NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HARVEY CARROLL, JR.,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1613

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-3616, Judge Bruce E. Kasold.

______________________ 

Decided: September 14, 2016 

______________________ 

HARVEY CARROLL, JR., Richmond, KY, pro se.

DOUGLAS GLENN EDELSCHICK, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D. AUSTIN; Y. KEN LEE, 

CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, Office of General Counsel, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
2 CARROLL v. MCDONALD

 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Harvey Carroll, Jr. appeals the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), which held that the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals (“Board”) did not err in its denial of disability 

benefits. The Board found that Carroll did not provide 

evidence of an in-service event that would cause posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and that his renal 

cancer, a cyst in his kidney, a cyst in his testicle, and 

epididymitis were not service connected. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Carroll served on active duty military between June 

1983 and May 1986, and continued his service postdischarge in the Individual Ready Reserve (“IRR”) until 

June 1989. In 2008, Carroll filed a disability claim with 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) requesting 

disability benefits based on allegedly service-connected 

PTSD and various conditions allegedly related to radiation exposure during service. Carroll claims, among other 

things, that he was exposed to ionizing radiation at some 

point during his active duty through his involvement in a 

“pulse nuclear reactor exercise to terrorist threat” at a 

classified location. J.A. 23. The Regional Office (“RO”)

denied Carroll’s service connection for each of the alleged 

conditions.

In 2014, Carroll appealed to the Board, which affirmed the RO’s determination. The Board found “no

diagnosis of PTSD, [and] no evidence of an in-service 

incurrence of a psychiatric disability.” J.A. 17. As to 

Carroll’s claim that his various other disabilities resulted 
CARROLL v. MCDONALD 3

from in-service exposure to radiation, the Board found 

“insufficient evidence of radiation exposure” given that 

“there is no service documentation and [Carroll] did not 

have a military occupational specialty that would involve 

such exposure.” J.A. 25. The Veterans Court affirmed.

DISCUSSION

This court has “jurisdiction to review and decide any 

challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or 

any interpretation thereof . . . , and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented 

and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). The 

court “may not review . . . a challenge to a factual determination, or . . . a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C.

§ 7292(d)(2).

Carroll first argues that the VA misstates his “inservice dates,” and therefore failed to recognize that he 

developed PTSD following stressor events that occurred 

during his active duty service. The Veterans Court reviewed the record and held that the Board did not clearly 

err in its finding that Carroll served on active duty between June 1983 and May 1986. Although Carroll argues 

that his IRR services were active duty, the Veterans 

Court affirmed the Board’s finding of no evidence that 

Carroll “had active duty, active duty for training, or 

inactive duty training with line-of-duty injuries” while in 

the IRR. J.A. 6 (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 101(24)(C)). To 

the extent that Carroll asks us to revisit these factual 

findings, we are without jurisdiction to do so. See 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

 Second, Carroll challenges the Veterans Court’s 

holding that he was not competent to self-diagnose his 

PTSD. In Jandreau v. Nicholson, we held that “[l]ay 

evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a 

diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent 

to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is 
4 CARROLL v. MCDONALD

reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay 

testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a 

later diagnosis by a medical professional.” 492 F.3d 1372, 

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted). We identified a 

distinction between conditions that are “simple” and may 

be more amenable to competent lay diagnosis, such as a 

broken leg, and conditions that are less simple, such as a 

form of cancer. See id. at 1377 n.4. Here, the Board determined that Carroll was not competent to self-diagnose 

his PTSD. The Veterans Court found no error in the 

Board’s finding that Carroll was not competent to give a 

self-diagnosis of PTSD. We see no legal error in the Veterans Court’s determination given the complexity involved in a PTSD diagnosis. 

Third, Carroll argues that the Veterans Court erred 

in failing to credit his statements that he was exposed to 

radiation during service. We may not review such factual 

determinations. Given the Veterans Court’s determination we also see no error in its determination that Carroll 

was not entitled to a presumption of service connection 

under 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d). The 

Board found that the presumption of service connection 

did not apply because Carroll had not alleged that he was 

involved in a “radiation risk activity” as it is narrowly 

defined. Again, review of that determination is beyond our 

jurisdiction.

Fourth, Carroll asserts that the VA failed in its duty 

to assist by failing to conduct a psychiatric examination to 

determine whether he suffered from PTSD. Service connection for PTSD for non-combat veterans requires evidence of the existence of an in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.304(f). The Veterans Court found no error in the 

Board’s determination that a medical examination was 

not necessary because, as a factual matter, there was no 

evidence that Carroll’s alleged PTSD was linked to his 

service or that it manifested itself during the applicable 

presumptive period. Review of the Veterans Court’s
CARROLL v. MCDONALD 5

determination is beyond our jurisdiction. The other arguments regarding duty to assist that Carroll sets forth in 

his Supplemental Brief were either not addressed by the 

Veterans Court or involve purely factual determinations

which we have no jurisdiction to review.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.