IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1106

Filed September 12, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF A.W.,

Minor Child,

J.M., Father,

Appellant,

K.W., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph W. Seidlin, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Steven L. Cooper of Cooper, Goedicke, Reimer & Reese, PC, West Des 

Moines, for appellant father.

Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Yvonne C. Naanep, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to A.W., born in March 2017. The father argues: (1) the State failed to 

present clear and convincing evidence of the grounds for termination, 

(2) termination is not in the child’s best interest, (3) statutory exceptions to 

termination apply, and (4) additional time for reunification should be granted. The 

mother only challenges the court’s denial of a six-month extension.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

A.W. came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services 

(DHS) in late June 2017 upon information that the mother was using heroin while 

caring for A.W. On June 21, A.W. was removed from the mother’s care and placed 

with the father.1 The mother admitted herself to the hospital that same day, 

seeking to detox. During her hospitalization, the mother was diagnosed with 

several mental disorders and continued inpatient hospitalization was 

recommended. However, on the next day, June 22, the mother became violent 

and attacked staff, which resulted in her arrest and transfer to jail. After the mother 

posted bail, she did not return to the hospital or follow through with the 

recommended inpatient hospitalization.

The child was subsequently removed from the father’s custody after he 

tested positive for methamphetamine. The child was initially placed with a paternal 

aunt. The court later modified placement to a foster home because the aunt no 

longer wanted to care for the child.

 

1 The father only learned of his paternity a few weeks prior to assuming care of A.W.
3

In July, DHS returned a founded child-abuse assessment against both 

parents for denial of critical care—failure to provide adequate supervision. During 

the investigation, the mother admitted to using both heroin and methamphetamine 

while caring for A.W and the father admitted he observed and made a video of the 

mother using heroin while A.W. was in the home. 

In August, A.W. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance with a primary 

permanency goal to return to the mother’s care. The court ordered the parents to 

engage in substance-abuse and mental-health evaluations and treatment and 

provide random drug screens. The court also ordered both parents to engage in 

domestic violence services due to reported aggressive incidents between the two

parents, both before and after A.W.’s birth, and the father’s acknowledged history 

of domestic violence. Further, the mother was required to continue treatment with 

her psychiatrist and follow all medication recommendations. 

Before coming to the attention of DHS, the mother had a significant history 

of childhood trauma and suffered from multiple mental-health issues. As a result, 

she takes medication and attends therapy. The mother is currently pregnant with 

twins,

2 which resulted in a decrease of some of her medications. Her doctor 

terminated their doctor-patient relationship due to the mother’s failure to comply 

with recommended prenatal care or appear for prenatal visits.

From October 2017 to February 2018, the mother participated in childparent psychotherapy (CPP) with A.W. However, the sessions ended due to the 

mental-health issues which negatively affected A.W. during their sessions. The 

 

2 A.W.’s father is believed to be the father of the twins. The mother and father were not in 

a romantic relationship at the time of the termination hearing. 
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father declined to engage in any mental-health services during the pendency of 

this case except for attempting to set up CPP sessions between A.W. and himself 

two weeks prior to the termination hearing. He also had a mental-health evaluation 

scheduled after the hearing date.

The mother did not complete substance-abuse treatment by the time of the 

termination hearing. She participated in services but continued to use illegal 

substances. She admitted she used heroin in February and March 2018. On April 

21, the police arrested the mother for possession of methamphetamine after they 

found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in her purse. The mother also 

admitted to police she used methamphetamine the previous day. The father 

attempted outpatient substance-abuse treatment three times over the course of 

the case, with the most recent attempt beginning two weeks prior to the termination 

hearing. In his first two attempts, he was unsuccessful and ended his participation 

after only a few weeks. The father’s drug tests during the proceedings were all 

positive for methamphetamine. 

The permanency goal remained reunification until March 5, when the State 

filed a petition to terminate parental rights based on the lack of progress of both 

parents in addressing their mental-health and substance-abuse issues. The court 

ultimately terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(h) (2018) and the mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 

232.116(1)(h) and (l). The mother and father separately appeal.

II. Standard of Review

“We review proceedings terminating parental rights de novo.” In re A.S., 

906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s 
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findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility 

of witnesses.” Id.

III. Analysis

“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step 

analysis.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). “First, the court must 

determine if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been 

established.” Id. “If a ground for termination is established, the court must, 

secondly, apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide 

if the grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights.” Id.

at 706–07. “Third, if the statutory best-interest framework supports termination of 

parental rights, the court must consider if any statutory exceptions set out in 

section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 

707.

The mother does not argue the State did not meet its burden for termination 

under section 232.116(1)(h) and (l), termination is contrary to the best interests of 

A.W., or a statutory exception to termination should be applied. As such, we need

only consider her challenge to the denial of an extension of time to work toward 

reunification. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

A. Statutory Grounds for Termination

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to section 

232.116(1)(h), which provides termination may be ordered where there is clear and 

convincing evidence the child: (1) is three years of age or younger, (2) has been 

adjudicated a child in need of assistance, (3) has been removed from the physical 

custody of the parents for at least six of the last twelve months, or for the last six 
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consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days, 

and (4) the child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody at the present time.

The father does not challenge the establishment of the first three elements. 

He only challenges the fourth element, contending he was in a position to resume 

care and custody of A.W. at the time of the termination hearing. See D.W., 791 

N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting term “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the 

termination hearing”). He argues DHS had no concerns about his parenting during 

the pendency of the case and he has demonstrated periods of sobriety. He further 

highlights that he reengaged in substance-abuse treatment and any substanceabuse issues he may have does not prevent A.W.’s return to his custody.

Despite the father’s contentions that he was able to resume care and 

custody of A.W. at the time of the hearing, a review of the record provides abundant 

evidence of the contrary. The child was removed from the father’s care due to his 

substance abuse, and that issue remains unaddressed. The father recognizes that 

he is a “functional addict,” but has yet to take any meaningful steps to address his 

addiction. Although the father completed several substance-abuse evaluations, 

he failed to follow through on the recommendations for treatment. The father 

started treatment on several occasions but ceased attendance after a short time. 

He has tested positive for methamphetamine multiple times over the pendency of 

this case. He admitted he relapsed five times since the case began and used 

marijuana and methamphetamine approximately two weeks prior to the 

termination hearing. Further, in addition to substance-abuse services, mentalhealth services were recommended for the father, but the father failed to follow 

through with these recommendations. He completed a mental-health evaluation 
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in November 2017, but he declined any services other than to contact a therapist 

to set up CPP sessions two weeks prior to the termination hearing. Finally, though 

the father’s interactions with A.W. were positive, they never progressed beyond 

fully supervised visits.

“Time is a critical element. A parent cannot wait until the eve of termination 

. . . to begin to express an interest in parenting.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 

(Iowa 2000). We agree with the juvenile court that the State proved by clear and 

convincing evidence the child could not returned to the father’s care at the time of 

the termination hearing and find sufficient evidence to support the ground for 

termination under subsection (h).

B. Best Interests and Exception to Termination

The father next claims termination of his parental rights is not in A.W.’s best 

interests, arguing that he loves the child and has never done anything to harm 

A.W. He also contends he is the best long-term option for A.W.’s growth and 

development.

“As a general rule, when the statutory grounds for termination of parental 

rights have been proved, the termination of parental rights is in the best interests 

of the children.” In re C.M., No. 14-1140, 2015 WL 408187, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Jan. 28, 2015). “When we consider whether parental rights should be terminated, 

we ‘shall give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for 

furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, 

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.’” In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 

212, 224 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). The court can also 

consider if the “child has become integrated into the foster family” and “whether 
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the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster 

family.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). 

At the time of the termination hearing, A.W. was one year old and had been 

removed from the father’s care for approximately ten months. A.W. had been in 

the father’s care for less than three weeks before removal due to his 

methamphetamine use. Despite the offer of services to address his substanceabuse and mental-health issues, the father has failed to participate in any 

meaningful way. Though the father’s visits with the child were mostly positive, he 

has not progressed to an increased number of visits or a lower level of supervision 

and they remained fully supervised. A.W. has remained in the same foster family 

since August 2017 and has bonded with them; the foster parents seek to adopt 

A.W. We find termination is in A.W.’s best interests. 

The father further argues that an exception to termination applies because 

of the bond between him and the child. Termination may be precluded when 

“[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental 

to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Id.

§ 232.116(3)(c). “‘The factors weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) 

are permissive, not mandatory,’ and the court may use its discretion, ‘based on the 

unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to 

apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.’” In re A.M., 

843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (quoting In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2011)). “Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best 

interests can be gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that 

performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is 
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capable of providing.’” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495 (quoting In re Dameron, 306 

N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981)).

On our de novo review, we do not find clear and convincing evidence that 

termination would be detrimental to A.W. Though the father loves A.W., “our 

consideration must center on whether the child will be disadvantaged by 

termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the father’s] inability to 

provide for [A.W.]’s developing needs.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. A.W. was only 

in the father’s care for a few weeks when she was only a few months old, and after 

removal, he did not progress beyond fully supervised visits. The father continued 

to use methamphetamine and marijuana after A.W.’s removal and declined to 

participate in recommended services. Whatever bond there is between A.W. and 

the father, “the [father]-child bond should not override termination where, as here, 

the [father] is unable to meet the child’s needs for a consistent permanent home 

with a responsible parent, and the child is adoptable.” In re J.P., No. 14-0673, 

2014 WL 3513237, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014). 

Further, A.W. has remained in the consistent and stable care of the same 

foster family since August 2017, who have expressed the desire to adopt A.W. 

The father alternatively requests the court place A.W. in a guardianship instead of 

terminating his rights. However, no witnesses at trial mentioned the idea of 

guardianship and both the family safety, risk, and permanency (FSRP) care 

coordinator and DHS worker recommended termination. Upon our review, we find 

the father failed to meet his burden to establish a statutory exception to termination 

or establish guardianship as a meaningful option to preclude termination of his 

parental rights.
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C. Extension

Finally, both parents request an additional six months to work toward 

reunification. The mother contends she has attended mental-health and 

substance-abuse treatment throughout the entire case and participated in both 

visits and therapy with A.W. She argues that with her recent acceptance into an 

inpatient program, reunification is possible within six months. She further argues 

that she suffers from severe mental-health and substance-abuse issues which take 

longer to address and with the added stress of her pregnancy, she needs more 

time to resolve those issues. The father argues he has demonstrated stability in 

many areas of his life, including housing, transportation, and employment and with 

his participation in substance-abuse treatment, he would be able to resume 

custody within six months.

Section 232.104(2)(b) allows the juvenile court the option to continue 

placement of a child for an additional six months to work towards reunification if 

the court finds “the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the 

additional six-month period.” Despite the mother’s contention that she attended 

the recommended services throughout the case, the record reflects that she failed 

to engage in those services in any meaningful way and was not receptive to

feedback about her lack of engagement. Further, A.W. was removed from the 

mother’s care due to her heroin use while caring for the child. After removal, she 

refused on numerous occasions to drug test in a timely manner. The mother 

relapsed at the end of February, admitted to using heroin and methamphetamine 

only two weeks prior to the termination hearing, and was arrested for possession 

of methamphetamine on April 21. The mother was unemployed for the majority of 
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the pendency of the case, and DHS has not observed her residence to verify its 

suitability since late 2017. The mother’s visits remained fully supervised, and the 

record reflects there were issues with her behavior and self-care during many visits 

and her sobriety at recent interactions. Additionally, the effect the mother’s visits 

had on A.W. is concerning. The FSRP worker noted A.W. became limp like a rag 

doll or had a flat affect during several visits. A.W. also exhibited an unwillingness 

to engage with the mother and often looked to the worker rather than the mother 

for care. The CPP therapist reported the mother struggled to understand how her 

disorganized and distressed responses negatively affected A.W, failing to 

recognize A.W.’s reactions to her mood and behavior during their joint sessions. 

The sessions ended due to the mother’s need to address her mental health. In 

sum, the issues that led to A.W.’s removal from the mother’s care remain, and the 

record does not support the mother’s claim that she will be able to address those 

issues and be in a position to safely parent A.W. within six months.

Much like the mother, the record also reflects the father would not be able 

to resume custody of A.W. within six months. The father has failed to address his 

substance-abuse issues, the impetus for A.W.’s removal from his care. He 

admitted relapsing multiple times during the pendency of the case and used both 

marijuana and methamphetamine only a few weeks prior to the termination 

hearing. He failed to participate in recommended services and if he did participate, 

it was only minimally or for a short period of time. Though the father completed a 

substance-abuse evaluation in the month prior to the termination hearing and 

planned to enter an inpatient treatment facility after the termination hearing, he still 

has not addressed his mental-health and domestic-violence issues.
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The circumstances and issues that existed at the time of A.W.’s removal 

from both the mother’s and father’s care remain, and there is no evidence any 

additional time would correct the issues. Children “should not be forced to 

endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent.” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 

(Iowa 1997). We echo the juvenile court and “implore both parents to fully engage 

in and complete the treatment they each told the court they now recognize they 

need. There are two more children on the way . . . [and] the court would wish 

nothing more than to see [the] parents put themselves in a position to raise them.” 

However, A.W. is in need of permanency and stability now and should not have to 

wait any longer while the parents attempt sobriety and face their problems. We 

find an extension is unwarranted for either parent and therefore affirm the order 

terminating their parental rights.

IV. Conclusion

On our de novo review we find by clear and convincing evidence the 

grounds for terminating the father’s rights, termination is in A.W.’s best interests, 

and no statutory exceptions to termination apply. We decline to grant either parent 

an extension and affirm the decision of the juvenile court to terminate the father’s

and mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.