DOD JOINT BASES

Management 

Improvements Needed 

to Achieve Greater 

Efficiencies

Report to Congressional Addressees

November 2012

GAO-13-134

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-134, a report to 

congressional addressees

November 2012

DOD JOINT BASES

Management Improvements Needed to Achieve 

Greater Efficiencies

Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has designated DOD support 

infrastructure as an area of high risk 

and included one key related 

category—installation support—as an 

area for potential savings. In 2005, 

DOD recommended to the Base 

Realignment and Closure Commission 

combining 26 installations into 12 joint 

bases to generate efficiencies and cost 

savings and, in 2010, completed this 

consolidation. GAO assessed the 

extent to which (1) DOD developed 

and implemented a plan to achieve 

cost savings and efficiencies at the 

joint bases, (2) joint base common 

standards provide a common 

framework to manage and plan for 

installation support services, and 

(3) DOD has a process to consistently 

identify and address any 

implementation challenges. GAO 

reviewed DOD policies and guidance 

on joint basing, visited 3 joint bases 

and obtained answers to written 

questions from the other 9, interviewed 

OSD and military service officials, and 

analyzed performance data on joint 

base support services.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD take six

actions, such as developing a plan to 

achieve cost savings, prioritizing 

review and revision of unclear common 

standards, and developing a strategy 

to share solutions to common 

challenges. DOD partially agreed with 

five recommendations and did not 

concur with the recommendation to 

develop a plan to achieve cost savings, 

because it stated that such goals are 

not appropriate at this time. GAO 

continues to believe that the 

recommendations are valid as 

discussed further in the report.

What GAO Found

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not developed or implemented 

a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) originally estimated saving $2.3 billion from joint 

basing over 20 years, but in the absence of a plan to drive savings, that estimate 

has fallen by almost 90 percent. OSD also does not yet have a fully developed

method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies 

achieved specifically from joint basing. GAO previously reported that 

organizational transformations such as merging components and transforming 

organizational cultures should be driven by top leadership, have implementation 

goals and a timeline to show progress, and include a communication strategy. 

Although the joint bases anecdotally reported achieving some savings and 

efficiencies, without an implementation plan to drive savings and a means to 

collect reliable information on the specific costs, estimated savings, and 

efficiencies from joint basing, DOD will not be able to facilitate achievement of 

the goals of cost savings and efficiencies, track the extent to which these goals 

have been achieved, or evaluate the continuation or expansion of joint basing. 

The joint bases implemented common standards for installation support services 

developed by OSD, and in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 reported meeting the 

standards more than 70 percent of the time. However, three factors limited the 

usefulness of the reported standards as a common tool for managing installation 

support services: the lack of clarity in some standards, unclear standards that 

were not reviewed and changed in a timely manner, and data collection and 

reporting on the standards that in some cases adhered to individual service 

standards rather than the common standard. DOD guidance states that the 

purpose of the joint base common standards framework was to provide a 

common language to serve as a basis for planning and management across the 

joint bases, and GAO previously reported that performance measures should be 

clear and follow standard procedures. Without a consistent interpretation and 

reported use of the standards, OSD and the joint bases will not have reliable or 

comparable data with which to assess their service support levels. 

OSD and the joint bases have various mechanisms in place to address

challenges in achieving joint basing goals, such as a joint management oversight 

structure and annual OSD-joint base review meetings, but none of these 

routinely facilitates communication among the joint bases to identify solutions to 

common challenges. The reported challenges cover a wide range of issues, from 

different expectations among military services as to how base support services 

should be provided to incompatible information technology networks. However, 

the absence of a formal method to routinely share information on common 

challenges and possible solutions, or guidance on developing and providing 

training for new personnel on how joint bases provide installation support, means 

DOD is likely to miss opportunities to develop common solutions to common 

challenges. Federal internal control standards state that for an entity to control its 

operations, it must have relevant and timely communications, and information is 

needed throughout the agency to achieve objectives. In addition, without 

processes to identify common challenges and share information across the joint 

bases, DOD may miss opportunities for greater efficiencies and be unable to 

provide uniform policies across the joint bases. 

View GAO-13-134. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Letter 1 

Background 5

DOD Has Not Developed a Plan for Achieving Joint Basing Cost 

Savings and Efficiencies or a Reliable Method for Tracking Costs 

and Estimated Savings 9

Joint Bases Report Meeting Many Common Standards, but the 

Usefulness of the Standards as a Common Framework to 

Manage Installation Support Services Is Limited 14

OSD and Joint Bases Have Processes to Identify Joint Basing 

Implementation Challenges, but Lack of Routine 

Communication Limits Opportunities for Greater Efficiencies 20

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 25

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II BRAC Commission Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including 

Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the Commission) 40

Appendix III Joint Basing Installation Support Functional Areas 44

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 45

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Related GAO Products 53

Tables

Table 1: Joint Bases’ Details and Implementation Phases 7

Table 2: Comment Categories and Definitions 37

Contents
Page ii GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Table 3: Functional Areas of Installation Support 44

Figures

Figure 1: Joint Management Oversight Structure Levels and 

Decision Chain 8

Figure 2: Joint Bases’ Top Reported Reasons for Not Meeting 

Common Standards 16

Abbreviations 

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

DOD Department of Defense

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page 1 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

November 15, 2012

Congressional Addressees

GAO has designated Department of Defense (DOD) support 

infrastructure as a high-risk area, and identified installation support as 

one key support infrastructure category where opportunities existed for 

savings.1 In originally citing support infrastructure as high risk, we stated 

that reducing the cost of excess infrastructure activities was critical to 

making use of scarce resources and maintaining high levels of military 

capabilities. We reported that DOD believed that greater economies of 

scale and savings could be achieved by further consolidation and 

elimination of duplicate support services where military bases were 

located close to one another or similar functions were performed at 

multiple locations. However, we also noted that despite the potential for 

reducing base operating support costs through greater reliance on 

interservice-type agreements, differing service traditions and cultures and 

concern over losing direct control of support assets had caused 

commanders to resist such measures. In a subsequent recommendation 

submitted to the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

Commission, DOD proposed that the department consolidate 26 military 

installations into 12 joint bases to take advantage of opportunities for 

efficiencies arising from such consolidation and elimination of duplicate 

support services on bases located close to one another. DOD estimated 

that by taking this action it could save about $2.3 billion over a 20-year 

period.2

 

1 GAO, High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure, 

In its justification for the recommendation, DOD noted, among 

other things, that because the installations either shared a common 

boundary or were in proximity to at least one other installation, and 

performed common support functions, there was a significant opportunity 

to reduce duplication of similar support services, which could produce 

savings. The BRAC Commission approved a modified version of DOD’s 

recommendation, which the commission found more fully reflected 

GAO/HR-97-7 (Washington, D.C.: 

February 1997). 

2 DOD, Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: May 2005).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

statutory selection criteria and DOD’s force structure plan.3 Through 

updates to our high-risk series reports, we have continued to monitor 

DOD’s ability to achieve economies of scale and savings by consolidating 

and eliminating duplicate installation support services. Our most recent 

high-risk report, issued in February 2011, continued to designate DOD’s 

management of its support infrastructure as an area of high risk.4

DOD’s joint basing initiative—implemented in two phases, with 5 joint 

bases established in October 2009 and the remaining 7 bases 

established in October 2010—created 12 joint bases from the 26 

installations that were originally operated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, or 

Marine Corps, combining installation support services such as airfield 

operations, grounds maintenance, and custodial services. The 2005 

BRAC recommendation on joint basing established which military bases 

would receive installation management functions from one or more other 

bases. On the basis of these realignments, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) designated the receiving military service as the lead for 

delivering installation support at each joint base, and in 2008, OSD issued 

further guidance for joint basing implementation. According to this 

guidance, the lead service is referred to as the supporting component and 

the military services receiving the installation support are referred to as 

the supported components. OSD also established a set of joint base 

common standards for providing consistent delivery of installation support 

services to the 12 joint bases. According to the latest DOD information, 

there are 280 joint base common standards grouped into 48 functional 

areas.

One of 

the reasons for this designation was DOD’s lack of progress in achieving 

the anticipated efficiencies and cost savings objectives associated with 

consolidating installation services through the joint basing initiative.

5

 

3 The full text of the BRAC joint basing recommendation and elements of DOD’s 

recommendation to the BRAC Commission (as reproduced in the commission’s report) 

appear in app. II of this report. The BRAC Commission assessed all of DOD’s 

recommendations against eight statutory selection criteria and DOD’s force structure plan. 

The standards cover a wide range of installation support services, 

4 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011). 

The High-Risk Series focuses on government operations that GAO identified as high risk 

because of their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the 

need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.

5 These functional areas include a diverse range of functions such as airfield operations, 

child and youth services, and morale, welfare, and recreation. See app. III for a full list of 

these functional areas. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

from establishing the acceptable waiting time for ensuring that 100 

percent of eligible children are placed within the base-run child 

development program to conducting a minimum of two daily airfield 

checks.

In 2009, we reviewed DOD’s progress to date toward meeting the joint 

basing goals of increased efficiencies and cost savings.6 We reported that 

the cost of installation support was expected to increase rather than 

decrease due in part to the adoption of the new common standards, 

which required higher levels of funding in some cases than the previous 

standards, and because the services’ approach to implementing joint 

basing would result in additional administrative costs and the loss of 

some existing installation support efficiencies. As a result, in 2009 DOD 

significantly reduced its estimated 20-year cost savings projection from 

$2.3 billion to about $273 million. More recently, we reported in June 

2012 that our analysis based on updated DOD estimates of the one-time 

and recurring costs and savings from joint basing based on DOD’s fiscal 

year 2011 BRAC budget submission to Congress showed that this 20-

year savings estimate had fallen to $249 million.7

We are conducting this follow-on review under the Comptroller General’s 

authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative in order to provide 

updated information on DOD’s progress in achieving its joint basing 

objectives. For this report, we evaluated the extent to which (1) DOD 

developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and 

efficiencies at the joint bases and has tracked the costs, estimated 

savings, and efficiencies from joint basing; (2) joint base common 

standards provide a common framework to manage and plan for 

installation support services at the joint bases; and (3) the joint bases or 

DOD have a process in place to consistently identify and address any 

implementation challenges to facilitate achievement of joint basing goals.

 

6 GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and 

Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses, 

GAO-09-336 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).

7 GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings Estimates 

from BRAC 2005, GAO-12-709R (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012). These figures are 

expressed in 2005 dollars to facilitate comparison with the original 20-year savings 

estimates developed in 2005.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

To address these objectives overall, we analyzed DOD guidance and 

data relating to joint basing. We also selected a nonprobability sample of 

3 of the 12 joint bases to visit based on several criteria. Among these 

criteria, we ensured that we would visit one base where each of the three 

military departments was the supporting component and therefore had 

the lead for ensuring that the joint base common standards were met, and 

that we visited at least one joint base implemented in each of the two 

implementation phases. We interviewed OSD officials in addition to 

officials at the 3 joint bases we visited. For the remaining 9 joint bases, 

we obtained written answers to our questions pertaining to these 

objectives.

To assess the extent to which DOD developed and implemented a plan to 

achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint bases and tracked the 

cost effects of joint basing, we analyzed relevant DOD guidance as well 

as our prior findings on key practices and steps used by organizations to 

successfully implement organizational mergers and transformations. We 

also interviewed OSD and joint base officials, and obtained answers to 

written questions, to determine the extent to which there was a plan in 

place to achieve cost savings and efficiencies, and the extent to which 

OSD or the joint bases measured and tracked costs, estimated savings, 

and efficiencies achieved as a result of joint basing.

To evaluate the extent to which joint base common standards have 

provided a common framework for defining installation support services 

and are used to manage and plan for those services at the joint bases, 

we reviewed DOD’s policy and guidance on the joint base common 

standards as well as federal internal controls and data reliability 

standards. We obtained joint base performance reporting on the common 

standards from fiscal years 2010 through 2011 and conducted a content 

analysis of these data to determine the degree of achievement of the 

standards and to identify reported challenges to the joint bases’ ability to 

meet the standards. We analyzed OSD’s processes for reviewing and 

changing the standards by reviewing OSD guidance, and interviewed or 

obtained written answers to our questions from OSD and joint base 

officials about how they addressed reported problems with the standards. 

Although we identified some problems with the joint base common 

standards, which we discuss in this report, we found the data on the joint 

base common standards to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

reporting on the number of standards the joint bases reported as having 

met or not met and the content of the comments accompanying the 

standards reporting.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

To assess OSD’s process for identifying and addressing implementation 

challenges, we reviewed DOD policy and guidance for joint base 

oversight and management, as well as federal internal control standards. 

We then identified how OSD uses its formal joint base management 

structure, joint base common standards reporting, and formal review 

meetings between joint base commanders and OSD to obtain information 

on challenges faced at the joint bases. We analyzed performance 

reporting comments, DOD documentation that identified and 

demonstrated how OSD addressed these challenges, and DOD guidance 

on established procedures to resolve issues. We also interviewed or 

obtained written answers to questions from OSD, military service, and 

joint base officials in order to determine how OSD and the military 

services resolved issues with the joint bases through informal methods, 

such as newsletters and direct communications.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to November

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discuss our scope 

and methodology in more detail in appendix I.

DOD noted in its recommendation to the 2005 BRAC Commission that all 

military installations employ personnel to perform common functions in 

support of installation facilities and personnel and that all installations 

execute these functions using similar or nearly similar processes. DOD’s 

justification for the recommendation stated that this, along with the 

proximity of the bases in question, allowed for significant opportunity to 

reduce duplication and costs by consolidating the installations. 

Specifically, DOD stated that savings in personnel and facilities costs 

could be realized by, among other things

• reducing duplication of efforts,

• paring unnecessary management personnel,

• achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale,

• consolidating and optimizing existing and future service contract 

requirements,

Background 

Implementation of the 

Joint Bases and 

Management 

Responsibilities 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

• establishing a single space management authority that could achieve 

greater utilization of facilities, and

• reducing the number of base support vehicles and equipment 

consistent with the size of the combined facilities.

As a result, the BRAC Commission approved a modified version of DOD’s 

recommendation, and recommended combining 26 installations that were 

close to one another into 12 joint bases.

In its January 2008 joint basing implementation guidance, OSD 

established a schedule dividing the joint bases into two implementation 

phases and required that the installations complete a memorandum of 

agreement that would describe how the military components would work 

together at each joint base.8

• how the installations were to fully implement the 2005 BRAC joint 

basing recommendation and

Each agreement was required to outline, 

among other things,

• how the supporting component was to deliver installation support 

services to the other military components at the base—called 

supported components—in accordance with the joint base common 

standards.

Table 1 identifies the location, implementation phase, and supporting 

military service at each of the joint bases.

 

8 Phase I bases had a September 30, 2008 milestone for developing and signing a 

memorandum of agreement and an October 31, 2009, milestone for full implementation. 

Phase II bases had a September 30, 2009 milestone for signing a memorandum of 

agreement and an October 31, 2010, milestone for full implementation. According to DOD, 

phase I full implementation was achieved on October 1, 2009, and phase II full 

implementation was achieved on October 1, 2010.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Table 1: Joint Bases’ Details and Implementation Phases

Joint base Location Phase Supporting service Supported service

McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst New Jersey I Air Force Army, Navy 

Little Creek-Fort Story Virginia I Navy Army 

Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington Maryland I Air Force Navy

Myer-Henderson Hall Virginia I Army Marine Corps

Marianas Guam I Navy Air Force 

Lewis-McChord Washington II Army Air Force

Charleston South Carolina II Air Force Navy

Langley-Eustis Virginia II Air Force Army 

Pearl Harbor-Hickam Hawaii II Navy Air Force

Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska II Air Force Army 

San Antonio Texas II Air Force Army 

Anacostia-Bolling District of Columbia II Navy Air Force

Source: OSD.

The 2008 joint basing implementation guidance designated the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics as the 

official within OSD responsible for establishing overarching guidance, 

procedures, and policy and for providing oversight for implementation of 

the joint basing guidance. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the lead office for 

DOD’s installations and facilities is the Office of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), which conducts 

oversight of and provides guidance to the joint bases.

OSD’s 2008 guidance on implementing joint basing established a set of 

installation support functional areas and provided for the creation of a set 

of joint base common standards to define the level of service expected to 

be provided at each joint base and in order to ensure consistent delivery 

of installation support services. As of April 2012, there were 280 joint 

base common standards grouped into 48 functional areas, such as the 

standard that 90 percent of law enforcement investigations be completed 

within 30 days, which falls under the security services functional area 

(see app. III for a complete list of these functional areas). Each joint base 

can seek approval to have deviations from the common standards, which 

would be outlined in its memorandum of agreement. One-third of the joint 

bases told us they had approved deviations from certain common 

standards. OSD officials stated that they have changed the joint base 

Joint Base Common 

Standards 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

common standards over time to clarify or better align them with how the 

services are providing installation support services.

The Joint Management Oversight Structure was established as a 

mechanism to provide for six levels of performance review and dispute 

resolution as part of managing implementation of the joint bases. Issues 

raised at the joint bases are first addressed at the lowest level of the 

structure, the local Joint Base Partnership Council, which includes 

officials from the supported and supporting services on each joint base. If 

issues are not resolved there, they are raised to higher levels of 

command, such as the Senior Installation Management Group, which 

includes the service installation commands, such as Commander, Navy 

Installations Command, and the Army Chief of Staff Installation 

Management Command. If the issues remain unresolved, they can go up 

through the service Vice Chiefs of Staff and finally on to OSD. See figure 

1 for the oversight structure and decision chain.

Figure 1: Joint Management Oversight Structure Levels and Decision Chain

a

Comprises Commander, Naval Installations Command, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Installation Management (Army), Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, and Headquarters Marine 

Corps, Installations Department, Facilities and Services Division.

Joint Management 

Oversight Structure
 

Page 9 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

DOD’s recommendation to the 2005 BRAC Commission noted anticipated 

cost savings and efficiencies to be gained from joint basing, but OSD has 

not developed an implementation plan to guide joint bases in their efforts 

to achieve these cost savings and efficiencies. Furthermore, DOD does 

not have a reliable method of collecting information on the net costs or 

estimated savings, and efficiencies, specifically resulting from joint basing 

and excluding other influences on the bases’ budgets. Without a plan to 

guide and encourage joint bases to pursue cost savings and efficiencies 

and without a method to track joint basing-specific costs, savings, and 

efficiencies, DOD will likely miss opportunities for cost savings and 

continue to be unaware of the extent to which joint bases have been able 

to meet the objectives laid out in the 2005 BRAC recommendation on 

joint basing.

Officials in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Installations and Environment) said they did not have a plan in place to 

guide the efforts to achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint 

bases because joint basing is a relatively new initiative and they are still 

resolving implementation issues. DOD’s 2005 joint basing 

recommendation estimated a 20-year savings of $2.3 billion, with 

$601 million in savings by the end of the implementation period in fiscal 

year 2011. However, the 20-year savings estimate has now decreased by 

nearly 90 percent, to $249 million.9

We have previously reported that successful organizational 

transformations—such as merging components and transforming 

organizational cultures—in both the public and private sector, involve 

several key practices, including ensuring that top leadership drives the 

transformation, setting implementation goals and a timeline to show 

progress from day one, and establishing a communication strategy to 

create shared expectations and report related progress.10

 

9 These figures are in 2005 dollars to facilitate comparison.

10 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003), and 

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a 

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

DOD Has Not 

Developed a Plan for 

Achieving Joint 

Basing Cost Savings 

and Efficiencies or a 

Reliable Method for 

Tracking Costs and 

Estimated Savings

DOD Has Not Developed a 

Plan to Guide Joint Bases 

toward Achieving Cost 

Savings and Efficiencies
 

Page 10 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

• Ensuring top leadership drives the transformation. DOD 

leadership has not provided clear direction to joint basing officials on 

achieving the cost savings and efficiency goals of joint basing. Some 

joint basing officials told us they perceived a lack of direction from 

OSD about the joint basing initiative and more specifically about 

whether the purpose of joint basing is to meet the joint base common 

standards for installation support or to achieve cost savings and 

efficiencies. These two goals may not always be in harmony since 

meeting some joint standards requires a higher level of service, which 

can increase costs rather than save money.

• Setting implementation goals and a timeline to show progress. 

One of DOD’s stated objectives for joint basing was to save money; 

however, it did not establish quantifiable and measurable objectives 

for how to achieve cost savings or efficiencies through joint basing, 

nor did it establish a timeline to achieve such goals. Such methods for 

achieving cost savings or efficiencies could include, for example, 

reducing duplication of efforts, paring unnecessary management 

personnel, consolidating and optimizing service contract 

requirements, and reducing the number of base support vehicles and 

equipment, among other things noted in DOD’s recommendation to 

the 2005 BRAC Commission.

• Establish a communication strategy. DOD has not established a 

communication strategy that provides information to meet the needs 

of joint basing officials on how to achieve the joint basing goals of cost 

savings and efficiencies. Some joint base officials told us that they 

desire additional guidance about how to achieve cost savings and 

efficiencies.

In addition to not having an implementation plan, DOD does not yet have 

a fully developed method for accurately gathering information on costs, 

estimated savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically as a 

consequence of joint basing, and as a result it does not have an estimate 

of the extent to which joint basing has realized actual cost savings. OSD 

has developed a data collection tool, called the Cost and Performance 

Visibility Framework, through which the joint bases report installation 

support performance data, including annually reporting on funds obligated

to provide base support services, and officials involved in management 

and oversight of the joint bases can use this information to improve joint 

base management. In addition, OSD can measure these data against the 

level of funding the military services expect they would have had to 

obligate for installation support on the joint bases if no savings resulted 

from joint basing—what DOD refers to as the Cost and Performance 

Visibility Framework baseline. However, because of inconsistencies in the 

DOD Has Developed a 

Method of Identifying 

Costs and Efficiencies on 

Joint Bases, but This 

Method Cannot Yet 

Accurately Isolate the

Effects of Joint Basing
 

Page 11 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

way the joint bases reported data through the framework to date, and 

because the data reported through the framework do not exclude costs 

and savings that are not specific to joint basing, OSD is not yet able to 

accurately isolate the effects of joint basing on the cost of providing 

support services.11

The Cost Performance and Visibility Framework is a web-based 

application managed by OSD which allows joint bases to report on their 

performance against the joint base common standards quarterly and to 

report on the funds obligated and manpower employed to meet the 

common standards annually. Various levels of the joint basing Joint 

Management Oversight Structure use the framework as a management 

tool to review and assess performance of the joint base common 

standards by category, service, and base, including comparing 

performance of the standards to the funds obligated and manpower 

employed to meet particular categories of standards. For example, 

officials can compare the funds obligated on housing on a particular joint 

base with the extent to which that joint base met the common standards 

related to housing, as well as the baseline, or anticipated cost of meeting 

those common standards. OSD officials told us that they use these data 

to identify categories of joint base common standards where the bases 

are performing especially well or poorly, and can compare this 

performance to the funds obligated relative to achievement of the 

standards, as well as to the baseline—the level of funding the military 

services anticipated they would need to obligate to meet the standards. 

This information provides an initial insight and a basis for further 

discussion at the working level with officials involved in joint base 

management and oversight. Through further discussion, the officials said 

they were able to identify the reasons why joint bases may be performing 

In addition, comparing support service obligations to 

the Cost and Performance Visibility Framework baselines does not show 

whether overall savings were achieved as a result of joint basing since 

the new support service standards themselves are a part of the joint 

basing initiative. Measuring against these baselines therefore does not 

provide a true picture of savings resulting from joint basing. 

 

11 In a June 2012 report on military base realignments and closures, we reported that DOD 

projects net annual recurring savings of $32 million from joint basing based on a 

methodology that was used during the development of the original recommendations to 

the BRAC Commission. See GAO-12-709R. As noted previously, this report examined the 

extent which DOD has tracked the actual costs, estimated savings, and efficiencies 

achieved from joint basing. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

well or underperforming in particular areas relative to the funds obligated

and the baseline. In turn, this allows the officials to make adjustments in 

funding, learn from the experiences of particular joint bases in providing 

support services, and improve joint base management going forward.

For fiscal year 2011, the first year all of the joint bases had completed 

implementation, the joint bases reported through the Cost and 

Performance Visibility Framework obligating a total of about $4.3 billion 

on support services. The military services also created baselines against 

which to measure these funding levels. According to these servicedeveloped baselines the 12 joint bases’ installation services were 

expected to cost $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, as compared with the 

framework-reported actual cost of about $4.3 billion, for a reported 

savings of $800 million less than the baseline. However, this difference 

between the reported baselines and the installation support funding levels

on the joint bases does not accurately reflect savings arising from joint 

basing for several reasons. First, these baselines were calculated using 

actual obligations in fiscal year 2008, when the joint bases were 

standalone bases, and were adjusted to include increases in personnel 

needed to meet the new joint base common standards and other 

expected changes, such as utility rate changes. This effectively inflated 

the baselines beyond what was actually obligated prior to joint basing. 

Therefore, while the adjusted baselines are meant to represent the 

projected costs to operate the newly established joint bases, they 

overstate the actual cost to operate the bases as compared to when they 

were standalone bases. As a result, these are not true baselines against 

which a valid comparison can be made of the cost to operate joint bases 

compared with standalone bases. Moreover, DOD officials noted that the 

adjusted baselines and the reported obligations did not always exclude 

one-time expenditures unrelated to the cost of providing support services, 

such as military construction projects, which impairs the reliability of 

comparisons using the obligations data. Finally, the framework does not 

identify when costs, savings, or efficiencies occurred specifically as a 

result of joint basing, as opposed to other actions such as military servicewide budget cuts. Therefore, the absence of a comparison with the funds 

obligated for support services on the installations prior to becoming joint 

bases, reliability problems in the data, and the inability to isolate jointbasing specific costs, savings, and efficiencies, limits the use of the 

framework as a definitive tool to identify the overall effects on cost of the 

joint basing initiative. 

OSD officials said that they expect to correct the data reliability problems 

by the end of fiscal year 2012, and as joint basing continues these 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

officials believe it will be possible to compare each year’s obligations at 

the joint bases against prior years’ obligations and therefore gain insight 

into the extent that savings and efficiencies are achieved. However, DOD 

officials also acknowledged that other factors have affected and will 

continue to affect funding levels at the joint bases, including budgetdriven reductions by the military services that do not necessarily 

represent savings or efficiencies specifically from joint basing, and as a 

result, OSD may not be able to determine joint basing-specific costs and 

estimated savings even with its improved data collection. 

We found that the individual joint bases do not systematically track cost 

savings and efficiencies achieved as a result of joint basing. However, 

some joint bases have achieved efficiencies through consolidating service 

contracts, combining departments, and reducing administrative overhead, 

and identified anecdotal examples of such efficiencies, including the 

following.

• Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst. Base officials told us that by 

combining telephone services under the existing Air Force contract, 

call rates were substantially reduced, and that they have saved about 

$100,000 annually as a result. Additionally, the officials said that 

consolidating nine maintenance support contracts into one has 

produced $1.3 million in annual savings.

• Joint Base Charleston. Base officials stated that information 

technology network upgrades resulted in improved high-speed access 

and annual savings of $747,000. Additionally, these officials told us 

that they consolidated multiple contracts for chaplains, resulting in 

$55,000 in annual savings.

• Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. Base officials told us that they have 

realized efficiencies and cost savings through consolidating some 

offices in their Morale, Welfare & Recreation Departments. Through 

this effort, they saved about $400,000 in fiscal year 2011 and expect 

those savings to increase in subsequent years.

Conversely, some joint basing officials have told us that the joint basing 

initiative may be increasing rather than cutting costs because in some 

cases the new joint base common standards require a higher level of 

support than was previously provided by service-specific standards. As 

previously noted, we reported in 2009 that the new joint base common 
 

Page 14 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

standards required the services to fund installation support at higher-thanprevious levels.12

Even with the achievement of some efficiencies, the joint bases lack clear 

direction and impetus to identify and execute cost-saving measures

because OSD has not established an implementation plan with 

measurable goals to track progress toward meeting the cost savings and 

efficiencies goals that it recommended to the 2005 BRAC Commission. In 

the absence of such a plan, opportunities for savings and efficiencies are 

likely to be missed. In addition, without a reliable method to collect data 

on costs or estimated savings resulting specifically from joint basing, 

DOD cannot identify the net savings, if any, associated with joint basing. 

As a result, DOD will likely remain unable to quantify the effects of the 

joint basing initiative and unable to evaluate whether to continue or 

expand joint basing.

In fiscal years 2010 and 2011 the joint bases reported meeting the 

common standards more than 70 percent of the time. However, the lack 

of clarity in some standards, the fact that unclear standards are not 

always reviewed and changed in a timely manner, and the fact that the 

data collection and reporting on the standards in some cases adhere to 

individual service standards rather than the common standard hinders the 

effectiveness of the standards as a common framework for managing 

installation support services. Without a consistent interpretation and 

reported use of the standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and 

comparable data with which to assess their service support levels, and 

OSD cannot be assured of receiving reliable and comparable data on the 

level of support services the joint bases are providing.

According to OSD guidance, DOD developed the standards to provide 

common output or performance-level standards for installation support, 

and to establish a common language for each base support function on 

the joint bases.13

 

12

 These common standards provide a common 

GAO-09-336. 

13 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Modification to the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (July 1, 2010). 

Joint Bases Report 

Meeting Many 

Common Standards, 

but the Usefulness of 

the Standards as a 

Common Framework 

to Manage Installation 

Support Services Is 

Limited

Meeting the Common 

Standards 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

framework to manage and plan for installation support services. In 

quarterly reporting from 2010 and 2011 using the joint basing Cost and 

Performance Visibility Framework, the joint bases and various offices 

within the joint bases reported on whether they met the established 

common standards or whether the standard was either not applicable to 

them or not reported by them. In eight quarters of reporting, the 12 joint 

bases and various offices within the joint bases submitted over 53,000 

reports on standards. Our analysis showed that 74 percent of these 

reports stated that the joint base or office met the standard, and 10 

percent of the time the joint base or office did not meet standard.14

The functional areas of standards the joint bases most frequently reported 

not meeting, according to our analysis of the joint base performance 

reporting data, included the following.

The 

other 16 percent of the time the joint bases or office reported that the 

standard was either not applicable to the particular joint base or office, or 

that the joint base or office did not report on the standard.

• Information technology services and management. This includes 

such areas as telephone services and video teleconference. 

• Facilities sustainment. This includes certain building restoration, 

modernization, and maintenance. 

• Command management. This includes such areas as postal 

services and records administration services. 

• Emergency management. This includes such areas as emergency 

notification and emergency training. 

• Base support vehicles and equipment. This includes shuttle bus 

services, and vehicle and equipment maintenance.

Based on our analysis of the reasons joint base officials reported to OSD 

for not meeting standards, we found that the joint bases reported a range 

of reasons for not meeting a given standard, such as a lack of personnel 

or resources, as well as the inability to meet the standard because of 

contract-related resourcing issues. For example, the joint base may have 

 

14 For most of this period, joint bases and offices within the joint bases had the option of 

reporting on a given standard as “not reported.” This option ended with the June 2011 

update to OSD’s handbook for joint base common standards reporting, which stated that 

the option was made available only for the implementation phase of the joint bases. As a 

result, the joint bases must now report on all of the standards. Various offices within the 

joint bases also report on standards, although each of these offices only reports on certain 

standards relating to that office’s activities. 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

a contract in place for providing multimedia services, but the contract 

does not provide for video production, and therefore the base chooses 

not to meet the common standard because it would be too costly to 

modify the contract or let an additional contract. The most common 

reasons joint bases reported as to why the standard was not met, as 

determined by our analysis, are shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Joint Bases’ Top Reported Reasons for Not Meeting Common Standards

In addition to the ability of the joint bases to meet the standards, joint 

base officials and our analysis of the comments in the common standard 

reporting system identified three main issues affecting the joint bases’ 

ability to interpret and report on base support services, regardless of 

Usefulness of the 

Standards 
 

Page 17 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

whether the standards are met. These are (1) the standards are in some 

cases unclear, (2) the standards are not reviewed and changed in a 

timely manner when clarity issues arise, and (3) data in some cases are 

still collected in a service-specific manner that does not correspond to the 

common standard, or the bases are reporting according to a servicespecific rather than a joint standard.

According to joint base officials, the joint base common standards in 

some cases are not measurable or clear. We have previously reported 

that key attributes of successful performance measures include a 

measurable target and clarity.15

• One common standard requires that 100 percent of installations meet 

a DOD requirement for at least annual exercise testing of mass 

warning and notification systems. However, according to officials at 

Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington (in Maryland), 

there are many modes of emergency management notification and 

many ways to test these modes. As a result, they are unsure about 

how to adequately answer this common standard and therefore report 

it as not met.

Having a measurable target in a 

performance measure ensures the ability to determine if performance is 

meeting expectations. Clarity of a performance measure means that the 

measure is clearly stated and the name and definition are consistent with 

the methodology used to calculate it, so that data are not confusing and 

misleading to the users of the data. Joint basing officials provided many 

examples of standards that lack clarity and therefore cause uncertainty in 

how the standards should be reported, including the following:

• One common standard relating to awards and decorations to 

recognize individual and unit achievements states that 90 percent of 

awards should be posted to personnel records in accordance with 

service-specific timeliness standards. However, the standard is not 

clear because, according to joint base officials, not all of the services 

have applicable timeliness standards. According to comments 

accompanying common standard reporting from officials at Joint Base 

San Antonio and Joint Region Marianas, no service standard defines 

 

15 Key attributes of successful performance measures were applied in GAO, Tax 

Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance 

Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002), and according to this report, 

these attributes were based largely on previously established criteria found in prior GAO 

reports, review of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, and other 

performance literature. 

Some Common Standards Are 

Unclear 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

when a posting is late, and therefore they consider this standard to 

always be met, regardless of when awards are posted.

• One common standard requires that 60 percent of certain service 

vehicles be repaired within 24 hours. However, officials at Joint Base 

McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst said the standard was unclear because it 

does not take into account the priority of the vehicle. Therefore, for the 

purposes of the standard, a vehicle that is essential to accomplishing 

the base’s mission would need to be fixed within the same time frame 

as a non-mission-essential shuttle bus that transports personnel 

around the base.

• One common standard related to investigations and crime prevention 

requires joint bases to maintain 7 days’ processing time for law 

enforcement information to meet legal and command requirements for 

adjudication and action. However, according to officials at Joint Base 

McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, this standard does not specify whether the 

timeline is in calendar or business days. In the absence of 

clarification, the joint base has marked the standard as met. 

According to GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, information should be recorded and communicated to 

management and others within a time frame that enables them to carry 

out their responsibilities.16

 

16 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

However, according to officials at several joint 

bases, the OSD process to review and clarify standards does not update 

standards in a time frame to allow joint bases to accurately report each 

quarter on those standards that are unclear. OSD conducts a review of 

selected functional areas each year. As an example, for its most recent 

review for fiscal year 2012, conducted in February 2012, OSD selected 

the facility operations, facility investment, and information technology 

services management as the functional areas for review. Changes made 

to these standards took effect in April 2012. Joint base officials stated that 

since OSD selects certain functional areas to review each year and does 

not review standards outside those particular functional areas, standards 

in those functional areas that are not selected are not reviewed and 

clarified even though clarification in those areas may be necessary. OSD 

officials told us that in their most recent review, they used input from the 

joint bases, military services, and functional area experts within OSD to 

determine which functional areas of standards to review, among other 

inputs, such as which of the standards bases were most frequently not 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Changing Unclear Common 

Standards
 

Page 19 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

meeting. However, since OSD does not necessarily select all those 

standards to which joint bases have requested clarification and only 

reviews standards for possible updating once a year, changes to the 

standards are not implemented in time for the next quarterly reporting 

cycle and joint base officials in some cases are required to continue 

collecting data on and reporting on standards that they have difficulty 

interpreting.

The joint bases do not always report on the common standards in ways 

that produce similar results because in some cases they are using 

service-specific data collection methods that are unable to provide 

information on whether the joint standard is being met, and in some cases 

they are reporting on service-specific performance measures rather than 

the joint standard. We have previously reported that to achieve reliability 

in performance reporting, measurements must apply standard procedures 

for collecting data or calculating results so that they are likely to produce 

the same results if applied repeatedly to the same situation.17

• One common standard states that joint bases should maintain a clean 

and healthy environment by cleaning certain restrooms three times a 

week, and should sweep and mop floors, vacuum carpets, remove 

trash, and clean walk-off mats once a week; buff floors monthly; and 

maintain/strip floors and shampoo carpets annually. Officials at Joint 

Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst reported not meeting the common 

standard because the Air Mobility Command method for data 

collection differs from the information needed to report on the 

common standard. Therefore, the joint base could be meeting the 

standard, but officials do not know because they are not collecting the 

data required to identify whether they are doing so.

The 

following are instances when joint bases may rely on data that do not 

support reporting on the joint base common standard or where joint bases 

are adhering to an individual service standard rather than the common 

standard.

• One common standard related to technical drawings requires that 98 

percent of requests for location data result in no incidents of 

misidentified data. Officials at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 

 

17 Key attributes of successful performance measures were applied in GAO-03-143, and 

according to this report, these attributes were based largely on previously established 

criteria found in prior GAO reports, review of the Government Performance and Results 

Act of 1993, and other performance literature. 

Continued Use of ServiceSpecific Data Collection 

Methods and Reporting
 

Page 20 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

reported not meeting the common standard, stating that they were not 

tracking this metric because the Air Force did not independently 

require it and they were therefore unable to know whether they met 

the metric.

• One common standard requires that 100 percent of joint bases hold 

emergency management working group meetings quarterly. Joint 

Base San Antonio officials reported not meeting the common standard 

because the base is instead holding semiannual emergency 

management working group meetings, which officials said is in 

accordance with Air Force policy.

Because some of the standards are not clear and are not reviewed and 

changed in a timely fashion and in some cases the joint bases use 

service-specific data and standards rather than the joint standard, the 

common standards do not provide OSD and the joint bases with a 

common tool to ensure that the joint bases are interpreting and reporting 

on the standards consistently. As a result, it is not clear to what extent the 

joint bases are achieving the intent of the common standards, even 

though the joint bases report meeting the standards the majority of the 

time. Without a consistent interpretation and reported use of the 

standards, the joint bases will not have reliable and comparable data with 

which to assess their service support levels, and OSD cannot be assured 

of receiving reliable and comparable data on the level of support services 

the joint bases are providing.

OSD and the joint bases have various mechanisms in place to address 

challenges in achieving joint basing goals, but these mechanisms do not 

routinely facilitate the identification of common challenges among the joint 

bases or the development of common solutions to these challenges. 

Specifically, we found that the joint bases do not have a formal method of 

routinely sharing information among the joint bases on identified 

challenges and potential solutions or guidance on developing and 

providing training for new joint base personnel on how the joint bases 

provide installation support services. Without processes to identify 

common challenges and share information across the joint bases, and 

guidance on delivering consistent training to new personnel, DOD will 

likely miss opportunities to efficiently develop common solutions to 

common challenges and to reduce duplicating efforts to provide training 

to new personnel.

OSD and Joint Bases 

Have Processes to 

Identify Joint Basing 

Implementation 

Challenges, but Lack 

of Routine 

Communication 

Limits Opportunities 

for Greater 

Efficiencies 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

OSD and the joint bases have several mechanisms in place to address 

challenges in consolidating installation support services at the joint bases. 

These include a multi-level management structure for the joint bases, 

annual review meetings, performance reporting, newsletters, and informal 

communications, as follows.

• The Joint Management Oversight Structure. According to DOD 

guidance, challenges at the joint bases in consolidating installation 

support services should be addressed at the lowest possible level of 

the Joint Management Oversight Structure—the local joint base 

partnership council. Most problems are addressed between command 

components at an individual joint base, or by intermediate service 

commands, such as the Army’s Installation Management Command, 

according to joint base officials.

• Annual management review meetings between OSD and the joint 

bases. As part of its management of the joint bases, OSD holds an 

annual meeting each February in which joint base commanders brief 

OSD on the status of the bases’ consolidation and any challenges that 

the bases may or may not have been able to address.

• Joint base common standards performance reporting. The joint 

bases report on a quarterly basis on whether they met the common 

standards. As part of this reporting, the bases can provide comments 

identifying challenges they faced in meeting particular standards.

• Joint base newsletters. OSD publishes a monthly newsletter about 

and for the joint bases. This newsletter highlights changes to joint 

basing processes, common challenges, lessons learned, and policy 

issues affecting joint bases. For example, the March 2011 newsletter 

noted that Joint Base San Antonio had combined the best practices of 

the various military services in consolidating motorcycle safety 

training.

• Informal communications. Joint base officials told us that they 

sometimes communicate implementation challenges directly to OSD 

officials by e-mail or telephone in order to request assistance or 

guidance.

In meetings and written responses, joint base officials reported facing a 

variety of challenges in implementing joint basing as well as implementing 

the specific common standards. These challenges cover a wide range of 

issues, from differing expectations among the military services about how 

particular base support services should be provided to the incompatibility 

of information technology systems. The following examples illustrate the 

range of problems joint bases have faced.

Mechanisms to Address 

Support Service 

Consolidation Challenges

Wide-ranging 

Implementation 

Challenges
 

Page 22 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

• Differences in how the military services conduct snow removal have 

led to unexpected effort or cost for some supported components. Joint 

Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst officials told us that when the Air Force 

took over providing the support for the joint base, Army and Navy 

personnel were surprised when they had to shovel the sidewalk 

around their buildings because previously this service was provided 

by the base. By contrast, the officials said that the Air Force removes 

snow from roads and parking lots on base but not from sidewalks and 

building paths. The officials told us they had to spend additional 

money to contract for snow removal on sidewalks or use their own 

personnel to remove the snow, which diminished productivity of 

mission functions. While there is no joint base common standard 

specifically on snow removal, there is one on pavement clearance, 

which includes snow and ice removal, which states that joint bases 

should have an installation pavement clearance plan developed in 

accordance with best practices of the military components to meet 

safety and mission needs. Notes accompanying the standard state 

that each joint base defines its own best practices.

• Services had different expectations for maintenance of building 

components such as alarm systems and fire extinguishers. For 

example, Navy officials on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst told us 

that previously, the Navy installed security systems and replaced fire 

extinguishers as part of base support services. However, following 

joint basing and the installation becoming part of an Air Forcesupported base, the Air Force did not provide these services and 

expected building occupants to fund these services themselves.

• Some supported components and tenant organizations are 

experiencing changed expectations and increased costs under the 

joint base structure, in part because of differences in the way the 

military services budget and pay for installation support. For example, 

officials of a Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam tenant told us that their 

costs rose significantly following the transition to the joint base in 

order to cover expenses, such as telephone service, not previously 

required under the tenant’s own budget. In addition, the tenant 

officials stated that the different service standards under the Navy had 

raised their expenses. 

• The variety of incompatible information technology networks and other 

systems among the services inhibits communication and requires 

additional effort. For example, the absence of common information 

technology and communications networks hampered communications 

and information sharing between joint base occupants, and the bases 

expended significant efforts transitioning data from one service 

system to another.
 

Page 23 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Officials at a number of joint bases stated that they believe the individual 

efforts and relationships developed between the components and 

commands at the joint bases have facilitated consolidation of installation 

support services and resolution of implementation challenges. However, a 

number of joint base officials noted that there was no systematic process 

in place to identify and resolve common challenges and share information 

with new base personnel.

OSD and the joint bases have some methods to address challenges in 

consolidating support services, but the absence of a method for routinely 

communicating among the joint bases limits opportunities to jointly 

identify common challenges to joint basing implementation and share 

best practices and lessons learned in order to develop common solutions 

to those challenges. Because problems are first identified and addressed 

at the lowest level of the Joint Management Oversight Structure, which 

only includes officials from a given joint base, other joint bases do not 

become aware of these problems or the associated solutions. If joint 

bases are not informed of problems at other joint bases, then they cannot 

work together and collectively elevate issues to OSD for the purposes of 

identifying best practices and disseminating them to the joint bases. One 

joint base official noted that the information contained in the newsletters 

does not represent formal guidance. In addition, some joint base officials 

said that the annual program management reviews conducted by OSD 

are not sufficient to respond to day-to-day challenges faced at the joint 

bases. Joint base officials told us that in some cases they have obtained 

needed guidance through informal contacts with OSD. However, they 

noted that a formal, routine method of sharing information received from 

these sources would help to ensure consistent performance across the 

joint bases. Without such guidance and a mechanism to routinely share 

lessons learned across the joint bases, opportunities will be missed to 

work together to resolve common challenges and reduce duplication of 

effort, and the potential that joint bases may be implementing policies 

inconsistently will increase.

In addition, OSD has not provided guidance to the joint bases on 

developing training materials to be used to inform incoming personnel 

about the specifics of how installation services are provided on joint 

bases. Such guidance is needed since joint base standards may differ 

from standards and approaches used on standalone bases. Some 

components, such as the Air Force Wing Command at Joint Base Pearl 

Harbor-Hickam, developed their own briefings or training courses to 

provide information on the process of requesting and receiving installation 

Limited Routine 

Communication 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

support services and how the process is different from that of other Air 

Force bases. Some joint base officials stated that educating personnel 

about joint base-specific processes requires a great deal of effort. 

Because of the lack of OSD guidance on providing common training 

materials, the joint bases have in some cases developed their own 

materials, which can result in duplication of efforts and inconsistencies 

across the joint bases.

DOD recommended consolidation of installations into joint bases to the 

2005 BRAC Commission to, among other things, reduce duplication of 

management and installation support services, resulting in potential 

efficiencies and cost savings. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the 

Federal Government states that the policies, procedures, techniques, and 

mechanisms that enforce management’s directives are an integral part of 

an entity’s planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for 

stewardship of government resources and achieving effective results. It 

also states that for an entity to run and control its operations, the entity 

must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to 

internal events, and that information is needed throughout the agency to 

achieve all of its objectives.18 Without a means of identifying common 

challenges and sharing best practices and lessons learned in order to 

identify common solutions, DOD is likely to miss opportunities to 

efficiently resolve joint base challenges using common methods. In 

addition, without sharing guidance for new personnel, some joint bases 

will duplicate efforts to solve problems previously encountered elsewhere 

and be unable to provide uniform policies across joint bases.

Since 2008, OSD has consolidated installations in proximity into joint 

bases and established common standards for delivering installation 

support services at these bases. As DOD stated in its recommendation to 

the 2005 BRAC Commission, DOD anticipated that this effort represented 

a significant opportunity to reduce duplication of effort and achieve 

efficiencies and cost savings across the 12 joint bases. However, to date 

OSD has not developed and implemented a plan to guide the joint bases 

in achieving cost savings and efficiencies. OSD has developed and 

implemented a framework for collecting and reporting data on 

performance of joint base common standards and the funds spent and 

 

18 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Conclusions 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

manpower used to meet those standards. However, OSD has not yet 

developed this framework to the point where it can isolate the costs, 

savings, and efficiencies resulting specifically from joint basing, excluding 

non-joint basing actions and using reliable data. Without this information, 

OSD is not in a position to know to what extent DOD has made progress 

toward achieving the joint basing objectives, and will be unable to 

evaluate whether to continue or expand joint basing. Additionally, a lack 

of specificity and clarity within the joint base common standards, the long 

process to review and adjust the standards, and the absence of 

consistently reported data hinder the standards’ effectiveness as a 

common framework or tool for managing support services. Without a 

consistent interpretation and reported use of the standards, OSD and the 

joint bases cannot ensure that they are receiving reliable and comparable 

data on the level of support services provided, and as a result will not 

have information necessary to make informed resource allocation 

decisions so that joint base services are delivered consistently. While 

OSD and the joint bases can identify challenges in implementing the joint 

bases, OSD has no common strategy to ensure that the joint bases 

routinely share information with each other on best practices and lessons 

learned in order to resolve common challenges. Finally, OSD has not 

provided guidance to ensure that bases provide consistent information to 

new joint base personnel to better inform them as to procedures for 

obtaining support services on joint bases. Without taking further steps to 

address these issues, DOD will likely miss opportunities to achieve cost 

savings and efficiencies, provide consistent levels of support services, 

and to work together to resolve common challenges and reduce 

duplication of effort across the joint bases.

To enable DOD to achieve cost savings and efficiencies and to track its 

progress toward achieving these goals, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations 

and Environment) to take the following two actions:

Develop and implement a plan that provides measurable goals linked to 

achieving savings and efficiencies at the joint bases and provide 

guidance to the joint bases that directs them to identify opportunities for 

cost savings and efficiencies. DOD should at a minimum consider the 

items identified in its recommendation to the 2005 BRAC Commission as 

areas for possible savings and efficiencies, including

• paring unnecessary management personnel,

• consolidating and optimizing contract requirements,

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 26 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

• establishing a single space management authority to achieve greater 

utilization of facilities, and

• reducing the number of base support vehicles and equipment.

Continue to develop and refine the Cost Performance and Visibility 

Framework in order to

• eliminate data reliability problems, 

• facilitate comparisons of joint basing costs with the cost of operating 

the separate installations prior to implementing joint basing, and 

• identify and isolate the costs and savings resulting from actions and 

initiatives specifically resulting from joint basing and excluding DODor service-wide actions and initiatives. 

To improve DOD’s ability to provide a common framework for the 

management and planning of support services at the joint bases, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the following 

two actions:

• Direct the joint bases to compile a list of those common standards in 

all functional areas needing clarification and the reasons why they 

need to be clarified, including those standards still being provided or 

reported on according to service-specific standards rather than the 

common standard.

• Amend the OSD joint standards review process to prioritize review 

and revision of those standards most in need of clarification within this 

list. 

To increase opportunities for the joint bases to obtain greater efficiencies 

in developing common solutions to common challenges and reduce 

duplication of efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to 

take the following two actions:

• Develop a common strategy to expand routine communication 

between the joint bases, and between the joint bases and OSD, to 

encourage joint resolution of common challenges and sharing of best 

practices and lessons learned.

• Develop guidance to ensure all the joint bases develop and provide 

training materials to incoming personnel on how installation services 

are provided on joint bases.
 

Page 27 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it does not 

agree that at this point in the joint bases’ development that the 

department should establish savings targets because they would be 

premature and arbitrary. DOD partially concurred with the remainder of 

our recommendations; however, in most instances, DOD did not identify 

what, if any, actions the department plans to take to implement the 

recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in 

appendix IV.

DOD did not concur with our first recommendation, to develop and 

implement a plan to provide measurable goals linked to achieving savings 

and efficiencies at the joint bases and provide guidance to the joint bases 

directing them to identify the savings and efficiencies. In its comments, 

DOD said such targets would restrict the authority of local commanders to 

manage the merger of the formerly standalone bases into joint bases. 

DOD also stated that while savings targets may be appropriate in the 

future, imposing savings goals would restrict the authority of the joint 

base commanders and burden them while implementing new 

organizational structures, which would unnecessarily risk negative 

impacts to mission support when operational effectiveness of the bases is 

paramount. Moreover, DOD stated that the department should continue 

its approach of being patient with obtaining savings and efficiencies at 

joint bases because this approach is working. DOD cited two cost-savings 

examples through personnel cuts achieved in fiscal years 2012 and 2013: 

the Air Force reduced civilian positions for all the joint bases for which it is

the lead, and the Navy chose to not fill all of its civilian vacancies. Finally, 

DOD stated that the creation of the joint bases from separate installations 

is equivalent to the mergers of corporations with very different financial 

systems, management structures, operating procedures, and cultural 

differences. DOD has decided it is important to empower each joint base 

commander to design, implement, and adapt cost efficient and effective 

approaches to their unique situations while adopting new and crosscutting business practices, thereby making them incubators of innovation. 

Therefore, DOD has decided to allow for an extended transition period 

and defer near-term savings. 

We acknowledge that establishing joint basing is a complex undertaking, 

but DOD’s current position of taking a patient approach and deliberately 

deferring near-term savings contradicts the position it took when 

requesting the BRAC Commission to approve its joint basing 

recommendation. Specifically, in its justification to the Commission 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 28 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

(published in our report as appendix II), DOD stated that joint basing 

would produce savings exceeding the cost of implementation 

immediately. Moreover, as our report clearly points out, DOD projected 

20-year net present value savings of over $2.3 billion although the current 

20-year net present value savings estimate is now about $249 million—a 

decrease of about 90 percent. DOD also asserted that it is achieving 

savings, as shown by the Air Force and Navy manpower reductions at the 

joint bases. However, these cuts were not the result of a purposeful effort 

to pare unnecessary management personnel due to the implementation 

of joint basing. Air Force and Navy documents and interviews with 

officials from these services indicate that the joint bases’ memoranda of 

agreement show increases in budget and civilian manpower required as a 

result of joint basing. Any reductions in civilian positions at the joint bases 

through attrition or leaving unfilled positions open are attributable to 

general service-wide initiatives and reductions and not joint basing 

efficiencies.19 The Secretary of Defense’s justification to the BRAC 

Commission requesting approval of the joint basing recommendation 

stated that “there is a significant opportunity to reduce duplication of 

efforts with resulting reductions of overall manpower and facilities 

requirements capable of generating savings.” We continue to believe that 

DOD’s justification for joint basing—the realization of savings—is 

attainable by developing guidance and encouraging appropriate 

practices, goals, and time frames. Therefore, we continue to believe our 

recommendation is warranted. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation, to continue to 

develop and refine the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework in 

order to (1) eliminate data reliability problems, (2) facilitate comparisons 

of joint basing costs with the cost of operating the separate installations 

prior to implementing joint basing, and (3) identify and isolate the costs 

and savings resulting from actions and initiatives specifically resulting 

from joint basing and excluding DOD or service-wide actions and 

initiatives. DOD stated that its Cost Performance and Visibility Framework 

already provides a method to collect quarterly data on performance 

towards the Common Output Level Standards, annual data on personnel 

 

19 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see our comments regarding the second 

recommendation on DOD’s ability to isolate the effects of joint basing from other DOD initiatives or 

budget cuts.
 

Page 29 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

assigned, and funds obligated for each joint base. However, DOD also 

acknowledged that there were inconsistencies in the current data 

captured in the Framework and that DOD is working through and 

improving its data reliability. DOD stated that it invested considerable 

effort to clarify this data and expected to have sufficient data to begin 

assessing joint base efficiencies by the end of fiscal year 2012. It stated 

that then it would be able to compare the current fiscal year financial and 

performance data to the baseline and previous year’s obligations. DOD 

also stated that it could perform an additional analysis to compare the 

joint bases’ baseline data with the costs of operating the separate 

installations prior to implementing joint basing because this information is 

included in annex U of each joint base’s memorandum of agreement. 

However, DOD also acknowledged that this comparison still would not be 

able to identify cost savings resulting solely from joint basing and 

asserted that it is impractical to isolate and distinguish joint basing cost 

savings from the savings that result from DOD- or service-wide actions 

using the data contained in its Framework. Furthermore, DOD pointed out 

that it did not believe that accounting systems are designed to track 

savings, rather they are designed to track expenses and disbursements, 

which DOD stated in its comments is what we concluded in a 1997 

report.20

We also see that the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework 

represents a good start on development of a system to measure joint 

basing performance. However, as it was being used at the time of our 

review, and as we clearly state in the report, it was not adequate to 

reliably identify any savings. First, DOD’s proposed analysis of 

comparing current operating costs to the baseline would not result in an 

accurate assessment of savings from the joint bases because DOD has 

included in the baseline the higher costs of implementing the higher joint 

basing standards, such as expected increases in personnel and higher 

utility rates. The baseline would not accurately reflect the cost of the 

standalone bases prior to the joint basing initiative. Therefore, while this 

analysis might show some bases spending less than the inflated baseline, 

it would not show if they are spending less than what they spent as 

standalone bases. Second, DOD’s proposed analysis to compare the 

current cost of joint basing documented in its framework to the cost of 

standalone bases as captured in annex U of the memoranda of 

 

 

20 Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds. GAO/NSIAD-97-

151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.
 

Page 30 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

agreement as currently planned would also produce inaccurate results. 

As DOD stated, this analysis would not be able to isolate any savings 

specific to joint basing since some savings have been made that are not 

directly attributable to joint basing such as the general service personnel 

reductions. Third, the memoranda of agreement annexes U do not 

consistently and clearly show the costs of operations of each base prior to 

joint basing and the respective transfers of funds between the services, 

rendering them unreliable for this analysis. Finally, we agree with DOD’s 

statement that our 1997 report concluded that the department’s 

accounting systems are not designed to track savings. However, it is for 

this reason that we also concluded in our 1997 report that “the absence of 

efforts to update projected savings indicates the need for additional 

guidance and emphasis from DOD on accumulating and updating savings 

data on a comprehensive and consistent basis,” and we so recommended 

it then. As we believed in 1997 and continue to believe, DOD needs to 

improve its ability to update savings from BRAC recommendations.

Refinements to the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework would 

position the department to effectively measure savings from joint basing, 

and therefore the need for our recommendation remains. 

DOD partially concurred with our third and fourth recommendations—to 

compile a comprehensive list of common standards needing clarification 

and to prioritize the review and potentially revise those standards within

that list, respectively—and stated that there is already a quarterly 

feedback process on the joint base common standards and an annual 

review process that incorporates input from the joint bases. Specifically, 

DOD stated that standards may need changing as priorities change and 

missions evolve, but that the current process strikes an appropriate 

balance between the analytical burden of repeated reviews with the need 

for clarity and refinement. DOD also stated that it believes that reviewing 

all the standards simultaneously does not allow for the depth of analysis 

required to make sound decisions. DOD suggested that GAO should 

conduct a qualitative assessment of the standards because our findings 

on the need to revise its process for reviewing and clarifying its standards 

appear to be based on an anecdotal assessment. 

While we agree with DOD that the standards need to be continually 

reviewed and adjusted as priorities and missions change, we found ample 

evidence that the individuals that report on the joint bases’ ability to meet 

the current standards believe some of the standards need clarification 

now, and that in many instances, these officials believe it is unclear what 

some of the standards are measuring. It is important to note that nothing 

in our recommendation requires DOD to review all the standards 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

simultaneously. To the contrary, our recommendation specifically states 

that DOD should compile a list of standards needing clarification. In fact, 

because DOD has not issued any guidance to prioritize the standards, 

joint bases continue to report on and provide resources toward reporting 

on all the standards whether they are problematic or not. Lastly, DOD 

stated that they believed our evidence was based on an anecdotal 

assessment. We disagree. We conducted a comprehensive qualitative 

review of over 59,359 comments entered into the Cost Performance and 

Visibility Framework from fiscal years 2009 through 2011 and categorized 

them into broad themes of issues raised by the bases in reference to the 

Common Output Level Standards. As shown in figure 2 of our report, the 

need for clarity of the Common Output Level Standards was raised over 

200 times by the joint bases during this timeframe. However, because 

DOD’s data is not adequate to permit us to specifically identify what types 

of clarification problems were being encountered by the bases, we 

supplemented our analyses with follow-up interviews to provide anecdotal 

examples that added some context to our analyses and described a few 

of the types of problems encountered. Moreover, our data suggested that 

DOD’s quarterly process had proven ineffective at addressing the need 

for clarification and review of problematic standards since some 

standards continue to be problematic despite the quarterly reviews which 

DOD asserts are working. For these reasons, we continue to believe that 

improvements are needed in DOD’s current process for reviewing and 

clarifying the common standards to address the bases reported concerns.

DOD partially concurred with our fifth recommendation, to develop a 

common strategy that expands routine communication between the joint 

bases, and between the joint bases and OSD, to encourage joint 

resolution of common challenges and sharing of best practices and 

lessons learned. DOD stated that it believed there are already 

mechanisms in place to facilitate routine communication between the joint 

bases, as well as between OSD and the joint bases, and that it is 

increasing those opportunities. DOD listed the various opportunities it has 

for sharing joint basing information, all of which we are aware:

• The military services have routine communication with the joint bases 

and are the lead to encourage joint resolution of common challenges 

and sharing of best practices. 

• DOD chairs a working group twice a month where headquarters 

service representatives offer information and ideas generated during 

internal service meetings with joint bases.

• Best practices from the bases are shared in a periodic newsletter.
 

Page 32 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

• OSD and the military services conduct joint base site visits each year 

to capture any opportunities for improvement and hosts an annual 

management review meeting each year with the joint base 

commanders.

While we recognize that DOD has facilitated communication of lessons 

learned and best practices, as we note in our report, because different 

services have the lead role in providing support services at different joint 

bases, best practices are not necessarily shared with all the bases across 

the services. DOD’s joint basing policy states that problems at the joint 

bases should be identified and addressed at the lowest possible level, 

which can include only officials at any given joint base. Thus, the majority 

of these issues may not be elevated to the working group but may still 

occur at multiple joint bases leading to duplication of effort in resolving 

common problems experienced in multiple locations. Moreover, those 

issues that are not elevated to the working group may never be relayed to 

other joint bases since there is no explicit policy or process in place to do 

so. The newsletters, which we discuss in our report, only convey a limited 

number of best practices, and exclude problems and solutions identified 

in the course of implementing joint basing. Additionally, contributions to 

the newsletters are not required and are not always comprehensive. 

Moreover, the contributions tend to highlight best practices which are 

good but exclude unsolved challenges, which if shared, could result in the 

bases jointly resolving problems or elevating them when needed to more

senior leadership. As a result, some joint base officials told us that they 

found the newsletters to be of limited usefulness. For these reasons, we 

continue to believe that the joint bases could benefit from routine 

communication that allows them to commonly and routinely share 

identified challenges and possible solutions, rather than having such 

communication occur only sporadically or be filtered through the higher 

levels of the oversight structure put in place by OSD.

DOD partially concurred with our sixth recommendation, to develop 

guidance that would ensure all joint bases develop and provide training 

materials to incoming joint base personnel. DOD stated that the 

department will ensure each of the services is providing training materials 

to incoming personnel; however, joint base commanders need flexibility to 

tailor training to the needs of their installation. We agree that the 

commander of each joint base needs the flexibility to provide joint basespecific training. The intent of our recommendation is that in addition to 

establishing a requirement that joint bases develop training guidance and 

ensure training occurs at each base, OSD’s guidance should encourage 

the sharing of training materials across bases to reduce duplication of 

effort, promote commonality where appropriate, and provide a means of 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

potentially sharing best practices. Our recommendation was not intended 

to require standardized training at each location. Therefore, we continue 

to believe that OSD-level guidance for joint bases to develop and provide 

training to incoming personnel is necessary to help the joint bases 

facilitate the provision of services on the bases and may provide a way to 

reduce duplication of effort and more effectively share information. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Installations and Environment); the Secretaries of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. 

In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix V.

Brian J. Lepore

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
 

Page 34 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

List of Addressees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Chairman

Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight

Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

In order to assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) 

developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and 

efficiencies at the joint bases and tracked the costs, savings, and 

efficiencies resulting from joint basing, we analyzed DOD guidance 

related to joint base implementation, specifically looking for any measures 

or reporting processes on efficiencies and cost savings. We also 

reviewed our prior findings on key practices and implementation steps for 

mergers and organizational transformations.1

To evaluate the extent to which joint base common standards have 

provided a common framework for defining and reporting installation 

support services, we reviewed DOD policy and guidance related to the 

common standards; the standards themselves, including both functional 

areas and specific standards; and federal internal control standards and 

We interviewed DOD 

officials at the service headquarters and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) to obtain information about cost savings, joint basing 

budget data, and guidance related to cost savings and efficiencies. We 

also interviewed joint basing officials at three joint bases and obtained 

answers to written questions from the remaining nine joint bases that we 

did not visit in person to obtain information on actual cost savings and 

efficiencies achieved and guidance and communication related to cost 

savings and efficiencies. We selected a nonprobability sample of three 

site visit locations based the following factors: (1) we chose to visit one 

base where each military department (Army, Air Force and Navy) had the 

lead responsibility for providing installation support, (2) we considered 

geographic diversity, (3) we chose to visit at least one base that we did 

not visit for our 2009 joint basing report, (4) we selected at least one joint 

base from each of the two phases of joint base implementation, and 

(5) we chose joint bases where the installations that had been combined 

into the joint base were directly adjacent to each other. Based on these 

factors, we chose to visit Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, Joint Base 

Lewis-McChord, and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam.

 

1 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003), and 

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a 

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

key elements of successful performance measures.2 We obtained and 

reviewed the joint bases’ reporting on the joint base common standards 

for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. To determine the degree to which the 

standards were achieved, we analyzed the data to determine how many 

standards were met, not met, or determined to be not applicable. We 

conducted a content analysis of the comments accompanying the 

standards reporting from fiscal years 2010 to 2011 to identifying concerns 

regarding the various standards. In conducting this content analysis, we 

reviewed comments accompanying all reported standards, including 

those reported as met, not met, and not applicable. Using this analysis, 

we identified the most frequent reasons the joint bases provided for not 

meeting the standards, as well as challenges the joint bases faced in 

implementing and reporting on various standards. To conduct the content 

analysis, two analysts individually coded all comments accompanying the 

standards reporting into one of the 17 categories listed in table 2. After 

the comments were coded, a third analyst adjudicated any differences 

between the coding of the first two analysts.

 

2 Key attributes of successful performance measures were applied in GAO, Tax 

Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance 

Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002), and according to this report, 

these attributes were based largely on previously established criteria found in prior GAO 

reports, review of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, and other 

performance literature; GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Table 2: Comment Categories and Definitions

Comment category Category definition

Subcategory: does not meet

1. Cannot meet. The comment stated that the base or office would not be able to meet the common 

standard even with additional resources.

2. Does not meet due to personnel. The comment stated that the base or office did not meet the common standard due to 

lack of availability of military or civilian personnel.

3. Does not meet due to resources. The comment stated the base or office did not meet the common standard due to the 

lack of necessary facilities, equipment, or funding.

4. Does not meet due to failure to report. The comment stated the base or office did not measure the common standard or did 

not have sufficient data to determine if the standard was met.

5. Does not meet due to contract-related 

resourcing issues.

The comment stated the current contract does not include functions necessary to meet 

the common standard or that there was no contract in place to provide the service.

6. Does not meet, corrective actions being 

taken.

The comment stated that the standard was not met, but provided information on how 

they would achieve it and an estimated achievement date. 

7. Does not meet, following different 

standard.

The comment stated the common standard was not met because they were following 

a different service standard or best practice.

8. Fell short of standard. A specific reason was not identified in the comment as to why the common standard 

was not met.

a

Subcategory: meets

9. Meets per subject matter expert. The comment stated that a subject matter expert determined that the standard was 

met.

10. Meets but with concerns. The comment stated the base or office met the standard but only as a result of 

additional manpower or resources.

Subcategory: comments that applied to both meets and does not meet

11. Function not required/met during time

frame.

The comment stated the base was not required to provide the function, could have 

provided the function but it was not requested.

12. No comment. No comment was provided.

13. Need standard clarification. The comment stated the base or office believed the standard should be changed or 

clarified for better measurement.

b

Subcategory: data discrepancies

14. Should be marked as meets. The common standard was marked as does not meet; however, the comment 

indicated the standard was met.

15. Should be marked as does not meet. The common standard was marked as meets or not applicable when the comment 

provided stated they did not meet the standard.

16. Should be marked as not applicable. The common standard was marked as meets or does not meet, but it is not a service 

that the base or office provides.

17. Comment does not agree with status 

designation. 

Analysts could not determine how the comment should be categorized.

Source: GAO analysis.

a

We did not include the category “fell short of standard” in our list of the most common reasons joint 

bases reported for not meeting a common standard (see fig. 2 in this report) because this category of 

comment did not include an explanation of why the standard was not met.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

b

To assess the reliability of the common standards reporting, we analyzed 

the process by which joint bases review the standards and OSD reviews 

and changes them. To do this, we analyzed the comments accompanying 

the joint base standards reporting to identify problems raised by joint 

bases with the clarity of the common standards. We also obtained 

information on the clarity and usefulness of the joint base common 

standards and the reporting process through site visits to the three joint 

bases and answers to written questions from the other nine bases. In 

addition, we analyzed the reliability of the common standards reporting 

data for completeness and accuracy. As discussed in this report, we 

identified problems with the clarity of some standards and the consistency 

of the way in which the standards are reported. However, we found the 

data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the number of 

standards joint bases identified as being met or not met. We also found 

the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting on the 

results of our analysis of the comments accompanying the standards 

reporting.

Although this category of comment accompanied standards that were reported as both meets and 

does not meet, it was one of the top eight categories of comments associated with standards reported 

as not being met (see fig. 2 in this report).

To evaluate OSD’s process for identifying and addressing implementation 

challenges, we reviewed DOD policy and guidance for joint base 

oversight and management as well as federal standards for internal 

control. Through interviews with OSD officials, select joint base officials, 

and answers we obtained to our written questions to joint bases, we 

identified how OSD and joint bases used the formal joint base 

management structure, joint base common standards reporting, and 

formal review meetings between joint base commanders and OSD to 

obtain information on challenges faced at the joint bases. To identify 

challenges faced by the joint bases, we analyzed comments 

accompanying the joint bases’ reporting on common standards and 

interviewed officials at the three joint bases we visited and obtained 

answers to written questions from the other nine joint bases regarding the 

types of challenges they faced in implementing joint basing. To determine 

the extent to which OSD and joint bases were able to address common 

challenges, we interviewed joint base officials and reviewed their answers 

to our written questions.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to November

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: BRAC Commission 

Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including 

Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the 

Commission)

Page 40 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Appendix II: BRAC Commission Recommendation 

on Joint Basing (Including Elements of DOD’s 

Recommendation to the Commission)
Appendix II: BRAC Commission 

Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including 

Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the 

Commission)

Page 41 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix II: BRAC Commission 

Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including 

Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the 

Commission)

Page 42 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix II: BRAC Commission 

Recommendation on Joint Basing (Including 

Elements of DOD’s Recommendation to the

Commission)

Page 43 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix III: Joint Basing Installation Support 

Functional Areas

Page 44 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

The joint base common standards developed by the DOD for use by the 

joint bases in managing and reporting on installation support services are 

grouped into 48 functional areas of installation support. Table 3 shows the 

48 functional areas.

Table 3: Functional Areas of Installation Support

Airfield operations Child and youth programs

Command management Installation public affairs

Legal support Financial management

Management analysis Procurement operations

Installation safety Installation chaplain ministries

Installation history and museums Laundry and dry cleaning

Food services Custodial services

Emergency management Environmental compliance

Environmental conservation Environmental pollution prevention

Environmental restoration Facilities demolition

Facilities new footprint Facilities restoration and modernization

Facilities sustainment Family housing services

Fire protection and emergency services Grounds maintenance and landscaping

Information technology services management Lodging

Military and family support programs Military personnel services

Morale, welfare, and recreation Pavement clearance services

Pest control services Port services

Readiness engineering services Real property management and engineering services

Real property leases Refuse collection and disposal

Installation law enforcement operations Installation physical security protection and services

Installation protection support Small arms range management

Supply storage and distribution (SSD-munitions) Supply storage and distribution (non-munitions)/logistics services

Base support vehicles and equipment Installation movement

Unaccompanied personnel housing services Utilities

Source: DOD.

Appendix III: Joint Basing Installation 

Support Functional Areas
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 45 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 46 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 47 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 48 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 49 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 50 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 51 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 52 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant 

Director; Jameal Addison; Grace Coleman; Chaneé Gaskin; Simon 

Hirschfeld; Gina Hoffman; Charles Perdue; Michael Silver; and Michael 

Willems made key contributions to this report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 53 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to 

BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.

Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy 

to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.: 

September 19, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan 

Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington. D.C.: April 1, 

2011.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February 

2011.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is 

Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the 

Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to 

Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs. 

GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning 

Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth. 

GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 

2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of 

Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are

Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings 

Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating SupplyRelated Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 54 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support 

Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of 

Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently 

Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: 

January 30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 

Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 

GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. 

Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Related GAO Products

Page 55 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 

2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 

Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.
Related GAO Products

Page 56 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need 

for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2004.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 

Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2004.

Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military 

Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 

2004.

Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 

2003.

Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve 

Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management 

Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and 

Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic

Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities. 

GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Greater Management Emphasis Needed to 

Increase the Services’ Use of Expanded Leasing Authority. GAO-02-475. 

Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2002.

Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior 

Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 

2002.

Military Base Closures: Overview of Economic Recovery, Property 

Transfer, and Environmental Cleanup. GAO-01-1054T. Washington, D.C.: 

August 28, 2001.

Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains 

Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.
Related GAO Products

Page 57 GAO-13-134 DOD Joint Bases

Military Base Closures: Lack of Data Inhibits Cost-Effectiveness of 

Analyses of Privatization-in Place Initiatives. GAO/NSIAD-00-23. 

Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1999.

Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds.

GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.

Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and 

Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.

Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing Louisville Operations in Place Is Not 

Cost-Effective. GAO/NSIAD-97-52. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997.

Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.

Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup 

Requires Difficult Choices. GAO/NSIAD-96-172. Washington, D.C.: 

September 5, 1996.

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not 

Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations 

for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.: 

April 14, 1995.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection 

Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173. 

Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.

Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed 

Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: 

May 15, 1991.

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and 

Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.: 

November 29, 1989.

(351654)
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