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NEWS FROM THE FRONT 

 December 2019 

The Science of Control: Synchronizing Current Operations Cells 

By 

Major David Chichetti 

Reviewed and Edited by Mr. Rick Averna 

 

Approved for Public Release, 

Distribution Unlimited 
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The Science of Control: Synchronizing Current Operations Cells 

The current operations (CUOPS) cell is essential to translating plans to orders 

and eventually the execution of combat operations. The CUOPS integrating cell “is the 

focal point for controlling the execution of operations. It “involves assessing the current 

situation while regulating forces and warfighting functions in accordance with the 

mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations.”1 CUOPS synchronizes 

operations, sustains the common operational picture (COP) and mitigates risk to the 

mission. In the operations process, the CUOPS cell is the commander’s most prominent 

tool to understand, describe, visualize, and direct operations. Because of the cell’s 

importance, the CUOPS teams must organize and train personnel, information systems, 

and processes to enable the commander to make a decision based on understanding 

rather than data points. 

 Despite the importance of the CUOPS cell, trends from combat training centers 

(CTCs), Mission Command Training Program (MCTP), and lessons learned from recent 

deployments demonstrate that units continue to struggle with synchronizing current 

operations. This is despite — or because of — advances in technology and years of 

combat experience. Recent trend analyses demonstrate that units commonly fail to 

integrate warfighting functions throughout the operations cycle. Root-cause analyses 

from these trends point to lack of home-station training as well as poor standard 

operating procedures (SOPs). However, perhaps a lack of practical understanding 

                                                            

1 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, 01 March 

2017, page 2-7.
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exists at the field-grade level of the concepts and tools commanders have to exercise 

control of the battle. 

For commanders to exercise mission command, CUOPS cells exercise control. 

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines control as “the regulation of warfighting 

functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commanders’ intent.”2 The 

science of control “relies on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis.”3 Data 

and information reported to the operations center can be dense and complex. Utilizing 

procedural controls, CUOPS can identify variances that give commanders the 

appropriate decision space to mass effects of combat power and direct necessary 

changes. Components of command and control (C2) systems are utilized by CUOPS to 

achieve control over forces. 

 This article discusses the processes and techniques that optimize CUOPS cells’ 

control over forces. In addition to C2 systems, this article intertwines techniques to 

manage CUOPS personnel and enhance the rapid decision-making and 

synchronization process. The operations process of planning, preparing, executing, and 

assessing forms the outline of this article. The intent is to bridge doctrinal understanding 

with the practical application of managing a CUOPS cell. 

 

                                                            

2 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 31 

July 2019, page 1-17.

3 Ibid., page 3-1. 
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Planning: Transition the Plan to CUOPS

 Transitioning from planning to execution is a difficult and complicated process. 

Planners “must allow enough time for the CUOPS integration cell to understand the plan 

well enough to coordinate and synchronize its execution.”4 A common mistake is 

allowing planning integration cells to use the majority of allotted time creating the plan 

and gaining commander approval rather than ensuring shared understanding by 

CUOPS and subordinate units. This pitfall can lead to poor execution, missed 

opportunities, an inability to identify risk, and possible mission failure. But transitions are 

not the sole responsibility of the plans cell. The transition is a shared responsibility 

between the planning teams and CUOPS teams. The CUOPS team should aggressively 

seek information, attend meetings, and ask questions to ensure seamless execution. 

 The daily operations synchronization meeting (OPSYNC) is an effective transition 

point from plans to CUOPS. The chief of operations (CHOPS) chairs this meeting to 

ensure all warfighting functions understand their roles and responsibilities. The 

OPSYNC serves as the proverbial handoff between planning and execution because it 

aligns resources inside of hours and days. However, due to time constraints, the 

OPSYNC can only provide a quick conditions check. Therefore, the question is, what 

are the most beneficial meetings to attend? 

 A detailed understanding of the staff gatherings can assist CUOPS with 

collecting the necessary information for execution. There is a multitude of meetings, 

working groups, and boards to build plans. Depending on the operational tempo 

                                                            

4 ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 31 July 2019, page 3-8.
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(OPTEMPO), CUOPS personnel usually only have enough time to attend one to two 

meetings during their shift. Because a board involves a decision from the commander or 

a delegate, it would seem like a natural selection for CUOPS personnel to attend. 

However, CUOPS needs an understanding of the “why,” not just knowledge of a 

decision. Because working groups provide in-depth discussions, these meetings can at 

times be more beneficial for a CUOPS team. For example, a division target working 

group can provide a more in-depth conversation about target nominations and changes 

in fire support coordination lines than bullet-point recommendations to the commander 

on a board. The CUOPS chief of fires can easily transition decisions from the board to 

CUOPS. The CHOPS needs to carefully manage who attends what meetings to ensure 

understanding of the plan. CUOPS involvement in planning beyond the near term can 

pay major dividends with understanding and sharing of information.

 Establishing minimum synchronization tool requirements for planning transitions 

allows appropriate time to revise, rehearse, and disseminate information to lower 

headquarters. Future operations (FUOPS) cells refine plans from conceptual to detailed 

and develop the minimum synchronization tools or “fighting” documents for CUOPS. 

CUOPS can also assist in the process if not outright owning some documents. Minimum 

requirements for transitions should include, but are not limited to revised commander’s 

critical information requirements (CCIRs), decision support templates, operation 

schedules (OPSKEDs), overlays, Keyhole Markup Language Zipped (KMZ) files (if 

digital), and a detailed execution matrix that includes combat enablers. These items and 

FUOPS participation in the OPSYNC are critical elements in avoiding pitfalls and 

sustaining momentum. 
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Preparing 

 The Army adage of “poor preparation creates poor execution” is never truer than 

in a CUOPS cell. The ability to sift through hundreds of data points, understand multiple 

systems and platforms, and then quickly analyze the situation to enable decisions is not 

an easy task. As the primary C2 systems integrator, CUOPS has to prevent information 

silos and rapidly disseminate information across the breadth of the force. Thus, 

preparation in the CUOPS cell mitigates confusion and enhances capabilities. CUOPS 

preparation should include building reporting requirements, decision support tools, 

building a common understanding of the COP, and lastly, rehearsals. 

Prepare: Build Reporting Requirements 

 For the COP to be accurate, subordinate units need to understand what is 

required for reporting. Requirements should be agreed on before execution. Similar to a 

reconnaissance operation, CUOPS is constantly collecting information from across the 

force and relies on information requirements to build situational understanding. The 

CUOPS team utilizes feedback from different sensors such as other command posts 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to collect intelligence 

requirements. Detailed information such as indicators and warnings enhance 

understanding throughout the command post by identifying variances in the plan. 

CUOPS leverages information requirements as procedural controls to develop the COP 

and build assessments. Clear, sufficient, and commonly understood information 

requirements combined with disciplined reporting feed the COP. Significant activities 

(SIGACTs), CCIRs, and essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs) provide a 

doctrinal framework for information requirements. 
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 SIGACTs should be the most commonly understood reporting requirements. 

There is no standard definition in U.S. Army doctrine for a SIGACT. SIGACT reports are 

not only actions that indicate variances, they are also actions that collectively assist in 

understanding the progress of the operations. A common understanding of a SIGACT is 

the minimum reporting requirement to higher command posts from subordinate units. 

These are the routine actions of enemy contact, crossing graphic control measures, and 

achieving objectives. Units need to clearly define these actions so that no time is 

wasted by CUOPS requesting reports from subordinates. Figure 1 is an example of a 

SIGACT list.
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Figure 1. Example SIGACT list 

EEFIs are the items friendly forces want to protect. Items such as counter-battery 

radars, supply routes, and frequencies are examples of an EEFI. An EEFI is closely tied 

to the critical asset list (CAL)/defended asset list (DAL). Understanding EEFIs allows 

CUOPS to prioritize protection assets and develop courses of action for the 

commander. Any compromise of this information should be included in a CCIR list. 

 A CCIR is dynamic to the current situation. Effective utilization of CCIRs focuses 

the CUOPS team to find the right details. A common mistake is to keep the same CCIR 

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Loss of HIMARs launcher

SIGACT LIST

 Achievement of a BN or greater OBJ 

 Crossing a phase line, DIV CP 

 Contact with enemy unit greater than company size

Below are events the DIV considers to be SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES. Based 

on circumstances, any other event can be elevated to a SIGACT by the 

CHOPs. THESE ARE THE EVENTS MSCS WILL REPORT TO DIV CHOPS. 

 Anything covered in PIR/EEFI/FFIR

 Capture/Loss of key terrain or infrastructure 

 Detainee abuse allegation 

 Damage to FLS

 Explosive Hazard Cache discovered

 Indirect Fire asset down (above 120mm)

 Radar goes down for more than 30 minutes

 Loss of Tactical Transmitter

 Damage/destruction of cultural significant site

 Enemy/Anti-US Propaganda

 NMC Route Clearance platforms

 NMC Dig platform

 Incident requiring MEDEVAC or CASEVAC beyond BCT Organic assets

 Loss of Air Defense Coverage (Avenger, Patriot) 

 Key Leader Casualty

 Any discovery or use of CBRN

 Unit is black on ammo

 Unauthorized release of photo or video documenting unit activity

 Downed Friendly Aircraft

 Loss of Communication with subordinate unit 9 (within COM window)

 Any CIVCAS incident

 COMSEC compromise

 Suspect Enemy Air Threat

 Damage, destruction of a cultural significant site

 CAB Operational Readiness State falls below 50%

Q53, Q37, Sentinel radar inoperable 

 CBRN ROTA

 Factually incorrect reporting on unit operations

 Collateral damage to key infrastructure

 Loss of Network Critical infrastructure causing outages longer than 3 hours

 IA Incident

 UXO/IED 9 line
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throughout the entirety of the operation. A stagnant CCIR indicates that no 

reassessment of the current situation has been made or that the operation has not 

changed upon enemy contact. A CCIR consists of friendly force information 

requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).5 Similar to 

reconnaissance and security operations, CUOPS can tailor FFIRs and PIRs to identify 

variances. FFIRs assist with understanding friendly capabilities. During execution, 

FFIRs may change based on resource allocation and time. A beneficial FFIR list can 

assist CUOPS in determining courses of action and regulating the allocation of 

resources. PIRs are threat-focused information requirements that identify information 

about the enemy and operational environment the commander considers most 

important.6 To a CUOPS cell, PIRs can be too broad. Because CUOPS is trying to 

determine variances to the enemy situation, the intelligence section should break down 

PIRs to essential elements of information (EEIs). Essentially, EEIs break down PIRs 

into indicators that reflect enemy intent or courses of action.7 For example, if the PIR is 

“When will enemy artillery be in range of our main body?” then a potential EEI could be 

“Is there enemy movement south of Phase Line Gowins?”8 The daily OPSYNC should 

include a discussion of current CCIRs where staff sections are allowed the opportunity 

to nominate new CCIRs. Effective use of and frequent reassessment of CCIRs can 

enhance the command post’s ability to identify opportunities, exploit enemy 

                                                            

5 Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 July 2015, paragraph 4-31. 6 Ibid., paragraph 4-32. 

7 Ibid., paragraph 4-78. 

8 Ibid., paragraph 4-78.
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weaknesses, and avoid catastrophes. With CCIRs understood across the force, the 

CUOPS team can provide the decision space required to adapt to a changing enemy. 

Preparing: Develop Fighting Documents 

 Synchronizing and decision support tools — colloquially referred to as “fighting” 

documents — succinctly organize information to allow CUOPS to regulate forces. These 

documents show how the fight should progress as they align resources in time and 

space. In conjunction with the FUOPS team, CHOPS develops and refines these items. 

“Fighting” documents include but are not limited to items such as an attack guidance 

matrix (ATGM), decision authority matrix (DAM), decision support matrix, resource 

allocation matrix, sustainment overlay, and overall operations synchronization matrix. 

These documents organize information to allow rapid decision-making by CUOPS. A 

similar concept would be what a commander would put on a battle board in combat to 

organize information. 

 The execution and synchronization matrices must be intricately detailed and 

inclusive of all warfighting functions. CUOPS uses these tools to control warfighting 

functions and provide assessments to the commander. The execution matrix outlines 

the operation by major muscle movements, priorities, and decision points. The 

synchronization matrix provides visibility in both time and space for resource allocation. 

Although the execution matrix may not change for several days, the synchronization 

matrix changes often based on the situation and priorities. The CUOPS and FUOPS 

cells should work hand-in-hand to develop the synchronization matrix. The 

synchronization matrix should be as inclusive as possible, with ISR, close air support 

(CAS), sustainment, and maneuver all represented in time and space. The 
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synchronization matrix should be refined daily at the OPSYNC. Because CUOPS fights 

hours to days, the “one-page, one-day” synchronization matrix is the most effective 

construct (see Figure 2).9 

Figure 2. The “one-page, one-day” synchronization matrix10

In addition to the execution and synchronization matrices, each warfighting 

function has decision support tools. These tools supplement the synchronization matrix 

by framing the operation by warfighting function. These are documents such as the 

                                                            

9 Center for Army Lessons Learned, News from the CTC: The OPSYNC Best Practices, 10 January 2018, 

page 10.

10 Ibid., page 20.  
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ATGM, high-payoff target list (HPTL), no-strike list, CAL/DAL, and obstacle overlays. 

CUOPS integrates these tools into the COP and rapid decision-making process. 

Additionally, CUOPS delegates authorities for action. An example would be the fires cell 

executing a strike on an electronic intelligence indicator based on the HPTL and ATGM. 

These warfighting function-specific tools focus team members and provide more indepth data points. 

 To eliminate confusion among subordinate headquarters staff and commanders, 

a DAM based on a higher order needs to be developed with the CUOPS team. The 

DAM identifies authority for sensitive circumstances. A DAM allows decision space by 

delegating low-level decisions to the S-3, G-3 or deputy, or chief of staff. Additionally, it 

gives the CUOPS team clear scope of its authorities. CUOPS authorities should be 

limited to risk mitigation measures such as requests for support, dynamic retasking of 

asset criteria, and personnel recovery operations. The DAM alleviates tension and 

removes the blame game from the CUOPS cell (see Figure 3). 

 
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Figure 3. Example decision authorities matrix 

Prepare: The COP 

 A primary responsibility of the CUOPS team is maintaining the COP during 

execution. The COP is the “end product of knowledge and information activities, running 

estimates, and battle tracking.”11 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-0.5, Command 

Post Organization and Operations, states that “Units facilitate situational understanding 

through knowledge and information management, when they create, organize, apply, 

and transfer knowledge to help develop the COP.”12 Essentially, accurate battle tracking 

creates the feedback loop between headquarters and subordinates that builds the COP. 

The tendency is to think of the COP as a consolidated picture of the battlefield displayed 

                                                            

11 ATP 6-0.5: Command Post Organization and Operations, 01 March 2017, paragraph 3-51. 12 Ibid., paragraph 3-41. 

# Action / Decision HHQ CG DCG CoS G3 CHOPS BDEs

1 Re-task organize FF units X

2 Exceed bypass criteria X

3 Approve media release (strategic level importance) X

4 Waive medical RoE X

5 Change MSR priority X

6 Initiate 15-6 investigation X

7 Request assets from HHQ X

8 Assign a destroy mission to an AVN/FA unit X

9 Change priority of support X

10 Authorize destruction of sensitive equipment X

11 CDE > 3 X

12 Re-task CAS X

13 ATACMS release X

14 Change MOPP level X

15 Authorize hasty internment of CBRN casualties X

16 Authorize destruction of critical HN infrastructure X

17 Attack target on the no-strike list X

18 Conduct cross-boundary joint fires X

19 Bypass a WMD/CBRN site X

20 SCAM release (4 hours-48 hours) X

21 Employ the DIV reserve X

22 Cross-FLOT operation X

23 Investigation of a CF/HN partner X

24 High value EPW transfer X

25 Employ riot control agents X

26 Change priority of fires X

27 Cross boundary fires planning X

28 Change decision support matrix criteria X

29 Change priority of AVN support X

30 Conduct offensive EW employment X

31 Change to CCIR X

32 Dynamic retasking of assets (within ATO) X

DECISION AUTHORITIES MATRIX
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on several screens. The COP, in practice, is what the staff and subordinate units 

commonly understand to be the running estimate of the situation. If subordinate units 

and higher staffs disagree on unit locations and actions, there is no true COP. Preparing 

a robust knowledge management process is critically important to mitigate against this 

mistake. Due to proximity to the fight, CUOPS assumes a de facto role of the 

knowledge management team. 

Prepare: Train on Analog, Then go Digital 

 To train knowledge management and COP sustainment successfully, units need 

to train and master the analog process. Although the digital COP uses automated 

means to distill information for rapid decisions, the analog COP requires more discipline 

and rigor to sustain. The analog COP cannot be consolidated into several screens. 

Information has to be constantly updated and rules must rigorously be enforced by the 

CUOPS cell. Working with analog products forces the CHOPS to exercise units’ 

primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan to ensure the transfer of 

information. Additionally, an analog COP is still required to sustain operations against a 

cyber or electronic attack. Mastery of knowledge management with analog products is 

difficult given the density of data points on the modern battlefield; however, using 

analog methods will create a mutual understanding of information requirements by 

outstations and planning cells. Once the CUOPS team understands the analog process, 

it can develop techniques for digital COP management. 

 
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Prepare: Digital COP SOPs 

 An agreed-on SOP for digital information display should be understood and 

rigorously trained. Unregulated digital COP displays can overload a unit with data. As a 

general rule, the digital COP should be intuitive and no person entering the CUOPS 

floor should have to search for information. The targeting methodology of decide, 

detect, and deliver (D3) provides a strong organizational construct technique (see 

Figure 4). 

Detect can be maintained by the intelligence section and consists of the current 

positions of ISR assets, templated or confirmed enemy positions, PIRs, named areas of 

interest, target areas of interest, and synchronization of ISR assets and CUOPS. The 

deliver section of the COP is controlled by the fires cell and integrates all CAS, air 

weapons teams, fire support assets, fire control measures, air control measures, 

CAL/DAL, and a critical munitions list. Decide is controlled by the battle captain or 

noncommissioned officer (NCO) and integrates friendly battle positions relative to 

enemy positions, FFIRs, and decisions points. Combat power can be displayed over 

friendly and enemy icons using percentages derived from the correlation of forces 

(COF) tool (discussed in the assessing current operations section of this article). The 

D3 technique is intuitive and provides the CUOPS cell the rapid ability to control forces. 

As stated before, the D3 method is a technique. The point is to use a commonly 

understood methodology to organize information to enable a decision for the 

commander. 
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Figure 4. The decide, detect, deliver COP organizational construct 

Final Preparations: Rehearsals 

 Rehearsals and conditions checks assist CUOPS and outstations with an 

understanding of the problem. Before the operation, the CHOPS usually has the 

responsibility of preparing and, in some units, executing the combined arms rehearsal 

(CAR). This ensures the plan is fully transferred from plans to CUOPS. However, 

conducting full-force rehearsals during continuous operations is difficult and often not 

possible due to time constraints. At a minimum, an OPSKED rehearsal utilizing the unit 

communications SOP (PACE plan) should be conducted to ensure the sequencing of 

key steps and reinforcing reporting discipline. Additionally, contingency rehearsals 

assist the chain of command during a serious incident such as a downed aircraft. 

Rehearsals and conditions checks assist in controlling actions during operations and 

contingencies. Gene Kranz, NASA mission control lead for the moon landings, stated in 

his book Failure is not an Option that during missions, “you did not have any time for 

second thoughts or arguments. You wanted the debate behind you. So before the 

Common Operational Picture

Common Operational Picture
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mission, you held meetings to decide what to do if anything went wrong.”13 The same 

principle can be applied to the CUOPS cell. 

Executing CUOPS 

 As stated previously, preparation is key to proper execution. But unlike the 

preparation phase, execution in CUOPS is where the human dimension becomes 

increasingly significant over time. It is no secret that productivity can decrease when 

individuals become tired, complacent, or frustrated. The difference in a CUOPS cell is 

that all these attributes can have particularly pernicious effects on an entire operation. 

CUOPS teams must develop disciplined SOPs to guard against these issues. 

Checklists, balancing duties among all individuals, and creating intuitive techniques for 

the exchange of information mitigate against fatigue and sustain the fight. 

Executing: Battle Tracking and COP Sustainment 

 As stated previously, battle tracking creates the feedback loop between 

headquarters and subordinates that builds the COP. But battle tracking during a largescale combat operation can prove arduous as team members become fatigued. It is the 

responsibility of the CHOPS to develop control measures that ensure continuous 

updates despite physical limitations caused by continuous operations. The CHOPS 

should delegate to each warfighting function its responsibilities to the COP using both 

analog and digital terms. Essentially, battle tracking should be a shared responsibility 

among the team not one to two individuals. Unit liaison officers are great assets to 

                                                            

13 Gene Kranz, Failure is Not an Option: Mission Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 2000) 21. 
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continuously battle track friendly elements. Each warfighting function inside CUOPS can 

leverage C2 systems to develop the battlespace picture. Accurate battle tracking is 

critical to understanding the situation and mitigating risk to mission. Once battle-tracking 

rules have been established, CUOPS can focus on sustaining the COP. 

 The battle update brief (BUB) and the commanders update brief (CUB) are tools 

used by CUOPS to provide feedback to the commander and sustain the COP by clearly 

articulating up, down, and laterally across the force. The BUB is focused on staff 

reports, whereas the CUB is focused on subordinate commanders’ feedback. CUOPS is 

generally the office of primary responsibility for these meetings, so the CHOPS must 

develop formats that extricate information and prevent redundancy. A general rule is to 

format the CUB to allow maximum time for subordinate commander dialogue. The BUB 

should provide a platform for the warfighting functions of the battle staff to communicate 

key issues to the commander. These meetings can differ depending on the echelon of 

operations centers, but in essence, they are procedural control measures for feedback. 

Although these meetings are effective with COP sustainment, they should be 

supplemented by CUOPS-level updates throughout the targeting cycle. 

 A CUOPS-level update brief should be built into the battle rhythm to supplement 

the CUB/BUB meetings. For example, every three hours, the team could conduct an “instride operations and intelligence” meeting. This CUOPS-level meeting ensures 

situational understanding and provides commanders with a running estimate of the 

situation. The in-stride method forces warfighting functions to update both their analog 

and digital running estimates. A two-minute drill where team members quickly brief their 

running estimates to the commander should also be included in all SOPs. Updating the 
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COP is a byproduct of disciplined battle tracking and disciplined action inside the 

CUOPS cell. 

Executing: Communication 

 Technical systems integration is a vital component of information management. 

Transmission of information to the CUOPS team can come from multiple mission 

command platforms. Discipline with these systems should be clearly defined in a rules 

document designed and policed by the operations noncommissioned officer in charge 

(NCOIC). Use of a communications platform such as Ventrilo (Voice over Internet 

Protocol [VoIP] group communications software) for traffic inside the operations center 

can prevent chaos and shouting. Once people begin to shout, commanders and staff 

become concerned and CUOPS risks losing the ability to manage a situation. Units 

should also develop tactical chat SOPs with systems such as mIRC and TransVerse. 

Tactical chat allows coding of messages and minimal traffic that can assist with 

OPSKEDs. Email and VoIP should be lower in the PACE plan, but still serve to enhance 

dialogue. Frequency modulation (FM) and satellite communications C2 systems should 

be monitored by an operations NCO and checked hourly with outstations. Through a 

PACE plan, units can utilize redundant measures that flatten the organization and 

reduce missed communications. 
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Executing: Battle Drills 

 ATP 6-0.5 defines a battle drill as “a collective action performed without the 

application of a deliberate decision-making process.”14 Essentially, a battle drill is 

automatic and done without discussion. Battle drills should be a part of any rehearsals. 

During execution, battle drills need to quickly focus all elements’ attention. The 

tendency is to centralize control of the drill by the CHOPS, but the most effective battle 

drill execution occurs when all team members instinctively understand their roles and 

execute on cue. A shared responsibility of battle drills enhances responsiveness, 

communications, and builds decision space. Additionally, they mitigate against fatigue. 

Executing: Mitigate Against Human Limitations 

 Even with effective standardized practices, the CHOPS needs to be creative 

about keeping everyone fresh. There are many techniques to mitigate this issue. The 

following is a list of small techniques a CUOPS team can do to keep everyone fresh: 

 Provide time and equipment for small exercises, such as a pull-up bar in the 

operations center or doing pushups. 

 Provide staff members with breaks. 

 Change the method of two-minute drills or in-stride operations and intelligence. 

One iteration may be in front of the analog board. The next may be in front of the 

digital display. 

 Use a staggered shift. A staggered shift assists with continuity of operations and 

loss of context or perspective. 

                                                            

14 ATP 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations, 01 March 2017, paragraph 3-39.
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 Write a rules of the tactical operations center (TOC)/joint operations center (JOC) 

document. This document lays down business rules for maintenance and 

conduct. Tasks as simple as trash clean up, if not policed, can have morale 

impacts. 

 Create an environment that allows for the sharing of ideas. It is cliché, but true. 

There are no dumb questions in the JOC. If you don’t know something, ask. The 

team relies on flattened communication. 

Executing: Decision Making in the Operations Center 

 While a DAM delineates key authorities, the CUOPS will have to make critical 

decisions in dynamic situations. CUOPS is empowered to mitigate risk to mission, but 

they cannot be impulsive. The DAM should be designed so that CUOPS must be 

compelled to make decisions, meaning there is little other choice. For example, a 

downed aircraft scenario should compel the CUOPS team to reallocate resources 

whereas a convincing request for ISR support from an operations officer does not 

compel the CUOPS cell to change the plan. To clarify, CUOPS cells are designed to 

execute the plan and mitigate against its failure, not to change the plan based on 

feelings or arguments. CUOPS should be given the freedom to make specific decisions 

where action is required. Changing the execution plan should be the decision of an 

operations officer or higher. 
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Assessing CUOPS 

 CUOPS’s role in the assessment/feedback loop is to provide data points and 

information to feed planning and decisions. This includes battle tracking combat power, 

resources, and progress of the operation. Additionally, the CUOPS team should 

constantly reassess its performance to enhance operations. CUOPS is the driver of the 

assessment process for the battle staff. The feedback loop it creates needs to be 

understood by all warfighting functions. 

Assessing Combat Power

 CUOPS has the responsibility to drive battlefield assessments by empirical 

means. Empirical assessments account for enemy and friendly combat power via battle 

damage assessments (BDAs). Combat power includes all warfighting functions.15 In the 

preparation phase, CUOPS cells need to build BDA reports into the SIGACT list to 

ensure reports from subordinate elements. Combat power should be tracked via analog 

and digital means. For analog purposes, a technique is to create “bingo” sheets that 

account for enemy and friendly combat formations. The bingo sheet or sheets can be 

kept with the analog board and updated by liaison officers and S-2 personnel. A more 

robust means of combat power tracking is using the COF spreadsheet. This document 

is usually kept by operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) personnel in the 

plans cell. By linking directly with the ORSA team, CUOPS is automatically tying itself to 

plans and providing data-based assessments rather than guesses. Both the analog and 

digital methods can be simultaneously maintained by the CUOPS team. 

                                                            

15 Field Manual 6-0, Operations, 06 October 2017, page 2-21.   
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Assessing Performance 

 Journaling events is a key component in understanding the performance of the 

battle staff. Journaling events and actions assist the battle staff with understanding 

enemy actions, friendly responses, and identifying variances. Additionally, the 

information-driven environment today demands accurate accounting of events. To 

counter enemy propaganda and fabricated claims, accurate recounting of events in time 

and space is essential. The journal also provides the CHOPS with a tool to assess the 

speed at which the team operates. The journal is usually assigned to a staff NCO or 

radiotelephone operator (RTO). This individual needs to be keenly aware of all events 

and should have a working knowledge of all functions of CUOPS. The digital 

infrastructure today has multiple platforms that can account for time and events. An 

agreed-upon, single-source journal document can mitigate disagreements among the 

staff as to how events took place and counter inaccurate claims. The journal also helps 

the after action review (AAR) process. 

 Conducting AARs during CUOPS execution is difficult. The fallout from major 

events can consume key members of the CUOPS cell. Gathering necessary individuals 

to collectively learn lessons is an arduous task and usually is lower in priority than the 

current situation. A technique to mitigate losing lessons learned dialogue is to 

immediately conduct a hot wash after the event. The RTO and battle NCOs can record 

and distribute key lessons. Conducting a formal AAR during execution adds another 

meeting and is usually too far removed from the event to gather fresh ideas. A quick 

AAR following the event also gives the next shift a chance to obtain the lessons learned. 
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The immediate AAR method is the best opportunity to learn lessons during high 

OPTEMPO. 

Conclusion 

CUOPS teams need to be tough, competent, and disciplined16 in all actions. As 

the systems integrator, their focus must be on the fight and to be ready for any 

contingencies. Modern combat is becoming more complex with new data systems. The 

CUOPS cell needs to engineer both digital and analog systems that extricate key 

information for rapid analysis. Essentially, building situational understanding throughout 

the force is the responsibility of the CUOPS. Doctrinal understanding of the operations 

process, combined with well-rehearsed procedural controls for the technical and human 

dimensions, prevent missed opportunities and exploit successes. 

                                                            

16 Gene Kranz, Failure is Not An Option: Mission Control from Mercury to Apollo 13 and Beyond (New 

York: Simon and Schuster) 381.