2017 IL App (3d) 140881

Opinion filed May 9, 2017. 

Modified upon denial of rehearing June 15, 2017 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2017 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

BETHANY L. McKEE, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-14-0881 

Circuit No. 13-CF-100 

The Honorable

Gerald R. Kinney, 

Judge, presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Carter and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 

____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant, Bethany L. McKee, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder 

(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)) following a bench trial and was sentenced to natural life 

imprisonment. On appeal, McKee raises an as-applied constitutional challenge to her sentence.

We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS
2 

¶ 3 On April 25, 2013, the State charged McKee, Adam Landerman, Alisa Massaro, and 

Joshua Miner by superseding indictment with six counts of first degree murder in connection 

with the strangulation deaths of Eric Glover and Terrance Rankins. 

¶ 4 The circuit court held a bench trial in August 2014 at which the evidence presented 

tended to establish the following facts.

¶ 5 On January 10, 2013, at shortly before 4:00 p.m., McKee’s father placed a call to the 

police to report two dead individuals in the residence occupied by Alisa Massaro and her father, 

Phillip. When the police responded, they first had contact with Massaro, who said there were two 

other individuals hiding in the house—Miner was hiding upstairs and Landerman was hiding 

downstairs. One officer found Miner upstairs where the two bodies were located; both bodies 

were face down and showed signs of rigor mortis. One of the bodies was lying on top of black 

garbage bags that had been separated at the seams with its head wrapped in a plastic grocery bag. 

The head on the other body had been wrapped in a red plastic bag and was resting on a pillow. 

Miner told police that he had killed one of the men and Landerman had killed the other. 

Eventually, the police also discovered Landerman in the house. 

¶ 6 McKee was not at the scene, but she was located driving her vehicle in Kankakee; she 

was stopped and taken into custody in connection with the murders. At the police station, when a 

detective told McKee that he wanted to speak with her, she said she wanted to talk, that she 

wanted to tell the truth, and that she wanted to know how much time she would get for being an 

accessory to murder. McKee was taken into an interview room, read her Miranda rights (which 

she waived), and interrogated. A recording of the interrogation was introduced into evidence. 

¶ 7 In January 2013, McKee and her 15-month old daughter were staying in Massaro’s 

residence in Joliet. Massaro occupied the second floor, while her father lived on the first floor.
3 

¶ 8 On the night of January 9, 2013, Miner, who was Massaro’s boyfriend, and Landerman 

were hanging out with McKee and Massaro at Massaro’s residence. Short on money to buy 

alcohol and cigarettes, the group began discussing how to come up with some money. McKee 

had received a text from Rankins, who asked her if she wanted to drink alcohol with him and his 

friend, Glover. McKee mentioned to the group that Rankins always carried a large amount of 

cash, as he had two days earlier when she and Massaro had contacted him to buy them alcohol. 

Thereafter, the group began discussing a plot to rob Rankins. 

¶ 9 Miner stated that he could beat up and kill Rankins and Glover, and then steal their 

money. Landerman volunteered to help him. McKee indicated in her interview that she did not 

think anything was going to happen, but she also admitted that she went along with the plan. 

¶ 10 McKee contacted Rankins, luring him and Glover to the residence. The group set up a 

signal to indicate when McKee and Massaro were to leave the room so Miner and Landerman 

could put the plan into action. 

¶ 11 Rankins was with Glover when McKee contacted him. She led Rankins to believe that he 

and Glover were coming over to party with her and Massaro. When the two men arrived, the 

group began drinking and playing video games. After some time had passed, Miner gave the 

prearranged signal, so McKee picked up her daughter and left the upstairs apartment. Massaro 

also left.

¶ 12 McKee and Massaro went downstairs, where Massaro’s father was sleeping on a couch.

He was awakened by a loud noise coming from upstairs and was told that two men were moving 

a broken television. He threatened to call the police if the noise did not cease, and Massaro went 
4 

to the door at the top of the stairs, saying she would tell the two men to be quiet. The door was 

locked, however, and Massaro heard Miner say “die, die.”1 The noise stopped shortly thereafter. 

¶ 13 McKee and Massaro left to drop McKee’s daughter at another residence. When they 

returned, Miner and Landerman were still there and Rankins and Glover were lying stacked on 

the floor in one of the rooms. The bodies were later moved to the positions in which they were 

found by police. 

¶ 14 McKee denied searching the bodies, but she acknowledged having been given some 

money by Miner, which she used for gas. She also searched Glover’s vehicle and took several 

items, including compact discs, stuffed animals, and a pair of baby boots. The group left the 

residence and bought cigarettes and cocaine with the money taken from the Rankins and Glover. 

When they returned, they used the cocaine. They also kicked the bodies and hit them with an 

empty liquor bottle, although McKee said during her interrogation that she, at the insistence of 

Miner, kicked only one of the bodies one time. Also during that interrogation, McKee became 

upset when it was suggested to her that not all of the roughly $120 obtained from the robbery had 

been shared with her. 

¶ 15 The next day, the group discussed what to do with the bodies. They talked of cutting 

them up and disposing of the parts, and Miner even brought over tools for that purpose. Miner 

also talked about cutting the face, with attached scalp, from one body and wearing it over his 

face—a suggestion which McKee admitted made the group laugh. McKee then proposed calling 

her father because he would know how to dispose of the bodies. The group agreed on that plan. 

McKee called her father, who said he would help her, but instead he called the police.

 1 Massaro testified at McKee’s trial in exchange for the State dropping the first degree murder 

charges against her and her guilty plea to two counts of robbery and two counts of concealment of a 

homicidal death. Massaro was sentenced to a total of 10 years of imprisonment as a part of the plea deal.
5 

¶ 16 The circuit court announced its decision on August 29, 2014. Citing the common-design 

rule and numerous cases, the court analyzed the question of McKee’s guilt on the basis of 

accountability. In part, the court found: 

“A review of [the] facts show a stunning lack of concern for the 

consequences of taking two human lives. The facts established at 

the trial indicate Ms. McKee played a key role in getting the 

victims over to the Massaro residence, knowing that the groups’ 

intent was to commit the offense of robbery. She left the room 

when signaled so that the robbery could begin. She went 

downstairs and, when confronted by Phillip Massaro, lied to him 

regarding what was occurring in the upstairs apartment. She, along 

with Alisa Massaro, convinced Mr. Massaro to stay downstairs and 

not interrupt what was occurring on the second floor. After the 

victims were subdued, she participated in discussions with the 

other defendants and implicates herself in her statement that she 

felt that it was important that these bodies be removed from the 

premises by saying ‘you got to get them out of here.’ The money, 

that was the proceeds of the robbery, was used by this Defendant 

to obtain cigarettes and gas for her vehicle. She also participated in 

the drug use that occurred from the proceeds of the robbery. She 

assisted other individuals in helping place a Jewel bag over the 

head of Terrance Rankins and holding a lamp so that the bag could 

be placed on the victim’s head. She clearly indicates in her 
6 

statement that she knew there was going to be at the very least a 

fight and a robbery if Rankins came over. She also seemed upset in 

her interview when she realizes that there was probably more 

money stolen from these victims than she was told. She 

volunteered to search the vehicle of Eric Glover and removed from 

that vehicle stuffed animals, CDs, apparently for her use or her 

child’s use.” 

The court also found: 

“This Defendant had numerous opportunities to take steps to 

withdraw from the common criminal plan. She had her own 

vehicle at the residence, so she could have taken her child with her 

at any time and left. While texting Rankins, she could have taken 

steps to prevent him from even coming over to the house. When 

she was speaking with Phillip Massaro, she could have asked for 

his intervention to prevent the crime from occurring. When she left 

the residence to take her child away from the scene of the crime, 

she could have summoned the police. When she spoke to her 

father, she shows no discontinuation of her involvement with these 

individuals, but simply seeks his assistance to remove the bodies 

from the residence.”

Accordingly, the court found that McKee was guilty by way of accountability of the first degree 

murders of Rankins and Glover. 
7 

¶ 17 On November 4, 2014, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing. Testimony at the 

hearing disclosed that McKee had been raped when she was 14 years old. The rapist also cut her 

face and chest with a knife over 200 times. In addition, McKee allegedly suffered from 

depression, bipolar disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and post-traumatic stress 

disorder, and she had a history of cutting herself. She had been hospitalized nine times for her 

mental health issues—once for 89 days. She also had taken medication for her issues, but they 

were ineffective. In addition, McKee had transferred from a public high school to a therapeutic 

school to help her with her issues. Further, when McKee was still 14 but after the rape, she was

missing for 14 days. When she was found, it was learned that, during those 14 days, she had been 

forced into prostitution, drugged, and beaten. 

¶ 18 During arguments, defense counsel acknowledged that the statutory scheme mandated a 

natural life sentence for McKee, but he argued that the imposition of that sentence would violate 

the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

¶ 19 At the close of the hearing, the court commented that it believed this case exemplified 

why the legislative imposition of mandatory sentencing was problematic. McKee only aided and 

abetted, yet she was subject to the same penalty as the actual murderers. The court noted that it 

wished it had discretion to fashion a more appropriate sentence for McKee, but because the 

legislature had removed that discretion, it was compelled to sentence her to natural life 

imprisonment on her two first-degree murder convictions. 

¶ 20 McKee filed a motion to reconsider sentence in which she argued that her sentence was 

unconstitutional because it was cruel and unusual, in violation of the eighth amendment, and 

because it violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Regarding the 

latter argument, McKee pointed out that one of her codefendants, Massaro, received only 10 
8 

years of prison time on two convictions for robbery and two convictions for concealment of a 

homicidal death. The court denied the motion, and McKee appealed. 

¶ 21 ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, McKee argues that her natural life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to 

her particular circumstance. She does not challenge the validity of her two first degree murder 

convictions or the fact that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) mandates a natural life sentence for first 

degree murder involving more than one victim. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2012).

Rather, she claims that her natural life sentence both constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend VIII) and 

violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, 

§ 11). 

¶ 23 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) can be constitutionally 

applied to adult accomplices. People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 337 (2002). Miller also held that, 

while there is not a blanket dispensation from the mandatory sentence for juveniles, the statute is 

vulnerable to a properly supported, as-applied constitutional challenge by a juvenile. Id. at 341. 

More recently, the First District found an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute valid 

where, given the particular facts of the case, the mandatory natural life sentence of a 19-year-old 

adult shocked the conscience of the community. People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, 

¶ 101. It is the challenging party’s burden to establish the constitutional invalidity of a statute.

Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 335. “[A]n as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates 

the constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. 

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36. Further, the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of 

law that we review de novo. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 335. 
9 

¶ 24 In the instant case, McKee, who was 18 and an adult at the time of the crime, asks that we 

follow the First District’s decision in House and find the statute unconstitutional as applied to her 

and vacate her sentence of mandatory natural life.

¶ 25 The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual 

punishments. U.S. Const., amend. VIII.2

 Cruel and unusual punishments include those that are 

“disproportionate to the crime.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). The proportionate 

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution is coextensive with the federal Constitution’s eighth 

amendment and states that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness 

of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 

1970, art. I, § 11; In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 518 (2006). One of the forms of 

proportionality review that exists in Illinois states that “[a] statute may be deemed 

unconstitutionally disproportionate if *** the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or 

so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Miller, 

202 Ill. 2d at 338. 

¶ 26 McKee cites to Miller and House in support of her argument. In Miller, our supreme 

court held that section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) was unconstitutional as applied to the juvenile 

defendant. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. The court ruled that a natural life sentence in that case 

“grossly distort[ed] the factual realties of the case and [did] not accurately represent defendant’s 

personal culpability such that it shock[ed] the moral sense of the community.” Id. at 341. The 

court described those factual realities as “a 15-year-old with one minute to contemplate his 

decision to participate in the incident and stood as a lookout during the shooting, but never 

 2 The eighth amendment is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., 

amend. XIV; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008). 
10 

handled a gun,” which resulted in the juvenile receiving the same sentence as the actual shooter.

Id.

¶ 27 The instant case is readily distinguishable from Miller. The Miller court stated that even a 

juvenile accomplice could be sentenced to natural life imprisonment. Id. While McKee was only 

18 at the time of the murders, she was nonetheless an adult, unlike the juvenile defendant in 

Miller. In addition, McKee did not join in the crime at the last minute or play only a peripheral 

role, such as a lookout like Miller. Rather, she actively participated in the planning of the 

robbery. She made the initial suggestion to rob Rankins; she lured Rankins and Glover to 

Massaro’s residence; she helped conceal what was happening from Massaro’s father; she stole 

items from Glover’s car after he was dead; she accepted proceeds from the robbery and later 

complained because she might not have gotten her fair share; she participated in insults, although 

possibly unwillingly, to the bodies of the victims; and she sought the help of her father in 

disposing of the bodies. Under these circumstances, Miller is of no avail to McKee.

¶ 28 In House, the 19-year-old defendant was present and armed at the time the victims were 

forced into a vehicle at gunpoint, and he also served as a lookout at the time the victims were 

shot. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, ¶ 84. The First District found that the defendant’s young 

age was an important factor to consider, and the court cited to scientific research that indicated 

the young adult brain did not fully develop until the mid-20s. Id. ¶¶ 89, 95. The court also noted 

that the defendant did not aid in the planning of the crime (id. ¶ 89), had no criminal history of 

violent crimes, never knew his father (and his mother died when he was 18), was raised by his 

maternal grandmother, and did not graduate from high school (id. ¶ 101). Thus, the First District 

concluded that the defendant’s sentence shocked the moral sense of the community and was 

unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. 
11 

¶ 29 While some similarities exist between the involvement of McKee and the defendant in 

House, the differences are significant enough that we do not believe the same result is warranted 

in this case. McKee actively participated in the planning of the crimes; she was not just 

complicit, she was an instigator. While it is true that she did not personally participate in the 

murders, it must be noted that she was aware that murder was at least a possibility and an 

intended consequence of their plan. During the planning of the crimes, Miner stated that he could 

kill Rankins and Glover, and Landerman stated that he could help. Then, the group decided on a 

signal that, when given, indicated to McKee and Massaro that they were to leave the room so the 

two men could carry out their part. Further, after the robbery and murders were committed, 

McKee took part in the distribution of the proceeds and the discussion of options for 

dismembering and disposing of the bodies, as previously described. It was only due to the 

intervention of McKee’s father that actual disposal of the bodies was thwarted. In sum, McKee’s 

factual culpability for these crimes was much greater than that of House. 

¶ 30 McKee also claims that we should follow the First District’s decision in People v. Harris, 

2016 IL App (1st) 141744 (pet. for leave to appeal allowed, No. 121932 (May 24, 2017)), and 

hold that McKee’s sentence is unconstitutional as applied. 

¶ 31 In Harris, the 18-year-old defendant shot two individuals at a gas station and one of the 

individuals died. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 14. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and 

attempted first degree murder and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 76 years. Id. ¶ 1. 

The defendant raised an as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence, alleging that it was 

tantamount to a life sentence and therefore violated, inter alia, the proportionate penalties clause 

of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. The Harris majority agreed and held that “we believe 

that it shocks the moral sense of the community to send this young adult to prison for the 
12 

remainder of his life, with no chance to rehabilitate himself into a useful member of society.” Id.

¶ 69. In so ruling, the Harris majority emphasized that the defendant was young and had no 

criminal background, and it speculated that because he grew up in a stable home and finished his 

GED while in pretrial custody, he might be able to rehabilitate himself if given the chance. Id. ¶ 

64. Furthermore, like the court in House and like McKee in our case, the defendant alluded to 

scientific research on brain development, which the Harris majority found persuasive: 

 “The Illinois Supreme Court had recognized that research 

on juvenile maturity and brain development might also apply to 

young adults. The 19-year-old defendant in People v. Thompson

argued, for the first time on appeal, that Miller should apply with 

equal force to him. 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 18-21. The Illinois 

Supreme Court noted that in as-applied challenges, ‘it is paramount 

that the record be sufficiently developed’ and that Thompson’s 

record failed to contain any information regarding how the 

‘ “evolving science” on juvenile maturity and brain development’ 

should apply to the circumstances in the case. Id. ¶ 38. Though 

the Illinois Supreme Court did not extend Miller to young adults in 

Thompson, it did open the door for that argument. 

 Unlike the dissent, we believe that the record contains 

sufficient facts to consider Miller’s applicability. We cannot 

extend Miller’s holding directly, but find that its analysis applies 

with equal force under the Illinois Constitution to a 19-year-old 

like Harris.” Id. ¶¶ 61-62. 
13 

¶ 32 Justice Mary Anne Mason dissented from the Harris majority’s ruling that the 

defendant’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 

78 (Mason, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Mason argued, inter alia, that 

the record was insufficient to decide whether the science on juvenile maturity and brain 

development impacted the defendant’s case because he did not introduce evidence in the circuit 

court that this science applied to him. Id. ¶ 79 (Mason, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part).

¶ 33 In addressing McKee’s Harris-based argument, we note initially that we are not bound by 

the decisions of other districts of the appellate court. See, e.g., Kovac v. Barron, 2014 IL App 

(2d) 121100, ¶ 85. We also note that another panel of the First District refused to follow Harris

due to its alleged misinterpretation of Thompson. People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, 

¶¶ 38-43. The Thomas majority stated that, contrary to the Harris majority’s claim, “[t]he 

supreme court in Thompson did not ‘open the door’ for defendants to argue that the reasoning in 

Miller should be extended to young adults over the age of 18” because the ruling in Thompson

was based on forfeiture. Id. ¶ 43 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 39, for its ruling that the 

defendant had forfeited his as-applied constitutional challenge because he raised it for the first 

time on appeal).

¶ 34 Even if Harris was correctly decided, the instant case is factually distinguishable. The 

majority in Harris believed that the record contained sufficient facts to consider Miller’s 

applicability. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 62. The same cannot be said for this case. In 

this regard, we find the following commentary in Thompson—on the nature of the defendant’s 

as-applied challenge to the extent that it sought support in scientific research on juvenile 

development—to be particularly relevant:
14 

“To support his as-applied challenge, defendant relies exclusively 

on the ‘evolving science’ on juvenile maturity and brain 

development that formed the basis of the Miller decision to ban 

mandatory natural life sentences for minors. Defendant maintains 

that this science applies with ‘equal force’ to a criminal defendant 

who was between the ages of 18 and 21 when the underlying crime 

was committed. The record here, however, contains nothing about 

how that science applies to the circumstances of defendant’s case, 

the key showing for an as-applied constitutional challenge. Nor 

does the record contain any factual development on the issue of 

whether the rationale of Miller should be extended beyond minors 

under the age of 18. Undoubtedly, the trial court is the most 

appropriate tribunal for the type of factual development necessary 

to adequately address defendant’s as-applied challenge in this 

case.” Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38. 

Here, McKee offered no evidence in the circuit court on the science of juvenile development or 

how it applied to her. Accordingly, Harris is of no avail to McKee, and we reject her request to 

follow it.

¶ 35 We acknowledge that McKee’s personal history includes significant mental health issues 

and at least two extended and extremely tragic and traumatizing experiences as a 14-year-old. 

These experiences may well have arrested her maturation and exacerbated her mental health

issues. We are also aware, as was the First District when it decided House, that research shows 

the 18-year-old brain, even without trauma, is not fully mature. We appreciate the trial court’s 
15 

frustration at being forced by section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) to impose what it believed, given all of 

the circumstances, to be an unjustifiably harsh sentence. 

¶ 36 The legislature has, however, evidenced its intent to bar consideration of those factors by 

withholding all discretion from the courts to impose any sentence more lenient than natural life 

upon conviction of more than one first-degree murder. The supreme court found in Miller that 

the statutory penalty is too harsh to impose on selected juveniles; that its imposition can, in some 

situations, shock the moral sense of the community. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 341. Where, as here, 

the wrongdoer is legally an adult, played a critical role in developing the criminal plan, and was 

actively complicit in the execution of the robbery that resulted in the deaths of two men, we do 

not see that McKee has met her burden of establishing that her natural life sentence would shock 

the moral conscience of the community and was, therefore, unconstitutional as applied. Nor, 

given the facts of this case, do we see ourselves as authorized to reduce on appeal a sentence the 

circuit court was statutorily compelled to impose. 

¶ 37 CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.