fuel 

cost, gallons per mile (the reciprocal of fuel economy or miles per gallon), also rose, causing a 

spurious positive correlation between his measure of fuel cost and vmt. It is not surprising, then, 

that his point estimate for the influence of fuel costs on vehicle miles traveled (vmt) is positive –

that as fuel economy falls and thus his measure of “fuel costs“ rises, his model finds that 

consumers will drive their vehicles more, not less (and conversely). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9319-A1 p. 17] 
EPA Response to Comments

15-6

It would also seem that gallons per mile is not a good measure of fuel cost, which requires the 

dollar sign in the numerator. Without the price of gasoline in the numerator, the measured level 

of fuel costs -- gallons per mile -- can increase even when fuel cost per mile is falling and can 

fall when fuel cost per mile is actually rising. Certainly, real-world consumers would be foolish 

to look at mpg or its reciprocal in a vacuum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 17] 

We agree with Dr. Greene that his result – that as fuel costs rise auto owners do not respond by 

reducing their driving (and possibly even increase their driving) -- is counter intuitive. Indeed, it 

violates the most well-established finding in all of economics, what economists call the “First 

Law of Demand” – that, all else equal, when the price of a good or service rises, less is 

demanded, not more or none at all.28 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 17] 

His rationale for finding that owners do not reduce their driving when fuel costs rise is that 

binding fuel economy standards cause vehicle prices to rise and that increased amortization of 

the higher purchase prices partially offsets the reduction in fuel costs. To be sure, binding 

mandates do raise the average price of the new car fleet. But much of the increase is an increase 

in fixed costs that, unlike reductions in fuel costs, does not affect the marginal and thus variable

cost of driving. Much of the increase is dissipated immediately after the vehicle is taken home 

from the showroom and a further amount later by vehicle obsolescence that is related solely to 

age and not to the wear and tear that comes with vehicle miles traveled. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9319-A1 p. 17] 

The only empirical evidence Greene offers in support of a negative or zero rebound effect is 

Greene’s downward-biased estimate and that of Small and Van Dender – the other study on 

which the agencies rely for their estimate of a 10% effect. But Greene, correctly, in our view, 

rejects the Small and Van Dender rebound study, the update of which now finds a 15% rebound 

effect,, because, as he says, it “does not represent an adequate representation of the effect of fuel 

economy standards,” and because, as he also points out, it finds a lack of statistical significance 

for the fuel price variable, which “creates doubts about the validity of the methodology.” Indeed, 

economists at NERA Consulting found that Small and Van Dender failed to account for cost of 

living differences across the metropolitan areas covered by his study, so that seemingly high fuel 

prices in some areas were actually lower than fuel prices in other areas. Correcting for this error 

and for certain econometric shortcomings, they found a statistically significant rebound effect of 

a positive 0.24.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 18] 

As Greene observes, “Most studies [of rebound effects] base their estimates on the elasticity of 

vehicle travel with respect to fuel cost per mile, thereby constraining the elasticity of fuel price to 

be equal and opposite in sign to the elasticity of fuel economy.” As he also notes, they make this 

assumption because “the two affect fuel cost per mile in equal and opposite ways.”30 Greene’s 

own study rejects that hypothesis, finding a (longrun) fuel price elasticity of 0.30 and finding a 

statistically insignificant fuel cost elasticity. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 18] 

Greene cites two other studies of this issue. He reports that one (Schimek31) “estimated the 

elasticities of vehicle travel with respect to fuel price and with respect to fuel economy 

individually,” finding, in Greene’s words, that fuel price elasticity and fuel economy elasticity –

the rebound effect – were “almost precisely equal and opposite in sign as theory would predict.” 
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-7

Greene co-authored the other study, which, in his words, did not reject the hypothesis of “equal 

and opposite effects” for the fuel price and mpg elasticities. Greene ignores yet two other studies, 

one of which was performed by Yale Professor Pinelopi Goldberg, current editor-in-chief of the 

American Economic Review, and both of which found fuel price and fuel cost elasticities of 

equal and opposite magnitude.32 Clearly, the weight of the literature is on the side of equal and 

opposite effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 18] 

In our view, the agencies should, therefore, take account of recent research by Spiller and by 

Greene himself, that finds fuel price elasticities far higher (in absolute values) than the minus 

0.20 reported in much of the econometric literature. Greene finds an elasticity of minus 0.30. As 

previously noted, Spiller finds base elasticities of minus 0.30, rising to as “high” as minus 0.43 

when aggregation errors are taken into account33 – suggesting similar real-world values for the 

rebound effect. At a minimum, an estimate of at least 25% seems warranted at this time. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 19] 

Finally, Greene finds that there has been a secular decline in the rebound effect in response to 

rising incomes, mirroring the results of Small and Van Dender’s regressions. However, as we 

have shown, those regression studies contain serious errors that bias the estimates of rebound 

effects and their mirror image, fuel price elasticities (in absolute values), dramatically 

downward. What’s more, the decline that he tracks occurred during a period of record low fuel 

prices and recent research, including Spiller’s for the years 2001 through 2009 and his own, finds 

a sharp uptick even as fuel prices have rebounded to record highs. This suggests that as fuel 

prices have risen, fuel costs have become a higher percentage of the household budget, which 

renders households more, not less responsive to fuel prices and thus fuel costs. It further suggests 

that as time goes on rebound effects may rise along with rising fuel prices and as consumer 

expectations catch up with those increases over the years. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p. 

19]

12 - Howard Gruenspecht, “Zero Emission Vehicles: A Dirty Little Secret,” Resources (Winter 

2001) at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Resources-142-zeroemmis.pdf 

13 - Lawrence Goulder, Mark Jacobsen, and Arthur van Benthem, “Unintended Consequences 

from Nested State & Federal Regulation: The Case of Pavely Greenhouse-Gas-per-Mile Limits,” 

Stanford, University of California at San Diego, NBER, and Resources for the Future, Available 

at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491895, page 26. 

14 - If the rebound effect of 20% reduces fuel savings and attendant ghg and energy security 

benefits to 80% of those in the table and if the clunker effect cuts that 80% by another 31.5%, the 

net effect is a 55% reduction of those values. Raising the rebound effect from 10% to 20% 

implies a doubling of the estimate for the externality costs of raising the standards, which bear a 

straight-line relationship to the rebound effect. 

15 - Total Social Benefits in Table VIII-27b, page 715 of the PRIA come to $16.7 billion in MY 

2025. Total Social costs come to the sum of Lost Fuel Tax Revenues of $9.6 billion and 
EPA Response to Comments

15-8

Increased Congestion (and accident) Costs of $9.3 billion, or $18.9 billion, for a net social 

welfare loss of $2.2 billion, which divided by 17 million unit sales comes to a loss of $129 per 

vehicle. The 45% offset for the combined leakage associated with the rebound and clunker 

effects reduces total benefits to $9.15 billion and reduces fuel tax revenue losses to $5.26 billion. 

The doubling of the rebound effect raises Increased Congestion (and accident) Costs to $18.6 

billion. Total net costs or welfare losses are increased to $14.7 billion, or $864 per vehicle. 

16 - Gruenspecht, Ibid. 

26 - See Meghan Busse, Christopher Knittel, and Florian Zettlemeyer, “Pain at the Pump: The 

Effect of Gasoline Prices on New and Used Automobile Markets, University of California 

Energy Institute, UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies and National Bureau of Economic 

Research (September 2011), James Sallee, Sarah West, and Wei Fan, “The Effect of Gasoline 

Prices on the Demand for Fuel Economy in Used Vehicles: Empirical Evidence and Policy 

Implications,” May 24, 2011, funded by the Energy Initiative at the University of Chicago and 

by the Keck Foundation of Macalister College, and Elisheba Spiller, “Household Vehicle Bundle 

Choices and Gasoline Demand,” Resources for the Future and Duke University, January and July 

2011 at http://emf.stanford.edu/files/docs/322/SPILLER.pdf and 

http://fds.duke.edu/db/aas/Economics/phd/elisheba.spiller/files/Elisheba%20Spiller%20Job%20

Market%20Paper.pdf (two separate papers). 

27 - Spiller, Ibid. 

28 - Of course, “all else is not equal” in his analysis because he fails to account for the secular 

movement from lower VMT and lower gallons per mile cars to higher VMT and higher gallons 

per mile trucks. 

29 - NERA Economic Consulting, Evaluation of NHTSA’s Benefit-Cost Analysis of 2011-2015 

CAFE Standards, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (2008), Appendix B. 

30 - Ibid, pages 3 and 7. 

31 - P.aul Schimek, “Gasoline and Travel Demand Models Using Time Series and Cross-Section 

Data from the United States,” National Research Council/Transportation Research Board, 

Transportation Record 1558, 83-89 

32 - Pinelopi Goldberg, ”The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards in the 

US,” Journal of Industrial Economics, (1998) and Antonio Bento, Shanjun Li, and Kevin Roth, 

“Is There an Energy Paradox in Fuel Economy?” A note on the Role of Consumer Heterogeneity 

and Sorting Bias,” Resources for the Future, November 2010. 

33 - See Spiller supra note 23. 

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-9

12. Historical VMT rebound estimates should not be used, as they do not consider the impacts of 

personal income, vehicle efficiency, and fuel prices. Only dynamic models of the future VMT 

rebound effect are appropriate and should be used in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 3]

12) VMT Rebound Effect

The agencies used a fixed estimate of 10% for the rebound effect. This estimate was not based 

upon the latest research, but instead was a compromise between the latest research and outdated 

historical data:

'In summary, the 10 percent value was not derived from a single estimate or particular study, but 

instead represents a compromise between historical estimates and projected future 

estimates.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 24]

'As we discussed in the 2012-2016 rulemaking and in Chapter 4 of the Joint TSD, this value was 

not derived from a single point estimate from a particular study, but instead represents a 

reasonable compromise between the historical estimates and the projected future 

estimates.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 24]

The agencies quoted the latest research from Small and VanDender and David Greene 

demonstrating that the rebound effect is linked to personal income and vehicle efficiency, as well 

as fuel prices, and has been declining over time. EPA also referenced recent work by Kenneth 

Gillingham, who provides suggestive evidence that consumers may be less responsive to changes 

in fuel efficiency than to changes in fuel prices. Yet, when it came time to select the number used 

for the rebound effect, outdated studies with strictly historical effects were given equal weight to 

the recent studies projecting the future VMT effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 

24-25]

The proposed rule asks for the submission of new data regarding estimates of the rebound effect 

and comments on the methodology for applying the rebound effect. Additional data is not 

needed. The Greene and Small and VanDender work is the proper basis for calculating the 

rebound effect. They made a major contribution to the field by incorporating economic impacts 

and the cost of driving into calculations of price elasticity of demand. This is much more

appropriate than assuming a fixed 10% rebound effect that does not take into account future 

changes in vehicle efficiency, fuel prices, and future income. Only future projections of the 

rebound effect that include the impacts of personal income, vehicle efficiency, and fuel price 

should be used to calculate the future rebound effect. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 

25]

Organization: Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc.

1. The Proposed GHG Standards are inconsistent with law because do not regulate greenhouse 

gasses. Instead, their main thrust is to regulate fuel economy. Fuel economy is not an accurate 

surrogate for greenhouse gas emissions because of the rebound effect, whereby an improvement 

in diesel engines’ fuel efficiency has, in the aggregate, the paradoxical result of increasing 
EPA Response to Comments

15-10

consumption of the energy resource necessary to run the engines, and consequently, increasing 

GHG emissions. While the Proposed Regulations acknowledge the factual existence of the 

rebound effect, their analysis of it is incomplete and unduly limited. The expert opinion of Dr. 

Harry D. Saunders (“Dr. Saunders”) demonstrates that the Proposed Regulations, as drafted, 

“grossly overestimate the savings in total overall energy consumed, and CO2 emissions reduced,”

resulting from the Proposed Rules. Declaration of Dr. Saunders (“Saunders decl.”), paragraph 18 

(Exhibit 1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 1-2]

a. re-do their assessment of the rebound effect on GHG emissions resulting from the Proposed 

GHG Standards, in light of Dr. Saunders’s information and opinion (Exhibit 1 [Docket number 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9882-A2]); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 2]

While relying on other, preexisting EPA Regulations, the main mechanism that the Proposed 

GHG Standards utilize for reducing fuel consumption and GHG emissions is fuel economy. The 

Agencies couple improvements in fuel economy with a corresponding equivalent decrease in 

GHG emissions, CO2 being by far the biggest constituent of GHG emissions from mobile 

sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 3]

The Agencies acknowledge that a rebound effect exists, but they limit consideration of the 

rebound effect to narrow grounds: the result that improved fuel economy will lead to an increase 

in vehicle miles traveled (“VMT”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 3]

POP DieselTM herewith submits evidence responding to the Agencies’ appeal for more 

information on the rebound effect. This evidence is in the form of the declaration by Dr. 

Saunders, a leading American scholar and researcher on the rebound effect. Saunders decl. 

(Exhibit 1). In summary, Dr. Saunders states that the rebound effect, properly understood, has 

both direct and indirect manifestations in the economy. The Proposed Regulations’ treatment of 

the rebound effect ignores all indirect effects. Saunders decl., paragraphs 14-15 (Exhibit 

1). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 3-4]

The Agencies’ consideration of direct rebound is limited to only one aspect of direct rebound: an 

increase in vehicle miles traveled (“VMT”) caused by lowered engine operating costs due to 

improved fuel efficiency. Saunders decl. (Exhibit 1). The Proposed Regulations estimate a 10 

percent rebound effect due to increased VMT occasioned by more fuel efficient light duty 

engines. However, a study of the passenger vehicle market in Germany put this figure of rebound 

caused by increased VMT at 58 percent. Saunders decl., at paragraph 12 (Exhibit 1). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 4]

A recent article from the Wall Street Journal illustrates an aspect of the direct rebound effect that 

the Agencies do not consider, but automakers acknowledge: the head of marketing for Chevrolet 

states that improved fuel economy spurs demand for bigger sport utility vehicles and pick-up 

trucks. “Americans Embrace SUV’s Again,” Dec. 2, 2011, at page 1 (Exhibit 2). This 

phenomenon lowers, if not defeats, the overall fuel economy savings that would result if 

consumers stayed with more fuel efficient, smaller motor vehicles. The Proposed Regulations 

play into this shift towards bigger, higher fuel consuming vehicles, which erases expected gains 

from improved fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, p. 4]
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-11

A recent study by C.R. Knittel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology gauges the direct 

rebound effect in the light duty market, including shifts to bigger engines and vehicles, and not 

just VMT, at 75 percent. Saunders decl., at paragraph 6 (Exhibit 1). Others raise the prospect that 

engine efficiency rules like those incorporated into the Proposed Regulations may lead to 

“energy backfire,” a condition of greater than 100 percent rebound, “wherein an energy 

efficiency gain leads to an absolute increase in overall energy use.” Saunders decl., paragraph 8 

(Exhibit 1) (referring to study from Austria). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, pp. 4-5]

Furthermore, the Agencies underplay the uncertainty of their estimates of the rebound effect. 

Saunders decl., paragraph 16 (Exhibit 1). This underestimated uncertainty undermines the 

credibility of their predictions for total overall fuel savings resulting from the Proposed 

Regulations’ mandate for better fuel economy. Saunders decl., paragraph 17 (Exhibit 1). All of 

the foregoing flaws in the Agencies’ analysis of the rebound effect increase the chance that due 

to the true magnitude of the rebound effect, the Proposed Regulations may not, in fact, reduce 

GHG emissions, but may backfire and make them worse. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10337-A2, 

p. 5]

The Latest Evidence of the Rebound Effect Shows That the Proposed Regulations Will Actually 

Backfire and Produce More New Greenhouse Gas Emissions Than They Save.

In support of POP DieselTM's position criticizing reliance on Fuel Economy Standards to achieve 

Greenhouse Gas Reductions, POP DieselTM submits herewith in their entirety two copyrighted 

academic studies:

1. Christopher Knittel, "Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute Trade-Offs and 

Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector," American Economic Review 2012, 101 

(December 2011): 3368-3399 (Exhibit 1). This study points out that sales-weighted CAFE 

standard has changed little since 1983 because automakers have increased the size of vehicles in 

their fleets to take advantage of mandated improvements in fuel economy.

2. Kate S. Whitefoot and Steven J. Skerlos, "Design Incentives to Increase Vehicle Size Created 

from the U.S. Footprint-Based Fuel Economy Standards," Energy Policy 41 (2012), 402-411 

(Exhibit 2). This article quantifies the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of the footprint-based 

approach taken in the Proposed Regulations to countering the rebound effect. The Agencies have 

not conducted such a quantitative analysis. This article concludes that, for instance, in 2017, a 

rebound effect of at least 71 percent will ensue and that the rebound effect will more likely than 

not be above 100 percent, producing a backfire condition by which the Proposed Regulations' 

dependence on Fuel Efficiency Standards will actually increase the overall amount of energy 

consumed and greenhouse gases emitted. [These comments were submitted late on July 31, 

2012, EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11820]

Response:

Commenters suggested that EPA should use values both lower and higher than our 

proposed value of the VMT rebound effect. We did not find that the commenters presented any 

persuasive new data or analysis that justify revising the 10 percent value at this time, so we 

continued to assume a 10 percent value in the final rule (i.e., we assume a 10 percent decrease in 

fuel cost per mile from our standards would result in a 1 percent increase in VMT). We relied on 
EPA Response to Comments

15-12

a wide range of peer-reviewed literature to inform our estimate of the VMT rebound effect, 

including recent studies and projected estimates as well as a larger body of historic literature 

using both aggregate and household level data. As we discussed in the preamble (section 

III.H.4.c) and Chapter 4.2.5.3 of the Joint TSD, the 10 percent value was not derived from a 

single point estimate or from a particular study, but instead represents a reasonable compromise 

between historical estimates and projected future estimates.

The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) suggested that we use 5 percent in our 

national analysis since it would better reflect the income effect (consumers having more money 

in their pockets to spend on driving) and not the price effect (consumers wanting to drive more 

because it costs less) associated with lower driving costs. Much of the literature we reviewed to 

inform our analysis of the rebound effect controls for income (since all sources of income, not 

just income associated with fuel savings, can influence VMT) and, therefore, only captures the 

price effect. 

CFA also suggested that any additional driving due to the rebound effect increases 

consumer welfare and therefore the rebound effect should not be subtracted in the consumer 

pocketbook analysis. However, in both our proposed and final rules, we did not incorporate the 

rebound effect in our consumer payback analysis (i.e., we calculate the consumer payback 

associated with reference case VMT, which does not include rebound VMT). See RIA Chapter 

5.5. As CFA recommends, we only considered the additional fuel consumption and fuel costs 

associated with rebound driving in our overall, national-level analysis of costs and benefits. 

Additionally, we quantify the value that consumers derive from additional rebound driving in our 

analysis of national-level costs and benefits. 

The Defour Group suggested using an estimate of 20 percent or higher for the VMT 

rebound effect. The Defour Group cited potential methodological shortcomings in two studies 

that informed our analysis of the rebound effect (Greene and Small and Van Dender29); 

suggested that EPA should instead consider findings from studies evaluating the price elasticity

of demand for gasoline; and further suggested that the magnitude of the rebound effect might 

increase rather than decrease in the future. The Defour Group also commented that Greene’s 

study was not available for public review and that EPA relied solely on studies from Greene and 

Small and Van Dender in selecting the 10 percent value.

We found a number of errors and misrepresentations in the Defour Group’s interpretation 

of Greene and Small and Van Dender’s studies.30 For example, the commenter suggests that 

 29 While not specified in their comments, we assume the Defour Group is referring to the online version of Greene, 

David, 2012. “Rebound 2007: Analysis of U.S. light-duty vehicle travel statistics,” Energy Policy, vol. 41, pp. 14-

28 (which was publically available on the journal’s website as of February 9, 2010) and Small, K. and K. Van 

Dender, 2007a. “Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The Declining Rebound Effect.” The Energy Journal, 

vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 25-51. We referenced both studies in the NPRM and placed copies in the docket (EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-0759 for Greene’s paper and EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0755 for Small and Van Dender’s paper).

30 The examples included here are illustrative and are by no means exhaustive. There are a plentitude of 

errors and misrepresentations of equal magnitude throughout the Defour Group’s comment. Additional examples 

include a statement, without citation, that Small and Van Dender updated their study and now find a 15% rebound 

effect; however Small and Van Dender have reported no such estimate. The Defour Group also states that Greene 
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-13

Greene’s study rejects the findings from Small and Van Dender’s study, however, Greene’s 

study actually provides broad confirmation of their work using a different dataset and method.31 

As another example, the Defour Group critiques Greene’s purported use of gallon/mile as a 

surrogate for fuel costs whereas Greene actually used $/mile in his analysis. As yet another 

example, the Defour Group suggests that, in contrast to findings in Greene’s study and to a 

certain extent in Small and Van Dender’s study, the weight of literature supports the hypothesis 

that elasticities of VMT with respect to fuel prices and fuel efficiency are of equal and opposite 

magnitude, however, neither of the studies the Defour Group cited seems to support this claim.32 

The Defour Group references findings in research from Spiller33 as evidence that the 

rebound effect should be higher than 10 percent and compares these findings to Greene’s 

analysis of the rebound effect. The findings in Spiller’s research, however, are related to the 

price elasticity of demand for gasoline. This type of elasticity, while a useful point of 

comparison, is not appropriate for measuring the VMT rebound effect because it reflects 

consumer selection of vehicle fuel efficiency (both via vehicle choice as well as vehicle 

 

finds that auto “owners do not reduce their driving when fuel costs rise”, which is not true. Greene does not 

conclude that auto owners do not respond to changes in fuel costs. Greene is simply unable to find a statistically 

significant relationship between VMT and fuel efficiency (i.e., he is unable to find empirical evidence), but he goes 

on to evaluate the rebound effect by looking at VMT responsiveness to changes in fuel cost per mile rather than fuel 

efficiency and he produces statistically significant results (indicative that auto owners are responsive to fuel costs, 

but not necessarily fuel efficiency).

31 For example, Greene states in the conclusion of his study, “The results obtained here with national time series data 

are quite consistent with Small and Van Dender’s estimates using state level time series, cross sectional data.” (pg. 

27). Greene’s inability to find a statistically significant elasticity of VMT with respect to fuel economy “is not new, 

having been previously reported by Small and Van Dender.” (pg. 26). Greene goes on to explain on pg. 26, “What 

is new is the finding that the hypothesis that the elasticities of vehicle travel with respect to fuel price and fuel 

efficiency (gallons per mile) are equal, as predicted by theory, is now rejected by the national time series data.” This 

hypothesis is mainstream, having been adopted by many modelers examining the rebound effect, not just Small and 

Van Dender (we discuss this topic in section 4.5 of the Joint TSD as a potential reason why rebound estimates in the 

literature may overestimate the magnitude if, for example, people are more responsive to fuel prices than to fuel 

efficiency). 

32 The first study they cited did not find evidence that a change in the price per mile of driving impacts VMT

(Goldberg, Pinelopi, 1998, “The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards in the US”, Journal of 

Industrial Economics, vol. XLVI) (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). There is no mention of rebound in the 

second study they cited as it focuses on willingness to pay for fuel efficiency, not VMT responsiveness to fuel 

efficiency or fuel prices (Bento et al., 2010, “Is There an Energy Paradox in Fuel Economy? A Note on the Role of 

Consumer Heterogeneity and Sorting Bias”, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper available at 

http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-10-56.pdf) (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). 

33 Spiller, E. “Household Vehicle Bundle Choices and Gasoline Demand,” Resources for the Future and Duke 

University, paper from January 2011availavble at 

http://fds.duke.edu/db/aas/Economics/phd/elisheba.spiller/files/Elisheba%20Spiller%20Job%20Market%20Paper.pd

f and PowerPoint from July 2011 available at http://emf.stanford.edu/files/docs/322/SPILLER.pdf. (Docket EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799)
EPA Response to Comments

15-14

operation and maintenance) in addition to VMT.34 Along these lines, the Defour Group cites

two other studies (Busse et al.35 and Sallee et al.36) that find fuel prices have a much stronger 

impact on consumer purchase of fuel efficient vehicles than previous studies have found, but 

again these findings are not directly relevant to estimating the VMT rebound effect since the 

rebound effect is a measure of the additional VMT as a result of increased fuel efficiency, which 

is a separate consumer behavior (modeled differently) than consumer choice of fuel efficiency.

In addition, the Busse et al. and Sallee et al. studies draw their conclusions based on analysis of 

the used vehicle market, which may not behave in the same way as the new vehicle market.

The Defour Group also suggests that the magnitude of the rebound effect could increase 

if fuel prices rise in the future, since this will cause fuel costs to represent a greater share of 

household budgets, which in turn makes households more responsive to fuel costs. While this is 

not implausible, the same logic holds that the rebound effect would continue to decline if other 

driving costs (such as the time cost of driving associated with income and congestion levels, and 

costs of other vehicle ownership and operational categories such as insurance, maintenance, and 

tolls) increase enough to counteract the effect of higher fuel prices. Income is anticipated to 

increase in the future and, as we discuss in the Chapter 4.2.5.2 of the Joint TSD, Small and Van 

Dender (2007) and Hymel, Small, and Van Dender (2010) find that the rebound effect is more 

strongly dependant on income than on fuel costs. 

With respect to the Defour Group’s comment on the availability of Greene’s study, EPA 

included in the NPRM docket the version that was accepted into the journal, Energy Policy, and 

published in early 2012.37 This version was also available online at the journal’s website as of 

February 2010. Finally, the Defour Group’s assertion that EPA justified our selection of a 10 

 34 We sought comment in the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking on using the elasticity of demand for gasoline to 

estimate the VMT rebound effect. We received one comment during that rulemaking, from ICCT, that this elasticity 

should not be used to guide the choice of a value for the VMT rebound effect.

35 Busse, M., Knittel, C., and Zettelmeyer, F.. “Pain at the Pump: The Effect of Gasoline Prices on New and 

Used Automobile Markets”, September 2011. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)

36The authors of this study clearly note that it is preliminary and incomplete and request that it be cited only 

with permission. It is not clear if the Defour Group had permission to cite it in their comments. Sallee, J., West, S., 

and Fan, W., “The Effect of Gasoline Prices on the Demand for Fuel Economy in Used Vehicles: Empirical 

Evidence and Policy Implications,” May 24, 2011, funded by the Energy Initiative at the University of Chicago and 

by the Keck Foundation of Macalister College. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).

37 We included the following citation in the NPRM preamble (76 FR at 75126) and in Chapter 4.2.5.2 of the Draft 

Joint TSD:

Greene, David, “Rebound 2007: Analysis of National Light-Duty Vehicle Travel Statistics,” February 9, 2010. 

This paper has been accepted for an upcoming special issue of Energy Policy, although the publication date has not 

yet been determined. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-15

percent rebound value solely on the basis of two studies is not accurate, as we discuss above, in 

preamble section III.H.4.c, and at section 4.2.5.3 of the Joint TSD. 

The Defour Group also suggests that there will be a potential delay in fleet turnover (i.e., 

the retirement of used vehicles and their replacement by new models) as a result of our rule, 

which the Defour Group refers to as “the clunker effect” in its comments. We discuss this topic

(which is unrelated to the VMT rebound effect) in section III.H.11.a of the preamble. In brief, 

the effect of this rule on the use and scrappage of older vehicles is influenced by a number of 

factors, including the rule’s impacts on vehicle prices, the fuel efficiency of new vehicle models, 

the fuel efficiency of used vehicles, and the total sales of new vehicles. If the value of fuel 

savings resulting from improved fuel efficiency to the typical potential buyer of a new vehicle 

outweighs the average increase in new models’ prices, sales of new vehicles could rise, the used 

vehicle market may increase in volume as new vehicle buyers sell their older vehicles, and 

scrappage rates of used vehicles may increase slightly. This will cause both an influx of more 

efficient vehicles into the used vehicle market and an increase in the turnover of the vehicle fleet, 

thus accentuating the anticipated effect of the rule on fleet-wide fuel consumption and CO2

emissions. The opposite scenario, as the commenter suggests, is also possible. Because we do not 

have good estimates of the relationships between the new and used vehicle markets, we have not 

attempted to estimate explicitly the effects of the rule on the used vehicle market, scrappage of 

older vehicles, and the turnover of the vehicle fleet. EPA’s analysis of the effects of the rule on 

new vehicle sales, however, reasonably indicates that it is possible for the rule to increase vehicle 

sales through its role in promoting social learning, reducing risk and uncertainty for 

manufacturers, and promoting innovation (as discussed in section III.H.11.a of the preamble).

Our response to this commenter on vehicle sales impacts is available in section 18.7 of this RTC 

document. 

The International Council for Clean Transportation (ICCT) suggested we should rely 

solely on projected estimates of the VMT rebound effect that account for future incomes and fuel 

prices, which tend to be lower than 10 percent for the years covered by this rule. We recognize 

the merit of projected estimates of the VMT rebound effect that take into account future incomes, 

fuel efficiency, and fuel prices over the period impacted by our rulemaking, particularly since the 

recent studies ICCT cites (from Greene and from Small and Van Dender) have found evidence 

that the VMT rebound effect is declining over time (see Joint TSD section 4.2.5.2). However, as 

discussed above, we determined it was appropriate to consider projected estimates from recent 

studies as well as the larger body of literature on this topic, reflecting a range of different 

analytical methods and results, in selecting the most appropriate value to use in this rulemaking.

Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Systems, Inc. (POP Diesel) cited a recent study in 

Germany (Frondel et al., 2011) based on household survey data as evidence that EPA had 

underestimated the VMT rebound effect. We focused on U.S.-based studies of the VMT rebound 

effect to inform our regulatory analysis because driver behavior in the U.S. may differ from 

driver behavior in other countries (e.g., there is likely to be less elastic demand for VMT in the 

U.S. than Germany because of longer driving distances and fewer transportation 
EPA Response to Comments

15-16

alternatives).38 The declaration from Dr. Saunders that POP Diesel referenced in its comments 

also suggested that EPA relied too heavily on older analyses that use older data and that recent 

studies using recent data tend to show a rebound effect that is larger than 10 percent. As 

discussed above, we relied on a wide range of studies to inform our analysis, which were based 

on data that spanned multiple decades. Recent studies have actually found evidence that the 

rebound effect has declined in recent years and could be less than 10 percent in the years covered 

by our rule (as we discuss in preamble section III.H.4.c and Joint TSD Chapter 4.2.5.2). POP 

Diesel also suggested that EPA and NHTSA’s uncertainty analysis was too narrow (referencing 

the declaration from Dr. Saunders which cites the agencies’ range as 5-15 percent). EPA and 

NHTSA, however, conducted sensitivity and uncertainly analyses over a broader range of 

estimates of the direct VMT rebound. EPA’s sensitivity analysis covered a range of 0-20 percent

(see EPA RIA section 4.5.1) and NHTSA’s uncertainty analysis, which we reference in the 

introduction to preamble III.H, covered a range of 5-30 percent. Even assuming the higher end 

of these ranges for rebound, EPA would not have changed the standards. Among other things, 

the benefits of the rule would still vastly exceed the costs. 

POP Diesel also suggested that EPA should account for the energy and GHG emissions 

impact associated with the so-called “indirect rebound effects” (distinct from the VMT rebound 

effect) of consumers using the increased disposable income they gain from fuel savings to 

purchase goods and services that were produced with energy or that consume energy. We are not 

aware of any data on the magnitude of potential indirect rebound effects, if any, from our rule. 

Research on indirect rebound effects is nascent and POP Diesel did not provide analysis in its 

comments indicating an appropriate method or value to use to estimate these putative effects

from our rule.

39 We therefore believe it is unreasonable to consider potential indirect rebound 

effects, if any, from our rule based on the commenter’s speculative assertions. Furthermore, as 

noted in the previous footnote, there are additional benefits to consumers associated with 

increased consumption of goods and services, which would be important to consider if we were 

 38 Frondel, Manuel and Vance, Colin, 2011. “Re-Identifying the Rebound – What About Asymmetry?”, Ruhr 

Economic Papers #276. (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)

39 The declaration from Dr. Saunders that POP Diesel referenced in their comments cited only one study on indirect 

rebound effects (Druckman et al., 2011 , "Missing carbon reductions? Exploring rebound and backfire effects in UK 

households", Energy Policy, vol. 39, pp. 3572-3581.) (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). While this UK-based 

study could offer insights into how to estimate indirect rebound effects, the method is not appropriate for use in our 

rule for many reasons. First, the U.S. economy and consumer behavior is likely to differ from other countries (e.g., 

Americans have different product and service preferences and our products and services have different levels of 

embedded energy). Similar data and models may not exist to replicate the UK study in a U.S.-context. Second, the 

study is designed to examine behavioral strategies (e.g., lowering thermostats, reducing food waste, and biking 

instead of using a car) rather than improving technology. Among other things, the study does not consider capital 

expenditures associated with energy savings that could dampen any increase in disposable income (e.g., our rule

increases the cost of new vehicles, which decreases disposable income). Third, the study does not consider the 

potential for economic restructuring in response to decreased energy consumption (i.e., it does not consider "general 

equilibrium" effects), which could lead to either lower or higher energy consumption as a result of our rule. Fourth, 

the authors recognize that there is a major limitation of the study: they have only a very small number of 

expenditure categories in their model and there is considerable disparity in GHG intensities of commodities within 

each category (p. 3578). Finally, the authors do not attempt to quantify the additional benefits to consumers 

associated with increased consumption of goods and services, which would be important to consider if we were 

assessing the overall costs and benefits associated with potential indirect rebound effects from our rule.
Economic Assumptions Used in Analyses

15-17

assessing the overall costs and benefits associated with potential indirect rebound effects from 

our rule.

POP Diesel also commented that there is a potential for consumers to shift to larger, more 

powerful vehicles that are less fuel-efficient in response to our standards. POP Diesel described 

this as a direct rebound effect; however, since this behavior does not influence VMT, we 

consider it to be another type of indirect effect unrelated to the direct VMT rebound effect. As 

discussed above, we are not aware of any data on the magnitude of potential indirect rebound 

effects from this rule, let alone whether they would be significant. POP Diesel’s specific 

assertion that people will spend some of the money they expect to gain from fuel savings on 

larger, more powerful vehicles is highly uncertain. It assumes that not only would consumers 

not be put off by what are likely to be higher vehicle prices, but would purchase disproportionate 

numbers of the more expensive large footprint vehicles because of the perceived fuel savings. 

First, as we discuss in preamble III.H.1.a and in response to comments in section 18.1, predicting 

consumer preferences (and therefore the future fleet mix) is challenging. It is difficult to isolate

the influence of fuel efficiency standards from other factors (e.g., fuel prices, consumer taste, 

demographics) on consumer vehicle choice. It is not yet clear whether vehicle choice models 

can provide reasonable predictions of future fleet mixes with and without our rule. While it is 

possible people will buy bigger, more powerful cars in response to our rule, it is also possible 

they will do the opposite. Comments from the Institute for Policy Integrity suggest our rule 

could actually make fuel-efficient vehicles more popular and that we have therefore 

underestimated the benefits of our rule (see its discussion of “positionality” and the “bandwagon 

effect” in EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 19-21). Second, the commenter does not 

seem to account for the fact that our rule sets attribute-based standards (whereby every size 

vehicle has an emissions target), which reduces incentives to change the size distribution of 

vehicles in the fleet (see preamble section II.C and joint TSD chapter 2.1 and 2.2).40 In late-filed 

comments on July 31, 2012, POP Diesel submitted a study from Whitefoot and Skerlos41

claiming it as evidence that our rule will lead to vehicle upsizing that results in a large rebound 

 

40 Ironically, the Knittel study cited in the declaration from Dr. Saunders that POP Diesel submitted with 

their comments, and cited again by POP Diesel in their late-filed comment of July 31, 2012, maintains that 

manufacturers will have to downsize their fleets to meet even the MY 2016 standards (Knittel, Christopher R., 2011,

"Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute Trade-Offs and Technological Progress in the Automobile 

Sector." American Economic Review, 101(7): 3368–99) (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). See Knittel at 3388. 

Although EPA disagrees (as explained at RIA 1-40 and section 18.1 of this RTC, this rule includes costs of 

maintaining all vehicle attributes of the existing fleet, including size, weight, torque, and horsepower), this study 

appears to contradict POP Diesel’s ultimate point. Furthermore, the Knittel study does not discuss rebound effects, 

so EPA does not see that the study can properly be cited as support for a quantified rebound effect between 1980-

2006 as suggested in the Saunders declaration.

41 Whitefoot, Kate and Skerlos, Steven, 2012. "Design Incentives to Increase Vehicle Size Created from the 

U.S. Footprint-Based Fuel Economy Standards," Energy Policy 41, pp. 402-411 (EPA Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799).
EPA Response to Comments

15-18

effect that negates much, if not all, of the estimated fuel and GHG savings. This study does not 

deal with rebound effects (nor does it purport to), and EPA disagrees that the standards will 

result in a significant upsizing of the fleet in any case.42 We respond to comments on car and 

light truck footprint curve shapes and level of the standards, including comments from Whitefoot 

and Skerlos and other commenters who cite this study, in section 2.2.2 of the RTC (see also a 

summary of our response in the previous footnote).

Our analysis of this rule has shown that it is possible to maintain vehicle characteristics 

(including safety, size, and horsepower) and improve fuel economy (see EPA RIA at 1-40). It 

should also be possible, though of course with increased cost, to have more fuel economy as well 

as more size, safety, and/or horsepower. Nothing in our rule precludes these changes in vehicles. 

We have assumed, however, that the fleet mix will not need to change in response to this rule

since we have factored in the cost of preserving the vehicle utility present in the existing fleet. 

If, as POP Diesel suggests, changes occur in response to market forces, it is reasonable to assume 

that those changes will reduce the costs or increase the benefits associated with consumer 

ownership of the vehicles. We will review the environmental implications of any changes in the 

vehicle fleet during the mid-term evaluation (see preamble section I.B.5 for information on the 

mid-term evaluation). 

 42In its late-filed comments, POP Diesel states that the Whitefoot and Skerlos study posits a rebound effect of at 

least 71 percent will ensue and that the rebound effect will more likely than not be above 100 percent, producing a 

backfire condition. In fact, the Whitefoot and Skerlos study does not discuss any type of rebound effect, much less 

the quantified values attributed to the study by the commenter. Rather, the primary focus of the study is on issues of 

curve shape and standard stringency. The authors analyze the 2012-2016 CAFE standards (not the standards 

proposed in this rule), and do so assuming different inputs than the agencies actually used in the MYs 2012-2016 

rule regarding the baseline fleet, the cost and efficacy of potential future technologies, and the relationship between 

vehicle footprint and fuel economy. Were the agencies to use the Whitefoot and Skerlos methodology with the 

actual inputs to the MYs 2012-2016 rules, it is likely that different results would be obtained from those in the 

Whitefoot and Skerlos study. We have responded to these issues in detail in section 2.4 of the Joint TSD, RTC 

2.2.2, and preamble section II.C. We also explain that the gradual extension of the cutpoint in the right hand portion 

of the truck curve does not create an incentive to upsize. See preamble section II.C.5.b and Joint TSD section 2.5.2. 

Thus, this study does not deal with rebound effects at all (nor does it purport to), and EPA disagrees that the 

standards will result in a significant upsizing of the fleet in any case. We therefore believe that POP Diesel has 

significantly mischaracterized the Whitefoot and Skerlos study, and that it does not support the commenter’s 

assertions regarding rebound effects. We also note that the other study submitted by POP Diesel, by Knittel, 

postulates a reverse effect: that manufacturers will necessarily have to downsize the fleet to meet the standards. 

Although we disagree (see footnote discussing the Knittel study, which precedes the previous footnote citing the 

Whitefoot and Skerlos study), the study is illustrative of the range of views in the literature on the potential effects 

of the standards.
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-1

16. Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16.1. Impact on GHG emissions

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Weiner, L.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Weighted Average CO2 Content for Diesel Fuel [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.91]

Footnote 164 on page 74933 of the NPRM states that the Agencies used 10,200 grams/gallon as 

an estimated weighted average CO2 content for diesel fuel. This is not consistent with the 2012-

16MY rule, where the Agencies had used the estimated weighted average CO2 content for diesel 

fuel of 10,180 grams/gallon. (See footnote 20 of the 2012-2016 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse 

Gas and CAFE rulemaking; 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25330 (May 7, 2010)) To stay consistent, 

10,180 should be used in the 2017-25MY rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.91-92]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 29.]

Taken together with light- and heavy-duty standards being implemented now, the proposed 

standards will cut carbon pollution by over 650 million metric tons by year by 2030, about 10 

percent of the total carbon pollution today. This is a historic step forward to combat our climate 

challenge.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 123-124.]

Finally these standards will keep 280 million metric tons of carbon pollution out of the 

atmosphere. That's the equivalent of shuttering 72 coal-fired power plants for one year.
EPA Response to Comments

16-2

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Environmental Benefits

The proposed standards will also deliver significant reductions in the greenhouse gas emissions 

that cause climate change. Based on UCS analysis, the 2017-2025 standards would reduce global 

warming pollution by as much as 290 million metric tons (MMT) in 2030 alone. This is 

equivalent to shutting down 62 (600 megawatt) coal-fired power plants for an entire year. When 

combined with the final standards for MYs 2012-2016, the National Program will reduce U.S. 

greenhouse gas emissions by more than 630 MMT in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-

A2, p. 3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 216.]

Based on UCS analysis, the 2017 through 2025 standards alone would reduce global warming 

pollution by as much as 290 million metric tons in 2030. This is equivalent to shutting down 62 

600-mega watt coal-fired power plants for an entire year. Cumulatively, this program will reduce 

emissions by more than 1.7 billion metric tons through 2030.

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

The success of the new rules ultimately will be judged by reductions in real-world petroleum 

barrels and real-world GHG tons from 2017 through 2025. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 106.]

In relation to carbon pollution, the reduction of carbon pollution by implementing these 

standards, as you well understand, is another significant benefit. Cutting carbon pollution by 2 

billion metric tons is equivalent to the annual emissions from 474 coal-fired power plants. And 

as I'm sure you are aware, coal-fired power plants are very high makers of carbon pollution. This 

is a considerable reduction of a dangerous greenhouse gas. The reality, as we know, is that global 

efforts in reducing climate change have been slow.

Response:

EPA appreciates the many commenters (NWF; Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe 

Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council; UCS; Weiner, L.) who recognized the significant 

GHG reductions that we expect from this rule. We agree with the U.S. Coalition for Advanced 

Diesel Cars that the success of our rule is tied to the real-world fuel and GHG savings it will 

achieve, which we have estimated using best available methods.
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-3

With respect to the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturer’s comment, the CO2 content 

for diesel fuel in EPA’s analysis is consistent with the MYs 2012-2016 rulemaking value (10,180 

grams/gallon) (see section 4.3.6 of the RIA). The 10,200 gram/gallon value presented in 

footnote 164 on page 74933 of the NPRM was an approximate value. 

16.2. Climate Change Impacts from GHG Emissions and Other ClimateForcing Agents

Organizations Included in this Section

Adams, G.

American Medical Association of California

Axford, H.

Cafagna, R.

Ceres

Cuenca, M.

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Faria, R.

Haroldson, C.

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Lennon, S.

Links, W.

Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Parker, M.

Paul, M.

Pearce, F.

Smith, G.

Steffanoff, N.

Steyn, R.

Sullivan, T.

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Van Coppenolle, J. and L.

Organization: Adams, G.

I do care about cutting US dependence on fossil fuel in general because I do NOT like what 

global warming is doing to the weather. I am afraid that drought, flood, high winds, and crazy 

weather in general are likely to drive the price of food sky-high. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1550-A1, p. 1]

Organization: American Medical Association of California

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 46.]
EPA Response to Comments

16-4

Without strong action to reduce greenhouse gases, rising temperatures due to climate change will 

lead to even higher suffering from increases in ozone pollution, pollen production, expanded heat 

waves, devastating wildfires and accompanying wildfire smoke exposures. These will also 

impact our most vulnerable communities the hardest.

Organization: Axford, H.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, 

p. 2]

Organization: Cafagna, R.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689-

A1, p. 2]

Organization: Ceres

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 75.]

Strong standards will also serve to mitigate climate change risks and the very significant 

economic as well as environmental and human disruption that a changing climate will likely 

cause -- and, in fact, is already causing.

Organization: Cuenca, M.

Lastly, the EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. 

However the EPA admits this rule will, at best, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. 

Less than two hundredths of a single degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the 

climate therefore, the EPA should not claim any climate benefits from this silly mandate. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Our petroleum addiction has significant environmental consequences. The combustion of oil in 

our nation’s fleet of light-duty vehicles emits about 20 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gases 

emissions. Carbon dioxide and other potent heat-trapping gases contribute to climate change, 

which can threaten us at home and abroad. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 2]
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-5

The U.S. Global Change Research Program has found that climate changes “are already affecting 

water, energy, transportation, agriculture, ecosystems, and health.” Its 2009 Assessment predicts 

that water resources will be further stressed, crop and livestock production will be increasingly 

challenged, coastal areas will be increasingly threatened, and human health will be impacted due 

to heat stress, waterborne diseases, poor air quality, extreme weather events, and diseases 

transmitted by insects and rodents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 2]

The number of people at risk due to droughts will increase because many low-rainfall areas are 

projected to receive less rain and because rising temperatures and evaporation will cause soils to 

dry. Seasonal snow packs in the Western United States will shrink, endangering water supplies 

relied upon by Western communities. The number and extent of wildfires, insect outbreaks, and 

tree mortality in the interior West, the Southwest, and Alaska will likely expand. And damaging 

impacts outside of the United States may harm our trade, humanitarian, and national security 

interests. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 2]

Natural disasters in 2011 wielded the costliest toll in history — a massive $380 billion worth of 

losses from earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, wildfires, tsunamis and more. And that 

figure does not include the expenses associated with sickness or injuries triggered by the 

disasters.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 287-288.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 173.]

With respect to climate security, the combustion of oil in our nation's fleet of passenger vehicles 

accounts for about 20 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Together with the first-phase 

standards, the proposed standard under consideration will cut heat-trapping carbon dioxide 

pollution by over 6 million metric tons.

These emission reductions are an important part of a national and global effort to ward off the 

worst consequences of climate change. The U.S. Global Change Research Program has found 

that climate change is already affecting water, energy, transportation, agriculture ecosystems and 

health.

Organization: Faria, R.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, 

p. 2]

Organization: Haroldson, C.
EPA Response to Comments

16-6

Climate change concerns are becoming increasingly debunked and should no longer be a 

concern. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11137-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

This comment explains that EPA, and by extension NHTSA, fail to justify increasing the 

greenhouse gas emissions standards for light-duty vehicles. EPA’s rule does not affect the pace 

of climate change in any meaningful way. Therefore, this rule is fatally flawed or the 

endangerment finding is fatally flawed. After all, EPA is regulating greenhouse gases in order to 

reduce climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 1]

EPA fails to provide any justification to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from light-duty 

vehicles. In fact, EPA’s proposed rule clearly demonstrates that greenhouse gas emissions from 

light-duty vehicles do not “endanger public health or welfare” as required by section 202 of the 

Clean Air Act. For these reasons, EPA should not regulate greenhouse gases using the Clean Air 

Act. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 23]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

18. Black carbon is an important climate-forcing agent. EPA should regulate black carbon 

indirectly via stringent limits on particulate matter and expedite the congressionally mandated 

black carbon study report followed by all appropriate steps to regulate this pollutant as a climateforcing agent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 4]

18) Black Carbon

Black carbon is the light-absorbing fraction of particulate matter that causes warming. In January 

2012 an article published in the journal Science found emission standards for new light- and 

heavy-duty vehicles, as well as scrappage of high emitting vehicles, to be one of a handful of 

measures to control black carbon that are necessary to guarantee stabilization of global average 

temperatures no greater than 2°C above temperatures in the pre-industrial period.81 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 51]

EPA acknowledges the climate benefits of reductions in particulate matter emissions that would 

be generated by this rule, though they would be smal1.82 However, EPA does not evaluate the 

concomitant reductions in black carbon, nor does it propose to regulate black carbon. Previously 

the agency cited its concern that no definitive scientific assessment on the climate impacts of 

black carbon had been made.83 EPA has been directed by Congress to conduct a review of black 

carbon climate science to be completed in 2010, but this is now overdue and remains 

unpublished. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 51]

Other actions on black carbon are worth noting. In December 2010, the executive body of the 

Convention on Long Range Transport of Air Pollution directed its Working Group on Strategies 

and Review to consider the inclusion of black carbon in the revision of the Gothenburg 

Protocol.84In May 2011 the Arctic Council put forward an assessment of emissions and 

mitigation options for control of black carbon climate impacts on the Arctic. In June 2011, the 
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-7

International Maritime Organization adopted a workplan to investigate the definition, 

measurement, and control options for black carbon. In November 2011, the Arctic Monitoring 

and Assessment Program published a report on the impact of black carbon on Arctic Climate. 

And in January 2012, CARB issued a staff report that captures the current state of scientific 

knowledge and remaining areas of investigation for black carbon.85 These actions reflect a 

growing international scientific and policy interest in identifying mechanisms to regulate the 

climate impacts of black carbon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 51-52]

There is reason to believe that black carbon emissions from current on-road vehicles have been 

underestimated. Testing conducted by EPA and CARB staff of PFI engines caused an upward 

revision of emission factors for PM in the California emissions inventory from less than 1 mg per 

mile to 4 mg per mile.86This suggests that black carbon emissions have also been 

underestimated, although speciation of these emissions was not conducted. High cold start 

emissions contributed the bulk of this increase, but oil burning and engine degradation also 

contribute. According to our calculations, a light-duty vehicle emitting on average 0.004 g 

PM/mile would represent approximately 2.4 g CO2-eq/mile black carbon emissions assuming 

75% of PM is black carbon and the GWP-100 value, is 800.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 52]

Both the US EPA and CARB have regulatory provisions for non-CO2 climate forcing agents, 

such as methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons. The IPCC in its Fourth Assessment 

Report quantified estimated that the radiative forcing of black carbon ranks third among the 

climate pollutants. Meanwhile, research conducted more recently by Ramanathan and 

Carmichael concluded that IPCC estimates of radiative forcing are overly conservative, putting 

black carbon second after carbon dioxide in terms of global contribution to radiative forcing.87

From this perspective, black carbon deserves greater priority than other climate forcing agents 

currently regulated by EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 52]

We recognize that EPA must initiate a process to bring black carbon into the basket of regulated 

climate forcing agents, so regulation under this rulemaking may be premature. In light of this, we 

strongly urge the agency to consider (a) regulating black carbon indirectly via stringent limits on 

particulate matter in future rulemakings; and (b) expeditiously finalizing the congressionally 

mandated black carbon study report to inform future direct regulation of this pollutant. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 52]

81 (Shindell et al, 2012)

84 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2010j eb/ eb/ 

eb%20decisions/Decision_2 010.2.e.pdf

85 CARB. 2011 Appendix U Proposed Technical Support Document: LEV III Climate Change 

Impacts of Black Carbon Particles. Sacramento, CA: California Air Resources Board. 

November, 2011. See http://www.arb.ca.govjregactj2012jleviiighg2012jlevappu.pdf
EPA Response to Comments

16-8

86 CARB, 2012

87 Dr. V. Ramanathan and G. Carmichael, 2008

Organization: Lennon, S.

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019-A1, 

p. 1]

Organization: Links, W.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10348-

A1, p. 2]

Organization: Manufacturers of Emission Controls Association (MECA)

There is a significant linkage between ground level ozone concentrations and climate change 

impacts. One example was detailed by a group of researchers from the United Kingdom in a 

2007 Nature publication. In this work, ground-level ozone was shown to damage plant 

photosynthesis resulting in lower carbon dioxide uptake from plants that have been exposed to 

higher levels of ozone. Other studies have shown that increasing average annual temperatures are 

likely to result in even higher levels of ozone in the environment. Emission reductions aimed at 

lowering ambient ozone levels, such as lower emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) 

and NOx, will have a positive impact on climate change, as well as human health. Policies that 

aim to reduce ambient ozone levels may also become more necessary and important to either 

mitigate the climate change impacts of ground level ozone or to mitigate higher ozone levels that 

result from climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.4]

Black carbon is a major component of particulate matter emissions from mobile sources and is 

believed to have a significant net atmospheric warming effect by enhancing the absorption of 

sunlight. Black carbon is a mix of elemental and organic carbon emitted by fossil fuel 

combustion, bio-mass burning, and bio-fuel cooking as soot. Black carbon is a dominant 

absorber of visible solar radiation in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic sources of black carbon are 

transported over long distances and are most concentrated in the tropics where solar irradiance is 

highest. Because of the combination of high absorption, a regional distribution roughly aligned 

with solar irradiance, and the capacity to form widespread atmospheric brown clouds in a 

mixture with other aerosols, emissions of black carbon are thought to be the second strongest 

contribution to current climate change, after CO2 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-

A3, p.5]

According to scientists at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography and University of Iowa, soot 

and other forms of black carbon could have as much as 60% of the current global warming effect 

of carbon dioxide. Black carbon plays a major role in the dimming of the surface and a 
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-9

correspondingly large solar heating of the atmosphere. For example, the retreat of the 

Himalayan-Hindu Kush glaciers is one of the major environmental problems facing the Asian 

region. The glacier retreat has accelerated since the 1970s and several scientists have speculated 

that solar heating by soot in atmospheric brown clouds and deposition of dark soot over bright 

snow surfaces may be an important contributing factor for the acceleration of glacier retreat. A 

recent study published in a 2009 issue of Nature Geoscience (vol. 2, 2009) by researchers from 

the NASA Goddard Institute and Columbia University found that black carbon is responsible for 

50% of the total Arctic warming observed from 1890 to 2007 (most of the observed Arctic 

warming over this timeframe occurred from 1976 to 2007). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-

A3, p.5]

It is estimated that 70% of the black carbon emissions from mobile sources are from dieselfueled vehicles, with the assumption that 40% of gasoline PM is black carbon and 60% of diesel 

PM is black carbon. Up to 25% of the carbon footprint of a heavy-duty diesel truck is associated 

with black carbon exhaust emissions. Since black carbon particles only remain airborne for 

weeks at most compared to carbon dioxide, which can remain in the atmosphere for more than a 

century, removing black carbon would have an immediate benefit to both global warming and 

public health. The black carbon concentration and its global heating will decrease almost 

immediately after reduction of its emission. For these reasons and the growing body of scientific 

evidence that links black carbon emissions with climate change, MECA believes that EPA 

should include black carbon emissions as part of its overall greenhouse gas emission control 

strategy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.5]

Black carbon from diesel vehicles can be significantly reduced through emission control 

technology that is already commercially available. High efficiency diesel particulate filters 

(DPFs) on new and existing diesel engines provide nearly 99.9% reductions of carbon emissions. 

During the regeneration of DPFs, captured carbon is oxidized to CO2 but this filter regeneration 

still results in a net climate change benefit since global warming potential of black carbon has 

been estimated to be as high as 4,500 times higher than that of CO2 on a per gram of emission 

basis. To meet EPA’s 2007-2010 heavy-duty engine PM standards, essentially all new, on-road 

heavy-duty diesel engines are now equipped with high efficiency DPFs. It is estimated that the 

installation of DPFs will reduce PM emissions from U.S. heavy-duty diesel vehicles by 110,000 

tons per year. Current California and EPA light-duty emission standards for diesel particulate 

matter also require the use of a high efficiency DPF on new light-duty diesel vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, pp.5-6]

Because older diesel engines emit significant amounts of PM, there are also significant 

opportunities to reduce black carbon emissions through diesel retrofit programs that make use of 

retrofit DPF technology. The number of vehicles retrofitted, the number of programs, and the 

interest in new programs for DPFs have grown significantly over the past few years with more 

than 250,000 DPFs installed as retrofits to date in a variety of world markets. Retrofit filters can 

provide large benefits in human health through reductions in diesel PM and climate change 

benefits through reductions in black carbon emissions on both existing, on-road and off-road 

diesel engines. California has already tackled black carbon emissions from existing mobile 

sources through its ambitious Diesel Risk Reduction Plan and their associated regulatory 

initiatives that target the reduction of diesel particulate emissions from existing diesel engines 
EPA Response to Comments

16-10

over the next fifteen years. In many of these California regulatory programs existing diesel 

engines will need to be retrofit with high efficiency DPFs or replaced/repowered with engines 

that are equipped with high efficiency filters by OEMs. Similar regulatory programs could be 

implemented within other states or by EPA to reap the public health and climate change cobenefits associated with reductions in black carbon emissions. Incentive funding programs like 

California’s Carl Moyer program or the federal Diesel Emission Reduction Act (DERA) also can 

be used as a strategy for mobile source retrofit programs at the state or federal level that target 

black carbon reductions. Incentive funds for filter retrofits might also be generated by a state or 

national greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.6]

In the case of gasoline vehicles, additional climate change benefits could be obtained by 

lowering federal gasoline fuel sulfur levels to enable the use of lean NOx adsorber catalysts on 

gasoline lean-burn engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9452-A3, p.6]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 28-29.]

Carbon pollution is warming our climate locally and worldwide. These changes threaten people

and global security right now, and they are a most profoundly threatening force against the future 

of wildlife. Rising temperatures, flood, fires, droughts and ecosystem alterations are creating 

direct habitat loss, increased invasive species and other threats for wildlife species, and many of 

those species may not adapt.

Organization: Parker, M.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, 

p. 2]

Organization: Paul, M.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But the 

EPA **ADMITS•• that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184°C by 2100... 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]

THAT'S JUST TWO **HUNDREDTHS** OF A DEGREE CELSIUS !!! [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]

Therefore, EPA CANNOT CLAIM any appreciable climate benefits from this mandate. Just 

2/100ths of a degree Celsius IS ••NOT•• ENOUGH TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE 

CLIMATE OF THE EARTH AND... [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

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Organization: Pearce, F.

The EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. Global 

Warming has been exposed to be nothing but a scam created through falsified data. Even then 

the EPA admits that the additional regulations would reduce global temperature minimally at 

best. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10343-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Smith, G.

'Reduce carbon dioxide pollution by over 6 billion metric tons over the life of the 

program equivalent to the emissions from the United States in 2010.' Who cares? CO2 is not a 

problem. It has zip to do with global warming and our air is more pure than it has been for 200 

years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8438-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Steffanoff, N.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, 

p. 2]

Organization: Steyn, R.

* EPA claims its proposed increase is necessary to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, supposedly 

to reduce global warming. Again, EPA has NO statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases 

such as carbon dioxide, which is not a pollutant and indeed is vital to the biosphere’s life cycle. 

Moreover, EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 

2100. Two hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate. 

Therefore, EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

* The very scientific basis upon which EPA bases its illegal rule-making to reduce greenhouse 

gases is under increasing challenge. According to a recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal 

signed by a two dozen respected, senior scientists and engineers, “...a large and growing number 

of distinguished scientists and engineers do not agree that drastic actions on global warming are 

needed.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Sullivan, T.

Lastly, EPA claims these regulations are necessary because of carbon dioxide emissions. But 

EPA admits that this rule will, at most, reduce global temperature by 0.0184 °C by 2100. Two 

hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to have an impact on the climate and therefore, 

EPA cannot claim any climate benefits from this mandate. Besides, the theory of global warming 

is a failure, since none of their predictions are coming true. Not one. CO2 is harmless, and is in 
EPA Response to Comments

16-12

fact beneficial to plant life, and thus to all animal life including mankind. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-10341-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Finally, strong standards will help reduce the heat-trapping emissions that cause global warming. 

Current and projected climate change impacts pose significant risks to public health, the 

economy, and the environment. Delaying action now and waiting for the future before initiating 

accelerated action to reduce global warming emissions would be more costly than initiating 

action now. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Van Coppenolle, J. and L.

Climate change, as you at the EPA should well know, is not just theory and not a diabolical 

scheme on the part of climate scientists to punish corporations. It is a threatening reality that 

should have been vigorously addressed a decade or more ago. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-

A1, p. 1]

You at the EPA have the opportunity to address a major component of climate change with the 

proposed new standards. Please take this opportunity to do as much as reasonably possible to 

mitigate that phenomenon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1284-A1, p. 1]

Response:

Commenters in this section fall into three categories, one supportive of the rule’s impact 

on reducing future climate change, one discussing the role of black carbon and other non-GHG 

forcing agents in climate change, and one dismissive of the rule either because the magnitude of 

the estimated impacts are small or because of doubts regarding the science underlying those 

impacts. Each category will be addressed in turn.

The EPA agrees with the commenters who support the benefits of the rule. We agree with 

Ceres, EDF, NWF, UCS, the Van Coppenolles, and Weiner that these standards will serve to 

mitigate climate change risks by reducing emissions of the greenhouse gases which are 

reasonably anticipated to endanger human health and welfare. We also agree with the American 

Medical Association that certain groups such as children, the elderly, and the poor are most 

vulnerable to climate-related health effects.

Issues regarding black carbon were raised by ICCT and MECA. These organizations urge 

the regulation of black carbon (potentially through limits on PM) and request the expediting of 

the black carbon report to congress. Since the proposed rule, EPA has recently released a Report 

to Congress addressing black carbon.43 EPA continues to recognize that black carbon is an 

important climate forcing agent and takes very seriously the emerging science on black carbon’s 

contribution to global climate change in general and the high rates of observed climate change in 

 43 EPA, March 2012. Report to Congress on Black Carbon (EPA-450/R-12-001) available at

http://epa.gov/blackcarbon
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

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the Arctic in particular. See generally 77 FR at 38991-993 (June 29, 2012) (proposal for revised 

PM NAAQS discussing effects of black carbon on climate). However, issues of control of black 

carbon are beyond the scope of this rulemaking, which implements section 202 (a) of the CAA 

and focuses on control of the vehicular GHG emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O and HFCs. MECA 

also mentioned the effects of NOx on climate. As discussed above, changes in NOx emissions 

are included as an input into the MAGICC model. However, the effects due to NOx changes 

alone have not been isolated, and because NOx emissions lead to decreased levels of methane in 

addition to increased levels of ozone, the net effect on climate of changes in NOx emissions is 

unclear.

A number of commenters criticized the rules. The most common criticism was that 

because the climate impacts were small, that two hundredths of a degree Celsius is not enough to 

have an impact on the climate (Axford, Cafagna, Cuenca, Faria, Lennon, Links, Parker, Paul, 

Pearce, Smith, Steffanoff, Steyn, Sullivan), and that therefore EPA cannot claim any benefits 

from the standards. EPA responds that, as stated in section III.F.2 of the Preamble, no one rule is 

expected to prevent climate change by itself. As stated in the Endangerment and Cause or 

Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final 

Rule (74 FR at 66543), “The commenters’ approach, if used globally, would effectively lead to 

a tragedy of the commons, whereby no country or source category would be accountable for 

contributing to the global problem of climate change, and nobody would take action as the 

problem persists and worsens.”44 While this rule does not single-handedly eliminate climate 

change, it is an important contribution to reducing the rate of change, and this reduction in rate is 

global and long-lived. EPA appropriately placed the benefits of reductions in context in the rule, 

by calculating the likely reductions in temperature and comparing them to total projected 

changes in temperature over the same time period. In addition, EPA used the social cost of 

carbon methodology in order to estimate a monetization of the benefits of these reductions (see 

section III.H.6), and the net present value resulting from the CO2 reductions due to this rule 

(between years 2017 and 2050) was calculated to be between tens to hundreds of billions of 

dollars. The D.C. Circuit pointedly rejected the argument that EPA should refrain from issuing 

GHG standards under section 202 (a) due to claimed lack of mitigating effect on the 

endangerment, and further held that “the emission standards would result in meaningful 

mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions” in the form of “960 million metric tons of CO2e over 

the lifetime of the model year 2012-2016 vehicles”. Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. 

EPA, No. 09-1322 (June 26, 2012)) slip op. p 43; projected emissions reductions of this MYs 

2017-2025 rule are projected to be approximately double those of the MYs 2012-2016 rule. 

Some commenters (Haroldson, Pearce, Steyn) additionally claimed that climate change 

science is “becoming increasingly debunked” and “a scam created through falsified data”. 

However, these commenters provide no support for their assertions except for one quote from an 

 44 The Supreme Court likewise spoke to this issue, stating that “[a]gencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve 

massive problems” like climate change “in one fell regulatory swoop.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524. 

They “whittle away at them over time.” Id. The Supreme Court additionally emphasized that “reducing domestic 

automobile [greenhouse gas] emissions is hardly a tentative step” toward addressing climate change, inasmuch as 

“the United States transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.” Id. 

Thus, “[j]udged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas 

concentrations.” Id. at 525.
EPA Response to Comments

16-14

editorial in the Wall Street Journal. These claims are contrary to the conclusions of the major 

scientific assessments by the National Academies, the US Global Change Research Program, and 

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Responses to similar but more detailed 

comments may also be found in the Response to Comments and the Response to Petitions for the 

original Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 

202(a) of the Clean Air Act (74 FR 66496, December 15, 2009). Finally, see Coalition for 

Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (June 26, 2012) (D.C. Circuit) slip op. p. 30, 

upholding all of EPA’s findings and stating “EPA had before it substantial record evidence that 

anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases ‘very likely’ caused warming of the climate over 

the last several decades. EPA further had evidence of current and future effects of this warming 

on public health and welfare. Relying again upon substantial scientific evidence, EPA 

determined that anthropogenically induced climate change threatens both public health and 

public welfare. It found that extreme weather events, changes in air quality, increases in foodand water-borne pathogens, and increases in temperatures are likely to have adverse health 

effects. The record also supports EPA’s conclusion that climate change endangers human 

welfare by creating risk to food production and agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure, 

ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence further supported EPA’s conclusion that the 

warming resulting from the greenhouse gas emissions could be expected to create risks to water 

resources and in general to coastal areas as a result of expected increase in sea level.”

16.3. Changes in Global Climate Indicators Associated with the GHG 

Emissions Reductions

Organizations Included in this Section

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

A. ACCORDING TO EPA, THIS PROPOSED RULE WILL ONLY REDUCE GLOBAL 

TEMPERATURE 0.0076–0.0184 °C BY 2100—TOO LITTLE TO AFFECT CLIMATE IN A 

MEANINGFUL WAY OR BE DETECTABLE AGAINST BACKGROUND NATURAL 

VARIABILITY

This proposed rule to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from light-duty vehicles (as well as 

EPA’s endangerment finding for greenhouse gases under section 202 of the Clean Air Act), and 

Massachusetts v. EPA are all predicated on the assumption that regulating greenhouse gas 

emissions from light-duty vehicles will reduce the impacts of climate change in a meaningful 

way. According to this proposed rule, however, the climatic benefits from reducing greenhouse 

gas emissions from light-duty vehicles are very, very small. Because the climatic benefits are so 

small, this rule will not affect climate change in a meaningful way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9573-A1, p. 2]
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

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1. Climate Concerns in Massachusetts v. EPA—regulating vehicle emissions should result in a 

“meaningful contribution” to “global warming”

In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court argued that greenhouse gas emissions were causing 

a number of harms including, “the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover 

extent, the earlier spring melting of ice on rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of 

sea levels during the 20th century relative to the past few thousand years . . . .” [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 3]

The Court continued to explain global warming harms:

If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant 

fraction of coastal property will be ‘either permanently lost through inundation or temporarily 

lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.’ Remediation costs alone, petitioners 

allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. [internal citations omitted] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 3]

The failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, according to the Court, “contributes” to 

Massachusetts’ injuries and therefore, EPA could take steps to remedy the injuries caused by 

climate change. The Court further argued that “reducing domestic automobile emissions is 

hardly a tentative step” and EPA could regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles 

because, “[j]udged by any standard, U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful 

contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence . . . to global warming.” [emphasis 

added] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 3]

2. Climate Concerns in EPA’s Proposed Endangerment Finding

On December 15, 2009, EPA found that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere “endanger public 

health and public welfare.” In the endangerment finding, EPA argued that increased levels of 

greenhouse gases were leading to increased temperatures, decreased Arctic sea ice extent, 

increased precipitation, an increase in sea level rise, increased forest fires, reduced snowpack, 

increased droughts, and “endangers the water resources important for public welfare” among 

other concerns. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 3-4]

3. Climate Concerns in EPA’s Proposed Rule to Regulate GHGs from Light-Duty Vehicles 

2017–2025

As EPA explains in the current proposed rule, “light-duty vehicles, heavy-duty trucks, buses, and 

motorcycles—accounted for 23 percent of all U.S. GHG in 2007.” Because greenhouse gas 

emissions from light-duty vehicles represent a large portion of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, 

EPA argues light-duty vehicles contribute to the effects of climate change: [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 4]

the health effects of climate change linked to observed and projected elevated concentrations of 

GHGs include the increased likelihood of more frequent and intense heat waves, increases in 

ozone concentrations over broad areas of the country, an increase of the severity of extreme 
EPA Response to Comments

16-16

weather events such as hurricanes and floods, and increasing severity of coastal storms due to 

rising sea levels. These effects can all increase mortality and morbidity, especially in vulnerable 

populations such as children, the elderly, and the poor.

The proposed rule also states there is a “critical need to address global climate change.” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 4]

4. Despite these concerns, the proposed rule does not affect climate in a meaningful way, but 

instead results in, at most, 0.02°C less warming by the year 2100

According to statements from the Supreme Court and EPA on the need to address climate 

change, this rule would not affect global warming or climate change in any meaningful way. 

This is because, according to EPA’s modeling, the proposed rule would result in an incredibly 

small reduction in the increase in global temperature. According to EPA: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, p. 4]

The results of the analysis demonstrate that relative to the reference case, projected atmospheric 

CO2 concentrations are estimated by 2100 to be reduced by 3.29 to 3.68 part per million by 

volume (ppmv), global mean temperature is estimated to be reduced by 0.0076 to 0.0184 °C, and 

sea-level rise is projected to be reduced by approximately 0.074– 0.166 cm, based on a range of 

climate sensitivities. The analysis also demonstrates that ocean pH will increase by 0.0018 pH 

units by 2100 relative to the reference case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 5]

A reduction of global temperature by 0.0076–0.018°C 90 years in the future is too small an 

amount to affect heat waves, air quality, precipitation, intense storms, harm agriculture, wildlife, 

or ecosystems in any way. A decrease in sea level rise of 0.0074–0.166 cm, 90 years in the future 

will not reduce the loss of costal property that the Supreme Court was concerned about in 

Massachusetts v. EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 5]

Because EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases from light-duty vehicles does not impact global 

warming in a meaningful way, EPA’s regulation is not rational. Either global warming and 

climate change is a problem that can and should be addressed in a meaningful way through the 

regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles or EPA should not be regulating 

greenhouse gases from vehicles. Instead, EPA claims global warming is a problem but takes no 

meaningful steps to do anything about it. This is not rational. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-

A1, p. 5]

EPA’s regulations themselves are very significant. The regulations would double fuel economy 

standards from 2010 to 2025. But even this will not result in a meaningful reduction in the 

increase in temperature. Therefore, it does not appear that U.S. greenhouse gas emissions from 

light-duty vehicles endanger public health and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 

5]

In the proposed rule, EPA obfuscates the fact that the rule does not make any meaningful 

contribution to global warming by stating that the climate impacts are merely “small.” EPA 

states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 5]
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-17

Although the projected reductions and improvements are small in comparison to the total 

projected climate change, they are quantifiable, directionally consistent, and will contribute to 

reducing the risks associated with climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 5-6]

EPA’s explanation is not sufficient. Just because EPA can quantify something using a computer 

model or a hand-held calculator, does not mean that it is either detectable or meaningful. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 6]

For instance, Hansen et al. 2006 reported that that the precision of their estimate of the annual 

global temperature anomaly is only known (with 95% confidence) within a range of +/-0.05°C.

Thus the error in our measurement of the global temperature is more than twice as great as the 

highest level of temperature savings calculated by the EPA (which is 0.0184°C). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 6]

The error is compounded when calculating a trend over the long-term (like out to the year 

2100—or a timescale of about a century). For instance, using a least-squares statistical fit to the 

temperature annual global temperature anomalies in Hansen’s dataset from 1900–2011 shows 

that the temperatures have risen at a rate of 0.681 +/- 0.074°C per century. So for a century-long 

trend, the error is more than 4 times as large as the EPA’s highest amount of temperature 

savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 6]

While EPA’s temperature savings is quantifiable, it is not detectable. Since it is not detectable, it 

means that we cannot assess any sort of scientific meaningfulness from such a change. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 6]

This lack of scientific meaningfulness in EPA’s regulation is a problem. EPA is supposed to 

protect the public health and welfare. EPA’s regulations should be meaningful, not merely 

“quantifiable,” and “directionally consistent.” EPA’s statement about quantifiability and 

directionality would be equally true if greenhouse gas emissions standards were increased by 1 

gram per mile (i.e. 249 grams per mile instead of 250). But instead of tightening the standard to 

249 grams per mile, EPA sets the standard at 163 grams per mile in 2025. EPA gives no rational 

basis for choosing 163 grams per mile instead of 249 grams per mile. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, p. 6]

For all practical purposes, in the context of human welfare, setting the GHG emission standard at 

249 grams per mile would result in the same climate impact as setting the standard at 163 grams 

per mile. The theoretical temperature impact of a 1 gram per mile standard would be even less 

than 0.0076–0.018°C, but because 0.0076–0.018°C is so small, the difference would be 

indistinguishable in the real world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 6-7]

It should be noted that the EPA Administrator is required to explain the reasonableness of her 

regulatory response. For example, Motor Vehicle Mfrs.’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., requires the agency to “examine the relevant data and articulate ... a ‘rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice made.’” The EPA has not done that in this case—there is 

no rational connection between EPA finding that greenhouse gases endanger public health and 
EPA Response to Comments

16-18

welfare and a rule which does not result in a meaningful impact on the imperiled public health 

and welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 7]

5. The climate impact of the proposed rule, though small, may nevertheless be overstated

It is quite possible that EPA’s estimate of the reduction in temperature and sea level rise is an 

overestimate. EPA used a climate sensitivity of 1.5 to 6°C. More recent science argues that the 

climate sensitivity is likely to be below or in the low range of this estimate. For example, one 

recent paper found it likely that that climate sensitivity is between 1.7°C and 2.6°C. Another 

recent paper found a “Transient Climate Response of 1.3–1.8°C”. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9573-A1, p. 7]

Previously, EPA has avoided considering climate sensitivities lower than the AR4 range arguing 

that the IPCC was correct. In 2010, EPA stated: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 7]

“the IPCC indicates the levels of understanding and confidence in quantitative estimates of 

equilibrium climate sensitivity have increased substantially and there is increased confidence of 

key processes that are important to climate sensitivity due to improved comparisons of models to 

one another and to observations. Thus EPA concludes that the use of the climate sensitivity range 

for the climate analysis for this rule is appropriate and supported by the scientific literature from 

the major assessment reports.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 7-8]

In this proposed rule, it is good to see EPA consider a climate sensitivity lower than the IPCC’s 

standard climate sensitivity of 2 to 4.5°C. EPA’s past response is now inadequate because of 

more recent science. Furthermore, the more recent science argues for climate sensitivity nearer 

the low end of the range and discounts the top end of the range EPA used. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, p. 8]

The climate sensitivity is important because it forms the basis for EPA’s justification for 

regulating greenhouse gases from light-duty vehicles. If the lower bound for climate sensitivity is 

correct, the impact of this proposed rule would only be about 0.008°C by 2100—an incredibly 

small amount to say the least. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 8]

6. Because these regulations would not affect climate in a meaningful way, this calls into 

question EPA’s Endangerment Finding

This proposed rule is a follow-up to EPA’s proposal that greenhouse gases from motor vehicles 

“endanger public health or welfare” under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. The 2017-2025 

light-duty vehicle standard demonstrates that the Endangerment Finding is on shaky ground. If 

greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles “endanger public health or welfare,” it stands to 

reason that this proposed rule should lead to meaningful climatic benefits. However, because this 

proposed rule would only lead to a reduction in global temperature by 0.0076–0.0184°C by 2100 

that is both climatically meaningless and undetectable against background natural variability, this 

rule does not create a meaningful impact. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 8]

7. Conclusion to Section A
Analysis of GHG Emissions Reductions and Their Associated Effects

16-19

Because this rule fails to affect climate in a meaningful way, and because reducing climate harms 

is the point of EPA’s regulatory authority under Massachusetts v. EPA and the proposed 

endangerment finding, EPA should not regulate greenhouse gases from light-duty 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 8]

Response:

The Institute for Energy Research (IER) makes two major claims in order to argue 

against the standard. First, that the estimated reductions in climate change in the rule do “not 

affect climate in a meaningful way.” This argument has been addressed in Section 16.2. As noted 

there, the commenter’s argument has been decisively and pointedly rejected by the D.C. Circuit. 

It also bears mention that regardless of the degree to which this rule will, in and of itself, 

ameliorate global climate change, EPA has clear discretion under section 202 (a) to issue these 

standards following its positive endangerment finding. Section 202 (a) does not specify any 

minimum level of effectiveness for standards. Rather, section 202 (a) directs EPA to set the 

standards at a level that is reasonable in light of applicable compliance cost and technology 

considerations. Like any other technology based standard, the rule’s stringency is not dependent 

on any particular environmental outcome but rather on a weighing of the statutorily specified 

criteria relating to feasibility, cost and available lead time. The second claim by IER is that the 

climate impact of the rule has been overstated. IER references two new studies in order to argue 

that the climate sensitivity of the Earth system to a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations is 

at or below the low end of the range used by the EPA (which was 1.5 to 6.0 degrees C). While 

this new research is of interest, these studies are not definitive. The EPA has reasonably relied on 

comprehensive assessments like those of the National Academies, US Global Change Research 

Program, and IPCC because assessments cover the full range of the literature and place the 

individual studies in context. 

The first study cited by IER is Schmittner et al., 2011, which estimates a likely range of 

climate sensitivity of 1.7 to 2.6 degrees C. This climate sensitivity is on the low end of the IPCC 

estimates. This study is a useful contribution, but depends on a single computer model as well as 

on estimates of conditions during the last glacial maximum (such as temperature and forcing) 

that are difficult to calculate. For example, the authors acknowledge that their estimates of global 

mean temperatures in the last glacial maximum are 30 to 40 percent smaller than previous 

estimates, and only 2.2 degrees C cooler than present, and a recent review of paleoclimate 

studies shows that the Schmittner et al. estimate of global glacial temperatures remains an outlier 

(Braconnot et al., 201245). Meanwhile, other recent studies estimating climate sensitivity have 

come to the conclusion that the IPCC range is possibly an underestimate rather than an 

overestimate (Pagani et al., 200946). Therefore, it would be premature at this time to conclude 

based on Schmittner et al. that the climate sensitivity range used by the EPA is either an over or 

an underestimate.

 45 Braconnot P. et al., Evaluation of climate models using palaeoclimatic data, Nature Climate Change (2012), 

doi:10.1038/nclimate1456. (Docket EPA EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799) 46 Pagani, M., Z. Liu, J. LaRiviere, and A. Ravelo, 2010: High Earth-system climate sensitivity determined from 

Pliocene carbon dioxide concentrations. Nature Geoscience, 3, 27-30. (Docket EPA EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
EPA Response to Comments

16-20

The second paper cited by IER estimated the “Transient Climate Response” (TCR), and 

IER incorrectly compares this TCR estimate to the range of equilibrium climate sensitivity 

estimates used by the EPA. Transient sensitivity is a measure of the temperature change 

precisely at the time of doubling of CO2 concentrations, before the climate system has come to 

equilibrium, in contrast to the climate sensitivity which is related to the temperature response 

after the system has come to equilibrium. The IPCC fourth assessment report, in Table 8.2 

(Randall et al., 200747), shows how the TCR compares to the climate sensitivity in a number of 

climate models. The climate sensitivity in this table ranges from 1.3 to 2.3 times the TCR. 

Applying these ratios to the TCR estimates provided by the commenter results in a range of CS 

from 1.7 to 4.2, which is similar to the likely range of 2 to 4.5 provided by the IPCC. 

Therefore, the EPA finds that the range of climate sensitivity used in this rule is 

appropriate, and that the analysis of climate impacts was appropriate and reasonable. 

 47 Randall, D.A., R.A. Wood, S. Bony, R. Colman, T. Fichefet, J. Fyfe, V. Kattsov, A. Pitman, J. Shukla, J. 

Srinivasan, R.J. Stouffer, A. Sumi, and K.E. Taylor (2007) Climate Models and Their Evaluation. In: Climate 

Change2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, 

M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, 

USA. (Docket EPA EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799)
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-1

17. Analysis of Impacts on Non-GHG Emissions

Organizations Included in this Section

American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

Growth Energy

Comments on GDI and PM

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

OEMs NEED CLEANER FUELS IN ORDER TO FULLY AND COST EFFECTIVELY 

COMPLY WITH THE RULE. 

To meet the aggressive targets established by this rule, OEMs will employ advanced engine 

technologies that would benefit from and require fuel quality improvements in order to meet the 

fuel efficiency and lower carbon goals without worsening other forms of pollution and 

contributing to air quality backsliding. The OEMs will bundle multiple advanced engine 

technologies to meet the stricter targets. Notably, the Agencies project that for spark ignition (SI) 

engines, gasoline direct injection (GDI) will be an especially important compliance tool, and 

they expect the OEMs to rapidly adopt it, projecting 85% penetration by 2016, and 100% by 

2020 and beyond. However, as will be discussed more below, absent fuel composition changes, 

experts warn that for all of its mileage efficiency and carbon reduction benefits, GDI technology 

is expected to result in substantial increases in urban ambient particulate matter, especially the 

highly pathogenic PM2.5 that includes UFPs.5 Unfortunately, if regulators ultimately decide to 

deal with that problem by requiring the OEMs to install filters and traps on SIDI engines (as is 

now done with diesel engines), adverse consequences are likely to ensue. Engine efficiencies and 

costs to consumers will be compromised. The Agencies will limit the ability of the OEMs to 

utilize engineering expertise to develop the optimal solution to reach the goals of this regulation. 

Experts warn that gasoline UFPs are so much smaller than diesel PM, use of filters will be 

ineffective, cost prohibitive, and counterproductive, leading to increased carbon emissions and 

reduced engine efficiency.6 In short, failure to synchronize fuel composition changes with 

advanced engine technologies could negate many of the positive outcomes this rule is designed 

to achieve. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 3]

As previously discussed, experts warn that advanced engine designs needed for automakers to 

comply with tighter fuel efficiency rules could lead to a significant increase in the UFP fraction 

of PM2.5 emissions unless fuel composition is upgraded to replace the toxic octane components 

of Aromatic Group Compounds with Clean Octane components.24 [Attachment E can be found 

in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A8] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 

7]

PAHQs are combustion byproducts and derivatives of Aromatic Group Compounds (see 

Attachment C for the discussion in the 2010 Honda SAE paper), and could be inadvertently and 
EPA Response to Comments

17-2

substantially increased by this rulemaking in the absence of fuel composition changes. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 7]

As the 2007 Tufts University study warned, this oversight represents a major deficiency in 

transportation fuels regulatory policy, especially since vehicle GHG reduction technologies 

expected to come into widespread use as a result of this rule are likely to increase these 

pollutants dramatically.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 8]

VEHICLE FILTERS INEFFECTIVE FOR GASOLINE‘S SMALLER PARTICLES. 

A number of recent studies have concluded that requiring the OEMs to fit gasoline-powered 

vehicles with filters or traps, as they have done with diesel engines, would be cost prohibitive, 

ineffective, and counterproductive. For example, according to the Delphi Powertrain 

International 2011 SAE study, “. . . the number size distributions show for homogeneous 

gasoline engines compared to Diesel engines typically a higher number of particles at smaller 

sizes...the typically smaller particles generated by gasoline engines require a finer filter 

characteristic...which consistently leads to a negative impact on performance, fuel consumption, 

and CO2 emissions.” For that reason, we firmly believe that the most cost effective, and 

technologically efficient, solution to these undesirable tradeoffs is to upgrade fuel standards to 

significantly reduce Aromatic Group Compounds, which are the primary source of the PM2.5 and 

particle-bound toxics. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 7]

Organization: Governors' Biofuels Coalition

Recent reports indicate that the failure to establish tighter fuel standards to complement 

advanced engine designs could result in dramatic increases in a major health threat in urban

areas: fine and ultrafine particulate matter. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9570-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Growth Energy

This Attachment explains why, in the Joint NPRM, the Agencies should have thoroughly 

examined the impacts of new technologies used to meet the GHG standards on PM emissions. 

There are many studies that indicate that gasoline direct injection, a technology which will be 

used to meet the GHG standards, will increase both particulate matter mass and particulate 

number emissions. The Agencies need to consider an alternative approach, which would include 

fuel parameter changes that could enable additional engine technologies to be used to improve 

efficiency and reduce emissions. The Agencies’ proposal requires new technology to be used on 

vehicles using old technology fuels. It has long been recognized that vehicles and fuels operate 

as a system. To undertake significant changes and increases in the stringency of tailpipe GHG 

standards without a parallel and integrated examination of potential changes in the fuel used by 

these vehicles is inappropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 22]

I. Relevant Emissions Impacts
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-3

The Joint NPRM includes extensive discussion of the technologies, costs, and benefits of the 

proposal, seeking comments on many aspects of the proposal. In addition, EPA “seeks comment 

on whether there are any other health and environmental impacts associated with advancements 

in vehicle GHG reduction technologies that should be considered.” These are the salient points:

• EPA and NHTSA project widespread use of gasoline direct injection (GDI) in meeting 

the proposed CAFÉ and GHG standards.

• There is substantial evidence that GDI increases PM mass and PM number emissions 

compared to the conventional port fuel injection (PFI) technology now in widespread use.

• There is also substantial evidence that increased ethanol use will decrease PM mass and 

PM number emissions from the affected vehicles.

• The EPA and NHTSA proposal does not account for the increased PM emissions from 

GDI technology.

• The benefits from the proposal are sensitive to the PM effects assumed by the Agencies.

• Therefore, the final rule should evaluate and consider both the increased PM due to GDI 

use and the potential for more widespread ethanol use to decrease PM mass and number 

emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 23]

A. EPA and NHTSA project widespread use of gasoline direct injection (GDI) in meeting the 

proposed CAFÉ and GHG standards.

The proposed rule discusses technologies that can increase fuel economy, indicating that many of 

the technologies are already available, and that manufacturers will be able to meet the standards 

through significant efficiency improvements in these technologies as well as a significant 

penetration of these technologies across the fleet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 23]

The proposed rule indicates:

There are a number of competing gasoline engine technologies, with one in particular that the 

agencies project will be common beyond 2016. This is the gasoline direct injection and 

downsized engines equipped with turbochargers and cooled exhaust gas recirculation, which has 

performance characteristics similar to that of larger, less efficient engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, p. 24]

The Joint NPRM also provides estimates of the penetration of various technologies in 2021 and 

2025. GDI penetrations are forecast to be greater than 90% in both cars and trucks by 2025 as 

shown in Tables III-42 and III-43. Therefore, widespread use of GDI is one of the technologies 

that the Agencies are relying on in the proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 24]
EPA Response to Comments

17-4

34 In the recent California GHG rulemaking, the Air Resources Board avoided this issue by 

assuming that PM mass emissions from PFI and GDI would be similar based primarily on 

speculative assumptions about future GDI technology and deterioration rates.

The Joint NPRM considers several impacts of the proposal on non-GHGs, both positive and 

negative. For example, the analysis evaluates the impact that reductions in domestic fuel refining 

and distribution due to lower fuel consumption will have on U.S. emissions of various pollutants. 

In addition, the analysis evaluates the increase in emissions from additional vehicle use 

associated with the rebound effect from higher fuel economy. As the various positive and 

negative impacts on non-GHGs and considered, the proposal indicates: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, p. 30]

Thus the net effect of stricter CAFE standards on emissions of each pollutant depends on the 

relative magnitudes of its reduced emissions in fuel refining and distribution, and increases in its 

emissions from vehicle use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 30]

One aspect of these “complex interactions” that certainly merits attention is the potential effect 

of technological innovation on criteria and toxic pollutants, in the absence of improved in-use 

fuel standards. As HEI’s February 2011 study noted, the use of GDI technology increases some 

current gasolines’ particulate emissions. Without NHTSA having directly addressing that study 

in the DEIS, the Agencies simply note in the NPRM that “the net effect of stricter standards on 

emissions of each criteria pollutant depends on the relative magnitudes of reduced emissions 

from fuel refining and distribution, and increases in emissions resulting from added vehicle use.” 

76 Fed. Reg. at 74,933. That cursory observation does not meet the requirements of NEPA for a 

“thorough investigation” and a “candid acknowledgment” of risks. Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Dept. 

Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005; see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. 

Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 fn. 21 

(1976); 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coalition v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006; accord, Ctr. 

for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1223 (9th Cir. 

2008). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 31]

B. There is substantial evidence that GDI increases PM mass and PM number emissions 

compared to the conventional PFI technology now in widespread use.

A recent Myung and Park review of nano-particle emissions from internal combustion engines 

indicates that GDI engines produce considerably more particles than conventional port fuel 

injection ones and that “much of the research indicates that GDI engines produce significantly 

more particulates than conventional PFI engines, especially during the cold start phase and 

during stratified operation.” Myong and Park provide numerous references to support their 

findings, including textbooks, literature surveys, research studies using single-cylinder and 

multi-cylinder engines in which various parameters can be changed, measurements from 

production engines, and studies of various potential after-treatment systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 24]

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) in 2010 acknowledged that GDI increased PM 

mass and number emissions substantially. The CARB report indicated “GDI technology tends to 

have higher PM mass and particle number emissions than conventional PFI technology.” The 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-5

CARB report noted that the published literature points to GDI PM mass emissions in the range of 

2 to 20 mg/mi, and indicated that, if not abated, the GDI combustion system has the potential to 

emit two to eight times more PM mass than PFI vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

p. 24]

Szybist et al., 2011 also report that “while gasoline DI technology is beneficial for fuel economy, 

it produces an increase in particulate matter emissions in comparison to PFI engines” and 

provide several references to support that fact. Maricq also notes the DI PM issue: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 24-25]

GDI engines offer a number of opportunities for improved fuel efficiency, such as reduced 

pumping losses, charge air cooling, and downsizing when turbocharged. But, direct injection of 

fuel into the engine cylinder is susceptible to incomplete fuel evaporation and to fuel 

impingement on piston and cylinder walls, both of which lead to combustion of liquid fuel and, 

consequently, to increased PM emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 25]

A recent report by the Health Effects Institute's Special Committee on Emerging Technologies 

states that the need to improve fuel economy and the need to reduce GHG emissions are driving 

the introduction of gasoline direct injection (GDI) technology because it improves fuel economy 

and performance. They state GDI is more expensive than the port fuel injection (PFI) system that 

it is replacing. They also point out that because of less complete mixing of the fuel vapor and air 

in GDI systems, particulate emissions of the engine increase, including the number of ultrafine 

particles (UFPs defined as particles that are less than 100 nanometers (nm) in diameter). Thus 

additional technological fixes may be required to meet the Tier 2 PM2.5 emission standards for 

GDI vehicles which would incur additional costs. More recently, similar concerns were echoed 

by Ayala, Brauer, Mauderly and Samet. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 25]

With respect to current production vehicles, Piock et al., 2011 present results for particle number 

and particle mass for a number of production European vehicles that meet the Euro 4 (2005) 

standards in their Figure 1. The seven GDI vehicles have an order of magnitude higher PM mass 

and PM number emissions than do the three PFI vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

p. 25]

Because a limit on PM number emissions is under discussion for implementation in 2014 in 

Europe, effort toward understanding and reducing PM mass and PM number emissions from 

GDI engines is underway. There are two basic approaches on the emitted by the engine, and (2) 

aftertreatment particulate filters. It is not clear how successful either of these approaches can be. 

With manufacturers under strong incentives to optimize engines for fuel economy and cost, 

optimization for minimum PM mass and number emissions may conflict with optimization for 

fuel economy or may add additional cost for hardware and development. With regard to 

particulate filters, Piock et al. indicate: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 25-26]

In principle, particulate filters already in standard use on modern Diesel engine powered 

passenger cars can be applied to gasoline engines as well. The typically smaller particles 

generated by gasoline engines require a finer filter characteristics (e.g. cell density, mean pore 

size and porosity) which consequently leads to a higher exhaust system backpressure with a 

negative impact on performance, fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. The addition of a 
EPA Response to Comments

17-6

particulate filter system would cause a significant increase of the overall aftertreatment system 

complexity and cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 26]

The proposed rule is silent on the potential increase in PM mass and number emissions due to the 

widespread use of GDI. As noted above, this is a major oversight. EPA and NHTSA have an 

obligation to insure that any new fuel or technology developed for transportation must not 

adversely impact health or the environment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 26]

Despite the evidence that widespread use of GDI may increase PM emissions, the proposal does 

not address the issue. The proposal does note that:

EPA has the discretion under the CAA to consider many related factors, such as the availability 

of technologies, the appropriate lead time for introduction of technology, and based on this the 

feasibility and practicability of their standards; the impacts of their standards on emissions 

reductions (of both GHGs and non- GHGs); [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 30]

Therefore, even if EPA determines that it cannot implement Growth Energy’s proposal at the 

current time, given the limits on the current rulemaking, the Final Rule should evaluate and 

consider both the increased PM due to GDI use and the potential for more widespread ethanol 

use to decrease PM emissions. In considering the increased PM due to widespread use of GDI 

technology, the final rule should consider the increase in PM mass as well as particle number.34 

The emission of, effects from, and potential mitigation of ultrafine particles from vehicles are all 

active research areas. In addition, various approaches for setting particle number standards for 

vehicles are being considered in Europe and California. Within the time frame of the regulations 

in the proposed rule, the importance of ultrafine particles and their control will be 

understood. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 40]

The final rule should also consider potential ways of mitigating the PM increases from GDI use. 

The mitigation methods examined should include both fuel-related methods and aftertreatment. 

Higher ethanol use should be thoroughly evaluated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 40]

However, there is no discussion in the in the proposal indicating that EPA considered whether 

the technologies assumed in the proposal would increase non-GHG emissions. This is an 

important oversight. Instead, EPA merely assumed that they would not. For example, the 

proposal indicates: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 30]

The agencies’ analysis assumes that the per-mile emission rates for cars and light trucks 

produced during the model years affected by the proposed rule will remain constant at the levels 

resulting from EPA’s Tier 2 light duty vehicle emissions standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 30]

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

As air toxics, PAHs must be removed under the MSAT provisions, because there are ample 

substitutes. It is especially important to do this before efficiency technologies such as direct 

injection are adopted. Such technologies will increase PAH emissions, compounding the 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-7

problem and necessitating expensive future tailpipe adjustment for pollution that is the fault of 

the fuel, not the car, and that could be addressed at no cost today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9506-A1, pp. 8-9]

Organization: Marz, Loren C.

GDI technology (especially lean-burn GDI) may have difficulty meeting future PM emission 

limits as currently proposed by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) based on several 

studies (e.g., 'Preliminary Discussion Paper – Proposed Amendments To California’s LowEmission Vehicle Regulations – Particulate Matter Mass, Ultrafine Solid Particle Number, And 

Black Carbon Emissions.' CARB, 

http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/levprog/leviii/meetings/051810/pm_disc_paper-v6.pdf; Walter 

Piock et al, “Strategies Towards Meeting Future Particulate Matter Emission Requirements in 

Homogeneous Gasoline Direct Injection Engines.” SAE International, 2011-01-1212, 

http://delphi.com/pdf/techpapers/2011-01-1212.pdf; Kody Klindt, IAV Automotive Engineering 

Inc., 'Reducing the particulate emission numbers in DI Gasoline Engines.' 

http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/deer_2010/monday/presentations/deer10_kli

ndt.pdf). This has the potential of effectively requiring particulate filters (GPF) on GDI vehicles, 

which in turn has the potential of significantly increasing the price of GDI technology and/or 

reducing the assumed efficiency of GDI technology. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0213-A1, pp.4-5]

Response to GDI-PM Comments:

As discussed in Preamble section III. G.1 and RIA Chapter 6.2, EPA is finalizing 

greenhouse gas emissions standards that will result in a net reduction of PM2.5. In 2030, the EPA 

estimates that the MY 2017-2025 light-duty standards will reduce total PM 2.5 inventories by 

1,254 short tons. The EPA analyzed the impact the MY 2017-2025 light-duty vehicle GHG rule 

will have on PM2.5 and other non-GHG pollutants in both 2020 and 2030. For PM2.5 the EPA 

estimates reductions in "upstream" PM2.5 emissions, including reductions from fuel refining, 

distribution and transport as a result of the standards, We also estimated "downstream" increase 

in PM2.5 due to people driving more. The rule effectively makes the cost per mile of driving 

lower for consumers by improving fuel economy, increasing the likelihood that they will drive 

more. This is known as the "rebound effect." Thus this small downstream PM2.5 increase is a 

result of a predicted change in driving behavior consistent with the economics literature, as well 

as the past four Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rulemakings. In addition, we also 

estimate a small increase in PM2.5 from power plants as electric powertrain vehicles increase in 

prevalence as a result of this rule. 

With regard to advanced engine technologies, such as "gasoline direct injection fuel 

systems" or GDI, there are various forms of this technology in production today. While some 

initial designs are not yet optimized for PM emissions performance, the EPA believes that 

industry will have adopted the cleanest forms of GDI by the timeframe of this rule. 

We received several comments on PM2.5 emissions from advanced technology vehicles. 

Growth Energy commented that “There is substantial evidence that GDI increases PM mass and

PM number emissions compared to the conventional port fuel injection (PFI) technology now in 

widespread use... Therefore, the final rule should evaluate and consider both the increased PM 
EPA Response to Comments

17-8

due to GDI use and the potential for more widespread ethanol use to decrease PM mass and 

number emissions.” The Clean Fuels Development Coalition and Loren Marz submitted similar 

comments. EPA agrees with the commenter that testing on initial GDI technology, primarily 

wall-guided systems, has shown an increase in PM emissions over the FTP as compared to 

conventional PFI gasoline engines. However as noted above, the technology is still evolving, 

making it difficult to predict future PM emission performance of GDI vehicles. Testing on initial 

spray-guided GDI systems has shown less of a PM increase over the FTP, and even reduced PM 

emissions over the US06 compared to PFI vehicles.48 Due to the improved fuel economy and 

reduced emissions offered by spray-guided GDI technology, it is anticipated that spray-guided 

GDI will replace wall-guided systems in the 2017 to 2025 timeframe.

49 As a result, in the 

technical assessment conducted by the agencies as part of this rulemaking, the agencies assessed 

the emissions and fuel consumption improvements associated with spray-guided GDI systems 

and assumed that their overall in-use PM emission performance was comparable to that of PFI 

vehicles.

Regarding comments from Clean Fuels Development Council (CFDC) on use of 

Aromatics as ethanol use in gasoline has continued to rise in response to market forces and RFS, 

the additional octane provided by ethanol has been used by refiners to reduce the concentration 

of aromatics (another source of octane) in the gasoline they supply. As shown below in figure 

below, there has been a 15 percent decrease in aromatics with the rise in ethanol use over the 

past decade. Some recent research50 suggests that this aromatics reduction has lead to reductions 

in both PM emissions and improvement in PM air quality. Instead of allowing aromatics levels 

to fall naturally as ethanol levels increase, an aromatics standard could ensure that gasoline 

aromatic levels fell in proportion to the projected increase in ethanol use. With the increased use 

of ethanol, not only have the aromatic levels in gasoline been declining, but we project that they 

will continue to decline. The average level of aromatics in gasoline today is around 22 percent, 

although it ranges from 3 to 47 percent on a batch basis, and 10 to 40 percent on a refinery 

average basis due to the wide variation in refinery configuration, crude oil source, and available 

product markets.51 Some stakeholders have stated that EPA should mandate even larger 

reductions in the aromatics content of gasoline in order to provide an incentive for increased 

ethanol use in gasoline beyond RFS levels. They believe that the country would benefit from 

reduced air pollution (air toxics, PM emissions and secondarily-formed PM) resulting from the 

reduction in the aromatic content of gasoline. Such regulatory action is clearly outside the scope 

of this light-duty GHG standards rulemaking. However, given the potential PM emission 

benefits, it is something that may warrant further study in the future. 

 48 “Test Program to evaluate PM emissions from GDI vehicles,” Memo from Michael Olechiw to EPA docket EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799 

49 The technology modeling for this rule includes a spray guided GDI system. See Joint TSD Section 3.3 

50 “Development of a Predictive Model for Gasoline Vehicle Particulate Matter Emissions," by K. Aikawa, T. 

Sakurai, J. Jetter. SAE International 2010-01-2115. Published 10/25/2010. SAE International Journal of Fuels and 

Lubricants, Volume 3, Issue 2. "Particle Emissions from a 2009 Gasoline Direct Injection Engine Using Different 

Commercially Available Fuels," by I. Khalek, T. Bougher, J. Jetter. SAE International 2010-01-2117. Published 

10/25/2010. SAE International Journal of Fuels and Lubricants, Volume 3, Issue 2.

51 Based on current refinery batch data.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-9

Figure: Aromatics and Gasoline Ethanol Concentration vs. Time

Increases in Pollutants due to the Final Standards

Organization: American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 81-82.]

Although reducing traditional air pollution emissions is not the primary focus of the proposed 

rules, in some scenarios result in increases for particular vehicle pollutants, notably carbon 

monoxide and aldehydes.

ALA nevertheless recognizes that the general trend across the alternatives considered is to lower 

emissions of ambient air pollutants when compared with the no action alternative.

Not only does the preferred alternative, the proposed standards, result in significantly lower 

carbon dioxide emissions.

26.6 27.1

26 26.5

27.3

26.4

25.6 25.1

23.5 23.6

22.6

1.3 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.0

4.0

4.9

7.2

8.1

9.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Gasoline Concentration (vol%)

Avg. Corrected Aromatics, vol% (AAM)

Avg. EtOH, vol% (EIA)
EPA Response to Comments

17-10

But these standards also result in lower levels of sulfur dioxide, fine particle pollution, volatile 

organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, benzene and diesel particulate matter once fleet turnover 

would be substantially complete by 2040 with the reduction in VOCs and NOx yielding 

corresponding increases in ground level ozone.

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Again, at the very least, EPA must address this issue: if it is going to rely on the CAA for 

authority to reduce mobile CO2, it cannot ignore the same statute’s requirements to reduce 

mobile source air toxics, especially if that reduction also reduces CO2. At the very least, EPA 

cannot under the CAA cause an increase of one form of regulated pollution that causes serious 

health problems by reducing another that does not. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 10]

There are other factors at work in addition to the rebound effect. The California Air Resources 

Board’s (CARB) pending proposal for lowering PM standards charts the increase in PM that is 

expected to result from new technologies such as GDI. CARB’s proposed tightened PM limits 

are thus designed to counteract this “backsliding”—an increase in addition to that caused by the 

rebound effect. But fuel reformation with alcohol blending or CNG could produce reductions and 

block this “backsliding” at far less cost than tailpipe regulations. At the very least, this issue must 

be addressed in this proceeding, which will otherwise cause pollution increases that are likely to 

be held illegal under the CAA and which might never be precluded by any Tier III rule. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 10]

Response:

As we state in Section 11 of this Response to Comments document, reducing the 

aromatic content of gasoline is clearly outside the scope of this LD GHG standards rulemaking. 

However given the potential PM emission benefits, the Agency is continuing to study the effects 

of aromatics on vehicle emissions and air quality. The innuendo that this rule will significantly 

increase emissions of air toxics as a trade-off for controlling GHGs is misplaced. EPA 

performed national-scale air quality modeling to estimate future year annual PM2.5

concentrations, 24-hour PM2.5 concentrations, 8-hour ozone concentrations, air toxics 

concentrations, visibility levels and nitrogen and sulfur deposition levels based on the final 

vehicle standards and, as detailed in Section 6.2.2 of the RIA, our modeling indicates that there 

will be only small changes in ambient concentrations of criteria and air toxics pollutants as a 

result of this rule. The overall small impacts of the final vehicle standards are a function of 

emissions changes related to VMT increases from rebound, upstream reductions in petroleum 

consumption from crude oil production and transport, and gasoline production, distribution and 

transport, and changes in location and amount of electricity generation. 

Comments on Regional Modeling

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-11

5. Update the CMAQ model to ensure full capture of the benefits derived from the significant 

reductions in urban PM2.5 secondary organic aerosol (SOA) that will occur due to the reductions 

in gasoline “Aromatic Group Compounds” made possible by E30+ blends‘ substitution 

(especially significant for OMB cost – benefit analysis purposes, see discussion on p. 6 and 

Attachment D). [This attachment can be found in Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9574-A7] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 1]

As will be discussed in more detail below, the Agencies have stated their intention to incorporate 

more detailed findings in the final rule from new science and model improvements. For example, 

the EPA says it will use its updated CMAQv.5.0 model to ―...analyze the impact of the 

standards on PM2.5, ozone, and selected air toxics.‖ This is potentially significant because EPA 

has known for years that its CMAQ model was substantially under-reporting the formation of 

mobile source PM2.5 secondary organic aerosols (SOAs). In urban areas, PM2.5 SOAs primarily 

originate from mobile sources, most importantly from toluene within the Aromatic Group 

Compounds. It must be assumed that incorporation of these new findings will also require 

NHTSA to make adjustments to its draft EIS, which gives insufficient attention to mobile source 

PM2.5, particularly the future health and welfare costs which will be imposed by increases in 

gasoline-derived particulate matter emissions, and will most severely impact the nation‘s highly 

vulnerable urban population. New science suggests that the particulate bound toxics can be found 

at elevated levels up to 2,500 meters from congested roadways, thus exposing a vast majority of 

Americans to these deadly pollutants.

• We also note that the EPA‘s October 19, 2011, announcement of the completion of its 

CMAQ 5.0 model means that it will be better able to measure localized pollution impacts, 

such as those that occur near congested roadways.18 As a 2007 Tufts University study19 

and others have warned, EPA‘s regional modeling approach has seriously masked the 

true health costs of gasoline Aromatic Group Compounds and their primary role in urban 

PM emissions. 

P. 75109, EXPOSURE AND HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH TRAFFIC-RELATED 

AIR POLLUTION. We strongly urge the Agencies to update their database and assumptions 

with regard to how far mobile source air pollutants can travel at elevated levels. The Agencies, 

both EPA in the rulemaking, and NHTSA in its EIS, assume populations are exposed only 300 –

500 meters from congested roadways. (Even at this limited range, the Agencies note that 48 

million people would be subjected to these elevated pollutant levels.) However, more recent 

studies (such as 2009 CARB, UCLA, and University of Southern California research) show that 

mobile source-generated PAHs can be found at elevated levels as far away as 2,500 meters, or 

more than 1.5 miles. The report states that these findings have “significant exposure 

implications, since most people are in their homes during the hours before sunrise, and outdoor 

pollutants penetrate into indoor environments.”28 This means that the vast majority of 

Americans are exposed to pathogenic PAHs and other particle-bound toxics that this rulemaking 

does not consider. As the 2007 Tufts University study warned, this oversight represents a major 

deficiency in transportation fuels regulatory policy, especially since vehicle GHG reduction 

technologies expected to come into widespread use as a result of this rule are likely to increase 

these pollutants dramatically.29 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

17-12

Response:

EPA performed national-scale air quality modeling using CMAQ v4.7.1 for the final rule. The 

air quality modeling for these final standards was initiated prior to February 2012, when CMAQ 5.0 was publically 

released. CMAQ 4.7.1 was used since it was the most current version of the model available at the time the air 

quality modeling started. CMAQ v4.7.1 includes updates related to secondary organic aerosol (SOA) chemistry. 

SOA chemistry research, described in Section 6.2.1.2.2 of the RIA, has led to implementation of 

new pathways for SOA in CMAQ 4.7, based on recommendations of Edney et al. and the recent 

work of Carlton et al.52, 53 In previous versions of CMAQ, all SOA was semivolatile and 

resulted from the oxidation of compounds emitted entirely in the gas-phase. In CMAQ v4.7, 

parameters in existing pathways were revised and new formation mechanisms were added. 

Some of the new pathways, such as low-NOX oxidation of aromatics and particle-phase 

oligomerization, result in nonvolatile SOA. 

Section 6.1.1.10 of the RIA presents information on exposure and health effects associated with trafficrelated air pollution near roads. This information is focused within 500 meters of a road because that range includes 

the distance that review articles show as the range where most studies indicate that pollutants reach background 

levels. There is research, such as the 2009 study cited by the commenter, indicating that depending on 

meteorological conditions, near road pollutants can be transported further than 500 meters. 

The CMAQ model, described in Section 6.2.1 of the RIA, does not make any assumptions about 

exposure at various distances from roads. Instead it models the transport and dispersion of 

pollutants based on numerous science modules that simulate the emission, production, decay, 

deposition and transport of organic and inorganic gas-phase and particle-phase pollutants in the 

atmosphere. In addition, as noted above, there are various forms of advanced engine technologies such as GDI, 

and EPA believes that over the timeframe addressed by this rule, manufacturers will have adopted the cleanest forms 

of GDI which are expected to have emission performance comparable to PFI vehicles. 

Comments on Health Effects of Acetaldehyde

Organization: Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

P. 75107, ACETALDEHYDE. We note that EPA states it is currently “conducting a 

reassessment of cancer risk from inhalation exposure to acetaldehyde,” which is the only 

hazardous air pollutant associated with increased use of E30+ blends. Attachment F provides 

preliminary details on acetaldehyde‘s extremely low ranking in terms of Inhalation Risk Factor 

(IRF), as reported by DOE, CARB, and other experts (1, 3 butadiene = 100; formaldehyde = 4.6; 

benzene = 3.0; acetaldehyde = 0.8). We will be submitting a more detailed analysis on this 

subject for the Tier 3 rulemaking, but, in the meantime, we respectfully request that the Agencies 

take this information into account as they finalize this rule. [Attachment F can be found in 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A10] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9574-A3, p. 

8]

 52 Edney, E. O., T. E. Kleindienst, M. Lewandowski, and J. H. Offenberg, 2007. Updated SOA chemical mechanism 

for the Community Multi-Scale Air Quality model, EPA 600/X-07/025, U.S. EPA, Research Triangle Park, NC. 

Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135. 53 Carlton, A.G., B. J. Turpin, K. Altieri, S. Seitzinger, R. Mathur, S. Roselle, R. J. Weber, (2008), CMAQ model 

performance enhanced when in-cloud SOA is included: comparisons of OC predictions with measurements, 

Environ. Sci. Technol. 42 (23), 8798–8802. Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0135.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

17-13

Response:

EPA is currently conducting a reassessment of cancer risk from inhalation exposure to 

acetaldehyde. However, inhalation unit risk factors were not used in any of the analyses for this 

rule. 

Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-1

18. Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

Organizations Included in this Section

Center for Biological Diversity

Growth Energy

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) – Ceres

Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union of Concerned Scientists-1)

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

New Jersey Senate, Third Legislative District

New York City Council, 35th District

New York State Assembly Committee on Government Operations

New York State Senate, 26th District

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Shick, R.

Smith, Frank Houston

State of New York, The Assembly

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

The Agencies cite the fact that the rulemaking’s benefits far outweigh their costs as an indication 

of its reasonableness. But the opposite is true. In light of the statutory mandate to achieve energy 

conservation, it is unreasonable to design a rulemaking that so obviously undervalues benefits. 

Here, technologies that can improve fuel efficiency significantly have been ruled out because of 

alleged cost concerns by manufacturers. Yet, the rulemaking’s benefits exceed its costs by many 

hundreds of billions of dollars.39 The fuel savings alone pay for the costs of additional 

technologies many times over, leaving billions of dollars in consumer pockets. The Agencies 

have thus left substantial, achievable fuel economy improvements and public benefits unrealized 

due to industry objections. Plainly, a rulemaking that elevates the protection of industry profits 

over energy conservation is contrary to EPCA and EISA. This calculus underlying the preferred 

alternative is anything but reasonable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 8]

Response:

EPA agrees with the commenter’s assessment that the projected benefits of the final standards far 

exceed the projected costs. Given the entire impact analysis set forth in the preamble and the 

RIA, EPA concludes that the final standards are reasonable and feasible. However, the 

commenter’s claim that even more stringent standards would be reasonable (because benefits so 

far exceed projected costs) does not take into account that the benefits of the rule are dependent 

on vehicles actually being built and purchased when one takes into consideration issues of cost, 

consumer acceptance, and available lead time. Note that EPA also responds to comments 

regarding the stringency of the standards in Section 2.
EPA Response to Comments

18-2

EPA has analyzed these issues in detail, including a projection of technology penetration rates 

needed to meet more stringent car and truck standards. As set out in detail in Section III.D.6 of 

the preamble to the final rule, truck and car standards which are 20 grams/mile more stringent 

would result in significantly increased penetration rates for advanced technologies. This is true 

in both MY 2021 and even more so in MY 2025. See Tables III-35 and III-37 for trucks, Tables 

III-42 and III-44 for cars. In addition, as discussed in that section of the preamble, a 20 g mile 

more stringent truck standard in MY 2021 would raise issues of available lead time and 

consumer acceptance for introducing challenging technologies into large pickup trucks. -This 

rapid influx of technologies (and costs) is also illustrated in figures III-3 and III-4. The tables 

and figures show that more stringent standards add costs and technologies in a non-linear 

fashion, as costs greatly increase as the rate of electrification increases. This commenter 

advocated alternative 4 (cars -20g/mi) as its preferred alternative, which is equivalent to an 

average of 6.5% annual rate of increase in stringency for cars. 

This level of stringency increase leads not only to increased costs, but raises issues of consumer 

acceptance due not only to the cost increases but in response to a marked increase in technology 

in vehicles. These technology increases include a doubling of electric vehicles and hybrid 

electric vehicles. For the MY 2025 standards, our analysis indicates that some manufacturers 

would be required to use the maximum amount of advanced technology we consider feasible (i.e. 

the phase-in cap amount) to achieve the 20 grams per mile more stringent standard and in some 

cases add even further advanced technology (see Table III-54 for the alternative 4 example). A 

number of commenters have noted that current penetration rates of HEVs are low (see discussion 

in Response to Comments section 18.1). Preamble III.H.1.b discusses issues related to consumer 

acceptance of EVs. As discussed there, we consider the projected level of EVs and PHEVs in 

this rule to be small enough that the market is likely to absorb the vehicles, but we acknowledge 

that we do not have sufficient information to estimate consumer response to these 

unconventional technologies. Increasing stringency of the standards would of course raise even 

more questions about market acceptance. In addition, more aggressive standards would raise 

significant issues not only of cost and consumer acceptance, but available lead time as well. 

Additionally, EPA feels that there are substantial uncertainties about the ability of consumers and 

automakers to absorb the total cost of a program where the total lifetime benefits equal the costs 

of the program. Although the commenter does not explicitly espouse such stringent standards, 

the commenter states that “fuel savings alone pay for the costs of additional technologies many 

times over, leaving billions of dollars in consumer pockets.” Simultaneously the commenter 

must acknowledge the market limitations associated with such radically high costs as in the 

alternative where total costs equals total benefits (which would be significantly more stringent 

than the standards in this rule). Some, if not all, of the increasing costs associated with this rule 

will be passed along to consumers (see discussions of cost pass-through in Preamble Section 

III.H.11.a and Response to Comments Section 18.7.1); thus, it is incorrect to imply that “industry 

profits” are the primary beneficiary of the standards in this rule relative to more stringent 

standards. Various public commenters (see discussion in Response to Comments Section 18.1) 

already raise concerns about public acceptance of the increased costs and new technologies 

resulting from this rule; other commenters express more optimism. As discussed in Response to 

Comments Section 18.1, consumer acceptance of the vehicles subject to these standards is 

necessary for the standards to have the impacts predicted in this rule. We believe that the 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-3

standards in this rule achieve a reasonable balance in promoting technological innovation while 

maintaining consumer acceptance. Tighter standards would involve significant uncertainties 

about these factors.

We note that analyses substantially similar to these were presented in the proposed rule, and the 

commenter does not raise any questions as to the accuracy of these analyses. EPA has made a 

reasonable policy choice to encourage more rapid penetration of advanced technology, especially 

into the heavy truck sector, by means of incentives and credit mechanisms, rather than by 

adopting aggressive standards under which the projected benefits may not accrue in whole or in 

part for the reasons just given.

Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Depending on the discount rate used, and the value attributed to the social benefits from reduced 

greenhouse gas emissions, EPA estimates that through the year 2050, the proposed rule will have 

net benefits (i.e. benefits exceeding costs) ranging from $460 billion to $1.7 trillion (in 2009 

dollars). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 9]

However, EPA’s cost-benefit analysis rests upon several dubious assumptions, at times straining 

to account for various possible benefits from the new rule while ignoring quite plausible 

drawbacks. Even a cursory inspection of EPA’s own breakdown of the numbers should give 

EPA pause before implementing the rule. Because of the sensitivity of the results to the 

controversial assumptions, it is not merely that EPA may be overstating the net benefits of the 

rule. Rather, the new rule may impose large net costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 

9]

Furthermore, EPA’s cost-benefit analysis for this rule is fatally flawed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, p. 23]

Response:

EPA disagrees with the commenter’s assertion that the cost-benefit analysis is fatally flawed. 

EPA uses standard economic parameters (including discount rates) to measure the monetary 

value of the rule’s impacts. These parameters, methods and assumptions are based on the best 

available data at the time and are documented extensively in the Preamble, RIA, and Joint TSD 

that accompanies this rule. 

EPA acknowledges that a wide range of estimates is available for many of the primary inputs 

that are used in the GHG emissions models. EPA recognizes that each of these values has some 

degree of uncertainty, which we discuss in the Joint TSD. EPA tested the sensitivity of their 

estimates of costs and benefits to a range of assumptions about each of these inputs, and found 

that the magnitude of these variations would not have changed the final standards. EPA 

conducted sensitivity analyses on discount rates (throughout the rulemaking package, but see 

specifically preamble III.H.10 and RIA Chapter 7.3), the social cost of carbon (preamble III.H.6 

and RIA Chapter 7.2), the rebound effect (RIA Chapter 4.5.1), and battery costs, mass reduction 
EPA Response to Comments

18-4

costs, the indirect cost markup factor and on the cost learning curves used in this analysis (RIA 

Chapter 3.11). 

In total, EPA’s analysis found that the benefits of the final rulemaking, including fuel savings 

and many other benefit categories such as the Social Cost of Carbon, far outweigh the costs of 

the standards. See, for example, preamble Table I-17; preamble section III.H.10.

Organization: Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) - Ceres

Finally, strong standards will serve to mitigate the economic risks associated with our continuing 

dependence on oil as well as climate change. In light of the inevitable rise in oil prices given 

increased demand from China, India and Brazil, we need strong standards in order to reduce 

transportation costs for businesses and consumers. In addition, climate change presents 

significant long-term risks to the global economy, and to investors across all asset classes.

Strong standards will serve to mitigate that risk by providing significant GHG reductions; the 

proposed standards would save approximately two billion metric tons of GHG emissions. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516-A1, p. 2]

Response:

We agree that world oil demand could be relatively strong over the time frame of this rule and 

that lower demand for petroleum as a result of this rule could help to lower fuel costs in the U.S. 

transportation sector. We also agree that climate presents significant long-term risks to the 

global economy and that our climate impacts analysis and valuation show notable benefits 

associated with GHG reductions. We refer the commenter to the climate impacts and SCC 

sections in Preamble Section III.H.6, Section III.F.2, RIA Chapter 7, and the Joint TSD Chapter 

4 for more details about the benefits.

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union of Concerned Scientists-1)

The proposed standards can bring significant economic, environmental, and energy security 

benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1558-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 37-38.]

The estimated benefits of this proposal include a reduction in oil consumption of four billion 

barrels, a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of two billion million metric tons, fuel savings 

on the order of $347 to $444 billion and a monetized net benefit to society in the range of $311 

to $421 billion.

Organization: New Jersey Senate, Third Legislative District
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-5

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

• $45 billion in savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9970-

A1, p. 1]

Organization: New York City Council, 35th District

On behalf of my constituents urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of 

these standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process.

The projected annual benefits of such standards are enormous. By 2030 the standards would:

• Save Americans $45 billion at the gas pump

• Cut annual oil use by an amount equivalent to our imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2010

• Reduce annual global warming pollution by the amount equivalent to shutting down 70 coalfired power plants for one year [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9901-A2, p. 1]

Organization: New York State Assembly Committee on Government Operations

On behalf of my constituents urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of 

these standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process.

The projected annual benefits of such standards are enormous. By 2030 the standards would:

• Save Americans $45 billion at the gas pump

• Cut annual oil use by an amount equivalent to our imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 

2010

• Reduce annual global warming pollution by the amount equivalent to shutting down 70 

coal-fired power plants for one year [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9453-A2, p. 1]

Organization: New York State Senate, 26th District

On behalf of my constituents I urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits 

of these standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process.

The projected annual benefits of such standards are enormous. By 2030 the standards would:

• Save Americans $45 billion at the gas pump

• Cut annual oil use by an amount equivalent to our imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2010
EPA Response to Comments

18-6

• Reduce annual global warming pollution by the amount equivalent to shutting down 70 coalfired power plants for one year [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9884-A1, p. 1]

Organization: State of New York The Assembly

On behalf of my constituents urge you to maximize the consumer and environmental benefits of 

these standards by keeping the standards as strong as possible through the rulemaking process.

The projected annual benefits of such standards are enormous. By 2030 the standards would:

• Save Americans $45 billion at the gas pump

• Cut annual oil use by an amount equivalent to our imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in 2010

• Reduce annual global warming pollution by the amount equivalent to shutting down 70 coalfired power plants for one year [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10155-A1, p. 1]

Organization: The Catskill Center for Conservation and Development

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

• $45 billion in savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9913-

A1, p. 1]

Organization: Weiner, L.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 105.]

The scale of benefits far outweighs any opposition: Reducing reliance on foreign oil, saving 

American families thousands of dollars in gas, cutting pollution, creating jobs and revitalizing 

the American auto industry as an engine of economic growth and innovation, as you heard.

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

39 The Agencies state the net benefits of the rulemaking as between $311 billion and $421 

billion, at 7 and 3% discount rates, respectively, over the lifetimes of the vehicles sold during 

MY 2017-2025. NPRM, 76 Fed. Reg. 74859 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 8]

Response:
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-7

EPA thanks the commenters for pointing out the clear benefits associated with the final standards 

and agrees that the benefits of the standards far outweigh the costs.

Organization: Shick, R.

If enacted, these new regulations will increase average vehicle costs by $5000 (source: NADA 

study) and drastically limit consumers' choices as popular and useful vehicles as pickup trucks 

and SUVs are either removed from the market or simply become unaffordable. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-6215-A1, p. 1]

The regulations will also reduce vehicle sales and production which will reduce employment, 

cause people to drive their vehicles longer, and risk safety by forcing vehicles to be smaller and 

lighter weight. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6215-A1, p. 1]

I have seen first hand the incredible expense of the technologies required to meet these 

requirements and they are certainly not justified by the limited potential benefits in fuel savings.

Even if fuel usage were drastically reduced, state and federal governments would increase the 

gasoline taxes to make up for the reduced gasoline tax revenue, thus negating the savings to 

consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6215-A1, p. 1]

Response:

EPA disagrees with the commenter’s assertion that the expense of the technologies is not 

justified by the potential benefits of fuel savings. Our analysis found that the benefits of the final 

rulemaking, including fuel savings and many other benefit categories such as the Social Cost of 

Carbon, far outweighed the costs of the standards. See, for example, preamble Table I-17. How 

state and federal governments address the impacts of this rule on gasoline taxes is beyond the 

scope of this rule. The benefit-cost analysis does not include sales tax, because sales tax 

revenues are a transfer of income, not income created or reduced by this rule.

Regarding the other points the commenter makes, we address these concerns elsewhere in our 

Response to Comments document: costs are addressed in Section 12.3, safety in Section 13, fuel 

savings in Section 18.3, vehicle sales in Section 18.7, and employment in Section 18.8.

Organization: Smith, Frank Houston

The range of impacts extend well beyond ... automotive fuel economy, lack of US parity with 

world CO2/fuel economy standards NOW & post 2014, 2025 CAFE, US industrial base, US jobs 

creation/loss, oil imports/energy independence, balance of trade, US economic expansion 

without requiring TAXPAYER MONEY, preventing the demise of Det3 (& general) US auto 

industry post 2016, ultimately ... Our US ECONOMY ... and ... NATION SECURITY. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0240, p.2]

Concerns or Opportunity?
EPA Response to Comments

18-8

President Obama's 2012 STATE of the UNION address praised the auto industry recovery and 

the idea/opportunity of exporting US automotive product. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

Unfortunately, the EU and South Korea will require, by statute, ≤ 140 gCO2/km in 2015 to avoid 

severe financial penalties (> USD $25/gram minimum over limit, in some jurisdictions 

increasing to almost $90/gram by 2020) for each noncompliant vehicle sold. This requires 

minimum fuel economy of 40 and 44 mpg(US) combine for gasoline and diesel vehicles 

respectively to avoid these penalties. It is reasonable to believe China and India will be following 

soon after. Table 4 offers an assessment of the current UK/EU market status to allow 

appreciation of future expectations. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

For reference 22.2 (the 2011 US fleet average) and 30 mpg combined are roughly 250 and 182 g 

CO2/km respectively. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

Are there any current or proposed US manufactured vehicles that would NOT be subject to 

penalties when exported to those 4 regions constituting about 70% [and growing] of world 

automotive markets in 2011? [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

Will these external CO2 limits make it more difficult to export US manufactured automotive 

product based on foreseeable offering and emerging US powertrain technologies? See Table 4 

above for UK/EU market status. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

This may be a serious problem ... except for the niche high end segments where price/cost is of 

no concern. The down side of this is that the rich can only buy a relatively limited number of 

vehicles per year. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.6]

Response:

EPA thanks Mr. Smith for his thoughtful comment. The final standards will move 

automakers towards more fuel efficient vehicles and move the US toward lower GHG emissions. 

However, it is up to the automakers to decide how to respond to environmental standards in other 

countries. We believe that it is possible that the standards will facilitate meeting increasingly 

stringent international standards, which may reduce coordination costs, and thus overall costs for 

the standards. We discuss this issue in Preamble III.H.11.a.

18.1. Consumer Impacts/Consumer Welfare/Consumer Acceptance of 

Vehicles

Organizations Included in this Section

AAA

Alexandria Hyundai

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Applied Materials

BlueGreen Alliance

BMW of North America, LLC
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-9

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumer Reports

Consumers Union

Dawid, I.

Defour Group LLC

Detroit NAACP

E100 Ethanol Group

Eaton Corporation

Ecology Center

EcoMotors International, Inc.

Edmunds.com

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF

Ford Motor Company

General Motors Company

Gilles, B.

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Michigan State Senate, District 18

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

National Caucus of Environmental Legislators

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Pennsylvania State Senate et al.

Rafter, M.

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Slemp III, R. L.

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Volkswagen Group of America

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: AAA

Since the first CAFE standard was established in 1975, automotive technologies have advanced 

to provide consumers with a range of choices for automobiles that meet mobility needs, are safe, 

and fulfill a desire for fuel economy. AAA hopes that the CAFE reforms sought under this 

rulemaking will continue the progress we have made as a country in improving automobiles from 

all perspectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, p. 1]

AAA’s interest in CAFE has always been to represent the motorist, while leaving the 

establishment of specific target numbers to manufacturers, researchers and policymakers. In this 
EPA Response to Comments

18-10

capacity, AAA’s position and policy has remained that the federal government should establish 

fuel economy standards that are ambitious enough to result in marked improvements in overall 

efficiency but realistic enough to maintain passenger safety and consumer choice. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9484-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Alexandria Hyundai

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 64-68.]

Safety, reliability, styling and fuel economy are all key considerations for our customers when 

selecting a vehicle brand or model.

I believe our customers will continue to value and place great emphasis on fuel economy. And 

that is one of the reasons I generally support the proposed standards.

I have seen firsthand how customers are open to new platforms and technologies when selecting 

a new vehicle.

Achieving the 54.5 MPG target will most certainly require a great deal of automotive ingenuity 

and substantial investment on the part of all key stakeholders.

However, I am certain consumers will continue to demand improvements in fuel economy and 

purchase vehicles from manufacturer vehicle offerings achieving that target.

I state this example to underscore that while we must remain sensitive to cost increases, 

consumers will see value in and pay for advancements in technologies that improve their lives 

and the lives of those around them.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Even assuming that the energy cost savings will far exceed the increased up-front vehicle costs, 

consumer response is difficult to predict. The NPRM describes what the agencies call an “energy 

paradox” whereby consumers appear not to purchase products featuring levels of energy 

efficiency that, according to some metrics, might appear to be in their economic self-interest:

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.19]

Of 27 studies, significant numbers of them find that consumers undervalue, overvalue, or value 

approximately correctly the fuel savings that they will receive from improved fuel economy. The 

variation in the value of fuel economy in these studies is so high that it appears to be 

inappropriate to identify one central estimate of value from the literature. Thus, estimating 

consumer response to higher vehicle fuel economy is still unsettled science. Regarding consumer 

response to [fuel economy] labeling information on cost savings: Whether the new label will 

help consumers to overcome the ‘‘energy paradox’’ is not known at this point. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.19]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-11

Are Consumers Purchasing the Technologies Needed to Achieve the Goals of the Rulemaking? 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.23]

Of course, the ultimate question will be whether mainstream consumers will be able and willing 

to purchase the technologies needed to achieve this country’s fuel economy energy security and 

environmental goals – particularly as the federal and state governments phase out many of the 

financial incentives that are available today.10 The proposed regulatory language does not 

include this single most critical factor. Will mainstream consumers be willing and able to 

purchase vehicles with more fuel efficient technologies? As the NPRM states, “there is 

considerable uncertainty in the economics literature about the extent to which consumers value 

fuel savings from increased fuel economy.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.23]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 97.]

In fact, consumer acceptance is the most critical – and unpredictable – component of advanced 

technology vehicle deployment. Manufacturers strive to understand how their advanced 

technology vehicles will be used and fueled and what combination of pricing, incentives and 

vehicle attributes are needed to convince mainstream consumers to invest in new technologies. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.23]

Recognizing the critical role of customers in determining the viability of future vehicle 

technologies, the NAS wrote: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.23]

Manufacturers will choose fuel economy technologies based on what they think will be most 

effective and best received by consumers. Customers also will have a central role in what 

technologies are actually chosen and will make those choices based partly on initial and

operating costs. Subsidies and other incentives also can significantly impact the market 

acceptance rate of technologies that reduce fuel consumption. Finally, adoption of these 

technologies must play out in a sometimes unpredictable marketplace and policy setting, with 

changing standards for emissions and fuel economy, government incentives, consumer 

preferences, and other events impacting their adoption. Thus, the committee acknowledges that 

technologies downplayed here may play a bigger role than anticipated, or that technologies 

covered in this report may never emerge in the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.23]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 96-98.]

The unprecedented effort of the coming 13 years to further our country's energy and 

environmental goals will succeed only, only if consumers buy the fuel-efficient technologies that 

we will be offering.

Looking into the future, consumer purchasing patterns will be the biggest unknown. Besides fuel 

economy, we know that consumers demand affordability, safety, convenience and utility. One 

challenge we have is that fuel economy considerations often rank below those other factors. Fuel 
EPA Response to Comments

18-12

prices are especially difficult to predict and have a huge impact on how consumers weigh fuel 

economy at the dealership.

First, let consumers determine the winning fuels and technologies. Ultimately consumers should 

decide what best meets their needs. Vehicles that run on gasoline, diesel, biofuels, electricity, 

hydrogen and natural gas will all play a role in improving fuel efficiency and reduce greenhouse 

gas emissions.

10 - In 2011, when automakers offered 231 models that achieved 30 miles per gallon or more on 

the highway, these vehicles represented about 37% of U.S. sales. More than ten years after 

hybrids were introduced to the U.S. market, in a year when there were 38 different models of 

hybrids on sale in the United States, these vehicles represented only 2.1% of new vehicle sales. 

In 2011, the top-selling pickup truck outsold all hybrids combined by a factor of two to one. 

(Data in this footnote is computed based on data from www.fueleconomy.gov and from 

WardsAuto

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

II. NHTSA should adopt feasible CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.3]

NHTSA’s authority to issue these CAFE standards is set forth at 49 U.S.C.§ 32902(b)(2)(B). 

That statute requires NHTSA’s CAFE standards to be “feasible” and practicable and states: 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.3]

When deciding maximum feasible average fuel economy under this section, the Secretary of 

Transportation shall consider technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of 

other motor vehicle standards of the government on fuel economy, and the need of the United 

States to conserve energy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.3]

In analyzing the latest round of CAFE standards, NHTSA recognized that some technologies 

currently have limited commercial use and require a realistic schedule for widespread 

commercialization to be feasible. We note that consumer acceptability is an important element of 

economic practicability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.3]

AFPM is very concerned that this proposal is based on an analysis that does not incorporate a 

vehicle choice model that appropriately considers the impacts of consumer choice upon 

industries and individuals that will be affected by the rulemaking. This is a serious deficiency 

that must be addressed to properly understand the implications of this proposal. EPA 

acknowledges this need with the following excerpt from the proposal: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.4]

The agency hopes to evaluate those potential impacts through use of a ‘‘market shift’’ or 

‘‘consumer vehicle choice’’ model, discussed in Section IV of the NPRM preamble. With an 

integrated market share model, the CAFE model would then estimate how the sales volumes of 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-13

individual vehicle models would change in response to changes in fuel economy levels and 

prices throughout the light vehicle market, possibly taking into account interactions with the used 

vehicle market. Having done so, the model would replace the sales estimates in the original 

market forecast with those reflecting these model-estimated shifts, repeating the entire modeling 

cycle until converging on a stable solution. We seek comment on the potential for this approach 

to help the agency estimate sales effects for the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, 

p.4]

Using a new consumer choice model to evaluate the impacts of the final rule is appropriate, but 

requires the agency to re-propose the rule and offer its revised conclusions on sales estimates and 

market forecasts for public comment. It is inappropriate and a violation of the Administrative 

Procedure Act to promulgate a final rule without first seeking comment on the changes caused 

by the application of the revised model. A new consumer vehicle choice model should have been 

peer-reviewed and then employed in this proposal to permit public review and comment on the 

impacts of this proposal. It is improper to propose a rule, accept comments, change the 

methodology for analyzing the rule’s impact and finalize the rule without providing an additional 

opportunity for comment on the impacts of the final rule. How can affected parties provide 

informed comments to the agency when the proposed rule excludes the agency’s understanding 

of the potential impacts of the proposed rule? Under these circumstances, the Administrative 

Procedure Act requires the agency to apply the vehicle choice model, describe its impact, and 

issue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to facilitate informed comment on the 

potential impact of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.4]

The agency’s failure to apply an appropriate vehicle choice model has resulted in proposed 

standards that are not feasible. Electrification is a good example. The following chart reflects the 

unwarranted optimism of attaining sufficient sales volumes for electric vehicles: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.4] [For the associated chart please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.5]

Conclusion [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.9]

AFPM believes that this rule needs to be re-proposed with the inclusion of a consumer choice 

model that reflects a feasible and practicable market penetration of alternative fuel vehicles. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.9]

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 201.]

We echo the support and the comments made regarding savings for consumers. We think those 

are going to be very real.

Organization: BlueGreen Alliance
EPA Response to Comments

18-14

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 58-60.]

Based on the agencies' initial technical assessment, the net consumer savings of fuel 

expenditures will be very substantial and will provide much needed relief at the pump. By 

developing and producing advanced fuel- saving technology in the United States, automakers 

and suppliers can create quality jobs and provide the clean, fuel-efficient cars and light-duty 

trucks consumers want.

We also request continuing federal programs to support these auto industry efforts in retooling to 

meet the demand for cleaner, more efficient cars.

Consumers looking to purchase vehicles in the next few years are expressing interest in higher 

fuel economy. Building the next generation of advanced vehicles in the United States will create 

tens of thousands of new engineering and manufacturing jobs and strengthen America's 

rebounding sector.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 38.]

This standard will give Americans more advanced vehicle choices, which in turn will help 

consumers save money at the pump. By making it less expensive to drive, by covering the same 

ground but using less fuel, consumers will have more money left over to spend or invest in other 

economically beneficial ways.

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

To reiterate, achievable greenhouse gas emission reductions and commensurate fuel economy 

increases depend on both designing more fuel-efficient vehicles AND increasing market demand 

for such vehicles. We can build the vehicles, but consumers must buy them. The implementation 

of new greenhouse gas-reducing technologies, alternative powertrains, and fuels strongly 

depends on customer acceptance. The proposed standards were developed based on today's best 

estimates of future technology, market developments, and assumed customer acceptance. A 

comprehensive emission reduction policy needs to consider all aspects, including the customer. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

The agencies project net benefits ranging from $262 billion (assuming a 7% discount rate) to 

$358 billion (assuming a 3% discount rate).2 These projections are based on assumptions 

regarding vehicle cost, fuel prices, and consumer acceptance that may or may not be borne out 

by events. Skepticism is justified. If the proposed standards are as beneficial to consumers and 

automakers as the agencies contend, why wouldn‘t consumers demand and profit-seeking 

manufacturers produce vehicles built to the same or similar standards without regulatory 

compulsion? Fuel economy regulation assumes that auto buyers do not want to avoid pain at the 

pump and automakers do not want to get rich. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 1]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-15

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 39-41.]

These potential consumer benefits come at a moment when American consumers are in desperate 

need of relief from rising and volatile gasoline prices. Gasoline prices set a record in 2011 in 

both nominal and real terms, averaging $3.53 per gallon. This week's price is a record for the 

month of January, and that clobbers the economy and the consumer pocketbook.

So if there is one thing you take away from this hearing today, remember this is a consumer 

benefit program. This is a wonderful consumer program. In fact, we estimate that 80 percent, 500 

billion of the $600 billion of total benefits are the consumer savings. So this is a consumer 

program.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 87-89.]

I gladly appreciate the opportunity to appear today because we believe that the benefits of this 

proposed rule are obvious.

They lower the cost of driving and will save consumers thousands of dollars per vehicle. It will 

save the national economy hundreds of billions of dollars.

They lower our imports, lower our vulnerability to supply disruptions. Above all, these are a 

consumer-friendly set of rules. This is the consumer policy that will benefit American 

consumers.

Consumers will buy the new fuel-efficient vehicles enabling auto makers to reach the targets that 

have been set. Not because they're so beneficial in terms of economics. That's important.

But also because the rules have been written in a consumer-friendly fashion that is sensitive to 

the needs of the industry. And that is the backbone of the political consensus that you have heard 

this morning.

First, the public is concerned about gasoline and that leads to support for higher fuel economy 

and it changes consumer behavior.

Seventy-five percent or more of respondents to our public opinion polls. And we've conducted a 

dozen over the last six or seven years.

Second of all, consumers have shown a willingness to shift their buying patterns in light of 

recent gas price spikes.

Americans are meeting their needs for driving with vastly more fuel-efficient vehicles. They are 

ready to do this. They have already started, and they are way ahead of the auto industry.
EPA Response to Comments

18-16

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 59-61.]

The car dealers say that fuel economy performance is typically not high on the consumer's list of 

priorities. If this were, in fact, true, why do we see so many car companies advertising fuel 

economy as a selling point. The car manufacturers who spend millions of dollars studying 

consumer behavior obviously disagree with their dealers. Fuel economy is the very top priority 

for consumers looking to purchase a new car. In fact, Consumers Union, the publishers of 

Consumer Reports, determined that fuel economy was the number two reason why consumers 

would change their brands of vehicle.

The NADA has said that just because vehicles can be built doesn't mean that they will be bought. 

Actual sales data, however, is very clear. Consumers want and will pay for more fuel-efficient 

vehicles. And the manufacturers supporting this new standard have agreed to make them. 

Consider Ford, for example. The combined sales of their two new fuel-efficient cars, the Fiesta 

and the Focus, in May 2011 are up 74 percent in one year.

Like everyone in the economy, car dealers are reeling from the financial setbacks. The reduction 

in the cost of driving from these new standards, however, will cause more autos to be sold and 

over 100,000 jobs to be created. More jobs and vehicles that are less expensive to drive means 

more consumers, not less, will be buying cars.

Consumers are desperate for more fuel-efficient vehicles. Consumer pocketbooks are hurting and 

more fuel-efficient vehicles will drive more and more consumers into the showroom. Right now, 

there are not enough fuel-efficient vehicles on the market to meet consumer demand.

V. NATIONAL COST BENEFIT: HIGHER FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS DELIVER 

LARGE AND DIVERSE BENEFITS

Exhibit S-5 shows CFA’s estimates of national benefits and costs. [See Exhibit S-5 on p. 7 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 

5]

The total discounted national benefits are close to $600 billion, a value that is well over three 

times the cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

Higher fuel economy standards are primarily a consumer benefit program, with consumer 

savings of close to $500 billion, over 80 percent of the total national benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

Environmental and public health benefits will be almost $60 billion (just over 10 percent of the 

total). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

Exhibit S-6 presents the full range of cases and scenarios considered by the agencies. It plots the 

costs (on the x-axis) and the benefits (on the y-axis) for the eight different target levels 

considered with each target level evaluated at discount rates of 3% and 7%. It also shows the 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-17

results of the sensitivity analyses that were conducted at the 3% discount rate. In all, there are 28 

cases/scenarios shown. The Exhibit also includes a break even line. If a case/scenario falls above 

the line, the benefits exceed the costs. [See Exhibit S-6 on p. 9 of Docket number EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

In every sensitivity analysis conducted by the agencies, no matter how extreme the assumptions, 

the benefits exceed the costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

The exhibit makes it clear that the benefits are likely to exceed the costs by a wide margin. Even 

under the most extreme assumption – i.e. that consumer pocketbook savings are only one-quarter 

of the base case calculation, the benefits are almost twice as large as the costs at the 3% discount 

rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

VIII. NHTSA AND EPA HAVE SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE BENEFITS OF 

THE STANDARDS

There are both quantitative and qualitative flaws in the agency analysis that must be corrected. 

The analyses presented in the attached Technical Appendices reflect our independent calculation 

of the costs and benefits which includes corrections of the flaws in the underlying agency 

analyses. At the outset, we want to stress that neither the standards nor the cost benefit analyses 

are perfect, but the perfect must not be the enemy of the excellent. Increasing the fuel economy 

of the vehicle fleet to the levels proposed by the standards represents such major progress 

towards important national policy goals and the approach taken by the standards is so well 

crafted that we believe it is of the utmost importance to adopt the standards and move vigorously 

to implement them. Our primary concern is that the agencies have underestimated the value of 

the standards in several important ways. Even with the flaws, the benefits of the standards are 

shown to far outweigh the costs, but it is important for the final rule to correct the flaws we 

identify. [The Technical Appendices can be found on pp. 16-55 of Docket number EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, pp. 11-12]

• NHTSA will be issuing final rules periodically over the next decade and a half, and the 

agencies will jointly conduct a mid-course review in a decade; the errors should not be 

allowed to become engrained in the analytic structure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-

A1, p. 12]

While the current standards are well within the frontier of what is technologically feasible and 

economically practicable (which are two key standards that in the authorizing legislation for 

NHTSA), over time, the standards may move closer to the frontier. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9419-A1, p. 12]

• As the fuel economy standards rise, they will be closer to the economic margin, which 

will make it more important for the agencies to get it right, so that future rules do not 

demur from setting standards that are in the public interest because benefits have been 

underestimated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 12]
EPA Response to Comments

18-18

The agencies need to articulate the analytic justification for the standards more clearly and 

forcefully. The Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis contains a lengthy discussion of what 

has been called the “efficiency gap” or the “efficiency paradox” for several decades. In many 

ways, this discussion is far superior to earlier discussions in the sense that it recognizes there are 

both supply-side and demand-side factors that may cause the market for new autos to under 

invest in fuel economy technologies. The “efficiency gap” is identified by the 

economic/engineering analysis, where, under reasonable and realistic assumptions about cost and 

value, there are many technologies available that would produce substantial net benefits to 

consumers if they were included in the new vehicles. The failure of the auto market to include 

these technologies raises the question of why, in a capitalist economy, where markets are 

presumed to be efficient, so much economic value is left unrealized. The answer, as we have 

pointed out in the all of the recent rulemakings dealing with the fuel economy of light duty 

vehicles is that there are market imperfections that suppress investment in fuel efficient 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 12]

Our earlier analyses are summarized in Exhibit S-9. The imperfections [See Exhibit S-9 on p. 13 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1]

• affect both the demand side and the supply-side of the light duty vehicle market,

• go well beyond the problems of externalities and information problems, and

• include significant market structural conditions, transaction costs and behavioral 

factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 12]

The fact that the market has begun to move in the right direction is encouraging. The fact that it 

has taken almost a doubling of the cost of gasoline in real terms to get it to move is testimony to 

the strength of the barriers to optimal investment in fuel economy in the market. In spite of the 

fact that the agency discussion of market imperfections is incomplete, the agencies conclude, 

correctly, that the base case analysis should be the pillar on which the choice of a standard rests. 

We agree with that conclusion. The agencies treat the base case with a 3% discount rate as the 

starting point for the sensitivity analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 12]

We do not agree with the decision to conduct a “fudge” factor analysis that arbitrarily slashed the 

size of the efficiency gap and the magnitude of consumer welfare gains. The analysis offers no 

empirical justification for doing so. Moreover, the general discussion of consumer welfare 

combined with the traditional sensitivity analysis has already addressed the underlying 

uncertainties. Uncertainties about the price of gasoline, the cost and effectiveness of 

technologies, the value of externalities are already incorporated in the sensitivity analysis. The 

“fudge” factor analysis is unnecessary and double counts uncertainty. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9419-A1, p. 12]

Organization: Consumer Reports

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 165-166.]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-19

It is our view that implementing these proposed fuel economy standards, will increase vehicle 

choice and provide consumers with more efficient and alternative fuel vehicles.

In a recent Consumer Reports survey, consumers demonstrated a strong support for fuel 

economy standards and alternative fuel vehicles and a willingness to pay more for these 

technologies.

Consumers want it all. They want function, performance, a variety of choices, and better fuel 

economy. And they have indicated that they'd rather pay slightly more for these vehicles if it 

means they would save money at the gas pump.

According to the survey, 93 percent believe that the fuel efficiency standards for all vehicles 

should be improved. Nearly 80 percent support the 55 miles per gallon target for the fleet by 

2025.

As the availability of these vehicles, many consumers would buy or consider an alternative fuel 

vehicle such as a hybrid, electric vehicle or natural gas.

Organization: Consumers Union

Finally, the standards are likely to improve the choices available to consumers. Because CAFE 

standards are now footprint-based, improvements are required across all vehicle sizes, so each 

class of car will likely see efficiency gains. Because the standards are scaled by size, there is no 

incentive for automakers to downsize vehicles. Consumers will have more efficient options 

across vehicle classes and are likely to see more partially and fully electrified options from many 

or all automakers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.3]

II. Consumers support a strong CAFE standard

Improving fuel economy also provides intangible benefits and acts as insurance against unstable 

oil prices. Uncertainty in fuel prices and price spikes take an emotional toll that is not easily 

captured in modeling or consumer choice analysis. Spikes in gasoline prices cause immediate 

and keenly noticed financial pain for many consumers. Consumers support improving fuel 

economy in large part because it provides peace of mind by improving energy security for 

individual consumers and the nation. The CAFE program is an effective, proactive option when 

it comes to dealing with rising gas prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.3]

In a recent Consumer Reports survey, consumers demonstrated strong support for fuel efficiency 

standards, a desire for alternative fuel vehicle options and a willingness to pay for more efficient 

technology.7 Consumers want it all—function, performance, a variety of choices and better fuel 

economy, and they would rather pay more for a vehicle in order to save on gasoline. According 

to the nationally representative survey conducted in October 2011: 93% believe that fuel 

efficiency standards for all vehicles should be improved; 80% support at least 55 mpg as a target 

fleet average for 2025; as availability improves, 72% ofconsumers who plan to buy a vehicle 

would consider an alternative power train, such as hybrid, electric, flex-fuel or natural gas; and 
EPA Response to Comments

18-20

83% are willing to pay extra for more fuel efficient vehicle if the payback from lower fuel costs 

is less than five years.8 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, pp.3-4]

Although surveys have limitations in capturing consumer preferences, relying solely on market 

data for consumer preferences is imperfect as well. Consumers are not satisfied with the status

quo, but they generally must buy a vehicle from the available fleet. By expressing support for 

improved standards, they are essentially stating a preference for better options in the future. A 

strong CAFE program gives credence to this consumer preference that is not being 

communicated effectively in the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.4]

It is true that when gas prices are relatively low, consumers tend to put less emphasis on fuel 

economy when buying a car. But as we saw in 2008, when gas prices soar, consumers quickly try 

and sell their gas guzzler and buy a more fuel efficient vehicle. Unfortunately, vehicle 

manufacturers cannot design, build and supply different vehicles on a monthly basis. A typical 

model cycle is about five years, and to take the best advantage of all the weight saving and new 

fuel efficient technologies, these decisions need to be made at the beginning of a model concept 

and cannot be easily retrofitted. The CAFE standard targets for 2017-2025 give manufacturers a 

predictable roadmap and the impetus to incorporate these technologies and sell desirable vehicles 

that achieve better fuel economy and save consumers money in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9454-A2, p.4]

7 - See Appendix D Consumer Reports Fuel Economy Poll November 2011 for full survey 

report.

8 - See Appendix D at 16.

Organization: Dawid, I.

Its' clear that Detroit and the overseas manufacturers can meet the 54.5 mpg regulation. What's 

NOT clear is whether the market wants them! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6325-A1, p. 1]

We know 2 things: new EV, EREV, and hybrids sell at a premium cost. Consumers determine 

whether to purchase them, or a comparable, ICE model at a significantly lower price, based on:

1. Price of gas

2. How high the premium is. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6325-A1, p. 1]

I urge the EPA to consider how the market affects the marketability of the vehicles they regulate. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6325-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Defour Group LLC

I. Willingness to Pay for Fuel Economy: Revealed Preference
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-21

The agencies erroneously assume that auto buyers will be willing to pay for 100% of their 

projected fuel economy gains. The real-world impact of the proposed standards, however, flow 

from actual consumer purchase decisions. There is a great deal of research supporting our 

conclusion that consumers are not willing to pay 100% for fuel economy gains. Thus, our first 

correction to the agencies’ analysis is based on real-world or revealed preference willingness to 

pay at $3.54 per gallon regular unleaded fuel, the price the agencies use to project their benefit 

and cost estimates for MY 2025 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.2]

We utilize a 25% U.S. consumer willingness to pay for fuel efficiency technology improvements. 

We derive this estimate from the MIT study, On the Road in 2035, which was published in 2008 

and found that U.S. consumers are not willing to spend any of the increases in the value of fuel 

efficiency technologies – the value of increases in gallons per ton mile -- on fuel economy (miles 

per gallon), but rather would prefer to spend all of the value of any potential gains on other 

vehicle attributes of greater value to them such as improved performance, carrying capacity, 

towing capacity, comfort, and safety. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.2]

They also found that European consumers are willing to spend roughly 50% of any gains in fuel 

efficiency on fuel economy and prefer to spend the rest of any such gains on the afore-mentioned 

other vehicle attributes.1 Their study was for the years 1995- 2006 -- years in which U.S. regular 

unleaded gasoline sold for an average $2.07 per gallon ($2009) and European premium unleaded 

fuel prices that power most of their gasolinepowered vehicles sold for an average of $5.15 per 

gallon (median of $5.30 per gallon). The actual relevant fuel cost in Europe, of course, is much 

higher when their substantial engine displacement taxes are factored in. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9319-A1 p.2]

We conservatively assume a $5.50 per gallon average price in Europe as the level of fuel prices 

at which auto buyers will be willing to take – i.e. pay for -- 50% of fuel efficiency gains as fuel 

economy improvements, and $2.10 per gallon as the price at which they are willing to pay for no 

increases in vehicle mpg. This gives us a midpoint estimate of about $3.80 per gallon as the point 

at which auto buyers are willing to spend 25% of any increase in fuel efficiency on fuel 

economy. NHTSA uses a gasoline price of $3.54 per gallon as their projection for MY 2025, so 

our estimate of willingness to pay is somewhat overstated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 

p.2]

II. Private Benefits vs. Private Costs of the Proposed Standard Lower Bound Estimate

In their Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration (NHTSA) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) find that U.S auto 

buyers will be willing to pay $6,000 per vehicle for standards achieving a combined 49.6 mpg in 

MY 2025 (56.0 mpg for cars and 40.3 mpg for light trucks) at $3.54 per gallon gasoline ($2009) 

– or $4,200 more than their estimated $1,800 per vehicle increase in retail price.2 We first 

multiply the agencies’ estimate of $6,000 per vehicle present discounted fuel savings by the 25% 

willingness to pay, which comes to a revised estimate of $1,500 per vehicle. The literature also 

shows that their estimate of the retail price increase necessitated by the proposed standards, or 

$1,800 per vehicle, is too low by at least 60%.3 Making just these two adjustments off their 

baseline of MY 2016 34.1 mpg results in a $4,500 per vehicle reduction in willingness to pay to 
EPA Response to Comments

18-22

$1500 per vehicle, and a $1,100 per vehicle increase in retail price to $2,900 per vehicle (all 

estimates rounded to the nearest $100 per vehicle). The fuel savings for a 49.6 mpg MY 2025 are 

worth $1500 per vehicle, but it costs $2900 to get them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 

p.3]

Net willingness to pay, the bottom-line number and what the agencies call “net lifetime owner 

fuel savings,“ or the difference between the present value of the expected fuel savings less the 

increased retail price of the vehicle, is a negative $1,400. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 

p.3]

For our lower bound estimate, we further adjust willingness to pay for more realistic assumptions 

for the rebound effect and for consumer interest rates. The agencies assume a rebound effect of 

10% and a discount rate of 3% for the above estimates. Using a mainstream historical literature 

estimate of 20% for the rebound effect and assuming the historical, long-term consumer auto 

loan rate of 9%, we further reduce willingness to pay from 25% to 15% of the agencies estimates 

$6,000 per vehicle. This yields a bottomline willingness to pay of $900 per vehicle and a net 

consumer or private welfare loss of $1,900 per vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 

p.3]

Mid-Range Estimate

Defour estimated willingness to pay in a study of the proposed standards that has been accepted 

for publication by the Society of Automotive Engineers and that was derived from the agencies’ 

earlier estimates of consumer benefits and costs in their Joint Technical Assessment Report 

(JTAR).4 Our estimates are for a scenario comparable to that of the Preferred Alternative, and 

which approximates the 51 mpg scenario in the Joint Technical Assessment Report. Adjusting 

their estimates of benefits for the 25% willingness to pay and for technology costs contained in 

the National Research Council’s 2010 report,5 we found consumer welfare losses of $2,900 per 

vehicle – our minimum estimate for the JTAR’s 4% growth scenarios. (There were four 

scenarios with losses ranging from $2,900 to $3,200 per vehicle.) Of course, a lower and more 

realistic baseline beyond which fuel economy standards become binding constraints would imply 

a still higher retail price increase and still higher losses in consumer welfare or net willingness to 

pay. That is why we call this a “mid-range” estimate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.4]

Reality Check

To subject these estimates to other authoritative sources, we compare our results to a study by 

the Energy Information Administration (EIA). In its 2011 Energy Outlook,6 the EIA concluded 

that a CAFE standard of 46.1 mpg (3.5 mpg lower than the proposed 2025 standard) would result 

in an 8% loss in new vehicle sales in 2025. Congress established the Energy Information 

Administration as a source of independent estimates of the impacts of alternative governmental 

policies, including the corporate average fuel economy standards. Applying the agencies’ unitary 

new vehicle price elasticity estimate implies an equal and opposite percentage increase in prices, 

which on the average $28,000 vehicle transaction price comes to $2,200 per vehicle. The EIA’s 

estimate is for a 46.1 mpg standard, which is 12 mpg above the baseline 34.1 mpg for MY 2016. 

Assuming a straight-line welfare loss yields an estimate of $2,900 per vehicle. Of course, the 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-23

straight-line assumption understates the actual cost increase because of the laws of diminishing 

marginal returns and increasing marginal costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.4]

Figure 1 compares estimates of consumer willingness to pay (PV Benefits), retail price increase, 

and net willingness to pay (NPV Benefits) for the proposed MY 2025 fuel economy mandate 

under our three alternative methodologies. (We are only able to infer net lifetime owner savings 

values from the EIA study.) The agencies’ estimates of benefits, as shown by the vertical blue 

line for PRIA are 6 times higher than our midrange estimate, while our mid-range estimate for 

the requisite retail price increase is roughly twice the agencies’. The bottom line estimate, NPV 

Benefits, the increase in willingness to pay less the increase in retail price on MY 2025 vehicles, 

ranges from the loss of $1,900 to $2,900 per vehicle to the positive gain of $4,200 per vehicle in 

the PRIA. [Please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.5 for Figure 1.] [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.5]

Both our estimates and those inferred from the EIA study are considerably understated when 

compared to those implied by the research of economists at Resources for the Future (RFF), the 

Environmental Protection Agency, and at the Congressional Budget Office – research that the 

agencies did not but should consider in this rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 

p.5]

An RFF November 2010 study co-authored by David Evans of the EPA,7 finds that “using 

standards to cut fuel use by 5 percent under a standard value for CO2 damages is warranted only 

if consumers fail to internalize 44 percent of the savings from fuel economy. In fact recent 

rulings that rapidly ramp up the corporate average fuel economy CAFE standards are not 

supported on welfare grounds, even under our bounding case for market failures. . . . In our 

bounding case for these failures, a standard that cut fuel use by 8.9 percent would be optimal, 

though potential welfare gains are only about a third of those for the fuel tax.” [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9319-A1 p.6]

Dr. Evans and co-authors assume a baseline free expression combined fleet fuel economy level 

of 23 mpg and the 5% and 8.9% reductions in fuel consumption represent 10 to 36% of the 25% 

cut mandated by the 2012- 2016 MY standards relative to that baseline. They find that the 

marginal welfare costs of increasing the standards rapidly escalate to $6 per gallon and higher 

well before required fuel savings approaches the 25% that would be achieved under the MY 

2016 standards. Going another 12.9 mpg to MY 2025 standards would dramatically increase 

these estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.6]

Earlier studies by economists at RFF and the Congressional Budget Office came to similar 

conclusions, finding that raising mandated fuel economy levels like those proposed would 

impose very substantial welfare losses on consumers and on the broader economy.8 These 

conclusions are summarized in the survey of mainstream research by economists at Resources 

for the Future, which was published in the Journal of Economic Literature, the leading survey 

journal for economic scholars, It is important to note that the authors address much smaller 

increases in the standards than here and from a much lower base mpg. The authors concluded:
EPA Response to Comments

18-24

Whether higher fuel-economy standards would increase or reduce efficiency or have little effect 

remains unsettled. Kleit (2004) and Austin and Dinan (2005) find that costs from binding 

increases in standards of 3−4 miles per gallon would cost around $3−4 billion or more, assuming 

market adoption of all privately cost-effective technologies. Higher fuel-economy standards 

significantly increase efficiency only if carbon and oil dependence externalities greatly exceed 

the mainstream estimates in Table 2, or if consumers perceive only about a third of the actual 

fuel-economy benefits (Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 2006).9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-

A1 p.6]

IX Summary and Conclusions

The agencies find net positive owner lifetime fuel savings or “willingness to pay” of $4,200 per 

vehicle in part because they ignore consumer tradeoffs between fuel economy and other vehicle 

attributes and assume auto buyers are willing to pay for 100% of the agencies’ projected fuel 

efficiency technology gains to 2025. But mainstream research shows that at fuel prices of the 

projected $3.54 per gallon consumers will be willing to pay for no more than 25% of any 

potential fuel economy improvements. When this adjustment is made, when further adjustments 

for a more realistic rebound effect and discount rate are made, and when the agencies’ estimate 

of retail technology costs is increased by a factor of 60% to reflect real-world retail price mark 

ups, we find the agencies’ Preferred Alternative for MY 2025 standards imposes net private 

welfare losses of at least $2,900 per vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.20]

Applying agency estimates of vehicle price elasticities and employment multiplier effects shows 

that the $2,900 per vehicle net consumer welfare cost will cause a loss of more than 1.8 million 

industry sales and more than 200,000 industry, supplier, and dealer jobs. The proposal is 

extremely regressive -- imposing disproportionately higher hardships on those who are the 

poorest and least able to afford personal transportation. Fuel prices well above $5.00 per gallon 

are necessary if consumers are to embrace these standards and eliminate the adverse impacts on 

sales and employment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.20]

Use of a more realistic estimate for the rebound effect and incorporation of a similarly realistic 

estimate of the clunker effect increases the agencies’ already negative estimate of social benefits 

from a minus $100 per vehicle to minus $900 per vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 

p.20]

These results are consistent with the findings of numerous studies by economists at the Energy 

Information Administration, Resources for the Future, the Congressional Budget Office, and 

even the Environmental Protection Agency. Those studies show that improving consumer and 

social welfare requires a reduction, not an increase in the standards from MY 2016 levels. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.20]

In the public interest, it is incumbent on the agencies to consider all of these studies their 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1 p.20]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-25

Based on real-world, revealed auto buyer preferences, we find that the proposed MY 2025 49.6 

mpg fuel economy standard for the combined passenger car and light truck fleet will result in net 

consumer welfare losses of at least $2,900 per vehicle relative to the base MY 2016. This 

compares to the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis’ (PRIA’s) estimate of net positive 

private benefits of $4,200 per vehicle. (All estimates are rounded to the nearest $100 per 

vehicle.) We find that implementation of the MY 2025 fuel economy standards will result in a 

loss of more than 1.8 million industry sales and a loss of more than 200,000 jobs in auto 

manufacturing, supply and retail distribution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 1]

We also find that the standard will impose additional net social externality costs of more than 

$900 per vehicle versus an agency net cost estimate of $100 per vehicle. We estimate the sum of 

net private and social welfare costs to be more than $3,800 per vehicle. This compares to the 

agencies’ estimate of $4,100 in net private and social benefits per vehicle. We find that the fuel 

economy standards are extremely regressive, imposing markedly disproportionate costs on the 

group of lowest-income households relative to those imposed on the highest-income households. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 1]

Our findings of substantial private net welfare losses result from a much:

• Lower, real-word assessment of auto buyer willingness to pay, and 

• Higher, real-world assessment of markups from direct manufacturing cost to retail 

consumer price than the agencies assume in their engineering/mathematical model. 

Our findings of substantially higher net societal costs follow from higher and more realistic 

estimates of the rebound effect –the offsetting impact of higher fuel economy on vehicle miles 

traveled and thus fuel consumption -- and from taking account of the “clunker effect,” or the 

impact of higher new vehicle prices on encouraging the retention of older and higher emitting 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 1]

We find that fuel prices well above $5.00 per gallon would be required to render the standards 

“consumer friendly.” We conclude that consumer or societal welfare is optimized at a level 

below the MY 2016 fuel economy standards. All of our findings are supported by mainstream 

research at leading governmental and academic institutions, including the Energy Information 

Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, Resources for the Future, and the 

Environmental Protection Agency. We urge the agencies to consider all of this research in 

finalizing their proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 1]

III. Fuel Prices and Willingness to Pay

The next question is what fuel price would be necessary for auto buyers to freely purchase a 

combined fleet with 49.6 mpg fuel economy? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 7]

The short answer is “well in excess of $5.00 per gallon.” As shown in Figure 2 below, the 

Energy Information Administration projects unconstrained or free expression levels of fuel 
EPA Response to Comments

18-26

economy for MY 2025 at 35.3 mpg for $3.54 gasoline (40.0 mpg for cars and 29.6 mpg for light 

trucks). It also finds that at $5.12 per gallon -- its highest fuel price scenario for 2025 -- the 

combined new vehicle fleet would attain 36.8 mpg with cars at 41.1 mpg and light trucks at 30.4 

mpg, well below the agencies’ proposed mandate.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 7]

Another estimate is provided by the European experience with much higher fuel prices when 

there were no fuel economy regulations. Estimates of willingness to pay at higher fuel prices can 

be derived from European levels of fuel economy that existed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 

before their standards became binding and which thus represent free expression levels that their 

consumers would be willing to pay for. Customer demand for passenger cars never exceeded 40 

mpg – well below the agencies’ projection of a 56.0 mpg achievable level in 2025 -- and this was 

so even with $7 and $8 per gallon gasoline, with heavy engine displacement taxes, and with 

substantial subsidies for diesel fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 7]

A third estimate can be inferred from a 2010 study by the National Research Council, which 

found that if consumers were willing to pay for 50% of potential fuel economy improvements the 

government could achieve a level of just 40 mpg for combined cars and light trucks and in MY 

2035. This was at the $5.50 or higher fuel price equivalents for the study period of 1995 to 

2006.11 Of course, the 50% willingness to pay is more than double the 25% willingness to pay 

we derived from the MIT study cited above, and the learning curve effect means that 2025 

technologies will cost more than the NRC’s estimate for MY 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9319-A1, p. 7] [For figure 2 please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 8.]

1 - Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, On the Road in 2035: Reducing 

Transportation’s Petroleum Consumption and GHG Emissions, Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology, July 2008, pages 61 and 156-157.

2 - Derived from Table VIII-27b, page 715 of the NHTSA PRIA. See also “Dealers Fight 

Mileage Rules,” The Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2012. The mandated level is 49.6 mpg. 

The agencies estimate that consumers will also be willing to pay for achieved levels of 56.0 mpg 

for MY 2025 cars and 40.3 mpg for MY 2025 light trucks. We derive a slightly lower estimate of 

the retail price increase, or $1,800 per vehicle versus the $2,000 per vehicle reported in the 

article. We derive a slightly lower estimate of $4,200 willingness to pay than the reported $4400 

per vehicle.

3 - National Research Council, Assessment of Fuel Economic Technologies for Light-Duty 

Vehicles (2011), pages 24-26.

4 - Dean Drake, David Aldorfer, Michael Whinihan, and Thomas Walton, “Using Economic 

Analysis to Assess the Viability of Post-2016 MY Greenhouse Gas Emission and Fuel Economy 

Standards for Light Duty Vehicles,” Paper #2012-01-0754, Society of Automotive Engineers, 

Forthcoming.

5 - National Research Council, America’s Energy Future (2010), Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-27

6 - Energy Information Administration, “Increasing light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas and fuel 

economy standards for model years 2017 to 2025,” (2011).

7 - Ian Parry, David Evans, and Wallace Oates, “Are Energy Efficiency Standards Justified?” 

Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 10-59, November 23, 2010 at 

http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-59.pdf

8 - See, in particular, Fischer, Harrington, and Parry, “Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards (CAFÉ) be Tightened?” Energy Journal (2007) at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFFDP-04-53-REV.pdf at and Harrington, Parry, and Walls, “Automobile Externalities and 

Policies,” Journal of Economic Literature (2007), and David Austin and Terry Dinan, “Clearing 

the Air: The Costs and Consequences of Higher CAFÉ Standards and Increased Gasoline 

Taxes,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (2005). The Journal of Economic 

Literature article is a survey of the leading economic studies in the field, and David Sandalow, 

Freedom from Oil: How the Next President Can End the United States’ Oil Addiction, Brookings 

(2008).

9 - Harrington et al, Ibid.

10 - Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2011, page 71.

11 - National Research Council, America’s Energy Future (2010), Tables 4.3 and 4.4.

VII. The “Energy Paradox” and Willingness to Pay 

The agencies suggest that consumer myopia – auto buyer systematic undervaluation of future 

fuel economy benefits -- and not any errors in their analysis, explains what they call the “Energy 

Paradox,” or why today’s auto buyers would be “hesitant” to buy vehicles that achieve 49.6 mpg 

on average and provide, by their reckoning, more than $4,000 worth of fuel savings net of retail 

price increases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 14]

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in a study commissioned by the U.S. Senate in 2002, 

addressed this contention, noting that many proponents of increased fuel economy standards 

argue that the market for fuel economy is inefficient because consumers either “lack information 

about vehicles’ fuel efficiency or that producers lack an incentive to respond to consumers’ 

preferences for fuel efficiency.” The CBO concluded:

“Most economists do not believe that either assumption is valid. Vehicles’ current level of fuel 

efficiency most likely reflects consumers’ trade-offs between fuel economy and other 

characteristics that drivers want, such as vehicle size, horsepower, and safety. The same 

technologies that can be used to boost fuel economy can be used to hold fuel economy constant 

while increasing the vehicles’ weight, size, or power. Thus, the fact that producers have done the 

latter rather than the former in recent years suggest that they have responded to buyers’ 

preferences by targeting available technologies toward other features that consumers desire. 

Raising CAFE standards would impose costs on both consumers and automobile producers by 
EPA Response to Comments

18-28

forcing improvements in fuel economy that car buyers may not want.”22 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9319-A1, p. 14]

Or, to quote the most recent, and we believe, most definitive study of this issue by economists at 

MIT and Northwestern University:

We find little evidence that consumers “undervalue” future gasoline costs when purchasing cars. 

The implied discount rates we calculate correspond reasonably closely to interest rates that 

customers pay when they finance their car purchases.23 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 

14]

Whether or not auto buyers know what they are doing, their choices do, in the final analysis, 

determine the demand for new cars and light trucks in the marketplace. When, for whatever 

reason, their willingness to pay for increased fuel economy falls short of the increased retail 

vehicle price necessary to attain that level, industry sales losses necessarily ensue, as the EIA 

analysis found.24 This is so even if better informed and more intelligent auto buyers would be 

willing to pay for 100% of the “cost-effective” fuel efficiency gains assumed in the agencies’ 

mathematical model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 15]

Moreover, if the mainstream studies that we cited are correct, the standards cannot be justified on 

benefit-cost grounds even if the supposed consumer undervaluations are corrected using the 

literature’s most optimistic, “upper bound” assumptions and even using the most optimistic,

“upper bound” assumptions regarding externality costs of climate change and energy security.25

There is no basis for increasing the standard – neither on the consumers’ behalf nor on the 

public’s behalf. The proposed increase will make everyone worse off. As these studies 

demonstrate, improving either consumer or societal welfare requires a reduction, not an increase 

in the standards from MY 2016 levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 15]

22 - Congressional Budget Office, A CBO Study: Reducing Gasoline Consumption: Three 

Policy Options (November 2002), Chapter 2, page 2. (Emphasis added)

23 - Meghan Busse, Christopher Knittel, and Florian Zettlemeyer, “Pain at the Pump: The Effect 

of Gasoline Prices on New and Used Automobile Markets,” University of California Energy 

Institute, UC Davis Institute of Transportation Studies and National Bureau of Economic 

Research (September 2”011), page 2.

24 - See text accompanying supra note 6.

25 - See text accompanying supra notes 7-9.

Organization: Detroit NAACP

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 140-141.]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-29

So, for us, you know, this is about countenance. For the NAACP these proposed standards will 

help families, families with passenger cars, light trucks, SUVs. It will help them save money, put 

more money back in your pocket. To extend the standards enacted last year that cover vehicles 

sold in 2012-2016 will raise the average fuel economy by 2016, but the first ever fuel-efficiency 

standards for medium- and heavy-duty trucks from 2014 to 2018 will also be enacted this year. 

So, the common sense standards that are represented here will be our largest reduction in oil 

consumption in the history of the United States of America.

As I said earlier, the average American household spends approximately $2,000 per year on 

gasoline. I don't know if I have $2,000 a year to spend on gasoline anymore, but the daily 

gasoline costs in the United States is astronomical. And adopting these standards of fuel 

efficiency and emissions performance, to take it to 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025 will save me, 

my mom, my family and consumers across the country about $6,000 a year, maybe more, which 

is very significant, and when it can go to so many other places to do so many other positive 

things other than going to a foreign oil distributor.

Organization: E100 Ethanol Group

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 202-203.]

Depending on electric cars to meet the program's objectives is a quote 'big bet; a huge bet,' end of

quote. That is a direct quote from Bill Ford, Jr., Chairman of the Ford Motor Company at a talk 

that he gave at the Commonwealth Club here in San Francisco last October 27 about his agenda.

Current lithium ion battery vehicles are not selling. Only 17,345 of the almost 13 million lightduty vehicles sold in 2011 were Chevy Volts and Nissan Leafs, a little more than one-tenth of 

1%. The Volt base price is $40,000 and the Leaf's is $36,050 after their large price increase in 

December.

Comparably-sized and equipped gasoline versions of these vehicles, the Chevy Cruz and Nissan 

Versa, are at least $20,000 less than the price of the electrics.

So the question becomes, will millions of consumers spend $20,000 up front to save the $8200 

over the life of the proposed standards? The answer, we believe, is clearly not.

Organization: Eaton Corporation

Allows OEM to bring safe, affordable vehicles to market that customers want to purchase. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9494-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 189.]
EPA Response to Comments

18-30

but that they will also lead to big savings by consumers at the pump as well as to the economy 

generally. The estimated consumer savings of approximately $3,000 to $4,400 in net lifetime 

savings is almost certainly a conservative estimate when considering likely increases in the fuel 

prices and improvements in technology. The estimated social level benefits of $311 to $421 

billion are, therefore, likely conservative as well. We certainly think that consumers and 

businesses alike who rely on transportation will all significantly benefit from having the 300-plus 

billion dollars more in their pocketbooks to spend on other things.

Organization: EcoMotors International, Inc.

The agencies have gone to great lengths in the Proposed Rule to stress how they have designed 

the standards to preserve consumer choice. EcoMotors suggests that EPA go a step further by 

acknowledging consumers' preference for familiar vehicle technologies and building in 

additional compliance flexibilities to enable OEMs to choose alternative advanced technology 

paths for achieving the same CO2 reductions and fuel economy improvements. OEMs should not 

be forced to produce vehicles that consumers may not want. Furthermore, if consumers are 

dissatisfied with the range or price of LDVs being offered, they could choose to keep their 

existing vehicles longer, reducing new vehicle sales and resulting in increased GHG emissions -

a scenario that could be avoided if EPA were less aggressive in promoting a small, select group 

of hybrids. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 6]

If a vehicle technology doesn't create a value proposition all the way through to the customer 

base, it will not succeed. Market forces will ultimately drive consumers' vehicle decisions - not 

intangible regulatory credits and incentives that only benefit automotive manufacturers. If there 

is not enough consumer demand for EVs, PHEVs and FCVs today, how will consumers react to 

even more expensive, high-mileage vehicles in the future? The agencies risk undermining their 

ultimate energy and environmental objectives if they fail to acknowledge this fact, and choose to 

remain firmly wedded to promoting only a small group of unfamiliar and expensive technologies 

- EVs, PHEVs and FCVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9594-A2, p. 6]

Organization: Edmunds.com

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 102-104.]

Our second point is that, by their nature, the proposed CAFE standards force automakers to focus 

their efforts on improving fuel economy. This dictates the nature of competition. Automakers 

focus on fuel economy rather than letting consumer preferences determine on what basis they 

compete. This focus on fuel economy for all automakers limits competition in other dimensions, 

such as safety, comfort, performance, design and electronics. In fact, the focus on fuel economy 

could limit the innovation of these other features, especially for automakers that have fewer 

resources or that need to work relatively harder to meet their fuel economy target. Moreover, the 

proposed rules have the potential to limit innovation of fuel economy itself by offering favored 

status to certain technologies via special credits, which could then deter automakers from 

developing other technologies.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-31

First, the current proposal needs to address the potential consequences of mandated increased 

focus on fuel economy for competition and innovation in the automotive industry. The proposed 

rules need to more fully explore how such consequences could force consumers to make 

sacrifices to get the desired emissions results.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing 

on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 100-103.]

Many parties involved in the CAFE process have asserted why the proposed rules should make 

sense for consumers, why consumers should embrace these rules, how consumers should benefit 

from these rules, despite higher vehicle prices, and so on. The problem is that while they purport 

to represent consumers, these parties typically do not represent consumers. In our view, it's better 

to go straight to the source, rather than to presume to know what is best for a particular group.

First of all, the improved fuel economy results for the proposed CAFE standards for 2017 to 

2025 are based on production forecasts and do not account for how consumer demand for and 

willingness to pay for fuel economy will keep pace with the more fuel-efficient fleet built. To 

date, consumers have demonstrated relatively little preference for high-mileage vehicles, and 

then usually just for brief periods during high gas prices. If reality differs significantly from key 

assumptions used in these forecasts, for example, if gas prices drop and consumer demand for 

fuel efficiency then decreases, a disconnect could arise between what consumers want and what 

automakers supply under the proposed standard. This has the potential to result in more limited 

choice, higher prices, and decreased auto sales.

Our third point is that the multiple measures of MPG that have emerged from the rulemaking 

process add excessive complexity to the consumer decision-making process, making it harder, 

not easier, for consumers to assess fuel economy, compare vehicles, and decide which vehicle 

works best for them.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 287.]

With respect to economic security, again, combined with the Phase I standards, the proposed rule 

will provide families with more than $8,000 in fuel savings over the lifetime of the new vehicle 

by 2025, for a total of $1.7 seven trillion and national fuel savings over the life of the program.

Organization: Ford Motor Company

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 43-44.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 32.]
EPA Response to Comments

18-32

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 85-86.]

The key is to ensure that the proposed targets do not outpace consumer demand or the 

affordability of the technologies needed for compliance. As a full-line manufacturer, we are 

challenged to meet a broad range of customer wants, such as function, performance, comfort and 

convenience, safety and fuel economy. And all these attributes need to come together in a line of 

vehicles that consumers can afford. After all, attainment of our national goals for CO2 reduction 

and energy security cannot be met by niche products and technologies. It does little good to 

produce vehicles with improved fuel efficiency unless those vehicles are actually purchased by a 

wide range of American consumers. Further, the technologies must be self-sustaining in the 

marketplace and not dependent on long-term government subsidies.

We must also acknowledge that market success is dependent upon many factors outside of our 

control, such as the price of fuel, the state of the economy or the availability of affordable 

technologies and materials. The further we look into the future, the more difficult it is to predict 

these factors with accuracy.

Organization: General Motors Company

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 37-38.]

Let me also note that the proposed standards will not be easy; they will be difficult and they will 

be expensive. The success of our current new offerings in the marketplace like the Chevy 

Malibu, Equinox, Cruze and the Volt convince us we are on a good path toward meeting these 

early requirements the proposal will create, but we will need further breakthroughs in technology 

and good customer acceptance of the additional vehicle changes, technologies and costs that will 

be associated with providing the vehicles needed in the future years to allow us continued 

success in meeting the aggressive requirements down the road.

Organization: Gilles, B.

It will hurt the consumer by making vehicles much more expensive. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

8065-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

EPA’s cost-benefit analysis for this rule is also fatally flawed. EPA’s cost-benefit analysis shows 

positive net benefits only because EPA omits the cost to consumers of limiting consumer choice. 

Instead, EPA credits forced fuel savings as a benefit. Because the rule increases the upfront cost 

of buying a car, the rule forces 7 million drivers out of the car market. This means that 7 million 

people will not be able to enjoy the fuel savings calculated by EPA because they will not be able 

to afford a car in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 1-2]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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As EPA’s own discussion indicates, its modeling assumes that the current market for fuel 

economy is incredibly inefficient, with consumers and businesses making massive, systematic 

errors in their behavior over the course of decades. If, in reality, households and businesses are 

not as shortsighted as the EPA analysis assumes—perhaps because the EPA modeling leaves out 

one or more important factors that matter to vehicle buyers in the real world—then the EPA’s 

cost-benefit analysis collapses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 9]

1. EPA Assumes That in Absence of Fuel Economy Regulations, Vehicle Buyers Would Ignore 

Hundreds of Billions of Dollars in Potential Gains [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 9]

In standard economic models, it is assumed that households rationally act in their interest, and 

spend their incomes in ways that maximize utility. It is not that economists literally believe each 

consumer is a robot capable of performing complex calculus problems with each item in the 

grocery store, but instead economists believe that rationality is a safe benchmark assumption. 

This is because the forces of competition, learning from the examples of others, and the ubiquity 

of product ratings and other information will tend to limit systematic errors on the part of 

consumers, especially for expensive, recurring purchases and in markets that have many 

customers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 9-10]

To be sure, standard economic theory allows a role for government intervention in the case of 

“negative externalities,” which can include greenhouse gas emissions. In this case, although 

motorists (for example) would presumably make vehicle purchases that tended to equate 

marginal private benefits with marginal private costs, nonetheless their behavior would be 

suboptimal since each vehicle buyer would ignore the social costs of his or her behavior. In this 

setting, the typical economic textbook might recommend a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade 

framework to force consumers to “internalize the externality” and to once again have their 

private incentives aligned with social welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 10]

To be clear, the above analysis is typical in standard economic theory, but this is not how EPA 

approaches the cost-benefit assessment of the proposed rule. Instead, EPA assumes that the new 

rule will benefit vehicle buyers even considering only their narrow self-interest, and then on top 

of these net private benefits, EPA adds the social benefits of reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 

In other words, EPA attempts to justify the new rule not simply on the grounds that individual 

consumers are ignorant of how their behavior will affect global temperatures in the year 2100, 

but EPA also assumes that consumers are ignorant of how their behavior will affect their 

gasoline purchases next year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 10]

EPA recognizes the problem:

For this proposed rule, EPA projects significant private gains to consumers in three major areas: 

(1) Reductions in spending on fuel, (2) for gasoline-fueled vehicles, for time saved due to less 

refueling, and (3) additional driving that results from the rebound effect. In combination, these 

private benefits, mostly from fuel savings, appear to outweigh the costs of the standards, even 

without accounting for externalities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 10]
EPA Response to Comments

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Admittedly, these findings pose an economic conundrum....If our analysis projects net private 

benefits that consumers have not realized...then, [assuming efficient markets], there must be 

additional costs of these private net benefits that are not accounted for [in the EPA 

analysis]....The estimate of large private net benefits from this rule, then, suggests either that the 

assumptions [of efficient markets and rational consumers] do not hold, or that EPA’s analysis 

has missed some factor(s) tied to improved fuel economy that reduce(s) consumer welfare. [Bold 

added.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 11]

To see just how important EPA’s assumption of consumer error is to its overall cost-benefit 

results, consider the following table: [See table on p. 11 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1]

The above table shows the breakdown of the aggregate net benefits figures quoted earlier. For 

example, if we assume a discount rate of 7% and take the lowest estimate of the SCC that EPA 

uses, then the cost of the proposed rule (through 2050) has an estimated present value of $243 

billion, in the form of higher vehicle costs passed on to the purchaser. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, pp. 11-12]

However, this gross cost is offset by (a) fuel savings of $579 billion and (b) other benefits 

(including avoided climate-change damages) of $124 billion. On net, therefore, the high discount 

rate and low SCC yield benefits of ($579 billion + $124 billion) - $243 billion = $460 billion. 

Similar calculations show that if we assume a low discount rate of 3%, and a high SCC, then the 

net benefits rise to $1.72 trillion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 12]

IER has added the row entitled “Implicit Assumed Consumer Error.” These values are the 

difference between the fuel savings and the assumed technology cost (i.e. higher vehicle price, 

holding all else constant except for fuel efficiency) for each time period. For example, in the year 

2040 EPA assumes consumers will suffer $39.8 billion in the form of higher vehicle prices. 

However, consumers will benefit from saving $144 billion in fuel expenditures. This means that 

looking solely at private costs and benefits, in the year 2040 the rule will ostensibly provide net 

benefits to consumers of $104.2 billion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 12]

This is quite a large error to attribute to consumers, and to repeat, this is an annual figure (for the 

year 2040), and it is reckoned in inflation-adjusted 2009 dollars. The reader should recall EPA’s 

own admission: Either consumers are going to systemically ignore hundreds of billions of dollars 

in free money, or the EPA’s modeling omits important real-world considerations. In the next 

subsection this comment will explore what these considerations might be. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, p. 12]

Before doing so, it should be reiterated just how significant this assumption of consumer 

irrationality is to EPA’s overall cost-benefit assessment. For the high discount rate, low SCC 

scenario, the implicit consumer error through 2050 is $336 billion, compared to total net benefits 

of $460 billion. Thus 73 percent of the total net benefits allegedly accruing from the proposed 

rules (in this particular scenario) are due to the assumed consumer error. In the scenario 

assuming a low discount rate and high SCC, the implicit consumer error accounts for 56 percent 

of the total estimated net benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 12]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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In other words, if it turns out that EPA is indeed omitting important factor(s) from its 

modeling—such that consumers wouldn’t systematically miss out on hundreds of billions of 

dollars over the course of decades if the government doesn’t force them to reap this free 

money—then EPA’s claimed net benefits from the proposed rules would fall by roughly one-half 

to three-fourths, depending on the other parameter values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, 

p. 12]

As explained in the previous subsection, EPA’s analysis rests on the assumption that consumers 

are irrationally unwilling to pay a higher price for “the same” vehicle that is equal in all respects 

to another, cheaper vehicle, except for superior fuel economy. This behavior is assumed true 

even when the present value of lifetime savings on fuel expenditures would more than 

compensate for the higher initial purchase price, leading to the term “energy paradox” in the 

literature. The EPA discussion relates some of the theories in the literature to explain this 

“conundrum,” such as consumers incorrectly calculating the fuel savings from differences in 

mpg ratings, consumers using rules of thumb when making purchases rather than optimizing 

calculations, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 13]

The problem with these ad hoc explanations is that they ignore the tremendous profit 

opportunities such massive consumer irrationality would leave open to enterprising firms. For 

example, even if one were to believe that individual motorists could make gross computational 

errors of this magnitude, surely entire taxicab fleets wouldn’t be plagued by these simple 

mistakes. (And yet, in 2011 New York City Mayor Bloomberg sought the power to regulate fuel 

economy standards for NYC cabs.) Another obvious industry—and one that is more open to 

competition than taxi fleets—to benefit from this alleged inefficiency is the rental car market. It 

might take some ingenuity to implement, but if the EPA’s analysis is correct, then a rental car 

company could presumably profit by buying only vehicles with very high fuel-efficiency, and 

coming up with various methods for capturing the savings this would allow for its customers. 

(For example, it would be fairly easy to estimate the dollar savings in fuel for a given trip that 

would last only a few days—as opposed to estimating the lifetime fuel savings when buying a 

new car.) The fact that rental car agencies currently don’t consist entirely of the highest fuelefficient models is yet more evidence that EPA’s modeling leaves out important factors. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 13]

Consider the following table produced from data from U.S. Department of Energy and EPA. In 

every case, the 2010 version of each car is larger, has a larger engine, has more passenger 

volume, and more luggage volume. The fuel economy is similar with the 2010 version generally 

getting slightly worse city fuel economy and slightly better highway fuel economy. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 13-14]

Consumers demand a certain fuel economy, but consumers also want to maximize other 

attributes such as performance and size (then again, maybe the fuel economy of these cars is 

actually higher than consumers’ actual preferences because of CAFE standards). If consumers 

really demanded very fuel efficient cars, Honda would still make a car today that gets better gas 

mileage than the 1985 Honda Civic Coupe HF. The Civic Coupe HF got nearly 50 mpg on the 

highway a quarter century ago. Today, the Honda’s most fuel efficient car is a hybrid sedan 

Civic that gets 44 mpg in the city and 44 mpg on the highway. The better explanation for this 
EPA Response to Comments

18-36

outcome is that consumers have preferences for a variety of attributes that the EPA analysis 

omits, not that consumer irrationality increased over the last 25 years. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9573-A1, p. 14]

Besides the possibility of other factors entering into the consideration, another explanation for 

the ostensible “irrationality” of consumers is that they treat the uncertainty of the future 

differently from how the EPA’s modeling approach requires. When evaluating the present 

monetary value of improvements in fuel efficiency, two of the most important considerations are 

future interest rates and the price of gasoline. These are highly volatile, and consumers quite 

rationally may not place much weight on expected savings from fuel economy occurring several 

years in the future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 16]

In other words, consumers may rationally have much higher discount rates than EPA assumes 

they should have. Consider this research presented by economist Ronald J. Sutherland in the 

context of a previous NHTSA rulemaking: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 16]

Corporations frequently require high hurdle rates in excess of 12 percent to undertake capital 

investments. Dixit and Pindyck present a compelling analysis of observed high discount rates for 

irreversible investments. The technical literature indicates that irreversible investments may 

require hurdle rates two to four times the average discount rate in order to trigger an investment. 

However, fuel economy standards have the unattractive investment properties of being 

irreversible, whereas common stocks are highly liquid. Metcalf and Rosenthal and Hassett and 

Metcalf explain how this irreversibility property warrants discount rates of at least two or three 

times higher than may be expected. Allowing for the irreversibility property of such investments, 

a required rate of return of at least 20% appears reasonable for high-income households. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 16-17]

Energy saving investments are typically irreversible investments and therefore require an even 

higher premium. The proposed fuel economy standards for light trucks are irreversible 

investments. The investment in fuel economy is a sunk cost at time of purchase. The investment 

cannot be reversed, should the consumer decide that the investment is unwarranted. Hassett and 

Metcalf apply the irreversible investment model to investments in energy conservation and 

conclude that an appropriate hurdle rate would be about four times greater than the standard 

discount rate. Metcalf and Rosenthal reach a similar conclusion in applying the model to 

commercial lighting and to energy efficient refrigerators. If the government imposed discount 

rate of 7 percent is considered standard, an appropriate discount rate for the fuel economy 

benefits would be at least 14 percent, but probably closer to 21 percent or event 28 

percent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 17]

The application of higher hurdle rates indicates that the benefits from fuel economy standards 

should be revised downward. The NHSTA study calculates consumer benefits as the present 

value of future energy saving using a 7 percent discount rate. However, the evidence on discount 

rates, as well as revealed consumer preferences, indicates that an appropriate discount rate is at 

least 2 or 3 times higher that [sic] the government imposed rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9573-A1, p. 17]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Consumers may not act as EPA assumes they should act, but that is no proof that consumers act 

against their rational economic self-interest. Consumers may be maximizing other dimensions 

that EPA is not considering. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 17]Responding to this 

argument in the past, EPA has argued that we are suggesting that “there must be a loss associated 

with improving fuel economy, because many consumers do not purchase highly fuel-efficient 

vehicles already on the market.” Furthermore, EPA states: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, 

p. 17]

OMB Circular A-4 notes that “Economists ordinarily consider market prices as the most accurate 

measure of the marginal value of goods and services to society.” The fuel savings that consumers 

will receive are directly measurable using market prices for fuel, while the values that consumers 

reveal through their purchase decisions are indirect measures and may therefore be less 

reliable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 18]

EPA, along with most commenters on the rule, finds that there are cost-effective fuel savings that 

the market has not at this time provided to consumers and includes those benefits in our 

analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 18]

In other words, EPA is ignoring (or at least heavily discounting) people’s actual purchase 

decisions and only considering what EPA can measure—fuel consumption. This same logic is 

contained in this proposed rule. Just because people may value safety, power, four wheel drive, 

comfort, convenience, size, more than fuel economy does not mean EPA can discount those 

choices. It is not necessarily irrational to value other characteristics more than fuel savings as 

EPA assumes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 18]

The EPA’s logic can be turned on its head, to show the problem with its approach. Currently, it 

is unprofitable for manufacturers to produce vehicles with the specific combination of attributes 

that would satisfy the proposed mileage standard. That means the amount consumers would be 

willing to pay for these compliant vehicles is less than the market value of the resources that 

would be required to produce them; that’s what it means to say their production is currently 

unprofitable. Thus EPA’s own criterion shows that its rule would force vehicle manufacturers to 

devote scarce resources into channels that are less valuable than other potential outlets. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 18]

3. Models which purport to show consumers do not act in their rational economic self-interest are 

crude at best [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 18]

To reiterate, the EPA cost-benefit analysis relies on a particular theory of consumer behavior—

namely that it is prone to extreme error in the context of vehicle fuel economy. In the literature 

modeling consumer behavior, the estimated valuations of fuel economy vary by an order of 

magnitude, suggesting that the econometricians do not understand this issue very well. In 

practice, there are no “controlled experiments” where consumers are offered the choice between 

two otherwise identical vehicles, where one is more expensive yet has better fuel economy. On 

the contrary, in the real world there are tradeoffs between vehicles that simultaneously differ on 

vehicle size, acceleration, price, safety, and finally fuel economy. More recent modeling has 

done a better job capturing these nuances, but economists have still not reached a consensus on 
EPA Response to Comments

18-38

exactly what motivates consumers when making vehicle purchases. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9573-A1, pp. 18-19]

To give a concrete example of the problem, the EPA’s discussion of the “energy paradox” 

acknowledges that consumers in practice do not always have a full spectrum of vehicle attributes 

varying in each dimension, and then says in a footnote: “For instance, in [model year] 2010, the 

range of fuel economy (combined city and highway) available among all listed 6- cylinder 

minivans was 18 to 20 miles per gallon. With a manual transmission, 4-cylinder minivan, it is 

possible to get 24 mpg.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 19]

The EPA discussion is here trying to explain why the energy paradox persists; in EPA’s view, 

the market for some inexplicable reason isn’t offering minivans getting 24 mpg, and so 

consumers have no choice but to buy the less fuel efficient models, even though the savings in 

price is swamped by the long-run fuel expenditures that these cheaper minivans will 

require. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 19]

But the EPA discussion fails to ask: Why did the market for minivans concentrate on automatic 

transmission, 6-cyclinder models that only got 18 to 20 mpg? After all, car companies in the past 

offered manual transmissions in their station wagons and vans. So why are car companies not 

offering manual transmissions in their minivans now? Could it be that many of the households in 

the market for a new minivan weren’t interested in an option that would require using the clutch 

while taking the kids to soccer games and other activities throughout the week in stop-and-go 

driving? In the EPA’s crude modeling, if these households had instead been forced to buy a more 

expensive, 4-cylinder minivan with a stick shift, EPA’s rule would be doing them a favor in the 

long run. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 19-20]

4. A one-size-fits-all regulatory policy is not the answer for people with heterogeneous tastes and 

preferences

As another specific example of the true subtleties involved—which are ignored by simplistic 

models—we must remember that a typical suburban family might purchase a “gas guzzling” 

SUV in order to make large grocery runs, pick up furniture, pull a boat, etc., while it also 

purchases a fuel efficient car for other travel. Depending on future movements in gasoline prices, 

the family can then adjust its driving accordingly, using the SUV more when gasoline is cheap, 

while relying more heavily on the hybrid when gasoline prices are relatively high. The typical 

model looking for “the” consumer valuation of fuel economy currently does not capture the 

flexibility and needs of actual motorists. By imposing a one-size-fits-all decision that raises fuel 

economy (while hurting other attributes) across the board, the government would be taking away 

options from families and making them worse off. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 20]

Another problem with the entire approach is to assume that consumers have identical tastes 

regarding fuel economy. In reality, some consumers may be very concerned, while others may 

not be. Thus even if the proposed rule made the “representative consumer” better off, in practice 

it would still harm those consumers who (for whatever reason) do not place a high subjective 

value on fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 20]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-39

As a final example showing the problem in the EPA’s assumption of a typical vehicle buyer, 

consider that the proposed rule increases the upfront cost of buying a car, and thereby forces an 

estimated 7 million drivers out of the car market. This means that 7 million people will not be 

able to enjoy the fuel savings calculated by EPA because they will not be able to afford a car in 

the first place. Thus the alleged fuel economy benefits to vehicle buyers who are still able to

afford their purchase must be weighed against the psychic losses to those who now must 

postpone or abandon their purchases altogether. Aggregating subjective preferences together to 

achieve a single number of “net benefits” is a very controversial area of economic theory, though 

EPA hardly discusses the issue. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 20-21]

EPA’s cost-benefit analysis shows positive net benefits only because EPA omits the cost to 

consumers of limiting consumer choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 23]

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

The agencies constant performance cost projections are likely to be an overestimate of the risk of 

lost consumer welfare. Since attributes like size and performance are at least partly relative, 

changing the fleet-wide average size or performance may not significantly impact overall 

consumer welfare. Manufacturers may not have to spend as much as the agencies’ assume in 

order to prevent any aggregate consumer welfare loss. Similarly, any risk of lost consumer 

welfare unaccounted for in the agencies’ constant performance cost projections is mitigated by 

the positionality of attributes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

The agencies should consider how positionality and the bandwagon effect will shape the 

consumer market for new technologies. As fuel-efficient vehicles become more visible and more 

common, the perceived attractiveness of fuel efficiency may increase. Information diffusion and 

habit formation will also affect the future of the market for electric vehicles and other new 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

Constant Performance Cost Projections Likely Overestimate the Risk of Lost Consumer Welfare, 

and the Agencies Should Treat Them as an Upper Bound

The agencies build an assumption of constant performance into their compliance cost estimates. 

They believe that manufacturers will spend whatever extra it costs to maintain current vehicle 

attributes as they increase fuel economy, in order to preserve consumer welfare. The cost 

projections therefore depend on the agencies’ best guesses about how changed attributes would 

impact consumer preferences and welfare. As the agencies note, “[b]ecause welfare losses are 

monetary estimates of how much consumers would have to be compensated to be made as well 

as in the absence of the change, the price increase measures the loss to the buyer.” [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 15]

As a result, if the agencies are wrong about how changing attributes would impact consumer 

preferences, then they are overestimating how much manufacturers will need to spend to 

maintain consumer welfare. The agencies acknowledge that their cost estimate is likely to be an 

overestimate: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 15]
EPA Response to Comments

18-40

because the consumer has choices other than buying the same vehicle with a higher price; she 

could choose a different vehicle, or decide not to buy a new vehicle. The consumer would choose 

one of those options only if the alternative involves less loss than paying the higher price. Thus, 

the increase in price that the consumer faces would be the upper bound of loss of consumer 

welfare, unless there are other changes to the vehicle due to the fuel economy improvements that 

make the vehicle less desirable to consumers.”98 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 15-

16]

Positional goods theory reinforces the conclusion that the agencies’ cost estimate is an upper 

bound and is likely an overestimate. 99 The value of a “positional good” depends on how it 

compares with similar goods possessed by others.100 The owner of a positional good derives 

more welfare from that good than expected when considering only its functional qualities. The 

prominent explanation for this phenomenon is that highly visible consumption becomes a signal 

for status,101 and people value status because they anticipate it will translate into more favorable 

treatment in economic and social interactions.102 For example, jewelry, silk ties, and expensive 

champagne all have very little functional value, but their consumption is conspicuous and 

conveys status to others. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 16]

Other goods, like cars, have both functional and positional value. Consumers may partially value 

vehicle size and horsepower for their functional utility like hauling capacity and speed, but a 

growing body of research indicates that many consumers do not necessarily want the biggest and 

fastest car, so long as their car is bigger and faster than their friends’ and neighbors’. According 

to a recent U.S. survey on the visibility of 31 expenditure categories (from food to mobile 

phones), new or used motor vehicle purchases were the second most visible expenditure; related 

expenditures on gasoline/diesel, vehicle maintenance, and insurance were all substantially less 

visible. 103 Surveys also consistently confirm that cars are highly positional goods, that people 

prefer a relative increase in a car’s value to an absolute increase,104 and that the more visible 

features of cars are more positional.105 Financial savings, in contrast, are typically considered 

non-positional.106 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 16]

The more observable prestige features of vehicles include newness, brand, size, design, and 

power. While all these traits have functional value (such as capacity, safety, and 

performance),107 they also all have relative value: consumers value power not just for speed but 

for the status signal and for the ability to out-accelerate others at a traffic light; consumers do not 

necessarily want a big car, but they do want a bigger car.108 As Bob Lutz, Vice Chairman of 

General Motors, has stated, “aspirational aspects overwhelm the functional differences” when 

customers choose cars.109 Importantly, many vehicle prestige features—especially larger size 

and increased performance—reduce fuel economy.110And given the low visibility of gasoline 

expenditures and of financial savings, fuel efficiency itself is currently a relatively non-positional 

good (though there is some chance that the agencies’ new vehicle labeling requirements could 

start to make fuel economy more visible and positional). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, 

p. 17]

A vehicle’s size and weight are also positional for safety reasons, in addition to status 

motivations. To the extent smaller cars fare worse in crashes with bigger cars, consumers may 

value bigger cars not because of any intrinsic safety value, but because of the average fleet size. 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-41

According to Wenzel’s research on the relationship between vehicle weight/size and safety, 

while an increase in footprint decreases the risk of casualty to the driver, an increase in 

footprint—especially for pick-up trucks and sports cars—raises the risk of both fatality and 

casualty to other drivers. 111 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 17]

The trouble with positional goods is they impose externalities. This is obvious in the safety 

context: if Joan upgrades from her compact car to a large pick-up truck, she may feel somewhat 

safer, but her purchase marginally increases the risk to all other drivers. It also applies in the 

status context. Again, if Joan buys a big, fast, flashy car to move up the status hierarchy, John’s 

big, fast, flashy car is no longer as rare. John feels relatively worse off and so will have to invest 

in an even bigger, faster, flashier car just to restore his previous status position. As a result, both 

consumers spend resources without actually improving their relative status. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 17]

Because vehicle purchase decisions are made non-cooperatively but in fact alter the spending 

behavior and relative safety of others, consumers get stuck on a “positional treadmill” that does 

not increase welfare.112 Yet if any individual opts out of this “expenditure arms race,” it would 

only move that consumer backwards on the status or safety hierarchy, which for most consumers 

is unacceptable.113 And given limited resources and limited market options, the overconsumption of positional goods results in under-consumption of non-positional goods (such as 

fuel efficiency). If consumers could maintain their relative economic position, they might be 

more willing to pay for non-positional goods.114 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 17-

18]

Fuel economy regulation, therefore, is a cooperative solution that allows consumers to achieve 

what they could not in the non-cooperative open market: namely, an increase in fuel economy 

without losing position in the status hierarchy.115 Regulations similarly help consumers select 

fuel economy without falling behind in the safety/size rankings, since with time the average fleet 

size will shift.116 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 18]

In other words, positional goods theory explains that consumer valuations of vehicle attributes 

like size and performance are relative, which means consumer preferences can adjust as average 

fleet-wide attributes shift. As a result, changing the fleet-wide average size or performance may 

not significantly impact overall consumer welfare. In the context of the agencies’ cost estimates, 

this means that manufacturers may not have to spend as much as the agencies’ assume in order to 

prevent any aggregate consumer welfare loss. Consequently, the agencies’ constant performance 

cost projects likely overestimate the actual cost of the regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, p. 18]

To improve the accuracy of their cost estimates, the agencies should reanalyze their assumption 

that “changes in vehicle attributes can significantly affect the overall utility that vehicles offer to 

potential buyers,” in light of positional goods theory. A better understanding of the positionality 

of cars will help the agencies refine their projections for how much manufacturers will need to 

spend to maintain actual consumer welfare. Even if a more accurate cost estimate is unlikely to 

change the stringency or structure of the proposed rule,118 refining the cost estimate remains 

important. Not only is an accurate cost-benefit analysis based on the best available evidence 
EPA Response to Comments

18-42

required by professional and legal norms,119 but a better cost estimate will enhance confidence

in justifications for the rule, will improve the public debate over fuel economy, and will set a 

valuable precedent for future rulemakings.120 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 18-19]

Any Risk of Lost Consumer Welfare Unaccounted for in the Agencies’ Constant Performance 

Cost Projections Is Mitigated by the Positionality of Attributes

Despite the constant performance price projection model, the agencies worry that “if estimates 

do not include adequate allowances to prevent attribute sacrifices, technological costs will 

underestimate true economic costs.” The agencies acknowledge that, even with footprint-based 

standards and a constant performance approach, the proposed rule could cause manufacturers to 

forego future planned attribute improvements or even, “[i]n extreme cases,” to change current 

attributes.122 NHTSA conducted a sensitivity analysis to test this possibility, and found that 

even if lost consumer welfare equaled 50% of total private benefits, the rule would still be costbenefit justified.123 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 19]

Nevertheless, for use in the final rulemaking, NHTSA is developing a fuller model of buyers’ 

decisions to estimate explicitly any welfare changes that could result from the combination of 

price increases, fuel economy increases, and altered vehicle attributes.124 NHTSA should be 

sure to build the lessons from positional goods theory into its model, and the agencies should use 

the positionality of vehicle attributes and explain why their cost estimates are not likely to 

underestimate consumer welfare losses; in fact, to the contrary, position goods theory would 

predict that the cost projections are more likely to be overestimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, p. 19]

Positionality and the Bandwagon Effect Will Shape the Consumer Market for New Technology

The agencies ask for comment on factors that may affect the consumer market for electric 

vehicles and other advanced technologies. In conducting this analysis, the agencies should 

consider the malleability of consumer preferences and valuations for new technologies. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 19]

If fuel efficiency becomes a sufficiently visibility trait (perhaps as a result of the vehicle labeling 

rule, marketing campaigns, and related efforts), it is possible that consumers could start 

competing for the highest fuel efficiency. But even if that does not happen, consumers’ valuation 

of fuel efficiency will undoubtedly change over time and as a result of the proposed 

regulation.126 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 19]

The bandwagon effect occurs when the perceived attractiveness of a good increases as more 

people consume it. Growing empirical evidence suggests an environmental bandwagon: people 

are more likely to make environmental choices when they think everyone else is doing the 

same.127 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 19]

The separate though conceptually related effects of information diffusion and habit formation 

might also affect the market for more fuel-efficient vehicles. Car choices are strongly influenced 

by the purchases of peers, 128 perhaps because consumers often deal with the need to justify 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-43

their choices by deferring to the preferences of others.129 Consumers might currently have a 

negative opinion of vehicles running on unknown technology or of unknown model types;130 

but once more fuel-efficient vehicles increase market share and become more familiar to 

consumers as a result of the proposed regulations, new consumer habits will form, and 

willingness to pay for fuel efficiency might increase. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 

19-20]

The agencies should treat their constant performance cost projections as an overestimate of the 

risk of lost consumer welfare. Positional goods theory explains that vehicle attributes like size, 

power, and safety have relative value. Since attributes like size and performance are at least 

partly relative, changing the fleet-wide average size or performance may not significantly impact 

overall consumer welfare. Manufacturers may not have to spend as much as the agencies’ 

assume in order to prevent any aggregate consumer welfare loss. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, pp. 20-21]

The agencies should consider how positionality and the bandwagon effect will shape the 

consumer market for new technologies. As fuel-efficient vehicles become more visible and more 

common, the perceived attractiveness of fuel efficiency may increase. Information diffusion and 

habit formation will also affect the future of the market for electric vehicles and other new 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 21]

98 Id. at fn. 525 (emphasis added).

99 See attached symposium paper on positional goods for additional details.

100 Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 AM. 

ECON. REV. 101, 101 (1985).

101 Id. at 107 (“When an individual’s ability level cannot be observed directly, such observable 

components of his consumption bundle constitute a signal to others about his total income level, 

and on average, therefore, about his level of ability. . . . [I]mperfect information about ability 

might create incentives for people to rearrange consumption patterns to favor observable 

goods.”). Consumption patterns might vary depending on the relevant population in the status 

competition. People might compete among friends, neighbors, and coworkers; within their socioeconomic class; with higher classes; or on a society-wide basis. See Fredrik Carlsson et al., Do 

You Enjoy Having More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods, 74 ECONOMICA 

586, 590 (2007). If a particular population has more reliable, independent information on 

abilities or income, consumption patterns for observable goods might shift. Frank, supra note 

100, at 108.

102 Y. Weiss & C. Fershtman, Social Status and Economic Performance: A Survey, 42 EURO. 

ECON. REV 801, 802 (1998). Status can be instrumental, in that higher status can carry better 

consumption opportunities, access to better employment, and even better marriage prospects. Ed 

Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a 
EPA Response to Comments

18-44

Game of Status, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1085, 1087 (2004). Factors like psychology, biological 

hardwiring, and envy also should not be ignored.

103 Ori Heffetz, A Test of Conspicuous Consumption: Visibility and Income Elasticities, 93 

REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 1101, 1106 (2011) (vehicle purchase had a visibility index of 0.73, 

second only to tobacco products (0.76); gasoline/diesel had a visibility index of 0.39, car repairs 

were at 0.42, and car insurance fell near the bottom at 0.23).

104 Specifically, a majority of people surveyed would prefer a world in which their car is 

superior to other people’s but less valuable overall, versus a world in which their car has more 

absolute value but is inferior to the societal average. See, e.g., Carlsson et al., supra note 101, at 

588, 593 (reporting results of a Swedish survey); Francisco Alpizar et al., How Much Do We 

Care About Absolute Versus Relative Income and Consumption?, 56 J. OF ECON. BEHAVIOR 

& ORG. 405, 412 (2005) (reporting results of Costa Rican survey). Though some such surveys 

were conducted in other countries, if anything positionality for cars could be stronger in the 

United States, given the American affinity for cars and the income distribution. See Reid R. 

Heffner et al., Effects of Vehicle Image in Gasoline-Hybrid Electric Vehicles 2 (U.C. Davis Inst. 

of Transportation Studies UCD-ITS-RR-05-08, 2005) (“In the words of automobile psychologist 

G. Clotaire Rapaille, Americans are in ‘a permanent search of an identity’ and ‘cars are very key 

. . . [they are] maybe the best way for Americans to express themselves.’”); Hopkins & 

Kornienko, supra note 102 (noting that positional effects increase as society’s income increases, 

because the portion of income spent on conspicuous consumption increases). On the other hand, 

cars are often more a necessity and less a luxury in the United States than in other countries. See 

Mark Grinblatt et al., Interpersonal Effects in Consumption: Evidence from the Automobile 

Purchases of Neighbors (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-10, 2004).

105 Carlsson et al., supra note 101, at 588, 593 (finding support for hypothesis that 'visible goods 

and their characteristics, such as the value of cars, are more positional than less visible goods and 

their characteristics, such as car safety.').

106 See, e.g. Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, Savings Rates and Poverty: The Role of 

Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital (2009), available at 

http://www.hecer.fi/Seminars/Papers/moav_paper.pdf.

107 Carlsson et al., supra note 101, at 595, could not provide a clear answer to the question of 

whether cars are completely positional. On average cars are highly positional, but that reflects a 

good deal of heterogeneity: cars may be completely positional for some people, but are possibly 

completely non-positional for others. Id. at 596.

108 Erik Verhoef & Bert van Wee, Car Ownership and Status: Implications for Fuel Efficiency 

Policies from the Viewpoint of Theories of Happiness and Welfare Economics 4 (Tinbergen 

Institute Discussion Paper TI 2000-076/3, 2000) ('However, most cars in most Western countries 

have engines with much more power than needed, given the characteristics of infrastructure, 

speed limits, and travel distances.').
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-45

109 George Will, Americans and Their Cars, TOWNHALL DAILY, Apr. 18, 2002, available at 

http://townhall.com/columnists/GeorgeWill/2002/04/18/americans_and_their_cars.

110 See Knittel, supra note 84.

111 Wenzel, supra note 85, at 19, 36. Effect of footprint on fatality risk to driver: P-value 0.215, 

R2 value 0.01. Effect of footprint on fatality risk to other drivers: P-value <0.001, R2 value 0.38 

(though the data for trucks drives this relationship much more than for cars). Effect of footprint 

on casualty risk to driver: P-value <0.001, R2 value 0.26. Effect of footprint on casualty risk to 

other drivers: P-value <0.001, R2 value 0.26 (though again the data for trucks drives this 

relationship much more than for cars).

112 Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 

AM. ECON. REV. 137, 137 (2005).

113 Frank, supra note 100, at 105-06.

114 Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 UNIV. 

OF CHICAGO LAW REV. 323, 326 (2001) (“If people could maintain their relative economic 

position, they would be willing to pay more, and possibly a great deal more, to purchase many of 

the goods that regulation attempts to deliver. . . .[W]hen an individual buys additional safety in 

isolation, he experiences not only an absolute decline in the amounts of other goods and services 

he can buy, but also a decline in his relative living standards. In contrast, when a regulation 

requires all workers to purchase additional safety, each worker gives up the same amount of 

other goods, so no worker experiences a decline in relative living standards. If relative living 

standards matter, then an individual will value an across-the-board increase in safety more highly 

than an increase in safety that he alone purchases.”).

115 Correcting for negative externalities and collective action problems is a classic case for 

regulation. “Analytically, positional externalities are no different from ordinary environmental 

pollutants.” Id. at 364. Such regulation is not about taking public action just because one 

consumer’s increased consumption makes another consumer unhappy or envious; rather, 

regulation is justified to address a market failure. Id. at 365. Even if not everyone wants to solve 

this particular collective action problem, “we do not require unanimity as a precondition for 

unquestionably legitimate collective action in other spheres.” Id. at 366. See also Verhoef & van 

Wee, supra note 91, at 13-14. (“On the free market, consumers would inefficiently strongly 

stimulate each other to purchase more luxurious variants. Corrective taxes [or a CAFE standard 

with tradable permits] may protect consumers against such treadmills.”).

116 Regulations also correct a supply-side problem, since theory predicts manufacturers will 

devote their research and development budget to status goods until government adjusts the 

incentives. Ben Cooper et al., Status Effects and Negative Utility Growth, 111 ECON. J. 642 

(2001).

118 See supra note 63, and accompanying text.
EPA Response to Comments

18-46

119 See supra note 62, and accompanying text.

120 See supra notes 65-67, and accompanying text.

122 See NHTSA, PRIA, supra note 69, at 708.

123 Id. at 719.

126 Heffner et al., supra note 104, at 3 (“As more hybrid models enter the market, the meanings 

of HEVs are likely to evolve.”).

127 For example, when hotel guests are told they should “join their fellow citizens” in saving 

water by reusing towels, reuse rates increase by 34%; similarly, when electric bills present a 

comparison of neighborhood consumptions, usage decreases by 2%. See Hunt Allcott & Sendhil 

Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCI. 1204 (2010); Hunt Allcott, Social Norms 

and Energy Conservation, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1082 (2011).

128 Grinblatt et al., supra note 104 (reporting results of study in Finland that found car purchases 

strongly influenced by purchases of neighbors, most likely because of information sharing).

129 James Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 3 

(1998).

130 Eugenio Miravete & Maria Moral, Qualitative Effects of Cash-For-Clunkers Programs 

(2009), available at http://www.eugeniomiravete.com/papers/EJM-MJM-Clunkers.pdf.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

The agencies may be confused by studies that rely on standard economic theory, which says that 

assuming full information and no uncertainty, consumers will make optimal tradeoffs between 

the purchase price and subsequent operating costs. However, the standard economic theory does 

not apply in this case because mainstream consumers undervalue fuel savings due to uncertainty 

and loss-aversion. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 15]

There is substantial circumstantial evidence that most consumers in the U.S. place a low value on 

fuel economy. For example, Turrentine and Kurani18 conducted an in depth survey of the carbuying histories of 57 California households. None of these 57 households made any kind of 

quantitative assessment of the value of fuel savings and only 9 stated they compared the fuel 

economy of vehicles in making their choice. The selected consumers were largely unaware of 

their annual fuel cost, in contrast to general knowledge of the daily price fluctuations of a gallon 

of gasoline. Turrentine and Kurani concluded that: 'When consumers buy a vehicle, they have 

neither the tools nor the motivation nor the basic building blocks of knowledge to make a 

calculated decision about fuel costs.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 15]

The question that has been debated for decades is simply - why? This is an extremely important 

question, as most of the calculation of consumer welfare is based on the answer. If consumers are 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-47

already receiving their optimum level of fuel economy, then efficiency standards will decrease 

their welfare. However, if there are valid reasons why consumers are not making optimal 

tradeoffs at the time of vehicle purchase, or if the entire question is not being framed properly, 

then efficiency standards would increase consumer welfare. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, p. 16]

ICCT believes uncertainties about the cost and value of fuel economy improvements, combined 

with general loss-averse behavior by consumers, offers a rational and accurate explanation of the 

failure of the market to optimize fuel cost savings. Green 201019 found that using reasonable 

estimates of the uncertainty offing-use fuel economy, future fuel prices, annual vehicle use, 

vehicle lifetime, and incremental vehicle price yielded an average customer payback period of 

roughly 3 years. While economists refer to this as a market failure, given the large uncertainties 

in the actual amount of future fuel cost savings and the other ways that consumers can spend 

their money, the typically loss-averse customer is being quite rational in only wanting to pay for 

2-5 years of projected fuel savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 16]

If consumers only value 2-5 years of fuel savings, does this mean their consumer welfare will 

decrease if standards force them to save money on fuel from technologies that achieve a fuelsavings based payback in more than 2-5 years? Greene's paper also addressed this issue and 

found there are two important issues that invalidate this conclusion: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 16]

(1) Standards change the status quo by removing the option to buy a vehicle without the 

additional efficiency technology - it is not presented to the customer at all. Loss aversion is 

context dependent, which leads to the paradox that consumers who would decline a risky bet 

may reach a higher level of utility if forced to accept the bet. Efficiency standards mandate that 

only vehicles with additional efficiency technology can be sold. There is no reason why 

consumers should evaluate the choice limited by standards in the same way they perceive the 

choice without standards. ICCT believes the only valid reference point for loss aversion is the 

updated status quo that exists when the consumer actually makes the purchase decision. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 16]

(2) Standards require everyone to purchase higher levels of efficiency technology, not just 

individual customers, leading to indirect consumer welfare benefits. The concept of consumer 

welfare under standard economic theory is based upon individual choices. However, efficiency 

standards affect everyone, not just individual customers. The individual's welfare is now the sum 

of the direct impact on the individual and the indirect benefit to the individual of forcing other 

customers to buy more efficient vehicles. There are substantial benefits to an individual if 

everyone else buys more efficient vehicles. It reduces demand for oil, which leads to lower fuel 

prices and reduced energy security risks. It also reduces carbon emissions and slows down global 

warming. Most people are aware of these benefits if standards are imposed on everyone and 

place significant value on them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 16-17]
EPA Response to Comments

18-48

18 Turrentine, Thomas S., and Kenneth S. Kurani, 'Car Buyers and Fuel Economy?' Energy 

Policy 35 (2007): 1213-1223.

19 Greene, David 2010. 'Uncertainty, loss aversion, and markets for energy efficiency', Energy 

Economics.

6. Mainstream customers severely discount the value of future, highly uncertain fuel savings. 

The primary purpose of efficiency standards is to make up for this discounting and push 

technology into the fleet beyond what would have otherwise been demanded by the market. 

Considering the stringency of the 2011-2016 standards, the sensitivity analysis for market-driven 

increases in efficiency after 2016 should be removed from the Final Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

11. The estimates of net benefits should fully value fuel savings over the lifetime of the vehicle. 

The alternative NHTSA estimates reducing the net benefits are speculative and should be 

removed from the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

11) Discounting of Consumer Benefits

The NPRM evaluates the costs and benefits of the proposed rule, and concludes that the net 

benefits to society of the National Program will be in the range of $311 billion to $421 billion (7 

and 3 percent discount rates, respectively) over the lifetimes of those vehicles sold in MY 2017-

2025. Most of these benefits are attributed to reductions in fuel consumption. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 23]

The reference case analysis of benefits includes the value of fuel savings over the entire lifetime 

of the vehicle. EPA summarizes its rationale for this approach as follows: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9512-A1, p. 23]

EPA continues to value fuel savings from the proposed standards using the projected market 

value over the vehicles' entire lifetimes, and to report that value among private benefits of the 

proposed rule. Improved fuel economy will significantly reduce consumer expenditures on fuel, 

thus benefiting consumers. Real money is being saved and accrued by the initial buyer and 

subsequent owners. In addition, using a measure based on consumer consideration at the time of 

vehicle purchase would involve a very wide range of uncertainty, due to the lack of consensus on 

the value of additional fuel economy in vehicle choice models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, pp. 23-24]

NHTSA's reference case analysis similarly assumes that there is no loss in value to consumers 

resulting from vehicles that have an increase in price and higher fuel economy. However, 

NHTSA also performed sensitivity analyses that assumed that there is a 25 percent or 50 percent 

loss in value to consumers--equivalent to the assumption that consumers will only value the 

calculated benefits they will achieve at 75, or 50 percent, respectively of the main analysis 

estimates. This is intended to account for possible unspecified or poorly understood negative 

impacts of the rule on consumer preferences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 24]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-49

The sensitivity analyses conclude that these alternative assumptions have a large impact on the 

magnitude of net benefits, reducing the estimated net benefit by 63.0% and 31.5% respectively. 

Even in the worst case, however, total benefits still exceed costs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 24]

ICCT agrees that estimates of net benefits should fully value fuel savings over the lifetime of the 

vehicle. As noted by EPA these are real-world impacts that have tangible value. The alternative 

NHTSA estimates presented in the NPRM are speculative and should not be given any 

consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 24]

Organization: Michigan State Senate, District 18

But increased fuel economy will also save working families already feeling the pinch at the 

pump. Americans spend approximately $2,000 a year on gasoline, and at this rate the costs 

quickly add up. In fact, all together Americans spend more than $1.3 billion filling up each day. 

The proposed 54.5 fuel economy standard will save consumers who buy cars after 2025 up to 

$6,600 in fuel costs over the life of their vehicle. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

And anyone who has filled up their car in the last few years is all too familiar with the price 

volatility of gas. In 2008, the price of oil stood at $147 a barrel. By 2009, it had dipped to $35 a 

barrel, but in 2011 it once again climbed to $120 per barrel. Greater fuel economy will insulate 

consumers and businesses from this constant rollercoaster and save us all money at the pump. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 34.]

Buffering against gasoline price volatility for consumers and a hedge against rising fuel prices 

due to increased use of domestic and alternative fuel sources;

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Since the enactment of EPCA in 1975, NADA has supported the goal of continuous fuel 

economy improvements. At the same time, NADA recognizes the constraints inherent in a 'push' 

approach to achieving such improvements. The success of mandates on vehicle manufacturers to 

research, develop, design, and manufacture vehicles to meet fuel economy performance targets is 

limited necessarily by the fact that their regulatory obligations end when those vehicles are 

delivered to the 17,000+ independent businesses licensed to sell or lease them to the motoring 

public. Real life fuel economy improvements cannot be achieved, and related policy benefits 

cannot be realized, unless and until consumers actually buy (or lease) and use those new 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 2]

'Push' mandates do not necessarily mean that 'if they build them, they will come.' It is this simple 

fact that serves as the basis for NADA’s concern. First, prospective new light-duty vehicle 
EPA Response to Comments

18-50

purchasers must need or desire to purchase or lease a new vehicle for there to be demand. And, 

the demand for new light-duty vehicles is and always will be constrained by choices, including 

the used vehicle marketplace, vehicle service and repair options, and alternatives to light-duty 

vehicle transportation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 2]

Lastly, prospective new light-duty vehicle purchasers must be willing to make a purchase, 

assuming they have the need and/or desire and the ability to do so. Factors influencing customer 

willingness to purchase a new light-duty motor vehicle include, but are not limited to, consumer 

confidence, perceived operating costs, and expected residual values. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9575-A1, p. 6]

B. Assuming a Need or Desire, and the Ability to Purchase a New Vehicle Covered by the MY 

2017-25 Standards, Will Consumers Be Willing to Do So?

Notwithstanding the very significant impact the MY 2017-2025 proposed rule could have on the 

ability of consumers to purchase or lease new vehicles subject to the rule, many other 

prospective purchasers with a need or desire to do so will have the ability to buy. For those 

customers, the issue is whether and to what extent they will be willing to 'pay-up' for fuel 

economy improvements. Answering this question is not a simple task in that it involves several 

key hard-to-predict variables and is dependent on the circumstances of individual 

consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 7]

A couple of facts are clear, however. First, as described above, vehicle lenders and lessors do not 

account for any potential reductions in vehicle operating costs, such as may result from lower 

household fuel costs, since they cannot predict actuarially if those avoided costs will be saved, 

let alone be applied to the loan or lease. Second, when assessing the willingness of prospective 

new vehicle purchases, it is neither appropriate nor fair to rely on surveys of what consumers say 

they might do if and when offered a new vehicle with improved fuel economy performance. This 

is especially true when the questioner neglects to note that the respondent must pay a premium 

up front for that improved fuel economy performance, or fails to accurately quantify that upfront cost premium, or the higher operating costs associated with that premium (additional 

interest, insurance, taxes, etc.). Indeed, many pollsters in this area fail to accurately inform the 

respondent of the degree to which the up-front cost premium and higher operating costs will offset any potential reductions in household fuel expenses, or may fail to remind those polled of any 

trade-offs that may be involved with vehicles designed to achieve improved fuel economy 

performance, let alone that they always have used vehicle, vehicle service and repair, and 

alternative transportation choices. Of course, consumer surveys can play a valuable role in 

assessing actual behavior, such as when used to evaluate why consumers do what they do or did 

what they did. But surveys with queries aimed at determining consumer willingness to pay for 

fuel economy performance 5 to 13 years into the future, which fail to provide respondents with 

information appropriate to make reasoned responses are of no value and should be considered as 

such by NHTSA and EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, pp. 7-8]

If and to the extent prospective purchasers are unwilling to pay some or all of a regulatory 

premium for mandated fuel economy improvements, it will negatively impact new vehicle sales 

and reduce forecasted regulatory benefits. The proposal characterizes increased fuel economy 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-51

performance (i.e., fuel cost reductions, discounted to the present) as the future benefit that offsets 

the higher up-front and operating costs needed to buy such performance. In and of itself, this 

cost/benefit analysis is problematic given that correct estimates of future fuel savings are not 

simple financial calculations in which one can estimate a discount rate as a corporation might for 

its cost of money when calculating the net present value of a potential project. It is incumbent 

upon EPA and NHTSA to accurately consider the expectations of able and willing prospective 

purchasers, because those expectations will ultimately determine their behavior in the 

marketplace. As illustrated in and supported by the paper attached as Exhibit D, prospective 

purchasers form expectations of the net present value of future fuel savings that are related, but 

not closely related, to a standardized financial calculation. During dramatic upward swings in the 

price of gasoline followed by heavy media coverage, consumers place a large value on fuel 

economy, as revealed by shifts in demand to more fuel efficient portion of the market. During 

slow and steady increases in the price of gasoline with little or no media attention, consumer 

demand shifts reveal a much diminished value for fuel economy.15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9575-A1, p. 8]

In addition, when assessing the valuation of fuel economy improvements by prospective 

purchasers, the financial benefits of reduced future fuel savings cannot be separated from the 

utility lost by necessary reductions to other vehicle qualities and performance. For example, if a 

consumer values an increase in fuel economy of 1 mpg at $500, but gaining this 1 mpg forces a 

reduction in power or safety valued at $600, then for this consumer the value of the fuel 

economy gain is negative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 9]

Consumer behavior indicates how these tradeoffs are valued. Indeed, these tradeoffs are 

available today in dealership showrooms which offer new light-duty vehicles with a wide variety 

of fuel economy performance, along with variations in other safety and performance features. A 

classic example of actual prospective purchaser willingness to pay involves a look at sales of 

models with both a hybrid electric and a conventional powertrain (e.g., Honda Civic, Ford 

Escape or Focus, Toyota Camry). The average fuel economy spread is approximately 20 mpg at 

a cost premium of approximately $5,000. In virtually every instance, hybrid sales have been very 

small and in total, have made up well below 3% of annual light-duty new vehicle sales. The 

proposed regulations will mandate this tradeoff for all new vehicle buyers. Admittedly, some of 

this lack of consumer willingness to pay may derive from concerns about new technologies, as 

suggested by sales experience with the Mercury Milan hybrid which had an up-front price close 

to a similar, but conventionally-powered model. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 9]

Exhibit D includes a review of the pertinent 'willingness to pay' literature, finding that statistical 

models that do not properly account for the tradeoff between fuel economy and other vehicle 

attributes will generate a false positive relationship between price and fuel costs, highlighting the 

significance of these tradeoffs in the mind the average consumer. Based on these revealed 

preferences, consumers are unlikely to value the proposal’s mandated fuel economy 

improvements more than the sum of the higher up-front costs for such improvements and other 

reductions to vehicle quality. In fact, when more reasonable estimates of per vehicle regulatory 

costs are used, the perceived net benefit will be negative for the average consumer. As a result, 

many prospective purchasers of new light-duty motor vehicles will be unwilling to 'pay-up' for 

costly fuel economy improvements, instead opting for less expensive and less fuel efficient 
EPA Response to Comments

18-52

options in the used vehicle market or the vehicle service and repair market, or for alternate 

transportation, thus reducing the proposal’s projected regulatory benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9575-A1, p. 9]

[This comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 57.]

Now, finally, America's auto dealers support continuous improvement to fuel economy. Instead 

of fighting the customer, we urge the administration to act in a measure [sic] that will leverage 

consumer demand, maximize fleet turnover and ensuring maximum feasible fuel economy 

increases.

[Supplemental comemnt to testimony]

I. Fuel Economy Program Success Depends on Consumer Affordability and Acceptance 

Several individuals and organizations presented testimony at the hearings suggesting that higher 

fuel economy production mandates necessarily will result in consumers achieving net fuel 

economy “savings,” “pay backs,” or “benefits”. Such assertions ignore the fact that no such 

“savings,” pay-backs,” or “benefits” are achieved unless, if, and until new vehicles covered by 

the proposed mandates are actually bought and used. The follow key factors do not allow one 

simply to assume that production mandates will equate to profitable retail sales: 

1. The fundamentals of new vehicle financing. 

2. The relative importance of fuel economy performance as a purchase criterion. 

3. Consumer alternatives to high-priced new light-duty vehicles. 

4. The degree to which high fuel prices undermine new vehicle affordability. 

5. That any operational “savings” will vary depending on an individual’s or households’ 

transportation profile. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, p.2]

III. Fuel Economy is But One of Many Factors Consumers Consider When Purchasing New 

Vehicles 

When evaluating consumer behavior, the proposal understandably is fuel economy performance 

focused. In reality, consumers interested in purchasing new vehicles consider a variety of factors. 

Fuel economy performance may be high on their list, or it may not be there at all. Naturally, 

when fuel economy performance enhancements involve no additional up-front costs or tradeoffs, they are readily accepted by the marketplace. Similarly, as demonstrated by the 2009 Cashfor-Clunkers program, consumers readily accept enhanced fuel economy performance when 

someone else pays for it. Unfortunately, the proposed fuel economy mandates involve 

significantly higher up-front costs and/or vehicle performance trade-offs which no one but 

consumers themselves must pay for. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, p.3]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-53

NADA’s written comments discussed how the overall new sales mix can vary significantly with 

dramatic fuel price swings and with the general perception of where fuel prices are headed. 

However, even when fuel prices are rising, fuel economy is rarely a high consumer priority.4 

Since at least 2002, there has been an overall increase in new light-duty fleet fuel economy 

paralleling a overall increase in real fuel prices (2008 being the exception), with fuel economy 

standards serving as a back-stop. At the same time, consumers consistently have demonstrated a 

limited willingness to “pay-up” for higher fuel economy performance. Contrary to the suggestion 

of many including CFA6, Consumer Reports7, and others, it matters much less what consumers 

say they will or might do, and much more what they actually do. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, 

p.3]

Actual consumer behavior with respect to “buying” fuel economy is perhaps no more evident 

than with conventional hybrids. Offering significantly higher fuel economy performance versus 

their conventional counterparts, hybrids typically are offered at significantly higher prices. To 

date, hybrid sales have peaked at just above 2% of the new light-duty sales market, despite 

strong interest from early adopters and car pool lane devotees. For many consumers, they simply 

do not offer a sufficient total cost of ownership value proposition. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-

A1, pp.3-4]

IV. Consumers Unable to Afford or Unwilling to Pay Higher Prices Have Other Options 

NHTSA and EPA recognize the existence of a “jalopy effect” that occurs when consumers face 

higher priced vehicles they are unable or unwilling to pay for. This behavioral effect is a 

cumulative measurement of the degree to which regulatory mandates that increase new vehicle 

costs or decrease (compromise) new vehicle performance can cause consumers to turn to the 

used vehicle marketplace, to hold on to their current vehicles longer (the service/repair 

marketplace), or to seek transportation alternatives. The first two of these consumer choices, if 

exercised, will inhibit fleet turnover and thereby eliminate regulatory benefits. Depending on the 

transportation option selected, the third choice actually may result in measurable “benefits,” but 

not without significant negative economic costs. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, p.4]

V. Higher Fuel Prices Can Create a Greater Interest in Fuel Economy Performance, But Also Act 

To Reduce Vehicle Affordability 

Consumer interest in fuel economy performance increases as fuel prices rise and when they are 

expected to trend higher. At the same time, NHTSA and EPA cannot ignore that many 

individuals and households are less able to afford a new (or new used) vehicle when higher

transportation expenses eat into their ability to muster a down payment. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0267-A1, p.4]

15 Analysis of wholesale used vehicle transaction data show that demand reactions to significant 

changes in gasoline prices between 2005 and 2011 vary significantly depending on media 

reaction, the speed at which the price of gasoline changes, and other economic circumstances. 

For example between February and July 2008, the price of gasoline (regular, national average) 
EPA Response to Comments

18-54

increased by $1.14/gal. At that time, approximately 70% of the price change for a given vehicle 

relative to the market average can be explained by its MPG rating, equivalent to a 1.7% relative 

price per MPG variation for a $1.00/gal. change in the price of gasoline. But when gasoline 

increased by $0.97/gal. in 2007, consumer reaction was less distinct, with just 8% of the price 

change for a given vehicle relative to the market average explained by its MPG rating, equivalent 

to a 0.3% relative price per MPG variation for a $1.00/gal. change in the price of gasoline. Media 

coverage played a role in the difference in these reactions, as coverage in 2008 was significantly 

stronger than in 2007. For the 2008 events, a Google News search found approximately 21,700 

gasoline price articles (an average of the total referencing 'Gas Prices' and the total referencing 

'Gasoline Prices'), while a search for 2007 shows less than half that amount or 8,745.

4 Since 2005, AutoPacific has conducted a bi-monthly Internet survey designed to measure the 

impact of fuel prices on consumer vehicle purchase decisions and driving behavior. This Fuel 

Price Impact Study puts years of trend data to work to understand how consumers react to 

fluctuating fuel prices and how the impact has changed over time. In April 2011, AutoPacific’s 

analysis revealed that, unlike in 2008, a run up in fuel prices from 2010 to 2011 did not drive the 

market to smaller vehicles and that, while fuel economy improvements are of value in the 

context of increasing fuel prices, the vehicle type and functionality is of greater importance. 

Moreover, the run up in fuel prices did not cause a rush to hybrids, with only 21 percent of 

surveyed consumers stating even a willingness to consider purchasing one. AutoPacific, 

Americans Want Fuel Efficiency, Not Smaller Cars: No Wholesale Move to Small Cars, Even 

With High Gas Prices (April 2011). To the extent that the MY 2012-2025 contemplates mix 

shifting and downsizing as important compliance strategies, the AutoPacific analysis is 

concerning. See, Knittel, Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute Trade-Offs and 

Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector (July 2009). [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, 

p.3]

Organization: National Caucus of Environmental Legislators

Strong standards maximize consumer savings at the pump. Under the 54.5mpg-by-2025 standard 

that you recently proposed Americans would save nearly $45 billion at the gas pump annually by 

2030, even after accounting for the cost of new technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9443-

A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

These standards don’t just deliver for America’s outdoor heritage, but for consumers and the 

economy

Consumers save big. The 2017-2025 proposed standards will save Americans half a trillion 

dollars. That’s tens of billions of dollars a year American families and businesses can spend at 

home building jobs instead of overseas for oil. Families and businesses will save more than 

$4,000 in the life-cycle cost of a car or truck, after accounting for the costs of more fuel-efficient 

technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 3]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-55

What’s more, many consumers will see saving the moment they drive off the lot. EPA and 

NHTSA estimate that the gas savings from the more efficient vehicle will offset the additional 

upfront cost of new technology in under 4 years. But this kind of payback assumes that drivers 

pay for their vehicles in cash. In fact, most consumers finance their vehicles, and in that case, 

many will see savings from day one, since the savings monthly on gas outpace the small added 

finance charge from a modestly higher purchase price. 4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, 

p. 3]

Put differently, for household budgets, doubling fuel economy is like cutting the price of 

gasoline in half. For those concerned about cutting dependence on foreign oil and reducing pain 

at the pump, the best place to drill for oil is under the hoods of our cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9887-A2, p. 4]

These standards bring innovation and fuel savings to owners of all kinds of vehicles. For many 

of our members, the outdoor traditions that mean most to them include getting together with 

family and friends, loading gear into the truck and heading out hunting or fishing. Across the 

country, communities and businesses that depend on outdoor recreation depend on these trips. 

For those who rely on larger vehicles, high gas prices hit particularly hard, and achieving robust 

fuel efficiency improvements is critical and welcome. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 

4]

Fortunately, today’s fuel economy standards don’t just focus on cars, but ensure improvement 

across all vehicle sizes and types to achieve an overall increase in fuel economy and reduction in 

pollution. And innovation is delivering far better fuel efficiency together with improved power 

and performance. This means not just financial savings but improved choices for 

consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 30-31.]

Today’s new vehicles provide a case in point. In a report NWF released in August 2011, we 

compared the fuel economy, power and performance options available to buyers of the 2011 

Ford F-150 pickup truck against a 2005 model they might trade in. The F150 is America’s 

bestselling vehicle, and the 2011 model incorporated the EcoBoost engine and other innovations 

that will be widely used to meet the new light duty standards. As shown in Figure 2 below, the 

2011 F150’s were more efficient while delivering greater horsepower and better torque, enabling 

customers to achieve more than 25% increase in fuel economy while still gaining greater 

performance. [Figure 2 can be found on p. 5 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9887-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4]

Consumers have responded positively to the more fuel efficient models. The EcoBoost 

turbocharged V6 model costs approximately $750 more than the comparable V8, but has sold 

strongly accounting for more than 40% of total sales – and exceeding the company’s sales 

forecasts. 5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

18-56

Consumer support for the most advanced vehicles is also growing. In a recent Consumer Reports 

survey 56% of adult car buyers said they would “consider an electric or hybrid for their next 

car”. 8 Sales of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles in 2011, while still 

relatively modest, were easily comparable to the sales of the first hybrids in 2000 and 2001. 

9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 6]

There are many reasons for optimism regarding consumer acceptance of the most advanced 

vehicles. Compared to most alternative fuels, infrastructure needs for electric vehicles –

especially PHEV’s – are relatively modest. As early as this year, automakers will be offering a 

wide range of alternatives to consumers on the hybrid/ PHEV/ BEV continuum – again providing 

greatly enhanced powertrain options to consumers, along with other vehicle benefits. Utilities 

and communities across the country are preparing to facilitate EV adoption, while technology 

companies are preparing to capture the benefits of connecting vehicles to home and business 

energy systems. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 6]

4 Ibid. We find similar “savings as soon as you drive of the lot” for buyers of super duty pickups 

in our own analysis of the medium and heavy duty rule, in our report Trucks that Work at 

http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/GlobalWarming/Reports/NWF_TrucksThatWork_FINAL.ashx

5 http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-seat/2011/10/13/ford-raises-sales-forecasts-for-ecoboost-f150s/?mod=google_news_blog

8 http://news.consumerreports.org/cars/2011/11/survey-car-owners-want-better-fuel-economysupport-increasedstandards.html

9 http://www.torquenews.com/1075/overhyped-criticism-electric-car-charging-station-subsidieswashington-post

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 199-200.]

Consumers would have an additional $200 billion in their pockets to spend on the economy, 

thanks to the fuel sipping vehicles.

Consumers win under this proposal because they have more choices of cleaner, fuel-efficient 

offerings in the showroom. As the agencies' analysis shows, consumers will have net savings of 

up to $4,400 over the life of their vehicle under the standard. Importantly, for most consumers 

that finance their vehicles, the net savings will be brought home immediately.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-57

Under the standards the combination of fuel expenditures and new car payments will be lower in 

the first month. By 2030 the aggregate national savings will provide the equivalent of an annual 

tax rebate of $330 for every American household.

Consumers want cleaner, more fuel-efficient vehicles, and they are buying them. According to 

data from the University of Michigan, the average fuel economy of new vehicles since data was 

first collected in October 2007 has been increasing year over year.

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 70.]

Consumers will benefit from decreased vulnerability to fuel price volatility, and from the longterm fuel cost savings it will more than offset the initial added vehicle costs necessary to meet 

the standards.

Organization: Pennsylvania State Senate et al.

Under the 54.5mpg-by-2025 standard that you outlined in July, Americans would save over $80 

billion at the gas pump annually by 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9914-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Rafter, M.

They also make cars that no one wants to buy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11587-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Enhancing Consumer Choice and Savings: Americans do not want to guzzle gas or waste billions 

at the pump, and they want a range of vehicle choices that reflect that. Polls consistently show 

that Americans support higher standards and are willing to pay more upfront for fuel-saving 

technology in order to use less gas and spend much less money at the pump. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 2]

A recent poll by Consumers Union finds that consumers are increasingly supporting stronger fuel 

efficiency standards, and the driving force is the cost of gasoline.4 Many consumers are 

considering more efficient vehicles, including advanced technology vehicles. Over half (56 

percent) of respondents said they were considering an electric vehicle for their next vehicle, and 

89 percent of consumers who are considering these vehicles cited lower fuel costs as the reason 

for their choice. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 2]

The results of the Consumers Union poll are consistent with polling done by the Go60 campaign 

in September of 2010. The September 2010 Mellman Poll released by the Go60 campaign found 

that an overwhelming majority support significantly increasing vehicle standards, even when told 
EPA Response to Comments

18-58

it would add $3,000 to the price of a new vehicle. When respondents were informed that the 

added cost of technology would be offset within four years by savings at the pump, 83% of 

respondents expressed support for higher standards (67% strongly).5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9549-A2, p. 2]

It is crucial that the agencies not use inflated and arbitrary discount rates when considering 

consumer benefits, such as the 25% and 50% discount rates considered in sensitivity analysis for 

NHTSA’s PRIA. Given the consequences of our oil addiction on our economy, environment, 

national security and on consumer’s individual pocketbooks, the full value of the savings and 

benefits must be accounted for. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

While the polling and recent study of Gen Y consumers supports consumer interest in fuel 

efficiency and willingness to pay for the technologies that will reduce oil consumption and 

emissions, the auto industry has, historically allowed new vehicle fuel consumption to stagnate 

absent rising standards. This conclusion is supported by the recent study, Automobiles on 

Steriods which concludes that between 1980 and 2006 (a period that includes increases due to 

the original CAFE program) average gas mileage increased 15% and application of technologies 

that could have significanlty reduced fuel consumption went to support increased vehicle weight 

and acceleration.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

The EPA and NHTSA both note that the proposed standards preserve consumer choice by basing 

the standards on vehicle footprint. The fact is that these standards enhance consumer choice. 

Consumers today already enjoy a full range of more efficient and less polluting vehicles. A new 

analysis shows that new vehicles purchased last year “averaged a half-mile more per gallon than 

those purchased in 2010, an improvement that saved $722 million at the gas pump, where 

consumers bought 214 million fewer gallons of gas than a year earlier.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

This year, Automotive News included in its top 10 new things of 2011, Ford’s Ecoboost engine 

for its F150 trucks – the top selling vehicle in the country. Automotive News writes: “A year 

ago, who would have guessed that Ford’s F-150 pickup buyers would prefer an EcoBoost v-6 to 

a traditional V-8.” This shows that the technologies exist and automakers are putting them to 

work to improve efficiency and reduce emissions, even in the largest pickup trucks, and that 

consumers will buy cars and trucks that go further on a gallon of gas. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

A recent study by University of Michigan Transportation researchers found that all classes of 

vehicles offered for sale in the U.S from 2008 to 2011 show improvements in fuel 

economy.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

On average, compact cars’ fuel economy increased 3.8 mpg to 25.6 mpg, and small pick ups 

increased 0.4 mpg to 18.6 mpg. While this may not sound like much, the study indicates that 

automakers are making more fuel efficient vehicles available across the board. Even with these 

small gains consumers are now able to buy greater fuel efficiency without having to express it as 

a preference. Absent standards, however, automakers cannot be relied upon to produce fuel 

efficient vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 4]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-59

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 123-124.]

Consumers will save more than $3,500 at the pump even after paying for the fuel-saving 

technology. Savings will be even greater if gas prices rise above current levels. According to 

DOT and the EPA these standards will save our economy and consumers more than 311 to 421 

billion dollars. These hundreds of billions of dollars will translate into new jobs.

Americans want choices in the vehicle market but they do not want to guzzle gas nor do they 

want to waste billions at the pump. Americans consistently support higher standards and are 

willing to pay more to save oil. We can now be confident that technology once used to make 

vehicles more powerful will be used to improve fuel efficiency from improving the internal 

combustion engine, better transmissions, high strength lightweight materials, and to hybrid and 

plug-in vehicles.

The EPA and NHTSA both note the proposed standards preserve consumer choice. The fact is 

that these standards enhance consumer choice. Consumers today already enjoy a full range of 

more efficient and less polluting vehicles. The new analysis shows that new vehicles purchased 

last year averaged a half mile more per gallon than those in 2010, an improvement that saved 

$722 million at the gas pump where consumers bought 214 fewer billion gallons of gas than the 

year earlier.

4 http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_other_issues/018227.html [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9549-A2, p. 2]

5 http://www.go60mpg.org/sites/default/themes/go60mpg/pdf/Voters-Support-FuelEfficiency.pdf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 2]

7 http://www.autoremarketing.com/trends/deloitte-gen-y-may-end-gasolinedomination#ixzz1k2QNjEZA [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

10 http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2011/cars-on-steroids-0104.html [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9549-A2, p. 3]

12 

http://www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120207/RETAIL01/120209843/1135 [

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 3]

Organization: Slemp III, R. L.

Most people cannot or should not spend this much money on a new vehicle. A lot of bigger 

vehicles are needed for business and bigger families. The average household will not get any 

benefit from these vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6314-A1, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

18-60

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Our comments below assert that technology neutral policies and consumer acceptance are the 

only proven methods for the automotive industry to move forward with certainty and with the 

flexibility to seek and strive for new innovations that will dramatically improve fuel economy 

and reduce emissions. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.1] [This statement also cross-referenced 

with section 4]

Market acceptance is also critical to defining the best technology or portfolio of technologies 

necessary to reach the targets set by government. Failure to adopt technology neutral policies and 

reality-based vehicle ratings will undermine consumer choice and drive a systematic shortfall in 

achieving the benefits promised by the new rulemaking. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, p.2]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 240-241.]

Predictions in the NPRM regarding consumer preference and driving habits within the NPRM 

ignore current data and are inaccurate. The agencies need only look to their predictions for 

500,000 electric vehicles to be sold for model years 2012-2016. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-A1, 

pp.2-3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 244-246.]

Current take rates for passenger HEV's clearly demonstrate consumer hesitance to invest in a 

vehicle that, while it's fuel efficient on the test cycle, does not fulfill their driving needs. When 

we refer to take rates, we're referring to the percentage of consumers who purchase an advanced 

technology powertrain over a standard gasoline powertrain when the option exists on the same 

vehicle.

From June 2010 to June 2011, the average take rate for HEV's was 5%. That means consumers 

chose a standard gasoline engine over the HEV version of the same vehicle 95% of the time. 

Comparing that to the take rate of the clean diesel technology over the same period, consumers 

chose the diesel option over the standard gasoline version 39% of the time. While both 

technologies offer comparable fuel savings over a standard gasoline vehicle, diesel technologies 

lower purchase price, and greater functionality proved more attractive to consumers than the 

HEV. The Coalition recognizes there are some popular vehicles such as the Toyota Prius that 

only offer the HEV option, therefore, do not factor into that average take rate referenced above. 

However, when provided the option, the vast majority of consumers are still choosing the 

standard gasoline vehicles over HEV.

EPA and NHTSA do not show any market data to suggest consumers will treat full-sized HEV 

pickup vehicle that, while it's fuel efficient on the test cycle, does not fulfill their driving needs. 

When we refer to take rates, we're referring to the percentage of consumers who purchase an 

advanced technology powertrain over a standard gasoline powertrain when the option exists on 

the same vehicle.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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From June 2010 to June 2011, the average take rate for HEV's was 5%. That means consumers 

chose a standard gasoline engine over the HEV version of the same vehicle 95% of the time. 

Comparing that to the take rate of the clean diesel technology over the same period, consumers 

chose the diesel option over the standard gasoline version 39% of the time. While both 

technologies offer comparable fuel savings over a standard gasoline vehicle, diesel technologies 

lower purchase price, and greater functionality proved more attractive to consumers than the 

HEV. The Coalition recognizes there are some popular vehicles such as the Toyota Prius that 

only offer the HEV option, therefore, do not factor into that average take rate referenced above. 

However, when provided the option, the vast majority of consumers are still choosing the 

standard gasoline vehicles over HEV.

EPA and NHTSA do not show any market data to suggest consumers will treat full-sized HEV 

pickup trucks any differently. In fact, consumers have already displayed significant reluctance to 

make an investment in a full-sized hybrid truck. In model year 2010, consumers showed the 

GMC Sierra and Chevy Silverado hybrid .23% of the time preferring the gasoline option in more 

than 99% of the cases. This amounts to 1165 hybrid models out of nearly 500,000 Sierra and 

Silverados sold in 2010, yet the incentive assumes consumers will flock to this option.

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Consumer and Economic Benefits

According to UCS analysis, full implementation of the proposed 2017-2025 standards would 

save consumers, cumulatively, $535 billion in avoided fuel expenses through 2030 – over $90 

billion in 2030 alone. Even after paying for the additional cost of better technology, consumers 

would see over $260 billion in net savings through 2030—over $50 billion in 2030 alone. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 2]

And while the cost of clean car technology will lead to a modest increase in new vehicle price, 

the average consumer will save money the moment they drive off the lot. Since most Americans 

finance the purchase of a new vehicle (or lease it), the higher vehicle price is borne as a slightly 

higher monthly loan payment, which is more than offset by avoided monthly fuel expenses. 

Based on an average 5-year, 5% APR loan and the agencies’ estimate that the most stringent 

standards will increase the average vehicle price by approximately $2,000, a consumer’s monthly 

loan payment would increase by $36. However, the standards would save that consumer $81 per 

month at the gas pump, assuming a price of $3.50 per gallon, resulting in a net monthly 

consumer savings of $45.2 Further, the consumer will capture the entire value of fuel-savings 

after the end of the loan period, resulting in even greater savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 2]

Beyond the monetary benefits to consumers, these standards will provide greater choice in the 

new and used vehicle markets. Currently, many consumers do not have meaningful options for 

better fuel efficiency and lower emissions depending on vehicle class. For instance, consumers 

interested in purchasing full-size minivans in today’s marketplace have virtually no clean vehicle 

options. If fully implemented, the 2017-2025 standards would ensure that automakers apply 
EPA Response to Comments

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clean, fuel-efficient technology across the entire fleet of new vehicles for nearly the next decade 

and a half. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 2]

(f) Discount Rates & Consumer Welfare

UCS supports the agencies’ decision to continue the use of discount rates of 3 and 7% in the 

proposed rule. As we have stated previously in both the MY2012-2016 rulemaking and our NOI 

comments, these discount rates properly reflect realistic interest rates and opportunity costs 

consumers face in the marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 12]

However, we are concerned that the proposed rule continues to include some debate about the 

role of private benefits and potential loss in consumer welfare in assessing the total benefits and 

costs of the program. In the proposed rule, EPA states that, “assuming full information, perfect 

foresight, perfect competition, and financially rational consumers and producers, standard 

economic theory suggests that normal market operations would have provided the private net 

gains to consumers, and the only benefits of the rule would be due to external benefits.” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 12]

The problem is that none of these assumptions accurately reflect the automotive market or 

consumer behavior. In the real world, we know that consumers cannot have full information and 

perfect foresight. For example, EPA window stickers and the EPA Fuel Economy Guide note 

that “Your Fuel Economy Will Vary.” Further, despite having extensive modeling experience 

and expertise, even the EIA has not accurately predicted gasoline prices – it is a stretch to think 

that an individual consumer would have more certainty. Consumers also cannot predict future 

traffic patterns, changes in job location and many other factors that will influence how much they 

could save on gasoline from various vehicle choices. Consumers also have not had perfect 

substitutes available in the market. The assertion that “financially savvy consumers could have 

sought vehicles with improved fuel efficiency, and auto makers seeking those customers could 

have offered them,” indicates unfamiliarity with actual vehicle offerings and a misunderstanding 

of the risk averseness of highly capitalized industries. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 

12]

Consider the following example: In model year 2010, the fuel economy range of full-size 

minivans spanned a mere two mpg, from 18 to 20 miles per gallon. To achieve higher fuel 

economy, a consumer had one choice, a 23 mpg model that was smaller and less powerful than 

the others on the market. While a consumer choosing the 20 mpg model instead of the 23 mpg 

model does indicate that they place more value on the available size and performance than on the 

benefit of a 3 mpg increase, it does not imply that they would experience a welfare loss should 

they be given a 23 mpg vehicle with the same size and performance as the 20 mpg model. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, pp. 12-13]

Given this market reality, UCS is deeply concerned that NHTSA evaluated scenarios in the 

proposed rule that would reduce consumer benefits by nearly 25 and 50%.37 This is an 

unprecedented shift in evaluating the CAFE program and should not be included in the final rule. 

Unless the agencies can demonstrate that consumers do not value one dollar in fuel savings as 

being worth one dollar, this is pure conjecture based on economic theory that seeks to apply an 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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ideal market model that does not comport with actual consumer experience in the 

marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 13]

The agencies should continue including the full private benefits to consumers, using discount 

rates that reflect market conditions, when calculating the total benefits of the program and should 

not shift to a system that would include highly uncertain and idealized consumer choice models 

in the benefits assessments. It was those same consumer choice models that led many companies 

to dismiss hybrid-electric vehicles like the Prius, airbags, and many other innovations that have 

seen significant market success. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 13]

Strong, cost-effective standards will provide consumers with a wider choice of cleaner and more 

fuel efficient vehicles that save drivers money. In the absence of standards, market barriers 

prevent drivers from realizing these savings, leaving drivers without the options they need to 

respond to volatile and rising gasoline prices. Standards are the right policy approach given the 

realities of this marketplace. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 217-223.]

Even after paying for the additional cost of better technology, consumers would still see over 

$260 billion of that savings through 2030.

While the cost of clean car technology will lead to an increase in vehicle price, the average 

consumer will save money the moment they drive off a lot.

Since most Americans finance the purchase of a new vehicle, the higher vehicle price is borne as 

a slightly higher monthly loan payment, which is more than off-set by avoided monthly fuel 

expenses.

The standards also strengthen our economy. By spending less on oil, consumers will have more 

money to spend on goods and services that will create U.S. jobs.

Hence, the CAFE and GHG standards being discussed in this meeting appear to be necessary 

from the consumer choice side; that the U.S. auto industry has been party to the setting of this 

specific standards under discussion in the case; that the standards are feasible and not unduly 

burdensome. Both sides of the auto market stand to benefit.

2 Analysis assumes on-road values of 22 mpg and 37 mpg, corresponding to unadjusted 2-cycle 

fuel economies of 28 mpg and 50 mpg, respectively.

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 24-25.]
EPA Response to Comments

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One obvious reason is that consumers are demanding more fuel-efficient vehicles, and meeting 

that demand is an increasingly important part of the business. In an age of rising and volatile fuel 

prices, American families want to save money on fuel.

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

Customer shopping habits for cars is highly personal with individuals balancing competing needs 

and wants against cost. For many people a car will amount to one of their most expensive 

purchases ever in their lifetime. If an individual is not comfortable with the capabilities or 

limitations of an advanced technology car, or if they fail to appreciate the long-term benefit, the 

car will simply remain unsold. Advanced technology left on a dealer’s lot provides no benefit to 

the environment or return on investment to the company who leveraged capital to develop the 

car.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

Volkswagen applies technologies which we expect will offer consumers with a market 

acceptable balance of performance and cost. Early adopters excited by the prospects of owning 

the latest technology will be open to explore new advancements in their purchase decision. 

However, for many mainstream consumers, the consideration of newer, more expensive, or 

alternative technology may invoke another set of considerations. Some people may choose more 

incremental gains of an evolved, but familiar technology, as opposed to jumping into something 

completely new. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

Volkswagen expressed some contrarian views with regards to projected estimates for future 

technology adoption by consumers. This was even more evident in terms of comprehending 

consumer demand for the longer 2022-2025 future timeframe. Volkswagen feels it is especially 

difficult to confidently predict consumer behavior that far into the future.[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 13]

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Regardless of the environmental imperatives, it remains difficult to assess what will motivate 

tomorrow's consumers to actually purchase these highly advanced vehicles in requisite numbers, 

both to achieve the desired environmental impact and to provide economies of scale. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p.2]

Response:

Comments in this section relate to the effect of the rule on the range of choices available 

to consumers, consumer acceptance of vehicles built in response to these standards, the use of 

consumer vehicle choice models to estimate what vehicles consumers will buy, and the role of 

fuel economy in consumer vehicle purchases (willingness to pay for fuel economy). 

Effect of the Rule on Choices to Consumers

EPA agrees with all of these commenters that consumer acceptance of the new 

technologies used to meet the standards is an important component of the program’s success. 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-65

These comments show a diversity of views on consumer response to the vehicles with 

compliance technologies under these standards. 

Some comments indicate that consumers are eager for more fuel-efficient vehicles, with 

their resulting fuel savings, and the increased choices of technologies and fuel economies that 

will result from this rule. These commenters find that consumers are willing to pay higher 

vehicle prices to get greater fuel savings. Some note that consumers want improvements in fuel 

economy in all vehicle categories, and the footprint-based standards encourage improvements 

across all vehicle types.

Other comments indicate that consumers are not willing to pay the higher up-front costs 

required for some of the technologies, especially electric vehicles. Some raise concerns over 

consumer willingness to change to unfamiliar technologies, and cite low adoption levels of 

hybrid vehicles as evidence of this reluctance. Others note that improving fuel economy comes 

at the expense of other vehicle features, such as performance or size, because of technological 

tradeoffs. Some comments suggest that consumer interest in fuel economy varies with the price 

of gasoline.

EPA has sought to achieve the goals of reducing GHG emissions and improving 

efficiency while maintaining safety and consumer choice. The use of the footprint-based 

standard is intended to maintain the size distribution of vehicles in the fleet; downsizing is not 

expected to be a compliance strategy. The engineering assessment is based on the costs of 

adding GHG-reducing technologies while maintaining all other vehicle characteristics at their 

current levels, with minor exceptions (such as electric vehicles where purchasers nonetheless 

would knowingly accept limited vehicle range). See EPA RIA Chapter 1.3 explaining how the 

agencies’ methodology for evaluating cost and effectiveness of the various technology packages 

preserves all existing vehicle utilities as part of the methodology. Thus, we reiterate that the 

agencies’ estimates of the estimated compliance costs of their respective rules include the costs 

of preserving all the utilities found in the present-day fleet. This analysis thus demonstrates that 

it is possible to improve efficiency without eliminating other vehicle attributes. That 

improvement comes at a cost, but the value of the fuel savings is expected to exceed those costs 

with a payback period of 3.2-3.4 years (see RIA Chapter 5.5) (for purchases in cash; there would 

be immediate savings for purchases made under now-standard credit arrangements). As 

discussed in Preamble III.H.1.a, by maintaining all other vehicle characteristics and utilities in its 

cost estimates, EPA’s cost estimates have accounted for tradeoffs with other vehicle 

characteristics in the reference fleet. Those commenters (e.g., Edmunds.com, IER, and NADA) 

that indicated that the rules would cause a reduction in vehicle utility – in essence that other 

desirable features would be sacrificed as fuel economy improved – overlook that the agencies’ 

analyses reflect the costs of preserving all of those flexibilities. The agencies have consequently 

reasonably concluded that nothing in these standards causes manufacturers to reduce vehicle 

utility, or results in a situation where consumers no longer have access to some type of vehicle 

attribute in the present fleet considered to be desirable. See preamble section II.C. We thus 

disagree with IER that the benefit-cost analysis is fatally flawed because it “omits the cost to 

consumers of limiting consumer choice.” We discuss the (incorrect) assertion from NADA and 

others that the rule “forces 7 million drivers out of the car market” in Preamble Section 

III.H.11.b and Section 18.7.1 of this Response to Comments.
EPA Response to Comments

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At the same time, notwithstanding that both agencies have demonstrated compliance 

paths that are feasible at reasonable cost without any diminution of present vehicle attributes and 

utility, the agencies are sensitive to the possibility that the standards may create incentives for 

manufacturers to reduce utility. For example, as explained in sections II.C.4.aand III.D.6, the 

agencies were sensitive about truck standards (curve shapes) and stringencies that would create 

incentives to reduce towing and hauling utility as a compliance path for larger trucks, and also 

sought to craft standards for which anticipated compliance paths are safety neutral. 

The new standards may provide consumers with greater choices in vehicle technologies 

and fuels, as automakers identify compliance approaches to these rules and may provide multiple 

versions of models – for instance, the choice between a Ford F-150 with an 8-cylinder engine 

and a Ford F-150 with a 6-cylinder Ecoboost engine, or hybrid and conventional models of the 

same vehicle. Consumers then have the opportunity to respond in their purchase patterns. 

Greater choices should generally improve consumer welfare.

EPA agrees that consumer interest in additional fuel economy in vehicles depends in part 

on the price of fuel. Because the price of fuel fluctuates rapidly, the resulting varying level of 

interest in fuel economy on the part of vehicle buyers can lead to problems for auto producers, 

who need much more lead time to change production and technology levels on vehicles. For 

instance, when gasoline prices rose suddenly in 2008, many vehicles with poor fuel economy 

went unsold, and many vehicles with high fuel economy were in high demand. Improving fuel 

economy reduces vulnerability to fuel price fluctuations; using a footprint-based standard 

encourages improvements in fuel economy across the fleet, rather than in just some market 

segments. 

The low adoption of hybrids (to date) is not expected to be a good model of consumer 

response to the technologies used to comply with these standards because we expect most of the 

technologies used for compliance to involve smaller cost increases and less apparent changes 

(except to fuel economy) than hybridizing a vehicle. On average, the GHG-reducing 

technologies expected to be used will involve lower cost increases than strong hybrids. For 

instance, though the Toyota Camry hybrid has an MSRP roughly $3,000 higher than the cost of a 

conventional Camry, the average cost of achieving the MY 2025 standards under this rule is 

about $1,800; in earlier years, those costs are lower. Other commenters (including Ford itself) 

point out that Ford’s EcoBoost engine in the Ford F-150 pickup is proving very popular: though 

costing $750 more than the comparable V8, it is accounting for more than 40% of sales of those 

trucks. For most vehicles, then, consumer response to the EcoBoost engine may be a more 

appropriate model than consumer response to hybrids. Among other things, EPA’s projected 

compliance paths utilize the turbocharged downsized engine technology far more than strong 

hybrid technology; see Preamble Tables III-47 and III-51.

Consumer Acceptance of Vehicles from Fleets Achieving the Standards

EPA agrees that consumer acceptance of the new vehicles is very important for the 

success of the program. Commenters show mixed responses: some state that consumers actively 

want more fuel-efficient vehicles and will respond very positively to the program, while others 

express concern that consumers may be hesitant about the new technologies and the costs 

associated with them. We agree with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers that it is 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-67

difficult to predict how consumers will respond to vehicles designed to comply with the 

standards. We note that sales of vehicles subject to the MY 2012 GHG/CAFE standards have 

been strong, though we acknowledge that some of the strong sales is due to improvement in 

economic conditions relative to the low point of the recession. The midterm evaluation provides 

an opportunity to evaluate the effects of GHG/fuel economy standards on the auto market.

Consumer Vehicle Choice Models

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) maintains that principles of 

administrative law compel EPA first to develop a quantitative sales analysis including a vehicle 

choice model, and to provide notice and opportunity for comment before adopting rules based 

upon the results of such a model.54 The premise of its comment is that a quantitative sales 

analysis based on the results of a consumer choice model is critical to the rule, and that such 

critical information must be subject to notice and opportunity for comment before a rule can be 

adopted. AFPM quotes language from the preamble to the proposed rule, which it attributes 

(incorrectly) to EPA,55 in support of its premise. Id.

AFPM’s premise regarding the centrality of a quantified sales analysis based on 

consumer vehicle choice models is mistaken. Consistent with CAA section 202 (a), the MYs 

2017-2025 greenhouse gas standards for light duty vehicles are premised on the standards being 

technically feasible at reasonable cost during the lead time provided by the rule. It is correct 

that, for the GHG rule’s objectives to be fulfilled, consumers will have to purchase the vehicles 

with the added technology, and EPA has carefully considered that issue. Among the factors that 

lead EPA to reasonably believe that the final standards will result in vehicles that consumers will 

purchase are: a) the short payback period and net financial benefits to consumers due to fuel 

savings; b) the auto industry’s support for the standards (presumably the industry would not 

support standards for vehicles which could not be sold); c) due to the footprint-based standards, 

fuel economy and CO2 emission improvements will likely include the entire range of vehicle 

footprints (see Preamble section II.C), meaning that there will be more efficient vehicles of every 

type available for purchase; d) the agencies’ costing methodology includes the cost of preserving 

all vehicle utilities found in the present fleet (see, e.g. EPA RIA Chapter 1.3), meaning that 

nothing in the GHG rule prevents consumers from purchasing the type of vehicle that best 

satisfies their needs. None of these bases for EPA’s belief that the rule establishes reasonable 

and feasible standards depends on a quantified sales analysis (much less use of a consumer 

vehicle choice model).

EPA in fact discussed U.S. vehicle sales impacts at proposal, indicating why the rule 

could have a positive impact on vehicle sales. 76 FR at 75150-53. This analysis likewise 

supports the reasonableness of the standards. A quantified sales analysis reflecting consumer 

choice modeling is thus not critical to EPA’s analysis. 

 54 These comments were addressed to NHTSA because, at the time, the D.C. Circuit had not yet ruled on 

industry challenges to EPA’s MYs 2012-2016 light duty vehicle standards. Since the time of the comment, the D.C. 

Circuit rejected all challenges to that rule, as well as all challenges to EPA’s endangerment finding and tailoring and 

timing rules. Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, no. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012). Consequently, 

EPA is considering these comments to be addressed to EPA as well as to NHTSA. 55 In fact, the quoted excerpt was a statement made exclusively by NHTSA.
EPA Response to Comments

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As discussed in Preamble Section III.H.1.a and RIA Chapter 8.1.2, EPA has done 

extensive research on consumer vehicle choice models. A number of such models exist, but the 

predictions from those models have rarely been evaluated against each other, or against actual 

vehicle sales. As also discussed in those sections, EPA has been developing a consumer vehicle 

choice model, with the goals of better understanding these models as well as the potential 

impacts of our rules. Those sections explain that EPA does not consider the model to be ready 

for use in regulatory analysis, in part because we have not had sufficient opportunity to evaluate 

its performance for predicting impacts on vehicle markets. We also discuss the even greater 

difficulties in predicting the effects of the rules on sales of advanced technology vehicles, such as 

electric vehicles, in Preamble Section III.H.1.b and RIA Chapter 8.1.2.7. EPA thus disagrees 

with American Fuels and Petroleum Manufacturers that using a vehicle choice model is 

necessary, because it is not yet clear whether vehicle choice models can provide reasonable 

predictions of the effects of this rule on vehicle sales, especially for advanced technology 

vehicles. 

In place of using vehicle choice models, EPA has provided a robust discussion of the 

expected impacts of this rule on aggregate vehicle sales and on the factors that are important in 

determining those impacts in Preamble Section III.H.11.a and RIA Chapter 8.1. As discussed 

above, we believe that we can reach reasonable conclusions about the feasibility of the rule 

without use of a vehicle choice model. Moreover, the discussion of these issues in the final rule 

(see EPA RIA section 8.1.1) is very similar to the information and analysis on vehicle sales EPA 

presented at proposal. See preamble section III.H.11. Thus, no legitimate issues of adequacy of 

notice and opportunity for comment arise. In any case, this analysis corroborates the information 

and analysis on vehicle sales EPA presented at proposal. It has long been held that agencies’ use 

of such corroborative information does not necessitate giving further notice and opportunity for 

public comment. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F. 2d 50, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 

Chemical Mfr’s Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F. 2d 177, 202 (5th Cir. 1989 ); Time Warner Entertainment 

v. FCC, 240 F. 3d 1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Chamber of Commerce of United States v. SEC, 

443 F. 3d 890, 900-901 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Therefore, no such notice is required here.

The Energy Paradox and the Role of Fuel Economy in Consumer Vehicle Purchases

We agree with several of these commenters that, if our rule analyses are correct, standard 

economic theory suggests that many of these fuel-saving technologies should be adopted in the 

absence of the rule, and that it is puzzling that both consumer benefits and producer profits of the 

magnitudes we estimate are left unadopted. In practice, though, many of these technologies have 

existed but not been widely adopted. Preamble III.H.1.a. and RIA Section 8.1.2.6 discuss this 

phenomenon, commonly called the energy paradox or efficiency gap, including the range of 

hypotheses for its existence and the lack of definitive empirical evidence to explain the apparent 

gap. The hypotheses mentioned by some reviewers, including uncertainty of future benefits, loss 

aversion, irreversibility of investments, tradeoffs with other vehicle attributes, and the 

“positional” nature of vehicles, are discussed in those sections. 

On the role of uncertainty of future benefits and irreversibility of investments, we note 

that high discount rates, attributed to investments in fuel economy being uncertain and 

irreversible, are a symptom of the issue rather than an explanation. The implicit discount rates 

found for many energy-saving technologies are far beyond any reasonable market rates. Left 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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unexplained is why the discount rates are so high. We agree with ICCT that this rule may 

change the reference point consumers use in considering additional technology, and that the rule 

provides external benefits for energy security (discussed in Section 18.5 of this Response to 

Comments) and climate change (see Section 16 of this Response to Comments). We 

nevertheless use a different rationale (see below) for why these standards will increase consumer 

welfare, by distinguishing between how consumers think of fuel savings when buying a vehicle 

compared to their post-purchase experience. 

The theory that consumers prefer other attributes to fuel economy, or are heterogeneous 

in their taste for other attributes, does not solve the conundrum, because it is possible to have 

both the existing vehicle attributes and additional fuel-saving technology. As noted above, 

EPA’s cost estimates include costs of preserving all vehicle utilities found in the present fleet, as 

well as the costs of adding greenhouse gas emission control technologies. See e.g. RIA at p. 1-

40.) Thus, it is incorrect for the IER to say that markets operated efficiently if consumers chose 

6-cylinder minivans over more efficient 4-cylinder minivans because they preferred greater 

power to fuel savings; the conundrum is why 6-cylinder minivans in MY 2010 got 18-20 mpg, 

when it was possible for them to get higher fuel economy with no loss of power and relatively 

short payback periods.56 For the same reason, it is irrelevant to compare, as NADA does, an 

increase in fuel economy worth $500 to a consumer with a reduction in power or safety valued at 

$600; a more relevant comparison for the $500 value of fuel economy is the cost of the fuel 

economy increase for a specified level of safety or power. 

We disagree that our rule omits costs associated with limiting choice. As noted above, 

the standards and analysis in this rule are based on maintaining the diversity of the vehicle fleet –

including all the utility of the vehicles comprising that fleet -- and improving fuel efficiency 

across the fleet. The commenters on this issue did not fully address the implications of the 

agencies’ cost methodology including the costs of preserving vehicle utilities found in the 

existing fleet. If auto makers choose to change the range of vehicles offered, they would do so 

only in response to market forces. The diversity of the fleet may increase, if auto makers add 

alternative-fuel or advanced technology alternatives for existing vehicles to their fleets without 

removing the conventional versions of these vehicles from their fleets.

We do not know how positionality and the bandwagon effect will affect the markets for 

more fuel efficiency. If, as the Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI) suggests, greater fuel efficiency 

starts to confer status for consumers, then acceptance of these more efficient vehicles should be 

high. If less compensation is needed than the technology costs for consumers to accept these 

vehicles, as IPI observes, then EPA has overstated the costs to consumers. We note this 

possibility but are not able to estimate this effect. We also note that the footprint-based standard 

is aimed to minimize the incentives for automakers to change their fleet size distribution purely 

in response to the rule. As a result, we do not expect changes in the utility associated with the 

positionality of autos unless what makes a vehicle confer status changes, a trend about which we 

do not make predictions.

 56 Indeed, in MY 2012 it is already possible to get a 6-speed minivan rated at 22 mpg. 

www.fueleconomy.gov.
EPA Response to Comments

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We note that the commenters critical of EPA’s use of the market value for fuel savings in 

the benefit-cost analysis, including the Walton and Drake study57 included in the NADA and 

Defour Group comments, do not provide comments disputing the reductions in fuel use predicted 

by the proposed MY2017-2025 GHG and CAFE rule, but rather argue that these fuel savings are 

not worth their market value to consumers. Here we find it important to distinguish between the 

role of fuel economy in consumers’ vehicle purchase decisions and the value of fuel savings that 

they will receive once the new vehicles are purchased. It is possible that these amounts differ; 

indeed, the “energy paradox” is defined as this gap between what consumers would “rationally” 

consider and what they actually consider, as discussed in Preamble Section III.H.1.a. Because 

reducing fuel consumption saves consumers money, a “rational economic actor” would take into 

account the expected lifetime fuel savings that s/he would experience when deciding what 

vehicle to buy.58 In reality, the role of fuel savings in consumer new vehicle purchases appears 

to be poorly estimated statistically. A review of the literature finds tremendous variation in the

role of fuel economy in consumer purchase decisions.59 The Defour Group is incorrect, then, 

when it claims that we “erroneously assume that auto buyers will be willing to pay for 100% of 

their projected fuel economy gains.” It is also incorrect to say that we “find that U.S auto buyers 

will be willing to pay $6,000 per vehicle for standards achieving a combined 49.6 mpg in MY 

2025.” As discussed in Preamble Section III.H.11 and RIA Chapter 8.1, EPA has in the past 

used a five-year payback period in its vehicle sales analysis. This corresponds to 30 to 50% of 

the expected future fuel savings resulting from these standards.

We note an internal inconsistency in the Walton and Drake study in their arguing both 

that consumers are behaving fully rationally, and that consumers are not willing to pay the full 

lifetime value of fuel savings in their vehicle purchase decisions. Economic studies that estimate 

whether vehicle buyers consider fuel economy “rationally” do so by comparing the estimated 

willingness to pay for additional fuel economy from their studies with estimates of the lifetime

fuel savings of vehicles.60 These calculations of lifetime fuel savings commonly draw on the 

 57 Walton, Thomas, and Dean Drake (2012). “Willingness to Pay for MY 2025 Fuel Economy Mandates: 

Government Estimates vs. Economic Reality.” Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575 and EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9319. 58 Even if the buyer does not expect to own the vehicle for its full lifetime, more fuel-efficient vehicles 

should be worth more than less fuel-efficient vehicles. Working papers by Allcott and Wozny, Busse et al., and 

Sallee et al. find that a large portion (arguably all) of the expected future fuel savings of used vehicles is reflected in 

their purchase prices. Allcott, H., and N. Wozny (2010). “Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy 

Paradox.” Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research Working Paper 10-003, Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). Busse, M., C. Knittel, and F. Zettelmeyer (2010). “Pain at the 

Pump: The Effect of Gasoline Prices on New and Used Automobile Markets,” Working Paper, University of 

California at Davis (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). Sallee, J., S. West, and W. Fan (2010). “The Effect of 

Gasoline Prices on the Demand for Fuel Economy in Used Vehicles: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications,” 

Working Paper Version 1.2, University of Chicago (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).

59 Greene, D. (2010). “How Consumers Value Fuel Economy: A Literature Review.” Office of 

Transportation and Air Quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report EPA-420-R-10-008 (Docket EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799).

60 See, e.g., Allcott, H., and Nathan Wozny, July 2011. “Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox.” 

Working paper, pp. 14-18 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799); Busse, M., C. Knittel, and F. Zettlemeyer. May 2011. 

“Pain at the Pump: The Effects of Gasoline Prices on New and Used Automobile Markets.” Working paper, pp. 21-

22 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799); Sallee, J., S. West, and W. Fan. May 2011. “The Effect of Gasoline Prices on 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-71

agencies’ estimates of expected future driving and fuel economy and use methods similar to 

those of the agencies. Thus, a claim that consumers are rational in their approach suggests that 

EPA should assume that consumers take into consideration the lifetime fuel savings of more 

efficient vehicles not only in its net benefits calculation, but also in any vehicle sales analysis. 

As discussed above and in Preamble Section III.H.1 and RIA Chapter 8.1.2.5, EPA instead finds 

that the value of fuel savings that consumers consider in their buying decisions is likely to differ 

from full lifetime fuel savings. The Walton and Drake study thus does not provide clear 

guidance into how to consider consumer fuel savings in either the vehicle buying decision or the 

benefit-cost analysis, because it asserts two claims that cannot both be true.

If there are two values for fuel economy – the expected future fuel savings over the 

vehicle’s lifetime, and the amount of fuel savings that consumers consider when buying a vehicle 

– which value should be used in the benefit-cost analysis? Here, commenters differ, with ICCT, 

Sierra Club et al., and UCS arguing for use of the expected value of future fuel savings, using 

standard economic parameters including the discount rate, while CEI, the Defour Group, IER, 

and NADA argue that this approach omits hidden costs or overstates benefits. IPI argues that 

EPA’s cost estimates are likely to overstate costs, but it does not speak specifically to the value 

of fuel savings in the benefit-cost analysis.

EPA’s principle for the benefit-cost analysis is to measure the actual expected impacts of 

the policy and use standard economic parameters (including discount rates) to measure their 

monetary value, because those are intended to measure the impacts projected to occur. Using 

only the amount of fuel savings that consumers think about when buying vehicles is 

inappropriate because it may not reflect actual fuel expenditure changes due to the rule. 

Consumers are under no obligation to think “rationally” about fuel savings when buying 

vehicles; indeed, they are not obligated to consider fuel economy at all. Similar principles apply 

with discount rates: 3 and 7 percent discount rates represent the opportunity cost of capital to 

consumers and producers in practice. As mentioned above, very high estimated discount rates 

for fuel savings in consumer vehicle purchases are a symptom rather than an explanation of the 

energy paradox. If the rule reduces the fuel consumption of the vehicles that consumers 

purchase, though, EPA estimates the impacts expected of the rule based on the market 

opportunity costs. 

We note that the Walton and Drake study bases its argument that consumers are willing 

to pay for 25 percent of fuel savings on a study of technology costs (Laboratory for Energy and 

the Environment, On the Road in 2035: Reducing Transportation’s Petroleum Consumption and 

GHG Emissions, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 2008, pp. 61, 156-157). EPA 

considers using technology costs an indirect approach at best to estimating consumer response, 

and considers it more appropriate to use the substantial literature (see Greene, footnote 59) 

specifically looking at consumer decisions on fuel economy. We thus find the 25 percent figure 

to be derived from a source less relevant to the analysis than those that EPA uses. Walton and 

Drake, in discussing Greene, state that “The most significant and widespread error – the very 

same error that is inherent to the agencies’ model of consumer choice – is that most of the studies 

 

the Demand for Fuel Economy in Used Vehicles: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications”, Working paper, pp. 

12-17 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
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and surveys fail to account for tradeoffs between fuel economy and other vehicle attributes of 

value to consumers – what the studies call ‘fixed effects.’”61 This statement is incorrect. In the 

studies that Greene reviews, virtually all of them account for other vehicle attributes. As noted 

above, the agencies’ costing methodology also prices in preservation of existing vehicle utilities. 

We appreciate the effort in Walton and Drake to identify reasons that the existing studies of the 

willingness to pay for fuel economy find varying results, although they do not provide a 

recommendation resulting from this critique. We agree that a number of statistical issues arise in 

estimating this parameter. This problem may not yet be solved. As a result, EPA has 

approached the use of consumer vehicle choice models cautiously. 

We agree that fuel economy changes are likely to influence consumers’ vehicle purchase 

decisions. We discuss the effects of this rule on vehicle sales in Preamble Section III.H.11 and 

RIA Chapter 8.1.

On the cost side, we base our estimates on the best available engineering data, as 

discussed in RIA Chapter 5. IER does not identify hidden costs of the rule; rather, it asserts that 

they must exist. In Preamble III.H.1.a., EPA explains that holding all vehicle attributes other 

than fuel economy and cost constant allows for direct measure of the welfare costs of the rule. If 

a vehicle buyer were given an amount equal to the price increase resulting from this rule, she 

could not be worse off than in the absence of the rule, because she would be able to buy her 

originally chosen vehicle (though with improved fuel economy). If the vehicle price increases 

by the same amount as technology cost, as would be expected in a perfectly competitive 

market,62 giving her the technology cost fully compensates her for any losses that the rule might 

impose; it is thus a measure of the full cost of the rule. The technology cost may actually 

overstate the cost to her, because she may choose to buy a different vehicle and save some of the 

compensation money for other purposes. IPI argues as well that the technology costs may 

overstate the rule costs, if the chosen vehicle ends up conferring greater status that makes it more 

attractive and thus needing less compensation. EPA agrees that this is a possible reason that 

lower compensation might be required than the technology costs, but we do not have a basis to 

say that more efficient vehicles will confer greater status in the future. 

The Defour Group (Walton and Drake) cites the National Research Council (NRC) for its 

claim that our cost estimates for this rule are too low. We note that the NRC cost estimates are 

“for technologies that are commercially available and can be implemented within 5 years.”63 We 

thus consider the NRC report an inappropriate source for adjusting the cost estimates of this rule, 

because the cost estimates are based on a much shorter lead time than is available under this rule. 

Because we consider both the willingness to pay (see above) and cost adjustments used in the 

 61 The reference to fixed effects is puzzling: fixed effects are not tradeoffs, but rather dummy variables 

used in regressions to account for discrete characteristics, such as vehicle type. 62 The auto market is not generally assumed to be perfectly competitive. In general, though, cost passthrough is commonly less in imperfectly competitive markets. See discussion in Preamble Section III.H.11.a, and 

Gron, Ann, and Deborah Swenson, 2000. “Cost Pass-Through in the U.S. Automobile Market,” Review of 

Economics and Statistics 82: 316-324 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-0675), who found significantly less than 

full-cost pass-through in the auto industry. 63 National Research Council, 2011. Assessment of Fuel Economy Technologies for Light-Duty Vehicles. 

Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, p. S-1 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Walton and Drake study to be based on an inappropriate sources, we consider their net benefits 

estimate of the rule of -$1,400 to -$2,900 to be fatally flawed. Their adjustment to the discount 

rate is discussed above. Loan rates are discussed in TSD Chapter 4.2.13. Rebound rate is 

discussed in Section 15.3.3 of this Response to Comments and TSD Chapter 4.2.5. Section 18.7 

discusses the Defour and EIA estimates of the effects of this rule on vehicle sales. Preamble 

Section III.H.11.a and Section 18.7 of this Response to Comments address the comments on 

vehicle sales. Preamble Section III.H.12 and Section 18.8 of this Response to Comments address 

the comments on employment. Preamble Section III.H.11.b and Section 18.7.1 of this Response 

to Comments address the comment on whether these standards are regressive.

Whether these technologies would be adopted in the absence of the rule is discussed in 

Preamble Section III.D.1 and in Section 12.1 of this Response to Comments. Walton and Drake 

cite two studies that predict achievement of average fuel economy levels in future years below 

the fuel economy levels of the rulemaking in the absence of regulation. EPA uses as its baseline 

a 2008 based model fleet64 projected out to MY 2025 and meeting the MY 2016 GHG standards 

in the absence of new standards; there are strong reasons for doing so, as explained in preamble 

section III.D.1.a. We agree that private market interactions may not provide the level of fuel 

economy that would occur with the rulemaking. This lack of provision of fuel economy, with its 

concomitant impacts on greenhouse gas emissions, is a motivation for the rule. 

Comments from the National Automobile Dealers Association state that consumers 

consider at most five years of fuel savings in their vehicle purchase decisions. As discussed in 

Preamble Section III.H.5, the payback period for the new technologies EPA projects to be 

needed in MY 2025 is 3.2-3.4 years (see RIA Chapter 5.5). 

The assertion from the IER that the rule will drive an estimated 7 million drivers out of 

the car market is erroneous in that it does not have any relationship to new vehicle purchasers or 

to new vehicle sales. The analysis that produced this value is not based on households in the 

market for new vehicles and thus includes many households who will not face direct effects of

this rule. This issue is discussed in Preamble Section III.H.11.b. and in Section 18.7.1 of this 

Response to Comments. 

We agree that consumers can and do respond more quickly than automakers to changes in 

fuel prices. Consumers can easily decide to buy different vehicles, but automakers need lead 

times to redesign vehicles in response to market signals. Because the rule allows for great 

diversity in the kinds of vehicles available to consumers – indeed, as discussed in Preamble 

III.H.1.a, it may increase choices to consumers – consumers will continue to be able to choose 

among a variety of vehicles, with improved fuel economy expected to be available in virtually all 

vehicle classes.

Walton and Drake cite criticism of the survey results presented by Consumer Reports 

(CR). The fundamental question is whether survey results are informative sources for public 

policy. EPA’s analysis of the net benefits of the rule does not rely on survey results of the 

popularity of fuel economy standards. We note, though, that one criticism raised is that the CR 

 64 In an alternative analysis, EPA uses a 2010 based model fleet. See RIA chapter 10.
EPA Response to Comments

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polling does not ask questions in terms of tradeoffs. In fact, one CR question asked whether the 

respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement, “I am willing to pay extra for a more fuel 

efficient vehicle if I can recover the additional cost through lower fuel costs within 5 years,” 

which identifies the opportunity costs. A total of 83 percent agreed, with 48 percent strongly 

agreeing.65

Walton and Drake note that, when presented with the choice of using additional 

technology to add fuel economy to an existing vehicle or making that existing vehicle larger with 

constant fuel economy, people have chosen the larger vehicle. Their examples suggest that 

consumers are likely to pursue additional fuel economy in various market segments: the larger 

vehicles, after all, are more efficient than without the added technology. Because the rule seeks 

to encourage additional fuel economy in all vehicle segments, the commenter’s argument here 

appears to support the structure of the rule. The agencies seek to maintain the range of vehicle 

choices currently available to consumers, but with additional fuel savings across the entire range 

of vehicle footprints (i.e., to all market segments. For any level of fuel economy, additional 

power or other vehicle characteristics can be achieved by adding more technology. The rule 

does not restrict these possibilities.

The Walton and Drake study discusses several papers in seeking to bolster its argument 

that fuel economy standards impose significant welfare losses. These studies all use older 

estimates of technology and fuel costs than those used in this rule. Several of them focus on the 

use of a gasoline tax compared to fuel economy standards. EPA does not tax gasoline. In 

economic theory, a gasoline tax may have a number of advantages relative to standards, as these 

papers discuss. Because EPA does not tax gasoline, though, the relative merits of GHG 

standards versus a tax are not relevant to the MYs 2017-2025 standards. We note, though, that 

the studies cited66 note reasons that increased fuel economy standards may be desirable policies 

in the absence of gasoline taxes. Fischer et al. note that regulation may promote the development 

of fuel-saving technologies with significant social returns (p. 25). The Congressional Budget 

Office study states, “If [consumers do not receive adequate information about the fuel savings 

offered by different vehicles and do not correctly value those savings], then the advantages of an 

increase in CAFE standards could be greater than assumed here” (p. 4). Parry et al. state that 

“using standards to cut fuel use by 5 percent under a standard value for CO2 damages is 

warranted only if consumers fail to internalize 44 percent of the savings from higher fuel 

economy” (p. 3). Five years of fuel savings for MY 2025 vehicles, the amount NADA states as 

an upper limit on how much consumers consider in their vehicle purchases, is approximately 30-

50% percent (depending on the discount rate) of the lifetime fuel savings; in other words, under 

that assumption, consumers fail to consider 50–70% of fuel savings. Using a 5-year or less 

payback period for vehicle sales purchases, as NADA suggests, may thus mean consumers are 

 65 Consumer Reports National Research Center. November 2011. “Consumer Reports Fuel Economy 

Poll.” CU Project #2012.51, p. 22 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). 66 Fischer, Carolyn, Winston Harrington, and Ian Parry (2007). “Should Automobile Fuel Economy 

Standards be Tightened?” Energy Journal 28(4): 1-29 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799); Congressional Budget 

Office, Fuel Economy Standards Versus a Gasoline Tax, March 9, 2004 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799); Parry, 

Ian W. H., David Evans, and Wallace E. Oates (2010). “Are Energy Efficiency Standards Justified?” Resources for 

the Future Discussion Paper RFF DP 10-59, http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-10-59.pdf (Docket EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799).
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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likely to “fail to internalize [more than] 44 percent of the savings from fuel economy” – the 

circumstance under which Parry et al. state that such standards are warranted.

Miscellaneous and Addressed Elsewhere

Fuel Savings to Consumers and Energy Shocks

EPA agrees with commenters that the rule will provide substantial fuel savings for 

consumers and will reduce vulnerability to shocks in international oil prices. The energy 

security impacts of the rule are discussed in Preamble Section III.H.8 and in Section 18.5 of this 

Response to Comments.

Impacts of the Rule on Employment

The impacts of this rule on employment in the U.S. are discussed in Preamble Section 

III.H.12 and RIA Chapter 8.2. We agree that developing and implementing the new technologies 

will require additional employment. As discussed in Preamble III.H.11 and III.H.12, 

employment would increase even more if there are increases in vehicle sales (though we do not 

quantify vehicle sales impacts). We are not able to predict how employment will change due to 

changing labor intensity of the new technologies; our analysis of employment in the auto sector 

is thus partial. The total effects of this rule on employment in the U.S. overall are even more 

difficult to predict. The effect of a rule on total employment in the U.S. depends heavily on the 

overall macroeconomic conditions of the country. When the economy is at or near full 

employment, the primary effect of this rule will be to reallocate workers among sectors, rather 

than to create or reduce employment; when the economy has substantial unemployment, the rule 

may have an impact on total employment, through its effects on the auto market, on auto 

suppliers and other related sectors, on fuel suppliers, and on consumer expenditure patterns.

Continuing Federal Programs for Retooling in the Auto Industry

Providing continuing federal programs to support retooling in the auto industry is beyond 

the scope of EPA authority.

Multiple measures of MPG

We do not understand Edmunds.com’s comment on the “multiple measures of MPG that 

have emerged from the rule-making process.” This rule does not change the information 

provided to consumers about mpg.

18.2. Analysis of Costs Associated with the Vehicle Standards

Organizations Included in this Section

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Clean Fuels Development Coalition (CDFC)

Growth Energy

Haroldson, C.

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)
EPA Response to Comments

18-76

Jackson, F.W.

Knapp, B.

Lipetzky, P.

Marshall, C.

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Ross, D.

Smith, Frank Houston

Tarazevich, Yegor

Van Voorhies, M.

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Vehicle Electrification Impacts [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.6]

Recharging during peak hours could increase peak electricity demand. For example, this could 

happen if many consumers in an area recharge their plug-in vehicle simultaneously in the early 

evening of a weekday after returning home from work. It could be necessary to restrict 

recharging to late-night off-peak hours and this could adversely impact the market penetration of 

EVs. These potential impacts must be analyzed by the agency and presented for comment. 

Moreover, if electrification requires additional fossil fuel-generated electricity (whether peak or 

off-peak), then these technologies will not deliver substantial carbon reductions. The proposed 

rule does not properly analyze these potential impacts, making it impossible to provide 

meaningful comment upon the agency’s estimates of GHG reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.6]

The agency states that “The analysis in this [EPA/NHTSA] proposal assumes that the consumer 

market is sufficient to absorb the expected number of EVs without subsidies.” 76 Federal 

Register 75118 This assumption is unrealistic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.6]

The National Research Council (NRC) analyzed PHEVs and concluded the following: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.6]

PHEVs will recoup some of their incremental cost, because a mile driven on electricity will be 

cheaper than a mile on gasoline, but it is likely to be several decades before lifetime fuel savings 

start to balance the higher first cost of the vehicles. Subsidies of tens to hundreds of billions of 

dollars will be needed for the transition to cost-effectiveness. Higher oil prices or rapid 

reductions in battery costs could reduce the time and subsidies required to attain costeffectiveness.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.6]

This NRC committee’s realistic assessment is ignored in this rulemaking. The agency must 

consider these real world implications in assessing the costs and benefits of this rulemaking. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.7]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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11 - “Transitions to Alternative transportation Technologies—Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles, 

“ 2010, p. 33

Organization: Defour Group LLC

The government and automotive industry are engaged in an ambitious program to raise the fuel 

economy of today’s new vehicle fleet to 49.6 mpg by 2025. This program is primarily embodied 

in two rulemakings: one for model years 2012 – 2016 and the rulemaking covered in this NPRM 

from model years 2017 – 2025. Taken together, these rulemakings represent what may well be 

the most expensive government-mandated program in automotive history. As such, it is essential 

that the cost of this program be estimated using the best information available. Unfortunately, in 

both this rulemaking and the previous one, the agencies involved have deviated from using 

mainstream economic assumptions to estimate costs in favor of new and unorthodox 

methodologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. i]

Attached to this letter and incorporated in our official comments by reference is a study by Dr. 

Thomas Walton detailing our concerns with the economic assumptions made in this rulemaking. 

Dr. Walton is uniquely qualified to perform this study. Academically, he holds a BA in 

Economics from the University of Missouri, Columbia and a Ph.D. in Economics from the 

University of California at Los Angeles. He has extensive experience within government, having 

served as Special Advisor for Regulatory Affairs, United States Federal Trade Commission and 

is a former Vice Chair of the Business Research Advisory Council to the United States Bureau of 

Labor Statistics. He has 24 years of experience within the automotive industry as Director of 

Economic Policy Analysis for General Motors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. i]

It is more important now than ever that government agencies use the best accounting procedures 

to estimate costs. Historically, government cost estimates were one of many independent cost 

estimates: today, the government is either directly or indirectly involved in every major effort to 

estimate the cost of this rulemaking. Government cost estimates are now used both within and 

outside of government to guide regulatory and investment decisions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9319-A1, p. ii]

If the government estimates of costs are too low, then the automotive industry may well find 

itself in the position of producing vehicles that consumers are unwilling to purchase. This could 

have profound impacts on the U.S. economy. Preliminary analysis by the Defour Group of the 

cost of this program indicate that consumer demand for fuel economy, which is primarily driven 

by fuel prices, may wane well before the 2017 model year. If our conclusions are correct, the 

automotive industry could find that the market for more fuel efficient vehicles will disappear 

before these standards are due to be implemented. Without additional policies in place to 

enhance consumer willingness to pay, sales and employment will be adversely impacted. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. ii]
EPA Response to Comments

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In conclusion, we urge the agencies to re-estimate the costs of this program using the most 

mainstream and conservative accounting methodology available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9319-A1, p. ii]

Organization: Growth Energy

Attachment 1 [pp. 7-15 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] to this letter 

explains why Growth Energy believes that the analyses supporting the Joint NPRM’s electric 

vehicle cost estimates are not reliable. Under the applicable Executive Orders governing costbenefit analyses, we believe that the Agencies need to reconsider and revise the current costbenefit analyses. In addition, given the significant under-estimation of electric vehicle costs in 

the Joint NPRM’s current analysis, Growth Energy questions whether EPA and NHTSA can 

properly determine that proposed standards are economically practicable and take proper account 

of the state of technology, as required by the governing statutes. If EPA and NHTSA believe that 

those methods of estimating the market impacts of regulatory programs that rely upon or require 

electric vehicles are inadequate or unnecessary, the Agencies should explain why. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Haroldson, C.

The proposed standards will either make all new vehicles too expensive to purchase or the 

vehicles will necessarily become too small to be safe to drive. Instead, let’s increase our 

domestic drilling for oil and reduce our dependence on foreign oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11137-A1, p. 1]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

5. While the 2011 NAS Report was well done, it specifically stated that only current and near 

term technologies and costs were analyzed. Thus, the sensitivity analysis using the 2011 NAS 

Report benefits and costs is inappropriate and should be removed from the Final Rule. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

5) Sensitivity Case using the 2011 NAS Report Benefits and Costs

NHTSA included a sensitivity case using costs and effectiveness from the 2011 NAS Report. 

This sensitivity run increases vehicle cost by 40 to 50 percent, adding about $800 to the per 

vehicle cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

It is inappropriate to use the 2011 NAS Report technologies and technology benefits and costs 

for 2017 to 2025 efficiency regulations. While the 2011 NAS Report is an excellent report, it 

makes several explicit statements constraining the applicability of its technology and cost data to 

the very near term, e.g.: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

'Tables S-1 and S-2 show the committee's estimates of fuel consumption benefits and costs for 

technologies that are commercially available and can be implemented within 5 years. The cost 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-79

estimates represent estimates for the current (2009/2010) time period to about 5 years in the 

future.' [NA5 report page S-1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

'Again, except where indicated otherwise, the cost estimates provided are based on current 

conditions and do not attempt to estimate economic conditions and hence predict prices 5, 10, or 

15 years into the future.' [NA5 report page S-6] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

'The cost estimates represent estimates for the current (2009/2010) time period to about 5 years 

in the future,' [NAS report page 9-8] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

While sensitivity analyses can illuminate the impacts of important uncertainties, in this case the 

2011 NAS Report expressly states that it is not applicable to the period considered by the 

proposed rule. In addition, as noted in our comments in section 1, above, the technology benefit 

and costs in the proposed rule are conservative and overstate the costs of the rule, not understate 

them. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 18]

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

'Faulty' analyses used to create more favorable values: 1. Points to limited areas to make a point 

without also pointing out complete impact, Le., at National level, 2. Poor competition selected to 

compare against instead of showing all possibilities and comparing against the best, 3. Using a 

reference case while 'flexibility' in the law allows far more expensive and less beneficial cases to 

be selected by profit motivated manufacturers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 1]

So starting with EPA's vehicle lifetime average mileage of 161,851 (cars) & 190,030 (trucks & 

MPVs) miles and 201635.5 mpgge vs. 2025 54.5 mpgge EPA proposal mix, I calc (assuming 

gasoline pre taxes at $3.00 per gallon fuel only at pump discounted 20% because it is spread out 

over many years to reflect the cost as at 2025 to with interest pay for the fuel) fuel savings at 

$4,333 less $ 1946 added vehicle cost reduces savings to $ 2,387 over the vehicles lifetime. 

Include taxes based on purchase price and claimed savings are further reduced. And this is 

against the 2016 35.5 mpgge, i.e., not the best competition; improve the competition, e.g. My 

Max technologies ICEs vs. EPA Proposal fleet I calc Max ICEs at $4,785 ($ 7,178 with assumed 

pass throughs) less over the vehicle lifetime. And vs. 36 Bgal corn ethanol 2025 proposal fleet $ 

8,004 and $ 12,006 (with pass throughs) less. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 2]

6. to account for Business/Govt pass throughs, i.e., inflation/taxes (very significant, albeit not 

included in most of my data), e.g., assuming for every consumer vehicle lifetime cost 

business+Govt also have some added cost then the delta cost (all factors included) would be an 

increase to consumers/taxpayers. For my analyses I assumed a 50 % pass throughs 

increase/decrease. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 2]

Taking all the above into effect and using ref 2 (tables 3.8-23 thru 25) proposal fleet here is what 

I calc for the 2025 proposal fleet VS. 2025 54.5 mpgge fleet:

EPA proposed fleet vs. 2025 new fleet (54.5 ave mpgge), both using gasoline liquid fuel; system 

lifetime cost up $174 ($ 261 with my assumed Govt/Business pass throughs), lifetime gCO2/mile 
EPA Response to Comments

18-80

up 14 g/mile. The EPA Proposal fleet has 2.8 % BEVs and 0 % PHEVs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8041-A1, p. 3]

Conclusion: when all factors fully and properly counted my calc indicates 2025 new fleet 

lifetime cost due to all Govt actions up, i.e., not down as shown in articles & references! [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 3]

So while EPA picks and chooses assumptions & methods & credits & multipliers to arrive at 

'make believe' savings my analyses yield: the cost to consumers & taxpayers is exceedingly high. 

And this is when EPA's proposed mix is used and as another 'mix' with increased % of more 

expensive Plug-ins, e.g., see EPRI mix, that allow more 'guzzlers' I would expect the numbers to 

get even worse! Also while EPA factors in a strong 2025 EV learning (which I have not factored 

in), it is also true EPA proposed 2025 fleet has very few Plug-ins so I would not expect a 

significant cost 'swing' from electrical equipment 'learning' with only minor plug-in 

penetration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 3]

Summary table of my evaluated 'mix's; 2025 57.4 % cars, 42.6 % Trucks & MPVs: [See table on 

pp. 3-4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

8041-A1, p. 3]

Note: above numbers for EPA & EPRI vehicles include allowed increase in 'guzzlers' that I 

believe should be added to numbers for allowing them. Other above table numbers do not 

include 'guzzler' impact as while Govt plan is to allow them, I would not plan to allow them. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 4]

Bundling obscures individual vehicle impacts: pretty clear, at National level, plug-ins 

exceedingly more expensive than ICEs and HEVs; they are also less efficient in fossil BTUs and 

produce far more National CO2! Expect EPA knows this, hence very limited penetration in EPA 

defined 2025 proposal fleet (zero penetration in my Mid and Max). E.g, if in the EPA proposal 

case with the 36 billion gallons of corn ethanol the HEVs were PHEVs instead, I calc, with 

assumed pass throughs, the consumer & taxpayer added cost per vehicle at $ 11,745. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 4]

Question: with such poor performance and minor PHEV & BEV penetration EPA proposal & 

reference cases why is Govt promoting and subsidizing plug-ins?? Could it be the only way to 

get Industry to go along with 54.5 mpgge target is if they have a path to continue highly 

profitable 'guzzlers'; e.g., if 54.5 average gge is target and for every 101 mpgge vehicle BEV 

they are able to build 1.5 23.5 mpgge 'guzzlers'. Bummer, Govt borrows money to subsidize 

BEVs so industry can build 'guzzlers'; taxes & inflation & deficit all up as is system CO2 and 

fossil fuel btus! Looks more to me like a 'guzzler protection ace than reducing overall cost, oil 

and CO2 greenhouse gas. More specifically, a 101 mpg BEV may not reduce gasoline demand 

because it could allow 1.5 23.6 mpgg vehicles instead of 1.5 54.5 mpgg, or 1.5 23.6 mpgg 

vehicles requires 6.36 gg for 150 miles traveled vs. 2.75 gg for 1.554.5 mpgg, a net increase of 

3.61 gg which when I credit to the BEV (for allowing the 'guzzlers') I calc reality a 101 mpgge 

BEV could be 29.4 mpgge when all it's possible National results duly credited! And if Govt 

allows a 2 multiplier the mpgge 29.4 would drop to 17.2 mpgge Bundling a few BEVs & 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-81

'guzzlers' with other vehicles can obscure impact and changing the mix of other vehicles from 

ICEs to HEVs and/or improved technologies can obscure totally, even show improvement! 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 4]

Additional relevant comments: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 6]

Nation needs much more efficient for Nation energy and money and CO2 products. I also 

recognize car companies are a business and have to watch their bottom lines; and I understand 

their desire to minimize investment, minimize risk and maximize return and early. So to me the 

answer is for Govt to get involved big time (a Manhattan Project) so development is supported, 

risk is protected and prices held down by Govt support. After all how do we get the tanks and 

planes the Nation's military needs, the Govt funds the development and risk and buys the 

products. Why not use same approach with some mods, e.g., for all Govt vehicle, light and heavy 

duty, procurements spec vehicles at what the Nation needs and a subsidy for non Govt vehicles 

based on actual gasoline/Diesel powered real mpg, i.e., higher mpg, higher subsidy, e.g., for 

Light Duty vehicles costing less than 20 $K then sliding scale to 30$k and over $ 30 $K they 

should be expected to 'pay their own way' to get the vehicles the Nation needs? As a discussion 

starting point for Light Duty vehicles I'd suggest Govt offer a $ 250 subsidy for each non Govt 

Light Duty system mpgge a vehicle gets above that years new vehicle target mpg ( I'd even 

consider adjusting the subsidy up or down based on driver's historical miles per year); and with 

2013 target set at 33 mpgge, 2015 at 38, 2018 at 50, 2020 and after at 75mpgge and by 2020 

project future dates for more than 75 mpgge (system). The subsidies to be paid for as much as 

practical as used, i.e., at purchase not a delayed tax rebate, with 'real' today's money; and to 

benefit from Govt program businesses cannot also engage in counterproductive actions like 

promoting 'guzzlers' because they are more profitable per vehicle produced and businesses have 

to show, commit to and get approval by Govt a plan (research, development and production) 

with measurable by Govt 'benchmarks' and progress reviews. And Govt doesn't have to give 

money away, i.e., any Govt monies can be repayable loans or stock of equivalent value. And if 

Congress fails to provide necessary Law for private sector make sure info is clearly articulated, 

and current Law permitting, consider Govt to sell Govt Spec vehicles to Public and/or Govt buy 

excess vehicles for resale to Public or Govt require mfgrs to offer Govt equivalent vehicles to 

Public or update Govt fleet sooner so more resale vehicles are offered to Public. And the Press 

needs to do and report full & accurate information based on thorough investigative reporting by 

qualified & objective individuals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, pp. 6-7]

This leaves where does the money come from, how about 'scooping' up other monies of lesser or 

no equivalent value to Nation's wellbeing: No corn ethanol subsidies and no ethanol mandates, 

no plug-in subsidies, bump up the gas tax, 'guzzler' tax for individual vehicles not meeting target 

(e.g., $ 250, or more, for each total to Nation ''fossil fuel' gpmgge over target), reduce vehicle 

emissions testing to minimum based on actual statistical need for most cost-effective necessary 

plan, no NASA Mars mission (this money and the technical talent can do far more for solving 

Nation's problems than an interesting venture that doesn't improve citizens lifestyles here on 

earth), 'capture' some of consumers savings (with hard facts to show savings; e.g., savings per 

vehicle mile with my Mid or Max technology plan vs. Govt & lndustry E36 'smoke and mirrors' 

54.5 mpgg plan and longer lasting vehicles to lower purchase cents/mile); Govt & lndustry plan 
EPA Response to Comments

18-82

cost per mile up big time when 'honest' analyses used. Put Nation's resources to use where it 

benefits the Nation & all citizens the most. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 7]

2. EPA Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis 'Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty 

Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards' 

EPA-420-D-11-004 November 2011

Organization: Knapp, B.

With our economy remaining is a severe slump, this is no time to increase the cost of a vehicle. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8255-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Lipetzky, P.

This will only lead to higher fuel and vehicle cost and in the end will amount to the same. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8184-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Marshall, C.

Historically, there have been two topics of pushback by those who would oppose this standard. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Regarding increased costs, my hunch is that the greater than $2K in the added cost of new cars is 

a worst-case analysis. As a contractor for both EPA and OSHA in rulemaking matters, there 

were reasons that cost estimates for compliance tended to be higher than what happened in 

reality under a regulation. We couldn’t easily take into account control cost savings that were 

expected because of innovation. I suggest putting further thought into finding methods of 

affordability for people to pay for the incremental capital costs of vehicles. Perhaps an 

affordability improvement mechanism could be implemented after the regulatory review is 

performed in 2021 (or 2019) and might depend on revised costs at that time taking into account 

improvements in powertrain technologies and advances in carbon and composite materials for 

replacing steel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 41.]

Measures that could lead to greater penetration to vehicles earlier in the programs could bring 

down vehicle cost.

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-83

NADA is also urging NHTSA and EPA to conduct and include in its final rule a worse case cost 

scenario reflecting a $12,349 average per vehicle cost to comply with the proposed mandate for 

MY 2025. This suggestion is being made to reflect the fact NHTSA and EPA are engaged in a 

rulemaking earlier than necessary aimed at applying mandates further out than necessary where 

many dynamic and hard to forecast variables are involved. These factors include conventional 

fuel costs, alternate fuel availability and costs, compliance technologies and their costs, interest 

rates, the general economy, etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 5]

If NHTSA and EPA were practiced at setting far-in-the-future standards based on hard to 

forecast variables, NADA would not be concerned. However, both agencies have historically set 

new CAFE and emissions mandates consistent with specific statutory time frames and in 

conformance with the statutory requirements for lead time and duration discussed in detail 

below. That is, with one major exception. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 5]

In the mid to late 1990s, EPA began the process of setting new tailpipe standards for on-road 

commercial trucks and engines, culminating in rules issued in 1997, 2000, and 2001 for MYs 

2004-2010. Largely due to EPA’s failure to accurately forecast compliance technologies and 

costs far into the future, these rules underestimated compliance costs by some 2-5 times what 

actually were incurred. In addition to detailing this forecasting failure, the attached look-back 

paper reviews some of the devastating impacts these truck mandates generally had on the new 

truck marketplace, and in particular on new truck customers, on truck and engine manufacturers 

and suppliers, and on dealers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 5]

In summary, given this recent and devastating example of what can happened when mandates are 

set too far into the future, the final rule should include a worse case MY 2025 cost scenario of 

$12,349 per vehicle, which approximates roughly 4.2 times the $2,936 NHTSA cost estimate 

discussed above. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 5]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 69-71.]

And, third, the proposal dramatically underestimates cost impacts on new vehicles.

To work, fuel economy rules must require improvements that are affordable. Why? Because you 

can mandate what the manufacturers must build but you can't dictate what consumers will buy. If 

our customers do not purchase these products, we all lose.

Not that we're not suggesting the proposal is technologically infeasible. For example, my 

manufacturer Ford Motor Company has or can develop the engineering and manufacturing 

expertise necessary to comply, but at what costs. Our concern is for our customers and the prices 

that they will face.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 55-56.]
EPA Response to Comments

18-84

The total cost of the administration's three fuel economy rules is approximately 210 billion. To 

put this figure into perspective, that's more than twice the amount of total government aid to the 

auto industry in 2009 and '10. The $157 billion proposal is by far the costliest auto regulation 

ever, and comes on the heels of the 2010 record-setting $51 billion fuel economy rule. I always 

have to remember that a billion is a thousand million.

And of course, these new regulatory costs will be borne by customers. And they exclude the 

billions of dollars in other new regulations you and California regulators have planned. No one in 

the government seems to be looking at the bigger picture of what all this regulatory activity is 

doing to the affordability for the average American.

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 199.]

Under the rule, the U.S. would invest about $300 billion in new vehicle technologies bringing 

cleaner, more fuel-efficient cars and trucks to the marketplace.

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

The Agencies Should Evaluate Fuel Costs, Availability, and Impacts of Higher Octane Gasoline.

Costs and Life-Cycle Costs. The extra cost for higher octane gasoline should be used to estimate 

the costs for this rulemaking. It appears that EPA used the cost of regular gasoline in their RIA 

(p. 3-15) for this rulemaking. Also, the increased performance that EPA is expecting to achieve 

from turbocharging and other technologies seems to be based on the vehicle using higher octane 

fuel. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

All potential costs and environmental impacts must be considered such as supply chain burdens, 

transportation availability, market transition costs, capital investments for higher octane gasoline 

and/or for production of additional ethanol or alkylates and the possibility of shortages in some 

areas of the country. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Nevertheless, we are concerned that much of the nation’s gasoline supply will require higher 

octane levels to meet these GHG standards and that EPA has not considered the implications. 

EPA either needs to address (in the face of manufacturers’ current recommendations) why more 

mid-grade gasoline will not be needed to run turbocharged, high-compression engines or the 

implications of greater use of higher octane gasoline should be fully evaluated. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Ross, D.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 242.]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-85

Anticipated net savings could be much greater if the real price of gasoline rises between now and 

2025 as seems all too plausible given rising demand for fossil fuels in low income countries, 

political and economic unrest in oil-rich regions, and the eventual recognition by the public and 

political elites of the dire consequences of human-influenced climate change.

Organization: Smith, Frank Houston

State of current ICE technology and Comparative Costs

This clearly demonstrates that the worst case average 'diesel vehicle price premium' is less than 

$1,800 for European small displacement diesels ... offering a minimum gain in fuel economy of 

50% [18 mpg(US)]. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.2]

For example the new Chevrolet New MY 2012 Aveo 1.3VCDi eco (95PS) (US Sonic?), and Kia 

5 door '1 Air' 1.1 CRDi 74bhp ISG Rio are NEDC rated above 78 mpg(Imperial) [≈65 mpg(US)] 

combined. After excluding value add (VAT) and other EU taxes, both should have list export 

prices below $15,000 USD including the less than a $1,500 premium for 62% and 40% fuel 

economy improvements over their respective significantly less fuel frugal gasoline counterparts 

rated 48 and 56 mpg(Imp) combined, again NEDC. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.2]

The 1.6 TDCi 95 Edge Econetic Fiesta Titanium offers similar fuel economies for about $18.9k 

and only roughly $1.3K more than its' 48.7 mpg(Imperial) [≈41 mpg(US)] combined 1.6 Liter 

gasoline counterpart. The 1.6 L diesel Edge Econetic should export for roughly $16.9K with a 

possibility of 1.5 gallons/100 miles. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.3]

In fact there is an 8.5K pound GVW diesel Sprinter 2500 planned for the US in 2013 expected to 

provide an average 30 mpg(US) in mixed driving... better than the base Sonic. Size/weight may 

not be the major issues. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.3]

This leads to the question of which models might already have been (or might be) seen on US 

highways and what is the best fuel economy they currently offer outside the US results in the 

following analysis. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, p.3] [[See Tables 2 &3 in Docket Number 

NHTSA-2010-0131-0240-A2, pp.3-4]]

Organization: Tarazevich, Yegor

Introduce gas tax that will gradually grow to $2 per gallon by 2025 to reduce air pollution and oil 

dependence. Otherwise with high MPG cars will just drive more. With high MPG cars people 

will still pay less for car ownership than they do today. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0199, p.1]

Organization: Van Voorhies, M.

It is lunacy to think that driving up the cost of cars and trucks is worth the time, effort and cost!! 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1629-A1, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

18-86

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

The 2012-2016 rulemaking will, according to the agencies, cost automakers more than $52 

billion – a higher cost than any rulemaking has ever imposed on any regulated industry. 

Volkswagen continues to make significant investments to both improve our conventional 

technologies and introduce advanced concepts into the US market. We have crafted a product 

portfolio that will be attractive to consumers while also achieving compliance with stringent 

2012-2016 CO2 and fuel economy targets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 3]

Cost of compliance for manufacturers weighted more towards light truck sales is projected to be 

on the order of $1,300-1,600 for 2012-2021. A Wall Street Journal article that appeared online 

on July 18, 2011 ('White House Offers Auto Makers Concessions to Win Mileage Support') 

describes how proposals to improve the fuel economy of pickups and sport utility vehicles at a 

slower pace than passenger cars would 'benefit Detroit manufacturers.' [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9569-A1, p. 10]

Response:

Regarding the comments from AFPM that the potential need to restrict recharging times 

could adversely impact market penetration of electrified vehicles, we do not believe that the 

market penetrations shown by our analysis (~2% increase in EVs and PHEVs in the 2025MY, 

see Table III-29 of the preamble) will have sufficient impact on the electrical grid to require any 

such restrictions to recharging times. As for the AFPM comment that we have not properly 

analyzed the impacts on carbon emissions that could result from increased electricity demands, 

this is not correct. We have accounted for increased electricity demands in our analysis as well 

as the increased carbon and other emissions associated with that increased demand. See 

preamble section III.F.1 and Table III-64 (showing quantified estimates of upstream electricity 

and associated GHG emissions attributable to EVs, as there explained, electricity emission 

factors used in those estimates were derived from EPA’s Integrated Planning Model). AFPM 

also commented that we have made an unrealistic assumption by assuming that the consumer 

market is sufficient to absorb the expected number of EVs without subsidies. Again, we 

disagree. We believe that the low penetration rates of EVs and PHEVs shown in our analysis 

can be made up by early adopters and the kinds of consumers that want such vehicles despite 

their payback characteristics. Further, we have not suggested that EVs or PHEVs are as cost 

effective as more traditional technologies; this is why their predicted penetration rate for MY 

2025 is quite modest and why they are not projected to be needed at all to meet the MY 2021 

standards. What we have shown is that the final standards provide significant public benefit and 

a path exists toward attaining both the standards and those benefits.

The Defour Group argues that the agencies have deviated from using mainstream 

economic assumptions to estimate costs in favor of new and unorthodox methodologies. It is not 

clear what methodologies the commenter considers to be unorthodox. If the meaning is that our 

use of teardown studies to estimate technology costs was unorthodox, then we disagree strongly. 

We believe, and nearly all commenters have agreed, that teardown studies represent the best 

method of estimating technology costs. See Chapter 3.1.1.1 of the joint TSD where we describe 

the teardown studies conducted for our GHG rules, the peer reviews that have been done and 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-87

changes made in response to them. Further, we believe that our technology cost estimates 

represent the best and most up-to-date estimates available today. The commenter also questions 

our accounting procedures used to estimate costs. The commenter claims that, if the 

government’s cost estimates are too low, auto makers may find themselves building vehicles that 

consumers are unwilling to purchase. We believe that recent trends suggest otherwise, such as 

the unexpectedly high sales of the Ford EcoBoost engine despite its higher cost relative to lower 

fuel economy engine choices for the same vehicle model. Further, at least thirteen automakers 

have expressed strong support for the proposed standards. We do not believe that they would 

have done so if they believed the standards compelled production of unsalable vehicles. See also 

the detailed responses to the Walter and Drake study and critique in section 18.1 above.

Regarding comments from Growth Energy, we have based on EV/PHEV cost estimates 

on the ANL BatPaC model (battery pack costs) and on FEV teardown studies (electric motors, 

etc.). We believe that the costs we are using are the best available cost estimates for EV/PHEV 

technology available. We have also used our High 1 and High 2 markups to estimate indirect 

costs, and have applied learning effects that are in line with the literature. We disagree with 

Growth Energy when they claim that we have not estimated costs reliably. Importantly, the 

information upon which Growth Energy appears to have based this claim is the NAS 2011 

report. In that report, NAS states the following about their report, “The cost estimates represent 

estimates for the current (2009/2010) time period to about 5 years in the future.” (See 

“Assessment of Fuel Economy Technologies for Light-Duty Vehicles,” National Academy of 

Sciences 2011, Summary at page 1.) Therefore, the NAS costs are not applicable for the MYs 

2017-2025 rulemaking timeframe. We have discussion of this in RIA Chapter 3.11.7 Further, 

our final analysis does not project a significant penetration of EV/PHEV technology so the 

impacts on our program costs are not significant. Lastly, we conducted a sensitivity surrounding 

our battery-pack costs and our indirect cost markups (which would also impact battery-pack 

costs) and neither sensitivity suggests significant impacts on the program.

Regarding the comment from Mr. Haroldson, we disagree that vehicles will become too 

expensive to purchase, especially in light of the significant savings that owners will realize on 

lower fuel expenditures. Our analysis shows that the cumulative fuel savings will exceed 

cumulative costs in just over 3 years, well within the typical vehicle ownership period, and that 

consumers purchasing new vehicles with credit will see immediate reductions in monthly 

payment amount. See preamble tables III-84 and III-85 and accompanying text. As for safety, 

we also disagree that vehicles will become too small to be safe to drive. In fact, our analysis was 

done assuming that vehicles would not change size at all (footprint will not change and, thus, 

passenger volume will not change). As explained in preamble section II.C and II.G, the footprint 

attribute removes inherent incentives to downsize as a compliance strategy (downsizing just 

makes the fleet average more stringent), and the agencies have developed safety neutral 

compliance paths limiting use of mass reduction as a compliance pathway for lower weight 

vehicles. Indeed, there were pointed comments (e.g. from CBD and ACEEE) that the proposed 

standards created incentives to upsize the fleet. Although we disagree with those comments, 

they stand in stark contrast to the assertions made here. Lastly, while reducing our dependence 

on foreign oil is a significant benefit of our standards, the primary intent is to reduce GHG 

emissions. That cannot be done by simply replacing consumption of foreign oil with 

consumption of domestic oil without a corresponding reduction in oil consumption and related 

vehicular GHG emissions.
EPA Response to Comments

18-88

Regarding comments from ICCT, we have not included a sensitivity using the 2011 NAS 

costs. We agree with the commenter that the costs contained in the 2011 NAS report were meant 

for the more immediate timeframe and are not necessarily appropriate for use in the 2017-2025 

timeframe.

Regarding the comments from Mr. Jackson, the primary point of the comments appears 

to be that EPA has conducted a faulty analysis in support of the proposal. Mr. Jackson also 

appears to be concerned that we have assumed certain technology penetration rates to ensure that 

our rule has the appearance of being beneficial while, if different penetration rates were to occur, 

our rule would have different costs and benefits. This is incorrect. EPA’s OMEGA modeling, 

the source of the technology penetration rate projections, is entirely transparent and refutes this 

unfounded comment in all respects. See, e.g. RIA sections 3.1to3.11. Thus, we have not 

prejudged the technology penetration outcome nor have we forced certain technologies into the 

mix with the intent of forcing them on the American car buyer. Instead, we have demonstrated 

what we believe to be the most cost effective approach for each individual auto maker to reach 

compliance with the final standards given the makeup of that particular manufacturer’s fleet. 

EPA’s technology penetrations projections are not binding in any way on the manufacturers, and 

manufacturers are free to choose any technology pathway for the fleets so long as they are 

meeting their CO2 target compliance levels. The possible technology outcomes are the result of 

the standard in conjunction with the footprint basis of the standard and, of course, the

technologies available to reach the standards. The outcomes are not predetermined by EPA. 

Therefore, it is true that a different fleet mix might result in different program costs and benefits, 

but the fleet mix that will exists in the 2025MY will be driven by the auto makers and the vehicle 

buying public within the constraints of the standards, not by EPA. Mr. Jackson is also concerned 

about the multiplier credit available to EVs as a means of encouraging the development of EV 

technology, which is addressed in Section 4 of this document as well as in preamble section 

III.C.2.

Regarding comments from Mr. Knapp and Mr. Lipetzky, we disagree that the final rule 

will result in higher fuel costs—why would fuel costs rise when so much less gasoline will be 

used—and we disagree with the implication that our rule will be harmful to our slumping 

economy. In fact, our analysis suggests that the final rule will not only provide significant public 

benefit, but it may also increase sales and jobs (see preamble sections III.H.11 and 12 and 

Chapter 8 of the final RIA).

Regarding the comment from Mr. Marshall, we agree that regulatory cost estimates 

probably overstate reality in general. However, this is a very difficult thing to prove or even 

analyze. That said, we have attempted to estimate the impacts of learning by doing in making 

our cost estimates (see preamble section II.D.2.d and Chapter 3.1.3 of the joint TSD). While not 

overly aggressive in that attempt, we believe that our learning effects strike the proper balance 

between being conservative and respectful of auto maker and supplier ingenuity.

Regarding the comment from the NACAA, we assume that the claim that, if vehicles 

equipped with the technologies needed to meet the MY 2025 emissions were introduced earlier 

then the additional cost per vehicle should be lower than $2000, is a reference to learning effects 

starting earlier and resulting in lower costs by 2025. While that may be true, one cannot lose 

sight of the need to introduce new technologies at a sustainable and reasonable pace. We have 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-89

attempted to provide auto makers sufficient time to introduce new technologies on a pace that 

will not result in scrapping of new model introductions or requiring model introduction outside 

of the existing model redesign schedules (thus serving to reduce costs67) and on a pace that will 

not result in costly mistakes and technology failures. in addition, a more rapid phase-in of the 

standards than we have provided for may well reduce some technology costs by 2025 (due to a 

longer learning period) but may also increase warranty costs and stranded capital costs, etc..

Regarding the comments from NADA, we have conducted a separate analysis of 

NADA’s (incorrect) claims about the impacts of our heavy-duty highway 2007-2010 rulemaking 

on the industry. That analysis, given its length and detail, is presented in its entirety at the end of 

this response section 18.2 as a supplemental response to NADA Exhibit B.. In short, we disagree 

with NADA’s claims and NADA’s assertions that we should apply a 4.2x factor to our cost 

estimates to shed light on the “worse case” (sic) scenario. NADA also claims that the rule will 

result in cars that consumers do not want to buy and, if so, we all lose. We agree that we all lose 

in that scenario, but disagree that the scenario will play out. In fact, we believe that, for the most 

part, 2025MY vehicles will look and feel much the same as today’s vehicles. There is no reason 

to believe that the highly boosted and downsized engines upon which the final rule 

overwhelmingly relies will be unattractive to consumers. In fact, Ford is selling considerably 

more of its turbocharged and downsized engine equipped F150 pickups than they expected and 

fewer of the F150s equipped with more traditional V8 naturally aspirated engines. And this is 

true in a market segment – large pickup trucks – that has traditionally been the one of the least 

concerned with fuel economy and the most reluctant to accept smaller engines.

NADA also expressed concerns about the high costs of the Administration’s three fuel 

economy/greenhouse gas emission rules. These rules certainly have costs, which the agencies 

have estimated carefully, but the rules also provide unparalleled savings to consumers and 

benefits to society that far outweigh the expected costs. We discuss NADA’s inappropriate 

accounting of costs for the rules in section 18.2.1, below. Moreover, these rules have been 

actively supported by the auto manufacturing industry. EPA strongly doubts that the industry 

would offer this strong support if manufacturers’ believed that the increased costs of installing 

new technology was either unaffordable or led to unmarketable vehicles.

Regarding comments from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 

we do not agree that higher octane fuel will be necessary for high compression turbocharged and 

downsized engines to prevent the onset of combustion knock. EPA assumed no change in the 

octane of certification or in-use gasoline within its analysis and the effectiveness values used for 

the high BMEP engines reflect that fact. The current Ford EcoBoost turbocharged GDI engines 

do not require the use of premium fuel, although those engines are not operating at BMEP levels 

as high as those expected under our rule. Importantly, a combination of both intake charge 

dilution (e.g., cooled EGR) and in-cylinder evaporative fuel cooling (e.g., direct injection) are 

expected to allow higher BMEP GDI engines to operate on regular grade gasoline. All packages 

 67 See 75 FR at 25451 describing increased costs associated with introduction of major vehicle changes 

outside the normal redesign cycle (“[t]he amortized cost of the capital necessary to produce a new vehicle design 

will increase by 23%, from one-fifth of the capital cost to one-fourth ...This would be on top of the cost of the 

emission control equipment itself. ...The capital costs associated with vehicle redesign go beyond CO2 emission 

control and potentially involve every aspect of the vehicle and can represent thousands of dollars”).
EPA Response to Comments

18-90

at 27 bar BMEP analyzed by EPA included cooled EGR to allow higher BMEP operation and 

prevent the onset of combustion knock on current certification or in-use fuels. See Joint TSD p. 

3-88 (“Use of GDI systems with turbocharged engines and air-to-air charge air cooling also 

reduces the fuel octane requirements for knock limited combustion and allows the use of higher 

compression ratios.”) 

Regarding the comment from D. Ross, we agree that fuel savings will be greater should 

future fuel prices be higher than projected in the AEO 2012 early release. However, we believe 

that the AEO projections are the best available projections and that they represent the best 

projected fuel prices for use in our analysis.

Regarding the comment from Frank Houston Smith, the primary point of the comment 

appears to be that small engine displacement diesel vehicles like those popular in Europe and 

other countries provide a possible bridge technology to a future fleet with much lower CO2 

emission characteristics. EPA has no preference for the technologies chosen by auto makers, our 

only requirement is that the standards be met. While it is true that some technologies are 

receiving credits in the final rule, those credits are meant to incentivize newer and/or emerging 

technologies. Also, Mr. Smith suggests that it might be necessary to relax the NOx standard 

such that small engine displacement diesels could more easily meet criteria emissions standards 

in the US (NOx standards are generally lower for diesels in other parts of the world). This is an 

idea that EPA opposes for reasons discussed at length in our Tier 2 Highway rulemaking where 

we took a fuel neutral approach to setting criteria emission standards (see 65 FR 6698 at page 

6728, February 10, 2000).

Yegor Tarazevich suggested that EPA introduce a gas tax that would grow to $2 per 

gallon by 2025 as a means of reducing air pollution and oil dependence. Such an approach is 

outside EPA’s regulatory authority and outside of the scope of this rulemaking.

Michelle Van Voorhies believes that it is lunacy to think that driving up the cost of cars 

and trucks is worth the time, effort and cost. There are no other details to suggest why Ms. Van 

Voorhies believes this. We disagree with this comment, since our Benefit Cost Analysis 

provides considerable detail to support our belief that the new standards will results in significant 

public benefits and significant savings of fuel resulting in significant reductions of GHG 

emissions despite the expected increase in new vehicle costs. 

In their comment, the Volkswagen Group of America suggests that the costs of 

compliance for makers of pickups and SUVs is lower than the costs for auto makers whose fleets 

consist of only cars. Further, the commenter appears to suggest that the standards are structured 

to benefit the domestic auto makers over other auto makers. Neither comment is true. In fact, 

each auto maker has a unique standard based on the makeup of its fleet. Likewise, each auto 

maker has a unique starting point, or baseline or reference point, from which it is starting based, 

again, on the makeup of its fleet. Another critical factor is the power-to-weight ratio of the 

vehicles in each manufacturer’s fleet, so a vehicle with a footprint of 50 square feet and a high 

power-to-weight ratio may experience higher costs of compliance than another 50 square foot 

footprint vehicle with a low power-to-weight ratio. Such is the nature of the footprint based 

standard. (Many of the manufacturers of these vehicles also chose to pay fines, rather than 

comply with earlier year CAFE standards. As a result, they have further catching up to do, and 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-91

hence higher costs.) The point is that the costs for full line manufacturers (i.e., makers of cars 

and pickups and SUVs) may be lower than for makers of cars only as a result of power-to-weight 

ratio characteristics more than fleet makeup. A good example of this would be Hyundai and Kia, 

who have fleet makeups similar to Volkswagen (mostly cars, some SUVs and cross-over utility 

vehicles/vans, no pickups), but costs of compliance in line with the full line auto makers. 

Supplemental response to NADA Exhibit B, “A Look Back at EPA’s Cost and Other 

Impact Projections for MY 2004-2010 Heavy-Duty Truck Emissions Standards”, attached to the 

comments of the National Automobile Dealers Association (on the EPA/NHTSA proposal, 

“2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate 

Average Fuel Economy Standards,” EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575).

In general, and as discussed in detail below, EPA believes NADA’s statements included 

in Exhibit B to its public comments related to the costs of past heavy-duty criteria emission 

standards are irrelevant to the Light-Duty Vehicle GHG standards and are incorrect in any case. 

Heavy-Duty Vehicle Focus in NADA’s Exhibit B

Exhibit B in NADA’s comments focuses on Class 4 through 8 heavy-duty trucks. In the 

exhibit, NADA does not describe the relationship between these heavy-duty vehicles and the 

light-duty market, which consists primarily of passenger vehicles, or how concerns in one market 

are relevant to the other market. Further, NADA ignores the Class 2b-3 segment of vehicles 

which share a stronger resemblance to light-duty vehicles in terms of vehicle types, fuels used to 

power the vehicles, purchasers, uses, and manufacturers. 

There are significant differences between the light-duty and the Class 4-8 heavy-duty 

vehicle markets. Light-duty vehicles include passenger cars, crossover vehicles, sport utility 

vehicles (SUVs), minivans, and light pickup trucks. On the other hand, the vehicles that NADA 

discusses in its comments include vehicles such as tractor-trailers, delivery trucks, cement 

haulers, utility trucks, street sweepers, and urban buses. There is also a significant difference in 

the engines used in light-duty vehicles when compared to heavy-duty vehicles. Light-duty 

vehicles are dominated by the use of gasoline engines, while heavy-duty market contains a mix 

of gasoline and diesel engines but heavy-duty vehicles are predominately diesel powered. The

purchasers also differ. Consumers typically purchase light-duty vehicles for their own personal 

transportation. In contrast, heavy-duty vehicles are most often purchased by commercial fleets 

and municipalities for the purpose of moving freight or conducting vocational activities, such as 

street sweepers. 

In Exhibit B, NADA ignores the segment of light heavy-duty vehicles which is 

dominated by the Class 2b-3 pickup trucks. These Class 2b-3 pickup trucks closely resemble 

their light-duty pickup truck counterparts and are more relevant to any light-duty vehicle 

discussion. All three of the major U.S. manufacturers offer a light-duty truck, which are often 

referred to as “half ton” trucks and are sold as the Ford F150, Ram 1500, and GM 

Silverado/Sierra 1500. The same manufacturers also offer “three-quarter ton” and “one ton” 

versions of these pickup trucks sold as the Ford F250/350, Ram 2500/3500, and GM 
EPA Response to Comments

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Silverado/Sierra 2500/3500 trucks. The Class 2b-3 trucks are considered heavy-duty vehicles 

because their gross vehicle weight rating is over 8,500 pounds. The light and heavy pickup 

trucks share a number of vehicle characteristics, including some common components and, to 

some extent, the typical vehicle use. See 76 FR at 57160-61 (Sept. 15, 2011).

Table 1 includes a summary of the vehicle characteristics of the light-duty vehicles 

covered under the MYs 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle GHG rule, the heavy-duty vehicles

discussed in NADA’s Exhibit B, and the heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans which were not 

discussed by NADA in Exhibit B. 

Table 2: Light-Duty and Heavy-Duty Vehicle Characteristics

Light-Duty Vehicles 

Covered by LD Vehicle 

GHG Rule

Heavy-Duty Vehicles 

Discussed in NADA 

Exhibit B

Heavy-Duty Vehicles Not

Included in NADA’s 

Exhibit B Discussion

Vehicle 

Architectures

Passenger cars, SUVs, 

crossover vehicles, 

minivans, light pickup 

trucks (like Ford F150)

Tractor-trailers, delivery 

vehicles, construction 

vehicles, utility trucks, 

buses, and many others

Heavy-duty pickup trucks 

and vans (like the Ford 

F250)

Fuel Use Significant majority are 

gasoline powered vehicles

Majority are diesel powered 

vehicles

Split between gasoline and 

diesel powered vehicles

Typical 

Purchaser Individual consumer

Commercial fleets, 

municipalities, utility 

companies, and single truck 

owners

Mix of individual 

consumers and small 

businesses (such as 

landscape companies)

Vehicle 

Purposes

Personal transportation. 

Hauling and towing 

primarily limited to light 

trucks and vans.

Delivery of freight or other 

goods, transportation of 

people, transportation to 

worksite, worksite power

Mix of personal 

transportation and 

hauling/towing.

Major Vehicle 

Manufacturers

Chrysler, Ford, General 

Motors, BMW, Mercedes, 

Toyota, Honda, Kia, 

Nissan, and many others

Daimler Trucks, PACCAR, 

Navistar, Volvo, Hino, 

Ford, and others

Chrysler, Ford, General 

Motors, Isuzu, Daimler, 

Nissan, and others

NADA’s Market Disruption Claim

NADA claims that “Implementation of EPA’s MY 2004-2010 emission mandates 

directly resulted in higher truck prices, increased operating costs, reduced reliability, and lower 

fuel economy performance, which caused dramatic disruptions to the new truck marketplace.” 

(Exhibit B, page 3) NADA’s exhibit goes on to state that “Many informed prospective new 

truck purchasers rushed to ‘pre-buy’ trucks with pre-compliant technologies to avoid the effects 

of EPA’s mandates.” (Exhibit B, page 3) NADA uses the heavy-duty exhibit as support for its 

(strident) assertion that setting standards “further out than necessary” may have “devastating 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-93

impacts” on the marketplace (NADA comments, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575, page 

5). EPA believes that NADA’s heavy-duty market disruption claims are not relevant to the 

Light-Duty Vehicle GHG proposal because of the differences in vehicle types, usage, and 

markets as discussed above. NADA did not make any claim of pre-buy relative to the heavy-duty 

pickup trucks and vans (the most analogous heavy-duty vehicle segment, as just explained), and 

EPA did not find any evidence to support pre-buys in that vehicle segment. Further, EPA 

discusses three additional reasons why any heavy-duty market disruption claim is irrelevant to 

the MYs 2012-2017 light-duty vehicle rulemaking.

First, there is a significant difference in the regulatory structure between the heavy-duty 

standards for criteria pollutants and the light-duty vehicle GHG standards. NADA’s pre-buy 

argument is not applicable to the light-duty vehicle GHG program because of this difference in 

structure. Under the Clean Air Act Section 202(a)(3)(C), the heavy-duty criteria emission 

standards are required to apply for a period of no less than three model years, which is 

commonly referred to as the stability requirement.68 As NADA points out in Exhibit B, EPA 

promulgated new heavy-duty criteria pollutant emission standards in 2004 and 2007, with the 

2007 standards phased in through 2010. However, unlike heavy-duty vehicle and engine 

emission standards, the Clean Air Act does not require a minimum stability period for light-duty 

vehicle emission standards. NHTSA and EPA have structured the light-duty vehicle fuel 

economy and GHG final standards such that they require annual improvements for MYs 2017 to 

2025. This builds on the MYs 2012-2016 light-duty vehicle GHG and fuel economy standards. 

The annual increase in CAFE standards for light-duty trucks actually began for MY 2005 and the 

annual increase for passenger cars for MY 2011.69 In addition, the light-duty vehicle GHG 

standards are a fleet average standard where each manufacturer may select a different standard 

and compliance path unique to its fleet. For example, some vehicles may see changes in one 

model year, while others will remain constant. As such, the light-duty vehicle market is not 

expected to experience a significant change in the vehicles available for sale in any given year. 

NADA’s claim that pre-buys disrupt markets is therefore not relevant to the light-duty vehicle 

GHG standards because the light-duty program requires modest, annual incremental increases in 

the stringency and costs of emission standards which are unlikely to have a substantial effect on 

purchasing behavior. 

Second, it is not appropriate to apply NADA’s claim of “pre-buy” in the heavy-duty 

market, in response to the costs of heavy-duty criteria pollutant emission rules, to the light-duty 

vehicle GHG standards because of the significant financial benefit to consumers accruing from 

the GHG rules. As documented in the proposal and final rule, the standards will result in a 

significant improvement in fuel economy and therefore reduce operating costs. Though the 

standards increase the upfront costs of the vehicles, owners will experience lower operating costs 

due to the improved fuel economy and reduced GHG emissions. In fact, in the MYs 2012-2016 

light-duty vehicle GHG rule, EPA projected an increase in vehicle sales in the 2012 through 

2016 timeframe if consumers take into consideration at least five years’ worth of fuel savings 

 68 United States Code, Title 42, Chapter 85. May be accessed at http://epa.gov/oar/caa/title2.html 69 U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. May be accessed at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fueleconomy.
EPA Response to Comments

18-94

when considering whether to buy a new vehicle.70 Similarly, as highlighted in the proposal, a 

light-duty vehicle consumer who purchases a vehicle in the 2017 through 2025 timeframe would 

not have any financial incentive to avoid the purchase because the average consumer would see a 

payback in the upfront costs in less than four years and on average gain a net savings of $3,000 

to $4,400 over the lifetime of the vehicle based on the proposed standards (discount rates of both 

seven and three percent, respectively).71 Consumers purchasing vehicles on credit would see 

immediate savings because monthly fuel savings more than offset the increase in monthly loan 

payment amount. Preamble section I.C.

Third, finalizing light-duty vehicle standards for the MYs 2017-2025 timeframe now 

provides regulatory certainty to auto manufacturers and suppliers along with the opportunity for 

long-term planning and time for continued development and deployment of GHG emission 

reducing technologies across the light-duty vehicle fleet. By setting standards with a significant 

amount of lead time, EPA is addressing one of the concerns raised by a General Accounting 

Office (GAO) study related to the 2007 heavy-duty standards.72 GAO suggested that EPA 

should address concerns raised by purchasers about whether new engines will be ready in time 

for validation testing by the vehicle manufacturers and truck fleets to help prevent any potential 

pre-buy of older engines before 2007. Longer lead times, such as those provided in the 2017-

2025 light-duty vehicle GHG program, could help consumers be more confident in the 

performance and durability of these new technologies because it provides the time for auto 

manufacturers and suppliers to develop and implement technologies in a robust manner and with 

sufficient time to ensure durability and reliability targets are met. 

Finally, NADA’s assertions that the 2004 and 2007/2010 heavy-duty emission standards 

caused the heavy-duty truck sales fluctuations over the past decade are mistaken. EPA believes 

that there are many factors that impact truck sales in any given year. For example, the American 

Trucking Associations develops the U.S. Freight Transportation Forecast based on factors such 

as the change in the U.S. gross domestic product, consumer confidence, housing, capital 

equipment purchases, government spending, imports and exports, bond yields, and truck capacity 

utilization.73 Figure 1 below shows the annual sales of heavy-duty trucks (those with a gross 

vehicle weight rating of over 14,000 pounds) and the annual rate of change of the U.S. Gross 

Domestic Product (GDP) since 2000. Although the figure is not intended to imply causality, 

because other factors are expected to influence vehicle sales, it does provide an indication that 

factors such as the annual growth rate of the U.S. GDP may have an impact on truck sales.74 

 70 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 75 Federal 

Register, May 7, 2010. Pages 25517-25518. 71 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 76 Federal 

Register, December 1, 2011. Pages 74972-74973. See also section I.C to preamble to final rules. 72 U.S. General Accounting Office. “EPA Could Maximize the Benefits from the 2007 Diesel Emissions Standards 

by Better Addressing Industry Concerns.” Appendix III – Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency. 

May be accessed at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-313/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-

313.htm

73 American Trucking Associations, Inc. U.S. Freight Transportation Forecast to 2022. Pages 10-12 and 52-53. 

2011.

74 The correlation between the truck sales and the annual GDP percent change was +0.78.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-95

Figure 1: U.S. Class 4-8 Truck Sales and U.S. GDP Annual Growth Rate75

Projected Cost of Compliance

NADA’s Exhibit B also discusses EPA’s projected fixed and operating costs of medium 

and heavy heavy-duty engines related to the 2004 and 2007/2010 criteria pollutant emission 

standards. NADA claims that by setting standards seven to ten years before implementation, 

EPA “dramatically underestimated” the costs associated with the program (Exhibit B, page 3). 

NADA makes no attempt to comment on the specific details of EPA’s detailed cost analysis for 

the proposed MYs 2017-2025 light duty vehicle standards (with the exception of indirect costs 

which we address in responding to NADA’s Exhibit A) and NADA’s discussion is focused on 

costs that are not related to the light-duty vehicle GHG standards. We nonetheless explain why 

NADA is incorrect as to that other rule.

As stated in the 2007/2010 heavy-duty emissions rule, EPA developed the compliance 

costs of the NOx standard assuming that NOx adsorbers would be the most likely technology 

 75 U.S. Truck Sales represent Class 4-8 truck sales from Ward’s Auto Group’s “U.S. Truck Sales by GVW 

by Month” 2000 through 2011. U.S. Gross Domestic Product percent change based on current dollars from the 

Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last accessed on May 8, 2012 at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Annual U.S. GDP % Change

Annual U.S. Class 4-8 Truck Sales

U.S. Heavy Duty Truck Sales and the U.S. GDP Annual Change

Heavy Duty Truck Sales

U.S. Annual GDP Change
EPA Response to Comments

18-96

applied by industry in order to meet the NOx standards.76 As noted in the 2007/2010 HD rule, 

we recognized that manufacturers had several years before implementation of the standards and 

we expected research would lead to enhanced emission control technologies with focused 

research efforts on drawbacks, such as fuel economy impacts, in an effort to minimize any 

potential negative effects.77 As a result of the industry’s research and development efforts, most 

heavy-duty engine manufacturers selected a technology path that included selective catalytic 

reduction (SCR) for 2010 NOx compliance rather than NOx adsorbers. There are several 

reasons why manufacturers selected this technology for the market. For one thing, 

manufacturers introduced SCR into the European heavy-duty market in the 2006 timeframe to 

meet the Euro V emission standards.78 The earlier introduction of the technology in Europe 

provided engine manufacturers time to gain experience with the technology in the marketplace 

before it was implemented in the United States. The use of SCR in the U.S. also provides global 

engine manufacturers with ability to use the research and development experience that they 

gained in Europe in addition to the potential economies of scale to reduce costs. SCR also 

provides the manufacturers with the flexibility to balance engine-out NOx emissions and fuel 

consumption to meet market demands. We believe, and manufacturers have provided 

confidential business information to support, that manufacturers have the ability to raise the 

engine-out NOx emissions of 2010 engines equipped with SCR to levels above the 2004 NOx 

levels in an effort to improve fuel consumption while remaining in compliance with NOx 

emission standards.

We would expect the cost analysis conducted by NADA to show that the compliance 

costs and manufacturer surcharges with respect to the 2007/2010 rule are different for two 

reasons. First, EPA developed costs in the 2007/2010 rule for a different emission reducing 

technology than the technology that was actually used in the market. Second, NADA used 

manufacturer surcharges in the comparison. Manufacturer surcharges are not equivalent to 

compliance costs. As would be expected, surcharges are often greater than the compliance cost 

because they are set by the manufacturers based upon what they believe the market will bear. 

This premise is supported by confidential business information submitted to EPA for the HeavyDuty Engine Nonconformance Penalty proposal.79 

EPA attempted to conduct a retrospective analysis of our projected costs of the heavyduty gasoline engine emission standards. However, we were unable to develop a robust method 

to identify the gasoline engine price (or cost) increases that were solely related to emissions 

which were passed along to consumers in the heavy-duty pickup market.

However, EPA has conducted a simple analysis of the projected costs of the 2004 and 

2007/2010 light heavy-duty diesel engine standards relative to the price increases that one major 

manufacturer actually placed on their heavy-duty diesel pickup trucks. As noted above, these

pickup trucks are more similar to the half-ton pickup trucks included in the light-duty vehicle 

segment than are the heavier trucks referred to by NADA. EPA is utilizing manufacturer 

 76 66 FR at 5090, January 18, 2001 77 66 FR at 5090, January 18, 2001 78 Cummins. Diesel Exhaust Fluid (DEF) Q &A. Last accessed on June 19, 2012 at 

http://www.cumminsfiltration.com/pdfs/product_lit/americas_brochures/MB10033.pdf 79 77 FR at 4736, January 31, 2012.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-97

surcharges in this analysis as a proxy for cost, similar to the approach taken in the NADA 

analysis, though we have no reason to believe that these particular surcharges were equal to costs 

associated with emissions abatement equipment.80 In the analysis below, EPA compares the cost 

increase that we projected in the 2004 rule, adjusted to 2004 dollars, to the price difference of the 

diesel engine option on a Ram 2500 pickup truck between 2003 and 2004. As shown in Table 2, 

the cost increase projected by EPA for the 2004 standard was $541 and Chrysler increased the 

price of the diesel engine option on the Ram 2500 by $330. By this comparison, EPA’s 

projected cost increase of the 2004 emission standards was $211 greater than the manufacturer’s 

actual price increase.

Table 3: EPA Cost Estimate and Manufacturer Price Increase for 2004 Light HeavyDuty Diesel Engine Standard (all values in 2004$)

Manufacturer Price IncreaseA,B $330

EPA Cost EstimateC $541

Manufacturer Price – EPA Cost -$211

Notes:

A Manufacturer Surcharge for Diesel Engines from Pickup Trucks.com 

Standard Equipment and Options. 2003 Surcharge was $5,225. Last accessed 

on May 7, 2012 at http://www.pickuptrucks.com/dodge/ram2500/2003/standard-equipment/ B Manufacturer Surcharge for Diesel Engines from Pickup Trucks.com 

Standard Equipment and Options. 2004 Surcharge was $5,555 (2004$). Last 

accessed on May 7, 2012 at http://www.pickuptrucks.com/dodge/ram2500/2004/standard-equipment/ C 2004 Light Heavy-Duty Emission Standard Cost was $485 (1999$). See 65 

FR October 6, 2000 at 59936.

Next, EPA compared the cost increase projected in the 2007 heavy-duty rule, adjusted to 

2007 dollars, to the price difference of the diesel engine option on a Ram 2500 pickup truck 

between 2006 and 2007. As shown below in Table 3, EPA’s projected cost increase for the 2007 

standard was $2,429 and Chrysler increased the price of the diesel engine option on the Ram 

2500 by $545. EPA’s projected cost increase of the 2007 emission standard was $1,884 more 

than the price increase of the diesel engine option for this category of engines.

 80 The Agency believes that the heavy-duty engine industry may not be a perfectly competitive market due 

to the limited number of manufacturers. In a concentrated market like this, pricing strategies such as surcharges 

may include additional costs for non-regulatory imposed features, non-emission-related regulatory imposed features 

or additional profit margin.
EPA Response to Comments

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Table 4: EPA Cost Estimate and Manufacturer Price Increase for 2007 Light 

Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine Standard (all values in 2007$)

Manufacturer Price IncreaseA,B $545

EPA Cost EstimateC $2,429

Manufacturer Price – EPA Cost -$1,884

Notes:

A Manufacturer Surcharge for Diesel Engines from Pickup Trucks.com 

Standard Equipment and Options was $5,555 in 2006. Last accessed on May 

7, 2012 at http://www.pickuptrucks.com/dodge/ram-2500/2006/standardequipment/

B Manufacturer Surcharge for Diesel Engines from Pickup Trucks.com 

Standard Equipment and Options was $6,100 in 2007. Last accessed on May 

7, 2012 at http://www.pickuptrucks.com/dodge/ram-2500/2007/standardequipment/

C 2007 Emission Standard Cost was $1,986 (1999$). Regulatory Impact 

Analysis: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel 

Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements (EPA 420-R-00-026), page V-38. Last 

accessed on May 7, 2011 at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/highwaydiesel/regs/ria-v.pdf

Finally, we compare the cost increase projected in 2010 for the 2007/2010 heavy-duty 

rule, adjusted to 2010 dollars, to the price difference of the diesel engine option on a Ram 2500 

pickup truck between 2009 and 2010. As shown below in Table 4, the projected cost increase 

for the 2010 standard was $2,046 and Chrysler increased the price of the diesel engine option on 

the Ram 2500 by $2,060 in 2010. In this instance, the projected the cost increase of the 2010 

emission standards was $14 less than the manufacturer’s price increase for this category of 

engines.

Table 5: EPA Cost Estimate and Manufacturer Price Increase for 2010 Light 

Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine Standard (all values in 2010$)

Manufacturer Price IncreaseA,B $2,060

EPA Cost EstimateC $2,046

Manufacturer Price – EPA Cost $14

Notes:

A Manufacturer Surcharge for Diesel Engines from Pickup Trucks.com Standard 

Equipment and Options was $6,100 in 2009. Last accessed on May 7, 2012 at 

http://www.pickuptrucks.com/dodge/ram-2500/2009/standard-equipment/ BManufacturer Surcharge for Diesel Engines from Pickup Trucks.com Standard 

Equipment and Options was $7,615 in 2010. Last accessed on May 7, 2012 at 

http://www.pickuptrucks.com/dodge/ram-2500/2010/standard-equipment/ C 2010 Emission Standard Cost was $1,601 (1999$). Regulatory Impact 

Analysis: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel 

Sulfur Control Requirements (EPA 420-R-00-026), page V-38. Last accessed on 

May 7, 2011 at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/highway-diesel/regs/ria-v.pdf

In summary, the most relevant heavy-duty engine cost discussion for the light-duty 

vehicle GHG standards did not show that EPA underpredicted costs by “two to five times the 

actual costs” as incorrectly claimed by NADA (Exhibit B, page 11).
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-99

Conclusion

In conclusion, NADA commented on the 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle GHG proposal 

by submitting a review of the costs of EPA’s 2004-2010 heavy-duty standards and a discussion 

on other impacts on heavy-duty vehicles. Two of the premises of the NADA exhibit were that 

rulemakings which provide seven to ten years of lead time lead to misrepresented costs and 

result in market disruptions. This memo discusses why EPA believes that any heavy-duty 

market disruption claim is irrelevant for the Light-Duty Vehicle GHG program because the 

regulatory structures of the programs are different and because the GHG program reduces

operator costs, unlike a criteria pollutant emission program. NADA fails to discuss any of the 

market differences between passenger cars and commercial heavy-duty vehicles. In addition, 

NADA ignores the most relevant segment of the heavy-duty market, the large pickup trucks, for 

comparison to light-duty vehicles. EPA has examined the actual price increase for the heavyduty pickup trucks and found they were generally less than the EPA cost estimates, not greater as 

NADA mistakenly asserts. In addition, we found no evidence of market disruptions for these 

vehicles during the implementation of the 2004 or 2007/2010 emission standards. 

18.2.1. Per Vehicle Average Costs

Organizations Included in this Section

American Petroleum Institute (API)

BMW of North America, LLC

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Cuenca, M.

Jackson, F.W.

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Ross, D.

Steyn, R.

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

The market place will determine the need for premium (higher octane) fuel

The EPA and NHTSA note that their assessment of the cost of technologies adopted to comply 

with the proposed CAFE and GHG standards was not predicated on the need for premium 

gasoline, and they request comment on this assumption. API concurs with the approach used by 

EPA and NHTSA in this regard. The market place will address and determine the octane needs 

of motor vehicles – as it has done, successfully, for decades. There is no need for government 

agencies to adopt a regulatory approach that pre-determines, prescribes, or specifies vehicle 

octane requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 11]

Octane needs are already addressed by the market and do not require government intervention 

The market place will address octane needs of vehicles as it has done successfully for decades. 
EPA Response to Comments

18-100

There is no need for government agencies to pre-determine, prescribe, or specify vehicle octane 

levels. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A2, p. 2]

Questionable Vehicle Cost and Consumer Benefit Estimates

EPA and NHTSA state that the proposed standards “would have significant savings for 

consumers.” This is based on an average increased cost of $2,000 for a MY 2025 new vehicle 

and a present value of fuel savings over the vehicle lifetime ranging from $5,200 to $6,600, 

depending on whether a 7% or 3% discount rate is used. The uncertainty over increased vehicle 

cost and the discount rate consumers would implicitly use to value fuel savings raises significant 

questions about the EPA/NHTSA claim that a consumer would see a “net lifetime savings of 

$3,000 to $4,400.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, pp. 9-10]

As one example, it should be noted that the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy 

Outlook 2011 included a sensitivity case with a 6% per year increase in CAFE -- reaching 

approximately 55 mpg in 2025. That sensitivity case estimated that such a CAFE requirement 

would increase the average cost of a new 2025 vehicles by about $4,600 relative to vehicles 

meeting the existing 2016 mpg requirement. The EIA cost increment is more than twice that of 

the EPA/NHTSA estimate, and likely reflects the use of a different set of assumptions that drive 

significantly higher penetrations of electric vehicle and diesel technologies into the light-duty 

vehicle fleet.22 Additionally, EIA uses a 15% consumer-relevant discount rate when evaluating 

the economic cost effectiveness of new vehicle efficiency technologies. A 15% discount rate 

would reduce the present value of fuel savings by about 40% to 50% compared to the 

EPA/NHTSA calculations. Combining EIA’s higher vehicle cost with a consumer relevant 

discount rate would turn the EPA/NHTSA consumer net benefit conclusion into at best a 

consumer break-even and more likely a consumer net cost. Furthermore, the EPA/NHTSA 

conclusion that a consumer paying cash for a new MY 2025 vehicle would see the added vehicle 

cost offset within 4 years by fuel savings would no longer be accurate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9469-A1, p. 10]

Given these uncertainties, it is not at all clear that the EPA/NHTSA proposal would, as claimed, 

“preserve consumer choice – that is, the proposed standards should not affect consumers’ 

opportunity to purchase the size of vehicles with the performance, utility and safety features that 

meets their needs.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 10]

22 When viewed in relation to projections made in similar studies conducted by the National 

Research Council (http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12924) and by the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (http://web.mit.edu/sloan-autolab/research/beforeh2/otr2035/On%20the%20Road%20in%202035_MIT_July%202008.pdf) , 

one observes a substantial range in the estimates of future incremental automotive technology 

costs, effectiveness and market penetrations, even in the near - to medium-term timeframe. In 

this context, the longer term projections made by EPA and NHTSA for the subject NPRM are 

particularly uncertain, reflecting, as they do, specific assumptions regarding future fuel prices, 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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product lifecycles, impacts of other anticipated regulatory initiatives, etc., etc. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 10]

Organization: BMW of North America, LLC

The projected cost increase of US $734 in MY 2021 and US $1946 in MY 2025 relative to 2016 

in the joint draft TSD is only valid for the average new US vehicle. The actual cost increase for 

the average BMW Group vehicle is much higher than projected in the joint draft TSD just 

because of the higher E-mobility share needed for future compliance (as mentioned above) and 

the need for much more expensive conventional improvement technologies (high-cost 

lightweight materials, etc.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 5]

Regarding the calculations of the projected cost increase per automaker in the joint draft TSD, 

the projected cost increase for the BMW Group fleet at the level of a large volume manufacturer 

or slightly lower is not at all accurate if considering the above mentioned high E-mobility share 

needed for the BMW Group. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9579-A1, enclosure p. 6]

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 61.]

The past 16 years, automobiles have increased an average of $500 a year. So this is a small price 

to pay for extra fuel economy and extra savings.

Organization: Cuenca, M.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and the EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of 

a new vehicle by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according 

to the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, pp. 1-2] (Also in Section 18.8)

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

3. EPA 11/16/11 Article '..... 2016 through 2025 model year. .. increase by $ 1,946 per vehicle' 

Not so 'per vehicle', Le., while each individual by class vehicle average might increase by this 

amount to incorporate the defined (e.g., turbochargers) technologies, there is also a class 'mix' 

impact that does not appear to be factored in by EPA to obtain their $ 1946; e.g., if I take a 2016 

Camry and spend $ 1,946 to increase its mpg, fine; but if I build one less Camry and build one 

more Prius (both with same defined technologies upgrade) I also increase the cost another 4-6 

$sK to convert to a Hybrid; and by not considering fleet 'mix' change impact the Hybrid cost 

does not show! And building a plug-in (e.g., Volt with 'fast' charging stations) instead of an ICE 

and the 4-6 $sK additional for a HEV grows to about 20 $s K per switch to a PHEV (e.g., Volt). 

Even 15% (EPA proposal percentage ref 23.8-21-23) HEVs in 2025 at 4 K$s added would alone 

be 600 $s - subtracting the $ 600 from the reported $ 1946 cost increase leaves $1346 for all 
EPA Response to Comments

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other upgrades and ref. 2 shows up to $ 1426 for high level turbo boost, $ 338 for V-6 Direct 

injection plus a number of other upgrades in the $100-200 range. We need to hear from EPA on 

whether the 'mix' factor is included in their reported $ 1946 value but from my brief look at their 

document it didn't appear to me it was in; the fact that EPA has one value ($ 1946) would 

support mix impact not factored in, i.e., different mixes would have different numbers! I also 

note in Ref. 2 EPA proposal fleet 2025 technology penetration 'low balls' cost by assuming low 

(ref. 2 table 3.8-19) penetration of PHEVs (0%) & BEVs (2.8%) while to comply manufacturers 

could opt for more Volts & LEAFs class vehicles so they could sell more 'guzzlers' these would 

raise the 'mix' cost and with the more weight of the 'guzzlers', mpgge would be less than EPA 

claim. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Second, EPA projects the cost of new technology will add, on average, about $2,000 to the price 

of a MY 2025 vehicle. NACAA recognizes that consumers will recoup this cost through fuel 

savings. However, we believe that the average vehicle cost could be brought down if cleaner 

vehicles were introduced earlier. If vehicles equipped with the technologies needed to meet MY 

2025 emissions and fuel economy requirements are introduced earlier, then by 2025 the 

projected additional cost should be lower than $2,000. In addition, early introduction of cleaner 

vehicles will provide added assurance that the projected fleet performance is achieved by 2025. 

Measures that lead to greater penetration of cleaner vehicles earlier in the program could bring 

down vehicle costs in later years of the program. Further, zero-emission vehicles and alternativefuel vehicles would help to further reduce criteria pollutant emissions as well as GHGs. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8084-A1, pp. 3-4]

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public 

hearing on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 36.]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

The proposal is drafted in a manner that makes it difficult to tease out the per vehicle costs 

associated with compliance. There are several reasons for this:

1. As with all estimates made in the proposal and in supporting documents, NHTSA and EPA 

struggle to forecast costs based on assumptions involving vehicles that will hit the market 5 to 13 

years out into the future. Given the potential for extreme variability for any number of factors, 

MY 2017-2025 predictions of average per vehicle cost/price are inherently suspect.[EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 3]

2. Each agency uses different models to calculate different and, in some cases, a variety of 

average per vehicle costs that do not mesh well together. This is just one example of why the socalled 'single national program' is a misnomer. The final rule should harmonize and clearly 

delineate a single set of average per vehicle costs, for both light-duty cars and trucks, using only 

one marginal 'cost-to-consumer' number. NHTSA and EPA should strive to ensure that these cost 

figures accurately depict for prospective purchasers what the final rule will cost, on average. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 3]
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3. The proposal and related fact sheets and press releases obfuscate cost projections. Instead of 

appropriately delineating costs, separately delineating benefits, and comparing the two, NHTSA 

and EPA go out of their way to emphasize gross and net benefits with little or no reference to 

costs. While by no means excusable, perhaps the unprecedented per vehicle and total costs have 

influenced EPA and NHTSA to do so. Regardless, the final rule should clearly show the average 

per vehicle costs prospective consumers should expect to have to pay up front. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9575-A1, pp. 3-4]

For purposes of understanding how the proposal will impact prospective new vehicle purchasers, 

these comments use the average per vehicle estimates NHTSA has set out in the proposal, 

adjusted to 2010 dollars. Moreover, NADA takes the position that the MY 2011, 2012-2016, and 

2017-2025 standards constitute a single post-EISA program. Thus, for purpose of its analyses, 

NADA characterizes the government’s total average per vehicle cost estimate to be $2936 (in 

2010 dollars), reflecting $91 dollars for MY 2011 adjusted to $95, $903 for MY 2016 adjusted to 

$945, and $1876 for 2025 adjusted to $1896. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 72-74.]

By EPA's own estimates, current prices would go up over today $3,200. I heard different 

numbers thrown around, but a third of that are the mandates that are just now going into effect 

through 2016 and then another $2000, or a little over 2,000 on the mandates from 2017 to 2025, 

which will total in today's dollars $3,200 over today's prices. This would raise payments between 

$60 and $70 a month in a typical automobile loan.

A study that the NADA will release next month will raise significant concerns regarding how the 

proposal calculates retail price impacts. By using a more realistic analytical approach, our initial 

analysis shows the proposal underestimates the cost at retail and suggests a compliance-related 

price increase in my showroom could be at least 60 percent higher than that which would be up 

to $5,000 increase.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 53-55.]

Totaling the administration's final and proposed fuel economy mandates results in an average 

vehicle cost increase of at least $3,200, a substantial amount that every new car buyer will have 

to pay up front. As Don Chalmers explained last week, NADA believes that the actual total 

increase will be even higher. Thus, customers who come into my showroom in 2025 will face 

vehicles that, as a result of these rulings, are dramatically more expensive than they are today.

Moreover, the U.S. Energy Information Administration finds that this proposal will regulate out 

of existence the most affordable cars on the market today. Adjusting for inflation, the Energy 

Economic Information Administration claims that in 2025, there will no longer be new vehicles 

on the market costing $15,000 or less. These are the vehicles I sell to smart frugal buyers, college 

students and working families. How can a rule that eliminates the most affordable new cars on 

the market be pro-consumer? You're right; it's not.
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Ross, D.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 241-242.]

Critics see the new standards as a formula for sticker shock. With price increases of $2,000 to 

$3,100, making automobiles unaffordable for low income consumers.

Well, history demonstrates that initial estimates of the cost of complying with new 

environmental standards have proven grossly exaggerated as human ingenuity, when facing the 

proper incentives, finds novel cost-effective solutions.

But suppose those purchase price estimates are accurate, at current, gasoline prices, the savings 

and lower fuel costs over the lifetime of the vehicle would be approximately $6,000.

Organization: Steyn, R.

* Clearly, the proposed two-fold increase in CAFE standards is a “drastic” action that will likely 

increase the cost of a new car by $5,000—$6,000. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

Response:

The API questions EPA’s estimates of consumer savings resulting from lower fuel 

expenditures. They correctly point out that the savings as calculated in our analysis depend on 

the discount rate used. EPA has shown savings using both a 3% and a 7% discount rate. These 

discount rates are generally accepted rates at which social costs should be discounted. Clearly, 

using a higher discount rate as suggested by API would result in lower present value fuel 

savings. The goal behind our payback analysis was to shed light on the real situation rather than 

attempting to determine how consumers might value future savings versus current and/or future 

costs. While inflation in recent years has been extremely low, inflation in the 3-7% range is not 

atypical. Inflation in the 15% range, in the United States, is not typical. Therefore, we do not 

agree that discounting future fuel savings at 15% as the commenter recommends would be more 

appropriate than what we have done. In the end, the point of our payback analysis is not to shed 

light on when consumers would perceive the future savings to outweigh their costs, but rather to 

shed light on when those savings actually would outweigh their costs. Lastly, we disagree that 

our standards may have any negative impact on the ability of consumers to purchase the size of 

vehicles with the performance, utility and safety features that meets their needs. The agencies’ 

cost estimates include the costs of preserving all of the utilities of the present vehicle fleet. See. 

e.g. EPA RIA pp. 1-39 to 40. We believe that the compliance path we have shown maintains 

utility of the existing fleet (with two limited exceptions as discussed in Chapter 1.3 of our RIA) 

and maintains the safety characteristics of today’s fleet as discussed in section II.G of the 

preamble and in Chapters 3.4 and 4.4 of our RIA. Regarding octane requirements, we address 

octane-related issues in section 11.2 of this Response to Comments document.

Regarding comments from BMW, we do not disagree that BMW’s costs are likely to be 

higher than the average. In fact, our analysis shows a 2025MY cost of $1910 for BMW, or $74 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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higher than the average. Our analysis also shows a 9% full EV penetration rate for BMW, versus 

the average penetration rate of 3%. While BMW might argue that those results suggest a BMWfleet utility considerably lower than their current utility (since full EVs, in our analysis, have a 75 

to 150 mile range versus the typical gasoline vehicle range of roughly 400 miles), we suggest 

that buyers of full electric BMWs are likely to purchase the full EV despite the shorter range for 

reasons other than utility (i.e., status, prestige, environmental stewardship, etc.). Therefore, we 

do not believe that those BMW buyers will perceive any loss in expected utility. 

Regarding the Consumer Federation of America, we have not studied the average cost 

increase of new vehicles over the past 15 years, so we will not comment on the claim that cars 

have increased $500 per year for 15 years. However, we do not ascribe unthinkingly to the 

comment that the cost of the final standards is a “small price to pay for extra fuel economy and 

extra savings.” In fact, an average $1800 cost increase is not a small price to pay. Many 

commenters have expressed considerable concerns with the costs and we do not want to suggest 

that it is insignificant. Instead, we want to focus on the net impact which shows that there will 

be considerable social benefits that result from the final standards, these benefits vastly outweigh 

the rule’s costs, and the fuel savings of the rule pay back the increased vehicle costs in a 

comparatively short time. We will all pay more for future vehicles, but we will certainly enjoy 

the savings that we realize as a result.

Regarding the comment from Mr. Jackson, please refer to our earlier response to Mr. 

Jackson in section 18.2.

Regarding comments from NACAA, please refer to our earlier response to NACAA in 

section 18.2.

Regarding the comments from NADA, we agree that there is uncertainty in our cost 

analysis given the long timeframe between now and 2025. For that reason, we have conducted 

several sensitivities surrounding costs and have found that the standards are very cost beneficial 

in each of our sensitivity cases as well as in our primary analysis. We present this sensitivity 

analysis in Chapter 3.11 of the RIA. NADA also suggests that EPA and NHTSA should use one 

marginal cost-to-consumer number and that, by not doing so, calling the rules a single national 

program is a misnomer. We disagree with this assertion. In fact, each agency has a different set 

of requirements to meet due to the different statutes that provide authority to each agency. 

NHTSA has a model that helps them estimate costs and benefits within the constraints of its 

statute. EPA has a model that helps it do the same. In fact, the estimated costs by each agency, 

using its respective models and analytic techniques, are corroborative. EPA believes that these 

corroborative analyses makes the overall conclusions more robust (and not in some way weaker, 

as the commenter would have it). We note further that the costs estimated by each agency will 

inherently be different for several reasons but, most notably, because NHTSA’s standard does 

not reflect the full array of AC-related improvements that EPA’s does, and EPCA/EISA allows 

manufacturers to pay fines rather than comply with the standards. Compliance is mandatory 

under the Clean Air Act. However, even though manufacturers will not be able to pay fines to 

comply with EPA standards (so that the ability to pay fines under the CAFE program becomes of 

no practical consequence), NHTSA still analyzes its program as though those fines will be paid. 
EPA Response to Comments

18-106

As for NADA’s claims that we have obfuscated cost projections, focusing only on 

benefits, we simply do not understand. Far from hiding or disguising costs, there are many 

prominent tables throughout the preamble and each agency’s RIAs that clearly present the costs 

of the programs. Nor are those costs aggregated in a way making it harder to evaluate 

individualized impacts. EPA has estimated technology penetration and associated costs for each 

manufacturer, for example. See e.g. preamble tables III-25, 28, and 29.

Regarding the $2936 cost claimed by NADA for the three recent fuel consumption and 

GHG reducing rules, again we disagree. In addition, even if (against our view) we accept that it 

is appropriate to aggregate the different rules’ costs here, NADA has made a number of factual 

errors in doing so. We have estimated the 2025MY reference case costs (i.e, the cost to meet the 

2016 standards in the 2025MY) at $719 (see RIA Table 3.6-1). We have also estimated 

2025MY control case costs (i.e., the cost to meet the 2025 standards in the 2025MY) at $1836 

(see RIA Table 3.6-3). The total cost of the two rules would then be $2555, or $381 lower than 

that suggested by NADA. In fact, the $719 value actually includes costs to meet NHTSA’s 

MY2011 standards in MY2025. To clarify, in the MYs 2012-2016 final rule, we estimated the 

cost to meet the MY2011 standard in MY2016 at $89 (2007$) (see EPA-420-R-10-009, Table 4-

6 at page 4-18) which would probably be on the order of $50-$70 (2010$) for meeting the 

MY2011 standard in MY2025. Therefore, the $2555 value stated here is slightly high since it 

already includes the costs of meeting the MY2011 standard in MY2025. In adding their costs, 

NADA has inappropriately added the costs presented in each of the rulemakings they mention. 

However, the cost they used for the MYs 2012-2016 rule, or $903 adjusted to $945, is the cost of 

complying with the 2016 standards in the 2016MY, not the 2025MY. To properly add the costs, 

one needs to use the cost of the 2016 standards in the 2025MY as we have done here. Curiously, 

NADA does not suggest adding together the cumulative benefits of these standards, which again 

vastly outweigh the standards’ cumulative costs.

Regarding NADA’s comments on calculating retail price impacts, please refer to our 

earlier response to NADA in section 12.3.2. Regarding NADA’s claims about lower priced 

vehicles and the ability of frugal buyers, students and working families to afford new cars, we 

have a response to that argument in section 18.7.1, below.

Regarding comments from David Ross, EPA would like to thank Mr. Ross for his 

comments and interest in our rule. As explained in section III.H.11 of the preamble, EPA agrees 

that vehicles in the low-priced (economy-class) segment will bear technology costs needed to 

meet the new standards, but it is not known how manufacturers will decide to pass on these costs 

across their vehicle fleets, including in the low-priced vehicle segment. If manufacturers decide 

to pass on the full cost of compliance in this segment, then it is possible that consumers who 

might barely afford new vehicles may be priced out of the new-vehicle market or may not have 

access to loans. However, the rule’s impacts on availability of loans are unclear, because some 

lenders do factor fuel economy into their loans, and it is possible that this trend may expand. In 

addition, as the Union of Concerned Scientists comments, auto makers have some flexibility in 

how both technologies and price changes are applied to these vehicles; auto makers have ways to 

keep some vehicles in the low-priced vehicle segment if they so choose. Though the rule is 

expected to increase the prices of these vehicles, the degrees of price increase and the impacts of 

the price increases, especially when combined with the fuel savings that will accompany these 

changes, are much less clear. See also responses in section 18.7.1 below.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Regarding comments from Ruth Steyn and Mark Cuenca, we disagree that the rule will 

result in new car costs increasing $5000-$6000 as made clear in the response to the NADA 

comments above, and in our response in section 12.3, above.

18.2.2. Annual Aggregate Costs

No Comments received on this topic.

18.2.3. Consumer Payback Analysis

Organizations Included in this Section

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumer Reports

Consumers Union

Defour Group LLC

Delphi Corporation

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Volkswagen Group of America

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 40.]

Household gasoline expenditures set a record in 2011 reaching an average of over $2,850 per 

year which means that gasoline expenditures were 40 percent higher than expenditures on home 

energy, electricity, natural gas and heating oil. Ten years ago gasoline expenditures were 13 

percent lower than home energy and that is why consumers are so troubled by gasoline prices.

But rising gasoline prices have also changed the structure of the cost of driving. Ten years ago 

the cost of owning a vehicle as reported in the consumer expenditure survey was the largest 

single component of the cost of driving by far, about three times as high as the cost of gasoline. 

In 2011 the cost of gasoline will equal or exceed the cost of ownership in the consumer 

expenditure survey. This is an entirely new automobile market.

IV. CONSUMER POCKETBOOK IMPACT: THE PROPOSED FUEL ECONOMY 

STANDARDS WILL PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT CONSUMER COST SAVINGS

The impact of the standards on consumers can be measured in a variety of ways – pocketbook 

cash flow, vehicle net benefit, and simple payback periods. By every consumer impact measure, 
EPA Response to Comments

18-108

the standards deliver substantial benefits to consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 

5]

As Exhibit S-4 shows, for the typical consumer who purchases a new auto that complies with the 

2025 standard with a five year auto loan, the higher fuel economy lowers the cost of driving from 

the first month because the reduction in gasoline expenditures is greater than the increase in the 

monthly payment to cover the cost of fuel saving technology. [See Exhibit S-4 on p. 6 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

At the end of the auto loan, the consumer will have saved an average of about $800.

By the tenth year, the vehicle will have generated an average of over $3,000 in savings, which 

means resale values are likely to be much higher, by $1,000 to $2,000.

Simple payback periods for new cars are less than three years; for new trucks, it will be less than 

two. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 39.]

Higher fuel economy standards lower the cost of driving from the first month. They are cash 

flow positive because the reduction in gasoline expenditures is greater than the increase in the 

monthly payment to cover the cost of fuel saving technology. At the end of the auto loan the 

consumer will have saved an average of $800. By the tenth year the vehicle will have generated 

an average of over $3,000 in savings. Therefore, the resale value of the vehicle is likely to be 

much higher.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 89.]

Almost two-thirds of respondents support a 60-mile per gallon standard as long as the payback 

period is within three to five years. And that is the case with these standards.

There are several flaws in quantitative analysis that cause the agencies to seriously underestimate 

the value of higher fuel economy standards. We have pointed out these flaws in past 

analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, pp. 12-13]

• The rebound effect should not be included in the consumer pocketbook analysis.

Organization: Consumer Reports

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 167.]

Most are willing to pay extra for the extra fuel economy if the payback is -- will mean a lower 

overall cost of that vehicle over five years.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Organization: Consumers Union

Once fully implemented, the standards will save most car buyers money in the very first month 

of ownership. According to CNW Marketing Research, approximately two-thirds of new car 

buyers finance their new vehicle purchases with an average five-year loan.4 Because average 

monthly fuel savings is greater than the additional monthly payment from a higher purchase

price, consumers start saving right away. For car buyers who pay cash for a new vehicle, the 

payback period is less than four years, even with EIA’s modest fuel price projections. Although 

consumers will be paying slightly more money for more efficient vehicles, they will more than 

recover this investment through savings at the pump. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.2]

4 - According to CNW Marketing Research, 67.38% of new-car purchases were financed in 

2010. The average length of time for a new car loan in November 2011 was 57.22 months. See 

Appendix B CNW Marketing Research on Financing Data and Appendix C CNW Marketing 

Research on Payment Type for data tables.

Organization: Delphi Corporation

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 110.]

Third, this rulemaking will enable the consumer to experience the inherent value of technologies 

that have a reasonable payback period.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

C. PAYBACK PERIOD

EDF supports the use of a 5-year or greater payback period as an input to estimate the value of 

fuel economy improvements to potential vehicle buyers. A payback period of anything less than 

5 years would not accurately reflect the current and forecasted buying trends of consumers. In 

2010, consumers owned vehicles for an average of 63.9 months, or just over 5 years.19 The 

average length of ownership of new vehicles has been on a steady rise since the economic and 

auto industry downturn in 2008 and is expected to continue to rise. 20 Therefore, the period of 

time that potential vehicle buyers can be assumed to value fuel economy improvements in 

making their purchasing decisions may also be increasing. For this reason, we strongly urge the 

Agency to use a payback period that accurately reflects the forecasted purchasing behavior of 

consumers. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 8]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

IV. THERE IS A NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONSUMER INFORMATION ON LOWER 

OPERATING COSTS AND FUEL ECONOMY 'PAY-BACK'
EPA Response to Comments

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Prospective purchasers able and willing to consider buying new vehicles covered by the proposal 

could benefit from additional information designed to enable them to better understand the value 

of investing in fuel economy performance. Current EPA/NHTSA fuel economy labels provide 

prospective purchasers with the tools necessary to make good comparisons between new 

vehicles, and between new and used vehicles. NADA is engaged with EPA on how best to use 

this tool to educate interested prospective purchasers on comparative fuel economy performance. 

In addition, dealers work with the Department of Energy to make available to consumers the 

annual DOE/EPA Fuel Economy Guide. In additon, a wealth of useful information is found on 

fueleconomy.gov and on other non-governmental websites devoted to the topic. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9575-A1, pp. 9-10]

Section 105 of EISA specifically directed DOT, in consultation with DOE and EPA, to 

implement a vehicle fuel efficiency and alternative fuel consumer education program. Pursuant 

to that mandate, NADA urges NHTSA to exercise its authority to collect annually from vehicle 

manufacturers, and to make available to the public, the actual cost of compliance with the socalled 'National Program' for each make, model, and powertrain. This key piece of information, 

not currently available, will enable prospective new vehicle shoppers to conduct a pay-back 

analysis for each new vehicle they are considering by measuring actual compliance costs against 

potential fuel savings. The availability of actual compliance cost data also will assist NHTSA 

and EPA with determining how best to make further modifications to the 'National Program' so 

as to improve its effectiveness. In short, enabling the transparency of actual compliance cost data 

will help to maximize the efficiency of consumer fuel economy decision making and to 

maximize net regulatory benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 10]

The final rule should assume that, at most, buyers value any fuel savings associated with the 

purchase of a new motor vehicle over a five-year period. As discussed above, except in rare 

instances of high and increasing fuel prices, consumers who view fuel economy as an important 

purchase criteria will be hard pressed to make the case for buying a more fuel efficient new 

vehicle if the up-front capital costs associated with doing so cannot be recouped in short order. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 10]

The benefits analysis used in the proposal uses an oversimplified pay-back method that 

overstates potential fuel economy savings. Instead, for purposes of calculating any 'pay-back,' 

real-world finance, opportunity, and additional maintenance costs should be accounted for. In 

other words, the final rule should evaluate its potential impact on a vehicle’s total cost of 

ownership. An example of such a calculator is found at http://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/Costto-Own. NADA would welcome the opportunity to discuss further with EPA and NHTSA how 

prospective purchasers of new light-duty customers would be better served by a total cost of 

ownership approach to understanding a given vehicle’s future costs of operation. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 10]

Dealers will continue their efforts to educate consumers on how best to make fuel efficient 

purchases, and on how actual mileage may vary from that set out on Monroney labels. Through 

efforts such as NADA’s Green Campaign (http://www.nada.org/green), dealers also will 

continue to educate customers on how to maximize in-use fuel economy performance. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 10]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 94-95.]

Proponents of the model year 2017 through 2025 proposal assert that higher upfront costs will 

pay back for purchases of the -- in the form of fuel cost savings.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

A consistent Consumer Federation Poll released in September of 2010 also showed consumers 

are willing to pay more for greater fuel efficiency. A majority (62 percent) were willing to pay 

more for efficiency if they recovered the added cost with a five-year payback period.6 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 2]

A more recent study by Deloitte reveals that Generation Y consumers show a strong preference 

for electric vehicles and hybrids and will pay more for these advanced technology vehicles. A 

strong majority (56 percent) prefer an electric vehicle over any other type of vehicle, while 

almost half (49 percent) said they would pay $300 for each mile per gallon of fuel economy 

improvement that a hybrid gets over a traditional model.7

The above mentioned polls and the Deloitte study support the agencies’ use of a 5 year pay back 

for the cost of technologies using a 3 and 7% discount rates. Significantly, the agencies find that 

consumers who use a standard 5-year loan to purchase a new vehicle will begin saving they 

when the drive off the lot, with monthly savings at the pump exceeding the increased loan 

payments associated with fuel saving technologies by $12 per month (or more).

6 http://consumerfed.org/pdfs/Consumer_Savings_Survey_Fact_Sheet092710.pdf

Organization: Volkswagen Group of America

An implication of the lack of cost parity is the impact on consumer payback. The agencies state 

that an average consumer will face just less than 4 years to achieve pay-back on the higher 

upfront investment. Clearly the payback time for a consumer purchasing a passenger car will be 

longer than a consumer purchasing a light truck, especially a larger pick-up. While Volkswagen 

has not directly calculated what the expected implication could be on a consumer evaluating two 

vehicles with different payback periods, it would seem anecdotally that in most cases the 

consumers would tend towards the shorter period. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9569-A1, p. 10]

Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

EPA states that the new rules will save consumers money under three scenarios: (1) the vehicle is 

driven by one owner for its entire life span; (2) the customer pays cash and keeps the vehicle for 

at least four years; or (3) the customer finances the car with a five-year loan and keeps the car for 

at least those five years. EPA appears to imply that anyone in a typical two-, three- or four-year 
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lease will pay more for their vehicle as a result of the new fuel economy standards. EPA also 

appears to imply that anyone purchasing a vehicle with a loan that lasts less than five years will 

pay more for their vehicle as a result of the new fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9521-A1, p. 2]

A large swath of the car buying public—i.e. anyone owning or leasing a new car for less than 

four years—will therefore be exposed to higher vehicle costs as a result of the proposed rule. 

Given that the driving force for this rule is fuel economy, if consumers are unwilling or unable to 

pay the added cost for this benefit, EPA and NHTSA must be prepared to make changes to the 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 2]

Response:

Regarding comments from CFA, we agree that consumers will save money due to the 

final standards through decreased fuel expenditures despite the higher new vehicle costs. 

Furthermore, we do not include rebound miles driven in our consumer payback analysis,

although we do include rebound miles driven in our benefit-cost analysis. We present our 

consumer cost of ownership (payback) analysis in section III.H.5 of the preamble and in Chapter 

5.5 of EPA’s final RIA. 

Regarding the comments from Consumer Reports and Consumers Union, our analysis 

shows that the payback period will indeed be within 5 years for the average new vehicle 

purchase (3.3 years using 3% discounting and a cash purchase). For credit purchases, the 

savings being in the first month as the fuel savings outweigh the increased loan payments 

assuming a 5 year loan at average national loan rates. We present our consumer cost of 

ownership (payback) analysis in section III.H.5 of the preamble and in Chapter 5.5 of EPA’s 

final RIA.

We addressed the concerns expressed by the Defour Group in our section 18.1 responses 

to the Defour Group. 

We agree with the Delphi Corporation that the rule will enable the consumer to 

experience in inherent value of technologies that have a reasonable payback period.

EPA would like to thank the Environmental Defense Fund for their comment and interest 

in our rule.

Regarding comments from NADA, that NHTSA should collect annually and make 

available to the public the actual cost of compliance with the National Program for each make, 

model, and powertrain, EPA doubts this could be done. It is one thing to require industry, any 

industry, to make available its costs of doing business—this is required by the Security and 

Exchange Commission for all public companies—but quite another to require that information at 

the product level. What NADA suggests is akin to requiring Apple to make available to the 

public the cost of producing a single iPad or iPhone. While no doubt interesting to the 

consumer, such information is among the most closely guarded information within most public 

companies. Further, it would require each auto maker to make available to the public their 

pricing strategy for each of their vehicles. Regarding the time period over which consumers 
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value fuel savings, we note that our OMEGA model runs calculate fuel savings, and discount 

those fuel savings, over a five year period, consistent with NADA’s recommendation. Our 

payback analysis shows a 3.3 year payback, on average, for 2025MY cash purchases. Regarding 

what NADA considers our oversimplified payback analysis, we note that our final payback 

analysis includes increased maintenance costs as the commenter suggested (as well as sales 

taxes, financing costs for credit purchases and increased insurance costs on the more valuable 

vehicles, again consistent with the commenter’s suggested approach). 

Regarding comments from the Sierra Club, et al, we agree that a five year payback 

period, as mentioned above in our response to NADA, is the appropriate period to use within 

OMEGA when determining the packages of technologies that are most appropriate for achieving 

compliance. 

Regarding the comment from Volkswagen that the payback period for cars will be longer 

than for trucks, VW appears concerned that comparison shoppers will gravitate toward the 

shorter payback periods (trucks) and away from the longer periods (cars). Being largely a car 

maker for the US market, this would be a concern for VW. However, the comment implies that 

potential car buyers are comparison shopping against trucks and vice versa. It seems just as 

probable, if not more so, that potential car buyers are shopping for a car while potential truck 

buyers are shopping for a truck. As such, their comparisons would be within class and not across 

class, at least for the most part. Nonetheless, while VW admits that they have not done the 

calculations to know whether paybacks are longer or shorter for cars versus trucks, we have. As 

noted, our payback period for a 2025MY cash purchase of the average vehicle is 3.3 years. For a 

2025MY car, the payback would be 3.5 years, and for a truck would be 3.2 years. We doubt that 

such a comparison would drive a potential car buyer to a truck since, despite a shorter payback 

period, the overall fuel costs would presumably be higher for the truck than the car. But, we 

leave it to VW to understand their potential customers.

Regarding comments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, there appears to be a 

misunderstanding with respect to our payback, or consumer cost of ownership, analysis. In fact, 

we fully acknowledge that MYs 2017-2025 vehicles are expected to have increased costs as a 

result of this rule, and that those costs will be borne in part or in total by the purchasers of the 

vehicles. The terms of the purchase do not matter in that respect – cars and light trucks are 

expected to cost more regardless of purchase option. Our analysis was meant to highlight that, 

despite the higher costs, consumers would actually save money through reduced fuel 

expenditures. The point at which the savings outweigh the costs is when we consider the savings 

to have “paid back” the increased costs. Since the cost side of the calculation varies depending 

on the purchase option – cash vs credit via 5 year loan vs credit via 4 year loan vs lease vs etc. –

we chose to focus on what seemed to be the most prevalent purchase options. Those options 

being cash purchase and credit purchase via 5 year loan. Focusing on those two purchase 

options should not be interpreted as meaning that purchasers choosing other purchase options 

will not experience the same fuel savings and/or nearly the same net savings. 

18.3. Analysis of Reduction in Fuel Consumption and Resulting Fuel 

Savings

Organizations Included in this Section
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Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

American Petroleum Institute (API)

American Road & Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA)

BlueGreen Alliance

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumers Union

E100 Ethanol Group

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Jackson, F.W.

Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union of Concerned Scientists-1)

Mass Comment Campaign (39) (Unknown Organization)

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Smith, G.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

The importance of gasoline pricing (including tax policy) cannot be underestimated, particularly 

for the post-MY 2020 timeframe, when policy makers are counting on a rapid transition to nonpetroleum transportation fuels. The report from Resources for the Future noted that “it is an open 

question whether carbon prices at the levels currently under discussion will be sufficient, by 

themselves, to bring ‘new’ fuel efficiency technology into the marketplace.” Yet the Energy 

Information Administration projects that fuel prices will be relatively stable over the next 15 

years, with gasoline prices rising by less than 4 cents per year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.19]

What Impact are the New Requirements Having on Government Revenues and How Are 

Governments Responding? [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.20]

As gas tax revenues decrease due to rising adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and improved fuel 

economy, both the federal government and the states will need to determine how to address 

budget shortfalls resulting from falling gas tax revenues. In February 2009, the National Surface 

Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission released a study recommending a shift from 

the present reliance on federal fuel taxes to fund federal surface transportation programs to a 

federal funding system based on more direct forms of ‘user pay’ charges, in the form of a charge 

for each mile driven (commonly referred to as a vehicle miles traveled or VMT fee system). 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.20]

Recently, certain states have been considering a vehicle miles traveled (VMT) tax or an annual 

registration fee on EVs as an alternative method to raise revenue for the state’s transportation 

system. Legislation has been introduced in several states attempting to recover these lost tax 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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revenues. State legislators in Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Texas, Indiana and Mississippi have 

attempted to address declining revenues with bills that would place fees (i.e., a road usage 

charge) on EVs, and in some cases, hybrid motor vehicles. States are expected to intensify such 

efforts to maintain their transportation infrastructure in light of these declining gas tax revenues. 

If states begin to enact such legislation, the agencies will need to evaluate how this could impact 

consumers’ willingness to invest in advanced technology vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.20]

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Include an estimate of the impact of the rule on vehicle sales. Use the approach taken for the 

2012-2016 rule unless a better approach is available.

Include economic benefits of the decline in fuel price as a result of the rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9528-A2, p.2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing 

on January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 109-110.]

We concur with the agencies' assessment that in order to thrive in the global automotive market, 

domestic manufacturers will need to invest consistently in technologies to improve fuel 

efficiency. We believe that the standards now proposed can help achieve that outcome. And in 

our testimony, we make three points:

First, that there is a huge potential for cost-effective investments in energy efficiency 

improvements across all sectors of the economy.

So what is that potential for cost-effective efficiency improvements? In a report we released two 

weeks ago titled, The Long-Term Energy Efficiency Potential; What the Evidence Suggests, we 

show that by investing in greater levels of energy productivity, we can slash the nation's energy 

use by 40 to 60 percent by the year 2050 as we create nearly 2 million more jobs and save the 

equivalent of $2600 per household annually across all sectors of the economy.

Second, fuel economy standards are a critical first step in capturing the full economic potential.

And third, promoting these standards will be good for jobs, even as the fuel economy 

improvements will save household consumers and businesses money that almost immediately 

will be respent in the broader economy.

How do fuel standards then become a critical step in that economic performance? Anytime we 

can promote cost-effective alternatives to the current pattern of technologies and services, the 

productivity of the economy is improved. And the evidence here suggests that improved fuel 

economy provides a significantly improved alternative to the purchase of gasoline. Drawing on 

data from EPA/NHTSA, we estimate that in constant 2009 dollars that efficiency might cost on 
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the order of 50 cents to $1.20 per gallon of gasoline equivalent compared to the 4, 5 or 6 dollars 

per gallon of gasoline we may have to pay in the year 2025.

Organization: American Road & Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA)

ARTBA appreciates both EPA and NHTSA’s goals of decreasing emissions generated by the 

burning of fossil fuels in automobile usage. There is already a well-documented history of 

reductions in fossil fuel emissions occurring through advances in automotive technology. 

According to the EPA, fuel economy is up 61 percent since 1975. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9403-A1, p. 1]

In 2009, the average personal vehicle got 21.1 miles per gallon, while its 1975 counterpart only 

managed 13.1 miles per gallon.1 As America’s fleet of vehicles become more and more fuel 

efficient, they will become less and less carbon emitting. For example, tighter fuel economy 

standards proposed in May 2009 by the Obama Administration will reduce vehicle greenhouse 

gas emissions by an estimated 900 million metric tons between 2012 and 2016. This is the 

equivalent of removing 177 million tons of today’s automobiles from the nation’s roadways.2 

Additionally, CO2 emissions are down 38 percent since 1975: A 2009 model car or light-duty 

truck (SUV, minivan, pickup) generates 422 grams of CO2 per mile compared a 1975 model car, 

which emitted 679 grams per mile.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1, p. 2]

Further, data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) shows substantial progress towards emissions reductions in a growing 

economy. According to both agencies, despite substantial gains in population, employment, 

gross domestic product (GDP), number of drivers, number of vehicles, and vehicle miles traveled 

(VMT) since 1970, the nation’s air quality has improved. Specifically, over the same time 

period, the transportation sector has reduced volatile organic compounds (VOCs) by 73 percent, 

nitrous oxides (NOx) by 41 percent, particulate matter (PM) by 50 percent, and carbon monoxide 

(CO) by 62 percent. NOx and VOCs are precursors to ozone and associated with GHGs and 

climate change. As levels of VOCs and NOx continue to decrease, so will ozone and 

GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1, p. 2]

ARTBA supports efforts to reduce emissions and improve fuel economy. It is inappropriate, 

however, to promulgate such proposals without acknowledging and attempting to mitigate the 

adverse effect they would have on other areas of federal responsibility. ARTBA is particularly 

concerned with the potential effect of EPA and NHTSA’s proposed rule on revenues generated 

for the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). The HTF was created in 1956 as an investment construct by 

which users of the national highway infrastructure are charged a direct user fee to maintain and 

improve the system on which they rely. Currently, 18.4 cents are directed to the federal HTF 

from each gallon of gasoline purchased and federal highway investment accounts for 45 percent 

of the national capital investment in highway and bridge construction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9403-A1, p. 2]

As fuel efficiency has increased and innovations in automotive technologies have progressed, 

revenues into the HTF have been negatively impacted. These positive developments in reducing 

the motor fuel usage, however, do not have to be inconsistent with the goal of meeting the 
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nation’s transportation infrastructure needs. Unfortunately, policymakers in the legislative and 

executive branches have not increased the per gallon rate of the federal motor fuels user fee since 

1993 and as a result the revenues flowing into the HTF and their corresponding purchasing 

power has fallen further behind the documented needs of the nation’s surface transportation 

system. This problem affects the amount of funding that all 50 states receive from the federal 

government to build and maintain their transportation infrastructure. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9403-A1, p. 2]

To illustrate the magnitude of the effect of the proposed CAFE Standards on HTF revenues, 

ARTBA has attached a memo which was distributed to Congress on July 28, 2011. According to 

ARTBA’s research, the proposed CAFE standards will result in a loss of $75,651.7 million 

dollars through the year 2025. At a time when the nation is struggling to find funding for long 

term solutions to pay for pressing transportation infrastructure needs, this kind of cut in HTF 

revenues could put the nation’s entire transportation program in jeopardy. [The memo can be 

found on p. 4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9403-A1, pp. 2-3]

ARTBA encourages the development and use of more energy efficient vehicles and supports the 

EPA and NHTSA proposal to raise the CAFE standards. This proposal, however, should be 

expanded to ensure it does not dilute existing or future federal HTF revenues. This adjustment 

could include an increase in the federal motor fuels tax or some other method of generating 

federal revenues that will accurately capture the benefit received by users of the system and 

protect against the effects of inflation, increases in construction costs, and advances in fuel 

efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1, p. 3]

1 Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 

1975 Through 2009, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, November 2009.

2 Obama Administration National Fuel Efficiency Policy: Good For Consumers, Good For The 

Economy And Good For The Country, May 2009.

3 Light-Duty Automotive Technology, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, and Fuel Economy Trends: 

1975 Through 2009, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, November 2009.

Organization: BlueGreen Alliance

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 38-39.]

Some of the fuel savings created by the standard will go to cover the modest incremental cost of 

higher performing vehicles. This diversion of spending from fuel to vehicle improvements also 

has the effect of boosting job creation. This is because vehicle manufacturing is more labor 

intensive per dollar spent.
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Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 88-89.]

Seventy-five percent are concerned about gasoline prices and dependence on Mideast oil. They 

think it is important to reduce oil consumption. They support higher fuel economy standards as a 

good way to do so.

There are several flaws in quantitative analysis that cause the agencies to seriously underestimate 

the value of higher fuel economy standards. We have pointed out these flaws in past 

analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, pp. 12-13]

• The base case price of gasoline is too low. The Energy Information Administration has 

recently raised its estimate of gasoline prices by an average 30 cents per gallon. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 13]

Significant macroeconomic benefits of greater fuel economy have been ignored.

• A “price effect” must be included that recognizes that the reduction in U. S. gasoline 

consumption lowers the world price of crude substantially. This is a true (consumption) 

externality and the agencies have estimated its value at $0.30 per gallon, but failed to 

include it in the analysis.

Organization: Consumers Union

As noted in the analysis of the proposed rule, the benefits of the rule far outweigh the costs of 

compliance. The vast majority of the benefits are direct consumer benefits in the form of fuel 

savings, while the costs are primarily investments in deploying (and to some extent. developing) 

more efficient and alternative fuel technologies. In making its cost-benefit calculations, NHTSA 

relies on the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) future forecasts of gasoline prices. 

Consumers Union notes that since 2004, actual oil prices were significantly higher than EIA’s 

five and ten year forecasts had predicted.3 While it is not feasible for EIA to predict oil price 

shocks—such as the one we experienced in 2008—with any certainty, the risks and costs of price 

spikes are nonetheless very real and likely to occur again in the near future. Consumers Union 

expects that the consumer savings will be even greater than the sizable benefits predicted by the 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.2]

3 - See Appendix A EIA Understimation of Oil Prices

Organization: E100 Ethanol Group

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 202.]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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If fully implemented, this plan would save 12 billion barrels of crude oil over the 14-year period 

between 2012 and 2025. This represents only 26 percent of our crude oil imports for that time 

period. Thus, it is not possible to achieve crude oil independence by increasing CAFE alone.

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

As a further the drawback of CAFÉ policy, the proposed higher fuel economy standards would 

cost $76 billion in lost fuel tax revenue. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

D. GASOLINE PRICE

Projected future fuel price is the key input in estimating the fuel savings to consumers and 

society, which accounts for the majority of the proposed program’s benefits. Therefore, the 

agencies’ choice of fuel price is very important as it impacts the perceived feasibility of the 

proposed program. For this proposed rule, the agencies use the most recent fuel price projections 

from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2011 

reference case forecast. While we agree that the AEO is a very credible source for fuel price 

forecast, it is important to remember that forecasts are based on models, which are not crystal 

balls (i.e. there is always some amount of uncertainty). For example, the EIA’s AEO2005 

forecast for fuel prices for 2005 to 2010 underestimated actual prices over those six years on 

average by 31%.21 This illustrates the importance of the use of a sensitivity analysis with 

significantly higher gasoline prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 8-9]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 173.]

With respect to economic security, combined again with the Phase 1 standards, the proposed rule 

will provide families with more than $8,000 in fuel savings over the lifetime of the new vehicle 

for a total of 1.7 trillion in national fuel savings over the life of the program.

Organization: Jackson, F.W.

“...no amount of domestic production could offset....”Increasing domestic production is a 

lengthy process, where I’ve seen it documented it says, and I accept, from start to 1st barrel is at 

least a decade. So, to have more domestic production available Bush would have to have 

initiated it over a decade ago. So, not Obama’s fault until several more years have passed; if 

Republican’s want to blame someone it’s Bush and Congress of a decade ago. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 1]

“....little he could do in the short run to ease the pain at the pump” Let’s change criteria to from 

what he can do to what could be done that he could speak out for and lead: Pain at the pump is 

more than posted price, e.g., drop ethanol mandate to lower per gallon price and require less 

gallons because a less ethanol content a gallon would have more btus. And there are others, some 

we have used before like reduced highway limits, politically very unpopular but would help (I do 
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not recommend this but it is something that we could do). But the most important action would 

be to implement a program that moves us as fast as practical to implement cost-effective 

maximum efficient technologies – see more specifics starting on bottom of page 7 “Additional 

relevant comments” and continuing on page 8; and this he could/should do today, i.e., embark on 

lowest future cost and maximum efficiency , no smoke and mirrors fleet!! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11785-A1, p. 2]

“....US producing more oil than any time during the last eight years...” This comes from preObama actions, i.e., not traceable to Obama actions.

“Neither he nor anyone else can do much about oil prices,...” He now, I accept, but statement to 

broad to be completely correct. Oil producers, e.g., Saudis, could increase production and lower 

price, i.e., they qualify as anyone else; and while Obama has very little he can do today with 

immediate price impact, he does have some, e.g., “lead” cut back on ethanol. And that is for 

today, there is much he can do to lower future price and price volatility, see below table on page 

5. “......new fuel economy standards....average nearly 55 mpg by....” Some “smoke and 

mirrors” here. Question of how one calculates, i.e., if I take a NHTSA 97 mpgge Leaf with a 12 

mpg guzzler I average (unweighted) 54.5 mpg but reality is if I take the gallons of gas equivalent 

vehicles weighted average I get 21.4 mpggev. Big difference and the one that matters is how 

many gallons, or ggeqv, in total to move the fleet, i.e., Govt always flashes the 54.5 ( and 

reporters report), it sounds good but not reality as far as oil (the issue at hand) demand is 

concerned! Obama has tried but he is following his advisers (or handlers) and while making 

some future progress potentially not the max that Nation needs and could/should have. 

Potentially is a key word: true CAFÉ unweighted Target raised to 54.5 mpg: problem is with 

way calculated and big loophole for manufacturers (see above build one LEAF and you can build 

a “Guzzler”), and unweighted mpg calc, i.e., reality is: weighted calc more fuel required than 

advertised! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 2]

So, Obama has potentially moved the “goal posts” but with big “loopholes” which I expect will 

be used, otherwise why were they put in! Obama not an Engineer so he may really believe the 

54.5, but what about NHTSA&EPA they have technical talent, why do they not tell him, or do 

they?? Anyway, here is what I calc for EPA 2025 Proposal with 36 BGals ethanol per year 

mandate fleet (see EPA references) vs. 2016 35.5 mpg: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, 

p. 2]

2016 35.5 mpg E15 fuel: 23.17 total ( to Nation) cents per mile 3.15 ggeq/100 miles, or 31.75 

mpggeq EPA Proposal 2025 fleet 36 BGal ethanol per year: 23.56 total cents per mile and 2.24 

gge/100 miles, or 44.6 mggeq, i.e., not 54.5; and at higher cost. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

11785-A1, pp. 2-3]

EPRI with it’s 50% plugins: 29.71 total cents per mile and 2.36 ggeq/100 miles, or 42.4 mpggeq 

at much higher cost!

Max technologies with minimum ethanol no hybrids or plugins: 17.83 total cents per mile and 

1.18 gg/100 miles, or 84.75 mpggev [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 3]
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Pretty clear plug-in and ethanol both very expensive and require more energy on-board vehicle 

(and in total) than Max (and or Min) technologies, e.g., EPRI with high plug-in % over the 

174,000 mile life of a vehicle (vs. Max) of $ 20,671 added total cost per vehicle (and with an 

assumed Taxes & inflation 50 % pass throughs $ 31,007) – quite a load. Even EPA’s Proposal 

case $ 9,970 added cost vs. Max (and with 50 % for Taxes & inflation pass throughs $14,955! 

And as I believe manufacturers will continue to find larger more powerful vehicles more 

profitable I believe EPA’s proposal case cost understated and actual mpgge overstated. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 3]

Bottom line: while Obama has moved the goal posts on gge from 35.5 mpg, it is at added cost ( 

and potentially much more added cost with methods of calc and/or plugins) with “smoke and 

mirrors” numbers offered while better alternatives (Mid, Max) available that reduce fuel demand 

far more while actually saving consumers & taxpayers a bundle! Obama needs to realize the 

problem is high cost and increasing cost more to Nation, as he is currently promoting,

undefendable and is a lost cause if/when the truth gets out; better now than September & 

October. The President is on exceedingly treacherous thin ice and needs to move now while he 

has time to demonstrate a new much better for Nation direction; and 36 BGals ethanol was 

instituted in 2007 before he came to office; the longer Obama continues to promote 36 BGals, 

the more difficult disowning it will be. And removing the faulty 54.5 analyses & claims now 

with President orchestrating the information release rather than his adversaries next fall will be 

far less treacherous during November!!! And he needs to officially chastise NHTSA and EPA for 

faulty analyses and claims and openly send message he is not happy with Govt performance and 

wants full and “honest” information in the future from all Govt entities. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-11785-A1, p. 3]

Otherwise he depends on the other candidate to look so bad that he still looks the better choice in 

November. “Drill baby drill” not a better alternative at least a decade for impact and probably 

inadequate price impact as world demand for oil increases and turmoil in producing areas 

continue and depletes our reserves at a faster rate, why speed up the date we run out?? And even 

though Obama’s approach is better than “drill baby drill” the voters could be so blinded by 

unhappiness with Obama’s performance in this area as to blindly opt for a change without 

rationally recognizing they will have two choices in November and unhappiness with continuing 

the one they have and are not happy with may get them to take a chance that I am confident they 

would later regret. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 3]

More information:

To:

EPA&NHTSA

1/27/12 Rev. D 2/18/12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 3]

Subject: Updated (mainly at paragraphs at end Re: messages sent to oil exporters) comments on 

Docket ID Nos. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799 and NHTSA-2010-0131 “2017 and Later Model 
EPA Response to Comments

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Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel 

Economy” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 4]

Per my above table let’s examine Govt proposal with 60 BGals corn ethanol vs. 2016 35.5 mpg 

standard using gasoline; and then compare against other options: Max technologies gasoline 

fueled. [See table on pp. 3-4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1] [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 11]

2016 35.5 CAFÉ gasoline fueled 20.98 cents/mile system 2.97 gg/100 miles. Vs. EPA proposal’s 

E36 (36 BGals corn ethanol of 23.56 cents/mile and 1.41 gal gas/100 miles; or, at 174,000 

lifetime miles deltas of 2.69 more cents/mile to reduce gasoline 1.56 gg/100 miles. Doing the 

math (includes backing out the 20 % fuel discount to get $s we are used to seeing, i.e., about 

$100/brl): lifetime gasoline reduced but at a cost of $ 1.72 more per gal reduced; adding in the 

$3.00 for gasoline yields $ 4.72 per gallon to drive vehicle. $ 4.72 equates to $ 198 per brl 

gasoline or about $ 168 per brl crude offset. Wrong message to oil exporters, our alternative to 

your $ 100/brl crude is to pay $ 168! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 11]

Now examine Max technologies ICEs at 17.83 cents per mile and 1.18 gg/100 miles; or save 

3.15 cents per mile while saving 1.79 gg/100 miles. Much better message to oil exporters: our 

alternative to your oil is to offset our demand for your oil several mbd while saving a couple of 

hundred $Billion per year. And with significantly reduced demand, the crude cost should be 

lower which would apply to all oil demand and would further increase our savings: e.g., if crude 

price dropped from $100/brl to $ 50/brl and our demand dropped 6mbd (from 20mbd to 14) and 

world followed and world demand dropped 20 mbd, I calc US crude savings at just under (0.47) 

half a $ Trillion per year staying in Nation’s economy; and with 0.065 $ Trillion less cost for 

crude to US consumers &Taxpayers, I make it 0.535 $sT/year consumer/taxpayer savings . In 

addition to savings at home more efficient military vehicles would require less fuel to support 

missions meaning less frequent fuel convoys saving both money and lives! [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 11]

Factor in a large number of plugins (EPRI case) and I calc $ 347 per brl crude (vs. $ 168 for EPA 

proposal, save $s for Max Tech). Need to stop showing oil exporters their oil as a bargain and 

show them oil should be cost plus a “reasonable” profit!!!! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-

A1, p. 11]

Once we are moving on Mid & Max the numbers might convince some exporters that a stable for 

5 or 10 year price for a guaranteed volume during the transition might be to both our & their 

benefit ; worth a try, especially close exporters. And we could make this more attractive by 

working with them to reduce their domestic demand by increased efficiency allowing more to be 

available for export instead of being used inefficiently (wasting a valuable saleable resource) at 

home! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, pp. 11-12]

I’d also consider increasing our online production capacity but capping it (and even some 

existing) and buying low cost foreign oil when available; saves our oil until last and in the 

interim it is available to help stabilize US “pump” price if world crude market goes wild. Keep 

US price lowest by when National energy resources put out for bid include a condition as 
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follows: crude and Nat Gas will be sold for use within US and in addition to current bid $s (up 

front cost and royalties ) at not to exceed prices must be included as part of bid and lower price 

needs to be properly accounted for Re: consumer cost; and Govt to have the right to reject all 

bids if they believe it would be better (lowest consumer’s prices) for Nation and all citizens for 

Corps of Engineers to do the production. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 12]

And as increased efficiency will reduce cost and jobs in fuel sector we need to apply these saved 

resources to other areas to keep the economy & jobs at high level. So a question becomes where 

to apply freed up resources in the most productive way for Nation to maximize goods & services 

and foreign sales to pay down debt. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 12]

And there is more: many other areas (all need to be evaluated) should be likewise completely & 

objectively evaluated; I’d start with the tax code. It shouldn’t matter how you get your money 

(earn it at work, earn it from investments or an inheritance) get so much less a base amount 

based on number in family (max number children 2 – over 2 pay for your own hobby) then a 

fixed %! Free enterprise Ideology, with Free enterprise focused on their bottom lines vs. taxes a 

specious argument. Republican’s declared Free enterprise the winners a decade ago promising a 

great economy – well here we are a decade later. What really matters is what we get for our 

resources and each action needs to stand on it’s own merits; is free enterprise the way, 

sometimes but not always; is Govt tax and spend better, sometimes but not always; or is it better 

for Nation & citizens for individuals to use the resources as they see fit, also true sometimes but 

not always! My answer: on a case by case basis it is not how we pay but what do we get for what 

we pay regardless of how we pay – this needs to be the objective discussion: for each way, case 

by case, what do we pay and what do we & Nation get, and how, case by case, do we maximize 

short & long term, with strong emphasis on long term, benefit with availability and price 

“stability” to Nation & citizens, i.e., get the resources to the sector that will make the best 

investment – one that creates more value than the resources expended so economic activity is 

sustainable and growing! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, p. 12]

And all changes need to be fair and equitable Re. benefits & burdens to all, i.e., not politicians 

protecting their special interests – every time politicians provide an advantage to a special 

interest Consumers & Taxpayers have to pay for it; there is no free lunch for Consumers & 

Taxpayers!!! Also true when Govt causes cost to go up for same output, e.g., cents per mile total, 

fixed income citizens have to reduce support in other economic sectors thereby reducing 

economic support & jobs there; e.g., while plugins add jobs in manufacturing plugins the less 

money to support other economic sectors results in job losses in these other sectors. And in 

addition to money and jobs, goods and services produced ( miles traveled, houses built, food 

produced, etc.) is what we get to support our lifestyle – we need to watch goods & services 

criteria carefully as this sets our standard of living, which is what really counts and we need to 

focus on! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11785-A1, pp. 12-13]

4. Additionally, Govt is mandating more expensive liquid fuel when all Govt actions counted, 

Le., 36 billion barrels per year of ethanol most all of which I expect will be corn based, and do 

not forget to include all impacts, including taxes & inflation. I calc cost to the Nation for 36 

BBris ethanol to be another $ 3220 added fuel cost per vehicle for EPA's proposal mix 

unaccounted for. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8041-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20) (Union of Concerned Scientists-1)

A strong clean car program is good for all Americans. The proposed standards would save the 

average consumer $6,000 over the lifetime of a new 2025 vehicle, even after accounting for the 

additional costs of clean car technology. This estimate assumes gas prices will remain below the 

2011 average until at least 2025; if gas prices instead continue to rise, savings from increased 

fuel efficiency will rise as well. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1558-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (39) (Unknown Organization)

Aside from health benefits, I am especially impressed by how these standards can reduce the 

nation's oil consumption by 12 billion barrels in the next 13 years. This will ultimately lead to a 

decrease in our reliance on foreign oil, which is a great step forward for the United States 

security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1245-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 41.]

In addition, earlier introduction of cleaner vehicles will provide added assurance that the 

projected fuel performance is achieved by 2025.

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

[Supplemental comments to the testimony]

VI. Any “Savings” Related To Particular Purchases Will Vary Depending On an Individual’s or 

Household’s Transportation Profile 

In addition to falling prey to a “if they build it, they will come” mentality, several folks testifying 

at the hearings, along with EPA and NHTSA, mistakenly used macro data to back into assertions 

of “consumer savings.” It is both inappropriate and overly simplistic to suggest that a new 

vehicle fleet phased-in over a certain number of years which may result in gross reductions in 

fuel use compared to a base scenario, necessarily will result in “the average consumer saving X 

dollars, “ assuming an average vehicle miles travelled (VMTs)and a certain fuel price. [NHTSA2010-0131-0267-A1, p.5]

Such an analysis raises at least two significant problems. First, to make assumptions so many 

years in advance based on historically volatile variables is an inherently weak proposition. 

Second, if and to what extent a given household may achieve a “pay-back” depends on its 

individual baseline, not on an assumed national average. NHTSA and EPA should conduct a 

more nuanced analysis of potential “fuel savings,” including a careful review of the economic 

status of prospective purchasers, of whether new vehicle purchases will serve as replacements or 

as new additions, of the spectrum of VMTs for a set of foreseeable fuel price scenarios, etc, 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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rather make crude, backed-into estimates of “consumer savings” using macro assumptions. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, p.5]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA and NHSTA should update fuel price inputs to reflect current forecasts which are higher 

than those used by the agencies and demonstrate that the agencies took a conservative approach 

in setting stringency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 3]

NHTSA’s baseline sensitivities based on voluntary overcompliance should be excluded from the 

final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

III. Design of the Standards

A. Stringency

1. Stringency Should be Higher Based on Most Recent Fuel Price Forecasts

The 54.5 mpg standards are strong but stronger standards are feasible and cost-effective, 

especially under higher fuel prices predicted by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). 

To develop an economically feasible and cost-effective standard, the agencies used a projection 

of fuel prices from the EIA Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2011. Since the proposal, the EIA 

has published AEO 2012 Early Release Reference Case, which projects prices to be $0.24 -

$0.34 per gallon higher than the AEO 2011 Reference Case during 2017 to 2035. The higher 

gasoline prices would increase the fuel-saving technologies that could be applied cost effectively 

and justify a higher standard. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 9]

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Transportation Program Funding

The overall reduction in fuel consumption resulting from this rule will affect fuel tax revenues 

and by extension, transportation funding that relies on per-gallon fuel taxes. While such revenue 

losses are a legitimate concern, this issue should not be a determinant of the final GHG standards 

adopted under this rule. For many reasons, federal and state agencies responsible for 

transportation infrastructure are faced with having to consider non-traditional mechanisms to 

ensure sustained funding into the future. Funding for transportation infrastructure should be 

addressed in a broader context outside of this regulatory proceeding. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9476-A1, p. 3]

As expected, a 6 percent annual rate of improvement in fuel economy would have a modestly 

greater impact on fuel tax revenues compared to the 5 percent rate proposed in the regulation. In 

either case, a reduction in tax revenue equates to a tax savings of the same amount for 

consumers. Over a span of 9 years (2017 – 2025) under the proposed 5 percent scenario, total tax 

revenue in the NESCAUM region from gasoline sales is estimated to be between $28 and $39 

billion, depending on the discount rate applied to the net present dollar value. Under the 6 
EPA Response to Comments

18-126

percent scenario in the same timeframe, this amount would be reduced by between $130 and 

$190 million, or around 0.5 percent of total revenues. By year 2025, the percentage reduction in 

revenues would be around 1.3 percent and from that point would gradually increase due to 

continued attrition of older vehicles in the fleet and top out in approximately 20 years at around a 

3.5 percent reduction in revenues. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9476-A1, p. 3]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

Consider more realistic gas price projections: When considering gas prices, the agencies use 

AEO’s 2011 Reference Case. AEO’s forecast assumes that gas prices will average $3.54 per 

gallon in 2025 (in 2009 dollars). According to EIA’s own “This Week in Petroleum,” gas prices 

the week of February 6, 2012 averaged $3.48 per gallon nationwide.33 It is shocking to think 

that gas prices will barely rise from 2012-2025. Although the agencies do consider higher gas 

prices in sensitivity analyses, when considering setting standards and the benefits derived from 

those standards, the agencies should place greater emphasis on the high gas price scenarios. We 

have attached comments submitted to the docket previously by Sierra Club regarding gas price 

assumptions. [See Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A3 for previous 

comments.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, 10]

33 http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/twip/twip_gasoline.html

Organization: Smith, G.

'Save families an estimated $8,200 in fuel savings over the lifetime of a new vehicle by 2025, for 

a total of $1.7 trillion in national fuel savings over the life of the program.' They fail to point out 

the 1) extra cost of fuel efficiency in vehicles 2) discomfort of the considerably smaller vehicles 

we will have to drive 3) loss of sales by domestic auto companies because they are perceived as 

not being able to build good small cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8438-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(g) Gasoline Prices

As noted above, the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) has 

become a common source used in many energy-related projections. However, that fact does not 

justify applying the AEO “reference case” projection, when there are very clear indications that 

the price projection is poor at best. According to AEO2011 – the projection used in this proposed 

rule – gasoline prices will range from $3.25-$3.55 per gasoline (in 2009 dollars) between 2017 

and 2025. It is hard to accept this as reasonable, given that the actual 2011 average price was 

$3.53, a mere two cents per gallon shy of EIA’s 2025 gasoline price projection. Further, 

AEO2011 projects regular gasoline prices will rise to a peak of $3.71 per gallon in 2035, a pump 

price not infrequently seen across the nation today. Clearly, the use of AEO2011 reference case 

gasoline price projection is inappropriate and should not be used in the agencies’ final rule, as it 
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unfairly diminishes the monetary value of fuel saved under the program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9567-A2, p. 13]

Within the past few weeks, EIA issued the AEO2012 Early Release, which includes a notable 

increase in gasoline prices over AEO2011. For the 2017-2035 window, AEO2012 Early Release 

reflects per-gallon prices $0.24 to $0.34 higher than AEO2011 values (converted to 2010 

dollars). EPA and NHTSA should, at a minimum, adopt the higher AEO2012 price projections, 

and investigate the historical accuracy of AEO’s High Price scenarios. If it is deemed that AEO’s 

High Price scenarios have, over the past 15 years, been better predictors of actual pump prices, 

the agencies should utilize High Price Scenario prices for assessing monetary benefits of fuel 

savings at the pump. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 13]

Finally, as UCS has noted in prior comment submissions, AEO’s projection does not account for 

inevitable price spikes that will occur during the lifetime of the vehicles assessed under this rule. 

Such spikes are closely tied to our nation’s inflation and GDP, and thus can have serious 

economic consequences. With this in mind, the agencies should attempt to quantify the benefits 

of reduced susceptibility to such spikes, and incorporate them into the program’s benefits writ 

large. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 13]

Response:

The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers suggests that, if states begin to enact 

legislation to maintain their transportation infrastructure to offset declining gas tax revenues, 

EPA will then need to evaluate how this could impact consumers’ willingness to invest in 

advanced technology vehicles. However, our analysis shows that compliance can be achieved 

with less than three percent EVs and PHEVs and just five percent strong HEVs, and those 

percentages are relative to today’s fleet, not the 2025 reference case fleet. See preamble section 

III.D.6 generally and Table III-52. So our analysis is not heavily reliant on the advanced 

technology vehicles of which API speaks. Of course, EPA expects to continue conducting 

analyses of our new standards—most notably for the mid-term review—and will analyze the 

necessary and pertinent issues as they arise.

Regarding the recommendations from ACEEE, we address the impact of the rule on 

vehicle sales in Chapter 8.1 of our final RIA and in section 18.7, below. We address the fuel 

price issue in section 18.5, below. Regarding ACEEE’s comments on the “Baseline and other 

scenarios,” we note that these comments appear directed to NHTSA as EPA has not done any 

analysis assuming that fuel economy will improve after the 2016MY absent any new regulatory 

requirements. 

Regarding comments from ARTBA suggesting that the proposal should include a method 

of generating federal revenues to offset lost revenue on fuel taxes, we note that EPA and NHTSA 

do not have the authority to enact revenue generating programs. Such programs must be enacted 

by Congress. We show the estimated lost revenue in Chapter 5.4 of the final RIA. Our estimates 

suggest lost tax revenue of roughly $17 billion for the calendar years 2017 through 2025 due to 

the MYs 2017-2025 standards, and $51 billion over the lifetimes of MYs 2017-2025 vehicles 

(which includes calendar years 2017 to beyond 2050 for the longest running 2025MY vehicles), 

both of which are considerably less than the $76 billion through 2025 suggested by ARTBA.
EPA Response to Comments

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Regarding the comments from BlueGreen Alliance, we discuss vehicle sales in preamble 

section III.H.11, in Chapter 8.1 of our final RIA and in section 18.7, below.

Regarding comments from CFA, we have used the most recent projected fuel prices 

available to us at the time modeling inputs had to be locked down. Those fuel prices are taken 

from the AEO 2012 Early Release. The AEO Early Release projections reflect detailed analysis 

and are used government-wide. EPA regards this estimate as a reasonable projection (although, 

like any such projection, actual prices over this period may deviate from those estimated). See 

also further response on this issue below. Regarding the “price effect,” we respond to these 

comments in section 18.5, below.

Regarding comments from Consumers Union regarding fuel price projections, we agree 

that predicting future oil and fuel prices is very difficult. EPA leaves that task to the experts at 

EIA. We believe that the projections provided by EIA represent that best future fuel prices for 

use in our analysis.

Regarding the comment from the E100 Ethanol Group, we agree that we cannot achieve 

crude oil independence by increasing CAFE, or GHG standards, alone. However, we can reduce 

our dependence on foreign oil, consistent with that goal.

Environmental Consultants of Michigan point out that the standards would cost $76 

billion in lost fuel tax revenue. EPA agrees that fuel tax revenue will fall if current tax rates 

remain in place (fewer gallons consumed results in less tax revenue). However, as stated above, 

our estimates suggest lost tax revenue of roughly $17 billion for the calendar years 2017 through 

2025 due to the MYs 2017-2025 standards, and $51 billion over the lifetimes of MYs 2017-2025 

vehicles (which includes calendar years 2017 to beyond 2050 for the longest running 2025MY 

vehicles), both of which are considerably less than the $76 billion suggested by the commenter.

The Environmental Defense Fund commented similarly to the Consumers Union, above. 

Please refer to our response to Consumers Union. As for sensitivities around fuel prices, we 

have not done this because doing so would be far more complex than it appears on the surface. 

To conduct a fuel price sensitivity correctly, we would need to generate unique fleet projections 

since our fleet projections depend on a macro-economic outlook that would change were we to 

use different projections of future fuel prices. We have two projected fleets already in our final 

rule (2008 and 2010 based reference fleets) and could not have added more given the time 

constraints we had. An alternative approach would have been to use our existing fleet 

projections and simply use higher/lower fuel prices. However, this would simply show how 

much our estimated benefits would change with different fuel prices given our existing fleet 

projections. This would simply show the program to be more or less cost beneficial and, given 

the magnitude of our fuel savings, higher or lower fuel prices would not change the conclusion 

that the rule is very cost beneficial. 

EPA would like to thank Francis Jackson, the commenters that were part of the mass 

comment campaigns and NACAA for their comments and interest in our rule.

NADA commented that our payback analysis was not appropriate for every household. 

EPA does not disagree. However, we cannot calculate the payback period for every household 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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given, as noted by NADA, that the payback period depends on each unique household’s 

transportation profile, their current vehicle’s fuel consumption, the new vehicle’s fuel 

consumption, etc. We have attempted to make clear that our payback analysis assumes the 

average driver that purchases the average vehicle and drives the average number of miles 

purchasing fuel at the prices projected by AEO in the 2012 Early Release. We have stated that 

drivers driving more miles will experience a shorter payback while those driving fewer miles 

will experience a slower payback. We have not meant to imply that everyone that purchases a 

new 2025MY car will experience the payback we have estimated. For the final rule, we have 

also included a payback estimate for purchasers of used vehicles to shed light on how their 

payback might differ from purchasers of new vehicles. We also analyze the issue of low priced 

vehicles in preamble section III.H.11.b and in section 18.7.1, below.

NRDC suggests that we update our fuel price inputs. We have done so since the proposal 

and are now using the AEO 2012 Early Release projections. As for standard stringency, we 

address such comments in section 2 of this Response to Comments document as well as in 

section III.D of the preamble to the final rule.

NESCAUM commented that funding for transportation infrastructure in light of falling 

gasoline tax revenues should be addressed in a broader context outside of this regulatory 

proceeding. We agree and are not addressing this issue in this rule.

Sierra Club, et al, commented that we should use higher fuel price projections in our 

analysis. We disagree that we should place greater emphasis on the high gas price scenarios 

rather than the reference case projections generated by EIA. In the AEO 2012 Early Release, 

EIA states that the Reference case focuses on the factors that shape U.S. energy markets in the 

long term, under the assumption that current laws and regulations remain generally unchanged 

throughout the projection period. They further state that the AEO2012 Reference case provides 

the basis for examination and discussion of energy market trends and serves as a starting point 

for analysis of potential changes in U.S. energy policies, rules, or regulations or potential 

technology breakthroughs. As such, we believe that the reference case prices represent the best 

prices for use in our primary analysis.

Gerald Smith commented in opposition to the rule. Mr. Smith incorrectly claims that 

supporters of the rule fail to acknowledge the cost of fuel efficiency in vehicles. We have made 

quite clear in our proposal and our final rule that we expect the cost of new vehicles to increase. 

For the final rule, we have estimated that cost at $1836 for a 2025MY vehicle meeting the 

2025MY standards when compared to one meeting the 2016MY standards. Mr. Smith also 

suggests that future vehicles will be considerably smaller and less comfortable than today’s 

vehicles. Again, we disagree. Our analysis assumes no change in vehicle size will result from 

the new standards, and we have still shown a very cost effective path to compliance. Mr. Smith 

also claims that domestic auto makers will lose sales due to the perception that they cannot build 

good small cars. Again, we disagree. The new Ford Fiesta and Focus and the Chevy Cruze and 

Sonic prove that the domestic auto makers can and do produce small cars that consumers want. 

The Union of Concerned Scientists commented that we should update our fuel prices to 

use the AEO 2012 Early Release. We have done so. UCS also commented that we should 

consider using the AEO high price projections rather than or in addition to the reference case 
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projections. Please refer to our responses to the Environmental Defense Fund and Sierra Club, et 

al, above. Lastly, UCS suggests that we attempt to quantify the benefits of reduced susceptibility 

to fuel price spikes that can result from inflation and GDP and can have serious economic 

consequences. We have not done so for the final rule.

18.4. Benefits of Reduced GHGs and Non-GHG Emissions

18.4.1. Estimated GHG Emissions Reductions Benefits (Including Social 

Cost of Carbon)

Organizations Included in this Section

Center for Biological Diversity

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

18.4.1.1 Comments about Social Cost of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

B. The Agencies’ Cost-Benefit Analysis is Faulty

Our January 31, 2012 comments to the DEIS contain an extensive discussion of the ways in 

which the Agencies’ cost-benefit analysis must be corrected. We incorporate that discussion 

here, but add the following observations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 6]

The Agencies acknowledge that they fail to quantify the benefits and costs of a number of the 

environmental impacts of the rulemaking. These benefits or costs, however, do not have a value 

of zero, and a number of them can be estimated and those estimates quantified. For example, 

monetized GHG benefits “exclude the value of reductions in non-CO2 GHG emissions (HFC, 

CH4 and N2O) expected under this proposal.” The Agencies do not dispute that the value of 

these benefits is not zero and can be ascertained – indeed, they set themselves a deadline to do 

so. The decision to delay the analysis is arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, the Agencies exclude 

the costs of maintaining a U.S. military presence to secure imported oil supplies from unstable 

regions “because their attribution to particular missions or activities is difficult.” “Difficulty” 

does not justify conducting a cost-benefit analysis that improperly puts a thumb on one side of 

the scale.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 7]

33 CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1198. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 7]
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34 ICCT Comments at 7, 8. The ICCT Comments contain other examples of Agency 

overestimation of costs and underestimation of technology improvements. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

IV. AGENCIES SHOULD INCLUDE MORE COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATION OF 

BENEFITS

F. EPA SHOULD INCLUDE A QUANTIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF NONCO2 GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS

EPA’s Regulatory Impact Analysis does not currently include estimates for the monetized 

impacts of this rule for reductions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. 28 The Interagency Working 

Group on SCC did not estimate the social costs of non-CO2 GHGs when it developed the current 

SCC values. The agency has requested comment on whether the “global warming potential 

(GWP) approach” should be used as an interim approach to valuing the costs of non-CO2 GHGs 

(as it did in their proposed New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for oil and gas 

exploration). This approach uses the GWP of non-CO2 gases to estimate CO2 equivalents and 

then multiplies these CO2 equivalent emission reductions by the social cost of CO2. Further, the 

agency has requested comment more broadly regarding methodologies for monetizing the 

benefits of reductions of non-CO2 GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 11-12]

EPA should include a range of estimates for the monetized benefits of reduced emissions of nonCO2 GHGs that will result from this rule (methane, nitrous oxides, hydrofluorocarbons). While 

there remain uncertainties associated with the currently available methodologies for estimating 

these benefits, it is clear that there are real benefits; they are most certainly not zero. Therefore, 

the omission of any estimate at all is unsatisfactory, and EDF strongly recommends the agency 

include and consider a range of potential estimates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 12]

There are currently two useful quantification methods available for the benefits of reducing nonCO2 GHGs. First, Marten and Newbold estimate the social costs of methane and nitrous oxide in 

a recent National Center for Environmental Economics working paper,29 and second, the GWP 

method, while imperfect, is better than not estimating the benefits at all, and can be used as a 

proxy. The agency should use these tools to report a range of monetized benefits for the rule. 

Since the agency has a quantitative foundation in the form of two methodologies for estimating 

the social costs of these non-CO2 GHGs, it should provide monetized benefits using both of these 

methodologies (accompanied by an explanation of any limitations and/or uncertainties in each 

methodology, as necessary). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 12]

In Marten and Newbold, the authors directly calculate the social cost of methane and nitrous 

oxide using the methodology used by the Interagency Working Group on the SCC, with some 

updates. This direct method would be the most straightforward, defensible, and consistent with 

earlier valuation efforts of greenhouse gases. As Marten and Newbold’s method is a valid and 

analytically supportable method, EPA should include figures calculated using their 

approach. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 12]
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The GWP method consists of converting the non-CO2 GHG emission reductions to CO2-

equivalent using global warming potentials (GWPs), then multiplying the resulting CO2e figure 

by the SCC. As noted by Marten and Newbold, this approximation of the climate benefits of 

methane and nitrous oxide reductions has the potential for significant error: in 2010 emission 

reductions for methane valued using the 100 year GWP could be underestimated by as much as 

36% while nitrous oxide could be overvalued by as much as 60%, depending on the discount 

rate. However, they specifically point out that for some policies, such as the light duty vehicle 

rule30 where non-CO2 gases represent only a fraction of the anticipated GHG reductions, the 

error induced by using the GWP method may be small. And most importantly, the authors also 

note, “ . . . if estimates of the social cost are not available, the value of non-CO2 GHG reductions 

estimated using GWPs and the SCCO2 will typically have lower absolute errors than default 

estimates of zero.” In other words, using GWP and the SCC to calculate the value of non-CO2

emissions reductions is more accurate than not calculating the value, particularly in the case of 

policies such as this one where the reductions of non-CO2 gases are a small portion of the overall 

GHG reductions. If EPA is unable to include directly-calculated social costs in support of the 

final rule due to methodological problems and uncertainties, it should (after identifying and 

explaining those problems) include an estimate of climate benefits calculated using this GWP 

method. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 12-13]

Regarding the specific GWP values, EPA should be commended for using the most recent 

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) GWP value for methane (25) from the 

Fourth Assessment Report in this rule proposal. However, even the most recent IPCC GWP from 

the Fourth Assessment Report may somewhat undervalue methane’s strength as a climate 

forcer. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 13]

EPA should, at least, include a sensitivity analysis using the more recent estimate from Shindell 

et al. (2009) of 33.31 EPA should provide a range of benefits yielded from the various methods 

and assumptions (c.f. table 1 in Marten and Newbold), as well as a clear, tabular, demonstration 

of how it has calculated the monetized benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 13]

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

The Agencies Should Work Toward Developing Non-Carbon Dioxide Benefits Estimates

The Working Group had also planned to develop better methods for estimating the benefits of 

reducing non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases within the same two-year timeframe mentioned 

above.70 The SCC does not smoothly translate into damage figures for other greenhouse gases 

like methane and hydrofluorocarbons, because of different radiative forcing, atmospheric 

lifetimes, and environmental impacts.71 As a result, the proposed rule excludes the monetized 

value of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas reductions, even though such reductions make 

important contributions to the program’s climate benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, 

p. 11]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
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Our recommendations regarding the GWP method and SCC are summarized as follows [Note: 

NRDC recommendations regarding SCC are listed below in section 18.4.1.2]:

1) GWP Method. Because models directly estimating climate mitigation benefits for other gases 

are still in their early stages of development, GWPs should be used to calculate climate benefits 

from reducing non-CO2 greenhouse gases (Recommendation #1). In so doing, 100 year GWPs 

should be used, following domestic and international conventions. Further, the most recent GWP 

estimates from the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report should be used (rather than GWP estimates 

from the Second Assessment Report, as was recently used in the proposed oil and gas new 

source performance standards for methane). For methane calculations and carbon monoxide, 

EPA should do a sensitivity analysis using the most recently published GWP estimates (Shindel 

et al.4) (Recommendation #2); in addition, CO2 fertilization benefits need to be adjusted to 

reflect non-CO2 gases actual contribution of CO2 to the atmosphere, which is less than direct 

CO2 emissions (Recommendation #3). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 5]

Response:

EPA reviewed the comments regarding monetization of non-CO2 GHG impacts (CH4, 

N2O, HFCs) and recognizes that the rulemaking will achieve non-zero, economic benefits 

through reductions in these gases. EPA estimated the non-CO2 GHG benefits in a sensitivity 

analysis for the final rule using the GWP approach because directly modeled interagency 

estimates are not available. The GWP approach entails converting the reductions of each nonCO2 gas to CO2-equivalents using the GWP and then valuing the CO2-equivalents with the SCC. 

EPA presented these estimates for illustrative purposes and did not include them in our total 

benefits estimate for this rulemaking because of the following GWP approach limitations. 

While the GWP approach would provide an approximation of the monetized value of the 

non-CO2 GHG reductions anticipated from this rule, it produces estimates that are less accurate 

than those obtained from direct model computations for a variety of reasons, including the 

differences in atmospheric lifetime of non-CO2 gases relative to CO2. This is a potentially 

confounding issue given that the social cost of GHGs is based on a discounted stream of 

damages—i.e., they are not constant over time—and that are non-linear in temperature. For 

example, CH4 has an expected adjusted atmospheric lifetime of about 12 years and associated 

GWP of 25 (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) 100-year GWP estimate). Gases with a 

relatively shorter lifetime, such as methane, have impacts that occur primarily in the near term 

and thus are not discounted as heavily as those caused by longer-lived gases such as CO2, while 

the GWP treats additional forcing the same independent of when it occurs in time. Furthermore, 

the baseline temperature change is lower in the near term and therefore the additional warming 

from relatively short-lived gases will have a lower marginal impact relative to longer-lived gases 

that have an impact further out in the future when baseline warming is higher. 

In addition, impacts other than temperature change also vary across gases in ways that are 

not captured by GWP. As noted in NRDC’s comments, CO2 emissions, unlike CH4, N2O, or 

HFCs, will result in CO2 passive fertilization to plants. EPA recognizes this limitation but 

cannot, as NRDC recommended, simply adjust the GWP to account for the difference. The only 

way to adequately resolve this limitation is to directly model each non-CO2 gas cycle. As 
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discussed further below, EPA believes there are several key modeling issues that must be 

addressed before non-CO2 gases can be modeled, and thus the interagency group has not yet 

directly modeled non-CO2 GHGs. 

A limited number of studies in the published literature explore the implications of using a 

GWP versus a direct estimation approach to quantify the benefits of changes in non-CO2 GHG 

emissions from a given policy. One recent working paper (Marten and Newbold, 2011), found 

that the GWP-weighted benefit estimates for CH4 and N2O are likely to be lower than those that 

would be derived using a directly modeled social cost of these gases for a variety of reasons.81 

The GWP reflects only the integrated radiative forcing of a gas over 100 years. In contrast, the 

directly modeled social cost differs from the GWP because the differences in timing of the 

warming between gases are explicitly modeled, the non-linear effects of temperature change on 

economic damages are included, and rather than treating all impacts over a hundred years 

equally, the modeled social cost applies a discount rate but calculates impacts through the year 

2300.

EPA has determined that key modeling issues must be addressed before directly 

modeling CH4, N2O, HFCs in a manner consistent with the 2009-2010 interagency modeling 

exercise. For example, a challenging issue in estimating the social cost of non-CO2 GHGs is that 

the integrated assessment models vary in how they represent the atmospheric chemistry for these 

gases. DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy) in particular poses a challenge 

because it does not directly model the atmospheric gas cycle for any GHG other than CO2. 

Instead, it jointly represents all non-CO2 GHGs through a single net radiative forcing vector. 

The other integrated assessment models, PAGE (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect) and 

FUND (Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution), directly represent 

the atmospheric chemistry for several non-CO2 GHGs (noting that for PAGE not all gas cycles, 

such as methane, were used in the analysis). 

There are options to incorporate a defensible cycle for methane in the DICE model, such 

as supplementing DICE with changes in radiative forcing estimates from MAGICC, a climate 

model that incorporates important interactions between various gases in the atmosphere.82 This 

modification, however, would differ from the methodology established by the 2009-2010 

Interagency Work Group.

In addition, EPA has reviewed the comments recommending use of alternative GWPs, in 

particular Shindell et al’s recent estimate of 33 for a 100-year GWP of methane. However, EPA 

is continuing to use the 100-year GWP approach recommended by the IPCC, consistent with the 

UNFCCC reporting requirements and the values used in the regulations and analyses for this 

rule. EPA believes it would be inappropriate to use alternative GWP estimates in the analyses, 

 81 Marten, A. and S. Newbold. 2011. “Estimating the Social Cost of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions: Methane 

and Nitrous Oxide.” NCEE Working Paper Series #11-01. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/WPNumber/2011-01?opendocument. Accessed May 24, 2012. 82 For example, see Marten and Newbold (2011) “Estimating the Social Cost of Non-CO2 GHG Emissions: 

Methane and Nitrous Oxide.” NCEE Working Paper Series #11-01. 

http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/WPNumber/2011-01?opendocument. Accessed May 24, 2012.
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even in sensitivity analyses, that have received relatively less scrutiny than those cited in the 

IPCC reports. 

The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented for illustrative purposes in preamble 

section III.H.6 and in Chapter 7 of EPA’s RIA. In sum, the total net present value of annual 

2017 through 2050 GHG benefits for this rulemaking would increase by about $3 billion to $50 

billion, depending on discount rate, or roughly 10 percent if these non-CO2 estimates were 

included. Given the magnitude of this increase in the context of the total costs and benefits 

considered in this rule and other critical decision factors related to technical issues, inclusion of 

these estimates in the primary analysis would not affect any of the decisions regarding the 

appropriateness of the standards EPA is adopting here. 

Regarding presentation of the non-CO2 GHG benefits, EPA agrees that a clear, tabular 

summary would be useful to the reader and has therefore included them in Table III-89 in the 

RIA for illustrative purposes. 

EPA has responded to comments regarding improvements to the social cost of CO2 in the 

next section, 18.4.1.2.

Finally, EPA has responded to several of the comments above in other sections. For a 

response to comments about the treatment of “costs of maintaining a U.S. military presence to 

secure imported oil supplies from unstable regions,” please see section 18.5 in this document. 

Regarding comments that the agencies should incorporate potential benefit revisions in the midterm evaluation process and account for the net upstream emissions from electric vehicles, please 

see section 2.4 (mid-term evaluation) and section 4 (electric vehicles) for EPA’s response. 

18.4.1.2 Comments about Social Cost of CO2 (Support for and recommendations to 

improve estimates)

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

IV. AGENCIES SHOULD INCLUDE MORE COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATION OF 

BENEFITS

A. AGENCIES SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR ALL QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 

BENEFITS

EDF recommends, where feasible, the agencies must estimate the monetized health, 

environmental and economic benefits. We also recommend that where monetization is not 

feasible, the Agency must present a qualitative list of benefits and explain why it is not feasible 

to monetize such benefits. This recommendation is in accordance with a January 2011 

Presidential Executive Order18: “It must take into account benefits and costs, both quantitative 

and qualitative.” “(c) In applying these principles, each agency is directed to use the best 

available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as 

possible. Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and discuss 
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qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, 

fairness, and distributive impacts.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 7-8]

E. SOCIAL COST OF CARBON

It is critical that NHTSA and EPA collaborate with other agencies and carry out their 

responsibilities to accurately account for the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC). Cf. Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 

a NHTSA fuel economy rule arbitrary and capricious where “[t]he value of carbon emissions 

reduction [was] nowhere accounted for in the agency's analysis, whether quantitatively or 

qualitatively”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 9]

The social cost of carbon is a monetary measure of the incremental damage resulting from 

greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The SCC assigns a net present value to the marginal impact of 

one additional ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions released at a specific point in time. 

EDF commented extensively on the consideration of the SCC in the first light-duty greenhouse 

gas rulemaking, the heavy-duty greenhouse gas rulemaking, and the Notice of Intent for Draft 

EIS. Those comments are hereby incorporated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 9]

It is imperative that the Agencies rigorously and transparently account for the SCC in carrying 

out responsibilities under NEPA, EISA, and EPCA. In the proposal, it is noted that the Agencies 

adopted an approach that relies on estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC) developed by the 

Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. While we support the collaboration and 

work of the Group, the SCC used should always be based on models reflecting the latest science, 

as the Agency has itself committed to do. All three modeling teams, whose work led to the report 

by the Interagency Working Group, have since updated their models to reflect the latest research 

and methodological developments. At the very least, the SCC used should be updated using the 

current versions of the models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 9]

We make additional suggestions below as to how current modeling approaches can and should 

be improved in order to meet the Agency’s commitment to update the social cost of carbon as the 

underlying models and methodologies are improved22: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 

9]

• Declining discount rate over time: In assigning a dollar value to reductions in CO2

emissions, the Agencies use the social cost of carbon and the discount rates included in 

the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon. This includes the use of 5 

percent, 3 percent and 2.5 percent discount rates. Recent advances in economic theory 

indicate that it is not appropriate to use such high and constant discount rates in the 

context of the social cost of carbon analysis, with a constant 5 percent discount rate being 

particularly inappropriate. A certainty-equivalent approach, for example, would yield 

much lower constant discount rates than those currently used. At the very least, we 

encourage the Agency to use a range of discount rates of 3 percent and below in its SCC 

analysis. We strongly recommend, however, that the Agency move as soon as possible to 

the use of a declining social discount rate. Appropriately accounting for uncertainty 

around the discount rate over long time horizons generates a discount rate that declines 
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over time. As demonstrated at an academic workshop convened by Resources for the 

Future on Intergenerational Discounting, September 22-23, 2011, there is broad support 

for the use of declining discount rates within the relevant community of experts.23 These 

declining rates reflect the scientific, economic, and ethical complexities and uncertainties 

inherent in intergenerational discounting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 9-10]

• Evaluating catastrophic risks: The SCC numbers currently used seriously undervalue 

low-probability/high-consequence climate impacts. Functional form assumptions in the 

models used in the Interagency Report misrepresent these risks and lead to inaccuratelylow SCC numbers. In particular, they cut off the tails of distribution functions too 

quickly, ignoring potentially catastrophic climate risks.24 The SCC numbers used should 

reflect the uncertainty range around different functional forms and standard assumptions 

around risk aversion in order to more accurately value potentially catastrophic climate 

impacts.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 10]

• Evaluating Non-Monetized Benefits: GHG reduction policies can significantly 

undervalue benefits simply because some of these benefits are not easily quantifiable. 

The White House Office of Management and Budget recognizes that some costs and 

benefits will be difficult to monetize, but directs agencies to consider other means of 

quantification.26 We request that the social cost calculations be updated to include the 

latest results on newly monetized benefits. All additional climate impacts omitted from 

the models should at the very least be identified explicitly. A table should be provided 

that lists, for each economic model, what impacts were not included in the model’s 

estimate of monetized damages. Accompanying text should serve to explain and 

complement the table entries but not be a substitute for them. Below, we have provided 

an example table listing impacts typically omitted from SCC models. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 10]

[See list on p. 12 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1]

Organization: Institute for Policy Integrity, New York University School of Law

The rule would raise the corporate average fuel economy standards for new automobiles and 

restrict the levels of greenhouse gases that vehicles may emit. While the proposed rule will 

generate large net social benefits, prior to the rule’s final publication, the agencies should 

consider adopting several refinements to their calculation of benefits and their approach to 

vehicle attributes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 1]

• The agencies should increase estimates of climate benefits to more accurately value the chance 

of catastrophic damages. Substantial economic literature, including much published in the last 

two years, supports the conclusion that current models do not place enough emphasis on 

catastrophic scenarios and, consequently, that some adjustment to the calculation of benefits is 

necessary. Disagreement over the exact size of that adjustment does not suggest the risk of 

catastrophe should be valued at zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 1]

• The agencies should increase estimates of climate benefits to account for risk aversion. Climate 

change is a categorically different kind of social problem: no single government can self-insure 

against the risk of irreversible, planet-wide damages. The government, therefore, should be risk 
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averse toward climate change. Though the degree of risk society faces is a subject of contention, 

most economists believe there is some non-negligible amount of risk that must be accounted for. 

A risk premium should be incorporated, either as an adder to the value of climate benefits, or as a 

downward adjustment to discount rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 1]

• The agencies should continually revise estimates of climate benefits to reflect the most recent 

scientific and economic knowledge. Even if a better estimate of benefits will not change the 

stringency or structure of the proposed rule, accuracy remains important. Professional and legal 

norms for economic analysis require it; accurate benefits estimates will increase confidence in 

the justifications for the rule and inform the public debate; and the agencies’ impact analysis will 

set a precedent for future rulemakings. The agencies should take the lead on adjusting estimates 

to account for risk and catastrophic damages, as well as the latest climate science. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

• The agencies should make several other improvements in the valuation of climate benefits, 

including development of non-carbon dioxide estimates, incorporation of potential benefit 

revisions in the mid-term evaluation process, and accounting for the net upstream emissions from 

electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

Part I. Climate Benefits

The proposed rule will significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and takes an important 

step in addressing climate change. However, the proposed rule underestimates the benefits of 

these emissions reductions. In so doing, it understates the need for increased reductions and sets 

standards that are more lenient than socially optimal. Developing the most accurate estimates of 

climate benefits and the appropriate stringency for emissions standards will set a valuable 

precedent for all future rulemakings that affect greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

The agencies should make several improvements to their calculation of the rule’s climate 

benefits. Most importantly, the agencies should update the social cost of carbon (SCC) estimate 

to: (1) reflect risk aversion, (2) appropriately weigh the possibility of catastrophic climate 

change, and (3) incorporate the most recent scientific advances on the relationship between 

greenhouse gas emissions and climatic stability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 2]

Disagreement over the size of risk aversion and catastrophic risk does not mean they should be 

valued at zero. Without more fully accounting for risk aversion and catastrophic climate 

outcomes, the SCC estimates used in the rule will be too low. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-

A1, p. 2]

The SCC revision process should be understood as an on-going activity that continually updates 

estimates to reflect the most recent science. The state of science on this issue continues to expand 

at a rapid pace, and it is important that the agencies incorporate recent insights as quickly as 

possible. The agencies should also seek to develop estimates for the benefits of non-carbon 

dioxide reductions, and the SCC revision process should be extended and incorporated into the 
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mid-term evaluation of the regulation. Finally, the agencies should rethink the way they calculate 

emissions from alternative fuel vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 3]

Background on the Social Cost of Carbon

The social cost of carbon (SCC) is an “estimate of the monetized damages associated with an 

incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year. It is intended to include (but is not 

limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from 

increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change.”2 Theoretically, 

the SCC includes all the economic losses associated with global climate change. An interagency 

working group (Working Group), which included both EPA and DOT, released initial estimates 

of the SCC in February 2010.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 3]

That report harmonized the federal government’s approach to valuing climate benefits and 

developed an initial set of four alternative estimates. The four estimates were built around the 

results from three integrated assessment models (IAMs), which “translate emissions into changes 

in atmospheric greenhouse concentrations, atmospheric concentrations into changes in 

temperature, and changes in temperature into economic damages.” 4 The proposed rule discusses 

all four SCC estimates, but relies mostly on the “central” value, which is based on a 3% discount 

rate.5 However, both the Working Group and the proposed rule note that the IAMs and the 

current SCC estimates contain significant limitations: incomplete treatment of catastrophe, 

uncertainty in the extrapolation of damages to high temperatures, and underdeveloped 

assumptions about risk aversion.6 The agencies seek comment on the assumptions used to 

determine the SCC.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 3]

The Agencies Should Increase the SCC Estimates to More Accurately Value Catastrophic 

Change

The possible levels of climate damages are often modeled as a distribution describing the 

probabilities of various economic outcomes. The Working Group estimated the SCC by

analyzing probability distributions generated by three IAMs, using those distributions to 

calculate the expected climate damages society would experience at various concentrations of 

greenhouse gases. IAMs, however, generally undervalue the possible damages associated with 

catastrophic climate change by reducing the complexity of the problem8—though scientific 

research predicts a non-negligible chance of a planet-wide, truly disastrous climate catastrophe, 

IAMs do not give much weight to such low-probability scenarios that exist on the far end of the 

probability distribution curves.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 3]

In short, the true probability distribution of climate damages has a longer and fatter right-hand 

tail than is represented in IAMs. 10 Weitzman argues that considering such “fat tails” increases 

the expected damages significantly, which could exert enormous influence on society’s 

willingness to pay for emissions abatement.11 That is, because extreme climate outcomes would 

impose such enormous economic losses, even relatively unlikely scenarios can shift the expected 

damages from climate change dramatically to the right. Should the possibility of these outcomes 

be great enough, the effect of such catastrophic damages could dominate the analysis. Tol notes 

similar difficulties with IAMs,12 and the National Academy of Sciences found that IAMs 
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insufficiently measure the totality of these effects.13 (The fact that both Weitzman and Tol find 

similar problems with IAMs14 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 4]

In early 2010, the Working Group suggested that scholarly disagreement warranted further 

investigation before it would be appropriate to adjust the SCC to account for catastrophic 

damages. is notable given their history of disagreement over optimal mitigation policies.) 

Because the Working Group’s analysis relied heavily on IAMs that do not fully account for the 

possibility of catastrophic damages, the agencies should adjust SCC estimates upward to 

properly value expected climate damages.15 The Working Group referred to the work of 

Nordhaus,16 Pindyck,17 and Newbold and Daigneault18 to support its decision to delay 

addressing catastrophic damages. While Nordhaus’s work is seminal in many ways, it is often 

recognized as undervaluing catastrophic outcomes. He relies heavily on one IAM (namely, 

DICE) that suffers from the problems explained above: it fails to fully account for the influence 

of catastrophic climate outcomes.19 Newbold and Daigneault’s results indicate that basing 

substantial SCC adjustments on catastrophic damages would depend heavily on the values 

assigned to model parameters. This merely shows that calculation of expected values is difficult 

and that extreme results such as Weitzman’s20 do not always hold. Their basic conclusion that 

current IAMs inadequately account for catastrophic damages21 still cuts in favor of some 

upward adjustment to the SCC, not waiting for further research. Pindyck finds only moderate 

expected utility differences when considering a wide distribution of climate outcomes.22 

However, he uses a simplified IAM with different damage and growth functions that do not 

assume fat tails. Yet it is fat tails and the growing possibility of extreme outcomes that drives 

much of the catastrophic damage analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 4-5]

The Working Group claimed that “further research in this area is needed before its practical 

significance can be fully understood and a reasonable approach developed to account for such 

risks in regulatory analysis.”23 In fact, no amount of research can lead to a “full understanding” 

of this problem. Nevertheless, a practical approach to treating catastrophe can be developed and 

implemented. Indeed, because a greater possibility of catastrophic damages exists than is 

included in the IAMs used by the Working Group (the Working Group essentially admits that 

this is the case24), the practical approach is to adjust the SCC upward. The fact that there is 

disagreement about the size of this catastrophic damage adjustment does not suggest that it 

should be zero.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 5]

Moreover, a substantial amount of research has been published since the Working Group’s 

report, adding to a growing body of literature that highlights the limitations of IAMs with regard 

to catastrophic damages. In the next revision of the SCC estimates, the agencies and the Working 

Group must address the relevance of work by Pycroft, Vergano, Hope, Paci, and Ciscar, 26 

Millner,27 Ackerman, Stanton, and Bueno,28 Dietz,29 and Gerst, Howarth, and Borsuk.30 

Combined with the work of climate scholars like Weitzman and Tol,31 the economic literature 

supports the proposition that IAMs do not place enough emphasis on catastrophic damages and, 

consequently, some adjustment should be made to account for this limitation. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 5]

The studies that attempt to calculate the amount of adjustment necessary generally find it to be 

large. Yohe and Tol opine that increasing the SCC by 50% “is not out of the question” given the 
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non-zero risk of catastrophic climate change. 32 In stylized conditions of structural uncertainty, 

Weitzman shows that the SCC might be infinite.33 This seems implausible, and several studies 

react by restricting the damage function to avoid this result.34 Pycroft, Vergano, Hope, Paci, and 

Ciscar find that allowing for the possibility of different tail sizes in both the climate sensitivity 

parameter and the damage function lead to increases in the SCC of 33% to 115%.35 A number of 

other studies suggest methods for addressing the problem of catastrophic changes. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 5-6]

Rather than waiting an indefinite amount of time for further insights, the agencies and the 

Working Group should evaluate the existing literature, make a decision about the best way to 

apply it, and begin incorporating greater consideration of catastrophic damages into the analysis 

to produce the most accurate SCC estimates available. If the agencies do not make an adjustment 

to the SCC estimates for catastrophic damages, the rule will underestimate greenhouse gas 

reduction benefits and will risk setting a precedent for future emissions standards to be less 

stringent than socially optimal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 6]

The Agencies Should Increase the SCC Estimates to Account for Risk Aversion36

Climate change outcomes are uncertain: the exact damages each additional unit of greenhouse 

gas emissions will cause are unknown. Consequently, each unit of emissions contributes 

additional risk that climate damages will be worse than expected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, p. 6]

This risk can be valued by thinking of climate abatement as an investment. Most people are 

naturally risk averse; when investments involve risk, people are willing to pay for greater 

certainty than when only considering the expected returns of the investment.37 For example, an 

investment option with less risk will typically sell at a higher price than a risky investment, even 

if the two alternatives have an equal expected payout. In portfolio theory, that price differential 

represents the risk premium that risk-averse actors demand for holding a risky asset. Investors 

also mitigate risk by buying investments that co-vary so that, ideally, when one investment 

performs poorly, the other performs well, increasing the certainty that the total investment 

portfolio will have positive returns. Thus, when investing in a range of assets, the covariance of 

the assets helps determine the price investors will pay for those assets. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9480-A1, p. 6]

The Working Group decided in early 2010 to continue “investigating” the issue of risk aversion 

in lieu of including a risk premium in the SCC. The Working Group did note that Anthoff, Tol, 

and Yohe found that risk aversion is at least as important as the rate of time preference 38 —a 

topic that the Working Group discusses in great detail. However, without citing studies with 

different results, it still concluded that further investigation was necessary before including a risk 

premium in the SCC. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 6]

It failed to mention the work of Heal and Kristrom,39 Heal,40 Hennlock,41 Tol,42 Yohe and 

Tol,43 or additional work by Weitzman,44 among many others that suggest the use of significant 

risk premiums. In short, the decision to delay inclusion of a risk premium in the SCC is 

inconsistent with the literature. Although scholars use different methods for calculating risk 
EPA Response to Comments

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premiums and arrive at different results, disagreement over the size of these values does not 

suggest that they should be zero.45 The degree of risk society faces is a subject of contention, 

but most economists believe that there is some non-negligible risk premium that must be 

accounted for in the SCC.46 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 7]

More important than the precise value is the realization that positive risk aversion warrants 

incorporating a positive risk premium into the SCC.47 There are two different pathways for risk 

aversion to be important for calculating the value of greenhouse gas abatement. In the first, 

mitigation steps taken today can be understood as an investment that is part of a larger portfolio 

of investments made by society. Under this framework, risk aversion can lead to a higher or 

lower social cost of carbon, depending on whether the value of greenhouse gas emissions in the 

future are correlated with the overall growth rate of the economy. To the extent that many of the 

effects of climate change will involve non-market impacts—the decimation of coral reefs, for 

example, or widespread extinction of terrestrial species—they may be substantially unrelated to 

the returns in the economy as a whole. If a substantial share of the damages from climate change 

is expected to be uncorrelated to returns in the economy as a whole, the discount rate should 

move toward the risk-free rate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 7]

For policymakers today, there is also a great deal of uncertainty about the relationship between 

the greenhouse gas emissions and climate outcomes. Resolution of that uncertainty is 

structurally similar to the realization of a risk that is uncorrelated with market returns, and can be 

thought of as serving the same function within an investment portfolio. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9480-A1, pp. 7-8]

In addition, the relationship between reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and economic 

growth reflects causation as well as correlation. Severe climate change could bear negatively and 

directly on overall economic productivity. For example, sea level rise could threaten large parts 

of the coastal United States, especially low-lying areas like Florida. In effect, such a causal 

relationship will be a source of negative correlation between the benefits of mitigation and 

broader market returns. In climate scenarios with greater temperature change, total damages from 

climate change will be higher, but total economic activity will be lower (ceteris paribus)—

marginal damages and therefore marginal benefits of mitigation will be high (due to convexity of 

damages) while the returns to the broader economy will tend to be low (the productivity 

effect). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 8]

The second pathway for risk aversion to impact the SCC concerns how investment in climate 

change mitigation reduces the variance of expected outcomes for the economy as a whole. The 

distribution of possible climate outcomes is a function of emissions, such that each ton of 

emissions can amplify the variance of aggregate economic damages and thereby further increase 

systematic risk. This means that, in addition to increasing the likelihood of catastrophic 

outcomes, each additional unit of emissions also increases the uncertainty about which outcome 

will occur. Thus, a full risk premium in the climate change context values the ability of 

emissions abatement to reduce the variance of outcomes. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, 

p. 8]
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Despite these justifications, the Working Group noted that government is usually risk neutral and 

questioned whether the climate change context merits different treatment. In fact, the nature of 

the climate problem requires government to be risk averse. For most social problems, the 

government is large enough that it can self-insure against disaster and act without aversion to 

risk. But because climate change is qualitatively different than other social problems involving 

risk, the agencies should treat it differently. The Working Group noted the suggestion in the 

Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-4 that government agencies should “generally” 

assume the perspective of a risk neutral actor. But it also observed that society should not always 

be risk neutral, that Circular A-4 “allows for a different assumption on risk preference in 

regulatory analysis if it is adequately justified,”48 and that agencies should deviate from the risk 

neutral perspective when necessary.49 The global nature of climate change catastrophes requires 

such a deviation. Circular A-4 endorses the use of expected values without a risk premium—

here, the average damages of all possible climate outcomes—only when society is risk neutral. 

However, society will not be neutral when risks cannot be offset by other investments. 

Compensating for the loss of habitability on Earth is impossible; the ability of the planet to 

sustain human life is irreplaceable. The magnitude of the damages associated with the risk of 

catastrophic climate change overwhelms the ability of society to match these damages with gains 

from other investments.50This suggests that risk aversion is necessary for society to account for 

the uniquely problematic nature of climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 8]

The Working Group attempted to account for risk aversion by including a 95th percentile SCC 

estimate at a 3% discount rate. 51 The decision to include consideration of risk aversion in one of 

four estimated SCC values misses the point. Risk and uncertainty are systematic in the climate 

change context. Consequently, all SCC estimates should include risk premiums to account for 

these factors. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the selection of the 95th percentile SCC 

estimate was chosen based on a reasoned connection to the risks under consideration, or out of 

simple convenience. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 8-9]

Studies that either calculate a risk premium or that include a risk premium when estimating the 

SCC generally find such premiums to be substantial. Heal finds a premium between 0.1% and 

8.13% of national income.52 Tol calculates a risk premium with “conservative assumptions” 

around $6-$7/ton of carbon dioxide.53 Antoff, Tol, and Yohe report SCCs from about $16/ton of 

carbon dioxide to over $5,000/ton when incorporating uncertainty into the calculation.54 Finding 

that uncertainty and equity interact to increase the SCC, they report a final SCC estimate of more 

than $50/ton of carbon dioxide.55 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 9]

These studies constitute several ballpark examples of premium size. Other studies suggest both 

higher 56 and lower57values for risk premiums. Different assumptions about the degree of risk 

aversion and parameters in IAMs can radically change modeling outcomes. The point is that the 

values under consideration are often very large relative to current SCC estimates. The presence 

of many high estimates for risk premiums suggests that they should be given substantial weight 

in determining the SCC. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 9]

The wealth of studies on this subject provides the agencies with sufficient know-how to 

incorporate a risk premium into the SCC estimates. The agencies and the Working Group should 

analyze the range of approaches toward risk and implement the best method for incorporating a 
EPA Response to Comments

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defensible risk premium into the SCC. In particular, the agencies should consider including 

either a “risk adder” or a downward adjustment of the discount rate. 58Without a risk premium, 

the SCC estimates will be too low and the rule will undervalue benefits from greenhouse gas 

reductions, setting a precedent for future emissions standards to be inefficiently lenient. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 9]

Risk Aversion and Catastrophic Damages Likely Interact, Necessitating Even Larger SCC 

Values

The combination of risk aversion and uncertainty about catastrophic damages implies an even 

greater upward adjustment to SCC estimates may be necessary. Millner, Deitz, and Heal argue 

that differences among complex climate change models expose large gaps in our knowledge 

regarding climate damages.59 Substantial uncertainty remains for a variety of IAM 

parameters.60 In the presence of risk aversion, this deep uncertainty coupled with the possibility 

of catastrophic climate damages implies that the risk adjustment may need to be very large to 

account for society’s desire to avoid catastrophic climate damages. Each unit of emissions 

reduction not only decreases the average expected future damages, but also thins the fat tails in 

damage probability distributions, thereby reducing the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes.61 If 

the government is risk averse, the SCC should include a large risk premium to account for all of 

these effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, pp. 9-10]

The Agencies Should Continually Revise the SCC to Reflect the Most Recent Scientific 

Knowledge

Since the Working Group report, there have been substantial advances in climate science that 

should be taken into account in the models that underlie the SCC. Several arguments favor 

revising the SCC to account for the most recent scientific advances as soon as possible in 

advance of the final rulemaking. First, professional and legal norms for accurate cost-benefit 

analysis require doing so. Executive Orders instruct federal agencies to accurately weigh the 

costs and benefits of regulation and base decisions on “the best reasonably obtainable scientific, 

technical, [and] economic . . . information.”62

Although the stringency of the proposed emissions standards was negotiated prior to the 

rulemaking,63 and the rule will remain cost-benefit justified even with the underestimated SCC 

values, developing an accurate cost-benefit analysis for the final rule is still important. Given that 

the tremendous private benefits of the rule are somewhat controversial (though they are clearly 

real and should be counted),65 accuracy in the estimation of social benefits will help increase 

confidence in the judgment that total benefits will outweigh costs. Moreover, in addition to 

aiding the choice between regulatory alternatives, cost-benefit analysis is a way of presenting 

information to the public and decisionmakers.66 The analysis shapes the public debate not just 

about this rule, but about future related rulemakings on climate or efficiency. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 10]

Second, regulatory impact analysis often builds off of methodologies established in previous 

rulemakings. EPA and DOT’s regulatory impact analyses in particular have a history of setting a 

precedent for other federal—and even state—agencies to consider the SCC in their own 
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rulemakings. 67 Even if improving the accuracy of the SCC will not affect the stringency or 

structure of the present rulemaking, it could influence future emissions and efficiency standards 

developed in other rulemaking contexts or by other agencies. EPA and NHTSA therefore have a 

responsibility to include the most accurate SCC values, reflecting the most up-to-date scientific 

and economic literature, in their final rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 10]

Third, by incorporating the latest scientific developments, the agencies ensure that their analyses 

do not fall out of date, and can help encourage climate research. Revising the SCC to account for 

the most recent scientific developments will signal to researchers that the government cares 

deeply about better understanding these issues, stimulating additional research into these topics. 

The agencies can even use the revision as an opportunity to identify key outstanding questions, 

in order to direct future research. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 10]

In its February 2010 report, the Working Group committed to “updating these [initial] estimates 

as the science and economic understanding of climate change . . . improves” and “revisiting the 

SCC values within two years or at such time as substantially updated models become 

available.”68 The agencies can make good on this commitment by ensuring that the SCC used in 

the final rulemaking is based on the most recent climate science.69 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9480-A1, pp. 10-11]

Conclusion

The agencies should increase their estimates of climate benefits to more accurately value the 

chance of catastrophic damages. Substantial economic literature, including much published in 

the last two years, supports the conclusion that current models do not place enough emphasis on 

catastrophic scenarios and, consequently, that some adjustment to the calculation of benefits is 

necessary. Disagreement over the exact size of that adjustment does not suggest the risk of 

catastrophe should be valued at zero. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 20]

The agencies should increase their estimates of climate benefits to account for risk aversion. 

Climate change is a categorically different kind of social problem: no single government can 

self-insure against the risk of irreversible, planet-wide damages. The government, therefore, 

should be risk averse toward climate change. Though the degree of risk society faces is a subject 

of contention, most economists believe there is some non-negligible amount of risk that must be 

accounted for. A risk premium should be incorporated, either as an adder to the value of climate 

benefits, or as a downward adjustment to discount rates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 

20]

The agencies should continually revise their estimates of climate benefits to reflect the most 

recent scientific and economic knowledge. Even if a better estimate of benefits will not change 

the stringency or structure of the proposed rule, accuracy remains important. Professional and 

legal norms for economic analysis require it; accurate benefits estimates will increase confidence 

in the justifications for the rule and inform the public debate; and the agencies’ impact analysis 

will set a precedent for future rulemakings. The agencies should take the lead on adjusting 

estimates to account for risk and catastrophic damages, as well as the latest climate 

science. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 20]
EPA Response to Comments

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The agencies should make several other improvements in the valuation of climate benefits, 

including development of non-carbon dioxide estimates, incorporation of potential benefit 

revisions in the mid-term evaluation process, and accounting for the net upstream emissions from 

electric vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9480-A1, p. 20]

2 INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOV’T, 

TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY 

IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter 

“WORKING GROUP REPORT”].

3 Id.

4 Id. at 5.

5 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate 

Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854, 74,895, 75,292 fn. 774 (proposed Dec. 

1, 2011) [hereinafter “Proposed Rule”].

6 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-31; Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 75,127.

7 Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 74,930, 74,933.

8 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: 

UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 256-57 (2009).

9 See Martin Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate 

Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (2009).

10 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 293; Martin Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty 

in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 275 

(2011).

11 See generally Weitzman, supra note 9.

12 See generally Richard S. J. Tol, Is the Uncertainty About Climate Change Too Large for 

Expected Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 56 CLIMATE CHANGE 265 (2003).

13 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 256-57.

14 Compare Weitzman, supra note 9, with Tol, supra note 12.

15 See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-31. The Working Group does not 

completely differentiate between the discrete effects of risk aversion and expected utility 
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calculations when considering catastrophic damages, most likely because the scholars writing on 

these issues often consider both effects simultaneously.

16 WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON 

GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (2008); William D. Nordhaus, An Analysis of the Dismal 

Theorem (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1686, 2009). For an update, see William D. 

Nordhaus, The Economics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate Change, 5 REV. 

ECON. & POL’Y 240 (2011).

17 Robert S. Pindyck, Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy (NBER Working Paper 

No. 15,259, 2009). For more recent work, see Robert S. Pindyck, Fat Tails, Thin Tails, and 

Climate Change Policy, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 258 (2011).

18 Stephen C. Newbold & Adam Daigneault, Climate Response Uncertainty and the Benefits of 

Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 44 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 351 (2009).

19 See, e.g., Weitzman, supra note 10, at 280; Carolyn Kousky, Robert E. Kopp & Roger Cooke, 

Risk Premia and the Social Cost of Carbon: A Review 5 (Economics: The Open-Access, OpenAssessment E-Journal, Discussion Paper No. 2011-19, 2011).

20 See Weitzman, supra note 9, at 16 (finding that, in some circumstances, the possibility of 

catastrophic damages will result in a theoretical infinite willingness to pay to avoid climate 

catastrophes).

21 See generally Newbold & Daigneault, supra note 18.

22 See Pindyck, Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy, supra note 17, at 3-4.

23 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.

24 See id. at 31.

25 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“[W]hile the record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon emissions 

reduction is certainly not zero.”).

26 Pycroft et al., A Tale of Tails: Uncertainty and the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide 

(Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Discussion Paper 2011-36, 2011) 

(finding that tail shape can change the SCC dramatically and suggesting fatter tails may be more 

reasonable).

27 Antony Millner, On Welfare Frameworks and Catastrophic Climate Risks, in SOCIAL 

SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (2011) (arguing that satisfactory treatment of climate 

modeling requires consideration of catastrophe).
EPA Response to Comments

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28 Frank Ackerman et al., Fat Tails, Exponents, Extreme Uncertainty: Simulating Catastrophe in 

DICE, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1657 (2010) (finding that plausible increases in both the 

climate sensitivity and damage exponent parameters results in disastrous economic decline).

29 Simon Dietz, High Impact, Low Probability? An Empirical Analysis of Risk in the 

Economics of Climate Change, 108 CLIMATE CHANGE 519 (2011) (discussing one method of 

bounding damages to avoid infinite willingness to pay for abatement).

30 Michael D. Gerst, Richard B. Howarth & Mark E. Borsuk, Accounting for the Risk of 

Extreme Outcomes in an Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4540 

(2010) (finding that without aggressive abatement, the probability of catastrophic damages is 

high).

31 See Weitzman, supra note 9; Tol, supra note 12. Participants at an EPA/DOE workshop 

following the interagency process likewise noted that existing research already suggests that 

IAMs could better assess high-end warming scenarios. ICF INT’L, DRAFT WORKSHOP 

REPORT: IMPROVING THE ASSESSMENT AND VALUATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 

IMPACTS FOR POLICY AND REGULATORY ANALYSIS—PART 1, at 6 (2011), available 

at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0564-50.pdf/$file/EE-0564-50.pdf.

32 See Gary W. Yohe & Richard S. J. Tol, The Stern Review and the Economics of Climate 

Change: An Editorial Essay, 89 CLIMATE CHANGE 231, 237 (2008).

33 See generally Weitzman, supra note 9.

34 See, e.g., Pindyck, Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy, supra note 17.

35 See Pycroft et al., supra note 26.

36 Some of the literature on risk premiums distinguishes risk and uncertainty based on Knight’s 

definitions: risk involves known probabilities, while uncertainty involves the inability to 

determine the probabilities of different outcomes. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, 

UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921). However, the distinction between uncertainty and risk 

is not always clear. We do know that climate damages are not certain. We also know that people 

are willing to pay to increase the certainty of damages. For the sake of simplicity, these 

comments recommend a “risk” premium to account for the affects of aversion to both risk and 

uncertainty.

37 See Sonia Quiroga & Ana Iglesias, A Comparison of the Climate Risks of Cereal, Citrus, 

Grapevine and Olive Production in Spain, 101 AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS 91, 98-99 (2009) 

(specifying risk premium in relation to risk aversion among Mediterranean agricultural 

producers); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of 

Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2007) 

(discussing calculations for insurance policies amid climate change); Alicia N. Rambaldi & Phil 

Simmons, Response to Price and Production Risk: The Case of Australian Wheat, 20 J. 

FUTURES MKTS. 345 (2000). See also Joseph E. Aldy et al., Designing Climate Mitigation 
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Policy 14 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 08-16, May 2009) (noting that proper risk 

premium estimate is the subject of dispute, and that it varies with estimates of the marginal 

utility of consumption net of climate damages); David Anthoff, Richard S. J. Tol, & Gary W. 

Yohe, Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon, 4 ENVTL. RESEARCH 

LETTERS 1 (2009) (distilling from historical data values for the elasticity of marginal utility 

with respect to consumption, and identifying salience of uncertainty in SCC calculation).

38 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (citing Anthoff et al., supra note 37, at 1 

(“[T]he assumed rate of risk aversion is at least as important as the assumed rate of time 

preference in determining the social cost of carbon.”)).

39 Geoffrey Heal & Bengt Kristrom, Uncertainty and Climate Change, 22 ENVTL. RESOURCE 

ECON. 3 (2003) (analogizing climate change to insurance markets).

40 Geoffrey Heal, The Economics of Climate Change: A Post-Stern Perspective, 96 CLIMATE 

CHANGE 275 (2009) (identifying the effects of uncertainty and risk aversion and suggesting 

that society will pay to avoid climate change risks).

41 Magnus Hennlock, Robust Control in Global Warming Management: An Analytical Dynamic 

Integrated Assessment (University of Gothenberg, Working Papers in Economics No. 354, 2009) 

(finding that the preference for avoiding uncertainty entails a higher SCC due to the need for an 

ambiguity premium).

42 Richard S. J. Tol, The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers, and Catastrophes 2 

ECONOMICS: THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-JOURNAL (2008).

43 Yohe & Tol, supra note 32.

44 Martin L. Weitzman, Additive Damages, Fat-Tailed Climate Dynamics, and Uncertain 

Discounting, 3 ECONOMICS: THE OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-JOURNAL 1 

(2009); and Martin L. Weitzman, GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate 

Damages (NBER, Working Paper No. 16136, 2010).

45 See, e.g., Gary Yohe, Toward an Integrated Framework Derived from a Risk-Management 

Approach to Climate Change, 95 CLIMATE CHANGE 325, 329 (2009) (suggesting the need to 

account for risk and uncertainty in climate change policy); Yohe & Tol, supra note 32, at 237 

(arguing that the optimal carbon tax must be augmented by a non-zero risk premium); Heal & 

Kristrom, supra note 39; Heal, supra note 40; Hennlock, supra note 41; Antony Millner, Simon 

Dietz, & Geoffrey Heal, Ambiguity and Climate Policy (Center for Climate Change Economics

and Policy, Working Paper No. 28, 2010) (finding that aversion to uncertainty in some cases 

leads to very large “ambiguity” premiums); Gerst et al., supra note 30 (showing that ignoring 

uncertainty underestimates climate damages); and Robert E. Kopp et al., The Influence of the 

Specification of Climate Change Damages on the Social Cost of Carbon (Economics: The OpenAccess, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Discussion Paper No. 2011-22, 2011) (finding that 

uncertainty and risk aversion can significantly increase the SCC). Much of this literature review 

is based on Kousky, supra note 19. See also Ctr. for Biological Diversity, supra note 25.
EPA Response to Comments

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46 See, e.g., Anthoff et al., supra note 37, at 5 (finding SCC estimates over $5,000 per ton of 

carbon dioxide for some parameter values); Millner et al., supra note 45; Kousky et al., supra 

note 19, at 14 (concluding after surveying the literature on risk and uncertainty premiums that 

these premiums could be “quite large”).

47 See generally Yohe, supra note 45; Yohe & Tol, supra note 32, at 237 (“While reasonable 

people disagree how much of a risk premium should be placed on top of the Pigou tax, it should 

be clear that no reasonable person would argue that this premium should be zero.”); Kousky et 

al., supra note 19. See also Klaus Keller, Gary Yohe, & Michael Schlesinger, Managing the 

Risks of Climate Thresholds: Uncertainties and Information Needs, 91 CLIMATE CHANGE 5 

(2008) (discussing the proper portfolio of mitigation policies).

48 See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.

49 See id. at 30 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 

PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, 42 (2003)).

50 See Weitzman, supra note 9, at 11.

51 See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.

52 See Heal, supra note 40, at 287.

53 See Tol, supra note 42, at 6.

54 See Anthoff et al., supra note 37, at 5-6.

55 See id. at 6.

56 See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 29.

57 See, e.g., Robert Mendelsohn, Is the Stern Review an Economic Analysis?, 2 REV. ENVTL. 

ECON. & POL’Y 45 (2008).

58 Reducing the discount rate is one way to account for risk aversion. See Kousky et al., supra 

note 19, at 4. However, the effect of emissions abatement investments on the overall level of risk 

in the economy does not affect the discount rate as described by modern portfolio theory. There 

are also independent reasons for lowering the discount rates used by the Working Group, see 

Letter from Institute for Policy Integrity & Environmental Defense Fund, to Lisa P. Jackson, 

Administrator, EPA, 15 (Nov. 27, 2009) available at http://www.policyintegrity.org. Any 

downward adjustment to the discount rate to account for risk should not diminish those 

independent reasons to also lower the discount rate.

59 See Millner et al., supra note 45.
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60 See, e.g., Pindyck, Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy, supra note 17; Newbold 

& Daigneault, supra note 18.

61 See, e.g., Kousky et al., supra note 19, at 3.

62 Exec. Order 12866, § 1(b)(6)-(7); Exec. Order 13563 § 1(c) (“each agency is directed to use 

the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as 

accurately as possible”).

63 WHITE HOUSE, DRIVING EFFICIENCY (2011), available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ fuel_economy_report.pdf.

65 See infra Part II.

66 See Nathaniel Keohane, The Technocratic and Democratic Functions of the CAIR Regulatory 

Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS at 33 (Harrington, W., 

Heinzerling, L., & Morgenstern, R. eds., 2009).

67 See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4.

68 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.

69 In its Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis from November 2011, NHTSA simply 

repeated the two-year timeline without noting any concrete next steps. See NHTSA, PRIA, at 

654 (2011), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/ pdf/cafe/2017-

25_CAFE_PRIA_final.pdf. The proposed rule itself even more vaguely refers to a revision “in 

the next few years.” Proposed Rule, supra note 5, at 75,127. Though EPA and Department of 

Energy have co-hosted two workshops over the past two years bringing together top climate 

modelers, see http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/ ClimateEconomics.html, the 

agencies have not publicly committed to any specific plans to reconvene the interagency working 

group and update the SCC as of the date of these comments.

70 WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 (“The goal is to develop these estimates 

by the time we issue revised SCC estimates for carbon dioxide emissions.”).

71 Id.

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 33.]

The estimated benefits of this proposal include a reduction in oil consumption of 4 billion barrels 

and a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 2 billion metric tons, fuel savings on the order of 

347 to $444 billion, at a monetized net benefit to society in the range of 311 to $421 billion.
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA and NHTSA should use a social cost of carbon estimated using an improved methodology. 

NRDC’s recommendations authored by Dr. Laurie Johnson, Chief Economist of NRDC’s 

Climate and Clean Air Program, have been submitted as a separately docketed item from these 

broader comments. [See pp. 1-24 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1 for 

more detail on social cost of carbon.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

In the Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying the proposed light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas 

and CAFE rulemaking, EPA and DOT included benefits estimates for CO2 emission reductions 

—a monetized value of the marginal benefit of reducing a ton of CO2—using the social cost of 

carbon (SCC) as estimated by the Obama Administration’s Interagency Working Group on the 

Social Cost of Carbon (February 2010). Because the use of the Working Group’s SCC in this 

proposed ruling has implications beyond this regulation, we are submitting these comments 

separately from our more specific comments on the proposed motor vehicle standards. Most of 

our comments are recommendations for improving the methodology for estimating the SCC for 

future regulations. NRDC recognizes that implementing many of these recommendations will not 

be possible within the time frame of this ruling. Nevertheless, they should inform what the 

agencies decide to do in both the short- and longer-term. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, 

p. 2]

Our recommendations regarding the GWP method and SCC are summarized as follows [Note: 

NRDC recommendations regarding the GWP method are listed above in Section 18.4.1.1]:

2) Improved SCC.

a. Use the updated versions of the social cost of carbon models that were used for the 2010 

estimates to re-estimate the SCC for this rulemaking (Recommendation #4). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 5]

b. Use a lower discount rate. We recommend 0.7%, the average return on 6 month U.S. Treasury 

Notes (Recommendation #5), for several reasons (see discussions in Section I.2. and d) and e) in 

Section II. At a minimum, whatever discount rates the agencies adopt, it needs to include an 

estimate of the SCC using the government’s own recommended lower bound sensitivity value 

for intergenerational discounting, of 1% (OMB, Circular A-4).5 The choice by the Working 

Group not to use the lower bound was not justified, and should not be continued. If the agencies 

elect not implement this recommendation, we request it provide a justification (Recommendation 

#6). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 5]

c. Short of our preferred 0.7% rate, the agencies should at least use a more representative set of 

discount rates that take into account long run uncertainty in interest rates. The range should 

include Weitzman6 and UK Greenbook7 declining discount rate schedules, not just the NewellPizer estimate already used by the Working Group (Recommendation #7). If the agencies elect 

not implement this recommendation, we request it provide a justification. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9472-A1, pp. 5-6]
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3) Transparency of SCC. EPA should provide a more transparent presentation of the social cost 

of carbon used in the calculations, such that it better conveys the limitations of the models to 

handle catastrophic risks and many damage categories, by

a. Providing a detailed list of damages included and excluded from the models in tabular format 

(Recommendation #8). If the agencies elect not implement this recommendation, we request it 

provide a justification.

b. Providing the 99th percentile social cost of carbon estimates (Recommendation #9). If the 

agencies elect not implement this recommendation, we request it provide a justification. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 6]

4) Recommendations for the Interagency Working Group. The agencies should recommend to 

the Interagency Working Group, along with Recommendations above, that the Group:

a. Incorporate risk aversion according to different available methodologies as summarized in 

Kosky and Kopp (2011)8 (Recommendation #10). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 6]

b. In addition to incorporating risk aversion, better integrate the very high and catastrophic 

damages to which individuals are risk averse into all three models. Specifically, the Working 

Group should 1) use Weitzman’s analysis (2009)9 to 'extend the grid' in the Monte Carlo 

simulations; 2) for catastrophic outcomes, consider using as an estimate of damages Weitzman’s 

implied ?value of statistical life on Earth as we know it,? the VSL (value-of-a-statistical life), 

multiplied by world population; 3) reduce the amount of low cost adaptation assumed in the 

models; and 4) modify damage functions to reflect cross-sectoral damages (Recommendations 

#11, 12, 13, 14). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 6]

c. Conduct sensitivity analyses equity weighting the SCC according to different available 

methods (Recommendations #15, 16). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 6]

d. Review the literature for estimates of the ratio between non-use and use values, and develop a 

methodology to apply a multiplication factor (or factors) to relevant use values included in the 

models (Recommendation #17). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 6]

e. Dedicate full time staff to collecting and reviewing new climate science and economic 

modeling on an ongoing basis, and regularly incorporate these developments into the SCC 

models. As they become available, post findings on a public website with links to sources 

(Recommendations #18, 19). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 6]

f. Update the models to reflect recent research on agricultural changes, which suggest the CO2

fertilization is overestimated in the FUND model, and that much, if not all, fertilization benefits 

may be cancelled out by negative impacts on agriculture (e.g. extreme heat, pests, and weeds) 

(Recommendation #20). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 7]
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g. Examine whether the upper ends of the 612 to 889 ppm of CO2 in the four business-as-usual 

scenarios used by the Working Group reflect current worse-case estimates (Recommendation 

#21). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 7]

Section I below provides a more detailed summary discussion of these comments and 

recommendations, while Sections II and III provide extended discussions of discounting and 

equity weighting, and catastrophic risk representation in Monte Carlo analysis, respectively. [See 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1 pp. 8-24 for Sections I, II, and III.] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A1, p. 7]

4 Shindell, DT, Faluvegi, G, Koch, DM, Schmidt, GA, Unger, N and Bauer, SE (2009). 

Improved attribution of climate forcing to emissions. Science vol 326: 716-718.

5 In 2008, EPA suggested an even lower bound ,of 0.5%.Technical Support Document on 

Benefits of Reducing GHG Emissions. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, June 12, 2008. 

As EPA notes in the beginning of the document, it began developing most of the information in 

the report in support of the Executive Order 13432 for developing CAA (Clean Air Act) 

regulations that would reduce GHG emissions from motor vehicles.

6 Weitzman, M (2001). Gamma Discounting. American Economic Review, American Economic 

Association, vol. 91(1): 260-271.

7 Lowe, J (2008). Intergenerational wealth transfers and social discounting: supplementary 

greenbook guidance. UK Treasury. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/4(5).pdf. Note that the 

schedule in this supplement to the greenbook subtracts out an implicit positive value for the pure 

rate of time preference, appropriate for intergenerational discounting.

8 Kousky, C, and Kopp, RE (2011). Risk Premia and the Social Cost of Carbon: A Review. 

Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal. Discussion Paper No. 2011-19. 

http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2011-19.

9 Weitzman, M (2009). On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate 

Change. Review of Economics and Statistics 9(1): 1-19

Response:

EPA appreciates the commenters’ recommendations to modify the methodology 

underlying the SCC estimates and has considered each one in the context of this rulemaking. 

The interagency group committed to update the SCC estimates as the science and economic 

understanding of climate change and its impacts on society improves over time. To help motivate 

and inform this process, DOE and EPA hosted a series of workshops. The first workshop focused 

on conceptual and methodological issues related to integrated assessment modeling and valuing 

climate change impacts, along with methods of incorporating these estimates into policy 
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analysis.83 The second workshop reviewed research on estimating impacts and valuing damages 

on a sectoral basis.84 

In sum, EPA has determined that the SCC methodological recommendations require 

additional research, review, and public comment before it can apply them to a rulemaking 

context. EPA has therefore presented the SCC estimates developed through the 2009-2010 

interagency process in this rulemaking. EPA will continue to consider these comments and will 

share the recommendations with the interagency group for consideration in future reviews of the 

current SCC estimates. 

Regarding comments that the agencies should rethink the way they calculate emissions 

from alternative fuel vehicles, please see section 6.5 of this document for EPA’s response.

The remainder of this section provides more detailed responses to the recommendations.

Recommendations regarding treatment of uncertainty, catastrophic impacts, and risk. 

The interagency group specified three parameters—climate sensitivity, socioeconomic 

and emissions trajectories, and discount rate—as inputs into three integrated assessment models, 

leaving other key parameters unchanged from those specified by the authors but ran the models 

probabilistically for purposes of formal uncertainty analysis in the interagency modeling 

exercise. A probability distribution was specified for climate sensitivity and used as an input in 

the three models. A probability distribution was not specified for the other two parameters 

because of uncertainty about how to model them probabilistically for purposes of formal 

uncertainty analysis. For example, while models can project potential emissions pathways, 

assigning probability weights to different states of the world in an analytically rigorous way 

proved challenging given the dearth of information on the likelihood of a full range of future 

socio-economic pathways. Likewise, there is broad disagreement in the published literature on 

what discount rate is appropriate to use in an intergenerational setting. Therefore, the modeling 

exercise used multiple scenarios that span a range of socio-economic parameters and multiple 

values for the discount rate.

EPA recognizes the need to review how the models incorporate catastrophic damages and to 

account for uncertainties and risks in its analysis. EPA also agrees that it is important to account 

for these issues and notes that the rulemaking documents, in particular the SCC TSD, provide a 

thorough discussion about these considerations, the ongoing challenge to incorporate them into 

the SCC estimates, and the implications for the benefits analysis (for example, see Section V of 

the SCC TSD). 

EPA has continued to explore the literature and assess it in the context of its SCC 

analysis. For example, the DOE/EPA workshop series on integrated assessment modeling 

reviewed the emerging literature about treatment of economic catastrophes and risk aversion. 

Overall, the discussions revealed progress in understanding the implications of potential 

 83 For workshop proceedings, see http://go.usa.gov/426 84 For workshop proceedings, see http://go.usa.gov/42F
EPA Response to Comments

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catastrophes while underscoring the need for additional research regarding optimal ways to 

incorporate such information into regulatory rulemakings. Likewise, EPA carefully reviewed 

the commenters’ synthesis of the emerging literature regarding treatment of risk aversion, 

catastrophic impacts, and the calculation of a risk premium, but continues to believe that 

additional deliberation is required to better characterize these issues and identify the optimal way 

to modify the interagency group’s methodology and incorporate it in rulemakings. Furthermore, 

other federal agencies use the SCC estimates to analyze benefits of rulemakings and it is 

important to ensure consistency in the SCC estimates used across the government analyses. This 

is not consistency for the sake of consistency, but rather using well-documented, scientifically 

supported estimates, while at the same time continuing the iterative process of analyzing, 

reviewing, and updating the SCC to reflect best available science. Therefore, EPA will continue 

to research these important issues and to include the submitted comments in any review process 

to update the SCC estimates. 

Recommendations regarding model vintage. 

EPA has also begun to explore the updated versions of DICE, FUND, and PAGE. 

Additional analysis of the model updates is required before EPA can incorporate them in 

rulemakings. Furthermore, other federal agencies use the SCC estimates to analyze benefits of 

rulemakings and it is important to ensure consistency in the SCC estimates used across the 

government analyses. 

Recommendations regarding CO2 fertilization. 

EPA considered the comments regarding CO2 fertilization benefits in FUND and has 

determined that additional research would be required to implement these recommendations. 

EPA has recognized the need for a thorough review of damage functions in all three models that 

the interagency group used to estimate SCC. In addition to supporting the 2010-2011 DOE/EPA 

workshop series that explored treatment of impacts in the models, EPA initiated a review of the 

literature in agriculture and other sectors to help researchers more easily improve representation 

of damages. Consistent with the commenter’s recommendation, EPA is particularly interested in 

examining recent publications about the role of assumptions regarding carbon fertilization. EPA 

appreciates the references provided by the commenter and will continue to analyze the 

components of agricultural impacts.

In the meantime, EPA determined that modifying the FUND structure would be 

counterproductive, given that the latest version incorporates changes in the estimation of 

agricultural impacts. These changes are undergoing peer review and EPA looks forward to 

exploring these changes. 

Furthermore, introducing changes beyond those implemented by the model authors 

would conflict with the methodology established by the interagency working group. A key 

objective of the interagency process was to enable a consistent exploration of the three models 

while respecting the different approaches to quantifying damages taken by the key modelers in 

the field. After conducting an extensive literature review, the interagency group selected three 

sets of input parameters (climate sensitivity, socio-economic and emissions trajectories, and 
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discount rates) to use consistently in each model. All other model features were left unchanged, 

relying on the model developers’ best estimates and judgments.

Recommendations regarding omitted impacts. 

EPA disagrees with the comments that the agency has not responded to repeated requests 

for more information about how the models treat climate change impacts, i.e., which impacts are 

therefore included or excluded from the monetized estimates. Specifically, EPA has published 

written responses to this same comment in other rulemakings—see Light-Duty Vehicle 

Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, EPA 

Response to Comments Document for Joint Rulemaking and Greenhouse Gas Emission 

Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 

EPA Response to Comments Document for Joint Rulemaking. In short, it is not possible at this 

time to provide a precise list of each model’s treatment (i.e., included, excluded) of climate 

impacts. Instead, the SCC TSD presents a robust discussion of this key analytical issue, e.g., 

how each model estimates climate impacts, the known parameters and assumptions underlying 

those models, and the implications of incomplete treatment of impacts (catastrophic and noncatastrophic) for the SCC estimates. Moreover, the discussion in the SCC TSD underscores the 

difficulty in accurately distilling the models’ treatment of impacts in table-form. Most notably, 

the use of aggregate damage functions—which consolidate information about impacts from 

multiple studies—in two of the models poses a challenge in listing included impacts. For 

example, within the broad agricultural impacts category, some of the sub-grouped impacts are 

not explicitly modeled but are highly correlated to other subcategories that are explicitly 

modeled. Therefore, it may be misleading to identify these kinds of impacts as either “included” 

or “omitted” from the model. Along those lines, impacts may be included in models but not 

directly; the Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy (DICE) model represents adaptation 

implicitly through the choice of studies used to calibrate the aggregate damage function, and the 

Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND) model includes 

adaptation both implicitly and explicitly (see the SCC TSD for details).

Recommendations regarding discount rate. 

Regarding the recommendations for discount rate selection, EPA finds it to be defensible 

and transparent given its consistency with the standard contemporary theoretical foundations of 

benefit-cost analysis. The basis for the current discounting approach is discussed in detail in the 

SCC TSD. In sum, the interagency group applied three constant certainty-equivalent discount 

rates (2.5, 3, and 5 percent) to the SCC estimates to account for various perspectives about risk 

and uncertainty. The upper value of 5 percent accounts for the view that there may be a high 

correlation between climate damages and market returns while the rest of the SCC analysis 

centers on a discount rate consistent with concerns about risk aversion. The SCC TSD also 

summarizes the consideration of the literature about handling uncertainty in discounting (e.g., 

Newell and Pizer (2003), Weitzman (2001), and the UK’s “Green Book” for regulatory analysis) 

and concludes that the proper way to model discount rate uncertainty remains an active area of 

research. 
EPA Response to Comments

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In addition, EPA finds this approach to be consistent with OMB Circular A-4. Circular 

A-4 discusses the analytical challenges for discounting in an intergeneration context and 

concludes that agencies “might consider a further sensitivity analysis using a lower but positive 

discount rate in addition to calculating net benefits using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent.” 

Specifically, Circular A-4 states that “estimates of the appropriate discount rate” in an 

intergenerational context ranged from 1 to 3 percent.” Two of the three discount rates used in 

the interagency exercise fall within this range.

However, EPA recognizes the limitations of the discounting approach used in the 

interagency modeling exercise. Accordingly, EPA funded a workshop on discounting in 

September 2011 that invited world-recognized experts to discuss how the benefits and costs of 

regulations should be discounted for projects with long horizons. In particular, it explored what 

principles should be used to determine the rates at which to discount the costs and benefits of 

regulatory programs when costs and benefits extend over very long horizons. The charge 

questions that were the subject of the workshops discussion focused on three main areas: (1) 

whether and in what context it is appropriate to apply a Ramsey discounting framework in an 

intergenerational setting; (2) whether and how to directly estimate discount rates over long time 

horizons; and (3) how to apply discounting in a regulation where some costs and benefits accrue 

intra-generationally while others accrue inter-generationally. See 

http://rff.org/Events/Pages/Intergenerational-Discounting-Workshop.aspx for a summary of the 

main discussion points. EPA is in the process of evaluating next steps with regard to possible

methodological improvements in intergenerational discounting.

Recommendations regarding SCC presentation. 

Regarding the recommendation to provide the 99th percentile estimates of the social cost 

of carbon, EPA notes that these estimates are presented in the Appendix, Table A2, in the SCC 

Technical Support Document, “Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under 

Executive Order 12866 SCC TSD,” (SCC TSD), which is referenced in both the preamble and 

RIA. The SCC provides extensive information about the SCC estimates and the underlying 

parameters, which serve as the basis for the estimates of methane co-benefits. For example, the 

SCC TSD shows how SCC values for 2010 vary across model, scenario, and discount rate; it also 

presents the distribution of SCC estimates, including benefit estimates at the 95th and 99th 

percentiles for each model. EPA has determined that it is more appropriate to place such 

detailed technical information in the rulemaking’s technical supporting documents, i.e., the SCC 

TSD, rather than the co-benefits section of the RIA, which gives an overview of the calculation 

as well as a detailed table with the methane co-benefit estimates. The RIA also provides 

references to the SCC TSD for those seeking further information about the distribution. 

Recommendations regarding global estimates of SCC. 

EPA agrees with the comment regarding use of a global SCC value and notes that the agencies 

have in fact used global estimates to assess the benefits of this rulemaking. See preamble 

Section III.H.6 and Chapter 7 of the RIA for the SCC estimates.

18.4.1.3 Comments about Social Cost of CO2 (Opposition to estimates)
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Organization: Institute for Energy Research (IER)

Furthermore, EPA’s cost-benefit analysis utilizes the “social cost of carbon.” The estimates 

developed through EPA’s social cost of carbon analysis are arbitrary and capricious as the social 

cost of carbon is an unsupportable metric for use in federal rulemaking. Even on its own terms, 

the social cost of carbon estimate is inapplicable for EPA’s analysis, because of what is called 

“leakage” in the climate change literature. Specifically, EPA ignores the possibility that its rule 

will increase greenhouse gas emissions outside of the United States, through mechanisms such as 

a lower world price of oil due to restricted American demand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-

A1, p. 2]

In addition to basing its case on an assumption that households and businesses irrationally fail to 

reap advantageous fuel economy savings, EPA’s estimates also incorrectly deploy the concept of 

“Social Cost of Carbon” (SCC) from the climate change literature. Although the SCC is a useful 

theoretical concept in discussions of worldwide carbon taxes or other frameworks, there are 

several problems with EPA’s invocation of the concept in the context of US-based fuel economy 

mandates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 9]

5. The “Social Cost of Carbon” is used improperly in the EPA’s assessment

Besides the problems with overriding consumers’ voluntary choices, part of EPA’s analysis is 

methodologically flawed because EPA uses the “social cost of carbon” in its cost-benefit 

analysis. As a concept, the social cost of carbon has the appearance of specificity without 

necessarily reflecting reality in a meaningful way. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 21]

EPA and NHTSA explain the social cost of carbon thusly:

EPA has assigned a dollar value to reductions in CO2 emissions using global estimates of the 

social cost of carbon (SCC). The SCC is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with 

an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year. It is intended to include (but is not 

limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from 

increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 21]

EPA argues that by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, this rule would produce benefits, as 

measured by the social cost of carbon, of a discounted present value of $32.8 billion (using a 5% 

discount rate) to $522 billion (using a 3% discount rate) and 95th percentile social cost of carbon 

assumption. But these amounts are almost certainly overestimates. As EPA admits, this rule will 

only reduce global temperature by 0.0076–0.0184 °C by 2100. Even in the scenario with the 

most warming, a 0.02°C reduction in temperature is not enough to have any impact on the 

damages EPA claims will occur with higher temperatures—i.e. “changes in net agricultural 

productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of 

ecosystem services due to climate change.” Without having an impact on these damages, there 

are no real benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 21]
EPA Response to Comments

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In the economics of climate change literature, the social cost of carbon (SCC) is calculated by 

reducing the absolute amount of greenhouse gas emissions by one (carbon-dioxide-equivalent) 

ton and estimating the corresponding reduction in the present-discounted value of total long-run 

climate damages. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, pp. 21-22]

EPA’s cost-benefit methodology assumes that a proposal that reduces greenhouse gas emissions 

by a certain quantity R will therefore yield social benefits (from reduced climate damages) of R x 

SCC. However, this overstates the benefits, because of a phenomenon called “leakage.” The 

calculation of benefits using SCC assumes that if the United States foregoes greenhouse gas 

emissions as a result of this rule, then those emissions will not happen. This fails to include the 

impact of these rules outside the United States. Specifically, it is not the case that global 

emissions from all other sources will be unaffected by the proposed rules. For example, the new 

rules (and accompanying higher prices for new vehicles) will lead motorists to drive their older, 

less fuel efficient cars for longer than they otherwise would have, and in the extreme more 

people will emigrate to jurisdictions that have looser standards and buy more vehicles from 

exempt manufacturers than would otherwise have occurred. Another major consideration is that 

reduced U.S. demand for oil will depress world oil prices and lead to greater fuel use by 

motorists around the world. In the aggregate and over several decades, the actual reduction in 

global emissions will be lower—and possibly significantly lower—than a naïve estimate would 

indicate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 22]

EPA’s cost-benefit analysis utilizes the “social cost of carbon,” which estimates in this proposed 

rule demonstrate to be an arbitrary and unsupportable metric for use in federal 

rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9573-A1, p. 23]

Response:

EPA disagrees with the commenter’s characterization of the SCC as an “unsupportable 

metric for use in federal rulemaking.” While there are inherent uncertainties associated with 

modeling climate and economic systems over long time spans, the SCC estimates used in the 

rulemaking analysis were developed from three integrated assessment models that synthesize 

available scientific and economic research and have been used in the IPCC assessment. 

Integrated assessment models are particularly well suited to the estimation of SCC because they 

combine climate processes, economic growth, and feedbacks between the climate and global 

economy into a single modeling framework. See the SCC TSD for a complete discussion about 

the three models used to develop the SCC estimates. See also Coalition for Responsible 

Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012) slip op. p. 27 (“State and Industry 

Petitioners assert that EPA ‘delegated’ its judgment to the IPCC, USGCRP, and NRC by relying 

on these assessments of clime-change science. This argument is little more than a semantic 

trick....EPA simply did here what it and other decision-makers often must do to make a sciencebased judgment: it sought out and reviewed existing scientific evidence to determine whether a 

particular finding was warranted. It makes no difference that much of the scientific evidence in 

large part consisted of ‘syntheses’ of individual studies and research. Even individual studies 

and research papers often synthesize past work in an area and then build upon it. This is how 

science works. EPA is not required to re-prove the existence of the atom every time it 

approaches a scientific question.”)
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In addition, EPA disagrees that SCC overstates the benefits of mitigation. The SCC 

estimates do not include all significant climate changes damages and are therefore likely 

underestimates. In addition, the SCC estimate is for CO2 only, as noted in the previous comment 

response. As a result, EPA has supplemented the quantified benefit estimates with a qualitative 

discussion about benefits.

Furthermore, EPA disagrees with the commenter’s conclusions about the potential for 

emission leakage—in this case, the potential for the rule to “increase greenhouse gas emissions 

outside of the United States, through mechanisms such as a lower world price of oil due to 

restricted American demand”—and that SCC is therefore irrelevant. First, EPA disagrees that 

the rule would necessarily result in emission leakage. The analysis conducted for this rule 

estimates that the world price of oil will fall modestly in response to lower U.S. demand for 

refined fuel (see preamble section III.H.8.c for discussion). One potential result of this decline in 

the world price of oil would be an increase in the consumption of petroleum products, 

particularly outside the U.S. In addition, other fuels could be displaced from the increased use 

of oil worldwide. For example, if a decline in the world oil price causes an increase in oil use in 

China, India, or another country’s industrial sector, this increase in oil consumption may displace 

natural gas usage. Alternatively, the increased oil use could result in a decrease in coal used to 

produce electricity. An increase in the consumption of petroleum products particularly outside 

the U.S., could lead to a modest increase in emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as criteria air 

pollutants, and airborne toxics from their refining and use. However, lower usage of, for 

example, displaced coal would result in a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, any 

assessment of the impacts on GHG emissions from a potential increase in world oil demand 

would need to take into account market impacts in all segments of the global energy sector. 

Given the complexity of analyzing these multiple market impacts globally, the agencies’ 

analyses have not attempted to estimate these effects.

Second, even if emissions leakage were relevant to this rulemaking, it would affect the 

estimate of total emissions, not the estimate of the value of damages per ton. In other words, 

emission leakage is not relevant to the value of a one ton reduction in CO2 emissions (i.e., SCC). 

As discussed in the preamble we have assumed that this rule would result in small (marginal) 

impacts on cumulative global emissions. Even in the unlikely event that emissions leakage 

occurred under this rulemaking, it would be unlikely to alter the cumulative global emissions 

trajectory underlying the SCC estimates. 

18.4.2. Estimated Non-GHG Health and Environmental Impacts

Organizations Included in this Section

American Lung Association

Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Growth Energy

Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)
EPA Response to Comments

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Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: American Lung Association

The benefits anticipated from the proposed standards are significant. The preferred alternative 

directly reduces emissions of carbon dioxide, but should also result in reduced emissions of 

sulfur dioxide, PM2.5, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen oxides, benzene, and diesel 

particulates. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, p. 1]

Many of the emissions reduced because of the proposed rule directly impact the health, 

particularly the lung health, of millions of Americans. The American Lung Association’s 2011 

State of the Air report found that half the nation - over 154 million Americans - continues to live 

in areas with dangerous levels of ozone or particulate matter. Current studies warn of significant 

and complex impacts on particulate matter and tropospheric ozone from climate change. Areas 

already suffering from poor air quality will find it much harder to clean up ozone and particulate 

matter, as well as other emissions because of the added burden from the changes to climate. The 

proposed rule helps to mitigate the short and long-term health impacts of these pollutants as well 

as the targeted issue of climate change. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, p. 1]

Response:

EPA agrees that the benefits of the standards are significant and clearly outweigh the 

costs. In the RIA that accompanies the final rulemaking (Chapters 6 and 7), we discuss the 

breadth of benefits associated with both reductions in GHG emissions and non-GHG emissions 

associated with the standards, including (and especially) reductions in risk to human health and 

welfare.

Organization: Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC

Supporting action to address these toxic compounds in gasoline in this rulemaking through use of 

alternative fuels is EPA’s own acknowledgement that increased fuel efficiency results in what is 

known as the “rebound effect”—that is, an actual increase in driving that results from its lowered 

cost due to greater efficiency. The increased driving in turn means increased tailpipe 

emissions.30 EPA indicates that overall there is a decrease on these criteria pollutants because of 

offsetting decreases in upstream emissions. But there are at least two gaps in EPA’s 

reasoning. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 9]

First, it is not at all clear that the upstream reductions can offset increases in tailpipe emissions 

on a population-weighted basis, since tailpipe emissions occur on roadways, where the exposure 

is greatest, as EPA acknowledges in this rulemaking.31 The goal of EPA regulations under the 

CAA should be a reduction of human exposure to toxics, not simply the reduction of emissions 

in general. In fact, motor vehicle tailpipe emissions are the largest single source of air pollution 

affecting urban populations, and this exposure will not be significantly affected by upstream 
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reductions.32 At the very least, EPA needs to address this point. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9506-A1, p. 9]

Second, and perhaps more important, it is not clear how EPA is calculating the benefits in 

Chapter 6 of the DRIA. EPA provides charts and citations (i.e., Fann et al., 2007) that calculate 

the public health benefits per ton of reduction of “direct” PM at $300,000 per ton. At the same 

time, EPA states that the heavy molecular weight components of gasoline create what EPA 

classifies as “direct” PM emissions.33 These direct PM emissions are among those that will 

increase at the tailpipe under the proposal due to the rebound effect, but it is unlikely that this 

increase will be offset by upstream decreases, because these direct emissions are not associated 

with upstream operations. And it is not clear that secondary aerosols are associated with 

upstream operations, either. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 9]

In all of issues noted herein, EPA’s proposal raises not merely questions of law but also 

fundamental questions of regulatory costs and benefits. By undermining NHTSA’s incentives for 

CNG and alternative fuels, EPA will increase pollution. By requiring auto companies to reduce 

carbon output, EPA will exacerbate non-GHG pollution, both through the “rebound effect” and 

through the promotion of advanced engine technologies (such as direct injection) that increase 

pollution when not paired with cleaner, higher-octane fuel. As EPA itself noted in the DRIA (at 

p. 6-32), an accurate and thorough consideration of all costs and benefits is critically important to 

ensure that the agencies’ new standards will promote public health, not harm it. Accordingly, 

EPA and NHTSA must revisit their cost-benefit analyses, to account for each of those adverse 

effects of EPA's standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9506-A1, p. 11]

Organization: Growth Energy

The oversight with regard to potential PM increases due to widespread DGI use is important 

because PM effects are a substantial consideration in the cost-benefit analysis. In summarizing 

the benefits analysis, the proposal emphasizes PM benefits noting:

The benefits include all benefits considered by EPA such as GHG reductions, PM benefits, 

energy security and other externalities such as reduced refueling time and accidents, congestion 

and noise. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 39]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

In our original comments to the NOI, UCS urged the agencies to set standards based on the full 

set of societal benefits, not just fuel savings. Specifically, we stated “monetization of the full set 

of societal benefits should be assessed, including (but not limited to) improved energy security 

through reduced oil consumption, lower carbon emissions, and enhanced economic security in 

the face of likely gasoline price spikes.”19 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 5]

Response:

We refer the commenters to Preamble Section III.G.1 and RIA Chapter 4 for a complete

discussion of the emissions impacts associated with this rulemaking and the methods used to 
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estimate them. As the commenters note, we estimate that there will be slight emissions increases 

associated with rebound driving as well as emission reductions associated with upstream sources 

such as power plants, refineries, and related emission reductions due to reductions in upstream 

distribution and transport of fuels (associated with the rule’s fuel savings impacts).

The emission impacts associated with the standards serve as inputs to the non-GHG 

photochemical air quality modeling analysis and the associated health impacts analysis. As 

shown in RIA Chapter 6, our air quality modeling results indicate that there are very small nonGHG impacts over the majority of the country. For PM, the results indicate that in 2030, a 

population weighted average reduction of approximately 0.01 ug/m3 can be expected (see RIA 

Chapter 6.3.1). For ozone, we estimate that in 2030, on a population-weighted basis, there is 

virtually no change in ambient concentrations in ozone. For the commenter’s reference, we 

further discuss the impact of the rebound effect and advance engine technologies on emissions in 

Section 17 of this response to comments document.

In terms of health impacts, however, it is clear that upstream reductions in emissions 

related to ambient concentrations of both direct and indirect PM outweigh the slight emission 

increases associated with rebound driving. In terms of PM-related health impacts, we estimate 

that in 2030, emission reductions associated with the rule will result in between 110 to 280 fewer 

premature mortalities across the U.S. Compared to the estimate of 1 to 3 additional ozonerelated premature mortalities associated with rebound-related emission increases, it is clear that 

upstream emission reductions outweigh the slight downstream emission increases and in fact 

improve health on a national basis. We note that EPA conducted full-scale photochemical air 

quality modeling to capture the impacts both upstream and downstream emissions have on 

ambient ozone formation direct and indirectly formed ambient PM2.5 formation. We also note 

that all fine particles, regardless of their chemical composition, are equally potent in causing 

health impacts. EPA has also concluded that the scientific evidence is not yet sufficient to allow 

differentiation of effect estimates by particle type (See EPA’s Integrated Science Assessment for 

Particulate Matter - http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=216546#Download). 

Please refer to RIA Chapter 6 for a full discussion of the non-GHG health benefits associated 

with the rule.

Finally, in response to the comment made by the Union of Concerned Scientists, we note 

that on a nationally aggregated basis, our analysis shows that the standards do not increase 

pollution but in fact significantly reduces GHG emissions and improves ambient concentrations 

of PM. Our analysis in the final rulemaking (of all benefits categories such as GHG reductions, 

non-GHG benefits, fuel savings, energy security and other externalities such as reduced refueling 

time and accidents, congestion and noise) is an accurate and thorough consideration of all costs 

and benefits, and demonstrates that the new standards will promote public health, not harm it.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

I. EPA’S MONETIZED HEALTH BENEFITS OF AIR QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS ARE 

UNDERESTIMATED
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As explained in the proposal and EPA’s Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA), EPA 

calculates the premature-mortality-related effect coefficients that underlie the benefits per- ton 

estimates of reductions in criteria pollutants from only the American Cancer Society cohort 

(Pope et al. 2002). The Agency does not present the benefits-per-ton estimates using the Harvard

Six Cities cohort (Laden et al. 2006), even though EPA states, “If the benefit-per-ton estimates 

were based on the Six-Cities study (Laden et al., 2006), the values would be approximately 

245% (nearly two-and-a-half times) larger.” (Proposal Preamble, page 75131; DRIA, Page 6-33) 

In fact, EPA admits that, “...using the benefit per-ton value derived from the ACS study (Pope et 

al., 2002) alone provides an incomplete characterization of PM2.5 benefits.” [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 15]

In NHTSA’s DEIS, the Agency provides the benefits-per-ton estimates from both studies sideby-side. In fact, NHTSA states the reason it does so is because of a recommendation by EPA. 

“EPA calculated the premature-mortality-related effect coefficients that underlie the benefitsper-ton estimates from epidemiology studies that examined two large population cohorts – the 

American Cancer Society cohort (Pope et al. 2002) and the Harvard Six Cities cohort (Laden et 

al. 2006)...According to EPA, both studies should be used to generate benefits estimates.” 

(DEIS, Page 4-24) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 15-16]

EDF requests that EPA present the results based on both the Pope et. al. and the Laden studies to 

ensure that a more transparent and comprehensive estimate of the monetized health benefits of 

air quality improvements are developed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 16]

Organization: Growth Energy

The proposed rule also acknowledges that the agencies’ analysis includes no estimates of the 

direct health or other benefits associated with reductions in emissions of criteria pollutants other 

than PM. Therefore, two of the major drivers in the list of cost-benefit categories above, “other 

air pollutants” and “increased driving due to the rebound effect” are determined by PM 

emissions. The reason that PM dominates the EPA non- GHG analysis is that the damage cost in 

Table II-8 is much greater for PM than for other criteria pollutants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, pp. 39-40] 

Response:

For the FRM, we are conducting full-scale air quality modeling to assess the rule's impact 

on ambient concentrations of ozone and PM in 2030 and the associated quantified/monetized 

health impacts. The analysis includes a co-equal presentation of PM-related premature mortality 

based on Pope and Laden (Tables III-85, III-87, and III-89 of Preamble III, and corresponding 

tables in Chapter 6 of the RIA) along with a full accounting of the morbidity impacts associated 

with PM and ozone. Time and resource constraints preclude the agency from running air quality 

modeling for the Model Year analysis. We therefore continue to use a dollar-per-ton method 

(consistent with the 2012-2016 LD GHG approach) to monetize the PM-related benefits 

associated with the standards over the lifetime of each 2017-2025 Model Year vehicle. Because 

the difference between the Pope- and Laden-based estimates are so slight, relative to the other 

cost and benefits monetized in the analysis (they represent between ~1-3% of total benefits, 
EPA Response to Comments

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depending on the study and discount rate), we chose to simplify the presentation of PM-related 

benefits in the cost-benefit summary tables by presenting only the Pope-based value, while 

qualitatively describing that the Laden-based estimate would increase PM-related benefits by 

~2.5 times. Even though the Pope-based value is the more conservative end of the range of PMrelated benefits, the inclusion of Laden would not provide the reader with a meaningful 

difference when assessing the comparison of total costs and benefits of the rulemaking. 

We have, however, revised our text in Preamble Section III.H.7 (Table III-90) and in 

FRM TSD 4 - Joint Economic Assumptions (Table 4-13) to present, for reference purposes, the 

range of Pope- and Laden-based dollar-per-ton values. We have also edited the text to more 

clearly state that the presentation of the low end of the range of PM-related benefits is in no way 

meant to convey a preference for one study over the other (see Preamble III.H.7.b and RIA 

Chapter 6.3.2).

We continue to acknowledge that there are several health impact categories that EPA was 

unable to quantify in the Model Year analysis due to limitations associated with using dollar-perton estimates. Because NOx and VOC emissions are also precursors to ozone, changes in NOX 

and VOC would also impact ozone formation and the health effects associated with ozone 

exposure. Dollar-per-ton estimates for ozone, however, do not exist due to issues associated 

with the complexity of the atmospheric air chemistry and nonlinearities associated with ozone 

formation. However, given the magnitude of the ozone impacts modeled in the Calendar Year 

analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the ozone-related impacts would be minimal and would 

not make a difference when assessing the comparison of total costs and benefits of the 

rulemaking.

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (20,500) (Union of Concerned Scientists-3)

The proposal largely ignores the pollution released from power plants when electric cars are 

recharged. The Environmental Protection Agency should require automakers to fully account for 

their vehicles' pollution--whether from petroleum or power plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10166-A2_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (375) (Union of Concerned Scientists-2)

The proposal largely ignores the pollution released from power plants when electric cars are 

recharged. The Environmental Protection Agency should require automakers to fully account for 

their vehicles' pollution--whether from petroleum or power plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1246-A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (9,570) (Unknown Organization)

The proposal largely ignores the pollution released from power plants when electric cars are 

recharged. The Environmental Protection Agency should require automakers to fully account for 

their vehicles' pollution--whether from petroleum or power plants. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9578-A1_MASS, p.1]
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Response:

EPA estimates the full range of pollution impacts from the standards, including emissions 

at the tailpipe and emissions from “upstream” sources such as power plants, refineries, and fuel 

transportation and distribution. Please refer to Preamble Section III.G.1 and RIA Chapter 4 for a 

complete description of the emissions impacts of the rulemaking and the estimation 

methodology. Included in our analysis are power plant emissions related to increased 

penetration of electric vehicles in the future light duty vehicle fleet. These emissions were 

included in the air quality modeling conducted for this analysis, the output of which were used in 

the health impacts analysis. Refer to Chapter 6 of the RIA for a description of both the air 

quality modeling and health impact analyses. Taken together, the non-GHG emission changes 

yield a net reduction in human health risk and contribute to the overall benefits of the standards.

Organization: Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Air Quality Effects. In addition to examining the air quality effects of the factors above [see 

section 18.2 of this comment summary], the increase in volatile organic compounds (VOC) 

emissions needs to be estimated due to the possible increase in Reid vapor pressure in gasoline 

from the increased use of higher octane gasoline. Higher emissions of VOC can lead to increased 

ground-level ozone concentrations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7821-A1, p. 3]

Response:

Regarding comments from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 

we do not agree that higher octane fuel will be necessary. As explained in section 3.3.1.8 of the 

joint TSD, higher octane fuel is not necessary for high compression turbocharged and downsized 

engines to prevent the onset of combustion knock. EPA therefore assumed no change in the 

octane of certification or in-use gasoline within its analysis and the effectiveness values used for 

the high BMEP engines reflect that fact. 

In partial confirmation, the current Ford EcoBoost turbocharged GDI engines do not 

require the use of premium fuel, although those engines are not operating at BMEP levels as high 

as those expected under our rule. Importantly, a combination of both intake charge dilution (e.g., 

cooled EGR) and in-cylinder evaporative fuel cooling (e.g., direct injection) are expected to

allow higher BMEP GDI engines to operate on regular grade gasoline. All packages at 27 bar 

BMEP analyzed by EPA included cooled EGR to allow higher BMEP operation and prevent the 

onset of combustion knock on current certification or in-use fuels. 

EPA estimates the full range of pollution impacts from the standards, including emissions 

at the tailpipe and emissions from “upstream” sources such as power plants, refineries, and fuel 

transportation and distribution. Please refer to Preamble Section III.G.1 and RIA Chapter 4 for a 

complete description of the emissions impacts of the rulemaking and the estimation 

methodology. This includes both upstream and tailpipe VOC emissions associated with the final 

standards. We use these non-GHG inventories to estimate the changes in ambient concentrations 

of PM, ozone, and selected air toxics. Please refer to Chapter 6 of the RIA for a description of 

both the air quality modeling and health impact analyses. Taken together, the non-GHG 
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emission changes yield a net reduction in human health risk and contribute to the overall benefits 

of the standards.

18.5. Energy Security Impacts

Organizations Included in this Section

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

American Petroleum Institute (API)

American Public Gas Association (APGA)

Applied Materials

BlueGreen Alliance

Center for Biological Diversity (CBD)

Consumer Federation of America (CFA) 

Defour Group LLC

Detroit NAACP

Ecology Center

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Kobus, D. 

Marks, R.

Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

Michigan State Senate, District 18

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Pew Charitable Trusts

Renewable Energy Long Island

Securing America's Future Energy (SAFE) 

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Smith, G.

Tesla Motors, Inc.

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Thirty Senators from the United States Senate

Lieutenant General Rick Zilmer (Retired)

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

At the same time, this kind of savings will put a downward pressure on the price of all petroleum 

products. If that holds, then fuel economy standards might generate, we estimate, an additional 

$25 billion in price-related fuel savings. That means even if you're not driving a new car, but if 

you're heating your home with fuel oil, or if you're using petroleum as a chemical feed stock, or 

if you're flying from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., you're benefiting from a lower price of 

oil or gasoline, and that benefits everyone.

The agencies also decline to count the monopsony benefit of the rule, under which reduced U.S. 

demand leads to lower oil prices globally. This is a departure from previous rules, and is justified 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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by the argument that the monopsony benefit is of a “redistributive nature” when viewed from a 

global perspective (NPRM p.74932). However, even if all petroleum were produced 

domestically, reduction in the price of petroleum would bring a net economic benefit in terms of 

job creation, for example, as explained previously, due to the low labor intensity of the energy 

sector. Thus it is a mistake to exclude these effects from the analysis of the economic benefits of 

the rule. The agencies also do not take into account the price reduction following from the fact 

that reduced demand will generally mean that the most expensive sources of petroleum are not 

used, which also reduces the price of all petroleum. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, pp. 1-

2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 111-112.]

Organization: America's Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA)

C. The Agencies’ Analysis of the Benefits of this Rule Should Include More Complete Energy 

Security Costs

Energy Security Costs [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, p. 5]

In response to the agencies’ request for comment on whether to include costs of the relevant U.S. 

overseas military presence in the energy security benefits analysis (76 FR 75136), AGA and 

ANGA strongly support doing so. To include only “the macroeconomic disruption and 

adjustment costs portion of the energy security benefits to estimate the monetary value of the 

total energy security benefits of this program” (id. at 74932) ignores enormous costs that are 

directly attributable to U.S. dependence on overseas oil supplies. A single example should 

suffice: the express purpose of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet – reestablished in 1995 and based in 

Bahrain – is to secure the Persian Gulf sea-lanes, and the annual cost of maintaining this force is 

in the billions of dollars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9548-A1, pp. 5-6]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

Comments on Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities

The issue of petroleum consumption and import externalities is discussed on page 74898 of the 

Preamble, consisting of a one-paragraph summary of the issue. The Preamble notes the following 

externalities are not reflected in the market price for crude: (1) higher price for petroleum 

products from the effect of U.S. demand on world oil prices; (2) the risk of disruptions caused by 

sudden reductions in the supply of imported crude; and (3) the expenses of maintaining a 

military presence to secure imported oil supplies and for maintaining the strategic petroleum 

reserve. This summary paragraph goes on to say that higher volumes of imported crude and 

refined products increases the magnitude of these external economic costs (increasing the true 

economic costs of transportation fuels above the resource costs of producing them), and that 

reducing volumes of imports or reducing fuel consumption can reduce these external costs. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 11]
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In the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis (PRIA) developed for this rulemaking, NHTSA 

stated the following with respect to issue of military expenses associated with protection of 

supply (page 643): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 11]

NHTSA currently believes that while costs for U.S. military security may vary over time in 

response to long-term changes in the actual level of oil imports into the U.S., these costs are 

unlikely to decline in response to any reduction in U.S. oil imports resulting from raising future 

CAFE standards for light-duty vehicles. U.S. military activities in regions that represent vital 

sources of oil imports also serve a broader range of security and foreign policy objectives than 

simply protecting oil supplies, and as a consequence are unlikely to vary significantly in 

response to changes in the level of oil imports prompted by higher standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9469-A1, pp. 11-12]

Neither the Congress nor the Executive Branch has ever attempted to calibrate U.S. military 

expenditures, force levels, or deployments to any oil market variable, or to some calculation of 

the projected economic consequences of hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Instead, changes in U.S. 

force levels, deployments, and thus military spending in that region have been largely governed 

by political events, emerging threats, and other military and political considerations, rather than 

by shifts in U.S. oil consumption or imports. NHTSA thus concludes that the levels of U.S. 

military activity and expenditures are likely to remain unaffected by even relatively large 

changes in light duty vehicle fuel consumption. As a consequence, the agency’s analysis of 

alternative CAFE standards for MYs 2017-2025 does not include savings in budgetary outlays to 

support U.S. military activities among the benefits of higher fuel economy and the resulting fuel 

savings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 12]

The above PRIA statements are important points with respect to military expenditures and the 

protection of crude supply. They are very consistent with the points made by EPA during the 

RFS2 rulemaking that were included in the “Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS2) 

Summary and Analysis of Comments” document (page 7-248).25 Further, a 2010 report 

prepared by the National Research Council also considered the issue of military protection of 

crude supply and found the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 12]

Dependence on imported oil has well-recognized implications for foreign policy, and although 

we find that some of the effects can be viewed as external costs, it is currently impossible to 

quantify them. For example, the role of the military in safeguarding foreign supplies of oil is 

often identified as a relevant factor. However, the energy-related reasons for a military presence 

in certain areas of the world cannot readily be disentangled from the non energy-related reasons. 

Moreover, much of the military cost is likely to be fixed in nature. For example, even a 20 per 

cent reduction in oil consumption, we believe, would probably have little impact on the strategic 

positioning of U.S. military forces throughout the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, 

p. 12]

Although NHTSA conducted a sensitivity analysis of the impact of some reduction in military 

spending as a result of this rule, it was not included in the baseline assessment for the very good 

reasons spelled out above. The Preamble should note the highly speculative nature of this kind of 
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assessment and provide the reader with the appropriate caveats that were included by NHTSA in 

the PRIA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A1, p. 12]

Organization: American Public Gas Association (APGA)

APGA has long recognized that the United States’ dependence on foreign oil is one of the 

foremost threats to our nation both economically and militarily. The U.S. economy is 

dangerously dependent upon crude oil for stability and economic growth and in no area is this 

dependence more evident than in the transportation sector. Even slight increases in the price of 

gasoline can send shock waves throughout the economy, reduce consumers’ purchasing power 

and spending, cause financial markets to tumble, and inhibit economic growth. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9448-A1, p-.1]

Moreover, it is on the foundation of our economic strength that our military might depends. The 

sad fact remains that the main sources of crude oil are outside the U.S. According to the Energy 

Information Administration, the U.S. imports approximately 51 per cent of the oil it consumes 

(2009 data), meaning that America’s economic prosperity (and therefore its military strength) is 

tied to purchasing crude oil from foreign countries, many of which have interests that are 

antithetical to our own. In short, the U.S. sends billions of dollars to potentially hostile nations, 

upon which it is dependent for its prosperity and ultimately its security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9448-A1, p. 1

Organization: Applied Materials

And we think that it's very important from a security standpoint, as several speakers have stated, 

as well.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 201.]

Organization: BlueGreen Alliance

Every day our country sends an estimated $1 billion to foreign countries for oil. Strong standards 

will keep more of the dollars here in the United States and move America to a more efficient 

advanced vehicle fleet creating hundreds of thousands of jobs, economic opportunities both 

inside and outside the auto industry.

In 2008 we saw the consequences when automakers had difficulty responding to consumer shifts 

in response to volatile fuel prices. So these strong feasibility standards will provide long-term 

certainty to the industry and ensure that innovation continues and recent investments in advanced 

technology pay off. They will also set the stage for weaning America off oil dependence for 

good and for the long-term reductions in greenhouse gas pollution we need to create a 

sustainable clean energy economy.

In addition to the direct savings for those purchasing new cars and light trucks, the proposed 

standard will also put downward pressure on gasoline prices by reducing demand. Simple 
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demand-supply logic suggests that the standard will put downward pressure on the transportation 

fuel prices by putting downward pressure on the demand for transportation fuels. All drivers will 

benefit through lower gas prices than would be expected otherwise.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 38-39.]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

Similarly, the Agencies exclude the costs of maintaining a U.S. military presence to secure 

imported oil supplies from unstable regions “because their attribution to particular missions or 

activities is difficult.” “Difficulty” does not justify conducting a cost-benefit analysis that 

improperly puts a thumb on one side of the scale. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 7]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 59.]

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Given the burden on household budgets and the continuing problem of oil vulnerability, it is not 

surprising to find that in our surveys, over a dozen in the past six or seven years, we find that 

three-quarters or more of respondents are concerned about gasoline prices and dependence on 

Mideast oil. They get the fact oil imports are a political problem.

They think it is important to reduce oil consumption and they support higher fuel economy 

standards as a way to do so. Almost two-thirds of the respondents' records supported 60-milesper-gallon standards with a payback of three to five years, and this proposed standard meets and 

exceeds that. They also think a higher standard will be good for automakers.

There are several flaws in quantitative analysis that cause the agencies to seriously underestimate 

the value of higher fuel economy standards. We have pointed out these flaws in past 

analyses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, pp. 12-13]

• Oil has a strategic and security value that must be reflected in the analysis. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 14]

Indirect national security and economic benefits will be just over $40 billion (about 7 percent of 

the total) and include progress on major national public policy goals, such as reducing oil 

consumption and imports by almost 4 billion barrels and cutting the balance of payments deficit 

by $370 billion, which will produce a major boost to domestic economic growth by driving down 

the price of oil by $0.25 per gallon, lowering vulnerability to oil price shocks, and reducing the 

need for national security expenditures. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 5]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 40-41.]
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Organization: Defour Group LLC

Most studies show that increases in fuel economy standards will not enhance energy security and 

that the impacts on catastrophic global warming are negligible. To quote Michael Boskin, head 

of the first President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, concluded in testimony before the 

National Academy of Sciences in 1991:

In my view, the presumption that U.S. energy security is directly tied to our level of gasoline 

consumption does not withstand close scrutiny. Given the increasing integration of world 

economies and the total integration of the world oil market, our energy security cannot be 

defined independently of our trading partners. Moreover, when one considers our own situation 

or, more properly, that of the world economy as a whole, even the most optimistic assessment of 

the oil consumption effects of higher CAFE standards cannot conceivably push us past the 

threshold where we would no longer have a vital security interest in the major oil-exporting 

regions of the world.17 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p.11]

Or in the words of Resources for the Future economists, Douglass Bohi and Michael Toman, in 

their seminal 1996 study:

There is so much uncertainty about the costs used to calculate [energy security] premiums that it 

is impossible to make a credible judgment about the correct magnitude of the premium that 

should be attached to oil imports, oil consumption, or strategic oil storage. This very uncertainty 

should engender great caution about any efforts to apply energy security premiums in energy 

policy analysis. In particular, the energy security argument is a weak basis for supporting oil 

import controls, conservation of oil consumption, or larger strategic oil stocks. Because of the 

uncertainties, only win-win policies that offer prospects for benefits under a variety of 

circumstances can be recommended unambiguously. Such policies include support for energy 

research and development to improve energy efficiency and to diversity energy supplies.18 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p.11]

17 - Michael Boskin, Testimony on Fuel Economy Standards Before National Academy of 

Sciences, July 10, 1991.

18 - Douglass R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman, The Economics of Energy Security, 1996, 

Resources for the Future, page 71 (Emphasis Added).

Organization: Detroit NAACP

These standards mean reducing our dependence on foreign oil and it also, as was said earlier, 

will strengthen national security. In 2010 the United States imported more than 4.3 billion barrels 

of oil sending billions and billions of dollars to other nations where our economy suffered 

immensely and struggled.
EPA Response to Comments

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These proposed standards will reduce oil consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and air 

pollution. They will reduce dependence on oil by 4 billion barrels which is very, very significant, 

and it will slash 2 billion metric tons on greenhouse gas emissions.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 140.]

Organization: Ecology Center

We are especially supportive of the fact that the proposed rules will not only lead to significant 

reductions in petroleum use and greenhouse gas emissions.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 189.]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

With respect to the energy security, when combined with Phase 1 clean car standards, the 

proposed rule's fuel economy and emissions standards will cut our oil consumption by over 2 

million barrels a day, more than we import from the Persian Gulf.

Our nation’s dependence on oil is a threat to national security. The U.S. consumes nearly 25 

percent of the world’s oil production, but controls less than 2 percent of the supply. And over 

half of the oil we use each day is imported from foreign countries, many of which do not like us. 

In 2008, we sent over $1 billion a day overseas to pay for oil, the majority of it going to nations 

deemed “dangerous or unstable.” The rate at which we consume oil helps our enemies by paying 

to finance and sustain their unfriendly regimes. And the longer the U.S. remains dependent on 

petroleum, the more the U.S. will have to engage in tough fights just to protect our energy 

supplies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 2]

Additionally, the high price of oil threatens our fragile economy. Gasoline and diesel fuel prices 

remain high, leaving consumers with less money to spend elsewhere. More than 70 percent of 

the oil we consume is for transportation, and more than 60 percent of that is used to fuel 

passenger cars and light trucks. If we want to reduce our dependence on oil, we must address 

fuel consumption from our fleet of highway cars and trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-

A1, p. 2]

One piece of the economic picture that is often not considered is the economic impact of 

unexpected spikes in oil prices, price volatility. One of EDF’s economists, Jamie Fine, has 

worked with collaborators to show that policies that lower energy demand also provide a hedge 

against rising energy prices. Their study – which will soon be published in the Journal, Energy 

Policy – looked at the energy use that will be avoided and the resulting savings by California’s 

entire plan to reduce GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020, of which the current GHG standards are a 

critical part. They found that cost savings from avoided gasoline and diesel use in the event of an 

energy price shock in 2020 could be in the range of $2.4 to $5.2 billion for the state of California 

alone.11 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 2-3]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Agencies should include additional Energy Security Benefit 

Oil dependence has serious consequences. The US consumes nearly 19 million barrels of oil a 

day, which is nearly a quarter of the oil consumed in the entire world, and more than all EU 

nations combined. Over half of the oil we use each day is imported from foreign countries and 

more than 70 percent of the oil we consume is used for transportation. Our addiction to oil 

threatens our national security and puts our service men and women at risk. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 13]

Our petroleum addiction also has significant environmental consequences. Extracting oil fouls 

land and water, kills wildlife, and destroys habitat. Refining oil creates air pollution and water 

pollution. Combustion of oil—burning oil and oil-based fuels in engines—releases CO2, which 

causes global warming (about 42 percent of the world's energy-related CO2 emissions come from 

oil). Emissions from oil refining and combustion also contribute to ozone, which worsens 

asthma, causes premature death and contributes to other health problems.32 [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 13]

In addition, oil dependence makes the U.S. economy vulnerable to short-and long-term increases 

in energy costs. In terms of imported oil, an increase in the price of imported oil could lead to 

‘imported inflation’ and vulnerability of the local manufacturers and consumers alike. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 13]

We commend the Administration for recognizing the importance of U.S. energy security and the 

positive impact more efficient use of transportation rules would have. However, we believe the 

Agencies have consistently undervalued the benefits of past fuel economy and GHG rules, and 

this proposed rule, on U.S. energy security. Therefore, we recommend that the final rule include 

the following additional inputs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 13-14]

In determining the full benefits of fuel consumption reduction and energy security, the Agencies 

did not attempt to quantify the reduction in U.S. military spending associated with the reduction 

in U.S. oil imports. The Agencies state in the proposal that “attributing military spending to 

particular missions or activities is difficult.” (Proposal preamble, page 75136) While we agree 

that such a quantitative analysis would result in uncertainties, that is not a reason to assign the 

benefits a zero value. It is important the Agencies develop a methodology to value the benefits of 

reduced oil imports on U.S. military spending for this rule, and future rules that reduce our 

dependence on foreign oil. We request that the Agencies at least report a range of estimates for 

these benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 14]

We also recommend that the Agencies consider cost estimation proposals such as that included 

in Sen. Richard Lugar’s (R-Ind.) Practical Energy and Climate Plan, S. 3464. See Attachment A. 

This proposed legislation included both an extensive list of potential impacts of energy security 

to be considered and an alternative approximation valuation methodology for the “external cost 

of petroleum use” (i.e. this does not include the actual fuel savings). For inputs that the Agencies 

cannot quantify, the final rule should include a list and explain that the benefits of the rule are 

likely undervalued due to such factors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 14]
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public 

hearing on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 287.]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 173.]

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

There are other advantages to society from reducing the amount of fuel we consume. The 

benefits for energy security are the same as investing in new oil wells - reduced oil imports, 

improved balance of trade, and downward pressure on worldwide oil prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 13]

Organization: Kobus, D.

America's dependence on oil puts our environment, economy, and national security at risk. You 

recently took an important step toward addressing this problem when you proposed new global 

warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that would ensure new cars and light trucks 

meet the equivalent of a 54.5 mpg fleet-wide standard by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1370-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Marks, R.

I question the use of CAFE to reduce oil consumption. For the last 40 years, CAFE has had the 

opposite affect. People bought bigger cars and trucks and drove them more miles per year and 

consumed more gallons of gas per vehicle. 40 years ago, we were 25% dependent on foreign oil 

and today we are about 66% dependent. CAFE has not done what you claim, ever! The only 

reason gas consumption has dropped recently is that the price of gas has risen to between $3 and 

$4 per gallon. It has nothing to do with vehicle miles per gallon! Are you serious about our 

dependence on oil or not? If you are serious, then this Nation needs a National Energy Policy 

which will 1. Reduce our dependency on foreign oil, by using less, 2. Improve World climate 

concerns through reduction in fossil fuel consumption, 3. Develop alternative fuel solutions in 

both transportation and energy sectors, and 4. Keep America growing, moving forward and

secure. CAFE does not do this. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1680-A1, p. 1]

CAFE is stupid and there are much better market driven ways to create National security. Read 

your history! CAFE does not work. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1680-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Representative from Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

Greater fuel economy will also help reduce our dangerous addiction to foreign oil and keep the 

members of our armed services out of danger. The United States imported more than 4.3 billion 

barrels of oil in 2010. This dependency places increasing demands on American security forces 

to keep the peace in many of the most dangerous areas of the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7983-A1, p. 2]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Organization: State Senator from Michigan State Senate, District 18

Greater fuel economy benefits all of us in four ways: firstly, it benefits our environment by 

reducing greenhouse gas emissions; secondly, it secures our energy independence; thirdly, its 

saves us money at the pump; and finally, it creates high-quality U.S. jobs that strengthen the 

economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

Increased fuel economy will first benefit the environment by reducing greenhouse gas emissions 

and air pollution that stem from oil consumption. The proposed fuel economy standards will 

reduce our dependence on oil by 4 billion barrels and slash 2 billion metric tons in greenhouse 

gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

In turn, we will also be gaining energy independence. In 2010, the United States imported more 

than 4.3 billion barrels of oil, sending billions of dollars to other nations while our own economy 

struggled to recover from recession. This dependence on foreign oil has threatened our national 

security and our economic progress for far too long. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Our reliance on oil is a fundamental threat to wildlife, as well as to people and the economy

Our members and millions of Americans like them want to see America’s outdoor heritage 

sustained for their children. All too often, our heavy dependence on oil stands in the way. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 2]

Carbon pollution is warming our climate locally and worldwide. These changes threaten people 

and global security right now, and they are the most profoundly threatening force against the 

future of wildlife. Rising temperatures, floods, fires, droughts and ecosystem alterations are 

creating direct habitat loss, increased invasive species and other threats for wildlife species –

many may never adapt. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 2]

The 20 million barrels of oil America uses every day (mostly for transportation) account for 40% 

of the US carbon pollution that causes climate change.1 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 

2]

Meanwhile, when drilling projects go wrong, whole ecosystems are threatened by disasters like 

the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010. And smaller leaks and spills, like the recent Enbridge oil 

spill in Michigan, do grave harm right in our backyards: to residents, to wildlife like herons, 

muskrats, ducks, geese, and to decades of community efforts to restore rivers like the 

Kalamazoo. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 2]

These standards make real and significant steps to reduce these threats [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9887-A2, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

18-178

The proposed 2017 through '25 standards will double the fuel economy for our cars, SUVs and 

pickups from today's levels to an average of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025. These vehicles will 

save Americans 4 billion barrels of oil and 2 billion metric tons of carbon pollution.

Together these standards will cut our demand for oil by 3.4 million barrels per day; more than all 

the oil we get today from the Persian Gulf, Venezuela and Russia combined.

As we are ensuring that every car and truck uses less fuel, steady expansion of electric and 

advanced vehicle technology can lead us even further into mass markets, high performance 

vehicle fleet that uses little oil and produce nearly zero pollution.

[These comments were also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 28-30.]

Organization: Pew Charitable Trusts

We have also sought to inform the public and policymakers across the nation about the dangers

of U.S. oil dependence to our nation’s economy, national security and to the lives of the U.S. 

servicemen and women who defend oil transit routes and chokepoints around the world. The 

RAND Corporation estimates that the U.S. military spends between $67 and $83 billion annually 

defending oil chokepoints around the world. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A2, p. 1]

As you know, the public strongly supports reducing U.S. oil dependence through higher fuel 

economy. Our bipartisan poll commissioned in July 2011 found that 91 percent of Americans 

identify U.S. dependence on foreign oil as a threat to our national security, and significant 

bipartisan majorities in every region of the country believe that adopting stronger fuel economy 

standards is the best way to lessen that dependence. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9496-A2, p. 2]

[This comment was also submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-2010-1788, pp.190-20.]

Organization: Renewable Energy Long Island

America's deepening dependence on oil puts our economy, environment, and national security at 

risk. I am writing to applaud you for taking an important step to confront the dangers of this 

dependence by proposing new global warming pollution and vehicle efficiency standards that 

would ensure new cars and light trucks meet the equivalent of the 54.5-mpg fleetwide standard 

by 2025. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7933-A1, p. 1]

The projected annual benefits of such standards by 2030 are enormous:

• $45 billion in savings at the gas pump

• 23 billion gallons of gasoline saved

• 280 million metric tons of global warming pollution avoided [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7933-A1, p. 1]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-179

Organization: Securing America’s Future Energy

More than 70 percent of the oil consumed in the United States is used to fuel our transportation 

sector. The more than 240 million cars and light-duty trucks on the road in the United States in 

2010 accounted for approximately 40 percent of total oil demand and those vehicles were fueled

almost entirely by oil or other liquid fuels. Throughout the entire transportation sector, 93 

percent of delivered energy is derived from oil. Simply put, our economy is heavily dependent 

on oil, and there are no substitutes available at scale today. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, 

p. 2]

We have made tremendous strides in reducing the petroleum intensity as traditionally measured. 

In terms of barrels of oil consumed per dollar of gross domestic product (GDP), we have reduced 

petroleum intensity by about 50 percent since the early 1970s, as shown in Figure 2. Yet, despite 

this progress we remain highly dependent on oil to fuel our economy. It remains our primary 

transportation fuel and demand remains highly inelastic, especially in the short-term. It also is 

important to appreciate that the price of oil is set in a dynamic global market and our reduced use 

of several million barrels a day over a period of 15 years as the result of improved fuel economy 

is just as likely to result in lower production of oil as resulting in a lower price. Stated 

differently, over time, reducing domestic demand for oil will not necessarily lead to lower prices 

but might instead lead to production levels that are adjusted downward by producers based on 

expectations that increased fuel economy will reduce aggregate demand; in fact, oil prices can 

easily rise even in periods of shrinking domestic demand. [Figure 2 can be found on p. 5 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 

4]

A different measure of petroleum intensity than the traditional measure of barrels per $1,000 of 

GDP, our degree of dependence on oil is approaching levels we reached in the late 1970s. While 

our economy is becoming more fuel efficient and oil demand is stable in recent years, we are 

spending a growing portion of our national income on oil, even with relatively stable demand, 

due to rising oil prices. Although fuel economy requirements last year were at their highest level 

ever, our overall expenditure on oil and oil related products of $900 billion was far above 

historic levels, as shown in Figure 3. This represents about 6 percent of GDP, nearly twice the 

levels in the 1990s (see Figure 2), though we consumed approximately the same volume of oil. 

[Figure 3 can be found on p. 6 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1] [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 4-5]

Stated most simply, a portion of the benefit of increased fuel economy is being lost to high oil 

prices. And in a world with rising demand for oil, in which demand is being met by oil that is 

increasingly complex and expensive to produce, we must recognize that while improving fuel 

economy is an important measure, it cannot fully address the challenge posed to our energy and 

national security by persistently high and volatile oil prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-

A1, p. 5]

This oil dependence constrains our foreign policy and forces the United States military to accept 

the responsibility of securing the world’s oil supply. A RAND Corporation study showed the 

ongoing expense of oil dependence to the U.S. military is between $67.5 billion and $83 billion 
EPA Response to Comments

18-180

annually, while the cost of the constraints imposed on our foreign policy by our oil dependence 

may be impossible to calculate. Oil dependence also imposes significant costs on the nation’s 

economy. Sending about $1 billion abroad each day to pay for expensive oil drains our economic 

resources and strengthens oil-exporting countries that are often hostile to U.S. interests. In 2011 

alone, American businesses and consumers spent nearly $900 billion on gasoline, diesel and 

other refined petroleum products. This is part of an upward trend that has hit the average 

household particularly hard as oil prices have risen in recent years. As shown in Figure 1, annual 

household expenditures on gasoline have risen from about $1,800 in 2000 (representing 4.4 

percent of median household income) to $4,050 in 2011 (representing 8.2 percent of median 

household income). Separate from the out-of-pocket costs for oil incurred by consumers, 

Department of Energy researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory have estimated the 

economic cost of U.S. oil dependence to be more than $5 trillion since the early 1970s. [Figure 1 

can be found on p. 3 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 2-3]

In recognition of the threat to our nation posed by reliance on a single fuel whose market is 

dominated by governments that often share neither our interests nor our values, the United States 

has made genuine progress toward advancing energy security since we first became aware of the 

problem in the early 1970s. Most importantly, fuel economy has improved by more than 110 

percent, from 13.6 MPG in 1974 to 29.6 MPG in 2011 (although much of that progress was 

made between 1975 and 1986), helping reduce the petroleum intensity of the economy by nearly 

50 percent over the same period. This means that we are both spending less on oil, and that we 

are less affected by oil price volatility than we would have been in the absence of improved fuel 

economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, pp. 3-4]

These improvements in fuel economy certainly have enhanced our economic and national 

security. Although we have faced serious challenges as a nation over the past forty years as a 

result of our dependence on oil, there is no question that they would have been far more serious 

without the progress we have made thus far. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9518-A1, p. 4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 149-150.]

There's no question that using less oil is better than using more oil, especially for the 

environment. And these standards are an important tool to help us achieve that goal. But from an 

energy-security perspective, this rule is really requiring simply to maintain our current level of 

security. It's often overlooked that our dependence on oil arises not from how much oil we use 

but from how much we spend on oil, the volatility of that total expenditure, and the effect of 

volatility on the economy.

The price of oil is set in a dynamic global market, and our reduced use of several million barrels 

per day over a period of 15 years is just as likely to result in lower production as it is to result in 

higher prices. As we all know, growing demand from the developing world is increasing upward 

pressure on oil prices.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-181

And, in fact, just yesterday, the EIA posted on its website the early release of the 2012 Annual 

Energy Outlook, which is calling for oil prices to reach up to $146 per barrel in 2010 dollars by 

the end of the forecast period. In fact, if you look at the chart which I handed out and we'll stick 

in the record, what you can see here is, even if the energy intensity of the economy is improved 

over the past several decades, the actual percentage of our economy that we are spending, the 

percentage of GDP that we're spending on oil is actually increasing, which goes directly to the 

question of oil dependence.

The only way to address this price volatility, which is a threat of our nation, we believe, is to stop 

using oil.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

As we noted in our report to hear on the issues of the American Securities Project, much of our 

oil comes from countries at high risk of instability several of which work actively against U.S. 

interests. Recent developments with Iran are yet another reminder of this fact.

By 2030 we will be using 1.5 million barrels less oil every day due to these standards.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 122-123.]

Organization: Smith, G.

'Reduce oil consumption by an estimated 2.2 million barrels a day by 2025 more than our daily 

2010 oil imports from the entire Persian Gulf.' Here they fail to point out that by opening up and 

encouraging exploitation of our domestic oil and gas, we will not need to be reliant on any 

imports. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8438-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Tesla Motors, Inc.

Enacting a final rule that forces alternative technology is necessary to reduce dependence on the 

monopoly of oil in transportation fuel for national security, the economy and the environment; 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 1]

Reducing our dependence on petroleum in the transportation sector is a national imperative. By 

shifting the transportation sector to electricity, the United States can significantly reduce GHGs. 

Displacing traditional internal combustion engines with EVs can assist significantly in meeting 

this goal. EVs such as the Tesla Roadster, the Model S, and Model X generate zero greenhouse 

gases. Thanks to the over 2,500 all electric Roadsters in 31 countries on the roads today, Tesla 

customers have accumulated nearly 20 million pure EV miles displacing the need to utilize 

nearly 50,000 barrels of oil. Even when taking into consideration the source of the electricity 

stored on the vehicles, the GHG profile of EVs is lower than their internal combustion engine 

counterparts. A study by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Electric Power 

Research Institute (EPRI) demonstrated that on a well-to- wheels comparison, use of plug-in 
EPA Response to Comments

18-182

hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) would result in reductions of anywhere from 3.4 to 10.3 billion 

metric tons of GHGs from 2010 to 2050 depending on the penetration level of PHEVs. With EVs 

that utilize no gasoline whatsoever, this reduction should be even higher. With the impacts of 

climate change caused by excessive GHGs evident today, switching away from traditional ICE 

equipped vehicles is an environmental imperative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 3]

In addition to the environmental benefits, there are other compelling justifications for moving 

away from oil dependent modes of transportation. The United States currently accounts for 25% 

of world oil consumption. According to the Department of Energy, the U.S. transportation 

system remains dependent on petroleum for 97% of its energy needs. This dependence has left 

our nation vulnerable to various externalities that have placed undue burdens on the domestic 

economy. In fact, a 2005 study by Oakridge National Laboratory confirmed that the U.S. 

economy has lost trillions of dollars in the past 30 years due to our oil dependence. A recent blog 

post in the Washington Post put this figure in real terms: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, 

p. 3]

In 2011, the United States paid about $125 billion more for oil imports than it did in 2010 

(thanks, in part, to the disruptions caused by civil war in Libya). That “oil tax” was essentially 

enough to wipe out the entire stimulative effects of Barack Obama’s middle-class tax cut. A 

similar oil spike this year would cancel out a hefty chunk of the benefits of extending the $200 

billion payroll tax cut bill that Congress is fighting over. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, 

pp. 3-4]

The recent volatility and steady rise in oil prices highlights the economic vulnerability of 

America to foreign sources of oil. For example, OPEC forecasted revenues of over $1 trillion 

dollars for 2011, which represents a 32.5% increase since 2010. For comparison, this is 

approximately 1.6% of global GDP in 2010. With a trade deficit of nearly $500 billion for 2010, 

eliminating our dependence on foreign oil could cut that deficit nearly in half. These economic 

benefits are in addition to the number of jobs created by moving to clean technology vehicles 

like Tesla EVs. As noted earlier, Tesla projects total employment of over 3,000 employees by 

end of 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 4]

Moreover, being dependent on foreign sources of oil from volatile regions of the world requires 

the U.S. to spend more and more of its military budget on assisting in stabilizing these regions, 

even as the war in Iraq has ended. Iran’s recent threats to close the Strait of Hormuz (through 

which about 20 percent of the world’s oil flows) required redeployment of a U.S. Navy carrier 

group in order to ensure the security of that oil flow. Maintaining a strong and continuous 

military presence in the Middle East necessitates large expenditures by the federal government to 

support these operations. Such spending can and does contribute to the national deficit. More 

importantly, this puts America’s young men and women serving in the military in harm’s way to 

feed our national thirst for ever more oil resource. Reducing our dependence on foreign oil is, 

therefore, more than an environmental issue; it is a matter of economic and national

security. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 4]

The U.S.’s dependence on oil – both of foreign and domestic origin, has been due in part to a 

verifiable lack of competitive market alternatives. Due to developments by innovative companies 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-183

like Tesla Motors, alternative technologies are emerging as true competitors to the oil dominated 

marketplace. EPA and NHTSA are in a unique position to help push this innovation through a 

robust GHG/CAFE final rule. In fact, as is demonstrated below the case for EV technology is so 

compelling, EPA’s and NHTSA’s proposed standards are not only a step in the right direction; 

they can be further strengthened to encourage cost-effective, feasible EV technology. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9539-A2, p. 4]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Energy Security & Oil Savings

The proposed standards will also dramatically reduce U.S. oil consumption by as much as 1.5 

million barrels per day (mbd) – roughly 23 billion gallons of gasoline annually – in 2030 alone. 

This is equivalent to 2010 U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq combined. And the 

cumulative oil savings of the National Program (MYs 2012-2025) could result in a total 

reduction in U.S. oil consumption of nearly 3.5 mbd in 2030, nearly double the amount the U.S. 

currently imports from the entire Persian Gulf. No other federal policy has delivered greater oil 

savings, energy security benefits, or greenhouse gas emissions reductions to the country. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 4]

It appears that the agencies did not fully account for key societal benefits in the proposed rule. 

Specifically, the agencies did not account for the economic benefits from reduced oil imports for 

either the ‘monopsony’ effect or U.S. military expenditures. In both cases, real-world experience 

would dictate there are clear benefits to the United States. First, the U.S. spends significant 

resources defending oil shipping channels around the world and responding to threats of 

terrorism, which are often funded with profits from oil sales.20 We appreciate the agencies 

concern that it is a challenge to quantify these costs, however, such potentially significant costs 

cannot be discounted. For instance, a recent peer-reviewed study found that the U.S. military 

spent $7.3 trillion maintaining aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf from 1976-2007.21 Since this 

presence is largely purposed to protect key oil shipping lanes, it provides an indication of the 

significant cost to the U.S. economy as a result of our reliance on oil. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9567-A2, pp. 5-6]

Further, the agencies state that they did not include the benefits of the monopsony effects 

because of “the redistributive nature of this ‘monopsony effect’ when viewed from a global 

perspective.” The agencies elaborate: “Although there is clearly a benefit to the U.S. when 

considered from a domestic perspective, the decrease in price due to decreased demand in the 

U.S. also represents a loss to other countries.” This argument runs counter to the original intent 

of the CAFE program and its stated requirement to consider the need of the United States to 

conserve energy (49 U.S.C. 32902). Congress has consistently set CAFE standards for the exact 

purpose of delivering “energy security through improved vehicle fuel economy.”24 Energy 

security includes, though is not limited to, reducing U.S. exposure to volatile global oil markets, 

regardless of whether this results in an economic loss to oil-producing nations. To exclude this 

benefit when it is so fundamentally tied to the goals of the CAFE program is an abdication of 

NHTSA’s statutory responsibility. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]
EPA Response to Comments

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Our continued dependence on oil puts our economy at risk from the effects of oil price volatility 

and energy insecurity. Oil price spikes were associated with most of the U.S. recessions in the 

past 40 years. The United States currently sends $1 billion each day to foreign countries to pay 

for oil and other petroleum products—that is equivalent to more than half of the average daily 

U.S. trade deficit over the last decade. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A1, p. 2]

Finally, as UCS has noted in prior comment submissions, AEO’s projection does not account for 

inevitable price spikes that will occur during the lifetime of the vehicles assessed under this rule. 

Such spikes are closely tied to our nation’s inflation and GDP, and thus can have serious 

economic consequences. With this in mind, the agencies should attempt to quantify the benefits 

of reduced susceptibility to such spikes, and incorporate them into the program’s benefits writ 

large. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 13]

20 See, for example, The Saudi Connection: How billions in oil money spawned a global terror 

network. U.S. News & World Report. December 7, 2003. 

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031215/15terror.htm. Accessed February 10, 

2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]

21 http://www.princeton.edu/oeme/articles/US-miiltary-cost-of-Persian-Gulf-forceprojection.pdf [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]

24 The 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act contained increases to CAFE standards 

under Title 1, which carried the title “ENERGY SECURITY THROUGH IMPROVED 

VEHICLE FUEL ECONOMY” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]

America's dependence on oil puts our health and our environment and our national security at 

risk. Whether it's the threat of international terrorism, the devastating impact of global climate 

change or lost income and jobs due to oil price shocks, the damage caused by American's heavy 

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 215-216.

Organization: Thirty Senators from the United States Senate

The proposed standards have broad industry support, but they will also reduce petroleum use and 

pollution on an aggressive schedule, as Congress required in the 2007 statute. As the latest 

Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook has concluded, increases in fuel 

economy have contributed to our declining dependence on oil imports. [NHTSA-2010-0131-

0264-A1, p.1]

Further progress will be made with the implementation of the proposed standards, which taken 

together with the recently adopted standards for model years 2012 to 2016, will remove the need 

for as much as 3.8 million barrels of petroleum per day by 2030. Consumers will save thousands 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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of dollars at the pump over the lifetime of their vehicles, and both our economy and our security 

will be less dependent on imported oil. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0264-A1, p.2]

Organization: Lieutenant General Rick Zilmer (Retired)

On 01/19/2012 at Philadelphia, PA, Lieutenant General Rick Zilmer (Retired) testified in support 

of this rule. Highlights from his testimony are below: 

- He discussed the findings of a recently completed study entitled, "Ensuring America's Freedom 

of Movement, a National Security Imperative to Reduce U.S. Oil Dependence", developed by the 

Military Advisory Board at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). He testified that 

“[t]his...study looked a little bit outside of our lane by bringing it into looking at what the 

potential would be for incorporating the use of alternative fuels to reduce our dependency on 

U.S. oil and U.S. oil imports into this nation.” He went on to testify that there are about 11 

members on the Military Advisory Board and between them, they have 400 years of collective 

experience.

- In the study, it concluded that “...if the Strait of Hormuz closed for 30 days, it would bring our 

trucking industry to its knees, it would reduce our gross domestic product by somewhere in the 

order of four billion dollars just over a 30-day period.”

- The study concluded that “[w]e could reduce our consumption within ten years by 30 percent, 

and we could take some of these emergent technologies of alternatives fuels that are not yet 

ready for marketplace forces. They need more support. They need policy, national leadership, 

that is going to create the environment through which these emergent technologies can develop.”

- Finally, he testified that “[the energy security/fuel issue is] not going to get solved by hoping 

and praying that we can drill more. That's not the answer. It's looking to efficiency. And in 

closing, thank you again, and we do strongly from CNA support and urge the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration and EPA to finalize these rules that will set the bar at 54 and a half 

miles per gallon by 2025 for this simple reason, better gas mileage is simply a matter of national 

security.”

Response:

The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), America's Natural 

Gas Alliance (ANGA) and American Gas Association (AGA), American Public Gas Association 

(APGA), Applied Materials, BlueGreen Alliance, Consumer Federation of America, Detroit 

NAACP, Ecology Center, Environmental Defense Fund, International Council on Clean 

Transportation, National Wildlife Federation, a Representative from the Michigan House of 

Representatives (489th District), a Senator from the Michigan State Senate (District 18), Pew 

Charitable Trusts, Renewable Energy Long Island, Securing America’s Future Energy, Sierra 

Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, Clean Air Council, Tesla Motors Inc., 

Union of Concerned Scientists, and thirty Senators from the United States Senate and a couple of 

private citizens (Kobus, Smith) all commented that the U.S. transportation sector is highly 

dependent upon foreign oil, and that this rule will have the beneficial effect of reducing that 
EPA Response to Comments

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dependency. R. Mark questioned the effectiveness of previous CAFE standards and suggested 

that the current rule would have little impact on U.S. oil import reductions. We agree with the 

vast majority of commenters that this rule will reduce U.S. oil consumption and imports of oil 

and improve the energy security position of the U.S. Using detailed estimates of future 

technology penetration and vehicle fleet projections, EPA estimates that this rule will reduce oil 

consumption in the U.S. by 3.87 billion barrels over the lifetimes of the 2017 to 2025 model year 

vehicles covered by this rule, which, in turn, will reduce U.S. oil imports. (See Section I.D.2 of 

the Preamble.) 

EPA received numerous comments about the treatment and valuation of energy security 

benefits from this rule. The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE), the 

Union of Concerned Scientists and the BlueGreen Alliance recommended that the monopsony 

benefit of the rule be included in EPA’s overall estimates of the energy security benefits, since it 

is a benefit to the U.S. Alternatively, instead of focusing simply upon the economic benefits of 

lower petroleum prices on consumers, ACEEE specifically commented that the lower price of oil 

would result in job creation in the U.S. According to ACEEE, the employment benefits of the 

lower oil prices from the rule should be counted as a benefit to the U.S. as well as the 

monoposony benefit. EPA continues to view energy security from a global perspective, and 

therefore excludes the monopsony benefit to the U.S. since this benefit is offset by losses to 

foreign oil producers. (See Section III.H.8.c of the Preamble for more discussion of this topic.) 

Also, EPA has not been able to develop a robust estimate of the impacts of lower oil prices on 

overall economic activity or employment in the U.S. as a result of this rule. Therefore, we cannot 

draw conclusions as to the employment impacts of a decline in the world price of oil on the U.S. 

economy. (See Section III. H.12.c. of the Preamble for more discussion of this topic.)

In contrast, the other portion of the energy security premium, the U.S. macroeconomic 

disruption and adjustment cost that arises from U.S. petroleum imports, does not have offsetting 

impacts outside of the U.S., and is thus included in the energy security benefits estimated for this 

program. Therefore, EPA has included only the macroeconomic disruption portion of the energy 

security benefits to estimate the monetary value of the total energy security benefits of this 

program. EPA has calculated energy security in very specific terms, as the reduction in both 

financial and strategic risks caused by potential sudden disruptions in the supply of imported 

petroleum to the U.S. Reducing the amount of oil imported reduces those risks, and thus 

increases the nation’s energy security. (See Section III.H.8.b of the Preamble for more discussion 

of this topic.)

The Defour Group commented that there is no relationship between the energy security 

benefits of the U.S. and reduced oil consumption by the U.S., since the world economies are all 

tied together, thus calling into question estimates of the energy security benefits of these rules. 

As mentioned above, EPA does not count economic transfers between countries as a part of the 

energy security benefits of this rule, but we do count the macroeconomic disruption component 

of the energy security premium, which directly influences the performance of the U.S. economy. 

The macroeconomic disruption component of the energy security premium is specific to the U.S. 

Moreover, the Defour Group believes there is too much uncertainty in generating energy 

security premiums, and asserted that the energy security premiums are not a credible approach to 

providing estimates of energy security benefits of the rule. The EPA sponsored an extensive peer 
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review of the methodology on which the energy security benefits for the rule is based. (See 

Section III.H.8.b of the Preamble for more discussion of this topic.) The methodology of 

estimating the energy security benefits of particular actions, policies, and rules has been well 

documented and is well accepted by the energy security community. Thus, EPA continues to use 

the current methodology for estimating the energy security benefits of our rules.

Many commenters in both written comments and at the public hearings expressed their 

belief that these standards will have significant benefits for U.S. military-related energy and 

national security. A number of commenters, including consumer advocacy and environmental 

organizations, organizations representing labor, and state and local governments, as well as 

energy security advocates and numerous private individuals, felt that the EPA should quantify, to 

the extent possible, a military component of the energy security benefits associated with this 

rulemaking. These commenters felt that, although they understand that the EPA would have 

difficulties in determining a point estimate of the energy security benefits from reduced military 

costs as a result of the rule, that even ranges would be useful. The American Petroleum Institute 

suggested that quantification of this category of benefits—U.S. energy security and national 

security benefits—was too difficult, and it should be left unquantified.

As Lieutenant General (Ret.) Richard Zilmer, commander of U.S. coalition forces in 

Anbar province in Iraq in 2006-2007, testified at the Philadelphia public hearing in support of the 

proposed standards: “better gas mileage is simply a matter of national security.” Lt. Gen. (Ret.) 

Zilmer contributed to a report of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) that discussed the 

implications of oil import reductions and energy security. The report focused on changes in the 

American transportation sector, in terms of fuel efficiency, alternative fuels, and transportation 

habits that would be needed in order for the U.S. economy to have enough resilience to sustain a 

drastic disruption in oil supply. Among its findings and recommendations, the report states that 

“[t]he federal government fuel economy standards have proven to be effective at increasing 

efficiency and reducing the use of oil...These standards should be supported and strengthened as 

a means of making our nation more secure.” The report states that “[t]he benefits of efficiency 

are so obvious and sizeable that it is amazing to consider how or why our country has failed to 

insist on (or at least incentivize) it up to now. ̈ 

One of the goals of a U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf is to avoid the impacts oil 

price shocks from a supply cut-off on the U.S. economy. Although CNA did not conduct an 

economy-wide analysis of an oil supply shock, it did consider the impact of such a shock on one 

industrial sector that is heavily dependent on petroleum: the U.S. trucking transportation 

industry. CNA then considered a 100 per cent disruption in the flow of oil, lasting 30 days in the 

Strait of Hormuz. They estimated that such a disruption would have caused losses of $3.3 billion 

or 2.9 percent of the U.S. trucking industry’s output in 2009. According to CNA, this disruption 

would have caused 37,500 truckers to lose their jobs. This analysis concludes with “[i]f the U.S. 

– and this industry in particular – could reduce its use of petroleum by 30 percent, the effect of 

such supply disruptions would be nearly zero.” Although CNA’s report focused on the trucking 

sector, EPA believes that these findings are The Department of the Navy has also stated that the 

Navy and Marine Corps rely far too much on petroleum, which “degrades the strategic position 

of our country and the tactical performance of our forces. The global supply of oil is finite, it is 

becoming increasingly difficult to find and exploit, and over time cost continues to rise.” In 

remarks given to the White House Energy Security Summit on April 26, 2011, Deputy Security 
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of Defense William J. Lynn, III noted the direct impact of energy security on military readiness 

and flexibility. According to relevant to this rule since both the heavy-duty and light-duty 

vehicles in the U.S. are highly dependent upon petroleum. 

Moreover, the military itself is heavily dependent on oil. To maintain such military 

effectiveness and flexibility, the Department of Defense identified in the Quadrennial Defense 

Review that it is “increasing its use of renewable energy supplies and reducing energy demand to 

improve operational effectiveness, reduce greenhouse gas emissions in support of U.S. climate 

change initiatives, and protect the Department from energy price fluctuations.” Deputy Security 

Lynn, “Today, energy technology remains a critical element of our military superiority. 

Addressing energy needs must be a fundamental part of our military planning.” 

EPA’s analysis of energy security benefits from reducing U.S. oil imports did not include 

an estimate of potential reductions in costs for maintaining a U.S. military presence to help 

secure stable oil supply from potentially vulnerable regions of the world because attributing 

military spending to particular missions or activities is difficult. 

SAFE commented on a study by RAND that showed the ongoing expense of oil 

dependence to the U.S. military. RAND considered military force reductions and cost savings 

that could be achieved if oil security were no longer a consideration. Taking two approaches, 

and guided by post Cold-War force draw downs and by a top-down look at the current U.S. 

allocation of defense resources, RAND concluded that $75–$91 billion, or 12–15 per cent of the 

U.S. defense budget in 2009 could be reduced if U.S. dependence on imported oil were 

eliminated entirely. However, the study also concludes that the reduction in military costs from 

a partial reduction in the U.S. dependence on imported oil would be minimal. 

America’s Natural Gas Alliance, the American Gas Association, and Tesla Motors, Inc. 

pointed specifically to the expense of maintaining naval forces in the Persian Gulf as an 

important factor in this rulemaking. EPA reviewed a study by Stern that presents an estimate of 

military cost for Persian Gulf force projection, addressing the challenge of cost allocation with 

an activity-based cost method. Stern used information on actual naval force deployments rather 

than budgets, focusing on the costs of aircraft carrier deployment. For the 1976–2007 time 

frame, Stern estimated an average military cost of $212 billion per year and $500 billion for 

2007 alone, that could be potentially reduced will lower oil imports. 

Although these recent studies provide significant, useful insights into the military 

components of U.S. energy security, they do not provide enough substantive analysis to develop 

a robust methodology for quantifying the military components of energy security for this 

rulemaking. Even for studies that provide insight into the attribution of specific missions to the 

objective of securing international oil production and distribution, they provide little guidance on 

the degree to which incremental reductions in the U.S. dependence on imported oil would reduce 

or eliminate those missions or programs. Thus, while EPA plans to continue to review newer

studies and literature to better estimate the military components of U.S. energy security benefits, 

for this rulemaking EPA continues to exclude military cost components in our quantified energy 

security benefits. (See Section III.H.8.e of the Preamble for more discussion on this topic.) To 

summarize, EPA has been unable to calculate the monetary benefit that the United States will 

receive from the improvements in national security expected to result from our standards. 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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18.6. Other Impacts

Organizations Included in this Section

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 28-29.]

The 20 million barrels of oil America uses every day accounts for 40 percent of the U.S. carbon 

pollution load that causes climate changes. Meanwhile, when drilling projects go wrong, whole 

ecosystems are threatened by disasters like the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010, and smaller 

leaks and spills like the recent Enbridge oil spill here in Michigan. Recent pipeline spills do 

grave harm right in our backyards: to residents, to wildlife like herons, muskrats, and ducks and 

geese and destroy decades of community efforts that were intended on restoring rivers like the 

Kalamazoo. Today we have real opportunity to combat these threats.

Response:

EPA has estimated that there will be significant fuel savings associated with the final 

standards. In addition to the monetized fuel savings benefits EPA has estimated in its costbenefit analysis, it is likely that there are many additional impacts associated with the standards 

that have gone unquantified due to data, methodological, or resource limitations (for example, 

see RIA Chapter 6). To the extent that there are omitted beneficial impacts associated with 

reducing fuel consumption like those listed by the commenter, our benefits analysis can be 

considered conservative. However, such an analysis was beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

18.6.1. Added Costs from Congestion, Accidents, and Noise

Organizations Included in this Section

American Road & Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Organization: American Road & Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA)

Further, to improve traffic flow and reduce emissions and fuel waste, we must increase surface 

transportation system capacity. VMT has grown by over 150 percent since the 1970s. In stark 

contrast, the number of new lane miles in the United States has increased by only six percent. 

Providing additional lane miles requires a significant investment in our nation’s future and we 

must update the HTF to adequately reflect changing circumstances. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9403-A1, p. 3]

Congestion levels have grown continuously between 1982 and 2007. Since 1982, the number of 

hours spent in congested traffic in the nation’s largest metropolitan areas increased from 21 
EPA Response to Comments

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hours to 51 hours. In addition to losing valuable time in traffic, travelers are also wasting an 

estimated 4.2 billion gallons of fuel due to congestion. 4 Simply put, the nation’s road system is 

falling far behind growth in usage. The direct consequence is rampant traffic congestion and, 

with it, unnecessarily increased emissions and pollution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1, 

p. 3]

Insufficient capacity already produces specific bottlenecks cause 50 percent of total congestion 

on the nation’s freeways. In 2004, a study of the nation’s most severely congested highways 

highlighted the reality that significant reductions in emissions require a reduction in vehicle time 

traveled, not vehicle miles traveled. The study concluded that modest improvements to traffic 

flow at 233 bottlenecks would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by as much as 77 percent and 

conserve more than 40 billion gallons of fuel over a 20-year period.5 These fuel savings translate 

directly into lower CO2 emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9403-A1, p. 3]

4 Texas Transportation Institute, 2009 “Urban Mobility Report,”2009.

5 Unclogging America’s Arteries, Effective Relief for Highway, Cambridge Systematics, Inc., 

February 2004

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

The Relationship Between Congestion, Fuel Use and GHG Emissions Is Well Established

Congestion has a direct and well-documented impact on fuel economy and emissions. As shown 

through a 2010 Urban Mobility Report developed by the Texas Transportation Institute, traffic 

congestion has resulted in billions of gallons of wasted fuel each year: [See chart on p. A-9 of 

Docket number [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 

A-8]

Response:

While consideration of the need to increase surface transportation system capacity to 

improve traffic flow and reduce emissions and fuel waste is beyond the scope of this rulemaking, 

EPA does account for the fact that increased vehicle use associated with the rebound effect 

contributes to increased traffic congestion. As described in Joint TSD 4.2.7 and Preamble 

III.H.9, EPA monetizes the higher costs imposed by added delays to drivers and other vehicle 

occupants in the form of increased travel time and operating expenses. 

18.6.2. Benefits of Increased Driving

No comments were received on this topic.

18.6.3. Benefits of Less Frequent Refueling

No comments were received on this topic.
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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18.7. U.S. Vehicle Sales Impacts

Organizations Included in this Section

Alexandria Hyundai

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Ceres

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Defour Group LLC

Edmunds.com

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

Ross, D.

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Organization: Alexandria Hyundai

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 66-67.]

The agencies have acknowledged the technologies needed to meet regulations will increase the 

cost of vehicles. Thus for all stakeholders involved, including consumers, auto dealers and 

manufacturers, we must have a clear understanding of how much vehicle costs will increase, and 

whether consumers will perceive sufficient value in those increases to pay for them.

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Automakers today are driving this country’s economic recovery. Yet, in light of the uncertainty 

over consumer valuation of fuel savings and other factors, the agencies have not included an 

estimate of sales or employment impacts in the NPRM or supporting documents. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.20] [This comment can also be found in section18.8 of this 

comment summary.]

The agencies need to understand and take these impacts into account to assure that the 

standards being put in place for MY 2022-25 do not reverse the economic gains and 

environmental benefits that have come from the industry’s recent recovery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-
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2010-0799-9487-A1, p.20] [This comment can also be found in section18.8 of this comment 

summary.]

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

For the MY2012-2016 rule, the agencies projected an increase in vehicle sales, using an 

approach that is equally applicable to the current proposal. The approach considers five years of 

discounted fuel savings, minus the incremental cost of a more efficient vehicle, as the net added 

value to the buyer at the time of purchase. As noted in the current NPRM, the change in sales is 

among the factors determining the impacts of the rule on auto sector employment (NPRM 

p.75155). Despite this, the agencies do not quantify the sales impacts of the MY2017-2025 rule. 

We believe that the approach previously taken is reasonable and yields a better estimate than a 

default value of zero (for change in sales). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2 p.2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 112.]

One important question, clearly: What will the higher cost per vehicle do to car sales? This effect 

can be challenging to predict. But recent evidence from new polls and industry trends suggest a 

growing demand for fuel economy by consumers. And there, moreover, appears to be a strong 

link between consumer confidence and the purchase of new cars. So by enacting the proposed 

standards, EPA and NHTSA could positively influence consumer confidence, pushing it up, and 

by ensuring that we are moving in a positive direction with our energy use, they are likely to 

stimulate consumer spending in highly positive ways which, in turn, would result in greater gains 

from the proposed fuel economy standards. And equally critical, that would drive the positive job 

and other financial benefits to the U.S. economy.

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

These standards are based on an unreasonably aggressive expectation of increased electrification. 

The agency predicts that annual sales of hybrids, plug-in hybrids and all electric vehicles could 

represent 15% of new sales by 2025 (see footnote 13 at 76 Federal Register 74860; 17 – 35% in 

Figure 5 at 76 Federal Register 75081 for manufacturers with annual sales above 500,000 

vehicles; about 30% in Figure 6 at 76 FR 75082 for manufacturers with annual sales 30,000 –

500,000 vehicles). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.5]

In reality, electric vehicle sales have been a huge disappointment for automakers. The Chevy 

Volt, the American-made plug-in hybrid that General Motors had high hopes for going into 

2011, fell short of GM's planned sales target of 10,000 units for the year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.5]

This exuberant and unwarranted optimism also extends to hybrid electric vehicles as shown 

below: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.5] [For the figure 'shown below' please refer to 

EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.6]

Organization: Ceres
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18-193

The analysis concluded that, under the proposed standards, the auto industry as a whole is likely 

to see sales improve by 4.7%, and profits by 4.2%. The Detroit 3 are in the best position; they 

are likely to see sales increase by 5%, and profits by 5.2%. The rest of the industry, while 

benefiting from the standards, does not fare quite as well as the Detroit 3; it is likely to see sales 

increase by 4.4% and profits by 3.4%. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

VII. AUTOMAKER INCENTIVES: THE AUTO INDUSTRY HAS STRONG INCENTIVES 

TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARDS

Globalization of the auto industry means it is no longer possible to be a successful automaker 

without being able to compete globally. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

As shown in Exhibit S-7, the proposed standard brings U.S. standards up to international levels. 

[Exhibit S-7 can be found on p. 10 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1] 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

The proposed standard reduces the supply-side risk of introducing new fuel savings technologies 

and triggers competition around fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 8]

Automakers know they can sell quality. As shown in Exhibit S-8, according to statistics 

compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is responsible for the Producer Price Index, 

[Exhibit S-8 can be found on p. 11 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-

A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 10]

• Over the past fifteen years, automakers have added three times as much value (and cost) 

with optional improvements in quality than mandatory (safety and environmental) 

improvements. 

• The overall increase in MSRP tends to track closely to the increase in real disposable 

income.

• The cost increases that the long-term standards will require over the next 15 years are 

well below the cost of quality improvement over the past 15 years.

• Unlike most other quality additions, fuel economy improvements deliver pocketbook 

savings to consumers.

• In today’s market, fuel economy is a major determinant of vehicle quality that the market 

can easily absorb. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 10]

And that leads me to the fourth and most important reason. There is no sticker shock here, none 

whatsoever. There is no big jump year to year. It's a slow increase in prices. There are uniform 

price increases across all manufacturers because they all have to comply.

The cost of driving goes down. The value of vehicles goes up. There is no reason to believe that 

consumers will not buy these vehicles. And in fact, they've shown by their attitudes and the 

behaviors they are ready to do so.
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 59.]

Car dealers have expressed concern about jobs and dealerships, implying that the standards 

might further hurt them.

Organization: Defour Group LLC

IV. Impact of the Standard on Industry Sales and Employment

Assuming the agencies’ baseline sales of 17 million units in 2025, assuming a baseline combined 

auto and light truck retail transactions price of $28,000 per light duty vehicle ($2009), and 

assuming, with the agencies, a -1.0 industry demand price elasticity, our lower bound estimate of 

$1900 per vehicle net welfare loss yields a loss of 1.1 million industry combined car and light 

truck sales in 2025 relative to the MY 2016 baseline. Further assuming, also with the agencies, 

that every 1,000 unit sales provides 11.3 auto and supplier jobs yields a loss of just over 100,000 

auto industry and supplier jobs. We estimate another 35,000 jobs lost at auto dealers, based on 

BLS data, which brings the total to a loss of 135,000 jobs in MY 2025 (rounded to the nearest 

5,000 jobs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 9]

Our mid-range estimate for industry sales losses is 1.8 million units relative to the baseline, 

which translates into a loss of 155,000 jobs in manufacturing and supply, plus another 50,000 

jobs in distribution for a total job loss of 205,000 jobs in auto manufacturing, supply, and 

distribution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 9] [Cross-referenced with section 16.8]

By comparison, the EIA estimates a loss of 8% of industry sales in 2025 for a 46.1 mpg standard 

relative to the baseline. Scaling this estimate up to the mandated 49.6 mpg yields a loss of 10.3% 

of industry sales or 1.8 million units off the 17 million unit baseline sales —the same as our midrange estimate. This further translates into the identical loss of 205,000 in the manufacture, 

supply, and distribution of cars and light trucks. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 9]

All of these estimates are extremely conservative because they assume the 34.1 mpg mandate for 

MY 2016 as their baseline. This is inconsistent with the mainstream research cited in Part II and 

that found baselines of 23 mpg much closer to the level beyond which consumers would be 

unwilling to pay for increases in fuel economy. The laws of declining marginal benefits (utility) 

and increasing marginal costs imply that the actual level of net consumer welfare losses and the 

attendant sales and employment losses are exponentially higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9319-A1, p. 9]

Organization: Edmunds.com

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 103-104.]

Decreased competition or innovation of any features, including fuel economy, poses the risk that 

vehicles will be less differentiated, and thus offer decreased utility to certain consumers, 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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especially those who strongly value the affected features. This could decrease new car sales, if 

consumers are less motivated to replace their cars as frequently and/or if consumers turn to used 

cars. Given the sizable contribution of auto sales to the U.S. economy, any slowdown in auto 

sales has the potential to generate significant adverse effects in other parts of the economy as 

well.

Secondly, the current proposal needs to demonstrate a fuller understanding of consumer demand 

for vehicles and how adding higher prices, decreased innovation and choice, and excessively 

complex information could affect consumer decision-making on new vehicle purchases and 

potentially result in lower auto sales.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

H. FINAL RULE SHOULD INCLUDE QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES OF VEHICLES 

SALES AND AUTO MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

EPA and NHTSA conducted quantitative vehicle sales and auto manufacturing employment 

analyses in previous rulemakings and had prepared an estimate of these same indices for the 

rulemaking action at issue here using the same methodologies. However, the results of these 

analyses were not included in the published proposal. The changes occurred during the OMB 

review process. The docket for this rulemaking includes interagency drafts of the proposal 

submitted to OMB with the quantitative analyses included. The docket also includes the request 

by OMB to remove the quantitative analyses from the proposal33 and responses from EPA and 

NHTSA stating the importance of the quantitative analyses and requesting they be left in the 

final proposal.34 See Attachment B. We incorporate this document as an integral part of EDF’s 

comments for inclusion in the administrative record for this rulemaking action. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 14]

We respectfully request that the quantitative vehicle sales and auto manufacturing employment 

benefits be included in the final rule to fully reflect the comprehensive societal benefits of the 

proposed program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 14]

[The above comments can also be found in section 18.8 of this comment summary.]

i. VEHICLE SALES

EPA and NHTSA conducted a vehicle sales analysis in previous rulemakings by comparing the 

up-front costs of the vehicles with the present value of five years’ worth of fuel savings. The 

Agencies used the same methodology to quantify vehicle sales impacts for the current proposed 

standards, finding that in 2025, combined new car and light truck sales could increase by an 

estimated 644,000 vehicles.35 However, these results were not included in the final proposed 

rulemaking, which states, “This rule takes effect for MY 2017–2025. In the intervening years, it 

is possible that the assumptions underlying this analysis, as well as market conditions, might 

change.” (Proposal preamble, page 75,151) The proposal therefore concludes, “In light of the 

relevant uncertainties, the agency therefore decided not to include a quantitative sales 

estimate...” (Proposal preamble, page 75,320) While we agree that uncertainties indeed exist in 
EPA Response to Comments

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such an analysis, we strongly believe that a quantitative analysis should at the very least have 

been presented in the proposal for the public to review and comment on. We strongly encourage 

the Agencies to include quantitative vehicle sales estimates in the final rule to reflect full 

transparency and the true estimated benefits of the proposed standards [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9519-A1, pp. 14-15]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 69-71.]

But dealers are concerned about the accelerated schedule in this proposal. The mandates for 

model year 2011 to 2016 just now being implemented aggressively move up the 2020 goal of 35 

miles per gallon by four years. If this proposal aims to set mandates for model years 2017 

through 2025, five of the thirteen years out in the future will more than double the fuel economy 

of the vehicles I now sell.

The showroom realities I see suggest that we should take the time to evaluate how consumers 

react to the higher-mileage/higher-cost vehicles manufacturers will build in the next few years. 

In other words, if we want, if we wait two years, manufacturers would still have the time 

necessary to comply and we would all have better data on which to make decisions. Sales of new 

vehicles were 12.7 million last year, a far cry from the 17-plus million in the high water market 

in the mid 2000s, but much better than the 10.4 million sold in 2009.

Dealers embrace the pivotal role we are playing to help lead our nation back to the road of 

prosperity, but we are wary of anything that might depress sales and turn back the gains being 

made. Simply put, before rushing head-long into a new set of mandates aimed at doubling 

today's fleet fuel economy, we need to know better what the ramifications will be.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 94.]

Next month NADA intends to release a detailed analysis of the proposal's impact on sales, 

especially with respect to certain sensitive market segments.

[Supplemental comments to the testimony]

IV. Consumers Unable to Afford or Unwilling to Pay Higher Prices Have Other Options

New light-duty vehicle sales plummeted in 2008 and 2009, largely due to the recession. The 

measurable increases in average new light-duty vehicle fleet fuel economy performance which 

have occurred since then must be balanced against a dramatic reduction fleet turnover. Currently, 

the in-use fleet is the oldest it has ever been (almost 11 years, on average). Annual new lightduty sales have increased steadily since 2009, but have a long way to go before reaching the once 

“normal” 16 million vehicles per year level. As noted in NADA’s comments, effective fuel 

economy mandates must enhance new light-duty sales and fleet turnover, not retard them, 
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especially given that increases in average new vehicle fuel economy otherwise is expected to 

occur “naturally” as fuel prices trend higher. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, p.4]

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Overall, in 2011, a new study out this week confirms month by month increases in new vehicle 

fuel efficiency, while, despite continued economic uncertainty, vehicle sales were up about 10% 

- far outpacing overall economic growth. 6 7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 4]

6 http://www.umich.edu/~umtriswt/EDI_sales-weighted-mpg.html

7 http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?id=1065931875

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA and NHTSA should include a sales impact assessment using a methodology consistent with 

previous rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

NHTSA should not use a vehicle choice model in its CAFE assessment without opportunity for 

public review and comment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

Organization: Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 71.]

As part of the basis for the proposed rates of improvement, EPA projects that battery electric 

vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles will account for as little as one percent of sales in 

2021 and three percent of sales in 2025.

Yet nearly every major auto manufacturer will have EVs and PHEVs in production within the 

three years -- within three years.

EPA and the Department of Transportation previously estimated that a fleet-wide six-percent 

annual rate of improvement could be achieved with as little as four percent combined sale share 

of EVs and PHEVs in 2025, provided that sales of conventional hybrids continue to increase.

Four counts of significant reductions in the weight and cost of electric vehicle technologies 

further support our conclusion that the most increase in sales of these advanced technology 

vehicles require to achieve a fleet-wide six-percent annual rate of improvement is viable.

Organization: Ross, D.
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 243.]

Now some automobile dealers groups claim harm through lost sales and lost jobs. In reality, all 

else equal, the projected drop in the net cost of vehicle ownership will result in an increase in 

sales.

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

The new proposed standards will continue push improved technologies into the market and boost 

auto sales. In their initial submission to OMB, the agencies conducted a basic sales analysis and 

concluded that the effect on vehicle sales would be positive. Assuming a 3% discount rate, the 

agencies found that car sales would increase by 319,700 in 2025 and truck sales would increase 

by 324,600.13 This analysis was similar to that done in the 2012-16 rule. The final rule should 

include ta sale analysis consistent with that done for the prior rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9549-A2, p. 4]

13 EO12866 Review-Interagency Review material Part 1- 2017-2025 Vehicle GHG and Fuel 

Economy Standard and NPRM 2060 AQ54, Document ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1224, 

pgs. 891-892 of PDF [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 4]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Sales of new light-duty vehicles are also projected to increase under these standards. The Ceres 

analysis found an increase of light-duty vehicles sales compared to business as usual, resulting in 

an additional $37.4 billion in sales 2030.8 While not included in the proposed rule, interagency 

review documents show that EPA has projected a 2.8% increase in car sales and a 5.7% increase 

in light truck sales compared to business as usual.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 3]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 217-218.]

A recent report from CERES found that standards similar to those proposed by the agencies 

would create nearly 500,000 new jobs nationwide in 2030.

Moreover, better fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas performance will improve the

competitiveness of the American auto industry.

In 2008, in the face of rising gas prices and declining economy, American auto makers were ill 

prepared to meet consumers' needs. These standards will ensure that manufacturers continue to 

innovate over the coming decade, providing consumers clean and efficient vehicle choices that 

will help them fight for years to come.
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8 Ceres. More Jobs Per Gallon. Management Information Services, Inc. July, 2011. p. 14 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 3]

9 Interagency review document, EPA-HQ-OAR-20100799-1224, Joint Rulemaking to Establish 

2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards, p. 891-

892. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 3]

Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Unfortunately, this has become as much a political concern as an analytical one, which the UAW 

believes is to the detriment of a broader view of the demand for light-duty vehicles in the United 

States. New vehicle sales are largely driven by employment and income levels and the need for 

replacement vehicles as older vehicles are taken out of service. For example, the drastic 

reduction in vehicle sales that occurred in model year 2009 was caused by the economic crisis, 

and nearly all observers agree that auto sales will increase only to the extent that the economy 

continues to recover. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, pp.6-7]

The history of light-duty vehicle sales over the period that CAFE has been in effect shows that 

economic factors, not changes in CAFE requirements, are the main determinant of vehicle sales. 

The chart below provides a quick visual reference that shows no evident relationship between 

CAFE and sales when viewed in the context of the overall level of sales. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9563-A2, p.7] [To see the chart below please refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, 

p.7]

While the UAW believes that efforts to understand how sales are affected by increased vehicle 

prices for more efficient vehicles are worthwhile and should be continued, the history of new 

vehicle sales makes it clear that the best way to increase vehicle sales to former levels is to focus 

on efforts to improve the economy and increase employment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-

A2, p.7]

Organization: U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars

Overstated Residual Value: In its 2012-2016 Final Rule, EPA discussed the importance of a 

vehicle’s residual value retention over time as a component of the consumer’s total cost of 

ownership. This language appears again in the current NPRM as EPA states, “it is reasonable to 

estimate that the added technology to improve CO2 level and fuel economy will retain the same 

percentage of value when the vehicle is five years old.” In the case of hybrid pickup trucks, the 

marketplace has proven EPA’s estimation to be entirely unreasonable. Leading consumer 

websites, such as Edmunds and Kelley Blue Book, project hybrid pickup trucks depreciate faster 

than trucks with standard engine, resulting in the loss of thousands of dollars to consumers at 

trade-in time. Indeed, the extra depreciation caused by the hybrid content can erase much, if not 

all, of the fuel savings which can potentially accrue to the consumer. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0246-

A1, p.5]
EPA Response to Comments

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Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

The proposed regulations are, and will be, very challenging. One of the challenges is to identify 

the correct pacing of the introduction to the market of the Advanced Technology Vehicles (ATV) 

that are anticipated in the proposal. EPA and NHTSA are trying to clarify the environmental 

needs that are to push a more intensified introduction of ATV's. The intensified introduction of 

ATV's will create many significant challenges and require risk taking for VCC. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9551-A2, p.2]

Response:

These comments show a diversity of opinion on whether this rule will affect vehicle sales 

either positively or negatively. Some put the emphasis on up-front costs and predict reductions 

in vehicle sales; others put the emphasis on the net savings to consumers, based on fuel savings 

outweighing technology costs over the vehicle’s lifetime, and say that vehicle sales will increase. 

The UAW states that vehicle sales are mostly determined by the overall state of the economy. 

ACEEE says that enacting the proposed standards could lead to a positive effect on consumer 

confidence, and thus contribute to stimulating the economy. AFPM expresses concern over “an 

unreasonably aggressive expectation of increased electrification” of the vehicle fleet, while 

NESCAUM says that sales of EVs sufficient to meet even more stringent standards than those 

set here are viable. 

As ACEEE, EDF, Sierra Club et al., and UCS note, in the MYs 2012-16 GHG and CAFE 

rule, EPA conducted a vehicle sales analysis based on a comparison of the tradeoff between the 

desirability of additional fuel savings and the up-front costs of new vehicles (including sales tax, 

insurance, and vehicle financing costs). Several of these organizations recommended that we 

conduct an analysis using the same methodology for this rule. As discussed in Preamble III.H.11 

and RIA Chapter 8.1, we do not quantify vehicle sales impacts, because of uncertainties involved 

in the responses of consumers and automakers in the time horizon of this rule. As the United 

Auto Workers points out, for instance, the state of the economy is a major, if not the primary,

determinant of total vehicle sales. The impact of the rule on sales may therefore depend, among 

other factors, on changes in the state of the economy. Other commenters discussed the 

importance of consumer confidence, fuel prices, and even of publicity over fuel prices, in 

consumers’ interest in additional fuel economy. EPA agrees that these factors are important; 

indeed, fuel prices play an important role in estimating the fuel savings used in analyzing vehicle 

sales, as discussed in RIA Chapters 5.4 and 8.1.1. For other factors, including consumer 

confidence and publicity over fuel prices, we acknowledge their potential for impacts on vehicle 

sales. Even if we did quantify vehicle sales, though, we are not sufficiently confident in 

quantitative estimates of the impacts of those factors to develop numerical estimates.

Another method to estimate effects on vehicle sales is to model the market for vehicles. 

Consumer vehicle choice models estimate what vehicles consumers buy based on vehicle and 

consumer characteristics. As discussed in Section III.H.1.a, Chapter 8.1.2.8 of the RIA, and 

Section 18.1 of this Response to Comments, EPA has been exploring use of a consumer vehicle 

choice model, but we consider it premature to use the model in this rulemaking.
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The studies by Ceres and by the Defour Group (including the 2011 EIA study cited by the 

latter) show how the results of vehicle sales analyses depend on the underlying assumptions. 

The Ceres and Defour analyses, like the method that EPA has used in the past, are based on an

adjusted consumer price that reflects the increase in vehicle cost less a proportion of the expected 

future fuel savings; the EIA study does not consider consumer fuel savings. The per-vehicle 

technology cost estimates in Ceres’ study (for MY 2020) appear to be somewhat lower than 

EPA’s estimates; EIA’s cost estimates are higher; and the Defour Group’s cost estimates are 

substantially higher.85 In the Ceres and Defour cases the estimates take into account estimates of 

the amount of fuel savings that vehicle buyers consider when deciding what vehicles to buy; EIA 

does not consider fuel savings. Ceres estimates that vehicle buyers consider 7 years of fuel 

savings, with sensitivity analysis of 3 to 15 years; we estimate that the Defour Group’s estimate, 

of 25 percent of expected lifetime fuel savings, corresponds roughly to an assumption that buyers 

consider less than 3 years of fuel savings. Because the Defour Group and EIA analyses uses 

higher costs and lower benefits than the Ceres analysis, it is unsurprising that the three studies 

come up with very different vehicle sales estimates. EPA does not endorse the results of any of 

these studies. 

As discussed in Section III.D.6 of the Preamble, in this final rule we project very low 

rates of EV penetration as part of a compliance strategy for the rule – around 2 percent in MY 

2025 – and a combined penetration of strong HEVs, EVs, and PHEVs of around 7 percent (see 

Preamble Table III-52). We consider these penetration rates to be low enough that the new 

vehicle market will absorb these vehicles. We note that automakers are not obliged to use 

electrification as part of their strategies for compliance. 

We agree that enacting these standards should contribute to the development and use of 

advanced technologies that will have applicability for meeting standards in other countries. As a 

result, vehicles built in the U.S. are more likely to achieve international standards. The ability to 

design vehicles that meet standards in foreign as well as domestic markets can be expected to 

reduce costs of design for automakers.

We agree that the macroeconomy both affects and is affected by the auto industry’s 

condition, and by the level of production and sales of autos. The vehicle sales projections that 

we use for the rule analysis, as discussed in TSD Chapter 1, are based on models that incorporate 

projections of the economy into the future. 

We disagree with Edmunds that there will be decreased competition or innovation of any 

features. As discussed in Preamble III.H.1, RIA Chapter 8.1, and Section 18.1 of this Response 

to Comments, it is possible for automakers to achieve both improved fuel economy and 

maintained levels of other vehicle attributes, including fleet diversity; it should thus be possible 

for automakers to improve both fuel economy and other vehicle attributes, if consumers are 

 85 The Defour Group’s cost estimates are based on the technology costs of MYs 2011-25 rulemakings, not 

the costs just of this rule. EPA considers it appropriate to examine the costs and benefits of this rule, with the

impacts of other rules included in its baseline for analysis. In addition, the Defour Group assumes that indirect costs 

for all technologies equal the direct costs, by using a retail price equivalent multiplier of 2.0; EPA’s cost estimates 

take into account that indirect costs for new technologies vary with the complexity of the technology and the time 

frame since its adoption. This issue is discussed in detail in TSD Chapter 3.1.2.2.
EPA Response to Comments

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willing to pay for those other attributes. The agencies’ cost methodology in fact includes cost of 

preserving all vehicle utilities found in the present fleet. See EPA RIA at pp. 1-39 to 40. The 

rule provides a thorough review of the literature on consumer demand for vehicles and how fuel 

economy affects it, in Preamble III.H.1 and RIA Chapter 8.1.2. 

We do not understand what Edmunds means in expressing concern over “excessively

complex information.” Vehicle technology has been increasing in complexity probably since the 

invention of the automobile. For most vehicles, technologies that will satisfy the rule, such as 

improved transmissions, require little, if any, additional explanation, because their use is unlikely 

to play much of a direct role in vehicle purchase decisions.

The U.S. Coalition for Advanced Diesel Cars calls into question application of the same 

residual value to hybrid vehicles as to other vehicles in the cost of ownership analysis. The cost 

of ownership analysis (see Preamble III.H.5 and RIA Chapter 5.5) does not make use of residual 

value. The vehicle sales analysis that EPA has used in the past does take into account residual 

value, as described in RIA Chapter 8.1.1. That vehicle sales analysis was done at an aggregate 

level, though; it does not have the precision to separate effects for individual models or classes. 

For that purpose, we consider the use of an average residual value to be appropriate. 

18.7.1. Access to Auto Loans and Effects on Low-Income Consumers

Organizations Included in this Section

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Consumers Union

Defour Group LLC

Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Ross, D.

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

• Automakers adjust MSRP and discounts and auto financing in response to much larger 

changes in affordability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 10] 

Concerns about a negative impact of the standards on consumers and the auto market are 

unfounded, even in the case of low income consumers because they rest on faulty assumptions 

that are contradicted by the above analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 10]

• When the costs of driving go down, vehicle ownership becomes more affordable, so 

output and employment in the industry will expand. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-

A1, p. 10]

• Households with income below $20,000 made up approximately 22 percent of all 

households in 2010, but they accounted for only 2 percent of the money spent on new 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 11]
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• Gasoline expenditures are a much bigger problem for these households. In 2010, 

households with incomes below $20,000 spent 7.3 times as much on gasoline as they 

spent on new car payments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 11]

• Low-income households are much more involved in the used car market, in which we see 

an increase in supply of vehicles and lower prices as the standards accelerate the fleet 

turnover. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 11]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 61.]

So we are not worried about the increase in price associated with the technology because that 

increase in price will be paid back to the consumer who takes a typical five-month [sic] loan out 

during that very first month [sic].

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 39.]

By far, the single largest benefit is the reduction of consumer expenditure on gasoline and the 

decrease in the cost of driving. For the typical consumer who purchases a new auto that complies 

with the 2025 standard with a 5-year auto loan, the average life of auto loans these days, 

consumer pocketbook savings will be immediate and substantial.

Organization: Consumers Union

III. Low-Income Households Benefit from the Standards

Car prices have been remarkably stable over the last two decades, even as new features have 

proliferated and enormous safety gains have been achieved. Improving fuel economy is likely to 

have a modest price impact at most, while the savings on fuel will be tremendous. These net 

savings will benefit nearly all consumers, particularly low-income consumers. We are not aware 

of an in-depth, independent study that analyzes the impact of the proposed standards on lowincome households. However, our best estimate is that they will see even greater net benefits. 

Low-income households pay a disproportionately large portion of their income on fuel, so will 

benefit greatly from greater fuel economy. At the same time, they are primarily insulated from 

the costs of the new standards because they account for a very small portion of new car buyers. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.4]

Low-income consumers are the most vulnerable to price spikes in gasoline. Energy expenses in 

general and gasoline in particular constitute a disproportionately greater burden for low-income 

households.9 Decreasing national demand for oil by creating a gas-sipping fleet will help relieve 

this burden for low-income households. The Consumer Federation of America calculated that in 

2010, households with incomes below $20,000 spent 7.3 times as much on gasoline as the spent 

on new car payments.10 In comparison, households with incomes above $70,000 spent 1.2 times 

as much on gasoline as they did on new car payments.11 Reducing demand for gasoline and 

making vehicles more efficient is a very effective tool to combat vulnerability to gas price 

spikes, which is a real threat to low-income households. Some financial institutions already 
EPA Response to Comments

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recognize that lower operating costs lower credit and default risk and offer consumers lower 

interest rates for vehicles with superior fuel economy.12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, 

pp.4-5]

Low-income households are more likely to buy used rather than new vehicles, and as a 

consequence, they have lower depreciation costs than those absorbed by new car buyers. New 

vehicles lose an average of 65% of their value after five years of purchase.13 If the average cost 

increase for a new car is approximately $2,000, then the average cost increase of a five-year old 

car that meets the new standards would be about $700 (35%). The amount of savings depends 

largely on the starting point for the original vehicle’s fuel economy, but earning back the 

difference (assuming 10% interest loan: $770 difference, assuming cash purchase: $700) could 

be recouped quickly by fuel savings. For example, moving from 20 to 24 mpg, from 28 to 36 

mpg, or from 32 to 44 mpg would provide this level of savings within 2 years.14 Each of these 

examples is well within the expected average improvement that will result from the new 

standards, and average savings from the new standards are likely to be even greater. In addition, 

the standards are likely to diminish the premium often charged for more efficient used vehicles, 

making “efficiency” as an attribute relatively cheaper. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, 

pp.5-6]

Consumer Reports survey data show that low-income households want more efficient vehicles 

and support the fuel economy standards. While 59% of respondents in moderate and highincome households expect their next vehicle purchase to have better fuel economy, 71% of lowincome households expect to choose a model with better fuel economy.15 While an impressive 

78% of moderate and high-income households support fuel economy standards that increase to at 

least 55 mpg by 2025, an even greater number (85%) of low-income households support these 

standards.16 Although more expensive cars create a greater initial hardship for low-income 

households than for higher-income households, 79% of low-income respondents are still willing 

to pay extra for a more fuel efficient vehicle if they can recover the additional cost through lower 

fuel costs within five years (compared to 86% of moderate and high-income respondents).17 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9454-A2, p.6]

9 - See the Urban Institute's 'Impact of Rising Gas Prices on Below-Poverty Commuters', 

September 2008 accessed at: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411760_rising_gas_prices.pdf

10 - CFA’s calculations are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure 

Survey, accessible at: http://www.bls.gov/cex/2010/Standard/income.pdf.

11 - Id.

12 - Examples include U.S. Bank, Everence, and Truliant Federal Credit Union.

13 - Kelley Blue Book's 2012 Residual Value Analysis estimates the 60-month residual values 

for 2012 model-year vehicles average 35.5 percent of their original MSRP after five years of 
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ownership, accessed at: http://mediaroom.kbb.com/kelley-blue-book-releases-2012-residualvalue-analysis.

14 - See Appendix E CR Fuel Saving Chart.

15 - See Appendix D at 24.

16 - See Appendix D at 27.

17 - See Appendix D at 26.

Organization: Defour Group LLC

VI. Impact of the Standards on the Poor

The agencies’ assessment of the impacts of their fuel economy proposal fails to consider the 

proposed standard’s severely adverse impacts on the poor and otherwise disadvantaged. A recent 

study by Professor Mark Jacobsen (University of California at San Diego) found that fuel 

economy standards are “sharply regressive” and that the costs of fuel economy mandates “fall 

disproportionately on low-income households.” He found, for example, that “low-income 

households” buying ten-year-old vehicles are “suffering welfare losses (as a fraction of income) 

more than three times as large as those of the high-income group.”20 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9319-A1, p. 13]

This finding is important because used cars play an essential role in the escape from inner-city 

poverty. Studies show that car ownership rates are lower among minority groups, and this 

appears to be a significant factor in explaining the lower employment rates of these groups. A 

study conducted by researchers at the University of California at Berkeley estimated that raising 

minority car ownership rates to the white car ownership rate would eliminate 45 percent of the 

black-white employment rate differential and 17 percent of the comparable Latino-white 

differential.21 By raising the cost of vehicle ownership, fuel economy standards work in precisely 

the opposite direction. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 13]

20 - Mark R. Jacobsen, “Evaluating U.S. Fuel Economy Standards in a Model of Producer and 

Household Heterogeneity,” Working Paper, January, Stanford and the University of California at 

San Diego, January 2010.

21 - Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll, “Can Boosting Minority Car-Ownership Rates Narrow 

Inter-Racial Employment Gaps?” Working Paper W00’002, Berkeley Program on Housing and 

Urban Policy, Institute of Business and Economic Research, Abstract.

Organization: Representative from Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District
EPA Response to Comments

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The standards will also save consumers at the pump and help insulate them, especially those on 

fixed incomes like retirees and seniors, from the volatility of gas prices. As we have a debate 

here in Michigan about how to adequately invest in our roads and bridges, I will be working to 

make sure any solution considers how it impacts middle-class families that are already 

struggling. Increased fuel economy will help them by putting more discretionary income in their 

pockets so that they can spend more money on other goods and services. Over the lifecycle of a 

model year 2025 vehicle, consumers will in fact save up to $6,600 in fuel costs, which they can 

then use to help support local businesses and jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7983-A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Second, prospective new light-duty vehicle purchasers must have the ability to make a purchase 

or lease. Ability involves critical factors like financial wherewithal (for most consumers, this 

means creditworthiness), a driver’s license, and for certain alternative and new technology 

vehicles, the availability of convenient refueling. Third, prospective new light-duty vehicle 

purchasers must be willing to purchase, assuming they have the need and/or desire and the ability 

to do so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 2]

The proposal gives remarkably short shrift to these marketplace realities. A cynical view would 

argue that, under a 'push' mandate, regulators need not care if the vehicles they are mandating 

actually get sold or leased. These comments do not take that position, but instead suggest that a 

careful consideration of actual customer behaviors and marketplace realities will enable NHTSA 

and EPA to leverage customer demand to maximize fleet turnover, thus maximizing program 

effectiveness. Doing so is critical given that, by a wide margin, the proposal is the costliest of 

any ever considered for the U.S. automobile industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 

3]

III. THE PROPOSED MY 2017-2025 STANDARDS WILL DRAMATICALLY IMPACT THE 

ABILITY AND THE WILLINGNESS OF CUSTOMERS TO PURCHASE NEW LIGHTDUTY MOTOR VEHICLES.

As noted above, the demand for new light-duty motor vehicles, not unlike for most consumer 

goods, derives solely from and to the degree prospective purchasers need or desire them. 

Moreover, the demand for new light-duty vehicles is and always will be constrained by choices, 

including the used vehicle marketplace, vehicle service and repair options, and a variety of 

transportation alternatives that conceivably may satisfy those same needs and desires. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 6]

Assuming the requisite need or desire, prospective purchasers of new light-duty vehicles must 

have the ability to buy. For most households, a light-duty car or truck is the most expensive 

consumer purchase they make. Unlike for most other consumer goods, in excess of 90% of 

purchasers finance the new light-duty vehicles they acquire by means of a credit sale or lease, 

with less than ten percent involved in all-cash transactions. Thus, the single most important 

ability factor is creditworthiness. When prospective purchasers lack sufficient creditworthiness 

to enable a lender or lessor to finance the new light-duty vehicle they need or desire, they must 

consider other options. In addition to the alternate transportation choices noted above, 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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prospective purchasers may be able to consider a less expensive new vehicle option that meets 

their needs or desires but, as discussed below, at some point no such new vehicle option will be 

available. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 6]

A. The Ability of Prospective Purchasers of New Light-Duty Purchasers to Pay for the Costs of 

the Proposed Standards

However much prospective purchasers may need or desire new vehicles covered by the proposal, 

they must be able to afford them. Of course, other ability factors often come into play, such as 

meeting legal requirements for a license and obtaining liability insurance, or having reasonably 

available refueling options for alternative fuel and plug-in vehicles. Importantly, it matters not 

whether the new vehicles in question offer improved fuel economy performance characteristics 

compared to the transportation options currently being used by prospective purchasers. When 

underwriting loans or leases, lenders and lessors simply do not account for whether new vehicles 

offer more torque or horsepower, improved fuel economy, reduced GHGs, ubiquitous cup 

holders, or prettier paint. All that matters is whether prospective purchasers are creditworthy, that 

is, whether they will comply with their payment obligations as spelled out in the loan or lease. 

Regarding the new vehicles themselves, these decisions principally involve objective criteria and 

one key factor: the total amount of the up-front cost being financed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9575-A1, p. 6]

Nowhere does the proposal properly account for ability to pay. Consequently, the proposal 

significantly understates potential impacts on prospective new vehicle purchasers and overstates 

regulatory benefits. The paper Attached as Exhibit C lays out, for three cost-increase scenarios, 

how the proposal will impact on the ability of consumers to pay for vehicles covered by the rule, 

assuming the need or desire, and willingness, of those prospective purchasers to do so.13 Note 

that these cost increase scenarios only reflect what it will cost prospective purchasers up front 

due to the mandates imposed by the MY 2011-2025 standards. They do not take into account 

other potentially significant regulatory costs above the assumed baseline, including compliance 

with expected Tier III emissions standards and an array of new safety standards. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, pp. 6-7]

The attached paper analyzes Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey data to 

show how each average per vehicle cost increase scenario will impact the least expensive new 

vehicle in the market. For example, a regulatory cost of $2,937 (in 2010 dollars) could increase 

the cost of the least expensive new vehicle to approximately $15,700 versus the current $12,750. 

In doing so approximately 6.8 million licensed drivers will no longer qualify for a loan on that 

least expensive new vehicle and thus will have to turn to the other transportation options 

discussed above. In fact, projected per vehicle average cost increases will knock licensed drivers 

out of the market for all new light-duty vehicle segments, as illustrated by the fact that, at the 

same average per vehicle price increase of $2,937, another 6.8 million licensed drivers will no 

longer qualify for the purchase of the minimum cost new vehicle that accommodates more than 5 

people (or more than 2 child safety seats), currently selling for approximately $20,000. EPA and 

NHTSA must take these significant economic impacts into account, especially given that they 

have will have the greatest effect on lower income families at the margins of the market. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 7]
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 54-55.]

Some tout that the cost of the proposal is essentially free because of fuel savings. But before any 

fuel savings can be realized, customers must have the ability to buy. For over 90 percent of 

Americans, the purchase of a new vehicle is contingent on getting approved for a loan or a lease. 

If they don't qualify, they can't buy. They can't buy, they can't save money on fuel.

So as someone who works every day to secure financing for my customers, I'm unaware of 

anybody who will fund auto loans based on the promises of fuel savings. Loan qualification is 

based mainly on the income of the customer and on the vehicle price. What's clear is this 

proposal will make it harder for many customers to obtain financing, eliminating their ability to 

realize any fuel savings.

Specifically, NADA is preparing an analysis that conservatively estimates that about 7 million 

licensed drivers will be priced out of the new car market entirely when this proposal is fully 

implemented. But this consequence is not limited to those motorists who can only afford the 

most inexpensive vehicle. Let's talk about the family buyer. For example, our study also 

estimates that over 7 million licensed drivers would no longer qualify for financing to buy the 

lowest cost family vehicle, such as the Dodge Journey, which accommodates more than five 

people or more than two child passenger safety seats. This will be devastating for large families 

or families with small children that would like to carpool. And the burden of this rule is not even 

spread evenly. California, the most populous state, will see 662,000 of its citizens no longer able 

to qualify for a new car loan. In Tennessee, 5 percent of licensed drivers will be shut out of the 

new car market.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 53-55.]

Moreover, the U.S. Energy Information Administration finds that this proposal will regulate out 

of existence the most affordable cars on the market today. Adjusting for inflation, the Energy 

Economic Information Administration claims that in 2025, there will no longer be new vehicles 

on the market costing $15,000 or less. These are the vehicles I sell to smart frugal buyers, college 

students and working families. How can a rule that eliminates the most affordable new cars on 

the market be pro-consumer? You're right; it's not.

[This comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 57.]

We all want fuel economy, but it's not free. By adding $3,200 to the cost of a car, over seven 

million Americans will be priced out of the market, fleet turnover will be reduced and global 

warning benefits will be delayed. [Supplemental comment to testimony]

II. Financing Constraints Limit New Light-Duty Vehicle Affordability 
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NADA’s February 13th comments discussed at length the incontrovertible fact that affordability 

limits the new vehicle marketplace. For any given vehicle price increase, some portion of the 

market for that vehicle will disappear to the extent that they will be unable to qualify for a loan 

or lease. This issue is critical given that over 90% of all new vehicle transactions involve loans or 

leases, but is by no means limited to price increases associated with fuel economy or emissions 

mandates. At the same time, the fact that a vehicle’s higher price is associated with an improved 

performance characteristic (fuel economy or otherwise) is of no consequence to lenders and 

lessors as they almost exclusively focus on the likelihood of prospective borrowers or lessees to 

repay their prospective loans or leases in a full and timely manner. Testimony presented by the 

Consumers Union (CU), the Consumer Federation of America (CFA), the National Resources 

Defense Council (NRDC), Consumer Reports, and others ignored this critical affordability 

factor, in all likelihood because of their lack of a real-world understanding of how and why 

consumers actually buy new vehicles at retail. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0267-A1, pp.2-3]

Organization: Ross, D.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, p. 242.]

And most low income consumers finance vehicle purchases so that their net out-of-pocket 

expense would actually be lower from day one.

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

(h) Impact on Entry-Level Vehicles

One of the criticisms leveled at the proposed rule in the media over the past few months is that 

new standards will elevate costs of low-priced vehicles, pricing shoppers for those models out of 

the market. This is faulty logic for a few reasons. First, increased costs to a given model will not 

necessarily directly translate to increased price in those models. It is common knowledge that 

entry-level models are a sought-after market by automakers, as they represent an opportunity to 

build a long-term customer base through brand allegiance. Automakers seeking to reach that 

market are likely to keep prices of those models down and use other higher-profit margin 

vehicles to help defray costs of technology placed on entry-level models. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9567-A2, pp. 13-14]

Even given that fact, however, it is important to note that the cost of technology in this market 

segment is not untenably high. Take for example, the Hyundai Elantra. The 2010 model, 

outfitted with stability and traction control but lacking the fuel-saving technologies that 

subsequently appeared on the 2011 model, achieved a fuel economy of 26/34/29 

(city/hwy/comb) at an MSRP of $17,845.38 The comparable 2011 Hyundai Elantra, by contrast 

– a model outfitted with a host of fuel-saving, emissions reducing technologies such as an 

efficient 1.8-liter engine and a 6-speed automatic transmission – achieved a fuel economy of 

29/40/33 (city/hwy/comb) at an MSRP of $17,195. Thus, the 2011 model (a) offers a 12% 

reduction in fuel use from the prior model, (b) already meets its GHG target through 2020, and 

(c) does so at a price reduction of $650. While this is but one example, clearly there is flexibility 
EPA Response to Comments

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in the way automakers distribute costs among their model offerings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 14]

Finally, arguments over the initial price of the vehicle ignore the substantial savings purchasers 

of those vehicles will see due to the improvements under this proposal. These savings will 

increase consumers’ ability to afford vehicles because they can shift money from gasoline

expenditures to vehicle expenditures. As noted earlier in our comments, EPA has indicated that 

such savings will drive an increase in vehicle sales, quite the opposite of pricing consumers out 

of the market. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 14]

UCS urges the agencies to dismiss the argument that the MY2017-2025 standards unfairly 

penalize shoppers of entry-level vehicles, and to dismiss any proposed modifications to 

stringency based on that argument. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A1, p. 2]

Response:

These comments raise several related, but somewhat separable issues: the impacts of this 

rule on vehicle sales; the impacts of this rule on the ability of consumers to buy new vehicles; the 

impacts of this rule on low-income households; and the impacts of this rule on low-priced 

vehicles. Section 18.7 of this Response to Comments, along with Preamble III.H.11.a, discuss 

the impacts of this rule on vehicle sales. Here we focus on the latter three issues. We first note 

that, in response to these comments, EPA has added a new section, III.H.11.b, to the Preamble, 

and Chapter 8.1.3 to the RIA, that discuss these issues.

Vehicle Affordability

Comments on the impacts of the rule on the ability of consumers to buy new vehicles 

discuss the role of costs, fuel savings, and the vehicle loan market. A number of organizations 

find, as does EPA (see Preamble III.H.5 and RIA Chapter 5.5), that, for those who buy vehicles 

on credit, the fuel savings exceed the up-front costs from the time of purchase; for those who buy 

vehicles using cash, the payback period is 3.2-3.4 years (see RIA Chapter 5.5). For those who 

buy used vehicles, the payback period is expected to be even shorter: the costs of the vehicles 

(and thus the increased technology costs due to this rule) will go down, but the fuel-saving 

technologies will maintain their effectiveness. These arguments suggest that the rule will 

increase the affordability of new vehicles. 

In contrast, NADA emphasizes the increase in up-front vehicle costs as a factor in 

consumers’ abilities to purchase. In particular, they state that new vehicle buyers may not be 

able to get loans for vehicles that have become more expensive as a result of new standards, 

because they cannot get access to sufficient credit for the additional cost. As a result, they will 

be unable to participate in the new vehicle market even if the new vehicles offer significant fuel 

savings. NADA says that auto lenders do not take into account the fuel economy of the vehicles 

when they are deciding on providing loans; the lenders consider only consumers’ debt-to-income 

ratios. NADA provided an analysis that concludes that up to 6.8 million licensed drivers may no 

longer have access to new vehicles as a result of the standards. According to NADA’s analysis, 

this estimate is the number of licensed drivers who live in the 3.1 – 4.2 million households that 

could borrow $11,750, the loan amount for the least expensive new vehicle in 2011 after a $1000 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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down payment, but could not borrow $14,750.86 This difference of $3,000 is meant to represent 

what NADA views as the cost increase of new fuel economy standards, which EPA believes is 

incorrect and responds to further below.

In assessing these comments, EPA finds that the NADA study does not provide a usable 

estimate of those consumers in the market for new vehicles who might have trouble getting 

loans, nor does it provide a usable estimate of the impacts of the rule on the new vehicle market. 

Because the NADA study does not separate consumers in the market for new vehicles from 

consumers who are not in the market for new vehicles, the 6.8 million licensed driver figure 

significantly overestimates any impact of this rule on the new vehicle market. Preamble Section 

III.H.11.b. includes a detailed response on the key issues raised in the NADA study. The key 

points from that response include:

• The NADA study is based on the entire population of the U.S., not those who are in the 

market for vehicles. Its results do not provide useful insights into the effects of the rule on 

sales of low-priced vehicles, on vehicle sales overall, or on low-income households, because 

the analysis is not based on households in the market for vehicles. For example, NADA cites 

7 million licensed drivers who will not be eligible to get financing for a Dodge Journey. With 

a total vehicle market estimated to be 17.2 million vehicles in 2025, it is highly unlikely that 

7 million people were intending to buy the Dodge Journey but will not do so because of the 

rule. Sales of the Dodge Journey are unlikely to be as high as 7 million, and even the most 

negative estimates of vehicle sales impacts from this rule (a loss of 1.8 million vehicles, 

estimated by the Defour Group; see Section 18.7 of this Response to Comments) do not 

approach 7 million. We thus find that the NADA study does not provide policy-relevant 

estimates of rule impacts.

• The NADA estimate of 6.8 million licensed drivers is not the appropriate measure within its 

own study. In the NADA study, the unit of analysis for affordability is households. Even if 

there are 6.8 million licensed drivers in those households, they are not independently 

buying new vehicles; the households can barely afford one, much less multiple, new 

vehicles. An accurate statement of the findings of the study is that there are 3.1 to 4.2 

million households in the U.S. who could theoretically qualify to borrow $11,750 but not 

$14,750, based purely on having a debt-to-income ratio less than 40 percent.87

• NADA’s assumption of a $3,000 cost increase per vehicle is based on inappropriately 

summing the costs of MY 2011, MYs 2012-16, and MYs 2017-25 rules, double-counting MY 

2011 costs, and overstating MY 2016 costs. It is also not true that all vehicles will 

experience the same price increase. See, for instance, RIA Tables 5.1-1, 5.1-6, and 5.1-7 for 

the variation in costs predicted for different auto companies. It is likely, as discussed in 

Preamble Section III.H.11.b, that auto makers have discretion to use different profit margins 

in different vehicle segments; if the auto manufacturers want to preserve access to lowpriced vehicles, they are likely to have the ability to do so.

 86 Wagner, D., P. Nusinovich, and E. Plaza-Jennings, National Automobile Dealers Association (February 

13, 2012). “The Effect of Proposed MY 2017-2025 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards on the 

New Vehicle Market Population.” Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-0799. 87 As noted, these amounts are based on the cost of the least expensive vehicle in 2011, with $1000 down 

payment, with the assumption that it will become $3000 more expensive as the result of three rulemakings, for MYs 

2011, 2012-16, and 2017-25 (see Wagner et al., footnote 86). 
EPA Response to Comments

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• It is incorrect that no lenders consider the fuel savings of more efficient vehicles in deciding 

on vehicle loans. As Consumers Union points out and as EPA has found,88 a number of 

financial institutions currently provide discounted loans for more efficient vehicles. Indeed, 

it is possible (though unknown at this time) that the auto loan market may evolve to include 

further consideration of fuel savings, as those savings play a significant factor in offsetting 

the increase in up-front costs of vehicles. Thus, the premise underlying NADA’s argument is 

overstated or misplaced.

EPA recognizes that higher vehicle costs will be a disadvantage for vehicle buyers, and 

that fuel savings will benefit owners of the more fuel-efficient vehicles. Our analysis shows, as 

does that of a number of commenters, that the fuel savings will considerably outweigh the 

technology costs and, considering that factor alone, the rule should increase the affordability of 

new vehicles. See Preamble III.H.5. We recognize that negative impacts on the market for 

vehicle loans due to these changes are possible, but it is also possible that the loan market may 

expand its attention to consider fuel savings and thus reduce any negative impacts.

Impact on Low-Income Households

EPA agrees with CFA, CU, and others that low-income households are more likely to 

buy used vehicles than new vehicles, and appear to be more vulnerable to swings in fuel prices 

than other households. Because the payback period for used vehicles is shorter than that for new 

vehicles (see Preamble III.H.5 and RIA Chapter 5.5), it is possible that low-income households 

may benefit from the rule. As discussed in Preamble III.H.11.a, sales impacts in the market for 

new vehicles may affect the availability of used vehicles. 

The NADA analysis does not distinguish impacts on low-income households from 

impacts in other sectors and thus does not provide insights into impacts on low-income 

households. 

The Defour Group suggests that the standards are regressive, with adverse impacts falling 

disproportionately on low-income households, and possibly limiting their ability to obtain 

employment because of limited mobility. As discussed in Preamble III.H.11.b, the commenter’s 

regressivity assessment is based on an inappropriate application of the cited Jacobsen study.89

Jacobsen examined the non-footprint-based fuel economy program; the disproportionate impact 

on low-income households is based on the increased prices of used vehicles and the shift toward 

smaller vehicles. As discussed above in Section III.H.11.a, EPA finds that the impact on the 

used vehicle market depends on the impact of the rule on new vehicle sales, which we do not 

quantify. Because the footprint-based standard sharply reduces incentives to downsize vehicles, 

we do not accept the conclusion that the rule will result in buyers of used vehicles getting smaller 

 88 An internet search on the term “green auto loan” produced more than 50 lending institutions that provide 

reduced rates for more efficient vehicles. See Helfand, Gloria (2012). “Memorandum: Lending institutions that 

provide discounts for more fuel-efficient vehicles.” Assessment and Standards Division, Office of Transportation 

and Air Quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-0799.

89 Jacobsen, Mark. “Evaluating U.S. Fuel Economy Standards In a Model with Producer and Household 

Heterogeneity.” Working paper, University of California, San Diego, September 2010 (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799).
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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ones, with a consequent welfare loss. For these reasons, the regressivity finding from Jacobsen’s 

paper is not applicable to the effects of this rule. 

Impact on Low-Priced Vehicles

The NADA analysis assumes that an average cost increase of $3000 per vehicle applies 

to vehicles in the low-priced vehicle segment. See above in this section, under “Vehicle 

Affordability,” for our discussion of the cost estimate itself. This segment of the market is of 

particular interest because it may be the entry class for first-time new vehicle buyers, who may 

develop brand loyalty and later aim to purchase other new vehicles. NADA argues further that 

this rule will eliminate from the market vehicles costing $15,000 or less, citing the Energy 

Information Administration.

As discussed in Preamble III.H.11.b, EPA agrees that some vehicles in the low-priced 

(economy-class) segment will bear technology costs needed to meet the new standards, but it is 

not known how manufacturers will decide to pass on these costs across their vehicle fleets, 

including in the low-priced vehicle segment. As the Union of Concerned Scientists comments, 

auto makers have some flexibility in which segments will bear more costs, and how those costs 

will be passed along to consumers in vehicle prices. Because of this flexibility, it is difficult to 

predict how costs will be translated into vehicle prices. UCS provides the example of the 

Hyundai Elantra, where the MY 2011 model has higher fuel economy and a lower price than the 

MY 2010 version, and meets its GHG target through 2020. Though this vehicle may not be 

considered to be in the lowest-price segment, it demonstrates that added technology does not 

necessarily translate directly into a higher price.

Moreover, because the standards are established as individual manufacturer fleet average 

standards, manufacturers can choose the vehicles on which to add controls. It may be, for 

example, that manufacturers will add fewer controls to smaller, less expensive vehicles, because 

these vehicles may already be meeting their regulatory targets, because it is more cost effective 

to add controls to larger less efficient vehicles, to preserve profit margins on lower-margin 

smaller vehicles, or for a combination of these reasons. 

In addition, the average per-vehicle cost increase EPA estimated for the entire industry 

(both cars and trucks) varies by company. As shown in Table III-25 of the Preamble, while the 

average MY2025 cost increase for passenger cars across the industry is estimated to be $1,836, 

EPA estimated that Ferrari's cost would be $7,864/car, Porsche costs would increase by 

$4,044/vehicle, and Tata-Jaguar-LandRover would increase by $3,390/vehicle. At the same 

time, several other companies had cost increases for passenger cars lower than the industry 

average: Toyota at $1,407, Kia at $1,658, and Honda at $1,642/car. Companies such as Ferrari, 

Porsche, Tata-Jaguar-LandRover, Daimler, and Geely-Volvo, all with estimated costs for 

passenger cars higher than the industry average, do not sell cars in the lowest price segments of 

the car market. However, companies such as Toyota, Kia, and Honda do sell to that market, and 

EPA estimated these companies’ cost increases for passenger cars to be lower than the industry 

average. 
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The Energy Information Administration’s 2011 estimates90 cited by NADA are based on 

more stringent standards than those in this rule; are based on cost estimates using a more 

restricted set of technologies than those examined in this rule (and what appear to be higher 

costs); and appear to have lower technology phase-in rates than estimated for this rule. Indeed, 

the timing of the Annual Energy Outlook release is such that even the 2012 AEO analysis of the 

rulemaking notes that, “due to the timing of the modeling process, [it] does not incorporate all 

information from the pending rulemaking process, to assess potential energy impacts of the 

regulatory proposal.”91 We thus do not consider it appropriate to base estimates of vehicle price 

changes on the 2011 AEO analysis, which uses even less of the data from this rulemaking. 

Though the rule is expected to increase the prices of low-price vehicles, the degrees of 

price increase and the impacts of the price increases, especially when combined with the fuel 

savings that will accompany these changes, are much less clear. We thus disagree that it is 

inevitable that vehicles with prices less than $15,000 will disappear from the market.

18.8. Employment Impacts

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Anonymous public citizen 4

Axford, H.

Bassett, S.

BlueGreen Alliance

Business for Innovative Climate & Energy Policy (BICEP)

Cafagna, R.

Center for Biological Diversity

Ceres

Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Cuenca, M.

Defour Group LLC

Detroit NAACP

Ecology Center

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Faria, R.

Feinstein, C.

Ford Motor Company

International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) – Ceres

 90 Energy Information Administration. “Increasing light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas and fuel economy 

standards for model years 2017 to 2025.” Annual Energy Outlook 2011, 

http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo11/pdf/0383(2011).pdf (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799). 91 Energy Information Administration. “Energy Impacts of Proposed CAFE Standards for Light-Duty 

Vehicles, model years 2017 to 2025.” Annual Energy Outlook 2012, Report Number DOE/EIA-0383(2012). 

http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/IF_all.cfm#energyimpact (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799).
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Johnson, C.

Lennon, S.

Links, W.

Mass Comment Campaign (39) (Unknown Organization)

Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

Michigan State Senate, District 18

National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Parker, M.

Paul, M.

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Steffanoff, N.

Stirling, D.

Sullivan, T.

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

United Automobile Workers (UAW)

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Automakers today are driving this country’s economic recovery. Yet, in light of the uncertainty 

over consumer valuation of fuel savings and other factors, the agencies have not included an 

estimate of sales or employment impacts in the NPRM or supporting documents. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.20] [This comment can also be found in section18.7 of this 

comment summary]

The agencies need to understand and take these impacts into account to assure that the standards 

being put in place for MY 2022-25 do not reverse the economic gains and environmental 

benefits that have come from the industry’s recent recovery. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.20] [This comment can also be found in section18.7 of this comment summary]

Organization: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE)

Economic Impacts 

Benefits of the proposed rule include major macroeconomic benefits in the form of increased 

jobs and GDP. The primary mechanism for these increases is the shifting of spending from the 

energy sector to the broader economy, which employs more people per dollar spent, on average. 

This shift comes about through consumer spending of the money saved on fuel expenditures.1 

The attached ACEEE testimony, delivered at the January 24th hearing on the NPRM in San 

Francisco, provides a summary of this and related issues, as well as a preliminary quantification 

of the magnitude of these effects. ACEEE is now refining these estimates in conjunction with 

work with the BlueGreen Alliance and plans to submit this information to the record in the near 

future. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A2, p.2] [Refer to EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9528-A1 

regarding the ACEEE testimony referenced above.]
EPA Response to Comments

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[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 109-111.]

And third, promoting these standards will be good for jobs, even as the fuel economy 

improvements will save household consumers and businesses money that almost immediately 

will be respent in the broader economy.

But more importantly, by redirecting the investment in fuel efficiency savings into other sectors 

of the economy, we support the increased number of jobs. How might that be? Tapping into the 

evidence, the economic accounts for the U.S. turns out that, directly and indirectly, the total jobs 

supported by a million dollars of the purchase of gasoline sales supports only 11 jobs per million 

dollars. But the sale and manufacturing of automobiles, 17 jobs, and in the economy as a whole, 

17 to 18 jobs. So anytime we cost-effectively redirect resources away from gasoline purchases 

into those sectors, we support a net gain of six to seven jobs. Using that logic but in a more 

sophisticated modeling exercise, we estimate these standards will provide, on average over the 

period 2017 to 2025, about 300- to 400,000 jobs for the larger economy.

We're going to update those in about a month, but, in effect, the evidence shows that efficiency 

and improved fuel economy provides more jobs per gallon equivalent.

1 - For a discussion of how energy efficiency creates jobs, see also 

http://aceee.org/blog/2011/11/how-does-energy-efficiency-create-job.

Organization: Anonymous public citizen 4

The added cost being forced on consumers will squeeze middle class Americans. They will no 

longer be able to contribute to the support of those not working. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

10317, p.1]

Realize that most Americans do not have the income to support this proposal. Don't do anything 

else to us that does not apply to ALL government workers including congress and the president. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10317, p.1]

Organization: Axford, H.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a 

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9149-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Bassett, S.

This is just another program to drive up auto prices, thereby eliminating jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-8123-A1, p. 1]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Organization: BlueGreen Alliance

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 58-60.]

Consumers looking to purchase vehicles in the next few years are expressing interest in higher 

fuel economy. Building the next generation of advanced vehicles in the United States will create 

tens of thousands of new engineering and manufacturing jobs and strengthen America's 

rebounding sector.

Evidence already exists that bringing cleaner vehicles into the market creates American jobs. We 

have, by example, the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing loan program that will 

preserve or create nearly 40,000 jobs in the U.S. auto sector, retooling America's factories to 

produce advanced technology vehicles and their key components.

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 38.]

Crucially, the proposed standard will help to create many thousands of jobs through net

consumer savings on fuel, as well as spending on higher performing vehicles. An initial 

assessment of the job impact by the University of California Professor David Roland-Holst finds 

that the proposed standard will create more than 200,000 jobs by the year 2025 in California 

alone.

Organization: Business for Innovative Climate & Energy Policy (BICEP)

Strong standards will lead to U.S. job growth by creating jobs in the auto industry, and more 

broadly by diverting consumer spending away from fuel. The July 2011 report “More Jobs Per 

Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG Standards Will Fuel American Jobs;” an economic 

analysis authored for Ceres by Management Information Services, Inc., found that a 54.5 mpg 

fuel economy standard3 would create approximately 484,000 economy-wide new U.S. jobs, 

with 43,000 in the auto industry and net job gains in 49 states in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9450-A1, p. 1]

Further, under the proposed standard, the report found that in 2030 national gross economic 

output, or sales, is projected to be $21.3 billion higher; personal income is projected to increase 

by approximately $14.2 billion, and revenue for cash strapped federal, state and local 

governments is projected to be approximately $12.7 billion higher in 2030. It is important to note 

that the higher the standard, the greater the economic benefits;4 thus it is critical that the 

standards be as strong as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9450-A1, pp. 1-2]

Given its links to so many other sectors of the economy, the health of the auto industry has a 

significant impact on the economy as a whole. Thus, we find the, recent analysis conducted by 

Walter McManus of the School of Business Administration at Oakland University, Alan Baum 

of Baum and Associates, and Dan Meszler of Meszler Engineering Services, in collaboration 

with Ceres, to be of particular interest. The analysis looked at the impact of the proposed 
EPA Response to Comments

18-218

standards (approximately 40 mpg) on the auto industry in 2020. The analysis found that the 

proposed standards will benefit the auto industry, a major creator of U.S. jobs, and a key player 

in U.S. manufacturing. In addition, the analysis found that Detroit 3 will see greater benefits than 

the rest of the industry. Finally, the analysis found that the proposed 2020 standard is costeffective at a fuel price of $1.50 per gallon. Since this is well below expected fuel prices in 2020, 

it is clear that the standards will ensure significant savings in fuel costs for consumers, and 

increase consumer spending in other sectors of the economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9450-

A1, p. 2]

3 Approximately equivalent to the 4% scenario presented in EPA and NHTSA’s Joint Notice of 

Intent, “2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards;” 

EPA 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600; http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/2010-25444.htm

4 For example, the report found that under a 6% improvement scenario, net job gains were 

projected to be 684,000.

Organization: Cafagna, R.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a 

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. Set the example, ride a burro or bicycle instead of S.U.V. Range 

Rovers and will follow. Do what I tell you don`t do what I do it does not work. EPA needs to go 

to China India Korea to see How Much Pollution they produce instead of destroying jobs in the 

U.S. Solar and wind DO NOT PUSH MY CAR TO WORK. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11689-

A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity

We also note that the Agencies’ initial submission of the rulemaking for review by OMB 

included additional economic benefits in the form of consumer welfare, increased sales and 

employment, and increased gross domestic product. These benefits have been deleted from the 

NPRM without explanation. Absent a rational explanation for this deletion, it must be reversed. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 7]

Organization: Ceres

We would like to call your attention to recent analysis conducted by Walter McManus of the 

School of Business Administration at Oakland University, Alan Baum of Baum and Associates, 

and Dan Meszler of Meszler Engineering Services, in collaboration with Ceres, on the impact of 

the proposed standards (approximately 40 mpg) on the auto industry in 2020. The analysis found 

that the proposed standards will benefit the auto industry, a major creator of U.S. jobs, and a key 

player in U.S. manufacturing. In addition, the Detroit 3 will see greater benefits than the rest of 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-219

the industry. [See Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A2 for a comprehensive 

presentation.] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 1]

Note that the underlying assumptions for this analysis were conservative; for example it assumed 

a gas price of $3.50, equal to the average price in 2011, although increased demand from 

countries such as China, India and Brazil is projected to result in higher prices by 2020. Note 

also that the analysis found that the proposed 2020 standard would be cost-effective at a fuel 

price of $1.50 per gallon, well below expected fuel prices in 2020. In fact, a 53 mpg standard 

would be cost effective at current average gas prices of $3.50 per gallon. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9475-A1, pp. 1-2]

Further, under the proposed standard, the report found that in 2030, national gross economic 

output, or sales, is projected to be $21.3 billion higher; personal income is projected to increase 

by approximately $14.2 billion, and revenue for cash strapped federal, state and local 

governments is projected to be approximately $12.7 billion higher. It is important to note that the 

higher the standard, the greater the economic benefits; thus it is critical that the standards be as 

strong as possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 2]

In addition to increased profits to the auto industry, the proposed standards will also bring job 

growth by creating jobs in the auto industry, and, more broadly, by diverting consumer spending 

away from fuel. The July 2011 report “More Jobs Per Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG 

Standards Will Fuel American Jobs;” an economic analysis authored for Ceres by Management 

Information Services, Inc., found that a 54.5 mpg fuel economy standard would create 

approximately 484,000 economy-wide new U.S. jobs, with 43,000 in the auto industry and net 

job gains in 49 states in 2030. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9475-A1, p. 2]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 74-76.]

Ceres' July 2011 report, 'More Jobs Per Gallon: How Strong Fuel Economy/Greenhouse Gas 

Standards Will Fuel American Jobs,' found that a 54.5 mpg standard will create about 484,000 

economy-wide new U.S. jobs, including 43,000 in the auto industry alone and net job gains in 49 

of the 50 U.S. states. National gross economic output would rise by tens of billions of dollars. 

And it's very important to note that the higher the standard, the greater the economic gain. This is 

from the report that we put out last summer.

A second report we collaborated on last year with Citi Investment Research, a bank in New 

York, found that stricter fuel economy standards will bring economic benefits to auto 

manufacturers, especially the Detroit 3 and their suppliers. The report shows that strong 

standards will improve the competitive positioning of U.S. automakers and provide the 

regulatory certainty needed to promote innovation and investment in the industries of the future.

Strong standards will reduce America's and California's dependence on foreign oil, save vast 

amounts of money for consumers at the gas tank and as well as money for businesses and bolster 

America's world-class vehicle technology companies, many of them based right here in 

California.
EPA Response to Comments

18-220

Organization: Consumer Federation of America (CFA)

Significant macroeconomic benefits of greater fuel economy have been ignored.

• A GDP multiplier must be included that recognizes increases in national output and 

employment that result from reducing imports and puts more purchasing power in 

consumer pockets. The estimation of this type of GDP multiplier is a routine practice in 

policy analysis, and the agencies have calculated its value to be hundreds of billions of 

dollars but failed to include them in the analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 

14]

Exhibit S-10 summarizes the key issues that should be addressed, giving a sense of how 

important they are expressed as a percentage of the total national benefit in the bases case 

NHTSA-EPA analysis. [See Exhibit S-10 on p. 14 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9419-A1]

• We believe that the base case analysis underestimates the benefits by at least 20 percent. 

In dollar terms, that is over $100 billion.

• Since the total cost of adding the fuel economy technologies necessary to meet the 

standard is only $132 billion and the calculated benefits are in the range of $500 billion, 

this underestimation of benefits is substantial.

• Inclusion of the GDP multiplier alone could raise the estimated benefits 

substantially. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 14]

The estimates of benefits presented above include the first five factors, but not the last two. 

Therefore, although our estimates of consumer and national benefits are higher than the agencies, 

the actual benefits are likely to be even higher. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9419-A1, p. 14]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 90-91.]

Organization: Cuenca, M.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and the EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of 

a new vehicle by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according 

to the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10142-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Defour Group LLC

Our mid-range estimate for industry sales losses is 1.8 million units relative to the baseline, 

which translates into a loss of 155,000 jobs in manufacturing and supply, plus another 50,000 

jobs in distribution for a total job loss of 205,000 jobs in auto manufacturing, supply, and 

distribution. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9319-A1, p. 9] [This comment can also be found 

at section 18.7. of this comment summary.]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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Organization: Detroit NAACP

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 141.]

Promoting fuel efficiency will create high quality jobs right here in the United States. As said 

earlier, one of the biggest things they outsourced in the past 20 years has been jobs, and the City 

of Detroit has felt it more than anybody else, I would say.

Organization: Ecology Center

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 189-190.]

Equally impressive are estimates of job creation and benefits to the manufacturing sector.

According to research commissioned by Ceres more than 500,000 new jobs would be created as 

a result of the new standards, many of them here in Michigan. Another study on the automotive 

supply chain for fuel-efficient vehicle technologies found there were already more than 150,000 

people employed in the advanced engine, transmission and other electric vehicle supply sectors 

with over 38,000 of those jobs here in Michigan. Jobs in these automotive supply chains could be 

expected to nearly double with the implementation of the new proposed standards.

It's important to note that while significant job losses have been sustained in the automotive 

industry in recent years, investments and new fuel-efficient technologies now provide a strong 

basis for new manufacturing job growth, providing even greater competitiveness for the U.S. 

going forward. The proposed standards along with other policies to facilitate research, 

development, and commercialization of new technologies will help to ensure those job gains 

continue to be realized here in the region as well as in the U.S. more broadly.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

H. FINAL RULE SHOULD INCLUDE QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES OF VEHICLES 

SALES AND AUTO MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

EPA and NHTSA conducted quantitative vehicle sales and auto manufacturing employment 

analyses in previous rulemakings and had prepared an estimate of these same indices for the 

rulemaking action at issue here using the same methodologies. However, the results of these 

analyses were not included in the published proposal. The changes occurred during the OMB 

review process. The docket for this rulemaking includes interagency drafts of the proposal 

submitted to OMB with the quantitative analyses included. The docket also includes the request 

by OMB to remove the quantitative analyses from the proposal33 and responses from EPA and 

NHTSA stating the importance of the quantitative analyses and requesting they be left in the 

final proposal.34 See Attachment B. We incorporate this document as an integral part of EDF’s 

comments for inclusion in the administrative record for this rulemaking action. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 14]
EPA Response to Comments

18-222

We respectfully request that the quantitative vehicle sales and auto manufacturing employment 

benefits be included in the final rule to fully reflect the comprehensive societal benefits of the 

proposed program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 14]

[The above comments can also be found in section 18.7 of this comment summary.]

ii. EMPLOYMENT

Additionally, the proposal fails to include the Agencies’ results of the quantitative employment 

analysis, which found that at a 3 percent discount rate, the proposed standards could add more 

than 65,000 jobs by 2025.36 While the proposal acknowledges, “...this program is expected to 

affect employment in the regulated sector (auto manufacturing) and other sectors directly 

affected by the proposal...”, the proposal also states, “EPA does not attempt to quantify the net 

effects of the regulation on overall national employment.” (Page 75,156) Again, we recognize 

the inherent uncertainties in estimating these impacts, but believe the public should have the 

opportunity to comment on the analysis and request the Agencies include the results of the 

analysis in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 15]

Organization: Faria, R.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a 

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9834-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Feinstein, C.

America's dependence on oil should create jobs here at home. Let's make some jobs first before 

imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-6745-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 45.]

For example, if a lack of adequate infrastructure hinders the introduction of new fuel-saving 

technologies or if fuel prices turn out to be substantially lower than anticipated, it might be 

necessary to change the standards in order to avoid damage to American jobs and the U.S. 

economy.

Organization: International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)

4. The benefits of the proposed rule on consumer welfare and jobs are very large and should be 

included in the final rule. In particular, the economy-wide benefits from reduced fuel 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-223

consumption on GDP, employment, and energy security are large and indisputable. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 3]

4) Sales, Employment and GDP

As proposed, the 2017-2025 standards will have major economic benefits. Analyses conducted 

for the initial submission for interagency review, but not included in the NPRM, concluded that:

• New vehicle sales will increase by more than 300,000 vehicles by 2025

• Net employment will increase by between 1,800 and 4,500 jobs in 2017 and between 22,300 

and 56,100 jobs in 2025

• US GDP will increase by 0.26% in 2020 and by 0.88% in 2030 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9512-A1, p. 13]

As discussed above, the cost to comply with the proposed requirements is likely to be 

substantially less than estimated by EPA and NHTSA. The fuel savings will pay for the cost of 

the technology many times over, effectively putting billions of dollars into consumers' pockets to 

buy other products. This will raise the standard of living, increase GDP and create economywide jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 13]

Given these huge and obvious benefits, it is essential that the rule assess the beneficial impacts of 

the rule on sales, jobs, and GDP. The initial submission for interagency review contains these 

analyses, but they were not included in the final rule proposal. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-

A1, pp. 13-14]

These sales impact results are also required as input to other economic impact analyses, such as 

employment and GDP. As a result of the lack of new vehicle sales impact data, the employment 

impacts due to changes in the demand of new vehicles was not estimated in the proposed rule. 

The initial submission for interagency review also conducted a careful analysis of associated 

increases in employment.13 The method for calculating employment effects included the 

demand effect, or the labor required to build more vehicles; the cost effect, which represents the 

labor required for new technologies manufacturing; and the factor shift effect, which looks at 

labor intensity changes due to changes in technology. The effect on employment was originally 

estimated to add between 1800 and 4500 jobs in 2017 and to add between 22300 and 56100 jobs 

in 2025.14 ICCT supports these analyses and believes they are appropriate and should be 

included in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 14]

Most importantly, the effect of the rule on GDP was also not included in the proposed rule. The 

initial submission for interagency review used computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling 

to evaluate the effects of this rule on consumer expenditure and predicted that the US GDP 

would increase over time as a result of the increase in consumer expenditure (by 0.26% in 2020 

and by 0.88% in 2030),15 This is an appropriate methodology and clearly shows that, due to fuel 

savings, consumer expenditure and consumer demand would increase, with substantial economywide benefits on GDP and employment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 14]
EPA Response to Comments

18-224

ICCT has reviewed the methodology EPA used for estimating the impact on vehicle sales in the 

initial submission for interagency review. We find that it is consistent with the approach in the 

2012-16 light-duty GHG and CAFE rule, and in several previous CAFE rulemakings by 

NHTSA. The method balances the changes in demand due to vehicle price increase and the 

economic benefits of fuel economy using a 5-year payback period, and found an increase in new 

vehicle sales of more than 300,000 vehicles by 2025 due to the fuel savings benefit,12 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 14]

The agencies state that the reason they do not include sales impact estimates is that there is no 

good analytical basis to make this calculation: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 14]

USEPA: 'The empirical literature does not provide clear evidence on whether consumers fully 

consider the value of fuel savings at the time of purchase. It also generally does not speak to the 

efficiency of manufacturing and dealer pricing decisions. Thus, for the proposal we do not 

provide quantified estimates of potential sales impacts. Rather, we solicit comment on the issues 

raised here and on methods for estimating the effect of this rule on vehicle sales.' [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, pp. 14-15]

NHTSA: 'As discussed below, for this analysis we have conducted a fresh search of the literature 

for additional estimates of consumer valuation of fuel savings, in order to determine whether the

5 year assumption was accurate or whether it should be revised. That search has led us to the 

conclusion for this proposed rule that consumer valuation of future fuel savings is highly 

uncertain. A negative impact on sales is certainly possible, because the proposed rule will lead to 

an increase in the initial price of vehicles. A positive impact is also possible, because the 

proposed rule will lead to a significant decrease in the lifetime cost of vehicles, and with 

consumer learning over time, this effect may produce an increase in sales. In light of the relevant 

uncertainties, the agency therefore decided not to include a quantitative sales estimate and 

requests comments on all of the discussion here, including the question whether a quantitative 

estimate (or range) is possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 15]

ICCT is not in agreement with the agencies assertion that the analytical basis for sales, 

employment, and GDP analyses is inadequate. While there are large uncertainties in how 

customers behave, such analyses are widely used in other contexts (e.g. the CARB analysis of 

the LEV III GHG rule uses CGE modeling and includes employment and GDP impacts) and are 

appropriate here as well. Further, the uncertainty in consumer behavior does not change the fact 

that the fuel savings will pay for the cost of the technology many times over. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 15]

The ICCT strongly supports adding consumer welfare analyses back into the final rule, as they 

provide relevant and important information regarding employment and GDP. In particular, the 

economy-wide benefits from reduced fuel consumption are large and indisputable. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

While the ICCT believes it is clear that the standards will have a positive impact on vehicle sales 

and direct vehicle-related employment, we do acknowledge that there is substantial uncertainty 

in how consumers will react to the higher vehicle prices, new technology, and lower fuel 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-225

payments. It is possible that the direct sales and employment benefits might be small. However, 

it is inexcusable to ignore the economy-wide benefits from the large reduction in vehicle fuel 

consumption. No matter how customers react, the fuel savings will pay for the cost of the 

technology many times over. This will give customers billions of dollars to buy other products, 

raising their standard of living, increasing GDP, and creating economy-wide jobs.20 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

There will be further economy-wide and energy security benefits from reducing oil imports and 

helping our balance of trade. These economy-wide benefits are certain and their exclusion from 

the proposed rule is inappropriate. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9512-A1, p. 17]

12 Summary of interagency working comments received on draft rule under EO 12866 review. 

Pages 439-443.

13 Docket item EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1224, pages 454-455

14 Summary of interagency working comments received on draft rule under EO 12866 review. 

Table III-88, page 458

15 Docket item EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1224, pages 460-461

20 See, for example, the Nextl 0 study at http://nextlO.org/nextlO 

jpublicationsjvehicle_efficiency.html.

Organization: Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) - Ceres

Strong standards will lead to job growth by creating jobs in the auto industry, and more broadly 

by diverting consumer spending away from fuel. The July 2011 report “More Jobs Per Gallon: 

How Strong Fuel Economy/GHG Standards Will Fuel American Jobs;”3 an economic analysis 

authored for Ceres by Management Information Services, Inc., found that a 54.5 mpg fuel 

economy standard would create approximately 484,000 economy-wide new U.S. jobs, with 

43,000 in the auto industry and net job gains in 49 states. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516-A1, 

p. 1]

Further, under the proposed standard, the report found that national gross economic output, or 

sales, is projected to be $21.3 billion higher; personal income is projected to increase by 

approximately $14.2 billion, and revenue for cash strapped federal, state and local governments 

is projected to be approximately $12.7 billion higher. It is important to note that the higher the 

standard, the greater the economic benefits;4 thus it is critical that the standards be as strong as 

possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516-A1, pp. 1-2]

Independent analysis also indicates that stronger standards will benefit the auto industry, a major 

creator of U.S. jobs, and a key player in U.S. manufacturing. Earlier this year, Ceres partnered 

with Citi Investment Research to produce “Fuel Economy Focus: Perspectives on 2020 (Auto) 
EPA Response to Comments

18-226

Industry Implications,” which found that strict fuel economy standards would bring economic 

benefits to auto manufacturers, particularly the Detroit 3, and their suppliers. Strong standards 

will improve the competitive positioning of U.S. automakers, and provide the regulatory 

certainty needed to promote innovation and investment in the industries of the future, such as 

clean tech and high tech sectors. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9516-A1, p. 2]

3 Approximately equivalent to the 4% scenario presented in EPA and NHTSA’s Joint Notice of 

Intent, “2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards;” 

EPA 40 CFR Parts 85, 86, and 600; http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/2010-25444.htm

4 For example, the report found that under a 6% improvement scenario, net job gains were 

projected to be 684,000.

Organization: Johnson, C.

Passing ARBITRARY rules hurts the economy and hurts my employment. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-6528-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Lennon, S.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a 

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9019-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Links, W.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a 

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10348-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Mass Comment Campaign (39) (Unknown Organization)

These rules will lead to substantial savings for American families. They will keep more money in 

American communities, and the economic multiplier will be a boon for the economy. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-1245-A1_MASS, p.1]

Finally, I strongly support the new technologies and innovations that will come from the 

standards set fourth in this proposal, and the resulting high quality jobs that will be necessary to 

create them. The new standards give automakers clear, long-term direction, and will help 

American car companies compete in an increasingly efficient global market. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-1245-A1_MASS, p.1]
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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I look forward to the improvements in public health, economy, environment, and national 

security that will result from these proposed CAFE standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1245-

A1_MASS, p.1]

Organization: Representative from Michigan House of Representatives, 49th District

The standards will help create and retain the good paying automotive jobs essential to the 

prosperity of states like Michigan and communities like Genesee County. A recent report by the 

United Auto Workers (UAW), National Wildlife Federation (NWF), and Natural Resources 

Defense Council (NRDC) found that Michigan employs the most at over 38,000 workers at 97 

facilities in the manufacture of fuel-efficient parts of the automotive supply chain. That’s not 

news to Flint: local auto suppliers employ hundreds of workers and substantially contribute to 

our region’s economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7983-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Senator from Michigan State Senate, District 18

Finally, increased fuel economy standards will continue to create jobs: good paying jobs that 

employ Michigan workers. A recent report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 

National Wildlife Federation (NWF), and United Auto Workers (UAW) found that the auto 

industry currently employs over 151,168 autoworkers at 504 facilities building cars with clean, 

efficient technology-and 38,067 of those jobs are in 97 facilities right here in Michigan. It might 

not surprise you to learn that Michigan has more autoworkers employed in building clean, 

efficient cars, than any other state in the nation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, p. 1]

If you want proof, you do not have to go far to see how we are benefitting from the production of 

this new technology. As we speak, the battery pack for the Chevy Volt is being produced in 

Brownstown, and the vehicle is being built in Detroit. In my own district, Ford’s hybrid electric 

vehicle battery pack assembly is coming to the Rawsonville plant, a facility that was once slated 

to close, and the vehicles will be fully constructed at the Michigan Assembly Plant in Wayne.

That is work that is being brought back from Mexico. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5594-A1, pp. 

1-2]

Organization: National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 34.]

Economic growth and the creation of high-quality jobs across the country due to the need for 

innovative automotive technologies upon which the standards rely;

Organization: National Wildlife Federation (NWF)

Fuel economy standards are working now to build jobs.
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This past summer NWF, with the UAW and NRDC, released Supplying Ingenuity a report that 

found 150,000 workers in 43 states employed today in more than 300 companies that make 

technology that specifically contribute to increasing fuel economy. These jobs were spread 

widely across traditional vehicles and components, materials, electronics, hybrids and batteries 

and electric technology. 10 [Figure 3 can be found on p. 6 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9887-A2] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, pp. 6-7]

This study follows a 2010 study, Driving Growth that found that incremental net content added 

to vehicles to achieve higher fuel economy means more manufacturing jobs. The study predicted 

that achieving 40mpg by 2020 would add up to 150,000 manufacturing jobs in the US. 11 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

Also in 2011, More Jobs Per Gallon a report by Management Information Systems for Ceres 

found that new 2017-2025 standards would add nearly 500,000 jobs once the economy wide 

impacts of consumer and business net savings on fuel were taken into account. The study found 

that stronger 2017-2025 fuel economy standards would also increase gross economic output, 

personal income and tax revenues. 12 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

Testing these studies against reality, Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows the auto sector added 

100,000 direct jobs building and selling the next generation of clean cars and trucks in 2011 

alone.

[This comment was also submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 32.]

These direct jobs anchor hundreds of thousands of additional jobs throughout American 

communities. 13 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

These manufacturing and technical jobs are critical today in an industry and in communities 

which have seen deep job losses over the past decade, and to bolstering the overall strength of 

the economy today and in decades to come. The standards help ensure the US auto 

manufacturing captures its full share of today’s competitive global auto market, and that 

Americans are able to increasingly spend their money building jobs in their communities at 

instead of leaving household and national budgets at the mercy of rising, volatile, global oil 

prices. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

These results show why it matters for America to lead in the clean energy economy. The 

standards the agencies have proposed are essential to sustaining that progress. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9887-A2, p. 7]

10 http://www.nrdc.org/transportation/autosuppliers/

11 http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/drivinggrowth.pdf
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12 http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/more-jobs-per-gallon

13 http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iagauto.htm

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

EPA and NHTSA should dramatically improve the employment and economic impact analysis 

by accounting for sales impacts using the methodology consistent with previous rules, creating 

an alternative non-full employment scenario, and fully accounting for economy-wide impacts. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 199.]

Making better vehicles means more U.S. jobs. A recent report from the investor group Ceres 

estimates that the auto industry investments and consumer savings triggered by the proposed 

standards would generate 484,000 jobs across the country. This is not surprising.

NRC recently partnered with the UAW and the National Wildlife Federation to quantify the jobs 

being spurred by the current 2012 to 2016 standards. In our joint report, 'Supplying Ingenuity,' 

we found that over 150,000 workers are currently employed in 300 automotive supply companies 

across 43 states to make parts that enable cars and trucks to cut pollution and go further on a 

gallon of gas.

Organization: Parker, M.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a 

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9017-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Paul, M.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and the EPA’s CAFE mandates could... 

INCREASE THE COST OF A NEW CAR BY $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive 

Research AND... $5,000 according to the National Automobile Dealers Association. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9027-A1, p. 2]

EITHER OF THESE PRICE INCREASES WOULD LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF TENS OF 

THOUSANDS OR SORELY NEEDED JOBS due to people not being able to afford these more 

expensive cars. Thus... the car companies will not have to produce as many cars, and as a 

consequence, will employ fewer workers to produce fewer cars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9027-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 
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Council

Increasing sales and creating jobs: Increased vehicle sales and advanced vehicle technologies 

will create jobs in the automotive manufacturing sector. In their initial submission to OMB, the 

agencies estimated that between 22,300-56,100 jobs would be created in the vehicle 

manufacturing sector as a result of these standards.14 Outside groups have reached similar 

conclusions that these standards will create jobs. A study by the investor network, Ceres, found 

that the proposed standards would create 43,000 jobs in the automotive industry and 484,000 

jobs economy-wide. The agencies’ jobs and sales analyses, as proposed in the initial submission 

to OMB, should stand in the final rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 4]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, p. 123.]

The report from Ceres estimates that nearly half a million jobs may be added to the economy 

between jobs and the auto industry.

14 EO12866 Review-Interagency Review material Part 1- 2017-2025 Vehicle GHG and Fuel 

Economy Standard and NPRM 2060 AQ54, Document ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1224, pg. 

907 of PDF [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 4]

Organization: Steffanoff, N.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life and EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a

new car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to 

the National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of 

tens of thousands of jobs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9335-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Stirling, D.

How many jobs will this cost? I am not in favor of the the government adding additional new 

standards when I cannot be employed as an engineer with thirty five years of experience 

designing computer equipment. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10065-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Sullivan, T.

Transportation is critical to our quality of life. EPA’s regulation could increase the cost of a new 

car up by $6,000 according to the Center for Automotive Research and $5,000 according to the 

National Automobile Dealers Association. This price increase would lead to a reduction of tens 

of thousands of jobs (at least). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-10341-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)
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The standards also deliver important economy-wide benefits. By spending less on oil, consumers 

have more income to spend on other goods and services. This has a direct effect on both national 

gross domestic product and U.S. employment. A recent report from Ceres found that standards 

similar to those proposed by the agencies would create nearly 500,000 new jobs nationwide in 

2030. The report also found that gross economic activity would increase more than $21 billion in 

2030.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 2]

Strong standards that save drivers money can also support robust employment. Increasing 

standards will promote new vehicle technologies and increase investment in the auto industry, 

generating new jobs throughout that sector. The savings consumers realize at the pump will also 

shift consumer purchases away from the petroleum and wholesale industries to other parts of the 

economy that generate more jobs for every dollar spent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9713-A1, p. 

2]

The agencies’ own analysis of the proposed standards showed similar positive economic benefits 

to the U.S. economy. Specifically, EPA found that the proposed standards would increase U.S. 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by over $100 billion in 2025 (a 0.48% increase) and over $400 

(a 1.31% increase) in 2040. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 2]

These standards will not only deliver positive benefits to the American economy, they will also 

benefit the domestic auto industry and its workers. Investing in fuel-saving and pollution 

reduction technology will increase value throughout the supply chain, creating new jobs. A 

recent report found that there are already over 151,000 people employed in the United States 

building fuel efficient vehicles and components.5 Under the proposed standards, analysis by 

Ceres projected that the automotive industry would gain an additional 43,000 jobs in 2030.6 EPA 

also projects an increase in employment of 23,400-56,100 new jobs in the automotive sector as a 

result of these standards.7 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 3]

In addition to job creation and increased sales, better fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas 

performance will improve the competitiveness of the American auto industry. Unlike in 2008, 

when American automakers faced severe financial hardship as a result of rising oil prices, these 

standards will ensure that manufacturers continue to innovate over the coming decade resulting 

in a product line that is both fuel efficient and at the forefront of automotive technology. Across 

the world, consumers and government standards are demanding greater fuel efficiency and lower 

emissions. These standards will help ensure that American automakers remain globally 

competitive. A recent report by Citigroup and Ceres found that a fuel economy standard of 42 

mile-per-gallon by 2020 (more stringent than the proposed standards) would increase the 

profitability and competitiveness of American automakers.10 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-

A2, p. 3]

As shown above, the literature and the agencies’ own analyses demonstrate that the proposed 

standards will deliver important benefits to consumers, the U.S. economy, automakers, and 

American autoworkers. While the agency’s economic analysis is discussed in the interagency 

review documents, it is surprising that this data on increased vehicle sales, GDP, and 

employment were not included in the proposed rule. UCS strongly encourages the agencies to 

include these figures in the final rule in order to educate the public on the positive economic 
EPA Response to Comments

18-232

benefits of strong fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 3]

As has been stated in prior comments, UCS objects to the agencies’ underestimation of longterm fuel price projections. In this proposed rule, the agencies again rely on the Energy 

Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook for long-term fuel price projections. 

We elaborate more on gasoline price projections in Section II(g) below, and thus will only 

remark here that EIA’s core projections have consistently underestimated future fuel prices. 

Moreover, EIA projects only very modest, steady changes in fuel prices, without any significant 

volatility. Oil and gasoline price spikes have occurred about twice each decade for the last 30 

years and almost every one was followed by a U.S. recession.25 Given these facts, the agencies 

should include such price spikes in their projections. At a minimum, UCS encourages the 

agencies to continually evaluate projections for future fuel prices and include sensitivity analysis 

demonstrating potential cost-effectiveness at higher stringency levels under more realistic fuel 

price scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]

By undervaluing the energy security costs and fuel-savings, the agencies are not fully evaluating 

the potential cost-effectiveness of more stringent standards. If the agencies properly valued the 

full set of societal costs and benefits, a more stringent standard of 143 g/mi and approximately 

60 miles-per-gallon in MY 2025 would deliver greater net societal benefits. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]

3 Ceres. More Jobs Per Gallon. Management Information Services, Inc. July, 2011. 

http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/more-jobs-per-gallon/view [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 2]

5 United Auto Workers, Natural Resources Defense Council, and National Wildlife Federation. 

Supplying Ingenuity U.S. Suppliers of Clean, Fuel-Efficient Vehicle Technologies. August, 

2011. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 3]

6 Ceres. More Jobs Per Gallon. Management Information Services, Inc. July, 2011. 

http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/more-jobs-per-gallon/view [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 3]

7 Interagency review document, EPA-HQ-OAR-20100799-1224, Joint Rulemaking to Establish 

2017 and Later Model Year Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and CAFE Standards, p., p. 

907 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 3]

10 Citigroup & Ceres. Fuel Economy Focus: Perspectives on 2020 Industry Implications. March 

2011. http://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/fuel-economy-focus [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9567-A2, p. 3]

25 http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/facts/2009_fotw579.html [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9567-A2, p. 6]
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Organization: United Automobile Workers (UAW)

The UAW believes strongly that the proposed rules will strengthen the overall economy and the 

domestic auto industry. The economy will benefit because consumers will spend less on fuel for 

vehicles and more on other goods and services. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.1]

This proposal will lead to significant net job creation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.1]

Increasing the efficiency of light-duty vehicles leads directly to the creation of jobs in the auto 

industry because the technology needed to increase efficiency represents incremental net content 

on each vehicle, and that additional content must be engineered and produced by additional 

employees. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.1]

Employment Effects [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.4]

The UAW represents about 150,000 members in the light-duty vehicle assembly and parts 

sectors, so understanding the effects of significant rulemaking in the automobile industry is 

important to the UAW and its members. The UAW has taken an active role in efforts to identify 

and quantify how the drive to improve the efficiency of automobiles affects employment in the 

domestic auto industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.4]

The UAW believes very strongly that because improving the efficiency of light-duty vehicles 

requires additional content on each vehicle, and that additional content requires more engineers 

and production workers, developing and producing cleaner cars increases employment in the 

auto industry. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.5]

In 2010, the UAW, along with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Center 

for American Progress, published a report titled “Driving Growth” that used the net cost of 

equipment added to increase vehicle efficiency to estimate how many jobs could be created by 

the addition of enough fuel-saving technology for the new vehicle fleet to reach 40 miles per 

gallon by 2020. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.5]

The study found that the additional content needed to reach 40 miles per gallon would create 

190,000 jobs of all types somewhere in the world. The number of jobs this would create in the 

United States is dependent on how much of the additional content is produced domestically. The 

results estimate that if 75% of the additional content were produced in the United States, as many 

as 150,000 jobs would be created. The study is attached to these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9563-A2, p.5]

In 2011, the UAW, NRDC and the National Wildlife Foundation published a report titled 

“Supplying Ingenuity,” which was meant to identify the wide variety of jobs and locations 

associated with clean car technology. The report identified 504 facilities across 43 states 

employing over 500,000 people where some or all of the work is researching, developing or 

producing clean-car technologies. One significant finding is that fully 67% of these jobs are 

related to advanced conventional technologies such as better engines and transmissions and 
EPA Response to Comments

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components like electric power steering and high-strength steel. The “Supplying Ingenuity” 

report is also attached to these comments. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.5]

Because of the UAW’s interest in seeing improved fuel economy and reduced tailpipe pollution 

bolster the domestic auto industry, we were particularly pleased that in President Obama’s 2010 

memo directing the agencies to develop rules extending beyond 2016, he also directed that the 

proposed program “...should strengthen the industry and enhance job creation in the United 

States.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.5]

Accordingly, EPA made an effort to estimate the employment effects of the proposed regulation 

in order to demonstrate the proposal was constructed so that its effect would meet the conditions 

set forth in President Obama’s memo. The UAW commends the EPA for its extensive 

consideration and extended discussion of the issues associated with estimating the employment 

effects of the proposed rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.5]

Although the EPA was unable to complete and publish estimates of several important ways that 

the rule could affect employment, the UAW applauds EPA’s findings that the additional content 

on each vehicle needed to reduce tailpipe emissions does indeed result in increased employment 

in the auto industry and the intermediate and basic industries that supply the auto industry. By 

estimating broad employment effects in the auto industry using data on the number of employees 

per million dollars of expenditure, EPA has outlined a useful approach for understanding how 

cleaner cars can create jobs. The UAW is also encouraged by the EPA’s recognition that the 

import share of additional production must be taken into consideration when estimating these 

domestic employment effects. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, pp.5-6]

The UAW also believes that in the Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (DRIA) that accompanies 

the proposed rules, the EPA has provided excellent and useful examples of how to assess the 

change in labor demand for several of the fuel-saving technology packages that are projected to 

be widely applied during the 2017 – 2025 period. This methodology centers on tear-down studies 

of fuel-saving technology packages by EPA’s engineering consultant that accounts for the net 

incremental content in that specific package. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.6]

The results, as summarized in table 8.2-3 of the DRIA, show that in each of the six technologies 

evaluated, additional labor is required to produce the technology. In the case of switching from a 

six-speed to an eight-speed transmission, an additional .33 hours of labor are required for each 

unit. This result suggests that one full-time job will be created for each increment of about 4,500 

eight speed transmissions when upgrading from a six-speed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-

A2, p.6]

In the example of a downsized, turbocharged gas direct injection V-6 that replaces a V-8 engine, 

similar to the EcoBoost engine offered by Ford in its full-size pick-up trucks, the additional labor 

requirement is estimated at 1.82 hours per unit. This implies that a full-time position is created 

for each increment of about 825 such engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.6]

More complicated technology packages with greatly increased content require even more labor. 

A full hybrid with a power-split design is estimated to require an additional 8.54 hours of labor, 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

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which implies an additional full-time employee for each 175 units produced. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9563-A2, p.6]

However, because EPA was unable to evaluate the additional labor requirement for all the 

technologies that were considered in the technical analysis, EPA was not able to give a complete 

estimate of the potential employment effects using this excellent methodology. The UAW urges 

EPA to continue this work in its ongoing evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of fuel-saving 

technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.6]

EPA was also unable to quantify the employment effects of any potential change in sales 

resulting from the increase in the price of vehicles accounted for by the additional content. This 

is a tortured subject, studied repeatedly with conflicting results across studies at even the basic 

level of whether the effect is positive or negative. The UAW recognizes EPA’s effort to discuss 

and sort through the issues involved with estimating change in sales due to the regulation of 

tailpipe emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9563-A2, p.6]

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Detroit, Michigan public hearing on 

January 17, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11786, pp. 22-25.]

Adopting the proposed rules will give an additional boost to the revitalization of the auto 

industry that began with President Obama's courageous action in the depths of the industry's 

crisis to save American manufacturing jobs by giving GM and Chrysler the breathing room they 

needed to restructure.

After a painful process in which workers and retirees made significant sacrifices, the industry is 

coming back strong. Our units with collective bargaining agreements with Ford, General Motors 

and Chrysler include substantial investments by all three companies, in some cases bringing back 

work from overseas.

The 20,000 UAW-represented hourly jobs that will be protected and added over the next four 

years will have a substantial and positive ripple effect throughout the supply chain as well as the 

local communities.

One important reason we are so confident that the industry's future -- in the industry's future is 

that we are excited about the new green technologies that are being developed in the United 

States and produced in UAW-represented facilities. The drive to bringing innovative fuel-saving 

technologies to market is transforming the auto industry in the United States in creating good 

jobs in the research labs to the factory floor. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler have made 

unprecedented commitments to invest billions of dollars in their U.S. operations over the next 

few years and in every case the investment of supporting new vehicles and powertrains that will 

be more efficient than the previous generation.

There's a common element in all of these technologies. They are all now or will soon be 

produced by UAW members and factories located in the United States, and that's just the 

beginning.
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Although most auto makers will continue to meet fuel efficiency and tailpipe emissions through 

improvements in conventional vehicles, we are excited that these new transforming technologies 

are being produced by UAW members. These are the automotive jobs of the future. We are very 

pleased that they are starting to ramp up here in the United States.

Thanks to the fresh start President Obama gave to the domestic auto industry, new labor 

agreements that are the result of innovative, problem-solving approach in bargaining and the 

strong transparent working relationships we have with UAW employers, the U.S. auto industry is 

growing and adding employees. These proposed rules are the cornerstone of that growth. It 

provides certainty as manufacturers map out their product investment plans.

I want to underscore why we believe the drive to increase fuel efficiency and reduce tailpipe 

pollution is creating jobs in the U.S. auto industry.

A second, more fundamental reason is because the technology needed to improve efficiency and 

reduce pollution represents additional content on each vehicle. That additional content must be 

engineered and produced by additional employees.

Last year the UAW and the Natural Resources Defense Council and Larry's organization, The 

National Wildlife Federation, produced a report called Supplying Ingenuity. That report 

identifies more than 500 separate facilities in the United States, employing over 150,000 people, 

where some or all the employees are working to invent, engineer, or produce advanced vehicles 

and fuel- savings components. These are real jobs supporting real American families.

Response:

Several commenters specifically requested inclusion of employment impacts in the 

analysis for this rule. EPA discusses employment impacts in Preamble Section III.H.12 and RIA 

Chapter 8.2. We include a detailed discussion of the expected impacts of this rule on 

employment, and on methods for measuring employment impacts. We also present a partial 

quantification of the impacts of this rule on employment in the auto sector, in our estimates of 

the effects on employment due to developing and using the technologies expected to be used for 

compliance with the standards (the “cost effect”). Our discussion explains that we do not 

provide fuller quantification for several reasons. First, we do not quantify the impacts of the rule 

on auto sector employment due to changes in vehicle sales (the “demand effect”) or due to the 

labor intensity of vehicle production (the “factor shift effect”), other pathways for employment 

impacts, due to insufficient data to support that analysis. Second, the impacts of the rule on 

national employment depend heavily on the state of the macroeconomy at the time of 

implementation, which begins in MY 2017. If the economy is at or close to full employment, the 

primary effect of the rule on employment will be to shift employment among sectors, rather than 

to create or reduce job availability. On the other hand, if there is substantial involuntary 

unemployment at the time of implementation, the rule may affect aggregate employment levels. 

Difficulties in estimating unemployment rates in the future imply that the impacts of the rule on 

employment in the wider economy will be highly uncertain. We offer the detailed discussion of 

these issues as the explanation for our decision to quantify some but not all employment impacts 

of the rule. We appreciate the support from the UAW of our identification of these multiple 
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-237

effects, our identification of domestic versus foreign impacts, and our discussion of these 

complexities. We did not receive comments identifying problems with our analysis.

A major conclusion from this review is that increasing standards does not inevitably 

cause losses in employment, either in the auto sector or in the economy as a whole. Because 

employment impacts in the auto industry result from expenditures on new technologies as well as 

effects on vehicle sales, it is possible that employment may increase; the analysis in Preamble 

section III.H.12 and RIA Chapter 8.2 in fact show increases. Employment impacts in the rest of 

the economy may be positive in some sectors (such as suppliers of materials for auto parts) and 

negative in others (such as gasoline production), as further discussed in those sections. 

Comments from the Defour Group estimating employment losses of about 200,000 from 

the rule analyze impacts in the auto and distribution sector due only to the demand effect; they 

do not consider impacts due to the cost or the factor-shift effects. As discussed in Section 18.7 

of this Response to Comments, the negative vehicle sales estimates from the Defour Group are 

based on cost estimates substantially higher, and a smaller role for fuel savings, than those found 

in this rule. TSD Chapter 3.1.2.2 discusses the Defour Group/NADA cost estimates – in 

particular, the higher indirect cost estimates; Section 18.2.1 of this Response to Comments 

discusses those cost estimates as well as those from the Center for Automotive Research 

mentioned by several individuals. The omission in its study of cost-effect employment impacts 

leaves out a potentially significant source of employment gains. Impacts due to the factor-shift 

effect may increase or decrease employment. Because the Defour Group uses costs significantly 

higher than those we have estimated, and because they do not consider some of the channels 

through which employment in the auto sector is likely to be affected by the standards, we do not 

rely on these results.

Other commenters point to expected increases in vehicle sales as a source of increased 

employment; these analyses are based on lower per-vehicle cost estimates and possibly greater 

consideration of fuel savings in the vehicle purchase decision. As discussed in Section 18.7 of 

this Response to Comments, the difference between the results in these studies and those from 

the Defour Group appear to be due to lower cost estimates and a greater role for fuel economy in 

vehicle purchase decisions in the former group. Several commenters specifically cite a study by 

Ceres showing an increase of 43,000 jobs in the auto industry in 2030. This employment appears 

to be driven by the need for additional workers to reconfigure vehicles and add technology (the 

cost effect), though it also estimates increases in vehicle sales. Ceres also shows job gains in the 

broader economy. As discussed in Preamble Section III.H.12 and RIA Chapter 8.2, we do not 

extend our analysis to the broader economy, because of uncertainty over the state of the 

macroeconomy in the time frame for this rule.

Additional comments point to gains in employment associated with developing the 

technologies that companies will use to comply with the standards. Several commenters cite a 

report from NRDC, NWF, and UAW, “Supplying Ingenuity,” which estimates that 150,000 

people are currently employed in companies that make “clean, fuel-efficient” technologies. As 

discussed in Preamble Section III.H.12 and RIA Chapter 8.2, we agree that the employment 

effects of this rule in the auto sector depend, not only on vehicle sales, but also on the need to 

develop and use the technologies for compliance with the standards, and any changes in labor 

intensity of production associated with the new technologies. EPA, in MY 2025, estimates 
EPA Response to Comments

18-238

increases due solely to increased expenditures on technologies on the order of 6,000-31,000 jobs 

in the auto industry. 

A few commenters argue that, although employment may go down in fuel-related sectors, 

switching consumer spending from fuel to other sectors should increase employment, because 

fuel sectors have lower labor intensity than the economy as a whole. EPA acknowledges this 

possibility but has not estimated this effect in this rule.

Commenters differ on the effects of this rule on the competitiveness of the auto industry 

and its ability to innovate. Those who state that the rule will increase competitiveness and 

innovation cite increasingly stringent fuel economy standards in other countries; this rule will 

provide further incentives to coordinate vehicle and technology development for all these 

markets and speed cost reductions. In addition, they state that the standards will provide the 

regulatory certainty needed for increased investment in research and development and ensure 

continued innovation. The increased investment and innovation, they say, will increase 

employment in the auto industry. Those who state that innovation will decrease cite the need for 

auto manufacturers to invest specifically in fuel-saving technology, which will reduce their 

ability to invest in technological advances for other vehicle qualities and attributes (see 

comments from Edmunds.com). EPA disagrees that investing more in fuel economy requires 

reduced investments in improving other aspects of the vehicles; it is possible for auto makers to 

do both, except under the circumstances that they are unable to convince potential investors of 

the merits of those other improvements. As noted earlier in section 18.1, the agencies’ costing 

methodology includes the costs of preserving all attributes in the present vehicle fleet. In 

addition, because all major auto makers selling vehicles in the U.S. are subject to the same rule 

requirements, we do not expect changes in the competitive structure of the industry, nor in where 

vehicles are produced, in response to these standards. EPA agrees that the standards are 

stringent enough to encourage continuing innovation on technologies that reduce GHG emissions 

and improve fuel economy, and that these innovations are likely to be useful for meeting 

standards in other countries besides the U.S. Companies that make the greatest advances in these 

innovations may increase their competitive position in both the U.S. and world markets.

A number of comments state that this rule will increase economic growth in the U.S. 

Several commenters recommend that EPA include an analysis of the economy-wide impacts of 

the rule, including impacts on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and consumption patterns. 

They say that fuel savings from the rule would allow consumers to increase their spending on 

other goods and services in more productive sectors of the economy, which would likely increase 

GDP and consumption in the U.S. CFA specifically recommended that EPA use a GDP 

multiplier approach that recognizes that national output would increase from the rule as a result

of reducing U.S. oil imports and reducing consumer expenditures on fuel. Several commenters 

cite a report for Ceres by Management Information Services, Inc. that found that a 4 per cent 

annual improvement in fuel economy would increase U.S. gross economic output by $21.3 

billion, personal income by $14.2 billion, and revenue for federal, state, and local governments
Analysis of Estimated Costs, Economic and Other Impacts

18-239

by $12.7 billion in 2030.

92 On the other hand, other comments express concern that the 

economy could be harmed as a result of this rule, because increased vehicle costs will reduce 

vehicle sales and employment. Analyzing the economy-wide impacts from this rule is 

challenging due to the inherent uncertainty in projecting a myriad of economic parameters into 

the future (e.g., levels of employment of labor and capital, the structure of the economy, prices of 

goods and services) and determining an appropriate economic framework to model (e.g., supply 

equaling demand in all markets and specific forms of market interactions). EPA has not been 

able to identify a widely agreed upon methodology and thus we continue to not quantify the 

impacts of the rule on overall economic patterns in the U.S. 

 92 Management Information Services, Inc., July 2011, “More Jobs Per Gallon: How Strong Fuel 

Economy/GHG Standards Will Fuel American Jobs”, A Ceres Report, Washington DC (Docket EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799). 

EPA Statutory Authority

19-1

19. EPA Statutory Authority

Organizations Included in this Section

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

American Petroleum Institute (API), National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and 

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

Environmental Consultants of Michigan

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Growth Energy

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air Council

Steyn, R.

University of Michigan

U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

In addition, the Agencies should not issue the revised proposal until after the court has ruled on 

the GHG lawsuits. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.9]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API), National Association of Manufacturers 

(NAM), and American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

V. The 2017 Car Rule Would Also Be Arbitrary and Capricious Because It Is Based on an 

Invalid Endangerment Finding [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]

Lastly, finalizing the 2017 Car Rule would also be arbitrary and capricious because the rule is 

predicated on an invalid endangerment finding. As the 2017 Car Rule itself explains, EPA’s 

authority to propose the rule flows from the Endangerment Finding for GHGs. 76 Fed. Reg. 

74,964. Thus, if the Endangerment Finding is invalid, EPA has no authority to finalize the 2017 

Car Rule. For this reason, the Associations briefly explain some of the reasons why the 

Endangerment Finding is arbitrary and capricious. A more complete explanation is contained in 

the Associations’ comments, which are also submitted here. Exhs. A-B. EPA’s Endangerment 

Finding is arbitrary and capricious for several reasons: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, pp. 

10-11]

• The Endangerment Finding failed to weigh offsetting or beneficial effects of climate 

change against its threatened harms. Exh. A. at 7.

• The Endangerment Finding improperly failed to consider the possibility of adaptation to 

climate change. Id. at 8–9.

• The Endangerment Finding improperly relied on effects of climate change occurring 

outside of the United States, in violation of the CAA. Id. at 9–10.
EPA Response to Comments

19-2

• The Technical Support Document for the Endangerment Finding does not contain the 

critical review of all the science that EPA’s Information Quality Act Guidelines require. 

Id. at 10-28.

• EPA’s finding that GHGs endanger public health is not scientifically supported or 

justifiable under the CAA. Id. at 28–33.

• EPA’s finding that GHGs endanger public welfare is not supported. Id. at 33–38.

• EPA’s assertion that current atmospheric levels of GHGs endanger public health and 

welfare is not supported. Id. at 38–39.

• The Endangerment Finding is inappropriate because GHG emissions from motor vehicles 

are insubstantial. Id. at 40–42.

• The Endangerment Finding improperly includes two pollutants not emitted by mobile 

sources—perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. Id. at 42–43.

• EPA failed to adequately explain its decision to exclude the most abundant GHG—water 

vapor—from its Endangerment Finding. Id. at 43–44.

• EPA should have proposed its rules for motor vehicles at the same time as its 

Endangerment Finding. Id. at 44.

• EPA failed to analyze the possible affect of its Endangerment Finding on stationary 

source permitting requirements. Id. at 45–49.

• EPA failed to explain why it did not use alternative approaches to addressing climate 

change, such as CAA Section 115. Id. at 49–50. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 

11]

Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

Experts will likely debate for years the net benefits of the rule as data become available 

regarding vehicle costs and sales and auto industry profits and employment. This comment letter 

examines a cost most experts have not addressed: the damage the Obama Administration’s fuel 

economy agenda does to our constitutional system of separated powers and democratic 

accountability. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 1]

I. End Run Around Congress

In the press release announcing their proposed MY 2017-2025 GHG/fuel economy standards, 

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood boast that they are 

bypassing Congress: “Today’s announcement is the latest in a series of executive actions the 

Obama Administration is taking to strengthen the economy and move the country forward 

because we can’t wait for Congressional Republicans to act” [emphasis added].3 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, pp. 1-2]

A legislative proposal boosting average fuel economy to 54.5 mpg would not pass in the 112th 

Congress. Note also that NHTSA need not propose fuel economy standards for MY 2017 until 

2014. “We can’t wait” really means: We won’t let the people’s representatives decide, either 

now or after the 2012 elections. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 2]

Circumventing Congress has, alas, become the Administration’s preferred M.O. Under the 

statutory scheme Congress created, one agency –NHTSA – regulates fuel efficiency through one 
EPA Statutory Authority

19-3

set of standards – Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) – under one statute – the Energy 

Policy Conservation Act (EPCA). Yet today, three agencies – EPA, NHTSA, and the California 

Air Resources Board (CARB) – regulate fuel efficiency via three sets of standards under three 

statutes – the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPCA, and California Assembly Bill 1493. The CAA 

provides no authority to prescribe fuel economy standards, and EPCA specifically prohibits 

states from adopting laws or regulations “related to” fuel economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 2]

II. GHG, Fuel Economy Standards: Highly Related

EPA and CARB claim they are regulating GHG emissions, not fuel economy. But greenhouse 

gas emission standards implicitly regulate fuel economy. As EPA and NHTSA’s May 2010 

Tailpipe Rule explains, no commercially available technologies exist to capture or filter out 

carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from motor vehicles. Consequently, the only feasible way to 

decrease CO2 emissions per mile is to reduce fuel consumption per mile — that is, increase fuel 

economy. Carbon dioxide constitutes 94.9% of vehicular greenhouse gas emissions, and “there is 

a single pool of technologies... that reduce fuel consumption and thereby CO2 emissions as 

well.”4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 2]

That EPA and CARB are regulating fuel economy is also apparent from EPA, NHTSA, and 

CARB’s Interim Joint Technical Assessment Report, the framework document for the agencies’ 

proposed rule.5 The document considers four fuel economy standards, ranging from 47 mpg to 

62 mpg; each is the simple reciprocal of an associated CO2 emission reduction scenario. The 

54.5 mpg standard is a negotiated compromise between the 4% (51 mpg) and 5% (56 mpg) CO2

reduction scenarios. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 2]

CARB’s 2004 Staff Report presenting the agency’s plan to implement AB 1493 is another 

smoking gun.6 Nearly all of CARB’s recommended technologies for reducing GHG emissions 

(Table 5.2-3) were previously recommended in a 2002 National Research Council study on fuel 

economy (Tables 3-1, 3-2).7 CARB proposes a few additional options, but each is a fuel-saving 

technology, not an emissions-control technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 2]

Even the text of AB 1493 implies that CARB is to regulate fuel economy. CARB’s GHG 

standards are to be “cost-effective,” defined as “Economical to an owner or operator of a vehicle, 

taking into account the full life-cycle costs of the vehicle.”8 CARB reasonably interprets this to 

mean that the reduction in “operating expenses” over the average life of the vehicle must exceed 

the expected increase in vehicle cost.9 Virtually all such “operating expenses” are expenditures 

for fuel. The CARB program cannot be “cost-effective” unless CARB regulates fuel 

economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, pp. 2-3]

V. Constitutional Common Sense

EPA contends that its current and future GHG rules derive from the CAA as interpreted by 

Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA (April 2007). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is now 

reviewing arguments regarding that claim in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. 

EPA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]
EPA Response to Comments

19-4

However that case is decided, EPA is clearly wielding powers Congress never intentionally 

delegated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]

Congress declined to give EPA explicit authority to regulate GHGs only last year, when Senate 

leaders pulled the plug on companion legislation to the American Clean Energy and Security Act 

(ACESA) – the House-passed cap-and-trade bill sponsored by Reps. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) 

and Ed Markey (D-Mass.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 5]

One of ACESA’s selling points was precisely that it would preempt regulation of GHGs under 

several CAA programs. If instead of proposing cap-and-trade, Waxman and Markey had 

introduced legislation authorizing EPA to do exactly what it is doing now – regulating GHGs via 

the CAA as it sees fit – their bill would have been dead on arrival. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9552-A1, p. 5]

The notion that Congress gave EPA such expansive authority when it enacted the CAA in 1970, 

years before global warming emerged as a public policy concern, defies both history and 

logic. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 5]

[See footnote list for this comment on pp. 5-6 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9552-A1]

Organization: Environmental Consultants of Michigan

EPA erred in its implementation of the Supreme Court decision on GHG emissions [NHTSA2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 4]

On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, a case 

involving EPA’s 2003 denial of a petition for rulemaking to regulate GHG emissions from motor 

vehicles under section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Court held that GHGs fit within 

the definition of air pollutant in the Clean Air Act and further held that the Administrator must 

determine whether or not emissions from new motor vehicles cause or contribute to air pollution 

which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, or whether the 

science is too uncertain to make a reasoned decision. The Court further ruled that, in making 

these decisions, the EPA Administrator is required to follow the language of section 202(a) of 

the CAA. The Court rejected the argument that EPA cannot regulate CO2 from motor vehicles 

because to do so would de facto tighten fuel economy standards, authority over which has been 

assigned by Congress to DOT. The Court stated that ‘‘[b]ut that DOT sets mileage standards in 

no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with 

protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare’, a statutory obligation wholly independent of 

DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency.’’ The Court concluded that ‘‘[t]he two obligations 

may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their 

obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.’’ The case was remanded back to the Agency for 

reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, pp. 4-5]

EPA could have honored the decision of the Supreme Court by regulating the carbon content of 

the fuel as is done in Europe; instead, they immediately began a duplicative tailpipe carbon 
EPA Statutory Authority

19-5

dioxide standard. EPA initially argued that their greenhouse gas standard was necessary because 

there were vehicle emissions that were not covered by the CAFÉ equivalent standard. All of 

these other GHG pollutants are currently regulated by the existing EPA tailpipe or evaporative 

emission standards. In May 2009, the National Fuel Efficiency Policy was announced that for the 

first time provided what amounted to double jeopardy for vehicle manufacturers with duplicative 

greenhouse gas standards and CAFÉ standards. This unprecedented level of control provides two 

sets of compliance regulations and two sets of penalties (fines) for what amounts to a single 

action. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 5]

EPA should have done a thorough analysis of the policy alternatives prior to arbitrarily jumping 

to vehicle tailpipe standards. A fair and balanced policy review would have led to a different 

policy to achieve the target, one that changes the fuel such as the required use of a renewable 

Fischer-Thropsch fuel. The DoE GREET model demonstrates that usage of this fuel can be an 

effective strategy for achieving GHG reductions unlike the slow and limited progress that 

accompanies tailpipe standards. This policy would have the secondary effect of reducing 

petroleum consumption. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0166-A1, p. 5]

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

III. EPA HAS EXPANSIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE CAA TO REGULATE GHG 

EMISSIONS FROM LIGHT DUTY VEHICLES AND NHTSA’S AUTHORITY IS MORE 

CONSTRAINED IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT WAYS

A. EPA and NHTSA have Different Statutory Mandates

The primary purpose of EPA’s regulation under the Clean Air Act is “to protect and enhance the 

quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 

productive capacity of its population.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (emphasis added). This protective 

purpose is reflected in the text of Section 202 of the Act. Section 202(a) requires the EPA 

Administrator to promulgate standards for the emission of air pollutants from new motor 

vehicles “which in his [her] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably 

be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (emphasis added). 

Both the “may reasonably be anticipated” and “endanger” language reflect Congress’ intent for 

EPA to act in a manner that prevents, rather than merely responds to, harm. See Ethyl Corp. v. 

EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[E]ndangers means something less than actual harm. 

When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual injury need ever occur.”). Because of the 

important public health purpose and preventative nature of the Clean Air Act’s mandate, EPA’s 

authority to regulate under it is far-reaching. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 4-5]

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)’s purpose in implementing the 

Energy Policy Conservation Act (EPCA) is “to provide for improved energy efficiency of motor 

vehicles.” 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5). This mandate, while vital to curbing our Nation’s energy use, is 

narrowly focused on one aspect of motor vehicles— fuel efficiency—without regard to the 

vehicles’ effects on public health and welfare. The purposes of these two Acts are “wholly 

independent,” as the Supreme Court made clear in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 531-32 

(2007): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 5]
EPA Response to Comments

19-6

EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles because 

doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job (according to EPA) that Congress 

has assigned to DOT. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52929. But that DOT sets mileage standards in no way 

licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting 

the public’s “health” and “welfare,” 42 U. S. C. 7521(a)(1), a statutory obligation wholly 

independent of DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency. See Energy Policy and 

Conservation Act, §2(5), 89 Stat. 874, 42 U. S. C. §6201(5). The two obligations may overlap, 

but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet 

avoid inconsistency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 5]

B. EPA’s Expansive Authority under Section 202

For light-duty vehicles, as well as heavy-duty vehicles, EPA’s authority, and imperative, to 

protect human health and the environment through rigorous emission standards is more farreaching and effective than the U.S. Department of Transportation’s authority to set standards for 

fuel economy because of EPA’s ability to address all greenhouse gases, to efficiently and 

effectively address the interactions between all vehicle components, and due to the breadth of the 

delegated rulemaking authority and associated protections under the Clean Air Act. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 5]

EPA has broad authority under Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act to “prescribe . . . standards 

applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or 

new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which 

may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) 

(emphasis added); see also id. §7521 (a) (EPA authorized to set standards for air pollutants from 

vehicles and engines “whether such vehicles and engines are designed as complete systems or 

incorporate devices to prevent or control such pollution”). This language clearly delegates to 

EPA the responsibility to adopt standards for air pollutants. EPA relies on this authority in the 

proposed rule to regulate, in addition to CO2, N2O, CH4, and hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) 

emissions. All of these substances are listed among the “primary GHGs of concern” as 

contributors to global warming. 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,963. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, 

pp. 5-6]

C. Constraints on NHTSA’s Authority

In contrast to EPA’s expansive authority under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPCA as 

amended by EISA includes limitations on NHTSA’s authority to regulate fuel economy. 

NHTSA’s authority is focused on fuel economy and not air pollution, and as a result, NHTSA is 

constrained in regulating direct discharges of N20, CH4, and HFC emissions from automobiles. 

76 Fed. Reg. at 74,902. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 6]

Within its focus on fuel economy, EPCA contains additional, limitations on NHTSA’s discretion 

to establish CAFE standards including the nexus to fuel efficiency. And, of particular 

importance, any proposed expansion of NHTSA’s fuel economy analysis must be consistent with 

EPA’s statutorily-mandated procedures to test fuel economy. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-

A1, p. 6]
EPA Statutory Authority

19-7

EPCA directs the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe CAFE standards, which “shall be the 

maximum feasible average fuel economy level that the Secretary decides the manufacturers can 

achieve in that model year.” 49 U.S.C. § 32902; see also § 32902(f) (directing the Secretary to 

consider statutorily-enumerated factors in making this determination). While NHTSA has 

discretion in standard setting, under EPCA, EPA alone has the authority to measure fuel 

economy and to calculate CAFE values, 49 U.S.C. § 32904(a). In doing so, EPA “shall use the 

same procedures for passenger automobiles the Administrator used for model year 1975 . . . or 

procedures that give comparable results.” Id. at 32904(c). The D.C. Circuit has concluded that, to 

produce “comparable results,” “[t]he critical fact is that a procedure . . . was available for 

MY1975 testing, and those manufacturers, however few in number, that found it advantageous to 

do so, employed that procedure.” Center for Auto Safety v. EPA, 806 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 6]

In a previous rulemaking, the agencies concluded that this statutory structure did not allow for 

incorporation of air-conditioning efficiency improvement and off-cycle technology credits into 

NHTSA’s fuel economy analysis. 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,544 (“The CAFE standards and compliance 

testing cannot capture all of the real world CO2 emissions, because EPCA currently requires 

EPA to use the 1975 passenger car test procedures under which vehicle air conditioners are not 

turned on during fuel economy testing.”); 25,663 (requesting comment on including air 

conditioning credits in light-truck testing requirements but emphasizing “that modernizing the 

passenger car test procedures as well would not be possible under EPCA as currently 

written.”). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 6]

In this proposal, however, the agencies forward different legal rationales, id. at 74,998, which 

they characterize as “major changes” from past practice, id., that would allow them to 

incorporate air-conditioning efficiency and off-cycle technology improvements into NHTSA 

standard setting. Both the agencies themselves, supra, and regulated industry have raised 

questions regarding this conclusion. See EPA Doc. No. OAR-2009- 0472-7123.1 at 17 

(Comments of Association of International Automakers on LDV Phase I) (noting that the 

Association “does not support fundamentally changing the fuel economy/greenhouse gas test 

procedures at this time”); see also EPA Doc. No. EPA-HQOAR- 2003-0214-0208 at 10 

(Comments of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers) (noting that any change in test 

procedures would require EPA “to develop a complex set of test procedure adjustment factors to 

ensure that the new procedures ‘give comparable results’ to the existing ones”). [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 6-7]

D. EPA and NHTSA Must Carefully Coordinate the Joint Rulemaking

Alone, NHTSA’s CAFE standards cannot capture the significant opportunities for meaningful 

greenhouse gas reductions available to EPA pursuant to its broad authority under the Clean Air 

Act to address air pollution for the protection of human health and welfare. As such, EDF 

strongly supports the agencies’ focus on a joint rulemaking proposal that is “carefully 

coordinated and harmonized,” and, like the agencies, EDF recognizes that such coordination 

must be “in accordance with all substantive and procedural requirements imposed by law” to 

achieve durable and legally-defensible results. 76 Fed. Reg. 74,860; see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 

74,902 (describing differences in the agencies’ statutory authorities, including EPA’s ability to 
EPA Response to Comments

19-8

address various GHGs and EPA’s ability to account for certain compliance adaptability). Indeed, 

the regulated community has long questioned the scope of NHTSA's authority. In contrast, there 

is a well established body of law affirming the broad authority of EPA under the Clean Air Act 

to adopt emission standards protecting human health and welfare from air pollutants. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 7]

EDF applauds the agencies’ efforts to collaborate on regulations to reduce greenhouse gas 

emission and improve fuel economy and recognizes the imperative of doing so consistent with 

the agencies’ separate statutory mandates. EDF also recognizes the imperative of EPA action 

under the full breadth and protections of the Clean Air Act to safeguard human health and the 

environment from harmful air pollutants and to ensure those protections are lasting through 

EPA's durable, tested delegated rulemaking authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 

7]

Organization: Growth Energy

If EPA believes that the examination of the proposal to increase octane outlined in Attachment 3 

is unnecessary or inappropriate because it lacks authority under section 211 of the Clean Air Act 

to take the recommended action, then the Agency should fully explain why it believes it lacks 

that authority, among other reasons so that Congress can consider appropriate changes in the 

statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1. p. 6]

Organization: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

With this proposal, EPA is leveraging four decades of authority and expertise in successfully 

regulating conventional pollutants from mobile sources to establish controls on GHG emissions. 

While past improvements to Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) have made some 

progress in reducing GHG emissions, the Clean Air Act authority is a far superior statute for the 

purpose of controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since it provides the agency the ability 

to adopt forward looking standards that are consistent with long-term environmental targets, 

address all GHG emissions—not just carbon dioxide, and accurately reflect the true carbon 

impacts of substituting different fuels for gasoline through life-cycle analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 2]

II. Clean Air Act is Appropriate Statute for Regulating Greenhouse Gases from Motor Vehicles

The Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA ruled that the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the 

adoption of standards to control greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution from motor vehicles if EPA 

determines that these emissions contribute to endangerment of public health or welfare. With the 

model year 2012-2016 National Program Final Rule, the U.S. EPA and NHTSA established an 

important partnership that ensures that the pollution and health protections of the CAA are 

appropriately aligned with the fuel-conservation directive of the Energy Policy and Conservation 

Act (EPCA). The latest proposal maintains that current partnership and alignment. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 7]
EPA Statutory Authority

19-9

EPA has used its authority and technical expertise to successfully regulate conventional 

pollutants from mobile source emissions for nearly four decades. Since the 1970s, EPA has 

significantly reduced transportation emissions by establishing performance-based standards for 

all categories of mobile sources. The impact has led to tremendous success -- EPA’s mobile 

source emission programs have reduced conventional pollutants from today’s new personal 

vehicles by 98-99 percent compared to those sold in the 1960s. EPA’s fuel programs have 

effectively removed lead from gasoline and most recently, led to the development of ultra low 

sulfur diesel in the U.S. and advanced clean diesel technologies. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9472-A2, p. 7]

Several major factors have led to EPA’s success in controlling conventional pollutants from 

mobile sources. These same factors provide the Agency with distinct advantages in terms of 

regulating greenhouse gas emissions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 7]

First, unlike EPCA which limits NHTSA to setting standards just five years into the future, the 

CAA allows EPA to set technology-forcing standards that consider longer-term environmental 

targets. With this latest proposal, EPA is proposing standards for a nine-year period into the 

future, consistent with previous pollution emission standards. Addressing the multi-generational 

environmental challenges of climate change is virtually impossible with only a five-year 

perspective that necessarily relies upon only incremental additions of new technologies. This 

longer-term, innovation-based approach creates the regulatory certainty necessary for 

automakers to strategically plan for and invest in emerging and advanced technologies that are 

needed to meet climate stabilization goals. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, pp. 7-8]

Second, it is critical to address all GHG emissions, not just CO2. Unlike EPCA, the CAA allows 

EPA to set standards that directly address non-CO2 GHG pollutants, in particular HFC-134a, 

N2O, and CH4. According to EPA, these latter GHG pollutants currently compose 7.2 percent of 

the effective vehicle GHG emissions.31 Inclusions of these pollutants enable EPA to adopt GHG 

standards that achieve the maximum feasible reductions in GHGs in the most flexible and costeffective manner possible. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 8]

Third, the CAA allows EPA to adopt standards that accurately reflect the true impacts of 

substituting different fuels for gasoline. Environmentally effective GHG standards must consider 

both the carbon content and lifecycle emissions. Since fuel economy standards only consider the 

miles driven per gallon of fuel used, it fails to account for the fact that a fuel such as diesel has a 

higher carbon content per gallon than gasoline. Fuel economy standards under EPCA also do not 

properly account for the differences in upstream emissions of different types of fuels. Ignoring 

upstream emissions for fuels such as electricity, hydrogen, biofuels and diesel tend to inflate 

their GHG benefits in comparison to gasoline. For example, a diesel-fueled vehicle that achieves 

a fuel economy benefit of 20 percent or more versus a conventional gasoline-fueled vehicle using 

diesel produced from coal (i.e. coal-to-liquid) could result in almost two times greater GHG lifecycle on a per mile basis due to the inherently higher carbon content of diesel and the extremely 

high carbon emissions associated with producing a diesel-like fuel from coal. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

19-10

It is important to note that using the Clean Air Act to control carbon pollution was first initiated 

by the Bush administration. In fact, in May 2007, a month after the Supreme Court’s landmark 

decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, President Bush went to the Rose Garden and ordered EPA 

Administrator Johnson to carry it out by setting carbon pollution standards for new 

vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 8]

In January 2008, Administrator Johnson appealed directly – albeit unsuccessfully – to President 

Bush to allow EPA to carry out the law. His letter to the president stated that the science 

supported “a positive endangerment determination” on carbon pollution and “does not permit a 

negative finding.”32 The Johnson letter reveals three important facts: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9472-A2, p. 8]

(1) That the Bush administration’s EPA thought “a positive endangerment finding” was 

compelled by both the science and the law. Johnson wrote that the Supreme Court’s decision 

“combined with the latest science of climate change requires the Agency to propose a positive 

endangerment finding.” He continued: “the state of the latest climate change science does not 

permit a negative finding, nor does it permit a credible finding that we need to wait for more 

research.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, pp. 8-9]

(2) That Johnson’s action plan – to issue an endangerment finding, set vehicle standards, and 

more – had “Cabinet-level” buy-in. Johnson wrote that the scientific and legal need to issue a 

positive endangerment finding “was agreed to at the Cabinet-level meeting in November.” He 

continued: “A robust interagency policy process involving principal meetings over the past eight 

months has enabled me to formulate a plan that is prudent and cautious yet forward 

thinking.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 9]

(3) That Johnson’s action plan contained exactly the same steps that his successor, Lisa Jackson, 

has carried out. Johnson told President Bush he had formulated a “prudent and cautious yet 

forward thinking” action plan that “will fulfill your Administration’s obligations under the 

Supreme Court decision.” Phase 1 of the plan called for these actions: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9472-A2, p. 9]

In response to the Supreme Court mandate in Massachusetts v EPA, issue a proposed positive 

endangerment finding for public notice and comment as agreed to in the policy process. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 9]

In response to the direction in [the Energy Independence and Security Act], issue a proposed 

vehicles rule jointly with the Department of Transportation to implement the new EISA and 

address issues raised in the Supreme Court case. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 9]

To address requirements under the Clean Air Act, issue a proposed rule to update the New 

Source Review program to raise greenhouse gas thresholds to avoid covering small sources and 

to better define cost-effective, available technology. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 9]

--Quoted from letter from EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson to President Bush, January 31, 

2008. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 9]
EPA Statutory Authority

19-11

31 4.3 percent, 2.7 percent and 0.2 percent respectively. 74 FR 49454 at 49524, 49525, 

49532. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 8]

32Steven L. Johnson, Former EPA Administrator, Memo to Former US President George Bush, 

January 31, 2008. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9472-A2, p. 8]

Organization: Sierra Club, Environment America, Safe Climate Campaign, and Clean Air 

Council

The National Program accounts for both EPA’s and NHTSA’s authority and requires no 

additional action: NHTSA notes that it is “confronted with the issue of how to treat” EPA 

standards in setting its own standards under EPCA and EISA. The Supreme Court has ruled that 

EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases such as CO2, holding that the Clean Air act 

“is unambiguous” in its “sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’;” that the statute “embraces all 

airborne compounds of whatever stripe,” including the greenhouse gasses “[c]arbon dioxide, 

methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons.”34 Both the prior rule for MY 2012-16 vehicles 

and this NPRM, which continues the process of joint standard setting with California and EPA 

carries out the Mass. v. EPA decision. The NPRM and the prior rule demonstrate successful 

cooperation and NHTSA’s capacity to both account for, and in fact, improve upon its standard 

setting process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, p. 10]

34 Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9549-A2, 

p. 10]

Organization: Steyn, R.

* EPA has NO statutory authority to determine fuel economy standards for any reason. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8724-A1, p. 2]

Organization: University of Michigan

A Call to EPA and NHTSA to Consider the Consumer Fuel Usage Reduction Options in the 

Mid-term Evaluation of the Greenhouse-Gas Emission and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, p. 1] [This comment 

can also be found in section 2.4 of this comment summary.]

The emission standard is completely based on vehicle technology applied to a specific drive 

cycle. Even the potential off-cycle credits are based on technology advancements or vehicle 

hardware improvements. In the past, meeting the emission standards for regulated pollutants has 

been the sole responsibility of the vehicle manufacturers. This is appropriate since (1) only the 

manufacturers can implement the emission control technologies on the vehicles, (2) the impact of 

fuels and vehicle usage on pollutant emissions are relatively limited, and (3) the cost of such 
EPA Response to Comments

19-12

implementation has not been excessive even though we may be approaching the state of 

diminishing return. In the case of GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles, however, vehicle 

technology is only one of three contributors. The others are vehicle fuels and consumer usage. 

Vehicle technology alone cannot shoulder the full burden of CO2 emission reductions in mobile 

sources when carbon-containing fuels are used. CO2 emissions are directly proportional to the 

amount of carbon-containing fuels (in the well-to-wheels sense) used in propelling the vehicles. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, pp. 1-2]

The laws of physics dictate the limits of technology capability in CO2 emission reduction. 

Economics and material resource availability further constrain the potential affordability of some 

new technologies, low-carbon fuels and their accompanying infrastructure, even when financial 

incentives are provided to cushion the costs of initial investments. It is obvious that in the effort 

toward increasingly stringent reductions of GHG emissions, the role of consumer fuel usage can 

no longer be ignored. As both the EPA and NHTSA will be undertaking the midterm evaluation 

of the GHG emission and the corporate average fuel economy standard for model year 2022-

2025 vehicles in due course, we recommend that meaningful incentives for consumer fuel usage 

reduction be taken into consideration. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, p. 2] [The last 

sentence of this comment can also be found in section 2.4 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-7986-A1]

Bringing the consumer’s energy usage into the picture for CO2 emission reduction is obviously 

nontrivial. Cap-and-trade and carbon tax are two known economically efficient approaches in 

reducing CO2 emissions. Cap and trade is a massive undertaking and can be achieved by an 

upstream and/or a downstream approach. In the upstream approach, carbon trading is achieved at 

the level of fuel producers with the incurred cost adjustments being eventually borne by fuel 

users. In the downstream approach, consumers directly adjust their fuel usage through available 

fuel or carbon tradable credits available to them. Anticipating the advent of cap and trade in the 

US at the time, Ellerman, Jacoby and Zimmerman (2006) proposed a mechanism to bring the 

CAFE standard into the realm of cap and trade. Their rationale and proposed mechanism are 

most definitely worthy of further consideration. Carbon tax is considerably simpler to design and 

administer but will likely face substantial political resistance in the US, perhaps even when the 

designed carbon-tax system is revenue neutral. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, pp. 2-3]

In the absence of the two most efficient fossil-carbon-fuel usage reduction programs, other 

options need to be explored. Opportunities abound in the design of new mobility options. Key 

among them includes incentives for transit usage (both public and private in the broadest sense) 

that can be translated into verifiable CO2 emission and equivalent fuel-economy credits; 

manufacturer’s or consumer credits for encouragement of telecommuting, car pooling, use of 

public and private transit options, credits for coupling of private and public transportation modes 

for trip completion; credits for use of car-share systems as well as taxi and private shuttle use 

that lead to actual fuel use reduction; use of mileage-based vehicle-insurance policies, and other 

new incentives for total annual trip mileage reduction that can be translated into CO2 reduction 

credit. While it is difficult to assess the most feasible and equitable fuel-usage reduction 

programs at this time, this fact should not deter the EPA and NHTSA to explore and to 

encourage the public to explore these options. It is only a matter of time that non- hardwarerelated, carbon-fuel usage reduction options must become an integral part of a workable and 
EPA Statutory Authority

19-13

meaningful CO2 and GHG emission reduction program. It is high time that we seriously consider 

novel ways to power our vehicles and facilitate innovation in broader approaches to mobility to 

create new options and incentivize behavior that reduces CO2 and GHG emission. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, pp. 3-4]

Reference: Ellerman, A.D., Jacoby, H.D. and Zimmerman, M.B. (2006): “Bringing 

Transportation into a Cap-and-Trade Regime.” MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of 

Global Change, Report No. 136, June. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7986-A1, p. 4]

Organization: U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Moreover, as was the case with the 2012-2016 fuel economy rule, the Chamber has serious 

concerns with the redundant regulatory framework proposed for 2017-25, and recommends 

consolidation into a single program administered by NHTSA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-

A1, p. 1]

II. There Must Be One Fuel Economy Rule, Administered By NHTSA

The Chamber believes there should be only one rule governing fuel economy, administered by 

NHTSA under its existing authority. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)3 gives 

NHTSA authority to set mandatory CAFE standards for motor vehicles. To the extent that EPA’s 

rule is the same as NHTSA’s, there is no need for the rule. If EPA’s rule provides added benefits, 

then those benefits should be identified with specificity and any EPA regulations should be 

narrowly tailored to achieve those additional objectives.4 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, 

p. 3]

EPA attempts to justify two rules on the basis that its standards, unlike NHTSA’s, include air 

conditioning improvements and slightly different compliance flexibilities. However, just a few 

sentences later, EPA admits the obvious: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 3]

These differences, however, do not change the fact that in many critical ways the two agencies 

are charged with addressing the same basic issue of reducing GHG emissions and improving fuel 

economy. The agencies are looking at the same set of control technologies (with the exception of 

the air conditioning leakage-related technologies). The standards set by each agency will drive 

the kind and degree of penetration of this set of technologies across the vehicle fleet. As a result, 

each agency is trying to answer the same basic question—what kind and degree of technology 

penetration is necessary to achieve the agencies’ objectives in the rulemaking time frame, given 

the agencies’ respective statutory authorities?5 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, pp. 3-4]

In other words, there is little to no need for dual sets of regulations by EPA and NHTSA. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 4]

As the Chamber pointed out in its comments on the 2012-2016 program, EPA can regulate air 

conditioning improvements without even using Title II of the Clean Air Act. Title VI of the Act, 

“Stratospheric Ozone Protection,” gives EPA wide flexibility to regulate motor vehicle air 

conditioners and their emissions.6 Section 608 and its corresponding regulations govern the use 
EPA Response to Comments

19-14

and disposal of ozone-depleting substances—of which air conditioning refrigerant qualifies—

and prohibits the knowing release of these substances into the atmosphere.7 Section 609, entitled 

“Servicing of motor vehicle air conditioners,” and the regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 82 subpart B, 

set forth specific regulations for the handling of motor vehicle air conditioning refrigerant during 

servicing and upon disposal.8 Section 612 and its corresponding regulations set forth criteria for 

evaluation of substitutes for existing ozone-depleting substances.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9521-A1, p. 4]

It seems as though the only reason EPA feels the need to regulate fuel economy is to pacify 

California, which remains the driving force behind the continuation of this bizarre tripartite fuel 

economy arrangement. But the California problem is one of EPA’s own making, one that could 

have easily been avoided by denying its request for a waiver to regulate greenhouse gases from 

motor vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 4]

The Clean Air Act requires EPA to justify its emissions standards by articulating a rational 

connection between the alleged risk and the selected standards.10 To avoid irrational regulation, 

EPA must explain how its emissions standards will meaningfully ameliorate the endangerment 

risk it has identified.11 EPA once again appears to provide shaky evidence regarding whether its 

own rule will meaningfully avert any predicted danger not already averted by NHTSA’s 

standards. Likewise, EPA appears to overstate the potential benefits that accrue from EPA’s rule 

that would not otherwise occur from NHTSA’s. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9521-A1, pp. 4-5]

EPA has consistently maintained that Massachusetts v. EPA12 recognized that EPA has a 

statutory obligation “wholly independent” from NHTSA. But the Supreme Court was only 

recognizing that EPA had an obligation to examine the issue of GHG regulation and could not 

side-step that obligation merely because NHTSA has authority to regulate fuel economy. 

Nothing in Massachusetts suggests that EPA should ignore NHTSA’s specific fuel-economy 

regulations or that EPA may refuse to consider whether those regulations are sufficient to realize 

its own GHG reduction goals. Indeed, Massachusetts made clear that “there is no reason” 

NHTSA and EPA could not “administer their obligations” in a way that “avoid[s] 

inconsistency.”13 There is accordingly no reason EPA should not take into account GHG 

reductions achieved by NHTSA’s rules, especially because Congress has given NHTSA (unlike 

EPA) a mandatory, specific instruction to promulgate fuel-economy standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9521-A1, p. 5]

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Chamber strongly recommends issuing a single fuel 

economy rule for the 2017-2025 period, administered by NHTSA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9521-A1, p. 5]

4 To the extent EPA continues to interpret this rule as triggering absurd regulation on other 

sources that requires rewriting of the statute (i.e. the Tailoring Rule), then this rule relies on an 

improper and untenable construction of the statutory requirements. Moreover, EPA must 

consider all of the costs and consequences of its rule in a meaningful fashion.
EPA Statutory Authority

19-15

6 Congress even recognized the ability to limit greenhouse gas emissions through Title VI: 

Section 602(e), entitled “Ozone-depletion and global warming potential,” requires the 

Administrator to assess the global warming potential of each ozone-depleting substance covered 

by Title VI.

7 42 U.S.C. § 7671g.

8 Id. at § 7671h.

9 Id. at § 7671i.

10 See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also CAA § 307(d)(9).

11 See Chemical Mfrs., 217 F.3d 861, 865-67 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (although statute mandated 

regulation, EPA still must show that regulations served statutory objectives); Alabama Power 

Co. v. Costle, 636 F.3d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (interpretations that “mandate pointless 

expenditures of effort” should be avoided).

12 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

13 Id. at 532.

Response:

The comments that EPA lacks authority to issue standards controlling GHG emissions 

from new motor vehicles, that EPA’s regulations rest on an incorrect finding that greenhouse 

gases endanger public health and welfare, and that EPA should defer any regulation to NHTSA 

under the CAFE program, have all been rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible 

Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (June 26, 2012). In particular, the court held that the 

endangerment finding was reasonable and fully grounded and supported by the vast body of 

scientific literature and information on climate change, and that EPA had a mandatory duty 

under section 202 (a) to issue the MYs 2012-2016 standards. Slip op. pp. 22-34, 40-43. Section 

202 (a) (1) further provides that EPA may revise section 202 (a) “from time to time”, which 

authority EPA is exercising in this proceeding. The Coalition for Responsible Regulation court 

likewise rejected arguments that EPA had any discretion to defer regulation of vehicular GHGs 

due to NHTSA’s authority under EPCA/EISA: “Just as EPA lacks authority to refuse to regulate 

on the grounds of NHTSA’s regulatory authority, EPA cannot defer regulation on that basis.” 

Slip op. p. 41. The commenters’ argument that the EPA and NHTSA programs are duplicative is 

also factually wrong. As with the MYs 2012-2016 rules, the section 202 (a) GHG standards 

“provide benefits above and beyond those resulting from NHTSA’s fuel-economy standards.” 

Slip op. p. 42. These benefits “above and beyond” are not just from control of direct air 

conditioning emissions, as the commenters mistakenly would have it. The GHG rules result in 

more reductions of CO2 emissions (see preamble Tables III-61 and IV-42), and more reductions 

in petroleum consumption than the CAFE rules (see preamble Tables III-80 and IV-41). These 

incrementally greater reductions of both GHGs and savings of petroleum are substantial: Thus,
EPA Response to Comments

19-16

even assuming that the MYs 2022-2025 augural CAFE standards were actually in place, the 

GHG rules are estimated to achieve 17%, 23%, and 27% greater reductions in GHG emissions in 

calendar years 2030, 2040, and 2050, and to achieve 9%, 18%, and 20% greater reductions in 

petroleum than the CAFE standards in those same calendar years. The differences are far greater 

in fact, since there are no CAFE standards after MY 2021.

 The comment that these rules are an end-run on Congressional authority are likewise

misplaced. Section 202 (a) has been definitively construed as applying to carbon pollution, and 

EPA’s duty to determine if carbon pollution endangers public health and welfare, and to issue 

standards to control emissions of the pollutants which endanger is mandatory. EPA is thus 

implementing the authority delegated by Congress, not flouting Congressional authority.

Comments that the GHG rules should reflect fuel content, or otherwise should be based 

on lifecycle analysis rather than tailpipe emissions are addressed in sections 6 and 14 of this 

document. We note here that section 202(a) standards address control of vehicular emissions. 

Converting that program into a fuel-based program would constitute a dramatic distortion of the 

purpose and structure of the vehicle emissions standard program. There is no good reason to 

consider such a result, and that is especially the case here where there is a separate fuel based 

program, the RFS program, that achieves a reduction in lifecycle GHG emissions associated with 

the diesel fuel used by motor vehicles, through a mandate to use certain renewable diesel fuels. 

Regarding comments from the University of Michigan, some of the concepts suggested 

by the commenter go beyond the scope of this rule. Nevertheless, EPA appreciates the 

suggestions of the commenter, and notes that we have been involved in programs that encourage 

the voluntary change in travel behavior, such as encouraging commuters to use public 

transportation. 
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-1

20. Statutory and Executive Orders

Organizations Included in this Section

American Petroleum Institute (API), National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and 

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Center for Biological Diversity

Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

Growth Energy

Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)

RVIA

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API), National Association of Manufacturers 

(NAM), and American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Contrary to the text of the statute, and the Supreme Court’s direction in Massachusetts, EPA 

failed to consider the cost of compliance with the stationary source regulations that the 2017 Car 

Rule could trigger. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 9]

EPA failed to perform a host of other mandatory analyses, including but not limited to: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 9]

• Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 603(a) & 605(b), EPA must 

prepare an analysis that describes the effects of a proposed rule on small businesses, or 

certify that there are no such effects. Despite EPA’s assertion that vehicle emissions 

standards trigger permitting requirements for stationary sources, it certified that the 2017 

Car Rule would “not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 

entities.” 2017 Car Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,161. EPA’s reliance on Mid-Tex. Elec. Coop 

v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 

255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001), is misplaced because the 2017 Car Rule’s impact on small 

businesses is not merely an indirect effect of the 2017 Car Rule’s impact on regulated 

entities. Instead, as a result of the triggering effect of the 2017 Car Rule for stationary 

source permitting requirements, many small businesses will be regulated directly by EPA 

as a result of this rule. EPA is required to analyze these impacts in accordance with the 

RFA before issuing a rule. Instead, EPA asserts that any impact on small businesses 

should be attributed to express statutory requirements in the CAA or previously 

promulgated EPA regulations. 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,162 n.597. EPA ignores the fact that 

once the Car Rule and Truck Rule are vacated, the 2017 Car Rule will be sole “trigger” 

for EPA’s GHG permitting requirements for stationary sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9509-A1, p. 9]

• Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 2 U.S.C. § 1535, EPA must 

consider regulatory alternatives and adopt the least costly, most cost-effective, or least 

burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule. Here, EPA’s sole 

proclaimed goal is regulating emissions from vehicles, yet it has ignored apparent 

alternatives that would fully realize that goal while avoiding the heavy burdens on 

stationary sources. See Section I supra. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]
EPA Response to Comments

20-2

• Similarly, under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521, EPA 

must seek approval from the Office of Management and Budget before creating rules that 

will involve information collection requirements. EPA never submitted a request for 

approval of the massive information collection requirements that the 2017 Car Rule could 

impose on stationary sources newly subject to permitting requirements. 76 Fed. Reg. at 

75,160. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]

• EPA has also failed to perform the economic impact assessment required by CAA § 317, 

42 U.S.C. § 7617, which, by law, must contain an analysis of a proposed rule’s 

compliance costs, inflationary or recessionary effects, competitive effects, effect on 

consumers, and impact on energy use. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]

• Finally, the proposed rule fails to satisfy Executive Order 13211’s requirement that EPA 

conduct an analysis of its actions’ impact on energy supply, distribution, and use, 76 Fed. 

Reg. at 75,163, as well as Executive Order 12898’s requirement that EPA identify and 

address disproportionate effects of its actions on minority and low-income populations in 

the United States, id. Triggering stationary source permitting requirements for GHGs will 

undoubtedly raise energy prices, thereby harming low-income populations that are most 

vulnerable to high energy prices. EPA failed to consider these impacts in proposing its 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]

Thus, in the proposed rule, EPA has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 

problem,” making the proposed GHG Truck Rule arbitrary and capricious. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 

463 U.S. at 43. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]

Response:

These incorrect assertions were rejected in their entirety by the D.C. Circuit in Coalition 

for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012) slip op. pp. 44-45. 

The commenter is equally mistaken in this rulemaking. Thus, EPA has prepared an RIA which 

assesses, among other things, costs of the vehicle program, impacts and assessment of standards 

both more and less stringent than those adopted, vehicle sales impacts, employment impacts in 

the light duty vehicle sector, consumer lifetime savings on new vehicle purchases, energy use 

impacts, and small business impacts. Substantially the same analysis was available as part of the 

record for the proposed rule. This analysis fully satisfies the requirement in CAA section 317. 

The commenter is equally incorrect regarding requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act. 

See 76 FR 75160 (“[t]he information collection requirements in this proposed rule have been 

submitted for approval to the Office of Management and Budget ... under the Paperwork 

Reduction Act... The Information Collection Request ...document prepared by EPA has been 

assigned EPA ICR number 0783.61”). The remaining assertions are predicated on the incorrect 

assumption that EPA must account for stationary source burdens flowing from this rule, an 

argument rejected in its entirety by the D.C. Circuit in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. 

EPA. In any case, this rule has no such effect on stationary sources, since greenhouse gases are 

already “regulated pollutants” under the Act by virtue of the MYs 2012-2016 rule, as well as 

other regulatory actions which control emissions of GHGs.

Organization: Center for Biological Diversity
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-3

A. The Agencies Misapprehend the Nature and Relative Weight of the Factors They Must 

Consider Under EPCA and EISA

In enacting EPCA in 1975, shortly after the energy crisis of 1973, Congress observed that “[t]e 

fundamental reality is that this nation has entered a new era in which energy resources previously

abundant, will remain in short supply retarding our economic growth and necessitating an 

alteration in our life’s habitats and expectations.”7 Among the goals of EPCA are to “‘decrease 

dependence on foreign imports, enhance national security [and to] achieve the efficient 

utilization of scarce resources . . .’”8 The fundamental purpose of EPCA, however, is energy 

conservation.9 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 3]

In furtherance of the overarching goal of energy conservation, NHTSA must set fuel economy 

standards at “the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that the Secretary decides the 

manufacturers can achieve in that model year.” 10 The statute provides that “[w]hen deciding 

maximum feasible average fuel economy under this section, the Secretary . . . shall consider 

technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of 

the Government on fuel economy, and the need for the United States to conserve cannot balance 

them in a manner that is contrary to fuel conservation: NHTSA “cannot set fuel economy 

standards that are contrary to Congress’ purpose in enacting the EPCA – energy 

conservation.”12 Further, NHTSA cannot give so much weight to any factor, including 

consumer choice or demand, that the goal of fuel conservation is undercut: “NHTSA may 

consider consumer demand, but ‘it would clearly be impermissible for NHTSA to rely on 

consumer demand to such an extent that it ignored the overarching goal of fuel conservation.’”13 

The Agencies also cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously; cannot advance conclusions 

unsupported by the evidence; if they conduct cost-benefit analyses, they may not assign values of 

zero to benefits that can be ascertained within a range; and they cannot bias their cost-benefit 

analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, pp. 3-4]

I. The Agencies must Complete an Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation to Ensure 

that their Action will not Jeopardize or Adversely Modify the Critical Habitat of any Species 

Listed as “Threatened” or “Endangered”

To our knowledge the Agencies have not initiated consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service under Section 7 

of the federal Endangered Species Act to ensure that this action will not jeopardize or adversely 

modify the critical habitat of any species listed as “threatened” or “endangered.” [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) to conserve endangered and threatened 

species and the ecosystems upon which they depend.111 The Supreme Court’s review of the 

ESA’s “language, history, and structure” convinced the Court “beyond a doubt” that “Congress 

intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”112 As the Court found, 

“the plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward 

species extinction, whatever the cost.”113 Species are added to the lists of endangered and 

threatened species by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (with jurisdiction over most terrestrial 

and freshwater species) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (with jurisdiction over most 
EPA Response to Comments

20-4

marine species) (collectively, the “Services”). A species is “endangered” if it “is in danger of 

extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 114 A species is “threatened” if it 

“is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 

significant portion of its range.”115 Once a species is listed under the ESA, Section 7 requires all 

federal agencies to “insure” that their actions neither “jeopardize the continued existence” of any 

listed species nor “result in the destruction or adverse modification” of its “critical habitat.”116 

In addition, the “take” of listed species is generally prohibited.117 “Take” means “to harass, 

harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any 

such conduct.”118 The Services may, however, permit “incidental” take on a case-by-case basis 

if it finds, among other things, that such take will be minimized and mitigated and that such take 

will not “appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species.”119 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, pp. 25-26]

Section 7 consultation is required for “any action [that] may affect listed species or critical 

habitat.”120 Agency “action” is defined in the ESA’s implementing regulations to include “all 

activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by 

Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas. Examples include, but are not 

limited to: (a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of 

regulations; (c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or 

grants-in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or 

air.”121 This regulatory definition of “action” clearly encompasses the Agencies’ rulemaking, 

since the emissions from the regulated vehicles unquestionably will cause “modification to the 

land, water, or air.” The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s and National Marine Fisheries 

Service’s Consultation Handbook, Procedures for Conducting Consultation and Conference 

Activities under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (March 1998,) explains the above 

terms and definitions. There can also be no question that the enormous volume of direct, indirect, 

and cumulative emissions from the regulated vehicles “may affect” listed species, and therefore 

the Agencies must consult. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

The rulemaking will impact species listed as threatened and endangered in several ways, yet the 

Agencies have failed to initiate the required Section 7 consultations with the Services on its 

impact. If the Agencies fail to initiate and complete the required Section 7 consultations on the 

rulemaking, they may be held liable for take of listed species caused by the impacts of their 

action, including increased greenhouse gas emissions and other emissions such as NOx. On May 

15, 2008, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service listed the polar bear as a threatened species 

throughout is range due to global warming. 122 The Agencies must consult on the impact of the 

rulemaking on the polar bear. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

On May 9, 2006, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the staghorn and elkhorn corals as 

threatened due in part to increasing ocean temperature and ocean acidification due to 

anthropogenic greenhouse emissions. 123 The Agencies must consult on the impact of the 

rulemaking on these coral species. The Agencies must also consult on the impact of the 

rulemaking on the polar bear’s and the corals’ critical habitat, once such habitat is 

designated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-5

Global warming was cited by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in its critical habitat 

rulemakings for the Quino Checkerspot and Bay Checkerspot butterflies.124 The Agencies must 

consult on the impact of the rulemaking on these species and their critical habitat as well. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

The Agencies must not limit their consultation, however, to species like the polar bear, corals, 

and checkerspot butterflies for which anthropogenic greenhouse emissions were cited as a reason 

for listing or as an impact in the listing or critical habitat rules. Numerous species are affected by 

climate change as reflected in the recovery plans for those species and other documents. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 27]

There at least 124 listed species for which a recovery plan has been adopted that specifically 

identifies climate change or a projected impact of climate change as a direct or indirect threat to 

the species, as a critical impact to be mitigated, as a critical issue to be monitored, and/or as a 

component of the recovery criteria.125 These findings constitute clear evidence that the 

Agencies’ rulemaking “may affect” these species, and that they must consult on the impact of 

this action on all listed species which may be affected. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 

27]

The rulemaking will impact listed species in ways beyond global warming and ocean 

acidification. For example, vehicles are a primary source of excess nitrogen in the environment. 

Excess nitrogen contributes to major environmental problems including reduced water quality, 

eutrophication of estuaries, nitrate-induced toxic effects on freshwater biota, changes in plant 

community composition, disruptions in nutrient cycling, and increased emissions from soil of 

nitrogenous greenhouse gases.126 Nitrogen deposition therefore impacts species listed under the 

Endangered Species Act in a number of ways. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 27]

The direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of setting fuel economy standards for all passenger 

vehicles and light trucks nationally are extraordinarily significant, and therefore a large number 

of species may be implicated. Where, as here, the Agencies’ rulemaking is national in scope, 

they should conduct a nationally focused consultation. The agencies must not attempt to use the 

large scale of the rulemaking as an excuse for ignoring its environmental review duties; instead, 

the scope of the action only makes it more important to thoroughly review its impacts under all 

applicable laws. Nor can the mere fact that a large geographical area or large number of species 

will be affected be used as an excuse for inaction.127 If anything, a nationally focused 

consultation will provide the opportunity to most efficiently analyze the impact of the 

rulemaking on species and groups of species. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 27]

7 H.R. Rep. No. 94-340 at 1-3 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1762, 1763. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 3]

8 Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2008) (“CBD v. 

NHTSA”) (quoting S.Rep. No. 94-516 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

1956, 1957). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

20-6

9 Id. at 1195. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 3]

10 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a)(emphasis added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 3]

11 Id. § 32902(f). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

12 CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d at 1197. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

13 Id. at 1195 (quoting Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 4]

111 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

112 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 25]

113 Id. at 184. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

114 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

115 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

116 Id. at § 1536(a)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

117 Id. at § 1538(a); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

118 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 25]

119 Id. at § 1539(a). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

120 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

121 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

122 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Determination of Threatened Status for the 

Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28212-28303 (May 15, 

2008). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

123 71 Fed. Reg. 26852 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 26]

124 See 73 Fed. Reg. 3328-3373 and 72 Fed. Reg. 48178-48218. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9479-A1, p. 26]

125 Anthony Povilitis and Kieran Suckling, Addressing Climate Change Threats to Endangered 

Species in U.S. Recovery Plans, Conservation Biology, Vol. 24, No 2, 372-376 (2010). [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 27]
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-7

126 Fenn M.E. et al., Ecological Effect of Nitrogen Deposition in the Western United States, 

Bioscience 53:404 (2003), available at 

www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/fenn/psw_2003_fenn012.pdf. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-

A1, p. 27]

127 See, e.g., Wash. Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. Wash. 2005) (upholding 

order requiring the EPA to consult on the impact of 54 pesticide ingredients on 25 species of 

fish.). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9479-A1, p. 27]

Response:

Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires federal agencies, in 

consultation with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service 

(NOAA Fisheries) and/or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS, and, with NOAA Fisheries, 

the Services), to ensure that actions they authorize, fund, or carry out are not likely to jeopardize 

the continued existence of federally-listed threatened or endangered species, or result in the 

destruction or adverse modification of designated critical habitat of such species. 16 U.S.C. § 

1536(a)(2). Under the Services’ relevant implementing regulations, consultation is required for 

actions that “may affect” listed species or designated critical habitat. 50 CFR § 402.14. 

Consultation is not required where the action has “no effect” on such listed species or critical 

habitat. Under this standard, it is the federal agency taking the action that evaluates the action 

and determines whether consultation is required. See 51 FR 19926, 19949 (June 3, 1986). The 

effects of a federal action are defined by regulation to include both the direct and indirect effects 

of the action on listed species or designated critical habitat. 50 CFR § 402.02. Indirect effects 

are those that are caused by the action and are later in time, but still are reasonably certain to 

occur. Id.; Cf., 51 FR at 19932-19933 (discussing “reasonably certain to occur” in the context of 

cumulative effects analysis and noting that only matters that are likely to occur – and not 

speculative matters – are included within the standard). 

Pursuant to Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, EPA has carefully considered the effects of its 

MYs 2017-2025 light duty motor vehicle rule and has reviewed applicable ESA regulations, case 

law, and guidance to determine what, if any, impact there may be to listed species or designated 

critical habitat. EPA has considered issues relating to emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and 

other greenhouse gases (GHGs) as well as issues relating to emissions of non-GHG air 

pollutants. EPA has also coordinated with NHTSA to assess ESA requirements in connection 

with EPA’s rulemaking and NHTSA’s related CAFE Standards. EPA notes that NHTSA’s 

response to the ESA comment submitted on the NPRM is found in Chapter 9 (pages 9-99 

through 9-102) of its Final EIS. EPA agrees with the reasoning in NHTSA’s response as applied 

to EPA’s rulemaking. Based on EPA’s assessment, EPA has determined that the agency’s 

rulemaking action, which will generally result in emissions reductions from what would 

otherwise occur in the absence of this rule, does not require consultation with the Services under 

Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. 

EPA notes that similar issues regarding applicability of ESA Section 7(a)(2) consultation 

requirements were raised by the same commenter in connection with EPA’s MY 2012-2016 light 

duty motor vehicle rulemaking. In that context, EPA addressed in detail issues regarding ESA 

Section 7(a)(2) in its Response To Comment document at pages 4-94 through 4-103 (the MY 
EPA Response to Comments

20-8

2012-2016 ESA Response). EPA believes that the same basic rationale as set forth in that 

response also applies to the current comment and rulemaking, and EPA adopts and incorporates 

that prior response here. 

In particular, EPA notes that its rulemaking will result in GHG emissions reductions that 

would be expected to have beneficial effects with respect to global climate change and associated 

impacts. The commenter appears to generally misunderstand the effect of the rule and to 

attribute the entire volume of emissions from the regulated sector to EPA’s action. To the 

contrary, the rule will generally reduce the impacts of climate change and will, therefore, be 

expected to have a beneficial effect with respect to global climate change. EPA believes, 

however, that any potential for a specific impact to particular listed species and their habitats 

associated with the emission changes achieved by this rulemaking is too uncertain and remote to 

trigger the threshold for ESA Section 7(a)(2) consultation. 

As detailed in the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, EPA’s conclusion that ESA Section 

7(a)(2) consultation is not required relies on the significant legal and technical analysis 

undertaken by FWS, the Department of the Interior (DOI), and EPA regarding GHG emissions 

and the ESA. As explained in that response, FWS and DOI have – in the context of various 

documents relating to the listing of the polar bear as a threatened species – determined that it is 

not possible, for ESA purposes, to trace a causal link between a single stationary source’s GHG 

emissions and any reasonably certain effect on a specific species in a specific habitat.93 Although 

EPA’s rule involves GHG reductions from mobile sources rather than emissions from a single 

stationary source, EPA believes that the analysis regarding causation is relevant here. EPA

agrees that there must be a causal connection between a federal action and a potential effect on 

listed species or critical habitat for Section 7(a)(2) consultation requirements to apply, and that 

the potential effect must be reasonably certain to occur.

In addition, as EPA did in the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, EPA has also considered 

the specific GHG emissions reductions achieved by the current rule in light of any potential 

impacts on listed species or designated critical habitat. In the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, 

EPA explained that it had previously attempted to analyze the impacts on temperature and 

tropical ocean pH of GHG emissions from a single large stationary source. In that prior analysis, 

EPA concluded that any such potential effects were too remote to trigger ESA Section 7(a)(2) 

consultation requirements. In the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, EPA extended that analysis to 

the magnitude of GHG emission changes resulting from implementation of that rule and for 

similar reasons concluded that ESA consultation was not required. EPA has also considered the 

magnitude of GHG emission changes achieved by the current rule and finds that for the same 

reasons described in the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, any potential effects attributable to such 

 93 One of the principal relevant documents from the polar bear listing is FWS’ Final Special Rule for the 

Polar Bear (73 FR 76249 (Dec. 16, 2008)). EPA is aware that the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 

has found that the Final Special Rule did not comply with requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA). See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 818 F. Supp.2d 214 

(D.D.C. 2011). Importantly, however, the District Court did uphold FWS’ approach regarding ESA Section 7(a)(2), 

which supports the relevant analytical framework addressed in EPA’s MY 2012-2016 ESA Response and adopted as 

part of the current response set forth here.
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-9

changes are too remote to trigger ESA consultation. In particular, the EPA technical analysis for 

MY 2017-2025 concludes that, relative to the reference case, by 2100 projected atmospheric CO2

concentrations are estimated to be reduced by 3.21 to 3.58 part per million by volume (ppmv), 

global mean temperature is estimated to be reduced by 0.0074 to 0.0176°C, and sea-level rise is 

projected to be reduced by approximately 0.071-0.159 cm, based on a range of climate 

sensitivities. The analysis also demonstrates that ocean pH will increase by 0.0017 pH units by 

2100 relative to the reference case (ie, reduced acidification). As noted above, EPA believes that 

these results fit within the analytical framework of EPA’s prior ESA/GHG assessments as 

described in the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response.

In the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, EPA also considered non-GHG air pollutant 

emissions and concluded – for similar reasons as explained in relation to GHG emission changes 

– that the changes in emissions of such pollutants attributable to that rule did not trigger ESA 

Section 7(a)(2) consultation. EPA has also considered changes in non-GHG pollutant emissions 

associated with the current rulemaking. The following chart provides EPA’s estimated changes 

for each of the non-GHG pollutants. 

Annual Non-GHG Pollutant Emission Impacts of Program (short tons)

CY 2020 CY 2030

Pollutant Impacts 

(Short Tons)

% of Total 

US Inventory

Impacts 

(Short Tons)

% of Total 

US Inventory

VOC -11,712 -0.1% -123,070 -1.0%

CO 14,164 0.0% 224,875 0.4%

NOX -904 0.0% -6,509 -0.1%

PM2.5 -136 0.0% -1,254 0.0%

SOX -1,270 0.0% -13,377 -0.2%

1,3-

Butadiene 1 0.0% 25 0.2%

Acetaldehyde 3 0.0% 57 0.1%

Acrolein 0 0.0% 2 0.0%

Benzene -16 0.0% -101 0.0%

Formaldehyde -7 0.0% -43 0.0%

Source: RIA Table 4.3-19

Consistent with the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, EPA notes that the modeling tools 

available for EPA’s regulatory analysis of the non-GHG pollutants are not designed to trace 

fluctuations in ambient concentration levels to potential impacts on particular species. EPA 

believes that such models do not, therefore, attribute any biological response or impact on listed 

species to the ambient concentration changes with the degree of reasonable certainty required 

under the ESA. In addition, EPA is unaware of information identifying any effects on listed 

species from the small fluctuations in amounts of non-GHG pollutants indicated in the chart. For 

the same reasons identified in the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response, EPA thus concludes that ESA 
EPA Response to Comments

20-10

consultation is not required with respect to the non-GHG emission changes attributable to the 

current light duty motor vehicle rule.

For additional discussion of EPA’s analysis regarding the light duty motor vehicle rule

and ESA Section 7(a)(2) requirements, see the MY 2012-2016 ESA Response.

Organization: Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)

III. EPA/NHTSA: Denying Plain Facts They Must Know to be True

At a recent hearing before a House oversight panel, three Obama Administration witnesses —

NHTSA Administrator David Strickland, EPA Assistant Air Administrator Gina McCarthy, and 

EPA Transportation and Air Quality Director Margo Oge – denied under oath that motor vehicle 

GHG emission standards are “related to” fuel economy standards.10 In so doing, they denied 

plain facts they must know to be true. They lied to Congress. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-

A1, p. 3]

House Government Oversight and Reform Chairman Darrell Issa put it more diplomatically: 

“Your statements under oath misrepresented the relationship between regulating greenhouse 

gases and regulating fuel economy.” By “obstinately insisting” that regulating greenhouse gases 

and fuel economy are “separate and unrelated endeavors,” he said, the Administration officials 

“impede the Committee’s important oversight work.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 3]

Why did they “misrepresent” and “impede”? Had they answered truthfully, they would have to 

admit that California’s greenhouse gas motor vehicle emissions law, AB 1493, which EPA 

approved in June 2009,11 violates EPCA’s express preemption of state laws or regulations 

“related to” fuel economy.12 The officials would also have to admit that EPA is effectively 

regulating fuel economy, a function outside the scope of its statutory authority. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 3]

IV. Power Grab

The falsehood that GHG emission standards are not related to fuel economy standards does more 

than mask EPA and CARB’s poaching of NHTSA’s statutory authority. It also protects EPA’s 

efforts to legislate climate policy under the guise of implementing the CAA. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 3]

To begin with, the falsehood facilitated a regulatory extortion strategy enabling the Obama 

Administration to convert the auto industry from opponent to ally in any congressional debate on 

EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 3]

In February 2009, EPA Administrator Jackson decided to reconsider13 Bush EPA Administrator 

Stephen Johnson’s denial of California’s request for a waiver to implement AB 1493.14 Because 

GHG emissions standards implicitly regulate fuel economy, because the waiver would allow 
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-11

other states to follow suit, and because auto makers would have to reshuffle the mix of vehicles 

sold in each “California” state to achieve the same average fuel economy, Jackson confronted the 

financially-distressed auto industry with the prospect of a market-balkanizing fuel-economy 

“patchwork.”15 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 3]

Then, in May 2009, in backdoor negotiations conducted under a vow of silence (“We put nothing 

in writing, ever,” CARB Chairman Mary Nichols told the New York Times),16 the White House 

offered to protect auto makers from the patchwork threat if – but only if – they agreed to support 

EPA and CARB’s newfound careers as GHG/fuel economy regulators. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9552-A1, p. 3]

Specifically, under what President Obama dubbed the “Historic Agreement,”17 California and 

other states agreed18 to deem compliance with EPA’s GHG standards as compliance with their 

own in return for auto makers’ pledge19 not to challenge either the Tailpipe Rule or the 

California waiver. The Administration may also have tied its offer of bailout money to 

automakers’ acceptance of the ‘triplification’ of fuel economy regulation.20 Outsiders may never 

know the details, because participants, in apparent defiance of the Presidential Records Act,21 

kept no minutes or notes of the meetings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]

The political payoff for EPA and CARB was not long in coming. In 2010, Alaska Sen. Lisa 

Murkowski introduced a resolution22 to overturn EPA’s greenhouse gas Endangerment Rule,23 

the prerequisite for the Tailpipe Rule and all other EPA greenhouse gas regulations. The auto 

industry lobbied against the resolution,24 warning that it would undo the Historic Agreement 

and, thus, expose auto makers to a “multitude” of conflicting state and federal 

standards.25 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]

Of course, the threat of a patchwork exists only because Jackson, disregarding the EPCA 

preemption, granted the waiver in the first place. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]

EPA then parlayed its new role as de-facto fuel economy regulator into a mandate to regulate 

GHG emissions throughout the economy. The Tailpipe Rule – at least as EPA reads the CAA26 

– compels the agency to regulate GHGs from “major emitting facilities.” EPA is now applying 

CAA preconstruction and operating permit requirements to large CO2 emitters such as coal-fired 

power plants, petroleum refineries, cement production facilities, steel mills, and pulp and paper 

factories.27 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]

Given these precedents, it was inevitable that EPA would settle environmental lawsuits by 

consenting to develop GHG “performance standards” for power plants28 and refineries,29 with 

GHG performance standards for other industrial categories sure to follow. In time, litigants will 

likely induce EPA to establish quasi-fuel economy standards for marine vessels, aircraft, and 

non-road engines,30 even though no agency sets such standards under any existing 

statute. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9552-A1, p. 4]

Because the Endangerment Rule identifies the “elevated concentration” of GHGs as the source 

of endangerment,31 EPA has logically committed itself to develop national ambient air quality 

standards (NAAQS) for GHGs set below current atmospheric concentrations.32 In an August 
EPA Response to Comments

20-12

2010 brief to the Supreme Court in American Electric Power v. State of Connecticut, the 

Department of Justice favorably cited the NAAQS program as a potential regulatory tool 

displacing federal common law tort action against GHG emitters.33 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9552-A1, p. 4]

[See footnote list for this comment on pp. 5-6 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9552-A1]

Response:

Most of this comment again reflects reasoning repudiated by the D.C. Circuit in Coalition 

for Responsible Regulation v. EPA. In addition, the stationary source consequences that the 

commenter decries occur essentially by operation of statute, not because of EPA action. 

Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, no. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012) slip op. pp. 

40-41, 54-59. 

Organization: Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)

We address two issues regarding the Proposed Regulations. First, the Proposed Regulations must 

be submitted to EPA's Science Advisory Board (“SAB”) for review during the public comment 

period, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4365. In addition, the preamble to the final regulations should set 

forth in detail the time and circumstances of EPA's submittal of the Proposed Regulations to 

SAB, as well as any comments provided by SAB, whether EPA made changes to the Proposed 

Regulations in response to such comments, and why or why not. [Refer to pp. 2-4 of Docket 

number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8108-A1 for detailed information] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-8108-A1, p. 2]

Second, EPA must comply with the special rulemaking provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) in 

connection with the promulgation of the Proposed Regulations. Among other things, that 

subsection of the Clean Air Act sets forth detailed requirements for EPA’s “promulgation ... of 

regulations under section 202” of the Clean Air Act. Because EPA is promulgating the 

regulations under section 202 (a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, the regulations are subject to the 

special rulemaking requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d). EPA must document in detail in the 

preamble to the final LDVR II regulations the precise manner in which it has complied (or not 

complied) with such requirements. The remainder of this letter sets forth in detail the reasons 

EPA must perform the two actions summarized above. [Refer to pp. 4-7 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-8108-A1 for detailed information] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8108-A1, 

p. 2]

Response:

The commenter is factually mistaken. In fact, EPA submitted the proposed rule to the 

SAB at its meeting of March 23, 2012. The SAB declined to consider the proposed rule. 

Surprisingly, given the commenter’s professed interest in the matter, it failed to submit either 

written or oral comments to the SAB, even though notice of the meeting was published in the 
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-13

Federal register and other entities submitted comments on matters discussed at the meeting. See 

77 FR 12579, 12580 (March 1, 2012). EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11793. 

In addition, the commenter fails to demonstrate that 42 USC. 4365 ©(1) is applicable. 

That provision applies only when EPA submits documents to other agencies “for formal review 

and comment.” The light duty vehicle GHG rule implements section 202 (a) of the Clean Air 

Act. That provision contains no requirement that implementing regulations be submitted to other 

federal agencies for formal review and comment, nor did EPA do so. EPA submitted the draft of 

the proposed rule to the Office of Management and Budget for informal review, pursuant to 

Executive Order 12866, but this is not the type of formal review to which section 4365 (c)(1) 

speaks. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 

2012) slip op. pp. 35-36 (noting this distinction). 

Finally, EPA agrees that the procedures set out in section 307 (d) apply to this 

rulemaking, and EPA has followed all of those procedures in promulgating the proposed and 

final rules setting GHG emission standards for MYs 2017-2025 light duty motor vehicles. The 

commenter does not allege otherwise. Rather, the commenter maintains (comment pp. 6-7) that 

EPA must document in the preamble compliance with each of the procedural requirements of 

section 307 (d). This argument lacks any statutory foundation. The commenter mistakenly cites 

section 307 (d)(3)(C) as support. This provision states that a proposed rule shall “set forth ... 

any pertinent finding, recommendations, and comments of the Scientific Review Committee 

established under section 109 (d)”. Section 109 (d) applies exclusively to establishment of 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards, so section 307 (d)(3)(C) is inapplicable here. EPA in 

fact established a docket for the proposed and final rule (see 76 FR 74855-56), announced and 

held public hearings (76 FR at 74857), set forth in the preamble, draft TSD and DRIA the basis 

and purposes of the proposed rule, etc. The commenter is consequently mistaken as a matter of 

both fact and law.

Organization: RVIA

Cost considerations per Executive Order # 13563 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

In accordance with Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13563 (Improving Regulations and 

Regulatory Review), when issuing new regulations, agencies shall tailor their regulations to 

impose the least burden on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into 

account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations.” 

In proposing the 2017-2025 GHG and CAFÉ standards for light duty vehicles, RVIA believes 

that EPA and NHTSA have failed to fully comply with this directive. While the agencies have 

informed the public of what the cost impact of the proposed standards are projected to be, they 

have not informed the public of the cumulative costs of their regulations. When informing the 

public of the cost of the impact, we believe that, as a matter of good public policy, the public 

should be informed that the vehicle is going to realize additional price increases due to other 

EPA and NHTSA regulations that will be implemented during these same model years. NHTSA 

rules that will likely be implemented in the future and thus add additional cost to new vehicles 

include the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

1. FMVSS 111 backup camera [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]
EPA Response to Comments

20-14

2. FMVSS 124 accelerator control update [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

3. FMVSS 214 side impact upgrade [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

4. FMVSS 216 roof crush upgrade [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

5. FMVSS 226 ejection mitigation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

6. 49 CFR Part 563 Event Data Recorder mandate [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.3]

7. Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act audible alert [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

8. Pedestrian safety Global Technical Regulation [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

9. Brake override mandate [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

For the above rules that have already been finalized but not yet fully implemented, NHTSA has 

projected that the costs per rule could be as much as: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

$299/vehicle for the ejection mitigation rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

$243/vehicle for the side impact rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

$203/vehicle for the backup camera rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

$114/vehicle for the roof crush rule [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

These four rules alone cumulatively could increase the price of a new vehicle by $859 (eight 

hundred and fifty-nine dollars). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

EPA (along with CARB) will also introduce new requirements like the Tier 3 emissions 

standards. If the cost of implementing Tier 3 standards compares to the cost of implementing 

Tier 2 emissions standards, one can expect the average price of a passenger car to increase by 

$100 and the average price of a light truck to increase by $200. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9550-A2, p.4]

Just the five rules mentioned here could potentially increase the cost of a new light vehicle by 

another $1,000 (one-thousand dollars). Consumers have a right to know the cumulative cost 

impact of the EPA/NHTSA regulations. RVIA therefore recommends that the agencies take 

these cumulative costs into consideration when setting future standards and that you inform the 

public of the cumulative cost impacts of EPA/NHTSA regulations on new vehicle prices. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.4]

With regard to all light vehicles, EPA and NHTSA should take the cumulative costs of its 

regulations into consideration when setting future standards and inform the public of the impact 

on new car prices. In this rulemaking, EPA and NHTSA did not fully consider the cumulative 
Statutory and Executive Orders

20-15

costs of its regulations on new car prices. We have listed several EPA and NHTSA rules that 

were not discussed in the NPRM that will drive up new car prices by possibly another $1,000. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9550-A2, p.5]

Response:

EPA believes it has followed both Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 both in the 

proposal and in this final rulemaking. Specifically, Executive Order 13563 was published 

January 21, 2011 (76 FR 3821) to, “supplement and reaffirm the principles, structures and 

definitions of government contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive 

Order 12866 of September 30 1993.” 

In responding to these executive orders, EPA has provided detailed costs analysis of this 

action in both the Preamble and Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA). EPA submitted this 

action to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as required under these Executive 

Orders for review and any changes made in response to OMB recommendations have been 

documented in the docket for this action as required by CAA section 307(d)(4)(B)(ii). .

Specifically, section III. H of the preamble provides an in-depth discussion of the 

estimated costs, economic and other impacts of this final rule. This is supplemented by further 

detailed discussion in the FRIA, Chapter 3. Regarding the treatment of cumulative costs from 

previous light-duty vehicle rules, EPA for this final rule, has estimated the 2025MY reference 

case costs (i.e, the cost to meet the 2016 standards in the 2025MY) at $719 (see RIA Table 3.6-

1). We have also estimated 2025MY control case costs (i.e., the cost to meet the 2025 standards 

in the 2025MY) at $1836. The total cost of these rules would then be $2555. To properly add 

the costs, one needs to use the cost of the 2016 standards in the 2025MY as we have done. With 

regard to Tier 2 costs which became effective in 2004MY EPA has not specially highlighted 

those costs but they are part of the baseline for the 2025 reference case costs. Given that EPA

has not even proposed Tier 3 rules, it would be premature (at best) and merely speculative (at 

worst) to estimate those costs here. Neither executive order addresses, or contemplates including 

costs of pre-proposal nascent regulatory potential actions.

Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

21-1

21. Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Borg Warner, Inc.

Ferrari

Fisker Automotive, Inc.

Ford Motor Company

Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

Roush Industries, Inc.

Toyota Motor North America

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Proportion of Recovered Braking Energy for Hybrid Electric Vehicles [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.88]

The following comments address EPA’s proposed changes to 40 C.F.R. §600.116-12(c) for 

determining the proportion of recovered braking energy for hybrid electric vehicles. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

In 40 C.F.R. §600.116-12(c)(1)(i)(A) and (B), it is unclear whether road load power and applied 

deceleration power are to be calculated from scheduled speed or measured speed. We 

recommend that Vmph, V and Vt+1 be defined as “measured velocity in miles/hour, rounded to 

the nearest 0.01 miles/hour...” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

In 40 C.F.R. §600.116-12(c)(1)(C), EPA proposes to determine braking power by the following 

equation: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

Pbrake = Paccel – Proadload [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.88]

We recommend that the equation be changed to the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.88]

Pbrake = Paccel + Proadload and if Pbrake >0, set Pbrake = 0 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.88]

The Proadload should decrease the magnitude of the Pbrake term. As it is currently written, the 

magnitude of Pbrake is not decreased by Proadload during deceleration. If Pbrake isn't decreased 

by Proadload, the Emax equation would assume that the roadload force could be recovered by 

regenerative braking, and this would cause the Emax calculation to give a higher value than is 

possible (thus lowering the eventual Energy Recovered %). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-

A1, p.89]
EPA Response to Comments

21-2

As can be seen in the following chart, the proposed equation would indicate that roadload during 

steady cruising would be able to be recaptured as regeneration (red line). The green line is Emax 

when you replace the '-' sign with a '+' sign in the Pbrake equation and revise the Pbrake = 0 

criteria. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.89] [For the chart please refer to EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.89]

Therefore, it would be more appropriate if the equation were written as Pbrake = Paccel + 

Proadload with the additional criteria that Pbrake = 0 whenever the calculation results in a 

positive value. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.89]

In addition, the following clerical errors were discovered during our review of the NPRM: [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.89]

§600.116-12(c)(1)(i)(A): Road load equation has an extra “x” between 0.47704 and 4.448 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.89]

§600.116-12(c)(3)(iii): “battery” is misspelled as “batter” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, 

p.89]

§600.116-12(c)(4)(3)(iii): Definition of Erec under the Energy Recovered % equation references 

paragraph (c)(2)(iii), should reference paragraph (c)(3)(iii) instead [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, p.89]

§600.116-12(c)(4)(3)(iii): Conflicting nomenclature. Energy Recovered % equation uses Emax, 

which appears to be called Ebrake in the paragraph referenced by the Emax definition, §600.116-

12(c)(2). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.89]

Further, prior to the final rule, we plan to engage the agency technical experts to ensure that the 

test procedure specifications and regulatory language for determining the proportion of 

recovered braking energy is clear, accurate and consistent with previous hybrid procedural 

guidance (e.g., SAE J1711, Part 86, Part 600), where applicable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9487-A1, pp.89-90]

Fuel Economy Calculations [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.91]

The Alliance suggests following corrections to the fuel economy calculations in § 600.113–12 

(fuel economy, CO2 emissions, and carbon-related exhaust emission calculations for FTP, HFET, 

US06, SC03 and cold temperature FTP tests): [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.91]

(l)(1) Ethanol FE equation: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.91]

mpg = (CWF × SG × 3781.8)/((CWFexHC × HC) + (0.429 × CO) + (0.273 × CO2) + (0.375 × 

CH3OH) + (0.400 × HCHO) + (0.521 × C2H5OH) + (0.545 × C2H4O)) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9487-A1, p.91]

Comment: This entire section needs review of equations, but specifically the ethanol equation 

and its importance to E15/E10 testing. The referenced FE equation is incorrect. The equation 
Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

21-3

does not utilize net heating value (NHV) as an adjustment for different ethanol blends, so it is 

unclear how this equation accounts for different ethanol blends or equivalence back to the 

conventional gasoline FE equation. This equation will produce lower FE due to the fact that 

ethanol blended fuels have less energy content (NHV) per gallon than conventional gasoline. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.91]

The Alliance requests a test procedure adjustment (TPA) that references the carbon weight 

fraction (CWF), net heating value, and specific gravity of the 1975 E0 reference fuel that was 

used to establish the initial CAFE baseline. A TPA (including coverage of the density and RFactor) is necessary to maintain consistency with the 1975 test procedures. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.91]

86.1866-12(b)(2)(ii) [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.92]

The reference to the annual refrigerant leakage rate in the definition section should be titled 

“LeakScore” instead of “Leakage” to align with the terminology in the Leakage Credit equation. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.92]

Organization: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

• U.S. “Production” vs. “Sales”: §86.1866-12(d)(1) shows a table that identifies certain offcycle technologies, their credits for passenger cars and light trucks, and the “minimum percent of 

U.S. production” that must have a feature applied before receiving the off-cycle credit. We 

believe the intent of this section is better understood to be “minimum percent of U.S. Sales,” 

since many U.S. – produced vehicles are intended for export and are not relevant. Similarly, it is 

unclear how imported vehicles would be treated. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9489-A1, p. 6] 

Organization: Toyota Motor North America

U.S. Production Criteria

There are provisions in the proposed regulations that reference U.S. production as a component 

of applicability or eligibility for those provisions. For example, in describing the minimum sales 

volume threshold for the list of pre-determined off-cycle technologies, §86.1866-12 (d)(l)(i) 

states 'The manufacturer may generate a CO2 gram/mile credit ... provided that each technology 

is applied to the minimum percentage of the manufacturer's U.S. production of passenger 

automobiles ... for which credit is claimed'. Similarly, the provisions for advanced technology 

vehicles in §86.1866-12 (a)(l) state 'Electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel 

cell vehicles...that are certified, produced, and delivered for sale in the United States ... may use a 

value of zero (0) grams/mile ofCO2''. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, p.23]

A reasonable interpretation of the provisions above could imply they are applicable only to 

vehicles produced in the U.S. Toyota understands the agencies do not intend for the applicability 

or eligibility of the proposed regulations to depend on a vehicle's origin. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9586-A1, p.24]
EPA Response to Comments

21-4

Toyota requests that the agencies clarify that the eligibility and applicability of the provisions 

being proposed are not contingent on a manufacturer producing vehicles in the United States. We 

suggest that where the agencies currently reference 'U.S. production' in a provision, that 

language be revised to instead use the term ''production for U.S. sale' which is consistent with the 

intent of the provisions in both the CAA and EISA/EPCA. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9586-A1, 

p.24]

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

Global Automakers is concerned that the proposed regulatory language is not sufficient to truly 

make the MY 2022-2025 standards “conditional;” rather, they have all of the hallmarks of final 

standards that are simply subject to possible revision at a later time. As such, we believe that the 

proposed regulatory language violates the prohibition against adopting standards for more than 

five model years found in 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(3)(b). Global Automakers suggests that a 

better—and more legally defensible—approach would be to draft 49 C.F.R. § 531.5(c) to cover 

only vehicles through MY 2021, and to have MY 2022 through 2025 covered in a separate 

subsection that explicitly states that the standards for those model years are not final, but rather 

have been conditionally set at these levels subject to future de novo final rulemaking. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9466-A1, p. 10]

Organization: Borg Warner, Inc.

Additionally, for the “Engine Heat Recovery” off-cycle credit, although a clear definition is not 

provided in the Technical Support Document, it uses a term “thermoelectric device”. This term is 

normally applied to devices using the Peltier–Seebeck effect. We request that the EPA and 

NHTSA clarify the definition of “Engine Heat Recovery” to be technology neutral and include 

any device that captures waste heat energy and converts it into electricity for use on the vehicle. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9320-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Ferrari

40 CFR § 86.1838-01(b) is amended by adding a new subparagraph (4) as follows: [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(4)(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b)(3), upon application to the 

Administrator, a manufacturer may be classified as a small volume manufacturer for purposes of 

this section, if the Administrator determines that it is operationally independent of the 

manufacturer that owns 10 percent or more of the applicant and, for the three years preceding the 

year in which the initial application is submitted, the average United States sales for the applicant 

does not exceed 5,000 vehicles per year. The Administrator may make a determination of 

operational independence if the criteria in (i)-(vii) are met for the at least 24 months preceding 

the application. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(i) No financial or other support of economic value is provided by related manufacturers for 

purposes of design, parts procurement, R&D and production facilities and operation, and any 

other transactions between related manufacturers are conducted under normal commercial 
Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

21-5

arrangements like those conducted with other parties, at competitive pricing rates to the 

manufacturer; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(ii) related manufacturers maintain separate and independent research and development, testing, 

and production facilities; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(iii) the applicant does not use any vehicle powertrains or platforms developed or produced by 

related manufacturers; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(iv) patents are not held jointly with related manufacturers; [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-

A2, p.7]

(v) related manufacturers maintain separate business administration, legal, purchasing, sales, and 

marketing departments, as well as autonomous decision making on commercial matters; [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(vi) the overlap of the Board of Directors between related manufacturers is limited to 25% with 

no sharing of top operational management, including president, chief executive officer, chief 

financial officer, and chief operating officer, and provided that no individual overlapping director 

or combination of overlapping directors exercises exclusive management control over either or 

both companies; and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(vii) parts or components supply between related companies must be established through open 

market process, and to the extent that the manufacturer sells parts/components to non-related 

manufacturers, it does so through the open market a competitive pricing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(b)(i) The Administrator shall require the applicant to submit information to update any of these 

factors as material changes to any factor occur. If there are no material changes to any of the 

factors, the applicant shall certify to the Administrator on an annual basis. With respect to any 

such changes, the Administrator may consider extraordinary conditions (e.g., changes to 

economic conditions, unanticipated market changes, etc.) and may continue to find the applicant 

to be operationally independent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.7]

(c) If a manufacturer loses its eligibility as an operationally independent small volume 

manufacturer at any time, the manufacturer must begin compliance with the primary greenhouse 

gas emissions program in the third model year after the manufacturer loses its eligibility. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.8]

(d) If a manufacturer loses its eligibility as an operationally independent small volume 

manufacturer at any point in time, the manufacturer must meet the criteria in (a)(i)-(vii) for three 

consecutive years before applying to the Administrator to be again considered operationally 

independent. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.8]

(e) The manufacturer applying for operational independence shall engage an independent 

certified public accountant, or firm of such accountants (hereinafter referred to as “CPA”), to 
EPA Response to Comments

21-6

perform an agreed-upon procedures attestation engagement of the underlying documentation that 

forms the basis of the application as required in (a)(i)-(vii). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-

A2, p.8]

(i) The CPA shall perform the attestation engagements in accordance with the Statements on 

Standards for Attestation Engagements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.8]

(ii) The CPA may complete the requirements of this paragraph with the assistance of internal 

auditors who are employees or agents of the application, so long as such assistance is in 

accordance with the Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9535-A2, p.8]

(iii) Notwithstanding the requirements of subparagraph (ii) of this section, an applicant may 

satisfy the requirements of this paragraph if the requirements of this paragraph are completed by 

an auditor who is an employee of the applicant, provided that such employee: a. Is an internal 

auditor certified by the Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “CIA”); and 

b. Completes the internal audits in accordance with the Codification of Standards for the 

Professional Practice of Internal Auditing. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.8]

(iv) Use of a CPA or CIA who is debarred, suspended, or proposed for debarment pursuant to the 

Government wide Debarment and Suspension Regulations, 2 CFR part 1532, or the Debarment, 

Suspension, and Ineligibility Provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 CFR part 9, 

subpart 9.4, shall be deemed in noncompliance with the requirements of this section. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, p.8]

(v) The following documents are incorporated by reference: the Statements on Standards for 

Attestation Engagements, Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, written by the 

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1991, and published by the Commerce 

Clearing House, Inc., Identification Number 059021, and the Codification of Standards for the 

Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, written and published by the Institute of Internal 

Auditors, Inc., 1989, Identification Number ISBN 0- 89413-207-5. These incorporations by 

reference were approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies of the Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements 

may be obtained from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1211 Avenue 

of the Americas, New York, New York 10036, and copies of the Codification of Standards for 

the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing may be obtained from the Institute of Internal 

Auditors, Inc., 249 Maitland Avenue, Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701- 4201. Copies may be 

inspected at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of the Air Docket, 401 M St., 

SW., Washington, DC., or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: 

http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_lo cations.html. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9535-A2, pp.8-9]

Organization: Fisker Automotive, Inc.
Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

21-7

Given the feasibility of optionally complying to the greenhouse gas standards beginning with the 

2012 model year, Fisker Automotive respectfully proposes the following modifications to the 

regulatory language: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-A1, p. 3]

§ 86.1801–12 Applicability.

(j) Exemption from greenhouse gas emission standards for small businesses.

(2) Effective for the 2014 and later model years, a A manufacturer that would otherwise be 

exempt under the provisions of paragraph (j)(1) of this section may optionally comply with the 

greenhouse gas emission standards specified in § 86.1818. A manufacturer making this choice is 

required to comply with all the applicable standards and provisions in § 86.1818 and in 

associated provisions in this part and in part 600 of this chapter. A manufacturer may optionally 

comply with the greenhouse gas emission standards as soon as the rule goes into effect, 

beginning with the 2012 model year. Manufacturers may optionally earn early credits in the 2012 

and/or 2013 model years by demonstrating CO2 emission levels below the fleet average CO2

standard that would have been applicable in those model years if the manufacturer had not been 

exempt. Manufacturers electing to earn these early credits must comply with the model year 

reporting requirements in § 600.512–12 for each model year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9266-

A1, p. 3]

Organization: Ford Motor Company

Also related to the 5-cycle demonstration methodology, we believe there is a typographical error 

in the calculation described in 40 CFR § 86.1866-12(d)(2)(iii). The text indicates that the 5-cycle 

weighted city/highway value from paragraph (d)(2)(i) [without the off-cycle technology 

operating] should be subtracted from the value from paragraph (d)(2)(ii) [with the off-cycle 

technology operating] to determine the off-cycle benefit. Presumably, the carbon-related exhaust 

emissions from (d)(2)(ii) will be lower than those from (d)(2)(i), resulting in a negative value for 

the credit calculation. To remedy this, Ford believes the text of 40 CFR § 86.1866-12(d)(2)(iii) 

should be revised to state the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 17]

“Subtract the combined city/highway value determined in paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section 

from the value determined in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section”..... [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9463-A1, p. 18]

Regulatory text clarification: With regard to the production volume multiplier and the 0 gram per 

mile emissions value, the proposed regulatory text reads as follows:

86.1866-12(a)(1) and (2) Electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell 

vehicles, as those terms are defined in S.86.1803-01, that are certified and produced and 

delivered for sale in the United States... [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 20]

We request clarification that the intent is that the provisions apply to those vehicles “delivered 

for sale” in the United States, and that production in the United States is not a new conditional 

provision, per the following recommended revision:
EPA Response to Comments

21-8

86.1866-12(a)(1) and (2) Electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and fuel cell 

vehicles, as those terms are defined in S.86.1803-01, that are certified and produced and

delivered for sale in the United States... [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9463-A1, p. 20]

Organization: Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA)

The definition in the proposed regulatory text at § 86.1866–12 (d)(1)(i) for active seat ventilation 

is “a device which draws air from the seating surface ... and exhausts it ... away from the seat.” 

MEMA believes this definition is narrow in scope because there are other mechanisms for active 

seat ventilation available. For example, systems that push the air (versus drawing the air) to the 

seating surface and remove the heated, humid air between the seat surface and the passenger 

contact points just like the drawing type of active seat ventilation. Therefore, MEMA requests 

the agencies modify the definition to also include a push type system. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9478-A1, p.8]

In the NPRM’s regulatory text for this section, § 86.1866–12 “CO2 fleet average credit and 

incentive programs” Subpart (e) “Credits for certain full-size pickup trucks”9 there are several 

places where the mild and strong hybrid propulsions are referenced as “gasoline-electric.” There 

are several other technical possibilities for full-size pick-up truck hybrids – such as, dieselelectric, gasoline-hydraulic, diesel-hydraulic. Therefore, MEMA strongly recommends that the 

agencies change the regulatory text to simply the term “hybrid” and to remove specific 

descriptive terms “gasoline-electric.” Otherwise, the credits in this area would only be narrowly 

restricted to “gasoline-electric” hybrids, which MEMA believes is counter to the intent of the 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9478-A1, p.11]

11 - In the NPRM, it is proposed to issue a credit of 10g/mile (MY2017-2021) for mild hybrid 

full size pickup trucks, on the condition that the vehicle manufacturer produces a minimum of 30 

percent of total full-size pickups as mild hybrids in 2017 subsequently increasing them to 80 

percent of total full size pickups by 2021. A credit of 20g/mile will be issued if the manufacturer 

produces 10 percent of total full size pickups as strong hybrids.

Organization: Roush Industries, Inc.

Upon review of the subject document the absence of regulations to calculate constituent fuel 

economy, CREE and CAFÉ for the LPG alternate fuel was noted. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

7823-A2, p. 1]

The LPG regulation proposal is recommended for inclusion in CFR 40 commencing Part 

600.113-12 amongst the regulatory description for the other fuels. Also reference of LPG in Part 

600.510-12 (Calculation of average fuel economy and average carbon-related exhaust emissions) 

is desirable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7823-A2, p. 1]

Response:
Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

21-9

Proportion of Recovered Braking Energy

The comments from the Alliance pointed out confusion over the appropriate sign for the terms in 

the equation used in this calculation. The regulations have been amended to clarify the 

appropriate sign for each term that will result in the equation being correct. 

EPA appreciates the comments pointing out various clerical errors and conflicting nomenclature, 

and appropriate corrections have been made.

Fuel Economy Calculations

The ethanol equation was finalized in the MY 2012-2016 program, and EPA believes it to be 

correct. However, the regulations always permit manufacturers to approach EPA with alternative 

calculations that yield similar or improved results. 

Production vs. Sales and U.S. Production Criteria

EPA agrees with the comment that suggests clarification. Certainly EPA does not intend any 

provision to be limited to vehicles produced in the U.S.

MY 2022-2025 Standards

The comments from the Association of Global Automakers are principally directed at NHTSA 

and that agency’s statutory limitation regarding the establishing of CAFE standards. EPA does 

not face such a restriction, and EPA regulations are drafted accordingly.

Engine Heat Recovery

EPA has modified the definition in the final rule to read as follows. We believe this is consistent 

with the comments from Borg Warner. 

(viii) Waste heat recovery means a system that captures heat that would otherwise be lost 

through the engine, exhaust system, or the radiator or other sources and converting that heat to 

electrical energy that is used to meet the electrical requirements of the vehicle or used to 

augment the warming of other load reduction technologies (e.g., cabin warming, active engine or 

transmission warm-up technologies). 

Operational Independence Regulatory Provisions

The provisions regarding small volume manufacturers and operational independence provisions 

are discussed in detail in section III.B.5 of the preamble to the final rule. Ferrari was the 

strongest advocate of the operational independence provisions, and, as shown above, they 

proposed specific regulatory language. EPA agrees with the substance of the operational 

independence provisions as outlined in Ferrari’s comments, and we note that their proposed 

regulatory language is essentially identical to the language in the preamble to the proposed rule. 

As described in the preamble to the final rule, EPA is finalizing the operational independence 

criteria that were described in the request for comments in the proposal (see 76 FR 74922). 
EPA Response to Comments

21-10

Although our final regulations regarding operational independence criteria are consistent with 

our proposal and with Ferrari’s proposed regulations, there is one key difference between our 

final rule and Ferrari’s proposal. Ferrari proposed a regulatory structure that would broadly 

amend the existing definition of small volume manufacturer and would appear to expand the use 

of the operational independence provisions to a broad set of EPA emission control programs. 

EPA did not propose such a broad use of the operational independence criteria, and although the 

elements of the criteria are virtually the same as those proposed by Ferrari, we are finalizing the 

provisions such that their applicability is limited to determining eligibility for the specific GHG 

programs contemplated in the proposal (i.e., the remaining years of the conditional exemption for 

small manufacturers available through the 2016 model year, and the alternative standards for 

small manufacturers in the 2017 and later model years). The final operational independence 

regulations are structured such that other EPA programs could incorporate them, but doing so 

would require an evaluation of the impact and appropriateness of doing so and would have to be 

conducted via a separate notice and comment process. 

Optional Small Business Compliance

At least one small business manufacturer, Fisker Automotive, in discussions with EPA 

prior to proposal, suggested that small businesses should have the option of voluntarily opting-in 

to the GHG standards. This manufacturer sells electric vehicles, and sees a potential market for 

selling credits to other manufacturers. As discussed in the proposal, EPA believes that there 

could be several benefits to this approach, as it would allow small businesses an opportunity to 

generate revenue to offset their technology investments and to encourage commercialization of 

the innovative technology. There would likewise be a benefit to any manufacturer seeking those 

credits to meet their compliance obligations. EPA proposed and is finalizing allowing small 

businesses to waive their small entity exemption and opt-in to the primary GHG standards based 

on this same rationale. This will allow small business manufacturers to earn CO2 credits under 

the program, which may be an especially attractive option for the new electric vehicle 

manufacturers entering the market. The small business would have to meet the primary standard 

for its fleet (that is, the small business would be allowed to opt-in to the primary program 

standard, but not the small volume manufacturer standards, since SVMs are not eligible to 

generate credits for trading as explained above). As proposed, manufacturers waiving their small 

entity exemption must meet all aspects of the GHG standards and program requirements across 

their entire product line.

EPA proposed to make the opt-in available starting in MY 2014, as the MY 2012, and 

potentially the MY 2013, certification process will have already occurred by the time this 

rulemaking is finalized. See 76 FR at 74994. EPA proposed this timing to avoid retroactively 

certifying vehicles that have already been produced. EPA proposed, however, that 

manufacturers certifying to the GHG standards for MY 2014 would be eligible to generate 

credits for vehicles sold in MY 2012 and MY 2013 based on the number of vehicles sold and the 

manufacturer’s footprint-based standard under the primary program that would have otherwise 

applied to the manufacturer if it were a large manufacturer. This approach would be similar to 

that used by EPA for early credits generated in MYs 2009-2011, where manufacturers did not 

certify vehicles to CO2 standards in those years but were able to generate credits. See 75 FR at 

25441. 
Comments Regarding Proposed Regulatory Text

21-11

EPA received comments from Fisker requesting that EPA reconsider the timing of the 

opt-in provisions. Fisker commented that under EPA’s proposal, manufacturers would not be 

able to generate credits until the end of MY 2014, even for vehicles that are produced in MYs 

2012-2013. Fisker commented that this would significantly diminish the revenue generating 

benefit of these credits, particularly during the critical early years of their company when 

potential credit revenues would be of most benefit to the company. EPA is persuaded by this 

reasoning, and the final rule therefore provides that believes that the opt-in provisions begin with 

MY 2013. See §86.1801-12(j)(2)(i). The timing of the final rule will allow the GHG 

requirements to be integrated into the MY 2013 certification process for these small businesses. 

Once the small business manufacturer opting into the GHG program completes certification for 

MY 2013, the company will be eligible to generate GHG credits for their MY 2012 production. 

Manufacturers will not have to wait until the end of MY 2013 to generate MY 2012 credits. 

EPA believes this provision is responsive to the concerns of the commenter while still ensuring 

that the manufacturer is certified under the GHG program prior to generating credits.

Regulatory Text Clarifications from Ford

EPA appreciates the detailed look that Ford and some other manufacturers took at the 

regulations, and informing us of errors and useful clarifications. These have been incorporated to 

the extent that is appropriate. 

Active Seat Ventilation Definition

EPA agrees with the commenter and has modified the definition to read as follows:

(ix) Active seat ventilation means a device which draws air, pushes or forces air, or 

otherwise transfers heat from the seating surface which is in contact with the seat occupant and 

exhausts it to a location away from the seat. At a minimum, the driver and front passenger seat 

must utilize this technology for a vehicle to be eligible for credit. 

Definition of Mild and Strong Hybrid Electric Vehicles

EPA agrees with the commenter and the regulations have been amended to no longer use the 

phrase “gasoline-electric.” The final regulations should be neutral regarding the fuel that is 

paired with a hybrid battery system. 

Calculation of Values for LPG

In response to the comments, EPA has added equations for calculating the MPG for LPG 

vehicles. 

Tier 3 Standards

22-1

22. Comments Regarding EPA Tier 3 Rulemaking

Organizations Included in this Section

American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

Organization: American Lung Association of the Mid-Atlantic

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania public hearing 

on January 19, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11788, pp. 83-84.]

Therefore, just last week the American Lung Association nationally in concert with six other 

leading public health and medical organizations wrote to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to 

request that she should move forward with Tier 3 vehicle emission and fuel standards, and that 

she finalize those standards as soon as possible.

According to the National Association of Clean Air Agencies, by 2030 such standards will 

reduce overall mobile source emission of NOx by 29 percent, CO by 38 percent and VOCs by 26 

percent.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 175.]

We respectfully urge EPA to build from the foundation forged by California's leadership and 

immediately propose Tier 3 emissions and gasoline fuel standards for passenger vehicles and to 

finalize these protections by the summer of 2012. Such rigorous programs would have immediate 

and far-reaching health and environmental benefits.

Organization: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 140-141.]

In addition, we urge the EPA to move forward expeditiously with the next round of criteria 

pollutant standards -- the Tier 3 emissions and gasoline standards for passenger vehicles -- and to 

finalize these protections by the summer of 2012. A rigorous Tier 3 program would have 

immediate and far-reaching health and environmental benefits: Reducing harmful airborne 

contaminants, ensuring longer and healthier lives, and helping states and communities across our 

country to restore healthy air. These vital health protections will be achieved at an extremely 

modest cost. Timely finalization of Tier 3 standards would allow manufacturers to efficiently 

align technology upgrades with the proposed 2017 through 2025 fuel efficiency and greenhouse 

gas emissions standards.
EPA Response to Comments

22-2

Response:

These comments deal with a different rulemaking matter and so are outside the scope of 

this rulemaking.

22.1. Tier 3 Standards

Organizations Included in this Section

American Lung Association

California Air Resources Board (CARB)

Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

South Coast AQMD

Organization: American Lung Association

Also, promulgation of a Tier 3 vehicle and fuels standard would complement the proposed rule 

while reducing overall mobile source emissions of nitrogen oxides by 29 percent, carbon 

monoxide by 38 percent and volatile organic compounds by 26 percent by 2030. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9902-A2, p. 2]

Organization: California Air Resources Board (CARB)

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, p. 14.]

We know that EPA is nearing completion of its Tier 3 proposal to address these same pollutants 

from passenger vehicles. We know this because we shared with you our assessment of the 

feasible standards and the implementation schedule, and we've worked together to reach a 

common understanding of the many testing and compliance details.

We urge you to propose and finalize this Tier 3 regulation as soon as possible. It will benefit the 

vehicle manufacturers in that they'll be able to build one car that meets California and EPA 

standards. And it will benefit California and our partner states by assuring that federally certified 

new cars that subsequently operate in our states will be as clean as those sold here and purchased 

by our citizens.

Organization: Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

II. EDF URGES EPA TO FINALIZE TIER 3 STANDARDS IN 2012

We strongly urge EPA to immediately propose Tier 3 emissions and gasoline standards for 

passenger vehicles and to finalize these protections by the summer of 2012. A rigorous Tier 3 

program would have immediate and far-reaching health and environmental benefits: reducing a 
Tier 3 Standards

22-3

cascade of harmful airborne contaminants, ensuring longer and healthier lives, and helping states 

and communities across our country restore healthy air. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 

3]

In a May 2010 Rose Garden ceremony, President Obama announced his intention to finalize a 

Tier 3 program by 2012 that would reduce sulfur levels in gasoline and introduce cleaner cars 

and light trucks on the same schedule as his already-finalized greenhouse gas program. 

Proposing this program now will help ensure that the President’s commitment is kept. And 

timely finalization of Tier 3 standards would allow manufacturers to efficiently align technology 

upgrades with the proposed fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions standards. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, pp. 3-4]

Millions of Americans breathe cleaner, healthier air as a result of the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency's leadership in carrying out our nation's clean air laws. But serious challenges 

remain. More than 1 in 3 Americans still live in areas where air pollutant levels exceed at least 

one of the health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards. And passenger vehicles remain 

the second largest emitters of oxides of nitrogen and volatile organic compounds in the U.S. –

the primary pollutants that form ozone. These vehicles also emit more than half of all carbon 

monoxide pollution and contribute significantly to lethal particulate matter emissions.15 [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 3]

A protective Tier 3 program has the potential to cut gasoline vehicle emissions of nitrogen 

oxides by nearly sixty percent, carbon monoxide by about 38 percent, and volatile organic 

compounds by close to a third when these protections are carried out. The substantial emissions 

reductions from all vehicles will translate into more than 400 avoided premature deaths and 

52,000 avoided lost workdays each year.16 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 4]

Reducing sulfur in gasoline will also result in an immediate reduction in emissions from the 

existing fleet – on the order of approximately 260,000 tons of nitrogen oxides in 2017 when the 

program begins – equivalent to taking 33 million cars off our nation’s roads. And the additional 

cost to consumers of the cleaner gasoline would be less than a penny a gallon.17 [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9519-A1, p. 4]

A timely federal Tier 3 program is also imperative for states to meet the health-based National 

Ambient Air Quality Standards, including the ozone standard adopted in 2008, which assumed 

final Tier 3 emissions and gasoline standards in its baseline. Emissions reductions not achieved 

through a rigorous Tier 3 program would have to come from controls on local sources, which 

could be far less significant in magnitude and less cost-effective. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9519-A1, p. 4]

Organization: Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

DAG supports the agencies' efforts to implement the Tier III and LEV III programs and will 

continue to work towards a nationwide requirement for ultra low sulfur gasoline to maximize the 

potential for direct injection gasoline engines. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9483-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

22-4

Organization: Renewable Fuels Association (RFA)

EPA/NHTSA must ensure the final standards are harmonized with the upcoming “Tier 3” 

vehicle and fuel standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.2]

IN ADDITION TO MAKING CERTAIN THE PROPOSED CAFE/GHG STANDARDS ARE 

COMPLEMENTARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RFS2, EPA MUST ALSO ENSURE 

THE FINAL STANDARDS ARE HARMONIZED WITH THE UPCOMING “TIER 3” 

VEHICLE AND FUEL STANDARDS. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.6]

In the current CAFE/GHG proposal, EPA states that it will propose Tier 3 vehicle and fuel 

standards “in the near future.” The Tier 3 rulemaking, which EPA acknowledges will generally 

apply to the “same set of new vehicles...as would the proposed light-duty GHG emissions 

standards,” is expected to set new limits for tailpipe and evaporative emissions from light-duty 

vehicles, including volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, and air 

toxics. EPA acknowledges the need for close coordination of the Tier 3 rules with the 

CAFE/GHG standards, such that automakers and fuel providers can most effectively plan for the 

future regulatory landscape. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.7]

Vehicle engines, the fuels that power them, and emissions control systems must be considered as 

equally important components of integrated systems. Thus, EPA/NHTSA should take a systems 

approach to the coordination of pending and existing regulations that affect both future fuel 

composition and future vehicle and engine technology. It is absolutely critical that EPA/NHTSA 

ensure the requirements of one rule don’t impede the regulated community’s ability to comply 

with the requirements of separate, but related, rules. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9490-A1, p.7]

Organization: South Coast AQMD

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 70-71.]

While the focus of the proposed rule is on greenhouse gas emissions, we urge U.S. EPA to move 

forward with proposals to set criteria pollutant tailpipe emissions standards as soon as possible.

Response:

These comments all deal with issues outside the scope of this rulemaking.

22.2. Changes to Fuel Specifications

Organizations Included in this Section

Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

American Petroleum Institute (API)

Growth Energy

Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)
Tier 3 Standards

22-5

Organization: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers

Fuel quality improvement can help further the program goals. As EPA has requested, the 

Alliance plans to make its substantive comments about market fuel quality specifications within 

the context of the pending EPA “Tier 3” proposed rule (and perhaps independently as well, 

separate from the Tier 3 rulemaking) and will not elaborate on them here. We want to note, 

however, that fuel quality can have a significant impact on fuel efficiency and GHG emission 

reductions. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, pp.5-6]

In the meantime, it is expected that market fuel sulfur content and possibly other fuel properties 

will be addressed as part of the pending EPA “Tier 3” rulemaking. As noted above, market fuel 

developments need to be part of the planned Mid Term Evaluation incorporated in this rule. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

As EPA has requested, the Alliance plans to make its substantive comments about market fuel 

quality specifications within the context of the pending EPA “Tier 3” proposed rule (and perhaps 

independently as well, separate from the Tier 3 rulemaking) and will not elaborate on them here. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

Alliance members want to underscore for the rulemaking record and any future regulatory 

review that in reserving substantive comments on fuel quality to the pending Tier 3 rulemaking 

as requested, we recognize that considerable benefits could inure to fuel efficiency and economy, 

and GHG emission reductions (and thus to the relevant statutory authority for this rulemaking), 

from fuel quality changes addressed elsewhere. We are relying on the agency that consideration 

of such benefits and reliance on such authority will not be foreclosed by reserving our fuel 

quality comments for the Tier 3 rulemaking or other rulemaking initiatives. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9487-A1, p.85]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API)

EPA’s Plans for Further Standards for Light-Duty Vehicle Criteria Pollutants and Gasoline Fuel 

Quality

EPA references plans to propose a “Tier 3” program of emissions and fuel quality standards 

intended to further reduce non-GHG pollutants (including volatile organic compounds, nitrogen 

oxides, particulate matter, and air toxics) from new light-duty vehicles. API and its members 

firmly support the principle that no Tier 3 regulation of fuel quality should be proposed without 

first providing a thorough science-based justification that demonstrates the health benefits along 

with a rigorous economic and supply impact analysis that assesses fundamental cost and energy 

security consequences related to the viability of a domestic refining industry. As noted above, 

vehicle technologies that might require fuel changes are not likely to be employed for meeting 

the CAFE standards proposed for MY 2017 – 2025 light-duty vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9469-A1, p. 8]
EPA Response to Comments

22-6

Until EPA releases data and analysis on the benefits of the Tier 3 standards under consideration, 

a comprehensive fuel/vehicle system-focused assessment cannot be conducted or evaluated by 

stakeholders and/or the public. In this regard, EPA should complete an Anti-Backsliding study of 

the RFS program and make it available for public scrutiny and comment prior to proposing any 

rule to change fuel quality. Congress mandated the study, which is now more than two years 

overdue. In addition, EPA has indicated to industry that it has been performing emissions 

measurements on in-use vehicles operated on gasoline fuels containing significantly lower levels 

of sulfur. These data and EPA’s associated analyses also need to be made publicly available prior 

to the issuance of a proposed rule. Absent these actions and a demonstration that fuel changes 

will achieve cost effective emissions reductions that would improve air quality or have other 

health benefits, EPA should not propose a Tier 3 Rule. By moving forward with a Tier 3 

proposal, EPA is making conclusions based on an incompletely vetted set of data and analysis 

and is allowing scant time for scrutiny from interested stakeholders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9469-A1, p. 9]

• Tier 3 fuel requirements are unnecessary and unjustified - The EPA should not link a Tier 3 

program of non-GHG emissions and fuel quality standards for new light-duty vehicles to the 

referenced proposed rulemaking. The EPA has not yet completed long overdue studies mandated 

by Congress, nor has it conducted and released a thorough science-based justification that 

demonstrates the need for Tier 3. Finally, the Agency has yet to provide stakeholders with 

adequate opportunity to evaluate and submit input on all of the data and analysis that it has 

collected and performed to support such an initiative. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9469-A2, p. 2]

Organization: Growth Energy

II. Potential Fuel Parameter Changes

A. Background

In the Joint NPRM EPA did not evaluate potential fuel quality changes in the GHG proposal. 

The proposed rule contains the following discussion with respect to the Tier 3 standards and 

possible fuel changes: In the May 21, 2010 Presidential Memorandum, in addition to addressing 

GHGs and fuel economy, the President also requested that EPA examine its broader motor 

vehicle air pollution control program. The President requested that ‘‘[t]he Administrator of the 

EPA review for adequacy the current nongreenhouse gas emissions regulations for new motor 

vehicles, new motor vehicle engines, and motor vehicle fuels, including tailpipe emissions 

standards for nitrogen oxides and air toxics, and sulfur standards for gasoline. If the 

Administrator of the EPA finds that new emissions regulations are required, then I request that 

the Administrator of the EPA promulgate such regulations as part of a comprehensive approach 

toward regulating motor vehicles.’’ [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 31]

EPA is currently in the process of conducting an assessment of the potential need for additional 

controls on light-duty vehicle non-GHG emissions and gasoline fuel quality. EPA has been 

actively engaging in technical conversations with the automobile industry, the oil industry, 

nongovernmental organizations, the states, and other stakeholders on the potential need for new 

regulatory action, including the areas that are specifically mentioned in the Presidential 
Tier 3 Standards

22-7

Memorandum. EPA will coordinate all future actions in this area with the State of 

California. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 32]

Based on this assessment, in the near future, EPA expects to propose a separate but related 

program that would, in general, affect the same set of new vehicles on the same timeline as 

would the proposed light-duty GHG emissions standards. It would be designed to address air 

quality problems with ozone and PM, which continue to be serious problems in many parts of the 

country, and light-duty vehicles continue to play a significant role. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9505-A1, p. 32]

EPA expects that this related program, called ‘‘Tier 3’’ vehicle and fuel standards, would among 

other things propose tailpipe and evaporative standards to reduce non-GHG pollutants from 

light-duty vehicles, including volatile organic compounds, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, 

and air toxics. EPA’s intent, based on extensive interaction to date with the automobile 

manufacturers and other stakeholders, is to propose a Tier 3 program that would allow 

manufacturers to proceed with coordinated future product development plans with a full 

understanding of the major regulatory requirements they will be facing over the long term. This 

coordinated regulatory approach would allow manufacturers to design their future vehicles so 

that any technological challenges associated with meeting both the GHG and Tier 3 standards 

could be efficiently addressed. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 32]

It should be noted that under EPA’s current regulations, GHG emissions and CAFE compliance 

testing for gasoline vehicles is conducted using a defined fuel that does not include any amount 

of ethanol. If the certification test fuel is changed to some ethanol-based fuel through a future 

rulemaking, EPA would be required under EPCA to address the need for a test procedure 

adjustment to preserve the level of stringency of the CAFE standards.26 EPA is committed to 

doing so in a timely manner to ensure that any change in certification fuel will not affect the 

stringency of future GHG emission standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 32]

The discussion indicates EPA will evaluate changes to certification fuel in Tier 3, and if there are 

changes made to this certification fuel, that EPA would be required under EPCA to preserve the 

stringency of the GHG standards. Thus, EPA acknowledges that certification fuel has an effect 

on GHG emissions, and therefore also acknowledges that vehicles and fuels operate as a system, 

not only for the criteria pollutants like PM and NOx, but also GHGs. And yet, EPA did not 

evaluate changes in fuel for the GHG rule. Growth Energy believes that because vehicles and 

fuels are obviously inseparable when it comes to both criteria pollutants and GHG emissions, 

that the Agencies should have evaluated both changes to vehicles and fuels for the GHG 

rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, pp. 32-33]

EPA has not yet published its Tier 3 proposal, and it is possible that EPA will propose new 

certification fuel requirements that directly affects the ability of automakers to meet the GHG 

requirements. Therefore, new certification fuels should have been examined in the GHG 

requirements, and it is in this context that Growth Energy proposes a new certification and in-use 

fuel for 2017 and later cars and light duty trucks. We believe that EPA and the Agencies should 

examine this proposed certification and in-use fuel as an alternative in developing the final 

GHG/CAFÉ rules for 2017-2025 vehicles. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 33]
EPA Response to Comments

22-8

Growth Energy’s proposal for 2017 certification fuel is shown in Table 3. This certification fuel 

is essentially the same as the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturer’s proposal to CARB, but 

with the addition of 20 volume percent more ethanol, so that octane is higher, the distillation 

parameters are changed, and other parameters are lower by dilution. [Table 3 can be found on p. 

33 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-

A1, p. 33]

Fuel marketers would be required to produce fuel that would be similar to this proposed fuel for 

2017+ vehicles.27 In conventional areas of the U.S., it would meet EPA’s sulfur, MSAT and 

RVP regulations, but still have 94 octane and 30% ethanol. In reformulated gasoline areas, it 

would meet the requirements of the RFG regulations, the low sulfur regulations, and the MSAT 

and RVP regulations, but otherwise have 94 octane and 30% ethanol. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, pp. 33-34]

Most of the U.S. already has E10, so both RFG and conventional fuel already contains E10 for 

the current fleet. Adding 20% more ethanol to these fuels would increase octane, reduce sulfur, 

reduce RVP, reduce total and multi-substituted aromatics, olefins, benzene, and change the T50 

and T90 points. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 34]

Other concepts of this proposal are as follows:

• Automakers would certify 2017+ vehicles only on E30, they would not be required to 

certify on E10. The legacy fleet would continue to operate on E10

• Ramp-up of ethanol for E30 would build with the introduction of each successive model 

year of 2017+ vehicles. Ethanol would have to be used preferentially for E30, then for 

E10 in the legacy fleet.

• There may be a net positive impact on upstream GHG emissions from producing the base 

gasoline (normalized to gasoline volume); this would have to be evaluated [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 34]

The primary advantages of implementing this type of fuel are:

• Low carbon intensity ethanol volumes ramp up slowly from calendar year 2017 as the 

new vehicles using this fuel are introduced into the fleet, and continue ramping up well 

beyond the 2020-2022 timeframe, providing ongoing upstream (i.e., lifecycle) GHG 

reductions well into the future (through 2040) beyond the RFS.

• Currently the cellulosic projections in the RFS are not being met in part because the 

United States ethanol market is saturated by E10. Creating an E30 certification fuel 

would send a fresh market signal to the cellulosic industry that market space is being 

created through this new fuel standard. To meet the 36 billion gallon biofuel projection 

by 2022, market access for advanced (50% lifecycle emissions reduction) and cellulosic 

ethanol (60% lifecycle emissions reduction) must be offered a path. This proposal would 

provide that opportunity as well as the other benefits a higher octane standard would 

offer.

• Automakers should be able to use the higher octane ethanol fuel to boost engine 

efficiency beyond the engine efficiency obtained from the current Agency proposal 
Tier 3 Standards

22-9

(tailpipe GHG emissions would be the same as the Agency proposal), maintaining the 

same fuel economy and vehicle range

• Importantly, exhaust Particulate Matter (PM) emissions and carbon monoxide (CO)

emissions from 2017-2025 model year vehicles would be much lower than the current 

proposal because of increased fuel oxygen content. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9505-A1, 

p. 34]

Other criteria pollutant emissions (exhaust and evaporative NMOG and NOx) from onroad 2017+ 

motor vehicles should be the same with E30 as with current certification fuel, whether they are 

Tier 2 or Tier 3 vehicles, since the same tailpipe and evaporative standards must be met. 

Distribution of the E30 fuel should ultimately be no more difficult than E85 distribution, which 

has to take place anyway because of the RFS. The slow phase-in of E30 gives time for additional 

low carbon intensity (i.e., cellulose and other) ethanol supplies to develop. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9505-A1, p. 35]

It is also important to note that Tier 2 and Tier 3 vehicles will have to meet very low emission 

standards for evaporative NMOG, exhaust NMOG, CO, and NOx, no matter what fuel they are 

certified on. So ultimately, there should be no difference in these emissions between an E10 fuel 

and an E30 fuel. A number of manufacturers offer FFVs that meet Tier 2 and emission standards 

on E85 and E0 now. Increasing ethanol from E10 to E30 reduces fuel volatility, so depending on 

a final volatility specification, meeting evaporative requirements could be somewhat less 

difficult with an E30 blend. Fuel system permeation also contributes to evaporative emissions. 

Permeation emissions have not been studied on E30 blends, but a Coordinating Research Council 

study on permeation from ethanol blends between E6 and E20 found that increasing ethanol 

content from E10 to E20 increased diurnal permeation emissions by about 16% on five vehicles, 

however, one FFV that was tested experienced lower permeation emissions on E20 than E10. 

This factor should also be considered in a revised cost-benefit analysis. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9505-A1, pp. 40-41]

26 EPCA requires that CAFE tests be determined from the EPA test procedures in place as of 

1975, or procedures that give comparable results. 49 USC 32904(c).

27 Subject to approval/oversight by EPA and others, E30 could be marketed to FFVs prior to 

calendar year 2017. Current FFV customers probably often have E30 in their fuel tanks if they 

switch back-and-forth between E85 and E0.

Organization: Volvo Car Corporation (VCC)

Certification Gasoline and Harmonization

VCC supports a single certification fuel for EPA and CARB. It is expensive and inefficient to 

develop toward and store several different fuels to meet two nearly identical regulations. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 13]
EPA Response to Comments

22-10

When EPA/NHTSA/CARB require different fuels, it effectively doubles the amount of testing 

manufacturers are required to perform, while yielding limited, if any, additional environmental 

benefit. Even though it appears that 10% ethanol is likely to be the most common fuel on the 

U.S. market for the foreseeable future, EPA has, through the upcoming TIER3 regulation, 

indicated that it will require E15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 13]

The consequence of this would be that CARB and EPA will have different certification gasoline 

requirements. To eliminate unnecessary duplicative testing, VCC has requested that CARB 

accept certification using the EPA proposed fuel from MY2017. VCC requests though that 

EPA/NHTSA/CARB reach a harmonized approach toward a national fuel for certification after 

reaching a common approach towards harmonized definition of CO2 and fuel economy. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9551-A2, p. 14]

Response:

These comments regarding possible changes to fuel specifications under a future EPA Tier 3 

rulemaking are outside the scope this GHG rulemaking.
Request for Extension of the Comment Period

23-1

23. Request for Extension of the Comment Period

Organizations Included in this Section

Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

Volkswagen

Organization: Association of Global Automakers, Inc. (Global Automakers)

The Association of Global Automakers, Inc. hereby requests a 30-day extension from January 

30, 2012 to March 1, 2012 to submit its comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) for 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards [76 FR 74854, December 1, 2011]. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, p.1]

The need for this extension is underscored by the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-

A1, p.1]

1. The complexity, cost, and importance of this rulemaking warrant allowing all stakeholders 

sufficient time to review and understand the extensive Federal Register and supporting 

documents and to provide meaningful feedback to the agencies. Although the basic outline of the 

proposal was announced in advance through a supplemental notice of intent, the details of the 

proposal were not publicly available until the issuance of the proposal. These details are of 

critical importance to participants in the rulemaking in developing a full understanding of the 

potential impacts of this far-reaching rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, p.1]

2. The release of this rulemaking corresponds to the release of other complex and significant 

rulemaking documents by the California Air Resources Board (ARB), which are not limited to 

GHG standards but also include proposals for the next round of low emission vehicle criteria 

pollutant standards for 2015+ vehicles, zero emission vehicles, clean fuels outlets, and 

environmental performance labeling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, p.1]

3. The current end date of the comment period falls on the heels of the public hearings, which 

will require additional time and resource commitments: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, 

p.1]

a. The public hearings for the EPA-NHTSA proposal are scheduled on January 17, 19, and 24, 

2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, p.1]

b. The ARB Board hearing on the aforementioned California regulations is scheduled for January 

26-27, 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, p.1]
EPA Response to Comments

23-2

These overlapping and important rulemaking activities, in combination with the approaching 

holiday season, make a modest extension of the comment period even more compelling. All of 

our member companies and the auto industry generally are closed during the week between 

Christmas and New Years Day, making communications among the Association and our 

members extremely difficult. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, pp.1-2]

Furthermore, as noted in the NPRM and the Notice of Public Hearings for the proposal [76 FR 

76932, December 9, 2011], NHTSA and EPA are required to “keep the official record of each 

hearing open for 30 days to allow speakers to submit supplementary information” [76 FR 

76933], as required by § 7607 (d)(5)(iv) of the Clean Air Act. Therefore, the public hearing 

record must remain open until February 23, 2012 or so. Thus, approving our request would have 

no material impact on the rulemaking schedule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1307-A1, p.2]

Organization: National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA)

By this letter, NADA requests an extension of the January 30, 2012, comment period deadline 

for the above-referenced proposed rulemaking for an additional 30 days or until February 29, 

2012. 76 Fed. Reg. 76932, et seq. (December 9, 2011). In support of this request, please 

recognize and consider the following: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.1]

1. The joint proposal is 567 Federal Register pages long. It is accompanied by a 482 page Draft 

Joint Technical Support Document, an 833 page Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, and a 

482 page Draft Environmental Impact Statement. These three documents cite hundreds of other 

documents. In addition, the EPA docket currently contains 726 non-comment documents and the 

NHTSA docket currently contains 148 non-comment documents. Despite an intention to devote 

substantial resources to the task, NADA cannot complete a review of these documents by 

January 30, 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.1]

2. On December 9, 2011, NHTSA and EPA issued a notice with details regarding three public 

hearings on the proposal. 76 Fed. Reg. 76932-3 (December 9, 2011). NADA immediately 

arranged for three dealers to testify at these hearings, sending an e-mail to EPA with the specifics 

requested in the December 9 notice. Consequently, in addition to developing comments 

responding to the joint proposal, NADA will be working diligently to assist these dealers with 

the development of their testimony. Given the short time frame involved, this will be a daunting 

task. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.2]

3. As recognized by EPA and NHTSA, the Clean Air Act requires that the records for the 

hearings discussed above be kept open for at least 30 days following each hearing. 42 USC 

§7607(d)(5). At the very least, this means that EPA must accept written submissions pertaining 

to the January 24, 2012, hearing until at least February 23, 2012. 42 USC §7607(d)(5). 

Consequently, extension of the comment period to February 29, 2012, will have no negative 

consequences for the regulatory development process. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.2]

4. On December 7, 2011, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) announced a voluminous 

package of advanced Clean Car Rules. These rules in part relate to the NHTSA/EPA proposal 

and, if promulgated and granted a preemption waiver, will apply (at least in part) in as many as 
Request for Extension of the Comment Period

23-3

15 states. Consequently, NADA’s limited resources also are burdened with reviewing and 

responding to this CARB proposal, a hearing for which is scheduled for January 26-27, 2012. 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.2]

5. The NHTSA/EPA proposal seeks to establish CAFE and GHG mandates which, at the earliest, 

would begin to take effect in MY 2017. The proposal is not tied to a specific statutory deadline. 

Indeed, the 35 mpg standard recently promulgated for MY 2016 will kick in some four years 

earlier than Congress contemplated. 49 USC §32902(b)(2)(A). In any event, new CAFE 

standards must be issued at least 18 months prior to the model year in question. 49 USC 

§32902(a). In addition, new GHG standards may not issue sooner than the model year 

commencing 4 years after they are promulgated. 42 USC §7521(a)((3)(C). Thus, affording 

interested parties an additional 30 days to submit comments will neither conflict with a statutory 

deadline nor interfere with existing statutory mandates designed to provide vehicle 

manufacturers with adequate lead time. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.2]

6. Of primary importance is the issue of fair and adequate due process. Persons potentially 

impacted by the December 1, 2011, proposal are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to provide 

comment and testimony to the record. In this regard, NADA appreciates the fact that NHTSA

and EPA allowed interested parties the opportunity to provide input in response to several 

Notices of Intent leading up to the proposal. NADA also applauds the three hearing opportunities 

mentioned above. It is in light of these fair and adequate opportunities for public participation 

that NADA urges NHTSA and EPA to recognize that 60 days is an insufficient amount of time 

for interested parties to develop and submit written comments on what may well be the most 

voluminous, most far reaching, and most expensive regulatory proposal ever issued by the 

Federal government. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.2]

7. For comparison purposes, NADA pulled from its stack of regulatory notices two recently 

issued items of interest to its members. The first, an EPA notice of some 89 pages involving 

proposed management standards for the underground storage tanks sometimes found at 

dealerships, allows for a 90 day comment period. 76 Fed. Reg. 71708, et seq. (November 18, 

2011). The docket for this proposal currently contains a mere 211 documents. The second, a 

NHTSA notice involving Theft Protection and Rollaway Prevention is 17 pages long yet it also 

affords 90 days for public comment. 76 Fed. Reg. 77183, et seq. (December 12, 2011). The 

docket for that proposal currently contains roughly 2 documents. Note that NADA is in no way 

suggesting that these proposals are any less important than the joint CAFE/GHG proposal, only 

that they would appear to be no more (and arguably far less) complex and burdensome for 

interested parties to digest and respond to. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.3]

For all of the above-listed reasons, NADA urges NHTSA and EPA to extend the comment period 

in this matter to February 29, 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1308-A1, p.3]

In mid-December, NADA petitioned NHTSA and EPA for a 30 day extension of the 60 day 

comment period. A month later, a 14 calendar day extension was granted. Hearings on the 

proposal were held on January 17, January 19, and January 24, 2012, with NADA dealerdirectors presenting testimony at each. The hearing records remain open for 30 days. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9575-A1, p. 2]
EPA Response to Comments

23-4

Organization: Volkswagen

With this letter Volkswagen Group of America (Volkswagen) requests a 30 day extension to the 

comment period for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for 2017 and Later Model 

Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards (76 FR 748S4, December 1, 2011). Volkswagen requests that the comment period be 

extended from January 30, 2012 to February 29, 2012. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, 

p.1]

The reasons to extend the comment period are compelling. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, 

p.1]

• The regulation is extremely long, complex and costly. Sufficient time is required for all 

stakeholders to thoroughly review the regulation and all the supporting documents that detail the 

agency analysis that has led to the proposal published on December 1, 2011. While the overall 

program was outlined earlier this year with the publication of the Supplemental Notice of Intent 

(SNOI), there are many aspects of the joint regulation that are available for the very first time 

with the publication of the NPRM. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, p.1]

• During the month of January EPA and NHTSA have scheduled 3 hearings to present this 

complex regulation to the public and allow all stakeholders a chance to comment on the details 

of the regulation. The short time frame between the hearings and the close of the comment 

period and the fact that discussions that result from the hearings may also need to be addressed in 

stakeholder comments lends additional need for an extension. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-

A1, p.2]

• This joint regulation from EPA and NHTSA also coincides with a lengthy and complex 

regulation issued by the state of California. The proposed regulation from California, in addition 

to detailing their version of the Greenhouse Gas regulation that will be part of the National 

Program, also proposes complex and costly regulations for criteria pollutants, evaporative 

emissions, the California 2EV Program, changes to certification fuel and the Clean Fuels Outlet 

Program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, p.2]

• Ninety day comment periods are typical and are appropriate given the size and scope of this 

regulation and the sheer volume of supporting documents. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, 

p.2]

• A 30 day extension should have no impact on the timing for the publication of the final 

regulation. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1309-A1, p.2]

Response:

EPA in fact extended the public comment period in response to the above requests.
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-1

24. Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications and Pending GHG 

Lawsuits

Organizations Included in this Section

American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

American Petroleum Institute (API), National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and 

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)

Organization: American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

I. EPA’s GHG CAFE Standards are Under Judicial Review. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-

A1, p.2]

The legal effect of EPA’s original light-duty vehicle GHG regulation is under judicial review and 

the implications of that challenge likely will impact this rulemaking. Extensive, unreasonably 

stringent GHG emissions standards for light-duty vehicles (LDVs) are not required by statute or 

by the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Although section 102 of the 

Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-140, hereinafter EISA) requires 

the Secretary of Transportation to establish automobile fuel economy standards for model years 

through 2020, there is no statute requiring EPA to set GHG emission standards for LDVs. While 

section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Administrator of EPA to set standards 

“which in [her] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” the CAA does not require excessive or stretch 

standards. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.2]

On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate 

GHG emissions from new motor vehicles. Although the Supreme Court recognized that EPA has 

“significant latitude as to the manner, timing, [and] content” of its regulations, this Supreme 

Court decision in 2007 did not mandate GHG emissions rulemakings. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.2]

EPA is involved in at least four related lawsuits: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.2]

• GHG endangerment, [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.2]

• GHG/CAFE standards for LDVs (MYs 2012-2016), [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.2]

• GHG Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) “tailoring,” and [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9485-A1, p.2]

• GHG PSD, review of 12/18/08 “Johnson memo” - also called “grounds arising after.” [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.2]
EPA Response to Comments

24-2

Oral argument is scheduled for February 28 and 29, 2012 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

D.C. Circuit for all four of these lawsuits. A decision is expected in 2012 and will have 

ramifications for a final rule for LDVs beginning with MY 2017. Judicial decisions on all four 

lawsuits are likely before EPA and NHTSA promulgate a joint final rule for LDVs after MY 

2016. Therefore, this proposal for MYs after 2016 is premature and presumptive. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.2]

EPA’s LDV rule for MYs 2012-2016 has been challenged as arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise 

not in accordance with law because EPA: (1) failed to address the broad consequences for 

stationary sources that automatically result from that rule; (2) refused to analyze the 

extraordinary burdens on other source categories imposed by that rule; (3) failed to give 

meaningful consideration to the option of deferring regulation; and (4) failed to justify its rule by 

articulating any rational connection between the alleged endangerment and EPA’s selected 

standards. EPA should delay promulgation of this rule to fully consider the implications of this 

judicial review. The agency’s LDV proposal is similarly arbitrary and capricious in its failure to 

address these problems for LDVs with MYs after 2016. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, 

pp.2-3]

As a result of its improper interpretation of the Clean Air Act, EPA has also asserted that the 

LDV rule for MYs 2012-2016 triggers an obligation to regulate GHG emissions from stationary 

sources under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permitting 

programs. AFPM strongly opposes any approach to implementing mobile source standards that 

could impact such a wide swath of unrelated stationary sources. AFPM has filed joint comments 

with American Petroleum Institute and the National Association of Manufacturers that address 

the proposed rule’s potential impact on stationary sources and explain why EPA’s improper 

interpretation renders the rulemaking arbitrary and capricious. We hereby incorporate by 

reference those joint comments in this submission. In short, EPA should not assert that this rule 

acts as an independent trigger for the PSD program, requiring regulation of GHG emissions from 

stationary sources, particularly in the face of an imminent court decision vacating elements of 

EPA’s existing GHG regulatory regime. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9485-A1, p.3]

Organization: American Petroleum Institute (API), National Association of Manufacturers 

(NAM), and American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)

Regardless of the substance and stringency of the actual greenhouse gas (GHG) standards that 

EPA proposes to impose on light-duty vehicles, the Associations strongly oppose any approach 

to implementing mobile source standards in a manner that impacts a wide swath of unrelated 

stationary sources.1 As of January 2, 2011, as a result of a prior rulemaking for model year 2012-

2016 light-duty vehicles, EPA has begun imposing significant and unprecedented GHG 

permitting requirements on stationary sources around the nation. It has accomplished this 

through “four related actions that, taken together, trigger [permitting requirements] for GHG 

sources on and after January 2, 2011.” Action to Ensure Auth. to Issue Permits under the 

Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 

Finding of Substantial Inadequacy and SIP Call (Proposed SIP Call), 75 Fed. Reg. 53,892, 

53,895 (Sept. 2, 2010) (emphasis added). These four actions are: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9509-A1, p. 2]
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-3

• the “Endangerment Finding,” Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for GHGs 

under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009);

• the “Car Rule,” Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emission Standards and Corporate Average 

Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010);

• the “PSD Interpretive Memorandum,” Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations 

that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg.

• 17,004 (April 2, 2010); and

• the “Tailoring Rule,” Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 

Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,557 (June 3, 2010). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9509-A1, p. 2]

EPA explained that, in its view, the Car Rule regulations, “when they [took] effect on January 2, 

2011, . . . subject GHGs emitted from stationary sources to” permitting requirements. Proposed 

SIP Call, 75 Fed. Reg. at 53,892. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 3]

As explained in the Associations’ comments on each of these four actions, EPA’s decision to 

impose GHG permitting requirements on stationary sources as a result of the implementation of 

mobile source standards is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law” as well as being adopted “without observance of procedure required by 

law.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(9)(A),(D). Consequently, the Associations, as part of a coalition of 

trade associations, have petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit to review each of the four related actions, that, in EPA’s view, trigger GHG 

permitting requirements. See National Association of Manufacturers et al. v. EPA, D.C. Cir Nos. 

10-1044, 10-1127, 10-1166, 10-1218. The Associations have also challenged other EPA 

regulations that EPA has suggested could have a role in triggering GHG permitting requirements. 

See National Association of Manufacturers et al v. EPA, D.C. Cir. Nos. 10-1177, 10-1178, 10-

1179, 10-1180. Oral argument is scheduled in these cases for February 28 and 29, 2012. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 3]

EPA has taken additional action by promulgating the “Truck Rule,” Greenhouse Gas Emissions 

Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 

Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011). The Truck Rule is analogous to the Car Rule in that it sets 

standards for the quantity of GHGs that a vehicle may emit for a given amount of distance 

covered or work performed. Id. at 57,115. In the likely event that the Car Rule is vacated by the 

D.C. Circuit, EPA may continue to assert that the Truck Rule serves as a trigger for GHG 

permitting requirements for stationary sources. See EPA, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards 

and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles: EPA Response to 

Comments Document for Joint Rulemaking,” EPA-420-11-004, at p. 2-8 (Aug. 2011). Thus,

several of the Associations, as part of a coalition of trade associations, have also petitioned the 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review the Truck Rule. 

See American Petroleum Institute et al v. EPA, D.C. Cir No. 10-1440. That case has not yet been 

briefed or set for argument. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 3]

Like the initial Car Rule, the 2017 Car Rule sets standards for the quantity of GHGs that a 

vehicle may emit for a given distance travelled. 2017 Car Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,976. In the 

context of the initial car rule, EPA inappropriately and illegally took the position that the Car 
EPA Response to Comments

24-4

Rule triggers GHG permitting requirements for stationary sources. Consequently, as it did in the 

Car Rule and Truck Rule dockets, the Associations submit these comments explaining why it is 

arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unlawful for EPA to adopt the 2017 Car Rule while 

maintaining its illegal interpretation that Clean Air Act (CAA) permitting requirements for 

stationary sources are triggered by vehicle emissions standards such as those proposed here or 

adopted in the Car Rule and Truck Rule. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 3]

EPA has not yet asserted that this rulemaking would independently have the same triggering 

effect on stationary source GHG regulations as the Car Rule and Truck Rule despite the fact that 

it also seeks to regulate GHG emissions from the transportation sector. 2017 Car Rule, 76 Fed. 

Reg. 74,963. In general, EPA’s position is that “any impacts on stationary sources arise because 

of express statutory requirements in the CAA, not as a result of vehicle regulation. Moreover, 

GHGs have become subject to regulation under the CAA by virtue of other regulatory actions 

taken by EPA before this proposal.” Id. at 75,162. In the final 2017 Car Rule, EPA should clarify 

whether, in the likely event that the Car Rule and Truck Rule are vacated, it would cite to the 

2017 Car Rule as an independent trigger for GHG stationary source permitting 

requirements. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, pp. 3-4]

As explained below, finalizing the 2017 Car Rule would be arbitrary and capricious and 

unlawful because EPA has not corrected its interpretation of the CAA to provide that vehicle 

emission standards do not trigger GHG stationary source permitting requirements. Thus, EPA 

should not finalize the 2017 Car Rule with an incorrect interpretation of the CAA. In the 

alternative, the NHTSA standards would realize equivalent GHG reductions without CAA 

ramifications on stationary sources. Further, EPA has not considered the costs or ramifications 

that the 2017 Car Rule will impose on stationary sources by triggering GHG permitting 

requirements in violation of numerous laws and Executive Orders, as well as the Administrative 

Procedure Act. Lastly, finalizing the 2017 Car Rule would also be arbitrary and capricious and 

unlawful because the rule is predicated on an invalid endangerment finding. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 4]

The Associations further elaborate on these issues below. They also incorporate by reference 

here each of the comments that they submitted on the actions that comprise EPA’s regulatory 

scheme to impose PSD permitting requirements as a result of mobile source standards2 as well 

as their Petition to Reconsider, Rescind and/or Revise EPA’s Prevention of Significant 

Deterioration Regulations. Because EPA is relying on a similar flawed approach and 

interpretation in the context of the 2017 Car Rule, the Associations’ positions in those comments 

are germane here and are incorporated herein in their entirety. These comments, hereby 

submitted as comments to the 2017 Car Rule docket, are attached as Exhibits A through J, and 

should be considered as part of and incorporated into the Associations’ submission of comments 

to the 2017 Car Rule. Below, the Associations summarize key positions but do not waive the 

more complete set of arguments made in the comments in the five rulemakings and attached 

herein. [Exhibits A through J can be found on pp. 12-397 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9509-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 4]

I. EPA Must Correct Its Mistaken View That Mobile Source Emission Standards Trigger GHG 

Permitting Requirements
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-5

EPA has stated that, in its view, the Car Rule’s vehicle emission standards took effect on January 

2, 2011, and as a result triggered GHG permitting requirements for stationary sources as of that 

date under two programs: the Title V operating permit program; and the Prevention of 

Significant Deterioration (PSD) pre-construction permit program. PSD Interpretive Rule, 75 Fed. 

Reg. at 17,019–20. EPA has not expressly announced whether it would take the same position 

regarding the vehicle emission standards proposed in the 2017 Car Rule. Instead, it has simply 

asserted that “GHGs have become subject to regulation under the CAA by virtue of other 

regulatory actions taken by EPA before this proposal.” 76 Fed. Reg. 75,162 n.597. But to the 

extent EPA believes that regulations of GHGs from model year 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles, 

like those from model year 2012-2016 light-duty vehicles, trigger stationary source permitting 

ramifications, such position is inconsistent with the CAA, as explained below. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 4]

A. The Title V Operating Permit Program and the PSD Preconstruction Permit Program

Added by Congress in the 1990 amendments, CAA Title V requires a source that emits, or has 

the potential to emit, more than 100 tpy of any air pollutant to obtain an operating permit that 

lists applicable regulatory requirements. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(b), 7661c. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 5]

The PSD program is significantly more complex. It was designed to help states maintain the 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) prescribed by EPA for specific air pollutants 

known as “criteria pollutants.” Under CAA § 107, EPA establishes geographic air quality 

districts and designates them as (a) in attainment, (b) in non-attainment, or (c) unclassifiable for 

each criteria pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d). The CAA treats areas designated attainment and 

unclassifiable for a particular pollutant—hereinafter “attainment areas”— identically for PSD 

purposes. States apply NAAQS to individual stationary sources through a State Implementation 

Plan (SIP) “for each ‘air quality control region’ within the state,” which ensures that the region 

meets the applicable NAAQS. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 346 (D.C. Cir. 

1979); 42 U.S.C. § 7410. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 5]

Congress enacted the PSD program to prevent “a decline of air quality to the minimum level 

permitted by NAAQS.” Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1990). 

Consequently, it requires a facility in an attainment area for a specific criteria pollutant to obtain 

a pre-construction permit when it has the potential to emit more than the CAA threshold for that 

pollutant, either 100 or 250 tons per year (tpy), depending on the source. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7471, 

7475(a), 7479. No construction may begin on a new or modified source until a final PSD permit 

is obtained. Sources subject to PSD must adopt Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for 

emissions of pollutants “subject to regulation” under the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 5]

EPA’s view that mobile source emission standards trigger GHG permitting requirements hinges 

on this final point—that sources subject to PSD permitting must adopt BACT for pollutants 

“subject to regulation” under the CAA. EPA argues that GHGs became “subject to regulation” 

under the CAA when the Car Rule took effect because that rule imposed GHG emission 

standards. PSD Interpretive Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,019–20. Consequently, EPA asserted that, 
EPA Response to Comments

24-6

starting January 2, 2011, stationary sources that require a PSD permit must adopt the BACT for 

GHGs. Id. As explained in Section I.C. below, that argument is mistaken—mobile source 

emission standards do not make GHGs subject to regulation for purposes of the PSD 

program. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 5]

EPA goes even further, however, arguing that GHG emissions, standing alone, may trigger the 

need for a PSD permit. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,560-62. As explained in Section I.B. 

below, this violates the plain text of the CAA. Briefly, as noted above, PSD permits are only 

required in “attainment areas.” 42 U.S.C. § 7471. And areas are only designated “attainment” in 

reference to a NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d). Thus, it is logically impossible for there to be 

“attainment areas” for GHG, and so GHG emissions cannot necessitate a PSD permit. That is, 

even if EPA is correct that a source that already must obtain a PSD permit due to emissions of 

other pollutants for which the area is in attainment must therefore adopt BACT for GHGs, that 

does not mean that GHGs can trigger the prerequisite need for a PSD permit. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 5]

B. A Source Triggers PSD Permitting Only if it Emits a NAAQS Pollutant in an Area 

Designated Attainment for That Pollutant

CAA Section 107(d) establishes the process of designating an area as “attainment,” 

“nonattainment,” or “unclassifiable” for each pollutant for which “a new or revised [NAAQS]” 

has been issued. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d). Section 107(d) thus explicitly links the designation 

determinations exclusively to NAAQS criteria pollutants. In turn, Section 107’s designation 

determinations are the critical prerequisite to determining if the PSD program is triggered. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 6]

CAA Section 161, the first substantive provision of Part C (the PSD provisions), incorporates 

those prerequisites by limiting the PSD program to areas designated under Section 107 as 

attainment or unclassifiable:

In accordance with the policy of section 7401(b)(1) of this title, each applicable implementation 

plan shall contain emission limitations and such other measures as may be necessary, as 

determined under regulations promulgated under this part, to prevent significant deterioration of 

air quality in each region (or portion thereof) designated pursuant to section 7407 of this title as 

attainment or unclassifiable. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 6]

42 U.S.C. § 7471 (emphasis added). These geographic limitations make sense because the 

purpose of the PSD program is to assure that NAAQS continue to be achieved. See 42 U.S.C. § 

7410(a)(2)(C) (describing PSD permit program as “necessary to assure that [NAAQS] are 

achieved”). In fact, almost all of the 1977 CAA amendments focused on attainment of NAAQS, 

and essentially codified EPA’s original PSD program, which had been focused solely on 

NAAQS pollutants. See S 95-127 (95th Cong., 1st Sess.), at 27; Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 

31,549. Finally, CAA § 165(a) limits the facilities for which a PSD permit is required to facilities 

constructed “in any area to which this part applies.” 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a) (emphasis 

added). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 6]
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-7

Because there is no NAAQS for GHGs, no region is designated attainment or unclassifiable for 

GHGs. No stationary source, then, is located in a region designated attainment or unclassifiable 

for GHGs. Consequently, no source triggers PSD permitting simply because it emits GHGs 

above the statutory thresholds. The D.C. Circuit, indeed, has mandated this interpretation in 

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where it held that location is the 

key determinant for PSD applicability. EPA had argued that PSD permitting requirements should 

apply not only to sources in attainment areas for a given pollutant, but to sources located any 

place where a new emitting facility would “adversely affect the air quality of an area to which” 

PSD requirements apply. Id. at 364. The Court held that EPA’s reading violated the CAA’s plain 

language: “The plain meaning of the inclusion in [Section 165, 42 U.S.C. § 7475] of the words 

‘any area to which this part applies’ is that Congress intended location to be the key determinant 

of the applicability of the PSD review requirements.” Id. at 365. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9509-A1, p. 6]

Rather than comply with the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, EPA’s interpretation defies it. EPA’s position 

requires permits for a source emitting above the statutory thresholds for one pollutant as long as 

the source is located in an area that is in attainment for any pollutant. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,675, 

52,677 (Aug. 7, 1980) (“PSD requirements apply to any area that is “designated ... as 

‘attainment’ or ‘unclassifiable’ for any pollutant for which a national ambient air quality 

standard exists.”); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(i)(2) (PSD “shall not apply to a major stationary source or 

major modification with respect to a particular pollutant if ... the source or modification is 

located in an area designated as nonattainment under section 107”). That is no limitation at all. 

Every area of the country is, and always has been, in attainment for at least one criteria pollutant. 

Id. at 31,561. Thus, in response to Alabama Power’s holding that EPA has improperly broadened 

the geographic confines of the PSD program, EPA actually broadened the geographic scope even 

further, so that, under EPA’s current interpretation, it now applies to every area of the country. 

EPA’s view defies both Alabama Power and the language of the CAA that it was 

interpreting. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, pp. 6-7]

C. GHGs Are Not Subject to Regulation Under the PSD Program

Furthermore, Title II GHG vehicle emission standards cannot make GHGs “subject to 

regulation” within the meaning of the CAA’s PSD program. Congress did not intend for PSD 

requirements to apply to unconventional, non-NAAQS pollutants, particularly GHGs. EPA 

readily concedes Congress did not have GHGs in mind when it formulated the PSD provisions of 

the Act. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,549, 31,555, 31,561, 31,559 n.41 (Congress “might 

not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming”). The 

text of the PSD provisions and their application to GHGs bear that out. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9509-A1, p. 7]

The 28 source categories listed in Section 169(1) as major emitting facilities potentially subject 

to the PSD program are the very ones EPA thought (in 1977, when the PSD program was added) 

posed the greatest threat to air degradation because they emitted conventional air pollutants—

that is, pollutants with local air quality impacts. Naturally, Congress included only those source 

categories in Section 169(1) because Congress, too, was concerned about only conventional 

pollutants. GHGs, by contrast, are emitted by many more categories of sources. The emissions 
EPA Response to Comments

24-8

cutoffs in Section 169(1) reflect the same concern. Whereas conventional pollutant emissions of 

100 and 250 tpy are significant, GHG emissions of 100 and 250 tpy are commonplace. The 

thresholds make sense only if Congress envisioned only conventional pollutants as “subject to 

regulation.” [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 7]

The PSD program itself is geared toward conventional pollutants. The program is principally 

concerned with “air quality,” 42 U.S.C. § 7471, that is, the air people breathe. GHG emissions 

have no nexus to local air quality. Instead, they are distributed globally. For that reason, PSD 

provisions focusing on local or regional impacts of a pollutant cannot encompass GHGs. For 

instance, the provisions of Sections 165(a) and (e) require air quality monitoring and air quality 

impact analysis. Such local monitoring and local analysis is illogical for emissions of 

GHGs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 7]

D. EPA’s Interpretation of the CAA Is Unreasonable [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 7]

EPA’s contrary interpretation, that GHGs are made subject to regulation by vehicle emissions 

standards, is unreasonable. EPA has admitted that its approach leads to burdens that “should be 

considered ‘absurd results.’” Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,517. According to EPA, its 

interpretation creates a scenario where “PSD permit issuance would be unable to keep up with 

the flood of incoming applications, resulting in delays, at the outset, that would be at least a 

decade or longer.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,557. “During this time, tens of thousands of sources a year 

would be prevented from constructing or modifying.” Id. As a result, EPA’s interpretation 

“slow[s] construction nationwide for years, with all of the adverse effects that this would have on 

economic development.” Id. EPA has said this outcome would be “administratively infeasible,” 

75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516, and would “adversely affect national economic development,” id. at 

31,557. As EPA has acknowledged, this outcome is absurd. Contrary to EPA’s assertions, an 

agency interpretation of a statute that is absurd cannot also be reasonable. Courts “must reject 

administrative constructions of [a] statute ... that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to 

implement.” Continental Air Lines v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 

see also Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 27, 35 (D.C. Cir. 

2003). EPA must, instead, adopt the reasonable interpretations proposed by the 

Associations. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, pp. 7-8]

II. EPA Should Delay Finalizing The 2017 Car Rule Until It Has Corrected Its Mistaken 

Interpretation of the CAA, Allowing NHTSA to Move Forward

EPA has broad discretion to delay finalizing the 2017 Car Rule under the “rule of reason” that 

courts employ in assessing delay in agency decision making. Telecommunications Research & 

Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 

U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (EPA has “significant latitude as to the manner, timing, content, and 

coordination of its regulations with those of other agencies”). Given this discretion, it would be 

arbitrary and capricious for EPA to finalize the CAA component of the 2017 Car Rule at this 

time; instead, it should allow NHTSA to finalize the rule independently. When the D.C. Circuit 

vacates EPA’s Car Rule and Truck Rule for the reasons stated in the Associations’ Comments, 

see Exhs. A–J, the 2017 Car Rule could cause the same harm that the Car Rule (and Truck Rule) 
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-9

threatened: triggering massive and unwarranted permitting burdens. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 

at 31,517. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 8]

These harms entirely outweigh any possible benefit from finalizing the rule, because the rule was 

jointly proposed by EPA and NHTSA. This means the NHTSA portion of the 2017 Car Rule 

could be finalized under NHTSA authority, avoiding triggering permitting requirements under 

the CAA. Consequently, delaying the EPA rule (but not the NHTSA rule) would not cause any 

serious disruption to implementing GHG emission standards for model years 2017-2025 lightduty vehicles, but would avoid massive harm to stationary sources. Furthermore, the delay need 

not be long—if EPA implemented the interpretation offered in Section I, above, it could then 

finalize the 2017 Car Rule without harming stationary sources. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9509-A1, p. 8]

III. EPA Failed to Assess the Consequences of Its Rule and Alternatives to Its Actions Rendering 

the Rulemakings Arbitrary and Capricious [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 8]

Given EPA’s interpretation that vehicle emissions standards trigger stationary source GHG 

permitting requirements, PSD Interpretive Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,019–20, EPA is required to 

consider the ramifications on stationary sources subject to those permitting requirements before 

promulgating the 2017 Car Rule. EPA has entirely failed to perform this duty—the proposed 

2017 Car Rule contains no discussion of its impacts on stationary sources. Instead, it states in 

cursory fashion that impacts on stationary sources are attributable to EPA’s upon are subject to 

pending legal challenges and are at risk for being vacated.3 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-

A1, pp. 8-9]

EPA’s refusal to consider the effects of its Rule makes the rule “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” as well as being adopted “without 

observance of procedure required by law.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(9)(A),(D). An agency acts 

arbitrarily and capriciously if it does not “examine the relevant data,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 

of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), or fails to make its 

decision “based on a consideration of the relevant factors,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. ArkansasBest Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 9]

Congress and the Executive Branch have directed EPA, before taking final action, to assess all 

the impacts of its actions and to consider the benefits of alternative approaches. Under the very 

section discussed, Section 202(a), regulations may only “take effect after such period as the 

Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite 

technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.” 42 

U.S.C. § 7621(a); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S at 529 (GHG regulation cannot be 

“extreme” because EPA must “delay any action to permit the development and application of the 

requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance”). [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 9]

IV. EPA Should Clarify Whether the 2017 Car Rule Triggers Stationary Source Impacts in the 

Absence of Another Trigger
EPA Response to Comments

24-10

The Associations believe EPA’s position to be that, absent any other trigger such as the Car Rule 

or Truck Rule, the 2017 Car Rule will trigger applicability of the Title V and PSD programs to 

GHG emissions from stationary sources. Thus, for example, should the Car Rule and Truck Rule 

be vacated by the Court, the 2017 Car Rule would become the regulation that triggers the 

stationary source regulation of GHGs. If that is not EPA’s position, EPA should so clarify and 

explain its position. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1, p. 10]

1 These comments do not address the substance and stringency of the actual GHG standards that 

EPA proposes to impose on light-duty vehicles. Each Association is filing individual comments 

that discuss various policy and technological impacts of the GHG standards in the 2017 Car 

Rule.

2 Because the Truck Rule will undoubtedly serve the same role in EPA’s justifications after the 

Car Rule is vacated, the Associations also incorporate by reference their comments on the Truck 

Rule.

3 At a minimum, EPA should delay finalizing the 2017 Car Rule until after the D.C. Circuit has 

issued decisions in the challenges to the Car Rule and Truck Rule. Until these decisions become 

final, EPA cannot accurately assess the impact that the 2017 Car Rule will have on stationary 

sources.

Organization: National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)

In addition, the NAM, along with American Petroleum Institute and American Fuel & 

Petrochemical Manufacturers (Associations) have submitted joint comments on this proposed 

rule opposing any approach to implementing of mobile source standards that will impact a wide 

swath of stationary sources. We hereby incorporate by reference those joint comments in this 

submission. This proposed rule is the EPA’s third rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) 

emissions from mobile sources, following the Light Duty Vehicle GHG Emission Standards and 

Corporate Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) and Greenhouse Gas 

Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy- Duty Engines and 

Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,105 (Sept. 15, 2011). The EPA has taken the position that these 

mobile source standards – along with related regulations and guidance – require it to regulate 

GHG emissions from stationary sources under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 

and Title V Programs. Both of those rules are currently subject to judicial review and the 

Associations are concerned that once they are vacated the EPA will assert that this rule serves as 

an independent trigger for the regulation of GHG emissions from stationary sources.

In the joint comments, we explain why the EPA’s view that mobile source emission standards 

trigger GHG permitting requirements for stationary sources is mistaken and urge it to correct its 

interpretation. Further, because NHTSA can issue the same mobile source standards without 

creating the risk of adverse impacts on stationary sources, we urge the EPA to defer any further 

action on the proposed rule until it corrects its interpretation, allowing NHTSA to proceed alone 

at this time. The joint comments also explain why the EPA’s failure to consider the 
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-11

consequences of the proposed rule on stationary sources and alternatives to its proposed actions 

render the rulemaking arbitrary and capricious. Finally, we explain that the rulemaking is 

arbitrary and capricious because it is based on an invalid endangerment finding for GHGs that is 

likely to be vacated upon judicial review. [Joint comments can be found in Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9509-A1] [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9538-A2, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)

UARG submits these comments solely for the purpose of addressing possible alleged stationary 

source effects under the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA” or “Act”) prevention of significant 

deterioration (“PSD”) and Title V permitting programs that might result from promulgation of a 

final rule in the present rulemaking. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1, p. 1]

On May 7, 2010, EPA published a final rule establishing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions 

standards for model year 2012-2016 light-duty vehicles. 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (hereinafter the 

“2012 Light-Duty Rule”). EPA has adopted an interpretation of the CAA under which 

promulgation of the 2012 Light-Duty Rule made GHGs subject to the CAA’s PSD and Title V 

permitting programs for stationary sources beginning on January 2, 2011. See Reconsideration of 

Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting 

Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (hereinafter the “Reconsideration Rule”). EPA’s 

regulation of GHG emissions from stationary sources under the PSD and Title V programs is the 

subject of considerable controversy, and every major EPA rule related to the Agency effort to 

require regulation of GHG emissions under those programs is, in one respect or another, the 

subject of pending petitions for review filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit by numerous parties, including UARG. See, e.g., Coalition for Responsible 

Regulation, et al. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir.) (petitions for review 

of EPA’s GHG “endangerment” and “cause or contribute” findings for motor vehicles under 

CAA section 202(a)); Coalition for Responsible Regulation, et al. v. EPA, No. 10-1073 (and 

consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir.) (petitions for review of the Reconsideration Rule); Coalition for 

Responsible Regulation, et al. v. EPA, No. 10-1092 (and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir.) 

(petitions for review of the 2012 Light-Duty Rule); Southeastern Legal Foundation, et al. v. 

EPA, No. 10-1131 (and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir.) (petitions for review of EPA’s Tailoring 

Rule for GHGs under the PSD and Title V programs). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1, p. 

1]

Depending on the outcome of these pending cases, it is possible that the current PSD and Title V 

permitting rules as they are deemed by EPA to apply to stationary sources’ GHG emissions may 

be vacated in whole or in part or otherwise changed significantly as a result of judicial review. If 

that occurs, it is possible that the proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule, if made final by EPA at the 

conclusion of the present rulemaking, could be interpreted by the Agency to be the rule that 

makes GHGs subject to the PSD and Title V permitting requirements.1 To protect its interests in 

the event that occurs, UARG submits the following comments to the docket for the present 

rulemaking: [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1, p. 2]

• The proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule relies on EPA’s final endangerment and “cause or 

contribute” findings for GHGs under section 202(a) of the Act, which EPA published at 
EPA Response to Comments

24-12

74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009); see, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 74861, 74964. UARG filed 

three sets of comments on EPA’s proposed endangerment and cause or contribute 

findings under section 202(a): (1) Comments of the Utility Air Regulatory Group on the 

Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 

Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171-

3394.1 (Attachment 1 to these comments [Attachment 1 can be found on pp. 5-265 of 

Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1]); (2) Supplemental Comments of 

the Utility Air Regulatory Group on the Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute 

Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA Docket 

ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171-4932.1 (Attachment 2 to these comments 

[Attachment 2 can be found on pp. 266-279 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9510-A1]); and (3) the Utility Air Regulatory Group’s Additional Supplemental 

Comments on the Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for 

Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA Docket ID No. EPAHQ-OAR-2009-0171-11491.1 (Attachment 3 to these comments [Attachment 3 can be 

found on pp. 280-291 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1]). UARG 

incorporates all of these comments herein by reference. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9510-A1, p. 2]

• As discussed in UARG’s previous comments incorporated herein, the proper purpose of 

any EPA endangerment finding under the CAA is to avert or prevent the danger the 

Agency concludes is presented by the emissions that are the subject of the finding, or at 

least to significantly mitigate that danger. This principle is reflected in the CAA’s 

legislative history and the decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 

(en banc). As the legislative history and Ethyl make clear, the fundamental purpose of the 

CAA provisions that incorporate the endangerment criterion, such as section 202(a)(1), is 

to authorize regulation of emissions when and to the extent such regulation will be 

effective in fruitfully attacking the cause of the endangerment, and not to impose 

“regulation for regulation’s sake.” The proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule does not meet 

this standard. EPA analyzed the reductions in GHG emissions that would result from the 

proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule by the year 2100 and projected the effects those 

reductions would have on atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, global mean 

surface temperature, sea-level rise, and ocean-water acidity. 76 Fed. Reg. at 75097-99 & 

Table III-62. EPA acknowledges that “[t]he projected reductions are small.” Id. at 75099. 

EPA makes the following projections for the year 2100 as a result of the proposed 2017 

Light-Duty Rule: (1) atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations will be reduced by 3.29 

to 3.68 parts per million by volume; (2) global mean surface temperature will be reduced 

by 0.0076°C to 0.0184°C; (3) sea-level rise will be reduced by 0.074 to 0.166 centimeter; 

and (4) ocean pH will increase by 0.0018 pH unit. Id. at 75097-99 & Table III- 62. These 

amounts constitute a minuscule fraction of changes projected by the Intergovernmental 

Panel on Climate Change, on whose reports EPA relies. See, e.g., id. at 75096, 75098 & 

nn.385, 386. Even assuming that EPA’s proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule would achieve 

the maximum EPA-projected reductions, these reductions are vanishingly small, to the 

point of being all but unquantifiable and, in any event, imperceptible on any human scale. 

Thus, the proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule does not meet the Ethyl standard for regulation 

under section 202. See Attachment 3; Comments of the Utility Air Regulatory Group on 

the Proposed Rulemaking To Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Comments Regarding PSD/Title V Implications

24-13

Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, EPA Docket ID No. EPAHQ-OAR-2009-0472-7262, at 7-10 (Attachment 4 to these comments; incorporated 

herein by reference [Attachment 4 can be found on pp. 292-329 of Docket number EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1]). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1, pp. 2-3]

• Furthermore, EPA appears to analyze the projected GHG emission reductions from the 

proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule by including the projected GHG emission reductions that 

would occur from the vehicle fuel efficiency standards proposed by the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) concurrently with EPA’s proposed 

rule. It appears that the majority of the emission reductions projected by EPA likely 

would occur anyway as a result of promulgation of the NHTSA fuel efficiency standards. 

Accordingly, the already minuscule projected effects from EPA’s proposed rule, noted 

above, become even smaller if one excludes (as one should) the projected effects from 

the NHTSA standards. See Attachment 3; Attachment 4 at 10-15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9510-A1, p. 3]

• If the proposed 2017 Light-Duty Rule, if made final, is interpreted by EPA to be the rule 

that makes GHGs subject to PSD and Title V requirements, then -- accepting arguendo 

such an EPA interpretation -- the date on which, according to EPA, that rule “takes 

effect” for purposes of commencing the applicability (in EPA’s view) of PSD and Title V 

requirements to GHGs should be no earlier than the date on which the applicable model 

year begins pursuant to NHTSA rules or practice, i.e., October 1 of the preceding 

calendar year (e.g., October 1, 2016, for model year 2017). See Utility Air Regulatory 

Group Petition for Reconsideration and Request for Administrative Stay, EPA Docket ID 

No. EPA-HQ-OAR- 2009-0597, at 11-13 (June 1, 2010) (Attachment 5 to these 

comments; incorporated herein by reference [Attachment 5 can be found on pp. 330-350 

of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1]).2 [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

9510-A1, p. 3]

• EPA published its final Tailoring Rule on June 3, 2010. Prevention of Significant 

Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514. EPA 

promulgated the Tailoring Rule because the Agency concluded that application of the 

PSD and Title V requirements to stationary sources of GHG emissions would, due to the 

Act’s PSD and Title V applicability thresholds, produce absurd results contrary to 

congressional intent. For the reasons described in UARG’s comments on the proposed 

Tailoring Rule, however, EPA instead could have avoided, and should have avoided, 

such results by adopting the approaches described in those UARG comments, and, in 

particular, by determining that carbon dioxide is excluded from the scope of the PSD 

requirements under the CAA and EPA’s regulations. See Comments of the Utility Air 

Regulatory Group on the Proposed Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 

Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, EPA Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517-5317.1, 

at 19-27 (Attachment 6 to these comments; incorporated herein by reference 

[Attachment 6 can be found on pp. 351-424 of Docket number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9510-A1]). [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9510-A1, pp. 3-4]

1 Nothing herein should be construed as suggesting that UARG would agree with any such 

interpretation.
EPA Response to Comments

24-14

2 EPA has not responded to this petition.

Response:

The District of Columbia Circuit recently held that the unambiguous language of the Clean Air 

Act makes stationary source permitting requirements applicable automatically to a pollutant 

when that pollutant is regulated under the Act (including Title II of the Act). Coalition for 

Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012), slip op. pp. 50-77. This 

decision expressly and implicitly rejects the arguments advanced by comments against regulation 

of GHG under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permitting 

programs. The court held that the PSD requirements apply to all air pollutants anywhere in the 

atmosphere and are not limited to only pollutants that affect public health at ground level or in 

local areas near the source of the air pollutants. The court rejected the argument that PSD 

requirements are only applicable to pollutants for which EPA has promulgated a National 

Ambient Air Quality Standard. The court also recognized that EPA was not required to 

promulgate regulations under section 166 of the Act before the permitting programs may apply 

to greenhouse gases.
Comments Unrelated to the Proposed Rule

25-1

25. Comments Unrelated to the Proposed Rule

Organizations Included in this Section

Adams, G.

Axford, H.

Climate Institute

EutecticSolutions Inc.

Green, K.

Haroldson, C.

Hohenstein, H.

Integrated Consultants, Inc.

Lipetzky, P.

Marks, R.

Marlinghaus, E.

Marshall, C.

Miller, P.

National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS)

South Coast AQMD

Statman, P.

Organization: Adams, G.

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who already are 

forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for basic transportation needs.This needs to happen, 

in order to break our dependence on fossil fuel, both foreign and domestic. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-1550-A1, p. 1]

I believe there is a lot to be said for switching FROM non-tariff regulation of pollution including 

greenhouse gases TO excise taxes high enough to account for all external costs. This would 

create LOTS of CONSUMER pressure to improve efficiency of all consumer energy-using 

products. If Detroit insists on producing gas hogs, they can go the way of the Edsel. It should 

increase demand for sustainable energy in all areas of the economy. Already, in Connecticut 

where consumers are allowed to choose their electric generation firm, while stuck with the 

distributing utility where they live, sustainable source electricity ranges from the same price as 

fossil fuel electricity to only about one half cent per kWh more. I believe there is a lot to be said 

for bribing fossil fuel firms to invest in sustainable energy by accepting such investment as 

payment of the excise tax on the greenhouse gas part of pollution. While sustainable energy also 

helps cut toxic pollution from fossil fuel, it will take so long (approximately twenty years) to 

replace all our fossil fuel-fired electric generators with sustainable energy electric generators that 

fossil fuel firms should be allowed write off each year against toxic pollution excise tax only as 

much toxic pollution as would be emitted by the fossil fuel being replaced by the sustainable 

energy generator that year. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1550-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Axford, H.
EPA Response to Comments

25-2

Build More Oil Refinerys, Drill for oil and gas in America and put more people back to work!! 

Approve the Pipeline you have tabled, and call all the drilling bands off, and call our rigs and 

workwes back from South America where many have gone. Chose to be an American President, 

instead of a apoligetic pice of junk politics. You can not do for others what they refuse to do for 

themselves, stop being a fundamentel Liberal Marxtist and seek Freedom and Liberty for all our 

financial and religious freedoms that were established by our founders. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-9149-A1, pp. 1-2]

Organization: Climate Institute

I also, however, would note that actions are needed to reduce emissions from all types of 

transportation, not just automobiles, so please keep working to do more. Making the voluntary 

black carbon reduction program mandatory would be a great step as well--perhaps by requiring 

all construction vehicles working on federally funded transportation projects to be equipped with 

black carbon capture equipment. This might be done by allowing the installation of black carbon 

filters to be a legitimate charge to the construction project, and this would have the effect 

of getting at the very high emissions from older, long-lasting equipment. The US per capita black 

carbon emissions are higher than the global average--we need to act and act now. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-7944-A1, p. 1]

And there is more that can be done on methane--also by making voluntary programs mandatory 

(and many of the steps are cost effective for other reasons). So, please keep aggressively working 

to limit warming influences. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-7944-A1, p. 1]

Organization: EutecticSolutions Inc.

As you are working towards reducing GHGs and improving fuel economy, don't forget the issue 

of HD trucks with excessive air brake leaks. Many need to idle for extended periods of time 

when the air supply has leaked below 60psi over night. FYI when an air brake system leaks its 

air below 60psi, the parking brake system comes ON and the vehicle cannot move until the 

pressure is built back up over 60 psi (sometimes more). A vehicle that has lost all of its air may 

need to idle for as much as 15 minutes before it can be moved to do useful work. [NHTSA-2010-

0131-0270, p. 1]

This is not a rare occurrence and many HD trucks are operating with large leaks that technicians 

cannot find or repair. These vehicles use more fuel than necessary and add to the GHG issue. 

[NHTSA-2010-0131-0270, p. 1]

Organization: Green, K.

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who already are 

forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for basic transportation needs. While this may be 

true - this situation did not have to arise! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524-A1, p. 1]
Comments Unrelated to the Proposed Rule

25-3

The introduction of mandatory bio-fuel quotas has been a tragic and immoral mistake that has 

enriched a few and brought hunger to many! It is not an answer that can prevail for very long! 

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1524-A1, p. 1]

America has, within its borders, immense potential for energy independence. It has the 

opportunity to purchase even more fossil fuel from a friendly neighbor, Canada. Look 

realistically at the future and devise a more intelligent Energy Plan! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-

1524-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Haroldson, C.

Instead, let's increase our domestic drilling for oil and reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Of 

course this is a much safer alternative than shipping oil from the middle east and it will also 

create jobs at home. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11137-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Hohenstein, H.

I support greater drilling in America to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil.

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, therefore the market 

will cause Americans to drive more efficient cars.

Close DOE permanently, use more CNG, drill in the productive deposits in America and allow 

American entrepreneurs to develop the necessary technology to buy American. [EPA-HQ-OAR2010-0799-1515-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Integrated Consultants, Inc.

Integrated Consultants, Inc. (ICI) is a Military prototype hardware R&D firm. During our efforts 

on extended Battery range/life research for electric powered devices we developed a New 

Operator Driving Feature that Increases Vehicle Efficiency. Although initially for electric cars a 

modified regeneration arrangement could potentially increase the mileage range/efficiency of all 

vehicles. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0217, p. 1]

The issue for vehicle manufacturers becomes the adoption of a new indicator standard for 

vehicles, and vehicle safety. Manufacturers are reluctant to apply non adopted options that could 

affect vehicle safety, and efficiencies that can be easily leveraged are being abandoned. As 

electric vehicles and electric assist motor vehicles proliferate, the adoption of a standard will be 

required from a motor vehicle operator safety standpoint. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0217, p. 1]

ICI has been researching this topic for over 2 years, and we believe the regenerator slowing 

indicator is a more significant indicator than the high center “third brake light”. Could someone 

kindly visit http://www.integratedconsultants.com/ and view the data listed on our home 

page. [NHTSA-2010-0131-0217, p. 1]
EPA Response to Comments

25-4

Organization: Kobus, D.

We must stop the PetroChemical/Agribusiness lock on the direction of our nation and future. 

Healthcare, the environment, and energy can all be targeted through correcting the nation's food 

sources. We must stop targeting extreme energy sources (oil sands, hydrofracturing, deep ocean 

drilling), GMOs, and nanoparticles. We are launching full-on into realms of science that are 

untested and unsafe in standard scientific terms. It is not right, and it is our right as Americans to 

say so. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1370-A1, p. 2]

Organization: Lipetzky, P.

Just think what we can do for the economy RIGHT NOW if we lower gas by $1/gallon. Let's 

focus on the economy NOW. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-8184-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Marks, R.

We need an immediate $1.00 per gallon tax on gas, followed each year for the next 8 years with 

an additional $0.50. This sets a long term term vision to start to change our wasteful habits. This 

tax money needs to be strictly allocated with public oversight, to develop alternative energy 

sources - 35%, build mass transit - 20%, into infrastructure of roads and rails - 10%, help those 

caught in the cost shift - 25% going to 0% and rebuild our cities - 10% going to 35%. If you 

want to extend to dirty coal used in electricity generation, now is the time to tax it. [EPA-HQOAR-2010-0799-1680-A1, p. 1]

Organization: Marlinghaus, E.

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who already are 

forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for basic transportation needs. But, what the 

American people don't seem to realize, is that the price of gas is this country is really way below 

what it should be. If all the real costs of our addiction to oil were factored in, the true cost of a 

gallon of gasoline would be at least 2-3 times the current price. I can't help but believe that if 

even a portion of these costs were allowed to be added in that our government, bolstered by the 

insistence of the American public, would finally get their priorities straight and demand that our 

automotive industry make fuel economy their highest priority. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1581-

A1, p. 1]

Organization: Marshall, C.

It may also be a good idea to encourage that highway funds be switched from a tax on gasoline 

to a tax on vehicle miles traveled. As less gasoline is used to meet this standard, fewer revenues 

will come into the highway funding programs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-5917-A2, p. 1]

Organization: Miller, P.
Comments Unrelated to the Proposed Rule

25-5

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who already are 

forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for basic transportation needs. We need to move 

ahead much more strongly! [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-1755-A1, p. 1]

Organization: National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS)

Cost of Satisfying the RFS

Currently, the market is struggling to accommodate the 'blend-wall,' that point beyond which 

traditional blends of E10 and E85 cannot satisfy the mandated volumes of the RFS. EPA has 

sought to relieve this pressure for a short period of time by authorizing the sale of E15 for 

vehicles manufactured in and after model year 2001. However, automobile manufacturers are 

concerned that even these vehicles are not suitable for this fuel and there is ongoing litigation 

concerning the authorization to use E15. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 3]

For retailers, the challenge is two-fold: equipment compatibility and consumer demand.

Current federal law requires retail equipment to be listed by a nationally recognized testing 

laboratory as compatible with the fuel they wish to sell. The vast majority of equipment, 

however, is listed as compatible with fuels containing no more than 10% ethanol. Underwriters 

Laboratories (most equipment is listed by Underwriters Laboratories) does not recertify 

equipment after it has been manufactured. Consequently, retailers wishing to sell fuels 

containing more than 10% ethanol are required to replace their underground storage tank systems 

and dispensers with equipment that is certified as compatible with the new fuels. This is an 

extremely costly proposition. Underground storage tank systems can cost $100,000 to $200,000 

and dispensers can cost up to and above $20,000 per unit. Retailers interested in pursuing a fuel 

like E15 may find the investment difficult to justify, especially considering the automobile 

manufacturers' opposition to the fuel and the uncertainty regarding consumer demand. [EPAHQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 3]

Similar equipment compatibility conditions apply for E85. However, there is the additional 

concern regarding consumer demand. At the end of 2010, the number of flexible fuel vehicles 

(FFVs), which are designed to operate on fuels containing between 0% and 85% ethanol, 

represented only 3.6% of the market. By 2025, EIA projects FFVs will represent only 16% of the 

vehicles on the market. Further, FFV customers, who have the ability to purchase regular 

gasoline or E85, for a variety of reasons often do not purchase E85 when available. 

Consequently, this is a very limited potential market and this can dissuade retailers from making 

the considerable investment to upgrade a facility to sell E85. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-

A1, p. 3]

These are the current challenges associated with overcoming the blend-wall that exists in 2012. 

With the proposed CAFE revisions, the problem becomes exponentially more serious over the 

next 10 years. By 2022, to satisfy the RFS every gallon of gasoline must contain nearly 40% 

renewable fuels. This means that every fuel retailer will be required to replace all of their fueling 

equipment. This will cost the industry billions of dollars. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, 

p. 3]
EPA Response to Comments

25-6

The average convenience store selling fuel operates four dispensers and two underground storage 

tanks. Assuming the average price for a dispenser is $20,000 and the average price for a new 

underground storage tank system is $100,000, the typical store will be required to invest 

$180,000 to accommodate the fuels required by the RFS. Multiply the per-store total by the 

120,950 convenience stores that sell fuels and the industry-wide cost is staggering: $21.7 billion. 

After this enormous investment, it may still be impossible to satisfy the RFS considering that 

only one in six consumers will drive vehicles capable of running on the mandated fuels: EIA 

projects only 16% of consumers will drive FFVs by 2035. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, 

p. 3]

Of the 120,950 convenience stores that sell fuel, 58% are one-store companies and fewer than 

1% are owned by an integrated oil company. Therefore the burden for satisfying the RFS under 

the new CAFE standards will fall squarely on the small businesses that dominate the fuels 

retailing market and many will likely go out of business. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, 

p. 4]

Conclusion

NACS members strongly support efforts to enhance the nation's energy security and do not 

oppose improving the fuel efficiency of the nation's vehicle fleet. However, they are very 

concerned that the policies being enacted and proposed are not effectively coordinated. The 

effect of the proposed rule on overall fuel consumption in the United States will greatly 

exacerbate the difficulties associated with implementation of the Renewable Fuels Standard. 

NACS members are concerned that this incompatibility has not been recognized or considered 

by the Agency. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 4]

Further, NACS is concerned that if policies like these cannot be designed in a manner that 

compliments rather that compromises the other, countless small businesses will be forced to 

examine whether they want to spend the money for upgrades or exit the business. Either way, the 

consumer ultimately loses. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 4]

NACS urges EPA to consider the implications of this proposed rule on other regulatory 

requirements already affecting not just the automobile industry but the fuels industry as well. 

NACS does not believe that improved efficiency, enhanced sustainability, national energy 

security and economic growth are mutually exclusive objectives. But if they are not pursued in a 

strategic, coordinated effort they can lead to unintended consequences that can derail progress 

towards all of the objectives. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-9543-A1, p. 4]

Organization: South Coast AQMD

[These comments were submitted as testimony at the San Francisco, California public hearing on 

January 24, 2012. See Docket Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0799-11787, pp. 70-71.]

Lastly, we urge U.S. EPA to begin analysis to set criteria and greenhouse gas emissions 

standards for vehicles produced after 2025. It is critically important, given that many areas in the 
Comments Unrelated to the Proposed Rule

25-7

U.S. must meet the new eight-hour ozone standard and the potential for ever tighter ambient air 

quality standards.

Organization: Statman, P.

The price of gas is once again squeezing the budgets of American families, who already are 

forced to cut back in other areas just to pay for basic transportation needs. [EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-

0799-1472-A1, p. 1]

Response:

These comments, although clearly sincere, concern issues beyond the scope of this 

rulemaking and therefore no response is necessary.